Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-02-03062/USCOURTS-caDC-02-03062-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
James Isaac Gaston
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notify

the Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made

before the bound volumes go to press.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 10, 2003 Decided February 13, 2004

No. 02-3062

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

JAMES ISAAC GASTON,

APPELLANT

Consolidated with

No. 02–3063

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(01cr00259)

(01cr00259–01)

Neil H. Jaffee, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued

the cause for appellant James Isaac Gaston. Paul H. Zuker-

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #02-3062 Document #803256 Filed: 02/13/2004 Page 1 of 16
2

berg argued the cause for appellant Jacqueline V. Shelton.

With them on the briefs was A. J. Kramer, Federal Public

Defender.

Lisa H. Schertler, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Roscoe C.

Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher and Thomas J.

Tourish, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: RANDOLPH and ROGERS, Circuit Judges, and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.

Opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment

filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge: James I. Gaston and Jacqueline

V. Shelton appeal their convictions for possessing heroin with

intent to distribute it, and for possessing a firearm during a

drug trafficking offense. Gaston also appeals his conviction

for unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. The issues

deal with the legality of the search of Gaston’s residence, with

the admission into evidence of statements he made during the

search, with the sufficiency of the evidence, and with Shelton’s motion to disclose the identity of a confidential informant.

I.

An agent of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms

(‘‘ATF’’), in his affidavit supporting a search warrant, stated

that a confidential informant – ‘‘CI–1’’ – contacted the agent

‘‘[w]ithin the last 72 hours,’’ gave the address of a house in

which ‘‘Jimmy’’ resided, and reported observing a handgun

there. The affidavit further stated that CI–1 had provided

reliable information to ATF in the past, leading to the execution of four search warrants and the recovery of firearms,

narcotics and money; that CI–1 had never provided inaccurate information; and that in the agent’s experience, those

who illegally possess firearms do not regularly dispose of

them. The affidavit reported that ATF’s investigation, using

the computer-based Washington Area Law Enforcement SysUSCA Case #02-3062 Document #803256 Filed: 02/13/2004 Page 2 of 16
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tem, indicated that ‘‘Jimmy’’ was James Isaac Gaston, an

individual who ‘‘ha[d] been arrested numerous times in the

past for weapon and drug violations,’’ and had ‘‘felony convictions’’ for carrying a ‘‘pistol without a license in 1982, 1987

and 1990.’’

A judge of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia

issued a search warrant on June 19, 2001, finding probable

cause to believe that there was a firearm in the two-story row

house Gaston occupied. Later in the day, officers of ATF

and the United States Park Police executed the warrant,

seizing among other things two pistols, heroin, a scale and

cash.

Gaston and Shelton claim the search violated their Fourth

Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures

because the affidavit did not support the judge’s finding of

probable cause. They identify several defects in the affidavit:

the affidavit did not say when CI–1 saw the handgun; it did

not explain why CI–1 was in the house, or where in the house

CI–1 saw the weapon; and it did not indicate that the agents

had corroborated CI–1’s information before seeking the warrant. Also, the statement that Gaston had felony convictions

in 1982, 1987 and 1990 for unlawfully possessing firearms

turned out to be incorrect; the presentence report stated that

he had only one such conviction, in 1984.

In none of the pretrial proceedings did Gaston alert the

district court to the affidavit’s mistake about the number of

his felony convictions for firearms offenses, something one

would expect Gaston to know. His attorney merely said to

the court, first, that he ‘‘had joined’’ Shelton’s pretrial motion

to suppress, which the court earlier had denied without a

hearing, and second: ‘‘we would also challenge the evidence

seized from the home on the basis of a Franks violation

contained in the warrant. I think there are some factual

inaccuracies in the warrant.’’ The court responded that

counsel had not triggered a ‘‘Franks hearing.’’

The district court was surely right. Under Franks v.

Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978), a defendant is entitled to

an evidentiary hearing only if his attack on the accuracy of

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the affidavit is ‘‘more than conclusory’’ and is accompanied by

‘‘allegations of deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard

for the truth, and those allegations must be accompanied by

an offer of proof.’’ Gaston made no offer of proof. He did

not allege deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard of the

truth. He directed his claim of ‘‘inaccuracies’’ at the ‘‘warrant,’’ rather than the affidavit. And even if he had the

affidavit in mind, he identified no particular inaccuracy, let

alone a deliberate or reckless one. Shelton’s motion to

suppress filled in none of these gaps. Her motion merely

asserted, in general terms, that the warrant was not supported by probable cause ‘‘with respect to Ms. Shelton.’’

Given this record, the government urges us to review the

district court’s refusal to suppress the evidence for plain

error only. At oral argument, Gaston conceded that plain

error was the proper standard. In the normal course, we

would sustain the district court’s findings of fact unless they

were clearly erroneous and would examine its legal conclusions de novo. See United States v. Pindell, 336 F.3d 1049,

1052 (D.C. Cir. 2003). In this case, it hardly matters which of

these standards of review we employ. There is no possible

way for these defendants to overcome United States v. Leon,

468 U.S. 897 (1984). The Supreme Court there assumed that

the affidavit in support of the warrant did not supply probable cause because it relied on a confidential informant of

unproven credibility; because some of his information was

stale; and because the police had not corroborated other

information the informant provided. But Leon held that if

the officers had gathered evidence in objectively reasonable

reliance on the search warrant, the evidence should not be

suppressed despite the affidavit’s inadequacy. Id. at 922–24.

Here the defendants offered no reason to believe that the

ATF agent, in preparing his affidavit, knew that what he

wrote about Gaston’s felony convictions was false, or that he

acted in reckless disregard of the truth. Id. at 926. Neither

defendant formally moved for an evidentiary hearing under

Franks, or even attempted to make the sort of showing that

would have entitled them to one. We also doubt that it

mattered much whether Gaston had ‘‘only’’ one prior convicUSCA Case #02-3062 Document #803256 Filed: 02/13/2004 Page 4 of 16
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tion, rather than three. But even if it did matter, there is no

evidence to support attributing the error to the deliberate or

reckless action of the officers involved in the search. The

affidavit indicated that the information about Gaston’s convictions came not from the officers, but from information in a

computer system. The defendants’ arguments rest on unsupported factual inferences, unsupported because they never

made their evidentiary case in the district court.

There is nothing to the defendants’ further point that

Leon’s good-faith exception is inapplicable because the affidavit was ‘‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render

official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.’’ Leon,

468 U.S. at 923 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610–

11 (1975)). The ATF agent’s affidavit was as strong as the

affidavit in Leon, and in important respects stronger. The

ATF agent at least established the informant’s reliability.

And fairly read, his affidavit indicated that the informant’s

information was fresh. The affidavit said CI–1 had contacted

the agent within the last ‘‘72 hours’’ about observing a

handgun in ‘‘Jimmy’s’’ residence. It is a fair reading, though

not the only one, that the report and the observation occurred

within the last three days. See United States v. Ventresca,

380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965). Besides, the affidavit stated that in

the agent’s experience, individuals who come into possession

of firearms tend to keep possession of them. If ‘‘Jimmy’’ had

a gun in his house three days before the search, or three

weeks before the search, that information would support

probable cause. On the other hand, in Leon the informant’s

first-hand knowledge concerned drugs sold out of home five

months before the search, which is why the court of appeals

treated the information as stale. 468 U.S. at 904.

We therefore hold that under Leon, defendants were not

entitled to suppression of the evidence seized in the search of

Gaston’s residence.

II.

Gaston claims the district court should have suppressed

statements he made to an officer during the search.

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Ten to fifteen officers entered the row house. They found

three adults and three children. The three children were

Gaston’s and Shelton’s. Gaston and Shelton were in the

doorway of the second floor master bedroom. The officers

handcuffed them and moved them to the first floor living

room. There Officer David Hurley interviewed Gaston, who

remained handcuffed. At the time, the search of the premises had not begun. Officer Hurley asked Gaston for his name,

address, date of birth, and social security number. Gaston

gave his present location as his address. Officer Hurley also

asked Gaston if he owned the house, to which Gaston replied

that he co-owned the house with his sisters, who lived elsewhere. The government introduced Gaston’s statements at

trial.

