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Parties Involved:
Sealed Case

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 24, 2003 Decided December 19, 2003

No. 03-3008

IN RE: SEALED CASE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 01cr00270–05)

Leslie Ann Gerardo, appointed by the court, argued the

cause and filed the brief for appellant.

Mary B. McCord, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Roscoe C.

Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher, Thomas J.

Tourish, Jr. and Alyse Graham, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and EDWARDS and ROGERS,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: The appellant was convicted by a

jury of one count of conspiracy to illegally purchase and

unlawfully transport firearms, see 18 U.S.C. § 371, and one

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

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count of unlawful transportation and aiding and abetting the

transportation of firearms, see id. §§ 922(a)(3), 924(a)(1)(D),

2. The only substantial question on appeal is whether appellant suffered substantial prejudice as a result of the exclusion

of character evidence of his reputation for truthfulness and

honesty. The government concedes that the exclusion of the

evidence was error as to the conspiracy count, and we agree

in view of the purpose, means, and overt acts charged in the

indictment as well as the expert evidence presented by the

government. Whether the exclusion of such evidence also

was error with respect to the unlawful transportation count is

a closer question. We need not decide that question, however, for we hold that any error was harmless. See Kotteakos v.

United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946). The excluded evidence

was cumulative of the character evidence before the jury and

unlikely to overcome the strong evidence of appellant’s guilt.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of conviction.

I.

The evidence showed that Special Agent Susan Poorbaugh,

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (‘‘ATF’’), began an

investigation into an illegal firearm recovered in the District

of Columbia and traced to a purchaser, Quentin Jackson, in

Atlanta, Georgia. Agent Poorbaugh discovered that Jackson

had purchased multiple firearms from various Atlanta dealers

on October 31, 1998, January 8, 1999, and May 15, 1999, and

that his roommate, Michael Jones, had also purchased multiple firearms on May 15, 1999 and July 3, 1999. Additional

investigation traced the firearms purchased by Jackson and

Jones to Thomas Bing, a District of Columbia native, and

several of his associates, including appellant.

The indictment charged appellant and two others with one

count of conspiracy to illegally purchase and unlawfully transport firearms, see 18 U.S.C. § 371, and various counts of

unlawful transportation and aiding and abetting the transportation of firearms, see id. §§ 922(a)(3), 924(a)(1)(D), 2, of

which appellant was indicted on two counts relating to events

on January 8, 1999 and May 15, 1999. One defendant entered

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into a plea agreement and a second defendant was found not

guilty by the jury.

At the trial, the government introduced evidence that appellant was involved in a ‘‘straw purchase’’ scheme. Special

Agent Joseph L. Bisbee, ATF, testifying as an expert in

firearms trafficking, explained that, in ‘‘straw purchases,’’ the

ultimate purchaser will ask a third party to purchase a

firearm so that either the ultimate purchaser will not be

subject to a background check or the ultimate purchaser’s

name will not appear on the ATF Form 4473 required for all

firearm purchases from licensed gun dealers. Pursuant to

various plea agreements Bing, Jackson, and Jones testified

regarding appellant’s involvement in such a scheme whereby

Jackson and Jones would purchase firearms for Bing and

appellant, who would then transport the firearms to the

District of Columbia for resale. Dwan Anderson, who was

not charged with a crime relating to the ATF investigation

underlying appellant’s indictment and who testified under

subpoena, corroborated the co-conspirators’ testimony about

events on May 15, 1999. Anderson testified that appellant

traveled with Bing to Atlanta in May 1999 and that he saw

appellant while there moving gun boxes from the back seat to

the trunk of appellant’s car. The government also introduced

appellant’s employment records from Hecht’s department

store in the District of Columbia, showing that in 1999

appellant did not work on January 7 or 8, left early on May

14, and did not work on May 15.

Appellant called a single character witness in defense.

Gregory Archer, a retired Metropolitan Police Department

(‘‘MPD’’) homicide detective, who was then working as a

background investigator for the MPD, testified that he had

conducted an investigation of appellant’s reputation in the

community as a result of appellant’s application for a position

as a MPD police officer. In the course of his investigation

Archer had spoken to 14–15 members of the community and

all regarded appellant as ‘‘law abiding.’’ Archer also testified

that appellant had a reputation among other police officers as

being ‘‘an outstanding young man’’ and ‘‘a law abiding young

man.’’ Further, Archer, who had known appellant since he

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was five years old and knew that appellant’s father was a

sergeant in the MPD homicide branch, testified: ‘‘In my

opinion, he is a law abiding young man, honest, responsibleTTTT’’

The jury found appellant guilty of conspiracy to illegally

purchase and unlawfully transport firearms and of unlawful

transportation and aiding and abetting the transportation of

firearms on May 15, 1999, and not guilty of charges relating

to January 8, 1999. The district court sentenced appellant to

22 months’ incarceration, three years of supervised release,

and 100 hours of community service.

