Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-03066/USCOURTS-ca13-15-03066-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of Justice
Respondent
John C. Parkinson
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

JOHN C. PARKINSON,

Petitioner

v.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Respondent

______________________ 

2015-3066

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. SF-0752-13-0032-I-2.

______________________ 

Decided: February 29, 2016

______________________ 

 KATHLEEN M. MCCLELLAN, Government Accountability Project, Washington, DC, argued for petitioner. Also 

represented by JESSELYN A. RADACK. 

 MELISSA M. DEVINE, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, argued for respondent. Also represented 

by ELIZABETH M. HOSFORD, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR.,

BENJAMIN C. MIZER. 

______________________ 

Before TARANTO, PLAGER, and LINN, Circuit Judges.

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2 PARKINSON v. DOJ

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge LINN. 

Opinion dissenting-in-part filed by Circuit Judge 

TARANTO. 

LINN, Circuit Judge. 

Lt. Col. John C. Parkinson (“Parkinson”), a preference 

eligible veteran, appeals from a final decision of the Merit 

Systems Protection Board (“Board” or “MSPB”) sustaining 

his removal as a Special Agent at the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (“FBI”) for lack of candor under oath in 

violation of FBI Offense Code 2.6, and obstruction of 

process of the Office of Professional Responsibility 

(“OPR”) in violation of FBI Offense Code 2.11. Parkinson 

v. Dep’t of Justice, No. SF-0752-13-0032-I-2 (M.S.P.B. Oct. 

24, 2013). The Board assumed jurisdiction under 5 U.S.C. 

§§ 7513(d), 7511(b)(8) and 7701, and we have jurisdiction 

on appeal from the Board’s final decision under 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7703.

We sustain the obstruction charge, and the Board’s 

dismissal of Parkinson’s affirmative defense of violations

of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (“USERRA”). Because the lack of 

candor charge is unsupported by substantial evidence, 

and because the Board improperly precluded Parkinson 

from raising an affirmative defense of whistleblower 

retaliation, we reverse-in-part and vacate-in-part the 

Board’s decision and remand for consideration of Parkinson’s whistleblower defense and, if necessary, the appropriate penalty.

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PARKINSON v. DOJ 3

I. BACKGROUND

A. Parkinson and Facility Build-Out1

Parkinson served as a special agent with the Sacramento field office of the FBI. Beginning in 2006, Parkinson served as the leader of a special operations group 

(“group” or “SOG”), and was tasked with relocating a 

previously compromised undercover facility.

In 2006, the FBI leased a facility from James Rodda 

(“Rodda”), who agreed to contribute $70,000 to be used for 

“construction, construction documents, permits and fees” 

(“tenant improvement funds”). Parkinson negotiated the 

terms of the lease on behalf of the FBI, and managed the 

tenant improvement funds.

In February of 2008, partway through the facility 

build-out, Parkinson met with Assistant Special Agent in 

Charge Gregory Cox (“Cox”), and made whistleblowereligible disclosures, implicating two pilots involved with 

the group in misconduct. In August 2008, Cox and Parkinson’s immediate supervisor, Supervisory Special Agent 

Lucero (“Lucero”), issued Parkinson a low performance 

rating, removed him as group leader, and thereafter 

reassigned him to another field office.

Believing these acts to be retaliation for his February 

2008 disclosure, Parkinson sent a letter to Senator 

Charles Grassley, who forwarded Parkinson’s whistleblower reprisal allegations to the Department of Justice’s 

Office of the Investigator General (“OIG”) for investiga-

 

1 The detailed factual background herein is based 

on reports by the Office of the Inspector General (“OIG”) 

and the Office of Professional Responsibility (“OPR”), the 

Board’s opinion, and the testimony of record. Except 

where indicated, these facts are not in dispute.

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4 PARKINSON v. DOJ

tion. OIG, in turn, opened a whistleblower reprisal investigation.

B. OIG Investigation of Parkinson

In October 2008, Special Agent Robert Klimt (“Klimt”) 

replaced Parkinson as group leader, and took over the 

management of the off-site build-out. The OPR report 

describes Klimt’s testimony with respect to the state of 

the facility build-out as Klimt found it: “the build-out had 

not been completed, there were no records concerning the 

build-out, there was no inventory for tools and equipment, 

and no building plans or permits.”

In December 2008, Klimt requested from Rodda all 

receipts, invoices, and information relating to the tenant 

improvement funds used during the facility build-out. 

Rodda explained that the $70,000 in tenant improvement 

funds had been spent, and that Parkinson had requested, 

received, and spent an additional $7,000. Rodda indicated that he would look for the requested receipts, but failed 

to provide them after repeated FBI requests over several 

months. 

On August 6, 2009, Cox and the Sacramento Office of 

the FBI submitted a referral to investigate possible misuse of the tenant improvement funds. The request was 

sent to the OIG, which began a misuse investigation 

shortly thereafter.

The OIG investigation included consideration of paper 

documents, interviews with Rodda, his office manager 

Barbara Rawls (“Rawls”), his bookkeeper Maureen Massara, each of Parkinson’s supervisors in Sacramento, and 

multiple interviews with Parkinson. Parkinson testified 

that until the Spring of 2010, he believed the interviews 

to be in connection with Parkinson’s whistleblower reprisal complaint against the FBI leadership in Sacramento.

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PARKINSON v. DOJ 5

In November 2009, the OIG interviewed Rodda, who 

provided a Vendor Balance Detail report, listing all the 

tenant improvement expenses and hired vendors, and 

subsequently provided the OIG with all receipts and 

invoices to support the listed expenditures. The report 

indicated that Parkinson had spent $78,789.48 for tenant 

improvements. When the OIG asked Rodda why he had 

not provided the report and receipts to the FBI earlier, he 

first responded that the FBI agents “were being snoopy,” 

but later stated that Parkinson “had told” him “not to 

provide them as the OIG would be coming and asking for 

them in the near future.” J.A. 175. The characterization 

and import of Parkinson’s communication to Rodda to 

withhold the receipts from the FBI is in dispute, and is 

described infra in connection to the lack of candor determination.

In April 2010, Rodda, Rawls, and Parkinson met to 

come to a “mutually agreed set of facts” with regard to a 

check written directly to Parkinson on July 12, 2007 for 

$1,215.67. J.A. 14. Parkinson took notes during the 

meeting, gave them to Rawls to type, and had Rodda sign 

the resulting statement. The statement indicated that 

the check was made out to Parkinson to pay for a subcontractor who would only accept payment in cash. Parkinson testified that “the document was created in response 

to the rampant rumors that were going through the 

Sacramento Division about possible misuse of funds [by 

Parkinson],” J.A. 759, and that he was trying to “defend 

[him]self against those accusations.” J.A. 760. The statement explains: “I authorized this check to cover the cost of 

installing interior doors to the building. Upon completion 

of the door installation, the contractor who performed the 

work indicated that he required cash payment . . . . My 

bookkeeper was out of the office that day and, in light of 

my staff shortage, Mr. Parkinson took the check to my 

bank to acquire the cash to pay the contractor.” J.A. 171–

72. Rodda confirmed in a later interview that the inforCase: 15-3066 Document: 31-2 Page: 5 Filed: 02/29/2016
6 PARKINSON v. DOJ

mation in the statement appeared to be correct, but that 

he could not verify the specific details. The OIG report 

noted that on June 17, 2010, two months after the meeting took place, neither Rodda nor Rawls could recall what 

the check was for. The Board determined that as of April 

2010, Parkinson “anticipated that OIG would be investigating his handling of the build-out.” J.A. 15.

Throughout 2009, and until May 2010, Parkinson was 

interviewed repeatedly by OIG officials. In Spring 2010, 

Rodda told Parkinson that he believed the OIG was 

targeting Parkinson, and not just investigating Parkinson’s whistleblower complaint. In a May 2010 interview, 

OIG confirmed to Parkinson that he was indeed the target 

of its investigation concerning the tenant improvement 

funds. 

In the course of the interviews, Parkinson made two 

groups of statements that are particularly relevant to the 

instant case. First, the OIG investigator, David Loftus, 

asked, “what were considered tenant improvement items 

that [Rodda,] the owner of the [group] off-site was to pay 

for? . . . . What was that supposed to be for, the improvements?” and Parkinson answered, “Let me be very clear 

on this point. Nothing was done with any of the tenant 

improvement funds that was not approved by [Rodda].” 

J.A. 635.

Second, Parkinson was asked several times about his 

communication to Rodda about his desire that Rodda 

provide the receipts to the OIG and withhold them from 

the FBI. The relevant colloquies are reproduced below:

Q: Did you instruct [Rodda] not to provide [the 

FBI] with receipts?

A: I instructed [Rodda] to provide those to the Office of the Inspector General. 

. . . 

