Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-50336/USCOURTS-ca9-12-50336-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Jesus Valdez-Novoa
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JESUS VALDEZ-NOVOA,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 12-50336

D.C. No.

3:11-cr-00872-JAH-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

John A. Houston, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

November 6, 2013—Pasadena, California

Filed July 28, 2014

Before: M. Margaret McKeown, Ronald M. Gould,

and Jay S. Bybee, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Bybee;

Dissent by Judge McKeown

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2 UNITED STATES V. VALDEZ-NOVOA

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed a conviction for attempting to enter

the United States without consent after having been

previously removed under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a).

The defendant collaterally attacked the underlying June

11, 1999, removal order, alleging that the immigration judge

erred in concluding that he had been convicted of an

aggravated felony (based on his conviction of reckless driving

causing great bodily injury) and therefore violated his right to

due process by failing to advise him of his apparent eligibility

for voluntary departure relief. The panel held that the

defendant was not denied due process because the IJ’s

determination that he had been convicted of an aggravated

felony was not contrary to this court’s precedent at the time

the removal order was issued and was the product of a

reasonable reading of 18 U.S.C. § 16. Because the defendant

had been convicted of an aggravated felony, the panel

concluded that he was statutorily ineligible for voluntary

departure, and the IJ was under no obligation to inform him

of the existence of such relief for the proceedings to comport

with due process. 

Alternatively, the panel held that even if the IJ should

have informed the defendant of his apparent eligibility for

voluntary departure, the defendant was not prejudiced by the

error because the defendant has not shown that it is plausible

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. VALDEZ-NOVOA 3

that an IJ would have granted a request for voluntary

departure in light of his negative and positive equities at the

time of the removal proceedings. Because the defendant was

not prejudiced by the presumed error, the panel concluded

that the removal order was not fundamentally unfair under

8 U.S.C. § 1326(d)(3).

The panel held that the conviction based on the

defendant’s videotaped confession does not run afoul of the

corpus delicti doctrine because ample record evidence

corroborates the defendant’s confession to the gravamen of

the offense and establishes the trustworthiness of his

statement to a DHS officer.

Dissenting, Judge McKeownwrote separatelybecause the

government earlier conceded that there was a due process

violation, and because the majority elevates the benchmark

for prejudice, the “plausibility” inquiry, to the higher standard

of either preponderance or probability. She would reverse the

district court’s judgment because it is plausible that the IJ

would have exercised discretion to grant voluntary departure.

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4 UNITED STATES V. VALDEZ-NOVOA

COUNSEL

Kristi A. Hughes (argued) and Lauren D. Cusick, Federal

Defenders of San Diego, Inc., San Diego, California, for

Defendant-Appellant.

Daniel E. Zipp (argued), Assistant United States Attorney;

Laura E. Duffy, United States Attorney; Bruce R. Castetter,

Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate Section,

Criminal Division, San Diego, California, for PlaintiffAppellee.

OPINION

BYBEE, Circuit Judge:

Jesus Valdez-Novoa, a native and citizen of Mexico,

appeals his conviction for attempting to enter the United

States without consent after having been previously removed

in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.

Valdez-Novoa entered the U.S. without inspection in

1983 and has never obtained legal status. On June 11, 1999,

an Immigration Judge (IJ) deemed Valdez-Novoa removable

and prohibited him from reentering the U.S. at any time

because he had been convicted of an aggravated felony. 

Throughout the next decade, Valdez-Novoa returned to the

U.S. on several occasions and each time he was subsequently

removed pursuant to the IJ’s 1999 order. On February 16,

2011, Valdez-Novoa attempted to reenter the U.S. on foot at

the San Ysidro Port of Entry. At trial, the government

introduced a videotaped conversation between Valdez-Novoa

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UNITED STATES V. VALDEZ-NOVOA 5

and a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officer in

which Valdez-Novoa explained that he was attempting to

cross the border using an identification document bearing

another person’s name that he had purchased in Mexico. He

also confessed that he had been previously removed several

times and that he had not requested permission to return to

the U.S. Valdez-Novoa was convicted and sentenced to

seventy months’ imprisonment.

Valdez-Novoa raises two issues on appeal. First, he

collaterally attacks the underlying June 11, 1999, removal

order under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d). He alleges that the IJ erred

in concluding that he had been convicted of an aggravated

felony and therefore violated his right to due process by

failing to advise him of his apparent eligibility for voluntary

departure relief. We hold that Valdez-Novoa was not denied

due process because the IJ’s determination that he had been

convicted of an aggravated felony was not contrary to our

precedent at the time the removal order was issued and was

the product of a reasonable reading of the statute. Because

Valdez-Novoa had been convicted of an aggravated felony,

he was statutorily ineligible for voluntary departure, and the

IJ was under no obligation to inform him of the existence of

such relief for the proceedings to comport with due process. 

Alternatively, we hold that even if the IJ should have

informed Valdez-Novoa of his apparent eligibility for

voluntary departure, the failure to do so did not render the

removal proceedings “fundamentally unfair” under

§ 1326(d)(3) because Valdez-Novoa was not prejudiced by

the alleged error. We therefore conclude that the June 11,

1999, removal order is a valid predicate to a conviction for

attempted illegal reentry in violation of § 1326(a).

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6 UNITED STATES V. VALDEZ-NOVOA

Second, Valdez-Novoa contends that the government

failed to introduce sufficient independent evidence to satisfy

the corpus delicti rule. We hold that ample record evidence

corroborates Valdez-Novoa’s confession to the gravamen of

the offense and establishes the trustworthiness of his

statement to the DHS officer. For these reasons, the

conviction based on Valdez-Novoa’s videotaped confession

does not run afoul of the corpus delicti doctrine.

I

A. Valdez-Novoa’s Immigration and Criminal History

Valdez-Novoa arrived in the U.S. without inspection in

1983 when he was nine years old. He lived with his parents

and eight siblings in California. Although Valdez-Novoa’s

parents and siblings eventually obtained legal status, he

remained in the U.S. without documentation.

Over the next two decades, Valdez-Novoa accumulated

a substantial criminal record. In 1992, he was convicted of

misdemeanor driving under the influence and sentenced to

probation. Two years later, he was convicted of

misdemeanor disobeying a court order and sentenced to six

days in jail and probation. Later that same year, ValdezNovoa was again convicted of misdemeanor driving under the

influence as well as misdemeanor driving with a suspended

license and sentenced to twelve days in jail and probation. In

1996, he was convicted of felony assault likely to cause great

bodily injury. According to the probation officer’s report,

Valdez-Novoa grabbed his ex-girlfriend by the hair and threw

her onto the hood of his car. Valdez-Novoa then fought his

ex-girlfriend’s companion when he intervened. He was

sentenced to 180 days in jail and three years’ probation. His

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UNITED STATES V. VALDEZ-NOVOA 7

parole was twice revoked, and he served additional time in

custody.

After his conviction for felony assault likely to cause

great bodily injury, the Immigration and Naturalization

Service (INS) served Valdez-Novoa with a notice to appear. 

The agency released him on bond pending his removal

proceedings. In 1998, while awaiting his removal

proceedings, Valdez-Novoa was convicted of felony reckless

driving causing great bodily injury and misdemeanor driving

with a suspended license. According to the police

investigation report, Valdez-Novoa followed a car carrying

two men whom he had been harassing, caused a collision by

cutting in front of them, and then rammed their car until it

flipped off the road. One of the victims experienced

significant bleeding while Valdez-Novoa fled the scene. He

was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment.

UponValdez-Novoa’s release from California state prison

on June 11, 1999, an IJ deemed him removable and

prohibited him from reentering the U.S. at any time because

he had been convicted of an aggravated felony. The INS

removed Valdez-Novoa to Mexico four days later, but

Valdez-Novoa quickly returned to the U.S. A police officer

who recognized Valdez-Novoa detained him, and, on

January, 18, 2000, he was again removed to Mexico pursuant

to the June 11, 1999 removal order. At some point within the

next few months, Valdez-Novoa crossed the border again. 

On October 1, 2000, he was convicted of misdemeanor

driving under the influence and sentenced to 150 days in jail

and probation.

Upon being released from jail, Valdez-Novoa was

removed to Mexico for the third time on May 16, 2001. Two

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8 UNITED STATES V. VALDEZ-NOVOA

years later, he was again arrested for misdemeanor driving

under the influence and sentenced to eleven days in jail and

probation. On October 3, 2003, Valdez-Novoa was removed

to Mexico for the fourth time. He returned to the U.S., and

seven days later, he was removed again.

In 2004, Valdez-Novoa was convicted of misdemeanor

driving under the influence and sentenced to twenty days in

jail and probation. In 2005, he was again convicted of

misdemeanor driving under the influence and sentenced to

fourteen days in jail and probation. And, in 2006, he was

convicted of felony driving under the influence and

misdemeanor driving with a suspended license and sentenced

to thirty months’ imprisonment.

On June 2, 2008, after he was released from California

state prison, Valdez-Novoa was removed to Mexico. Once

more he returned to the U.S., and, nine days later, he was

removed for the seventh time. Valdez-Novoa soon reentered

the U.S. again. In November 2008, he was convicted of

felony transportation or sale of methamphetamine and

sentenced to four years in federal prison. On January 18,

2011, Valdez-Novoa was released from prison and removed

to Mexico pursuant to the original June 11, 1999, removal

order.

