Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01331/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01331-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc.
Appellant
Dow Chemical Company
Cross-Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

AKZO NOBEL COATINGS, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY,

Defendant-Cross-Appellant

______________________ 

2015-1331, 2015-1389

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the 

District of Delaware in No. 1:12-cv-01264-LPS, Chief 

Judge Leonard P. Stark.

______________________ 

Decided: January 29, 2016

______________________ 

 ELIZABETH GARDNER, Kenyon & Kenyon LLP, New 

York, NY, argued for appellant. Also represented by 

MICHAEL D. LOUGHNANE, RICHARD DELUCIA, MERRI C.

MOKEN. 

 AARON A. BARLOW, Jenner & Block LLP, Chicago, IL, 

argued for cross-appellant. Also represented by PAUL 

DAVID MARGOLIS, HARRY J. ROPER; JOSHUA SEGAL, Washington, DC.

______________________ 

Case: 15-1331 Document: 52-2 Page: 1 Filed: 01/29/2016
2 AKZO NOBEL COATINGS, INC. v. DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY

Before LOURIE, REYNA, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.

LOURIE, Circuit Judge. 

Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc. (“Akzo”) appeals from the 

decision of the United States District Court for the District of Delaware granting summary judgment that Dow 

Chemical Company (“Dow”) did not infringe the claims of 

U.S. Patent 6,767,956 (“the ’956 patent”), either literally 

or under the doctrine of equivalents. Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., No. 1:12-cv-01364 (D. Del. 

Jan. 26, 2015) (“Decision”). Dow cross-appeals from the 

court’s conclusion that the claims of the ’956 patent are 

not indefinite. Id. at 10–14. For the reasons that follow, 

we affirm both appeals. 

BACKGROUND

Akzo owns by assignment the ’956 patent, directed to 

an extrusion process that generates low viscosity aqueous 

polymer dispersions. ’956 patent, at [57]. In order to 

achieve uniform distribution of the polymer in the aqueous medium, the specification notes that “the mixture 

cannot be heated above the boiling point of the carrier 

liquid, or else the liquid boils and it becomes impossible to 

disperse the polymer.” Id. col. 1 ll. 57–59. The claimed 

invention aims to prevent such boiling, and thus achieve

uniform polymer distribution, by maintaining the pressure in the extruder above atmospheric. Id. col. 2 ll. 26–

33. Specifically, “[t]he pressure in the extruder [is] maintained by . . . connecting the outlet of the extruder to a 

pressurized collection vessel.” Id. col. 2 l. 64–col. 3 l. 1. 

Claim 1 is representative and reads as follows:

1. A process for producing a dispersion of a polymer in an aqueous medium in which the polymer is dispersed in an aqueous medium in an 

extruder at a temperature above 100° C. in an 

extruder having an outlet 

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AKZO NOBEL COATINGS, INC. v. DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY 3

wherein the pressure in the extruder is maintained above atmospheric so that the aqueous 

medium does not boil characterized by maintaining the pressure above atmospheric for the 

extruder at the outlet with a pressurized collection vessel and 

wherein aqueous dispersion from the extruder 

has at least 25% by weight of the aqueous medium where the aqueous medium has less than 

40% by weight of organic solvent and 

wherein the aqueous dispersion enters the outlet and pressurized collection vessel at a pressure above atmospheric so that the aqueous 

medium does not boil and is subjected to the 

action of a cooling zone to lower the temperature of the aqueous dispersion to below 100° C. 

to have an aqueous dispersion with a viscosity 

below 10 Pa.s. 

Id. col. 7 l. 9–col. 8 l. 4 (emphases added). Claim 2 further 

requires: “[a] process according to claim 1 which is carried 

out at a temperature of from about 5 to 150° C. above the 

melting point of the polymer.” Id. col. 8 ll. 5–7 (emphasis 

added).1 

Dow’s accused process, called BLUEWAVETM, uses an 

extruder to generate low viscosity polymer dispersions. In 

Dow’s process, the dispersion exits the extruder, passes 

through a valve located at the extruder’s outlet, and then 

travels through a series of pipes and heat exchangers. 

