Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-03006/USCOURTS-caDC-98-03006-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Marc K. Weathers
Appellant

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 14, 1998 Decided August 6, 1999

No. 98-3006

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Marc K. Weathers,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 97cr00165-02)

Beverly G. Dyer, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was A.J.

Kramer, Federal Public Defender.

Rachel Adelman-Pierson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued

the cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Wilma A.

Lewis, U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher and Elizabeth Trosman, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

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Before: Silberman, Rogers and Garland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Garland.

Garland, Circuit Judge: Defendant Marc Weathers was

found guilty on all counts of a six-count indictment arising out

of his attempts to arrange for the murder of several witnesses

and a prosecutor. He contends that two of his six convictions

should be vacated because each charges an offense also

included in the remaining four counts. We conclude that

defendant waived this claim by failing to raise it before trial.

We find that defendant's further contention, that his attorney

provided ineffective assistance by failing to assert this claim

in a timely manner, must be remanded to the district court

for an initial determination.

I

In a case filed in the Superior Court of the District of

Columbia in 1996, Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA)

Bernadette Sargeant obtained an indictment charging Weathers with thirty-seven counts of rape and related offenses

involving five victims, including a thirteen-year-old child.1

The presiding judge ordered the five rape cases severed for

separate trials. Prior to trial on the first rape case, an

informant told Sargeant that defendant had plotted to kill the

five victims to prevent them from testifying. The trial was

postponed, and after investigation Sargeant obtained a second

Superior Court indictment charging Weathers with two

counts of obstruction of justice.

In March 1997, just weeks before the rescheduled rape trial

was set to begin, a second informant told the FBI that

Weathers was trying to hire him to arrange the killing of both

the rape victims and the prosecutor. At the government's

request, the informant met with Weathers and recorded a

conversation in which defendant said he would pay $1,000 in

advance and $19,000 after AUSA Sargeant was killed. The

__________

1 The United States Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia prosecutes offenses in both the United States District Court and

the local Superior Court. See United States v. Brooks, 966 F.2d

1500, 1503 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

plan required the informant to hire a hit man, and provided

that defendant's friend on the outside, Maurice Logan, would

make the necessary payments. 9/30/97 Tr. at 6-8, 10-11, 15-

19.

On March 19, 1997, Detective Larry Best of the Metropolitan Police Department, posing as a hit man, met with Weathers in jail and discussed the details of the murder-for-hire

scheme. Weathers instructed Detective Best that he should

first kill the victim in the upcoming trial, who lived on Hayes

Street. "I need Hayes done first," defendant said. App. 19;

9/29/97 Tr. at 138-40. "Maybe you can blow that [expletive

deleted] up." App. 23. With respect to AUSA Sargeant,

whom he referred to as the "DA," Weathers first said that

killing her "ain't gonna do nothing but slow the proces[s] ...

cause see if she gone they just put another one in." Id. at 19.

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Later, however, defendant said: "I just want her gone. You

know what I'm saying. I just want 'em gone. Set an

example.... I don't really got no ... special way. I just

want it done. You know what I'm saying. Easiest way for

you." Id. at 20, 22. Weathers told Best that he could get his

payment for the killings from Weathers' friend Logan and a

woman named Mattie. Id. at 15-19.

On March 26, 1997, the FBI conducted a search of Maurice

Logan's apartment, in which it found a letter from defendant

dated March 9. 9/29/97 Tr. at 150-53. In that letter, Weathers urged Logan to burn down the witnesses' homes to keep

them from testifying. The letter read, in part:

[T]hese people are trying to give me life without parole,

and we both know I can't do that number, so I need you

to get at a couple of these bitches for me. You don't

have to kill them, just burn they house down while they

in it, or something, so they won't come to court. You

know if the situation was reversed, I'd do it for you....

[T]hey don't have a case without these bitches, and they

ain't going to spend no money hiding everybody.

Id. at 180-81.

