Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-13-20533/USCOURTS-ca5-13-20533-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Charles Wright
Appellant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-20533

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

CHARLES WRIGHT, 

 Defendant – Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and JONES and HIGGINSON, Circuit 

Judges.

HIGGINSON, Circuit Judge:

Defendant-Appellant Charles Wright was indicted, tried, and found 

guilty of distributing child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 

2252A(a)(2)(B) and (b)(1), and possessing child pornography, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2) and 2256(8)(A). He was subsequently 

sentenced to 240 months imprisonment and a lifetime of supervised release. 

He timely appealed both his conviction and sentence. For the reasons stated 

below, we AFFIRM Wright’s conviction and sentence.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

February 3, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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I.

On September 14, 2011, at around 7:00 a.m., state and federal law 

enforcement officers executed a search warrant of Wright’s home. Officer John 

Barnes of the Houston Police Department, who had been assigned to the 

Houston Child Exploitation Task Force, obtained the search warrant after his 

investigation revealed that an IP address registered to Wright appeared to be 

sharing child pornography through a file sharing network. The officers who 

executed the search warrant were all wearing bulletproof vests and/or raid 

jackets and were all armed. Six officers were on the “entry team” and had their 

guns drawn as they entered the residence, while six officers were on the 

“perimeter team” and were tasked with ensuring that no one left the perimeter 

without permission from law enforcement. The officers knocked and 

announced and then entered and cleared the house, which had seven occupants 

in it. Some of the occupants, including Wright, were wearing nightgowns and 

pajamas when they were forced to exit the residence. 

As the search of the residence was taking place, Officer Barnes 

approached Wright and told him that he wanted to talk to him. Officer Barnes 

escorted Wright to his bedroom so that he could change into more appropriate 

clothing. Wright testified that Officer Barnes grabbed him by the back of his 

arm to escort him, but Officer Barnes testified that he did not remember ever 

touching Wright. There were three officers in Wright’s bedroom as he got 

dressed. After Wright got dressed, Officer Barnes escorted him to an 

unmarked Ford Taurus—Officer Barnes’s patrol unit—which was parked next 

to the parking lot of a neighboring church, about thirty feet from the house. 

While walking to the car, Officer Barnes told Wright that he was not under 

arrest and that he was free to leave at any time. Officer Barnes led Wright to 

the front door of the car, and Wright sat in the front passenger seat and closed 

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the door. Agent Guerra sat in the back seat of the car, and Officer Barnes sat 

in the driver’s seat. Officer Barnes put a recorder on and started the interview. 

The interview lasted one hour and two minutes. At the beginning of the 

interview, Officer Barnes showed Wright a copy of the search warrant, which 

Wright said that he could not see without his glasses. Office Barnes for a 

second time told Wright that he was not under arrest and that he was free to 

leave. Officer Barnes then read Wright his Miranda rights, explained to him 

the nature of the investigation, and proceeded to ask him questions. Three 

times during the course of the recorded interview, Wright mentioned the 

possibility of talking to a lawyer. Each of the three references was made in 

response to Officer Barnes’s questions regarding Wright’s use of ages as search 

terms when searching for pornography. The first reference was made shortly 

after the interview commenced when the following exchange took place: 

JB [Officer Barnes]: [] what about ages, you ever put 

in ages in search terms?

CW [Wright]: Sometimes.

JB: What ages do you put in?

CW: Front, well.

JB: Do you ever put in 12 year old [].

CW: We’re, we’re getting into somethin’.

JB: Or 14 year old?

CW: [unintelligible] I probably should talk to that 

lawyer first yea. 

 

Office Barnes did not address Wright’s reference to a lawyer, but instead 

responded by slightly changing the subject. Shortly after this first exchange, 

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Officer Barnes returned to the topic of ages, and the following exchange took 

place:

JB: What ages do you put in[]there?

CW: I, that’s what I say again, we’re getting into 

[simultaneous conversation] where I should talk to a 

lawyer.

JB: [] ok, we’ll, oh, oh, only uh, only talk to me about 

stuff that you wanna talk about.

CW: Yea, that’s what I’m sayin’.

JB: Ok, so I, I don’t wanna, I don’t want you to tell 

me anything you don’t want to, but I wanna help you 

at the same time, being cooperative.

CW: I’ll be, but I don’t wanna say anything, again, 

that’s gonna get me in trouble either.

Finally, on a third occasion when Officer Barnes returned to the subject of 

search terms, Wright responded: “There again, we’re gettin’ towards the 

lawyer.” 

During the course of the lengthy interview, Wright made numerous

incriminating statements. Wright told Officer Barnes about his use of the 

program Frost Wire to download music, videos, and pictures. He stated that 

he used Frost Wire to search for adult pornography, but he freely admitted to 

using the search term “pedophilia” as well as “PTHC”—an acronym commonly 

used to search for child pornography.1 Wright admitted that when he used 

those terms he would get 50% child pornography and 50% adult pornography 

as a result, but he claimed that he would delete the child pornography as soon 

1 Officer Barnes testified at trial that “PTHC” stands for “preteen hardcore.”

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as he got it. Wright told Officer Barnes about his use of an “internet washer” 

that was supposed to do an “FBI wipe” of his computer to delete files that he 

did not want. He explained that he would delete files containing child 

pornography because he knew they were illegal. Wright discussed his 

knowledge, or purported lack of knowledge, regarding the Frost Wire filesharing feature. He also stated “you see the kid stuff and, and you know, it’s, 

it’s, like drugs.” 

