Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-55558/USCOURTS-ca9-14-55558-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Director
Appellee
District Director
Appellee
Yu-Ling Teng
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

YU-LING TENG,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DISTRICT DIRECTOR, US Citizenship

and Immigration Services;

DIRECTOR, US Citizenship and

Immigration Services,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 14-55558

D.C. No.

2:09-cv-08537-

AG-RNB

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Andrew J. Guilford, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

February 8, 2016—Pasadena, California

Filed May 4, 2016

Before: Andrew J. Kleinfeld, M. Margaret McKeown,

and Sandra S. Ikuta, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge McKeown

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2 TENG V. DISTRICT DIRECTOR, USCIS

SUMMARY*

Immigration

The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction of Yu-Ling Teng’s petition to

require the United States Citizenship and Immigration

Service to amend her date of birth on her naturalization

certificate, which was issued in 2001 by the Immigration and

Naturalization Service.

The panel held that federal courts lack subject matter

jurisdiction under the Immigration Act of 1990 to modify

naturalization certificates issued by an administrative agency. 

The panel wrote that the courts would have jurisdiction to

modify a certificate issued by a court before 1991, noting that

the panel addressed that different situation in its separate

opinion filed concurrently in Collins v. USCIS, 13-55290, 

__F.3d__ (9th Cir. 2016).

COUNSEL

Kyle Todd (argued), The Law Offices of Kyle Todd, Los

Angeles, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Robert I. Lester (argued), Assistant United States Attorney,

Los Angeles, California, for Defendant-Appellee.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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TENG V. DISTRICT DIRECTOR, USCIS 3

OPINION

McKeown, Circuit Judge:

Yu-Ling Teng, a naturalized citizen, wants to change the

birthday listed on her certificate of naturalization. Although

this request is seemingly simple, Teng faces a labyrinthine set

of laws and regulations that have made it impossible for her

to do so. The consequences extend beyond the claimed

inaccuracy on an essential identity document: because the

date of birth on Teng’s naturalization certificate does not

match the date of birth on file with the Social Security

Administration (“SSA”), California has not allowed Teng to

renew her state driver’s license.

Teng has asked for help from U.S. Citizenship and

Immigration Services (“USCIS”), her state assemblywoman,

and finally the federal courts. She has been rebuffed at every

turn. Her certificate was issued in 2001 by the Immigration

and Naturalization Service (“INS”), an administrative agency,

not by a court.1 This distinction dooms her appeal. We

would entertain her plea if we could, but because federal

courts lack subject matter jurisdiction under the Immigration

Act of 1990 to modify certificates of naturalization that were

issued by an administrative agency, we must deny Teng’s

request.

BACKGROUND

Yu-Ling Teng claims she was born in China on August 9,

1939. Unfortunately for her, this is not the date recorded on

her certificate of naturalization, which says that she was born

 

1

 INS was the predecessor agency of USCIS.

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4 TENG V. DISTRICT DIRECTOR, USCIS

in 1944. Teng wants to change her naturalization certificate

to reflect the earlier (and, she claims, correct) date.2

Teng’s problems stem from a discrepancy between the

date she initially provided to the SSA and the date now on file

with USCIS. When Teng first came to the U.S. on a student

visa in 1965, she held a Taiwanese passport that stated she

was born in 1939. The SSA adopted the 1939 birth year and

issued Teng a Social Security card.

When she applied for a green card in 1974, Teng provided

different information about her date of birth to INS.3 As part

of her application, Teng submitted a declaration from her aunt

that Teng was born on August 9, 1944, and Teng signed off

on that date. Based on these documents, INS issued a green

card that listed her date of birth as August, 9, 1944. Teng

became a U.S. citizen in 2001 and received a naturalization

certificate from INS that adopted 1944 as her birth year.

Teng tried to renew her California driver’s license in

2004, but according to Teng was denied because USCIS and

the SSA had different birth years on file. To fix the issue,

Teng filed a request for a replacement naturalization

certificate from USCIS. Nearly three years later, she was

interviewed by a USCIS officer. He told her that he had no

authority to change the birth date under agency regulations

2

In a post-hearing brief filed with the district court, USCIS disputed that

Teng was born in 1939 and filed documents in support ofits position. The

district court did not rely on these documents in its order dismissing

Teng’s petition, and USCIS acknowledged that this factual dispute is not

relevant to the question of subject matter jurisdiction.

 

3

 Teng became a lawful permanent resident in 1987.

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TENG V. DISTRICT DIRECTOR, USCIS 5

because she had signed off on it. Teng’s request to the SSA

to change the date of birth it had on file was also rejected.

