Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00389/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00389-7/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joe McGrath
Respondent
Miguel Wilson Young
Petitioner

Document Text:

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MIGUEL WILSON YOUNG,

Petitioner, No. CIV-S-04-0389 RRB KJM P 

vs.

JOE MCGRATH, et al., 

Respondents. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding with an application for writ of habeas

corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He challenges Sacramento County convictions for attempted

murder, first degree robbery and assault on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Petitioner also challenges the resulting prison sentence of seventy-years-to-life, which was

imposed under California’s “Three Strikes Law,” on ex post facto grounds.

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I. Background 

Petitioner was found guilty by a jury. After sentencing, petitioner appealed to the

California Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal summarized the facts supporting petitioner’s

conviction as follows:

Defendant entered the home of an elderly couple late one night in

February 1997. He took property from both victims; threw the

wife to the ground, breaking her leg; and stabbed the husband

multiple times with a knife. Both victims required surgery as a

result of the attack.

 

Resp’ts’ Lodged Doc. No. 20 at 2-3. Petitioner’s convictions and sentence were affirmed by the

Court of Appeal. Id. at 7. Petitioner asked the California Supreme Court to review the Court of

Appeal’s decision. Resp’ts’ Lodged Doc. No. 1. The California Supreme Court denied

petitioner’s request. Resp’ts’ Lodged Doc. No. 2.

The claims presented in this action were not presented by petitioner on direct

appeal. Rather, the claims were presented in state collateral actions. Petitioner raised his first

claim, in which petitioner asserts ineffective assistance of counsel, in the Superior Court of

Sacramento County, the California Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court. Resp’ts’

Lodged Docs. No. 3 at 4, No. 5 at 6-8, No. 7 at 6-9, and No. 15 at 3. Only the Superior Court of

Sacramento County issued a reasoned opinion with respect to petitioner’s first claim. Resp’ts’

Lodged Doc. No. 4 at 2-3. Petitioner raised his second claim concerning his sentence in the

California Supreme Court. Resp’ts’ Lodged Doc. No. 7 at 10. No California court issued a

reasoned opinion with respect to petitioner’s second claim.

II. Habeas Corpus Standard

An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a

judgment of a state court can be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the

United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Also, federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any 

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 In Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 162 (4th Cir. 2000), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 1

held in a § 2254 action that “any independent opinions we offer on the merits of constitutional

claims will have no determinative effect in the case before us . . . At best, it is constitutional

dicta.” However, to the extent Bell stands for the proposition that a § 2254 petitioner may obtain

relief simply by showing that § 2254(d) does not preclude his claim, this court disagrees. Title

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) still requires that a habeas petitioner show that he is in custody in violation

of the Constitution before he or she may obtain habeas relief. See Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 70-71;

Ramirez, 365 F.3d at 773-75. 

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claim decided on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state court’s adjudication of the

claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (referenced herein in as “§ 2254(d)” or “AEDPA). See Ramirez v. Castro,

365 F.3d 755, 773-775 (9th Cir. 2004) (Ninth Circuit affirmed lower court’s grant of habeas

relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 after determining that petitioner was in custody in violation of his

Eighth Amendment rights and that § 2254(d) does not preclude relief); see also Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-71 (2003) (Supreme Court found relief precluded under § 2254(d) and

therefore did not address the merits of petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim). Courts are not 1

required to address the merits of a particular claim, but may simply deny a habeas application on

the ground that relief is precluded by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71 (overruling

Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1154-55 (9th Cir. 2000) in which the Ninth Circuit required

district courts to review state court decisions for error before determining whether relief is

precluded by § 2254(d)). It is the habeas petitioner’s burden to show that he is not precluded

from obtaining relief by § 2254(d). See Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002). 

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The “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” clauses of § 2254(d)(1) are

 different. As the Supreme Court has explained:

A federal habeas court may issue the writ under the “contrary to”

clause if the state court applies a rule different from the governing

law set forth in our cases, or if it decides a case differently than we

have done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. The court

may grant relief under the “unreasonable application” clause if the

state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle from

our decisions but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the

particular case. The focus of the latter inquiry is on whether the

state court’s application of clearly established federal law is

objectively unreasonable, and we stressed in Williams [v. Taylor, 

529 U.S. 362 (2000)] that an unreasonable application is different

from an incorrect one.

Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). A state court does not apply a rule different from the

law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or unreasonably apply such law if the state court simply

fails to cite or fails indicate an awareness of federal law. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). 

The court will look to the last reasoned state court decision in determining

whether the law applied to a particular claim by the state courts was contrary to the law set forth

in the cases of the United States Supreme Court or whether an unreasonable application of such

law has occurred. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). Where the state court fails

to give any reasoning whatsoever in support of the denial of a claim arising under Constitutional

or federal law, the Ninth Circuit has held that this court must perform an independent review of

the record to ascertain whether the state court decision was objectively unreasonable. Himes v.

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). In other words, the court assumes the state court

applied the correct law, and analyzes whether the decision of the state court was based on an

objectively unreasonable application of that law. 

