Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-02472/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-02472-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
CMG Service Co., LLC
Defendant
Chipotle Mexican Grill Service Co., LLC
Defendant
Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc.
Defendant
Chipotle Services, LLC
Defendant
Danisha Harris
Plaintiff
Deonte Mask
Plaintiff
Jason Ryan
Plaintiff
Antanisha Wiley
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

DANISHA HARRIS; ANTANISHA WILEY; 

DEONTE MASK; JASON RYAN; 

individually, and on behalf of 

other members of the general 

public similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CHIPOTLE MEXICAN GRILL, INC., a 

Delaware corporation; and DOES 1 

through 10, inclusive,

Defendant.

CIV. NO. 2:13-2472 WBS EFB 

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: 

MOTION FOR MODIFICATION OF 

SCHEDULING ORDER AND LEAVE TO 

FILE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 

----oo0oo----

Plaintiffs Danisha Harris, Antanisha Wiley, Deonte 

Mask, and Jason Ryan brought this action against defendant 

Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. (“CMGI”), arising out of defendant’s 

allegedly discriminatory employment practices. Plaintiffs now 

move to modify the court’s Scheduling Order and seek leave to 

file a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) to add defendants Chipotle 

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Mexican Grill Service Co., LLC, CMG Service Co., LLC, and 

Chipotle Services, LLC. (“additional defendants”).

I. Factual and Procedural Background 

Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on November 26, 2013, 

asserting claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.; the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 

U.S.C. §§ 1981 et seq.; and the California Fair Employment and 

Housing Act (“FEHA”), Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 12940 et seq. (Compl. 

(Docket No. 1).) On February 18, 2014, the parties filed a Joint 

Status Report (“JSR”), in which plaintiffs stated they did not 

anticipate joining additional parties. (Docket No. 13.) 

Accordingly, the court issued a Status (Pretrial Scheduling) 

Order (“Scheduling Order”) on February 21, 2014, which stated 

that no further joinder of parties or amendment to pleadings 

would be permitted except with leave of court and showing of good 

cause. (Docket No. 14.) 

On May 12, 2014, plaintiffs filed the present motion to

join Chipotle Mexican Grill Service (“CMGS”) as a defendant. 

(Docket No. 17.) In opposing plaintiffs’ motion, defendant 

asserted that no such entity as “Chipotle Mexican Grill Service”

exists, but explained for the first time that a succession of 

entities known as Chipotle Mexican Grill Service Co., LLC; CMG 

Service Co., LLC; and Chipotle Services, LLC; have employed 

individuals at defendant’s restaurants in California. (McGawn 

Decl. ¶¶ 3-8 (Docket No. 19-1).) In Reply, plaintiffs seek to 

join these additional defendants. (Docket No. 20.) In the 

interest of judicial economy, the court will construe plaintiffs’ 

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initial motion as seeking to add these additional defendants 

instead of CMGS. 

II. Analysis

Generally, a motion to amend is subject to Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 15(a), which provides that “[t]he court should 

freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 15(a)(2). However once the district court has filed a 

Scheduling Order pursuant to Rule 16, which establishes a 

timetable for amending pleadings, that rule’s standards control. 

Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607-08 (9th 

Cir. 1992). If the court finds Rule 16 satisfied, it must then 

evaluate the request to amend under Rule 15(a)’s more liberal 

standard. Id. at 608. Here, the court must first apply Rule 

16(b) because plaintiffs seek to modify the Scheduling Order and 

join a party after the deadline therein. 

A. Rule 16

Under Rule 16(b), a party seeking leave to amend must 

demonstrate “good cause.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b). “Rule 16(b)’s 

‘good cause’ standard primarily considers the diligence of the 

party seeking the amendment,” and “[i]f that party was not 

diligent, the inquiry should end.” Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. 

Although the court may consider prejudice to opposing party, “the 

focus of the inquiry is upon the moving party’s reasons for 

seeking modification.” Id.

Another judge in this district has found good cause 

with facts closely mirroring those at hand. In Thompson v. 

