Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01288/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01288-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lori Ann Brown
Plaintiff
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LORI ANN BROWN, 

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,

Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

_____________________________________/

Case No. 1:14-cv-01288-DAD-SKO

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

THAT PAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 

ATTORNEY FEES AND EXPENSES

PURSUANT TO THE EQUAL ACCESS 

TO JUSTICE ACT BE GRANTED

Objections Due: 15 Days

(Doc. 23)

After successfully obtaining reversal of an Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision 

denying her application for Social Security disability benefits, Plaintiff filed an application for an 

award of attorney fees and costs pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”) in the 

amount of $5,834.84. (Doc. 23.) 

On May 18, 2016, the Commissioner filed an opposition asserting that litigation position 

and underlying administrative decision were substantially justified. (Doc. 26.) Defendant further 

argued that because Plaintiff achieved only limited success in the litigation, any award for attorney 

fees should be reduced. (Doc. 26.) On May 19, 2015, Plaintiff filed a reply brief, which requested 

a supplemental EAJA award of $228.07 for 1.2 hours spent on the reply brief. (Doc. 27.) For the 

reasons set forth below, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s application for EAJA fees and 

expenses be GRANTED.

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I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed this action on August 16, 2014, seeking judicial review of a final 

administrative decision denying her application for Social Security disability benefits on the 

grounds that the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) failed to properly weight conflicting medical 

evidence, improperly evaluated the limiting effects of Plaintiff’s impairments, and improperly 

rejected Plaintiff’s testimony. (Docs. 1; 13; 15.) 

On January 29, 2016, the undersigned found the Commissioner’s decision was supported 

by substantial evidence within the record and recommended that Plaintiff’s appeal be denied and 

judgment be entered in favor of the Commissioner. (Doc. 17.) On March 23, 2016, the District 

Judge adopted in part the undersigned’s recommendation, remanding solely for reconsideration of 

portions of examining physician Dr. Valos’s medical opinion. (Doc. 21.) The Court’s decision 

was based upon the conclusion that “the ALJ failed to fully incorporate into her hypothetical 

questions posed to the [vocational expert] all of plaintiff’s limitations as indicated by Dr. Valos’s 

opinion.” (Doc. 21, p. 8.) The case being remanded back to the agency for reconsideration, 

judgment was entered for Plaintiff and against the Commissioner. (Doc. 22.) 

Plaintiff seeks a total of $6,062.91in EAJA fees and expenses. It is Plaintiff’s motion for 

attorney fees and expenses under the EAJA that is currently pending before the Court.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The EAJA provides that “a court shall award to a prevailing party . . . fees and other 

expenses . . . incurred by that party in any civil action . . . brought by or against the United States . 

. . unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that 

special circumstances make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A); see also Gisbrecht v. 

Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 796 (2002). “It is the government’s burden to show that its position was 

substantially justified or that special circumstances exist to make an award unjust.” Gutierrez v. 

Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255, 1258 (9th Cir. 2001).

A “party” under the EAJA is defined as including “an individual whose net worth did not 

exceed $2,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B)(i). The 

term “fees and other expenses” includes “reasonable attorney fees.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). 

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“The statute explicitly permits the court, in its discretion, to reduce the amount awarded to the 

prevailing party to the extent that the party ‘unduly and unreasonably protracted’ the final 

resolution of the case.” Atkins v. Apfel, 154 F.3d 986, 987 (9th Cir.1998) (citing 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 2412(d)(1)(C) & 2412(d)(2)(D)).

A party who obtains a remand in a Social Security case is a prevailing party for purposes 

of the EAJA. Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 300-01 (1993) (“No holding of this Court has 

ever denied prevailing-party status . . . to a plaintiff who won a remand order pursuant to sentence 

four of § 405(g) . . . , which terminates the litigation with victory for the plaintiff”). “An applicant 

for disability benefits becomes a prevailing party for the purposes of the EAJA if the denial of her 

benefits is reversed and remanded regardless of whether disability benefits ultimately are 

awarded.” Gutierrez, 274 F.3d at 1257.

