Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-03752/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-03752-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jim Hamlet
Respondent
Billy E. Turner
Petitioner

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BILLY E. TURNER,

Petitioner,

 vs.

JIM HAMLET, Warden,

Respondent. 

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No. C 03-3752 JSW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

Billy Turner, a prisoner of the State of California, has filed a pro se

petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Per order filed

on October 28, 2003, this Court found that the petition, liberally construed, stated

cognizable claims under § 2254 and ordered Respondent to show cause why the

petition should not be granted. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition

as not fully exhausted. Respondent filed its answer on January 22, 2004. 

Petitioner filed his traverse on April 27, 2005. This order denies the petition for

writ of habeas corpus on the merits.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On July 29, 1999, a jury convicted Petitioner of first degree residential

burglary (Cal. Penal Code § 459/460), and evasion of a peace officer while

driving recklessly (Cal. Veh. Code § 2800.2). On January 14, 2000, the trial

court found that Petitioner suffered 17 previous “strikes” within the meaning of

California Penal Code section 667, subdivisions (b) - (i). On January 19, 2000,

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Petitioner was sentenced to a term of incarceration of 40 years to life: 25 years to

life for the residential burglary conviction and five years consecutive for each of

the three enhancement allegations found true pursuant to Penal Code section 667,

subdivision (a). On December 19, 2001, the conviction was affirmed on direct

appeal by the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District. The Supreme

Court of California denied review on March 30, 2002, and denied review en banc

on July 30, 2002. Petitioner filed the instant petition on August 11, 2003. 

In his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Petitioner asserts ten claims for

relief: 1) the trial court violated his due process rights when it denied his motion

for an in-person lineup; 2) his right to counsel was violated during an in camera

hearing; 3) his conviction for evasion of a peace officer was supported by

insufficient evidence; 4) the trial court violated his right to counsel when it

revoked its appointment of an alternate attorney for the limited purpose of

investigating the possibility of a new trial motion; 5) the trial court violated his

right to a jury on the prior conviction allegations because his waiver was

involuntary; 6) the trial court violated his due process rights by changing its

initial decision to stay imposition of the sentence for evading a peace officer; 7)

the trial court’s reasonable doubt instruction violated his due process rights; 8)

the appellate court violated Petitioner’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights

when it refused to provide the transcript of the in camera hearing; 9) he suffered

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and 10) trial counsel. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The facts underlying the charged offenses as found by the California Court

of Appeal, First District, Division Three, are summarized below.

The charges against appellant arose from the February 5,

1999 burglary of the home of Richard McCullough and a

subsequent high speed pursuit of the suspects’ car by the police. At

about 11 a.m. on the day of the burglary, Sue Gatsos noticed that

the driver of a red Firebird was driving slowly, and the car’s

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occupants appeared to be casing the McCullough house located at

the corner of Hummingbird and Killdeer. Gatsos did not see the

front of the driver’s face. However she did see the driver’s profile,

his left ear and back of his bald head. Gatsos noted the license

plate number of the car, which was registered in appellant’s name. 

Within minutes of seeing the Firebird, Gatsos located

uniformed Antioch Police Officer Chris Valliere, who was seated in

a marked police car, parked a short distance way from the

intersection of Hummingbird and Killdeer. Gatsos told the officer

her observations, described the driver as a black man, but did not

mention the license plate number. Within ten seconds of Gatsos’

report, Brian Pendleton approached Valliere. Pendleton had seen a

large black man holding a computer and coming from the tall

hedges near the McCullough house and another person standing

near a hatchback type car, with the trunk lid open. Pendleton was

unable to identify either of the persons or the specific type of car he

had seen.

After speaking with Pendleton, Valliere proceeded to the

Hummingbird and Killdeer intersection, where he observed two

black men inside a red Firebird or Trans Am, which was parked on

the west side of the McCullough house. As the officer attempted to

block the Firebird, he turned on the police car’s overhead lights. 

The Firebird then took off, going through a stop sign without

stopping. With the police car siren now on, Valliere pursued the

Firebird. The Firebird traveled at speeds above the posted limit and

at times, the car crossed over into oncoming traffic lanes. After

about one mile, Valliere ended his chase for safety reasons.

Shortly thereafter, Tom Fuentes, the Hudson Townhomes’

maintenance manager who was standing outside, saw the Firebird

enter the Hudson Court Townhomes. The car stopped about 20

yards from Fuentes. Two men jumped out of the car, and then they

jumped over a five-foot masonry wall. As the driver ran towards

the wall, Fuentes got a look at his face. 

Responding to a dispatch about the fleeing Firebird and its

occupants, Antioch Police Officer Leonard Orman went to the

Hudson Court Townhomes. Orman parked his car and searched for

the two men. A few blocks from the Townhomes, the officer found

appellant crawling on his hands and knees, perspiring and panting

heavily. Orman identified himself as a police officer and told

appellant to lie on the ground. Appellant spontaneously stated, “I

was only driving the car, I didn’t know what was going on, the

other guy said he had a warrant, so I ran.”

After his arrest, appellant was taken to a nearby schoolyard. 

The police asked Gatsos and Fuentes to come to the schoolyard to

view appellant. Within one or two hours of their initial

observations, Fuentes and Gatsos separately viewed appellant in a

one-man showup to determine whether he was the person they saw

in the car. They both identified him as the driver of the Firebird. 

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At the time of the showup, Gatsos stated that she believed the

actual driver had lighter skin color than the person she viewed at

the showup. While Gatsos was later shown photographic arrays by

the police, she did not identify the driver from any photograph. 

Nor did Gatsos recall telling the police that one of the

photographed men looked similar to the driver of the car. Both

Gatsos and Fuentes made in-court identifications of appellant as

driver of the Firebird. 

Appellant claimed he was not present at the burglary scene. 

He presented evidence that his cousin, Maurice Green, had access

to the Firebird; the police had found Green’s fingerprints on the

outside of the car; and according to the police, Gatsos had

identified a photograph of Green as looking similar to the driver of

the Firebird. 

People v. Turner, No. A090072, slip op. at 2-3 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2001).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court only on the

ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A district court may grant a petition

challenging a state conviction or sentence on the basis of a claim that was

“adjudicated on the merits” in state court only if the state court’s adjudication of

the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented

in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if

a state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme

Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the

Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). “Under the ‘unreasonable application’

clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if a state court identifies the

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correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. 

As summarized by the Ninth Circuit: “A state court’s decision can involve an

‘unreasonable application’ of federal law if it either 1) correctly identifies the

governing rule but then applies it to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively

unreasonable, or 2) extends or fails to extend a clearly established legal principle

to a new context in a way that is objectively unreasonable.” Van Tran v. Lindsey,

212 F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-07),

overruled on other grounds by Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-73 (2003). 

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 411; accord

Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 436 (2004) (per curiam) (challenge to state

court’s application of governing federal law must not only be erroneous, but

objectively unreasonable); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002) (per

curiam) (“unreasonable” application of law is not equivalent to “incorrect”

application of law). In deciding whether a state court’s decision is contrary to, or

an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, a federal court

looks to the decision of the highest state court to address the merits of the

petitioner’s claim in a reasoned decision. LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669

n.7 (9th Cir. 2000). 

The only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is in the holdings of the Supreme Court as of the time of the

state court decision. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412; Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062,

1069 (9th Cir. 2003). While the circuit law may be “persuasive authority” for the

purposes of determining whether a state court decision is an unreasonable

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application of Supreme Court precedent, only the Supreme Court’s holdings are

binding on the state courts and only those holdings need be “reasonably” applied. 

Id.

A federal habeas court may grant the writ if it concludes that the state

court's adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Section 2254(d)(2) applies to

intrinsic review of a state court’s process, or situations in which the petitioner

challenges the state court’s findings based entirely on the state court record,

whereas § 2254(e)(1) applies to challenges based on extrinsic evidence, or

evidence presented for the first time in federal court. Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d

992, 999-1000 (9th Cir. 2004). The relevant question under § 2254(d)(2) is

whether an appellate panel, applying the normal standards of appellate review,

could reasonably conclude that the state court findings are supported by the

record. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 978 (9th Cir. 2004).

DISCUSSION

I. Denial of Motion for an In-Person Lineup

Petitioner contends that his rights to due process and equal protection were

violated when the trial court denied his pre-trial motion for an in-person lineup. 