Before questioning Gaston about his address and ownership

of the house, no officer gave him the warnings set forth in

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). The government defends the omission on several grounds, one of which is

that Miranda did not apply because Gaston was not in

custody. The ‘‘ultimate inquiry,’’ the Court said in California

v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983), ‘‘is simply whether

there is a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement

of the degree associated with a formal arrest.’’ ‘‘Custody’’ is

determined objectively: would a reasonable person have understood his situation to be comparable to a formal arrest?

Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 441–42 (1984). Gaston

was handcuffed when Officer Hurley questioned him although

the officers had not yet formally arrested him. The government argues that handcuffing does not automatically constitute custody, but is merely one factor to be considered.

There is authority to this effect, see, e.g., United States v.

Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1109–10 (4th Cir. 1995), United States

v. Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286, 1291–92 (9th Cir. 1982), but we do

not have to decide whether to follow it because the questioning fell within an exception to Miranda.

The Supreme Court held in Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496

U.S. 582, 601–02 (1990), that officers asking routine booking

questions ‘‘reasonably related to the police’s administrative

concerns’’ are not engaged in interrogation within Miranda’s

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meaning and therefore do not have to give Miranda warnings. Gaston’s address and ownership interest in the house

also related to ‘‘administrative concerns.’’ 496 U.S. at 601–02.

The questions dealt as much with record-keeping as the

similar booking questions asked in Muniz. Under FED. R.

CRIM. P. 41(f)(3)(A), the ‘‘officer executing the warrant must

TTT give a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property

taken to the person from whom, or from whose premises, the

property was takenTTTT’’ In order to comply with Rule 41,

the officers sought to find out who owned the house. While

public records would show this, we believe Muniz allowed the

officers to ask routine questions about the subject without

having to advise Gaston of his right to counsel and his

privilege against self-incrimination. We do not agree with the

concurring opinion that the officers should have performed an

analysis, based on the law of real property, of the difference

between residency and ownership in order to determine – in

the words of Rule 41 – ‘‘whose premises’’ they were searching. At any rate, the incriminating fact was that Gaston

resided in the house and, on that subject, the government

introduced ample other evidence, some of which is summarized below, thus rendering any error in receiving Gaston’s

statement harmless.

III.

Gaston and Shelton assert that their convictions under 18

U.S.C. § 924(c) for possessing a firearm in furtherance of a

drug trafficking offense are not supported by the evidence.

Section 924(c)(1)(A) imposes a mandatory five-year sentence

for ‘‘any person who, during and in relation to any crime of

violence or drug trafficking crime TTT for which the person

may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or

carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime,

possesses a firearm.’’ 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).

When the officers entered the house they found Gaston and

Shelton standing in the doorway of the master bedroom on

the second floor. In the bedroom, the officers recovered a

clear ziplock bag from the floor between the bed and the wall;

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the bag contained forty smaller ziplock bags of heroin. They

also found two firearms: a loaded semiautomatic pistol between the box spring and the mattress of the bed, and a

loaded .38 caliber revolver in a pillowcase on the floor in front

of the bed. The pillowcase also contained $9,650 in cash.

Elsewhere in the bedroom officers collected items linking

Gaston and Shelton to the residence, including a dry-cleaning

ticket in Gaston’s name attached to a shirt hanging beside a

closet; in a purse on the floor, Shelton’s driver’s license

identifying the search address as her residence; bills for

utilities addressed to Gaston at the search address; and a

copy of Shelton’s income tax return for 2000 listing the same

address as her place of residence. In the kitchen officers

recovered a scale and two more ziplock bags of heroin. The

government presented all of this evidence to the jury.

The facts of this case are similar to those in United States

v. Wahl, 290 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Officers executing a

search warrant at a residence found the defendant standing

in front of an entertainment center on top of which was a

firearm. Drugs were recovered from the VCR’s videotape

slot and from the pockets of another person in the residence.

