Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_15-cv-02200/USCOURTS-alnd-5_15-cv-02200-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lainie Alexander
Defendant
Mike Key
Defendant
Steven C. Smith
Plaintiff

Document Text:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

STEVEN C. SMITH, as conservator

for Brandon Jeffries, a minor,

Plaintiff,

vs.

LAINIE ALEXANDER and MIKE

KEY, 

Defendants.

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Case No. 5:15-cv-02200-CLS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This action is before the court on plaintiff’smotion to remand,1and defendants’

responses to this court’s order to show cause why they should not be required to pay

plaintiff’s attorney fees and costs incident to the removal, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1447(c).2 In support of his motion to remand, plaintiff states the following:

1. This action was initiated in Cullman County naming as

defendants Lainie Alexander and Mike Key. Both are over the

age [of] nineteen and residents of the State of Alabama. Both

individuals are employed by the Cullman County Department of

Human Resources, however each defendant issued solely in their

[sic] individual capacity. (Compl. at ¶¶ 2, 3)

2. The Complaint alleges three causes of action: Negligence;

Wantonness; and Outrage. Each count is premised on the

1

 Doc. no. 8.

2

 Doc. nos. 14, 15.

FILED

 2016 Apr-04 PM 02:39

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 5:15-cv-02200-CLS Document 16 Filed 04/04/16 Page 1 of 9
violation of state regulations, state law and policies. (Compl. at

¶9)

3. Plaintiff alleges the defendants acted willfully, maliciously,

fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond their authority, or under a

mistaken interpretation of law in their acts and conduct. (Compl.

at ¶16)

4. The defendants, ignoring the plain language of the complaint,

make the following statement: “The Complaint alleges that the

Defendants, acting under the color of the State of Alabama,

negligently, wantonly, and intentionally deprived B.J. [the minor

plaintiff] of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws causing him damage”. (¶3 of the Notice of

Removal)

5. The above statement does not appear in the Complaint. There

are no claims premised on the U.S. Constitution, federal law or

regulation. There are no federal claims disguised asstate claims. 

The complaint is unambiguous that the claims are premised on

state regulations, law and policies relating to placement and

services, including medication and education. (Compl. at ¶16)

6. Defendants [sic] entire Notice of Removal, based on this

falsehood, converts each state claim into some perceived federal

equivalent. (¶ 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 of the Notice of Removal)

Doc. no. 8 (Motion to Remand), at ECF 2-3 (alterations and emphasis supplied).3

3

 “ECF is the acronym for Electronic Case Filing, a filing system that allows parties to file

and serve documents electronically.” Atterbury v. Foulk, No. C-07-6256 MHP, 2009 WL 4723547,

*6 n.6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2009). Bluebook Rule 7.1.4 allows citation to “page numbers generated

by the ECF header.” Wilson v. Fullwood, 772 F. Supp. 2d 246, 257 n.5 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing The

Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation R. B. 7.1.4, at 21 (Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al. Eds.,

19th ed. 2010)). Even so, the Bluebook recommends “against citation to ECF pagination in lieu of

original pagination.” Wilson, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 257 n.5. Thus, unless stated otherwise, this court

will cite to the original pagination in the parties’ pleadings. When the court cites to pagination

generated by the ECF header, it will, as here, precede the page number with the letters “ECF.” 

2

Case 5:15-cv-02200-CLS Document 16 Filed 04/04/16 Page 2 of 9
A federal district court may possess subject-matter jurisdiction over an action

under either the federal question statute, or the diversity of citizenship statute. See

28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. The court has reviewed the complaint, and finds that

plaintiff pled only state-law claims of negligence,4 wantonness,

5

and outrage,6and

pled no violation of the United States Constitution or any other federal law. See

U.S.C. § 1331. Moreover, diversity jurisdiction does not exist, because all parties are

citizens of the State of Alabama.7

See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). Accordingly, this

court concludes that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over this action, and that the

action is due to be remanded to the Circuit Court of Cullman County, Alabama.

Plaintiff also seeksto recover expenses and attorney fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1447(c), which states, in pertinent part:

If at any time before the final judgment it appears that the district court

lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded. An order

remanding the case may require payment of just costs and any actual

expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.

28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (emphasis supplied). 

The Supreme Court has stated, with regard to the discretionary fee-shifting

provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), that by

4

 Doc. no. 1-1 (Complaint), ¶¶ 18-20.

5

Id. ¶¶ 21-23.

