Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-02826/USCOURTS-ca7-15-02826-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jessica Brady
Appellee
City of Chicago
Appellee
Marc Lapadula
Appellee
William Viramontes
Appellant

Document Text:

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15‐2826

WILLIAM VIRAMONTES,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

CITY OF CHICAGO, JESSICA BRADY, AND MARC LAPADULA

Defendants‐Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 13 C 6251 — Virginia M. Kendall, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 13, 2016 — DECIDED OCTOBER 21, 2016

____________________

Before BAUER, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

KANNE, Circuit Judge. William Viramontes was convicted

in Illinois state court of aggravated assault and resisting ar‐

rest. Despite the conviction, Viramontes filed this § 1983 suit

against the officers involved in the altercation alleging that

they used excessive force in violation of his Fourth Amend‐

ment rights.

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2 No. 15‐2826

The jury returned a verdict for the officers. Viramontes

sought a new trial for two reasons: (1) because the district

court instructed the jury that it had to take as true the facts

underlying the state‐court conviction, and (2) because de‐

fense counsel made improper statements during closing ar‐

gument. The district court denied the motion, holding that

the jury instruction was proper and that, although defense

counsel’s statements during closing argument were improp‐

er, they did not warrant a new trial. We agree and affirm.  

I. BACKGROUND

Viramontes was charged with mob action, aggravated as‐

sault, and resisting arrest in Cook County Circuit Court aris‐

ing out of an incident at a Puerto Rican street festival in Chi‐

cago. Following a bench trial, Viramontes was convicted of

aggravated assault and resisting arrest. The state court judge

held, “I find the Defendant guilty of resisting a police officer

and aggravated assault in that he took a substantial step and

actively swung in the direction of the police officer and

missed,” and that “after the Defendant swung ... he did ac‐

tively resist.” (R. 58‐3.) The court sentenced Viramontes to

100 days’ imprisonment.

Viramontes then sued two officers involved in the arrest,

Jessica Brady and Marc Lapadula, and the City of Chicago.

Viramontes brought a § 1983 claim, alleging that the officers

used excessive force during the arrest violating his Fourth

Amendment rights.  

After trial, the jury returned a verdict for the defendants

on Viramontes’s claims. Viramontes filed a Rule 59 motion

for a new trial, arguing that attorney misconduct and proce‐

dural and evidentiary errors rendered the trial unfair. The

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No. 15‐2826 3

district court denied the motion. On appeal, Viramontes ar‐

gues that an allegedly improper jury instruction and defense

counsel’s improper statements in closing argument entitle

him to a new trial.  

Because the § 1983 claim involved the same incident for

which Viramontes had been convicted of aggravated assault

and resisting arrest, the claim implicated the Supreme

Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey. There, the Court held

that a plaintiff’s § 1983 claim is barred if it “necessarily

impl[ies] the invalidity of his conviction.” 512 U.S. 477, 487

(1994). The district court relied on our decision in Gilbert v.

Cook, 512 F.3d 899 (7th Cir. 2008) and held that an excessive‐

force claim was not inconsistent with Viramontes’s convic‐

tion. The district court also held, however, that the facts un‐

derlying the conviction had to be taken as true. Before trial

and over Viramontes’s objection, the district court read the

following jury instruction:  

Mr. Viramontes actively swung in the direction of a

police officer and missed. After he swung, Mr. Vi‐

ramontes actively resisted the police officer. Any

statements to the contrary by Mr. Viramontes, his

lawyers, or a witness must be ignored. What you

need to determine is whether the officers used

more force than was reasonably necessary under

the circumstances and whether the officers mali‐

ciously prosecuted Mr. Viramontes for mob action.

Although during the trial you must accept that Mr.

Viramontes swung in the direction of a police of‐

ficer and missed, you must also decide whether the

testimony of each of the witnesses is truthful and

accurate in part, in whole, or not at all. You should

give fair and equal consideration to all the evidence

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because you are the impartial judges of all of the

facts.

(R. 97 at 20–21.) The court read the instruction before and

after the parties presented evidence. During trial, the court

reread the instruction when it believed testimony contradict‐

ed Viramontes’s conviction. Of importance here, the district

court stopped Officer Lapadula from answering whether he

testified at the criminal trial that Viramontes had pulled

away after swinging (as the state court found) or that Vi‐

ramontes had pulled away and then swung. The court told

Viramontes that he was “not permitted to directly examine

in contradiction” of the state court’s findings. (R. 98 at 124.)

