Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-02741/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-02741-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Summer Black
Defendant
City of Petaluma
Defendant
City of Santa Rosa
Defendant
Justin Farrington
Defendant
Andy Ford
Plaintiff
Brenda Harrington
Defendant
David Lamb
Defendant
David Linscomb
Defendant
David Marconi
Defendant
Robert Moore
Defendant
Ronald Nelson
Defendant
Steven Pehlke
Defendant
Matthew Rooney
Defendant
John Silva
Defendant
Thomas Walsh
Defendant
John Whitten
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANDY FORD,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CITY OF SANTA ROSA, CITY OF PETALUMA,

JOHN WHITTEN, JOHN SILVA, JUSTIN

FARRINGTON, THOMAS WALSH, DAVID LAMB,

BRENDA HARRINGTON, STEVEN PEHLKE,

MATTHEW ROONEY, DAVID LINSCOMB,

SUMMER BLACK, ROBERT MOORE, DAVID

MARCONI, RONALD NELSON, and DOES 1–25, inclusive,

Defendants. /

No. C 19-02741 WHA

ORDER RE MOTION

TO DISMISS

INTRODUCTION

In this civil rights action, two of fifteen defendants move to dismiss the action pursuant to

FRCP 12(b)(6). For the reasons stated herein, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART AND

DENIED IN PART.

STATEMENT

The operative complaint alleges the following facts. Plaintiff Andy Ford is a veteran who

received a Purple Heart during his tour of duty in Afghanistan. As a result of his injuries,

plaintiff carries shrapnel in one leg and suffers from refractory epilepsy, an untreatable condition

that causes uncontrollable seizures (Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 9–14). During recovery, which lasts minutes

to hours following each seizure, plaintiff becomes “unconscious of [his] actions, easily panicked,

combative, upset, and unable to communicate” (id. ¶ 15). 

At the time of the alleged incident, defendants John Whitten, Justin Farrington, Thomas

Walsh, David Lamb, Brenda Harrington, Steven Pehlke, Matthew Rooney, David Linscomb,

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Summer Gloeckner (erroneously sued as Summer Black), Robert Moore, David Marconi, and

Ronald Nelson worked as police officers for the City of Santa Rosa (id. ¶ 5; Dkt. No. 8 at 1). 

Defendant John Silva rated as a detective for the City of Petaluma (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 6). 

Defendants Detective Silva and his employer, the City of Petaluma, move to dismiss pursuant

to FRCP 12(b)(6) (Dkt. No. 9). 

In February 2018, as plaintiff walked to a bus stop on his way to a neurology

appointment, he encountered a homeless woman struggling to carry her belongings. 

Plaintiff stopped to assist her. After helping her, he began to have a seizure. The homeless

woman flagged down a passing police car for help (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 16). Officer Whitten, the driver

of the passing patrol car, stopped and approached plaintiff, who laid unresponsive on the side of

the road. Officer Whitten allegedly said, “You just drunk, man[]” (id. ¶ 17). Plaintiff started to

rise unsteadily, unable to speak. Officer Whitten radioed for medical assistance, for “extreme

intoxication.” He then attempted to grab plaintiff, who pushed the officer’s hands away. Officer

Whitten took plaintiff down and pinned him to the ground as plaintiff shouted and struggled (id.

¶ 18). 

At this time, Detective Silva drove by and saw Officer Whitten on top of plaintiff. 

He stopped and ran to assist Officer Whitten by placing plaintiff in a figure-four wristlock. 

