Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-22-03025/USCOURTS-caDC-22-03025-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Edward Magruder
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 11, 2024 Decided January 21, 2025

No. 22-3025

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

EDWARD MAGRUDER,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:19-cr-00203-1)

Bruce H. Searby, appointed by the court, argued the cause 

and filed the briefs for appellant.

Michael E. McGovern, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Matthew M. 

Graves, U.S. Attorney, and Chrisellen R. Kolb, John P. 

Mannarino, and Nihar R. Mohanty, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: HENDERSON, MILLETT, and CHILDS, Circuit 

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

USCA Case #22-3025 Document #2095099 Filed: 01/21/2025 Page 1 of 12
2

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: In October 

2019, Edward Magruder pleaded guilty to possession with 

intent to distribute more than a kilogram of heroin. He later 

sought to withdraw his plea but the district court denied the 

motions. On appeal, Magruder contends that the district court 

erred in two respects. First, he argues that the district court 

applied an erroneous legal standard by requiring him to assert 

his innocence as a prerequisite to granting a withdrawal. 

Second, he asserts that his plea was tainted because he received 

ineffective assistance of counsel based on his counsel’s failure

to mount several Fourth Amendment challenges to the 

evidence against him. As detailed infra, we affirm the district 

court.

I. BACKGROUND

In 2018, the FBI collaborated with the Colombian National 

Police (CNP) to investigate a drug-trafficking organization 

with ties to the New Orleans, Louisiana area. The investigation 

revealed that Juan Carlos Mosquera-Amari, a New Orleans 

resident, was part of a drug-trafficking conspiracy connected to

Colombia. By wiretapping Mosquera-Amari’s telephone, the 

FBI identified his Colombian contact and, with the help of the 

CNP, further identified Jhon Jairo Mosquera-Asprilla as the 

Colombian-based source of the drugs. Through a CNP wiretap 

on Mosquera-Asprilla’s telephone, the FBI intercepted 

communications between Mosquera-Asprilla and an individual

with a U.S. telephone number discussing (in coded language) 

various aspects of drug processing and sales. The FBI then 

obtained a search warrant under the Stored Communications 

Act (SCA), 18 U.S.C. § 2703, from a magistrate judge of the

U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana to 

obtain geolocation data for that telephone number; the data 

ultimately associated the number with Magruder, a District of 

Columbia (D.C.) resident. 

USCA Case #22-3025 Document #2095099 Filed: 01/21/2025 Page 2 of 12
3

The geolocation data obtained between December 2018 

and May 2019 showed that Magruder traveled at least seven 

times between D.C. and New York. Each trip lasted no more 

than a few hours in New York and before each trip Magruder 

communicated with Mosquera-Asprilla. During that period, 

the FBI learned that Magruder previously had been convicted 

of drug distribution and, while imprisoned, placed in the same 

facility as Mosquera-Asprilla (who was deported following his

incarceration). By March 2019, the FBI obtained a search 

warrant from the D.C. federal district court authorizing 

interception of communications to Magruder’s telephone. See 

infra n.3. At that point, FBI agents had also determined that 

Magruder had switched to a second telephone with a new

number. They obtained geolocation tracking authorization for 

the new number but did not yet have authority to intercept 

communications at the time of Magruder’s arrest. 

On June 7, 2019, Magruder again traveled to New York 

and was put under FBI observation as soon as he arrived. 

While in New York, he made several calls on a telephone 

(which the FBI could not intercept) and was observed carrying 

a bright blue backpack. The next day, he returned to D.C. 

When he got off the bus carrying a bright blue backpack, FBI 

agents stopped him and searched the backpack. They 

discovered two duct-taped blocks of heroin and arrested 

Magruder. 

On June 10, 2019, Magruder was charged with Unlawful 

Possession with Intent to Distribute One Kilogram or More of 

Heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(i). 

After Magruder’s initial appearance, court-appointed counsel

guided Magruder through the discovery process. On 

September 13, Magruder informed the district court that he 

wished to proceed to trial. Less than a month later, however, 

Magruder changed his position and accepted the Government’s 

USCA Case #22-3025 Document #2095099 Filed: 01/21/2025 Page 3 of 12
4

plea offer. Under the plea agreement, the Government agreed

not to file enhancement papers based on Magruder’s past

convictions under 21 U.S.C. § 851—such filing would have 

increased Magruder’s mandatory minimum sentence from 10 

to 25 years. Instead, the parties agreed to a recommended 

sentencing range of 12 to 15 years of imprisonment.

Before the October 25, 2019 plea hearing, Magruder had 

at least four discussions with his counsel regarding the relevant 

sentencing calculations and discovery process. At the plea 

hearing, Magruder expressed his satisfaction with his counsel’s 

representation and acknowledged that he waived his right to 

appeal any issue other than ineffective assistance of counsel. 

