Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02274/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02274-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ana Luisa Salinas de Valle
Plaintiff
Sierra Cascade Nursery, Inc.
Defendant

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANA LUISA SALINAS DE VALLE, )

et al., individually, and ) 2:06-cv-2274-GEB-DAD

acting in the interest of )

other current and former )

employees, )

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) ORDER

)

SIERRA CASCADE NURSERY, INC., )

a California corporation, and )

Does ONE through TWENTY, )

inclusive, )

)

Defendants. )

)

On October 16, 2006, Plaintiffs commenced this action in the

Superior Court of Siskiyou County and moved ex parte for a temporary

restraining order ("TRO"). The hearing was scheduled for October 16,

2006. Defendant filed a notice of removal on October 16, 2006,

effectively removing this action to federal court. Plaintiffs then

moved for a TRO. The Court directed Defendant to respond to

Plaintiffs’ motion by 2:00 p.m. on October 18, 2006, and scheduled a

hearing on the TRO on October 19, 2006, at 2:30 p.m. 

Case 2:06-cv-02274-GEB-DAD Document 42 Filed 10/20/06 Page 1 of 6
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Plaintiffs are Mexican migrant workers who were recruited by

Defendant, an operator of strawberry nurseries, to work as strawberry

trimmers in Tulelake, California. The workers received work

authorization through the issuance of H-2A non-immigrant visas, and

were transported by Defendant from Mexico to California by bus. The

workers entered into an H-2A Employment Agreement (“H-2A Agreement”)

with Defendant, the terms of which include the requirements that

Defendant provide the workers housing and three meals a day. All

workers are scheduled to end their employment with Defendant under the

H-2A visa program on October 27, 2006. 

The parties dispute the evidence that can be used when

ruling on a TRO. In particular, Defendant objects to a number of

declarations submitted by Plaintiffs in support of their motion. (See

Def.’s Objections and Mot. to Strike, Oct. 18, 2006.) The trial court

has considerable discretion in weighing evidence submitted in an

injunction proceeding. “The urgency of obtaining [an] injunction

necessitates a prompt determination and makes it difficult to obtain

affidavits from persons who would be competent to testify at trial. 

The trial court may give even inadmissible evidence some weight, when

to do so serves the purpose of preventing irreparable harm.” Flynt

Distributing Co., Inc. v. Harvey, 734 F.2d 1389, 1394 (9th Cir. 1984)

(internal citation omitted). Accordingly, the Court will decide what

weight is given to the evidence.

The issuance of a TRO is appropriate only where the movants

demonstrate "either (1) a combination of probable success on the

merits and the possibility of irreparable injury [footnote omitted] or

(2) the existence of serious questions going to the merits and that

the balance of hardships tips sharply in [their] favor." GoTo.com,

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Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1205 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal

quotation and citation omitted). “Under any formulation of the test,

plaintiff must demonstrate that there exists a significant threat of

irreparable injury.” Oakland Tribune, Inc. v. Chronicle Publishing

Co., 762 F.2d 1374, 1376 (9th Cir. 1985) (internal citation omitted). 

Plaintiffs have failed to show a significant threat of irreparable

injury on the majority of their complaints. (See Pls.’ Mot Ex. A at

4-10.) However, Plaintiffs have shown a significant threat of

irreparable injury with regards to three matters: bed spacing, heating

of fairgrounds bathrooms and the need to ensure that nutritious meals

are provided. 

The first issue addressed is bed spacing. Under 29 C.F.R. §

1910.142(b)(2) and (3), Defendants must ensure that “each room for

sleeping purposes shall contain at least 50 square feet of floor space

for each occupant” and that “such beds or similar facilities shall be

spaced not closer than 36 inches both laterally and end to 

end . . . .” See also 25 CA ADC §§ 724, 732. Plaintiffs’

declarations and photographs show that their living area is currently

not in compliance with these spacing requirements. (See e.g., Lopez

Decl. ¶ 8, Oct. 11, 2006; Barreras Decl. ¶ 6, Oct. 15, 2006; Ocana

Decl. ¶ 6, Oct. 15, 2006.) Defendant counters that the spacing

requirements were met when the workers were initially placed in the

dormitories, but certain workers changed the spacing of the beds so

they could more easily play cards. Defendant expresses concern that

to change the spacing now would force Defendant to enter the workers’

living area and could potentially violate their privacy rights. 

