Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01074/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01074-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gregory Caldwell
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

____________

No. 05-1062

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 *

*

United States of America, *

 * 

Appellee, *

 *

v. *

 *

Eric Lamont Williams, *

 *

Appellant. *

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Appeals from the United States

No. 05-1074 District Court for the

____________ Eastern District of Arkansas.

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

Gregory Caldwell, *

*

Appellant. * ___________

Submitted: June 23, 2005

Filed: November 17, 2005

___________

Before ARNOLD, MCMILLIAN and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

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McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge.

Eric Lamont Williams and Gregory Caldwell appeal from final judgments

entered upon jury verdicts finding them guilty of conspiring to possess with intent to

distribute and possession with intent to distribute marijuana and crack cocaine in

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. For reversal, Williams argues that the

district court erred in denying his motions to suppress his statement and to sever his

trial. Caldwell argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress

his statements and the evidence seized from his vehicle. Both appellants argue that

the district court erred in allowing the government to amend the indictments at trial.

We affirm in part and reverse in part and remand the case with directions.

I. BACKGROUND

In October 2002, members of a DEA task force operating in Pine Bluff,

Arkansas, received information that Williams would be transporting drugs from Los

Angeles, California to Little Rock, Arkansas. The DEA set up surveillance to track

his movements. Williams was picked up at the airport in Little Rock and driven to

the Horizon Inn in Pine Bluff, Arkansas, where he was seen entering room 127. The

next day he went to a hair salon at 401 N. Myrtle Avenue in Pine Bluff, a location at

which a significant number of persons were observed entering and leaving again

within minutes. Williams was picked up and driven to numerous locations in Pine

Bluff, as well as making a round trip to Stuttgart, Arkansas. In Stuttgart, the police

observed Williams stop at a residence and then at a business. At the latter he was

seen talking with Caldwell.

 Later Williams was seen again in Pine Bluff at 403 N. Myrtle Avenue, a

residence next to the hair salon. Vehicles would pull up to the residence, Williams

would come out to talk, and then the vehicles would leave. One of the vehicles was

a green Ford Focus occupied by Caldwell and several unidentified passengers.

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Williams was observed retrieving a package from an apparently inoperable vehicle

and handing the package Caldwell. Williams and a female then got into Caldwell's

car and were driven to the Horizon Inn, where Williams and Caldwell entered room

127. When they exited the room and returned to the car, Williams was observed

handing a package to a passenger in the front seat of the Focus before entering the

vehicle himself. The car the left the hotel and made a stop at Second and Orange in

Pine Bluff before continuing on.

Suspecting that drugs might be in the car, Officer Kelvin Sergeant made a radio

request that the Focus be stopped if probable cause could be established to stop the

vehicle. The only information transmitted was that there might be controlled

substances in the car. A Pine Bluff police officer stopped the car because it was

going too slowly (30-35 miles per hour in a forty-five miles per hour zone) and

because the driver had crossed over the center line while approaching a curve. The

officers called for a drug dog, which arrived approximately five to six minutes later

and alerted to two locations in the car. Marijuana and crack cocaine were found, and

Caldwell was arrested. Williams was no longer in the car when it was stopped.

Based on statements made by Caldwell after his arrest, the police obtained a

search warrant for room 127 at the Horizon Inn. They found crack cocaine and

marijuana and a California driver's license for Eric Williams. While the search was

in progress, Williams arrived in a car driven by Aaron Dancy. Williams identified

himself as Eric Dancy before being confronted with the California driver's license.

Marijuana was found in a backpack in the car, and both Williams and Dancy were

arrested, as was Tamika Ingram, another occupant of the room. Williams and Dancy

each gave statements. Caldwell gave a second statement. Williams, Caldwell, Dancy

and Ingram were indicted on conspiracy and drug possession charges.

Williams moved to suppress his statement on the ground that he was

improperly advised of his rights in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436

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 Caldwell does not pursue his Miranda claim on appeal.

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(1966), that there was no written waiver of his rights, that he did not sign his

statement, and the statement was not tape-recorded. He claimed that the statement

was not an accurate rendition of what he actually said, and requested that the

government turn over the rough notes of the interrogation. 

Williams also moved for severance of his trial from that of his co-defendants.

He contended that his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him

would be violated by the admission of his non-testifying co-defendants' statements,

which he argued could not be redacted in a way that would remove their prejudicial

impact. 

