Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01158/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01158-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Danny Cooper
Appellant
Cornelius Company
Appellee
Schneider Metal Manufacturing Co.
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

DANNY COOPER, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

FILE PA...,,.,.,,., 

U • , . .....1 States Court 01 P.i:I ...... ~ n1~ c· .• Tent.'1 1rcu1., 

SEP 2 6 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

) No. 90-1158 

v. ) 

) 

SCHNEIDER METAL MANUFACTURING) 

CO. and CORNELIUS COMPANY, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

(D.C. Civil No. 89-A-6) 

(D. Colo.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MOORE, SETH and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. 

Appellant Danny Cooper commenced this action against his 

former employer, Schneider Metal Manufacturing Co., and its parent 

company, Cornelius Company (collectively referred to as Schneider 

Metal), in state court, asserting various causes of action in 

relation to the termination of his employment. Schneider Metal 

removed the case to federal court based upon diversity 

jurisdiction. Upon removal, appellant tailored his claims to: 

(1) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (2) breach of 

implied contract; (3) breach of express contract; and (4) wrongful 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-1158 Document: 010110090685 Date Filed: 09/26/1991 Page: 1 
retaliation for filing a workmen's compensation insurance claim. 

The district court granted a directed verdict in favor of 

Schneider Metal as to the intentional infliction of emotional 

distress and the wrongful retaliation claims. The two claims 

based on contract theories were submitted to the jury and 

ultimately denied. 

Appellant appeals the district court's decision granting the 

directed verdicts in favor of Schneider Metal. He also appeals 

the district court's refusal to submit the claim of fraudulent 

misrepresentation to the jury. For the reasons that follow, we 

affirm the district court's rulings. 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 

appellant, as we must, the following events occurred in relation 

to this appeal. Appellant began working for Schneider Metal in 

March 1980. During the following years, he was promoted to the 

position of area sales manager. This position required that he 

travel approximately three weeks out of every month. While on a 

business trip in June 1986, appellant became ill and suffered a 

brain aneurysm upon returning home. The aneurysm and accompanying 

surgery resulted in a stroke which caused paralysis. 

At trial, appellant testified that James Tjaden, appellant's 

immediate supervisor at Schneider Metal, visited him in the 

hospital. During this visit, appellant testified that Tjaden said 

"Dan, everything is going to be all right, going to be fine." 

"Don't worry about your job. Your job's secure. The main thing 

you have to concern yourself with is get well." Tr. Vol. IX, at 

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67-68. Appellant alleged that similar statements were repeated by 

Tjaden to him and other members of his family during the course of 

the next two years. The thrust of appellant's case focuses on 

these statements. 

Because of appellant's paralysis, he was unable to perform 

his normal duties of traveling three weeks out of every month; 

however, he did maintain contact with his clients by telephone and 

correspondence through his office at home. During the following 

two years, appellant was kept on Schneider Metal's employment 

rolls as an inactive, disabled employee. He received disability 

payments from Schneider Metal's insurance carrier and the Social 

Security Administration. 

Approximately six months after his aneurysm, Schneider Metal 

reorganized its sales force and eliminated appellant's previous 

position. In an attempt to place appellant within the company, 

Schneider Metal created the position of Cornelius products 

coordinator specifically for appellant. He initially accepted the 

position but did not take the job when he learned that his social 

security benefits would be in jeopardy. Six months later, he 

decided to take the job; however, the position was no longer 

viable given the dwindling product line. 

At that time, Tjaden encouraged appellant to look at other 

job possibilities in the Denver area. Although appellant denies 

that this conversation occurred, he did send out approximately 

fifty letters inquiring about future employment opportunities with 

other companies. 

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Schneider Metal also wanted to offer appellant a position as 

regional manager. Before extending the position to appellant, 

however, Schneider Metal requested that appellant obtain a release 

from his doctor. It was Dr. Krauth's opinion that the extensive 

amount of travel required of the position would be unsafe to 

appellant and others; therefore, appellant was not given the job. 

