Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_05-cv-00110/USCOURTS-almd-2_05-cv-00110-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alfa Corporation
Plaintiff
Alfagres, S.A.
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

ALFA CORPORATION, etc., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO.

) 2:05cv110-T

ALFAGRES, S.A., etc., ) (WO)

)

Defendant. )

ORDER

Plaintiff Alfa Corporation, a Delaware corporation with

its principal place of business in Montgomery, Alabama,

brings this lawsuit against defendant Alfagres, S.A., a

Colombian business, asserting violations of the U.S.

Trademark Act of 1946 (the “Lanham Act”), 15 U.S.C.A.

§ 114(1), known as the “Lanham Act.” Now before the court

is Alfagres’s motion to quash service of process and

alternative motion to dismiss for lack of personal

jurisdiction and insufficient service of process. For the

reasons that follow, the motions will be denied. 

Case 2:05-cv-00110-MHT-DRB Document 13 Filed 08/30/05 Page 1 of 27
1. Complaint (Doc. No. 1), p. 2-3.

2. Id. at 3.

3. Id.

2

I. Background

According to its complaint, Alfa is a financial services

conglomerate that operates through a number of wholly owned

subsidiaries, divisions, and related companies; it provides

realty and construction services through Alfa Realty, Inc.,

Alfa Properties, Inc., and Alfa Builders, Inc.; and it is

publicly traded on the NASDAQ stock exchange under the

symbol “ALFA.”1

 In its complaint, Alfa alleges that it has

acquired common-law trademark rights to the name “Alfa”

throughout the United States, including within the States of

Alabama and Florida.2

 In addition, Alfa holds a number of

federally registered trademarks incorporating the word

“Alfa,” such as “Alfa Builders” and “Alfa Realty.”3

Alfagres is a Colombian tile manufacturer that markets

and sells its products worldwide, including in the United

States. Its brochures and website indicate that “Alfagres

Case 2:05-cv-00110-MHT-DRB Document 13 Filed 08/30/05 Page 2 of 27
4. Opposition to defendant’s motion to quash (Doc. No.

11), Exs. 1-6. Alfa has submitted numerous exhibits

including Alfagres’s marketing and promotional materials,

brochures, and catalogues. In all of these materials, a

Miami address and phone number, along with an American email

address, alfagres@bellsouth.net, are listed as a means of

contacting the company.

5. Id., Declaration of Colin R.B.L. Phipps, p. 2.

3

handles all the orders for North America, The Caribean

[sic], Europe, Asia and the Pacific from their office in

Miami, USA.”4

 In these materials, the address for Alfagres’s

Miami “office” is listed as 7122 N.W. 50th Street, Miami,

Florida, 33166. 

Alfa also contends that Alfagres maintains a sales

office at this Miami location. An investigator for Alfa

visited the Miami address listed on Alfagres’s website and

was provided marketing and promotional materials, product

samples, and other information about Alfagres. In addition,

he was greeted by several personnel who identified

themselves as employees of Alfagres.5

 Photographs taken by

Case 2:05-cv-00110-MHT-DRB Document 13 Filed 08/30/05 Page 3 of 27
6. Plaintiff’s memorandum of law in opposition to

defendant’s motion to quash (Doc. No. 12), p. 2. 

4

the investigator indicate that the name “Alfagres” is

displayed outside the Miami office building.6

 

Despite this evidence, including the fact that its

brochures and promotional materials list the Miami address

as its American office, Alfagres now contends that it does

not actually maintain a business office in the United

States, and that the Miami address is in fact the location

of OPA International Corporation, the American distributor

of Alfagres products. It states that mail sent to this

Miami address is forwarded to Alfagres’s headquarters in

Colombia, and is thus in reality only a “mail drop.”

Alfagres states that it “sells product[s] to this

distributor, and the distributor resells the product in the

United States.” Alfagres admits that it allows the

distributor to use the name “Alfagres” at its location, and

also allows it to distribute Alfagres marketing information.