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PARKINSON v. DOJ 7

Q: [D]id you tell [Rodda] not to provide receipts to 

the FBI? It’s a simple yes or no.

A: I asked him not to do that.

Q: Okay. So you told him not to provide receipts to 

us, I mean to the FBI?

A: I didn’t tell him. I asked him not to.

Q: You asked him not to? And what was your purpose for that?

A: Because my situation was having invoked the 

protections of the Whistleblower Protection 

Act . . . [a]nd I necessarily wanted OIG to be the 

fair arbiter of that.

. . . 

A: No, no, I don’t feel like I have the authority to 

tell anyone anything with regard to this.

Q: Well, you did.

A: No, I asked [Rodda] to provide the information 

to the OIG rather than FBI management.

. . .

A: I did not instruct [Rodda] to refuse to do it, in 

terms of providing it to the FBI. I advised him 

that those were his private business documents.

. . .

Q: . . . How are those records his private records 

that he is not to share with FBI, who has entered 

into an agreement with him? If he’s not paying 

that money, if he has paid nothing, FBI could pull 

out of the lease. They have every right to see it. I 

don’t know why you’re classifying this as his private records?

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8 PARKINSON v. DOJ

A: I can’t agree with you on this point because, as 

a private businessman, a private person, issuing 

funds that are his personal funds to improve his 

building, which he owns [in] fee simple, that is 

solely his business.

J.A. 709–713. 

C. Procedural History and Parkinson’s Challenges

The OIG sent the FBI its report of factual findings, 

and the OPR thereafter issued its own report, and proposed Parkinson’s dismissal. The OPR report concluded 

that a preponderance of the evidence substantiated four 

offenses: 1) theft under FBI Offense Code 4.5 for removal 

of furniture from the offsite location2; 2) obstruction of the 

OPR process under FBI Offense Code 2.11 for creating the 

April 2010 “mutual recollection” document for Rodda’s 

signature; 3) unprofessional conduct on duty under FBI 

Offense Code 5.22 for (a) instructing Rodda and Rawls not 

to provide the receipts to the FBI, (b) signing a false 

purchase agreement for the removal of furniture from the 

off-site, (c) spending tenant improvement funds for nonconstruction related expenses, (d) using cash to pay a 

laborer; and 4) lack of candor under FBI Offense Code 2.6 

for statements made during the OIG investigation, reproduced supra at 6–8, concerning: (a) distinguishing between advising and telling Rodda and Rawls not to 

provide the FBI with the receipts; (b) asserting that 

Rodda approved all statements—without explaining that 

 

2 Part of the tenant improvement funds were used 

to purchase furniture, which Parkinson removed to another of Rodda’s warehouses to secure from access by 

persons who were the subject of his original whistleblower 

disclosure. Because the Board did not sustain this 

charge, see infra, we need not and do not further address 

it.

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PARKINSON v. DOJ 9

Rodda ratified the statements only afterwards; (c) asserting that the statement signed by Rodda regarding the 

check made out to Parkinson was a “mutual recollection” 

while neither Rawls nor Rodda could remember the 

purpose of the check two months later; and (d) statements 

made about furniture removed from the SOG site.

The OPR thereafter proposed to dismiss Parkinson for 

the theft (FBI Offense Code 4.5), unprofessional conduct 

while on duty (FBI Offense Code 5.22), and lack of candor 

(FBI Offense Code 2.6) charges, but did not impose a 

separate sanction for the obstruction of the OPR process 

charge (FBI Offense Code 2.11). OPR considered the 

Douglas factors, Parkinson’s prior history of misusing a

government credit card to make $2,500 in personal purchases, and aggravating and mitigating circumstances for 

each of the offenses, and concluded that dismissal was the 

appropriate penalty. The FBI thereafter dismissed Parkinson pursuant to the OPR report, and Parkinson appealed to the Board. 

The Board affirmed the AJ’s dismissal of Parkinson’s 

whistleblower and USERRA affirmative defenses, relying 

on its prior decision in Van Lancker v. Department of 

Justice, 119 M.S.P.R. 514 (2013) that FBI agents were not 

entitled to such affirmative defenses under 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7701(c)(2)(B) because the FBI is excluded from the 

definition of agency in 5 U.S.C. § 2302.

The Board did not sustain the theft charge because 

Parkinson did not have the specific intent required, and 

did not sustain the unprofessional conduct charge because 

Parkinson was not on duty during the alleged misconduct. 

The Board did sustain the obstruction charge because 

Parkinson “met with potential witnesses to ensure that 

they had their stories straight, and he persuaded a key 

witness to lock in his story by committing it to writing,” 

with the result that the OIG could not obtain Rodda’s and 

Rawls’s “untainted recollection of events, but rather their 

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10 PARKINSON v. DOJ

recollection as affected by the appellant’s efforts.” J.A. 14. 

Though it concluded that “[t]he agency did not prove that 

the written statement he drafted for the landlord was 

incorrect or that he asked the landlord to lie about anything,” J.A. 16, the Board decided that success in obstruction is not required to sustain the charge. The Board did 

not sustain the lack of candor charge for two of the specifications—holding that Parkinson did not lack candor in 

stating that the April 2010 document was a “mutual 

recollection[,]” and that Parkinson did not lack candor 

with regard to the reasons for his moving of the furniture. 

It did sustain the other two specifications—that Parkinson lacked candor by distinguishing between “telling” and 

“asking” Rodda and Rawls not to provide the receipts to 

the FBI, and that Parkinson lacked candor by failing to 

explain that Rodda’s approval was in the form of ratification, not pre-expense approval.

Despite its dismissal of several of the charges, the 

Board sustained the OPR’s removal penalty. The Board 

reconsidered the Douglas factors, noted the unique responsibilities of FBI agents, again considered the aggravating circumstance of Parkinson’s prior disciplinary 

record, the mitigating circumstance of Parkinson’s prior 

record of military and FBI service, and that Parkinson 

believed he was the victim of improper whistleblower 

retaliation. The Board noted that many past removal 

cases “involved more egregious acts of falsification than 

the mischaracterizations or half-truths at issue here,” but 

the Board nevertheless approved the removal penalty. 

The full Board on review added some analysis, adopted 

the initial decision, and came to the same conclusion. The 

agency did not appeal the overruled charges. Parkinson 

timely appealed the sustained charges.

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PARKINSON v. DOJ 11

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review and Burdens of Proof

We may set aside the Board’s decision only where the 

Board’s actions are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 

discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) 

obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or 

regulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported by 

substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c). Credibility 

determinations by the Board are “virtually unreviewable.” 

Hambsch v. Dep’t of Treasury, 796 F.2d 430, 436 (Fed. 

Cir. 1986). We review the Board’s statutory interpretations de novo. Weatherby v. Dep’t of Interior, 466 F.3d 

1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2006).

The Agency has the burden to show that removal of 

an employee will “promote the efficiency of the service.” 

Doe v. Dep’t of Justice, 565 F.3d 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 

2009) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a)). 

B. Obstruction of the OPR Process

FBI Offense Code 2.11 prohibits “taking any action to 

influence, intimidate, impede or otherwise obstruct the 

OPR process.” The Board held that Parkinson obstructed 

the OPR process in crafting the mutual recollection document, categorizing Parkinson’s action as meeting with 

“potential witnesses to ensure that they had their stories 

straight,” and convincing “a key witness to lock in his 

story by committing it to writing.” J.A. 14. The Board 

explained that the obstruction was in preventing the OIG 

from acquiring Rodda’s untainted recollection. There was 

no evidence that Rodda’s testimony regarding the check 

was altered by the meeting or the document.

We agree that the Board’s determination was supported by substantial evidence. There is no dispute that 

Parkinson did in fact meet with Rodda and Rawls, that he 

prepared the statement from his notes, and that he asked 

Rawls to type it and Rodda to sign it. Indeed, Parkinson

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12 PARKINSON v. DOJ

testified that his motivation for the meeting and for 

creating the document was “to clarify the expenditure in 

light of the false accusation Sacramento management was 

levying against me that I had stole[n] $77,000 of Mr. 

Rodda’s money.” J.A. 758. The document was thus 

intended to improperly influence the investigation that he 

believed would arise from the Sacramento office’s accusation.

Parkinson offers two unconvincing arguments against 

this charge. First, that as of April 2010, he did not know 

of the OPR investigation into his actions, and cites United 

States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995) and Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005) for the 

proposition that knowledge of a particular proceeding (not 

an “ancillary proceeding”) is necessary to support a charge 

of obstructing that proceeding. Aguilar was not interpreting FBI Offense Code 2.11, and did not purport to set 

overarching rules for all obstruction-based offenses, 

particularly as the language of the criminal statute atissue in that case was critical to the decision, see 515 U.S. 

at 598–600. Arthur Andersen also cannot stand for the 

broad proposition Parkinson asserts; that case interpreted 

a different criminal statute and required only that the 

proceeding was “foreseeable” to support an obstruction

charge. 544 U.S. at 708. 

