Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-16-06297/USCOURTS-ca10-16-06297-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joe M. Allbaugh
Appellee
Reuben Julius Ingram III
Appellant

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

REUBEN JULIUS INGRAM III, 

 Petitioner - Appellant, 

v. 

JOE M. ALLBAUGH, Director, 

Respondent - Appellee. 

No. 16-6297 

 (D.C. No. 5:16-CV-00316-D) 

(W.D. Oklahoma) 

ORDER DENYING 

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*

_________________________________ 

Before BRISCOE and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.**

_________________________________ 

Reuben Julius Ingram III, an Oklahoma state prisoner proceeding pro se,1

 seeks a 

certificate of appealability (COA) to challenge the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. 

 *

 This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, 

res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value 

consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

** The Honorable Neil Gorsuch was assigned to this matter originally but did not 

participate in this Order. The practice of this court permits the remaining two panel 

judges, if in agreement, to act as a quorum in resolving the appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(d); 

United States v. Wiles, 106 F.3d 1516, n.* (10th Cir. 1997); Murray v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 

35 F.3d 45, 48 (2nd Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1082 (1995) (remaining two judges 

of original three-judge panel may decide petition for rehearing without the third judge). 

1

 Because Mr. Ingram is proceeding pro se, we construe his filings liberally. See 

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). “[T]his rule of liberal 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

February 3, 2017

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

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2 

§ 2254 application. Mr. Ingram also requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 

Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we deny both requests and dismiss the 

appeal. 

I. BACKGROUND

Following a jury trial in 2014, Mr. Ingram was convicted of trafficking in illegal 

drugs and received a thirty-year sentence. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals 

(OCCA) affirmed Mr. Ingram’s sentence and conviction on direct appeal. Mr. Ingram 

then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, asserting the same 

five claims of error he raised on direct appeal. The district court referred the petition to a 

magistrate judge, who recommended denial of all claims in a thorough fifteen-page report 

and recommendation (R&R). 

The magistrate warned Mr. Ingram that failure to object to the R&R would result 

in waiver of appellate review. Mr. Ingram timely objected to the R&R, but the district 

court, liberally construing Mr. Ingram’s arguments, found he raised arguments regarding 

only his second claim (ineffective assistance of counsel) and fifth claim (cumulative 

error). Accordingly, under our firm waiver rule, the district court concluded Mr. Ingram 

waived further review of his other claims. See Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 

(10th Cir. 1991). Mr. Ingram does not challenge this ruling on appeal. 

The district court proceeded with a de novo review of the two remaining claims 

and adopted the R&R in its entirety. The court then denied a COA after concluding jurists 

 

construction stops, however, at the point at which we begin to serve as his advocate.” 

United States v. Pinson, 584 F.3d 972, 975 (10th Cir. 2009). 

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of reason could not disagree with its denial of the petition. And the court denied Mr. 

Ingram’s application to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal after determining an appeal 

would not be taken in good faith, as Mr. Ingram had not presented a reasoned, 

nonfrivolous argument for appeal. See, e.g., McIntosh v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 115 F.3d 

809, 812 (10th Cir. 1997). Mr. Ingram appeals the district court’s denial of his petition, 

asserting the same five claims of error asserted below and on direct appeal. 

II. ANALYSIS 

To appeal the district court’s denial of habeas relief, Mr. Ingram must first obtain a 

COA,2

 which we will grant “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the 

denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To meet this burden, Mr. Ingram 

must show that “reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) 

the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented 

were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 

U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, Mr. Ingram 

must show the district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims was either “debatable 

or wrong.” Id.

Because Mr. Ingram has waived review of his first, third, and fourth claims of 

error, we review only his ineffective assistance of counsel and cumulative error claims. 

 2

 We construe Mr. Ingram’s “Petition for Federal Writ of Habeas Corpus” as his 

combined opening brief and COA. Although his petition does not include an express 

request for a COA, his notice of appeal may be construed as a request for a COA. See 

Fed. R. App. P. 22(b)(2); 10th Cir. R. 22.1(A). 

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A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

Mr. Ingram contends the district court’s decision was contrary to clearly 

established federal law because the court “ignored the holding of Strickland” in 

concluding his trial counsel was not deficient and that Mr. Ingram could not show 

prejudice. In order to demonstrate a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to the 

effective assistance of counsel, Mr. Ingram must show both deficient performance and 

prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). In applying Strickland, 

“there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim . . . to address both 

components of the inquiry if the [petitioner] makes an insufficient showing on one.” Id. at 

697. 