However, it contends that the distributor is “a separate

Case 2:05-cv-00110-MHT-DRB Document 13 Filed 08/30/05 Page 4 of 27
7. Supplemental brief in support of defendant’s motion

to quash (Doc. No. 10), pp. 1-2. 

8. Defendant’s motion to quash service of process (Doc.

No. 7), Ex. A, Declaration of German Eduardo Ramirez Dallos;

Memorandum in support of defendant’s motion to quash (Doc.

No. 8), pp. 2-3. 

9. Id. 

5

legal corporation, and is not authorized to receive service

of process for Alfagres.”7

Though the function of this Miami address is hotly

contested, the parties do not dispute that Alfagres does not

own or lease any real estate in the State of Alabama, has no

employees in Alabama, does not pay Alabama taxes, and does

not contract or conduct business with any entity or customer

located in Alabama.8

 Alfagres does not actively advertise or

solicit business in Alabama. Its website, www.alfagres.com,

can be accessed by computers anywhere in the world,

including from computers in Alabama, although no orders can

be placed through the website.9

 

Alfa alleges that Alfagres uses the name and mark “Alfa”

in connection with offering building and construction

Case 2:05-cv-00110-MHT-DRB Document 13 Filed 08/30/05 Page 5 of 27
10. Complaint (Doc. No. 1), p. 5.

11. Id.

6

services and products in a way that is confusing to

customers and detrimental to Alfa. It further states that,

when Alfagres sought to register the designation “Alfa” with

the United States Patent and Trademark Office, it sent

Alfagres a letter demanding that it withdraw its trademark

applications and cease and desist from all use of the name

“Alfa” in connection with its services and products, but

that Alfagres refused to respond and continued to use the

“Alfa” trademark.10 The Patent and Trademark Office

subsequently denied Alfagres’s trademark applications based

on Alfa’s senior registered marks.11 

Alfa filed this suit in the Middle District of Alabama

in February 2005, alleging various trademark infringement

claims. Upon the filing of the complaint, a summons and

complaint were sent by the clerk of the court, via certified

mail, to the above-referenced Miami address. An individual

named Alba Montallana signed for the return receipt, which

Case 2:05-cv-00110-MHT-DRB Document 13 Filed 08/30/05 Page 6 of 27
12. Alfa states that Montallana previously held herself

out to its investigator as an attorney for and employee of

Alfagres. Plaintiff’s memorandum of law in opposition to

defendant’s motion to quash service (Doc. No. 12), p. 2. 

13. Defendant’s motion to quash (Doc. No. 7), p. 2.

7

was then filed with the court.12 Several weeks later,

Alfagres filed the motions now before the court, contending

that Montallana was neither an employee nor an agent

authorized to receive service of process on behalf of

Alfagres and that, therefore, service had not been executed

pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(h) & (f); in the alternative,

Alfagres asks that this lawsuit be dismissed for lack of

personal jurisdiction and insufficient service of process.13

 

II. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2) Motion to Dismiss 

Before addressing the issue of service of process, the

court will first address the threshold issue of whether it

has personal jurisdiction over Alfagres. See Fed.R.Civ.P.

12(b)(2) (“jurisdiction over the person”).

Case 2:05-cv-00110-MHT-DRB Document 13 Filed 08/30/05 Page 7 of 27
8

Alfa presents two alternative arguments in support of

its contention that this court has personal jurisdiction

over Alfagres. First, it argues that this court has

specific jurisdiction over Alfagres pursuant to the

“effects” test established in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783,

104 S.Ct. 1482 (1984), because Alfagres intentionally

committed trademark infringement against Alpha, knowing that

the effect of these actions would primarily be felt in

Alabama. Second and in the alternative, Alfa argues that

this court has personal jurisdiction over Alfagres pursuant

to the Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(k)(2) “national contacts” test.

Because the court concludes that it has specific

jurisdiction over Alfagres pursuant to the Calder “effects”

test, it need not reach Alfa’s Rule 4(k)(2) argument.