Upon receipt of Dr. Krauth's letter dated July 31, 1987, Tjaden 

advised appellant that he was no longer to incur expenses working 

from his home. 

On May 4, 1988, Dr. Krauth stated in a letter that 

"Mr. Cooper has reached maximum medical improvement at this time 

and that he is still significantly disabled because of a stroke 

resulting from his ruptured aneurysm." Vol. IX, at 169. Sometime 

during May 1988, appellant filed for workmen's compensation 

benefits. Due to economic hardship, Schneider Metal was forced to 

reduce the number of employees employed at the company. Schneider 

Metal requested that Tjaden discharge approximately five to seven 

individuals from his division. During August, Tjaden terminated 

five individuals including appellant. 

After the presentation of plaintiff's case, Schneider Metal 

moved for a directed verdict on all claims. The district court 

ruled that as a matter of law there was no evidence to support the 

claim of emotional distress and granted a directed verdict in 

favor of Schneider Metal. As to the retaliatory discharge and 

contract claims, the district court reserved its ruling. 

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At the close of the evidence, Schneider Metal renewed its 

motion for a directed verdict. The district court directed a 

verdict on the retaliatory discharge claim but permitted the 

contract claims to go to the jury. After deliberating, the jury 

returned a verdict in favor of Schneider Metal on the contract 

claims. 

Appellant challenges the district court's decision granting 

directed verdicts in favor of Schneider Metal on the intentional 

infliction of emotional distress and retaliatory discharge claims. 

We review a ruling on a directed verdict motion de novo. Hill v. 

Goodyear Tire & Rubber, Inc., 918 F.2d 877, 880 (10th Cir.). When 

reviewing a directed verdict in a diversity case, we apply 

"'the federal standard in determining whether 

the evidence is sufficient to go to the jury 

or, as a matter of law, the court should 

direct a verdict. Under the federal standard, 

the trial court must view the evidence and the 

inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light 

most favorable to the party against whom the 

motion is directed. When the evidence is so 

viewed, a directed verdict is proper only when 

the evidence is so patently in favor of the 

moving party that a jury verdict in favor of 

the opposing party would be improper and would 

have to be set aside by the trial judge. 

"'While the sufficiency of the evidence 

is tested against the federal standard, the 

underlying cause of action in a diversity case 

is governed by state law. ' " 

Wilson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 261, 264 (10th 

Cir.) (quoting Peterson v. Hager, 724 F.2d 851, 853-54 (10th 

Cir.)). In this case, Colorado law is applicable. 

First, we address appellant's contention that the district 

court erred in directing a verdict in favor of Schneider Metal on 

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·• 

his claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress caused 

by outrageous conduct. Under Colorado law, the conduct must be: 

"'so outrageous in character, and so extreme 

in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds 

of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, 

and utterly intolerable in a civilized 

community. Generally, the case is one in 

which the recitation of the facts to an 

average member of the community would arouse 

his resentment against the actor, and lead him 

to exclaim, "Outrageous!"'" 

Churchey v .• Adolph Coors Co., 759 P.2d 1336, 1350 (Colo.) (quoting 

Rugg v. McCarty, 476 P.2d 753, 756 (Colo.)) (quoting Restatement 

(Second) of Torts§ 46 comment d (1965)). In assessing claims of 

outrageous conduct, the jury determines the ultimate question of 

whether the conduct is outrageous, "but the trial court decides 

whether the issue should be submitted to the jury in the first 

instance, based on whether reasonable persons could differ on the 

conduct being outrageous." Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Andrews, 736 

P.2d 40, 46 (Colo. App.) (citations omitted). Where the conduct 

is not sufficiently atrocious as to permit recovery, the claim is 

properly dismissed. See Therrien v. United Air Lines, Inc., 670 

F. Supp. 1517, 1524 (D. Colo.). 

In this instance, the district court determined that the 

evidence was insufficient to submit the issue of outrageousness to 

the jury and directed a verdict in favor of Schneider Metal. 