Parkinson does not dispute that he knew about the 

OIG investigation as of April 2010, and indeed argued to 

the Board that he “was trying to facilitate—not obstruct—

the OIG’s investigation,” J.A. 958–59, by meeting with 

Rodda and Rawls. Moreover, in his briefs to the Board, 

Parkinson explained that in April 2010 “Mr. Parkinson 

did believe the OIG would look into the build-out, in the 

context of conducting an investigation into Mr. Parkinson’s whistleblower reprisal complaint.” J.A. 958–59. 

Parkinson admitted that the reason for the April 2010 

meeting—“to clarify the expenditure in light of the false 

accusation Sacramento management was levying against 

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PARKINSON v. DOJ 13

me that I had stole[n] $77,000 of Mr. Rodda’s money,” J.A. 

758—was directly related to the anticipated OPR proceeding. This is sufficient to establish the nexus between the 

obstruction and the proceeding; the OIG investigation 

here was not “ancillary” to the OPR process.

Second, Parkinson argues that because Rodda later 

testified that the April 2010 statement was true, he 

cannot be said to have obstructed the OPR process. FBI 

Offense Code 2.11 does not require a showing that the 

action taken in fact influences the OPR process—it requires only that actions are taken for proscribed purposes. 

Parkinson’s admission that he wanted to “clarify the 

expenditures in light of the false accusation Sacramento 

management was levying against me” provides substantial evidence to support the charge that he was trying to 

improperly influence the OPR process, which is all that is 

required.3

C. Lack of Candor

Parkinson was charged with “lack[ing] candor under 

oath in violation of FBI Offense Code 2.6 (Lack of Can-

 

3 Parkinson does not argue on appeal that the 

Board applied a standard that lacked any requirement of 

impropriety in the attempted influence. Such a requirement is implicit in the FBI Offense Code 2.11, given the 

other words following “influence” and given that even 

candid action aimed at persuasion would be covered by 

“influence” if read without a requirement of impropriety. 

Cf. Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 703–04 (reciting legitimate reasons for persuading others to withhold evidence, 

thus stressing the importance of the “corruptly persuad[ing]” requirement for criminal obstruction under 18 

U.S.C. § 1512). Clarity would be served if the Offense 

Code language were modified to reflect the implicit requirement.

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14 PARKINSON v. DOJ

dor/Lying Under Oath).” FBI Offense Code 2.6 provides 

for dismissal when an employee “[k]knowingly provid[es] 

false information in a verbal or written statement made 

under oath.” “False information” is further defined, inter 

alia, as “false statements; misrepresentations; the failure 

to be fully forthright; or the concealment or omission of a 

material fact/information.”

In Ludlum v. Department of Justice, 278 F.3d 1280, 

1284 (Fed. Cir. 2002), this court explained that lack of 

candor and falsification are distinct charges. While 

falsification “involves an affirmative misrepresentation 

and requires intent to deceive,” id. at 1284 (citing Naekel 

v. Dep’t of Transp., 782 F.2d 975, 977 (Fed. Cir. 1986)), 

lack of candor “is a broader and more flexible concept 

whose contours and elements depend upon the particular 

context and conduct involved,” id. We explained that

“lack of candor is established by showing that the FBI 

agent did not ‘respond fully and truthfully’ to the questions he was asked . . . . Although lack of candor necessarily involves an element of deception, ‘intent to deceive’ 

is not a separate element of that offense—as it is for 

‘falsification.’” Id. at 1284–85 (emphasis added). 

In the context of FBI Offense Code 2.6, we understand 

this “element of deception” to mean that the “failure to be 

fully forthright” must be done “knowingly.” Indeed, this 

was the distinction that ultimately led this court to affirm 

the Board’s decision in Ludlum: “the gross disparity 

between the three instances [of transporting unauthorized 

persons in a Bureau vehicle] he first admitted and the 

twelve to fourteen additional instances he admitted [to] a 

month later indicates he must have known it was substantially more than three,” id. at 1285–86 (emphasis added), 

and Ludlum’s “later explanation for his earlier failure to 

mention these additional instances—‘fear of causing me 

further problems’—demonstrated that he was less than 

candid in his [earlier] statement,” id. at 1286. Though 

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PARKINSON v. DOJ 15

lack of candor is distinct from falsification in that it does 

not require a showing of an “intent to deceive,” id. at 

1284–85, it nevertheless requires that information is 

conveyed “knowing” that such information is incomplete.

1. Characterization of Statements to Rodda Not to 

Provide Receipts to the FBI

Lack of candor, as relevant here, requires proof of two 

elements: that the employee failed to be fully forthright, 

and that the employee did so knowingly. Even assuming 

that Parkinson failed to be fully forthright, there is no 

substantial evidence that this failure was done “knowingly.”

First, the Board found that Parkinson’s statement, “I 

didn’t tell him, I asked him not to [provide the receipts]” 

was “not accurate,” J.A. 20, because Parkinson later 

stated that he “directed [Rodda] to provide the documents 

to OIG rather than—or not the FBI,” and Rodda testified 

that “[w]e got the impression that . . . we should give it to 

the OIG and not the FBI.” J.A. 20–21. The distinction 

between “asked” and “directed” was itself the only basis 

for the Board’s inference that Parkinson “was trying to 

minimize his culpability by suggesting he had done something of far less concern.” J.A. 22. According to the 

Board, “[i]n drawing a distinction between telling and 

asking, it appears that the appellant was trying to convey 

the impression that he did not have much control or 

influence over what the landlord did.” J.A. 21. The Board 

concluded that “in the absence of any other plausible 

explanation for his mischaracterization . . . the appellant 

made it to deceive OIG about what had happened.” J.A. 

22.

The distinction between the two characterizations is 

not enough to allow an inference that the characterization 

was done knowingly, because the statements can well be 

read to convey the same message in different words: that 

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16 PARKINSON v. DOJ

Parkinson wanted the receipts to go to the OIG rather 

than the FBI. Indeed, Rodda later explained his statement that Parkinson “told” him not to provide the receipts, saying that “Parkinson asked him” not to provide 

the receipts (quoted from the OIG report), “advised him to 

not give the FBI any documentation” (quoted from the 

OIG report), and “I think Parkinson didn’t trust the FBI 

hierarchy, and he requested me to hold all documents 

until [the] OIG asked for them.” J.A. 176 (Rodda being 

quoted by OIG report, emphases added). Moreover, the 

OIG report concluded that “Parkinson hindered the 

Sacramento Division’s attempts to determine how the 

SOG offsite tenant improvement funds were spent by 

asking [Rodda] and those working for him not to provide 

that information to the FBI.” J.A. 177. The interchangeable use of words of direction and words of request by 

Rodda, the OIG, and Parkinson shows that Parkinson’s 

choice of words in explaining the communication provides 

no foundation upon which to infer that he knowingly

lacked candor. 

Moreover, Parkinson explained that the reason for his 

insistence on the distinction was his understanding that 

it was not his place to tell Rodda what to do with Rodda’s 

own documents:

A: No, no, I don’t feel like I have the authority to 

tell anyone anything with regard to this.

Q: Well, you did.

A: No, I asked [Rodda] to provide the information 

to the OIG rather than FBI management.

. . .

A: I did not instruct [Rodda] to refuse to do it, in 

terms of providing it to the FBI. I advised him 

that those were his private business documents. . . . 

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PARKINSON v. DOJ 17

. . .

Q: . . . How are those records his private records 

that he is not to share with FBI, who has entered 

into an agreement with him? If he’s not paying 

that money, if he has paid nothing, FBI could pull 

out of the lease. They have every right to see it. I 

don’t know why you’re classifying this as his private records?

A: I can’t agree with you on this point because, as 

a private businessman, a private person, issuing 

funds that are his personal funds to improve his 

building, which he owns [in] fee simple, that is 

solely his business.”

J.A. 711–13. No evidence contradicts that this was Parkinson’s reason for insisting on the distinction. The 

Board’s simple disbelief of Parkinson is not sufficient to 

thus conclude that Parkinson knew he was not being 

forthright and complete.

To be clear, the issue is not whether he, in fact, asked 

or told Rodda to withhold the receipts. The issue is 

whether the choice of words in these circumstances is 

alone enough to meet the agency’s burden of showing that 

Parkinson “knowingly” failed to be fully forthright. It is 

not.

We thus hold that the lack of candor charge with respect to the ask/tell distinction is unsupported by substantial evidence.

