Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-07-03070/USCOURTS-caDC-07-03070-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Duane Phillip Jones
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 24, 2008 Decided June 9, 2009

No. 07-3070

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

DUANE PHILLIP JONES, ALSO KNOWN AS CHICKEN JONES,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 06cr00273-01)

Mary E. Davis, appointed by the court, argued the cause and

filed the briefs for appellant. 

Nicholas P. Coleman, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. On the brief were Jeffrey A. Taylor, U.S.

Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese III, Mary B. McCord, and

Michael T. Ambrosino, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: ROGERS, GARLAND, and KAVANAUGH, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

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GARLAND, Circuit Judge: A jury convicted Duane Phillip

Jones of gun and drug crimes. Jones contends that he is entitled

to a new trial for two reasons. First, he argues that the district

court erred in failing to suppress a statement he made at the time

of his arrest. Second, he maintains that the government

improperly disclosed inadmissible information to the jury. We

find no error on either ground, and we therefore affirm Jones’

convictions. 

I

The facts surrounding Jones’ arrest are not in dispute. The

Superior Court of the District of Columbia issued a warrant for

Jones on a charge of first-degree murder while armed, in

connection with a homicide that took place on June 27, 2006.

At a law enforcement briefing held on August 10, 2006, Deputy

U.S. Marshal James Cyphers learned that the murder had been

committed with a handgun; that Jones might possess two

firearms because the victim’s gun was taken during the murder;

and that Jones had previous convictions for gun and drug

offenses.

On the afternoon of August 10, Cyphers and approximately

twenty other members of the U.S. Marshals Service Fugitive

Task Force converged on the Clay Terrace area in northeast

Washington, D.C., in search of Jones. Clay Terrace, which

Cyphers characterized as “an open-air drug market” and “a very

dangerous part of the city,” was filled with people, some of

whom fled when the marshals arrived. Mot. Hr’g Tr. 6-7, 20

(Jan. 16, 2007). As Cyphers got out of his vehicle, he made eye

contact with Jones, who stood up and turned “frantic[ally]” in

circles. Id. at 21. Jones then took off running, and Cyphers

chased him for approximately 100 yards. During the chase,

Cyphers heard a gunshot fired somewhere to his left. Jones

eventually ran into the stairwell of an apartment building;

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moments later, two small children emerged from the stairwell.

Cyphers pursued Jones into the stairwell, which was semi-lit,

and finally apprehended Jones there by grabbing him around the

waist and pulling him to the ground. Jones, who was wearing a

bulky jacket, landed on his stomach.

Within thirty seconds of apprehending Jones, and before

administering Miranda warnings, Cyphers asked Jones whether

he had “anything on” him. Id. at 12. Jones replied, “I have a

burner in my waistband,” which Cyphers understood to mean a

gun. Id. at 13. Another deputy marshal then recovered a loaded

firearm from Jones’ waistband. Jones was handcuffed and

escorted to a police car, where a third deputy marshal conducted

a pat-down search and discovered a bag containing crack

cocaine in Jones’ back pocket.

On September 15, 2006, a grand jury indicted Jones on

three counts: possession with intent to distribute five grams or

more of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),

(b)(1)(B)(iii); possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug

trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A); and

unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted

felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Before trial, Jones

moved to suppress his statement regarding the gun on the

ground that it was obtained in contravention of the Supreme

Court’s decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

After listening to Cyphers’ testimony at the suppression hearing,

the district court denied the motion to suppress, concluding that

Jones’ statement fell within the public safety exception to

Miranda. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984).

At trial, Cyphers and other deputy marshals testified about

the circumstances surrounding Jones’ arrest, including the

statement Jones made about the gun. Jones did not testify or call

any witnesses. On January 24, 2007, the jury convicted him on

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all counts. The district court sentenced Jones to a term of 135

months’ incarceration on the first count, a consecutive term of

60 months’ incarceration on the second count, and a concurrent

term of 120 months’ incarceration on the third count. Jones now

raises two challenges to his convictions and also seeks a remand

for resentencing under a retroactive amendment to the

Sentencing Guidelines.

II

Jones’ first contention is that the district court erred in

denying his motion to suppress his statement concerning the

gun. Statements made in response to custodial interrogation are

normally inadmissible unless preceded by Miranda warnings.

