Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_06-cv-00585/USCOURTS-alsd-1_06-cv-00585-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robin Dial
Defendant
Hudson Salvage, Inc.
Defendant
Mary Kimbrough
Plaintiff

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

MARY KIMBROUGH, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 06-0585-WS-C

 )

ROBIN DIAL, et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (doc. 6) this action to the

Circuit Court of Clarke County, Alabama. The jurisdictional issue presented in the Motion has

been briefed and is ripe for disposition at this time.

I. Background.

On or about August 7, 2006, plaintiff Mary Kimbrough filed a Complaint in the Circuit

Court of Clarke County, Alabama against named defendants Robin Dial and Hudson Salvage,

Inc., d/b/a Hudson’s Dirt Cheap, as well as certain fictitious defendants. The Complaint alleged

that Kimbrough is a citizen of Wilcox, Alabama; that Dial is a citizen of Thomasville, Alabama,

and that Hudson Salvage is a Mississippi corporation. (Complaint, ¶¶ 1-3.)

In the Complaint, Kimbrough asserted Alabama common-law claims against Dial and

Hudson Salvage on theories of negligence and wantonness, based on her contention that she

slipped and fell on a foreign substance on the floor of Hudson Salvage’s business establishment

in Thomasville, Alabama on October 12, 2005. The Complaint alleged that defendant Dial was

the manager of Hudson Salvage and that she “had direct responsibility over the maintenance of

the property” at which the accident occurred. (Complaint, ¶ 9.) The Complaint further alleged

that both Dial and Hudson Salvage were negligent or wanton in failing to maintain the premises

in a reasonably safe condition, failing to warn plaintiff of the unreasonably dangerous condition,

causing or allowing the slippery floor to exist, and failing to establish safe work practices and

procedures. (Id., ¶¶ 10, 14.) Kimbrough claims to have sustained injuries in her fall at the

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Hudson Salvage site, including a hip injury requiring surgery, bruises, permanent disfigurement,

physical and emotional suffering, and the like. (Id., ¶¶ 11, 15.) On August 29, 2006, plaintiff

amended her Complaint to include a specific allegation that the amount in controversy exceeded

$75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. (Amended Complaint, ¶ 7.) 

Shortly thereafter, defendants removed this action to this District Court on grounds of

diversity of citizenship, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441. In their Notice of Removal

(doc. 1), defendants maintained that there is diversity of citizenship between the parties and that

the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, such that federal subject matter jurisdiction vests

under § 1332. On its face, this allegation is puzzling, inasmuch as there is no dispute that both

plaintiff Kimbrough and defendant Dial are citizens of Alabama. In the Brief (doc. 2)

accompanying their Notice of Removal, however, defendants insist that Dial’s citizenship should

be disregarded because she was fraudulently joined. In response, plaintiff filed a Motion to

Remand (doc. 6), contesting defendants’ characterization of Dial’s status. Ultimately, the

jurisdictional posture of this action hinges on the proper application of the fraudulent joinder

doctrine to plaintiff’s claims against Dial. That singular issue is the focus of the Motion to

Remand.

II. Governing Legal Standard.

A removing defendant must establish the propriety of removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441

and, therefore, must establish the existence of federal jurisdiction. Leonard v. Enterprise Rent a

Car, 279 F.3d 967, 972 (11th Cir. 2002) (“A removing defendant bears the burden of proving

proper federal jurisdiction.”). Because removal infringes upon state sovereignty and implicates

central concepts of federalism, removal statutes must be construed narrowly, with all doubts

resolved in favor of remand. See University of South Alabama v. American Tobacco Co., 168

F.3d 405, 411 (11th Cir. 1999) (explaining that strict construction of removal statutes derives

from “significant federalism concerns” raised by removal jurisdiction); Whitt v. Sherman Int’l

Corp., 147 F.3d 1325, 1333 (11th Cir. 1998) (expressing preference for remand where removal

jurisdiction is not absolutely clear); Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir.