Additionally, two district court orders are relevant to Vi‐

ramontes’s appeal. First, the district court denied Vi‐

ramontes’s motion to bar reference to prior convictions, al‐

lowing the defendants to use Viramontes’s 2012 felony con‐

viction for impeachment purposes only. Second, the district

court granted Viramontes’s motion in limine to bar evidence

bolstering the officers’ character. In closing argument, how‐

ever, defense counsel disobeyed the district court’s orders.

Defense counsel used the 2012 felony conviction to make a

propensity argument when he argued that the felony “con‐

viction reflects on Mr. Viramontes’ unwillingness to conform

his conduct to the law.” (R. 99 at 40.) Defense counsel also

claimed that the officers were “stars” and “outstanding po‐

lice officers.” (R. 99 at 61.) Viramontes objected immediately

to the remarks. The district court sustained both objections

and instructed the jury that statements made during closing

argument were not evidence.  

   

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No. 15‐2826 5

II. ANALYSIS

Viramontes appeals the district court’s denial of his mo‐

tion for a new trial on two grounds. First, Viramontes argues

that the Gilbert instruction was unlawful and prejudiced him

in three ways: (1) the instruction reflected the state court’s

factual findings instead of the criminal complaint, (2) the in‐

struction was read before he contradicted his conviction, and

(3) the district court inappropriately used the instruction to

prevent him from impeaching Officer Lapadula. Second, Vi‐

ramontes argues that defense counsel’s improper comments

during closing argument denied him his right to a fair trial.

We take those claims in turn.

A. The Gilbert Instruction

In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff seeking

damages under § 1983 cannot recover if judgment in the

plaintiff’s favor would “necessarily imply the invalidity” of a

criminal conviction. 512 U.S. at 487. This court has held that

a plaintiff’s conviction for assaulting a police officer does not

“necessarily imply” that the officer used appropriate force

during the course of arrest after the assault. Gilbert, 512 F.3d

at 901. A subsequent excessive‐force claim may, however,

imply the invalidity of a conviction if the plaintiff attempts

to testify in a way that contradicts the conviction’s factual

basis. To balance this tension, we held in Gilbert that the dis‐

trict court should implement Heck by instructing the jury

that it must take as true the facts proved at the earlier crimi‐

nal or disciplinary proceeding. Id. at 902. The district court

gave this exact instruction.  

This court reviews jury instructions “de novo when the

underlying assignment of error implicates a question of

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law.” Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Balmoral Racing Club, Inc.,

No. 15‐2526, 2016 WL 4097439, at *14 (7th Cir. Aug. 2, 2016)

(citing United States v. Macedo, 406 F.3d 778, 787 (7th Cir.

2005). We give the district court “substantial discretion with

respect to the precise wording of instructions so long as the

final result, read as a whole, completely and correctly states

the law.” Saathoff v. Davis, 826 F.3d 925, 932 (7th Cir. 2016)

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Brown v. Smith,

827 F.3d 609, 614 (7th Cir. 2016) (“We review a district courtʹs

decisions on jury instructions for abuse of discretion.”). Re‐

versal due to an improper jury instruction is warranted only

if the “instruction misstates the law in a way that misguides

the jury to the extent that the complaining party suffered

prejudice.” Brown, 827 F.3d at 614.

1. Content

Viramontes argues that the district court erred in crafting

the jury instruction because it relied on the state court’s fac‐

tual findings instead of the criminal complaint. We disagree.

Gilbert itself belies Viramontes’s argument. There, the

court referred to the prison disciplinary board’s finding that

the plaintiff had delivered the first punch in the fight be‐

tween the plaintiff and the prison guards. 512 F.3d at 902.

The Gilbert court’s proposed jury instruction was not limited

to the complaint filed with the disciplinary board but instead

mirrored the disciplinary board’s factual findings. Id. at 900.  

That principle has since been entrenched in our case law.

In Helman v. Duhaime, we held that, when considering

whether Heck bars a § 1983 claim, “we must consider the fac‐

tual basis of the claim and determine whether it necessarily

implies the invalidity of [the] conviction.” 742 F.3d 760, 762

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No. 15‐2826 7

(7th Cir. 2014) (emphasis added). “[T]he plaintiff can only

proceed to the extent that the facts underlying the excessive

force claim are not inconsistent with the essential facts sup‐

porting the conviction.” Id. (citing Evans v. Poskon, 603 F.3d

362, 363–64 (7th Cir. 2010)). In Moore v. Mahone, this court

held that the plaintiff’s § 1983 suit was barred by Heck be‐

cause the allegations were “in tension with the disciplinary

board’s findings.” 652 F.3d 722, 724–25 (7th Cir. 2011).  

