Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-07822/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-07822-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sandy Phillips
Defendant
Kirstin Ridgway
Plaintiff
Soley Performance Limited
Defendant

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KIRSTIN RIDGWAY,

Plaintiff,

v.

SANDY PHILLIPS, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-07822-HSG 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. Nos. 49

Pending before the Court is Defendant Sandy Phillips’s motion for summary judgment. 

Dkt. No. 49. For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN 

PART the motion. 

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Kirstin Ridgway initially filed this action in Sonoma County Superior Court 

against Defendant Phillips, individually and “doing business as” Soley Performance Limited 

(“Soley”). See generally Dkt. No. 1-1. Defendant Phillips removed the action to this Court and 

filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and based on form non conveniens. Dkt. 

Nos. 1, 7. The Court denied Defendant’s motion, but found that to the extent Plaintiff was 

attempting to join Soley as a separate defendant, Soley was not properly named as a defendant in 

this action. Dkt. No. 26. On May 13, 2019, after considering the parties’ proposed schedule, the 

Court set a case schedule with a fact discovery deadline of October 28, 2019, expert discovery 

deadline of December 12, 2019, and dispositive motion filing deadline of December 22, 2019. 

Dkt. No. 31. 

On July 8, 2019, Plaintiff filed the operative first amended complaint, this time purporting 

to name Soley as a separate defendant. See generally Dkt. No. 33 (“FAC”). Defendant Phillips 

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moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s FAC and noticed the motion for a hearing on December 19, 2019. 

Dkt. No. 39. Although the hearing was noticed for a date after the discovery deadline, and only a 

few days before the dispositive motions filing deadline, the parties did not seek to expedite the 

motion to dismiss hearing or extend discovery and subsequent deadlines. 

Defendant Phillips filed her motion for summary judgment on December 22, 2019. Dkt. 

No. 49. The Court held a hearing on the motion on January 30, 2020. Dkt. No. 54. Given the 

parties’ case schedule, by the time Defendant filed her motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff 

presumably has had a full opportunity to conduct discovery on all her claims in the FAC (even 

claims the Court may have found to be deficient). In light of this, and because the parties raise 

similar arguments at the summary judgment stage, the Court denied Defendant’s motions to 

dismiss and to strike. Dkt. Nos. 55, 56. 

The Court now turns to the motion for summary judgment to determine whether there are 

genuine issues of material fact, even assuming arguendo (without deciding) that all of Plaintiff’s

claims were sufficiently pled. 

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Court briefly recounts the facts in the record, viewed in the light most favorable to 

Plaintiff, the nonmoving party, as it must at the summary judgment stage. See Tolan v. Cotton, 

572 U.S. 650, 651 (2014); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) 

(“The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn 

in his favor.”).

Soley is a private limited liability company incorporated under the laws of England. Dkt. 

No. 49-3, Declaration of Sandy Phillips (“Phillips Decl.”) ¶ 3; id., Ex. 1. 1 Defendant Phillips is 

domiciled in the United Kingdom and is the sole shareholder of Soley. Id. ¶ 2. As a member of 

Soley, Defendant Phillips’s liability is “limited to the amount, if any, unpaid on the shares held by 

[her].” Ex. 1 at PHILLIPS_000005 (Articles of Association of Soley). Soley is in the equine 

1 All numbered exhibits referenced are attached to the Phillips Declaration and Declaration of 

Ryan C. Wood, Dkt. No. 49-2 (“Wood Decl.”), and all lettered exhibits referenced are attached to 

the Declaration of Kirstin Ridgway, Dkt. No. 51 (“Ridgway Decl.”). 

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industry, and Defendant Phillips, as director of Soley, manages the company’s business and 

oversees the upkeep, training, and competition schedules of horses in Soley’s care. Phillips Decl. 

¶ 4. 

In April 2016, Defendant Phillips contacted Plaintiff and solicited her “to breed her 

Olympic mare, Lara, and another mare named[ ] Riverdance, to produce two foals.” Ridgway 

Decl. ¶ 4. In April 2016, through a text message to Defendant Phillips, Plaintiff confirmed that 

she desired to “go ahead with breeding Lara and Riverdance.” Id. ¶ 5. Defendant Phillips then 

emailed Plaintiff on May 16, 2016, stating that they needed “to get going on the breeding!!” Ex. 

