Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-1_04-cv-00033/USCOURTS-ared-1_04-cv-00033-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joanie Barber
Plaintiff
Social Security Administration
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

NORTHERN DIVISION

JOANIE BARBER Plaintiff

v. 1:04CV00033 SWW/HLJ

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

Commissioner, Social

Security Administration, Defendant

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION

INSTRUCTIONS

This recommended disposition has been submitted to United

States District Judge Susan Webber Wright. The parties may file

specific written objections to these findings and recommendations

and must provide the factual or legal basis for each objection. An

original and two copies of the objections must be filed with the

Clerk no later than eleven (11) days from the date of the findings

and recommendations. A copy must be served on the opposing party.

The District Judge, even in the absence of objections, may reject

these findings and recommendations in whole or in part.

DISPOSITION

Plaintiff, Joanie Barber, has appealed the final decision of

the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration to deny her

claim for Disability Insurance benefits and Supplemental Security

Income, based on disability. Both parties have submitted appeal

briefs and the case is ready for decision.

The Court's function on review is to determine whether the

Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence on the

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record as a whole and whether it is based on legal error. Long v.

Chater, 108 F.3d 185, 187 (8th Cir. 1997); see also, 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Reynolds v.

Chater, 82 F.3d 254, 257 (8th Cir. 1996).

 In assessing the substantiality of the evidence, the Court

must consider evidence that detracts from the Commissioner's

decision as well as evidence that supports it; the Court may not,

however, reverse the Commissioner's decision merely because

substantial evidence would have supported an opposite decision.

Sultan v. Barnhart, 368 F.3d 857, 863 (8th Cir. 2004); Woolf v.

Shalala, 3 F.3d 1210, 1213 (8th Cir. 1993).

"Disability" is the "inability to engage in any substantial

gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical

or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or

which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period

of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). A

"physical or mental impairment" is "an impairment that results from

anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are

demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory

diagnostic techniques." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3).

Plaintiff alleged disability based on a back injury which led

to spinal fusion and is complicated by being overweight. (Tr. 85)

The Commissioner found that she was not disabled within the meaning

of the Social Security Act. The only issue before this Court is

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The Hon. William H. Helsper.

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whether the Commissioner's decision that Plaintiff was not disabled

within the meaning of the Act is supported by substantial record

evidence.

After conducting an administrative hearing, the Administrative

Law Judge1

 (ALJ) concluded that Plaintiff had not been under a

disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act at any

time through January 23, 2004, the date of his decision. (Tr. 17)

On March 18, 2004, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request

for a review of the ALJ's decision, making the ALJ's decision the

final decision of the Commissioner. (Tr. 3-5) Plaintiff then

filed her complaint initiating this appeal. (Docket #2)

After consideration of the record as a whole, the Court finds

that the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial

evidence.

Plaintiff was 39 years old at the time of the hearing. (Tr.

296) She is a high school graduate. (Tr. 61, 66, 91, 296) She

has past relevant work as an administrative assistant and telephone

solicitor. (Tr. 16, 76-80, 86, 304)

The ALJ considered Plaintiff's impairments by way of the

required five-step sequential evaluation process. The first step

involves a determination of whether the claimant is involved in

substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)(2004). If

the claimant is, benefits are denied, regardless of medical

condition, age, education or work experience. Id.

Step 2 involves a determination, based solely on the medical

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evidence, of whether the claimant has an impairment or combination

of impairments which significantly limits claimant’s ability to

perform basic work activities, a “severe” impairment. Id.,

§ 404.1520(c). If not, benefits are denied. Id.

Step 3 involves a determination, again based solely on the

medical evidence, of whether the severe impairment(s) meets or

equals a listed impairment which is presumed to be disabling. Id.,

§ 404.1520(d). If so, and the duration requirement is met,

benefits are awarded. Id.

If claimant does not meet or equal a Listing, then a residual

functional capacity assessment is made based on all the relevant

medical and other evidence. Id., § 404.1520(e). This residual

functional capacity assessment is utilized at Steps 4 and 5. Id.

Step 4 involves a determination of whether the claimant has

sufficient residual functional capacity, despite the impairment(s),

to perform the physical and mental demands of past relevant work.

Id., § 404.1520(f). If so, benefits are denied. Id.

Step 5 involves a determination of whether the claimant is

able to make an adjustment to other work, given claimant's age,

education and work experience. Id., § 404.1520(g). If so,

benefits are denied; if not, benefits are awarded. Id.

The ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial

gainful activity since January 1, 2001, her alleged onset of

disability. (Tr. 11) He found that the evidence established that

Plaintiff had status post lumbar fusion, with recovery complicated

by wound infection, obesity and nicotine abuse, with a history of

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asthma, controlled on medication, but that she did not have an

impairment or combination of impairments that met or equaled a

Listing. Id. The ALJ did not specifically find that Plaintiff

suffered from a "severe" impairment. He proceeded to Step 4 of the

sequential evaluation, however, which is an implicit finding of

"severe" impairment. He judged that Plaintiff’s allegations that

she was completely unable to perform any work activity were not

credible. (Tr. 12)

The ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the residual functional

capacity to perform work between the sedentary and light exertional

levels where she had a sit/stand option. (Tr. 15) He recognized

that Plaintiff's past relevant work as an administrative assistant

and as a telephone solicitor did not require the performance of

work-related activities precluded by her limitations, and that her

impairments did not prevent her performing her past relevant work.

