Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_08-cr-00033/USCOURTS-almd-2_08-cr-00033-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Anqwuan Lamar Osborne
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

)

v. ) CRIMINAL ACTION NO.

) 2:08cr33-MHT

ANQWUAN LAMAR OSBORNE ) (WO)

OPINION AND ORDER

Defendant Anqwuan Lamar Osborne pled guilty to being

a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He is currently before the court for

sentencing. In its presentence investigation report

(PSR), the United States Probation Office recommended

that Osborne receive a four-offense-level enhancement to

his sentence pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6) because

he possessed the firearm “in connection with another

felony offense,” namely, possession of ten pills of

ecstasy. Osborne objects that the § 2K2.1(b)(6)

“specific offense characteristic” is inapplicable because

there is no evidence the firearm facilitated his

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possession of ecstasy. For the reasons given below, the

court holds that § 2K2.1(b)(6) does not apply. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Osborne was arrested on June 29, 2007, when Corporal

Sims of the Montgomery City Police Department witnessed

Osborne exit a black SUV and cross the street to meet

another individual, who was in another vehicle. Sims and

another officer, Corporal Butler, approached Osborne and

the individual in the vehicle. Osborne began running;

Sims pursued. Eventually, Osborne stumbled to the

ground, and the firearm he was carrying fell from his

waistband. As Sims caught up, he saw Osborne scramble to

regain control over the pistol; he then saw Osborne stuff

something, later identified as a small envelope

containing ten pills of ecstasy, into his front

waistband. The individual in the vehicle was not

apprehended. 

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 1. Section 922(g)(1) provides:

“It shall be unlawful for any person–-

who has been convicted in any court of

a crime punishable by imprisonment for

a term exceeding one year ... to ship or

transport in interstate or foreign

commerce, or possess in or affecting

commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or

to receive any firearm or ammunition

which has been shipped or transported in

interstate or foreign commerce.” 

2. Section 844(a) provides:

“It shall be unlawful for any person

knowingly or intentionally to possess a

controlled substance unless such

substance was obtained directly, or

pursuant to a valid prescription or

order, from a practitioner, while acting

in the course of his professional

practice, or except as otherwise

authorized by this subchapter or

subchapter II of this chapter.”

3

A two-count indictment was filed on February 12,

2008, charging Osborne with one count of violating 18

U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the “felon-in-possession” statute,1

and one count of possession of a controlled substance in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a), the “simple possession”

statute.2

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Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2), the base-offense

level in Osborne’s case is 24. The PSR concluded,

however, that Osborne should receive a four-level

enhancement based on the specific-offense characteristic

in U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6), which reads: “If the defendant

used or possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection

with another felony offense; or possessed or transferred

any firearm or ammunition with knowledge, intent, or

reason to believe that it would be used or possessed in

connection with another felony offense, increase by 4

levels.” The PSR applied the specific-offense

characteristic because it concluded that Osborne

possessed the firearm “in connection with” the ecstasy

tablets found in his waistband, raising his offense level

to 28. The PSR then recommended that Osborne receive a

three-level downward adjustment for acceptance of

responsibility, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) & (b),

reducing his total offense level to 25. 

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II. DISCUSSION

Osborne objects to the § 2K2.1(b)(6) four-offenselevel enhancement on two grounds. First, he contends

that the government tested only one ecstasy tablet; he

maintains that the other nine may have been legal

substances such as caffeine pills. Second, he contends

that the government has not proved that he possessed the

pistol “in connection with” another felony offense.

In assessing Osborne’s objection, the court

recognizes two well-settled propositions. First, the

court’s inquiry into whether the § 2K2.1(b)(6) “specificoffense characteristic” applies is necessarily factintensive. Cf. United States v. Saunders, 318 F.3d 1257,

1267 (11th Cir. 2003) (determining that application of

U.S.S.G. § 2B6.1(b)(2), which applies a two-point

enhancement if the defendant was dealing in stolen

property, depends on the “totality of the

circumstances”); United States v. Morris, 286 F.3d 1291,

1296 (11th Cir. 2002) (determining that what constitutes

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“position of trust” within meaning of U.S.S.G § 3b1.3 is

highly dependant on specific facts of each situation).

