Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-56973/USCOURTS-ca9-13-56973-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Glen Biondi
Appellant
City of Laguna Beach
Appellee
Steve Klein
Appellant
Howard Putnam
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

STEVE KLEIN; HOWARD PUTNAM;

GLEN BIONDI,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

CITY OF LAGUNA BEACH,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 13-56973

D.C. No.

8:08-cv-01369-

CJC-MLG

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Cormac J. Carney, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

December 10, 2015—Pasadena, California

Filed January 14, 2016

Before: Ronald M. Gould and Marsha S. Berzon, Circuit

Judges, and Jack Zouhary,

*

 District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Gould

* The Honorable Jack Zouhary, District Judge for the U.S. District Court

for the Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.

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2 KLEIN V. CITY OF LAGUNA BEACH

SUMMARY**

Civil Rights/Attorneys’ Fees

The panel affirmed the district court’s order denying

attorneys’ fees under California law, vacated the denial of

attorneys’ fees under federal law, and remanded for further

proceedings.

In the underlying action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

plaintiff sought to invalidate aspects of Laguna Beach

ordinances prohibiting the use of sound-amplification devices

on public sidewalks. After winning two appeals in this court,

plaintiff was awarded nominal damages on three of his four

as-applied claims. The district court concluded that plaintiff

was a prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, but it denied

attorneys’ fees per Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992),

which held that a prevailing party who seeks a large

compensatory award but receives only nominal damages may

not be entitled to fees. The district court also concluded that

plaintiff was not entitled to fees under California law because

the court had entered judgment for the City on plaintiff’s state

claims. 

The panel affirmed the district court’s order denying fees

under California law. Under federal law, the panel held that

because plaintiff’s lawsuit achieved its future-oriented goals

and plaintiff never attempted to secure compensatory

damages under § 1983, the Farrar exception did not apply,

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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KLEIN V. CITY OF LAGUNA BEACH 3

and the district court erred by not considering plaintiff’s

entitlement to fees under the standard framework.

COUNSEL

Michael J. Kumeta, La Mesa, California; William G.

Gillespie (argued), Bonsall, California, for PlaintiffsAppellants.

Philip D. Kohn, Michelle D. Molko (argued), Rutan &

Tucker, LLP, Costa Mesa, California, for DefendantAppellee.

OPINION

GOULD, Circuit Judge:

Steve Klein filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit to invalidate

aspects of Laguna Beach ordinances prohibiting the use of

sound-amplification devices (“amplified speech”) on public

sidewalks. After winning two appeals in this court, Klein was

awarded nominal damages on three of his four as-applied

claims. Klein then moved for attorneys’ fees under both state

and federal law. The district court concluded that Klein was

a prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, but it denied

attorneys’ fees per Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992),

which held that a prevailing party who seeks a large

compensatory award but receives only nominal damages may

not be entitled to fees. Id. at 115. The district court also

concluded that Klein was not entitled to fees under California

law because the court had entered judgment for the City on

Klein’s state claims.

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4 KLEIN V. CITY OF LAGUNA BEACH

We affirm the district court’s order denying fees under

California law. Under federal law, we hold that because

Klein’s lawsuit achieved its future-oriented goals and Klein

never attempted to secure compensatory damages under

§ 1983, the Farrar exception does not apply, and the district

court erred by not considering Klein’s entitlement to fees

under the standard framework. See Hensley v. Eckerhart,

461 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1983); Gonzalez v. City of Maywood,

729 F.3d 1196, 1202 (9th Cir. 2013). We vacate and remand

for further proceedings.

I

In 2008, Laguna Beach Municipal Code section 5.40.010

prohibited people from using “anyradio loudspeaker or sound

amplifier in such a manner as to cause any sound to be

projected outside . . . without having first procured a permit

from the citymanager so to do [sic].” Section 5.40.020 stated

that a permit “shall be granted at the will of the city

manager,” although the Code gave no standards for

exercising his discretion. At the same time, Laguna Beach

had another Code provision, section 7.25.120, on amplified

speech that required speakers to secure a permit from the

Chief of Police, who was directed to “consider the

constitutional right of free speech of all persons” along with

factors ranging from “the volume of traffic” to “the threat of

the overthrow of the lawfully established government.” The

Code also prohibited use of amplifying devices within 100

yards of hospitals, churches, schools, and City Hall. Section

7.25.120 was intended to repeal other inconsistent Code

provisions, which would include sections 5.40.010–020.

