Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-09-50323/USCOURTS-ca9-09-50323-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Manuel Ignacio Juarez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  No. 09-50323

Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.

v.  2:89-cr-00381-

M GHK-1 ANUEL IGNACIO JUAREZ,

Defendant-Appellant. OPINION 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

George H. King, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

February 5, 2010—Pasadena, California

Filed April 8, 2010

Before: Mary M. Schroeder, Raymond C. Fisher and

N. Randy Smith, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam Opinion

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COUNSEL

Amber D. Garza and Michael J. Raphael (argued), Los Angeles, California, for plaintiff-appellee United States of America.

Gia Kim, Los Angeles, California, for defendant-appellant

Manuel Ignacio Juarez.

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Manuel Ignacio Juarez appeals the district court’s judgment

revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to eighteen months in prison. Juarez contends the district court

lacked jurisdiction to revoke his supervised release because

his term of supervision expired before the district court either

entered the order of revocation or issued a bench warrant that

could have extended the court’s jurisdiction to do so under 18

U.S.C. § 3583(i). The district court determined that it had

jurisdiction to revoke Juarez’s supervised release because his

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term of supervision was tolled during the period of time he

was at large, after he absconded from supervision by changing

his residence and not reporting it to his probation officer as

required by the conditions of his supervised release. We hold

that the district court did have jurisdiction and affirm in a

published opinion to clarify that fugitive tolling of a defendant’s term of supervised release begins when the defendant

becomes a fugitive, not at the later time when a warrant is

issued for his apprehension.

BACKGROUND

The facts of this case are important to our resolution of the

jurisdictional question. Juarez pled guilty to bank robbery in

1989. The district court sentenced him to forty-six months in

prison, to be followed by three years of supervised release.

Under the conditions of Juarez’s supervised release, he was

required to notify his probation officer within seventy-two

hours of any change in residence, and he was prohibited from

possessing drugs or drug paraphernalia or committing any further crimes. 

On August 26, 1992, the Bureau of Prisons released Juarez

into the custody of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) for deportation, and the Probation Office placed

his case on “inactive” status. When the INS deported Juarez

to Mexico, his supervised release was scheduled to terminate

on August 25, 1995.

Sometime after his deportation, however, Juarez illegally

reentered the United States. He did not inform his probation

officer that he had reentered or that he had changed residences. On August 31, 1993, he applied for and received a

California driver’s license under a false name. The license

stated his residence to be at an address in Riverside, California.

In November 1994, California law enforcement authorities

arrested Juarez for possession of drug paraphernalia. Juarez

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identified himself using the false name on his driver’s license

and was released the same day. Juarez was again arrested by

state authorities on June 23, 1995, and charged with two separate counts of robbery. This time, he remained in state custody

pending resolution of the charges. Juarez eventually pled

guilty to both robbery charges, and on October 4, 1996, he

was sentenced to a cumulative term of fifteen years in state

prison.

Juarez’s illegal reentry and his two arrests all occurred

before his supervised release was scheduled to terminate.

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i), the district court’s authority to

revoke a term of supervised release “extends beyond the expiration of the term of supervised release for any period reasonably necessary for the adjudication of matters arising before

its expiration if, before its expiration, a warrant or summons

has been issued on the basis of an allegation of such a violation.” Accordingly, Juarez’s probation officer applied to the

district court in July 1995 for a bench warrant authorizing

Juarez’s arrest for violating the conditions of his supervised

release by illegally reentering the United States, by using

drugs, and by failing to report his whereabouts to his probation officer. That warrant application was filed within the

term of supervised release, but was not supported by an affidavit or any sworn facts. The district court issued a bench

warrant on July 17, 1995, but it was not immediately executed

because Juarez by that time was in state custody pending the

resolution of the two robbery charges.

In November 2004, this court decided United States v.

Vargas-Amaya, 389 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2004). We held that a

district court’s jurisdiction to revoke supervised release can be

extended beyond the term of supervision under § 3583(i) on

the basis of a warrant issued during the term of supervision,

but “only if the warrant was issued ‘upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,’ as required by the Fourth

Amendment.” Id. at 907. When Juarez’s probation officer recognized that the initial warrant issued by the district court for

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Juarez’s arrest did not comply with Vargas-Amaya, he applied

for a new warrant. This time, he included a sworn statement

of facts in support of the application and alleged two new violations of Juarez’s release conditions, on account of Juarez’s

two robbery convictions. On May 3, 2005, the district court

issued a new bench warrant for Juarez’s arrest. This warrant

also could not be immediately executed, however, because

Juarez was still serving his state prison sentences for the robbery convictions.

Almost four years later, on February 10, 2009, Juarez was

paroled from state prison and transferred to federal custody

pursuant to the 2005 bench warrant. He promptly moved to

dismiss the petition to revoke his supervised release. He

argued that because the 2005 warrant had been issued nearly

ten years after his original term of supervision was to expire,

the district court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his supervised

release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i).

