Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00350/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00350-8/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Matthew Kramer
Respondent
Albert Levell Riley
Petitioner

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U.S. District Court

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALBERT LEVELL RILEY, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

A.K. SCRIBNER, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:05-CV-0350 LJO JMD HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS 

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT

TO CHANGE NAME OF RESPONDENT

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant to

a judgment of the Fresno County Superior Court. A jury convicted Petitioner of attempted murder

(Cal. Penal Code §§ 187(a), 664), attempted robbery (Cal. Penal Code §§ 211, 664), attempted

carjacking (Cal. Penal Code §§ 215, 664), and assault with a firearm (Cal. Penal Code § 245(a)(2)). 

(Answer at 2.) The jury also found that Petitioner personally used a firearm (Cal. Penal Code §§

12022.5(a)(1), 12022.53(b), 1203.06(a)(1)), personally and intentionally discharged a firearm (Cal.

Penal Code § 12022.53(c)), personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily

injury (Cal. Penal Code § 12022.53(d)), personally inflicted great bodily injury (Cal. Penal Code §

12022.7(a)), and personally inflicted great bodily injury causing paralysis (Cal. Penal Code §

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12022.7(a), (b)). (Id.) The trial court sentenced Petitioner to a total term of 32 years to life. (Id.) 

Petitioner appealed to the California Court of Appeal. On August 28, 2002, the court

affirmed the judgment. (Answer at 2; Lodged Docs. 1-4.) 

Petitioner then filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. On November 13,

2002, the court denied the petition. (Answer at 2; Lodged Docs. 5-6.)

On February 18, 2003, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Fresno

County Superior Court. On March 5, 2003, the court denied the petition. (Lodged Docs. 7-8.) 

On September 18, 2003, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California

Supreme Court. On June 9, 2004, the court denied the petition. (Lodged Docs. 9-10.)

On February 10, 2005, Petitioner filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Supreme Court. On December 14, 2005, the court denied the petition. (Lodged Docs. 11-

12.)

On March 15, 2005, Petitioner filed the instant petition in this Court. The petition raises the

following fifteen grounds for relief: 1) denial of right to self-representation violated Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendments; 2) ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on failure to secure

testimony of Delma Wilks; 3) imposition of 25-years-to-life firearm enhancement under Penal Code

section 12022.53(d) violated ban on cruel and unusual punishment; 4) imposition of 25-years-to-life

firearm enhancement under Penal Code section 12022.53(d) violated due process and equal

protection; 5) instructing the jury with CALJIC 17.41.1 violated rights to trial by fair and impartial

jury and to unanimous verdict; 6) trial court committed sentencing error when it imposed, then

stayed, the enhancement for great bodily injury under Penal Code section 12022.7 when it also

imposed the enhancement under section 12022.53(d); 7) various claims of ineffective assistance of

trial counsel; 8) ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on failure to move for mistrial after

jurors observed Petitioner in shackles; 9) insufficient evidence to support convictions for attempted

robbery and attempted carjacking; 10) ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on failure to

investigate and put forth a self-defense or accidental shooting defense; 11) violation of confrontation

rights when trial court allowed Officer Irel Del Valle to testify regarding the victim’s statements; 12)

ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel based on the failure to object to, or raise on

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28 The facts are derived from the factual summary set forth by the California Court of Appeal in its opinion of August 1

8, 2002 and are presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(2), (e)(1); Lodged Doc. 1.

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California Jp 3

appeal, Petitioner’s claims of Confrontation Clause violations; 13) trial court improperly admitted

testimony of prosecution fingerprint expert and trial and appellate counsel were ineffective in failing

to “press” the objection to the evidence and raise the issue on appeal; 14) Petitioner is actually

innocent of the crimes for which he was convicted; and 15) ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel. 

On June 15, 2006, Respondent filed a response to the petition. 

On December 8, 2006, Petitioner filed a traverse to the answer.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

At approximately 9:15 in the morning of June 24, 1999, Santos Garcia was driving on East

Drummond Street near Bardell in Fresno looking for a place to park. As Garcia slowed, a man

opened the passenger door, sat in the front seat, pulled out a chrome revolver and pointed it at

Garcia's head. The man said about two words in English; however, Garcia, who spoke only Spanish,

did not understand them.

Garcia reached out with his right arm and attempted to lower the gun by lowering the man's

hand. The man fired the gun immediately, striking Garcia on his right shoulder. Garcia let go of the

steering wheel, causing the vehicle to go up over a curb and come to rest against a chain link fence

surrounding a house. Garcia described his attacker as a tall, medium build, African-American male,

with short curly hair and a scar on the left side of his forehead. As a result of the shooting, Garcia

was permanently paralyzed from his midchest to his feet.

Fresno Police Officers Irel Del Valle and James Rossetti responded to the shooting, arriving

at 9:18 am. Officer Del Valle accompanied Garcia to the hospital. He told Del Valle, in Spanish,

that his attacker had gotten into his car and said, “Give me your fucking money and your car.” 

Garcia described the assailant as a tall (six feet seven inches or taller), 20-year-old, AfricanAmerican male with a three- to four-inch scar on his forehead. He also stated that he had seen the

man in the neighborhood during the past month and would be able to recognize him if he saw him

again. However, Garcia did not identify Petitioner from a photographic array at the hospital; he was

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also unable to identify Petitioner at trial. In fact, Garcia identified two different men as his attacker

during the photographic lineup.

Katherine J. lived on East Drummond Street at the time of the incident. At the time of the

crash, her children, 10-year-old Erica and 9-year-old Rodney, were watching television in the living

room while she was sleeping in her bedroom. Erica woke up Katherine, who dialed 911 and ran

outside. Katherine told the 911 operator that a tall, African-American male shot Garcia and then ran

down Bardell Street. However, at trial, Katherine insisted that she only saw Garcia alone in the

vehicle after the shooting. Officer James Brewer of the Fresno Police Department testified that he

had interviewed Katherine shortly after the incident. She stated that she had seen an AfricanAmerican male exit from the passenger side of Garcia's vehicle and run southbound on Bardell.

