Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00644/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00644-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alfred Campos
Defendant
City Of Fresno
Defendant
Fresno Police Department
Defendant
Ron Manning
Defendant
Angel Sandoval Rios
Plaintiff

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The Second Amended Complaint also names Does 1-100 as 1

defendants. Because no defendants have been substituted for the

Doe defendants, the Doe defendants are dismissed. 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANGEL SANDOVAL RIOS, )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

)

CITY OF FRESNO, et al., )

)

)

Defendant. )

)

)

No. CV-F-05-644 OWW/SMS

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS'

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(Doc. 31) AND SCHEDULING

PRETRIAL CONFERENCE FOR

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 2006 AT

11:00 A.M. IN COURTROOM 3

Angel Sandoval Rios is proceeding against the City of

Fresno, Fresno Police Officers Alfred Campos and Ron Manning

pursuant to a Second Amended Complaint. The Second Amended 1

Complaint arises out of the detention, tasering, arrest and

prosecution of plaintiff. 

The First Cause of Action is captioned for violation of 42

U.S.C. § 1983 and alleges in pertinent part:

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38. Defendants ... and each of them, without

legal justification, willfully, maliciously,

and intentionally illegally arrested

Plaintiff, by, including but not limited to,

unlawfully detaining and arresting Plaintiff

... This illegal arrest and prosecution is in

violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

39. The unlawful and illegal arrest and

prosecution ... was without just and legal

cause, thereby violating Plaintiff’s right

under ... the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendment, and his right under the

Constitution of the State of California. 

Said conduct also constitutes a violation of

California Civil Code § 43, § 51.7 and §

52.1.

40. In perpetrating said unlawful and

illegal arrest and prosecution, Defendant[s]

... and each of them, perpetrated and caused

to happen the malicious prosecution of

Plaintiff.

... 

42. As a further and direct result of the

above-described acts, Plaintiff was deprived

of the rights and immunities secured to him

under the Constitution of the United States

... including, but not limited to his right

under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to

be secured in her [sic] person, to be free

from summary punishment without due process,

and to equal protection of the laws.

43. Defendant City of Fresno and DOE ONE,

the supervisory officers or agents of the

CITY OF FRESNO, are directly liable and

responsible for the acts of Defendants CAMPOS

and MANNING, because Defendant CAMPOS took

the action of tazering Plaintiff pursuant to

governmental custom.

44. Plaintiff alleges that it is the custom

of Fresno Police Officers, including

Defendant Campos, to resort to the use of a

tazer gun, even when the totality of the

circumstances do not warrant said use.

45. Plaintiff also alleges that Fresno

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Police Officers including Defendant Campos,

resort to the use of a tazer gun, when force

is applied, in nearly half of the reported

incidences involving use of force. The use

of the tazer guns is by far the most commonly

used instrument involved in the use of force.

46. Plaintiff further alleges that

Defendants CAMPOS and MANNING conspired with

one another to enter into an agreement with

the intent to commit wrongful acts:

violations of the Fourth Amendment to the

United States Constitution, Article One,

Sections One and Seven of the California

Constitution, and California Civil Code ... §

43 and § 52.1. Defendants MANNING, CAMPOS,

CITY OF FRESNO, and each of them, committed

wrongful acts in furtherance of the

conspiracy, causing Plaintiff to sustain

injury and damages. Plaintiff ... further

alleges that the act or acts of one

conspirator pursuant to or in furtherance of

the common design of the conspiracy is the

act of all the conspirators. The acts in

furtherance of the conspiracy as set forth

herein in this FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION [sic]. 

47. Defendants CAMPOS and MANNING conspired

with one another to deprive Plaintiff of his

right to be free of unreasonable seizures

under the Fourth Amendment .. and to be free

of deprivation of life and liberty under the

Fourteenth Amendment ..., Article One,

Sections One and Seven of the California

Constitution, and California Civil Code ... §

43 and § 52.1.

The Second Cause of Action is captioned “false arrest and

imprisonment” and alleges that defendants arrested plaintiff on

March 20, 2004 “without a warrant, without probable cause and

without any legal justification”; that the warrantless false

arrest and false imprisonment “was in violation of Plaintiff’s

right to be free of an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth

Amendment ... and to be free of deprivation of life and liberty

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under the Fourteenth Amendment, Article One, Sections One and

Seven of the California Constitution, and California Civil Code

... § 43 and § 52.1"; and that defendants Manning and Campos

“conspired with one another to enter into an agreement with the

intent to commit [the] wrongful acts”. 

The Third Cause of Action is captioned “interference with

civil rights” under the Tom Banes Civil Rights Act alleging that,

under California Civil Code §§ 43, 51 and 52.1, plaintiff is

entitled “to equal protection of the laws, substantive and

procedural due process as stated in the Fourth, Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and

California Constitution”, and that plaintiff “was deprived of

liberty, substantive and procedural due process” as a result of

the conduct of defendants alleged in the First and Second Causes

of Action. 

The Fourth Cause of Action is for intentional infliction of

emotional distress. 

The Fifth Cause of Action is captioned “negligence per se”

and alleges that defendants “owed a duty of care to Plaintiff,

not to falsely arrest and imprison him as Set forth in the Fourth

Amendment ..., Article One, Sections One and Seven of the

California Constitution, and California Civil Code ... § 43 and §

52.1" and that the alleged conduct of defendants “constitutes

negligence per se ... in that Defendants ... breached the

statutory standards set forth” in these constitutional and

statutory provisions. 

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The motion for summary judgment, filed on August 4, 2006, was 2

noticed for hearing on September 25, 2006. Pursuant to Rule 78-

230(c), Local Rules of Practice, plaintiff’s opposition should have

been filed on or before September 11, 2006. Plaintiff’s response

to defendants’ statement of undisputed facts and declarations and

exhibits in opposition to the motion were not filed until

September 14, 2006. Plaintiff’s memorandum of points and

authorities in opposition to defendants’ motion was not filed until

September 18, 2006. The untimely filing of plaintiff’s opposition

necessitated continuance of oral argument. This is not the first

time in this action that plaintiff’s counsel has failed to comply

with Rule 78-230. In connection with defendants’ motion to

dismiss, plaintiff’s opposition should have been filed on June 13,

2006 but was not filed until June 16 at 4:15 p.m. Although Judge

5

The Sixth Cause of Action is for negligent infliction of

emotional distress and negligence. The Seventh Cause of Action

is for assault and battery, alleging that “Defendants CAMPOS and

MANNING, and each of them, illegally and without legal

justification tackled, assaulted, shot Plaintiff with a tazer

gun, and otherwise used excessive force upon Plaintiff.” The

Eighth Cause of Action is for negligence, alleging that Manning

and Campos “negligently, carelessly and unlawfully attempted to

restrain Plaintiff by use of excessive force by shooting

Plaintiff with a tazer gun”; that Manning and Campos “failed to

exercise reasonable care to prevent the injuries from occurring

by utilizing excessive force without justification”; and that the

City of Fresno “was negligent in the training of the police

officers in that it does not require training of the police

officers in the use of a tazer gun.” 

Defendants move for summary judgment or summary adjudication

with respect to each of the causes of action alleged in the

Second Amended Complaint. 

2

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Coyle considered the untimely opposition in resolving the motion to

dismiss, he specifically noted in the July 26, 2006 Order resolving

the motion to dismiss: “[P]laintiff is advised that it is his

obligation to timely comply with court orders, the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. Failure to do so

may result in the imposition of sanctions, including the sanction

of dismissal.” Plaintiff’s counsel is again warned that he must

timely comply with court orders, the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. Continued failure to

do so may result in the imposition of sanctions, including the

sanction of dismissal. 

In addition, plaintiff’s opposition refers to citations to

deposition testimony which, in certain instances, are not included

with the excerpts of deposition testimony attached to the Mr.

Ruiz’s declaration and a copy of which has not been lodged with the

court as required by Rules 5-133(j) and 56-260(b) and (d), Local

Rules of Practice.

6

A. Governing Standards.

Summary judgment is proper when it is shown that there

exists “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. A fact is “material” if it is relevant to an

element of a claim or a defense, the existence of which may

affect the outcome of the suit. T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v.

Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th

Cir.1987). Materiality is determined by the substantive law

governing a claim or a defense. Id. The evidence and all

inferences drawn from it must be construed in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. 

