Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02806/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02806-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alderwoods Group, Inc.
Defendant
Batesville Casket Company
Defendant
Hillenbrand Industries, Inc.
Defendant
Pioneer Valley Casket Co., Inc.
Plaintiff
Service Corporation International
Defendant
Stewart Enterprises, Inc.
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IN RE FUNERAL CONSUMERS

Antitrust Litigation.

 /

No. C 05-01804 WHA

Consolidated cases:

No. C 05-02501 WHA

No. C 05-02502 WHA

No. C 05-02792 WHA

No. C 05-03124 WHA

No. C 05-03305 WHA

Related case: 

No. C 05-02806 WHA

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO TRANSFER

INTRODUCTION

In these antitrust cases, defendants jointly have moved under 28 U.S.C. 1404(a) to

transfer venue to the Southern District of Texas. Defendants have carried their burden of

proving that the convenience of parties and witnesses, and the interest of justice, would clearly

and substantially be improved by such a transfer. The motion is therefore GRANTED.

STATEMENT

The complaint in the first of these cases was filed May 2, 2005. Certain plaintiffs, a

consumers group and individual consumers, purchased caskets and other funeral-industry

products and services. Another plaintiff, Pioneer Valley Casket Co, Inc., is an independent, lowcost casket seller. Defendants are funeral-home chains, a casket manufacturer and its parent

company. Plaintiffs accuse defendants of violating Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15
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U.S.C. 1–2, and the California Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200–210. 

The consumers group, Funeral Consumers Alliance, Inc., and the individual consumers, sue on

behalf of a putative nationwide class of consumers who bought Batesville caskets from the

funeral-home co-defendants, Service Corporation International (SCI), Alderwoods Group, Inc.,

and Stewart Enterprises, Inc. Pioneer Valley sues on behalf of a putative nationwide class of

independent casket retailers. Specifically, plaintiffs claim defendants 

• conspired through a group boycott to prevent independent casket

retailers from selling caskets marketed under the Batesville brand

and others, 

• engaged in a campaign of disparagement against independent casket

retailers and their wares, and 

• jointly worked to restrict casket price competition and to coordinate

casket pricing by restricting or preventing price advertising, sharing

price information and promoting “sham” discounting. 

On August 2, 2005, defendants jointly moved under 28 U.S.C. 1404(a) to transfer these

cases (collectively, “In re Funeral Consumers Antitrust Litigation”) to the Southern District of

Texas. This motion applies to the following of cases, described here by plaintiff name and case

number: FCA (No. C 05-01804 WHA), Rocha (No. C 05-02501 WHA), Berger, (No. C 05-

02502 WHA), Magsarili (No. C 05-02792 WHA), and Pioneer Valley (No. C 05-02806 WHA). 

ANALYSIS

1. VENUE TRANSFER RULES.

“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court

may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.” 

28 U.S.C. 1404(a). The section’s purpose is “to prevent the waste of time, energy and money

and to protect litigants, witnesses and the public against unnecessary inconvenience and

expense.” Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616 (1964) (internal quotation marks omitted).

A district court has discretion “to adjudicate motions for transfer according to an individualized,
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case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness.” Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487

U.S. 22, 29 (1988) (citation omitted). A court must “balance the preference accorded plaintiff’s

choice of forum with the burden of litigating in an inconvenient forum.” Decker Coal Co. v.

Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 F.2d 834, 843 (9th Cir.1986).

In weighing each case, a court also should consider:

(1) the relative ease of access to sources of proof, (2)

availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling

witnesses, (3) the cost of obtaining attendance of willing

witnesses, (4) the possibility of view of premises, if appropriate

to the action, (5) all other issues related to making a trial easy,

expeditious and inexpensive, (6) the relative congestion of the

two courts, (7) the local interest in having localized

controversies decided at home, (8) the interest in having the

trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home with the law

that must govern the action, (9) avoidance of unnecessary

problems in conflict of laws, or in the application of foreign

law, and (10) the unfairness of burdening citizens in an

unrelated forum with jury duty, (11) the location where

relevant agreements were negotiated and executed, (12) the

respective parties’ contacts with the forums, (13) contacts

relating to the plaintiff’s causes of action in the chosen forum,

and (14) the differences in the costs of litigation in the two

forums.

Ibid.; Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495, 498–99 (9th Cir. 2000). 

