Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-85-01768/USCOURTS-ca10-85-01768-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Luis Anthony Rivera
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

FILE-D 

Unitl.ld Star.a Oourt o! Appa.ls 

'tenth Circuit 

JAN 2 01988 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

v. 

LUIS 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

) Nos. 85-1768 

) 85-1771 

ANTHONY RIVERA, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

{D.C. Nos. 83-138-02-CR and 83-96-01-CR) 

Louis Vernell, North Miami Beach, Florida (Gregory Meier, 

Muskogee, Oklahoma, on the brief of Appellant, and Louis Vernell 

on the supplemental brief), for Defendant-Appellant. 

Gene V. Primomo, Assistant u.s. Attorney {Roger Hilfiger, United 

States Attorney for the Eastern District of Oklahoma, with him on 

the brief), Muskogee, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before McKAY and MOORE, Circuit Judges, and BROWN, District 

Judge*. 

McKAY, Circuit Judge. 

*Honorable Wesley E. Brown, United States Senior District Judge 

for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 85-1768 Document: 01019290425 Date Filed: 01/20/1988 Page: 1 
Luis Anthony Rivera was found guilty of all counts under both 

a seven-count indictment (indictment I) and a six-count indictment 

(indictment II) in a consolidated trial. He was sentenced to the 

maximum term allowable under every count with each to run consecutively, resulting in a life sentence without parole plus 140 

years. 

Indictment I charged defendant and six other named 

individuals, with: (1) conspiracy to import cocaine in violation 

of 21 u.s.c. §§ 952(a), 960, and 963 <1982 & Supp. III 1985); (2) 

importation of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a) and 960 

(1982 & Supp. III 1985); (3) conspiracy to possess cocaine with 

intent to distribute in violation of 21 u.s.c. §§ 84l(a) (1) and 

846 (1982); (4) possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in 

violation of 21 u.s.c. § 841 (a) (1) <1982); (5) conspiracy to 

travel in interstate and foreign commerce with the intent to 

import and possess with the further intent to distribute cocaine 

in violation of 18 u.s.c. §§ 371 and 1952 (a) (3) <1982); (6) 

traveling in interstate and foreign commerce with intent to import 

and possess with the further intent to distribute cocaine in 

violation of 18 u.s.c. § 1952(a) (3) <1982); and (7) engaging in a 

continuing criminal enterprise (CCE) in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 848 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). See Indictment, record, vol. 1, at 

1-12. 

The acts described in indictment I allegedly occurred between 

January 1, 1983, and July 1, 1983, culminating in 460 pounds of 

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cocaine being smuggled from Columbia to an isolated airstrip in 

Talihina, Oklahoma, on the latter date. The defendants had allegedly arranged to hide the narcotics in secret compartments in various horse trailers and pickup trucks for transport to Miami, 

Florida, for further distribution across the country. The plan 

was interrupted with the arrest of several of the defendants and 

seizure of the cocaine shortly after it was transferred from the 

aircraft to a pickup truck in twenty-four green duffel bags. 

Mr. Rivera was arrested approximately eighteen months later. 

The indictment detailed Mr. Rivera's recruiting activities in 

finding someone both to locate an appropriate airstrip and to 

arrange transport of the cocaine to Miami. It described the purchases of the Cessna aircraft and two pickup trucks used to transport the cocaine and recounted the travels of the various participants under assumed names in the days before July 1, 1983. All 

actions and facts alleged in the indictment were directly related 

to the July 1, 1983, transaction. 

The six counts in indictment II were identical to the first 

six counts in indictment I, but they related to actions allegedly 

occurring between May 1, 1982, and July 12, 1982. There was no 

CCE count. The indictment only charged defendant and Alan Ronald 

Kaye, although it named two unindicted co-conspirators who were 

indicted in indictment I. The smuggling operation described was 

similar to that in indictment I, allegedly resulting in the successful importation of approximately 400 pounds of cocaine into 

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Appellate Case: 85-1768 Document: 01019290425 Date Filed: 01/20/1988 Page: 3 
Talihina on July 12, 1982, which were then transported to Florida. 

See indictment, record, vol. 2, at 1-7. All of the alleged 

actions and facts in indictment II directly pertained to the 

July 12, 1982, operation. 

I. 

Mr. Rivera contends that the trial court erred in admitting 

evidence of two substantial drug offenses not charged in either 

indictment. The first transaction occurred in May of 1983 when 

the defendant contacted Cecil Ford, an indicted co-conspirator 

under indictment I, and instructed him to travel from Florida to 

the Denver Airport to deliver five kilos of cocaine. Mr. Ford was 

paid $5,000.00 for the job. The second transaction occurred 

approximately one week prior to the July 1983 importation charged 

in indictment I. The defendant instructed William Sebolt and 

Rogers Ariza, also indicted co-conspirators under indictment I, to 

travel from Oklahoma to Milwaukee, Wisconsin, in order to pick up 

cocaine from a parked aircraft. They did so, placing the cocaine 

in a hidden compartment in a truck provided by Mr. Rivera, and 

transported the cargo to Florida. Upon delivering the cocaine to 

the defendant, Messrs. Ariza and Sebolt received cash payments of 

$10,000.00 and $5,000.00, respectively. Each of the three coconspirators testified at length to these events, and the prosecutor cited them in both his opening statement and closing argument. 

See record, supp. vol. 2, at 126-27; supp. vol. 4, at 479-87; 

supp. vol. 5, at 686-96, 751-55; supp. vol. 7, at 1,222-24. 

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Defendant's counsel apparently learned of this line of evidence from the prosecution shortly before trial and at the 

beginning of the trial moved to exclude evidence of these 

uncharged offenses. See id., supp. vol. 2, at 97-106. The 

prosecutor freely admitted that "the reason that [these offenses 

were] not in the indictment is at the time the indictment was 

drafted we did not know that." Id. at 99 (emphasis added). The 

record clearly shows that this evidence was not presented to the 

grand jury that returned the indictment. 

The prosecution offered three grounds supporting admissibility of this evidence: (1) that it was direct support indicating 

Mr. Rivera was a supervisor or manager within the meaning of the 

CCE statute, id. at 98; (2) that it showed "agreements and plans 

and whatnot" in general support of the CCE charge, id. at 100; and 

(3) that it was circumstantial evidence showing "four or five 

things, one of which is absence of mistake, motive, intent, 

identity, I forget what all, there are four or five" and was thus 

admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) •

1 Id. at 103. 

1 Rule 404(b) provides: 

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 

admissible to prove the character of a person in order 

to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, 

however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof 

of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 

knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 

Even if admissible as a threshold matter under Rule 404(b), 

other crimes or wrongs evidence must be excluded if its 

prejudicial tendencies outweigh its probative value under Fed. R. 

(continued to next page) 

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Appellate Case: 85-1768 Document: 01019290425 Date Filed: 01/20/1988 Page: 5 
In response to the prosecution's assertion that such evidence 

is admissible "mainly under the continuing criminal enterprise," 

id. at 100, defendant's counsel argued that the CCE count of the 

indictment "specifically allege[d] that Mr. Rivera caused the 

importation of cocaine in the United States and caused the possession of cocaine with intent to distribute as alleged in Counts Two 

and Four of this indictment." Id. at 101 (emphasis added). As 

noted, counts two and four, indeed the entire indictment, discussed only facts regarding preparation for and execution of the 

July 1983 Oklahoma importation. 2 Defense counsel submitted that 

if these particular serious offenses, transporting 

cocaine up to Wisconsin, transporting cocaine to 

Colorado, if those are to be part of this indictment and 

a part of this case, I think the law is that they have 

to take that matter back to the grand jury, because it's 

a substantial variance from what they have alleged that 

they're going to prove to prove [sic] this count. 

Evid. 403. See United States v. Kendall, 766 F.2d 1426, 1436-37 

(10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 848 (1986). 

2 Even the prosecutor, who had argued to the judge that the 

Denver ~nd Milwaukee deliveries were closely connected to the 

Oklahoma importation, stated before the jury that the Denver trip 

"didn't have anything to do with the July importation of cocaine n 

Record, supp. vol. 4, at 550-51. 

This evidence was not, as the Government argues on appeal, so 

"inextricably intertwined" with the evidence used to prove the 

charged July importation that it was intrinsic to that crime and 

thus admissible independent of Rule 404(b). See United States v. 

McCrary, 699 F.2d 1308, 1311 (11th Cir. 1983) (evidence of dealing 

in marijuana and quaaludes on occasions other than those charged 

in indictment admissible independent of Rule 404(b) in trial for 

distributing methaqualone because "inextricably intertwined with 

the evidence used to prove the crime charged"). 

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Appellate Case: 85-1768 Document: 01019290425 Date Filed: 01/20/1988 Page: 6 
Id. at 102-03. Furthermore, with respect to the Rule 404{b) 

ground, defense counsel argued that none of the 404(b) elements 

was at issue in this case. See id. at 104. 

In ruling the evidence admissible, the trial court stated, 

. "In my opinion it's relevant and closely connected, and I think it 

fits under the conspiracy as an overt act, if nothing else, but 

certainly under Rule 404(b) ." Id. at 105. The court also 

overruled defendant's motion for a mistrial on these grounds after 

the prosecutor's opening statement. Id. at 137. Each of his 

ensuing objections were similarly overruled, but the court cited 

only Rule 404(b) grounds on each subsequent occasion. See record, 

supp. vol. 4, at 480-81; supp. vol. 5, at 688-90, 751. 

"Various circuit courts have admitted into evidence proof of 

other illegal controlled substance activities in a trial dealing 

with illegal controlled substance charges, as establishing various 

elements of the crime." United States v. Nolan, 551 F.2d 266, 271 

ClOth Cir.) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 904 

(1977). Nevertheless, "[tlhe use of other crimes evidence is not 

looked on favorably and its use must be narrowly circumscribed and 

limited." United States v. Lewis, 787 F.2d 1318, 1321 (9th Cir. 

1986). In this circuit, 

the Government bears the burden of showing how the proffered evidence is relevant to one or more issues in the 

case. • • • The Government must articulate precisely 

the evidentiary hypothesis by which a fact of consequence may be inferred from the evidence of other acts. 

In addition, the trial court must specifically identify 

the purpose for which such evidence is offered and a 

broad statement merely invoking or restating Rule 404(b) 

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Appellate Case: 85-1768 Document: 01019290425 Date Filed: 01/20/1988 Page: 7 
will not suffice. A specific articulation of the relevant purpose and specific inferences to be drawn from 

each proffer of evidence of other acts will enable the 

trial court to more accurately make an informed decision 

and weigh the probative value of such evidence against 

the risks of prejudice specified in Rule 403. This 

requirement is an attempt to ensure that a decision to 

admit or exclude be made only after issues and reasons 

are exposed and clearly stated. In addition, specific 

and clear reasoning and findings in the trial record 

will greatly aid an appellate court in its review of 

these evidentiary issues. 

United States v. Kendall, 766 F.2d 1426, 1436-37 (lOth Cir. 1985) 

(emphasis added) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 848 

(1986). 

