Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cr-00541/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cr-00541-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John Ching En Lee
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

JOHN CHING EN LEE,

Defendant.

Case No. 15-cr-00541-SI-1 

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR BILL 

OF PARTICULARS AND GRANTING 

IN PART AND DENYING IN PART 

MOTION FOR DISCOVERY

Re: Dkt. No. 60

Defendant John Ching En Lee has filed a motion for a bill of particulars and to compel 

discovery. Docket No. 60. This matter came on for hearing on May 17, 2016. Having considered 

the arguments of counsel and the papers submitted, the Court hereby rules as follows.

BACKGROUND

On February 28, 2014, a special agent for the United States Department of Homeland 

Security swore out a criminal complaint against defendant John Ching En Lee. Docket No. 1. 

The complaint alleged that on March 6, 2008, the Contra Costa County Sheriff’s Department 

executed a search warrant at the Crystal Massage Parlor. Id., Scott Aff. ¶ 6. Qingmin Liu, the 

owner of the parlor, was arrested for soliciting prostitution. Id. Defendant Lee, Liu’s husband, 

posted bail for Liu. Id. On March 11, 2008, the Department of Homeland Security, Office of 

Inspector General, received a complaint that Lee, an Immigration Services Officer with the United 

States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“CIS”), “had an association with the owner of a 

brothel, which operated under the auspice of a massage parlor.” Id. 

As part of his official investigation into Lee, Special Agent Lamont Scott reviewed Lee’s 

activity in the Treasury Enforcement Communications System (“TECS”) government database. 

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Id. ¶ 8. When Scott reviewed the “TECS playbacks” to determine whether Lee had ever queried 

himself or his family members, Scott confirmed that Lee conducted three subject queries of 

Qingmin Liu’s name on March 19, 2009.1 Id. ¶ 10. Scott stated that Lee conducted this search 

while he worked at the CIS Office in San Francisco, California, and that such a search would not 

have fallen within his official duties. Id. 

According to the criminal complaint, on August 26, 2009, Special Agent Richard Fuentes 

from the Department of Homeland Security interviewed Lee. Id. ¶ 9. During the interview, Lee 

“acknowledged that his wife was the owner and operator of the massage parlor, but denied any 

association with the business . . . .” Id. Fuentes’s memorandum of that interview states, “Lee 

denied that he ever funded or gave money to Liu for the massage parlor.” Kollios Decl. Ex. A at 

2.

On August 30, 2013, Special Agent Scott, along with Special Agent William Lee from the 

IRS, interviewed defendant Lee. Kollios Decl. Ex. C. Scott’s memorandum of that interview 

states, “Lee’s wife asked him to help her purchase the [massage] business and in 2006 he got a 

loan for $30,000 from Wells Fargo Bank.” Id. at 1.

Special Agent Scott and IRS Special Agent William Lee again interviewed defendant Lee 

on October 10, 2013. Kollios Decl. Ex. E. During the interview, Lee was asked whether he had 

“‘ever made unauthorized queries in TECS for [his] personal use,’ and Lee responded, ‘to the best 

of my recollection, no.’” Id. at 1. Lee further denied making unauthorized queries of himself or 

of his wife for personal use. Id.

On November 19, 2015, a grand jury returned an indictment against Lee. Docket No. 42. 

The indictment charged Lee with two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2), false statement 

or representation made to a department or agency of the United States. Id. at 1-2. 

As to Count One, the indictment charges: 

 

1

Lee’s motion states that the TECS playbacks review revealed that “Lee had searched 

three versions of his wife’s name on March 19, 2009 and one version of his name on March 20, 

2006 (although using a different birth date than his own).” Motion at 3 (citing Docket No. 60-1, 

Declaration of Lara Kollios (“Kollios Decl.”) Ex. D).

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United States District Court

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On or about August 26, 2009, . . . the defendant, JOHN CHING EN LEE, did 

willfully and knowingly make a materially false, fictitious, and fraudulent 

statement and representation . . . by making false statements to representatives of 

the Department of Homeland Security about his involvement in providing funding 

to the owner of Crystal Massage Parlor, who was arrested for prostitution in 

relation to the Crystal Massage Parlor. The statements and representations were 

false because JOHN CHING EN LEE then and there knew that he had provided 

$30,000 to the owner to fund the Crystal Massage Parlor.

Id. 

Count Two of the indictment charges: 

On or about October 10, 2013, . . . the defendant, JOHN CHING EN LEE, did 

willfully and knowingly make a materially false, fictitious, and fraudulent 

statement and representation . . . by making false statements to representatives of 

the Department of Homeland Security about his use of Treasury Enforcement 

Communications System (TECS) for personal reasons. The statements and 

representations were false because JOHN CHING EN LEE then and there knew 

that he had queried his own name, as well as the name of the owner of the Crystal 

Massage Parlor, using multiple spellings of the owner’s name and using the 

owner’s birthdate.