3. A little over a week later on May 27, 2016, Defendant Phillips followed up with Plaintiff to 

confirm whether she still wanted to proceed with the breeding:

Just confirming that you want to go ahead with the breeding of Lara 

and Riverdance. 

They can be inseminated here with my local vet and the embryo 

transfer is done by Beaufort Embryo Transfer who has done all my 

work over the years and knows the mares very well. 

You can pay Beaufort and the local vet directly. 

The summer keep for the mares is £12 per day, the winter keep is 

£22, and the timing of when they start winter keep depends on the 

weather. 

We try to keep them out as long as possible. 

The cost of the embryo for Lara is £12,000[.] 

The cost of the embryo for Riverdance is £8,000[.]

Please confirm what stallions you want to use and we can organise 

it. 

For Lara, Sir Donnerhall and Fursten Look are very good[.]

For Riverdance, she works really well with my stallion, Diamond 

Design, by Diamond Hit -- she makes very big babies so don't put 

her to anything too big!!

Ex. 4. Plaintiff responded on June 3, 2016 stating, “I’d like to move forward.” Ex. 5. That same 

day, Defendant Phillips emailed Plaintiff to inform her that they will “just need to know what 

stallions” Plaintiff wanted for breeding with Lara and Riverdance. Ex. 6. Defendant Phillips also 

clarified that Beaufort Embryo Transfer would email Plaintiff directly “with contracts” so Plaintiff 

could pay it directly. Id. Once Defendant Phillips knew the selected stallions, Plaintiff could “pay 

direct,” and Defendant Phillips would have “my accountant [ ] send you details for the mares.” Id. 

Defendant Phillips’s May 16, May 27, and June 3 emails were sent from a 

“sandy@equiland.co.uk” email address. Exs. 3–5. 

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Martin Green, the “Book Keeper for Soley Performance Limited,” emailed Plaintiff on 

June 8, 2016, telling her that “Sandy Phillips has asked me to send you the two attached invoices. 

One is for an embryo from Lara and the other is for an embryo from Riverdance.” Ex. 7. The two 

attached invoices, invoice 1844 and 1845, are made out to “Kirstin Ridgway” and contain a header 

prominently displaying the name “SOLEY PERFORMANCE LIMITED.” Id. The invoices also 

contain wiring instructions to Soley’s bank accounts. Id.

On June 13, 2016, Plaintiff sent Defendant Phillips a text message confirming that she 

“[g]ot the email from Martin.” Ex. 2 at 2-045. A few days later, Defendant Phillips then 

requested that Plaintiff “confirm when funds have been sent and whether in dollars or pounds.” 

Id. Plaintiff responded with: “I need to crunch the numbers again. I don’t know if I’m going to be 

able to swing it this year. ... Next year would probably be better if that is a possibility.” Id. at 2-

046. However, on June 23, 2016, Plaintiff initiated the wire transfers, with her bank account 

listing “SOLEY PERFORMANCE LIMITED” as the recipient and payment for invoice 1844 and 

1845. Ex. F. Plaintiff admits that she “received numerous invoices” from June 3, 2016 through 

February 2018, “some from Soley Performance Limited, some from Beaufort Embryo Transfer, 

and others, related to costs and fees for the breeding and upkeep of Defendant Sandy Phillips’ two 

mares, Lara and Riverdance.” Ridgway Decl. ¶ 10; see also Ex. G.

Lara was unable to produce an embryo, so in September 2016, Plaintiff agreed to “stop 

trying to breed Lara, and receive a refund of the deposit monies that [she] had paid in June 2016 to 

breed Lara, namely 12,000 British pounds.” Ridgway Decl. ¶ 12; see also Phillips Decl. ¶ 23. 

Sadly, Lara was humanely euthanized in December 2016. Phillips Decl. ¶ 24. The other mare, 

Riverdance, became pregnant in 2016. Id. ¶ 27. In July 2017, Defendant Phillips texted Plaintiff 

the news that Riverdance delivered her foal. Id. ¶ 28. The parties began disputing the terms of 

payment, and eventually Defendant Phillips sold the colt. Id. ¶¶ 39–48; Ridgway Decl. ¶¶ 11–13. 

