Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-16-01244/USCOURTS-ca7-16-01244-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Four Seasons Hotels
Appellee
Diane Parker
Appellant

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 16-1244

DIANE PARKER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

FOUR SEASONS HOTELS, LIMITED,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 1:12-cv-03207 — Manish S. Shah, Judge.

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 27, 2016 — DECIDED JANUARY 6, 2017

Before BAUER, ROVNER, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Diane Parker was injured when a

sliding glass door in the bathroom of her Four Seasons Hotel

room shattered. The hotel admitted negligence and a jury

awarded Parker $20,000 in compensatory damages, which was

reduced to $12,000 after a motion for set-off was granted. The

district court declined Parker’s request to put the question of

Case: 16-1244 Document: 43 Filed: 01/06/2017 Pages: 16
2 No. 16-1244

punitive damages to the jury, finding her evidence insufficient

as a matter of law. We reverse and remand for further proceedings on the question of punitive damages.

I.

Four Seasons asserts that the federal courts lack jurisdiction

over this diversity suit because the amount in controversy does

not exceed $75,000, citing the ultimate award of $12,000. But

the requirements for diversity jurisdiction (including the

amount in controversy) must be satisfied only at the time the

suit is filed. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 405 n.6 (1970)

(noting the well-settled rule that a federal court does not lose

jurisdiction over a diversity action which was well founded at

the outset even though one of the parties may later change

domicile or the amount recovered falls short of the statutory

threshold); St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S.

283, 289–90 (1938) (“Events occurring subsequent to the

institution of suit which reduce the amount recoverable below

the statutory limit do not oust jurisdiction.”). Four Seasons

does not deny that, when Parker filed her complaint, she

brought claims in apparent good faith for compensatory and

punitive damages exceeding $150,000. Dart Cherokee Basin

Operating Co. v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547, 553 (2014) (“When a

plaintiff invokes federal-court jurisdiction, the plaintiff’s

amount-in-controversy allegation is accepted if made in good

faith.”); Meridian Sec. Ins. Co. v. Sadowski, 441 F.3d 536, 541 (7th

Cir. 2006) (once the facts supporting the amount in controversy

have been established, the proponent’s estimate of the claim’s

value must be accepted unless there is legal certainty that the

controversy’s value is below the threshold). Parker’s claimed

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No. 16-1244 3

damages are well in excess of the requisite amount, and federal

jurisdiction is secure.

We turn to the facts, which we will simplify to focus on the

issue at hand. Parker and her sister, Cindy Schiavon, checked

into the Four Seasons on April 27, 2007, requesting adjoining

rooms. After a short delay at the desk, Parker was assigned to

room 3627 and her sister was given the room next door. In

Parker’s room, a sliding glass door separated the shower area

from the vanity area.1

 On the day after check-in, Parker took a

shower and attempted to exit the shower area by opening the

glass door. As she slid the door, it exploded suddenly, raining

shards of glass onto her naked body and causing her injuries.

Parker’s sister summoned help from the front desk. Shortly

thereafter, Joseph Gartin, an engineer employed by the hotel,

arrived to investigate the incident. According to Schiavon’s

affidavit, Gartin: 

immediately looked up at the overhead track

and said: “Looks like the stopper moved again!”

... He explained that the hotel had recently

undergone renovations, and that a “bunch” of

the newly installed sliding glass doors had

exploded because the overhead track stoppers

were not working properly. That allowed the

door-handles to crash into the walls and cause

the glass doors to explode. This was one of the

1

 This door is referred to in the record as a “barn door.” Apparently, it is

separate from or in addition to a shower door.

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rooms on the “do not sell” list. You might want

to check yours.

R. 101-7, at 2. Taking Gartin’s advice, Schiavon checked the

sliding door in her bathroom in the adjoining room and

determined that it suffered from the same defect.