The initial burden in a motion for summary judgment is on

the moving party. The moving party satisfies this initial burden

by identifying the parts of the materials on file it believes

demonstrate an “absence of evidence to support the non-moving

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party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325

(1986). The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to defeat

summary judgment. T.W. Elec., 809 F.2d at 630. The nonmoving

party “may not rely on the mere allegations in the pleadings in

order to preclude summary judgment,” but must set forth by

affidavit or other appropriate evidence “specific facts showing

there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. The nonmoving party

may not simply state that it will discredit the moving party’s

evidence at trial; it must produce at least some “significant

probative evidence tending to support the complaint.” Id. The

question to be resolved is not whether the “evidence unmistakably

favors one side or the other, but whether a fair-minded jury

could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence

presented.” United States ex rel. Anderson v. N. Telecom, Inc.,

52 F.3d 810, 815 (9 Cir.1995). This requires more than the th

“mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the

plaintiff’s position”; there must be “evidence on which the jury

could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Id. The more

implausible the claim or defense asserted by the nonmoving party,

the more persuasive its evidence must be to avoid summary

judgment.” Id. 

B. Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts.

In moving for summary judgment, defendants set forth the

following facts as undisputed. Plaintiff accepts these facts as

undisputed except where noted and discussed in this memorandum. 

UMF 1. On March 20, 2004, Officer Alfred Campos and Officer

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Plaintiff attempts to dispute these facts by referring to 3

deposition testimony from some of the passengers that he was

driving in a safe manner. However, the fact involved is not

whether plaintiff was driving in a safe manner but what Mr. Roberts

told 911 and what was reported to the officers. 

8

Ron Manning were partners working patrol on the swing shift. At

approximately 7:56 p.m., Officers Campos and Manning were parked

in the parking lot of a 7/11 store on Fresno and McKinley writing

a report when they were approached by a citizen who advised there

was a bus running people off the road. The officers later

learned that the person who approached them was Charlie Roberts.

UMF 2. Mr. Roberts had previously called 911, while he was

driving north on highway 41, and reported observing a bus driving

recklessly. He specifically reported that he noticed a bus

approaching from behind in the left lane as he was traveling

northbound on highway 41, that the bus was traveling a little

faster than he was driving and passed him, that, as the bus

approached within ten feet behind the vehicle in front of it in

the same lane, the bus began to flash its lights; that the

vehicle merged into Mr. Roberts’ lane to get out of the way; that 

a little further north, the bus, without activating its signal

turning light, tried to merge into Mr. Roberts’ lane where cars

were, but immediately maneuvered back into its lane.3

UMF 3. As Mr. Roberts was speaking with the dispatch, he

saw the bus move over into the middle law again, this time

merging over the lane dividers without using its turn signal,

causing the four cars in Mr. Roberts’ lane to slow down and move

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Again, plaintiff disputes this fact, referring to deposition 4

testimony from some of the passengers on the bus to support his

contention that he was driving in a safe manner. The fact involved

is not whether plaintiff was driving in a safe manner but what Mr.

Roberts told 911 and what the officers were told. 

Plaintiff does not dispute this fact, stating only that he 5

does not know whether or not Mr. Roberts exited and followed the

bus. However, Mr. Roberts’ testimony that he did so is

uncontradicted. 

Plaintiff does not dispute this fact, stating only that he 6

does not know what exactly Mr. Roberts said to the officers.

However, what Mr. Roberts said to the officers is in the record and

is uncontradicted.

9

towards the shoulder, and reported this to dispatch.4

UMF 4. The bus then exited off highway 41 at the McKinley

exit, slowed down and stopped at the bottom of the exit ramp. 

Mr. Roberts also exited and followed the bus.5

UMF No. 5. As the bus approached Fresno Street, Mr. Roberts

saw a patrol car in a 7/11 parking lot. Mr. Roberts pulled into

the parking lot and reported to the officers that the bus was

driving erratically and almost ran other cars off the highway and

that the bus had been speeding. Mr. Roberts pointed the bus out

to the officers, which was at the intersection of Fresno and

McKinley getting ready to turn southbound onto McKinley.6

UMF No. 6. The officers immediately pursued the bus. 

Officer Campos activated the patrol lights on Fresno Street as

the bus turned into the San Joaquin Memorial High School parking

lot. The bus failed to yield and continued down the road for

about a quarter of a mile before it stopped. When the bus

stopped, the officers approached it.

Plaintiff disputes these facts only to the extent that

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“yielded 75 feet after seeing the patrol lights.” Therefore, the

only dispute is the number of feet the bus traveled after the

officers put on the patrol lights. 

UMF No. 7. As the officers approached the bus, Angel Rios

stepped out and started to open the luggage compartments. The

officers approached and Officer Campos asked Mr. Rios for his

driver’s license. Officer Campos made this request several times

but Mr. Rios kept moving around the luggage compartment as if the

request had not been made. During the time the officers were

trying to talk to Mr. Rios he was getting luggage from the

compartment, despite their requests that he stop and speak with

them. Mr. Rios seemed to the officers to be very preoccupied

with getting the luggage out of the compartment.

Plaintiff disputes this fact, referring to his deposition

testimony that his license was in his case in the luggage

compartment of the bus and that he was trying to get it to show

to the officers.

UMF No. 8. At one point Mr. Rios asked the officers why

they stopped him; he was told that someone reported him for

making unsafe lane changes. Mr. Rios demanded that the reporting

person be brought to the scene.

UMF No. 9. Mr. Rios finally handed Officer Campos a renewal

application for a class A driver’s license. When questioned

about the type of license he had, Mr. Rios told the officers “you

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Although plaintiff attempts to dispute this fact by referring 7

to his deposition testimony, the testimony referred to does not

contradict UMF No. 9. 

Plaintiff disputes this fact, stating that he “will not 8

speculate as to what the Defendants’ perception was of him.”

However, the officers may testify as to their perceptions. 

11

should know, your are the police.”7

UMF No. 10. Mr. Rios admits that he was frustrated by this

encounter.

UMF No. 11. The officers’ perception was that Mr. Rios was

not only frustrated, but appeared to be angry and

confrontational.8

UMF No. 12. In order to get Mr. Rios’ full attention,

and because the noise from the bus made it difficult to hear, the

officers asked Mr. Rios to step away from the bus so they could

proceed with their investigation.

Plaintiff disputes this fact only as to the term “away”,

stating that the engine was in the rear of the bus and that

defendants moved him to the rear of the bus where it was much

louder and more difficult to hear.

UMF No. 13. The officers escorted Mr. Rios to the patrol

car parked behind and off to the right of the bus. Mr. Rios

seemed to calm down momentarily but then began to clench his

hands into a fist position and seemed very upset. The officers

believed, based on his demeanor, that Mr. Rios was possibly

preparing for a physical confrontation. The officers then

decided that it would be best to move Mr. Rios away from the

vehicle and have him sit on a nearby curb in order to reduce

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Plaintiff disputes this fact as to “clenching his hands into 9

a fist position and seemed very agitated.” Plaintiff asserts that

it was the defendants who were belligerent and/or agitated. In so

asserting, referring to the deposition testimony of bus passenger

Betty Gerardin. Ms. Gerardin testified that she thought the

officers were very belligerent when Mr. Rios was opening the

luggage compartment because they were yelling at him. Plaintiff

also refers to another portion of Ms. Gerardin’s deposition but

does not include the excerpt and has not lodged Ms. Gerardin’s

deposition. Ms. Gerardin’s deposition testimony provided by

plaintiff is not relevant to dispute UMF No. 13 because she is

referring to an earlier time. 

Plaintiff disputes this fact, stating: “At any time prior to 10

the tasing, Defendants could have conducted a pat down of

Plaintiff.” Plaintiff’s assertion is irrelevant to the fact being

asserted, i.e., that at the time plaintiff was told to sit down on

12

officer safety concerns and to de-escalate the situation.9

UMF No. 14. Mr. Rios was asked several times to sit on the

nearby curb. He refused, telling the officers that he did not

have to listen to them.

Plaintiff did not testify in his deposition that he told the

officers that he did not have to listen to them. Defendant

officers aver in their declarations that plaintiff made this

statement. However, in his deposition plaintiff testified that

he told the officers “I was driving since San Diego”, that “I

need to straighten my legs”, that “If you don’t mind, I can

stand”, that “There ain’t no place to sit down”, that “I’m not

going to sit down on the floor”, and that, after the officers

again told him to sit down, he said “I don’t want to”. 

UMF No. 15. At that point, the officers had not yet had the

opportunity to check to see if Mr. Rios had any outstanding

warrants, or was on probation or parole. Nor had they had the

opportunity to see if he had any weapons on him.10

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the curb and did not comply, the officers had not had the

opportunity to check him out for warrants or weapons. 

Plaintiff contends that defendants’ objective as to punish 11

and inflict pain on plaintiff, antagonizing him along the way. In

so asserting, plaintiff relies on the deposition testimony of

passenger Gerardin. However, the excerpts of Ms. Gerardin’s

testimony provided by plaintiff do not dispute UMF No. 16. 

