Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-14-03011/USCOURTS-ca8-14-03011-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Darryl House
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-3011

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Darryl House

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Missouri - Cape Girardeau

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 Submitted: April 14, 2016

 Filed: June 6, 2016

____________

Before RILEY, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

____________

MURPHY, Circuit Judge.

Darryl House displayed a handgun while robbing the Jayson Jewelers store and

was found guilty of violating the Hobbs Act and brandishing a weapon during a crime

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of violence. The district court1

 sentenced House to life imprisonment. He appeals his

sentence and several of the district court's rulings. We affirm.

I. 

On September 23, 2009 Darryl House and his associates robbed Jayson

Jewelers in Cape Girardeau, Missouri. Kevin Stitt and Keyessence Fountain entered

the store pretending to be a couple interested in wedding rings and started speaking

with the clerk Debbie Drerup. House then entered the store and pointed a handgun at

Drerup. Stitt placed handcuffs on Drerup, wrapped duct tape over the handcuffs and

Drerup's eyes, and left her in the back room with the door closed. While Drerup was

restrained, House, Stitt, and Fountain took jewelry produced outside Missouri and

cash from the store before fleeing. After House and his associates had fled the scene,

the police arrived and took DNA samples from the handcuffs. 

About three years later Stitt was arrested in Tennessee. The Missouri highway

patrol crime laboratory notified the Cape Girardeau police department that his DNA

sample matched one taken from Jayson Jewelers on the day of the robbery. Stitt

subsequently admitted that he had robbed the store in 2009 and identified House as

his associate who had carried the handgun during the robbery.

House was charged with interfering with interstate commerce by aiding and

abetting a robbery of a business, in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, and

with brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(c). During jury selection the government used one of its peremptory strikes on

juror 18, the only black member of the jury panel. House objected to the strike and

raised a Batson challenge, see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84 (1986), but the

district court accepted the prosecution's justification for striking the juror. During the

1 The Honorable Stephen N. Limbaugh, United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of Missouri.

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trial the parties stipulated to the interstate nexus element of the Hobbs Act charge. 

Several witnesses testified for the prosecution, including Stitt and the clerk Drerup

who identified House as the person who pointed the handgun at her during the

robbery. The jury convicted House on both counts. 

The presentence investigation report indicated that House was subject to a

mandatory life sentence for his Hobbs Act violation since he had at least two prior

felony convictions for crimes of violence — a 2001 conviction for aggravated robbery

in Tennessee and a 2006 conviction for aggravated robbery in Illinois. According to

the report, House's guideline range for possessing a firearm during the robbery was

seven years to life. The district court overruled his objections to the report and

sentenced him to life imprisonment for his Hobbs Act violation and a consecutive

seven years for brandishing a firearm. House appeals his sentence and several of the

court's rulings. 

II. 

We review Batson rulings for clear error, according great deference to the

district court's findings, and "keeping in mind that the ultimate burden of persuasion

regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from the party opposing the

strike." United States v. Maxwell, 473 F.3d 868, 871 (8th Cir. 2007) (internal

quotation marks omitted). "If a party makes a prima facie showing that a peremptory

challenge is race based, the proponent must show a race neutral justification to

overcome the objection." United States v. Ellison, 616 F.3d 829, 832 (8th Cir. 2010). 

The district court then determines whether the objecting party has shown purposeful

discrimination. Id. 

The district court did not clearly err by overruling House's Batson challenge.

The government claimed that its race neutral justifications for striking juror 18, the

sole potential black juror, were that he had refused to make eye contact with the

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attorneys or the judge, had slouched in his chair and appeared disinterested in the trial,

and had been the only prospective juror not to list an occupation or work history on

the juror information sheet. "[D]emeanor and body language" may serve as

legitimate, race neutral reasons to strike a potential juror. Maxwell, 473 F.3d at 872.

A venire member's "nearly empty questionnaire" may also be a valid, race neutral

reason to strike that person. See United States v. Carter, 481 F.3d 601, 610 (8th Cir.

2007), rev'd on other grounds, 554 U.S. 237 (2008). Even though the district judge

had not personally detected disinterest by the prospective juror, he was permitted to

credit the government's observations in overruling defendant's Batson challenge. See

Ellison, 616 F.3d at 832.

III.

House claims that the Hobbs Act is unconstitutional on its face because

Congress exceeded the legislative power granted it under the Commerce Clause when

it passed this statute. We review constitutional challenges de novo. United States v.

Foster, 443 F.3d 978, 981 (8th Cir. 2006). House argues that the Commerce Clause

and the Tenth Amendment prohibit the federal government from making robbery of

a local store a federal crime, but the Hobbs Act contains an express nexus requiring

the charged criminal conduct to affect interstate commerce. See, e.g., United States

v. Vong, 171 F.3d 648, 654 (8th Cir. 1999). Congress has the constitutional authority

to pass such legislation, and House's constitutional challenge to the Hobbs Act thus

fails. 