2. ACTION COULD HAVE BEEN BROUGHT IN THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS.

There is no dispute that plaintiffs could have brought this action either here or in the

Southern District of Texas. The unfair competition claim could have been brought in any court

of competent jurisdiction, although this does not mean the California law reaches extra-territorial

conduct. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17203. Antitrust venue may be laid in any district in

which a corporate defendant “may be found or transacts business.” 15 U.S.C. 22. That means

that large corporations are subject to suit in virtually every corner of the country, given their

commonly wide scope of operations these days. Such breadth of operations provokes motions

such as the present one to transfer venue under 28 U.S.C. 1404(a). 

The Court finds that venue would have been proper in the United States District Court for

the Southern District of Texas. It would have had jurisdiction over the federal antitrust actions
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under 28 U.S.C. 1331 and supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claim under 28 U.S.C.

1367. 

3. BALANCING THE FACTORS: AN OVERVIEW. 

No plaintiff resides in this district. Only one of the dozen or so plaintiffs even resides in

California. Most reside on the East Coast. All of defendants’ principal places of businesses are

in Houston or points east. No operative fact is alleged to have occurred in this district. On the

other hand, defendant funeral home companies operate 44 funeral homes in this district and

228 in California (as well as many others nationwide). The Rule 26(a) disclosures reveal some

witnesses in California. Most, however, reside in Texas or on the other side of the

Mississippi River. No district claims a majority of all witnesses, but the Southern District of

Texas claims more than any other district. 

Section 1404(a) calls out three factors to guide a transfer motion: (i) the convenience of

parties, (ii) the convenience of witnesses and (iii) the interest of justice. In volumes, the caselaw

has illuminated the meaning of these three factors. This order will concentrate on the caselaw

most pertinent to the record at hand. 

Under Section 1404(a), a plaintiff’s choice of venue is entitled to substantial weight,

although this is often said to be less controlling in a purported nationwide class actions, as here. 

Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730, 739 (9th Cir. 1987). At all events, movants must make a clear-cut

showing. The issue is not merely whether some other district would better serve the parties and

witnesses. The burden is on the moving parties to show that the Section 1404(a) factors would

clearly be better served by a transfer. 

4. PARTY CONVENIENCE. 

We may not use a transfer simply to shift the burden of venue from one side to the other. 

Here, however, no plaintiff resides in this district and only one resides in California. The clear

center of gravity of the residences of all plaintiffs is well east of the Mississippi River. 

Houston is the principal place of business of the largest of defendant funeral-home

company, SCI, and is in the Southern District of Texas. Another defendant funeral-home

company is Stewart, headquartered in New Orleans. In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, it has
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 Plaintiff Funeral Consumers Alliance, Inc., is located in Vermont (and incorporated in Pennsylvania). 

While it has many members in California, it has a nationwide membership (Compl. ¶ 12). The members,

however, are not parties. Their convenience does not matter. The leadership and executive officers of the

association are in Vermont and will benefit, cost-wise, by a transfer to Texas. 

5

temporarily moved its headquarters to Irving, Texas. Alderwoods is the third defendant

funeral-home company. It is headquartered in Cincinnati. All three own and operate outlets in

this district. Given their nationwide scope, their connections to this district are similar to their

connections to districts elsewhere in America. Their executive offices and the representatives

supervising the defense, however, are in the cities stated — Houston, New Orleans and

Cincinnati. 

The three funeral-home chains are alleged to have entered into a horizontal conspiracy to

stamp out independents who seek to sell low-priced caskets to bereaved families. Plaintiffs

claim this forced consumers to pay exorbitant prices for caskets. The three allegedly pressured a

prominent manufacturer, defendant Batesville Casket Company, to refuse to do business with the

independents, thus cutting off the independents from a source of quality product. Batesville has

its headquarters in Batesville, Indiana. The last defendant is Batesville’s parent, Hillenbrand

Industries, Inc., also located in Batesville. 

How will the situs of this case affect the burden on the parties? In addition to litigation

counsel, corporate representatives can be reasonably expected to attend various hearings and the

trial. Given the complexity and scope of the case, more hearings can be expected than in the

usual case, not counting mere discovery conferences with the judge that may be manageable by

telephone. The trial can surely be expected to last longer than the usual case. All of this means

that more days will be spent in court by the parties themselves than in the usual case. 

