Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-14-03339/USCOURTS-ca8-14-03339-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Neiman Regis Adams
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-3339

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Neiman Regis Adams

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

___________________________

No. 14-3354

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Neiman Regis Adams

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeals from United States District Court 

for the District of Minnesota - St. Paul

____________

 Submitted: October 23, 2015

 Filed: April 11, 2016

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Appellate Case: 14-3339 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/11/2016 Entry ID: 4387050 
Before WOLLMAN, BYE, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

____________

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Neiman Regis Adams was convicted of armed bank robbery, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d), and was sentenced to 240 months’ imprisonment. He was

also sentenced to a consecutive term of 18 months’ imprisonment for violating the

terms of supervised released that was imposed following an earlier conviction. He

appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress statements that he 1

made during a custodial interrogation, as well as from the sentences imposed by the

district court, arguing that they are substantively unreasonable. We affirm.

I.

On August 13, 2013, two black men entered the Virginia Cooperative Credit

Union (the bank) located in Virginia, Minnesota, and committed an armed robbery. 

At that time, three tellers and one customer were in the bank. Neither of the men who

entered the bank wore a mask. One of the men was armed with a handgun and wore

a flat-brimmed baseball cap, a dark, hooded sweatshirt with the hood up, and a

lanyard around his neck. That individual pointed his gun at the tellers and the

customer, ordering them to lie on the ground, while the other individual walked

behind the counters and emptied the tellers’ cash drawers. The robbery lasted

approximately two minutes, and the men stole approximately $53,000. The local

police department, with assistance from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),

investigated the robbery. The police were unable to identify the robbers from any

The Honorable Richard H. Kyle, United States District Court for the District 1

of Minnesota, adopting the report and recommendations of the Honorable Leo I.

Brisbois, United States Magistrate Judge for the District of Minnesota.

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physical evidence left at the scene of the crime, but the robbery was captured on the

bank’s security cameras from multiple angles. Following a three-day investigation,

police arrested Adams on August 16, 2014. That day, police detective Bruce L.

Hedstrom met with Adams. After being informed of his Miranda rights, Adams

stated that he did not want to answer questions, and Hedstrom terminated the

interrogation. 

On August 30, 2013, Hedstrom brought FBI special agent Timothy Ball to the

jail, where Ball interviewed Adams. Ball first advised Adams of his rights under

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), reading aloud an FBI “Advice of Rights”

form. After stating each right, Ball asked Adams whether he understood, and Adams

indicated that he did. Ball asked Adams to sign his name at the bottom of the form,

indicating that he understood his rights, but Adams refused to do so, stating that he

did not understand why he was being questioned and that he did not like “dealing

with cops.” Ball informed Adams that he could refuse to answer questions, could

choose to answer some questions but not answer others, and could terminate the

interview at any time. Approximately three minutes and forty seconds into the

interview, Ball asked Adams if he wanted to answer questions. The two then had the

following exchange:

ADAMS: No, I don’t think I wanna, you know-- 

BALL: I’ll explain what’s going on. We’ve got you in the . . . bank. 

We’ve talked to a lot of people and collected a lot of information. And

that’s why you’re here, for robbing the bank.

Approximately six minutes into the interview, Adams stated:

ADAMS: I was at my girlfriend’s Rebecca’s-- 

BALL: Okay, so you were--

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ADAMS: Nah, I don’t want to talk, man. I mean, I–2

BALL: Okay, so you were saying you were at your girlfriend Rebecca’s

house.-- 

ADAMS: I mean-- 

BALL: That’s where the problem is, okay, because we know you

weren’t at your girlfriend Rebecca’s house.-- 

ADAMS: I just, I just, I just wanna, you know what I’m saying?--

BALL: Okay, okay, that’s fine, but just so you know, your alibi of being

at Rebecca’s house all day, every second--

ADAMS: No, I wasn’t there all . . . I wasn’t there all day.

BALL: Okay.

The interview continued for approximately sixteen additional minutes, during which

time Adams made statements that he was innocent, that he was not a “rat,” and that

he had sold his white Dodge Durango SUV before the robbery occurred.