Parker also uncovered evidence suggesting that the sliding

door in her room had shattered before the incident that caused

her injury, and that the door had been replaced. An October

2007 email between third party contractors working on door

breakage issues revealed that several rooms configured in the

same manner as Parker’s room had similar issues:

BobHere is an update from Contract Mirror &

Supply on the shower doors at the Four Seasons.

CMS installed 150 tub doors, 136 shower doors,

and 136 sliding barn doors during the renovation. We have had one shower door break (room

4401) and five sliding glass barn doors break

(rooms 3427, 3527, 3627 twice, and 4419). The

cause of the shower door breakage was identified and all of the shower doors were inspected

to be sure that there were no additional problems. Since the X27 rooms represent 80% of the

barn door failures these rooms were examined

to identify what was different in these rooms

that may have caused the problems. The thicker

wall construction in this room leaves less clearance for the door (+/- 1⁄2” clearance versus +/- 1"

in other rooms) and the tight tolerance may

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No. 16-1244 5

contribute to the breakage because the door may

deflect up to 1⁄2” if someone pulls on the door

while operating it which would allow the corner

of the glass to hit the stone. CMS has been

working with Jim DeFily to add corner protection to the glass to protect the corners in the

event of impact and CMS is also researching a

continuous bottom guide that was suggested by

the hotel.

R. 101-2.2

The hotel conceded negligence and so the only issue for

trial was damages. But Four Seasons moved to block Parker

from raising the issue of punitive damages before the jury,

contending that her evidence was insufficient as a matter of

law to present that claim to the jury. The district court agreed,

and after trial, Parker recovered $20,000 in compensatory

damages which was reduced to $12,000 after set-off. Parker

appeals. 

2

 Judge Leinenweber found this email admissible under the residual

exception to the hearsay rule. Parker v. Four Seasons Hotels, Ltd., 2014 WL

1292858, *3 (N.D. Ill. March 31, 2014). Although Four Seasons argues in its

response brief that the email is inadmissible, the hotel fails to acknowledge

that the district court rejected this argument, and fails to make any

argument that the district court abused its discretion in deeming the email

admissible. United States v. Ferrell, 816 F.3d 433, 438 (7th Cir. 2015) (we

review a district court’s decision on the admissibility of hearsay statements

for abuse of discretion, reversing if the decision strikes us as fundamentally

wrong). By failing to argue that the district court abused its discretion, Four

Seasons has waived any claim regarding the admissibility of this evidence. 

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6 No. 16-1244

II.

Parker proceeded pro se through much of the litigation in

the district court and also represented herself in this appeal. A

trial court is obligated to liberally construe a pro se plaintiff’s

pleadings. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Kelley v.

Zoeller, 800 F.3d 318, 325 (7th Cir. 2015); Nichols v. Michigan City

Plant Planning Dept., 755 F.3d 594, 600 (7th Cir. 2014). On

appeal, we too construe pro se filings liberally, and will address

any cogent arguments we are able to discern in a pro se

appellate brief. Anderson v. Hardman, 241 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir.

2001). The Honorable Harry Leinenweber oversaw the case

from filing in April 2012 until July 2014, when it was transferred to the newly forming docket of the recently appointed

Honorable Manish S. Shah. Shortly before his transfer off the

case, Judge Leinenweber ruled on the Four Seasons’ motion for

summary judgment. Faced with the plaintiff’s rambling pro se

complaint, a document that did not set forth any particular

counts, Judge Leinenweber liberally construed the document

and inferred six possible causes of action under Illinois law:

premises liability, common law fraud, violation of the Illinois

Safety Glazing Materials Act and the Chicago Municipal Code,

negligence in the installation of the sliding glass doors,

spoliation of the evidence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Judge Leinenweber granted summary judgment

in favor of the defendants on all of these claims except premises liability. 

Under Illinois law, property owners owe to their invitees a

duty to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition.

