Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-05129/USCOURTS-ca10-94-05129-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Johnny Eugene Glover
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

FILEDrA ~~·~ United States Court o PP ..... -' 

Tenth Circuit 

APR 0 3 1995 

PATRICK FISilEU 

Cler:< 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. No. 94-5129 

JOHNNY EUGENE GLOVER, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. 94-CR-4-B} 

Thomas Scott Woodard (Stephen C. Lewis, United States Attorney, 

with him on the brief), Assistant United States Attorney, Tulsa, 

Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Stanley D. Monroe, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before BRORBY and EBEL, Circuit Judges, and BRATTON,* District 

Judge. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

* The Honorable Howard C. Bratton, Senior United States District 

Court Judge for the District of New Mexico, sitting by 

designation. 

Appellate Case: 94-5129 Document: 01019283034 Date Filed: 04/03/1995 Page: 1 
Mr. Glover pled guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 1623, False 

Declarations Before the Court, and now appeals his sentence. 

Specifically, Mr. Glover pled guilty to making two irreconcilable 

sworn statements on two different occasions. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1623 (c). One statement was testimony given in court during his 

brother's criminal trial; the other was a sworn affidavit given to 

help his brother get a new trial. Mr. Glover appeals his sentence 

claiming (1) the district court erred by applying a crossreference provision in the sentencing guidelines which directed 

the court to sentence Mr. Glover as an accessory after the fact, 

(2) the district court erred in using the entire quantity of 

methamphetamine from the underlying offense in calculating Mr. 

Glover's base offense level, and (3) the district court erred in 

calculating Mr. Glover's criminal history. We find no error in 

the sentencing; therefore, we affirm Mr. Glover's sentence. 

BACKGROUND 

Mr. Glover was serving time in prison when he was indicted on 

a charge of Continuing Criminal Enterprise. Mr. Glover agreed to 

enter a plea of guilty to the charge and to testify against his 

brother, Roy Glover, in exchange 

Glover testified, during his 

operated a methamphetamine 

for a reduced sentence. Mr. 

brother's trial, that his brother 

laboratory and delivered 

methamphetamine to another coconspirator. The brother was 

subsequently convicted of conspiracy to manufacture, possess, and 

distribute methamphetamine. 

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Later, when the brother moved for a new trial, Mr. Glover 

executed an affidavit under oath stating his brother was never 

physically present at the site of the methamphetamine laboratory, 

his brother never participated in the operation of the laboratory, 

and his brother never received any of the proceeds from the sale 

of the methamphetamine. The affidavit stated Mr. Glover's trial 

testimony to the contrary was false. As a result of this 

affidavit and his trial testimony, Mr. Glover was indicted on five 

counts of making irreconcilably contradictory sworn declarations 

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623(c). 

Mr. Glover pled guilty to violating § 1623, and the 

prosecution dropped the remaining four counts. Using U.S.S.G. 

§2J1.31 and §2X3.1,2 the sentencing court calculated Mr. Glover's 

base offense level to be 30.3 The court granted a three point 

reduction for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to guideline 

§3E1.1(b) (2) (Acceptance of Responsibility) but increased Mr. 

Glover's criminal history to a category of III pursuant to 

§§4A1.1(d)4 and (e) .5 These calculations resulted in a sentence 

1 "Perjury or Subornation of Perjury; Bribery of Witness .... If 

the offense involved perjury ... , apply §2X3.1 (Accessory After 

the Fact)." U.S.S.G. §2J1.3 (c) (1). 

2 "Accessory After the Fact (a) Base Offense Level: 6 levels 

lower than the offense level for the underlying offense, but in no 

event less than 4, or more than 30." U.S.S.G. §2X3.1. 

3 The court sentenced Mr. Glover in May of 1994. 

4 "Criminal History Category .... Add 2 points if the defendant 

committed the instant offense while under any criminal justice 

sentence, including ... imprisonment." U.S.S.G. §4A1.1(d). 