B. The Attempted Illegal Reentry at Issue in This Case

On February 16, 2011, Valdez-Novoa once more

attempted to return to the U.S. This time he was detained by

Customs and Border Protection officials at the San Ysidro

Port of Entry and indicted for attempted illegal reentry in

violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). At trial, DHS Customs and

Border Protection Officer Edgar Pascua testified that he was

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UNITED STATES V. VALDEZ-NOVOA 9

working in the secondary screening area at the San Ysidro

Port of Entry on February 16, 2011. Pascua explained that he

prepared a report stating that on that date he fingerprinted a

man who matched Valdez-Novoa’s profile in the Integrated

Automated Fingerprinting Identification System.

Next, DHS Criminal Enforcement Officer Sue Curtis

testified that she placed Valdez-Novoa under arrest and

advised him of his Miranda rights. The government

introduced a videotaped recording of Curtis’s interview with

Valdez-Novoa. During the interview, Valdez-Novoa stated

that he had presented an identification document bearing the

name Omar Parra-Sanchez. He explained that he had

purchased the document from a woman in Tijuana, Mexico. 

Valdez-Novoa acknowledged that he understood that it is

illegal to present another person’s identification in order to

gain entry into the U.S. He further admitted that he had been

removed to Mexico about a month earlier and on other

occasions dating back to 1999 and that he had not requested

permission to reenter the U.S.

After the jury returned a guilty verdict, the district court

entered judgment and sentenced Valdez-Novoa to seventy

months’ imprisonment. Valdez-Novoa timely appealed.

II

Valdez-Novoa’s first argument on appeal is that the

district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the

indictment on the basis that the June 11, 1999, removal order

was invalid under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d). We “review[] de novo

the denial of a motion to dismiss an 8 U.S.C. § 1326

indictment when the motion to dismiss is based on alleged

due process defects in an underlying deportation proceeding.” 

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10 UNITED STATES V. VALDEZ-NOVOA

United States v. Muro-Inclan, 249 F.3d 1180, 1182 (9th Cir.

2001).

A. Statutory Framework

A jury convicted Valdez-Novoa of violating 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326(a), which imposes criminal sanctions on “any alien

who—(1) has been denied admission, excluded, deported, or

removed . . . and thereafter (2) enters, attempts to enter, or is

at any time found in, the United States, unless . . . the

Attorney General has expressly consented.” In § 1326(d), the

statute offers a limited avenue by which the defendant can

collaterally attack the underlying removal order that serves as

a predicate to his conviction for violating § 1326(a). Section

1326(d) provides in relevant part that

an alien may not challenge the validity of the

deportation order described in [§ 1326(a)(1)]

. . . unless the alien demonstrates that—(1) the

alien exhausted any administrative remedies

that may have been available to seek relief

against the order; (2) the deportation

proceedings at which the order was issued

improperly deprived the alien of the

opportunity for judicial review; and (3) the

entry of the order was fundamentally unfair.

Valdez-Novoa contends that the June 11, 1999, removal

order is invalid because the IJ did not inform Valdez-Novoa

that he might be eligible for voluntary departure relief. An IJ

is obligated to inform an alien of his “apparent eligibility” for

forms of relief such as voluntary departure. See 8 C.F.R.

§ 1240.11(a)(2); see also United States v. Arrieta, 224 F.3d

1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[W]here the record contains an

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UNITED STATES V. VALDEZ-NOVOA 11

inference that the petitioner is eligible for relief from

deportation, the IJ must advise the alien of this possibility and

give him the opportunity to develop the issue.” (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted)). An IJ’s failure to

inform an alien of his apparent eligibility for voluntary

departure can serve as the basis for a collateral attack on the

underlying removal order under § 1326(d). See, e.g., United

States v. Rojas-Pedroza, 716 F.3d 1253, 1262 (9th Cir. 2013).

To challenge the validity of a removal order under

§ 1326(d), the defendant must first demonstrate that he

“exhausted any administrative remedies that may have been

available to seek relief against the order.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326(d)(1). Where, as here, the defendant argues that “the

IJ has failed to provide information about apparent eligibility

for relief, we excuse the alien from demonstrating that the

alien exhausted any administrative remedies that may have

been available.” United States v. Vidal-Mendoza, 705 F.3d

1012, 1015 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). Second, the defendant must demonstrate

that “the deportation proceedings at which the order was

issued improperly deprived the alien of the opportunity for

judicial review.” 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d)(2). Valdez-Novoa need

not make any further showing to satisfy this prong because

“the [ ] failure to inform an alien regarding ‘apparent

eligibility’ for relief [ ] deprive[s] the alien of the opportunity

for judicial review.” Rojas-Pedroza, 716 F.3d at 1262 (third

alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). Third, the defendant must demonstrate that “the

entry of the [removal] order was fundamentally unfair.” 

8 U.S.C. § 1326(d)(3). We have held that “[a]n underlying

removal order is fundamentally unfair if: (1) [a defendant’s]

due process rights were violated by defects in his underlying

deportation proceeding, and (2) he suffered prejudice as a

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12 UNITED STATES V. VALDEZ-NOVOA

result of the defects.” United States v. Ubaldo-Figueroa,

364 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted). Our resolution of Valdez-Novoa’s

collateral attack on his removal proceedings therefore turns

on whether the IJ’s failure to advise him of his apparent

eligibility for voluntary departure relief was (1) a due process

violation that was (2) prejudicial.

B. Due Process Violation

As noted, an IJ is obligated to inform an alien of his

apparent eligibility for forms of relief such as voluntary

departure. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(a)(2); see also Arrieta,

224 F.3d at 1079. But an alien is not eligible for voluntary

departure if he has been convicted of an aggravated felony. 

See 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(1); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). 

Valdez-Novoa contends that the IJ erred in concluding that he

had been convicted of an aggravated felony and thus erred in

failing to advise him of his apparent eligibility for voluntary

departure. The government disagrees, and it argues that

Valdez-Novoa was statutorily ineligible for voluntary

departure because the IJ correctly determined that he had

been convicted of an aggravated felony.

1

1 The government did not raise this argument before the district court,

where it expressly conceded that the IJ’s failure to advise Valdez-Novoa

of his eligibility for voluntary departure relief was a due process violation

“in light of later-developing case law.” “Issues not presented to the

district court cannot generally be raised for the first time on appeal.” 

United States v. Robertson, 52 F.3d 789, 791 (9th Cir. 1994). We may,

however, consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal if “the issue

presented is purely one of law and the opposing party will suffer no

prejudice as a result of the failure to raise the issue in the trial court.” 

United States v. Carlson, 900 F.2d 1346, 1349 (9th Cir. 1990). This is a

pure question of law, and Valdez-Novoa was not negatively affected by

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UNITED STATES V. VALDEZ-NOVOA 13

the government’s decision not to raise it before the district court. Because

the district court concluded that Valdez-Novoa was not prejudiced by any

alleged due process violation that occurred during his removal

proceedings, the parties would be in the same position before us if the

government had raised the point regardless of how the district court

resolved it.

The fact that the government conceded before the district court that

Valdez-Novoa experienced a due process violation does not preclude us

from resolving its argument on appeal. “‘We may consider an issue

conceded or neglected below if the issue is purely one of law and the

pertinent record has been fully developed.’” White v. McGinnis, 903 F.2d

699, 700 n.4 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (emphasis added) (quoting United

States v. Gabriel, 625 F.3d 830, 832 (9th Cir. 1980)); see also Phillips v.

Ornoski, 673 F.3d 1168, 1190 n.17 (9th Cir. 2012). “It is immaterial

whether the issue was not tried in the district court because it was not

raised or because it was raised but conceded by the party seeking to revive

it on appeal.” United States v. Patrin, 575 F.2d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 1978);

see also Costanich v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 627 F.3d 1101, 1110

(9th Cir. 2010).

“Even when a case falls into one of the exceptions to the rule against

considering new arguments on appeal, we must still decide whether the

particular circumstances of the case overcome our presumption against

hearing new arguments.” Dream Palace v. Cnty. of Maricopa, 384 F.3d

990, 1005 (9th Cir. 2003). Our general presumption against considering

new arguments on appeal operates to “ensure that legal arguments are

considered with the benefit of a fully developed factual record, offers

appellate courts the benefit of the district court's prior analysis, and

prevents parties fromsandbagging their opponents with newarguments on

appeal.” Id. Here, the issue before us does not require additional factual

development, and the district court’s decision would not have been

dispositive in light ofits conclusion that Valdez-Novoa was not prejudiced

by the IJ’s failure to advise him of his apparent eligibility for voluntary

departure. Furthermore, Valdez-Novoa had ample opportunity to argue

that the IJ violated his right to due process before the government

conceded this point in the proceedings below and again in its reply brief

on appeal. We will exercise our discretion to reach the issue in order to

offer clarity to district courts, immigration judges, and aliens in future

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14 UNITED STATES V. VALDEZ-NOVOA

An aggravated felony is “a crime of violence . . . for

which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year.” 

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F).2In 1999, when the IJ issued the

removal order, we had yet to decide whether an offense

involving reckless conduct—such as felony reckless driving

causing great bodily injury—was a crime of violence. We

subsequently held that convictions under similar statutes

punishing the reckless use of force were crimes of violence. 