Plaintiff disputes this fact, stating “See Exhibit D attached 12

to the Declaration of Eddie Ruiz, Deposition of Angel Rios, P. 70,

l 16-22.” However, Exhibit D is excerpts of the deposition

testimony of passenger Gerardin. Exhibit A is excerpts of Mr.

Rios’ deposition testimony, which excerpt does not include page 70.

Defendants, however, lodged plaintiff’s deposition. Plaintiff

testified that he was not asked to put his hands behind his back to

be arrested and that, when Officer Manning grabbed plaintiff’s

right arm, plaintiff was not trying to pull it away from Officer

Manning and that, because it was hurting, plaintiff told Officer

Manning, “you don’t have to use force.” 

13

UMF No. 16. The officers had no idea how many people were

on the bus, and whether or not the people on the bus might be

confrontational with the officers. Their objective was to gain

control of the situation as quickly as possible.11

UMF No. 17. Because Mr. Rios refused to follow the

officers’ lawful commands to sit down, he was told that he would

be arrested if he did not cooperate. He still refused to sit

down on the curb as the officers directed and when told he would

be arrested, said “go for it.”

UMF No. 18. Officer Campos then attempted to take hold of

Mr. Rios’ arm in an attempt to take him into custody. Mr. Rios

pulled away and brought his arms in front of him in an attempt to

avoid being handcuffed. Officer Manning then grabbed his other

arm and struggled with Mr. Rios.12

UMF No. 19. At that point Officer Campos stepped back

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Plaintiff asserts that he cannot dispute this fact because 13

“[n]o such authority has been provided to Plaintiff.” California

Penal Code § 13500 et seq. governs the Commission on Peace Officer

Standards and Training (POST). The standards and training for

peace officers in California is set forth by statute and

regulation. 

14

and deployed the taser. Mr. Rios fell to the ground and was

taken into custody without further incident.

UMF No. 20. Mr. Rios was criminally prosecuted on the

charge of resisting arrest. The decision to prosecute was an

independent decision made by prosecutor Nathan Lane of the Fresno

County District Attorney’s Office.

UMF No. 21. The authority that governs the training of law

enforcement officers in California is Peace Officer Standards and

Training (P.O.S.T.).13

UMF No. 22. Prior to this incident, Officer Campos was

trained in the use of the taser in accordance with P.O.S.T.

requirements. Additionally, at the time of the incident, Officer

Campos had not only met, but exceeded, P.O.S.T. training

requirements. Officer Manning has also exceeded P.O.S.T.

training requirements.

UMF No. 23. The Fresno Police Department’s use of force

policy in effect at the time of this incident was consistent with

state and federal standards. The Fresno Police Department’s

adaptation of the taser system and the controlling policy

statements concerning its proper use is consistent with other law

enforcement agencies across the County, including those at the

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Plaintiff contends that there is no such specific policy, nor 14

a controlling policy statement with regard to the proper use of the

taser. Plaintiff refers to “Exhibit G, Deposition of Alfred

Campos, P. 16, L 17-25, P. 17, L.1.” Exhibit G is an excerpt of

the deposition of Myrl Stebens and no excerpt of the deposition of

Alfred Campos is attached to Mr. Ruiz’s declaration in opposition

to the motion.

Plaintiff disputes this fact only as to the term “away”, 15

stating that the engine was in the rear of the bus and that

defendants moved him to the rear of the bus where it was much

louder and more difficult to hear.

15

federal, state and local levels.14

UMF No. 24. The officers were not only authorized to

stop and briefly detain Mr. Rios to investigate; they had a

responsibility to investigate the report of a reckless bus

driver.

UMF No. 25. Mr. Rios had a responsibility to cooperate

with the officers; and it was reasonable for the officers to

expect him to cooperate.

UMF No. 26. The officers were reasonable in electing

to move plaintiff away from the noise of the bus. This technique

is consistent with modern police procedures and is the

recommended practice in such circumstances.15

UMF No. 27. Mr. Rios was criminally prosecuted on the

charge of resisting arrest (PC 148(a)). A criminal trial began

on October 21, 2004. On October 26, 2004, the jury advised that

they were hung on this charge and a mistrial was declared. The

case was ultimately dismissed in July, 2005 when there were no

new filings.

UMF No. 28. According to Mr. Rios, Officer Manning did not

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Plaintiff disputes this fact, referring to the deposition 16

testimony of Myrl Stebens. the pages of deposition testimony

referred to are not attached to Mr. Ruiz’s declaration. However,

defendants lodged Stebens’ deposition. In pertinent part, Stebens

testified:

There was absolutely no need, in my opinion,

based on the position of Mr. Rios, with two

trained officers in the position that they

were - one to the left, and one to the right

rear - that this taser had to be employed.

They could - should have been able to take him

down or gain control of him without any other

unnecessary use of the taser or even an impact

weapon. [DT 105:23 - 106:4]

16

make any statements to Officer Campos during this encounter.

UMF No. 29. The taser represents a modern alternative to

other force options such as striking techniques, kicks, impact

weapons, police service dogs and even deadly force in certain

circumstances.

UMF No. 30. The taser fires two probes up to a distance of

twenty-one feet. The probes are connected to the taser by highvoltage insulated wire. When the probes make contact with the

target, the taser transmits electrical pulses along the wires and

into the body.

UMF No. 31. When properly deployed, the taser has a proven

ability to rapidly gain control of a resisting subject with

minimum exposure to serious injuries. The ability to quickly

control a resisting subject reduces the probability of a

protracted struggle and associated risks to the subject and the

arresting officers. It is less injurious than the traditional

police baton.16

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Stebens’ deposition testimony in no way contradicts UMF No. 31. 

Plaintiff disputes this fact, referring to the deposition 17

testimony of Myrl Stebens quoted above in footnote 16 to UMF No.

31. The quoted portion of Stebens’ deposition in no way

contradicts the fact set forth. 

Plaintiff disputes this fact, referring to the deposition 18

testimony of passenger Gerardin, wherein she testified that the

officers were “yelling” at plaintiff as he was opening the luggage

compartment of the bus. Plaintiff also refers to another page of

Ms. Gerardin’s deposition which is not included in the excerpt

17

UMF No. 32. The officers were justified in using force on

plaintiff when he resisted the arrest. According to plaintiff’s

force expert, the officers could have physically taken Mr. Rios

to the ground; they could have used chemical agents such as OC

(pepper) spray, or they could have used a medium level strike

with a baton.

UMF No. 33. The Fresno Police Department’s use of force

policy authorized the use of physical force to effect an arrest,

prevent an escape, overcome resistance or defend themselves and

others from injury. The type and degree of force used is that

which is reasonably necessary to effectively bring an incident

under control. The use of the taser is an authorized force

application provided the officer has been trained in its use.

UMF No. 34. The Fresno Police Department’s development of

the taser as a viable alternative to more traditional and

injurious force options and the controlling policies regarding

its proper use, are consistent with other local, state, and

federal law enforcement agencies across the country.17

UMF No. 35. Neither Officer Campos nor Officer Manning

harbored any animus, hostility, or malice towards Mr. Rios.18

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attached to Mr. Ruiz’s declaration. Ms. Gerardin’s testimony that

the officers were “yelling” at Mr. Rios as he was opening the

luggage compartment does not suffices to raise a material question

of fact that either of the officers animus, hostility or malice

toward plaintiff. It is undisputed that the bus engine was running

at the time Mr. Rios was at the luggage compartment, that it was

difficult to make oneself heard, and that the officers and Mr. Rios

later moved away from the bus.

Plaintiff disputes this fact, referring to the same excerpts 19

from Ms. Gerardin’s deposition discussed in UMF No. 35. Ms.

Gerardin’s testimony that the officers were “yelling” at plaintiff

as he was opening the luggage compartment of the bus in no way

contradicts UMF No. 36. 

Plaintiff disputes this fact but does not refer to any 20

evidence in so doing. Therefore, it is undisputed. 

Plaintiff does not dispute this fact, but asserts that he 21

could not afford such treatment. In so stating, he refers to a

page of his deposition that is not included in the excerpts of his

deposition attached to Mr. Ruiz’s declaration. However, in

reviewing the cited portion of his deposition lodged by defendants,

plaintiff, when asked if he had ever had x-rays on his hip,

responded: “Not yet. I don’t got the money to pay for that. And

the doctor is waiting for Medicare to accept it to do so.”

Plaintiff’s deposition testimony does not establish that plaintiff

did not seek medical attention for his alleged emotional distress

18

UMF No. 36. The officers did not use excessive or

unnecessary force.19

UMF No. 37. Plaintiff did not suffer severe emotional

distress as a result of this incident. His emotional injury

consists of alleged memory loss; reacting by shaking if someone

mentioned the taser; and being jumpy at night. The memory loss

consists of not being able to remember a number on one occasion. 