A. Standard

In the context of a motion to dismiss in which no

evidentiary hearing is held, a plaintiff need establish only

a prima-facie case of jurisdiction. Madara v. Hall, 916

Case 2:05-cv-00110-MHT-DRB Document 13 Filed 08/30/05 Page 8 of 27
9

F.2d 1510, 1514 (11th Cir.1990). “The district court must

accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true, to the

extent they are uncontroverted by the defendant’s

affidavits.” Id. at 1514. Where the parties’ allegations

conflict, all pleadings and affidavits introducing evidence

relating to jurisdictional facts are to be construed in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff. Mutual Service Ins.

Co. v. Frit Industries, Inc., 358 F.3d 1312, 1319 n.6 (11th

Cir. 2004).

B. Discussion

When a defendant challenges personal jurisdiction, the

plaintiff has the twin burdens of establishing that personal

jurisdiction over the defendant comports with (1) the forum

State’s long-arm provision and (2) the requirements of the

due-process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United

States Constitution. Oliver v. Merritt Dredging Co., 979

F.2d 827, 830 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 983,

113 S. Ct. 1577 (1993). 

Case 2:05-cv-00110-MHT-DRB Document 13 Filed 08/30/05 Page 9 of 27
10

Because Alabama’s long-arm provision, Ala.R.Civ.P.

4.2(a), authorizes the assertion of personal jurisdiction to

the limits of the United States Constitution, a plaintiff

may carry both of these burdens by demonstrating that

personal jurisdiction over the defendant meets the

requirements of federal due process. Id. Due process

requires, first, that the defendant have “certain minimum

contacts” with the forum State and, second, that the

exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant does not offend

“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”

Burnham v. Superior Court of California, County of Marin,

495 U.S. 604, 618, 110 S. Ct. 2105, 2114-15 (1990) (quoting

International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, Office of

Unemployment Compensation and Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 316,

66 S. Ct. 154, 158 (1945)); see also SEC v. Carrillo, 115

F.3d 1540, 1542 (11th Cir. 1997).

Case 2:05-cv-00110-MHT-DRB Document 13 Filed 08/30/05 Page 10 of 27
11

i. Minimum Contacts

To constitute minimum contacts for purposes of specific

jurisdiction, the defendant’s contacts with the applicable

forum must satisfy three criteria: first, the contacts must

be related to the plaintiff’s cause of action or have given

rise to it; second, the contacts must involve some act by

which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the

privilege of conducting activities within the forum; and,

third, the contacts must be such that the defendant should

reasonably anticipate being haled into court in the forum.

Carillo, 115 F.3d at 1542.

Given the fact that a defendant might reasonably

anticipate suit in a specific State for a variety of

reasons, the minimum contacts standard is often more easily

articulated than applied. However, the Supreme Court has

specifically distinguished between negligent and intentional

actions, holding that the latter indicate that “the

defendant may be held to have expected its conduct to have

an effect in that state, and further to have expected that

Case 2:05-cv-00110-MHT-DRB Document 13 Filed 08/30/05 Page 11 of 27
12

the victim will bring suit for redress there.” Coblenz v.

General Motors Corp., 724 F.Supp. 1364 (M.D. Ala. 1989)

(Thompson, J.). Thus, relying on Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S.

783, 104 S.Ct. 1482 (1984), this court previously stated

that, 

“when the origin of a deliberate,

nonfortuitous tort is in one state, and

the intended injury to a recognized victim

is in another state, the tortfeasor has

affirmatively established minimum contacts

with the state in which the injury

occurred, if the tortfeasor knew at the

time it committed the alleged tort that

the victim would be injured in that

state.” 

 

Coblenz, 724 F.Supp. at 1369 (citing Calder, 465 U.S. at

790, 104 S.Ct. at 1487); see also Burger King v. Rudzewicz,

471 U.S. 462, 472, 105 S.Ct. 2174 (1985); Asahi Metal

Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 107 S. Ct.

