Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-06-03047/USCOURTS-caDC-06-03047-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Carlos Curtis
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 20, 2007 Decided March 20, 2007

No. 06-3047

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

CARLOS CURTIS,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 03cr00533-01)

Thomas J. Saunders, appointed by the court, argued the

cause and filed the brief for appellant.

Elizabeth H. Danello, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Jeffrey A. Taylor,

U.S. Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese III, Cynthia G. Wright, and

Patricia Stewart, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: SENTELLE, RANDOLPH and BROWN, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.

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RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge: Defendant Carlos Curtis was a

pimp whose prostitutes included girls under the age of eighteen.

A jury convicted him on six counts of an indictment, including

two counts of sex trafficking of children in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 1591 and two counts of transportation of minors for

prostitution in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). In a proceeding

after United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), and

consistent with it, the district court found Curtis to be a career

offender and sentenced him to concurrent terms of life

imprisonment. Curtis’s appeal raises several issues, only two of

which warrant discussion: whether the district court should have

excluded evidence of his prior bad acts and whether he was

properly sentenced as a career offender. We have considered

and rejected his other arguments.

The bad acts evidence consisted of Curtis’s conviction in

New Jersey in 1998 for promoting prostitution of a minor. Over

Curtis’s objection, two New Jersey police officers testified about

his admission that he was the pimp of two minor girls he had

met on a “track” (a street where prostitutes gather). The

government also introduced a copy of the transcript of the

hearing in which Curtis entered a plea of guilty. Curtis has no

argument about the transcript. His claim is that the district court

should have excluded the officers’ testimony under Rule 403 of

the Federal Rules of Evidence, pursuant to which the court may

refuse to admit relevant evidence “if its probative value is

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . ..”

The risk, present in all cases in which prior bad acts are

admitted under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, is

that the jury might conclude “that because the defendant

committed some other crime, he must have committed the one

charged in the indictment.” United States v. Crowder, 141 F.3d

1202, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc). Given the nowuncontested introduction of the transcript of Curtis’s plea, we

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cannot see how the officers’ testimony could have heightened

the risk to a point that would have triggered Rule 403. The

transcript had Curtis admitting that he was a pimp and that some

of his prostitutes were minors. The live testimony added some

details about how Curtis operated as a pimp. The government

is, in general, permitted to determine how to present its case.

See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 186-89 (1997).

There may have been some overlap between the plea transcript

and the officers’ testimony, but the government is not limited to

one piece of evidence for each material fact. The district court

therefore did not abuse its discretion in allowing the officers’

testimony, particularly in light of its uncontested limiting

instruction. See United States v. Bowie, 232 F.3d 923, 926-27,

933 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

Under the “career offender” provisions of the United States

Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant with at least two prior felony

convictions of qualifying offenses receives a greatly enhanced

guideline sentence when convicted of another qualifying

offense. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. A qualifying offense is either a

“controlled substance offense” or a “crime of violence.” Id.

Curtis concedes that in 1998 he was convicted of a controlled

substance offense. But he contends his felony conviction for

promoting prostitution of a minor in violation of N.J. Stat. Ann.

§ 2C:34-1(b)(3) was not a crime of violence. 

The Guidelines define a “crime of violence” as:

any offense under federal or state law, punishable by

imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that –

(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or

threatened use of physical force against the person of

another, or

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(2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion,

involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves

conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical

injury to another.

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). In determining whether an offense is a

crime of violence, we evaluate the statutory definition of the

crime without considering the particular facts underlying the

defendant’s conviction. See United States v. Hill, 131 F.3d

1056, 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 

Since use of force is not an element of the New Jersey

offense, the question is whether promoting prostitution of a

minor “involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of

physical injury to another.” We conclude it does, as has the

other circuit to have decided the issue. See United States v.

Carter, 266 F.3d 1089, 1091 (9th Cir. 2001); see also United

States v. Battley, 2000 WL 1568149, at *1 (5th Cir. Sept. 11,

2000) (non-precedential decision). It is common knowledge,

confirmed in this case through expert testimony, that prostitutes

risk serious physical harm from customers and from their pimps.

A child prostitute is particularly vulnerable to such violence. In

addition, a pimp is complicit in the sex offense of the customer,

and courts have universally recognized that sex offenses against

minors are crimes of violence under the career offender

provision because of the substantial likelihood that the

perpetrator will use physical force to ensure the child’s

compliance. See, e.g., United States v. Pereira-Salmeron, 337

F.3d 1148, 1155 (9th Cir. 2003) (carnal knowledge with a child

under 15); United States v. Pierce, 278 F.3d 282, 289 (4th Cir.

2002) (taking indecent liberties with a minor); United States v.

Campbell, 256 F.3d 381, 396-97 (6th Cir. 2001) (incest with a

child between 13 and 16 years old); United States v. CoronadoCervantes, 154 F.3d 1242, 1244-45 (10th Cir. 1998) (sexual

contact with a minor); United States v. Meader, 118 F.3d 876,

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885 (1st Cir. 1997) (statutory rape of a child under 14); United

States v. Kirk, 111 F.3d 390, 395 (5th Cir. 1997) (indecency

with a child involving sexual contact); United States v. Shannon,

110 F.3d 382, 387-89 (7th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (sexual

intercourse with a 13-year-old). The district court therefore

correctly treated Curtis as a career offender.

Affirmed.

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