Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-07-06836/USCOURTS-ca4-07-06836-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John Hackman
Appellee
Blendi Haxhiaj
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

BLENDI HAXHIAJ, 

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.  No. 07-6836 JOHN HACKMAN, United States

Marshal for the Eastern District of

Virginia,

Respondent-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.

Leonie M. Brinkema, District Judge.

(1:06-cv-01088-LMB)

Argued: March 20, 2008

Decided: June 9, 2008

Before TRAXLER, Circuit Judge,

HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge, and

David R. HANSEN, Senior Circuit Judge of the

United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,

sitting by designation.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Traxler wrote the opinion, in

which Senior Judge Hamilton and Senior Judge Hansen joined.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Darren Johnson, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC

DEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Justin Okun,

Appeal: 07-6836 Doc: 39 Filed: 06/09/2008 Pg: 1 of 15
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal

Public Defender, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Chuck Rosenberg, United States Attorney, Lawrence J. Leiser, Assistant United

States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,

Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee. 

OPINION

TRAXLER, Circuit Judge: 

Blendi Haxhiaj seeks review of the district court’s denial of habeas

relief from a certification of extradition declaring that Haxhiaj is eligible to be extradited to Italy to serve a 12-year sentence imposed in

2003 by an Italian court as a result of a drug trafficking conviction.

Haxhiaj contends that there was insufficient evidence presented to the

extradition court to establish probable cause that he committed the

underlying drug offense, and hence the certification should not have

issued. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3184 (West Supp. 2007). As explained

below, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence in the record to

support the extradition court’s finding of probable cause. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of Haxhiaj’s habeas petition. 

I.

Haxhiaj is an Albanian national who was charged in Italy with various crimes arising from his participation in a large drug-trafficking

organization that transported heroin and other illegal drugs from

Albania into Italy between 1997 and August 2000. In 2000, Italian

law enforcement agents arrested numerous participants in this conspiracy, including Haxhiaj’s sister, Doriana. Haxhiaj avoided arrest,

however, by fleeing to the United States in November 2000 and subsequently applying for asylum here. 

In June 2003, Haxhiaj was convicted in absentia by the Court of

Milan on three drug-trafficking counts in a multiple-count indictment

relating to the conspiracy; he was acquitted on seven counts. In July

2 HAXHIAJ v. HACKMAN

Appeal: 07-6836 Doc: 39 Filed: 06/09/2008 Pg: 2 of 15
2004, Haxhiaj’s convictions were affirmed by the Court of Appeal of

Milan and became final on October 14, 2004, whereupon Haxhiaj was

sentenced to a prison term of twelve and one-half years. The Court

of Appeal of Milan then issued a warrant for Haxhiaj’s arrest as a

fugitive. 

Meanwhile, Haxhiaj was living and working in Madison, Wisconsin. In February 2004, apparently unaware that Haxhiaj was a fugitive

from Italy when he arrived here or that he had been convicted by an

Italian court for international drug trafficking since his arrival, the

United States granted Haxhiaj asylum from Albania. The Department

of Homeland Security ("DHS") learned of Haxhiaj’s fugitive status

the following year and, on October 11, 2005, took Haxhiaj into custody as he was re-entering the United States after an overseas trip. On

November 8, 2005, pursuant to the bilateral extradition treaty between

the United States and Italy (the "Treaty" or "Extradition Treaty"), the

United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia filed a formal extradition request for Haxhiaj on behalf of Italy. See Extradition

Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and

the Government of the Republic of Italy, U.S.-Italy, Oct. 13, 1983, 35

U.S.T. 3023, art. I; see 18 U.S.C.A. § 3184 (establishing extradition

proceedings in the United States). 

The Treaty imposes mutual obligations upon the United States and

Italy "to extradite to each other . . . persons whom the authorities of

the Requesting Party have charged with or found guilty of an extraditable offense." U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty, art. I. An extraditable

offense under the Treaty is an offense that is "punishable under the

laws of both Contracting Parties by deprivation of liberty for a period

of more than one year," id., art. II, ¶ 1, including "[a]ny type of association to commit [such] offenses" and "conspiracy to commit [such]

an offense," id., art. II, ¶ 2. 

