Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-05215/USCOURTS-ca10-90-05215-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Lathan E. Willeford
Appellant

Document Text:

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FI LED 

United States Court of Appeals UHITED STATES COURT OP APPEALS Tenth Circuit 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

JUN 4 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

LATHAN E. 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

WILLEFORD, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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No. 90-5215 

(N.D. Oklahoma) 

(D.C. No. 85-CR-149-C) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before ANDERSON, TACHA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

This is the fourth time Mr. Willeford has been before us. 

His first appearance was on direct appeal following his conviction 

of conspiracy to manufacture, possess, and distribute amphetamines, and interstate travel in aid of racketeering. On direct 

appeal from his conviction, Willeford urged five grounds for 

reversal. First, he argued that the district court erred in 

admitting statements made by him and his coconspirator. Second, 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-5215 Document: 010110118072 Date Filed: 06/04/1991 Page: 1 
he argued that the district court should not have allowed the 

testimony of the government's paid informant, Brian Norman. 

Third, he contended that the district court erred when it admitted 

invoices showing the amount of chemicals and equipment purchased 

by Willeford and his coconspirator. Fourth, he alleged that 

prosecutorial misconduct occurred in the government's opening 

statement and closing argument. Finally, he argued that the 

indictment upon which he was charged was defective. We found no 

merit in those arguments and affirmed Willeford's conviction. 

United States v. Willeford, unpubl. no. 86-2043 (10th Cir. Aug. 

25, 1987). A copy of the decision in that appeal is attached. 

Willeford then filed a motion to correct sentence pursuant to Fed. 

R. Crim. P. 35(a), alleging that pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 

§ 812(A)(l), amphetamines were schedule III drugs not schedule II 

and, therefore, he was wrongfully convicted of violating 21 U.S.C. 

§§ 841 and 846. He argued that because five years is the maximum 

sentence which can be imposed following conviction of a violation 

involving a schedule III drug, his sentence of eight years was 

illegal. He also alleged that the indictment failed to state an 

offense as to the violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1952. The district 

court denied relief and, on appeal, we affirmed, finding no merit 

in Willeford's arguments. United States v. Willeford, unpubl. no. 

88-1134 (10th Cir. June 28, 1988). A copy of our decision in that 

appeal is also attached. Thereafter, Willeford filed a petition 

for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. In that petition he challenged 

his conviction and sentence, raising the following five grounds: 

(1) Improper sentencing based on false information 

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included in presentence report and U.S. Attorney's 

statement to the court; 

(2) Admission of hearsay evidence and improper instruction to jury on its use; 

(3) Insufficient evidence to support conviction; 

(4) Illegal search and seizure based on involuntary 

expression of consent; and 

(5) Ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and 

sentencing. 

The district court denied relief by minute order dated April 10, 

1989. Willeford appealed, and we remanded for a statement of 

reasons underlying the district court's ruling. United States v. 

Willeford, unpubl. no. 89-5062 (10th Cir. July 11, 1990). On 

remand the district court entered a detailed order, with supporting documents, again denying relief. Specifically, the district 

court ruled that issues (2) through (5) listed above, are 

precluded from review in a federal habeas corpus proceeding for 

failure of petitioner to raise the issues on direct appeal. 

Peoples v. United States, 365 F.2d 284 (10th Cir. 1966). The 

district court addressed issue (1) (alleged improper sentencing) 

on the merits and rejected Willeford's arguments with respect to 

that issue. R. Vol. I, Tab 93 at 2-4. Willeford now appeals from 

the district court's order, reasserting all five grounds for 

relief referred to above. 

Issue (1) 

Willeford alleges that his sentence should be set aside 

because the district court relied on false information in the 

presentence report and was misled by the U.S. Attorney's 

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mischaracterization of the offense as one involving methamphetamine, rather than amphetamine. He also suggests that there is a 

disparity between his sentence and that of his codefendant which 

allegedly proves that the district court was misled. We affirm 

the district court's denial of relief on this issue. 