Petitioner argues that Gatsos’ identification of Petitioner as the driver of the

Firebird was suspect because at the time that she identified Petitioner in the

schoolyard as the car’s driver, she told the police that she had thought the driver

had lighter skin. See RT at 293. She later testified on redirect examination that

she was certain of her schoolyard identification of Petitioner as the driver. RT at

301-02. Petitioner argues that, due to her statement about the perpetrator’s skin

tone at the in-person show-up, Gatsos’ identification was material, a reasonable

likelihood of mistaken identification existed, and the trial court erred in denying

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his motion for an in-person lineup. 

A. Legal Standard 

"A conviction which rests on a mistaken identification is a gross

miscarriage of justice." Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967). Procedures

by which the defendant is identified as the perpetrator therefore must be

examined to assess whether they are unduly suggestive. "It is the likelihood of

misidentification which violates a defendant's right to due process." Neil v.

Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 (1972). Due process protects against the admission

of evidence deriving from suggestive pretrial identification procedures. See id. at

196. Unnecessarily suggestive pretrial identification procedures alone do not

require exclusion of in-court identification testimony, however; reliability is the

linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony. See Manson

v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 100-14 (1977). Identification testimony is

inadmissible as a violation of due process only if (1) a pretrial encounter is so

impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of

irreparable misidentification, and (2) the identification is not sufficiently reliable

to outweigh the corrupting effects of the suggestive procedure. See Van Pilon v.

Reed, 799 F.2d 1332, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986). 

An identification procedure is impermissibly suggestive when it

emphasizes the focus upon a single individual thereby increasing the likelihood

of misidentification. See United States v. Bagley, 772 F.2d 482, 493 (9th Cir.

1985) (repeated showing of picture of individual impermissibly reinforces image

of picture in mind of viewer); see, e.g., United States v. Burdeau, 168 F.3d 352,

357-58 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that photo placement, hue and facial expression

were insubstantial differences between defendant's photograph and the others in a

photographic array and did not create an impermissible suggestion that defendant

was the offender); United States v. Montgomery, 150 F.3d 983, 992-93 (9th Cir.

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1998) (showing witness photographs of defendant, giving witness own copy of

photograph of defendant and allowing witness to view defendant in courtroom

day before witness testified found suggestive); Johnson v. Sublett, 63 F.3d 926,

929 (9th Cir. 1995) (identification procedures not unnecessarily suggestive where

witness failed to identify defendant from photo spread but later made positive

identification at pretrial suppression hearing which defendant voluntarily

attended). Showing an eyewitness a surveillance photo of the actual criminal

immediately prior to the photospread does not render the identification procedure

impermissibly suggestive. United States v. Beck, 393 F.3d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir.

2005). 

In determining whether in-court identification testimony is sufficiently

reliable, courts consider five factors: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the

defendant at the time of the incident; (2) the witness' degree of attention; (3) the

accuracy of the witness' prior description; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated

by the witness at the time of the identification procedure; and (5) the length of

time between the incident and the identification. See Manson, 432 U.S. at 114;

Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 84 F.3d 1206,

1209-10 (9th Cir.) (although drive-by identification by witnesses was suggestive,

it was permissible because there was not a substantial likelihood of

misidentification), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 973 (1996); United States v. Wang, 49

F.3d 502, 505 (9th Cir. 1995) (identification of defendant in photographs reliable

where witness had ample opportunity to view defendant and actually spoke with

him). 

To prevail on habeas review, a petitioner must show that the identification

procedures used in the case were "'so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to

irreparable mistaken identification that he was denied due process of law.'" 

Johnson, 63 F.3d at 929 (quoting Stovall, 388 U.S. at 301-02) (finding no due

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process violation where any possible prejudice defendant may suffer from

unreliable identification mitigated by cross-examination and other courtroom

safeguards). The bare fact that a confrontation was suggestive does not alone

establish constitutional error. Id. (quoting Biggers, 409 U.S. at 196). The

confrontation must be impermissibly or unduly suggestive under the totality of

the circumstances. Id. The ultimate question of the constitutionality of pretrial

identification procedures is a mixed question of law and fact. See Van Pilon, 799

F.2d at 1336; Ponce v. Cupp, 735 F.2d 333, 336 (9th Cir. 1984).

B. Analysis

 Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a pretrial lineup identification procedure under Evans v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d

617, 625 (1974), which holds that due process requires that a defendant’s request

for a lineup be granted only where eye witness identification is shown to be

material and there is a reasonable likelihood of mistaken identification. In

rejecting Petitioner’s challenge, the Court of Appeal found that there was no

reasonable likelihood of mistaken identification. The Court of Appeal

distinguished Evans on the basis that the witnesses in Evans had committed

themselves to their identifications at the preliminary hearings. Thus, they would

be reluctant to recede even if they were mistaken. Turner, slip op. at 4. The

Court of Appeal found that no such basis for mistaken identification existed in

the instant case because Gatsos had not previously committed herself to an

identification since she did not testify at the preliminary hearing. Id. Moreover,

the Court of Appeal noted that “the right to a lineup arises . . . only when

eyewitness identification is shown to be a material issue and there exists a

reasonable likelihood of a mistaken identification which a lineup would tend to

resolve.” Id. at 4 (quoting Evans, 11 Cal. 3d at 625). Given that Gatsos had not

committed herself to an identification, Fuentes, another witness, positively

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identified Petitioner at the showup and at the preliminary hearing, and that

Petitioner admitted that he drove the car, the Court of Appeal found that the

evidence substantially supported the trial court’s decision that Gatsos’

identification was not material nor was there a reasonable likelihood of a

mistaken identification. Id. at 5. 

The decision of the Court of Appeal is not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, federal law as established by the Supreme Court of the United

States. The ultimate inquiry is whether, in light of the totality of the

circumstances, the showup where Gatsos identified Petitioner is so

“unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification

that he was denied due process of law.” Johnson, 63 F.3d at 929 (quoting

Stovall, 388 U.S. at 301-02). Although the showup at the schoolyard focused

only on Petitioner, the “bare fact that a confrontation was suggestive does not

alone establish constitutional error.” Id. (quoting Biggers, 409 U.S. at 196). 

Here, the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that there was no likelihood of

mistaken identification is amply supported by the record. Gatsos identified

Petitioner within one to two hours of observing the driver of the car, and she

identified Petitioner at the schoolyard by looking at his profile, similar to the

angle at which she had previously observed the driver of the car. In addition,

both Gatsos and Fuentes separately identified Petitioner as the driver of the car at

the schoolyard. Lastly, the risk that Gatsos would be reluctant to admit mistake

is minimized since she did not commit herself to an identification at the

preliminary hearing since she did not testify there. 

However, the Court of Appeal acknowledged that Gatsos had identified

Maurice Green, Petitioner’s cousin, as looking similar to the driver of the car in a

subsequent photo lineup conducted in her home a few weeks after the incident. 

The Court of Appeal recognized that this subsequent identification was a

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“weakening of Gatsos’ identification” because she identified someone other than

Petitioner as looking similar to the driver of the car when she viewed the

photospread. However, the Court of Appeal determined that in light of the

totality of the circumstances, there was no reasonable likelihood of mistaken

identification because Gatsos’ identification of Petitioner as the driver of the

Firebird was supported by Fuentes’ identification of Petitioner as the driver at the

showup and preliminary hearing and Petitioner’s admission that he was the driver

of the Firebird. Turner, slip op. at 5. 

The Court of Appeal’s analysis of Petitioner’s claim under Evans

comports with the analysis required by Stovall and Biggers because the Court of

Appeal reviewed the record to determine if a reasonable likelihood of mistaken

identification existed and reasonably determined that it had not. See Biggers, 409

U.S. at 198 (“It is, first of all, apparent that the primary evil to be avoided is a

very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification”) (internal quotations

omitted). Thus, its decision is consistent with federal law and habeas relief is not

warranted. 

II. In Camera Hearing Without Defense Counsel

Petitioner contends that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right

to counsel when it conducted an in camera hearing regarding the identity of a

confidential informant, who provided information that Green was the “second

responsible” for the burglary, without defense counsel. See Turner, slip op. at 5. 

Respondent counters that Petitioner is procedurally barred from raising this claim

because an adequate and independent state ground exists for the state court’s

denial of his claim, in that he failed to object at trial (invoking the

contemporaneous objection rule as the state procedural rule barring federal

review). 

A. Legal Standard

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A federal court will not review questions of federal law decided by a state

court if the decision also rests on a state law ground that is independent of the

federal question and adequate to support the judgment. Coleman v. Thompson,

501 U.S. 722, 729-30 (1991). In the context of direct review of a state court

judgment, the independent and adequate state ground is jurisdictional. Id. at 729.

In cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state court

pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas

review of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the

default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or

demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. 