Id. at 373. In affirming the defendant’s § 924(c) conviction,

we held that the jury could find that the defendant had

constructive possession of the firearm. Officers found the

firearm in close proximity to him, and ‘‘a jury is entitled to

infer that a person exercises constructive possession over

items found in his home.’’ Id. at 376; see also United States

v. Jenkins, 928 F.2d 1175, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (‘‘The natural

inference is that those who live in a house know what is going

on insideTTTT’’). The ‘‘in furtherance of’’ language of § 924(c)

means that ‘‘the weapon must promote or facilitate the

crime.’’ See Wahl, 290 F.3d at 376 (citing United States v.

Mackey, 265 F.3d 457, 460–61 (6th Cir. 2001)). This requirement can be satisfied by ‘‘a showing of some nexus between

the firearm and the drug selling operation.’’ Mackey, 265

F.3d at 462. In Wahl, we considered the factors the Sixth

Circuit cited in Mackey: ‘‘whether the gun was loaded, the

type of weapon, the legality of its possession, the type of drug

activity conducted, and the time and circumstances under

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which the firearm was found.’’ Wahl, 290 F.3d at 376 (citing

Mackey, 265 F.3d at 462, and United States v. Ceballos–

Torres, 218 F.3d 409, 414–15 (5th Cir. 2000)). ‘‘The list of

factors is not exclusive, but it helps to distinguish possession

in furtherance of a crime from innocent possession of a wallmounted antique or an unloaded hunting rifle locked in a

cupboard.’’ Mackey, 265 F.3d at 462.

The firearm in Wahl was loaded and ‘‘in close proximity’’ to

cocaine and a small amount of cash, and the defendant

possessed the gun illegally. Wahl, 290 F.3d at 376. So here.

Both pistols were illegally possessed; both were loaded; both

were in the bedroom Gaston and Shelton occupied; and both

pistols were close to drugs, and – so the jury could have

found – drug proceeds. Here, as in Wahl, the pistols were

‘‘strategically located so that [they were] quickly and easily

available for use’’ in furtherance of the drug crimes. Wahl,

290 F.3d at 376 (quotations omitted). We therefore uphold

the defendants’ § 924(c) convictions.

IV.

Shelton challenges the district court’s denial of her motion

for disclosure of the identity of the confidential informant

mentioned in the search warrant affidavit.

Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957), approved –

in the exercise of the Court’s supervisory power – an ‘‘informer’s privilege’’ protecting the identity of individuals who provide the government with information about crimes. ‘‘The

privilege recognizes the obligation of citizens to communicate

their knowledge of the commission of crimes to lawenforcement officials and, by preserving their anonymity,

encourages them to perform that obligation.’’ Id. However,

‘‘fundamental requirements of fairness,’’ id. at 60, limit use of

the privilege at trial. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 309

(1967). When ‘‘the disclosure of an informer’s identity TTT is

relevant or helpful to the defense of an accused TTT the

privilege must give way.’’ Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 60–61.

One must be careful not to read too much into this last

statement from Roviaro. In speaking of evidence ‘‘relevant

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or helpful to the defense’’ the Court could hardly have meant

that the privilege covers only irrelevant and unhelpful evidence. The Court supported its statement with a footnote

citing, among other cases, Scher v. United States, 305 U.S.

251 (1938), from which it quoted the following: ‘‘public policy

forbids disclosure of an informer’s identity unless essential to

the defenseTTTT’’ 353 U.S. at 61 n.9 (citing Scher, 305 U.S. at

254). The Court also described three appellate decisions as

holding that an informant’s identity ‘‘must be disclosed whenever the informer’s testimony may be relevant and helpful to

the accused’s defense.’’ 353 U.S. at 61–62. Again the Court

dropped a footnote and again it described one of the appellate

cases as holding disclosure must be ordered when it ‘‘was

essential to the defense.’’ Id. at 62 n.12. And in concluding

its general discussion of the privilege, the Court stated that

‘‘no fixed rule with respect to disclosure is justifiable.’’ Id. at

62.

In Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528 (1964), a stolen

property prosecution after Roviaro, the Court refused to

order disclosure of the identity of an informant who allegedly

saw the stolen property in the defendant’s basement. Id. at

534–35. The Court distinguished Roviaro ‘‘where the informant had played a direct and prominent part, as the sole

participant with the accused, in the very offense for which the

latter was convicted.’’ Id. at 534. By contrast, in Rugendorf

the Court could not ‘‘say on this record that the name of the

informant was necessary to his defense.’’ Id. at 534–35.

In light of Rovario and Rugendorf, we have required, as a

prerequisite to disclosure, that the informant have had some

sort of direct connection, either as a participant or an eyewitness, to the crime charged. The issue in United States v.

Skeens, 449 F.2d 1066 (D.C. Cir. 1971), was whether a defendant charged with armed robbery had the right to learn the

identity of an informant who three weeks after the crime

provided officers with, inter alia, information about the

whereabouts of the shotgun involved and details of the robbery. Skeens refused to require disclosure because ‘‘[u]nlike

Roviaro, nothing in this record establishes that the informant

was a participant, an eyewitness, or a person who was otherUSCA Case #02-3062 Document #803256 Filed: 02/13/2004 Page 10 of 16
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wise in a position to give direct testimony concerning the

crime TTT [A]ll the evidence discloses is that the informer was

an informer and nothing more.’’ Id. at 1070 (quotations

omitted). The defendant has a ‘‘heavy burden TTT to establish that identity of an informant is necessary to his defense.’’

449 F.2d at 1071 (citing Rugendorf, 376 U.S. at 535). With

respect to search warrants we have not required the government to disclose the identity of an informant who saw the

fruits of the search prior to execution of the warrant but who

had no involvement in the charged crime. In United States v.

Warren, 42 F.3d 647 (D.C. Cir. 1994), the informant advised

police that within the past seven days crack cocaine had been

stored and sold at a specified residence. The informant also

participated in a controlled drug buy. The police recited this

information in an affidavit submitted to a magistrate, who

then issued a search warrant. 42 F.3d at 652. When the

search of the residence uncovered drugs and a firearm,

Warren was charged with (and later convicted of) possession

of crack cocaine with intent to distribute and use of a firearm

during and in relation to a drug offense. Id. at 652. While

we recognized that the informant’s testimony ‘‘might have

been helpful to Warren,’’ particularly since the informant was

the sole witness besides Warren to the controlled drug buy,

we did not require disclosure. Warren had not been charged

with an offense arising from the drug transaction with the

informant. He was convicted only of crimes arising from the

search and the informant was not a participant in, or eyewitness to, those crimes. Id. at 654. The ‘‘informant’s role was

limited to providing the information that justified issuance of

the search warrant.’’ Id.

In the district court Shelton argued that because the

government relied on the informant to obtain the search

warrant, it was ‘‘essential’’ for her ‘‘to investigate whether the

government’s reliance on such sources was reasonable.’’ The

district court quite clearly did not abuse its discretion – the

standard of review (see Warren, 42 F.3d at 654) – in denying

Shelton’s disclosure motion. The case is indistinguishable

from Warren. As here, the offenses charged in Warren were

possession of illegal drugs and use of a firearm in relation to

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the drug offense. As here, the informant provided information leading to a search warrant. The offenses charged in the

Warren indictment and the indictments of Gaston and Shelton occurred not when the informant made his observations,

but at the time of the search, when the illicit items were

discovered. We therefore held in Warren and hold in this

case that because the informant neither participated in nor

witnessed the offenses, the district court properly denied the

disclosure motion. Id.

Shelton has a rather a different argument on appeal regarding why the district court should have ordered the government to identify the informant. Now the claim is that the

informant’s testimony could exculpate her if the informant

linked only Gaston, or someone else, to the firearms and

drugs found during the search. If the warrant affidavit is to

be believed, she claims, the informant would have testified

that Gaston was in either actual or constructive possession of

the firearms. The district court did not commit plain error in

failing to anticipate this argument and in declining to order

the government to reveal the informant’s identity. It was

incumbent upon Shelton to shoulder the ‘‘heavy burden’’ of

showing why the informant’s testimony was ‘‘necessary’’ to

her defense at trial. Skeens, 449 F.2d at 1070. She did

nothing of the sort. Her motion did not even describe the

nature of her defense; still less did it mention how she

expected the informant to advance her cause.

