Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-93-03159/USCOURTS-caDC-93-03159-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
El Tora Graham
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 17, 1996 Decided August 9, 1996

No. 93-3159

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

EL TORA GRAHAM,

APPELLANT

-

Consolidated with

No. 95-3060

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 92cr00286-01)

Joseph F. Yenouskas argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant.

Ann M. Carroll, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for appellee, with whom Eric

H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, John R. Fisher, Thomas J. Tourish, Jr., and Lynn C.

Leibovitz, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief. Elizabeth Trosman, Assistant United

States Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: WILLIAMS, GINSBURG and SENTELLE, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GINSBURG.

GINSBURG, Circuit Judge: A jury convicted El Tora Graham on six counts of a seven-count

indictment charging a variety of drug trafficking offenses, and the district court imposed a life

sentence asrequired by the United States Sentencing Guidelines. On appeal Graham claims that the

district court improperly denied histhree pretrial motions for appointment ofsubstitute counsel and,

relatedly, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during pretrial negotiations and at

sentencing, in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Graham also

claimsthat the Government failed to prove at trial the same conspiracy alleged in the indictment. We

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affirm Graham's conviction and sentence against all such claims.

I. Background

In the course of investigating several violent crimes committed on two blocks of Newton

Street in Northwest Washington, the Metropolitan Police Department learned of a drug trafficking

organization known as the "Newton Street Crew," headed by Mark "Markie" Hoyle and John

McCullough. The efforts of the MPD and of the Federal Bureau of Investigation lead to the

indictment of twenty-three alleged Crew members.

In one indictment the grand jury charged El Tora Graham and three co-defendants with a

variety of offensesrelated to the distribution of cocaine base (a/k/a crack cocaine). The Government

engaged in plea negotiations with all four defendants, and all but Graham pleaded guilty. Graham

stood trial on one count of conspiring to distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine, in violation

of 21 U.S.C. § 846; three counts of distributing five or more grams of crack, in violation of 21

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(B)(iii); and three counts of using a telephone to facilitate cocaine

distribution, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). Convicted by a jury on each charge save one of the

telephone counts, Graham wassentenced to concurrent terms oflife imprisonment on the conspiracy

count and each of the distribution counts, and to concurrent eight-year terms on each of the two

telephone counts.

Graham filed a timely notice of appeal and a motion to vacate his sentence per 28 U.S.C. §

2255, claiming that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing. Graham subsequently

added a claim of ineffective assistance during plea negotiations. After a two-day hearing, the district

court rejected both claims of ineffective assistance and denied Graham's § 2255 motion. Graham's

appeal from that order is consolidated here with his direct appeal.

A. Pretrial Plea Negotiations

Graham was arrested in July 1992. In August he attended a meeting with defense counsel

Robert Werdig, Detective Sergeant Daniel Wagner of the MPD, and FBI Special Agent Mark

Giuliano. The purpose of this meeting, according to Wagner's testimony at the hearing on Graham's

§ 2255 motion, was to explore the possibility of Graham's working out a plea offer and assisting the

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Government in the prosecution of other members of the Newton Street Crew, "most importantly,

against what were considered the top members[,] that is Mark Hoyle and John McCullough, Mario

Harris and that level." Wagner told Graham that he would "spend the rest of his life in jail" if he did

not cooperate. Agent Giuliano also told Graham that he faced a life sentence. Graham's lawyer, who

had been present when Wagner warned Graham that he could spend the rest of hislife in jail, told the

defendant, in the presence of Wagner and Giuliano, "that he, indeed, should listen to [them] and pay

attention to what [they] had to say."

According to Sergeant Wagner, Graham said that he wanted to cooperate because "he

couldn't do that kind of time in jail," but then gave only information "that actually wasfairly common

knowledge, and it was not about the Newton Street Crew." Wagner warned him that "he was going

to have to think harder, because while we knew that he was going to have to talk about his friends

and people that he was afraid of, that was fair ... [and] he was going to have to if he expected to be

credited with any kind of cooperation." The meeting ended with Graham insisting that he had told

all he knew.

