Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-01139/USCOURTS-ca10-91-01139-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Richard J. Nolan
Appellant
United States Department of Justice
Appellee
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

RICHARD J. NOLAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

.FILJ:.JD 

Um(.ed Stateg Court of Ap-~..,1~ T"'n•h c· · &' ...... ., \;. ".t ·1rcu11; 

AUG18 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER Clerk . .., 

v. 

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No. 91-1139 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE and 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

acting through its agency, 

DEFENSE INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 89 A 2035) 

Wendy Keats, Attorney, Civil Division, United States Department of 

Justice (Leonard Schaitman, Attorney, Civil Division, U.S. 

Department of Justice; Stuart M. Gerson, Assistant Attorney 

General; and Michael J. Norton, United states Attorney, Denver, 

Colorado, with her on the brief), Washington, D.C., for the 

Defendants-Appellants. 

Richard J. Nolan, prose, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Before LOGAN, ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, and THEIS, Senior District 

Judge.* 

THEIS, Senior District Judge. 

*Honorable Frank G. Theis, Senior United States District Judge for 

the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 91-1139 Document: 010110276759 Date Filed: 08/18/1992 Page: 1
Plaintiff-appellant Nolan appeals the district court's 

adverse summary disposition of his action against the Department 

of Justice (DOJ) and the Defense Investigative Service (DIS) for 

violations of the Privacy Act, 5 u.s.c. § 552a, and the Freedom 

of Information Act, 5 u.s.c. § 552. We dismiss Nolan's DIS 

appeal for want of appellate jurisdiction, and affirm the 

district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of DOJ. 

I 

Appellant Richard Nolan, an attorney, was previously 

employed by various agencies in the federal government. In 

January 1988, while serving as regional counsel for the 

Environmental Protection Agency, he received an offer of 

employment from the United States Attorney's Office, contingent 

on security clearance and approval by the United States Attorney 

General. Nolan expected a routine security clearance. 

Earlier, on July 22, 1987, Nolan had requested all 

investigative records pertaining to himself maintained by the 

Defense Investigative Service. The DIS produced those documents 

on June 16, 1988. Pursuant to§ 552a(d) (1) of the Privacy Act, 1 

Nolan sought to amend certain statements contained in the 

documents. He claimed that those statements, uttered by his 

former EPA supervisors, Barnes and Adams, falsely "accus[ed] him 

1

section 552a(d) of the Privacy Act affords individuals the 

right to access and amend records pertaining to themselves 

maintained by government agencies, save those records specifically 

exempted by subsections 552a(j) and 552a(k). 

2 

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of disloyalty, lack of leadership ability, and incompetence." 

DIS refused to amend the statements except to delete all 

references to two particular allegations made by Adams. 

On November 3, 1988, when he had still not received his 

appointment, Nolan made a Privacy Act request with the Department 

of Justice to access all his records. About a year later, on 

November 24, 1989, when the DOJ records had not been released, 

Nolan initiated this action against DOJ to access those records, 

and against DIS to correct or expunge the unfavorable statements 

in the DIS records. Four days after the suit was filed, the DOJ 

released 411 pages of documents, followed by an additional 1000 

pages of documents in March 1990. The released documents were 

heavily redacted. A great number of documents, however, were 

withheld completely. 

The district court granted summary judgment for DOJ on March 

18, 1991, holding that the redacted and unreleased documents were 

properly exempt under sections (j) (2) and (k) (5) of the Privacy 

Act. on July 17, 1991, the district court entered a second 

order, granting summary judgment in favor of DIS on the ground 

that the adverse statements that Nolan sought to amend were not 

based on clearly erroneous facts. This appeal followed. 

II 

We first address the appellees' assertion that this Court 

lacks appellate jurisdiction over the DIS claim due to Nolan's 

failure to file a timely notice of appeal. The district court 

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entered two separate orders in favor of two separate defendants 

on two separate occasions. The district court first dismissed 

the claim against DOJ on March 18, 1991. Nolan duly filed a 

notice of appeal. However, because the claim against DIS still 

remained unadjudicated in the district court, the March 18 

district court order was not yet final and appealable. This 

Court concluded that Nolan's notice of appeal was premature and 

directed Nolan either to submit a certified copy of a district 

court order granting certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) or 

to file a final district court order adjudicating the remaining 

claims in this case -- in order to avoid summary dismissal of his 

DOJ appeal. 

