Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03214/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03214-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Felipe DeJesus Gallardo
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Warren K. Urbom, United States District Judge for the District

of Nebraska, adopting the report and recommendation of the Honorable David L.

Piester, United States Magistrate Judge for the District of Nebraska.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-3214

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the District of

* Nebraska.

Felipe DeJesus Gallardo, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: June 14, 2007

 Filed: July 31, 2007 

___________

Before MELLOY, SMITH, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

MELLOY, Circuit Judge.

Felipe DeJesus Gallardo conditionally pled guilty to possession with intent to

distribute cocaine. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1). The district court1

 sentenced

him to fifty-two months in prison and ordered forfeiture of Gallardo’s vehicle and

nearly $4,000 in cash. Gallardo appeals the conviction, arguing that police officers

illegally detained him, lacked voluntary consent to search his vehicle, exceeded the

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scope of that consent, and obtained self-incriminating statements from him absent a

valid waiver of his Miranda rights. We affirm the judgment of the district court.

I. BACKGROUND

On the morning of July 2, 2005, Nebraska State Patrol trooper Greg Goltz

placed several signs along Interstate 80 near Giltner, Nebraska. The signs were a

ploy: they warned drivers of an upcoming drug interdiction checkpoint that did not

exist in the hope that drivers transporting narcotics would see the signs, take the

Giltner exit in response, and engage in suspicious activity, whereby a watchful Goltz

could stop their vehicles. Gallardo was driving eastbound on I-80 in a 2004 Nissan

pick-up truck and passed the signs around 11 a.m. He exited the Interstate at the

Giltner interchange, took a right on the intersecting state highway, turned around in

the nearest driveway, and got back on the Interstate heading the same direction. As

Gallardo did so, Goltz noticed that Gallardo’s truck lacked license plates, in violation

of Nebraska state law. 

Goltz turned on the squad car’s flashing lights, which activated the vehicle’s incar camera and microphones. Therefore, the entire stop and the parties’ interaction

was captured on audio and video. Goltz stopped the truck, approached it, and told

Gallardo that he had been pulled over for not having license plates. They conversed

primarily in English, although Gallardo’s spoke in accented and broken English.

Goltz asked Gallardo for his license and registration; Gallardo produced a Nebraska

driver’s license, a California identification card, and numerous documents, including

proof of insurance and several invoices for vehicle maintenance work performed

between December 2004 and May 2005. Each service invoice stated the mileage of

the truck at the time of service. From these invoices and the current odometer reading

on the vehicle, Goltz learned that Gallardo had put roughly 39,000 miles on the truck

in the previous seven months. 

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Goltz instructed Gallardo to join him in the squad car while Goltz processed the

information and paperwork. Upon questioning, Gallardo stated that he lived with his

wife and two children in Fontana, California, and that he put the mileage on his truck

while working on projects as a carpet and tile installer in California. Gallardo also

explained that he had a Nebraska license because he had previously lived in South

Sioux City, Nebraska, with a friend. Goltz asked about Gallardo’s travel plans, and

Gallardo said he was traveling to Sioux City to look for an apartment or trailer there;

he was considering moving there for a brief period of time for his job. Gallardo said

he planned to stay three or four days in Sioux City to find a home, then return to

California. He said he was still unsure if he was going to make the temporary move

to the Sioux City area.

During the encounter, Goltz contacted his dispatcher to request information

regarding Gallardo and the vehicle. The dispatcher stated that Gallardo’s Nebraska

license and California identification were valid and that Gallardo owned the pick-up.

Goltz also asked why Gallardo had exited at the Giltner interchange after passing

signs indicating an upcoming drug checkpoint. Gallardo stated that he was hoping to

stop off for food and gas; when he saw upon exiting that there were no businesses near

the interchange, he turned around and got back on the Interstate.

After this exchange, the dispatcher called and informed Goltz that Gallardo’s

California address had been the site of a sizeable methamphetamine bust two years

earlier, although Goltz also learned that Gallardo himself had no criminal record or

outstanding warrants for his arrest. Goltz questioned Gallardo about the duration of

his residency at that address in California, and Gallardo said that he had lived with his

wife at the Fontana address for one-and-a-half years. The dispatcher also informed

Goltz that California had issued valid plates to Gallardo, but they had not yet arrived.

Goltz then voided the ticket he had written to Gallardo for failing to properly display

license plates on the truck. Goltz returned Gallardo’s paperwork to him, and Gallardo

opened the squad-car door and began to exit the vehicle.

