Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00375/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00375-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Sacramento
Defendant
Raymond M. Douglas
Plaintiff
Rath
Defendant
Sacramento Police Department
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

RAYMOND M. DOUGLAS, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CITY OF SACRAMENTO, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:16-cv-0375 MCE AC (PS) 

ORDER 

 Plaintiff is proceeding in this action pro se. This proceeding was referred to the 

undersigned by E.D. Cal. R. (“Local Rule”) 302(c)(21). This case is related to Douglas v. County 

of Sacramento, 2:16-cv-0415 (E.D. Cal.). ECF No. 7. 

 Plaintiff has requested authority pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 to proceed in forma 

pauperis (“IFP”). Plaintiff has submitted the affidavit required by Section 1915(a) showing that 

plaintiff is unable to prepay fees and costs or give security for them. ECF No. 2. Accordingly, 

the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 

I. SCREENING 

 Granting IFP status does end the court’s inquiry, however. The federal IFP statute 

requires federal courts to dismiss a case if the action is legally “frivolous or malicious,” fails to 

state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 

Case 2:16-cv-00375-MCE-AC Document 8 Filed 05/02/16 Page 1 of 7
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 Plaintiff must assist the court in making this determination by drafting their complaint so 

that it contains a “short and plain statement” of the basis for federal jurisdiction (that is, the 

reason the case is filed in this court, rather than in a state court), as well as a short and plain 

statement showing that plaintiffs are entitled to relief (that is, who harmed the plaintiffs, and in 

what way). Plaintiffs’ claims must be set forth simply, concisely and directly. See “Rule 8” of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Fed. R. Civ. P. 8). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

are available online at www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/current-rules-practice-procedure/federalrules-civil-procedure. Forms are also available to help pro se plaintiffs organize their complaint 

in the proper way. They are available at the Clerk’s Office, 501 I Street, 4th Floor, Sacramento, 

CA 95814, or online at www.uscourts.gov/forms/pro-se-forms. 

 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the 

court will (1) accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint, unless they 

are clearly baseless or fanciful, (2) construe those allegations in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff, and (3) resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; 

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at 

Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2010); Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 340 (9th Cir. 2010). 

 However, the court need not accept as true, legal conclusions cast in the form of factual 

allegations, or allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice. See Western 

Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981); Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 

266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir.), as amended, 275 F.3d 1187 (2001). 

 Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. 

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Pro se complaints are construed liberally and may 

only be dismissed if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support 

of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 908 (9th 

Cir. 2014). A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and an 

opportunity to amend, unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See 

Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987). 

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II. THE COMPLAINT 

 The following description assumes, for purposes of this screening only, the truth of the 

allegations of the complaint. On March 23, 2015, plaintiff had taken shelter “inside of boxes that 

protected him from cold, wind or other encounters” in “a courtyard of a hospital complex.” 

Complaint (ECF No. 1) ¶ 4. At or around 10:30 p.m., defendant Police Officer Rath, Badge # 

610, “viciously and violently” tore away the boxes protecting plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 4, 5. Rath then 

searched plaintiff and his belongings, and restrained plaintiff while a Sheriff’s Deputy arrested 

plaintiff, even though no reasonable suspicion or probable cause existed to do so. Id. ¶ 9. The 

complaint names the City of Sacramento and the Sacramento Police Department as additional 

defendants, but makes no allegations against them. The complaint names no other defendants. 

III. ANALYSIS 

 For screening purposes, the complaint states cognizable Section 1983 (42 U.S.C. § 1983) 

claims for relief against defendant Rath.1

 These claims are for (1) violating the Fourth 

Amendment of the U.S. Constitution by unreasonably searching and seizing plaintiff’s person and 

property,2 and (2) violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by (a) invading 

plaintiff’s security and privacy,3 and (b) seizing plaintiff’s property without due process.4

 However, the complaint fails to state a cognizable claim against the City of Sacramento or 

the Sacramento Police Department. These defendants cannot be held liable under Section 1983 

 

1

 The court notes that plaintiff admits that he has already signed a “Release of all Claims” related 

to this incident, and was paid $2,000 in settlement. Complaint ¶¶ 24-26. However, “[s]ettlement 

and release is an affirmative defense” that is subject to waiver by defendant. Lowery v. Channel 

Communications, Inc. (In re Cellular 101, Inc.), 539 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 8(c), which includes “release” in the list of affirmative defenses). As such, this 

admission does not mean that plaintiff has failed to state a claim, or that the claim is frivolous, for 

screening purposes. The court also notes that in the related case, plaintiff alleges that the Release 

was the result of “duress and undue influence.” See Douglas v. County of Sacramento, 2:16-cv0415, ECF No. 1 ¶ 4 (E.D. Cal. February 26, 2016).

2

 See Lavan v. City of Los Angeles, 693 F.3d 1022,1027-31 (9th Cir. 2012) (the Fourth 

Amendment protects the homeless against unreasonable seizure and destruction of their unabandoned property), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2855 (2013).

