Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00806/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00806-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gloria Henry
Respondent
Tracee Beatrice Ward
Petitioner

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TRACEE BEATRICE WARD,

Petitioner,

v.

WARDEN GLORIA HENRY,

Respondent.

 /

1: 05 CV 0806 OWW WMW HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RE

MOTION TO DISMISS

[Doc. 10]

Petitioner is a prisoner proceeding with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. Section 2254. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72-302. Pending before the court is Respondent’s motion to

dismiss this action on the ground that it was filed beyond the one-year statute of limitations

contained in 28 U.S.C. Section 2244(d).

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 29, 1999, Petitioner was convicted of attempted murder, kidnaping during a

carjacking, kidnaping, burglary, two counts of carjacking, two counts of murder, and three counts of

robbery. A personal use of firearm enhancement was found to be true. Petitioner received an

indeterminate state prison term of life without the possibility of parole for the murder convictions, an

Case 1:05-cv-00806-OWW -WMW Document 16 Filed 01/08/08 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

indeterminate state prison term of life with the possibility of parole for the attempted murder and

kidnaping during a carjacking convictions, and ten years for the enhancements. The sentences were

stayed on the remaining counts.

Petitioner filed a direct appeal with the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District

(“Court of Appeal”). On May 1, 2001, the Court of Appeal directed the trial court to amend the

abstract of judgment to delete the reference to a restitution fine and affirmed the judgment in all

other respects. Petitioner did not seek review in the California Supreme Court.

On July 17, 2001, the trial court amended the abstract of judgment in accordance with the

opinion issued by the Court of Appeal. Petitioner did not appeal.

Petitioner filed six pro se state post-conviction challenges as follows:

First Petition

September 29, 2000: Petition for post-conviction relief filed in Kern County Superior Court.

October 26, 2000: Petition denied.

Second Petition

February 20, 2001: Petition for post-conviction relief filed in Kern County Superior Court.

March 14, 2001: Petition denied.

Third Petition

August 1, 2002: Petition for post-conviction relief filed in San Francisco County Superior

Court.

October 11, 2002: Petition denied.

Fourth Petition

August 2, 2002: Petition for post-conviction relief filed in the California Supreme Court.

April 30, 2003: Petition denied.

Fifth Petition

March 10, 2004: Petition for post-conviction relief filed in the Court of Appeal.

April 15, 2004: Petition denied.

Sixth Petition

June 24, 2004: Petition for post-conviction relief filed in the California Supreme Court

Case 1:05-cv-00806-OWW -WMW Document 16 Filed 01/08/08 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

May 11, 2005: Petition denied.

Petitioner filed a prior habeas corpus petition in this court on July 6, 2001. Ward v. Henry,

CV F 01-5878 AWI DLB HC. On September 13, 2002, the Magistrate Judge entered findings and

recommendations that the petition be dismissed for Petitioner’s failure to exhaust her state remedies. 

The District Judge adopted the findings and recommendations on October 11, 2002, and the Clerk of

the Court entered judgment on October 15, 2002.

Petitioner filed the present action on June 21, 2005.

LEGAL STANDARD

A. JURISDICTION

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant

to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct.

1495, 1504 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that she suffered violations of her rights as guaranteed by

the United States Constitution. In addition, the conviction challenged arises out of the Kern County

Superior Court, which is located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d). 

Accordingly, the court has jurisdiction over the action. 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. 

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct.

586 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 th

F.3d 751, 769 (5 Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107, 117 S.Ct. 1114 (1997), overruled on other

th

grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059 (1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable

to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant petition was filed on June 21, 2005, after the

enactment of the AEDPA, thus it is governed by its provisions. 

B. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

Case 1:05-cv-00806-OWW -WMW Document 16 Filed 01/08/08 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The AEDPA altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply with

respect to a state prisoner's claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court. Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518-23 (2000). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus will

not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 1173 (2003) (disapproving of the Ninth

Circuit’s approach in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9 Cir. 2000)); Williams v. Taylor, 120 th

S.Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). “A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Lockyer, at 1174 (citations omitted). “Rather,

that application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citations omitted). 

