Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-04-03129/USCOURTS-caDC-04-03129-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joseph B. Simpson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 16, 2005 Decided December 13, 2005

No. 04-3129

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

JOSEPH B. SIMPSON,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 04cr00096-01)

Lisa B. Wright, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued

the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was A.J. Kramer,

Federal Public Defender. Neil H. Jaffee and Mary M. Petras,

Assistant Federal Public Defenders, entered appearances.

Elizabeth H. Danello, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. On the brief were Kenneth L. Wainstein,

U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher, Assistant U.S. Attorney at the

time the brief was filed, and Roy W. McLeese, III, Catharine A.

Hartzenbusch, and Mary B. McCord, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

USCA Case #04-3129 Document #937134 Filed: 12/13/2005 Page 1 of 33
2

Before: GARLAND, Circuit Judge, and SILBERMAN and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

Concurring opinion filed by Senior Circuit Judge

SILBERMAN.

GARLAND, Circuit Judge: Joseph B. Simpson, a citizen of

Jamaica, pled guilty to re-entering the United States unlawfully

after having been deported following conviction for an

aggravated felony. Due to uncertainty regarding the continued

validity of the United States Sentencing Guidelines in the

months after the Supreme Court decided Blakely v. Washington,

542 U.S. 296 (2004), the district court imposed a 46-month

prison term under two separate rationales. The court first

sentenced Simpson by applying the Guidelines as mandatory; it

then sentenced him as it would in its discretion, treating the

Guidelines as advisory only. Simpson now appeals, seeking a

remand to the district court for re-sentencing in light of the

Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct.

738 (2005). We conclude that the alternative sentencing

methodology employed by the district court was consistent with

the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Booker and that

Simpson’s sentence must therefore be affirmed.

I

On October 6, 2000, Simpson was convicted in federal

court in Virginia of conspiring to possess with intent to

distribute 100 kilograms or more of marijuana. As a result of

that conviction, Simpson was deported from the United States

on October 23, 2003. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). Two

months later, using a false name, Simpson re-entered the United

States near Port Everglades, Florida. One month after reUSCA Case #04-3129 Document #937134 Filed: 12/13/2005 Page 2 of 33
3

1

The plea agreement included a waiver of Simpson’s right to

appeal any sentence imposed by the court, unless the sentence

exceeded the statutory maximum or was the consequence of an

upward departure from the applicable Guidelines range. Plea

Agreement 3. The government relies on this as an independent ground

for affirmance. Because we conclude that the court’s alternative

sentence is a sufficient ground, it is unnecessary for us to consider the

validity of the waiver.

entering the country, Simpson was arrested in the District of

Columbia for threatening to kill his wife with a kitchen knife.

Fingerprints and photographs revealed Simpson’s true identity,

and on February 27, 2004, he was indicted on one count of reentry by an alien deported following conviction for an

aggravated felony, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(2).

Simpson signed an agreement to plead guilty to the

indictment. The parties agreed that Simpson’s base offense

level under the Sentencing Guidelines was 8, and that his

offense level should be enhanced to 24 “because the defendant

was previously deported after a conviction for a drug trafficking

offense for which the sentence imposed was greater than 13

months.” Plea Agreement 2; see U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A).

The parties further agreed that the offense level should be

reduced by 3 levels to 21, due to Simpson’s acceptance of

responsibility. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. The plea agreement did

not include a stipulation regarding Simpson’s criminal history

category. The district court accepted the plea at a hearing on

June 10, 2004, and it scheduled sentencing for August 25.1

Following entry of the plea, the U.S. Probation Office

prepared a Presentence Report (PSR) that accepted the parties’

calculation of Simpson’s offense level. The PSR also placed

Simpson in criminal history category III. That calculation was

based on the PSR’s finding of a total of 5 criminal history

USCA Case #04-3129 Document #937134 Filed: 12/13/2005 Page 3 of 33
4

2

The PSR stated that Simpson’s marijuana conviction had

resulted in a sentence of 36 months’ imprisonment followed by four

years of supervised release, and that Simpson had been released from

prison on August 15, 2003 and subsequently deported. PSR ¶ 24.

points: 3 points for Simpson’s marijuana conspiracy conviction

and sentence, see U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(a), and 2 additional points

for committing the re-entry offense while still under sentence

(supervised release) for the marijuana conviction, see id. §

4A1.1(d). At the subsequent sentencing hearing, the district

court agreed with the PSR’s offense level calculation, but added

another criminal history point because the re-entry offense was

committed less than two years after Simpson’s release from

imprisonment. See id. § 4A1.1(e).2 The resulting 6 criminal

history points did not change Simpson’s criminal history

category, which remained at III. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A. The

combination of offense level 21 and criminal history category III

yielded a Guidelines sentencing range of 46-57 months’

imprisonment. See id.

In the interim between Simpson’s plea and sentencing, the

Supreme Court decided the Blakely case, in which it invalidated

a Washington state determinate sentencing regime similar to the

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. The Court held that a sentencing

court violates the Sixth Amendment when it imposes a sentence

higher than the statutory maximum sentence it “may impose

solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or

admitted by the defendant.” Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303. Relying

on Blakely, Simpson’s counsel challenged the calculation of her

client’s criminal history category as a violation of the Sixth

Amendment, arguing that the category had been assigned on the

basis of facts Simpson had not admitted. Def.’s Objections to

PSR 2. In particular, she argued that, even if Simpson had

admitted the facts necessary to assign him 3 points for the

marijuana conspiracy conviction, those 3 points would only put

USCA Case #04-3129 Document #937134 Filed: 12/13/2005 Page 4 of 33
5

3

Simpson’s counsel also argued that Blakely’s exception for “‘the

fact of a prior conviction,’” 542 U.S. at 301 (quoting Apprendi v. New

Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)), did not extend to whether the

instant offense took place while he was on supervised release or within

two years after release from imprisonment. See infra note 8. 

him in category II, which would yield a lower sentencing range

(41-51 months). See Appellant’s Br. 4. The calculation that

raised the criminal history category to III, she contended,

required the court to find additional facts -- that Simpson was on

supervised release at the time of his unlawful re-entry and/or

that he had committed that offense less than two years after

release from imprisonment. Simpson’s counsel asserted that he

had not admitted those facts, and that Blakely therefore barred

the court from using them to sentence him.3 Accordingly, she

asked the sentencing judge to “just use your discretion.”

Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 8 (August 25, 2004). 

