Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-01166/USCOURTS-ca10-95-01166-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Anthony Lee Cunningham
Appellant
Warren T. Diesslin
Appellee

Document Text:

• 

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

ANTHONY LEE CUNNINGHAM, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

FILED 

United States Court of Appe::ls 

Tenth Circuit 

AUG 1 o 1996 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

No. 95-1166 

V. 

WARREN T. DIESSLIN, Warden, 

Buena Vista Correctional Facility, 

Colorado Department of Corrections, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Colorado 

(D.C. No. 93-Z-894) 

Kathleen A. Lord, Deputy State Public Defender (David F. Vela, Colorado State 

Public Defender, with her on the brief), Denver, Colorado, for PetitionerAppellant. 

Robert M. Petrusak, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Gale A. Norton, Attorney 

General, with him on the brief), Denver, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellee. 

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Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, KELLY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. 

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. 

Anthony Lee Cunningham appeals from the district court's denial of his 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In 1982, Cunningham pleaded guilty in 

Colorado state court to first-degree sexual assault. He now argues that his plea 

was neither knowingly nor intelligently entered because he did not understand the 

length of incarceration to which he could be subjected. Cunningham mistakenly 

believed that he would serve only half of his sentence. He seeks specific 

performance of the plea bargain as understood by the parties or, in the alternative, 

to withdraw his plea. For the reasons given below, this court affirms the 

judgment of the district court. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Cunningham was originally charged in the District Court, City and County 

of Denver, Colorado, with first-degree sexual assault and three other counts. He 

pleaded guilty to the sexual assault charge, a class-2 felony, on September 13, 

1982. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-402(3 ). The State subsequently dismissed the 

remaining counts. At the time of his guilty plea, first-degree sexual assault 

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carried a possible sentence of twelve to twenty four years incarceration. !d. § 18-

1-105(1)(a)(I), (9)(e). The trial court 1 sentenced Cunningham to seventeen years. 

Consistent with the plea agreement, however, the trial court stayed 

Cunningham's sentence. Instead of incarceration under the Department of 

Corrections, the plea agreement provided that Cunningham, who was eighteen at 

the time of his plea, would enter a treatment program at the Closed Adolescent 

Treatment Center under the supervision of the Department of Youth Services. If 

Cunningham violated any of the rules of the treatment center, however, the trial 

court would lift the stay of his sentence and he would serve the balance of his 

sentence under the supervision of the Department of Corrections. 

As a result of Cunningham's subsequent violation of the rules of the Closed 

Adolescent Treatment Center, the trial court terminated his treatment on July 6, 

1984. In accordance with the terms of the plea agreement, the trial court 

permanently lifted the stay of Cunningham's seventeen-year prison sentence and 

ordered him transferred to the Department of Corrections. 

At the time Cunningham committed his offense, Colorado generally 

sentenced persons under a determinate sentencing scheme. See Thiret v. Kautzky, 

1

The Colorado state court heard both Cunningham's plea in 1982 and his 

subsequent habeas petition in 1989. For ease of reference, we will refer to the 

state court as the "trial court" in connection with Cunningham's plea and 

sentencing. We will refer to the state court as the "habeas court" in relation to 

Cunningham's habeas proceedings. 

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792 P .2d 801, 804 (Colo. 1990) (en bane). This scheme removed substantially all 

discretion from the sentencing courts and the Colorado State Parole Board (the 

"Parole Board"). Jd. at 803-04. Persons sentenced under the determinate scheme 

received mandatory parole after reaching the parole date, determined by 

deducting vested good time and earned time credits from the sentence. 2 I d. at 

805. Thus, under the determinate scheme, the Parole Board could not extend the 

parole date beyond that established by the formula. From the time of the 

legislature's enactment of determinate sentencing in 1979 until January 1989, the 

Parole Board interpreted the requirement of mandatory parole to apply to all 

inmates serving sentences for crimes committed between July I, 1979, and July 1, 

1985, with limited exceptions. 3 Thiret, 792 P.2d at 806. 

