Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-01178/USCOURTS-caDC-96-01178-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Federal Aviation Administration
Respondent
Donald J. Jackson
Petitioner
National Transportation Safety Board
Respondent

Document Text:

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 27, 1997 Decided June 3, 1997

No. 96-1178

DONALD J. JACKSON,

PETITIONER

v.

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD AND 

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,

RESPONDENTS

On Petition for Review of an Order of the 

National Transportation Safety Board

Robert P. Silverberg argued the cause for the petitioner. 

Barbara J. Stob was on brief.

Susan S. Caron, Attorney, Federal Aviation Administration, argued the cause for the respondents. Kathleen A. 

Yodice and Timothy P. Melcher, Attorneys, Federal Aviation 

Administration were on brief. Robert P. Vente, Counsel, 

Federal Aviation Administration entered an appearance.

USCA Case #96-1178 Document #276208 Filed: 06/03/1997 Page 1 of 9
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

1

Section 91.123(a) provides in relevant part: "When an [Air 

Traffic Control] clearance has been obtained, no pilot in command 

may deviate from that clearance unless an amended clearance is 

obtained, an emergency exists, or the deviation is in response to a 

traffic alert and collision avoidance system resolution advisory." 14 

C.F.R. § 91.123(a). 

2

Section 91.13(a) provides:

(a) Aircraft operations for the purpose of air navigation. No 

person may operate an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of another.

4 C.F.R. § 91.13. 

Before: GINSBURG, SENTELLE and HENDERSON, Circuit 

Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Petitioner 

Donald J. Jackson seeks review of an order of the National 

Transportation Safety Board (NTSB or Board) affirming an 

oral decision and order of the Administrative Law Judge 

(ALJ) which in turn affirmed the finding of the Federal 

Aviation Administration (FAA) that Jackson violated two air 

safety regulations: 14 C.F.R. § 91.123(a), which prohibits a 

pilot in command from deviating from a transmitted clearance,1

and 14 C.F.R. § 91.13(a), which prohibits any person 

from operating an aircraft "in a careless or reckless manner 

so as to endanger the life or property of another."2Jackson 

does not contest the facts underlying the violations: while 

pilot in command of a commercial aircraft he misinterpreted 

an Air Traffic Control (ATC) traffic advisory as a clearance 

instruction, causing his aircraft to ascend about 900 feet 

above its authorized clearance. Jackson contends, however, 

that he should not be charged with a violation because the 

controller failed to secure adequate confirmation from the 

aircraft that the message had been correctly received and 

because he reasonably relied on his first officer's identical 

misinterpretation of the transmission. In addition, he maintains that the FAA failed to establish an independent violation of 14 C.F.R. § 91.13(a). While we agree with Jackson 

USCA Case #96-1178 Document #276208 Filed: 06/03/1997 Page 2 of 9
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

that the controller violated ATC's published (if widely flouted) 

radio guidelines, we conclude that neither the controller's nor 

the first officer's errors excuse Jackson's own breach of his 

duty to attentively monitor ATC communications. We also 

conclude that the finding of a section 91.13(a) violation must 

be upheld as "derivative" of the section 91.123(a) violation. 

Accordingly we deny the petition for review.

I.

The material facts, as established before the ALJ, are 

largely undisputed.

On February 13, 1993 Jackson was pilot in command of 

American Airlines Flight 1206 from New York City to Toronto. On this leg of the journey First Officer Roger Ellison was 

the "flying pilot" and Jackson was the "nonflying pilot" with 

primary responsibility for monitoring radio communications.

Upon departure from LaGuardia Airport in New York, the 

aircraft was cleared by Air Traffic Control to "climb to 16,000 

feet, fly to GAYEL intersection and contact New York Center." Exhibits to Appendix (App. Exh.) 126. This was not 

the clearance Jackson expected and as a result he and Ellison 

began searching through aeronautical charts to locate it.

While occupied with the charts, Jackson radioed New York 

Center as he had been instructed and received the following 

advisory from ATC: "American twelve zero six New York 

roger stand by for climb a traffic at five o'clock and eight 

miles northwest bound at one seven thousand a seven forty 

seven clear of traffic I'll have higher for you." App. Exh. 298. 

The ALJ found this message was a "clear and unambiguous" 

advisory that another aircraft was approaching at 17,000 feet. 