The interview and, specifically, Wright’s references to a lawyer are the 

subject of two of Wright’s three issues on appeal. First, Wright argues that the 

district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress the statements that 

he made to Officer Barnes during the interview. Second, Wright contends that 

the government violated Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), when, during its 

closing argument, the prosecutor commented on Wright’s reluctance to answer 

certain questions during the interview. Third, Wright argues that at 

sentencing the district court violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 

when it refused to allow defense counsel to respond after the government 

attorney made her sentencing presentation. We will discuss each issue in turn. 

II.

Before trial, Wright moved to suppress “any statements made to law 

enforcement officers.” Wright argued that he properly, and unambiguously, 

invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel and that Officer Barnes violated 

that right when he continued to ask questions. The district court held a 

suppression hearing during which it heard testimony from four witnesses—

Officer Barnes, two FBI Special Agents who participated in the search of 

Wright’s house, and Wright. The district court denied Wright’s motion to 

suppress. The district court concluded that Wright’s statements should not be 

suppressed because Wright was not “under arrest at the time that he spoke 

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with the interrogating officer”2 and because Wright “never requested the 

presence of an attorney.” Order on Motion to Suppress at 3, United States v. 

Wright, No. 12-91 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 28, 2013), ECF No. 61 (citation omitted)

(finding that Wright “was not in handcuffs and had the freedom to remove 

himself from the vehicle where the questioning was ongoing” and that he “was 

permitted to enter his home, even during the search, to obtain additional 

clothing”). 

A.

“When the district court denies a motion to suppress, we review factual 

findings for clear error and conclusions of law de novo.” United States v. 

Rodriguez, 702 F.3d 206, 208 (5th Cir. 2012) (citation and quotation marks 

omitted); see also United States v. Harrell, 894 F.2d 120, 122-23 (5th Cir. 1990) 

(“The question of whether Miranda’s guarantees have been impermissibly 

denied to a criminal defendant, assuming the facts as established by the trial 

court are not clearly erroneous, is a matter of constitutional law, meriting de 

novo review.”). “A factual finding is not clearly erroneous as long as it is 

plausible in light of the record as a whole.” United States v. Jacquinot, 258 

F.3d 423, 427 (5th Cir. 2001). “Where a district court’s denial of a suppression 

motion is based on live oral testimony, the clearly erroneous standard is 

particularly strong because the judge had the opportunity to observe the 

demeanor of the witnesses.” United States v. Montes, 602 F.3d 381, 384 (5th 

Cir. 2010). “We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prevailing party, which in this case is the government.” United States v. 

Santiago, 410 F.3d 193, 197 (5th Cir. 2005).

2 Both parties agree that the district court’s statement should be interpreted as a 

finding that Mr. Wright was not “in custody” for Miranda purposes, rather than that he was 

not “under arrest.” 

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B.

In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Supreme Court

determined that “the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ prohibition against 

compelled self-incrimination required that custodial interrogation be preceded 

by advice to the putative defendant that he has the right to remain silent and 

also the right to the presence of an attorney.” Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 

477, 481-82 (1981). “[I]f the accused indicates in any manner that he wishes 

to remain silent or to consult an attorney, interrogation must cease, and any 

statement obtained from him during interrogation thereafter may not be 

admitted against him at his trial.” Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 709 (1979)

(citing Miranda, 384 U.S. 444-45). Not only must the current interrogation 

cease, but as the Supreme Court established in Edwards v. Arizona, law 

enforcement may not re-approach the suspect for further questioning until a 

lawyer has been made available. See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484 (“[A]n accused,

. . . having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is 

not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been 

made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further 

communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.”); see also McNeil

v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 176 (1991) (describing Edwards as having 

“established a second layer of prophylaxis for the Miranda right to counsel”). 

The rights established in Miranda, such as the right to counsel, “were not 

themselves rights protected by the Constitution but were instead measures to 

insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination was protected.” 

Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457 (1994) (citation and quotation marks 

omitted). Importantly, these rights, or measures, were “designed to counteract 

the ‘inherently compelling pressures’ of custodial interrogation.” McNeil, 501 

U.S. at 176; see also Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608 (2004) (“In Miranda, 

we . . . recognized that ‘the coercion inherent in custodial interrogation blurs 

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the line between voluntary and involuntary statements, and thus heightens 

the risk’ that the privilege against self-incrimination will not be observed.”). 

The Supreme Court has explained that the interest protected by “the 

Miranda-Edwards guarantee . . . relates only to custodial interrogation.” 

McNeil, 501 U.S. at 178. “Custodial interrogation is ‘questioning initiated by 

law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody.’” United 

States v. Salinas, 543 F. App’x 458, 462 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States 

v. Gonzales, 121 F.3d 928, 939 (5th Cir. 1997) (overruled on other grounds)). 

“A suspect is . . . ‘in custody’ for Miranda purposes when placed under formal 

arrest or when a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would have 

understood the situation to constitute a restraint on freedom of movement of 

the degree which the law associates with formal arrest.” United States v. 

Bengivenga, 845 F.2d 593, 596 (5th Cir. 1988). “Two discrete inquiries are 

essential to the determination: first, what were the circumstances surrounding 

the interrogation; and second, given those circumstances, would a reasonable 

person have felt he or she was at liberty to terminate the interrogation and 

leave.” United States v. Cavazos, 668 F.3d 190, 193 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting 

J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2402 (2011)). The requisite restraint 

on freedom is greater than that required in the Fourth Amendment seizure 

context. See Bengivenga, 845 F.2d at 598 (explaining that “a Fourth 

Amendment seizure does not necessarily render a person in custody for 

purposes of Miranda”). “The critical difference between the two concepts . . . 

is that custody arises only if the restraint on freedom is a certain degree—the 

degree associated with formal arrest.” Id. 