Furthermore, in order for evidence to be admissible under 

Rule 404(b), "[t]he element of the prior crime for which there is 

a recognized exception to the general rule, such as intent, must 

be a material issue in the instant case; [and there] must be a 

substantial need for the probative value of the evidence provided 

for by the prior crimes." United States v. Rice, 550 F.2d 1364, 

1372 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 954 (1977); see also 

United States v. Brunson, 549 F.2d 348, 359 (5th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 434 U.S. 842 (1977). If none of the elements listed in 

Rule 404(b) is at issue in a given case, evidence of other acts 

could only go toward proving the character of a person in order to 

show that he acted in conformity therewith--a prohibited use of 

such evidence under Rule 404(b). See supra note 1. The danger 

that the jury would impermissibly use such evidence as character 

evidence increases as the likelihood that there is any issue 

regarding the Rule 404(b) elements decreases. The Kendall 

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Appellate Case: 85-1768 Document: 01019290425 Date Filed: 01/20/1988 Page: 8 
requirements help minimize that danger by forcing the Governn~nt 

and the court to precisely articulate the legitimate need for the 

evidence in a given case. 

The Government in this case failed to satisfy its burden of 

articulating precisely its 404(b) analysis. The trial court likewise failed to identify the specific purpose for which the evidence was admitted. Neither the prosecutor nor the court specifically identified which, if any, of the 404(b) elements were 

disputed in this case, and only if an element is disputed is other 

acts evidence permitted to aid the jury in resolving the issue. 

See United States v. !1erryman, 630 F.2d 780, 786 <lOth Cir. 1980) 

(prior acts evidence circumstantially establishing knowledge 

"answered a specific requirement" because knowledge was "a vital 

issue" in the case). Here, however, both the Government and the 

court made "broad statement(s] merely invoking or restating Rule 

404(b)" which, as Kendall states, "will not suffice." In short, 

they took the "laundry list" approach. 3 

3 A few quotations from the record illustrate the total lack of 

specificity in this case with respect to the Rule 404(b) argument. 

THE COURT: 404 (b), which one? vlhich one of those 

exceptions? 

l1R. BAKER: All of them. 

THE COURT: Name them. 

1·1R. BAKER: Your Honor, it would go to show proof 

of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 

knowledge, identity, and absence of mistake or accident. 

I mean, it's the same thing, it's dealing in cocaine. 

(continued to next page) 

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Appellate Case: 85-1768 Document: 01019290425 Date Filed: 01/20/1988 Page: 9 
If the Government need only parrot the list of elements in 

Rule 404(b), as it did in this case, without affirmatively 

demonstrating that one of those elements is actually in dispute 

THE COURT: I'll overrule your objection. Now, 

under 404(b) I find it more probative than prejudicial 

because of all of those reasons. 

Record, supp. vol. 4, at 481. 

MR. BAKER: Then I think that it's, under Rule 404(b), 

that it goes to show that it's part of a common scheme 

to import cocaine and to transport the cocaine, that it 

goes to show that it wasn't an absence of mistake on Mr. 

Rivera's part, it goes to show that all the things 

listed in 404(b) that the Court previously ruled on. 

THE COURT: Which are? 

MR. BAKER: That is should be admissible for all 

purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, and absence of 

mistake or accident. 

THE COURT: You ask him when it was. If it was 

about that time, I think it's close enough to show 

motive, opportunity, intent, absence of mistake, and all 

the other matters pointed out, and I will overrule your 

objection. 

MR. HAYES: Okay. 

THE COURT: Show I believe it's more probative than 

prejudicial. 

Id., supp. vol. 5, at 689-90. 

THE COURT: You again ask that there be an 

exception under 404(b)? 

MR. BAKER: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: Overruled. 

motive, intent, opportunity, 

matter of fact, contained in 

probative than prejudicial. 

!d. at 751. 

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I find that it's proof of 

all the other matters, as a 

404(b), and it's more 

Appellate Case: 85-1768 Document: 01019290425 Date Filed: 01/20/1988 Page: 10 
and without affirmatively demonstrating the nexus of the other 

acts evidence to the resolution of the disputed issue, the general 

bar of other acts evidence would be rendered illusory. Other acts 

evidence of similar crimes would always be admissible once the 

Government recited its "laundry list." The record in this case 

illustrates precisely why we impose the burdens outlined in 

Kendall when admitting other acts evidence under Rule 404(b). 

That rule is not to be used as an excuse or a smokescreen to get 

other acts evidence before the jury when the Government cannot 

show that it is necessary to resolve a material issue in dispute. 

Of even greater significance in this case than the failure to 

satisfy the Kendall requirements was the court's failure to limit 

the use of such evidence to those purposes listed in Rule 404(b). 

If evidence is admitted solely under the authority of Rule 404(b), 

the court must give a limiting instruction both at the time the 

evidence is admitted and in the general charge to minimize the 

danger that the jury might use the evidence as proof that the 

defendant acted in conformity with his past acts on the occasion 

for which he is being tried. See United States v. Brown, 770 F.2d 

912, 914 (lOth Cir. 1985) (jury instructed that other acts evidence "not to be considered as proof of the offense at trial, but 

for the limited purpose of determining motive, intent, knowledge, 

absence of mistake"), rev'd on other grounds, 107 S. Ct. 708 

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(1987); Merryman, 630 F.2d at 786 (quoting and stressing importance of limiting instruction with respect to Rule 404(b) evidence); United States v. Herbst, 565 F.2d 638, 642 ClOth Cir. 

1977) (quoting lengthy limiting instruction) • 

In this case, the court instructed the jury as follows: 

"Evidence concerning offenses and conduct by the defendant other 

than the offenses charged in the indictment has been admitted for 

the limited purposes of establishing intent, motive, knowledge, 

plan, absence of mistake, accident, or continuin£_££imingl_gnt~rprise. You will consider that evidence only for those purposes." 

Record, supp. vol. 7, at 1244-45 (emphasis added). The possibility thus created was not the usual danger that the jury would use 

the other acts evidence as character evidence but instead that the 

jury would use the evidence to satisfy one or more of the elements 

of the continuing criminal enterprise count. Rather than limiting 

the jury to viewing the evidence of prior acts only as fl~cumstantial evidence of defendant's intent, motive, etc., on the occasion 

for which he was tried, the court allowed the jury to use the evidence as direct evidence of the crime of continuing criminal 

enterprise. 4 Because that evidence was not properly admitted 

4 The prosecutor's closing argument 

that the jury used the evidence of the 

as substantive evidence supporting the 

enterprise count. 

increased the likelihood 

Denver and Milwaukee trips 

continuing criminal 

Continuing criminal enterprise? What about when 

they went to Denver, what about when they went to 

Milwaukee, what about July of '82? He's only charged in 

'83, in the July. There he is charged with a continuing 

criminal enterprise. Well, if that isn't a continuing 

(continued to next page) 

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under the authority of Rule 404(b), we must examine whether such 

substantive use of the other acts evidence was proper under the 

circumstances of this case. 

The trial court correctly instructed the jury that five 

essential elements comprise the crime of engaging in a continuing 

. . 1 t . 5 cr2m2na en erpr2se. 

criminal enterprise, he did it in '82, he tried to do it 

in April of '83, he takes a little load, or sees that 

it's taken up here to Denver. Because, you see, once 

this old stuff gets in here, he can't just set it in 

Miami. We've got to take it, distribute it. And, so, 

they take it to Denver. And, so, they take it to 

Milwaukee. And who is there? 

Record, supp. vol. 7, at 1222-23. 

5 The statute provides that 

a person is engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise 

if 

(1) he violates any prov2s2on of this subchapter or 

subchapter II of this chapter the punishment for 

which is a felony, and 

(2) such violation is a part of a continuing series 

of violations of this subchapter or subchapter II 

of this chapter --

(A) which are undertaken by such person in 

concert with five or more other persons with 

respect to whom such person occupies a 

position of organizer, a supervisory position, 

or any other position of management, and 

(B) from which such person obtains substantial 

income or resources. 

21 u.s.c. § 848 (b) (1982). 

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First: That the defendant committed the alleged 

offenses as charged in Counts Two ancr Four of the 

indictment in Case Number 83-96-CR, or either of these 

offenses; and 

Second: That the violation of either of these offenses 

committed by the defendant was part of a continuing 

series of violations by him of the federal narcotics 

laws; and 

Third: That the defendant undertook to commit such 

series of offenses in concert with five or more persons; 

and 

Fourth: That the defendant occupied a position of 

organizer or supervisor or other position of management 

with respect to such five or more persons in said undertaking; and 

Fifth: That the defendant obtained substantial income 

or resources from said continuing series of violations. 

Id. at 1240-41. The prosecutor's closing argument cites the 

Denver and Milwaukee trips as proof of element two, the 

continuing-series-of-violations element •. See supra note 4. 

Mr. Rivera argues that because the only facts alleged in the 

indictment as supporting the continuing criminal enterprise count 

related to the July importation in Counts Two and Four, evidence 

of the Denver and Milwaukee trips constitute a prejudicial variance from the indictment. Both at trial and on appeal, Mr. Rivera 

quotes language from United States v. Johnson, 575 F.2d 1347 (5th 

Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 907 (1979): "'If an indictment 

alleges particular facts as constituting an element of a charged 

crime, there is a variance if the trial judge admits evidence that 

make out this element in a different manner.'" Id. at 1356 (quoting United States v. Lambert, 501 F.2d 943, 947 (5th Cir. 1974) 

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Appellate Case: 85-1768 Document: 01019290425 Date Filed: 01/20/1988 Page: 14 
(en bane)). 

Mr. Rivera's assertion reveals that he misreads the indictment. In pertinent part, the indictment states: 

From on pr about January 1, 1983, to on or about 

July 1, 1983, in the Eastern District of Oklahoma, and 

elsewhere, LUIS ANTHONY RIVERA and MITCHELL SKIFF 

ENGELHART, defendants herein, knowingly and willfully 

violated Title 21, United States Code, Section 952, 960 

and 841, by doing and causing the importation of cocaine 

into the United States from Columbia, South America, and 

by doing and causing the possession of cocaine with 

intent to distribute and the distribution of cocaine, as 

alleged in Counts II and IV of this Indictment, which 

are incorporated herein by reference, which violations 

were a part of the continuing series of violations 

undertaken by defendants LUIS ANTHONY RIVERA and 

MITCHELL SKIFF ENGELHART in concert with at least five 

other persons with respect to whom defendants LUIS 

ANTHONY RIVERA and MITCHELL SKIFF ENGELHART, and each of 

them, occupied a position of organizer, a supervisory 

position, and other positions of management, and from 

which defendants LOUIS ANTHONY RIVERA and MITCHELL SKIFF 

ENGELHART and each of them, obtained and utilized substantial income and resources. 

Record, vol. 1, at 11-12. A careful reading of this language 

indicates that the facts alleged in Counts Two and Four are 

alleged in the CCE count as satisfying element one of the CCE 

count, the commission of a felony narcotic offense. They are not 

cited as supporting element two, the continuing-series-ofviolations element. 6 No particular facts are alleged in the 

6 In fact, if the indictment charged that the continuing-series 

element depended only on proof of the crimes charged in Counts Two 

and Four, as Mr. Rivera implies, the indictment would automatically fail. Several circuits have concluded that the continuingseries element requires proof of at least three narcotic violations. See United States v. Ricks, 776 F.2d 455, 463 n.l3 (4th 

Cir. 198sr-(listing cases), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 650 (1986). 