See United States v. Ceron-Sanchez, 222 F.3d 1169, 1171–72

(9th Cir. 2000), overruled by Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales,

466 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc); United States

v. Grajeda-Ramirez, 348 F.3d 1123, 1124–25 (9th Cir. 2003),

overruled by Fernandez-Ruiz, 466 F.3d at 1129. But, in

2006, we reversed course and held that offenses involving the

reckless use of force are not crimes of violence. See

Fernandez-Ruiz, 466 F.3d at 1129. If Valdez-Novoa’s

removal order had been issued after Ceron-Sanchez was

decided in 2001 and before Fernandez-Ruiz was decided in

2006, then we would unquestionably follow Ceron-Sanchez

and Grajeda-Ramirez in applying § 1326(d) even though we

subsequently overruled these cases. See United States v.

Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d 894, 895, 901 (9th Cir. 2010) (en

proceedings that present the same question. See, e.g., Emmert Indus.

Corp. v. Artisan Assocs., Inc., 497 F.3d 982, 986 (9th Cir. 2007).

2 As the government acknowledges, Valdez-Novoa’s 1996 conviction

for felony assault likely to cause great bodily injury is not an aggravated

felony because the term of imprisonment was not at least one year. He

was initially sentenced to 180 days’ imprisonment and eventually served

363 days after his probation was twice revoked. For this reason, the only

conviction that might qualify as an aggravated felony is his 1997

conviction for felony reckless driving causing great bodily injury.

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UNITED STATES V. VALDEZ-NOVOA 15

banc); Vidal-Mendoza, 705 F.3d at 1017 (“[A]n IJ must

provide accurate information regarding an alien’s eligibility

for relief ‘under the applicable law at the time of his

deportation hearing,’ . . . [but] by the same token, an IJ need

not anticipate future ‘change[s] in law’ when determining an

alien’s ‘apparent eligibility’ for relief from removal.”

(quoting Lopez-Velasquez, 705 F.3d at 897, 901) (second

alteration in original)). In other words, our decision in

Fernandez-Ruiz does not apply retroactively to cases on

collateral review.

Valdez-Novoa correctly points out that we must evaluate

this question under the law as it existed in 1999 rather than as

it stands today or at any other point time. In short, the

subsequent fluctuations in our case law concerning whether

offenses that punish reckless conduct are crimes of violence

cannot decide this case. For this reason, Valdez-Novoa

argues that reckless driving causing great bodily injury is not

a crime of violence under the plain meaning of the phrase as

it is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16.3 But it is not a due process

violation for an IJ to conclude, based solely on the text of

18 U.S.C. § 16, that reckless driving causing great bodily

injury is a crime of violence. In the absence of contrary

precedent from our court or the Supreme Court, we will not

disrupt an IJ’s reasonable reading of an ambiguous provision

when the decision is collaterally attacked under § 1326(d). 

3

“The term ‘crime of violence’ means—(a) an offense that has as an

element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against

the person or property of another, or (b) any other offense that is a felony

and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force

against the person or property of another may be used in the course of

committing the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 16. The definition of “crime of

violence” is adopted in the Immigration and Nationality Act’s definition

of “aggravated felony” in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F).

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16 UNITED STATES V. VALDEZ-NOVOA

The IJ’s decision was plainly reasonable given that we

reached the same conclusion when interpreting similar

offenses involving reckless conduct in Ceron-Sanchez and

Grajeda-Ramirez, which were decided soon after the IJ

concluded that Valdez-Novoa was convicted of a crime of

violence. The IJ encountered a difficult question that had yet

to be resolved by our court and offered a reasonable

resolution that was consistent with the one we arrived at when

we first confronted the issue.

In Vidal-Mendoza, we rejected an argument similar to the

one raised by Valdez-Novoa in part because it “would

effectively transform a § 1326(d) collateral challenge into a

direct appeal.” Vidal-Mendoza, 705 F.3d at 1019. ValdezNovoa could have appealed to the Board of Immigration

Appeals (BIA) and then filed a petition for review with this

court if he wished to advance his argument that the IJ erred in

determining that he had been convicted of a crime of

violence. Cf. Alvarenga-Villalobos v. Ashcroft, 271 F.3d

1169, 1173 (9th Cir. 2001) (rejecting the argument, in the

context of deciding a petition for habeas corpus, that an alien

who had unlawfully reentered the U.S. in violation of § 1326

“did not have meaningful judicial review available to him at

the time of the IJ’s original ruling because the law at the time

was unfavorable to him” by reasoning that the alien “had the

right to appeal his removal order to the BIA and, if

unsuccessful there, to this court”). Valdez-Novoa could have

later attempted to take advantage of our favorable decision in

Fernandez-Ruiz. Cf. Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d at 899–900

(“[W]hen intervening law renders an alien eligible for

discretionary relief for which he was ineligible at the time of

his deportation hearing, the proper remedy is for the [alien]

. . . to file a motion to reopen.” (quotation marks and citation

omitted) (second alteration and omission in original)). 

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UNITED STATES V. VALDEZ-NOVOA 17

Instead of pursuing the available administrative and judicial

remedies, Valdez-Novoa waited until he was charged with

violating § 1326(a) before deciding to collaterally attack the

IJ’s determination by asking us to stand in the shoes of an IJ

in 1999. Valdez-Novoa advocates for an approach that

would, in effect, deem any decision by an IJ susceptible to

collateral attack unless there is circuit precedent squarely on

point at the time the decision is rendered. We decline to

convert § 1326(d) into a mechanism for invalidating removal

orders that are not contrary to circuit precedent and are based

on a reasonable reading of the statute at issue.

We hold that Valdez-Novoa was not deprived of his due

process rights when the IJ determined that he had been

convicted of an aggravated felony and accordingly concluded

that he was ineligible for voluntary departure relief. 

Although this decision is sufficient to dispose of ValdezNovoa’s collateral attack on his removal order, we next

conclude that, in the alternative, Valdez-Novoa was not

prejudiced by any alleged due process violation.

C. Prejudice

In order to demonstrate that “the entry of the [removal]

order was fundamentally unfair,” 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d)(3), the

defendant must also show that “he suffered prejudice as a

result of the defects” in the removal proceedings. UbaldoFigueroa, 364 F.3d at 1048; see also Rojas-Pedroza,

716 F.3d at 1263 (“Where an IJfailed to advise an alien of his

or her apparent eligibility for relief, the alien must still

establish prejudice under the second prong of § 1326(d)(3).”

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Even

assuming arguendo that Valdez-Novoa’s removal

proceedings did not comport with due process because the IJ

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18 UNITED STATES V. VALDEZ-NOVOA

did not advise him of his apparent eligibility for voluntary

departure relief, we hold that Valdez-Novoa was not

prejudiced by the error.

1. Defining “prejudice” under § 1326(d)(3)

The IJ’s failure to advise Valdez-Novoa of his apparent

eligibility for voluntary departure prejudiced him only if it is

“plausible” that the IJ would have granted voluntary

departure relief. See United States v. Cisneros-Resendiz,

656 F.3d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 2011) (“If the alien alleges that

the IJ’s failure to provide information about a form of

potentially available discretionary relief caused a due process

violation, the alien must show prejudice by establishing that

it was plausible that the IJ would have granted such relief.”). 

At oral argument, Valdez-Novoa’s counsel posited that

discretionary relief is “plausible” when “it would not have

been an abuse of discretion for the IJ to grant relief.” ValdezNovoa’s proposed definition of “plausibility” is contrary to

our case law. We have held that “establishing ‘plausibility’

requires more than establishing a mere ‘possibility.’” United

States v. Barajas-Alvarado, 655 F.3d 1077, 1089 (9th Cir.

2011); see also Cisneros-Resendiz, 656 F.3d at 1018

(requiring the alien to demonstrate that “it was plausible (not

merely conceivable) that the IJ would have exercised his

discretion in the alien’s favor.” (citation omitted)). We

reaffirm once more that a defendant is prejudiced under

§ 1326(d)(3) when he shows that it is plausible, rather than

merely conceivable or possible, that an IJ would have granted

the relief for which he was apparently eligible. We expressly

reject the contention that relief is “plausible” whenever an IJ

could have granted the relief at issue without abusing his

discretion. Such a standard is akin to a showing of mere

possibility or conceivability, which we have plainly held is

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UNITED STATES V. VALDEZ-NOVOA 19

insufficient to satisfy the prejudice prong of § 1326(d)(3). 

See Barajas-Alvarado, 655 F.3d at 1089; Cisneros-Resendiz,

656 F.3d at 1018.

Although the test proffered by Valdez-Novoa lacks

support in our case law, we wish to clarify a different

ambiguity concerning how we have allocated the burden to

show that it is plausible that the IJ would have granted

discretionary relief. Most of our cases state simply that the

defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that he was

prejudiced by the due process violation. See United States v.

Gomez, No. 11-30262, 2014 WL 1623725, at *9 (9th Cir.

Apr. 24, 2014) (“[I]n a collateral attack on the validity of a

deportation order the defendant bears the burden of proving

prejudice under § 1326(d)(3). To establish prejudice in this

context, the defendant must show that it was ‘plausible’ that

he would have received some form of relief from removal had

his rights not been violated in the removal proceedings.”

(citation omitted)); Rojas-Pedroza, 716 F.3d at 1263; VidalMendoza, 705 F.3d at 1016; United States v. ValdavinosTorres, 704 F.3d 679, 690 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v.

