Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-mc-80055/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-mc-80055-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John Boone Kincaid III
Petitioner

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

In re: KINCAID, 

Petitioner, 

Case No. 15-mc-80055-DMR 

REQUEST FOR REASSIGNMENT; 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

RE: RENEWED PETITION FOR 

EXPUNGEMENT OF CENTRAL 

REGISTRATION DEPOSITORY 

RECORDS 

Re: Dkt. No. 7 

On February 4, 2015, John Boone Kincaid III (“Kincaid”) filed a petition requesting that 

the court confirm an arbitration award directing expungement of his central registration depository 

(“CRD”) records pursuant to Rule 2080 of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc. 

(“FINRA”).1

 Pet. [Docket No. 4] at 2. On April 16, 2015, this court denied the petition without 

prejudice because Kincaid had not established subject matter jurisdiction, and also had failed to 

demonstrate that he had met the regulatory requirements to file his petition. Order [Docket No. 5] 

at 7. Kincaid has filed a renewed petition that attempts to address the insufficiencies the court 

identified in its earlier order. [Docket Nos. 6-7.] 

The court has reviewed Kincaid’s unopposed brief2

 and accompanying submissions, and 

 

1

 FINRA is a “self-regulatory organization” under the Securities and Exchange Act. One of 

FINRA’s duties is to maintain a collection of registration information about FINRA-licensed 

financial advisors such as Kincaid, which it does through its CRD system. FINRA Rule 2080 

governs the process of expunging records from the CRD system. 

2

 Kincaid proceeds ex parte. FINRA expressly waived its right to be named as a party in this 

action to confirm Kincaid’s arbitration award pursuant to FINRA Rule 2080. See Supp. Morris 

Decl. [Docket No. 6] at ¶¶ 10-11, Ex. 4 (“FINRA has reviewed, and determined to grant, 

[Kincaid’s] request for a waiver of the obligation under FINRA Rule 2080 to name FINRA has a 

party in any action to confirm the award issued [in In the Matter of the Arbitration Between

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finds that this matter is appropriate for determination without oral argument. Civil L.R. 7-1(b). 

Kincaid has not consented to have this petition decided by a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. 636(c). For this reason, the court requests that the matter be reassigned to a district judge, 

and issues this report and recommendation. The court recommends that the petition be denied due 

to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

I. BACKGROUND 

A. The FINRA Arbitration 

The court has summarized the factual allegations elsewhere. See Order at 1-3. In brief, 

Kincaid is a financial advisor. On June 11, 2013, one of his former customers, Charles W. Liotta, 

trustee for the Charles Liotta Trust DTD 3/8/94 initiated an arbitration against Kincaid and Cetera 

Advisors LLC.3 The Statement of Claim in the arbitration alleged two counts against Kincaid: (1) 

breach of fiduciary duty; and (2) “violation of NASD and FINRA rules, and breach of contract and 

negligence.”4 Supp. Morris Decl., Ex. 1 at 9. Liotta demanded “judgment against respondents for 

compensatory damages in the amount of $70,000 plus interest, costs, attorneys’ fees and such 

other damages the panel deem[ed] appropriate.” Supp. Morris Decl., Ex. 1 at 9. 

Kincaid settled with Liotta on March 6, 2014. Kincaid also filed an unopposed motion 

asking the arbitrator to expunge all references to the arbitration claim from FINRA’s CRD system 

pursuant to FINRA Rule 2080. On June 23, 2014, the arbitrator issued an award finding that the 

claim against Kincaid was factually impossible or erroneous, as well as false. Morris Decl., Ex. 3 

at 000048 (“[T]he Arbitrator has made the following Rule 2080 affirmative findings of fact: The 

claim, allegation, or information is factually impossible or clearly erroneous; and the claim, 

 

Charles Liotta Trust dated 3/8/94 v. Cetera Advisors LLC, John Boone Kincaid III, FINRA Case 

No. 13-01619].”). 

