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Parties Involved:
American Phoenix
Appellee
Demetrius Blankenship
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted February 24, 2020*

Decided February 26, 2020

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge

No. 19‐2255

DEMETRIUS BLANKENSHIP,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

AMERICAN PHOENIX, INC.

Defendant‐Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 17‐cv‐847‐jdp

James D. Peterson,

Chief Judge.

O R D E R

Demetrius Blankenship, an African American man, sued his former employer for

race discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

During discovery, the district court denied his motion to compel discovery and, a few

months later, entered summary judgment for the employer, concluding that

Blankenship had not introduced enough evidence to support his allegations. It then

denied Blankenship’s post‐judgment motions to vacate the decision and compel

* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not

significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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discovery. Blankenship appeals the entry of summary judgment and the denial of his

motions to compel. We agree with the district court’s reasoning and affirm.

About a year after Blankenship began working for American Phoenix, a rubber

manufacturer, he reported to human resources that a coworker had said “hey n****r”

and “hey black boy” when Blankenship passed him in the hall. The human resources

department obtained statements from Blankenship, the coworker, and two others who

were present (a peer and a supervisor). All agreed that the coworker used the n‐word

but disagreed about whether he directed it toward Blankenship (though Blankenship

was the only African American in the vicinity). Regardless, the company issued a

warning to the coworker who used the derogatory language, made the warning part of

his personnel file, and admonished him that any future incident may subject him to

further discipline, including suspension or discharge. The coworker had no more

complaints filed against him after the warning.

Four months later, Blankenship’s department implemented a change in its

punctuality standards. Blankenship attended a training session about the company’s

employee handbook and the new policy, which would no longer allow workers a

“grace period” for tardiness (clocking in even one minute late would count as tardy).

Under the company’s attendance policy, an employee receives a half‐point for

unexcused tardiness and one point for an unexcused absence or for leaving work early

without permission. The company issues written warnings when an employee has

accrued four, five, and six points. At seven points, it imposes a one‐day, unpaid

suspension. At eight, the employee is fired. Each attendance point expires after

12 months.   

More than a year after the company tightened its punctuality standards, in

August 2016, Blankenship received his eighth attendance point in a single 12‐month

period. Among other violations, on ten occasions during that year he had incurred a

half‐point for being less than five minutes late. American Phoenix issued written

warnings to Blankenship when he received his fourth, fifth, and sixth attendance points.

The company advised Blankenship that additional warnings would subject him to

further disciplinary action including suspension and discharge. When Blankenship

received his seventh attendance point, the company suspended him for a day without

pay. Three days later, he received his eighth point, and after conducting a termination

hearing, American Phoenix fired Blankenship. Among others, the director of human

resources (who had received Blankenship’s complaint about the racial slur) and the

supervisor of Blankenship’s department (who had overheard and submitted a report

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about the racial slur) were present at the hearing. Blankenship did not contest the

accuracy of his total points at any time.

Blankenship sued American Phoenix for race discrimination and retaliation

under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e‐2, 2000e‐3. As relevant to this appeal, he alleged that

the company fired him because he is African American and because he complained

about race discrimination. After screening the complaint, the district court provided a

scheduling order which included information about how to make discovery requests

and file a motion to compel discovery. At one point, Blankenship moved to compel

discovery responses, FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a), and American Phoenix answered the

outstanding requests three days later. Blankenship argued in a reply brief that the

responses were “irrelevant, non‐responsive, and totally opposite to the documentation

requested.” When the court denied the motion to compel, it explained to Blankenship

that he could not raise a “vague objection” to the discovery responses in his reply brief

and clarified how he could support another motion to compel discovery. Blankenship

did not move to compel again or move for sanctions.   

Eventually, American Phoenix filed a motion for summary judgment, which the

district court granted, concluding that Blankenship offered no evidence that the

company’s stated reason for firing him—his attendance—was not genuine. Within

28 days, Blankenship filed a “motion to vacate,” and another motion to compel

discovery. He insisted that he could not offer evidence only because American Phoenix

withheld information and the court had wrongly denied his original motion to compel.

The court denied both motions, and Blankenship appeals both the entry of summary

judgment and the denial of his motions to compel.

To avoid summary judgment on his discrimination claim, Blankenship needed to

submit evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that American Phoenix

fired him because of his race. Ortiz v. Werner Enter. Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 764 (7th Cir. 2016).

