Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-02208/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-02208-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Board of Parole Hearings
Defendant
Calvin D Pritchett Jr.
Plaintiff

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1 The Board of Prison Terms was abolished effective July 1,

2005, and replaced with the Board of Parole Hearings. Cal. Penal

Code § 5075(a).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CALVIN D. PRITCHETT, JR.,

Petitioner,

v.

JAMES DAVIS, Chairman,

Board of Parole Hearings,

Respondent.

 /

No. C 06-2208 CW (pr)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

Petitioner Calvin D. Pritchett, Jr., proceeding pro se, has

filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to title 28

U.S.C. § 2254, challenging as a violation of his constitutional

rights the denial of parole by the California Board of Parole

Hearings (Board).1 

On December 4, 2006, Respondent James Davis filed an answer. 

On February 2, 2007 Petitioner filed a traverse. Having considered

all of the papers filed by the parties, the Court DENIES the

petition.

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BACKGROUND

At Petitioner's first parole suitability hearing on August 6, 2003,

which is at issue here, the Board considered the following

information, derived from the San Diego County Probation Officer's

Report, about the murder of Jeff Burnett:

On August 19 of 1991, at approximately 8:21

a.m., police received a call regarding the

discovery of a body in the Pine Valley area of

San Diego County. . . . The body was in a state

of extensive skeletonization and advanced

decomposition. Three ligatures and an electric

cord secured a blanket around the remains. 

. . . A post-mortem examination revealed a

slug in the left chest area. There appeared to

be a gunshot wound to the face. The shot to

the chest was believed to be the cause of

death. . . . The victim’s girlfriend . . .

testified that she and the victim were in the

process of buying a limousine from the prisoner

at the time of the victim’s death. . . the

victim made arrangements to meet with the

prisoner to make another payment. . . . After

the victim had not returned home . . . . [t]he

prisoner confirmed that Burnett had attended

the meeting and denied knowing where the victim

went later. . . John Baldon testified [at the

preliminary hearing] that the prisoner informed

him he had killed the victim in self-defense. 

Later during the preliminary hearing, Mr.

Baldon testified the prisoner had told him the

murder was not only pre-planned, but was an

assassination. Baldon helped remove the body

from the prisoner’s home, but was in fear of

the prisoner who carried the murder weapon on

him while they disposed of the body. He

further related the prisoner was proud of the

murder and told Baldon . . . the offense was

committed to protect the prisoner’s family from

the victim. The prisoner wanted to take

pictures of the deceased to give to his uncle

for his photo album and also talked of cutting

off the victim’s hands to destroy them. Baldon

asserted that all aspects of the disposal of

the body and weapon were done under the

direction of the prisoner. When Mr. Baldon

arrived at the prisoner’s house, the body was

hanging in the closet with its head covered in

a plastic bag. There was blood on the floor

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2In California, a plea under People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d 595

(1970), permits a defendant to deny committing a crime while

admitting that there is sufficient evidence for a conviction. Roe

v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 473 (2000).

3

under the body. The prisoner told Baldon he

meant to kill Armando Leon first, not the

victim. He also wanted to kill a vice

detective named Lehr. The prisoner wore gloves

for disposing of the victim’s car and wiped the

vehicle down for fingerprints. Armando Leon

testified that he had moved onto the property

of the prisoner’s father . . . . Mr. Leon

informed the court that the prisoner approached

him prior to the murder and asked Leon’s help

in killing the victim. . . . The prisoner

informed the police the offense had been

committed in self defense.

(Resp't Ex. E, Initial Parole Suitability Hearing Transcript at 9-

14.)

On August 28, 1992, Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to

second degree murder with the use of a firearm, pursuant to People

v. West.2 (Pet’r Ex. 4, Transcript of Proceedings at 6.) Under

the plea agreement, all additional allegations were dismissed by

the district attorney. (Id. at 2.) The San Diego superior court

judge explained that “there are otherwise no agreements concerning

sentencing meaning that the maximum sentence that could be imposed

as a matter of law is twenty years to life in state prison.” (Id.) 

Petitioner agreed with the judge’s characterization of his West

plea as: 

although you may dispute your factual culpability to some

greater or lesser degree in this case, nonetheless, as a

matter of law, you wish to plead guilty to this charge of

second degree murder and admit the allegation in order to

avoid the potential of a greater sentence or harsher

consequences befalling you were this case to proceed to

trial.

