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Parties Involved:
Jessica Harris
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 13-11017

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 2:12-cr-14046-KMM-6

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

JESSICA HARRIS, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

________________________

(April 3, 2015)

Before TJOFLAT and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges, and DuBOSE, District 

Judge.*

PER CURIAM: 

 * Honorable Kristi K. DuBose, United States District Judge for the Southern District of 

Alabama, sitting by designation. 

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Defendant Jessica Harris appeals her 24-month sentence, imposed after 

pleading guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit mail fraud and two counts of 

mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1349 and 1341, respectively. On appeal,

Defendant argues that the district court erred by including the amount of fraudulent 

checks cashed by co-conspirator Venus Holloman in the loss amount attributed to 

Defendant. Second, Defendant argues that the district court erred by determining 

that two of her prior state convictions were unrelated for the purpose of calculating 

her criminal history category. We find no reversible error and affirm. 

I. Background

According to the presentence investigation report (“PSR”), Defendant joined 

a scheme to cash fraudulent refund checks purportedly issued as part of a program 

to provide healthcare insurance for indigent children in Georgia. The leader of the 

scheme was Erica Gilmore-Grier, who was an employee at Policy Studies, Inc., a 

company that was responsible for administering Georgia PeachCare for Kids. The 

latter was a children’s insurance program providing affordable healthcare for lowincome children in Georgia. Using her position at Policy Studies, Gilmore-Grier 

authorized Policy Studies employees to issue refund checks, drawn either on 

Policy Studies’ or Georgia PeachCare’s bank account, to several individuals who 

were not enrolled in the designated program and who were therefore not authorized 

to receive benefits. A Secret Service investigation revealed that, all total, GilmoreUSCA11 Case: 13-11017 Date Filed: 04/03/2015 Page: 2 of 12
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Grier had caused the issuance of 77 fraudulent refund checks, totaling 

$219,172.56, to fifteen individuals who had subsequently cashed the majority of 

these checks. 

Venus Holloman, Defendant’s aunt, was also part of the scheme, and it was 

she who approached Defendant and encouraged her to likewise participate by 

cashing some of the fraudulently-issued checks for Gilmore-Grier. Defendant

subsequently began cashing checks for Gilmore-Grier over a five-month period of 

time. Later on Defendant also recruited another aunt, Jamile Williams, to do the 

same. 

In calculating loss under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, the PSR

held Defendant responsible for the checks she personally cashed (totaling 

$12,900); the checks cashed by the aunt that Defendant recruited (Jamile Williams)

(totaling $16,700); and the checks cashed by Holloman after Defendant began 

participating in the scheme (totaling $17,750). The PSR therefore attributed 

$47,350 in total loss to Defendant. 

As to the final Guidelines’ calculations reflected in the PSR, the latter 

calculated a base offense level of 7, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(a)(1). Defendant

received a six-level enhancement under § 2B1.1(b)(1)(D). The latter assesses a 

six-level enhancement when the loss amount is greater than $30,000, but less than 

$70,000, and Defendant’s loss was calculated as being $47,350. After receiving a 

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two-level reduction under § 3E1.1(a) for acceptance of responsibility, Defendant’s 

total offense level was 11. 

Albeit Defendant was only twenty-three years old when sentenced for the 

present offense, she already had three prior convictions for fraud offenses. These 

prior convictions resulted in the assessment of seven criminal history points, which 

placed Defendant in criminal history category IV. Based on her criminal history 

category of IV and total offense level of 11, Defendant’s resulting Guidelines’

range was 18 to 24 months’ imprisonment. The district court overruled 

Defendant’s objections to the loss and criminal history calculation, and sentenced 

her to 24 months’ imprisonment. 

She now appeals that sentence.

II. Discussion

A. Loss Calculation

Defendant challenges the inclusion in her loss calculation of $17,750 

attributable to co-defendant Holloman’s activities that were made in furtherance of 

the scheme to cash fraudulent checks and that occurred after the latter had solicited 

Defendant to join the scheme. In a case involving jointly undertaken criminal

activity, the defendant is responsible for all reasonably foreseeable acts of others in 

furtherance of this activity that occurred during the offense’s commission, in 

preparation for the offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection. 

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U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). A jointly undertaken criminal activity is a criminal 

plan or scheme undertaken by the defendant together with others, even if not 

charged as a conspiracy. Id. § 1B1.3, comment. (n.2). 