At the August 25 sentencing hearing, the district court

advised the parties that, in light of Blakely, it would give

Simpson “alternative sentences”: one as if the Guidelines were

“controlling,” and one as if the Guidelines were “not

controlling” but could be looked to “for whatever assistance . .

. [the court] might be able to get from them.” Id. at 25. With

respect to the latter, the court invited the parties to give it “the

assistance that you would like to give . . . with respect to what

sentence should be imposed.” Id. at 26. Simpson’s counsel

objected that the court should not announce an alternative

sentence that would be “automatically imposed” if the Court of

Appeals were to determine that the Guidelines sentence was

unconstitutional, because “it doesn’t give the defendant a chance

to respond to whatever it is the Court says was wrong with the

first sentence.” Id. at 27. Counsel then went on to cite

circumstances that she thought justified sentencing Simpson “at

the lowest level of whatever guideline range, should the court

USCA Case #04-3129 Document #937134 Filed: 12/13/2005 Page 5 of 33
6

impose a guideline range, or if the Court views the guidelines

only as guidelines and not mandatory, . . . [to] a sentence less

than what the guidelines would otherwise dictate.” Id.

The district court proceeded to sentence Simpson under

each of the two approaches. Turning first to the Guidelines, the

court set forth the calculations outlined above, concluding that

Simpson’s offense level was 21, that his criminal history

category was III, and that the resulting Guidelines sentencing

range was 46-57 months. The court then sentenced Simpson to

the bottom of that range, imposing a sentence of 46 months’

imprisonment, followed by two years of supervised release. Id.

at 46-48.

The court next addressed the appropriate sentence in the

event the Guidelines were not controlling:

I would take into account and do take into account the

seriousness of this offense, that it was a conscious,

intentional decision by the defendant following a

conviction for an aggravated felony offense and

deportation from the United States and that the Court

is not confident that Mr. Simpson would not choose to

return to the United States illegally in the future as

well, and that the guidelines, using them only as a

reference point, would suggest that an appropriate

sentence for this offense should be in the range of 46 to

57 months based on a particular criminal history

category.

I find in my discretion, without the guidelines, that the

appropriate sentence would be at 46 months, that that

is a sentence that addresses the interests of the criminal

justice system and addresses the interests and

sentencing objectives of punishment and deterrence

USCA Case #04-3129 Document #937134 Filed: 12/13/2005 Page 6 of 33
7

and is the sentence that the Court imposes in its

discretion, given all the facts and circumstances

relevant here.

Id. at 49.

 Simpson noted an appeal on September 2, 2004. On

January 12, 2005, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in

United States v. Booker, which held that Blakely applied to the

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and that the mandatory imposition

of enhanced sentences under the Guidelines violated the Sixth

Amendment. 125 S. Ct. at 746. In light of this holding, the

Court invalidated two statutory provisions that had the effect of

making the Guidelines mandatory. Id. We now consider

Simpson’s appeal in the wake of Booker.

II

We begin with a discussion of Booker and of the legal

doctrines governing appellate review of sentencing error. That

discussion will guide the analysis in the balance of this opinion.

A

The Supreme Court’s decision in Booker consisted of two

separate majority opinions. In the first, “substantive” opinion,

the Court held that the Sixth Amendment is violated when a

court imposes a sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines based

on its own determination of “[a]ny fact (other than a prior

conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding

the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of

guilty or a jury verdict . . . .” Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756. The

Court emphasized, however, that its conclusion “rests on the

premise . . . that the relevant sentencing rules are mandatory and

impose binding requirements on all sentencing judges.” Id. at

USCA Case #04-3129 Document #937134 Filed: 12/13/2005 Page 7 of 33
8

4

Booker further stated that the statute continues to provide for

appellate “review [of] sentencing decisions for unreasonableness.”

125 S. Ct. 738, 767 (2005); see id. at 765-67. Simpson, however, has

not objected to his sentence on any ground other than those considered

in Part III.

749-50. “If the Guidelines as currently written could be read as

merely advisory provisions that recommended, rather than

required, the selection of particular sentences in response to

differing sets of facts,” the Court said, “their use would not

implicate the Sixth Amendment” regardless of whether they

enhanced a sentence above that consistent with a plea or verdict.

Id. at 750. 

In the second, “remedial” opinion, the Court found that the

federal statutory provisions making the Guidelines mandatory

were “incompatible with [Booker’s] constitutional holding” and

had to be “severed and excised.” Id. at 756. “So modified,” the

Court said, “the Federal Sentencing Act . . . makes the

Guidelines effectively advisory.” Id. at 757. The modified

statute, the Court explained, “requires the sentencing court to

consider Guidelines ranges, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)(4) (Supp.

2004), but it permits the court to tailor the sentencing in light of

other statutory concerns as well, see § 3553(a) (Supp. 2004).”

Id.

4

The Booker decision resolved two companion cases, one

involving defendant Freddie Booker and another involving

defendant Ducan Fanfan. The two dispositions identified two

kinds of sentencing error. With respect to the sentence of

Freddie Booker, the Court found constitutional error under the

Sixth Amendment because, in obeying the mandatory

Guidelines regime, the judge had increased Booker’s sentence

beyond the maximum that could have been imposed based

USCA Case #04-3129 Document #937134 Filed: 12/13/2005 Page 8 of 33
9

5

The jury found that Booker had possessed with intent to

distribute at least 50 grams of cocaine base. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 746.

Although the Guidelines indicated a sentence of 210-262 months for

that amount, the district court increased the sentence to 360 months

based on its own finding that Booker had possessed an additional 566

grams of cocaine base and had also obstructed justice. Id.

6

Fanfan’s jury found him guilty of conspiracy to distribute and to

possess with intent to distribute at least 500 grams of cocaine powder.

Under the Guidelines, the maximum sentence authorized by the jury

verdict -- without additional findings of fact -- was 78 months, which

was the sentence the district court imposed. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 747.

solely on the facts reflected in the jury verdict. Id. at 769.5 By

contrast, the Court found no constitutional violation in defendant

Ducan Fanfan’s sentence -- which was the maximum Guidelines

sentence authorized by the jury’s verdict without additional

findings of fact. Id. at 769.6

 Nonetheless, the Court vacated

Fanfan’s sentence and remanded to permit either party to seek

resentencing “under the system set forth” in the Booker

opinions, because the district court had committed nonconstitutional error by applying the Guidelines in a mandatory

rather than advisory fashion. Id.

The Supreme Court’s conclusion that the sentencing courts

in the companion cases had erred followed from the Court’s

ruling that it “must apply today’s holdings -- both the Sixth

Amendment holding and our remedial interpretation of the

Sentencing Act -- to all cases on direct review.” Id. at 769; see

also Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987) (holding that

a “new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be

applied retroactively to all cases . . . pending on direct review .

