Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00230/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00230-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
J. Marshall
Respondent
Omero Becerra Rodriguez
Petitioner

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1

This information is derived from the petition for writ of habeas corpus, Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition,

and Petitioner’s opposition to Respondent’s motion to dismiss.

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OMERO BECERRA RODRIGUEZ, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

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v. )

)

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J. MARSHALL, )

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Respondent. )

 )

1:05-0230 LJO HC

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS 

[Doc. #12]

ORDER DISMISSING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. #1]

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT

TO ENTER JUDGMENT

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The parties having voluntarily consented to exercise of Magistrate

Judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), by order dated July 27, 2005, this case was

assigned to the undersigned for all purposes, including entry of final judgment.

BACKGROUND1

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant to

a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Kern, following his conviction by jury

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2Although the petition actually was filed in the California Supreme Court on September 8, 2004, the petition’s proof

of service was dated August 19, 2004. In Houston v. Lack, the Court held that a pro se habeas petitioner's notice of appeal

is deemed filed on the date of its submission to prison authorities for mailing, as opposed to the date of its receipt by the court

clerk. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 2385 (1988). The Ninth Circuit has applied the rule to assess

the timeliness of federal habeas filings under the AEDPA limitations period. Huizar v. Carey, 273 F.3d 1220, 1222, (9th Cir.

2001), citing Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 2385 (1988). Therefore under the mailbox rule, the Court

deems the petition filed on August 19, 2004, the date Petitioner presumably handed his petition to prison authorities for

mailing. 

U.S . District Court

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trial on September 5, 2001, of one count of assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury in

violation of Cal. Penal Code § 245(A)(1), one count of battery resulting in great bodily injury in

violation of Cal. Penal Code § 243(D), and one count of burglary in the first degree in violation of

Cal. Penal Code § 460(A). See Lodged Document No. 1, Exhibits Lodged in Support of Answer

(hereinafter “Exhibits). Allegations that Petitioner had personally inflicted great bodily injury were

found to be true. Id. On November 1, 2001, Petitioner was sentenced to serve a determinate term of

17 years in state prison; however, the trial court stayed 10 years of Petitioner’s sentence. Id.

Petitioner appealed the conviction. On March 11, 2003, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth

Appellate District (hereinafter “5th DCA”), affirmed the judgment. See Lodged Document No. 2,

Exhibits.

On April 25, 2003, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. See

Lodged Document No. 3, Exhibits. On June 11, 2003, the California Supreme Court denied the

petition. See Lodged Document No. 4, Exhibits.

On August 19, 2004, Petitioner filed a supplemental petition for review with the California

Supreme Court.2 See Lodged Document No. 5, Exhibits. The supplemental petition for review was

construed as a petition for writ of habeas corpus, and on September 22, 2004, the California Supreme

Court denied the petition. See Lodged Document No. 6, Exhibits.

On January 11, 2005, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the 5th DCA.

See Lodged Document No. 7, Exhibits. On January 21, 2005, the 5th DCA denied the petition as

untimely. See Lodged Document No. 8.

On February 2, 2005, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court. The

petition raises the following four claims: 1) “[T]rial court imposed an illegal enhancement”; 2)

“[D]ue process was violated when trial court instructed jury as to a ‘group beating’ exception, use of

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illegal enhancement”; 3) “[D]ue process violation because evidence did not support petitioner

inflicted great bodily injury”; and 4) “[C]ourt erred when it denied appellant’s request to obtain juror

records to establish juror misconduct.”

On June 7, 2005, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition as being filed outside the

one-year limitations period prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

On August 12, 2005, Petitioner filed an opposition to Respondent’s motion to dismiss.

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not

entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer if

the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being in violation of the

state’s procedural rules. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990) (using Rule

4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to exhaust state remedies); White v. Lewis, 874

F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989) (using Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review motion to dismiss for

state procedural default); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). 

Thus, a respondent can file a motion to dismiss after the court orders a response, and the Court

should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533 F. Supp. at 1194 & n. 12.

In this case, Respondent's motion to dismiss is based on a violation of 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)'s

one-year limitations period. Because Respondent's motion to dismiss is similar in procedural

standing to a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust state remedies or for state procedural default

and Respondent has not yet filed a formal answer, the Court will review Respondent’s motion to

dismiss pursuant to its authority under Rule 4. 

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (hereinafter “AEDPA”). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of

habeas corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059,

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2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct.

586 (1997). 

In this case, the petition was filed on February 14, 2005, and therefore, it is subject to the

provisions of the AEDPA. The AEDPA imposes a one-year period of limitation on petitioners

seeking to file a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended,

§ 2244, subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In most cases, the limitations period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. In this case, the petition for review was denied by the California Supreme

Court on June 11, 2003. Direct review concluded on September 9, 2003, when the ninety (90) day

period for seeking review in the United States Supreme Court expired. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S.

880, 887 (1983); Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir.1999); Smith v. Bowersox, 159 F.3d

345, 347 (8th Cir.1998). Petitioner had one year until September 9, 2004, absent applicable tolling,

to file his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. However, Petitioner delayed filing the instant

petition until February 14, 2005, over five months beyond the due date. Absent any applicable

tolling, the instant petition is barred by the statute of limitations.

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C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In

Carey v. Saffold, the Supreme Court held the statute of limitations is tolled where a petitioner is

properly pursuing post-conviction relief, and the period is tolled during the intervals between one

state court's disposition of a habeas petition and the filing of a habeas petition at the next level of the

state court system. 536 U.S. 214, 214-15, 122 S.Ct. 2134 (2002); see also Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d

1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1846 (2000).