Fresno Police Officer Dean Cardinale also responded to the shooting. Shortly after the

incident, Cardinale interviewed Erica, who stated that she had been looking out the window when

she saw Garcia's vehicle come to a stop on the front lawn. She saw a six feet six inches tall AfricanAmerican man, weighing over 200 pounds, get out of the passenger side of the vehicle with a gun in

his hand. The man put the gun in his pocket and then ran south down Bardell Street. She stated that

she recognized the man as one of her neighbors, although she did not know his name. However, she

did know where he lived and pointed out the residence to Cardinale. It was later established that

Petitioner lived at that residence.

At trial, Erica testified that she did not see anyone exit Garcia's vehicle. She also stated that

an officer had taken her to identify a man; however, she stated she could not make an identification

because she had not seen him. She also denied ever pointing out a house to the officers.

Rossetti testified that he interviewed Rodney shortly after the incident. Rodney stated that he

was inside when he heard a shot and then saw a man run from the vehicle and around the corner. A

prosecution investigator testified that he spoke with Rodney three months after the shooting. Rodney

told him that he had been watching television when he heard a shot. He then went to get his mother

and they went outside. He saw a man running south down Bardell, but he did not see his face. At

trial, Rodney testified that he did not remember the incident and he did not remember speaking to the

police or the prosecutor's investigator about the incident.

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Cloyd Marshall also resided on East Drummond. He testified that he went outside after the

shooting and saw Petitioner walking at a fast pace in a southerly direction down Bardell. The day

after the shooting, Detective Torres contacted Marshall and showed him a photographic array. 

Marshall identified Petitioner as the man he had seen walking from the scene of the shooting. 

Marshall also told Torres that if he was looking for Petitioner, he was on the “right track.” Torres

testified that Marshall told him he saw Petitioner running from the scene. He also noted that it was

difficult to get Marshall to cooperate with the investigation.

Fingerprint expert Christina Stirling testified that she processed Garcia's car for fingerprints

about an hour after the shooting. She recovered two fingerprints from the passenger door. After

conducting a fingerprint analysis, she determined that the fingerprints belonged to Petitioner.

A partial palm print was also recovered from the door; however, it did not match Petitioner's

palm print, and Stirling was unable to positively identify it.

The day after the shooting, Fresno Police Officer William Andrews observed Petitioner get

into the back of a sport utility vehicle driven by a female. Once inside the vehicle, Petitioner put his

head down, as if he were lying down. The woman drove off and was stopped by a marked patrol unit

a short time later. Both Petitioner and the female were ordered out of the vehicle. Petitioner

remained lying down until he exited the vehicle. A search of the vehicle revealed two empty

suitcases and an empty garment bag.

Officer Andrews testified that Petitioner had a scar on his forehead and was six feet four

inches to six feet five inches tall.

Petitioner presented no defense.

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant

to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

375 n.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S.

Constitution. In addition, the conviction challenged arises out of the Fresno County Superior Court,

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which is located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d). 

Accordingly, the Court has jurisdiction over the action. 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. 

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114

F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997), quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir. 1996),

cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320

(1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant petition

was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA; thus, it is governed by its provisions.

II. Legal Standard of Review

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The instant petition is reviewed under the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act which became effective on April 24, 1996. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70 (2003). 

Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus will not be granted unless the adjudication of

the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or

“resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Lockyer, 538 U.S. at

70-71; see Williams, 529 U.S. at 413.

As a threshold matter, this Court must "first decide what constitutes 'clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.'" Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71,

quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In ascertaining what is "clearly established Federal law," this Court

must look to the "holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions as of the time

of the relevant state-court decision." Id., quoting Williams, 592 U.S. at 412. "In other words,

'clearly established Federal law' under § 2254(d)(1) is the governing legal principle or principles set

forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision." Id.

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Finally, this Court must consider whether the state court's decision was "contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law." Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72,

quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). “Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant

the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a

question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of

materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413; see also Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72. 

“Under the ‘reasonable application clause,’ a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court

identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies

that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. 

“[A] federal court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state court decision applied clearly established federal law

erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A

federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state

court’s application of clearly established federal law was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. 

 Petitioner has the burden of establishing that the decision of the state court is contrary to or

involved an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court precedent. Baylor v. Estelle,

94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996). Although only Supreme Court law is binding on the states,

Ninth Circuit precedent remains relevant persuasive authority in determining whether a state court

decision is objectively unreasonable. See Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th Cir.

1999). 

AEDPA requires that we give considerable deference to state court decisions. The state

court's factual findings are presumed correct, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), and we are bound by a state's

interpretation of its own laws. Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 621 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied,

537 U.S. 859 (2002), rehearing denied, 537 U.S. 1149 (2003). 

III. Review of Petitioner’s Claims

A. Ground One

Petitioner argues that the trial court violated his constitutional right to self-representation

when it failed to act on Petitioner’s unequivocal request to represent himself. Petitioner bases his

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claim on a discussion that took place at a hearing on Friday, September 24, 1999. After Petitioner’s

counsel requested a continuance of the trial, which was scheduled to begin the following Monday,

Petitioner stated, “I would like to exercise my pro per status rights by right of law because I don’t

feel that I should have to waive time.” (RT at 2.) The trial court stated that a hearing could be set,

but cautioned Petitioner of the seriousness of the decision that he was making. (RT at 2-3.)

Petitioner stated that he had a right to a speedy trial and that he would like a speedy trial. (RT at 3.) 

Petitioner then stated that he was ready to go to trial, but that he had not yet received discovery. (Id.) 

