Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-03106/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-03106-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jeff Macomber
Respondent
Francisco J. Serrano
Petitioner

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRANCISCO J. SERRANO,

Petitioner,

v.

JEFF MACOMBER,

Respondent.

Case No. 14-cv-03106-JD 

ORDER DENYING PETITION 

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

AND DENYING CERTIFICATE 

OF APPEALABILITY

Francisco Serrano, a pro se state prisoner, has brought a habeas petition pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254. The Court ordered respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted. 

Respondent filed an answer and a memorandum of points and authorities in support of it. Serrano

filed a traverse. The petition is denied.

BACKGROUND

A jury found Serrano guilty of aggravated assault and active participation in a criminal 

street gang and that he personally inflicted great bodily injury. Clerk’s Transcript (“CT”) at 666-

70. The jury deadlocked on the count of attempted premeditated murder. CT at 666. Serrano was 

sentenced to 14 years and eight months in prison. CT at 833, 840. The California Court of 

Appeal affirmed the judgment, but stayed the eight-month sentence imposed for active 

participation in a criminal street gang. People v. Serrano, No. A134211, 2013 WL 441960, at *1 

(Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2013). The California Supreme Court denied a petition for review. 

Answer, Ex. C.

Case 3:14-cv-03106-JD Document 18 Filed 02/17/16 Page 1 of 14
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The California Court of Appeal summarized the relevant facts of the underlying crime as 

follows:

Testimony of Detective John Cregan

John Cregan of the Santa Rosa Police Department testified that he 

was a detective assigned to the department's gang crimes team. On 

July 21, 2010 at 7:54 p.m., he responded to a radio dispatch that a 

stabbing had occurred on Washington Street in Santa Rosa. He 

drove to the reported scene of the incident and saw a “young man” 

with “visible injuries.” The young man, identified as Jose Cortez by 

Cregan at trial, had “numerous bleeding wounds on his back and 

chest area.” Cortez was accompanied by his “girlfriend, Cindy 

Chavarria,” who was “wearing a bright red, zip up sweater.” At trial 

he identified a photograph he took of “Chavarria” at the police 

department showing the “red little zip up sweater, or sweatshirt, that 

she was wearing the night of this incident,” as well as photographs 

of the sweater itself.

Cregan viewed the private home surveillance video of a resident in 

the vicinity that depicted the incident, and, based on the video, he 

broadcast “what suspect descriptions [he] could see” and a vehicle 

description to patrol officers. He obtained a copy of the video and 

booked it into evidence.

Testimony of Area Residents

Brittany Baer testified that she was in the living room of her 

Washington Street home, which was “100 feet, maybe” from the 

street, when she heard “a bunch of feet stomping.” She looked 

outside and “noticed a boy. It looked like he tripped and fell. Two 

people ran past him, and another boy came and stood over top of 

him.” This boy, who was a “light skinned, Hispanic male,” stood 

over the victim and made “arm movements” over the top of the 

victim that were “[n]ot your typical punches; it was more side 

motion, into the victim’s side.” Baer saw a “small object sticking 

out of the attacker's hand” that “looked like a small blade,” and she 

thought he was stabbing the victim. The attacker “looked very 

young;” he seemed younger than Baer, who was 25 years old.

According to Baer, the attacker stabbed the victim at least 15 times. 

Two other men stood watching. The attacker ran when a neighbor 

came outside and yelled at him. The victim yelled for an ambulance 

and asked people to call 911.

Jason Taylor testified that he also lived on Washington Street. On 

the evening in question, he was watching television when he heard 

someone run by his window. When he heard some commotion, he 

and his wife opened their front door and took a look outside. They 

saw “a car out on the street.” Three men were kicking and punching 

a man on the ground. He noticed one attacker leaning over the 

victim and “kind of punching on him.” After his wife yelled at the 

attackers to “[g]et off him,” the attackers jumped into a “little sedan 

type car” that sped off. The victim came stumbling towards his 

Case 3:14-cv-03106-JD Document 18 Filed 02/17/16 Page 2 of 14
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

house and asked them to call 911 and for an ambulance.

Kira Lee, Taylor’s wife, testified that she was in her living room 

watching television on the night of the incident when she noticed a 

car stopped in the middle of the street. She went outside and saw 

“four guys” “beating up” someone. She yelled that they should stop 

and when they did not, she called the police. She saw a car in the 

middle of the street, and the attackers get in it and take off. She did 

not realize someone was being stabbed or “how bad it was until the 

victim stood up and he said, ‘I need help. I need an ambulance.’ 