Second, “[t]he government bears the burden of

establishing by a preponderance of evidence the facts

necessary to support a sentencing enhancement.” United

States v. Kinard, 472 F.3d 1294, 1298 (11th Cir. 2006)

(per curiam). While not the most exacting of standards,

it must be noted that “the preponderance standard is not

toothless” and “does not grant district courts a license

to sentence a defendant in the absence of sufficient

evidence.” United States v. Lawrence, 47 F.3d 1559,

1566-1567 (11th Cir. 1995). 

A. 

Osborne’s first contention in support of his

objection–-that the government tested only one of the ten

pills and that the other nine may have been legal

substances--does not affect the application of the

§ 2K2.1(b)(6) enhancement. The Guidelines state that,

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“‘Another felony offense’ for purposes of subsection

(b)(6) means any federal, state, or local offense ...

punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year,

regardless of whether a criminal charge was brought, or a

conviction obtained.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6), comment. n.

14(c). In Alabama, possession of ecstasy, in any amount,

is a felony punishable by imprisonment of not less than

one year and one day. 1975 Ala. Code §§ 13A-12-212(a)(1),

13A-12-212(b), 13A-5-6(a)(3) (2005). Therefore, Osborne’s

possession of even one pill of ecstasy establishes the

predicate “felony offense” necessary for application of

the § 2K2.1(b)(6) enhancement, and it does not matter that

the other nine pills were not tested. 

B.

Osborne’s second contention in support of his

objection–-that the government has not proved that he

possessed the weapon “in connection with” his possession

of ecstasy–-has merit. Prior to 2006, the Guidelines did

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not define “in connection with” as used in § 2K2.1(b)(6),

see U.S.S.G. App. C. (Nov. 1, 2007) at amd. 691

(explaining why the Guidelines were amended to include a

definition of “in connection with” and clarifying that the

effective date of that amendment was November 1, 2006);

see also United States v. Rhind, 289 F.3d 690, 695 (11th

Cir. 2002)(noting that the Guidelines do not define “in

connection with”), and the federal courts of appeals were

split regarding the proper interpretation of the phrase.

The November 1, 2006, Guideline Manual changed this by

offering comment notes 14(A) and 14(B), which interpret

“in connection with” under § 2K2.1(b)(6). Comment note

14(A) adopted the then-majority and more restrictive

“facilitation” standard for all offenses--except drugtrafficking offenses--and explained that “in connection

with” should be interpreted to require that the firearm

“facilitated or had the potential of facilitating” another

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3. Before the adoption of comment note 14(A), the

“facilitation standard” was used by a majority of courts

of appeals to interpret § 2K2.1(b)(6). The standard was

appropriated from Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223

(1993), in which the Supreme Court determined that the

phrase “in relation to,” as used in 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(c)(1), required that the firearm “facilitated” or

“had the potential of facilitating” another crime.

4. See, e.g. United States v. Regans, 125 F.3d 685,

687 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Condren, 18 F.3d

1190, 1197 (5th Cir. 1994). These courts adapted the

“presence” standard for § 2K2.1(b)(6) from a different

guidelines provision, § 2D1.1(b)(1), where an enhancement

applies “if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly

improbable that the weapon was connected with the

offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1), comment. n. 3.

9

felony offense. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6), comment n.

14(A).3

For drug-trafficking offenses, comment note 14(B)(ii)

adopted something very similar to the more permissive,

“presence” standard formerly utilized by a minority of

courts of appeals to interpret “in connection with” under

§ 2K2.1(b)(6).4

 Commentary note 14(B)(ii), establishes a

“proximity” standard and states that the “in-connectionwith” enhancement applies, in the case of a drug

trafficking offense, if the “firearm is found in close

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5. Comment note 14(B)(i) applies to burglary offenses

and also lays out something similar to the “presence”

standard. However, as no act of burglary has been

alleged in this case, comment note 14(B)(i) is irrelevant

and need not be discussed. 

10

proximity to drugs, drug-manufacturing materials, or drug

paraphernalia.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6), comment n.

14(B)(ii)(emphasis added).5

 

In sum, comment note 14 lays out two different

interpretations for the phrase “in connection with” as

used in § 2K2.1(b)(6): If the underlying felony offense

is a drug-trafficking offense, then the interpretation

offered in 14(B)(ii) applies and the government need only

show that the gun was in “close proximity” to the drugs;

if the underlying offense is any other crime, such as a

drug-possession offense, then the interpretation offered

in 14(A) applies and the government must show that the

weapon “facilitated” the offense. Thus, the court must

first determine a threshold question: Was Osborne engaged

in drug trafficking or simply drug possession? 

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1.