. . , with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes

a ‘clear break’ with the past”). As a consequence, on direct

review appellate courts must regard any sentencing

methodology that was materially inconsistent with the Booker

USCA Case #04-3129 Document #937134 Filed: 12/13/2005 Page 9 of 33
10

remedial opinion -- and not just the mandatory application of the

Guidelines -- as Booker error. A district court’s failure to

consider the sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), for

example, is a species of such non-constitutional (statutory) error.

See United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 115 (2d Cir. 2005);

infra Part III.B.

B

When a defendant does not timely object to an error in the

district court, appellate review is limited by the “plain error”

standard: “[T]here must be (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3)

that affect[s] substantial rights. If all three conditions are met,

an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a

forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affect[s] the

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”

Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997) (internal

citations and quotation marks omitted); see also FED. R. CRIM.

P. 52(b). Under the plain error standard, it “is the defendant

rather than the Government who bears the burden of persuasion

with respect to prejudice.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S.

725, 734 (1993).

 If a defendant does timely object to an alleged error in the

district court, appellate review is instead conducted in

accordance with the “harmless error” standard: If the district

court erred, we must correct the error if it affects the defendant’s

“substantial rights.” See FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a). “[I]n most

cases[, this] means that the error must have been prejudicial: It

must have affected the outcome of the district court

proceedings.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 734. The government bears

the burden of proving that prejudice did not result from the

error. See id.

USCA Case #04-3129 Document #937134 Filed: 12/13/2005 Page 10 of 33
11

7

For this reason, we have no occasion to consider what the

appropriate disposition would be if the district court had announced a

The test for harmless error comes in two models, one for

non-constitutional error and one for error of constitutional

dimension. See United States v. Powell, 334 F.3d 42, 45 (D.C.

Cir. 2003). A constitutional error is harmless if it appears

“beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not

contribute to the [sentence] obtained.” Chapman v. California,

386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). By contrast, a non-constitutional error

is harmless if it did not have a “substantial and injurious effect

or influence in determining” the sentence. Kotteakos v. United

States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946).

III

Simpson contends that the district court committed

constitutional Booker error by increasing his statutory maximum

based on the court’s own findings of fact under a mandatory

guidelines system. Further, because his trial counsel timely

objected on that ground, Simpson contends that his sentence

may be affirmed only if the error was harmless. Finally,

insisting that the error was not harmless, Simpson argues that his

sentence should be vacated and his case remanded for

resentencing.

The threshold question is whether there was error at all.

Although the district court spoke of imposing two “sentences,”

a primary and an alternative, the “judgment in a criminal case”

filed by that court records only a single sentence: 46 months’

imprisonment. J.A. 28-29. The judgment states that the

sentence “is imposed pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of

1984” and that, “[a]lternatively, the same sentence is imposed

by the Court in its discretion assuming the Sentencing

Guidelines do not apply.” Id. at 28 (emphasis added).7

USCA Case #04-3129 Document #937134 Filed: 12/13/2005 Page 11 of 33
12

different alternative sentence.

8

The parties dispute whether the error in the first sentence was

constitutional or non-constitutional. The dispute is generated by the

parenthetical caveat to Booker’s constitutional holding: “Any fact

(other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a

sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established

by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant

or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” Booker, 125 S. Ct. at

756 (emphasis added). Simpson contends that the district court’s

determination that he was still under a criminal justice sentence at the

time of the instant offense, and that the instant offense was committed

less than two years after his release from imprisonment, are not within

the “fact of a prior conviction” exception. If correct, this would mean

that Simpson’s first sentence was unlawful due to a Sixth Amendment

violation and not merely due to the mandatory application of the

Guidelines. Because we conclude that the court’s alternative sentence

requires affirmance in any event, we need not determine the scope of

the exception to resolve this appeal.

There is no question that the court’s first rationale (and

“sentence”) was error under Booker, as it was calculated based

on a mandatory application of the Guidelines.8 But “[i]n cases

on appeal from the district court, we are to review ‘judgments,

not opinions.’” People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t

of State, 182 F.3d 17, 23 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quoting Chevron

U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837,

842 (1984)); see Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292,

297 (1956). Of course, a sentence based on an invalid rationale

may be erroneous. But here, the district court provided two

independent rationales for the same sentence of 46 months. If

the alternative rationale is sufficient to support that judgment,

the judgment must be upheld. See, e.g., United States v. Jones,

948 F.2d 732, 740-41 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (affirming a Guidelines

departure that rested on both permissible and impermissible

grounds); United States v. Bowie, 232 F.3d 923, 929 (D.C. Cir.

USCA Case #04-3129 Document #937134 Filed: 12/13/2005 Page 12 of 33
13

2000) (upholding a district court’s evidentiary ruling on that

court’s alternative ground); United States v. Lugg, 892 F.2d 101,

105 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (denial of rehearing en banc) (finding no

error in a decision due to a valid independent ground).

On first glance, it does not appear that there was a material

error in the alternative rationale relied on by the district court.

In United States v. Coles, 403 F.3d 764 (D.C. Cir. 2005), a plain

error case, we said that “[a] prescient pre-Booker sentencing

court committing no error would have behaved just as a

sentencing court in the post-Booker era will operate: it would

have treated the Guidelines as advisory.” Id. at 768 (emphasis

added). The district court here looks very much like that

hypothetically prescient court. It considered the Guidelines as

a “reference point,” Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 49, and cited a number

of other factors relevant under § 3553(a) as well, see id. In the

balance of this Part, we consider three specific errors that

Simpson nonetheless contends are reflected in the district court’s

alternative rationale. 

A

Simpson’s first contention is that the court’s imposition of

an alternative sentence violated “the long-standing judicial

canon prohibiting advisory opinions.” Appellant’s Br. 8. At

oral argument, Simpson conceded that this was not a reference

to “advisory opinions” in the Article III sense, since there was --

and continues to be -- a live dispute between the parties that the

federal courts must adjudicate. Cf. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,

95-97 (1968) (noting that the proscription against advisory

opinions is based on Article III’s limitation of the federal

judicial power to “Cases” and “Controversies”). Rather, he

contends that the announcement of an alternative sentence

violates prudential norms. 

USCA Case #04-3129 Document #937134 Filed: 12/13/2005 Page 13 of 33
14

9

In the 1980s, appellate courts upheld the imposition of

alternative sentences in anticipation of a different challenge to the

constitutionality of the Guidelines, one that was ultimately resolved in

Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989). See, e.g., United

States v. Draper, 888 F.2d 1100 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v.