On November 11, 2008, Steve Klein sent a letter to the

citymanager applying for a sound amplification permit under

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KLEIN V. CITY OF LAGUNA BEACH 5

section 5.40.010 to conduct religious “youth outreach” on

public sidewalks around Laguna Beach High School. The

city manager rejected the request, explaining that his

“longstanding and consistently followed policy and practice

has been not to issue amplified sound permits.” Klein filed

a complaint on December 3, 2008, seeking declaratory and

injunctive relief under the U.S. and California Constitutions

and the California Bane Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(b).1 Klein

also sought nominal damages for each claim and statutory

damages under the Bane Act.2 Six days later, the Laguna

Beach City Council passed an ordinance repealing Chapter

5.40 of the Municipal Code and amending § 7.25.120 to

remove the permit requirement. At the same time, the City

further restricted the hours that amplifying equipment could

be used from 8 a.m.–8 p.m. to 9 a.m.–5 p.m. These

amendments were temporary “while the subject matter [was]

further studied.”

Klein amended his complaint to incorporate new factual

developments and direct his constitutional challenge to

§ 7.25.120. On December 15, 2008, Klein wrote another

letter to the city manager, this time seeking permission to use

a sound amplification device in derogation of § 7.25.120 in

two ways: first, by speaking within 100 yards of Laguna

Beach High School and City Hall, and second, by speaking

between 5 p.m.–6 p.m. in “the busy downtown commercial

1 The Bane Act provides a cause of action for individuals whose “rights

secured by” federal or California law have been interfered with “by threat,

intimidation, or coercion.” Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1 (a)–(b).

2 The Bane Act allows recovery for “actual damages” and treble

damages, “but in no case less than four thousand dollars.” Cal. Civ. Code

§ 52.

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6 KLEIN V. CITY OF LAGUNA BEACH

area of the City.” Speaking through counsel, the City

responded in a letter that did not address Klein’s request,

stating instead that “no permission” was necessary to use

amplification equipment and that Klein should familiarize

himself with the applicable regulations if he had not already

done so.

On June 16, 2009, the City replaced the temporary

ordinance with a permanent ordinance that limited the

application of the 100-yard ban at City Hall and the high

school to times when “such facilities are in use or operation,

and for a period of thirty minutes both before and after such

use and operation.” The City kept the general 5 p.m. to

9 a.m. ban citywide. This new ordinance continued to

preclude Klein’s request to use amplifying devices downtown

after 5 p.m., at City Hall between 5–6 p.m., and at the school

between 3:35–4:05 p.m.

Klein filed a motion for a preliminary injunction on

August 3, 2009, which the district court denied, concluding

that the ordinance was “a content neutral, reasonable

restriction on time, place and manner of speech.” We

reversed on appeal, holding that Laguna Beach presented

insufficient evidence that the ordinance was narrowlytailored

to the City’s interests. Klein v. City of Laguna Beach, 381 F.

App’x 723, 726–27 (9th Cir. 2010) (Klein I). We also

concluded that the remaining preliminary injunction factors

favored Klein given the “fundamental interest in the

protection of all people’s constitutional rights” and that the

City had other ordinances “prohibiting excessive and

disruptive sound.” Id. at 727.