Jackson testified, however, that he "was quite busy at the 

time" and when he heard the words  'clear,' and 'climb' and 

'17,000 feet,' " it was his "perception" that he "was cleared to 

climb to 17,000 feet." App. Exh. 129. Jackson further 

testified that he verified the new altitude clearance with 

Ellison and then transmitted the following response to the 

controller: "American 1206 cleared to one-seven-thousand 

feet." App. Exh. 130. Ellison corroborated Jackson's testiUSCA Case #96-1178 Document #276208 Filed: 06/03/1997 Page 3 of 9
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

3At the time of the incident Kurz was supervising a trainee, 

Michael Langguth, who actually transmitted most of the messages. 

mony regarding both his verification and his response. No 

such response can be heard on the ATC radio message 

recording but, instead, approximately nine seconds after the 

advisory there is a "click" perhaps followed by a short 

utterance. Michael Kurz, the air traffic controller on duty at 

the time,3testified that he heard a click immediately after the 

advisory was transmitted and interpreted the sound as an 

"acknowledgment" that the pilot "had heard the traffic call." 

App. Exh. 18, 23-24. Although Kurz, FAA Aviation Safety 

Inspector Theodore Secola and Jackson's expert witness, 

American Airlines air traffic control coordinator Samuel 

Smith, all testified that some pilots use a simple click or 

"roger" to acknowledge receipt of a transmission, Jackson 

stated unequivocally that it was his "day-in/day-out practice 

to read back all clearances" and that "no pilot will leave an 

altitude to a new assigned altitude without reading back the 

clearance." App. Exh. 134-35. He offered the following 

explanation for the lack of response on the recording:

[T]here's a lot of reasons this couldn't come through. It 

is an imperfect system, our radio system, you know that. 

Mr. Secola knows that. All of our people know that. My 

finger could have slipped off the button. The transthe 

receiver at the ATC center may not have received it. I 

don't know what happened.

App. Exh. at 156-57. Smith similarly testified that "[t]here 

are many things that cause transmissions not to be heard. I 

mean you can, you can go down a list. The radio not working 

properly, the mike not working properly, or whatever." App. 

Exh. 210.

As a result of the pilots' misinterpretation, their aircraft 

ascended ultimately to 16,900 feet which, as the FAA asserted 

and the ALJ agreed, resulted in "a potential danger ... 

caused by the loss of separation between the two aircraft 

potential danger due to the loss of separation with the other 

aircraft." App. 25. When the controller observed the airUSCA Case #96-1178 Document #276208 Filed: 06/03/1997 Page 4 of 9
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

4

"The [Aviation Safety Reporting Program] allows pilots who 

timely file an incident report with NASA, to escape any certificate 

suspension stemming from that incident, provided that, among 

other things, the violation was inadvertent and not deliberate. See 

FAA Advisory Circular, AC No. 00-46C ¶ 9(c)(1) (Feb. 4, 1985)." 

Richards v. Halbert, NTSB Order No. EA-3628, 1992 WL 187824, 

*2 (1992). 

craft's ascent, he transmitted instructions to "maintain" the 

previously cleared 16,000-foot altitude and Ellison and Jackson immediately complied.

On June 16, 1994, the FAA issued an order suspending 

Jackson's pilot certificate for 90 days based on his violation of 

14 C.F.R. §§ 91.123(a) and 91.13(a). Jackson appealed the 

suspension and on September 28, 1994, after a full hearing, 

the ALJ issued his oral decision affirming the FAA's finding 

of both violations but imposing no sanction because Jackson 

had filed a timely report of the incident in accordance with 

the Aviation Safety Reporting Program.4Jackson appealed 

the ALJ's decision to the NTSB which, by opinion and order 

dated July 18, 1995, affirmed the ALJ. By order dated 

March 19, 1996 the NTSB denied Jackson's motion for reconsideration. Jackson petitions for review of the Board's decisions.

II.

Jackson offers three grounds for overturning the NTSB's 

decisions. We find none of them persuasive.

First, Jackson contends that his misinterpretation of the 

advisory should be excused under NTSB precedent holding 

that "even if a deviation from a clearance is initiated by an 

inadvertent mistake on the pilot's part, that mistake will be 

excused and no violation will be found if, after the mistake, 

the pilot takes actions that, but for ATC, would have exposed 

the error and allowed for it to be corrected." Hinson v. 