Willeford correctly points out that at sentencing the 

assistant U.S. Attorney representing the government repeatedly 

referred to methamphetamine, rather than amphetamine. In its 

order, the district court minimized the difference between the two 

drugs, a proposition with which Willeford takes issue at some 

length on appeal, Brief at 4-6. Much of what Willeford argues on 

the subject is a rehash of what we addressed in our opinion no. 

88-1134, i.e., amphetamines are schedule II not schedule III 

drugs, with corresponding sentencing ranges under the Guidelines. 

Willeford does not contest the fact that his sentence falls within 

the sentencing guideline range for the offenses for which he was 

convicted. Furthermore, although the assistant United States 

attorney erroneously referred to methamphetamine, rather than 

amphetamine, Willeford's attorney, in turn, correctly referred to 

amphetamine. R. Vol. I, Tab 93 at 8. The sentencing transcript 

does not indicate that the court at any time used the term methamphetamine. Moreover, the presentence report clearly and properly 

identifies Willeford's offenses as relating to amphetamine, as did 

all other documents reflecting Willeford's conviction and 

sentence. On this record there is absolutely no credible support 

for the proposition that the district court thought it was 

sentencing Willeford for a crime other than that which he 

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committed. The alleged disparity between Willeford's sentence 

(eight years) and that of his codefendant, Coleman, (four years) 

does not persuade us to the contrary. Nothing in the record 

reveals the criteria used in imposing sentence on Coleman. We do 

not know the criminal history category in which Coleman was placed 

or other matters which the district court had before it at the 

time of Coleman's sentencing. Different sentences are not 

necessarily disparate sentences. 

Willeford next contends that the presentence report contained 

the following inaccuracies: 

(1) The report said defendant-appellant was conspiring 

to manufacture methamphetamine instead of amphetamine; 

(2) Defendant-Appellant never said that he knew what 

the chemicals he sold were to be used for; 

(3) Defendant-Appellant has never said he was hired by 

anyone only that he was buying and reselling chemicals 

and equipment; 

(4) There is no evidence at trial defendant-appellant 

was manager or organizer of anything; 

(5) Not in the indictment nor at trial was there 

evidence of 385 pounds of any controlled substance; 

(6) There was no evidence at trial nor in the indictment of 6,080,000.00 dollars; and 

(7) Prosecutor's version of September 25, 1985 having 

defendant-appellant's truck stopped and searched was 

false and inaccurate with no evidence of alleged 

conversation. See United States vs. Stevens, 559 

F.Supp. 1007 (D. Kansas 1985). 

Brief at 7. Willeford's assertion amounts to an argument that the 

district court violated Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)(D). The problem 

with that argument is that neither Willeford nor his counsel made 

any objection to the factual accuracy of the presentence report at 

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the time of sentencing. At that time the following colloquies 

occurred: 

THE COURT: Do you know of any reason why the Court 

shouldn't pronounce sentence? 

THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 

THE COURT: Have you read the presentence report, 

and is it accurate and correct? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: Mr. Roach, do you know of any reason 

why the Court shouldn't pronounce sentence? 

MR. ROACH: No, sir. 

THE COURT: And have you read the presentence 

report? 

MR. ROACH: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: Is it accurate and correct? 

MR. ROACH: Yes, sir. 

* * * 

THE COURT: Mr. Willeford, I will be pleased to 

hear anything you have to say in your own behalf or 

receive any additional information you wish the Court to 

consider. 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. I'd like to make a 

statement, Your Honor, that from the get-go, I do not 

feel that I was breaking any law buying and selling 

chemicals. I am not in the dope business, have not been 

in the dope business. I was in the chemical business. 

Mr. Ward -- he alleged all of these large amounts of 

money and I have no large amount of money, sir. I've 

got a family I take care of and as Mr. Roach says, what 

I've done, I was up there running my head, trying to 

impress Mr. Norman and --

THE COURT: Did you impress him? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. I did. 

