Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-01419/USCOURTS-ca10-91-01419-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Citicorp Diners Club, Inc.
Appellant
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH F I L .. . ..J l 

United States Co~:-t<?f Appea-F 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS r.renth Circuit 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ) 

COMMISSION, ) 

) 

Petitioner-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

CITICORP DINERS CLUB, INC. ) 

) 

Respondent-Appellant. ) 

FEBO t 1993 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 91-1419 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Colorado 

(D . C. No. 91-S- 1341) 

Lamont N. White, Attorney (Donald R. Livingston, General Counsel; 

Gwendolyn Young Reams, Associate General Counsel; and Vincent J. 

Blackwood, Assistant General Counsel; with him on the brief) for 

Petitioner-Appellee, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 

Washington, D.C. 

Bruce W. Sattler (and Anthony A. King of Faegre & Benson, with him 

on the brief) , Attorneys for Respondent-Appellant, Denver, Colo- rado . 

Before McKAY, Chief Judge, KELLY, Circuit Judge, and MCWILLIAMS, 

Senior Circuit Judge. 

McWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 91-1419 Document: 010110165510 Date Filed: 02/01/1993 Page: 1 
This case involves an administrative subpoena issued by the 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission {EEOC). 

On September 2, 1988, Ms. Deborah Hinton Brown, a black female employee of Citicorp Diners Club , Inc. (Diners Club) in its 

office located in Englewood, Colorado, filed a charge with the 

EEoc wherein she alleged that Diners Club denied her a promotion 

because of her sex and race. Shortly thereafter, the EEOC commenced an investigation of Ms. Brown's charge. From September 2, 

1 989, to June 4, 1990, the EEOC conducted on-site interviews and 

made numerous requests for infonnation concerning Diners Club's 

promotion policies. Diners Club apparently complied with these 

requests. 

On June 4, 1990, the EEOC requested additional infonnation 

from Diners Club concerning its promotion policies. After seeking 

and receiving clarification from the EEOC regarding the request, 

Diners Club provided only such additional infonnation as it believed was relevant and not unduly burdensome. In this regard, 

Diners Club declined to give the EEOC infonnation regarding promo -

tions outside Ms. Brown's work group, which infonnation it believed was not relevant to Ms. Brown's charge. Diners Club also 

dee.lined to provide information regarding its "within promotion" 

pol~cy, 1 which infonnation it contended did not exist and would 

require hundreds of hours of work by Diners Club employees to develop and compile. 

1 

"Within promotion, 11 a tenn apparently coined by the EEOC, 

refers to Diners Club's practice o f promoting a candidate selected 

by a manager rather than posting the position. 

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Appellate Case: 91-1419 Document: 010110165510 Date Filed: 02/01/1993 Page: 2 
To compel Diners Club to produce all the information the EEOC 

sought, on March 26, 1991, the EEOC issued and served on Diners 

Club an administrative subpoena, which is the genesis of the 

present 

ment A. 

controversy. That subpoena is attached hereto as AttachTwo requests in the subpoena required production of information relating to Diners Club facilities nationwide. The remaining requests related solely to the Diners Club facility in 

Englewood, Colorado. 

On April 2, 1991, Diners Club petitioned the Denver District 

Office of the EEOC to either revoke or modify the subpoena. The 

EEOC refused to either modify or revoke, whereupon Diners Club 

notified the EEOC that it would not comply with the subpoena . 

On August 5, 1991, pursuant to 42 U.S . C. §§ 2000e-5(f) and 

2000e-9, the EEOC petitioned the United States District Court for 

the District of Colorado for an order to enforce the subpoena. On 

September 6, 1991, the district court ordered Diners Club to show 

cause why it had not produced the information requested in the 

subpoena. Diners Club filed with the district court a brief in 

opposition to the order to show cause, advising the district court 

that Ms. Brown and Diners Club had reached a settlement and that 

Ms . Brown had requested that the charge be withdrawn. However, 

the settlement was apparently contingent on the EEOC's withdrawal 

of the charge . The EEOC had refused to consent to the withdrawal 

of the charge until it received the subpoenaed information so that 

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Appellate Case: 91-1419 Document: 010110165510 Date Filed: 02/01/1993 Page: 3 
it could then determine whether withdrawal of the charge would 

defeat the purposes of Title VII. 2 

On October 4, 1991, a hearing was held on the order to show 

cause . As we understand it, no witnesses were called, although 

Diners Club offered the affidavit of one of its employees, 

Patricia Giordano. That affidavit, which was received into evidence, is attached hereto as Attachment B. Otherwise, the hearing 

consisted of argument by opposing counsel and colloquy between the 

court and counsel. 

On November 5, 1991, the district court ordered Diners Club 

to comply with the subpoena, except in one important particular. 

