Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-03885/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-03885-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Oakland, California
Defendant
John Phillips
Plaintiff
Scott N. Schools
Defendant
Arnold Schwarzenegger
Defendant
Karen P. Tandy
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1

Defendants Karen P. Tandy, the administrator of the U.S. Drug

Enforcement Administration, and Scott N. Schools, the U.S. Attorney

for the Northern District of California, have not yet appeared in

this action. Any reference in this order to “Defendants” refers

only to the City of Oakland and Gov. Schwarzenegger.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN PHILLIPS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CITY OF OAKLAND; KAREN P. TANDY;

SCOTT N. SCHOOLS; and ARNOLD

SCHWARZENEGGER,

Defendants. /

No. C 07-3885 CW

ORDER GRANTING CITY OF

OAKLAND’S AND ARNOLD

SCHWARZENEGGER’S

MOTIONS TO DISMISS

Pro se Plaintiff John Phillips brings this action alleging

violations of his constitutional rights in connection with

Defendants’ refusal to allow him to operate a storefront marijuana

dispensary. Defendants City of Oakland and California Governor

Arnold Schwarzenegger move separately to dismiss the claims against

them.1 In an order dated October 4, 2007, the Court informed

Plaintiff that the deadline for filing his opposition to

Defendants’ motions was October 18, 2007, and that failure to file

a timely opposition could result in the motions being granted. 

Case 4:07-cv-03885-CW Document 20 Filed 12/14/07 Page 1 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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2

Plaintiff’s second cause of action is cast as a violation of

his “right to earn a living.” Because Plaintiff alleges no absence

or failure of procedural safeguards in connection with his attempt

to open a marijuana dispensary, the Court construes this cause of

action to allege a substantive due process violation.

2

Plaintiff did not file an opposition. The matter was taken under

submission on the papers. Having considered the papers filed by

Defendants, the Court grants their motions.

BACKGROUND

While the complaint is not clear on the factual details giving

rise to this lawsuit, Plaintiff alleges that he was criminally

prosecuted by the State of California for running a storefront

marijuana dispensary. He also maintains that the City of Oakland

refuses to allow him to operate such a dispensary in downtown

Oakland, even though he possesses a license from the federal

government that permits him to grow and sell marijuana.

Plaintiff claims in his first and second causes of action that

the City of Oakland’s acts violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights

to equal protection and due process.2 He claims in his third cause

of action that the City of Oakland and Gov. Schwarzenegger violated

the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution by not allowing him

to run a storefront marijuana dispensary, in disregard of his

federal license.

LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a). When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule

12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, dismissal is appropriate

Case 4:07-cv-03885-CW Document 20 Filed 12/14/07 Page 2 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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only when the complaint does not give the defendant fair notice of

a legally cognizable claim and the grounds on which it rests. See

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, __ U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964

(2007).

In considering whether the complaint is sufficient to state a

claim, the court will take all material allegations as true and

construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. NL

Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Although the court is generally confined to consideration of the

allegations in the pleadings, when the complaint is accompanied by

attached documents, such documents are deemed part of the complaint

and may be considered in evaluating the merits of a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion. Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th

Cir. 1987).

When granting a motion to dismiss, the court is generally

required to grant the plaintiff leave to amend, even if no request

to amend the pleading was made, unless amendment would be futile. 

Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv. Inc., 911

F.2d 242, 246-47 (9th Cir. 1990). In determining whether amendment

would be futile, the court examines whether the complaint could be

amended to cure the defect requiring dismissal “without

contradicting any of the allegations of [the] original complaint.” 

Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Leave to amend should be liberally granted, but an amended

complaint cannot allege facts inconsistent with the challenged

pleading. Id. at 296-97.

Case 4:07-cv-03885-CW Document 20 Filed 12/14/07 Page 3 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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DISCUSSION

I. Fourteenth Amendment

Plaintiff claims that the City of Oakland’s refusal to let him

open a storefront marijuana dispensary violates the Equal

Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

Because Plaintiff does not allege that he is a member of a

protected class, he can succeed on his equal protection claim only

by demonstrating that he “has been intentionally treated

differently from others similarly situated and that there is no

rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Squaw Valley

Development Co. v. Goldberg, 375 F.3d 936, 944 (9th Cir. 2004)

(quoting Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000)). 

“Disparate government treatment will survive rational basis

scrutiny ‘as long as it bears a rational relation to a legitimate

state interest.’” Id. (quoting Patel v. Penman, 103 F.3d 868, 875

(9th Cir. 1996)).

The allegations in the complaint do not establish that

Plaintiff has been treated differently from similarly situated

individuals, let alone in an irrational manner. To the extent

Plaintiff’s claim is based on the City treating him, as a

proprietor of a medical marijuana dispensary, differently from

businesspeople who sell other products, his claim must fail. Even

though California’s Compassionate Use Act permits the personal use

of marijuana for medical reasons, the commercial sale of medicinal

marijuana is still illegal under California’s criminal law. People

ex rel. Lungren v. Peron, 59 Cal. App. 4th 1383, 1389-90 (1997). 

The City of Oakland does permit dispensaries to sell marijuana for

Case 4:07-cv-03885-CW Document 20 Filed 12/14/07 Page 4 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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medical use, but it limits their number and location. Oakland Mun.

Code § 5.80. The City has a legitimate interest in regulating the

dispensaries in this way because such regulation may prevent their

uncontrolled proliferation, which could pose a threat to public

safety, and may ensure that the dispensaries comply with the

provisions of the Compassionate Use Act. Cf. Wash. Mercantile

Ass’n v. Williams, 733 F.2d 687, 691 (9th Cir. 1984) (government

has a legitimate interest in regulating the sale of drug

paraphernalia); United States v. Huss, 7 F.3d 1444, 1448 (9th Cir.

1993), overruled on other grounds, United States v.

Sanchez-Rodriguez, 161 F.3d 556 (9th Cir. 1998) (government has a

legitimate interest in regulating the use of firearms). The

complaint alleges no facts suggesting that the City’s permit scheme

is an irrational means of regulating medical marijuana

dispensaries.

As for Plaintiff’s due process claim, he is correct that the

rights conferred by the Fourteenth Amendment include “some

generalized due process right to choose one’s field of private

employment.” Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 291-292 (1999). 

However, substantive due process does not provide an individual the

unfettered right to earn a living in whatever way he or she

desires. Rather, the right is “subject to reasonable government

regulation.” Id. at 292. Substantive due process certainly does

not entitle an individual to engage in a profession that is

criminalized under both state and federal law. Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s substantive due process claim fails.

Case 4:07-cv-03885-CW Document 20 Filed 12/14/07 Page 5 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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3

Plaintiff supports his contention that he possesses a federal

license by reference to Exhibit A to the complaint. Exhibit A,

however, is nothing more than an IRS payment voucher.

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II. Supremacy Clause

Plaintiff claims that he possesses a federal license to grow

and distribute marijuana and, therefore, the City of Oakland and

the State of California have violated the Supremacy Clause of the

U.S. Constitution by failing to allow him to operate his business. 

Marijuana is a Schedule I drug, the possession and distribution of

which is a federal criminal offense. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 844, 812. 

The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the United States

government does not issue licenses to individuals who wish to grow

and sell marijuana, for medical purposes or otherwise.3 Because

Defendants’ actions are not inconsistent with federal law, there is

no basis for Plaintiff’s Supremacy Clause claim.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’

motions to dismiss the claims against them (Docket Nos. 11 and 12),

and Plaintiff’s first, second and third causes of action are hereby

dismissed. The Court finds that any amendment of these claims

would be futile because the facts on which they are based are

fundamentally incompatible with a legal claim. Accordingly, these

claims are dismissed with prejudice.

The docket sheet does not reflect whether Defendants Tandy and

Schools have been served with process. Plaintiff was required to

serve these Defendants by November 27, 2007, within 120 days of

filing the complaint. The Court will give Plaintiff until January

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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28, 2008 to serve these Defendants and file proof of such service

with the Court. If he does not do so, the claims against them will

be dismissed. Plaintiff is referred to Rule 4(i) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure for the requirements of service upon

officers of the United States.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 12/14/07 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

Case 4:07-cv-03885-CW Document 20 Filed 12/14/07 Page 7 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PHILLIPS et al,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CITY OF OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV07-03885 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court,

Northern District of California.

That on December 14, 2007, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located

in the Clerk's office.

Jill Bowers

Office of the Attorney General

1300 I Street

PO Box 944255

Sacramento, CA 94244-2550

John Phillips

2337 Ransom Avenue

Oakland, CA 94601-3827

Rachel Wagner

Office of the City Attorney, Oakland

One Frank H. Ogawa Plaza, 6th Floor

Oakland, CA 94612

Dated: December 14, 2007

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Sheilah Cahill, Deputy Clerk

Case 4:07-cv-03885-CW Document 20 Filed 12/14/07 Page 8 of 8