Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-07-01015/USCOURTS-ca8-07-01015-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ford Motor Company
Appellee
Jennifer Menz
Appellant
Steven A. Menz
Appellant
New Holland North America
Appellee
Westendorf Manufacturing Co.
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Jean C. Hamilton, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 07-1015

___________

Steven A. Menz; Jennifer Menz, *

*

Appellants, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Missouri.

New Holland North America, Inc.; *

Ford Motor Company; Westendorf *

Manufacturing Co., Inc., *

*

Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: June 14, 2007

Filed: November 14, 2007

___________

Before BYE, RILEY, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

RILEY, Circuit Judge.

Steven Menz (Menz) and Jennifer Menz (Mrs. Menz) appeal the district court’s1

grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants New Holland North America, Inc.

(New Holland), Ford Motor Company (Ford), and Westendorf Manufacturing Co.,

Inc. (Westendorf). We affirm.

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This “washout” had resulted from an earlier intentional cutting of the levee to

drain the pond. Menz testified the washout was twelve to eighteen inches deep and

was wide enough for his tractor to fit in while upside down. 

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I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

This products liability case arises from a tractor roll-over accident that occurred

on October 3, 2002. On that day, Menz was moving dirt using his 1976 Ford model

6600 tractor (tractor), which was equipped with a front-end loader (loader)

manufactured by Westendorf. Menz planned to use the tractor and loader to move dirt

at the bottom of a levee near a pond adjacent to Menz’s Missouri farm to decrease the

slope of the terrain.

Menz began dumping his first load of dirt while driving at the bottom of and

parallel to the levee, on a slight incline sloping downward toward a “washout.”2

 To

the left of Menz’s path was the washout. To Menz’s right was the uphill side of the

levee. The loader was three-fourths full to completely full of dirt. Before Menz began

raising the loader bucket, it was about one or two feet off the ground. When Menz

was approximately ten feet from the spot where he intended to unload the dirt, he

began raising the loader bucket further off the ground. As Menz approached the

unloading spot and raised the loader bucket, the tractor’s left front tire skidded into

the washout. The tractor then rolled over onto its left side. Menz tried to jump out of

the way but failed; ultimately, Menz was pinned by the tractor face down in the dirt.

Menz suffered several injuries, including the amputation of his left arm. 

Menz purchased the tractor from a previous owner in about 1992, and acquired

the loader in approximately 1994 or 1996. Menz estimated he had used the tractor

with its attached loader for “hundreds of hours.” In the years before the accident,

Menz had not experienced any problems with the tractor or loader, and the tractor had

not previously leaned or tipped over while in use. Menz’s tractor was not equipped

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New Holland owns certain assets of Ford’s tractor division. 

4

After the accident, Menz repaired the tractor by replacing the back fenders,

seat, steering wheel, muffler, and top hood assembly. He sold the loader to another

individual, who subsequently sold the loader to someone else. Sometime following

the accident, Menz had the pond and the cut in the levee refilled. In the summer and

fall of 2003, Menz regraded the slope of the levee where the accident occurred. 

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with a roll-over protection system (ROPS), a device capable of being installed on a

tractor to aid the operator in the event of a roll-over.

B. Procedural Background

Menz and Mrs. Menz (collectively, the plaintiffs) filed suit against New

Holland,3

 Ford, and Westendorf (collectively, the defendants), asserting product

liability claims under strict liability and negligence theories as well as a claim for loss

of consortium. Ford filed a motion for sanctions, seeking to have the case dismissed

due to spoliation of evidence.4

 The district court granted the motion and dismissed the

plaintiffs’ case with prejudice, finding: (1) Menz spoliated evidence by making postaccident repairs to the tractor, selling the loader, and completing the levee work; and

(2) such spoliation prejudiced the defendants. On appeal, we reversed and remanded

for a determination by the district court on whether Menz acted in bad faith. Menz v.

New Holland N. Am., Inc., 440 F.3d 1002, 1007 (8th Cir. 2006). 

