Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-14-03576/USCOURTS-ca8-14-03576-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Brent Ballinger
Appellant
Cedar County
Appellee
John and Jane Does
Appellee
David Starbuck
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-3576

___________________________

Brent Ballinger

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Cedar County, Missouri; David Starbuck; John and Jane Does

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Springfield

____________

 Submitted: September 21, 2015

 Filed: January 14, 2016

____________

Before RILEY, Chief Judge, BYE and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

____________

RILEY, Chief Judge.

Brent Ballinger was serving an eight-year sentence in a Missouri Department

of Corrections (DOC) prison when a Missouri state court judge granted Ballinger’s

motion to vacate and set aside his conviction and sentence. The state court judge

ordered that Ballinger be remanded to the custody of the Cedar County Sheriff’s

Department. While awaiting transfer, Ballinger was placed in administrative

segregation, where, he contends, he spent approximately one year. Ballinger sued

Appellate Case: 14-3576 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/14/2016 Entry ID: 4355926 
Cedar County, the county sheriff, and several unnamed DOC employees, alleging a

deprivation of his constitutional rights. The district court granted the sheriff’s and

the county’s motion and dismissed Ballinger’s lawsuit for failure to state a claim.

1

Having jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we now affirm in part and reverse

in part. 

I. BACKGROUND2

On January 23, 2009, a jury convicted Ballinger of three felonies in Missouri

state court. See State v. Ballinger, 298 S.W.3d 572, 573 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009). He

was sentenced to eight years. On September 15, 2010, Ballinger filed in the Circuit

Court of Cedar County, Missouri, a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his

conviction and sentence under Missouri Supreme Court Rule 29.15, alleging he

received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. On December 8, 2010, a state court

judge granted Ballinger’s motion, ordering Ballinger’s judgment and sentence

“vacated and set aside.” The state court judge ordered that Ballinger “be remanded

to the custody of the Cedar County Sheriff’s Department for further proceedings in

[his] underlying case.” The state appealed. On November 15, 2011, the Missouri

Cedar County and Sheriff David Starbuck’s motion to dismiss did not include

1

the John and Jane Does, yet the district court included the John and Jane Does with

Cedar County and Sheriff Starbuck when granting their motion and dismissing all of

Ballinger’s claims. Ballinger never served the John and Jane Does and has not

pursued the Doe claims in the district court or on appeal. We, therefore, consider any

claims against the John and Jane Does abandoned. However, the John and Jane Does

should not have been included in the district court’s order dismissing Ballinger’s

claims because the Does were never before the district court. Accordingly, we

reverse and remand to dismiss those claims without prejudice. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

4(m).

“‘[W]e recite the facts as alleged in the complaint, viewing them in the light

2

most favorable to the plaintiff[.]’” Henley v. Brown, 686 F.3d 634, 636 n.1 (8th Cir.

2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Davenport v. Farmers Ins. Grp., 378 F.3d 839,

841 (8th Cir. 2004)).

-2-

Appellate Case: 14-3576 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/14/2016 Entry ID: 4355926 
Court of Appeals affirmed the order, and later the state’s motion for rehearing and

transfer to the Missouri Supreme Court was denied. 

Shortly after the state court judge first set aside Ballinger’s conviction, the

DOC, “per [the] court ruling overturning his sentence,” assigned Ballinger to

administrative segregation, which Ballinger refers to as “solitary confinement” and

“the hole.” Ballinger requested a classification hearing to find out how long he would

be kept in solitary confinement. At a hearing on January 27, 2011, a DOC

classification committee recommended Ballinger remain in administrative segregation

until March 24, 2011, “[p]ending . . . transfer by County.” Ballinger alleges in his

complaint he was kept in solitary confinement for at least one year.3

Ballinger filed this claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 against 

Cedar County Sheriff David Starbuck and DOC employees, who have been

designated as John and Jane Does (collectively, defendants), alleging constitutional 4

violations. Asserting he became a pretrial detainee when his conviction was 5

overturned, Ballinger alleges that the defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment

due process rights by leaving him in administrative segregation. Ballinger maintains

Ballinger claims the DOC classification committee held additional hearings

3

but nonetheless decided Ballinger should remain in solitary confinement. During oral

argument, Ballinger’s counsel explained it was “a little unclear as to exactly how

long” Ballinger spent in solitary confinement, but it was his allegation he was there

for approximately one year.

During oral argument Ballinger’s counsel explained he requested the names 4

of the employees on the DOC classification committee, but the DOC did not provide

them.

Ballinger originally brought claims under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 5

Amendments to the United States Constitution but does not argue his Fourth and

Eighth Amendment claims, so we consider them waived. See Chavero-Linares v.

Smith, 782 F.3d 1038, 1040 (8th Cir. 2015).