THE COURT: You impressed some other people too. 

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THE DEFENDANT: Evidently I did, sir. What I have 

done is made a fool out of myself, sir. That's all I 

have to say. 

R. Vol. I, Tab 93 at 2, 10-11. Willeford's counsel also addressed 

the court at length without suggesting that the presentence report 

was inaccurate in any way. Id. at 6-10, 13-14, 16. Willeford's 

attempt in this second post-conviction proceeding, many years 

after his conviction, to dredge up claimed inaccuracies in the 

presentence report and thereby attack his sentence is untimely. 

Even if we were to address Willeford's claimed inaccuracies, 

we would find them insubstantial. The first claimed inaccuracy, 

that the presentence report refers to methamphetamine, is wrong. 

The presentence report presented to the court and included in the 

file refers only to amphetamine. Asserted factual inaccuracies 

(2) and (3) are wholly inconsequential because of the jury's 

verdict finding Willeford guilty of the crimes charged, a verdict 

which necessarily included the factual predicates included in the 

claimed inaccuracies. Asserted inaccuracy (4) relates to a statement made in the probation officer's assessment portion of the 

presentence report. A probation officer's opinion is not a statement of fact to which a defendant may take exception. Asserted 

inaccuracies (5) and (6) relate to an estimate by DEA agents. 

Contrary to Willeford's assertion, such an estimate need not be 

included in the indictment or as evidence admitted at trial. 

Finally, Willeford's alleged inaccuracy (7), even if true, is 

wholly lacking in any potential prejudice. The statement reads: 

"The agents finally stopped his vehicle. They told Willeford they 

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Appellate Case: 90-5215 Document: 010110118072 Date Filed: 06/04/1991 Page: 7 
knew he had all the chemicals in his possession needed to manufacture amphetamine. Willeford told the agents they were mistaken, 

that he lacked two of the required chemicals. The agents searched 

his vehicle and discovered Willeford was correct." Given 

Willeford's admission that he knows the "recipe" for amphetamine, 

nothing in this statement is prejudicial. Furthermore, Willeford 

admits in his own brief at page 16, that DEA agents did in fact 

follow him from Tulsa Scientific in Tulsa, Oklahoma to Fort Worth, 

Texas and became aware that he was not carrying all of the 

chemicals necessary to make amphetamine -- which is the gist of 

the statement in the presentence report. 

Issues (2) through (5) 

The district court erroneously held that issues (2) through 

(5) were "precluded from review in a federal habeas corpus proceeding for failure of petitioner to raise these issues on direct 

appeal." R. Vol. I, Tab 93 at 1. Such a failure does not result 

in per .fill preclusion of habeas relief. Instead, petitioner 

typically will not obtain relief on issues he fails to raise on 

direct appeal unless he satisfies Frady's cause and prejudice 

standard, i.e., he shows both "cause" excusing his procedural 

default and "actual prejudice" resulting from the alleged errors. 

United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68, reh'g denied, 456 

U.S. 1001 (1982); United States v. Hall, 843 F.2d 408, 409-10 

(10th Cir. 1988). 

However, since the district court did not apply Frady's cause 

and prejudice standard, neither will we. United States v. Hall, 

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843 F.2d at 409-10. 1 We review issues (2) through (5) on their 

merits. 

Issues (2) and (3). 

Willeford contends that the district court erroneously admitted hearsay evidence and improperly instructed the jury with 

respect to its use; and, that there was insufficient evidence to 

support his conviction. In his brief he combines those two issues 

for purposes of argument. 

Approximately half of Willeford's arguments on these issues 

relate to the propriety of coconspirator testimony, the so-called 

preferred order of proof articulated in United States v. Petersen, 

611 F.2d 1313 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 905 (1980), 

and the propriety of testimony given by Brian Norman. We ruled 

against Willeford with respect to the substance of those arguments 

in our treatment of his direct appeal, no. 86-2043. Thus, the 

arguments, and variations on those arguments, are res judicata. 

