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Parties Involved:
Willie J. Murry
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES COURT OF 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

-vsWILLIE J. MURRY, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appellee. 

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No. 90-1014 

(D.C. No. 89-CR-275) 

(D. Colo.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

William R. Lucero, Assistant U.S. Attorney (Michael J. Norton, U. 

s. Attorney, with him on the brief), Denver, Colorado, for 

Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Charles Szekely, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Michael G. 

Katz, Federal Public Defender, with him on the brief), Denver, 

Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before LOGAN, Circuit Judge, EBEL, Circuit Judge, and RUSSELL, 

District Judge.** 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

** Honorable David L. Russell, United States District Judge for 

the Northern, Eastern and Western Districts of Oklahoma, sitting 

by designation. 

Appellate Case: 90-1014 Document: 010110047828 Date Filed: 11/07/1990 Page: 1 
The sole issue raised by this appeal is whether a 

variance between the facts proved at trial and those alleged in the 

indictment warranted a judgment of acquittal. 

After the government dismissed three counts of the 

indictment by which Defendant Willie J. Murry was charged and the 

defendant waived his right to a jury trial, the defendant stood for 

trial before the court on a single-count indictment which in 

material part charged as follows: 

On or about July 14, 1989, at the Mile 

High Kennel Club, State and District of 

Colorado, willie J. Murry, a resident of 

Colorado, willfully made and subscribed an 

Internal Revenue Service Form 5754, Statement 

of Persons Receiving Gambling Winnings, the 

statements required by 26 United States Code, 

Section 3402 (q) (6), which contained and was 

verified by a written declaration that it was 

made under the penalties of perjury, which he 

did not believe to be true and correct as to 

every material matter, in that said Form 5754 

stated that the person to whom the winnings 

are paid was Willie J. Murry, 1084 Clarkson, 

#103B, Denver, Colorado, and was signed by 

Willie J. Murry, when he then knew that such 

information was false in that the true person 

to whom the winnings were paid was Jerald H. 

Parker of Denver, Colorado, all in violation 

of Title 26, United States Code, Section 

7206(1). 

Evidence adduced at trial showed that the race track 

winnings were in fact paid to Willie J. Murry, a resident at the 

address alleged in the indictment. Internal Revenue Service Agent 

Arthur Mendez, although somewhat equivocal, testified that he 

believed the inaccuracy in the IRS Form 5754 in question was not 

in Part 1, concerning to whom the winnings were paid, but was in 

the omission in Part 2 of the name of the person to whom the 

2 

Appellate Case: 90-1014 Document: 010110047828 Date Filed: 11/07/1990 Page: 2 
winning payments are taxable, Jerald H. Parker. 1 The race track 

accountant, Kimberly Valeske, also testified that Part 1 of Form 

5754 had been correctly filled out but that the defendant should 

have indicated in Part 2 of the form that Parker was the person to 

whom the winnings were taxable and included therein Parker's social 

security number, address and the full amount of the winnings. 2 

At the close of the government's case in chief, defendant 

moved for a judgment of acquittal on the ground that there was a 

variance between what was pleaded and what was proved. The 

district court denied the motion, stating that "there's no 

significant variance"; that any error was harmless; and that [Part 

1 of] the form should not be read literally to mean the person 

standing at the window to whom currency is physically transferred. 

R. Vol. II at 48-49. Following denial of the motion, defendant was 

convicted of the offense charged. 

In oral argument before this court, the government 

admitted that there was a variance between the proof adduced at 

1

Agent Mendez testified in part as follows: 

Q: Doesn't it indicate that if he, the person receiving the 

money, is not the winner, he has to list who the winner 

is on Section 2 of this form? 

A: That's correct. 

Q: All right. So the inaccuracy in this form isn't in Part 

1, its in the fact that it was omitted, Part 2 was 

omitted, the true winner was omitted? 

A: I believe so. I'm not sure, to be quite honest. 

R. Vol II at pp. 42-3. 

2

The only witnesses called by the government were Agent 

Mendez, Kimberly Valeske and Jerald H. Parker. 

3 

Appellate Case: 90-1014 Document: 010110047828 Date Filed: 11/07/1990 Page: 3 
trial and the facts alleged in the indictment. 3 The court agrees 

that there was such a variance. The question thus remaining on 

appeal, which was the focus of the government's appellate brief and 

the parties' oral arguments, is whether the admitted variance 

constituted a fatal variance. This is a question of law which we 

review de novo. United States v. Cardall, 885 F.2d 656, 670 (10th 

Cir. 1989). 

