Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02754/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02754-7/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Kelly Lee Johnson
Plaintiff

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KELLY LEE JOHNSON, No. 2:14-cv-2754-MCE-CMK 

Plaintiff, 

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL

SECURITY,

Defendant.

 /

Plaintiff, who is proceeding with retained counsel, brings this action for judicial

review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

Pending before the court are plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 22) and defendant’s

cross-motion for summary judgment (Doc. 23). For the reasons discussed below, the

undersigned will recommend the court deny plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment or remand

and grant the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment. 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

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I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

Plaintiff applied for social security benefits on August 3, 2011, alleging an

amended onset of disability on January 1, 2008, due to chronic pain, bipolar disorder, insomnia,

and depression (Certified administrative record (“CAR”) 72-73, 87-88, 103-05, 109, 183). 

Plaintiff’s claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration. Plaintiff requested an

administrative hearing, which was held on April 3, 2013, before Administrative Law Judge

(“ALJ”) Mark C. Ramsey. In a July 1, 2013, decision, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff is not

disabled2 based on the following findings: 

1

 Because the parties are familiar with the factual background of this case, including

plaintiff’s medical history, the undersigned does not exhaustively relate those facts here. The

facts related to plaintiff’s impairments and medical history will be addressed insofar as they are

relevant to the issues presented by the parties’ respective motions. 

2

 Disability Insurance Benefits are paid to disabled persons who have contributed to

the Social Security program, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) is

paid to disabled persons with low income. 42 U.S.C. § 1382 et seq. Under both provisions,

disability is defined, in part, as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” due to

“a medically determinable physical or mental impairment.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(a) &

1382c(a)(3)(A). A five-step sequential evaluation governs eligibility for benefits. See 20 C.F.R.

§§ 423(d)(1)(a), 416.920 & 416.971-76; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987). The

following summarizes the sequential evaluation: 

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful

activity? If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed

to step two. 

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment?

If so, proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is

appropriate. 

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination

of impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt.

404, Subpt. P, App.1? If so, the claimant is automatically

determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four. 

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past

work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step

five. 

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional

capacity to perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not

disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled.

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). 

The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation

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1. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since

August 3, 2011, the application date (20 CFR 416.971 et seq).

2. The claimant has the following severe impairments: degenerative

disc disease of the cervical spine with radiculopathy, low back

pain, anxiety disorder and panic attacks (20 CFR 416.920(c)). 

3. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of

impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed

impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR

416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).

4. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned

finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to

perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b). In particular,

claimant can lift/carry 20 pounds occasionally, 10 pounds

frequently; she can stand/walk six hours in an eight-hour workday. 

She has no limitations in sitting. She is restricted to no climbing,

frequently balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching and crawling. 

She would be limited to working at heights and around heavy

machinery based on her cervical spine radiculopathy. The claimant

has the ability to perform simple unskilled work with only

occasional public or fellow employee contact. 

5. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work (20 CFR

416.965).

6. The claimant was born on November 19, 1959 and was 51 years

old, which is defined as a younger individual age 18-44, on the

date the application was filed (20 CFR 416.963).

7. The claimant has a limited education and is able to communicate in

English (20 CFR 416.964).

9. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of

disability because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a

framework supports a finding that the claimant is “not disabled,”

whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills (See SSR

82-41 and 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2). 

9. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and

residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant

numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform (20

CFR 416.969 and 416.969(a)).

10. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the

Social Security Act, since August 3, 2011, the date the application

process. Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5. The Commissioner bears the burden if the sequential

evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.

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was filed (20 CFR 416.920(g)). 

(CAR 17-26). After the Appeals Council declined review on September 30, 2014, this appeal

followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The court reviews the Commissioner’s final decision to determine whether it is: 

(1) based on proper legal standards; and (2) supported by substantial evidence in the record as a

whole. See Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). “Substantial evidence” is

more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. See Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521

(9th Cir. 1996). It is “such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971). The record as a whole, including

both the evidence that supports and detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion, must be

considered and weighed. See Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th Cir. 1986); Jones v.

Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). The court may not affirm the Commissioner’s

decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. See Hammock v.

Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). If substantial evidence supports the administrative

findings, or if there is conflicting evidence supporting a particular finding, the finding of the

Commissioner is conclusive. See Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Therefore, where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of

which supports the Commissioner’s decision, the decision must be affirmed, see Thomas v.

Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002), and may be set aside only if an improper legal

standard was applied in weighing the evidence, see Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th

Cir. 1988). 

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in two ways. First, plaintiff contends the ALJ erred

in his treatment of the medical opinions, leading to a failure to properly assess her residual

functional capacity (RFC) and failing to utilize the services of a vocational expert (VE). Second,

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plaintiff contends the ALJ erred in evaluating plaintiff’s credibility. 

A. Medical Opinions

The weight given to medical opinions depends in part on whether they are

proffered by treating, examining, or non-examining professionals. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d

821, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1995). Ordinarily, more weight is given to the opinion of a treating

professional, who has a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual,

than the opinion of a non-treating professional. See id.; Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1285

(9th Cir. 1996); Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 1987). The least weight is given

to the opinion of a non-examining professional. See Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 502, 506 & n.4

(9th Cir. 1990).

In addition to considering its source, to evaluate whether the Commissioner

properly rejected a medical opinion the court considers whether: (1) contradictory opinions are

in the record; and (2) clinical findings support the opinions. The Commissioner may reject an 

uncontradicted opinion of a treating or examining medical professional only for “clear and

convincing” reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 831. 

While a treating professional’s opinion generally is accorded superior weight, if it is contradicted

by an examining professional’s opinion which is supported by different independent clinical

findings, the Commissioner may resolve the conflict. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035,

1041 (9th Cir. 1995). A contradicted opinion of a treating or examining professional may be

rejected only for “specific and legitimate” reasons supported by substantial evidence. See Lester,

81 F.3d at 830. This test is met if the Commissioner sets out a detailed and thorough summary of

the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, states her interpretation of the evidence, and makes a

finding. See Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751-55 (9th Cir. 1989). Absent specific and

legitimate reasons, the Commissioner must defer to the opinion of a treating or examining

professional. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. The opinion of a non-examining professional,

without other evidence, is insufficient to reject the opinion of a treating or examining

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professional. See id. at 831. In any event, the Commissioner need not give weight to any

conclusory opinion supported by minimal clinical findings. See Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111,

1113 (9th Cir. 1999) (rejecting treating physician’s conclusory, minimally supported opinion);

see also Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751. 

Here the medical evidence in the record consist of records from plaintiff’s treating

physician, Lee Shoop, M.D., reports from two psychological consultative examiners, Sid

Cormier, PhD., and Lea K. Tate, Psy.D, a report from an internal medicine consultative examiner

Brian Dossey, M.D., and opinions from state agency-reviewing physicians M. Tambellini, M.D.,

and Kim Morris, Psy.D. The ALJ gave significant weight to the opinions of Drs. Dossey and

Tate, but little weight to Dr. Cormier’s opinion. Plaintiff objects to the ALJ’s decision not to

credit Dr. Cormier’s opinion, as well as his treatment of the other medical opinions as to the

limitations she asserts were included therein.

As to Dr. Cormier’s opinion, the ALJ gave it little weight. In so doing, the ALJ

reasoned “the claimant’s mental condition is well controlled and it appears that Dr. Cormier’s

opinions’ are inconsistent with the medical record and overly restrictive in comparison to

examination findings and treatment history and based only on a snapshot of the individual’s

functioning.” (CAR 25).