In fact, at no point has our focus been on the words used

in the actual criminal or disciplinary complaint. Even our

Heck analysis in decisions that predate Gilbert focused on

facts and not on the formalistic language in the original

complaint. See VanGilder v. Baker, 435 F.3d 689, 692 (7th Cir.

2006) (holding that the plaintiff’s § 1983 suit was not barred

by Heck in part because it didn’t “challenge the factual basis

presented at his change of plea hearing”); McCann v. Neilsen,

466 F.3d 619, 621 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[A] plaintiffʹs claim is Heck‐

barred despite its theoretical compatibility with his underly‐

ing conviction if specific factual allegations in the complaint

are necessarily inconsistent with the validity of the convic‐

tion ... .”); Okoro v. Callaghan, 324 F.3d 488, 490 (7th Cir. 2003)

(“It is irrelevant that he disclaims any intention of challeng‐

ing his conviction; if he makes allegations that are incon‐

sistent with the conviction’s having been valid, Heck kicks in

and bars his civil suit.”).

Here, the state court held that Viramontes was guilty of

aggravated assault because “he took a substantial step and

actively swung in the direction of the police officer and

missed.” (R. 58‐3.) The state court also concluded that Vi‐

ramontes was guilty of resisting arrest because “after the De‐

fendant swung ... he did actively resist.” (Id.) The jury in‐

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struction the district court gave—that “Mr. Viramontes ac‐

tively swung in the direction of a police officer and missed.

After he swung, Mr. Viramontes actively resisted the police

officer.”—was consistent with the state court’s findings. (R.

97 at 20.) Consequently, the jury instruction’s content was

appropriate.

2. Timing

Viramontes next argues that the district court should not

have read the instruction until he contradicted his convic‐

tion. We disagree.

First, we expressly stated in Gilbert that an instruction

could be read to the jury “at the start of trial, as necessary

during the evidence, and at the close of the evidence.” 512

F.3d at 902. The district court did exactly what we stated dis‐

trict courts should do and thus did not err.  

Despite the plain language in Gilbert, Viramontes argues

that this case is distinguishable because the court in Gilbert

was faced with a plaintiff who “encountered difficulty ad‐

hering to an agnostic posture on” the disciplinary board’s

factual findings. 512 F.3d at 902. Viramontes argues, then,

that no instruction should be given until a defendant contra‐

dicts a prior conviction. Although Viramontes correctly ar‐

ticulates the factual situation in Gilbert, we decline to adopt

his narrow interpretation of the rule. In most cases, a district

court judge won’t know before trial whether a plaintiff will

remain agnostic about a prior conviction. Indeed, before tri‐

al, all plaintiffs must claim to remain agnostic in order to

have their day in court. See Evans, 603 F.3d at 364 (stating

that “a plaintiff is master of his claim and can, if he insists,

stick to a position that forecloses relief”). Waiting to instruct

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No. 15‐2826 9

the jury to take certain facts as true until the plaintiff claims

innocence or disputes the conviction’s factual basis might

confuse the jury. An instruction before the presentation of

evidence solves this potential problem—the jury knows up‐

front that it must decide all facts except for the facts already

stipulated.  

Even if the rule was not as plain as we make it here, the

district court’s decision would still withstand scrutiny be‐

cause Viramontes proved that he could not remain agnostic

about his conviction. Viramontes claimed in his deposition

that he never tried to hit Officer Lapadula, a claim that di‐

rectly contradicts his conviction. Further, at trial, Viramontes

testified that he “never resisted” (R. 97 at 103) and was “in‐

nocent” (R. 97 at 120). Far from remaining agnostic, Vi‐

ramontes’s conduct makes clear why a Gilbert instruction is

necessary in these cases.  

Because the district court was within its discretion to give

the Gilbert instruction at the beginning of trial, the timing of

the instruction was appropriate.  

