Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-02217/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-02217-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Curtisha Holden
Plaintiff
Target Corporation
Defendant

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CURTISHA HOLDEN,

Plaintiff,

v.

TARGET CORPORATION and Does 1-25,

Defendants.

Case No. 16-cv-02217-JST 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: ECF No. 3

Before the court is Defendant Target Corporation’s Motion to Dismiss. ECF No 3. The

Court will grant the motion as to the Plaintiff’s claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress 

with prejudice; grant the motion as to Plaintiff’s claims for intentional infliction of emotional 

distress and defamation with leave to amend; and deny the motion as to all remaining claims.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual History 

Plaintiff Curtisha Holden, who is appearing pro se, claims that she was injured by 

Defendant Target’s loss prevention employee after she was caught shoplifting at a Target store in 

Emeryville, California. Her complaint includes the following factual allegations:

I was caught shoplifting on [blank space] 2016 and I was escorted to 

the back. They asked me to go into the room without my sons (loss 

prevention). I told them that I can’t leave my sons with someone 

that I don’t know and the loss prevention male who was working 

that day grabbed me by my arm and put me in a armhold [sic] bar. 

He pushed me in the room and the other guard was calling me a 

bitch and saying CPS was going to take my children. The loss 

prevention officer who had my arm pulled my arm all the way up 

my back and threatened to break my arm and called me a bitch in 

front of my son. I was screaming for help. Other employees near 

the room [were] laughing. I was physically hurt and I am hurt still 

today. This incident [occurred] in [E]meryville, CA.

ECF No. 1-1, Ex. A at 6. 

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B. Procedural History 

Holden filed a civil action in Alameda County Superior Court against Defendants Target 

Corporation and John Does 1-25. ECF No. 1-1, Ex. A at 2. Her complaint alleges the following 

causes of action: (1) negligence, (2) negligent infliction of emotional distress, (3) intentional tort, 

(4) intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (5) defamation. ECF No. 1-1, Ex. A at 5-6. 

Holden alleges injuries in the form of “hospital and medical expenses,” “general damage,” 

“emotional distress,” “ongoing pain in right arm,” “restricted movement in right arm,” and a 

“mental change in [her] sons [sic] behavior.” Id. Holden seeks compensatory and punitive 

damages. Id. 

II. JURISDICTION

This Court has diversity jurisdiction over this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because the 

parties are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of 

interest and costs. ECF Nos. 1, 12. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief,” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and 

the grounds upon which it rests.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 555 (2007). A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the 

legal sufficiency of the claims in the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 

2001). In analyzing a motion to dismiss, the court accepts as true all factual allegations in the 

complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Retail Prop. Trust 

v. United Bd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 768 F.3d 938, 945 (9th Cir. 2014). The Court also 

liberally construes the pleadings of pro se litigants. See Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1020 

(9th Cir. 2001). 

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial 

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 

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678 (2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In the Ninth Circuit, “[i]f there are 

two alternative explanations, one advanced by defendant and the other advanced by plaintiff, both 

of which are plausible, plaintiff’s complaint survives a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). 

Plaintiff’s complaint may be dismissed only when defendant’s plausible alternative explanation is 

so convincing that plaintiff’s explanation is implausible.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th 

Cir.2011) (emphasis in original).

IV. DISCUSSION

Target moves the Court to dismiss all claims against it for failure to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). ECF No. 3. The 

Court addresses each of Holden’s claims in turn. 

A. Claim One: Negligence 

The factual allegations in Holden’s complaint sufficiently state a claim for negligence. To 

state a claim for negligence under California law, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to show 

“(1) duty; (2) breach; (3) causation; and (4) damages.” Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1203 

(9th Cir. 2003). Holden’s complaint alleges sufficient factual information to satisfy all four 

elements. 

First, Target’s loss prevention officer owed Holden a duty of due care. “Under general 

negligence principles . . . a person ordinarily is obligated to exercise due care in his or her own 

actions so as not to create an unreasonable risk of injury to others.” Lugtu v. California Highway 

Patrol, 26 Cal. 4th 703, 716 (2001). Second, Holden’s allegations suggest that Target’s loss 

prevention officer breached that duty when he put her in an “armhold bar,” “pushed [her],” “pulled 

[her] arm all the way up [her] back and threatened to break [her] arm.” ECF No. 1-1, Ex. A at 5-6. 

This conduct created an unreasonable risk of injury to Holden. Finally, Holden alleges that this 

breach of duty harmed her. Specifically, she alleges that she “was physically hurt and [is] hurt still 

today,” is suffering “on-going pain . . . [and] restricted movement in [her] right arm,” and has 

suffered “emotional distress.” Id.