“[W]hether a suspect is ‘in custody’ is an objective inquiry,” J.D.B., 131 

S. Ct. at 2402, that “depends on the ‘totality of circumstances,’” Cavazos, 668 

F.3d at 193 (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983)). “[T]he 

‘subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person 

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being questioned’ are irrelevant.” J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2402 (quoting Stansbury 

v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994)). “The reasonable person through whom 

we view the situation must be neutral to the environment and to the purposes 

of the investigation—that is, neither guilty of criminal conduct and thus overly 

apprehensive nor insensitive to the seriousness of the circumstances.” 

Bengivenga, 845 F.2d at 596.

Recognizing that no one fact is determinative, this court has repeatedly 

considered certain key details when analyzing whether an individual was or 

was not in custody. Important factors include: (1) the length of the questioning,

see Harrell, 894 F.2d at 124 n.1 (5th Cir. 1990) (“[W]e reject the broad 

proposition that a short delay constitutes per se a noncustodial interrogation 

or that an hour-long delay constitutes a per se custodial interrogation. It is but 

one, albeit important, factor to consider in applying our objective standard 

outlined in Bengivenga.”); (2) the location of the questioning, see Bengivenga, 

845 F.2d at 599 (emphasizing that the questioning took place “only a short 

distance” from where the defendants had been, in a location that was not 

isolated and subjected agents to “public scrutiny”); Harrell, 894 F.2d at 125 

(holding defendant not in custody where the interrogation took place in “glass 

conference area” that was “in close proximity to the immigration checkpoint”); 

(3) the accusatory, or non-accusatory, nature of the questioning, see 

Bengivenga, 845 F.2d at 597 n.16 (“The awareness of the person being 

questioned by an officer that he has become the ‘focal point’ of the 

investigation, or that the police already have ample cause to arrest him, may 

well lead him to conclude, as a reasonable person, that he is not free to leave . 

. . .” (citation omitted)); United States v. Chavira, 614 F.3d 127, 133-34 (5th 

Cir. 2010) (emphasizing that the officers told the defendant that “they knew 

she was not telling the truth”); (4) the amount of restraint on the individual’s 

physical movement, see Cavazos, 668 F.3d at 194 (pointing out that defendant 

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was “followed and monitored” when he tried to go to the bathroom); Chavira, 

614 F.3d at 134 (holding that defendant was in custody where her “freedom of 

movement was severely restrained” by officers when they confiscated her birth 

certificate and ID and handcuffed her to a chair); (5) statements made by 

officers regarding the individual’s freedom to move or leave, see Cavazos, 668 

F.3d at 195 (finding officers’ statements that interview was “non-custodial” 

relevant but not determinative and explaining that such statements should be 

“analyzed for their effect on a reasonable person’s perception, and weighed 

against opposing facts”); United States v. McNair, 444 F. App’x 769, 770 (5th 

Cir. 2011) (relying heavily on the fact that officers told the defendant that “he 

was not under arrest” and was “free to leave” to support a finding that 

interrogation was non-custodial). 

Wright relies heavily on this court’s decision in United States v. Cavazos,

affirming a district court’s order suppressing the defendant’s incriminating 

statements under comparable factual circumstances. 668 F.3d at 195. In 

Cavazos, officers executed a search warrant at the home of the defendant, who 

was suspected of texting sexually explicit material to a minor female. Id. at 

192. The court summarized the relevant circumstances as follows: 

. . . Just after 5:30 a.m., Cavazos was awakened from 

his bed, identified and handcuffed, while more than a 

dozen officers entered and searched his home; he was 

separated from his family and interrogated by two 

federal agents for at least an hour; he was informed he 

was free to use the bathroom or get a snack, but 

followed and monitored when he sought to do so; and 

he was allowed to make a phone call, but only when 

holding the phone so that the agents could overhear 

the conversation.

Id. at 194 (footnote omitted). The court also emphasized that at the start of 

the search, the officers “immediately located and handcuffed” the defendant, 

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demonstrating that he was the focus of the search and that the officers “had 

physical dominion over him.” Id. at 194-95. While the court acknowledged 

that the officers told the defendant that the interview was “non-custodial,” it 

explained why this fact was not determinative. Id. at 195. The court concluded 

that the “totality of circumstances, drawn from the record as seen in the light 

most favorable to [the defendant],” indicated that the defendant was in custody 

during the questioning that took place in his home. Id. at 194 (“An 

interrogation under such circumstances, and those others discussed above, 

would lead a reasonable person to believe that he was not ‘at liberty to 

terminate the interrogation and leave.’” (quoting J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2402)). 

While Wright correctly identifies similarities between the present case 

and Cavazos, there are significant differences that warrant an opposite holding

here. First, unlike in Cavazos, we are reviewing a district court’s denial of a 

motion to suppress, which means that we must review the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the government, rather than the defendant. See Santiago, 

410 F.3d at 197; cf. Cavazos, 668 F.3d at 195 (evaluating the record in the light 

most favorable to the defendant). Also crucial to our decision is the fact that, 

according to Wright’s own testimony, he was told by Officer Barnes “[s]everal 

times” that he was “free to leave” and that he “wasn’t under arrest.” Cf. 