3. Use

During the presentation of evidence, the district court

read the Gilbert instruction multiple times when it believed

that testimony contradicted Viramontes’s conviction. Vi‐

ramontes objects to one of those times. At trial, Viramontes

sought to get Officer Lapadula to testify that at the criminal

trial he said Viramontes resisted arrest and then swung, not

vice versa. The district court stopped Officer Lapadula from

answering based on the Gilbert instruction that stipulated

that Viramontes had swung and then resisted arrest. Vi‐

ramontes now claims that he should have been able to “ar‐

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gue this contradiction” between the conviction and Officer

Lapadula’s testimony and to impeach Officer Lapadula for

inconsistencies in his testimony.  

A district court’s evidentiary decisions are reviewed for

an abuse of discretion. Nelson v. City of Chicago, 810 F.3d

1061, 1066 (7th Cir. 2016). We will not reverse a jury verdict

unless the district court’s error affected the objecting party’s

substantial rights. Id.; Barber v. City of Chicago, 725 F.3d 702,

715 (7th Cir. 2013). An error affects substantial rights only if

there is a “significant chance” that the ruling affected the tri‐

al’s outcome. Nelson, 810 F.3d at 1066 (quoting Maurer v.

Speedway, LLC, 774 F.3d 1132, 1135 (7th Cir. 2014)). We will

not reverse if the error is harmless in light of the trial record

as a whole. Nelson, 810 F.3d at 1066; Barber, 725 F.3d at 715.

First, the district court did not err in denying Viramontes

the chance to argue a contradiction between Officer Lapadu‐

la’s testimony and the state court’s factual findings. Specifi‐

cally, Viramontes wanted to argue that “[r]egardless of the

extent, or even direction, that Plaintiff’s fist moved, he did so

after the defendants touched his person; he resisted then

swung—not swung and then resisted.” (Appellant’s Br. at

12.) Fair enough, Viramontes might believe that to be the se‐

quence of events. But that sequence directly contradicts his

conviction. Consequently, that argument would violate Heck

and thus the district court did not err.

Second, the district court erred in preventing Viramontes

from impeaching Officer Lapadula based on inconsistent tes‐

timony. The district court was correct in its pretrial ruling:

Heck prevents plaintiffs from implying the invalidity of a

conviction; it does not bar a plaintiff from impeaching a wit‐

ness based on inconsistent testimony across trials. Impeach‐

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No. 15‐2826 11

ment evidence is used to impugn a witness’s reliability, not

to prove the truth of the matter asserted. United States v. Burt,

495 F.3d 733, 736–37 (7th Cir. 2007). Thus, even though Vi‐

ramontes could not challenge the state court’s factual find‐

ings, he should have been allowed to argue that Officer

Lapadula was not a reliable witness because his testimony

had changed over time.

The district court’s error, however, was harmless. Despite

Viramontes’s argument to the contrary, Officer Lapadula’s

testimony at the criminal trial was consistent with the state

court’s factual findings. Viramontes alleges that Officer

Lapadula testified that Viramontes resisted arrest and then

swung at him, not that Viramontes swung and then resisted

arrest as the state court found. The Illinois Appellate Court’s

decision affirming the state court conviction stated that

“both officers testified that after they took defendant down

to the ground and attempted to handcuff him, defendant

continued moving his body and arms, and tried to get away

from them.” People v. Viramontes, 2013 IL App (1st) 123014‐U,

¶ 16. Any attempt to impeach Officer Lapadula would have

been rebutted by the fact that he did testify that Viramontes

resisted arrest after swinging at him. In fact, both officers

testified that Viramontes continued to resist arrest after he

swung at Officer Lapadula.  

There is not a substantial likelihood that the jury’s analy‐

sis would have been any different than it was because Of‐

ficer Lapadula’s testimony was consistent. United States v.

Miller, 688 F.3d 322, 329 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The test for harm‐

less error is whether, in the mind of the average juror, the

prosecution’s case would have been significantly less per‐

suasive had the improper evidence been excluded.” (quoting

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12 No. 15‐2826

United States v. Loughry, 660 F.3d 965, 975 (7th Cir. 2011)).

Thus, the error was harmless.  

B. Defense Counsel’s Improper Comments  

We turn to Viramontes’s argument that defense counsel’s

improper statements during closing argument denied him

his right to a fair trial. Defense counsel stated that Vi‐

ramontes’s 2012 felony conviction reflected his “unwilling‐

ness to conform his conduct to the law.” Defense counsel al‐

so attempted to bolster the officers’ character and credibility

by calling them “stars” and “outstanding officers.” Appel‐

lants admit that the statements were improper but argue that

the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Vi‐

ramontes’s motion for a new trial. We agree.  

