Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-02213/USCOURTS-ca10-92-02213-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Melvin Joe
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

t 

Robert L. Hoecker 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

Tenth Circuit 

Office of the Clerk 

C404 United States Courthouse 

Denver, Colorado 80294 

(303) 844-3157 

November 9, 1993 

Patrick Fish

Chief Depu

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

RE: 92-2213, USA v. Joe 

Filed November 3, 1993 by Judge Tacha 

Please be advised of the following correction to the 

captioned opinion: 

David Williams' title, as arguing attorney for the 

Plaintiff-Appellee, should read Assistant United States 

Attorney, not Assistant United States. 

Please make this correction to the caption page of 

your copy. 

Very truly yours, 

ROBERT L. HOECKER, Clerk 

By~£1h-ie~~.i. Barbara Schermerhorn 

Deputy Clerk 

Appellate Case: 92-2213 Document: 01019284107 Date Filed: 11/03/1993 Page: 1 
PUBLISH 

FILED 

United States Court of Appc:lls Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 0,3 1993 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

TENTH CIRCUIT ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. No. 92-2213 

MELVIN JOE, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. CR-92-116-JB-01) 

Stephen P. McCUe, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Albuquerque, 

New Mexico, for the Defendant-Appellant. 

David Williams (Don J. Svet, United States Attorney; and Joe M. 

Romero, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Albuquerque, New 

Mexico, were on the brief), Assistant United States, Albuquerque, 

New Mexico, for the Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before LOGAN, TACHA and KELLY, Circuit Judges. 

TACHA, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 92-2213 Document: 01019284107 Date Filed: 11/03/1993 Page: 2 
.. 

Melvin Joe, a Native American living on the Navajo Indian 

Reservation in New Mexico, was convicted of one count of first 

degree murder (Count I) and one count of second degree murder 

(Count II) in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153 and 1111(a). Mr. Joe 

was sentenced to life imprisonment for Count I and a concurrent 

term of life imprisonment for Count II. Joe appeals his 

conviction and sentence. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and affirm in part, reverse in part, 

and remand for resentencing on Count II. 

I. Background 

A. General Background 

Melvin Joe and Julia Joe were married in November 1980. Ms. 

Joe filed a petition for divorce in August 1991 and the couple 

separated. The Joes had four young children who continued to 

reside with Ms. Joe in Sanostee, New Mexico, a small, rural 

village located within the Navajo Indian Reservation. 

On February 23, 1992, Melvin and his brother, Wallace Joe, 

drank beer continually throughout the morning and afternoon and 

Melvin passed out in Wallace's truck at approximately two o'clock. 

Sometime after six o'clock, Melvin drove a Chevrolet blazer 

belonging to his mother, Edith Joe, to his wife's residence. He 

knocked on the front door. When no one answered, he kicked open 

the door and entered the home brandishing an unloaded .22 caliber 

rifle. Melvin and Julia Joe fought and Melvin became physically 

abusive. Eventually, with the help of a neighbor, Matilda 

washburn, Julia was able to get Melvin to leave the house. 

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Fearful that Melvin would return, Julia, Ms. Washburn, and 

one of the Joe children decided to leave the house and go to Ms. 

Washburn's horne. As they exited, they noticed that Melvin had 

returned to the Blazer and was circling Julia's house. They stood 

next to the house for protection. The child, Jessica Joe, 

eventually ran to Ms. Washburn's house without interference. When 

Julia and Ms. Washburn tried to run, however, Melvin altered his 

circular pattern and drove straight at the fleeing Ms. Joe, 

striking her with the truck. Ms. Washburn went to the aid of the 

injured and screaming Julia Joe, helping her to the anticipated 

shelter of a nearby truck bed located in the field between the two 

houses. The truck bed, which had been completely removed from its 

frame, rested on four short wooden stumps. 

Melvin apparently was undeterred by this new obstacle. He 

turned the Blazer in the direction of the truck bed, and, from a 

distance of approximately fifty feet, accelerated toward the truck 

bed, ramming the end of it opposite where the two women were 

standing. Upon impact, Melvin continued to accelerate, knocking 

the truck bed off the wooden stumps and pushing it over and onto 

Julia and Ms. Washburn. Still accelerating, Melvin pushed the 

truck bed forward another fifty feet, running over the two women. 

Julia Joe and Ms. Washburn both died of multiple internal and 

external injuries caused by blunt force. After kicking Julia's 

body several times, Melvin put it in the Blazer and drove to a 

hilly area three miles from the crime scene. Officers later 

recovered the abandoned Blazer with the keys in the ignition and 

Julia's body still inside. Two days later, on February 25, 1992, 

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... 

Melvin Joe turned himself in. Joe was indicted for two counts of 

first degree murder. 

B. Dr. Smoker's testimony 

At trial, defense counsel conceded that Melvin Joe had killed 

the two women. Mr. Joe's defense was that at the time of the 

killings he was intoxicated and enraged over the pending divorce, 

thus negating the requisite specific intent to sustain a 

conviction for first degree murder. With respect to Joe's intent, 

the government presented two types of evidence: the circumstances 

surrounding the murders and the testimony of Dr. Brett Smoker 

regarding statements made to him by Julia Joe. Dr. Smoker, an 

Indian Health Service family physician, testified that, eight days 

before Ms. Joe was killed, he treated her for an alleged rape and 

that she had identified her assailant as the defendant, Mr. Joe. 

