Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-03424/USCOURTS-ca7-14-03424-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sylvester Purham
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 14-3424 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

SYLVESTER PURHAM, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Central District of Illinois. 

No. 3:12-cr-30019 — Sue E. Myerscough, Judge. 

____________________ 

SUBMITTED JUNE 2, 2015 — DECIDED AUGUST 5, 2015 

____________________ 

Before KANNE, ROVNER, Circuit Judges and DOW, District 

Judge.

 

 After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral 

argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and 

record. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 

 Of the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation. 

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2 No. 14-3424 

KANNE, Circuit Judge. Sylvester Purham appeals his sentence for conspiracy to distribute 280 grams or more of crack 

cocaine. He raises three challenges to his sentence. First, he 

argues that the district court exceeded the scope of our remand order when it recalculated his base offense level. Second, he argues that his prison sentence of 324 months is unreasonable. And third, he argues that the district court erred 

in imposing two special conditions of supervised release: (1) 

prohibiting him from associating with any member of any 

street gang and wearing or carrying on his person any sign, 

symbol, or paraphernalia associated with gang activity; and 

(2) requiring him to perform 20 hours of community service 

per week at the direction of the Probation Office if he is unemployed for a period of 60 days. 

I. BACKGROUND

On June 4, 2012, Purham pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute 280 grams or more of crack cocaine. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 

846. During the plea hearing, Purham agreed that “the 

weight of the drug involved in the conspiracy was 280 grams 

or more.” He further agreed that he faced a 20-year mandatory minimum sentence. After the hearing, Purham developed second thoughts. He says he learned—for the first 

time—that he could not argue a different drug-quantity 

amount at sentencing. He discussed this inability to challenge the drug amount with his attorney and the probation 

officer. He then sent multiple letters to the district court attempting to withdraw his guilty plea. The district court held 

a hearing, and then denied Purham’s request. 

The court sentenced Purham to imprisonment for 360 

months, supervised release for 10 years, and a $100 special 

assessment. Purham appealed that sentence. We affirmed in 

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No. 14-3424 3

part and reversed in part. See generally United States v. 

Purham, 754 F.3d 411 (7th Cir. 2014) (reversing the district 

court’s imposition of a sentencing enhancement and remanded for resentencing). Specifically, we held that the district court clearly erred in counting Purham’s 2008 drug 

transactions as “relevant conduct” under 

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2). Purham, 754 F.3d at 414-16 (“The 2008 

conduct was not part of the same course of conduct as the 

2010 drug conspiracy to which Purham pled guilty. ... Neither was the 2008 conduct part of a ‘common scheme or plan’ 

that included the convicted offenses.”). Because we were 

unwilling to completely shut the door on this enhancement, 

we issued guidance for resentencing “[T]he government may 

well have the necessary evidence at its disposal to establish a 

link between Purham’s 2008 drug transportation and the later distribution activity. The government is free to present 

this evidence at resentencing, if it does in fact possess it.” Id.

at 415. 

The government declined our invitation. So consistently 

with our decision, the district court did not count Purham’s 

2008 drug activity as relevant conduct under § 1B1.3(a)(2). In 

recalculating the period of incarceration, the court started 

with a base offense level of 32 for at least 280 grams but less 

than 840 grams of crack cocaine. The court then added some 

levels and subtracted some levels. It added: two levels because Purham had a coconspirator purchase a firearm for 

him, § 2D1.1(b)(1); two levels because members of the conspiracy made threats against two cooperating witnesses, § 2D.2(b)(2); two levels because he employed multiple 

residences for the sole purpose of distributing crack cocaine, § 2D1.1(b)(12); and four levels because Purham acted 

as the manager of the conspiracy, § 3B1.1(a). It then subtractCase: 14-3424 Document: 22 Filed: 08/05/2015 Pages: 13
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ed two levels due to the “Drugs Minus Two” amendment,1

which lowered his base offense level for 280 grams of crack 

cocaine. Purham’s criminal history score of 15 points placed 

him in Category VI. Based on his total offense level of 42, 

Purham’s guidelines range was set at 360 months to life in 

prison. 

The district court then noted the sentencing disparity between crack cocaine and powder cocaine. This disparity, the 

court observed, “fosters disrespect for and mistrust in the 

criminal system because of its disproportionate impact on 

African-American defendants.” (Sent. Tr. 29.) Trying to remedy this problem, while at the same time accounting for the 

seriousness of the offense, the district court sentenced 

Purham to imprisonment for 324 months (a 36-month discount from his previous sentence), supervised release for 120 

months, and a $100 special assessment. 