2Under § 17-22.5-301(1) of the Colorado Revised Statutes, a person serving 

a sentence for a crime committed between July I, 1979, and July I, 1985, could 

earn a good time deduction equal to one day of credit against a sentence for each . 

day served. Price v. Mills, 728 P.2d 715, 718 (Colo. 1986) (en bane). The same 

inmate could receive additional earned time deductions under § 17 -22.5-302(1 ). 

The Colorado Supreme Court has construed the interplay between § 17-22.5-

301(1) and§ 17-22.5-302(1) to provide for a deduction of approximately one-half 

of the sentence received, assuming the inmate earned the maximum allowances. 

People v. Alexander, 797 P.2d 1250, 1254 & n.6 (Colo. 1990) (en bane) (giving 

the example that an inmate sentenced to 50 years who received the maximum 

deductions would be released after serving approximately 23 years). Cunningham 

based his understanding that he would serve only one-half of his sentence on this 

calculation. 

3

ln 1988, the Colorado legislature amended the parole provisions of its 

criminal code to authorize increased discretion to the Parole Board to grant or 

deny parole. See Thiret v. Kautzky, 792 P.2d 801, 805 (Colo. 1990). 

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One exception to mandatory parole, in the Parole Board's pre-1989 view, 

was for persons sentenced pursuant to the indeterminate scheme of the Sex 

Offenders Act,§§ 16-13-201 to -216 of the Colorado Revised Statutes. Thiret, 

792 P.2d at 803; Aue v. Diesslin, 798 P.2d 436, 438 n.2 (Colo. 1990) (en bane). 

Persons sentenced under this indeterminate scheme were not subject to mandatory 

parole but were reviewed yearly by the Parole Board. !d. Cunningham was not 

sentenced for first-degree sexual assault under the Sex Offenders Act, but was 

given a determinate sentence under§ 18-3-105(l)(a)(l), (9)(e) of the Colorado 

Revised Statutes. 

The Parole Board changed its interpretation of the exception to the 

mandatory parole provision in January 1989. Under this new interpretation, all 

individuals sentenced for any sex offense, as the Sex Offenders Act defines "sex 

offense,"4 but not limited to those who were sentenced pursuant to that Act, were 

not subject to mandatory parole. Thiret, 792 P.2d at 803. The Parole Board thus 

4

The Sex Offenders Act reads: 

"Sex offense" means sexual assault, except misdemeanor 

sexual assault in the third degree, as set forth in part 4 

of article 3 of title 18, C.R.S.; sexual assault on a child, 

as defined in section 18-3-405, C.R.S.; aggravated 

incest, as defined in section 18-6-302, C.R.S.; and an 

attempt to commit any of the offenses mentioned in this 

subsection (5). 

Colo. Rev. Stat.§ 16-13-202(5). 

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had discretion to grant or deny parole to all persons convicted of a defined sex 

offense even if they had received a determinate sentence. !d. The Colorado 

Supreme Court has since upheld the Parole Board's new interpretation of the 

extent of its discretion and the consequent retroactive increase in incarceration 

time. !d. at 806-07; see also Aue, 798 P.2d at 441 (upholding the Thiret decision 

against a due process challenge on the ground that the new interpretation was 

foreseeable). 

Soon after the Parole Board changed its interpretation of its authority under 

§ 17-2-201(5)(a), Cunningham learned that mandatory parole would not apply to 

him. On August 2, 1989, he filed a motion in Colorado state court to vacate his 

plea. Cunningham argued he did not voluntarily and knowingly enter his guilty 

plea because he did not understand the consequences. In particular, Cunningham 

alleged he was advised by counsel that if he were sentenced to prison, his 

sentence would be subject to mandatory parole. Cunningham claimed to 

understand this to mean that he would be released from prison after serving only 

one-half of his sentence. He alleged that he was not advised that he would fall 

into an exception to mandatory parole because his conviction was for a sex 

offense. 

The habeas court subsequently held a hearing and denied Cunningham's 

motion to vacate his plea. At this hearing, the parties stipulated to certain 

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pertinent facts: (1) Cunningham's initial counsel advised his clients that they 

would only have to serve one-half of their sentences less earned time; (2) the 

district attorney who negotiated the plea also believed that the maximum time of 

incarceration would be one-half the sentence imposed; and (3) this half-time 

provision was not part of the plea offer. In addition, Cunningham's attorney at 

the time of his guilty plea stated on the record and without objection that he 

understood mandatory parole to apply and that he advised Cunningham he would 

serve half his sentence if the stay were lifted. 