About two weeks later, Graham attended another meeting with the same three people plus

Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) Paul Howes, who also told Graham that he faced life

imprisonment if he did not cooperate. Again Graham claimed that he was willing to cooperate, but

again, according to Wagner, when the meeting ended Grahamhad offered "nothing substantial at all."

In April 1993 AUSA Lynn Leibovitz made Graham a plea offer in a telephone conversation

with his attorney, Werdig. At the § 2255 hearing she testified that the cooperation she sought from

Graham in exchange

was not specifically limited to Newton Street. Its was broad-based cooperation and

truthful testimony in whatever otherat trial or whatever other proceedings we

would ask him about.

Graham did not accept.

A third meeting took place the next month, shortly before Graham's trial was scheduled to

start. All the dramatis personae were present: Graham, Wagner and Giuliano, and the lawyers

Leibovitz, Howes, and Werdig. Two members of the Newton Street Crew, Donnie Strothers and

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William "Toby" Hoyle, had just been convicted. Howes told Graham that this was his last chance to

cooperate in the prosecution of Mark Hoyle "and the other senior defendants" in the Newton Street

cases; the Government would negotiate no further and Graham would spend the rest of his life in jail.

Howes asked Graham why he would "do life for Markie Hoyle." Although the Government went so

far asto bring in other cooperating defendants, who told Graham that they intended to testify against

him and encouraged him to accept the Government's offer, Graham said that he would take his

chances in court.

During these three meetings, Wagner and Giuliano had explained to Graham that he would

surely get a life sentence if convicted on the conspiracy charge because of the way in which crimes

committed by his co-conspirators would affect the calculation of his sentence, and that the sentence

would be mandatory under the Sentencing Guidelines unless the Government asked the court to

depart downward. Throughout the course of the meetings Graham never expressed any doubt that

he would face life imprisonment if he went to trial and was convicted; indeed, at the first two

meetings he said that he would cooperate in order to avoid this fate.

B. Motions for Appointment of Substitute Counsel

Betweenthe second and third plea negotiationmeetingsrecounted above, Grahammade three

written requests for appointment of substitute counsel. In his first letter to the district judge

(February 1993), Graham charged that his attorney (still Werdig) "doesn't show any type of

professional ethicsthat may be sufficient in my case," "[has] a lack of confidence in his[sic]self," and

"seemsto alwaystry to push me in the other directions." Graham asked the judge to appoint counsel

who would "work with me and not against me."

In a second request letter to the district court (undated), Graham said that he was "still

dissatisfied" with his attorney's performance. He charged that Werdig lacked interest in his case and

had not been to see him in jail for nine months. Finally (in April 1993) Graham sent a third letter, in

which he charged that Werdig was not working in Graham's best interest, had still not visited him in

jail, had provided himwith no information regarding the progress of his case, and had performed none

of the investigative work that Graham had requested and believed "vital" to his case. Graham also

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said that he had never succeeded in reaching Werdig by phone, and that "with no communication

there is absolutely no chance to build a defense to fight my case." After receiving the third letter, the

district court scheduled a hearing, at which the court denied Graham's request for new counsel

without giving him an opportunity to speak.

C. Negotiation for Sentence Reduction 

After the district court sentenced Graham to life imprisonment and the defendant had filed a

timely notice of appeal, this court appointed Joseph Yenouskas to serve as appellate counsel.

Sometime around March 1994several weeks before the trial of Newton Street Crew leader Mark

HoyleYenouskas contactedAUSALeibovitz to determine whethertheGovernment wasinterested

in obtaining Graham's cooperation in exchange for a Government motion to reduce hissentence under

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b) (district court may upon Government's motion reduce

sentence based upon defendant's having provided "substantial assistance in the investigation or

prosecution of another person who has committed an offense").

At the later hearing on Graham's § 2255 motion, Leibovitz testified that she told Yenouskas

that the Government would be interested in testimony concerning the drug trafficking activities and

acts of violence, "including possibly murders," committed by Mark Hoyle, Mario Harris, and other

members of the Newton Street Crew, but could offer no guarantee regarding whether or to what

extent Graham's sentence would be reduced until Graham had provided the "substantial assistance"

necessary to support a Rule 35(b) motion. She testified that in a subsequent conversation Yenouskas

told her that Graham would not cooperate without such a guarantee.