Our decision issued on June 4, 2010. On October 5, 2010,

the City amended section 7.25.120 to remove the 100-yard

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KLEIN V. CITY OF LAGUNA BEACH 7

restriction around schools and City Hall and to increase the

time amplified speech was allowed from 9 a.m.–5 p.m. to

9 a.m.–9 p.m. The parties then filed cross-motions for

summary judgment, with Klein seeking an award of nominal

damages and attorneys’ fees. The district court granted

Klein’s motion in part, entering judgment in favor of Klein on

his nominal damages claims that the repealed permitting

scheme was an unconstitutional prior restraint and that the

City’s restriction of Klein’s speech in the downtown business

district violated the First Amendment. Klein received $1

damages for each of those claims. The court also granted the

City’s motion in part, concluding that Laguna Beach did not

violate Klein’s rights by restricting his speech outside the

high school and outside City Hall. The court then entered

judgment in favor of the City on Klein’s remaining claims for

nominal damages, his California Bane Act claim, and his

claims for declaratory and injunctive relief for federal and

state constitutional violations. The judgment stated that

“Plaintiffs shall recover their costs, including reasonable

attorneys’ fees pursuant to motion for the two claims on

which they prevailed.”

Klein again appealed. We affirmed the district court as to

the high school and downtown business district, but we

reversed with respect to Klein’s proposed speech near City

Hall, holding that Klein was entitled to summary judgment on

that claim as well. Klein v. City of Laguna Beach, 533 F.

App’x 772, 774–75 (9th Cir. 2013) (Klein II). Klein therefore

won nominal damages on three of his four as-applied

challenges under federal law.

Klein then filed a motion for attorneys’ fees. The district

court denied the motion in the decision now on appeal. 

Although the court ruled that Klein’s award of nominal

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8 KLEIN V. CITY OF LAGUNA BEACH

damages made him a “prevailing party” under 42 U.S.C.

1988(b), the court relied on Farrar v. Hobby to conclude that

Klein was not entitled to fees for his merely “technical”

victory. See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115 (1992). The

court analyzed the three Farrar factors3and concluded that

the nominal damages judgment accomplished no “public

goal,” that Klein achieved “de minimis” success, and that

Klein’s First Amendment rights were “not so significant as to

overcome the other two factors, which counsel strongly

against an award of fees.” The court also concluded that it

was unable to award Klein fees under California Civil

Procedure Code § 1021.5 because Klein had not prevailed on

his California state law claims. Klein appeals both of these

issues.4

II

We review de novo whether the district court applied the

correct legal standard in determining entitlement to attorneys’

fees. Labotest, Inc. v. Bonta, 297 F.3d 892, 894 (9th Cir.

2002).

3

See Farrar, 506 U.S. at 116–22 (1992) (O’Connor, J., concurring);

Mahach-Watkins v. Depee, 593 F.3d 1054, 1059–60 (9th Cir. 2010).

4 Klein preliminarily argues that he was entitled to attorneys’ fees under

law of the case because the district court’s initial judgment specified that

“Plaintiffs shall recover their costs, including reasonable attorneys’ fees

pursuant to motion for the two claims on which they prevailed,” and the

City did not challenge this on appeal in Klein II. That statement in the

order did not indicate that the court had analyzed or considered Klein’s

entitlement to fees, and the claim for attorneys’ fees had not been

presented, briefed, or argued. We conclude that the district court’s

judgment merely suggested that Klein would later be able to seek

attorneys’ fees “pursuant to motion.”

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KLEIN V. CITY OF LAGUNA BEACH 9

III

42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) provides that the “prevailing party”

in a § 1983 suit may be entitled to “a reasonable attorney’s

fee” in the court’s “discretion.” A prevailing plaintiff

“should ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee unless special

circumstances would render such an award unjust.” Hensley

v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983) (citation omitted). A

party that wins only nominal damages is a “prevailing party”

under the statute. Farrar, 506 U.S. at 112.

Once a party is found eligible for fees, the district court

must then determine what fees are reasonable. Hensley,

461 U.S. at 433. District courts generally start by applying

the “lodestar method,” i.e., multiplying “the number of hours

the prevailing party reasonably expended on the litigation by

a reasonable hourly rate.” Gonzalez v. City of Maywood,

729 F.3d 1196, 1202 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Ballen v. City

of Redmond, 466 F.3d 736, 746 (9th Cir. 2006)). The district

court “may then adjust [the lodestar] upward or downward

based on” twelve factors identified in Hensley. Id. (quoting

Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir.

