Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-05-03101/USCOURTS-caDC-05-03101-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gregory Curry
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 13, 2007 Decided July 31, 2007

No. 05-3101

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

GREGORY CURRY,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 03cr00305-01)

Mary E. Davis, appointed by the court, argued the cause and

filed the brief for appellant.

Cassidy Kesler Pinegar, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Jeffrey A. Taylor,

U.S. Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese, III, Elizabeth Trosman, and

Kenneth F. Whitted, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: TATEL, GARLAND, and KAVANAUGH, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

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GARLAND, Circuit Judge: Gregory Curry pled guilty to a

single count of conspiring to distribute and to possess with intent

to distribute cocaine base, in exchange for the government’s

agreement to drop numerous additional charges. Before he was

sentenced, Curry moved to withdraw his plea, arguing that his

attorney’s advice that his case was “hopeless” amounted to

constitutionally ineffective assistance. The district court denied

the motion. On appeal, Curry contends that the court abused its

discretion in denying his request to withdraw his plea. We reject

that contention and affirm the judgment of the district court.

I

On July 17, 2003, a grand jury returned a twelve-count

indictment against Curry and co-defendant Ann Arrington.

Count One charged the defendants with conspiracy to distribute

and to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of

cocaine base (“crack”), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and §

841(a)(1). The remaining counts charged additional violations

of the narcotics and firearms laws. On November 6, 2003,

Arrington pled guilty to Count One, and to a similar count in an

unrelated case.

The day before Curry’s trial was scheduled to begin, the

district court conducted a hearing on Curry’s motion to suppress

evidence. At that hearing, FBI Special Agent Brian Wilhite

testified in considerable detail about the events that preceded

Curry’s arrest on June 18, 2003. Wilhite testified as follows.

On June 6, 2003, the FBI employed an informant to make

a “controlled buy” of 31 grams of crack from Curry, using

Arrington as an intermediary. Agent Wilhite searched the

informant and the informant’s vehicle and gave the informant

recorded funds to use for the purchase. Agents then followed

the informant to Arrington’s apartment on 61st Street in

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northeast Washington, D.C., maintaining video and audio

surveillance. After the informant arrived, Arrington called

Curry, who drove up in a red Cadillac a short time later.

Arrington went outside, got into the car with Curry, and then got

out. Curry then drove away, and some time later other agents

videotaped him arriving at 5909 Clay Street, N.E., where he

entered and exited apartment 204. Shortly thereafter, Curry

returned to Arrington’s residence and parked immediately

behind the informant’s car, in which Arrington and the

informant were then sitting. Arrington got out of the

informant’s car, climbed into Curry’s car, spoke with Curry, and

returned to the informant’s car, where she gave the informant 31

grams of crack cocaine. Afterwards, Wilhite met with the

informant and took possession of the drugs and the recording

device that the informant had worn.

On June 18, the FBI used the same informant to arrange

another controlled buy from Curry through Arrington. This

time, Curry arrived at Arrington’s residence in a burgundy

Dodge Neon, met with Arrington, and drove back to the

apartment on Clay Street. He entered the apartment, remained

inside for approximately two minutes, and then returned to the

car. At that point, FBI agents moved in and arrested him. When

the agents searched the Dodge Neon, they discovered 40 to 44

grams of crack beneath the front passenger seat, where a female

juvenile had been sitting. They also recovered $4,000 from

Curry’s person. After arresting Curry, Wilhite read him his

Miranda rights. Curry waived his right to remain silent, and

indicated that “he was not going to cooperate . . . and . . . he was

just going to have to take his punishment.” Suppression Hr’g

Tr. 62 (Jan. 26, 2004). He also “said that he had been in the

business, he wanted to get out of the business, but as of that

point he had not.” Id.

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1

At the close of the suppression hearing, the district court

indicated that it was inclined to deny the motion to suppress, but that

it would entertain further submissions from the parties.

In its opposition to Curry’s motion to suppress, the

government also advised the court that a post-arrest search of the

Clay Street apartment had yielded five firearms, ammunition,

cocaine, heroin, and drug paraphernalia, as well as evidence

linking Curry to the apartment. That evidence included various

documents bearing Curry’s name. Telephone records

subpoenaed to support the search warrant for the apartment also

listed Curry as the subscriber to the telephone service in the

apartment. In addition, the government advised the court that it

would introduce evidence that Curry had been involved in

another, 30-gram crack sale to the same informant on May 21,

2003.