(We will refer to Ms. Joe's comments regarding the alleged rape 

and her assailant as the 11 rape statement. ") Dr. Smoker further 

testified that Ms. Joe stated she was "afraid sometimes" because 

Mr. Joe suspected her of having an extramarital affair and had 

threatened to kill her if he caught her with another man. (We 

will refer to Ms. Joe's comments regarding her fear and the basis 

for her fear as the "threat statement".) 

The trial court admitted Dr. Smoker's testimony over defense 

counsel's timely objection, ruling on the evidence in two stages. 

The court first ruled that the threat and rape statements were 

admissible under the hearsay exception contained in Fed. R. Evid. 

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803(3) 1 , rather than the Rule 803(4) exception2 proffered by the 

government. The court then responded to defense counsel's 

objections under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) 3 . The court determined that 

the threat and rape statements were not precluded under Rule 

404(b), as they were being offered to show Mr. Joe's "specific 

intent." The court also ruled that the relevance of the threat 

and rape statements was not outweighed by their prejudicial effect 

under Fed. R. Evid. 403. 

After hearing the evidence, including the testimony of Dr. 

Smoker, the jury convicted Joe of first degree murder for killing 

his wife and second degree murder for killing Ms. Washburn. 

C. Grounds for this appeal 

On appeal, Joe asserts the following errors: ( 1) Dr. 

Smoker's testimony that Melvin had previously raped and threatened 

Ms. Joe was inadmissible hearsay evidence and prejudicial "other 

acts" evidence which violated his rights under the Sixth 

Amendment's Confrontation Clause; (2) Dr. Smoker's testimony of 

Joe's prior incarceration violated his due process rights under 

the Fifth Amendment; (3) the government's peremptory strike of the 

only Native American juror on the venire violated his right to 

equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment; (4) the trial 

court's admission of photographs of the two victims violated his 

1 Hearsay exception regarding statements about a then existing 

mental, emotional, or physical condition. 

2 Hearsay exception regarding statements made for purposes of 

medical diagnosis or treatment. 

3 Hearsay rule which directs that evidence of past crimes or 

other bad acts is generally inadmissible where offered to prove 

character in order to show action in conformity therewith. 

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' 

rights to due process and a fair trial; (5) the trial court's jury 

instruction on "malice aforethought" violated his rights to due 

process and a fair trial; (6) the trial court's determination that 

life imprisonment is the mandatory minimum sentence for first 

degree murder was improper under the United States Sentencing 

Guidelines; and (7) the trial court's imposition of a life 

sentence for second degree murder was improper under the 

Guidelines. 

II. Review of District Court's Rulings on Dr. Smoker's Testimony 

Joe contends that Dr. Smoker's testimony contained 

inadmissible hearsay, "bad character" evidence barred by Rule 

404(b), and that the admission of the rape and threat statements 

violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause. We review the 

admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion. United States 

v. Talamante, 981 F.2d 1153, 1155 (lOth Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 

113 S. Ct. 1876 (1993). Further, "[w]e may affirm the rulings on 

admission of evidence if that evidence is admissible under any of 

the Federal Rules of Evidence; this court is not bound by the 

evidentiary basis relied upon by the trial court for the admission 

of the challenged evidence." Fortier v. Dona Anna Plaza Partners, 

747 F.2d 1324, 1331 (lOth Cir. 1984); see also United States v. 

Robinson, 978 F.2d 1554, 1562 (lOth Cir. 1992). We review Joe's 

claim under the Confrontation Clause de novo. See United States 

v. Ellzey, 936 F.2d 492, 495 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 

400 (1991). 

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Appellate Case: 92-2213 Document: 01019284107 Date Filed: 11/03/1993 Page: 7 
A. Rule 803(3) 

We first address whether the district court properly admitted 

Dr. Smoker's testimony under Rule 803(3), which excepts from the 

hearsay rule "[a) statement of the declarant's then existing state 

of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as 

intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily 

health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to 

prove the fact remembered or believed." Fed. R. Evid. 803(3). 

The court ruled that both the rape statement and the threat 

statement fell within the Rule 803(3) exception to the hearsay 

rule. 

Rule 803(3) clearly sanctions the admission of a declarant's 

out-of-court statement concerning her then existing state of mind. 

See United States v. Donley, 878 F.2d 735, 737 (3d Cir. 1989), 

cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1058 (1990). With respect to the threat 

statement, Rule 803(3) therefore would extend to Ms. Joe's 

statement that she was "afraid sometimes." We disagree with the 

district court's ruling, however, because Ms. Joe's statement to 

Dr. Smoker, though indicating her state of mind, also included an 

assertion of why she was afraid (i.e., because she thought her 

husband might kill her). This portion of Ms. Joe's statement is 

clearly a "statement of memory or belief" expressly excluded by 

the Rule 803(3) exception. See United States v. Rodriquez-Pando, 

841 F.2d 1014, 1019 (lOth Cir. 1988). This situation is identical 

to that in United States v. Cohen, 631 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir. 1980). 

