Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01119/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01119-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alameda County Sheriff
Defendant
Richmond City Police
Defendant
Sacramento City Police
Defendant
Sacramento County Sheriff
Defendant
United States Government
Defendant
Jalen Vaughn
Plaintiff
Jamarco Vaughn
Plaintiff
Jamonte Vaughn
Plaintiff
Zakiya Vaughn
Plaintiff

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In a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, a

municipality is a proper defendant, but a department or subdivision

of the municipality is not. See, e.g., United States v. Kama, 394

F.3d 1236, 1239-40 (Ferguson, J., concurring); Vance v. County of

Santa Clara, 928 F. Supp. 993, 996 (N.D. Cal. 1996).

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ZAKIYA VAUGHN, as an 

individual and Guardian Ad

Litem for JAMONTE VAUGHN,

JAMARCO VAUGHN and JALEN

VAUGHN, minors and real

parties in interest,

NO. CIV. S-07-1119 LKK/KJM 

Plaintiffs,

v.

O R D E R

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT (FBI);

SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF;

SACRAMENTO CITY POLICE;

RICHMOND CITY POLICE; ALAMEDA

COUNTY SHERIFF,

Defendants.

 /

Pending before the court is a motion to dismiss and motion to

strike filed by defendant City of Richmond (identified in this

action as “Richmond City Police”)1. For the reasons described

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The plaintiff alleges that the defendants’ actions violated

the “Civil Rights Act of 1966 (as amended).” The court assumes that

this is a reference to 42 U.S.C. section 1983. 

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herein, the court grants the motion to dismiss in part and denies

it in part. The court denies the motion to strike.

I. ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT

The plaintiff’s complaint alleges that agents of the defendant

law enforcement agencies used excessive force when entering the

home where the plaintiff’s minor children were located. The

complaint alleges that the defendant’s acts were racially

motivated, in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments

and 42 U.S.C section 19832. According to the complaint, agents of

the defendant law enforcement agencies entered the plaintiff’s home

searching for the husband of plaintiff Zakiya Vaughn. The agents

allegedly broke the front door of plaintiff’s home, “ransacked” the

interior, and used tear gas in the home while the plaintiff and her

minor children were present. The plaintiff alleges that during the

search “certain racial epithets were directed towards plaintiff .

. . and certain gestures generally known to be racist in nature

were also directed towards said plaintiff . . . .” 

The plaintiff alleges that she and her children suffered

emotional distress as a result of the defendants’ acts. She seeks

monetary damages, attorney fees, and costs.

II. STANDARDS

A. Standard for Dismissal Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6)

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On a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint must

be accepted as true. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972).

The court is bound to give the plaintiff the benefit of every

reasonable inference to be drawn from the "well-pleaded"

allegations of the complaint. See Retail Clerks Intern. Ass'n,

Local 1625, AFL-CIO v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963).

Thus, the plaintiff need not necessarily plead a particular fact

if that fact is a reasonable inference from facts properly alleged.

See id.; see also Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 648 (1963)

(inferring fact from allegations of complaint).

In general, the complaint is construed favorably to the

pleader. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). The

court may not dismiss the complaint if there is a reasonably

founded hope that the plaintiff may show a set of facts consistent

with the allegations. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct.

1955, 1967-69 (2007). In spite of the deference the court is bound

to pay to the plaintiff's allegations, however, it is not proper

for the court to assume that "the [plaintiff] can prove facts which

[he or she] has not alleged, or that the defendants have violated

the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged." Associated

General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council

of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

B. Standard for Motion to Strike Pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(f)

Rule 12(f) authorizes the court to order stricken from any

pleading "any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous

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3

The plaintiff concedes in her “response” to the defendant’s

motion that her claim cannot be brought under the Fifteenth

Amendment. The court dismisses this claim with prejudice.

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matter." A party may bring on a motion to strike within 20 days

after the filing of the pleading under attack. The court, however,

may make appropriate orders to strike under the rule at any time

on its own initiative. Thus, the court may consider and grant an

untimely motion to strike where it seems proper to do so. See 5A

Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d ' 1380.