II. Analysis

Graham's claims of ineffective assistance are intertwined with his claim that we must vacate

his conviction because the district court improperly denied his motionsfor appointment ofsubstitute

counsel. Although Graham disputes the point vigorously, an indigent defendant who seeks

court-appointed representation has no constitutional right to the counsel of his choice; he has only

the right to effective representation. Unless he can establish an ineffective assistance claim under

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), therefore, any error in the district court's disposition

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of Graham's motion for appointment of substitute counsel is harmless.

We turn first to Graham's claims ofineffective assistance during the pretrial plea negotiations,

then at sentencing; he has not claimed that Werdig rendered ineffective assistance during trial. We

next address Graham's objection to the manner in which the district court disposed of his motion for

appointment of substitute counsel, taking the opportunity to claify the district court's obligation to

investigate the facts underlying such a motion.

A. Assistance of Counsel During Pretrial Plea Negotiations

TheGovernment does not dispute that a defendant's constitutionalright to effective assistance

of counsel attaches during plea negotiations, and that during the pretrial plea negotiationsin this case

counselfailed to inform Grahamthat he faced a mandatory life sentence if convicted at trial. Further,

the Government concedes that in this respect counsel's performance fell below "the range of

competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases," thereby making out the first element of an

ineffective assistance claimunder Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. See United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d

1458, 1465 (9th Cir. 1994); Lewandowski v. Makel, 949 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1991); Beckham v.

Wainwright, 639 F.2d 262 (5thCir. 1981). The Government contends, however, that Graham cannot

make out the second element of such a claim"a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different," Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 694because, as the district court found, even if his attorney had adequately informed him of his

sentencing exposure, he would have gone to trial rather than accept any plea offer the Government

was willing to make. See Blaylock, 20 F.3d at 1466.

Based upon the testimony of AUSA Leibovitz, the district court found that even after he had

been sentenced to life imprisonment Graham rejected the Government's offer of a possible sentence

reduction under Rule 35(b) in exchange for his cooperation because the Government would not offer

a guaranteed deal prior to obtaining that cooperation. That finding is sufficient to support the court's

ultimate conclusion that Graham would have rejected the Government's plea offer despite correct

advice from counselregarding his maximum sentencing exposure, for the record indicates that every

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plea offer the Government made was conditioned upon the sufficiency of Graham's cooperation.

Graham argues, however, that the district judge erred by admitting Leibovitz' testimony on this

subject, and erred again when he threatened to disqualify Yenouskas from further representing

Graham if Yenouskas took the stand to rebut Leibovitz' testimony regarding their conversations.

Graham's theory is that Leibovitz' testimony should have been excluded from the § 2255

hearing under Federal Rules of Evidence 408 and 410 because it concerns "settlement discussions,"

specifically, the possibilityof aRule 35(b)sentence reduction for the purpose of "resolving" Graham's

pending appeal and § 2255 motion. Rule 408 provides that

Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or

offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or

attempting to compromise a claimwhich was disputed asto either validity or amount,

is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount.

Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is likewise not

admissible....

The subject of this rule is the admissibility of evidence (in a civil or criminal case) of negotiations

undertaken to "compromise a claim" in a civil action, see Jack B. Weinstein et al., 2 Weinstein's

Evidence ¶ 408[01] at 408-17 & n.28 (citing cases) (1992); it does not address the admissibility of

evidence concerning negotiationsto "compromise" a criminal case. See United States v. Baker, 926

F.2d 179, 180 (2d Cir. 1991) ("Negotiations over immunity from criminal charges or a plea bargain

do not in ordinary parlance constitute discussions of a "claim' over which there is a dispute as to

"validity' or "amount' "); see alsoCharles Alan Wright and Kenneth W. Graham, 23 Federal Practice

and Procedure § 5306 at 216-219 (1980) ("It seems odd to refer to the prosecution's case against

a criminal defendant as a "claim'.... The arguments [in favor of doing so] are not convincing").

