Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cr-00117/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cr-00117-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ramiro Guizar-Valencia
Defendant
United States of America
Plaintiff

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 Citations to "document # ___" are to documents in United States of America v. Ramiro

Guizar-Valencia, 05-CR-117-SRB-PHX.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America, 

Plaintiff/Respondent, 

vs.

Ramiro Guizar-Valencia,

Defendant/Movant. 

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No. CR-05-117 PHX-SRB

 CV 05-2146 PHX-SRB (LOA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter arises on Movant’s Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence

by Person in Federal Custody (document # 28). Respondent filed an Answer to the Motion

(document # 24) to which Movant has not replied and the time for doing so has expired. 

In his § 2255 Motion, Movant alleges ineffective assistance of counsel and that his

criminal history is overstated because his prior convictions are ten years old and are being

"double counted." (document # 17)

Procedural History

Pursuant to a written plea agreement, on February 10, 2005, Movant waived

indictment and pleaded guilty to Re-entry after Deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)

enhanced by § 1326(b)(2) as charged in the information. (document # 51

) Pursuant to

Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e)(1)(C), the government and Movant agreed that Movant should receive a

three-level reduction in base offense level for acceptance of responsibility and an additional

Case 2:05-cr-00117-SRB Document 27 Filed 03/28/06 Page 1 of 8
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four-level downward departure based on savings to the government. (document # 16 at 3) In

accordance with the plea agreement, Movant's sentencing guideline range was reduced from 51-

125 months to 37-46 months. (PSR at ¶ 78) On May 23, 2005, the Court sentenced Movant to

37 months imprisonment followed by three years supervised release. (document # 15)

Thereafter, Movant filed the pending § 2255 motion. Respondent concedes that

Movant's motion is timely, therefore, the Court will not address the statute of limitations. 

ANALYSIS

Based on the following discussion, the undersigned recommends denying the

pending § 2255 motion because Movant's claims fail.

I. Waiver

Respondents assert that the Court should dismiss Movant's § 2255 motion because,

pursuant to his written plea agreement, he expressly waived the right to file a § 2255 motion.

Movant pleaded guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement which the District Court

accepted. (documents # 12, # 15, # 16) The written plea agreement provided that Movant

waived "(1) any right to appeal the court's entry of judgment against the defendant; (2) any right

to appeal the imposition of sentence upon defendant under Title 18, United States Code, Section

3742 (sentence appeals); and (3) any right to collaterally attack defendant's conviction and

sentence under Title 28, United States Code, Section 2255, or any other collateral attack."

(document # 16 at 5) Movant also waived "any and all motions, defenses, probable cause

determinations, and objections which the defendant could assert to the information or indictment

or to the court's entry of judgment against defendant and imposition of sentence upon the

defendant provided the sentence is consistent with this agreement." (Id.) 

Express waivers of the right to collaterally attack a conviction or sentence are

enforceable. United States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1013-14 (9th Cir. 1993)(stating that

movant’s waiver executed in his plea agreement foreclosed him from challenging his sentence

in a § 2255 motion.) Where a movant pleads guilty, review is limited to whether the underlying

plea was counseled and voluntary. United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989); Boykin

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v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969)(stating that to comport with due process, a guilty plea

must be knowing and voluntary.)

Here, Movant does not challenge the validity of the plea agreement itself. Rather,

liberally construing the § 2255 motion, Movant claims that counsel rendered ineffective

assistance because he advised Movant that he would receive a 24-month sentence. 

The Ninth Circuit has recently stated that review of an ineffective assistance claim

is limited where a defendant has waived his right to collaterally attack his conviction and

sentence. Specifically, in United States v. Jeronimo, 398 F.3d 1149, 1156 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2005),

the court stated that:

We leave open the possibility that Jeronimo might raise his ineffective

assistance argument on federal habeas procedure, through a § 2255

motion, notwithstanding that Jeronimo's appeal waiver covered 'all his

waivable statutory rights to file a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255

challenging the length of his sentence.' Although a defendant may

waive the statutory right to file a § 2255 petition 'challenging the length

of his sentence,' we do not decide whether such language would

necessarily encompass a claim challenging the knowing and voluntary

nature of the plea agreement (and accompanying waiver of § 2255

rights). Further, we do not decide whether even an express waiver of all

§ 2255 rights could be enforced to preclude an ineffective assistance

claim implicating the voluntariness of the waiver itself. See, United

States v.Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431, 433 (9th Cir. 1994)(expressing "doubt" that

plea agreement could waive such a claim, but declining to reach the

issue). 

Jeronimo, 398 F.3d at 1156 n. 4. Thus, the only reviewable claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel is a claim relating to counsel's performance affecting the voluntariness of Movant's plea

agreement or waiver. Any other claims of ineffective assistance are not properly before the

Court in view of Movant's waiver. 

II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Movant claims that counsel was ineffective because he advised Movant that he

would receive a 24-month sentence but the Court sentenced Movant to 37 months

imprisonment. 

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Movant must establish that

(1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) he was

prejudiced thereby. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688-692 (1984). To establish

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prejudice, movant must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466

U.S. at 694. 

Because Movant pleaded guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement, he can only

challenge counsel's ineffectiveness as it relates to the voluntariness of his plea. Tollett v.

Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973)("When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in

open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense of which he is charged, he may not thereafter

raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior

to the entry of the guilty plea. He may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the

guilty plea by showing that the advice he received from counsel was [deficient.]") The Ninth

Circuit recognizes that "[a] defendant who pleads guilty upon the advice of counsel may only

attack the voluntary and intelligent character of his guilty plea by showing that the advice he

received from counsel was not within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in

criminal cases." United States v Signori, 844 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1988). "Because of the

difficulties in evaluating attorney performance in hindsight, courts considering ineffective

counsel claims 'indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range

of reasonable professional assistance.'" Jeronimo, 398 F.3d at 1155 (quoting Strickland, 466

U.S. at 689). 

