Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05799/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05799-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Edward Overstreet
Petitioner
James A. Yates
Respondent

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U.S . District Court

 E. D . California 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDWARD OVERSTREET, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

)

v. )

)

)

JAMES A. YATES, )

)

Respondent. )

____________________________________)

1:04-cv-05799-REC-TAG HC

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO DENY PETITIONER’S MOTION

FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF (Doc. 20)

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 6, 2005, Petitioner filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Order to Person Having Custody of

Petitioner to Retain Custody of Prisoner. (Doc. 20). Petitioner moves the Court to order Respondent

not to transfer him to another prison. In his motion, Petitioner contends that although he is currently

incarcerated at Pleasant Valley State Prison (“PVSP”), he has been “reviewed for transfer to another

prison,” is currently availing himself of “inmate assistance” within PVSP, that the proposed transfer

is for “non-adverse” reasons, and that a transfer will “cause Petitioner undue hardship with

maintaining active court proceedings.” (Doc. 20, pp. 2-3). Petitioner asks the Court to intervene by

issuing an order “detaining/retaining him” at PVSP pending habeas corpus review by this Court. 

(Doc. 20, p. 3).

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U.S . District Court

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In support of his motion, Petitioner attaches a declaration from Douglas Langill, also an

inmate at PVSP, who states that he is the individual providing legal “advice” to Petitioner regarding

this case and that he will continue to do so as long as Petitioner is confined at that institution. (Doc.

20, p. 4). 

DISCUSSION

Petitioner moves the Court to order Respondent not to transfer him to another prison,

pursuant to Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. However, Rule 23(a) applies

only to prisoner transfers pending review of federal habeas corpus decisions. The Court construes

Petitioner’s motion as a request for injunctive relief. The relief requested by Petitioner relates to the

conditions of Petitioner’s confinement, not to the fact or duration of his incarceration, thus this Court

lacks jurisdiction to grant his request. 

A. Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure Applies Only To Transfers 

Pending Appellate Review. 

Petitioner seeks relief “in accordance to local rules, and Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure

23(a) Transfer of Custody Pending Review.” (Court Doc. 20, p. 2). Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules

of Appellate Procedure provides:

Rule 23. Custody or Release of a Prisoner in a Habeas Corpus Proceeding

(a) Transfer of Custody Pending Review. Pending review of a decision in a habeas

corpus proceeding commenced before a court, justice, or judge of the United States

for the release of a prisoner, the person having custody of the prisoner must not transfer

custody to another unless the transfer is directed in accordance with this rule. When,

upon application, a custodian shows a need for a transfer, the court, justice or judge

rendering the decision under review may authorize the transfer and substitute the

successor custodian as a party.

Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure applies to the transfer of custody of

prisoners “[p]ending review of a decision in a habeas corpus proceeding.” Rule 23(a) applies only to

prisoner transfers in habeas cases in which decisions have already been entered and where review of

those decisions are pending. No decision has been entered in this case. Indeed, the case is currently

being held in abeyance pending Petitioner’s exhaustion of certain issues in state court. Since Rule

23(a) applies only to habeas corpus decisions that are on appeal, the Court has no power to issue an

injunction pursuant to Rule 23(a) and, therefore, Petitioner’s request for relief must be denied. 

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B. The Requirements For Injunctive Relief Have Not Been Satisfied.

The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo if the balance of equities

so heavily favors the moving party that justice requires the Court to intervene to secure the positions

until the merits of the action are ultimately determined. University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S.

390, 395 (1981). The general legal principles applicable to a request for preliminary injunctive

relief are well established. To prevail, the moving party must show either (1) a combination of

probable success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury, or (2) the existence of serious

questions going to the merits, the balance of hardships tipping sharply in the moving party's favor,

and at least a fair chance of success on the merits. Owner Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n., Inc. v.

Swift Transp. Co., Inc., 367 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2004). These two formulations represent two

points on a sliding scale, on which the required degree of irreparable injury increases as the

probability of success decreases. Id.; Oakland Tribune,Inc. v. Chronicle Publishing Company, Inc.,

762 F.2d 1374, 1376 (9th Cir. 1985). "Under any formulation of the test, plaintiff must demonstrate

that there exists a significant threat of irreparable injury." Oakland Tribune, Inc., 762 F.2d at 1376. 