3 See In the Matter of the Arbitration Between Charles Liotta Trust dated 3/8/94 v. Cetera 

Advisors LLC, John Boone Kincaid III, FINRA Case No. 13-01619. Morris Decl. at ¶ 2, Ex. 1. 

4

 Although the second claim appears to state several different causes of action, Liotta pleads it as 

one claim. See Supp. Morris Decl., Ex. 1 at 9 (noting that “violations of industry rules and 

practices give rise to common law claim[s] for negligence”). 

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allegation, or information is false.”). The arbitrator further recommended expungement of all 

references to the arbitration from Kincaid’s registration records maintained by the CRD. Pet. at 3; 

Morris Decl. at ¶¶ 7-8, Ex. 3 at 000048. The arbitrator noted two additional prerequisites pursuant 

to FINRA Rule 2080(a) and 2080(b) before an expungement directive could be issued: (1) Kincaid 

was required to obtain confirmation of the expungement relief from a court of competent 

jurisdiction, and (2) if Kincaid sought such confirmation, he was required to name FINRA as a 

party unless FINRA waived participation in the proceeding in writing. Morris Decl. at ¶ 7, Ex. 3 

at 000048. See also FINRA R. 2080(a) ([m]embers . . . seeking to expunge information from the 

CRD system arising from disputes with customers must obtain an order from a court of competent 

jurisdiction . . . confirming an arbitration award containing expungement relief.”); and FINRA R. 

2080(b) (Kincaid “must name FINRA as an additional party . . . unless this requirement is waived 

[by FINRA].”). 

B. First Petition 

Kincaid then brought this proceeding requesting that the court confirm his FINRA 

arbitration award directing expungement of his CRD records. The court denied the petition 

without prejudice to its renewal on two grounds. 

First, Kincaid had not demonstrated that the court had subject matter jurisdiction to 

confirm the arbitration award.5

 The only jurisdictional basis asserted by Kincaid was Section 9 of 

the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 9, which governs confirmation of arbitration 

awards by federal courts. The court noted that “the FAA is not a grant of federal subject matter 

 

5

 “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by 

Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). 

See also U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. If subject matter jurisdiction is lacking, the action must be 

dismissed. Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time and by any party. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter 

jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”); Am. Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 16-

18 (1951); Attorneys Trust v. Videotape Computer Prods., Inc., 93 F.3d 593, 594-95 (9th Cir. 

1996) (citation omitted). “The party asserting jurisdiction always bears burden of establishing 

subject matter jurisdiction.” Hernandez v. McClanahan, 996 F. Supp. 975, 977 (N.D. Cal. 1998) 

(citing Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377; Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 

(9th Cir. 1989)). “The court, in effect, presumes lack of jurisdiction unless the asserting party can 

prove otherwise.” Id. 

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jurisdiction. Rather, for a federal court to have jurisdiction under the FAA, the litigant must assert 

an independent jurisdictional basis.” See Order at 4-6 (citing Hall St. Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, 

Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581-82 (2008); Gen. Atomic Co. v. United Nuclear Corp., 655 F.2d 968, 969 

(9th Cir. 1981) cert. denied, 455 U.S. 948 (1982), reh’g denied, 456 U.S. 939 (1982); Carter v. 

Health Net of California, Inc., 374 F.3d 830, 833 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted)). 

Second, the court found that Kincaid had not met the requirements of FINRA Rule 2080, 

because he did not demonstrate that FINRA had affirmatively waived the requirement that it be 

named as a party. Order at 6. The court noted that Kincaid may have mistakenly attached the 

wrong exhibit to his declaration, since his petition referenced a September 11, 2014 FINRA letter 

in which it expressly waives the requirement to name FINRA as a party in the litigation, but the 

attached exhibit was a letter dated July 28, 2014. Id. at n.8. 

