Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-85-02482/USCOURTS-ca10-85-02482-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rita Bell
Appellant
Dresser Titan
Appellee
Larry Gross
Appellee

Document Text:

FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

United itatea Q>urt of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

FEB 2 41988 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk RITA BELL, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

DRESSER TITAN, a Division of 

DRESSER INDUSTRIES, INC., and 

LARRY GROSS, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT 

No. 85-2482 

(D.C. No. 83-6009) 

(District of Kansas) 

Before McKAY, ANDERSON, and TACHA, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.8. The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

Ms. Rita Bell appeals from the district court's modification 

of its earlier judgment in her favor in a sexual discrimination 

suit against Dresser Titan (Dresser) and Dresser's employee, 

Mr. Larry Gross. In June, 1981, Ms. Bell was hired by Dresser as 

a manual laborer and placed under the supervision of Mr. Gross. 

In her position Ms. Bell was required to load and unload 100-pound 

Appellate Case: 85-2482 Document: 010110027779 Date Filed: 02/24/1988 Page: 1 
sacks of chemicals and sand, drive trucks, and ''handle iron" until 

she was discharged by Dresser the following August. 

In August, 1984, following a two-day trial to the court, the 

district court concluded that during the brief term of her employment, Ms. Bell had been sexually harassed by Dresser and Mr. Gross 

in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 

u.s.c. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982) (Title VII). The court ordered 

Dresser to pay Ms. Bell back wages for the period beginning on the 

date she was discharged and ending on the date of trial and 

directed Dresser to reinstate Ms. Bell to employment similar to 

that which she had held in the summer of 1981. 

Dresser and Mr. Gross appealed to this court from the district court's judgment but later petitioned for a remand of the 

case to allow them to comply with the award of back pay and reinstatement. In an order entered on April 15, 1985, we granted the 

petition and directed the parties to submit a request for dismissal of the appeal with prejudice once the district court's 

judgment had been carried out. 

Two weeks later Dresser interviewed Ms. Bell and offered her 

employment in the same capacity in which she had been hired originally, but in a location removed from Mr. Gross' supervision. The 

company allowed Ms. Bell one week to decide whether to accept the 

offer and one additional week to report for work. During the 

interview Ms. Bell told Dresser that almost two years earlier (and 

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therefore about two years after she had been discharged by 

Dresser) she had injured her lower back while engaged in manual 

labor for another firm. According to Ms. Bell, her condition had 

been diagnosed as a permanent partial disability and due to her 

injury, she was unable to lift more than fifty pounds. 

Less than one week later, Ms. Bell filed a Motion for Protection and Enforcement of Prior Court Orders in which she asked the 

district court to direct Dresser and Mr. Gross to comply fully 

with the judgment of back pay and reinstatement. In response to 

the motion, Dresser declared that it had offered Ms. Bell employment as required by the court's order but explained that in view 

of Ms. Bell's inability to lift more than fifty pounds, it was 

doubtful that she was physically qualified to resume her duties as 

a manual laborer. Dresser also pointed out that although Ms. Bell 

had injured her back long before she filed suit against Dresser 

and Mr. Gross, she failed to inform the court of her disability 

during trial. The following September, after several conferences 

between the parties had failed to settle the terms of Ms. Bell's 

reemployment, the district court accepted briefs and heard oral 

argument on Ms. Bell's motion. In opposing the motion, Dresser 

repeated its claim that Ms. Bell's back injury disqualified her 

from reemployment in manual labor. 

The same day it heard oral argument on Ms. Bell's motion, the 

district court issued an "Order Modifying Journal Entry Dated 

September 24, 1984," in which it reexamined all aspects of its 

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earlier judgment. In the order the court found that Dresser had 

made good faith efforts to comply with the order of reinstatement, 

but that in view of Ms. Bell's back injury, Dresser was unsure how 

to proceed. Record, vol. 1, doc. 42, at 3-4. In contrast, the 

court found that Ms. Bell's demands for reemployment "in any form 

•.. which is reasonably available to her," id. at 3, and her 

unwillingness to change the location of her employment had 

prevented Dresser's compliance. Id. at 4. 

Admonishing Ms. Bell for her failure to disclose her disability at trial, the order implied that the absence of information on her injury had impaired the court's ability to render an 

informed judgment in the case: 

It was the Court's intent then to cause plaintiff's 

reinstatement in a similar form of employment, or in an 

area consistent with her skill, training and experience. 