Appellant claims that this was error because a reasonable jury 

could have found Schneider Metal's conduct to be outrageous based 

upon the following events: Schneider Metal knew that appellant 

was disabled and that a termination without warning would come as 

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a special blow; Schneider Metal repeatedly made promises that his 

job was secure in an effort to keep him out of the job market and 

prevented him from getting a job elsewhere because of the noncompete agreement; Schneider Metal benefitted from his work at 

home; and Schneider Metal fired him for filing the workmen's 

compensation claim. 

While Colorado law has recognized that outrageous conduct may 

occur in an employment situation, Churchey, 759 P.2d at 1350, we 

do not believe that the facts as presented were sufficient to 

submit an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim to 

the jury. Appellant essentially is claiming that Schneider Metal 

breached its contract with him by stringing him along and then 

discharging him. Appellant's claim is not supported in law or in 

fact. 

Colorado law is clear that an allegation by an employee that 

he was dismissed or that his employer breached its contract does 

not set forth a claim for intentional infliction of emotional 

distress. See Churchey, 759 P.2d at 1350; Therrien, 670 F. Supp. 

at 1524, and the cases cited therein. 

Furthermore, a review of the record reveals that none of 

appellant's allegations are supported by the record. Appellant's 

claim that the termination occurred without warning is contrary to 

the evidence presented at trial. Appellant testified that he 

thought he better start "seriously investigating opportunities" 

when the two positions with Schneider Metal fell through. He also 

testified that he did not interpret Tjaden's statements as an 

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absolute guarantee of employment. He believed that Tjaden had the 

right to terminate him if he did not perform his job functions. 

Further, on two separate occasions, his doctor refused to sign a 

release recommending that he return to work in his previous 

capacity as a traveling salesman with Schneider Metal. We fail to 

see how his termination could have come as a great surprise to 

appellant. 

Appellant's claim that Schneider Metal attempted to keep him 

out of the job market by making promises of job security and by 

enforcing the non-compete agreement is not supported by the 

record. The non-compete agreement provided that appellant was not 

to accept employment with a competitor for 18 months after his 

employment with Schneider Metal ceased. The agreement provided 

that if appellant wanted to accept employment with a competitor, 

he was to tender a written statement to Schneider Metal informing 

it of his desire to work for another company. If appellant could 

not find work because of the agreement, Schneider Metal agreed to 

pay him for the months that he could not work. After his 

termination, appellant sent out approximately fifty letters 

inquiring about future employment with various companies. At 

trial, appellant testified that he did not receive any firm offers 

and did not have the opportunity to invoke the non-compete 

agreement. The only time he was offered a position with another 

company was prior to his termination. Appellant alleged that he 

was prevented from obtaining a position because of the non-compete 

agreement; however, he did not invoke the non-compete agreement at 

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that time either. Schneider Metal not only attempted to place 

appellant in positions within the company but encouraged him to 

seek employment elsewhere. 

Appellant's claim that Schneider Metal benefitted from the 

work that he performed at home is easily disposed of given the 

jury's resolution of the contract claims. The jury explicitly 

rejected appellant's claim that there was a promise concerning his 

employment or that Schneider Metal was unjustly enriched. 

Appellant's claim that he was fired for filing a workmen's 

compensation claim is a serious allegation. However, he confuses 

the emotional distress claim with a claim of wrongful retaliation. 

We do not believe that such an allegation rises to the level of 

outrageous conduct. See Grandchamp v. United Air Lines, Inc., 854 

F.2d 381, 385-86 (10th Cir.) (claim of age discrimination will not 

support a claim of outrageous conduct). Such a claim is properly 

framed in the retaliatory discharge claim which is addressed 

below. 

