Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-6_06-cv-06041/USCOURTS-arwd-6_06-cv-06041-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Delta Beverage Group, Inc.
Defendant
Brett Dingler
Defendant
PepsiAmericas, Inc.
Defendant
Lisa Vaughn
Defendant
Randy Whitehead
Plaintiff

Document Text:

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint only modified the name of Defendant PEPSI from 1

“PEPSIAMERICAS, INC.” to “Delta Beverage Company, Inc. d/b/a PEPSIAMERICAS, INC.”

(Doc. 1 & 2).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HOT SPRINGS DIVISION

RANDY WHITEHEAD PLAINTIFF

v. Case No. 06-6041

DELTA BEVERAGE GROUP, INC., 

d/b/a PEPSIAMERICAS, INC.; 

LISA VAUGHN INDIVIDUALLY AND 

IN HER CAPACITY AS HUMAN RESOURCE 

MANAGER WITH PEPSIAMERICAS, INC.; 

AND BRETT DINGLER INDIVIDUALLY 

AND IN HIS CAPACITY AS REGIONAL 

SUPERVISOR WITH PEPSIAMERICAS, INC. DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Currently before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint and Brief in Support (Docs. 6 &

7), Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Doc. 2), and Plaintiff’s 1

Response and Brief in Support (Docs. 15 & 16). Based on the

reasons stated below, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is

GRANTED. 

A. Background

The following facts are stated in a light most favorable

to Plaintiff’s position. Plaintiff, Randy Whitehead, worked

as an at-will employee for PEPSIAMERICAS, INC. (PEPSI), for

six years and reached the status of senior territory sales

manager before his employment was terminated on May 27, 2005.

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On or about May 21, 2005, the Plaintiff and his wife went

to Docker’s Sports Bar & Grill (Docker’s) in Hot Springs,

Arkansas, for a meeting with the manager and several employees

of Docker’s to discuss a number of business related issues

between PEPSI and Docker’s. Shortly after that meeting

finished, a female employee became intoxicated and allegedly

acted in an unbecoming manner. The female employee allegedly

showed her breasts on a number of occasions to patrons of the

establishment. (Doc. 2, ¶ 9). Plaintiff contends he was not

present while this was occurring. Id. 

On May 27, 2005, Plaintiff was called into a meeting and

informed that PEPSI and its agents would like to discuss a

number of situations and Plaintiff’s actions. Plaintiff

answered some questions, was dismissed, and informed to wait

for further instruction. Within the hour, Plaintiff was told

by PEPSI that he was terminated for an alleged policy

violation. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Brett Dingler

(Dingler), regional manager for PEPSI, stated he believed that

Plaintiff had taken the female employee out and enticed her to

become intoxicated and to expose her body publicly. (Doc. 2,

¶ 13). This was based on information received by Lisa Vaughn,

Director of Human Resources for PEPSI, during prior interviews

with ten (10) of Plaintiff’s employees from the Hot Springs

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On October 10, 2006, the Clerk’s Office entered a Default Judgment against

2

Separate Defendant Dingler (Doc. 13). The record indicates Separate Defendant Dingler was

served on September 8, 2006, and the other Defendants were served on September 11, 2006. On

October 10, 2006, Separate Defendant Dingler filed a Motion to Set Aside the Clerk’s entry of

default (Doc. 14) and this Court granted that order on October 20, 2006 (Doc. 17).

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facility. 

On August 4, 2006, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against

the Defendants alleging four causes of action: (1) Deprivation

of Constitutional Rights and Privileges under 42 U.S.C. §

1983; (2) a claim under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985; (3)

Defamation; (4) Wrongful Discharge, and also sought a

Declaratory Judgment. On October 2, 2006, Defendants filed 2

a joint response with a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 6). The

Defendants’ motion to dismiss contends: (1) Plaintiff’s 42

U.S.C. § 1983 action must be dismissed because Defendants are

private actors and there is no allegation Defendants acted

“under color of law;” (2) Plaintiff’s employment with

Defendant PEPSI was at-will and therefore no due process

attached; (3) Plaintiff’s complaint was devoid of any

allegation of discrimination based on a protected status; (4)

the Arkansas Supreme Court has made it clear that employer’s

cannot be liable for intentional infliction of emotional

distress for terminating an at-will employee; and (5) the

complaint fails to state a claim for defamation. 

B. Motion to Dismiss Standard of Review

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the district court must

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accept the allegations contained in the complaint as true, and

all reasonable inferences from the complaint must be drawn in

favor of the non-moving party. Hafley v. Lohman, 90 F.3d 264,

266 (8th Cir. 1996). Complaints should be liberally construed

in the plaintiff’s favor and “‘should not be dismissed for

failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that

the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [her]

claim which would entitle [her] to relief.’” Rucci v. City of

Pacific, 327 F.3d 651, 652 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting Conley v.

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)).

C. Analysis

In Plaintiff’s response (Doc. 16), he agrees that his

claims filed under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 are without

merit and were filed with no basis to support such claims.