It was not the Court's intention to place her in any 

form of employment. Indeed, the plaintiff and her counsel would have been well-advised to share these facts 

with the Court at the time of trial because they surely 

would have affected the Court's decision. In other 

words, if for reasons not the fault of defendants, which 

occurred since her discharge by defendant company, she 

suffered certain limitations which precluded her employment in the same or similar job, then reemployment is 

probably not in order. 

Id. The court then modified its award of back pay by ending the 

period for which compensation was due on the date Ms. Bell 

suffered her back injury rather than on the date of trial. In 

addition, the court struck its order of reinstatement. 

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The arguments Ms. Bell makes on appeal may be distilled to 

these three: the district court lacked the jurisdiction necessary 

to modify its original judgment; even if the court's jurisdiction 

were proper, the court was empowered only to enforce--not 

modify--its original judgment; and, finally, the substance of the 

modified judgment violated the intent of Title VII. 

Ms. Bell is correct in asserting that the district court had 

been divested of jurisdiction in this case well before the court 

modified its ruling.* When Dresser and Mr. Gross filed their 

notice of appeal from the award of back pay and reinstatement, 

jurisdiction over the case was transferred to this court. Griggs 

v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982); Garcia 

v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co., 818 F.2d 713, 721 (10th Cir. 

1987). Moreover, full jurisdiction has never been restored to the 

district court. As paragraph two of our order of April 15, 1985, 

indicates, we have retained jurisdiction in this matter for the 

limited purpose of entering a subsequent order dismissing the 

appeal with prejudice once the judgment of the district court has 

been implemented. Record, vol. 1, doc. 35 at 1. 

The authority of federal courts to retain jurisdiction while 

ordering a "limited remand" is perhaps not well known, but it is a 

prerogative the courts exercise frequently. See,~, Aurora 

* But her argument directly conflicts with the assertion in her 

Motion for Protection and Enforcement of Prior Court Orders that 

the district court had retained jurisdiction over the case. See 

record, vol. 1, doc. 36, at 2. 

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Bancshares Corp. v. Weston, 777 F.2d 385, 387-88 (7th Cir. 1985); 

Gulliver v. Dalsheim, 739 F.2d 104, 106 (2d Cir. 1984); In re 

Geisser, 627 F.2d 745, 748-49 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 

U.S. 1031 (1981); United States v. Le Patourel, 571 F.2d 405, 411 

(8th Cir. 1978). Typically the courts of appeals retain jurisdiction for procedural reasons, for example: to direct further 

fact-finding, In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 643 

F.2d 195, 218 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 998 (1982); 

to clarify the record on appeal, In re Chatman-Bey, 718 F.2d 484, 

486 (D.C. Cir. 1983); to reduce the likelihood of a "proliferation 

of motions and collateral proceedings,'' United States v. Hubbard, 

650 F.2d 293, 296 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1980); and, in situations such as 

we faced when this matter was first brought before us, to expedite 

the dismissal of a moot appeal. 

The emphasis Ms. Bell places upon jurisdiction in her first 

argument has diverted her attention from a more appropriate concern for an appellant disputing a modified district court judgment. When examining a district court's actions following a 

remand, the focus of the inquiry must be upon the authority and 

obligation of the court to carry out the appellate court's mandate, not upon the incidental matter of where in the federal judicial system the litigation is lodged. 

Following the truncated appeal by Dresser and Mr. Gross, we 

returned the case to the district court "for the purpose of entertaining and implementing the settlement agreement outlined by the 

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parties which includes an award of back wages and reinstatement of 

plaintiff in Dresser Titan's employ and a satisfaction of the 

orders contained in that court's judgment ..•• " Record, 

vol. 1, doc. 35. Once our mandate issued, the district court was 

bound to carry our order into effect. The court's obligation in 

this regard arises under the ''law of the case" doctrine which 

states that "[a] district court's duty on remand is to carry out 

the decree of the superior court; it cannot 'give any other or 

further relief, or review it upon any matter decided on appeal for 

error apparent, or intermeddle with it, further than to settle so 

much as has been remanded."' Rutherford v. United States, 806 

F.2d 1455, 1462 (10th Cir. 1986) (quoting Sibbald v. United 

States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 488, 492 (1838)). The "law of the case" 

doctrine is recognized in all the federal courts of appeals, 

Maggard v. O'Connell, 703 F.2d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1983); United 

States v. DeJesus, 752 F.2d 640 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 469 

U.S. 841 (1984); Fine v. Bellefonte Underwriters Insurance Co., 

758 F.2d 50 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 826 (1985); Seese v. 

Volkswagonwerk, A.G., 679 F.2d 336 (3d Cir. 1982); Hill v. BASF 

Wyandotte Corp., 696 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1982); Daly v. Spraque, 

742 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1984); Jaimes v. Lucas Metropolitan Housing 

Authority, 833 F.2d 1203 (6th Cir. 1987); Gertz v. Robert Welch, 

Inc., 680 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226 

(1983); Otten v. Stonewall Insurance Co., 538 F.2d 210 (8th Cir. 