1026, 1033 (1987) (“‘substantial connection’ ... between the

defendant and the forum State necessary for a finding of

minimum contacts must come about by an action of the

defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State”)

(citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 

Case 2:05-cv-00110-MHT-DRB Document 13 Filed 08/30/05 Page 12 of 27
13

Several courts have applied Calder to trademark

infringement disputes, holding that the use of a trademark

with knowledge of the infringement constitutes intentional

tortious wrongdoing such that the alleged infringer could

reasonably anticipate being haled into court in the state

where the effects of the infringement are felt. For

example, in Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metro. Baltimore

Football Club, 34 F.3d 410, 412 (7th Cir. 1994), the Seventh

Circuit held that the Maryland-based defendant could

reasonably expect to be haled into court in Indiana because

it knew that the effects of its alleged trademark

infringement would be felt primarily in Indiana. The

trademark dispute arose after the owner of the Baltimore

Colts secretly and suddenly moved his team to Indianapolis

in 1984, a decision that outraged the citizens of Baltimore.

34 F.3d at 411. Nine years later, the defendant, a

franchise of the Canadian Football League, established a new

football team in Baltimore named the “Baltimore CFL Colts.”

Id. The Indianapolis Colts subsequently brought suit for

Case 2:05-cv-00110-MHT-DRB Document 13 Filed 08/30/05 Page 13 of 27
14

trademark infringement in Indiana against the Baltimore

franchise. Given that the defendant was clearly aware of

the Indianapolis Colts’ existence, the court held that “by

choosing a name that might be found to be confusingly

similar to that of the Indianapolis Colts, the defendants

assumed the risk of injuring valuable property located in

Indiana.” Id. 

Similarly, in Dakota Industries, Inc. v. Dakota

Sportswear, Inc., 946 F.2d 1384, 1391 (8th Cir. 1991), the

Eighth Circuit held that the defendant, a California

corporation, had established minimum contacts with the State

of South Dakota, where the South Dakota-based plaintiff

alleged that the defendant had intentionally committed

trademark infringement. The defendant continued to use the

plaintiff’s trademark after it had twice been rejected in

its attempts to register the trademark “Dakota,” and had

received a “cease and desist” letter from the plaintiff

demanding that it stop using the “Dakota” trademark. These

facts played a significant role in the court’s conclusion

Case 2:05-cv-00110-MHT-DRB Document 13 Filed 08/30/05 Page 14 of 27
14. Complaint (Doc. No. 1), p. 5; plaintiff’s

(continued...)

15

that the defendant knew it was likely infringing upon the

plaintiff’s trademark and therefore “must reasonably

anticipate being haled into court in South Dakota.” 946

F.2d at 1391. See also Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta

National, Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000)

(Georgia-based corporate defendant established minimum

contacts with California where it knew of and individually

targeted California-based plaintiff in trademark dispute);

Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316

(9th Cir. 1998). 

In this case, Alfa alleges that Alfagres intentionally

committed tortious conduct by continuing to use the name

“Alfa” in connection with its services and products even

after (1) Alfa demanded that Alfagres withdraw its trademark

applications with the Patent and Trademark Office and cease

and desist from all use of the name “Alfa,” and (2)

Alfagres’s trademark application was rejected due to Alfa’s

senior registered marks.14 Taken as true, the facts alleged

Case 2:05-cv-00110-MHT-DRB Document 13 Filed 08/30/05 Page 15 of 27
14. (...continued)

memorandum of law in opposition to defendant’s motion to

quash (Doc. No. 12), p. 15.

16

in the complaint clearly indicate that Alfagres knew it was

likely committing trademark infringement specifically

against Alfa in Alabama and continued to do so anyway.

Because it could anticipate that the primary effects of its

wrongful conduct would be felt in Alabama, Alfagres could

reasonably have expected that Alpha would bring suit here,

even given Alfagres’s lack of other contacts with Alabama.

Calder, 465 U.S. at 790, 104 S.Ct. at 1487 (“An individual

injured in California need not go to Florida to seek redress

from persons who, though remaining in Florida, knowingly

cause the injury in California”).