The jumpiness at night resulted in plaintiff’s taking sleeping

pills for two weeks.20

UMF No. 38. There has been no evidence presented during

discovery that Mr. Rios received treatment for any emotional

distress he allegedly suffered.21

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because he could not afford it. 

In stating this fact, defendants refer to Stebens’ deposition 22

testimony that Stebens could not comment on the Fresno Police

Department use of force policies, whether those policies are

inconsistent with state and federal standards, or about the

training policies or training of the officers because no

information concerning these matters had been provided to him.

Plaintiff disputes this fact, referring to Stebens’ deposition

testimony as follows:

Q. Do you consider yourself qualified to

comment or criticize the policies of a law

enforcement agency?

A. In this particular case, yes.

Q. And why is that?

A. Well, because there are, as I pointed out,

certain aspects that law enforcement did not

use. You don’t have to be a police officer to

understand use of force. You don’t have to be

a police officer to understand what is

appropriate and what is not appropriate. [¶]

There is a right way, and then there the [sic]

wrong way, but there is no right way to do the

wrong thing, and I think the wrong thing was

done, here. [DT 107:7-23]

19

UMF No. 39. The pain compliance techniques discussed by

Myrl Stebens were not appropriate to the circumstances and would

not have resulted in quickly gaining control of Mr. Rios, which

was the objective. The techniques suggested by Mr. Stebens may

have further escalated an already uncertain situation. 

Plaintiff disputes this fact, again relying on Stebens’

deposition testimony quoted above in UMF Nos. 31 and 34.

UMF No. 40. Plaintiff’s use of force expert, Myrl Stebens,

has no familiarity with the current policies and practices of law

enforcement agencies or the training of officers, particularly in

the use of a taser.22

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Stebens’ testimony does not suffices to create an issue of fact.

Stebens testified repeatedly that he could not opine about the use

of force and training policies of the Fresno Police Department

and/or relative to state and federal standards. The testimony

relied upon by plaintiff speaks only to the specific incident

involving Mr. Rios and does not constitute evidence that the

policies or customs of the Fresno Police Department were

unconstitutional under the Monell standard. See discussion infra.

20

C. Claims Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Defendants move for summary judgment with respect to

plaintiff’s claims that his federal constitutional rights were

violated.

1. Detention, Warrantless Arrest and Malicious

Prosecution.

Plaintiff stated at oral argument that he is abandoning any

claims that his detention, warrantless arrest and prosecution 

violated his constitutional rights. 

Therefore, defendants’ motion is GRANTED to the extent that

the First Cause of Action alleges unlawful detention, arrest and

prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

2. Excessive Force.

All claims of excessive force are analyzed under the

objective reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment set

forth in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) and Tennessee v.

Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). Motley v. Parks, 432 F.3d 1072, 1088

(9 Cir.2005). “Determining whether the force used to th

effectuate a particular seizure is reasonable under the Fourth

Amendment requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality

of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests

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against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” 

Graham, 490 U.S at 396: This balancing test entails

consideration of the totality of the facts and circumstances in

the particular case, including “the severity of the crime at

issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the

safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively

resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. 

The most important of these factors is the threat posed by the

suspect. Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 702 (9 Cir. th

2005). The “broad discretion that must be afforded to police

officers who face a tense situation,” must be extended to

mistakes of fact concerning “the existence of probable cause” as

well as to mistakes as to what the law requires under particular

circumstances. Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 909 (9 Cir. th

2001). 

“The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be

judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,

rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham, 490

U.S. at 396. The “question is whether the officers’ actions are

‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances

confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or

motivation.” Id. at 397. “The question is not simply whether the

force was necessary to accomplish a legitimate police objective;

it is whether the force used was reasonable in light of all the

relevant circumstances.” Hammer v. Gross, 932 F.2d 842, 848 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. City of Newport Beach, Cal. v.

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Hammer, 502 U.S. 980 (1991). As explained in Forrester v. City

of San Diego, 25 F.3d 804, 807-808 (9 Cir.1994), cert. denied,

th

513 U.S. 1152 (1995):

Police officers ... are not required to use

the least intrusive degree of force possible. 

Rather ..., the inquiry is whether the force

used to effect a particular seizure was

reasonable, viewing the facts from the

perspective of a reasonable officer on the

scene ... Whether officers hypothetically

could have used less painful, less injurious,

or more effective force in executing an

arrest is simply not the issue. 

The court’s consideration of whether a particular use of force is

reasonable “must make allowance for the fact that police officers

are often forced to make split-second judgments - in

circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving -

about the amount of force that is necessary in a given

situation”, Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-397 (not every push or shove,

even if it may later seem unnecessary in hindsight violates the

Fourth Amendment). Proper application of the reasonableness

standard “requires careful attention to the facts and

circumstances of each particular case, including 1) the severity

of the crime at issue; 2) whether the suspect poses an immediate

threat to the safety of the officers or others; and 3) whether he

is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by

flight. 

Defendants assert that the facts demonstrate that plaintiff

had been belligerent and uncooperative when detained by the

officers, displaying frustration, anger and what was perceived by

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the officers to be aggressive posturing. In attempting to arrest

plaintiff, the officers were forced to physically struggle with

plaintiff as he pulled his arms away and tucked them in front of

him, refusing to be handcuffed. Officer Campos did not deploy

the taser until plaintiff began to physically struggle with the

officers. Plaintiff concedes that he was aware he was being

arrested when he told the officers to “go for it” and that he

pulled his arm away from the officers when they attempted to

handcuff him. California Penal Code § 835a provides: “If a

person has knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable care,

should have knowledge, that he is being arrested by a peace

officer, it is the duty of such person to refrain from using

force ... to resist such arrest.” The only force used by

Officer Manning was to grab plaintiff’s arm when attempting to

effect the arrest. Defendants contend that Officer Campos’s use

of the taser to effectuate plaintiff’s arrest was reasonably

proportionate to the “difficult, tense and uncertain situation”

the officers faced during plaintiff’s detention. Plaintiff does

not dispute that the taser represents a modern alternative to

other less lethal force options, such as striking techniques,

kicks, impact weapons, police service dogs. Plaintiff’s expert

concedes that the officers were justified in using force to

arrest plaintiff in that the officers could have physically taken

plaintiff to the ground, used pepper spray, or a medium baton

strike. Plaintiff’s expert only opines that the use of the taser

was not necessary because the officers could have used these

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other force options. However, police officers are not required

to use the least intrusive degree of force possible. Forrester,

supra. Defendants contend that the taser provides the ability

to quickly control a resisting subject which reduces the

probability of a protracted struggle and associated risks to the

officers and the suspect.

There is a dispute of material fact whether plaintiff

resisted arrest in any way and was cooperative as he maintains. 

The Gerardin testimony offers some support to plaintiff’s version

of events. Plaintiff also responds that “there is no question

that the severity of the crime (i.e. unsafe lane change) was

low”, that there are genuine issues “as to whether Defendants

reasonably believed that the Plaintiff posed an immediate threat

to the officers”, and that “the only evidence presented by

Defendants are their own respective self-serving testimonials

alleging that Plaintiff appeared to be ready to confront the

Defendants in a stand up struggle”. Plaintiff further contends

that “even if the Defendants had probable cause to believe a

crime had been committed in their presence, this does not give

them carte blanche to inflict more pain than is necessary to make

an arrest.”

Under the totality of the circumstances, although the

officers were not required to use the least amount of force to

arrest plaintiff, there is evidence that plaintiff was

considerably smaller that the officers. Two expert opinions vary

that a reasonable officer would not have used the taser in view

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of the officers’ size and stature and should have simply taken

plaintiff down. If reasonable minds can differ whether a taser

should have been employed or whether any force should have been

employed, the dispute cannot be resolved as a matter of law. 

Defendants motion for summary judgment on the excessive

force claim is DENIED. 

3. Equal Protection.

Defendants move for summary judgment to the extent that the

Complaint alleges plaintiff’s arrest and prosecution denied his

right to equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth

Amendment. 

“To succeed on a § 1983 equal protection claim, the

plaintiffs must prove that the defendants acted in a

discriminatory manner and that the discrimination was

intentional.” Reese v. Jefferson School Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d

736, 739 (9 Cir.2000). See also Draper v. Reynolds, 369 F.3d th

1270, 1278 n.14 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 988 (2004)(“To th

state an equal protection claim, [plaintiff] must allege that

‘through state action, similarly situated persons have been

treated disparately’ ... and put forth evidence that

[defendant’s] actions were motivated by race.”) 