In that case, a defendant charged with impersonating a federal 

officer contended that he lacked the requisite intent because he 

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Appellate Case: 92-2213 Document: 01019284107 Date Filed: 11/03/1993 Page: 8 
acted under duress. As evidence of duress, he sought to introduce 

out-of-court statements he had made relating alleged threats by 

Galkin, a co-conspirator. In admitting Cohen's out-of-court 

statement that he was scared but excluding the alleged basis for 

his fear under Rule 803(3), the Fifth Circuit explained: 

That rule by its own terms excepts from the ban on 

hearsay such statements as might have been made by Cohen 

of his then existing state of mind or emotion, but 

expressly excludes from the operation of the rule a 

statement of belief to prove the fact believed. . . . [T]he state-of-mind exception does not permit the 

witness to relate any of the declarant's statements as 

to why he held the particular state of mind, or what he 

might have believed that would have induced the state of 

mind. If the reservation in the text of the rule is to 

have any effect, it must be understood to narrowly limit 

those admissible statements to declarations of 

condition--"I'm scared"--and not belief--"I'm scared 

because Galkin threatened me." 

Id. at 1225; see also United States v. Liu, 960 F.2d 449, 452 (5th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 418 (1992); United States v. 

Emmert, 829 F.2d 805, 810 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Cohen). 

Here, Dr. Smoker testified that Ms. Joe said she was afraid 

of her husband because he had threatened her. Ms. Joe's statement 

that she was afraid of her husband was admissible under Rule 

803(3). The testimony relating Ms. Joe's belief underlying her 

fear, however, was not admissible under Rule 803(3) . 4 Further, we 

see no grounds for admitting the rape statement under Rule 803(3). 

4' We also reject the government's contention that Rule 803(3) 

applies here because the statement concerned an intended course of 

conduct. See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmen, 145 U.S. 285 

(1892). Ms. Joe did not state her intent, but rather her 

husband's purported intent. Rule 803(3}, however, applies only to 

a statement of the declarant's state of mind. See United States 

v. Gomez, 927 F.2d 1530, 1535-36 (11th Cir. 1991). An out-of-

(Footnote Continued on Following Page) 

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B. Alternative Grounds for Ruling on Dr. Smoker's Testimony 

Because we may consider grounds for admission not relied on 

by the district court, Fortier, 747 F.2d at 1331, we also address 

the government's contention that the statements were admissible 

under Rule 803(4). The government argues that, because the rape 

and threat statements were made by Ms. Joe in the course of her 

treatment by Dr. Smoker, they are admissible under the exception 

to the hearsay rule contained in Fed. R. Evid. 803(4). Joe 

contends, however, that the statements were unrelated to diagnosis 

and treatment of her rape injuries and therefore not within the 

ambit of the Rule 803(4) exception. He also contends that they 

constitute inadmissible "other acts" evidence under Rule 404(b). 

We address separately the effect of Rules 803(4) and 404(b) on the 

rape and threat statements. 

1. The rape statement 

a. Rule 803(4) 

Rule 803(4) excepts from the hearsay bar "[s]tatements made 

for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing 

medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, 

or the inception or general character of the cause or external 

source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or 

treatment." Fed. R. Evid. 803(4). The Rule 803(4) exception to 

the hearsay rule is founded on a theory of reliability that 

emanates from the patient's own selfish motive -- her 

(Footnote Continued from Previous Page) 

court statement relating a third-party's state of mind falls 

outside the scope of the hearsay exception because such a 

statement necessarily is one of memory or belief. 

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Appellate Case: 92-2213 Document: 01019284107 Date Filed: 11/03/1993 Page: 10 
understanding "that the effectiveness of the treatment received 

will depend upon the accuracy of the information provided to the 

physician." 2 McCormick on Evidence §277, at 246-47 (John W. 

Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992). The Supreme Court has noted that 

"statements made in the course of receiving medical care . . are 

made in contexts that provide substantial guarantees of their 

trustworthiness." White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736, 742 (1992). 

While this guaranty of trustworthiness extends to statements 

of causation, it does not ordinarily extend to statements 

regarding fault. Fed. R. Evid. 803(4) advisory committee's note. 

Thus, a declarant's statement relating the identity of the person 

allegedly responsible for her injuries is not ordinarily 

admissible under Rule 803(4) because statements of identity are 

not normally thought necessary to promote effective treatment. 

See United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430, 436 (8th Cir. 1985). 

Nevertheless, the Fourth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits have held 

that statements made by a child to a physician which identify the 

sexual abuser as a member of the family or household are 

"reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment" and may therefore 

be admissible. See United States v. Balfany, 965 F.2d 575, 579 

(8th Cir. 1992) (citing Renville, 779 F.2d at 436); United States 

v. George, 960 F.2d 97, 99-100 (9th Cir. 1992); Morgan v. 

Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 949 (4th Cir. 1988) . 5 Statements 

5 The Fourth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits agree that the crucial 

question in determining admissibility under Rule 803(4) is whether 

the statement is "reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment." 

George, 960 F.2d at 99; Morgan, 846 F.2d at 949; Renville, 779 

F.2d at 436. The Fourth and Eighth Circuits, however, have 

employed the following two-part test to determine a statement's 

(Footnote Continued on Following Page) 

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revealing the identity of the child abuser are "reasonably 

pertinent" to treatment because the physician must be attentive to 

treating the child's emotional and psychological injuries, the 

exact nature and extent of which often depend on the identity of 

the abuser. Renville, 779 F.2d at 437. Moreover, physicians 

often have an obligation under state law to prevent an abused 

child from being returned to an abusive environment. Id. at 438. 