Atkins & Richards, NTSB Order EA-4078, 1994 WL 49589, 

*2 (1994) (citing Del Balzo v. Frohmuth & Dworak, NTSB 

Order EA-3816, 1993 WL 75479 (1993)). In denying reconsideration in Atkins, however, the Board explained: "In our 

USCA Case #96-1178 Document #276208 Filed: 06/03/1997 Page 5 of 9
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

5

In Frohmuth, the Board emphasized:

We do not by any means intend that our decision here affirming the law judge be read to minimize the importance of careful 

attention to tower transmissions, or to suggest that pilots will, 

as a general rule, not be held accountable when they mistakenly believe that a particular clearance has been given them.

NTSB Order EA-3816, 1993 WL 75479 at *2. 

6The Board observed that "[n]o other plausible explanation for 

ATC's non-receipt of the readback was offered," App. 42, noting 

that "[t]here is no squelch or squeal, which would indicate a 

'blocked' transmission due to two or more aircraft transmitting at 

once," App. 36 n.6, and "[t]here was no evidence ... of an equipment malfunction," App. 37. 

view, this decision emphasizes the importance to be placed on 

readbacks, and only reflects our concern that, as we noted 

recently in Administrator v. Swafford and Coleman, NTSB 

Order No. EA-4117 at 7 (1994), '[a] readback would be futile 

if the controller who is receiving it fails to listen carefully and 

assure that it is consistent with his instruction.' " 1994 WL 

238999 at *1 (quoting Swafford at 7).5 Consistent with that 

characterization, the Board reasonably concluded here that 

"the record in this case does not support a finding that 

respondent took appropriate action to expose his error" because "even assuming that respondent attempted a complete 

read back, we think the most favorable inference that can be 

drawn from this record is that it was not heard by FAA 

because, as respondent himself suggested, he failed to properly depress the microphone button." App. 41-42.6

We nevertheless agree with Jackson that Kurz acted improperly when he accepted the click as acknowledgment of 

the advisory. Guideline 2-72 in the ATC Handbook directs 

air traffic controllers as follows: "When issuing clearances, 

instructions, or information, ensure acknowledgment by the 

pilot." While the same guideline authorizes pilots to "acknowledge clearances, instructions, or other information by 

using 'Wilco,' 'Roger,' 'Affirmative,' or other words or remarks," it nowhere sanctions use or acceptance of a click to 

USCA Case #96-1178 Document #276208 Filed: 06/03/1997 Page 6 of 9
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

7Kurz repeatedly described what he heard as a simple "click." 

See App. Exh. 17-18 ("It was, I know it says 'unintelligible,' it was 

like a click. You can't even say 'unintelligible' in the amount of time 

you heard it. I thought he just clicked to me, like clicked the 

microphone."); 24 ("That was just like a click. It sounds like a click 

to me...."). Only once,and belatedlydid he suggest "or maybe 

it was a quick Roger." App. Exh. 24. And in fact the NTSB 

expressly found: "The only audible response is the click of a 

microphone, and what sounds like a very short (unintelligible) word 

or portion of a word." App. 36. 

acknowledge any sort of communication.7 Further, Guideline 

4-31(b) in the Airman's Information Manual states in part: 

"It is essential ... that pilots acknowledge each radio communication with ATC by using the appropriate aircraft call 

sign." There was no call sign or any other craft identification 

in the brief transmission received by ATC. Kurz testified 

that he merely "assumed" it was from Flight 1206 because 

"we talked directly to the plane and had a response right 

away to our communication with the plane." App. Exh. 45-

46. Such an assumption was not only unwarranted but 

potentially dangerous as well.

Even more disturbing than ATC's dereliction here is 

NTSB's reaction to it. The Board conceded below that 

transmission and acceptance of a "click" in response to an 

advisory violates both Guideline 2-72 and Guideline 4-31(b). 

