Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01599/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01599-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John Ray Dynes
Plaintiff
Kern County Superior Court
Defendant

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN RAY DYNES, ) Case No. 1:07-cv-1599 AWI TAG

)

Plaintiff, ) FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

) TO DISMISS COMPLAINT 

) (Doc. 1)

KERN COUNTY SUPERIOR )

COURT, Delano Branch, )

)

Defendant. )

____________________________________/

On November 1, 2007, Plaintiff John Ray Dynes (“Dynes”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se,

filed the instant civil rights action, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1). The matter has been referred to the

Magistrate Judge pursuant to § 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 72-302.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Title 28, Section 1915A(b) Screening

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), this Court must “screen” a prisoner’s complaint to

determine whether the case should be dismissed because, among other things, it “is frivolous,

malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

A claim is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490

U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-1228 (9th Cir. 1984). A frivolous claim

is based on an inarguable legal conclusion or a fanciful factual allegation. A federal court may dismiss

a claim as frivolous if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or if the factual contentions

are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325; Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1228. The test for malice is a

subjective one that requires the Court to determine whether the applicant is proceeding in good faith.

Kinney v. Plymouth Rock Squab. Co., 236 U.S. 43, 46 (1915); see Wright v. Newsome, 795 F.2d 964,

Case 1:07-cv-01599-AWI-TAG Document 6 Filed 11/29/07 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 2

968 n.1 (11th Cir. 1986). A lack of good faith is most commonly found in repetitive suits filed by

plaintiffs who have used the advantage of cost-free filing to file a multiplicity of suits. A complaint may

be inferred to be malicious if it suggests an intent to vex the defendants or abuse the judicial process by

relitigating claims decided in prior cases, Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305, 1309 (D.C.Cir. 1981); if

it threatens violence or contains disrespectful references to theCourt, id.; or if it contains untrue material

allegations of fact or false statements made with knowledge and an intent to deceive the Court, Horsey

v. Asher, 741 F.2d 209, 212 (8th Cir. 1984).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)

During the screening process, this Court also considers whether the plaintiff has complied with

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), which requires that:

A [complaint] contain (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the

court’s jurisdiction depends . . . , (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for the relief the

pleader seeks.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint must give

fair notice and state the elements of the claim plainly and succinctly. Jones v. Community Redev.

Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). 

Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983

To warrant relief under the Civil Rights Act, a plaintiff must allege and show that the defendant’s

acts or omissions caused the deprivation of his constitutionally protected rights. Leer v. Murphy, 844

F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1993). In order to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) a

person was acting under color of state law at the time the complained of act was committed; and (2) that

person’s conduct deprived plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of

the United States. Paratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled in part on other grounds,

Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-331 (1986). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person

‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he

does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is

legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which the complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy,

Case 1:07-cv-01599-AWI-TAG Document 6 Filed 11/29/07 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 Although the Delano Branch of the Kern County Superior Court is the captioned defendant, Dynes 1

does not make any allegations against it. (See Doc. 1).

3

588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

In his complaint, Dynes alleges that Defendant, the Delano Branch of the Kern County Superior

Court (the “Superior Court”), violated his civil rights and his due process rights under the Fifth

Amendment of the United States Constitution when Superior Court Judge Robert Tafoya (“Judge

Tafoya”), who is named as a defendant in the body of Dynes’ complaint, denied Dynes’ request to

proceed in his state small claims action without paying the requisite filing fees, i.e., in forma pauperis

(“IFP”). (Doc. 1). Dynes is attempting to pursue a small claims case against two correctional officers

whom he also names as defendants in the body of his complaint, and who are the named defendants in

his excessive force § 1983 action currently pending in this Court. (Id. at 2-3); see Dynes v. Medina, et

al., Case No. 1:07cv1359-LJO-WMW. Dynes requests that his small claims action proceed against the

two correctional officers and that he be awarded $3,750 from each officer, adding that the state court

may collect any costs and fees he owes, from his judgment in this case. (Id. at 6). 

Immunity

The only defendant identified in the caption of Dynes’ complaint is the Superior Court, which,

as a state entity, cannot be sued in federal court pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g.,

Simmons v. Sacramento County Superior Court, 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003)(Eleventh

Amendment bars suit against state superior court); Hyland v. Wonder, 117 F.3d 405, 413 (9th Cir.

