Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-10-01121/USCOURTS-caDC-10-01121-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 513, AFL-CIO
Petitioner
National Labor Relations Board
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 16, 2011 Decided April 5, 2011

No. 10-1121

INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS, LOCAL

513, AFL-CIO,

PETITIONER

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

RESPONDENT

Consolidated with 10-1137

On Petition for Review and Cross-Application for

Enforcement 

of an Order of the National Labor Relations Board

James P. Faul argued the cause for petitioner.

Amy H. Ginn, Attorney, National Labor Relations Board,

argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were 

John H. Ferguson, Associate General Counsel, Linda Dreeben,

Deputy Associate General Counsel, and Jill A. Griffin,

Supervisory Attorney.

USCA Case #10-1121 Document #1301663 Filed: 04/05/2011 Page 1 of 7
2

Before: TATEL and BROWN, Circuit Judges, and

SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

SILBERMAN.

SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge: Local 513 of the

International Union of Operating Engineers challenges a

National Labor Relations Board policy that has been followed

for over thirty years, and which the Ninth Circuit has endorsed. 

The Board has held since 1977 that it is a per se unfair labor

practice in violation of section 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor

Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A), for a union to

discipline a union member who complied with an employer’s

safety rules. We agree with the union that the Board’s policy

does not accord with the National Labor Relations Act. 

I

Two construction companies – Fred Weber, Inc. and ASI

Constructors, Inc. – formed a joint venture, Ozark Constructors,

LLC, to rebuild a hydroelectric facility in southeast Missouri. 

Local 513 represented Ozark’s operating engineers, who were

covered by two collective bargaining agreements – a National

Maintenance Agreement and a separate agreement with Fred

Weber, Inc. (the latter dealt with wages and benefits).

Mark Overton, a member of another International Union of

Operating Engineers Local (in Albuquerque), was hired by

Ozark because of his experience working on some of the

specialized equipment needed on the project, experience which,

apparently, Local 513's members lacked. Overton sought to

transfer his membership to Local 513, which the union denied,

although it did grant him a traveler permit authorizing him to

work on the project.

USCA Case #10-1121 Document #1301663 Filed: 04/05/2011 Page 2 of 7
3

Overton, one morning, noticed that a piece of machinery

was not properly deployed (an outrigger was not fully extended),

which was a safety violation. Ozark’s safety rules – which are

incorporated into the National Maintenance Agreement – oblige

any employee to report to a supervisor safety violations. Indeed,

an employee who does not do so is subject to discipline. 

Overton did report the safety violation and sought to determine

who was responsible. After an investigation, another employee

and Local 513 member was suspended for three days.

That led the union’s business agent to file charges against

Overton for gross disloyalty and conduct unbecoming a union

member. (Apparently the union also objected to Overton’s

desire to bring in other experienced operating engineers rather

than train the union’s members.) The union fined Overton

$2,500, which prompted Ozark to file an unfair labor practice

charge against the union. The Board’s general counsel issued a

complaint alleging that the union violated section 8(b)(1)(A). 

That section precludes a union from “restrain[ing] or coerc[ing]”

an employee in the exercise of his section 7 rights, with the

proviso that a union may continue to “prescribe its own rules

with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership

therein.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A). And section 7 protects an

employee’s right to “to engage in . . . concerted activities” [or]

“. . . to refrain from . . . such.” Id. § 157.

An administrative law judge recommended that the Board

find a violation. The judge relied on two theories: first, Overton

was deemed to have refused to join other employees who

apparently wished to ignore Ozark’s safety orders, and therefore

was refraining from concerted activity, even though no evidence

of other employees’ concerted refusal was adduced. 

Alternatively, even in the absence of a finding of concerted

activity, the judge acknowledged that the Board had repeatedly

held that when a union’s disciplinary action affects an

USCA Case #10-1121 Document #1301663 Filed: 04/05/2011 Page 3 of 7
4

employee’s “employment relationship,” it, per se, commits a

section 8(b)(1)(a) violation.

The Board pointedly rejected the administrative law judge’s

effort to describe Overton’s action as refraining from concerted

activity. The Board instead relied on its long-time precedent

finding a violation of section 8(b)(1)(A) where a union

disciplines an employee for complying with an employer’s

safety rules, regardless of whether the employee acted in concert

with other employees or in opposition to other employees acting

in concert. 

II

The union’s argument is rather simple and direct: without

a finding of concerted activity (protected by section 7) on the

part of Ozark’s employees, it is analytically impossible for the

Board to conclude that Overton either engaged in or refrained

from engaging in such activities. Therefore, the union cannot be

held to have restrained or coerced Overton in the exercise of his

section 7 rights.

