Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02752/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02752-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
William Festus Coker
Plaintiff
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM FESTUS COKER, No. 2:14-CV-2752-CMK

Plaintiff, 

vs. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL

SECURITY,

Defendant.

 /

Plaintiff, who is proceeding with retained counsel, brings this action under 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. 

Pursuant to the written consent of all parties, this case is before the undersigned as the presiding

judge for all purposes, including entry of final judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Pending

before the court are plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 14) and defendant’s crossmotion for summary judgment (Doc. 15). 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff applied for social security benefits on July 27, 2011. Plaintiff’s claim

was initially denied. Following denial of reconsideration, plaintiff requested an administrative

hearing, which was held on March 7, 2013, before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Peter F.

Belli. At the hearing, plaintiff alleged that his disability began on September 6, 2011. In a May

29, 2013, decision, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff is not disabled based on the following

relevant findings:

1. The claimant has the following severe impairment(s): degenerative disc

disease, depressive disorder, and anxiety disorder;

2. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments

that meets or medically equals an impairment listed in the regulations;

3. The claimant has the following residual functional capacity: The claimant

can perform light work; he is able to occasionally stoop, crouch, crawl,

and kneel, he is restricted from balancing, climbing, ladders, ropes, and

scaffolds, and from exposure to unprotected heights and machinery; he has

no limits on remembering and carrying out simple job instructions and is

able to remember and carry out detailed or complex instructions

occasionally; he is able to interact appropriately with the public, coworkers, and supervisors; he is able to make judgments on normal work

activities; he is able to adjust to changes in the workplace;

4. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, residual

functional capacity, and vocational expert testimony, there are jobs that

exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can

perform.

After the Appeals Council declined review on September 24, 2014, this appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The court reviews the Commissioner’s final decision to determine whether it is: 

(1) based on proper legal standards; and (2) supported by substantial evidence in the record as a

whole. See Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). “Substantial evidence” is

more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. See Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521

(9th Cir. 1996). It is “. . . such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

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support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971). The record as a whole,

including both the evidence that supports and detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion, must

be considered and weighed. See Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th Cir. 1986); Jones

v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). The court may not affirm the Commissioner’s

decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. See Hammock v.

Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). If substantial evidence supports the administrative

findings, or if there is conflicting evidence supporting a particular finding, the finding of the

Commissioner is conclusive. See Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Therefore, where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of

which supports the Commissioner’s decision, the decision must be affirmed, see Thomas v.

Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002), and may be set aside only if an improper legal

standard was applied in weighing the evidence, see Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th

Cir. 1988). 

III. DISCUSSION

In his motion for summary judgment, plaintiff argues: (1) the ALJ failed to

provide sufficient reasons for rejecting his testimony as not credible; and (2) the ALJ failed to

provide sufficient reasons for rejecting the opinion of treating doctor Anita Blosser, M.D.

A. Credibility Assessment

The Commissioner determines whether a disability applicant is credible, and the

court defers to the Commissioner’s discretion if the Commissioner used the proper process and

provided proper reasons. See Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1996). An explicit

credibility finding must be supported by specific, cogent reasons. See Rashad v. Sullivan, 903

F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1990). General findings are insufficient. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d

821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995). Rather, the Commissioner must identify what testimony is not credible

and what evidence undermines the testimony. See id. Moreover, unless there is affirmative

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evidence in the record of malingering, the Commissioner’s reasons for rejecting testimony as not

credible must be “clear and convincing.” See id.; see also Carmickle v. Commissioner, 533 F.3d

1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Lingenfelter v Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1936 (9th Cir. 2007),

and Gregor v. Barnhart, 464 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir. 2006)). 

If there is objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment, the

Commissioner may not discredit a claimant’s testimony as to the severity of symptoms merely

because they are unsupported by objective medical evidence. See Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d

341, 347-48 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). As the Ninth Circuit explained in Smolen v. Chater:

The claimant need not produce objective medical evidence of the

[symptom] itself, or the severity thereof. Nor must the claimant produce

objective medical evidence of the causal relationship between the

medically determinable impairment and the symptom. By requiring that

the medical impairment “could reasonably be expected to produce” pain or

another symptom, the Cotton test requires only that the causal relationship

be a reasonable inference, not a medically proven phenomenon. 