After going back and forth with USCIS, the SSA, and the

California Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) for

almost five years, Teng was finally able to obtain a temporary

driver’s license. However, the license expired less than two

months after it was issued, was “not a verified identification,”

and “[did] not establish eligibility for employment, voter

registration, or public benefits.”

Teng then turned to her local assemblywoman for help. 

A representative from the assemblywoman’s office advised

her to file a petition in federal court against the Department

of Homeland Security, which she did. The district court

dismissed her petition, concluding that it did not have subject

matter jurisdiction to amend an agency-issued naturalization

certificate.

Finally, Teng appealed to this court. We review de novo

the district court order dismissing Teng’s petition for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction, Tritz v. U.S. Postal Serv., 721 F.3d

1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 2013), and we affirm.

ANALYSIS

This appeal presents a single legal question: do federal

courts have subject matter jurisdiction to order USCIS to

amend agency-issued certificates of naturalization? We are

sympathetic to Teng’s situation. However, in light of

statutory revisions to the immigration code, we hold that

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6 TENG V. DISTRICT DIRECTOR, USCIS

federal courts lack jurisdiction to amend agency-issued

naturalization certificates.4

Until 1991, courts had “[e]xclusive jurisdiction to

naturalize persons as citizens of the United States.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1421(a) (1988). A citizen who was naturalized by a “court

. . . [was] entitled upon such admission to receive from the

clerk of such court a certificate of naturalization.” Id. § 1449. 

Courts also had authority to “to correct, reopen, alter, modify,

or vacate [a] judgment or decree naturalizing such person.” 

Id. § 1451(i).

Although courts had exclusive jurisdiction to naturalize

immigrants before 1991, the executive branch also played an

advisory role. Before filing a petition for naturalization with

the court, an applicant needed to “first file[] an application”

with INS. Id. § 1445(b). INS then conducted a “preliminary

examination[]” and made a recommendation about the

petition. Id. § 1446(b). Only after this process was complete

did the court accept or reject INS’s recommendation by

naturalizing (or declining to naturalize) the immigrant.

This bifurcated process resulted in wait times of up to two

years for qualified applicants. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-187, at

8 (1989). Congress recognized that the existing two-branch

4 The situation is different for a naturalized citizen who holds a

naturalization certificate issued by a court before 1991. In that

circumstance, the court has jurisdiction to modify the certificate in light

of the Immigration Act of 1990’s uncodified savings clause, Pub. L. No.

101-649 § 408, 104 Stat. 4978, 5047 (1990), which preserves the

jurisdiction of the federal courts to modify a court-issued certificate under

the pre-1990 Immigration Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1451(i) (1988). We address this

issue in Collins v. USCIS, No. 13-55290, __F.3d__ (9th Cir. 2016), filed

concurrently with this opinion.

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TENG V. DISTRICT DIRECTOR, USCIS 7

system was “often times cumbersome and frustrating,” and

that the delays risked affecting “employment opportunities,

travel plans, [] conferring of immigration benefits on

relatives, and . . . [the] right to vote.” Id.

Accordingly, in the Immigration Act of 1990, Congress

transferred “[t]he sole authority to naturalize persons as

citizens of the United States” from the courts to the executive

branch, effective October 1, 1991. 8 U.S.C. § 1421(a);

104 Stat. at 5008; see also Gorbach v. Reno, 219 F.3d 1087,

1089 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[T]he power to naturalize

plainly was shifted by the 1990 amendment from the courts

to the INS.”). In doing so, Congress intended to “streamline[]

the process towards citizenship” by reducing the judiciary’s

involvement in naturalization proceedings. H.R. Rep. No.

101-187, at 8 (1989). “By vesting authority for naturalization

with the Attorney General,” Congress hoped, “the applicant

will be relieved of onerous paperwork burdens, confusing

divisions of responsibilities between the Courts and the

Department of Justice, and unduly lengthy processing times

to achieve their goal of acquiring U.S. citizenship.” Id.

The result of the legislation was that, going forward, the

federal courts effectively lost jurisdiction over naturalization

proceedings. Today, the “sole authority to naturalize persons

as citizens of the United States is conferred upon the Attorney

General,” not the courts. 8 U.S.C. § 1421(a).5

5 Under the revised regime, federal courts do retain some narrow

authority to participate in the naturalization process. For example, the

courts can administer oaths of allegiance, 8 U.S.C. § 1421(b)(1), and can

assert jurisdiction over a naturalization petition if the executive branch

fails to act on an application within 120 days of the applicant’s interview

with the executive branch. See 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b); United States v.

Hovsepian, 359 F.3d 1144, 1159–60 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc).

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8 TENG V. DISTRICT DIRECTOR, USCIS

The executive branch’s naturalization authority is

extremely broad; for example, the Attorney General provides

new citizens with certificates of naturalization, 8 U.S.C.

