Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-06-03048/USCOURTS-caDC-06-03048-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Vincent E. Reed
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 19, 2007 Decided April 8, 2008

No. 06-3048

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

VINCENT E. REED,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 03cr00560-01)

Adam H. Kurland, appointed by the court, argued the cause

for the appellant.

Patricia A. Heffernan, Assistant United States Attorney,

argued the cause for the appellee. Jeffrey A. Taylor, United

States Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese III and Julieanne

Himelstein, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on brief.

Before: HENDERSON, TATEL and KAVANAUGH, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

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1

A bank customer, Sarah Johnson, observed the men in the

hallway outside the credit union just before the robbery. During a

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Vincent E.

Reed was tried by a jury and convicted of armed bank robbery,

18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d). He was also convicted of two

violations of the District of Columbia Criminal Code namely,

armed carjacking, D.C. Code § 22-2803(a)(1), (b)(1), and

destruction of property, D.C. Code § 22-303. The district court

sentenced Reed to 300 months’ imprisonment on the armed

bank robbery, 180 months on the armed carjacking and 102

months on the destruction of property count, all to be served

concurrently. Judgment 2. Reed appeals on three grounds,

contending that (1) the court erred by admitting his allegedly

involuntary confession into evidence; (2) in her closing

argument the prosecutor improperly compared him to Jesse

James and Billy the Kid and vouched for the credibility of a

Government witness; and (3) the court mischaracterized his

criminal history and failed to consider mitigating evidence

during sentencing. Appellant’s Br. 6–8 We affirm both Reed’s

conviction and his sentence.

I.

On December 1, 2003, at approximately 9:30 a.m., a “tall,

dark-skinned” man wearing a “hooded jacket” and “skull cap”

with “ski mask” holes cut into it entered the Bureau of

Engraving and Printing Federal Credit Union (credit union)

located in Leahy Hall on the campus of The Catholic University

of America (CUA). 12/12/05 Tr. 29, 51–52, 103–06, 135–36.

He pointed a gun at the teller and demanded money. Id. at

103–05, 135–36. A second man then “rushed in the door” and,

at the masked man’s direction, closed the door and shut the

blinds. Id. at 110–11. The second man was a “medium-brown

skinned” man in his “late 30's or early 40's.” Id. at 113. He did

not wear a mask or carry a gun. Id. at 112–13.1 The masked

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photo line-up Johnson identified the second man as Reed’s brother,

RonaldReed. 12/12/05 Tr. 176, 178–81, 187–89; 12/14/05 Tr. 49–50.

2

Michael Paolantonio, a CUA student, saw the two as they

“quickly” walked away from Leahy Hall. 12/12/05 Tr. 191, 195. One

wore “a black ski cap, like a black woolen winter hat” on his head. Id.

at 196. He lost sight of them as they rounded the corner of Hartke

Theater. Id. at 203.

man began collecting cash and money orders from behind the

counter. Id. at 113–15. When he had finished, the two rushed

from the credit union. Id. at 69, 116. The teller, Sallie Lombre,

then activated an alarm. Id. at 116–17. Robert Miller, a

customer who was waiting outside the credit union, saw them

flee. Id. at 67–69. He described one as wearing a “ski mask.”

Id. at 70. Miller went to the CUA security office, located some

20 feet from the credit union, to report the robbery; the CUA

dispatcher had already heard the alarm and radioed for help. Id.

at 41–44, 48, 74–75. Lombre watched from a window as the

armed man “ran” across the lawn behind Leahy Hall.2 Id. at

121–23. He escaped with $25,683. Id. at 128–29.

Responding to the dispatcher’s call, CUA Officer Marvin

Dicksimmediately drove his unmarked van towards Leahy Hall

where he saw two men who fit the description of the suspects

walking at a “very fast pace.” Id. at 204, 207–09. There was no

one else in the area. Id. at 209. He watched as one of the men

removed the “hat or mask” from his head and dropped it near

Hartke Theater. Id. at 210–11. At about the same time, CUA

Officers James Lee and Maurice Cartledge arrived in a marked

CUA patrol car. 12/13/05 Tr. 131–35. The two officers

observed the two men walking at a “medium-to-fast pace”

between Leahy Hall and Hartke Theater. Id. at 135–36. When

the two men saw the CUA officers, one pulled the hood of his

jacket over his head “like he didn’t want to be seen” and

continued on Harewood Road. Id. at 136–37, 140. The two

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officers jumped from the car and arrested the second man, id. at

138, subsequently identified as Ronald Reed, Vincent Reed’s

brother. 12/14/05 Tr. 43.