See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45. In New York v. Quarles,

however, the Supreme Court announced a “‘public safety’

exception” to the Miranda rule. 467 U.S. at 655-56. In Quarles,

police officers followed the defendant into a supermarket after

a rape victim told them that her attacker had just entered the

store carrying a gun. When the defendant noticed one of the

officers, he turned and ran toward the rear of the store. The

officer eventually caught the defendant, frisked him, and

discovered that he was wearing an empty shoulder holster.

After handcuffing the defendant, but before advising him of his

rights, the officer asked him where the gun was, and the

defendant responded, “the gun is over there.” Id. at 652. 

Concluding that, “under the circumstances involved[,] . . .

overriding considerations of public safety justif[ied] the officer’s

failure to provide Miranda warnings before he asked questions

devoted to locating the abandoned weapon,” the Court held the

defendant’s statement admissible at trial. Id. at 651. “[T]he

need for answers to questions in a situation posing a threat to the

public safety,” the Court said, “outweighs the need for the

prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment’s privilege

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against self-incrimination.” Id. at 657. Hence, Miranda should

not apply to situations “in which police officers ask questions

reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety,” id. at

656, or for the safety of the arresting officers, id. at 658-59. In

Dickerson v. United States, the Court confirmed that the public

safety exception to Miranda is “as much a normal part of

constitutional law as the original decision.” 530 U.S. 428, 441

(2000).

To date, this circuit has had only one occasion to address

the exception. In United States v. Brown, police officers who

apprehended a defendant moments after he robbed a bank asked

him about the location of the gun he had used during the

robbery. 449 F.3d 154, 159 (D.C. Cir. 2006), abrogated in part

on other grounds by Dean v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1849

(2009). Although the officers had not read Brown his rights, we

held that their “inquiries f[e]ll squarely within the public-safety

exception to Miranda v. Arizona, recognized by the Supreme

Court in New York v. Quarles.” Id. (citations omitted).

Based on the totality of the circumstances that confronted

Deputy Marshal Cyphers when he asked Jones whether he had

“anything on” him, we conclude that Cyphers’ question fell

squarely within the public safety exception as well. See United

States v. Reyes, 353 F.3d 148, 152 (2d Cir. 2003) (describing the

public safety exception as “‘a function of the facts of cases so

various that no template is likely to produce sounder results than

examining the totality of the circumstances in a given case’”

(quoting United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 36 (2003))).

Before Cyphers entered the Clay Terrace area, he knew that

Jones was wanted for murder while armed, that he could well be

in possession of two firearms, and that he had previously been

convicted of gun and drug offenses. Mot. Hr’g Tr. at 5-7.

Cyphers testified that Clay Terrace was known as a dangerous

drug market, and that “[f]irearms are used in the drug trade as

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protection and coercion.” Id. at 6. Indeed, the Marshals Service

dispatched twenty marshals to arrest Jones specifically because

of his criminal record, the severity of the crime for which he was

sought, and the dangerous nature of the Clay Terrace area. Id.

at 30. Moreover, once Cyphers made eye contact with Jones,

several factors further heightened the threat to public safety:

Jones led Cyphers on a chase in a crowded area; Cyphers heard

a gunshot fired during the pursuit; the stairwell where Cyphers

apprehended Jones was dimly lit; children had been present in

the stairwell only moments earlier; Jones was wearing a bulky

jacket that could conceal a weapon; and Cyphers had not yet

been able to handcuff Jones when he asked whether Jones had

anything on him. 

We need not assess the weight of each of these individual

factors, as in combination they clearly establish that Cyphers’

question was “reasonably prompted by a concern for the public

safety.” Quarles, 467 U.S. at 656. Jones maintains that “no

Court has gone so far as the district court did” in applying the

public safety exception, Appellant’s Br. 8, but that is plainly

incorrect. Without necessarily endorsing them, we note that

decisions in which other circuits have found the exception

satisfied have emphasized the following factors, among others:

the defendant’s prior criminal record, see United States v.

Everman, 528 F.3d 570, 572-73 (8th Cir. 2008); United States

v. Coleman, No. 97-4078, 1999 WL 147262, at *2 (4th Cir. Mar.

18, 1999); the defendant’s drug dealing, see United States v.

Estrada, 430 F.3d 606, 613 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v.