80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to the test established in

Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

The Commissioner may, however, consider the nature of the symptoms alleged,

including aggravating factors, medication, treatment, and functional restrictions. See Bunnell,

947 F.2d at 345-47. In weighing credibility, the Commissioner may also consider: (1) the

claimant’s reputation for truthfulness, prior inconsistent statements, or other inconsistent

testimony; (2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a

prescribed course of treatment; (3) the claimant’s daily activities; (4) work records; and (5)

physician and third-party testimony about the nature, severity, and effect of symptoms. See

Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284 (citations omitted). It is also appropriate to consider whether the

claimant cooperated during physical examinations or provided conflicting statements concerning

drug and/or alcohol use. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2002). If the

claimant testifies as to symptoms greater than would normally be produced by a given

impairment, the ALJ may disbelieve that testimony provided specific findings are made. See

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Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1161 (citing Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 1989)). 

Regarding reliance on a claimant’s daily activities to find testimony of disabling

pain not credible, the Social Security Act does not require that disability claimants be utterly

incapacitated. See Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 602 (9th Cir. 1989). The Ninth Circuit has

repeatedly held that the “. . . mere fact that a plaintiff has carried out certain daily activities . . .

does not . . .[necessarily] detract from her credibility as to her overall disability.” See Orn v.

Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 639 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Vertigan v. Heller, 260 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th

Cir. 2001)); see also Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1488 (9th Cir. 1986) (observing that a

claim of pain-induced disability is not necessarily gainsaid by a capacity to engage in periodic

restricted travel); Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984) (concluding that the

claimant was entitled to benefits based on constant leg and back pain despite the claimant’s

ability to cook meals and wash dishes); Fair, 885 F.2d at 603 (observing that “many home

activities are not easily transferable to what may be the more grueling environment of the

workplace, where it might be impossible to periodically rest or take medication”). Daily

activities must be such that they show that the claimant is “. . .able to spend a substantial part of

his day engaged in pursuits involving the performance of physical functions that are transferable

to a work setting.” Fair, 885 F.2d at 603. The ALJ must make specific findings in this regard

before relying on daily activities to find a claimant’s pain testimony not credible. See Burch v.

Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005). 

In assessing plaintiff’s credibility, the ALJ outlined the following testimony:

. . .[T]he claimant testified that he has experienced three back injuries

(1999, 2007, and August 2011) and feels that he has been totally disabled

since then and not able to work full-time. He reported that he has constant

back pain, has to change position, and is bipolar and depressed. He noted

that he is optimistic about his future, has gone to Shasta College from

January to June, and has plans to go back. He stated that he works very

part-time and hopes to get back to full-time work in the future. He

reported that he lives at a homeless shelter with three others and gets along

well with them. He noted that he cooks for himself, makes his bed, and

does laundry. He stated that he walks several blocks to the grocery store

and carries the groceries home. He reported that his kids visit him and that

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he volunteers at the homeless shelter twice a week and cleans toilets and

moves boxes and furniture. He noted that he picks up his daughter who

weighs 30 pounds and cooks for his kids. 

The claimant stated that he sometimes wears a back brace, takes Depakote,

Sertaline, Cymbalta, Abilify, and Norco and has no trouble from his

medications. He reported that he sometimes feels dizzy. He noted that he

has not had any back surgery and none is scheduled. He noted that he has

groin and leg pressure from an injury in the Navy, back pain, migraines,

depression, and anxiety, and cannot work because he cannot reach, sit for

over an hour, or relax, but can walk for at least a mile at one time. He

stated that he could work an eight-your day for 40 hours per week if he had

the option to sit or stand, but because of depression, he may call in and not

show up. 

Additionally, the ALJ considered a third-party statement:

The undersigned has also considered the observations of the claimant’s exwife, Melinda Casey, as expressed in a Third Party Function Report (Ex.

5E) and finds that, while they are essentially credible, they do not support

a conclusion that the claimant is precluded from all work activity. Ms.