Dr. Cormier’s opinion, as an examining professional, is contradicted by another

examining professional’s opinion, based on independent clinical findings. As such, the ALJ may

resolve the conflict, and need only provide specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting the

opinion. Here, the ALJ gave specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting Dr. Cormier’s opinion. 

Specifically, the ALJ found the opinion was inconsistent with plaintiff’s medical records, was

overly restrictive compared to the examination findings and plaintiff’s treatment history. The

undersigned finds these reasons supported by the record. The ALJ determined that Dr. Cormier’s

opinion was inconsistent with the medical records and his own examination findings. The

undersigned finds that determination supported by the record. Plaintiff only occasionally sought

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medical treatment for her anxiety, and often presented herself in no acute distress. She did

receive additional treatment after Dr. Cormier’s examination and prior to Dr. Tate’s. Therefore,

the undersigned finds no error in the ALJ’s decision to credit Dr. Tate’s opinion over Dr.

Cormier’s, which is supported by the record.

 B. Residual Functional Capacity

Plaintiff also contends the ALJ erred in failing to adopt all of the limitations from

the opinions he purported to accept. She claims the ALJ failed to incorporate all of the

limitations from the medical opinions into plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (RFC).

In determining the plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ must assess what the plaintiff can still

do in light of both physical and mental limitations. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a)

(2003); see also Valencia v. Heckler, 751 F.2d 1082, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985) (residual functional

capacity reflects current “physical and mental capabilities”). 

Specifically, plaintiff argues the ALJ gave significant weight to Dr. Tate’s opinion

as well as the State agency reviewing physician, Dr. Morris. However, plaintiff contends the

ALJ failed to include in the RFC the limitations including her moderate limitations as to her

ability to make judgments on simple work-related decisions, understand complex instructions,

carry out complex instructions, make judgments on complex work-related decisions, interact

appropriately with the public, supervisors or coworkers, respond appropriately to usual work

situations or changes in a routine work-setting, maintain attention and concentration, maintain

regular attendance, complete normal workday or workweek, and perform at a consistent pace. 

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ tacitly rejected these restrictions as they were not incorporated in

the RFC despite the ALJ giving significant weight to the medical opinions. 

After examining plaintiff, Dr. Tate opined that plaintiff had mild limitations in her

ability to understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions, and was moderately limited in

her ability to make judgments on simple and complex work-related decisions, and to understand,

remember and carry out complex instructions. As to those limitations, Dr. Tate explained that

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plaintiff “displays memory problems and depression symptoms which can exacerbate the ability

to understand, remember and carry out instructions.” (CAR 454). She further opined that

plaintiff was moderately limited in her ability to interact appropriately with others, including the

public, supervisors, and co-workers, as well as respond appropriately to ususal work situations

and to changes in a routine work setting. She explained plaintiff’s “mood disorder and panic

attacks can impact the way she interacts with the public, supervisors and co-workers. 

Interactions with people can be moderately difficult.” (CAR 455). In addition, Dr. Tate

explained that plaintiff “takes Methadone & Zolpidem on a daily basis. These medications may

assist with pain & sleep but can alter her ability to function at home or in public in a meaningful

way.” (CAR 455). 

In reviewing the record, Dr. Morris found plaintiff was not significant limited in

her ability understand and remember very short and simple instructions, but moderately limited

related to detailed instructions; moderately limited in her ability to maintain attention and

concentration for extended periods, her ability to perform within a schedule, maintain regular

attendance, be punctual, and complete a normal workday and workweek without interruption, but

not significantly limited in her ability to sustain an ordinary routine without special supervision,

working in coordination with or in proximity to others, and making simple work-related

decisions; not significantly limited in her ability to ask simple questions, accept instructions and

respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors, get along with coworkers, or maintain

socially appropriate behavior, but moderately limited in her ability to interact appropriately with

the general public; not significantly limited in her ability to be aware of normal hazards and take

precautions or travel in unfamiliar places, but moderately limited in her ability to respond

appropriately to changes in the work setting and setting realistic goals. (CAR 114-15). Based on

those findings, Dr. Morris opined that plaintiff “is capable of understanding and remembering

simple instructions/ procedures as well as work place locations. . . capable of maintaining

concentration, pace and persistence for simple routines throughout a normal work day/work

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week. . . . able to interact with co-workers and supervisors. . . . capable of brief public contact. . .