While habeas corpus relief is an important instrument to assure that individuals are

constitutionally protected, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3391-3392 (1983);

Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086 (1969), direct review of a criminal

conviction is the primary method for a petitioner to challenge that conviction. Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993). In addition, the state court’s factual

determinations must be presumed correct, and the federal court must accept all factual findings made

by the state court unless the petitioner can rebut “the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S.Ct. 1769

(1995); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116 S.Ct. 457 (1995); Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380,

1388 (9 Cir. 1997). th

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a federal

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, Section 2244, subdivision

(d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

Case 1:05-cv-00806-OWW -WMW Document 16 Filed 01/08/08 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 In California, the Supreme Court, intermediate Courts of Appeal, and Superior Courts all have original habeas 1

corpus jurisdiction. See Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006, n. 2 (9th Cir. 1999). Although a Superior Court order denying habeas corpus

relief is non-appealable, a state prisoner may file a new habeas corpus petition in the Court of Appeal. Id. If the Court of

Appeal denies relief, the petitioner may seek review in the California Supreme Court by way of a petition for review, or may

instead file an original habeas petition in the Supreme Court. See id. 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

In most cases, the limitation period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct review

became final. 

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2 28 244( d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment

or claim is pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. In Nino v. Galaza,

the Ninth Circuit held that the “statute of limitations is tolled from the time the first state habeas

petition is filed until the California Supreme Court rejects the petitioner’s final collateral challenge.”1

Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1846 (2000); see also

Taylor v. Lee, 186 F.3d 557 (4th Cir. 1999); Barnett v. Lemaster, 167 F.3d 1321, 1323 (10th Cir.

1999). The Court reasoned that tolling the limitations period during the time a petitioner is preparing

his petition to file at the next appellate level reinforces the need to present all claims to the state

courts first and will prevent the premature filing of federal petitions out of concern that the limitation

period will end before all claims can be presented to the state supreme court. Id. at 1005. The

limitations period does not, however, toll for the time during which a petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus is pending in federal court. Duncan v. Walker, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 2129 (2001). 

Case 1:05-cv-00806-OWW -WMW Document 16 Filed 01/08/08 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

In 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Carey v. Saffold, 122 S.Ct. 2134 (2002). In Carey

v. Saffold, the Court determined that under California’s collateral review process, the intervals

between a lower court decision and the filing of a new petition in a higher court are within the scope

of the statutory word “pending.” Id. at 2140. Thus, as in Nino v. Galaza, tolling occurs during the

intervals between petitions in the state courts. The Supreme Court examined this principle in light of

California’s unique original writ system where the timeliness of a petition is determined according to

a “reasonableness” standard. Carey v. Saffold, 122 S.Ct. at 2139. Thus, the California Supreme

Court’s denial of the petition “on the merits and for lack of diligence” cannot, by itself, indicate that a

petition is timely under California’s reasonableness standard. Id. at 2141 (explaining that there are a

variety of reasons why the California Supreme Court may have included the words “on the merits,”

and therefore those words cannot by themselves indicate that the petition was timely). The Court

further explained that had the California Supreme Court “clearly ruled that Saffold’s 4 1⁄2 – month

delay was ‘unreasonable,’ that would be the end of the matter” and the petition would not be pending

for purposes of tolling. Id. at 2141. In other words, where a California prisoner delayed

"unreasonably" in seeking further review of his petition, he is not entitled to tolling under §

2244(d)(2). Saffold was remanded back to the Ninth Circuit to determine whether Saffold’s 4 1⁄2

month delay between state habeas petitions was unreasonable and therefore, insufficient for statutory

tolling. Id.

DISCUSSION

Respondent moves to dismiss this petition on the ground that it is barred by the statute of

limitations. Petitioner opposes the motion.

As set forth above, the Kern County Superior Court issued an amended abstract of judgment

on July 17, 2001. The state appeal process became “final” within the meaning of Section

2244(d)(1)(A) when the time for filing an appeal expired sixty days later, on September 15, 2001. 

See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 31(d). It is undisputed that the statute of limitations began running the

following day, on September 16, 2001. Therefore, the last day to file a federal habeas corpus

petition, absent any tolling, was September 15, 2002.