1 Claims 1–8 all contain the disputed “pressurized 

collection vessel” and “viscosity below 10 Pa.s” limitations. 

Claims 2–6 further contain the disputed “carried out . . . 

of the polymer” limitation. The parties only rely on those 

three limitations in challenging the district court’s judgment. 

 

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4 AKZO NOBEL COATINGS, INC. v. DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY

Joint App. (“J.A.”) 1012, 1040–41. The dispersion then

continues on through a filter and collects in a “Product 

Tote,” an unpressurized compartment, eventually used to 

transport the end-product. J.A. 1012. 

In October 2012, Akzo sued Dow for patent infringement, alleging that Dow’s BLUEWAVETM process infringed claims 1–8 of the ’956 patent. In view of what it 

considered to be Akzo’s failure to identify any “pressurized collection vessel” in the accused process, Dow sought 

leave of court to file an early summary judgment motion 

of noninfringement. J.A. 685–88. The district court 

granted the request and combined the summary judgment 

and Markman hearings. J.A. 52–53. 

After the combined hearings, the district court first 

construed several disputed limitations. Decision at 6–14. 

It construed “pressurized collection vessel” as “tubing, 

piping, or other container where a desired material accumulates, which is maintained above atmospheric pressure.” Id. at 6–7. The court reasoned that, to properly 

give meaning to the word “collection,” “some amount of 

material must be permitted to accumulate within the 

vessel, rather than all of the material flowing through the 

vessel at a constant rate.” Id. at 7. It specifically relied 

on two examples in the specification, Examples 2 and 3, 

id., which state: “[t]he dispersion was collected into a 

water-cooled pressurized vessel maintained under nitrogen at 7 bar and from which the dispersion, once cooled to 

below 100° C., could be periodically removed,” ’956 patent 

col. 6 ll. 40–44, col. 7 ll. 1–4 (emphases added). 

The district court next addressed and rejected Dow’s 

contention that the limitation “viscosity below 10 Pa.s”

rendered claims 1–8 indefinite. According to Dow, the 

limitation could be definite only if it incorporated a requirement that the viscosity be tested at a certain temperature; a failure to require such a temperature, Dow 

suggested, was fatal. The court disagreed, instead finding

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AKZO NOBEL COATINGS, INC. v. DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY 5

that “in context one of ordinary skill in the art would 

know with reasonable certainty that viscosity is to be 

measured at room temperature.” Id. at 11. It accordingly 

construed “viscosity below 10 Pa.s” to mean “viscosity 

below 10 Pa.s at room temperature.” Id. at 10. 

The court then addressed and rejected Dow’s contention that the limitation “carried out at a temperature of 

from 5 to 150° C. above the melting point of the polymer” 

rendered claims 2–6 indefinite. Specifically, Dow argued 

that the limitation failed to specify to which steps in the 

claimed process it applied, and that simply applying the 

limitation to every step, as the plain meaning suggests,

would be irrational, for many steps require a temperature

at or below 100° C. The court disagreed, however, instead 

finding that the specification explains that only a subset 

of steps in the claimed process occurs at elevated temperatures, id. at 14 (citing ’956 patent col. 2 ll. 38–41), and 

therefore “the limitation in claim 2 refers to the elevated 

temperature phases,” id. The court concluded: “Dow has 

provided no evidence to show that a person of ordinary 

skill in the art would not know with reasonable certainty 

the steps to which the limitation in claim 2 applies.” Id. 

It accordingly construed the limitation to mean “[t]he 

elevated temperature phases of claim 1 are carried out at 

a temperature of from 5 to 150° C above the melting point 

of the polymer.” Id. at 13. 

