Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00502/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00502-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Charter Communications, Inc.
Defendant
Eric W. Rund
Plaintiff

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1 Unless otherwise stated, further references to a “Rule”

are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

 ERIC W. RUND,

NO. CIV. S-05-0502 FCD/GGH

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

 CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC.; 

 DOES 1 TO 100, Inclusive,

Defendants.

_____________________________/

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on motion by Charter

Communications, Inc. (“defendant”) to dismiss claims six and

seven of the complaint, for negligent infliction of emotional

distress and negligent supervision, respectively, pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).1

/ / / 

Case 2:05-cv-00502-FCD-GGH Document 13 Filed 07/25/05 Page 1 of 7
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2 Unless otherwise noted all background facts are based

upon the complaint. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), all

factual allegations from the complaint are taken as true.

2

BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff was employed by defendant, and its predecessors in

interest, as a line system technician for twenty-two years until

his termination at age fifty-eight.2 In June 2003, plaintiff

suffered a work-related knee injury. After plaintiff recovered

from his injury and returned to work, he was able to perform his

previous job duties, with the exception of crawling and climbing

telephone poles. However, plaintiff alleges that defendant

failed to accommodate plaintiff’s limitations and terminated

plaintiff on September 9, 2004, falsely claiming he could not

perform his job. 

Plaintiff filed charges of disability discrimination and

retaliation against defendant and defendant’s manager with the

California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (“DFEH”),

and within one year DFEH issued a “Right-to-Sue” notice. On

March 11, 2005, plaintiff filed a complaint setting forth claims

for: (1) employment discrimination in violation of the Fair

Employment and Housing Act, Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940 et seq.

(“FEHA”); (2) retaliation in violation of FEHA; (3) wrongful

termination in violation of public policy (Cal. Lab. Code §

132(a)); (4) breach of contract; (5) intentional infliction of

emotional distress; (6) negligent infliction of emotional

distress; (7) negligent supervision; (8) failure to accommodate

physical or mental disability or medical condition in violation

of Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(a). 

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3

On June 17, 2005, defendant filed the instant motion to

dismiss claims six and seven, negligent infliction of emotional

distress and negligent supervision, respectively, on the grounds

that the claims were barred by the WCA’s exclusivity provisions.

STANDARD

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of the

claims asserted in the complaint. A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is

proper only where there is either a "lack of a cognizable legal

theory" or "the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a

cognizable legal theory." Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t.,

901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Moreover, "it is axiomatic

that the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is viewed

with disfavor and is rarely granted." Hall v. City of Santa

Barbara, 813 F.2d 198, 201, n.9 (9th Cir. 1986). 

The issue on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim is not whether the claimant will ultimately prevail but

whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the

claims asserted. Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249

(9th Cir. 1997). All allegations of the complaint must be

accepted as true. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). The

court is bound to give the plaintiff the benefit of every

reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded”

allegations of the complaint. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v.

Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). Thus, the plaintiff

need not necessarily plead a particular fact if that fact is a

reasonable inference from facts properly alleged. Id.

The burden is on the moving party to prove beyond doubt that

the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim

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3 Cal. Labor Code § 3600 in relevant part states:

Liability for the compensation provided by this division, in lieu

of any other liability whatsoever to any person except as

otherwise specifically provided . . . shall, without regard to

negligence, exist against an employer for any injury sustained by

his or her employees arising out of and in the course of the

employment . . . where the . . . conditions of compensation

concur: (1) Where, at the time of the injury, both the employer

and the employee are subject to the compensation provisions of

this division.(2) Where, at the time of the injury, the employee

(continued...)

4

which would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.

41, 45-46 (1957); see also NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d

896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986).

Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has determined that a motion

to dismiss in a civil rights case should be scrutinized with

special care. Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir.

1992) (citing Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 

1987))(liberal construction rules are particularly important in

civil rights cases).

ANALYSIS

Defendant contends that plaintiff’s claims for negligent

infliction of emotional distress and negligent supervision are 

barred by the WCA’s exclusivity provisions. Plaintiff responds 

that defendant’s alleged age and disability discrimination is not 

a risk reasonably encompassed by the compensation bargain and

therefore his claims for negligent infliction of emotional

distress and negligent supervision are not preempted by the WCA’s

exclusivity provisions. 

To trigger the WCA’s exclusivity rule, there must be an

injury compensable under the workers’ compensation statute. Cal.

Lab. Code § 3600.3 For the injury to be compensable for

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3(...continued)

is performing service growing out of and incidental to his or her

employment and is acting within the course of his or her

employment. (emphasis added).

4 Parties appear to have no dispute that plaintiff

suffered an emotional injury.