On remand, rather than pursuing the issue of bad faith, the defendants moved

for summary judgment and also moved to exclude the opinions of the plaintiffs’

liability expert, J.D. Ryan (Ryan), under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and under

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The district

court granted summary judgment in the defendants’ favor on all claims, and granted

in part the defendants’ motion to exclude Ryan’s expert opinion. See Menz v. New

Holland N. Am., Inc. (New Holland), 460 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (E.D. Mo. 2006) (granting

New Holland’s and Ford’s motion for summary judgment); Menz v. New Holland N.

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Am., Inc. (Westendorf), 460 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (E.D. Mo. 2006) (granting

Westendorf’s motion for summary judgment). 

The plaintiffs appeal, challenging the dismissal of their: (1) strict liability

failure to warn claims against the defendants, (2) strict liability claim for design defect

against New Holland and Ford, (3) negligence claims against the defendants, and

(4) loss of consortium claim against the defendants.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

We review de novo a district court’s order granting summary judgment. See

Ehlis v. Shire Richwood, Inc., 367 F.3d 1013, 1015 (8th Cir. 2004). Summary

judgment is proper if, after viewing all the evidence and drawing all reasonable

inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, no genuine issue of

material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Libel v. Adventure Lands of Am., Inc., 482 F.3d 1028, 1033

(8th Cir. 2007). “Mere allegations, unsupported by specific facts or evidence beyond

the nonmoving party’s own conclusions, are insufficient to withstand a motion for

summary judgment.” Thomas v. Corwin, 483 F.3d 516, 527 (8th Cir. 2007). We may

affirm a district court’s grant of summary judgment on any basis supported by the

record. See Tenge v. Phillips Modern Ag. Co., 446 F.3d 903, 906 (8th Cir. 2006).

Missouri substantive law governs in this diversity action. See Pro Serv. Auto., L.L.C.

v. Lenan Corp., 469 F.3d 1210, 1213 (8th Cir. 2006).

B. Strict Liability Failure to Warn Claim Against New Holland and

Ford

Menz first argues the district court erred in granting summary judgment to New

Holland and Ford on Menz’s strict liability failure to warn claim. To prove causation

in a failure to warn case, Menz must demonstrate (1) his injuries were caused by a

product for which there was no warning, and (2) a warning would have altered his

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behavior. See Arnold v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 834 S.W.2d 192, 194 (Mo. banc 1992).

Summary judgment is proper if either element is not satisfied. See Mothershead v.

Greenbriar Country Club, Inc., 994 S.W.2d 80, 89 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999). The district

court found Menz failed to satisfy the second causation element because Menz’s

expert witness Ryan testified “there were no warnings [New Holland and Ford] could

have given Menz that would have altered his conduct at the time of the accident.”

New Holland, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 1066. During Ryan’s deposition, he testified:

Q: Is there information that you believe Steve Menz lacked that

would have changed the outcome of this accident?

A: No . . . .

Q: So, there isn’t any information that you think [Menz] needed to be

warned about– 

A: No.

Q: –that would have changed the outcome.

A: No. . . . You can’t do safety with warnings. It’s Number 3 or

Number 4, depending on the standard. So forget warnings. Fix

it.

On appeal, Menz argues the district court erroneously determined (1) Missouri

law requires expert testimony to prove causation for his failure to warn claim, (2) Menz

was not entitled to a presumption that he would have heeded a warning because he had

knowledge of the tractor’s specific dangers, and (3) Menz could not contradict his

expert witness’s testimony by submitting his own affidavit regarding the effect of a

warning. 

Missouri law does not necessarily require expert testimony in a strict products

liability case. See Pro. Serv. Auto., 469 F.3d at 1214 (citing Tune v. Synergy Gas

Corp., 883 S.W.2d 10, 14 (Mo. banc 1994)). Such testimony is necessary, however,

“where the lay jury [does] not possess the experience or knowledge of the subject

matter sufficient to enable them to reach an intelligent opinion without help.” Id.