Ward v. Kmart Corp., 554 N.E.2d 223, 227 (Ill. 1990). See also

Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 856 N.E.2d 1048, 1058 (Ill. 2006).

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No. 16-1244 7

In a premises liability action, a plaintiff has the burden of

proving: (1) the existence of a condition that presents an

unreasonable risk of harm to persons on the premises; (2) that

the defendants knew, or should have known, that the condition

posed an unreasonable risk of harm; (3) that the defendants

should have anticipated that individuals on the premises

would fail to discover or recognize the danger or otherwise fail

to protect themselves against it; (4) a negligent act or omission

on the part of the defendant; (5) an injury suffered by the

plaintiff; and (6) that the condition of the property was a

proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff. Jordan v. National

Steel Corp., 701 N.E.2d 1092, 1094 (Ill. 1998); Mueller v. PharMor, Inc., 784 N.E.2d 226, 231 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). Judge

Leinenweber concluded that Schiavon’s affidavit and the

contractor’s email provided sufficient evidence to preclude

summary judgment on a premises liability claim. The court did

not specifically address whether Parker’s premises liability

claim was limited to compensatory damages for negligence or

whether she could also seek punitive damages for wilful and

wanton conduct.

After the case had been transferred to the docket of Judge

Shah and shortly before trial, Four Seasons submitted a motion

seeking to prohibit the plaintiff from presenting a claim for

punitive damages to the jury. Although the hotel characterized

its filing as a motion in limine, it was really a motion for partial

summary judgment on the issue of punitive damages, and the

district court appeared to treat it as such. Judge Shah considered whether Parker had presented sufficient evidence to meet

the standard for punitive damages under Illinois law, specifically whether she had evidence of wilful and wanton conduct

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8 No. 16-1244

by the defendant. Judge Shah agreed with Judge Leinenweber

that Parker had sufficient evidence to present to the jury a

premises liability claim founded on negligence but concluded

that the same evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to

prove the wilful and wanton conduct that could justify

punitive damages. 

Parker’s primary claim on appeal is that the district court

erred when it concluded that her claim for punitive damages

failed as a matter of law. Four Seasons contends that we should

review the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion

because it involves the admission or exclusion of evidence,

matters peculiarly within the competence of the district court.

But the basis of the court’s decision was whether a particular

claim could be sustained as a matter of law, not whether

evidence should be admitted or excluded.3 We therefore

review the district court’s grant of partial summary judgment

de novo, examining the record in the light most favorable to

Parker and construing all reasonable inferences from the

evidence in her favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 255 (1986); Yahnke v. Kane County, Ill., 823 F.3d 1066, 1070

(7th Cir. 2016). Summary judgment is appropriate when there

are no genuine disputes of material fact and the movant is

3

 In deciding the legal issue under review here, the district court also

determined the admissibility of certain evidence, namely, the email

regarding door problems. Admissibility is a threshold question because a

court may consider only admissible evidence in assessing a motion for

summary judgment. Gunville v. Walker, 583 F.3d 979, 985 (7th Cir. 2009). As

we noted above, Four Seasons made no argument that the district court

abused its discretion in finding the email admissible and thus only the

summary judgment decision is at issue at this stage.

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No. 16-1244 9

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a);

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Yahnke, 823 F.3d at 1070. The preliminary question of whether the facts of a particular case justify

the imposition of punitive damages is properly one of law.

Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353, 359 (Ill. 1978).

Under Illinois law, “punitive or exemplary damages may

be awarded when torts are committed with fraud, actual

malice, deliberate violence or oppression, or when the defendant acts willfully, or with such gross negligence as to indicate

a wanton disregard of the rights of others.” Kelsay, 384 N.E.2d

at 359. See also Stojkovich v. Monadnock Bldg., 666 N.E.2d 704,

712 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (same). Although Parker contends that

the hotel committed fraud when it failed to warn her at checkin time that her room contained a hazardous condition, like the

district court we conclude that Parker has presented no

evidence of fraud or intent to deliberately harm her. Instead,

the question is whether the hotel’s conduct was so grossly

negligent “as to indicate a wanton disregard of the rights of

others.” Kelsay, 384 N.E.2d at 359. Punitive damages serve to

punish the offender and to deter that party and others from

engaging in similar acts of wrongdoing in the future. Loitz v.