With respect to retaliation, Blankenship required evidence that his complaints of racial

discrimination were the but‐for cause of his firing. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar,

570 U.S. 338, 362 (2013); see Abrego v. Wilkie, 907 F.3d 1004, 1014 (7th Cir. 2018). We

review de novo. Abrego, 907 F.3d at 1011.

Blankenship argues first that the court improperly construed facts in the

defendant’s favor when it stated that the coworker who used a racial epithet did not

direct it at Blankenship. He maintains that the slur was directed at him and that the

company’s response to it reveals its tolerance for racist behaviors and its general

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discriminatory intent. But this question is not material to whether American Phoenix

had a discriminatory motive for terminating Blankenship more than a year after the

comment. A stray comment might be material in determining unlawful animus,

depending on the timing and context of the remark and the identity of the speaker.

See Bagwe v. Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 811 F.3d 866, 885 (7th Cir. 2016). Here,

the reprehensible slur was used by a coworker, not anyone who had a role in firing

Blankenship. Id. Moreover, American Phoenix furnished evidence that, when

Blankenship complained, it promptly investigated and then issued a formal disciplinary

warning to the coworker, condemning the use of the slur and admonishing that future

incidents could result in termination. Therefore, even if we assume that the coworker

had directed the slur at Blankenship, the remark does not create a genuine issue of

material fact about whether Blankenship was fired because of his race. To the extent

that Blankenship implies that the racial slur shows that American Phoenix fostered a

hostile work environment, we will not consider arguments not raised before the district

court. Grant v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 569 (7th Cir. 2017).

Blankenship also contends that American Phoenix’s reason for firing him—his

attendance—was pretext for discrimination and retaliation. When, as here, an employer

presents a non‐discriminatory or non‐retaliatory reason for the adverse employment

action, a plaintiff can still raise a genuine factual dispute with evidence that the

proffered reason is a smokescreen for an unlawful motive. Harden v. Marion Cty. Sheriff’s

Dep’t, 799 F.3d 857, 863–64 (7th Cir. 2015). American Phoenix came forth with ample

evidence that it fired Blankenship under a neutral, department‐wide policy of which he

was aware and under which he had been warned. Blankenship presents no evidence

that this reason is false. In particular, no evidence supports his assertion that the policy

was selectively enforced within his department. See Baker v. Macon Res., Inc., 750 F.3d

674, 677 (7th Cir. 2014). Nor does any support his contention that his attendance points

were miscalculated. (At his deposition, Blankenship admitted that there was no error in

the calculations). In any event, a mistake does not amount to pretext. See Harden,

799 F.3d at 864. And, despite Blankenship’s suggestion to the contrary, there is no

evidence that the company revised the department‐wide punctuality standards as a

way to trump up a reason to fire Blankenship. In short, Blankenship did not provide

any evidence from which a jury could conclude that either his race or his prior

complaints of discrimination was the real reason he was fired.   

Lastly, Blankenship challenges the district court’s denial of his motions to compel

discovery because, he says, American Phoenix delayed discovery with phony

settlement overtures and then withheld information that prevented him from

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presenting evidence at summary judgment. We review for an abuse of discretion and

reverse only if the denial caused actual and substantial prejudice. Gonzalez v. City of

Milwaukee, 791 F.3d 709, 713 (7th Cir. 2015). We see no abuse of discretion here. The

court denied the initial motion to compel after American Phoenix responded to the

discovery requests that Blankenship had attached to his motion. And, addressing the

complaints in Blankenship’s reply brief, the court explained that any noncompliance

had to be addressed with another motion identifying, among other things, the specific

information he required. Despite these instructions, Blankenship did not file another

motion to compel during the discovery period nor, after American Phoenix moved for

summary judgment, did he ask for additional discovery before responding to the

motion. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(d); First Nat’l Bank and Tr. Corp. v. Am. Eurocopter Corp.,

378 F.3d 682, 694 (7th Cir. 2004). Therefore, if Blankenship was prejudiced by any

missing discovery, the prejudice resulted from his delay in following up. See Packman v.

Chicago Tribune Co., 267 F.3d 628, 647 (7th Cir. 2001). Further, after the district court

ruled on the summary judgment motion, it was too late to reopen discovery, so the

court appropriately denied the second motion to compel.

Accordingly, the judgment is AFFIRMED.   

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