(internal quotation omitted); see, e.g., Housman v. Fiddyment, 421 S.W.2d 284, 289

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(Mo. banc 1967) (“When jurors, for want of experience or knowledge of the subject

under inquiry, are incapable of reaching an intelligent opinion without outside aid[,]

the courts out of necessity admit the testimony of experts in the field.”). Because the

determination of whether expert testimony is necessary rests in the first instance in the

trial court’s sound discretion, we review that decision for abuse of discretion. See

Housman, 421 S.W.2d at 289.

The necessity of expert testimony in a failure to warn case turns on the

complexity of the subject matter. See Bryant v. Laiko Int’l Co., No. 1:05CV00161,

2006 WL 2788520, at *10 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 26, 2006) (recognizing “Missouri courts

have always allowed, and often required expert testimony” on the question of failure

to warn). Here, Menz’s strict liability claim alleges the defendants failed to warn him

of the tractor’s inherent instability and propensity to turn over on relatively level

ground, and of the added danger of using a loader. Menz argues “[r]esolution of these

issues does not require analysis of any complex machinery.” We disagree. Contrary

to Menz’s assertion, the products at issue in this case are fairly technical and complex,

and are not the type of machinery commonly utilized by the typical lay juror. See Pro.

Serv. Auto., 469 F.3d at 1214 (requiring expert testimony on causation for the

plaintiff’s strict products liability claim given the complexities involved in the

operation of the equipment at issue). The district court did not abuse its discretion in

concluding a lay jury would lack the experience and knowledge necessary to determine

causation on Menz’s warnings claim without the aid of expert testimony. Cf. Cole v.

Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 967 S.W.2d 176, 185 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (holding the

trial court did not abuse its discretion in failure to warn case by admitting testimony

of the plaintiff’s expert witness, and noting “[w]arnings and how people react to

warnings are arguably subjects about which persons having no particular training are

incapable of forming accurate opinions”). As noted previously, Menz’s expert, Ryan,

testified unequivocally there was no information or warning the defendants could have

given Menz that would have altered Menz’s conduct at the time of the accident. Thus,

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Menz testified during his deposition that after filling the loader bucket with dirt

and while driving to the spot where Menz intended to unload the dirt, the loader was

about one or two feet above the ground. Despite being warned to keep the loader

bucket low to the ground, as he neared his intended unloading spot, Menz began

raising the loader bucket higher off the ground. 

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summary judgment in New Holland’s and Ford’s favor is proper on Menz’s strict

liability failure to warn claim.

In reaching this conclusion, we note that even if expert testimony were not

required, Menz failed to provide any other evidence demonstrating a warning would

have altered his behavior. Although Missouri law recognizes a rebuttable presumption

that a warning will be heeded, this presumption arises only when there is sufficient

evidence from which a jury could find the plaintiff did not already know of the specific

danger involved. See Arnold, 834 S.W.2d at 194. Menz fails to meet his burden to

demonstrate that lack of knowledge. See id. At the time of the accident, Menz had

been operating tractors for nearly thirty years, and he had been using this particular

tractor for approximately ten years before the accident. During his deposition, Menz

conceded he (1) was “aware that any tractor will tip over if it’s driven across a steep

enough hillside”; (2) knew from “common sense” he should not drive his tractor any

higher on the levee while carrying something in the loader, due to the risk of roll-over;

(3) had developed a “general appreciation” commencing sometime between ages 12

and 20 that “the steeper the incline[,] the more you should avoid it and the more

caution you should exercise”; and (4) was instructed before the accident to keep the

tractor’s loader bucket low to the ground when hauling dirt to avoid getting into

trouble.5

Menz attacks the significance and relevancy of these admissions, arguing that

at the time of the accident he was operating the tractor on “relatively level ground” and

was unaware the tractor could turn over on a slight slope. However, Menz’s repeated

attempts to characterize the plane on which he was driving as “relatively level ground”

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Menz’s affidavit stated he (1) had no idea his tractor was inherently unstable

and had a propensity to roll over, (2) was unaware this propensity to roll over would

be increased by using a front-end loader, and (3) would not have used the tractorloader combination to perform the regrading work had he known of these factors.

