Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-14-02998/USCOURTS-ca8-14-02998-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Carmen Haire
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-2998

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Carmen Haire

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

___________________________

No. 14-3196

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

George Lee

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeals from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis

____________

Appellate Case: 14-2998 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/23/2015 Entry ID: 4338955 
Submitted: September 22, 2015

 Filed: November 23, 2015

____________

Before MURPHY, MELLOY, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

____________

MURPHY, Circuit Judge.

Agents from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) overheard George

Lee making statements on a wiretapped phone about the shipment of cocaine and

marijuana from Houston to distributors in St. Louis. Carmen Haire was arrested on

his way to Houston with over $33,000 of cash that he was carrying to Lee. After a

jury trial Lee was convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and marijuana,

conspiracy to launder the proceeds of drug trafficking, and possession of a firearm in

furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Haire was convicted of conspiracy to 1

launder the proceeds of drug trafficking. Lee appeals, challenging the foundation for

the wiretap recordings, the admission of expert testimony interpreting language used

on the recordings, and the admission of statements mentioning drug cartels. Haire

also appeals, challenging the admission ofstatements made by his coconspirators, the

jury instruction on willful blindness, and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting

his conviction. We affirm.

I.

In November 2011 DEA agents learned that Juan Williams was supplying

cocaine to a drug dealer in St. Louis. In January 2012 postal inspectors intercepted

a package sent from Houston to St. Louis containing 3 kilograms of cocaine and

The Honorable Catherine D. Perry, Chief Judge, United States District Court

1

for the Eastern District of Missouri.

-2-

Appellate Case: 14-2998 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/23/2015 Entry ID: 4338955 
arrested the intended recipient, Carl King. In King's possession were two phonesthat

had been in contact with cell phones used by Williams. DEA agents applied for and

received a Title III warrant to wiretap Williams's phones and later received a warrant

to wiretap Lee's phone. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518.

During the wiretapped conversations Lee arranged to ship drugs to Williams

and to other distributors in Mississippi and South Carolina. Lee discussed the price

of the cocaine and how much money he was owed. Lee also called his own suppliers

to order cocaine.

In April 2012 the DEA learned from the wiretap that Williams and Jamiel

Johnson were bringing cash from St. Louis to Lee in Houston. The DEA had local

police stop the car. A search of the car revealed a hidden compartment containing

$69,910 in a vacuumsealed plastic bag. Although police seized the money, Williams

and Johnson did not realize it until after they were released and checked the

compartment. Williams called Lee to discuss the stop and the missing money. Lee

in turn called an unnamed man to ask for advice. Later that month the DEA learned

that Lee was mailing a package to South Carolina. Police obtained a search warrant

and intercepted the package, which contained 3 kilograms of cocaine, crack cocaine,

and marijuana. After the intercept Lee made a phone call to discuss retrieving the

package from the post office, presuming that there was a problem with the delivery. 

Johnson testified at trial about other shipments of cocaine and marijuana that Lee had

sent to Williams in exchange for cash. Johnson personally saw Williams receive a

total of over 10 kilograms of cocaine and over 100 pounds of marijuana from Lee.

In May 2012 Lee and Williams made a series of phone calls about sending

Haire from St. Louis to Houston with "sealed up" money. Williams was to get him

a one way train ticket to Houston, and Lee would purchase a one way plane ticket

back to St. Louis. Williams spelled Haire's name for Lee so he could purchase the

plane ticket and then called Haire to get his date of birth. Lee and Williams also

-3-

Appellate Case: 14-2998 Page: 3 Date Filed: 11/23/2015 Entry ID: 4338955 
discussed giving Haire a phone to use during the trip. In these conversations,

Williams referred to Haire as his uncle or "Unc," and said he had "already told him

the deal" and that Haire "already [knew] what's going on." Lee stated that "Unc 100,"

meaning that Haire was reliable or solid. At trial Johnson identified Haire as

Williams's uncle and testified that Williams said that he had paid Haire to receive

packages of drugs at Williams's father's address.

On June 1, 2012 a DEA agent spotted Haire boarding a train in St. Louis

carrying a black backpack. Early the next morning at the train station in Longview,

Texas, where passengers bound for Houston transfer to a bus, DEA officer Chad

Lanier saw Haire anxiously looking at a drug sniffing dog. Lanier stopped Haire as

he attempted to board a bus to Houston. Lanier said he was looking for a possible

terrorist, and asked Haire if he was carrying any narcotics or large sums of currency. 