Whether a variance is fatal depends on whether the 

variance in proof adversely affects the substantial rights of the 

accused. See United States v. Cardall, 885 F.2d at 670; United 

States v. Pinto, 838 F.2d 426, 433 (10th Cir. 1988). Prejudice to 

the accused resulting from the variance is the hallmark of a fatal 

variance. See id. This occurs when the accused could not have 

anticipated from the indictment what evidence would be presented 

at trial, United States v. Rinke, 778 F.2d 581, 590 (10th Cir. 

1985); United States v. Morris, 623 F.2d 145, 149 (10th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 449 u.s. 1065, 101 s.ct. 793, 66 L.Ed.2d 609 (1980); 

when a conviction based upon the indictment would not bar a 

subsequent prosecution for the same offense, United States v. 

Cardall, 885 F.2d at 670; United States v. Rinke, 778 F.2d at 590; 

United States v. Morris, 623 F.2d at 149; or when there is a strong 

3

The case of United States v. Snyder, 549 F.2d 171 (10th Cir. 

1977), on which the government relied in its brief, is inapposite 

because of critical differences between IRS Form 1099 and IRS Form 

5754, as demonstrated by the testimony of the government's own 

witnesses in this case. In any event, the government's concession 

that there was a variance between the facts proved at trial and 

those alleged in the indictment makes any consideration of Snyder 

unnecessary. 

4 

Appellate Case: 90-1014 Document: 010110047828 Date Filed: 11/07/1990 Page: 4 
likelihood of transference of guilt to the accused as a result of 

the presentation of evidence relating to conduct of a co-defendant 

in which the accused did not participate. United States v. 

Cardall, 885 F.2d at 670; United States v. Pinto, 838 F.2d at 433; 

United States v. Morris, 623 F.2d at 149. 

Defendant has not identified any prejudice resulting to 

him from the variance. In oral argument, it was conceded that the 

defendant was not misled by the indictment or unfairly surprised 

by the evidence adduced at trial inasmuch as he "knew the facts" 

which formed the basis for the conviction. Since defendant was not 

tried with any co-defendants, prejudice from "transferred guilt" 

was not possible. We are left with the question of whether the 

variance was such that a conviction based upon the indictment would 

protect defendant from double jeopardy, i.e., whether conviction 

of the offense charged would preclude prosecution of defendant for 

the same offense predicated on defendant's knowledge that the 

information contained in the form was false because it did not 

disclose that the person to whom the winnings were taxable was 

Jerald H. Parker. We hold that it would. When the collateral 

estoppel component of the Double Jeopardy Clause is invoked, a 

court's determination of whether a second prosecution is barred is 

not made on the basis of the indictment and judgment alone. See 

Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 444, 90 s.ct. 1189, __ , 25 L.Ed.2d 

469, 475 (1970) (prior judgment of acquittal based on a general 

verdict); United States v. Beachner Construction Co., 729 F.2d 

1278, 1281-1283 ( 10th Cir. 1984) (prior judgment of acquittal). 

5 

Appellate Case: 90-1014 Document: 010110047828 Date Filed: 11/07/1990 Page: 5 
Rather, a court must "examine the record of a prior proceeding, 

taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other 

relevant matter." Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. at 444, 90 s.ct. at 

__ , 25 L.Ed.2d at 475 (quoting D. Mayers & F. Yarborough, Bix 

Vexare: New Trials and Successive Prosecutions, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 

1, 38-9 (1960)). See also United States v. Beachner Construction 

Co., 729 F.2d at 1283. Applying this standard, Defendant would be 

protected from double jeopardy. A review of the record in this 

case would demonstrate that an indictment charging the defendant 

with making and subscribing IRS form 5754 on or about July 14, 1989 

which he did not believe to be true in that the form failed to 

disclose that Willie J. Murry was not the person to whom the 

winnings are taxable and that defendant then knew that such 

information was false in that the person to whom the winnings were 

taxable was Jerald H. Parker of Denver, Colorado, would charge 

defendant with the same offense of which he had been convicted in 

this case, in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, precluding 

proceedings thereon. Accordingly, the variance between the facts 

alleged in the indictment and those proved at trial has not 

resulted in defendant's loss of protection from double jeopardy. 

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the district 

court is AFFIRMED. 

6 

Entered for the Court 

David L. Russell 

District Judge 

Appellate Case: 90-1014 Document: 010110047828 Date Filed: 11/07/1990 Page: 6