C. Renewed Petition 

This renewed petition followed. Kincaid has attached the correct exhibit demonstrating 

that FINRA has affirmatively waived its right to be named as a party to this action. See Supp. 

Morris Decl. at ¶¶ 10-11, Ex. 4. He has therefore met the requirement for expungement set forth 

in FINRA Rule 2080(b). Thus, the only remaining issue is whether Kincaid has established that 

the court has subject matter jurisdiction over this proceeding. 

Kincaid asserts that this court exercises diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 

because the parties are diverse and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.6

 He also asserts 

that the court exercises jurisdiction over this action pursuant to the Securities and Exchange Act of 

1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa, which grants federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over actions brought to 

 

6

 A court has original jurisdiction over civil actions in which the amount in controversy exceeds 

$75,000 and there is complete diversity of citizenship between all plaintiffs and all defendants. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1); Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996) (“The current 

general-diversity statute, permitting federal district court jurisdiction over suits for more than 

[$75,000] between citizens of different States, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), thus applies only to cases in 

which the citizenship of each plaintiff is diverse from the citizenship of each defendant.”) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

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enforce certain securities laws and regulations. The court considers each assertion in turn.

II. DISCUSSION 

A. Diversity Jurisdiction 

1. Amount in Controversy 

 In the Ninth Circuit, the amount demanded in the underlying arbitration determines the 

amount in controversy in a motion to confirm an arbitration award arising under the FAA.7 See

Theis Research, Inc. v. Brown & Bain, 400 F.3d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 2005) (“We conclude that the 

amount at stake in the underlying litigation, not the amount of the arbitration award, is the amount 

in controversy for purposes of diversity jurisdiction . . . under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.”). This so-called 

“demand approach” requires the court to consider only what Liotta actually demanded in the 

underlying arbitration when determining the amount in controversy for purposes of diversity 

jurisdiction. 

 

7

 There is a circuit split regarding how to determine the amount in controversy in cases concerning 

whether to confirm or vacate an arbitration award under Section 9 of the FAA. See Choice Hotels 

Int’l, Inc. v. Shiv Hospitality, L.L.C., 491 F.3d 171, 175 (4th Cir. 2007). Some circuits follow the 

“award approach,” wherein the amount of the award determines the amount in controversy. See

Ford v. Hamilton Investments, Inc., 29 F.3d 255, 260 (6th Cir. 1994) (“A claim for vacation of an 

arbitral award [below jurisdictional amount] is not sufficient for diversity jurisdiction”); Baltin v. 

Alaron Trading Corp., 128 F.3d 1466, 1472 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that because the amount 

sought to be vacated in the award was only $36,284.69, there was “legal certainty” that the amount 

in controversy could not be met). The Seventh Circuit has adopted the “remand,” or “mixed” 

approach, in which the amount awarded in the arbitration determines the amount in controversy, in 

addition to any other amount if the case was remanded and arbitration was reopened. See Sirotzky 

v. New York Stock Exch., 347 F.3d 985, 989 (7th Cir. 2003) abrogated on other grounds by Martin 

v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132 (2005) (“[T]he amount in controversy in a suit 

challenging an arbitration award includes the matter at stake in the arbitration, provided the 

plaintiff is seeking to reopen the arbitration.”) (citation omitted). It is clear, however, that the 

Ninth Circuit follows the “demand approach.” See Karsner v. Lothian, 532 F.3d 876, 883 (D.C. 

Cir. 2008) (“[T]he demand approach has merit and has recently been applied by two other circuit 

courts. For example, the Ninth Circuit recently upheld the exercise of diversity jurisdiction over a 

petition to vacate an arbitration award of $0.”) (citing Theis Research, Inc., 400 F.3d at 664–65; 

Am. Guaranty Co. v. Caldwell, 72 F.2d 209, 211 (9th Cir.1934)); see also Shannon Assocs. LLC v. 

