Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-01212/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-01212-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kenneth A. Frank
Petitioner
James A. Yates
Respondent

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KENNETH A. FRANK, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

)

v. )

)

)

JAMES A. YATES, Warden, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:10-CV-01212 GSA HC 

ORDER DISMISSING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR STAY

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT

TO ENTER JUDGMENT AND CLOSE CASE

ORDER DECLINING ISSUANCE OF

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner has consented to the exercise of magistrate judge

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

On July 6, 2010, Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court.

He challenges a 1989 conviction in the Kern County Superior Court.

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Summary Dismissal

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases provides in pertinent part:

If it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not

entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the petition and direct the clerk

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to notify the petitioner. 

The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 8 indicate that the court may dismiss a petition for writ of

habeas corpus, either on its own motion under Rule 4, pursuant to the respondent’s motion to

dismiss, or after an answer to the petition has been filed. See Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039 (9

th

Cir.2001). A petition for habeas corpus should not be dismissed without leave to amend unless it

appears that no tenable claim for relief can be pleaded were such leave granted. Jarvis v. Nelson,

440 F.2d 13, 14 (9 Cir. 1971). th

B. Failure to State a Cognizable Federal Claim

The basic scope of habeas corpus is prescribed by statute. Subsection (c) of Section 2241 of

Title 28 of the United States Code provides that habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless

he is “in custody in violation of the Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) states:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall 

entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to a judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in 

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

(emphasis added). See also, Rule 1 to the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States

District Court. The Supreme Court has held that “the essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a

person in custody upon the legality of that custody . . .” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484

(1973).

Furthermore, in order to succeed in a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Petitioner must

demonstrate that the adjudication of his claim in state court

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States; or resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),(2). 

In the instant case, Petitioner fails to state a cognizable federal claim with respect to his

fourth ground for relief. In said ground, Petitioner alleges the Kern County Superior Court

committed prejudicial error when it destroyed the court reporter’s notes of Petitioner’s jury trial

without complying with relevant California statutes. As this claim is grounded in state law, it does

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not present a cognizable federal claim. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, (1991) ("We have

stated many times that 'federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.' "), quoting

Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990); Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 348-49 (1993)

(O’Connor, J., concurring) (“mere error of state law, one that does not rise to the level of a

constitutional violation, may not be corrected on federal habeas”). While Petitioner claims a

violation of federal due process principles, merely placing a “due process” label on an alleged

violation does not entitle Petitioner to federal relief. Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1386, 1388-89

(1996). Broad, conclusory allegations of unconstitutionality are insufficient to state a cognizable

claim. Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 205 (9 Cir.1995); Greyson v. Kellam, 937 F.2d 1409, 1412 th

(9th Cir.1991) (bald assertions of ineffective assistance of counsel did not entitle the petitioner to an

evidentiary hearing); see also Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9 Cir.1999), citing Gray v. th

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996) (“general appeals to broad constitutional principles, such

as due process, equal protection, and the right to a fair trial, are insufficient to establish exhaustion). 

There is no federal right to a copy of the court reporter’s notes of which this Court is aware. Further,

the alleged destruction of these notes did not bar him from filing an appeal. Therefore, the claim

must be dismissed.

C. Exhaustion of State Remedies

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by a

petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The

exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial

opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158,

1163 (9 Cir. 1988). th

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with a

full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. Duncan v.

Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88

F.3d 828, 829 (9 Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full th

and fair opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the

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claim's factual and legal basis. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365 (legal basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504

U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis). 