After the trial court vacated the September 27 trial date based on counsel’s request, Petitioner stated,

“I’ll just go ahead and let him do his thing. I’m going to trial on the 27th so that’s a violation of my

speedy trial rights anyway so there’s nothing I can do.” (RT at 4.) The trial court then inquired

whether Petitioner wanted a hearing on the issue of representing himself before the 27th, with

Petitioner responding, “Yes, I would love to have that hearing.” (RT at 4.) The court, however,

informed Petitioner that a hearing could not be held before September 27, as it was the next court

day, and asked Petitioner what he wished to do. (RT at 5.) Petitioner, after a discussion regarding a

new trial date, waived his speedy trial rights, agreeing to a trial date of November 8. (RT at 6.) The

court then stated “if there’s anything else that you wish to file or do you may do that but as the Court

understands there is nothing else that is before the Court right now, Mr. Riley; is that correct?” (Id.) 

Petitioner responded, “Yes, sir,” and did not subsequently raise the issue of self-representation. (RT

at 6.)

This claim was presented in an appeal to the California Court of Appeal, which affirmed the

judgment on August 28, 2002. (Lodged Docs. 1-4.) The issue was then raised in a petition to the

California Supreme Court, which summarily denied review. (Lodged Doc. 5-6.) The California

Supreme Court, by its “silent order” denying the petition, is presumed to have denied the claims

presented for the same reasons stated in the opinion of the lower court. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501

U.S. 797, 803 (1991). 

In rejecting Petitioner’s claim, the Court of Appeal found that Petitioner’s request to

represent himself was at best equivocal and that, in any case, he subsequently withdrew the motion. 

(Lodged Doc. 1 at 6-9.)

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Under the Sixth Amendment, a criminal defendant has the right to waive his right to counsel

and represent himself. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975). “[T]he first requirement in

this process is that the request to forego the assistance of counsel be unequivocal.” U.S. v.

Robinson, 913 F.2d 712, 714 (9th Cir. 1990). “The second requirement under this circuit's reading

of Faretta is that the defendant's waiver of the right to counsel must be made knowingly and

intelligently; that is, a criminal defendant must be aware of the nature of the charges against him, the

possible penalties, and the dangers and disadvantages of self representation.” Id. (quotation marks

omitted). “In addition to being knowing and intelligent, a waiver of the right to counsel must also be

voluntary.” Id. at 715.

The state court’s determination that Petitioner’s request was equivocal and eventually

withdrawn was not unreasonable. While Petitioner initially stated that he wished to exercise his right

to self-representation because he did not want to “waive time,” he later agreed to let counsel “do his

thing” once it became clear that the trial would be continued from September 27. Further, after

Petitioner learned that he could not obtain a hearing on the self-representation issue prior to

September 27, he waived his right to a speedy trial, then agreed with the trial court that nothing

further was pending. Petitioner also did not attempt to revisit the self-representation issue despite the

trial court informing him that he was free to file or do whatever he felt was necessary. 

B. Ground Two

Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to secure the testimony of his

aunt, Delma Wilks. Counsel had spoken to Ms. Wilks and, despite the fact she was reluctant to

appear because there was a warrant out for her arrest, counsel did not subpoena her. (Traverse, Ex. I

at 15-19.) Counsel claims that Ms. Wilks would have testified that she knew the victim, that he had

often dropped her off at Petitioner’s house, and that Petitioner came into contact with the victim’s

vehicle on at least one of those occasions. (Id. at 16.) Ms. Wilks’s declaration, which was submitted

in support of Petitioner’s motion for new trial, stated that the victim was a drug dealer who Petitioner

regularly purchased crack cocaine from, that she saw them together in the victim’s vehicle at 9:00

a.m. on the morning of the incident when the victim was dropping Petitioner off at her house, and

that she failed to appear to testify at Petitioner’s trial because of an outstanding warrant for her arrest. 

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(CT at 1041-42.)

This claim was presented in an appeal to the California Court of Appeal, which affirmed the

judgment on August 28, 2002. (Lodged Docs. 1-4.) The issue was then raised in a petition to the

California Supreme Court, which summarily denied review. (Lodged Docs. 5-6.) The California

Supreme Court, by its “silent order” denying the petition, is presumed to have denied the claims

presented for the same reasons stated in the opinion of the lower court. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501

U.S. 797, 803 (1991). 

In rejecting Petitioner’s claim, the Court of Appeal found that Petitioner did not show

prejudice resulting from counsel’s actions as it was not clear that Ms. Wilks would have testified

even if she had been subpoenaed and because there was a significant amount of evidence other than

the fingerprints that placed Petitioner at the scene. The court further noted that Ms. Wilks’s

declaration would have, at least in part, undermined Petitioner’s case as it would have placed

Petitioner near the scene of the crime and disclosed a motive for the shooting. (Lodged Doc. 1 at 12-

15.)

The law governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is clearly established for the

purposes of the AEDPA deference standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Canales v. Roe, 151

F.3d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 1998.) In a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging ineffective

assistance of counsel, the court must consider two factors. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

687 (1984); Lowry v. Lewis, 21 F.3d 344, 346 (9th Cir. 1994). First, the petitioner must show that

counsel's performance was deficient, requiring a showing that counsel made errors so serious that he

or she was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Strickland, 466

U.S. at 687. The petitioner must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard

of reasonableness, and must identify counsel’s alleged acts or omissions that were not the result of

reasonable professional judgment considering the circumstances. Id. at 688; United States v.

Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d 1344, 1348 (9th Cir. 1995). Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance is

highly deferential. A court indulges a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the

wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Sanders v. Ratelle, 21

F.3d 1446, 1456 (9th Cir.1994).

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Second, the petitioner must demonstrate that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel's unprofessional errors, the result ... would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

Petitioner must show that counsel's errors were so egregious as to deprive the defendant of a fair

trial, one whose result is reliable. Id. at 688. The court must evaluate whether the entire trial was

fundamentally unfair or unreliable because of counsel’s ineffectiveness. Id.; Quintero-Barraza, 78

F.3d at 1345; United States v. Palomba, 31 F.3d 1356, 1461 (9th Cir. 1994).