Target argues that it did not breach its duty to Holden because its employee was simply 

using the reasonable amount of nondeadly force necessary to move the Plaintiff to a separate room 

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in the store after she was caught shoplifting. ECF No. 3 at 5. The “Shopkeeper’s Privilege” 

allows a merchant to “use a reasonable amount of nondeadly force to protect himself or herself 

and to prevent escape of the person detained” if the merchant has probable cause to believe that 

the person has shoplifted. Cal. Penal Code § 490.5(f). Based on the “Shopkeeper’s Privilege,” 

Target argues that this force was reasonable in the circumstances because Holden refused to 

comply with the Target employee’s request to move to a separate room. ECF No. 3 at 5. 

There are two responses to this argument. First, the Shopkeeper’s Privilege is an 

affirmative defense, and an affirmative defense is not a proper ground for dismissal on a 12(b)(6) 

motion. See Giannini v. Am. Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc., No. C11-04489 TEH, 2012 WL 

298254, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2012) (“[I]t would be inappropriate for the Court to base a 

dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) on an affirmative defense.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (“Every 

defense to a claim for relief in any pleading must be asserted in the responsive pleading if one is 

required.”). For that reason alone, the argument fails. 

Second, the argument requires the Court to consider material outside the four corners of 

the complaint ‒ specifically, a surveillance video that Target says shows Holden kicking the door 

to the loss prevention detention room from the room’s interior. Id. at 5, n. 2. “[W]hen the legal 

sufficiency of a complaint’s allegations is tested by a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), [however], 

review is limited to the complaint.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001)

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). And nothing in Holden’s complaint, which the 

Court accepts as true and construes in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, indicates that she 

tried to harm a Target employee or escape such that any force was necessary to detain her. Rather, 

the Plaintiff’s complaint suggests that she was “escorted to the back” and then simply told Target 

personnel that she could not leave her sons with someone she did not know. See generally ECF 

No. 1-1, Ex. A at 6. These allegations do not state a defense under the Shopkeeper’s Privilege. 

Because Holden’s complaint sufficiently alleges that Target breached its duty of due care 

and caused Holden harm, the Court denies Target’s Motion to Dismiss Holden’s negligence claim.

B. Claim Two: Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

In California, “there is no independent tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress.” 

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Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal.4th 965, 984 (1993). “The tort is negligence.” Id. 

Accordingly, Holden’s negligent infliction of emotional distress claim is dismissed with prejudice 

as duplicative of her negligence claim.

C. Claim Three: Intentional Tort

“The elements of a battery claim in California are that (1) the defendant intentionally did 

an act that resulted in harmful or offensive contact with the Plaintiffs’ person, (2) the plaintiff did 

not consent to the contact, and (3) the contact caused injury, damage, loss or harm to the plaintiff.” 

Tekle v. United States, 511 F.3d 839, 855 (9th Cir. 2007). The factual allegations in Holden’s 

complaint satisfy all three elements of a battery claim. First, Holden alleges that “[t]he loss 

prevention officer . . . pulled [her] arm all the way up [her] back and threatened to break [her] 

arm.” ECF No. 1-1 at 5-6. This suggests that Target personnel intentionally acted so as to result 

in a harmful or offensive contact to Holden’s person. In response, Target argues that its loss 

prevention officer did not intend to harm Holden but rather was just trying to move her into a 

separate room. ECF No. 3 at 6. At this stage of the case, the Court is required to construe the 

pleadings in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and the Court reasonably infers based on 

Holden’s factual allegations that the loss prevention officer’s physical contact demonstrates an 

intent to harm. ECF No. 1-1, Ex. A at 6. Second, Holden alleged that she “was screaming for 

help,” indicating her lack of consent to the contact. Id. Finally, Holden alleged that she is “hurt 

still today,” suffering “pain ... [and] restricted movement in [her] right arm”). Id. In sum, the 

factual allegations in Holden’s complaint state a claim for battery. 

Holden’s complaint also states a claim for assault. To properly state a claim for assault 

claim under California law, a plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant threatened to touch her in 

a harmful or offensive manner; (2) it reasonably appeared to the plaintiff that the defendant was 

about to carry out the threat; (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the conduct; (4) the plaintiff was 

harmed; and (5) the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing the harm. Tekle, 511 

F.3d at 855. Again, the factual allegations in Holden’s complaint satisfy all of these elements. 