Cavazos, 668 F.3d at 195 (evaluating officers’ statements that the interview 

was “non-custodial” and explaining that “to a reasonable lay person, the 

statement that an interview is ‘non-custodial’ is not the equivalent of an 

assurance that he could ‘terminate the interrogation and leave’”). Finally, 

unlike the defendant in Cavazos, Wright was not singled out and handcuffed 

when arresting officers entered his home.3 Cf. Cavazos, 668 F.3d at 194 

3 The district court heard conflicting testimony at the suppression hearing regarding 

whether Wright was handcuffed by the officers while they were executing the search warrant. 

Officer Barnes testified that some of the occupants were briefly handcuffed for safety reasons. 

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(emphasizing that the defendant “was immediately located and handcuffed at 

the start of the search, demonstrating that the agents sought out Cavazos and 

had physical dominion over him”). 

There is no doubt that the presence of 17 to 19 law enforcement officers 

in and around Wright’s home was startling and intimidating. Furthermore, 

the length of the questioning weighs in favor of finding that it was custodial. 

But see Harrell, 894 F.2d at 124 n.1 (warning against “[o]verreliance upon the 

length” of the questioning, as it “injects a measure of hindsight into the 

analysis which we wish to avoid” and rejecting the “broad proposition” that “an

hour-long delay constitutes a per se custodial interrogation”). On the other 

hand, Officer Barnes repeatedly assured Wright that he was not under arrest 

and that he was free to leave. Further, there is no evidence that Wright was 

physically restrained during the interrogation, which took place close to the 

home, in a car subject to public scrutiny. Finally, the transcript of the

interview, and the cooperative tone throughout, highlights that the 

conversation was as much an opportunity taken by Wright to tell his story to 

the officers as it was an opportunity taken by the officers to get information 

from Wright. 

Considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding Wright’s 

interrogation, drawn from the record as seen in the light most favorable to the 

Wright testified that he was handcuffed for about 10-15 minutes as he was escorted out of 

the door and that he believed he was the only person who was handcuffed. However, FBI 

Agent Ryan McKee, who participated in the search of Wright’s home, testified that while 

sometimes the officers do handcuff certain residents for safety reasons, he did not believe 

that any of the occupants were handcuffed in this case. The district court did not make an 

explicit finding as to whether Wright had been handcuffed at any point during the execution 

of the search warrant, but the court did state that “[t]he testimony shows that the defendant 

was not in handcuffs [when he spoke to Officer Barnes] and had the freedom to remove 

himself from the vehicle where the questioning was ongoing.” Viewing the record in the light 

most favorable to the government, Wright was not handcuffed; at the very most, Wright was 

handcuffed for 10-15 minutes along with other occupants of the home and was, thus, neither

singled out like the defendant in Cavazos, nor handcuffed during the interview in question. 

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government, we affirm the district court’s finding that Wright was not in 

custody at the time he spoke with the interrogating officer. Because Wright 

was not in custody for the purposes of Miranda, we find no error in the district 

court’s denial of Wright’s motion to suppress. See Murray v. Earle, 405 F.3d 

278, 286 (5th Cir. 2005) (explaining that an individual’s Fifth Amendment 

right against self-incrimination, which Miranda aims to protect, “is implicated 

only during a ‘custodial’ interrogation”). Therefore, we do not reach whether 

Wright’s reference to a lawyer was “an unambiguous or unequivocal request 

for counsel,” as required in this suppression context by Davis v. United States, 

512 U.S. 452, 461-62 (1994). See generally Griffin v. Lynaugh, 823 F.2d 856, 

863 (5th Cir. 1987) (“[W]hen an accused makes an unambiguous but limited 

request for counsel, in the absence of police interference with the accused’s fifth 

amendment guarantee to counsel, interrogation may proceed after satisfaction 

of that request.”); United States v. Ivy, 929 F.2d 147, 153 (5th Cir. 1991) 

(affirming district court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress where, 

during the interrogation, the defendant “expressed his unwillingness to 

answer questions about” a certain topic, and law enforcement “honored this 

request by moving to a different subject”).

III.

We turn now to Wright’s contention that the government violated Doyle 

v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), when, during closing argument, the prosecutor 

commented on Wright’s refusal to answer certain questions during the 

interrogation. 

A.

The question of whether the government’s comment violated the Due 

Process Clause, as proscribed by Doyle, is a constitutional question of law, 

which this court reviews de novo. See United States v. Pando Franco, 503 F.3d 

389, 393 (5th Cir. 2007); see also United States v. Perez-Macias, 335 F.3d 421, 

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425 (5th Cir. 2003) (“Constitutional questions are reviewed by this court de 

novo.”). If a constitutional error occurred, we must determine whether the 

error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Moreno, 

185 F.3d 465, 472 (5th Cir. 1999); see also Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 

629 (1993) (explaining that “Doyle error fits squarely into the category of 

constitutional violations which we have characterized as ‘trial error’” and are 

thus “amenable to harmless-error analysis”).