CUA OfficerJulius Pittman also responded to the vicinity of

Harewood Road and Taylor Street. 12/13/05 Tr. 56–58. There

he saw a man fitting one suspect’s description “walking real fast

up the street with his hood over his head.” Id. at 59. From a

distance of “about twenty feet,” Pittman said, “Campus police.

Hold it right there.” Id. at 62, 64. The man looked up and the

hood fell from his head. Id. at 65. Pittman recognized the man

as the appellant, a man named “Vincent,” who formerly worked

in housekeeping at CUA. Id. at 65–66. The man then looked

toward Officer Dicks, who had been following him since

observing him discard the ski mask near Hartke Theater.

12/12/05 Tr. 211–14. Dicks also recognized him, remembering

that he was “a former employee of the university.” Id. at 214.

At about the same time, Officer Lee, who had driven north on

Harewood Road, stopped near Reed and looked at him from

“about 16 or 17 feet” away. 12/13/05 Tr. 141–42. He

“immediately” recognized Reed as a CUA custodial employee

whom he had greeted on several occasions. Id. at 142–43. Lee

said, “Man, I know you. Why don’t you put the gun down and

turn yourself in.” Id. at 143.

Reed then pulled a “short-nosed revolver” from his jacket

and tried to stop passing cars. 12/12/05 Tr. 215–16, 218;

12/13/05 Tr. 66–71. After several unsuccessful attempts, Reed

headed to the intersection of Harewood Road and Taylor Street.

12/13/05 Tr. 148; 12/12/05 Tr. 218–19. Officer Lee followed

Reed in his vehicle. 12/12/05 Tr. 224; 12/13/05 Tr. 148–49.

James Smith, a landscaper, was stopped in his pickup truck at

the traffic light at the Harewood/Taylor intersection. 12/12/05

Tr. 219–20; 12/13/05 Tr. 94–97. Reed jumped into the bed of

Smith’s truck, pointed his gun at Smith and ordered Smith to

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3

Smith described the carjacker as a “black man, aboutsix feet tall,

about 180 pounds, with short hair” and “a two-day growth of facial

hair.” 12/13/05 Tr. 108, 114.

drive away.3 12/13/05 Tr. 100–01. Instead, Smith fled the

truck. Id. at 103. Reed jumped from the truck bed, got into the

cab and began driving away. 12/12/05 Tr. 220. Lee attempted

to block his path; however, the truck Reed was driving rammed

Lee’s vehicle, jumped the curb and then sped away. 12/13/05

Tr. 77–79, 107–08.

Later that afternoon, an FBI agent discovered Smith’s truck

in the 800 block of Quincy Street, N.W. 12/13/05 Tr. 53–54.

FBI agents also searched the area between Leahy Hall and

Hartke Theater and discovered a black skullcap with two holes

cut in it, a knife and a bag of money orders. 12/12/05 Tr. 10,

13–14, 31–34. Subsequent testing revealed that Reed’s DNA

was on the cap. 12/14/05 Tr. 142–50.

The next day, at approximately 3:15 p.m., officers of the

Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) arrested Reed at a local

motel. 12/7/05am Tr. 11; 12/13/05 Tr. 188–95. Reed was in

possession of approximately $1245 in cash. 12/14/05 Tr. 91,

165. The officers took Reed to police headquarters and, at

approximately 6:15 p.m., seated him in an interview room.

12/1/05 Tr. 39; 12/7/05am Tr. 11–12. MPD Detective Gail

Brown advised Reed that he was under arrest and read him his

Miranda rights. 12/14/05 Tr. 68–71. Reed agreed to speak with

Detective Brown and FBI Special Agent Paul Timko. Id. Reed

initially denied committing the robbery—explaining that he had

been at CUA smoking crack. 12/14/05 Tr. 72–73. Agent Timko

and Detective Brown told Reed that several witnesses had seen

him commit the carjacking. 12/7/05am Tr. 16. Reed then

confessed to both the credit union robbery and the carjacking.