-3-

Appellate Case: 14-3576 Page: 3 Date Filed: 01/14/2016 Entry ID: 4355926 
Sheriff Starbuck, who knew orshould have knownBallinger would remain in solitary

confinement unless transferred, “purposely and maliciously refused to allow” Cedar

County employees to pick him up and take him to the Cedar County jail. Ballinger

asserts Cedar County, through its policy maker Sheriff Starbuck, maintained policies

that were deliberately indifferent to his Fourteenth Amendment rights. 

Sheriff Starbuck and Cedar County moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be

granted. Sheriff Starbuck and Cedar County argued Ballinger wasstill a prisoner and

did not suffer a significant or atypical hardship, as required when an inmate makes

a due process challenge. The district court granted the motion to dismiss. Ballinger

appeals.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

“‘Whether a complaint states a cause of action is a question of law which we

review on appeal de novo.’” Packard v. Darveau, 759 F.3d 897, 900 (8th Cir. 2014)

(quoting Miller v. Redwood Toxicology Lab., Inc., 688 F.3d 928, 936 (8th Cir.

2012)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations in a complaint,

assumed true, must suffice ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Northstar Indus., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 576 F.3d 827, 832 (8th Cir. 2009)

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

B. Ballinger’s Legal Status: Prisoner or Pretrial Detainee

Prisoners’ and pretrial detainees’ constitutional claims are analyzed under

different standards. See Morris v. Zefferi, 601 F.3d 805, 809 (8th Cir. 2010). 

Generally, while a pretrial detainee is presumed innocent and may not be punished,

see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979); Smith v. Copeland, 87 F.3d 265, 268

(8th Cir. 1996), a prisoner must demonstrate he has suffered “atypical and significant

hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life” to establish a claim

-4-

Appellate Case: 14-3576 Page: 4 Date Filed: 01/14/2016 Entry ID: 4355926 
under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process clause, Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S.

472, 484 (1995). Because the applicable constitutionalstandard depends on whether

Ballinger was a prisoner or a pretrial detainee during the time relevant to his claims,

we first must determine his legal status.

Ballinger argues he became a pretrial detainee when his conviction was

overturned and the defendants punished him by keeping him in solitary confinement. 

The district court decided Ballinger was still a prisoner. The district court relied on

Missouri Supreme Court Rule 30.17, a rule of appellate criminal procedure that

establishes what happens to a defendant when the state appeals a postconviction

order. The rule states:

If an appeal istaken by the state, such appealshall not stay the operation

of an order or judgment in favor of the defendant. . . . This Rule 30.17

shall not apply to an appeal taken by the state from an order entered in

a proceeding under . . . Rule 29.15, but in such case, if the defendant is

in custody, he shall remain in custody during the pendency ofthe appeal.

Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 30.17 (emphasis added). The district court determined, because

Ballinger’s conviction was overturned pursuant to Rule 29.15 and the state appealed

while Ballinger was in custody, “under Rule 30.17, [Ballinger] was to remain in

custody while the state’s appeal was pending.”

Ballinger argues Rule 30.17 is not dispositive because it issilent asto the legal

status of the defendant—“only requir[ing] that he remain in custody.” Analogizing

to a successful habeas petition, Ballinger asserts there is no reason he should be

“entitled to any less status than a person that has had [his] murder conviction

overturned as the result of a habeas proceeding.” Ballinger offers two Missouri

habeas casesin support of his position. In both Ferguson v. Dormire, 413 S.W.3d 40,

73 n.51 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013), and State ex rel. Koster v. Green, 388 S.W.3d 603, 605

-5-

Appellate Case: 14-3576 Page: 5 Date Filed: 01/14/2016 Entry ID: 4355926 
n.2 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012), the Missouri Court of Appeals ruled when a prisoner’s

conviction is vacated through habeas relief, the prisoner’s legal status returns to the

status of a pretrial detainee. 

Though these habeas cases do suggest a prisoner may in some circumstances

regain pretrial detainee status, neither of the convictions in Green or Ferguson were

vacated pursuant to Rule 29.15. See Ferguson, 413 S.W.3d at 73; Green, 388 S.W.3d

at 605. As the district court noted, this is a critical distinction because Rule 30.17

expressly does not apply when the state appeals an order entered under Rule 29.15. 

Further, the state cannot appeal from a grant of a writ of habeas corpus, see Ferguson,

413 S.W.3d at 50 (noting that when a Missouri circuit court grants a petition for a

writ of habeas corpus, the state’s “only recourse is to seek review by filing a petition

for writ of certiorari”), so it appears Rule 30.17 would not apply to Green or Ferguson

at all. 

