Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06416/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06416-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Attorney General
Appellee
Stephen W. Kaiser
Appellee
Ralph W. Severe
Appellant

Document Text:

... FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Cirrnit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

MAY 1 'l 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

RALPH W. SEVERE, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

STEPHEN W. KAISER and ATTORNEY 

GENERAL, 

Respondents-Appellees. 

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No. 89-6416 

(W.D. Oklahoma) 

(D.C. No. CIV-89-1559-T) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before ANDERSON, TACHA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Ralph w. Severe, appearing prose, appeals the denial of his 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254. The district court denied the petition. We grant the motion for a certificate of probable cause, and affirm. 

Severe pled guilty to one count of first degree robbery and 

two counts of robbery with firearms, all after former conviction 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-6416 Document: 010110106525 Date Filed: 05/17/1991 Page: 1 
.;, 

of a felony. He was sentenced to 25 years on each count, with the 

sentences to run concurrently. His first argument is that the 

district court erred in determining that his guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily given despite the fact that he had been 

deprived of insulin periodically during his confinement in the 

Oklahoma County Jail and, particularly, for the four days prior to 

entering his guilty plea. He claims that the insulin deprivation 

caused him to hallucinate and to not be lucid. 

Severe attached to his habeas petition affidavits from his 

mother and sister, which state that they became aware of his 

insulin deprivation and informed jail officials of the situation. 

The affidavits also assert that, during the guilty plea proceedings, Severe's sister attempted to inform the judge of Severe's 

insulin deprivation for the preceding four days, but was told to 

"shut up and sit down." The judge then directed that the exchange 

be deleted from the record. 

The record in this case amply supports the district court's 

conclusion that Severe's guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily 

given. In the written summary of facts Severe signed in connection with his guilty plea, he responded "no" to the question of 

whether he was taking any kind of medication and whether it affected his judgment. When questioned orally by the judge during 

his plea proceedings, Severe said he was taking insulin but that 

it did not affect his judgment. His attorney stated he had no 

reason to believe Severe was not competent to understand the 

proceedings taking place, and the judge, after questioning and 

observing him, specifically found him competent to enter his plea. 

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We must accord that finding a presumption of correctness. See 

Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 430-37 (1983); Sumner v. 

Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 547 (1981); Cartwright v. Maynard, 802 F.2d 

1203, 1216-18, (10th Cir. 1986), appealed on other grounds, 822 

F.2d 1477 (10th Cir. 1987) (en bane), aff'd, 486 U.S. 356 (1988). 

We therefore affirm the district court's determination that 

Severe's guilty plea was freely, knowingly and voluntarily 

entered. 

Severe next argues that in neither the charging information 

nor the plea and sentencing proceedings did the state inform him 

whether penalty enhancement was being sought under the general 

enhancement statute (Okla. Stat. Tit. 21 § 51) or under a specific 

enhancement statute applicable to those with multiple robbery 

convictions (Okla. Stat. Tit. 21 § 801). That failure, he argues, 

violated his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendments. We affirm the district court's rejection of this 

argument. 

As the district court noted, Severe has not cited any authority for his assertion that the state must inform him of the 

specific penalty enhancement statute, nor are we aware of any such 

authority. It was clear that Severe was charged with robbery 

after prior conviction of a felony, as both the summary of facts 

signed by Severe and the transcript of plea and sentencing 

proceedings indicate. Furthermore, he was told during the plea 

and sentencing proceedings that the possible minimum and maximum 

penalties would be 20 years and an indefinite sentence, 

respectively. He indicated his understanding of those penalties, 

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both orally and in the written summary of facts. Those penalties 

correspond to an enhancement under section 51, the general 

enhancement statute, not under section 801, the specific enhancement statute for multiple robbery convictions. We thus reject the 

argument that Severe suffered a constitutional deprivation because 

of an alleged failure to notify him of the specific enhancement 

statute utilized in his case.

1 

Severe's third argument is that the district court erred in 

finding that his counsel was not ineffective. Severe alleges that 

his attorney was aware of the extended insulin deprivation, that 

he had seen Severe hallucinating at times as a result of such 

deprivation, that he failed to bring to the court's attention the 

fact of this deprivation, and that he failed to investigate the 

possibility that the prolonged insulin deprivation might have affected the voluntariness of his guilty plea. He also charges 

ineffectiveness in his attorney's alleged failure to investigate 

and discover what enhancement procedures were being used. 

Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) governs ineffective assistance claims in the guilty plea context. See also Laycock v. 

New Mexico, 880 F.2d 1184, 1187 (10th Cir. 1989). Hill reiterates 

the two-part test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 

1 In his appellate brief, as in his submissions to the district 

court, Severe refers to the fact that the Oklahoma Department of 

Corrections is apparently treating his case as if his penalty had 

been enhanced under section 801 and is thereby denying him goodtime credits and certain prerogatives relating to parole. The 

district court specifically found that Severe had not exhausted 

his available remedies on this claim, but concluded that Severe's 

references to this claim should not be viewed as a separate allegation requiring exhaustion in view of the repeated assertions 

by the state that section 801 was not, and could not be, the basis 

for Severe's sentence enhancement. 

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_;, 

(1984), pursuant to which an "appellant must show both that his 

attorney's performance fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness and that, but for the counsel's inadequacies, the 

result of the proceedings would have been different." Tapia v. 

Tansy, 926 F.2d 1554, 1564 (10th Cir. 1991); see also United 

States v. Treff, 924 F.2d 975, 979-80 (10th Cir. 1991). The question under the first part of the Strickland test is whether the 

attorney rendered "reasonably effective assistance." Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 687; Laycock, 880 F.2d at 1187. Under the second 

(prejudice) prong, Severe must show "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded 

guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill, 474 U.S. 

at 59. Failure to satisfy either prong will defeat his claim. 

See Tapia, 926 F.2d at 1564. We affirm the district court's 

conclusion that Severe failed to satisfy the prejudice prong of 

the Strickland test. 

Severe asserts that until the plea proceedings, he "had been 

completely adamant about going to trial on the charges." Brief of 

Petitioner-Appellant at 11. He further alleges that "had [he] 

been lucid, received the proper medical assistance to which he was 

entitled and been made fully aware of the specific enhancement 

procedures, he would have insisted on proceeding to trial." Id. 

Such conclusory assertions do not establish prejudice. 

Severe specifically stated in the summary of facts and in the 

plea proceedings that he pled guilty because he committed the acts 

charged. As the district court noted, prior to the plea agreement, Severe faced a possible minimum sentence of 20 years on each 

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count, with no maximum, and with the possibility that the 

sentences would run consecutively. These sentences were based 

upon an enhancement under section 51, the only enhancement provision applicable to Severe. 2 Under the plea arrangement, Severe 

received 25 year sentences, all running concurrently. We are thus 

not persuaded by his argument that he was somehow prejudiced by 

pleading guilty pursuant to the plea arrangement. 

Further, the transcript of the plea proceedings and the summary of facts reveal that Severe specifically stated that he had 

been satisfied with his attorney's representation and advice. As 

the district court noted, such solemn declarations made in open 

court carry a strong presumption of truth. See Blackledge v. 

Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977); Laycock v. New Mexico, 880 F.2d 

1184, 1186-87 (10th Cir. 1989); Phillips v. Murphy, 796 F.2d 

1303, 1304 (10th Cir. 1986). We therefore view with considerable 

skepticism his conclusory assertion that he would have insisted on 

going to trial, but for his attorney's errors. Severe has failed 

to establish that he suffered any prejudice from his counsel's 

alleged ineffectiveness. 

Finally, Severe alleges that the district court erred in 

denying his habeas petition without conducting an evidentiary 

hearing on his claims. As the district court noted, an 

2 The State has consistently argued, and the district court 

agreed, that Severe's sentence could not have been enhanced under 

section 801 because that section permits enhancement when there 

have been three or more robbery with firearms convictions. 

Severe's prior convictions were not for robbery; only two of the 

three current convictions were for robbery with firearms. Thus, 

it appears that the State is correct in arguing that enhancement 

would only be appropriate under section 51. 

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evidentiary hearing is unnecessary if an issue can be resolved on 

the basis of the record. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 

(1963); Cartwright v. Maynard, 802 F.2d 1203, 1216 (10th Cir. 

1986). We have found that each claim can be so resolved. Accordingly, there was no error in refusing to conduct an evidentiary 

hearing. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Stephen H. Anderson 

Circuit Judge 

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