Prior to trial, Adams moved to suppress the statementsthat he made during the

interrogation because they were obtained in violation of Miranda, 384 U.S. 436. The

district court denied the motion, finding that Adams had implicitly waived his

Miranda rights when he answered Ball’s questions. It further found that Adams’s

statement, “I don’t want to talk, man,” was not an unambiguous invocation of his

right to remain silent, because the context suggested that he was expressing his

reluctance to talk about certain topics and because he continued to answer questions

immediately after he made the statement. The district court concluded that under the

totality of the circumstances, Adams had voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.

Both Adams and the district court transcribed this sentence differently. Adams

2

transcribed the phrase as “Naw. I mean, I don’t want to talk man. Cuz I mean I

don’t--.” The district court transcribed it as “I don’t want to talk to you.” We have,

for the most part, adopted Adams’s version, and note that Adams’s exact words are

unclear from the recording because of poor sound quality. In any event, the

difference has no bearing on the outcome of this appeal.

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Most of the government’s evidence at trial centered on identifying Adams as

the armed individual who robbed the bank. The government introduced the video

recordings of the robbery and testimony from two of the bank tellers who had been

working during the robbery. The tellerstestified that they saw the armed individual’s

face and that they recognized Adams as that individual. The government also

introduced testimony from three of Adams’s girlfriends, D.D., C.O., and R.S. D.D.,

who testified on the condition thatshe receive immunity fromprosecution, stated that

she knew that Adams was the individual in the video based on her familiarity with

Adams and “[t]he way his hands were, the way he was standing, vaguely the face, his

structure, everything.” C.O., who worked for the police as a confidential informant,

testified that she had identified Adams as the individual in the video for the police

during the investigation. On cross-examination, she testified that her confidence that

Adams was the man in the video was “50-50.”

The government also introduced evidence of Adams’s conduct before and after

the robbery. D.D. and R.S. both testified that soon after the robbery, Adams asked

them to store large sums of money for him, and that following his arrest he instructed

them to deliver the money to various individuals. R.S. further testified that Adams

was with her on the day of the robbery but left her apartment at approximately noon

and returned at approximately 2:00 p.m., and that one week before the robbery

occurred Adams had shown her a gun matching the description of the gun used in the

robbery. D.D. further testified that Adams frequently wore a flat-brimmed baseball

cap and a lanyard around his neck, and that the day before the robbery Adams made

statements and sent text messages to her, including that he was “going to do

something stupid,” that “thisisthe last day you’ll see me,” and that “I got to get ready

for tomorrow.” The government also introduced audio recordings of Adams’s prison

phone calls, during one of which Adams instructed a friend to remove money hidden

in R.S.’s house, stating, “They ain’t got nothing, I don’t want them to get nothing.” 

Additional testimony addressed Adams’s white Dodge Durango SUV. A witness

stated that he had observed two black men in a vehicle matching the description of

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Adams’s Durango, and that the vehicle was parked in a parking lot near the bank

shortly before the time of the robbery.

Detective Hedstrom was the only witness who discussed the statements that

Adams made during his interrogation. Hedstrom testified that during the August 30

interrogation, Adams “said he was at his girlfriend[’s apartment], and [that] when

[told] that his vehicle was seen approximately a block away from the credit union,

[said] that he had sold that truck.” The government discussed those statements in its

opening and closing arguments, noting that they were lies and could be interpreted

as evidence of Adams’s guilt.

Adams’s presentence investigation report (PSR) calculated a base offense level

of 29 and a criminal history category of IV. Based on Adams’s two prior convictions

for violent felonies, however, the PSR applied the career-offender enhancement under

§ 4B1.1 oftheU.S.Sentencing Guidelines Manual (U.S.S.G. or Guidelines), resulting

in a total offense level of 34, a criminal history category of VI, and a recommended

sentencing range of 262 to 300 months’ imprisonment. The district court adopted the

findings in the PSR, varied downward, and, as set forth above, sentenced Adams to

240 months’ imprisonment.

Adams previously had been convicted of bank robbery with a dangerous

weapon and was serving a term of supervised release when he committed the instant

offense. Because his conviction for bank robbery constituted a violation of the terms

of his supervised release, the district court also conducted a revocation hearing during

sentencing. The Guidelines recommended a sentencing range of 18 to 24 months. 