Remington Arms Co., 563 N.E.2d 397, 401 (Ill. 1990). “Because of

their penal nature, punitive damages are not favored in the

law.” Loitz, 563 N.E.2d at 401. 

Illinois courts distinguish negligence from wilful and

wanton conduct. Stojkovich, 666 N.E.2d at 712; Loitz, 563 N.E.2d

at 402. One court described wilful and wanton conduct as “a

hybrid between acts considered to be negligent and intentional

acts.” Stojkovich, 666 N.E.2d at 712. Negligence that does not

justify punitive damages includes “mere inadvertence,

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mistake, errors of judgment and the like.” Stojkovich, 666

N.E.2d at 712; Loitz, 563 N.E.2d at 402. But punitive damages

may be awarded in cases involving “reckless indifference to

the rights of others,” or conduct that approaches the degree of

moral blame attached to intentional harm, where a defendant

inflicts a highly unreasonable risk of harm on another in

conscious disregard of that risk. Loitz, 563 N.E.2d at 402. In the

context of premises liability, wilful and wanton conduct

includes an act committed with reckless disregard for the

safety of others, “such as a failure, after knowledge of impending danger, to exercise ordinary care to prevent it or a failure

to discover the danger through recklessness or carelessness

when it could have been discovered by the exercise of ordinary

care.” Salazar v. Crown Enterprises, Inc., 767 N.E.2d 366, 371 (Ill.

App. Ct. 2002) (citing American Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. City of

Chicago, 735 N.E.2d 551, 557 (Ill. 2000)).

The district court focused on Stojkovich, Loitz and Salazar in

finding that Parker did not meet the Illinois standard for

punitive damages. In Loitz, the plaintiff was injured when the

barrel of his Remington shotgun exploded, injuring his hand.

Remington had received reports of ninety-four shotgun barrel

explosions resulting in injury for this particular model. But the

company had investigated every reported incident and

determined the cause in each instance to be shells that had

been reused and overloaded by the user of the gun. The court

concluded that Remington’s conduct was not wilful and

wanton in part because guns are inherently dangerous instrumentalities and so the mere occurrence of an explosion without

more does not establish a level of misconduct sufficient to

justify punitive damages. Loitz, 563 N.E.2d at 404. The court

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No. 16-1244 11

further found that punitive damages were not warranted

because the plaintiff had cast no doubt on Remington’s good

faith in investigating prior explosions. Loitz, 563 N.E.2d at 407. 

In Stojkovich, the plaintiff was injured while attempting to

escape from an elevator that had stalled between the second

and third floors of the historic Chicago building. The elevator

had stalled on seventeen prior occasions and five of the

stoppages had resulted in passengers being trapped. In each

prior instance, the elevator was serviced and became operable

again. The elevator was never taken out of service and the true

problem was not diagnosed until after the plaintiff fell down

the shaft while trying to leave the stalled elevator. There was

no evidence that the company responsible for maintaining the

elevator had ever failed to respond to service calls, failed to

attempt to repair the problematic elevator when called upon to

do so, or placed the elevator back in service knowing that it

was defective and remained unrepaired. 666 N.E.2d at 712–13.

Absent evidence that the company deliberately refused to

attempt repairs, or placed it back in service knowing both the

cause of the stoppages and that the cause had not been

remedied, the court declined to find that the company’s

conduct approached the degree of moral blame necessary to

justify punitive damages. 666 N.E.2d at 713.