In the absence of a significant showing of irreparability, the court need not reach the issue of

likelihood of success on the merits. Id. Here, Petitioner has failed to show irreparable harm.

Although Petitioner contends that his ability to represent himself in this case will be

prejudiced by a transfer to another penal institution, his generalized allegation, without more, fails to

demonstrate actual injury, as required by Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996). First, Petitioner’s

concerns are, at present, purely hypothetical. Although Petitioner has been “reviewed” for transfer,

no transfer has taken place, nor has one been ordered. From the present record, the Court cannot

determine whether a transfer is probable. Accordingly, the harm Petitioner alleges is speculative and

contingent at the present time.

Moreover, although Petitioner has been able to locate an inmate at his current prison to assist

him in this case, Petitioner has not established that this individual is the only inmate within the

California Department of Corrections capable of rendering him assistance or that Petitioner will be

unable to obtain similar, and perhaps even better, assistance at other institutions, should a transfer

take place. 

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Thus, because Petitioner has not made an adequate showing that he has suffered or is in

imminent danger of suffering irreparable injury, the Court must recommend that injunctive relief be

denied. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 762 F.2d at 1376. 

C. The Court Lacks Habeas Jurisdiction To Consider Conditions of Confinement.

Additionally, the Court lacks jurisdiction, within the framework of a habeas corpus

proceeding, to grant the relief Petitioner requests. A federal court is a court of limited jurisdiction. 

As a threshold and preliminary matter, the Court must have before it for consideration a “case” or

“controversy.” Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 (1968). Absent such a case or controversy, the

Court has no power to hear the matter. Rivera v. Freeman, 469 F.2d 1159, 1162-1163 (9th Cir.

1972). 

The Court’s habeas jurisdiction was invoked and is delimited by the amended habeas corpus

petition challenging Petitioner’s 2002 conviction for a violation of California Penal Code § 288.5

(sexual assault on a child), and his subsequent twelve-year prison sentence. (Doc. 15, p. 2). Thus,

the “case” or “controversy” over which this Court now has habeas jurisdiction is framed by the

allegations in the amended petition. None of those claims, however, relates in any fashion to the

location of Petitioner’s incarceration within the California Department of Corrections. Since the

amended petition does not contain allegations raising issues similar to those presented in Petitioner’s

motion, there is no controversy present with respect to the issues in Petitioner’s motion to which the

Court’s habeas jurisdiction would extend, nor would the issuance of the order sought by Petitioner in

his motion provide relief as to any of the claims contained in his amended petition. Accordingly, the

Court lacks jurisdiction to issue such an order. 

Petitioner’s objections are conditions of confinement claims more properly raised under

42 U.S.C. § 1983. A habeas corpus action is the proper mechanism for a prisoner to challenge the

fact or duration of his confinement. Badea v. Cox, 931 F.2d 573, 574 (9th Cir. 1991); Tucker v.

Carlson, 925 F.2d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1991); Crawford v. Bell, 599 F.2d 890, 891-892 (9th Cir.

1979); Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 1 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. In

contrast, a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, where the defendants are state actors, or

an action pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), where

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the defendants are federal actors, is the proper method for challenging the conditions of confinement. 

See McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 141-142 (1991); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499

(1973); Badea, 931 F.2d at 574; Tucker, 925 F.2d at 332.

By his motion, Petitioner seeks injunctive relief with respect to conditions of confinement

(i.e., location); the motion does not seek relief based on a challenge to the fact or duration of

confinement. Thus, the appropriate vehicle for such a claim is an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. 

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s ex-parte motion

for an order prohibiting transfer (Doc. 20), be DENIED. 

 This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the Senior United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty

(30) days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation, any party may file

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be

captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation." Replies to the

Objections shall be served and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three (3) days if served by mail)

after service of the Objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified

time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th

Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 12, 2005 /s/ Theresa A. Goldner 

j6eb3d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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