Brittman, 872 F.2d 827 (8th Cir. 1989). And in the period between

Blakely and Booker, several circuits expressly endorsed the calculation

of alternative sentences in order to avoid resentencing if the

Guidelines were invalidated. See, e.g., United States v. Dickerson,

381 F.3d 251, 260 n.9 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. Hammoud, 381

F.3d 316, 353-54 (4th Cir. 2004); United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d

508, 515 (7th Cir. 2004).

We disagree. As discussed above, Simpson’s alternative

sentence was essentially an independent ground by which the

district court reached the same judgment -- a sentence of 46

months’ imprisonment -- and thereby hoped to avoid the need

for resentencing if the constitutional challenge came out as the

court expected it would. The provision of alternative rationales

for the same judgment does not violate prudential norms; to the

contrary, it is a common component of judicial opinions.9 We

find no error in the district court’s decision merely to announce

an alternative sentence.

B

Simpson’s second contention is that Booker’s remedial

opinion requires courts to base sentences on the factors listed in

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and that the district court did not do so

here. Section 3553(a) enumerates a number of factors that a

court “shall” consider in imposing a sentence. These include the

(now advisory) range established by the Guidelines. See 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4). But they also include such factors as “the

nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and

characteristics of the defendant,” id. § 3553(a)(1); the need for

the sentence to “reflect the seriousness of the offense,” to

USCA Case #04-3129 Document #937134 Filed: 12/13/2005 Page 14 of 33
15

“promote respect for the law,” to “provide just punishment,” to

“afford adequate deterrence,” to “protect the public,” and to

“provide the defendant with needed . . . training [and] medical

care,” id. § 3553(a)(2); and the need to “avoid unwarranted

sentence disparities” among similarly situated defendants, id. §

3553(a)(6). 

Simpson is correct that Booker required sentencing courts

to consider the § 3553(a) factors. 125 S. Ct. at 764 (“Without

the ‘mandatory’ provision, the [Federal Sentencing] Act

nonetheless requires judges to take account of the Guidelines

together with [the] other sentencing goals. See 18 U.S.C.A. §

3553(a) (Supp.2004).”). In so doing, however, the Supreme

Court did not create a wholly new obligation. As Simpson

acknowledges, see Appellant’s Br. 19, judges have been

required to consider the § 3553(a) factors “in determining the

particular sentence to be imposed,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), since

the enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. See 18

U.S.C. § 3582; see also Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 108

(1996) (“The statute requires a court to consider the listed goals

. . . . in determining which sentence to choose from a given

Guideline range or from outside the range, if a departure is

appropriate.”).

The district court made clear that it did consider those

factors. In explaining its alternative sentence, the court

expressly addressed the nature and circumstances of the offense

and the history and characteristics of the defendant: 

[I take] into account the seriousness of this offense,

that it was a conscious, intentional decision by the

defendant following a conviction for an aggravated

felony offense and deportation . . . and that the Court is

not confident that Mr. Simpson would not choose to

USCA Case #04-3129 Document #937134 Filed: 12/13/2005 Page 15 of 33
16

return to the United States illegally in the future as

well.

Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 49. The court also took into account “the

interests of the criminal justice system” and “the interests and

sentencing objectives of punishment and deterrence.” Id. All of

this sounds in the terms of § 3553(a), and the court’s references

manifest an understanding of its statutory responsibility. See

United States v. Solis-Vaquera, No. 04-3627, 2005 WL

2108318, at *1 (7th Cir. Sept. 2, 2005) (inferring that a

sentencing court had examined the § 3553(a) factors from the

fact that it referenced three of them, albeit without statutory

citation).

It is true that the district court did not specifically refer to

each factor listed in § 3553(a). But we have not required courts

to do so. See United States v. Ayers, 428 F.3d 312, 315 (D.C.

Cir. 2005) (“[W]e ordinarily presume a district court imposing

an alternative non-guidelines sentence took into account all the

factors listed in § 3553(a) and accorded them the appropriate

significance.”). Nor have other circuits. See United States v.

Robles, 408 F.3d 1324, 1328 (11th Cir. 2005); cf. Crosby, 397

F.3d at 112-13 (noting that the Second Circuit’s previous

decisions involving “a sentencing judge’s duty to ‘consider’

matters relevant to sentencing . . . . have refrained from

imposing any rigorous requirement of specific articulation by

the sentencing judge”). Section 3553(c) provides that “[t]he

court, at the time of sentencing, shall state in open court the

reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(c). The district court met that requirement here, and the

statute does not require more in the way of explanation. See

United States v. Bridges, 175 F.3d 1062, 1066 (D.C. Cir. 1999);

United States v. Dozier, 162 F.3d 120, 124-25 (D.C. Cir.

USCA Case #04-3129 Document #937134 Filed: 12/13/2005 Page 16 of 33
17

10Something more is required if a district court imposes a

sentence outside the Guidelines range. Section 3553(c)(2) provides

that, if a sentence “is not of the kind, or is outside the range” described

by the Guidelines, the court must state “the specific reason for the

imposition of a sentence different from that described, which reasons

must also be stated with specificity in the written order of judgment

and commitment.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2) (emphasis added); see also

United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he

farther the judge’s sentence departs from the guidelines sentence . . .

, the more compelling the justification based on factors in section

3553(a) that the judge must offer in order to enable the court of

appeals to assess the reasonableness of the sentence imposed.”).

11Even if we were to regard the district court’s imposition of the

alternative sentence as erroneous because the court did not expressly

recognize its obligation to consider all of the § 3553(a) factors, such

an error would be statutory, not constitutional. See supra Part II.A.

1998).10 When a defendant has not asserted the import of a

particular § 3553(a) factor, nothing in the statute requires the

court to explain sua sponte why it did not find that factor

relevant to its discretionary decision. And nothing in Booker

added such a requirement. See Robles, 408 F.3d at 1328 (“Even

[post-Booker], we would not expect the district court in every

case to conduct an accounting of every § 3553(a) factor . . . and

expound upon how each factor played a role in its sentencing

decision.”); see also United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725, 728

(7th Cir. 2005) (rejecting the contention that “it is the duty of the

sentencing judge, in every case and whether or not the defendant

invokes any of the factors mentioned in section 3553(a), to make

an explicit, articulated analysis of all of them a part of the

sentencing process”); United States v. George, 403 F.3d 470,

472-73 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Judges need not rehearse on the record

all of the considerations that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) lists; it is

enough to calculate the range accurately and explain why (if the

sentence lies outside it) this defendant deserves more or less.”).11

USCA Case #04-3129 Document #937134 Filed: 12/13/2005 Page 17 of 33
18

Accordingly, we would regard it as harmless if it did not have a

“substantial and injurious effect” on the sentence. Kotteakos, 328 U.S.

