Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01895/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01895-6/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Marisa Bigot
Defendant
Doe
Defendant
David N. Osolinski
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Plaintiff David N. Osolinski is a civil detainee appearing pro se and in forma pauperis in this 

civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Individuals detained pursuant to California Welfare 

and Institutions Code § 6600 et seq. are civil detainees and are not prisoners within the meaning of the 

Prison Litigation Reform Act. Page v. Torrey, 201 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2000

Now pending before the Plaintiff’s amended complaint, filed March 12, 2015. (ECF No. 27.) 

I.

SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The in forma pauperis statutes provides that “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the 

court determines that ... the action or appeal ... fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual 

allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported 

DAVID N. OSOLINSKI,

 Plaintiff,

v.

MARISA BIGO, et al.,

Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case No.: 1:14-cv-01895-AWI-SAB (PC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF ACTION 

FOR FAILURE TO STATE A COGNIZABLE 

CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF MAY BE 

GRANTED 

[ECF No. 27]

Case 1:14-cv-01895-AWI-SAB Document 28 Filed 04/09/15 Page 1 of 5
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing 

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)), and courts “are not required to indulge 

unwarranted inferences,” Doe I v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal 

conclusions are not. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Under section 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in 

the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). This requires the 

presentation of factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678-679; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The mere possibility of 

misconduct falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id. 

II.

SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

On April 28, 2014, at approximately 9:00 a.m. and 11:00 a.m., Defendants Bigot, Alekhoughie, 

and Rivera entered Plaintiff’s sleeping area while he was asleep and began rummaging through his 

personal property, conducting a routine general search. Plaintiff is aware of no authority which 

permits Defendants to perform a routine general search while the person is asleep in the area being 

searched. The aforementioned action was taken by Defendants on at least two other occasions. The 

routine general searches were performed in a manner solely for harassment and invasion of Plaintiff’s 

privacy. 

Plaintiff would awaken from his sleep and find Defendants going through his personal 

property. Plaintiff yelled, “Get the hell away from my bed area while I am sleeping.” Plaintiff would 

further state, “You can’t keep invading my sleeping space while I am asleep! You’re not trying to 

announce [your intent] or making any attempts to awaken me to let me know you are in my bed 

space!” Defendant Marisa Bigot told Plaintiff, “I am the Unit 18 Supervisor. I can do whatever I 

want no matter what.”

Defendants, and each of them, have a pattern, policy, and practice of making up new rules as 

they go, while nothing whatsoever is codified, and frequently changed to fit the situation. 

///

Case 1:14-cv-01895-AWI-SAB Document 28 Filed 04/09/15 Page 2 of 5
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

III.

DISCUSSION

A. Civil Rights Section 1983

“[C]ivil detainees retain greater liberty protections than individuals detained under criminal 

process, and pre-adjudication detainees retain greater liberty protections than convicted ones. . . .” 

Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 932 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Treatment is presumptively 

punitive when a civil detainee is confined in conditions identical to, similar to, or more restrictive than 

his criminal counterparts, and when a pre-adjudication civil detainee is detained under conditions more 

restrictive than a post-adjudication civil detainee would face. Id. at 932-33.

Civil detainees “are entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than 

criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish.” Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 

307, 322 (1982) (citation omitted).

B. Unreasonable Search of Room

The Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 

558 (1979); Byrd v. Maricopa Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 629 F.3d 1135, 1140 (9th Cir. 2011); 

Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 332 (9th Cir. 1988). The reasonableness of the search is 

determined by the context, which requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the 

invasion of personal rights the search entails. Bell, 441 U.S. at 558-59 (quotations omitted); Byrd, 629 

F.3d at 1141; Bull v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964, 974-75 (9th Cir. 2010); Nunez v. 

Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217, 1227 (9th Cir. 2010); Michenfelder, 860 F.2d at 332-34. Factors that must be 

evaluated are “the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the 

justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted. Bell, 441 U.S. at 559; Byrd, 639 

F.3d at 1141. 

Civil detainees have “a diminished expectation of privacy after commitment to a custodial 

facility. Bell, 441 U.S. at 557. Legitimate concerns justifying searches and seizures are “the safety 

and security of guards and others in the facility, order within the facility and the efficiency of the 

facility’s operations.” Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 993 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks 

Case 1:14-cv-01895-AWI-SAB Document 28 Filed 04/09/15 Page 3 of 5
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

omitted). However, “a search or seizure that is arbitrary, retaliatory, or clearly exceeds the legitimate 

purpose of detention” violates the Fourth Amendment. Id. 

Plaintiff’s bare allegations that his living area was subject to a routine general search solely for 

harassment and invasion of privacy fails to state a cognizable claim for relief. Plaintiff’s allegations 

simply do not demonstrate or support a plausible finding that the April 28, 2014, search and 

subsequently two searches were unreasonable. Thus, even if a reasonable expectation of privacy in 

Plaintiff’s room can be established, Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient consistent facts to reflect an 

unreasonable search of his living area. See, e.g., Bell, 441 U.S. 520, 557 (1979) (“No one can 

rationally doubt that room searches represent an appropriate security measure ....”) Accordingly, 

Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable Fourth Amendment claim. 

C. Violation of California Constitution and State Law

Plaintiff contends that under California law, he has a constitutional right to privacy and to 

acquire and protect property, a statutory right to property, and a regulatory right to privacy, dignity, 

respect, and human care. Violations of state law do not give rise to a claim for relief under section 

1983. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2009); Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 824-25 

(9th Cir. 2001); Sweaney v. Ada Cnty., Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997). 

 D. Further Leave to Amend

The Court previously notified Plaintiff of the deficiencies and granted leave to amend, and 

because Plaintiff has failed to cure the deficiencies further amendment is not warranted. Lopez v. 

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-1449 (9th Cir. 

1987). 

IV.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to state any cognizable claims for 

relief under section 1983. As Plaintiff has had previously opportunities to cure the deficiencies 

identified by the Court and has failed to do so, further leave to amend shall not be granted. Lopez v. 

Smith, 203 F.3d at 1130. 

Case 1:14-cv-01895-AWI-SAB Document 28 Filed 04/09/15 Page 4 of 5
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Accordingly, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that his action be DISMISSED based on 

Plaintiff’s failure to state a cognizable section 1983 claim.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty (30) days 

after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may file written objections 

with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 

Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 

result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014)

(citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 8, 2015 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:14-cv-01895-AWI-SAB Document 28 Filed 04/09/15 Page 5 of 5