 Under the ‘independent’ prong, where the state decision fairly appears to

rest primarily on federal law or be interwoven with it, and the state court did not

clearly and expressly rely on an independent state law ground for denial, the state

grounds is not “independent” and the federal court should reach the merits. See

Siripongs v. Calderon, 35 F.3d 1308, 1316-18 (9th Cir. 1994) (petition

summarily denied by state court "both for reasons of procedural default and on

the merits"). On the other hand, where the state court decision rests on clearly

alternate grounds, one invoking a state procedural bar and the other addressing

the merits, the state procedural ground is still sufficiently independent to preclude

habeas review. See Bargas v. Burns, 179 F.3d 1207, 1214 (9th Cir. 1999); see

also Moran v. McDaniel, 80 F.3d 1261, 1269 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding that

Nevada Supreme Court rested its dismissal of petition on independent state

procedural grounds because it stated that any discussion of merits was strictly for

purpose of demonstrating that petitioner's procedural defaults could not be

overcome by showing of cause and prejudice). 

Under the ‘adequate’ prong, the state procedural bar cited must be "clear,

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consistently applied, and well-established at the time of the petitioner's purported

default." Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Bean), 96 F.3d 1126, 1129 (9th

Cir. 1996) (internal quotations and citation omitted), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1204

(1997). The federal court must look at the actual practice of state courts in

enforcing their procedural bars, and not just at the rule as stated in state court

decisions. Powell v. Lambert, 357 F.3d 871, 879 (9th Cir. 2004). In examining

the rule in practice, the federal court may consider both published and

unpublished state court decisions. Id. The state bears the burden of proving the

“adequacy” of a state procedural bar. Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 585-86

(9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 938 (2003).

B. Analysis

The Court of Appeal initially noted that neither Petitioner nor defense

counsel objected when the trial court stated in open court that it was going to

hold an in camera hearing. Turner, slip op. at 6. The Court of Appeal concluded

that Petitioner was procedurally barred from challenging the exclusion of the

defense from that hearing. Id. (citing People v. Baines, 30 Cal. 3d 143, 149

(1981)). However the Court of Appeal also considered and rejected Petitioner’s

claim on the merits, explaining that “the trial court was not obligated sua sponte

to offer appellant and/or his counsel an opportunity to be present at the in camera

hearing.” Turner, slip op. at 6. Relying on California Evidence Code section

1042 subdivision (d), the Court of Appeal reiterated that where a defendant

demands disclosure of a confidential informant on the ground that the informant

is a material witness on the issue of guilt, an in camera hearing must be

conducted outside the presence of the defendant and his counsel if the

prosecution so requests. Id. The Court of Appeal further noted that “the use of

an in camera hearing in this case does not implicate appellant’s federal or state

constitutional rights ‘to be present and have effective aid of counsel.’” Id.

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(quoting People v. Levine, 152 Cal. App. 3d. 1058, 1068 (1984)). 

Because the Court of Appeal rested its decision on alternate grounds, one

invoking a state procedural bar and the other addressing the merits, the state

procedural ground can still preclude habeas review. See Bargas, 179 F.3d at

1214; see also Moran, 80 F.3d at 1269. 

The Ninth Circuit has previously held in Melendez v. Pliler, a case cited

by Respondent, that the contemporaneous objection rule is an independent state

ground for a procedural bar. See 288 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2002) (the

“contemporaneous objection rule” is California Evidence Code section 353). 

Moreover, in Melendez, the Ninth Circuit held that the contemporaneous

objection rule was consistently applied. Id. (“We held more than twenty years

ago that the rule is consistently applied when a party has failed to make any

objection to the admission of evidence.”) Also cited by Respondent is Vansickel

v. White, 166 F.3d 953, 957-58 (9th Cir. 1999), in which the Ninth Circuit found

that petitioner had procedurally defaulted when his counsel failed to

contemporaneously object at trial. Thus, this Court finds that this claim is

procedurally barred from federal review, unless Petitioner demonstrates cause for

the default and prejudice. 

1. Cause 

The existence of cause for a procedural default “must ordinarily turn on

whether the prisoner can show that some objective factor external to the defense

impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule.” Murray v.

Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). Ineffective assistance of counsel is cause for

procedural default, but “[a]ttorney error short of ineffective assistance of counsel

does not constitute cause.” Id. at 492. Petitioner does not allege ineffective

assistance of counsel, or any other basis, as a factor that impeded his counsel’s

efforts to comply with California’s procedural bar. Attorney ignorance or

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inadvertence is not “cause.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753. Therefore, this Court

finds that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate cause for the procedural default. 

2. Prejudice

 Although this Court need not address the issue of prejudice since

Petitioner has not demonstrated cause, this Court will nevertheless address the

issue. Petitioner argues that he was prejudiced by the appellate court’s refusal to

allow his appellate counsel to view the transcript of the in camera hearing

because his appellate counsel needed to see the sealed transcript in order to

effectively represent Petitioner. Traverse at 16. In order to establish prejudice, a

habeas petitioner must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been

different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Vansickel, 166 F.3d at 958-59 (holding that the

prejudice standard in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) is the

standard for prejudice standard in procedural bar cases) (internal citations

omitted). 

Here, Petitioner has not demonstrated that had trial counsel objected to the

in camera hearing, the result of the proceedings would have been different. The

trial court determined that there was “no reasonable probability that

nondisclosure would deprive [Petitioner] of a fair trial.” RT 47. Moreover, that

appellate counsel was precluded from reviewing the transcript of the in camera

hearing does not demonstrate how trial counsel’s failure to object created a less

favorable result. As such, Petitioner has not shown a reasonable probability that

the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. 

In addition, Petitioner has not alleged or demonstrated that failure to

consider this claim on the merits will result in a fundamental miscarriage of

justice. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. In sum, this Court is barred from

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reviewing Petitioner’s claim that trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right

to counsel when it held the in camera hearing outside the presence of defense

counsel.

III. Sufficiency of the Evidence of Evasion of a Peace Officer

Petitioner next asserts that insufficient evidence supports his conviction

for evading a peace officer because there was no evidence that Officer Valliere

was appointed by the chief of police. 

A. Legal Standard

The Due Process Clause "protects the accused against conviction except

upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the

crime with which he is charged." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). A

federal court reviewing collaterally a state court conviction does not determine

whether it is satisfied that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt. Payne v. Borg, 982 F.2d 335, 338 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 510 US

843 (1993). The federal court "determines only whether, 'after viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" 

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Payne, 982 F.2d at 338. Only if

no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt, may the writ be granted. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324; Payne, 982 F.2d at

338; Miller v. Stagner, 757 F.2d 988, 992-93 (9th Cir.), amended, 768 F.2d 1090

(9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1048, and cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1049

(1986); Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1239 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.

838 (1984).

If confronted by a record that supports conflicting inferences, a federal

habeas court “must presume – even if it does not affirmatively appear on the

record – that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the

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 Penal Code Section 830.1(a) states, in pertinent part: “any police officer, employed in that

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prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326. The

prosecution need not affirmatively rule out every hypothesis except that of guilt. 

Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 296-97 (1992) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326);

see, e.g., Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 639-41 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding

sufficient evidence of premeditation). The existence of some small doubt based

on an unsupported yet unrebutted hypothesis of innocence therefore is not

sufficient to invalidate an otherwise legitimate conviction. See Taylor v. Stainer,

31 F.3d 907, 910 (9th Cir. 1994) (three hypotheses regarding petitioner's

fingerprints which government failed to rebut unsupported by evidence and

therefore insufficient to invalidate conviction). After AEDPA, a federal habeas

court applies the standards of Jackson with an additional layer of deference. 

Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274 (9th Cir. 2005). Generally, a federal

habeas court must ask whether the operative state court decision reflected an

unreasonable application of Jackson and Winship to the facts of the case. Id. at

1275 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). 

B. Analysis

Petitioner contends that insufficient evidence supports his conviction for

evading a peace officer because the Prosecution did not present evidence that

Officer Valliere was appointed by the chief of police. The Court of Appeal

rejected Petitioner’s argument based on its decision in People v. Lara, 30 Cal.

App. 4th 658, 668-69 (1994) and the California Supreme Court’s decision in

People v. Flood, 18 Cal. 4th 470, 490-91 n. 13 (1998), which held that evidence

demonstrating that an officer is employed by the city as a police officer is

sufficient to establish that he is a peace officer within in the meaning of Penal

Code section 830.1.1

 The Court of Appeal noted that it was undisputed that

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capacity and appointed by the chief of police or chief, director, or chief executive of a

public safety agency, of a city . . . is a peace officer.” 