(Tr. 16) Consequently, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not

disabled. (Tr. 17)

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not inquire into the demands

of her past jobs sufficiently. (Brief at 10) There is no absolute

requirement that the ALJ make findings based on the actual

functional demands of a past relevant job; instead, as the ALJ in

this case did, the findings may be based on the functional demands

and job duties of the occupation as generally required by employers

throughout the national economy. (Tr. 16) Evans v. Shalala, 21

F.3d 832, 833-34 (8th Cir. 1994); Kirby v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1323,

1326 (8th Cir. 1991); Martin v. Sullivan, 901 F.2d 650, 653 (8th

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Cir. 1990) (rejecting only past relevant job analysis). The latter

may be determined by the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. Evans

at 834; Kirby at 1327.

Plaintiff, of course, has the burden of proving her

disability. E.g., Sykes v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 284, 285 (8th Cir.

1988). That includes a showing that Plaintiff's impairments

prevented her from performing past relevant work. Dixon v.

Sullivan, 905 F.2d 237, 238 (8th Cir. 1990). Plaintiff did not

meet that burden.

Next, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s hypothetical question to

the vocational expert was inadequate and insufficient. (Br. 10)

The ALJ reached a Step 4 determination that Plaintiff could return

to her past relevant work. (Tr. 16) Testimony of a vocational

expert is not required at Step 4 of the sequential evaluation

process; such testimony is only required at Step 5, when the burden

shifts to the Commissioner, and claimant has a nonexertional

impairment. Johnston v. Shalala, 42 F.3d 448, 452 (8th Cir. 1994).

Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ’s credibility

determination was improper. (Br. 11-13) The ALJ evaluated

Plaintiff's subjective complaints in light of Polaski v. Heckler,

739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984). (Tr. 12-15)

The absence of an objective medical basis which supports

the degree of severity of subjective complaints alleged

is just one factor to be considered in evaluating the

credibility of the testimony and complaints. The

adjudicator must give full consideration to all of the

evidence presented relating to subjective complaints,

including the claimant's prior work record, and

observations by third parties and treating and examining

physicians relating to such matters as:

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1. the claimant's daily activities;

2. the duration, frequency and intensity of the

pain;

3. precipitating and aggravating factors;

4. dosage, effectiveness and side effects of

medication;

5. functional restrictions.

The adjudicator is not free to accept or reject the

claimant's subjective complaints solely on the basis of

personal observations. Subjective complaints may be

discounted if there are inconsistencies in the evidence

as a whole. 

Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d at 1322 (emphasis in original).

There is little objective support in the record for

Plaintiff's claim of disability. No evaluations showed medical

conditions that were disabling. Furthermore, inconsistencies

between the medical evidence and Plaintiff's subjective complaints

gave reason to discount those complaints. Richmond v. Shalala, 23

F.3d 1141, 1443 (8th Cir. 1994). 

Given the inconsistencies in Plaintiff's statements, the lack

of medical evidence in support of Plaintiff's allegations, the lack

of treatment for significant periods of time, Plaintiff's daily

activities, her functional capabilities and the lack of greater

restriction placed on Plaintiff by her physicians, the ALJ could

rightly discount Plaintiff's subjective complaints. See Thomas v.

Sullivan, 928 F.2d 255, 259-60 (8th Cir. 1991); Cabrnoch v. Bowen,

881 F.2d 561, 564 (8th Cir. 1989).

Plaintiff provided inconsistent information. For instance, on

a Disability Supplemental Interview Outline dated August 14, 2002

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(Tr. 67), she stated that she did not prepare meals (Tr. 64). On

a Disability Supplemental Interview Outline dated December 19, 2002

(Tr. 62), she indicated that she prepared meals including

sandwiches, frozen dinners, meats, vegetables, desserts and dishes

that required recipes. (Tr. 59) On the former, she indicated that

she walked for exercise and used public transportation. (Tr. 64)

On the latter, she stated she did not walk for exercise and had

never used public transportation. (Tr. 59)

As the ALJ noted (Tr. 13), Plaintiff chose to forego a

definitive evaluation of her back complaints for almost a year,

instead caring for relatives and taking a trip to Florida (Tr.

275).

The ALJ's credibility analysis was proper. He made express

credibility findings and gave multiple valid reasons for

discrediting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. E.g., Shelton v.

Chater, 87 F.3d 992, 995 (8th Cir. 1996); Reynolds v. Chater, 82

F.3d 254, 258 (8th Cir. 1996); Hall v. Chater, 62 F.3d 220, 224

(8th Cir. 1995).

Finally, Plaintiff contends that there is “not one iota of

evidence” that the ALJ considered her impairments in combination.

(Br. 14) Plaintiff’s point is not well taken. (Tr. 11, 12)

Furthermore, the ALJ discussed Plaintiff’s limitations of function,

which are a cumulation of her impairments, at some length.

It is not the task of this Court to review the evidence and

make an independent decision. Neither is it to reverse the

decision of the ALJ because there is evidence in the record which

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contradicts his findings. The test is whether there is substantial

evidence in the record as a whole which supports the decision of

the ALJ. E.g., Mapes v. Chater, 82 F.3d 259, 262 (8th Cir. 1996);

Pratt v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 830, 833 (8th Cir. 1992).

There is ample evidence in the record as a whole that "a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support [the]

conclusion" of the ALJ in this case. Richardson v. Perales, 402

U.S. at 401; see also Reutter v. Barnhart, 372 F.3d 946, 950 (8th

Cir. 2004). The Commissioner's decision is not based on legal

error.

THEREFORE, the Court hereby affirms the final determination of

the Commissioner and dismisses Plaintiff's complaint with

prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 11th day of July, 2005.

 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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