Plaintiff’s FAC alleges that Defendants allegedly breached the contract by selling the 

offspring of Riverdance to another buyer, “even though Plaintiff had already paid Defendant more 

than $57,524.00 for the ownership of said foal.” FAC ¶ 12. Plaintiff also brings a fraud claim and 

a claim seeking “imposition of constructive trust for unjust enrichment / alter ego / piercing the 

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corporate veil and an accounting.” Id. ¶¶ 14–28. She seeks compensatory damages in the amount 

of $57,524.52, punitive damages, prejudgment interest, and costs. FAC at 7. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper when a “movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to 

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. And a dispute is “genuine” if there is evidence in the record sufficient 

for a reasonable trier of fact to decide in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. But in deciding if a 

dispute is genuine, the court must view the inferences reasonably drawn from the materials in the 

record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith 

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587–88 (1986), and “may not weigh the evidence or make credibility 

determinations,” Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled on other 

grounds by Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884–85 (9th Cir. 2008). If a court finds that there is 

no genuine dispute of material fact as to only a single claim or defense or as to part of a claim or 

defense, it may enter partial summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

With respect to summary judgment procedure, the moving party always bears both the 

ultimate burden of persuasion and the initial burden of producing those portions of the pleadings, 

discovery, and affidavits that show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. 

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the moving party will not bear the burden of proof on 

an issue at trial, it “must either produce evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving 

party’s claim or defense or show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an 

essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. 

Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). Where the moving party will bear the 

burden of proof on an issue at trial, it must also show that no reasonable trier of fact could not find 

in its favor. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. In either case, the movant “may not require the nonmoving 

party to produce evidence supporting its claim or defense simply by saying that the nonmoving 

party has no such evidence.” Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1105. “If a moving party fails to carry its 

initial burden of production, the nonmoving party has no obligation to produce anything, even if 

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the nonmoving party would have the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Id. at 1102–03. 

“If, however, a moving party carries its burden of production, the nonmoving party must 

produce evidence to support its claim or defense.” Id. at 1103. In doing so, the nonmoving party 

“must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” 

Matsushita Elec., 475 U.S. at 586. A nonmoving party must also “identify with reasonable 

particularity the evidence that precludes summary judgment,” because the duty of the courts is not 

to “scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact.” Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 

1279 (9th Cir. 1996). If a nonmoving party fails to produce evidence that supports its claim or 

defense, courts must enter summary judgment in favor of the movant. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Defendant Soley

As an initial matter, there is no evidence that Plaintiff ever served Soley in compliance 

with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4. 2 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4(f)(1) and 4(h)(2)

govern service of process on a foreign corporation, partnership, or association. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

4(f), 4(h)(2). Under Rule 4(f)(1), service on a foreign corporation may be made “by any 

internationally agreed means of service that is reasonably calculated to give notice, such as those 

authorized by the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial 

Documents.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(1). 

Rule 4(m)’s requirement that a complaint be served within 90 days after filing does not 

apply to service in a foreign country. Lucas v. Natoli, 936 F.2d 432, 432–33 (9th Cir. 1991); see 

also Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). However, a court may impose a reasonable time limit for service upon 

a foreign defendant when complying with the Hague Convention. Zehavi v. Reef, No. 18-CV06394-EJD, 2019 WL 917423, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2019) (citations omitted). Here, Plaintiff

2 Plaintiff filed a “Certificate of Service,” stating that counsel “transmitted the Plaintiff’s First 

Amended Complaint ... using the CM/ECF System ... to the CM/ECF registrants on record.” 

Dkt. No. 34. But the Court’s CM/ECF system is not a substitute for service of the initial 

complaint and summons. Civ. L.R. 5-1(d) (“Upon the filing of a complaint or other case-initiating 

document, whether manually or electronically, the plaintiff shall manually serve upon the 

defendant along with the complaint, the ECF Registration Information Handout ....” (emphasis 

added)).

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has had over eight months to complete service on Soley. At the January 30, 2020 hearing, 

Plaintiff’s counsel explained that he had not served Soley because of the complexities and expense 

of serving a foreign corporation. But Plaintiff knew Soley’s status as a foreign entity when she 

named Soley as a Defendant in her FAC. And although Plaintiff’s counsel represented that he has 

attempted to serve Soley, there is no evidence in the record that Plaintiff is in the process of 

complying with Hague Convention requirements. Nor did Plaintiff ever seek an extension to serve 

Soley, request alternative service, or respond to defense counsel’s proposals concerning service. 

