Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_04-cr-02043/USCOURTS-azd-4_04-cr-02043-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
William Stanton Nestle
Defendant
United States of America
Plaintiff

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 "TR1" refers to the Transcript of Motion Hearing dated May 11, 2006, and filed with the

Clerk on May 22, 2006. "TR2" refers to the Transcript of Motion Hearing dated May 12, 2006, and

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

William S. Nestle, 

Defendant. ______________________________________

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No. CR-04-2043 TUC RCC (JM)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION

This matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Marshall for all pretrial matters. A

Motion to Suppress Evidence and Motion to Suppress Statements [Docket No. 19] filed by

Defendant William S. Nestle was heard by Magistrate Judge Marshall on May 11 and 12,

2006. The Defendant was present at the hearing and was represented by counsel. Four

witnesses were presented: Border Patrol Agents Jorge Gonzales, Carlos Landin, Richard

Ramirez, and Jason Thomas. The witnesses were examined, cross-examined, and questioned

by the Court. Having considered the matter, the Magistrate Judge submits the following

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and recommends that Defendant Nestle's Motions

be denied.

I. FINDINGS OF FACT 

On August 8, 2004, Border Patrol Agent Jorge Gonzales prepared an alert he sent to

other agents via e-mail concerning vehicles and individuals that were suspected of being

involved with narcotics trafficking. (TR1:7; Exhibit 1).1

 The alert identified "a couple of

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filed with the Clerk on May 22, 2006. 

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load vehicles out of Arivaca," one of which was a "white Lincoln Town car registered to and

driven by William Stanton Nestle . . . ." (TR1:10; Exhibit 1). In the message, Agent

Gonzales reported that the identified sedan "was parked in a stash house owned by James

William Tilden . . . in Arivaca where we tracked a group of backpackers to that residence and

seized 437.2 pounds of marijuana in a cellar." Gonzales further indicated that he had

"pictures of the sedan parked at [the stash house], " with the "cellar and marijuana in full

view with the sedan in the background." (Id.; Exhibits 2 & 3 (photographs)). Agents ran a

K-9 on the vehicle and "[m]arijuana and debris was found in the trunk and it also smelled

heavily of marijuana. Mr. Nestle was not at the residence at the time, but it is believed that

he ran off when [agents] approached the home." (TR1:10; Exhibit 1). 

The alert from Agent Gonzales also described an attempted vehicle exchange

involving Nestle:

Two weeks ago I was on my way out of Arivaca nearing Amado

when I caught up to the Lincoln driven by Mr. Nestle. He

immediately took evasive action. I decided to let him hook

himself more so I continued to follow him. He tried to ditch me

in Green Valley, not stopping at stop signs and driving behind

a gas station and then into the shopping plaza. I then spotted the

sedan back north bound on I-19 (he did not have enough time to

get out of his car at the shopping center). I caught up to the

sedan just north of Papago Road south of Tucson. He continued

to take evasive action keeping vehicles between he and I. I was

having trouble with my truck and could not keep up with him

after that and lost him in traffic on I-10. I am pretty sure that he

was driving a load of dope that day. 

(Exhibit 1). Agent Gonzales concluded the alert by identifying where Nestle lived and who

he might be working for. (Id.).

 A few days after receiving Agent Gonzales' e-mail alert, Agent Landin conducted a

traffic stop of Nestle's white Lincoln Town Car. (TR1:29). Outside of Arivaca, on Arivaca

Road, Agent Landin first became interested in a vehicle that appeared to be traveling in

tandem with Nestle's. (TR1:29-30). Nestle distracted Agent Landin's attention by driving

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very close to the divider line and preventing the agent from passing and pursuing the other

vehicle. (TR1:32). Agent Landin eventually stopped Nestle's vehicle, in which Nestle was

the driver and sole occupant. (Id.). On initial contact, Nestle became belligerent, using

profane language and asking Agent Landin why he stopped him. (Id.). After explaining why

he was stopped and requesting identification, Agent Landin sought permission to look into

Nestle's vehicle. (TR1:32-33). When the agent mentioned that he was going to call a K-9

unit, Nestle's attitude changed, and he consented to the search of his vehicle. (TR1:34).

Agent Landin searched the trunk of the car and noticed that, while it was completely empty,

it did contain a small piece of cellophane and some dirt. (TR1:34-35). Agent Landin

allowed Nestle to go on his way. (TR1:35).

A few days later, on August 14, 2004, agents were again briefed concerning Nestle.

(TR1:93). Nestle's car and the earlier stop by Agent Landin were described and agents were

told that the vehicle would leave Arivaca at certain times of the morning. (TR1:93-94). At

approximately 10:00 a.m., Agent Landin, along with Agents Richard Ramirez and Jason

Thomas, was stationed at Milepost 1 on Arivaca Road outside the town of Arivaca. (TR1:26-

27, 73 & 78). Agent Landin was alone in his vehicle with the windows rolled down when

he noticed Nestle's white Lincoln Town Car pass his location. (TR1:28-29). As the vehicle

passed, Agent Landin was "overwhelmed with the smell of marijuana." (TR1:40 & 61).