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Officer Valliere was employed by the city of Antioch as a police officer. Thus,

the Court of Appeal concluded that Petitioner’s claim failed because Officer

Valliere was a peace officer within the meaning of Penal Code section 830.1. 

The decision of the Court of Appeal is not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, federal law as established in Jackson. The record indicates that

Officer Valliere testified that he was employed by the City of Antioch as a police

officer for a year and two months, and on the day of the incident, he was on

patrol. Reporter’s Transcript (“RT”), 354, 356. Petitioner presented no evidence

to the contrary. Indeed, Petitioner concedes that “at the time of the events,

Officer Valliere was a police officer for the (c)ity of Antioch and had been so

employed for about 9-10 months.” Traverse at 17. Given these facts, the Court

of Appeal found that Petitioner had not demonstrated that no reasonable trier of a

fact could infer that Officer Valliere was a peace officer within the meaning of

Penal Code section 830.1. This Court concludes that the Court of Appeal’s

decision is not an unreasonable application of the Jackson standard. 

IV. Right to Counsel for New Trial Motion 

After the jury verdict, Petitioner moved under People v. Marsden, 2

Cal.3d 118 (1970), for the trial court to appoint new counsel to continue with

Petitioner’s post-verdict proceedings. RT 706. After considering Petitioner’s

argument for substitution of counsel, the trial court appointed independent

counsel from the Alternate Defender’s Office (“ADO”) for the limited purpose of

investigating whether there was a basis for a new trial motion. RT 704-05. 

However, the trial court denied the Marsden motion for all other purposes,

continuing trial counsel’s representation for the remaining post-conviction

proceedings. RT 717-18. At a later proceeding, the trial court relieved the ADO

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after hearing argument from its attorney that the appointment was inappropriate

under People v. Smith, 6 Cal. 4th 684, 693-95 (1993), which held that

appointment of counsel for the purpose of arguing that previous counsel was

incompetent is inappropriate based on the “undesirable consequence[]” of having

a series of attorneys claim that the previous one was incompetent, and that new

counsel should only be appointed upon a proper showing by defendant that

adequate grounds exist to substitute counsel. RT 728-30. 

Notwithstanding its prior denial of the Marsden motion, the trial court

agreed to hold another Marsden hearing. RT 754-76 (sealed). After hearing

further argument from Petitioner, the trial court denied his motion for new

counsel, finding that no grounds existed to warrant substitution of counsel. See

RT 748-49, 776. Petitioner asserts that the trial court violated his right to counsel

when it revoked its appointment of independent counsel for the limited purpose

of investigating the possibility of a new trial motion. 

A. Legal Standard

 The denial of an indigent criminal defendant's motion for substitution of

counsel may violate his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See Daniels v.

Woodford, 428 F.3d 1181, 1197-98 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that test for

determining whether court should have granted substitution motion is same as

test for determining whether an irreconcilable conflict existed); see, e.g., United

States v. Moore, 159 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 1998) (where irreconcilable

conflict existed between defendant and counsel trial court's failure to appoint

substitute counsel was reversible error); Crandell v. Bunnell, 144 F.3d 1213,

1215-18 (9th Cir. 1998) (denial of substitute counsel violated Sixth Amendment

where appointed counsel failed for months to investigate case and to develop

relationship with defendant), overruled on other grounds by Schell v. Witek, 218

F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). However, a criminal defendant who cannot

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 2People v. Marsden, 2 Cal. 3d 118 (1970), requires the trial court to permit a criminal

defendant requesting substitution of counsel to specify the reasons for his request and

generally to hold a hearing. This California rule substantially parallels the one

prescribed by the Ninth Circuit in Hudson v. Rushen. See Chavez v. Pulley, 623 F.

Supp. 672, 687 n.8 (E.D. Cal. 1985).

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afford to retain counsel has no right to counsel of his own choosing. Wheat v.

United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988). Nor is he entitled to an attorney who

likes and feels comfortable with him. United States v. Schaff, 948 F.2d 501, 505

(9th Cir. 1991). The Sixth Amendment guarantees effective assistance of

counsel, not a "meaningful relationship" between an accused and his counsel. 

Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983). 

The denial of a motion to substitute counsel implicates a defendant's Sixth

Amendment right to counsel and is properly considered in federal habeas. Bland

v. California Dep't of Corrections, 20 F.3d 1469, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled

on other grounds by Schell, 218 F.3d at 1023. The Ninth Circuit has held that

when a defendant voices a seemingly substantial complaint about counsel, the

trial judge should make a thorough inquiry into the reasons for the defendant's

dissatisfaction. Id. at 1475-76; United States v. Robinson, 913 F.2d 712, 716 (9th

Cir. 1990); Hudson v. Rushen, 686 F.2d 826, 829 (9th Cir. 1982).2

 The inquiry

need only be as comprehensive as the circumstances reasonably would permit,

however. King v. Rowland, 977 F.2d 1354, 1357 (9th Cir. 1992) (record may

demonstrate that extensive inquiry was not necessary). The habeas court

considers whether the trial court's denial of or failure to rule on the motion

"actually violated [petitioner's] constitutional rights in that the conflict between

[petitioner] and his attorney had become so great that it resulted in a total lack of

communication or other significant impediment that resulted in turn in an

attorney-client relationship that fell short of that required by the Sixth

Amendment." Schell, 218 F.3d at 1026. 

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B. Analysis

The trial court did not violate Petitioner’s right to counsel when it denied

his Marsden motion. Consistent with Bland, the trial court thoroughly

investigated Petitioner’s dissatisfaction with his trial counsel. After hearing

argument by Petitioner, the trial court assigned independent counsel to

investigate whether there were grounds for a new trial motion based on

ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied the Marsden motion for

all other purposes, thus Petitioner continued to be represented by counsel during

that time. Subsequently, the trial court relieved the ADO only after it determined

that its appointment was inappropriate under People v. Smith, 6 Cal. 4th 684

(1993). 

Even after it ruled that Petitioner was not entitled to new court-appointed

counsel, the trial court held another Marsden hearing when Petitioner submitted

another such motion. That motion was denied because Petitioner did not make an

adequate showing that his trial counsel was incompetent. Petitioner’s sole basis

for requesting new counsel rested upon his dissatisfaction with his trial counsel’s

trial tactics. RT 710. Petitioner cited no other evidence to demonstrate that his

relationship with his trial counsel had so deteriorated such that “it resulted in a

total lack of communication or other significant impediment that resulted in turn

in an attorney-client relationship that fell short of that required by the Sixth

Amendment.” Schell, 218 F.3d at 1026. Disagreement between a defendant and

his trial attorney over trial strategies does not warrant substitution of counsel. Id.

at 1026 n.8 (quoting Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 8 (1966) (“[A] lawyer may

properly make a tactical determination of how to run a trial even in the face of his

client’s incomprehension or explicit disapproval”)).

Additionally, as noted by the Court of Appeal, Petitioner’s argument that

he was not represented by counsel at the hearing where the trial court revoked

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appointment of the ADO is without merit. Turner, slip. op at 9 n.4 (citing People

v. Hines, 15 Cal. 4th 997, 1024-25 (1997) (a defendant does not have a

constitutional right to a second separate counsel at a Marsden hearing). The trial

court had appointed counsel solely for investigation of whether a new trial

motion was in order; Petitioner was represented by his original trial counsel for

all other purposes. When it became clear that appointment of the ADO was

inappropriate, the trial court properly relieved the Alternate Defender of its

limited representation on that issue. RT 730. Subsequently, the trial court denied

Petitioner’s new trial motion based on ineffective assistance of counsel and

insufficiency of evidence because it found that it lacked merit. See RT 748, 751,

754-76 (sealed), 779.

Petitioner cites no legal authority to support his claim that he was

“unrepresented” at the Marsden hearing because the trial court revoked

appointment of the ADO. See e.g., Pet. at 49-54; Traverse at 26. The record

indicates that the trial court made a comprehensive inquiry into Petitioner’s

concerns with his trial counsel, and after such inquiry, properly denied his

motion. Although the record shows that Petitioner was dissatisfied with his

counsel’s trial tactics, this alone is not sufficient to demonstrate that his Sixth

Amendment right to counsel had been violated. See Schell, 218 F.3d at 1026 n.8.

Moreover, the record indicates that Petitioner was represented by his original trial

counsel at the hearing where the trial court relieved the ADO of its duty to

investigate the possibility of a new trial motion. See RT 714-18, 750-51, 778-79. 