Cunningham also testified at the hearing in the habeas court. He stated he 

was advised by counsel and understood that the maximum amount of time he 

could be incarcerated under the plea agreement was one-half the maximum 

penalty of twenty four years. He explained that this understanding was the only 

reason he pleaded guilty. Cunningham also testified that if he had known he 

would have to serve his entire sentence, he would not have pleaded guilty. 

The habeas court denied Cunningham's requested relief and ruled that his 

plea was voluntarily and intelligently made. The habeas court pointed to the 

many advisements by the trial court on the record to Cunningham that he could 

receive a twenty four-year sentence. Prior to taking his plea, the trial court 

specifically told Cunningham of the possible twenty four-year sentence at least 

five times. The trial court also warned Cunningham, prior to taking his plea, that 

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it was considering a sentence of about sixteen years and that if he violated the 

rules of the treatment center, "[Y]ou are going to do 16 years at the penitentiary." 

In addition, the trial court asked Cunningham whether he understood the possible 

sentence that could be imposed as a result of his plea; Cunningham responded, 

"Yes." 

Prior to taking Cunningham's plea, the following colloquy took place: 

THE COURT: ... Now, have there been any other 

promises made to you other than what I have just talked 

about here to get you to enter this plea? 

THE DEFENDANT: No. 

THE COURT: Has anybody at all told you that I would 

give you a certain sentence or treat you in a certain way 

other than what's been said here? 

THE DEFENDANT: No. 

Despite this colloquy, the habeas court found that Cunningham was told by his 

attorneys that he would only have to serve one-half of his sentence plus one year 

of parole. Moreover, the habeas court acknowledged that it shared the 

understanding of the parties at the time of the plea as to the application of 

mandatory parole to Cunningham's sentence. 

Nevertheless, the habeas court also found that Cunningham did not rely on 

the advice that he would be released after serving half his sentence. It further 

found that he made his plea solely with the consideration that he would enter the 

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treatment program and avoid supervision by the Department of Corrections. The 

habeas court based this finding on statements made during the plea colloquy. 

Prior to the plea, the trial court asked Cunningham the reason for the plea hearing 

and Cunningham responded, "I don't know, so that I can go to the [Closed 

Adolescent Treatment Center]." Then the trial court explained to Cunningham 

the nature and elements of the crime to which he was pleading guilty and the right 

to trial he was foregoing in order to ensure that Cunningham understood the effect 

of his guilty plea. Cunningham responded that he understood the explanations 

given to him by the trial court. On these bases, the habeas court held that 

Cunningham's guilty plea was voluntarily and knowingly made. 

The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling in an 

unpublished order. Relying on the reasoning of Aue, 798 P.2d at 441, which held 

that the change from mandatory to discretionary parole was foreseeable, the Court 

of Appeals held that this change did not itself eviscerate the guilty plea. People 

v. Cunningham, No. 90CA2065, slip op. at 3-4 (Colo. Ct. App. July 2, 1992). The 

court held that even if Cunningham were improperly advised by counsel or the 

trial court, this had no effect on the voluntariness of his plea. I d. at 4. The 

Colorado Supreme Court denied Cunningham's petition for certiorari in an 

unpublished order. 

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After having exhausted his state remedies, Cunningham filed a petition for 

a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court 

for the District of Colorado. The magistrate judge held a hearing and heard 

argument but appears not to have heard additional testimony from witnesses. The 

magistrate reviewed the records created in the trial and habeas courts and issued a 

Recommendation to deny the petition. Cunningham then timely filed objections 

to the magistrate judge's Recommendation. The district court reviewed the record 

before it but apparently did not receive additional evidence. It then adopted the 

magistrate judge's findings in the Recommendation and dismissed the petition. 

Cunningham timely appealed the district court's Order of Dismissal. We exercise 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253. 

