Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-95-07001/USCOURTS-caDC-95-07001-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Association of Flight Attendants, AFL-CIO
Appellee
United Air Lines, Inc.
Appellant

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 2, 1995 Decided December 15, 1995

No. 95-7001

ASSOCIATION OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS, AFL-CIO,

APPELLEE

v.

UNITED AIRLINES, INC.,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(92cv0947)

Robert A. Siegel argued the cause for appellant, with whom Michael G. McGuinness and David T.

Beddow were on the briefs.

Stephen B. Moldof argued the cause for appellee, with whom Edward J. Gilmartin was on the brief.

Before: WALD, SILBERMAN and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SILBERMAN.

SILBERMAN, Circuit Judge: United Airlines, Inc. appeals the district court order directing

arbitration of a collective bargaining dispute between it and the Association of Flight Attendants

(AFA). We affirm.

I.

The facts are not disputed. UAL Corporation, which is the sole owner of United Airlines,

acquired all the shares of Air Wisconsin. UAL maintained the two airlines as separate subsidiaries.

The Association of Flight Attendants represents the flight attendants at both Air Wisconsin and

United pursuant to National Mediation Board (NMB or Board) certifications. The AFA demanded

that the Air Wisconsin flights be staffed only by flight attendants on the United Airlines System

Seniority List under the terms and conditions of the AFA-United collective bargaining agreement,

notwithstanding the AFA-Air Wisconsin collective bargaining agreement. United refused, and the

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1A third category of disputes, not at issue in this case, are "major" disputes which have to be

resolved through an elaborate and lengthy procedure of bargaining and mediation. See generally

Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 491 U.S. 299, 302-03 (1989). 

AFA filed a grievance.

A1986 side letter agreement between the parties, the source ofUnited's purported contractual

obligation, provides:

Except as specifically provided in [another side letter agreement], neither

UAL, Inc., United Airlines nor a successor, assign, or subsidiary thereof (hereinafter

referred to as the "Company"), will, if such entity has a controlling interest, whether

acting individually or jointly with any of the above entities, conduct any commercial

flight operations of the type historically performed by United Airlines Flight

Attendants, unlessit performssuch work with flight attendants on the United Airlines

System Seniority List. Such flying shall be performed in accordance with the terms

and conditions of the existing agreement or any other applicable agreement between

the Company and the Union.

This scope clause agreement was incorporated verbatim into, and runs concurrently with, the post1986 AFA-United collective bargaining agreement, which became effective September 1, 1991, and

is not amendable until March 1, 1996. United refused to process this grievance, asserting that the

AFA's claim fell within the Board's exclusive jurisdiction. The AFA sought an order from the district

court compelling United to arbitrate its scope clause claim before the United-AFA system board of

adjustment. Summary judgment was granted in favor of the AFA.

II.

The parties disagree over the proper characterization of their dispute. AFA claims that it is

a "minor" dispute while United argues that it is a representation dispute. The Railway Labor Act

(RLA) provides different procedures for the resolution of "minor" disputes and representational

disputes.1"Minor" disputes, which " "relate[ ] either to the meaning or proper application of a

particular provision' " of a collective bargaining agreement, Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway

LaborExecutives' Ass'n, 491 U.S. 299, 303 (1989) (quoting Elgin, J.&E. Ry. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S.

711, 723 (1945)), must be submitted to arbitration before a system board of adjustment for "final and

binding" resolution. See Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 869 F.2d 1518, 1520-

21 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The district court has jurisdiction to compel arbitration of such disputes. See

Western Airlines, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 480 U.S. 1301, 1302 (O'Connor, J.),

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motion denied, 481 U.S. 1002 (1987); Association of Flight Attendants v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 879

F.2d 906, 917 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 (1990). Representation issues, on the

other hand, are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board to investigate, if need be, and to decide,

and are not ordinarily subject to judicial review. See Switchmen's Union of North America v.

