Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-03430/USCOURTS-ca8-05-03430-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kenneth L. Richey
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr., United States District Judge for the

Western District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-3430

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal From the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Missouri.

Kenneth L. Richey, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: March 14, 2006

Filed: March 28, 2006

___________

Before COLLOTON, HEANEY, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Kenneth L. Richey appeals the district court’s1

 denial of his motion to suppress

evidence seized in the warrant search of his residence. Richey asserts that probable

cause did not exist to issue the warrant because it was based on stale information and

misrepresentations by law enforcement, in violation of Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S.

154 (1978). We affirm.

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The Honorable Sarah W. Hays, United States Magistrate Judge for the

Western District of Missouri.

-2-

On February 5, 2004, officers searching Richey’s residence discovered a

methamphetamine lab in his bathroom, and seized methamphetamine and three jars

containing a mixture of a substance containing methamphetamine. Richey was

subsequently charged by indictment with manufacturing methamphetamine in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. He moved to suppress the evidence gleaned from the

search. Based on the report and recommendation issued by a magistrate,2

 the district

court denied Richey’s motion to suppress. Richey then entered a conditional plea of

guilty, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. 

We review the district court’s findings of fact underlying the denial of a motion

to suppress for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. United States v.

Riedesel, 987 F.2d 1383, 1387-88 (8th Cir. 1993). This court gives substantial

deference to the issuing magistrate’s probable cause finding and will “uphold a

judicial determination of probable cause if we believe that there was a substantial

basis for concluding that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing.” United

States v. Nation, 243 F.3d 467, 469-70 (8th Cir. 2001). A search warrant may only

issue upon a judicial determination, based on the totality of the circumstances, that

there was a “fair probability” that evidence of a crime would be found at the place to

be searched. United States v. Coleman, 349 F.3d 1077, 1083 (8th Cir. 2003). 

Richey asserts that the affidavit in support of the search warrant application

contained misrepresentations. In order to have the alleged misrepresentations

omitted, Richey must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the affidavit

included a deliberate falsehood or the affiant showed a reckless disregard for the

truth. Franks, 438 U.S. at 156. Richey challenges the veracity of Deputy Fugate’s

statement, that on February 5, 2004, he noticed a strong odor of ether coming from

Richey’s house. Richey bases his challenge primarily on the wind direction on

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February 5, 2004 (blowing away from the street), and his belief that no odors could

have escaped from his home because he had installed an odor filtering system in the

bathroom where the methamphetamine lab was located. Fugate, who at that time had

worked on approximately 100 methamphetamine lab cases, testified that he noticed

the odor of ether while driving by Richey's house, and then got out of the car and

walked by the Richey residence to verify that the odor was coming from that house.

Detective Fugate’s statement that there was a noticeable odor of ether

emanating from Richey’s house was corroborated by the sworn testimony of

Detectives Shroyer and Chubick. In fact, the ether odor was so strong that the

officers cleared the house, opened all of the windows, and ventilated the house with

industrial exhaust fans before they conducted the search. The district court credited

these statements and we find no error in that determination.

We also find no error in the ultimate conclusion that the warrant established

probable cause. Ether is “known to be used in the manufacture of

methamphetamine.” Kleinholz v. United States, 339 F.3d 674, 667 (8th Cir. 2003)

(per curiam). “The smell of ether might alone support a finding of probable cause.”

Id. (holding that odor of ether combined with an anonymous tip that the house

contained a methamphetamine lab was sufficient to establish probable cause). In

addition to the ether smell, the warrant included additional evidence that Richey was

manufacturing methamphetamine at his residence. Accordingly, we affirm the district

court’s denial of Richey’s motion to suppress. 

______________________________

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