Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_20-cr-00161/USCOURTS-caed-1_20-cr-00161-9/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Victor Romero Galvan
Defendant
Omar Velazquez Landeros
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff
Jorge Luis Velasquez
Defendant

Document Text:

1 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME 

PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

30

31

MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

ANGELA SCOTT

Assistant United States Attorney

2500 Tulare Street, Suite 4401

Fresno, CA 93721

Telephone: (559) 497-4000

Facsimile: (559) 497-4099

Attorneys for Plaintiff

United States of America

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

JORGE LUIZ VELASQUEZ,

OMAR VELAZQUEZ LANDEROS, and

VICTOR ROMERO GALVAN,

 Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:20-CR-00161 NONE-SKO

STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE 

TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; 

FINDINGS AND ORDER

DATE: March 17, 2021

TIME: 1:00 p.m.

COURT: Hon. Sheila K. Oberto

This case is set for status conference on March 17, 2021. On May 13, 2020, this Court issued 

General Order 618, which suspends all jury trials in the Eastern District of California until further 

notice, and allows district judges to continue all criminal matters. Further, pursuant to General Order 

611, this Court’s declaration of judicial emergency under 18 U.S.C. § 3174, and the Ninth Circuit 

Judicial Council’s Order of April 16, 2020 continuing this Court’s judicial emergency, this Court has 

allowed district judges to continue all criminal matters to a date after May 2, 2021.

1

 This and previous 

General Orders, as well as the declarations of judicial emergency, were entered to address public health 

concerns related to COVID-19.

Although the General Orders and declarations of emergency address the district-wide health 

 

1

 A judge “may order case-by-case exceptions” at the discretion of that judge “or upon the 

request of counsel, after consultation with counsel and the Clerk of the Court to the extent such an order 

will impact court staff and operations.” General Order 618, ¶ 7 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2020).

Case 1:20-cr-00161-JLT-SKO Document 47 Filed 03/10/21 Page 1 of 5
2 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME 

PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

30

31

concern, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act’s end-of-justice provision 

“counteract[s] substantive openendedness with procedural strictness,” “demand[ing] on-the-record 

findings” in a particular case. Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-therecord findings, there can be no exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). Id. at 507. Moreover, any such 

failure cannot be harmless. Id. at 509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 

(9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a judge ordering an ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit 

findings on the record “either orally or in writing”).

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which Zedner emphasizes as both mandatory 

and inexcusable—General Orders 611, 612, 617, and 618 and the subsequent declaration of judicial 

emergency require specific supplementation. Ends-of-justice continuances are excludable only if “the 

judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such 

action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 

3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable unless “the court sets forth, in the record of the 

case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of 

such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” Id.

The General Orders and declaration of judicial emergencies exclude delay in the “ends of 

justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly 

address continuances stemming from pandemics, natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has 

discretion to order a continuance in such circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a twoweek ends-of-justice continuance following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. Furlow v. United States, 644 F.2d 

764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. 

Id. at 767-68; see also United States v. Correa, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Furlow to 

exclude time following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). 

The coronavirus is posing a similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated 

by the statutory rules. 

In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following 

case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-ofCase 1:20-cr-00161-JLT-SKO Document 47 Filed 03/10/21 Page 2 of 5
3 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME 

PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

30

31

justice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). 2 If continued, this Court should designate a new date 

for the status conference. United States v. Lewis, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any 

pretrial continuance must be “specifically limited in time”).

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant JORGE 

LUIS VELASQUEZ, by and through defendant’s counsel of record, Peter Jones, defendant OMAR 

VELAZQUEZ LANDEROS, by and through defendant’s counsel of record, Scott Quinlan, and 

defendant VICTOR ROMERO GALVAN, by and through defendant’s counsel of record, Barbara 

O’Neill, seek a continuance of the current status conference to June 16, 2021 and hereby stipulate as 

follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on March 17, 2021. 

2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until June 16, 

2021, and to exclude time between March 17, 2021, and June 16, 2021, under Local Codes T2 and T4. 

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: 

a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case

includes over 14,000 pages of Bates stamped discovery and numerous wiretap recordings. All of 

this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection 

and copying.

b) Counsel for defendants desire additional time to consult with their clients, to 

review the current charges, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, to review 

and copy discovery for this matter, to discuss potential resolutions with their clients, to prepare 

pretrial motions, and to otherwise prepare for trial.

c) Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested 

continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into 

account the exercise of due diligence.

d) The government does not object to the continuance.

 

2 The parties note that General Order 612 acknowledges that a district judge may make 

“additional findings to support the exclusion” at the judge’s discretion. General Order 612, ¶ 5 (E.D. 

Cal. March 18, 2020).

Case 1:20-cr-00161-JLT-SKO Document 47 Filed 03/10/21 Page 3 of 5
4 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME 

PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

30

31

e) Additionally, given the voluminous discovery and the fact that this case involved 

a wiretap investigation, it is so complex that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation for 

pretrial proceedings or for the trial itself prior to June 16, 2021.

f) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the 

case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the 

original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

g) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, 

et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of March 17, 2021 to June 16, 2021, 

inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] 

and 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(ii) [Local Code T2], because it results from a continuance 

granted by the Court at defendant’s request on the basis of the Court’s finding that the ends of 

justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in 

a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the 

Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial 

must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

Dated: March 8, 2021 MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

/s/ ANGELA SCOTT

ANGELA SCOTT

Assistant United States Attorney

Dated: March 8, 2021 /s/ per email authorization

PETER JONES

Counsel for Defendant

JORGE LUIS VELASQUEZ

Case 1:20-cr-00161-JLT-SKO Document 47 Filed 03/10/21 Page 4 of 5
5 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME 

PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

30

31

 Dated: March 8, 2021

 

 Dated: March 8, 2021

FINDINGS AND ORDER

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 9, 2021 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto .

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

/s/ per email authorization

SCOTT QUINLAN

Counsel for Defendant

OMAR VELAZQUEZ 

LANDEROS

/s/ per email authorization

BARBARA O’NEILL

Counsel for Defendant

VICTOR ROMERO GALVAN

Case 1:20-cr-00161-JLT-SKO Document 47 Filed 03/10/21 Page 5 of 5