Reyes-Bonilla, 671 F.3d 1036, 1049 (9th Cir. 2012); United

States v. Melendez-Castro, 671 F.3d 950, 954 (9th Cir. 2012);

Cisneros-Resendiz, 656 F.3d at 1018; Bajaras-Alvarado, 655

F.3d at 1089; United States v. Arias-Ordonez, 597 F.3d 972,

978 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Moriel-Luna, 585 F.3d

1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. CalderonSegura, 512 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2008); United States

v. Bahena-Cardenas, 411 F.3d 1067, 1077 (9th Cir. 2005);

United States v. Pallares-Galan, 359 F.3d 1088, 1103 (9th

Cir. 2004); Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d at 1048; United States

v. Ahumada-Aguilar, 295 F.3d 943, 947 (9th Cir. 2002);

Muro-Inclan, 249 F.3d at 1185; United States v. GarciaMartinez, 228 F.3d 956, 963 (9th Cir. 2000); Arrieta,

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20 UNITED STATES V. VALDEZ-NOVOA

224 F.3d at 1079; United States v. Esparza-Ponce, 193 F.3d

1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Acre-Hernandez,

163 F.3d 559, 563 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. JimenezMarmolejo, 104 F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1996); United

States v. Leon-Leon, 35 F.3d 1428, 1432 (9th Cir. 1994).

But in a few of our older cases, we articulated a burden

shifting scheme, whereby the burden shifts to the government

to prove that the defendant would not have received

discretionary relief if the defendant makes a “prima facie

showing of prejudice.” See United States v. GonzalezValerio, 342 F.3d 1051, 1054 (9th Cir. 2003) (“In order

successfully to challenge his deportation order, [the

defendant] must establish that he was prejudiced by the

failure of the IJ to inform him of the potential for

discretionary relief. . . . Once [the defendant] makes a prima

facie showing of prejudice, the burden shifts to the

government to demonstrate that the procedural violation

could not have changed the proceedings’ outcome.”); United

States v. Lopez-Vasquez, 1 F.3d 751, 756 n.9 (9th Cir. 1993);

United States v. Gonzalez-Mendoza, 985 F.2d 1014, 1017

(9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Cerda-Pena, 799 F.2d 1374,

1379 (9th Cir. 1986).

We detect no meaningful distinction between our cases

that use the language of “prima facie showing” and “burden

shifting” and those that do not. In other words, there is no

difference between saying that the defendant must “make[] a

prima facie showing of prejudice,” Gonzalez-Valerio,

342 F.3d at 1054, and saying that “the defendant must show

that it was ‘plausible’ that he would have received some form

of relief from removal,” Gomez, 2014 WL 1623725, at *9. 

We do not read any of our cases to suggest that requiring the

defendant to make “a prima facie showing” is either more or

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UNITED STATES V. VALDEZ-NOVOA 21

less onerous than requiring the defendant to show that relief

was “plausible.” Rather, the word “plausibility” describes the

substantive content of the requisite “prima facie showing.” 

To say that a defendant must “make[] a prima facie showing

of prejudice,” Gonzalez-Valerio, 342 F.3d at 1054, begs the

question: What must the defendant show in order to satisfy

this requirement? The answer is that in order to “make a

prima facie showing of prejudice,” id., the defendant must

“show that it was ‘plausible’ that he would have received

some form of relief from removal,” Gomez, 2014 WL

1623725, at *9.4

4 To illustrate this point, consider two well-developed areas of the law

where one party is required to make a “prima facie showing” in order to

shift the burden to his opponent: the limits on the use of peremptory

challenges imposed by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), and the

framework for evaluating disparate-treatment claims developed in

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). In the former

context, we have reasoned that “under Batson, [the defendant] has made

a prima facie showing” where he “has shown a pattern of strikes that

raises a plausible inference of discrimination.” Paulino v. Castro,

371 F.3d 1083, 1092 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added). In the latter

context, the Supreme Court has held that its requirement that a complaint

include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”

is not contrary to its holding that “‘a complaint in an employment

discrimination lawsuit [need] not contain specific facts establishing a

prima facie case of discrimination under the framework set forth in

[McDonnell Douglas].’” Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

569–70 (2007) (emphasis added) (first alteration in original) (quoting

Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 (2002)). In both

contexts, demonstrating that relief is “plausible” is part of the requisite

“prima facie showing.” Put differently, there is nothing inconsistent about

saying that the defendant must make a “prima facie showing” in one case

and saying that the defendant must show that relief is “plausible” in

another case.

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22 UNITED STATES V. VALDEZ-NOVOA

It follows that there is no difference between describing

the prejudice analysis as a two-part burden shifting inquiry,

on the one hand, and stating that it is the defendant’s burden

to show prejudice, on the other hand. Compare GonzalezValerio, 342 F.3d at 1054 (“Once [the defendant] makes a

prima facie showing of prejudice, the burden shifts to the

government to demonstrate that the procedural violation

could not have changed the proceedings’ outcome.”) with

Gomez, 2014 WL 1623725, at *9 (“[I]n a collateral attack on

the validity of a deportation order the defendant bears the

burden of proving prejudice under § 1326(d)(3).”). The

crucial point is that all of our cases hold that the defendant

must make the initial showing that he was prejudiced by the

alleged due process violation. Every case involving the

prejudice prong of § 1326(d)(3) proceeds in much the same

way: the defendant cites cases from the courts and the BIA

where an alien with similar equities was granted the

discretionaryrelief at issue, and the government distinguishes

those cases, cites cases to the contrary, or argues that the

cases relied on by the defendant are outliers. We have always

(1) placed the burden on the defendant to show that he was

prejudiced by the due process violation, (2) evaluated the

authorities cited by the defendant, (3) compared them to the

authorities offered by the government, and (4) determined

whether the defendant has carried his burden to prove that he

suffered prejudice.

All of our recent cases have discarded the burden-shifting

language in favor of the more straightforward statement that

the defendant bears the burden of proving prejudice under

§ 1326(d)(3). See, e.g., Rojas-Pedroza, 716 F.3d at 1263

(citing Gonzalez-Valerio, 342 F.3d at 1054, for the

proposition that § 1326(d)(3) “requires the alien to make an

additional showing and demonstrate ‘plausible grounds’ for

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UNITED STATES V. VALDEZ-NOVOA 23

relief”). We reaffirm that the burden to show prejudice rests

with the defendant. We now apply this well-established

approach to the facts of this case and conclude that the IJ’s

failure to notify Valdez-Novoa of his apparent eligibility for

voluntary departure did not prejudice him because ValdezNovoa has not shown that it is plausible that he would have

received such relief.

2. Application of the § 1326(d)(3) prejudice prong

We follow a two-step process to determine whether the

defendant was prejudiced by the IJ’s decision not to inform

of his apparent eligibility for voluntary departure relief.

First, we identify the factors relevant to the

IJ’s exercise of the discretion for the relief

being sought. Next, we determine whether,

“in light of the factors relevant to the form of

relief being sought, and based on the unique

circumstances of the alien’s own case, it was

plausible (not merely conceivable) that the IJ

would have exercised his discretion in the

alien’s favor.”

Rojas-Pedroza, 716 F.3d at 1263 (quotingBarajas-Alvarado,

655 F.3d at 1089).

The factors relevant to an IJ deciding whether to grant

voluntary departure are the alien’s negative and positive

equities. See Matter of Gamboa, 14 I. & N. Dec. 244, 248

(BIA 1972); see also Rojas-Pedroza, 716 F.3d at 1264–65. 

The negative equities include “the nature and underlying

circumstances of the deportation ground at issue; additional

violations of the immigration laws; the existence, seriousness,

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24 UNITED STATES V. VALDEZ-NOVOA

and recency of any criminal record; and other evidence of bad

character or the undesirability of the applicant as a permanent

resident.” Matter of Arguelles-Campos, 22 I. & N. Dec. 811,

817 (BIA 1999). The positive equities “are compensating

elements such as long residence here, close family ties in the

United States, or humanitarian needs.” Id.

Turning to the facts of this case, we first note that ValdezNovoa’s criminal record was recent and serious when he was

deemed removable in 1999. He had been convicted of two

felonies involving injury to others: assault likely to cause

great bodily injury and reckless driving causing great bodily

injury. Taken together, he was incarcerated for almost three

years as a consequence of these convictions. He had also

been convicted of three misdemeanors, including two DUIs. 

Valdez-Novoa’s criminal record reveals that he engaged in a

pattern of increasingly dangerous and violent conduct over

the years leading up to his removal proceedings in 1999. His

inability to abide by the law also affected the functioning of

the immigration system. The INS served Valdez-Novoa with

a notice to appear after he was convicted of felony assault

likely to cause great bodily injury in 1996. The agency

permitted him to post bond rather than remain in detention

while his removal proceedings were pending even though he

resided in the U.S. without documentation and had already

been convicted of three misdemeanors and one felony. But

Valdez-Novoa could not attend his scheduled hearing before

the IJ because he wound up back in jail. He was eventually

convicted of felony reckless driving causing great bodily

injury and served part of his two-year prison sentence before

the IJ was able to conclude his removal proceedings.

On the other side of the ledger, Valdez-Novoa could have

presented meaningful positive equities. He arrived in the

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UNITED STATES V. VALDEZ-NOVOA 25

U.S. as a child, and by 1999 his parents had obtained status as

lawful permanent residents. He had eight younger siblings

who also lived in California, some or all of whom were either

citizens or lawful permanent residents at the time he was

deemed removable. When he was not incarcerated, ValdezNovoa earned a diploma from an alternative high school and

a welding certificate from a college and worked various jobs.