Plaintiff continued to struggle and to shout in pain, so Detective Silva employed a

pain-compliance technique. At this point, several Santa Rosa officers arrived and jumped

into the fray, including Officers Farrington, Linscomb, Lamb, Walsh, Marconi, Pehlke, Nelson,

and Rooney (id. ¶¶ 19–24). By the time the paramedics arrived, plaintiff had been hogtied with

maximum leg restraints. The paramedics, who knew plaintiff, apprised the officers of plaintiff’s

neurological condition. The paramedics sedated plaintiff. Once the sedative took effect, the

officers released plaintiff from the maximum restraints, shackled him to a backboard, and then

transported him to a hospital in custody (id. ¶¶ 24–26). At the hospital, medical staff informed

the officers present, once again, of plaintiff’s epileptic disorder. When plaintiff regained

consciousness, however, the officers placed him under arrest and transported him to the Sonoma

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County Main Adult Detention Facility, booking him on “felony charges of resisting arrest, and

assault on a peace officer” (id. ¶ 26). 

Afterward, fourteen police officers filed reports to the Sonoma County District Attorney

in support of plaintiff’s prosecution. None of the reports disclosed plaintiff’s neurological

condition (id. ¶ 30). The district attorney initiated criminal proceedings against plaintiff

but dismissed them after the prosecutor reviewed the body-camera footage from the arresting

officers (id. ¶ 31). At the hearing, the police reports submitted to the district attorney were

reviewed.

Plaintiff alleges three claims: (1) wrongful arrest under Title II of the ADA and the

Rehabilitation Act; (2) false arrest/imprisonment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (3) malicious

prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants City of Santa Rosa and Officers Whitten,

Farrington, Walsh, Lamb, Harrington, Pehlke, Rooney, Linscomb, Gloeckner, Moore, Marconi,

and Nelson have answered the complaint (Dkt. No. 8). Now, defendants Detective Silva and the

City of Petaluma, move to dismiss pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6) (Dkt. No. 9). This order follows

full briefing and oral argument. 

ANALYSIS

1. WRONGFUL ARREST CLAIM UNDER THE ADA

AND THE REHABILITATION ACT.

Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by

reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the

services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such

entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The Rehabilitation Act, in turn, provides: “No otherwise qualified

individual with a disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability,

be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination

under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 29 U.S.C. § 794. This act

applies the same “standards applied under [T]itle I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of

1990” to determine whether a violation has occurred. 29 U.S.C. § 791(f). Our court of appeals

has held that the ADA applies to arrests, though “exigent circumstances inform the

reasonableness analysis under the ADA.” Sheehan v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 743 F.3d

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1211, 1232 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. City & Cty. of San

Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765 (2015). To survive a motion to dismiss in the context of

wrongful arrest, plaintiff must plausibly allege that: “(1) he was disabled; (2) the officers knew

or should have known he was disabled; and (3) the officers arrested him because of legal conduct

related to his disability.” Lawman v. City and Cty. of San Francisco, 159 F. Supp. 3d 1130,

1147 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (Judge Donna Ryu). 

Here, plaintiff alleges wrongful arrest under Title II of the ADA and under

the Rehabilitation Act on the grounds that all the officers involved “intentionally

deprived . . . plaintiff of his freedom of movement by the use of physical force,” that

defendants “arrested . . . plaintiff without a warrant or probable cause,” and that “no reasonable

officer would reasonably believe that plaintiff had committed a crime” (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 40). 

Plaintiff further suggests that defendants knew that plaintiff “lacked the mental capacity to

commit a crime” prior to arresting him (id. ¶¶ 27–29, 42). 

This order finds that plaintiff does not plausibly allege that Detective Silva engaged in

a wrongful arrest under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. While the complaint adequately

alleges that plaintiff had a disability and that Detective Silva knew about plaintiff’s disability,

it insufficiently alleges that Detective Silva knew about the disability at the time he became

involved or that he continued to be involved in the arrest after learning this information. 

As such, the complaint fails to plausibly allege that Detective Silva “arrested plaintiff

without . . . probable cause” (id. at ¶ 40). Probable cause exists when, considering the totality

of circumstances known to the arresting officers, a prudent person would believe the suspect had

committed a crime. Dubner v. City and Cty. of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 959, 966 (9th Cir.