Case 1:05-cv-00806-OWW -WMW Document 16 Filed 01/08/08 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

In regard to statutory tolling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2 28 244( d)(2) , the court finds initially

that Petitioner is not entitled to any tolling during the time the first two state post-conviction

proceedings were pending. Both of these actions were resolved before the statute of limitations

commenced on September 16, 2001, and therefore had no tolling consequence. 

Petitioner’s third state court action was filed on August 1, 2002, at which time 316 days of the

initial one-year statutory period had elapsed. Respondent does not dispute that Petitioner is entitled to

statutory tolling during the time the third action was pending. Respondent also does not dispute that

Petitioner is entitled to statutory tolling during the time the fourth action was pending. Both the third

and fourth actions were filed under the mailbox rule on the same day: July 29, 2002. The latest of the

petitions, the fourth petition, was denied on April 30, 2003. Respondent therefore concedes that

Petitioner is entitled to statutory tolling for the period from July 29, 2002, until April 30, 2003. 

Respondent does, however, argue that Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling for the

period between the denial of her fourth state action and the filing of her fifth state action. Despite

Petitioner’s claims to the contrary, Respondent correctly states that Petitioner was not ascending up

the state court hierarchy as required by Nino. Petitioner filed her fourth petition with the California

Supreme Court and then proceeded downward and filed her fifth petition with the California Court of

Appeal. Further, the delay of over ten months (307) after the denial of her fourth action on April 30,

2003, to the filing under the mailbox rule of her fifth action on March 4, 2004, appears to be

unreasonable. The court finds, therefore, that Respondent is correct in concluding that Petitioner is

not entitled to statutory tolling between the fourth and fifth actions.

In summary, the statute of limitations began running on September 16, 2001. The first and

second state actions were filed before the commencement of the limitations period and have no tolling

consequence. A total of 316 days of the one-year limitations period ran before Petitioner filed her

third state post-conviction petition. Petitioner then waited an additional 307 days after the denial of

her fourth petition to file her fifth petition. The court must agree with Respondent that the statute of

limitations expired during this time. With the benefit of tolling for the 276 days the third and fourth

state actions were pending, the statute of limitations expired on June 18, 2003. The fifth and sixth

state actions were filed after the statute expired, and therefore have no tolling effect. See Green v.

Case 1:05-cv-00806-OWW -WMW Document 16 Filed 01/08/08 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9th Cir.2000) (petitioner not entitled to tolling where the limitations

period has already run). 

In opposing the motion to dismiss, Petitioner argues repeatedly that the statute of limitations

should be tolled from July 6, 2001, until October 15, 2002, the period in which her prior habeas

corpus petition was pending in this court. However, it is well-established that actions pending in

federal court have no tolling effect under Section 2244(d)(2). Duncan, 121 S.Ct. at 2129. Further,

Petitioner’s argument that she properly exhausted her state court remedies, as previously directed by

this court, does not overcome the fact that the statute of limitations expired before the filing of the

present action. Finally, despite Petitioner’s claims that she proceeded in a timely manner in state

court, it is clear from the 307 day delay in filing her fifth state action that she did not do so. Her claim

that she proceeded directly from the Superior Court, to the Court of Appeal, to the California

Supreme Court with new petitions being filed within 20 days of receiving a denial from a lower court

is belied by the procedural history set forth above. At no point in this history did Petitioner proceed

directly between these three levels of the California courts.

In light of all of the above, the court finds that the present action, filed June 21, 2005, was

filed more than two years after the expiration of the statute of limitations and is therefore barred.

Based on the foregoing, the court HEREBY RECOMMENDS as follows:

1) That Respondent’s motion to dismiss this action as barred by the statute of limitations be

GRANTED;

2) That this case be dismissed with prejudice;

3) That the Clerk of the Court be directed to enter judgment for Respondent and to close this

case.

These Findings and Recommendation are submitted to the assigned United States District

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within

thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with the court

and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate

Case 1:05-cv-00806-OWW -WMW Document 16 Filed 01/08/08 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and filed within

ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the objections. The court will

then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 7, 2008 /s/ William M. Wunderlich 

mmkd34 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:05-cv-00806-OWW -WMW Document 16 Filed 01/08/08 Page 9 of 9