J.A. 56, 59–61. The district court accepted Magruder’s guilty 

plea.1

Nevertheless, later that same day Magruder advised the 

district court by letter that he was dissatisfied with his counsel’s

services, alleging that counsel had inadequately investigated

the case. At a January 27, 2020 hearing, Magruder’s new 

court-appointed counsel affirmed that Magruder wished to 

withdraw his plea and would soon file a motion to that effect. 

Before so moving, however, Magruder’s second courtappointed counsel withdrew his representation and a third

court-appointed counsel assumed Magruder’s representation 

soon thereafter. Magruder subsequently filed sixteen pleadings

seeking to withdraw his guilty plea, all of which were denied 

by the district court. J.A. 276. 

On April 22, 2022, the district court sentenced Magruder 

to 180 months of imprisonment followed by 60 months of 

supervised release. This appeal followed.

1 Neither party disputes that the October 25, 2019 plea hearing 

complied with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 

USCA Case #22-3025 Document #2095099 Filed: 01/21/2025 Page 4 of 12
5

II. ANALYSIS

A. Rule 11(d)(2)(B) Plea Withdrawal

We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s 

denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing. 

Everett v. United States, 336 F.2d 979, 983 (D.C. Cir. 1964).

Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B), a defendant may 

withdraw a previously accepted guilty plea if “the defendant 

can show a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal.” 

Withdrawal “is liberally granted, although . . . not granted as a 

matter of right.” United States v. Ford, 993 F.2d 249, 251 

(D.C. Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 

38 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). In deciding whether such reason exists, 

the court considers three factors: “(1) whether the defendant 

has asserted a viable claim of innocence, (2) whether the delay 

between the guilty plea and the motion to withdraw has 

substantially prejudiced the Government’s ability to prosecute 

the case, and (3) whether the guilty plea was somehow tainted 

by a violation of Rule 11.” United States v. Leyva, 916 F.3d 

14, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (quoting Ford, 993 F.2d at 251) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). The first factor requires the 

defendant to offer a viable claim of innocence, which this court 

has sometimes characterized as requiring, at a minimum, a 

“legally cognizable defense” that effectively denies a 

defendant’s culpability. See id. at 24 (citing United States v. 

Curry, 494 F.3d 1124, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). A guilty plea 

found invalid under the third factor “is all but dispositive.” Id.

at 22 (citing United States v. Cray, 47 F.3d 1203, 1207 (D.C. 

Cir. 1995)). The “validity of a guilty plea” turns on “whether 

the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice” by the 

USCA Case #22-3025 Document #2095099 Filed: 01/21/2025 Page 5 of 12
6

defendant. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985) (citations 

omitted).2

B. District Court’s Application of First Ford Factor

Magruder correctly asserts that we do not require every

defendant seeking to withdraw his guilty plea before 

sentencing to satisfy Ford’s first factor by asserting a “viable”

innocence claim, especially if the third factor weighs heavily 

in the appellant’s favor. Indeed, we are “very lenient when the 

plea was entered unconstitutionally or contrary to Rule 11 

procedures. Such pleas should almost always be permitted to 

be withdrawn . . . regardless of whether the movant has 

asserted his legal innocence.” United States v. Barker, 514 

F.2d 208, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1975). But, without deciding whether 

Magruder is correct in his assertion that the district court “shut 

down consideration of the withdrawal of the plea because of 

the lack of a claim of actual innocence,” we affirm the district 

court because the error, if any, would be harmless. Appellant’s 

Br. 53.

In his series of motions to withdraw his guilty plea, 

Magruder made various Fourth Amendment challenges in

district court. In some, he argued that his claims rendered him

innocent under the first Ford factor; in others, he argued that 

his counsel’s failure to raise his claims amounted to ineffective 

assistance of counsel sufficient to taint his plea under the third 

2 The Government does not claim that the seven-month delay 

between Magruder’s plea and his first motion to withdraw 

“substantially prejudiced” its “ability to prosecute the case.” Ford, 

993 F.2d at 251 (citation omitted). Because that factor “has never 

been dispositive,” the district court rightly focused its analysis on the 

first and third factors, as we do here. Curry, 494 F.3d at 1128 

(quoting United States v. Hanson, 339 F.3d 983, 988 (D.C. Cir. 

2003)). 

USCA Case #22-3025 Document #2095099 Filed: 01/21/2025 Page 6 of 12
7

Ford factor. In rejecting these claims as meritless, the district 

court noted that “Defendant Magruder again fails to recognize 

that ‘suppression of evidence does not amount to legal 

innocence.’” J.A. 279 (quoting United States v. Wintons, 468

F. App’x 231, 233 (4th Cir. 2012)). Although this statement

may have suggested the court’s refusal to entertain an asserted

Fourth Amendment violation as the basis of an innocence 

claim, it would amount to, at most, harmless error. For the 

reasons discussed infra, Magruder could not have succeeded in 

withdrawing his plea based on the suppression motions he 

claims his counsel failed to assert. See United States v. 

