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Parties Involved:
Ambrose L. Clayton
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15‐2553

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

AMBROSE L. CLAYTON,

Defendant‐Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 13‐CR‐2 — Rudolph T. Randa, Judge.

____________________

SUBMITTED JANUARY 7, 2016 — DECIDED JANUARY 28, 2016

____________________

Before RIPPLE, WILLIAMS, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. Ambrose “Lamont” Clayton sought to re‐

duce his 91‐month prison sentence based on Amend‐

ment 782 to the federal sentencing guidelines. That amend‐

ment retroactively reduced the guideline range for his con‐

                                                   After examining the briefs and record, we have concluded that oral

argument is unnecessary. The appeal is submitted on the briefs and rec‐

ord. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

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2 No. 15‐2553

viction for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute co‐

caine and heroin. The district court declined to reduce the

sentence. Because the district court did not abuse its discre‐

tion, we affirm the judgment.  

A federal investigation revealed that Clayton and his as‐

sociates sold drugs and laundered the proceeds for at least

two years. He later pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with

intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and

heroin, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846, and conspiracy to

launder money, see 18 U.S.C. § 1956. Using the 2013 Sentenc‐

ing Guidelines, the district court found Clayton responsible

for at least five kilograms of cocaine and one kilogram of

heroin, which added up under the Guidelines to the equiva‐

lent of 2,000 kilograms of marijuana, and calculated a base

offense level of 32. The district court added four levels for

Clayton’s aggravating role as an organizer or leader and

subtracted three levels because Clayton accepted responsi‐

bility, yielding a total offense level of 33. (The conviction for

money laundering was grouped with the drug conviction,

and the latter’s offense level applied to the group because it

was so much higher. See U.S.S.G. §§ 3D1.2, 3D1.3). Coupled

with his category I criminal history, Clayton’s guideline im‐

prisonment range was 135 to 168 months.

The district court sentenced Clayton to 91 months in

prison. It recognized the seriousness and duration of the of‐

fense, the violent danger it poses to the public, and Clayton’s

role in it. The court also recognized Clayton’s positive at‐

tributes. Because of Clayton’s cooperation and the govern‐

ment’s 5K1.1 motion for a below‐minimum sentence based

on his substantial assistance, Clayton’s sentence was 42

months below the low end of the guideline range and 29

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No. 15‐2553 3

months below the 120‐month statutory minimum.

See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e); U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. At the hearing,

Clayton and the government discussed the then‐pending

proposal from the Sentencing Commission to lower the base

offense levels for drug offenses, including Clayton’s, by two

levels. Aware that the proposal would drop the low end of

his range to 108 months, the district court stated that even “if

there was a change, this [91‐month] sentence would still be

the appropriate sentence, given what I’ve just talked about.”

After sentencing, the Sentencing Commission amended

the base offense level for drug offenses exactly as was dis‐

cussed at Clayton’s sentencing hearing. Amendment 782,

which is retroactive, reduced the offense levels assigned to

Clayton’s drug quantities, resulting in a base offense level of

30 instead of 32. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(d); U.S.S.G. supp. to

app. C, amends. 782, 788 (2014). With the adjustments he re‐

ceived, Clayton’s new total offense level would be 31 rather

than 33, resulting in a guidelines range of 108 to 135 months

rather than 135 to 168 months.

Two days after Amendment 782 became effective, Clay‐

ton moved for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3582(c)(2). He asked for a reduction to 72 months in prison.

That would be, like his original sentence, 33 percent below

the low end of the applicable guideline range. The district

court denied Clayton’s request, explaining that “based upon

the severity of the offense, the Court’s original below‐

guideline sentence and its rationale in imposing such sen‐

tence, and despite Clayton’s current eligibility for reduction,

the Court will not alter the original sentence.”

On appeal Clayton argues that the district court abused

its discretion in denying him a reduction. He contends that

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the court failed to comply fully with the two‐step process

mandated in Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (2010), for

motions under § 3582(c)(2). Step one requires the court to

determine the amended guideline range, the prisoner’s eli‐

gibility for a sentence modification, and the extent of the re‐

duction authorized. Dillon, 560 U.S. at 827. At step two, a

court must consider any applicable § 3553(a) factors and de‐

termine whether, in its discretion, a reduction is warranted.

Id.

The court committed no reversible error in step one. At

the original sentencing, the parties and the court correctly

anticipated that the proposed guideline would reduce Clay‐

ton’s base offense level by two, with a new low end of 108

months. While the district court did not itself state the new

range when Clayton moved for a sentencing reduction, it

acknowledged, as step one contemplates, that the amend‐

ment reduced Clayton’s offense level and that he was eligi‐

ble for a reduction in sentence. The purpose of step one was

anticipated and then achieved. Further, at the original sen‐

tencing hearing, the district court explained that it would not

reduce Clayton’s sentence any further based on the antici‐

pated new guideline. Any error in not stating the new range

explicitly after the amendment actually took effect would

have been harmless. See United States v. Hill, 645 F.3d 900,

912 (7th Cir. 2011).

Clayton next contends that the district court erred in the

second step. He accuses the court of failing to consider every

§ 3553(a) factor, the low risk his early release would pose to

the public, and his conduct while imprisoned. But in decid‐

ing a motion under § 3582(c)(2), the district court is not re‐

quired to analyze extensively every § 3553(a) factor; it suffic‐

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No. 15‐2553 5

es that its explanation is consistent with § 3553(a). See United

States v. Purnell, 701 F.3d 1186, 1190 (7th Cir. 2012); United

States v. Marion, 590 F.3d 475, 477–78 (7th Cir. 2009). That

happened here. During the original sentencing, the district

court considered the § 3553(a) factors and the serious risk

that Clayton posed to public safety, and it referred to that

rationale in the § 3582 decision. While the district court’s or‐

der could have considered Clayton’s post‐conviction behav‐

ior, see U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, cmt. n.1(B)(iii), Clayton presented

no such evidence to the district court.

Clayton replies that his attorney incompetently failed to

request and submit this evidence. But there is no right to

counsel in § 3582(c)(2) proceedings. See United States v. John‐

son, 580 F.3d 567, 569 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Tidwell,

178 F.3d 946, 949 (7th Cir. 1999). And where there is no right

to counsel, there is no right to effective counsel. See Anderson

v. Cowan, 227 F.3d 893, 901 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991)); Wainwright v. Torna, 455

U.S. 586, 587–88 (1982).

                                                   United States v. Marion directs district courts, on § 3582 motions for

sentence reductions, to “at least address briefly any significant events

that may have occurred since the original sentencing.” 590 F.3d at 477. If

nothing noteworthy changed concerning the basis for the original sen‐

tence, “some simple explanation to that effect will apprise both the de‐

fendant and this court of that fact.” Id. The government suggests that this

direction may be limited to situations when the district court does not

supply any reasons for its decision and when many years have inter‐

vened between sentencing and the § 3582 motion. Marion does not con‐

tain this limitation, but even so the absence of any discussion by the dis‐

trict court of events since sentencing does not require a remand in this

case. Clayton did not submit information on any significant events since

his original sentencing with his § 3582 motion; a discussion was unnec‐

essary.

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6 No. 15‐2553

We have considered Clayton’s remaining arguments and

none has merit. His request for appointment of counsel on

appeal is denied. The judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

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