Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-50373/USCOURTS-ca9-12-50373-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Francisco Jimenez-Arzate
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

FRANCISCO JIMENEZ-ARZATE,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 12-50373

D.C. No.

3:12-cr-01421-LAB-1

ORDER AND

AMENDED

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

November 19, 2014—Pasadena, California

Filed January 12, 2015

Amended March 30, 2015

Before: Andrew J. Kleinfeld and Kim McLane Wardlaw,

Circuit Judges, and Matthew F. Kennelly, District Judge.*

Order;

Per Curiam Opinion

* The Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly, District Judge for the U.S.

District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.

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2 UNITED STATES V. JIMENEZ-ARZATE

SUMMARY**

Criminal Law

The panel amended an opinion, filed January 12, 2015,

affirming a sentence for illegal reentry after deportation;

denied a petition for panel rehearing; and denied on behalf of

the court a petition for rehearing en banc, in a case in which

the district court found that the defendant’s prior conviction

for violation of California Penal Code § 245(a)(1) is

categorically a crime of violence for federal sentencing

purposes. 

The panel rejected the defendant’s contention that United

States v. Grajeda, 581 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2009), which held

that a conviction under § 245(a)(1) is categorically a crime of

violence, is no longer good law in light of People v.

Aznavoleh, 148 Cal. Rptr. 3d 901 (Ct. App. 2012), and People

v. Wyatt, 229 P.3d 156 (Cal. 2010).

The panel held that Ceron v. Holder, 747 F.3d 773 (9th

Cir. 2014) (en banc), does not abrogate Grajeda. The panel

observed that Ceron, which addresses whether a § 245(a)(1)

conviction is categorically a crime of moral turpitude, does

not address the question of whether a § 245(a)(1) conviction

is categorically a crime of violence; and that Ceron, which

relied exclusively on the identical language from People v.

Williams, 29 P.3d 197 (Cal. 2001), that is quoted in Grajeda,

does not clearly indicate a different interpretation of the mens

rea requirement for § 245(a)(1) than that set forth in Grajeda.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. JIMENEZ-ARZATE 3

The panel held that there was justification for the district

court’s exercise of discretion in imposing supervised release. 

COUNSEL

Vincent J. Brunkow (argued), Kara Lee Hartzler, Federal

Defenders of San Diego, Inc., San Diego, California, for

Defendant-Appellant.

Laura E. Duffy, United States Attorney, Bruce R. Castetter,

Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate Section,

Criminal Division, Andrew R. Haden (briefed), Assistant

United States Attorney, and Mark R. Rehe (argued), Andrew

R. Haden, United States Attorney’s Office, San Diego,

California, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

ORDER

The opinion filed on January 12, 2015, and appearing at

776 F.3d 662, is amended as follows:

On Opinion page 664, replace the paragraph beginning

“Ceron v. Holder, 747 F.3d 773 (9th Cir.2014) (en banc),

addresses the question” with the following:

Ceron v. Holder, 747 F.3d 773 (9th Cir.

2014) (en banc), does not abrogate Grajeda’s

holding that a conviction under § 245(a)(1) is

categorically a crime of violence. Grajeda,

581 F.3d at 1197. Ceron addresses the

question of whether a conviction under

California Penal Code § 245(a)(1) is

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4 UNITED STATES V. JIMENEZ-ARZATE

categorically a crime of moral turpitude. It

does not address the question of whether a

conviction under § 245(a)(1) is categorically

a crime of violence. Furthermore, in Ceron,

we discussed the mens rea requirement for

§ 245(a)(1), relying exclusively on the

California Supreme Court’s opinion in

Williams, 29 P.3d at 202–03. Ceron, 747 F.3d

at 779, 784. However, the identical language

from Williams is also quoted in Grajeda. See

Grajeda, 581 F.3d at 1194. Accordingly,

Ceron does not clearly indicate a different

interpretation of the mens rea requirement for

§ 245(a)(1) than that set forth in Grajeda.

With the opinion thus amended, the panel has voted

unanimously to deny the petition for rehearing. Judge

Wardlaw has voted to deny the petition for rehearing en banc,

and Judges Kleinfeld and Kennelly recommended denial.

The full court has been advised of the petition for

rehearing and no active judge of the court has requested a

vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc. Fed. R. App. P.

35.

The petition for rehearing and petition for rehearing en

banc is DENIED. No further petitions for rehearing or

petitions for rehearing en banc will be entertained.

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UNITED STATES V. JIMENEZ-ARZATE 5

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Francisco Jimenez-Arzate pleaded guilty to having

illegally re-entered the United States after having previously

been deported. The district court sentenced him to 34 months

in prison and three years of supervised release. He timely

appeals his sentence.

