Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-14-02495/USCOURTS-ca8-14-02495-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ameriprise Financial
Appellee
Marissa Walz
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-2495

___________________________

Marissa Walz

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Ameriprise Financial, Inc.

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis

____________

 Submitted: February 12, 2015

 Filed: March 9, 2015

____________

Before GRUENDER, SHEPHERD, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

____________

GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

Marissa Walz sued Ameriprise Financial, Inc. (“Ameriprise”) alleging

wrongful termination and failure to accommodate her disability. The district court1

The Honorable Richard H. Kyle, United States District Court for the District 1

of Minnesota.

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granted Ameriprise’s motion for summary judgment. Walz appeals this decision, and

we affirm. 

I.

Marissa Walz worked for Ameriprise from 1996 to 2012 and received mostly

positive reviews. Most recently, Walz worked as a Process Analyst in Ameriprise’s

Enterprise Operations Support department. Walz admitted that the ability to work

well with others was important for her job. Walz also admitted that the Process

Analyst position required people, teamwork, communication, and time-management

skills. In fact, Walz was recruited for her position in part because she was “good at

relationships.” 

Walz suffers from bipolar affective disorder, which caused her to interrupt

meetings, disturb her coworkers, and disrespect her supervisor. Walz’s behavioral

problems were noticed first on March 16, 2012 when, during a meeting, she told a

coworker to “[s]top interrupting me, you don’t know what you are talking about,” and

then proceeded to scribble illegible notes on a whiteboard. After thisincident, Walz’s

supervisor, Thad Radel, began documenting her conduct. Several of Walz’s

coworkers were disturbed by her behavior and independently reported their concerns

to Radel. For instance, one coworker described Walz as “[m]anic” and explained that

Walz was “[t]alking very rapidly and not making sense,” “excited and easily

agitated,” and “sending e-mails that do not make sense.” 

Radel approached Walz several times to discuss her behavioral problems and

to offer help. On March 19, 2012, after hearing reports from Walz’s coworkers,

Radel approached her to ask if she was okay. Walz was agitated and disparaged her

coworkers. Walz also was rude and insubordinate towards Radel, stating, “[n]o one

thinks your position is necessary” and “[t]here is no sense of direction since you came

on board.” Walz claimed that a coworker had referred to Radel as a “puppet.” Radel

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spoke with Walz again the next morning and Walz was similarly erratic—even

challenging Radel to fire her. Immediately after that encounter, Walz attended a

meeting that she had scheduled with a group of coworkers. At the meeting, Walz

spoke in an erratic and confusing fashion that disturbed her peers. Walz abruptly

ended the meeting after fifteen minutes and left visibly upset.

Eventually, after coworkers complained further and Radel made another failed

attempt to speak with Walz concerning her conduct, Radel issued Walz a formal

behavioral warning. Walz then applied for Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”)

leave, which was granted by Ameriprise’s third-party vendor that handles such

requests. Walz never disclosed the reason for her FMLA leave to Ameriprise. Upon

returning fromleave, Walz gave Radel a note fromher doctor at Allina Mental Health

Servicesthat cleared her to return to work for a maximum of forty hours per week and

stated, “[s]he has been stabilizing on her medication.” Walz also reviewed and signed

Ameriprise’s Individual Treatment Policy, which explained Ameriprise’s policy

against disability discrimination and the process for requesting accommodations. 

A few months after returning to work, Walz’s erratic and disruptive behavior

returned. On July 27, 2012, Walz was aggressive with coworkers during a meeting. 

Radel warned Walz to be more gentle, but Walz repeated her erratic and intimidating

behavior in later meetings. Ameriprise fired Walz because of her repeated

misconduct. At no point did Walz inform Ameriprise that she suffered from bipolar

disorder or request any accommodation. 

Walz sued Ameriprise, alleging that Ameriprise terminated her because of her

disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the

Minnesota HumanRights Act (“MHRA”). Ameriprise moved for summary judgment. 

The district court interpreted Walz’s complaint asraising two claims: (1) thatshe was

wrongly terminated based on her bipolar disorder and (2) that Ameriprise improperly

failed to accommodate her disorder. With respect to the wrongful termination claim,

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the court concluded that Walz failed to establish a prima facie case because she did

not show that her termination was based on her disability. As to the failure to

accommodate claim, the court reasoned that this claim failed because Walz never

requested an accommodation. Walz now appeals.