1994) (uncertainties regarding removal are resolved in favor of remand); Newman v. Spectrum

Stores, Inc., 109 F. Supp.2d 1342, 1345 (M.D. Ala. 2000) (“Because federal court jurisdiction is

limited, the Eleventh Circuit favors remand of removed cases where federal jurisdiction is not

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absolutely clear.”).

As mentioned supra, defendants based removal on diversity of citizenship. Under 28

U.S.C. § 1332(a), federal courts have original jurisdiction over all civil actions between citizens

of different states where the amount in controversy “exceeds the sum or value of $75,000,

exclusive of interest and costs.” Id.; see Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc., 154 F.3d 1284,

1287 (11th Cir. 1998). Section 1332 demands complete diversity, such that no plaintiff may be a

citizen of the same state as any defendant. See Riley v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,

Inc., 292 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002). That said, however, a non-diverse defendant who is

fraudulently joined does not defeat diversity because her citizenship is excluded from the

diversity calculus. Thus, “[f]raudulent joinder is a judicially created doctrine that provides an

exception to the requirement of complete diversity.” Triggs, 154 F.3d at 1287. To establish

fraudulent joinder, a defendant must demonstrate either that “(1) there is no possibility the

plaintiff can establish a cause of action against the resident defendant; or (2) the plaintiff has

fraudulently pled jurisdictional facts to bring the resident defendant into state court. ... The

defendant must make such a showing by clear and convincing evidence.” Henderson v.

Washington National Ins. Co., 454 F.3d 1278, 1281 (11th Cir. 2006). The burden on the

removing party to prove fraudulent joinder is a “heavy one.” Crowe v. Coleman, 113 F.3d 1536,

1538 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Gonzalez v. J.C. Penney Corp., 2006 WL 2990086, *3 (11th Cir.

Oct. 20, 2006) (“The burden of establishing fraudulent joinder is a heavy one.”). In assessing a

fraudulent joinder objection, “the district court must evaluate factual allegations in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff and resolve any uncertainties about the applicable law in the plaintiff’s

favor.” Pacheco de Perez v. AT & T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1380 (11th Cir. 1998).

For purposes of fraudulent joinder, the Court is mindful that “[i]f there is even a

possibility that a state court would find that the complaint states a cause of action against any

one of the resident defendants, the federal court must find that the joinder was proper and

remand the case to the state court.” Triggs, 154 F.3d at 1287; see also GMFS, L.L.C. v. Bounds,

275 F. Supp.2d 1350, 1353-54 (S.D. Ala. 2003) (“A defendant (typically a resident of the forum)

is fraudulently joined if there is no possibility that the plaintiff can prove a cause of action

against him.”); Raye v. Employer’s Ins. of Wausau, 345 F. Supp.2d 1313, 1317 (S.D. Ala. 2004)

(similar). “The plaintiff need not have a winning case against the allegedly fraudulent

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1 In weighing the parties’ respective arguments, the Court examines “the plaintiff’s

pleadings at the time of removal, supplemented by any affidavits and deposition transcripts

submitted by the parties.” Legg, 428 F.3d at 1322 (citation omitted). In that respect, the

procedural mechanism for resolving a fraudulent joinder objection is akin to that utilized on

summary judgment. See id. In this case, neither side has supplemented the record with material

outside the pleadings in support of their respective positions; therefore, the fraudulent joinder

issue here will be evaluated solely by reference to the four corners of the pleadings.

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defendant; he need only have a possibility of stating a valid cause of action in order for the

joinder to be legitimate.” Triggs, 154 F.3d at 1287; see also Pacheco de Perez, 139 F.3d at 1380

(noting that a mere “colorable claim” is sufficient to negate fraudulent joinder argument). 

Nonetheless, it bears emphasizing that “[t]he potential for legal liability must be reasonable, not

merely theoretical,” in order to foil a fraudulent joinder objection. Legg v. Wyeth, 428 F.3d

1317, 1325 n.5 (11th Cir. 2005) (observing that possibility of liability is evaluated by reason and

common sense, and that more is required than such a possibility that a designated residence

might be struck by a meteor on a given evening) (citations omitted).1

III. Analysis.

To meet their heavy burden of showing fraudulent joinder by clear and convincing

evidence, defendants proffer two distinct legal arguments.