Although not squarely analyzing the issue, the supreme Court 

implicitly concurred in this conclusion in Garrett v. United 

States, 471 u.s. 773 (1985), by assuming that "three predicate 

(continued to next page) 

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Appellate Case: 85-1768 Document: 01019290425 Date Filed: 01/20/1988 Page: 15 
indictment as supporting element two. Thus, Johnson is 

inapplicable because the prerequisite for application of the 

rule--allegation of particular facts as constituting an element of 

the charged offense--is not satisfied. 

Our inquiry does not end here, however. The real problem 

experienced by Mr. Rivera, although not carefully articulated as 

such, was his complete lack of notice that these uncharged 

offenses would be used to prove the continuing-series-ofviolations element of the CCE charge. Although the indictment 

does allege facts supporting the first element of the CCE charge, 

it merely tracks the statutory language without alleging any supporting facts with respect to elements two through five. At the 

heart of this case, then, .is whether evidence of uncharged 

offenses may be admitted as substantive evidence of the 

continuing-series-of-violations element of a CCE charge when the 

indictment fails to give notice of that proof and when the defendant does not have actual notice that the prosecution planned to 

use such proof. 

After reviewing the body of cases dealing with a CCE charge, 

we realized why this issue has never been squarely addressed 

before. Typically, the continuing-series element is proven by the 

multiple offenses charged in the same indictment as well as by 

offenses •.. must be shown to make out a CCE violation." Id. at 

775. 

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. t. . t. 7 pr1or narco 1c conv1c 1ons. This is a natural result of the 

circumstances commonly surrounding the prosecutor's decision to 

bring a CCE charge. As an indictment becomes lengthier and 

lengthier with drug offenses, the likelihood of adding a CCE 

charge increases, based on the very charges contained in the same 

indictment. The proof at trial supporting the CCE charge encompasses much of the same proof supporting the other substantive 

drug offenses in the indictment. See, ~, United State~~ 

Jones, 621 F. Supp. 383, 385 (E.D. Ark. 1985) (indictment charged 

CCE nby committing the offenses set forth in the Indictment and 

the Overt Acts in Count Twon), aff'd, 801 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 

1986) • Rarely would an indictment contain solely a CCE charge or 

a CCE charge with only one or two other substantive offenses. 

Indeed, we were not able to find such a case in the reported 

appellate decisions. 

There have been general challenges on vagueness grounds to 

the sufficiency of CCE indictments that simply paraphrased the 

statutory terminology, but all such challenges have failed. See 

7 We do not, however, mean to imply that only proof of convictions satisfies the continuing series element. The precise statutory language is ncontinuing series of violations.n 21 u.s.c. 

§ 848 (b) (2) (emphasis added). If the prosecution proves an uncharged offense beyond a reasonable doubt, such offense may constitute one of the three requisite offenses sustaining a CCE 

charge. See United States v. Markowski, 772 F.2d 358, 361 (7th 

Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1202 (1986); United States v. 

Young, 745 F.2d 733, 747 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 u.s. 

1084 (1985); United States v. Lurz, 666 F.2d 69, 78 (4th Cir. 

1981), cert. denied, 455 u.s. 1005, 457 U.S. 1136, 459 U.S. 843 

<1982) • 

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United States v. Amend, 791 F.2d 1120, 1125 (4th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 107 s. Ct. 399 (1986); United States v. Lurz, 666 F.2d 69, 

78 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied" 455 u.s. 1005, 457 U.S. 1136, 

459 u.s. 843 (1982); Johnson, 575 F.2d at 1356; United States v. 

Sperling, 506 F.2d 1323, 1344 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 

U.S. 962, 421 u.s. 949 (1975). In each of those cases, however, 

the offenses charged in the same indictment or prior drug convictions appear to be the proof used to satisfy the continuing-series 

element. 

In United States v. Young, 745 F.2d 733 (2d Cir. 1984), .£~rt. 

denied, 470 u.s. 1084 (1985), the defendant evidently argued that 

the indictment was insufficient on its face because evidence of 

other crimes not charged in the indictment was used to establish 

the continuing-series element of a CCE charge. See id. at 752-53. 

However, the Second Circuit did not need to reach the issue, for 

the defendant "con_9eded (but only for purposes of his appeal 

•• ) that in order to support a § 848 charge, the government 

is not required to plead in any form, much less obtain convictions 

on, any of the eligible predicate offenses, but may instead simply 

prove at trial the continuing series of offenses." Id. at 747 

(emphasis added). A full reading of the case suggests that the 

facts underlying the uncharged offenses used to establish the 

continuing-series element were alleged as overt acts in the 

indictment so that the defendant had notice of this evidence. 

While this fact is not unequivocally clear, the defendant did not 

claim surprise. Rather, his argument was technically drawn, 

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focusing narrowly on the failure of the CCE count itself to list 

the offenses proven. 

The Ninth Circuit has summarily held that "there is no legal 

requirement that the violations which make up the continuing 

series be specifically listed in the indictment." United States 

v. Sterling, 742 F.2d 521, 526 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 

u.s. 1099 (1985). The court has not, however, addressed whether 

the defendant is entitled to any notice of such evidence, such as 

through a bill of particulars, if it is not alleged in the other 

counts of the indictment. 

The most pertinent and instructive circuit decision with 

respect to the present inquiry is United States v. Becton, 751 

F.2d 250 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1018 <1985), in 

which the defendant mounted a general challenge to the indictment 

on appeal because of its failure to specify the underlying 

felonies constituting the continuing-series element. Although the 

court ruled against the defendant, it did not do so on the ground 

specified in Amend, Lurz, Johnson, and Sperling--that an indictment tracking the statutory language is sufficient. Instead, the 

court recognized that 

[a]s a general rule, due process requires that the 

indictment give a defendant notice of each element of 

the charge against him so that he can prepare an adequate defense. However, if the defendant has actual 

notice of the charges, due process may be satisfied 

despite an inadequate indictment. In this case, other 

counts of the indictment gave Becton notice of the 

underlying felonies. • . • Significantly, Becton fails 

to allege that any of the felonious activities proved at 

trial took him by surprise. Furthermore, he did not 

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raise this objection to the indictment before or during 

trial, and on appeal he raised it for the first time in 

his reply brief. These facts lead us to conclude that 

the government's failure to specify underlying felonies 

in [the CCE count] of the indictment did not prejudice 

Becton in any way. 

We do nat, by this opinion, necessarily approve of 

the government's handling of the indictment in this 

case. We think it would be far preferable to list the 

felonies comprising the criminal enterprise in the CCE 

count of an indictment, thereby eliminating the potential problems suggested by Becton. However, we conclude 

on the facts in this case, that Becton received adequate 

notice of the charges against him and had an opportunity 

to present an adequate defense. 

Id. at 256-57 (citations omitted). Thus, Becton was a more factually typical case in which the three offenses satisfying the 

continuing-series element were alleged in the other substantive 

counts of the indictment. The language implies that had the three 

offenses proved at trial been uncharged offenses of which the 

defendant had no prior notice, the outcome may have been different. The defendant's actual notice of the charges and lack of 

surprise were the persuasive factors for the court. Such is the 

extent of the prior case law with which we approach the issue 

before us. 

Two concerns bring us to the conclusion that the decision in 

this case must be reversed. The first is grounded in the sixth 

amendment, which guarantees that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, 

the accused shall enjoy the right •.• to be informed of the 

nature and cause of the accusation .. n U.S. Const. amend. VI. 

(emphasis added). Further support is found in the due process 

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notion that fundamental fairness requires basic notice of the 

events for which a defendant must answer in court. See ~ecton, 

751 F.2d at 256. These guarantees underlie the Fed. R. Crim. P. 

7(c) (1) provision that an indictment must contain a "plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential_tB£ts 

constituting the offense charged." (Emphasis added). Mere technical deficiencies in an indictment of no prejudice to the defendant do not result in the abridgement of sixth amendment and due 

process rights. Cf. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a) ("Any error, defect, 

irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights 

shall be disregarded.") Prejudice does arise, however, if either 

an indictment fails to sufficiently apprise a defendant "of what 

he must be prepared to meet" or if the defendant would not be 

"fully protected from again being put in jeopardy for the same 

offense." Russell v. United §tates, 369 u.s. 749, 763-64 (1962) •8 

8 Many of the cases discussing these principles involve an 

issue of variance from the indictment; that is, the indictment 

does recite supporting facts, but the crime charged is proven at 

trial with facts different from those alleged. See United States 

v. Somers, 496 F.2d 723, 743-44 (3d Cir.) (reviewing history of 

law regarding variances from the indictment and amendments to the 

indictment), cert. denied, 419 u.s. 832 (1974). The present case 

deals not with a variance of proof at trial from that alleged in 

the indictment but rather a failure to allege in the indictment 

any of the facts proved at trial. We are justified in borrowing 

from these variance cases, however, for the underlying concern for 

adequate notice of the nature of the proof is the same in both 

instances. Indeed, the posture of the Russell case is more closely analogous to the present facts than to the multitude of variance cases that cite it. RY§sell dealt with the failure of an· 

indictment to aver the subject under inquiry of the House 

Committee on On-American Activities when the crime charged was 

failure to respond to a question "pertinent to the question then 

under inquiry." Ru~sell, 369 U.S. at 752. See also infra note 10 

(arguing that the case before us could be interpreted as a 

variance case). 

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While we are not convinced on the indictment and record before us 

that Mr. Rivera would be able to plead double jeopardy if subsequently charged with offenses relating to the Denver and Milwaukee 

incidents, we need not resolve that issue. Ru~sell makes clear 

that the sufficient-notice prong is separate from the doublejeopardy prong, see id. at 764, and failure under either prong 

requires reversal. See United States v. Lambert, 501 F.2d 943, 

948 n.7 (5th Cir. 1974). The sufficient-notice prong was not 

satisfied in this case. 

The continuing-series-of-violations element charged in the 

indictment merely tracked the statutory language. 

"It is an elementary principle of criminal pleading, that where the definition of an offence, whether it 

be at common law or by statute, 'includes generic terms, 

it is not sufficient that the indictment shall charge 

the offence in the same generic terms as in the definition; but it must state the species,--it must descend to 

particulars.' United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 

558. • • • "Undoubtedly the language of the statute may 

be used in the general description of an offence, but it 

must be accompanied with such a statement of the fa~t§ 

and circumstances as will inform the accused of the 

specific offence, corning under the general description, 

with which he is charged." United States v. Hess, 124 

u.s. 483, 487. 

Russell, 369 U.S. at 765 (emphasis added). Narcotics "violations," three of which must be proven to satisfy the continuingseries element, see supra note 6, is just such a generic term that 

must be supported by a statement of the surrounding circumstances. 

See generally United States v. Salazar, 720 F.2d 1482, 1486 (lOth 

Cir. 1983) (indictment must contain elements of offense and sufficiently apprise defendant of what he must be prepared to meet), 

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cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1110 (1985); United States v. Boston, 718 

F.2d 1511, 1515 (10th Cir. 1983) (indictment must inform accused 

of nature of crime charged and its basis so that he may prepare 

his defense), cert. denied, 466 u.s. 974 (1984); United States v. 

Elliott, 689 F.2d ~78, 180 (lOth Cir. 1982) (indictment should lay 

out elements of charge and factual circumstances underlying them); 

United States v. Morris, 623 F.2d 145, 149 (10th Cir.) 