MacKay, No. C 09-4184 CW, 2009 WL 4756568, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2009) (“In Theis 

Research, Inc. v. Brown & Bain, the Ninth Circuit held that the measure of the amount of 

controversy in arbitration award cases is the amount at stake in the underlying litigation, not the 

amount of the arbitration award.”) (citation and internal quotations omitted). 

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The amount demanded by Liotta in the arbitration does not exceed $75,000. The 

Statement of Claim demanded “judgment against respondents for compensatory damages in the 

amount of $70,000 plus interest, costs, attorneys’ fees and such other damages the panel deem[ed] 

appropriate.” Supp. Morris Decl., Ex. 1 at 9. Despite this, Kincaid contends that he has met the 

amount in controversy requirement under 28 U.S.C. §1332 on five different grounds. Only two of 

his arguments are consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s “demand approach” to determining whether a 

party has met the $75,000 threshold amount for establishing diversity jurisdiction with regard to 

the confirmation of FAA arbitration awards.8 Thus, the court considers Kincaid’s assertions that 

(1) attorneys’ fees and (2) costs should each be factored into the amount in controversy. 

a. Attorneys’ Fees 

Attorneys’ fees are generally excluded from the amount in controversy calculation. See 

Galt G/S, 142 F.3d 1150, 1155-56 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Velez v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 599 F.2d 

471, 474 (1st Cir. 1979)). However, “there are two logical exceptions to this rule: one where the 

fees are provided for by contract, and two, where a statute mandates or allows the payment of such 

fees.” Alcatel Lucent USA, Inc. v. Dugdale Commc’ns, Inc., No. CV 09-2140 PSG (JCX), 2010 

WL 883831, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2010) (citing Galt, 142 F.3d at 1155) (quotation marks 

omitted). See also Kroske v. U.S. Bank Corp., 432 F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir. 2005), as amended on 

denial of reh’g and reh’g en banc (Feb. 13, 2006) (“The amount in controversy includes the 

amount of damages in dispute, as well as attorneys’ fees, if authorized by statute or contract”); 

Patel v. Nike Retail Servs., Inc., No. 14-CV-00851-JST, 2014 WL 3611096, at *13 (N.D. Cal. July 

 

8

 The other three arguments would require the court to consider additional damages not demanded 

in the arbitration. See Am. Pet. at 4-5. First, Kincaid argues that the court should add $65,000 to 

the amount in controversy, representing Liotta’s lost income. There is no basis for adding lost 

income damages when Liotta himself did not demand these damages. Second, Kincaid urges the 

court to increase the amount in controversy based on the possibility of punitive damages in the 

arbitration. Again, there is no authority for this position, given that Liotta himself made no 

demand for punitive damages. See Supp. Morris Decl., Ex. 1 at 5; Morris Decl., Ex. 3 at 000047. 

Third ̧ Kincaid requests that the court consider his own “economic hardship, including loss of 

prospective clients[,]” to determine the amount in controversy. Am. Pet. at 5; Kincaid Decl. at ¶ 7. 

Kincaid’s economic hardship has no bearing on the amount demanded in the underlying 

arbitration, and is thus irrelevant to the analysis. 

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21, 2014) (“The amount in controversy includes . . . attorney’s fees, if authorized by statute or 

contract.”). 

Kincaid contends that attorneys’ fees should be counted toward the amount in controversy 

because they were authorized by statute in the underlying arbitration. He asserts that Liotta would 

have had a statutory right to attorneys’ fees of approximately $23,000 under California Welfare 

and Institutions Code section 15657.5. That statute provides for mandatory attorneys’ fees in 

successful elder abuse actions.9 Kincaid argues that because Liotta was eighty-three years old, he 

would have been awarded attorneys’ fees had he been successful in the arbitration. This argument 

fails because Liotta did not bring an elder abuse claim. He would not have been entitled to 

statutorily-mandated attorneys’ fees simply by virtue of being elderly. 