Casey largely reiterated the claimant’s description of his daily activities

and limitations as described above and in Ex. 3E. Ms. Casey noted that

the claimant helps with the kids by playing on the floor with them,

changing diapers, and cooking for them. 

 

In finding plaintiff’s allegations of totally disabling pain not credible, the ALJ provided the

following rationale:

In terms of the claimant’s alleged debilitation due to back issues and

depression, the record shows a history of chronic low back pain with past

radiographic studies indicating either a T10 or L1 wedge fracture. 

However, the claimant’s physical function is good with normal joint range

of motion and no neurological deficits. He is able to walk, move about

normally, and use his arms, hands, and legs in a satisfactory manner. The

claimant walks, rides a bicycle, uses public transportation, carries

groceries several blocks, and actively plays with and cares for his three

preschool children. Although he may be precluded from very heavy

lifting, he frequently performs light-medium lifting when he routinely lifts

his preschool children and when volunteering at a homeless shelter. 

Despite becoming depressed and anxious at times, the claimant is able to

think, communicate, act in his own interests, adjust to ordinary emotional

stresses, get along with others, do his usual activities, and remember and

follow basic instructions. Mentally, the claimant is able to perform simple

repetitive tasks, make simple decisions, and keeps a schedule despite

occasional feelings of depression and anxiety. The claimant has submitted

many job applications and has attended Shasta College. He reported to Dr.

Blosser of Tehama County Health in October 2011 that he had “gotten

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himself together” and was beginning to move on by getting himself

disability, as he wanted to go back to school and get a desk job. 

Apparently, the claimant had been working with a vocational rehabilitation

counselor who said that he could qualify for a desk job once he earned a

two-year degree (Ex. 11F & 18F). 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly relied on his activities of daily living in

determining that his testimony was not credible. According to plaintiff: “The ALJ may not rely

on evidence of activities that do not contradict the claimant’s testimony or fail to meet a

threshold of having application in the work setting.” Plaintiff adds: “Simply put, evidence that a

claimant can participate in basic human function” is not determinative. Plaintiff repeatedly

stresses that the Social Security Act does not require claimants to vegetate in a dark room. 

Plaintiff’s argument is unpersuasive. As discussed above, in assessing credibility

the ALJ may cite daily activities that show the claimant is “. . .able to spend a substantial part of

his day engaged in pursuits involving the performance of physical functions that are transferable

to a work setting.” Fair, 885 F.2d at 603. In this case, the ALJ cited such activities. For

example, the ALJ noted that plaintiff reported walking several blocks for groceries and carrying

the groceries home. Walking and carrying are both work-related physical functions. Similarly,

plaintiff reported lifting his child frequently. Again, lifting is a work-related function. Plaintiff

also reported moving furniture and boxes for the homeless shelter. Finally, plaintiff testified that

he had frequently worked part-time jobs and had hopes of returning to full-time work at a desk

job.

Likewise, as to alleged mental limitations, the ALJ cited daily activities directly

bearing on work-related functions. For example, plaintiff reported he had attended classes at

Shasta College, indicating an ability to follow instructions and complete tasks. Plaintiff also

reported that he gets along well with people around him, indicating an ability to get along with

co-workers, supervisors, and the public, which are work-related functions. 

/ / /

/ / /

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B. Evaluation of Medical Opinions

The weight given to medical opinions depends in part on whether they are

proffered by treating, examining, or non-examining professionals. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d

821, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1995). Ordinarily, more weight is given to the opinion of a treating

professional, who has a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual,

than the opinion of a non-treating professional. See id.; Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1285

(9th Cir. 1996); Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 1987). The least weight is given

to the opinion of a non-examining professional. See Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 502, 506 & n.4

(9th Cir. 1990).

In addition to considering its source, to evaluate whether the Commissioner

properly rejected a medical opinion the court considers whether: (1) contradictory opinions are

in the record; and (2) clinical findings support the opinions. The Commissioner may reject an 

uncontradicted opinion of a treating or examining medical professional only for “clear and

convincing” reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 831. 