The district court also imposed special conditions of supervised release, two of which Purham challenges on appeal. 

One condition concerns gang association and the other condition concerns community service. Regarding gang association, the district court ordered Purham to “not associate with 

any member of any street gang.” The court’s order continued: “You shall not wear or carry on your person colors or 

any sign, symbol, or paraphernalia associated with gang activity. Only gang tattoos received prior to incarceration are 

not considered a violation of this condition.” The government quickly sought clarification: 

[Government]: Your Honor said he should not possess or wear any gang colors. You don’t mean obvi-

 

1 The formal name for this amendment is Amendment 782. 

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No. 14-3424 5

ously that he can’t wear red if that’s associated; they 

have to be intended to be a gang color as opposed 

to just that color? 

The Court: Yes. 

[Government]: Just to make the record clear on 

that. 

The Court: Yes. Any questions? 

[Defense Attorney]: No, Your Honor. 

(Sent. Tr. 40.) 

Regarding community service, the district court ordered: 

“If you’re unemployed after the first 60 days of supervision, 

or if unemployed for 60 days after termination or layoff from 

employment, you shall perform at least 20 hours of community service work per week at the direction of Probation until 

gainfully employed.” (Sent. Tr. 37.) On October 31, 2014, the 

same day of the resentencing, Purham filed a notice of appeal. 

II. ANALYSIS

We review a district court’s determination of the scope of 

remand de novo. United States v. Husband, 312 F.3d 247, 251 

(7th Cir. 2002). The reasonableness of a sentence is reviewed 

for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Turner, 569 F.3d 

637, 640 (7th Cir. 2009). Factual findings are reviewed for 

clear error. United States v. Walsh, 723 F.3d 802, 807 (7th Cir. 

2013). 

Our analysis begins with whether the district court acted 

within the scope of our remand order. 

 

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A. The Remand Order 

According to Purham, the district court “ignore[d]” the 

“limited nature” of our remand order when it made a fresh, 

drug-quantity determination at resentencing. (Appellant’s 

Br. 22-23.) The district court did no such thing. After ruling 

that it would not consider as relevant conduct the 1.8 kilograms of crack cocaine that it erroneously considered at the 

original sentencing, the district needed to recalculate the 

drug-quantity amount to determine Purham’s base offense 

level under § 2D1.1(c). It chose the obvious number—280 

grams—which is the amount Purham pled guilty to conspiring to distribute.2 “If this Court remands to correct a discrete, particular error that can be corrected ... without ... a 

redetermination of other issues, the district court is limited to 

correcting that error.” United States v. Barnes, 660 F.3d 1000, 

1006 (7th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added) (internal quotations 

and citations omitted). Because exclusion of the 1.8 kilograms of crack cocaine as relevant conduct compelled a fresh 

look at Purham’s drug-quantity amount, the district court 

could not resentence Purham without a redetermination of 

this other, critical issue. It follows that the district court did 

not exceed our remand order. Purham’s arguments to the 

contrary are without merit. 

 

 

2 In agreeing that he conspired to distribute 280 grams or more of crack 

cocaine, Purham relieved the government of its burden of proof at sentencing. Cf. United States v. Redmond, 667 F.3d 863, 875 (7th Cir. 2012) 

(“The government must prove the quantity of drugs for sentencing purposes by a preponderance of the evidence.”). 

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No. 14-3424 7

B. The Reasonableness of the Sentence 

Purham next challenges the reasonableness of his sentence. He finds fault in the district court’s calculation of the 

base offense level and in its application of the sentencing factors found in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). He also characterizes a 

prison term of 324 months as greater than necessary to meet 

the goals of § 3553(a). We disagree. 

A below-guidelines sentence is “presumptively reasonable against an attack by a defendant claiming that the sentence is too high.” United States v. Liddell, 543 F.3d 877, 885 

(7th Cir. 2008). Indeed, “[i]t is hard to conceive of belowrange sentences that would be unreasonably high.” United 

States v. George, 403 F.3d 470, 473 (7th Cir. 2005). 