Id. at 2.

Now before the Court is defendant’s motion for a bill of particulars and to compel 

discovery. Docket No. 60 (“Motion”). 

DISCUSSION

I. Bill of Particulars

Defendant Lee seeks a bill of particulars containing factual detail bearing on Counts One 

and Two of the indictment, alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Specifically, Lee seeks 

information identifying: “(a) the exact statements the government alleges were false in Count One 

and (b) the materiality of the alleged false statements in Count Two . . . .” Motion at 1.

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(f) provides that “[t]he court may direct the 

government to file a bill of particulars.” “The bill of particulars has three functions: ‘to inform the 

defendant of the nature of the charge against him with sufficient precision to enable him to prepare 

for trial, to avoid or minimize the danger of surprise at the time of trial, and to enable him to plead 

his acquittal or conviction in bar of another prosecution for the same offense when the indictment 

itself is too vague, and indefinite for such purposes.’” United States v. Giese, 597 F.2d 1170, 1180 

(9th Cir. 1979) (quoting United States v. Birmley, 529 F.2d 103, 108 (6th Cir. 1976)); see also 

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United States v. Mitchell, 744 F.2d 701, 705 (9th Cir. 1984) (“The purposes of a bill of particulars 

are to minimize the danger of surprise at trial and to provide sufficient information on the nature 

of the charges to allow preparation of a defense.”). However, a defendant may not use a motion 

for a bill of particulars to obtain discovery of all the evidence the government intends to produce. 

Giese, 597 F.2d at 1181 (concluding court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for bill of 

particulars seeking the “when, where, and how” of every act in furtherance of a conspiracy, when 

indictment and discovery provided defendant with information sufficient to meet purposes of a bill 

of particulars). “The decision whether to grant a request for a bill of particulars is directed to the 

trial court’s discretion.” United States v. Long, 706 F.2d 1044, 1054 (9th Cir. 1983) (citations 

omitted).

The Court finds that a bill of particulars should not issue in this case. “A defendant is not 

entitled to know all the Evidence the government intends to produce, but only the Theory of the 

government’s case.” Giese, 597 F.2d at 1181 (citing Yeargain v. United States, 314 F.2d 881, 882 

(9th Cir. 1963)). Count One of the indictment sufficiently informs Lee of the government’s theory 

of the case. It specifies the date (August 26, 2009) on which Lee is alleged to have made the false 

statement, that Lee made false statements “about his involvement in providing funding to the 

owner of Crystal Massage Parlor,” and that the statements were false because Lee “then and there 

knew that he had provided $30,000 to the owner to fund the Crystal Massage Parlor.” Indictment 

¶ 1. 

In considering a motion for a bill of particulars, courts are to consider both the language of 

the indictment and the information provided through discovery. Giese, 597 F.2d at 1181. In the 

context of the discovery produced in this case, there is nothing ambiguous about the term 

“funding” in Count One of the indictment. See Motion at 7. The government has produced a 

three-page “Memorandum of Activity” summarizing the interview conducted on August 26, 2009. 

Kollios Decl. Ex. A. The memorandum includes the following: “Lee denied that he ever funded 

or gave money to Liu for the massage parlor.” Id. at 2. Additionally, defense counsel indicated at 

the hearing that she had recently received additional agent notes of interviews with Lee, and the 

Court intends to order the government to produce any remaining agent notes from Lee’s 

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interviews. This information, though not necessary, will further help Lee understand the charges 

against him and “will obviate the need for a bill of particulars.” See Long, 706 F.2d at 1054. Lee 

is not entitled to know “the exact statements [the government] alleges Mr. Lee made that were 

false on August 26, 2009” when he has more than enough information to inform him of the 

government’s theory of the case. See Giese, 597 F.2d at 1181; Motion at 7.

Count Two of the indictment also sufficiently informs Lee of the government’s theory of 

the case. Again, it states the date the false statements were made (October 10, 2013), that Lee 

made false statements “about his use of Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS) 

for personal reasons,” and that the statements were false because Lee “then and there knew he had 

queried his own name, as well as the name of the owner of the Crystal Massage Parlor . . . .” 

Indictment ¶ 2. Through discovery, Lee has in his possession Memoranda of Activity that 

summarize the interview that took place on October 10, 2013, as well as the TECS playbacks 

search that Special Agent Scott ran on September 19, 2013. Kollios Decl. Ex. D, E. This 

information gives Lee the dates on which he allegedly ran the unauthorized TECS searches as well 

as the specific queries he is alleged to have used. Kollios Decl. Ex. D; Docket No. 65-1, 

Declaration of Lara Kollios in Support of Reply, Ex. H; Motion at 3. Lee argues that a bill of 

particulars is needed as to Count Two because the indictment does not make clear “what could be 

material about Mr. Lee’s denials.” Motion at 8. However, in the Ninth Circuit, an indictment is 

usually sufficient if it sets forth the elements of the offenses charged. United States v. Fernandez, 

388 F.3d 1199, 1200 (9th Cir. 2004); see also United States v. Woodruff, 50 F.3d 673, 676 (9th 

Cir. 1995). It is enough that Count Two of the indictment charges that Lee’s allegedly false 

statement was material. 