For the above reasons, the three criteria necessary to

satisfy minimum contacts are satisfied here.

ii. Fair play and substantial justice

As for the second aspect of jurisdictional due process,

the court also concludes that its exercise of jurisdiction

Case 2:05-cv-00110-MHT-DRB Document 13 Filed 08/30/05 Page 16 of 27
17

over Alfagres complies with traditional notions of fair play

and substantial justice. As this court has previously

noted, 

“[I]n the typical intentional tort case,

it is both fair and just to allow the

victim of an alleged tort to call the

tortfeasor to account in the victim’s home

forum. A contrary result would force

injured parties to go to the alleged

tortfeasor for redress even though, taking

the victim’s position as justified at the

institution of suit, the tortfeasor has

knowingly brought about the situation

through its actions.” 

Coblentz, 724 F.Supp. at 1371 (citing Burger King, 471 U.S.

at 474-76, 105 S.Ct. at 2183-84). Therefore, given that

Alfa has alleged intentional trademark infringement,

Alfagres must present a “compelling case” that other factors

render this court’s exercise of jurisdiction offensive to

fair play and substantial justice, notwithstanding minimum

contacts. Id. Alfagres has failed to do so.

In evaluating whether the exercise of jurisdiction

comports with fair play and substantial justice, the court

must consider such factors as (1) the burden on the

Case 2:05-cv-00110-MHT-DRB Document 13 Filed 08/30/05 Page 17 of 27
15. Defendant’s memorandum in support of motion to

quash (Doc. No. 8), p. 11.

18

defendant, (2) the forum State’s interest in adjudicating

the dispute, (3) the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining

convenient and effective relief, (4) the interstate judicial

system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution

of controversies, and (5) the shared interest of the several

States in furthering fundamental substantive social

policies. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477, 105 S.Ct. at 2184.

Alfagres’s primary argument that the court’s exercise of

personal jurisdiction would offend notions of fair play and

substantial justice is that it would be highly inconvenient

for it to litigate this dispute in Alabama. It points out

that “Alfagres has no contact with the State of Alabama” and

that “All of their resources, employees, officers,

directors, and facilities, are located in Bogota,

Colombia.”15 It then argues that Alfa should have filed suit

in a State where it does have some contact, such as Florida.

Case 2:05-cv-00110-MHT-DRB Document 13 Filed 08/30/05 Page 18 of 27
19

The fact that Alfagres is a foreign corporation whose

headquarters are in Bogota, Colombia does nothing to

persuade the court that it would be unfair for it to

exercise personal jurisdiction in this case. Holding

otherwise would be tantamount to allowing foreign

corporations to evade the consequences of committing

intentionally wrongful acts in this jurisdiction.

Furthermore, Alfagres’s argument that Alfa should have

brought suit in Florida, where it has “some contact,” is

also to no avail. Elsewhere in its briefs, Alfagres argues

that the Miami address listed in its promotional materials

is nothing but a “mail drop” for its Colombian office.

Though the court views this argument with suspicion, this

statement, if taken as true, implies that it would be no

more convenient for Alfagres to defend this action in the

Southern District of Florida than it would be in the Middle

District of Alabama.

Put simply, while defending this action will necessarily

impose burdens upon Alfagres, it is also clear that Alfagres

Case 2:05-cv-00110-MHT-DRB Document 13 Filed 08/30/05 Page 19 of 27
20

was aware of the potential conflict it was creating with

Alfa by its continued use of the “Alfa” trademark.

Therefore, Alfagres could and should have anticipated the

burden of litigating a trademark infringement dispute in

Alabama. 

Finally, the court’s interest in the efficient

resolution of this dispute as well as Alfa’s interest in

obtaining convenient and effective relief both weigh in

favor of the court’s exercise of jurisdiction over Alfagres.

III. Motions Related to Service of Process

Because the court finds that it has personal

jurisdiction over Alfagres, it must reach Alfagres’s

argument that service of process is defective and should be

quashed or, alternatively, that the action should be

dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(5) (“insufficiency

of service of process”). The court finds that this argument

also fails. 