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is incongruous with his deposition testimony, during which Menz stated that

immediately before the accident, he had been driving on a “slight downward incline”

or “slightly sloped ground,” and his tractor was not on perfectly level ground and was

tilting downward to its left toward the washout. For these reasons, Menz is not entitled

to a presumption that a warning would have been heeded and would have altered his

behavior.

Finally, we reject Menz’s attempt to contradict Ryan’s testimony by submitting

his own affidavit regarding Menz’s knowledge at the time of the accident and the effect

of a warning.6

 It is well settled under Missouri law “that a party is bound by the

uncontradicted testimony of his own witness.” Silberstein v. Berwald, 460 S.W.2d

707, 710 (Mo. 1970); see, e.g., Erdman v. Condaire, Inc., 97 S.W.3d 85, 88 (Mo. Ct.

App. 2002). Even if Menz were not bound by Ryan’s testimony, Menz cannot create

a genuine issue of material fact by attempting to contradict his own previous testimony.

See, e.g., Camfield Tires, Inc. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 719 F.2d 1361, 1365-66 (8th Cir.

1983). Although Menz’s affidavit alleged he would not have used the tractor-loader

combination had he known of the dangers involved, Menz previously testified no

particular warning or piece of information would have changed his behavior. Thus, the

district court properly refused to consider Menz’s affidavit.

Because Menz failed to show a warning would have altered his behavior, the

district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of New Holland and Ford

on Menz’s strict liability failure to warn claim.

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C. Strict Liability Failure to Warn Claim Against Westendorf

Menz’s strict liability claim against Westendorf is based solely on Westendorf’s

alleged failure to warn about the propensity of the loader to cause tractors to become

dangerously unstable and susceptible of tipping over under normal use conditions. In

granting summary judgment in Westendorf’s favor, the district court found Menz

(1) failed to present expert testimony on the causation element of his failure to warn

claim, (2) was not entitled to a presumption that he would have heeded an absent

warning, and (3) could not counter Ryan’s expert opinion by submitting his own

affidavit. Westendorf, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 1055-56, 1056 n.9-10.

For the same reasons discussed with regard to Menz’s failure to warn claim

against New Holland and Ford, we similarly affirm the grant of summary judgment on

Menz’s claim against Westendorf. First, the district court did not abuse its discretion

in requiring Menz to present expert testimony given the complexities of the product at

issue, and given a lay jury’s probable lack of the experience and knowledge necessary

to determine causation. See Pro. Serv. Auto., 469 F.3d at 1214; Cole, 967 S.W.2d at

185. Menz failed to present such evidence, because Ryan clearly testified there was

no warning that would have changed the outcome of the accident. Second, Menz is not

entitled to a presumption that he would have heeded a warning and altered his

activities. See Arnold, 834 S.W.2d at 194 (holding presumption arises only when there

is sufficient evidence from which a jury could find the plaintiff did not already know

of the specific danger involved). Finally, Menz cannot contradict his expert witness’s

opinion by submitting his own affidavit regarding Menz’s knowledge at the time of the

accident and the effect of a warning. See Silberstein, 460 S.W.2d at 710. Because

Menz failed to make a submissible case with regard to the causation element of his

failure to warn claim, summary judgment in Westendorf’s favor was proper.

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These “critical components” cited by the district court included the height of

the loader, the angle of the loader bucket, the weight of the dirt in the loader, the speed

of the tractor, the angle of the turn, the slope of the ground, the depth of the ditch, the

soil conditions, the nature of the terrain, any braking applied, and the condition of the

tractor’s wheels and hydraulics.