Edwards, 885 F.2d 377, 384 (7th Cir. 1989); the fact that the

defendant was not yet handcuffed, see Reyes, 353 F.3d at 154;

and the dangerous nature of the neighborhood where the

defendant was arrested, see United States v. Brady, 819 F.2d

884, 888 (9th Cir. 1987). The instant case includes all of these

factors, as well as the others noted in the preceding paragraph.

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Jones raises two specific objections to the application of the

public safety exception in this case. First, he argues that there

was “no objectively reasonable need to protect either the public

or the officer from immediate danger” because the murder for

which he was wanted had taken place six weeks earlier,

rendering it “not reasonable to believe that . . . Jones would still

be in possession of both firearms.” Appellant’s Br. 10. We see

nothing unreasonable about an officer worrying that a person

who committed a murder just six weeks before, and who had a

previous conviction for a firearm offense, would be in the habit

of carrying a weapon. In any event, this is just one factor among

the many that, in their totality, warrant a finding that the public

safety exception applies here. 

Second, Jones claims that Cyphers’ question was “designed

to elicit testimonial evidence” rather than to address safety

concerns. Id. at 11. Jones bases this argument on Cyphers’

testimony during the suppression hearing that he chose the

words, “do you have anything on you?,” because “[i]f you go

into specifics, then they give you a specific answer. If you keep

it general, then they usually tell you what they have.” Mot. Hr’g

Tr. at 12-13. But Jones’ argument fails in light of the Supreme

Court’s instruction that “the availability of th[e] exception does

not depend upon the motivation of the individual officers

involved.” Quarles, 467 U.S. at 656. As the Court explained,

“[i]n a kaleidoscopic situation such as the one confronting these

officers, where spontaneity rather than adherence to a police

manual is necessarily the order of the day, the application of the

exception . . . should not be made to depend on post hoc findings

at a suppression hearing concerning the subjective motivation of

the arresting officer.” Id. The Court recognized that

“[u]ndoubtedly most police officers . . . would act out of a host

of different, instinctive, and largely unverifiable motives -- their

own safety, the safety of others, and perhaps as well the desire

to obtain incriminating evidence from the suspect.” Id. The

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Court trusted that officers would “distinguish almost

instinctively between questions necessary to secure their own

safety or the safety of the public and questions designed solely

to elicit testimonial evidence from a suspect.” Id. at 658-59

(emphasis added). So do we.

Furthermore, Cyphers’ question does not appear to have

been crafted solely to obtain testimonial evidence. In fact,

Cyphers made it clear that he phrased the question generally in

order to elicit whether Jones had any weapon, rather than a

specific weapon like a gun. Mot. Hr’g Tr. at 12-13 (testimony

by Cyphers that his question was intended to find out whether

Jones had “anything that can hurt me . . . anything at all”). As

the Second Circuit has held, “a question need not be posed as

narrowly as possible, because precision crafting cannot be

expected in the circumstances of a tense and dangerous arrest.”

Estrada, 430 F.3d at 612 (internal quotation marks omitted); see

also United States v. Williams, 181 F.3d 945, 954 n.13 (8th Cir.

1999). Moreover, Cyphers’ actions bolster his testimony that

his query related to safety concerns: he asked the question

within 30 seconds of apprehending Jones, and he did not follow

up with more questions. See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 659

(explaining that the officer clearly recognized the distinction

between safety-related questions and investigatory questions

because he had “asked only the question necessary to locate the

missing gun before advising [the defendant] of his rights”);

Reyes, 353 F.3d at 154-55 (noting the significance of the

“arresting officer’s disinclination to exploit the situation” by

asking further questions); United States v. Carrillo, 16 F.3d

1046, 1050 (9th Cir. 1994) (emphasizing the officer’s

“deliberate refusal” to ask further questions).

Finally, Jones reminds us that “the public safety exception

is just that -- an exception.” Appellant’s Br. 10. He is plainly

correct about that. See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 658 (characterizing

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the exception as “narrow”). We must therefore take care that the

exception not be applied so routinely as to swallow the rule. Cf.

Estrada, 430 F.3d at 613-14 (warning that the exception “must

not ‘be distorted into a per se rule as to questioning people in

custody on narcotics charges,’” and emphasizing “that the

exception will apply only where there are sufficient indicia

supporting an objectively reasonable need to protect the police

or the public from immediate harm” (quoting Reyes, 353 F.3d at

155)). But although Quarles was decided a quarter century ago,

this is only the second time we have reviewed a case in which

the government has relied on the public safety exception. Our

decision today holds only that, based on the totality of the

circumstances in this case, Cyphers’ single question was

“reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety,”

Quarles, 467 U.S. at 656, and therefore fell within the

exception.