In this appeal, Cunningham argues that the plea bargain was not fair 

because he was induced to plead guilty by his false understanding of the 

application of mandatory parole. Because he has served longer than what he 

understood to be the twelve-year maximum period of incarceration, he contends 

that fundamental fairness dictates specific performance of the sentencing term of 

the plea bargain, as understood by all the parties. As a result, he claims he should 

be released from the custody of the Colorado Department of Corrections. In the 

alternative, Cunningham argues that his guilty plea and conviction should be 

vacated. We address these claims seriatim. 

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II. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF THE PLEA AGREEMENT 

Whether government conduct has violated a plea agreement presents a 

question of law which we review de novo. United States v. Robertson, 45 F .3d 

1423, 1442 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied,- U.S.-, 116 S. Ct. 133 (1995), and cert. 

denied sub nom. Graves v. United States,- U.S.-, 115 S. Ct. 2258 (1995) and 

Torres v. United States,- U.S.-, 115 S. Ct. 2259 ( 1995). 

"Where the government obtains a guilty plea predicated in any significant 

degree on a promise or agreement with the prosecuting attorney, such promise 

must be fulfilled to maintain the integrity of the plea." United States v. Hand, 

913 F.2d 854, 856 (lOth Cir. 1990). Interpreting the terms of a plea bargain 

involves a two-step process. The court must first examine the nature of the 

prosecutor's promise. United States v. Pogue, 865 F .2d 226, 227 (1Oth Cir. 

1989). Next, the court examines this promise based upon the defendant's 

reasonable understanding upon entry of the guilty plea. See Robertson, 45 F .3d at 

1442. Cunningham has the burden of proving the underlying facts establishing 

the breach by a preponderance of the evidence. Allen v. Hadden, 57 F .3d 1529, 

1534 (1Oth Cir. 1995), cert. denied,- U.S. -, 116 S. Ct. 544 (1996). 

Cunningham maintains that he is entitled to specific performance of the 

terms of the plea bargain as understood by the parties. Cunningham refers, of 

course, to the application of mandatory parole to his sentence. In Lustgarden v. 

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Gunter, 996 F.2d 552 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1008 (1992), which also 

involved the issue of the Colorado State Parole Board's discretion to deny parole 

to sex offenders, we dealt with a related argument. The plea agreement itself did 

not state that mandatory parole would apply. This court then rejected the claim 

that promissory estoppel required the Parole Board to grant the petitioner parole 

because neither the statutory language nor the sentencing court promised 

mandatory parole. Lustgarden, 966 F.2d at 555; see also Mahn v. Gunter, 978 

F .2d 599, 602 (1Oth Cir. 1992) (rejecting petitioner's reliance argument because 

there was no evidence of a promise of mandatory parole by the sentencing court). 

The court reasoned that even if the petitioner's attorney had promised him 

mandatory parole, this promise did not bind the court. Lustgarden, 966 F .2d at 

554. 

Cunningham nevertheless argues that the understanding of the parties at the 

time of the plea should control the construction of the terms of the plea bargain. 

His claim fails because the application of mandatory parole to Cunningham's 

sentence is neither an explicit nor an implicit part of the plea agreement. The 

undisputed fact is that mandatory parole was not a part of the plea offer; 

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Cunningham does not now allege to the contrary. 5 Thus his argument does not 

concern the construction of the plea agreement. 

Because there was no promise that was impliedly part of the understanding 

of the plea agreement and the plea agreement does not specify that mandatory 

parole would apply, the cases cited by Cunningham are inapposite. See, e.g., 

Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 258-59, 262 (1971) (undisputed promise 

by the first prosecutor not to make a recommendation regarding sentence was 

violated by the second prosecutor); Allen, 57 F.3d at 1531-32 (understanding of 

the plea agreement expressed on the record by counsel and the court that 

dismissed counts would not be used to calculate the defendant's eligibility for 

parole was violated when used by the parole board); Lucero v. Kerby, 7 F .3d 

1520, 1521-22 (1Oth Cir. 1993) (concerning the understanding of the term of 

incarceration contained in the plea agreement); United States v. Shorteeth, 887 

F .2d 253, 254-55 (1Oth Cir. 1989) (involving the understanding of the term of the 

plea agreement that the Government would institute no prosecutions against the 

5 Although the parties do not dispute that both the prosecutor and the trial 

court understood mandatory parole to apply to Cunningham's sentence at the time 

of his plea, Cunningham never alleges that either told him it would apply. In fact, 

one of the undisputed facts is the testimony of the prosecutor that mandatory 

parole was not part of the plea offer. The trial court never indicated on the record 

that Cunningham would only have to serve one-half of the sentence imposed. 