2008)); see Hensley, 461 U.S. at 430 n.3.5

Because “‘the most critical factor’ in determining the

reasonableness of a fee award ‘is the degree of success

obtained,’” Farrar, 506 U.S. at 114 (quoting Hensley,

461 U.S. at 436), the Supreme Court has created a narrow

exception to the standard Hensley procedure: When a

5 These twelve factors are often called the “Kerr factors” in the Ninth

Circuit, because of Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th

Cir. 1975), in which we first adopted them. See Gonzalez, 729 F.3d at

1209 n.11.

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10 KLEIN V. CITY OF LAGUNA BEACH

plaintiff “seeks compensatory damages but receives no more

than nominal damages,” “the court may lawfully award low

fees or no fees without reciting the 12 [Hensley] factors

bearing on reasonableness” or calculating the lodestar. Id. at

115. The Court declined to award Farrar fees because he won

only a $1 nominal victory despite having sought $17 million

in compensatory damages. Id. at 114. We have since stated

that in cases where “a plaintiff recovers only nominal

damages because of his failure to prove an essential element

of his claim for monetary relief,” the district court should

balance three factors derived from Justice O’Connor’s

concurrence in Farrar. Mahach-Watkins v. Depee, 593 F.3d

1054, 1059 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Farrar, 506 U.S. at 115).

In this case, the district court concluded that because

Klein received only nominal damages, the Farrar exception

applied, and the court balanced the O’Connor factors and

determined that Klein was not entitled to fees. Klein argues

that the district court erred by applying Farrar. In Klein’s

view, “The Farrarspecial circumstances exception is limited

to cases where civil rights plaintiffs seek compensatory

damages but obtain only nominal damages, not to cases

where plaintiffs seek only nominal damages” like this one. 

Instead, Klein argues that he was entitled to receive attorneys’

fees under the standard procedure, i.e., beginning with the

lodestar and then considering the twelve Hensley/Kerr

factors. We agree.

While we have not addressed this precise issue, we stated

in Stivers v. Pierce, 71 F.3d 732 (9th Cir. 1995), that

“Farrar’s holding is limited to cases in which the plaintiff

seeks substantial monetary damages but obtains only a

nominal award.” Id. at 753. We held that Farrar did not

apply in that case because the plaintiffs had obtained some of

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KLEIN V. CITY OF LAGUNA BEACH 11

the injunctive relief they sought via a settlement agreement. 

Id. This reading of Farrar was appropriate because Congress

has “emphasized the importance of attorneys’ fees in cases

seeking injunctive relief, where there is no monetary light at

the end of the litigation tunnel.” Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1111

n.1. The same logic applies here. Without a request for

compensatory damages, Klein had no chance of receiving a

significant monetary payout, and his suit was not one in

which “recovery of private damages is the purpose of . . .

civil rights litigation.” Farrar, 506 U.S. at 114 (quoting

Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 585 (1986) (Powell, J.,

concurring in the judgment)). Instead, Klein’s primary goal

has always been to legalize amplified speech in Laguna

Beach. While Laguna Beach argues that Klein did not seek

“elimination of the challenged regulation” because he never

brought a facial challenge, the City is mistaken; the complaint

alleges, “On its face, and as applied, the ordinances violate

the First Amendment to the United States Constitution” and

Article I, section 2 of the California Constitution.

Laguna Beach also argues that Klein sought $72,000 in

compensatory damages under the California Bane Act, and

judgment was entered against him on the merits of that claim. 

This argument is unpersuasive. First, Klein sought only

$4,000 under the statute as nominal damages, not

compensatory damages—unlike federal law, the statute

guarantees a minimum of $4,000 regardless of actual

damages. Cal. Civ. Code § 52. Klein’s attempt to get

statutory damages under the Bane Act did not place him into

the class of plaintiffs to which Farrar applies. Second,

42 U.S.C. § 1988 rewards plaintiffs who prevail on federal

claims, so Klein’s request for relief under state law has no

bearing on our analysis of what legal framework applies to

motions under § 1988.

