Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-18-36005/USCOURTS-ca9-18-36005-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mark T. Esper
Appellee
Garry Heimrich
Appellant
United States Department of the Army
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GARRY HEIMRICH,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE 

ARMY; MARK T. ESPER, Secretary, 

Department of the Army,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 18-36005

D.C. No.

3:17-cv-01615-

HZ

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Marco A. Hernandez, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted November 7, 2019

Portland, Oregon

Filed January 16, 2020

Before: Ronald Lee Gilman,* Richard A. Paez,

and Johnnie B. Rawlinson, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Gilman

* The Honorable Ronald Lee Gilman, United States Circuit Judge 

for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.

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2 HEIMRICH V. U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY

SUMMARY**

Civil Service Reform Act of 1978

The panel affirmed the district court’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(b)(6) dismissal of a former federal employee’s Equal 

Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) complaint challenging 

his removal from his position as a power-plant mechanic 

with the United States Army Corps of Engineers.

5 U.S.C. § 7121(d), a provision of the Civil Service 

Reform Act of 1978, provides that unionized federal 

employees seeking to bring discrimination claims may “raise 

the matter” through either (1) their union’s negotiated 

procedure, or (2) their agency’s EEO office, “but not both.”

Plaintiff initially challenged his removal by filing a 

grievance through his union’s negotiated procedure, and 

then filed a separate complaint with the Army Corps’ EEO 

office. Plaintiff contended on appeal that his EEO complaint 

contained allegations of a hostile work environment that 

were not presented in his collective bargaining agreement 

(“CBA”) grievance, so the complaint did not raise the same 

“matter.”

The panel held that plaintiff’s EEO complaint raised the 

same matters as previously covered in plaintiff’s union 

grievance, which was prohibited by § 7121(d). Specifically, 

the panel held that the term “matter” in § 7121(d): referred 

to the underlying action in the CBA grievance or the EEO 

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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HEIMRICH V. U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY 3

complaint; was broader than legal theory; and referred to the 

factual basis of the employee’s adverse action. The panel 

further held that it would not impute a hostile-workenvironment claim where no such allegation expressly 

appeared in plaintiff’s EEO complaint. The panel concluded 

that plaintiff’s attempt to raise new legal arguments to 

challenge his termination failed under § 7121(d). The panel 

noted that, although plaintiff’s EEO complaint was barred, 

there was a procedure available to raise the hostile-workenvironment claim: had plaintiff exhausted the union 

grievance procedure, he could have appealed to the Equal 

Employment Opportunity Commission, and then amended 

his CBA grievance under 29 C.F.R. § 1614.106(d) to pursue 

a hostile-work-environment claim before the Commission.

COUNSEL

Shaun Ryan Yancey (argued), Melville Johnson P.C.,

Atlanta, Georgia; Craig A. Crispin, Crispin Employment 

Law PC, Portland, Oregon; for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Jared D. Hager (argued), Assistant United States Attorney; 

Kelly A. Zusman, Appellate Chief; Billy J. Williams United 

States Attorney; United States Attorney’s Office, Portland, 

Oregon; for Defendants-Appellees.

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4 HEIMRICH V. U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY

OPINION

GILMAN, Circuit Judge:

This case focuses on 5 U.S.C. § 7121(d), a provision of 

the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. Section 7121(d) 

provides that unionized federal employees seeking to bring 

discrimination claims may “raise the matter” through either 

(1) their union’s negotiated procedure, or (2) their agency’s 

Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) office, “but not 

both.”

Garry Heimrich was removed from his position as a 

power-plant mechanic for the United States Army Corps of 

Engineers in 2016. He initially challenged his removal by 

filing a grievance through his union’s negotiated procedure. 

He then filed a separate complaint with the Army Corps’s 

EEO office. The Army Corps contends that the EEO 

complaint raises the same matters as previously covered in 

Heimrich’s union grievance, which is prohibited by 

§ 7121(d). Heimrich, in response, argues that his EEO 

complaint contains allegations of a hostile work 

environment, a separate matter not explicitly raised in his 

union grievance. The district court agreed with the Army 

Corps, granting the latter’s motion to dismiss Heimrich’s 

complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure for failure to state a claim. For the reasons set 

forth below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

I. BACKGROUND

Heimrich worked as a power-plant mechanic for the 

Army Corps from September 2011 to July 2016, at which 

time he was terminated from his position. In its notice to 

Heimrich, the Army Corps cited as reasons for Heimrich’s 

removal his defiance towards supervisors, noncompliance 

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HEIMRICH V. U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY 5

with leave procedures, submission of fabricated medical 

documents in leave requests, and disruptive behavior.