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Goltz then called to Gallardo by name and asked, “Do you have a minute?”

Gallardo said he did, and he returned to his seat in the vehicle. Goltz told him that

Nebraska had been experiencing problems with vehicles carrying drugs and guns from

California. Goltz then switched languages and attempted to speak to Gallardo in

Spanish, a language with which Goltz’s familiarity was limited. Goltz successfully

asked Gallardo if he had any guns or drugs in the truck, to which Gallardo responded

in the negative. The following exchange then ensued. The parties stipulated to the

accuracy of the English translation of the audio transcription of the recorded

conversation, which appears in brackets, although they apparently disagree as to

whether a question mark or a period should follow Goltz’s first sentence below:

Goltz: ¿Yo, yo policía, yo policía buscar el carro? [I, I police, I police

search the car?]

Gallardo: OK, go ahead.

Goltz: Any problemo? [Any problem?]

Gallardo: Nada de problema. [No problem at all.]

Goltz: You comprende? [You understand?]

Gallardo: Sí. [Yes.]

Goltz: ¿No problemo? [No problem?]

Gallardo: No problema. [No problem.]

Goltz: OK. Gracias. Muchas gracias. [OK. Thank you. Thanks a lot.]

Another trooper arrived at the scene, and he and Goltz proceeded to search the

pick-up while Gallardo remained in the squad car. In less than ten minutes, Goltz had

opened the hood and noticed an indentation in the engine’s firewall area that had been

filled with auto-body repair putty, then covered with fresh paint. Goltz, a trooper with

seventeen years’ experience, had seen similar firewall modifications in the past and

associated them with hidden compartments for narcotics. He also noticed that the

adjacent fender had been attached incorrectly using an electronic trunk-lock

mechanism, possibly indicating a point of entry into what he increasingly suspected

was a hidden compartment beyond the firewall.

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Goltz arrested Gallardo and drove him to the Nebraska State Patrol office in

nearby Grand Island. Another trooper took the truck to the State Patrol office, where

officers dismantled part of the vehicle to gain access to the hidden compartment.

Inside, they found thirty-one packages containing a total of approximately seventyeight pounds of cocaine.

In the State Patrol office, Goltz attempted to inform Gallardo of the nature of

the charges he faced and expressed his desire for Gallardo’s cooperation. His tone

was straightforward and informative, and he did not ask Gallardo any questions about

the offense. Goltz also provided Gallardo with a waiver-of-Miranda-rights form

written in Spanish. Gallardo read the form aloud, but expressed confusion regarding

its meaning and did not sign it. Goltz was unable to clarify the kind of cooperation

he sought from Gallardo, the nature of Gallardo’s rights, or the significance of their

waiver due to the language barrier. A fellow officer returned shortly thereafter with

a Spanish-speaking agent from the United States Bureau of Immigration and Customs

Enforcement (“ICE”). 

Gallardo re-read the Miranda waiver aloud, and the ICE agent answered his

questions and described the significance of signing the form. The ICE agent also

informed Gallardo that Gallardo could cease the officers’ interrogation at any time and

request the assistance of an attorney. Gallardo indicated that he understood his rights,

the implication of waiving them, and the nature of the interrogation to follow. He

signed the Miranda waiver. Officers then questioned Gallardo, and he made several

self-incriminating statements.

The government charged Gallardo with possession of cocaine with intent to

distribute. Gallardo moved to suppress the cocaine evidence, arguing that Goltz’s

search of the truck violated the Fourth Amendment because Gallardo’s purported

consent to the search was involuntary. He also moved to suppress his selfincriminating statements to officers, arguing that his waiver of his Miranda rights was

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invalid. The district court denied the motions. Despite obvious language barriers

between Goltz and Gallardo, the district court examined the videotape and the

translated transcription of the encounter, as well as other circumstances, and found

that “as a whole the circumstances show that consent [to search the truck] was

voluntarily given without coercion.” The district court also found that Gallardo

voluntarily and knowingly waived his Miranda rights because he had read the waiver

form in Spanish, had the opportunity to ask questions with a Spanish-speaking agent,

and was informed of his right to cease questioning at will and request an attorney.

Gallardo entered a conditional guilty plea preserving his right to appeal the

denial of his motions to suppress evidence. The district court sentenced Gallardo to

fifty-two months in prison. It also ordered forfeiture of the pick-up truck and nearly

$4,000 that Gallardo had been carrying at the time he was arrested. 

II. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Gallardo challenges the denial of his motions to suppress the fruits

of the search and his subsequent statements to police. We address the denial of each

motion in turn.