12/14/05 Tr. 79–87.

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The Government charged Reed with one count each of

armed bank robbery (18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d)), armed

carjacking (D.C. Code § 22-2803(a)(1), (b)(1)), destruction of

property (D.C. Code § 22-303) and assault with a dangerous

weapon (D.C. Code § 22-402). See Superseding Indictment 1.

Reed moved to suppress his confession, see Mot. to Suppress 1,

which motion was denied. 12/7/05pm Tr. 33. After a jury trial,

Reed was convicted on the bank robbery, carjacking and

destruction of property counts. See 12/15/05 Tr. 57–58. He was

acquitted of assault with a dangerous weapon. See id. The

district court sentenced Reed to concurrent prison terms of 300

months for armed bank robbery, 180 months for armed

carjacking and 102 months for destruction of property.

Judgment 2.

II.

Reed first arguesthat his confession “was, under the totality

of the circumstances, involuntary[] and should have been

suppressed.” Appellant’s Br. 8 (capitalization altered). Second,

Reed argues that the prosecutor made prejudicial statements

during closing argument. Id. at 11. Finally, Reed argues that his

sentence was unreasonable and he seeks a remand for

resentencing before a different judge. Id. at 18.

A. Confession

Reed claims that “in the several days [before] his arrest,” he

“ingested crack cocaine and alcohol . . . and waslikely suffering

some withdrawal symptoms at the time he purportedly”

confessed. Appellant’s Br. 8. He argues that “[h]e exhibited

paranoia when he was arrested” and that the police

“intentionally took advantage of [his] intellectually vulnerable

[state]” by “plac[ing him] in a cold and uncomfortable room”;

by “forc[ing him] to take off his clothes and . . . put on a

jumpsuit without underwear”; and by “str[iking him] in the face

at least once after he was placed under arrest.” Id. at 8–9

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4

The Government asserts that Reed never claimed before the

district court that his confession was the product of withdrawal

symptoms, “‘intellectual[] vulnerab[ility]’” or coercive interrogation

techniques and that, as a result, the claims have been waived. Gov’t.

Br. 25–26 (citing United States v. Redman, 331 F.3d 982, 986–88

(D.C. Cir. 2003)). We do not agree. The Government’s arguments

made during the suppression hearing manifest that the claims were

before the district court. See 12/7/05pm Tr. 26–27 (discussing Reed’s

mental state and conditions of interrogation).

(capitalization altered) (record citations omitted). He concludes

that “this adroit psychological pressure[] . . . amount[ed] to

coercive governmental action.” Id. at 9.

In determining the voluntariness of a confession, we review

the district court’s underlying factual findings for clear error;

however, “the ultimate issue of ‘voluntariness’ is a legal

question” which we review de novo. United States v. Baird, 851

F.2d 376, 379–80 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (quoting Miller v. Fenton,

474 U.S. 104, 110 (1985)); see also United States v. West, 458

F.3d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

4

 “A confession is inadmissible as

a matter of due processif under the totality of the circumstances

it was involuntarily obtained . . . .” United Sates v. Bradshaw,

935 F.2d 295, 299 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Although the defendant’s

mental condition can be a factor in the “‘voluntariness’

calculus,” “this fact does not justify a conclusion that a

defendant’s mental condition, by itself and apart from its

relation to official coercion,should ever dispose of the inquiry.”

Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164 (1996). “[C]oercive

police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a

confession is not ‘voluntary’ within the meaning of the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 167. The

Government must establish the voluntariness of a confession by

a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 168.

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5

The fact that the district court discredited Reed’s claim that he

was struck is hardly surprising given his repeated claims that at the

time he was experiencing “paranoid” delusions and thought people

were trying to hurt or kill him. See 12/7/05am Tr. 45.

Given the totality of the circumstances, we do not believe

Reed’s confession was the product of police coercion. Reed

alleges that the police acted inappropriately when they put him

in a cold room without a blanket, struck him in the face at least

once and put him in a jumpsuit without underwear. The record

contains conflicting testimony with regard to the first two

allegations. At the suppression hearing Agent Timko testified

that Detective Brown gave Reed a blanket. 12/1/05 Tr. 47.

Agent Timko also testified that Reed had not been hit.

