Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-04040/USCOURTS-ca10-95-04040-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Anthony Brian Lewis
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

FILED .. ~·~ Unlted States Court ~f Av~ ..... - Tenth Cirrmt 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

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DEC 0 5 1995 

PATRICK FISHER Clerl~ 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

vs. No. 95-4040 

ANTHONY BRIAN LEWIS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 

(D.C. No. 94-CR-12 S) 

Bruce C. Lubeck, Assistant United States Attorney (Scott M. 

Matheson, Jr., United States Attorney, with him on the brief), 

Salt Lake City, Utah, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Charles F. Loyd, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before BALDOCK, McWILLIAMS, and REAVLEY,* Circuit Judges. 

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge. 

On February 23, 1993, Defendant Anthony Brian Lewis was 

paroled from Utah State Prison while serving a sentence for 

unlawful possession of crack cocaine. Defendant's Parole 

Agreement authorized "a Parole Agent to search [his] person, 

residence, vehicle, or any other property under [his] control, 

without a warrant, any time day or night, upon reasonable 

* The Honorable .Thomas J. Reavley, Senior Circuit Judge, United 

States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting by 

designation. 

Appellate Case: 95-4040 Document: 01019280398 Date Filed: 12/05/1995 Page: 1 
suspicion as ascertained by a Parole Agent, to insure compliance 

with the conditions of [his] parole." On October 13, 1993, parole 

agents, accompanied by Salt Lake City police officers, searched 

Defendant's home without a warrant after receiving a confidential 

informant's tip to the police that Defendant might be selling 

crack cocaine. The agents' search uncovered approximately five 

grams of crack cocaine. 

Defendant pled guilty to a one count information charging him 

with possession of crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 844(a). Defendant, however, reserved his right under Fed. R. 

Crim. P. ll(a) (2) to appeal the district court's denial of his 

motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search.l The 

district court sentenced Defendant to 104 months imprisonment and 

Defendant appealed. Defendant asserts the confidential 

informant's tip was insufficient to establish the necessary 

reasonable suspicion to justify a warrantless search of his 

residence. Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

On appeal from a denial of a motion to suppress, we view the 

evidence in a light most favorable to the government and accept 

the district court's findings of historical fact unless clearly 

erroneous. United States v. Maden, 64 F.3d 1505, 1508 (lOth Cir. 

1 Rule ll(a) (2) states: 

Conditional Pleas. With the approval of the court and 

the consent of the government, a defendant may enter a 

conditional plea of guilty or nolo contendere, reserving 

in writing the right, on appeal from the judgment, to 

review of the adverse determination of any specified 

pretrial motion. A defendant who prevails on appeal 

shall be allowed to withdraw the plea. 

Fed. R. Crim. P. ll(a)(2). 

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Appellate Case: 95-4040 Document: 01019280398 Date Filed: 12/05/1995 Page: 2 
1995). We review the district court's ultimate determination of 

reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment de novo. Id. We have 

thoroughly reviewed the record and find ample support for the 

findings of the district court, which we summarize below. Because 

the facts establish reasonable suspicion to justify the 

warrantless search of Defendant's residence, we affirm. 

I. 

Salt Lake City police officer Isaac Astencio had been working 

with a confidential drug informant for three to four months. In 

September 1993, the informant advised Astencio that a man called 

"Gucci 11 was selling crack cocaine. Although he did not know 

Gucci's full identity, the informant provided Astencio with a 

license plate number from Gucci's car. Astencio ran the plate 

number which named Defendant as the registered owner. Further 

investigation revealed that Defendant was on parole in Utah. 

Astencio informed the parole division of the Utah Department of 

Corrections that he was investigating Defendant. 

On the evening of October 13, 1993, Astencio and the 

informant planned a "controlled purchase" from the Defendant. The 

informant twice unsuccessfully attempted to contact Defendant 

through a pager number. Astencio and the informant then proceeded 

to the Defendant's residence in Salt Lake City, but again were 

unable to contact Defendant. Shortly thereafter, Astencio tried 

unsuccessfully to phone Defendant's assigned parole agent, Bill 

Stephenson, to inform him of Defendant's suspected criminal 

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Appellate Case: 95-4040 Document: 01019280398 Date Filed: 12/05/1995 Page: 3 
activity. Astencio left a message indicating he was discontinuing 

his investigation of Defendant. 

Later that evening, Astencio spoke with parole agent Leslie 

Lewis at the police station.and informed her of the situation. 

Although Astencio did not request Lewis' assistance, Lewis 

contacted parole agent Arthur Street, who was making home visits 

on his assigned caseload, and informed him of Defendant's 

suspected involvement in selling crack cocaine. Lewis asked 

Street to make a "home visit" on Defendant. Street, accompanied 

by another parole agent, arrived at Defendant's residence around 

10:30 p.m. Street had no prior involvement with the Defendant. 

