Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-03916/USCOURTS-ca8-05-03916-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Anne Marie Borne
Not Party
Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company
Not Party
Firstar Bank of Minnesota
Not Party
Sheri L. Lauckner
Not Party
William Charles Pugh
Appellant
Nance Reeves
Not Party
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-3916

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

William Charles Pugh, *

*

Defendant - Appellant. * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the District of

----------------------------- * Minnesota.

*

Commonwealth Land Title Insurance *

Company; Firstar Bank of Minnesota, *

N.A.; Anne Marie Borne, *

*

Petitioners, *

*

Nance Reeves; Sheri L. Lauckner, *

*

Garnishees. *

___________

Submitted: April 19, 2006

Filed: April 24, 2006

___________

Before MURPHY, MELLOY, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

MURPHY, Circuit Judge.

Appellate Case: 05-3916 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/24/2006 Entry ID: 2036352
1

The Honorable Michael J. Davis, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota.

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In the proceedings that gave rise to this appeal, attorney William Charles Pugh

was found by the district court1

 to owe $711,509.43 in outstanding restitution debt

from a 1997 criminal conviction and was sanctioned for his pro se submission of a

false discovery plan in preparation for an evidentiary hearing on the debt. On appeal

Pugh challenges both the outstanding debt amount and the imposition of sanctions.

We affirm.

Pugh was convicted in 1997 for orchestrating a fraudulent scheme to

misappropriate funds entrusted to him to complete real estate transactions. He was

sentenced to prison and ordered to pay restitution of over $1.2 million to

Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company (Commonwealth). Pugh discharged

a portion of his restitution debt while incarcerated, and an additional $147,012.21 was

discharged by his former companion, Anne Marie Borne. 

After Pugh was released in 2002, the government applied for a writ of

garnishment to collect the remainder of the debt pursuant to the Federal Debt

Collection Procedures Act (FDCPA), 28 U.S.C. § 3205(b)(1). A magistrate judge

granted the writ over Pugh's objections and denied his request for an evidentiary

hearing to determine how much had already been discharged. Pugh appealed, and we

concluded that the amount of remaining restitution debt was unresolved and remanded

with instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing. See United States v. Pugh, 75

Fed.Appx. 546 (8th Cir. 2003). 

Once the case was again in the district court, Borne successfully moved to be

substituted for Commonwealth as the restitution payee for that part of Pugh's debt she

had paid and counsel engaged in extensive negotiations over discovery in preparation

for the evidentiary hearing. They were unable to agree on a discovery plan, however.

Appellate Case: 05-3916 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/24/2006 Entry ID: 2036352
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The Honorable Jonathan Lebedoff, then Chief Magistrate Judge for the District

of Minnesota. Judge Lebedoff retired from his position on September 20, 2005.

3

A copy of the order of the magistrate judge was forwarded to the proper state

licensing authorities; Pugh was subsequently disbarred. See In re Disciplinary Action

Against Pugh, 710 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. 2006).

-3-

In June 2005 Pugh, whose counsel had by that time withdrawn, filed a pro se Motion

for Discovery with an attached discovery plan purportedly agreed to by both sides.

At the end of the document there were signature lines for the attorneys representing

each side, on which there were handwritten notations of "/s/" indicating electronic

signatures. The government objected to the discovery report and subsequently moved

to strike it and for sanctions. The motion to strike was granted on June 30 without any

objection from Pugh, and a hearing on the motion for sanctions and on Pugh's

objections to the original garnishment order was conducted on July 26.

The magistrate judge2

 issued two separate decisions some three weeks later. A

report and recommendation found Pugh's outstanding restitution debt to be

$711,509.43 and discounted as unproven his assertion that part of the debt to Borne

had already been paid. In addition an order imposed sanctions on Pugh for filing a

document he knew to be false, censuring him and recommending to state authorities

that he never again be allowed to practice law.3

 The district court adopted the

magistrate judge's findings on the outstanding restitution debt and affirmed the

sanctions order. Pugh challenges both actions on appeal.

Pugh first argues that he submitted adequate proof to show that his restitution

obligation to Borne should have been discounted by $20,000 to account for his

transfer to her of his half interest in a Cayman Island condominium and by $18,700

for his assignment to her of rents from several North Dakota properties for the period

July 1, 1997 to July 1, 2001. He claims alternatively that he should at least be credited

for $1200 of the North Dakota rent payments for which he attached cancelled checks

Appellate Case: 05-3916 Page: 3 Date Filed: 04/24/2006 Entry ID: 2036352
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to an affidavit he filed after the evidentiary hearing. We review the district court's

application of the restitution statute de novo. United States v. Bush, 252 F.3d 959,

962 (8th Cir. 2001). A defendant claiming partial payment of his restitution debt has

the burden of proof, and ambiguous evidence may be discounted. See id. at 962-63.

At the evidentiary hearing Pugh submitted only an unregistered deed without Borne's

signature to show transfer of his interest in the condominium and a document, also

unsigned by Borne, purporting to assign the North Dakota rents to her as payment for

"a debt." There was no evidence other than Pugh's testimony to show that the purpose

of either transfer was to pay part of his restitution debt or even that Borne received

any funds. Although Pugh later produced cancelled checks for some of the rent

payments, they were not properly submitted before the trial court and are therefore

excluded from the record on appeal. Rivers-Fison v. Southeast Missouri Comm.

Treatment Ctr., 133 F.3d 616, 619 n.2 (8th Cir. 1998). We conclude that the district

court did not err in adopting the magistrate judge's findings concerning Pugh's

outstanding restitution debt.

Pugh next challenges the imposition of sanctions, arguing they were not

supported by sufficient evidence and were unduly severe and that he should have been

allowed to submit expert testimony showing a "strong probability" that he did not

forge the /s/ notations over the signature lines on the discovery plan. We review for

abuse of discretion both the exclusion of expert testimony, Torbit v. Ryder System,

Inc., 416 F.3d 898, 903 (8th Cir. 2005), and the imposition of sanctions, Nick v.

Morgan Foods, Inc., 270 F.3d 590, 594 (8th Cir. 2001), and see no error. The

proffered expert testimony was excluded because it was irrelevant; the government

did not contend that Pugh personally forged the /s/ notations, only that he had

knowingly submitted a false document. Pugh had himself admitted during cross

examination that as of "later 2004" he knew through his counsel that no discovery

plan had been agreed to by the parties. Although Pugh subsequently filed an affidavit

claiming that the document he filed was intended as nothing more than an "example"

of the discovery he wished to undertake, his attempt to supplement his trial testimony

Appellate Case: 05-3916 Page: 4 Date Filed: 04/24/2006 Entry ID: 2036352
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was properly rejected. See Camfield Tires, Inc. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 719 F.2d

1364-65 (8th Cir. 1983) (affidavit conflicting with earlier sworn testimony could not

create issue of fact). Finally, as the magistrate judge noted, Pugh was no ordinary pro

se litigant, but a trained and licensed attorney. We conclude that under all the

circumstances the imposition of sanctions was reasonable.

For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

_________________________

Appellate Case: 05-3916 Page: 5 Date Filed: 04/24/2006 Entry ID: 2036352