Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-01182/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-01182-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Genuine Data Services, LLC
Defendant
Asya Ameenah Hunter
Plaintiff
RealPage, Inc.
Defendant

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ASYA AMEENAH HUNTER,

Plaintiff,

v.

REALPAGE, INC. dba LEASINGDESK 

and GENUINE DATA SERVICES, LLC,

Defendants.

No. 2:24-cv-01182-TLN-CSK

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendants RealPage, Inc. (“RealPage”) and Genuine 

Data Services, LLC’s (“GDS”) (collectively, “Defendants”) Response to the Court’s Order to 

Show Cause as to why this case should not be sua sponte remanded to state court for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction. (ECF No. 16.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court sua sponte

REMANDS this action to state court. 

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

Case 2:24-cv-01182-TLN-CSK Document 17 Filed 12/16/24 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff Asya Ameenah Hunter (“Plaintiff”) filed this action in Sacramento County 

Superior Court on March 22, 2024. (ECF No. 1-1 at 3.) On April 23, 2024, RealPage removed 

the action to this Court based on federal question jurisdiction. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) GDS joined in 

the removal. (ECF No. 1-2 at 2.) On November 14, 2024, the Court ordered Defendants to show 

cause as to why this action should not be sua sponte remanded to state court for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction. (ECF No. 15.) Defendants filed a response on November 27, 2024. (ECF 

No. 16.) 

II. STANDARD OF LAW 

28 U.S.C. § 1441 permits the removal to federal court of any civil action over which “the 

district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “Removal is 

proper only if the court could have exercised jurisdiction over the action had it originally been 

filed in federal court.” Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). 

Courts “strictly construe the removal statute against removal jurisdiction,” and “the 

defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 

F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). Further, “[i]f the district court at any time determines 

that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the removed action, it must remedy the improvident 

grant of removal by remanding the action to state court.” Cal. ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 

375 F.3d 831, 838, as amended, 387 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied 544 U.S. 974 (2005). 

III. ANALYSIS 

In the Notice of Removal, RealPage asserts this Court has federal question jurisdiction 

because Plaintiff alleges claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), which is a federal 

law. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) After examination of the Complaint, however, it appears Plaintiff only 

alleges state law claims. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges the following claims: (1) violation of 

California Civil Code § 1786.20(b); (2) violation of California Civil Code § 1786.18(c); and (3) 

violation of California Civil Code §§ 1786.10 and 1786.22. (ECF No. 1-1 at 8–9.) Further, in the 

prayer for relief, Plaintiff only seeks remedies for violations of state law — not the FCRA. (Id. at 

10.) Although Plaintiff does mention the FCRA three times in the Complaint (id. at ¶¶ 1, 16, 27), 

Case 2:24-cv-01182-TLN-CSK Document 17 Filed 12/16/24 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

those vague references are not connected to any of Plaintiff’s listed claims and seem to be 

boilerplate allegations. Therefore, contrary to Realpage’s assertions in the Notice of Removal, it 

appears Plaintiff does not allege a claim under the FCRA. Based on these concerns, the Court 

ordered Defendants to show cause as to why this case should not be sua sponte remanded to state 

court. (ECF No. 15 at 2.) 

In response, Defendants argue Plaintiff’s Complaint specifically alleges that under the 

FCRA, “Defendant was required to use reasonable procedures to ensure the maximum possible 

accuracy of the information reported” and “[d]isclosing outdated information is a clear violation 

of this statute.” (ECF No. 16 at 2 (citing ECF No. 1-1 at ¶ 16).) Defendants argue Plaintiff also

alleges she “suffered and continues to suffer actual damages and emotional distress as a result of 

her denial of housing.” 1 (Id. (citing ECF No. 1-1 at ¶ 17).) 

“Article III of the Constitution gives the federal courts power to hear cases ‘arising under’ 

federal statutes.” Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 807 (1986). “[T]he 

question whether a claim ‘arises under’ federal law must be determined by reference to the ‘wellpleaded complaint.’” Id. at 808. “[T]he vast majority of cases brought under the general federalquestion jurisdiction of the federal courts are those in which federal law creates the cause of 

action.” Id. If a federal law does not create the cause of action, a defendant may establish federal 

question jurisdiction by showing that one or more of the state law claims should be 

“recharacterized as a federal claim” or that one or more of the state law claims “necessarily 

turn[s] on the construction of a substantial, disputed federal question.” Rains v. Criterion Sys., 

Inc., 80 F.3d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1996).

