Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-09-30142/USCOURTS-ca5-09-30142-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Antonnio Pickett
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-30142

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff — Appellee,

v.

ANTONNIO PICKETT,

Defendant — Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

Before CLEMENT, PRADO, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Defendant Antonnio Pickett pleaded guilty to one count of possession of

child pornography. He appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to

suppress physical evidence and custodial statements. Pickett argues that the

warrantless search of his belongings by Immigration and Customs Enforcement

(“ICE”) agents was not justified by the “border search” exception to the Fourth

Amendment. We AFFIRM. 

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

The facts of this case are not in dispute. Pickett worked as a commercial

diver on the CM15, a pipelay/bury barge which was stationed at an oil and gas

production site thirty miles off the coast of Louisiana in international waters.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

March 2, 2010

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

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During the time Pickett was stationed on the CM15, ICE learned that Pickett

had subscribed to child pornography websites in December 2006 and January

2007. ICE also discovered that Pickett had an outstanding warrant for domestic

violence, and that he would be returning to shore on July 2, 2007. On July 2,

Pickett left the CM15 after ending his shift and boarded an offshore supply

vessel. He and five other passengers traveled a distance of approximately thirty

miles from Main Pass 296 through international waters to the

Martin-Mid-Stream Dock in Venice, Louisiana. When he arrived after the threehour voyage, a team of two ICE agents, four customs agents, and two

Plaquemines Parish Sheriff's deputies encountered Pickett when he docked in

Venice. ICE agents detained him and conducted a “secondary customs

inspection” of Pickett and the five other crew boat passengers. The agents relied

on the border search exception to view the contents of Pickett’s thumb drives,

portable hard drives, and laptop memory card. No warrant was obtained for the

search, which revealed several images of child pornography. Following the

search, Pickett waived his Miranda rights and admitted to accessing and

downloading the illegal pornographic images. Thereafter, agents obtained a

warrant for a more intrusive search and eventually found several hundred

illegal images and videos. 

Before the district court, Pickett moved to suppress the child pornography

images found during the search at the Venice dock, along with any statements

he made to law enforcement officers on that date. He also sought to suppress,

as fruits of an “illegal warrantless search,” those materials revealed in the

subsequent search which was conducted pursuant to a warrant. Pickett claimed

that he was entitled to have these materials suppressed because ICE agents did

not obtain a warrant for the July 2 search. He disputed the Government’s

argument that the warrantless search was justified under the “border search

exception,” as articulated in United States v. Stone, 659 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1981).

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He argued that the border search exception to the Fourth Amendment did not

apply to the agents’ search of his possessions on the theory that his voyage to

shore involved “no border crossing,” because it allegedly originated from a

“federal enclave.” Pickett contends that the CM15 was a “federal enclave” under

the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”), which extends adjacent state

law as adopted federal law to the “subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental

Shelf, and artificial islands and fixed structures erected thereon.” 43 U.S.C.

§ 1333 (a)(2)(A). Without deciding whether the CM15 was an OCSLA situs, and

therefore a federal enclave, the district court denied the motion. The court

reasoned that the border search exception applied because Pickett was “outside

the country, headed in,” and he crossed the border “from international waters.”

Preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress, Pickett pled

guilty to one count of possession of child pornography. He was sentenced to 87

months’ imprisonment. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“In an appeal of a denial of a motion to suppress evidence, ‘we review the

district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions, including

its ultimate conclusion as to the constitutionality of the law enforcement action,

de novo.’” United States v. Harris, 566 F.3d 422, 433 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting

United States v. Chavez, 281 F.3d 479, 483 (5th Cir. 2002)). We view the

evidence presented at the suppression hearing in the “light most favorable to the

prevailing party.” Id.

DISCUSSION

The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be

secure in their persons . . . and effects, against unreasonable searches and

seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable

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 Pickett never disputed whether the search of his laptop and external hard drives was 1

“routine.”

 In Stone, the district court rejected the argument that the border search exception

2

applied, though it upheld the motion to suppress on the ground that “the existence of probable

cause and exigent circumstances rendered the search fully reasonable under the [F]ourth

[A]mendment.” 659 F.2d at 570. We affirmed on different grounds, for the reasons stated

above.

4

cause.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “[W]arrantless searches and seizures are

unreasonable per se unless they fall within a few narrowly defined exceptions.”