On April 22, 1997, Weathers was indicted in United States

District Court for plotting against the witnesses and prosecuUSCA Case #98-3006 Document #454862 Filed: 08/06/1999 Page 3 of 18
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tor in his Superior Court cases. The indictment charged him

with: (1) using facilities of interstate commerce in the commission of murder-for-hire, in violation of 18 U.S.C. s 1958;

(2) threatening to injure a person (the rape victims), in

violation of D.C. Code s 22-2307; (3) obstructing justice

(based on the threats against the rape-victim witnesses), in

violation of D.C. Code s 22-722(a)(6); (4) threatening a federal official (AUSA Sargeant), in violation of 18 U.S.C. s 115;

(5) threatening to injure a person (Sargeant), in violation of

D.C. Code s 22-2307; and (6) obstructing justice (based on

the threats against Sargeant), in violation of D.C. Code

s 22-722(a)(6). App. 11-14.2 The defendant was convicted

on all counts, and was sentenced to: (1) ten years imprisonment on Count One; (2) 80-240 months on each of Counts

Two and Five; (3) fifteen years to life on both Counts Three

and Six; and (4) five years imprisonment on Count Four.

The court ordered Counts Two, Three, Five, and Six to run

consecutive to each other, but concurrent with consecutive

sentences on Counts One and Four.

II

Defendant contends that his indictment charged the same

offense in more than one count, a problem known as "multiplicity." See 1A Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice &

Procedure ss 142, 145, at 7-8, 86 (3d ed. 1999). Because the

Double Jeopardy Clause protects not only against "a second

prosecution for the same offense" after acquittal or conviction, but also against "multiple punishments for the same

offense," North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969),

defendant contends that two of his convictions must be vacated. See Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 381 (1989). Whether

defendant has in fact been punished twice for the same

offense, however, depends upon what "the legislature intend-

__________

2 Federal and District of Columbia offenses may be charged in

the same indictment and prosecuted in the United States District

Court for the District of Columbia. D.C. Code s 11-502(3); see

United States v. Sumler, 136 F.3d 188, 190 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

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ed." Id.; see Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366-68

(1983).3

Defendant's first contention is that his conviction on Count

Four for threatening a federal official (AUSA Sargeant) in

violation of 18 U.S.C. s 115, and his conviction on Count Five

for threatening to injure a person (also Sargeant) in violation

of D.C. Code s 22-2307, constitute two convictions for the

same offense. To determine whether Congress intended two

statutory provisions to proscribe the same offense, the Supreme Court has applied the rule set forth in Blockburger v.

United States: "[W]here the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test

to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or

only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact

which the other does not." 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932); see

Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 297 (1996); Hunter,

459 U.S. at 366-67. Defendant contends that the offenses

charged under 18 U.S.C. s 115 and D.C. Code s 22-2307

constitute a single offense under Blockburger.

Section 115(a) makes it a crime to "threaten[ ] to assault,

kidnap, or murder, a United States official, ... with intent to

impede, intimidate, or interfere with such official, ... while

engaged in the performance of official duties...." D.C.

Code s 22-2307 makes it a crime, within the District of

Columbia, to "threaten[ ] ... to injure the person of another."

As is apparent from a reading of the two statutes, some facts

required to prove Count Four are not required to prove

Count Five (for example, that the threatened person is "a

United States official" and that the threat was made with

"intent to impede"). Defendant contends, however, that

there is no fact required to prove Count Five that is not also

required to prove Count Four. If true, this would make the

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3 Although the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar multiple

punishments under federal and state law, a defendant may not be

punished twice for the same offense under both the United States

Criminal Code and the District of Columbia Criminal Code because

both were adopted by Congress. See Sumler, 136 F.3d at 191;

United States v. Shepard, 515 F.2d 1324, 1331 (D.C. Cir. 1975).

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local crime charged in Count Four the equivalent of a "lesser

included offense" of the federal crime charged in Count Five.

Therefore, an indictment charging both would fail the Blockburger test. See Rutledge, 517 U.S. at 297.