750, 776 (1946); see supra Part II.B. The court’s failure to expressly

address the § 3553(a) factors did not have such an effect here, as the

court made clear that it would consider any factor the defense thought

relevant to mitigating the sentence.

C

Simpson’s third contention is that, by concomitantly

imposing primary and alternative sentences, the district court

violated his “right to be present at his sentencing and to have an

opportunity to present argument under now-applicable law.”

Appellant’s Br. 7-8. The first half of this contention need not

detain us, since Simpson was present at the sentencing hearing

at which his (single) 46-month term was imposed. The real

question is posed by the second half of the contention: Did

Simpson have an opportunity at that hearing to present argument

consistent with the law Booker later set down?

Simpson contends that he did not have such an opportunity

because there were a variety of mitigating circumstances that

courts were not permitted to consider -- or to consider fully --

under the mandatory Guidelines regime that preceded Booker.

Simpson’s opening brief contains a single such example. He

argues that, due to his status as a deportable alien, he faces “a

fortuitous increase in the severity of his sentence” -- by which

he means that he is ineligible for early release to community

confinement or assignment to a minimum security prison.

Appellant’s Br. 20. And Simpson notes that, pre-Booker, some

courts had held that downward departures from the Guidelines

sentencing range on the ground of such ineligibility were not

available in unlawful re-entry cases. See, e.g., United States v.

Ebolum, 72 F.3d 35, 38-39 (6th Cir. 1995).

USCA Case #04-3129 Document #937134 Filed: 12/13/2005 Page 18 of 33
19

12Simpson’s trial counsel argued that: (1) Simpson had only reentered the United States because he feared retribution from gang

members in Jamaica; (2) Simpson understood that he would again be

deported and he had no intent to re-enter the United States thereafter;

In his reply brief, Simpson cites a second mitigating

circumstance that he contends he was likewise unable to

advance pre-Booker. He argues that, as an unlawful re-entrant

arrested in the District of Columbia, he faces a stiffer sentence

than similar re-entrants arrested in border jurisdictions with

“fast-track” departure programs. See United States v. BanuelosRodriguez, 215 F.3d 969, 971 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that, under

the fast-track program in one California district, most unlawful

re-entrants are permitted to plead to an offense that carries a

two-year statutory maximum sentence). In light of § 3553(a)(6),

Simpson contends, he should have been able to ask the court to

reduce his sentence to avoid that disparity. See 18 U.S.C. §

3553(a)(6) (requiring the sentencing court to consider “the need

to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants

with similar records who have been found guilty of similar

conduct”).

The flaw in Simpson’s general argument is that, although

consideration of some mitigating factors was indeed barred (or

limited) under the mandatory Guidelines regime, see Koon, 518

U.S. at 92-95, the alternative sentencing methodology employed

by his sentencing court did not treat the Guidelines as

mandatory. Nor did the court exclude or limit its consideration

of any category of sentencing factors. To the contrary, the court

extended Simpson an open-ended invitation to make mitigating

arguments, regardless of whether they would have been

available under the Guidelines scheme. See Sentencing Hr’g Tr.

25-26. And Simpson responded to that invitation by citing a

series of factors in support of a sentence well below the

Guidelines range. See Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 27-34.12

USCA Case #04-3129 Document #937134 Filed: 12/13/2005 Page 19 of 33
20

and (3) Simpson had tried to cooperate with the government after his

arrest. See Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 27-35. His counsel contended that, in

light of these considerations and the fact that he would still have to

answer to a federal court in Virginia for violating his supervised

release, the district court should “consider imposing a sentence of time

served.” Id. at 34.

Accordingly, and contrary to his contention on appeal, Simpson

did have an opportunity at his sentencing hearing to present

argument consistent with the law as later set forth in Booker.

It is true that the district court did not address the two

specific mitigating circumstances Simpson cites in his appellate

briefs. That was not, however, because the court barred their

consideration. Rather, it was because Simpson failed to suggest

them. In the closest analogy under the mandatory Guidelines

regime, this Circuit initially ruled that it could not discern error

at all in a court’s failure to address unrequested grounds for a

discretionary sentencing departure. See United States v.

Leandre, 132 F.3d 796, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that “the

district court cannot be faulted for failing sua sponte to also

address whether [the defendant’s] deportable status would affect

the severity of his sentence”); see also United States v. Pinnick,

47 F.3d 434, 440 (D.C. Cir. 1995). In later cases, we settled on

a plain error standard of review for such claims. See United

States v. Draffin, 286 F.3d 606, 609 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding

that the failure to grant a sentencing departure on an unrequested

ground is reviewable only for plain error); In re Sealed Case,

204 F.3d 1170, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (same).

 We cannot find plain error here. To establish the second

element of plain error, see supra Part II.B, an appellant must

show that, “from the perspective of the trial court, the claimed

error was so plain that the trial judge and prosecutor were

derelict in countenancing it, even absent the defendant’s timely

USCA Case #04-3129 Document #937134 Filed: 12/13/2005 Page 20 of 33
21

assistance in detecting it.” Draffin, 286 F.3d at 610 (internal

quotation marks omitted). Given the multitude of factors

potentially relevant in a discretionary sentencing scheme, we

must be particularly cautious in finding plain error when trial

counsel has failed to suggest a particular factor, lest we end up

remanding whenever appellate counsel asserts a factor her

predecessor did not. Indeed, under the prior sentencing regime,

we held that “[o]rdinarily, [plain] error will not be found where

the lawyer fails to propose a discretionary departure ground . .

. .” Draffin, 286 F.3d at 610; see also Leandre, 132 F.3d at 808.

Moreover, given the district court’s adoption of an alternative

sentencing methodology under which it was willing to consider

any mitigating circumstances, Simpson cannot satisfy his burden

of proving (under the third element of the plain error test) that,

if only the court had had the benefit of reading Booker itself,

there is a reasonable likelihood it would have considered these

two specific circumstances and imposed a sentence materially

more favorable to the defendant. See Coles, 403 F.3d at 767;

United States v. Saro, 24 F.3d 283, 288 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

Recognizing the hurdle posed by relying on arguments that

he could have asserted at sentencing, Simpson added a new twist

to his “fast-track” disparity contention at oral argument. Noting

that prior to Booker he could not have anticipated how postBooker courts would treat unlawful re-entrants, Simpson

complained that he was therefore disabled from pointing out

disparities in the way that border and non-border courts would

sentence such offenders after Booker. In short, Simpson insisted

he could not effectively make a § 3553(a)(6) argument based on

fast-track disparities until a post-Booker track record of such

disparities developed.