A. Whether Dial Owed a Duty of Care to Kimbrough.

First, defendants contend, “Dial is an improper party to this action as she did not

personally owe the plaintiff a duty to maintain Hudson’s in a manner that was reasonably safe.” 

(Defendants’ Brief (doc. 2), at 2.) In making this argument, defendants do not cite a single

Alabama authority for the proposition that a store manager owes no duty to business invitees that

might give rise to a viable cause of action for negligence or wantonness in these circumstances. 

Alabama law is ambiguous on this point, and may even be contrary to defendants’ position. In

these types of cases, Alabama courts routinely speak in terms of the duty of a “storekeeper” or

“shopkeeper” to exercise reasonable care to customers. See, e.g., McCombs v. Bruno’s, Inc., 667

So.2d 710, 712 (Ala. 1995); Dunklin v. Winn-Dixie of Montgomery, Inc., 595 So.2d 463, 465

(Ala. 1992). Perhaps Alabama courts would exclude store managers from the ambit of the terms

“storekeeper” or “shopkeeper.” Perhaps they would not. On occasion, they appear to have taken

the latter approach. For example, in Boyd v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 710 So.2d 1258

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2 See generally Dodson v. K-Mart Corp., 891 So.2d 789 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2004)

(explaining that a “manager of a retail establishment is not automatically personally liable for

injuries that may occur on the premises under his ‘watch,’” without indicating that no duty could

ever attach to such a manager).

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(Ala.Civ.App. 1997), the court reversed entry of summary judgment in favor of Wal-Mart and

two of its managers where the plaintiff alleged that all defendants had acted negligently or

wantonly in failing to maintain reasonably safe premises at a Wal-Mart store. The Boyd court

did not specifically delineate its reasoning as to the two managers, except to indicate, “We

cannot say that, as a matter of law, the evidence before us shows that Wal-Mart, Wilson and

Shirley were not negligent” in tending to the accumulation of rainwater on the floor of the store. 

Id. at 1260. Implicit in the Boyd decision, then, is a recognition that the managers of the WalMart store owed a duty of care to customers to ameliorate unduly slippery floor conditions in the

store. Furthermore, plaintiff cites Waters v. Anthony, 40 So.2d 316 (Ala. 1949), in which the

Alabama Supreme Court explained that a movie theater manager, who was actively managing

the theater and had charge of its physical condition, “owed a patron of the theater a duty to

exercise due care to have the seat used by her reasonably free from danger.” Id. at 319.

It is not certain that Alabama state courts would apply Boyd and Waters in the

circumstances pleaded by Kimbrough here. Indeed, as defendants aptly observe, certain courts

in other jurisdictions have declined to impose a duty of care on store managers who may have

been situated similarly to Dial. See, e.g., Benjamin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 413 F. Supp.2d

652, 655-56 (D.S.C. 2006) (predicting in slip and fall case alleging negligence against store

manager that South Carolina state courts would find that manager owed no affirmative duty to

act and prevent customer’s injuries); Griffin v. Dolgen Corp., 143 F. Supp.2d 670 (S.D. Miss.

2001) (making a similar forecast about Mississippi law, while recognizing that this

determination was ultimately the province of the Mississippi Supreme Court, which had not

ruled on the issue).2

This Court is not as sanguine about Alabama law as the district courts in Benjamin and

Griffin were about the law of their respective states. The Boyd and Waters decisions at least

raise a reasonable possibility that Alabama courts would impose a duty of care on a store

manager such as Dial in the circumstances alleged in the Complaint. More importantly,

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however, the Eleventh Circuit’s recent opinion in Henderson v. Washington National Ins. Co.

strongly counsels against this Court engaging in the sort of speculative crystal ball-gazing

enterprise that the Benjamin and Griffin courts did. In Henderson, there was a substantial

question of unsettled Alabama law as to whether the complaint successfully pleaded a cause of

action for fraudulent concealment against the allegedly fraudulently joined defendant. 

