Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00386/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00386-7/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Steve Wilhelm
Plaintiff
Jeannie Woodford
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVE WILHELM,

Plaintiff,

v.

JEANNIE WOODFORD,

Defendant.

Case No. 1:12-cv-00386-AWI-SAB

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

RECOMMENDING THAT PLAINTIFF’S 

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT BE 

DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO 

AMEND

ECF NO. 28

OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN THIRTY (30) 

DAYS

I.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Steve Wilhelm (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed the original complaint in this 

action on March 14, 2012. (ECF No. 1.) Before the Court screened the original complaint, 

Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint on July 22, 2013. (ECF No. 15.) The Court screened 

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint on September 10, 2013. (ECF No. 16.) This action 

proceeds on Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint filed on November 19, 2013. (ECF No. 28.)

For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Second Amended 

Complaint fails to state any cognizable claims.

/ / /

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II.

SCREENING

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 

legally “frivolous or malicious,” that “fail[] to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or 

that “seek[] monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate 

that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights. Jones v. 

Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).

Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings 

liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 

1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be 

facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer 

that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss 

v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a defendant 

has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s 

liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 

F.3d at 969.

III.

PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

The events described in Plaintiff’s complaint took place while Plaintiff was incarcerated 

at Wasco State Prison (“Wasco”), Lancaster State Prison (“Lancaster”) and Corcoran State 

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Prison (“Corcoran”). Plaintiff names John Doe, “Director of CDCR,” as defendant in this action.

Defendant alleges that CDCR rules and regulations in effect while Plaintiff was housed at 

Wasco and Lancaster between 1999 and 2006 permitted prisoners to purchase and receive 

cigarettes. Plaintiff contends that his cellmates smoked, causing Plaintiff to be exposed to 

second-hand smoke. Plaintiff also alleges that while at Corcoran, the exhaust fan did not work, 

causing dust and dirt to blow into Plaintiff’s cell. Plaintiff contends he has emphysema and 

chronic bronchitis from the exposure to bad air.

IV.

DISCUSSION

A. Eighth Amendment Claim

Plaintiff contends that his rights under the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual 

Punishments Clause were violated. To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of 

the Eighth Amendment, prison conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction 

of pain.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). “[A] prison official violates the Eighth 

Amendment only when two requirements are met. First, the deprivation alleged must be, 

objectively, ‘sufficiently serious.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citations 

omitted). Second, “a prison official must have a ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind.’ 

[Citations.] In prison-conditions cases that state of mind is one of ‘deliberate indifference’ to 

inmate health or safety.” Id. A prison official acts with “deliberate indifference” if:

the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate 

health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from 

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of 

serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.

Id. at 837.

Plaintiff fails to state any claims against “John Doe” because Plaintiff fails to allege facts 

that plausibly support the conclusion that “John Doe” had actual knowledge of a substantial risk 

of serious harm. Plaintiff alleges that “John Doe” approved or acceded to prison policies 

allowing inmates to smoke tobacco products and knew generally that two inmates were likely to 

be housed in a single cell. These facts do not plausibly support the conclusion that “John Doe” 

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was aware of a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff, particularly in light of his position as 

director of CDCR. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 680-83 (2009) (conclusory allegations 

against high-ranking officials not entitled to presumption of truth). Plaintiff’s allegation that the 

director of CDCR was generally aware that inmates were allowed to smoke tobacco products is 

not sufficient to support the conclusion that the director was aware that Plaintiff was being 

exposed to such excessive amounts of second hand smoke that it posed a substantial risk of 

serious harm. Even assuming “John Doe” was aware that second hand smoke exposure was 

generally unhealthy, the facts alleged do not plausibly support the conclusion that “John Doe” 

believed that the risk of harm was so serious and substantial that it rose to the level of an Eighth 

Amendment violation.

Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint fails to state any 

cognizable claims against “John Doe” for the violation of Plaintiff’s rights under the Eighth 

Amendment.

B. Dismissal Without Leave to Amend

Generally, leave to amend a dismissed complaint should be granted if it appears at all 

possible that the plaintiff can correct the defects in the complaint. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 

1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). However, leave to amend may be denied when a plaintiff was 

previously notified of the deficiencies in his claims but did not cure them. See Chodos v. West 

Publishing Co., 292 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002).

Here, Plaintiff was previously informed of the deficiencies in his claims and his Second 

Amended Complaint failed to cure them. Accordingly, the Court will recommend dismissal of 

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint without leave to amend.

V.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Second Amended 

Complaint fails to state any cognizable claims. Moreover, the Court finds that leave to amend 

should be denied because Plaintiff’s claims cannot be cured by granting further leave to amend.

/ / /

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Accordingly, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Second Amended 

Complaint be DISMISSED, without leave to amend.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the district judge assigned to this 

action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and this Court’s Local Rule 304. Within thirty (30)

days of service of this recommendation, any party may file written objections to these findings 

and recommendations with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be 

captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The district 

judge will review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 

waive the right to appeal the district judge’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 

1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 15, 2014 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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