As a result, where the abuser is a member of the family or 

household, the abuser's identity is especially pertinent to the 

physician's recommendation regarding an appropriate course of 

treatment, which may include removing the child from the home. 

Unlike the victims in the cases cited above, Ms. Joe was not 

a child but rather the estranged wife of the alleged sexual 

(Footnote Continued from Previous Page) 

admissibility under Rule 803(4): "first, the declarant's motive 

in making the statement must be consistent with the purposes of 

promoting treatment; and second, the content of the statement must 

be such as is reasonably relied on by a physician in treatment or 

diagnosis." Renville, 779 F.2d at 436; Morgan, 846 F.2d at 949 

(quoting Renville) . This two-part test is not contemplated by the 

rule and is not necessary to ensure that the rule's purpose is 

carried out. 

The first prong of this two-part test inquires into the 

declarant's motive. Such inquiries, however, were not 

contemplated by the rule; the rule itself has built-in guarantees 

that assure the trustworthiness of a statement made for purposes 

of medical diagnosis or treatment. See White, 112 S. Ct. at 742 

(noting that such statements "are made in contexts that provide 

substantial guarantees of their trustworthiness"). The second 

prong, which assures that the content of the statement (in these 

cases the identity of the abuser) is reasonably relied on by the 

physician in treatment or diagnosis, merely rephrases the Rule 

803(4) requirement that the statement be "reasonably pertinent to 

diagnosis or treatment." In short, the plain language of Rule 

803(4) should guide us in determining the admissibility of 

statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. 

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Appellate Case: 92-2213 Document: 01019284107 Date Filed: 11/03/1993 Page: 12 
abuser. However, the identity of the abuser is reasonably 

pertinent to treatment in virtually every domestic sexual assault 

case, even those not involving children. All victims of domestic 

sexual abuse suffer emotional and psychological injuries, the 

exact nature and extent of which depend on the identity of the 

abuser. 6 The physician generally must know who the abuser was in 

order to render proper treatment because the physician's treatment 

will necessarily differ when the abuser is a member of the 

victim's family or household. In the domestic sexual abuse case, 

for example, the treating physician may recommend special therapy 

or counseling and instruct the victim to remove herself from the 

dangerous environment by leaving the home and seeking shelter 

elsewhere. In short, the domestic sexual abuser's identity is 

admissible under rule 803(4) where the abuser has such an intimate 

relationship with the victim that the abuser's identity becomes 

"reasonably pertinent" to the victim's proper treatment. 

The facts of this case underscore the point. After 

performing a rape kit test on Ms. Joe, Dr. Smoker asked her 

several questions relating to her injuries. In answering these 

questions, Ms. Joe identified her husband, Melvin Joe, as her 

6 In this case, Dr. Smoker testified as follows: 

[The identity of the assailant is] extremely important 

in the sense that when we deal with victims of sexual 

assault, in terms of the way I look upon it, my care 

doesn't end at the end of my examination. I feel it's 

my duty to follow up that patient's care, make sure that 

they've gotten into appropriate counseling if necessary. 

Make sure that -- if they are in a situation where this 

assault might occur again and again and again, that they 

do the best they can, draw up on [sic] as many resources 

within the community as possible to remove themselves 

from that dangerous situation. 

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sexual abuser. Dr. Smoker testified that the identity of the 

sexual assailant was important for his recommendation regarding 

Ms. Joe's after-care, including appropriate counseling. Moreover, 

after discovering her assailant's identity, Dr. Smoker 

specifically recommended that Ms. Joe seek protection, offering 

her the number of the Navajo Police Department and referring her 

to the women's shelter in Shiprock, New Mexico. It is abundantly 

clear that the statement made by Ms. Joe revealing the identity of 

her alleged abuser was "reasonably pertinent" to her proper 

treatment by Dr. Smoker. Thus, we conclude that Dr. Smoker's 

testimony regarding Ms. Joe's rape statement, which identified Mr. 

Joe as her assailant, is admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 803(4). 

b. Rule 404(b) 

Joe contends that, even if the rape statement is admissible 

under the hearsay rules, it is inadmissible "other acts" evidence 

under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). Rule 404(b) is a special relevancy 

rule that deals with admission of evidence of a defendant's prior 

crimes or other bad acts. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 

u.s. 681, 687 (1988). We review the district court's 

determination that evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b) only 

for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Hamilton, 992 F.2d 

1126, 1131 (lOth Cir. 1993). 

Rule 404(b) prohibits the admission of evidence of other bad 

acts offered only for the purpose of adversely reflecting on the 

actor's character, but permits such evidence for other purposes, 

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h d . . 7 

sue as emonstrat1ng 1ntent. Four general requirements 

emanating from Rule 404(b) and other relevancy rules must be met 

before evidence of prior acts will be admissible: ( 1) the 

evidence must be offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b); 

(2) the evidence must be relevant; (3) the trial court must make a 

Rule 403 determination that the probative value of the similar 

acts evidence is not substantially outweighed by its potential for 

unfair prejudice; and (4) under Rule 105, the trial court must, 

upon request, instruct the jury that the evidence of similar acts 

is to be considered only for the proper purpose for which it was 

admitted. United States v. Jefferson, 925 F.2d 1242, 1258 (lOth 

Cir. 1991); see Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 691-92. On appeal, Joe 

contends that the government failed to satisfy all four 

requirements. We disagree. 