§ 1449, and also has the power to cancel those certificates,

8 U.S.C. § 1453.6 As part of these statutory revisions,

Congress has also shifted the power to “correct, reopen, alter,

modify, or vacate an order naturalizing the person” from the

federal courts to the Attorney General. Compare 8 U.S.C.

§ 1451(i) (1988) with 8 U.S.C. § 1451(h).

As courts of limited jurisdiction, federal courts “possess

only that power authorized by Constitution and statute[.]” 

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377

(1994). Nothing in the Immigration Act of 1990 grants us

jurisdiction to amend an agency-issued certificate of

naturalization or to order USCIS to do so. But see Collins v.

USCIS, No. 13-55290, __ F.3d __ (9th Cir. 2016). Instead,

the statute vests in the Attorney General the sole jurisdiction

to change agency-issued naturalization certificates. We agree

with our colleagues in the Tenth Circuit that, “when Congress

ended the jurisdiction of district courts to naturalize aliens, it

necessarily ended the jurisdiction to exercise powers

derivative of the power to naturalize, including the power . . .

to modify naturalization documents.” McKenzie v. U.S.

Citizenship &Immigration Servs., 761 F.3d 1149, 1156 (10th

Cir. 2014); see also Gorbach, 219 F.3d at 1094 (writing that

the Immigration Act of 1990 “plainly and unambiguously

gives the Attorney General the power to naturalize citizens

and to cancel certificates of citizenship . . . and plainly and

6 The Attorney General does not have authority to actually denaturalize

a citizen; that authority rests with the federal courts. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a);

Gorbach, 219 F.3d at 1094.

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TENG V. DISTRICT DIRECTOR, USCIS 9

unambiguously gives to district courts the power to

denaturalize citizens”).

Teng argues that the district court’s subject matter

jurisdiction is derived from two agency regulations. The first

regulation, 8 C.F.R § 334.16(b), states:

Amendment of petition for naturalization . . .

[a]fter final action on petition. Whenever an

application is made to the court to amend a

petition for naturalization after final action

thereon has been taken by the court, a copy of

the application shall be served upon the

district director . . . . No objection shall be

made to the amendment of a petition for

naturalization after the petitioner for

naturalization has been admitted to citizenship

if the motion or application is to correct a

clerical error arising from oversight or

omission.

8 C.F.R. § 334.16(b).7

The second regulation, 8 C.F.R § 338.5, which governs

the “[c]orrection of certificates,” provides:

(b) Court-issued certificates. If the certificate

was originally issued by a clerk of court under

a prior statute and USCIS finds that a

7 This regulation was revoked by the agency effective November 28,

2011. See Immigration Benefits Business Transformation, Increment I,

76 Fed. Reg. 53,764, 53,769 (Aug. 29, 2011). Teng filed her district court

petition before this date.

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10 TENG V. DISTRICT DIRECTOR, USCIS

correction is justified . . . , USCIS will

authorize the issuing court to make the

necessary correction and to place a dated

endorsement of the court on the reverse of the

certificate explaining the correction. The

authorization will be filed with the

naturalization record of the court, the

corrected certificate will be returned to the

naturalized person, and the duplicate will be

endorsed to show the date and nature of the

correction and endorsement made, and then

returned to USCIS. No fee will be charged the

naturalized person for the correction.

(c) USCIS-issued certificates. If the

certificate was originally issued by USCIS (or

its predecessor agency), and USCIS finds that

a correction was justified, the correction shall

be made to the certificate and a dated

endorsement made on the reverse of the

certificate.

. . .

(e) Data change. The correction will not be

deemed to be justified where the naturalized

person later alleges that the name or date of

birth which the applicant stated to be his or

her correct name or date of birth at the time of

naturalization was not in fact his or her name

or date of birth at the time of the

naturalization.

8 C.F.R. § 338.5(b), (c) & (e).

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TENG V. DISTRICT DIRECTOR, USCIS 11

These regulations do not create subject matter

jurisdiction. Most importantly, the regulations cannot

override the statute’s clear designation of exclusive

jurisdiction. See United States v. Alisal Water Corp.,

431 F.3d 643, 650 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Congress may negate

district court jurisdiction [b]y virtue of . . . a specific

reference or assignment.” (internal quotation mark and

citation omitted)). The Immigration Act of 1990 explicitly

vests the “sole authority to naturalize persons as citizens of

the United States” in the Attorney General, along with the

power “to correct, reopen, alter, modify, or vacate an order

naturalizing the person.” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1421(a), 1451(h); see

also McKenzie, 761 F.3d at 1156 (“[W]hen Congress ended

the jurisdiction of district courts to naturalize aliens, it

necessarily ended the jurisdiction to exercise powers

derivative of the power to naturalize, including the power . . .

to modify naturalization documents.”).