A court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining

the prejudice suffered by the petitioner as a result of the alleged deficiencies. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

697. Since the defendant must affirmatively prove prejudice, any deficiency that does not result in

prejudice must necessarily fail. However, there are certain instances which are legally presumed to

result in prejudice, e.g., where there has been an actual or constructive denial of the assistance of

counsel or where the State has interfered with counsel’s assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692;

United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 & n.25 (1984). Ineffective assistance of counsel claims

are analyzed under the “unreasonable application” prong of Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). 

Weighall v. Middle, 215 F.3d 1058, 1062 (9th Cir. 2000). 

The state court’s determination that Petitioner failed to establish prejudice was not

unreasonable, as Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that Ms. Wilks would have

testified even if she had been subpoenaed. Petitioner’s trial counsel’s declaration, which was

submitted in support of Petitioner’s motion for new trial, states that counsel spoke to Ms. Wilks the

day before the trial and that she stated she would appear to testify. (CT at 1068.) Nevertheless, she

did not appear the following day and counsel was informed by Petitioner’s mother “in no uncertain

terms” that Ms. Wilks was not going to appear. (CT at 673.) Further, Ms. Wilks’s declaration does

not suggest that she would have appeared if she had been subpoenaed, as she states that she avoided

appearing because she did not want to be arrested on an outstanding warrant. (CT at 1041-42.) 

Even assuming Ms. Wilks would have appeared and testified in accordance with her

declaration, Petitioner has not shown a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been

different as there was evidence aside from the fingerprints establishing Petitioner’s involvement in

the crime. This evidence included the physical description given by the victim, the description given

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by Erica and the fact that she identified Petitioner’s house as the home of the man seen running from

the scene, the description given by Katherine, and the identification made by Marshall. Further, Ms.

Wilks’s expected testimony would have, at least to some extent, undermined Petitioner’s case as it

would have put him at the scene near the time of the incident and shown that a drug deal gone bad

was a possible motive for Petitioner to commit the crime.

C. Ground Three

Petitioner argues that the trial court’s imposition of the 25-years-to-life firearm enhancement

under Penal Code section 12022.53(d), as applied to him, constituted cruel and unusual punishment. 

Petitioner argues that the punishment is disproportionate to his crime, to other sentences in

California, and to other states’ firearm enhancements.

This claim was presented in an appeal to the California Court of Appeal, which affirmed the

judgment on August 28, 2002. (Lodged Docs. 1-4.) The issue was then raised in a petition to the

California Supreme Court, which summarily denied review. (Lodged Docs. 5-6.) The California

Supreme Court, by its “silent order” denying the petition, is presumed to have denied the claims

presented for the same reasons stated in the opinion of the lower court. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501

U.S. 797, 803 (1991). 

In rejecting Petitioner’s claim, the Court of Appeal, referencing analyses done in prior

California Court of Appeal opinions, found that the 25-years-to-life enhancement did not constitute

cruel and unusual punishment. (Lodged Doc. 1 at 15.)

“The Eighth Amendment ... contains a narrow proportionality principle that applies to

noncapital sentences. Under this narrow proportionality principle, the Eighth Amendment does not

require strict proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences

that are grossly disproportionate to the crime. [¶] Although the Supreme Court has reviewed Eighth

Amendment challenges to a number of state and federal sentences, it has struck down only two of

them over the past century. In Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367, 30 S.Ct. 544, 54 L.Ed.

793 (1910), the Court invalidated under the Eighth Amendment a sentence of fifteen years in chains

and at hard labor, plus permanent surveillance and civil disabilities, for the crime of falsifying a

public document. Seventy-three years later, in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77

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L.Ed.2d 637 (1983), the Court invalidated under the Eighth Amendment a sentence of life

imprisonment without the possibility of parole imposed under South Dakota law against a nonviolent

recidivist whose final crime was writing a no account check with the intent to defraud.” U.S. v.

Angelos, 433 F.3d 738, 750 (10th Cir. 2006) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

“In contrast to these two cases, the Supreme Court has rejected Eighth Amendment

challenges to the following sentences:

• A life sentence, with the possibility of parole, under a Texas recidivist statute for

successive convictions of (1) fraudulent use of a credit card to obtain $80 worth of

goods or services, (2) passing a forged check in the amount of $28.36, and (3)

obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 285, 100

S.Ct. 1133, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980).

• A forty-year sentence for possession and distribution of 9 ounces of marijuana. 

Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375, 102 S.Ct. 703, 70 L.Ed.2d 556 (1982).

• A life sentence, without the possibility of parole, for possession of more than 650

grams of cocaine. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005, 111 S.Ct. 2680.

• A twenty-five year to life sentence imposed under a California recidivist statute for

the offense of felony grand theft (i.e., stealing three golf clubs worth approximately

$1,200). Ewing, 538 U.S. at 30-31, 123 S.Ct. 1179.

• Two consecutive twenty-five-year to life sentences under a California recidivist

statute for two counts of petty theft. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 77, 123 S.Ct.

1166, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003).

Considered together, these cases clearly support the Supreme Court's recent statement in Andrade

that [t]he gross disproportionality principle reserves a constitutional violation for only the

extraordinary case.” Id. at 750-51.

The state court’s determination that the 25-years-to-life enhancement was not cruel and

unusual punishment was not unreasonable, as this is not an “extraordinary” case in which the

sentence was grossly disproportionate to the crime for which it was imposed. See U.S. v. Khan, 461

F.3d 477, 495 (4th Cir. 2006) (finding that severe, mandatory penalties may be cruel, but that they

are not unusual, noting that the Supreme Court has never held that a sentence to a specific term of

years constituted cruel and unusual punishment).

D. Ground Four

Petitioner argues that Penal Code section 12022.53 violates due process and equal protection

because it is irrational and because it results in unreasonably disparate punishment of similar

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offenders whose only difference is their deadly weapon of choice.

This claim was presented in an appeal to the California Court of Appeal, which affirmed the

judgment on August 28, 2002. (Lodged Doc. 1.) The issue was then raised in a petition to the

California Supreme Court, which summarily denied review. (Lodged Doc. 6.) The California

Supreme Court, by its “silent order” denying the petition, is presumed to have denied the claims

presented for the same reasons stated in the opinion of the lower court. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501

U.S. 797, 803 (1991). 

