Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-02345/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-02345-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
A. P. Kane
Respondent
Lance Grant Van Hook
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LANCE GRANT VAN HOOK,

Petitioner,

 vs.

A. P. KANE, Warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 05-2345 PJH (PR)

ORDER DENYING

HABEAS PETITION

This is a habeas corpus case filed by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254. 

The petition is directed to a denial of parole.

The court ordered respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted. 

Respondent has filed an answer and a memorandum of points and authorities in support

thereof, and has lodged exhibits with the court. Petitioner has responded with a traverse. 

For the reasons set forth below, the petition will be denied.

BACKGROUND

A jury in Los Angeles County Superior Court found petitioner guilty of second degree

murder under Cal. Penal Code § 187 and use of a firearm in the commission of the offense

under Cal. Penal Code § 12022.5. In 1989 petitioner received a sentence of fifteen years

to life in prison, plus a two-year enhancement pursuant to § 12022.5. On July 7, 2004,

after a hearing before the Board of Prison Terms (“Board”), during which petitioner was

represented by counsel and was given an opportunity to be heard, the Board found

petitioner unsuitable for parole. Resp't Ex. 2 at 83. The Board based its decision on the

callousness of the crime, the triviality of the motive in relation to the offense, the multiple

victims involved in the incident, the prisoner's history of unstable relationships with others

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as a result of his early and heavy addiction to methamphetamine, his misconduct while

incarcerated, his failure to develop a marketable skill, his insufficient participation in drug

therapy programs, his inconclusive psychological report, and opposition from the district

attorney and the police department.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

This court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus "in behalf of a person

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. §

2254(a).

The writ may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the

merits in state court unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2)

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first

prong applies both to questions of law and to mixed questions of law and fact, Williams

(Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407-09 (2000), while the second prong applies to decisions

based on factual determinations, Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

"Under the 'contrary to' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state

court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question

of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of

materially indistinguishable facts." Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 412-13. "Under the

'unreasonable application clause,' a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state

court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court's decisions but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 413. The

federal court on habeas review may not issue the writ "simply because that court concludes

in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

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established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Id. at 411. Rather, the application must

be "objectively unreasonable" to support granting the writ. Id. at 409. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision "based on a factual

determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in

light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding." Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340.

When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state court to consider the

petitioner's claims, the court looks to the last reasoned opinion. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker,

501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991); Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079 n.2 (9th Cir.

2000). 

II. Issues Presented

Petitioner claims that his due process rights were violated because: (1) the Board's

decision was not supported by "some evidence"; (2) the Board improperly relied on the

circumstances of his offense in denying him parole; (3) the Board failed to set a fixed date

for release pursuant to the principle of "uniform terms"; and (4) the Board was biased. 

Respondent contends that California prisoners have no liberty interest in parole and

that, if they do, the only due process protections available to them are a right to be heard

and a right to be informed of the basis for the denial of parole. In other words, respondent

contends that there is no due process right to have the parole decision supported by

sufficient evidence. Because respondent's contentions go to whether petitioner has any

due process rights at all in connection with parole and, if he does, what those rights are,

they will addressed first.

A. Respondent’s Contentions

1. Liberty Interest

Respondent contends that California law does not create a liberty interest in parole. 

This argument is without merit.

 The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state may “deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. While there

is "no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released

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1 After the Answer was filed, in Hayward v. Marshall, 512 F.3d 536, 542 (9th Cir. 2008), the Ninth Circuit affirmed that there is a liberty interest in parole in California and that parole board decisions must be supported by "some evidence." That decision has

been vacated and is now under submission en banc. Hayward v. Marshall, No.

06-55392, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 10538 (9th Cir. May 16, 2008).

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before the expiration of a valid sentence," Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal

and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979), a state's statutory parole scheme, if it

uses "mandatory language," may create a presumption that parole will be granted when or

unless certain designated findings are made, and thereby give rise to a constitutionally

protected liberty interest, Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 376-78 (1987). For

parole decisions, this "mandatory language" analysis survived the Supreme Court’s later

rejection of it for prison disciplinary decisions in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). 

See Sass v. Cal. Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1127 n.3 (9th Cir. 2006). 

California's parole statute provides that the parole board "shall set a release date

unless it determines that the gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses, or the

timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that

consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration for this

individual, and that a parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed at this meeting." Cal. Penal

Code § 3041(b). The Ninth Circuit has held that "[u]nder the 'clearly established' framework

of Greenholtz and Allen, . . . California's parole scheme gives rise to a cognizable liberty

interest in release on parole." McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 902; see also Irons v. Carey, 505

F.3d 846, 850-51 (9th Cir. 2007); Sass, 461 F.3d at 1127-28; Biggs, 334 F.3d at 914-15. 

Respondent relies on the California Supreme Court case In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal.

4th 1061, 1087-88 (2005), in support of his contention that the California statute does not

create a liberty interest. The Ninth Circuit considered and rejected this argument in Sass,

461 F.3d at 1127-28, but respondent wanted to preserve the argument because at the

time the answer was filed, a petition for rehearing en banc was pending in Sass.

That petition has now been denied, establishing that the argument is without merit. 

See Sass, case no. 05-16455 (order Feb. 13, 2007).1

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In sum, the mandatory language of California's parole scheme gives rise to a

federally protected liberty interest in parole such that an inmate has a federal right to due

process in parole proceedings. Respondent’s argument to the contrary is without merit. 

2. Due Process Protections 

Respondent contends that even if California prisoners do have a liberty interest in

parole, the due process protections to which they are entitled under clearly established

Supreme Court authority are limited to an opportunity to be heard and a decision explaining

the reasons for parole denial. That is, respondent contends that there is no due process

right to have the parole board's decision supported by “some evidence.” This position,

however, has been rejected by the Ninth Circuit, which has held that the Supreme Court

has "clearly established" that a state parole board’s suitability decision deprives a prisoner

of due process if the board’s decision is not supported by "some evidence in the record" or

is "otherwise arbitrary." Irons, 505 F.3d at 851 (applying "some evidence" standard used

for disciplinary hearings in Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445-455 (1985), to the parole

rescission context); Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128-29 (same). Respondent's argument

challenging the "some evidence" standard is without merit.

B. Petitioner’s Claims

1. "Some Evidence"

Petitioner contends that his due process rights were violated because the Board's

decision denying him parole was not supported by “some evidence.”

As discussed in the previous section, the Supreme Court has "clearly established

that a parole board’s decision deprives a prisoner of due process . . . if the board’s decision

is not supported by 'some evidence in the record,' or is 'otherwise arbitrary.'" Irons, 505

F.3d at 851 (citations omitted). Ascertaining whether the "some evidence" standard is met

"does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the

credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the relevant question is

whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by

the disciplinary board." Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128 (quoting Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56). The

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some evidence standard is minimal, and assures that "the record is not so devoid of

evidence that the findings of the disciplinary board were without support or otherwise

arbitrary." Id. at 1129 (quoting Hill, 472 U.S. at 457). 

When a federal habeas court assesses whether a state parole board's suitability

determination was supported by "some evidence," the state's statutes and regulations

governing parole suitability determinations control the analysis. Irons, 505 F.3d at 851. 

Accordingly, here the court first looks to California law to determine the findings that are

necessary to deem a prisoner unsuitable for parole; then, it reviews the record in order to

determine whether the state court decision holding that these findings were supported by

"some evidence" constituted an unreasonable application of the "some evidence" principle. 

See id. 

Under California law, "a life prisoner shall be found unsuitable for and denied parole

if in the judgment of the panel the prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to

society if released from prison." Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(a); see also Dannenberg,

34 Cal. 4th at 1080. The Board must determine whether a prisoner is presently too

dangerous for release based on the "circumstances tending to show unsuitability" and

"circumstances tending to show suitability" set forth in Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(c)-

(d). Irons, 505 F.3d at 851. The unsuitability factors include an especially heinous

commitment offense, a previous record of violence, a history of unstable social

relationships, a lengthy history of severe mental problems related to the offense, and

serious misconduct in prison. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(c). The suitability factors

include absence of a juvenile record, stable social relationships, demonstration of remorse,

lack of violent criminal history, realistic parole plans, and institutional activities indicating an

enhanced ability to function within the law upon release. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15 § 2402(d).

In the present case, the California Superior Court and the California Court of Appeal

held that the record contains "some evidence" to support the Board's determination that

petitioner was unsuitable for parole. Resp't Ex. 10 at Ex. B; Resp't Ex. 9. Because the

court of appeal's one-page decision did not explain what that "some evidence" was, this

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court looks to the reasoning of the superior court. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06. The

superior court rejected the Board's finding that multiple victims were attacked, injured, or

killed, that the offense involved human suffering, and that petitioner must upgrade

vocationally in order to be suitable for release; however, it concluded that there was "some

evidence" to support the factors of trivial motive, unstable social history, escalating pattern

of criminal conduct, insufficient substance abuse programming, misconduct while

incarcerated, and negative psychological evaluation. Resp't Ex. 10 at Ex. B. 

The record indicates that the state courts' decisions upholding the denial of parole

did not constitute an unreasonable application of Hill's "some evidence" principle. See

Irons, 505 F.3d at 851. First, "some evidence" supported the Board's finding that the

motive was trivial in relation to the offense. See Resp't Ex. 2 at 84. The initial dispute

between petitioner and the victim was over items of personal property, specifically, a stereo

belonging to petitioner's co-defendant that the victim had taken and sold for drugs, and a

leather jacket belonging to the victim that either petitioner or his co-defendant refused to

return. Id. at 14-18. After an argument over these items, the victim returned to his car. Id.

at 16-17. Petitioner followed the victim and shot at the car over a six-foot wall. Id. at 16-19. 

The victim died from two gunshot wounds in the chest area. Id. at 16. Even if petitioner's

version of the events is true and he shot in response to seeing three armed passengers get

out of the car, see id. at 17, the dispute over the personal property was a weak motive for

petitioner to follow the victim outside with a gun in the first place and to shoot from his

position of safety behind a six-foot wall. Thus, the Board's finding that the motive was trivial

in relation to the offense was supported by "some evidence." 

"Some evidence" also supports the Board's finding that petitioner's participation in

substance abuse programs while in prison had been insufficient. Petitioner became

addicted to drugs at around the age of thirteen, id. at 31; at the time of his offense, he was

using methamphetamine "all the time." Id. at 26. Petitioner acknowledged that his preincarceration "drug lifestyle" "interrupt[ed his] relationships with [his] family and other loved

ones." Id. at 27. Despite this history of drug abuse, petitioner was not active in AA or NA

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at the time of the Board hearing. Id. at 42. He said he stopped participating in December

2002 because he knew that his liver condition made it extremely dangerous to do drugs or

alcohol, and because the waiting lists for these programs were too long. Id. at 42, 90. As

the Board noted, however, even people with serious physical problems continue to use

drugs. Id. at 91. Moreover, the clinician who prepared petitioner's most recent

psychological report noted that resumption of drug use was a serious risk factor in

petitioner's case. Resp't Ex. 5 at 6-7 ("should [petitioner] choose to abuse [alcohol and/or

drugs] again, his violence potential would be considered much higher than the average

citizen in the community"). 

Additionally, there was ample evidence to support the factor of misconduct while

incarcerated. Since being imprisoned, petitioner had received a total of about six CDC

115s. Id. at 39. The most recent was in May 2001, approximately three years before the

parole hearing, for refusing to work in the Culinary department, which petitioner said was

due to his having Hepatitis B. Resp't Ex. 5 at 6; Resp't Ex. 2 at 39-40, 86. The other CDC

115s were for using drugs in 1997, fighting in 1994, threats in 1992, threatening an inmate

in 1990, and again for refusing to work in 1989. Resp't Ex. 5 at 6. Petitioner's most recent

counselor's report stated that "[a]lthough [petitioner] made some positive steps . . . [he]

continues to receive disciplinary actions." Resp't Ex. 4 at 2. 