During the course of the suppression hearing, the court and

counsel discussed the applicability of the United States

Sentencing Guidelines to Curry’s case. Based on a prior drug

conviction, the government had filed enhancement papers

pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851(a), which would subject the

defendant to a mandatory minimum sentence of 240 months if

he were convicted at trial, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(b). The

government had also made a plea offer to Curry, which was put

on the record. The court advised Curry that the sentence under

the plea offer (which included withdrawal of the enhancement

papers) carried only a ten-year mandatory minimum and an

estimated Guidelines range of 121 to 151 months (assuming a

three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility). The

district court instructed Curry to speak with his attorney and to

consider his alternatives over the evening recess.1

The next day, Curry and the government entered into a

written agreement, under which Curry agreed to plead guilty to

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Count One of the indictment. The government, for its part,

agreed to withdraw the enhancement papers and to dismiss all

of the remaining counts. The agreement explained that Curry

would face a minimum sentence of ten years. It also noted that,

if instead he were convicted at trial without a plea, the

enhancement papers “would require [him] to serve a mandatory

term of 20 years’ (240 months’) incarceration.” J.A. 57.

As part of the agreement, Curry signed a “proffer of

evidence,” which read as follows:

Between May 2003 and June 18, 2003, in the District

of Columbia, Gregory Curry, the defendant, did

knowingly and intentionally agree together with

another person to unlawfully, knowingly and

intentionally distribute and possess with intent to

distribute 104.2 grams of cocaine base (crack), 80.7

grams of cocaine hydrochloride, and 0.92 grams of

heroin. During the period of the conspiracy, Defendant

Curry sold and distributed approximately 30 grams of

cocaine base on May 21, 2003, and on June 6, 2003.

Moreover, on June 18, 2003, defendant Curry intended

to sell an additional 30 grams of cocaine base and

possessed additional controlled substances on this date

inside 5909 Clay Street . . . .

J.A. 14. Curry’s signature appears below a paragraph that

states: “I have discussed this proffer fully with my attorney . .

. . I fully understand this proffer and I acknowledge its

truthfulness, agree to it and accept it without reservation.” J.A.

15. 

After Curry signed the agreement, the district court

conducted a plea hearing and engaged Curry in a lengthy

colloquy. It informed him of his rights and of the nature of the

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charges against him, and established that there was a factual

basis for the plea and that it was knowing and voluntary. During

the colloquy, Curry acknowledged that he was satisfied with his

attorneys’ representation, that they had “thoroughly investigated

this matter and . . . the facts relating to this case,” and that they

had reviewed the plea agreement with him and answered his

questions about it. Plea Hr’g Tr. 6-7 (Jan. 27, 2004).

The court scheduled Curry’s sentencing for April 29, 2004.

On that day, however, Curry told the court that he no longer

wanted to be represented by his current attorneys. Thereafter,

he retained new counsel and filed a motion to withdraw his

guilty plea. In support, he contended that his plea proceeding

had been flawed because it was rushed, and that his attorneys

had been ineffective in advising him to enter into the plea.

The district court denied Curry’s motion on October 20,

2004. See United States v. Curry, 344 F. Supp. 2d 22, 29

(D.D.C. 2004). On April 22, 2005, the court sentenced him to

135 months in prison. Curry now appeals, contending that the

district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to

withdraw his guilty plea.

II

A defendant may withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing

if he “can show a fair and just reason for requesting the

withdrawal.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d)(2)(B). Although

“[w]ithdrawal of a guilty plea prior to sentencing is to be

liberally granted,” United States v. Taylor, 139 F.3d 924, 929

(D.C. Cir. 1998), we review a district court’s refusal to permit

withdrawal only for abuse of discretion, United States v.

Hanson, 339 F.3d 983, 988 (D.C. Cir. 2003). In reviewing such

a refusal, we consider three factors: “(1) whether the defendant

has asserted a viable claim of innocence; (2) whether the delay

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between the guilty plea and the motion to withdraw has

substantially prejudiced the government’s ability to prosecute

the case; and (3) whether the guilty plea was somehow tainted.”

Id. (quoting United States v. McCoy, 215 F.3d 102, 106 (D.C.

Cir. 2000) (quoting Taylor, 139 F.3d at 929)). In this case, the

government concedes “that the withdrawal of [Curry’s] guilty

plea would not have prejudiced [it] at trial.” Appellee’s Br. 18

n.9. This factor, however, “has never been dispositive in our

cases.” Hanson, 339 F.3d at 988. Our review therefore focuses

on the first and third factors.

With regard to the first factor, Curry contends that he “had

a legitimate defense” to the charges against him. Appellant’s

Br. 7. He characterizes that defense as follows: “[T]here were

no controlled buys from him, . . . he was never found in

possession of any drugs, he did not own the car in which it was

alleged drugs were transported, and . . . other individuals had

access to the apartment from which contraband was recovered.”