II.

On appeal, appellant’s sole claim of error by the district

court is its denial of his request to present character evidence

regarding his reputation for truthfulness and honesty in the

community. Appellant’s defense counsel had argued to the

district court that the government had put appellant’s reputation for law-abidingness, truthfulness, and honesty at issue by

charging him with participating in a conspiracy where appellant aided in the preparation of false statements filed with

licensed gun dealers. Trial and appellate counsel maintain

that character testimony regarding these separate character

traits was admissible, notwithstanding appellant’s decision not

to testify, because the charges were analogous to fraud cases.

The district court ruled that while character evidence regarding appellant’s reputation for law abidingness would be admissible on all counts, character evidence regarding appellant’s truthfulness and honesty would be inappropriate unless

appellant testified.

This court reviews a district court’s exclusion of character

evidence for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Bailey,

319 F.3d 514, 517 (D.C. Cir. 2003); United States v. Washington, 106 F.3d 983, 999 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see also Michelson v.

United States, 335 U.S. 469, 480 (1948). If the evidence was

improperly excluded, this court must then determine whether

the error was harmless. See Bailey, 319 F.3d at 519; Washington, 106 F.3d at 1000. Where a non-constitutional trial

error is involved, as here, the question is whether the error

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‘‘had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’’ Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776; see also

Washington, 106 F.3d at 1000. To the extent that this court

applied the Chapman standard in United States v. Lechoco,

542 F.2d 84, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1976), it was error. See, e.g.,

O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 437–38 (1995). As noted

in In re Sealed Case No. 97–3112, 181 F.3d 128, 143–44 (D.C.

Cir. 1999) (en banc) (Edwards, C.J. & Tatel, J., concurring)

(discussing Irons v. Diamond, 670 F.2d 265, 268 n.11 (D.C.

Cir. 1981)), a three-judge ‘‘panel may always TTT determine

TTT that a prior holding has been superseded, and hence is no

longer valid as precedent’’ without resorting to en banc

endorsement, id. at 143 (quoting Policy Statement on En

Banc Endorsement of Panel Decisions 2–3 (Jan. 17, 1996)).

A.

Under Fed. R. Evid. 404(a), character evidence is inadmissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith, except ‘‘[e]vidence of a pertinent trait of character

offered by an accusedTTTT’’ Fed. R. Evid. 404(a)(1). Courts

have held that the general character trait of law-abidingness

is pertinent to almost all criminal offenses. See United States

v. Daily, 921 F.2d 994, 1010 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v.

Hewitt, 634 F.2d 277, 279 (5th Cir. 1981); see also JOHN W.

STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 191, at 674 (5th ed. 1999).

Evidence on the specific character traits for truthfulness and

honesty has been held admissible both when the defendant

testifies at trial and the prosecution attacks the defendant’s

credibility, and when the defendant is charged with an offense

in which fraud or falsehood is one of its statutory elements.

See Edgington v. United States, 164 U.S. 361, 363–64 (1896);

Lechoco, 542 F.2d at 88; Hewitt, 634 F.2d at 279; United

States v. Darland, 626 F.2d 1235, 1237 (5th Cir. 1980);

Carnley v. United States, 274 F.2d 68, 69 (5th Cir. 1960); see

generally Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C.

Cir. 1967). Edgington, 164 U.S. 361, is an example of the

latter situation. In that case, the defendant was charged with

making a false deposition in aid of a fraudulent pension claim.

Id. at 363. The Court rejected the argument that character

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evidence of the defendant’s reputation for truth and veracity

was admissible only if the defendant testified, and held that

because the crime charged was a species of the crimen falsi,

i.e., a crime involving some element of dishonesty or false

statement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 379 (7th ed. 1999), such

evidence was ‘‘material and competent’’ to show a general

character inconsistent with the crime, id. at 363–64, which,

‘‘when considered with other evidence in the case, may generate a reasonable doubt,’’ id. at 366.