1976); Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 673 F.2d 1110 

(9th Cir. 1982), aff'd, 475 U.S. 211 (1986); Delano v. Kitch, 663 

F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 946 (1982); 

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Dorsey v. Continental Gas Co., 730 F.2d 675 (11th Cir. 1984); 

Gindes v. United States, 740 F.2d 947 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 

469 U.S. 1074 (1984), and, in its broader formulations, binds not 

only the district court following remand of a case but also the 

court of appeals that issues the mandate if additional appeals 

ensue. See Westbrook v. Zant, 743 F.2d 764 (11th Cir. 1984). 

Thus, the district court's authority to act in this matter is 

unimpeachable and its duty under that authority is clear. The 

court was obligated to enforce its judgment of September 24, 1984. 

We next consider whether the district court was entitled to 

modify its judgment when implementing our mandate under the "law 

of the case" doctrine. Though it is often expressed in terms that 

appear to bind the district court rigidly, the doctrine does 

recognize three circumstances in which the district court may 

exercise discretion when executing an appellate mandate. 

[T]he law of the case doctrine does not apply to bar 

reconsideration of an issue when (1) a subsequent trial 

produces substantially different evidence, (2) controlling authority has since made a contrary decision of law 

applicable to that issue, or (3) the prior decision was 

clearly erroneous and would work manifest injustice. 

Wheeler v. City of Pleasant Grove, 746 F.2d 1437, 1440 (11th Cir. 

1984) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 690 F.2d 869, 872 (11th 

Cir. 1982)) (emphasis added). In view of these limitations on the 

doctrine, we may recast Ms. Bell's second argument to ask whether 

one of these exceptional circumstances is imbedded in the factual 

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or legal setting of this case. 

We conclude that the evidence of Ms. Bell's back injury and 

her fitness to resume employment was sufficiently different from 

that previously available to allow the district court to consider 

whether a modification of its earlier judgment was justified. We 

reach this conclusion though the evidence was introduced in a 

hearing scheduled to accommodate Ms. Bell, not in a subsequent 

trial as prescribed in Wheeler. A new trial was not needed to 

resolve the dispute between the parties in this case, nor was one 

contemplated by our mandate or by the district court. When 

Ms. Bell and Dresser proved unable to settle their differences, 

the court decided to ventilate all outstanding issues in a hearing 

on Ms. Bell's Motion for Protection and Enforcement of Prior Court 

Orders. As we recently pointed out, when "evidence is newly 

' discovered--evidence that existed at the time of the trial but was 

not discovered then--the proper forum for reconsideration is with 

the body that initially decided the issue." Rutherford v. United 

States, 806 F.2d 1455, 1460 (10th Cir. 1986). Thus it is the 

forum in which new evidence is heard that imparts validity to a 

finding of fa ct , not the style of the proceeding in that forum. 

The district court's decision to amend its earlier judgment is 

well within "the law of the case" and will not be disturbed on 

appeal. 

Finally, we must decide whether the substance of the modified 

judgment will achieve a result permissible under Title VII. We 

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have held that the district court has broad discretion in fashioning remedies in Title VII cases, see Sears v. Atchison, Topeka, & 

Santa Fe Railway, 749 F.2d 1451, 1456 (10th Cir. 1984); Stone v. 

D. A. & S. Oil Well Servicing, Inc., 624 F.2d 142, 144 (10th Cir. 

1980), and that we will disturb a judgment only if the court has 

exceeded the bounds of that discretion, Stone, 624 F.2d at 144; 

Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 524 F.2d 263, 267 (10th Cir. 

1975). When determining whether the district court has acted lawfully, we are mindful that "[t]he District Court's decision must 

.•. be measured against the purposes which inform Title VII," 

Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975), and that 

the court's discretionary choices when deciding upon a remedy "are 

not left to a court's 'inclination, but to its judgment; and its 

judgment is to be guided by sound legal principles.''' Albemarle, 

422 U.S. at 416 (quoting United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 35 

(C.C. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d). 