The government seeks extradition based on Haxhiaj’s three counts

of conviction, describing them as follows: (1) "having unlawfully

kept for distribution purposes 1.932 kilograms of heroin" on June 5,

2000; (2) "[f]rom approximately 1997 through . . . August 2000, in

Milan, Bergamo, Naples, Brindisi and Ravenna, Italy, and in Albania,

having associated with others for the purpose of trafficking in illegal

drugs, namely heroin, cocaine and marijuana;" and (3) "[f]rom about

HAXHIAJ v. HACKMAN 3

Appeal: 07-6836 Doc: 39 Filed: 06/09/2008 Pg: 3 of 15
July 31, 2000 to August 12, 2000, in Naples, Italy, having purchased,

received and kept with the intent to distribute approximately 60 kilograms of marijuana." J.A. 12. In support of its extradition request, the

government offered a certified copy of the judgment issued by the

Court of Appeal of Milan affirming Haxhiaj’s conviction.

The magistrate judge conducted an extradition hearing pursuant to

18 U.S.C.A. § 3184 "to determine whether (1) the crime[s are] extraditable; and (2) there is probable cause to sustain the charge[s]."

Ordinola v. Hackman, 478 F.3d 588, 608 (4th Cir.) (Traxler, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct.

373 (2007). As for whether Haxhiaj was charged with "extraditable"

crimes, the magistrate judge noted that it was "essentially uncontested" that "[t]he drug trafficking crimes for which [Haxhiaj’s] surrender is sought are covered by the terms of the Treaty," J.A. 192, and

Haxhiaj does not challenge this conclusion now. However, the magistrate judge determined that the government failed to submit sufficient

evidence of probable cause and refused to certify Haxhiaj for extradition. The magistrate judge reasoned that, unlike evidence of a conviction where the fugitive was present at trial, mere evidence of an in

absentia conviction, by itself, will not sustain a finding of probable

cause as required by § 3184. Instead, the magistrate judge was looking for evidence of the kind "adduced at the trial in absentia" in order

to make an independent assessment of probable cause. J.A. 195. 

Finding no such evidence, the magistrate judge denied the request

for a certificate of extradition; however, instead of dismissing the

extradition complaint, the magistrate judge permitted the government

to supplement the record. The government then submitted a statement

from Procuratore Generale Dr. Bruno Fenzia, an Italian magistrate

who performs a prosecutorial function in the Italian system of criminal justice. Fenzia’s statement summarized the evidence supporting

Haxhiaj’s conviction, including the testimony of one of the investigators as well as the results of wiretaps and physical surveillance. In

support of his summary, Fenzia cited relevant portions of the written

opinion of the Court of Appeal of Milan affirming Haxhiaj’s conviction. The government, however, did not submit trial transcripts of the

investigator’s testimony or any evidence underlying such testimony,

like transcripts of the wiretapped phone conversations or documents

created during the investigation of Haxhiaj and his co-conspirators.

4 HAXHIAJ v. HACKMAN

Appeal: 07-6836 Doc: 39 Filed: 06/09/2008 Pg: 4 of 15
Additionally, Fenzia’s statement did not explain the basis for his summary of the evidence, and thus it is unclear whether Fenzia related

this information based on personal knowledge or whether he gleaned

it solely from the Court of Appeal’s opinion or some other source. 

On August 16, 2006, the magistrate judge concluded that, in view

of the additional information submitted by the government, there was

probable cause to believe that Haxhiaj committed the crimes identified in Italy’s extradition request. Accordingly, the magistrate judge

issued a certificate of extraditability. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3184; see also

Ordinola, 478 F.3d at 609 ("If the extradition judge concludes that

there is, in fact, probable cause, he is required to certify the individual

as extraditable to the Secretary of State.") (internal quotation marks

omitted) (Traxler, J., concurring). 