5 "Criminal History Category Add 2 points if the defendant 

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of sixty months incarceration, three years supervised release, a 

fine of $2,000, and a special assessment of $50. Section 

§ 1623(a) restricts the maximum sentence for violating 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1623 to a fine of "not more than $10,000 or imprisonment not 

more than five years, or both." Mr. Glover thus received the 

maximum length of imprisonment allowed under the statute. 

I. 

We review a sentencing court's interpretation of law de novo 

and its factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard. 

United States v. Lowder, 5 F.3d 467, 470 (lOth Cir. 1993). We 

must accept the plain meaning of the language of the guidelines as 

we would in interpreting a statute. United States v. Agbai, 930 

F.2d 1447, 1449 (lOth Cir. 1991). 

Mr. Glover claims the district court erred in calculating his 

sentence in accordance with the method prescribed in §2X3.1, 

"Accessory After the Fact," because he was not convicted of being 

an accessory after the fact. Section 2Jl.3 provides: 

Perjury or Subornation of Perjury; Bribery of Witness 

(a) Base Offense Level: 12 

(c) Cross Reference 

(1) If the offense involved perjury, subornation 

of perjury, or witness bribery in respect to a 

criminal offense, apply §2X3.1 (Accessory 

committed the instant offense ... while in imprisonment .... If 2 

points are added for item (d), add only 1 point for this item." 

U.S.S.G. §4Al.l(e). 

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Appellate Case: 94-5129 Document: 01019283034 Date Filed: 04/03/1995 Page: 4 
After the Fact) in respect to that criminal 

offense, if the resulting offense level is 

greater than that determined above. 

Section 2X3.1 states: 

AccessokY After the Fact 

(a) Base Offense Level: 

offense level for the 

event less than 4, or 

where the conduct 

fugitive, the offense 

level 20. 

Application Notes: 

6 levels lower than the 

underlying offense, but in no 

more than 30. Provided, that 

is limited to harboring a 

level shall not be more than 

1. "Underlying offense" means the offense as to which 

the defendant is convicted of being an accessory. 

Apply the base offense level plus any applicable 

specific offense characteristics that were known, 

or reasonably should have been known, by the 

defendant; see Application Note 10 of the 

Commentary to §1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct). 

As the plain language of §2J1.3 indicates, a defendant 

charged with perjury is to be sentenced according to the method 

set forth in §2X3.1 (Accessory After the Fact). Guideline §2J1.3 

requires the base level offense to be calculated under §2X3.1 if 

(1) perjury was part of the violation, (2) the underlying offense 

was a criminal offense, and (3) the resulting offense level would 

be greater than the offense level calculated by §2J1.3 alone. 

U.S.S.G. §2J1.3(c). The sentencing court found these conditions 

were met. Therefore, the court correctly sentenced Mr. Glover 

using §2X3.1 even though Mr. Glover may not have been an accessory 

after the fact. This reading of the Guidelines is consistent with 

the application of the §2J1.3 cross-reference by some of our 

sister circuits. See United States v. Gay, ___ F.3d I 1994 WL 

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724006 (2d Cir. 1994); United States Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384, 1402 

(3d. Cir. 1994) (in dicta, the court notes an identical crossreference from §2Jl.2(c) to §2X3.1 applies even though the 

declarant was obstructing investigations into his own unlawful 

activities) . 

Mr. Glover claims §2X3.1 can only be used if the declarant is 

an accessory after the fact because the application notes of 

§2X3.1 define "underlying offense" as the offense "as to which the 

defendant is convicted of being an accessory." U.S.S.G. §2X3.1 

comment. (n.l). Since he was not convicted of being an accessory, 

Mr. Glover maintains there is no underlying offense. However, the 

application notes of §2X3.1 relate to the substantive crime of 

accessory after the fact. The application notes are not relevant 

in this case because §2X3.1 is being used simply as a formula for 

the perjury offense. 

Regardless of the plain language of the statute, Mr. Glover 

persists in his argument by relying on cases in which the crossreference from §2Jl.3 to §2X3.1 did not apply. The Fourth and 

Eleventh Circuits have carved out an instance where the crossreference is inappropriate. See United States v. Pierson, 946 

F.2d 1044 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v. Huppert, 917 F.2d 507 

(11th Cir. 1990) .6 The Pierson and Huppert opinions hold that the 

6 Huppert dealt with the cross-reference from §2Jl.2(c), 

"Obstruction of Justice," to §2X3.1 (Accessory After the Fact). 