See Dkt. No. 49-2, Declaration of Ryan C. Wood (“Wood Decl.”), Ex. 16. At this point, multiple 

rounds of motions to dismiss have been briefed and decided, discovery is complete, and the parties 

have fully briefed a motion for summary judgment. Given the current stage of litigation and 

Plaintiff’s lack of effort to comply with Rule 4, the Court DISMISSES Soley from this action 

without prejudice.

B. Alter Ego Liability

Defendant Phillips is the sole member and shareholder of Soley. Ex. 3. Under California 

law, a member of a limited liability company is not personally liable for debts, legal liability, or 

obligations unless liability attaches under an alter ego theory. Cal. Corp. Code § 17703.04. A 

claim against a defendant based on the alter ego theory “is not itself a claim for substantive relief,” 

but rather, a procedural claim to hold the “alter egos liable on the obligations of the corporation.” 

Hennessey’s Tavern, Inc. v. Am. Air Filter Co., 204 Cal. App. 3d 1351, 1359 (Ct. App. 1988). 

“The alter ego doctrine arises when a plaintiff comes into court claiming that an opposing party is 

using the corporate form unjustly and in derogation of the plaintiff's interests.” Mesler v. Bragg 

Mgmt. Co., 39 Cal. 3d 290, 300. Under the doctrine, “[a] corporate identity may be disregarded—

the ‘corporate veil’ pierced—where an abuse of the corporate privilege justifies holding the 

[owner] of a corporation liable for the actions of the corporation.” Sonora Diamond Corp. v. 

Superior Court, 83 Cal. App. 4th 523, 538 (2000) (citation omitted).

“There is a strong presumption against disregarding corporate identities and finding a 

person to be the alter ego of a corporation.” Tarel Seven Design, Inc. v. Magni Grp., Inc., No. SA 

CV 89–210 AHS (RWRX), 1990 WL 118290, at *4 (C.D. Cal. May 30, 1990) (citing In re 

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Christian & Porter Aluminum Co., 584 F.2d 326, 338 (9th Cir. 1978)). To overcome this 

presumption, a plaintiff ‘must make out a prima facie case (1) that there is such unity of interest 

and ownership that the separate personalities [of the two entities] no longer exist and (2) that 

failure to disregard [their separate identities] would result in fraud or injustice.” Ranza v. Nike 

Inc., 793 F.3d 1059, 1073 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation and quotations omitted and alterations in 

original). The party asserting alter ego liability bears the burden of establishing it. See UA Local 

343 v. Nor–Cal Plumbing, Inc., 48 F.3d 1465, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994). 

To assess whether there is unity of interest between a corporation and an individual for the 

purposes of piercing the corporate veil under alter ego liability, courts consider many factors, 

including:

[T]he commingling of funds and other assets; the failure to segregate 

funds of the individual and the corporation; the unauthorized 

diversion of corporate funds to other than corporate purposes; the 

treatment by an individual of corporate assets as his own; the failure 

to seek authority to issue stock or issue stock under existing 

authorization; the representation by an individual that he is personally 

liable for corporate debts; the failure to maintain adequate corporate 

minutes or records; the intermingling of the individual and corporate 

records; the ownership of all the stock by a single individual or 

family; the domination or control of the corporation by the 

stockholders; the use of a single address for the individual and the 

corporation; the inadequacy of the corporation's capitalization; the 

use of the corporation as a mere conduit for an individual's business; 

the concealment of the ownership of the corporation; the disregard of 

formalities and the failure to maintain arm's-length transactions with 

the corporation; and the attempts to segregate liabilities to the 

corporation.

Digby Adler Grp. LLC v. Image Rent a Car, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 3d 1095, 1106–07 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 

2015) (citing Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Gardner, 9. Cal. App. 4th 1205, 1213 n.3 (1992)). 

Defendant Phillips argues that she has presented evidence that Soley is a separate business 

entity with a limited liability structure, and that Plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence of an 

alter ego relationship between the two. Dkt. No. 49 at 24. The Court agrees, and finds that even 

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, she has failed to make out a prima 

facie case of alter ego liability. 