Id. at 7-8. These assertions do not, however, constitute a “viable

claim of innocence.” Hanson, 339 F.3d at 988 (quoting McCoy,

215 F.3d at 106 (quoting Taylor, 139 F.3d at 929)). Indeed, they

do not constitute a claim of innocence at all. A person can be

found guilty on a theory of conspiracy, aiding and abetting, or

constructive possession without ever having touched the drugs

at issue. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, __ F.3d __, slip op.

at 22-24 (D.C. Cir. June 22, 2007); United States v. Martinez,

476 F.3d 961, 968-70 (D.C. Cir. 2007); United States v. Dykes,

406 F.3d 717, 721 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Curry’s appellate brief does

not include a single sentence declaring that he is actually

innocent or disclaiming his admission of guilt at the plea

proceeding. Although Curry did “assert[] his innocence to the

charges” in his motion to withdraw the plea before the district

court, J.A. 35, that kind of “general denial” is not sufficient to

satisfy the first factor, United States v. Cray, 47 F.3d 1203, 1209

(D.C. Cir. 1995).

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2

In 2002, the provision of the Federal Rules relating to plea

withdrawals was moved from Rule 32 to Rule 11. See FED. R. CRIM.

P. 32 advisory committee’s notes to 2002 amendments.

What Curry’s argument really amounts to is the claim that,

if he went to trial, a jury might not be persuaded that the

government had met its burden of proving his guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt. We have previously found such a claim

insufficient to satisfy the first factor. See id. (“A defendant

appealing the denial of his motion to withdraw a guilty plea,

unlike a defendant who has not first pled guilty, must do more

than make a general denial in order to put the Government to its

proof; he must affirmatively advance an objectively reasonable

argument that he is innocent, for he has waived his right simply

to try his luck before a jury.” (internal citation omitted)); see

also FED.R.CRIM. P. 32(d) advisory committee’s notes to 1983

amendments (commenting on the predecessor of the current

Rule 11(d), and stating that “[w]hether the movant has asserted

his legal innocence is an important factor to be weighed” in

determining whether his reason for requesting withdrawal of his

plea is “fair and just”).2

It is true that some of our cases have characterized this first

factor as requiring a “legally cognizable defense” rather than as

requiring a viable claim of innocence, see, e.g., United States v.

Shah, 453 F.3d 520, 522 (D.C. Cir. 2006), and that many have

used the terms interchangeably, see, e.g., McCoy, 215 F.3d at

106; Cray, 47 F.3d at 1207, 1209; United States v. Ford, 993

F.2d 249, 251 (D.C. Cir. 1993). But even if putting the

government to its proof constituted a “legally cognizable

defense” within the meaning of those cases, there is no question

that doing so in this case had a very limited chance of success,

as we discuss further below. Under these circumstances, we

“cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion in

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deciding that [Curry’s proffered] defense added little weight on

the side of permitting withdrawal.” Hanson, 339 F.3d at 988.

The remaining factor is whether Curry’s guilty plea was

tainted in some manner. Curry does not contend that his plea

proceeding violated the requirements of Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 11. See Appellant’s Br. 8. And he has

abandoned his earlier argument that the plea was rushed by the

district court. Instead, he rests on the claim that, “because of his

attorney’s ineffective performance, . . . his plea was not

voluntary.” Id.

In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985), the Supreme

Court held that “challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective

assistance of counsel” must be evaluated under the general test

for ineffective assistance set forth in Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668 (1984). Such a claim requires two showings:

“First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was

deficient . . . . Second, the defendant must show that the

deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland, 466

U.S. at 687.

To establish deficient performance, “a defendant must show

that his counsel’s performance fell below ‘an objective standard

of reasonableness’ under prevailing professional norms.”

United States v. Glover, 153 F.3d 749, 758 (D.C. Cir. 1998)

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88). Curry’s claim of

deficient performance is based solely on his allegation that one

of his attorneys wrongly “told him the case was hopeless.”

Appellant’s Br. 11. Since the district court did not hold an

evidentiary hearing, we do not know whether the attorney

actually told Curry his case was hopeless. But even if he did,

we do not believe that such an assessment fell outside “the range

of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” Hill,

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474 U.S. at 56 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759,

771 (1970)).

Curry insists that his case was not “hopeless,” because he

had “a colorable claim of innocence.” Appellant’s Br. 11. For

Curry, apparently, “[h]ope springs eternal.” ALEXANDER POPE,

ESSAY ON MAN 30 (MacMillan and Co. 1869) (1733). But even

if we were to adopt Curry’s sunny perspective and regard his

attorney’s assessment as overly pessimistic, we could not say

that it was unconstitutionally so. As the district court

emphasized, “[t]he government had persuasive evidence of

defendant’s involvement in at least three drug transactions.”