III

Jones’ second contention is that he is entitled to a new trial

because the government disclosed to the jury that he was

arrested for murder. The district court had ruled that the nature

of the charge upon which the warrant was based was

inadmissible because its prejudicial effect outweighed its

probative value. Jones maintains that, despite this ruling, the

government showed the jury an unredacted Drug Enforcement

Administration (DEA) form -- a “DEA-7” -- that specified that

Jones was arrested pursuant to a homicide warrant. Jones

concedes that the DEA-7 was not available to the jury during its

deliberations, Oral Arg. Recording at 9:06-10, but he insists that

the government inadvertently displayed it to the jurors on a

projection screen for a few seconds during the testimony of a

government witness.

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The parties disagree on the standard that governs our review

of this claim. Jones argues that we must evaluate it under the

harmless error standard. The government, by contrast, contends

that plain error review applies because Jones failed to object

sufficiently at trial. See generally United States v. Coumaris,

399 F.3d 343, 347 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (describing the differences

between harmless and plain error review). 

We need not resolve this dispute because Jones has not

established that the jury ever saw the DEA-7. Regardless of

which standard of review applies, an appellant bears the initial

burden of showing that the events allegedly constituting error

did, in fact, occur. See, e.g., Stockton v. Virginia, 852 F.2d 740,

743 (4th Cir. 1988) (explaining that a defendant who alleged

that jurors engaged in unauthorized communications with third

parties bore the burden of establishing “that an unauthorized

contact was made”); Anderson v. Acad. Sch. Dist., 122 Fed.

Appx. 912, 914 (10th Cir. 2004) (“The appellant bears the

burden of providing this court with the materials necessary to

establish that error occurred in the district court.”); see also

Sherman v. Smith, 89 F.3d 1134, 1155 (4th Cir. 1996) (Motz, J.,

dissenting on other grounds) (observing that a defendant who

claimed that a juror made an unauthorized visit to the crime

scene “bore the initial burden of proving that the site visit

occurred”). In most cases, the burden will be met easily and

without explicit discussion because the transcript will reflect --

or the parties will not dispute -- what happened at trial. But

when, as here, a factual dispute exists, it is the appellant’s

burden to show that the events allegedly constituting error

actually took place. 

The DEA-7 is a one-page form that was included as part of

a three-page document labeled “Government Exhibit 2A.” The

three pages of Exhibit 2A were, in consecutive order: (1) a DEA

laboratory report analyzing the drugs; (2) photographs of the

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analyzed drugs; and (3) the DEA-7. R. Material for Appellee

Tab A at 1-3. A DEA-7 is a “report of drug property collected”

by the police, id. at 3, and is filled out by the seizing officer for

transmission to the DEA laboratory. In this case, the DEA-7

contained the following statement: “On August 10th 2006,

members of the Metropolitan Police Department arrested the

above named Defendant for HOMICIDE (Arrest Warrant

#2006CRW001978).” Id. This reference to the homicide

warrant appeared only on the DEA-7 and not on the other two

pages of the exhibit. Id. at 1-3.

Although the prosecutor used Exhibit 2A when questioning

an expert witness and repeatedly described it as “the DEA-7,” it

is clear from the transcript that he used the term as shorthand to

refer to the entire three-page document and only displayed the

first page. See, e.g., Trial Tr. 387 (Jan. 23, 2007) (“Do you see

on your monitor . . . the front page of the DEA-7?”) (emphasis

added). This is also clear from the testimony of the witness,

who described what he was seeing on the screen as a “certified

report of controlled substance analysis,” which was the

laboratory report included as the first page of Exhibit 2A. Id. at

388. There is no evidence that the last page of the exhibit -- the

DEA-7 itself -- was ever displayed to the jurors.

Jones’ attorney did interrupt the testimony regarding

Exhibit 2A and stated that the prosecutor “ha[d] the wrong side

on there.” Id. (emphasis added). The most natural reading of

the attorney’s comment is that the back side of the first page of

Exhibit 2A -- the laboratory report analyzing the drugs -- was on

the screen. Had the DEA-7 itself been displayed, the attorney

would have stated that the wrong page was on the monitor.