The language of Rule 404(a)(1) extends beyond cases in

which the defendant’s reputation for truthfulness and honesty

is relevant because the defendant testifies or is charged with

a crimen falsi. See Lechoco, 542 F.2d at 88. Illustrative of

the flexible application of the rule, the court held in Lechoco

that testimony regarding the defendant’s reputation for truthfulness may be ‘‘particularly pertinent’’ even where a defendant, who is charged with an offense in which his honesty or

truthfulness is not a statutory element, does not testify. Id.

There, the defendant had presented an insanity defense to

the charge of kidnaping. During cross examination of the

defendant’s medical experts, the prosecutor brought out that

their opinions were premised on the truthfulness of the

defendant’s statements during psychiatric interviews. Id. at

86–87. The court held that by raising the issue of the

defendant’s credibility, the prosecutor had ‘‘opened the door

for the defendant to introduce testimony as to his reputation

for truth and veracity.’’ Id. at 88.

Appellant contends that he was charged with an offense of

crimen falsi because the indictment alleged that he participated in a conspiracy where he aided his co-conspirators in

falsifying documents. While no circuit has held that truthfulness and honesty are relevant to conspiracy to illegally purchase firearms, we agree with the parties that the circumstances here are analogous to cases involving fraud or false

statements in which courts have held that such character

evidence is admissible. Edgington, 164 U.S. at 363–64; see

also Daily, 921 F.2d at 1011; Hewitt, 634 F.2d at 279. The

charges in appellant’s indictment are premised on the filing of

false statements. The indictment states that the object of the

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conspiracy was ‘‘to acquire firearms and money by obtaining,

through straw purchasers TTT firearms in the State of Georgia.’’ In describing the ways, manner, and means of the

conspiracy, the indictment alleged that:

It was part of the conspiracy that co-conspirators

who were lawfully eligible to purchase firearms in

the State of Georgia, would knowingly make false

and fictitious written statements to licensed federal

firearms dealers, to the effect that they were the

actual buyers of the firearms, when in truth and

fact, they purchased the firearms for other coconspirators who could not lawfully purchase the

firearmsTTTT

Among the overt acts listed in the indictment are events

occurring on May 15, 1999, when two unindicted coconspirators each allegedly executed a ATF Form 4473, ‘‘signifying that they were the actual buyers of the firearms TTT

whereas in truth and fact, they purchased the firearms for

[appellant] and another co-conspirator not indicated hereinTTTT’’

Although the indictment did not charge appellant with

making the false statements himself, it charged him with

participating in a conspiracy in which he ‘‘recruited’’ eligible

firearm purchasers to ‘‘knowingly make false and fictitious

statements’’ in order to purchase firearms that he had paid

for and selected. The government’s evidence at trial, particularly Agent Bisbee’s expert testimony, was aimed at demonstrating that appellant and Bing had enlisted Jackson and

Jones to falsify the ATF forms. Because the indictment and

the government’s proof of the conspiracy made appellant’s

truthfulness and honesty a part of the charged conspiracy,

and thereby invited appellant to introduce character evidence

for those traits, see Edgington, 164 U.S. at 363–64, we hold

that the district court erred in ruling that appellant’s character evidence regarding his truthfulness and honesty was

inadmissible on the conspiracy count. Cf. United States v.

Bayless, 940 F.2d 300, 304 (8th Cir. 1991). Whether the

district court also erred in excluding character evidence reUSCA Case #03-3008 Document #792492 Filed: 12/19/2003 Page 7 of 10
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garding appellant’s honesty and truthfulness with respect to

the unlawful transportation count, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(3),

924(a)(1)(D), 2, is a far closer question, as appellant’s counsel

acknowledged during oral argument. Although appellant

contends that honesty and truthfulness are pertinent traits

because ‘‘willfulness’’ is an element of the crime, 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(a)(1)(D), it is unclear, as defense counsel acknowledged

in the district court, that the offense involves any element of

fraud or false statement, and appellant points to no other

ground for admission. The court need not decide this question, however, for any error in exclusion of the evidence was

harmless.

B.

The nature of any prejudice to appellant as a result of the

exclusion of character evidence on his truthfulness and honesty arises both from the government’s expert evidence on

‘‘straw purchases’’ in support of the allegations in the indictment that appellant and Bing hired Jackson and Jones to

make false statements, and from the closing argument in

which the prosecutor referred to the co-conspirators’ agreement to have others lie on the ATF forms. As appellant

maintains, ‘‘[t]o believe the government’s witnesses, the jury

necessarily had to believe that appellant was the type of

person who would knowingly connive with others to purchase

guns through the use of false statements and certifications.’’