The district court denied Juarez’s motion. The court ruled

that his fugitive status tolled the term of supervised release for

close to two years, and that because the term as tolled by fugitive status was again tolled by reason of his state prison sentences, the court had jurisdiction to revoke his supervised

release. The district court explained its reasoning as follows.

First, when Juarez applied for a California driver’s license

on August 31, 1993, he effectively admitted he had changed

his residence from Mexico to Riverside, California. Juarez did

not report this change in residence to the Probation Office

within seventy-two hours as required by the conditions of his

supervised release. Therefore, the district court found that

Juarez had absconded from supervision and become a fugitive

“on or about August 31, 1993, or within 72 hours thereof.”

This is because Juarez’s reentry into the United States triggered reinstatement of the terms of his supervision, which

Juarez then violated “in such a way as to disable the probation

officer from knowing his whereabouts and being able to begin

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supervision.” Thus, because Juarez was a fugitive until his

arrest on June 23, 1995, the running of his term of supervised

release was tolled for nearly two years. 

Second, on October 3, 1996, during the extended period of

supervised release, Juarez’s term of supervision was again

tolled as a result of his incarceration for his two robbery convictions. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) (“A term of supervised

release does not run during any period in which the person is

imprisoned in connection with a conviction for a Federal,

State, or local crime unless the imprisonment is for a period

of less than 30 consecutive days.”). Because the May 2005

bench warrant was issued while Juarez was still serving his

prison sentences for the two robbery convictions, and thus

before the extended term of supervised release expired, the

district court held it had jurisdiction to revoke Juarez’s term

of supervised release under § 3583(i). 

On June 8, 2009, Juarez admitted to the violations of

release conditions alleged by the government. The court

revoked his supervised release on July 15, 2009, and sentenced him to eighteen months in prison. Juarez timely

appealed the district court’s judgment to this court. He contends that the district court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his

supervised release because its term was not tolled by his

nearly two-year status as a fugitive and had therefore expired.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

DISCUSSION

We review de novo whether the district court had jurisdiction to revoke a term of supervised release. United States v.

Sullivan, 504 F.3d 969, 971 (9th Cir. 2007). The fugitive tolling issue is an issue of law, and there are no factual disputes

as to when the dispositive events occurred in this case.

Juarez argues that our case law establishes that fugitive

tolling cannot begin until the government has information

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concerning a defendant’s whereabouts and obtains an arrest

warrant. In this case that occurred in July 1995, so the term,

Juarez asserts, was not tolled during the first two years he was

actually a fugitive. There is no question that the term can be

tolled during the years Juarez was incarcerated for the two

robbery convictions, see 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e), but unless it

was first tolled during the two years that he was a fugitive, the

district court lacked jurisdiction. This is because the term of

supervision would have expired before his incarceration.

The district court held, however, that Juarez’s fugitive status began in 1993, when we know he had become a fugitive

from supervision. We agree with the district court, because

we conclude that our case law establishes that fugitive tolling

begins with fugitive status and not when the government is

able to secure a warrant. This is apparent from a careful

review of our cases.

We first recognized that a defendant’s term of supervised

release is tolled for fugitive status in United States v. Crane,

979 F.2d 687, 691 (9th Cir. 1992). In that case, the defendant

absconded from a community treatment center where he was

serving a one-year term of supervised release. Id. at 688. The

defendant’s probation officer immediately filed a petition for

revocation of supervised release, and the district court issued

a warrant for the defendant’s arrest. Id. Three months later,

state law enforcement authorities arrested the defendant and

held him in state custody until after his term of supervised

release would have expired, absent tolling. Id. at 688, 691.

We held that the district court retained jurisdiction to revoke

the defendant’s supervised release because his term of supervision was tolled for the three months he remained a fugitive

after leaving the community treatment center. Id. at 691.

In United States v. Murguia-Oliveros, 421 F.3d 951, 953-

54 (9th Cir. 2005), we reaffirmed our holding in Crane and

clarified that a defendant becomes a fugitive for purposes of

tolling when he absconds from his supervised release. The

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defendant in Murguia-Oliveros violated the conditions of his

supervised release by reentering the United States after being

deported and not reporting to his probation officer. Id. at 952.

The probation officer later learned of the defendant’s reentry

and sent a letter to his last-known address instructing him to

report. Id. When the defendant failed to report, the district

court issued a bench warrant for his arrest, but it was not

based on any sworn statement of fact. Id. Ten months after the

warrant issued and approximately two months after his term

of supervised release would normally have expired, the defendant was arrested and the district court revoked his supervised

release. Id. at 953. We held that the district court had jurisdiction because the defendant was a fugitive from supervised

release “at least from the time the government obtained a warrant for his arrest . . . until the time the supervised release

would have expired, absent a violation”—a period of eight

months. Id. at 955. Because this eight-month period of tolling

was more than sufficient to extend the term beyond the time

when the court revoked the defendant’s supervised release,

we did not have to decide whether tolling actually began with

the defendant’s initial failure to report to his probation officer.

