Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00180/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00180-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Andre Johnson
Petitioner
James Yates
Respondent

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANDRE JOHNSON,

Petitioner,

v.

JAMES YATES,

Respondent.

 /

CV F 06-00180 OWW DLB HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

REGARDING RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS AND ORDER GRANTING

RESPONDENT’S REQUEST FOR

MODIFICATION OF SCHEDULING ORDER

[Docs. 10, 11]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

 BACKGROUND

Petitioner was convicted of two counts each of second degree robbery, receiving stolen

property, and false imprisonment and one count each of burglary, and felon in possession of a

firearm. There were also a number of sentencing enhancements that were found true. Petitioner

received seven consecutive indeterminate state prison terms of twenty-five years to life and a

total of twenty-two years in determinate prison terms. (Respondent’s Lodged Docs. 1-2.) 

Petitioner filed a notice of appeal. On April 27, 2000, the California Court of Appeal,

Fifth Appellate District affirmed the judgment, with the exception of reversing one of the

receiving stolen property convictions. (Respondent’s Lodged Doc. 2.) Petitioner did not seek

review at the California Supreme Court.

Petitioner subsequently filed nine pro se state post-conviction collateral challenges. 

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Petitioner filed his first state habeas corpus petition on June 21, 1999 in the Fresno County

Superior Court. (Lodged Doc. 3.) The petition was denied on July 2, 1999. (Lodged Doc. 4.) 

Petitioner filed a second state habeas corpus petition in the Fresno County Superior Court

on November 14, 2000. (Lodged Doc. 5.) The petition was denied on November 21, 2000. 

(Lodged Doc. 6.) 

Petitioner filed a third petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Fifth District Court of

Appeal on December 19, 2000. (Lodged Doc. 7.) The petition was denied on August 9, 2001. 

(Lodged Doc. 8.) 

Petitioner filed a fourth petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme

Court on August 16, 2001. (Lodged Doc. 9.) The petition was denied on January 29, 2002. 

(Lodged Doc. 10.) 

Petitioner filed a fifth petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Fresno County Superior

Court on May 18, 2004. (Lodged Doc. 11.) The petition was denied on May 25, 2004. (Lodged

Doc. 12.) 

Petitioner filed a sixth petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Fifth District Court of

Appeal. (Lodged Doc. 13.) The petition was denied on October 21, 2004. (Lodged Doc. 14.) 

Petitioner filed a seventh petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Fresno County Superior

Court on November 2, 2004. (Lodged Doc. 15.) The petition was denied on November 12,

2004. (Lodged Doc. 16.) Petitioner filed a petition for rehearing on November 23, 2004, which

was denied on November 30, 2004. (Lodged Docs. 17, 18.)

Petitioner filed an eighth petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Fifth District Court of

Appeal on January 20, 2005. (Lodged Doc. 19.) The petition was denied on January 27, 2005. 

(Lodged Doc. 20.) 

Petitioner filed a ninth petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court

on February 7, 2005. (Lodged Doc. 21.) The petition was denied on January 4, 2006. (Lodged

Doc. 22.) 

Petitioner also filed a prior federal petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the same

conviction on February 6, 2002. See CV-F-02-5144 OWW TAG HC. The petition was denied

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on the merits on January 21, 2004. (Court Docs. 23-26.) 

Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus on February 17, 2006. 

Respondent filed the instant motion to dismiss on June 13, 2006, along with a motion for the

modification of the briefing schedule. (Court Docs. 10, 11.) Petitioner filed an opposition to the

motion to dismiss on July 18, 2006. (Court Doc. 12.) 

Initially, in its motion for modification of the briefing schedule, Respondent

acknowledges that the briefing schedule set forth by the Court’s order of March 15, 2006, set a

deadline for any motion to dismiss to be filed by May 14, 2006, and an answer to be filed by June

13, 2006. Respondent submits that upon receipt of the Court’s March 15, 2006, order, counsel

began researching and obtaining any prior state or federal flings by Petitioner. Counsel received

copies of the state filings sporadically during the months of March through May 22, 2006, and

then immediately began preparing a motion to dismiss, “only to realize that the state habeas

actions that were received as a result of the processing of the prior federal habeas action were not

include with the prior federal habeas file. Accordingly, Respondent immediately requested

copies of those documents from the state courts.” Respondent received the last of those petitions

the morning of June 13, 2006. Accordingly, Respondent requests that the Court amend the

briefing schedule.

Good cause having been demonstrated, Respondent’s request for modification of the

briefing schedule is GRANTED, and the instant motion is deemed timely filed as of June 13,

2006. 

