Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01305/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01305-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rash Curtis & Associates
Defendant
Donna Reddin
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

DONNA REDDIN,

Plaintiff,

v.

RASH CURTIS & ASSOCIATES,

 Defendant.

CIV. NO. 2:15-01305 WBS CKD

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff brought this action under the Fair Debt 

Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p, and 

California’s Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 

(“RFDCPA”), Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1788–1788.32, based on two phone 

calls she received from defendant Rash Curtis & Associates. 

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, defendant now 

moves for summary judgment on all of plaintiff’s claims. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The limited facts giving rise to plaintiff’s FDCPA and 

RFDCPA claims are essentially undisputed. Defendant is a debt 

Case 2:15-cv-01305-WBS-CKD Document 17 Filed 07/13/16 Page 1 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

collection agency and was assigned to collect a number of debts 

owed by plaintiff’s son. (Keith Decl. ¶ 3 (Docket No. 10-4).) 

At approximately 10:00 a.m. on February 25, 2015, defendant 

placed an automated call to plaintiff’s home number regarding 

that debt. (Id.) After the call, plaintiff called defendant and 

informed it that she did not want it to call her home number 

again. (Id. ¶ 5.) She also obtained defendant’s email address 

and sent an email to defendant instructing it not to call her 

home again. (Id.; Reddin Decl. Ex. A (Docket No. 12-1).) 

Defendant received the email request and informed plaintiff that

it would process her request. (Reddin Decl. Ex. A.) Although 

defendant removed plaintiff’s home number from its collection 

account after receiving her email, the number had already been 

loaded into a dialer campaign through defendant’s vendor, Global 

Connect, and Global Connect did not update its system to remove 

plaintiff’s number until that night.1 (Keith Decl. ¶ 6.) At 

6:00 p.m. that same day, defendant autodialed plaintiff’s home 

number a second time before it had been removed from the dialer 

campaign. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 6.) 

Plaintiff initiated this action against defendant in 

state court, and defendant removed it to this court on the basis 

 

1 In her response to defendant’s statement of undisputed 

facts, plaintiff indicates that she does not have “sufficient 

information” about Global Connect’s procedures. (Pl.’s Sep. 

Stmt. of Undisputed Facts Nos. 13-14 (Docket No. 13).) Discovery

in this case closed on April 1, 2016, (see Docket No. 8), and 

plaintiff did not seek to re-open discovery or make any showing 

suggesting she would be entitled to additional time under Rule 

56(d). Moreover, the court cannot imagine how any additional 

evidence about Global Connect’s procedures could establish a 

genuine issue for trial on plaintiff’s claims. 

Case 2:15-cv-01305-WBS-CKD Document 17 Filed 07/13/16 Page 2 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

of federal question jurisdiction. In her Complaint, plaintiff 

alleges claims for violations of the FDCPA and RFDCPA. She 

specifically alleges that defendant violated subsections 

1692c(a)(1), 1692d, 1692d(5), 1692e(2)(A), 1692e(10), 1692f, and 

1692f(1) of the FDCPA and subsections 1788.11(d) and 1788.11(e) 

of the RFDCPA. (Compl. ¶ 11.) Defendant now moves for summary 

judgment on all of plaintiff’s claims pursuant to Rule 56. 

II. Analysis

Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that 

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(a). A material fact is one that could affect the outcome 

of the suit, and a genuine issue is one that could permit a 

reasonable jury to enter a verdict in the non-moving party’s 

favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 

(1986). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial 

burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material 

fact and can satisfy this burden by presenting evidence that 

negates an essential element of the non-moving party’s case. 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). 

Alternatively, the moving party can demonstrate that the nonmoving party cannot produce evidence to support an essential 

element upon which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. 

Id.

Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the 

burden shifts to the non-moving party to “designate ‘specific 

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 

324 (quoting then-Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). To carry this burden, 

Case 2:15-cv-01305-WBS-CKD Document 17 Filed 07/13/16 Page 3 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

the non-moving party must “do more than simply show that there is 

some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita 

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). 

“The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence . . . will be 

insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could 

reasonably find for the [non-moving party].” Anderson, 477 U.S. 

at 252.

In deciding a summary judgment motion, the court must 

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving 

party and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor. Id. at 

255. “Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, 

and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury 

functions, not those of a judge . . . ruling on a motion for 

summary judgment . . . .” Id. 