First, the government clearly offered Dr. Smoker's testimony 

for a proper purpose. The government filed a Notice of Intention 

to Offer Proof, stating that it intended to introduce proof of Mr. 

Joe's alleged sexual assault against Ms. Joe as evidence of his 

motive, specific intent, plan, and absence of mistake or accident. 

The defendant argues that the government and the trial court 

failed to articulate precisely the purpose for which the rape 

statement was offered as is generally required under United States 

7 Rule 404(b) provides in relevant part: 

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 

admissible to prove the character of a person in 

order to show action in conformity therewith. It 

may, however, be admissible for other purposes, 

such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence 

of mistake or accident . . -14-

Appellate Case: 92-2213 Document: 01019284107 Date Filed: 11/03/1993 Page: 15 
v. Kendall, 766 F.2d 1426, 1436 (lOth Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 

474 U.S. 1081 (1986). In United States v. Record, 873 F.2d 1363, 

1375 n.7 (lOth Cir. 1989), however, we held that even if the basis 

for admission has not been specifically articulated, the error is 

harmless as long as a proper purpose is apparent from the record. 

Based on the record, it is evident that the proper purpose for 

admitting the rape statement was to prove the defendant's intent 

to commit acts of violence against his wife. Therefore, we 

conclude that the failure to adhere to the Kendall specificity 

requirements was harmless and that Dr. Smoker's testimony 

regarding the rape statement satisfies the first prong of the 

four-part admissibility test. 

Second, the rape statement was relevant because Mr. Joe's act 

of sexual violence is highly probative of his intent to commit 

acts of violence against Ms. Joe. See United States v. Russell, 

971 F.2d 1098, 1107 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that evidence of 

husband's prior acts of abuse against his wife was probative of 

his motive and intent to kill her), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1013 

(1993); Virgin Islands v. Harris, 938 F.2d 401, 420 (3d Cir. 

1991) (holding that evidence of husband's history of violence 

toward his wife, including his attempts to strangle and stab her, 

were highly probative in demonstrating his motive and intent) . 

Third, the trial court specifically made a Rule 403 

determination that the probative value of the rape statement was 

not substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair 

prejudice. "The trial court has broad discretion to determine 

whether or not prejudice inherent in otherwise relevant evidence 

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Appellate Case: 92-2213 Document: 01019284107 Date Filed: 11/03/1993 Page: 16 
·'. 

outweighs its probative value." Jefferson, 925 F.2d at 1258 

(quoting Record, 873 F.2d at 1375). We cannot say that the trial 

court abused its discretion here. 

Fourth, upon the defendant's request, the district court 

instructed the jury that the evidence of Mr. Joe's alleged rape of 

Ms. Joe was to be considered only for very limited purposes. 8 The 

defendant argues that the limiting instruction was improper 

because it contained a "laundry list" of the possible Rule 404(b) 

uses which confused the jury and encouraged them to convict Mr. 

Joe on the basis of his criminal propensities. We disagree. 

Although a limiting instruction containing a "laundry list" 

of permitted uses of Rule 404(b) evidence is disfavored, see 

United States v. Doran, 882 F.2d 1511, 1525 (lOth Cir. 1989) 

(stating that "merely 'laundry list[ing]'" the text of the rule to 

the jury is "not the best way to proceed in such matters"); see 

also United States v. Cortijo-Diaz, 875 F.2d 13, 15-16 (1st Cir. 

8 The instruction read: 

You have heard just now through Doctor Smoker evidence 

of another alleged wrongful act of the defendant. You 

must not consider any of this evidence in deciding if 

the defendant committed the acts charged in the 

indictment. However, you may consider this evidence for 

other very limited purposes. If you find beyond a 

reasonable doubt from other evidence in this case that 

the defendant did commit the acts charged in the 

indictment, then you may consider evidence of this other 

wrongful act committed on another occasion to determine 

whether the defendant had the state of mind or intent 

necessary to commit the crime charged in the indictment, 

or whether the defendant had a motive or the opportunity 

to commit the acts charged in the indictment, or whether 

the defendant acted according to a plan or in 

preparation for the commission of a crime, or whether 

the defendant committed the acts for which he is on 

trial by accident or mistake. 

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Appellate Case: 92-2213 Document: 01019284107 Date Filed: 11/03/1993 Page: 17 
1989), we have never held that such an instruction is improper per 

se. Moreover, the limiting instruction in this case did not 

merely recite a "laundry list" of the permitted uses of Rule 

404(b) evidence; it was carefully worded to ensure that the jury 

would understand the proper purposes for which the prior act 

evidence could be used. In addition, the court gave the limiting 

instruction both at the time the evidence was admitted and at the 

end of the case, instructing the jury not to "consider any of this 

evidence in deciding if the defendant committed the acts charged 

in the indictment." We conclude that the instruction was 

adequate. Thus, the rape statement is admissible under Rule 

404(b) because all four requirements were met. 

c. The Confrontation Clause 

Joe finally asserts that the admission of the rape statement 

was improper because it violated his rights under the 

Confrontation Clause. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 

Amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 

shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses 

against him " U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Supreme Court 

has "consistently held that the Clause does not necessarily 

prohibit the admission of hearsay statements against a criminal 

defendant, even though the admission of such statements might be 

thought to violate the literal terms of the Clause." Idaho v. 