Moreover, as the court pointed out in Baker, "[t]he very existence of Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 11(e)(6) [and of Rule 410] strongly support[ ] the conclusion that Rule 408 applies only

to civil matters." 926 F.2d at 180. But see United States v. Greene, 995 F.2d 793, 798 (8th Cir.

1993), citing United States v. Verdoorn, 528 F.2d 103, 107 (8th Cir. 1975) ("Under the rationale of

Fed.R.Evid. 408, which relatesto the generaladmissibilityof compromises and offersto compromise,

government proposals concerning pleas should be excludable").

In the context of a criminal case, Rule 410 (rather than Rule 408) strikesthe balance between

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the interest in admitting all relevant evidence, see Rule 402, and the interest in resolving disputes

without litigation. And Rule 410, like Criminal Procedure Rule 11(e)(6), applies only to "plea"

negotiations, not to every offer of cooperation, United States v. Hare, 49 F.3d 447, 450-51 (8th Cir.

1995); United States v. Guerrero, 847 F.2d 1363, 1367 (9th Cir. 1988), and certainly not to

post-conviction bargaining. This limitation apparently reflects the drafters' quite plausible policy

judgment that, in general, the social benefits of post-conviction bargaining are less than the benefits

of plea bargaining and the settlement of civil disputes, i.e., that encouraging post-conviction

bargaining does not warrant compromising the fact-finding process by excluding relevant evidence.

At the time of Leibovitz' conversations with Yenouskas, Graham had been convicted and

sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole. The Government did not need, and

Graham was not offering, a guilty plea. Therefore, Rule 410 is inapplicable and Graham's argument

beside the point.

Next, Graham argues that the district court imposed upon him a "substantial hardship" by

ruling that it would disqualify Yenouskas from further representing Graham if the attorney took the

stand to rebut Leibovitz' testimony. We do not see the hardship. Yenouskas had been accompanied

by a colleague, William Sheehan, on the motions and briefs filed in the district court. Although the

district judge ruled that lead counsel could not testify and continue to represent Graham, the judge

said that he would proceed with Sheehan representing Graham. Yenouskas argued that his colleague

was less familiar than was he with Graham's case, but the record contains no indication that the

district judge could not or would not have cured this problem by granting Sheehan's request for a

continuance, if made and needed.

In any case, based upon the testimonial proffer that Yenouskassubmitted, it is clear that there

was no harm done by the exclusion of his testimony. Graham claims that the attorney's proffer and

his owntestimony, takentogether, establishthat the Government'sinterests changed, to his detriment,

between the pretrial plea negotiations and the post-sentencing Rule 35 discussions. In particular,

Graham saysthat "the government's primary interest ... [had changed to] a subject that Graham knew

nothing about," rendering Graham's formerly valuable information worthless and leaving him with

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nothing else to trade. In fact, however, Yenouskas' testimony would not have shown this and would

have been in some tension with Graham's testimony.

Graham testified that he believed the Government wanted testimony concerning murders

committed by Mark Hoyle in exchange for a Rule 35(b) motion and that he had no such information.

Yenouskas would have testified that Leibovitz told him she was no longer interested in testimony

concerning Markie Hoyle, but was primarily interested in testimony about murders committed by

Mario Harris. Graham points to nothing in the recordnot even his own testimonyto suggest that

he could not have substantially assisted the Government in prosecuting Mario Harris.

Yenouskas would have denied telling Leibovitz that Graham would not cooperate without

a guaranteed sentence. If the district judge had admitted and credited this testimony, however, that

would simply leave unexplained Graham's refusal to cooperate despite the Government's offer of a

potentially substantial sentence reduction. The fact of Graham's refusal to cooperate after he had

received a life sentence would remain, and that refusal speaks louder than the reason he

refusedunless Graham can establish a reason that he did not have during plea negotiations. As

noted in the prior paragraph, however, his one attempt to establish such a reason falls short.

In sum, Leibovitz' testimony provided a proper and sufficient basis for the district court's

finding that Graham would not have pleaded guilty regardless of the advice he might have received

had Werdig's representation of Graham not been deficient. His claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel fails, therefore, for want of the showing of prejudice required under Strickland.