(prejudicial variance occurs when accused could not have 

anticipated from the indictment what evidence would be presented 

at trial), cert. denied, 449 u.s. 1065 (1980); United States~ 

Begnaud, 783 F.2d 144, 148 (8th Cir. 1986) (primary consideration 

in determining prejudice is whether indictment fully and fairly 

apprises defendant of charges he or she must meet; held--defendant 

sufficiently apprised of proof that prosecution ultimately 

presented); United States ex rel Ballard v. Bengston, 702 F.2d 

656, 660 (7th Cir. 1983) (indictment that does not inform 

defendant with reasonable certainty of nature of charge against 

him is defective even though it tracks language of pertinent 

statute); United States v. Horton, 676 F.2d 1165, 1169 (7th Cir. 

1982) (mere tracking of statutory language is insufficient when 

additional information is necessary to provide accused with clear 

understanding of specific charges against him), cert~-9~ni~g, 459 

u.s. 1201 (1983); United States v. Conlon, 628 F.2d 150, 155 (D.C. 

Cir. 1980) (indictment may track language of statute itself if 

statute directly and unambiguously sets forth all elements of 

offense, but more general rule is that statutory language must be 

supplemented with enough detail to alert accused of particular 

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offense with which he is charged). The CCE statute has been the 

subject of attack on "void-for-vagueness" grounds in several circuits. See, ~' Qn~ted States v. Dickey, 736 F.2d 571, 588 n.7 

(lOth Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 u.s. 1188 (1985); Johnsqn, 575 

F.2d at 1357; ~erling, 506 F.2d at 1343. Although the statute 

has withstood all such attacks, these repeated challenges nevertheless indicate enough vagueness in the statute that an 

indictment merely repeating its language without alleging any supporting proof is rendered questionable. 

When the indictment charging a continuing criminal enterprise 

fails to sufficiently specify the breadth of the criminal transactions the defendant must meet, the defendant suffers several 

harms. He cannot adequately prepare his defense, and the prosecution gains an unfair advantage in being "free to roam at large--to 

shift its theory of criminality so as to take advantage of each 

passing vicissitude of the trial and appeal." Russe~l, 369 U.S. 

at 768. If the trial court prohibits evidence of a specific 

offense, the prosecutor can simply admit evidence of a different 

offense of which defendant had no prior notice. The prosecutor 

would not be required to decide ahead of time which uncharged 

offenses, if any, he or she planned to prove at trial. 

Moreover, another object of an indictment is 

to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may 

decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a 

conviction, if one should be had. For this, facts are 

to be stated, not conclusions of law alone. A crime is 

made up of acts and intent; and these must be set forth 

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in the indictment, with reasonable particularity of 

time, place and circumstances. 

United States v. Cruikshank, 92 u.s. 542, 558 (1876). See 

Russell, 369 u.s. at 768 n.l5 <"principle enunciated in Cruikshank 

retains undiminished vitality">. The present indictment, in light 

of the proof offered, thereby vitiated yet another purpose for the 

requirement of some specificity in an indictment. 

Finally, such an indictment "enables [the defendant's] conviction to rest on one point and the affirmance of the conviction 

to rest on another." Id. at 766. In finding that the continuingseries element is satisfied, the jury may rely on three particular 

offenses. If the appellate court rules that one of those offenses 

could not properly be considered, it is free to search the record 

for another offense to take its place. If the offense is an 

uncharged one, the jury may never have reached a conclusion 

whether or not this replacement offense was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. These problems are compounded when, as in this 

case, the jury returns a general verdict and is not required to 

answer interrogatories regarding which three offenses satisfied 

the continuing-series element. 

The second concern prompting our decision is rooted in the 

fifth amendment's guarantee that ·"[nlo person shall be held to 

answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 

presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury .••• " U.S. Const. 

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amend. V. The crime of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise carries a possible life sentence without parole and is certainly an "infamous crime" to which the right to indictment by 

grand jury attaches. See Duke v. United States, 301 u.s. 492 

(1937). 

The indictment serves "as a link between the grand jury's 

considerations and the prosecutor's case at trial." United_States 

v. Piccolo, 696 F.2d 1162, 1166-67 (6th Cir.), vacated QD_Qther 

grounds, 705 F.2d 800 (1983). It serves as a check on the prosecuter, designed to prevent him or her "from modifying the theory 

and evidence upon which the indictment is based." United States 

v. Silverman, 430 F.2d 106, 110 (2d Cir. 1970) (emphasis added), 

cert. denied, 402 u.s. 953 (1971). 

The critical importance we attach to this fifth amendment 

right is reflected in the rule that an amendment to an indictment 

by the court or through jury instructions is ~ se fatal. See 

9 Russell, 369 U.S. at 770; Ex Parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1 (1887). In 

9 An amendment to an indictment must be distinguished from a 

variance. 

An amendment of the indictment occurs when the 

charging terms of the indictment are altered, either 

literally or in effect, • • • [while a] varj.p.nce occurs 

when the charging terms of the indictment are left unaltered, but the evidence offered at trial proves facts 

materially different from those alleged in the indictment. While variances are subject to the harmless error 

rule and require a showing of prejudice to the defendant, constructive amendments are generally considered 

prejudicial ~ se. 

(continued to next page) 

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United States v. Weiss, 752 F.2d 777 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 

s. Ct. 308 (1985), the defendant claimed that the government's 

theory and proof at trial "radically departed" from the indictment 

and thus constituted a constructive amendment to the indictment. 

In dismissing his ?laim, the court found it critical that the 

proof at trial "was virtually identical to the proof that was 

before the grand jury." Id. at 788. While we do not decide that 

the present facts entail an amendment--the defendant was charged 

with CCE by the grand jury and convicted of that same crime--the 

record reveals that evidence pertaining to the Denver and 

Milwaukee incidents was never submitted to the grand jury. See 

record, supp. vol. 4, at 529, 531; supp. vol. 5, at 722-23, 734-

35, 768. Apparently, the indicted co-conspirators who testified 

to this evidence during Mr. Rivera's trial had not revealed these 

incidents at the time of their grand jury testimony. As noted, 

the prosecutor admitted that he was unaware of these incidents 

when the grand jury returned the indictment against Mr. Rivera. 

Thus, the fear articulated by the Russell court, and echoed in 

this circuit, may have been realized in this case: "a defendant 

could then be convicted on the basis of facts not found by, and 

~rhaps not even presented to, the grand jury which indicted him." 

Russell, 369 U.S. at 770 (emphasis added); see also United $tat~E 

v. Neal, 692 F.2d 1296, 1302 n.5 (lOth Cir. 1982) (requirements on 

content of indictments enforced so as to avoid conviction on facts 

not found by, or perhaps not even presented to, grand jury that 

United States v. Weiss, 752 F.2d 777, 787 (2d Cir.) (citations 

omitted), cert. denied, 106 s. Ct. 308 (1985). 

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indicted defendant); United States v. Radetsky, 535 F.2d 556, 562 

<lOth Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 820 <1976); United 

States v. Keith, 605 F.2d 462, 464 (9th Cir. 1979) (same). 

At this point, we need to clarify the precise contours of our 

holding. We do not here hold that the prosecutor may never use 

uncharged offenses in proving the continuing-series element of a 

CCE charge. Neither do we hold that an indictment must always 

allege in the CCE count the three offenses that comprise the 

continuing-series element, although, like the Eighth Circuit, 

"[wJe think it would be far preferable to list the felonies comprising the criminal enterprise in the CCE count of an indictment, 

thereby eliminating [any] potential problems • . " Becton, 751 

F.2d at 257. 

If the prosecutor uses only the other crimes charged in the 

indictment as supporting the continuing-series element, as apparently is conventional, the defendant has adequate notice of the 

prosecutor's proof. There is no surprise at trial, even if the 

CCE charge merely alleges, as in this case, a "continuing series 

of violations." The defendant has actual notice of the underlying 

proof because of its recitation in parts of the indictment covering the predicate offenses. Thus, no sixth amendment or due 

process problems arise. Because the evidence recited in other 

parts of the indictment was presented to the grand jury, no fifth 

amendment problem is presented. An indictment that does not 

elaborate in the CCE count itself the three offenses supporting 

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the continuing-series element is therefore not fatally deficient 

~ se if the proof presented at trial corresponds to the proof 

alleged in the other counts of the indictment. 10 There simply is 

no prejudice. 

What we do hold is that if the prosecutor plans to use 

offenses not separately charged in the same indictment, he or she 

must present those particular facts to the grand jury, thus satisfying fifth amendment concerns, and must aver those facts in the 

indictment so as to satisfy sixth amendment and due process notice 

. t 11 requ1remen s. In the case of uncharged offenses, the words of 

the CCE statute alone are not sufficient to put the defendant on 

notice of the criminal transactions he must be prepared to meet. 

10 For this reason, we cannot reasonably expect a motion under 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b) (2) alleging a defect in the indictment to 

have been entered prior to trial. A defense attorney in a case 

like the present has no reason to suspect that the prosecutor will 

vary from the typical paradigm of proving the continuing-series 

element with the evidence supporting the other counts in the 

indictment and recited in those counts. There is no grievance 

before trial--or indeed at trial as long as the prosecution limits 

itself to evidence in the indictment and prior convictions. The 

problem here was not a defective indictment in any event but 

rather the inappropriate admission of evidence in_light of the 

indictment. Mr. Rivera would have no basis to complain about the 

present indictment and a conviction based upon it if surprise and 

prejudicial evidence of the Milwaukee and Colorado trips had not 

been used to support the CCE charge. If the prosecutor had relied 

only on the evidence recited in the other counts in the indictment 

to.support the continuing-series element, as is typical, we would 

have no reason to question the indictment. 

11 We view this requirement akin to inclusion of the overt acts 

relied upon by a grand jury to support a charge of conspiracy. 

See United States v. Watson, 594 F.2d 1330, 1341 (lOth Cir.), 

cert. denied, 444 u.s. 840 (1979). 

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If the continuing-series element is not further defined in the 

indictment beyond the statutory language, the defendant may presume that the proof of the continuing-series element will be that 

proof alleged in the other counts of the indictment. 12 The 

defendant in this .case apparently presumed such. If, however, the 

Government then attempts to admit evidence of uncharged felony 

violations of which defendant had no notice and which was not submitted to the grand jury as the supporting evidence for the 

continuing-series element, the trial court should disallow the 

evidence. The defendant is constitutionally entitled to at least 

basic notice of what proof supports the elements charged. 

We emphasize our holding is limited only to the government's 

attempt to use evidence of a complete criminal transaction. We do 

not proscribe appropriate Rule 404(b) evidence which may be 

incriminating but is not sufficient itself to support a charge of 

a substantive offense. Yet, a defendant simply cannot be left to 

deal with unexpected evidence of criminal conduct not considered 

by the grand jury to support a charge of a continuing criminal 

enterprise. Evidence of completed criminal transactions upon 

12 Because the defendant naturally assumes that the continuingseries element will be proved by the other offenses charged, one 

could plausibly argue that there is, in effect, an implicit 

variance when evidence of uncharged offenses is used instead. 

Although a showing of prejudice is required for a variance to 

constitute reversible error, see supra note 9, a variance is fatal 

if the "defendant could not have anticipated from the indictment 

what the evidence would be at trial • • " United States v. 

Freeman, 514 F.2d 1184, 1189 ClOth Cir. 1975). 

