Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00061/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00061-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jesse Rothchild Moore
Petitioner
United States of America
Respondent

Document Text:

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

JESSE ROTHCHILD MOORE, )

)

Defendant/Movant, )

) CR 03-00764 PHX JAT

v. ) CIV 11-00061 PHX JAT(MEA)

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

)

Plaintiff/Respondent )

)

_____________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE JAMES A. TEILBORG:

On January 7, 2011, Mr. Jesse Moore (“Movant”), who is

currently incarcerated in Florence, Colorado, filed a pro se

Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence, pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2255, regarding a criminal conviction and sentence

entered by the Court. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss

Movant’s motion to vacate or set aside his sentence pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2255 on April 25, 2011. See Civil Doc. 4. Movant

filed a response to the motion and Respondent filed a reply to

the response. See Doc. 5 & Doc. 7.

I Procedural History

An indictment returned July 22, 2003, charged movant

with one count of first-degree murder (aiding and abetting) and

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1 The crime involved the murder of an inmate within the confines

of a Federal Correctional Institute within the District of Arizona and

the indictment named seven co-defendants.

2 The criminal docket in this matter indicates that two

defendants had entered into plea agreements at this time.

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one count of conspiracy to commit murder.1 A warrant was issued

and Movant was arrested on August 27, 2003. Movant was

appointed counsel at his initial appearance on September 3,

2003. See Criminal Doc. 22. 

On October 10, 2003, the Court authorized a fact

investigator and mitigation specialist to act on behalf of

Movant. See Criminal Doc. 82. On November 24, 2003, the Court

granted Movant’s sealed ex parte motion seeking the appointment

of a neuropsychological expert. See Criminal Doc. 144. 

On June 18, 2004, the government filed notice that it

did not intend to seek the death penalty against any defendant.

See Criminal Doc. 385. On September 17, 2004, Movant filed

numerous pretrial motions and on September 20, 2004, Movant

filed a motion seeking to sever his trial from that of his codefendants. See Criminal Doc. 523. On November 16, 2004, the

Court denied, inter alia, Movant’s motion to sever.2 See

Criminal Doc. 711. On November 30, 2004, the Court denied

Movant’s motion to continue his trial. See Criminal Doc. 774.

A jury trial regarding Movant and three co-defendants

began December 1, 2004. See Criminal Doc. 817. On December 3,

2004, the entire voir dire panel was excused for cause and voir

dire continued with a new panel. See Criminal Doc. 833. On

December 9, 2004, Movant filed a motion seeking to determine his

competency to stand trial, which motion was granted the

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3 In that matter, pursuant to a written plea agreement, Movant

was convicted of the use of a firearm during a crime of violence and,

on September 11, 2000, sentenced to a term of ten years imprisonment.

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following day. See Criminal Doc. 844, 845, 847. After a

hearing conducted December 14, 2004, the Court determined Movant

was competent to stand trial. See Criminal Doc. 862. 

On January 6, 2005, the Court denied Movant’s renewed

motion to sever, denied Movant’s renewed motion for a mistrial,

and denied Movant’s motion for a directed verdict of not guilty.

See Criminal Doc. 921. On January 20, 2005, the twenty-third

day of trial and the day set for closing arguments, the Court

ordered Movant to show cause why he should not be sanctioned for

filing a late notice of an alibi, and ordered Movant to respond

to the government’s motion to preclude presentation of Movant’s

alibi witnesses. See Criminal Doc. 960. 

On January 26, 2005, the jury returned a verdict of

guilty as to Movant regarding both charged counts. The jury

found two other co-defendants guilty of at least some of the

charges against them and completely acquitted one co-defendant

of all charges. See Criminal Doc. 975 & 978.

On May 31, 2005, Movant was sentenced to concurrent

terms of life imprisonment pursuant to his convictions in this

matter. The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively

to a criminal sentence being served pursuant to his conviction

in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona

in Docket Number 2:00 CR 0083.3

Movant took a direct appeal of conviction. See

Criminal Doc. 1103. On December 8, 2006, the Ninth Circuit

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4 Movant was represented by Larry Hammond in his criminal

proceedings, by different counsel (at his behest) in his direct

appeal, and a third counsel in his criminal proceedings after remand.

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Court of Appeals reversed Movant’s conviction and remanded the

matter for a new trial, concluding that the Court abused its

discretion by excluding the testimony of Movant’s mental health

experts on the issue of diminished capacity, concluding that

Movant’s failure to list these witnesses at an earlier time was

not willful and was not done to seek tactical advantage. The

Ninth Circuit also determined the Court did not give enough

weight to Movant’s counsel’s representations that Movant was not

able to assist them in presenting a defense. See Criminal Doc.

1171.