The second portion of his argument is a straightforward 

attack on the sufficiency of the evidence at trial. Brief at 13-

15. The standard of review with respect to sufficiency of the 

evidence arguments requires us to affirm a conviction if, viewing 

the evidence "in the light most favorable to the government, a 

rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Tranakos, 911 F.2d 

1 The government has not argued that the Frady standard should 

apply. In its brief on this appeal, the government did cite to 

our decision in United States v. Hall, but for the proposition 

that Willeford could not now raise issues (2) through (5). Hall 

simply does not stand for such a proposition. 

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1422, 1430 (10th Cir. 1990) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 

307, 319, rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 890 (1979)). See also United 

States v. Hooks, 780 F.2d 1526, 1531 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 

475 U.S. 1128 (1986). Under this standard, there was clearly 

enough evidence upon which the jury could have found Willeford 

guilty of the offenses charged. 

Issue (4). 

Willeford next contends that his rights under the Fourth 

Amendment were violated on the grounds that government agents who 

followed him from Tulsa, Oklahoma to Ft. Worth, Texas stopped his 

vehicle without the necessary articulable suspicion, searched the 

vehicle without valid consent or probable cause, then coerced him 

into signing a consent to search his warehouse, which the government agents searched on the basis of the consent, and without a 

warrant. Willeford concedes that no Fourth Amendment issue was 

raised before the district court either on a motion to suppress 

prior to trial or by way of objection to the admission of evidence 

at trial. Because of Willeford's failure to raise the issue at 

trial it cannot be reviewed except on the basis of plain error. 

Despite Willeford's argumentative construction of the facts, his 

signed consent and the stop of his vehicle under the circumstances 

do not support an argument that Willeford's Fourth Amendment 

rights were violated on any basis. Certainly no plain error 

appears on the face of the record. 

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Issue (5). 

Finally, Willeford invokes the "open sesame" tactic of claiming ineffective assistance of counsel to obtain a review on the 

merits of virtually every issue discussed above. Specifically, 

Willeford argues that his trial counsel was ineffective on the 

following grounds: 

(1) Failure to object to the Court's failure to 

instruct the jury as to hearsay evidence and who it 

can be used against, the result of the trial would 

have been different. 

(2) Failure to object to the PSI and false statement of 

U. S. Attorney Ward at sentencing resulted in 

disparity of sentences between the co-defendants on 

same evidence. 

(3) Failure to move for evidentiary hearing to suppress 

the illegally obtained evidence from defendantappellant's warehouse. 

(4) Failure to research the statements and challenge 

the indictment before defendant-appellant 

(Willeford) was tried. 

(5) Failure to inform defendant-appellant (Willeford) 

as to the importance of the PSI and what it was 

truely [sic) used for in sentencing and parole 

hearings. 

Brief at 19 (emphasis in original). Under the two-part test of 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 

1267 (1984), an "appellant must show both that his attorney's 

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and 

that, but for the counsel's inadequacies, the result of the 

proceedings would have been different." Tapia v. Tansy. 926 F.2d 

1554, 1564 (10th Cir. 1991); ~ United States v. Treff, 924 F.2d 

975, 979-80 (10th Cir. 1991). The question under the first part 

of the Strickland test is whether the attorney rendered "reasonably effective assistance." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 

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Appellate Case: 90-5215 Document: 010110118072 Date Filed: 06/04/1991 Page: 11 
687. Under the second (prejudice) prong, the defendant must show 

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, 

the outcome would have been different. Failure to satisfy either 

prong with defeat an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 

Tapia v. Tansy, 926 F.2d at 1564. 