Heimrich was a member of the United Power Trades 

Organization (UPTO). He was thus covered under the 

collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between UPTO and 

the Army Corps, which allows UPTO and its members to file 

grievances against the agency. In August 2016, UPTO filed 

a grievance on Heimrich’s behalf, challenging his 

termination as discriminatory and retaliatory. The CBA 

grievance described a difficult relationship between 

Heimrich and the Army Corps, which was “exacerbated by 

both personal issues being dealt with by Mr. Heimrich and 

by actions the [Army Corps] has taken in response to the 

symptoms of the stress related disability diagnosed in 

Mr. Heimrich.”

More specifically, the CBA grievance alleged that 

Heimrich was “under constant observation by [Army Corps] 

management” and that he was subject to selectively imposed 

performance standards and leave restrictions. This 

heightened scrutiny, the CBA grievance asserted, allowed 

the Army Corps to gather negative material on Heimrich and 

to ultimately remove him from his position. Heimrich’s 

CBA grievance also generally cited violations of the 

Americans with Disabilities Act, as well as CBA Article 4.1, 

which prohibits “discrimination on the basis of race, color, 

religion, sex, national origin, age, mental or physical 

disabilities, and reprisal.”

The Army Corps upheld Heimrich’s termination at the 

first step of the CBA grievance procedure. UPTO then 

submitted the CBA grievance to the next step of the 

negotiated procedure, and the Army Corps again upheld its 

decision. UPTO finally requested that the CBA grievance 

be submitted to arbitration.

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6 HEIMRICH V. U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY

At that point, Heimrich filed a formal complaint with the 

Army Corps’s EEO office. The EEO complaint alleged that 

Heimrich’s termination resulted from discriminatory and 

retaliatory treatment. Specifically, Heimrich argued that he 

had been discriminated against due to (1) his disability status 

as an alcoholic, and (2) the race of his wife and children, 

who are African American (Heimrich is Caucasian). 

Heimrich further alleged that he was retaliated against 

because he raised safety concerns in Army Corps meetings. 

The complaint also described several specific acts by Army 

Corps employees not contained within Heimrich’s CBA 

grievance.

In October 2016, the Army Corps’s EEO office 

dismissed the complaint, informing Heimrich that the EEO 

office could not consider his claims because he had made a 

prior election to pursue the matter via the negotiated 

grievance procedure. Heimrich filed an appeal of the 

dismissal with the Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission (EEOC) the following month. While awaiting 

the EEOC’s decision, Heimrich withdrew his request for 

arbitration of his CBA grievance.

The EEOC affirmed the Army Corps’s dismissal of 

Heimrich’s complaint in January 2017. Heimrich’s request 

for reconsideration was subsequently denied, and the EEOC 

informed of him of his right to file an appeal in federal 

district court. He then timely proceeded to file his federalcourt complaint.

The Army Corps moved to dismiss Heimrich’s 

complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. After determining that 

Heimrich’s CBA grievance and his EEO complaint raised 

the same “matter,” the district court granted the Army 

Corps’s motion on the basis that Heimrich’s EEO complaint 

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HEIMRICH V. U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY 7

was filed in contravention of 5 U.S.C. § 7121(d). See 

Heimrich v. Dep’t of Army, No. 3:17-CV-01615, 2018 WL 

1938296, at *5 (D. Or. Apr. 20, 2018). This appeal 

followed.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of review

Dismissal for failure to state a claim is a question of law 

that we review de novo. Kruso v. Int’l Tel. & Telegraph 

Corp., 872 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1989). “To survive a 

motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that 

is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 

678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 570 (2007)). The complaint “does not need detailed 

factual allegations,” but the plaintiff must provide more than 

“labels and conclusions” to withstand scrutiny under Rule 

12(b)(6). Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. In evaluating such 

motions, “[w]e accept as true all well pleaded facts in the 

complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to 

the nonmoving party.” Zadrozny v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon,

720 F.3d 1163, 1167 (9th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).

B. The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978

The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA) 

establishes labor-management-relations practices for most 

federal workers. 5 U.S.C. § 7101 et seq. Recognizing that 

“the right of employees to organize, bargain collectively, and 

participate through labor organizations . . . safeguards the 

public interest,” 5 U.S.C. § 7101(a)(1)(A), the CSRA 

authorizes specified employees to “form, join, or assist any 

labor organization,” 5 U.S.C. § 7102. The CSRA provides 

for the formation of collective bargaining agreements 

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8 HEIMRICH V. U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY

(CBAs) between labor organizations and federal agencies, 

5 U.S.C. § 7114, and it requires that CBAs “provide 

procedures for the settlement of grievances,” 5 U.S.C.