1. FDCPA Claim

In 1977, Congress enacted the FDCPA “to eliminate 

abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure 

that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt 

collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to 

promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt 

collection abuses.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e). The Act establishes a 

nonexclusive list of unlawful debt collection practices and 

provides for public and private remedies. Id. §§ 1692–1692p.

a. Subsection 1692c(a)(1)

Subsection 1692c(a)(1) generally prohibits a debt 

collector from communicating with a “consumer in connection with 

the collection of any debt . . . at any unusual time or place or 

a time or place known or which should be known to be inconvenient 

Case 2:15-cv-01305-WBS-CKD Document 17 Filed 07/13/16 Page 4 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

to the consumer.” Id. § 1692c(a)(1). FDCPA defines “consumer” 

as “any natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay 

any debt.” Id. § 1692a(3). For purposes of § 1692c, “the term 

‘consumer’ includes the consumer’s spouse, parent (if the 

consumer is a minor), guardian, executor, or administrator.” Id.

§ 1692c(d). 

Here, it is undisputed that plaintiff was not obligated 

to pay any debt and that defendant telephoned her home only in an 

effort to collect debts her son owed, and plaintiff conceded at 

oral argument that her son was not a minor. Although plaintiff 

cites several cases recognizing FDCPA claims by non-debtors, 

those claims were for violations of other subsections of the 

FDCPA that are not limited to “consumers.” (See Pl.’s Opp’n at 5 

(Docket No. 13) (citing cases addressing § 1692d and § 1692e, 

which are not limited to “consumers”).) Plaintiff relies heavily

on the Sixth Circuit’s recognition in Montgomery v. Huntington 

Bank that a non-debtor may bring claims under § 1692d and 

§ 1692e. 346 F.3d 693, 696 (6th Cir. 2003). In that case, 

however, the Sixth Circuit expressly distinguished those 

subsections from § 1692c: “[R]elief is limited to ‘consumers’

only under § 1692c, [and] . . . . only a ‘consumer’ has standing 

to sue for violations under 15 U.S.C. § 1692c.” Id. at 696-97 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Plaintiff has also failed to put forth evidence from 

which a reasonable jury could find that telephone calls to a home 

at 10:00 a.m. or 6:00 p.m. are “at any unusual time or place or a 

time or place known or which should be known to be inconvenient 

to the consumer.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(1). Subsection 

Case 2:15-cv-01305-WBS-CKD Document 17 Filed 07/13/16 Page 5 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

1692c(a)(1) in fact contemplates calls at those times, providing 

that “a debt collector shall assume that the convenient time for 

communicating with a consumer is after 8 o’clock antemeridian and 

before 9 o’clock postmeridian, local time at the consumer’s 

location.” Id. § 1692c(a)(1). 

Accordingly, because § 1692c is limited to “consumers,” 

the court must grant defendant’s motion for summary judgment on 

plaintiff’s FDCPA claim based on § 1692c(a)(1).2

b. Subsections 1692d and 1692d(5)

Subsection 1692d generally prohibits a debt collector 

from “engag[ing] in any conduct the natural consequence of which 

is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the 

collection of a debt,” and subsection 1692d(5) specifically

provides that “[c]ausing a telephone to ring or engaging any 

person in telephone conversation repeatedly or continuously with 

intent to annoy, abuse, or harass any person at the called 

number” violates § 1692d. Id. § 1692d(5).

While the FDCPA is generally a strict liability 

statute, “Congress took care to require an element of knowledge 

or intent in certain portions of the FDCPA where it deemed such a 

requirement necessary,” such as § 1692d(5). Clark v. Capital 

Credit & Collection Servs., Inc., 460 F.3d 1162, 1176 (9th Cir. 

 

2 Under § 1692c(c), “[i]f a consumer notifies a debt 

collector in writing that the consumer refuses to pay a debt or 

that the consumer wishes the debt collector to cease further 

communication with the consumer, the debt collector shall not 

communicate further with the consumer with respect to such debt,” 

subject to limited exceptions. Plaintiff has not alleged a 

violation of § 1692c(c) in her Complaint and, even if she had, 

such a claim would fail because she is not a “consumer” under 

§ 1692c(c). 

Case 2:15-cv-01305-WBS-CKD Document 17 Filed 07/13/16 Page 6 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); accord

Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 

573, 594 (2010) (citing § 1692d(5) as a provision of the FDCPA 

“applying to acts taken with particular intent”). 

Even pretending that a reasonable jury could find that 

two telephone calls are sufficiently repetitive and continuous so 

as to annoy, abuse, or harass a person, the undisputed evidence 

is that defendant removed plaintiff’s number from its file after 

she requested it to cease calling her and the second call was 

inadvertently placed before the automated dialer system was 

updated that night. Based on this evidence, a reasonable jury 

could not find that defendant placed the second phone call “with 

intent to annoy, abuse, or harass,” 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(5). 