In rejecting Petitioner’s claim, the Court of Appeal found that the enhancement does not

violate due process or equal protection, referencing prior California Court of Appeal opinions

finding that the enhancement does not treat similarly-situated groups unequally and that it is

rationally related to a legitimate state interest, as it protects the public from firearms. (Lodged Doc.

1 at 15.)

“The Equal Protection Clause commands that no State shall deny to any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. This provision creates no substantive rights. Instead, it

embodies a general rule that States must treat like cases alike but may treat unlike cases accordingly. 

If a legislative classification or distinction neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect

class, we will uphold [it] so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end.” Vacco v.

Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799 (1997) (citations and quotation marks omitted). In the sentencing context,

an argument based on the Due Process Clause, which forbids imposing penalties based on arbitrary

distinctions, essentially duplicates an argument based on equal protection. Chapman v. U.S., 500

U.S. 453, 465 (1991).

The state court’s determination that section 12022.53 does not violate due process or equal

protection was not unreasonable, as the mandatory sentences imposed under the section are rationally

related to the legitimate purpose of discouraging the use of firearms in the commission of violent

crimes. See U.S. v. Khan, 461 F.3d 477, 495 (4th Cir. 2006) (finding no equal protection or due

process violation as “[d]iscouraging and preventing the use of firearms in the commission of crimes

of violence constitutes a legitimate state purpose” and “mandatory sentencing rationally relates to

this legitimate purpose”); U.S. v. Angelos, 433 F.3d 738, 754 (10th Cir. 2006) (finding that

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mandatory minimum sentencing scheme was rationally related to legitimate purpose of attempting to

combat the dangerous combination of drugs and guns); U.S. v. Ellsworth, 456 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th

Cir. 2006) (stating that rational basis standard of review applies to equal protection challenges based

on comparison of allegedly disparate sentences).

E. Ground Five

Petitioner argues that instructing the jury with CALJIC 17.41.1 violated his Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights to trial by a fair and impartial jury and to a verdict by a unanimous

jury. The instruction reads as follows:

The integrity of a trial requires that jurors at all times during their deliberations,

conduct themselves as required by these instructions. Accordingly, should it occur

that any juror refuses to deliberate or expresses an intention to disregard the law or to

decide the case based on penalty or punishment or any other improper basis, it is the

obligation of the other jurors to immediately advise the Court of the situation. 

(CT at 948.)

This claim was presented in an appeal to the California Court of Appeal, which affirmed the

judgment on August 28, 2002. (Lodged Docs. 1-4.) The issue was then raised in a petition to the

California Supreme Court, which summarily denied review. (Lodged Docs. 5-6.) The California

Supreme Court, by its “silent order” denying the petition, is presumed to have denied the claims

presented for the same reasons stated in the opinion of the lower court. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501

U.S. 797, 803 (1991). 

In rejecting Petitioner’s claim, the Court of Appeal noted that the California Supreme Court

had already found that the instruction did not infringe upon any constitutional right. (Lodged Doc. 1

at 17.) 

The state court’s determination was not unreasonable because no Supreme Court case

establishes that such an instruction violates any constitutional right. Brewer v. Hall, 378 F.3d 952,

955-56 (9th Cir. 2004) (“It is clear, however, that the California appellate court's holding was not

contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent, because

no Supreme Court case establishes that an instruction such as CALJIC 17.41.1 violates an existing

constitutional right.”).

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F. Ground Six

Petitioner argues that the trial court committed sentencing error when it imposed, then stayed,

the enhancements for great bodily injury under Penal Code section 12022.7 when it also imposed the

25-years-to-life enhancement under section 12022.53(d). Petitioner argues that a stay of the great

bodily injury enhancements was insufficient and that they should have been stricken. 

This claim was presented in an appeal to the California Court of Appeal, which affirmed the

judgment on August 28, 2002. (Lodged Docs. 1-4.) The issue was not presented to the California

Supreme Court. 

In rejecting Petitioner’s claim, the Court of Appeal found that the legislative history of

section 12022.53 and the California Rules of Court made clear that the proper procedure was to stay

the great bodily injury enhancements, rather than strike them, to prevent Petitioner from receiving an

undeserved windfall if the 25-years-to-life enhancement was later stricken. (Lodged Doc. 1 at 17-

20.) 

“Absent a showing of fundamental unfairness, a state court's misapplication of its own

sentencing laws does not justify federal habeas relief.” Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 461, 469 (9th

Cir. 1994); see also Hendricks v. Zenon, 993 F.2d 664, 674 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that “claim

regarding merger of convictions for sentencing is exclusively concerned with state law and [is]

therefore not cognizable in a federal habeas corpus proceeding”); Miller v. Vasquez, 868 F.2d 1116,

1118-19 (9th Cir. 1989) (refusing to address merits of whether assault with a deadly weapon

qualified as a serious felony under California’s sentence enhancement provisions as question was

purely one of state sentencing law).

Petitioner’s claim that the trial court erred when it imposed, then stayed, the enhancements

for great bodily injury under Penal Code section 12022.7 is not reviewable in a federal habeas

proceeding as it is purely a question of state sentencing law. Further, Petitioner has failed to show

that staying the enhancements rather than striking them was fundamentally unfair, as it did not result

in any prejudice to him such as an increase in his sentence.

G. Ground Seven

Petitioner makes numerous claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. As stated above,

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he must show deficient performance by counsel and prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 687, 691-92 (1984). 

These claims were presented in a petition for writ of habeas corpus to the Fresno County

Superior Court, which was denied on March 5, 2003. (Lodged Docs. 7-8.) The issues were then

raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus to the California Supreme Court, which was summarily

denied. (Lodged Docs. 9-10.) The California Supreme Court, by its “silent order” denying the

petition, is presumed to have denied the claims presented for the same reasons stated in the opinion

of the lower court. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). 