Appellant’s Brief at 26. Consistent with the district court’s

evidentiary ruling, appellant was unable to present evidence

of these character traits or to argue their relevancy during

his closing argument to the jury. Nevertheless, we can

conclude with ‘‘fair assurance,’’ Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 765,

that the exclusion of character evidence of appellant’s reputation for truthfulness and honesty was harmless because it did

not have a ‘‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury’s verdict,’’ id. at 776, and therefore did

not substantially affect appellant’s substantial rights, id. at

764–65.

First, the excluded character evidence was cumulative of

other good character evidence heard by the jury. See WashUSCA Case #03-3008 Document #792492 Filed: 12/19/2003 Page 8 of 10
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ington, 106 F.3d at 1000. Appellant presented forceful character evidence to the jury on his reputation in the community.

Archer testified as a trained criminal investigator, who had

conducted an investigation of appellant’s reputation for being

law-abiding as part of his professional responsibilities and

spoken with a number of members of the community and with

MPD police officers about appellant’s reputation. Archer’s

testimony was not limited to the community’s view of appellant’s reputation for law-abidingness. Rather, Archer testified that appellant had a reputation, particularly among other

police officers, for not only being ‘‘a law abiding young man,’’

but also being ‘‘an outstanding young man,’’ which, to the

extent that the latter phrase reflects a distinct character trait,

is broader than the general character trait for lawabidingness. In addition, Archer, who testified both as an

experienced police officer and a person who had known

appellant for many years, stated that he personally believed

appellant to be ‘‘a law abiding young man, honest, responsibleTTTT’’ The breadth of Archer’s testimony thus challenged

any assumption arising from the government’s evidence that

appellant’s association with his co-conspirators and government co-operators proved that he was the type of person who

would be criminally engaged. Indeed, the jury heard Archer’s opinion that appellant was honest, and it was instructed

that the evidence of appellant’s ‘‘good reputation in the

community for being TTT law abiding TTT may indicate TTT

that it is unlikely that a law-abiding person would commit the

crime charged.’’ Defense counsel’s proffer to the district

court of the testimony of the character witnesses that he

wished to present did not indicate that Archer or the other

witness would have covered new ground. Thus, further

character testimony on appellant’s reputation for truthfulness

and honesty would have been cumulative.

Second, the government presented strong evidence of appellant’s guilt. See Washington, 106 F.3d at 1000. Four

witnesses identified appellant as accompanying Bing on the

May 15, 1999 gun buying trip. Although the government’s

identification evidence consisted of the testimony of coconspirators and government co-operators, their testimony

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concerning appellant’s involvement in the May 15, 1999 events

was substantially similar. Jackson, Jones, and Anderson did

not know appellant before he traveled with Bing to Atlanta

and separately picked him out of a photo array. Jackson and

Jones also gave detailed descriptions of how Bing and appellant selected and paid for several firearms. Anderson, who

was not criminally charged with regard to this ATF investigation, corroborated much of the co-conspirator testimony. The

jury was aware of the status of the government witnesses and

their self-interest and was instructed to use caution and care

in scrutinizing the testimony of accomplices. In addition,

appellant’s employment records were corroborative of evidence that he was in Atlanta, Georgia on May 15, 1999.

Contrary to an argument appellant makes in a single

footnote, the prosecutor did not commit plain error during

closing argument. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,

731–37 (1993). The prosecutor did not suggest in closing or

rebuttal argument that appellant was guilty because of such

character traits as untruthfulness or dishonesty. Even assuming appellant’s claim about the prosecutor’s rebuttal closing argument, see Appellant’s Brief at 25 n.15, is properly

before the court, see Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(9); Terry v. Reno,

101 F.3d 1412, 1415 (D.C. Cir. 1996), the prosecutor could

properly respond in rebuttal to defense counsel’s emphasis in

closing argument on appellant’s relationship to law enforcement, cf. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 14–20 (1985).

Accordingly, because the additional evidence of appellant’s

reputation for truthfulness and honesty would have been

cumulative and unlikely to overcome the strong evidence of

appellant’s complicity in the May 15, 1999 events, we affirm

the judgment of conviction.

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