First, Target’s loss prevention officer threatened to touch Holden in a harmful manner by 

threatening to “break [her] arm.” ECF No. 1-1, Ex. A at 6. Second, Holden’s allegations 

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demonstrate that it reasonably appeared to Holden that the employee was about to carry out this 

threat (“[t]he loss prevention officer . . . pulled my arm all the way up my back . . . I was 

screaming for help.”). Id. Third, there is no indication that Holden consented to the loss 

prevention officer’s conduct. See generally id. To the contrary, the fact that Holden was 

“screaming for help” suggests that she did not consent to the conduct. Id. Finally, the loss 

prevention officer’s conduct proximately caused harm to Holden: She alleges that she “was 

physically hurt and [is] hurt still today” and is suffering “on-going pain . . . [and] restricted 

movement in [her] right arm”). Id.

Because Holden adequately states claims for both battery and assault, the Court denies 

Target’s Motion to Dismiss her intentional tort claim.

D. Claim Four: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Under California law, a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress 

exists when: (1) there is extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of 

causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff

suffers severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) the defendant’s outrageous conduct actually

and proximately caused the plaintiff’s emotional distress. Hughes v. Pair, 46 Cal. 4th 1035, 1050-

51 (2009) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Although Holden sufficiently alleges 

that Target engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct that caused her harm, her complaint fails 

to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress because she fails to sufficiently 

allege the nature and extent of her emotional distress. 

First, Holden’s complaint sufficiently alleges outrageous and extreme conduct by Target 

with the intent to cause emotional distress. “A defendant’s conduct is outrageous when it is so 

extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” See id. 

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). To determine whether the defendant’s conduct 

was outrageous, California courts also consider whether the defendant abused a position of power 

to injure the plaintiff or knew that the plaintiff had a special susceptibility to emotional distress

under the circumstances. See Kiseskey v. Carpenters’ Trust for So. California, 144 Cal. App. 3d

222, 230, 192 Cal. Rptr. 492, 496 (Ct. App. 1983); Cochran v. Cochran, 65 Cal. App. 4th 488, 494 

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(1998). Here, Holden alleges that a Target employee abused his position of power when he 

“grabbed” her, “pushed” her, “pulled [her] arm all the way up [her] back,” “threatened to break 

[her] arm,” declared that “CPS was going to take [her] children,” and called her a “bitch” in front 

of her son. ECF No. 1-1, Ex. A at 6. Holden further alleges that Target employees laughed as 

she “was physically hurt” and “screaming for help.” Id. Her complaint also implies that Target 

employees attempted to separate her from her children knowing that this would cause her 

emotional distress (“I told them that I can’t leave my sons with someone that I don’t know”). Id. 

Target argues that its alleged conduct, including the employee’s statement that CPS would 

take away Holden’s children and calling Holden a “bitch” in front of her son, amounted to no 

more than a non-actionable insult or threat. ECF No. 3 at 7. It is true that “[l]iability for 

intentional infliction of emotional distress does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, 

annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.” Hughes, 46 Cal. 4th at 1051. And “mere 

insulting language or threats, without more, does not constitute outrageous conduct,” Plotnik v. 

Meihaus, 208 Cal. App. 4th 1590, 1613 (2012) (emphasis added). However, courts have held that 

there is extreme and outrageous conduct where the defendant insults the plaintiff, threatens the 

plaintiff with physical violence, and threatens the well-being of the plaintiff’s family members. 

See, e.g., Kiseskey, 144 Cal. App. 3d at 230 (holding that the plaintiff sufficiently alleged 

outrageous conduct where the defendant called the plaintiff a “no good son of a bitch,” threatened 

to put the plaintiff in the hospital, and threatened the well-being of the plaintiff’s wife and 

children); Campbell v. Feld Entm’t Inc., No. 12-CV-4233-LHK, 2014 WL 1366581, at *12 (N.D. 

Cal. Apr. 7, 2014) (finding that the defendant’s “physically threatening behavior” constituted

extreme and outrageous conduct). Here, the Target employees similarly insulted Holden,

threatened her with physical violence (“threatened to break [her] arm”), and threatened the wellbeing of her family members (“the other guard was . . . saying that CPS was going to take my 

children”). ECF No. 1-1, Ex. A at 6. Taken together, these alleged actions constitute extreme and 

outrageous conduct for the purposes of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Ultimately, though, Holden’s complaint does not provide enough factual information to 

determine whether she suffered “severe or extreme emotional distress” as required under 

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California law. Hughes, 46 Cal. 4th at 1050-51. With respect to this requirement, California 

courts have set a “high bar”: The plaintiff must show “emotional distress of such substantial 

quality or enduring quality that no reasonable [person] in civilized society should be expected to 

endure it.” Hughes, 46 Cal. 4th at 1050-51 (citation omitted). And the “mere allegation that [a 

plaintiff] suffered severe emotional distress, without facts indicating the nature or extent of any 

mental suffering incurred as a result of the defendant’s alleged outrageous conduct, fail[s] to state 

a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Pitman v. City of Oakland, 197 