We have considered and rejected the defendant’s remaining

contentions.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of conviction are

affirmed.

So ordered.

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ROGERS, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and concurring

in the judgment: It is well established that law enforcement

officers must give Miranda warnings when questioning is

initiated once ‘‘ ‘a person has been taken into custody or

otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant

way.’ ’’ Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347 (1976)

(quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966)). The

court does not decide whether Gaston was in custody when he

was questioned by the police while in handcuffs prior to being

informed of his Miranda rights. It holds that the questions

Gaston was asked fall within the exception to Miranda recognized by the Supreme Court in Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496

U.S. 582, 600–02 (1990), for routine booking questions. See

Op. at 6–7. I write separately to clarify two points regarding

Gaston’s Fifth Amendment claim: first, whether Gaston was

in custody when he was questioned by the police while in

handcuffs; and second, whether Gaston’s Fifth Amendment

rights were violated when the police asked him whether he

resided in or owned the searched premises before advising

him of his Miranda rights.

First, the cases relied on by the court to the effect that in

determining whether a defendant is in custody the fact that

he is in handcuffs is only one factor are not dispositive here.

See Op. at 6 (citing United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105,

1109–10 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Bautista, 684 F.2d

1286, 1291–92 (9th Cir. 1982)); see also United States v.

Fountain, 2 F.3d 656, 666 (6th Cir. 1993). Although, under

this line of authority, the police acted reasonably in handcuffing all adults in the premises as a protective measure when

executing the search warrant for a firearm, by the time the

police officer questioned Gaston, without Miranda warnings,

the initial justification for handcuffing him that is recognized

in these cases, namely the officers’ safety, no longer existed.

By this time, the police had located all persons who were in

the premises and brought them to a central location in the

premises, with at least three or four police officers (not

including the officer who questioned Gaston) standing guard.

There was no evidence to suggest that the police had any

concern that these persons were armed, would be uncooperaUSCA Case #02-3062 Document #803256 Filed: 02/13/2004 Page 13 of 16
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tive, destroy evidence, or escape. Cf. Bautista, 684 F.2d at

1289–90. Under the circumstances, as ‘‘there was nothing to

suggest that any of the officers were any longer concerned

with their own physical safety,’’ Gaston was ‘‘in police custody.’’ New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 (1984). Unlike

in the only case cited by the government in which a statement

was taken at the premises from a defendant in handcuffs at

the time of the execution of a search warrant, United States

v. Newton, 181 F. Supp. 2d 157, 160, 174 (E.D.N.Y. 2002),

Gaston was not informed that he was not under arrest or that

the handcuffs were for his and the officers’ safety.

Second, the routine booking exception under Muniz applies

only to questions that are necessary to assist the police in

carrying out administrative functions. Muniz, 496 U.S. at

592–600, 602 n.14. In Muniz, the Supreme Court distinguished between routine booking questions ‘‘to secure the

biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial

services,’’ id. at 601 (citations omitted), and the type of

question that, while related, goes beyond what is necessary

for booking purposes. While the exception extends to questions ‘‘reasonably related to the police’s administrative concerns,’’ id. at 601–02, the Court instructed that ‘‘the police

may not ask questions, even during booking, that are designed to elicit incriminating admissions.’’ Id. at 602 n.14

(citations omitted). The police not only had asked Muniz,

who was suspected of driving while intoxicated, questions

about his name, address, height, weight, eye color, date of

birth, and current age, but also asked whether he knew the

date of his sixth birthday. Id. at 585–86. The Court held

that the sixth birthday question was ‘‘testimonial in nature,’’

id. at 594, causing the defendant to ‘‘reveal, directly or

indirectly, his knowledge of facts relating him to the offense,’’

id. at 595, and because that question was unnecessary for

administrative purposes, it did not fall within the routine

booking exception. Id. at 592–602.