After calculating a guidelines range of 360 months to life, 

the district court granted a downward variance to remedy 

the crack/powder disparity in the guidelines. After accounting for the mandatory minimum sentence and the seriousness of the offense, the district court then sentenced Purham 

to 324 months—still well below the initial guidelines range 

of 360 months to life. Purham advances no basis to rebut the 

presumption that this below-range sentence is reasonable. 

We already disposed of Purham’s argument regarding 

the power of the court to recalculate his drug-quantity 

amount. Purham cannot seriously question that he conspired 

to distribute 280 grams; he pled guilty to that amount. As for 

his claim that the district court misapplied the § 3553(a) factors, the record belies it: 

Mr. Purham, your PSR indicates you’ve made selfdestructive choices from an early age. Not only 

have you been convicted of other drug trafficking 

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offenses in the past, you orchestrated the drug trafficking conspiracy for which you’re being sentenced today while you were imprisoned by the 

State of Illinois. 

You’ve threatened witnesses against you with violence and the conduct is unacceptable and you 

must be punished for it. 

What is more, dealing drugs is illegal and carries 

with it the overhanging threat of violence and social decay. That threat is evident by the way you’ve 

conducted yourself. Your long history of drug offenses shows that you’ve made a habit of disregarding the law. And justice requires that your sentence reflect those social ills and serve as a deterrent to others. 

(Sent. Tr. 27.) 

Following its discussion of the crack/powder disparity, 

the district court noted Purham’s redeeming qualities. 

“[Y]ou have performed well in Bureau of Prisons. You’ve 

gone to the Challenge Program, the GED course work, parenting class. You’ve held positions in the food service and 

you’ve had no disciplinary infractions.” (Sent. Tr. 29.) 

The district court’s thoughtful and thorough explanation 

of its sentence is tailored to Purham and is wholly consistent 

with the § 3553(a) factors. The sentence is anything but unreasonable. 

C. The Conditions of Supervised Release

We now turn to Purham’s final issue on appeal—whether 

the district court erred in imposing the gang-association and 

community-service conditions of supervised release. The 

government argues that Purham waived any challenge to 

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No. 14-3424 9

these conditions by not objecting to them in his first appeal. 

We disagree. After his first appeal, we decided United States 

v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368 (7th Cir. 2015). That case vacated a 

number of conditions of supervised release after finding 

them to be fatally vague. Id. Two such conditions are present 

in substantially similar form here. We will not apply waiver 

under these circumstances. Cf. United States v. Adkins, 743 

F.3d 176, 193 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[D]espite a waiver of appellate 

review, the Due Process Clause permits review when a special condition is so vague that no reasonable person could 

know what conduct is permitted and what is prohibited.”). 

Further, immediately after the district court imposed its 

sentence on remand, Purham stated, “I would like to appeal.” (Sent. Tr. 39.) Although Purham did not object to a specific condition of supervised release at the time of sentencing, 

we construe this statement as a general objection to his entire 

sentence, which includes the court’s conditions of supervised 

release. Accordingly, we review the court’s conditions for an 

abuse of discretion. United States v. Baker, 755 F.3d 515, 523 

(7th Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. Neal, 662 F.3d 936, 938 

(7th Cir. 2011)). 

Purham argues that the gang-association and community-service conditions must be vacated because the district 

court did not explain how the conditions comport with the 

sentencing factors listed in § 3553(a). He also argues that the 

conditions are vague and overbroad, and therefore must be 

vacated. In advancing these arguments, Purham relies almost exclusively on United States v. Siegel, 753 F.3d 705 (7th 

Cir. 2014) and Thompson, supra. Before addressing the substance of these conditions, we highlight the district court’s 

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reasoning in issuing them. Its approach in this regard provides a model for other courts to follow. 

Regarding the challenged community-service condition, 

we believe the district court linked the disputed requirement 

to a job-training requirement. We therefore read the conditions—and the reasons supporting them—in tandem. 

You shall participate in a program of job training or 

employment counseling as directed by Probation. 

I’m imposing that because of the sparse history of 

legal employment. The employment record and the 

felony conviction you’ll have when you’re released, 

in addition to past felony convictions, are [going to] 

make it difficult for you to secure employment 

when you complete your term. So I believe job 

training and employment counseling will help you 

find a job. 