The Board nevertheless insists that it is entitled to interpret

8(b)(1)(A) to hold that a union violates that provision if a union

disciplines an employee member for reporting a safety violation,

which he has a duty to report, without regard to the presence of

concerted activity. Although we give wide deference to the

Board’s interpretation of the general language of the National

Labor Relations Act, see Brockton Hosp. v. NLRB, 294 F.3d

100, 103 (D.C. Cir. 2002), the Board here does not even purport

to rely on an interpretation of the Act’s language. Its brief –

although not its opinion – relies for support of the Board’s

policy on two Supreme Court cases: NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers

Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967), and Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S.

423 (1969). 

USCA Case #10-1121 Document #1301663 Filed: 04/05/2011 Page 4 of 7
5

The Board asserts that Allis-Chalmers and Scofield prevent

a union from enforcing its internal rules in such a fashion “to

affect a member’s employment status.” Allis-Chalmers, 388

U.S. at 195; see also Scofield, 394 U.S. at 428-30. Relying on

these cases is quite a reach. In Allis-Chalmers, a sharply divided

Court held that a union could fine union members who cross a

picket line (and seek court enforcement); that section 8(b)(1)(A)

– in light of the proviso – could not be read to preclude an

internal rule that restrained an employee from refraining from

concerted activity unless the union rule affected his or her

employment relationship. Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 195. And

that meant, as Scofield1

 indicated, action that would lead an

employer to discipline or discharge an employee. Scofield, 394

U.S. at 428-29, 436 & n.5 (a claim that could be true in our

case). But – and this is the crucial distinction – in both cases,

before even considering whether the proviso governed, the

Court recognized that concerted activity was present. See

Scofield, 394 U.S. at 426-27, 435; Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at

178-79. Therefore, the Board quite obviously overreads those

opinions by suggesting that they permit it to dispense with a

finding of engaging in concerted activity, or refraining from

concerted activity. 

To be sure, the Board’s reading of section 8(b)(1)(A) and its

interpretation of Allis-Chalmers and Scofield have been accepted

(rather summarily) by the Ninth Circuit in Teamsters Local No.

439, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, AFL-CIO, 175 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir.

1999). The Ninth Circuit, however, ignored the context of AllisChalmers and Scofield that we find dispositive. Accordingly, our

1

 In Scofield, the Court observed that the union’s rule was not

inconsistent with the collective bargaining agreement; indeed the

company had been unsuccessful in gaining union acquiescence with

its policy. 394 U.S. at 424-25.

USCA Case #10-1121 Document #1301663 Filed: 04/05/2011 Page 5 of 7
6

view, reached reluctantly, is that the Ninth Circuit’s opinion is

not persuasive.

The union’s brief – in anticipation of a potential argument

the Board might have made – sought to distinguish another

Supreme Court case, NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc., 465

U.S. 822 (1984). In that case, the Court held that an employee

fired by an employer for refusing to drive what he thought was

an unsafe truck had been exercising his section 7 rights because

the collective bargaining agreement gave him the right to

decline to operate unsafe equipment. Even though no other

employee joined with his protest, the Board and Supreme Court

concluded that an employee who relies on a collective

bargaining agreement right – explicitly or implicitly – is

engaging in concerted activity because the agreement itself is a

product of concerted activity, i.e., collective bargaining. City

Disposal, 465 U.S. at 832-33. The administration of the

agreement is a continuation of the collective bargaining process.

Local 513 argued that City Disposal’s treatment of an

employee’s right under a collective bargaining agreement as

concerted activity did not extend to a duty – such as Ozark’s

safety regulations – even if imposed by the contract. We note,

however, that the failure to comply with that duty, incorporated

into the collective bargaining agreement, could lead to an

employee’s discipline or discharge, which it might be argued

interferes with the employee’s employment relationship within

the meaning of Allis-Chalmers. We need not consider the effect

of City Disposal here because the Board, by pointedly rejecting

the administrative law judge’s effort to tease a finding of

concerted activity out of the facts of this case, has relied only on

its broad per se policy. To make its position crystal clear, the

Board’s brief explicitly declines to rely on City Disposal. Under

those circumstances, it would be improper for us to remand to

the Board to consider an alternative ground that it has explicitly

USCA Case #10-1121 Document #1301663 Filed: 04/05/2011 Page 6 of 7
7

declined to do. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88

(1943). 

III

We recognize that the Board has followed for more than

thirty years the interpretation of section 8(b)(1)(A) that it

advances here. But consistency alone cannot save the Board. 

We can find no support in sections 7 and 8(b)(1)(A) for the

Board’s decision, and we find it rather telling that the Board has

never attempted a detailed explanation of how its interpretation

of section 8(b)(1)(A) is consistent with the National Labor

Relations Act. Accordingly, the petition for review is 

granted.

2

 

2

 The cross-application for enforcement is denied.

USCA Case #10-1121 Document #1301663 Filed: 04/05/2011 Page 7 of 7