No evidence has been disclosed from which it may be inferred

that either officer discriminated against plaintiff or that

similarly situated persons have been treated disparately. 

Plaintiff did not respond to this ground for summary judgment in

opposing the motion and did not present any evidence or argument

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in support of this claim at the hearing. Consequently, summary

judgment is GRANTED with respect to this claim.

4. Conspiracy.

Defendants move for summary judgment to the extent that

Complaint alleges that Officers Campos and Manning and the City

of Fresno conspired to violate plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 

Because plaintiff concedes that the officers had probable cause

to detain and arrest plaintiff, the only basis for the conspiracy

claim is that the officers conspired to use excessive force in

arresting plaintiff in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

To prove a conspiracy under section 1983, plaintiff must

concrete evidence showing an agreement or meeting of the minds to

violate constitutional rights. To be liable, each participant in

the conspiracy need not know the exact details of the plan, but

each participant must at least share the common objective of the

conspiracy. Radcliffe v. Rainbow Const. Co., 254 F.3d 772, 782

(9 Cir.2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1020 (2001), citing United th

Steelworkers of America v. Phelps Dodge Corporation, 865 F.3d

1539, 1540-1541 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 809 (1989). th

Assuming arguendo that either officer violated plaintiff’s

Fourth Amendment rights by the use of excessive force, defendants

argue that there is no evidence of an agreement or a meeting of

the minds between Officers Campos and Manning to do so. 

Defendants note that Mr. Rios testified that Officer Manning made

no statements to Officer Campos during the encounter. Defendants

contend that “[w]ithout communication there can be no agreement

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or meeting of the minds.” 

In opposing this ground for summary judgment, plaintiff

cites California opinions: Black v. Sullivan, 48 Cal.App.3d 557,

567 (1975), that “[i]t is not necessary that the plaintiffs

produce evidence showing that the defendants met and actually

agreed to undertake the performance of unlawful acts” and Chicago

Title Ins. Co. v. Great Western Financial Corp., 69 Cal.2d 305,

316 (1968) that “[t]he conspiracy ‘may be inferred from the

nature of the acts done, the relations of the parties, the

interests of the alleged conspirators, and other circumstances’”. 

Plaintiff also cites Weatherton v. Growers Farm Labor Assn., 275

Cal.App.2d 168, 176 (1969):

Liability as a co-conspirator depends upon

projected joint action. ‘The mere knowledge,

acquiescence, or approval of the act, without

co-operation or agreement to co-operate is

not enough ...’ ... But once the plan for

joint action is shown, ‘a defendant may be

held liable who in fact committed no overt

act and gained no benefit therefrom.’ ....

Relying on these principles, plaintiff that there is evidence to

support his conspiracy claim:

Here Defendants were on patrol together, as

they had been in the past. Both are much

bigger in stature than Plaintiff. Both

easily could have arrested Plaintiff without

having to taser him. But instead they agreed

that they would deprive Plaintiff’s right to

be free from an unreasonable search and

seizure. Furthermore, they later attempted

to justify their use of force by creating a

corroborating account, between themselves, of

why Plaintiff deserved to be tazed [sic]: i)

that Plaintiff clenched his fists, rocked

back and forth, and challenged the Defendants

to a fight, ii) and that as Defendants tried

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to handcuff him he pulled away, or stiffened

his arm. The Plaintiffs [sic] and

Defendants’ respective accounts of what

happened at that moment (i.e [sic]

immediately prior to the tazing [sic]) is the

material in dispute.

The cases upon which plaintiff relies are factually

distinguishable. In Black, which involved an alleged conspiracy

among several defendants to interfere with and prevent the

closing of an escrow and sale of the property by willfully

failing to prepare and deliver a required beneficiary statement,

the court held that an issue of fact was demonstrated by the

conduct of the defendants and from documents admitted into

evidence that the defendants were working in concert to prevent

the sale and to regain the property because it had increased in

value. Plaintiff has offered no evidence that the officers “had

any kind of personal interest in depriving Plaintiff of his

constitutional rights.” Chicago Title Company, is

distinguishable because plaintiff “has failed to show that both

officers had a common plan, scheme and design to interfere with

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights for some personal interest, as

did the defendants in the Chicago Title Company case.” 

Furthermore, plaintiff has failed to show any evidence that the

officers entered into an agreement to use excessive force in

arresting plaintiff.

The fact that the officers patrol together and are

physically bigger than plaintiff cannot provide an inference that

these officers conspired to arrest plaintiff with the use of

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Although an officer has a duty to intervene when a fellow 23

officer violates the constitutional rights of a suspect or citizen,

United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1447 n.25 (9 Cir.1994), rev’d th

on other grounds, 518 U.S. 81 (1996), an officer can be held liable

for failing to intercede only if the officer had a realistic

opportunity to intercede, Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1289-

1290 (9 Cir.2000). Here, plaintiff has not alleged and presents th

no evidence that Officer Manning had advance knowledge and a

realistic opportunity to intervene to prevent Officer Campos’ use

of the taser. 

29

excessive force. Furthermore, the contention that a conspiracy

to arrest plaintiff by the use of excessive force may be inferred

from the fact that the officers’ post-arrest reports are

consistent and contradict plaintiff’s version of events is not

material or probative. The agreement had to arise before the use

of the taser. Here, the record establishes that the officers did

not even know about Mr. Rios until a citizen reported that the

driver of a bus had been driving recklessly, minutes before their

encounter. There is no evidence from which it may be inferred

that the officers agreed to use the taser before they approached

Mr. Rios at the luggage compartment of the bus or that Officer

Manning discussed or had any advance knowledge that Officer

Campos was going to deploy the taser. Mr. Rios concedes that

Officer Manning made no statements to Officer Campos during the

encounter. Plaintiff has not provided “concrete evidence showing

an agreement or meeting of the minds to violate constitutional

rights.”23

Defendants’ motion is GRANTED to the extent that plaintiff

contends that Officers Campos and Manning and the City of Fresno

conspired to use excessive force in arresting plaintiff.

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5. Monell Claim.

Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S.

658 (1978) authorizes direct suits against local government units

under Section 1983 where “the action that is alleged to be

unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement,

ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and

promulgated by that body’s officers.” 436 at 690-691. 

“Moreover, ... local governments ... may be sued for

constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental

‘custom’ even though such a custom has not received formal

approval through the body’s official decisionmaking channels.” 

Id. Since “Congress did not intend municipalities to be held

liable unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of

some nature caused a constitutional tort[,] ... a municipality

cannot be held labile solely because it employs a tortfesor - or,

in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983

on a respondeat superior theory.” Id. at 691. A municipality

will be liable under Section 1983 only if “the municipality

itself causes the constitutional violation at issue.” Canton v.

Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989). In order to assert a Monell

claim, plaintiff must establish: (1) a violation of

constitutional rights occurred; (2) the existence of a municipal

policy or custom; and (3) a causal nexus between (1) and (2). 

Canton, id. at 385-386; see also City of Los Angeles v. Heller,

475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986)(“If a person has suffered no

constitutional injury at the hands of the individual police

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officer, the fact that the departmental regulations might have

authorized the use of constitutionally excessive force is quite

beside the point.”).

The Second Amended Complaint alleges in pertinent part:

43. Defendant City of Fresno and DOE ONE,

the supervisory officers or agents of the

CITY OF FRESNO, are directly liable and

responsible for the acts of Defendants CAMPOS

and MANNING, because Defendant CAMPOS took

the action of tazering Plaintiff pursuant to

governmental custom.

44. Plaintiff alleges that it is the custom

of Fresno Police Officers, including

Defendant Campos, to resort to the use of a

tazer gun, even when the totality of the

circumstances do not warrant said use.

45. Plaintiff also alleges that Fresno

Police Officers including Defendant Campos,

resort to the use of a tazer gun, when force

is applied, in nearly half of the reported

incidences involving use of force. The use

of the tazer guns is by far the most commonly

used instrument involved in the use of force.

Defendants move for summary judgment on the ground that

there is no evidence of a policy or custom of “resorting to the

use of the taser” when circumstances do not warrant it as alleged

in the Second Amended Complaint. 

In opposing this aspect of the motion for summary judgment,

plaintiff argues as follows:

The argument here is simply that the person

causing the violation, namely the Defendants,

maybe subordinates, but that there [sic]

actions are ‘ratified’ by one with final

policymaking authority, namely Chief Dyer. 

The determination of who has final

policymaking authority is a question of law

for the court to decide, not the jury ... In

this instant case, Plaintiff argues that

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there should be municipal liability because

of the actions of the City’s final

policymaker, Chief of Police Jerry Dyer. It

is Plaintiff’s contention that Chief Dyer

acted with deliberate indifference to the

violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment

rights in approving an internal affairs

investigations [sic] against Defendant Rios

[sic], that were clearly deficient, and that

Chief Dyer thereby ratified the violations. 