As discussed above, the district court ruled against 

Willeford on this issue on the ground that he was required to 

assert his ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct 

appeal and is therefore precluded from raising the issue in a 

section 2255 proceeding. In United States v. Beaulieu, F.2d 

__ , __ (10th Cir. 1991), we recently held that the "preferred 

avenue for challenging the effectiveness of defense counsel in a 

federal criminal trial is by collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2255." However, we also recognized that failure to bring an 

ineffectiveness claim on a direct appeal bars the claim in 

collateral proceedings where the defendant is not represented on 

direct appeal by trial counsel and "it is evident that resolution 

of the ineffectiveness claim would not be substantially aided by 

further development of the record." Id. at This exception 

applies to Willeford's arguments regarding coconspirator testimony, the testimony of Brian Norman, and the sufficiency of the 

indictment, items (1) and (4) above. The record was complete on 

those issues on direct appeal. More importantly, we have already 

held that the trial court proceeded correctly with respect to the 

testimony in question, and that the indictment was proper. Based 

on those rulings it is impossible that counsel could have been 

ineffective on those subjects. 

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With respect to the presentence report and the sentencing 

hearing, items (2) and (5) above, the district court erred in 

holding that Willeford was required to raise an ineffectiveness 

claim on direct appeal. However, the error does not require 

remand for further consideration of the point since the district 

court did address these issues on their merits in its order of 

September 17, 1990. R. Vol. I, Tab 93. The district court's 

findings with respect to the merits of Willeford's allegations on 

this subject, together with the record, convince us that Willeford 

has not and cannot satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland on 

the point. That is, we are satisfied that Willeford's sentence 

would have been the same absent the mistake by the assistant U.S. 

attorney in referring to methamphetamine, and absent the few items 

which Willeford claims are inaccuracies in the presentence report. 

We have explained our reasoning on this subject under issue (1), 

above. 

However, with respect to Willeford's assertion that his trial 

counsel was ineffective by failing to raise a Fourth Amendment 

claim with respect to evidence obtained from Willeford's warehouse, item (3) above, the result must be different. The district 

court did not address the merits of this assertion, nor can we 

review the merits on the basis of the record before us. 

Willeford's habeas petition is his first opportunity to present 

the factual basis for this assertion to the district court. He 

should be allowed to do so. 

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Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court's determination 

with regard to this single issue, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We AFFIRM the district court's 

order in all other respects. 

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ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Stephen H. Anderson 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 90-5215 Document: 010110118072 Date Filed: 06/04/1991 Page: 14 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-App•llee, 

v. 

LATHAN EUGENE WILLEFORD, 

Defendant-Appellant, 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT 

FILED 

United Stat.et CJouri ot AppeaJ 

'T'4nt11 Cf re1dt 1 

AUG 2 51987 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 86-2043 

(D.C. No. 85-CR-149-C) 

(N.D. Okla.) 

Before MOORE and SE'l'B, Circuit Judges, and ALLEY, District Judge.• 

*Honorable Wayne E, Alley, Diatriot Judge, United StAtes District 

Court for the western District of OklahomA, itting by designation. 

After examining the briefs and th• appellate record, thia 

three-judge panel haa determined unanimoualy that oral argument 

would not be of material aaaiatance in the determination of this 

appeal. W. Fed. R, App. P. 34(&)1 10th Cir. R. 34.1.8(0) and 

27.1.2. The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral 

argument. 

A jury convicted the defendant, Lathan E. Willeford, of 

conspiracy to manufacture amphetamine and interatate travel in aid 

of racketeerin;. On Appeal from t.heae convictions, the defendant 

urges five ground• for reversal. Firat, he ar;uea that the 

Appellate Case: 90-5215 Document: 010110118072 Date Filed: 06/04/1991 Page: 15 
district court erred in admitting etatements mada by the defendant 

and his coconspirator. Second, he arguee that the district court 

should not have allowed the testimony of the government's paid 

informant. Third, he eontenda that the diatrict court erred when 

it 'admitted invoices showing the amount of chemicals and equipment 

purchased by the defendant and his 0oconspirator. Fourth, he 

alleges that proeeeutorial misconduct occurred in the government's 

opening statement and closing argument. Finally, the detandant 

argues that the indictment upon which he wa1 charged was 

defective. 