Plaintiffs rejoin that Defendant is obligated to ensure the workers

are aware of the spacing requirements and Defendant should be enjoined

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to tell the workers about those requirements and to take immediate

action to become in compliance with them. The Defendant shall make

the necessary adjustments so that its sleeping quarters at the subject

dormitories are in accordance with the stated spacing requirements and

shall tell the workers about those requirements no later than 

8:00 p.m. on October 20, 2006. 

Plaintiffs also complain about heating of the fairgrounds

bathroom facilities. Defendant conceded during the hearing that the

fairgrounds concrete bathrooms are unheated. Heating must be provided

in these bathrooms. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.142(b)(11) (“If a camp is

used during cold weather, adequate heating equipment shall be

provided.”); 25 CA ADC § 800 (“In temporary and seasonal labor camps

heating equipment is not required, except in shower 

rooms . . . .”). Therefore, Defendant shall ensure that adequate

heating is provided in the fairgrounds concrete bathrooms no later

than 8:00 p.m. on October 21, 2006. 

Finally, the parties dispute whether Plaintiffs are being

provided nutritious meals. Under the H-2A Agreement, Defendant is

obligated to provide the workers three meals per day that are “an

adequate, well-balanced serving of a variety of wholesome, nutritious

foods.” 8 CA ADC § 11140(10)(A); see also 20 C.F.R. § 655.102(b)(4). 

The record is unclear as to whether Defendant is providing the workers

with nutritious meals. Defendant argued it currently serves its

workers three meals a day, but only indicates the meals are

nutritious. (Def.’s Opp’n at 4.) Plaintiffs assert the meals are not

nutritious. (Pls.’ Mot Ex. A at 8; see, e.g., Valle Daniel Decl.

¶ 13, Oct. 15, 2006; Valles Gonzalez Decl. ¶ 12, Oct. 15, 2006.) 

Defendant indicated during oral argument that if a TRO issues

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requiring the meals to be nutritious, litigation would be continuous

over the meaning of the word “nutritious.” Plaintiffs rejoined that

the school lunch standards could be used. Since Defendant did not

provide sufficient assurance that the meals will be nutritious, the

standard Plaintiffs propose is adopted. Accordingly, Defendant shall

ensure it is providing its workers with three nutritious meals per day

under this standard no later than breakfast on October 21, 2006. 

The remaining issue concerns the parties’ factual dispute 

over whether Plaintiffs were properly informed about the Company’s

production standard at the time of recruitment. (See Pls.’ Mot Ex. A

at 5-6; Def.’s Opp’n at 6.) However, this factual dispute need not be

resolved because federal law provides that when the minimum

productivity standards are not “specified in the job offer . . . such

standards shall be no more than those normally required . . . by other

employers for the activity in the area of intended employment.” 20

C.F.R. § 655.102(b)(9)(ii)(B)(1) and (2). 

Defendant has introduced evidence showing its production

quota is similar to the production standards that are “normally

required” in the area where the workers are employed. (See Fortin

Decl. ¶ 3, Oct. 18, 2006; Albaugh Decl. ¶ 2, Oct. 17, 2006.) 

Furthermore, Defendant has also shown it has only terminated workers

for not meeting a production quota that is below these standards. 

(See Def. Opp’n at 6; Fortin Decl. ¶ 3.) Therefore, Defendant has a

likelihood of success on the merits of its position that its

production quota is not unlawful. 

Plaintiffs argue that Defendant is firing employees for

failure to meet this production quota, and that this firing causes

those employees to suffer irreparable harm. Plaintiffs point to five

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fired Plaintiffs and to the looming threat that other Plaintiffs could

be fired. While it is understood that termination could result in

economic injury, this does not constitute irreparable harm under the

circumstances. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ request for a TRO on this issue

is denied. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 20, 2006

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

Case 2:06-cv-02274-GEB-DAD Document 42 Filed 10/20/06 Page 6 of 6