This argument proves too much. Thanks to its prescience

regarding the fate of the Guidelines, Simpson’s sentencing court

was in approximately the same position as that of the first

USCA Case #04-3129 Document #937134 Filed: 12/13/2005 Page 21 of 33
22

13We have also determined that, if there were an error in the

alternative sentencing rationale employed in this case, that error would

district courts to render sentences after Booker. Yet it cannot be

argued that those early post-Booker sentences must also be

vacated because their recipients did not have the opportunity to

compare their sentences with sentences imposed even later.

Indeed, on Simpson’s theory, no sentencing could ever be the

first. Each would have to await others so that there could be a

basis for comparison -- which, of course, means that no

sentencing could ever occur. 

Simpson’s argument does not fail merely because of this

reductio ad absurdum. It also fails because it is inconsistent

with Booker itself. There, the Supreme Court remanded for the

resentencing of defendants Booker and Fanfan, without any

suggestion that the district courts should wait until a track record

was established by other courts. 125 S. Ct. at 769. Thus, 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6), which requires sentencing courts to

consider “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities

among defendants with similar records who have been found

guilty of similar conduct,” id. (emphasis added), must be read to

refer to disparities with past and present sentences -- not with

hypothetical future ones. 

In sum, we find no cognizable error in the alternative

rationale that the district court provided for its sentencing

calculation, and hence no cognizable error in the 46-month

sentence that the court imposed on Simpson.

IV

This opinion has proceeded on the basis that, if there is no

error in a district court’s alternative sentencing rationale, there

is no error in the sentence the court imposed.13 Appellate panels

USCA Case #04-3129 Document #937134 Filed: 12/13/2005 Page 22 of 33
23

be non-constitutional because the district court regarded application

of the Guidelines as non-mandatory. See supra note 11.

14See United States v. Chandler, 419 F.3d 484, 485 (6th Cir.

2005) (“In this case, . . . the district court not only determined the

Defendant’s sentence pursuant to the Guidelines, but also [in the

alternative] treated the Guidelines as advisory and sentenced the

Defendant pursuant to the sentencing factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. §

3553(a). Thus, the imposition of the Defendant’s sentence does not

implicate the Sixth Amendment” (footnote omitted)); United States v.

Porter, 417 F.3d 914, 917 (8th Cir. 2005) (“In some circumstances, an

alternative sentence can render a Booker error harmless. Or perhaps

more precisely, an alternative sentence can demonstrate that the

district court’s imposition of sentence involved no error at all, because

in one of the alternatives, the sentence was imposed consistent with

Booker.” (citations omitted)).

15See, e.g., United States v. Gill, No. 04-4947, 2005 WL 2436641,

at *2 (4th Cir. Oct. 4, 2005) (“[B]ecause the district court imposed an

alternative discretionary sentence pursuant to § 3553(a) that was

identical to the guidelines sentence, the Sixth Amendment error was

harmless.”); United States v. Cardenas, No. 04-11062, 135 Fed. Appx.

688, 690 (5th Cir. 2005) (“In this case, based on the alternative

judgment, the Government has met its burden of demonstrating

beyond a reasonable doubt that the Sixth Amendment violation at

issue did not contribute to the sentence that Cardenas received.”);

United States v. Christopher, 415 F.3d 590, 592 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Any

error in Christopher’s sentencing was harmless, because the district

in the Sixth and Eighth Circuits have suggested a similar

analysis.14 Other circuits have taken a different approach,

assuming that Booker error in a district court’s primary sentence

constitutes error in the judgment, and then asking whether the

court’s pronouncement of a lawful alternative sentence renders

that error harmless. Utilizing that approach, the circuits have

frequently found such error harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt.15

USCA Case #04-3129 Document #937134 Filed: 12/13/2005 Page 23 of 33
24

court adequately conveyed that it would impose the same sentence in

the absence of mandatory sentencing enhancements.”); United States

v. Solis-Vaquera, No. 04-3627, 2005 WL 2108318, at *1 (7th Cir.

Aug. 31, 2005) (“[T]he error was harmless in this case because the

district court selected an alternative sentence in accordance with our

advice in Booker.”); United States v. Thompson, 408 F.3d 994, 997

(8th Cir. 2005) (“Because the sentencing court made known that it

would impose the same 420-month sentence after taking [the §

3553(a)] considerations into account, any error was harmless beyond

a reasonable doubt.”); United States v. Becenti, No. 04-2187, 134 Fed.

Appx. 256, 257 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Sixth Amendment error here

was harmless because the district court imposed an alternative

sentence[,] . . . . and we are therefore not in the zone of speculation

and conjecture regarding whether the error affected the court’s

selection of the sentence imposed.” (internal quotation marks

omitted)); United States v. Robles, 408 F.3d 1324, 1328 (11th Cir.

2005) (holding a constitutional Booker error harmless on the ground

that, because the “district court stated its sentence would be the same

even if the guidelines were only advisory[,] . . . . we know with

certainty beyond a reasonable doubt what the district court would do

upon remand”); see also United States v. Hill, 411 F.3d 425, 426 (3d

Cir. 2005) (holding that, where “a District Court clearly indicates that

an alternative sentence would be identical to the sentence imposed

under the Guidelines, any error that may attach to a defendant’s

sentence under Booker is harmless”).

16Although the parties dispute whether the first sentence’s failing

was constitutional or non-constitutional, see supra note 8, the

difference is not dispositive because we would find any error harmless

even on the stricter constitutional standard. See generally supra Part

II.B.

Were we to apply such an analysis here, we would reach the

same result. Simpson’s objection to the district court’s

mandatory application of the Guidelines in calculating his

sentence was sufficient to preserve that objection for harmless

error review.16 But the existence of the alternative sentence,

USCA Case #04-3129 Document #937134 Filed: 12/13/2005 Page 24 of 33
25

17In United States v. Ayers, 428 F.3d 312 (D.C. Cir. 2005), we

followed this harmless error analytic approach because it was the

framework upon which the parties had agreed. 428 F.3d at 314.