On August 1, 1991, after the district court had dismissed 

the remaining DIS claims, Nolan filed a copy of the district 

court's July 17 order coupled with a Docketing Statement 

Supplement, which stated in full: "Comes now the PlaintiffAppellant and supplements the Docketing Statement with the 

included final Judgment and Memorandum Opinion and Order of the 

Court below in response to this Court's letter of July 1, 1991. 11 

on Nolan's cover letter was written: "Enclosed please find 

Plaintiff-Appellant's supplement to the Docketing material which 

is the District Court's final order and memorandum opinion. I 

believe that this should complete the Docketing requirements." 

DIS claims that the appellant failed to file a notice of 

appeal from the district court's July 17 order granting summary 

judgment in favor of DIS. According to DIS, the filing of the 

4 

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July 17 final order, while sufficient to ripen the prematurelyappealed March 18 order dismissing DOJ, does not suffice to 

confer appellate jurisdiction over the July 17 judgment itself. 

DIS contends that, to appeal the July 17 judgment, the appellant 

was required to file a separate notice of appeal within 60 days 

of the entry of the July 17 judgment. Failing to do so, argues 

DIS, the appellant has not properly invoked this Court's 

jurisdiction. 

Fed. R. App. P. 3(c) provides that "[a]n appeal permitted by 

law as of right from a district court to a court of appeals shall 

be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the 

district court within the [allowable] time." The notice of 

appeal "shall specify the party or parties taking the appeal; 

shall designate the judgment, order or part thereof appealed 

from; and shall name the court to which the appeal is taken." 

Fed. R. App. P. 3(c). 

The requirements of Rule 3 should be liberally construed. 

See Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 316 (1988); 

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181-82 (1962). "[M]ere 

technicalities" should not obstruct the consideration of a case 

on its merits. Foman, 371 U.S. at 181. As such, even when a 

formal notice of appeal is defective or non-existent, "a court 

may nonetheless find that the litigant has complied with the rule 

if the litigant's action is the functional equivalent of what the 

rule requires." Torres, 487 U.S. at 316-17. Subjecting Rule 3 

to a liberal construction does not, however, excuse compliance 

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with the rule. The dictates of Rule 3 are jurisdictional. Each 

requirement in Rule 3 must be satisfied as a prerequisite to 

appellate review. Smith v. Barry. 112 s. ct. 678, 682 (1992). 

In this case, the appellant did not file a formal notice of 

appeal from the DIS judgment. The sole notice of appeal, filed 

prematurely by Nolan, referenced only the dismissal of his DOJ 

claim. The filing of the district court's final order merely 

served to perfect Nolan's premature appeal of the DOJ ruling. 

See Lewis v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 850 F.2d 641, 645 (10th Cir. 

1988) (A premature notice of appeal becomes effective if the 

lower court has adjudicated all remaining outstanding claims 

before the appellate court considers the merits of the appeal.). 

We have never held, however, that the filing of a final order 

serves to ripen not only the previous premature appeal but also 

any subsequent appeals arising out of the same case. On the 

contrary, we stated in Lewis that when a final adjudication 

occurs, we will consider the premature appeal to have ripened and 

"will consolidate or companion any subsequent appeals arising out 

of the same district court case." Id. at 645. Implicit in our 

statement is that any subsequent appeals must separately and 

individually comply with the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

Merely submitting a final district court order for the purpose of 

perfecting a premature appeal does not automatically effectuate 

the appeal of every judgment or order rendered in the entire 

case. 

There was moreover no functional equivalent of a notice of 

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appeal filed within the allowable time to appeal the DIS 

judgment. Although an appellate brief may serve as a functional 

equivalent of a notice of appeal, Smith v. Barry, 112 s. ct. at 

682, Nolan's brief-in-chief was filed outside the allowable time, 

and cannot therefore be deemed a timely functional equivalent. 

Id. (appellate court may consider a filing styled as a brief if 

the filing is timely under Rule 4 and conveys the information 

required by Rule 3). Furthermore, nothing in Nolan's actions or 

communications manifested his intent to appeal both the DIS and 

DOJ rulings. Cf. Dupree v. United Parcel Serv .• Inc., 956 F.2d 

219, 220 n.1 (10th Cir. 1991) (single notice of appeal was 

adequate where the record shows that the parties clearly intended 

to appeal both of the district court's orders). Nolan filed the 

final district court order in response to this Court's directive 

that he do so to avoid summary dismissal of his DOJ appeal. We 

cannot discern from such a filing an intent also to appeal the 

DIS judgment. Likewise, Nolan's cover letter expressing his 

belief that "this should take care of the docketing requirements" 

conveys nothing about his intent to appeal both orders. 