II.

We review a grant ofsummary judgment de novo, viewing the facts in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party. Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d

1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc). “The non-moving party receivesthe benefit of

all reasonable inferences supported by the evidence, but has the obligation to come

forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” B.M. ex

rel. Miller v. S. Callaway R-II Sch. Dist., 732 F.3d 882, 886 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting

Atkinson v. City of Mountain View, Mo., 709 F.3d 1201, 1207 (8th Cir. 2013))

(internal quotation marks omitted). A complete failure by the non-moving party “to

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that

party’s case . . . necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). “Summary judgment is appropriate when there

is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law.” EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 477 F.3d 561, 568 (8th Cir. 2007)

(quoting Wojewski v. Rapid City Reg’l Hosp., Inc., 450 F.3d 338, 342 (8th Cir.

2006)). ADA and MHRA claims generally are analyzed in the same way, with one

exception that is not relevant here. Kammueller v. Loomis, Fargo & Co., 383 F.3d

779, 784 (8th Cir. 2004). 

To establish a prima facie wrongful-termination claim, Walz must show she

(1) is disabled within the meaning of the ADA, (2) is a qualified individual under the

ADA, and (3) suffered an adverse employment action because of her disability. 

Kallail v. Alliant Energy Corporate Servs., Inc., 691 F.3d 925, 930 (8th Cir. 2012). 

The district court held that Walz failed to establish the third element of her prima

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facie case because she did not show that her termination was based on her disability. 

We decline to reach this question and instead affirm the district court’s judgment on

the basis that Walz failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the

second element, that she was a qualified individual. See Saulsberry v. St. Mary’s

Univ. of Minn., 318 F.3d 862, 866 (8th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e may affirm a district court’s

order, including an order granting summary judgment, on any basis supported by the

record, even if that ground was not considered by the district court.” (quoting Viking

Supply v. Nat’l Cart. Co., Inc., 310 F.3d 1092, 1097 (8th Cir. 2002))). Because Walz

failed to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an essential element

of her wrongful-termination claim, summary judgment is appropriate. See Celotex

Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23.

Whether an individual is qualified within the meaning of the ADA is

determined by applying a two-part test. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 477 F.3d at 568-69. 

The first part is whether Walz “possesses the requisite skills, education, certification

or experience necessary for the job,” and the second part is whether Walz “can,

despite [her] impairments, perform the essential functions of the job either with or

without reasonable accommodation.” See id. (quoting Browning v. Liberty Mut. Ins.

Co., 178 F.3d 1043, 1047-48 (8th Cir. 1999)). Walz was a longtime employee of

Ameriprise, and the record does not indicate that she lacked any credentials for her

employment. Accordingly, our analysis hinges on whether Walz could perform the

essential functions of her position with or without reasonable accommodation. See

Browning, 178 F.3d at 1047-48. 

Essential functions are “the fundamental job duties of the employment

position.” Moritz v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., 147 F.3d 784, 787 (8th Cir. 1998)

(quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1)). “The term ‘essential functions’ does not include

the marginal functions of the position.” Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1)). See

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 477 F.3d at 568-69 (listing factors from 29 C.F.R.

§ 1630.2(n)(3)). Here, Walz failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to

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whether she could perform the essential functions of her position with or without

reasonable accommodation. There is no dispute that the ability to work well with

others was an essential function of Walz’s employment as a Process Analyst. See

EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Applying Performance and Conduct Standards to

Employees with Disabilities, 2008 WL 4786697, at *2 (Sept. 25, 2008) (explaining,

“the ability to work with other people” may be a job-related requirement). Walz

herself admitted that the “ab[ility] to work well with others” was important for her

job. Walz further admitted that people, teamwork, and communication skills were

needed for her position. Walz also explained that being respectful was important for

her job and that she originally was recruited to her position because she was skilled

at managing interpersonal relationships.

The record in this case showsthat Walz’s behavior was erratic, aggressive, and

rude in a way that disturbed her coworkers and disrupted the workplace. Walz

interruptedmeetings, disrespected her supervisor, and communicated in an erratic and

unintelligible manner. And Walz acknowledges that her behavioral problems were

symptoms of her bipolar disorder and concedes that her behavior was disruptive. 