Thus, Petitioner’s claim fails. 

V. Voluntariness of Waiver of Jury on Prior Conviction Allegations

Petitioner contends that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his

right to a jury trial on the prior conviction allegations (hereinafter referred to as

“priors”). Specifically, he argues that he conditioned his waiver of a jury trial on

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the priors on obtaining new counsel for the purpose of filing a motion for a new

trial. Pet. at 63. He argues that since the trial court subsequently relieved the

ADO without the filing of a new trial motion, Petitioner’s waiver was invalid

because he asserts that had he “known that [obtaining new counsel for a new trial

motion] wasn’t going to happen, he would have proceeded with the jury trial of

the priors.” Id. This argument also fails. 

A. Legal Standard 

There is no federal constitutional right to a jury trial on sentencing issues. 

See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 648-49 (1990); Spaziano v. Florida, 468

U.S. 447, 457-465 (1984); United States v. Kinsey, 843 F.2d 383, 391 (9th Cir.),

cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1223 (1988). Nor is there a federal constitutional right to a

jury trial on the fact of a prior conviction. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.

466, 488-90 (2000); United States v. Zepeda, 234 F. 3d 411, 414-15 (9th Cir.

2001), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 966 (2001). 

While there is no right under the Sixth Amendment to have a jury hear and

rule on a sentencing enhancement allegations based on a prior conviction, see

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 475-76, the deprivation of a statutory entitlement to a jury

trial implicates the federal Due Process Clause. See Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S.

343, 346 (1980); People v. Odle, 45 Cal. 3d 386, 412 (1988), cert. denied, 488

U.S. 917 (1988). The defendant in such a case has a substantial and legitimate

expectation that he will be deprived of his liberty only to the extent determined

by the jury in the exercise of its statutory discretion, and that liberty interest is

one that the Fourteenth Amendment preserves against arbitrary deprivation by the

state. See Hicks, 447 U.S. at 346 (citing Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates,

442 U.S. 1 (1979); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1979); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418

U.S. 539 (1974); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)). 

If a federal habeas court finds constitutional error, the appropriate standard

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for reviewing such violations may be whether the error had a substantial and

injurious effect or influence resulting in actual prejudice under Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993); see Dillard v. Roe, 244 F.3d 758, 770

(9th Cir. 2001) (holding that California trial court’s alleged error in removing

from jury question of authenticity of records submitted to establish two prior

felony convictions did not merit habeas relief because the error, if any, did not

have a substantial and injurious effect in determining the jury’s verdict; there was

an abundance of other, uncontradicted evidence that petitioner had suffered the

convictions alleged). 

B. Analysis

The Court of Appeal found that Petitioner voluntarily waived a jury trial

on the priors and that he did not condition his waiver on the appointment or

retention of new counsel. Turner, slip op. at 10. In reviewing the entire record,

the Court of Appeal made the following determination: 

Appellant agreed with his counsel’s statement that appellant

wanted to “waive jury, you won’t ever have a jury trial on the

priors, but you don’t want to have that trial in front of the judge

today, you want to see if you can have another lawyer do that

trial.” (Italics added.) . . . Our review of the entire record,

including the sealed Marsden hearings, supports the trial court’s

finding that appellant’s waiver of his right to a jury trial on the

prior conviction allegations was not conditioned on the actual

appointment of new counsel to represent him during that

proceeding. 

Turner, slip op. at 8.

Because the Court of Appeal made a factual determination that Petitioner

voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial on the priors, this claim is governed by

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Under § 2254(d)(2), the central inquiry is whether an

appellate panel applying the normal standards of appellate review, could

reasonably conclude that the state court findings are supported by the record.

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3

Respondent’s assertion that this claim is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) is incorrect.

Section 2254(e)(1) applies to challenges based on extrinsic evidence, or evidence presented

for the first time in federal court. Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999-1000 (9th Cir.

2004). Here, Petitioner asserts his claim based only on evidence in the record. Thus, §

2254(d)(2) is the appropriate standard of review because § 2254(d)(2) applies to intrinsic

review of state court’s process, or situations in which the petitioner challenges the state

court’s findings based entirely on the state court record. Id.

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Lambert, 393 F.3d at 978.3

 This Court finds that the Court of Appeal reasonably

concluded that the trial court’s finding that Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily

waived his jury trial on the prior conviction allegations is supported by the

record. 

The record reflects that on July 30, 1999, Petitioner indicated to the trial

court that he wished to waive a jury trial on the priors and to obtain a continuance

in order to retain new counsel to file a new trial motion and conduct the trial on

the priors. RT 691-93. The court granted Petitioner’s request for continuance

and the prosecutor conducted a voir dire of Petitioner regarding his waiver of a

jury trial on the priors. The following colloquy occurred: 

Q: Okay. You have a right to a jury trial on the truth of your prior

convictions that are alleged in this Information, which is the

charging document in the case. It is my understanding that you

wish to waive your right to a jury trial on those prior convictions

and have the Court decide the truth of those prior convictions,

albeit at later date, and in which you and -- between the two times

you wish to attempt to obtain new counsel?

A: Yes. 

Q: Is that -- that is my understanding, correct?

A: That is my only reason.

Q: Okay. Do you in fact waive your right to a jury trial on the issue

of enhancements for the prior convictions that are shown in the

Information under Penal Code Sections 1170.1, 2, 667(a), and

667.5(b)?

A. Yes, I -- I waive the jury. Like I said -- stated before, only for

the reason for a new counsel on my priors and mistrial. That is the

only reason why I am waiving this jury. I understand it. 

RT 693-94. 

About three weeks later, on August 23, 1999, the parties reconvened to

determine whether Petitioner or his family had retained new counsel. RT 704. 

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Petitioner replied that he was not able to obtain new counsel. RT 704. At that

point, Petitioner filed his first Marsden motion and the trial court decided to

appoint independent counsel, the ADO, to investigate whether a new trial motion

based on ineffective assistance of counsel was warranted. RT 705. The trial

court explained to Petitioner that it would address Petitioner’s concerns in the

Marsden motion by appointing independent counsel. RT 706. On August 30,

1999, the trial court appointed the ADO to investigate the possibility of a new

trial motion, RT 714, and later revoked its appointment of the ADO on November

5, 1999 when it determined that the ADO’s appointment was improper. RT 724. 

Under § 2254(d)(2), this Court must determine whether the Court of

Appeal reasonably concluded that the trial court’s finding that Petitioner

unconditionally waived a jury trial on the priors is supported by the record. This

Court finds that the record supports that court’s conclusion. First, Petitioner

waived his jury trial on the priors before the trial court announced that it would

appoint the ADO to investigate the possibility of a new trial motion. Thus,

Petitioner could not have reasonably believed that he conditioned his waiver of

jury trial on obtaining that counsel since the trial court had not yet indicated that

it would appoint new counsel and Petitioner had not yet filed his Marsden

motion. Indeed, it was only after Petitioner failed to retain new counsel, three

weeks after the hearing in which Petitioner waived jury trial on the priors, that

the trial court decided to appoint the ADO. 

Second, the trial court explicitly asked Petitioner whether he wanted to

waive jury trial on the priors and Petitioner reiterated that he was waiving jury

trial on the priors so that he could seek new counsel. See RT 692. The trial court

replied that Petitioner could waive jury trial for whatever reason he wanted,

whereupon Petitioner stated again that he was waiving a jury trial on the priors. 

Thus, the record demonstrates that Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily waived

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jury trial on the priors without conditioning the waiver on actual appointment of

new counsel. 

To the extent that any ambiguity may exist in the record concerning the

voluntariness of Petitioner’s waiver of jury trial, this Court cannot say that the

Court of Appeal’s determination that Petitioner’s jury waiver on the priors was

voluntary is an unreasonable conclusion from the record. 

Moreover, even assuming that the trial court erred in holding a bench trial,

the error did not have “a substantial and injurious effect or influence resulting in

actual prejudice.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. The Court of Appeal noted that

“[a]ppellant has made no showing that it is reasonably probable that a result more

favorable to him would have been reached . . . if the jury, instead of the court,

had determined that he had suffered (citation) the prior convictions.” Turner, slip

op. at 10 (internal quotations omitted). 

This Court concurs with the Court of Appeal. The record reveals that the

trial court found Petitioner’s prior convictions true based on certified copies of

the prior convictions and Petitioner offered no evidence to the contrary. RT 781-

83. In light of this evidence, Petitioner has not shown that having a judge decide

the truth of the priors, instead of a jury, “had a substantial and injurious effect or

influence resulting in actual prejudice.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. Thus,

Petitioner’s claim fails. 