. capable of adapting to a work environment, recognizing hazards, traveling, and setting goals

independently within the framework noted above.” (CAR 115)

The ALJ, in accepting those two opinions, found plaintiff “has the ability to

perform simple unskilled work with only occasional public or fellow employee contact.” (CAR

21). In support of that finding, the ALJ stated his interpretation of the medical opinions,

including that Dr. Tate “opined that even with her psychiatric impairments, she could perform

simple repetitive work. . . . [but] has moderate limitations in her ability to interact appropriately

with the public, supervisors or coworkers or respond appropriately to usual work situations and

to changes in routine work setting.” (CAR 23).

To the extent plaintiff argues the ALJ misstated Dr. Tate’s opinion, the

undersigned disagrees. The ALJ is tasked with interpreting the medical opinions and

determining the claimant’s abilities. Dr. Tate opined plaintiff only has mild limitations in terms

of understanding, remembering and carrying out simple instructions. This limitation is based on

plaintiff’s memory problems. As such, a reasonable interpretation of Dr. Tate’s opinion, in terms

of actual work abilities and limitation, is that plaintiff can perform simple repetitive work. 

Plaintiff’s argument to the contrary is simply not supported. 

Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ failed to include all of the limitations Drs.

Tate, Cormier, and Morris assessed. The rejection of Dr. Cormier’s opinion is discussed above. 

As the undersigned finds no error in the ALJ’s rejection thereof, it follows there was no error in

failing to include any limitations Dr. Cormier assessed in the RFC. As for Dr. Tate’s and Dr.

Morris’ opinions, the ALJ did incorporate the limitations assessed therein. While both doctors

found plaintiff had mild to moderate mental limitations, Dr. Tate only opined that her memory

problems and depression can exacerbate her ability to understand, remember and carry out

complex instructions which the ALJ incorporated into an RFC limitation to simple unskilled

work. Similarly, Dr. Tate opined that plaintiff would have difficulties interacting with others,

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which the ALJ again incorporated into the RFC limitation of working only occasionally with

public or fellow employee contact. Finally, Mr. Morris opined plaintiff was capable of

understanding and remembering simple instructions and procedures, maintaining concentration,

pace and persistence for simple routines throughout a normal workday/workweek, and is capable

of interacting with coworkers and supervisors, but only brief public contact. Again, those

limitations are included in the RFC. Therefore, the undersigned finds plaintiff’s argument that

the ALJ failed to include all limitations of medical experts is contrary to the evidence. 

The parties offer arguments on conflicting cases as to whether an RFC for simple,

repetitive work is sufficient to encompass moderate mental limitations in a claimant’s abilities to

maintain persistence and pace, relate to others, and adapt to changes in the workplace. See

Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2007); Brink v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin, 343

Fed. Appx. 211 (9th Cir. 2009). However, those cases address the situation where the ALJ

determined the claimant has those moderate limitations. In this case, the ALJ did not determine

plaintiff has moderate limitations in terms of persistence and pace when determining she was

able to perform simple repetitive work. Rather, no such limitation was actually opined by the

medical professionals the ALJ credited. 

Accordingly, the undersigned finds the RFC adopted by the ALJ is supported by

substantial evidence. 

C. Vocational Expert

Next, plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in failing to call a vocational expert (VE) to

testify at the administrative hearing, and in using the Medical-Vocational Guidelines without the

aid of a vocational expert. 