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12 KLEIN V. CITY OF LAGUNA BEACH

The district court reasoned that Farrar should be applied

because there was

no principled basis to treat differently a

plaintiff who does not seek compensatory

damages because he cannot prove actual

injury from a plaintiff who seeks

compensatory damages and fails to prove

actual injury. . . . Thus, although Mr. Klein’s

decision to not pursue in court what he cannot

prove is laudable, his failure to recover some

significant amount of damages or other

meaningful relief counsels against an award of

fees.

The district court’s reasoning does not persuade us because

it obscures the rationale behind Farrar’s narrow exception. 

Farrar emphasized the importance of considering “the

amount of damages awarded as compared to the amount

sought.” 506 U.S. at 114 (quoting Riverside, 477 U.S. at 585)

(emphasis added). This comparative analysis matters

because, as discussed above, “‘the most critical factor’ in

determining the reasonableness of a fee award ‘is the degree

of success obtained.’” Id. (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436). 

The Supreme Court in Farrar concluded that because Farrar

sought $17 million and was awarded only $1, he essentially

lost—his victory was only “technical.” Id. We drew the

same conclusion in Romberg v. Nichols, 48 F.3d 453 (9th Cir.

1995), where the plaintiffs sought $2 million and received

only $1. “As in Farrar,” we stated, “the Rombergs requested

a substantial sum, but received only one dollar each; although

they prevailed, the Rombergs did not succeed.” Id. at 455

(emphasis added). This makes good sense. A plaintiff who

“asked for a bundle and got a pittance” has not achieved

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KLEIN V. CITY OF LAGUNA BEACH 13

success in that he did not reach the goal sought. Farrar,

506 U.S. at 120 (O’Connor, J., concurring).

In this case, however, when one compares the relief Klein

sought with the results he achieved, it is clear that he

succeeded. Klein’s suit was forward-looking, and he gained

the relief that he primarily sought when the challenged law

was amended to expand the permissible use of amplification

devices. As we stated in a previous appeal of this matter, “the

City voluntarily repealed all challenged portions of the sound

ordinance as a result of this lawsuit.” Klein II, 533 F. App’x

at 775.6

The Fifth Circuit has also recently held that Farrar does

not apply in this type of situation. See Sanchez v. City of

Austin, 774 F.3d 873 (5th Cir. 2014). In that case, the district

court granted the plaintiffs’ request for an injunction but

denied all other requested relief, including nominal damages. 

Id. at 877. The City of Austin argued that “Appellants’ injury

and victory merely were technical or de minimis and thus

justify a wholesale denial of fees,” citing Farrar for support. 

Id. at 882. The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument and read

Farrar narrowly to apply only when the plaintiff “seeks

compensatory damages but receives no more than nominal

damages.” Id. at 883 (quoting Farrar, 506 U.S. at 115). The

court explained, “Unlike Farrar, Appellants’ primary goal in

this litigation was to force the City to stop issuing CTNs

[criminal-trespass notices]. Appellants achieved that goal by

securing a permanent injunction against future enforcement

6 Considering the total circumstances here, we agree that this

characterization is accurate and binding on our panel as the law of the

case. See Old Person v. Brown, 312 F.3d 1036, 1039 (9th Cir. 2002).

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14 KLEIN V. CITY OF LAGUNA BEACH

of the CTN policy. A fee award was therefore appropriate.” 

Id.

As in Sanchez, Klein’s primary goal was to change the

City’s policy, not to secure compensatory damages. 

