Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-04012/USCOURTS-ca8-06-04012-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company
Appellee
Lanna J. Meyers
Appellant

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Robert T. Dawson, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Arkansas.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-4012

___________

Lanna J. Meyers, *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the Western

Hartford Life and Accident * District of Arkansas.

Insurance Company, *

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: June 14, 2007

Filed: July 6, 2007

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, and ARNOLD and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.

Lanna Meyers appeals from the order of the district court1

 denying her

disability claim under ERISA against Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company.

See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461. The district court, after a trial on a stipulated record,

concluded that the applicable insurance policy gave Hartford the discretion to

determine a claimant's eligibility for benefits (a conclusion not challenged here), and

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held that Hartford had not abused its discretion in rejecting Ms. Meyers's claim. We

affirm. 

Ms. Meyers was employed by Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., for a number of years in

a position that the parties agree is properly classified as sedentary. She quit in 2004

and soon thereafter claimed that she was totally disabled within the meaning of her

benefits plan, which, as relevant here, requires her to show that she was unable to do

the job that she was doing when she quit.

Ms. Meyers has suffered from numerous ailments over the years. Her attending

physician, Dr. James Baker, diagnosed her as suffering primarily from Churg-Strauss

syndrome, interstitial lung disease, and peripheral neuropathy, with secondary

diagnoses (among others) of ocular migraines and lumbar degenerative disc disease.

He noted her secondary symptoms as chronic back pain, chronic diarrhea, bladder and

bowel incontinence, drop foot, and paresthesia. It was his opinion that Ms. Meyers

was unable to stand for more than 10 minutes, sit more than 15 minutes (due to pain

and paresthesia), carry more than 20 pounds (due to pain and weakness), or walk

without a cane and then no more than 15 minutes. When Hartford asked Dr. Baker

why he had put severe sitting limitations on Ms. Meyers but had put no driving

limitations on her, he explained that while driving she would simply have to stop and

rest at appropriate intervals. When Hartford asked Dr. Baker whether Ms. Meyers

could engage in a sedentary occupation, he said that she could not, stating that "patient

has other issues with urine and bowel incontinence problems." In a clinic note,

Dr. Baker wrote that "Ms. Meyers has become progressively more disabled due to her

back pain, intractable diarrhea, as well as her intractable infections which seem to be

recurrent." 

Ms. Meyers was also seen by Dr. Steven Moon, a neurologist, who performed

an MRI that revealed a multilevel degenerative disc disease. He opined that from a

strictly objective neurological viewpoint Ms. Meyers could sit for two hours at a time

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and was able to perform sedentary work. Dr. Regan Gallaher, a neurosurgeon,

reviewed the MRI and said that it did not provide a good explanation for Ms. Meyers's

symptoms.

Because of the conflict between the opinions of Dr. Baker and Dr. Moon with

respect to whether Ms. Meyers could perform sedentary work, Hartford engaged the

services of an independent physician, Dr. Todd Lyon, to assist in the determination

of whether Ms. Meyers was disabled. Dr. Lyon reviewed Ms. Meyers's medical

records and spoke with Dr. Baker on the telephone. According to Dr. Lyon, Dr. Baker

told him that from an objective medical viewpoint there was no evidence that

Ms. Meyers was not capable of working at her former job and that "she physically

retained the capacity for full time sedentary to light demand work." He did say,

however, that he "did not know if Ms. Meyers could tolerate working based solely

upon her continual back pain complaints." He did not mention any other condition

that would render Ms. Meyers disabled.

Dr. Lyon produced an extensive report that concluded that Ms. Meyers's main

subjective complaint was her chronic back pain. (Her Churg-Strauss syndrome, he

said, was "not producing symptomology sufficient enough to impair non-physically

demanding work.") He noted that she had complained of back pain for upwards of

two years before she quit work and that there was no objective medical evidence to

confirm her symptoms. He observed, moreover, that it was "highly unlikely that the

degenerative disc disease fully explains Ms. Meyers's low back complaints." He also

opined that "she would not have the ability for unrestricted standing and walking, nor

would she have the ability for repetitive stooping, bending or heavy lifting." He

nevertheless concluded that "Lanna Meyers retains the capacity for full-time sedentary

to light demand work." Dr. Lyon sent a copy of his report to Dr. Baker, inviting him

to make additions or corrections if he thought them necessary and noting that if he did

not respond, "I will assume that you essentially agree with my understanding of our

conversation." There is no response from Dr. Baker in the record. A few days later,

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Hartford denied Ms. Meyers's claim on the ground that she was capable of performing

her former job. Ms. Meyers then indicated that she wanted to appeal that decision.

In connection with the appeal, Hartford engaged the services of yet another

independent physician, Dr. Jerome Siegel; he examined Ms. Meyers's medical records

and spoke with Dr. Baker several times and at length by telephone. Dr. Siegel

observed that Ms. Meyers had been treated with increasing doses of narcotics,

including a Duragesic patch, Neurontin, and Zanaflex, but nevertheless believed that

she was "physically capable of performing sedentary to light physical demand

activities," a conclusion in which Dr. Baker concurred. Hartford thereupon denied the

appeal. 

Ms. Meyers maintained in the district court and on appeal that the combined

effect of her multiple medical difficulties rendered her totally disabled. But there is

little evidence in the record that Ms. Meyers suffers from any potentially disabling

condition aside from the pain that she experiences. There is indeed a good deal of

evidence that she has or has had a number of painful conditions, including low back

pain, myalgia, and arthralgia; but there is no evidence that the medicine that she takes

is not effective in relieving the pain. Drs. Lyon and Siegel, moreover, both noted that

Ms. Meyers had complained about pain for quite some time before she quit and had

nevertheless been able to work, an assessment with which Dr. Baker agreed. At least

four physicians, moreover, concluded that there is no objective evidence supporting

Ms. Meyers's subjective complaints of back pain. We observe, in addition, that there

is no personal statement in the record from Ms. Meyers about the extent of her pain

or when, how often, and how long she experiences it. Though her brief asserts that

"on any given typical day" she "wakes up to a life riddled with constant pain and

discomfort," there is no record evidence that this is true. Indeed, as we have already

said, her own attending physician, Dr. Baker, asserted only that he "did not know if

Ms. Meyers would tolerate working and this was based solely upon her continued low

back pain."

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We review de novo the district court's decision that Hartford did not abuse its

discretion in denying Ms. Meyers's claim. Maune v. International Bhd. of Elec.

Workers, 83 F.3d 959, 962 (8th Cir. 1996). In the present circumstances we would be

hard-pressed to conclude that Hartford abused its discretion. An abuse of discretion

occurs when a decision may properly be called extremely unreasonable,

extraordinarily imprudent, or arbitrary and capricious. Shell v. Amalgamated Cotton

Garment, 43 F.3d 364, 366 (8th Cir. 1994). Here there was considerable medical

evidence to support Hartford's action, especially when one considers the highly

equivocal nature of Dr. Baker's opinion about whether Ms. Meyers's pain would

prevent her from performing the duties of her previous job and his evident conclusion

in his conversation with Dr. Lyon that pain was her only potentially disabling

condition. 

We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.

______________________________

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