Thus, the court finds that Kincaid has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that 

attorneys’ fees should be factored into the amount in controversy under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 

b. Costs 

Kincaid also argues that the court should include costs in calculating the amount in 

controversy, given that Liotta sought reimbursement of the costs of the arbitration in the 

underlying Statement of Claim. According to Kincaid, these include the cost of transcribing the 

record, travel costs, expert witnesses’ fees, FINRA filing fees, and the arbitrator’s fees for motions 

and hearing costs. See Am. Pet. at 4. Kincaid avers that the cost of expert witnesses alone would 

exceed $5,000, and would thus bring him over the $75,000 minimum required to establish 

diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). See Am. Pet. at 4; Supp. Morris Decl. at ¶ 

14, Ex. 7. 

The language of the diversity statute specifically excludes costs from the amount in 

controversy calculation. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (“The district courts shall have original 

jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of 

$75,000, exclusive of interest and costs[.]”) (emphasis added). See, e.g., Curtis Int’l Ltd. v. Ewest 

 

9

 California Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.5 provides, in relevant part, “[w]here it is 

proven by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant is liable for financial abuse, as defined 

in [s]ection 15610.30 . . . the court shall award to the plaintiff reasonable attorney’s fees . . . .”

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Advantage, Inc., No. 07CV1265 JAH (CAB), 2007 WL 2462115, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2007) 

(“The diversity statute specifically excludes costs in the [amount in controversy] calculation and 

this [c]ourt sees no reason to include those costs . . . .”). Kincaid has provided no authority to 

support the argument that costs may be included in the calculation of the amount in controversy. 

 For the aforementioned reasons, Kincaid has failed to meet his burden of establishing that 

the amount in controversy in the underlying arbitration exceeds $75,000, as required by 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1332(a). 

2. Diversity of Citizenship 

Kincaid must further establish that the arbitral parties were citizens of different states. See

28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1); Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Distajo, 66 F.3d 438, 446 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[W]e 

hold that the district court was correct in looking only to the citizenship of the parties in the action 

before it—that is, [those] who signed the arbitration agreement—to determine whether there was 

complete diversity.”). 

 Kincaid resides in Sedona, Arizona. Liotta is a California resident. Respondent Cetera 

Advisors LLC is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Minnesota. See

Supp. Morris Decl., ¶ 16, Ex. 7.10 

 Kincaid’s allegations of citizenship are inadequate with respect to the limited liability 

company, Cetera Advisors LLC. The citizenship of an LLC for purposes of diversity jurisdiction 

is that of every state of which its owners or members are citizens. See Johnson v. Columbia 

Properties Anchorage, LP, 437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[L]ike a partnership, an LLC is a 

citizen of every state of which its owners/members are citizens.”); see also Charles Schwab Corp. 

v. Banc of Am. Sec. LLC, No. 10-CV-03489-LHK, 2011 WL 864978, at *4 n.2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 

2011) (“In the Ninth Circuit, the citizenship of an LLC is the citizenship of all its individual 

members.”) (citing Johnson, 437 F.3d at 899). Kincaid has merely stated that Cetera Advisors 

 

10 Kincaid additionally asserts that FINRA is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of 

business in Rockville, Maryland, but given that FINRA was not a signatory to the underlying 

arbitration, FINRA’s citizenship is not relevant to determining whether complete diversity exists 

among the arbitral parties. See Doctor’s Assocs., Inc, 66 F.3d at 446. 

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LLC is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Minnesota, which is 

insufficient to establish its citizenship.11 

Kincaid has neither demonstrated that he has met the amount in controversy requirement, 

nor that the arbitral parties are completely diverse as 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) requires. Thus, the court 

does not have subject matter jurisdiction over this Petition on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. 