Wright, 497 u.s. 805, 813 (1990). However, the clause does "bar[] 

the admission of some evidence that would otherwise be admissible 

under an exception to the hearsay rule." Wright, 497 U.S. at 814. 

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The Supreme Court has determined that a statement admissible 

under an exception to the hearsay rule does not violate the 

Confrontation Clause if the statement "bears adequate 'indicia of 

reliability'". Id. (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 

(1980). The "indicia of reliability" requirement may be satisfied 

in two ways. Reliability is assumed if the evidence is admitted 

under a "firmly rooted hearsay exception." Id. at 815. 

Otherwise, reliability is established if the evidence is supported 

by "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." Id. 

Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4), the exception to the hearsay 

rule for statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or 

treatment, is undoubtedly a firmly rooted hearsay exception. See 

White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736, 742 n.8 (1992); see also 

Wright, 497 U.S. at 820. Because the rape statement made by Ms. 

Joe to Dr. Smoker falls under the firmly rooted Rule 803(4) 

hearsay exception, the statement possesses the requisite "indicia 

of reliability." Therefore, Joe's Confrontation Clause rights 

were not violated by the admission of the rape statement. 

2. The threat statement 

The government asserts that the threat statement also is 

admissible under the exception to the hearsay rule contained in 

Rule 803(4). We disagree. Ms. Joe told Dr. Smoker that she was 

"afraid sometimes" because her husband had threatened to kill her 

if he ever caught her with another man. This statement is 

inadmissible under Rule 803(4) because it fails to satisfy the 

rule's requirements -- the statement does not describe medical 

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history, symptoms, pain, sensations, or the inception or general 

character of the cause of the alleged rape injury for which Ms. 

Joe was being treated. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(4). Because the 

threat statement does not fall under any other hearsay exception, 

we conclude that the district court erred in admitting it over the 

defendant's objection. 

This does not end our analysis, however, because we must 

determine whether the erroneous admission of the threat statement 

was harmless. Because Joe contends that the admission of the 

threat statement violated his rights under the Confrontation 

Clause, we apply the constitutional harmless error standard of 

review. A constitutional error may be deemed harmless only if it 

was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Chapman v. California, 

386 u.s. 18, 24 (1967). 

Based on our careful review of the record, we conclude that 

the error in admitting the threat statement was harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt. In addition to the threat statement, the record 

is replete with evidence from which the jury could infer Joe's 

intent to commit the murders. Moreover, the prosecution did not 

focus on the threat, referring to it only one time in the rebuttal 

portion of his closing argument. In this larger context, we find 

that the erroneous admission of the threat statement was harmless 

even under the constitutional harmless error standard. 

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.. 

C. Prior Incarceration 

In response to questioning by the prosecutor, Dr. Smoker 

referred to Mr. Joe's prior incarceration. 9 Defense counsel 

immediately objected to such testimony and, after cross-examining 

Dr. Smoker, moved for a mistrial. Joe asserts that the district 

court's failure to grant his motion for a mistrial deprived him of 

his right to due process and a fair trial. We review the district 

court's denial of Joe's motion for a mistrial for an abuse of 

9 Dr. Smoker's reference to Joe's prior incarceration occurred 

in the following context: 

Prosecutor: What concerns did she express to you with 

reference to her husband during the history that you 

were getting from her? 

Dr. Smoker: May I explain the context of the 

information I got? 

Prosecutor: Sure. 

Dr. Smoker: After examining a sexual assault patient 

who has allegedly been sexually assaulted, as I say, I 

try to establish the -- well, the likelihood of this 

happening again and if the patient is in a dangerous 

situation. And I asked her toward the end of our 

examination, do you feel that this might happen again or 

do you feel that you're in a situation where you might 

be in danger? 

And she responded, well, yes. And she said, I'm 

afraid sometimes he might kill me. And I said, my gosh, 

why is that? And she told me that her husband had 

suspected her of having extra-marital affairs or that 

she had a boyfriend, especially when he had recently 

been in jail [emphasis added]. And she said that on --

Defense counsel: Objection, Your Honor. May we 

approach the Bench? 

The Court: No, sir. Ladies and gentlemen, you'll 

ignore that last comment about -- other than what the 

doctor's testified -- do not relate any of the 

defendant's history, please, Doctor Smoker. 

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discretion. United States v. Peveto, 881 F.2d 844, 859 (lOth 

Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 943 (1989). 

In United States v. Sands, 899 F.2d 912 (lOth Cir. 1990), we 

held that a new trial is warranted where it cannot be said "with 

reasonable certainty that the reference to [the prior 

incarceration] 'had but very slight effect on the verdict of the 

jury.'" Sands, 899 F.2d at 916 (quoting Sumrall v. United States, 

360 F.2d 311, 314 (lOth Cir. 1966)). Here, Dr. Smoker's reference 

to Joe's prior incarceration was a single isolated occurrence in 

the context of a larger explanation and the trial judge gave an 

immediate curative instruction. Based on these factors, we 

conclude that the reference to Joe's prior incarceration "had but 

very slight effect on the verdict of the jury," Sumrall, 360 F.2d 

at 314, and that the district court therefore did not abuse its 

discretion in denying Joe's motion for a mistrial. 