Adams requested a within-Guidelines sentence and that his revocation sentence be

concurrent with his 240-month sentence for the instant offense. The district court

sentenced Adams to 18 months’ imprisonment, to be served consecutive to his other

sentence.

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II.

Adams first claims that the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress his

statements from the August 30, 2013, interrogation violated his Fifth Amendment

rights. “We review de novo the legal conclusions underlying the denial of a motion

to suppress on Fifth Amendment grounds, while the factual findings are reviewed for

clear error.” United States v. Thomas, 664 F.3d 217, 221 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting

United States v. Wise, 588 F.3d 531, 536 (8th Cir. 2009)).

A.

Adams argues that the district court clearly erred when it found that Adams’s

statement, “I don’t want to talk, man,” was not an unequivocal invocation of his right

to remain silent. During an interrogation, “[i]f the individual indicatesin anymanner,

at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the

interrogation must cease.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74. “To adequately invoke this

right and effectively cut off questioning, a suspect must indicate ‘a clear, consistent

expression of a desire to remain silent.’” United States v. Johnson, 56 F.3d 947, 955

(8th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Thompson, 866 F.2d 268, 272 (8th Cir.

1989)). “We consider the defendant’s statements as a whole to determine whether

they indicate an unequivocal decision to invoke the right to remain silent.” Id. After

Adams said “Nah, I don’t want to talk, man. I mean, I,” he immediately proceeded

to engage in an exchange with Ball. The phrase “I mean” signaled that Adams

intended to clarify the statement, “I don’t want to talk, man,” and the statement was

therefore ambiguous. See United States v. Havlik, 710 F.3d 818, 822 (8th Cir. 2013)

(holding that the statement “I guess you better get me a lawyer then” was not an

unequivocal invocation of the right to an attorney because the phrase “I guess” was

equivocal). Adams thereafter continued to talk with Ball for an additional sixteen

minutes, never clarifying his earlier statement or otherwise unequivocally invoking

his right to remain silent. In light of these circumstances, the district court did not

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commit clear error in finding that Adams had not indicated a clear, consistent

expression of a desire to remain silent.

Adams argues that the district court also clearly erred in finding that he

impliedly waived his Miranda rights when he answered Ball’s questions. He claims

that the circumstances surrounding his interrogation demonstrate that he did not

intend to waive his right to remain silent. Those circumstances include his refusal to

sign the FBI’s form, his statement that he did not like talking with law enforcement,

and his assertion of his right to remain silent during the August 16 interview. We

disagree. Waiver of the right to remain silent “can be clearly inferred from the

actions and words of the person interrogated.” North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S.

369, 373 (1979). “Where the prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was given

and that it was understood by the accused, an accused’s uncoerced statement

establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain silent.” Berghuis v. Thompkins,

560 U.S. 370, 384 (2010). Adams does not dispute that he was informed of his rights

or that he understood them. When Adams made uncoerced statements to Ball, he

engaged in a course of conduct indicating waiver. The circumstances to which he

cites do not overcome the fact that he understood his Miranda rights and nevertheless

chose to speak to Ball. See id. at 386 (“The fact that Thompkins made a statement

about three hours after receiving a Miranda warning does not overcome the fact that

he engaged in a course of conduct indicating waiver.”). The district court therefore

did not err in concluding that Adams had waived his Miranda rights.

Adams argues in the alternative that, even if he waived his right to remain

silent, that waiver was involuntary in light of his poor academic performance in high

school (he graduated with a 2.44 cumulative grade point average (GPA)) and in

community college (a GPA of 1.40 fromeighteen credits) and becauseBall continued

to ask questions after Adams stated, “I don’t want to talk, man.” “We consider the

totality of the circumstances, including the conduct of the officers and the

characteristics of the accused, in determining whether a suspect’s waiver or

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statements were the product of an overborne will.” Havlik, 710 F.3d at 822. 

Although Adams’s mental acuity is relevant in determining whether his statements

were voluntary, it is not dispositive. See Wilson v. Lawrence County, 260 F.3d 946,

952 (8th Cir. 2001) (concluding that a confession was involuntary because it was

obtained from a mentally handicapped suspect after more than four hours of

questioning, during which time the police asked leading questions and made

intimidating, threatening statements to the suspect). Here, the officers used no

coercive tactics, Adams knew his rights, and he was familiar with police

interrogations, having successfully invoked his right to remain silent two weeks

earlier. In light of these circumstances, we agree with the district court’s finding that

his waiver was voluntary.