Street knocked on the door and Defendant answered. Street 

identified himself and his partner as parole agents and informed 

Defendant that they were conducting a home visit. Because his 

partner was female, Street asked Defendant, who was in his 

underwear, to get dressed. Street followed the Defendant into the 

bedroom where he observed circular pieces of plastic commonly used 

in packaging small amounts of cocaine. Street also noticed a 

large bulge in Defendant's pants pocket, which Street subsequently 

identified as $540.00 in cash. Defendant indicated he earned 

$5.00 an hour and had just been paid. 

Based upon the plastic circles, the large amount of cash, and 

the information he had received from Lewis regarding Defendant's 

suspected involvement with cocaine, Street concluded that backup 

support was needed before thoroughly searching Defendant's 

residence to determine compliance with the conditions of his 

parole. Street radioed Lewis for assistance. A few moments 

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Appellate Case: 95-4040 Document: 01019280398 Date Filed: 12/05/1995 Page: 4 
later, Lewis and three Salt Lake City police officers, including 

Astencio, arrived. In the kitchen garbage can, agents located a 

pager and a wad of paper containing crack cocaine. 

II. 

The Fourth Amendment provides protection from unreasonable 

searches and seizures.2 Generally, law enforcement officials 

should conduct searches pursuant to a warrant supported by 

probable cause. Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, l15 S. Ct. 

2386, 2390-91 (1995). The Supreme Court, however, has recognized 

exceptions to the warrant requirement where 11 'special needs, 

beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and 

probable-cause requirement impracticable.' 11 Griffin v. Wisconsin, 

483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 

325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring)). 

A state's parole system presents such 11 special needs. 11 See 

Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873-74 (applying 11 special needs 11 exception to 

probation system). Parolees do not enjoy 11 the absolute liberty to 

which every citizen is entitled, but only . . conditional 

liberty properly dependent on observance of special parole 

restrictions. 11 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1982). 

2 The Fourth Amendment states: 

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 

houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 

searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 

Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported 

by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 

place to be .searched, and the persons or things to be 

seized. 

U.S. Canst. amend. IV. 

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Appellate Case: 95-4040 Document: 01019280398 Date Filed: 12/05/1995 Page: 5 
These restrictions are designed to ensure rehabilitation and 

protect the public. These twin aims justify the state limiting a 

parolee's Fourth Amendment rights and consequent expectations of 

privacy. See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 875. 

To determine the lawfulness of a warrantless search, we 

balance the parolee's expectations of privacy against the state's 

interests to determine the level of individualized suspicion 

necessary to support a warrantless search. Romo v. Champion, 46 

F.3d 1013, 1017 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 64 U.S.L.W. 3316 

(1995) . In this instance, we look to Utah state law to determine 

whether the 11 Special needs 11 of its parole system justify the 

warrantless search of Defendant's home. See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 

875. The search will satisfy the Fourth Amendment's 

reasonableness requirement to the extent parole_ agents carried it 

out pursuant to state law which itself satisfies the Fourth 

Amendment's reasonableness requirement. Id. at 873. 

III. 

We first conclude that the 11 special needs 11 of Utah's 

probation system justify a warrant exception in the parole 

context. See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 867 (approving Wisconsin's 

warrant exception in probation context) . The parole system is 11 a 

controlled passageway between prison and freedom. 11 State v. 

Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1983). Parole agents necessarily 

exercise close supervisory powers over their subjects to assure a 

successful transition. To adequately monitor a parolee's progress 

and deter further criminal conduct, a parole agent must be 

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Appellate Case: 95-4040 Document: 01019280398 Date Filed: 12/05/1995 Page: 6 
permitted in the proper instance to act expeditiously and without 

warning. 11 [T]he delay inherent in obtaining a warrant would make 

it more difficult for . . . officials to respond quickly to 

evidence of misconduct and would reduce the deterrent effect that 

the possibility of expeditious searches would otherwise create. 11 

Griffin, 483 U.S. at 867. 

Further, we conclude that the prerequisites to a warrantless 

search of a parolee's residence in Utah comply with the Fourth 

Amendment's reasonableness requirement. The Utah Supreme Court 

has held a warrantless search of a parolee to be valid where the 

evidence establishes 11 (1) that the parole agent has a reasonable 

suspicion that the parolee has committed a parole violation or 

crime, and (2) that the search is reasonably related to the parole 

agent's duty. 11 State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069, 1072-73 (Utah 

1987).3 

In Griffin, the Supreme Court upheld a probation officer's 

(not the defendant's assigned probation officer) warrantless 

search of a Wisconsin probationer's residence based solely on 

information obtained from police that the probationer might 

possess guns. The Court acknowledged that this evidence alone was 

sufficient to satisfy the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness 

requirement in the probation context: 

3 The first requirement is consistent with the standardized 

language of the Utah Parole Agreement which Defendant signed. The 

second requirement deters police officers from using parole agents 

to evade the necessity of procuring a warrant prior to a search. 