United States v. Rivas, 157 F.3d 364, 367 (5th Cir. 1998). The border search is

one such exception, and it has a “history as old as the fourth amendment itself.”

United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977). The border search exception

permits a government officer at an international border to conduct a “routine”

search and seizure, “without probable cause or a warrant, in order to regulate

the collection of duties and to prevent the introduction of contraband into this

country.” United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985)

(citation omitted). “A border search need not take place at the actual border.” 1

United States v. Stone, 659 F.2d 569, 572 (5th Cir. 1980). The search may take

place at “‘the functional equivalent of the border,’ such as the port where a ship

docks in this country after entering our territorial waters from abroad.” Id.

(quoting United States v. Prince, 491 F.2d 655 (5th Cir. 1974)).

Pickett argues that because ICE agents knew he was returning to shore

from a “federal enclave,” the border search exception was inapplicable to the

search of his belongings at the dock. We reject this argument as foreclosed by

our decision in Stone. 659 F.2d 569. In Stone, we held that the “critical fact” we

must look to in determining whether the border search exception applies is

“whether or not a border crossing has occurred,”—not the point of origin of the

defendant’s journey. 659 F.2d at 573. Stone involved a border search of a small 2

aircraft, which was intercepted flying low from international airspace toward

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See Stone, 659 F.2d at 573 (noting that customs officers could, “with complete 3

impunity,” search and inspect such objects as “fishing vessels, which, although they have not

departed from foreign territory, have crossed the border.”).

5

Florida. When the plane landed at Orlando International Airport, agents

conducted a warrantless border search that revealed several hundred pounds of

narcotics. Id. at 571. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence on the

ground that the border exception did not apply because the Government had

failed to “demonstrate not only that a border has been crossed but, additionally,

that the entering craft has left foreign land.” Id. We rejected the defendant’s

argument as “tenable neither in law or logic,” recognizing that “in no case has

a border search been invalidated because the object’s departure from foreign soil

was not demonstrated.” Id. at 573. In so holding, we affirmed that the

applicability of the border search exception “rests on the ‘critical fact’ of whether

or not a border crossing has occurred.” Id. at 573 (quoting Ramsey, 431 U.S. at

620 (emphasis added)). 

Pickett has failed to distinguish the instant case from Stone. He argues

that Stone does not control because here, unlike in Stone, the Government knew

that the defendant was traveling to the United States from a federal enclave. 

This distinction is immaterial. Stone holds that defendant’s point of origin is

irrelevant to the constitutionality of a border search so long as a border crossing

has occurred. As such, the government’s knowledge of that point of origin is

equally irrelevant. We likewise reject Pickett’s argument that no “border

crossing” occurs where a defendant enters the United States after crossing

international waters if he departs from a domestic point of origin. Our precedent

establishes that a border crossing occurs whenever a vessel crosses from

international waters into the United States, regardless of the defendant’s

departure point. 

3

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 We do not decide whether the CM15 is actually a “federal enclave” for the purposes 4

of 43 U.S.C. § 1333(2)(a), because the characterization of the defendant’s point of

origin—whether foreign or domestic—is irrelevant to the applicability of the border search

exception when the defendant enters the United States from international waters. Stone, 659

F.2d at 573. 

See United States v. Garcia, 672 F.2d 1349, 1357-58 (11th Cir. 1982) (noting, in a case 5

interpreting Stone, that the court “would not be prepared to uphold . . . a search of an aircraft

whose known points of origin and landing were within the United States simply by virtue of

the fact that the plane had passed over international waters” since unlike boats, planes were

unlikely to rendevous with contraband en route). The case before us presents no cause to

examine any purported distinctions between air and sea travel for purposes of the Fourth

Amendment, and we express no opinion on the matter. We also find inapposite Pickett’s cited

cases interpreting the federal drug importation statute, 21 U.S.C. § 952(a). These cases

concern matters of statutory interpretation, and their holdings are not material to our Fourth

Amendment analysis.