Nor could a reasonable jury find that the “natural 

consequence” of the two telephone calls in this case “is to 

harass, oppress, or abuse any person” as required for an FDCPA 

claim based solely on the general prohibition of § 1692d. 

“[C]laims under § 1692d should be viewed from the perspective of 

a consumer whose circumstances makes him relatively more 

susceptible to harassment, oppression, or abuse.” Arteaga v. 

Asset Acceptance, LLC, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1226 (E.D. Cal. 

2010) (quoting Jeter v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d 1168, 1179 

(11th Cir. 1985)). This objective standard is “similar to that 

of the ‘least sophisticated debtor,’ which the Ninth Circuit 

applies to other sections of the FDCPA.” Id. (citing Clark, 460

F.3d at 1171). “Whether there is actionable harassment or 

annoyance turns not only on the volume of calls made, but also on 

Case 2:15-cv-01305-WBS-CKD Document 17 Filed 07/13/16 Page 7 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

the pattern of calls.” Joseph v. J.J. Mac Intyre Cos., L.L.C., 

238 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1168 (N.D. Cal. 2002).

It is undisputed that defendant placed only two calls 

to plaintiff that were eight hours apart. The only evidence even 

weighing slightly in favor of plaintiff’s claim is that she had 

instructed defendant not to call her again between the two calls. 

After plaintiff sent defendant the email requesting it not to 

call her again, defendant responded nine minutes later with a 

professional email that was responsive to her request: “Good 

Morning, Your request will be processed accordingly, have a great 

day. Thank you, Client Services.” (Reddin Decl. Ex. A.) As the 

evidence reveals, the request required an overnight update of the 

automated dialer system to “process” plaintiff’s request. When 

plaintiff informed the representative on the second call that she 

had already instructed defendant to cease calling her, plaintiff 

does not indicate that the representative did anything but honor 

her request and terminate the call. There is simply no evidence 

from which a reasonable jury could find that defendant was 

anything but professional in its communications with plaintiff or 

that it threatened or attempted to force plaintiff to remain on a 

call. 

In arguing that defendant’s conduct is sufficient to 

create a triable issue of fact as to harassment under § 1692d, 

plaintiff relies primarily on Meadows v. Franklin Collection 

Servive, Inc., 414 F. App’x 230, 2011 WL 479997 (11th Cir. Feb. 

11, 2011), and Bingham v. Collection Bureau, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 

864 (N.D. 1981). In Meadows, the defendant repeatedly called the 

plaintiff at home in an attempt to collect debts owed by other 

Case 2:15-cv-01305-WBS-CKD Document 17 Filed 07/13/16 Page 8 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

individuals who did not live at the plaintiff’s residence. 2011 

WL 479997, at *1. In May 2006, the plaintiff informed the 

defendant that “she did not know or wish to provide location 

information for the debtors” and requested that the defendant 

cease calling her. Id. Despite this request, the defendant 

continued to call the plaintiff multiple times a week for twoand-a-half years, with a total of about 300 calls. Id. at *1-2. 

Under those facts, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district 

court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the 

defendant on the plaintiff’s § 1692d claim. Id. at *2. 

In Bingham, the defendant called the plaintiff at her 

home approximately fourteen times, with a call placed about every 

other day over a period of one month. 505 F. Supp. at 873. 

After the plaintiff hung up once the defendant had identified 

itself, the defendant immediately called the plaintiff a second 

time. Id. During the calls, representatives used alias, 

inquired about the plaintiff’s wedding ring, and told the

plaintiff something to the effect that she “should not have 

children if she could not afford them.” Id. at 873-74. After 

conducting a bench trial and finding the plaintiff’s testimony 

about the conduct credible, the court found harassment under 

§ 1692d. Id. at 874-75. 

The remaining cases plaintiff relies on are just as 

easily distinguished from the two calls placed in this case. See

Kavalin v. Glob. Credit & Collection Corp., No. 10-CV-314 JTC, 

2011 WL 1260210, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2011) (denying the 

defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s § 1692d claim based 

on allegations that the defendant had left “scores” of messages 

Case 2:15-cv-01305-WBS-CKD Document 17 Filed 07/13/16 Page 9 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

that contained deceptive and false statements); Pratt v. CMRE 

Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 4:10-CV-2332 CEJ, 2012 WL 86957, at *1-2, 