In Doyle, the Supreme Court held “that the use for impeachment 

purposes of [a defendant’s] silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving 

Miranda warnings, violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment.” 426 U.S. at 619. The Supreme Court explained that “while it is 

true that the Miranda warnings contain no express assurance that silence will 

carry no penalty, such assurance is implicit to any person who receives the 

warnings.” Id. at 618. The Court concluded that because of this implicit 

assurance, “it would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process 

to allow the arrested person’s silence to be used to impeach an explanation 

subsequently offered at trial.” Id.; see also Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 

284, 290 (1986) (“The source of the unfairness was the implicit assurance 

contained in the Miranda warnings ‘that silence will carry no penalty.’”). “The 

Supreme Court has adopted a strict prohibition against the use of postMiranda silence at trial.” Pando Franco, 503 F.3d at 396; see also United 

States v. Shaw, 701 F.2d 367, 382 (5th Cir. 1983) (“The standard is strict; 

virtually any description of a defendant’s silence following arrest and a 

Miranda warning will constitute a Doyle violation.”).4 

4 “With respect to post-Miranda warnings ‘silence,’ we point out that silence does not 

mean only muteness; it includes the statement of a desire to remain silent, as well as of a 

desire to remain silent until an attorney has been consulted.” Wainwright, 474 U.S. at 295 

n.13; see also United States v. Laury, 985 F.2d 1293, 1304 n.10 (5th Cir. 1993) (“We do not 

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The Court’s holding in Doyle demonstrates that it is not the arrest and 

custody that trigger Doyle protections, but rather the assurance of Miranda 

warnings. “First the Court said that a defendant’s silence in response to 

Miranda warnings is ‘insolubly ambiguous.’ Second, the Court held that by 

giving Miranda warnings, the Government implicitly assures a defendant that 

he will not be penalized for exercising those rights by remaining silent.” United 

States v. Rodriguez, 260 F.3d 416, 420-21 (5th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted); 

see also United States v. Carter, 953 F.2d 1449, 1464 (5th Cir. 1992) 

(“Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have clarified that the Doyle protection 

derives primarily from the implicit assurance of the Miranda warnings and 

thus is strongest in the context of immediate post-Miranda-warning 

interrogation.”); Kappos v. Hanks, 54 F.3d 365, 368-69 (7th Cir. 1995) 

(explaining that “the promise contained in the statement of Miranda rights 

precludes the prosecutor from commenting on the defendant’s silence” even if 

that silence occurred “prior to his arrest”); United States v. Quinn, 359 F.3d 

666, 677 (4th Cir. 2004) (“In evaluating Doyle-type claims, we focus on the 

question whether the government made any assurances to the defendant, 

either explicit or implicit, that his silence would not be used against him.”).

Consistent with this understanding of Doyle, the Supreme Court has 

subsequently described it “as a case where the government had induced silence 

by implicitly assuring the defendant that his silence would not be used against 

him.” Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 606 (1982) (holding that Doyle does not 

prohibit the government from commenting on a defendant’s post-arrest, but 

pre-Miranda warnings, silence). 

believe, however, that the Supreme Court in Doyle intended that a defendant remain 

completely silent following arrest in order to rely on the protection of the due process clause.”).

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“A prosecutor’s or witness’s remarks constitute comment on a 

defendant’s silence if the manifest intent was to comment on the defendant’s 

silence, or if the character of the remark was such that the jury would naturally 

and necessarily so construe the remark.” United States v. Andaverde-Tinoco, 

741 F.3d 509, 520 (5th Cir. 2013) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see 

also Moreno, 185 F.3d at 473 (“Doyle governs where the comments are designed 

to draw meaning from silence.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)). In 

order to determine whether the prosecutor’s comments violated Doyle, those 

comments must be evaluated in context. See Shaw, 701 F.2d at 381 (“Both the 

intent of the prosecutor and the character of the remarks are determined by 

reviewing the context in which they occur. . . .”).

B.

In the present case, the government had to prove, as an element of the 

charges, that Wright acted knowingly—that Wright “knowingly distributed 

materials containing child pornography” and that he “knowingly possessed 

materials containing images of child pornography.” The government also had 

to prove that Wright knew that the materials contained child pornography. 

While Wright did not present any evidence of his own, he tried to raise a 

reasonable doubt as to whether the government had established the element 

of knowledge. 

The government, in its principal closing argument, warned the jury that 

it “may hear argument that [Wright] didn’t intend to do it. He didn’t want to 

do it.” The prosecutor stated: 

But he knew that it was child pornography. 

How do we know he knew it was child pornography? 

It’s very interesting he says he uses the term “PTHC” 

because you get better stuff. And he’s referring to 

adult pornography, because he says that if you don’t 

put that in there, you’re going to get the old women. 

He wants the young stuff. 

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Then the prosecutor added: “It’s interesting though. He won’t tell Officer 

Barnes what ages he searches for.” Wright’s lawyer objected to this reference 

to Wright’s refusal and argued to the judge that it was “a comment on 

[Wright’s] exercising his right to remain silent” and Wright’s “refusal to answer 

questions after he was given Miranda and told he could remain silent.” The 

district judge overruled the objection, and the government then elaborated: 

In fact, he won’t tell Officer Barnes what ages he 

uses in search because, he says, ‘Because I don’t want 

to get in trouble.’ You saw the images. You saw that 

they are matched up with the ages in the title of the 

file. There’s no accident. There’s no mistake. This is 

exactly what he was looking for, and this is exactly 

what he got. 

On appeal, Wright argues that the district court erred in overruling his 

objection. 

C.