Motions to strike are generally viewed with disfavor, and will

usually be denied unless the allegations in the pleading have no

possible relation to the controversy, and may cause prejudice to

one of the parties. See 5A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice

and Procedure: Civil 2d ' 1380; See also Hanna v. Lane, 610 F.

Supp. 32, 34 (N.D. Ill. 1985). If the court is in doubt as to

whether the challenged matter may raise an issue of fact or law,

the motion to strike should be denied, leaving an assessment of the

sufficiency of the allegations for adjudication on the merits.

See 5A Wright & Miller, supra, at ' 1380.

III. ANALYSIS

The plaintiff alleges that the defendant violated her rights

under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments3 and “the Civil

Rights Act of 1966 (as amended).” As explained below, the

defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in

part. The motion to strike is denied. 

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A. Motion to Dismiss

1. Plaintiff’s Allegations Under the Fourteenth

Amendment

Drawing every inference in favor of the plaintiff, the

plaintiff appears to allege that the defendant violated her rights

under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. She

alleges that the defendants’ actions were “racially motived,” which

may be read to allege that the defendant acted with a invidious

purpose and discriminated against the plaintiff based on her

membership in a definable class. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne

Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985); McLaughlin v. State of

Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964). The facts she pleads to

substantiate her claim are that “during the course of the events

described [in the complaint], certain racial epithets were directed

towards plaintiff . . . and certain gestures generally known to be

racist in nature were also directed towards said plaintiff . . .

.” This suffices to provide the defendant fair notice of the nature

of the claim and the legal grounds upon which it rests. At the

pleading stage, no more is required. See Bell Atlantic Corp., 127

S.Ct. at 1965 fn. 3. The defendant’s motion to dismiss this claim

on the basis that plaintiff's claim fails to allege a cognizable

claim is therefore denied.

2. Excessive Force

The plaintiff does not allege a claim under section 1983 for

excessive force. Such a claim is properly characterized as

implicating the Fourth Amendment, not the due process clause of

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Fourteenth Amendment. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989).

The plaintiff, however, has not pled her claim as implicating her

Fourth Amendment rights. If she intended to do so, her claim is

inadequately pled. 

In order to state a claim against a municipal entity, the

plaintiff must allege that an action pursuant to an official policy

or a custom of the municipality causes the plaintiff’s injury.

Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978).

A municipality is not liable under section 1983 simply on a theory

of respondeat superior. Id. A plaintiff must plead facts that

support the existence of a custom or official policy that caused

the violation of the plaintiff’s rights. Kelson v. Springfield, 767

F.2d 651, 656 (9th Cir. 1985). Because the plaintiff has not done

so, her cause of action under section 1983 must be dismissed. 

B. Motion to Strike

The defendant City of Richmond moves to strike all of the

plaintiff’s claims. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f)

authorizes the court to strike from any pleading “any redundant,

immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(f). Motions to strike are viewed with disfavor, and will usually

be denied unless the allegations in the pleading have no possible

relation to the controversy, and may cause prejudice to one of the

parties. See 5A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and

Procedure, § 1380 (3d ed. 2004). 

The defendant has failed to show that the plaintiff’s claims

have no possible relation to the controversy and may prejudice the

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parties, or that they contain “redundant, immaterial, impertinent,

or scandalous matter.” As described above, the plaintiff’s

Fourteenth Amendment claim states a valid cause of action against

the defendant. Moreover, because the plaintiff’s section 1983 claim

is dismissed with leave to amend, it is premature to strike this

claim without having permitted the plaintiff to clarify the factual

and legal basis for this claim. The defendant’s motion to strike

is denied. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons provided herein, the defendant’s motion to

dismiss premised on a failure to allege a policy or custom of the

defendant is GRANTED. The motion to strike is DENIED. The plaintiff

is given thirty days to file an amended complaint. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 16, 2007.

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