2. Pre-Approval/Ratification

The Board found that Parkinson exhibited a lack of 

candor when he testified that: “Nothing was done with 

any of the tenant improvement funds that was not approved by [Rodda].” See J.A. 635. The Board so held 

because it concluded that the statement “provides an 

appearance of pre-approval by the landlord of the expensCase: 15-3066 Document: 31-2 Page: 17 Filed: 02/29/2016
18 PARKINSON v. DOJ

es,” and “for the appellant’s statement to OIG to have 

been accurate and complete, he would have had to explain 

the approvals were after-the-fact ratifications, not explicit 

pre-expenditure authorizations to spend the funds in 

particular ways.” With little further analysis, the Board 

found that “in the absence of any other plausible explanation for his misstatement . . . the appellant made it to 

deceive OIG about the extent of the landlord’s involvement in approving the expenditures.”

The problem with the Board’s analysis of Parkinson’s 

state of mind is two-fold. First, the context of the question was whether Rodda approved the expenses, not when

he did so. Parkinson’s use of “approved” in that context 

instead of “ratified” is thus not enough to prove the necessary element of a knowing failure to be forthright. Second, “approved” is a generic way of saying “pre-approved 

or ratified,” and Parkinson’s statement could thus be read 

to be wholly accurate. Though this does not necessarily 

preclude a finding of a lack of candor based on other 

evidence of the speaker’s state of mind, the use of the 

generic term does not alone provide substantial evidence 

that Parkinson “knowingly” failed to be forthright.

We thus hold that the lack of candor charge with respect to the pre-approval/ratification distinction is unsupported by substantial evidence.

D. Availability of Judicial Review of Parkinson’s 

USERRA and Whistleblower Claims

It is undisputed in this case that Parkinson has no 

right to assert before the Board an individual right of 

action under the Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. 

§ 1201 et seq., or the Uniformed Services Employment and 

Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (“USERRA”), 38 U.S.C. 

§ 4301 et seq. The issue here is whether a preference 

eligible FBI agent with the right to appeal an adverse 

personnel action before the Board is foreclosed from 

asserting USERRA violations and whistleblower reprisal 

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PARKINSON v. DOJ 19

as affirmative defenses in such an appeal to the Board. 

These are issues of first impression in this court.

There is no dispute in this case that the Board has jurisdiction to consider the propriety of Parkinson’s removal 

by the FBI as a whole. The chain of statutes creating this 

jurisdiction, and defining allowable affirmative defenses 

is as follows. Title 5, section 7513(a) allows an “agency” to 

“take an action covered by this subchapter [(titled “Removal, Suspension for More than 14 Days, Reduction in 

Grade or Pay, or Furlough for 30 Days or Less”)] against 

an employee only for such cause as will promote the 

efficiency of the service.” That same section creates a 

judicial enforcement mechanism for this provision, by 

providing that “An employee against whom an action is 

taken under this section is entitled to appeal to the Merit 

Systems Protection Board under section 7701 of this 

title.” 5 U.S.C. § 7513(d).

Most FBI personnel are not afforded this judicial enforcement mechanism because § 7511(b) states: “This 

subchapter does not apply to an employee . . . (8) whose 

position is within the . . . Federal Bureau of Investigation.” However, the statute voids the exception for employees of the FBI for whom “subsection [5 U.S.C. 

§ 7511(a)(1)(B)] of this section . . . is the basis for this 

subchapter’s applicability.” 5 U.S.C. § 7511(b)(8). Section 7511(a)(1)(B) defines an Employee as “a preference 

eligible in the excepted service who has completed 1 year 

of current continuous service in the same or similar 

position[]—(i) in an Executive Agency.”4 In other words, 

preference eligible FBI employees against whom adverse 

employment action has been taken may appeal such 

action to the Board, though non-preference eligible FBI 

employees do not have such a right.

 

4 It is undisputed that the FBI is “an Executive 

Agency” for purposes of this subchapter.

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20 PARKINSON v. DOJ

Title 5, U.S. Code, section 7701, the Board’s general 

jurisdictional statute, provides that “[a]n employee, or 

applicant for employment, may submit an appeal to the 

Merit Systems Protection Board from any action which is 

appealable to the Board under any law, rule, or regulation.” The Board may sustain the agency decision: “Subject to paragraph (2) of this subsection . . . only if the 

agency’s decision . . . (B) . . . is supported by a preponderance of the evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(1). This section 

forms the basis of Parkinson’s challenges to the factual 

bases of the lack of candor and obstruction of the OPR 

process charges above.

Paragraph (2) goes on to preclude the Board from sustaining agency decisions as follows: 

(2) Notwithstanding [5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)] paragraph (1), the agency’s decision may not be sustained under subsection (b) of this section if the 

employee or applicant for employment – 

. . .

(B) shows that the decision was based on 

any prohibited personnel practice described in section 2302(b) of this title; or

(C) shows that the decision was not in accordance with law.

5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2).5 The Government and Parkinson 

agree that this section generally allows petitioners to 

 

5 Section § 7701(c)(2)(B) uses the phrase “prohibited 

personnel practice described in section 2302(b),” and 

section 2302(b) uses the phrase “personnel action.” Section 2302(a)(1) defines “prohibited personnel practice” as 

“any action described in subsection (b).” Neither Parkinson nor the Government distinguishes between the 

phrases “personnel practice” and “personnel action.”

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PARKINSON v. DOJ 21

assert certain affirmative defenses to contest agency 

personnel decisions. The parties disagree whether Parkinson, as an FBI agent, can assert the Whistleblower 

Protection Act and USERRA rights as affirmative defenses under §§ 7701(c)(2)(B) or (C). 

The relevant whistleblower protections are codified, 

inter alia, in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b) (emphasis added): “Any 

employee who has authority to take, direct others to take, 

recommend, or approve any personnel action, shall not, 

with respect to such authority . . . (8) take or fail to take, 

or threaten to take or fail to take, personnel action with 

respect to any employee or applicant for employment 

because of (A) any disclosure of information by an employee or applicant which the employee or applicant 

reasonably believes evidences (i) any violation of any law, 

rule, or regulation . . . [or] (11)(A) knowingly take, recommend, or approve any personnel action if the taking of 

such action would violate a veterans’ preference requirement.” Section 2302(a)(2)(A) (emphasis added) defines a 

“personnel action” as, inter alia, “(iii) an action under 

chapter 75 of this title or other disciplinary or corrective 

action [including removal]. . . with respect to an employee 

in, or applicant for, a covered position in an agency.” In 

turn, section 2302(a)(2)(C) (emphasis added) defines 

“agency” as “an Executive Agency and the Government 

Publishing Office, but does not include . . . the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation.” 

A divided Board here dismissed Parkinson’s whistleblower reprisal and USERRA affirmative defenses, relying on its previous decision in Van Lancker v. Department 

of Justice, 119 M.S.P.R. 514 (2013). In Van Lancker, 

another divided Board dismissed a preference eligible FBI 

agent’s affirmative defense of whistleblower retaliation, 

holding that “The FBI is specifically excluded from coverage under 5 U.S.C. § 2302, and therefore the reference to 

2302(b) in section 7701(c) is inapplicable to FBI employees.” 119 M.S.P.R. at 517. The Board reasoned that 

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22 PARKINSON v. DOJ

Congress could have carved out an exception to the prohibition in § 2302 for preference eligible employees, or 

“refrain[ed] from referencing section 2302(b) exclusively 

in section 7701(c)(2)(B)” in defining a prohibited personnel 

practice. Id. at 517–18. Finally, the Board distinguished 

cases where it had allowed affirmative defenses of whistleblower reprisal by preference eligible Postal Service 

employees—though those employees too are generally 

excluded from coverage under § 2302. It distinguished 

Postal Service and FBI employees because of the likelihood of sensitive information being revealed with respect 

to FBI whistleblowers and Congressional intent that FBI 

whistleblower claims be resolved internally, as manifested by Congress’s creation of § 2303 to provide a separate 

internal enforcement mechanism for whistleblower claims 

by FBI agents. See id. at 518–19 (discussing Mack v. 

U.S.P.S., 48 M.S.P.R. 617 (1991) and Butler v. U.S.P.S., 

10 M.S.P.R. 45 (1982)). The Board here added that 

§ 7701(c)(2)(C) could not allow Parkinson’s whistleblower 

affirmative defense because, though whistleblower retaliation against FBI employees generally is not in accordance with the law under § 2303, the Board has no review 

authority over violations of that section in whatever 

posture presented.