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which the government relies for proof of the substantive CCE 

charge must be either set out with particularity in the indictment 

or otherwise disclosed to the defendant sufficiently in advance of 

trial to allow him the opportunity to prepare a meaningful defense 

before it is admissible. The burden for these disclosures falls 

upon the government. 

II. 

Mr. Rivera also appeals the trial court•s failure to grant a 

continuance for the trial when appointed counsel was supplemented 

by retained counsel seven days before trial. In addition, he 

alleges that ineffective assistance of appointed counsel requires 

reversal. As these issues are intertwined in this case, we deal 

with them together. 

Mr. Rivera was arrested on January 18, 1985, and arraigned on 

January 24, 1985. At his arraignment, the trial court found him 

indigent and appointed Gregory Meier as counsel. The court 

allowed Mr. Meier five days in which to file motions and docketed 

the case for trial on March 18, 1985. On January 25, 1985, Mr. 

Meier filed a routine discovery motion requesting "Rule 16" and 

"Brady/Giglio" information. At trial, the court noted the lack of 

other pretrial motions. See record, supp. vol. 5, at 833, 843. 

The court granted the discovery motion in part and denied it in 

part and required the prosecution to supply the ordered material 

by February 15, 1985. Mr. Rivera alleges that the prosecution did 

not provide discovery until February 21, 1985. On February 27, 

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Mr. Meier moved to withdraw as counsel on grounds of "irreconcilable conflict." 13 Without inquiry or a hearing, the court denied 

the motion on February 28. 

Because of the irreconcilable conflict, Mr. Rivera's parents 

thereafter retained private counsel, D. D. Hayes, who filed an 

entry of appearance on March 11, seven days before the scheduled 

trial date. In light of the multiple counts, two indictments, 

numerous witnesses in several states, the potential life sentence 

(actually imposed in this case, as well as an additional 140 

years> involved, documentary evidence located in Florida that 

needed to be gathered and forwarded to Oklahoma by Mr. Rivera's 

parents, transcripts of prior trials that needed to be read, and 

thousands of business records already obtained from Florida that 

needed to be reviewed, Mr. Hayes moved for a continuance on March 

13, 1985. Mr. Rivera waived his rights under the Speedy Trial Act 

and joined in the motion. The trial court denied the motion on 

March 14. The defense received the formal order denying this 

motion on March 18, the morning the trial began as originally 

scheduled. 

Mr. Hayes orally renewed his motion for continuance on the 

morning of trial. See id. at supp. vol. 2, at 3. Mr. Hayes 

13 The conflict apparently developed when Mr. Meier advised a 

certain course of action during plea negotiations with which 

defendant disagreed. The consequent communication problems 

evidently hampered Mr. Meier's ability to prepare Mr. Rivera's 

defense. See record, supp. vol. 2, at 8. 

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represented that he was not aware until after being retained 

of the magnitude of paper work and of the necessity of 

obtaining evidence from Miami, Florida. I don't think 

that those things were really called to my attention 

until after I was employed. I realized it was an important case, and I realized there would be a lot of work, 

but I didn't realize quite the scope of the Government's 

evidence until I had been employed and seen the discovery. 

Id. at 5. The prosecutor countered that he understood that Mr. 

Hayes had 

put in ten and twelve hours a day, and maybe more, each 

and every day on this case, that he has abandoned his 

other law practice and devoted the last week entirely to 

this matter •••• and if the truth be known, he knows 

more about the Government's evidence than the prosecutor 

does that has had it for a long time. 

Id. at 5-6. The court overruled the motion, stating: 

[Tlhere is nothing to indicate other than that the 

defendant has had a lawyer all of this time, the other 

two months, appointed by the Court at his request. And 

comes on at this relatively late hour, although it isn't 

all that late, relatively ·later hour and hires his own 

lawyer, and then because of some action of his, asks the 

Court to strike the case from the trial docket. And I 

don't believe that is well taken. I will overrule the 

motion. 

Id. at 9. Nevertheless, the court did not allow Mr. Meier to 

withdraw from the case, ordering instead that he remain so as to 

assist Mr. Hayes. 

Mr. Rivera argues that Mr. Meier's failure to investigate the 

issues, to obtain further pretrial discovery, and to file appropriate pretrial motions constituted ineffective assistance of 

counsel. He alleges that Mr. Meier did little more than interview 

him in preparation of his defense prior to the retention of Mr. 

Hayes. He further argues that his harm was compounded when the 

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trial court failed to grant Mr. Hayes 1 motion for a continuance 

"to enable him to do what appointed counsel failed to do." 

Supplementary Brief of Appellant at 10. 

"[A] myopic insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a 

justifiable request for delay can render the right to defend with 

counsel an empty formality." Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 u.s. 575, 589 

(1964) • 

[A] scheduled trial date should never become such an 

overarching end that it results in the erosion of the 

defendant 1 s right to a fair trial. If forcing a defendant to an early trial date substantially impairs his 

ability to effectively present evidence to rebut the 

prosecution 1 s case or to establish defenses, then pursuit of the goal of expeditiousness is far more detrimental to our common purposes in the criminal justice 

system than the delay of a few days or weeks that may be 

sought. 

United States v. Uptain, 531 F.2d 1281, 1291 (5th Cir. 1976). A 

trial court should consider several relevant factors when assessing a continuance motion based on claims of inadequate preparation 

time: 

the quantum of time available for preparation, the likelihood of prejudice from denial, the accused 1 s role in 

shortening the effective preparation time, the degree of 

complexity of the case, and the availability of discovery from the prosecution • . • • any pre-appointment or 

pre-retention experience of the attorney with the 

accused or the alleged crime, and any representation of 

the defendant by other attorneys that accrues to his 

benefit. 

Id. at 1286-87 (footnotes omitted); see also 1Inited~.tate.§~ 

Golub, 638 F.2d 185, 189 (lOth Cir. 1980). 

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The two relevant Supreme Court cases in this area are Qngar 

v. Sarafite, quoted above, and Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 

(1983). The facts in Ungar dealt with adequate preparation time 

for a contempt hearing based on the defendant's outburst while 

testifying as a wi.tness in a case. The Court held that " [ tl he 

five days' notice given petitioner was not a constitutionally 

inadequate time to hire counsel and prepare a defense to a case in 

which the evidence was fresh, the witnesses and the evidence readily available, the issues limited and clear-cut and the charge 

revolving about one statement made by Ungar during a recently completed trial." Ungar, 376 U.S. 590. 

Unlike the limited evidence and issues in Ungar, the case at 

bar, in the words of the prosecutor, involved "37 witnesses, over 

a hundred documents of evidence [and] a complicated factual situation," record, supp. vol. 2, at 108, as well as "boxes after 

boxes" of discovery. Id., supp. vol. 3, at 292. Mr. Hayes' 

seven-day preparation time was clearly inadequate to afford Mr. 

Rivera a proper defense consistent with due process. Of course, 

Mr. Meier had nearly two months in which to prepare a defense. 

The fact of the matter is, however, that little was apparently 

done during that two-month period, and we refuse to compromise Mr. 

Rivera's right to have adequate defense preparation because of the 

possible shortcomings of appointed counsel. 

In Slappy, the Deputy Public Defender assigned to defend the 

defendant against various crimes, including rape, robbery, and 

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burglary, supervised an extensive investigation before being hospitalized for emergency surgery. Six days before trial, a senior 

trial attorney in the Public Defender's Office was assigned the 

case. Midway through the trial, the defendant personally moved 

for a continuance until the attorney originally assigned the case 

could return, claiming that the newly assigned attorney had insufficient time to prepare his defense. The trial attorney, however, 

attested that he was fully prepared, stating: "My own feeling is 

that a further continuance would not benefit me in presenting the 

case." 461 u.s. at 6. The Supreme Court upheld the trial court's 

denial of a continuance. In this case, unlike in Sl§QQY, Mr. 

Hayes himself pled unreadiness. Moreover, he did not have the 

benefit of an extensive investigation undertaken by his predecessor. 

The fear that many defendants would retain counsel shortly 

before trial and thereby gain a continuance is, we believe, 

unfounded. The late intercession of Mr. Hayes in this case was 

well justified. Not until discovery began and plea negotiations 

were initiated did the irreconcilable conflict between Mr. Rivera 

and Mr. Meier develop. By that time, they were already dangerously close to trial. "[T]he timing of the motion gave [no] reason to believe that it might have been imposed for purposes of 

delay." Uptain, 531 F.2d at 1290. Furthermore, the court's own 

denial of Mr. Meier's motion to withdraw prompted the necessity of 

retaining other counsel late in the day. We believe it will be 

easy enough to distinguish those cases in which late retention of 

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Appellate Case: 85-1768 Document: 01019290425 Date Filed: 01/20/1988 Page: 36 
counsel is not made in good faith but rather only for purposes of 

delay. Finally, we doubt most defendants would risk delayed preparation of their defense in the hope of being granted an uncertain 

continuance. The risks are too great. 

We do not here hold that the failure to grant the continuance, in isolation, necessarily constituted an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Jones_, 730 F. 2d 593, 596 <lOth Ci r. 

1984) (applying abuse of discretion standard in examining denial 

of motion for continuance); United States v. Wilk.e_, 629 F.2d 669, 

673 <lOth Cir. 1980) (same); United States v._Erb, 596 F.2d 412, 

421 (lOth Cir.> (same), cert. c1enied, 444 u.s. 848 <1979). 

Neither do we hold that Mr. Meier's questionable preparation 

before retention of Mr. Hayes Qy itself constituted ineffective 

a~ssistance of counsel under the strict dictates of §.t.r.i£~12-DfL..Y...!.. 

washington, 466 u.s. 668 <1984), echoed in Kimm§J!!l§.DJ-!.--~9II).?QD, 

106 S. Ct. 2574, 2583 (1986) •

14 Rather, our holding is compelled 

by the interaction of these elements with each other and with the 

lack of notice of use of the uncharged offenses examined in section I. As discussed, one of the harms caused by the lack of 

notice is the inability to prepare a defense to meet such evidence. That harm was exacerbated in this case by the general 

14 We do note, however, that K.imm~1man affirms the principle 

that to be effective, "'counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.'" Kimmelman, 106 S. Ct. at 2588 

(quoting Strickland, 466 u.s. at 691). Failure to adequately 

investigate for other than strategic or tactical reasons is 

suspect. Id. 

-37-

Appellate Case: 85-1768 Document: 01019290425 Date Filed: 01/20/1988 Page: 37 
impediments to preparing a defense caused by Mr. Meier's lack of 

early preparation and Mr. Hayes' late entry. Mr. Hayes was still 

frantically preparing Mr. Rivera's defense during the trial and 

could not devote "free time" to investigation of the surprise 

Denver and Milwau~ee evidence. 15 

15 Near the close of the prosecution's case in chief, Mr. Hayes 

requested a recess over the weekend before putting on their case. 

He told the court: 

[W]e have been rece1v1ng records periodically from Miami 

which we feel contain exculpatory information. Some of 

them I received before the trial started and the rest of 

them I received after the trial started, and I'm 

supposed to get another box in today. These records -- this is the box, and I don't know how many documents it 

contains, but I would estimate it's about a thousand. 

Now, we're trying to go through these at night. And to 

show you that we're not just on a fishing expedition 

hoping we'll find something, we have found some things 

that we believe are exculpatory. For example, there was 

testimony by one of the people at Aerospatiale that it 

was peculiar that the defendant paid for some stuff by 

cash, and we've got a document showing that $7300 of the 

money was paid by cashier's check and not in cash. 