In this case, Chief Dyer’ [sic] has provided

(in lieu of our ‘Pitches’ [sic] motion during

the criminal trial of Plaintiff), ‘the

information found to discoverable’ [sic]

consisting of the names, addresses and phone

numbers of those individuals who have alleged

constitutional violations and/or deprivations

at the hands of Defendant Campos (The

protective order on file is attached hereto

as Exhibit A). In those cases, Chief Dyer

found the complainants’ allegations to be

‘unfounded’ and ‘not sustain[able]’. (See

Exhibit A). A municipality can be liable for

an isolated constitutional violation if the

final policymaker ‘ratified’ a subordinate’s

action ... The City of Fresno also rejected

Plaintiff’s claim (See Exhibit B). 

Furthermore, according to the Fresno Police

Department’s own reportable use of force

data, electronic immobilization devices, like

the one used by Defendant Campos, are 42%

more likely to be used than pepper spray. 

(See Exhibit B). Clearly the use of taser

has been ratified, but it has also become the

weapon of choice when taking a suspect into

custody. In this case the Plaintiff was

taken to the hospital and then released.

“A municipality ... can be liable for an isolated

constitutional violation if the final policymaker ‘ratified’ a

subordinate’s action.” Christie v. Topa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1238

(9 Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. County of Hawaii v. Anderson,

th

528 U.S. 928 (1999). “To show ratification, a plaintiff must

prove that the ‘authorized policymakers approve a subordinate’s

decision and the basis for it.’” Christie, id. at 1239 quoting

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St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988). As explained

in Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1347-1348 (9 Cir.1992), th

cert. denied, 510 U.S. 932 (1993). In Pembaur v. City of

Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480-481 (1986), the Supreme Court held

that a single decision by a municipal policymaker may be

sufficient to trigger Section 1983 liability under Monell. 

“There must, however, be evidence of a conscious, affirmative

choice. Municipal liability under section 1983 attaches only

where ‘a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made

from among various alternatives by the official or officials

responsible for establishing final policy with the respect to the

subject matter in question.’” Gillette, id. at 1347, quoting

Pembaur, id. at 483-484. In Gillette, the plaintiff argued that

the failure of the City Manager to countermand the Fire Chief’s

final decision to terminate Gillette and to object to the hiring

of counsel to represent the City in the arbitration of

plaintiff’s grievance, ratified the Fire Chief’s decision and

effectively made employment policy. In so arguing, Gillette

relied on the statement in Praprotnik, id. 485 U.S. at 127, that

“[i]f the authorized policymakers approve a subordinates decision

and the basis for it, their ratification would be chargeable to

the municipality because their decision is final.” The Ninth

Circuit rejected this contention:

The cases make clear that the

unconstitutional discretionary actions of

municipal employees generally are not

chargeable to the municipality under section

1983. See Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 126 ...

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(observing that ‘[i]f the mere exercise of

discretion by an employee could give rise to

a constitutional violation, the result would

be indistinguishable from respondeat superior

liability.’). In Praprotnik, the Court

considered whether a policymaker’s

deferential review of a subordinate’s

discretionary decision constituted a

delegation of policy-making authority. The

plurality concluded that there was no

delegation and thus no basis for section 1983

liability, but observed that it would be a

different case ‘if a particular decision by a

subordinate was cast in the form of a policy

statement and expressly approved by the

supervising policymaker ... [or] if a series

of decisions by a subordinate official

manifested a “custom or usage” of which the

supervisor must have been aware.’ Id. at 130

....

Gillette’s evidence is not sufficient under

Pembaur or Praprotnik to establish section

1983 liability based on the City Manager’s

alleged acquiescence in Gillette’s

termination. Pembaur requires that an

official policymaker make a deliberate choice

from among various alternatives to follow a

particular course of action ... Likewise,

Praprotnik requires that a policymaker

approve a subordinate’s decision and the

basis for it before the policymaker will be

deemed to have ratified the subordinate’s

discretionary decision.

...

At most, Gillette established that the City

Manager did not overrule a discretionary

decision by the Fire Chief and did not object

to the retention of counsel to represent the

City in an arbitration proceeding pursuant to

a collective bargaining agreement. The Fire

Chief did not cast his decision to discipline

Gillette in the form of a policy statement,

and the City Manager’s testimony that he did

not object to hiring counsel for Gillette’s

arbitration is at least equally consistent

with a general policy of routinely hiring

lawyers to defend the City in all litigation

or labor grievance proceedings. There is no

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evidence that the City Manager made a

deliberate choice to endorse the Fire Chief’s

decision and the basis for it.

The fact that the City Manager did not

overrule the Fire Chief in this instance thus

cannot form the basis of municipal liability

under section 1983. To hold cities liable

under section 1983 whenever policymakers fail

to overrule the unconstitutional

discretionary acts of subordinates would

simply smuggle respondeat superior liability

into section 1983 law under the guise of

Pembaur’s ‘single decision’ rule. We decline

to endorse this end run around Monell.

Id. at 1348. See also Christie, id., 176 F.3d at 1239:

A policymaker’s knowledge of an

unconstitutional act does not, by itself,

constitute ratification. Instead, a

plaintiff must prove that the policymaker

approved of the subordinate’s act. For

example, it is well-settled that a

policymaker’s mere refusal to overrule a

subordinate’s completed act does not

constitute approval.

Exhibit A referred to by plaintiff is a copy of a letter

dated September 27, 2004 to Mr. Ruiz from Deputy City Attorney

James D. Miller regarding People v. Angel Rios, Fresno County

Superior Court Case No. M04913169-9, which letter states:

Enclosed herewith is the information found to

be discoverable in the Pitchess motion held

on Friday, September 24, 2004, in the aboveentitled matter, consisting, in part, of the

names, addresses and phone numbers of

involved parties in Fresno Police Department

Internal Affairs Cases Nos. 20000093 and

2002140.

Also please be reminded that the Protective

Order on file with the court prohibits

duplication of these materials. Accordingly,

upon completion of these proceedings, all

material provided herein must be returned to

the Fresno Police Department.

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Exhibit A also includes a copy of the notification dated

September 3, 2004 from the City of Fresno that plaintiff’s tort

claim was rejected by operation of law on August 6, 2004. 

Exhibit B is document entitled “Fresno Police Department

Reportable Use of Force Project” for October, November and

December 2003 which has attached to it a pie chart showing the

percentages of types of force used by police officers during that

time period. The pie chart shows that the taser (referred to as

“electronic immobilization device) was used 37.4%; body strike

was used 28.1%; K-9 was used 13.4%; pepper spray was used 7.6%;

“projected impact weapon” was used 5.6%; baton was used 5.0%;

“object strike” was used 1.4%; firearm was used 1.2%; and vehicle

was used 0.3%. 

Plaintiff’s attempt to base Monell liability on Chief Dyer’s

ratification of the defendant officers’ conduct is not alleged in

the Second Amended Complaint. Chief Dyer is not named as a

defendant in this action. The Scheduling Order filed on

September 27, 2005 states in pertinent part:

Plaintiff ... contends that the City of

Fresno is liable and responsible for the acts

of Officers Campos and Manning, because the

City took the action of tazering [sic]

plaintiff pursuant to governmental custom. 

Plaintiff alleges that it is the custom of

Fresno Police Officers, including Officers

Campos and Manning, to resort to the use of a

tazer [sic] gun, even when the totality of

the circumstances do not warrant said use.

When force is applied, Fresno Police

Department Officers, in nearly half of the

reported incidences involving use of force,

resort to the use of a tazer [sic] gun. The

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use of the tazer [sic] gun is by far the most

commonly used instrument involving the use of

force. Despite the tazer gun’s extensive

use, the City failed, and continues to fail,

to properly train Officers Campos and

Manning, and officers of the Fresno Police

Department in the use 

The Second Amended Complaint alleges at Paragraph 9 that

“Plaintiff reserves the right to amend this Complaint to conform

to proof adduced at trial upon oral motion to the Court.”

Plaintiff has made no such request to amend in opposing the

motion for summary judgment nor did he make such request at oral

argument. However, even if such request had been made, it would

be denied. Rule 15(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

provides that “leave [to amend] shall be freely given when

justice so requires.” “The purpose of pleading is ‘to facilitate

a proper decision on the merits’ ... and not erect formal and

burdensome impediments to the litigation process. Unless undue

prejudice to the opposing party will result, a trial judge should

ordinarily permit a party to amend its complaint.” Howey v.