Indeed, in explaining the possibility of a sixteen-year sentence, the trial court told 

him he was "going to do 16 years at the penitentiary," not half of that. The court 

repeatedly told Cunningham of the possibility of a twenty four-year sentence. 

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defendant based on cooperation testimony); accord Pogue, 865 F .2d at 227; 

United States v. Thomas, 580 F.2d 1036, 1037-38 (lOth Cir. 1978) (promise made 

on the record by the court to the first codefendant, and acquiesced in by the 

prosecutor, not to sentence until all charges had been brought was understood by 

the second codefendant to apply to her as well), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1130 

(1979); People v. Fisher, 657 P.2d 922, 924-25 (Colo. 1983) (en bane) (promise 

by the detective that videotaped testimony of the defendant would not be used by 

the prosecutor in any criminal proceeding against him). 

The understanding Cunningham argues should control concerns the length 

of the sentence he received, which is not part of the plea agreement. That all of 

the parties may have understood mandatory parole to apply at the time of the plea 

does not make this a part of the plea agreement. Cunningham can point to no 

promise of mandatory parole that existed outside of the formal, written 

agreement; nor can he show that the parties intended mandatory parole to be a 

part of the plea agreement. As this court held in Lustgarden, any statement by the 

petitioner's attorney about the application of mandatory parole does not bind the 

court unless it is a part of the plea agreement. 966 F.2d at 555. Moreover, 

Lustgarden held the Parole Board's prior misapplication of the Colorado statute 

defining its discretion does not constitute a promise which binds the court. Jd. 

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III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE GUlL TY PLEA 

Cunningham also argues that he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter his 

guilty plea because he was led to believe that mandatory parole would be a part of 

the agreement. He asserts that the reason he accepted the plea was to take 

advantage of mandatory parole, which his counsel informed him would apply. 

Cunningham argues that because the agreement did not actually conform to his 

understanding and contain this term, he should be able to withdraw his plea. 

Whether a defendant entered a knowing and voluntary guilty plea presents a 

question of law which this court reviews de novo. Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 

U.S. 422, 431 (1983); Martin v. Kaiser, 907 F .2d 931, 933 (1Oth Cir. 1990); 

Laycock v. New Mexico, 880 F .2d 1184, 1186 (1Oth Cir. 1988). To the extent that 

the question of whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily made the plea 

depends on findings of fact made by the state court on habeas review, these 

findings, with specified exceptions, carry a presumption of correctness. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d); Marshall, 459 U.S. at 431-32; Jones v. Cowley, 28 F.3d 1067, 

1069 (1Oth Cir. 1994 ). 

On review, a federal court may set aside a state court guilty plea only for 

failure to satisfy due process. Miles v. Dorsey, 61 F.3d 1459, 1465 (lOth Cir. 

1995), cert. denied,- U.S.-, 116 S. Ct. 743 (1996). In order to comport with 

due process guarantees, a defendant must have voluntarily and intelligently 

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entered a guilty plea. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 , 242 (1969). The plea 

must be knowing and the product of a deliberate, intelligent choice. Parke v. 

Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 28 (1992); United States v. Wright, 43 F.3d 491, 495 (lOth 

Cir. 1994 ). Furthermore, the defendant must have "a full understanding of what 

the plea connotes and of its consequences." Boykin, 395 U.S. at 244; see also 

Miles, 61 F.3d at 1466. We will uphold a state court guilty plea if the 

circumstances demonstrate that the defendant understood the nature and 

consequences of the charges and the defendant voluntarily chose to plead guilty. 

Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 passim (1970); Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242-44; 

Miles, 61 F.3d at 1466. 

