Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01896/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01896-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert F. Schuh
Petitioner
Dennis Smith
Respondent

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U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT F. SCHUH, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

DENNIS SMITH, Warden, )

)

Respondent. )

____________________________________)

1:06-cv-01896-LJO-TAG HC 

ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER’S

MOTION TO AMEND PETITION (Doc. 7)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO

GRANT RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS FOR LACK OF

RIPENESS (Doc. 8)

ORDER DIRECTING OBJECTIONS TO BE

FILED WITHIN TWENTY DAYS

Petitioner is a federal prisoner proceeding with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The instant petition was filed on December 29, 2006. (Doc. 1). The petition contends

Petitioner pleaded guilty and was convicted of violating 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1) (maintaining a drug

house), and sentenced to a prison term of one hundred fifty-one months. (Doc. 1, p. 4). The petition

also asserts that Petitioner is now in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), and that he is

presently assigned to a prison camp without bars or fences, a fact that, in Petitioner’s view, is

evidence that he poses no flight risk or danger to the community and that he is a person of “honesty

and integrity.” (Id.). Petitioner indicates that he is fifty-six years old and destitute, and immediate

placement in a Residential Re-entry Center (“RRC”) would permit him to “engage in full-time

employment.” (Id. at p. 5). 

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Petitioner notes that various federal courts, including this Court, have concluded that the

2002 and 2005 BOP regulations, by which the BOP has arbitrarily designated a maximum placement

time in RRC’s equal to 10% of the prisoner’s sentence, are illegal. (Doc. 1, pp. 5-6). Petitioner

contends that, under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b), the BOP “has a duty to consider the enumerated factors

set forth in the consideration of each individual prisoner on a case by case basis to determine the

appropriate place of imprisonment,” and, implicitly, Petitioner contends that the BOP has failed to

do so in his case. (Id. at p. 5). Petitioner seeks an immediate placement in an RRC. (Id. at p. 6). 

On April 26, 2007, before any responsive pleading had been filed, Petitioner filed a document

entitled “Motion Pursuant to Rule (15) Amended and Supplemental Pleadings Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.” (Doc. 7). In that document, Petitioner clarifies that the claims raised in his petition do

not challenge his eligibility for RRC placement, but rather seek an “immediate re-designation” to a

RRC because he satisfies all of the criteria of § 3621(b). (Doc. 7, p. 2). 

On May 16, 2007, Respondent filed the instant motion to dismiss, alleging that the petition is

premature because the BOP is not legally required to evaluate Petitioner for placement in an RRC

until eleven to thirteen months before his release date. (Doc. 8, p. 2). Respondent has submitted a

copy of “Program Statement 7310.04, Community Correction Center (CCC) Utilization and Transfer

Procedure, (12-16-1998).” (“Program Statement”). (Doc. 8-3). The Program Statement sets forth

procedures for placement of prisoners in RRC’s by the BOP. (Id.). That document also provides

that, “[n]ormally 11 to 13 months before each inmate’s probable release date, the unit team shall

decide whether to refer an inmate to a Community Corrections program.” (Id. at ¶ 12.). 

Respondent contends that Petitioner’s release date is not until July 6, 2011, presently fortyfive months from now. (Doc. 8, p. 2). Respondent observes that, while challenging the 2002 and

2005 BOP regulations and arguing that the BOP has illegally failed to assign his to an RRC pursuant

to 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b), the petition does not challenge the Program Statement as illegal. (Id. at p. 2). 

Because the program statement does not require the BOP to make an assessment in Petitioner’s case

for almost three more years, in Respondent’s view, the petition is not ripe and should be dismissed. 

(Id. at p. 4). 

///

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U.S. District Court

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On May 25, 2007, Petitioner filed a response to the motion to dismiss, contending that he did

not challenge the Program Statement in his petition because he was unaware of it. (Doc. 9, p. 2). 

Petitioner also contends that use of the Program Statement is an effort to circumvent the holdings of

courts that have found the BOP’s regulations unlawful and that the Program Statement uses “the

same time limitations, time restraints, and unlawful procedures that this Court and numerous Circuit

Courts have deemed unlawful.” (Id.). 