George DeLallo Co., Civ. No. S-12-1058 LKK CMK, 2013 WL 211204, 

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at *4-6 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2013), the defendant argued that 

leave to amend to add plaintiff’s employer was improper because 

the plaintiff had received numerous documents indicating that 

defendant was a fictitious business name for the employer and 

thus the plaintiff should have known it was not suing the proper 

party. Id. at *5. The court, however, rejected this argument, 

determining that the plaintiff’s “errors must be balanced against 

the defendant’s conduct.” Id. Thus, because the defendant 

possessed detailed information about the plaintiff’s employment, 

defendant’s answer asserted defenses consistent with being the 

employer despite its denial of that allegation, and defendant 

shared the same address and was closely related to the actual 

employer, the court found that the plaintiff was diligent because 

he could not have reasonably foreseen that he sued the wrong 

entity before the scheduling order deadline. Id. at *6. 

Here, defendant similarly argues that plaintiffs were 

not diligent because plaintiffs knew or should have known that 

another entity than defendant was their employer. For example, 

“Chipotle Mexican Grill Service” was listed on plaintiffs’ pay 

stubs and payroll records that they received in 2012, (Pls.’ Mem. 

at 8:4 (Docket No. 17); Aiwazian Decl. ¶ 7), and plaintiffs’ presuit administrative filings name both defendant and “Chipotle 

Mexican Grill Service,” (Cavanagh Decl. Exs. A-D (Docket Nos. 19-

3-19-6)). Defendant’s Answer also asserted it was not 

plaintiffs’ employer. (Docket No. 12.) Nonetheless, plaintiffs 

represented in the JSR that they did not anticipate joining new 

parties or amending their complaint. 

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As in Thompson, however, defendant’s conduct as well as 

the close relation between defendant and the entities which 

plaintiffs seek to join gave plaintiffs a reasonable basis to 

believe that they had sued the proper party. 2013 WL 211204, at 

*6. Not only did defendant have access to plaintiffs’ personnel 

and payroll records, but when it provided those files to 

plaintiffs defendant referred to itself as “Chipotle” and stated 

that “Chipotle is required by law to provide upon request an 

employee’s personnel file,” making no mention of any other 

entity. (Aiwazian Decl. Ex. A.) Although plaintiffs listed 

“Chipotle Mexican Grill Service” on their administrative 

complaints, they appeared to believe that it and defendant were 

the same entity, as they later refer to them interchangeably as 

“Chipotle.” (See, e.g., McGawn Decl. Ex. A.) To this end, 

plaintiffs’ counsel also represents that she searched for 

“Chipotle Mexican Grill Service” in the Colorado, California, and 

Delaware Secretary of State’s business listings but only found an

entry for defendant, which lists the same address as on 

plaintiffs’ paystubs. (Parker Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. A (Docket No. 21); 

Cavanagh Decl. Ex. K.) These facts indicate that plaintiffs were 

diligent in determining the proper party to sue.1 

Moreover, defendant’s conduct was equivocal despite its 

 

1 Plaintiff also points to a prior employment suit 

against defendant, Hernandez v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 208 

Cal. App. 4th 1487 (2d Dist. 2012), which notably makes no 

mention of the entities defendant now asserts were responsible 

for its California employees. It is not clear, however, when 

plaintiffs’ counsel researched this prior suit and whether this 

further influenced plaintiffs’ belief that defendant was the 

proper party to sue here.

 

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denials that it was not plaintiffs’ employer. Defendant’s Answer 