A. The Search of Gallardo’s Pick-Up Truck

With regard to motions to suppress evidence, we review a district court’s

factual findings for clear error and its determination of whether a Fourth Amendment

violation occurred de novo. United States v. Olivera-Mendez, 484 F.3d 505, 509 (8th

Cir. 2007).

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1. Whether Gallardo was Unlawfully Detained at the Time of Consent

Gallardo first challenges the extent of the stop, arguing that Goltz

unconstitutionally questioned and detained him after Goltz had voided the traffic

citation. Therefore, Gallardo contends, the unlawful detention invalidated any

purported consent to the search of his truck. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 507-

08 (1983) (plurality opinion) (“Because . . . [the defendant] was being illegally

detained when he consented to the search of his luggage, we agree that the consent

was tainted by the illegality and was ineffective to justify the search.”). 

“A seizure that is justified solely [as a stop for a traffic violation] can become

unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that

mission.” Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005). To prevail on this issue,

Gallardo must prove (1) that he was in fact seized; that is, a reasonable person in

Gallardo’s position would not have felt free to terminate the encounter with Goltz

after Goltz voided the traffic ticket and returned Gallardo’s paperwork to him, Florida

v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991); and (2) that Goltz lacked the requisite

reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity to prolong Gallardo’s detention after

all tasks, inquiries, and paperwork related to the initial purpose of the stop had been

completed. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985); Terry v. Ohio, 392

U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968). An officer has “reasonable suspicion” necessary to briefly

detain a suspect if the circumstances show that the officer could “articulate more than

an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch of criminal activity” and

possessed “at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.”

Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-24 (2000) (internal quotations omitted).

We find it unnecessary to address the question of whether Gallardo’s continued

conversation with Goltz after Goltz asked him if he “ha[d] a minute” occurred in the

context of a seizure or a consensual encounter. Even assuming that a reasonable

person in Gallardo’s position would not have felt free to leave after Goltz concluded

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all business relating to the initial purpose of the traffic stop, we find that a number of

factors, taken together, supplied Goltz with reasonable suspicion to prolong Gallardo’s

detention to question him about narcotics trafficking.

During the traffic stop, Goltz discovered that Gallardo had put more than

39,000 miles on his truck in seven months. Gallardo’s only explanation for the

exceptionally high mileage over such a relatively short duration was that he

occasionally had to travel from Fontana to other destinations in California for his

employer. Gallardo was driving from California to Sioux City; Goltz, an officer of

seventeen years’ experience, knew that California was a regular source of illegal

narcotics in the Midwest and Sioux City was a known destination for narcotics

traffickers. Gallardo’s asserted purpose of his trip—to drive from Fontana, California

to Sioux City (a roundtrip of over 3,000 miles) solely to find an apartment, then

immediately return to California—was not particularly credible, especially given the

fact that Gallardo told Goltz that he was not looking for any particular kind of

apartment in Sioux City but simply wanted “something cheap.” To a reasonable

person, this limited purpose would not justify a trip of such distance, particularly if

the traveler states that financial efficiency is a factor in his decision-making. Finally,

prior to any conversation with Gallardo about drugs, Goltz learned that lawenforcement authorities in California had made a large methamphetamine bust at

Gallardo’s California address two years earlier. Gallardo had no criminal record and

he asserted to Goltz that he had not lived at that address at the time of the bust.

Nevertheless, the temporal and physical proximity between Gallardo and a prior drugtrafficking operation at least raises a suspicion that Gallardo may have had some

interaction or connection with the person or people involved in that operation. 

We agree with the district court that this evidence, as a whole, provided “at least

a minimal level of objective justification” for briefly extending Gallardo’s detention

after Goltz had already completed all tasks relating to the initial purpose of the stop.

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Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123. Gallardo was not unlawfully detained at the time Goltz

asked for Gallardo’s consent to search the truck.

2. Whether Gallardo Voluntarily Consented to the Search

The government bears the burden of proving the voluntariness of a suspect’s

consent to a search by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Willie, 462

F.3d 892, 896 (8th Cir. 2006). We review a district court’s finding of voluntary

consent for clear error, id., taking the “totality of all the circumstances” into

consideration. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973). 

This case presents the threshold question of whether Goltz effectively

communicated a request for Gallardo’s consent to search the truck. Viewed out of

context and looking only at the translated transcript of the conversation, one could

understand Goltz’s words—“I, I police, I police search the car”—to carry one of at

least two different messages. Those words could constitute a declaration of Goltz’s

intention to search Gallardo’s truck, regardless of Gallardo’s consent or non-consent.