We find that the facts presented were insufficient to create 

liability on Schneider Metal for a claim of emotional distress 

stemming from outrageous conduct and that the district court 

properly removed the issue from the jury's province. 

Appellant also challenges the district court's decision to 

grant a directed verdict in favor of Schneider Metal on the 

retaliatory discharge claim. He claims that his termination was 

in retaliation for filing a claim for workmen's compensation. 

Schneider Metal claims that the combination of appellant's 

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., 

inability to travel and the reduction of Schneider Metal's work 

force led to the termination of appellant's employment. 

In Lathrop v. Entenmann's, Inc., 770 P.2d 1367, 1372-73 

(Colo. App.), the Colorado Court of Appeals recognized retaliation 

for filing a workmen's compensation claim as a cause of action. 

While the Lathrop decision failed to set out the elements 

necessary to establish the claim, it is clear that in order to 

fall within the public policy exception to the employment at-will 

doctrine, the terminated employee must show "that he was 

discharged for exercising a specifically enacted right or duty." 

Cronk v. Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass'n., 765 P.2d 619, 622 

(Colo. App.). In this case, the specifically enacted right is the 

filing of a workmen's compensation claim. Because Colorado law is 

silent on the elements and burdens applicable to retaliatory 

discharge cases, we must predict how the Supreme Court of Colorado 

would rule. Weiss v. United States, 787 F.2d 518, 525 (10th 

Cir.) . 

In Pytlik v. Professional Resources, Ltd., 887 F.2d 1371 

(10th Cir.), we applied Oklahoma law to a claim of retaliatory 

discharge. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under 

Oklahoma law, "'[t]he discharged employee must show employment, on 

the job injury, receipt of treatment under circumstances which put 

the employer on notice that treatment had been rendered for a 

work-related injury, or that the employee in good faith 

instituted, or caused to be instituted, proceedings under the Act, 

and consequent termination of employment.'" Id. at 1381 (quoting 

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Buckner v. General Motors Corp., 760 P.2d 803, 806 (Okl.)) 

(emphasis in original). 

The ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the employee. 

Once the employee establishes a prima facie case, however, the 

burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate a 

legitimate non-retaliatory reason for the discharge. Buckner, 760 

P.2d at 806. Thereafter, the employee bears the burden of 

persuading the court that the reason given was pretextual. Id. 

Applying these principles to the facts before us, we conclude 

that the district court's directed verdict on the retaliation 

claim was proper. It is undisputed that appellant was employed by 

Schneider Metal; he suffered an injury while on the job; he filed 

a workmen's compensation claim; and he was subsequently 

terminated. Because appellant established a prima facie case, the 

burden of production shifted to Schneider Metal to articulate a 

legitimate non-retaliatory reason for the termination. 

At trial Schneider Metal offered two reasons for appellant's 

termination. The primary reason offered for appellant's discharge 

was that he was unable to perform the job duties. Prior to 

suffering the aneurysm, appellant traveled approximately three 

weeks out of every month. After the aneurysm, appellant's doctor 

placed restrictions on appellant and did not recommend that he 

return to work in his previous capacity. The positions which 

Schneider Metal attempted to place appellant in required an 

extensive amount of travelling which his doctor deemed as unsafe 

for appellant. 

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• 

The second reason offered by Schneider Metal for appellant's 

discharge was the reduction in its work force. At the time that 

appellant was terminated, Schneider Metal was facing economic 

hardship and was forced to restructure the company. During this 

time, Tjaden not only terminated appellant but four other 

employees from his division as well. 

The record amply supports Schneider Metal's position that 

appellant was terminated for legitimate non-retaliatory reasons. 

Appellant was unable to establish that the reasons set forth by 

Schneider Metal were pretextual. While appellant claims that he 

could perform the job, this argument is inconsistent with his 

disability claim and with the recommendation from his doctor. An 

employee's inability to perform the work required of the position 

is a legitimate reason and not pretextual. Buckner, 760 P.2d at 

806-07; Elzey v. Forrest, 739 P.2d 999, 1003 (Okl.). 