Case 2:05-cv-00110-MHT-DRB Document 13 Filed 08/30/05 Page 20 of 27
21

A. Rules

Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(h) governs service of process upon

corporations and associations. Rule 4(h)(1) states, in

relevant part, that, “[u]nless otherwise provided by federal

law, service upon a domestic or foreign corporation ...

shall be effected ... in a judicial district of the United

States in the manner prescribed for individuals by

subdivision (e)(1).” Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(e)(1), in turn, directs

that service upon individuals can be effected “pursuant to

the law of the state in which the district court is

located.” The court thus turns to the Alabama law. 

Ala.R.Civ.P. 4(i)(2) provides for service of process by

certified mail. Rule 4(i)(2)(B) states that “in the case of

an entity within the scope of one of the subdivisions of

Rule 4(c), the addressee shall be a person described in the

appropriate subdivision.” Rule 4(c)(6) dictates that

service upon a foreign corporation may be effected through

service upon “a managing or general agent, or any agent

authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of

Case 2:05-cv-00110-MHT-DRB Document 13 Filed 08/30/05 Page 21 of 27
22

process.” Thus, when attempting to serve a corporation by

certified mail, the summons and complaint must be addressed

to either “a managing or general agent,” or “any agent

authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of

process,” pursuant to Rule 4(c)(6). 

Rule 4(i)(2)(C) further provides that,

“Service by certified mail shall be deemed

complete and the time for answering shall

run from the date of delivery to the named

addressee or addressee’s agent as

evidenced by signature on the return

receipt. Within the meaning of this

subdivision, ‘agent’ means a person or

entity specifically authorized by the

addressee to receive the addressee’s mail

and to deliver that mail to the addressee.

Such agent’s authority shall be

conclusively established when the

addressee acknowledges actual receipt of

the summons and complaint or the court

determines that the evidence proves the

addressee did actually receive the summons

and complaint in time to avoid a default.”

 

B. Discussion

In this case, the summons and complaint, addressed

simply to “Alfagres, S.A.,” were sent by certified mail on

Case 2:05-cv-00110-MHT-DRB Document 13 Filed 08/30/05 Page 22 of 27
16. Plaintiff’s memorandum of law in opposition to

defendant’s motion to quash service (Doc. No. 12), p. 2. 

17. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A) states that unless a

different time is prescribed in a statute of the United

States, a defendant shall serve an answer “within 20 days

after being served with the summons and complaint.” The

deadline for Alfagres to file an answer was March 3, 2005.

23

February 9, 2005, to the address listed as the company’s

“Miami office” in Alfagres’s promotional and marketing

materials. A woman named Alba Montallana, who had

previously held herself out as an employee of Alfagres,16

signed the return certificate on February 11, 2005. The

certificate was filed in this court on February 16, 2005.

Although Alfagres did not file an answer within 20 days, as

prescribed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(a),17 it filed this motion to

quash service of process on March 14, 2005. Attached to the

motion is an exhibit entitled “Declaration of German Eduardo

Ramirez Dallos,” the legal representative of Alfagres, which

is dated March 11, 2005.

The court finds that service of process in this case was

in substantial compliance with the Federal and Alabama Rules

of Civil Procedure and that any defects in service of

Case 2:05-cv-00110-MHT-DRB Document 13 Filed 08/30/05 Page 23 of 27
24

process have not prejudiced Alfagres and are therefore

harmless error. See, e.g., Sanderford v. Prudential

Insurance Co., 902 F.2d 897, 900 (11th Cir. 1990)

(“Fed.R.Civ.P. 4 is a flexible rule that should be liberally

construed so long as a party receives sufficient notice of

the complaint”) (quoting United Food & Commercial Workers

Union v. Alpha Beta Co., 736 F.2d 1371, 1382 (9th Cir.

1984)); Thomas v. Yonkers Police Dept., 147 F.R.D. 77

(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (Broderick, J.). 