The government disputes this conclusion. It contends that

the D.C. statute does have an additional element not contained in the federal statute. Pointing to model jury instructions for D.C. Code s 22-2307, and to United States v. Baish,

460 A.2d 38, 42 (D.C. 1983), the government argues that the

D.C. statute requires a threat of serious bodily harm. By

contrast, the federal statute is violated by a threat of mere

"assault," which, the government contends, may involve a

threat of nothing more serious than being spat upon or hit

with an egg. Gov't Br. at 15-16 & n.14. Since (if correct)

this means the D.C. law has an element not found in the

federal statute (the threat of serious harm), the government

contends that charging and convicting defendant of both does

not fail Blockburger.

Defendant's second contention is that we must vacate either his conviction on Count Three, for violating D.C. Code

s 22-722(a)(6) by obstructing justice based on the threats he

made against the rape-victim witnesses, or his conviction on

Count Six, for violating the same statute based on the threats

he made against Sargeant. He argues that these also constitute a single offense. Where two violations of the same

statute rather than two violations of different statutes are

charged, courts determine whether a single offense is involved not by applying the Blockburger test, but rather by

asking what act the legislature intended as the "unit of

prosecution" under the statute. See Sanabria v. United

States, 437 U.S. 54, 70 n.24 (1978); see also Bell v. United

States, 349 U.S. 81 (1955) (holding that interstate transportation of two women on same trip in same vehicle constitutes

single violation of Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. s 2421).

D.C. Code s 22-722(a)(6) provides that

[a] person commits the offense of obstruction of justice if

that person [c]orruptly, or by threats of force, any way

obstructs or impedes or endeavors to obstruct or impede

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the due administration of justice in any official proceeding.

Defendant contends that the unit of prosecution intended by

the statute is an "official proceeding," and hence that any

number of threats against any number of witnesses on any

number of occasions may be charged only once, as long as

they all relate to a single such proceeding. The government

responds by asserting that the District of Columbia Court of

Appeals has routinely permitted multiple convictions for obstruction of justice (albeit under a different subsection of the

statute), where the defendant has impeded multiple witnesses

in a single trial. See Gov't Br. at 22 (citing Skyers v. United

States, 619 A.2d 931 (D.C. 1993) (prosecution under D.C.

Code s 22-722(a)(1)); Smith v. United States, 591 A.2d 229

(D.C. 1991) (same)). Hence, in the government's view,

Counts Three and Six are not multiplicitous.

III

Although it denies that its indictment is multiplicitous, the

government argues that we need not resolve the merits of

defendant's multiplicity challenges because he failed to raise

them before trial, or at any time prior to this appeal. We

agree. Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states:

Any defense, objection, or request which is capable of

determination without the trial of the general issue may

be raised before trial by motion ..... The following

must be raised prior to trial: ... Defenses and objections based on defects in the indictment or information....

Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2). Rule 12(f) provides that "[f]ailure

by a party to raise defenses or objections or to make requests

which must be made prior to trial ... shall constitute waiver

thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant relief from

the waiver." Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(f). According to Circuit

precedent, multiplicity claims of the kind presented here are

defenses based on "defects in the indictment" within the

meaning of Rule 12(b)(2), and hence are waived under Rule

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12(f) if not raised prior to trial. This means that unless

"cause" is shown, they "may not later be resurrected" on

appeal. Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233, 242 (1973).

Because defendant has asserted no "cause" for granting relief

from the waiver (other than his claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel, which we discuss separately below), we must

affirm Weathers' convictions.

In United States v. Harris, 959 F.2d 246, 250-51 (D.C. Cir.

1992), the defendants challenged their convictions for both

conspiracy to distribute cocaine and conspiracy to use firearms during a drug trafficking offense. Those convictions

subjected them to multiple sentences for the same offense,

defendants argued, since under Blockburger the counts were

"substantially identical because there was only one alleged

conspiracy." Id. at 250. Defendants, however, had "not even

allude[d] to such an objection prior to a motion they made

midway through the trial." Id. We therefore held that

under Rule 12, defendants had waived their claims and could

not revive them on appeal. Id.