Valdez-Novoa cites a number of BIA decisions in support

of his position that it is plausible that an IJ would have

granted voluntary departure to an alien with his mix of

negative and positive equities. His best case is probably In re

Gonzales-Figeroa, 2006 WL 729784 (BIA Feb. 10, 2006).

There, the Board concluded that the IJ did not abuse his

discretion in deciding to grant voluntary departure to an alien

who had four convictions for assault—one of which had led

to a six-month prison term—along with a conviction for

resisting arrest. Id. at *1. Gonzales-Figeroa presented

compelling positive equities that counterbalanced his criminal

record. He had resided in the U.S. for fifteen years at the

time of his removal proceedings, his mother was a lawful

permanent resident who relied on him for financial support,

his sister and nieces were citizens, his mother had already

filed a visa petition on his behalf, and he had joined

Alcoholics Anonymous while in prison and stopped drinking. 

Id. On balance, Valdez-Novoa’s criminal history was

arguably more serious given the risk of severe injury or death

posed by his two felony offenses, the length of his prison

terms, and the absence of record evidence that he was

reforming the behaviors that contributed to his recidivism. 

Both Gonzales-Figeroa and Valdez-Novoa offered similarly

meaningful positive equities, namely lengthy residence in the

U.S. and close ties to family members residing lawfully in the

U.S.

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26 UNITED STATES V. VALDEZ-NOVOA

Valdez-Novoa also relies on In re Sanabria-Dominguez,

2010 WL 2601495 (BIA May 25, 2010). There, the Board,

applying de novo review, reversed the IJ’s determination that

the alien was not entitled to voluntary departure. Id. at *1. 

Sanabria-Dominguez’s negative equities included “his history

of repeated illegal entries to the United States with the

assistance of smugglers, record of previous voluntary returns,

failure to file tax returns, and driving without a license.” Id.

And his positive equities included “his residence in the

United States, the assistance that he has provided his United

States citizen wife with regard to her addiction and medical

condition, his United States citizen son, and his contributions

to his community, including his work as a drug counselor and

the assistance he has provided his church.” Id. Unlike

Valdez-Novoa, Sanabria-Dominguez had no convictions for

violent conduct, let alone multiple felony convictions for

inflicting injury on others and multiple convictions for

placing the lives of others at risk by driving under the

influence. Sanabria-Dominguez’s positive equities were

arguably more compelling as well, since he not only had ties

to family members residing lawfully in the U.S., but was

responsible for supporting his wife and child, both of whom

were U.S. citizens.

The other cases referenced by Valdez-Novoa are farther

afield. In Matter of Magana, 17 I. & N. Dec. 111 (BIA

1979), the Board held that the alien was entitled to voluntary

departure even though he was married to a woman in Mexico

when he married another woman in the U.S. and then applied

for a visa. Id. at 112, 115. But there is no indication that

Magana was saddled with other negative equities such as a

lengthy criminal history involving violent conduct. And in

Matter of Battista, 19 I. & N. Dec. 484 (BIA 1987), the Board

did not disturb the IJ’s decision to grant voluntary departure

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UNITED STATES V. VALDEZ-NOVOA 27

to an alien who had been convicted of breaking and entering,

grand theft, and possession of criminal tools. Id. at 484–85. 

Battista’s negative equities are less impactful because his

convictions arose from a single incident rather than a pattern

of ongoing and increasingly serious misconduct and they did

not involve violence toward others. And Battista, like

Valdez-Novoa, presented compelling positive equities

because he was married to a U.S. citizen who was pregnant

with his child. Id. Although Valdez-Novoa does not cite the

case, we note that he might draw some support from In re

Moreno Bacahui, 2010 WL 5635608 (BIA Dec. 30, 2010). 

There, the BIA, applying de novo review, reversed the IJ’s

decision to deny the alien’s request for voluntary departure. 

Id. at *1. An INS report stated that Moreno Bacahui was

found to be in possession of 1.5 grams of cocaine at a port of

entry. Id. at *2. But there was no indication that Moreno

Bacahui was ever charged or convicted of the alleged drug

offense, which had occurred seven years before his removal

proceedings. The only infraction on his record involved

failing to appear in state court after a traffic incident. Id. 

Moreno Bacahui was also married to a U.S. citizen who had

filed a visa petition on his behalf. Id. Once again, there is a

wide gulf between the negative equities of the alien who was

granted voluntary departure and Valdez-Novoa’s negative

equities at the time of his removal proceedings.

We do not think the cases cited by our dissenting

colleague show that it is plausible, rather than merely

possible or conceivable, that Valdez-Novoa would have

received voluntary departure relief. In In re PinedaCastellanos, 2005 WL 3833024 (BIA Nov. 16, 2005), the

alien had “convictions for illegal entry, battery, drunkenness,

threatening, a second battery, and driving under the

influence.” Id. at *1. Valdez-Novoa similarly had been twice

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28 UNITED STATES V. VALDEZ-NOVOA

convicted of driving under the influence, but he was also

saddled with convictions for two felonies that caused serious

injury to others. Furthermore, the Board observed in PinedaCastellanos that “[g]iven the respondent’s criminal record, a

grant of voluntary departure by the Immigration Judge was

more than generous.” Id. at *2 (emphasis added). The

Board’s intimation that Pineda-Castellanos represents the

outer bound of voluntary departure relief does not lead us to

believe that it is plausible that Valdez-Novoa would have

received the same relief despite his more serious criminal

record. We are likewise unmoved by cases where the Board

has merely agreed to remand to the IJ to consider whether to

grant voluntary departure to aliens with fewer negative

equities than Valdez Novoa because such remands tell us

little about the Board’s standards or practices. See In re

Tipaz-Poncio, 2014 WL 1401572, at *1 (BIA Mar. 19, 2014)

(remanding to the IJ to consider whether to grant voluntary

departure to an alien who had been convicted of “Class A”

assault with family violence and sentenced to forty-five days

in prison); In re Toledo-Alvarado, 2014 WL 1278406, at *1

(BIA Feb. 26, 2014) (remanding to the IJ to consider whether

to grant voluntary departure to an alien who had been

convicted of attempted theft and sentenced to one year in

prison); In re Villalongja Mante, 2007 WL 1676929, at *1–3

(BIA May 18, 2007) (remanding to the IJ to consider whether

to grant voluntary departure to an alien who had been

convicted of sexual battery and sentenced to “a relatively

brief period of felony probation”); In re Reyes-Jiminez, 2004

WL 2418597, at *2 (BIA Oct. 4, 2004) (remanding to the IJ

to consider whether to grant voluntary departure to an alien

who had been sentenced to ten days in prison for disorderly

conduct, thirty-one days in prison for second-degree burglary,

and one year in prison for driving under the influence). We

are equally unpersuaded by cases where the Board has

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UNITED STATES V. VALDEZ-NOVOA 29

remanded to the IJ to consider whether to grant voluntary

departure to lawful permanent residents with criminal

histories. See In re Guillermo Ramirez, 2005 WL 698425, at

*1–2 (BIA Mar. 8, 2005) (remanding to the IJ to consider

whether to grant voluntary departure to a lawful permanent

resident who did not have “any recent criminal convictions”

but who had “committed at least two serious crimes,

involving controlled substances and robbery, provided a false

name to law enforcement authorities at least once, stealing

the identity of a friend in the process, and was arrested on a

different occasion for driving under the influence”); In re

Hernandez-Barreto, 2004 WL 2943517, at *1–2 (BIA Oct.

29, 2004) (remanding to the IJ to consider whether to grant

voluntary departure to a lawful permanent resident who had

been convicted of inflicting corporal injury upon a spouse,

possession of a controlled substance, and driving under the

influence, for which he received a 150-day suspended

sentence and probation). Finally, our position is bolstered

rather than undercut by the citation to In re Ortiz-Bustos,

2014 WL 1652408 (BIA Apr. 10, 2014), where the Board

affirmed the IJ’s denial of voluntary departure to an alien who

had been twice convicted of driving under the influence. Id.

at *1.

Our survey of BIA decisions fails to reveal a single case

where an IJ granted voluntary departure to an alien with a

criminal history as recent and serious as the record compiled

by Valdez-Novoa. An IJ would have considered the fact that

the conduct that led to Valdez-Novoa’s two felony

convictions could have resulted in serious injury or death. 

See Arguelles-Campos, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 817 (instructing IJs

to consider, among other things, “the existence, seriousness,

and recency of any criminal record; and other evidence of bad

character or the undesirability of the applicant as a permanent

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30 UNITED STATES V. VALDEZ-NOVOA

resident”). His two convictions for driving under the

influence would have also weighed heavily on the IJ even

though they were misdemeanors. See In re Romero-Reyes,

2010 WL 3780635, at *1 (BIA Sept. 9, 2010) (“We note that

driving under the influence is a very dangerous crime which

may cause serious injury or death to innocent bystanders.”). 

The fact that Valdez-Novoa twice violated the conditions of

his parole after his first stint in prison would have likewise

cautioned the IJ against granting voluntary departure relief. 