In light of the above constructions, the district court 

granted Dow’s motion for summary judgment of noninfringement of claims 1–8. In describing Dow’s accused 

process, the court found that “Dow’s accused process uses 

a valve and allows the polymer dispersion to flow continuously. It does not accumulate.” Id. at 17. That lack of 

accumulation precluded a finding of literal infringement. 

Indeed, as the court noted: “no reasonable juror could find 

that Dow’s accused process uses a ‘pressurized collection 

[vessel]’” because “a reasonable juror could only find that 

the accused BLUEWAVETM process allows for the polymer 

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6 AKZO NOBEL COATINGS, INC. v. DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY

dispersion to flow continuously.” Id. The lack of accumulation likewise precluded a finding of infringement under 

the doctrine of equivalents. As the court found, “[t]o allow 

Akzo to prevail on infringement by the doctrine of equivalents would vitiate the claim limitation that the ‘pressurized collection vessel’ be a ‘container where the desired 

material accumulates.’” Id. at 18. 

Akzo timely appealed and Dow timely cross-appealed. 

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1). 

DISCUSSION

I. Akzo’s Appeal

We review the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment under the law of the regional circuit, here, the 

Third Circuit. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 769 

F.3d 1371, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Applying the law of the 

Third Circuit, we review the grant of summary judgment 

de novo. Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 805 (3d Cir. 2000) 

(en banc). Summary judgment is proper when, drawing 

all justifiable inferences in the non-movant’s favor, “there 

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 255 (1986). 

Evaluation of summary judgment of noninfringement 

is a two-part inquiry: construing the claims and comparing the properly construed claims to the accused product. 

Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282, 1288 (Fed. 

Cir. 2009). We review de novo the ultimate interpretation 

of a claim term and the evidence intrinsic to the patent. 

Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U.S. ___, 135 

S. Ct. 831, 841 (2015). When a district court makes 

factual findings about extrinsic evidence, we review those 

subsidiary factual findings for clear error. Id. at 835, 841. 

 Infringement, whether literal or under the doctrine of 

equivalents, is a question of fact. Absolute Software, Inc. 

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AKZO NOBEL COATINGS, INC. v. DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY 7

v. Stealth Signal, Inc., 659 F.3d 1121, 1129–30 (Fed. Cir. 

2011). As such, it is amenable to summary judgment 

when no reasonable factfinder could find that the accused 

product contains every claim limitation or its equivalent. 

PC Connector Sols., LLC v. SmartDisk Corp., 406 F.3d 

1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. 

Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29, 39 n.8 (1997). 

A. Claim Construction

On appeal, Akzo first faults the district court for narrowly construing “pressurized collection vessel” to require 

accumulation. Akzo argues that the term should instead

assume its ordinary meaning of “gather or receive.” Akzo 

contends that such a construction is supported by both the 

claim language and specification, neither of which requires the dispersion to be held for a period of time. 

According to Akzo, the court’s construction imports further, unspecified process limitations on how long the 

dispersion must be in the vessel and the manner by which 

the dispersion exits the vessel, among others. See Appellant’s Br. 34. 

Dow responds that “collection,” in context, necessarily 

requires accumulation, as the district court held. Dow 

relies primarily on Examples 2 and 3 in the specification, 

which state: “from which the dispersion, once cooled to 

below 100° C., could be periodically removed.” Appellee’s 

Br. 28 (quoting ’956 patent col. 6 ll. 40–44, col. 7 ll. 1–4). 

According to Dow, “‘once cooled’ implies . . . that the 

material is sitting there and ‘periodically removed’ requires not immediately removed; it is removed after a 

period of time. Both of those assume that accumulation 

has occurred.” Oral Argument 14:30–14:42. Moreover, 

Dow contends, construing the term to broadly mean 

“gather or receive” renders the limitation superfluous 

because, under a “gather or receive” construction, any 

pressurized vessel is a “pressurized collection vessel.” 

