Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02364/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02364-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
County of Sacramento
Defendant
Jacqueline Jennings
Defendant
Wendy Jones
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

WENDY JONES, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

JACQUELINE JENNINGS, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:15-cv-02364-KJM-AC 

ORDER 

Having reviewed the allegations of the complaint and the parties’ briefing on 

defendants’ motion to dismiss, the court orders as follows.1

I. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

A. Jennings, Doe 1, and Doe 2 (First Claim) 

On a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court 

assumes a complaint’s factual allegations are true and construes them in the light most favorable 

to the non-moving party. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Mollett v. Netflix, Inc., 795 

F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2015). 

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 In an effort to streamline resolution of motions to dismiss in certain cases where the 

parties have counsel, when the court is granting leave to amend it is adopting a shortened form of 

order consistent with the order issued here. 

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Here, Wendy Jones alleges that during a post-DUI-arrest search in June 2015, 

Sacramento County Sheriff’s Deputy Jacqueline Jennings handcuffed her, twisted her arms 

painfully behind her back, forced her roughly to the floor, and violently handled her breasts and 

chest beneath her underwear. Compl. ¶¶ 14–29, ECF No. 1. Jones was never a danger to 

Jennings or anyone else. Id. ¶ 28. Two other unidentified officers stood by while Jennings 

conducted this search and did not intervene. Id. ¶ 24. Jones told Jennings and other officers that 

she was in pain, that they were hurting her, and that she suffered from post-traumatic stress 

disorder and a leg disability. Id. ¶¶ 24, 26, 27. After the search, Jennings and the two 

unidentified officers left her lying on the floor of a jail cell in pain. Id. ¶ 25. As a result of the 

deputies’ treatment, she suffered injuries to her ankle and wrist and emotional and psychological 

trauma. Id. ¶¶ 30, 34(f). 

These allegations suffice to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Jennings 

and the unidentified officers for violation of Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights to be free from 

excessive force during searches and seizures. The Fourth Amendment allows officers to use only 

objectively reasonable force when they conduct searches and seizures. See, e.g., Green v. City & 

Cnty. of S.F., 751 F.3d 1039, 1049 (9th Cir. 2014). Under the test of Graham v. Connor, the 

court balances the “nature and quality of the intrusion” against the “countervailing governmental 

interests at stake” in light of “the totality of the circumstances.” 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) 

(citations and quotation marks omitted). 

Officers also “have a duty to intercede when their fellow officers violate the 

constitutional rights of a suspect or other citizen.” Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1289 

(9th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1447 n.25 (9th Cir. 1994), rev’d on 

other grounds, 518 U.S. 81 (1996)). “Thus, ‘an officer who is present at the scene and who fails 

to take reasonable steps to protect the victim of another officer’s use of excessive force can be 

held liable under section 1983 for his nonfeasance.’” Kyles v. Baker, 72 F. Supp. 3d 1021, 1040 

(N.D. Cal. 2014) (quoting Gaudreault v. Municipality of Salem, Mass., 923 F.2d 203, 207 n.3 (1st 

Cir. 1990)). 

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The allegations summarized above allow the court to “draw the reasonable 

inference” Jennings and the two unidentified officers used objectively unreasonable force or did 

not intervene to prevent the use of objectively unreasonable force. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The 

motion is denied with respect to this claim. 

B. Supervisory Defendants (Fifth Claim) 

“In a § 1983 suit . . .—where masters do not answer for the torts of their 

servants—the term ‘supervisory liability’ is a misnomer.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. But 

supervisors can be liable for their own conduct. Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1085 (9th Cir. 

2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 946 (2015). Here, the complaint’s austere allegations of 

supervisory liability do not paint a plausible picture of the supervisory defendants’ liability. See

Compl. ¶¶ 36, 45–46. These claims are therefore dismissed with leave to amend, if amending is 

possible under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (legal conclusions 

do not suffice to state a claim); Sharkey v. O’Neal, 778 F.3d 767, 774 (9th Cir. 2015) (the court 

should grant leave to amend where additional factual allegations could cure a complaint’s 

defects).

C. The County of Sacramento (Sixth Claim) 

“A municipality or other local government may be liable under [§ 1983] if the 

governmental body itself subjects a person to a deprivation of rights or causes a person to be 

subjected to such deprivation.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (citation and 

quotation marks omitted). To succeed on a § 1983 claim against a municipal government, a 

plaintiff must plead and prove the defendant’s policies, customs, or practices were the moving 

force behind the constitutional violation she suffered. See, e.g., City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 

489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989). To withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a case cannot 

rest on the bare allegation of unlawful policies, customs, or practices. AE ex rel. Hernandez v. 

Cty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012). 

Here, Jones relies on her allegation that the Sacramento County Sheriff’s 

Department ratified the individual defendants’ conduct through an investigation of the incident. 

See Compl. ¶¶ 31–33, 49. A municipal body’s ratification of its employees’ unconstitutional 

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actions may support a claim under § 1983. See Clouthier v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 

1232, 1250 (9th Cir. 2010) (summarizing the required showing). But Jones’s allegations suggest 

no more than the possibility of ratification. The possibility of a defendant’s liability cannot see a 

case through to discovery. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. This claim is dismissed with leave to 

amend. 

II. STATE LAW CLAIMS 

Jones concedes her seventh claim against the County of Sacramento should be 

dismissed. Opp’n 9, ECF No. 12. The claim is dismissed with prejudice. See Cal. Gov’t Code 

§§ 844, 844.6(a)(2). 

As to her other claims, “[a]s a prerequisite for filing suit for ‘money or damages’ 

against a public entity, the California Government Claims Act requires presentation of a claim to 

the public entity.” Gen. Sec. Servs. Corp. v. Cnty. of Fresno, 815 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1131 (E.D. 

Cal. 2011); see also Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 911.2, 915, 945.4; State of Cal. v. Superior Court, 

32 Cal. 4th 1234, 1239–44 (2004). A claim must contain certain information, including “[t]he 

date, place and other circumstances of the occurrence or transaction which gave rise to the claim,” 

“[a] general description of . . . injury, damage or loss incurred,” and “[t]he name or names of the 

public employee or employees causing the injury, damage, or loss.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 910. This 

pre-filing requirement covers claims sounding in tort, including the state-law claims here. See 

City of Stockton v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 4th 730, 737–38 (2007). A plaintiff must both plead 

and prove her compliance with these provisions, including in federal court. Gen. Sec. Servs. 

Corp., 815 F. Supp. 2d at 1131–32. 

Here, Jones alleges that on September 17, 2015, she filed a “citizen’s complaint” 

with the Sheriff’s Department “based on the unlawful conduct” alleged in her complaint. Compl. 

¶ 31. These allegations, assumed true, do not show she complied with the provisions reviewed 

above. The state-law claims are dismissed with leave to amend, if possible within the confines of 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. 

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III. CONCLUSION 

The defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART as follows: (1) The 

motion to dismiss the first claim is DENIED; (2) The motion to dismiss the second, third, fourth, 

fifth, and sixth claims is GRANTED with leave to amend; and (3) The motion to dismiss the 

seventh claim is GRANTED with prejudice and without leave to amend. 

An amended complaint shall be filed no later than twenty-one days after the date 

this order is filed. 

This order resolves ECF No. 10. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: April 19, 2016. 

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