In reaching this result, Harris expressly rejected the argument "that a multiplicity objection is not included within the

defects contemplated by Rule 12(b)(2), because it is a defect

in the sentencing, not in the indictment." Id. To the contrary, the court held that "if the multiplicity objection could

have been raised based on the indictment, Rule 12(b)(2)

applies." Id. "The purpose of the rule," Harris said, "is to

compel defendants to object to technical defects in the indictment early enough to allow the district court ... to permit

the prosecution to accommodate meritorious challenges, and

to do so without disrupting an ongoing trial." Id. The court

then quoted extensively from the Supreme Court's opinion in

Davis v. United States, which identified the same underlying

purpose for the waiver provision of Rule 12:

If [Rule 12(b)(2)] time limits are followed, inquiry into an

alleged defect may be concluded and, if necessary, cured

before the court, the witnesses, and the parties have

gone to the burden and expense of a trial. If defendants

were allowed to flout its time limitations, on the other

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hand, there would be little incentive to comply with its

terms when a successful attack might simply result in a

new indictment prior to trial. Strong tactical considerations would militate in favor of delaying the raising of

the claim in the hopes of an acquittal, with the thought

that if those hopes did not materialize, the claim could be

used to upset an otherwise valid conviction at a time

when reprosecution might well be difficult.

Id. (quoting Davis, 411 U.S. at 241) (alteration in Harris).

"A claim of multiplicity," we concluded, "at least in the typical

case where the defect appears on the face of the indictment,

falls clearly within the letter and spirit of the rule." Id. at

250-51.

Two years later, in United States v. Clarke, 24 F.3d 257

(D.C. Cir. 1994), we applied Harris to defendants' claim that

they had been convicted twice for the violation of a single

statute. " '[O]bjections based on defects in the indictment or

information,' " Clarke said, "including an objection to the

indictment on the grounds of multiplicity, must be raised

before trial." Id. at 261 (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2) and

citing Harris, 959 F.2d at 250-51). Because defendants had

not objected to the indictment until after the jury was selected, the court held that "any complaint based on multiplicity

was waived." Id. (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(f) and Davis, 411

U.S. at 242). See also United States v. Scott, 464 F.2d 832,

833 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("[C]onstitutional immunity from double

jeopardy is a personal right which, if not affirmatively pleaded by the defendant at the time of trial, will be regarded as

waived.") (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2)).4

__________

4 In United States v. Anderson (Anderson I), 39 F.3d 331, 353-

54 (D.C. Cir. 1994), a panel of this court held that defendant's claim

that "his sentence on multiplicitous counts [was] illegal" could be

raised on appeal even though it had not been raised before trial.

The full court, however, granted rehearing en banc and vacated the

judgment. Id. at 361 (order of Feb. 9, 1995). As a consequence,

the panel's decision has "no precedential value." National Fed'n of

Fed. Employees v. Greenberg, 983 F.2d 286, 293 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

Rehearing en banc was "granted on the limited issue" of the merits

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This case is on all fours with Harris and Clarke. Weathers

challenges his convictions on multiplicity grounds; he makes

both the two-statutes-charge-one-offense claim considered in

Harris and the single-statute-charges-only-one-offense claim

reviewed in Clarke. Like defendants Harris and Clarke,

Weathers did not object before trial. And as in Harris and

Clarke, the alleged defect appears on the face of the indictment--a point which defendant concedes and upon which he

even insists, see Def. Br. at 20; Reply Br. at 8, 11, 18.5

Counts Four and Five expressly charge Weathers with

threatening the same person (Sargeant) during the same time

period, and specifically list the two statutes assertedly violated. App. 13. Since a Blockburger claim focuses exclusively

on the statutory elements of the offenses, see United States v.

White, 116 F.3d 903, 931 (D.C. Cir. 1997), the face of the

indictment presents all the information defendant required to

notice the alleged error. Similarly, Counts Three and Six

expressly charge Weathers with violating a single statute by

impeding the same proceedings during the same time period,

the only difference being that Count Three refers to the

threats against the rape-victim witnesses while Count Six

refers to the threats against AUSA Sargeant. App. 12-14.