The district court held that the requests for information concerning the promotion policies of Diners Club "nationwide" were 

"overbroad" and limited the request for information concerning 

promotion policies to the Diners Club office in Englewood, Colorado. In ordering compliance, the district court rejected Diners 

Club's suggestion that the subpoena was moot because Diners Club 

had settled with Ms. Brown and Ms. Brown had requested withdrawal 

of the charge. The district court also rejected Diners Club's 

suggestion that in requiring Diners Club to develop and compile 

information not then in existence, the subpoena was burdensome and 

overbroad. Finally, the district court rejected Diners Club ' s 

contention that the EEOC had no authority to require Diners Club 

2 29 C.F.R. § 1601 .10 provides that a charge filed by or on 

behalf of a person claiming to be aggrieved may be withdrawn only 

by the person claiming to be aggrieved and only with the consent 

of the Commission. Further, the Commission may consent to a request to withdraw a charge where the withdrawal will not defeat 

the purposes of Title VII. 

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Appellate Case: 91-1419 Document: 010110165510 Date Filed: 02/01/1993 Page: 4 
to compile information. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, Diners Club seeks our review of 

the district court's order of November 5, 1991. An order of a 

district court directing the production of records described in an 

administrative subpoena is a final judgment . EEOC v. University 

of New Mexico, 504 F.2d 1296, 1300 (10th Cir. 1974) . 

On appeal, Diners Club raises three matters: (1) under its 

statutory powers EEOC cannot require Diners Club to interview its 

employees and review its files to prepare summaries that do not 

presently exist; (2) since Ms. Brown only alleged discrimination 

based on her race and sex, the EEOC cannot request documents and 

information relating to possible discrimination based on national 

origin; and (3) the EEOC's subpoena requests were unduly burdensome. We shall consider these matters separately. 

Diners Club's initial argument is that although EEOC may re -

quest the production of relevant documents then in existence for 

examination and copying, it cannot compel the Diners Club to develop and compile summaries by examining personnel files or by 

interviewing employees. In thus arguing, Diners Club asserts that 

such is the inescapable teaching of Joslin Dzy Goods Co . v. EEOC, 

483 F . 2d 178 (10th Cir. 1973). That is not our reading of that 

case . While it is true that the district court in Joslin held 

that the EEOC could not compel an employer to "compile" information for use by the EEOC, Joslin Dry Goods Co . v . EEOC, 33 6 F. 

Supp. 941, 947 (D. Colo . 1971) , we did not so hold on appeal. Apparently the EEOC did not raise this particular matter in this 

court, and, in any event, we did not address it. 

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Appellate Case: 91-1419 Document: 010110165510 Date Filed: 02/01/1993 Page: 5 
We deem Circle K Corp. v. EEOC, 501 F.2d 1052 (10th Cir. 

1974 ) to be instructive . In that case, the subpoena issued the 

employer by the EEOC sought the following: 

a list of all applicants and present employees 

subjected to the polygraph examination, their 

racial-ethnic identity and whether they were 

accepted or rejected; documentation of the 

nature, standardization and validity of the 

polygraph test and a list of questions asked 

of each applicant; qualifications of the examiners who administered the tests; testimony 

under oath of all knowledgeable employees and 

officers; and all related matters. 

501 F.2d at 1054. 

Although the word 11 compile 11 was never used in our opinion in 

Circle K, certainly the subpoena required the employer to develop 

and compile information for EEOC's use. In Circle K the district 

court had refused to enforce the subpoena, relying, in part, on 

the fact that compliance would entail compilation. Circle K Corp . 

v. EEOC, 7 Fair Empl. Prac . Cas. (BNA) 1058, 1059 (D .N.M. 1972). 

On appeal, we reversed the district court and ordered enforcement. 

In so doing, we cited with approval Local No. 104, Sheet Metal 

Workers v. EEOC, 439 F.2d 237 (9th Cir. 1971 ). In Local No. 104, 

the Ninth Circuit stated: "Local 104 contends there is something 

unique about an order to compile lists. Local 104 is mistaken." 

439 F.2d at 243. 

Other circuit courts have also held that the EEOC may compel 

an employer to compile information within its control in order to 

respond to a subpoena, and th~t the subpoena power of the EEOC is 

not limited to the production of documents already in exis~ence. 

See EEOC v. Tempel Steel Co., 814 F.2d 482, 485 fn. 9 (7th Cir. 

1987) ; EEOC v. Maryland Cup Corp., 785 F.2d 471, 478 (4th Cir. - 6 -

Appellate Case: 91-1419 Document: 010110165510 Date Filed: 02/01/1993 Page: 6 
1986); EEOC v. Bay Shipbuilding Corp., 668 F.2d 304, 313 (7th Cir. 