The defendant's first argument involve• the diatrict court's 

decision to allow the government's witness, Brian Norman, to 

testify as to statements that the defendant and his coconspirator 

made in Mr. Norman's presence. Setore allowing the teatimony, the 

district court held a he~ring outside of the presence of the jury. 

The district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that 

the government had introduced substantial, independent evidence 

that (1) a conspiracy existed, (2) the declarant of the statement 

and the defendant were member• of the conapirocy, and (3) the 

statement was mad~ in the course of and in furtherance of the 

conspiracy. united stotes y. Pet1r1en, 611 F.2d 1313 (10th Cir. 

1979>, ~rt. dl!)iedf 440 u.s. 905 (1980>1 Ynited stot11......L. 

Andrews, ses F.2d 961 <10th Cir. 1978). Based on thi1 

the district court determined that the 1tat•menta 

finding, 

of the 

coconapirator were admiaaible. Fed. R. Evid. 80l(d) (2) (!). 

2 

Appellate Case: 90-5215 Document: 010110118072 Date Filed: 06/04/1991 Page: 16 
Our review of the record convinces us that the district 

court's finding was neith•r clearly erroneous nor contrAry to law. 

The statements of the coconspiratora were properly admitted. 

The defendant's next arqument is that his conviction should 

be' reversed because the government elicited the testimony of a 

wcontingency feet witneaa, namely Mr. Norman. The defendant 

relies on the case ot Williameon y, united states, 311 F,2d 441 

(5th Cir. 1962), to support this argument. In Williamson, the 

Fifth Circuit overturned the defendant's conviction because the 

government had promised to pay its informant a certain amount of 

money to •catchw specific individual•. 

· The entrapment aspects of the government'a arrangement in 

Willi4msgn, of great concern to the . Fifth Circuit, are abaent from 

the present case. · Moreover, the record indicates that Mr. Norman 

was not paid to 'catch" the defendants, but rather to provide 

informAtion about the defendants' activities. Therefore, 

Williamsgn. a case which should be limited to ita facts, United 

States v, Gomez, 810 P,2d 947, 957 (10th Cir.>, cert, denied, 107 

s.ct. 2488 (1987), do•a not indicate that reveraal would be 

appropriate in this caae. Furthermore, the diatrict court jud9e 

and both parties alerted the jury to Mr. Norman'• fee arrangement. 

Any effect that the arrangement may have had on Mr. Norman's 

credibility was for the jury to weigh. SU. J..Q. at 952 n,3. 

The defendant raises his third and fourth arguments for the 

first time on appeal, The third &rgurnent involves the district 

court's decision to admit invoice& that Mr, Norman had prepnred 

when the defendAnt and his coconspirator purchased chemicala and 

3 

Appellate Case: 90-5215 Document: 010110118072 Date Filed: 06/04/1991 Page: 17 
equipment from the supply store that Mr. Norman operated. We are 

persuaded that the invoices were relevant, and admissible pursuant 

to Fed. R. Evid. 803(6), and their admission could not constitute 

plain error that affected the defendant's substantial rights. 

Fed. R. Crim. P. s2<b>1 united states v._~illing, 721 r.2d 286, 

295 (10th Cir. 1983). 

The defendant's fourth argument, that the prosecution was 

guilty of misconduct in his opening and oloaing statements, ie 

entirely without merit. None ot the alleged transgressions 

pointed to by the defendant rise to the lev•l of plain error. 

_u-n_i-te-d ___ ._s~t,.a-t_e_s_......,v~•·-·--Y~o-u_n_g, 470 o.s. 1, 14-16 Cl9BS>. The 

prosecutor's comments were not wenou;h to influence the jury to 

render a conviction on grounds beyond the admissible evidence 

presented." United states vA Dickey, 736 r.2d 571, 576 (10th Cir. 

1984), ~.t, denied, 469 U.S. 1188' (1985). 