JURISDICTION

Writ of habeas corpus relief extends to a person in custody under the authority of the United

States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241. While a federal prisoner who wishes to challenge the validity or

constitutionality of his conviction must bring a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255, a petitioner challenging the manner, location, or conditions of that sentence's execution must

bring a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See, e.g., Capaldi v. Pontesso,

135 F.3d 1122, 1123 (6th Cir. 1998); Kingsley v. Bureau of Prisons, 937 F.2d 26, 30 n.5 (2nd Cir.

1991); United States v. Jalili, 925 F.2d 889, 893-894 (6th Cir. 1991); Brown v. United States, 

610 F.2d 672, 677 (9th Cir. 1990). To receive relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 a petitioner in federal

custody must show that his sentence is being executed in an illegal, but not necessarily

unconstitutional, manner. See e.g., Clark v. Floyd, 80 F.3d 371, 372, 374 (9th Cir. 1995)

(contending time spent in state custody should be credited toward federal custody); Jalili, 925 F.2d

at 893-894 (asserting petitioner should be housed at a community treatment center); Barden v.

Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 479 (3rd Cir. 1990) (arguing Bureau of Prisons erred in determining whether

petitioner could receive credit for time spent in state custody); Brown, 610 F.2d at 677 (challenging

content of inaccurate pre-sentence report used to deny parol). A petitioner filing a petition for writ of

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 must file the petition in the judicial district of the petitioner's

custodian. Brown, 610 F.2d at 677. 

In this case, Petitioner alleges that BOP’s failure to conduct an immediate RRC placement

assessment and immediate re-designation for Petitioner violates the federal courts’ interpretation of

the 2002 and 2005 regulations and the BOP’s exercise of discretion under § 3621(b). Petitioner is

therefore challenging the legality of the manner in which his sentence is being executed. Thus, his

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petition is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In addition, because Petitioner is incarcerated at the

Federal Prison Camp, Atwater, California, which is within the Eastern District of California, Fresno

Division, this Court has jurisdiction to proceed to the merits of the petition.

EXHAUSTION

A preliminary question is whether petitioner has exhausted available administrative remedies. 

Before filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus, a federal prisoner challenging any circumstance of

imprisonment must first exhaust all administrative remedies. Western Radio Services Co. v. Espy,

79 F.3d 896, 899 (9th Cir. 1996); Martinez v. Roberts, 804 F.3d 570, 571 (9th Cir. 1986); Chua Han

Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1313 (9th Cir. 1984); Ruviwat v. Smith, 701 F.2d 844, 845

(9th Cir. 1983). 

The exhaustion prerequisite for filing a § 2241 petition is judicially created; it is not a

statutory requirement. Brown v. Rison, 895 F.2d 533, 535 (9th Cir. 1990), overruled on other

grounds, Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 54-55 (1995). Thus, “[b]ecause exhaustion is not required by

statute, it is not jurisdictional.” Brown, 895 F.2d at 535. If a petitioner has not properly exhausted

his claims, the district court, in its discretion, may either “excuse the faulty exhaustion and reach the

merits, or require the petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies before proceeding in court.” 

Id.; McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144-145 (1992), superceded on other grounds, 42 U.S.C.

§1997(e). 

One of the purposes of administrative exhaustion is to allow the agency an opportunity to

remedy its own mistakes before being haled into court, and this applies with particular force when

the challenged action involves an exercise of the agency’s discretionary power. See McCarthy v.

Madigan, 503 U.S. at 145. Thus, exhaustion of administrative remedies would be futile and should

be excused if the agency lacks authority to grant the requested relief or has predetermined the issued

before it. See id. at 148. 

Here, Petitioner has not indicated that he has undertaken any efforts to exhaust his

administrative remedies, but does contend that exhaustion would be futile. (Doc. 1, p. 3). 

Respondent has not addressed the issue. As mentioned, however, futility is an exception to the

exhaustion requirement. Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 1000-1001 (9th Cir. 2004). In the instant

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action, it is apparent that it would be futile for Petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies

because he alleges he is being denied an immediate RRC placement based on formally-adopted BOP

regulations, including the Program Statement defining the RRC placement process, the validity of

which BOP strenuously maintains. In the Court’s view, therefore, Petitioner’s exhaustion of his

administrative remedies is not a pre-requisite to the district court’s jurisdiction over the case because

of the BOP’s intractable and immutable policy against the relief sought.

DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Amend.

