Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00389/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00389-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joe McGrath
Respondent
Miguel Wilson Young
Petitioner

Document Text:

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MIGUEL WILSON YOUNG, 

Petitioner, No. CIV-S-04-0389 DFL KJM P 

vs.

JOE MCGRATH, 

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a California prisoner proceeding pro se with an application for writ of

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss arguing that

this action is time-barred.

 Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) provides as follows:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ

of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such

review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of

the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from

filing by such State action;

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(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

On October 3, 2001, petitioner filed in the California Supreme Court a petition for

review of the California Court of Appeal’s denial of petitioner’s appeal of his conviction and

sentence. Resp’t’s Lodged Doc. # 1. The petition for review was denied November 20, 2001. 

Resp’t’s Lodged Doc. # 2. Petitioner’s conviction became final for purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A)

on February 18, 2002 when time expired for petitioner to seek a writ of certiorari with respect to

the California Supreme Court’s denial of petitioner’s request for review. See Bowen v. Roe, 188

F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999) ("We hold that the period of ‘direct review’ in 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d)(1)(A) includes the period within which a petitioner can file a petition for a writ of

certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, whether or not the petitioner actually files such

a petition."). 

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) provides that “the time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this

subsection.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

Petitioner filed his first application for state post-conviction relief in the Superior

Court of Sacramento County on February 11, 2002, before the one year limitations period

established by § 2244(d)(1) began to run. Resp’t’s Lodged Doc. # 3. The application was denied

on March 13, 2002. Resp’t’s Lodged Doc. # 4. Petitioner filed a second application in the

California Court of Appeal on May 16, 2002. Resp’t’s Lodged Doc. # 5. That application was 

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denied on July 3, 2002. Resp’t’s Lodged Doc. # 6. Respondent concedes that petitioner was

entitled to tolling of the limitations period through July 3, 2002. Mot. at 6:5-13.

Petitioner filed his third application in the California Supreme Court on July 22,

2002. Resp’t’s Lodged Doc. # 7. The application, which included two DNA-related claims and

one claim based on a “three strikes” challenge, was denied on March 13, 2003. Resp’t’s Lodged

Doc. # 8. The order denying petitioner’s application reads as follows:

Petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. (But see Penal

Code section 1405.)

Id. Respondent claims that the “But see. . .” phrase indicates that petitioner’s state Supreme

Court application was not “properly filed” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) and

therefore petitioner is not entitled to tolling for the period of time this application was pending. 

Mot. at 6:24 -7:20. The court does not agree. As noted by respondent, California Penal Code

section 1405, as it read in 2002, provided that a person serving a felony sentence may file a

motion with the trial court that entered the judgment of conviction for DNA testing. Id. at 7:3-7. 

Contrary to respondent’s interpretation, however, by including the “But see Penal Code section

1405” reference, the California Supreme Court appears to have been indicating that, despite its

decision with respect to petitioner’s application, petitioner still could utilize the different

procedures set forth in the Penal Code with regard to his DNA-related claims, if appropriate. 

Because the DNA testing procedures provide a different remedy than a petition in habeas, the

court’s reference cannot reasonably be construed as a determination that the habeas petition,

which included one non-DNA-related claim, was not “properly filed.” Bolstering this conclusion

is the fact that petitioner previously had submitted to the superior court the DNA-related claims

included in his third application. See Lodged Doc. #3. Accordingly, petitioner is entitled to

tolling while his state supreme court application was pending, as well as for the nineteen day

period between the denial of petitioner’s second application, and the filing of the third. See

Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 221-25 (2002); Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 126 S. Ct. 846,

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852 (2006). Petitioner also is entitled to tolling for thirty days after the California Supreme Court

rendered its decision, through April 13, 2003. Bunney v. Mitchell, 262 F.3d 973 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Before the thirty days ran, petitioner filed a fourth application for post-conviction

relief on March 19, 2003 in the California Supreme Court. Resp’t’s Lodged Doc. # 9. This

application was denied on January 28, 2004. In its denial, the California Supreme Court cited “In

re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750.” A citation to Clark does indicate the application was not timely. 

See King v. Lamarque, 464 F.3d 963, 965 (9th Cir. 2006). Because his fourth petition was

denied as untimely, petitioner is not entitled to tolling of the limitations period for the more than

ten months it was pending. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417 (2005). Accordingly, the

limitations period began to run in this action on April 13, 2003, when the California Supreme

Court’s denial of petitioner’s third application for state collateral relief became final.

The limitations period then ran for 32 days until petitioner filed his fifth

application for state collateral relief in the California Court of Appeal on May 16, 2003. Resp’t’s

Lodged Doc. #11. This application was denied on June 20, 2003. Resp’t’s Lodged Doc. #12. 

Respondent concedes that petitioner is entitled to tolling while his fifth application was pending. 

Mot. at 8:2-13.

Petitioner filed his sixth application in the California Supreme Court on June 30,

2003. Resp’t’s Lodged Doc. #13. This petition was denied on the same day as the fourth

petition, January 28, 2004, also with a citation to In re Clark. Resp’t’s Lodged Doc. #14. 