Vice Chairman Wagner filed dissenting opinions in 

both Van Lancker and in this case. In Van Lancker, Vice 

Chairman Wagner argued that “the existence of section 

2302 does not justify disregarding the holdings in Butler

and Mack,” since both the Postal Service and the FBI are 

excluded from individual causes of action under § 2302 

and both have internal procedures for enforcement of 

whistleblower retaliation claims. Van Lancker, 

119 M.S.P.R. at 524–25. Vice Chairman Wagner reiterated that position in her dissent in this case.

Parkinson argues that: 1) Van Lancker was wrongly 

decided because the exclusion of the FBI as an “agency” in 

§ 2302(a) only applies to claims made under § 2302 and 

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PARKINSON v. DOJ 23

not to affirmative defenses where the Board otherwise has 

jurisdiction over the personnel action; 2) there is no 

principled way to distinguish Parkinson’s case from the 

preference eligible postal workers in Mack and Butler; 

and 3) the “not in accordance with law” provision in 

§ 7701(c)(2)(C) may use the prohibition against whistleblower retaliation at the FBI found in § 2303 and against 

USERRA violations at the FBI found in 38 U.S.C. § 4325 

as affirmative defenses. 

1. Whistleblower Retaliation Defense

With regard to his whistleblower defense, we agree 

with Parkinson. As a preference eligible FBI agent, 

Parkinson was an “employee” under § 7511, with the right 

to appeal his removal to the Board under 5 U.S.C. 

§§ 7513(d) and 7701. Section 7701(c)(2)(C) unambiguously provides, inter alia, that “the agency’s decision may not 

be sustained under subsection (b) of this section if the 

employee . . . (C) shows that the decision was not in 

accordance with law.”

Section 2303 unambiguously prohibits whistleblower 

reprisal at the FBI:

Any employee of the Federal Bureau of Investigation . . . shall not . . . take or fail to take any personnel action with respect to any employee of the 

Bureau as reprisal for a disclosure of information 

by the employee to the Attorney General (or an 

employee designated by the Attorney General for 

such purpose) which the employee or applicant 

reasonably believes evidences – (1) a violation of 

any law, rule, or regulation.

5 U.S.C. § 2303(a). The statute goes on to define “personnel action” as “any action described in clauses (i) through 

(x) of section 2302(a)(2)(A) of this title with respect to an 

employee in, or applicant for, a position in the Bureau.” 

Id. Section 2302(a)(2)(A)(iii) covers adverse actions under 

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24 PARKINSON v. DOJ

chapter 75, such as the removal taken here against Parkinson. Thus, if Parkinson was removed in reprisal for 

his whistleblowing disclosures, his removal would be “not 

in accordance with law,” and the Board would be statutorily prohibited from sustaining the agency’s decision to 

remove Parkinson.

The only issue is whether the creation of an FBIspecific enforcement mechanism for whistleblower retaliation in § 2303 preempts the availability of an affirmative 

defense of whistleblower retaliation by a preference 

eligible FBI employee before the MSPB.

The Government offers three arguments why it does. 

First, the Government emphasizes that the statutory 

language in § 7701(c)(2)(B) does not support a distinction 

between individual causes of action and affirmative 

defenses. In either case, the FBI is not an “agency” and is 

thus incapable of taking “personnel action” under 5 U.S.C 

§ 2302(a). Thus, the Government argues, Parkinson 

cannot show that the FBI’s removal decision “was based 

on any prohibited personnel practice described in section 

2302(b)” for purposes of 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2)(B), even as 

an affirmative defense. The Government notes that the 

Supreme Court has stated that Congress exempted the 

FBI from “the requirements of Section 2302(b)(8)(A) 

entirely,” Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. MacLean, 135 S. Ct. 

913, 923–24 (2015). Even assuming without deciding that 

the reference in § 7701(c)(2)(B) to “prohibited personnel 

practice described in section 2302(b)” necessarily excludes 

Parkinson’s affirmative defenses, such a determination 

does not undermine Parkinson’s argument under 

§ 7701(c)(2)(C) that his removal was not in accordance 

with the whistleblower law directly applicable to FBI 

personnel, i.e., § 2303. 

Second, the Government argues that § 7701(c)(2)(C), 

as a general “catch-all” provision, cannot “evade 

[§ 7701(c)(2)(C)’s] clear limitations to section 2302,” 

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PARKINSON v. DOJ 25

because, as a general rule, the “specific [statutory provision] governs the general [statutory provision], as explained in Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 

374, 384 (1992). Section 7701(c)(2)(B) and (C) do not 

stand in a specific/general relation to one another with 

respect to the FBI. If it is true, as the Government argues, that the FBI is incapable of taking a prohibited 

personal action under § 2302(b), then § 7701(c)(2)(B) says 

nothing about affirmative defenses available to FBI 

employees, and there can be no conflict between the 

“specific” provision of § 7701(c)(2)(B) and the “general” 

provision of § 7701(c)(2)(C). The FBI’s exclusion from the 

definition of an “agency” in § 2302(a)(2)(A) does not mean 

that an FBI decision based on the prohibited personnel 

practices described in § 2302(b) would thus be in accordance with law. To the contrary, as evidenced by § 2303, 

the prohibited personnel practices at issue here are prohibited by law at the FBI. In other words, although the 

FBI is excluded from the scope of § 7701(c)(2)(B), that 

subsection does not prohibit the applicability of 

§ 7701(c)(2)(C) to the FBI. 

Finally, the Government argues that even if 

§ 7701(c)(2)(C) could be used as a basis for Parkinson’s 

affirmative defense, § 2303 cannot form the predicate 

violation of law because that section gives the Attorney 

General the power to promulgate regulations to prevent 

whistleblower reprisals, and gives the President the 

power to enforce § 2303, and these powers are to be exercised in a way that did not provide for judicial review with 

the Board and this court. In other words, the Government argues that the Department of Justice regulations 

promulgated under § 2303(b)—creating a non-judicial 

resolution mechanism of whistleblower retaliation claims 

at the FBI—preempt the right of preference eligible FBI 

employees from asserting whistleblower retaliation as an 

affirmative defense under § 7701(c)(2)(C). The Government also argues that whistleblower reprisal claims by 

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26 PARKINSON v. DOJ

employees in the intelligence community raise serious 

security concerns, as the Board held in Van Lancker, and 

allowing such defenses at the Board and this court violates the Congressional intent in § 2303 to resolve those 

claims within the Department of Justice. This is roughly 

the argument accepted by the dissent-in-part, “that a 

sufficiently specific remedial regime can displace an 

otherwise-available general remedy whose application 

would impair policies evident in the specific remedial 

provisions.” Dissent-in-part at 3 (citing cases).

This argument is ultimately unconvincing because it 

fails to appreciate the distinct rights Congress provided to 

preference eligible and non-preference eligible FBI employees. As discussed supra, most FBI employees have no 

right of appeal to the Board under 5 U.S.C. §§ 7701(a), 

7513(a), and 7513(d) by virtue of the exclusion of FBI 

employees from the definition of “employees” under 5 

U.S.C. § 7511(b)(8). As such, 28 C.F.R. § 27 provides an 

important, and potentially exclusive, procedure for most 

FBI employees to resolve whistleblower retaliationmotivated agency actions. Preference eligible FBI employees, however, do have a right of review over certain 

adverse agency action to the Board, and such employees 

are explicitly protected from action that is taken “not in 

accordance with law.” Neither the Government nor the 

dissent explain how the existence of internal FBI procedures for resolving whistleblower retaliation undermines 

this statutory right. Section 2303 gives to the Attorney 

General the responsibility of prescribing regulations “to 

ensure that such personnel action shall not be taken 

against an employee of the Bureau as a reprisal for any 

disclosure of information described in subsection (a) of 

this section,” and gives to the President the responsibility 

to “provide for the enforcement of this section in a manner 

consistent with applicable provisions of sections 1214 and 

1221 of this title.” 5 U.S.C. § 2303. Although the promulgated regulations do not provide for judicial review, see 28 

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PARKINSON v. DOJ 27

C.F.R. §§ 27.1–27.5, nothing in the statute prohibits 

judicial review of whistleblower retaliation claims when 

presented as affirmative defenses under a separate statute providing for such review in cases affecting preference 

eligible FBI employees.

This is not a situation where the statutory scheme evidences a clear Congressional intent to exclude whistleblower affirmative defenses from judicial review. See e.g., 

United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 452 (1988) (considering the effect of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 

including 5 U.S.C. §§ 7701, 7511 and 7513, on the appeal 

rights of non-preference eligible employees in the excepted service). To the extent that the FBI’s exclusion from 

§ 2302(b) evidences a Congressional intent to exclude the 

actions of at least some FBI employees from judicial 

review, cf. MacLean, 135 S. Ct. at 923–24 (noting in dicta 

that Congress exempted the FBI from “the requirements 

of Section 2302(b)(8)(A) entirely”),6 such a determination 

is more than balanced by the Congressional intent 

evinced by the explicit statutory right given to preference 

eligible FBI agents to have adverse employment actions 

judicially reviewed and to allow affirmative defenses 

based on violations of law presented during such a review. 

 

6 MacLean concerned a Department of Homeland 

Security employee’s eligibility to challenge his removal 

under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) for making disclosures of 

sensitive information. Unlike the FBI, Homeland Security is not one of the agencies listed in 5 U.S.C. 