Evaluated in narrow context, the prosecutor identified a piece of Wright’s

defense (lack of knowledge of children’s ages) and then sought to impeach that 

defense by commenting on Wright’s purportedly inconsistent act of refusing to 

answer certain questions about that topic. Drawing attention to Wright’s 

avoidance of questions pertaining to his use of certain search terms could raise 

the inference that Wright used impermissible search terms, and thus knew 

that he was downloading child pornography. The prosecutor’s comments thus 

drew meaning from Wright’s refusal to answer questions yet, Wright argues, 

his refusal was invited by Officer Barnes through his recitation of Miranda

warnings and his reassurance that Wright should “only talk to [Officer Barnes] 

about stuff that [he wanted to] talk about.” 

Preliminarily, we note that the prosecutor’s inference, elaborated after 

sidebar contended that Wright “won’t tell Officer Barnes what ages he uses in 

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search because, he says, ‘Because I don’t want to get in trouble,’’’ drew a link 

not to Wright’s silence nor to any invocation of counsel but instead to Wright’s

separate admission about wanting to avoid trouble, as well as to the photo 

evidence itself: “You [the jury] saw the images. You saw that they are matched 

up with the ages in title of the file. There’s no accident. There’s no mistake. 

This is exactly what he was looking for, and this is exactly what he got.” 

With this context in mind, yet with the strictness of Doyle exactitude also 

in mind, we choose to assume arguendo that the initial inculpatory inference

of reluctance to answer child age questions, without connection immediately 

thereafter to Wright’s admitted concern about “trouble” and to the exhibit 

evidence of the photos, would be improper, hence we proceed to assess whether 

such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Shaw, 701 F.2d at 

382. This is not an easy task, as “[c]ircumstances that render Doyle error

harmless have defied formulaic precision for almost half a century.” 

Andaverde-Tinoco, 741 F.3d at 522 n.2. “An error is harmless only if we can 

determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the improper [comments] did not 

contribute to the jury’s verdict.” Moreno, 185 F.3d at 475. Determining the 

effect of the error “requires ‘an examination of the facts, the trial context of the 

error, and the prejudice created thereby as juxtaposed against the strength of 

the evidence of the defendant’s guilt.’” Shaw, 701 F.2d at 383. “[T]his Court’s 

basic concern has been whether or not the improper comment was harmless 

error because by its nature and under the circumstances it would have only an 

insignificant impact on the jury.” Id.

In Chapman v. United States, this court developed a framework for 

analyzing the harmlessness of Doyle violations by categorizing our prior cases

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into three groups.5 See Carter, 953 F.2d at 1462. “Subsequent cases have 

illustrated, however, that factual situations are not always amenable to 

description within the rigid Chapman types,” therefore we have repeatedly 

emphasized that we look to the Chapman framework for guidance in 

performing a case-specific harmlessness analysis.6 Shaw, 701 F.2d at 382-83; 

see also United States v. Rodriguez, 43 F.3d 117, 121-22 (5th Cir. 1995) (“Many 

cases cannot be resolved solely by reference to the Chapman categories; in such 

instances, we apply a case-by-case approach using the Chapman categories as 

guidelines for assessing the prejudice to the defendant in a particular context, 

including the strength of the evidence.”). Again, this court has explained that 

5 In Chapman, the court grouped prosecutors’ impermissible comments into three 

categories: 

(1) When the prosecution uses defendant’s post-arrest 

silence to impeach an exculpatory story offered by defendant at 

trial and the prosecution directly links the implausibility of the 

exculpatory story to the defendant’s ostensibly inconsistent act 

of remaining silent, reversible error results even if the story is 

transparently frivolous.

(2) When the prosecutor does not directly tie the fact of 

defendant’s silence to his exculpatory story, i.e., when the 

prosecutor elicits that fact on direct examination and refrains 

from commenting on it or adverting to it again, and the jury is 

never told that such silence can be used for impeachment 

purposes, reversible error results if the exculpatory story is not 

totally implausible or the indicia of guilt not overwhelming.

(3) When there is but a single reference at trial to the fact of 

defendant’s silence the reference is neither repeated nor linked 

with defendant’s exculpatory story, and the exculpatory story is 

transparently frivolous and evidence of guilt is otherwise 

overwhelming, the reference to defendant’s silence constitutes 

harmless error. 

Rodriguez, 260 F.3d at 422 (citing Chapman, 547 F.2d at 1249-50). 6 “For analytical purposes, it is important to differentiate cases falling within 

Chapman’s first category from cases in the other two categories. The second and third 

categories articulated in Chapman are not to be used as rigid rules, but only as helpful 

guides.” Rodriguez, 260 F.3d at 422 n.3 (citation and quotation marks omitted). The “first 

category includes Doyle violations that explicitly or repeatedly link the silence to the 

exculpatory story; these are harmful per se, affecting the fundamental fairness of the trial, 

and require reversal.” Moreno, 185 F.3d at 475. 

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“Fifth Circuit cases subsequent to Chapman have substantially modified its 

apparent rigidity, have recognized that many cases fall somewhat between its 

categories, and have declined to reverse even where the exculpatory story is 

not totally implausible but the evidence of guilt is substantial or 

overwhelming.” United States v. Martinez-Larraga, 517 F.3d 258, 270 n.10 

(5th Cir. 2008). This is consistent with the Supreme Court’s general 

clarification of Doyle errors as “trial error[s],” which the Court explained are 

amenable to the Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), harmless-beyonda-reasonable-doubt standard. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 629-30. Similarly, other 

circuits have declined to embrace a rigid, automatic-reversal standard. See, 

e.g., Phelps v. Duckworth, 772 F.2d 1410, 1413 (7th Cir. 1985); Gov’t of Virgin 

Islands v. Davis, 561 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2009); United States v. RamirezEstrada, 749 F.3d 1129, 1137 (9th Cir. 2014). 