Because the extradition statute does not allow the fugitive to seek

direct review of an extradition certification, Haxhiaj next petitioned

for habeas review pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241. See Ordinola, 478

F.3d at 609 (explaining that "the fugitive has but one means of judicial recourse—filing a habeas petition"); Kastnerova v. United States,

365 F.3d 980, 984 n.4 (11th Cir. 2004) ("There is no direct appeal in

extradition proceedings."); see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Extradition: United States Law and Practice 911 (5th ed. 2007)

("An extradition order is not a final order within the meaning of Title

28 U.S.C. § 1291 . . . [and therefore] there is no direct appeal from

the decision of the judicial officer conducting the extradition proceedings."). The district court, noting the narrow scope of habeas review

in the extradition context, recognized that it was not permitted to disturb the decision of the magistrate judge to issue an extradition certification as long as there was "any evidence" in the record supporting

the finding of probable cause. J.A. 521. The district court, after

reviewing the record, found that there was indeed evidence supporting

the probable cause determination:

Although the magistrate judge correctly found that a conviction in absentia is not sufficient by itself to meet the probable cause requirement of the Treaty and the Statute, the

evidence contained in the record through the detailed opinion of the Court of Appeal of Milan is much more than the

mere fact of conviction. The opinion methodically described

HAXHIAJ v. HACKMAN 5

Appeal: 07-6836 Doc: 39 Filed: 06/09/2008 Pg: 5 of 15
each offense charged against each defendant and detailed

the wire tap and surveillance evidence that supported the

conviction of the various members of the conspiracy. 

J.A. 523-24. The district court, therefore, rejected the notion that "actual evidence in the form of witness testimony, affidavits, or transcripts of wiretaps" was required for a probable cause determination.

J.A. 527. Observing that there was no difference between the evidence originally submitted and the evidence before the magistrate

judge after the government supplemented the record, the district court

opined that "the magistrate judge erred in not finding probable cause

on the basis of the appellate opinion presented in the original extradition request." J.A. 526. Because the magistrate judge ultimately found

that there was probable cause, however, the district court denied the

habeas petition and refused to disturb the certification of extraditability. 

Subsequently, the district court issued an order clarifying the

record. The court explained that the "detailed summary of the trial

evidence by the Court of Appeal of Milan" had not been "among the

materials presented [to the magistrate judge] in the original request"

and was submitted only with the government’s supplemental materials. J.A. 531. Based on this clarification, the district court concluded

that "the magistrate judge was correct in his initial finding that the

record at the time of the first extradition hearing was insufficient to

establish probable cause." J.A. 531. The clarification, however, did

not alter the district court’s ultimate conclusion that the full record as

supplemented was sufficient to support the magistrate judge’s finding

of probable cause. 

II.

Habeas review of an extradition certification is quite narrow, limited to consideration of whether the extradition court properly exercised jurisdiction, whether the crime upon which extradition is sought

qualifies under the relevant treaty as an extraditable offense, and

whether the record contains sufficient evidence to support the extradition court’s probable cause determination. See Fernandez v. Phillips,

268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925); see also Sidali v. INS, 107 F.3d 191, 195

(3d Cir. 1997); United States v. Wiebe, 733 F.2d 549, 552 (8th Cir.

6 HAXHIAJ v. HACKMAN

Appeal: 07-6836 Doc: 39 Filed: 06/09/2008 Pg: 6 of 15
1984). Neither the magistrate judge’s jurisdiction nor the extraditability of the underlying offense are matters of dispute in this appeal;

we focus solely on the magistrate judge’s probable cause determination. 

During the extradition hearing, the magistrate judge applies the

same probable cause standard that applies in federal preliminary hearings, "meaning that the magistrate judge’s role is merely to determine

whether there is competent evidence to justify holding the accused to

await trial." Ordinola, 478 F.3d at 608 (Traxler, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted). The extradition hearing is not to serve

as a full-blown trial and serves simply to permit a limited inquiry

"into the presence of probable cause to believe that there has been a

violation of one or more of the criminal laws of the extraditing country." Peroff v. Hylton, 542 F.2d 1247, 1249 (4th Cir. 1976). Section 3184 therefore requires the extradition court to conduct

essentially the same preliminary inquiry typically required for issuance of a search warrant or an arrest warrant for crimes committed in

this country—a familiar task for any magistrate judge. See Eain v.

Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 508-09 (7th Cir. 1981) (explaining that an

extradition request must "be supported by sufficient evidence to show

. . . that there is sufficient justification for the individual’s arrest had

the charged crime been committed in the United States"). 

