Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-02783/USCOURTS-ca8-03-02783-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Carlus L. Phillips
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-2783

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Western

* District of Missouri.

Carlus L. Phillips, *

*

Defendant - Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: October 29, 2004

Filed: December 6, 2004

___________

Before MURPHY, HANSEN, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

___________

MURPHY, Circuit Judge.

Carlus L. Phillips pled guilty to possession of crack cocaine with intent to

distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B). The district court

sentenced him to 252 months after departing upward. Phillips appeals, arguing that

the district court erred by failing to warn him it could depart from the sentencing

guidelines and that the government breached the plea agreement by moving for an

upward departure. He asks that he be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea, relief

sought and denied in the district court. We affirm.

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In order to be entitled to withdraw his plea at the sentencing stage, Phillips had

to show that the violation constituted a "fair and just reason for requesting

withdrawal." See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B).

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Phillips was arrested after several sales of crack cocaine to a confidential

informant. His plea agreement anticipated that he would be held responsible for

between 38 and 61.52 grams of crack cocaine and a criminal history category of VI.

After he entered a guilty plea, a Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) was

prepared, and it calculated his offense level at 29 and assigned a criminal history

category of V. The PSR estimated a sentencing range of 140-175 months, but it noted

that the court could depart upward if it found the criminal history category did not

reflect the seriousness of Phillips' past criminal conduct or the likelihood that he

would commit future crimes. The government moved for an upward departure. It

argued that the criminal history category assigned in the PSR was inadequate in light

of Phillips' gang affiliation, seven municipal offenses involving violence or the

presence of a weapon, and twenty nine unadjudicated incidents, including alleged

murder and rape. The government urged the court to depart upward by assessing

Phillips' criminal history category at VI and then setting his offense level at 36 or

higher to authorize a sentence of 360 months.

At the sentencing hearing Phillips moved to withdraw his guilty plea on the

grounds that the government had violated the plea agreement by moving for an

upward departure.1

 The district court denied his motion. It stated that the

government's motion to depart upward did not violate the plea agreement but that

even if it had, the proper remedy would be to deny the motion rather than allowing

withdrawal of the guilty plea. It then proceeded to sentencing. Although the court

declined to consider Phillips' unadjudicated conduct, it found that he represented a

danger to society and that past punishments had not motivated him to change his

behavior. Based on these findings, the court granted the government's motion to

depart upward, and it assigned Phillips an offense level of 32 and a criminal history

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category of VI, resulting in a range of 210-262 months. It sentenced him to 252

months.

Phillips filed a notice of appeal, and his counsel filed a brief and moved to

withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Following its own

review under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988), this court denied the motion to

withdraw and instructed Phillips' counsel to submit an additional brief addressing two

issues: (1) whether the district court's Rule 11 violation amounted to plain error

affecting Phillips' substantial rights and (2) whether the government violated the plea

agreement by moving for an upward departure.

Phillips argues that, by failing to warn him that it had the discretion to depart

from the sentencing guidelines, the district court violated Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 11 and substantially affected his rights. At the change of plea proceeding,

the district court advised Phillips that his maximum sentence would be 40 years. The

court also warned Phillips that it could decide not to adopt terms in the plea

agreement and that he could not withdraw his plea if the resulting sentence were

higher than he anticipated. The district court did not specifically say, however, that

it had the discretion to depart from the guidelines. This omission was a violation of

Rule 11(b)(1)(M), which requires a court to inform the defendant that it has

"discretion to depart from [the sentencing] guidelines under some circumstances." 

Because Phillips did not raise his Rule 11 argument in the trial court, we

review the district court's actions for plain error. United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55,

58-59 (2002). Phillips has the burden on plain error review to show that his

substantial rights were affected. Id. at 63. To satisfy this burden, an appellant

claiming plain error under Rule 11 must "show a reasonable probability that, but for

the error, he would not have entered the plea." United States v. Dominguez Benitez,

124 S. Ct. 2333, 2340 (2004).

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Although Phillips says he would have gone to trial instead of pleading guilty

if he had known of the possibility of a departure, he has not established this by a

reasonable probability. The district court informed Phillips of the consequences of

pleading guilty despite not following the exact requirements of Rule 11. The risk of

receiving a higher sentence was also discussed in the plea agreement, which Phillips

acknowledged he had read and understood. Phillips was put on notice that he could

receive a higher sentence than anticipated, and he has not shown that he would have

made a different decision had he known of the particular mechanism by which the

higher sentence could be imposed. Cf. United States v. Molzen, 382 F.3d 805, 807

(8th Cir. 2004) (affirming where appellant was not advised in plea colloquy that he

might have to pay $10,000 in restitution, but was advised that he might be fined up

to $2,000,000). We conclude that there was no plain error that substantially affected

Phillips' rights.

Phillips also argues that the government’s upward departure motion violated

the plea agreement. In an oral motion to withdraw his plea made at the sentencing

hearing, he claimed that the government's departure motion violated ¶¶ 10(a) and

10(d) of the plea agreement. Paragraph 10(a) stated that the court would determine

drug quantity and the related offense level. Paragraph 10(d) stated that the parties

anticipated that Phillips would be in category VI, but that the court would determine

the criminal history category. The district court did not err when it determined that

the government's motion did not violate either of these plea agreement provisions.

On appeal Phillips' main contention is that the upward departure motion

violated the spirit of the plea agreement. He claims that the government always knew

of his background, but nonetheless induced him to plead guilty by forecasting that he

would be in criminal history category VI. The court ultimately assigned him category

VI, as the plea agreement had anticipated, so this complaint is without merit.

Furthermore, the parties had agreed in ¶11 of the plea agreement that they could

"advocate any position at the sentencing hearing regarding any sentencing issues not

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Phillips has requested leave to file a supplemental brief on the applicability of

Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), but we will not entertain such briefs

until after the Supreme Court releases its opinions in United States v. Booker and

United States v. Fanfan. See Administrative Order Regarding Blakely Cases, issued

on September 27, 2004.

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addressed in this agreement," and in ¶9 the government reserved the right to "make

any recommendations it deems appropriate regarding the disposition of this case,

subject only to any limitations" contained in the plea agreement. Nothing in the

agreement prohibited departure motions. We conclude that the motion for an upward

departure did not violate the terms or the spirit of the plea agreement.

For these reasons the judgment of the district court is affirmed.2

_________________________

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