The Medical-Vocational Guidelines (“Grids”) provide a uniform conclusion about

disability for various combinations of age, education, previous work experience, and residual

functional capacity. The Grids allow the Commissioner to streamline the administrative process

and encourage uniform treatment of claims based on the number of jobs in the national economy

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for any given category of residual functioning capacity. See Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458,

460-62 (1983) (discussing creation and purpose of the Grids). 

The Commissioner may apply the Grids in lieu of taking the testimony of a

vocational expert only when the Grids accurately and completely describe the claimant’s abilities

and limitations. See Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Heckler v.

Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 462 n.5 (1983). Thus, the Commissioner generally may not rely on the

Grids if a claimant suffers from non-exertional limitations because the Grids are based on

exertional strength factors only.

3

 See 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, § 200.00(b). 

“If a claimant has an impairment that limits his or her ability to work without directly affecting

his or her strength, the claimant is said to have non-exertional . . . limitations that are not covered

by the Grids.” Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 958 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing 20 C.F.R., Part 404,

Subpart P, Appendix 2, § 200.00(d), (e)). The Commissioner may rely on the Grids when a

claimant has combined exertional and non-exertional limitations, if non-exertional limitations do

not impact the claimant’s exertional capabilities. See Bates v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1059, 1063

(9th Cir. 1990); Polny v. Bowen, 864 F.2d 661, 663-64 (9th Cir. 1988). The Grids do “provide

for the evaluation of claimants asserting both exertional and non-exertional limitations,” unless

3 Exertional capabilities are the primary strength activities of sitting, standing,

walking, lifting, carrying, pushing, or pulling and are generally defined in terms of ability to

perform sedentary, light, medium, heavy, or very heavy work. See 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart

P, Appendix 2, § 200.00(a). “Sedentary work” involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time

and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools. See 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a). “Light work” involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at

a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. See 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1567(b) and 416.967(b). “Medium work” involves lifting no more than 50 pounds at a time

with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 25 pounds. See 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1567(c) and 416.967(c). “Heavy work” involves lifting no more than 100 pounds at a time

with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 50 pounds. See 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1567(d) and 416.967(d). “Very heavy work” involves lifting objects weighing more than

100 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing 50 pounds or more. 

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(e) and 416.967(e).

Non-exertional activities include mental, sensory, postural, manipulative, and

environmental matters which do not directly affect the primary strength activities. See 20 C.F.R.,

Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, § 200.00(e). 

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“a claimant’s non-exertional limitations are ‘sufficiently severe’ so as to significantly limit the

range of work permitted by the claimant’s exertional limitations.” Razey v. Heckler, 785 F.2d

1426, 1430 (9th Cir. 1986), Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1340 (9th Cir. 1988). 

In cases where the Grids are not fully applicable, the ALJ may meet his burden

under step five of the sequential analysis by propounding to a vocational expert hypothetical

questions based on medical assumptions, supported by substantial evidence, that reflect all the

plaintiff’s limitations. See Roberts v. Shalala, 66 F.3d 179, 184 (9th Cir. 1995). Specifically,

where the Grids are inapplicable because plaintiff has sufficient non-exertional limitations, the

ALJ is required to obtain vocational expert testimony. See Burkhart, 587 F.2d at 1341.

Here, plaintiff argues that based on the numerous mental limitations the medical

professionals found, and the ALJ should have included in the RFC, the ALJ was required to

utilize the services of a VE instead of relying on the GRIDS. However, as discussed above, the

ALJ did not err in determining plaintiff’s RFC. As such, her argument as to the use of a VE is

not persuasive. The non-exertional limitations the ALJ included in plaintiff’s RFC do not appear

to be sufficiently severe as to significantly limit the range of work permitted by her exertional

limitations, nor does she contend as much. The undersigned therefore finds no error in the ALJ’s

decision not to call a VE to testify.

D. Credibility

Finally, plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to properly evaluate and credit plaintiff’s

testimony. As to plaintiff’s credibility, the ALJ determined that plaintiff’s “statements

concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely

credible for the following two reasons.” (CAR 22).

