Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00574/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00574-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
George P. Childs
Plaintiff
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GEORGE P. CHILDS

Plaintiff,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY,

Defendant.

No. 2:15-cv-574-KJN

ORDER

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision by the Commissioner of Social Security

(“Commissioner”) determining that plaintiff did not continue to be disabled for purposes of 

receiving Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under 

Titles II and XVI, respectively, of the Social Security Act (“Act”).1 In his motion for summary 

judgment, plaintiff principally contends that the Commissioner erred by finding that plaintiff’s 

disability ceased as of March 2012. (ECF No. 14.) The Commissioner opposed plaintiff’s 

motion and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 15.) No optional reply brief 

was filed.

 

1

This action was referred to the undersigned pursuant to Local Rule 302(c)(15), and both parties 

voluntarily consented to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge for all purposes. (ECF 

Nos. 7, 17.) 

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2

For the reasons that follow, the court DENIES plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, 

GRANTS the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and AFFIRMS the final 

decision of the Commissioner. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was born on November 20, 1965, has completed at least two years of college, can 

read and write in English, and previously worked as a customer service representative and a 

pressroom assistant. (Administrative Transcript (“AT”) 50-54,101, 256, 262.)2 In a previous 

decision dated March 22, 2007, plaintiff was found disabled as of February 1, 2007. (AT 25.) 

However, in the course of a subsequent continuing disability review, the Commissioner 

determined that plaintiff was no longer disabled as of March 2012. (Id.) That determination was 

upheld upon reconsideration after a hearing before a disability hearing officer on November 5, 

2012. (AT 120-49.) Thereafter, plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative law judge

(“ALJ”), which took place on March 11, 2013, and at which plaintiff, represented by an attorney, 

testified. (AT 80-100.) A supplemental hearing was also held on July 2, 2013, at which plaintiff 

was again represented by counsel, and in the course of which the ALJ heard testimony from a 

medical expert, a mental health expert, and a vocational expert (“VE”). (AT 45-79.)

In a decision dated August 12, 2013, the ALJ determined that plaintiff’s disability had 

ceased as of March 2012. (AT 25–41.) The ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the 

Commissioner when the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for review on January 12, 

2015. (AT 1-6.) Plaintiff then filed this action in federal district court on March 12, 2015, to 

obtain judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision. (ECF No. 1.) 

II. ISSUES PRESENTED

On appeal, plaintiff raises the sole issue of whether the ALJ improperly discounted 

plaintiff’s own testimony concerning his symptoms and functional limitations attributable to his 

impairments.

 

2 Because the parties are familiar with the factual background of this case, including plaintiff’s 

medical and mental health history, the court does not exhaustively relate those facts in this order. 

The facts related to plaintiff’s impairments and treatment will be addressed insofar as they are 

relevant to the issues presented by the parties’ respective motions. 

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3

III. LEGAL STANDARD

The court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether (1) it is based on 

proper legal standards pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and (2) substantial evidence in the record 

as a whole supports it. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial 

evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Connett v. Barnhart, 340 

F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). It means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable 

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th 

Cir. 2007), quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). “The ALJ is 

responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving 

ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). “The 

court will uphold the ALJ’s conclusion when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008).

IV. DISCUSSION

“A Social Security disability benefits claimant is no longer entitled to benefits when 

substantial evidence demonstrates (1) there has been any medical improvement in the claimant’s 

impairment and (2) the claimant is now able to engage in substantial gainful activity.” Attmore v. 

Colvin, 2016 WL 3563596, at *1 (9th Cir. Jun. 30, 2016) (citation and punctuation marks 

omitted). As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals explained:

Medical improvement is defined as any decrease in the medical 

severity of a recipient’s impairment, and requires a comparison of 

prior and current medical evidence which must show that there 

have been changes (improvement) in the symptoms, signs or 

laboratory findings associated with that impairment(s). The 

Commissioner’s regulations prescribe a specific baseline for this 

comparison: an ALJ must compare the medical severity of the 

impairment(s) present at the time of the most recent favorable 

medical decision—that is, when the claimant was last found 

disabled or continued to be disabled—to the medical severity of 

that impairment(s) at the time of the comparison.