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8 AKZO NOBEL COATINGS, INC. v. DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY

We agree with Dow and affirm the district court’s construction of “pressurized collection vessel” as “tubing, 

piping, or other container where a desired material accumulates, which is maintained above atmospheric pressure.” Our claim construction analysis begins with the 

language of the claim itself, as it would have been understood by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the 

invention. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 

(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). The claims “must be read in 

view of the specification, of which they are a part.” Id. at 

1315 (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 

F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)). Indeed, we have 

said that the specification “is always highly relevant to 

the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; 

it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed 

term.” Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 

1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 

As an initial matter, we agree with the district court 

that adopting Akzo’s proffered construction of “gather or 

receive” would “obviate[] the import of the word ‘collection.’” Decision at 7. There is no dispute that the “pressurized collection vessel” receives the dispersion; that 

function is clearly contemplated by the surrounding claim 

language. ’956 patent col. 7 ll. 19–21 (“[T]he aqueous 

dispersion enters the outlet and pressurized collection 

vessel at a pressure above atmospheric.”). But allowing 

“collection” to mean “receive” would render “collection” 

entirely superfluous and allow any pressurized vessel to 

constitute a “pressurized collection vessel”; such a result 

is disfavored. Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 395 

F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“A claim construction 

that gives meaning to all the terms of the claim is preferred over one that does not do so.”); Power Mosfet Techs., 

L.L.C. v. Siemens AG, 378 F.3d 1396, 1410 (Fed. Cir. 

2004) (“[I]nterpretations that render some portion of the 

claim language superfluous are disfavored.”). The district

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AKZO NOBEL COATINGS, INC. v. DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY 9

court’s construction of “accumulation,” on the other hand,

gives the term “collection” proper meaning in context. 

Moreover, the remainder of the specification supports 

the court’s construction. In addition to the limitation 

itself, “collection” and/or “collected” is used twice in the 

specification, in Examples 2 and 3. ’956 patent col. 6 l. 40, 

col. 7 l. 1. In those examples, the dispersion is collected, 

allowed to cool, and then “periodically removed.” Id. col. 6 

l. 43, col. 7 l. 4. Those examples clearly contemplate a 

buildup or accumulation of dispersion in the collection 

vessel before the eventual “periodic removal.” Thus, as 

the court noted, to give meaning to “collection” consistent 

with the specification, “material must be permitted to 

accumulate within the vessel, rather than all of the 

material flowing through the vessel at a constant rate.” 

Decision at 7; cf. Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Blue Sky Med.

Grp., Inc., 554 F.3d 1010, 1018–19 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (construing “wounds” as “skin wounds” because “[a]ll of the 

examples described in the specification involve skin 

wounds,” and construing otherwise “would thus expand 

the scope of the claims far beyond anything described in 

the specification”). 

B. Literal Infringement

Akzo next argues that it has raised a genuine issue of 

material fact as to literal infringement under the court’s 

construction of “pressurized collection vessel.”2 According 

to Akzo, it proved “substantial facts to rebut Dow’s claims 

regarding the function of its control valve,” and provided 

“unrebutted evidence to support a finding that dispersion 

‘accumulates’ in Dow’s heat exchange equipment,” includ2 Because we affirm the district court’s construction 

of “pressurized collection vessel,” we need not address 

Akzo’s arguments regarding infringement under Akzo’s 

proffered construction.

 

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10 AKZO NOBEL COATINGS, INC. v. DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY

ing inspections of Dow’s BLUEWAVETM process and the 

expert declaration of Dr. Eldridge M. Mount III. Appellant’s Br. 46, 48 (referencing J.A. 1098 ¶ 46). 

Dow responds that Akzo did not provide sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find accumulation. Moreover, Dow contends, the declaration Akzo relies 

on fails to create a genuine issue of material fact because 

it is ambiguous at best about whether dispersion “accumulates” in the heat exchangers. 

