Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01942/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01942-9/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
M. D. Biter
Defendant
CDCR
Defendant
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
Defendant
K. Doran
Defendant
Maurice Howard
Defendant
Paul Shleffar
Defendant
S. Tallerico
Defendant
Cherylee Wegman
Defendant
Howard Allen Young
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HOWARD ALLEN YOUNG,

Plaintiff,

 v.

M. D. BITER, et al.,

 Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

1:14-cv-01942-BAM (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING SECOND AMENDED 

COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 

(ECF No. 30)

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

I. Screening Requirement and Standard

Plaintiff Howard Allen Young (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in 

forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1

(Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA)). Plaintiff filed this 

action on December 5, 2014. Plaintiff filed a consent to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction on January 

5, 2015. The Court screened the complaint on June 8, 2015 and denied a motion for 

reconsideration on December 23, 2015. Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint on February 5, 

2016 and without leave of Court, filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) on May 27, 

2016.1The Second Amended Complaint is currently before the Court for screening. 

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 

 

1 A subsequent complaint supercedes prior allegations. Therefore, the Court proceeds to screen the Second 

Amended Complaint.

Case 1:14-cv-01942-BAM Document 31 Filed 12/09/16 Page 1 of 10
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous or 

malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary 

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2); 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 

1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 

(2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge 

unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires 

sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks omitted); 

Moss v. United States Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility 

that a defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short 

of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks 

omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

II. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff is currently housed at Kern Valley State Prison, where the events in the 

complaint are alleged to have occurred. 

The allegations in the SAC are wholly unrelated to the original complaint’s allegations.

In the SAC, plaintiff names the following defendants; (1) Lt. Guierrez, (2) Karlow, Law 

Libraian, (3) Lt. K. Doran, (4) C. Wegman, Community Resource Manager, (5) S. Tallerico, 

Appeals Coordinator, (6) Sgt. Melvin.2 In the SAC, Plaintiff alleges that he has been denied law 

 

2

In the original complaint, Plaintiff named as defendants: (1) Warden M. D. Biter; (2) Appeals Coordinator S. 

Tallerico; (3) Community Resource Manager Cherylee Wegman; (4) Jewish Chaplain Paul Shleffar; (5) CDCR A 

Case 1:14-cv-01942-BAM Document 31 Filed 12/09/16 Page 2 of 10
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

library access, wrongly unassigned from a chapel position, denied guitars for use by the 

Messianic Jewish services and provided non-kosher meals, denied access to court by screening 

out his 602s, took his tennis shoes, denied yard time and family visitation.

III. Deficiencies of the Complaint

In the order screening the original complaint (ECF. No. 20), Plaintiff was warned that his 

allegations must meet the requirement of Rules 8 and 18 and upon amendment, he may not add 

or change the allegations. The allegations in the SAC are entirely different, and where related, 

are more conclusory, than the allegations in the original complaint screened by this Court. In 

granting leave to amend, this Court warned Plaintiff that he “may not change the nature of this 

suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his first amended complaint.” In the SAC, Plaintiff’s 

complaint again fails to comply with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 18, and fails to state 

a cognizable claim. As Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, he will be given a final opportunity to

amend his complaint. To assist him, Plaintiff is provided with the pleading and legal standards 

that appear applicable to his claims. Plaintiff should amend only those claims that he believes, in 

good faith, are cognizable. 

A. Pleading Requirements

1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must contain “a short and 

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 

As noted above, detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as 

true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are 

not. Id; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–557; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

 

Yard Chaplain (Islamic) Maurice Howard; (6) Former Inmate Assignment Staff K. Doran; and (7) the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”).

Case 1:14-cv-01942-BAM Document 31 Filed 12/09/16 Page 3 of 10
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

While Plaintiff’s complaint is a short statement of his claims, Plaintiff’s allegations are 

conclusory statements. Plaintiff fails to describe specific actions taken by the Defendants named 

in his complaint which violated his constitutional rights. The complaint lumps Defendants 

together and fails to distinguish adequately claims and alleged wrongs among Defendants. A 

plaintiff suing multiple defendants must allege the basis of his claim against each defendant to 

satisfy Rule 8(a)(2). Plaintiff may not simply complain about every incident or issue that he has 

with prison officials in a single filing. If Plaintiff chooses to amend his complaint, he should 

briefly and clearly state the facts giving rise to his claims for relief against the named defendants. 

Further, Plaintiff was cautioned in the prior screening order that the complaint must be complete 

in and of itself, and the Court will not review prior complaints for factual allegations to support a 

claim.

2. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 18

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 18 states that “[a] party asserting a claim, counterclaim, 

crossclaim, or third-party claim may join, as independent or alternative claims, as many claims

as it has against an opposing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a). “Thus multiple claims against a single 

party are fine, but Claim A against Defendant 1 should not be joined with unrelated Claim B 

against Defendant 2. Unrelated claims against different defendants belong in different suits, not 

only to prevent the sort of morass [a multiple claim, multiple defendant] suit produce[s] but also 

to ensure that prisoners pay the required filing fees--for the Prison Litigation Reform Act limits 

to 3 the number of frivolous suits or appeals that any prisoner may file without prepayment of 

the required fees.” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(g)).

Here, Plaintiff has changed the named defendants from the originally screened complaint 

and Plaintiff attempts to bring suit against multiple defendants for different incidents at different 

times. For example, Plaintiff complains about the denial of law library access while 

simultaneously complaining, in a conclusory fashion, about the denial of Kosher meals. As 

Plaintiff has already been warned, Plaintiff may not pursue unrelated claims against different 

Case 1:14-cv-01942-BAM Document 31 Filed 12/09/16 Page 4 of 10
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

defendants in a single action. If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint and it fails to 

comply with Rule 18(a), all unrelated claims will be subject to dismissal. 

3. Supervisory Liability

Insofar as Plaintiff attempts to impose liability against any defendants based solely on 

their roles as supervisors, he may not do so. Supervisory personnel may not be held liable under 

section 1983 for the actions of subordinate employees based on respondeat superior or vicarious 

liability. Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 977 (9th Cir. 2013); accord Lemire v. Cal. Dep’t of 

Corr. and Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2013); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 

896, 915–16 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). “A supervisor may be liable only if (1) he or she is 

personally involved in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) there is a sufficient causal connection 

between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Crowley, 734 F.3d 

at 977 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Lemire, 726 F.3d at 1074–75; Lacey, 693 F.3d 

at 915–16. “Under the latter theory, supervisory liability exists even without overt personal 

participation in the offensive act if supervisory officials implement a policy so deficient that the 

policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force of a constitutional 

violation.” Crowley, 734 F.3d at 977 (citing Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir.1989)) 

(internal quotation marks omitted).

B. Legal Standards

1. Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment

“Inmates . . . retain protections afforded by the First Amendment, including its directive 

that no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion.” O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 

342, 348, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The 

protections of the Free Exercise Clause are triggered when prison officials substantially burden 

the practice of an inmate’s religion by preventing him from engaging in conduct which he 

sincerely believes is consistent with his faith. Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884–85 (9th Cir.

2008).

Plaintiff complains about his ability to practice his religion and denial of a kosher diet. 

Given Plaintiff’s lack of dates and other factual contentions, the Court cannot adequately 

Case 1:14-cv-01942-BAM Document 31 Filed 12/09/16 Page 5 of 10
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

determine whether his constitutional rights have been violated. Plaintiff will be given leave to 

cure these deficiencies. 

2. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”)

A claim under RLUIPA may proceed only for injunctive relief against defendants acting 

within their official capacities. Wood, 753 F.3d at 904 (RLUIPA does not contemplate liability 

of government employees in individual capacity); Alvarez v. Hill, 667 F.3d 1061, 1063 (9th Cir.

2012) (money damages not available for RLUIPA claim against defendants sued in their official 

capacity); Graddy v. Ding, 2014 WL 6634580, *3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2014).

To state a claim for violation of RLUIPA, Plaintiff must allege facts plausibly showing 

that the challenged policy and the practices it engenders impose a substantial burden on the 

exercise of his religious beliefs; Plaintiff bears the initial burden of persuasion on this issue. 

Hartmann v. California Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1124–25 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(quotation marks omitted).

“Courts are expected to apply RLUIPA’s standard with due deference to the experience 

and expertise of prison and jail administrators in establishing necessary regulations and 

procedures to maintain good order, security and discipline, consistent with consideration of costs 

and limited resources.” Id. (citing Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 723, 125 S.Ct. 2325, 161 

L.Ed.2d 1020 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

As with his First Amendment claim, Plaintiff’s allegations are not sufficiently clear to 

determine whether or not Plaintiff has stated a claim for violation of RLUIPA. 

3. Appeals Processing

Plaintiff cannot pursue any claims against staff relating to processing and review of his

inmate appeals. The existence of an inmate appeals process does not create a protected liberty 

interest upon which Plaintiff may base a claim that he was denied a particular result or that the 

appeals process was deficient. Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003); Mann v. 

Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). To state a claim under section 1983, Plaintiff must 

demonstrate personal involvement in the underlying violation of his rights, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

677; Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002), and liability may not be based merely 

Case 1:14-cv-01942-BAM Document 31 Filed 12/09/16 Page 6 of 10
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

on Plaintiff's dissatisfaction with the administrative process or a decision on an appeal, Ramirez, 

334 F.3d at 860; Mann, 855 F.2d at 640.

4. Retaliation

Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment rights to speech or to 

petition the government may support a section 1983 claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 

(9th Cir. 1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v. 

Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First 

Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some 

adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that 

such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did 

not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567–

68 (9th Cir. 2005); accord Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009).

Plaintiff alleges that he was wrongfully unassigned from the Chapel Clerk position 

without Due Process. Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to any particular job in the 

prison. At best, Plaintiff’s allegations are conclusory. Further, he has not alleged that 

Defendants’ actions did not advance a legitimate correctional goal. 

5. Eighth Amendment-Conditions of Confinement

Plaintiff appears to allege that lockdowns violated his rights under the Eighth 

Amendment. Although unclear, it appears that Plaintiff is complaining about the denial of yard

time. The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment and 

from inhumane conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir.

2006). Extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions of confinement claim, and 

only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are 

sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation. Hudson v. McMillian, 

503 U.S. 1, 9, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992) (citations and quotations omitted). In order 

to state a claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment, the plaintiff must allege facts sufficient 

to support a claim that prison officials knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm 

Case 1:14-cv-01942-BAM Document 31 Filed 12/09/16 Page 7 of 10
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

to the plaintiff. E.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 

(1994); Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998).

The circumstances, nature, and duration of the deprivations are relevant in determining 

whether the conditions complained of are grave enough to form the basis of a viable Eighth 

Amendment claim. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2006).

Here, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate that the conditions he is 

complaining of are grave enough to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment claim. Plaintiff 

does not include facts regarding the circumstances, nature or duration of any claimed violation. 

6. Visitation

Inmates do not have a clearly established constitutional right to receive visits, or in 

particular contact visits. Dunn v. Castro, 621 F.3d 1196, 1202 (9th Cir.2010); Toussaint v. 

McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1114 (9th Cir.1986) (“To the extent that denial of contact visitation is 

restrictive and even harsh, it is part of the penalty that criminals pay for their offenses against 

society”). The Supreme Court has upheld a variety of restrictions on visitation (including denials 

of contact visitation, as well as limitations on the people allowed to visit an inmate) against First, 

Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment challenges. Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 133, 123 

S.Ct. 2162, 156 L.Ed.2d 162 (2003).

7. Property

Plaintiff alleges his tennis shoes were taken. A prisoner does have a protected property 

interest in his personal belongings such that he may be able to challenge their confiscation on 

due process grounds. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 

(1984); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). 

However, only authorized, intentional deprivations of property implicate constitutional concerns. 

Hudson, 468 U.S. at 532. Thus, to the extent an inmate challenges a confiscation carried out 

pursuant to “established state procedure, rather than random and unauthorized action,” he or she 

is entitled to predeprivation process. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 532 (citing Logan v. Zimmerman 

Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 435–436, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982)). However, an 

“unauthorized, intentional deprivation of property by a governmental employee” does not violate 

Case 1:14-cv-01942-BAM Document 31 Filed 12/09/16 Page 8 of 10
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

procedural due process “if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy for the loss is available.” 

Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533; Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816–817 (9th Cir.1994). The Ninth 

Circuit has found that California's post-deprivation remedy is adequate. Blueford v. Prunty, 108 

F.3d 251, 256 (9th Cir.1997); Barnett, 31 F.3d at 816–817.

C. Conclusion and Order

Plaintiff’s SAC fails to comply with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 18, and fails 

to state a cognizable claim upon which relief may be granted under section 1983. Despite being 

provided guidance by the Court Plaintiff’s SAC is more conclusory, with unrelated claims, than 

alleged in the original complaint. The Court will provide Plaintiff with a final opportunity to 

amend his complaint to cure the identified deficiencies. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 

(9th Cir. 2000).

Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but must state what 

each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or other federal 

rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Plaintiff also must set forth “sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state 

a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 

Additionally, Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated 

claims in his first amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no 

“buckshot” complaints). 

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. 

Lacey, 693 F.3d at 927. Therefore, Plaintiff’s amended complaint must be “complete in itself 

without reference to the prior or superseded pleading.” Local Rule 220. 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a complaint form;

2. Plaintiff’s second amended complaint is dismissed for failure to comply with 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 18 and for failure state a claim.

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file a 

third amended complaint; and 

Case 1:14-cv-01942-BAM Document 31 Filed 12/09/16 Page 9 of 10
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, the Court will dismiss this action 

for failure to obey a court order and for failure to state a claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 9, 2016 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:14-cv-01942-BAM Document 31 Filed 12/09/16 Page 10 of 10