Haire said he had a little bit of money, and pulled a roll of about ten $20 bills out of

his pocket. Lanier asked if he had any more money in his bag and Haire replied,

"Yeah, I do have a little bit of money." When asked how much, Haire firststated that

he had a few thousand dollars, but then clarified that he had $25,000. Haire told

Lanier that the money was his and that he was going to buy a car. 

Lanier obtained Haire's consent to search his backpack, which contained

clothing and two nested vacuum sealed plastic bags containing rubber banded stacks

of bills totaling $33,530. A canine alerted to an odor of narcotics on the backpack,

and the currency smelled of marijuana when officers later opened the sealed bags. 

The DEA seized the currency. After the dog alerted on the backpack, Haire told

Lanier that he smoked marijuana but did not have any on him. Haire also changed

his story about planning to buy a car, stating that he was going to fly back to St. Louis

instead. Later that day Williams called Lee to report that "they hit Unc" and relayed

what Haire had told him about the stop and seizure.

-4-

Appellate Case: 14-2998 Page: 4 Date Filed: 11/23/2015 Entry ID: 4338955 
In February 2013 the DEA obtained a seizure warrant for Lee's car. When

agents executed the warrant Lee gave them consent to search his house, where they

found marijuana, electronic scales, $5,000 in currency, chemicals used to dilute

cocaine, and several firearms.

Lee and Haire were each indicted for conspiracy to distribute cocaine and

marijuana, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846, and conspiracy to launder the proceeds of drug

trafficking, 18 U.S.C. § 1956. Lee was also indicted for possessing a firearm in

furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Williams, Johnson,

and King were also charged with conspiracy to distribute drugs and pled guilty. The

jury found Lee guilty of all charges and found Haire guilty of the money laundering

charge but not guilty of the distribution charge. The district court sentenced Lee to

240 months imprisonment and Haire to 36 months imprisonment. Lee and Haire now

appeal their convictions.

II.

Lee contends that the district court improperly admitted the wiretapped phone

conversations because the government failed to authenticate the recordings. See Fed.

R. Evid. 901(a). Our review is for clear abuse of discretion. United States v. Henley,

766 F.3d 893, 912 (8th Cir. 2014). Admission of wiretap recordings is likely proper

if the government establishes that: (1) the device was capable of recording the

statements; (2) the operator was competent to operate the device; (3) the recordings

are authentic and correct; (4) changes have not been made; (5) the recordings have

been preserved; (6) the speakers are identified; and (7) the conversation was

voluntary. Id. (citing United States v. McMillan, 508 F.2d 101, 104 (8th Cir. 1974)). 

We have explained that these McMillan factors are merely helpful guidelines and

must be viewed in light of the circumstances rather than rigidly applied. Id.

-5-

Appellate Case: 14-2998 Page: 5 Date Filed: 11/23/2015 Entry ID: 4338955 
The very fact that the recordings in this case exist establishes that the device

was capable of recording conversations, United States v. McCowan, 706 F.2d 863,

865 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam), and the fact that the operator successfully made the

recordings satisfies the competency requirement, United States v. Franklin, 747 F.2d

497, 498 (8th Cir. 1984) (per curiam). At trial DEA special agent Brett Johnson

identified the speakers on the recordings and testified about the equipment used by

the DEA to make unalterable recordings of each conversation. That testimony and

the fact that nothing showed the recorded conversations were other than voluntary

satisfies the remaining McMillan factors. See United States v. Roach, 28 F.3d 729,

733 (8th Cir. 1994). Given Johnson's testimony and the absence of any evidence

indicating that the recordings were not authentic, the district court did not abuse its

discretion in admitting them into evidence.

Lee next argues that the district court abused its discretion in allowing special

agent Johnson to give expert testimony about the meaning of drug related terms used

by Lee and his coconspirators on the recordings. See Fed. R. Evid. 702. It is "well

established that experts may help the jury with the meaning of jargon and codewords"

used by drug dealers. United States v. Delpit, 94 F.3d 1134, 1145 (8th Cir. 1996). 

Lee concedes that Johnson was qualified to interpret terms and phrases used on the

recordingsthat were "common drug terminology," but contendsthatJohnson was not

an expert with respect to certain phrases that were "specific only to this case." Lee

fails to cite a single example of Johnson's testimony that was improper. Because his

failure to cite to the record does not comply with Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A), see

United States v. Ali, 799 F.3d 1008, 1026 n.3 (8th Cir. 2015), and because our review

ofthe record indicatesthatspecial agent Johnson applied his expertise to help the jury

understand recordings that were permeated with drug jargon, United States v.