If there is a multiplicity problem in these counts, then it is, as

defendant himself insists, "clear from the plain language of

s 22-722(a)(6) and the indictment," Reply Br. at 18, and

therefore subject to Rule 12(b)(2) and (f).6

__________

of the defendant's multiplicity claim, and the court did not address

the question of waiver. United States v. Anderson (Anderson II),

59 F.3d 1323, 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc); see Whitacre v.

Davey, 890 F.2d 1168, 1172 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("We cannot count as

controlling a decision that never touched upon the issue we confront."). Accordingly, Harris and Clarke stand as the law of the

Circuit.

5 Defendant insists that the multiplicity violation is clear on the

face of the indictment as support for his argument that it constitutes plain error under Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). See discussion infra

pp. 11-12.

6 Counts Three and Six each charged Weathers with impeding

two proceedings, the original (unsevered) Superior Court rape case

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The "spirit of the rule" identified in Harris is also consistent with a finding of waiver in this case. See Harris, 959

F.2d at 250-51. Had defendant raised his Blockburger claim

before trial, the government could have filed a superseding

indictment, replacing Counts Four and Five with three new

counts for making threats against Sargeant on three separate

occasions--the threat recorded by the informant, by the

undercover detective, and in the letter found in Logan's

apartment. See generally United States v. Lindsay, 47 F.3d

440, 444 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Similarly, the government could

have cured any defect based on a "per proceeding" unit of

prosecution for obstruction by replacing Counts Three and

Six with five new counts, one for each of the five severed rape

trials. As the Supreme Court said in Davis, if Rule 12(b)(2)'s

"time limits [had been] followed," the alleged defect might

have been "cured before the court, the witnesses, and the

parties [went] to the burden and expense of a trial" by the

"simpl[e]" expedient of "a new indictment prior to trial."

Davis, 411 U.S. at 241 (quoted in Harris, 959 F.2d at 250).

In his reply brief, defendant urges us not to follow Harris,

contending that the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in

United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993), puts Harris'

continuing validity in doubt. Olano concerned the meaning of

__________

and the Superior Court obstruction case. App. 12-14. Hence, as

the government contends, if defendant had timely objected, any

multiplicity problem might have been repairable through a bill of

particulars stating that each count referred to a different Superior

Court case. The fact that the problem was curable, however, does

not take it outside the scope of Rule 12(b)(2). To the contrary, the

purpose of the Rule is to ensure that "inquiry into an alleged defect

may be concluded and, if necessary, cured." Davis, 411 U.S. at 241.

See Clarke, 24 F.3d at 261 (holding multiplicity claim waived

because not raised before trial notwithstanding trial court's attempt

to cure by instructing jury that separate counts referred to drugs

found at different locations). As long as "the multiplicity objection

could have been raised based on the indictment, Rule 12(b)(2)

applies." Harris, 959 F.2d at 250 (emphasis added). Weathers

does not dispute that he could have raised his multiplicity objection

based on the face of his indictment.

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Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b),7 rather than Rule

12. Rule 52(b), the Court said, gives courts of appeals "a

limited power to correct errors that were forfeited because

not timely raised in district court." Id. at 731. "Forfeiture,"

the court noted, is different from "waiver." When an error is

forfeited, it is not "extinguish[ed]" but instead is subject to

review under the plain error standard of Rule 52(b). Id. at

733. When an error is waived, on the other hand, it is

extinguished; the result is that there is no error at all and an

appellate court is without authority to reverse a conviction on

that basis. Id. at 733-34. Finally, "[w]hereas forfeiture is

the failure to make the timely assertion of a right," Olano

described "waiver [as] the 'intentional relinquishment or

abandonment of a known right.' " Id. at 733 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).

Weathers contends that the failure to raise a multiplicity

(or any other) claim before trial cannot by itself amount to

the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Thus, he

argues, that failure must be considered a forfeiture and not a

waiver. From this he concludes that Olano requires that his

appeal be reviewed for plain error--effectively overturning

Harris' holding that a failure to come within Rule 12(b)(2)'s

time limits results in the waiver of any claim covered by that

Rule.