The Guidelines do not define the term “drugtrafficking” offense. The Supreme Court recently faced a

similar issue in Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47 (2006), in

which it interpreted “trafficking” in relation to the

Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(43)(B). The Court concluded that common usage

should be examined and that “ordinarily[,] ‘trafficking’

means some sort of commercial dealing.” 549 U.S. at 51.

This definition helps focus the court’s inquiry; it must

determine whether Osborne was engaged in “commercial

dealing” of drugs or whether he simply purchased or

possessed the drugs for personal use. 

2.

First, the expert testimony offered by Agent Whittle

of the Drug Enforcement Agency ultimately and credibly

demonstrates that Osborne was not engaged in drug

trafficking. Whittle initially concluded that ten pills

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exceed the amount normally associated with personal use.

However, despite having worked thousands of drug cases in

his career, Whittle could not recall a case in which

someone was indicted as a distributor for possessing as

few as ten pills of ecstasy; he could establish only that

20 to 30 pills might be seen as a distributor’s amount,

while two to three pills would be a typical user’s

amount. Whittle further conceded that an individual

could personally consume ten pills in a couple of

weekends of partying. Finally, when the government

recounted the facts of Osborne’s case to Whittle and

asked him to interpret the situation, he did not conclude

that Osborne was engaged in drug trafficking; rather, he

said either “there had been a transaction and no money

was exchanged” or “there had been no transaction, if ten

units is all the individual had.” Trial tr. at 37 (doc.

no. 43). 

The government’s other principal witness, Agent

Spence, read from a report made by the officers who

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arrested Osborne. According to the report, the block on

which the arrest took place had been targeted for

“saturation patrol” because of a high number of

complaints concerning drug activity. The report further

explained that the officers approached Osborne after he

had crossed the street and interacted with another

individual in a manner that appeared to be a “drug

transaction.” Trial tr. at 11 (doc. no. 43). Because

she was simply reading from a report, however, Agent

Spence could not explain to the court exactly what

Osborne did or exactly why the officers who arrested him

believed he was engaged in a drug transaction. 

In conclusion, the court finds that, because there is

no evidence that Osborne had money on him or engaged in

any exchange of money, and because he possessed only a

small amount of ecstasy when arrested, Osborne was not

engaged in “trafficking” or “commercial dealing” of drugs

when arrested.

 

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3.

Because Osborne was not engaged in drug trafficking,

the general “facilitation” standard under commentary note

14(a) applies, and the court must determine whether

Osborne’s possession of the weapon “facilitated” or “had

the potential of facilitating” his simple possession of

ecstasy. U.S.S.G § 2K2.1(b)(6), comment. n. 14(A). 

The word “potential” casts a wide net and, in a case

such as this, may appear limited only by human imagination.

Smith, however, the original source of the standard, offers

one limitation: The enhancement at issue should not apply

if the gun was present as a “result of accident or

coincidence.” 508 U.S. at 237-238. The Eleventh Circuit

Court of Appeals did not previously favor the facilitation

standard for interpreting § 2K2.1(b)(6). See Rhind, 289

F.3d at 695; see also United States v. Jackson, 276 F.3d

1231, 1234 (11th Cir. 2001)(discussing § 2K2.1(b)(6) and

stating that, “in certain circumstances, mere possession

of a firearm can be enough to apply a sentencing

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enhancement”); c.f. United States v. Young, 115 F.3d 834,

837-838 (11th Cir. 1997)(per curiam)(declining to use the

more restrictive “facilitation” standard from Smith to

interpret “in connection with” in § 4B1.4(b)(3)(A), a

guideline provision similar to § 2K2.1(b)(6), and applying

the “presence” standard § 2D1.1(b)(1) instead). As such,

there is a dearth of case law from this circuit

interpreting the facilitation standard, and this court must

look to other circuits.

Courts of Appeals that have frequently interpreted

“potential of facilitating” regarding § 2K2.1(b)(6) have

often asked whether possession of the gun may have

“emboldened” the defendant's felonious conduct. See, e.g.

United States v. Routon, 25 F.3d 815, 819 (9th Cir. 1994);

United States v. Gomez-Arrellano, 5 F.3d 464, 466-67 (10th

Cir. 1993); United States v. Loney, 219 F.3d 281 (3rd Cir.

2000). In drug and counterfeiting cases, in particular,

courts have asked whether the defendant may have possessed

the weapon to protect his or her contraband. Rhind, 289

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F.3d at 695; United States v. Condren, 18 F.3d 1190, 1199

(5th Cir. 1994).