2001). Plaintiff alleges that Detective Silva became involved in the altercation after he drove by

and saw Officer Whitten and plaintiff struggling. As pleaded, it appears that Detective Silva’s

involvement in the arrest came before he learned of plaintiff’s condition and that he became

involved only because he believed plaintiff had committed or was committing a crime (resisting

arrest). Thus, the complaint insufficiently alleges that Detective Silva lacked probable cause

when he decided to intervene.

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The complaint also vagues out as to whether Detective Silva’s involvement continued

beyond his initial intervention. Detective Silva’s name only appears in one paragraph of

plaintiff’s factual allegations (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 19). The complaint does not clearly state whether or

not Detective Silva continued to participate in the arrest after he learned of plaintiff’s disability. 

Because the complaint fails to adequately plead Detective Silva’s involvement in the arrest

after he allegedly learned of plaintiff’s disability, the motion to dismiss this claim is GRANTED.

2. SECTION 1983 CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIMS.

Section 1983 provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute . . . of any

State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the

United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an

action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress,

except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an

act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive

relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated

or declaratory relief was unavailable. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion on a Section 1983 claim, plaintiff must

plausibly allege that defendants: (1) violated rights protected by the Constitution or by federal

statue and (2) that the violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. 

West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Each defendant in a Section 1983 claim must personally

participate in the alleged violation of rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir.

2002). Plaintiff advances two Section 1983 claims, both of which are discussed in turn.

A. False Arrest and False Imprisonment. 

Plaintiff alleges that the officers, including Detective Silva, “intentionally

deprived . . . plaintiff of his freedom of movement” and that they “arrested . . . plaintiff

without a warrant or probable cause.” Additionally, plaintiff alleges that defendants “acted in

concert and as integral participants” when they unlawfully held plaintiff in custody (Dkt. No. 1,

¶¶ 48–49).

Our court of appeals has held that “[a] claim for unlawful arrest is cognizable under

[Section] 1983 as a violation of the Fourth Amendment, provided the arrest was without

probable cause or other justification.” Dubner, 266 F.3d at 964. Probable cause exists when,

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considering the totality of circumstances known to the arresting officers, a prudent person would

believe the suspect had committed a crime. Id. at 966. As such, the crux of this claim is whether

plaintiff plausibly alleges that Detective Silva acted without probable cause. This order finds

that while plaintiff plausibly alleges that Detective Silva was acting under color of state law,

plaintiff fails to plausibly allege that he acted without probable cause. The complaint, as

pleaded, gives rise to the inference that Detective Silva became involved merely because he

believed that plaintiff was resisting arrest, not because plaintiff suffered a seizure. Beyond that,

the complaint does not adequately allege, as already stated, his personal participation in the

arrest after allegedly learning of plaintiff’s disability.

Although plaintiff states that defendants acted as integral participants in his allegedly

unlawful arrest, he also seems to advance a theory of team liability by stating that defendants

acted in concert. This theory fails. It has been widely recognized that plaintiff cannot “hold an

officer liable because of his membership in a group without a showing of individual participation

in the unlawful conduct.” Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d at 935. As described above, allegations

of Detective Silva’s personal participation in the arrest remain tenuous. The complaint fails to

plausibly allege that Detective Silva continued to personally participate in plaintiff’s arrest after

learning of his disability. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss this claim is GRANTED. Insofar as

plaintiff would like to amend his complaint, he should adequately allege the extent of Detective

Silva’s personal participation as it pertains to the arrest.

* * *

There is no claim for excessive force. The claims are for wrongful arrest, false

arrest/imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. While the struggle on the sidewalk is

described, at no point does the complaint characterize the force used by the police officers as

excessive. The gravamen of the complaint is that plaintiff should not have been arrested or

deprived of his freedom of movement by the use of physical force in light of his disability. 