Unlike habeas, Rule 29.15(k) authorizesthe state to appeal an order sustaining

or overruling a motion filed under the rule. Rule 30.17 states, “If an appeal is taken

by the state, such appeal shall not stay the operation of an order or judgment in favor

of the defendant. . . . This Rule 30.17 shall not apply to an appeal taken by the state

from an order entered in a proceeding under . . . Rule 29.15.” We read the rule’s

exception plainly to provide that an appeal by the state from an order under Rule

29.15 does stay the operation of the order. Here, the state court judge vacated

Ballinger’s judgment and sentence in an order entered in a proceeding under Rule

29.15, and the state appealed. Because the order was stayed by the appeal and

Ballinger’s conviction and sentence were not in fact vacated, he remained a prisoner

while the appeal was pending and did not regain the status of a pretrial detainee. See

Crane v. Logli, 992 F.2d 136, 139 (7th Cir. 1993) (“Bell does not require us to hold

that [the plaintiff] became a pretrial detainee, in a constitutional sense, once his

conviction was reversed.”); cf. Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 241-42 (3d

Cir. 1999) (concluding the intermediate reversal of a conviction did not take

-6-

Appellate Case: 14-3576 Page: 6 Date Filed: 01/14/2016 Entry ID: 4355926 
immediate effect and was not final under applicable state law until a petition for

further review was acted upon and the automatic stay on that reversal expired). 

C. Ballinger’s Due Process Claims

Ballinger alleges the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his due process

rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by keeping him in solitary confinement for

approximately one year. While in solitary confinement, Ballinger declares he

experienced different conditions than inmates in the general population, including

“[c]omplete isolation from the general population” and limited access to showers,

social interaction, a telephone, and exercise. As a result of extended solitary

confinement, Ballinger claims he “has been diagnosed with Post-Traumatic Stress

Disorder” and “has suffered emotional distress.”

“[T]o prevail on a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim, [Ballinger] must

first demonstrate that he was deprived of life, liberty or property by government

action.” Phillips v. Norris, 320 F.3d 844, 846 (8th Cir. 2003). Because we agree with

the district court that Ballinger remained a prisoner while he was in solitary

confinement, Ballinger “must identify conditionsthat impose ‘atypical orsignificant

hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life’” to establish his

deprivation of liberty claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. Orr v. Larkins, 610

F.3d 1032, 1034 (8th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (alteration in original) (quoting Sandin,

515 U.S. at 484).

The district court found Ballinger failed to plead how “being placed in solitary

confinement was an atypical and significant hardship such that his due process rights

were violated,” and denied Ballinger’s request to amend his complaint, stating doing

so “would be futile.” Notably, the district court considered Ballinger’s time spent in

solitary confinement as “approximately three months.” While Ballinger pled he was

in solitary confinement continuously from sometime in late December 2010 “until at

least March 24, 2011,” he later stated he “remained in the hole for at least one year.”

-7-

Appellate Case: 14-3576 Page: 7 Date Filed: 01/14/2016 Entry ID: 4355926 
On appeal from a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, we assume Ballinger’s factual allegations

are true. See Northstar, 576 F.3d at 832. Therefore, we assume Ballinger spent

approximately one year in administrative segregation. 

But any error the district court made by failing to consider the greater length

of time Ballinger alleges he was kept in solitary confinement does not change the

result. “‘We have consistently held that a demotion to [administrative] segregation, 

even without cause, is not itself an atypical and significant hardship.’” Orr, 610 F.3d

at 1034 (quoting Phillips, 320 F.3d at 847) (deciding a prisoner was not deprived of

a liberty interest during a nine-month stay in administrative segregation); accord

Portley-El v. Brill, 288 F.3d 1063, 1065 (8th Cir. 2002) (repeating “administrative

and disciplinary segregation are not atypical and significant hardships under

Sandin”).

There is “no liberty interest in avoiding administrative segregation unless the

conditions of . . . confinement ‘present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in

which a state might conceivably create a liberty interest.’” Wycoff v. Nichols,

94 F.3d 1187, 1190 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486). The

conditions Ballinger experienced in solitary confinement were not materially different

from other cases in which we have declined to find a liberty interest. Cf. Kennedy v.

Blankenship, 100 F.3d 640, 643 (8th Cir. 1996) (declaring a “transfer from

administrative segregation to punitive isolation was not ‘a dramatic departure from

the basic conditions’ of [a prisoner’s] confinement”) (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at

486)); Rahman X v. Morgan, 300 F.3d 970, 973-74 (8th Cir. 2002) (reasoning that

although a twenty-six-month assignment to a segregation cell “was substantial, [the

defendant] was not subject to the hardships that prisoners placed in that ward for

punitive reasons face” and “was given sufficient process by the prison officials”). As

a prisoner, Ballinger has not sufficiently alleged he was deprived of a liberty interest

under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process clause.

-8-

Appellate Case: 14-3576 Page: 8 Date Filed: 01/14/2016 Entry ID: 4355926 
III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the district court’s dismissal of Ballinger’s claims against Cedar

County and Sheriff Starbuck. We reverse the district court in part and remand with

instructionsto dismiss without prejudice Ballinger’s claims against the John and Jane

Does.

______________________________

-9-

Appellate Case: 14-3576 Page: 9 Date Filed: 01/14/2016 Entry ID: 4355926