There, however, we found the Booker error in the primary sentence

harmful -- despite the district court’s announcement of an alternative,

non-Guidelines sentence -- because the court had denied the defendant

an opportunity to present “additional mitigating evidence specifically

for the court’s use in determining his non-guidelines sentence.” Id. at

315. Such evidence “would have been relevant, of course, to the

court’s analysis under § 3553(a),” id., and the denial was thus contrary

to the sentencing methodology prescribed in Booker. Here, by

contrast, the district court invited Simpson to present any mitigating

evidence he wished, and the court’s methodology was consistent with

Booker’s prescription.

18Although the passage was dicta in Crosby, the Second Circuit

has recently adopted it in holding that a particular alternative sentence

was not harmless error. See United States v. Fuller, 426 F.3d 556, 561

(2d Cir. 2005).

imposed in a manner consistent with the post-Booker sentencing

regime, removes any mystery as to what the district court would

have done had Booker been the law at the time of Simpson’s

sentencing. Consequently, any error in the first sentence is

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.17

In opposition to this conclusion, Simpson draws our

attention to a passage in a Second Circuit opinion, United States

v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2005), which questions whether

an alternative sentence can ever render Booker error harmless.18

The first sentence of the passage, and its accompanying

footnote, reads as follows:

[E]ven if a judge, prior to Booker/Fanfan, indicated an

alternative sentence that would have been imposed if

compliance with the Guidelines were not required, that

USCA Case #04-3129 Document #937134 Filed: 12/13/2005 Page 25 of 33
26

alternative sentence is not necessarily the same one

that the judge would have imposed in compliance with

the duty to consider all of the factors listed in section

3553(a).*/

*/ Although the duty to comply with section

3553(a) existed prior to Booker/Fanfan, it is

unlikely that a sentencing judge anticipating that

decision would have anticipated the full import of

the Remedy Opinion, and considered the section

3553(a) factors, including the guidelines, with

awareness of the excision of the subsection [that

made the Guidelines mandatory].

Id. at 118 & n.18. Unlike the judge hypothesized in Crosby,

Simpson’s sentencing judge was particularly prescient. He did

anticipate Booker’s remedial opinion and did consider the §

3553(a) factors with an awareness that he should do so on a nonmandatory basis. We are therefore confident that the alternative

sentence in this case is in fact “the same one that the judge

would have imposed in compliance with the duty to consider all

of the factors listed in section 3553(a).” Id. at 118. 

The second sentence of the cited passage from Crosby

continues:

In addition, such an alternative sentence is not

necessarily the same one that the judge would have

imposed after presentation by the Government of

aggravating circumstances or by the defendant of

mitigating circumstances that existed at the time but

were not available for consideration under the

mandatory Guidelines regime.

USCA Case #04-3129 Document #937134 Filed: 12/13/2005 Page 26 of 33
27

Id. Again, contrary to the Crosby hypothetical, any mitigating

circumstances that existed at the time were available for

consideration under the alternative sentencing regime employed

by Simpson’s sentencing judge. Accordingly, if there were any

error, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

V

Although the district court pronounced sentence on Joseph

Simpson prior to the Supreme Court’s substantial restructuring

of the federal sentencing regime in United States v. Booker, the

court accurately predicted the course the Supreme Court would

ultimately take. Because the district court’s alternative

sentencing methodology was materially consistent with that of

Booker, the court’s judgment is 

Affirmed.

USCA Case #04-3129 Document #937134 Filed: 12/13/2005 Page 27 of 33
SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring:

I concur fully in the court’s opinion, but write separately to

discuss the government’s waiver argument. Although it is

perfectly appropriate for the court to rest its decision on the

alternative grounds we have used, normally we would consider

first whether, as the government contends, Simpson waived the

right to appeal his sentence on the basis he asserts. See United

States v. West, 392 F.3d 450, 458 (D.C. Cir. 2004).

Upon reading the briefs, I concluded that Simpson

knowingly and intelligently waived the right to appeal his

sentence on the basis of Booker errors. Simpson’s plea

agreement included the following waiver provision:

Limited Waiver of Appeal: Your client is aware that federal

law . . . affords him the right to appeal his sentence. . . .

[T]he defendant waives the right to appeal his sentence or

the manner in which it was determined . . . , except to the

extent that (a) the Court sentences the defendant to a period

of imprisonment longer than the statutory maximum or (b)

the Court departs upward from the applicable Sentencing

Guideline range . . . . Realizing the uncertainty in

estimating what sentence the Judge will ultimately impose,

the defendant knowingly and willingly waives his right to

appeal the sentence, to the extent noted above, in exchange

for the concessions made by the [government] in this

agreement.

By his signature, Simpson acknowledged that he had “read [the]

plea agreement and carefully reviewed every part of it with [his]

attorney” and that he “fully underst[ood] this plea agreement

and voluntarily agree[d] to it.” At Simpson’s plea hearing, the

court asked Simpson if he had “had the opportunity to read over

the letter containing the plea agreement carefully” and if he had

“had the chance to discuss [the plea agreement] with [his]

counsel,” to which he answered in the affirmative. The court

USCA Case #04-3129 Document #937134 Filed: 12/13/2005 Page 28 of 33
2

also asked Simpson, “do you understand that under the plea

agreement in this case, you are giving up your right to appeal the

sentence that I impose to the extent that is noted in the plea

agreement,” and Simpson replied, “Yes, sir.”

Simpson asserts that the waiver was not knowing and

intelligent because “it was based on misinformation as to the

mandatory nature of the sentencing guidelines,” but the Supreme

Court has held that imperfect knowledge of future developments

in the law has no bearing on the question of the validity of a

waiver. For instance, in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742

(1970), the Court observed that

[a] defendant is not entitled to withdraw his plea merely

because he discovers long after the plea has been accepted

that his calculus misapprehended the quality of the State’s

case or the likely penalties attached to alternative courses of

action. More particularly, absent misrepresentation or other

impermissible conduct by state agents, a voluntary plea of

guilty intelligently made in the light of the then applicable

law does not become vulnerable because later judicial

decisions indicate that the plea rested on a faulty premise.

A plea of guilty triggered by the expectations of a

competently counseled defendant that the State will have a

strong case against him is not subject to later attack because

the defendant's lawyer correctly advised him with respect to

the then existing law as to possible penalties but later

pronouncements of the courts, as in this case, hold that the

maximum penalty for the crime in question was less than

was reasonably assumed at the time the plea was entered.

