Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-13-01649/USCOURTS-ca13-13-01649-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
BIAX Corporation
Appellant
NVIDIA Corporation
Cross-Appellant
Sony Computer Entertainment America, Inc.
Cross-Appellant
Sony Electronics Inc.
Cross-Appellant

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

BIAX CORPORATION,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

NVIDIA CORPORATION,

Defendant-Cross Appellant

SONY COMPUTER ENTERTAINMENT AMERICA, 

INC. SONY ELECTRONICS, INC.,

Defendants-Cross Appellants

______________________ 

2013-1649, 2013-1653, 2013-1654

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the 

District of Colorado in No. 09-CV-1257, Judge Philip A. 

Brimmer.

______________________ 

Decided: February 24, 2015 

______________________ 

CHRISTIAN C. ONSAGER, Onsager Guyerson Fletcher

Johnson, Denver, Colorado, argued for plaintiff-appellant. 

Also represented by ANDREW D. JOHNSON. 

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2 BIAX CORPORATION v. NVIDIA CORPORATION

MARK S. DAVIES, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, 

Washington, DC, argued for defendant-cross appellant, 

Nvidia Corporation. Also represented by CHRISTOPHER R.

OTTENWELLER, INDRA NEEL CHATTERJEE, Menlo Park, CA;

DONALD E. DAYBELL, CHRISTINA MARIE VON DER AHE, 

Irvine, CA; ALEX V. CHACHKES, New York, NY; BRIAN 

PHILIP GOLDMAN, San Francisco, CA.

DAVID ROKACH, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Chicago, IL, 

argued for defendants-cross appellant, Sony Computer 

Entertainment America, Inc., Sony Electronics Inc. 

PETER MCCREERY LANCASTER, Dorsey & Whitney 

LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota, argued for amicus curiae, 

Dorsey & Whitney LLP. 

______________________ 

Before LOURIE, DYK, and TARANTO, Circuit Judges.

DYK, Circuit Judge.

Biax Corporation (“Biax”) appeals the district court’s 

grant of attorneys’ fees to Nvidia Corporation (“Nvidia”), 

Sony Computer Entertainment America, Inc., and Sony 

Electronics, Inc. (collectively, “Sony”) pursuant to 35 

U.S.C. § 285. Nvidia and Sony cross-appeal the district 

court’s denial of attorneys’ fees against Dorsey & Whitney 

LLP (“Dorsey”), Biax’s trial counsel, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1927. We reverse the district court’s grant of fees under 

§ 285 and affirm the district court’s denial of fees under 

§ 1927.

BACKGROUND

Biax is the owner of U.S. Patent Nos. 5,517,628 (“the 

’628 patent”) and 6,253,313 (“the ’313 patent”), which

share a common specification and relate to parallel proCase: 13-1649 Document: 108-2 Page: 2 Filed: 02/24/2015
BIAX CORPORATION v. NVIDIA CORPORATION 3

cessing computer systems. Biax sued Nvidia and Sony for 

infringement of unspecified claims of the ’313 and ’628 

patents on May 29, 2009.1 At the time, Biax did not 

1 Biax subsequently asserted, inter alia, claims 3–5, 

8, 9, 12–16, 19–21, 24, and 25 of the ’313 and claims 1, 9–

14, 16, 17, 25, 26, and 29 of the ’628 patent. Claim 1 of 

the ’628 patent is representative and provides: 

A computer comprising:

a general purpose register file comprising at least 

two general purpose registers;

a condition code register file distinct from said 

general purpose register file, having a plurality of 

addressable condition code registers, each condition code register for representing a condition code 

value as a small number of bits summarizing the 

execution or result of a previously-executed instruction;

a processor element configured to execute instructions, including condition-setting instructions that 

each produce a condition code value for storage in 

one of said condition code registers;

a branch execution unit configured to execute 

conditional branch instructions that each determine a target instruction for execution based on 

analysis of a condition code value from one of said 

condition code registers; and

a condition code access unit configured to act in 

response to condition-selecting instructions, at 

least one of said condition-selecting instructions 

being one of either said condition-setting instructions or said conditional branch instructions, said 

condition-selecting instructions for selecting from 

 

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4 BIAX CORPORATION v. NVIDIA CORPORATION

specify particular products it alleged to infringe, but 

generally accused “graphics systems which employ a 

plurality of condition code registers.” J.A. 265–67. On 

February 15, 2012, the district court granted Nvidia’s and 

Sony’s motions for summary judgment of noninfringement. Biax appealed, challenging, inter alia, 

claim construction under the theory that the district court 

improperly read limitations from claim 2, which requires 

that condition code registers be shared by all processor 

elements, into all of the asserted claims.2 This court 

said condition code register file a condition code 

register for at least one of:

storing into said selected condition code register a condition code value produced by one of 

said condition-setting instructions, and

fetching from said selected condition code register a condition code value for analysis by one 

of said conditional branch instructions;

said selecting being by direct addressing on a 

condition code address field of the conditionselecting instruction.