4 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 11, 2012) (denying the defendant’s motion for 

summary judgment on the plaintiff’s § 1692d(5) claim after the 

plaintiff put forth evidence from which a jury could find that he 

received approximately sixty-five automated telephone calls after 

he had informed the defendant on the first call that it had the 

wrong number and that he did not owe the debt); Penny v. Williams 

& Fudge, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1322 (M.D. Fla. 2012) 

(denying the defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law 

or, alternatively, a new trial after a jury returned a verdict in 

favor of the plaintiff on his § 1692d claim based on the 

defendant having called fifty to seventy times to collect a debt

the plaintiff did not owe and leaving threatening or 

inappropriately suggestive messages); Rucker v. Nationwide 

Credit, Inc., No. 2:09-CV-2420 GEB EFB, 2011 WL 25300, at *2 

(E.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2011) (finding a triable issue of fact on the 

plaintiff’s § 1692d and § 1692d(5) claims based on the defendant 

having called the plaintiff approximately 80 times); Bassett v. 

I.C. Sys., Inc., 715 F. Supp. 2d 803, 810 (N.D. Ill. 2010) 

(denying the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the

plaintiff’s § 1692d(5) claim when the undisputed evidence was 

that the defendant called the plaintiff thirty-one times over 

twelve days). 

Because no reasonable jury could find that the “natural 

consequence” of the two non-threatening phone calls in this case 

would be to “harass, oppress, or abuse any person” or that 

defendant placed the calls with the intent to “annoy, abuse, or 

Case 2:15-cv-01305-WBS-CKD Document 17 Filed 07/13/16 Page 10 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

harass” plaintiff, the court must grant defendant’s motion for 

summary judgment on her FDCPA claim based on § 1692d and 

§ 1692d(5). 

c. Subsections 1692e(2)(A) and 1692e(10) 

Section 1692e prohibits a debt collector from “us[ing]

any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in 

connection with the collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 

A debt collector can violate this subsection by falsely 

representing “the character, amount, or legal status of any 

debt,” id. § 1692e(2)(A), or using “any false representation or 

deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to 

obtain information concerning a consumer,” id. § 1692e(10). 

In her affidavit, plaintiff states that the first 

call was “automated” and was “seeking to collect a debt from 

someone else.” (Reddin Decl. ¶ 4.) As to the second call, she 

states only that it was from a “live person,” but does not even 

suggest that the caller sought to collect a debt from her or made 

any false representations about the debt her son owed. (Id. ¶ 

7.) She neither advances an argument nor submits any evidence 

suggesting a violation of § 1692e(2)(A) or § 1692e(10)in 

opposition to defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The court 

must therefore grant defendant’s motion for summary judgment on 

plaintiff’s FDCPA claim premised on any violation of 

§ 1692e(2)(A) or § 1692e(10). 

d. Subsections 1692f and 1692f(1)

Section 1692f prohibits a debt collector from using 

“unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect 

any debt,” which includes “[t]he collection of any amount 

Case 2:15-cv-01305-WBS-CKD Document 17 Filed 07/13/16 Page 11 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

(including any interest, fee, charge, or expense incidental to 

the principal obligation) unless such amount is expressly 

authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by 

law.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1).

Similar to the alleged violations of § 1692e, plaintiff 

neither explains nor offers evidence supporting such violations

in her opposition to defendant’s motion for summary judgment. 

The undisputed evidence is that defendant was attempting to 

collect a debt from plaintiff’s son and never attempted to or 

actually collected any debt or fee from plaintiff. The court 

must therefore grant defendant’s motion for summary judgment on 

plaintiff’s FDCPA claims based on violations of § 1692f and 

§ 1692f(1). 

2. RFDCPA Claim

Under the RFDCPA, “every debt collector collecting or 

attempting to collect a consumer debt shall comply with the 

provisions of Sections 1692b to 1692j, inclusive, of, and shall 

be subject to the remedies in Section 1692k of, Title 15 of the 

United States Code.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.17. The parties 

agree that plaintiff’s RFDCPA claim survives summary judgment 

only if the court finds a disputed issue of material fact on her 

FDCPA claim. (See Def.’s Mem. at 10:14-16; Pl.’s Opp’n at 13:16-

14:15.) Because the court finds that defendant is entitled to 

summary judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff’s FDCPA claim, 

the court must also grant defendant’s motion for summary judgment 

on her RFDCPA claim. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant’s motion for 

summary judgment be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED.

Case 2:15-cv-01305-WBS-CKD Document 17 Filed 07/13/16 Page 12 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

Dated: July 11, 2016

Case 2:15-cv-01305-WBS-CKD Document 17 Filed 07/13/16 Page 13 of 13