United States, 481 F.2d 1187, 1990 (1973). However, “[t]his

strong policy toward permitting the amendment of pleadings ...

must be tempered with considerations of ‘undue delay, bad faith

or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to

cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue

prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the

amendment, futility of amendment, etc.’ Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S.

178, 182 ... (1962).” Schlacter-Jones, 936 F.2d 455, 443 (9th

Cir. 1991). Denial of leave to amend is not an abuse of

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A Pitchess motion, based on Pitchess v. Superior Court, 11 24

Cal.3d 531 (1974), involves discovery in a criminal case of police

personnel records. This discovery is now governed by various

statutes. See City of San Jose v. Superior Court, 5 Cal.4th 47

(1993).

38

discretion when the motion for leave to amend is an attempt to

avoid pending summary judgment. See Schlacter-Jones, id., 936

F.2d at 443 (“A motion for leave to amend is not a vehicle to

circumvent summary judgment”) and cases cited therein.

Here, plaintiff does not contradict defendants’ assertion

that no discovery was conducted by plaintiff that in any way

infers that there is any basis for the complaints referenced or

that findings made in relation to those complaints were

inappropriate under the totality of the investigation conducted. 

Therefore, leave to amend will result in undue delay. 

Furthermore, it is clear from the record that leave to amend

would be made in an attempt to avoid summary judgment for the

City of Fresno on the Monell claim.

Furthermore, the evidence submitted by plaintiff in

opposition to the motion for summary judgment is not relevant or

probative. A letter submitted by the City Attorney’s Office in

response to an order following a Pitchess motion does not provide

a basis for liability against the City of Fresno. The letter 24

rejecting plaintiff’s tort claim cannot provide a basis for

finding that the City of Fresno ratified unconstitutional

conduct. Ratification by Chief Dyer based on what plaintiff

characterizes in his brief as “clearly deficient” internal

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affairs investigations is not alleged in the Second Amended

Complaint and is not supported by any evidence submitted by

plaintiff. The letter provided by the City Attorney in the

criminal action against Mr. Rios provides no specifics of the

claims made against Officer Campos or the details of the internal

investigation. Plaintiff nowhere sets forth facts upon which he

relies in contending that these investigations were “clearly

deficient.” The rejection of plaintiff’s tort claim by the City

of Fresno simply does not constitute evidence that Chief Dyer

ratified the alleged use of excessive force. There is no

evidence before the court that Chief Dyer participated in the

internal affairs investigation resulting from this incident.

Accordingly, summary judgment for defendants is GRANTED with

respect to plaintiff’s claim against the City of Fresno pursuant

to Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services.

6. Qualified Immunity.

Qualified immunity serves to shield government officials

“from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does

not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The Ninth Circuit employs

a three-part test to determine whether an individual is entitled

to qualified immunity. First, the specific right allegedly

violated must be identified. Secondly, it must be determined

whether that right was so clearly established as to alert a

reasonable officer to its constitutional parameters. Third, if

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the law is clearly established, it must be determined whether a

reasonable officer could have believed lawful the particular

conduct at issue. Kelly v. Borg, 60 F.3d 664, 666 (9 Cir. th

1995). The plaintiff in a Section 1983 action bears the burden

of proving that the right allegedly violated was clearly

established at the time of the officer’s allegedly impermissible

conduct. Camarillo v. McCarthy, 998 F.2d 638, 640 (9 Cir. th

1993). A law is “clearly established” when “the contours of that

right [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable officer would

understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson

v. Creighton, 489 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). To demonstrate clearly

established law at the time of the events in question, the

plaintiff

‘must show that the particular facts of [the]

case support a claim of clearly established

right.’ ... This does not mean that the

‘exact factual situation’ of [the case] must

have been previously litigated ...

‘[S]pecific binding precedent is not required

to show that a right is clearly established

for qualified immunity purposes.’ ... Absent

binding precedent, ‘a court should look at

all available decisional law including

decisions of state courts, other circuits,

and district courts to determine whether the

right was clearly established.’ ...

Nonetheless, ‘[t]he contours of the [clearly

established] right must be sufficiently clear

that a reasonable official would understand

that what he is doing violates that right.’

....

Doe By and Through Doe v. Petaluma City School Dist., 54 F.3d

1447, 1450 (9 Cir. 1995). The Supreme Court has set forth a th

two-pronged inquiry to resolve all qualified immunity claims. 

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First, “taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting

the injury, do the facts alleged show the officers’ conduct

violated a constitutional right?” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,

201 (2001). If the court determines that the conduct did not

violate a constitutional right, the inquiry is over and the

officer is entitled to qualified immunity. However, if the court

determines that the conduct did violate a constitutional right,

Saucier’s second prong requires the court to determine whether,

at the time of the violation, the constitutional right was

“clearly established.” Id. “The relevant, dispositive inquiry

in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether

it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was

unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id. at 202. This

inquiry is wholly objective and is undertaken in light of the

specific factual circumstances of the case. Id. at 201. Even

if the violated right is clearly established, Saucier recognized

that, in certain situations, it may be difficult for a police

officer to determine how to apply the relevant legal doctrine to

the particular circumstances he faces. If an officer makes a

mistake in applying the relevant legal doctrine, he is not

precluded from claiming qualified immunity so long as the mistake

is reasonable. If “the officer’s mistake as to what the law

requires is reasonable, ... the officer is entitled to the

immunity defense.” Id. at 205. In Brosseau v. Haugan, 543 U.S.

194 (2004), the Supreme Court reiterated:

Qualified immunity shields an officer from

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suit when she makes a decision that, even if

constitutionally deficient, reasonably

misapprehends the law governing the

circumstances she confronted. Saucier v.

Katz, 533 U.S., at 206 (qualified immunity

operates ‘to protect officers from the

sometimes “hazy border between excessive and

acceptable force”’). Because the focus is on

whether the officer had fair notice that her

conduct was unlawful, reasonableness is

judged against the backdrop of the law at the

time of the conduct. If the law at that time

did not clearly establish that the officer’s

conduct would violate the Constitution, the

officer should not be subject to liability

or, indeed, even the burdens of litigation.

It is important to emphasize that this

inquiry ‘must be undertaken in light of the

specific context of the case, not as a broad

general proposition.’ Id., at 201. As we

previously said in this very context:

‘[T]here is no doubt that Graham v.

Connor, supra, clearly establishes

the general proposition that use of

force is contrary to the Fourth

Amendment if it is excessive under

objective standards of

reasonableness. Yet, that is not

enough. Rather, we emphasized in

Anderson [v. Creighton] “that the

right the official is alleged to

have violated must have been

‘clearly established’ in a more

particularized, and hence more

relevant, sense: The contours of

the right must be sufficiently

clear that a reasonable officer

would understand that what he is

doing violates that right.’ ... 

The relevant, dispositive inquiry

in determining whether a right is

clearly established is whether it

would be clear to a reasonable

officer that his conduct was

unlawful in the situation he

confronted.’ ... 

The Court of Appeals acknowledged this

statement of law, but then proceeded to find

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fair warning in the general tests set out in

Graham and Garner ... In so doing, it was

mistaken. Graham and Garner, following the

lead of the Fourth Amendment’s text, are cast

at a high level of generality. See Graham v.

Connor, supra, at 396 (‘”[T]he test of

reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is

not capable of precise definition or

mechanical application”’). Of course, in an

obvious case, these standards can ‘clearly

establish’ the answer, even without a body of

relevant case law.’

543 U.S. at 198-199.

Defendant Officer Campos is not entitled to summary judgment

on the issue of qualified immunity. Although plaintiff’s main

complaint is that a less painful force option should have been

used to effectuate his arrest and, as held in Forrester, supra,

there is no constitutional requirement that an officer use the

least intrusive force option, the facts underlying the decision

to use force to effect plaintiff’s arrest are disputed. A

reasonable jury, if it accepts plaintiff’s version of the events, 

could find that the decision by Campos to use any force to effect

the arrest violated the excessive force clause of the Fourth

Amendment. Furthermore, as discussed above, there is no

evidence that Officer Manning deployed the taser, conspired to do

so, or failed to intervene to prevent the use of the taser,

having a realistic opportunity to do so. 

Accordingly, summary judgment for defendant Manning on the

ground of qualified immunity is GRANTED. As to defendant Campos,

the motion is DENIED.

D. Claims Pursuant to California Civil Code §§ 43, 51 and

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The First Cause of Action alleges a violation of Civil Code 25

§ 52.7, which is not mentioned by defendants.

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52.1. 