VI. Concurrent Sentence

Petitioner contends that the trial court improperly changed its mind when

it imposed a concurrent sentence for the conviction for evading a peace officer

rather than imposing a stay of that sentence, as initially considered. Thus,

Petitioner argues, the trial court committed a sentencing error, violating his state

and federal due process rights as well as the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth

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This Court notes that Petitioner does not argue that a concurrent sentence for the

evading a peace officer conviction was itself improper, or that the sentence should have

been stayed pursuant to Penal code section 654. Instead, Petitioner argues that the trial

court changed the sentence on an improper basis: because the Prosecutor suggested that

the sentence should run concurrent instead of being stayed. Pet. at 69-71; Traverse at

33-34.

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Amendment.4

 Pet. at 71. Respondent maintains that this claim is procedurally

barred by the state court’s determination that the argument was forfeited when

Petitioner failed to object at the time the sentence was rendered. 

A. Legal Standard

State sentencing courts must be accorded wide latitude in their decisions

as to punishment. See Walker v. Endell, 850 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1987), cert.

denied, 488 U.S. 926, and cert. denied, 488 U.S. 981 (1988). Generally, a federal

court may not review a state sentence that is within statutory limits. See id.

However, there are exceptions under the Due Process Clause and the Eighth

Amendment. The constitutional guarantee of due process is fully applicable at

sentencing. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977). Federal courts

must defer to the state court’s interpretation of state sentencing laws. See Bueno

v. Hallahan, 988 F.2d 86, 88 (9th Cir. 1993). "Absent a showing of fundamental

unfairness, a state court's misapplication of its own sentencing laws does not

justify federal habeas relief." Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 461, 469 (9th Cir.

1994); see, e.g., Miller v. Vasquez, 868 F.2d 1116, 1118-19 (9th Cir. 1989)

(whether assault with deadly weapon qualifies as "serious felony" under

California's sentence enhancement provisions, Cal. Penal Code §§ 667(a) and

1192.7(c)(23), is a question of state sentencing law and does not state a

constitutional claim). 

The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment serves to prevent

both successive punishment and successive prosecution. See Garrett v. United

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If the alleged second punishment is for a different offense, the court need not inquire

into whether there have been multiple punishments. See Noriega-Perez v. United

States, 179 F.3d at 1171 (declining to inquire whether INS penalty is civil or criminal

because penalty was assessed for separate offense from prior criminal conviction). 

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States, 471 U.S. 773, 793 (1985); Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 499 (1984);

Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977); Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389,

396 (9th Cir. 1995).5

 The Double Jeopardy Clause is not violated if "each

[offense] requires proof of a fact which the other does not." Blockburger v.

United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) ; see, e.g., United States v. Garlick, 240

F.3d 789, 793-94 (9th Cir. 2001) (two counts of wire fraud based on two fax

transmissions not multiplicitous, even though only first fax was sent by defendant

and first fax could have been used to prove defendant caused second fax to be

sent).

The Blockburger test does not necessarily control the inquiry into the

intent of a state legislature, however. Even if the crimes are the same under

Blockburger, if it is evident that Congress or a state legislature intended to

authorize cumulative punishments, a federal court's inquiry is at an end. See

Johnson, 467 U.S. at 499 n.8; Hunter, 459 U.S. at 369; United States v. Martinez,

49 F.3d 1398, 1402 n.6 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1065 (1996);

accord United States v. Wolfswinkel, 44 F.3d 782, 784 (9th Cir. 1995) ("If

Congress enacts statutes that indicate an intent to impose separate punishments,

those statutes define separate offenses, and the punishments do not violate the

Constitution.") (citing Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344 (1981)).

B. Analysis

The Court of Appeal correctly noted that Petitioner had not asserted that

the sentence for evading a police officer should have been stayed under Penal

Code section 654. Rather, Petitioner challenges the sentence as procedurally

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flawed because the trial court changed its initial determination to impose a stay

on an improper basis: the prosecutor’s argument that the sentence should run

concurrent to the burglary sentence. The Court of Appeal concluded that because

neither Petitioner nor his counsel objected to the imposition of concurrent

sentences, Petitioner’s claim was procedurally barred. However, the Court of

Appeal went on to reject Petitioner’s argument on the merits stating, “at the time

the court changed its mind, it had the ‘jurisdiction and authority to amend or

modify its previous’ statement regarding the staying of the sentence on the

conviction for evading a peace officer while driving recklessly.” Turner, slip op.

at 11. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal noted that Petitioner’s claim that the

court’s change of mind resulted in an increased or harsher sentence was without

merit. 

1. Procedural Bar

As discussed above, a federal court will not review questions of federal

law decided by a state court if the decision also rests on a state law ground that is

independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment. 

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30. The state bears the burden of proving that the

grounds for the state procedural bar is clear and consistently applied. See

Mueller, 322 F.3d at 585-86. As the Ninth Circuit has noted, it is most just to

place the burden of establishing such a default with Respondent, as it is "the

state, not petitioner, often appearing pro se, who has at its hands the records and

authorities to prove whether its courts have regularly and consistently applied the

procedural bar." Id. at 585.

With regard to Respondent's arguments that the state court’s decision rests

on adequate and independent state grounds precluding federal review, this Court

finds that Respondent has failed to meet its burden under Bennett v. Mueller of

establishing the adequacy of the procedural bar, specifically that it was

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consistently applied and well- established at the time of the alleged default. See

Bean, 96 F.3d at 1129. As such, because Respondent has not established that

federal review is barred by the existence of an adequate and independent state

ground for the state court's decision, this Court has reviewed Petitioner’s claim

on the merits.

Petitioner’s claim fails because he has not established that the trial court’s

conduct at sentencing violated his due process rights. The crux of Petitioner’s

claim is that the trial court committed a sentencing error when it imposed the

sentence for evading a peace officer concurrent to the sentence for burglary,

rather than staying the sentence. As such, unless Petitioner can show

“fundamental unfairness” resulting from the alleged sentencing error, federal

habeas relief is not warranted on the basis of the state court’s misapplication of

its sentencing laws. See Christian, 41 F.3d at 469; Miller, 868 F.2d at 1118-19. 

This Court finds no such fundamental unfairness in violation of

Petitioner’s due process rights. The trial judge announced at the beginning of

sentencing that he believed that the sentence for the conviction for evading a

peace officer was stayed under Penal Code section 654, but even if it were not, he

would run the sentence concurrent. RT 812-13. Petitioner claims that this

sentencing error resulted in an increased sentence, but does not support this

contention. Pursuant to the California Three Strikes Law, Penal Code section

667(2)(A), Petitioner was sentenced to 25 years to life for the burglary

conviction. RT 812. Petitioner has not shown how running the sentence for

evading a peace officer concurrent to the sentence for burglary increased his

sentence in any way. Therefore, Petitioner has not established a due process

violation in the trial court’s actions at sentencing. Thus, Petitioner’s claim fails

on the merits. 

2. Double Jeopardy

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California Penal Code section 459 provides, in pertinent part, that “every person who

enters any house, room, apartment, tenement, shop, warehouse, store, mill, barn, stable,

outhouse or other building, . . . with intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony

is guilty of burglary. 

California Vehicle Code section 2800.2 provides, in pertinent part, that “(a) If a person

flees or attempts to elude a pursuing peace officer in violation of Section 2800.1 and the

pursued vehicle is driven in a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or

property, the person driving the vehicle, upon conviction, shall be punished by

imprisonment in the state prison, or by confinement in the county jail for not less than six

months nor more than one year. The court may also impose a fine of not less than one

thousand dollars ($1,000) nor more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or may impose

both that imprisonment or confinement and fine.

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Petitioner further contends that the trial court violated the Double

Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment by imposing a concurrent sentence for

the evading a peace officer conviction. The Supreme Court of the United States

has held that the test to determine whether there are two offenses for Double

Jeopardy purposes, is whether each offense requires proof of an additional fact

which the other does not. Witte, 515 U.S. at 396 (quoting Blockburger, 284 U.S.

at 304). In Blockburger, the defendant was convicted of violating two sections of

the Anti-Narcotic Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 692 and 696, which prohibited the sale of

certain enumerated drugs, and the sale of any of those drugs “not in pursuance of

a written order of the person to whom the drug is sold.” 284 U.S. at 304. The

Supreme Court upheld both convictions and punishment for each offense even

though defendant made one sale that gave rise to both offenses because each

offense required proof of a different element. See id. at 304-05. 