Indeed, the government clarified during a bench conference that

the prosecutor “didn’t use the ‘7’” when questioning the witness.

Id. at 389. At the end of the conference, the court confirmed

that “[w]hat we have on the screen is a laboratory report itself”

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-- which, again, was the first page of Exhibit 2A. Id. And after

the prosecution rested, the court stated there was no “need to

worry about [Exhibit 2A] going back” with the jury because the

DEA-7 indicating the arrest warrant charge was not “part of the

evidence.” Id. at 426-27. 

At oral argument, Jones’ appellate counsel stated that the

transcript is “at best . . . confusing,” and that it is “really not

clear what was on the screen [in front of the jurors].” Oral Arg.

Recording at 9:41-47. Even if counsel were correct, the most

that can be said is that the issue is unclear, in which case Jones’

appeal still falls short because he cannot satisfy his burden of

showing that the act he describes as error actually occurred.

IV

After Jones was sentenced, the U.S. Sentencing

Commission “lower[ed] the Sentencing Guidelines ranges for

certain categories of offenses involving crack cocaine and

permit[ted] district courts to apply the lower ranges

retroactively.” United States v. Pettiford, 517 F.3d 584, 594

(D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing Notice of Final Action Regarding

Amendments to Policy Statement § 1B1.10, Effective March 3,

2008, 73 Fed. Reg. 217 (Jan. 2, 2008), and Notice of Submission

to Congress of Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines, 72

Fed. Reg. 28,558 (May 21, 2007)). Jones asks us to remand his

case to the district court so that he can request a lower sentence

based on the amended Guidelines. The government agrees that

Jones may petition the district court for a reduced sentence, but

it contends that “[t]he proper procedural mechanism” under

these circumstances is for us simply to affirm and leave it to

Jones to file a petition with the district court pursuant to 18

U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Appellee’s Br. 30 n.25. That section

provides:

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In Pettiford, we declined a defendant’s request to remand. 517

F.3d at 594. But we did so in that case because -- unlike here -- the

effective date of the Guidelines amendment had not yet arrived, and

the defendant therefore was not yet entitled to request a lower

sentence. 

[I]n the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to

a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range

that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing

Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 944(o), upon

motion of the defendant or the Director of the Bureau

of Prisons, or on its own motion, the court may reduce

the term of imprisonment, after considering the factors

set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are

applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with

applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing

Commission.

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).

Both Jones and the government agree that Jones will be

entitled to ask the district court for a reduced sentence under

§ 3582(c)(2) regardless of which course we follow, and both

agree that no collateral consequences will attend our decision.

Oral Arg. Recording at 13:27-32, 24:53-25:12; see also

Pettiford, 517 F.3d at 594.1

 Curiously, this dispute has

occasioned a circuit split. Nearly all courts of appeals that have

considered the issue have decided to remand to save the

defendant the “additional step” of petitioning the district court

for a sentencing modification. United States v. Wales, 977 F.2d

1323, 1328 n.3 (9th Cir. 1992); see United States v. Ursery, 109

F.3d 1129, 1137-38 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Vazquez, 53

F.3d 1216, 1227-28 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. Marcello,

13 F.3d 752, 756 n.3 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Coohey, 11

F.3d 97, 101 & n.3 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Connell,

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960 F.2d 191, 197 n.10 (1st Cir. 1992). The Fourth Circuit, by

contrast, has simply affirmed “without prejudice to [the

defendant’s] right to pursue . . . relief in the sentencing court”

under § 3582(c)(2). United States v. Brewer, 520 F.3d 367, 373

(4th Cir. 2008). Other than the potential time savings, no circuit

has articulated a substantive difference between these two

options with respect to the relief available to a defendant.

We join the majority of our sister circuits and remand to

give Jones an opportunity to request a reduced sentence. This

course has a small advantage in terms of administrative

efficiency, as it will put the issue in front of the sentencing court

most directly and expeditiously. Whether to grant a reduction

remains within the discretion of the district court. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3582(c)(2) (providing that the court “may reduce the term of

imprisonment” (emphasis added)); Ursery, 109 F.3d at 1137-38.

V

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Jones’ convictions and

remand the case to the district court.

Affirmed and remanded.

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