6

Id. ¶¶ 24-26.

7

 Id. at 1.

3

Case 5:15-cv-02200-CLS Document 16 Filed 04/04/16 Page 3 of 9
enacting the removalstatute, Congress granted a right to a federal forum

to a limited class of state-court defendants. If fee shifting were

automatic, defendants might choose to exercise this right only in cases

where the right to remove was obvious. See Christiansburg Garment

[Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 434 U.S. 412, 422

(1978)] (awarding fees simply because the party did not prevail “could

discourage all but the most airtight claims, for seldom can a [party] be

sure of ultimate success”). But there is no reason to suppose Congress

meant to confer a right to remove, while at the same time discouraging

its exercise in all but obvious cases. 

Congress, however, would not have enacted § 1447(c) if its only

concern were avoiding deterrence of proper removals. Instead,

Congress thought fee shifting appropriate in some cases. The process

of removing a case to federal court and then having it remanded back

to state court delays resolution of the case, imposes additional costs on

both parties, and wastesjudicialresources. Assessing costs and fees on

remand reduces the attractiveness of removal as a method for delaying

litigation and imposing costs on the plaintiff. The appropriate test for

awarding fees under § 1447(c) should recognize the desire to deter

removals sought for the purpose of prolonging litigation and imposing

costs on the opposing party, while not undermining Congress’ basic

decision to afford defendants a right to remove as a general matter, when

the statutory criteria are satisfied. 

In light of these “‘large objectives,’” [Independent Federation of

Flight Attendants v.] Zipes, [491 U.S. 754, 759 (1989)], the standard for

awarding feesshould turn on the reasonableness of the removal. Absent

unusual circumstances, courts may award attorney’s fees under §

1447(c) onlywhere the removing party lacked an objectively reasonable

basisfor seeking removal. Conversely, when an objectively reasonable

basis exists, fees should be denied. See, e.g., Hornbuckle, 385 F.3d at

541; Valdes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 199 F.3d 290, 293 (CA5 2000). 

Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 140-41 (2005) (first and third

alterations and emphasis supplied, second alteration in original).

4

Case 5:15-cv-02200-CLS Document 16 Filed 04/04/16 Page 4 of 9
This court ordered defendants to show cause why they should not be required

to pay such fees.

8 Defendantsrespond that they had an “objectively reasonable basis”

for removing the action: that is, Alabama’s so-called “notice pleading standard,”

which governsthe construction of plaintiff’sstate-lawcomplaint, provided themwith

notice of the existence of federal claims; and, if they had failed to remove the action

within thirty days of receiving such notice, theywould have risked waiving their right

of removal.

9

 Specifically, defendants state:

3. This Court found that the Plaintiff only pled state law claims of

negligence, wantonness, and outrage, and pled no violation of the

United StatesConstitution or any other federal law. Respectfully,

the Defendant[sic] disagrees with this court’sfindings. Although

the Plaintiff’s complaint explicitly names state causes of action

and does not explicitly name any federal law claim, under

Alabama’s rules of pleading, the Plaintiff’s complaint gives

adequate notice to the Defendants of federal questions claims

[sic] as stated in the Defendants’ Joint Notice of Removal.

4. “Alabama employs a notice pleading standard, which notably

does not incorporate Iqbal or Twombly pleading standards. See

Thomas v. Williams, 21 So. 3d 1234, 1236 n.1 (Ala. Civ. App.

2008) (refusing to apply Twombly to state court standards). 

Notice pleading must “provide defendants adequate notice of the

claims against them.” Ex parte International Ref. & Mfg. Co.,

972 So. 2d 784, 789 (Ala. 2007); See also, A. R. Civ. P. 8,

8

See doc. no. 13 (Order to Show Cause).

9

See doc. no. 14 (Defendant Alexander’s Response to Show Cause Order and Motion to

Reconsider Order of Remand), at ECF 3; doc. no. 15 (Defendant Key’s Response to Show Cause

Order and Motion to Reconsider Order of Remand), at ECF 3. Although they are not carbon-copies,

the pleadings filed by defendants Alexander and Key are substantively the same. The Court

therefore will only cite to doc. no. 14 for the remainder of the Opinion.

5

Case 5:15-cv-02200-CLS Document 16 Filed 04/04/16 Page 5 of 9
Committee Comments(‘the prime purpose of pleadings isto give

notice.’) . . . The Plaintiff’s complaint, having been filed in

Alabama, required a liberal reading by the Defendants as to all

possible claims it contained. . . . .