1997)(California Superior Court is a state agency), amended, 127 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 1997); Greater Los

Angeles Council on Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103, 1110 & n.10 (9th Cir. 1987)(Eleventh

Amendment bars suit against Superior Court of California regardless of relief sought); Pobursky v.

Madera County, No. 07-cv-0611, 2007 WL 2023529, *8 (E.D. Cal. July 12, 2007)(California Superior

Court is a state agency) (citations omitted). Accordingly, to the extent that Dynes is bringing a § 1983

action in this Court against the Superior Court, his action should be dismissed with prejudice.

1

The body of Dynes’ complaint alleges that Judge Tafoya, in his official and individual capacities,

Case 1:07-cv-01599-AWI-TAG Document 6 Filed 11/29/07 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 4

deprived Dynes of his constitutional rights by denying him the right to proceed with his state small

claims action IFP. (Doc. 1, pp. 2-3). A judge is absolutely immune from civil liability for damages for

acts performed in his judicial capacity. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 226-228 (1998); Imbler v.

Pachtamn, 424 U.S. 409, 423 n. 12 (1976); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-555 (1967)(applying

judicial immunity to actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th

Cir. 1988). Judicial immunity is a “sweeping form of immunity” that insulates judges from charges of

error or irregularity, even when the judge is accused of acting with malicious or corrupt motives or of

committing grave procedural errors. Forrester, 484 U.S. 219, 226-228 (1998); Stump v. Sparkman, 435

U.S. 349, 359 (1979). “A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in

error, was done maliciously, or in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when

he has acted in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’” Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-357 (citation omitted).

Judicial immunity includes immunity from suit for damages. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11

(1991). 

Whether a judge’s act is a judicial one depends on the nature and function of the act and the

expectations of the parties. When a judge performs an act that is normal judicial function, and when

the parties deal with the judge in his official capacity, the judge’s act is a judicial one and the judge is

immune from civil liability. Stump, 435 U.S. at 362. Ruling on a motion or request before the court is

a normal judicial function performed by a judge in his official capacity. See Duvall v. County of Kitsap,

260 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001). Here, Dynes’ § 1983 claim against Judge Tafoya is based on the

contention that Judge Tafoya denied Dynes’ request to proceed in a state court small claims action

without paying the requisite filing fees. Judge Tafoya is entitled to judicial immunity because his act

of ruling on a party’s fee waiver request was judicial in nature and was not done in the clear absence of

all jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court recommends that Dynes’ claim against Judge Tafoya be

dismissed with prejudice.

State Claim

The filing of a small claims complaint commences in the Small Claims Court, a division of the

California Superior Court, and constitutes a state, not a federal, action. See CAL.CODE CIV. PROC., Part

Case 1:07-cv-01599-AWI-TAG Document 6 Filed 11/29/07 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

See 2007 California Assembly Bill No. 1248 (NS), CA LEGIS 738, § 4(c) (2007), approved by the 2

Governor on October 14, 2007.

5

1, Title 1, Chapters 4 and 5.5. The underlying purpose of small claims cases is “to dispense justice

promptly, fairly, and inexpensively.” Bricker v. Superior Court, 133 Cal.App.4th 634, 637 (Cal.App.1

Dist. 2005)(citing Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 116.510). Prior to October 14, 2007, section 116.230 of the

California Code of Civil Procedure, which addresses filing fees in Small Claims Court, did not contain

a provision concerning the requirements or method of application for proceeding IFP. See CAL. CIV.

PROC.CODE § 116.230 (2006). This omission, combined with the amended version of section 116.230

that details how an individual can apply to proceed IFP in a small claims action, supports the conclusion 2

that an indigent party may apply for leave to proceed IFP in Small Claims Court pursuant to CAL. CIV.

PROC.CODE § 3.52 and CAL.GOV’T CODE § 68511.3, which sections apply to cases filed in the Superior

Court generally. 

Dynes states that he first filed a state small claim action on May 31, 2007, adding that it was

dismissed during a September 2007 hearing because he had not served the defendants – the two

correctional officers. (Doc. 1, p. 5). Dynes does not state whether the dismissal was with or without

prejudice. (Id.). According to Dynes, he re-filed his small claims complaint on October 18, 2007, but

he was not allowed to proceed IFP and, because he is indigent, he could not proceed with his October

18 small claims action against the correctional officers. (Doc. 1, p. 5). 