§ 7121(a)(1). A CBA’s procedures constitute the “exclusive 

administrative procedures for resolving grievances which 

fall within its coverage,” with several noted exceptions. Id.

The provision of the CSRA in question in the present 

case, 5 U.S.C. § 7121(d), constitutes one such exception. 

Section 7121(d) sets forth the options available to unionized 

federal employees who, like Heimrich, raise grievances 

involving allegations of discrimination. Where the 

employee is affected by one of the discriminatory practices 

listed under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1)—and where the 

applicable CBA allows employees to raise discrimination 

claims—§ 7121(d) establishes two alternative means by 

which to raise the “matter.”

The aggrieved employee may, as one option, raise the 

matter by filing a grievance under the “negotiated 

procedure” described in the CBA. See id.;see also 29 C.F.R. 

§ 1614.301(a). In the alternative, the employee may raise 

the matter under the “statutory procedure” by filing a formal 

complaint with the employing agency’s EEO office. See 

5 U.S.C. § 7121(d); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1614.301(a). The 

employee “shall be deemed to have exercised his option” 

under § 7121(d) when he or she files the grievance or the 

EEO complaint, whichever first occurs. See 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7121(d). These procedures are mutually exclusive, 

meaning that an aggrieved employee seeking redress for a 

prohibited personnel practice under the CSRA may “raise 

the matter under a statutory procedure or the negotiated 

procedure, but not both.” Id. (emphasis added); see also 

Vinieratos v. U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, 939 F.2d 762, 768 

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HEIMRICH V. U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY 9

(9th Cir. 1991) (explaining that an employee’s election is 

irrevocable).

C. Defining the term “matter” under 5 U.S.C. § 7121(d)

At issue is whether Heimrich’s CBA grievance and his 

EEO complaint raised the same “matter” under § 7121(d). 

Heimrich contends that his EEO complaint contains 

allegations of a hostile work environment that were not 

presented in his CBA grievance, so that the grievance and 

the complaint did not raise the same “matter.” The Army 

Corps, however, argues that Heimrich’s EEO complaint 

covers the same matters previously raised in his CBA 

grievance. Therefore, the Army Corps argues, the EEO 

office properly dismissed Heimrich’s EEO complaint.

The district court noted that “[b]inding Ninth Circuit 

case law that interprets the term ‘same matter’ under 

5 U.S.C. § 7121(d) and 29 C.F.R. § 1614.301(a) is sparse.” 

Heimrich, 2018 WL 1938296, at *4. Cases outside this 

circuit, however, provide guidance. The leading cases are 

Bonner v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 781 F.2d 202 

(Fed. Cir. 1986), and Facha v. Cisneros, 914 F. Supp. 1142 

(E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 106 F.3d 384 (3d Cir. 1996) 

(unpublished table decision).

The Federal Circuit in Bonner held that the term “matter” 

under § 7121(d) refers to the “underlying action” challenged 

in the CBA grievance or the EEO complaint. 781 F.2d 

at 205. In reaching this conclusion, the court looked to 

congressional reports preceding the enactment of the CSRA, 

which largely used the term “matter” to refer to the 

underlying actions by the agency. Id. at 204. The court also 

noted that other subsections of § 7121 refer to underlying 

government actions as “matters.” Id. at 204–205. To assign 

any other definition to the term, the court decided, would be 

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10 HEIMRICH V. U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY

“inconsistent with the clear meaning of the statute.” Id. 

at 205.

In Facha, the district court embraced the definition of the 

term “matter” in Bonner and established the following test: 

if the aggrieved employee “raised a topic in both” the CBA 

grievance and the EEO complaint, or if those assigned to 

handle the CBA grievance or the EEO complaint would 

“necessarily have needed to inquire into a topic in 

discharging their duties,” then the employee has raised the 

same matter. 914 F. Supp. at 1149. This inquiry requires 

the court to “focus on the ‘matter’ that the employee raised 

. . . , not on legal jargon.” Id. at 1148.

A number of courts in other circuits have relied on the 

approach set forth in Bonner and Facha. The D.C. Circuit 

in Guerra v. Cuomo, 176 F.3d 547, 550 (D.C. Cir. 1999), for 

example, did not expressly adopt a definition of the term 

“matter” under 5 U.S.C. § 7121(d), but the court cited 

Bonner and Facha with approval, noting that “courts have 

tended to construe the term ‘matter’ to encompass more than 

a legal claim and instead to encompass the ‘underlying 

action,’ or the ‘topics’ raised.” Id. at 550 (citations omitted). 