B. Assistance of Counsel at Sentencing

Grahamalso arguesthat Werdig's preparation forsentencing wasinadequate and that counsel

negligently failed to dispute severalrecommendationsin the Presentence Report (PSR) received and

adopted by the district court. As Graham concedes, in order to prevail on these claims he must show

that counsel's performance was so deficient as to "undermine confidence in the outcome" of the

proceeding. United States v. Saro, 24 F.3d 283, 287 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The Government, of course,

arguesthat defense counselmade no such significant error. We address in turn each of the sentencing

recommendations in the PSR that Graham says his lawyer should have but did not challenge.

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1. Quantity of Drugs. The PSR recommended a base offense level of 40 on the ground that

Graham had distributed at least five kilograms of crack cocaine. Graham says that counsel should

have challenged the factual predicate, but there is no apparent reason why he should have. The

supporting evidence includes undisputed testimony that Mark Hoyle gave Graham an eighth of a

kilogram per week for at least the first 26 weeks of 1992 (.125 kg × 26 = 3.25 kg) and that another

supplier, one Adolph, supplied Graham with a quarter of a kilogram every other week during the

same period (.25 kg × 13 = 3.25 kg) for a total of 6.5 kilograms.

2. Manager/Supervisor Status. The PSR recommended a three-point increase in Graham's

offense level, pursuant to USSG § 3B1.1, to reflect his status as a "manager or supervisor" of the

conspiracy. Graham argues that counsel also should have "challenged the factual basis" for this

enhancement. Werdig did not challenge the accuracy of the facts recounted in the PSR, and with

good reason, for they are amply supported in the record. He did, however, challenge the legal

sufficiency of the evidence in the record to establish that Graham had been a manager or supervisor

within the meaning of the Sentencing Guidelines. On this point, therefore, Graham cannot satisfy

even the first element of an ineffective assistance claimdeficient performance.

3. WrongCriminal HistoryCategory. Graham argues that defense counsel failed to challenge

the erroneous recommendation in the PSR that he be assigned a criminal history category of III. He

argues also that defense counsel should have asked for a downward departure because Graham's

criminalhistorycategory"over-represents" the seriousness of his criminal background. No argument

based upon Graham's criminal history category could have helped him, however, because an offense

level of 43 (calculated from his base offense level of 40 plus 3 points for being a manager or

supervisor) requires a mandatorylife sentence regardless ofthe defendant's criminal history category.

4. Proportionality. Finally, Graham faults defense counsel for not having argued that the

district court should depart downward from the life sentence required by the Guidelines because

Graham's criminal activity was less serious than that of other miscreants in the Newton Street Crew

who would likely receive the same sentence. Mandatory life imprisonment, however, is the highest

penalty imposed by the Guidelines. Inevitably, therefore, it will be imposed upon defendants the

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seriousness of whose criminal activity varies, perhaps substantially. That a defendant whose crimes

were more serious also received a mandatory life sentence can never, therefore, justify a downward

departure from a life sentence mandated by the Guidelines.

C. Motions for Appointment of Substitute Counsel

Graham argues that the district court's denial of his motions for appointment of substitute

counsel deprived him of his right to counsel of choice under the Sixth Amendment. That right could

not have been violated, however, because Graham was asking the district court to replace one

appointed attorney with another and never either expressed a desire to retain counsel or represented

that he had the means to do so. "One of the express limitations upon the right to choose one's own

attorney is that the criminal defendant be "financially able' to retain counsel of his choice." United

States v. Friedman, 849 F.2d 1488, 1490 (D.C. Cir. 1988). See also United States v. Childress, 58

F.3d 693, 736 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (defendant "has no constitutional right to appointed counsel of his

choice") (original emphasis).

Still, a defendant does have the right to effective representation byappointed counsel, and this

right may be endangered if the attorney-client relationship is bad enough. United States v. Lockhart,

923 F.2d 1314, 1320 (8thCir. 1991) (defendantseeking appointment ofsubstitute counselhas burden

of showing good cause, "such as a conflict of interest, an irreconcilable conflict, or a complete

breakdown in communication"); United States v. Iles, 906 F.2d 1122, 1130 (6thCir. 1990) (accord).