While a treating professional’s opinion generally is accorded superior weight, if it is contradicted

by an examining professional’s opinion which is supported by different independent clinical

findings, the Commissioner may resolve the conflict. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035,

1041 (9th Cir. 1995). A contradicted opinion of a treating or examining professional may be

rejected only for “specific and legitimate” reasons supported by substantial evidence. See Lester,

81 F.3d at 830. This test is met if the Commissioner sets out a detailed and thorough summary of

the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, states her interpretation of the evidence, and makes a

finding. See Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751-55 (9th Cir. 1989). Absent specific and

legitimate reasons, the Commissioner must defer to the opinion of a treating or examining

professional. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. The opinion of a non-examining professional,

without other evidence, is insufficient to reject the opinion of a treating or examining

professional. See id. at 831. In any event, the Commissioner need not give weight to any

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conclusory opinion supported by minimal clinical findings. See Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111,

1113 (9th Cir. 1999) (rejecting treating physician’s conclusory, minimally supported opinion);

see also Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751. 

As to Dr. Blosser, who was plaintiff’s treating doctor at Tehama County Mental

Health, the ALJ stated:

In November 2011, Dr. Blosser said MRI reports were not as bad as the

claimant was hoping, as he wanted to obtain disability income so he could

go back to school as he had made 600 job applications without a single hit. 

Specifically, a thoracic MRI revealed an old appearing fracture involving

the anterior aspect of the T11 and a very small posterior disc protrusion at

T5-6 that was causing mild central canal stenosis. A lumbar MRI revealed

small disc protrusions at L3-4 and L4-5 that were broad based, but worse

on the left and were causing mild lateral recess stenosis and neural

foramen compromise and small disc protrusion into the inferior endplate

of L1 with a small anterior disc bulge, a small annulus tear and an

osteophyte developing on the anterior inferior aspect of the L1 vertebral

body (Ex. 5F). Dr. Blosser prescribed Cymbalta and the claimant was

doing better by December 2011. Sleep had improved. Dr. Blosser

diagnosed chronic back pain and depression/anxiety. She gave the

claimant a list of muscle relaxants to research and (again) referred him to a

back specialist. She also prescribed more Cymbalta and referred the

claimant to mental health (Ex. 11F). 

* * *

Dr. Blosser completed a Lumbar/Thoracic Medical Source Statement

Questionnaire in July 2012 in which she found the claimant limited to less

than sedentary work, subject to good and bad days and likely to be absent

for three or more days per month due to arthritis, degenerative disc

disease, and old spinal fracture. Dr. Blosser assessed that the claimant

probably could continue to study with adequate pain medication, but will

always require frequent changes of position and would likely worsen with

time. She noted that the claimant could no longer do physical labor, which

had been his source of income, and that pain occasionally interferes with

attention and concentration (Ex. 14F). The undersigned assigns minimal

weight to Dr. Blosser’s assessment, as it is not supported by the claimant’s

activities of daily living and the remainder of the evidence of record. 

Plaintiff appears to argue that the ALJ’s rationale for rejecting Dr. Blosser’s

opinions – because they were inconsistent with plaintiff’s own statements as to his daily

activities – is flawed because “William Coker testified consistent with what Dr. Blosser opined.”

This “argument” is premised on the notion that plaintiff’s subjective complaints provide

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objective evidence supporting a doctor’s opinion. To the contrary, where a doctor’s opinion is

supported only by subjective complaints, the ALJ may reject it. 

In any event, the court finds no error in the ALJ’s analysis. Notably, Dr. Blosser

opined that plaintiff could no longer perform physical labor. This opinion is clearly inconsistent

with plaintiff’s own statements that he performs part-time jobs, attends college classes, rides a

bike, and can move boxes and furniture. By outlining the daily activities contradicting Dr.

Blosser’s opinion, the ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons supported by the record for

rejecting the doctor’s assessment. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that the Commissioner’s final

decision is based on substantial evidence and proper legal analysis. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY

ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 14) is denied;

2. Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment (Doc. 15) is granted; and

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment and close this file.

DATED: March 21, 2016

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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