(Id. at 6.) Both the prosecution and defense stipulated that the

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preliminary hearing transcript could be used to provide a factual

basis for the plea. (Resp't Ex. B, Probation Officer’s Report at

1.) Petitioner’s attorney noted that he had advised Petitioner of

the possibility that he could be eligible for parole after serving

half of his sentence. (Pet’r Ex. 4 at 5.) The judge informed

Petitioner that he should not expect a reduced sentence; although

he might become legally eligible for parole after serving twothirds of his minimum sentence, a life sentence “means the very

real potential . . . [that Petitioner] could be in prison for the

rest of [his] natural life.” (Id. at 5.) Petitioner stated that

he understood the consequences of his plea and admission. (Id.)

On November 6, 1992, the superior court sentenced Petitioner

to fifteen years to life in prison with the possibility of parole,

plus an additional five year firearm enhancement. (Resp't Ex. A,

Abstract of Judgment at 2.) Petitioner is incarcerated at the

Correctional Training Facility at Soledad. (Resp't Ex. E at 1.) 

He started serving his sentence on November 19, 1992, and his

minimum eligible parole date was July 30, 2004. (Id.) Petitioner

was represented by counsel at his initial parole suitability

hearing on August 6, 2003. (Id. at 2.)

Since his incarceration, Petitioner has maintained a positive

work history. He has received three laudatory chronos for work

performance. (Id. at 39.) He has worked as a program clerk, a

chapel clerk with above average work report ratings, a law library

clerk with above average exceptional work reports, and a housing

unit porter with satisfactory reports. (Id. at 35.) On April 1,

1998, Plaintiff’s custody classification was reduced to Medium A. 

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(Id.) On June 6, 2000, Plaintiff was assigned to be a teacher’s

aide in landscaping, and he received exceptional reports. (Id.) 

Plaintiff took a vocational class in landscaping and horticulture,

where he received A and B grades, and on August 3, 2000, he

received a certificate of completion. (Id. at 35-36.) At the time

of the initial parole suitability hearing Petitioner was working in

the vocational upholstery shop. (Id. at 44.)

While incarcerated, Petitioner also engaged in many self-help

programs. (Id. at 36-39.) In 1998, he participated in a seven

week bible study series. (Id. at 36.) In 1999, Petitioner

completed a Prison Fellowship Ministries (PFM) training program,

bible study courses and a Life Skills Program. (Id.) In 2000, he

participated in a PFM program. (Id.) In 2001, Petitioner took

part in a children’s Christmas festival and two PFM training

programs. (Id.) In 2002, he completed a fourteen week IMPACT

program and “Perspective from the Eyes of the Victims” and a

twenty-two week introduction to Spanish course, with a grade of

eighty-five percent. He also volunteered as a Spanish instructor

in a literacy program, participated in a bible trivia series and an

Easter trivia program and took part in several PFM programs. (Id.

at 36-37.) In 2003, Petitioner was a facilitator for the Usher

Program, received certificates for his participation in PFM and

bible studies and completed Project Change. (Id. at 39.) 

The Board also looked at Petitioner’s pre-incarceration

history, and noted that he had no prior criminal or juvenile arrest

record. (Id. at 31.) Prior to his conviction, Petitioner had

graduated from high school and completed approximately ninety-one

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units at San Diego State University. (Id. at 31-32.) At the time

of the crime, Petitioner worked at a carpet cleaning business and

his father was awaiting trial on pandering charges. (Id. at 32-

34.) 

The Board considered a 2003 report by Petitioner's

correctional counselor. Upon assessing Petitioner's commitment

offense, prior record and prison adjustment, the counselor found

that Petitioner would pose a moderate to minimal degree of threat

to society if released from prison. (Id. at 45.) The counselor

noted that Petitioner had “programmed exceptionally well” in

prison; he remained disciplinary-free, participated in numerous

self-help programs, received several exceptional vocational

reports, had solid parole plans, possessed good communication

skills, and got along well with staff members. (Id. at 45-46.)

Petitioner's 2003 mental health evaluation indicated that he

"made gains psychologically since being incarcerated" and that "his

violence potential is estimated to be no higher than the average

citizen in the community." (Id. at 49.) The evaluation took into

account Petitioner's lack of criminal history and the gains he made

since being incarcerated, particularly through his utilization of

self-help. (Id.) The evaluation also included an observation that

Petitioner had a history of making poor choices when involved in

conflictual social situations, and would “most likely benefit from

additional opportunities to improve [him]self,” particularly those

that “focus on interpersonal relationship skills.” (Id. at 49-50.)