A transfer to the Southern District of Texas will drastically reduce the burden on the

largest funeral-home defendant, SCI. And, it will significantly reduce the burden on the other

defendants as well. The travel times from their locations to the Southern District are all

markedly less than the travel times to San Francisco, as the record demonstrates in detail. The

same is true for almost all of the plaintiffs. The Southern District seems to present a clear

advantage over San Francisco.1

 
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For the Northern District of California

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 This order agrees with plaintiffs that the availability of modern imaging and copying methods greatly

reduces the importance of the location of documents. 

3

 In light of Decker Coal and the language of the statute itself, this order rejects the notion that

inconvenience to party witnesses must be ignored or discounted. See Decker Coal, 805 F.2d at 843. 

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Although a few decisions have given weight to the location of counsel, most have not,

saying that it is not to be considered at all or to be given very little weight. Charles Alan Wright,

Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 3850 (2d ed. 1986). 

One reason is that it would be easy to manipulate venue simply by obtaining counsel in the

venue of choice. Be that as it may, it is worthwhile to note that the largest team of plaintiffs’

counsel in this action is based in New York. Even for plaintiffs’ counsel, therefore, the burden

would be diminished by a transfer to the Southern District of Texas.2

 

5. WITNESS CONVENIENCE.

In assessing a Section 1404(a) transfer motion, the matter of trial witnesses subdivides

into two parts: the willing and the unwilling. Willing witnesses are those who can be expected

to appear at trial voluntarily, meaning without the necessity of a subpoena. The unwilling are

those who can be expected to testify live at trial only if they are within subpoena range of the

courthouse. 

As for the willing, the convenience-of-witnesses factor looms large. These individuals

must take time out of their work and private time to travel to and from the place of trial, to live

away from home and to wait around windowless corridors on call to testify. Back home, they

have children to get to school, elderly parents to care for, jobs to do and lives to lead — all of

which must be managed somehow or put on hold. Although lawyers tend to underestimate this

burden, it is genuine, all the more so in a distant city. Even where a witness is an employee of a

party and will be paid, the disruption is still a hard fact. The expenses of transportation, housing

and meals, even if borne by a party, are nonetheless authentic outlays. See, e.g., Decker Coal,

805 F.2d at 843. Among other things, Section 1404(a) prefers a venue where the burden on

witnesses will be clearly reduced. Belzberg, 834 F.2d at 739.3

In order to better appreciate the comparative witness burdens associated with the

two districts in question, the Court requested post-hearing supplemental information to include
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all Rule 26(a) disclosures of potential witnesses, among other things. This was invited so that

the prospective witnesses, as disclosed by counsel themselves, could be, in effect, imagined on a

map of the United States. These were submitted and reviewed by the Court. 

The Rule 26(a) disclosures identified a large number of witnesses. Plaintiffs identified

69 individuals and organizations likely to have discoverable information that plaintiffs might use

to support their claims. One is a resident of this district. A half-dozen live in other parts of

California. The overwhelming majority are in Texas or east of the Mississippi River, including

present and former employees of defendants. Plaintiffs also listed every state funeral-directors

association. Plaintiffs also listed 161 casket retailers throughout the country, six of which are

located in this district. Defendants listed 209 individuals throughout the United States, of which

one resides in this district and 49 reside in Houston. Overall, the vast majority reside east of the

Mississippi River. 

We all know that the final trial witnesses will be a much smaller subset. In a Sherman

Act case, the key liability witnesses (on both sides) are usually present and former officers and

employees of the accused. This is because they were the ones at various meetings alleged to be

conspiratorial or with pricing and marketing responsibilities. When a nationwide antitrust

conspiracy is alleged, the key witnesses usually work (or worked) at a national office or a

regional office rather than a local retail outlet. Therefore, the final trial witnesses (on liability)

are very likely to be drawn in this case from Houston and east of the Mississippi River, as

plaintiffs’ own Rule 26 disclosures bear out. The damages witnesses will likely be plaintiffs

themselves (and retained experts as yet unknown). 

Plaintiffs now showcase four California-based witnesses. One is the editor of the

Funeral Monitor, an industry newspaper published in Monterey. The complaint (¶¶ 63, 68,

75–76) quotes from four or so articles therein. It is hard to see, however, how newspaper articles

will be admissible at trial. The same is true as to any information possessed by the editor. It will

be largely hearsay. As for Mark Blankenship, the record does not show that he resides in

California. He may work for a chain with an outlet in Susanville, California, but his residence is
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 In fact, plaintiffs’ Rule 26 disclosures show his address as “in care of” a funeral chapel in Carson

City, Nevada. 