Movant claims that defense counsel advised him that if he pled guilty he would only

be sentenced to 24 months in prison. Movant has not submitted any evidence in support of that

claim and the record does not support Movant's allegations. Movant has not shown that counsel

provided deficient advice that rendered Movant's plea involuntary. Rather, the record

demonstrates that Movant was satisfied with counsel's advice and that he knowingly and

voluntarily pleaded guilty without force, threats, or promises. (document # 26) Movant advised

the Court that he understood the nature of the charge and that he voluntarily entered his guilty

plea without any force, threats or promises. (Id. at 9-15) He also advised the Court that he was

sure of his decision to plead guilty and that he was acting voluntarily. (Id. at 10-15) "Solemn

declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity." United States v. Rubalcaba,

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811 F.2d 491, 494 (9th Cir. 1986)(rejecting claim of involuntariness of guilty plea). 

Significantly, Movant advised the Court that counsel had discussed with him the nature and

range of possible sentences. (document # 26 at 14-19) Movant also acknowledged that counsel

had advised him of the possible sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines and that the

Guidelines are only advisory and not binding on the court. (document # 16 at 7; document #

26 at 14-16) 

Additionally, in the plea agreement itself, Movant acknowledged that he had read

the plea agreement and understood its provisions. (document # 16 at 7) The plea agreement

provided that the offense level and length of the sentence imposed would be determined by the

court based upon Movant's criminal record. (document # 16 at 4) Because he read the plea

agreement, Movant knew that under the plea agreement, a maximum sentence of 63 months

could be imposed depending on Movant's criminal. (document # 16 at 3) Movant also

acknowledged that the plea agreement contained all of the terms and conditions to which he and

the government had agreed. (Id. at 8) 

In accepting Movant's guilty plea, the Court noted that Movant had acknowledged

that he was guilty as charged, there was a factual basis for Movant's plea, he was aware of his

rights and waived those rights, and he did so knowingly and voluntarily. (document # 26 at 23-

24) Movant advised the Court that he was satisfied with counsel's representation in the

following exchange:

The Court: Are you satisfied with your lawyer's representation in this case?

Defendant Guizar: Yes.

The Court: Is there anything you think he should do that he hasn't done or anything

you want him to do that he hasn't done, Mr. Guizar?

Defendant Guizar: I'm fine with my lawyer.

(document # 26 at 9) Movant, while under oath, swore that he had read the plea agreement,

understood its terms, discussed it with counsel, and agreed to be bound by its terms. (document

# 26 at 12-14) Because the district court's plea colloquy adhered to the requirements of Rule

11, the plea was not unknowing or involuntary on its face. Jeronimo, 398 F.3d 1149, 1157.

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Because the point of Rule 11 is to ensure that a plea is knowing and voluntary, Rule 11 provides

authority for the decision that Movant's pleas was voluntary. Jeronimo, 398 F.3d at 1157(citing

Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)-(d) (2001) (provisions entitled "Advice to Defendant" and "Insuring That

the Plea is Voluntary"); Fed.R.Crim.P. 11 advisory committee's note, 1975 Enactment (amended

Rule 11(c) and (d) outline advice the court must give the defendant and "the steps that the court

must take to insure that a . . . plea has been voluntarily made.") The Ninth Circuit has stated that

"[a] colloquy satisfying Rule 11's requirements will lead to a plea being considered knowing and

voluntary, unless some misrepresentation or gross mischaracterization by counsel has tainted

the plea." Jeronimo, 398 F.3d at 1157. 

Movant has not established that counsel's performance was deficient or that counsel

made a "misrepresentation or gross mischaracterization" which tainted the plea. Id. Moreover,

the record does not contain any evidence suggesting that Movant was prejudiced by any acts

or omissions of counsel that fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Accordingly,

Movant's claim of ineffective assistance fails.

II. Criminal History 

Movant next argues that his criminal history is overstated because his prior

convictions are over ten years old. The government properly alleged prior convictions in this

case because there is no limit on the date of conviction to be considered in determining whether

a defendant should be deemed an aggravated felon pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2. "For purposes

of subsection (b)(1)(C), 'aggravated felony' has the meaning given that term in 8 U.S.C. §

1101(a)(43) without regard to the date of conviction for the aggravated felony." U.S.S.G. §

2L1.2, comment (n. 3). Additionally, there is no prohibition on calculating criminal history

points based on a conviction that is ten years old. "Any prior sentence of imprisonment

exceeding one year and one month that was imposed within fifteen years of the defendant's

commencement of that instant offense is counted." U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(e). 

Here, Movant was sentenced at a total offense level of 17, criminal history category

IV. (PSR ¶ 33; document # 25 at 8) Contrary to Movant's assertion, his 1986 conviction was not

used to calculate criminal history points. (document # 25 at 4) As a result of Movant's guilty

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plea, he received a 37-month sentence which is 20 months less than the 51-month minimum

recommended by the Guidelines. (document # 25 at 10-11) Thus, Movant benefitted by the plea

agreement. Movant's criminal history was not overstated, therefore, his claim fails. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Movant's claims fail and the Court should deny Movant’s

Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by Person in Federal Custody pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2255. 

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Movant’s Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or

Correct Sentence by Person in Federal Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (document # 17)

be DENIED. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court=s judgment. The parties

shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1); Rules 72, 6(a), 6(e),

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within which to file a

response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the

District Court without further review. See United States v. Reyna- Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121

(9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate

Judge will be considered a waiver of a party=s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in

an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge=s recommendation. See, Rule 72,

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 27th day of March, 2006.

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