Washington, 969 F.2d 1073, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (affirming 

a defendant’s conviction because even though the “trial court 

abused its discretion . . . the error was harmless.”).

C. Magruder’s Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Claims

Magruder asserts that his original retained counsel

rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise at least two 

suppression claims under the Fourth Amendment. Were he

correct, his guilty plea could then be considered tainted under

the third Ford factor. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 56. The general test 

for ineffective assistance is set forth in Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See Curry, 494 F.3d at 

1129. Specifically, a criminal defendant asserting ineffective 

assistance of counsel bears the burden of showing (1) “that 

counsel’s performance was deficient” (i.e., below an “objective 

standard of reasonableness”) and (2) “that the deficient 

performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

687–88. If the defendant asserts that counsel improperly failed 

to challenge a search warrant under the Fourth Amendment, a 

showing of Strickland prejudice requires both that the 

defendant’s “Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious and that 

there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have 

USCA Case #22-3025 Document #2095099 Filed: 01/21/2025 Page 7 of 12
8

been different absent the excludable evidence.” Kimmelman v. 

Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986). Neither of the Fourth 

Amendment claims Magruder asserts his counsel should have 

raised would have been successful and so they fail to satisfy 

Strickland’s prejudice requirement. Accordingly, there was no

taint to Magruder’s guilty plea under the third Ford factor.

1. Backpack Search

Magruder first claims that the district court erred in finding 

his counsel’s failure to move for suppression of the backpack 

search did not constitute ineffective assistance. Magruder 

bases this claim on his assertion that the FBI agents had no 

intention of arresting him until after they discovered the heroin 

and thus they did not conduct a proper search incident to arrest. 

Relatedly, he asserts that the agents lacked probable cause

before their search to believe Magruder was guilty of 

possessing with intent to distribute over a kilogram of heroin, 

the charge he ultimately faced. Both of Magruder’s arguments 

are without merit.

“Where the formal arrest followed quickly on the heels of 

the challenged search of [defendant’s] person, we do not 

believe it particularly important that the search preceded the 

arrest rather than vice versa.” Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 

98, 111 (1980) (citing Bailey v. United States, 389 F.2d 305, 

308 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (“Even if the formal arrest was not made 

until after the search, the search will be upheld so long as there 

is probable cause for an arrest before the search is begun.”)). 

The Government asserts, Magruder does not contest and the 

district court had earlier found that, when the FBI stopped 

Magruder, probable cause existed to believe that Magruder was 

part of an ongoing conspiracy to traffic heroin.3

 Moreover, 

3 The March 2019 search warrant, issued less than three months 

before Magruder’s arrest, was based on “probable cause to believe 

USCA Case #22-3025 Document #2095099 Filed: 01/21/2025 Page 8 of 12
9

Magruder’s unusual travel patterns between New York and 

D.C., coupled with the associated telephone calls with 

Mosquera-Asprilla, a known drug dealer, created a substantial 

likelihood that Magruder was actively engaged in the 

furtherance of that conspiracy as he stepped off the bus in D.C. 

Having thus established probable cause for arrest before the 

search, and with the formal arrest promptly following the 

search, we conclude that the arrest was lawful. Nor does it

matter whether the agents subjectively intended to arrest 

Magruder before the search or whether they announced that 

Magruder was under arrest before conducting the search. See 

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“Subjective 

intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth 

Amendment analysis.”). Cf. United States v. Thornton, 733 

F.2d 121, 123, 128 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (characterizing a 

search as properly incident to arrest when an officer with 

probable cause to arrest stated during the initial search that the

defendant was not yet under arrest but then placed the 

defendant under arrest upon discovering narcotics).

It is also of no consequence that Magruder was not charged 

with conspiracy, the crime for which probable cause was most 

clearly established at the time of the search. As this Court has 

said, “even if probable cause does not support arrest for the 

offense charged by the arresting officer, an arrest (and search 

incident thereto) is nonetheless valid if the same officer had 

probable cause to arrest the defendant for another offense.”

United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 565 (D.C. Cir. 

2002). With probable cause to believe some crime existed 

before searching Magruder, as was patently the case here, the 

FBI agents could stop and search Magruder and his backpack 

that [Magruder] . . . [was] committing . . . violations of . . . 

Possession with Intent to Distribute and Distribution of Controlled 

Substances,” conspiracy to commit the same violations and money 

laundering. J.A. 205. 