On January 4, 2007, the Court granted Movant’s thencounsel’s motion to withdraw as counsel and appointed new

counsel to represent Movant and set a trial date of February 6,

2007. See Criminal Doc. 1177.4 The trial date was continued

several times and, on June 8, 2007, the trial date was set for

January 8, 2008. See Criminal Doc. 1204. On October 12, 2007,

the trial date was moved to April 1, 2008. See Criminal Doc.

1227. 

On February 11, 2008, pursuant to a written plea

agreement, Movant entered a guilty plea to the lesser-included

offense of second-degree murder in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

1111. See Criminal Doc. 1249, 1293. Count 2 was dismissed as

part of the plea agreement. In the written plea agreement

Movant waived his right to a direct appeal of his conviction and

sentence and also waived his right to challenge his conviction

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and sentence through an action pursuant to section 2255. In the

written plea agreement Movant averred: “On May 9, 2001, I

stabbed Jesus Lopez Rocha with a ‘shank’ while on the recreation

yard at FCI Phoenix, Arizona. He died as a result.” Criminal

Doc. 1249, Attach.

On June 23, 2008, Movant was sentenced to a term of 151

months of imprisonment, to be served consecutively to the

sentence being served in United States District Court for the

District of Arizona 2:00 CR 83, to be followed by a term of five

years supervised release. See Criminal Doc. 1292, 1295.

Movant did not take a direct appeal of his conviction

and sentence. On January 7, 2011, Movant filed this section

2255 action, asserting that his guilty plea was not knowingly

and voluntarily made, in violation of Rule 11, Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure, and that he was denied his right to the

effective assistance of counsel. Respondent contends the motion

and this action should be dismissed because the action was not

filed within the statute of limitations and because Movant

waived his right to collaterally attack his conviction and

sentence in the written plea agreement.

II Analysis

Statute of limitations

A one-year statute of limitations on a section 2255

action applies to criminal convictions entered by the Court.

The statute of limitations begins to run when a conviction

becomes final. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 210 F.3d

1058, 1060 (9th Cir. 2000). “The Supreme Court has held that a

conviction is final in the context of habeas review when ‘a

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judgment of conviction has been rendered, the availability of

appeal exhausted, and the time for a petition for certiorari

elapsed or a petition for certiorari finally denied.’” United

States v. Schwartz, 274 F.3d 1220, 1223 (9th Cir. 2001),

quoting Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 321 n.6, 107 S. Ct.

708, 712 n.6 (1987). 

Section 2255 provides that “[a] 1–year period

of limitation shall apply to a motion under

this section. The limitation period shall run

from ... the date on which the judgment of

conviction becomes final.” 28 U.S.C. §

2255(f)(1). “Finality attaches when [the

Supreme Court] affirms a conviction on the

merits on direct review or denies a petition

for a writ of certiorari, or when the time

for filing a certiorari petition expires.”

Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 527, 123

S.Ct. 1072, [] (2003). See also Jimenez v.

Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 129 S.Ct. 681, 685,

[] (2009) (same); Aguirre–Ganceda, 592 F.3d

at 1045 (same). 

United States v. Buckles, ___ F.3d ___, 2011 WL 2150992, at *3

(9th Cir.). The Supreme Court has stated that “Applied in the

context of a criminal prosecution, finality is normally defined

by the imposition of the sentence.” Flynt v. Ohio, 451 U.S.

619, 620, 101 S. Ct. 1958, 1959 (1981), quoted in United States

v. LaFromboise, 427 F.3d 680, 683 (9th Cir. 2005). The Ninth

Circuit has held that, in cases in which the defendant does not

file a direct appeal, the conviction becomes final fourteen days

after the entry of the judgment. See Schwartz, 274 F.3d at 1223

n.1; United States v. Garcia, 210 F.3d 1058, 1060-61 (9th Cir.

2000).

Movant was sentenced on June 23, 2008. Assuming that

Movant’s conviction and sentence became final, at the latest,

two weeks later, i.e., on or about July 7, 2008, the statute of

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limitations regarding his conviction expired on or about July 8,

2009. See Schwartz, 274 F.3d at 1223; Garcia, 210 F.3d at 1060-

61. Accordingly, the motion filed January 7, 2011, was filed

more than one year after the statute of limitations expired and

may be dismissed. 

Movant would be entitled to equitable tolling of the

statute of limitations if he establishes that he has diligently

been pursuing his rights and that “some extraordinary

circumstance prevented timely filing of his section 2255 motion.

See, e.g., Buckles, 2011 WL 2150992, at *5 (holding that the

movant was not entitled to equitable tolling notwithstanding his

counsel’s alleged misconduct because it had “no effect” on the

timeliness of his motion). The Ninth Circuit has held that

movants who relied to their detriment on incorrect statements of

law by the Ninth Circuit, or those who are “affirmatively

misled” by a court’s erroneous instructions may be entitled to

tolling. See id., 2011 WL 2150992, at *7.

In response to the motion to dismiss Movant asserts the

Court did not ensure there was a factual basis for his guilty

plea. Movant also contends his plea is invalid because he was

not placed under oath before the plea colloquy.