In reviewing the extradition court’s finding of probable cause

under § 3184, a federal habeas court applies a standard of review that

"is at least as deferential, if not more so, than that applied to a magistrate judge’s decision to issue a search warrant." Ordinola, 478 F.3d

at 609-10 (Traxler, J., concurring). "Just as the magistrate judge’s

underlying determination is not a mini-trial on the guilt or innocence

of the fugitive, . . . habeas review should not duplicate the extradition

hearing." Id. at 610. Accordingly, our limited function in performing

habeas review of the decision to issue a certificate of extradition is to

determine whether there is "any evidence" in the record supporting

the probable cause finding of the magistrate judge. Prushinowski v.

Samples, 734 F.2d 1016, 1018 (4th Cir. 1984) (emphasis omitted)

(quoting Fernandez, 268 U.S. at 312); see Kastnerova, 365 F.3d at

984-85. 

The evidence submitted in support of the extradition request consists of the written opinion of the Court of Appeal of Milan affirming

HAXHIAJ v. HACKMAN 7

Appeal: 07-6836 Doc: 39 Filed: 06/09/2008 Pg: 7 of 15
Haxhiaj’s conviction and the statement of Italian magistrate Fenzia

summarizing the evidence. As previously explained, the district court

concluded that these documents satisfied the "any evidence" standard

and that the appellate opinion, even standing alone, provided a sufficient basis for the probable cause finding because it "methodically

described each offense charged against each defendant and detailed

the wire tap and surveillance evidence that supported the conviction

of the various members of the conspiracy." J.A. 524. 

Haxhiaj insists, however, that the government’s evidence was

insufficient to satisfy even the generous "any evidence" standard that

applies in habeas review. Haxhiaj argues that mere evidence of an in

absentia conviction, without more, is insufficient to support a probable cause determination by the extradition court. Rather, he maintains

that the government was required to submit "actual evidence" that

would permit the extradition court to make its own independent

assessment of probable cause, such as trial testimony, documents created by investigators, transcripts of wiretapped conversations or affidavits from law enforcement officials with personal knowledge of the

evidence against Haxhiaj. 

Haxhiaj appears to derive his "actual evidence" requirement for

probable cause from two sources. First, he contends that the language

of the Extradition Treaty requires the requesting nation to submit such

evidence in order to establish the probable cause required for extradition. Second, Haxhiaj looks to the extradition statute, see 18 U.S.C.A.

§ 3184, as well as various judicial interpretations of what proof is

required to satisfy the probable cause standard for an extradition

request based on an in absentia conviction, see, e.g., Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77, 78-79 (2nd Cir. 1960). We conclude, as explained

below, that neither basis requires "actual evidence" — as Haxhiaj

defines that phrase — to support a finding of probable cause. 

A.

We first look to the language of the Extradition Treaty to determine

whether it mandates that an extradition request based on an in absentia conviction be supported by "actual evidence" establishing a reasonable basis to believe that Haxhiaj committed the crime for which

he is sought. Although the probable cause requirement for the issu8 HAXHIAJ v. HACKMAN

Appeal: 07-6836 Doc: 39 Filed: 06/09/2008 Pg: 8 of 15
ance of a certification of extradition is a matter of statute, see 18

U.S.C.A. § 3184; Ordinola, 478 F.3d at 608 (noting that "courts have

uniformly interpreted the statutory language to require a finding of

‘probable cause’") (Traxler, J., concurring), the applicable extradition

treaty often bears upon the scope of probable cause by establishing

what constitutes an adequate evidentiary showing. See Bassiouni,

supra at 877 (noting that "[t]he finding of probable cause is specifically required by legislation in 18 U.S.C. § 3184 and is also embodied

in United States treaties"). 

As reflected by Article X of the Extradition Treaty, the United

States and Italy agreed upon specific documentary support that must

accompany an extradition request between the two countries. Paragraph 2 of Article X requires that all extradition requests be accompanied by "documents, statements or other information" identifying the

individual sought, including, "if available, physical description, photographs and fingerprints"; "a brief statement of the facts of the case,

including the time and location of the offense"; and "the texts of the

laws" setting forth the elements of the offense for which extradition

is sought, the punishment for such offense, and the applicable limitations period, if any. See U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty, art. X, ¶ 2. 