In rejecting the claims, the Superior Court found that Petitioner had not shown prejudice

resulting from counsel’s actions, noting that many of the claims were based on counsel’s failure to

put forth the conflicting defense theories of misidentification and self-defense. (Lodged Doc. 8 at 1-

2.) 

1. Failure to provide witness statements

Petitioner argues that his former trial counsel, Jack Weiss, provided ineffective assistance

when he failed to provide Petitioner’s new counsel, Linden Lindahl, with certain reports and

statements. Petitioner argues that Mr. Lindahl was not able to properly prepare a defense strategy or

engage in effective cross-examination because he did not obtain the July 28, 1999 statement of Erica

Wainwright.

At trial, a police officer testified that, shortly after the incident, Erica told him that she saw a

person exit the victim’s vehicle with a gun and run down the street. She recognized the man as one

of her neighbors and, when asked where he lived, she identified Petitioner’s residence. Erica

testified, however, that she did not see a man exit the vehicle and she denied identifying a residence

to police. In the July 28, 1999 statement Erica gave to an investigator, she stated that she observed a

black man run away from the scene but that she never saw his face and could not make an

identification of him. (Petition, Ex. C at 1.) Erica denied seeing the man do anything and she denied

pointing out where Petitioner lived to police. (Id. at 1-2.) Mr. Lindahl declares that, if he would

have obtained the July 28, 1999 statement prior to trial, he would have used it as a prior consistent

statement to bolster Erica’s trial testimony. (Petition, Ex. A, ¶ 12.)

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The state court’s determination was not unreasonable, as Petitioner has not established a

reasonable probability that the result of his trial would have been different if Erica’s July 18, 1999

statement was presented in his defense. The jury was aware of the conflicting testimony of Erica,

that she had not seen anyone at the scene, and of the police officer, who stated that Erica had given a

detailed description of the suspect and pointed out Petitioner’s residence. The July 18, 1999

statement, while generally consistent with Erica’s trial testimony, is not significant enough to

establish a reasonably likelihood of a different result, particularly given the other evidence against

Petitioner including the fingerprint evidence and other eyewitness testimony. 

2. Failure to investigate and prepare for trial

Petitioner argues that his trial counsel failed to conduct an adequate investigation into the

facts surrounding the allegations against him and into the defenses available to him. Petitioner

claims that counsel should have hired an investigator and independent experts and that he filed

inadequate pretrial motions. Petitioner fails, however, to specify what facts would have been

discovered through further investigation or expert analysis, or what motions could have been filed,

that would have resulted in a different outcome. See Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1042 (9th

Cir. 1995) (“Absent an account of what beneficial evidence investigation into any of these issues

would have turned up, [defendant] cannot meet the prejudice prong of the Strickland test.”).

3. Failure to consult

Petitioner claims that his trial counsel failed to spend enough time consulting with him

regarding the facts of the case and trial strategy. Petitioner fails to identify in what way further

consultation would have affected the outcome of his trial.

4. Failure to challenge prosecution witnesses

Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to adequately challenge the

testimony of prosecution witnesses. In support of his claim, Petitioner identifies various portions of

witnesses’ testimony that were inconsistent or that conflicted with other evidence. However, the jury

heard the various inconsistencies and conflicts and was free to consider them. Petitioner does not

specify what counsel should have done to “challenge the validity” of the various statements, and he

has not shown that any such challenge was likely to change the outcome of the trial.

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5. Failure to object to inadmissible evidence

Petitioner, in his motion for new trial, argued that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing

to secure the testimony of Delma Wilks, who would have provided an “innocent explanation” of the

presence of Petitioner’s fingerprints on the victim’s vehicle. (CT at 1037-40.) The trial court denied

the motion, relying in part on Petitioner’s previously suppressed statement in which he admitted

being present in the victim’s vehicle, because there was evidence other than the fingerprints that

placed Petitioner at the scene. (RT at 512-19.) Here, Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was

ineffective in failing to object to the improper consideration of the suppressed statement.

Petitioner has not shown prejudice resulting from counsel’s failure to object, however, as the

court’s basis for denying the motion was not solely the suppressed statement, but also the trial

testimony of independent witnesses who placed Petitioner at the scene. (RT at 517.) 

6. Failure to develop a viable defense strategy

Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to develop an effective trial

strategy. Petitioner claims that, if counsel had conducted an adequate investigation, he would have

discovered the basis for a “self-defense/accidental shooting defense.” Petitioner also claims,

however, that “[c]ounsel possessed evidence that Santos Garcia was dealing crack-cocaine and

involved in a drug deal gone bad with petitioner, struggled over a gun Garcia pulled and an

accidental shooting occurred, yet he failed to use this information to develop a defense.” (Petition at

20.) 

Counsel could not put forth the conflicting theories of misidentification and self-defense. 

Petitioner has not shown that counsel failed to adequately investigate Petitioner’s claim of selfdefense or that he performed deficiently by choosing to employ a misidentification defense rather

than arguing self-defense.

7. Failure to present available evidence

Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to present “evidence

concerning an on-going conflict and animosity between the Fresno County Public Defender’s Office

and the law firm of Barker and Associates which adversely affected the conduct of petitioner’s

defense.” (Petition at 22.) In support of his claim, Petitioner has submitted an article from the

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California Lawyer. (Petition, Ex. D.)

Petitioner has not shown deficient performance or prejudice, however, as the article does not

establish that there was any conflict relating to Petitioner’s case or that the outcome of Petitioner’s

trial was adversely affected. 

H. Ground Eight

Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to move for a mistrial based

on the jury viewing Petitioner in shackles. On November 16, 1999, the trial court announced that it

had been informed by the clerk that some of the jurors may have viewed Petitioner in restraints when

he was being led from the courtroom for lunch. (CT at 302.) It was not clear how many jurors saw

Petitioner, how close they were to him, or how he was restrained. (Id.) Counsel declined the court’s

offer to inquire about whether the juror’s viewed Petitioner in restraints, stating that he believed it

would be more damaging to Petitioner to emphasize the point to the jury that he was in custody. (Id.

at 303.) Counsel instead accepted the trial court’s offer to generally instruct the jury that it could not

consider the fact that Petitioner was in custody for any purpose. (Id.)