The thrust of Defendants’ argument is that there is federal question jurisdiction because 

Plaintiff alleges violations of the FCRA. However, Defendants do not adequately address the 

1

In a footnote, Defendants argue “the only logical inference is that Plaintiff does, in fact,

assert federal questions” because Plaintiff never moved to remand or otherwise argued that her 

Complaint does not assert federal questions. (ECF No. 16 at 3.) Defendants’ argument is 

unpersuasive, as federal courts “must consider whether federal jurisdiction exists, even if no 

objection is made to removal, and even if both parties stipulate to federal jurisdiction.” Rains v. 

Criterion Sys., Inc., 80 F.3d 339, 342 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal citations omitted). 

Case 2:24-cv-01182-TLN-CSK Document 17 Filed 12/16/24 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Court’s concern that, despite a few boilerplate allegations about the FRCA elsewhere in the 

Complaint, Plaintiff’s claims are based solely on violations of the California Civil Code and do 

not mention the FCRA. Moreover, as alleged, the elements of the claims track with the language 

from each respective California Civil Code section. For example, Claim One alleges a violation 

of California Civil Code § 1786.20(b) (“§ 1786.20(b)”). (ECF No. 1-1 at 8.) Section 1786.20(b) 

states in relevant part, “Whenever an investigative consumer reporting agency prepares an 

investigative consumer report, it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible 

accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom the report relates.” Cal. Civ. 

Code § 1786.20(b). Tracking with the language of § 1786.20(b), Claim One alleges Defendants

“failed to use reasonable procedures to ensure the maximum possible accuracy of the information 

reported.” (ECF No. 1-1 at 8.) To the extent there is overlap between the cited California Civil 

Code sections and the FCRA, it seems Plaintiff ultimately chose to bring claims only under state 

law. See Ethridge v. Harbor House Restaurant, 861 F.2d 1389, 1395 (9th Cir. 1988) (“If the 

plaintiff may sue on either state or federal grounds, the plaintiff may avoid removal simply by 

relying exclusively on the state law claim”).

Accordingly, Defendants fail to convince the Court that this is one of the “vast majority” 

of federal question cases where a federal law creates the cause of action. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. 

at 807. The Court also notes that Defendants do not argue that Plaintiff’s state law claims should 

be “recharacterized as a federal claim” or that Plaintiff’s state law claims “necessarily turn on the 

construction of a substantial, disputed federal question.” Rains, 80 F.3d at 343. The Court 

acknowledges the Complaint could have been clearer. See Mateo v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 

No. 23-CV-01561-AMO, 2023 WL 7089937, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2023) (“[W]hether by 

carelessness or otherwise, [plaintiff] has muddled the bases for his state law claims by including 

references to federal law. . . .”). However, based on the limited arguments before the Court, the 

Court concludes Defendants have failed to meet their burden to show removal was proper.2 Id. at 

2 Defendants alternatively argue this Court has diversity jurisdiction, which was not a basis 

for jurisdiction raised in the Notice of Removal. (ECF No. 16 at 3–4.) Defendants fail to cite 

authority that would allow this Court to consider a basis for removal that was not raised in the 

Notice of Removal. As such, the Court does not address diversity jurisdiction. 

Case 2:24-cv-01182-TLN-CSK Document 17 Filed 12/16/24 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

*4 (“The basis for removal is questionable in light of the ambiguity in the complaint, and the

Court resolves that ambiguity, as it must, in favor of remand.”). 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court sua sponte REMANDS this action. The Clerk of 

Court is directed to REMAND this action back to Sacramento County Superior Court. 

___________________________________ 

TROY L. NUNLEY

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

IT IS SO ORDERED:

Dated: 

December 13, 2024

Case 2:24-cv-01182-TLN-CSK Document 17 Filed 12/16/24 Page 5 of 5