There are additional requirements, depending on whether or not the

person sought to be extradited has already been convicted of the subject offense in the courts of the requesting nation. For those who have

been convicted already, paragraph 4 of Article X requires the extradition request to be accompanied by "a copy of the judgment of conviction"; "a copy of the sentence and a statement as to the duration of

the penalty still to be served"; and documents demonstrating "that the

person sought is the person convicted." Id., art X, ¶ 4. When extradition is sought for a person who has been charged but not convicted

of an offense, however, more detailed information is required under

paragraph 3, including "a certified copy of the arrest warrant" and "a

summary of the facts of the case, of the relevant evidence and of the

conclusions reached, providing a reasonable basis to believe that the

person sought committed the offense." Id., art X, ¶ 3(a)-(b). The

Treaty therefore incorporates the probable cause requirement of

§ 3184 for extradition based on a mere criminal charge.1

1When Italy is seeking extradition, as it is here, the case summary

"shall be written by a magistrate." Extradition Treaty between the GovHAXHIAJ v. HACKMAN 9

Appeal: 07-6836 Doc: 39 Filed: 06/09/2008 Pg: 9 of 15
Finally, Article X specifically addresses requests to extradite those

who were convicted of an extraditable offense in absentia:

If the person sought has been convicted in absentia or in

contumacy, all issues relating to this aspect of the request

shall be decided by the Executive Authority of the United

States or the competent authorities of Italy. In such cases,

the Requesting Party shall submit such documents as are

described in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of this Article and a statement regarding the procedures, if any, that would be available to the person sought if he or she were extradited.

Id., art. X, ¶ 5. By incorporating the requirements of paragraph three

into paragraph five, the Treaty requires more proof than just the fact

of an in absentia conviction, and directs that a summary of the facts

and evidence be supplied to establish "a reasonable basis to believe

that the person sought committed the offense for which extradition is

requested," id., art. X, ¶¶ 3(b), i.e., probable cause under § 3184. 

Therefore, for an extradition request based upon a conviction in

absentia, the Treaty requires more detail than mere proof of the fact

of conviction to establish probable cause, i.e., "a reasonable basis to

believe that the person sought committed the offense," id., art. X,

¶ 3(b), but it clearly does not require the kind of actual evidence suggested by Haxhiaj, such as trial testimony or transcripts of the wiretap

evidence. Instead, the Extradition Treaty requires merely a summary

of the facts and relevant evidence sufficient to provide a reasonable

basis to believe the relator committed the offense. We conclude that

the certified copy of the appellate opinion of the Court of Appeal of

Milan satisfies the showing required by the Treaty and clearly affords

a reasonable basis upon which to find probable cause. The opinion is

remarkable for its detailed description of the evidence developed durernment of the United States of America and the Government of the

Republic of Italy, U.S.-Italy, Oct. 13, 1983, 35 U.S.T. 3023, art. X,

¶ 3(b). When the United States is the requesting party, the summary

"shall be written by the prosecutor and shall include a copy of the

charge." Id.

10 HAXHIAJ v. HACKMAN

Appeal: 07-6836 Doc: 39 Filed: 06/09/2008 Pg: 10 of 15
ing the investigation of Haxhiaj’s drug trafficking ring, including this

key wiretap describing Haxhiaj’s role:

Having obtained [kingpin] Eduart Tresa’s go-ahead, Boka

takes action to ensure that the batch of drugs will be delivered. He contacts [Haxhiaj] and gives him instructions, after

which he calls a certain Franscesco and informs him of

[Haxhiaj’s] arrival, to whom he should hand over the drug.

Shortly afterwards, called by Di Serio, Boka tells him of

[Haxhiaj’s] arrival in the hotel. Called by Cosimo Vita,

Boka reassures him, telling him that Di Serio and [Haxhiaj]

are meeting . . . . 

The Police observed that a Volvo SW . . . was parked in

the hotel garage. 

. . . . 

At about 10.45 the Police saw the VW Polo . . . drive up

to the Martini Hotel. Out stepped a young man ([Haxhiaj])

who was met by Di Serio. A few moments later they were

joined by a third person in a Fiat Uno . . . . 

. . . . 

Other conversations were tapped between Armand Boka

and [Haxhiaj], among them those confirming that the "exchange" was about to take place . . . and then that it had

actually take[n] place. 

Then at 14.25 . . . the Police . . . observed the Fiat Uno

and the Volvo indicated above approaching, and they carried out their control [stop]. 