National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297, 302-05 (1943). The RLA provides that the NMB is to

resolve "any dispute [which] arise[s] among a carrier's employees as to who are the representatives

ofsuch employees." Accordingly, the Board is given authority, in conducting an election in order to

determine who is the representative, to "designate who may participate in the election." 45 U.S.C.

§ 152, Ninth (1986) (emphasis added). Such designations are labeled a "craft or class" determination.

All this is common ground between the parties.

United argues that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the AFA's scope

clause claim because the requested order encroaches upon the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board.

The scope clause dispute, it is argued, raises a representation issue because the "NMB must first

resolve the question of whether previously separate carriers have in fact combined to form a single

carrier and whether the employee groups at each carrier should therefore be combined." An

arbitrator's resolution of this issue would infringe upon the "continuing right of a majority of

employees within each "craft or class' at each carrier to determine whether, in the future, they desire

to be represented by a particular union, or at all." United points out that federal courts, including our

circuit, have addressed situations where an airline carrier has been acquired byanother airline inwhich

the union representing employees of the acquiring company attempts to enforce a scope agreement

which requires the application of its collective bargaining agreement to the corresponding class of

employees of the acquired carrier. And in those cases courts have concluded that the scope clause

dispute implicates representation issues which can only be resolved by the NMB. See, e.g., Flight

Eng'rs' Int'l Ass'n v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 896 F.2d 672, 673 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,

499 U.S. 953 (1990); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Texas Int'l Airlines, Inc., 717 F.2d 157,

163-64 (5th Cir. 1983); Independent Union of Flight Attendants v. Pan American World Airways,

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2

In Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. National Mediation Bd., 29 F.3d 655, 666-669 (en

banc) (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1392 (1995), we held that a representation

proceeding could be initiated only by employees or their representativenot even by the NMB

itself. We have not been asked to consider whether our holding in that case affects the reasoning

of these cases. 

Inc., 664 F. Supp. 156, 159-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, 836 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1988).2 We asked the

NMB if it wished to file an amicus briefsince the question presented went to its jurisdiction, but the

Board respectfully declined stating only that the "Board has determined that paramount needs of

neutrality militate against filing an amicus brief."

We think, as did the district court (and AFA), that the cases United relies on are

distinguishable. It is rather obvious that if two airlines merge and their employees in the same jobs

are represented by different unions the federal courts lack jurisdiction over collective bargaining

claims because a representation issue is necessarily implicated. See, e.g., Air Line Employees v.

Republic, Inc., 798 F.2d 967 (7th Cir. 1986); Brotherhood of Ry. and Steamship Clerks v. United

Air Lines, Inc., 325 F.2d 576, 579-80 (6thCir. 1963), cert. dismissed asimprovidently granted, 379

U.S. 26 (1964); cf. General Comm. of Adjustment v. Southern Pacific Co., 320 U.S. 338 (1943)

(holding that a union's request for declaratory relief invalidating a collective bargaining agreement

insofar asit designated another union asthe representative of certain employees was a dispute within

the exclusive jurisdiction of the NMB). The application of one union's collective bargaining

agreement to another union's members would create a situation where those members would have,

in effect, two representatives. But, one could no more have two exclusive representatives than, to

use the old baseball expression, "two men on second base."

In Delta Airlines, 879 F.2d at 912-13, and Association of Flight Attendants v. USAir, Inc.,

24 F.2d 1432, 1440 (D.C. Cir. 1994), we indicated our approval of the reasoning of Texas Int'l

Airlines, 717 F.2d at 157, in which this principle was extended to a merger of a smaller unionized

airline into a larger non-union one. The Fifth Circuit refused to enforce any part of the collective

bargaining agreement between the carrier and the Teamsters because it perceived that the NMB's

policy was normally to extinguish a certification in such situationsif a representation proceeding was

initiated. To enforce provisions of the contract pending that determination would be impractical even

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if theoretically possible. Id. at 164. And, of course, if the NMB were to subsequently determine that

the affected employees fell within a much broader class or craft in which the union did not enjoy

majority support, the contractual relationship would necessarily terminate. The court, therefore,

concluded that the NMB's exclusive jurisdiction to decide representation issues was implicated.