’628 patent, col. 50 ll. 10–43 

2 Claim 2 provides:

The computer of claim 1 further comprising:

at least one additional processor element configured to execute instructions including conditionsetting instructions that each produce a condition 

code value for storage in one of said condition code 

registers;

each said processor element being enabled to deliver the condition code values produced by said 

 

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BIAX CORPORATION v. NVIDIA CORPORATION 5

affirmed without opinion. Biax Corp. v. Nvidia Corp., 498

F. App’x 998 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 

On April 27, 2012, during the pendency of Biax’s prior 

appeal to this court, Nvidia and Sony filed a motion for 

attorneys’ fees under both 35 U.S.C. § 285 and 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1927. On March 30, 2013, the district court granted-inpart Nvidia and Sony’s motion, awarding fees against 

Biax under § 285 but denying them against Dorsey under 

§ 1927. In granting fees under § 285, the district court

applied the then-prevailing standard articulated in 

Brooks Furniture Manufacturing, Inc. v. Dutailier International Inc., 393 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005), and its 

progeny, which required that a defendant demonstrate

that the litigation was objectively baseless and brought in 

subjective bad faith in order to be entitled to fees. Id. at 

1381. 

The district court found objective baselessness and 

bad faith (based on the continued assertion of an objectively baseless claim) and awarded fees for the period 

between Biax’s expert’s deposition and the district court’s 

summary judgment decision. The district court reasoned 

that its 2010 claim construction orders foreclosed Biax’s 

infringement contentions, but that Biax nonetheless 

continued to pursue litigation until the court issued its 

summary judgment order in 2012. Specifically, the discondition-setting instructions to condition code 

registers of said condition code register file, said 

condition code register file being shared by said 

processor elements, a condition code value produced by any of said processor elements being 

readable by said branch execution unit.

’628 patent, col. 50 ll. 44–55.

 

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6 BIAX CORPORATION v. NVIDIA CORPORATION

trict court found that Biax’s litigation position was objectively baseless because Biax “persistent[ly] disregard[ed] . . . the Court’s unambiguous statements in 

orders,” and that Biax “aggressively pursu[ed] this litigation [in the district court], even after the unequivocal 

statement of its own expert that defendants’ devices could 

not infringe the asserted patents . . . .” J.A. 13. On these 

findings, the district court awarded fees from the time 

Biax’s expert (supposedly) admitted that Biax had no 

infringement position under the district court’s claim 

construction orders to the time when the district court 

decided summary judgment. 

The district court denied Nvidia’s and Sony’s motion 

for fees pursuant to § 1927, explaining that Dorsey did 

not “exceed[] the bounds of zealous advocacy.” J.A. 22. 

Biax appealed the district court’s award of fees under 

§ 285. Nvidia and Sony cross-appealed the district court’s 

denial of fees under § 1927. While the appeals were 

pending, the Supreme Court decided Octane Fitness, LLC 

v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014), 

and Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Management System, 

Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014), which changed the standard 

for awarding fees under § 285 and the standard for our 

appellate review. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1). 

DISCUSSION

I 

Section 285 provides: “The court in exceptional cases 

may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing 

party.” 35 U.S.C. § 285. In Octane Fitness, the Supreme 

Court rejected the Brooks Furniture standard, explaining

that “there is no precise rule or formula for making” a 

determination as to whether a case is exceptional. Octane 

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BIAX CORPORATION v. NVIDIA CORPORATION 7

Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1756 (quotation and citation omitted). It is a case-by-case determination based on considering the totality of the circumstances. Id. Such an 

exceptional case is “rare.” Id. at 1757. But, if the case 

“stands out from others with respect to the substantive 

strength of a party’s litigating position . . . or the unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated,” it is 

“exceptional” under the meaning of the statute. Id. at 

1756. Thus, objective reasonableness remains a relevant 

factor. An abuse-of-discretion standard applies in reviewing all aspects of a district court’s § 285 determination. 

Highmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1747. 

We do not read the district court’s fee award here as 

being based on Biax’s continued disagreement with the 

district court’s claim construction that claim 2’s requirement, that “condition code register file[s be] shared by 

said processor elements,” ’628 patent, col. 50 ll. 44–55, 

was an element of the asserted claims and that the asserted claims required “that any processor element is able 

to access any condition code register . . . .” J.A. 1157. 