§ 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii)(I), and the issue was whether an exception withholding whistleblower protection for statements 

prohibited by law extends to statements prohibited by 

regulation. The availability of an affirmative defense to a 

preference eligible FBI employee under 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7701(c)(2)(C) or § 7701(c)(2)(B) was simply not at issue 

in that case.

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28 PARKINSON v. DOJ

Section 7701(c)(2)(C) does not exclude FBI employees, and 

§ 2303 does not prohibit judicial review. In the absence of 

a clearer Congressional mandate, and in light of Congress’s solicitous treatment of preference eligible FBI 

employees, we decline the Government’s invitation to read 

§ 2303 to impliedly overrule the explicit statutory availability of affirmative defenses under § 7701(c)(2)(C). 

The legislative history of the 1978 Act manifests an 

intention that the appeal rights of preference eligible FBI 

agents be grouped with other preference eligibles rather 

than other FBI employees. Title 5, Sections 7701, 7511, 

7513, 2302, and 2303 were all part of the Civil Service 

Reform Act of 1978. That Act abolished the Civil Service 

Commission, and assigned its adjudicative functions to 

the Merit Systems Protection Board. S. Rep. 95-969, at 5 

(1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2723, 2727. At 

that time, preference eligible veterans, including preference eligible FBI employees, already had the right to 

appeal their removal to the Civil Service Commission 

under Section 14 the Veterans’ Preference Act of 1944, 58 

Stat. 390, as amended 61 Stat. 723 (“[A] preference eligible . . . shall have the right to appeal to the Civil Service 

Commission from an adverse decision of the administrative officer.”). Preference eligible FBI agents could exercise this right just as well as preference eligible employees 

of other agencies. See id. (granting appeal rights to 

preference eligible employees “in any establishment, 

agency, bureau, administration, project, or department” 

without qualification on agency); Chastain v. Kelley, 510 

F.2d 1232, 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (discussing preference 

eligible FBI agent’s rights under the Veterans Preference 

Act). Cf. Carter v. United States, 407 F.2d 1238, 1242 

& n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (“Because of the exemption of the 

FBI from the civil service laws, the Bureau is generally 

free to discharge its employees for any reasons it chooses,” 

but “like any other employer, the FBI is subject to the 

provisions of § 9(c) of the Universal Military Training and 

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PARKINSON v. DOJ 29

Service Act by which Congress granted special rights and 

protections to the returning veteran,” though that agent 

could not appeal to the Civil Service Commission because 

he was not preference eligible).

The focus of the 1978 Act was to expand the procedural and substantive employment rights of nonpreference eligible members of the excepted service. H.R. 

Rep. No. 101-328, at 3, as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 

695, 697 (“The key difference between the protections 

available to competitive service employees and preference 

eligibles in the excepted service, on the one hand, and 

excepted service employees who are not preference eligibles, on the other, is the right to appeal an adverse action 

to the Merit Systems Protection Board for independent 

review. H.R. 3086 eliminates that difference.”). The 1978 

Act was not intended to restrict the rights of preference 

eligible employees at the FBI:

The bill limits the procedural protections for employees of . . . the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

(FBI) . . . solely to preference eligibles, thereby 

preserving the status quo. The committee preserved the status quo in relation to the FBI and 

NSA because of their sensitive missions.

Id. at 699. See also id. at 697 (“An estimated 30 to 40 

percent of the remaining 445,700 excepted service employees already have appeal rights because they are 

veterans preference eligible.”). Although the Act did not 

extend Board appeal rights for FBI employees, nothing in 

the text or legislative history with respect to §§ 2302, 

2303, 7511, 7513, or 7701 suggests that Congress intended to curtail rights already extant—such as those available to preference eligible employees. Congress 

maintained this right despite a clear recognition of the 

security concerns of doing so. This is in contrast to employees of “some agencies, such as the Central Intelligence Agency and the General Accounting Office, [where] 

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30 PARKINSON v. DOJ

even veterans do not have appeal rights.” Id. The FBI’s 

exclusion from § 2302 and the creation of a separate 

offensive enforcement mechanism for FBI whistleblowers 

in § 2303 should thus not be read to undermine by implication rights already extant before 1978.

The dissent-in-part’s cited cases are not to the contrary. For example, United States v. Bormes, 133 S.Ct. 12, 

18 (2012) held that the Little Tucker Act is not available 

as a waiver of sovereign immunity because the Fair 

Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) “contains its own judicial 

remedies” for its violation. The case further held that the 

Little Tucker Act is available only where “no special 

remedy has been provided,” and the FCRA created a 

detailed remedial scheme with particular rights, that was 

“plaintiff-specific,” and “precisely defined the appropriate 

forum.” Id. However, that case says nothing about the 

scope of proper adjudication where judicial review is 

already clearly available (under § 7513 and § 7701). In 

RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC. v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 

S. Ct. 2065, 2071 (2012), the Supreme Court addressed 

the interaction between two statutory provisions for 

repayment of a creditor by a bankruptcy debtor: one 

provision (clause (ii)) allowing a sale of a property and 

repayment with the proceeds—but requiring the debtor to 

allow a creditor “credit-bid”—and a second catch-all 

provision (clause (iii)) allowing repayment with the “indubitable equivalent” of the value of the creditor property. 

The Supreme Court precluded a mechanism equivalent to 

the first provision but without the “credit-bid” option 

using the second provision because otherwise the general 

provision would swallow up the specific one. This case too 

cannot apply to the instant situation—the FBI’s exclusion 

from § 2302(b) was not directed to the availability of an 

affirmative defense for a preference eligible with independent Board appeal rights, and the FBI is not excluded 

in § 7701(c)(2)(B). As such, the allowance of the whistleblower defense to the FBI here under § 7701(c)(2)(C) 

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PARKINSON v. DOJ 31

would not swallow up the specific provision. The remainder of the cited cases are similarly inapposite.

Our decision is bolstered by consideration of

5 U.S.C. §§ 1214 and 1221. See 5 U.S.C. § 2303(c) (“The 

President shall provide for the enforcement of this section 

in a manner consistent with applicable provisions of 

sections 1214 and 1221 of this title.”). Those sections 

allow employees with “the right to appeal directly to the 

Merit Systems Protection Board under any law, rule, or 

regulation” to seek corrective action for prohibited personnel action first to the Board, whereas other employees 

must first seek corrective action from Special Counsel. 

See 5 U.S.C. §§ 1221(a), (b), and 1213(a)(3). 

We therefore reverse the Board’s decision prohibiting 

Parkinson from raising the affirmative defense of Whistleblower retaliation under 5 U.S.C. § 2303.

2. USERRA Violation Affirmative Defense

Similarly, Parkinson argues that his removal would 

be not in accord with law under § 7701(c)(2)(C) if it is 

brought in violation of USERRA. In contrast to the 

whistleblower retaliation defense, however, the USERRA 

violation claims do manifest a clear Congressional will to 

withhold all judicial review of USERRA violations for FBI 

agents.

Parkinson does not explain the specific USERRA violation herein, and cites only 38 U.S.C. § 4315. That 

section, titled “Reemployment By Certain Federal Agencies” provides, inter alia, as follows: 

(a) The head of each agency referred to in section 

2302(a)(2)(C)(ii) of title 5 [including the FBI] shall 

prescribe procedures for ensuring that the rights 

under this chapter apply to the employees of such 

agency.

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32 PARKINSON v. DOJ

(b) In prescribing procedures under subsection (a), 

the head of an agency referred to in that subsection shall ensure, to the maximum extent practicable, that the procedures of the agency for 

reemploying persons who serve in the uniformed 

services provide for the reemployment of such 

persons in the agency in a manner similar to the 

manner of reemployment described in section 

4313.

Section 4315 goes on to wholly exclude the FBI’s determination of reemployability under that section from judicial 

review as follows:

(c) (1) The procedures prescribed under subsection 

(a) shall designate an official at the agency who 

shall determine whether or not the reemployment 

of a person referred to in subsection (b) by the 

agency is impossible or unreasonable.

(2) Upon making a determination that the 

reemployment by the agency of a person referred 

to in subsection (b) is impossible or unreasonable, 

the official referred to in paragraph (1) shall notify the person and the Director of the Office of Personnel Management of such determination.

(3) A determination pursuant to this subsection 

shall not be subject to judicial review.

