Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00227/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00227-6/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Michael Haltom
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL HALTOM,

Plaintiff,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY,

Defendant.

No. 2:13-cv-0227-KJM-KJN

ORDER

Plaintiff Michael Haltom commenced this social security action on August 25, 2011. 

(ECF No. 1.) Although the action was initially erroneously filed in the Fresno division of this 

district, it was ultimately transferred to the Sacramento division on February 6, 2013. (ECF No. 

23.) On September 26, 2013, the court granted plaintiff‟s motion for summary judgment in part, 

denied the Commissioner‟s cross-motion for summary judgment, remanded the case for further 

proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and entered judgment for plaintiff. 

(ECF Nos. 28, 29.) 

Presently pending before the court is plaintiff‟s motion for attorneys‟ fees pursuant to the 

Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), filed on December 24, 2013. (ECF No. 30.) The 

Commissioner filed an opposition to plaintiff‟s motion on January 22, 2014. (ECF No. 31.) 

After considering the parties‟ briefing and the applicable law, the court grants plaintiff‟s motion 

for EAJA fees in part.

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The EAJA provides, in part, that: 

Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall 

award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and 

other expenses, in addition to any costs awarded pursuant to 

subsection (a), incurred by that party in any civil action (other than 

cases sounding in tort), including proceedings for judicial review of 

agency action, brought by or against the United States in any court 

having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the 

position of the United States was substantially justified or that 

special circumstances make an award unjust.

A party seeking an award of fees and other expenses shall, within 

thirty days of final judgment in the action, submit to the court an 

application for fees and other expenses which shows that the party 

is a prevailing party and is eligible to receive an award under this 

subsection, and the amount sought, including an itemized statement 

from any attorney or expert witness representing or appearing in 

behalf of the party stating the actual time expended and the rate at 

which fees and other expenses were computed. The party shall also 

allege that the position of the United States was not substantially 

justified. Whether or not the position of the United States was 

substantially justified shall be determined on the basis of the record 

(including the record with respect to the action or failure to act by 

the agency upon which the civil action is based) which is made in 

the civil action for which fees and other expenses are sought.

The court, in its discretion may reduce the amount to be awarded 

pursuant to this subsection, or deny an award, to the extent that the 

prevailing party during the course of the proceedings engaged in 

conduct which unduly and unreasonably protracted the final 

resolution of the matter in controversy. 

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A)-(C). 

Here, the Commissioner does not dispute that plaintiff is a prevailing party, because he 

successfully obtained a remand for further proceedings under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g). Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 300-02 (1993). Furthermore, plaintiff‟s application 

for EAJA fees is timely, because it was filed within thirty days of final judgment in this action.

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 The term “final judgment” for purposes of the EAJA “means a judgment that is final and not 

appealable....” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(G). The court entered judgment for plaintiff on 

September 26, 2013. (ECF No. 29.) The judgment became a non-appealable “final judgment” 60 

days later on November 25, 2013. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B) (providing that the notice of 

appeal may be filed by any party within 60 days after entry of the judgment if one of the parties is 

the United States, a United States agency, or a United States officer or employee sued in an 

official capacity). Accordingly, plaintiff was required to file an application for EAJA fees no 

later than 30 days after the “final judgment,” i.e., by December 25, 2013. Plaintiff‟s December 

24, 2013 application is therefore timely. 

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Nevertheless, the Commissioner argues that plaintiff is not entitled to an award of fees under the 

EAJA, because the position of the Commissioner was substantially justified. See Flores v. 

Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 569 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that claimant is entitled to attorneys‟ fees 

unless the government shows that its position “with respect to the issue on which the court based 

its remand was „substantially justified‟”). 

The burden of establishing substantial justification is on the government. Gutierrez v. 

Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255, 1258 (9th Cir. 2001). In Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988), the 

Supreme Court defined “substantial justification” as:

“justified in substance or in the main” – that is, justified to a degree 

that could satisfy a reasonable person. That is no different from the 

“reasonable basis in both law and fact” formulation adopted by the 

Ninth Circuit and the vast majority of other Courts of Appeals that 

have addressed this issue.

Id. at 565. A position does not have to be correct to be substantially justified. Id. at 566 n.2; see 

also Lewis v. Barnhart, 281 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 2002). In determining substantial 

justification, the court reviews both the underlying governmental action being defended in the 

litigation and the positions taken by the government in the litigation itself. Gutierrez, 274 F.3d at 

1259.