Dynes’ primary allegation in the instant federal complaint is that the Superior Court and Judge

Tafoya denied him leave to proceed IFP in a state court small claims action, presumably in violation of

various California Civil and Government Rules. Dynes appears to be trying to appeal a state court order,

a procedure that is more appropriate through the state court, not the federal court. Moreover, allegations

that a defendant violated state laws or regulations do not provide a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Sweaney v. Ada County, Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, Dynes’

claims that the Superior Court and Judge Tafoya erred under state law should be dismissed from this

federal action.

///

Case 1:07-cv-01599-AWI-TAG Document 6 Filed 11/29/07 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 6

Due Process Claim

In the instant § 1983 action, Dynes complains that his Fifth Amendment due process rights were

violated when he was prevented from proceeding with his small claims action. (Doc. 1). The Fifth

Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that the “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or

property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST., amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment rendered

these constitutionally protected due process rights applicable to the states. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV,

§ 1; Koloa Marketplace, LLC v. County of Kauai, No. 06-00570, 2007 WL 2247797, *12 (D.Hawai‘i

July 31, 2007).

The Due Process Clause guarantees procedural and substantive due process. Procedural due

process “protects individuals against the deprivation of liberty or property by the government without

due process.” Urbina v. Carson, 2007 WL 2814652 at *6 (E.D. Cal. September 25, 2007)(citation

omitted). Substantive due process protects individuals against arbitrary, capricious, or excessive action

by the government, and “bar[s] certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures

used to implement them.” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 840 (1998)(citations omitted).

In order to allege a cognizable § 1983 claim based on procedural due process, the plaintiff must contend

“(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the

alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487

U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda County, 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir.1987). In order to allege

a cognizable § 1983 claim based on substantive due process, a plaintiff must allege that the state or

government’s action was arbitrary, capricious, or excessive, and that the plaintiff has a Constitutionally

protected interest. See Urbina, 2007 WL 2814652 at *5. 

In the instant case, Dynes alleges that his due process rights were violated because the Superior

Court and Judge Tafoya denied him the opportunity to proceed with hisstate small claims action against

two correctional officers without paying the filing fees. (Doc. 1, p. 5). Dynes identifies correctional

officers Juan Medina and David Williams as additional defendants in the body of his complaint, but does

not implicate them in the fee waiver denial or provide a factual basis for his claims against them. Dynes,

thus, does not satisfy the requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Moreover,

Case 1:07-cv-01599-AWI-TAG Document 6 Filed 11/29/07 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 7

currently pending in this Court is Dynes’ § 1983 complaint against correctional officers Medina and

Williams. (See Case No. 1:07-cv-1359 LJO WMW.) Dynes’ pending § 1983 action against

correctional officers Medina and Williams was filed in the United States District Court for the Central

District of California on August 29, 2007 and was transferred to this Court on September 17, 2007. (See

Case No. 1:07-cv-1359 LJO WMW, docket entries 1, 2.) 

In the instant case, Dynes fails to allege any rights that could be vindicated via a § 1983 action,

and, as addressed above, his claims regarding the fee waiver denial are against parties immune from

federal suit or from whom he cannot gain relief in a § 1983 action. It is, therefore, recommended that

the Fifth Amendment and due process violations alleged in Dynes’ complaint be dismissed with

prejudice. 

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

As discussed above, Dynes’ § 1983 complaint fails to set forth allegations against defendants

who either are entitled to immunity or whose rulings should be appealed in the state court, if at all. To

the extent that Dynes alleges that his due process rights were violated, he has failed to specify how the

denial of leave to proceed in forma pauperis in a state small claims action deprives him of liberty or

property without due process of law such that it constitutes the deprivation of a right secured to him

under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendmentsto the United States Constitution that a § 1983 could remedy.

Moreover, given that Dynes has set forth only a violation of rights purportedly pertaining to a state court

action, his complaint is devoid of any viable allegations of harm that would entitle him to relief under

a § 1983 action. 

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED THAT:

1. Plaintiff John Ray Dynes’ Complaint (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED with prejudice; and

2. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED be directed to close this case.

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the United States District Court Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within

twenty (20) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with the court and

Case 1:07-cv-01599-AWI-TAG Document 6 Filed 11/29/07 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 8

serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

Findings and Recommendations.” The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified

time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir.

1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 28, 2007 /s/ Theresa A. Goldner 

j6eb3d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Case 1:07-cv-01599-AWI-TAG Document 6 Filed 11/29/07 Page 8 of 8