Plaintiff appears to proffer the following evidence to support her alter ego theory: (1) she 

received an email from “sandy@equiland.co.uk,” which she alleges is Defendant Phillips’s 

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personal email account, Dkt. No. 50 at 2, see also Ex. B; and (2) Defendant Phillips never 

“mention[ed] anything about her company,” Dkt. No. 50 at 2. This proffered evidence falls well 

short of creating a triable issue of fact as to the first prong of the alter ego test, which requires a 

showing of a unity of interest and ownership such that Soley and Defendant Phillips no longer 

exist as separate entities. That Defendant Phillips may not have mentioned anything about Soley, 

or that Defendant Phillips sent an email from an “equiland.co.uk” email account, is insufficient to 

prove any of the multiple factors courts consider when analyzing alter ego liability, including ones 

Plaintiff alleges in her FAC. See FAC ¶ 6; see also Digby, 79 F. Supp. 3d at 1106–07 (listing 

factors such as such “commingling of funds and other assets,” “the failure to segregate funds,” 

“the unauthorized diversion of corporate funds to other than corporate purposes,” and “the 

representation by an individual that [s]he is personally liable for corporate debts”). There is no 

evidence that Defendants Phillips commingled funds and assets or that Soley was underfunded and 

inadequately capitalized. In fact, Defendant Phillips produced evidence establishing that Soley’s 

bookkeeper sent Plaintiff invoices from Soley with only Soley’s bank account information. Ex. 7. 

And Plaintiff’s bank transactions verify that outgoing wire transfers were made to “SOLEY 

PERFORMANCED LIMITED,” not to an account associated with Defendant Phillips 

individually. Ex. F. Plaintiff herself admitted to having no knowledge as to whether Defendant 

Phillips maintained a single bank account for her business and for her personal use. Ex. 17 at 

246:9–15.3 Further, Plaintiff does not produce any evidence suggesting that an injustice or fraud 

would result if Defendant Phillips was not considered the same entity as Soley.4 

Accordingly, even assuming arguendo that Plaintiff’s alter ego theory was sufficiently 

pled (which the Court does not decide), there is no triable issue of fact as to whether Soley is an 

alter ego of Defendant Phillips. The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary judgment 

3 Although Defendant’s motion cites to Plaintiff’s deposition transcript as “Exhibit 18,” there is no 

Exhibit 18 attached.

4 The Court notes that Plaintiff’s only allegation of inequity is an inability to collect judgment 

against Defendant Phillips. See FAC ¶ 6. But California courts have rejected “‘the view that the 

potential difficulty a plaintiff faces collecting a judgment is an inequitable result that warrants 

application of the alter ego doctrine.’” Sandoval v. Ali, 34 F. Supp. 3d 1031, 1041 (N.D. Cal. 

2014) (citations omitted).

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with respect to alter ego liability. 

C. Breach of Contract

Plaintiff also argues that there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether she 

contracted with Defendant Phillips “individually or with her solely owned company, Sole[y].” 

Dkt. No. 50 at 7. The Court thus addresses whether there is a genuine dispute of material fact 

regarding with whom the contract was made. Put another way, the Court determines whether 

Soley was an undisclosed principal when Defendant Phillips executed the contract with Plaintiff.

It is well-settled under California law that “‘only a signatory to a contract may be liable for 

any breach.’” United Computer Sys., Inc. v. AT & T Corp., 298 F.3d 756, 761 (9th Cir. 2002)

(quoting Clemens v. American Warranty Corp., 193 Cal. App. 3d 444, 452 (1987)); see also

Money Matters Mgmt. v. Niche Mktg., Inc., No. 07-CV-0591IEGCAB, 2007 WL 3052996, at *3 

(S.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2007). A plaintiff cannot proceed against a director or officer who signs a 

contract on behalf of a company, unless they “contract with a third person who is ignorant of the 

existence of the corporation and to whom no disclosure of the existence of the corporation is 

made.” Carlesimo v. Schwebel, 87 Cal. App. 2d 482, 486 (1948); see also Money Matters, 2007 

WL 3052996, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2007) (“But there is no basis in California law for 

proceeding against an agent signing on behalf of a corporation.” (collecting cases)). To excuse the 

agent from responsibility, the agent must show that she disclosed the principal “at the time of 

making the contract, and that [the agent] acted on [the principal’s behalf], so as to enable the party 

with whom [the agent] deals to have recourse to the principal in case the agent had authority to 

bind [the principal].” J & J Builders Supply v. Caffin, 248 Cal. App. 2d 292, 295 (1967) (citation 

and quotation omitted); see also Starnet Int'l AMC Inc. v. Kafash, No. 09-CV-04301-LHK, 2011 

WL 845908, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2011). But the agent does not need to prove that the party 

knew the identity of the principal, as it is sufficient to prove that the party should have known. 