Regardless of the helpfulness of the Chapman groupings to any given 

case, the prosecutor’s comment in the present case does not fit squarely into or 

out of Chapman’s first category. First, Wright’s refusal to answer certain 

questions took place prior to his arrest, unlike the heartland of Chapman

category one. See Chapman, 547 F.2d at 1249 (describing the reversible 

category of Doyle errors as occurring when the “prosecution uses defendant’s 

post-arrest silence to impeach an exculpatory story” (emphasis added)); cf.

Kappos, 54 F.3d at 368-69 (“But the fact that an arrest had not yet occurred 

does not render Doyle inapplicable.”). Second, although the initial comment 

and inference was made by the prosecutor, rather than elicited from a witness, 

the prosecutor did not directly link silence with the implausibility of Wright’s

exculpatory story. Instead, the prosecutor elaborated: “He won’t tell Officer 

Barnes what ages he uses in search because, he says ‘Because I don’t want to 

get in trouble,’” linking Wright’s reluctance to answer certain questions with 

an admission he did volunteer to Officer Barnes. See Wainwright v. Greenfield, 

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474 U.S. 284, 301 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (finding Doyle error likely 

harmless where it was based on testimony that was already heard by the jury 

and “was there for the jury to consider on its own regardless of whether the 

prosecutor ever mentioned it”); see also Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 409 

(1980) (“Any ambiguity in the prosecutor’s initial questioning was quickly 

resolved by explicit reference to Detective LeVanseler’s testimony, which the 

jury had heard only a few hours before.”).

Also important is the fact that the prosecutor’s isolated, original 

comment did not “strike at the jugular” of Wright’s defense. Compare United 

States v. Harp, 536 F.2d 601, 603 (5th Cir. 1976) (“Because the prosecutor’s 

comments struck at the jugular of [the defendants’] story, those remarks 

cannot be classified as harmless.”), and United States v. Johnson, 558 F.2d 

1225, 1230 (5th Cir. 1977) (finding reversible Doyle error where the 

impermissible testimony “went to the heart of the sole defense”); with Carter, 

953 F.2d at 1465 (finding Doyle error harmless where “the story being 

impeached [was] essentially peripheral to [the defendant’s] defense”), and

United States v. Davis, 546 F.2d 583, 595 (5th Cir. 1977) (emphasizing that 

Doyle error did not “[strike] at the jugular” of the defendant’s story because the 

defense being attacked was “paper-thin”). During opening argument, Wright’s 

counsel characterized the case as being “about who did it. That’s it. This is 

essentially a case about the keeper of the inn and all the people he allowed to 

stay in the inn, all the occupants of that house.” Consistent with this 

statement, Wright’s primary defense throughout trial was that someone else 

in the house could have been responsible. Then in closing argument, similarly, 

Wright’s counsel emphasized to the jury: “And as I told you earlier, this case, 

in opening statement [defense counsel] told you, it’s a who done it, who actually 

put the child pornography on the hard drive.” The argument that Wright did

not know that the images he was downloading were child pornography was

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arguably in tension with Wright’s primary defense, and was only alluded to by 

defense counsel during the cross examination of Officer Barnes as well as 

briefly during opening and closing arguments. 

The fact that the prosecutor’s initial, Doyle-implicating comment was 

isolated, rather than repeated, further reduces the possibility of prejudice. See 

Shaw, 701 F.2d at 383 (finding no reasonable possibility that “isolated and 

unsolicited” reference to defendant’s silence contributed to his conviction). 

Again, the jury had already listened to the 43-minute audio recording of the 

interview and received the transcript, thus, it already knew what Wright said, 

his admission about not wanting to get in trouble, and his accommodation with 

Officer Barnes not to delve into the topic of children’s ages.

Finally, the government presented strong evidence that Wright knew 

that at least some of the images were child pornography. The interview

transcript itself, as elaborated in this closing argument circumstance, provides 

strong evidence of Wright’s knowledge. Wright admitted to Officer Barnes that 

when he searched with the search term PTHC he got about 50% child 

pornography, which he claimed that he would delete quickly because he knew 

it was illegal. Wright also stated that “the kid stuff” is “like drugs.” Taken 

together, the prosecutor’s terse comment then tied to Wright’s volunteered 

admission and the photo evidence, along with Wright’s primary blame-shifting 

defense and the strong evidence presented to the jury regarding his knowledge 

that some of the downloaded images were child pornography, convince us that 

the prosecutor’s comment was harmless. 

IV.

Wright’s final issue on appeal pertains to the district court’s refusal to 

allow Wright’s counsel to respond to the government’s sentencing presentation 

at the sentencing hearing. Wright argues that the district court violated 

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Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 and denied his attorney a meaningful 

opportunity to speak on his behalf.

A.

We review a district court’s compliance with Federal Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 32 de novo. See United States v. Medina, 161 F.3d 867, 874 (5th Cir. 

1998) (“We review the district judge’s implementation of Rule 32(c)(1) de 

novo.”); see also United States v. Myers, 150 F.3d 459, 461 (5th Cir. 1998) (“We 

review de novo whether a district court complied with a Federal Rule of 

Criminal Procedure.”), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Reyna, 

358 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2004).

B.