The Board also considered the twenty-four support letters that

were submitted on Petitioner's behalf, noting that they were sent

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from family, friends, church acquaintances and others, from both

Georgia and California. (Id. at 52-58.) Several letters offered

Petitioner a place to stay if he was paroled, including one from a

friend, one from an aunt, and one from his mother, Wanda Hughes. 

Ms. Hughes said that she had a place for Petitioner to live in

Georgia, would support him and provide him with transportation and

aid. (Id. at 57.) Petitioner also received several letters

containing offers of employment and employment assistance,

including one from his second cousin, Lucy Lanier, offering a job

in landscaping and one from Richard Carpenter, the owner of the

Adopt-A-Highway Service in San Diego. (Id. at 55, 58.) Among the

letters offering financial support, Petitioner received one from

John Palhegyi, the father of a friend, who wrote that he would

provide Petitioner with clothing and a gift of one-hundred dollars

a month for six months. (Id. at 56.) If paroled, Petitioner

stated, he would like to live with his mother and help out on his

family’s farm in south Georgia. (Id. at 50.) Petitioner said that

he had a friend at the Department of Labor in Georgia, who would

give him leads on landscaping jobs. (Id. at 51.) 

Finally, the Board considered the opposition to Petitioner’s

parole. A letter from the San Diego County Sheriff urged the Board

to deny parole, “due to the brutal and callous manner in which this

crime was carried out and the total disregard for human life.” 

(Id. at 59.) A San Diego County deputy district attorney wrote a

letter stating, “given the level of sophistication . . . and the

cruel and callous way it was perpetrated,” Petitioner should not be

paroled because he posed “a risk of harm to society.” (Id. at 60.) 

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Deputy District Attorney Genaro Ramirez, who was present at the

hearing, reported the District Attorney’s opposition to parole,

pointing out the egregious nature of Petitioner’s crime and “his

lack of self-help.” (Id. at 77.) Deputy District Attorney Ramirez

asserted that, although Petitioner killed Jeff Burnett, Petitioner

felt that he was the victim. (Id. at 72.) Consequently, Ramirez

argued, Petitioner “is not accepting responsibility” and has not

“come to grips with what he did.” (Id. at 74-76.)

After deliberation, the Board concluded that Petitioner was

not suitable for parole and would pose an unreasonable risk of

danger to society or a threat to public safety if released. (Id.

at 83.) The Board set Petitioner’s next parole consideration

hearing for 2007 and found that it was not reasonable to expect

that parole would be granted at a hearing during the intervening

four years. (Id. at 87-88.) The Board stated that its paramount

reason for denying parole was the gravity and timing of

Petitioner’s offense, and the evidence that the offense was carried

out in an especially vicious and brutal manner.” (Id. at 83.) The

Board found that Petitioner was dispassionate and calculated in

committing the crime, and demonstrated an “exceptionally

insensitive regard for human suffering” by luring the victim to his

apartment, shooting him twice, and disposing of the body the way he

did. (Id.) The Board also noted that it was troubled by conflicts

and irregularities in Petitioner’s testimony, which indicated that

he had not fully accepted culpability for his crime. (Id. at 90.)

Although the Board commended Petitioner for actively

participating in self-help, staying out of trouble and achieving

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marketable vocational skills, it found that Petitioner's gains were

recent and that he must continue to demonstrate "the ability to

maintain those gains for an extended period of time." (Id. at 86-

87.) In the interim, the Board directed Petitioner to remain

disciplinary-free and to participate in self-help programming that

would assist him to “understand the causative factors” as well as

his culpability in committing the crime. (Id. at 89.) 

On June 9, 2005, Petitioner filed a petition in Superior Court

for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the Board's decision. 

(Resp't Ex. F, Aug. 3, 2005 San Diego County Superior Court Order

at 1.) The court denied the petition, finding that the Board did

not abuse its discretion by denying Petitioner's parole. (Id.) 

The California Court of Appeal also denied Petitioner’s

petition for habeas corpus. (Resp't Ex. G, Nov. 21, 2005

California Appellate Court Order at 3.) The court explained that

the facts of Petitioner’s crime, including luring the victim to his

apartment, shooting him in the face and chest, hanging the body in

a closet, and shrouding and abandoning the victim’s body, justified

the Board’s finding that the “murder was carried out in an

especially vicious, brutal and calculated manner.” (Id. at 2-3.) 