B.

In any event, any error in denying the motion to suppress would have been

harmless. “An error is harmless ‘if, after reviewing the entire record, we determine

that the substantial rights of the defendant were unaffected, and that the error did not

influence or had only a slight influence on the verdict.’” United States v. Looking

Cloud, 419 F.3d 781, 787 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Crenshaw, 359

F.3d 977, 1003-04 (8th Cir. 2004)). “The admission of statements obtained in

violation of Miranda may constitute harmless error [when] there remains

overwhelming independent evidence as to the defendant’s guilt.” Chavez v. Weber,

497 F.3d 796, 805 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Packer, 730 F.2d 1151,

1157 (8th Cir. 1984)). 

As recounted above, the government presented substantial evidence to identify

Adams as the individual who robbed the bank. It introduced the video recordings of

the robbery, from which the jury could tell that Adams was the same size and build

as the individual in the video. Two bank tellers identified Adams as the individual

who had pointed a gun at them, and two of Adams’s girlfriends identified him as the

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individual in the video recording of the robbery. There was evidence that Adams’s

vehicle waslocated near the bank shortly before the robbery, as well astestimony that

shortly after the robbery Adams hid large sums of money in his girlfriends’ houses. 

And there were Adams’s own incriminating statements, presented through text

messages and recordings of phone calls he made from prison. By contrast, evidence

from Adams’s interrogation consisted of only one sentence in Hedstrom’s testimony,

and the government mentioned the interrogation only briefly during opening and

closing statements. Adams’s statements thus were not the focus of the trial, and any

influence they might have had on the jury was slight in comparison to the evidence

that identified Adams as one of the bank robbers.

Adams argues that those statements were highly prejudicial because they

directly contradicted his theory of the case, which was that he was aware of the crime

and helped hide the money, but did not directly participate in the robbery. Again,

whatever impact his statements may have had on the jury’s assessment of Adams’s

mere-tangential-involvement defense pales in comparison to the overwhelming

evidence that he had participated in the robbery.

III.

Adams next challenges his sentences as substantively unreasonable. “We will

not reverse a sentence as substantively unreasonable absent a showing of abuse of

discretion by the district court.” United States v. San-Miguel, 634 F.3d 471, 475 (8th

Cir. 2011) (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). “A district court

abuses its discretion when it fails to consider a relevant [sentencing] factor, gives

significant weight to an irrelevant or improper factor, or considers only appropriate

factors but nevertheless commits a clear error of judgment by arriving at a sentence

that lies outside the limited range of choice dictated by the facts of the case.” Id.

(quoting United States v. Jones, 509 F.3d 911, 913 (8th Cir. 2007)). Given the

district court’s discretion in imposing sentence, “it will be the unusual case when we

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reverse a district court sentence . . . as substantively unreasonable.” United States v.

Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 464 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quoting United States v.

Gardellini, 545 F.3d 1089, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 2008)).

Adams argues that his 240-month sentence is substantively unreasonable

because the district court did not give sufficient weight to mitigating factors and

because the sentence is greater than necessary to accomplish the goals of sentencing. 

In particular, Adams points to his difficult upbringing—his father was an abusive

alcoholic, his mother was a drug addict, and he was eventually placed in the fostercare system. Additionally, he recounts his substance abuse history; his mental-health

treatment; and his previous attempts, though unsuccessful, to turn his life around. 

“Simply because the district court weighed relevant factors . . . more heavily than

[Adams] would prefer does not mean the district court abused its discretion.” United

States v. Farmer, 647 F.3d 1175, 1179 (8th Cir. 2011). The record makes clear that

the district court was aware of the relevant facts and that it considered them in

imposing sentence. Although the district court placed more weight on some factors

and placed less weight on other factors than Adams thinks it should have, we

conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in doing so.

We have considered and find to be without merit Adams’s argument that his

consecutive 18-month revocation sentence issubstantively unreasonable because the

district court did not identify which sentencing factors it considered in imposing the

sentence and did not take into account those previously listed mitigating factors.

The judgment is affirmed.

______________________________

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