Caldwell moved to suppress his statements and the evidence taken from his car,

alleging that the stop violated the Fourth Amendment. He alleged that there was no

probable cause for the stop, that it was purely pretextual, and that he was unlawfully

detained to await the arrival of a drug-sniffing dog. He also made a Miranda claim

as to a portion of his statements.1

After hearings on the motions, the district court found that there was probable

cause for the traffic stop and that the defendants had been properly Mirandized before

making their statements. The district court also reviewed the rough notes of

Williams's interrogation, found no material differences with the statement, and denied

Williams access to them. The district court also denied Williams's severance motion.

Williams, Caldwell and Dancy were tried together. Over renewed motions and

strenuous and continued objections, Caldwell's redacted statement was read to the

jury. After Dancy's redacted statement was read to the jury, Dancy testified in his

own defense, incriminating Williams. The district court denied Williams's renewed

motion for severance.

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On the third day of trial, the prosecution discovered a problem with the

possession counts of the indictment. Count 4 charged that Caldwell "knowingly and

intentionally possessed approximately 18.1 grams of crack cocaine, a Schedule II

controlled substance" in violation of Title 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Count 5 charged

that Williams "knowingly and intentionally possessed approximately 25.2 grams of

crack cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance" in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1). Although the statute cited in each count was the correct one for

possession with intent to distribute, the indicting language failed to allege the

element that the possession was with intent to distribute. The related conspiracy

counts contained the intent to distribute element, but the possession counts did not.

The district court determined that the omission was mere oversight or typographical

error and that there was no surprise or Fifth Amendment violation, and amended the

counts to add the missing element. The jury was instructed accordingly and the

defendants were convicted on all counts. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Suppression

"We review the denial of a motion to suppress de novo, but review the

underlying factual determinations for clear error, giving due weight to the inferences

of the district court and law-enforcement officials." United States v. Coleman, 349

F.3d 1077, 1083 (8th Cir.2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1080 (2004). A district court's

credibility determinations are entitled to great deference on review. United States v.

Gregory, 302 F.3d 805, 811 (8th Cir. 2002), cert. denied 538 U.S. 992 (2003).

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1. Caldwell

Caldwell argues that the drugs found within the car and the statements he made

thereafter should have been suppressed as the fruits of an illegal stop of his vehicle.

He contends that the district court erred in finding that there was probable cause to

stop his vehicle, because there was no proof that any traffic violations actually

occurred, and that the traffic stop was simply a pretext to search the car because the

DEA "thought" there might be drugs inside. He argues that the DEA had insufficient

information to establish reasonable suspicion for the stop of his vehicle, and that

whatever no information was communicated to the officer who made the stop.

Caldwell further claims that he was unlawfully detained for a dog sniff of his vehicle.

It is well established that even a minor traffic violation provides probable cause

for a traffic stop. United States v. Barragan, 379 F.3d 524, 528 (8th Cir. 2004). The

subjective belief of the officer that there might be illegal drugs in the vehicle does not

invalidate the stop. United States v. Martinez, 358 F.3d 1005, 1009 (8th Cir. 2004).

Thus, "a traffic-violation arrest . . . would not be rendered invalid by the fact that it

was a 'mere pretext for a narcotics search.'" Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806,

812-13 (1996)(quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 n. 1 (1973)).

Applying these standards of review to our consideration of the record, we hold

that the district court's finding that there were in fact traffic violations is supported

by the evidence, and thus there was probable cause for the stop of Caldwell's vehicle.

In the alternative, we also hold that the collective knowledge of the DEA team was

sufficient to provide reasonable suspicion to stop Caldwell's vehicle, and such

knowledge was imputed to the officer at the scene when he received Sgt. Sergeant's

radioed request. See United States v. Gillette, 245 F.3d 1032, 1034 (8th Cir. 2001)

(collective knowledge imputed to arresting officer when there is some degree of

communication).

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The use of the drug-sniffing dog on the exterior of a vehicle during a valid

traffic stop does not infringe upon any Fourth Amendment rights. Illinois v.

Caballes,125 S.Ct 834, 837-838 (2005). Because the dog sniff of the exterior of

Caldwell's car was not a search, the officer did not need probable cause nor

reasonable suspicion before calling for the drug dog unit. See United States v.

Gregory, 302 F.3d at 810. Moreover, the brief five to six minute wait for the drugsniffing dog is well within the time frame for finding that the stop was not

unreasonably prolonged. See United States v. White, 42 F.3d 457, 460 (8th Cir.

1994) (eighty-minute wait reasonable); United States v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910, 917

(8th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (one-hour detention permissible).