House also argues that his robbery of Jayson Jewelers was not unlawful under

the Hobbs Act because it did not obstruct, delay, or affect interstate commerce. See

18 U.S.C. § 1951. The federal jurisdictional requirement in the Hobbs Act is satisfied

however when a robbery depletes the assets of a business engaged in interstate

commerce. See United States v. Farmer, 73 F.3d 836, 843 (8th Cir. 1996). The

robbery here satisfies this requirement because the stolen jewelry had been made

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outside of Missouri and shipped to a store in Missouri where it was offered for sale. 

See Vong, 171 F.3d at 654. House's robbery of Jayson Jewelers thus met the Hobbs

Act jurisdictional requirement. 

IV.

House argues that the district court erred by imposing a mandatory life sentence

under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c). Section 3559 mandates a life sentence for a defendant

who commits a serious violent felony and already has at least two such convictions. 

We review statutory construction and constitutional challenges de novo and factual

findings for clear error. See Foster, 443 F.3d at 981; United States v. Brummels, 15

F.3d 769, 771 (8th Cir. 1994). 

House argues that a Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a "serious violent

felony" under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c) so his life sentence for his crime was improper.

"[S]erious violent felony" is defined in § 3559(c) as an "offense punishable by a

maximum term of imprisonment of 10 years or more that has as an element the use,

attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another." 18

U.S.C. § 3559(c)(2)(F)(ii). Robbery is defined in the Hobbs Act as "the unlawful

taking or obtaining of personal property from the person or in the presence of another,

against his will, by means of actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury,

immediate or future, to his person or property." 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1). The district

court thus did not err by ruling that House's robbery conviction was a "serious violent

felony" under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(2)(F)(ii). Farmer, 73 F.3d at 842.

House also claims that his life sentence is unlawful under 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(c)(3)(A), which provides penalties for "crime[s] of violence" or felonies that

have "as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against

the person or property of another." He contends that Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime

of violence under this statutory definition. The district court sentenced House to life

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imprisonment under § 3559(c), however, not § 924(c). Furthermore, even if we

analyzed the lawfulness of his sentence under § 924(c), we would be bound by 

Farmer, 73 F.3d at 842, where we concluded that Hobbs Act robbery has "as an

element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person

of another."

According to House, his 2006 Illinois conviction for aggravated robbery does

not qualify as a prior serious violent felony. Robbery is however one of the

enumerated serious violent felonies provided in § 3559(c)(2)(F)(i). Under § 3559(c),

an offense qualifies as robbery if it contains the elements of generic robbery which is

defined as aggravated larceny, or the misappropriation of property under

circumstances involving immediate danger to a person. See United States v.

Becerril–Lopez, 541 F.3d 881, 891 (9th Cir. 2008); 3 W. LaFave, Substantive

Criminal Law § 20.3(e) (2d ed. 2003). The definition of aggravated robbery in the

Illinois statute under which House was convicted was the unlawful taking of personal

property from a person or in the presence of another by force or threat of force while

"indicating verbally or by [] action" that he is armed with a dangerous weapon. 720

Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/18-5 (2006). We conclude that House's 2006 state conviction

satisfies the generic definition of robbery and therefore qualifies as a prior serious

violent felony. See Farmer, 73 F.3d at 842. 

 Another reason House argues his Illinois robbery conviction does not qualify

as a serious violent felony is because he claims he did not use a dangerous weapon

when he committed that crime. According to § 3559(c)(3)(A), robbery cannot be a

predicate offense if clear and convincing evidence shows that it did not result in death

or serious bodily injury and "no firearm or other dangerous weapon was used" or

threatened to be used. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(3)(A). Here, House and his uncle

submitted affidavits stating that the conduct underlying his aggravated robbery

conviction did not involve the use or threatened use of a dangerous weapon. To have

been convicted of the Illinois offense of aggravated robbery, however, House had to

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have indicated to the victim that he was "armed with a firearm or other dangerous

weapon." See 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/18-5 (2006). The district court therefore did not

err by determining that his Illinois robbery conviction qualified as a prior serious

violent felony.

House also challenges the constitutionality of § 3559(c) because he claims it

places the burden on him to show that his prior conviction does not qualify as a

predicate offense. The burden shifting provision in § 3559(c)(3)(A) is not

unconstitutional, however, because "Congress has the power to place on a defendant

the burden of establishing an affirmative defense that is not an essential element of the

crime." United States v. Davis, 260 F.3d 965, 970 (8th Cir. 2001). 

Appellant also claims that his Tennessee conviction in 2001 for aggravated

robbery does not qualify as a second requisite predicate offense because this

conviction was unconstitutional as he cannot recall meeting with an attorney before

his hearing on the state's motion to transfer him from juvenile to adult criminal court. 

His argument fails because "[t]he Constitution only requires federal [sentencing]

courts to permit a collateral attack on an earlier state conviction . . . [if] the defendant

asserts the state court violated [his] right to appointed counsel." United States v.