Petitioner has filed a motion to amend the petition. (Doc. 7). The Court construes this as a

motion to supplement the petition because it does not raise any new claims or issues, but merely

seeks to clarify Petitioner’s original claim. The Court has always understood Petitioner’s claim as

involving both a challenge to the validity of the BOP’s regulations, as well as a claim that he is

entitled to immediate placement in an RRC. Therefore, no clarification is, in the Court’s view,

necessary. However, the Court perceives no prejudice in permitting the motion to amend filed on

April 26, 2007, to be filed and construed as a motion to supplement the arguments and contentions

contained in the original petition. Accordingly, Petitioner’s motion to amend will be construed as a

motion to supplement the petition, and, as construed, it will be granted.

B. Motion to Dismiss.

Respondent contends that Petitioner’s claim is premature and should therefore be dismissed

without prejudice. The Court agrees.

Article III of the United States Constitution limits the federal courts to deciding “cases” and

“controversies.” To ensure that any matter presented to a federal court meets that requirement, the

Court considers the doctrines of standing, ripeness, and mootness. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,

502-505 (1961). The most important of these doctrines is standing. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,

750 (1984). As a manifestation of the Article III case-or-controversy requirement, standing is a

determination of whether a specific person is the proper party to invoke the power of a federal court. 

Coalition of Clergy, Lawyers, and Professors v. Bush, 310 F.3d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 2002). “In

essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits

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of the dispute or of particular issues.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). To establish

standing, “[a] plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly

unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.” Id. at 751. The injury must be

“an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) ‘actual or

imminent,’” not conjectural or hypothetical. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560

(1992)(citations omitted). 

Closely related to standing is the issue of ripeness. The ripeness doctrine serves “to prevent

the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract

disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference

until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the

challenging parties. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-149 (1967), overruled on

other grounds, Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977). The Supreme Court has stated that to meet

the ripeness standard, plaintiffs must show either a specific present objective harm or the threat of

specific future harm. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 14 (1972). “A claim is not ripe for adjudication if

it rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at

all.” Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998)(internal citations omitted). 

The Court agrees with Respondent that Petitioner’s claim is not ripe and that, therefore, he

presently lacks standing under Article III. Even assuming, arguendo, that the petition properly

challenged the validity of the Program Statement, that regulation does not, as Petitioner has

suggested in his reply to the motion to dismiss, improperly limit the discretion of the BOP to make

an RRC placement in any individual case. Rather, the regulation only requires that the BOP make an

RRC placement assessment at least eleven to thirteen months prior to the inmate’s release date. 

Nothing in the Program Statement prevents the BOP, in the exercise of its statutory discretion, from

making an earlier determination, although the Court is not aware of any statute or regulation that

requires such expedited action by the BOP. In other words, the Program Statement simply insures

that inmates will receive an RRC assessment sufficiently in advance of their release date to permit

them to make appropriate plans prior to their transfer. Because the Program Statement does not limit

or otherwise intrude upon the BOP’s exercise of discretion either in making its RRC assessment or

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Moreover, even had Petitioner included a challenge to the Program Statement in his original

1

petition, a habeas claim cannot be sustained based solely upon the BOP’s purported violation of its own

Program Statement. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a petitioner’s custody need not be in violation of the

Constitution; a violation of federal law issufficient. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). However, the violation

of a BOP Program Statement is not a violation of federal law. Program Statements are “internal agency

guidelines [that] may be altered by the Bureau at will” and that are not “subject to the rigors of the

Administrative Procedure Act, including public notice and comment.” Jacks v. Crabtree, 114 F.3d 983,

985 n. 1 (9th Cir.1997). BOP Program Statements are simply interpretive rules. Reno v. Koray, 515

U.S. 50, 61 (1995). “[T]he internal guidelines of a federal agency, that are not mandated by statute or

the constitution, do not confer substantive rights on any party.” United States v. Craveiro, 907 F.2d

260, 264 (1st Cir. 1990);see also e.g., Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 789 (1981) (Social Security

Administration Manual was only regulation, had no legal force, and did not bind government); United

States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409, 1411 (9th Cir.1987) (United States Attorneys’ internal guidelines do

not create any rights enforceable at law); Thompson v. United States, 592 F.2d 1104, 1110 (9th

Cir.1979) (government safety manual or safety programs do not grant right to have them followed);

United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979) (failure to follow internal IRS regulations did not violate

federal law). 