1981) . In Bay Shipbuilding, the Seventh Circuit responded to the 

employer's argument that the EEOC has no authority to require an 

employer to compile information simply by stating that "[t]his 

hoary point has already been correctly rejected in other EEOC 

cases. 113 

Diners Club's next argument is that since Ms. Brown's charge 

involved discrimination based on race and sex, EEOC's request for 

information on Diners Club's promotion policies as such relate to 

national origin is irrelevant. That is too narrow a reading of 

EEOC's investigative authority. The EEOC seeks to "vindicate the 

public interest, which is broader than the interest of the charging parties." EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352, 1361 

(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 994 (1975). 

In Circle K, supra, the employer's policy was to give all 

prospective employees a polygraph test prior to any employment. 

However, the charging party in Circle K was not given a polygraph 

test. In Circle K, we held that the fact that the charging party 

3 We note that the subpoena speaks in terms of producing copies 

of documents, copies of position descriptions, copies of postings, 

copies of advertisement or placement notice, and the like . The 

subpoena itself does not speak in terms of interviewing employees, 

past or present. In the district court, Citicoorp apparently argued that many of the requested documents did not presently exist 

and would have to be "compiled," and that such would involve interviewing current employees, and possibly past employees. In 

connection with that argument, the district court stated that the 

fact "that some of the information sought exists in the minds of 

Citicorp employees does not absolve Citicorp from compiling the 

information" (emphasis added) . We agree . However, we find nothing in the district court's order to indicate that in compiling 

the requested information Citicorp could also be required to track 

down and interview former employees. 

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Appellate Case: 91-1419 Document: 010110165510 Date Filed: 02/01/1993 Page: 7 
was not given a polygraph test did not preclude the EEOC from requiring the employer to produce records and information pertaining 

to its use of the polygraph. 501 F.2d at 1054. 

Similarly, in Joslin, supra, the district court held that 

because the charging employee had been discharged, the EEOC was 

not entitled to documents and information rel ating to Joslin's 

hiring policies. On appeal, we reversed the district court and 

held that "[t]he factual statement of a wrongful discharge is 

enough to justify an investigation of employment practices and 

policies, as to hiring as well as to firing." 483 F.2d at 184. 

Diners Club's final argument is that it would be unduly burdensome for it to comply with the EEOC's subpoena. We do not 

think Diners Club has demonstrated that compliance would be unduly 

burdensome. At best, it has perhaps shown that compliance would 

be inconvenient and involve some expense. Ms. Giordano in her affidavit did indicate that much of the information the EEOC seeks 

does not presently exist in documentary form and must be reconstructed by reviewing personnel files or by interviewing past or 

present employees. Ms. Giordano further stated in her affidavit 

that for Diners Club to respond to the subpoena "would require two 

full-time employees working approximately six months." We also 

learn from the affidavit that "during the time period in question, 

the Englewood facility [of Diners Club] employed on average 1,100 

people." 

The only evidence offered to show that compliance would be 

unduly burdensome is the affidavit of Ms. Giordano, and such, in 

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Appellate Case: 91-1419 Document: 010110165510 Date Filed: 02/01/1993 Page: 8 
our view, is insufficient to prove that production of the requested information would be unduly burdensome. A court will not 

excuse compliance with a subpoena for relevant information simply 

upon the cry of "unduly burdensome." Rather, the employer must 

show that compliance would unduly disrupt and seriously hinder 

normal operations of the business. EEOC v. Maryland Cup Corp., 

785 F.2d 471, 479 (4th Cir. 1986). In this connection, Diners 

Club has not offered any specific estimate of cost involved nor 

shown how compliance would impact the normal operations of Diners 

Club. 

One facet of Diners Club's "unduly burdensome" argument is 

that since Diners Club and Ms. Brown have settled her dispute, 

further investigation is unnecessary. However, although Ms. Brown 

and Diners Club may have settled her particular charge, the EEOC 

has not approved the settlement. The EEOC requires all of the 

requested information in order to make an informed decision 

whether to allow Ms. Brown's charges to be withdrawn. In any 

event, a charging party's settlement with his employer does not 

necessarily end the EEOC's investigatory and enforcement powers. 

EEOC v. Children's Hospital Medical Center, 719 F.2d 1426 (9th 

Cir. 1983). 

Judgment affirmed. 

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Appellate Case: 91-1419 Document: 010110165510 Date Filed: 02/01/1993 Page: 9 
No. 91-1419, EEOC v. Citicorp Diners Club, Inc. 

KELLY, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 

I concur in this court's decision that the EEOC may extend 

its investigation to respondent's promotion policy as it relates 

to possible discrimination based on national origin. Ct. Op. at 

7-8 . I also agree that respondent failed to make the showing 

required to prove that a request is unduly burdensome. Id. at 8-

9. However, footnote 3, Ct. Op. at 7, notwithstanding, I cannot 

agree with the court's conclusion that the EEOC, via a subpoena to 

produce documents, may require the development or creation of new 

information by the respondent. lg. at 6-7. 