Salazar addressed the duty of a landowner to a trespasser

on the land. The trespasser, a homeless person, was beaten to

death on the defendant’s unsecured property. His survivors

alleged that the property was in such a state of disrepair and

abandonment that it posed structural, sanitary and social

hazards that rendered it unreasonably dangerous even to

trespassers. In Illinois, landowners owe trespassers a duty only

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to refrain from wilful and wanton conduct. The court declined

to find that the landowner could be held responsible for the

criminal acts of a third party against a trespasser where the

plaintiff lacked evidence that the landowner engaged in any

intentional act or knew of other injuries or accidents caused by

the allegedly dangerous condition. Without that knowledge,

the court concluded that allowing the property to fall into

disrepair did not rise to the level of wilful and wanton conduct.

767 N.E.2d at 371.

With those standards in mind, we turn to Parker’s evidence

of wilful and wanton conduct here. The affidavit from

Schiavon and the email from the contractor working on the

door issues were Parker’s best evidence that the hotel knew

there was a serious problem with the sliding doors at the time

the room was rented to Parker. Parker had the admission of the

hotel’s engineer that the stopper had moved “again,” that a

“bunch” of the newly installed sliding glass doors had exploded because the overhead track stoppers were not working

properly, that the doors were crashing into the walls and

exploding, and that rooms affected by the problem had been

placed on a “do not sell” list. See Barton v. Chicago & N. W.

Transp. Co., 757 N.E.2d 533, 555 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (evidence of

substantially similar occurrences is admissible to show a

conscious disregard for the safety of others). She also had the

email suggesting that several doors had broken in a similar

manner and that the glass door in her very room had previously exploded and been replaced. 

Although competing inferences could be drawn from this

evidence, on summary judgment we draw all reasonable

inferences in favor of the party opposing judgment, in this

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No. 16-1244 13

instance, Parker. Construing this evidence in Parker’s favor, it

would be fair to infer that the Four Seasons knew that there

was a problem with the glass doors generally, that the door in

Parker’s room had previously shattered, and that there was a

problem with the stopper that allowed the door handle to

come into contact with the wall, resulting in the shattering of

the glass door. It would also be fair to infer that the hotel knew

that the problem had not been fixed as of the time that Parker

checked into the room, and that the room had been taken out

of service for that very reason, and placed on a “do not sell”

list. Yet the hotel rented the room to Parker anyway. Although

Parker may not have presented evidence that the glass door

explosions had previously resulted in injury, at this stage she

need only show that injury was reasonably foreseeable. See

Barton, 757 N.E.2d at 556–57 (noting that in assessing substantially similar occurrences, the relevant test is not injuries

actually suffered but injuries reasonably foreseeable from such

incidents). Injury is more than reasonably foreseeable when a

hotel installs in a shower area a glass door that is prone to

exploding in regular use. 

Parker asserts that her case is more like Mathias v. Accor

Economy Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2003), than it is like

Stojkovich, Salazar or Loitz. In Mathias, a motel knowingly and

repeatedly rented out hotel rooms that it knew were infested

with bedbugs. Although the defendant claimed that it was

guilty of nothing more than simple negligence, we explained

that the hotel’s conduct easily fit the definition of gross

negligence and even recklessness because of the unjustifiable

failure to avoid a known risk. As we noted, rooms “that the

motel had placed on ‘Do not rent, bugs in room’ status neverCase: 16-1244 Document: 43 Filed: 01/06/2017 Pages: 16
14 No. 16-1244

theless were rented.” 347 F.3d at 675. The plaintiffs received a

room the motel had classified as “DO NOT RENT UNTIL

TREATED,” even though the room had not been treated.

Because the motel likely could not have rented any rooms at

the prices charged if the guests had been informed that the risk

of being bitten by bedbugs was appreciable, we concluded that

the failure to either warn the guests or to take effective

measures to control the bedbugs amounted to fraud and

probably battery as well. 347 F.3d at 675. The conduct therefore

met the standard for wilful and wanton conduct under Illinois

law, allowing a claim for punitive damages to proceed.