If said with the proper inflection, however, they could alternatively constitute a

request for permission to search Gallardo’s truck.

The district court looked at Goltz’s words in the context of the conversation, as

well as examining the audio and video recordings of the entire encounter to determine

Goltz’s tone and manner of delivery. After doing so, the district court found that

Gallardo would have (and did) interpret those words as a request for consent to search

the truck. We have made the same examination, and we are satisfied that the district

court’s characterization of Goltz’s message to Gallardo was not clearly erroneous.

Goltz’s mannerisms and the tone and delivery of his words clearly indicated that he

was seeking a response from Gallardo; Goltz was not simply informing Gallardo of

his imminent plans. The fact that Gallardo immediately responded affirmatively to

Goltz—“OK, go ahead”—suggests that he viewed Goltz’s words as a question rather

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than a declaration. This interpretation is further supported by the context of the

conversation. Goltz followed up on his initial question by asking Gallardo if he

understood and by twice asking Gallardo for confirmation that Gallardo had no

problems with it. Gallardo told Goltz that he understood, and that he had “no problem

at all.” Gallardo never expressed any doubts as to what Goltz was asking, and

Gallardo’s responses were clear and unequivocal. In sum, the totality of the

circumstances provide support for the district court’s determination that Gallardo

understood Goltz’s communication as a request for consent to search Gallardo’s truck.

Having reached that conclusion, we turn now to the question of whether

Gallardo’s consent was voluntary. This analysis requires an examination of a number

of factors, “[s]ome relat[ing] to the characteristics and behavior of the defendant, . . .

[o]thers relat[ing] to the environment surrounding the defendant at the time he gave

his consent, . . . [and s]till others relat[ing] to the interaction between police and the

defendant in the encounter.” Willie, 462 F.3d at 896. “No one factor is dispositive.”

Id.

As to those characteristics of Gallardo relevant to the voluntariness inquiry, we

note that there is nothing in the record to suggest that Gallardo had knowledge of his

constitutional rights at the time he consented to the search. Further, Gallardo’s ability

to communicate with Goltz was limited by the language barrier. These two facts

weigh against a finding of voluntariness. See id. (noting that a defendant’s

“knowledge of his constitutional rights (whether from Miranda warnings in the

encounter at issue or from previous interactions with police)” is a factor in

determining voluntariness); United States v. Guerrero, 374 F.3d 584, 588-89 (8th Cir.

2004) (upholding a district court finding of involuntary consent when the defendants

“were unable to communicate effectively and [the officer] was aware of the

communication barrier”). 

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Nevertheless, other characteristics make it unlikely that Gallardo’s “will ha[d]

been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired” at the time

he gave consent to the search. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424 (1976)

(quotation omitted, alteration in original). Gallardo was fifty-four years old. He had

little formal education, but he held a job and supported his family. Gallardo did not

appear intoxicated or impaired during his interaction with Goltz. In addition, Gallardo

proved unafraid to assert himself or ask questions during the encounter; he asked

Goltz not to ticket him for failing to display any license plates, he asked about

alternatives to a ticket, and—after Goltz had voided the citation—he asked how to

properly fill out follow-up paperwork after he received his plates. Taken together,

Gallardo’s relevant characteristics do not suggest an especially high vulnerability to

police coercion.

In addition, the environment of the encounter was not inherently coercive.

Although the discussion did take place in a squad car while Gallardo was arguably

detained, that car was parked on the shoulder of a well-traveled Interstate highway

during the middle of a summer day. This is far from a secluded or threatening

location. Furthermore, the interaction with Goltz was straightforward and brief.

Goltz’s tone was serious but not aggressive. He made no intimidating gestures or

statements and no promises or misrepresentations. Goltz did not break down

Gallardo’s will through incessant questioning over a long period of time; Goltz first

asked for consent a mere twenty-five minutes into the initial stop, and Gallardo

immediately agreed to allow the search.

Looking at the totality of these circumstances, the district court did not clearly

err in finding that Gallardo’s consent to the search was voluntary.