Id. at 757 (citation omitted). More than 30 years later, the

Supreme Court reaffirmed Brady and explained that “the

Constitution, in respect to a defendant’s awareness of relevant

circumstances, does not require complete knowledge of the

USCA Case #04-3129 Document #937134 Filed: 12/13/2005 Page 29 of 33
3

1

See also United States v. Sahlin, 399 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 2005)

(rejecting a defendant’s argument that Booker rendered his plea

involuntary and observing that “the possibility of a favorable change

in the law occurring after a plea is one of the normal risks that

accompany a guilty plea”); United States v. Bond, 414 F.3d 542, 545

(5th Cir. 2005) (delineating the bounds of a sentence-appeal waiver

where a defendant conceded that the waiver’s broad language covered

Booker errors).

relevant circumstances, but permits a court to accept a guilty

plea, with its accompanying waiver of various constitutional

rights, despite various forms of misapprehension under which a

defendant might labor.” United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622,

630 (2002). Applying these cases, nine circuit courts have

definitively upheld pre-Booker sentence-appeal waivers against

post-Booker claims of a right to a discretionary sentence.

See United States v. Morgan, 406 F.3d 135, 137 (2d Cir. 2005);

United States v. Lockett, 406 F.3d 207, 214 (3d Cir. 2005);

United States v. Johnson, 410 F.3d 137, 152-53 (4th Cir. 2005);

United States v. Bradley, 400 F.3d 459, 463-64 (6th Cir. 2005);

United States v. Bownes, 405 F.3d 634, 636 (7th Cir. 2005);

United States v. Killgo, 397 F.3d 628, 629 n.2 (8th Cir. 2005);

United States v. Cortez-Arias, 425 F.3d 547, 548 (9th Cir. 2005);

United States v. Green, 405 F.3d 1180, 1190 (10th Cir. 2005);

United States v. Frye, 402 F.3d 1123, 1129 (11th Cir. 2005).1

This would have seemed to settle the waiver issue against

Simpson, had he not brought to the court’s attention Halbert v.

Michigan, 125 S. Ct. 2582 (2005), in a Rule 28(j) letter the day

before oral argument. Simpson relies on Halbert for the

proposition that a defendant pleading guilty cannot waive a right

that has not yet been recognized – in Simpson’s case, “the right

to obtain a discretionary sentence via appeal.” 

USCA Case #04-3129 Document #937134 Filed: 12/13/2005 Page 30 of 33
4

In Halbert, the Court addressed the constitutionality of a

Michigan constitutional amendment limiting the appellate rights

of defendants who plead guilty or nolo contendere. Under the

amendment, such defendants have no appeal of right to the

Michigan Court of Appeals, the state’s intermediate appellate

court. See Mich. Const. art. I, § 20. Instead, defendants must

petition the court for leave to appeal and, in most cases, indigent

defendants are not entitled to appointed counsel to aid them

during this process. See Halbert, 125 S. Ct. at 2588. The Court

invalidated the Michigan scheme and held that it created a

situation more like an appeal of right, for which Douglas v.

California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), requires the appointment of

counsel, than a discretionary appeal, for which Ross v. Moffitt,

417 U.S. 600 (1974), provides that such appointment is not

constitutionally required. The Court reasoned that “Michigan’s

intermediate appellate court looks to the merits of the claims

made in the application” and that “indigent defendants pursuing

first-tier review in the Court of Appeals are generally ill

equipped to represent themselves.” Halbert, 125 S. Ct. at 2590.

Relevant to our case, the majority responded to Michigan’s

contention that “even if Halbert had a constitutionally

guaranteed right to appointed counsel for first-level appellate

review, he waived that right.” Id. at 2594. The Court’s response

included two independent grounds. First, the Court stated,

surprisingly, that “Halbert, in common with other defendants

convicted on their pleas, had no recognized right to appointed

appellate counsel he could elect to forgo.” Id. (emphasis added).

The court also rejected Michigan’s waiver argument because

“the trial court did not tell Halbert, simply and directly, that in

his case, there would be no access to appointed counsel.” Id. 

It is of course the first ground on which Simpson relies. He

claims that the “[un]recognized right to appointed appellate

counsel” at issue in Halbert is indistinguishable from the

USCA Case #04-3129 Document #937134 Filed: 12/13/2005 Page 31 of 33
5

2

Only the Ninth Circuit’s Booker-waiver decision, Cortez-Arias,

was issued post-Halbert.

“[un]recognized” jury trial right at issue in Booker, and suggests

that Halbert’s sweeping anti-waiver language casts doubt not

only on the circuit courts’ Booker-waiver cases, but also on both

Brady and Ruiz. Justice Thomas actually recognized this newly

created tension in his dissent. After musing that “[w]hat this

cryptic statement” – “no[t] recognized” – “means is unclear,”

Halbert, 125 S. Ct. at 2604 (Thomas, J., dissenting), Justice

Thomas observed, presciently, that

the majority’s failure to make clear which sources of law

are to be considered in deciding whether a right is “no[t]

recognized,” and hence nonwaivable, is bound to wreak

havoc. For instance, suppose that a defendant waived the

right to appeal his sentence after the regional Court of

Appeals had held that the principle of Blakely v.

Washington did not apply to the United States Sentencing

Guidelines, but before this Court held the contrary in

United States v. Booker. The defendant could claim that, in

his circuit, the Sixth Amendment right against the

application of the Guidelines was “no[t] recognized,” and

hence that the right was nonwaivable.

Id. at 2604 n.2 (citations omitted). 

The Supreme Court majority’s blithe drive-by implicit

questioning of the considered views of eight circuit courts,2

 not

to speak of the doubt it casts upon its own precedent, is to say

the least rather discouraging to circuit judges. I suspect the

Supreme Court’s approach stems from its disposition to decide

the issues that generate certiorari interest “come hell or high

water.” The shame of it is that the manner in which the Court

decides cases is more important than what it decides. It is the

USCA Case #04-3129 Document #937134 Filed: 12/13/2005 Page 32 of 33
6

former that has the greatest influence on the American judiciary.

See United States v. Moore, 110 F.3d 99, 102 (D.C. Cir. 1997)

(Silberman, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). In

acting as it did in Halbert, the Court once again demonstrated

that it sees itself primarily as a tribunal for issue determination

rather than resolution of cases and controversies – which is why

I have referred to it as a “noncourt court.” See Lederman v.

United States, 291 F.3d 36, 48 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (Silberman, J.,

concurring).

In any event, Halbert certainly leads us to pretermit the

waiver issue and instead rely on the alternative grounds set forth

in the court’s opinion. 

USCA Case #04-3129 Document #937134 Filed: 12/13/2005 Page 33 of 33