Carlesimo, 87 Al. Capp. 2d at 486. “[T]he mere self-serving statement of the third party that [s]he 

did not know of the existence of the corporation is not binding on the trier of the facts.” Id. 

Although the Court finds it difficult to believe that Plaintiff did not know about the 

existence of Soley given the numerous invoices from Soley to Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s transfer of 

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funds to Soley, see Exs. 7–8, Ex. F, the critical question here is whether Plaintiff should have 

known about Soley at the time the contract was executed. See J & J, 248 Cal. App. 2d at 295. 

The parties do not dispute that the material terms of the agreement were set forth and confirmed in 

an email from Defendant Phillips to Plaintiff on May 27, 2016. Ridgway Decl. ¶ 7; Phillips Decl. 

¶ 4. In that email, Defendant Phillips lists the costs for summer and winter keep and the down 

payment of the embryos for Lara and Riverdance. Ex. 4. But the email does not indicate that 

Defendant Phillips is an agent of, or even associated with, Soley. The email contains no mention 

of Soley at all and is sent from a domain that does not appear to be associated with Soley. 

Compare id. (email from “sandy@equiland.co.uk”) with Ex. 7 (invoices from Soley listing email 

as “sp@soleyperformance.co.uk”). Plaintiff responded to Defendant Phillips on June 3, 2016, 

confirming that she would “like to move forward.” Ex. 5. There is no evidence demonstrating 

that Plaintiff should have known at that point that Defendant Phillips was acting on behalf of 

Soley. 

To avoid this conclusion, Defendant Phillips argues that “[p]rior to commencing any work, 

Defendant made it clear to Plaintiff that payment was mandatory on the first two invoices.” Dkt. 

No. 49 at 18; see also Dkt. No. 52 at 2 (“The terms of the agreement ... make it clear that in order 

for Plaintiff to receive the benefit of breeding ... she had to pay an embryo fee for the right to 

breed ...”). In other words, as defense counsel asserted during oral argument, payment of the 

embryo fees was a “condition precedent,” meaning there was no contract formed until Plaintiff 

remitted payment on June 23, 2016. By then, Plaintiff undoubtedly knew she was contracting 

with Soley, in light of the undisputed fact that she received invoices from and remitted payment to 

Soley. Defendant argues that this theory is bolstered by the fact that prior to payment, Plaintiff

voiced concerns on June 16, 2016, as to whether she would be able to pay the fees this year, and 

stated that “[n]ext year would probably be better if that is a possibility.” Ex. 2 at 2-046. Though 

not articulated in the brief, defense counsel argues that Plaintiff’s June 16 text message proves that 

she herself did not believe she had entered into a contract yet. 

While the Court acknowledges Defendant’s argument, making all reasonable inferences in 

Plaintiff’s favor as it must at this stage, the Court finds that there is at least a dispute of material 

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fact as to, for example, whether Plaintiff’s June 3 email stating “I’d like to move forward” was 

acceptance of the material terms in the May 27, 2016 email. A reasonable fact finder could 

conclude that this statement was an “outward manifestation of consent” which would lead a 

“reasonable person to believe” that there was the existence of mutual assent, thus forming a 

contract at that point. Chaganti v. I2 Phone Int’l, Inc., 635 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1071 (N.D. Cal. 

2007) (quoting Meyer v. Benko, 55 Cal. App. 3d 937, 942–43 (1976)), aff’d, 313 F. App’x 54 (9th 

Cir. 2009). Because the evidence here establishes that there is no mention of the name “Soley” in 

any of the text messages or emails between Plaintiff and Defendant Phillips prior to Mr. Green’s 

email on June 8, 2016, the Court finds there is a triable issue as to whether Plaintiff was aware that 

Defendant Phillips was acting as an agent for Soley when the contract was executed. See Exs. 2–

6; see also Carlesimo, 87 Cal. App. 2d at 486 (1948) (inquiry is whether the plaintiff had 

knowledge “of the existence of the [principal] prior to and at the time the contract was executed”). 

Defendant Phillips fails to satisfy her burden of proving that she disclosed the identity of Soley 

when she made the contract with Plaintiff. See J & J, 248 Cal. App. 2d at 295. Accordingly, the 

Court finds that there is, at a minimum, a genuine dispute of material fact as to when the contract 

was formed and whether Plaintiff knew, or should have known, that she was entering into an 

agreement with Soley at the time she made the contract, and DENIES Defendant’s motion for 

summary judgment as to this claim.