Jimenez-Arzate argues that the district court erred in

finding that his prior conviction for violation of California

Penal Code § 245(a)(1) is categorically a crime of violence

for federal sentencing purposes. He contends that United

States v. Grajeda, 581 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2009), is no longer

good law in light of People v. Aznavoleh, 148 Cal. Rptr. 3d

901 (Ct. App. 2012), and People v. Wyatt, 229 P.3d 156 (Cal.

2010). Jimenez-Arzate also argues that Ceron v. Holder,

747 F.3d 773 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc), abrogates Grajeda.

We disagree. Aznavoleh involved a defendant who

intentionally ran a red light while racing another car down the

street even though he saw a car entering the intersection on

the green. People v. Aznavoleh, 148 Cal. Rptr. 3d 901, 905,

908 (Ct. App. 2012). The defendant made no effort to stop

despite a passenger warning him that he needed to stop. Id.

at 904. The California Court of Appeal upheld the trial

court’s finding that the defendant met the willfulness element

of assault under California Penal Code § 245(a)(1), which the

California Court of Appeal defined as intentionality. Id. at

906.

Wyatt involved a father who, while play wrestling with

his infant son, struck the boy with such force that he killed

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6 UNITED STATES V. JIMENEZ-ARZATE

him. People v. Wyatt, 229 P.3d 156, 157 (Cal. 2010). The

Wyatt court upheld the father’s conviction for involuntary

manslaughter and assault on a child causing death because

“substantial evidence established that defendant knew he was

striking his young son with his fist, forearm, knee, and elbow,

and that he used an amount of force a reasonable person

would realize was likely to result in great bodily injury.” Id.

As did the California Court of Appeal in Aznavoleh, the

California Supreme Court in Wyatt explained that “a

defendant guilty of assault must be aware of the facts that

would lead a reasonable person to realize that a batterywould

directly, naturally and probably result from his conduct. He

may not be convicted based on facts he did not know but

should have known.” Id. at 159 (quoting People v. Williams,

29 P.3d 197, 203 (Cal. 2001)).

Contrary to Jimenez-Arzate’s argument, Aznavoleh did

not hold that an automobile accident stemming from merely

reckless driving may result in a conviction under § 245(a)(1). 

The defendant in Aznavoleh engaged in street racing,

heedlessly disregarding a perceived likelihood of death or

grave injury to others. Likewise, in Wyatt, a reasonable

person would have recognized the dangers of striking a child

with the deadly force used, even if the defendant was not

subjectively aware of the risks of his “play wrestling” with

the child in that manner.

Ceron v. Holder, 747 F.3d 773 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc),

does not abrogate Grajeda’s holding that a conviction under

§ 245(a)(1) is categorically a crime of violence. Grajeda,

581 F.3d at 1197. Ceron addresses the question of whether

a conviction under California Penal Code § 245(a)(1) is

categorically a crime of moral turpitude. It does not address

the question of whether a conviction under § 245(a)(1) is

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UNITED STATES V. JIMENEZ-ARZATE 7

categorically a crime of violence. Furthermore, in Ceron, we

discussed the mens rea requirement for § 245(a)(1), relying

exclusively on the California Supreme Court’s opinion in

Williams, 29 P.3d at 202–03. Ceron, 747 F.3d at 779, 784. 

However, the identical language from Williamsis also quoted

in Grajeda. See Grajeda, 581 F.3d at 1194. Accordingly,

Ceron does not clearly indicate a different interpretation of

the mens rea requirement for § 245(a)(1) than that set forth in

Grajeda.

Jimenez-Arzate also argues that the district court abused

its discretion in imposing a term of supervised release

because he would be deported as an illegal alien upon his

release. Here, the district court made an individualized

finding that supervised release was warranted because of

Jimenez-Arzate’s consistent history of sneaking back into the

United States after deportation. The district court specifically

noted that Jimenez-Arzate had previouslybeen deported three

times and that “[t]he three wags of fingers in his face saying

‘stay out, stay out or you’re going to be subject to

prosecution’ didn’t do any good.” The district judge also

noted that he “can’t trust [Jimenez-Arzate’s] assurance he’s

not going to come back” because “[h]e probably gave that

assurance on three prior occasions, and yet he’s back again

committing crimes.” The district judge concluded that

supervised release was necessary to protect the public and

deter Jimenez-Arzate from returning to the United States. 

There was justification for the district court’s exercise of

discretion in imposing supervised release.

AFFIRMED.

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