In the case at bar, Petitioner suffered separate convictions for burglary

(Cal. Penal Code § 459) and evading a peace officer (Cal. Veh. Code § 2800.2),

which obviously include proof of very different facts.6

 To be convicted of

burglary, proof that the accused entered a house (or building) with an intent to

commit a felony is required. See § 459; People v. Carter, 36 Cal. 4th 1114, 1144

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 The trial judge instructed the jury on “reasonable doubt” as follows: “Reasonable

doubt is defined as follows: It is not a mere possible doubt, because everything relating

to human affairs is open to some possible and imaginary doubt. It is that a state of the

case which after entire comparison and consideration of all of the evidence leaves the

minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding

conviction of the truth of the charge.” RT 570. 

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(2005) (“Penal Code section 459, then and now, requires entry with intent to

commit ‘grand or petit larceny or any felony’”) (emphasis in original). 

Obviously, a person can commit either of these offenses without committing the

other. Accordingly, under Blockburger, Petitioner’s convictions for burglary and

evading a peace officer while driving recklessly are two separate offenses for

which Petitioner can be separately punished. Thus, no violation of the Double

Jeopardy Clause occurred.

VII. Jury Instruction on Reasonable Doubt 

Petitioner argues that the trial court’s use of the phrase “abiding

conviction” in explaining “reasonable doubt” in its jury instruction violated his

process rights because it did not adequately describe the quantum of doubt

required for acquittal.7

 However, the Ninth Circuit has previously rejected this

identical argument in Lisenbee v. Henry, 166 F.3d 997, 1000 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Therefore, Petitioner’s claim fails. 

VIII. Failure to Provide Transcript of In Camera Hearing

Six days after the burglary, the police received information from a

confidential informant that Maurice Green, Petitioner’s cousin, was the “second

responsible [for] the burglary” and that Green had an outstanding “nobail

warrant” for his arrest. Turner, slip op. at 5. Petitioner’s trial counsel argued that

since the confidential informant had knowledge of the burglary, he or she may

have information beneficial to Petitioner’s defense. RT 27. The trial court found

that Petitioner had made a showing that disclosure might be relevant to his

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defense and held an in camera hearing to determine whether the confidential

informant had information that could benefit Petitioner’s defense such that his or

her identity should be disclosed to Petitioner. See RT 25-28. Petitioner contends

that the transcript of the hearing should have been disclosed to his appellate

counsel so appellate counsel could determine whether any issues should be raised

on appeal regarding the in camera hearing. Pet. at 79. Petitioner contends that

the Court of Appeal violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when it

denied his motion to disclose the transcript of the in camera hearing regarding

the identity of confidential informant to his appellate counsel. 

A. Legal Standard

Under Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957) the Supreme

Court recognized the Government’s privilege to withhold from disclosure the

identity of confidential informants. The Supreme Court noted, however, that the

scope of the privilege is limited. “Where the disclosure of the informer’s

identity, or of the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the

defense of an accused, or essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege

must give way.” Id. at 60-61. The petitioner bears the burden of showing that

disclosure would be relevant to at least one defense. See United States v. Sai

Keung Wong, 886 F.2d 252, 256 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing United States v.

Buffington, 815 F.2d 1292, 1299) (9th Cir. 1987)). He must show that he has

more than a "mere suspicion" that the informant has information which will prove

"relevant and helpful" or will be essential to a fair trial. United States v. AmadorGalvan, 9 F.3d 1414, 1417 (9th Cir. 1993). Once the threshold showing is made,

a court must balance the “the public interest in protecting the flow of information

against the individual’s right to prepare his defense” in determining whether to

disclose the identity of the confidential informant. Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 62. 

There is no bright line rule. See id. Whether a proper balance renders

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nondisclosure erroneous depends on the particular circumstances of the case,

taking into consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible

significance of the informer’s testimony, and other relevant factors. Id. 

B. Analysis

The Court of Appeal noted that under California law, “Subdivision (d) of

section 1042 [of the Evidence Code] . . . provides that where the defendant

demands disclosure of the identity of a confidential informant ‘on the ground that

the informant is a material witness on the issue of guilt’ (emphasis added) [by the

Hobbs court], a hearing must be held, and it must be conducted in camera and

outside the presence of the defendant and his counsel if the prosecution so

requests.’” Turner, slip op. at 6 (citing People v. Hobbs, 7 Cal. 4th 948, 961

(1994)). After reviewing the transcript of the in camera hearing and the

proceedings in the open court, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court

did not err in denying Petitioner’s disclosure motion. Specifically it held that

when an in camera hearing is held and the trial court reasonably concluded that

the informant does not have knowledge of facts that would tend to exculpate the

defendant, “disclosure of the identity of the informer is prohibited by Evidence

Code section 1042, subdivision (d). . . .” Turner, slip op. at 7. Furthermore, the

Court of Appeal denied Petitioner’s request to reconsider its order in which it

refused to grant Petitioner’s appellate counsel access to the transcript of the in

camera hearing. Id. at 7 n.1.

The Court of Appeal’s decision to deny appellate counsel access to the

sealed transcript is not contrary to, or unreasonable application of, federal law as

set forth in Roviaro. Once the trial court concluded that Petitioner had made the

minimal threshold showing, it held an in camera hearing to assess the materiality

of the confidential informant’s information. RT 27. After the in camera hearing,

the trial court ruled that the information provided by the confidential informant

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was not material on the issue of Petitioner’s guilt and there was no reasonable

probability that nondisclosure would deprive Petitioner of a fair trial. RT 47. 

Ordinarily, an in camera review of the confidential information adequately

protects an accused’s right to a fair trial. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S.

39, 60 (1987) (holding that a defendant’s “interest in ensuring a fair trial can be

protected fully by requiring that the [confidential information] be submitted only

to the trial court for in camera review”). The Court of Appeal reviewed the

entire transcript of the proceeding including the sealed transcript, and concluded

that the confidential informant did not have knowledge of facts that would tend to

exculpate Petitioner. Under Roviaro, the Court of Appeal was only required to

balance the public interest in the free flow of information against the defendant’s

interest in preparing a defense. Since the Court of Appeal found that the

information revealed in the in camera hearing would not tend to help Petitioner’s

defense, the Court of Appeal found the balance was in favor of non-disclosure. 

Moreover, this Court finds that the facts underlying the holding in Rovario

are distinguishable from the facts here. In Rovario, defendant was convicted of

sale and illegal transportation of heroin. 353 U.S. at 59. The confidential

informant was an undercover employee of the Government who helped set up the

narcotics transaction and who participated in it. Id. at 61-62. The Court found

the confidential informant’s identity and testimony “highly material” because the

informant actually took part in the crime, and his testimony might have disclosed

entrapment. In addition, the informant was the “only witness who might have

testified to petitioner’s lack of knowledge of the contents of the package.” Id. at

64. In concluding the defendant’s right to prepare a defense outweighed the

public’s interest in the free flow of information, the Court reasoned that since the

informant was the sole participant other than the defendant in the transaction

charged, he was the only witness who could have confirmed or contradicted the

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During his appeal, Petitioner filed a motion in propria persona asserting

that his appellate counsel was ineffective because he failed to challenge the trial court’s

denial of Petitioner’s motion to suppress in-court identifications from Gatsos and

Fuentes and the Court of Appeal issued a reasoned decision on that claim. Therefore,

this court will review whether the decision of the Court of Appeal is contrary to or

unreasonable application of the standard in Strickland.

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testimony of the federal narcotics agents who observed the crime. Id. at 64-65. 

The Court held that under these circumstances, it was prejudicial error to

withhold identity of the confidential informer. Id. 

 On the contrary, in the case at bar, the confidential informant provided

information about another person’s involvement in the burglary. Unlike the

informant in Roviaro, this confidential informant could not contradict the

testimony of the prosecution witnesses regarding Petitioner’s involvement in the

crime. Thus, disclosure would not be helpful to Petitioner’s defense since the

prosecution alleged that two people committed the burglary and the informer

provided information about the “second responsible” for the burglary. 

The Court of Appeal properly balanced Petitioner’s interest in preparing a

defense and the public’s interest in protecting the flow of information. Thus, the

Court of Appeal’s denial of Petitioner’s motion for disclosure is not contrary to,

or an unreasonable application of the test set out in Roviaro. 

IX. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

Petitioner asserts that his appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance

on the grounds that appellate counsel 1) failed to challenge the trial court’s ruling

on a motion to suppress any in-court identifications;8

 2) failed to challenge the

trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on receiving stolen property as a lesser

included offense of burglary; and 3) failed to challenge the insufficiency of the

evidence of burglary. 