Movant has not provided a basis for the equitable

tolling of the statute of limitations on his section 2255

action. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss should be granted

because the section 2255 action is untimely.

Waiver of the right to a collateral attack

Respondent asserts that Movant waived his right to

collaterally attack his conviction and sentence pursuant to

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section 2255 in the written plea agreement. The plea agreement

signed by Movant expressly waived his right to collaterally

attack any matter pertaining to Movant’s conviction and sentence

if the sentence imposed was consistent with the written terms of

the agreement. The sentence imposed on Movant was consistent

with the terms of the plea agreement, i.e., the plea agreement

stated Movant’s sentence would be between 15 and 25 years and he

was sentenced to a term of 25 years imprisonment. Because the

sentence imposed was in accordance with the plea agreement, the

plea agreement is valid. Therefore, Movant is bound by the plea

agreement’s waiver of his right to collaterally attack his

conviction and sentence. 

Because Movant legitimately waived his right to bring

this action, his section 2255 motion may be summarily denied.

See Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508-09, 104 S. Ct. 2543,

2546-47 (1984) (“It is well settled that a voluntary and

intelligent plea of guilty made by an accused person, who has

been advised by competent counsel, may not be collaterally

attacked.”); United States v. Jeronimo, 398 F.3d 1149, 1157 (9th

Cir. 2005) (reaching this conclusion in the context of a direct

appeal wherein the Movant waived his right to directly appeal or

collaterally attack his conviction and sentence in a plea

agreement); United States v. Bolinger, 940 F.2d 478, 480-81 (9th

Cir. 1991). 

However, a plea agreement which waives the Movant’s

right to collaterally attack their sentence is not enforceable

if the waiver was involuntary. See, e.g., Jeronimo, 398 F.3d at

1156. In Jeronimo the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded

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that the District Court did not have jurisdiction to consider

the appeal of a Movant who had waived his right to collaterally

attack his conviction in a plea agreement because the agreement

was knowing and voluntary on its face, stating: “A defendant’s

waiver of his appellate rights is enforceable if (1) the

language of the waiver encompasses his right to appeal on the

grounds raised, and (2) the waiver is knowingly and voluntarily

made”. Id. See also United States v. White, 307 F.3d 336, 343

(5th Cir. 2002).

A collateral attack alleging ineffective assistance of

counsel in negotiating a plea agreement may be brought

notwithstanding a waiver of this right in the agreement, but

only if the agreement was involuntary or unknowing, or if the

court relied on an impermissible factor such as race, or where

the agreement is otherwise unlawful. See United States v.

Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1182 (10th Cir. 2001); Bridgeman v.

United States, 229 F.3d 589, 591 (7th Cir. 2000).

Movant’s contemporaneous statements regarding his

understanding of the plea agreement carry substantial weight in

determining if his entry of a guilty plea was knowing and

voluntary. Cf. United States v. Mims, 928 F.2d 310, 313 (9th

Cir. 1991) (reaching this holding in a section 2255 case);

United States v. Walker, 160 F.3d 1078, 1096 (6th Cir. 1998)

(holding, in a section 2255 case, that “a straightforward and

simple ‘Yes, your Honor’ is sufficient to bind a Movant to [the]

consequences [of a plea agreement].”). Because he was

adequately informed of the consequences of his plea, Movant’s

guilty plea can be considered voluntary and knowing. See Boykin

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v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 1712 (1969).

The undersigned concludes Movant’s guilty plea was voluntary and

made intelligently. See Chizen v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 560, 562

(9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1383

(9th Cir. 1986).

Because Movant does not produce any evidence indicating

he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter into the agreement,

the undersigned concludes the plea agreement was valid, as was

Movant’s voluntary waiver of his right to collaterally attack

his sentence. Accordingly, the section 2255 petition should be

denied and dismissed. Compare United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d

431, 433 (9th Cir. 1994) (“we doubt that a plea agreement could

waive a claim of ineffective of assistance of counsel based on

counsel’s erroneously unprofessional inducement of the defendant

to plead guilty or accept a particular plea bargain.”).

III Conclusion

Movant’s section 2255 motion was not timely filed and

Movant presents no basis for equitable tolling of the statute of

limitations. Because the waiver of his right to collaterally

attack his sentence in the writtten plea agreement was not

unknowing or involuntary, the Court may dismiss Movant’s claims

as waived.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Respondent’s motion to

dismiss be granted and Mr. Moore’s motion for relief from his

convictions and sentences pursuant to section 2255 be denied and

dismissed with prejudice.

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This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter,

the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a

response to the objections. 

Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil Procedure

for the United States District Court for the District of

Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right

to de novo appellate consideration of the issues. See United

States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en

banc). Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a

waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of

fact and conclusions of law in an order or judgment entered

pursuant to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.

DATED this 20th day of June, 2011.

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