Agent Ramirez also got a "whiff" of what he believed was marijuana. (TR1:91). Agent

Landin recalls that he told Agents Ramirez and Thomas to pursue the vehicle. (TR1:41).

Agent Ramirez recalls that he decided to pursue the Lincoln. (TR1:80). In any event, Agent

Landin remained where he was so that he could see if there was a scout vehicle traveling with

the Lincoln. (Id.). After a few seconds, he followed the other agents who were pursuing

Nestle's car. (TR1:42). After following Nestle for approximately 7.5 miles, Agent Ramirez

activated his overhead lights and Nestle stopped at Milepost 8.5. (TR1:62 & 82). 

Agent Ramirez questioned Nestle about his immigration status, and because he had

smelled marijuana, asked to see Nestle's identification. (TR1:84). At that point, Nestle

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questioned why he had been stopped and became belligerent and irate. (Id.). Agent Ramirez

then asked Nestle for consent to search the vehicle's trunk. (Id.). When Nestle refused to

consent, Agent Ramirez told him he would have to wait until a K-9 unit arrived to inspect

the vehicle. (Id.; TR2:133). 

Agent Landin, who had seen the stop take place, arrived and also approached Nestle's

vehicle. (TR1:42-43). He observed Nestle sitting in the driver's seat of the Lincoln "cussing

at the agents" and refusing to consent to a search of his car. (Id.). Smelling marijuana, Agent

Landin suggested that a K-9 unit be called to conduct a sniff. He then called the Nogales

checkpoint to make the request. (TR1:44). When the K-9 arrived approximately 20 minutes

later, Nestle reached for his keys, said "Oh, hell you're going to find out what's in there

anyway," and volunteered to open the trunk for inspection. (TR1:44, 52-53, 66 & 85;

TR2:134). Agents discovered bundles of cellophane wrapped marijuana in the trunk. (Id.;

Exhibits 4 & 5 (photographs of the marijuana)). 

After the marijuana was discovered, Agent Landin handcuffed and advised Nestle of

his Miranda rights by reading them to him from a card. (TR1:50-52 & 67; TR2:135; Exhibit

6 (rights card)). Nestle was silent but indicated he understood his rights. (TR1:52). Nestle

was asked a few questions but he did not respond. (TR1:54). Nestle then began to feel a

little ill. (TR1:86). Prompted by this and his anticipation that Nestle would be detained,

Landin asked Nestle if he had medications in his possession and if he had any other

prescriptions. (TR1:46 & 86-87). Nestle indicated that he had medications at home and

agreed to go with the agents to retrieve them. (TR1:47; TR2:136). 

Agents Landin, Thomas and Ramirez then drove Nestle to his residence. (TR1:47 &

90). Nestle was told that he was under arrest and that, if he went into the home, it would be

necessary for agents to accompany him inside. (TR1:47-48). For officer safety, both Agent

Landin and Agent Thomas accompanied Nestle into the home. (TR1:47). Once inside,

Agent Landin immediately observed "a pile of bundles being concealed under a blanket."

(TR1:48). Agent Ramirez, who remained at the doorway, and Agent Thomas also saw the

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bundles. (TR1:90; TR2:143). The pile of bundles was uncovered a few inches from the

bottom and the agents could see cellophane packages marked "TIBU," which was the same

marking on the bundles they had discovered in Nestle's trunk. (TR1:48-49). Nestle then

stated, "It's too bad it's illegal." (TR2:141). Nestle was then reminded of his rights and

affirmatively invoked his right to silence by stating that he did not want to speak anymore.

(TR1:54; TR2:140-141).

II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. Legality of the Stop

Nestle alleges that reasonable suspicion did not exist to support the stop of his car.

The Fourth Amendment protects the right of the people to be secure in their person, houses,

papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. v. Hensley, 469 U.S.

221, 226 (1985). In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 (1968), the Supreme Court held that,

consistent with the Fourth Amendment, police may stop persons in the absence of probable

cause under limited circumstances. The Court has held that law enforcement agents may

briefly stop a moving automobile to investigate a reasonable suspicion that its occupants are

involved in criminal activity. Hensley, 469 U.S. at 226.

Reasonable suspicion exists when an officer is aware of specific articulable facts, that,

together with rational inferences drawn from them, reasonably warrant a suspicion that the

person to be detained has committed or is about to commit a crime. United States v. Cortez,

449 U.S. 411, 416-18 (1981). When assessing the reasonableness of the police officer's

actions, the court must consider the totality of the circumstances which confronted the officer

at the time of the stop. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8 (1989). The articulable facts

forming the basis of a reasonable suspicion must be measured against an objective

reasonableness standard, not by the subjective impressions of a particular officer. GonzalezRivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 1441, 1445 (9th Cir.1994).