This claim was presented in a petition for writ of habeas corpus to the California Supreme

Court, which was summarily denied on December 14, 2005. (Lodged Docs. 11-12.) When the state

court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, we

independently review the record to determine whether the state court clearly erred in its application

of Supreme Court law. Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002). However, although

we independently review the record, we still defer to the state court's ultimate decision. Id.

Petitioner has not shown deficient performance, as counsel’s decision to accept the general

instruction to avoid drawing attention to the issue was a reasonable, tactical decision. See

Rutherford v. U.S., 242 Fed.Appx. 427, 428 (9th Cir. 2007) (rejecting an ineffective assistance claim

where trial attorney’s failure to call a witness was a defensible, tactical decision). Further, Petitioner

has not shown prejudice resulting from counsel’s failure to request further inquiry. See Ghent v.

Woodford, 279 F.3d 1121, 1133 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The jury's ‘brief or inadvertent glimpse’ of a

shackled defendant is not inherently or presumptively prejudicial, nor has Ghent made a sufficient

showing of actual prejudice.”); Rhoden v. Rowland, 172 F.3d 633, 636 (9th Cir. 1999) (“A jury's

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brief or inadvertent glimpse of a defendant in physical restraints outside of the courtroom has not

warranted habeas relief.”).

I. Ground Nine

Petitioner argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of attempted robbery and

attempted carjacking.

This claim was presented in a petition for writ of habeas corpus to the California Supreme

Court, which was summarily denied on December 14, 2005. (Lodged Docs. 11-12.) When the state

court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, we

independently review the record to determine whether the state court clearly erred in its application

of Supreme Court law. Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002). However, although

we independently review the record, we still defer to the state court's ultimate decision. Id.

A federal habeas court reviews sufficiency of evidence claims by determining “whether, after

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Lewis v. Jeffers, 497

U.S. 764, 781 (1990); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979). “[T]he standard must be

applied with explicit reference to the substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state

law.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 n.16 (1979).

“An attempt to commit a crime requires a specific intent to commit the crime and a direct but

ineffectual act done toward its commission.” People v. Kipp, 18 Cal.4th 349, 376 (1998); see also

Cal. Penal Code § 664. “Robbery is the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of

another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of

force or fear.” Cal. Penal Code § 211. “‘Carjacking’ is the felonious taking of a motor vehicle in the

possession of another, from his or her person or immediate presence, or from the person or

immediate presence of a passenger of the motor vehicle, against his or her will and with the intent to

either permanently or temporarily deprive the person in possession of the motor vehicle of his or her

possession, accomplished by means of force or fear.” Cal. Penal Code § 215. 

Here, the victim stated that the perpetrator entered his vehicle and pointed a gun at his head. 

There was also testimony that the victim told police that, after the perpetrator entered the vehicle, he

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said, “Give me your fucking money and your car.” Witnesses, including Katherine, Erica, and

Rodney, saw an African-American male exit the passenger seat of the victim’s vehicle and run down

the street. Erica further stated that she saw the man put a gun in his pocket and she took police to

Petitioner’s house when asked where the man she had seen lived. Cloyd Marshall stated that he saw

Petitioner walking down the street at a fast pace following the shooting and he was able to identify

Petitioner from a photographic array. Further, fingerprint expert Christina Stirling testified that she

found Petitioner’s fingerprints on the victim’s vehicle.

This evidence was sufficient to establish that Petitioner entered the victim’s vehicle and

attempted to take his money and vehicle using threats of violence. Viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the prosecution, a reasonable trier of fact could have found Petitioner guilty of

attempted robbery and attempted carjacking.

J. Ground Ten

Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in using a misidentification defense

instead of investigating and putting forth a “self-defense, accidental shooting defense.” Petitioner

claims that counsel failed to obtain and utilize, among other things, 1) the July 28, 1999 statement

made by Erica Wainwright which was consistent with her trial testimony that she could not identify

the man seen running from the incident; 2) the July 28, 1999 statement of Mrs. Cloyd Marshall who

stated that the victim was a regular in the neighborhood and that the incident was not a carjacking;

and 3) the August 4, 1999 report in which Tita Carlos contradicted the victim’s claim that he was in

the neighborhood to visit her. (Decl. Albert Riley ¶ 12; Petition, Ex. C.)

This claim was presented in a petition for writ of habeas corpus to the California Supreme

Court, which was summarily denied on December 14, 2005. (Lodged Docs. 11-12.) When the state

court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, we

independently review the record to determine whether the state court clearly erred in its application

of Supreme Court law. Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002). However, although

we independently review the record, we still defer to the state court's ultimate decision. Id.

The state court did not clearly err in its application of Supreme Court law. Petitioner

acknowledges that, prior to trial, he informed counsel of the factual basis for a potential self-defense

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claim including his version of the incident and the expected testimony of witnesses such as Cloyd

Marshall, Tita Carlos, and Delma Wilks. (Decl. Albert Riley ¶ 19-27.) Petitioner has not shown that

counsel’s investigation was deficient or that his decision to forego a self-defense claim in favor of a

misidentification defense was outside the reasonable range of professional assistance considering the

conflicting evidence and the victim’s inability to identify the perpetrator. See Bean v. Calderon, 163

F.3d 1073, 1082 (9th Cir. 1998) (rejecting ineffective assistance claim where counsel made a

reasonable strategic choice to present an alibi defense rather than a diminished capacity defense).

K. Ground Eleven

Petitioner argues that his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses was violated when the

trial court allowed Officer Irel Del Valle to testify that the victim, Santos Garcia, told her that the

perpetrator said, “Give me your fucking money and your car.” 

This claim was presented in a petition for writ of habeas corpus to the California Supreme

Court, which was summarily denied on December 14, 2005. (Lodged Docs. 11-12.) When the state

court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, we

independently review the record to determine whether the state court clearly erred in its application

of Supreme Court law. Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002). However, although

we independently review the record, we still defer to the state court's ultimate decision. Id.