We agree with Dow and the district court that Akzo 

failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to literal 

infringement, and thus affirm the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment of no literal infringement. All of the 

claims contain the “pressurized collection vessel” limitation and are thus subject to the same analysis and conclusion. 

Literal infringement exists when every limitation recited in the claim is found in the accused device. Cole v. 

Kimberly-Clark Corp., 102 F.3d 524, 532 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 

On appeal from a grant of summary judgment of no literal 

infringement, we determine, after resolving all inferences 

in favor of the patentee, whether the district court correctly concluded that no reasonable jury could find infringement. Move, Inc. v. Real Estate Alliance Ltd., 709 F.3d 

1117, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2013).

As the movant, Dow had “the initial responsibility of 

identifying the legal basis of its motion, and of pointing to 

those portions of the record that it believes demonstrates 

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Novartis 

Corp. v. Ben Venue Labs., Inc., 271 F.3d 1043, 1046 (Fed. 

Cir. 2001). Dow satisfied this burden by identifying that 

its accused process lacks a “pressurized collection vessel,” 

as construed, and by pointing to record evidence suggesting that, in its process, “the material continuously passed 

through the heat exchangers.” J.A. 914 (“Dow’s dispersion is only collected at the very end of the Dow process in 

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AKZO NOBEL COATINGS, INC. v. DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY 11

a large open-to-the-atmosphere plastic crate or an even 

larger, open-to-the-atmosphere storage tank, neither of 

which is pressurized.”). Accordingly, “the burden shift[ed]

to [Akzo] to designate specific facts showing that there is 

a genuine issue for trial.” Novartis, 271 F.3d at 1046. 

The court correctly determined that Akzo failed to meet 

that burden. 

For its part, Akzo had to present evidence that the 

dispersion accumulates in Dow’s downstream heat exchangers and pipes. Akzo primarily relied on the declaration of its expert, Dr. Mount, which stated that the piping 

“represents a defined volume of space in which the dispersion collects and is resident for a period of time such that 

a backpressure is created” on the extruder. J.A. 1098 

¶ 46. According to Akzo, that “unrebutted” statement 

established a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 

Dow’s pipes and heat exchangers “accumulate” dispersion, 

as required by the claims. 

We disagree. Dr. Mount’s statement is ambiguous at 

best as to whether accumulation occurs in Dow’s accused 

process. It does not recite “accumulation,” nor does it 

expressly refute Dow’s contention that dispersion flows 

continuously throughout its process and does not accumulate. Akzo instead relies heavily on Dr. Mount’s language,

“resident for a period of time.” Such reliance is misplaced, 

however, for such a phrase does not invoke the “accumulation” envisioned by the claims, and certainly, as Dow 

notes, “liquid passing through pipes is always ‘resident for 

a period of time.’” Appellee’s Br. 47. Ultimately, the 

passage states that “dispersion collects,” yet it fails to 

identify which construction of “collection” it relies on. 

Such evidence did not establish a genuine issue of material fact. 

Accordingly, Akzo failed to provide sufficient evidence 

from which a reasonable jury could find that the dispersion in Dow’s process accumulates within a “pressurized 

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12 AKZO NOBEL COATINGS, INC. v. DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY

collection vessel.” The district court’s grant of summary 

judgment of no literal infringement of all the claims was 

therefore correct. 

C. Infringement Under the Doctrine of Equivalents

Akzo lastly contends that the district court committed 

legal error by applying the concept of vitiation and impermissibly creating “a ‘binary choice’ in which an element is either present or ‘not present.’” Appellant’s Br. 52 

(quoting Deere & Co. v. Bush Hog, LLC, 703 F.3d 1349, 

1356 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). Under a correct application of the 

doctrine of equivalents, Akzo argues, it raised a genuine

issue of material fact as to whether Dow’s equipment 

performed the same function in substantially the same 

way to reach the same result. 