6

Even assuming, arguendo, that the CM15 was an OCSLA situs and Pickett

did depart from a federal enclave, there is no doubt that the border search was 4

proper because Pickett crossed the border from “international waters” en route

to the dock in Louisiana. Pickett suggests we consider his voyage akin to a flight

over international waters between known domestic points of origin—a situation

which a sister circuit has suggested merits different treatment under the Fourth

Amendment due to the substantially diminished likelihood of bringing aboard

contraband mid-journey while on an airplane. This comparison is spurious, as 5

Pickett traveled by boat on his three-hour voyage to shore, and it is not difficult

to imagine picking up contraband while crossing open waters. We therefore

conclude that the border search of Pickett’s belongings was justified where it is

undisputed that he entered the United States by boat from international waters.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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EDITH BROWN CLEMENT, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment only.

Pickett’s sole argument on appeal is that there was no “border crossing”

within the meaning of Stone because he moved to shore from a federal enclave

as defined in OCSLA and government agents were aware that he had not made

an intervening stop in a foreign country. Confronting this argument requires, as

a first step, that we determine whether CM15 is an OCSLA situs and thus a

federal enclave in international waters. Applying longstanding Fifth Circuit

precedents, I would hold that CM15 is not an OCSLA situs and affirm the

district court on this ground, without reaching the question whether we may

consider point of origin in Fourth Amendment border search cases. 

Our cases have recognized a basic distinction regarding the application of

OCSLA: for a rig or platform to be a federal enclave in international waters, it

must be “erected” upon the Outer Continental Shelf (“OCS”); OCSLA does not

apply to vessels that float on the water. See 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1) (noting that

OCSLA does not apply to “a ship or vessel”). In Longmire v. Sea Drilling Corp.,

we stated that 

OCSLA covers fixed platform workers, while floating rig workers,

even those whose tasks are essentially identical to the tasks

performed by fixed platform workers, are treated differently. The

reason for the different treatment of fixed and floating rig workers

is that floating rigs are treated like vessels while fixed platforms

are considered “artificial islands.”

610 F.2d 1342, 1348 (5th Cir. 1980) (footnote omitted). Likewise, in Parks v.

Dowell Division of Dow Chemical Corp., we held that OCSLA did not govern the

claim of a worker who performed a substantial part of his work aboard “a

floating barge-like structure used for transporting and housing men and

equipment on and over water,” even when the vessel was attached to a fixed

platform. 712 F.2d 154, 157 (5th Cir. 1983). As we noted in that case, OCSLA

does not apply to “vessel[s] designed to float on water.” Id. at 158. This

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distinction between floating rigs and fixed rigs also drove our opinion in Demette

v. Falcon Drilling Co., Inc., where we held that a jack-up rig is erected within

the meaning of OCSLA when the rig is jacked up and its legs are resting upon

the OCS, even temporarily. 280 F.3d 492, 498 (5th Cir. 2002), overruled on other

grounds, Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc. v. Seacor Marine, LLC, 589 F.3d 778 (5th Cir.

2009). In that case, we also noted that “[a]lthough arguably an anchor

‘attache[s]’ a ship to the seabed, a tender, unlike a jack-up rig, is not ‘erected’ on

the OCS.” Id. at 500 n.28 (second alteration in original). See also Becker v.

Tidewater, Inc., 581 F.3d 256, 264-66 (5th Cir. 2009) (applying Demette).

CM15 is not a fixed platform. Nor is it a jack-up rig. As was undisputed at

the evidentiary hearing, it is a 220-foot barge, powered by a tug boat, that moves

from point to point on the open seas as frequently as every thirty minutes. When

it is working, the vessel drops eight large anchors to stabilize its position but is

not erected on the OCS within the meaning of Demette. In this sense, it is

indistinguishable from the floating barges at issue in both Longmire and Parks.

CM15 also fits squarely within the maritime law definition of “vessel” as a

“watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a

means of transportation on water.” 1 U.S.C. § 3. The fact that CM15 is not a

traditional boat, or that it does not power itself, is irrelevant. Courts have

defined a number of non-traditional craft as “vessels.” See, e.g., Stewart v. Dutra

Const. Co., 543 U.S. 481 (2005) (floating dredge with limited means of selfpropulsion); Holmes v. Atlantic Sounding Co., Inc., 437 F.3d 441, 448-49 (5th Cir.