U.S. District Court

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in applying the appropriate criteria under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b), the Program Statement, contrary to

Petitioner’s assertions, is not in any way analogous to the 2002 and 2005 regulations that many

courts, including this one, have found to be an illegal limitation on the discretion vested in the BOP

by § 3621(b). 

1

Because Petitioner’s release date is July 6, 2011, the Program Statement does not require that

the assessment team meet to consider Petitioner’s RRC placement until between June and August

2010, approximately thirty-two months from now. Because Petitioner is not presently entitled to an

RRC assessment under the applicable BOP regulation, he cannot show either a specific present

objective harm or the threat of specific future harm. Laird, 408 U.S. at 14. Moreover, even

Petitioner’s release date is only tentative at this point; events could transpire between now and July

6, 2011 that would affect that date and result in the postponement of Petitioner’s release date to a

more distant point in time. For this reason, Petitioner’s claim of a right to an immediate assessment

rests “upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at

all.” Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. at 300. Thus, the claim is not ripe.

Moreover, the Court is unaware of any authority requiring the BOP to conduct its RRC

eligibility reviews or immediately transfer a prisoner to an RRC facility on demand of the prisoner. 

Indeed, while case law from this Court and other jurisdictions strongly suggests that Petitioner is

entitled to an RRC assessment made independently of the 2002 and 2005 regulations, Petitioner cites

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no authority for the proposition that he has either a statutory or constitutional right to an immediate

assessment or transfer. 

Finally, for good reason, the Court is reticent to micro-manage the BOP regarding inmate

RRC assessments and placements. “[F]ederal courts ought to afford appropriate deference and

flexibility to state officials trying to manage a volatile environment....Such flexibility is especially

warranted in the fine-tuning of the ordinary incidents of prison life....” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S.

472, 482 (1995). In Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-405 (1974), overruled in part on other

grounds, Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989), the Supreme Court explained the basis for this

deference:

Traditionally, federal courts have adopted a broad hands-off attitude toward problems of

prison administration. In part this policy is the product of various limitations on the scope of

federal review of conditions in state penal institutions. More fundamentally, this attitude

springs from complementary perceptions about the nature of the problems and the efficacy of

judicial intervention. Prison administrators are responsible for maintaining internal order and

discipline, for securing their institutions against unauthorized access or escape, and for

rehabilitating, to the extent that human nature and inadequate resources allow, the inmates

placed in their custody. The Herculean obstacles to effective discharge of these duties are too

apparent to warrant explication. Suffice it to say that the problems of prisons in America are

complex and intractable, and, more to the point, they are not readily susceptible of resolution

by decree. Most require expertise, comprehensive planning, and the commitment of

resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive

branches of government. For all of those reasons, courts are ill equipped to deal with the

increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform. Judicial recognition of

that fact reflects no more than a healthy sense of realism. 

In the instant motion to dismiss, Respondent indicates that the BOP is “well-aware of the

Court’s ruling that RRC placement evaluations must be made without reference to 28 C.F.R.

§§ 570.20-21 and has been making its evaluations on that basis.” (Doc. 8, p. 4). Respondent also

indicates that “[i]n all likelihood, petitioner will receive an evaluation of that type while he still has

at least 11 months to go before his good conduct release date.” (Id.). Petitioner has given the Court

no reason to doubt the BOP’s representations to the Court in that regard such that this Court should

expend its limited resources to oversee the BOP’s conduct of future RRC assessments.

In light of the foregoing, the Court will recommend that Respondent’s motion to dismiss be

granted and that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be dismissed without prejudice. Petitioner

may re-file this habeas action if Respondent’s final decision regarding Petitioner’s RRC placement

///

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fails to comply with current federal case law construing § 3621(b) and the applicable BOP

regulations. 

ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, it is HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion to Amend

(Doc. 7), is GRANTED.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS as follows:

1. Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 8), be GRANTED;

2. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1), be DISMISSED as not ripe; and,

3. The Clerk of Court be DIRECTED to enter judgment.

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304

of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within twenty (20) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with

the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served and

filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the objections. 

The District Judge will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636

(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive

the right to appeal the District Judge’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 4, 2007 /s/ Theresa A. Goldner 

j6eb3d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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