Certainly Biax was entitled to seek reconsideration of 

that claim construction in the district court and challenge 

on appeal what it regarded to be an incorrect claim construction.3 But Biax could not continue to assert its 

infringement claims in the district court unless it had an 

objectively reasonable infringement position under the 

3 Indeed, after claim construction, Biax continued 

to argue that the “shared by all processor elements” 

limitation was incorrectly imported into claim 1 from 

claim 2 or that the claim construction only applied to 

claim 2. We ultimately rejected these arguments. See

Biax, 498 F. App’x at 998. 

 

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8 BIAX CORPORATION v. NVIDIA CORPORATION

district court’s claim construction. The district court held 

that Biax had no such reasonable position.

Determining whether the district court was correct 

that Biax had no reasonable theory of infringement after 

claim construction requires an understanding of Biax’s

argument as to infringement. Biax initially accused

products containing various graphical processor units 

(“GPUs”) of infringement. The GPUs at issue are computer chips, each containing a number of sub-units called 

“shaders.” Shaders are specially designed processing 

engines, capable of quickly modifying graphical data for 

presentation to the end user. The shaders on the accused 

chips have one or more processors and multiple code 

registers associated with them. The processor(s) for a 

particular shader can access all of that shader’s own code 

registers. But, the processors cannot access the code 

registers on other shaders. 

Following claim construction, Biax argued that individual shaders were infringing products and that processors on a particular shader need only access condition 

code registers associated with that same shader—that is, 

it was not necessary for the processors on an accused 

shader to access condition code registers throughout the 

chip. According to Biax, because a shader taken in isolation met the stipulated definition of a “computer” (which 

is not in dispute) and met the other limitations of claim 1, 

each shader taken in isolation infringed. Thus, according 

to Biax, even under the district court’s claim construction 

it had a reasonable infringement position, and continued 

prosecution of the action in the district court was not 

objectively baseless or in bad faith. 

In awarding attorneys’ fees under § 285, the district 

court here disagreed, holding that, first, Biax’s “own 

expert conceded that the processors in defendants’ chips 

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BIAX CORPORATION v. NVIDIA CORPORATION 9

cannot access all of the condition code storage locations,” 

and second, the language in its claim construction orders 

precluded Biax’s scope argument. J.A. 12. 

As to the first ground, the district court misread the 

expert’s testimony. The testimony in question came from 

a deposition of Biax’s expert in which counsel for the 

defendants asked: “[i]n informing your infringement 

opinions for the ’313 patent, did you apply a requirement 

that condition code storage locations are shared by all 

processor elements?” J.A. 5. The witness clarified: “[b]y 

all processor elements [on the chip]? No.” Id. Subsequently, counsel for defendants asked again “if there is a 

requirement that processor elements need to access any of 

the condition code registers or condition code storage 

locations in the chip, then [the chip] doesn’t infringe?” Id.

(emphasis added). To this, the witness responded: “[i]t 

doesn’t infringe that requirement, no. But there is no 

such requirement.” Id. Contrary to the district court’s 

interpretation of the exchange, Biax’s expert did not 

admit that Biax had no infringement positions under the 

district court’s claim construction. Indeed, at oral argument in our court, counsel for defendants admitted that 

the expert did not say that there is no infringement if one 

considers only the individual shaders. See Oral Ar. Tr. at 

19:55–20:14 (The Court: “[The expert’s testimony] doesn’t 

say that there is no infringement if you consider the 

individual shaders?” Counsel: “No, no it doesn’t say that, 

your honor.”). 

Nor did the district court’s pre-summary judgment 

claim construction foreclose Biax’s infringement position. 

The claim construction did not require that processors 

must be able to access condition code registers on a chipwide basis. In its claim construction order, the court 

noted that, “while defendants are correct that any processor element is able to access any condition code register, 

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10 BIAX CORPORATION v. NVIDIA CORPORATION

their argument to include within the definition of ‘condition code register’ a reference to multiple processor elements sharing the condition code register is a more 

limited definition than Claim 1 requires.” J.A. 1157. This 

statement did not resolve claim construction for two 

reasons. First, it suggested that single processor devices 

could infringe claim 1. Second, what is noticeably absent 

from this statement is a clarification of scope—that is, 

“able to access any condition code register” on what? 

Must a processor element in an accused product only 

access every condition code register associated with that 

shader? Or, must a processor element be able to access 

every condition code register on the entire chip? 

After the district court issued its claim construction 

order, the defendants filed a motion for clarification. In 

it, they requested that the district court “clarify” its order 

by modifying the construction of “condition code register” 

to include the requirement that “any processor element is 

able to access any condition code register.” J.A. 1171. 