This is not to say, however, that a parole agent's search is 

unlawful because the police assist in the search or benefit from 

its fruits. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1072-73. 

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Appellate Case: 95-4040 Document: 01019280398 Date Filed: 12/05/1995 Page: 7 
[W]e think it reasonable to permit information provided 

by a police officer, whether or not on the basis of 

firsthand knowledge, to support a probationer search. 

. . . [W]e think it enough if the information provided 

indicates, as it did here, only the likelihood ("had or 

might have guns") of facts justifying the search. 

Griffin, 483 U.S. at 879-80. Applying Griffin in the parole 

context of this case, the Utah Supreme Court's warrantless search 

standard set forth in Johnson is consistent with the Fourth 

Amendment's reasonableness standard. Johnson authorizes a 

warrantless search of a parolee only when "the parol officer has a 

reasonable suspicion that the parolee has committed a parole 

violation or crime and . . . the search is reasonably related to 

the parole officer's duty." Johnson, 748 P.2d at 1072. At a 

minimum, this standard ensures that a parole agent may search a 

parolee's residence only if there exists "the likelihood of facts 

justifying the search". Griffin, 483 U.S. at 890. Consequently, 

the Utah standard satisfies the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness 

requirement.4 

IV. 

Next, we must determine whether the parole agents carried out 

the search of Defendant's residence in accord with the Utah 

warrantless search standard. Officer Astencio had been working 

4 The Utah Supreme Court also has recognized that "under the 

reasonable suspicion standard, searches have generally been upheld 

where the parole officer's suspicion is based only on a tip by an 

anonymous informer, the police or other sources." Velasguez, 672 

P.2d at 1262 (reasonable suspicion based on informant's tip 

relayed by police and observation that parolee had no visible 

means of support); accord State v. Martinez, 811 P.2d 205, 209-10 

(Utah Ct. App. 1991) (tip relayed by police officer sufficient to 

support reasonable suspicion) . 

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Appellate Case: 95-4040 Document: 01019280398 Date Filed: 12/05/1995 Page: 8 
with the informant for three to four months and had confidence in 

the informant's reliability. The license plate check of "Gucci" 

revealed the suspect as Defendant. A further background check 

indicated Defendant was on parole in Utah. Thus, Astencio was 

acting on more than a "whim" or "hunch" when he and his informant 

attempted to make a controlled purchase from Defendant. Rather, 

the information which Astencio possessed, and which he relayed to 

parole agents, created a reasonable suspicion of Defendant's drug 

activity justifying the parole agents' warrantless search of his 

residence. Accordingly, we reject Defendant's argument that the 

confidential informant's tip to Officer Astencio, subsequently 

relayed to Parole Agent Lewis, was insufficient to establish 

reasonable suspicion in compliance with the Fourth Amendment.S 

Finally, we conclude that the search was reasonably related 

to the parole agents' duties, Johnson, 748 P.2d 1072-73, and to 

the "legitimate demands of the operation of the parol process," 

Velasquez, 672 P.2d at 1263. Agents performed the search because 

of legitimate concerns relating to Defendant's suspected drug 

activity and compliance with the terms of his parole. To 

adequately deter misconduct and protect the public, parole agents 

must be permitted to act expeditiously upon reasonable suspicion 

5 Defendant suggests that because parole agent Street initially 

characterized the search of Defendant's residence as a home visit, 

only Defendant's assigned probation agent was authorized to 

conduct it absent a warrant. Defendant points to language in his 

parole agreement that authorizes home visits "as required by my 

Parole Agent." (emphasis added). Lest the court become a citadel 

of technicality, we believe a parole agent's characterization of a 

search is irrelevant where, as in this case, the agent possesses a 

reasonable suspicion of criminal misconduct and the search is 

reasonably related to the legitimate demands of the parole system. 

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Appellate Case: 95-4040 Document: 01019280398 Date Filed: 12/05/1995 Page: 9 
of a parole violation. Consequently, we conclude the parole 

agents acted in a manner reasonably related to their duty. 

We hold the warrantless search of Defendant's residence was 

reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because 

parole agents conducted the search pursuant to state law which 

itself satisfies the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness 

requirement. Accordingly, the district court properly denied 

Defendant's motion to suppress. 

AFFIRMED. 

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