Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_17-cv-00533/USCOURTS-caed-2_17-cv-00533-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mohammed Issifu
Defendant
River Terrace LP
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RIVER TERRACE LP,

Plaintiff,

v.

MOHAMMED ISSIFU,

Defendants.

No. 2:17-cv-00533-TLN-GGH

ORDER

This matter is before the Court pursuant to Defendant Mohammed Issifu’s Notice of 

Removal. (ECF No. 1.) Defendant also filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 

2.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court remands the action to the Superior Court of 

California, County of Sacramento, due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 23, 2017, Plaintiff River Terrace LP (“Plaintiff”) filed an unlawful detainer action 

in the Superior Court of California, County of Sacramento. (Not. of Removal, ECF No. 1.) The 

complaint alleged that on January 9, 2017, Defendant failed to comply with a 3-day notice to pay 

rent or quit the premises. (ECF No. 1 at 8.) On March 3, 2017, Defendant filed a Notice of 

Removal in the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. (ECF No. 1.) In his

Notice of Removal, Defendant alleges the Court has jurisdiction under “28 U.S.C. § 1441 (a) 

and/or (b).” (ECF No. 1 at 2.) Defendant further alleges that “[t]he complaint presents federal 

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questions.” (ECF No. 1 at 2.) 

II. STANDARD OF LAW

28 U.S.C. § 1441 permits the removal to federal court of any civil action over which “the 

district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “Removal is 

proper only if the court could have exercised jurisdiction over the action had it originally been 

filed in federal court.” Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). 

Courts “strictly construe the removal statute against removal jurisdiction,” and “the 

defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 

F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). Furthermore, “[i]f the district court at any time 

determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the removed action, it must remedy the 

improvident grant of removal by remanding the action to state court.” California ex rel. Lockyer 

v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 838, as amended, 387 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied 544 

U.S. 974 (2005). 

The “presence or absence of federal question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded 

complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is 

presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 386. 

Removal cannot be based on a defense, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party claim raising a 

federal question, whether filed in state court or federal court. See Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 

U.S. 49 (2009); Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042–43 (9th Cir. 2009). 

III. ANALYSIS

Defendant states in his notice of removal that jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 

1441(a) and/or (b). (ECF No. 1 at 2.) Defendant further states that “[f]ederal question exists 

because Defendant’s Answer, a pleading depend [sic] on the determination of Defendant’s rights 

and Plaintiff’s duties under federal law.” (ECF No. 1 at 3.) Defendant argues that his answer 

raises a question of the adequacy of the notice to quit under The Protecting Tenants at 

Foreclosure Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5220. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) After reviewing the Notice of Removal, 

the Court concludes that Defendant cannot present a viable argument to support federal question 

jurisdiction. 

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Subject matter jurisdiction exists where a federal question arises on the face of the 

complaint. See Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 386 (“federal [question] jurisdiction exists only when a 

federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint”). Plaintiff 

does not bring any claims within the complaint that involve a federal question that would supply 

this Court with original jurisdiction. Defendant asserts that his answer in state court creates a 

federal question because it depends on a determination of the parties’ rights and duties under the 

Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) However, Defendant has not presented 

adequate facts to demonstrate how federal law arises out of the answer. Even if the Defendants 

had adequately alleged a federal question from his answer, the federal question would not arise on 

the face of the complaint. Defendant’s assertion is akin to a defense and a defense that rests on 

federal question cannot form a basis for federal question jurisdiction. See Id. at 393 (“it is now 

settled law that a case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense”). 

Therefore, Defendant is not entitled to removal on the grounds of federal question jurisdiction. 

Defendant has failed to establish his burden of showing that jurisdiction before this Court 

is proper based on federal question jurisdiction. Therefore, it is appropriate to remand this case, 

sua sponte, for lack of federal jurisdiction. See United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed 

Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 967 (9th Cir. 2004) (“the district court ha[s] a duty to establish subject matter 

jurisdiction over the removed action sua sponte, whether the parties raised the issue or not.”).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby REMANDS this action to the Superior Court 

of California, County of Sacramento. Additionally, the Court has reviewed Defendant’s motion 

for in forma pauperis status (ECF No. 2), and finds that Defendant meets the requisite standard. 

As such, Defendant’s motion for in forma pauperis status is GRANTED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 15, 2017

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