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Parties Involved:
Michael Catala
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 15-13772

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 1:15-cr-00096-WSD-LTW-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

MICHAEL CATALA, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

________________________

(April 29, 2016)

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Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Michael Catala appeals his 21-month sentence, imposed as an upward 

variance from the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range, after being convicted of 

failure to appear as directed by the district court, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3146(a)(1). Because Catala has failed to show that his sentence was 

substantively unreasonable, we affirm.

I.

An information charged Catala with conspiracy to commit bank fraud and 

aggravated identity theft for his alleged participation in a conspiracy to obtain bank 

account information to make unauthorized bank withdrawals. The information

specified that, as part of this conspiracy, Catala recruited two bank employees who 

could obtain the account information of individuals who used the bank. He then 

provided that information to his co-conspirators, who used it to pose as account 

holders and make fraudulent withdrawals. Catala ultimately pled guilty to both 

counts in the information. 

While on bond awaiting sentencing, Catala fled to California. Police 

eventually apprehended him in California for possession with intent to use a 

fraudulent credit card. Following this arrest, Catala was charged with failure to 

appear and sentenced to a total of 84 months’ imprisonment on his initial 

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conspiracy to commit bank fraud and aggravated identity theft charges. Catala 

appeared at a separate sentencing proceeding for his failure to appear. There, the 

district court sentenced him to 21 months’ imprisonment followed by three years

of supervised release, a sentence above the guidelines range of eight to 14 months 

but below the statutory maximum of 60 months. Catala’s objection to the 

substantive reasonableness of his sentence was overruled. This is his appeal. 

II.

On appeal, Catala renews his challenge to the substantive reasonableness of 

the sentence the district court imposed for his failure to appear. We review the 

reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential abuse of discretion standard. Gall 

v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Indeed, “it is only the rare sentence that 

will be substantively unreasonable.” United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 

1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). The party 

challenging the sentence bears the burden of establishing that the sentence is 

unreasonable. United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010).

In reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence, we first ensure that the 

district court committed no significant procedural error, and then we examine 

whether the sentence was substantively unreasonable based on the totality of the 

circumstances. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. As Catala does not contend that the district 

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court committed a procedural error, we need only consider whether his sentence 

was substantively unreasonable. 

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the district court must impose a sentence 

sufficient, but not greater than necessary to comply with the purposes set forth in

§ 3553(a)(2), including promoting respect for the law, deterring criminal conduct, 

and protecting the public from the defendant’s future criminal conduct. See 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). The court must also consider the nature and circumstances of 

the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the kinds of sentences 

available, the applicable guidelines range, the pertinent policy statements of the 

Sentencing Commission, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and 

the need to provide restitution to victims. Id. § 3553(a)(1), (3)-(7). 

A district court abuses its discretion and imposes a substantively 

unreasonable sentence if it “(1) fails to afford consideration to relevant factors that 

were due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper or 

irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in considering the proper 

factors.” Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1256 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Thus, deciding whether a district court has imposed a substantively unreasonable 

sentence involves an inquiry into whether the statutory factors in 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a) support the sentence. See United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 

1324 (11th Cir. 2008). “The weight to be accorded any given § 3553(a) factor is a 

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matter committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” United States v. 

Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). In 

imposing an upward variance, the district court may consider any information 

relevant to a defendant’s background, character, and conduct. Tome, 611 F.3d at 

1379.

We find no support for Catala’s contention that his sentence is substantively 

unreasonable. As an initial matter, Catala’s sentence of 21 months is well below 

the statutory maximum, which is a “consideration favoring its reasonableness.” 

Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1257. The sentence was also below the government’s 

recommendation of 27 months. The record of Catala’s sentencing reveals that, 

after considering the nature of and circumstances surrounding Catala’s offense and 

his personal history and characteristics, the district court determined that an 

upward variance would best promote respect for the law, deter criminal conduct, 

and protect the public from future criminal conduct. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).

The district court was within its discretion to highlight these factors. After 

pleading guilty to his crimes, Catala fled to California, where he remained for 

several months before being apprehended by police. Catala never turned himself 

in. Worse, after he absconded to California, he was arrested for engaging in 

criminal conduct similar to that to which he had recently pled guilty. Familiar with 

Catala from the previous guilty plea, the district court concluded that Catala’s 

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conduct evinced “a serious . . . inability to abide by and respect the law[],” and that 

Catala did not truly appreciate the reprehensible nature of his actions. Sentencing 

Hr’g Tr. at 21 (Doc. 30).1 As such, the court concluded an upward variance was 

necessary to protect the public from further criminal conduct on the part of Catala

and to deter him from engaging in any such conduct in the future. We find no 

abuse of discretion in this reasoning, nor does Catala provide one. Indeed, the 

sentencing judge is better placed to make these kinds of determinations because he 

“sees and hears the evidence, makes credibility determinations, has full knowledge 

of the facts and gains insights not conveyed by the record.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51

(internal quotation mark omitted).

Catala argues that, at sentencing, the court improperly considered the 

conduct of the bank employees he recruited into the conspiracy and the costs law 

enforcement incurred in tracking him down after he fled. Even accepting, 

arguendo, Catala’s argument that these are improper considerations, we conclude 

that his sentence was not substantively unreasonable because there is no evidence 

in the record that the court improperly relied on these facts in determining Catala’s 

sentence.

Although it is true that the district court referenced the conduct of the bank 

employees and the costs incurred in locating Catala, the sentencing hearing

 1 “Doc.” refers to the docket entry in the district court record in this case.

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transcript, when read as a whole, makes clear that the court made these references 

to highlight Catala’s disregard for the law and the likelihood of his committing 

future crimes—factors properly considered under § 3553(a)(2). See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a)(2). The court discussed the bank employees to contrast their conduct 

with that of Catala, who “did . . . not even hav[e] the integrity to do what they did, 

which was to say I have committed a crime, . . . . there is a consequence and I 

accept it.” Sentencing Hr’g Tr. at 14 (Doc. 30). The court acknowledged the cost 

incurred in finding Catala to highlight his indifference to the burden his conduct 

placed on others. The court made these observations to illustrate Catala’s lack of 

respect for the law and to support the court’s conclusion that an upward variance 

was necessary to protect the public from Catala and to deter him from committing 

further crimes. A district court may not rely on improper factors in sentencing, but 

we will not impose a requirement that it refrain from discussing facts and 

circumstances arguably outside the scope of § 3553(a) when explaining its 

sentencing rationale. 

III.

Upon review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we 

conclude that Catala has failed to demonstrate that his sentence is substantively 

unreasonable. We therefore affirm the sentence the district court imposed.

AFFIRMED.

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