Finally, · we need not review the defendant's final argument 

that his indictment was defective. Because the defendant did not 

raise this alleged problem before the district court, he waived 

his objection to the indictment. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12 Cb) (2), Cf). 

The judgment of the united statea District Court for the 

Northern District of Oklahoma ia AFFIRMED. 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CORIAM 

4 

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

LATHAN E. WILLEFORD, 

Detendant-Appellant. 

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FILED 

Unft«I Stat.a Court of Appeal, .,_,,th r.rN!of t 

JUN 2 81988 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 88-1134 

(O.C. No. 8S•CR-149-C) 

(N.D. Okla.) 

OROER AND JUDGMENT 

Before ANDERSON, SETH, Circuit Jud9es, and CAMPOS, District 

Jud9e.•· 

•The Honorable 

District Court 

designation. 

Santiago E, Campos, Chief Judge, United Stat.es 

for the Diatrict ot New Mexico, 1ittin9 by 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

•••i•t the determination of thia app•al, See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.l.S. The cause ■ therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Following a jury trial, defendant wa ■ convicted of con piracy 

to manufacture, possess, and distribute amphetamines in violation 

of 21 u.s.c. 55 84l(a)(l) and 846 and interatate travel in aid of 

racketeering in violation of 18 u.s.c. S 1952. Be was aentenced 

Appellate Case: 90-5215 Document: 010110118072 Date Filed: 06/04/1991 Page: 19 
to eight year, imprisonment on th• Title 2l violation ■ and 

concurrent sentences of five year, imprisonment on each of the 

Title 18 violations. 

The convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. United 

States v. Willeford, Unpubli1hed No, 86-2043 (10th Cir. filed 

August 2s, 1987), Defendant then filed a motion to correct 

sentence pursuant to red, R, Crim. P. 35(&). He alleged that 

pursuant to 21 u.s.c. S 8l2(A)(l) amphetamines were Schedule III 

drugs not Schedule II and, therefore, he was wron;fully convicted 

of violating 2l o.s.c. SS 841 and 846, Beoauae five years is the 

maximum sentence which can be imposed following conviction of a 

violation involving a Schedule III drug, defendant alleged that 

his sentence of eight years was illegal, Defendant also alleqed 

that the indictment . failed to stat• an offense as tp the 

violations of 18 o.s.c. S 1952, The district court denied reli•f 

and defendant appealed. 

On appeal, defendant argues that amphetamines were improperly 

rescheduled as Schedule II drugs because the attorney general "did_ 

not subdelegate the powers vested in him by the 1984 amendment" to 

the Drug Enforcement Agency and, therefore, that agency did not 

have the requieite authority to raaohedule druga. 

Amphetamine ■ were upgraded to Schedule II July 7, 197l. See 

36 Fed, Reg, l2734 (1971), Prior to that date, the attorney 

general had delegated authority to reschedule drugs to the 

director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. See 28 - C.F.R. S 0.100 (1971), Defendant's ~rgument is without merit. 

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Appellate Case: 90-5215 Document: 010110118072 Date Filed: 06/04/1991 Page: 20 
Oefendant alao argues that the indictment failed to "state an 

offense" as to the charged violation• ol 18 o.s.c. S 1952. 

Although the challenge that an indictment faila to state en 

offense may be raised at any time, tardily challen;ed indictment• 

will be construed liberally in favor of validity. United States 

v. Freeman, 813 F.2d 303, 304 (10th Cir. 1987)1 United States v. 

Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353, 361 (9th Cir. 1976), rt. denied, 429 

U.S. 1099 (1977). The indictment here "tracks the lan;uage of the 

statute and autficiently sets forth the element ■ of the crime 

charged." United States v. Wexler, 621 F.2d 1218, 1223 (2d Cir.), 

cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980). Thue, this argument is also 

without merit. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Northern Dis tr i,ct of Oklahoma ·11 AFFIRMED. 

The mandate shall ia1ue forthwith. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

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Appellate Case: 90-5215 Document: 010110118072 Date Filed: 06/04/1991 Page: 21