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Parties Involved:
Patrick Del Monico
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted May 25, 2010

  Decided May 26, 2010

Before

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

No. 09‐1607

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

PATRICK DEL MONICO,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division

No. 07 CR 217‐1

John W. Darrah,

Judge.

O R D E R

Over the course of a dozen years, Patrick Del Monico stole heavy equipment and

other assets from one employer, used phony invoices to cheat that employer and another

out of more than $1.1 million, and tried to wring an additional $2.4 million from the United

States government with fictitious equipment‐rental agreements.  Then in bankruptcy

proceedings he tried to hide some of that ill‐gotten gain from creditors with falsified bank

statements, an alias, and other material omissions and misrepresentations.  After he was

charged with these offenses and released on bond, Del Monico defrauded yet another

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 09‐1607 Page 2

victim of $2,000.  By agreement with the government he pleaded guilty to mail and wire

fraud, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, and bankruptcy fraud, id. § 157, in exchange for dismissal of

16 other counts.  He was sentenced to a total of 96 months’ imprisonment and 3 years’

supervised release, and ordered to pay approximately $1.2 million in restitution.  Del

Monico filed a notice of appeal, but his appointed appellate lawyers seek to withdraw

under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), because they cannot identify any

nonfrivolous argument to pursue.  Del Monico did not accept our invitation to respond to

counsel’s submission, see CIR. R. 51(b), so we limit our review to the potential issues

identified in counsel’s facially adequate brief, see United States v. Schuh, 289 F.3d 968, 973‐74

(7th Cir. 2002).

Del Monico has told counsel that he wants his guilty pleas set aside, so counsel first

consider whether there is any nonfrivolous basis for challenging the pleas.  See United States

v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2005).  We agree with counsel, however, that the plea

colloquy substantially complied with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.  See United

States v. Blalock, 321 F.3d 686, 688 (7th Cir. 2003); Schuh, 289 F.3d at 975.  Counsel identify

minor omissions in the colloquy but correctly explain that we would consider each

harmless.  First, although the district court did not mention that Del Monico could stand on

his earlier plea of not guilty, see FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(B), or that he could present

evidence on his own behalf at trial, see FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(E), Del Monico already knew

about these rights because both were addressed in the written plea agreement, see United

States v. Driver, 242 F.3d 767, 771 (7th Cir. 2001).  Second, counsel observe that the district

court did not advise Del Monico of his right to the assistance of counsel, see FED. R. CRIM. P.

11(b)(1)(D), but Del Monico could not have been prejudiced by this error because he was

accompanied by counsel during the colloquy, see United States v. Lovett, 844 F.2d 487, 491

(7th Cir. 1988).

Counsel also question whether Del Monico could argue that the district court abused

its discretion by refusing to let him withdraw his guilty pleas after he was diagnosed with

anxiety and personality disorders.  Del Monico had argued that these conditions, together

with a “preoccupation” with unspecified “injustices” perpetrated by his victims, might have

somehow affected his decision to plead guilty.  But guilty pleas taken in substantial

compliance with Rule 11 enjoy a presumption of verity.  See United States v. Mays, 593 F.3d

603, 607 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Patterson, 576 F.3d 431, 437 (7th Cir. 2009), cert.

denied, 130 S. Ct. 1284 (2010).  Del Monico waited to file his motion until after he had seen

the presentence investigation report, and nowhere in that motion does he explain how his

newly discovered disorders undermined the voluntariness of his guilty pleas.  Indeed, the

doctor who diagnosed Del Monico’s disorders also concluded that he understood the

criminal proceedings and was competent.  Thus, we agree with counsel that an appellate

claim regarding the motion to withdraw his pleas would be frivolous.

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Del Monico’s lawyers then evaluate whether he could challenge his prison sentence

as unreasonable.  The 96‐month overall term falls within the correctly calculated guidelines

range of 87 to 108 months and is presumed reasonable.  See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S.

338, 347 (2007); United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005).  Counsel has

found no basis to set aside that presumption, nor have we.  At sentencing the district court

addressed Del Monico’s principal arguments for a below‐guidelines sentence, see United

States v. Villegas‐Miranda, 579 F.3d 798, 801 (7th Cir. 2009), including the asserted hardship

on his family and his professed positive role in the lives of others.  The court reasoned that

other sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) outweighed those concerns and

warranted a sentence near the middle of the guidelines range.  The court emphasized

Del Monico’s longstanding history of fraud, his lack of respect for the law, and the need to

deter him and others like him.  As counsel correctly conclude, it would be frivolous to press

a reasonableness claim.

Counsel also explore whether Del Monico could argue that the district court erred in

not setting a precise number of drug tests that he must undergo while on supervised

release.  By statute the sentencing court must order a defendant to submit to a drug test

upon release from imprisonment and then ʺat least 2 periodic drug tests thereafter (as

determined by the court).ʺ  See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d).  The district court entered judgment on a

standard form that requires Del Monico to be tested upon release and then submit to ʺat

least two periodic drug tests thereafter, as determined by the court.ʺ  Cf. United States v.

Bonanno, 146 F.3d 502, 511 (7th Cir. 1998) (invalidating language in prior version of form

that improperly delegated to probation officer the decision as to number of drug tests).  We

have not yet addressed whether § 3583(d) requires the district court to set any number

greater than three at sentencing—and thus whether there is a problem with the current

version of the standard  form—but two of our sister circuits have answered no.  See United

States v. Garcia, 522 F.3d 855, 861 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Lewandowski, 372 F.3d 470,

471 (1st Cir. 2004).  In any event, at sentencing Del Monico did not raise an issue about the

number of drug tests, and even if it was error not to designate a precise number up front,

we would not conclude that there was plain error because the district court remains free to

modify the conditions of supervised release.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2); FED R. CRIM. P.

32.1(c); United States v. Tejeda, 476 F.3d 471, 475 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. McKissic, 428

F.3d 719, 726 (7th Cir. 2005).  Thus, we agree with counsel that it would be frivolous to raise

this challenge on appeal.

Finally, appellate counsel correctly point out that any challenge to the effectiveness

of Del Monico’s trial counsel is best left to a collateral proceeding where a more complete

record can be developed.  See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504‐05 (2003); United

States v. Harris, 394 F.3d 543, 557‐58 (7th Cir. 2005).

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For the foregoing reasons, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS

Del Monico’s appeal.

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