Making this comparison is straightforward in ordinary termination 

cases where the ALJ finds a claimant is disabled (or continues to be 

disabled) in one decision and, in a later decision, finds the claimant 

has medically improved. In those cases, the most recent favorable 

medical decision is an earlier decision, and the severity of the 

claimant’s impairment at the time of that decision provides the 

relevant baseline for comparison.

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Attmore, 2016 WL 3563596, at *3 (citations and punctuation marks omitted). 

In this case, the ALJ identified the most recent favorable medical decision, also known as 

the comparison point decision (“CPD”), as the March 22, 2007 decision, finding that plaintiff was 

disabled as of February 1, 2007. (AT 27.) At the time of the CPD, plaintiff suffered from the 

following medically determinable impairments: “major depression, severe, without psychotic 

features and a personality disorder not otherwise specified with narcissistic features; diabetes 

mellitus type II with symptoms consistent with peripheral neuropathy but no other complications 

and intermittent lower back pain.” (Id.) At that time, it was determined that plaintiff could 

physically perform a heavy range of work, but was “unable to sustain the concentration, 

persistence and/or pace needed for substantial gainful activity in a competitive environment; was 

unable to respond appropriately to changes in a work setting or complete a normal workday or 

workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms.” (Id.) 

In comparison, the ALJ found that, at the time of the alleged medical improvement in 

March 2012, plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform the full range of 

sedentary work, and “mentally retains the capacity to understand, remember and carry out simple 

job instructions; interact with and respond appropriately to supervisors, coworkers or the public; 

as well as respond appropriately to routine work-related changes or stresses.” (AT 29.) Based on 

plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ concluded, in reliance on the VE’s 

testimony, that plaintiff had been able to perform a significant number of jobs in the national 

economy as of March 2012. (AT 33.) 

On appeal, plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s evaluation of the medical evidence or 

the vocational expert’s testimony. However, plaintiff contends that, in formulating plaintiff’s 

RFC and determining that medical improvement related to plaintiff’s ability to work occurred as 

of March 2012, the ALJ improperly discounted the credibility of plaintiff’s own testimony 

regarding his continuing symptoms and functional limitations. That argument is unpersuasive. 

In Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2007), the Ninth Circuit Court of 

Appeals summarized the ALJ’s task with respect to assessing a claimant’s credibility:

////

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To determine whether a claimant’s testimony regarding subjective 

pain or symptoms is credible, an ALJ must engage in a two-step 

analysis. First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has 

presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment 

which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other 

symptoms alleged. The claimant, however, need not show that her 

impairment could reasonably be expected to cause the severity of 

the symptom she has alleged; she need only show that it could 

reasonably have caused some degree of the symptom. Thus, the 

ALJ may not reject subjective symptom testimony . . . simply 

because there is no showing that the impairment can reasonably 

produce the degree of symptom alleged. 

Second, if the claimant meets this first test, and there is no evidence 

of malingering, the ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony about 

the severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and 

convincing reasons for doing so. . . .

Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1035-36 (citations and quotation marks omitted). “At the same time, the 

ALJ is not required to believe every allegation of disabling pain, or else disability benefits would 

be available for the asking....” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). 

“The ALJ must specifically identify what testimony is credible and what testimony 

undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 

693 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 

1999)). In weighing a claimant’s credibility, an ALJ may consider, among other things, the 

“‘[claimant’s] reputation for truthfulness, inconsistencies either in [claimant’s] testimony or 

between [her] testimony and [her] conduct, [claimant’s] daily activities, [her] work record, and 

testimony from physicians and third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect of the 

symptoms of which [claimant] complains.’” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th Cir. 