Also, we found that, through going through all of 

these boxes, we found a receipt where Mr. Rivera stayed 

on April 11th in Dallas at a motel, and it is a different motel than -- the phone number of this motel is different than any of the numbers that were called in 

Dallas on the lOth. So they didn't reach him at the 

motel where he was staying. 

And then also there is evidence, there has been 

evidence that he left in the middle of the night from 

Dallas and assumed the name Lamar Huggins, and we found 

a receipt where he, after July 1, was in Miami in a 

motel registered under his real name. 

We think that if we had time to go through all 

these documents that we could find additional exculpatory evidence, but we just can't physically do it by 

starting here at nine o'clock in the morning and going 

until about five and so forth. 

(continued to next page) 

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Appellate Case: 85-1768 Document: 01019290425 Date Filed: 01/20/1988 Page: 38 
In short, the record convinces us that the hampered representation in this case due to the unique interaction of these three 

elements permeated the trial and thereby undermined the fundamental fairness guaranteed Mr. Rivera by the due process clause of 

the fifth amendment. We therefore hold that justice requires 

retrial not only on the CCE count, for the reasons discussed in 

part I, but also on the other counts charged in these indictments. 

III. 

Various other points have been raised on appeal, but we 

address only those that, if well-taken, could result in dismissal 

rather than a new trial. 

A. 

Mr. Rivera claims that, with respect to the continuing criminal enterprise count, the Government failed to establish that he 

obtained substantial income or resources from his cocaine smuggling. If he is correct, he would be entitled to dismissal of the 

CCE count rather than to remand for a new trial, but we disagree 

with his assertion. "The government need not prove a definite 

amount of net profit--it is sufficient to show substantial gross 

Qj.ckey, 736 F.2d at 588 (emphasis added). 

Record, supp. vol. 5, at 668-69. Several such documents were, in 

fact, used in Mr. Rivera's defense. 

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Appellate Case: 85-1768 Document: 01019290425 Date Filed: 01/20/1988 Page: 39 
The record is replete with testimony of Mr. Rivera's large 

cash expenditures in connection with the cocaine importations. 

Evidence was presented that: (1) the pilots together received 

$40,000.00 from defendant for their participation in the July, 

1982, importation,. see record, supp. vol. 2, at 178-79; (2) 

Mr. Rivera purchased a cessna 404 Titan aircraft for $200,000.00, 

see id. at 146-47; (3) defendant also bought two trucks for 

$10,000.00 cash, see id. at 147-48; (4) Messrs. Ariza and Sebolt 

received cash payments of $10,000.00 and $5,000.00, respectively, 

from the defendant, see id., supp. vol. 5, at 695-96; (5) a local 

Oklahoma rancher was paid $4,000.00 in cash by one of defendant's 

co-conspirators for the one-time use of a makeshift runway in his 

field, see id., supp. vol. 3, at 442; and (6) defendant supplied 

one of his co-conspirators with $30,000.00 in cash to buy trucks, 

trailers, and other equipment and to serve as expense money for 

the 1983 importation. See id., supp. vol. 4, at 486-87. This 

evidence was sufficient to prove the substantial income or 

resources element of the CCE count. 

B. 

After the defendant pleaded not guilty to all counts at his 

arraignment, the Government recommended that bond be denied pursuant to the Comprehensive Crime Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3142 

(Supp. III 1985) .

16 See record, supp. vol. 1, at 10-13. 

16 The statute provides in pertinent part: 

If, after a hearing pursuant to the prov~s~ons of 

subsection (f), the judicial officer finds that no con-

(continued to next page) 

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Appellate Case: 85-1768 Document: 01019290425 Date Filed: 01/20/1988 Page: 40 
Defendant requested a continuance before his mandatory detention 

hearing so as to prepare evidence. The statute entitles a defendant up to five days continuance for such purposes.

17 In answer to 

the court's question whether defendant wanted the full five days 

or wanted to schedule the hearing sooner, defense counsel 

answered, "If Your Honor please, maybe I could get back with the 

court clerk's office or Your Honor on Monday." Id. at 15. The 

dition or combination of conditions will reasonably 

assure the appearance of the person as required and the 

safety of any other person and the community, he shall 

order the detention of the person prior to trial •••• 

Subject to rebuttal by the person, it shall be presumed 

that no condition or combination of conditions will 

reasonably assure the appearance of the person as 

required and the safety of the community if the judicial 

officer finds that there is probable cause to believe 

that the person committed an offense for which a maximum 

term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed 

in the Controlled Substances Act (21 u.s.c. 801 et 

seq.), the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act 

(21 u.s.·c. 951 et seq.>, section 1 of the Act of 

September 15, 1980 (21 u.s.c. 955a), or an offense under 

section 924(c) of Title 18 of the United States Code. 

18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). 

17 The statute provides in pertinent part: 

The judicial officer shall hold a hearing to determine whether any condition or combination of conditions 

set forth in subsection (c) will reasonably assure the 

appearance of the person as required and the safety of 

any other person and the community . . . . The hearing 

shall be held immediately upon the person's first 

appearance before the judicial officer unless that person, or the attorney for the Government, seeks a continuance. Except for good cause, a continuance on 

motion of the person may not exceed five days, and a 

continuance on motion of the attorney for the Government 

may not exceed three days. During a continuance, the 

person shall be detained . • . • 

18 u.s.c. § 3142(f). 

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Appellate Case: 85-1768 Document: 01019290425 Date Filed: 01/20/1988 Page: 41 
court replied, "All right. I will grant the five days unless you 

ask for a hearing in a period of time shorter than that." Id. at 

16. Apparently, defense counsel did not follow up on scheduling a 

date, and the court did not automatically schedule it on the fifth 

day. In any event, a detention hearing was never held, and 

defendant was therefore effectively, although not formally, denied 

bond. 

On appeal, defendant argues: 

The appellant submits that the failure to provide him 

with a bail detention hearing as mandated in 18 u.s.c. 

3142(e) is tantamount to the denial of bail without a 

hearing, and that as such, such action violates the 

Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. For 

this reason, the Appellant urges the Court to set aside 

the judgment and sentence of the trial court and dismiss 

these charges against this Defendant-Appellant. 

Brief of Appellant at 4-5. 

While the failure to provide defendant with the hearing 

demanded by the statute is inexcusable, we do not find it a sufficient reason to dismiss all charges against defendant, partieularly since his own counsel apparently failed to pursue the 

matter with the trial court. However, we do order that defendant's detention hearing regarding bond pending retrial on these 

matters be held as soon as practicable. 

c. 

We reject defendant's claims that: (1) the counts with which 

he was charged were multiplicitous, see Brief of Appellant at 12-

14; (2) there was no proof of constructive possession of cocaine, 

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Appellate Case: 85-1768 Document: 01019290425 Date Filed: 01/20/1988 Page: 42 
see id. at 15; (3) counts II in both indictments are lesser 

included offenses of count VI in each, see id.; (4) all six conspiracies charged are lesser included offenses of the CCE count, 

see id. at 15-16; and (5) the CCE statute is unconstitutionally 

vague or was unconstitutional as applied in this case. gee Supplementary Brief of Appellant at 24-27, 30. 

REVERSED and REMANDED for retrial consistent with this 

opinion. 

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Appellate Case: 85-1768 Document: 01019290425 Date Filed: 01/20/1988 Page: 43 
NOS. 85-1768 and 85-1771 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. LUIS ANTHONY RIVERA 

BROWN, Senior District Judge, Dissenting. 

I must respectfully dissent from the majority•s opinion that 

defendant•s convictions on all counts must be reversed. I disagree 

with the conclusion that the defendant•s trial was fundamentally 

unfair. I dissent from the majority•s position that evidence of 

the two drug transactions not specified in the indictment --the Denver 

and Milwaukee incidents-- was impermissibly admitted as proof of 

a continuing criminal enterprise. I am not persuaded that the trial 

court abused its discretion in denying a continuance. 

In reviewing the record in a case of this kind, we must look 

to the record as a whole, and view the evidence, and all reasonable 

inferences which follow, in the light most favorable to the government. 

United States v. Tolman, No. 86-2909, F.2d (lOth Cir. 1987). 

A determination of whether evidence is relevant lies within the sound 

discretion of the trial court, and that discretion should not be 

subject to revers a 1 , in the absence of abuse. United States v. Nea 1 , 

718 F.2d 1505, 1509-10 (lOth Cir. 1983), cert. den. 469 U.S. 818. 

Likewise, the trial court has broad discretion in determining 

whether otherwise relevant evidence should be excluded when the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger 

of unfair prejudice. Clearly evidence of other criminal acts is 

not admissible solely to prove a defendant•s criminal disposition, 

but such evidence may be admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 

1 

Appellate Case: 85-1768 Document: 01019290425 Date Filed: 01/20/1988 Page: 44 
404(b) when necessary to show knowledge, motive~ identity or intent 

on the "part of a defendant. 

Apart from the count involving a continuing criminal enterprise, 

the two indictments in this case charged defendant and others with 

at least twelve v1olations of narcotic laws. The court instructed 

the jury to consider each defendant and each count of the indictments 

separately, with the proviso that only if the jury found a defendant 

to be guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on each count could they find 

him guilty on that count. As noted, the jury returned verdicts of 

guilt on all counts, and my review of the record discloses that those 

verdicts are fully supported by the evidence. Indeed, resolving 

issues of credibility in favor of the government, the evidence of 

defendant•s guilt was overwhelming. 

The trial court admitted evidence concerning the trip by Cecil 

Ford to Denver, Colorado, and the trip by Ariza and Sebolt to Milwaukee, Wisconsin, which occurred one week before the cocaine importation into Talahina, Oklahoma. This evidence was admitted as being 

relevant and closely connected and clearly admissible under the provisions of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). Such evidence is admissible 

under the rule for proof of motive, intent, knowledge, plan and absence 

of mistake or accident when these elements are at issue in the case. 

The record discloses that these very matters were at issue during 

the trial. The government introduced substantial evidence showing 

that defendant Rivera directed a plan to import and distribute cocaine. 

Defendant testified that he had no knowledge of any such plan, contending that he was an innocent businessman and merely a victim of circum2 

Appellate Case: 85-1768 Document: 01019290425 Date Filed: 01/20/1988 Page: 45 
stances. He offered evidence that his dealings with the six coconspirators were in his capacity as an airplane broker and completely 

innocent. 

In light of this testimony, evidence of defendant•s drug transactions during the same period of time in which he disclaimed any 

knowledge of the plan to import and distribute cocaine was fairly 

admissible to show identity, motive, intent, knowledge, plan and 

absence of mistake or accident. In addition, such evidence tended 

to prove that defendant acted as a director or manager of crimina 1 

activities under the count involving a continuing criminal enterprise. 

Criminal intent is a state of mind which negates innocent motive. 

Evidence of other crimes which tend to undermine a defendant • s 11 i nnocent explanation.. for his activities is clearly admissible, when 

tested under the standards of Rule 404(b). See United States v. 