Placensia, 352 F.3d 1157, 1164–65 (8thCir. 2003), we conclude that the district court

did not abuse its discretion in admitting Johnson's testimony.

-6-

Appellate Case: 14-2998 Page: 6 Date Filed: 11/23/2015 Entry ID: 4338955 
Lee finally asserts that the district court abused its discretion in admitting

testimony about "drug cartels and Colombians" which he claims was prejudicial. 

Notwithstanding his failure to cite to particular statements in the record, Lee appears

to focus on two recordings in which he himself stated that he knew someone who

"know[s] cartel members" and described his attempts to connect with Colombians

whom he was willing to pay extra for their purer cocaine. Lee's statements were

admissible non hearsay because they were statements by a party opponent. Fed. R.

Evid. 801(d)(2)(A). Lee argues that the drug cartel evidence was not admissible

because it was meant to prejudice him or prove his guilt by association with the

cartel, see United States v. McKay, 431 F.3d 1085, 1093 (8th Cir. 2005), but that was

not the case here. Lee's statements indicated his knowing and active participation in

a conspiracy to distribute cocaine and were thusrelevant to the charges he faced. See

United States v. Ellison, 616 F.3d 829, 833–34 (8th Cir. 2010). Given the strength

of the government's evidence there was little risk that the statements would cause the

jury to find him guilty solely because of any affiliations with the cartel. See id. We

conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting these portions

of Lee's wiretapped statements.

III.

Haire contendsthat the district court abused its discretion byadmitting portions

of the wiretapped conversations between Lee and Williams and portions ofJohnson's

testimony. Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) permits the government to admit,

as nonhearsay, statements made by a coconspirator of a defendant "during and in

furtherance of the conspiracy." In order to do so, the government must prove by a

preponderance of evidence "that a conspiracy existed, that the defendant and

declarant were members of the conspiracy, and that the statements were made during

and in furtherance of the conspiracy." United States v. Williams, 87 F.3d 249, 253

(8th Cir. 1996). The district court conditionally admitted the evidence pursuant to

United States v. Bell and then at the close of evidence made a finding that the

-7-

Appellate Case: 14-2998 Page: 7 Date Filed: 11/23/2015 Entry ID: 4338955 
government had proven each prerequisite by a preponderance of the evidence. See

573 F.2d 1040, 1044 (8th Cir. 1978). We review the decision to admit coconspirator

statements for abuse of discretion, and have stated that a district court's discretion is

particularly broad in conspiracy trials. United States v. Young, 753 F.3d 757, 771

(8th Cir. 2014).

Haire does not dispute that the statements Lee and Williams made to each other

about his trip to Texas were made during and in furtherance of a conspiracy to

launder the proceeds of drug trafficking. He contends only that the government

produced insufficient evidence showing that he was a member of that conspiracy or

any conspiracy at all. To determine whether the government has established that a

defendant was a member of a conspiracy, a district court may consider the content of

the proffered coconspirartor statements so long as a statement does not provide the

sole evidence of its own admissibility. United States v. Roach, 164 F.3d 403, 409

(8th Cir. 1998).

The statements Haire challenges, in which Lee and Williams plan his trip to

Texas and discuss his stop by law enforcement, are each strong evidence that he was

a member of the conspiracy. The wiretapped statements made prior to the trip are

reinforced by the statements made after the stop, and vice versa. The statements are

also reinforced by the evidence obtained in Texas. After Lee and Williams discussed

sending "Unc" to Texas with drug money, Haire traveled from St. Louis to Texas,

acted suspiciously around law enforcement, and was found with a large amount of

cash in a vacuum sealed bag. Johnson's testimony that Haire was involved in

Williams's drug dealing operation also supports a finding that he was a member of a

conspiracy to launder the proceeds. Finally, it is irrelevant whether the allegedly

inadmissible statements occurred before Haire actually joined the conspiracy, because

the conspiracy "existed at the time the statements were made." United States v.

Tremusini, 688 F.3d 547, 555 (8th Cir. 2012). The district court did not abuse its

discretion in determining that a preponderance of evidence showed that Haire was a

-8-

Appellate Case: 14-2998 Page: 8 Date Filed: 11/23/2015 Entry ID: 4338955 
member of the conspiracy and thus admitting the wiretapped statementsthat mention

him.

Johnson's testimony that Williams had said that he used Haire to receive

packages of drugs was made in furtherance of the charged conspiracy to distribute

drugs because it identified Haire's role and the method by which Williams was

shipping the drugs. See United States v. Ragland, 555 F.3d 706, 713 (8th Cir. 2009). 