Mr. Ingram claims his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the 

admission of telephone conversations that were recorded while Mr. Ingram was 

incarcerated for a prior offense. These recordings allowed the police to obtain a search 

warrant of his girlfriend’s home, where the police found drugs and evidence linking Mr. 

Ingram to the drugs. Mr. Ingram asserts that “[w]ithout the phone calls, the state would 

have had absolutely no evidence connecting [Mr. Ingram] to the house or the drugs 

seized.” 

In order for the admission of these calls to have violated Mr. Ingram’s Fourth 

Amendment rights and thus sustain a claim that counsel was ineffective for not objecting 

to the admission of the calls, Mr. Ingram must show he had a reasonable expectation of 

privacy. See United States v. Maestas, 639 F.3d 1032, 1035 (10th Cir. 2011) (“A 

defendant invoking the protection of the Fourth Amendment must demonstrate that he 

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personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched, and that his expectation is 

reasonable.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The district court reasoned Mr. Ingram 

had no reasonable expectation of privacy in these calls because (1) he was in custody, and 

(2) he had been warned at the beginning of each conversation, both orally and in writing, 

that his calls would be recorded. Thus, the district court concluded Mr. Ingram did not 

show his trial counsel was deficient or that he was prejudiced by the failure to object 

“because any such motion would have been meritless.” In addition, Mr. Ingram’s counsel 

stated at trial that he made the decision not to challenge the search warrant because of the 

statements Mr. Ingram made during the phone conversations.3

 

We conclude that Mr. Ingram has not presented any arguments that the district 

court’s denial of his petition was “debatable or wrong.” Although Mr. Ingram may be 

correct that the state would not have found the drugs and other evidence it did without his 

phone calls, he has not shown any illegality in the admission of the phone calls or the 

evidence obtained from the search warrant. 

B. Cumulative Error 

Mr. Ingram next asserts the district court erred in concluding he simply reargued 

the merits of his cumulative error claim without addressing our standard of review under 

 3

 “[W]e give considerable deference to an attorney’s strategic decisions,” Bullock 

v. Carver, 297 F.3d 1036, 1044 (10th Cir. 2002), and a defendant cannot show the denial 

of a constitutional right where counsel has chosen as a matter of professional judgment 

not to press even nonfrivolous arguments, Tapia v. Tansy, 926 F.2d 1554, 1564 (10th Cir. 

1991). Where it would have been meritless for Mr. Ingram’s counsel to object to the 

admission of these legally obtained phone conversations, no reasonable jurist could 

conclude the failure to object constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. 

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28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). He also claims the court ignored Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 

U.S. 637 (1974), which he cited in his direct appeal and below. Mr. Ingram argues that 

trial errors, combined with prosecutorial misconduct, rendered his trial fundamentally 

unfair and violated due process. 

The district court in analyzing this claim found “no errors of a constitutional 

magnitude.” The court noted Mr. Ingram pointed to one statement made by the 

prosecutor in closing argument, but Mr. Ingram did not tie this statement to the violation 

of a specific constitutional right. The court concluded the “prosecutor’s statement 

properly commented upon evidence that had been presented to the jury,” and the court 

correctly stated that habeas relief is only available if prosecutorial misconduct “is so 

egregious that it renders the entire trial fundamentally unfair.” Cummings v. Evans, 161 

F.3d 610, 618 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 642–48). 

 Mr. Ingram has failed to show that reasonable jurists could debate the district 

court’s denial of this claim. He has not pointed to any error, let alone multiple errors, that 

rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. See Moore v. Reynolds, 153 F.3d 1086, 1113 

(10th Cir. 1998) (holding “[c]umulative error analysis applies where there are two or 

more actual errors; it does not apply to the cumulative effect of non-errors”). Therefore, 

we deny Mr. Ingram’s application for a COA on this claim. 

III. CONCLUSION

Mr. Ingram has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 

right. We therefore DENY his request for a COA and DISMISS the appeal. And because 

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we agree with the district court that this appeal was not taken in good faith, we DENY 

Mr. Ingram’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. 

Entered for the Court 

Carolyn B. McHugh 

Circuit Judge 

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