Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-06249/USCOURTS-ca10-91-06249-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Charles Ray Gregory
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

V • ) No. 91-6249 

l tu 

'1' 

SEP 3 S 1992 

) (W.D. Okla., No. CR-90-10-W) 

CHARLES RAY GREGORY, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before LOGAN, Circuit Judge, BARRETT, Senior Circuit Judge, and 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Therefore, the case is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

This is a direct appeal from a denial of the DefendantAppellant's motion for leave to file a late notice of appeal. The 

Defendant-Appellant makes two contentions on appeal: (1) that the 

district court erred in denying him leave to file a late notice of 

appeal, and (2) that if the district court properly denied his 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 91-6249 Document: 010110392316 Date Filed: 09/30/1992 Page: 1
motion to file a late appeal, he was denied his Sixth Amendment 

right to effective assistance of counsel because his lawyer failed 

to perfect his appeal. 1 

I. Denial of the Motion to File a Late Appeal 

We disagree with Defendant-Appellant Gregory's first 

contention. Gregory clearly failed to meet the prerequisites for 

timely notice of appeal under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 

4(b). In criminal cases, a defendant must file a notice of appeal 

within ten days after the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 

4(b). Upon a showing of excusable neglect the district court may 

extend the time for filing a notice of appeal for a period not to 

exceed thirty days from the expiration of the ten-day period. 

Fed. R. App. P. 4(b). A timely notice of appeal is "mandatory and 

jurisdictional." United States v. Davis, 929 F.2d 554, 557 (10th 

Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 224 

(1960)). 

In the instant case, Gregory pleaded guilty to bank robbery 

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and was convicted on February 

5, 1990. The district court sentenced him on April 5, 1991. 

Gregory did not file a motion for late notice of appeal until 

1 Although Gregory did not explicitly frame this issue on 

appeal as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we construe 

prose litigants' pleadings liberally and hold them to a less 

stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See 

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Hall v. Bellmon, 935 

F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). This rule applies to all 

proceedings involving a prose litigant. Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110. 

We find that the Gregory has sufficiently alleged an ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim. 

- 2 -

Appellate Case: 91-6249 Document: 010110392316 Date Filed: 09/30/1992 Page: 2
thirteen months later, on May 6, 1991. Because Gregory failed to 

file his notice of appeal within the time limits of Rule 4(b), the 

district court correctly denied his motion to file a late notice 

of appeal. 

II. Denial of the Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel 

We do, however, agree with Gregory's second contention, that 

he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of 

counsel because his lawyer failed to perfect his appeal. Gregory 

claims that he requested an appeal in open court after his 

sentencing. [Appellant's Br. at 1, 2] The sentencing transcript, 

however, does not reflect a direct request. Rather, it appears 

that after the district court advised Gregory of his right to 

appeal, Gregory asked, "How do I do that?" The court answered, 

"Your attorney will advise you in that regard and assist you in 

that regard." [Tr. 5] In an affidavit, Gregory's appointed 

counsel Larry Tedder confirmed Gregory's claim that Tedder told 

him that he would visit Gregory in jail to discuss an appeal. 

[Rec. at Tab 18] Tedder also stated in the affidavit that he and 

Gregory spoke briefly at the sentencing hearing about Gregory's 

right of appeal. [Rec. at Tab 18] In a subsequent affidavit, 

however, Tedder stated, "[A]t no time did Charles Ray Gregory 

indicate to me that he desired to appeal his case; Mr. Gregory 

merely indicated to me that he wanted to talk about an appeal." 

[Rec. at Tab 18] Tedder stated that when he went to visit 

Gregory in jail a few days after sentencing and within the time 

limit for filing a notice of appeal, Gregory had been transferred 

- 3 -

Appellate Case: 91-6249 Document: 010110392316 Date Filed: 09/30/1992 Page: 3
to another jail, and jail personnel could not tell him to which 

jail Gregory had been transferred. Gregory did not contact Tedder 

for several weeks after the sentencing. Feeling there was no 

legal ground for an appeal, Tedder did not prosecute an appeal for 

Gregory. [Rec. at Tab 18] 

The Government recognizes that "a defendant is denied 

effective assistance of counsel if he asks his lawyer to perfect 

an appeal and the lawyer fails to do so by failing to file a 

brief, a statement of appeal or otherwise." See Abels v. Kaiser, 

913 F.2d 821, 823 (10th Cir. 1990) (citing Evitts v. Lucey, 469 

U.S. 387, 389 (1985); Rodriguez v. United States, 395 U.S. 327, 

329 (1969)). Nevertheless, the government contends that because 

Gregory never explicitly instructed Tedder to prosecute an appeal 

or directly told the court that he wanted to appeal, he was not 

denied the effective assistance of counsel. We disagree. 