We cannot agree that Harris has been annulled by Olano.

First, we have continued to apply Harris to multiplicity

claims even after Olano was decided in 1993. See Clarke, 124

F.3d at 261.8 More broadly, we have continued to hold that

other claims within the compass of Rule 12(f) are waived if

not timely raised. See United States v. Sobin, 56 F.3d 1423,

__________

7 Rule 52(b) states: "Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the

attention of the court."

8 Although Clarke did not discuss Olano and Rule 52(b) in the

course of finding defendants' multiplicity claim barred by waiver, it

did discuss both in deciding that another of defendants' claims was

governed by the plain error standard. See Clarke, 24 F.3d at 266.

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1427 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that untimely claims under

Rule 12(b)(3) are waived).

Second, Olano itself recognized that there is a difference

between waiver and forfeiture. While Rule 52(b) does not

mention "waiver," Rule 12(f) expressly does. Yet, on defendant's reading, the waiver language of Rule 12(f) would add

nothing to the forfeiture principle of Rule 52(b). Defendant's

"waiver" of his multiplicity claim under Rule 12(f) would have

no consequence other than that it would be reviewed for plain

error, the same result as if there were no Rule 12(f). We

cannot conclude that the Supreme Court intended to render

Rule 12(f) a nullity in a decision that did not even mention it.

Finally, although in the context of its discussion of Rule

52(b) Olano said that waiver is the "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right," the Court also noted

that "whether the defendant's choice must be particularly

informed or voluntary ... depend[s] on the right at stake."

Olano, 507 U.S. at 733. The Court further stated that

"[a]lthough in theory it could be argued that if the question

was not presented to the trial court no error was committed

by the trial court, ... this is not the theory that Rule 52(b)

adopts." Id. at 733 (emphasis added) (internal quotation

omitted). The key question, then, is what theory Rule 12

adopts for the rights that come within Rule 12(b)(2). That is

not a question we answered on our own in Harris; with

respect to that issue we did nothing more than follow the path

laid down by the Supreme Court in Davis.

Davis involved a postconviction attack on a defendant's

indictment, based on the allegation that there had been

unconstitutional discrimination in the selection of the grand

jury that issued it. 411 U.S. at 234-35. Although the

defendant had failed to raise the point at trial, he contended

that he had not "understandingly and knowingly waived his

claim." Id. at 236 (citing Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458) (internal

quotation omitted). He also cited a prior case, Kaufman v.

United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969), in which the Court had

held that a failure to raise a Fourth Amendment claim on

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direct appeal did not bar postconviction relief. 411 U.S. at

239.9 The dissent agreed with the defendant, concluding that

in the absence of an intentional relinquishment of a known

right, defendant's claim should be subject to plain error

analysis under Rule 52(b) rather than waiver under Rule 12.

Id. at 245, 252, 254-57 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

The Court, however, did not agree. It conceded that

defendant had alleged the deprivation of a "substantial constitutional right," id. at 243, but held that Rule 12(b)(2) "[b]y its

terms ... applies to both procedural and constitutional defects in the institution of prosecutions." Id. at 236. It also

acknowledged its prior opinion in Kaufman, but noted that

there it "was not dealing with the sort of express waiver

provision contained in Rule 12(b)(2) which specifically provides for the waiver of a particular kind of constitutional

claim if it be not timely asserted." Id. at 239-40.10 Where

Congress "had not spoken on the subject of waiver," Davis

said, the Court might adopt its own "particular doctrine of

waiver." Id. at 242. The "express waiver provision" of Rule

12(b)(2), however, was a different matter. Id. at 240. That

Rule was "promulgated by this Court and ... 'adopted' by

Congress," and it "governs by its terms the manner in which

the claims of defects in the institution of criminal proceedings

may be waived." Id. at 241. According to those terms, the

Court held, an untimely claim is waived and "may not later be

resurrected, either in the criminal proceedings or in federal

habeas, in the absence of the showing of 'cause' which that

Rule requires." Id. at 242. See also Peretz v. United States,

501 U.S. 923, 936 (1991) (citing United States v. Bascaro, 742

F.2d 1335, 1365 (11th Cir. 1984), for the proposition that

"absence of objection is waiver of double jeopardy defense").11

__________

9 Kaufman was subsequently overruled in Stone v. Powell, 428

U.S. 465 (1976).