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 For this reason, this order rejects the argument by plaintiffs that defendants could save money by

presenting their defense at trial via depositions. 

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not shown to be in the state.4 On the other hand, plaintiffs may well be entitled to call the

spokesperson for the California Funeral Directors Association who made the disparaging

comment (Compl. ¶ 80). For that California witness to appear in Texas will be more

burdensome. The same is true for the president of the association. Against the larger picture of

the far greater number of witnesses in Texas, as shown by the Rule 26 disclosures, the California

witnesses shrink into insignificance. 

6. THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE.

Unwilling witnesses present more of an “interest of justice” problem than a “convenience

of witnesses” problem. In the conduct of the trial itself, any jury would prefer to see and hear

important witnesses in person. In this way, the jury can better assess demeanor and credibility. 

And, live testimony is easier to follow and comprehend than deposition read-ins or video clips. 

The difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that depositions are often taken before certain fact issues

gather importance. They may, therefore, not fully address points decisive to the jury. Live

testimony, therefore, always is to be preferred over deposition excerpts.5

 A problem arises when

witnesses are beyond trial subpoena range and they can only be compelled to attend via

depositions. 

To be sure, a corporate defendant can be expected to arrange for some present and past

employees to testify live and voluntarily but only if their testimony will be favorable on balance

to the defense. Those with testimony favorable to the other side are often unwilling to appear

except by deposition unless, of course, they are within subpoena range of the trial court. It

would be better to try a case where any such unwilling but important witnesses could be

compelled to appear in person. Plaintiffs’ counsel may be prepared to proceed via deposition but

we should not force a jury to suffer through it where there is a good alternative. 
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At this stage, it is impossible to predict exactly who the unwilling witnesses will be. 

Experience tells us, however, that they are likely to be present and former employees of

defendants. If they have information favorable to the other side, such individuals are usually

reluctant to testify against their former and present colleagues unless compelled to do so. So

while we do not yet know who precisely will fall into this category, it is reasonably certain that

such witnesses will emerge. Houston has the largest single concentration of such potential

witnesses. Those witnesses will be subject to trial subpoenas only in the Southern District of

Texas. 

In terms of “local interest,” i.e., the connection of the respective districts to the subject of

the action, the Southern District of Texas has a larger stake. Both districts, of course, have

funeral homes operated by the alleged wrongdoers. Both districts have alleged victims

(bereaved families and independent casket retailers) in the putative classes. What distinguishes

them is that the largest of the defendant funeral-home chains is based in Houston, not San

Francisco. That alone is a substantial connection. Moreover, conspiratorial events, if there were

any, were likely to have occurred in Houston. None would have likely occurred in this district

(and none is alleged to have occurred here). 

Turning to another interest-of-justice consideration, plaintiffs argue that our district has

less work than the Southern District of Texas and therefore this case could go to trial sooner here

than there. The statistics submitted do not bear out this claim. In terms of “weighted” filings per

judge, our district shows a heavier caseload per judge over the six-year period of data supplied

by plaintiffs’ counsel although, for 2003–04 and 2004–05, the Southern District had a slightly

heavier load. The median time to trial for civil cases is faster in the Southern District than here. 

It is true that we have fewer criminal actions here but the majority of the criminal docket in the

Southern District, especially in the divisions other than in the Houston division, are § 1326

illegal immigration cases, which almost always plead out without much burden on the judge. 

Overall, it is unfair to claim that the Southern District is not equipped to handle this large civil

action as expeditiously as it could be handled here. In this regard, it should be added that

counsel on both sides, at the initial case management conference, requested trial dates of
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November 2007 (plaintiffs’ choice) and January 2008 (defendants’ choice), both very far into the

future. This Court required an earlier date in December 2006. The point is that neither side

seemed to be in a hurry to go to trial; it is somewhat insincere not to express regret over a

possibly longer timetable. 

The basis for subject-matter jurisdiction is the federal antitrust law. Under the Court’s

supplemental jurisdiction, however, plaintiffs have alleged a claim under Section 17200 of

California’s Unfair Competition Law, at least on behalf of the general public in California. It is

probably true that judges in this district will be better able to handle this state-law claim than

judges in the transferee district. But the tail should not wag the dog. This is first and foremost a

purported nationwide antitrust class action under the Sherman Act. The caselaw favoring the

district “at home” on the controlling law has arisen in the diversity context, not the

federal-question context. Decker Coal, 805 F.2d at 843. If the main federal event is clearly

better served in the Southern District of Texas than in San Francisco, the pendency of a

supplemental state-law claim should not override the indicated result. Moreover, the

submissions indicate that federal judges in Texas are familiar with the Texas analogue to

California Section 17200. Finally, Pioneer Valley has alleged Texas as well as California statelaw antitrust and unfair-competition claims. In any case, this state-law question is a very small

factor in the overall balance. 