2.Williams

The district court credited the testimony of the government witnesses that the

Miranda warnings were given and Williams waived them. As Williams concedes,

there is no evidence in the record upon which to disturb this finding. 

Williams wants this Court to determine that the police failure to utilize a

written waiver form and tape-recording equipment was a bad faith denial of his Fifth

Amendment rights, and asks that we fashion a rule mandating their use in formal

interrogation settings. We decline to do so. While several states have so legislated,

there is no indication that such laws are constitutionally required. See United States

v. Montgomery, 390 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 2004); see also Jenner v. Smith, 982

F.2d 329, 331 n.2 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting that several other circuits have held that in

federal criminal cases, the failure of the police to electronically record or take notes

of incriminating statements does not render the statements inadmissible).

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The district court reviewed the handwritten notes taken during Williams's

interrogation and found that they did not materially differ from the statement

attributed to Williams. This Court has also reviewed the notes and agrees with the

District Court. Thus any error in keeping the notes from Williams would be harmless.

B. Severance

The district court denied Williams's motion to sever his trial from that of his

co-defendants. We review a district court's denial of severance abuse of discretion.

United States v. Blaylock, 421 F.3d 758, 766 (8th Cir. 2005). Generally, persons

charged with conspiracy should be tried together, particularly in cases such as this

"where proof of the charges against the defendants is based upon the same evidence

and acts." Id. 

1. From Caldwell

In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), the Supreme Court held that

a co-defendant's statement that facially incriminates a defendant violates the

Confrontation Clause despite cautionary instructions. In Richardson v. Marsh, 481

U.S. 200 (1987), the Court held that there is no Confrontation Clause violation when

the defendant's name and existence are excised from the statement and limiting

instructions are given, even though the confession might implicate the defendant

when linked to other evidence. The Court revisited the issue in Gray v. Maryland,

523 U.S. 185 (1998), holding that, notwithstanding cautionary instructions and

neutral redactions, Bruton is violated when the fact that a statement had been redacted

is so obvious as to lead the jury through ordinary inferences directly to a defendant.

The Gray Court held that the obvious indication of alteration is directly accusatory.

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Williams did not argue the applicability of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.

36, 57 (2004), in which the Supreme Court found a Confrontation Clause violation

in hearsay testimonial statements where there was no opportunity for crossexamination. We note that Crawford did not overrule Bruton and its progeny, id., and

like other Confrontation Clause error, is subject to harmless error analysis. United

States v. Rashid, 383 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 2004), cert. denied 125 S.Ct. 941 (2005).

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523 U.S. at 194.2

 In assessing whether a case falls within the Bruton rule as in Gray

or outside it as in Marsh, the Supreme Court looks at whether the context is one in

which the risk is too great that the jury will not or cannot follow the cautionary

instruction to consider the statement solely against the declarant. Gray, 523 U.S. at

190-191.

Williams argues that the manner in which Caldwell's statement was redacted

violated Gray because it impermissibly led the jury to infer that his name had been

deleted. He contends that the repeated use of the word "someone" in the recitation

of Caldwell's statement is awkward and so interlocked with the extensive testimony

about the police surveillance of Williams's travels that it was obvious to the jury that

only Williams could be the "someone" in Caldwell's statement.

The government argues in response that it properly replaced the defendant's

name with a neutral pronoun, which did not draw attention to the redaction and was

not incriminating unless linked to the co-defendant by other trial evidence. United

States v. Edwards, 159 F.3d 1117, 1125-26 (8th Cir. 1998). 

In United States v. Logan, 210 F.3d 820 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc), we

considered the kind and degree of the redactions to determine whether there was a

violation under Gray. We distinguished the almost invisible redaction in Logan,

where the substitution could just as easily have been the defendant's actual words,

from the obviousness of the word "deleted" which was condemned in Gray. Id. at

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823. We then compared the single instance of redaction in Logan with the violation

in Gray, where the word "deleted" was repeated four times in oral testimony, and

where the jury also had the written statement containing blanks where the defendant's

name had been excised. Id. 

In contrast to Logan and increasing ten-fold the number of redactions in Gray,

here we count more than forty instances where Williams's name was replaced with the

word "someone." The following are some excerpts from Caldwell's statement as read

to the jury:

Caldwell stated on October 25, 2002 that someone arrived

at his mother's residence earlier that day in Stuttgart,

Arkansas looking for him. Caldwell stated that his mother

advised someone that he was at work. Caldwell stated that

someone did arrive at the Precision Farm and Trucking

Company . . . at Caldwell's work place. Caldwell stated

that he met with someone [at his place of work]. Caldwell

stated that someone advised him that he had something . . .

and wants him to come by [after work]. Caldwell stated

that someone advised him that he had some good

[marijuana and cocaine]. . . . Caldwell stated that after

work he and two of his nephews . . . traveled to Pine Bluff,

Arkansas and met with someone . Caldwell stated that his

nephews were not involved with his drug deals with

someone. Caldwell stated that he met with someone at 403

North Myrtle Street in Pine Bluff, Arkansas. Caldwell

stated that he picked up [amount of] crack cocaine from

someone at that location...Caldwell stated that someone

advised him that someone had half a pound of weed, which

is marijuana, at room 127 at Horizon Inn in Pine Bluff,

Arkansas. Caldwell further stated that . . . someone wanted

him to go to the Horizon Inn to retrieve the marijuana. . . .

Caldwell stated that at that location someone and he exited

the vehicle and entered room 127. . . .Caldwell stated that

[after leaving the hotel] he dropped someone [and another

person] off at CJ's Garage located at 205 South Orange

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Street in Pine Bluff, Arkansas. . . . Caldwell stated that he

started dealing with someone in 1995 or 1996. . . .

Caldwell stated that during this time someone was

supplying a lot of people in the Pine Bluff, Arkansas area.

(Emphasis added.)

Applying the analysis of Logan, it would appear that in kind and degree, the

redaction of Caldwell's statement made it obvious that a name had been redacted.

The replacements were not seamlessly woven into the narrative as in Logan, and the

neutral pronoun "someone" may have lost its anonymity by sheer repetition. It may

well have been clear to the jury that the statement had obviously been redacted and

that the "someone" of the statement was defendant Williams. Gray, 523 U.S. at 196.

As the Supreme Court held in Gray, this case may fall within the Bruton class of cases

where a district's court's repeated cautionary instructions cannot protect the

defendant. Id. at 192.

However, we need not decide that issue because, assuming that a Confrontation

Clause error occurred, we hold that the error in admitting Caldwell's statement was

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Chapman, 345 F.3d 630, 635

(8th Cir. 2003)(stricter standard of harmless beyond a reasonable doubt applies to

confrontation right error). 

The independent evidence against Williams, including his own statement, was

so overwhelming as to render any such error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

The DEA was acting on information that Williams carried drugs into Arkansas. DEA

agents saw him at a business on Myrtle Street where the activity was indicative of

possible drug trafficking; they saw him at the residence next door where his activity

was consistent with drug trafficking; he met with Caldwell at that residence and was

observed giving him a package; he and Caldwell entered room 127 at the Horizon Inn

together, the room in which Williams's driver's license, crack cocaine, and other drug

paraphernalia were found; Caldwell and Williams left room 127 together and

Williams handed a package to the front seat passenger before entering Caldwell's car

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and leaving the hotel grounds; and when Caldwell was stopped shortly thereafter,

marijuana and crack cocaine were found in his car. Moreover, Williams himself

admitted that he had been involved in crack cocaine and marijuana trafficking for

many years. Thus, "we are convinced that [Williams's] conviction cannot be

attributed to [Caldwell's] statement." Id.

2. From Dancy

Williams argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to sever his

trial from Dancy's on the ground that their defenses were antagonistic. The district

court did not err, because it is well-established that defenses are not antagonistic

simply because one defendant tries to shift the blame to the other, as Dancy did.

United States v. Flores, 362 F.3d 1030, 1039-40 (8th Cir. 2004)

C. Sufficiency of the indictment

As the government concedes, failure of an indictment to allege the elements of

the offense cannot be corrected by amendment. The issue is not notice to the

defendants. Rather, the question is whether the grand jury considered the missing

element. "It is well-established in this circuit that citation of the statute, without more,

does not cure the omission of an essential element of the charge because bare citation

of the statute 'is of scant help in deciding whether the grand jury considered' the

missing element in charging the defendant." United States v. Olson 262 F.3d 795,

799 -800 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Camp, 541 F.2d 737, 740 (8th Cir.

1976)). Absent the allegation that possession of the drugs was with the intent to

distribute them, counts 4 and 5 did not charge a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)

and the convictions on those grounds must be reversed.

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III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, we reverse Caldwell's and Williams's convictions

for violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine)

(Counts 4 and 5 respectively), and remand the case to the district court with directions

to vacate Counts 4 and 5. We affirm the judgments of conviction with respect to all

other counts. 

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