The Second Amended Complaint contains numerous allegations

in the First, Second, Third and Fourth Causes of Action that

defendants violated California Civil Code §§ 43, 51, 51.7 and

52.1. Civil Code § 43 provides in pertinent part: 25

Besides the personal rights mentioned or

recognized in the Government Code, every

person has, subject to the qualifications and

restrictions provided by law, the right to

protection from bodily restraint or harm,

from personal insult, from defamation, and

from injury to his personal reputation.

Civil Code § 51, also known as the Unruh Civil Rights Act,

provides in pertinent part:

(b) All persons within the jurisdiction of

this state are free and equal, and no matter

what their sex, race, color, religion,

ancestry, national origin, disability,

medical condition, marital status, or sexual

orientation, are entitled to full and equal

accommodations, advantages, facilities,

privileges, or services in all business

establishments of every kind whatsoever. 

Civil Code § 51.7(a) provides in pertinent part that “[a]ll

persons within the jurisdiction of this state have the right to

be free from any violence, or intimidation by threat of violence,

committed against their persons ... on account of any

characteristic defined in subdivision (b) .. of Section 51 ... or

because another person perceives them to have one or more of

those characteristics.” Civil Code § 52.1 provides in pertinent

part:

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(a) If a person or persons, whether or not

acting under color of state law, interferes

by threats, intimidation, or coercion, or

attempts to interfere by threats,

intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise

or enjoyment by any individual ... of rights

secured by the Constitution or laws of the

United States, the Attorney General, or any

district attorney or city attorney may bring

a civil action .....

(b) Any individual whose exercise or

enjoyment of rights secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States or

of rights secured by the Constitution or laws

of this state, has been interfered with, or

attempted to be interfered with, as described

in subdivision (a), may institute and

prosecute in his ... own name and on his ...

own behalf a civil action for damages,

including, but not limited to, damages under

Section 52, injunctive relief, and other

appropriate equitable relief to protect the

peaceable exercise or enjoyment of the right

or rights secured.

“Section 52.1 does not provide any substantive protections;

instead, it enables individuals to sue for damages as a result of

constitutional violations.” Reynolds v. County of San Diego, 84

F.3d 1162, 1170 (9 Cir.1996). In Venegas v. County of Los th

Angeles, 32 Cal.4th 820, 843 (2004), the California Supreme Court

held “[i]n pursuing relief for their constitutional violations

under section 52.1, plaintiffs need not allege that defendants

acted with discriminatory animus or intent, so long as those acts

were accompanied by the requisite threats, intimidation, or

coercion.” 

Plaintiff has limited his federal constitutional claim to

excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Summary

judgment for defendants is granted with respect to these state

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law statutory claims. With regard to Section 51 and 51.7, there

is no evidence from which it may be inferred that defendants

acted against plaintiff unlawfully because of his race or

national origin. Furthermore, with regard to each of the

statutory claims, there is no evidence that any defendant

attempted to interfere with a specific constitutional right by

threats, intimidation or coercion, or by committing or

threatening to commit a violent act against plaintiff or that

plaintiff reasonably believed that if he exercised a specific

constitutional right, defendants would commit violence against

him.

Therefore, summary judgment for defendants is GRANTED with

respect to the claims in the First, Second, Third and Fourth

Causes of Action that defendants violated California Civil Code

§§ 43, 51, 51.7 and 52.1.

E. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.

Because plaintiff conceded summary judgment for defendants

at oral argument with respect to the Fourth Cause of Action for

intentional infliction of emotional distress, defendants’ motion

is GRANTED.

F. Negligence Per Se.

The Fifth Cause of Action, captioned “negligence per se,” 

alleges that defendants “owed a duty of care to Plaintiff, not to

falsely arrest and imprison him as Set forth in the Fourth

Amendment ..., Article One, Sections One and Seven of the

California Constitution, and California Civil Code ... § 43 and §

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52.1" and that the alleged conduct of defendants “constitutes

negligence per se ... in that Defendants ... breached the

statutory standards set forth” in these constitutional and

statutory provisions.

Defendants’ motion is GRANTED. “‘Negligence per se’ is an

evidentiary doctrine codified at Evidence Code section 669. 

Under subdivision (a) of this section, the doctrine creates a

presumption of negligence if four elements are established: (1)

the defendant violated a statute, ordinance, or regulation of a

public entity; (2) the violation proximately caused death or

injury to person or property; (3) the death or injury resulted

from an occurrence the nature of which the statute, ordinance, or

regulation was designed to prevent; and (4) the person suffering

the death or injury to his person or property was one of the

class of persons for whose protection the statute, ordinance, or

regulation was adopted.” Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Center, 140

Cal.App.4th 1256, 1285 (2006). “[T]he doctrine of negligence per

se does not establish tort liability. Rather, it merely codifies

the rule that a presumption of negligence arises from the

violation of a statute which was enacted to protect a class of

persons of which the plaintiff is a member against the type of

harm that the plaintiff suffered as a result of the violation.” 

Id. “Even if the four requirements of Evidence code section 669,

subdivision (a), are satisfied, this alone does not entitle a

plaintiff to a presumption of negligence in the absence of an

underlying negligence action.” Id.

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G. Sixth Cause of Action for Negligent Infliction of

Emotional Distress and Negligence and Eighth Cause of Action for

Negligence. 

Defendants move for summary judgment on the Sixth Cause of

Action for negligent infliction of emotional distress.

There is no independent tort of negligent infliction of

emotional distress. Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6

Cal.4th 965, 984 (1993). Rather, the tort is negligence. Id.

The facts set forth above establish as a matter of law that

the defendants did not act negligently in using force to arrest

plaintiff. Therefore, defendants’ motion is GRANTED.

H. Seventh Cause of Action for Assault and Battery.

Defendants move for summary judgment with respect to this

cause of action.

“In order to prevail on a claim of battery against a police

officer, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the officer

used unreasonable force ... ‘A police in California may use

reasonable force to make an arrest, prevent escape or overcome

resistance, and need not desist in the face of resistance. (Pen.

Code, § 835a.). The standard jury instruction in police battery

actions recognize this: “A peace officer who uses unreasonable or

excessive force in making a lawful arrest or detention commits a

battery upon the person being arrested or detained as to such

excessive force.”(BAJI No. 7.54).’ ....” Munoz, supra, 120

Cal.App.4th at 1102. 

Therefore, because defendants are not entitled summary

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judgment on plaintiff’s claim of excessive force in violation of

the Fourth Amendment, see discussion supra, defendants’ motion is

DENIED.

I. Punitive Damages.

The Second Amended Complaint prays for exemplary or punitive

damages against Officers Campos and Manning in connection with

each of the causes of action alleged against them in the Second

Amended Complaint.

Punitive damages may be assessed in a Section 1983 action

“when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil

motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous

indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” Smith

v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983). Under California law, punitive

damages are allowed if the plaintiff “has proved by clear and

convincing evidence that [the named defendant] engaged in that

conduct with malice, oppression, or fraud.” CACI 3941. 

“‘Malice’ means that [the named defendant] acted with into to

cause injury or that [the named defendant’s] conduct was

despicable and was done with a willful and knowing disregard of

the rights or safety of another. A person acts with knowing

disregard when he or she is aware of the probable dangerous

consequences of his or her conduct and deliberately fails to

avoid those consequences.’ Id. “‘Oppression’ means that [the

named defendant]’s conduct was despicable and subjected [the

plaintiff] to cruel and unjust hardship in knowing disregard of

[his] rights.” Id. “‘Despicable conduct’ is conduct that is so

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vile, base, or contemptible that it would be looked down on and

despised by reasonable people.” Id.

Defendants move for summary judgment in favor of the

defendant officers, contending that there is no evidence

presented which would support an award of punitive damages.

Plaintiff responds that defendant Campos “purposefully tazed

Plaintiff”, that the use of the taser was unreasonable, and that

plaintiff “has presented evidence to support that Defendants

displayed callous indifference to Plaintiff.”

Plaintiff has presented no evidence which would justify an

award of punitive damages against Officer Manning. 

Because the use of the taser by Officer Campos arguably

constitutes excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment

and state tort law, there is a question of fact whether his use

of the taser was motivated by evil motive or intent or was in

reckless or callous indifference to the Fourth Amendment rights

of plaintiff. 

ACCORDINGLY, as set forth above:

1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to

all defendants as to all claims, except, as to defendant Campos,

individually, for the First Cause of Action for excessive force

in violation of the Fourth Amendment and the Seventh Cause of

Action for battery under state law.

2. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the prayer

for punitive damages is GRANTED with respect to all defendants,

except it is DENIED with respect to defendant Campos as to the

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First Cause of Action for excessive force and the Seventh Cause

of Action for battery under state law.

3. Pretrial conference is scheduled for Monday, November

20, 2006 at 11:00 a.m. in Courtroom 3.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 14, 2006 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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