Accordingly, that portion of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is

dismissed without discussion. Plaintiff’s claims remain for

intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, and

for wrongful termination. 

Plaintiff alleges that conduct of Defendant Lisa Vaughn

was so outrageous in character, and extreme in degree, as to

go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded

as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society.

(Doc. 2). The elements of the tort of intentional infliction

of emotional distress are “extreme and outrageous conduct,

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willfully or wantonly performed, which caused severe emotional

distress.” Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202, 1206

(8th Cir. 1984). The Arkansas Supreme Court has held that

outrageous conduct is “conduct that is so outrageous in

character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all

possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious,

and utterly intolerable in a civilized society.” M.B.M. Co.,

Inc., v. Counce, 596 S.W.2d 681, 687 (Ark. 1980). 

The Arkansas Supreme Court considered whether the

discharge of an at-will employee constituted “extreme and

outrageous conduct” for purposes of recovering damages for

intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Court

concluded that the employer was not liable for intentional

infliction of emotional distress “for doing that which it had

a legal right to do.” M.B.M. Co., Inc., 596 S.W.2d at 688. 

Arkansas adheres to the employment-at-will doctrine.

Mertyris v. P.A.M. Transp., Inc., 832 S.W.2d 823, 825 (Ark.

1992), see also St. Edward Mercy Medical Center v. Ellison,

946 S.W.2d 726 (Ark. App. 1997). 

Generally, the law of this state [Arkansas] is

that an employer or an employee may terminate an

employment relationship at will. Under the

employment-at-will doctrine, an at-will employee

may be discharged for good cause, no cause, or

even a morally wrong cause. Although the

employment-at-will doctrine has been modified in

some respects, it continues to represent the law

of this state. 

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Ellison, 946 S.W.2d at 106 (citing Crain Indus., Inc. V. Cass,

810 S.W.2d 910 (Ark. 1991); Smith v. American Greetings Corp.,

804 S.W.2d 683 (Ark. 1991); Kimble v. Pulaski Co. Special Sch.

Dist., 921 S.W.2d 611 (Ark. 1996)). As espoused by the Eighth

Circuit, two exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine

exist in Arkansas; i.e., “where a personnel manual specifies

that termination will only be for cause and where the

employment agreement itself specifies that termination will

only be for cause.” Allen v. City of Pocahontas, 340 F.3d 551

(8th Cir. 2003). 

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s employment with

Defendant PEPSI was at-will. Plaintiff has failed to identify

any contract, state statute, or other document that

established a property interest in his continued employment.

Plaintiff’s response to the Defendants’ motion to dismiss does

briefly mention, and refers to the Complaint, which cites a

policy manual that sets forth the terms and conditions of

Plaintiff’s employment. The reference is to a policy manual

of PEPSI, but it appears from paragraph 57 of the Complaint

that Plaintiff’s argument is that the policy manuals of PEPSI

are unconstitutional. There is no further showing or

suggestion that Plaintiff was working under any personnel

manual. 

Terminating an at-will employee is not a basis for a

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claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress under

Arkansas law. There is no violation, constitutional or

otherwise, for the enforcement of the at-will employment law,

and accordingly, Plaintiff’s cause of action for intentional

infliction of emotional distress must be dismissed. 

The following elements are necessary to establish a claim

for defamation in Arkansas: (1) the defamatory nature of the

statement of fact; (2) that statement’s identification of or

reference to the plaintiff; (3) publication of the statement

by the defendant; (4) the defendant’s fault in the

publication; (5) the statement’s falsity; and (6) damages.”

Southall v. Little Rock Newspapers, Inc., 964 S.W.2d 187, 192

(Ark. 1998). Defendants contend that Plaintiff has failed to

allege the first three elements. 

The Court finds that Plaintiff has not provided any

defamatory statements, proof of any publication of any

defamatory statement, or proof of any actual damages resulting

from the alleged defamatory statements. Plaintiff has not

suggested that these things are in existence, and has

consequently not made a prima facie showing for a defamation

cause of action. Therefore, Plaintiff’s cause of action for

defamation must be dismissed. 

 Finally, the Court addresses Plaintiff’s wrongful

termination claim. Plaintiff was an at-will employee for

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PEPSI, and under Arkansas law, an at-will employee has a cause

of action for wrongful discharge if the employee was

discharged in violation of “well-established public policy of

the state.” Sterling Drug, Inc., v. Oxford, 743 S.W.2d 380,

382 (Ark. 1988). The Court is unable to find, within the

record, any violation of public policy by PEPSI through the

termination of Plaintiff. Therefore, Plaintiff’s cause of

action for wrongful termination must also be dismissed. 

D. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the Defendants’ motion to

dismiss is GRANTED and Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE. 

IT IS SO ORDERED this 27th day of December, 2006. 

 /s/ Robert T. Dawson 

 Robert T. Dawson

 United States District Judge

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