5. These liberal rules of pleading have led Alabama Courts to find

that even in cases where claims are not explicitly pleaded, it may

still make that claim. . . . 

6. . . . [E]ven though not specifically claimed, if the State Circuit

Court found that Plaintiff’s complaint put the Defendants on

notice of federal question claims, the Defendant would

nonetheless be compelled to defend those claims. The

Defendants only had thirty days in which to decide whether the

Plaintiff’s complaint put the Defendants on notice of a federal

question claims [sic] without benefit of any discovery or

pleadings. 28 USCS §1446(b)(1)[.] . . .

7. . . . The only way to determine whether an objectively reasonable

basis existed is to review the Complaint and determine if, under

Alabama’s rules of pleading, it was reasonable to determine that

the Complaint put the Defendants on notice of a federal question

claim whether or not that complaint explicitly denoted a federal

question claim. Even if the Defendants incorrectly made the

determination that they were put on notice of a federal question

claim, the Defendants’ reasonable interpretation that there was

such a notice would equate to an objectively reasonable basis for

removal. . . .

Doc. no. 14 (Defendant Alexander’s Response to Show Cause Order and Motion to

Reconsider Order of Remand), at ECF 3-7 (ellipses and alterations supplied).

Defendants also state that they have not located any authority from either this

court or the Eleventh Circuit “that is on point to the issue of whether a pleading

which does not specify a federal question claim could nonetheless put the Defendant

6

Case 5:15-cv-02200-CLS Document 16 Filed 04/04/16 Page 6 of 9
on notice so that the thirty day limitations period for removal under 28 USCS §1446

begins to run.”

10 Even so, they contend that a Northern District of Georgia case, i.e.,

Estate of Davis v. DeKalb County, 952 F. Supp. 2d 1369 (N.D. Ga. 2013), supports

their contention that they had an “objectively reasonable basis” for seeking removal.

This court has reviewed Estate of Davis. In that case, the plaintiff filed an

amended complaint on November 14, 2011, asserting a claim for “violation of

constitutional rights,” alleging that, “[u]nder color of office and without reasonable

suspicion and probable cause, the Defendant police officers improperly and

unlawfully detained [him]” and “used objectively unreasonable and excessive force

against [him].” Estate of Davis, 952 F. Supp. 2d at 1371 (first alteration supplied,

second alteration in original). It was not until April 22, 2013 that the defendants

removed the action to federal court. Id. The plaintiff argued that the removal was

untimely, because the generalized statement of a claimfor “violation of constitutional

rights” asserted in his amended complaint had provided the defendants notice that the

case was removable. Id. The Northern District of Georgia agreed and remanded the

action, reasoning that the defendants had failed to seek removal within thirty days of

their receipt “of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from

which it [might] first be ascertained” that the case had become removable. Id. at

10

 Doc. no. 14, ¶ 11.

7

Case 5:15-cv-02200-CLS Document 16 Filed 04/04/16 Page 7 of 9
1373; 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3) (alteration supplied).

The present case is very different. Plaintiff not only did not plead any specific

federal claims, but also made no mention of the United States Constitution in his

complaint. Moreover, he never employed the plural form of the noun “constitution,”

on the basis of which one might argue that plaintiff implicitly was basing his claims

upon both the Alabama and United States Constitutions. 

Defendants also have asked that this court reconsider its “order of remand,”

although no such “order” has been entered to date.11 This court remains convinced

that no federal question has been presented, because plaintiff’s complaint pled no

specific claim arising under the Constitution or other federal law; plaintiff’s

complaint makes no reference to the Constitution; and plaintiff has explicitly

reassured the court that “[t]here are no federal claims disguised as state claims.”12In

the event plaintiff should ever amend his state-court pleadings from which it might

be ascertained that a federal claim is asserted, defendants might then consider

removal. But, certainly, this removal was unreasonable.

In light of all of the foregoing, the court concludes that plaintiff’s motion to

remand is due to be granted, and defendants’ motion to reconsider is due to be denied. 

11

Id. at ECF 21.

12

See doc. no. 8 (Motion to Remand), at ECF 3 (alteration supplied).

8

Case 5:15-cv-02200-CLS Document 16 Filed 04/04/16 Page 8 of 9
An order consistent with this opinion will be entered contemporaneously herewith. 

DONE this 4th day of April, 2016.

______________________________

United States District Judge

9

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