III. Peremptory Challenge to Juror 

The defendant asserts that he was denied equal protection of 

the law as a result of the prosecutor's peremptory challenge of 

Dawn Ferguson, the only Native American juror on the venire. 

"This court reviews a challenge to the improper striking of 

prospective jurors based on their race de novo, giving deference 

to the trial court's first-hand observation of the circumstances 

of each case." United States v. Hartsfield, 976 F.2d 1349, 1355-

56 (lOth Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1344 (1993). 

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... 

To successfully challenge the government's peremptory strike 

of Dawn Ferguson, the defendant must first establish a prima facie 

case of purposeful discrimination: 

(1) the defendant must show that he is a member of a 

cognizable racial group, and that the prosecution has 

exercised peremptory challenges to remove members of a 

particular race from the venire; (2) the defendant is 

entitled to rely on the fact that peremptory challenges 

are a jury selection practice which permits 

discrimination by those who wish to discriminate; and 

(3) the defendant must show that these facts and other 

relevant circumstances raise an inference that the 

prosecutor used that practice to exclude the venire 

members from the petit jury on account of their race. 

United States v. Esparsen, 930 F.2d 1461, 1465 (lOth Cir. 1991) 

(citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986)), cert. denied, 

112 S. Ct. 882 (1992). "Once the defendant makes a prima facie 

showing, the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a 

neutral explanation" for the peremptory challenge. Batson, 476 

u.s. at 97. After receiving the state's explanation, the trial 

court must then "determine if the defendant has established 

purposeful discrimination." Id. at 98. 

We conclude that the defendant established a prima facie case 

of purposeful discrimination because Joe is a member of a 

cognizable racial group, Native Americans, and the prosecutor's 

use of one peremptory challenge to strike Dawn Ferguson, the only 

Native American juror on the venire, raised an inference that Dawn 

Ferguson was excluded on account of her race. See United States 

v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1313-14 (lOth Cir. 1987) (holding that 

the government's peremptory strike of the last potential American 

Indian juror created a prima facie case of discrimination) . The 

prosecutor, however, offered three legitimate race-neutral reasons 

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.. · 

for this peremptory challenge: Ms. Ferguson was an artist; she 

was only twenty-five years of age; and she failed to respond on a 

questionnaire whether she owned or rented a home. The prosecutor 

believed that artists tended not to be pro-government, and given 

the serious nature of a murder charge, the prosecutor was 

understandably concerned about the jurors' life experiences and 

maturity level. Based on these proffered reasons, the trial court 

ruled that the peremptory challenge of Dawn Ferguson was not based 

on race. Giving deference to the trial court's first-hand 

observation of these circumstances, we find insufficient evidence 

of purposeful discrimination and affirm the trial court's 

allowance of the prosecutor's peremptory challenge. 

IV. Victim Photographs 

The defendant asserts that the trial court's admission of 

identification photographs of the two victims violated his rights 

to due process and a fair trial. "We review the admission of 

photographs only for an abuse of discretion." United States v. 

Sides, 944 F.2d 1554, 1562 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 

604 (1991). "'The trial judge's exercise of discretion in 

balancing the prejudicial effect and probative value of 

photographic evidence of this type is rarely disturbed,'" United 

States v. Soundingsides, 820 F.2d 1232, 1243 (lOth Cir. 1987) 

(quoting United States v. Goseyun, 789 F.2d 1386, 1387 (9th Cir. 

1986)), and we will not disturb it in this case. 

The government alleged that the defendant murdered Ms. Joe 

and Ms. Washburn and therefore had the burden of proving the 

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• 

identity of these two victims. To prove the identity of the 

victims, the government introduced photographs of Ms. Joe and Ms. 

Washburn that had been taken prior to their deaths. Defense 

counsel objected to the admission of these photographs, arguing 

that the identity of the victims was not at issue and that the 

photographs were prejudicial. We reject these arguments. 

The defendant never stipulated to the identity of the 

victims. Thus, the government was not relieved of its burden to 

prove identity and the photographs are probative of the victims' 

identity. See United States v. De Parias, 805 F.2d 1447, 1453 

(11th Cir. 1986) (making the unsurprising point that 

"[p]hotographs of homicide victims are relevant in showing the 

identity of the victim"), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 916 (1987). More 

importantly, we are convinced that the photographs were not 

unfairly prejudicial. "'Relevant evidence is inherently 

prejudicial; but it is only unfair prejudice, substantially 

outweighing probative value, which permits exclusion of relevant 

matter .... '" Sides, 944 F.2d at 1563 (citations omitted). We 

held in Sides that close-up photographs revealing the victim's 

wounds and bloodstained shirt were probative and not unfairly 

prejudicial to the defendant. Id. Similarly, in United States v. 