Cal. App. 3d 1037, 1047 (Ct. App. 1988). Accordingly, courts dismiss claims for intentional 

infliction of emotional distress where the plaintiff fails to plead facts demonstrating the nature and 

extent of the emotional distress suffered. See, e.g., Angie M. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. App. 4th 

1217, 1227 (Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the lower court properly dismissed the plaintiff’s claim 

for intentional infliction of emotional distress because “[the plaintiff] pleaded no facts 

demonstrating the nature, extent or duration of her alleged emotional distress”); Schultz v. 

Stericylce, Inc., No. CV F 13-1244 LJO MJS, 2013 WL 4776517, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2013)

(holding that the complaint lacked facts to support severe emotional distress where the plaintiff’s 

complaint “[made] sweeping references to pain and suffering, extreme and severe mental anguish, 

and emotional distress with no facts to support such symptoms or conditions”) (internal quotation 

marks omitted)). Here, Holden merely asserts that she suffers “emotional distress” and a “mental 

change in sons [sic] behavior.” ECF No. 1-1, Ex. A at 5. She has therefore not alleged sufficient

facts to “indicat[e] the nature or extent of any mental suffering incurred” as a result of the Target 

employees’ extreme and outrageous conduct. Pitman, 197 Cal. App. 3d at 1047. 

Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Holden’s intentional 

infliction of emotional distress claim with leave to amend. Holden should add to any amended 

complaint additional facts indicating the nature and extent of her emotional distress.

E. Claim Five: Defamation

Holden’s complaint fails to properly allege a claim for defamation. Under California law, 

“[t]he elements of a defamation claim are (1) a publication that is (2) false, (3) defamatory, (4) 

unprivileged, and (5) has a natural tendency to injure or causes special damage.” Sanders v. 

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Walsh, 219 Cal. App. 4th 855, 862 (2013) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Because Holden alleges defamatory oral utterances, her complaint attempts to allege a claim of 

slander. See Cal. Civil Code §§ 45, 46. Under California law, slander is defined as: 

[A] false and unprivileged publication, orally uttered . . . which:

(1) Charges any person with crime, or with having been 

indicted, convicted, or punished for crime;

(2) Imputes in him the present existence of an infectious, 

contagious, or loathsome disease;

(3) Tends directly to injure him in respect to his office, 

profession, trade or business . . . ; 

(4) Imputes to him impotence or a want of chastity; or

(5) Which, by natural consequence, causes actual damage.

Cal. Civil Code § 46. 

In her complaint, Holden alleges that Target employees made three potentially slanderous 

utterances: (1) The guard called Holden a “bitch”; (2) The guard told Holden that “CPS was going 

to take [her] children”; and (3) Target’s loss prevention officer called Holden a “bitch.” ECF No. 

1-1, Ex. A at 6. The first and third utterances calling Holden a “bitch” cannot state a defamation 

claim because these statements constitute vague, rhetorical hyperbole and do not convey a 

provably false factual assertion. To properly state a claim for defamation the plaintiff must allege 

a statement that is capable of being proven true or false. See Manufactured Home Communities, 

Inc. v. Cty. of San Diego, 544 F.3d 959, 966 (9th Cir. 2008) (“It is an essential element of 

defamation that the publication be of a false statement of fact rather than opinion.”) (quoting

Eisenberg v. Alameda Newspapers, Inc., 74 Cal.App.4th 1359 (Ct.App.1999); Savage v. Pac. Gas 

& Elec. Co., 21 Cal. App. 4th 434, 444-45 (1993) (explaining that California Civil Code § 46 

refers to a “false ... publication” and this statutory definition can only be meaningfully applied to 

statements that are capable of being proven true or false). Thus, “satirical, hyperbolic, 

imaginative, or figurative statements are protected because the context and tenor of the statements 

negate the impression that the author seriously is maintaining an assertion of actual fact.” 

Franklin v. Dynamic Details, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 4th 375, 385 (2004) (internal citations and 

quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g., Seelig v. Infinity Broad. Corp., 97 Cal. App. 4th 798, 811 

(2002) (holding that “[t]he phrase big skank is not actionable because it is too vague to be capable 

of being proven true or false” and “the term skank constitutes rhetorical hyperbole which no 

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listener could reasonably have interpreted to be a statement of actual fact”). 

“The critical determination of whether an allegedly defamatory statement constitutes fact 

or opinion is a question of law for the court ... and therefore suitable for resolution by demurrer.” 