USCA Case #22-3025 Document #2095099 Filed: 01/21/2025 Page 9 of 12
10

immediately before formally arresting him and were not 

required to charge Magruder with the same offense that 

supported the initial probable cause.4

2. Louisiana Search Warrant

For the first time on appeal, Magruder argues that his 

counsel failed to challenge both the Louisiana magistrate 

judge’s jurisdiction to issue a warrant under the SCA as well as 

that district’s venue status. Magruder presupposes that,

because the FBI identified him only using the fruits of this 

allegedly invalid warrant, if his counsel had made the challenge 

and presumably succeeded, the proper remedy would have 

been suppression of the evidence. His counsel’s failure to do 

so thus constitutes prejudice under the Strickland definition 

thereof and, accordingly, tips the scale in favor of a “tainted” 

guilty plea withdrawal under Ford.

But the contraband evidence would not have been 

suppressed. Without deciding whether the warrant satisfied the 

venue and jurisdictional requirements under the SCA, or 

whether a violation of those provisions requires suppression 

under the Fourth Amendment, we conclude that, even if 

Magruder is correct and the Louisiana magistrate acted in error, 

the evidence is admissible under the good-faith exception.

“[T]he marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by 

suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable 

reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot 

4 Although both sides dispute which party bears the burden to 

show that the FBI agents had, or lacked, probable cause to arrest 

when the alleged lack of probable cause supports an ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim, we need not decide this question. Under 

either proof assignment, the FBI agents had probable cause to arrest 

at the time of the backpack search.

USCA Case #22-3025 Document #2095099 Filed: 01/21/2025 Page 10 of 12
11

justify the substantial costs of exclusion.” United States v. 

Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984). And notwithstanding not

every reliance is objectively reasonable, “‘a warrant issued by 

a magistrate normally suffices to establish’ that a law 

enforcement officer has ‘acted in good faith in conducting the 

search’” and therefore that the evidence should not be 

suppressed. Id. (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 

823 n.32 (1982)). The warrant that led agents to Magruder was 

supported by an affidavit that established probable cause to 

connect Magruder’s telephone number to the drug-trafficking 

conspiracy operating in New Orleans. That affidavit 

systematically laid out the ties between Magruder’s telephone 

number and Mosquera-Asprilla, a leader in a Colombian drugtrafficking conspiracy, along with that organization’s ties to 

Mosquera-Amari, a known New Orleans drug trafficker. It is 

well-established that “a conspiracy prosecution may be brought 

in any district in which some overt act in furtherance of the 

conspiracy was committed by any of the co-conspirators,”

United States v. Rosenberg, 888 F.2d 1406, 1415 (D.C. Cir. 

1989), and thus there is nothing unreasonable about FBI agents 

relying on a Louisiana magistrate judge’s probable cause

finding to believe that the telephone number targeted by the 

warrant was subject to his jurisdiction.

Nor is there merit to Magruder’s argument that the 

Louisiana search warrant was void ab initio. Several years ago, 

the Sixth Circuit held that a search warrant issued by a 

magistrate judge lacking the requisite legal authority is void ab 

initio and cannot be relied upon under the good-faith exception. 

See United States v. Scott, 260 F.3d 512, 515 (6th Cir. 2001). 

That holding was subsequently rejected. See United States v. 

Master, 614 F.3d 236, 243 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[W]e believe that 

the Supreme Court’s evolving suppression rulings in Fourth 

Amendment cases require clarification or modification of our 

precedent in Scott.”). The Tenth Circuit also rejected the void 

USCA Case #22-3025 Document #2095099 Filed: 01/21/2025 Page 11 of 12
12

ab initio argument. See United States v. Workman, 863 F.3d 

1313, 1318 (10th Cir. 2017) (the argument that a warrant “is 

essentially non-existent (void ab initio) when the judge lacks 

authority to issue the warrant . . . is foreclosed by the Supreme 

Court’s opinions” after Leon). Like our sister circuits, we have

no reason not to apply the good-faith exception even if the 

Louisiana search warrant was defective.

Finally, Magruder failed to make a Sixth Amendment 

claim based on the Louisiana warrant in district court but “this 

court does not remand every ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim that is initially raised on appeal.” United States v. GreenRemache, 97 F.4th 30, 34 (D.C. Cir. 2024). We routinely do 

not remand if “the record conclusively shows the defendant 

was not prejudiced, [because] no factual development could 

render the claim meritorious.” Id. (quoting United States v. 

Marshall, 946 F.3d 591, 596 (D.C. Cir. 2020)). For the reasons 

set forth supra, the record plainly requires no factual 

development for us to determine that Magruder’s claims based 

on the Louisiana search warrant are meritless.

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district 

court is affirmed.

So ordered.

USCA Case #22-3025 Document #2095099 Filed: 01/21/2025 Page 12 of 12