12/7/05am Tr. 15. Assessing the conflicting testimony, the

district court credited Timko over Reed. See, e.g., 12/7/05pm

Tr. 32–33 (“even if I were to accept [Reed’s] testimony”

(emphasis added)).5 Nothing in the record persuades us that the

district court’s decision was incorrect. See United States v.

Broadie, 452 F.3d 875, 880 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (district court

credibility determination “‘entitled to the greatest deference

from this court on appeal.’” (quoting United States v. Hart, 324

F.3d 740, 747 (D.C. Cir. 2003))). Regarding Reed’s third

objection, we do not believe that his donning a jumpsuit without

underwear, by itself, rises to the level of “coercive police

activity” that renders a confession “not ‘voluntary’ within the

meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment.” Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167. Accordingly, we

conclude that Reed’s confession was voluntary.

B. Prejudicial Statements

Reed next objects to two allegedly prejudicial statements

made by the prosecutor during closing argument. He first

challenges the prosecutor’s comparison of him to Jesse James

and Billy the Kid. The prosecutor stated: “This is a classic, yet

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simple, bank heist. It is not Jessie [sic] James. It is not Billy the

Kid. It is Vincent Reed and Ronald Reed, the Reed Brothers.”

12/15/05 Tr. 12. Reed argues:

At first blush, these outlaws may be thought of as

romantic characters drawn from old West folklore—but

they were real serial murderers. Jesse James was an

ardent Confederate sympathizer, serial bank robber,

serial murderer and infamous American outlaw. Billy

the Kid, according to legend, killed 21 men, one for each

year of his life. Reality was just as grim. In 1878, he

killed two deputies and engaged in large scale cattle

rustling—a major criminal scourge of the time. He was

sentenced to death, escaped and was finally shot and

killed by Sheriff Pat Garrett.

Appellant’s Br. 11–12 (footnote omitted). Reed argues that

courts “have consistently reversed convictions based on

inflammatory remarks by the prosecution equating a defendant

with notorious criminals.” Appellant’s Br. 13 (citing Shurn v.

Delo, 177 F.3d 662, 665 (8th Cir. 1999) (reversing conviction

after prosecutor alluded to Charles Manson, Richard Speck and

Son of Sam)); United States v. Steinkoetter, 633 F.2d 719, 720

(6th Cir. 1980) (reversing conviction after prosecutor likened

defendant to Pontius Pilate and Judas Iscariot); Mathis v. United

States, 513 A.2d 1344, 1347 (D.C. 1986) (reversing conviction

after prosecutor referred to defendant as “the Godfather”)).

Reed also objects to a statement made by the prosecutor

vouching for Agent Timko’s credibility. Appellant’s Br. 15.

She asked the jury: “Do you believe Agent Timko? Is defense

counsel saying that agent Timko is making all this up and that

none of this happened . . . ? Would agent Timko risk his entire

career?” 12/15/05 Tr. 49.

Reed concedes that he did not object to these statements

during closing argument and, therefore, they are reviewable only

for plain error. See United States v. Venable, 269 F.3d 1086,

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6

The prosecutor’s allusion to Jesse James and Billy the Kid, if

error, constitutes harmless error at most. The statement regarding

Timko’s credibility does constitute improper “vouching.” See, e.g.,

United States v. Boyd, 54 F.3d 868, 871 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (prosecutor’s

statement that police witnesses would “jeopardize their careers and

risk criminal prosecution” if they were untruthful constitutes improper

vouching).

1089 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Under this standard, Reed must show (1)

that the prosecutor’s remarks constituted error, (2) that the error

was “‘plain’” and (3) and that the error “‘affect[ed] substantial

rights.’” Id. (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461,

467 (1997)) (alterations added). “The third condition ‘in most

cases . . . means that the error must have been prejudicial: It

must have affected the outcome of the district court

proceedings.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S.

725, 734 (1993)) (alteration in Venable). “In evaluating the

potential prejudice from an improper statement in closing

argument, this court typically looks to the centrality of the issue

affected, the severity of the prosecutor’s misconduct, the steps

taken to mitigate the misconduct, and the closeness of the case.”

Id. at 1091 (emphasis added). It is “‘the defendant rather than

the Government who bears the burden of persuasion with

respect to prejudice.’” Id. at 1089 (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at

734). Even if the defendant meets this burden, the reviewing

“court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error,

. . . only if . . . the error ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness,

integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Id.