The court relies on Circle K Cor:p. v. EEOC, 501 F.2d 1052 

(10th Cir. 1974), which indeed addresses the "unduly burdensome" 

aspect of Citicorp's argument and perhaps the "scope of 

investigation" point as well . However, that case does not empower 

the EEOC to require a defendant to create a position paper or 

conduct extensive investigation regarding consideration for 

promotion which must then be reduced to document form and 

produced. We recognized the limited issues presented in Circle K 

in Rich v. Martin Marietta Cor:p., 522 F.2d 333, 344 (10th Cir. 

1975) (the objections involved in Circle K related only to the 

relevancy of the requested information and whether the request was 

unduly burdensome). I agree with the Second Circuit that Circle K 

does no more than "require[) defendants to compile information 

from data already in existence and under the control of the 

defendants," Parents' Committee v. Community School Bd., 524 F.2d 

Appellate Case: 91-1419 Document: 010110165510 Date Filed: 02/01/1993 Page: 10 
1138, 1141 & n.7 (2d Cir. 1975), a very different request than is 

made here. 

There is an important difference between compiling 

statistical information,~ Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 

F.2d at 345 (defendant could be required to produce "plant-wide 

statistics and department statistics" which the court noted" [i]n 

all likelihood the defendant already has ... isolated and 

computed"), and creating information, which is the type of 

discovery sought here. Some of the EEOC's requests will require 

that verbal interviews be conducted, reduced to an entirely new 

document, and then produced. This "manufacturing of evidence" is 

hardly the function of a subpoena. Parents' Committee, 524 F.2d 

at 1141. While the information the EEOC wishes to gain may be 

discoverable through other means (i.e. depositions, 

interrogatories), I do not believe the EEOC may pursue the 

information by way of a subpoena to produce documents. In effect, 

Citicorp is charged with conducting an investigation for the EEOC 

in order to comply with the subpoena. 

Section 2000e-9 of title 42 directs us to 29 U.S.C. § 161 to 

determine the EEOC's powers of investigation. Section 161 in turn 

delineates the investigatory tools of the agency: 

The [Commission] . shall at all reasonable 

times have access to, for the purpose of examination, 

and the right to copy any evidence of any person being 

investigated .... The [Commission] ... shall upon 

application of any party to such proceedings, forthwith 

issue to such party subpenas [sic] requiring the 

attendance and testimony of witnesses or the production 

of any evidence in such proceeding or investigation 

requested in such application. 

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Appellate Case: 91-1419 Document: 010110165510 Date Filed: 02/01/1993 Page: 11 
29 U.S.C. § 161(1). See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.16 (enumerating three 

separate subpoena powers). Section 161 makes a clear distinction 

between the power to compel the production of documents and the 

power to subpoena a witness to take testimony. I agree with the 

Fourth Circuit's analysis of the language granting the former 

power: "The terms 'copy' and 'examination' imply that the EEOC's 

right of access then extended only to existing documents." EEOC 

v. Maryland Cup Corp., 785 F.2d 471, 478 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 

479 U.S. 815 (1986). While the Fourth Circuit noted that some 

changes have been made to§ 161(1), the words of limitation 

discussed were not altered and continue to have the same 

implication. The power of the Commission, under the first 

sentence of§ 161, is still to have access to any evidence for the 

purpose of examining or tom. The information sought in the 

subpoena before us would be accessible under the powers described 

in the latter provision of§ 161, which grants the EEOC the 

authority to require the attendance and testimony of witnesses. 

The court relies on Maryland Cup. Ct. Op. at 6-7, but aside 

from statutory analysis, the facts of the Maryland Cup case do not 

support enforcement of the broad request in this case. In 

Maryland Cup the employer objected to the EEOC's requiring it to 

"gather information about the race of former employees." 785 F.2d 

at 478. In this case, the EEOC is requesting "previously 

nonexistent written position statements and explanations of the 

[promotion] systems used . " EEOC v . Gladieux Refinery, Inc . , 631 

F. Supp . 927, 935 n.2 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (scope of the subpoena 

power would not extend to require the respondent to produce 

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Appellate Case: 91-1419 Document: 010110165510 Date Filed: 02/01/1993 Page: 12 
"numerous documents and explanations that currently are not in 

existence" ). As the court noted in EEOC v. Bay Shipbuilding 

Corp., 668 F.2d 304, 313 (7th Cir. 1981), "[i]f respondent lacks 

the information necessary to respond ... , of course it would be 

excused pro tanto." 

For these reasons, I believe that at least some of the 

requests contained in the subpoena are beyond the scope the EEOC's 

power and enforcement should be denied . Accordingly, I 

respectfully dissent from that part of the court's opinion which 

requires interviews of employees and the reduction of those 

interviews to statements which must then be produced. 

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