The court holds that the questions Gaston was asked by the

police fall within the routine booking exception under Muniz.

See Op. at 6–7. As Muniz makes clear, whether a question

falls within the exception depends on the particular circumUSCA Case #02-3062 Document #803256 Filed: 02/13/2004 Page 14 of 16
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stances. 496 U.S. at 602. When the police officer asked

Gaston whether he resided in and whether he owned the

premises being searched, the questions were potentially incriminating given the object of the search warrant, namely a

firearm and any related paraphernalia at the premises. See

United States v. Disla, 805 F.2d 1340, 1346–47 (9th Cir. 1986);

see also Muniz, 496 U.S. at 602; United States v. Doe, 878

F.2d 1546, 1551–52 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Mata–

Abundiz, 717 F.2d 1277, 1280 (9th Cir. 1983); United States

ex rel. Hines v. LaVallee, 521 F.2d 1109, 1112–13 (2nd Cir.

1975). The court therefore must scrutinize the administrative

need for the questions, applying an objective standard, particularly where, as here, the questioning did not occur at a

police station. See Doe, 878 F.2d at 1551.

In support of its holding that the questions were related to

administrative concerns, the court cites FED. R. CRIM. P.

41(f)(3)(A), which requires that ‘‘[t]he officer executing the

warrant must TTT give a copy of the warrant and a receipt for

the property taken to the person from whom, or from whose

premises, the property was taken.’’ (emphasis added). See

Op. at. 7. On its face, the Rule would appear to indicate that

there was a ‘‘legitimate administrative need,’’ Doe, 878 F.2d at

1551, to ask Gaston both whether he resided in and whether

he owned the premises. However, once Gaston told the

officer that he resided at the searched premises, the Rule

simply required the notice of any property taken from his

residence to be given to him or another occupant present at

the time. It was unnecessary to determine if Gaston also

owned the premises. The language of the Rule does not

require the notice to be given to the property owner whenever the seized property is not taken from the immediate

possession of the defendant or another occupant of the premises. Further, the ownership question was potentially incriminating. Although Gaston’s residence at the premises may

suffice to establish his constructive possession of the seized

items, to the extent it did not, then evidence of his ownership

of the property would fill the evidentiary gap. See United

States v. Heckard, 238 F.3d 1222, 1228–29 (10th Cir. 2001);

see also United Mergerson, 4 F.3d 337, 348–49 (5th Cir. 1993);

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4

United States v. Foster, 783 F.2d 1087, 1089–90 (D.C. Cir.

1986); United States v. Whitfield, 629 F.2d 136, 142–43 (D.C.

Cir. 1980). Contrary to the suggestion of the court, the police

did not need to perform ‘‘an analysis, based on the law of real

property, of the difference between residency and ownership.’’ Op. at 7. Instead, consistent with the limited exception to the Miranda requirement that Muniz recognizes, the

police had to limit their questioning to the information that

was necessary for their legitimate administrative purposes.

To the extent the Rule is the underpinning of the court’s

conclusion that all of the questions the police asked Gaston

were within the Muniz exception, the Rule does not support

the conclusion.

It is unnecessary, however, to resolve whether the ownership question falls within Muniz’s limited exception to the

Miranda requirement. Even if Gaston was in custody when

he was asked if he owned the premises and the question was

unnecessary and potentially incriminating, and thus did not

fall within Muniz’s routine booking exception, any error was

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). At trial, the government used

the evidence of Gaston’s ownership of the premises to show

only that he resided at or possessed the premises as a means

of linking Gaston to the seized contraband. There was ample

other evidence that Gaston resided at the premises, including

his clothes and receipts, and bills and other mail in his name.

See Op. at 8. Under the circumstances, the court can confidently conclude that admission into evidence of Gaston’s

statement concerning ownership, even if violative of his Fifth

Amendment rights, had no effect on the jury’s verdict. Id.

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