Accordingly, Walz’s disruptiveness and rudeness prevented her from working well

with others—an essential function of her position. Therefore, Walz cannot make a

sufficient showing thatshe was able to perform the essential functions of her position

without an accommodation. See Rask v. Fresenius Med. Care N. Am., 509 F.3d 466,

470 (8th Cir. 2007). 

Walz nonetheless may be qualified under the ADA if a reasonable

accommodation would allow her to perform the essential functions of her position. 

See id. But because Walz failed to inform Ameriprise of her disability or request any

accommodation, Ameriprise had no duty to accommodate her. See id.; 29

C.F.R. § 1630.9(a) (“It is unlawful for a covered entity not to make reasonable

accommodation to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified

applicant or employee with a disability . . . .” (emphasis added)). Where a “disability,

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resulting limitations, and necessary accommodations, are not open, obvious, and

apparent to the employer,” a plaintiff who fails to disclose her disability and request

an accommodation from her employer cannot show that she is qualified with

accommodation. Rask, 509 F.3d at 470 (quoting Wallin v. Minn. Dep’t of Corr., 153

F.3d 681, 689 (8th Cir. 1998)).

Here, Walz’s disability, its limitations, and necessary accommodations were

not open, obvious, and apparent to Ameriprise. See id. (explaining that mental

disabilities are often non-obvious). The closest Walz came to disclosing her bipolar

disorder was when she gave Radel her doctor’s note upon returning from FMLA

leave. The note, from a doctor affiliated with Allina Mental Health Services,

permitted Walz to return to work for up to forty hours per week and explained that

her medication had stabilized her condition. The note did not inform Ameriprise of

Walz’s bipolar disorder, nor did it suggest any accommodations. Walz argues that

Radel, and therefore Ameriprise, knew that Walz’s conduct was caused by a serious

mental illness and that this constituted sufficient notice of Walz’s disability. In

Walz’s view, her erratic behavior, FMLA leave, and medical note sufficiently put

Ameriprise on notice that she was suffering from some type of mental illness. Radel

did acknowledge that, after receiving the doctor’s note, he surmised that Walz had

been treated for her mental health. Even if these facts were sufficient to notify

Ameriprise thatWalz suffered frombipolar disorder, they did not specifically identify

Walz’s resulting limitations. See id. (holding that an employee’s statements that she

was “having problems with my medication” and “might miss a day here and there”

did not specifically identify the employee’s resulting limitations). Because Walz

failed to disclose her non-obvious disability and any related limitations, she did not

establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she was able to perform the

essential functions of her job with reasonable accommodation. See id. at 470-71. 

Thus, Walz fails to make a prima facie case of wrongful termination.

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Walz nonetheless argues that Ameriprise failed to raise the issue whether Walz

was a qualified individual before the district court. See Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1042

(explaining that a movant for summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of

informing the district court of the basis for its motion” (quoting Celotex Corp., 477

U.S. at 323)). In support of this argument, Walz points to the district court’s

statement that Ameriprise did not dispute whether Walz was qualified. But the record

belies her argument. Ameriprise argued in support of its motion for summary

judgment that Walz failed to establish a prima facie case. And in support of this

argument, Ameriprise analogized this case to the facts of Rask, which affirmed

summary judgment for an employer on the basis that the plaintiff failed to make a

prima facie showing that she was a qualified individual within the meaning of the

ADA. 509 F.3d at 470. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary

judgment for Walz’s wrongful-termination claim on the alternative basis that Walz

failed to make a prima facie showing that she was qualified for her position.

Walz’s freestanding failure-to-accommodate claim similarly fails to raise a

genuine issue of material fact because she never requested an accommodation. See

Ballard v. Rubin, 284 F.3d 957, 964 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that an employer is not

liable for its failure to accommodate an employee who made no request for an

accommodation). Walz argues that Ameriprise “should have forced her on FMLA

leave” as an accommodation. According to Walz, her erratic behavior, prior FMLA

leave, and medical note should have put Ameriprise on notice that she was suffering

from a medical problem, and Ameriprise should have responded to this information

by forcing her to take leave. But Walz concedesthatshe received FMLA leave when

she requested it. Moreover, Radel suggested multiple times in response to Walz’s

behavioral problems that she should take time off if she needed. In sum, there is

nothing in the record that raises a genuine dispute about whether Walz ever requested

any accommodation. Walz cites no case holding that an employer has a duty to guess

an employee’s disability and force that employee to take leave, and we decline to so

hold here. 

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III.

We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Ameriprise.

______________________________

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