Henderson declared that “the decision as to the sufficiency of the pleadings is for the state

courts, and for a federal court to interpose its judgment would fall short of the scrupulous respect

for the institutional equilibrium between the federal and state judiciaries that our federal system

demands.” 454 F.3d at 1284 (reversing district court’s denial of motion to remand on fraudulent

joinder grounds). This approach is reinforced by Pacheco de Perez’s admonition that district

courts examining fraudulent joinder arguments must “resolve any uncertainties about the

applicable law in the plaintiff’s favor.” 139 F.3d at 1380. In light of these authorities, this Court

will not and cannot resolve the fraudulent joinder issue by articulating bold forecasts and fearless

predictions as to how Alabama state courts might resolve this unsettled duty of care question. 

Instead, this Court will defer to the state courts on this topic and will resolve uncertainties

concerning applicable law in Kimbrough’s favor. As such, defendants have not met their burden

of showing by clear and convincing evidence that there is no reasonable possibility that

Kimbrough’s negligence and wantonness claims against Dial could be sustainable under

Alabama law.

B. Whether Dial Personally Contributed to Kimbrough’s Injuries.

Second, in the alternative, defendants maintain that “Dial is an improper party to this

action since she did not personally contribute to the plaintiff’s injuries.” (Defendants’ Brief, at

6.) Certainly, it is a correct statement of Alabama law that an agent of the corporation cannot be

held individually liable for a corporation’s negligent or wrongful acts unless she contributed to

or participated in them. See generally Ex parte McInnis, 820 So.2d 795, 798-99 (Ala. 2001) (“A

corporate agent who personally participates, albeit in his or her capacity as such agent, in a tort is

personally liable for the tort.”); Ex parte Charles Bell Pontiac-Buick-Cadillac-GMC, Inc., 496

So.2d 774, 775 (Ala. 1986) (“In Alabama, the general rule is that officers or employees of a

corporation are liable for torts in which they have personally participated, irrespective of

whether they were acting in a corporate capacity.”).

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3 Instead, defendants merely argue in conclusory fashion that “[t]here are no

allegations in the pleadings that Dial took any personal action that contributed to the plaintiff’s

injuries.” (Defendants’ Brief, at 7.) This characterization of the Amended Complaint is

inaccurate, for the reasons stated above.

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Defendants cannot prevail under this line of cases because the Amended Complaint

adequately pleads participation by Dial. In particular, the Amended Complaint alleges that Dial

personally failed to maintain the store in a reasonably safe condition, that she personally failed to

warn Kimbrough of the unreasonably dangerous condition, and that she personally caused or

allowed the unreasonably dangerous condition to exist. (Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 10, 14.) 

Defendants offer no reasonable basis for concluding that these allegations are insufficient as a

matter of law to satisfy Alabama’s “personal participation” prerequisite for personal liability for

a corporate agent.3

 Accordingly, there is no pleading defect as to the “personal participation”

requirement which might negate any reasonable possibility of imposing legal liability against the

non-diverse defendant.

IV. Conclusion.

For all of the foregoing reasons, the undersigned concludes that defendants have failed to

meet their heavy burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that defendant Dial was

fraudulently joined. In light of that determination, Dial’s citizenship must be considered in

applying the diversity provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1332. It is undisputed that defendant Dial is of

non-diverse citizenship from plaintiff Kimbrough, inasmuch as both of them are citizens of

Alabama. Accordingly, Dial’s presence as a non-diverse defendant precludes the exercise of

diversity jurisdiction over this action and defeats removal. On that basis, plaintiff’s Motion to

Remand (doc. 6) is granted, and this action is hereby remanded to the Circuit Court of Clarke

County, Alabama pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), for further proceedings.

DONE and ORDERED this 8th day of December, 2006.

 s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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