First, the claimant’s allegations, and her husband’s allegations, are

inconsistent with treatment notes that show the claimant’s mental

condition is well controlled. Treatment notes repeatedly show that

the claimant demonstrated normal mental status examinations

(Exhibit 1F, pgs., 24, 32, 35; Exhibit 3F, pg., 3; Exhibit 13F, pgs.,

9, 10).

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She has no psychiatric hospitalizations. She has not been observed

responding to internal stimuli. Examinations noted she was

cooperative and displayed a pleasant mood (Exhibit 13F, pg., 9). 

She has only a mild impairment with respect to her ability to accept

and remember instructions from supervisors (Exhibit 1F, pgs., 24,

32, 35; Exhibit 3F, pg., 4; Exhibit 13F, pgs., 9, 10). In July 2012,

the claimant presented with noted improvement in her stress. She

was less panicky and less anxious and her mental condition was

well controlled (Exhibit 11F, pg., 21).

The claimant’s physical condition also appears well controlled. 

The claimant has not sought any specialized orthopedic or

neurological care even though she has headaches, had a thumb

injury and complained of back, neck and shoulder problems. 

Progress notes show few significant physical examination findings

except for some tenderness, and pain with range of motion due to

degenerative changes (Exhibit 1F, pgs., 1, 5, 6). She has

headaches, which are controlled with medication (Exhibit 1F, pg.,

3). She had a thumb injury that is not symptomatic currently

(Exhibit 2F, pgs., 84, 87). She had a shoulder injury, but there was

no evidence of a rotator cuff tear, fracture or joint effusion (Exhibit

11F, pg., 4). She alleged at the hearing carpal tunnel syndrome,

but there is no evidence in the record to support this allegation. 

Moreover, the claimant had a spinal fusion in the neck in 1992;

however, she has not had an MRI done since that time (Exhibit 1F,

pg., 16).

The record also reveals that the claimant’s allegedly disabling

impairments were present at approximately the same level of

severity prior to the alleged onset date. The fact that the

impairments did not prevent the claimant from working at that time

strongly suggests that it would not currently prevent work.

There is also evidence that the claimant stopped working for

reasons not related to the allegedly disabling impairments. The

claimant alleged that she stopped working for other reasons,

specifically she quit because of her work environment (Exhibit 2E,

pg. 2).

Second, these allegations are inconsistent with medical opinions

that show that the claimant has considerable work-related abilities. 

For example, consultative physician, Brian Dossey, M.D.,

examined the claimant on October 25, 2011, and opined that she

could lift 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently and

perform frequent postural activities with limitation only to no

climbing or working at heights or with heavy machinery (Exhibit

4F, pg., 3).

Consultative psychologist, Lea K. Tate, Psy.D, examined the

claimant on May 21, 2013, and opined that even with her

psychiatric impairments, she could perform simple repetitive work. 

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She has moderate limitations in her ability to interact appropriately

with the public, supervisors or coworkers or respond appropriately

to usual work situations and to changes in routine work setting

(Exhibit 13F, pgs., 3, 4). 

. . . 

Claimant’s allegations are partially supported by her use of

Methadone prescription medication and physical examination

findings of tenderness and pain with range of motion testing. 

However, the weight of the evidence shows that while the claimant

may experience some level of pain difficulties, the medical

evidence showed that it [is] well controlled and that the claimant

can nonetheless perform a wide range of unskilled light exertional

work.

(CAR 22-24).

The Commissioner determines whether a disability applicant is credible, and the

court defers to the Commissioner’s discretion if the Commissioner used the proper process and

provided proper reasons. See Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1996). An explicit

credibility finding must be supported by specific, cogent reasons. See Rashad v. Sullivan, 903

F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1990). General findings are insufficient. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d

821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995). Rather, the Commissioner must identify what testimony is not credible

and what evidence undermines the testimony. See id. Moreover, unless there is affirmative

evidence in the record of malingering, the Commissioner’s reasons for rejecting testimony as not

credible must be “clear and convincing.” See id.; see also Carmickle v. Commissioner, 533 F.3d

1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Lingenfelter v Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1936 (9th Cir. 2007),

and Gregor v. Barnhart, 464 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir. 2006)). 