The district court rejected this proposed clarification. The 

court quoted its prior claim construction order and reasoned that, “in the event there is only one processor 

element, that processor element is capable of accessing 

any of the condition code registers for storing condition 

code values” and that “the claim language already accounts for the shared access to condition code registers 

upon the introduction of additional processor elements.” 

J.A. 1203 (quotations and citation omitted). Additionally, 

the court stated that “the claim language clearly provides 

that the condition code storages are accessible by each of 

said processor elements.” Id. (quotations and citation 

omitted). This clarification order did nothing to resolve 

the ambiguity as to whether the shared-by-all limitation 

applied on a shader-by-shader or chip-by-chip basis; if 

anything, the district court’s claim construction orders 

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BIAX CORPORATION v. NVIDIA CORPORATION 11

appeared to suggest that the claim limitations apply to 

each shader separately and not to all processors and all 

condition code registers on the chip. 

It was not until summary judgment that the district 

court finally resolved the uncertainty. For the first time, 

the district court expressly announced that “[t]he attempted isolation of a single processor element does not 

change the fact that any particular processor element in

the accused chips [must be capable] of accessing all condition code registers and that any particular condition code 

register [must be] shared by all of the other processor 

elements which exist within the accused chips.” J.A. 1991

(emphasis added). Thus, it was not until a year and half 

after the claim construction orders that the district court 

finally answered the “on what” question against Biax. 

Biax’s claim construction position, that the asserted 

claims read onto individual shaders, was reasonable 

under the district court’s claim construction orders, 

especially in light of the stipulated definition of “computer,” which was met by the individual shaders.4

Because neither the expert testimony nor the claim 

construction orders foreclosed Biax’s position and there 

was nothing unreasonable about Biax’s infringement 

position, the basis for the district court’s award of fees no 

longer exists. Thus, even applying the deferential standard of review under Highmark, the district court’s fee 

award must be set aside. In some cases decided under the 

old Brooks Furniture standard, we have remanded for the 

district court to consider whether the case is “exceptional” 

in light of the new Octane Fitness standard. See, e.g., 

4 The parties stipulated that “computer” meant “a 

device that receives, processes, and presents data.” 

Appellant’s Br. 10.

 

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12 BIAX CORPORATION v. NVIDIA CORPORATION

Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. All-Tag Sec. S.A., 572 F. App’x 

988 (Fed. Cir. 2014). A remand is not necessary here 

because neither the defendants nor the district court has

suggested any basis for awarding fees other than the lack 

of objective reasonableness, and the resulting bad faith 

from continuing to litigate an objectively baseless position. Therefore, we reverse rather than vacate the fee 

award.

II

In addition to asking for fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285, 

the defendants also asked for fees from Dorsey under 28 

U.S.C. § 1927. Section 1927 provides:

Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct 

cases in any court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in 

any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be 

required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.

The district court denied this basis for the fee award. It 

found that Dorsey did not “exceed[] the bounds of zealous 

advocacy.” J.A. 22. The defendants appeal that denial.

Under Tenth Circuit law, an assessment of fees under 

§ 1927 is appropriate “only in instances evidencing a 

serious . . . disregard for the orderly process of justice.” 

Braley v. Campbell, 832 F.2d 1504, 1512 (10th Cir. 1987) 

(quoting Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc., 768 F.2d 

1159, 1165 (10th Cir. 1985)). Attorney conduct that is 

“objectively unreasonable” and manifests “either intentional or reckless disregard of the attorney’s duties to the 

court” is sanctionable. Hamilton v. Boise Cascade Express, 519 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting 

Braley, 832 F.2d at 1512). The defendants have not 

argued that making an objectively reasonable argument 

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BIAX CORPORATION v. NVIDIA CORPORATION 13

could support sanctions under § 1927, and the district 

court did not abuse its discretion by deciding to deny fees 

under § 1927. The denial of fees under § 1927 is affirmed 

for the same reasons we reverse the award of fees under

35 U.S.C. § 285—because § 1927 is inapplicable when the 

lawyer puts forth only objectively reasonable arguments 

in the absence of bad faith. Therefore, we need not address whether the “unreasonabl[e] and vexatious[]” 

standard of § 1927 under Tenth Circuit law is more 

stringent than the “exceptional” standard of § 285. 

CONCLUSION

 We affirm the district court’s denial of fees under 28 

U.S.C. § 1927 and reverse the award of fees under 35 

U.S.C. § 285. 

AFFIRMED-IN-PART, REVERSED-IN-PART

COSTS

Costs to appellant Biax Corporation. 

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