Rothbart, 723 F.2d 752 (lOth Cir. 1983). See also United States 

v. Jacobson, 578 F.2d 863 (lOth Cir. 1978), cert. den. 439 U.S. 932 

[in prosecution for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamines, where 

defendant testified he had nothing to do with drugs and was victim 

of circumstances, evidence of uncharged drug sales properly admitted]; 

United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1354, n.5 (8th Cir. 1976), 

cert. den. 431 U.S. 914 (1977) [cocaine transaction occurring six 

days before crime charged was relevant to show intent, knowledge, 

common plan or scheme]; United States v. Smith, 726 F.2d 183, 185-86 

(5th Cir. 1984) [testimony that defendant had sold drugs to witness 

prior to date of charged crime was properly admitted to show scheme 

by establishing on-going pattern of drug transactions]; Llach v. 

3 

Appellate Case: 85-1768 Document: 01019290425 Date Filed: 01/20/1988 Page: 46 
United States, 739 F.2d 1322, 1327 (8th Cir. 1984) [evidence of defendant's involvement in prior importation, distribution and sale of 

drugs was admissible to prove common scheme or plan]. 

The defendant claims lack of notice that the government would 

use "other crimes" evidence. In fact, the defense knew three or 

four days before the tria 1 started that the government intended to 

use evidence of the Denver and Milwaukee incidents. (Record, Supp. 

Vol. V, pp. 688-690). In any event, there is no requirement that 

the government give notice of its intent to use Rule 404(b) evidence. 

See Rule 404(b), Fed. R. Evid., and discussion, Weinstein's Evidence, 

Vol. 2, pp. 404-58. Rather, the use of such evidence is committed 

to the discretion of the trial judge. See United States v. Kendall, 

766 F.2d 1426, 1440-41 (lOth Cir. 1985), cert. den. 106 S.Ct. 848. 

Because the contentions in this case are similar to those disposed 

of in United States v. Kendall, supra, a quote from our holding in 

that case is appropriate: 

"'There is no general constitutional right to 

discovery in a criminal case. • Weatherford v. 

Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 ... ; See Chaney v. 

Brown, 730 F.2d 1334, 1339 (lOth Cir.) 

The Government is generally not required to disclose its witnesses or their testimony before 

trial. . .. United States v. Baca, 494 F.2d 424, 

427 (lOth Cir. 1974). The one significant excep- tion to this rule is exculpatory evidence; the 

government's failure to disclose such evidence 

before trial is a violation of due process. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 . . . . The Supreme 

Court has made it clear, however, that Brady 

does not extend beyond such exculpatory evidence. 

(Brady does not create any pretrial discovery 

privileges not contained in the Federal Rules 

of Crimina 1 Procedure.) Because the evidence 

of which Kendall complains was not exculpatory 

or discoverable under the Federal Rules of Criminal 

Procedure, the Government's failure to disclose 

4 

Appellate Case: 85-1768 Document: 01019290425 Date Filed: 01/20/1988 Page: 47 
its 404(b) evidence does not violate due process. 

Kendall cites no authority, nor have we been 

able to discover any, for the proposition that 

pretrial disclosure of Rule 404(b) evidence is 

required by the Sixth Amendment. Given the clear 

language of Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 559 

we conclude that there is no general Sixth Amendment righ-t to such pretrial disclosure ... 

766 F.2d at 1440-41 (footnote and some citations omitted.) 

Here, I believe that evidence of the Denver and t4ilwaukee trips 

was admissible under Rule 404(b) as substantive and circumstantial 

evidence to prove Count VII, which charged defendant with narcotic 

violations which were a part of a continuing series of narcotic violations undertaken by defendant Rivera in concert with at least five 

other persons. 21 U.S.C. § 848. 

While due process requires that an indictment give the defendant 

notice of the charges against him so that he can prepare his defense, 

and be protected against double jeopardy, it is clear that defendant 

is protected from double jeopardy since the entire record of the 

proceedings here may be referred to if a claim arises that a subsequent 

prosecution constitutes double jeopardy. See Woodring v. United 

States, 376 F.2d 619, 622 (lOth Cir. 1967), cert. den. 389 U.S. 885. 

Count VII of the indictment specifically put defendant on notice 

that his acts occurred between January 1, 1983, and July 1, 1983; 

that his acts were part of a continuing series of violations of the 

drug laws, the nature of which involved the importation, possession 

and di stri buti on of cocaine; that he acted as a manager of at 1 east 

five persons; and that he derived substantial income from his activities. This charge was sufficient to apprise defendant of the nature 

of the charge against him and to allow him to prepare his defense. 

5 

Appellate Case: 85-1768 Document: 01019290425 Date Filed: 01/20/1988 Page: 48 
Every court which has considered the issue to date has held 

that an indictment charging a continuing criminal enterprise is sufficient if it sets forth in the statutory language the elements of 

a continuing criminal enterprise. United States v. Johnson, 575 

F.2d 1347, 1356 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. den. 440 U.S. 907; United 

States v. Sperling, 506 F.2d 1323, 1344 (2nd Cir. 1974), cert. den. 

420 U.S. 962; United States v. Martinez-Torres, 556 F.Supp. 1255 

(S.D. N.Y. 1983); United States v. Bergdoll, 412 F.Supp. 1308 (D.C. 

Del. 1976); United States v. Collier, 358 F.Supp. 1351, 1355 (E.D. 

Mich. 1973). Underlying these holdings is the rationale that the 

statute does not require that three offenses be listed in the indictment. 

Defendant cites United States v. Becton, 751 F.2d 250 (8th Cir. 

1984), cert. den. 472 U.S. 1018, as the most "pertinent" decision 

on the issue of the sufficiency of the charge of a continuing criminal 

enterprise. In Becton, however, the court never reached the issue 

of whether the underlying violations must be listed in the charge. 

Instead, the Becton court decided that the defendant had actual notice 

of the underlying violations and therefore could not challenge the 

sufficiency of the indictment. Id. at 256-57. While it is true 

that the court said it would be preferable to list the underlying 

violations in a continuing criminal enterprise count, the court did 

not say or even imply that due process requires that the violations 

be listed in the indictment. 

A more pertinent decision on the issue at hand is United States 

v. Sperling, 506 F.2d 1323 (2nd Cir. 1974), cert. den. 420 U.S. 962. 

6 

Appellate Case: 85-1768 Document: 01019290425 Date Filed: 01/20/1988 Page: 49 
In that case, the defendant asserted that the indictment charging 

him with operating a continuing criminal enterprise was deficient 

11 because it failed to specify the names of the persons with whom 

he acted in concert and as to whom he occupied a position of organizer, 

. and because it failed to specify each violation constituting the 

continuing series of violations proscribed by the statute. 11 Id. 

at 1344 (emphasis added). The court responded: 11These contentions 

are wholly devoid of merit. Count Two (the continuing criminal enterprise count) tracks the statutory language. It contains every element 

of the offense charged. It satisfies the requirement that a defendant 

be given notice of the charges against him so that he can prepare 

his defense and plead the judgment in bar of any future prosecution 

for the same offense... Id. The court went on to say: .. [W]e reaffirm 

that § 848 is aimed at •the business of trafficking in the prohibited 

drugs on a continuing, serious, widespread, supervisory, and substantial basis. • (Citation omitted.) The indictment as amplified by 

the bill of particulars made it crystal clear to Sperling that this 

was the nature of the government•s case and afforded him an opportunity 

fairly and adequately to prepare his defense. 11 506 F. 2d at 1344-45.·!/ 

ll The continuing criminal enterprise count in the Sperling 

case (reported in 692 F.2d at 231-32, n.5) alleged: 

11 From on or about the 1st day of May, 1971, and 

continuously thereafter up to and including the 

date of the filing of this indictment, the 

defendant, unlawfully ... and knowingly did engage 

in a continuing criminal enterprise in that he 

unlawfully, willfully, intentionally, and knowingly 

did violate Title 21 [U.S.C.] Section 841(a)(l) 

and 841(b)(l)(a) as alleged in Counts Eight, Nine, 

7 

Appellate Case: 85-1768 Document: 01019290425 Date Filed: 01/20/1988 Page: 50 
The Ninth Circuit adopted this same rule in United States v. 

Sterling, 742 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. den. 471 U.S. 1099. 

In Sterling, the government introduced evidence at trial of the defendant•s drug-related activities dating back to 1971. The government 

contended that the· jury could have used evidence of these violations 

to satisfy the 11 continuing series of violations .. requirement. The 

court stated: 11We agree with the Second Circuit (the Sperling decision) that there is no legal requirement that the violations which 

make up the continuing series be specifically listed in the indictment. 11 742 F.2d at 526. 

Another case closely related to the present appeal was the district court decision of United States v. Martinez-Torres, supra, 

556 F.Supp. 1255. In that case, the trial judge instructed the jury 

that it could find violations of the drug laws (for a continuing 

criminal charge) other than the specific ones named in the indictment. 

and Ten of this indictment which are incorporated 

by reference herein, which violations were a 

part of a continuing series of violations of 

said statutes undertaken by the defendant in 

concert with at least five other persons with 

respect to whom the defendant occupied a position 

of organizer, supervisor and manager and from 

which continuing series of violations the defendant 

obtained substantial income and resources ... 

On appeal, the Second Circuit overturned Counts Eight, 

Nine and Ten for insufficient evidence. The Court upheld 

the continuing criminal enterprise conviction, however, 

because there was independent evidence supporting that 

conviction. Thus, Sperling was not a case where the offenses 

charged in the indictment were the proof used to satisfy 

the 11Continuing series .. element. See Majority Opinion, 

p.l8. 

8 

Appellate Case: 85-1768 Document: 01019290425 Date Filed: 01/20/1988 Page: 51 
.lQ.. at 1270, n.ll. The defendant objected, arguing that such an 

instruction would be a violation of due process since the defendant 

was not given notice of the possible violations. The court, relying 

on Sperling, concluded that the jury could use violations not listed 

in the indictment: The court noted that the continuing criminal 

enterprise count did not limit itself to the specific violations 

named in the indictment. 

These cases are consistent with the principles of due process 

as set forth in Tenth Circuit decisions. It is true that the indictment must sufficiently apprise the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet. United States v. Salazar, 720 F.2d 1482, 1486 (lOth 

Cir. 1983), cert. den. 469 U.S. 1110. In applying this principle, 

though, it should be noted that 11 an indictment generally is sufficient 

if it sets forth the offense in the words of the statute so 1 ong 

as the statute adequately states the elements of the offense." Id. 

[citing Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 

41 L.Ed.2d 50 (1974)]. Furthermore, the sufficiency of an indictment 

11 is not a question of whether it could have been more definite and 

certain ... Salazar, 720 F.2d at 1487 [citing United States v. Debrow, 

346 U.S. 374, 378, 74 S.Ct. 113, 115, 98 L.Ed.2d 92 (1953)]. Rather, 

an indictment may be drafted in general terms so long as it apprises 

the defendant of the nature of the charge against him. See, ~· 

United States v. Boston, 718 F.2d 1511, 1515 (lOth Cir. 1983), cert. 

den. 466 U.S. 974, rehearing den. 467 U.S. 1268 [in indictment 

for violation of the Hobbs Act, in which interference with commerce 

9 

Appellate Case: 85-1768 Document: 01019290425 Date Filed: 01/20/1988 Page: 52 
is an essential element, it is not necessary for the indictment to 

allege the exact nature of the interference with commerce]. 

An indictment is intended to put the defendant on notice of 

the charges against him; it is not intended to be an exhaustive list 

of the evidence wh"ich the government intends to introduce at trial. 