A. Legal Standard

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 9Although the right to the effective assistance of counsel at trial is guaranteed to

state criminal defendants by the Sixth Amendment as applied to the states through the

Fourteenth, see Lucey, 469 U.S. at 392, the Sixth Amendment does not address a

defendant's rights on appeal; the right to effective state appellate counsel is derived

purely from the Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantee. See id.

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The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a

criminal defendant the effective assistance of counsel on his first appeal as of

right. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 391-405 (1985).9

 Claims of ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel are reviewed according to the standard set out in

Strickland. Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir. 1989); United States

v. Birtle, 792 F.2d 846, 847 (9th Cir. 1986). A defendant therefore must show

that counsel's advice fell below an objective standard of reasonableness

(“performance prong”) and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel's unprofessional errors, he would have prevailed on appeal (“prejudice

prong”). Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434 & n.9 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694;

Birtle, 792 F.2d at 849). The Strickland framework for analyzing ineffective

assistance of counsel claims is considered to be "clearly established Federal law,

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" for the purposes of 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d) analysis. See Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-08

(2000). 

Appellate counsel does not have a constitutional duty to raise every

nonfrivolous issue requested by defendant. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745,

751-54 (1983); Gerlaugh v. Stewart, 129 F.3d 1027, 1045 (9th Cir. 1997); Miller,

882 F.2d at 1434 n.10. The weeding out of weaker issues is widely recognized as

one of the hallmarks of effective appellate advocacy. See id. at 1434 (footnote

and citations omitted). Appellate counsel therefore will frequently remain above

an objective standard of competence and have caused his client no prejudice for

the same reason--because he declined to raise a weak issue. See id. 

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B. Analysis

i. Failure to challenge denial of motion to suppress in-court

identifications

Petitioner’s trial counsel moved in limine to suppress any in-court

identifications on the grounds that the identification was unduly suggestive and

that it violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and

seizures on the grounds that he was not arrested when the police transported

Petitioner to the schoolyard for identification purposes. See RT 88, 171-215. 

This Court addresses the Court of Appeal’s decision regarding Petitioner’s claim

that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the trial court’s

denial of the motion to suppress in-court identification to determine whether the

Court of Appeal’s decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, the

Strickland standard. See Turner, slip op. at 11-14. 

In its decision, the Court of Appeal first set out the test to determine if

appellate counsel was ineffective: “To establish entitlement to relief for

ineffective assistance of counsel, the burden is on the [appellant] to show (1)

[appellate] counsel failed to act in a manner to be expected of reasonably

competent attorneys acting as diligent advocates and (2) it is reasonably probable

a more favorable determination would have resulted in the absence of counsel’s

failings.” Turner, slip op. at 12 (quoting People v. Turner, 7 Cal. App. 4th at

1219 (citing People v. Lewis, 50 Cal. 3d 262, 288 (1992))). Under the first

requirement, the Court of Appeal noted that “an attorney representing a criminal

defendant generally has the right to control the trial tactics and strategy, despite

differences of opinion or even open objections from the defendant.” Turner, slip

op. at 12 (quoting Turner, 7 Cal. App. 4th at 1220). The Court of Appeal refused

to second guess appellate counsel’s choice of issues raised on appeal since

Petitioner had not presented any evidence to demonstrate that “the failure to raise

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certain issues cannot be explained on the basis of any knowledgeable choice of

tactics.” Turner, slip op. at 13. 

Under the second requirement, the Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s

argument stating, “Where . . . counsel’s failure to litigate Fourth Amendment

claim competently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness, the defendant

must . . . prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious and that there is a

reasonable probability [that the outcome of the appeal would be different] in

order to demonstrate actual prejudice.” Id. (internal citations omitted). The

Court of Appeal determined that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred when

Petitioner was transported to the schoolyard for identification purposes because at

that time, probable cause existed to arrest Petitioner and Petitioner was under

arrest. Thus, the Court of Appeal, explained, Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment

claim lacked merit, and he failed to establish prejudice necessary to prevail on an

ineffective assistance claim. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal found that the

motion to suppress also failed on due process grounds since the schoolyard

identification was not so unduly suggestive to warrant suppression. Turner, slip

op. at 14.

The decision of the Court of Appeal is not contrary to ,or an unreasonable

application of, the Strickland standard. Under the performance prong, Petitioner

failed to establish that appellate counsel had no reasonable basis for failing to

challenge the denial of the motion to suppress on appeal. The trial court found

that Petitioner was lawfully arrested before he was transported to the schoolyard,

and that the identification procedure was not unduly suggestive. RT 215; Turner,

slip op. at 14. Appellate counsel does not have a constitutional duty to raise

every non-frivolous issue requested by the defendant. See Jones, 463 U.S. at

751-54. Moreover, appellate counsel’s decision not to raise this issue on appeal

is not an unreasonable decision in light of this Court’s own finding that the

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identification procedure was not unduly suggestive. See Boag v. Raines, 769

F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1985) (“Failure to raise a meritless argument does not

constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.”) Thus, Petitioner failed to show that

appellate counsel’s performance was deficient. 

Under the prejudice prong, the Court of Appeal properly determined that

Petitioner did not establish that there was a fair probability that he would have

had a more favorable result on appeal because his motion to suppress was based

on meritless claims. Therefore, the Court of Appeal’s rejection of Petitioner’s

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on his decision not to challenge

the denial of the motion to suppress is consistent with federal law. 

ii. Failure to challenge trial court’s refusal to instruct on

receiving stolen property as a lesser included offense of

burglary.

Petitioner further contends that his appellate counsel rendered ineffective

assistance because he did not challenge the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury

on the receiving stolen property as a lesser included offense of burglary. Because

receiving stolen property is not a lesser included offense of burglary, In re

Christopher S., 174 Cal. App. 3d 620, 623 (1985); see also People v. Allen, 21

Cal. 4th 846, 863-65 (1999), Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel based on failure to challenge the trial court’s refusal to instruct on

receiving stolen property as a lesser included offense also fails. 

iii. Failure to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence for his

burglary conviction

Petitioner asserts that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 

challenge the sufficiency of the evidence for the burglary conviction. Appellate

counsel does not have a constitutional duty to raise every non-frivolous issue

requested by defendant. See Jones, 463 U.S. at 751-54; Gerlaugh, 129 F.3d at

1045; Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434 n.10. Here, ample evidence supported

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Petitioner’s conviction for burglary. Gatsos identified Petitioner, the license plate 

number noted by Gatsos revealed that the Firebird was registered to Petitioner,

Fuentes positively identified Petitioner as the driver of the Firebird after directly

observing Petitioner’s face, Petitioner admitted that he drove the car, and several

stolen electronics equipment, including two VCRs, remote controls, and a

computer monitor, were located in Petitioner’s car. Because the evidence

supporting Petitioner’s burglary conviction is substantial, it cannot be said that

appellate counsel’s failure to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence for such

conviction constitutes deficient performance. See Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434 (the

weeding out of weaker issues is widely recognized as one of the hallmarks of

effective appellate advocacy). 

Since Petitioner has not established deficient performance with regard to

this claim, this Court need not address the issue of prejudice. See Siripongs v.

Calderon, 133 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that it is unnecessary for a

federal court considering a habeas ineffective assistance claim to address the

prejudice prong of the Strickland test if the petitioner cannot even establish

incompetence under the first prong). In sum, appellate counsel’s failure to raise

these claims does not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel under

Strickland. 

X. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

Petitioner also contends that his trial counsel provided ineffective

assistance because he did not argue for a jury instruction on receiving stolen

property as a lesser included offense of burglary. However, Petitioner concedes

and the record demonstrates, that trial counsel did in fact request the trial court to

instruct the jury on receiving stolen property as a lesser included offense of

burglary. RT 442-44. Thus, Petitioner’s contention that trial counsel did not

“place a valid objection when the trial court refused” is unfounded and

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unsupported by the record. Defense counsel rigorously argued in favor of

instructing the jury on receiving stolen property even after the trial court correctly

pointed out that receiving stolen property is not a lesser included offense of

burglary. See RT 443. A trial counsel has no duty to continuously challenge a

trial court’s ruling on baseless grounds. See Boag, 769 F.2d at 1344. Thus,

Petitioner has not demonstrated deficient performance by trial counsel. This

Court need not consider whether there was prejudice. Petitioner’s claim fails. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for the writ of habeas corpus is

DENIED. The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of the Respondent and close

the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATE: September 28, 2006

 _____________________

 JEFFREY S. WHITE

 United States District Judge 

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