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the

petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254

Cases.

The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer

if the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being in violation of

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the state’s procedural rules. See e.g. O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990)

(using Rule 4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to exhaust state remedies); White

v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989) (using Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review

motion to dismiss for state procedural default); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12

(E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). Thus, a Respondent can file a motion to dismiss after the court orders a

response, and the Court should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533 F.

Supp. at 1194 & n. 12.

In this case, Respondent's motion to dismiss is based on a violation of 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(b)’s proscription against successive petitions and 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)'s one-year

limitations period. Because Respondent's motion to dismiss is similar in procedural standing to a

motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust state remedies or for state procedural default and

Respondent has not yet filed a formal answer, the Court will review Respondent’s motion to

dismiss pursuant to its authority under Rule 4. 

B. Successive Petition

Because the current petition was filed after April 24, 1996, the provisions of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) apply to Petitioner's current

petition. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997). A federal court must dismiss a second or

successive petition that raises the same grounds as a prior petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). The

court must also dismiss a second or successive petition raising a new ground unless the petitioner

can show that 1) the claim rests on a new, retroactive, constitutional right or 2) the factual basis

of the claim was not previously discoverable through due diligence, and these new facts establish

by clear and convincing evidence that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder

would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A)-(B).

However, it is not the district court that decides whether a second or successive petition meets

these requirements, which allow a petitioner to file a second or successive petition. 

Section 2244 (b)(3)(A) provides: "Before a second or successive application permitted by

this section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of

appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application." In other words,

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Petitioner must obtain leave from the Ninth Circuit before he can file a second or successive

petition in district court. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 656-657 (1996). This Court must

dismiss any second or successive petition unless the Court of Appeals has given Petitioner leave

to file the petition because a district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over a second or

successive petition. Pratt v. United States, 129 F.3d 54, 57 (1st Cir. 1997); Greenawalt v.

Stewart, 105 F.3d 1268, 1277 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 794 (1997); Nunez v.

United States, 96 F.3d 990, 991 (7th Cir. 1996).

A second or successive petition for habeas corpus is not considered “successive” if the

initial habeas petition was dismissed for a technical or procedural reasons versus on the merits. 

See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 485-87 (2000) (holding that a second habeas petition is not

successive if the initial habeas petition was dismissed for failure to exhaust); Stewart v.

Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 643-45 (1998) (a second habeas petition is not successive if the

claim raised in the first petition was dismissed by the district court as premature.) 

As previously stated, Petitioner previously filed a federal petition for writ of habeas

corpus in this Court on February 6, 2002, challenging the same conviction. See Johnson v.

Scribner, CV-F-02-5144 OWW TAG HC. The petition was denied on the merits, after the

Report and Recommendation was adopted in full, and judgment was entered in favor of

Respondent. (Court Docs. 58, 63, 65.) Accordingly, the instant petition challenging the same

conviction is successive. Petitioner’s claim that he is currently challenging a sentencing

discrepancy under California’s Three Strikes law, is still a challenge to his underlying conviction

and sentence. Because there is no indication that Petitioner has obtained or been granted

permission by the Court of Appeal to file a second or successive petition in this Court, the instant

petition must be dismissed, without prejudice to refiling if Petitioner obtains the necessary order. 

In addition, for the reasons explained below, the instant petition is time-barred.

C. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (hereinafter “AEDPA”). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for

writ of habeas corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117

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S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. th

denied, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997). 

In this case, the petition was filed on February 17, 2006, and therefore, it is subject to the

provisions of the AEDPA. The AEDPA imposes a one-year period of limitation on petitioners

seeking to file a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As

amended, § 2244, subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. 

The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized

by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and

made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or

claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this

subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In most cases, the limitations period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. In this case, the California Court of Appeal affirmed Petitioner’s

conviction on April 27, 2000, with the exception of reversing one of the receiving stolen property

convictions. Petitioner did not file a petition for review. According to the Rules of Court, a

decision becomes final thirty (30) days after filing, and an appeal must be taken to the California

Supreme Court within ten (10) days of finality. Cal.R.Ct. 24(a), 28(b); Smith v. Duncan, 297

F.3d 809 (9 Cir. 2002). Therefore, Petitioner’s direct review concluded forty days thereafter

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on June 6, 2000, and commenced running on June 7. 2000. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d

1243, 1245 (9 Cir. 2001) (holding that Rule 6(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure th

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governs the calculation of statutory tolling applicable to the one year limitations period.) Thus,

the last day to file a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus was June 6, 2001, plus any time for

tolling. 

D. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the "time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward" the one year limitation period. 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002), the United States Supreme Court

rejected the Ninth Circuit’s view that where a state court denies the petition on both procedural

grounds and on the merits, the fact that the state court addressed the merits warranted tolling

under § 2244(d)(2). The Supreme Court stated:

Given the variety of reasons why the California Supreme Court may have

included the words “on the merits,” those words cannot by themselves indicate

that the petition was timely. And the Ninth Circuit’s apparent willingness to take

such words as an absolute bellwether risks the tolling of the federal limitations

period even when it is highly likely that the prisoner failed to seek timely review

in the state appellate courts. . . . The Ninth Circuit’s rule . . . threatens to

undermine the statutory purpose of encouraging prompt filings in federal court in

order to protect the federal system from being forced to hear stale claims. 

Saffold, 536 U.S. at 226 (citations omitted.) The Supreme Court also emphasized that only a

“timely” appeal tolls the AEDPA’s statute of limitations period, and that “unreasonable” delays

are not “timely.” Id. at 214. In Evans v. Chavis, the Supreme Court held that when the state

court denies a state habeas petition without any explanation or indication as to timeliness, the

federal court must conduct its own inquiry to determine whether the state habeas petition was

filed within a "reasonable time." 126 S.Ct. 846, 852 (2006). However, where there is a "clear

indication that a particular request for appellate review was timely or untimely," there is no need

to conduct such an independent examination. Id. 

1. No Tolling During Period First State Collateral Action Was Pending

As Respondent correctly argues, the limitations period commenced running on June 7,

2000. The first petition was filed on June 21, 1999, which was denied on July 2, 1999. (Lodged

Docs. 3, 4.) Because this petition was filed prior to the time that the statute of limitations began

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to commence, it does not have any tolling effect. See Hill v. Keane, 948 F.Supp. 157, 159

(E.D.N.Y.1997). 

2. No Tolling For Period Between Denial Of First Petition And Filing of Second

Petition

Petitioner filed the second post-collateral petition again in the Fresno County Superior

Court on November 14, 2000, which was denied on November 21, 2000. (Lodged Docs. 5, 6.) 

The time that a state application is “pending” includes the period between a lower court’s

denial of relief and filing in a higher court, provided that the filing in the higher court is timely

under state law. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002). 

Respondent submits that the delay of over sixteen months between the denial of the first

petition and the filing of the second petition was unreasonable. However, the Court of Appeal

did not deny Petitioner’s direct appeal until April 27, 2000, and as explained above, the statute of

limitations did not begin to run until June 7, 2000. Petitioner is not entitled to interval tolling

from the date of finality of direct review to the filing of his collateral petition on November 8,

2000 (application of the mailbox rule), as there was no petition “pending.” Nino v. Galaza, 183

F.3d 1003, 1006-07 (9 Cir. 1999). Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to interval tolling from th

the date the statute of limitations began to run to filing the second petition for writ of habeas

corpus at the Fresno County Superior Court, and the statute of limitations ran for 154 days. 

3. The Limitations Period That Lapsed Before State Collateral Actions Filed

 As stated, the limitations period commenced running on June 7, 2000, and it continued to

run until November 8, 2000, the date the second state post-conviction petition was filed under the

mailbox rule, resulting in 154 days of the initial one-year period expiring as of the time the

second state habeas petition was filed.

4. Tolling During Period Second Through Fourth Petitions Were Pending In State

Court

Respondent does not argue that the second through fourth petitions were improperly filed

or not entitled to interval tolling; therefore, Petitioner is entitled to tolling under the mailbox rule

from November 8, 2000 (the date the second petition was filed) through January 29, 2002 (the

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28 Bunney allows thirty additional days of tolling from the date of the denial of a post-conviction collateral 1

petition by the California Supreme Court which issued before January 1, 2003. 

9

date the fourth petition was denied). (Lodged Docs. 5-10.) See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 125 S.Ct.

1807 (2005). Petitioner is entitled to an additional 30 days under Bunney v. Mitchell, 262 F.3d

973, 974 (9 Cir. 2001). 

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5. No Tolling For Period Between Denial Of Fourth Petition And Filing Of Fifth

Petition

As Respondent argues, Petitioner is not entitled to tolling for the period between February

28, 2002 (fourth petition denied, plus Bunney time), and May 15, 2004, (the date the fifth

petition was filed under the mailbox rule). Petitioner delayed over two years before filing the

fifth petition after the fourth petition was denied. Again, Petitioner has not provided any

justification for the lengthy delay which is over four times longer than the delay in Chavis. 