III. ANALYSIS

There is no dispute Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this litigation. Moreover, the Court 

finds Plaintiff did not unduly delay this litigation, and Plaintiff’s net worth did not exceed two 

million dollars when this action was filed. The Court thus considers below whether the 

government’s actions were substantially justified.

A. The Government’s Position was Not Substantially Justified

The Commissioner contends Plaintiff is not entitled to EAJA fees because the 

Commissioner’s litigation position and underlying administrative decision were substantially 

justified. Substantial justification means “justified in substance or in the main -- that is, justified 

to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 

(1988) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In other words, the government’s position 

must have a reasonable basis both in fact and in law. Id. In considering whether the position of 

the government is substantially justified, the position of the United States includes “both the 

government’s litigation position and the underlying agency action giving rise to the civil action.” 

Meier v Colvin, 727 F.3d 867, 870 (9th Cir. 2013). 

In the social security context, it is the ALJ’s decision that is considered the “action or 

failure to act” by the agency. Id. Under the substantial justification test, the court first considers 

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the ALJ’s decision and then considers the government’s litigation position in defending that 

decision. Id. Where the underlying ALJ decision is not substantially justified, a court need not 

address whether the government’s litigation position was justified. Id. at 872 (citing Shafer v. 

Astrue, 518 F.3d 1067, 1071 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The government’s position must be substantially 

justified at each stage of the proceedings” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 

Pursuant to Meier, determining whether the agency’s position was substantially justified 

requires first examining the ALJ’s decision for substantial justification. 727 F.3d at 870. Here, 

the ALJ’s failure to explain her rejection of Dr. Valos’s opinion, or draw a meaningful distinction 

between her medical source opinion credibility findings despite obvious inconsistencies between 

Dr. Valos’s and Dr. Law’s opinion, was error. (See Doc. 21, pp. 6-7.) 

An ALJ’s failure to correctly evaluate testimony and rendering of a decision that is not 

supported by substantial evidence are the types of fundamental agency errors that are difficult to 

consider substantially justified. See Meier, 727 F.3d at 872; Thangaraja v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d at 

870, 874 (9th Cir. 2007) (“holding that the agency’s decision . . . was unsupported by substantial 

evidence is . . . a strong indication that the ‘position of the United States’ . . . was not substantially 

justified”); see also Sampson v. Chater, 103 F.3d 918, 921-22 (9th Cir. 1996) (ALJ’s failure to 

make necessary inquiries of the unrepresented claimant and his mother in determining onset date, 

as well as disregard of substantial evidence establishing the same was not substantially justified). 

That the Commissioner believes her litigation position before the Court was substantially 

justified does not vitiate the error at the administrative level. Williams v. Bowen, 966 F.2d 1259, 

1261 (9th Cir. 1991) (government’s position must be “substantially justified” at “each stage of the 

proceedings”). Moreover, the Commissioner cites no authority that a court may reduce the 

number of hours awarded under EAJA based on substantial justification for some portion of the 

government’s litigation conduct in defending the agency action. (See Doc. 26, pp. 3 (citing Lewis 

v. Barnhart, 281 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 2002) for position that a district court could consider 

the magistrate judge’s agreement with the ALJ’s decision to suggest the Commissioner was 

substantially justified).) Substantial justification is one of the threshold statutory requirements to 

determine whether EAJA fees are awardable; it is not a basis to carve out hours spent by the 

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prevailing party in responding to what Defendant asserts was a substantially justified litigation 

position. INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 166 (1990) (“‘substantial justification’ requirement of the 

EAJA establishes a clear threshold for determining a prevailing party's eligibility for fees”). 

Defendant has not satisfied her burden to show the government’s position was substantially 

justified at each stage of the proceedings. 

In sum, Plaintiff is entitled to attorney fees and expenses under the EAJA.