The commentary to the perjury section suggests that the perjury 

section should be interpreted like the obstruction of justice 

section. U.S.S.G. §2J1.3, Background Commentary. Therefore, the 

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cross-reference to §2X3.1 cannot be invoked when the perjury was 

committed for the purpose of helping the declarant as opposed to 

assisting a third party. Pierson, 946 F.2d at 1047-49; Huppert, 

917 F.2d at 510. These courts implicitly required the declarant 

to actually be an accessory after the fact in order to apply the 

calculation of §2X3.1. Although the Sixth Circuit had used the 

cross-reference when a declarant benefitted himself by perjury, 

see United States v. Gomez-Vigil, 929 F.2d 254 (6th Cir. 1991), it 

too has stated the issue to be determined before applying the 

cross-reference to §2X3.1 is "whether the defendant was an 

accessory after the fact to the [underlying offense]," United 

States v. Colbert, 977 F.2d 203, 208 (6th Cir. 1992). 

We are unpersuaded 

Eleventh Circuits. None 

by 

of 

the cases of the Fourth, Sixth, and 

these cases analyzes the plain 

language of the Guideline provisions, which we find dispositive. 

Rather, each seems to be influenced by the heading of § 2X3.1, 

"Accessory After the Fact." The sentencing guidelines must be 

interpreted as though they were a statute, see United States v. 

Smith, 900 F.2d 1442, 1446 (lOth Cir. 1990), and under the general 

rules of statutory interpretation, the title to a statutory 

provision is not part of the law itself, although it can be used 

to interpret an ambiguous statute. See Oklahoma v. United States 

Civil Serv. Comm'n, 153 F.2d 280, 283 (lOth Cir. 1946), aff'd, 330 

U.S. 127 (1947). Because we conclude §2Jl.3 and §2X3.1 are 

unambiguous as applied to this case, reliance on the title is 

Huppert decision is relevant. 

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unnecessary and inappropriate. Moreover, because the sentencing 

guidelines do not address the significance of section titles as it 

does the significance of commentary, see U.S.S.G. §1B1.7, we see 

no reason to stray from the general rules of statutory 

interpretation. 

The Huppert and Pierson courts were also influenced by the 

background commentary to §2J1.2, "Obstruction of Justice": 

The specific offense characteristics reflect the 

more serious forms of obstruction. Because the conduct 

covered by the guideline is frequently part of an effort 

to assist another person to escape punishment for a 

crime he has committed, an alternative reference to the 

guideline for accessory after the fact is made. 

U.S.S.G. §2J1.2, comment. (backg' d) (1990). However, this 

commentary was amended in 1991. U.S.S.G. App. C §401 at 289-90. 

The Sentencing Commission deleted the phrase "assist another 

person to escape punishment for a crime he has committed, an 

alternative reference to the guideline for accessory after the 

fact is made." In its place, the Commission inserted: 

avoid punishment for an offense that the defendant has 

committed or to assist another person to escape 

punishment for an offense, a cross reference to §2X3.1 

(Accessory After the Fact) is provided. Use of this 

cross reference will provide an enhanced offense level 

when the obstruction is in respect to a particularly 

serious offense, whether such offense was committed by 

the defendant or another person 

Id. (emphasis added) . It is clear from the commentary in effect 

at the time of Mr. Glover's sentencing that the sentencing court 

did not err in applying the cross-reference.? 

7 In fact, these changes to the commentary have caused the Fourth 

Circuit to question its holding in Pierson. See United States v. 

Jamison, 99"6 F.2d 698, 701 n.3 (4th Cir. 1993). 

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II 

Mr. Glover argues that even if the court properly used the 

cross-reference to §2X3.1 (Accessory After the Fact), it erred in 

calculating his base offense level by using the quantity of 

methamphetamine associated with his brother's conviction. Mr. 