One of the central purposes of Title VII is ''to make persons 

whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination." Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 418. When an employee has 

been forced to resign due to an employer's sexually discriminatory 

practices, it is common--and perfectly appropriate--for the district court to order the offending employer to pay the employee 

back wages and to reinstate the employee to the same or similar 

employment. In this way, the court attempts to make the employee 

"whole'' by restoring her to the economic condition she would have 

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been in but for the employer's unfair treatment. 

It is important to note, however, that Title VII does not 

require the court to award the employee either back pay or reinstatement. In its broad grant of equitable discretion, section 

706(9) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-5(g), 

allows the court to order "such affirmative action as may be 

appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, 

reinstatement .•• with or without back pay ••• or any other 

equitable relief as the court deems appropriate." (emphasis 

added). Instances in which the court may deny back pay will be 

rare in view of the objectives of the Act, Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 

421, but even when such compensation is granted, the award must be 

only in such measure "as the particular circumstances of a case 

may require to affect restitution." Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 764 (1975). 

In this case, the district court's original award of back pay 

reflected the court's judgment that Dresser's discriminatory 

employment practices had deprived Ms. Bell of income for the 

period beginning on the date she was discharged by Dresser and 

ending on the first day of trial. Given the evidence available to 

the court regarding the cause of Ms. Bell's lost income, the award 

was an appropriate measure of monetary restitution due Ms. Bell 

for the discriminatory treatment imposed upon her. In addition, 

the award was a conscientious attempt by the district court to 

achieve not only the "make whole" objective of Title VII, but also 

the prophylactic objective of encouraging the establishment of 

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equal opportunities for employment by eliminating practices that 

had operated in the past to favor one identifiable group of 

employees over another. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 

424, 429-30 (1971). 

When the district court learned of Ms. Bell's back injury, it 

did nothing more than tailor its earlier award of back pay (an 

order of restitution) to account more accurately for the economic 

injury inflicted by Dresser. The modified award not only maintained conformity with the mandate of Franks by reflecting the 

changed circumstances of the case, it also continued to uphold the 

dual purposes of Title VII. We find no abuse of discretion in the 

district court's decision to modify its award of back pay and 

therefore must affirm its judgment. 

Our review of the district court's decision to strike its 

order of reinstatement leads us to the same conclusion. Although 

Title VII does not mandate the reinstatement of one who has quit 

employment because of an employer's discriminatory practices, we 

agree that 

"reinstatement is a basic element of the appropriate 

remedy in wrongful employee discharge cases and, except 

in extraordinary cases, is required." Allen v. Autauga 

County Board of Education, 685 F.2d 1302, 1305 (11th 

Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). The rule of "presumptive reinstatement" in wrongful discharge cases follows 

the notion that money damages will seldom suffice to 

make whole persons who are unlawfully discriminated 

against in the employment environment. Id. at 1306. 

Darnell v. City of Jasper, 730 F.2d 653, 655 (11th Cir. 1984). 

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The case before us presents one extraordinary circumstance 

which overcomes the presumption in favor of reinstatement. That 

circumstance is, of course, the onset of a physical debilitation 

after an unlawful discharge that prevents the fired employee from 

resuming her previous duties. In this case Ms. Bell sustained a 

physical impairment severe enough in the district court's view to 

disqualify her from manual labor. As a result, the court struck 

that part of its original judgment ordering reinstatement. 

The district court is correct in its view that Dresser is not 

required to place Ms. Bell in a position for which she is no 

longer qualified due to a physical disability. Had Ms. Bell been 

both injured and subjected to intolerable sexual discrimination 

while employed by Dresser, we would expect the court to have considered the possibility of her reinstatement to lighter duty work. 

But Ms. Bell suffered her injury almost two years after leaving 

Dresser, and the district court decided not to explore alternate 

opportunities for employment. Our duty when examining the equitable remedy selected by the district court is clear. We are to 

"maintain a consistent and principled application of the [reinstatement] provision, consonant with the twin statutory objectives 

[of Title VII], while at the same time recognizing that the trial 

court will often have the keener appreciation of those facts and 

circumstances peculiar to particular cases." Albemarle, 422 U.S. 

at 421-22. The district court's decision to strike its order of 

reinstatement was not an abuse of discretion; its judgment is 

affirmed. 

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The modified judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED in 

its entirety. 

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Entered for the Court 

Monroe G. McKay 

Circuit Judge 

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