(quoting Johnson, 520 U.S. at 467) (alteration in Venable).

Because the evidence against Reed was overwhelming, we

do not believe that either of the challenged statements

constitutes plain error.6 From the moment the bank robbery

began until the carjacking, the two men were in the continuous

view of witnesses. Lombre, the bank teller, and Miller, the

customer, watched the two flee from Leahy Hall. Once outside,

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7

Reed also arguesthat Pittman “first described the perpetrator who

removed the mask as ‘clean shaven,’ although at the time of Reed’s

arrest one day later, he had a full moustache and goatee.” Appellant’s

Br. 4–5 (record citations omitted). Even assuming that Pittman had so

stated (which is not evident from the trial transcript—defense counsel

asked Pittman if he had earlier described Reed as “clean shaven” and

Pittman responded that he could not remember having done so,

12/13/05 Tr. 87–88), the record does not support Reed’s claim that he

had significant facial hair when he was arrested. In his brief, Reed

they were seen by Paolantonio, the CUA student, who watched

them as they headed toward Harewood Road. See supra note 2.

There they were spotted by CUA Officer Dicks who watched as

Reed removed his black cap and discarded it. As the two

proceeded up Harewood Road, Officer Lee and Officer Pittman

apprehended one of them—Reed’s brother, Ronald Reed.

Lombre later confirmed that Ronald Reed was the unmasked

robber. See also supra note 1 (Johnson’s identification of

Ronald Reed). The other man continued on Harewood where he

was in plain view of CUA Officers Dicks, Lee and Pittman.

Each recognized Reed as a former CUA employee. Moreover,

Dicks and Pittman knew Reed by name. When Reed was

arrested the next day, he had over $1200 in cash—an amount

much less than what was taken from the credit union but

nonetheless significant.

Nonetheless, Reed arguesthat thisis a close case. He points

to alleged inconsistencies in the evidence against him. He

claims, first, that Lombre’s testimony that one robber wore a

“ski mask” is inconsistent with the fact that the “mask”

recovered near Hartke Theater was in fact a “skullcap” with eye

holes cut into it. Appellant’s Br. 10. Next, Reed notes that the

carjacking victim, Smith, was unable to identify him as the

carjacker. Id. Finally, Reed notes that he was in possession of

only approximately $1200 at the time of his arrest, leaving over

$23,000 unaccounted for. Id. at 4.7

 Given the overwhelming

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cites “12/15/05 Trans. 9 (arrest photo admitted into evidence), 37

(description of Reed in arrest photo)” as evidence that he had a

moustache and goatee at the time of his arrest. Appellant’s Br. 4–5.

However, the photo admitted into evidence at 12/15/05 Tr. 9—which

depicts a man with a moustache and goatee—is the arrest photo of

Ronald Reed. See Appellee’s App. C. Furthermore, the description

of the photo at 12/15/05 Tr. 37 occurred during defense counsel’s

closing argument. He described an unidentified photo that allegedly

showed Reed “clearly with a mustache and clearly with a goatee.”

12/15/05 Tr. 37.

8

Reed also argues that the evidence against him is “largely

circumstantial.” Appellant’s Br. 17. Even if this characterization

were correct (which it is not), it would be immaterial because a

conviction can be based entirely on circumstantial evidence. United

States v. Collins, 56 F.3d 1416, 1421 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

weight of the evidence against Reed, these alleged discrepancies

are of no moment. Whether the robber wore a “ski mask” or

“skullcap” with eye holes cut into it is insignificant as each has

a similar appearance. Smith’s inability to identify Reed is

understandable given that the carjacker was located behind

Smith in the bed of his truck when he was carjacked. See

12/13/05 Tr. 76–77, 101, 149. Finally, the fact that the police

did not recover the entire $25,683 taken from the credit union

when they arrested Reed the next day is hardly surprising in

light of Reed’s admission that he spent the next day on a “crack

cocaine binge.” Appellant’s Br. 3.8

We note three additional factors supporting our conclusion

that the prosecutor’s comments were not plain error because

they were not prejudicial. The prosecutor’s vouching related to

Agent Timko who testified only as to Reed’s interrogation and

confession. We have upheld the voluntariness of Reed’s

confession. Moreover, the prosecutor’s reference to Jesse James

and Billy the Kid contrasted them to the Reed brothers: their

“simple[] bank heist” was “not Jessie (sic) James. It [was] not

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9

Citing United States v. Richardson, 161 F.3d 728 (D.C. Cir

1998), Reed argues that the prosecutor’s comparison is no less

prejudicial simply because of its negative wording. Appellant’s Br.