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D. Strict Liability Defective Design Claim Against New Holland and

Ford

Under Missouri law, to prevail in a products liability action under a theory of

defective design, Menz must demonstrate (1) the defendants sold the product in the

course of their business, (2) the product was then in a defective condition unreasonably

dangerous when put to a reasonably anticipated use, (3) the product was used in a

manner reasonably anticipated, and (4) Menz was injured as a direct result of such

defective condition as existed when the product was sold. Waggoner v. Mercedes

Benz of N. Am., Inc., 879 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994). The district court

found Menz failed to show he was injured as a direct result of a defective condition

that existed when the tractor was sold. New Holland, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 1062. The

district court excluded Ryan’s expert opinion that the accident was caused by the

tractor’s defective nature, noting Ryan was unable to verify several “critical

components of the accident.”7

 Id. at 1063 n.8. On appeal, Menz argues the district

court erred by finding Ryan’s expert testimony speculative and therefore inadmissible,

and attacks the district court’s reliance on several “critical components” as a basis for

excluding Ryan’s causation opinion.

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Rule 702 provides:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist

the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,

a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,

or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise,

if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the

testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the

witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the

case.

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Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702,8

 a qualified expert witness’s opinion is

admissible if, among other things, “it is based upon sufficient facts or data.” The

proponent of the expert testimony bears the burden to prove its admissibility. See

Lauzon v. Senco Prods., Inc., 270 F.3d 681, 686 (8th Cir. 2001). We review the

district court’s exclusion of such evidence for abuse of discretion. See Smith v.

Cangieter, 462 F.3d 920, 923 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S.

136, 142-43 (1997)). 

We find no abuse of discretion in the present case. In opining the tractor’s

defective nature caused the accident, Ryan did not believe it was necessary to

reconstruct the events preceding the accident; rather, he repeatedly testified the only

way to make the tractor safe was by installing a ROPS. Ryan failed to offer any

theory, supported by or based on sufficient facts or data, regarding how to design out

the tractor’s alleged inherent instability. Considering the deficiencies at the core of

Ryan’s opinion as well as his inability (or his apparent indifference to the need) to

reconstruct the accident scientifically, Ryan’s conclusion the tractor’s instability

caused Menz’s accident was mere speculation and conjecture. See J.B. Hunt

Transport, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 243 F.3d 441, 444 (8th Cir. 2001). As the

Supreme Court has recognized:

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[N]othing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a

district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data

only by the ipse dixit of the expert. A court may conclude that there is

simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion

proffered.

Gen. Elec. Co., 522 U.S. at 146. The district court did not abuse its discretion in

excluding Ryan’s expert opinion, leaving Menz without the requisite expert testimony

to establish causation on his defective design claim. We therefore affirm the grant of

summary judgment in favor of New Holland and Ford.

E. Negligence Claims

In Peitzmeier v. Hennessy Industries, Inc., 97 F.3d 293, 296 n.2 (8th Cir. 1996),

we recognized negligence claims “have a higher threshold of proof than strict liability

claims.” Relying on this principle and on Menz’s failure to present triable issues of

fact on any of his strict liability claims, the district court granted summary judgment

in favor of the defendants on Menz’s negligence claims. New Holland, 460 F. Supp.

2d at 1067; Westendorf, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 1057. 

Menz does not dispute the district court’s recognition of the higher threshold of

proof for negligence claims. Instead, Menz argues the district court’s dismissal of the

negligence claims are based solely on the court’s erroneous dismissal of Menz’s strict

liability claims. Menz offers no additional reasoning to support his claim of error.

Therefore, because summary judgment was proper on Menz’s strict liability claims

against the defendants, Menz’s negligence claims necessarily fail as well. 

F. Loss of Consortium

Finally, the plaintiffs agree that Mrs. Menz’s claim for loss of consortium is

wholly derivative and thus rises or falls with the success of the underlying claims of

Menz, her injured spouse. See Wright v. Barr, 62 S.W.3d 509, 537 (Mo. Ct. App.

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2001). Because summary judgment was proper on all of Menz’s claims, the loss of

consortium claim likewise must fail. 

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the judgment of the district court.

______________________________

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