Johnson's testimony supports a finding that Haire was a member of that conspiracy. 

The wiretapped statements regarding the trip to Texas and Haire's actions in

transporting the sealed cash also support a finding that he was a member of the

conspiracy to distribute drugs. Haire was acquitted of the distribution charge, but

"there is nothing inherently inconsistent" in the district court concluding that Haire's

participation in the conspiracy had been proved by a preponderance of the evidence

and the jury later concluding that his guilt had not been proved beyond a reasonable

doubt. United States v. Patino-Rojas, 974 F.2d 94, 96 (8th Cir. 1992). The district

court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Johnson's testimony.

Haire next argues that the district court erred by giving a willful blindness

instruction that the jury could find that he acted knowingly if it found beyond a

reasonable doubt that he "believed there was a high probability that the currency in

his suitcase involved some form of illegal activity and that he took deliberate actions

to avoid learning of that fact." We review the decision to give a willful blindness

instruction for abuse of discretion. United States v. Aleman, 548 F.3d 1158, 1166

(8th Cir. 2008). A willful blindness instruction is appropriate "when the defendant

asserts a lack of guilty knowledge, but the evidence supports an inference of

deliberate ignorance.” United States v. Whitehill, 532 F.3d 746, 751 (8th Cir. 2008)

(quoting United States v. Gruenberg, 989 F.2d 971, 974 (8th Cir. 1993)). Haire

traveled to Texas on a one way train ticket carrying over $33,000 in cash in a vacuum

sealed bag on behalf of his nephew Williams. Johnson's testimony also showed that

Haire was aware that Williams was a drug dealer. If Haire did not question the

-9-

Appellate Case: 14-2998 Page: 9 Date Filed: 11/23/2015 Entry ID: 4338955 
purpose of his trip or know that he was carrying drug money, "it was only because

[he] consciously chose to be ignorant of those facts." United States v. Hiland, 909

F.2d 1114, 1131 (8th Cir. 1990). We reject Haire's contention that the willful

blindness instruction lowered the government's burden of proof, because the district

court instructed the jury that it could not find he acted knowingly if he was merely

negligent, careless, or mistaken as to the fact that his suitcase contained drug

proceeds. Whitehill, 532 F.3d at 752. We therefore conclude that the district court

did not abuse its discretion in giving the willful blindness instruction.

Haire finally asserts that the government failed to present sufficient evidence

to convict him of conspiracy to launder the proceeds of drug trafficking. To obtain

a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)–(B), (h), the government was required

to prove that Haire "knew of and intentionally joined a conspiracy to conduct

financial transactions involving drug proceeds intending either to promote the

conspirators' illegal activity, or to conceal the nature, location, source, ownership, or

control of the proceeds." United States v. Elder, 682 F.3d 1065, 1071 (8th Cir. 2012). 

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, "we look at the evidence in the light

most favorable to the government and accept all reasonable inferences that support

the verdict." United States v. Martin, 777 F.3d 984, 992 (8th Cir. 2015).

The government's evidence showed that Haire knowingly and intentionally

joined a conspiracy to conduct financial transactionsthat concealed the nature of drug

proceeds. See Elder, 682 F.3d at 1071–72. After Williams and Johnson were caught

transporting drug proceeds to Lee by car, Lee and Williams were recorded planning

a trip to send Haire to Texas by train with "sealed up" money. Haire then traveled to

Houston and was caught with the money. Haire contends there is no evidence that

he knew the money was the proceeds of an unlawful activity, but there was strong

circumstantial evidence that he had this knowledge. None of Haire's own statements

were caught on the wiretap, but mens rea israrely proven directly. It israther "almost

always proven by using inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence as a whole." 

-10-

Appellate Case: 14-2998 Page: 10 Date Filed: 11/23/2015 Entry ID: 4338955 
United States v. Ott, 741 F.2d 226, 228–29 (8th Cir. 1984). Williams told Lee on the

wiretap that Haire "already [knew] what's going on," and Lee stated that Haire was

"100," or reliable to assist in the operation. Haire had also previously served as

Williams's paid intermediary for receiving shipments of drugs. Haire was carrying

an abnormally large amount of cash in a vacuum sealed bag. By inference, Haire

knew the illicit origins of the money he wastransporting. We conclude that there was

sufficient evidence to convict.

IV.

For these reasons we affirm the judgments of the district court.

______________________________

-11-

Appellate Case: 14-2998 Page: 11 Date Filed: 11/23/2015 Entry ID: 4338955