Accordingly, Lee’s motion for a bill of particulars is DENIED.

II. Discovery

Lee also seeks an order that the government produce requested discovery, citing Federal 

Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Motion at 4-5, 8-

12. Though not conceding that Lee is entitled to everything he requested, the government has 

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agreed to provide Lee’s financial records (Request O) and tolling agreements (Request P). Docket 

No. 63 (“Opposition”) at 4, 6-7.

The following discovery remains in dispute: FBI 302’s, agent notes, and other summaries 

of interviews with Lee (Request I); FBI 302’s of Lee’s wife, Mrs. Qingmin Liu (Request J), and of 

other individuals allegedly connected with Crystal Massage Parlor (Request M); Contra Costa 

Sheriff’s Department’s interrogation reports, crime reports, or other reports concerning the Crystal 

Massage Parlor and individuals allegedly associated with the parlor (Request L); and 

communications with the Contra Costa Sheriff’s Department regarding those same reports 

(Request K). See Motion at 5; Kollios Decl. Ex. F.2 

“Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure grants defendants a broad right to 

discovery, providing that ‘[u]pon a defendant’s request, the government must permit the defendant 

to inspect and to copy or photograph . . . documents . . . within the government’s possession, 

custody, or control . . . [that are] material to preparing the defense . . . .’” United States v. Doe, 

705 F.3d 1134, 1150 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(E)(i)). “To receive 

discovery under this Rule, the defendant must make a threshold showing of materiality, which 

requires a presentation of facts which would tend to show that the Government is in possession of 

information helpful to the defense.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). “Neither a general 

description of the information sought nor conclusory allegations of materiality suffice; a defendant 

must present facts which would tend to show that the Government is in possession of information 

helpful to the defense.” United States v. Mandel, 914 F.2d 1215, 1219 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations 

omitted).

The Court finds that Lee has not made a threshold showing of materiality as to discovery 

requests J, K, L, and M. These are the notes of interviews with Mrs. Liu and other individuals 

associated with the massage parlor as well as the reports and communications concerning the 

parlor from the Contra Costa Sheriff’s Department. The government argues that these documents 

 

2

Lee states at the outset of his motion that he also seeks search or arrest warrants relating 

to him (Request N), but he does not brief the issue further either in his motion or in his reply. See

Motion at 5.

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are not material because “[t]he government need not prove that the massage parlor was in fact a 

brothel . . . so long as the government can establish that agents developed an investigation as a 

result of the local action against the massage parlor and that Defendant gave false statements that 

were material to that investigation . . . .” Opposition at 6. Defendant Lee agrees that “it does not 

matter whether Defendant’s wife was actually running a brothel.” Reply at 6 (quoting Opposition 

at 5). Thus, it is difficult to understand how the information requested is material. Moreover, Lee 

has presented no facts tending to show that the discovery requested will be helpful to his defense. 

See Mandel, 914 F.2d at 1219. He argues, for instance, that the production “may contain 

impeachment of the government agents” and “may impeach the agents and their motives behind 

the investigation . . . .” Motion at 11 (emphasis added). These assertions regarding materiality are 

conclusory at best.

The materiality of Request I, by contrast, is more apparent. Lee is being charged with 

making false statements to federal agents on two occasions, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). 

The statements that Lee allegedly made during his interviews are themselves the crimes with 

which he is being charged. The government, though disputing that Lee is entitled to discovery of 

the agents’ notes of interviews with Lee, has agreed nevertheless to produce the notes “in an 

abundance of caution.” Opposition at 4. The government believes it has produced this material 

already, but at the hearing, defense counsel could not confirm that this was so. Under these 

circumstances, the Court finds that the government should produce the discovery sought under 

Request I and therefore GRANTS Lee’s motion to compel discovery on this issue. The parties

shall meet and confer and, if they find that the government has not already produced the notes as it 

believes it has done, they shall so notify the Court.

3

 

3 At the hearing, the government asked that the Court refrain from “granting” Lee’s

discovery motion as a technical matter, for fear that later discovered agent notes that have not been 

produced will put government counsel out of compliance with a court order. Should any agent 

notes under Request I be discovered at a later date, the Court will not consider the government to 

be non-compliant with a court order if the government promptly turns the notes over to defense 

counsel.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court hereby DENIES the motion 

for a bill of particulars. The Court DENIES the motion to compel discovery as to Requests J, K, 

L, and M. The Court GRANTS the motion to compel discovery as to Request I. Any later 

discovered material that falls within Request I shall be promptly produced to defense counsel.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 17, 2016

______________________________________

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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