Teng also argues that the regulations “imply” subject

matter jurisdiction from another unspecified statutory source. 

The problem with this argument is that even on their own

terms, the regulations do not recognize federal court

jurisdiction in the circumstances here. Section 338.5 allows

USCIS (not the courts) to authorize changes to naturalization

certificates, while § 334.16(b) allows courts to “amend a

petition for naturalization after final action thereon has been

taken by the court[.]” 8 C.F.R. § 334.16(b) (emphasis added). 

Here, no action has been taken by a court; Teng’s

naturalization proceedings were conducted by the agency and

she received an agency-issued certificate of naturalization. 

The plain language of both regulations is consistent with the

principle that federal courts lack jurisdiction to amend

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12 TENG V. DISTRICT DIRECTOR, USCIS

agency-issued naturalization certificates.8 Moreover, because

“[o]nly Congress may determine a lower federal court’s

subject-matter jurisdiction,” Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443,

452 (2004), an administrative regulation may not confer

jurisdiction where Congress has not done so. See Opera

Plaza Residential Parcel Homeowners Ass’n v. Hoang,

376 F.3d 831, 837 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that “a regulation

promulgated by an administrative agency . . . cannot by itself,

in the absence of congressional authorization, confer subject

matter jurisdiction on federal courts”); see also Bowles v.

Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 210–13 (2007).

Teng’s most sympathetic argument is that the outcome is

unfair, because all she wants is to have consistent dates on her

government documents. Of course, we take no position on

which date is correct or whether she is entitled to any relief. 

The lack of jurisdiction precludes us from considering the

merits of her claim. Nevertheless, we agree that Teng has

been subjected to a bureaucratic mess of Gogolian

proportions.9 Under current regulations, USCIS lacks

authority to amend Teng’s naturalization certificate because

Teng gave the agency an incorrect birthday. 8 C.F.R.

§ 338.5(e). And by statute, federal district courts also lack

8

Indeed, USCIS repealed § 334.16(b) as “expired and obsolete” in 2011.

USCIS explained that § 334.16(b) was no longer necessary because it

“relate[d] to any ‘petition for naturalization’filed prior to October 1, 1991. 

Such petitions were under the jurisdiction of the naturalization court until

that date.” Immigration Benefits Business Transformation, Increment I,

76 Fed. Reg. at 53,769.

9

See, e.g., Nikolai Gogol, The Overcoat (1842). The Overcoat

chronicles a civil servant who is robbed of a new coat, but is turned away

from each potential avenue of relief, echoing Gogol’s recurring theme of

the monolithic, non-responsive bureaucracy of nineteenth-centuryRussia.

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TENG V. DISTRICT DIRECTOR, USCIS 13

jurisdiction to amend her agency-issued naturalization

certificate. See 8 U.S.C. § 1451(h); Gorbach, 219 F.3d at

1089. This means that Teng is stuck with a birthday on her

certificate of naturalization that does not match the birthday

on file with the SSA.10

Teng asserts that an immediate consequence of this

statutory and regulatory scheme is that the REAL ID Act

effectively prevents her from obtaining a permanent,

federally-recognized driver’s license. See Pub. L. 109-13,

119 Stat. 302 (2005). According to Teng, because the SSA

has on file a different birthday than the date listed on her

naturalization certificate, she has been unable to renew her

California driver’s license. This problem is likely to persist

indefinitely.

Although the district court’s observation that “it might

make sense for the Petitioner to be granted the relief she

seeks” has a certain appeal, we hold only that the district

court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Immigration

Act to consider the merits and weigh whether USCIS should

change an agency-issued certificate of naturalization.11 Teng

10 Teng may also be stymied in her effort to get the SSA to effect a

birthday change, as her sister recently found two Taiwanese documents (a

Teng Family birthrole and a Taiwanese residence register book) that show

Teng’s birthday to be August 9, 1939—the date on file with the SSA.

11 In her opening brief, Teng writes in passing that the district court also

had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (the Declaratory

Judgment Act), and 5 U.S.C. §§ 555 and 701 et seq. (the Administrative

Procedure Act). She neither develops these claims nor responds to the

government’s assertion that she has waived this argument on appeal. We

conclude that Teng waived this argument. See Pierce v. Multnomah

County, 76 F.3d 1032, 1037 n.3 (9th Cir. 1996).

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14 TENG V. DISTRICT DIRECTOR, USCIS

may be able to pursue other avenues of relief, such as a

private congressional bill, congressional reform, or an

administrative or constitutional challenge. But those

potential remedies are beyond our jurisdiction and beyond our

purview in this appeal.

AFFIRMED.

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