Therefore, petitioner is not entitled to tolling while the sixth application was pending, King, 464

F.3d at 965, and also is not entitled to tolling between the day the California Court of Appeal

denied petitioner’s fifth application on June 20, 2003, and the filing of petitioner’s sixth

application in the California Supreme Court. Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 126 S. Ct. 846, 852

(2006). As of January 28, 2004 when the sixth petition was denied, then, 254 days of the

limitations period had expired.

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26 The petition was transferred to this court on February 25, 2004. 1

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This action was commenced on February 9, 2004 when petitioner filed his original

application for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern

California. As of February 8, 2004, 265 days of the limitations period had expired. 1

On July 6, 2005, petitioner filed the amended application for writ of habeas

corpus, which is now the operative application in this case. Respondent argues that the amended

application is not timely because the claims asserted therein do not “relate back” for statute of

limitations purposes to the date of the filing of the original habeas petition.

The United States Supreme Court has held that claims asserted in an amended

application will “relate back” to the original application for statute of limitations purposes under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(2) if the claims raised in the original and amended

application arise from a “common core of operative facts.” Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 125 S.

Ct. 2562, 2574-75 (2005). To determine whether Felix’s amended claims related back to the

original petition, the Court focused on the “key words” of Rule 15(c)(2): “conduct, transaction,

or occurrence,” and found specifically that “relation back depends on the existence of a common

‘core of operative facts’ uniting the original and newly asserted claims.” Id. at 2571-72. Felix’s

amended petition did not meet this standard because it “targeted separate episodes, the pretrial

police interrogation of witness Williams in his original petition, his own interrogation at a

different time and place in his amended petition.” Id. at 2572. In a footnote, the Court cited two

proper examples of “relating back.” The first involved an original challenge to the prosecution’s

failure to comply with its obligation to provide exculpatory materials to the defense and an

amended petition raising the failure to provide a particular report. The Court noted that both

pleadings “related to evidence obtained at the same time by the same police department.” Id. at

2575 n.7. The second involved an original petition challenging the trial court’s admission of a

witness’s recanted statements, while the amended petition challenged the court’s refusal to allow

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the defendant to show the statements had been recanted; the Supreme Court quoted the lower

court’s recognition that relation back would be appropriate if the new claim was based on the

same facts as the original pleading, but only changed the legal theory. Id.

In his original habeas application in this matter, petitioner identifies his claims as

follows:

1) 3 strikes; 2) ineffective counsel; 3) insufficient evidence; 4)

D.A. misconduct; 5) jury instruction; 6) D.N.A. testing. This is all

the stuff that was talked about; 7) Oh yea and also the judge denied

me a continuance to do D.N.A. which was important evidence for

my case.

Pet. at 6. Petitioner does not state anything further in support of these claims.

In his amended petition, petitioner claims: (1) his trial counsel’s failure to seek

and obtain DNA testing deprived petitioner of the right to effective assistance of counsel, and (2)

“California’s three strikes law is an ex-post facto violation of petitioner’s fourteenth amendment

right to due process.” Am. Pet. at I.

Petitioner’s identification of claims in his original habeas application is vague on

its face. The only facts petitioner identifies in his original habeas petition that might support a

claim for relief is that the trial judge denied petitioner a continuance to do DNA testing. See

Rule 2, Rules Governing § 2254 Proceedings. However, it is not apparent that the core facts of

this claim are common to petitioner’s claim in his amended petition that trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to seek and obtain DNA testing. Petitioner’s original claim concerns the

actions of the trial judge at a hearing on a motion for a continuance. The claim raised in

petitioner’s amended petition concerns the actions of trial counsel in preparing (or not) for trial. 

See Mayle, 125 S. Ct. at 2574-75 (petitioner’s Fifth Amendment challenge to pretrial statements

made by him during a police interview did not arise from the same common core of facts as

petitioner’s Sixth Amendment challenge to statements made during a separate jailhouse

interview of a witness). In any case, petitioner has not shown in his opposition that plaintiff’s

claim concerning the denial of a continuance and his ineffective assistance of counsel claim arise

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from a common core of operative facts. 

After petitioner commenced this action, petitioner filed his seventh and final

application for state collateral relief in the California Supreme Court on February 13, 2004. 

Resp’t’s Lodged Doc. #15. Through February 12, 2004, 269 days of the limitations period had

expired with respect to the claims asserted in petitioner’s amended petition. The seventh petition

was denied on January 12, 2005 with a citation to In re Clark, rendering that petition untimely. 

Therefore, petitioner is not entitled to tolling while the seventh petition was pending. Pace, 544

U.S. at 417. The limitations period ran out with respect to the claims presented in petitioner’s

amended petition by May 18, 2004, nearly one year before those claims were presented to this

court. Accordingly, respondent’s motion to dismiss should be granted. 

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Respondent’s June 23, 2006 motion to dismiss be granted; and

2. This case be closed.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: February 1, 2007.

1 youn0389.157

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