If you’re unemployed after the first 60 days of supervision, or if unemployed for 60 days after termination or layoff from employment, you shall perform at least 20 hours of community service work 

per week at the direction of Probation until gainfully employed. Again, I’m once again imposing this 

because I hope it will help you obtain gainful employment. And it will give you some work skills 

and help you make contacts with the community to 

find a job. 

(Sent. Tr. 36-37.) 

These reasons are consistent with the sentencing factors 

of § 3553(a), including providing Purham with educational 

or vocational training and addressing his history and characteristics. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(D). The law does not 

require a district court to apply the § 3553(a) factors in 

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checklist form. United States v. Jones, 774 F.3d 399, 404 (7th 

Cir. 2014). Further, in United States v. Bryant, 754 F.3d 443, 

444-45 (7th Cir. 2014), we clarified our holding in Siegel. We 

stated that “a district judge is required to give a reason, consistent with the sentencing factors in section 3553(a), for every discretionary part of the sentence[,]” including special 

conditions of supervised release. Bryant, 754 F.3d at 444-45 

(emphasis added). “[A] reason,” we emphasize, is not a 

laundry list. And “consistent with” does not require mathematical precision. The district court met its statutory requirement under § 3553(a). 

The district court’s explanation for its condition regarding gang association also passes muster: 

You shall not associate with any member of any 

street gang. You shall not wear or carry on your 

person colors or any sign, symbol, or paraphernalia 

associated with gang activity. Only gang tattoos received prior to incarceration are not considered a 

violation of this condition. 

And I’m imposing that because you were a member 

of the Black P Stone street gang. Cutting ties with 

the group would be a major step toward marking 

yourself a law-abiding member of society when 

you’re released. 

(Sent. Tr. 38.) 

As before, these reasons are consistent with the sentencing factors of § 3553(a). The district court addressed the history and characteristics of Purham. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). In 

denying him the ability to associate with members of street 

gangs, the district court promoted respect for the rule of law. 

Id. at § 3553(a)(2)(A). The district court also sought to deter 

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Purham from committing future crimes, thereby protecting 

the public from further crimes. Id. at § 3553(a)(2)(B)-(C). We 

commend the district court for its deliberate approach to issuing conditions of supervised release. 

Nevertheless, we must vacate the conditions under 

Thompson.

3 Regarding the community-service condition, the 

district court in Thompson imposed the same condition. 777 

F.3d at 381. We vacated it for a couple of reasons. First, the 

district court set “no limit on the amount of community service that the defendant could be ordered to do.” Id. And second, the district court did not mention the application note 

to U.S.S.G. § 5F1.3, which proscribes community service in 

excess of 400 hours. Because these deficiencies are also present here, our case law demands the condition be vacated. 

The same is true for the gang-association condition. In 

Thompson, the district court forbade the defendant from “associat[ing] with any person convicted of a felony, unless 

granted permission to do so by the probation officer.” 

Thompson, 777 F.3d at 377. We found the condition “fatally 

vague,” noting that because it failed to include a scienter requirement it “appear[ed] to impose strict liability.” Id. We 

also questioned the clarity of the term association—“Is a single meeting enough, or is the word intended to denote 

friendship, acquaintanceship, or frequent meetings?” Id. 

Here, the district court’s condition prohibits street-gang 

association rather than felony association, but that is a distinction without a difference. Although the district court required an intent element for wearing gang-related colors 

(i.e., Purham must intend to wear them as a representation 

 

3 The government concedes as much in its brief. 

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of a gang in order to offend the condition), it offered no such 

requirement for the association component of the condition. 

We remain unsure, then, whether an accidental or chance 

meeting with a street-gang member would violate this condition. Clarification must be provided to determine what 

“association” means. Accordingly, under Thompson, this 

condition must also be vacated. 

Purham’s sentence requires a limited remand for reconsideration of the above terms of supervised release. United 

States v. Sewell, 780 F.3d 839, 852 (7th Cir. 2015); see also Siegel, 

753 F.3d at 717 (“So the prison sentences ... stand, but the 

cases must be remanded for reconsideration of the conditions of supervised release”). 

III. CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM in part and VACATE in part. We AFFIRM 

the district court’s term of imprisonment. It is substantively 

reasonable, and the district court did not exceed the scope of 

our remand in imposing it. We VACATE, however, the 

community-service and gang-association conditions of supervised release discussed above. The sentence is 

AFFIRMED in every other respect. The case is REMANDED 

to the district court for limited proceedings consistent with 

this opinion. 

AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part. 

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