344 F. Supp. 2d at 27-28. At trial, Curry would have faced: the

testimony of the FBI agents who kept Curry, the informant, and

Arrington under surveillance; in all likelihood, the testimony of

one or both of the latter individuals; audio- and videotape of the

controlled transactions; the cash found on his person and the

drugs found in the car he was driving; documents, telephone

records, and videotape tying him to an apartment containing

more drugs, as well as guns and drug paraphernalia; and his own

inculpatory post-arrest statements.

Under these circumstances, “any competent attorney would

. . . have advised [Curry] that he stood little chance of obtaining

an acquittal at trial.” Hanson, 339 F.3d at 991. We do not think

that the difference between “little chance” and “hopeless” is of

constitutional magnitude. A lawyer is not required to rate a

defendant’s trial prospects with the precision of a Las Vegas

bookmaker, and cannot be regarded as ineffective merely

because a court might marginally disagree with that rating in

hindsight. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (holding that “[a] fair

assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be

made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight,” and that

“a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s

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conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional

assistance”).

Moreover, the attorney’s evaluation of Curry’s case must be

taken in context. As alleged by Curry, his attorney did not

simply tell him that the case was hopeless, but that “the case was

hopeless and that he should plead guilty.” Appellant’s Br. 5

(emphasis added). An important part of that calculation would

have included a balancing of the likelihood that Curry would

prevail at trial against the benefit to be obtained by accepting the

plea offer. Curry was correctly “informed that if convicted at

trial, he faced a mandatory minimum of 240 months, whereas a

plea would involve a ten-year mandatory minimum and an

estimated Guideline range of 121 to 151” months. 344 F. Supp.

2d at 24. We agree with the district court that, based on the

evidence against Curry, “which was known to counsel and to the

defendant prior to entering a guilty plea, it was prudent, and

certainly not deficient, for counsel to advise Curry to plead

guilty and to thereby avoid a mandatory minimum sentence of

240 months, as opposed to a sentence in the 121 to 151 month

range.” Id. at 28.

Because Curry has failed to satisfy the first prong of the

Strickland test, we need not dwell on the second. We do note,

however, that even if counsel’s assessment were deficient, it is

doubtful that the deficiency prejudiced Curry. “[I]n order to

satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement, the defendant must show

that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have

insisted on going to trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. Moreover,

“where the alleged error of counsel is a failure to advise the

defendant of a potential affirmative defense to the crime

charged, the resolution of the ‘prejudice’ inquiry will depend

largely on whether the affirmative defense likely would have

succeeded at trial.” Id. These “predictions of the outcome at a

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possible trial, where necessary, should be made objectively,

without regard for the ‘idiosyncrasies of the particular

decisionmaker.’” Id. at 59-60 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at

695); see Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 486 (2000)

(describing Hill as holding that “the prejudice inquiry depends

largely on whether th[e] affirmative defense might have

succeeded, leading a rational defendant to insist on going to

trial” (emphasis added)).

As we have discussed, even if Curry’s case were not

hopeless, any competent attorney would have advised him that

his chance of success was slim. Any competent attorney would

also have advised him that the deal offered by the government

was a good one, particularly given the weakness of the defense

case. We think it doubtful that, had a rational defendant been so

advised, he would have chosen to go to trial. See In re Sealed

Case, __ F.3d __, slip op. at 15-16 (D.C. Cir. June 1, 2007);

Hanson, 339 F.3d at 991-92.

Finally, Curry contends that the district court erred in

refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing on the request to

withdraw his plea. Although a district court should

“[o]rdinarily” conduct an evidentiary hearing “when a defendant

seeks to withdraw a guilty plea on the basis of ineffective

assistance of trial counsel,” a court does not abuse its discretion

in denying such a request where there are no material factual

issues in dispute. Taylor, 139 F.3d at 932; see United States v.

Jones, 381 F.3d 615, 618 (7th Cir. 2004); see also United States

v. Patterson, 652 F.2d 1046, 1047-48 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Curry

made (and makes) no controverted assertion that his attorneys

failed to pursue a line of investigation, overlooked a potential

defense, or gave incorrect advice regarding his sentencing

exposure. His only allegation is that one attorney told him that

his case was hopeless. We have concluded that, even assuming

this allegation is accurate, it did not render counsel’s

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representation ineffective. Thus, there was no need for the court

to conduct an evidentiary hearing.

III

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying

Curry’s request to withdraw his guilty plea or to hold an

evidentiary hearing. The judgment of the district court is

therefore

Affirmed.

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