In sum, because "some evidence" supports one or more of the unsuitability factors

relied upon by the Board in denying petitioner parole, and because that evidence also

constitutes “some evidence” to support the conclusion that petitioner would be a danger to

society if paroled, the court cannot say that the state courts' finding to that effect constituted

"an unreasonable application of the 'some evidence' principle." Irons, 505 F.3d at 851. 

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on this claim.

///

///

2. "Biggs Claim" 

In a line of relatively recent cases, the Ninth Circuit has discussed the

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constitutionality of denying parole when the only basis for denial is the circumstances of the

offense. See Irons, 505 F.3d at 852-54; Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129; Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915-

17. 

In Biggs, the court held that "continued reliance in the future on an unchanging

factor, the circumstance of the offense and the conduct prior to imprisonment, runs contrary

to the rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison system and could result in a due process

violation." 334 F.3d at 917. Because the court provided no legal rationale for this

statement, it was unclear whether the court was suggesting that the continued denial of

parole would be a new sort of due process violation, or that with the passage of time the

nature of the offense could cease to be “some evidence” that the prisoner would be a

danger if paroled. This ambiguity was helpfully cleared up in Irons, where the court clearly

treated a “some evidence” claim as different from a “Biggs claim.” Irons, 505 F.3d at 853-

54. It appears, putting together the brief discussions in Biggs and Irons, that the court

meant that at some point denial of parole based on long-ago and unchangeable factors,

when overwhelmed with positive evidence of rehabilitation, would violate due process. It

thus may be that the Ninth Circuit has recognized a due process right which for

convenience will be referred to in this opinion as a “Biggs claim.” 

Here, petitioner makes such a "Biggs claim" in contending that the Board's using the

circumstances of his offense as grounds for denying parole at his second parole hearing

violated due process. Petitioner has failed to establish the predicate for a Biggs claim. For

one thing, a second denial of parole based on the circumstances of the crime does not

amount to the repeated denials which the Biggs court suggested might violate due process. 

For another, petitioner’s parole was not denied solely because of the circumstances of his

offense, but also because of the factors described earlier, including the triviality of

petitioner's motive in relation to the offense, petitioner's insufficient participation in

substance abuse programs, and his misconduct while incarcerated. The state courts’

rejection of petitioner's "Biggs claim" therefore was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly-established Supreme Court authority. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

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 3. "Uniform Terms"

Petitioner appears to argue that his due process rights were violated because the

Board failed to set a fixed date for parole release pursuant to the principle of "uniform

terms" for crimes of similar gravity. This claim is meritless because it requires an

interpretation of state law, and this court is bound by the state court's interpretation of state

law. See Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005). In any event, the California

Supreme Court has held that the parole board "may decline to [set a fixed release date] in

an individual case if it concludes, on relevant grounds with support in the evidence, that the

grant of a parole date is premature for reasons of public safety." Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th

at 1071. As described earlier, sufficient evidence supported the Board's decision that

petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk to public safety if released from prison. 

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on this claim.

4. Biased Board

Petitioner contends that his due process rights were violated because the Board was

biased. The record shows that the Board reviewed the evidence extensively and discussed

it with petitioner and his attorney. Resp't Ex. 2 at 1-82. The Board’s decision explains the

facts it relied upon in finding him unsuitable for parole. Id. at 83-93. Both these factors

tend to negate the accusation of bias. Additionally, petitioner has not provided any

evidence to show that the Board's decision to deny him parole was based on its alleged

bias rather than on the numerous factors and evidence the Board discussed in its opinion. 

The state courts’ rejection of petitioner's bias claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly-established Supreme Court authority. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

///

///

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The

clerk shall enter judgment in favor of respondent and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 29, 2008. 

 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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