[1] Building on these precedents, however, we said clearly

in United States v. Delamora, 451 F.3d 977, 978 (9th Cir.

2006), that “a defendant’s term of supervised release is tolled

from the time that he absconds from supervision until the time

he is found by federal authorities.” In that case, the defendant’s probation officer filed an unsworn petition in the district court alleging the defendant had violated the conditions

of his supervised release by not reporting to the probation

officer for two months and not submitting monthly reports for

three months. Id. at 979. The probation officer also asserted

that the defendant could not be located. Id. The district court

issued a warrant for the defendant’s arrest. Id. More than

seven years later, the district court issued a second warrant,

this time based on sworn facts, and the defendant was arrested

within a month. Id. Because the second warrant was not

issued until after the defendant’s term of supervision was

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originally scheduled to expire, the district court ultimately

dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. Id.

[2] On appeal, however, we reversed, holding that the district court had jurisdiction to revoke the defendant’s supervised release because the defendant’s fugitive status had

tolled the running of his term of supervision, so that the term

extended beyond the original expiration date. Id. at 979-81. In

so holding, we rejected the defendant’s argument that

Murguia-Oliveros permitted tolling of a defendant’s term of

supervised release only from the date an arrest warrant issues

until the date the defendant’s term would expire absent a violation. Id. at 980. We explained in Delamora that “[t]olling of

a supervised release term extends the date the term is set to

expire so long as the defendant remains a fugitive.” Id. Thus,

we stated that the defendant in Delamora “became a fugitive

when he stopped reporting to his probation officer and

absconded from supervision,” and that “the start of [the defendant’s] flight . . . commenced the tolling of his supervised

release term.” Id. Once the defendant was arrested and

brought into federal custody, tolling ceased and “the clock

began running again.” Id. at 980-81. Accordingly, we held

that “[w]hat tolls the time is [the defendant’s] fugitive status,

not the [bench] warrant.” Id. at 981. 

Although our holding in Delamora was clear, we apparently actually calculated the number of days to be tolled from

the date of the issuance of the initial bench warrant. Id. at 980.

Juarez thus focuses only upon that and argues that tolling

should not begin in his case until the July 1995 bench warrant

was issued, thus in effect claiming that the term of supervised

release continued to run during the time in which he was a

fugitive. His argument is contrary to our holding in Delamora. 

[3] A close reading of Delamora reveals that we used the

bench warrant as the starting point for tolling because it was

the earliest ascertainable date when we knew the defendant

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had become a fugitive. We said: “Delamora’s status as an

absconder happens to coincide with the date of the unsworn

petition as it did in Murguia-Oliveros, and often might.” Id.

at 981. Thus, because the only known date to start the defendant’s flight in Delamora, as in Murguia-Oliveros, corresponded with the issuance of the first bench warrant, we

calculated the tolling period as beginning on that date. Id. at

980. But this does not mean, as Juarez tries to argue, that in

a case in which we know that the defendant was a fugitive at

an earlier date, we must still hold that the defendant’s term of

supervised release continues to run and is not tolled until a

bench warrant is issued. Such a result would run counter to

one of the primary principles on which the fugitive tolling

doctrine rests: “[a] person on supervised release should not

receive credit against his period of supervised release for time

that, by virtue of his own wrongful act, he [has absconded

from] supervised release.” Murguia-Oliveros, 421 F.3d at

954.

[4] Fugitive tolling begins when the defendant absconds

from supervision—making it impossible for the Probation

Office to supervise his actions—and ends when federal

authorities are capable of resuming supervision. See Delamora, 451 F.3d at 978 (“[A] defendant’s term of supervised

release is tolled from the time that he absconds from supervision until the time he is found by federal authorities.”). In this

case, Juarez absconded from supervision when he moved to

the United States and failed to advise the Probation Office of

his whereabouts. We know that he was residing in the United

States no later than August 31, 1993, and that he failed to

report his change of address to the Probation Office within 72

hours. Thus, tolling began at the latest on September 3, 1993.

Fugitive tolling ended on June 23, 1995, when Juarez was

arrested by California law enforcement authorities and federal

authorities became aware of his whereabouts. This tolling,

coupled with the undisputed tolling during his prison terms,

extended Juarez’s term of supervised release by more than

fourteen years, so that his term of supervision would not have

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expired until October 21, 2009. The district court correctly

ruled it had jurisdiction to revoke the supervised release well

before that date. 

AFFIRMED.

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