B. The Hours Expended by Plaintiff’s Counsel are Reasonable

Defendant contends the hours Plaintiff requests should be reduced because Plaintiff 

achieved only limited success, as the matter was ultimately remanded only as to reconsideration of 

Dr. Valos’s medical opinion, and not as to reconsideration of Plaintiff’s credibility or Plaintiff’s 

residual functional capacity. (Doc. 26, pp. 6-7.) 

The EAJA provides for an award of “reasonable” attorney fees. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2412(d)(2)(A). By statute, hourly rates for attorney fees under EAJA are capped at $125 per 

hour, but district courts are permitted to adjust the rate to compensate for increases in the cost of 

living.1 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A); Sorenson v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140, 1147-49 (9th Cir. 2001); 

Atkins, 154 F.3d at 987. Determining a reasonable fee “requires more inquiry by a district court 

than finding the ‘product of reasonable hours times a reasonable rate.’” Atkins, 154 F.3d 988 

(quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)). The district court must consider “the 

relationship between the amount of the fee awarded and the results obtained.” Id. at 989. 

Here, Plaintiff’s attorney obtained an order reversing, in part, the ALJ’s determination, 

which is a good outcome for Plaintiff. After carefully reviewing the record and the pending 

motion, the Court finds the claimed 31.9 attorney hours represent a reasonable amount of time for 

an attorney to expend on this particular matter, and the Court declines to conduct a line-by-line 

analysis of counsel’s billing entries. See, e.g., Stewart v. Sullivan, 810 F. Supp. 1102, 1107 (D. 

Haw. 1993) (“Absent any evidence of obvious ‘padding’ of hours that would lead the court to 

 

1

 Pursuant to Thangaraja, 428 F.3d at 876-77 and the Ninth Circuit Rule 39-1.6, the Ninth Circuit maintains a list of 

the statutory maximum hourly rates authorized under the EAJA, as adjusted annually to incorporate increases in the 

cost of living. The rates are found on that court’s website: http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/content/

view.php?pk_id=0000000039. Plaintiff requests hourly rates for her counsel that are consistent with the statutory 

maximum rates as set forth by the Ninth Circuit. 

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doubt the credibility of plaintiff’s application, the court will not conduct a line by line evaluation 

of the application”) (emphasis added); Vallejo v. Astrue, No. 2:09-cv-3088 KJN, 2011 WL 

4383636, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011) (declining to “conduct a line-by-line analysis” of billing 

entries to determine all 62.6 hours of attorney time spent on the litigation were justified). 

While the issues presented may have been fairly straightforward, 31.9 hours of attorney 

time are well within the limit of what would be considered a reasonable time spent on this action 

when compared to the time devoted to similar tasks by counsel in like Social Security appeals 

before this court. Costa v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 690 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(noting “[m]any district courts have noted that twenty to forty hours is the range most often 

requested and granted in social security cases”) (citing Patterson v. Apfel, 99 F.Supp.2d 1212, 

1214 n.2 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (collecting district court cases)); see also Thompson v. Colvin, No. 

2:12-cv-01850-AC, 2015 WL 1767733, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2015) (finding 63.4 hours to be 

reasonable); Boulanger v. Astrue, 2:07-cv-0849-DAD, 2011 WL 4971890, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 

19, 2011) (finding 58 hours to be a reasonable amount of time); Valleyjo v. Astrue, No. 2:09-cv03088 KJN, 2011 WL 4383636, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011) (finding 62.1 hours to be 

reasonable). 

Considering the procedural and administrative history of the case, the facts and nature of 

Plaintiff’s appeal, and the size and scope of the record, the requested hours of attorney time are 

reasonable. Costa, 690 F.3d at 1136.

IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's motion 

for EAJA fees and expenses be GRANTED in the amount of $6,062.91.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within

fifteen (15) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties may 

file written objections with the Court. Local Rule 304(b). The document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that 

failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. 

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Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 

1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 6, 2016 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto .

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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