To determine a defendant’s accountability for the acts of others in a criminal 

scheme, the district court first must make individualized findings as to the scope of 

the criminal activity undertaken by the defendant. United States v. Hunter, 323 

F.3d 1314, 1319, 1322 (11th Cir. 2003) (vacating and remanding where district 

court made findings regarding reasonable foreseeability without first determining 

scope of criminal activity that the defendants jointly agreed to undertake); see also 

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, comment. (n.2). The district court may consider any implicit 

agreement fairly inferred from the conduct of the defendant and others in 

determining the scope of the criminal activity that the defendant agreed jointly to 

undertake. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, comment. (n.2). Once the district court has 

determined the scope of the jointly undertaken criminal activity, a defendant may 

be held accountable for losses resulting from the reasonably foreseeable acts of 

other participants. Hunter, 323 F.3d at 1319. 

We review the district court’s findings of fact and loss calculations for clear 

error. United States v. McCrimmon, 362 F.3d 725, 728 (11th Cir. 2004). Review 

for clear error is deferential, and we will not disturb the district court’s finding 

unless left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made. United 

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States v. Ghertler, 605 F.3d 1256, 1267 (11th Cir. 2010). The district court’s 

application of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, however, is reviewed de novo. McCrimmon, 362 

F.3d at 728. 

Defendant initially acknowledged that she had joined with Holloman to 

participate in the fraudulent check scheme. During her interview with the 

probation officer after entering a plea of guilty, Defendant stated that her aunt, 

Venus Holloman, was already active in the fraudulent check scheme when she

solicited Defendant’s participation. According to Defendant, she agreed to take 

part in the scheme and checks were sent to her at her boyfriend’s residence.1

 But 

after the PSR had been prepared, Defendant backed off the above admission. In 

making Defendant’s loss calculation, the PSR had included checks that were 

attributable to Holloman after Defendant had joined the scheme to which 

Holloman had introduced her. Without the inclusion of this loss amount, 

Defendant’s loss calculation would have been $29,600, which was just $400 shy of

the $30,000–$70,000 threshold necessary for a six-level increase. With this loss 

 1 In addition, Jamile Williams, another aunt of Defendant’s, indicated that Defendant had 

later recruited her to participate in this same scheme. But having decided to quit the scheme 

after having cashed several checks, Williams stated that Defendant cashed future checks sent to 

Williams in the latter’s name. Although in her objections, Defendant denied having cashed 

checks issued in Williams’ name, when she was jointly interviewed with Williams, she did not 

dispute Williams’ allegation, but merely said she could not remember. This factual dispute was

of no moment, however, because Defendant did not contest the inclusion of losses attributable to 

Williams.

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amount included, however, Defendant’s loss amount was calculated at $47,350, 

qualifying her for the six-level increase. 

In objections filed by her attorney, the latter indicated that, even though 

Defendant had originally told the probation officer that Defendant had agreed to 

join in the scheme suggested by her aunt, in fact Defendant had initially rejected 

her aunt’s offer. And, according to the pleadings, it was only later on that 

Defendant contacted the organizer of the scheme, Gilmore-Grier, without 

involving Holloman. Neither Defendant nor anyone else testified at the sentencing 

hearing in support of the above contradiction of her initial admission, nor 

explained how Defendant would have been able to make the contact. But her codefendant Holloman, who was likewise trying to avoid being held responsible for 

loss attributable to Defendant, told the probation officer that Defendant initially 

declined to participate, but later changed her mind, got Gilmore-Grier’s number 

from Holloman’s telephone, and contacted the latter to convey her agreement to 

participate in the scheme. 

To the extent that Defendant is arguing that the district court did not make 

an individualized finding as to the scope of her jointly undertaken criminal activity, 

her argument is unpersuasive. The court did not attribute loss amounts resulting 

from the entire criminal activity to the Defendant, but, after hearing argument from 

counsel, made an individualized determination as to her jointly undertaken 

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criminal activity. Even if the district court could have perhaps articulated more 

clearly its findings, we need not reverse because the record supports the district 

court’s determination of Defendant’s loss amount. See United States v. Petrie, 302 

F.3d 1280, 1290 (11th Cir. 2002) (“sentencing court’s failure to make 

individualized findings regarding the scope of defendant’s activity is not grounds 

for vacating a sentence if the record support[ed] the court’s determination with 

respect to the offense conduct, including the imputation of others’ unlawful acts to 

the defendant”). From the facts in the record, the district court could fairly infer an 

implicit agreement between Holloman and Defendant, thereby making the checks 

cashed by Holloman a part of the scope of Defendant’s jointly undertaken criminal 

activity. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, comment. (n.2). Accordingly, we find no 

reversible error in the district court’s loss calculations for Defendant. 

B. Criminal History

Defendant received criminal history points for three separate convictions 

relating to other fraudulent activity. She argues that two of those convictions

should have been considered related, which argument, if accepted, would have 

reduced her number of criminal history points. The district court concluded that 

the convictions were not related, and Defendant now appeals that decision. 