Because Nolan has failed to comply with Rule 3(c) 's 

requirement of designating the specific judgment from which the 

party appeals, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the 

merits of the DIS claim. Accordingly, the DIS appeal is 

dismissed. 

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II 

With respect to Nolan's appeal from the dismissal of his DOJ 

claims, he argues principally that the district court erred in 

denying his rights to access and amend the records that were 

redacted or withheld by the DOJ. The district court concluded 

that the redactions and withholdings of the two FBI files at 

issue -- the public corruption investigation file (FBIHQ file 58-

11772) and the employment background investigations file (FBIHQ 

file 77-129721) -- were properly exempted under 5 u.s.c. §§ 552a 

( j ) ( 2 ) and ( k) ( 5 ) • 

Subsection (j) (2) authorizes an agency to promulgate rules 

exempting its system of records from access and amendment where 

the agency concerned is principally involved in law enforcement 

and the system of records consists of "information compiled for 

the purpose of a criminal investigation .•• and associated with 

an identifiable individual." 

hand, exempts 

Subsection (k) (5), on the other 

"investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of 

determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for 

Federal civilian employment •.. but only to the extent 

that the disclosure of such material would reveal the 

identity of a source who furnished information to the 

Government under an express promise that the identity of the 

source would be held in confidence." 

Pursuant to subsections (j) (2) and (k) (5), the DOJ promulgated 

rules exempting its Central Records System from access and 

amendment under§ 552a(d) of the Privacy Act. 2 See 28 C.F.R. 

2

The appellant does not contest the DOJ's compliance with the 

rule-making requirements. 

8 

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16.96. 

We first address the (j) (2) exemption of FBIHQ file 58-

11772. This file, retrieved from the Central Records System, was 

compiled in the course of a federal corruption investigation, of 

which Nolan was one of several subjects. The investigation 

concluded without any prosecutorial or disciplinary action 

recommended against Nolan. We agree with the district court that 

these records are exempt under (j) (2): the records are located in 

a system of records maintained by the DOJ, a criminal law 

enforcement agency; they consist of information compiled for the 

purpose of a criminal investigation and associated with an 

identifiable individual; and the records have been exempted from 

access and amendment by the DOJ through proper rule-making 

procedures. 

FBIHQ file 77-129721 is also properly exempt. The records 

were obtained in the course of background checks conducted on the 

appellant when he applied for three different positions with the 

DOJ. Empowered by 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g) (3) (A), the district court 

undertook an in camera examination of all the documents 

purportedly exempt under (k) (5), and verified that disclosing 

such information would reveal the identity of sources who were 

given an express promise of confidentiality. Nolan apparently 

does not challenge this conclusion. 

Were this case one involving solely the applicability of the 

statutory exemptions, the result would be clear-cut: the DOJ 

files at issue plainly meet the requirements set forth by 

9 

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exemptions (j) (2) and (k) (5). But Nolan, while conceding the 

applicability of those exemptions, implores the Court to 

scrutinize the motives of the government agency in exempting the 

records. As the appellant a4mits, "Nolan does not dispute these 

cited exemptions if they are used for a lawful purpose, but here 

he respectfully asks this Court to provide him his rightful 

opportunity to discover and demonstrate that the exemptions were 

not used for such purpose." Appellant's Reply Brief at 4. We 

are not unsympathetic to Nolan's predicament: how can he show 

that the government acted maliciously so as to violate the Act3 

when he cannot have access to the records that may contain the 

malicious information? Nolan also desires to graft an additional 

requirement that "when otherwise exempt records unfairly produce 

an adverse effect on an individual so devastating as to deprive 

that individual of his basic constitutional rights to seek 

employment and to financially provide for himself and his family, 

the exemptions must give way to the individual's rights as 

mandated by 5 u.s.c. § 552a(g)." Id. 