Dow responds that the district court engaged in the

proper “function-way-result” inquiry and simply concluded that Akzo failed to meet its burden of showing a genuine issue of material fact. 

We agree with Dow and affirm the district court’s 

grant of summary judgment of no infringement under the 

doctrine of equivalents. Although infringement under the 

doctrine of equivalents is a question of fact, summary 

judgment is proper “[w]here the evidence is such that no 

reasonable jury could determine two elements to be 

equivalent.” Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 39 n.8. A 

patentee must establish “equivalency on a limitation-bylimitation basis” by “particularized testimony and linking 

argument” as to the insubstantiality of the differences 

between the claimed invention and the accused device or 

process. Texas Instruments Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor 

Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The functionway-result test “often suffice[s] to show the substantiality 

of the differences.” Id. “[A]ll claim limitations are not 

entitled to an equal scope of equivalents.” Moore USA, 

Inc. v. Standard Register Co., 229 F.3d 1091, 1106 (Fed. 

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AKZO NOBEL COATINGS, INC. v. DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY 13

Cir. 2000). Ultimately, “many limitations warrant little, 

if any, range of equivalents.” Id. 

Akzo hones in on and challenges the district court’s 

use of “vitiate” in its equivalents analysis. We find this 

challenge unpersuasive. As the Supreme Court has 

stated, “if a theory of equivalence would entirely vitiate a 

particular claim element, partial or complete judgment 

should be rendered by the court . . . .” Warner-Jenkinson, 

520 U.S. at 39 n.8. The dictionary defines the term “vitiate” as “to make ineffective.” See MERRIAM WEBSTER, 

http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/vitiate (last 

visited Dec. 15. 2015). Under the doctrine of equivalents, 

an infringement theory thus fails if it renders a claim 

limitation inconsequential or ineffective. And as we have 

explained, “saying that a claim element would be vitiated 

is akin to saying that there is no equivalent to the claim 

element in the accused device based on the wellestablished ‘function-way-result’ or ‘insubstantial differences’ tests.” Brilliant Instruments, Inc. v. GuideTech, 

LLC, 707 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (emphasis 

added); cf. Cadence Pharm. Inc. v. Exela PharmSci Inc., 

780 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“The determination 

of equivalence depends not on labels like ‘vitiation’ or 

‘antithesis’ but on the proper assessment of the language 

of the claimed limitation and the substantiality of whatever relevant differences may exist in the accused structure.”). 

With these principles in mind, we conclude that Akzo 

failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to 

whether Dow’s process operates in substantially the same 

way. In fact, the opposite is true. The claimed process 

operates by using a pressurized collection vessel wherein 

dispersion accumulates to maintain backpressure in the 

extruder. To state it differently, it is the accumulation of 

dispersion in the collection vessel that generates the 

backpressure. Dow’s accused process, on the other hand, 

“uses a valve” and does not allow for accumulation in the 

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14 AKZO NOBEL COATINGS, INC. v. DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY

downstream pipes. Decision at 17. Thus, in order to 

survive summary judgment, Akzo had to show that a 

valve and a series of pipes and heat exchangers, wherein 

the dispersion flows continuously, generate backpressure

in the extruder in substantially the same way to increase 

the boiling point of the carrier fluid. It did not do so. 

Akzo introduced Dr. Mount’s declaration as support. 

In the last paragraph of a fifty-one paragraph declaration, 

Dr. Mount states: 

Dow’s and Michelman’s piping and heat exchangers perform the same function (maintain the pressure) and achieve the same result (maintaining 

sufficient pressure to prevent boiling of the aqueous medium) in substantially the same way (by 

collecting the dispersed material in a contained 

volume) as the vessel used by the inventors in Examples 2 and 3 of the patent. 

J.A. 1100–01. Dr. Mount’s discussion of the doctrine of 

equivalents is broad and scant. Telemac Cellular Corp. v. 