Further, the court rejected Petitioner's argument that the Board

relied on dismissed special circumstances to find him unsuitable

for parole. (Id. at 3.) The court also found that the Board

appropriately considered “the base and other commitment offenses,

including behavior before, during and after the crime,” pursuant to

15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(b). (Id.) Therefore, the court found

that “some evidence” supported the Board's denial of parole. (Id.)

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On August 3, 2005, the California Supreme Court summarily

denied Petitioner’s request for review. Subsequently, Petitioner

brought a federal habeas petition in this Court.

LEGAL STANDARD

Because this case involves a federal habeas corpus challenge

to a state parole eligibility decision, the applicable standard is

contained in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (AEDPA). McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 901 (9th Cir.

2002). 

Under AEDPA, a district court may not grant habeas relief

unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted

in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.

362, 412 (2000). A federal court must presume the correctness of

the state court's factual findings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

Respondents concede that Petitioner has exhausted his state

remedies by filing the petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the

California Supreme Court. Where, as here, the highest state court

to reach the merits issued a summary opinion which does not explain

the rationale of its decision, federal court review under § 2254(d)

is of the last state court opinion to reach the merits. Bains v.

Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 970-71, 973-78 (9th Cir. 2000). In this 

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case, the last state court opinion to address the merits of

Petitioner's claim is that of the California Court of Appeal.

DISCUSSION

Petitioner argues that (1) he was denied due process because

the Board's decision was not supported by evidence that he is

presently dangerous; (2) the State violated his plea agreement; and

(3) the Board violated Apprendi by relying on unproven facts

related to a special circumstances allegation that was dismissed.

I. Due Process Claim

Petitioner asserts that his due process rights were violated

by the Board's decision to deny parole because its decision was

arbitrary and not supported by "some evidence." Specifically,

Petitioner contends that the Board placed undue weight on the

unchanging factor of the gravity of the commitment offense as a

predictor of present dangerousness, without adequately considering

the other suitability factors outlined in 15 Cal. Code Regs. 

§ 2402. Petitioner's claim fails.

Under California Penal Code § 3041, state prisoners whose

sentences allow for the possibility of parole have an interest,

protected by the Due Process Clause, in a parole release date. 

Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 850 (9th Cir. 2007). Consequently, a

parole board's decision must be supported by "some evidence" to

satisfy the requirements of due process. Superintendent v. Hill,

472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). When assessing whether a state parole

board's suitability determination was supported by "some evidence,"

the court's analysis is framed by the statutes and regulations

governing parole suitability determinations in the relevant state. 

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3The factors tending to show unsuitability for parole are 

(1) the prisoner committed the offense in an especially heinous,

atrocious, or cruel manner; (2) the prisoner has a previous record

of violence; (3) the prisoner has an unstable social history; 

(4) the prisoner has committed sadistic sex offenses; (5) the

prisoner has a history of mental or psychological problems; and 

(6) the prisoner has engaged in serious misconduct while in prison. 

15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(c). The factors tending to show

suitability for parole are (1) the prisoner has no juvenile record;

(2) the prisoner has a stable social history; (3) the prisoner has

shown signs of remorse; (4) the prisoner was motivated to commit

the crime out of stress; (5) the prisoner suffered from Battered

Woman Syndrome; (6) the prisoner lacks a significant criminal

history; (7) the prisoner's age reduces the probability of

recidivism; (8) the prisoner has realistic plans for release; and

(9) the prisoner's behavior in prison indicates an ability to

function within the law upon release. Id. § 2402(d).

12

Id. California law provides that, when a prisoner serving an

indeterminate life sentence becomes eligible for parole, the Board

“shall set a release date unless it determines that the gravity of

the current convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and

gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such

that consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy

period of incarceration.” Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b). To make the

determination of whether a prisoner is suitable for parole, the

Board applies suitability factors3 outlined in the California Code

of Regulations. Hayward v. Marshall, 512 F.3d 536, 543 (9th Cir.

2008).