Here, prior to stopping Nestle's car, agents had reliable intelligence that Nestle was

involved in narcotics trafficking. Agent Gonzales had photographs of a cellar containing

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over 400 pounds of marijuana; Nestle's vehicle was pictured in the background. Agent

Gonzales described a thwarted vehicle exchange involving Nestle and Nestle's previous

successful evasion of authorities. Additionally, agents were briefed the day of the stop and

were told to be on the lookout for Nestle's vehicle. Field intelligence of this sort is properly

considered in determining reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 282

F.3d 673, 675 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Tiong, 224 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2000).

More importantly, just prior to stopping Nestle's car, both Agents Landin and Ramirez

smelled marijuana as Nestle passed them at Milepost 1 on Arivaca road. When considered

in conjunction with the characteristics of the area and its proximity to the border, Agents

clearly established reasonable suspicion to initiate a vehicle stop.

B. Legality of the Search

Nestle contends that he did not consent to the search of his home. In support of his

contention, Nestle refers to a report prepared by Agent Thomas, which states:

SBPA Landin advised [Nestle] that we would need to go to his

house in order to get these medications as he may be detained

for an unknown period of time. SBPA Landin advised him that

himself and I would be going into the house with him as he was

in our custody. He agreed, unlocked the house and we went in.

Motion to Suppress, Exhibit C. 

Nestle contends this passage establishes that the agents request to accompany Nestle

to his house to retrieve his medication was required or mandatory. See United States v.

Stevens, 206 F.3d 914, 917-18 (9th Cir. 2000). The record as a whole, however, does not

support this contention.

While the Court agrees that the phrase "need to go" could be construed as mandatory,

Agent Thomas' report that Nestle "agreed, unlocked the house and we went in" blunts the

assertion that Nestle was required to go to the house and allow agents inside. Furthermore,

when questioned at the hearing on this issue, the agents were uniformly asserted that Nestle

was given a choice to go to his house. (TR1:47; TR2:137). In fact, Agent Landin testified

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that he told Nestle that they could either obtain a prescription for him or retrieve the

medication from his home. (TR1:47). The Court finds that Nestle voluntarily consented to

the agents' entry into his home for the purpose of retrieving his medication.

 Nestle argues that, even if he did consent to the entry of the agents into his home for

the purpose of obtaining his medications, the agents exceeded the scope of the consent by

conducting a search of the home. This contention is without merit. "When an official search

is properly authorized - whether by consent or by the issuance of a valid warrant - the scope

of the search is limited by the terms of its authorization." Walter v. United States, 447 U.S.

649, 656 (1980). Providing keys to a residence is evidence of consent to a search, particularly

when coupled with a request for police to retrieve items from within or assist in their

retrieval. United States v. Gilbert, 774 F.2d 962, 963 (9th Cir. 1985) (per curiam); United

States v. Donlin, 982 F.2d 31, (1st Cir. 1992). More importantly in this case, the bundles of

marijuana were in plain view to the officers when they entered Nestle's home. Because the

agents were lawfully present and the illegal nature of the bundles was immediately apparent,

the agents were justified in seizing them under the “plain view” doctrine. Coolidge v. New

Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971) (“the ‘plain view’ doctrine has been applied where a

police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently

comes across an incriminating object.”); see also, United States v. Bulacan, 156 F.3d 963,

968 (9th Cir1998).

C. Voluntariness of the Statements

Nestle contends that his post-arrest statements are subject to suppression because he

was improperly questioned in violation of his Miranda rights. Specifically, Nestle asserts

that he was questioned at the scene of the stop and at his home after he had invoked his right

to remain silent. The record does not support his contention. The agents testified that, at the

scene of the stop, Nestle stated something to the effect of "Oh, hell you're going to find out

what's in there anyway." This statement was made prior to Nestle's arrest and before he was

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advised of his rights. At the residence, Nestle stated, "Too bad, it's illegal." Neither of these

statements was made in response to questioning by the agents. Spontaneous and voluntary

statements such as these, that are not the product of police interrogation or its functional

equivalent, are admissible regardless of whether the individual was warned of his rights.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966). 

In his motion, Nestle also urges the Court to suppress other statements he allegedly

made to the agents when he was at the residence and after he had affirmatively invoked his

right to remain silent. This issues involving these statements was resolved by counsel during

the hearing, with the Government stipulating that it would not offer these statements at trial.

(TR2:142, 156 & 164) 

III. RECOMMENDATION FOR DISPOSITION BY THE DISTRICT JUDGE

Based on the foregoing and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rule – Civil

72.1, Rules of Practice of the United States District Court, District of Arizona, the Magistrate

Judge recommends that the District Court, after an independent review of the record, DENY

the Motion to Suppress Evidence and Motion to Suppress Statements [Docket No. 19] filed

by Defendant William S. Nestle.

This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court's judgment. 

However, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of service of a copy of this

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the District Court. See

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72(b), 6(a) and 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Thereafter, the parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to the objections.

If any objections are filed, this action should be designated case number: CR 04-2043-TUCRCC. Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate

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Judge may be considered a waiver of a party's right to de novo consideration of the issues.

See United States v. Reyna-Tapia 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

DATED this 12th day of June, 2006.

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