 The court recognizes that there exists a “frequent

and overpowering connection between the use of firearms and

narcotics traffic.” United States v. Wooten, 253 Fed. Appx.

854, 858 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (quoting United

States v. Pham, 463 F.3d 1239, 1246 (11th Cir. 2006)); see

also United States v. Hodge, 313 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1290-91

(M.D. Ala. 2004) (Thompson, J.). This court has relied on

this assumption where there was sufficient evidence of drug

trafficking. See United States v. Hunter, 980 F. Supp.

1439, 1448 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (Thompson, J.). However,

lending too much weight to this assumption leads the

exception (that proximity suffices in drug trafficking

cases) to swallow the rule (that facilitation must be shown

in all other cases); this cannot be permitted. Each

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6. The court is aware that the Eleventh Circuit has

upheld district court decisions finding the requisite

“connection” under arguably similar facts to those

presented in this case. See, e.g., United States v.

Wooten, 253 Fed. Appx. 854 (11th Cir. 2007)(per

curiam)(finding “connection” where defendant had a loaded

shotgun in his trunk and marijuana, packaged for personal

use, in the passenger compartment); United States v.

Simmons, 2008 WL 4150004 (11th Cir. 2008)(upholding

sentencing enhancement where defendant had a semiautomatic pistol and a small bag of marijuana, both in

his front pants pocket). However, these cases do not

control the result in the present case for a number of

reasons. First, these cases did not apply the bifurcated

standard established in the November 1, 2006, Guidelines,

which applies a “facilitation” standard for drugpossession cases and a “proximity” standard for drugtrafficking cases; rather, they relied on precedent

under the Eleventh Circuit’s formerly “expansive”

standard, see Rhind 289 F.3d at 695 (holding that the

phrase “in connection with” should be given an “expansive

interpretation”), and placed great weight on the

assumption that “guns are the tools of the drug trade.”

Wooten 253 Fed. Appx. at 857, (quoting United States v.

Pham, 463 F.3d 1239, 1246 (11th Cir. 2006)). Second,

these decisions held only that the respective district

courts did not “clearly err” in applying the enhancement

under the circumstances presented; they did not hold that

all district courts viewing similar circumstance must

apply the enhancement. The leeway inherent in the clearerror standard permits district courts, acting as finders

of fact, to respond to the particular circumstances and

factual nuances of each given case. Finally, these cases

were not selected for publication, and, therefore, do not

bind this court. 

17

decision must turn on the particular facts of each case.6

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Ultimately, this court must look to the facts of this

case and ask if the government has offered sufficient

evidence that Osborne carried the weapon in connection with

the ecstasy. As mentioned above, the focus is on whether

the gun “emboldened” Osborne to possess ecstasy or whether

he carried the weapon to protect his ecstasy. In deciding

this very fact-intensive question, the court is impressed

by three pieces of evidence. First, there is the

relatively small amount of ecstasy possessed by Osborne, a

misdemeanor amount under federal law. Second, there was no

evidence presented that ecstasy is a particularly expensive

drug. If it were very expensive, that would provide

evidence that Osborne carried the weapon to protect his

drugs; if it were very cheap, that would provide evidence

that the gun and the drugs were not connected. When larger

amounts of drugs or cash are involved, it is easier to see

how a weapon might embolden its possessor or be used to

protect the money or contraband. Third, there is Agent

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Whittle’s testimony that ecstasy is a “club drug,” meaning

that it is typically found at “rave parties.” He testified

that ecstasy is a synthetic hallucinogen that increases a

users heart rate and blood pressure and “creates energy,”

and that it is “very prevalent” among teenagers and young

people, who take it to “dance for hours and hours.” Trial

tr. at 35-36 (doc. no. 43). No evidence, however, was

presented that guns are typically associated with such a

club drug, particularly in possessory or user amounts.

These three factors lead the court to conclude that Osborne

did not carry the weapon to embolden himself, or to protect

the ecstasy, or “in connection with” the ecstasy in any

other way; rather, he carried the ecstasy and the weapon at

the same time as a “result of accident or coincidence.” 

***

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that defendant Anqwuan Lamar

Osborne’s objection to the application of the four-offenseCase 2:08-cr-00033-MHT-TFM Document 44 Filed 12/19/08 Page 19 of 20
level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6) in the

presentence investigation report is sustained. 

 DONE, this the 19th day of December, 2008.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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