See id. (“We are further troubled by the fact that [the alien]

apparently violated his probation more than once.”). And the

IJ would have likely been influenced by the fact that ValdezNovoa’s conviction for felony reckless driving occurred after

the INS initiated removal proceedings against him. See In re

Abrahan Castillo, 2009 WL 638918, at *1 (BIA Feb. 23,

2009) (“The Immigration Judge denied voluntary departure

in this case due to the respondent’s history of criminal

offenses, which includes a violent offense that occurred after

the respondent was placed in proceedings.”).

Of the cases available to us, the facts of Gonzales-Figeroa

are the most difficult to distinguish given the alien’s similarly

lengthy criminal record. But the existence of a single case

that is arguably on point means only that it is “possible” or

“conceivable” that a similarly situated alien would be

afforded voluntary departure. That is plainly insufficient to

warrant a finding that the defendant was prejudiced by the

IJ’s failure to advise him of his apparent eligibility for

voluntary departure. See Barajas-Alvarado, 655 F.3d at 1089

(“[E]stablishing ‘plausibility’ requires more than establishing

a mere ‘possibility.’”); Cisneros-Resendiz, 656 F.3d at 1018

(requiring the alien to demonstrate that “it was plausible (not

merely conceivable) that the IJ would have exercised his

discretion in the alien’s favor” (citation omitted)).

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UNITED STATES V. VALDEZ-NOVOA 31

We do not discount the fact that Valdez-Novoa had spent

most of his life in the U.S. and that his parents and siblings

lived in the country. Although there is no indication that

Valdez-Novoa was married or had children in 1999, we

acknowledge that the presence of family members who are

citizens or lawful permanent residents is an important

positive equity. Yet it is hardly dispositive. On numerous

occasions, the BIA has affirmed an IJ’s decision to deny

voluntary departure relief where the alien claimed equally

compelling ties to the U.S. See, e.g., In re Velasquez-Garcia,

2012 WL 1495500, at *1 (BIA Mar. 22, 2012) (denying

voluntary departure where the alien had been convicted of

possession of cocaine even though “several of his family

members are United States citizens”); In re Garcia-Marquez,

2012 WL 911851, at *1 (BIA Mar. 9, 2012) (denying

voluntary departure where the alien had been arrested for

unlawful animal fighting and alien smuggling and had been

convicted of DUI despite “his long residence in the United

States [and] his family and community ties here.”); In re

Posadas-Posadas, 2012 WL 371659, at *1 (BIA Jan. 18,

2012) (denying voluntary departure where the alien had been

arrested for DUI and two subsequent driving-related offenses

despite his “family ties and length of stay in the United

States”); In re Ponce-Velez, 2011 WL 1570481, at *1–2 (BIA

Mar. 31, 2011) (denying voluntary departure where the

defendant had been convicted of DUI and driving without a

license and failed to appear in court for six years despite the

fact that he had “been in the United States for 13 years . . .

[and] has 3 United States citizen children”).

We conclude that Valdez-Novoa has not shown that it is

plausible that an IJ would have granted his request for

voluntary departure in light of his negative and positive

equities when he was deemed removable on June 11, 1999,

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32 UNITED STATES V. VALDEZ-NOVOA

even if he had not been deemed statutorily ineligible for

voluntary departure as a consequence of the IJ’s

determination that he had been convicted of an aggravated

felony. As a result, Valdez-Novoa was not prejudiced by the

IJ’s failure to advise him of his apparent eligibility for

voluntary departure relief. It follows that the entry of the IJ’s

order was not “fundamentally unfair” under § 1326(d)(3). 

The 1999 removal order is thus a valid predicate to a

conviction for attempted illegal entry under § 1326(a).

III

Valdez-Novoa’s second argument on appeal is that the

district court erred by denying his motion for judgment of

acquittal on the basis that the government did not provide

evidence sufficient to corroborate his confession under the

corpus delicti rule. We review the denial of a motion for

judgment of acquittal de novo, and “ask whether, after

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

United States v. Corona-Garcia, 210 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir.

2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

A. Attempted Illegal Reentry and the Corpus Delicti Rule

In United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188 (9th

Cir. 2000) (en banc), we held that

the elements of the crime of attempted illegal

reentry into the United States under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326 are: (1) the defendant had the purpose,

i.e., conscious desire, to reenter the United

States without the express consent of the

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UNITED STATES V. VALDEZ-NOVOA 33

Attorney General; (2) the defendant

committed an overt act that was a substantial

step towards reentering without that consent;

(3) the defendant was not a citizen of the

United States; (4) the defendant had

previously been lawfully denied admission,

excluded, deported or removed from the

United States; and (5) the Attorney General

had not consented to the defendant’s

attempted reentry.

Id. at 1196. Valdez-Novoa confessed to all of the elements

of the offense in a videotaped interview with DHS Criminal

Enforcement Officer Sue Curtis that was shown to the jury at

trial. Valdez-Novoa told Curtis that he was attempting to

enter the U.S. without requesting permission to do so. He

confessed that he had purchased an identification card bearing

another man’s name to use to enter the country. He also

acknowledged that he had previously been removed on

several occasions. And, in Section II, supra, we confirmed

that the 1999 removal order was lawful under § 1326(d).

But Valdez-Novoa’s confession standing alone is not

necessarily sufficient to support his conviction. “Although

the government may rely on a defendant’s confession to meet

its burden of proof, it has nevertheless been long established

that, in order to serve as the basis for conviction, the

government must also adduce some independent

corroborating evidence.” Corona-Garcia, 210 F.3d at 978. 

This is the contemporary iteration of the common law corpus

delicti rule. In United States v. Lopez-Alvarez, 970 F.2d 583

(9th Cir. 1992), we considered the ongoing vitality of the

corpus delicti principle in light of a trio of decisions by the

Supreme Court: Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84 (1954);

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Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147 (1954); and Wong Sun

v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). We held that these

cases stand for the proposition that “the state no longer need

introduce independent, tangible evidence supporting every

element of the corpus delicti. Instead, the state is required to

support independently only the gravamen of the offense—the

existence of the injury that forms the core of the offense and

a link to a criminal actor—with tangible evidence.” LopezAlvarez, 970 F.2d at 591.

B. The Gravamen of Attempted Illegal Reentry

Pursuant to our decision in Lopez-Alvarez, we must first

identify the gravamen of the offense. In Corona-Garcia, we

considered whether the government introduced sufficient

independent evidence of the corpus delicti in a case where the

defendant was convicted of illegal entry in violation of

§ 1326(a). Corona-Garcia, 210 F.3d at 977–79. We held

that “[t]he gravamen of the offense in this case—that is to say

the conduct at the core of the offense—is entry.” Id. at 978. 

We “expressly reject[ed] [the defendant’s] contention that

‘illegal entry’ is the gravamen of the offense.” Id. at 978 n.3. 

This case differs from Corona-Garcia becauseValdez-Novoa

was convicted of attempted illegal entry, rather than the

completed offense. Unlike Corona-Garcia, who was serving

time in aCalifornia state prison for an unrelated offense when

the government concluded that he had illegally entered the

U.S., Valdez-Novoa never made it past the San Ysidro Port

of Entry. Both attempted illegal reentry and the completed

version of the offense are prohibited by § 1326(a). But they

differ in one important respect: attempted illegal reentry is a

specific intent crime, while the completed offense is not. See

Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d at 1191–92 (“We hold that the

attempt prong of § 1326 incorporates the well-established

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UNITED STATES V. VALDEZ-NOVOA 35

common law meaning of ‘attempt’ and requires proof of a

specific intent to enter illegally.”); United States v. FloresVillar, 536 F.3d 990, 999 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Attempted illegal

entry . . . is a specific intent crime, but . . . illegal reentry and

being found in the United States is not.”). Because the

government must introduce “proof of a specific intent to enter

illegally,” Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d at 1192, the

gravamen of the offense is attempted illegal entry rather than

attempted entry.

C. Evidence Corroborating Valdez-Novoa’s Confession

We apply a two-pronged test to determine whether

sufficient evidence corroborates Valdez-Novoa’s confession:

[F]irst, although the state need not introduce

independent evidence of the corpus delicti in

conformance with the traditional test, it must

introduce sufficient evidence to establish that

the criminal conduct at the core of the offense

has occurred. Second, it must introduce

independent evidence tending to establish the

trustworthiness of the admissions, unless the

confession is, by virtue of special

circumstances, inherently reliable.

Lopez-Alvarez, 970 F.2d at 592.

With respect to the first prong, Valdez-Novoa argues that

his presence in secondary screening at the San Ysidro Port of

Entry does not corroborate his confession that he was

attempting to enter the U.S. without permission. An alien

could wind up in secondary screening even though he lacked

the specific intent to enter the U.S. without permission. For

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example, he might approach a port of entry to seek asylum,

or he might be under the mistaken assumption that he has

been granted permission to reenter. Under those

circumstances, the alien would not have committed the

gravamen of the offense of attempted illegal entry in violation

of § 1326(a). See Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d at 1194. 

Valdez-Novoa is correct that his presence in secondary

screening, standing alone, does not prove that he was

attempting to reenter the U.S. without permission.