Jones, 28 F.3d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1994). To establish this claim a defendant must allege

a "complete lack of representation by counsel during earlier state proceedings." Id.

Because House's argument is an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, his 2001

Tennessee conviction cannot be collaterally attacked here. See United States v.

Walker, 202 F.3d 1066, 1067 (8th Cir. 2000). Since House had at least two prior

violent felony convictions, the district court properly sentenced him to life

imprisonment under § 3559. 

House argues in addition that Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013),

and the Sixth Amendment require that a jury rather than a judge make any finding that

he had been previously convicted of at least two serious violent felonies since such a

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fact could increase the maximum penalty to which he was exposed. In

Almendarez–Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226–27 (1998), the Supreme

Court explained however that recidivism is not an element of an offense that must be

submitted to a jury, and the Alleyne Court, 133 S. Ct. at 2160 n.1, did not revisit that

conclusion. United States v. Roberts, 763 F.3d 947, 949 (8th Cir. 2014). We

conclude that the district court properly sentenced House to life imprisonment under

18 U.S.C. § 3559(c). 

V.

House also appeals some evidentiary rulings. He argues that the district court

violated his constitutional rights by denying his motion to suppress Stitt's trial

testimony. When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we review factual

findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Smith, 720

F.3d 1017, 1019 (8th Cir. 2013). After trial, "we examine the entire record, not

merely the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing." United States v. Henderson,

613 F.3d 1177, 1181 (8th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). House

contends that Stitt's trial testimony should have been suppressed because it was a

result of his involuntary confession. 

Although House does not have standing to vindicate Stitt's right against selfincrimination, he has standing to raise a Fifth Amendment claim to protect his own

right to a fair trial. See United States v. Dowell, 430 F.3d 1100, 1107 (10th Cir.

2005); United States v. Gonzales, 164 F.3d 1285, 1289 (10th Cir. 1999). Where a

defendant seeks to exclude witness testimony because it is a result of a coerced

confession, he has the burden to prove that the earlier confession was coerced and led

to false trial testimony. See Dowell, 430 F.3d 1107. Here, House's Fifth Amendment

challenge fails because he did not show a "serious factual dispute" about whether Stitt

was coerced to confess or whether Stitt's confession actually affected the reliability

of his trial testimony. See id. at 1108. Moreover, about two years had passed between

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Stitt's interrogation and his trial testimony, and "[w]ith this passage of time . . . [the

alleged] coercive atmosphere of the interrogation had certainly dissipated." See

Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 595 (9th Cir. 2002). The district court thus did

not err in denying House's motion to suppress Stitt's trial testimony. 

We review House's remaining evidentiary arguments for plain error because he

did not raise them below. United States v. Peneaux, 432 F.3d 882, 891 (8th Cir.

2005). House claims that the clerk Debbie Drerup was only able to identify him at

trial because a police detective had told her that House was "the guy" who robbed the

store and she had seen House in his prison uniform during earlier proceedings. House

argues these incidents were "impermissibly suggestive," and under the totality of the

circumstances they created "a very substantial likelihood of irreparable

misidentification." Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 107, 116 (1977) (internal

quotation marks omitted); see Graham v. Solem, 728 F.2d 1533, 1541–42 (8th Cir.

1984) (en banc). 

Even assuming that it was "impermissibly suggestive" for Drerup to have seen

House in his prison clothes during the state court proceedings and for the detective to

refer to House as "the guy" who committed the robbery, this did not create "a very

substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification" under the totality of

circumstances. See Manson, 432 U.S. at 113. Drerup testified that she had a clear

enough view of House during the robbery to describe his physical characteristics

accurately, and the district court did not plainly err by permitting her to identify him

in court. Moreover, any potential error was harmless because Stitt corroborated

Drerup's testimony by also testifying about House's role in the robbery. See Williams

v. Armontrout, 877 F.2d 1376, 1381 (8th Cir. 1989). 

House finally argues that the district court erred by admitting a motel receipt

with his name and driver license identification number on it because there was

insufficient authenticating evidence. The receipt was used by the government to

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demonstrate that House stayed at a hotel near Jayson Jewelers the night before its

robbery. We conclude that the receipt was sufficiently authenticated because the

motel record custodian, Melinda Schaffer, testified that she had obtained the receipt

from the company's records. See Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(1). House claims that the court

erred by permitting Schaffer to authenticate the motel receipt because she was not

present when the document was created, but the document would also have been

admissible under Rule 803(6) as a record of regularly conducted activity. See United

States v. Wigerman, 549 F.2d 1192, 1194 (8th Cir. 1977) (per curiam); United States

v. Franks, 939 F.2d 600, 602 (8th Cir. 1991). The district court did not plainly err by

permitting Schaffer to testify and admitting the motel receipt into evidence.

VI.

For these reasons the judgment of the district court is affirmed.2

______________________________

2

 The government's motion to supplement the record is denied as moot. 

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