* * *

In summary, the clear balance of the statutory factors favors transfer. The chief

consideration the other way is plaintiffs’ choice of forum. Although that choice is normally

given substantial weight, the Ninth Circuit has qualified that rule: 

If the operative facts have not occurred within the forum of

original selection and that forum has no particular interest in the

parties or the subject matter, the plaintiff’s choice is entitled only

to minimal consideration. 

Pacific Car and Foundry Co. v. Pence, 403 F.2d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 1968). That this is brought

as a nationwide class action further dilutes the deference due plaintiffs’ choice. Belzberg, 834

F.2d at 739. Plaintiffs also argue that 15 U.S.C. 22, the law granting them a wide choice of

venue in antitrust actions, entitles their choice to special deference upon a motion for transfer. 
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This is not the law. Courts may transfer cases under Section 1404(a) even though they are filed

pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 22. United States v. Nat’l City Lines, 337 U.S. 78, 84 (1949). 

Furthermore, the questions of proper venue and transfer of venue have a different relationship in

the instant case than plaintiffs suggest. Cf. Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 60 (1949) (holding, in

the context of a similar venue statute, 45 U.S.C. 56, that the venue statute and Section 1404(a)

“deal with two separate and distinct problems.”). Title 15 U.S.C. 22 makes venue here in this

case proper. Whether to transfer it under Section 1404(a) is, however, another matter. In this

case, movants have carried their burden. 

* * *

After the record was closed on this motion and as this order was being finalized, the

Court received a further declaration from counsel for plaintiffs. It stated that, in about ten days,

counsel would be adding a further-named plaintiff resident in this district. The record shows that

the day after the hearing of this motion, plaintiffs’ counsel sent out a solicitation letter. The

letter was sent to families who had purchased caskets from funeral homes in the district. 

Counsel’s letter invited them to join the suit as named plaintiffs, advising that “We are seeking a

few more individuals to serve as class representatives.” The letter added, “Being a class

representative takes very little time, will cost you nothing, and may entitle you to compensation

over and above any overcharge you paid for a casket.” Evidently, someone from San Jose has

answered the call. 

The Court has carefully considered whether this potential development would change

the outcome on this motion. The answer is no. First, we will take counsel at his word in his

solicitation letter that “being a class representative takes very little time.” If so, the

inconvenience to the solicited potential new party will be minimal no matter where venue is laid. 

Second, even adding a new plaintiff to the dozen already on board would not significantly shift

the geographic center of gravity of all plaintiffs. Third, the solicitation of a new party after the

fact to shore up local contacts for purposes of a pending § 1404 issue smacks of forum-shopping. 

The caselaw holds that if “there is any indication that plaintiff’s choice of forum is the result of

forum shopping, plaintiff’s choice will be accorded little deference.” Williams v. Bowman, 157
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F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1106 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (Walker, J.); Italian Colors Restaurant v. American

Express Co., No. C 03-3719 SI, 2003 WL 22682482 at *3–5 (Nov. 10, 2003 N.D. Cal.) (Illston,

J.). Fourth, as stated, plaintiffs’ choice of forum is accorded less weight where the action is

brought, as here, as a class action, all the more so when it is brought as a nationwide class action. 

Belzberg, 843 F.2d at 739.

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, the motion to transfer is GRANTED in the following cases:

FCA (No. C 05-01804 WHA), Rocha (No. C 05-02501 WHA), Berger, (No. C 05-02502 WHA),

Magsarili (No. C 05-02792 WHA), and Pioneer Valley (No. C 05-02806 WHA). The Clerk

shall transfer the files to the Clerk for the Southern District of Texas. Meanwhile, the amended

complaint and follow-on motions to dismiss should be served on the timetable previously set. 

When the cases arrive in the Southern District of Texas, the pleadings and motions should be

filed with the court. This will avoid any interruption in the prosecution of the cases, all of this,

of course, being wholly subject to whatever new schedule will be set by the transferee court. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 23, 2005. WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE