Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02145/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02145-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kevin P. McKinney
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable James C. England, United States Magistrate Judge for the

Western District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-2145

___________

United States of America, *

* Appeal from the United States

Plaintiff-Appellee, * District Court for the Western

* District of Missouri.

v. *

* 

Kevin P. McKinney, *

*

Defendant-Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: December 14, 2004

Filed: January 18, 2005

___________

Before MELLOY, BRIGHT, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

BRIGHT, Circuit Judge.

The government filed an indictment against appellant Kevin P. McKinney,

charging him with being a felon in possession of a firearm. McKinney requested a

speedy trial under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (IADA). That Act

required that his case must be brought to trial within 180 days. After the 180-day

time limit had expired without being brought before the federal court, McKinney filed

a motion to dismiss. The magistrate judge1

 held a hearing and recommended that the

Appellate Case: 04-2145 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/18/2005 Entry ID: 1855942 
2

The Honorable Scott O. Wright, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri.

-2-

district court dismiss the indictment without prejudice. The district court2

 agreed and

dismissed the indictment without prejudice. McKinney appeals and argues the

district court erred, because the government violated his right to a speedy trial under

the IADA. We affirm. The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing

the indictment without prejudice.

I. Background

Missouri State Highway Patrol troopers observed a speeding vehicle, and

pursued the vehicle for fourteen miles. The chase ended with the vehicle crashing

and the driver fleeing on foot. The troopers apprehended and arrested the driver, later

identified as McKinney. The troopers found a gun on the ground where McKinney

was lying, two shells for the gun, and four plastic “baggies” of methamphetamine in

McKinney’s pocket.

Following his arrest by state officials, McKinney pleaded guilty in state court

and the state court sentenced him to seven years on two counts of possession of a

controlled substance to be served concurrently. State officials transported McKinney

to the Missouri Department of Corrections to begin serving his sentence. McKinney

entered into a twelve-month drug rehabilitation program, and would be eligible for

probation on his state sentence when he completed the program.

The government filed a one-count indictment against McKinney charging him

with being a felon and an unlawful user of a controlled substance in possession of a

firearm and ammunition. The government later filed a two-count superseding

indictment against McKinney, alleging that, in addition to the above charge,

McKinney illegally possessed a firearm on an earlier date.

Appellate Case: 04-2145 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/18/2005 Entry ID: 1855942 
-3-

Officials at the Missouri Department of Corrections received a “Detainer

Against Sentenced Prisoner” from the United States Marshal’s Service. McKinney

completed and signed the detainer and requested a speedy trial under the IADA.

McKinney returned the request for a speedy trial, which was filed with the district

court on August 7, 2002. The United States Attorney’s Office received a copy of

McKinney’s signed request on August 7, 2002. 

The 180-day time limit in which McKinney’s case had to be brought to trial

under the IADA expired on February 3, 2003. The government requested a Writ of

Habeas Corpus Ad Prosequendum to bring McKinney before the federal courts on

February 25, 2003. The magistrate court issued the writ and directed McKinney to

appear in federal court in the instant case.

McKinney filed a motion to dismiss. David C. Jones, the government’s

attorney, recognized that he would be a fact witness and withdrew from

representation of the government on this matter. The magistrate judge held an

evidentiary hearing, where McKinney and Jones testified. McKinney testified that

he requested a speedy trial with the anticipation he would be able to quickly resolve

his federal charges and return to the state institution and the drug treatment program.

According to Jones, either Jones or his secretary misfiled McKinney’s IADA request

when the United States Attorney’s Office received it. Jones discovered the request

in a different file on February 24, 2003.

 After the hearing, the magistrate court noted that the time limits of the IADA

had not been complied with by the government and recommended the indictment be

dismissed. The magistrate court examined the factors identified in 18 U.S.C. App.

2 § 9(1) to determine whether to dismiss the indictment with or without prejudice.

The magistrate court concluded that dismissal with prejudice was not warranted. The

district court agreed with the magistrate court’s recommendation, and dismissed the

indictment against McKinney without prejudice.

Appellate Case: 04-2145 Page: 3 Date Filed: 01/18/2005 Entry ID: 1855942 
3

The Speedy Trial Act states:

In determining whether to dismiss the case with or without prejudice,

the court shall consider, among others, each of the following factors:

the seriousness of the offense; the facts and circumstances of the case

which led to the dismissal; and the impact of a reprosecution on the

administration of this chapter and on the administration of justice.

18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). 

-4-

On August 1, 2003, the government returned McKinney to the Missouri

Department of Corrections. On September 10, 2003, the government filed a new

indictment against McKinney, alleging the same charges and conduct that was alleged

in the original superceding indictment. McKinney renewed his motion to dismiss,

which the district court denied. McKinney entered a conditional guilty plea to the

indictment, reserving his right to appeal the district court’s order dismissing the

indictment without prejudice. The district court sentenced McKinney to sixteen

months on each count to run concurrently. The district court also ordered

McKinney’s sentence to run concurrently with his state sentence. This appeal

follows.

II. Standard of Review

The standard of review for reviewing a district court’s decision to dismiss an

indictment without prejudice under the IADA, 18 U.S.C. App. 2 § 9, has not yet been

established by this court.

The Ninth Circuit applies an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing a district

court’s decision to dismiss an indictment without prejudice under the IADA. See

United States v. Kurt, 945 F.2d 248, 254 (9th Cir. 1991). In addition, this court has

reviewed a district court’s decision to dismiss an indictment without prejudice under

the Speedy Trial Act, which has nearly identical language as the IADA.3

 United

Appellate Case: 04-2145 Page: 4 Date Filed: 01/18/2005 Entry ID: 1855942 
The IADA states: 

In determining whether to dismiss the case with or without prejudice,

the court shall consider, among others, each of the following factors:

The seriousness of the offense; the facts and circumstances of the case

which led to the dismissal; and the impact of a reprosecution on the

administration of the agreement on detainers and on the administration

of justice.

18 U.S.C. App. 2 § 9(1). 

-5-

States v. Koory, 20 F.3d 844 (8th Cir. 1994). In interpreting the nearly identical

language, this court noted it “will not overturn a district court’s decision to allow or

to bar reprosecution absent an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 846-47. This court also

noted that “when the statutory factors are properly considered, and supporting factual

findings are not clearly in error, the district court’s judgment of how opposing

considerations balance should not lightly be disturbed.” Id. (quotations omitted).

For the same reasons, we review the district court’s decision to dismiss

McKinney’s indictment without prejudice under the IADA for abuse of discretion,

and review the factual findings that support the decision for clear error.

III. Discussion

The IADA states that a prisoner against whom a detainer has been lodged

“shall be brought to trial within one hundred and eighty [180] days after” the prisoner

has given proper notice of his request for a speedy trial. 18 U.S.C. App. 2 § 2. A

court may dismiss an indictment with or without prejudice when the United States is

the receiving state. 18 U.S.C. App. 2 § 9 (1) & (2). The court must consider the

following factors in deciding whether to dismiss with or without prejudice: (1) the

seriousness of the offense; (2) the facts and circumstances leading to the dismissal;

Appellate Case: 04-2145 Page: 5 Date Filed: 01/18/2005 Entry ID: 1855942 
-6-

and (3) the impact of re-prosecution on the administration of the Act and on the

administration of justice. Id. 

The magistrate court considered the three factors in recommending to dismiss

the indictment without prejudice, and the district court adopted the magistrate court’s

recommendation. We review each factor in turn.

(1) Seriousness of the offense

The magistrate court found that McKinney’s charged conduct was serious. The

magistrate court concluded that this factor favors dismissal without prejudice.

The government charged McKinney with two counts of being a felon in

possession of a firearm. The IADA does not specify the criteria for analyzing the

seriousness of the offense, but other courts have examined the nature of the conduct

charged and the potential sentence. See, e.g., Kurt, 945 F.2d at 253 (examining the

facts of the crime and the potential sentence). 

The nature of McKinney’s conduct and the potential sentence for McKinney’s

charged offense demonstrates the seriousness of his offense. McKinney fled police

for fourteen miles and then continued to flee police on foot after abandoning his

vehicle. During the arrest the police discovered McKinney possessed four baggies

of methamphetamine, a gun and ammunition. The statutory maximum penalty for

each of McKinney’s charged counts is ten years of imprisonment and a fine of

$250,000. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) & (3), 924(a)(2). This court has found that a

single count with the same statutory penalty is a “serious offense.” See United States

v. Duranseau, 26 F.3d 804, 808 (8th Cir. 1994) (interstate transportation of stolen

property is a serious offense). 

Appellate Case: 04-2145 Page: 6 Date Filed: 01/18/2005 Entry ID: 1855942 
-7-

The magistrate court did not clearly err in its factual findings regarding the

seriousness of McKinney’s offense. The district court did not abuse its discretion in

concluding this factor supports dismissal without prejudice. 

(2) Facts and circumstances leading to the dismissal

The magistrate court noted that because “there has been no evidence of bad

faith or a pattern of negligence established, and because [McKinney] was the victim

of 'an unfortunate administrative oversight’ . . . the Court finds that the second factor

also favors dismissal without prejudice.” 

Here, either Jones or his secretary misfiled McKinney’s request to be brought

to trial within 180 days. When Jones discovered the error, he examined the district

court’s docket sheet, which described the request only as a detainer. The docket

sheet, therefore, did not provide notice of McKinney’s request to be brought to trial

within 180 days. After discovering the misfiled request, Jones immediately filed a

writ with the district court to bring McKinney before the court as soon as possible.

The magistrate court (and the district court in adopting the magistrate court’s

recommendation) did not clearly err in its factual findings on this factor. McKinney

did not present evidence of bad faith or a pattern of negligence. The only reason the

government did not honor McKinney’s request was due to a clerical filing error. In

addition, as discussed below, McKinney was not prejudiced by the error. Therefore,

the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding this factor supports

dismissal without prejudice.

(3) The impact of re-prosecution

The magistrate court noted that the focus on this issue “should be on whether

the prosecution had an improper motive, and whether the violation prejudiced the

Appellate Case: 04-2145 Page: 7 Date Filed: 01/18/2005 Entry ID: 1855942 
-8-

defendant.” The magistrate court noted that there is no evidence of improper motive

and the prejudice McKinney may have experienced by the violation does not rise to

the level that would mandate a dismissal with prejudice. The magistrate court

concluded that this factor favors dismissal without prejudice.

As noted above, the only reason the government did not bring McKinney

before the federal court within 180 days was due to a clerical filing error, not because

of any improper motive, bad faith, or pattern of negligence on the government’s

behalf. Furthermore, McKinney will not be prejudiced if he is re-prosecuted.

McKinney argues he may have to restart his drug rehabilitation program. However,

even if McKinney’s request to be brought to trial within 180 days was honored,

McKinney probably would need to restart the rehabilitation program. McKinney has

presented no evidence, other than his own statements, that the delay of his trial

actually prevented him from continuing his education and rehabilitation.

The magistrate court (and the district court in adopting the magistrate court’s

recommendation) did not clearly err in its factual findings on this factor. The district

court did not abuse its discretion in concluding this factor supports dismissal without

prejudice. 

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, we affirm.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 04-2145 Page: 8 Date Filed: 01/18/2005 Entry ID: 1855942