Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02149/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02149-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Keisha Braggs
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-2149

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Eastern

* District of Missouri.

Keisha Braggs, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: October 16, 2006

Filed: October 20, 2006

___________

Before MELLOY, BEAM, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Keisha Braggs appeals the sentence imposed following a guilty plea. Because

the district court retroactively applied an amended sentencing guideline, we reverse

and remand for resentencing. 

I. BACKGROUND

Braggs worked for a temporary employment agency. In February 2005, Braggs

updated an automobile insurance spreadsheet for nationwide sales representatives for

one of the temporary agency's clients. The insurance spreadsheet contained the sales

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The indictment charged that the offense conduct occurred between June 1,

2005, and October 3, 2005, and the plea agreement specified that the offense conduct

spanned June 2005 to October 2005.

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representatives' names, addresses, social security numbers, and other personal

information. Between June 1, 2005, and October 3, 2005,1

 Braggs used this

information to open several fraudulent credit accounts, resulting in actual losses to

credit agencies in the amount of $1,987.86. 

Braggs pled guilty to fraudulent use of an unauthorized access device, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(2). At sentencing, the district court applied a twolevel enhancement for abuse of position of trust under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, granted a

two-level adjustment for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, and

calculated the advisory guidelines sentencing range at twenty-one to twenty-seven

months. The district court varied upward from the guidelines sentencing range and

ordered forty-eight months' imprisonment. Braggs appeals her sentence, alleging that

the district court erred by failing to provide Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(h)

notice, by applying a sentencing enhancement for abuse of position of trust, and by

unreasonably varying the sentence from the guidelines sentencing range. We reverse

on a different ground, related to the application of the abuse of position of trust

enhancement.

II. DISCUSSION

Braggs asserts error in the district court's application of U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3,

abuse of position of trust. We examine de novo whether the district court correctly

interpreted and applied the guidelines, reviewing findings of facts for clear error.

United States v. Mashek, 406 F.3d 1012, 1017 (8th Cir. 2005). 

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An enhancement for abuse of position of trust applies "[i]f the defendant

abused a position of public or private trust . . . in a manner that significantly

facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense." U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3. At the

time the offense conduct occurred, the guidelines commentary explained that this

enhancement applied if a defendant is in a position in which he or she enjoys

professional or managerial discretion, such as an attorney serving as a guardian, or

if a defendant is an "employee of the U.S. Postal Service who engages in the theft or

destruction of undelivered United States mail." Id. at cmt. 1 (2004 ed.). Effective

November 1, 2005, "an adjustment under this guidelines shall apply" if a defendant

"exceeds or abuses the authority of his or her position in order to obtain unlawfully,

or use without authority, any means of identification." Id. at cmt. 2(B) (2005 ed.).

The district court applied the 2005 amendment to Comment 2(B) to enhance Braggs'

guidelines sentence.

The guidelines instruct that the court shall use the Guidelines Manual in effect

at the time of sentencing. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11(a). However, if the Ex Post Facto

Clause would be violated, then the court shall use the Guidelines Manual in effect at

the time of the offense. Id. at (b)(1). The "[r]etrospective application of an amended

sentencing guideline that makes the sentence more onerous than if the court had

applied the guideline in effect at the time the crime was committed violates the Ex

Post Facto Clause." United States v. Levi, 2 F.3d 842, 844-45 (8th Cir. 1993).

Indeed, "commentary and policy statements interpreting a guideline, or prohibiting

a district court from taking a specified action, are authoritative and binding on the

courts," and thus are also laws for the purpose of ex post facto analysis. Id. at 845.

Since Braggs' guidelines sentence was enhanced to her detriment by an amendment

to the commentary which went into effect after the offense conduct, the ex post facto

Clause was violated. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. After de novo review, we decide

that the district court's application of the guidelines was erroneous because of this ex

post facto violation.

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Furthermore, this error was not waived. The plea agreement, using the 2004

Guidelines Manual, did not recommend the section 3B1.3 enhancement, and the

government argued against its application at sentencing. Braggs objected generally

to the section 3B1.3 enhancement, but neither party specifically objected to the PSR's

use of the 2005 Guidelines Manual or made an ex post facto argument at sentencing.

Though Braggs did not raise this error specifically, we determine that the error was

not waived. 

Notwithstanding her failure to object, we conclude that because Braggs did not

intentionally relinquish or abandon a known right, she did not waive this issue. This

distinction is critical, because 

[w]hereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right,

waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known

right. Waiver extinguishes a potential error under Rule 52(b). The

result is: The plain error standard only applies when a defendant

inadvertently fails to raise an objection in the district court.

United States v. Harrison, 393 F.3d 805, 806 (8th Cir. 2005) (quotations omitted).

Braggs' simple omission may be readily contrasted with the waiver found in Harrison,

in which the district court advised the parties at sentencing that the guidelines were

subject to ex post facto considerations, set forth the sentence available if the correct

guidelines were to apply, continued the sentencing hearing to a different date, and

even unsuccessfully tried to elicit an ex post facto objection from the defense. Id. at

807-08. Rather, Braggs inadvertently forfeited the ex post facto issue, which was not

discovered by the district court. Therefore, plain error review is appropriate. Id.

"We have discretion to reverse for plain error if there is 'an error that is plain,'

'that affects substantial rights,' and that 'seriously affects the fairness, integrity or

public reputation of judicial proceedings.'" United States v. Rusan, 460 F.3d 989, 992

(8th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)). Because

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the plainly erroneous application of the enhancement directly affected the sentencing

proceedings, United States v. Villareal-Amarillas, 454 F.3d 925, 931 (8th Cir. 2006),

we reverse Braggs' sentence and remand for resentencing.

III. CONCLUSION

We reverse and remand for resentencing.

______________________________

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