Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00795/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00795-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
G. Holmes
Defendant
Roy Welsh
Plaintiff

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROY WELSH,

Plaintiff,

v.

G. HOLMES,

Defendants.

 /

CV F 05 795 AWI LJO P 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO

DISMISS CERTAIN CLAIMS AND

DEFENDANTS FROM ACTION (Doc. 1.) 

 Roy Welsh (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in

this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

A. SCREENING STANDARD

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

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A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding,

467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Palmer v.

Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a

complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in

question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the

pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. 

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

B. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

Plaintiff alleges that between August 16 and August 23, 2004, Plaintiff and Correctional th

Officer Holmes were involved in a dispute regarding Plaintiff’s entitlement to his daily shower

after work and before evening meals. Defendant refused to allow Plaintiff to shower which

resulted in Plaintiff having to consume his meal under “unsanitary conditions.” Plaintiff states

that he sought to grieve Defendant’s actions and that Defendant then instructed Plaintiff to

submit to handcuffing which Plaintiff complied. Defendant then “sadistically and deliberately in

an effort to cause suffering” twisted Plaintiff’s wrist and caused him to fall face first into the

concrete while restrained causing Plaintiff to incur a lump and broken prescription eyeglasses. 

C. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

1. Official Capacity

Plaintiff states that he is suing Defendant Holmes in his official and personal capacity. 

However, the Eleventh Amendment bars damages actions against state officials in their official

capacity. See Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat’l Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997);

Eaglesmith v. Ward, 73 F.3d 857, 859 (9th Cir. 1996); Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 472 (9th

Cir. 1992). Thus, Plaintiff may not pursue damages claims against the defendants in their official

capacities. 

The Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits seeking damages against state officials in

their personal capacity. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30 (1991); Ashker v. California Dep’t

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of Corrections, 112 F.3d 392, 394 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 168 (1997); Pena v.

Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 472 (9th Cir. 1992). “Personal-capacity suits seek to impose personal

liability upon a government official for actions [the official] takes under color of state law. See

Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1988). Where plaintiff is seeking damages against a

state official, such as in the instant action, this “necessarily implies” a personal-capacity suit

because an official-capacity suit would be barred. See Cerrato v. San Francisco Community

College Dist., 26 F.3d 968, 973 n.16 (9th Cir. 1994); Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Fish & Game

Comm’n, 42 F.3d 1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 1994); Price v. Akaka, 928 F.2d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Thus, Plaintiff may pursue an action against Defendant Holmes in his personal capacity. The

Court will issue separate Findings and Recommendations to dismiss the claims against the

Defendant in his official capacity and will proceed with the action against the Defendant in his

personal capacity. 

2. Retaliation

An allegation of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment right to file a prison

grievance is sufficient to support a claim under Section 1983. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283,

1288 (9 Cir. 2003. "Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation th

entails five elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an

inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the

inmate's exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a

legitimate correctional goal." Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir.2005) (citations

omitted). 

In assessing the fourth requirement, the court at the pleading stage should ask " 'whether

an official's acts would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future First

Amendment activities." ' Id. at 568, quoting Mendocino Environmental Center v. Mendocino

County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1300 (9th Cir.1999). "The 'government' to which the First Amendment

guarantees a right of redress of grievances includes prison authorities, as it includes other

administrative arms and units of government." Bradley v. Hall,64 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th

Cir.1995), citing Soranno's Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir.1989). An

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allegation that a defendant subjected a prisoner to "[v]erbal harassment or abuse ... is not

sufficient to state a constitutional deprivation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero,

830 F.2d 136, 138 (9th Cir.1987) (internal quotations omitted). However, in the context of a

prisoner's retaliation claim, threats of discipline or transfer for the plaintiff's exercise of his First

Amendment rights are sufficient adverse action to state a claim. See Gomez v. Vernon, 255 F.3d

1118, 1123 (9th Cir.2001); Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir.1989).

Plaintiff sufficiently states a retaliation claim against Defendant Holmes and the case can

proceed against Defendant Holmes in his personal capacity. 

3. Excessive Force

“What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual

Punishments Clause [of the Eighth Amendment] depends upon the claim at issue . . . .” Hudson

v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992). “The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim

is . . . contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of decency.” Id. (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). The malicious and sadistic use of force to cause harm always

violates contemporary standards of decency, regardless of whether or not significant injury is

evident. Id. at 9; see also Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 628 (9th Cir. 2002) (Eighth

Amendment excessive force standard examines de minimis uses of force, not de minimis

injuries)). However, not “every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause

of action.” Id. at 9. “The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments

necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided

that the use of force is not of a sort ‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Id. at 9-10

(internal quotations marks and citations omitted). 

“[W]henever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation

of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was

applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to

cause harm.” Id. at 7. “In determining whether the use of force was wanton and unnecessary, it

may also be proper to evaluate the need for application of force, the relationship between that

need and the amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials,

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and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.” Id. (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). “The absence of serious injury is . . . relevant to the Eighth

Amendment inquiry, but does not end it.” Id. 

The Court finds Plaintiff’s allegations sufficient to state a claim of excessive force against

Defendant Holmes. 

D. RECOMMENDATION Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that the allegations

against Defendant Holmes in his Official Capacity be DISMISSED from this action and that the

action proceed against Defendant Holmes in his personal capacity for retaliation and excessive

force. 

The Court HEREBY ORDERS that these Findings and Recommendations be submitted

to the United States District Court Judge assigned to this action pursuant to the provisions of 28

U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States

District Court, Eastern District of California. Within THIRTY (30) days after being served with

a copy of these Findings and Recommendations, any party may file written Objections with the

Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the Objections shall be served

and filed within TEN (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the

Objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file Objections within the specified time

may waive the right to appeal the Order of the District Court. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153

(9 Cir. 1991). th

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 16, 2007 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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