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a

federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669

(9th Cir.2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (2001); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9 Cir.1999); th

Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9 Cir.1998). In Duncan, the United States Supreme Court th

reiterated the rule as follows: 

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 . . . (1971), we said that exhaustion 

of state remedies requires that petitioners "fairly presen[t]" federal claims to the 

state courts in order to give the State the "'opportunity to pass upon and correct 

alleged violations of the prisoners' federal rights" (some internal quotation marks

omitted). If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations 

of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners 

are asserting claims under the United States Constitution. If a habeas petitioner 

wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due 

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only

in federal court, but in state court. 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule further, stating:

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not "fairly presented" (and thus 

exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to 

that court that those claims were based on federal law. See Shumway v. Payne, 

223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2000). Since the Supreme Court's decision in 

Duncan, this court has held that the petitioner must make the federal basis of the 

claim explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even

if the federal basis is “self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 889 

(9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 . . . (1982), or the

underlying claim would be decided under state law on the same considerations 

that would control resolution of the claim on federal grounds. Hiivala v. Wood, 

195 F3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830-31 

(9th Cir. 1996); . . . .

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert the state court to 

the fact that the relevant claim is a federal one without regard to how similar the 

state and federal standards for reviewing the claim may be or how obvious the 

violation of federal law is. 

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2000) (italics added). 

Petitioner concedes that the four remaining grounds for relief are unexhausted. He states he

is currently seeking relief for those claims in the state courts. As the instant petition is completely

unexhausted, it must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 

D. Motion for Stay

Petitioner has filed a motion to stay the petition pending exhaustion of state remedies. A

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district court has discretion to stay a petition which it may validly consider on the merits. Rhines v.

Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005); Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Taylor), 134 F.3d 981,

987-88 (9 Cir. 1998); Greenawalt v. Stewart, 105 F.3d 1268, 1274 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. th

1102 (1997). However, the Supreme Court recently held that this discretion is circumscribed by the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277. In light

of AEDPA’s objectives, “stay and abeyance [is] available only in limited circumstances” and “is

only appropriate when the district court determines there was good cause for the petitioner’s failure

to exhaust his claims first in state court.” Id. at 277. In this case, the four remaining claims for relief

are unexhausted, thereby rendering the petition unexhausted. The Court must dismiss such a

petition. Therefore, Petitioner’s motion for stay is DENIED. Petitioner may return to this Court

upon exhaustion of his claims, provided he does so within the statute of limitations. In this case, he

states he filed his first state habeas petition within the limitations period. Therefore, there is no good

cause to stay proceedings even if a stay were permitted. 

E. Certificate of Appealability

A state prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal a

district court’s denial of his petition, and an appeal is only allowed in certain circumstances. MillerEl v. Cockrell, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 1039 (2003). The controlling statute in determining whether to issue

a certificate of appealability is 28 U.S.C. § 2253, which provides as follows:

 (a) In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under section 2255 before a 

district judge, the final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by the court 

of appeals for the circuit in which the proceeding is held.

 (b) There shall be no right of appeal from a final order in a proceeding to test the 

validity of a warrant to remove to another district or place for commitment or trial 

a person charged with a criminal offense against the United States, or to test the 

validity of such person’s detention pending removal proceedings.

 (c) (1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an 

appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from–

 (A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the 

detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State 

court; or

 (B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.

 (2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the 

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applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

 (3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall indicate which 

specific issue or issues satisfy the showing required by paragraph (2).

If a court denies a petitioner’s petition, the court may only issue a certificate of appealability

“if jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or

that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed

further.” Miller-El, 123 S.Ct. at 1034; Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). While the

petitioner is not required to prove the merits of his case, he must demonstrate “something more than

the absence of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith on his . . . part.” Miller-El, 123 S.Ct. at

1040.

In the present case, the Court finds that reasonable jurists would not find the Court’s

determination that Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief debatable, wrong, or

deserving of encouragement to proceed further. Petitioner has not made the required substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Accordingly, the Court hereby DECLINES to issue a 

certificate of appealability. 

ORDER

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 

1) Ground Four of the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; 

2) The petition for writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure

to exhaust state remedies;

3) Petitioner’s motion for stay is DENIED; 

4) The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment and close the case; and

5) The Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: August 3, 2010 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

6i0kij UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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