A district court's denial of a motion for substitute counsel is reviewed only for abuse of

discretion, United States v. Zillges, 978 F.2d 369, 371 (7th Cir. 1992). When an indigent defendant

seeks appointment ofsubstitute counselpro se, however, the district court generallyhas an obligation

to engage the defendant in a colloquy concerning the cause of the defendant's dissatisfaction with his

representation. Iles, 906 F.2d at 1130 ("trial court clearly has a responsibility to determine the

reasons for the defendant's dissatisfaction with his current counsel," dictum quoting LaFave and

Isreal, Criminal Procedure, § 11.4 at 36 (1984)); Zillges, 978 F.2d at 372 (court must inquire into

specific basis of defendant's dissatisfaction with counsel unless reason is clear on face of motion);

McMahon v. Fulcomer, 821 F.2d 934, 942 (3dCir. 1987) (reversing denialof habeasrelief on ground

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that trial court did not inquire into reason for defendant's dissatisfactionwith counsel). This colloquy,

which should be conducted on the record, Smith v. Lockhart, 923 F.2d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir. 1991),

may not only help the pro se defendant adequately to express the reason for his dissatisfaction with

counsel, thereby promoting confidence in the integrity ofthe process and in the jury's verdict,see Iles,

906 F.2d at 1131; it also creates an opportunity for the court to ease the defendant's concern if it is

ill-founded, Lockhart, 923 F.2d at 1320.

The manner in which the district court disposed of Graham's motions shows little regard for

the values at stake when a defendant in good faith believesthat he is entitled to substitute counsel but

has not articulated a legally sufficient ground for substitution. As the Government admits, Graham's

first letter amounted to a "vague expression of dissatisfaction." Indeed, each of Graham's three letters

containssufficiently vague allegationsthat the court should have engaged Graham with regard to the

underlying facts. United States v. Morrison, 946 F.2d 484, 499 (7th Cir. 1991) (unless substitution

motion is "extremely detailed" district judge cannot evaluate attorney-client relationship without

conducting "a proper hearing at which both attorney and client testify as to the nature of their

conflict").

In this case, the district judge held a brief hearing at which Graham was given no opportunity

to speak. Indeed, the judge began the hearing by stating that "in the last analysis" it was up to defense

counsel to determine "whether or not your relationship with [the defendant] isso badly impaired that

you can't continue with the case." Based upon Graham's letters and defense counsel's representation

that he did not think Graham "could find other counsel in this jurisdiction that would represent him

any better than I can," the court ruled that Graham had "not made a sufficient showing" to warrant

appointment of a new lawyer.

Asthe constitutionalright to choice of counsel does not apply, however, Graham must show

not only that the district court improperly disposed of his motionsforsubstitute counsel, but also that

the error was prejudicial to his case:

[I]f a defendant is [ ] afforded effective representation, an erroneous denial of a

substitution motion is not prejudicial.... [I]n order to establish prejudice, [the

defendant] must demonstrate that the performance of his attorneywas not "within the

range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases," and that "but for"

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counsel's deficiencies, "the result of the proceeding would have been different."

Zillges, 978 F.2d at 372-73, quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 694; see also Brown v. United

States, 264 F.2d 363, 366 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (en banc) (dictumthat court would not reverse conviction

of defendant whose right to dismiss counsel and proceed pro se had been wrongfully denied if

defendant received effective representation and thus suffered no prejudice).

Graham does not argue that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and, as we

have seen, his claims of ineffective assistance during plea negotiations and at sentencing come up

short. His claim to substitute counsel must fall with his claims to have received ineffective assistance

from his court-appointed lawyer.

III. Conclusion

Graham raises one additional claimof a variance between the conspiracy charged in the

indictment and the Government's proof at trialthat does not warrant treatment in a published

opinion. Whatever variance there may have been caused Graham no "substantial prejudice" at trial.

See United States v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 1391 (D.C. Cir. 1988).

Having failed to establish his claims of ineffective assistance on either side of a trial about

which he offers only one insubstantial complaint, Graham must live with both the verdict and the

sentence. For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the district court is

Affirmed.

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