13–14. In Richardson, we held that a black prosecutor’s comment

during closing arguments that “we don’t all look alike,” despite being

phrased in the negative, was “instantly recognizable as a reference to

racial stereotyping” and “could well have inflamed the emotions of the

jury and resulted in a verdict based on something other than the

evidence.” Id. at 735–37 (emphasis added). Because “the evidence

against appellant . . . was not such that his conviction was by any

means a certainty”—the evidence “consist[ing] primarily of the

testimony of” a single witness who claimed to have seen the defendant

carrying a gun—we reversed the conviction. Id. at 732, 737 (emphasis

added). Here, the evidence against Reed—which includes the

testimony of multiple witnesses and DNA evidence linking him to the

crime as well as his confession—leaves little doubt as to Reed’s guilt.

Billy the Kid.” 12/15/05 Tr. 12 (emphases added). The contrast

merely highlighted the simplicity and lack ofsophistication with

which Reed and his brother committed the robbery.9 Further,

the court charged the jury that it “alone [is] to determine

whether to believe any witness” and that “the [closing]

arguments of the lawyers are not evidence,” 12/15/05 Tr. 9, 13,

which charge mitigated any harm caused by the statements. See

United States v. Brown, 508 F.3d 1066, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 2007).

Thus, neither the vouching for Agent Timko nor the allusion to

Jesse James and Billy the Kid constitutes plain error.

C. Sentencing

Finally, Reed argues that although he received a sentence

within the advisory range of the United States Sentencing

Guidelines(Guidelines), his “sentence was unreasonable and he

should receive a remand for resentencing before a different

judge.” Appellant’s Br. 18 (capitalization altered). Reed claims

that notwithstanding he presented a “compelling, if not

overwhelming case for leniency,” the district court “ignored all

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mitigating evidence.” Appellant’s Br. 18–19. Reed explains

that he “had been a superb high school basketball player,”

Appellant’s Br. 18, and his lifelong dream was to become a

professional athlete. Def. Sentencing Mem. 11. “Unfortunately,

Reed never learned to read or write, and had many enablers

assist him though two years of junior college.” Appellant’s Br.

18. When “‘illiteracy shut down the one aspect of his life that

had been positive to his self-image[—]his life as an athlete—’”

Reed began abusing drugs. Id. at 19–20 (quoting Def.

Sentencing Mem. 10). Reed contends that illiteracy and drug

addiction had a “‘crushing practical and psychological effect[]’”

on him and prompted his criminal conduct. See id. (quoting

Def. Sentencing Mem. 10). In light of these “tragic personal

circumstances,” Def. Sentencing Mem. 12, Reed argues that a

15-year sentence, rather than the 25-year sentence the court

imposed, would have been appropriate. Appellant’s Br. 20.

We review Reed’s sentence under a “‘reasonableness’

standard.” See United States v. Bras, 483 F.3d 103, 106 (D.C.

Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 262

(2005)). “‘[A] sentence within a properly calculated Guidelines

range is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness.’”

Id. (quoting United States v. Dorcely, 454 F.3d 366, 376 (D.C.

Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 691 (2006)); see also Rita v.

United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462–63 (2007). However, “[a]

sentencing court acts unreasonably if it commits legal error in

the process of taking the Guidelines or other factors into

account, or if it fails to consider them at all.” Id.

We do not believe Reed’s sentence was unreasonable. First,

the record does not support Reed’s view that the district court

“ignored all mitigating evidence” or refused to consider his case

for leniency. During the sentencing hearing, the court

acknowledged Reed’s mitigating evidence—expressing

sympathy for the “frustration” Reed experienced when his

dream of playing professional basketball ended. 3/21/06 Tr. 14.

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10The district court originally imposed a 327-month sentence for

armed bank robbery but later vacated it because it exceeded the

statutory maximum. 4/10/06 Tr. 2–4.