Parker’s case falls somewhere between Mathias on the one

hand and Stojkovich, Salazar or Loitz on the other. In both

Stojkovich and Loitz, the defendants investigated the problem

and believed they had addressed any danger. In Loitz, a case

involving a product the court characterized as inherently

dangerous, Remington could not control user errors in overloading shells and the company had investigated the problem

in good faith, finding no flaws in the construction of the

shotgun. See also Barton, 757 N.E.2d at 555–56 (distinguishing

Loitz from a case involving a passenger injured when

deboarding a commuter train because Loitz involved an

inherently dangerous product or situation and deboarding a

train stopped at a station is not inherently dangerous). In

Stojkovich, the elevator repair company thought that it had

fixed the problem each time the elevator had stalled, and no

one placed the elevator back in service knowing or even

suspecting that the true problem had not been fixed. In Salazar,

the property owner could not foresee the criminal acts of a

third party when such an act had never occurred on the

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No. 16-1244 15

property. But in Parker’s case, a factfinder could infer that the

hotel, like the motel in Mathias, was aware that there was a

problem that could cause injuries, that the problem had not yet

been fixed, and that the room had been removed from service

because of the problem. And yet, as previously noted, the hotel

rented the room to Parker. A fact-finder could conclude that

this was a “failure, after knowledge of impending danger, to

exercise ordinary care to prevent it.” Salazar, 767 N.E.2d at 371. 

Four Seasons vigorously disagrees with Parker’s characterization of the facts. The hotel has evidence that, if credited by

the fact-finder, counters those inferences. Four Seasons may

have thought it repaired the problem. Parker’s room could

have been pulled from service for some other reason, and

Parker’s sister may not be a credible witness when weighed

against the building engineer, Gartin, who may have a different recollection. These are issues for a fact-finder to decide.

Barton, 757 N.E.2d at 555 (whether punitive damages can be

awarded for a particular cause of action is a matter of law, but

the question of whether a defendant’s conduct was sufficiently

wilful and wanton to justify imposing punitive damages is

generally for the jury to decide). On summary judgment, we

conclude that Parker has the right to present her punitive

damages claim to the jury. We therefore remand the case for

further proceedings on the question of punitive damages.

We must briefly address a few other issues. Parker contends that the district court abused its discretion when it

allowed her attorney to withdraw prior to trial. We review for

abuse of discretion a district court’s decision to grant a motion

to withdraw in a civil case. Stafford v. Mesnik, 63 F.3d 1445, 1448

(7th Cir. 1995). “The attorney seeking to withdraw must

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16 No. 16-1244

establish that his client consents or that a valid and compelling

reason exists for the court to grant the motion over an objection.” Stafford, 63 F.3d at 1448 (citing Woodall v. Drake Hotel,

Inc., 913 F.2d 447, 449 (7th Cir. 1990)). The court was well

within its discretion to allow the attorney to withdraw where

he had reached an impasse with Parker in how to proceed with

the case. Washington v. Sherwin Real Estate, Inc., 694 F.2d 1081,

1087–88 (7th Cir. 1982) (finding no abuse of discretion in

allowing attorney to withdraw in civil matter where client

refused to accept attorney’s advice and attorney no longer felt

able to adequately represent client’s interests). Moreover,

Parker suffered no prejudice from her attorney’s withdrawal.

After the court allowed Parker’s lawyer to withdraw, more

than eleven months passed before the trial began, allowing

Parker ample time to either prepare for trial herself or to

replace her lawyer. And as the trial and the appeal have

demonstrated, Parker proved to be a very capable advocate.

That said, Parker, having raised one meritorious issue on

appeal, also makes a number of poorly founded arguments in

her brief. To the extent that we do not address a particular

issue raised in the briefs, it is because we have concluded that

the issue does not merit discussion. 

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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