Topp Telecom, Inc., 247 F.3d 1316, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 

(“Broad conclusory statements offered by Telemac’s expert 

are not evidence and are not sufficient to establish a 

genuine issue of material fact.”). Nevertheless, what 

truly undermines Akzo’s reliance on the above-quoted 

statement is the statement’s failure to articulate how 

Dow’s accused process operates in substantially the same 

way. Dr. Mount states that Dow’s process operates “in 

substantially the same way (by collecting the disperse 

material in a contained volume),” yet he fails to articulate 

which construction of “collecting” he invokes, much less 

articulate how the differences between the two processes 

are insubstantial. Such ambiguity and generality cannot 

create a genuine issue of material fact. 

Accordingly, Akzo failed to provide evidence from 

which a reasonable jury could find that Dow’s valve, 

pipes, and heat exchangers operate in substantially the 

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AKZO NOBEL COATINGS, INC. v. DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY 15

same way as the claimed “pressurized collection vessel” to 

generate backpressure in the extruder. The court’s grant 

of summary judgment was therefore correct.3 

II. Dow’s Cross-Appeal

In its cross-appeal, Dow challenges the district court’s 

conclusion that the claims of the ’956 patent are not 

invalid for indefiniteness. Specifically, Dow contests two 

limitations. First, Dow argues that “viscosity below 10 

Pa.s” renders claims 1–8 indefinite because it fails to 

recite the temperature at which the viscosity measurement is to be taken. Second, Dow argues that “carried out 

at a temperature of from 5 to 150° C. above the melting 

point of the polymer” renders claims 2–6 indefinite because it fails to specify which steps in the claimed process 

occur at those elevated temperatures. 

Indefiniteness is a question of law that we review de 

novo, Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 766 F.3d 1364, 

1370 (Fed. Cir. 2014), subject to a determination of underlying facts. A patent claim is invalid for indefiniteness if 

its language, when read in light of the specification and 

prosecution history, “fail[s] to inform, with reasonable 

certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the 

invention.” Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572

U.S. ____, 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014). Patents are 

presumed to be valid, and the challenger bears the burden 

of establishing invalidity. See 35 U.S.C. § 282; Nautilus, 

134 S. Ct. at 2130 n.10. 

We first address the “viscosity below 10 Pa.s” limitation. The district court’s determination that one of skill in 

the art would measure viscosity at room temperature in 

3 As we agree with the reasoning relied on by the 

district court in affirming the grant of summary judgment 

of no infringement, we find it unnecessary to consider 

Dow’s alternative grounds for affirmance.

 

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16 AKZO NOBEL COATINGS, INC. v. DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY

the absence of a specified temperature was based on 

extrinsic evidence. Because we see no clear error in that 

fact finding here, and it does not conflict with the intrinsic 

record, we affirm. See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, 

Inc., 789 F.3d 1335, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc., 783 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. 

Cir. 2015). 

The district court considered, inter alia, two pieces of 

extrinsic evidence: Dr. Mount’s declaration, J.A. 482–83,

and the ASTM protocol, J.A. 542–49. Dr. Mount’s declaration, in part, recites: “[t]he standard practice in analytical chemistry dictates that if a temperature is not 

specified for a given measurement, room temperature is 

implied.” J.A. 482 ¶ 18. The ASTM protocol, on the other 

hand, relays a “test method [for] the determination of the 

apparent viscosity of hot melt adhesives . . . at temperatures up to 175° C.” J.A. 542. The method then requires 

“report[ing] the apparent viscosity at a given temperature 

along with the particulars . . . .” J.A. 543. 

 The district court did not clearly err in crediting Dr. 