See App. 42-43. Yet at the same time, the Board premised 

its decision to affirm in part on its view that the controller 

acted not unreasonably when he accepted the anonymous 

click as a valid acknowledgment. See App. 42. ("Nor can we 

agree that the controller's acceptance of a microphone click or 

quick 'roger' as an acknowledgment of his advisory was 

improper to an extent that would excuse this violation. The 

preponderance of the evidence indicates that abbreviated 

acknowledgments of this sort are often used by pilots, and 

accepted by ATC...."). On reconsideration the Board went 

even further. While stopping short of "endorsing" the practice, it "recognize(d) that there was nothing aberrant in the 

controller's handling of the matter, given what the record in 

this case suggests is a prevailing industry custom." App. 92-

USCA Case #96-1178 Document #276208 Filed: 06/03/1997 Page 7 of 9
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

8Throughout, the NTSB and the FAA have suggested some 

meaningful distinction between "courtesy" information such as the 

traffic advisory here and what they apparently consider more 

important transmissions such as clearances. Guideline 2-72, however, draws no such distinction and we see no reason why a matter 

important enough to bring to a pilot's attention during flight should 

not require a clear acknowledgment if for no other reason than to 

prevent an occurrence similar to this one.

9Administrator v. Coleman, 3 N.T.S.B. 349 (1968), Administrator v. Thomas, 3 N.T.S.B. 349 (1977); Administrator v. Leenerts, 6 

N.T.S.B. 725 (1988). 

10In Administrator v. Buboltz, NTSB Order No. EA-3907 (1993), 

the NTSB set out the criteria necessary for invoking a reliance 

defense generally:

We have held that, in general, the pilot in command is responsible for the overall safe operation of the aircraft and that he can 

avoid responsibility for a violation only if: a particular task is 

the responsibility of another; he has no independent obligation 

or ability to ascertain the information; and he has no reason to 

question the other's performance.

NTSB Order No. EA-3907, 1993 WL 226110, *2 (1993) (emphasis 

added) (citing Administrator v. Fay and Takacs, NTSB Order No. 

EA-3501 at 9 (1992)). 

93 n.1.8 The Board's apparent acceptance of a practice that 

disregards the FAA's published guidelinesand that can so 

readily lead, as here, to a potentially hazardous situationis 

incomprehensible and indefensible.

But, returning to the narrow issues before us today, we 

next reject Jackson's argument that the violations should be 

vacated because he reasonably relied on Ellison's identical 

misinterpretation of the advisory. In the three Board decisions Jackson cites in support,9

it was the consulted pilot, not 

the pilot in command, who was the officer responsible for 

monitoring communications, while here, as we have stated, 

Jackson was himself the pilot with that responsibility. We 

therefore conclude that the NTSB properly held, based on its 

own precedent, that "the reliance defense is not available 

under these circumstances, since [Jackson] was the pilot 

whose original duty it was to handle and receive ATC radio 

communications." App. 43-44 (citing Del Balzo v. De Back,

NTSB Order No. EA-3843 (1993)).10

USCA Case #96-1178 Document #276208 Filed: 06/03/1997 Page 8 of 9
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

11We summarily reject Jackson's repeated contention that there 

was no evidence or finding of "carelessness." As the Board noted, 

the ALJ "concluded that the misunderstanding occurred only because respondent and his first officer were 'wholly preoccupied' with 

their navigational charts" App. 38, and this is supported by the 

evidence. The Board itself concluded: "That the crew was required 

to consult aeronautical charts in order to comply with those instructions does not excuse them from continuing to listen closely to ATC 

transmissions." App. 40 (quoting Administrator v. McIntosh &

Spriggs, NTSB Order No. EA-4174 at 5-6 (1994): "We have often 

emphasized that the pilot-in-command of a passenger-carrying 

flight in air transportation is held to the highest degree of care. 

Consistent with this high degree of care, it is not unreasonable to 

expect such a pilot to appropriately prioritize, and fulfill, competing 

duties."). 

Finally, Jackson argues that the Board erroneously found a 

separate, "non-derivative" violation of section 91.13(a). The 

Board's decision, however, characterizes the section 91.13(a) 

violation as "residual or derivative" based on the established 

section 91.123 violation. App. 45.11 As such the section 

91.13(a) violation is sustainable under Board precedent. See 

Administrator v. Clark, 7 N.T.S.B. 434, 436 (1990); Administrator v. Buller, 6 N.T.S.B. 31, 32 (1988).

For the preceding reasons, the petition for review is

Denied.

USCA Case #96-1178 Document #276208 Filed: 06/03/1997 Page 9 of 9