See Ferlauto v. Hamsher, 74 Cal. App. 4th 1394, 1401 (1999). Here, the alleged utterances calling 

Holden a “bitch”—like calling someone a “big skank”—cannot form the basis of a defamation 

claim because they constitute rhetorical hyperbole that is devoid of factual content. 

The second utterance, in which the guard told Holden that CPS was going to take away her 

children, does not qualify as slander per se under California law, and Holden’s complaint fails to 

allege the requisite special damages to state a claim for slander per quod. “A slander that falls 

within the first four subdivisions of Civil Code section 46 is slander per se and require[s] no proof 

of actual damages.” Regalia v. Nethercutt Collection, 172 Cal. App. 4th 361, 367 (2009). By 

comparison, “[a] slander that does not fit into those four subdivisions is slander per quod, and 

special damages are required for there to be any recovery for that slander.” Id. In turn, Civil Code 

§ 48a defines “special damages” as “all damages which plaintiff alleges and proves that he has 

suffered in respect to his property, business, trade, profession or occupation, including such 

amounts of money as the plaintiff alleges and proves he has expended as a result of the alleged 

libel, and no other.” Cal. Civ. Code § 48a(b). Here, the utterance that “CPS was going to take 

[her] children” is not slander per se because it does not (1) charge Holden with a crime, (2) impute 

in Holden the existence of a disease, (3) injure Holden’s business, or (4) impute to Holden a want 

of chastity. See Cal. Civil Code § 46(1)-(4). As a result, Holden must allege special damages to 

state a claim for slander per quod. However, Holden’s complaint does not allege that this 

utterance damaged her property, business, trade, profession, or occupation. See generally ECF 

No. 1-1, Ex. A at 6. Nor does she allege that she has expended money as a result of the alleged 

slander. Id. Holden merely asserts that she suffers “general damage,” “emotional distress” and a 

“mental change in sons [sic] behavior.” Id. at 5-6. These allegations, standing alone, are also too 

sparse to demonstrate that the utterance “by natural consequence, caused actual damage.” Cal. 

Civil Code § 46(5). To state a claim, Holden must make sufficient factual allegations to show, not 

just state, that Target is plausibly liable for defamation. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“A pleading 

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that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action 

will not do.’”).

In sum, Holden does not sufficiently state a claim for defamation. Therefore, Target’s 

Motion to Dismiss Holden’s defamation claim is granted with leave to amend. Holden should add 

to any amended complaint additional facts demonstrating that the allegedly defamatory statements 

either resulted in special damages or “by natural consequence caused actual damage.” Cal. Civil 

Code § 46(5).

F. Leave to Amend

When dismissing a complaint, leave to amend must be granted unless it is clear that the 

complaint’s deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment. Lucas v. Dep’t of Corrections, 66 F.3d 

245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995). Target argues that “allowing Plaintiff to amend her complaint would be 

futile” and that the Court should therefore deny Holden leave to amend. ECF No. 3 at 9. The 

Court rejects this argument, especially in light of Holden’s pro se status.

The Court encourages Holden to seek the assistance of the Legal Help Center. The Legal 

Help Center is located at 450 Golden Gate Avenue, 15th Floor, Room 2796, San Francisco, 

California, and in Oakland at 1301 Clay Street, 4th Floor, Room 470S, Oakland, California. 

Assistance is provided by appointment only. A litigant may schedule an appointment by signing 

up in the appointment book located on the table outside the door of the Center or by calling the 

Legal Help Center appointment line at (415) 782-8982. Holden may also wish to consult the 

Northern District of California manual, Representing Yourself in Federal Court: A Handbook for 

Pro Se Litigants, a copy of which may be downloaded at 

http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/prosehandbook or obtained free of charge from the Clerk's office.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants the Motion to Dismiss with prejudice as to 

Holden’s duplicative claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress; grants the Motion to 

Dismiss with leave to amend as to Holden’s claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress 

and defamation; and denies the Motion to Dismiss as to Holden’s claims for negligence and 

intentional tort. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint within 21 days of the date of this Order

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to plead additional facts not alleged in the original complaint. Failure to amend by this deadline 

will result in dismissal of those claims without prejudice. 

The Case Management Conference scheduled for July 27, 2016 is continued to September 

29, 2016 at 2:00 p.m. Updated Case Management Statements must be filed by September 20, 

2016. Defendant is cautioned that any future Case Management Statement must contain a 

proposed schedule. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 21, 2016

______________________________________

JON S. TIGAR

United States District Judge

Case 3:16-cv-02217-JST Document 19 Filed 07/21/16 Page 12 of 12