Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-08409/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-08409-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dignity Health
Defendant
Kelly Proctor
Plaintiff
Taos Proctor
Plaintiff
The Coleman Company, Inc.
Defendant
Walmart Inc.
Defendant
Worthington Cylinder Corporation
Defendant

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TAOS PROCTOR, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

WORTHINGTON CYLINDER 

CORPORATION, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-08409-EMC 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’

MOTION TO REMAND

Docket No. 12

Plaintiffs are Taos Proctor and Kelly Proctor, husband and wife. They have filed suit 

against the following companies: (1) Worthington Cylinder Corp.; (2) The Coleman Company, 

Inc.; (3) Walmart Inc.; and (4) Dignity Health. They have sued the first three companies 

(collectively, the “Product Defendants”) because Mr. Proctor was injured after using a propane 

cylinder and torch manufactured, distributed, and/or sold by one or more of the companies. In 

addition, Mr. Proctor has asserted a claim against Dignity Health based on the allegation that it 

negligently treated him for the injuries that he sustained, thereby engaging in medical malpractice.

The Proctors initiated the instant case in state court in January 2019. The Product 

Defendants removed the case to federal court in December 2019 (i.e., almost a year later). 

According to the Product Defendants, this Court has diversity jurisdiction over the case once the 

citizenship of Dignity Health – who has been fraudulently joined – is ignored. Currently pending 

before the Court is the Proctors’ motion to remand.

The Court held a hearing on the motion to remand on March 6, 2020. This order 

memorializes the Court’s oral ruling at the hearing and provides additional analysis, as necessary.

Ordinarily, a defendant has thirty days to remove after getting a copy of the plaintiff’s 

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complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) (“The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding 

shall be filed within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a 

copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding 

is based . . . .”). However, there is an exception:

[I]f the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice 

of removal may be filed within thirty days after receipt by the 

defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended 

pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be 

ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable.

Id. § 1446(b)(3) (emphasis added).

In the instant case, the Product Defendants claim that their removal of the case in 

December 2019 was timely based on § 1446(b)(3). According to the Product Defendants, they did 

not know, nor should they have known, that Dignity Health was fraudulently joined at the outset 

of the case. Only as litigation continued did it appear that the Proctors did not intend to prosecute 

the claim against Dignity Health1– for example, when the Proctors did not serve any discovery 

1 The Ninth Circuit does not appear to have recognized (at least as of yet) this specific theory of 

fraudulent joinder – i.e., where the plaintiff has no real/actual intention to prosecute the case 

against the nondiverse defendant. The Third Circuit has recognized this as a basis for fraudulent 

joinder. See Boyer v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 111 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating that 

“joinder is fraudulent ‘where there is no reasonable basis in fact or colorable ground supporting 

the claim against the joined defendant, or no real intention in good faith to prosecute the action 

against the defendant or seek a joint judgment’”). So too have several California district courts 

(relying primarily on Boyer). See, e.g., Osorio v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. C 12-02645 RS, 2012 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78073, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2012) (indicating that joinder is fraudulent if 

“plaintiff has no actual intention to prosecute an action against [that] particular resident 

defendant”; citing Third Circuit’s Boyer case) (internal quotation marks omitted); Diaz v. Allstate 

Ins. Grp., 185 F.R.D. 581, 586 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (stating that a joinder is fraudulent “if the plaintiff 

has no actual intention to prosecute an action against those particular resident defendants”; citing 

Third Circuit’s Boyer case) (emphasis omitted); Koutney v. Exxon Corp., C 93-20899 RMW, 1994 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6702, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 1994) (stating that “[j]oinder is fraudulent 

‘where there is no reasonable basis in fact or colorable ground supporting the claim against the 

joined defendant, or no real intention in good faith to prosecute the action against the defendant or 

seek a joint judgment’”; quoting Third Circuit’s Boyer case). However, not all courts are in 

agreement. See, e.g., Kyle v. Envoy Mortg., LLC, No. 18-cv-2396-BAS-WVG, 2018 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 212199, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2018) (stating that “[t]he more appropriate focus of the 

Court's fraudulent joinder inquiry is on Kyle's claims against Limon, not Envoy's speculation 

about Kyle's intent to prosecute [her claims against Limon;] [f]raudulent joinder does not require a 

finding of fraudulent intent, rather fraudulent joinder is deemed to exist if, whatever the plaintiff's 

subjective motive, the claim against the in-state defendant has no chance of success”); Verduzco v. 