(emphasis added). Unlike 5 U.S.C. § 2303(a), which sets 

forth a procedure for the internal resolution of whistleblower rights, 38 U.S.C. § 4315 explicitly indicates that 

the substantive determination of reemployability “shall 

not be subject to judicial review.” Although such a prohibition applies by its terms only for “a determination

pursuant to this subsection,” i.e., pursuant to internal 

agency procedures, the Congressional intent to insulate 

the substantive determination from judicial review would

be frustrated by allowance of judicial review under 5 

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PARKINSON v. DOJ 33

U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2). Cf. Dew v. United States, 192 F.3d 

366, 371–72 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345 (1984)) (“‘Whether and to 

what extent a particular statute [provides or] precludes 

judicial review is determined not only from its express 

language, but also from the structure of the statutory 

scheme, its objectives, its legislative history, and the 

nature of the administrative action involved.’”). We note 

also that unlike the whistleblower act, which protects 

both veteran and non-veteran employees, USERRA by its 

terms applies only to veterans. See 38 U.S.C. § 4303 

(defining “service in the uniformed services”) and 38 

U.S.C. §§ 4311–4312 (prohibiting certain acts against 

those who “serve in the uniformed services”). As such, it 

makes little sense to allow Parkinson—by virtue of his 

having served in the military service—access to judicial 

review over an affirmative defense grounded in a 

USERRA violation, when claims by others who have 

served are explicitly insulated from judicial review.

Congress’s coupling of a specific procedure for enforcing USERRA reemployment violations at the FBI and 

similar agencies, coupled with an affirmative prohibition 

on judicial review of the substantive determination made 

thereby, leads us to conclude that Congress intended to 

exclude the substantive determination from judicial 

review of any kind, including when presented in the 

context of an affirmative defense under 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7701(c)(2).

E. Remand

In light of our disposition reversing the lack of candor 

determination, lifting the Board’s prohibition of Parkinson’s whistleblower retaliation defense, and sustaining

the obstruction charge and the Board’s prohibition of 

Parkinson’s USERRA defense, we vacate the Board’s 

affirmance of Parkinson’s removal and remand. On 

remand, the only matters remaining for consideration are 

Case: 15-3066 Document: 31-2 Page: 33 Filed: 02/29/2016
34 PARKINSON v. DOJ

the obstruction charge, Parkinson’s whistleblowerreprisal defense thereto and the appropriate penalty, if 

any, after such consideration.

We note that the penalty determination section of the 

FBI’s dismissal letter relating to the obstruction charge 

states:

The investigation also established you violated FBI Offense Code 2.11 (OPR Matter – Obstruction). The standard penalty for this offense is a 

ten-day suspension. Mitigating factors warrant a 

three- to seven-day suspension. Aggravating factors warrant a fifteen-day suspension to dismissal.

Your misconduct was repeated. You not only 

had Person # 1 [Rodda, it seems] sign a document, 

prepared by you, setting out the facts concerning a 

check for $1,215.67 written directly to you, but also contacted SA # 2, after the OIG investigation 

had begun, and questioned her regarding her recollection of witnessing the paying of a laborer in 

cash, prior to her interview. Based on the circumstances of this case, I would normally impose a 30-

day suspension for your 2.11 offense, aggravated 

due to the multiple occurrences of attempting to 

influence witness statements. However, since I 

am dismissing you for your 4.5, 5.22, and 2.6 offenses, I am not imposing a separate sanction for 

your 2.11 offense.

J.A. 114–15. We note also the AJ’s observation at J.A. 16 

that “[t]his was not an especially egregious case of obstruction. The agency did not prove that the written 

statement [Parkinson] drafted for the landlord was incorrect or that he asked the landlord to lie about anything. Tr. 105, 116. The agency’s proposal suggested that 

this was the least serious of the charges, and that on its 

Case: 15-3066 Document: 31-2 Page: 34 Filed: 02/29/2016
PARKINSON v. DOJ 35

own it would have merited only a suspension rather than 

removal.” 

From the foregoing, it should be appreciated by the 

Board on remand that the penalty of removal, which was 

predicated on the now overturned lack of candor charge, 

cannot be sustained. Moreover, this court and the Board 

have made clear that, when “the Board sustains fewer 

than all of the agency’s charges,” the Board must defer to 

the agency’s clear statement in “its final decision . . . that 

it desires a lesser penalty [than the maximum reasonable 

penalty] be imposed on fewer charges.” J.A. 49 (Board 

decision in this case) (citing Lachance v. Devall, 178 F.3d 

1246, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Accordingly, the maximum 

penalty that can be sustained by the Board for the sole 

charge remaining in this case is a suspension of up to 30 

days. Whether and to what extent the FBI, in the Board 

proceedings, has established more than the single instance of obstruction noted in the AJ’s opinion at J.A. 14–

16 and the Board’s opinion at J.A. 38–40, or any other 

basis to warrant greater than a 10-day suspension for the 

obstruction charge is a question to be determined by the 

Board on remand. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Board’s decision relating to the lack of candor charge is reversed, its decision 

relating to the obstruction charge is vacated and the case 

is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion.

REVERSED-IN-PART, VACATED-IN-PART AND 

REMANDED

COSTS

Each party shall bear its own costs. 

Case: 15-3066 Document: 31-2 Page: 35 Filed: 02/29/2016
United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

JOHN C. PARKINSON,

Petitioner

v.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Respondent

______________________ 

2015-3066

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. SF-0752-13-0032-I-2.

______________________ 

TARANTO, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part. 

I join the court’s opinion except for the analysis of 

whistleblower reprisal, centered on Part II.D.1. In that 

portion of its opinion, the court holds that the Merit 

Systems Protection Board, in exercising its undisputed 

authority to review Mr. Parkinson’s removal from his FBI 

position, see 5 U.S.C. §§ 7512, 7701, must adjudicate in 

particular Mr. Parkinson’s claim that the removal constituted whistleblower reprisal in violation of 5 U.S.C. 

§ 2303. I would hold, in agreement with the Board, that 

the Board may not decide that issue in deciding Mr. 

Parkinson’s challenge to his removal. 

It is plain under the statute that the prohibitions on 

whistleblower reprisal codified in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) do 

not apply to the FBI: Congress expressly carved the FBI 

Case: 15-3066 Document: 31-2 Page: 36 Filed: 02/29/2016
2 PARKINSON v. DOJ

out of the definition of “agency” governing § 2302(b)’s 

coverage. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A), (C). The FBI’s reprisal 

against an employee for whistleblowing is addressed by a 

separate provision, § 2303, which provides more limited 

protection than § 2302(b)—protecting from reprisal only

whistleblower disclosures made “to the Attorney General”

(or her designee), not disclosures made to outsiders. 

§ 2303(a). With § 2302(b)(8) inapplicable, Mr. Parkinson’s 

whistleblower-reprisal contention is necessarily a contention that the FBI violated § 2303, as Mr. Parkinson made 

explicit in his Petition for Review to the Board. J.A. 964.

To seek relief from the Board based on § 2303—for 

what is undisputedly an adverse action (removal) within 

the Board’s review authority, 5 U.S.C. § 7512—Mr. Parkinson invokes 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2). In relevant part, 

that provision instructs the Board that “the agency’s 

decision may not be sustained if the employee or applicant 

for employment . . . (B) shows that the decision was based 

on any prohibited personnel practice described in section 

2302(b) of this title; or (C) shows that the decision was not 

in accordance with law.” Mr. Parkinson cannot invoke 

(B), but he invokes (C). He argues that the FBI’s removal 

of him was a whistleblower reprisal forbidden by § 2303, 

hence “not in accordance with law,” requiring that his 

removal be set aside.

I would reject the contention that § 2303 violations 

come within the “not in accordance with law” directive to 

the Board. I would read § 2303 as sufficiently embodying 

a determination by Congress, the President, and the 

Attorney General that § 2303 claims of FBI reprisal for 

whistleblower disclosures made to the Attorney General 

(the only disclosures protected by § 2303) are outside the 

Board’s jurisdiction and within the full and final control of 

the Attorney General. No provision so states expressly. 

But the limit on Board review of § 2303 issues seems to 

me a clear enough implication of the congressional and 

executive decisions that I would find § 7701(c)(2)(C)

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PARKINSON v. DOJ 3

inapplicable under the principle that a sufficiently specific 

remedial regime can displace an otherwise-available 

general remedy whose application would impair policies 

evident in the specific remedial provisions. See, e.g.,

United States v. Bormes, 133 S. Ct. 12, 18 (2012); RadLAX 

Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 

2065, 2071 (2012); Hinck v. United States, 550 U.S. 501, 

507–08 (2007); EC Term of Years Trust v. United States, 

550 U.S. 429, 433–34 (2007); Block v. North Dakota ex rel. 

Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 285 (1983); 

Brown v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 831–33 

(1976). 

When Congress enacted the Civil Service Reform Act 

of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (1978), it defined a series of “prohibited personnel practices” in 

§ 2302, which included, in § 2302(b)(8), a bar on whistleblower reprisal. See 92 Stat. at 1115–16. But Congress 

expressly made that provision inapplicable to the FBI. 92 

Stat. at 1115. It enacted a separate section, § 2303, to 

protect against some whistleblower reprisals by the FBI. 