Here, the Commissioner‟s attempt to show that its position with respect to the issue on 

which the court based its remand was substantially justified is unpersuasive. As discussed in 

detail in the court‟s prior order,2the ALJ failed to properly develop the record concerning 

plaintiff‟s reaching limitations. Although the ALJ found plaintiff, who is right handed, to be 

limited to only occasional reaching overhead with his right upper extremity, she nonetheless 

concluded that plaintiff was capable of performing his past relevant work as a trucking company 

manager, which the vocational expert testified requires frequent reaching. These findings at least

appear inconsistent, yet the ALJ failed to seek clarification from the vocational expert as to 

whether frequent bilateral overhead reaching was required for plaintiff‟s past relevant work or 

 

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The court does not repeat its detailed analysis of the substantive issues here, but instead refers 

the parties to its February 15, 2013 findings and recommendations (ECF No. 27), subsequently 

adopted by the district judge on September 26, 2013. (ECF No. 28.) 

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whether, for example, frequent overhead reaching with only one arm would be sufficient. 

Instead, the ALJ speculated that plaintiff‟s right upper extremity reaching limitation did not 

completely preclude plaintiff from performing his past relevant work. Such speculation, 

unsupported by vocational expert testimony, is facially deficient. As such, the Commissioner‟s

position during the administrative proceedings, and its defense of that position in the litigation 

before this court, were not substantially justified.

Therefore, having concluded that the Commissioner‟s position was not substantially 

justified as to the issue on which remand was based, and because there are no other special 

circumstances that would make an award of EAJA fees unjust, the court finds that plaintiff is 

entitled to an award of fees and expenses pursuant to the EAJA.

The EAJA directs the court to award a reasonable fee. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). In 

determining whether a fee is reasonable, the court considers the reasonable hourly rate, the hours 

expended, and the results obtained. See Commissioner, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 163 (1990); 

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983); Atkins v. Apfel, 154 F.3d 986, 988 (9th Cir. 

1998).

In considering a reasonable rate for attorneys‟ fees, an increase in the statutory rate of 

$125 may be justified to account for increases in the cost of living. See Sorenson v. Mink, 239 

F.3d 1140, 1148 (9th Cir. 2001). The cost of living adjustment to the statutory cap is computed 

by multiplying the statutory cap by the consumer price index for urban consumers for the year in 

which the fees were earned, then dividing by the consumer price index figure on the date that the 

cap was imposed by Congress. Id. at 1148-49; see also Thangaraja v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 870, 

876-77 (9th Cir. 2005). The national, rather than local, change in cost of living should be applied 

to adjust the EAJA rate cap because “if Congress had wanted to allow for cost of living 

adjustments in a particular region or city, it could have done so in the statute.” Stewart v. 

Sullivan, 810 F. Supp. 1102, 1107 (D. Haw. 1993).

In the event that the court found that the Commissioner‟s position was not substantially 

justified, the Commissioner does not oppose the computation of plaintiff‟s hourly rates -- $180.59 

for 2011 hours; $184.32 for 2012 hours; and $186.55 for 2013 hours. These rates comport with 

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the statutory maximum hourly rates under the EAJA, adjusted for increases in the cost of living, 

published on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals‟ website. See http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/

content/view.php?pk_id=0000000039. However, the Commissioner objects to some of plaintiff‟s 

counsel‟s time spent on the case. Those objections are well taken. 

Plaintiff submitted time records, with entries broken down by various tasks performed 

related to the case, showing that plaintiff‟s counsel spent a total of 36.1 hours on the case (4.6 

hours in 2011 at an hourly rate of $180.59; 27.4 hours in 2012 at an hourly rate of $184.32; and 

4.1 hours in 2013 at an hourly rate of $186.55) resulting in total attorneys‟ fees of $6,645.92. 

(ECF No. 30-1 at 8; Affidavit of Sengthiene Bosavanh, ECF No. 30-2 [“Bosavanh Aff.”].) 

Plaintiff additionally requests expenses in the amount of $71.10, for a total EAJA fees and 

expenses request of $6,717.02. (Id.)