5

D. Fraud Claim

Plaintiff’s second cause of action alleges fraud. According to Plaintiff, Defendant Phillips 

allegedly made misrepresentations when she told Plaintiff that she would receive two foals from 

Riverdance and Lara with a “Live Foal Guarantee.” FAC ¶ 15. But Defendant Phillips 

purportedly had no intention “of sending any offspring of Riverdance or Lara to Plaintiff,” and 

also concealed the fact that Lara was “incapable of conceiving a foal due to her age and prior poor 

health history which was known to Defendant[] at the inception of the subject agreement.” Id. ¶ 

5 Defendant also argues that there is no dispute of fact regarding Plaintiff’s non-performance. Dkt. 

No. 49 at 19–20. Having found at least one genuine dispute of material fact, the Court need not 

reach this argument. And in any event, the parties’ arguments simply highlight a factual dispute 

as to whether Plaintiff was obligated to pay for certain costs under the agreement.

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Under California law, fraud is actionable where there is: (a) misrepresentation (false 

representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or “scienter”); (c) intent 

to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage. Lazar v. 

Superior Court, 12 Cal. 4th 631, 638 (1996). However, the economic loss rule requires recovering 

“in contract for purely economic loss due to disappointed expectations, unless he can demonstrate 

harm above and beyond a broken contractual promise.” Robinson Helicopter Co. v. Dana Corp., 

34 Cal. 4th 979, 988 (2004). In other words, “‘no tort cause of action will lie where the breach of 

duty is nothing more than a violation of a promise which undermines the expectations of the 

parties to an agreement.” WeBoost Media S.R.L. v. LookSmart Ltd., No. C 13-5304 SC, 2014 WL 

824297, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2014) (citation omitted). “The rule serves to prevent every 

breach of contract from giving rise to tort liability and the threat of punitive damages.” Id. “Quite 

simply, the economic loss rule ‘prevent[s] the law of contract and the law of tort from dissolving 

one into the other.’” Robinson, 34 Cal. 4th at 988 (citation omitted and alteration in original). 

Tort damages may be allowable “where the contract was fraudulently induced,” because “the duty 

that gives rise to tort liability is either completely independent of the contract or arises from 

conduct which is both intentional and intended to harm.” Erlich v. Menezes, 21 Cal. 4th 543, 552 

(1999). 

First, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s fraud claim is barred by the economic loss doctrine, 

an argument Defendant Phillips raised in her motion to dismiss. See Dkt. No. 39 at 15–16. 

Plaintiff’s fraud claim rests on purported misrepresentations that are the alleged terms of the 

contract and not conduct independent of the agreement. Compare FAC ¶¶ 15 (alleged 

misrepresentations that “Plaintiff would receive two foals” and would receive a “‘Live Foal 

Guarantee’”) with id. ¶ 10 (alleged terms of contract that “Plaintiff was to receive two foals 

immediately” and Defendant gave Plaintiff a “‘Live Foal Guarantee.’”). Plaintiff attempted to 

sidestep this result in her opposition by claiming that she was alleging a fraudulent inducement 

claim. See Dkt. No. 43 at 9–10. But Plaintiff did not plead a fraudulent inducement claim in her 

FAC, so normally the Court would not consider these allegations. Schneider v. California Dep’t 

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of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998) (“In determining the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) 

dismissal, a court may not look beyond the complaint to a plaintiff’s moving papers, such as a 

memorandum in opposition”). 

Second, even assuming arguendo that Plaintiff’s fraudulent inducement claim had been

timely and sufficiently pled (which the Court does not decide), Plaintiff does not present any 

evidence establishing that Defendant Phillips had knowledge of the alleged falsity of any 

statements or that she had an intent to defraud Plaintiff. See Lazar, 12 Cal. 4th at 638. She 

admitted as much during her deposition:

Q: [ ] What knowledge do you have that Ms. Phillips would have 

made the promise to you that she was going to deliver these two 

foals but knowing at the time she made that promise that it wasn’t 

true? Do you have any knowledge of that?

A: I can’t say. I don't know what was in her head. But the reality is 

that I was buying two foals -- or two embryos with live foal 

guarantees, and I have no horse, not one. So not only was I not 

delivered two, I wasn't even delivered one.

Ex. 17 at 231:19–232:3. The fact that Plaintiff did not obtain her desired outcome does not create 

a genuine dispute as to whether Defendant Phillips intended to defraud her. 