As stated above, the statute of limitations began to run on September 9, 2003. On August 19,

2004, Petitioner filed a supplemental petition for review with the California Supreme Court which

was construed as a petition for writ of habeas corpus. At that point, 345 days of the limitations

period had run leaving Petitioner with 20 days remaining. Petitioner is entitled to tolling pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) for the time this petition was pending. On September 22, 2004, the

California Supreme Court denied the petition. The limitations period recommenced and expired 20

days later on October 13, 2004. Although Petitioner filed a subsequent petition for writ of habeas

corpus in the 5th DCA on January 11, 2005, that petition did not operate to toll the statute of

limitations because the limitations period had already expired. Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003

(9th Cir.2000) (Petitioner is not entitled to tolling where the limitations period has already run); see

also Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir.2000); Rendall v. Carey, 2002 WL 1346354

(N.D.Cal.2002). Therefore, the instant petition is untimely, having been filed over four months

beyond the limitations period.

D. Equitable Tolling

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if “extraordinary circumstances beyond a

prisoner’s control” have made it impossible for the petition to be filed on time. Calderon v. U.S.

Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9th Cir. 1998), citing Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107

F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1996), cert denied, 522 U.S. 814 (1997). As set forth by the Supreme Court,

“a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he has

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been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.”

Pace v. DiGuglielmo, __ U.S. __, 124 S.Ct. 1807, 1814, 2005 WL 957194 (2005). It should be noted

that equitable tolling is the exception rather than the rule. See Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498

U.S. 89, 96, 111 S.Ct. 453, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990) (explaining that equitable tolling "do[es] not

extend to what is at best a garden variety claim of excusable neglect"). Petitioner bears the burden of

alleging facts that would give rise to tolling. Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809 (9th Cir.2002); Hinton

v. Pac. Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 395 (9th Cir.1993).

Petitioner argues that he was prevented from timely filing the federal petition because his

appellate counsel failed to notify him when the petition for review was denied by the California

Supreme Court. Petitioner contends his appellate counsel told him he would be kept informed and he

believed his petition for review was still pending when he filed his supplemental petition for review

on September 8, 2004. In actuality, the petition had been denied nearly fifteen months earlier on June

11, 2003.

 The Ninth Circuit and several other circuits have held that “the miscalculation of the

limitations period by . . . counsel and his negligence in general do not constitute extraordinary

circumstances sufficient to warrant equitable tolling." Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th

Cir.2001), cert. denied, __ S.Ct. __, No. 01-1306, 2002 WL 386653 (U.S. May 13, 2002); Miranda

v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir.2002); Smaldone v. Senkowski, 273 F.3d 133, 138-39 (2d

Cir.2001) (finding "attorney error inadequate to create the 'extraordinary' circumstances equitable

tolling requires"); Fahy v. Horn, 240 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir.2001) ("In non-capital cases, attorney

error, miscalculation, inadequate research, or other mistakes have not been found to rise to the

'extraordinary' circumstances required for equitable tolling."); Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325,

330 (4th Cir.2000) ("[W]e cannot say that the lawyer's mistake in interpreting a statutory provision

constitutes that 'extraordinary circumstance' ... that would justify equitable tolling."); Taliani v.

Chrans, 189 F.3d 597, 598 (7th Cir.1999) (concluding that attorney's miscalculation of limitations

period was not a valid basis for equitable tolling); Kreutzer v. Bowersox, 231 F.3d 450, 463 (8th

Cir.2000) ("[C]ounsel's confusion about the applicable statute of limitations does not warrant

equitable tolling ."); Steed v. Head, 219 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir.2000) ("An attorney's

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Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the 5th DCA on January 11, 2005; however, in his opposition Petitioner states

he was attempting to file a federal habeas petition but mistakenly sent it to the wrong court.

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miscalculation of the limitations period or mistake is not a basis for equitable tolling."). 

The Court finds that Petitioner should not be entitled to equitable tolling. As noted above,

appellate counsel’s negligence alone does not constitute an extraordinary circumstance sufficient to

justify equitable tolling. Furthermore, although Petitioner’s appellate attorney failed to notify

Petitioner of the denial by the California Supreme Court, she did forewarn Petitioner that there

existed a one-year statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas action. In addition, in her letter of

April 21, 2003, she emphatically advised Petitioner to commence preparations for a federal habeas

action if it was his desire to pursue such relief. See Attachments to Petition. Furthermore, California

Rule of Court 28(b)(2) places petitioners on notice that petitions for review will be decided within

90 days. See Smith v. Roe, 1998 WL 657667, *3 n.5 (C.D. Cal.1998). Nevertheless, Petitioner did

not heed counsel’s warnings and failed to inquire into the status of his case for sixteen months. This

extremely lengthy delay, despite appellate counsel’s failure, constitutes a lack of diligence on

Petitioner’s part. This finding is further substantiated by Petitioner’s demonstrated lack of diligence

following the denial of his habeas petition by the California Supreme Court. Notwithstanding his

counsel’s warnings of a one-year limitations period and her advisements that he immediately begin

preparations for his federal petition, Petitioner did not at once pursue habeas relief in the federal

court following the California Supreme Court’s denial. He delayed again, and did not attempt to file

his federal habeas petition for an additional 111 days.3 Therefore, this Court finds Petitioner’s lack

of diligence precludes entitlement to equitable tolling. Pace, 121 S.Ct. at 1815. In addition,

Petitioner has not shown that he was in any way prevented from timely filing his federal habeas

petition. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling and the petition remains untimely.

///

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/// 

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ORDER

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1) Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition for violating the one-year statute of

limitations is GRANTED;

2) The petition for writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and

3) The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 23, 2005 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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