Ford Motor Co., No. 1:13-CV-01437-LJO-BAM, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163143, at *11-13 n.6 

(E.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2013) (noting that “Ford also argues that the F&Rs [Findings & 

Recommendations] ignored evidence that Plaintiff had no real intention in good faith to prosecute 

this action against Heritage,” but “[i]t is Ford that ignores the text of the F&Rs, which did no such 

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requests on Dignity Health (even after some eleven months) and when the Proctors did not insist 

on the presence of Dignity Health at a mediation.2 The Product Defendants maintain, however, 

that they had no actual basis to remove until an “other paper” was provided that started a new 30-

day clock under § 1446(b)(3). According to the Product Defendants, that “other paper” was 

provided when they were given notice (in November 2019) that Dignity Health had extended a 

998 Offer of Compromise to the Proctors. The offer “was for a waiver of costs in exchange for a 

dismissal with prejudice.” Ergo Decl. ¶ 6. In response, the Proctors suggest that the additional 

30-day period under § 1446(b)(3) may be triggered if there is non-written notice of a basis for 

removal, and that, according to the Product Defendants’ own argument, they had such notice by 

August 21, 2019, when counsel for the Proctors allegedly agreed not to involve Dignity Health in 

mediation. The Proctors’ position, however, is problematic in that § 1446(b)(3) expressly requires 

a writing – a pleading or “other paper.”3 

thing[;] [t]he F&Rs concluded, correctly, that intent is not relevant to the fraudulent joinder 

inquiry in the Ninth Circuit”); see also Willard v. UPS, 413 F. Supp. 2d 593, 599 (M.D.N.C. 2005) 

(stating that “the Fourth Circuit would seem to reject using a plaintiff's expressed subjective 

intention alone as a ground for a finding of fraudulent joinder[;] [d]efendants must also show the 

absence of a basis for a claim”). For the reasons stated herein, the Court need not resolve that 

issue.

2 For purposes of this order, the Court assumes that the Product Defendants did not violate any 

legal or ethical rules by disclosing the conversation between the Products Defendants and the 

Proctors about the need for Dignity Health to attend the mediation.

3 The Court acknowledges that “paper,” for purposes of § 1446(b)(3), has been held by some 

courts (including the Ninth Circuit) to cover oral statements, but only in very limited 

circumstances such as where there is a record of the statement. See, e.g., Carvalho v. Equifax Info. 

Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 887 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating that, “[l]ike a response to interrogatories, a 

plaintiff[’]s response to deposition questions can constitute ‘other paper’ within the meaning of 

section 1446(b)”); PSC Indus. Outsourcing, LP v. Burlington Ins. Co., No. 10-00751 ACK-BMK, 

2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50223, at *21-22 (D. Haw. May 10, 2011) (in reliance on Carvalho,

concluding that “the Ninth Circuit would conclude that a court's oral ruling triggers § 1446(b)'s 

removal period where it allows a defendant to ‘reasonably determine for the first time that’ the 

case is removable”). But other courts disagree. See Morgan v. Huntington Ingalls, 879 F.3d 602, 

609 (5th Cir. 2018) (stating that “[t]he plain meaning of each of these words [e.g., ‘receive,’ 

‘copy,’ and ‘paper’] suggests that the information giving notice of removal must be contained in a 

writing”; therefore, oral testimony given at a deposition cannot be an “other paper” for purposes of 

§ 1446(b)(3)); Mackinnon v. IMVU, Inc., No. C 11-4840 PJH, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3430, at *2-

3, 5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2012) (holding that “an in-court, off the record oral statement purportedly 

made by plaintiff's counsel at a September 27, 2011 discovery conference” was not an “other 

paper” because, “by its express terms, section 1446(b) does not apply to oral statements”; adding 

that “the parties dispute the content of the oral statement”). Requiring a writing (at least outside of 

the specific exception contemplated by Carvalho and its progeny) makes sense. Otherwise highly 

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That being said, the Court also rejects the Product Defendants’ argument that the 998 Offer 

constitutes an “other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or 

has become removable.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). Even if Dignity Health did not view Mr. 

Proctor as having a claim of value (thus offering only “a waiver of costs, in exchange for a 

dismissal with prejudice,” Ergo Decl. ¶ 6), Dignity Health’s views as embodied in an opening 

settlement offer has little if any probative value: it sheds little light on whether the Proctors

intended to prosecute the claim against Dignity Health.

At the hearing, the Product Defendants argued that the 998 Offer should be deemed an 

“other paper” when it is taken in context with the Proctors’ failure to conduct discovery and their 

agreement that Dignity Health need not attend a mediation. But the fact remains that the 998 

Offer says nothing about what the Proctors intended; the 998 Offer added nothing to the Product 

Defendants’ ascertainment that the case was removable. Thus, ultimately, the Product Defendants 

are basing their removal on the Proctors’ conduct and statements, and not any “paper.” 

Accordingly, the Proctors’ motion to remand is hereby GRANTED. However, the 

Proctors’ request for fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) is denied.

The Clerk of the Court is directed to remand the case back to state court and close the file 

in this case.

This order disposes of Docket No. 12.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 10, 2020

______________________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

United States District Judge

factual issues about the accuracy of an alleged oral representation or the intent and understanding 

of the parties in regard thereto could be implicated on motions to remand and require, e.g., an 

evidentiary hearing; remand motions have traditionally been based on legal assessments, not 

adjudication of disputed facts.

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