Although the summons and complaint were addressed to the

corporation itself, rather than to a specified person (i.e.

an officer, partner, or authorized agent of the corporation

described in Ala.R.Civ.P. 4(c)(6)), as required by

Ala.R.Civ.P. 4(i)(2)(B), service of the summons and

complaint clearly complied with all other aspects of Rule

4(i)(2) and reached the appropriate persons within Alfagres,

as evidenced by the fact that Alfagres filed its motion to

quash on March 14, 2005. See United Food & Commercial

Workers Union, 736 F.2d at 1382 (“[A] defendant’s ...

Case 2:05-cv-00110-MHT-DRB Document 13 Filed 08/30/05 Page 24 of 27
18. Memorandum in support of defendant’s motion to

quash (Doc. No. 8), pp. 2-3.

25

appearance in an action should be enough to prevent any

technical error in form from invalidating the process”)

(internal citations and quotations omitted). 

Alfagres’s argument that Montallana is not an agent

authorized to receive service of process on its behalf is

also to no avail. According to Ala.R.Civ.P. 4(i)(2)(C), the

“person or entity” who signs the return receipt need only be

an “agent” authorized to receive and deliver mail to the

addressee and need not be the actual person authorized to

receive process under Rule 4(c)(6). Throughout its briefs

and pleadings, Alfagres has repeatedly insisted that the

Miami address to which the summons and complaint was sent is

actually the address of OPA International Corporation,

Alfagres’s American distributor, and is for all practical

purposes simply a mail drop “from which mail is forwarded to

Alfagres at its Bogota, Colombia office.”18 Given Alfagres’s

clear admission that mail sent to the Miami address is

forwarded to Alfagres, the court finds that Montallana’s

Case 2:05-cv-00110-MHT-DRB Document 13 Filed 08/30/05 Page 25 of 27
26

signature was sufficient to comply with the requirements of

Ala.R.Civ.P. 4(i)(2)(C); regardless of whether Montallana

was in fact an employee of Alfagres or of OPA International,

her presence at the office and receipt of the mail indicates

that she was clearly part of the entity authorized to

forward mail to Alfagres at its Colombian headquarters.

Moreover, while it is unclear exactly when Alfagres

received the summons and complaint in Colombia, nowhere in

the record does it dispute eventually receiving the summons

and complaint. In fact, the record indicates that Alfagres

received actual notice of Alfa’s claim against it no later

than March 11, 2005, the date on which Dallos signed the

affidavit attached to Alfagres’s motion to quash. Given

that “the modern conception of service of process is

primarily as a notice giving device,” Andrews v. Coffee

County Bd. of Educ., WL 214509, *7 (M.D. Ala., 1988)

(Dubina, J.) (quoting Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and

Procedure, Civil 2d § 1083), “to quash service at this

juncture would simply serve to increase the costs of service

Case 2:05-cv-00110-MHT-DRB Document 13 Filed 08/30/05 Page 26 of 27
and delay the proceedings.” Coca-Cola Co. v. Empresa

Comercial Int’l de Frutas S.A., 1996 WL 378856, *2 (M.D.

Fla. 1996) (Kovachevich, J.).

However, the court is mindful that it is possible there

was some delay in the forwarding of the summons and

complaint from the Miami address to Alfagres’s Colombian

headquarters. Therefore, to ensure there is no prejudice to

Alfagres, the court will allow it 20 days from the date of

the issuance of this order to file another response to the

complaint.

For the forgoing reasons, it is ORDERED as follows:

(1) Defendant Alfagres, S.A.’s motion to quash service

of process and alternative motion to dismiss for lack of

personal jurisdiction and insufficient service of process

(Doc. No. 7) are denied.

(2) Defendant Alfagres, S.A. is allowed until September

19, 2005, to file a further response to the complaint.

Done, this the 30th day of August, 2005.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:05-cv-00110-MHT-DRB Document 13 Filed 08/30/05 Page 27 of 27