The complaint itself states that Detective Silva became aware of plaintiff’s disability when the

paramedics arrived and told the officers about the disability. Once Detective Silva was aware of

this information, however, the complaint is completely silent as to what Detective Silva did by

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way of further restraint or arrest of plaintiff. This seems curious because the complaint

overflows with detail as to what Detective Silva did prior to learning of plaintiff’s disability. 

For example, Paragraph 19 states, “Detective Silva grabbed [plaintiff’s] right arm and forced it

above his head, ultimately placing [plaintiff] in a figure-four wristlock,” and “Detective Silva

pushed down on his face with his right forearm, pressing [plaintiff’s] face into the ground and

applying pressure to his trans-mandibular joint in an effort to effect pain compliance.” 

Paragraph 40 lists eleven officers, including Detective Silva, who “intentionally

deprived . . . plaintiff of his freedom of movement by the use of physical force.” But, again,

the scenario laid out as to Detective Silva, only sets forth force used by him before

learning of plaintiff’s disability. Paragraph 40 goes on to say that defendants “wrongfully

arrested . . . plaintiff without . . . probable cause.” Curiously, the complaint fails to specifically

describe which of the officers actually arrested plaintiff. This is curious because the complaint

calls out specific officers and very specific conduct by them when it’s beneficial but at other

times vagues out. Detective Silva is not named as someone who arrests anyone. The same is

true of Paragraph 48 under plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim for relief. 

B. Malicious Prosecution.

For a Section 1983 claim of malicious prosecution, this order looks to the elements

set forth by state common law. See Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir.

2004). In California, plaintiffs alleging malicious prosecution must show that the action: 

“(1) was commenced by or at the direction of the defendant and was pursued to a legal

termination in . . . plaintiff’s[] favor; (2) was brought without probable cause; and (3) was

initiated with malice.” Mills v. City of Covina, 921 F.3d 1161, 1169 (9th Cir. 2019). 

Our court of appeals has long presumed that a “prosecutor filing the complaint exercised

independent judgment in determining that probable cause for an accused’s arrest exist[ed] at the

time.” Smiddy v. Varney, 665 F.2d 261, 266 (9th Cir. 1981). This presumption could be

rebutted in a number of ways, including when a prosecutor receives false information and when

the prosecution relies solely on the police investigation and arrest when initiating proceedings. 

Id. at 266–67. Our court of appeals has recently decided, however, that “a showing of a[n]

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‘[improper] motive on the part of an official urging prosecution combined with an absence of

probable cause supporting the prosecutor’s decision’ will suffice to rebut the presumption,”

rather than requiring an inquiry into the prosecutor’s actual state of mind. Beck v. City of

Upland, 527 F.3d 858, 865 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 265

(2006)). This order finds that plaintiff plausibly alleged a claim of malicious prosecution against

Detective Silva, as follows.

(1) Detective Silva’s Contribution to Plaintiff’s Prosecution.

 The complaint adequately alleges that Detective Silva provided the Sonoma County

District Attorney with “false, misleading, and incomplete information” by intentionally omitting

information about plaintiff’s medical condition in his report to the prosecutor. Plaintiff also

plausibly alleges that this report, in part, commenced plaintiff’s prosecution and that the case

was dismissed in plaintiff’s favor. Defendants argue that Detective Silva lacked knowledge

about the disability and thus any omission was unintentional. FRCP 12(b)(6) motions, however,

do not involve factual disputes. This order must analyze the motion based on the allegations set

forth in the complaint.

(2) Lack of Probable Cause.

This order finds that plaintiff adequately alleges lack of probable cause as it pertains to

his malicious prosecution claim. The facts alleged give rise to the inference that Detective Silva

became aware that plaintiff suffered from epilepsy and omitted this information from his report. 

Detective Silva, as a result of his training, knew that individuals who “commit an act or omission

because of a seizure . . . lack the intent necessary for the act to be considered a crime” (Dkt. No.