In subsection (a), Congress stated a limited reprisal rule 

to govern the FBI, protecting only disclosures made to the 

Attorney General or her designee, not disclosures made to 

anyone else. 92 Stat. at 1117–18. In subsection (b), 

Congress provided that the Attorney General should 

promulgate regulations to ensure compliance with the 

reprisal bar. And in subsection (c), Congress declared 

that “[t]he President shall provide for the enforcement of 

this section in a manner consistent with the provisions of

section 1206 of this title.” 92 Stat. at 1117–18.

The referred-to section 1206 was the 1978 Act’s provision defining the authority and duty of the Board’s Special Counsel to investigate prohibited personnel practices. 

See 92 Stat. at 1125–30. Neither that provision nor 

others provided employees a general right to seek Board 

review of whistleblower reprisal. But 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7701(c)(2) was part of the 1978 Act, see 92 Stat. at 1138,

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4 PARKINSON v. DOJ

and that provision authorized the Board to hear (and the 

Board did hear) whistleblower-reprisal and other prohibited-personnel-action challenges asserted by employees 

who had been subjected to otherwise-appealable adverse 

actions such as removals, with the Board’s decisions then 

subject to judicial review. See Knollenberg v. MSPB, 953 

F.2d 623, 625 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Hagmeyer v. Dep’t of 

Treasury, 757 F.2d 1281, 1283–84 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Sullivan v. Dep’t of Navy, 720 F.2d 1266, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 

In particular, as already noted, Congress separately 

directed the Board not to sustain an agency decision 

within its reviewing authority if the challenger “(B) shows 

that the decision was based on any prohibited personnel 

practice described in section 2302(b)” or “(C) shows that 

the decision was not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7701(c)(2). It is conspicuous that Congress, having 

carved the FBI out of § 2302(b) and adopted § 2303 as a 

limited FBI-specific counterpart, chose not to include 

§ 2303 in the provision of § 7701(c)(2) specifically addressing prohibited personnel practices, despite the overlap of 

whistleblower-reprisal subject matter. That omission on 

its face tends to suggest that Congress was excluding FBI 

whistleblower reprisal from Board review, notwithstanding the catchall “not in accordance with law” language.

In 1989, Congress enacted the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (1989). 

That Act strengthened the general whistleblower protections of § 2302(b)(8). Among other things, the 1989 Act

created a new Office of Special Counsel (OSC) with various powers, see 5 U.S.C. §§ 1211–19; 103 Stat. at 19–29, 

and it also specifically provided a new Individual Right of 

Action, see 5 U.S.C. §§ 1214(a)(3), 1221, by which an 

employee, applicant, or former employee may bring to the 

Board whistleblower claims covered by § 2302(b)(8), see 

103 Stat. at 24, 29–31. Those provisions replaced the 

former 5 U.S.C. § 1206, which now provides for certain 

annual reports. See 103 Stat. at 18–19. The 1989 Act 

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PARKINSON v. DOJ 5

made only one change in the limited FBI-specific whistleblower-reprisal provision, § 2303. It changed subsection 

(c)’s reference to “the provisions of section 1206” so that 

the provision now directs the President to provide for 

enforcement in a manner consistent with “applicable 

provisions of sections 1214 and 1221.” See 103 Stat. at 34.

In 1997, the President formally delegated to the Attorney General his responsibilities under § 2303(c) to 

establish means for enforcing the limited reprisal protection of § 2303(a). Memorandum, Delegation of Responsibilities Concerning FBI Employees Under the Civil 

Service Reform Act of 1978, 62 Fed. Reg. 23,123 (Apr. 14, 

1997). The President directed the Attorney General “to 

establish appropriate processes within the Department of 

Justice to carry out these functions.” Id. (emphasis added). 

The Attorney General, after adopting an interim rule 

in 1998, adopted a final rule to govern § 2303 in November 1999. 64 Fed. Reg. 58,782, 58,786–88 (Nov. 1, 1999)

(adopting 28 C.F.R. §§ 27.1–27.6). Like the interim rule, 

the final rule establishes the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) and the Office of Inspector General 

(OIG) as investigative authorities (each labeled a “Conducting Office”), and it designates the Director of the 

Office of Attorney Personnel Management (Director) to 

“decide whistleblower reprisal claims presented to her by 

OPR or OIG.” Id. at 58,783. The Attorney General explained that “the roles and functions of the Conducting 

Office and the Director are thus analogous to those of the 

OSC and MSPB, respectively, in whistleblower cases 

involving federal employees generally.” Id. 

She then explained a crucial difference—the retention 

of internal Department control of § 2303 matters. “One 

fundamental difference, however, between the two systems is that the procedures provided in the interim rule 

[not changed in the final rule in this respect] are entirely 

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6 PARKINSON v. DOJ

internal to the Department.” Id. She cited in support of 

that determination (a) the fact that the only protected 

disclosures are certain disclosures within the Department, (b) the President’s 1997 directive to establish 

processes within the Department, and (c) legislative 

history to the effect that “‘appeals would not be to the 

outside but to the Attorney General.’” Id. (quoting 124 

Cong. Rec. 28,770 (1978) (pre-Conference statement of 

Representative Udall, who came to chair the Conference 

Committee on the Civil Service Reform Act in 1978). The 

Attorney General reiterated the point in rejecting a

comment suggesting that the statute required “entities 

external to and independent of the Department” to carry 

out the § 2303 roles. Id. at 57,785. “If Congress had 

wanted to provide FBI employees with fora outside the 

Department to address their whistleblower reprisal 

claims, it could have included them in the OSC/MSPB 

scheme. The fact that Congress did not do so, see 5 U.S.C. 

2302(a)(2)(C)(ii), strongly suggests that Congress, in 

enacting section 2303, did not envision the creation of 

external entities to perform the OSC/MSPB functions.” 

64 Fed. Reg. at 58,785–86. 

Rounding out the relevant legal materials is what the 

Conference Committee said in explaining the conference 

bill that was adopted as the Civil Service Reform Act in 

1978. The Conference Committee explained: 

The conference substitute excludes the FBI from 

coverage of the prohibited personnel practices, except that matters pertaining to protection against 

reprisals for disclosure of certain information described in section 2302(b)(8) would be processed 

under special procedures similar to those provided 

in the House bill. The President, rather than the 

Special Counsel and the Merit Board, would have 

responsibility for enforcing this provision with respect to the FBI under section 2303.

Case: 15-3066 Document: 31-2 Page: 41 Filed: 02/29/2016
PARKINSON v. DOJ 7

S. Rep. No. 95-1272, at 128 (1978). The Conference 

Committee’s language is not limited to the special § 1206 

enforcement route. The 1978 Act being addressed by the 

Conference Committee included 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2)’s 

directive to the Board not to sustain removals and other 

adverse actions that were “not in accordance with law.”

Based on the pertinent statutory provisions, their evolution, their legislative history, and the actions of the 

President and Attorney General under the delegated 

implementation authority, I would conclude that the 

Board is not to adjudicate claims that the FBI engaged in 

whistleblower reprisal proscribed by § 2303(a). To apply 

§ 7701(c)(2)(C)’s general, catchall “not in accordance with 

law” provision would be to impair the determination—

strongly suggested by the congressional actions and 

statements, and made explicit by the President and the 

Attorney General—that resolution of such issues should 

be confined to the Department of Justice, which is the 

only recipient of disclosures protected from reprisal in the 

first place. The statutory materials provide substantial 

support for that conclusion, and given the implementation-authority grants of § 2303(b) & (c), it seems to me 

that the determination to that effect by the President and 

the Attorney General, made after the 1989 amendments,

is owed deference as a formal exercise of expressly delegated authority. 

Because this is an issue-specific exclusion from Board 

authority, I do not see why it matters that Mr. Parkinson 

is eligible to bring his removal to the Board for adjudication of other challenges under 5 U.S.C. §§ 7512–7513, 

7701. And I do not see why it should make a difference 

that Mr. Parkinson is raising the issue of whistleblower 

reprisal as an affirmative defense to his removal (he has 

the burden of persuasion), in a proceeding in which the 

FBI has the burden of affirmatively justifying the removal 

under 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(1)(B). That posture does not 

eliminate either a general concern about outside-theCase: 15-3066 Document: 31-2 Page: 42 Filed: 02/29/2016
8 PARKINSON v. DOJ

Department interference in FBI whistleblower-reprisal 

matters or a specific concern about the potential leaking 

of sensitive law-enforcement or intelligence information. 

Van Lancker v. Dep’t of Justice, 119 M.S.P.R. 514, 519 

(2013). The reasons for excluding the Board from ruling 

on the issue do not depend on the procedural posture 

before the Board.

For those reasons, I respectfully dissent from the 

holding that Mr. Parkinson may pursue his whistleblower-reprisal claim.

Case: 15-3066 Document: 31-2 Page: 43 Filed: 02/29/2016