If there is objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment, the

Commissioner may not discredit a claimant’s testimony as to the severity of symptoms merely

because they are unsupported by objective medical evidence. See Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d

341, 347-48 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). As the Ninth Circuit explained in Smolen v. Chater:

The claimant need not produce objective medical evidence of the

[symptom] itself, or the severity thereof. Nor must the claimant produce

objective medical evidence of the causal relationship between the

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medically determinable impairment and the symptom. By requiring that

the medical impairment “could reasonably be expected to produce” pain or

another symptom, the Cotton test requires only that the causal relationship

be a reasonable inference, not a medically proven phenomenon. 

80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to the test established in Cotton v. Bowen, 799

F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

The Commissioner may, however, consider the nature of the symptoms alleged,

including aggravating factors, medication, treatment, and functional restrictions. See Bunnell,

947 F.2d at 345-47. In weighing credibility, the Commissioner may also consider: (1) the

claimant’s reputation for truthfulness, prior inconsistent statements, or other inconsistent

testimony; (2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a

prescribed course of treatment; (3) the claimant’s daily activities; (4) work records; and (5)

physician and third-party testimony about the nature, severity, and effect of symptoms. See

Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284 (citations omitted). It is also appropriate to consider whether the

claimant cooperated during physical examinations or provided conflicting statements concerning

drug and/or alcohol use. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2002). If the

claimant testifies as to symptoms greater than would normally be produced by a given

impairment, the ALJ may disbelieve that testimony provided specific findings are made. See

Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1161 (citing Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 1989)). 

Plaintiff argues the reasons the ALJ gave were not sufficient in that they were not

supported by the record. The undersigned disagrees. The reasons provided by the ALJ are that

the testimony was inconsistent with the treatment notes, plaintiff’s pain was well controlled, she

received fairly conservative treatment, she provided other reasons for stopping work, her

impairments were relatively unchanged since before her alleged onset date, and her testimony

was inconsistent with the medical opinions in the record. These reasons are proper

considerations of plaintiff’s credibility, and contrary to plaintiff’s argument are supported by the

record. The undersigned finds no error.

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Plaintiff drops a footnote wherein she also contends the ALJ’s rejection of her

husband’s statements were equally inadequate. In determining whether a claimant is disabled, an

ALJ generally must consider lay witness testimony concerning a claimant’s ability to work. See

Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 1993); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(d)(4) & (e),

416.913(d)(4) & (e). Indeed, “lay testimony as to a claimant's symptoms or how an impairment

affects ability to work is competent evidence . . . and therefore cannot be disregarded without

comment.” See Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1467 (9th Cir. 1996). Consequently, “[i]f the

ALJ wishes to discount the testimony of lay witnesses, he must give reasons that are germane to

each witness.” Dodrill, 12 F.3d at 919. The ALJ may cite same reasons for rejecting plaintiff’s

statements to reject third-party statements where the statements are similar. See Valentine v.

Commissioner Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 694 (9th Cir. 2009) (approving rejection of a

third-party family member’s testimony, which was similar to the claimant’s, for the same reasons

given for rejection of the claimant’s complaints). As the ALJ rejected her husbands statements

for essentially the same reasons he rejected plaintiff’s, the undersigned finds no error. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned concludes that the Commissioner’s final

decision is based on substantial evidence and proper legal analysis. Accordingly, the

undersigned recommends that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 17) be denied;

2. Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment (Doc. 26) be granted;

and

3. The Clerk of the Court be directed to enter judgment and close this file.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

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objections with the court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of

objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal. 

See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: September 22, 2016

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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