B. Exclusive Jurisdiction Under 15 U.S.C. § 78aa 

Kincaid also argues that the court has subject matter jurisdiction over this proceeding 

pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 78aa. Section 78aa provides in relevant part that, in general, “[t]he district 

courts of the United States . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction . . . of all suits in equity and 

actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this title [15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et 

seq.] or the rules and regulations thereunder.”12 15 U.S.C. § 78aa(a).13 For this court to exercise 

jurisdiction under this statute, Kincaid must show that his petition was brought to “enforce any 

liability or duty” created by the Securities Exchange Act. 

Kincaid fails to explain how this proceeding seeks to enforce “any liability or duty” created 

 

11 Additionally, Kincaid’s allegations with respect to his own citizenship are deficient because he 

asserts that he resides in Arizona, but does not state where he is domiciled. Kincaid maintains that 

he has resided in Arizona for the last five years, and that he is “founder and president of Kincaid 

Financial Advisors located in Sedona, Arizona.” Am. Pet at 3; Kincaid Decl. at ¶ 1. “To 

demonstrate citizenship for diversity purposes a party must (a) be a citizen of the United States, 

and (b) be domiciled in a state of the United States.” Lew v. Moss, 797 F.2d 747, 749 (9th Cir. 

1986) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). “Domicile is not necessarily synonymous with 

residence, and one can reside in one place but be domiciled in another.” Mississippi Band of 

Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 48 (1989) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 

Kincaid has alleged his residency but not his domicile, and thus has not met his burden of 

establishing his citizenship for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction. For the same reason, 

Kincaid’s declaration that Liotta “resides” in California is insufficient to establish Liotta’s 

domicile. 

12 In Sparta Surgical Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Securities Dealers, Inc., 159 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 

1998), the Ninth Circuit held that “the rules and regulations thereunder” include not only the rules 

and regulations issued by the SEC directly but also the rules issued by self-regulating 

organizations such as NASD, now known as FINRA. See Sparta Surgical Corp, 159 F.3d at 1212. 

 

13 Section 78aa(b) further states, in relevant part, that “[t]he district courts of the United States . . . 

shall have jurisdiction of an action or proceeding brought or instituted by the [SEC] or the United 

States alleging a violation of the antifraud provisions of this chapter . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 78aa(b). 

This provision does not apply because this proceeding is not brought by the SEC or the United 

States. 

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deral questio

for there to b

o enforce a ‘l

eeks expung

INRA rules .

ause of actio

ubject matte

V. CONC

court recomm

aid’s CRD re

gn this case to

hin 14 days a

Cal. Civ. L.R

D. 

0

gulations un

directing exp

Lickiss, No. 

nding expung

rds was not a

gulations the

SX, 2013 WL

on jurisdictio

be exclusive 

liability’ or ‘

gement, as w

. . . . Therefo

n for expung

er jurisdictio

CLUSION

mends that th

ecords be de

o a district ju

after being s

R. 72-2. 

__

DO

Un

nder the Act. 

pungement o

C-11-1986 E

gement requ

a “lawsuit to

ereunder”); D

L 6092790, a

on under [15

federal juris

‘duty’ create

well as related

ore, there is 

gement.”) (e

on pursuant t

he petition t

enied. 

udge. Any p

served with a

___________

ONNA M. R

nited States M

 An action s

of CRD recor

EMC, 2011 

uest to state c

o enforce a d

Doe v. Fin. I

at *2-*4 (C.D

5 U.S.C. § 78

sdiction over

ed by the Sec

d declaratory

no exclusive

emphasis in o

to 15 U.S.C. 

to confirm th

party may fi

a copy. See 

__________

RYU 

Magistrate J

seeking 

rds is not an

WL 

court 

duty created 

Indus. 

D. Cal. Nov

8aa] for all

r Plaintiff’s 

curities 

y relief. 

e federal 

original). 

§ 78aa. 

he arbitration

le objections

28 U.S.C. §

____ 

Judge 

n

. 

 

n

s

Case 4:15-mc-80055-PJH Document 10 Filed 05/18/15 Page 10 of 10