An indigent criminal defendant has the constitutional right 

to the assistance of counsel. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 

339-40 (1963). This right to counsel extends to a defendant's 

first appeal of right. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 

(1963). More specifically, the right to counsel is the right to 

effective assistance of counsel. See Osborne v. Shillinger, 861 

F.2d 612, 624 (10th Cir. 1988) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (citations omitted)). To be considered 

constitutionally effective, a defense attorney "must explain the 

advantages and disadvantages of an appeal ... [and] inquire 

whether the defendant wants to appeal the conviction; if that is 

the client's wish, counsel must perfect an appeal." Baker v. 

- 4 -

Appellate Case: 91-6249 Document: 010110392316 Date Filed: 09/30/1992 Page: 4
Kaiser, 929 F.2d 1495, 1499 (10th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). 

Merely advising the defendant of the right to appeal is 

insufficient. Id. at 1499. The Baker court held that an 

appointed attorney's representation of a defendant was 

constitutionally ineffective because counsel "never advised [the 

defendant] of the pros and cons of appealing his conviction, and 

did not ascertain whether he wanted to appeal." 929 F.2d at 1499-

1500.2 

Although a criminal defendant generally has no right to 

notice concerning the right to appeal a guilty plea, Hardiman v. 

Reynolds, No. 91-6337, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 16312, at *18 (10th 

Cir. July 20, 1992), we have found two important exceptions to 

this rule. Counsel has a duty to inform the defendant of the 

right to appeal "[i]f a claim of error is made on constitutional 

grounds, which could result in setting aside the plea, or if the 

defendant inquires about an appeal right." Laycock v. New Mexico, 

880 F.2d 1184, 1188 (10th Cir. 1989) (citing Marrow v. United 

States, 772 F.2d 525, 528 (9th Cir. 1985)) (emphasis added). 

Although the record does not appear to support Gregory's 

claim that he directly requested an appeal at his sentencing 

2 When a defendant shows that counsel was constitutionally 

inadequate because of a failure to perfect an appeal properly, the 

defendant need not show that counsel's deficient performance 

prejudiced the defense as required by Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 

See Abels, 913 F.2d at 823 ("[W]hen courts have found counsel 

constitutionally inadequate, because either retained or appointed 

counsel failed to properly perfect an appeal, they do not consider 

the merits of arguments that the defendant might have made on 

appeal.") (citing Rodriquez, 395 U.S. at 330). Accordingly, we 

need not and do not consider whether Gregory's substantive claims 

have merit. 

- 5 -

Appellate Case: 91-6249 Document: 010110392316 Date Filed: 09/30/1992 Page: 5
hearing, the record clearly establishes that Gregory inquired 

about his right of appeal. For example, when Gregory was advised 

at his sentencing hearing of his right to appeal, Gregory asked, 

"How do I do that?" [Tr. 5] Gregory's appointed counsel, Tedder, 

confirmed that Gregory asked about an appeal; in his second 

affidavit, Tedder states that Gregory "indicated to me that he 

wanted to talk about an appeal." [Rec. at Tab 18] These remarks 

qualify as an "inquiry" under Laycock, thus triggering Tedder's 

duty under Baker to advise Gregory of the pros and cons of 

appealing and to ascertain whether Gregory wanted to appeal. The 

record establishes that Gregory never received such assistance 

from Tedder during the time required to perfect a timely appeal. 

Based upon the undisputed facts in the record, Gregory was denied 

the right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal under 

Baker. 3 

When a defendant has been denied effective assistance of 

counsel in perfecting an appeal, "[t]he proper remedy is a 

resentencing to enable defendant to perfect an appeal." U.S. v. 

3 We note that Tedder's belief that there was no legal ground 

for Gregory's appeal is irrelevant to our inquiry here. It has 

long been settled that if an appointed counsel finds a client's 

case to be wholly frivolous, he should so advise the court and 

furnish a brief referring to anything in the record that might 

arguably support an appeal. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 

744 (1967); Jackson v. Turner, 442 F.2d 1303, 1306 (10th Cir. 

1971). As the Supreme Court pointed out in Anders, "The 

constitutional requirement of substantial equality and fair 

process can only be attained where counsel acts in the role of an 

active advocate on behalf of his client, as opposed to that of 

amicus curiae." Id. This procedure helps counsel as well, 

protecting appointed attorneys from charges that they are 

ineffective and have not handled cases with the diligence that 

indigent defendants are entitled to. Id. 

- 6 -

Appellate Case: 91-6249 Document: 010110392316 Date Filed: 09/30/1992 Page: 6
Davis, 929 F.2d 554, 557 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Abels, 913 F.2d 

at 823); see Rodriguez v. United States, 395 U.S. 327, 332 (1969) 

(holding that the defendant was denied the right to effective 

assistance of counsel on appeal and remanding to the district 

court for resentencing so that the defendant could perfect an 

appeal). 

Accordingly, we REVERSE and REMAND this case to the district 

court for resentencing so that Gregory's time to perfect an appeal 

will begin to run anew. 

Entered for the Court 

David M. Ebel 

Circuit Judge 

- 7 -

Appellate Case: 91-6249 Document: 010110392316 Date Filed: 09/30/1992 Page: 7