2002) (modification in original) (quoting Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 

1997)). If the ALJ’s credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record, the 

court “may not engage in second-guessing.” Id. at 959.

As an initial matter, the ALJ did not entirely reject plaintiff’s claims of pain, numbness, 

tingling, fatigue, depression, and related symptoms, but instead gave plaintiff the benefit of the 

doubt regarding many of his subjective complaints, ultimately restricting plaintiff to a reduced 

range of sedentary work. Nevertheless, to the extent that plaintiff alleged additional functional 

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6

limitations beyond the RFC, the ALJ provided several specific, clear, and convincing reasons for 

discounting plaintiff’s credibility.

First, the ALJ properly found that plaintiff’s testimony regarding disabling symptoms and 

functional limitations was inconsistent with the medical opinion evidence. 

Around the time that plaintiff was previously found disabled in early 2007, the 

consultative evaluating psychiatrist, who personally examined plaintiff, found, inter alia, that 

because of plaintiff’s low energy, insomnia, and increased fatigue, he had a severe problem with 

persistence and pace. (AT 358.) Furthermore, the state agency psychiatrist, who reviewed 

plaintiff’s records, opined that plaintiff had several marked mental limitations and was unable to 

sustain concentration, persistence, and pace in a competitive work environment. (AT 27, 388-

90.) 

By contrast, on February 17, 2012, the consultative evaluating psychologist, Dr. Amy 

Eargle, who reviewed plaintiff’s prior records and personally examined plaintiff the month before 

his disability was deemed to have ceased, diagnosed plaintiff with “major depression, recurrent, 

mild” and opined that he was unimpaired in his ability to manage his own funds, perform simple 

and repetitive tasks, perform complex and detailed tasks, and respond appropriately to novel work 

situations including those involving urgency or safety considerations; mildly impaired in his 

ability to understand/ implement/remember instructions without special supervision or additional 

guidance, and complete a normal workweek and maintain regular attendance; and moderately 

impaired in his ability to interact appropriately with supervisors, coworkers, and the public, as 

well as in his ability to cope with changes in routine and stress. (AT 32, 434-39.) Additionally, 

at the July 2, 2013 hearing, mental health expert and psychiatrist, Dr. Herbert Tanenhaus, testified 

that he essentially agreed with Dr. Eargle’s assessed limitations, and clarified that plaintiff would 

be capable of at least occasional interactions with coworkers and could act appropriately with 

supervisors. (AT 32, 56-61.) Those mental health opinions were adopted by the ALJ, and 

support the ALJ’s finding that medical improvement related to plaintiff’s ability to work 

occurred, when compared to the earlier mental health opinions from 2007. (AT 32-33.) See

Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1077 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that moderate mental limitations 

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7

do not even require vocational expert testimony).

3

 

Additionally, with respect to plaintiff’s physical impairments, medical expert Dr. Lowell

Sparks at the July 2, 2013 hearing diagnosed plaintiff with diabetes type two (fairly well 

controlled on insulin and oral medication); diabetic peripheral neuropathy in the lower 

extremities; early diabetic renal disease; controlled hypertension; mild obstructive sleep apnea; a 

history of cellulitis of the right forefoot, which healed after surgery in 2010; and obesity. (AT 31, 

48-49.) Dr. Sparks essentially opined that plaintiff was capable of performing sedentary work 

with occasional postural activities and no manipulative or sensory limitations, and the ALJ

adopted Dr. Sparks’s opinion. (AT 31, 49-50.) 

The above-mentioned medical opinions, which relate to March 2012 onwards, constitute 

substantial evidence, and to the extent that plaintiff alleged more severe symptoms and functional 

limitations, the ALJ reasonably relied on such evidence to discount plaintiff’s allegations.