Now Di Serio was in the Volvo and the Fiat was being

driven by Vittorio Nisi. The search brought to light, concealed in the . . . Fiat Uno, 4 packs containing heroin weighing about 2 kg in all. Vittorio Nisi was placed under arrest,

while Di Serio was allowed to go. 

HAXHIAJ v. HACKMAN 11

Appeal: 07-6836 Doc: 39 Filed: 06/09/2008 Pg: 11 of 15
At 21.09 the same day, Eduart Tresa received confirmation from Armand Boka that the "transaction" had taken

place.

J.A. 524-25 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

This level of detail is clearly sufficient to satisfy the Treaty and

provide the requisite probable cause for the issuance of a certification

of extradition under § 3184. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court properly denied Haxhiaj’s petition for habeas relief. 

B.

Haxhiaj urges us to conclude that the extradition statute, apart from

the language of the Extradition Treaty between the United States and

Italy, requires the requesting nation to submit underlying trial evidence in support of an in absentia conviction. We disagree. 

A foreign conviction entered after a trial at which the defendant

was present suffices, in and of itself, to establish probable cause. See,

e.g., Spatola v. United States, 925 F.2d 615, 618 (2nd Cir. 1991);

Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States

§ 476 comment b (1987) ("With respect to persons whose extradition

is sought after conviction in the requesting state, the [probable cause]

requirement is met by proof of the judgment of conviction and, where

applicable, of sentence."). The extradition court need not "mak[e] an

independent assessment of the facts surrounding [the] offenses" and

may rely solely on a certified copy of the foreign conviction. Spatola,

925 F.2d at 618. Haxhiaj does not challenge this premise, which

appears to be widely accepted among the federal courts that have considered the issue. See, e.g., Sidali, 107 F.3d at 196; Spatola, 925 F.2d

at 618; Germany v. United States, ___ F.Supp.2d ___, 2007 WL

2581894, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2007); United States v. Clark, 470

F. Supp. 976, 978 (D. Vt. 1979). 

The principle that foreign convictions generally constitute probable

cause under § 3184 is rooted in comity. The duty to extradite internationally arises solely as a matter of treaty, see United States v.

Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 664 (1992), and the decision to

12 HAXHIAJ v. HACKMAN

Appeal: 07-6836 Doc: 39 Filed: 06/09/2008 Pg: 12 of 15
extradite is ultimately an executive function, see Martin v. Warden,

993 F.2d 824, 828 (11th Cir. 1993). "Extradition proceedings are

grounded in principles of international comity, which would be illserved by requiring foreign governments to submit their purposes and

procedures to the security of United States courts." Koskotas v.

Roche, 931 F.2d 169, 174 (1st Cir. 1991). To this end, "[q]uestions

about the procedural fairness of another sovereign’s justice system . . .

are within the purview of the executive branch," as are questions

about "whether the requesting nation is sincere in its demand for

extradition or is merely using the process as a subterfuge." Ordinola,

478 F.3d at 607 (Traxler, J., concurring). Therefore, we refrain "from

delving into and assessing the competence of the requesting government’s system of justice." Id. To then conclude that foreign convictions "do not constitute probable cause in the United States would

require United States judicial officers to review trial records and, consequently, substitute their judgment for that of foreign judges and

juries. Such an inquiry would be inconsistent with principles of comity." Spatola, 925 F.2d at 618. The primary tenet of comity is "that,

when possible, the decisions of foreign tribunals should be given

effect in domestic courts, since recognition fosters international cooperation and encourages reciprocity, thereby promoting predictability

and stability through satisfaction of mutual expectations." Id.

According to Haxhiaj, however, when the foreign conviction is in

absentia, this reasoning does not apply and evidence beyond the fact

of the foreign conviction itself is necessary to establish probable

cause. See Gallina, 278 F.2d at 78-79; Argento v. Horn, 241 F.2d 258,

259 n.1 (6th Cir. 1957); In re Extradition of D’Amico, 177 F. Supp.