See also Rosell v. Wood, 357 F. Supp. 2d 123, 129–30 

(D.D.C. 2004) (citing Guerra and Bonner as authority for 

the determination that the employee in question raised the 

same matter in both his CBA grievance and in his EEO 

complaint). Similarly, in Mustafa v. Iancu, 313 F. Supp. 3d 

684, 692 (E.D. Va. 2018), an employee attempted to raise a 

hostile-work-environment claim through the EEO process. 

The court determined that the employee had previously 

raised the bases for his claim as part of his earlier CBA 

grievance. See id. at 692. Citing Bonner and other cases, 

the court concluded that § 7121(d) prevented the employee 

from pursuing his claim through the EEO process, even 

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HEIMRICH V. U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY 11

though the employee did not “package defendant’s actions 

as part of a hostile work environment claim” during the CBA 

process. See id.

Other courts have applied the tests in Bonner and Facha 

to determine that an employee had raised separate matters 

under § 7121(d). The court in Zuzul v. McDonald, 98 

F. Supp. 3d 852, 861–62 (M.D.N.C. 2015), for example, 

cited the definition in Bonner and the test in Facha to 

conclude that an employee’s CBA grievance involving an 

assault-and-battery claim and her EEO complaint involving 

allegations of gender and racial harassment raised different 

matters. Likewise, in Smith v. Jackson, 539 F. Supp. 2d 116, 

131 (D.D.C. 2008), the court concluded that an employee’s 

CBA grievance and his EEO complaint contained the same 

matter to the extent that both challenged the revocation of a 

Compressed Work Schedule and charges of Absence 

Without Leave, but the court determined that the EEO 

complaint also contained unrelated allegations of a hostile 

work environment.

A similar approach to that in Bonner and Facha has been 

embraced by a district court within this circuit. In Macy v. 

Dalton, 853 F. Supp. 350 (E.D. Cal. 1994), a group of federal 

employees challenged their Reduction in Force terminations 

through both CBA grievances and EEO complaints. Id. 

at 352. The court in Macy adopted the logic in Bonner to 

conclude that the term “matter” encompasses not only the 

legal theory behind an employee’s claim, but also the 

underlying adverse action. Id. at 353. In reaching this 

conclusion, the court considered the implementing 

regulation of the EEOC, which makes clear that a plaintiff 

need not have raised a discrimination claim in order to have 

raised the same “matter” under § 7121(d). The regulation in 

question provides as follows:

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12 HEIMRICH V. U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY

An aggrieved employee who files a grievance 

with an agency whose negotiated agreement 

permits the acceptance of grievances which 

allege discrimination may not thereafter file 

a complaint on the same matter under this 

part 1614 irrespective of whether . . . the 

grievance has raised an issue of 

discrimination.

29 C.F.R. § 1614.301(a).

Considering the standard for reviewing interpretive rules 

put forth in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 

(1944), the court in Macy determined that the EEOC’s 

interpretation of the term “matter” in § 7121(d) was 

persuasive and worthy of deference, noting that “[t]he 

regulation would have to substantially contradict the statute 

in order to justify judicial tinkering with this comprehensive 

regulatory scheme.” 853 F. Supp. at 354. The court 

concluded that “[t]he dictates of this regulation are clear: if 

an employee chooses the grievance route, she may not 

thereafter file an EEO complaint regardless of whether her 

grievance alleged unlawful discrimination.” Id.

In light of the wording and legislative history of 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7121(d), as well as the persuasive consensus among courts 

within and outside this circuit, we adopt the definition of the 

term “matter” as set forth in Bonner. In other words, we hold 

that the term “matter” in 5 U.S.C. § 7121(d) refers to the 

“underlying action” in the CBA grievance or the EEO 

complaint. “Matter,” then, as other courts have 

acknowledged, is broader than “legal theory”: it refers to the 

factual basis of the employee’s adverse action. This leads us 

to the consideration of whether Heimrich has challenged the 

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HEIMRICH V. U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY 13

same underlying government action in both his CBA 

grievance and in his EEO complaint.

D. Heimrich’s CBA grievance and his EEO complaint

Heimrich does not contest that, to the extent that both his 

CBA grievance and his EEO complaint challenge his 

termination, the complaint was rightfully dismissed. He 

instead argues that his EEO complaint contained matters in 

addition to his termination, and that the parts of the 

complaint addressing these additional matters were 

wrongfully dismissed.

