Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-16-50156/USCOURTS-ca5-16-50156-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Christopher Chad Gammon
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-50156

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

CHRISTOPHER CHAD GAMMON,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 7:15-CR-186-1

Before JOLLY, SMITH, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Christopher Chad Gammon appeals his conviction and sentence for 

failing to register as a sex offender. Gammon has been released from prison 

but challenges the three-year term of supervised release that he is still serving.

Gammon first contends that the district court committed plain error by 

initially advising him that he faced a supervised release term of five years to 

life, when he actually faced a term of only one to three years. Any error did 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 28, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 16-50156 Document: 00513774416 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/28/2016
No. 16-50156

2

not affect Gammon’s substantial rights because there is no reasonable 

probability that the correct and more favorable information would have 

dissuaded him from pleading guilty. See United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 

542 U.S. 74, 83 (2004); United States v. Williams, 120 F.3d 575, 578 (5th Cir. 

1997).

Concerning the three-year term of supervised release, Gammon fails to 

show that the district court committed a procedural error by determining that 

Gammon was a Tier II sex offender. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 

(2007). Moreover, the sentence was within the properly calculated guideline 

range and is presumed to be reasonable. See United States v. Alonzo, 435 F.3d 

551, 554 (5th Cir. 2006). Gammon’s argument that we should adopt his 

assessment of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors is contrary to the 

deferential appellate review dictated by Gall and does not rebut the 

presumption of reasonableness. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51; United States v. Ruiz, 

621 F.3d 390, 398 (5th Cir. 2010). 

The judgment is AFFIRMED.

 Case: 16-50156 Document: 00513774416 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/28/2016