The court acknowledged that drugs “destroy[ed]” Reed’s life

and contributed to many of his later difficulties. See id.

Moreover, the court noted that it was “unfortunate” that Reed’s

family and teachers did not help him understand the importance

of education or that “most people don’t make it in sports.” Id.

at 13–14. The court also noted, however, that other factors

weighed in favor of “severe punishment.” Id. at 16. It

explained that the robbery and carjacking traumatized their

respective victims. See id. at 14–16. It also expressed

frustration with Reed’s “total lack of remorse” and his repeated

complaints about the quality of his representation—which the

court described as “outstanding.” Id. at 11–12. Finally, the

court explained that because Reed was almost forty at the time

he committed his crimes, it had little hope that Reed might be

rehabilitated. Id. at 15.

In imposing the 25-year sentence,10 the court specifically

considered the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553.

The court considered (1) the seriousness of Reed’s crimes and

their effect on the community, see, e.g., 3/21/06 Tr. 14–15; (2)

Reed’s history and characteristics (e.g., noting his illiteracy,

drug use, difficult childhood and lack of remorse); (3) the

likelihood of recidivism, id. at 15; (4) Reed’s need of mental

health and drug treatment, which it ordered, id.; (5) Reed’s need

of a literacy program, which it also ordered, id. at 21–22; (6) the

availability of consecutive sentences, which it rejected, id. at 21;

and (7) the need for restitution to the victims, which it ordered,

id. at 18–19. Furthermore, the court explained how the

Guidelines affected its analysis:

I did impose a sentence that is within the guidelines,

and I imposed that sentence considering the factors in

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11Reed had two prior felony convictions. On April 14, 1990, Reed

was arrested after selling crack cocaine to an undercover police

officer. Def. Sentencing Mem. 2. He pleaded guilty to attempted

distribution of a controlled substance and received one year of

probation. Id. Later in 1990, Reed pleaded guilty to attempted

possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. Id. at 3.

Reed was sentenced to 30–90 months’ imprisonment to be served

concurrently with the 24–72 month sentence imposed when his

probation was revoked. Id.

the United States Code in assessing what the appropriate

sentence should be in this case . . . .

I . . . also conclude that because of the serious nature of

these offenses, that appropriate punishment is necessary,

and I think that the sentence imposed is necessary to

protect the community against having this type of

offense committed again.

I imposed a guideline sentence and at the top of the

guideline range . . . to reflect the fact that there were

three separate events that needed to be punished. But for

the fact that hopefully by the time he comes out, he will

be too old to commit further crime, I would have given

him a maximum sentence that would have been

consecutive.

Id. at 20–21.

Finally, Reed claims that the district court mischaracterized

his prior criminal record. Reed claims that before he committed

these crimes, he “had virtually no history of violence, and that

[the robbery] was freakishly atypical of [him];” however,

according to Reed, the district court mistakenly believed he had

“a long criminal history of violence.” Appellant’s Br. 19.11

Reed highlights the court’s observation during sentencing that

at “nearly 40 years old, [Reed] was ‘still doing this type of

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12The court explained that when people in their “teens” and

“twenties” commit crimes:

[Y]ou have a hope that, with age, they slow down and they

quit committing this type of crime, but when somebody is

mid-thirties—now almost 40—and they engage in thistype of

behavior, it causes you to have to believe that when you are

that age and you are still doing this type of stuff, that there is

not a lot of hope that this type of activity isn’t going to occur

again . . . .

3/21/06 Tr. 15 (emphasis added).

stuff.’” Id. at 19 (quoting 3/21/06 Tr. 15) (emphasis in

Appellant’s Br.). But at no point did the district court state that

Reed had a “long criminal history of violence.” Nor did the

court’s observation that Reed was “still doing thistype ofstuff,”

demonstrate that it misunderstood his criminal history. It

merely reflected the court’s concern that because Reed

committed armed bank robbery when he was almost 40—an age

at which criminal behavior is expected to have

waned—recidivism waslikely and therefore a significant prison

sentence was necessary to protect the public.12 This was a

legitimate sentencing concern. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C)

(sentencing factors include need “to protect the public from

further crimes of the defendant”).

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court

is affirmed.

So ordered.

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