1 ¶ 29). These alleged facts give rise to the inference that Detective Silva had no reason to

believe that plaintiff possessed the necessary intent to commit the crimes for which he was

charged. It is thus unlikely that a prudent officer, knowing what Detective Silva knew at the

time of the report, would have believed the suspect had committed a crime. Plaintiff sufficiently

alleges that Detective Silva filed a false report encouraging prosecution without probable cause.

Defendants contend that plaintiff has not sufficiently rebutted the District Attorney of

Sonoma County’s presumption of independent judgment. In light of the new standard for

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prosecutorial independence adopted in Beck, however, plaintiff’s complaint plausibly alleges

that Detective Silva, an official, submitted a false report urging for prosecution and that the

decision to prosecute plaintiff lacked probable cause as described above. 

(3) Acting with Malice.

Malice means more than hostility or ill will. Under California law, if defendants had

“no substantial ground for believing in the plaintiff’s guilt, but . . . instigated proceedings

against . . . plaintiff, it is logical to infer that . . . defendant’s motive was improper.” Greene v.

Bank of America, 216 Cal. App. 4th 454, 464 (2013) (citation omitted). Plaintiff alleges that

Detective Silva’s report to the prosecutor did not include information about plaintiff’s medical

condition, despite the allegation that he possessed this knowledge. This information materially

impacted whether plaintiff possessed the intent to commit a crime. Accordingly, plaintiff

adequately alleges that Detective Silva had no substantial ground to believe in plaintiff’s guilt

but filed the report anyway, giving rise to the inference that Detective Silva had an improper

motive for submitting the report.

Though the complaint vagues out as to Detective Silva’s involvement in the arrest,

Paragraph 52 under the malicious prosecution claim for relief does specifically say that

Detective Silva “intentionally provided the prosecutor with false, misleading, and incomplete

information.” This is enough to state a claim for relief under Blankenhorn v. City of Orange,

485 F.3d 463,484 (9th Cir. 2007), which suggests an intentional omission of material

information from a police report that would establish a lack of probable cause precludes a

defendant from prevailing on summary judgment on a malicious prosecution claim. 

With respect to qualified immunity, defendants’ opening motion focused on the qualified

immunity defense solely on Detective Silva’s intervention in the sidewalk struggle:

Here, Detective Silva acted reasonably in deciding to intervene in

an ongoing struggle between Plaintiff and a uniformed officer

(Officer Whitten). These facts are openly admitted by Plaintiff in

his Complaint and confirm that Detective Silva is entitled to

qualified immunity.

(Dkt. No. 9 at 14). Defendants’ opening brief did not raise qualified immunity as to the

allegedly false police report. The reply brief attempted to do so, but that is too little too late. 

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It is unfair to raise in the reply brief a point that should have been raised in the opening brief. 

Doing so deprives the opposing party of the opportunity to rebut. For this reason alone, the issue

of qualified immunity with respect to the allegedly false police report will not be reached on this

motion. Even if it were to be reached, qualified immunity is a matter of defense. It may only be

reached on a motion to dismiss on FRCP 12(b)(6) if the complaint on its face establishes that the

officer is entitled to qualified immunity. Here, the defense is not self-evident on the face of the

complaint with respect to the issue of the allegedly false police report. For the foregoing

reasons, the motion to dismiss this claim is DENIED.

3. REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE.

A court may take judicial notice of any fact “not subject to reasonable dispute because

it . . . can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably

be questioned.” FRE 201(b)(2). Plaintiff filed one request for judicial notice — a copy of the

underlying criminal complaint in this matter (Dkt. No. 15, Exh. 1). This exhibit is not necessary

for resolving the motion to dismiss, thus the request is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, defendants motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART AND

DENIED IN PART. As to the dismissed claims, plaintiff may move for leave to file an amended

complaint by AUGUST 28 AT NOON. Any such motion should include as an exhibit a redlined

version of the proposed amended complaint that clearly identifies all changes from the initial

complaint. Plaintiff should be sure to plead his best case. If no such motion is filed, the answer

is due seven consecutive days thereafter.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 9, 2019. WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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