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to tolling from February 28, 2002 to May 15, 2004. 

Moreover, as Respondent correctly submits, the denial of the fourth petition by the

California Supreme Court concluded Petitioner’s first round of challenges. (Lodged Doc. 10.) 

Petitioner then began a new round of challenges with the filing of his fifth petition in the Fresno

County Superior Court. (Lodged Doc. 11.) Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d at 1005-06, provides for

tolling only for “one complete round” in the state’s appellate court system, which does not

include the gap between the conclusion of the first series of filings that proceed up the state court

hierarchy and the beginning of the second series. See also Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045, 1048

(9 Cir. 2003) (once habeas petition denied in California Supreme Court, petitioner “ceased to th

have an application for post-conviction review pending”). Thus, because Petitioner completed

his first round with the denial of the fourth petition, he is not entitled to interval tolling for the

time period between the denial of the fourth petition and the filing of his fifth petition. 

C. Expiration of Limitation Period

As previously stated, 154 days of the one-year limitations period was used as of the date

Petitioner’s second habeas petition was filed. Further, because Petitioner is not entitled to tolling

for the period between the denial of the fourth petition and the filing of the fifth and subsequent

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petitions, the statute of limitations expired on September 26, 2002. 

D. Subsequent Post-Conviction Actions

Under the mailbox rule, Petitioner filed the earliest of his fifth through nine state postconviction collateral challenges on May 15, 2004, over nine months after the statute of

limitations expired. (Lodged Doc. 11.) It is well-established that the filing of a state collateral

action after the expiration of the limitation period does not restart the clock at zero or otherwise

save a claim from being time-barred. In other words, once the statute has run, a collateral action

cannot revive it. Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9 Cir. 2001). Consequently, his fifth th

petition, as well as the sixth through ninth petitions, fail to extend the statute of limitations as

they were all filed after its expiration. 

Additionally, the sixth and ninth petitions fail to toll the statute of limitations on an

additional basis. In denying the sixth petition, the Court of Appeal found it to be “untimely.” 

(Lodged Doc. 14.) The California Supreme Court, in citing to, inter-alia, In re Robbins, 18

Cal.4th 770, 780 (1998), found the ninth petition to be untimely filed. (Lodged Doc. 22.) 

Consequently, the sixth and ninth petitions are not considered properly filed as to provide for

tolling within the tolling provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 125 S.Ct.

at 1807 (a petition for writ of habeas corpus rejected by a state court as untimely is not “properly

filed” within the meaning of the statutory tolling provision of the AEDPA).

E. Prior Federal Habeas Action Does Not Toll

As previously stated, Petitioner filed a prior petition challenging the same conviction and

sentence. See Johnson v. Scribner, CV-F-02-5144 OWW TAG HC. This prior federal action

does not extend the statute of limitations. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 121 S.Ct. 2120,

2129 (2001) (federal petition for writ of habeas corpus does not qualify to toll the statute of

limitations as it was not an “application for state post-conviction or other collateral review”

under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

F. Equitable Tolling

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if “extraordinary circumstances

beyond a prisoner’s control” have made it impossible for the petition to be filed on time. 

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28 Although a dismissal based on the proscription against successive petitions, is without prejudice, because 2

the instant petition is also untimely, the dismissal shall be with prejudice. 

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Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9 Cir. 1998), citing Alvarez-Machain v. th

United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9 Cir. 1996), cert denied, 522 U.S. 814 (1997); (Beeler), 128 th

F.3d at 1288 (noting that "[e]quitable tolling will not be available in most cases, as extensions of

time will only be granted if 'extraordinary circumstances' beyond a prisoner's control make it

impossible to file a petition on time"). "When external forces, rather than a petitioner's lack of

diligence, account for the failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of

limitations may be appropriate." Id.; Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9 Cir. 1999). th

Petitioner bears the burden of alleging facts that would give rise to tolling. Smith v. Duncan, 297

F.3d 809 (9 Cir.2002); Hinton v. Pac. Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 395 (9th Cir.1993). th

Petitioner does not argue that he was prevented in any way from timely filing the federal

petition. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling and the petition remains

untimely. 

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition be GRANTED, and the habeas

corpus petition be DISMISSED with prejudice for Petitioner’s failure to comply

with 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)’s one year limitation period and 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)’s

proscription against successive petitions.2

This Findings and Recommendations is submitted to the assigned United States District

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of

the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with

the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served

and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the

objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

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636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time

may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th

Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: August 30, 2006 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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