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3. Whether Goltz’s Search Exceeded the Scope of Gallardo’s Consent

Gallardo further argues that a reasonable person would not have interpreted his

exchange with Goltz as providing Goltz with sufficiently broad consent to search the

engine compartment of the truck for drugs. See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251

(1991) (stating that the scope of consent to a search is “generally defined by its

expressed object” and determined by “what . . . the typical reasonable person [would]

have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect[.]”). We

disagree. The exchange left no doubt that illegal drugs would be the object of Goltz’s

search; immediately prior to asking for consent to search the vehicle, Goltz asked

Gallardo several times if Gallardo had drugs in the truck. In addition, Gallardo placed

no qualifications upon his consent. We have held that “the typical reasonable person”

would understand a suspect’s general consent to search a vehicle for drugs to include

consent to open unlocked containers within the vehicle, id., access apparently false

compartments, United States v. Ferrer-Montoya, 483 F.3d 565, 568-69 (8th Cir.

2007), and “search any part of the truck where [drugs] might be stored.” United States

v. Siwek, 453 F.3d 1079, 1085 (8th Cir. 2006). Goltz had the benefit of several years’

experience in locating hidden compartments in vehicles used for drug trafficking as

a state patrol officer, and this experience had shown that the engine compartment was

a “part of the truck where [drugs] might be stored.” Id. Given the above precedent,

the acts of opening the hood and examining the engine compartment did not exceed

Gallardo’s unqualified consent to search the truck for drugs.

Gallardo also argues that he was deprived of an opportunity to withdraw or

limit the scope of his consent after the search began because Goltz told him to sit in

the squad car during the search. See United States v. Sanders, 424 F.3d 768, 774 (8th

Cir. 2005) (“Once given, consent to search may be withdrawn . . . .”). We need not

reach this argument. Even assuming that the searching officers had some independent

duty to ensure Gallardo an opportunity to withdraw consent after the search

began—and Gallardo offers no authority suggesting that such a duty exists—the facts

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here do not compel the conclusion that Gallardo lacked such an opportunity. The

squad car was parked immediately behind Gallardo’s truck. Gallardo was not

handcuffed, and he sat in the front seat of the squad car for the duration of the search.

If Gallardo wished to withdraw his consent, there is no evidence that he was unable

to do so—particularly because Gallardo made no attempt to attract the attention of the

officers once the search began. Under these facts, Gallardo was at least obligated to

make some effort to communicate an intent to withdraw his consent. He did not, and

therefore we find Gallardo’s argument on this issue to be without merit.

B. The Self-Incriminating Statements to Officers

Finally, Gallardo contends that the district court erred in failing to suppress selfincriminating statements he made to officers in the absence of counsel. Gallardo made

these statements only after signing a waiver of his Miranda rights. “Miranda holds

that the defendant may waive effectuation of the rights conveyed in the warnings

provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.” Moran v.

Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986) (quotations and alterations omitted). The “totality

of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation” guide the determination of

whether a waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Id. (quotation omitted).

Gallardo apparently concedes that he signed the waiver and answered subsequent

questions voluntarily. He does, however, argue that the waiver was not knowing and

intelligent. To make a knowing and intelligent waiver, the defendant must have “full

awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the

decision to abandon it.” Id. To support his argument, Gallardo points to the language

barrier and officers’ allegedly inadequate or misleading explanation of the

significance of waiving those rights prior to their custodial interrogation of Gallardo.

We agree that, in isolated instances, Gallardo showed confusion regarding “the

nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon

it.” Id. Looking to the totality of the circumstances, however, we believe the

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evidence supports the district court’s conclusion that Gallardo knowingly and

intelligently waived his right to counsel. First, Gallardo signed a Miranda waiver

form written in his native language. This fact alone carries significant weight in

determining whether his waiver was knowing and intelligent. See North Carolina v.

Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979) (“An express written or oral statement of waiver of

the right to remain silent or of the right to counsel is usually strong proof of the

validity of that waiver . . . .”). Further, Gallardo did not sign the form automatically

or absent-mindedly; he asked questions about its significance, read it aloud twice, and

waited for a Spanish-speaking ICE agent to arrive before agreeing to waive his rights.

In short, he treated the waiver of his rights with appropriate caution. Finally, the ICE

agent clarified the nature of those rights and the significance of their waiver for

Gallardo. He told Gallardo that he could make no promises regarding leniency, that

the sentencing decision was in the hands of the judge, that Gallardo would be

subjecting himself to questions without an attorney, and “if . . . we are doing questions

and you don’t want to answer any more without an attorney, then you say, ‘Listen, I

don’t want to answer more.’” Gallardo then orally affirmed his desire to “answer

questions . . . without attorney.”

Given these facts, in their totality, we do not believe the district court erred in

finding that Gallardo’s Miranda waiver was knowing and intelligent.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

______________________________

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