A district court’s ruling on a Rule 59 motion for a new tri‐

al is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Empress Casino,

2016 WL 4097439, at *13. Parties seeking a new trial based on

counsel’s improper comments must show that “misconduct

occurred and that it prejudiced their case.” Christmas v. City

of Chicago, 682 F.3d 632, 642 (7th Cir. 2012); see also Smith v.

Hunt, 707 F.3d 803, 812 (7th Cir. 2013). We give great defer‐

ence to the district court’s ruling because the district court is

in the best position to evaluate improper conduct in light of

the trial and determine whether it caused prejudice. Christ‐

mas, 682 F.3d at 642–43.

Defense counsel’s comments were plainly improper. That

propensity arguments are improper is basic hornbook evi‐

dence law. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1); United States v. Gomez, 763

F.3d 845, 855 (7th Cir. 2014). The statements concerning the

officers’ character were also improper—the district court ex‐

plicitly ruled before trial that these comments were prohibit‐

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No. 15‐2826 13

ed. The impropriety of the comments notwithstanding, we

cannot conclude that the statements prejudiced Viramontes.

Improper comments during closing argument rarely consti‐

tute reversible error. Smith, 707 F.3d at 812; Schandelmeier‐

Bartels v. Chi. Park Dist., 634 F.3d 372, 388 (7th Cir. 2011).  

Viramontes objected immediately to the propensity ar‐

gument and to the comment that the officers were “stars.”

The district court sustained those objections. When improper

comments are objected to and the district court sustains the

objection, the comments are less likely to require reversal.

See Smith, 707 F.3d at 812; Christmas, 682 F.3d at 643. Moreo‐

ver, the district court instructed the jury twice, once before

closing argument and once after, that attorneys’ statements

during closing argument are not evidence. “There is a

longstanding presumption that ‘curative instructions to the

jury mitigate harm that may otherwise result from improper

comments’ during closing argument.” Smith, 707 F.3d at 812

(citing Schandelmeier‐Bartels v. Chi. Park Dist., 634 F.3d 372,

388 (7th Cir. 2011)); see also Soltys v. Costello, 520 F.3d 737, 744

(7th Cir. 2008) (“We presume that juries follow the instruc‐

tions given them by the court.”). Finally, the statements were

brief and did not represent a substantial part of defense

counsel’s closing statement. Banister v. Burton, 636 F.3d 828,

834 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that brief and unrepeated im‐

proper statements at closing are unlikely to rise to the level

of reversible error).

Because the improper comments were made in closing

argument, objections to the statements were sustained, the

district court gave a curative instruction, and the statements

were brief, the district court did not abuse its discretion

denying the motion for a new trial.  

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14 No. 15‐2826

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s

denial of Viramontes’s motion for a new trial.  

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No. 15‐2826 15

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, concurring. I join Judge Kanne’s

opinion for the court, including the holding that the district

judge did not abuse her discretion by denying a new trial on

the basis of the defendants’ lawyer’s misconduct in closing ar‐

gument. I write separately to emphasize how important our

standard of review is on that issue.  

The defendants’ lawyer said in closing argument that

plaintiff’s 2012 felony conviction for unlawful use of a

weapon “reflects on Mr. Viramontes’ unwillingness to con‐

form his conduct to the law.” The admissibility of the convic‐

tion had been the subject of a pretrial motion in limine and

order by the district court limiting its use to references only to

“a felony conviction,” without explanation, based on the per‐

missible purpose (as defense counsel had argued to the court)

of impeaching credibility under Federal Rule of Evidence 609.

The defense brief to the district court on the motion in limine

shows that counsel fully understood the difference between

proper and improper use of the conviction, as should any law‐

yer who has passed an introductory evidence class. It is diffi‐

cult to see this misconduct during closing argument as any‐

thing other than a deliberate harpoon, in flagrant violation of

Rule 609 and the judge’s orderin limine. The defendants make

no effort on appeal to justify the misconduct. They ask only

that we not order a new trial.

As the court explains, the appropriate response to such

misconduct during trial is left to the sound discretion of the

district judge. In this case, Judge Kendall’s response was to‐

ward the gentler end of the spectrum of reasonable responses.

It is important to recognize that a much strongerresponse was

also within the judge’s discretion. For example, the trial judge

might have granted a new trial and ordered the offending

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16 No. 15‐2826

party to pay the court and opposing party for the additional

costs of a new trial. I would also have found such a response

within the judge’s discretion.

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