Heimrich’s brief asserts, more specifically, that his EEO 

complaint contained allegations of a hostile work 

environment based on “(1) race by familial association; 

(2) retaliation; and (3) disability discrimination.” The key 

problem with this argument, however, is that his EEO 

complaint in fact contains no mention of a hostile-workenvironment claim. It instead alleges that Heimrich was 

wrongfully terminated on the bases quoted above, stating 

that

the grounds given by management for 

[Heimrich’s] removal from the Corps of 

Engineers are false and that the real reasons 

are: 1) retaliation for raising safety concerns; 

2) complaining to the OSC and the MSPB; 

3) discrimination against [Heimrich] for 

being a recovering alcoholic and using 

medical leave; and 4) having an African 

American wife and children.

Heimrich’s belated attempt to retroactively 

recharacterize his challenge to his termination is unavailing. 

We will not impute a hostile-work-environment claim where 

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14 HEIMRICH V. U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY

no such allegation expressly appears in Heimrich’s EEO 

complaint.

Heimrich further argues that his EEO complaint 

discussed “several harassing acts” not addressed in his CBA 

grievance. Although he does not point to any specific 

sections of his complaint in support of this contention, two 

particular allegations arguably fall within this category. One 

paragraph in the complaint alleges that an employee referred 

to Heimrich’s African-American wife and children using a 

racial epithet and that another employee made a racially 

charged statement regarding Heimrich’s son. Another 

sentence notes that Heimrich informed his supervisors that 

his drinking was exacerbated by the harassment he received 

in the form of “unwarranted discipline and leave restriction.”

We see no indication, however, that Heimrich intended 

to establish a separate hostile-work-environment claim on 

these bases. The natural reading of Heimrich’s EEO 

complaint is that these allegations were included to support 

his challenge to his termination under a new legal theory—

that he was removed on the basis of his family’s race and his 

disability. Under the definition set forth in Bonner and now 

adopted by this court, Heimrich’s attempt to raise new legal 

arguments to challenge his termination must fail under 

5 U.S.C. § 7121(d). Other courts have similarly rejected 

attempts to reframe CBA grievances under new theories of 

discrimination. See, e.g., Rosell v. Wood, 357 F. Supp. 2d 

123, 131 (D.D.C. 2004).

Heimrich’s own EEO complaint supports our 

conclusion. He checked the box on the EEO form indicating 

that he had previously raised the same issues in his CBA 

complaint under a union-negotiated grievance procedure. 

His appeal to the EEOC also noted that he had previously 

filed a complaint on the same matter with his collective 

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HEIMRICH V. U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY 15

bargaining unit. Finally, the district court observed that 

Heimrich, in his federal-court complaint, described his EEO 

complaint as challenging his termination, but made no 

mention of a hostile-work-environment claim. See 

Heimrich, 2018 WL 1938296, at *3 n.2.

Moreover, even if Heimrich’s EEO complaint had 

contained a specific hostile-work-environment claim, this 

would not change the outcome because the basic underlying 

facts remain the same. Heimrich, after all, alleged in his 

EEO complaint that his family’s race and his disability were 

factors that led to his termination. He therefore should have 

raised these facts in his CBA grievance, where an arbitrator 

charged with handling the grievance would necessarily have 

inquired into the specific acts allegedly supporting his claim 

of wrongful termination. See Facha, 914 F. Supp. at 1149. 

Heimrich’s failure to do so should not give him two bites at 

the apple. This is the precise point of 5 U.S.C. § 7121(d), 

which allows an employee to raise the “matter” in either a 

CBA grievance or an EEO complaint, but not both.

We also note that, although Heimrich’s EEO complaint 

is barred, there was a procedure available to Heimrich to 

raise his hostile-work-environment claim in the grievance 

process. Had he exhausted the union grievance procedure, 

he could have appealed to the EEOC. See 29 C.F.R. 

§ 1614.401(d). He could then have amended his CBA 

grievance under 29 C.F.R. § 1614.106(d), which governs 

complaints within the EEOC’s agency program. It provides 

that “[a] complainant may amend a complaint at any time 

prior to the conclusion of the investigation to include issues 

or claims like or related to those raised in the complaint.” Id. 

Heimrich would have therefore been able to pursue a hostilework-environment claim before the EEOC if he had so 

desired. But what he could not do is attempt to pursue a 

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16 HEIMRICH V. U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY

hostile-work-environment claim in a separate EEO 

complaint.

III. CONCLUSION

For all of the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the 

judgment of the district court.

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