Cunningham's argument centers on his understanding of the parole terms 

resulting from his plea. He does not contend that his plea resulted from any form 

of coercion, material misrepresentation by the prosecutor or the trial court, or an 

unfulfilled promise. See, e.g., Laycock, 880 F.3d at 1186 (discussing factors 

contributing to involuntary pleas). Instead, Cunningham argues his lawyers 

advised him that he would serve only one-half of his sentence, that he relied on 

and believed this misunderstanding, and that both the prosecutor and the trial 

court shared this same misunderstanding. These contentions bear on whether 

Cunningham knowingly entered his plea and this court will focus on the state of 

his understanding at the time of his plea as reflected in the record. 

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An attorney's erroneous sentence estimate or prediction of parole does not 

render a plea unknowingly made. Laycock, 880 F.2d at 1186; Selfv. Blackburn, 

751 F .2d 789, 793 (5th Cir. 1985). A defendant's subjective understanding that 

he will serve less than one-half of his sentence, if it is not based upon any 

promise made by the defense attorney, the prosecutor, or the court, will not 

undermine the constitutionality of the plea or raise a question of whether the state 

breached its end of a plea bargain. Laycock, 880 F .2d at 1186; Bonvillain v. 

Blackburn, 780 F.2d 1248, 1252 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1143 (1986); 

Hall v. Maggio, 697 F.2d 641, 643 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding the defendant's 

understanding that a life sentence was really only ten and one-half years, which 

he based upon "common knowledge," was not a promise that could render the 

plea involuntarily entered). 

Closer to the issue here, in Lustgarden, this court considered a due process 

challenge to the Colorado Parole Board's 1989 reinterpretation of the application 

of mandatory parole to sex offenders. 966 F .2d at 553. The petitioner in 

Lustgarden had pleaded guilty in Colorado state court to three counts of sexual 

assault on a child. Lustgarden v. Gunter, 779 F. Supp. 500, 501 (D. Colo. 1991 ), 

aff'd, 966 F.2d 552 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1008 (1992). When he 

learned that mandatory parole would not apply to him, he filed a petition for a 

writ of habeas corpus .alleging he was entitled to mandatory parole. I d. at 501-02. 

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Following the result reached by the Colorado Supreme Court in Aue, 798 P .2d at 

441, this court held the 1989 reinterpretation of the parole statute by the Parole 

Board was a foreseeable change which did not violate due process guarantees. 

Lustgarden, 966 F.2d at 554. The issue raised by Cunningham, however, which 

focuses on his knowledge of the length of confinement he faced, is not squarely 

settled by either Laycock or Lustgarden. 

Laycock establishes that a defendant's understanding he will serve less than 

his full sentence does not alone render his guilty plea constitutionally infirm. 880 

F .2d at 1186. The defendant's belief must be based upon some other additional 

factor, such as coercion or material misrepresentation by the prosecutor. 

Moreover, this understanding, from whatever its source, must have affected the 

defendant's decision with respect to the plea. That Cunningham's attorneys 

advised him mandatory parole would apply to his sentence is not in dispute. The 

habeas court, however, found that Cunningham did not rely on that advice when 

he accepted the plea. 

Cunningham urges this court to hold that two findings by the habeas court 

are not supported by the record: (1) he did not rely on his counsel's statements 

that he would serve only one-half of his sentence; and (2) that he entered his plea 

solely to avoid incarceration under the Department of Corrections. Under 

Laycock, Cunningham's claim cannot stand unless his misunderstanding about the 

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length of his possible incarceration resulted from some promise made by his 

counsel, the prosecutor, or the trial court or some other impermissible action. See 

Laycock, 880 F .2d at 1186. As a result, the first of the challenged findings is 

crucial. 

Federal review of a state court's factual findings is of limited scope. Ball 

v. Ricketts, 779 F .2d 578, 579-80 (1Oth Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub nom. Rive/and 

v. Ball, 479 U.S. 870 (1986). A federal court must accept as true the state court's 

determination of underlying questions of historical fact and the inferences drawn 

therefrom based upon testimony taken in that court unless one of the exceptions 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) applies. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 547-50 

(1981 ); Ball, 779 F .2d at 580; see also Thompson v. Keohane, No. 94-6615, slip 

op at 10-12 (U.S. Nov. 29, 1995) (holding that§ 2254(d) applies to basic, 

primary, or historical facts but that the "in custody" determination is a legal 

question outside the scope of§ 2254(d)). At issue here is 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(8), 

which provides that the state court's findings are entitled to a presumption of 

correctness unless they are not fairly supported by the record: 6 

6Cunningham more strenuously challenges the factual findings of the 

federal district court and magistrate judge. It appears that these findings were 

made on the basis of the state record and that neither the district court nor the 

magistrate took additional testimony from witnesses. This court has held that 

findings by a district court and magistrate based merely upon their review of the 

state record are not fully entitled to the clearly erroneous standard of review. 