It is appropriate to look to lower federal court decisions to determine what law has

been "clearly established" by the Supreme Court and the reasonableness of a particular

application of that law. See Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 598 (9th Cir. 1999).

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III. Arguments And Analysis

A. Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel

Petitioner’s first claim is that he was denied effective assistance of counsel, as

guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, by his trial counsel. Specifically, petitioner claims his trial

counsel should have obtained DNA testing with respect to blood stains found on petitioner’s

pants. Am. Pet. at 6-13. 

The Supreme Court has enunciated the standards for judging ineffective assistance

of counsel claims. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). First, a defendant must

show that, considering all the circumstances, counsel's performance fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness. Id. at 688. To this end, the defendant must identify the acts or

omissions that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. Id. at

690. The court must then determine whether in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts

or omissions were outside the wide range of professional competent assistance. Id. Second, a

defendant must affirmatively prove prejudice. Id. at 693. Prejudice is found where “there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

would have been different.” Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.; see also United States v. Murray, 751 F.2d 1528,

1535 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schaflander, 743 F.2d 714, 717-18 (9th Cir. 1984) (per

curiam). 

The Superior Court of Sacramento County denied petitioner’s ineffective

assistance of counsel claim because petitioner failed to establish prejudice flowing from trial

counsel’s failure to have DNA tests conducted on blood found on petitioner’s pants. Resp’ts’

Lodged Doc. No. 4 at 2 (“petitioner attaches no reasonably available documentation to show

what the results of the DNA test would have been, and how that would have made a difference in

his trial had the evidence been introduced.”). After reviewing the record before this court, the

court finds the decision reached by the Superior Court of Sacramento is sound. Because the

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 The court notes that petitioner filed a motion in the Superior Court of Sacramento 2

County for DNA testing under California Penal Code § 1405. Resp’ts’ Lodged Doc. No. 11,

App. 1. The motion was denied on May 2, 2003. Id., App. 5. Petitioner appealed the Superior

Court’s decision to the California Court of Appeal, id., and the California Supreme Court,

Resp’ts’ Lodged Doc. No. 13, App. 1. Petitioner’s appeals were denied. Resp’ts’ Lodged Docs.

No. 12 & No. 14. In this action, petitioner does not challenge the state courts’ denial of his

motion for DNA testing nor does petitioner ask that this court order DNA testing. 

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results of DNA tests are unknown, it is impossible to say the lack of DNA testing prejudiced

petitioner’s defense.

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B. Ex Post Facto / Due Process

The convictions used to enhance petitioner’s sentence under California’s “Three

Strikes Law” were sustained by petitioner in 1987 pursuant to pleas of guilty and before the

“Three Strikes Law” was enacted in 1994. Resp’ts’ Lodged Doc. No. 20 at 3-5 (reviewing prior

convictions). In 1995, the language of the “Three Strikes Law” was scrutinized by the California

Court of Appeal, which found that a “strike” could have been incurred by a criminal defendant

before the “Three Strikes Law” was enacted. People v. Reed, 33 Cal.App.4th 1608 (1st Dist.

1995). Petitioner argues that before Reed it was not clear that any of his 1987 convictions could

be considered “strikes” under the “Three Strikes Law.” Because of this, petitioner argues, the

use of his 1987 convictions to enhance his sentence imposed in 1997 violates the Constitution’s

prohibition against ex post facto laws and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

Am. Pet. at 18-21.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has found that as long as a sentence

enhancement statute is in effect at the time of the triggering offense, it is not an ex post facto

violation to allow a sentence to be enhanced under that statute by using an offense committed

before enactment. See, e.g., U.S. v. Ahumada-Avalos, 875 F.2d 681, 683-84 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Whether the Court of Appeal’s finding in Reed extended the date of enactment of the “Three

Strikes Law,” as petitioner suggests, is immaterial in this case because the crimes for which

petitioner was convicted in this action occurred after Reed was decided. Under the law of this

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 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a guilty plea be 3

both voluntary and intelligent. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). 

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Circuit, there is no ex post facto violation in this case. 

Petitioner suggests that if his 1987 plea agreements contemplated that the law

could be changed with respect to how the resulting convictions could be used to enhance a

subsequent sentence, and that such a change could apply to a subsequent sentence imposed upon

petitioner, petitioner’s pleas were either unintelligent or involuntary. Am. Pet. at 14. There is 3

no legal authority to support the proposition that a defendant pleading guilty must be informed

how the resulting conviction might be used to enhance a future sentence associated with a crime

for which the defendant has not yet been charged, or that the law with respect to how the

resulting conviction could be used to enhance a future sentence for a future crime could change. 

See U.S. v. Brownlie, 915 F.2d 527, 528 (9th Cir. 1990) (defendant need only be informed of

direct consequences of plea; the possibility that the defendant will be convicted of another

offense in the future and will receive an enhanced sentence is a not a direct consequence). 

Petitioner’s second claim should be rejected. 

IV. Conclusion

For all of the foregoing reasons, the court will recommend that petitioner’s

application for writ of habeas corpus be denied.

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that

petitioner’s application for writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fifteen

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within five days after service of the objections. The parties are advised 

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that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: September 4, 2007.

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youn0389.157(a)

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