In our case, both groups of employees are represented by the AFA so there is no question as

to the identity of the exclusive representative. The AFA contends that fact is dispositive of the case;

as the union puts it, representation issues are essentially "who" questionswhich union, if any, will

represent employees. United points out, however, that as a corollary, or precondition of such a

determination, the NMB must determine the appropriate craft or class, or grouping of employees, to

be represented by a union. Nor is such a Board craft or class designation only made at the time an

election is to be held. United points to a recent NMB case in which the Board determined the

appropriate class or craft after a merger of four airlines, all represented by the same union. See U.S.

Air Express, 18 N.M.B. 441 (1991). Although the carriers urged that the union's application should

be dismissed because no representation dispute wasraised, the Board rejected that argument, holding

that whether the "carriers will be treated separately or combined for representation purposes or

whether their respective employees fall within one or more crafts or classes" are representation

questions within the Board's exclusive jurisdiction. Id. at 444.

The case comes down then to the question whether the district court's order interfereslegally

or practically with the Board's capacity, at any timewhether in connection with an election or

otherwiseto determinewhetherthe flight attendants at bothairlines constitute one orseparate crafts

or classes. We do not think so. The Board itself has stated "that carriers and labor organizations are

free to include any employee classifications under a voluntary recognition agreement, [but] once a

representation dispute is brought before the Board ... [such an agreement] ... cannot dictate the

Board's craft or class findings." Aircal, 14 N.M.B. 33, 42-43 (1986). Collective bargaining

agreements, it should be remembered, are not necessarily coextensive with bargaining units. It is

rather common, for instance, for a multi-employer bargaining group to arrive at one contract covering

separate employers and therefore separate bargaining units. And there is no barrier to an employer

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3The court in Texas Int'l Airlines reasoned that enforcement of the contract would result in a

situation where the union retained its bargaining responsibilities despite the NMB "rule" that upon

a merger of two airlines all certifications are extinguished by law. Allowing the union to remain

de facto the representative of its pre-merger members would frustrate the NMB goal behind this

"rule" of avoiding "uneven representation, duplication of effort, and confusion." Id. at 163

(citation omitted). While not taking a position on the validity of this reasoning, a facet of Texas

Int'l Airlines that Delta Air Lines and USAir did not focus on, the enforcement of the side letter

agreement would not result in the frustration of any NMB policy as far as we can ascertain. 

and unionagreeing to separate contracts covering different groups of employeesalthough the Board

discourages itwithin the same Board-certified craft or class. Nor do we perceive any problems,

such asthe FifthCircuit saw in TexasInt'l Airlines, 717 F.2d at 164, creating friction between a court

order enforcing arbitration, leading perhaps to the application of the United agreement to the

Wisconsin flight attendants, and a subsequent Board determination of the craft or class for RLA

purposes.3 To be sure, the Board might well be influenced, in a subsequent representation

proceeding, by an extension of the terms of the AFA-United agreement to the Wisconsin flight

attendants, with perhaps modifications agreed to by United and the AFA, and any experience the

parties gain under that situation, but the important point is that the Board is free to make its own

decision on that issue. In the event that the Wisconsin flight attendants (the only likely petitioner)

were to apply to the Board for a separate craft or class determination and were successful, the AFAUnited contract insofar as it was applied to the Wisconsin flight attendants would presumably be

terminated, see id.at least as to the union's rights to continue to represent the employees. Cf. Air

Line Pilots Ass'n v. Department of Transp., 838 F.2d 563, 566 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (leaving open

the question of whether a collective bargaining agreement is extinguished even if the affected

employees will be denied vested rights under the agreement). But under those circumstances, the

Wisconsin flight attendants would likely be either unrepresented or represented by a different union.

* * * *

For the preceding reasons, we hold that the AFA's claim must proceed to arbitration.

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