3

 See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977) (“[a]mong the historic liberties” protected 

by the Due Process Clause “was a right to be free from and to obtain judicial relief, for unjustified 

intrusions on personal security”). 

4

 See Lavan, 693 F.3d 1022 at 1031-33 (the Due Process clause protects the homeless against 

having their property taken without the due process of law). 

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based solely upon the conduct of Officer Rath, as that would be “vicarious liability.” See 

Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011)) (municipal defendants “are not vicariously liable 

under § 1983 for their employees’ actions”). Instead, these defendants can be held liable only for 

the harm caused by their own actions and policies. Id. (municipal defendants “are responsible 

only for their own illegal acts”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. 

of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Therefore, “to prevail on a Fourth Amendment 

§ 1983 claim against a municipal defendant or police department,” plaintiff must allege facts 

showing: 

(1) that he was “deprived of [his] constitutional rights by 

defendants and their employees acting under color of state law; 

(2) that the defendants have customs or policies which amount to 

deliberate indifference to ... constitutional rights; and (3) that these 

policies [were] the moving force behind the constitutional 

violations.” 

Gant v. County of Los Angeles, 772 F.3d 608, 617 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Lee v. City of Los 

Angeles, 250 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 2001)). 

 One way the “customs or policies” requirement can be satisfied is if plaintiff can 

truthfully allege facts showing that he was harmed by the municipal defendants’ custom or policy 

of conducting inadequate “training or supervision,” where that training or supervision “is 

sufficiently inadequate as to constitute ‘deliberate indifference’ to the righ[t]s of persons” with 

whom its deputies come into contact. Davis v. City of Ellensburg, 869 F.2d 1230, 1235 (9th 

Cir. 1989) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989)). The requirement can also be 

satisfied if plaintiff can truthfully allege facts showing that the municipal defendants ratified 

Officer Rath’s allegedly unconstitutional conduct. See Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 

701, 737 (1989) (Section 1983 claim may be made out by acquiescence in a longstanding practice 

or custom which constitutes the “standard operating procedure” of the local governmental entity). 

 Plaintiff’s complaint alleges no such facts against the municipal defendants, and therefore, 

the complaint fails to state a claim against them. 

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IV. CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

 1. Plaintiff's request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2), is GRANTED. 

 2. Plaintiff may proceed now to serve Officer Rath, as set forth below, and pursue his 

claims against only that defendant. Alternatively, he may delay serving Officer Rath, and attempt 

to state a cognizable claim against the City of Sacramento and the Sacramento Police Department. 

 3. If plaintiff elects to amend his complaint to state a cognizable claim against the 

municipal defendants, he has thirty days so to do, and he may skip the following service 

instructions (Nos. 4-10). Plaintiff is not obligated to amend his complaint. However, if he does 

so, the amended complaint will also be subject to screening. 

 4. If plaintiff elects to proceed now against Officer Rath alone, then within thirty days, 

plaintiff must return the materials for service of process that are enclosed with this order, as 

described below. In this event the court will construe plaintiff’s election as consent to the 

dismissal of all claims against the City of Sacramento and the Sacramento Police Department, 

without prejudice. 

 5. Service is appropriate for the following defendant: Police Officer Rath, Badge # 610. 

 6. The Clerk of the Court is directed to issue forthwith, and the U.S. Marshal is directed 

to serve within ninety days of the date of this order, all process pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 4, without prepayment of costs. 

 7. The Clerk of the Court shall send plaintiff, for each defendant in ¶ 5, above: one 

USM-285, one summons, a copy of the complaint, and an appropriate form for consent to trial by 

a magistrate judge. 

 8. Plaintiff is directed to supply the U.S. Marshal, within 15 days from the date this order 

is filed, all information needed by the Marshal to effect service of process, and shall file a 

statement with the court that said documents have been submitted to the United States Marshal. 

The court anticipates that, to effect service, the U.S. Marshal will require, for each defendant in 

¶ 5, above, at least: 

 a. One completed summons; 

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 b. One completed USM-285 form; 

 c. One copy of the endorsed filed complaint, with an extra copy for the U.S. 

Marshal; and 

 d. One copy of the instant order. 

 9. In the event the U.S. Marshal is unable, for any reason whatsoever, to effect service on 

Officer Rath within 90 days from the date of this order, the Marshal is directed to report that fact, 

and the reasons for it, to the undersigned. 

 10. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this order on the U.S. Marshal, 

501 “I” Street, Sacramento, Ca., 95814, Tel. No. (916) 930-2030. 

 11. Failure to comply with this order may result in a recommendation that this action be 

dismissed. 

DATED: April 30, 2016 

 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

RAYMOND M. DOUGLAS, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CITY OF SACRAMENTO, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:16-cv-0375 MCE AC (PS) 

NOTICE OF SUBMISSION 

 Plaintiff has submitted the following documents to the U.S. Marshal, in compliance with 

the court’s order filed _____________________: 

 ____ completed summons form 

 ____ completed USM-285 form 

 ____ copy of the complaint 

 ____ completed form to consent or decline to consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction 

____________________________________ ____________________________________ 

Date Plaintiff’s Signature 

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