10 At the time the Court decided Davis, the waiver provision

now in Rule 12(f) was contained in Rule 12(b)(2) itself. See Fed. R.

Crim. P. 12(b)(2) (1971).

11 Defendant cites the pre-Davis case of Green v. United

States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957), as one that applied the intentional and

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In sum, Olano and Davis (and therefore Harris) are not

inconsistent with each other. Although Olano indicates that

untimely objections are generally regarded as forfeitures

subject to Rule 52(b), Davis dictates that untimely objections

that come within the ambit of Rule 12(b)(2) must be considered waivers and may not be revived on appeal. We cannot

conclude that the Court intended Olano, a case which mentioned neither Rule 12 nor Davis, to overrule Davis by

redefining sub silentio the meaning of the word "waiver" in

Rule 12.12

__________

knowing standard to waivers of Double Jeopardy rights. Reply Br.

at 4-5. The defendant in Green was tried for first degree murder

and the lesser included offense of second degree murder. The jury

convicted him of the latter but was silent as to the former. Defendant appealed his conviction on the second degree charge, which

was overturned on insufficiency of the evidence grounds. 355 U.S.

at 185-86. On remand, defendant was retried and convicted on the

first degree murder charge despite his pre-trial plea of former

jeopardy. Id. at 186. The Court held the second conviction a

violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, rejecting the government's

contention that merely by appealing his second degree murder

conviction defendant had voluntarily and knowingly " 'waived' his

constitutional defense of former jeopardy to a second prosecution on

the first degree murder charge." Id. at 191.

Green does not assist defendant in the instant case. Unlike the

provision in Rule 12 that expressly makes the failure to timely

object a waiver, there is no rule that makes the filing of an appeal a

waiver. Nor is there any logical reason to regard an appeal as a

waiver. Rather, as the Court ultimately concluded, the notion that

an appeal constitutes a waiver was nothing more than the "wholly

fictional" construct of government counsel. Id. at 192.

12 Of course, even if we thought it did, it is not for the lower

courts to conclude that the Supreme Court's "more recent cases

have, by implication, overruled an earlier precedent." Agostini v.

Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997). "If a precedent of this Court has

direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected

in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow

the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions." Id. (quoting Rodriguez de

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Finally, defendant seeks some support for his position in

the post-Davis, pre-Olano case of United States v. Broce, 488

U.S. 563 (1989). But if anything, Broce is contrary to defendant's view. Broce held that a defendant's plea of guilty

under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 waives any

multiplicity challenge he may have had to his indictment.

Although waiver of multiplicity claims as part of a broader

voluntary plea of guilty is, of course, distinguishable from

waiver based solely on an untimely objection, in Broce the

Court expressly rejected the defendants' claim that they had

not intentionally and knowingly waived their multiplicity challenge because they had not known of it. Id. at 572-74.13

Defendant focuses on the fact that Broce distinguished an

earlier case, Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975), in which

the Court had refused to find that defendant's plea of guilty

waived a claim that he had previously been prosecuted for the

same crime. But Broce distinguished Menna on the ground

that the nature of defendant's claim in the latter case "precluded" the government "from haling a defendant into court

on a charge" at all. Broce, 488 U.S. at 575 (quoting Menna,

423 U.S. at 62). That is, Menna's claim of former jeopardy

was "a claim that ... the charge [was] one which the State

may not constitutionally prosecute." Broce, 488 U.S. at 575

(quoting Menna, 423 U.S. at 63 n.2). A claim of multiplicity,

by contrast, does not bar prosecution or prevent the government from haling a defendant into court--as the defendant

himself recognizes, Reply Br. at 6-7. See Ohio v. Johnson,

467 U.S. 493, 500 (1984) ("While the Double Jeopardy Clause

may protect a defendant against cumulative punishments for

convictions on the same offense, the Clause does not prohibit

the State from prosecuting respondent for such multiple

offenses in a single prosecution."); see also Ball v. United

__________

Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484

(1989)) (alteration omitted).