As to Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant Phillips concealed the fact that Lara was 

incapable of producing offspring, Defendant Phillips produces substantial evidence demonstrating 

that Lara had a good breeding history, see Dkt. No. 49-4 at ¶ 4, Dkt. No. 49-5 at ¶ 3, Dkt. No. 49-6 

at ¶ 3, and Lara was inseminated three separate times in an attempt to provide Plaintiff with an 

embryo, Dkt. No. 49-6 at ¶ 3. Plaintiff herself declined to try to breed Lara again in 2017. 

Ridgway Decl. ¶ 12. There is no evidence that Defendant Phillips knew Lara would not be able to 

produce an embryo when Plaintiff entered into the contract. 

The Court also notes that Plaintiff fails to even address her fraud claim in her opposition to 

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Instead, she merely states that there are multiple 

issues of facts, “namely ... [w]as Defendant in breach of contract or fraudulent when she sold the 

foal to another buyer?” Dkt. No. 50 at 7. The Court may infer from Plaintiff’s failure to address 

the fraud claim that she has abandoned it. Ramirez v. City of Buena Park, 560 F.3d 1012, 1026 

(9th Cir. 2009); Jenkins v. Cty. of Riverside, 398 F.3d 1093, 1095 n.4 (9th Cir. 2005) (upholding 

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finding that the plaintiff “abandoned her other two claims by not raising them in opposition to the 

motion for summary judgment”). 

The Court finds that Plaintiff has presented no evidence to support her fraud claim and 

GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary judgment with respect to that claim.6

E. Constructive Trust and Accounting

Plaintiff’s third cause of action purportedly brings a claim for “Imposition of Constructive 

Trust for Unjust Enrichment / Alter Ego / Piercing the Corporate Veil and an Accounting.” FAC 

¶¶ 21–28. Under this claim, Plaintiff alleges that the “assets of the alter ego entity Defendants 

should be held in constructive trust for the benefit of Plaintiff,” and “defendant should be ordered 

to render an account for all monies paid to them.” Id. ¶¶ 27–28. 

As discussed, alter ego liability is not itself a basis for substantive relief. See Hennessey's 

Tavern, 204 Cal. App. 3d at 1359. Because there is insufficient evidence to sustain Plaintiff’s 

alter ego allegations, Plaintiff’s claim for imposition of a constructive trust fails.

7

Nor can the Court decipher what Plaintiff believes she is entitled to under an accounting 

claim. An accounting is generally a remedy in equity. Periguerra v. Meridas Capital, Inc., No. C 

09-4748 SBA, 2010 WL 395932, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2010) (citing Batt v. City & County of 

San Francisco, 155 Cal. App. 4th 65, 82 (2007)). A plaintiff may bring an accounting claim as a 

standalone cause of action when a defendant owes a fiduciary duty to a plaintiff which requires an 

accounting, and a balance is due that can only be ascertained by an accounting. Id. (citation 

omitted). But this type of accounting claim is dependent upon a substantive basis for liability, 

meaning that it has no separate viability if plaintiff’s other causes of action fail. Id. (citation 

omitted). In addition, an action for accounting “‘is not available where the plaintiff alleges the 

right to recover a sum certain or a sum that can be made certain by calculation.’” Lester v. J.P. 

Morgan Chase Bank, 926 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1098–99 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (citation omitted). 

Plaintiff provides no evidence of a fiduciary relationship between her and Defendant Phillips. 

6 Because summary judgment has been granted as to this claim, Plaintiff’s punitive damages claim 

is also dismissed. See FAC at p.7.

7 The Court does not construe Plaintiff’s third cause of action to allege an unjust enrichment claim, 

as there is no unjust enrichment theory articulated in the FAC. 

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And critically, Plaintiff alleges a right to recover a sum certain, specifically $57,524.24, see FAC 

at 7, therefore barring her accounting claim.

In any event, Plaintiff also fails to address her third cause of action in her opposition to 

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, which the Court construes as a concession that 

summary judgment should be granted as to this claim.

V. CONCLUSION

The Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendant’s motion for 

summary judgment, Dkt. No. 49. Unless they reach a final settlement agreement (not a settlement 

in principle) as to what remains of this case, the parties must be prepared to proceed to trial as 

scheduled on May 18, 2020 (and to meet all pretrial deadlines, which remain in effect).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

3/18/2020

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