Second, the ALJ properly referenced a lack of objective findings to support at least some 

of plaintiff’s alleged symptoms and functional limitations. By way of example, the ALJ noted 

that although plaintiff alleges that fibromyalgia and osteoarthritis cause him to suffer from 

widespread joint and muscle pain, the record “does not show the claimant being diagnosed with 

either of these conditions by his treating physician or him alleging to his physician that he suffers 

from pain throughout his musculoskeletal system.” (AT 30-31.) Furthermore, although plaintiff 

testified regarding blurry vision allegedly attributable to his diabetes, the medical evidence did 

not document any vision problems caused by diabetes. (AT 30.) Even though a lack of objective 

findings to support the alleged severity of symptoms attributable to a medically determinable 

impairment cannot be the sole reason for discounting a claimant’s credibility, it is nonetheless a 

relevant factor for the ALJ to consider. Burch, 400 F.3d at 681. 

////

 

3 Although the ALJ’s RFC did not specifically include a limitation to only occasional contact with 

co-workers, the VE noted that the representative occupations identified by the VE in response to 

the RFC involved only limited social interaction with others. (AT 58-61.) The VE and mental 

health expert also clarified that plaintiff would be able to perform those representative 

occupations despite his stress limitations, because they were unskilled, simple and repetitive, lowstress occupations. (AT 65-68.) 

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8

Third, the ALJ legitimately observed that, despite alleging disabling mental impairment,

plaintiff did not seek mental health treatment from a psychologist, psychiatrist, or other mental 

healthcare provider. (AT 32, 92.) Failure to seek consistent treatment is a proper consideration 

when evaluating credibility. See Burch, 400 F.3d at 681. “We have long held that, in assessing a 

claimant’s credibility, the ALJ may properly rely on unexplained or inadequately explained 

failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of treatment.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1113

(citation and quotation marks omitted). Here, plaintiff did not address or dispute the ALJ’s 

finding regarding plaintiff’s failure to seek mental health treatment, and has offered no plausible 

explanation. Plaintiff does not contend that he lacks insurance, nor does the record suggest that 

plaintiff’s mental health impairments were so acute as to render him unable to seek treatment or 

comply with a treatment regimen.

Fourth, the ALJ rationally found that many of plaintiff’s impairments were controlled with 

medication. (AT 28, 30-31.) A condition that can be controlled or corrected by medication is not 

disabling for purposes of determining eligibility for benefits under the Act. See Warre v. Comm’r 

of Soc. Sec. Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006). As the ALJ observed, the medical 

records indicate that plaintiff’s diabetes and hypertension were generally adequately controlled 

with insulin and oral medication, and although a sleep study performed on January 9, 2013, was 

indicative of mild sleep apnea, the evidence showed that plaintiff was able to control his 

symptoms using a continuous positive airway pressure (“CPAP”) machine. (AT 30-31, 857.) 

Plaintiff’s briefing again fails to address or contest the ALJ’s finding regarding the efficacy of 

plaintiff’s treatment. 

Consequently, the court concludes that the ALJ’s credibility finding was supported by the 

record and by the proper analysis. Although an alternative interpretation of the evidence may be 

possible, the court defers, as it must, to the ALJ’s reasonable and rational resolution of any 

ambiguities and inconsistencies. As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals explained:

It may well be that a different judge, evaluating the same evidence, 

would have found [the claimant’s] allegations of disabling pain 

credible. But, as we reiterate in nearly every case where we are 

called upon to review a denial of benefits, we are not triers of fact. 

Credibility determinations are the province of the ALJ...Where, as 

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here, the ALJ has made specific findings justifying a decision to 

disbelieve an allegation of excess pain, and those findings are 

supported by substantial evidence in the record, our role is not to 

second-guess that decision.

Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 604 (9th Cir. 1989).

V. CONCLUSION

In sum, the court finds that ALJ’s decision is free from prejudicial error and supported by 

substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 14) is DENIED.

2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 15) is 

GRANTED.

3. The final decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED, and judgment is entered 

for the Commissioner.

4. The Clerk of Court shall close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 22, 2016

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