We addressed a similar situation in Hernandez v. Alexander, 

671 F.2d 402 (10th Cir. 1982). There, the plaintiff-appellant 

sought access to an investigative report and memoranda discussing 

his continued employment with the Department of the Army. As to 

the investigative report, the government agency invoked exemption 

3The Privacy Act affords damages to an individual who shows 

that the agency intentionally and willfully failed to maintain 

records with accuracy, relevance, timeliness and completeness. 

5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(l)(C), (g)(4)(A). 

10 

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(k) (5), and redacted portions of the document that contained the 

identity of sources who declined to consent to the release of 

their testimony. The plaintiff argued that "without the 

opportunity to confront and ~xamine persons who gave statements 

there can be no determination as to the accuracy, relevance, 

timeliness and completeness of the statements." Id. at 407. We 

rejected the plaintiff's argument, reasoning that "if assertion 

of a claim •.• of failure to maintain any record with accuracy, 

relevance, timeliness and completeness would mean that the 

plaintiff is entitled to have the identity of persons giving 

statements to establish alleged inaccuracy or the like, then all 

the exceptions could be swallowed up." Id. at 408. We concluded 

that, as a matter of necessity, "[t]here is some impediment by 

operation of the exemptions but that must be accepted unless the 

exceptions are to be destroyed." Id. 

Nolan's unfortunate predicament is the necessary and 

unavoidable concomitant of the statutory exemptions. If he were 

allowed to access records that are concededly exempted, then the 

statutory exemptions would become a nullity. such an absurd 

result would not comport with congressional intent in creating a 

system of exemptions. One of the fundamental premises of the 

Privacy Act is that "all records compiled on an individual must 

on request be revealed to that individual unless they fall within 

one of more specifically enumerated exemptions." Londrigan v. 

Federal Bureau of Investigation, 670 F.2d 1164, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 

1981) (emphases added). In justifying exemption (j) (2), the 

11 

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Senate Committee Report on the Privacy Act declares that 

investigative or intelligence files maintained by law enforcement 

agencies "contain highly sensitive and usually confidential 

information [and] it would not be appropriate to allow 

individuals to see their own intelligence or investigative files. 

Therefore, the bill exempts such information from access and 

challenge requirements .. " S. Rep. No. 1183, 93d Cong., 2d 

Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6916, 6938. 

Similarly, Congress determined that it would significantly impede 

the government's investigative process to allow disclosure of the 

identity of sources who furnish information under an express 

promise of confidentiality. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k) (5). Congress 

thus allows agencies to categorically prohibit disclosure of 

information under certain well-defined circumstances. 

Nolan provides no authority to support his exhortation that 

the district court explore the motives of the agency or balance 

the parties' interests whenever the exempt records produce 

devastating effects. We decline to impose any such requirements. 

Where, as here, an agency has properly exempted its records, the 

agency no longer has any obligation to disclose those records--

irrespective of the underlying motives of the agency or the 

impact of the records upon the parties. 4 

4Although Nolan's briefs discuss only the Privacy Act, he 

alluded during oral arguments that his appeal is also based on the 

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) ~ The results would remain 

unchanged, however. Like the Privacy Act, the Freedom of 

Information Act exempts confidential law enforcement records 

furnished by confidential sources. See 5 u.s.c. § 552(b) (7). 

As such, the public corruption materials are exempted by the 

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Aside from the exemption issue, the appellant claims that 

the district court erred in deferring discovery pending the 

disposition of DOJ's summary judgment motion. District courts 

have broad discretion in controlling the discovery process. See 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). Considering that the appel-lant sought to 

discover records that were exempted by the Privacy Act, the 

district court acted well within its discretion in deferring 

discovery so as to determine the propriety of the exemptions. 

See Simmons v. Department of Justice, 796 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 

1986) (construing Freedom of Information Act). 

We also reject the appellant's argument that the FBI 

intentionally and willfully dragged its feet in releasing the 

requested records. The Privacy Act does not impose a specific 

time limitation on agency action. Moreover, the record does not 

support the appellant's contention that the FBI did nothing until 

suit was filed: the FBI released hundreds of pages of documents 

days after the lawsuit, which indicates that the FBI had been 

processing Nolan's request long before his suit was filed. 

We therefore AFFIRM the district court's grant of summary 

judgment in favor of DOJ. 

FOIA. The identity of the sources in the employment background 

investigation is also protected because, although the file does not 

itself involve a criminal investigation, the withheld information 

was obtained from interviews during the course of a criminal 

investigation. 

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