admitted plaintiffs’ allegation that defendant “employed 37,310 

employees,” (Am. Answer ¶ 11; Compl. ¶ 1, 11), and asserted an 

affirmative defense that its employment decisions regarding 

plaintiffs were done for legitimate business reasons, (Am. Answer 

at 18:17-23). In the JSR, although defendant asserted that it 

did not employ plaintiffs, it also explained the exact reasons 

each plaintiff was fired.2 (JSR at 2:10-3:14.) These actions 

are entirely consistent with plaintiffs’ belief that defendant 

was their employer. Thus, based on defendant’s equivocal conduct 

and the apparent close relation between it and the additional 

defendants, plaintiffs were not entirely unreasonable in assuming

that defendant was not the proper entity to sue. See Thompson,

2013 WL 211204, at *6. 

Finally, plaintiffs were diligent in seeking amendment 

once it was clear they needed to do so. See Johnson, 975 F.2d at 

609 (determining that the plaintiff was not diligent because he 

“[f]ail[ed] to heed clear and repeated signals that not all the 

necessary parties had been named in the complaint”). As 

discussed above, plaintiffs relied on defendant’s indications it 

was involved in their employment and would cooperate with them by 

providing employment related information. After the court filed 

the Scheduling Order, it became clear to plaintiffs that they 

 

2 Unlike cases where courts have denied leave to amend

because the plaintiffs were not diligent, defendant here did not 

point plaintiffs to the correct entity to sue. See Johnson, 975 

F.2d at 606-07 (determining that the plaintiff was not diligent 

in part because plaintiff did not seek leave to amend after 

defendant notified plaintiff of the proper party). 

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needed to add additional parties when defendant refused to 

provide various interrogatory responses because it was not 

plaintiffs’ employer. (See Aiwazian Decl. ¶ 3-7, 9, Ex. B.) 

Ten days after receiving defendant’s interrogatory 

responses, plaintiffs’ counsel made the first of multiple 

attempts to discuss with defendant’s counsel their contention 

that they did not employ plaintiffs. (Id. at ¶¶ 5-9, Exs. C-D.) 

Defendant’s counsel responded a month after plaintiffs’ counsel’s 

first email. Id. Plaintiffs then filed the present motion on 

May 12, 2014, twelve days after the parties met regarding the 

interrogatory responses. (Id. at ¶ 9.) Because plaintiffs

quickly followed up with defendant and filed this motion soon 

after it became apparent they needed to join additional parties, 

plaintiffs conduct favors a finding of diligence. 

Accordingly, because plaintiffs were diligent in 

seeking amendment, the court finds they have demonstrated good 

cause under Rule 16. See Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. 

B. Rule 15 

Having determined that plaintiffs satisfy Rule 16’s 

good cause standard, the court must still determine whether 

plaintiffs fulfill the requirements of Rule 15. Id. at 608. 

“Generally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) liberally 

allows for amendments to pleadings.” Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co.,

232 F.3d 1271, 1294 (9th Cir. 2000). “Courts may decline to 

grant leave to amend only if there is strong evidence of ‘undue 

delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, 

repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously 

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allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of 

allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of amendment.’” Sonoma 

Cnty. Ass’n of Retired Emps. v. Sonoma County, 708 F.3d 1109, 

1117 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 

(1962)). 

“Because Rule 16(b)’s ‘good cause’ inquiry essentially 

incorporates the [previous] factors, if a court finds that good 

cause exists, it should then deny a motion for leave to amend 

only if such amendment would be futile.” Lewis v. Russell, Civ. 

No. 2:03-2646 WBS CKD, 2012 WL 4711959, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 

2012); see also Algee v. Nordstrom, Inc., No. C 11-301 CW, 2011 

WL 6779324, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 27, 2011). However, denial of 

leave to amend on futility grounds alone is rare. Netbula v. 

Distinct Corp., 212 F.R.D. 534, 539 (N.D. Cal. 2003). 

“Ordinarily, courts will defer consideration of challenges to the

merits of a proposed amended pleading until after leave to amend 

is granted and the amended pleading is filed.” Id. The court 

will do so here. 

Accordingly, because plaintiffs’ diligence satisfies 

Rule 16’s “good cause” requirement, and the court cannot conclude 

at this stage that amendment would clearly be futile under Rule 

15, the court will grant plaintiffs’ motion.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion to 

modify the scheduling order and for leave to file an amended 

complaint be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED.

Plaintiffs shall file the FAC naming the additional 

defendants within ten days of the date this Order is signed. 

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Dated: July 1, 2014

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