Additionally, the evidence underlying the Board's decision

must have some indicia of reliability. McQuillion, 306 F.3d at

904. Although a parole denial based solely on the gravity of the

commitment offense can initially satisfy due process requirements,

over time, "a continued reliance on an unchanging factor such as

the circumstances of the commitment offense, pre-conviction

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criminal history, or other past conduct, might in some cases result

in a due process violation.” Hayward, 512 F.3d at 545 (citing

Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 916 (9th Cir. 2003)). In Hayward,

the Ninth Circuit overturned the Governor’s reversal of the Board’s

grant of parole, holding that no evidence supported the Governor’s

conclusion that the release of the petitioner, who had served

twenty-seven years in prison for second-degree murder, would

threaten the public safety. Id. at 547. In Irons, the Ninth

Circuit explained that Biggs represents the law of the circuit that

continued reliance on a prisoner’s commitment offense or conduct

prior to imprisonment could result in a due process violation over

time. Irons, 505 F.3d at 853. Nevertheless, the court held that,

given the egregiousness of the commitment offense, due process was

not violated when the Board deemed a prisoner unsuitable for parole

prior to expiration of his minimum term. Id. at 846. Likewise,

Sass v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir.

2006), pertained to a prisoner who had not yet served his minimum

sentence at the time of the challenged parole. In Sass, the court

determined that “evidence of Petitioner’s prior offenses,” along

with “the gravity of his convicted offenses” constituted “some

evidence” to support the Board's decision. Id. at 1129.

In denying Petitioner's request for parole, the Board opined

that the commitment offense demonstrated that Petitioner displayed

an "exceptionally insensitive disregard for human suffering." 

(Resp't Ex. E at 88.) The Board noted that Petitioner murdered

Burnett in “an especially vicious and brutal manner,” and pointed

to the Statement of Facts, indicating that Petitioner lured the

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victim to his apartment, shot him multiple times, shrouded the body

and kept it in a closet, and attempted to enlist the aid of others

in disposing of the body. (Id. at 83-84.) The Ninth Circuit's

evolving guidance suggests that because this was Petitioner’s first

parole hearing and because he had not yet served the minimum number

of years to which he had been sentenced, the Board did not violate

Petitioner’s due process rights by relying heavily on the static

factor of the commitment offense.

During Petitioner’s parole suitability hearing, the Board also

cited a need for more therapy and self-help programming before

release. (Id. at 84.) The Board was pleased that Petitioner had

stayed out of trouble, noting that, prior to the commitment

offense, he had no history of criminality or misconduct and while

in prison, he had programmed well. (Id. at 84.) It also commended

Petitioner for completing various vocational programs and

participating in personal self-help programs, including IMPACT and

Project Change. (Id. at 87.) However, the Board determined,

Petitioner had not yet demonstrated full responsibility for his

crime and the positive aspects of his profile were outweighed by

the factors of unsuitability. (Id.) It found that Petitioner:

still needs some therapy in order to face, discuss,

understand and cope with stress in a nondestructive

manner so that [he] can better understand the causative

factors as well as his culpability in this particular

crime, the crime of taking the life of Mr. Burnett.

(Id. at 86.) Finally, the Board stressed the importance of

continuing to participate in self-help programming, such as

Breaking Barriers, Anger Management, and Alternatives to Violence. 

(Id. at 89.) 

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4

Petitioner asserts that the Board failed to recognize that

Project Change was an anger management course. Although the Board

acknowledged that Petitioner had completed Project Change, it found

that he had failed to complete anger management programming. (Id.

at 87-89.) Regardless of the content of Project Change, the Board

determined that Petitioner needed more time to focus on a broader

spectrum of programming, beyond anger management, that would help

him understand both the causative factors and his culpability in

the crime. (Id. at 89.)

15

 The Board concluded that Petitioner’s participation in

beneficial self-help programs was relatively recent, and that

Petitioner must demonstrate “the ability to maintain those gains

for an extended period of time." (Id. at 87.)4

 The Board

explained that Petitioner’s 2003 mental health evaluation, which

noted his history of making poor choices when involved in

conflictual social situations, also counseled against parole. 

(Resp't Ex. E at 85.) Thus, the Board relied on more than the

single "unchanging factor" of the timing and gravity of

Petitioner's commitment offense in denying him parole.

Although the Board's decision at issue here does not

constitute a due process violation, as the Ninth Circuit has

stated, over time, continuous denial of parole based on the

commitment offense could result in denial of due process. This

was Petitioner's initial parole suitability hearing. Should

Petitioner continue to follow the Board's advice by attending selfhelp programs and maintaining a positive disciplinary record,

continued parole denials based on Petitioner's commitment offense

alone could eventually give rise to a due process violation.