Glover asserts the sentence must be limited to the drug quantities 

about which he testified during his brother's trial. 

Mr. Glover's testimony at his brother's trial related to six 

pounds of methamphetamine. Using six pounds of methamphetamine 

would result in a base offense level of 12 (equivalency of 2.6 

kilograms of marijuana), minus 6 levels as proscribed in §2X3.1, 

thus ending with a base offense level of 6. However, his brother 

was convicted of crimes involving 17.69 kilograms of 

methamphetamine. This amount established a base offense level of 

36. U.S.S.G. §2D1.1(c) (2). Therefore, the base level offense for 

Mr. Glover, pursuant to §2X3.1, was 30, rather than 6. 

Mr. Glover cites no law in arguing the sentencing court erred 

in using the full amount of methamphetamine from the underlying 

offense. He simply argues that for a fair and consistent 

application of the cross-reference, the base offense level should 

stem from his testimony. He claims the dangers of the sentencing 

court's interpretation of the Guidelines would be revealed if the 

third party were acquitted of the underlying offense. If this 

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happened, Mr. Glover asserts, §2X3.1 would have no application 

because there would be no underlying offense. However, neither 

§2J1.3 nor §2X3.1 require the third party be convicted of the 

underlying offense. 

Mr. Glover's irreconcilable statements were not limited to 

six pounds of methamphetamine. His affidavit broadly claimed his 

brother did not participate in the operation of the 

methamphetamine laboratory and received no profits from the sale 

of the drugs. Because Mr. Glover's statements relate to his 

brother's entire underlying offense and are not purely limited to 

six pounds of methamphetamine, we need not decide whether the 

content of a perjurer's statement can limit the sentence imposed 

under §2X3.1. We find no support in the Guidelines to limit the 

sentencing calculations in Mr. Glover's case to the quantity of 

drugs attributed only to the amount in his trial testimony. 

Therefore, the sentencing court was correct in using the entire 

underlying offense to calculate Mr. Glover's base offense level. 

III 

Mr. Glover's final issue on appeal is whether the sentencing 

court properly calculated his criminal history category. The 

court increased his criminal history by three points because he 

committed the present offenses while serving a sentence for the 

charge of Continuing Criminal Enterprise (case No. 91-CR-050-001-

C). See U.S.S.G. §4A1.1(d) and (e). Mr. Glover contends this was 

an error because his crime of making irreconcilable sworn 

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statements began before he was sentenced on his guilty plea to 

Continuing Criminal Enterprise. 

It is undisputed that Mr. Glover executed the affidavit for 

his brother while he was serving this sentence. It was the 

affidavit that completed Mr. Glover's crime of perjury. If he had 

not given the affidavit, then he would not have violated§ 1623(c) 

by making, under oath, "irreconcilably contradictory declarations 

material to the point in question in any proceeding before or 

ancillary to any court." 18 U.S.C. § 1623(c). Thus, Mr. Glover 

committed the crime while serving his sentence for case No. 91-CR050-001-C. 

Mr. Glover also argues the increase was improper because the 

prior conviction used to increase his criminal history was vacated 

by reason of double jeopardy implications. However, it was not 

the conviction for case No. 91-CR-050-001-C that was vacated. It 

was an earlier conviction, case No. 89-CR-056-001-E, that was 

vacated because that offense was deemed to be included in the 

conviction for case No. 91-CR-050-001-C. The sentencing court did 

not give Mr. Glover any criminal history points for case No. 89-

CR-056-001-E. Therefore, Mr. Glover's argument is without merit. 

CONCLUSION 

Section 2J1.3 directs the sentencing court to use §2X3.1 

(Accessory After the Fact) to calculate the base offense level if 

perjury was committed "in respect to a criminal offense" and 

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results in a higher offense level. The sentencing court found 

these conditions were met and, therefore, correctly applied the 

cross-reference to §2X3.1 (Accessory After the Fact). Also, we 

find no error in the court's calculations of the base offense 

level and the criminal history category. Accordingly, we AFFIRM 

Mr. Glover's sentence. 

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