5

exclusivity purposes it must meet two conditions. First, the

injury must cause a “disability or the need for medical

treatment.” Gomez v. Acquistapace, 50 Cal. App. 4th 740, 748

(1996).4 Second, if an injury has occurred, the acts or motives

giving rise to the injury must constitute “a risk reasonably

encompassing the compensation bargain.” Vacanti v. State Comp.

Ins. Fund, 24 Cal. 4th 800, 819-820. Where the alleged injury is

neither collateral to nor derivative of an injury that satisfies

both of these conditions, then it is not subject to exclusivity.

Id. at 820 (emphasis added); Livitsanos v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.

4th 744, 754 (1992); Cal. Lab. Code § 3602(c).

Conduct that violates a fundamental public policy of the

state is not within the compensation bargain, and thus not

preempted by the WCA. City of Moorpark v. Superior Court, 18

Cal. 4th 1143, 1153 (1998)(“the compensation bargain cannot

encompass conduct, such as . . . discrimination, obnoxious to the

interests of the state and contrary to public policy and sound

morality . . . Employees discharged in violation of fundamental

public policy may bring an action against their employers

sounding in tort”); Gantt v. Century Ins., 1 Cal. 4th 1083, 1100

(1992), overruled on other grounds in, Green v. Ralee Eng’g Co.,

19 Cal. 4th 66, 80 (1998) (defendant’s misconduct was not a

normal part of the employment relationship so exclusivity does

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5 Defendant contends that plaintiff does not provide

citations specifically illustrating that negligence claims have

been exempted by the WCA’s exclusivity provisions. (Reply at

2:21-23.) The court notes that under Rule 12(b)(6) defendant,

not plaintiff, bears the burden. 

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not apply); Fermino v. Fedco, Inc., 7 Cal. 4th 701, 708 (1994)

(where “the employer engag[ed] in conduct that ‘stepped out of

its proper role’” it may be subject to tort liability); Huffman

v. Interstate Brands Corp., 121 Cal. App. 4th 679, 695

(2004)(employer actions violating a fundamental public policy are

exempt from exclusivity as they are outside the normal employment

relationship) (citations omitted). 

Defendant contends that plaintiff’s negligence-based claims

are not outside the compensation bargain, and thus are preempted

by the WCA’s exclusive remedies. Specifically, defendant

contends “it is axiomatic that only intentional acts on the part

of the employer will be sufficient to place the alleged injury

outside the compensation bargain.”5 (Reply at 2:20-21) [no

citations].) This area of the law is not nearly so well-settled

as defendant proclaims. While there are cases which appear to

support the position advocated by defendant, see e.g., Coit

Drapery Cleaners, Inc. v. Sequoia Ins. Co., 14 Cal. App. 4th

1595, 1606 (1993), there also are many cases which hold that

negligence-based claims are not in all cases preempted by the

WCA. See Pitchford v. Hematronix Inc., C-95-105, 1995 U.S. Dist.

Lexis 4647 (N.D. Cal. April 4, 1995) (citing Gantt, 1 Cal. 4th at

1097-1101) (claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress

arising from sexual harassment and discrimination are not

preempted by the WCA’s exclusivity rule where wrongful

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6 In the motion to dismiss, with less than a page of

legal argument, defendant contends that “it is well-settled,

however, that the California Workers’ compensation Act provides

the exclusive remedy for alleged workplace injuries.” This

broad, conclusory statement ignores the multitude of statutory

and common law exceptions to the WCA’s exclusivity provisions. 

In its 3-page reply, defendant clarifies that all negligence

claims are precluded by the WCA. Unfortunately, this too is an

inaccurate generalization. 

7

termination in violation of public policy is alleged); Smith v.

Int’l. Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 109 Cal. App. 4th 1637,

1658 (2003), review denied, 2003 Cal. LEXIS 7249 (Sept. 24, 2003)

(negligent infliction of emotional distress not barred by WCA

where based on employer’s violation of fundamental public

policies); Accardi v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. App. 4th 341, 352

(1993) (citing Watson v. Dep’t. of Rehab., 212 Cal. App. 3d 1271,

1285-1286 (1989))(claim for emotional distress damages is not

barred where employer’s illegal discriminatory practices

engendered the distress). Defendant omits any reference to

contrary authority in its brief, conclusory papers.6 Because the

legal principles defendant cites in support of its motion are at

worst incorrect, and at best incomplete, articulations of the

law, the court finds no basis for granting defendant’s motion. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss

plaintiff’s sixth and seventh claims for negligent infliction of

emotional distress and negligent supervision is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 25, 2005

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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