Mount’s declaration over the ASTM protocol. The ASTM 

protocol does indicate that viscosity varies with temperature. But the described method only discusses “hot melt 

adhesives” above 175° C, which is inapposite to the 

claimed product that has been cooled to below 100° C, 

aims to find different viscosities over a range of temperatures, and fails to indicate what a skilled artisan would 

understand. Accordingly, the court correctly discounted 

the ASTM protocol to find that one of skill would understand that room temperature is implied for a viscosity 

measurement with no specified temperature. As the court 

then noted, Dow “fail[ed] to establish by clear and convincing evidence that a person skilled in the art would not 

know with reasonable certainty at what temperature to 

measure viscosity.” Decision at 11. 

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AKZO NOBEL COATINGS, INC. v. DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY 17

Moreover, although the district court did not expressly rely on the intrinsic record, we conclude that the intrinsic record only further supports the court’s determination. 

Granted, neither the claim language nor the specification 

indicates a temperature for the final viscosity measurement. But room temperature is the only temperature 

mentioned at all in the ’956 patent in connection with a 

viscosity measurement. ’956 patent col. 3 l. 23. Accordingly, we affirm the court’s conclusion that the expression 

“viscosity below 10 Pa.s” does not render claims 1–8 

indefinite, as well as its construction of that limitation as 

“viscosity below 10 Pa.s at room temperature.” 

We next address the “carried out . . . of the polymer” 

limitation.4 The process recited in claim 2 is “a process 

according to Claim 1.” Id. col. 8 ll. 5–8. Claim 1 recites a 

process “for producing a dispersion in an aqueous medium 

in which the polymer is dispersed in an aqueous medium 

in an extruder at a temperature above 100° C.” Id. col. 7 

ll. 9–11. The specification then teaches that the dispersing step necessarily takes place before the dispersion exits 

the extruder; it is during that dispersing step when the 

temperature exceeds the melting point of the polymer. 

Indeed, the specification describes a typical process where

the polymer “is melted in the initial melt zone of the 

extruder at a temperature above the melting point of the 

polymer, preferably from 5 to 150° C, typically 10 to 130° 

C, above the melting point.” Id. col. 2 ll. 36–41. Thus, as 

the district court found, “the specification supports a 

construction which indicates that the limitation in claim 2 

refers to the elevated temperature phases and not to the 

stages that follow.” Decision at 14. 

4 Claims 2–6 all contain the same “carried out . . . of 

the polymer” limitation and are thus subject to the same 

analysis. 

 

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18 AKZO NOBEL COATINGS, INC. v. DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY

Further, in concluding that claims 2–6 were not indefinite, the district court stated that “Dow has provided no 

evidence to show that a person of ordinary skill in the art 

would not know with reasonable certainty the steps to 

which the limitation in claim 2 applies.” Decision at 14. 

Absent any evidence contrary to the clear meaning of the 

intrinsic record, the court did not err in finding that one of 

skill in the art would understand which steps the elevated 

temperature range applied to. See id. 

Dow suggests that, in affirming the district court’s 

construction, we run afoul of the principle that courts may 

not redraft claims to sustain their validity. Appellee’s Br. 

67–68 (discussing Chef Am., Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 

358 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Dow’s reliance on Chef 

America, however, is misplaced. In affirming the district 

court’s construction, we are not redrafting the claims, but 

rather construing the claims to require the heightened 

temperature range to apply to the elevated temperature 

phases in accordance with the specification. Eidos Display, LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 779 F.3d 1360, 1367–68 

(Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Determining how a person of ordinary 

skill in the art would understand the limitation, however, 

is different from rewriting the limitation.”); Wellman, Inc. 

v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 

2011). 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s conclusion 

that “carried out . . . of the polymer” does not render 

claims 2–6 indefinite, as well as its construction of that 

limitation as “[t]he elevated temperature phases of claim 

1 are carried out at a temperature of from 5 to 150° C 

above the melting point of the polymer.” 

CONCLUSION

We have considered all remaining arguments, but find 

them unpersuasive. For the reasons set forth above, we 

affirm the judgment of the district court. 

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AKZO NOBEL COATINGS, INC. v. DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY 19

AFFIRMED

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