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment bars the introduction of testimonial, outof-court statements by witnesses who are not subject to cross-examination. U.S. v. Law, 528 F.3d

888, 912 (D.C. Cir. 2008). It does not, however, apply to hearsay by a declarant who appears for

cross-examination at trial. U.S. v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931, 966 (9th Cir. 2007); Crawford v.

Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004) (“[W]hen the declarant appears for cross-examination at

trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial

statements.”); see also U.S. v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 564 (1988) (holding that Confrontation Clause

was not violated where trial court admitted out-of-court identification statement of a witness who

was unable, because of memory loss, to testify concerning the basis for the identification).

The state court did not clearly err in its application of Supreme Court law, as Petitioner had

the opportunity to cross-examine both Santos Garcia and Officer Del Valle regarding the statement

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and he did so. (CT at 165-81, 214-17.)

L. Ground Twelve

Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object on Confrontation

Clause grounds to Officer Del Valle’s testimony regarding the victim’s statement, “Give me your

fucking money and your car.” Petitioner further argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective in

not raising the issue on appeal. 

These claims were presented in a petition for writ of habeas corpus to the California Supreme

Court, which was summarily denied on December 14, 2005. (Lodged Docs. 11-12.) When the state

court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, we

independently review the record to determine whether the state court clearly erred in its application

of Supreme Court law. Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002). However, although

we independently review the record, we still defer to the state court's ultimate decision. Id.

As stated above, Petitioner must show deficient performance by trial counsel resulting in

prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 691-92 (1984). Claims of ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel are also reviewed according to the two-pronged test set forth in

Strickland. See, e.g., Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Birtle,

792 F.2d 846, 847 (9th Cir. 1986). Further, appellate counsel does not have a constitutional duty to

raise every nonfrivolous issue requested by defendant. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-54

(1983); Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434 n.10. The weeding out of weaker issues is widely recognized as one

of the hallmarks of effective appellate advocacy. Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434. As a result, appellate

counsel will frequently remain above an objective standard of competence and have caused his client

no prejudice for the same reason - because he declined to raise a weak issue. Id.

The state court did not clearly err in its application of Supreme Court law. Petitioner has not

shown deficient performance by counsel or prejudice, as his Confrontation Clause claims lack merit

for the reasons previously discussed. 

M. Ground Thirteen

Petitioner argues that the trial court improperly admitted the testimony of Christina Stirling

who analyzed the fingerprints taken from the victim’s vehicle. Petitioner claims that Ms. Stirling’s

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analysis was inaccurate and unreliable and that she should not have been permitted to testify as an

expert witness. Petitioner further argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to press his

objection to the testimony after it was overruled by the trial court and that appellate counsel was

ineffective in failing to raise the claim on appeal.

These claims were presented in a petition for writ of habeas corpus to the California Supreme

Court, which was summarily denied on December 14, 2005. (Lodged Docs. 11-12.) When the state

court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, we

independently review the record to determine whether the state court clearly erred in its application

of Supreme Court law. Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002). However, although

we independently review the record, we still defer to the state court's ultimate decision. Id.

Federal habeas courts do not review questions of state evidence law. Instead, a court may

only consider “whether the petitioner's conviction violated constitutional norms.” Jammal v. Van de

Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991). “We therefore consider whether the admission of the

evidence so fatally infected the proceedings as to render them fundamentally unfair.” Id. “Only if

there are no permissible inferences the jury may draw from the evidence can its admission violate

due process. Even then, the evidence must be of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial.” Id.

at 920 (quotation marks omitted).

The state court did not clearly err in its application of Supreme Court law. Ms. Stirling

testified that she had extensive training and experience in fingerprint analysis and that she had

qualified as an expert in numerous cases in Fresno County. (CT at 260-63.) She then testified

regarding the process of obtaining fingerprints, stated how she had done so in the present case, and

explained how she had conducted her analysis and reached her conclusions. (CT at 264-82.)

Petitioner has not demonstrated that admission of the fingerprint evidence rendered the proceedings

unfair, as he has failed to state facts to support his conclusory claims that Ms. Stirling lacked the

qualifications to testify as an expert and that the techniques she used to analyze the fingerprints were

inaccurate and unreliable. Further, Petitioner has not shown deficient performance by counsel or

prejudice resulting from the failure to “press” the objection to the evidence or raise the claim on

appeal.

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N. Ground Fourteen

Petitioner argues that he is actually innocent of the crimes for which he was convicted and

that, absent the constitutional errors alleged elsewhere in the petition, no jury would have convicted

him. Petitioner also requests an evidentiary hearing on all disputed facts which were not developed

or resolved by the state courts.

“On collateral review of a state court conviction, a federal court must consider whether [an

evidentiary] hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition's factual allegations, which, if

true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief. Additionally, in considering whether the

applicant would be entitled to federal habeas relief, a federal court must take into account the

deferential standards of 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” Estrada v. Scribner, 512 F.3d 1227, 1235 (9th Cir.

2008). 

Petitioner has not set forth any new facts showing that he is actually innocent of the crimes

for which he was convicted or any facts warranting an evidentiary hearing.

O. Ground Fifteen

Petitioner argues that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise the issues set forth

in this petition on appeal. Petitioner has not shown deficient performance by appellate counsel and

prejudice, however, for the reasons stated above.

P. Proper Respondent

Petitioner is currently incarcerated at Folsom State Prison. Respondent states that the warden

of that institution is Matthew Kramer. (Answer at 1.) Pursuant to Rule 25 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, the Clerk will be directed to substitute Matthew Kramer as Respondent in this

matter.

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be

DENIED WITH PREJUDICE and the Clerk of Court be DIRECTED to enter judgment for

Respondent. 

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Lawrence J. O’Neill,

United States District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Rule

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72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of

California. Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall

be served and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the

objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may

waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

ORDER

The Court HEREBY ORDERS that the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to substitute Matthew

Kramer as Respondent in this matter.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 24, 2008 /s/ John M. Dixon 

9f4gk8 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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