We address these offenses in chronological order by conviction date. On 

September 15, 2010, Defendant was convicted in DeKalb County, Georgia of 

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forgery and identity fraud, arising out of her effort to cash a stolen check at a bank

in January 2010. The court imposed a one-year term of imprisonment to be 

followed by four years of probation. Defendant received two criminal history 

points as a result of this conviction. DeKalb authorities also nolle prossed a 

separate charge of financial transaction fraud based on Defendant’s alleged theft of 

a purse containing over 20 credit cards. 

In March 2011, Defendant was convicted of unauthorized use of a credit 

card and third degree grand theft in St. Lucie County, Florida, based on her credit 

card fraud in a jewelry store in May 2009. She received a five-year probationary 

term. Defendant received one criminal history point as a result of this conviction. 

In July 2012, Defendant was convicted of theft by taking in DeKalb County, 

Georgia, based on her theft of an automobile from an automobile sales company on 

May 21, 2009. She received a two-year sentence, with the sentence reduced to the 

338 days she had already served. Defendant received two criminal history points 

as a result of this conviction. 

Further, because the present offense (committed between February 2, 2011

and June 20, 2011) was committed during Defendant’s term of probation imposed 

as a result of the Florida conviction, two additional points were added pursuant to 

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U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d).2 All total, Defendant had seven criminal history points, 

which placed her in criminal history category IV.

Defendant objected at sentencing that the conviction for forgery and identity 

fraud and the conviction for theft by taking should have been considered to be 

related and counted as only one conviction. Had this occurred, Defendant would 

have received only three criminal history points for the two offenses, instead of the 

four points she received by having them counted as separate convictions, and her 

total points would have been just six. With only six criminal history points, 

Defendant would have then been placed in category III, and thus subject to a lower 

Guidelines’ range. In support of this argument, Defendant notes that an accusation 

charging her with theft by taking was filed in June 2009 in DeKalb County and that 

this charge could have been consolidated at the sentencing in September 2010 in 

DeKalb for the unrelated forgery and identity fraud conviction. She further asserts 

that, at the time of the 2010 DeKalb County proceeding, she believed that 

sentencing to have represented a global settlement of all her pending charges. 

We review for clear error a district court’s determination that prior 

convictions are not related under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2. Hunter, 323 F.3d at 1322. As 

to the first argument, it is not clear, as a factual matter, that DeKalb was in a 

 2 To put the timing of Defendant’s offenses in perspective, she began the commission of 

the present offense in February 2011, less than five months after being sentenced in DeKalb 

County, Georgia for forgery and identity fraud. She was given a probationary sentence in St. 

Lucie, Florida in March 2011, one month into her commission of the present offense, with her 

conduct continuing for three more months. 

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position to resolve the theft by taking charge in 2010. A warrant for Defendant’s 

arrest was not issued until February 2012 and not served on Defendant until May 

2012. Nor is it certain whether or not Defendant would have been willing to plead 

guilty to that charge at that time or what plea agreement the State would have 

agreed to with the addition of that charge. Further, whether or not Defendant 

believed or hoped that her 2010 sentencing represented a global resolution of her 

pending charges, the only charge that was nolle prossed was a third unrelated 

identify fraud and financial transaction charge. If the theft by taking charge 

sentenced in 2012 was to have been resolved by a global agreement, that objection 

should have been made at the time Defendant was sentenced on that charge in 

2012. 

Regardless of all the above, though, Defendant’s argument that the two 

convictions were related for Guidelines’ purposes finds no support in the 

Guidelines. Section 4A1.2(a)(2) of the Sentencing Guidelines provides:

If the defendant has multiple prior sentences, determine whether those 

sentences are counted separately or as a single sentence. Prior 

sentences always are counted separately if the sentences were 

imposed for offenses that were separated by an intervening arrest (i.e., 

the defendant is arrested for the first offense prior to committing the 

second offense). If there is no intervening arrest, prior sentences are 

counted separately unless (A) the sentences resulted from offenses 

contained in the same charging instrument; or (B) the sentences were 

imposed on the same day. Count any prior sentence covered by (A) or 

(B) as a single sentence.

U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2).

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There having been no intervening arrest between the commission of the two 

offenses at issue, then the prior sentences for each should have been counted 

separately, as the district court did, unless either the sentences resulted from 

offenses contained in the same charging instrument or the sentences were imposed 

on the same day. Yet, neither of these preconditions for counting the two 

separately exists. The sentences did not emanate from the same charging 

instrument nor were they imposed on the same day. That is the end of the debate 

for purposes of applying § 4A1.2(a)(2).

As to Defendant’s argument that sentences on the two offenses should have 

been imposed on the same day, she cites no authority for this proposition and no 

authority to suggest that, even if true, this fact would warrant ignoring the plain 

language of § 4A1.2, which requires that the two sentences at issue be counted 

separately. Therefore, the district court did not clearly err in refusing to treat the 

two sentences as related.

For the above reasons, Defendant’s sentence is AFFIRMED.

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