The court has performed an independent review of the individual time entries, and agrees 

with the Commissioner that plaintiff is not entitled to fees for time spent drafting and finalizing 

the confidential letter brief required by the Fresno division of this court, or for time spent

reviewing the Commissioner‟s response thereto. Had plaintiff filed this case in the proper venue, 

the time spent on these activities would not have been necessary, because the Sacramento division 

of this court does not require the filing of a confidential letter brief in addition to an opening brief 

or motion for summary judgment. In responses to orders to show cause issued by the magistrate 

judge in Fresno concerning plaintiff‟s counsel‟s repeated failure to properly determine venue in 

multiple cases, including the instant case, plaintiff‟s counsel conceded her errors and indicated 

that she did not intend to handle any new federal court appeals in the foreseeable future. (See

ECF Nos. 17-21.) Accordingly, the court deducts the 6.0 hours spent on February 12, 2012, the 

2.3 hours spent on February 13, 2012, and the 0.2 hours spent on February 24, 2012, related to the 

confidential letter brief and the Commissioner‟s response thereto; a total of 8.5 hours at an hourly 

rate of $184.32, resulting in a deduction of $1,566.72.

Additionally, the court deducts time plaintiff‟s counsel spent on routine, secretarial, and/or 

clerical work, including reviewing standard docket notices, consents to magistrate judge 

jurisdiction, designations of counsel, etc. Such documents are routine and largely identical in all 

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social security cases, and, absent any special issues that deserve further attention (which are not 

documented in the records here), reviewing or preparing them does not constitute work properly 

billed as attorney or paralegal work. Therefore, the court deducts the following time in 2011

related to routine tasks: 0.1 hours spent on August 25, 2011; 0.5 hours spent on August 26, 2011; 

0.5 hours spent on September 15, 2011; 0.2 hours spent on September 16, 2011; 0.1 hours spent 

on September 20, 2011; 0.1 hours spent on September 21, 2011; 0.1 hours spent on October 10, 

2011; and 0.3 hours spent on January 13, 2012,

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for a total of 1.9 hours in 2011 at an hourly rate 

of $180.59, resulting in an overall deduction of $343.12 for 2011 routine tasks. The court also 

deducts the following time in 2013 related to routine tasks: 0.1 hours spent on February 6, 2013; 

0.1 hours spent on February 8, 2013; and 0.1 hours spent on February 11, 2013, for a total of 0.3 

hours in 2013 at an hourly rate of $186.55, resulting in an overall deduction of $55.96 for 2013 

routine tasks. Thus, the court‟s total deduction related to routine tasks is $399.08. 

In sum, the court reduces plaintiff‟s EAJA fees and expenses request of $6,717.02 to 

$4,751.22 ($6,717.02 minus $1,566.72 minus $399.08). The court finds this overall award of fees 

and expenses to be generous in light of the results achieved, because although plaintiff obtained a 

remand for further proceedings based on the ALJ‟s failure to properly develop the record 

concerning plaintiff‟s reaching limitations, the remaining issues raised by plaintiff concerning his 

psoriasis bordered on the frivolous. The court further finds the reduced amount appropriate given 

plaintiff‟s filing of the case in the improper intra-district venue, which resulted in substantial 

delays to this case and waste of court resources.

The $4,751.22 in EAJA fees and expenses are awarded to plaintiff and not to plaintiff‟s 

counsel. See Astrue v. Ratliffe, 130 S. Ct. 2521 (2010). Plaintiff‟s motion papers do not include 

an executed assignment of EAJA fees to plaintiff‟s counsel, although the proposed order 

submitted by plaintiff‟s counsel suggests that such an assignment may have been executed. (ECF 

No. 30-6.) If the government ultimately determines that plaintiff does not owe a federal debt that 

 

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Plaintiff‟s time records incorrectly indicate that the 0.3 hours, actually spent on January 13, 

2012, were spent on January 13, 2011, and it appears that plaintiff‟s counsel billed for this time at 

the 2011 rate. (ECF No. 30-2 at 2.) As such, in fairness, the court also deducts this time at the 

2011 rate. 

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qualifies for offset, and if plaintiff‟s counsel provides the government with sufficient evidence of 

an executed assignment of EAJA fees to plaintiff‟s counsel, payment may be made in the name of 

plaintiff‟s counsel. 

Accordingly, for the reasons outlined above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff‟s motion for attorneys‟ fees and expenses under the EAJA (ECF No. 30) is 

GRANTED IN PART.

2. Plaintiff is awarded attorneys‟ fees and expenses in the total amount of $4,751.22 

pursuant to the EAJA, with payment to be made according to the terms outlined in this 

order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: February 14, 2014

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