2006) (housing barge incapable of self-propulsion); Bunch v. Canton Marine

Towing Co., Inc., 419 F.3d 868, 873-74 (8th Cir. 2005) (cleaning barge attached

to the river bed by poles); Burks v. Am. River Transp. Co., 679 F.2d 69, 75 (5th

Cir. 1982) (drilling barge and submerged barge in use as a drilling platform);

Marine Drilling Co. v. Austin, 363 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1966) (not reversing jury

finding that a submersible drilling barge “stabilized in navigable water” was a

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 The en banc opinion in Grand Isle had not been issued at the time Pickett filed his 1

briefs. The en banc court affirmed the district court, which the panel had reversed. Regardless,

Grand Isle was never applicable to Pickett’s case because it dealt with how to determine situs

in cases arising out of contract claims.

9

vessel); Producers Drilling Co. v. Gray, 361 F.2d 432, 433 (5th Cir. 1966)

(submersible drilling barge “resting on the bottom of a canal”); Kibadeaux v.

Standard Dredging Co., 81 F.2d 670, 673-74 (5th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 299

U.S. 549 (1936) (floating dredge without self-propulsion connected to shore by

pontoons). 

Pickett cites to Union Tex. Petroleum Corp. v. PLT Eng’g, Inc., 895 F.2d

1043 (5th Cir. 1990) and to Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc. v. Seacor Marine, LLC, 543

F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2008), rev’d en banc, 589 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2009), in support

of his argument that CM15 is an OCSLA situs. These cases do not support 1

Pickett’s position. In both cases, the court was attempting to determine whether

the OCSLA situs requirement was met where the claims arose from contractual

agreements. In this criminal appeal, however, there is no dispute that the

relevant location for determining whether Pickett departed from an OCSLA

situs is CM15.

CM15 is not an OCSLA situs and it was working within international

waters. When Pickett moved from CM15 to shore, he moved from international

waters into United States territorial waters, crossing the United States border

as he did so. This movement is indistinguishable from that in Stone, in which the

defendant moved from international airspace to domestic airspace and was

stopped and searched at the functional equivalent of the border.

The per curiam opinion holds that Pickett crossed the border within the

meaning of Stone regardless of whether he departed from a federal enclave,

concluding that the point of origin preceding a border crossing makes no

difference in the constitutional analysis. This is an issue of first impression in

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 The per curiam opinion attempts to reserve the question whether there is a distinction 2

to be made between crossing the border by boat and crossing it by plane. But a fair reading of

the per curiam opinion is that under Stone, because point of origin is not relevant to whether

a border crossing has occurred, ICE agents can indeed conduct warrantless searches of

passengers on a flight that takes off in Miami, crosses into international airspace over the Gulf

of Mexico, and lands in Houston. Regardless of whether the court were to accept such a

premise—one that three circuits have cast serious doubt upon—I believe that the facts of this

case do not require us to reach this question, especially given the cursory briefing before us.

Stone certainly does not compel this conclusion. There is language in Stone suggesting

that the border search exception is broad enough to apply to movement from a domestic site

through international space and across the border. This language is dicta. The issue in Stone

was whether the border search exception applied in a case where the point of origin was

unclear. 659 F.2d at 573. The court held that it did. In this case, the point of origin is clearly

foreign territory, because CM15 is not an OCSLA situs. There is no reason to expand the

holding of Stone, and especially to venture into unsure constitutional waters, when Stone

already suffices to decide this case. 

10

 this circuit and it is not an easy one. Two circuits have considered a similar

question and have concluded that point of origin does matter in determining

whether there has been a border crossing for purposes of the drug importation

statute. See United States v. Cabaccang, 332 F.3d 622, 626-27 (9th Cir. 2003) (en

banc) (rejecting contention that drugs shipped by air from California to Guam

were imported from “place outside” United States because they moved through

international airspace); United States v. Ramirez-Ferrer, 82 F.3d 1131, 1135 (1st

Cir. 1996) (en banc) (rejecting contention that statute is applicable to movement

from international waters to domestic waters “without regard to the ‘place’ from

which the shipment actually originated”); see also United States v. Garcia, 672

F.2d 1349, 1357 (11th Cir. 1982) (casting doubt on assertion that “point of origin

has no bearing on the reasonableness of a search so long as a border crossing has

been established”). The per curiam opinion’s holding is not only unnecessary, but

creates a circuit split. The defendant’s argument on appeal rests on the 2

assertion that CM15 is an OCSLA situs. That assertion is untenable. The

doctrine of constitutional avoidance suggests that we should decide the case on

the well-traversed ground of our OCSLA precedents, and leave the difficult

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constitutional question for another day when it is squarely before us.

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