Archuleta v. Kerby, 864 F.2d 709, 711 n.2 (lOth Cir. 1989); Castleberry v. Alford, 

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Having closely reviewed the entire record, we conclude it supports the 

habeas court's finding that Cunningham did not rely on the advice of his counsel 

concerning his length of confinement. Although the parties do not dispute that 

Cunningham's attorneys informed him mandatory parole would apply to his 

sentence, Cunningham stated in open court during his plea colloquy that he was 

not relying on any promises or predictions of a possible sentence made to him 

prior to his plea. "Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption 

of verity." Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977). Given this evidence, 

and the absence of any of the factors present in Blackledge which question the 

truth of the petitioner's declarations, the record supports the finding of the habeas 

court. 

Furthermore, the habeas court's finding that Cunningham pleaded guilty 

solely to enter the program at the treatment center in turn additionally supports 

the conclusion that he pleaded without reliance on the promise of mandatory 

parole. That finding corresponds precisely with Cunningham's statement to the 

666 F.2d 1338, 1342 n.2 (lOth Cir. 1981). These findings are subject to this 

court's independent review of the record on these points. Archuleta, 864 F .2d at 

711 n.2. Although the district court and magistrate judge made additional 

findings beyond those of the habeas court, their findings included the reiteration 

of the two habeas court findings listed above. Cunningham's claim will fail if 

these two findings are fairly supported by the record and are not shown by 

convincing evidence to be erroneous,. As a consequence, we focus on these 

findings by the habeas court, which are entitled to the degree of deference 

accorded 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

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trial court during the plea colloquy. Moreover, Cunningham's argument that he 

accepted the plea agreement because of the application of mandatory parole is 

dubious. It does not really address the finding that he accepted the plea solely to 

enter the treatment program. The application of mandatory parole would have 

caused Cunningham's plea to provide no benefit to him over going to trial. In 

this context, the habeas court's finding that the promise of the treatment program 

motivated Cunningham to accept the plea explains his motivation because the 

treatment program did represent a benefit of the plea bargain. 

Because the record supports the habeas court's findings, we cannot 

conclude that Cunningham relied on his attorney's statements at the time of the 

plea that he would receive mandatory parole. Laycock indicates the defendant's 

guilty plea may be constitutionally suspect when the defendant's attorney 

promised he would serve less than his actual sentence. Laycock, 880 F .2d at 

1186-87. The record here, however, supports the finding that Cunningham did 

not act on the basis of that advice and did not rely on his counsel's statements 

when he made his plea. We therefore cannot conclude that Cunningham's guilty 

plea is constitutionally infirm. We hold that Cunningham entered his guilty plea 

knowingly and intelligently and that it cannot now be vacated on those grounds. 

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IV. CONCLUSION 

Because the undisputed facts demonstrate that mandatory parole was not a 

part of the plea offer, Cunningham's argument that the plea agreement should be 

construed to contain that term is unavailing. Cunningham's specific performance 

argument thus fails. Moreover, the habeas court found that the trial court never 

told Cunningham that he would serve only one-half of his sentence. It further 

found that Cunningham did not rely on any statements made to him by his counsel 

at the time of his plea that he would only serve one-half of his sentence. After a 

careful review of the record, this court is left with the conviction that these 

findings are supported by the record. As a result, we cannot conclude that 

Cunningham's attorneys misinformed him of any material consequences of his 

plea which caused him to accept the plea. Accordingly, this court holds that 

Cunningham entered his plea knowingly and intelligently. For these reasons, the 

district court's dismissal of Cunningham's petition for a writ of habeas corpus is 

AFFIRMED. 

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