Naranjo, 710 F.2d 1465, 1468-69 (lOth Cir. 1983), we held that the 

probative value of a photograph depicting a great deal of blood on 

a pillow, bedsheets, and the victim's face was not outweighed by 

its potential for prejudice. Unlike the graphic photographs in 

Sides and Naranjo, the photographs in this case merely showed the 

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.. 

v~c ' t' ~ms I f aces pr~or ' t ' ' o ~nJury. 10 The district court did not 

abuse its discretion in admitting the identification photographs. 

V. Jury Instructions 

The defendant next asserts that the district court's 

instructions to the jury were improper. When examining a 

challenge to jury instructions, "we examine [the instructions] as 

a whole and apply a de novo standard of review to determine the 

propriety of tendering an individual jury instruction." United 

States v. Sasser, 974 F.2d 1544, 1551 (lOth Cir. 1992), cert. 

denied, 113 S. Ct. 1063 (1993). Thus, we "consider all that the 

jury heard and, from [the] standpoint of the jury, decide 'not 

whether the charge was faultless in every particular but whether 

the jury was misled in any way and whether it had understanding of 

the issues and its duty to determine these issues.'" United 

States v. Cardall, 885 F.2d 656, 673 (lOth Cir. 1989) (quoting 

Durflinger v. Artiles, 727 F.2d 888, 895 (lOth Cir. 1984)). 

The district court instructed the jury that, "To kill with 

malice aforethought means either to kill another person 

deliberately and intentionally, or to act with callous and wanton 

disregard for human life." Joe contends that the district court 

erred in submitting this instruction because it authorized the 

jury to infer malice based on a callous and wanton disregard for 

human life. According to Joe, the "callous and wanton disregard 

for human life" instruction relieved the prosecution of its burden 

10 We also note that the trial judge was careful not to admit 

any photographs depicting the gruesome injuries inflicted upon Ms. 

Joe and Ms. Washburn. 

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to prove specific intent because the jury was permitted to find 

"malice aforethought" based solely on Joe's actions. 

We have previously noted that "[m]alice aforethought may be 

established by evidence of conduct which is reckless and wanton, 

and a gross deviation from a reasonable standard of care, of such 

a nature that a jury is warranted in inferring that the defendant 

was aware of a serious risk of death or serious bodily harm." 

Soundingsides, 820 F.2d at 1237; see also Montoya v. United States 

Parole Comm'n, 908 F.2d 635, 641 (lOth Cir. 1990) (Tacha, J., 

dissenting) (stating that "malice aforethought" may be based on 

one's callous and wanton disregard for human life); United States 

v. Chagra, 807 F.2d 398, 402 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 

U.S. 832 (1987). Based on Soundingsides, we conclude that Joe's 

malice aforethought may be established by his "callous and wanton 

disregard" for the lives of Ms. Joe and Ms. Washburn. The trial 

court's instruction on this point was proper. 

Joe also argues that, taken as a whole, the jury instructions 

were "hopelessly undecipherable" and that they prevented the jury 

from properly distinguishing between the elements of first and 

second degree murder and manslaughter. In the instructions, the 

court first gave the jury a list of the distinct elements required 

to convict the defendant of first degree murder, the crime charged 

in the indictment, and then outlined the specific elements of 

second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. Further, the 

court instructed the jurors that they must acquit the defendant if 

they were not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the 

defendant's guilt of first degree murder, second degree murder or 

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. . 

, ~ .. • 

voluntary manslaughter. The court also gave carefully worded 

pattern instructions defining the key terms "unlawfully," 

"willfully," "malice aforethought," "premeditation," and "specific 

intent." The court emphasized that proof of specific intent was 

required to convict the defendant of first degree murder but not 

second degree murder or voluntary manslaughter. After carefully 

reviewing the record and examining the jury instructions as a 

whole, we believe that the instructions accurately stated the 

governing law so that the jury understood its duties and was not 

misled in any way. Accordingly, we conclude that the instructions 

submitted to the jury were not improper. 

VI. Sentencing 

Joe finally contends that the district court committed two 

separate sentencing errors. The validity of a sentence imposed 

under the Sentencing Guidelines is a question of statutory 

interpretation which we review de novo. Supre v. Ricketts, 792 

F.2d 958, 961 (lOth Cir. 1986). 

A. Count I 

The district court sentenced Joe to life imprisonment after 

the jury convicted him of first degree murder on Count I. Joe 

asserts that the trial court erred in concluding that life 

imprisonment is the mandatory minimum sentence for first degree 

murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1811. In Sands, 968 F.2d at 1066, we 

held that the statutory language of 18 U.S.C. § 1111 requires that 

a defendant convicted of first degree murder serve a minimum 

sentence of life imprisonment. We find Sands dispositive and 

conclude that the district court did not err here. 

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• 

• 

B. Count II 

The defendant also alleges that the district court erred by 

imposing a life sentence for his conviction of second degree 

murder on Count II. The government concedes that the life 

sentence imposed on Count II is inconsistent with the applicable 

sentencing guidelines contained in§§ 2A1.2 and 3D1.4(c). We 

therefore reverse the sentence of life imprisonment for Count II 

and remand for the limited purpose of resentencing on this count. 

VII. Conclusion 

We AFFIRM Joe's conviction and sentence on Count I. We 

AFFIRM Joe's conviction on Count II. We REVERSE the district 

court's sentencing decision on Count II and REMAND for the limited 

purpose of resentencing on Count II. 

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