The California courts' conclusion that the record contained

"some evidence" to support the Board's finding that Petitioner was

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unsuitable for parole was reasonable, both in light of the facts

and controlling federal law. Accordingly, Petitioner’s due process

claim is DENIED.

II. Plea Agreement Claim

Petitioner further alleges that the Board violated his plea

agreement. This claim is without merit.

Plea agreements are contractual in nature and subject to

contract law standards of interpretation. In re Ellis, 356 F.3d

1198, 1207 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S.

670, 677-78 (1997)). Thus, a petitioner is entitled to habeas

relief if he or she enters into a plea agreement with a state

prosecutor, and the prosecutor breaches the agreement. Gunn v.

Ignacio, 263 F.3d 965, 969-70 (9th Cir. 2001). However, after

sentencing, a defendant who pleads guilty may not collaterally

challenge a guilty plea that was voluntary and intelligently

entered into with the advice of competent counsel. United States

v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 572 (1989). Nor may a defendant

collaterally attack this plea's validity merely because he or she

made what turned out, in retrospect, to be a poor deal. Bradshaw

v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 186 (2005).

Although Petitioner characterizes his plea agreement as a

contract between Petitioner and the Board, it was actually an

agreement between Petitioner and the San Diego County District

Attorney. The plea agreement specified that Petitioner would plead

guilty to second degree murder with the use of a firearm and in

return the District Attorney would dismiss all additional

allegations. (Pet’r Ex. 4 at 2.) When Petitioner entered his

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5Petitioner argues that the Board relied on previously

stricken allegations in order to increase punishment. 

Alternatively, Petitioner argues that the Board used evidence

outside the scope of the plea “contract.” As discussed in the

previous section, Respondent did not violate Petitioner’s plea

agreement. Therefore, other arguments related to this claim are

unavailing.

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guilty plea on August 28, 1992, in open court, the judge clarified

that “there are otherwise no agreements concerning sentencing” and

Petitioner could be sentenced to twenty years to life in state

prison. (Id.) Petitioner does not provide evidence that the plea

agreement is anything other than the agreement described by the

judge, nor does he argue that the District Attorney violated the

agreement by pursuing any of the other allegations. Therefore

Petitioner’s argument that his plea agreement was violated fails. 

III. Apprendi Claim

Finally, Petitioner argues that the Board used inadmissible

evidence in making the parole determination,5 because it looked at

allegations to which Petitioner had not plead guilty. This claim

is without merit.

The United States Supreme Court has ruled that "[o]ther than

the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the

penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be

submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 488-90 (2000). For example,

an allegation that a criminal defendant used a firearm in the

commission of the underlying offense may not be adjudicated by a

judge alone where doing so could alter the maximum penalty for the

crime. Dillard v. Roe, 244 F.3d 758, 773 (9th Cir. 2001). 

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However, Apprendi does not apply here because the statutory

maximum for second degree murder in California is an indeterminate

life sentence. Cal. Penal Code § 190(a). Further, when entering

his guilty plea, Petitioner stipulated that the preliminary hearing

transcript could be used to provide a factual basis for the plea. 

(Resp't Ex. B at 1.) The facts that the Board considered during

Petitioner’s parole hearing derived from this transcript. (Resp't

Ex. E at 9.) Accordingly, because the decision to deny parole was

based on the facts to which Petitioner plead guilty, and the

decision neither increased the maximum penalty for second degree

murder nor Petitioner’s sentence, Petitioner’s Apprendi claim is

DENIED.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus is DENIED. 

The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment, terminate all

pending motions, and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 3/19/08 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CALVIN D. PRITCHETT JR.,

Plaintiff,

 v.

BOARD OF PAROLE HEARINGS et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV06-02208 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court,

Northern District of California.

That on March 19, 2008, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located

in the Clerk's office.

Amber Nicole Wipfler

Office of the Attorney General

Correctional Law Section

455 Golden Gate Avenue

Suite 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102-7004

Calvin D Pritchett Jr. H56017

PO Box 689 B-237-U

Soledad, CA 93960-0689

Dated: March 19, 2008

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Sheilah Cahill, Deputy Clerk

Case 4:06-cv-02208-CW Document 13 Filed 03/19/08 Page 19 of 19