But the corpus deliciti rule does not require the

government to introduce evidence that would be

independently sufficient to convict the defendant in the

absence of the confession. Rather, it requires evidence

sufficient to corroborate the defendant’s confession. See

Smith, 348 U.S. at 156 (“All elements of the offense must be

established by independent evidence or corroborated

admissions, but one available mode of corroboration is for the

independent evidence to bolster the confession itself and

thereby prove the offense ‘through’ the statements of the

accused.”); Corona-Garcia, 210 F.3d at 979 (“Although it is

true that the sum total of this evidence might well be

insufficient, standing alone, to prove entry, we do not read

Opper or Lopez-Alvarez to require such absolute proof. 

Indeed, Opper andLopez-Alvarezrequire corroboration of the

defendant's confession—that is to say evidence that fortifies,

augments, or supports it—from which a jury may infer that

the defendant's confession was a trustworthy admission to

core conduct that actually occurred.”); Thomas v. United

States, 370 F.2d 621, 623 n.3 (9th Cir. 1967) (“[I]n those

cases where the crime involves no tangible corpus delicti, the

corroborative evidence need show no more than the

trustworthiness of the admission or confession—it need not

show the actual commission of the crime.”).

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UNITED STATES V. VALDEZ-NOVOA 37

The government introduced ample independent evidence

that corroborates Valdez-Novoa’s statement that he

committed the gravamen of the offense of attempted illegal

reentry. First, Valdez-Novoa confessed that he had been

removed to Mexico one month before he attempted to reenter

the U.S. At trial, Customs and Border Patrol Officer Bianca

Marcel testified that, according to Valdez-Novoa’s

immigration file, he was removed to Mexico on January 18,

2011. The warrant of removal in Valdez-Novoa’s file was in

fact signed on January 18, 2011. That is almost exactly one

month before he was detained while attempting to enter the

U.S. at the San Ysidro Port of Entry on February 16, 2011. 

Valdez-Novoa also confessed that he was first ordered

removed in 1999 in proceedings that occurred in San

Francisco. Officer Marcel testified that, according to ValdezNovoa’s immigration file, he was deemed removable on June

11, 1999, and removed to Mexico on June 15, 1999. The

warrant of removal in Valdez-Novoa’s file reflects the same

information, and the IJ’s decision was issued in San Francisco

on June 11, 1999. Finally, Valdez-Novoa confessed that he

had not applied for permission to return to the U.S. Officer

Marcel testified that an alien can request permission to

reenter the U.S., but that Valdez-Novoa’s immigration file

revealed that he had not done so. The documentary evidence

is indeed devoid of any indication that Valdez-Novoa

requested permission to reenter the U.S.

All of this “independent evidence [ ] bolster[s] the

confession itself and thereby prove[s] the offense ‘through’

the statements of the accused,” Smith, 348 U.S. at 156, by

showing that Valdez-Novoa was attempting to enter the U.S.

without permission after having been previously removed. 

We relied on the same kind of corroborative evidence in

Lopez-Alvarez. For example, we explained that “the details

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38 UNITED STATES V. VALDEZ-NOVOA

of the crimes provided by the defendant are verified by

independent evidence” because the defendant confessed to

using iron pipes to beat the victim, which was “consistent

with the condition of the body.” Lopez-Alvarez, 970 F.2d at

593. The defendant also discussed a tape recording of an

exchange between the victim and several other men. Id. The

government introduced the recording, “and its contents

matched the defendant’s general description.” Id. Likewise,

the details of Valdez-Novoa’s confession matched the record

evidence introduced by the government. As in LopezAlvarez, “we believe that the admissions were supported by

credible evidence, that a jury would be substantially justified

in believing them, and that they were therefore sufficiently

reliable to support a conviction.” Id.

With respect to the second prong of the Lopez-Alvarez

inquiry, we conclude that the government “introduce[d]

independent evidence tending to establish the trustworthiness

of the admissions.” Id. at 592. As noted, Officer Marcel’s

testimony concerning Valdez-Novoa’s immigration file and

the contents of the file itself confirmed the accuracy of the

statements that Valdez-Novoa made to Officer Curtis at the

San Ysidro Port of Entry. The same evidence that

corroborates Valdez-Novoa’s confession to having committed

the gravamen of the offense also verifies the “trustworthiness

of the admissions.” Id. We have previously relied on more

attenuated corroborating evidence in deeming a confession

trustworthy under the second prong of the Lopez-Alvarez

analysis. In Corona-Garcia, we reasoned that the defendant’s

confession that he reentered the U.S. at the Calexico Port of

Entry was corroborated by the fact that he had been

previously removed through the same port of entry. CoronaGarcia, 210 F.3d at 979. Here, the independent evidence

introduced by the government matched very specific details

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UNITED STATES V. VALDEZ-NOVOA 39

offered by Valdez-Novoa about his immigration history

during his interview with Officer Curtis. Valdez-Novoa’s

confession also included specific details about how he used

another man’s identification to attempt to enter the country

without permission, including the name of the woman who

sold him the identification and how he intended to pay her

after crossing. The specificity of his account further bolsters

its trustworthiness by making it even more implausible that

Valdez-Novoa found himself in secondary screening without

intending to reenter the U.S. without permission.

Furthermore, the confession in this case can be considered

“inherently reliable,” Lopez-Alvarez, 970 F.2d at 592,

because it was videotaped, voluntary, and occurred after

Officer Curtis advised Valdez-Novoa of his Miranda rights. 

At bottom, the corpus delicti doctrine’s “purpose is to prevent

errors in convictions based upon untrue confessions alone” in

light of the reality that “[c]onfessions may be unreliable

because they are coerced or induced.” Smith, 348 U.S. at 153

(quotation marks and citation omitted). Where the

government complies with all of the procedural protections

afforded the accused and the defendant’s videotaped

statement is shown to the jury, there is no elevated risk that

the confession was the product of coercion or that the

defendant’s words were misconstrued. The corpus delicti

rule is not inevitably satisfied whenever a confession is not

tainted by a constitutional violation or any indicia of undue

coercion. The government is still obligated to “introduce

sufficient evidence to establish that the criminal conduct at

the core of the offense has occurred” in order to satisfy the

first prong of the Lopez-Alvarezinquiry. But the fact that the

confession is recorded, voluntary, and the result of an

interrogation that is conducted in a manner consistent with

the constitutional protections afforded the accused supports

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40 UNITED STATES V. VALDEZ-NOVOA

a determination that it is “inherently reliable” under LopezAlvarez’s second prong.

We conclude that the government introduced sufficient

independent evidence to corroborate Valdez-Novoa’s

confession to attempting to enter the U.S. without permission

after having been previously removed. Because the evidence

adduced at trial satisfied the corpus delicti doctrine, the

district court correctly denied Valdez-Novoa’s motion for

judgment of acquittal.

IV

We affirm the district court’s judgment. First, we

conclude that the IJ’s June 11, 1999, order deeming ValdezNovoa removable is a valid predicate to his conviction for

violating § 1326(a). The IJ’s determination that ValdezNovoa had been convicted of an aggravated felony and was

therefore statutorily ineligible for voluntary departure does

not constitute a due process violation because it was not

contrary to our precedent at the time the removal order was

entered and involved a reasonable reading of 18 U.S.C. §16. 

Alternatively, even if we assume arguendo that the IJ erred

in determining that Valdez-Novoa was not apparentlyeligible

for voluntary departure relief, we hold that Valdez-Novoa

was not prejudiced by the error because he has not shown that

it is plausible that an IJ would have granted a request for

voluntary departure in light of his negative and positive

equities at the time of the removal proceedings. Because

Valdez-Novoa was not prejudiced by the presumed error, the

removal order was not “fundamentally unfair” under

§ 1326(d)(3). Second, we conclude that the government

introduced ample independent evidence corroborating

Valdez-Novoa’s confession to attempting to enter the U.S.

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UNITED STATES V. VALDEZ-NOVOA 41

without permission after having been previously removed to

satisfy the corpus delicti rule. The district court correctly

denied both Valdez-Novoa’s motion to dismissthe indictment

and his motion for judgment of acquittal. The judgment of

the district court is AFFIRMED.

Judge McKEOWN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. As the majority notes, ValdezNovoa’s case turns on whether the Immigration Judge’s

(“IJ’s”) failure to advise him of his apparent eligibility for

voluntary departure was a due process violation and whether

that violation was prejudicial. I write separately because the

government earlier conceded that there was a due process

violation, and because the majority elevates our benchmark

for prejudice, the “plausibility” inquiry, to the higher standard

of either preponderance or probability. Because it is plausible

that the IJ would have exercised discretion to grant voluntary

departure, I would reverse the district court’s judgment.

Before the district court, the government conceded that

there was a “due process violation, in light of

later–developing case law,” and focused its argument solely

on the prejudice issue. The court implicitly accepted the

violation as conceded, and it too addressed only prejudice.

The government has now entirely changed its position, and

maintains on appeal that there was no due process violation

in the earlier proceedings.

The majority reasons that we may reach the government’s

novel argument under an exception permitting us, in certain

conditions, to reach “[i]ssues not presented to the district

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court . . . [and presented] for the first time on appeal.” United

States v. Carlson, 900 F.2d 1346, 1349 (9th Cir. 1990). But

this is not an issue that is being raised for the first time on

appeal. To the contrary, the issue was squarely before the

district court, and the government affirmatively abandoned it.