Although Klein did not receive a permanent injunction and

declaratory relief, the district court appears to have denied

such relief only because the City voluntarily eliminated the

policies about which Klein complained. It is more accurate

to think of Klein’s request for an injunction as being mooted

when the City changed the law to accommodate Klein’s

planned conduct, rather than denied on its merits. Klein

achieved the outcome he sought when he filed this lawsuit,7

and Farrar “does not control” in these circumstances. Id.8

7 And although Klein did not receive nominal damages for his

constitutional claim regarding the use of sound-amplifying devices near

the high school between 3:35 and 4:05 p.m., the new ordinance does not

prohibit that conduct so long as he does not “unreasonably disrupt[],

obstruct[], impair[] or interfere[] with the normal use and operation of[the

school] for [its] intended purposes.”

8 Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department

of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001), does not prevent us

from considering the City’s voluntary changes in determining the

appropriateness of a fee award in this case. Buckhannon held that litigants

are not prevailing parties based on the “catalyst theory,” i.e., when “the

lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant’s conduct.” Id.

at 601. For the plaintiff to qualify as a prevailing party, his suit must have

led to a “judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the

parties.” Id. at 605. But as we explained in Benton v. Oregon Student

Assistance Commission, 421 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2005), “Buckhannon did

not address the issue of the factors to be applied in determining the

reasonableness of an attorney’s fee award to a prevailing party.” Id. at

907. As long as a litigant can establish prevailing party status without

reliance on the catalyst theory—which Klein can, because he was awarded

nominal damages—a court may consider whether the litigant achieved a

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KLEIN V. CITY OF LAGUNA BEACH 15

We vacate the district court order and remand for the district

court to analyze Klein’s entitlement to attorneys’ fees under

the procedures specified by the Supreme Court in Hensley. 

See Gonzalez, 729 F.3d at 1202.

IV

Klein also argues that he was entitled to attorneys’ fees

under California law, including an enhancement multiplier. 

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1021.5 states, “Upon motion, a court

may award attorneys’ fees to a successful party against one or

more opposing parties in any action which has resulted in the

enforcement of an important right affecting the public

interest.” When California plaintiffs prevail in federal court

on California claims, they may obtain attorneys’ fees under

section 1021.5. See Mangold v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n,

67 F.3d 1470, 1478 (9th Cir. 1995). Klein does not dispute

that section 1021.5 does not apply in federal court when a

plaintiff does not plead any California claims.

Klein argues that because he pled a California state law

claim, he is entitled to fees under the California statute even

though he lost on the claim. But federal courts apply state

law for attorneys’ fees to state claims because of the Erie9

doctrine, see id., and Erie does not compel federal courts to

apply state law to a federal claim. See MRO Commc’ns, Inc.

v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 197 F.3d 1276, 1279–80 (9th Cir.

public goal or accomplished a public purpose with the litigation, including

inducing a voluntary change by the defendant, “for the limited purpose of

determining a reasonable fee award.” Benton, 421 F.3d at 907.

9 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (holding that federal

courts apply state law to non-federal claims).

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16 KLEIN V. CITY OF LAGUNA BEACH

1999) (in an action involving state and federal claims,

awarding attorneys’ fees under state law only with respect to

state claims). Klein was only a prevailing party on his federal

claims, and “since we address federal, not state claims, the

federal common law of attorney’s fees, and not [state] law, is

the relevant authority.” Modzelewski v. Resolution Trust

Corp., 14 F.3d 1375, 1379 (9th Cir. 1994).

Klein cites Jones v. City of L.A., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

68416 (C.D. Cal. 2011), for the proposition that attorneys’

fees under California law are proper when the party pleads

both state and federal claims and prevails on federal law even

when he “did not pursue the state claim in summary

judgment.” Id. at *4. But the plaintiff in Jones never lost on

the state claims—the parties reached a settlement, and the

court reasoned that “[t]he settlement agreement provides for

almost all the relief which the plaintiffs sought, and the

plaintiffs’ complaint included a state law claim.” Id. Jones

does not stand for the proposition that a party gets fees under

California law when it wins a federal claim but loses its state

claim on the merits. We affirm the district court’s denial of

fees under California law.10

AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and

REMANDED.

10 We therefore need not reach Klein’s contention that the district court

erred in concluding that he forfeited his catalyst theory argument

regarding attorneys’ fees under California law.

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