Wright was sentenced on September 9, 2013. At the sentencing hearing,

after some preliminary matters, the court called upon Wright’s attorney to 

allocute with respect to the sentence the court should impose. The court stated, 

“[w]e’ll start with you, counsel, and then we’ll hear from [the prosecutor], and 

then finally from your client.” Wright concedes that his lawyer, who spoke for 

three minutes before voluntarily concluding her allocution, was allowed to 

“make an initial presentation to the district court without interruption.” 

During her allocution, defense counsel asked the court to grant Wright a 

downward variance because, she argued, the sentencing guidelines are 

outdated and “barbaric” and because Wright had overcome a difficult 

upbringing. Defense counsel sought a 120-month sentence and argued that 

“the nature of this offense and the facts which the Court heard and saw during 

the trial” did not warrant a sentence close to the statutory maximum of 20 

years, which is what the guidelines called for. 

The government provided a response that lasted slightly over four 

minutes. The government argued that the guidelines were appropriate and 

that Wright’s “situation and how he perpetrated this crime” placed him in the 

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“heartland” of the guidelines. The government claimed that Wright’s previous 

hardships did not warrant leniency. The government also asserted that there 

had been allegations of abuse against Wright in the past, although they were 

not thoroughly investigated. The government spoke about the many victims of 

Wright’s crime, the children who were abused in the images, and asked the 

court for a sentence of 262 months imprisonment—“[a] sentence at the high 

end of the guidelines.” 

After the government concluded, defense counsel asked if she could 

“briefly respond.” The court responded: “I want your client to respond. These 

are just arguments, counsel. You’ve made your statement, the government’s 

made its statement. Mr. Wright, you may speak.” Defense counsel objected to 

“not being allowed to allocute” and the court overruled the objection. Wright 

stated, “I put myself to the mercy of the Court.” 

On appeal, Wright argues that the district court reversibly erred by 

refusing to allow defense counsel to respond to the government at sentencing. 

Wright contends that his right to allocute, as provided by Federal Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 32, was violated because his defense counsel was “not 

afforded a ‘meaningful’ opportunity to allocute” on his behalf. While Wright 

states that “[t]his is not to say that, in every case, a response/rebuttal from 

defense counsel will be necessary to comply with Rule 32(i)(4)(A)(i),” Wright 

claims that here, where the government brought up new issues during its 

allocution, defense counsel needed to be given an opportunity to address those 

issues. 

C.

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 provides that:

Before imposing sentence, the court must:

(i) provide the defendant’s attorney an opportunity 

to speak on the defendant’s behalf;

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(ii) address the defendant personally in order to 

permit the defendant to speak or present any 

information to mitigate the sentence; and 

(iii) provide an attorney for the government an 

opportunity to speak equivalent to that of the 

defendant’s attorney.

Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(A). As Rule 32 makes clear, the sentencing court must 

allow both defense counsel and the defendant himself, as well as the 

government, an opportunity to speak before imposing a sentence. Id. In order 

to satisfy Rule 32, the district court “must apply the rule ‘quite literally.’” 

United States v. Magwood, 445 F.3d 826, 829 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting United 

States v. Dickson, 712 F.2d 952, 956 (5th Cir. 1983)). Rule 32 provides no 

details about how much time each individual should be allowed to speak or 

whether the district court can place limitations on the length or subject matter 

of the allocutions. Other circuits have sensibly explained that the district court 

is allowed to place some limits on the parties’ right to allocute. See United 

State v. Li, 115 F.3d 125, 133 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[A] defendant’s right to allocution 

is not unlimited in terms of either time or content.”); United States v. 

Maldonado-Zamora, 325 F. App’x 655, 657 (10th Cir. 2009) (acknowledging 

that a district court “has some discretion to place reasonable limits on what 

may be addressed” during allocution). In an effort to create some limiting 

principle, courts have consistently indicated that the opportunity to speak 

must be “meaningful.” See United States v. Valtierra-Ortega, 402 F. App’x 34, 

36 (5th Cir. 2010) (agreeing with government’s concession that defense counsel 

was not given a “meaningful opportunity” to argue on defendant’s behalf where 

district court refused to allow counsel to make “a general mitigation argument 

or one for downward departure”); United States v. Gutierrez, 555 F.3d 105, 110 

(2d Cir. 2009) (“We agree that a defense counsel’s opportunity to argue at a 

sentencing hearing—like a defendant’s opportunity to address the sentencing 

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court—must be meaningful.”); Li, 115 F.3d at 134 (finding that district court 

violated Rule 32 where defendant was not “able to speak meaningfully of the 

factors that she legitimately thought relevant to the mitigation or her 

sentence”). 

In the present case, we find that Wright’s attorney was given a 

meaningful opportunity to speak on Wright’s behalf. The district court 

explicitly told the parties how the allocutions would proceed and then strictly 

complied with the language of Rule 32, allowing all three individuals to speak. 

Not only did the district court give Wright’s lawyer an opportunity to speak, 

but it did so without placing any time or subject-matter limitations on that 

opportunity. Wright’s lawyer voluntarily concluded her allocution after she 

spoke, uninterrupted, for several minutes. Furthermore, the prosecutor’s 

statements to which “defense counsel felt the need to respond,” pertained to 

information that was contained in the PSR. Thus, it was not new to either 

party or the district court and defense counsel had a meaningful opportunity, 

during her initial allocution, to discuss those topics if she wanted to. Because 

Wright’s lawyer was given a meaningful opportunity to speak on Wright’s 

behalf—for as long as she wanted and about any subject that she saw fit—we 

find that the district court complied with Rule 32. 

V.

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Wright’s conviction and sentence.

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