648, 651 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). By and large, the precedents upon

which Haxhiaj relies treat in absentia convictions as nothing more

than charges of criminal wrongdoing, requiring the government to

present proof from which the magistrate judge can make an independent assessment of whether probable cause exists. See Argento, 241

F.2d at 264 n.1; see generally Bassiouni, supra, at 792 n.506 (collecting decisions in which a conviction in absentia "is regarded as a

charge, requiring independent proof of probable cause"). Underlying

the disparate treatment of a conviction rendered in absentia is the

notion that "a trial in absentia is not likely to be a fair trial," affording

the accused "no opportunity to confront the prosecution witnesses or

to present a defense" and providing no real "assistance in ascertaining

HAXHIAJ v. HACKMAN 13

Appeal: 07-6836 Doc: 39 Filed: 06/09/2008 Pg: 13 of 15
the probable guilt of the accused." Note, Foreign Trials in Absentia:

Due Process Objections to Unconditional Extradition, 13 Stan. L.

Rev. 370, 377 (1961); see Bassiouni, supra, at 792-95. 

In view of the record evidence in this case, it is unnecessary for us

to weigh in on the question of whether the fact of a foreign conviction, without more, can ever be sufficient to establish probable cause

under § 3184 when the conviction resulted from a trial conducted in

absentia.

2

 Even assuming that the fact of an in absentia conviction by

itself is an insufficient basis per se for a finding of probable cause,

the government presented more than just the fact of conviction. As

detailed previously, the excerpts from the appellate opinion go well

beyond the mere verdict, summarizing the underlying evidence

amassed against Haxhiaj and his co-conspirators. We have found

nothing in the body of extradition law to suggest that such independent evidence of probable cause must be the kind of "actual evidence"

Haxhiaj is seeking. 

In fact, general extradition procedures under § 3184 suggest precisely the opposite. The extradition hearing is not a full criminal trial.

See Peroff, 542 F.2d at 1249. Determining the ultimate guilt of the

accused, therefore, is a function committed to the justice system of

the requesting country. See Eain, 641 F.2d at 508; Bassiouni, supra,

at 879 ("Reliance on the probable cause standard reflects the universal

disinclination of the courts to transform the limited inquiry of the

extradition hearing into a trial on the merits."). A requirement that the

requesting government present "actual evidence" that it intended to

2The answer to this question is not necessarily as clear as Haxhiaj suggests. It seems debatable that the international comity justification for the

general rule that foreign convictions constitute probable cause under

§ 3184 would not include in absentia foreign convictions. To assume that

a foreign proceeding held in absentia is unfair and unreliable is essentially to "delv[e] into and assess[ ] the competence of the requesting government’s system of justice." Ordinola, 478 F.3d at 607 (Traxler, J.,

concurring). Questions about the legitimacy and procedural fairness of

the Italian justice system are for the executive branch, not the courts, to

ponder in determining whether to exercise its discretion to grant an extradition request. See United States v. Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 111 (1st

Cir. 1997). 

14 HAXHIAJ v. HACKMAN

Appeal: 07-6836 Doc: 39 Filed: 06/09/2008 Pg: 14 of 15
submit, or already had submitted, at trial is antithetical to the comity

basis that underlies extradition. Moreover, in light of the limited

nature of the extradition hearing, "certain evidentiary showings inadmissible at trial will be admitted." Bassiouni, supra, at 879. For example, courts have consistently concluded that hearsay is an acceptable

basis for a probable cause determination in the extradition context.

See, e.g., Emami v. United States, 834 F.2d 1444, 1451 (9th Cir.

1987); Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098, 1102 (5th Cir.

1980). Unsworn statements can be sufficient to support a probable

cause determination. See Afanasjev v. Hurlburt, 418 F.3d 1159, 1165

(11th Cir. 2005). And, the Federal Rules of Evidence do not even

apply to proceedings under § 3184. See Fed. R. Evid. 1101(d)(3). 

Clearly, the magistrate judge has a great amount of latitude in considering evidentiary support for an extradition request, and Haxhiaj

has not directed us to any authority that would reduce such latitude

in this particular case. We conclude that the evidentiary summary

contained within the opinion of the Court of Appeal of Milan is

within the scope of evidence that the extradition court may consider

in making its limited preliminary decision under § 3184. 

III.

For the foregoing reasons, the order of the district court denying

Haxhiaj’s habeas petition is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

HAXHIAJ v. HACKMAN 15

Appeal: 07-6836 Doc: 39 Filed: 06/09/2008 Pg: 15 of 15