13 Defendants' trial counsel submitted an affidavit stating that

he had not discussed his clients' Double Jeopardy rights with them,

nor had his clients considered the possibility of raising that defense

before entering their plea. Id. at 572-73.

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States, 470 U.S. 856, 859-61 & n.7 (1985). There is thus

nothing in Broce, or in Menna, to bar the application of Rule

12's waiver provision to Weathers' claim of multiplicity.14

In sum, Harris and Davis continue to guide our course

here. Together, they compel the conclusion that defendant

has waived his multiplicity claims by failing to raise them

before trial.

IV

Defendant contends that his trial counsel's failure to raise

his multiplicity claims in a timely manner constituted ineffective assistance under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668

(1984). The government argues, and defendant acknowledges, that when a defendant has not previously raised such a

claim before the district court, our general practice is to

remand it for an evidentiary hearing. Gov't Br. at 25; Def.

Br. at 21; see United States v. Soto, 132 F.3d 56, 59 (D.C. Cir.

1997); United States v. Fennell, 53 F.3d 1296, 1304 (D.C. Cir.

1995). Defendant notes, however, that there is an exception

to this usual practice where no factual issues are in dispute

and the proper disposition is clear. See Soto, 132 F.3d at 59.

In his reply brief, Weathers contends that this is such an

exceptional case because "the government raises no factual

__________

14 Indeed, unlike a claim of multiplicity, a claim of former

jeopardy like that at issue in Menna may not fall within Rule

12(b)(2) at all. But see Scott, 464 F.2d at 833. The Advisory

Committee Notes regarding Rule 12(b)(1) and (b)(2) specifically

state that "such matters as former jeopardy, former conviction,

[and] former acquittal" fall within the permissive category of defenses "which at the defendant's option may be raised by motion,

failure to do so, however, not constituting a waiver." Fed. R. Crim.

P. 12 Advisory Committee Note (1944 Adoption) (Note to Subdivision (b)(1) and (2)), 18 U.S.C. App., p. 744. These three prohibitions all arise out of the Double Jeopardy Clause's successive

prosecution prong, see United States v. Andrews, 146 F.3d 933, 936

n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1998). They are therefore distinguishable from a

claim of multiplicity (not mentioned by the Advisory Committee)

which, to the extent it sounds in Double Jeopardy, is rooted in the

multiple punishments prong. See Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. at 499.

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disputes or arguable trial strategy that would limit review by

this Court." Reply Br. at 9.

A Strickland claim has two components. First, "the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient."

466 U.S. at 687. Second, "the defendant must show that the

deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Id. With

regard to the first requirement, "the defendant must overcome the presumption that ... the challenged action might

be considered sound trial strategy." Id. at 689 (internal

quotation omitted).

Notwithstanding the argument made in his reply brief, at

oral argument defendant conceded that his trial counsel's

failure to raise the multiplicity claims before trial might have

been predicated on a tactical choice. As discussed in Part

III, had defense counsel raised the claims pretrial, not only

might the defects have been repaired, see supra note 6, they

might have been repaired by increasing the number of counts

arrayed against defendant, see supra page 11. Faced with

that possibility, defense counsel might well have opted to

leave the indictment as it stood rather than risk making

matters worse for his client. Recognizing that defense counsel's silence may therefore have represented a strategic decision, at oral argument defendant changed course and joined

the government in requesting a remand of his ineffective

assistance claim for initial determination by the district court.

That is clearly the proper disposition of this issue. See

Fennell, 53 F.3d at 1304 (stating that ineffective assistance

claim "cannot be resolved without a hearing in district court"

where defense counsel's decisions "could have involved a

reasoned tactical choice").

V

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that defendant has

waived his multiplicity claims. His charge of ineffective

assistance of counsel is remanded to the district court.

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