Regardless of whether Colorado would apply the same 

principles as set forth in Buckner, it is clear that Schneider 

Metal articulated legitimate non-retaliatory reasons for 

appellant's discharge. Appellant was unable to establish that 

these reasons were pretext; therefore, he failed to meet his 

burden of persuasion. The district court properly removed the 

claim of retaliatory discharge from the jury's province. 

At the close of the evidence, appellant tendered an 

instruction on fraudulent misrepresentation. Schneider Metal 

objected to the jury receiving such an instruction because the 

claim was not alleged in the complaint. Appellant argued that 

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although it was not specifically pled, the elements were in the 

complaint. 

The district court refused to read the instruction to the 

jury on two grounds. First, the claim had not been pled in the 

complaint or mentioned in the pretrial order. Second, the 

district court did not believe that such a claim was viable given 

the facts of the case. Appellant contends that the district 

court's refusal to instruct the jury on a fraudulent 

misrepresentation claim was error. We disagree. 

First, appellant had numerous opportunities to specifically 

assert the claim and failed to do so. A review of the record 

reveals that appellant experienced great difficulty in crafting a 

clear and concise complaint. After considerable discussion and 

redrafts, appellant presented a second amended complaint which was 

filed with the court. There were also numerous modifications on 

the pretrial order. The fraudulent misrepresentation claim was 

not specifically alleged in any of the documents filed with the 

court. 

Second, any error in failing to submit a claim of fraudulent 

misrepresentation was harmless given the jury's ultimate 

resolution of the case. See Dixon v. City of Lawton, Okl., 898 

F.2d 1443, 1449 (10th Cir.). Under Colorado law, to establish a 

claim of fraudulent misrepresentation, appellant was required to 

show that: (1) the defendant made a false representation of a 

material fact; (2) the defendant made the representation knowing 

that it was false; (3) the defendant made the representation 

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knowing that it would be relied upon; (4) the statement was relied 

upon; and (5) reliance on the representation caused damages. Club 

Valencia Homeowners v. Valencia Assoc., 712 P.2d 1024, 1026-27 

(Colo. App.). 

In support of his argument, appellant claims that Schneider 

Metal knowingly made false statements of promised employment; 

Schneider Metal knew that appellant would rely on the statements; 

appellant did rely on the statements; and due to his reliance, 

appellant did not seek other job opportunities. 

By rejecting appellant's contract claims, the jury apparently 

concluded that there were no express guarantees of employment or 

unjust enrichment. We must conclude that this same reasonable 

jury would have rejected the misrepresentation claim as well. 

Contrary to appellant's claims, the evidence presented did 

not bear out an elaborate scheme of deception. Schneider Metal, 

through Tjaden, told appellant that he should concentrate on 

getting well and not worry about his job. Schneider Metal worked 

with appellant for over two years in a good faith effort to place 

him in a position within the company. After several failed 

attempts, Schneider Metal encouraged him to seek employment 

elsewhere. 

At trial, appellant testified that he did not interpret the 

statements made by Tjaden to mean that his job was absolutely 

guaranteed. He also testified that he was concerned about his 

future employment with Schneider Metal after two jobs fell 

through. During this time, he was actively sending out letters 

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• 

• 

inquiring about future employment with other companies. Tjaden's 

statements did not cause appellant to miss out on other employment 

because there was simply no reliance on those statements by 

appellant. We find that the evidence presented did not establish 

a viable claim of fraudulent misrepresentation. 

Appellant raises additional arguments relating to the issue 

of damages. While we have considered those arguments, we do not 

reach them given our disposition above. See Nesbit v. City and 

County of Denver, 539 P.2d 509, 510 (Colo. App.). 

Accordingly, the decision of the district court for the 

District of Colorado is AFFIRMED. 

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Entered for the Court 

Oliver Seth 

Circuit Judge 

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