See, ~· United States v. Williams, 679 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1982), 

cert. den. 459 U.S. 1111 [Rule 7(c) does not require that the indictment set forth facts and evidentiary details necessary to establish 

each of the elements of the charged offense]; United States v. Carr, 

582 F.2d 242 (2nd Cir. 1978) [the government is not required to set 

forth evidentiary matter in an indictment]. See a 1 so United States 

v. Bernstein, 533 F.2d 775 (2nd Cir. 1976), cert. den. 429 U.S. 

998 [bill of particulars may be sought to provide evidentiary details 

of the charge]. 

Proving a series of violations in a continuing criminal enterprise 

is comparable to proving overt acts in a conspiracy charge. In United 

States v. Johnson, supra, 575 F.2d 1347, 1357, the court discussed 

the continuing criminal enterprise charge, stating: 11 [I]n an analogous 

situation, when a conspiracy is alleged the government is not limited 

to proving at trial only those overt acts which it has stated either 

in the indictment or in the bill of particulars. Thus, we have held 

that it is not prejudicial for the government to show other acts 

of the conspirators occurring during the life of the conspiracy. 11 

In a continuing criminal enterprise charge, then, the government 

should not be limited to proving violations specifically listed in 

the indictment so long as the indictment gives notice of the nature 

of the charge. 

10 

Appellate Case: 85-1768 Document: 01019290425 Date Filed: 01/20/1988 Page: 53 
Defendant had actual notice of the government's intention to 

use the Denver and Milwaukee acts. As discussed infra, I cannot 

say that the refusal to continue the case was an abuse of discretion. 

If the notice was short under the circumstances of this case, it 

was not error to use such evidence.g; 

g; As in other aspects of the government's case, the probative 

value of the evidence concerning the Denver and Mi 1 waukee 

trips depended upon the credibility of the witnesses. 

Rivera's testimony concerning these trips was as follows 

(Rivera Direct Examination): 

"Q. Did you, in fact, ever go to Milwaukee, 

Wisconsin, in June of '83 to pick up 

some cocaine and give it to Rogers 

Ariza and Bill Sebolt? 

"A. No, I did not. 

"Q. Do you know whether they went up there 

or not? 

"A. I don't have the slightest idea. 

"Q. How long have you knm-1n about this 

accusation that you were involved in 

cocaine transportation in Wisconsin? 

"A. About two days before the trial. 

"Q. You're not charged with that in the 

indictment? 

"A. No, I'mnot. 

(Prosecutor:) Objection, Your Honor, 

to leading his witness, and it's a 

legal conclusion on his part. 

The Court: Sustained. 

"Q. There has been testimony that you sent 

Cecil Ford to Co 1 ora do on the same 

sort of mission. Did you do that? 

"A. No, I did not. 

"Q. How long prior to trial did you know 

about that accusation? 

"A. It was the same thing, about two days 

(before the trial)." 

11 

Appellate Case: 85-1768 Document: 01019290425 Date Filed: 01/20/1988 Page: 54 
Failure to Grant a Continuance 

The standard of review for a denial of continuance is whether 

or not there has been an abuse of discretion. United States v. Jones, 

730 F.2d 593, 596 (lOth Cir. 1984). Furthermore, a denial of a continuance will not be· reversed unless the denial was arbitrary and unreasonable and materially prejudicial to the defendant. United States 

v. West, No. 86-1499 (lOth Cir. 1987). 

In this case, I am unable to find that the trial judge•s denial 

of a continuance was an abuse of discretion, or to find that defendant 

was materially prejudiced by such denial. 

Attorney Meier. was appointed as defense counsel on January 24, 

1985, and trial was set for March 18th. He promptly filed a motion 

for discovery, which was granted. On January 27th, Meier filed a 

motion to withdraw from the case because of "defendant•s lack of 

confidence" in Meier•s judgment. The trial court denied this motion, 

and its action was proper. See United States v. Johnson, 585 F.2d 

374 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. den. 440 U.S. 921. 

On March 11, 1985, D.O. Hayes entered his appearance as defendant's retained counsel. On March 13th, Hayes moved for a continuance 

for the purpose of going over business records recently received 

from Miami. The motion was denied. On the morning of the trial, 

March 18th, Hayes renewed his request for a continuance. At that 

time, the trial court inquired into Meier's preparation for trial. 

Meier stated that he had spent a substantial number of hours on the 

case. Meier also stated that the defendant had lost confidence "in 

12 

Appellate Case: 85-1768 Document: 01019290425 Date Filed: 01/20/1988 Page: 55 
my willingness to advocate his cause, which I am ready and able to 

do ... (Record, Supp. Vol. II, p. 8. Emphasis supplied.) 

The motion for continuance was overruled, but the court directed 

that Meier continue to represent Rivera, 11 at government expense, 11 

and Meier did sit at the counsel table, assisting the defense throughout the tria 1 )I 

Under a 11 the circumstances presented in this record, I cannot 

find that there was a clear abuse of discretion in the denial of 

a continuance. Defendant was represented in fact by two attorneys 

throughout his trial, one of which had clearly indicated to the court 

that he was willing and able to proceed with the trial. 

In addition, it is my opinion that defendant has failed to establish that he sustained any prejudice because of the denial of his 

motion for continuance. The continuance was sought for the purpose 

of allowing examination of boxes of the defendant's business records. 

In fact, the defense introduced numerous business records in its 

attempt to persuade the jury that defendant was a legitimate businessman engaged in brokering the sale of airplanes. He also introduced 

copies of past due personal bills, etc., for the purpose of establishing that he had no financial resources to support the cocaine importation scheme . .Y 

]/ Meier took an active part in the defense by cross-examining 

some of the government's witnesses. 

if The existence of defendant's business records is somewhat 

in question for defendant testified that sometime after July 1, 

1983, two unidentified 11 lawyer-type 11 men showed up at his 

door in Miami, demanding to see his business records on certain 

aircraft, including the wrecked Cessna. Rivera testified 

that the two men carried away his files. (Record, Supp. 

Vol. VII, pp. 1085-86.) 

13 

Appellate Case: 85-1768 Document: 01019290425 Date Filed: 01/20/1988 Page: 56 
In my view, following an examination of the issues at the trial, 

a continuance would not have had any effect on the evidence presented 

at trial. There is not a hint in the record that any documentary 

evidence exists which caul d have refuted the testimony of Rivera • s 

six co-conspirators, his former girlfriend and various disinterested 

witnesses whose testimony was extremely damaging to the defendant. 

For example, there would be no documentary evidence which could refute 

Leslie Tottenhoff's testimony that she carried a large amount of 

cash for the defendant, or the testimony of disinterested witnesses 

who testified as to defendant • s whereabouts on the night of July 1, 

1983. 

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

The defendant has a 1 so asserted that he was denied effective 

assistance of counsel. His claim focuses primarily on attorney Meier's 

failure to gather defendant's business records together prior to 

trial. 

The standard for determining whether counsel was ineffective 

is clearly set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 

L.Ed.2d 674, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). In order to prevail on such 

a claim, the defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but 

for counsel's unprofessional errors, the results of the proceeding 

would have been different. In my opinion, defendant has failed to 

make any such showing. 

As noted in the discussion of the denial of a continuance, the 

defendant has not demonstrated even a reasonable possibility that 

14 

Appellate Case: 85-1768 Document: 01019290425 Date Filed: 01/20/1988 Page: 57 
his records contained exculpatory evidence which would have affected 

the outcome of the tria 1. Thus, absent a showing of prejudice, the 

law states that a conviction may not be reversed for lack of preparation on the attorney's part. 

Despite the· majority's characterization of attorney Meier's 

preparation as questionable, in my opinion nothing in the record 

indicates that Meier's representation was inadequate. Indeed, any 

deficiency in preparation is more likely attributable to the defendant's lack of cooperation with Meier. 

In reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the 

court should keep in mind the dictate of the United States Supreme 

Court in Strickland: 

11 Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance 

must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting 

for a defendant to secondguess (sic) counsel •s 

assistance after con vi cti on or adverse sentence, 

and it is all too easy for a court, examining 

counsel •s defense after it has proved unsuccessful, 

to conclude that a particular act or omission 

of counsel was unreasonable. (Citation omitted.) 

A fair assessment of attorney performance requires 

that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the 

circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, 

and to evaluate the conduct from counsel •s perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties 

inherent in making the evaluation, a court must 

indulge a strong presumption that counsel •s conduct 

fa 11 s within the wide range of reasonab 1 e profes- sional assistance; that is, the defendant must 

overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be considered 

sound trial strategy .... 

80 L.Ed.2d at 694-95. 

In discussing the duty to investigate, the Court went on to 

say that 11 Strategic choices made after less than complete investigation 

15 

Appellate Case: 85-1768 Document: 01019290425 Date Filed: 01/20/1988 Page: 58 
are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional 

judgments support the limitations on investigation." 80 L.Ed.2d 

at 695. 

It is clear in the instant case that Meier believed the government•s evidence against his client was overwhelming. The record 

and the jury•s verdict bears out that belief. The court cannot conelude that it was unreasonable for ~1eier to forego spending his time 

before trial on an exhaustive review of the defendant•s records. 

This is especially true in light of the defendant•s lack of cooperation 

with his attorney and the fact that the records ultimately produced 

no exculpatory evidence. See United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 

196, 210 (D.C. Cir. ~ bane 1979) [claims that defense counsel has 

been ineffective by reason of failure to investigate must be examined 

in light of strength of the government•s case].2/ The simple fact 

is that the defendant • s documentary records caul d not have addressed 

the testimony against him in this case. His records could have shown 

only that he had brokered planes in the past, a fact which does not 

address the central issues in this case. 

2.1 See also United States v. Katz, 425 F.2d 928, 930 (2nd Cir. 

1970~ere Judge Friendly stated: 

"Determination of the effectiveness of counse 1 

cannot be divorced from the factual situation 

with which he is confronted. When, as here, 

the prosecution has an overwhelming case based 

on documents and the testimony of disinterested 

witnesses, there is not too much the best defense 

attorney can do. If he simply puts the prosecution 

to its proof and argues its burden to convince 

the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant 

may think him lacking in aggressiveness, and 

surely will if conviction occurs." 

16 

Appellate Case: 85-1768 Document: 01019290425 Date Filed: 01/20/1988 Page: 59 
The defendant was entitled to a fair trial. I believe the record 

shows that the trial he received was fundamentally fair. It is apparent that the government produced overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt. That evidence convinced an impartial jury of the defendant's guilt, and I believe the jury's decision should be upheld. 

Other Issues On Appeal 

I concur in Section III-A of the majority's opinion, which held 

there was sufficient evidence to prove 11 SUbstantial income .. for the 

continuing criminal enterprise charge. 

Because I would recommend upholding the jury verdict, I would 

not require the district court to ho 1 d a bond hearing. (Majority 

Opinion, Section III-B.) 

I would also concur in Section III-C of the majority opinion, 

except that I believe the defendant was improperly sentenced. The 

defendant was sentenced consecutively on the continuing criminal 

enterprise charge and on severa 1 cons pi racy charges. The government 

concedes on appeal that the drug conspiracy charges under 21 U.S.C. 

§§ 846 and 963 are lesser included offenses of 21 U.S.C. § 848. 

Accordingly, I would remand the case in order to correct this sentencing error. 

17 

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