Waiver or judicial estoppel are the appropriate doctrines. To

ignore those doctrines is to permit a party to relitigate an

issue already abandoned.1

Nor does this situation fall, as the government suggests,

under the intervening law exception. The government argues

that the law changed between the district court proceeding in

2011 and this appeal, citing United States v. Vidal-Mendoza,

705 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2013). This argument fails because

Vidal-Mendoza did not “fundamentally alter[] the applicable

law.” Indeed, the language the government cites from VidalMendoza comes from United States v. Lopez-Velasquez,

629 F. 3d 894 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), which was decided

three years earlier and before Valdez-Novoa was even

1

See, e.g., Export Grp. v. Reef Indus., Inc., 54 F.3d 1466, 1470-71 (9th

Cir. 1995) (holding that a party waived the right to allege contrary facts

on appeal, e.g. that defendant was not an agent or instrumentality of the

Mexican government for sovereign immunity purposes, where the party

alleged that the defendant was an agent or instrumentality in its

complaint); see also New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001)

(noting that “judicial estoppel generally prevents a party from prevailing

in one phase of a case on an argument and then relying on a contradictory

argument to prevail in another phase”) (internal quotation marks omitted);

id. at 750 (noting that the purpose of estoppel is to “prohibit[] parties from

deliberately changing positions according to the exigencies of the

moment” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

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UNITED STATES V. VALDEZ-NOVOA 43

indicted.2 The government should not be permitted to

resurrect on appeal an argument that it affirmatively

jettisoned before the district court.

We should not countenance a change in position simply

because the government has changed its mind. To do so

would make every appeal a jump ball situation in which the

appeal is just another chance to raise a new issue and tip the

litigation game in one party’s favor without regard to what

happened in the trial court. This approach is particularly

unfair when the appellee adopts a contradictory position on

appeal, since the appellant has no warning and cannot tailor

its opening brief to meet the argument. The circumstance here

is nothing more than the government’s created “exigenc[y] of

the moment.” New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750

(2001). To the extent we have discretion to entertain the

government’s about-face, we should decline to do so here. To

do otherwise makes a sham of the principles of waiver and

estoppel.

The majority concludes, in the alternative, that ValdezNovoa was not prejudiced by the due process violation. I

likewise disagree with this conclusion. To establish prejudice,

Valdez-Novoa “does not have to show that he actually would

have been granted relief. Instead, he must only show that he

had a ‘plausible’ ground for relief from deportation.” United

States v. Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir.

2 Because, in my view, Valdez-Novoa had not “previously been lawfully

. . . removed,” I would likewise hold that the fourth element of the crime

of illegal reentry here was not satisfied, United States v. GracidasUlibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1196 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc), for purposes of

the corpus delicti rule.

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2004) (quoting United States v. Arrieta, 224 F.3d 1076, 1079

(9th Cir. 2000)).3

Although our cases reference the “plausibility” standard,

we have yet to define it with precision. We have set a floor:

“establishing ‘plausibility’ requires more than establishing a

mere ‘possibility.’” United States v. Barajas-Alvarado, 655

F. 3d 1077, 1089 (9th Cir. 2011). We have also explained, in

the context of a § 212(h) waiver, that while the evidence did

not guarantee a waiver, “it provide[d] the ‘something more’

that ma[de]it plausible.” Arrieta, 224 F.3d at 1082–83. While

citing earlier cases, the majority fails to articulate an actual

plausibility standard. I agree with the majority that the

standard is not, as Valdez-Novoa advocates, whether it would

have been an abuse of discretion for an IJ to grant voluntary

departure. But neither do our cases require a petitioner to find

a case that is “on all fours” with his own to demonstrate

plausibility. That would elevate our plausibility standard to a

probability standard.

Two Supreme Court decisions underscore that the

plausibility bar is low and, at the very least, that it does not

rise to the level of “probability.” The Court’s formulation in

Armour v. City of Indianapolis is instructive: a “plausible

reason” is one in which “there is any reasonably conceivable

state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the

classification.” 132 S. Ct. 2073, 2080 (2012) (internal citation

3 Other circuits have adopted different standards for demonstrating

prejudice. See, e.g., United States v. Charleswell, 456 F.3d 347, 362 n.17

(3d Cir. 2006) (adopting a “reasonable likelihood” standard); United

States v. Aguirre-Tello, 353 F.3d 1199, 1209 (10th Cir. 2004) (same);

United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61, 74 (2d Cir. 2004) (adopting a

“reasonable likelihood” or “reasonable probability” standard).

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and quotation marks omitted). Similarly, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

the Court specified that “[t]he plausibility standard is not akin

to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a

sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Considering the Supreme Court’s

formulation coupled with our precedent, I believe that our

“plausibility” standard is best understood as more than a mere

possibility but less than a probability: in short, as “reasonably

conceivable or possible.”

In considering whether to grant voluntary departure,

immigration judges are required, as the majority

acknowledges, to “weigh favorable and unfavorable factors.”

Campos-Granillo v. INS, 12 F.3d 849, 852 (9th Cir. 1993).

Favorable factors include 

family ties within the United States; residence

of long duration in this country, particularly if

residence began at a young age; hardship to

the petitioner or petitioner’s family if relief is

not granted; service in the United States

armed forces; a history of employment; the

existence of business or property ties;

evidence of value and service to the

community; proof of rehabilitation if a

criminal record exists; and other evidence

attesting to good character.

Id. at 852 n.8.

Valdez-Novoa met a number of these criteria in 1999. At

that time, Valdez-Novoa had a plausible claim for relief based

on his arrival in the United States as a nine-year-old boy and

his continuous residence for sixteen years between his arrival

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and deportation in 1999; his three U.S. citizen siblings, his

mother and father who held legal permanent resident (“LPR”)

status and his five additional siblings, all of whom ultimately

gained legal status; and his educational certification as a

welder and his extensive employment history as a welder,

field worker, and fence repairer.4

To be sure, Valdez-Novoa has an extensive criminal

history, much of it stemming directly from his past abuse of

alcohol. But the BIA has supported voluntary departure, or

remanded to the IJ to consider whether to grant voluntary

departure, for aliens with extensive criminal records,

including alcohol-related crimes. The BIA has done so in

cases involving, among others, six criminal convictions

including battery, drunkenness, threatening, and driving

under the influence, In re Pineda-Castellanos, 2005 WL

3833024 (BIA Nov. 16, 2005); attempted theft, In re ToledoAlvarado, 2014 WL 1278406 (BIA Feb. 26, 2014); “Class A”

assault with family violence, In re Tipaz-Poncio, 2014 WL

1401572 (BIA Mar. 19, 2014); two convictions for driving

while intoxicated, one “recent,” In re Ortiz-Bustos, 2014 WL

1652408 (BIA Apr. 10, 2014); four convictions for assault, a

conviction for resisting arrest, and numerous arrests,

purportedly as a result of alcohol abuse, In re. GonzalesFigeroa, 2006 WL 729784 (BIA Feb. 10, 2006); a conviction

for sexual battery, In re Villalongja Mante, 2007 WL

1676929 (BIA May 18, 2007); convictions for “two serious

crimes[] involving controlled substances and robbery” and an

arrest for driving under the influence, In re Guillermo

4

Interestingly, though not part of a retrospective analysis, had the IJ

taken a chance on Valdez-Novoa, it would have turned out to be a good

one. Valdez-Novoa has been sober since 2007, and now has a U.S. citizen

wife and three citizen children.

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Ramirez, 2005 WL 698425 (BIA Mar. 8, 2005); convictions

for domestic violence, possession of a controlled substance,

and driving under the influence, In re Hernandez-Barreto,

2004 WL 2943517 (BIA Oct. 29, 2004); and convictions for

driving under the influence, burglary, and disorderly conduct,

In re Reyes-Jiminez, 2004 WL 2418597 (BIA Oct. 4, 2004).

These cases underscore the wide range of cases in which the

BIA has determined that it was appropriate to consider the

exercise of discretion. They fall squarely in the category of

plausible relief. The majority’s backhanded dismissal of these

cases simply underscores that it is elevating the plausibility

standard to one of preponderance or probability.

I highlight cases involving alcohol and violence like

battery or domestic violence to illustrate that the BIA has

exercised its discretion to grant voluntary departure in a wide

range of cases involving criminal histories that equal or

exceed that of Valdez-Novoa. Of course, we cannot know for

certain whether the BIA would have done so here, but this is

not our charge. The question before us is not whether ValdezNovoa would probably or inevitably have been granted relief,

but only whether, at the time his rights were violated, he had

a “plausible” ground for relief. Detailing, as the majority

does, cases in which the BIA chose not to exercise its

discretion underscores only that the choice to grant or not lies

with the BIA. Those cases do not prove, given the ranks of

cases similar to Valdez-Novoa’s in which relief was granted,

that relief was not “plausible.” When considered in light of

the substantial positive factors, the combination of favorable

and unfavorable factors easily satisfies a standard of

“plausibility” for relief from deportation. Valdez-Novoa has

established prejudice under Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d at

1048.

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48 UNITED STATES V. VALDEZ-NOVOA

The existence of such a wide range of cases—both

granting and denying relief—only highlights that the BIA and

IJs have taken a broad view of when to grant voluntary

departure. I fear that the panel’s contrary result in this case

turns the plausibility standard into something it was never

intended to be: a preponderance or probability standard. The

standard is low because the affront inherent in the violation

is great. Without a true plausibility standard and the remedy

of dismissal of the indictment, there would be no effective

deterrent to due process violations in this context. I therefore

respectfully dissent.

 Case: 12-50336, 07/28/2014, ID: 9182788, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 48 of 48