And then, all of a sudden, he just started bleeding everywhere.”

Testimony of Cindy Sarabia Antonia and Jose Rafael Cortez

Cindy Sarabia Antonia, also identified in the reporter’s transcript as 

“Cindy Sarabia–Chavarria” (Sarabia), testified that she was 19 years 

old, and that Jose Rafael Cortez (Cortez) was her boyfriend at the 

time he was stabbed. On the evening in question, Cortez was 

walking with her on Ninth Street as they headed to her home. 

Sarabia was wearing a burgundy-colored sweater. As they walked 

past a church, a gold car with four doors, with four or five people 

inside, gave Cortez “attention.” One of them, a man, asked Cortez if 

he was Norteño, and “what hood he was from.” According to 

Sarabia, Cortez was not a Norteño, but he did “hang out” with 

Norteños.

At some point, the car turned around, Cortez pushed her away and 

told her to run, he ran towards the other side of the church, and three 

“guys,” all male, from the car “chased him around the corner, all the 

way down.” As they chased him, they asked him “what hood are 

you from?” She thought it was some kind of gang challenge 

directed at Cortez.

Sarabia, without a cell phone, looked everywhere to get help 

because she knew something was going to happen. As soon as the 

car left, she started walking quickly to Cortez. When she caught up 

to him, he was on the ground, alone. He said “they had stabbed

him” and she saw that he was bleeding. Cortez underwent surgery 

and was hospitalized for two days. She assumed his attackers were 

Sureños because she was wearing a burgundy-colored sweater. She 

did not see their faces.

Cortez testified that he was 17 years old at the time of trial, and 

indicated that he did not want to appear in court. He acknowledged 

that he had been hospitalized in July 2010 for stab wounds, that the 

day he was stabbed he was walking his girlfriend, Sarabia, home, 

that he ran because he wanted to and was stabbed when he stopped 

running, and said that he did not know who stabbed him. He did not 

“hang out” with Sureños or Norteños, and had heard of the “Varrio 

Santa Rosa Norte” (VSRN) and thought it would be okay to “hang 

out” with someone who said they were VSRN.

Physician Chris Kosakowski, a surgeon, testified that according to 

his records, he treated Cortez on July 21, 2010. His dictation of the 

treatment provided indicated that he treated 17 stab wounds on 

Cortez’s neck, chest, and arms.

Case 3:14-cv-03106-JD Document 18 Filed 02/17/16 Page 3 of 14
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Testimony Regarding Evidence Obtained by Police

Technician Janice Wohlert, an evidence technician with the Santa 

Rosa Police Department, testified that she processed a vehicle on 

July 22, 2010, which was the day after the incident. She was able to 

develop latent fingerprint samples from various parts of the outside 

of the car, including from the car rear window. She looked for, but 

did not find, any blood evidence in the vehicle. It was not disputed 

at trial that the vehicle belonged to Lorenzo Medina Avalos 

(Avalos), whose testimony we summarize below.

Forensic specialist John Jaynes testified as a latent print expert. He 

processed a latent print taken from the rear car window of the 

vehicle processed by Wohlert, entered the print into an automated 

fingerprint search computer, and received information linking the 

print to fingerprint samples taken from defendant on July 22, 2007. 

Jaynes conducted a manual comparison and determined that the 

print matched defendant’s right palm print. He “rolled” another set 

of defendant's palm prints the morning that he testified, compared 

the latent print to that sample, and after a manual comparison 

determined that they were from the same person.

Testimony of Lorenzo Medina Avalos

Avalos testified pursuant to an agreement with the prosecution. He 

said he was 29 years old and had joined the Sureño gang when he 

was around 13 years old. He had Sureño gang-related tattoos, 

including the gang sign “13” on his elbow. His record included a 

youth authority commitment, convictions for misdemeanor domestic 

violence and receiving stolen property, and parole violations for 

associating with gang members. He had been arrested for the 

current incident and pled guilty to felony assault with a gang 

enhancement. He had agreed to a maximum four-year state prison 

sentence if he testified truthfully in this case. He testified that no 

other promises had been made to him concerning his testimony.

Avalos testified that he no longer considered himself a member of 

the Sureño gang. He said that he did not expect the Sureño gang to 

ever accept him for testifying in court, as his testimony was a 

violation of the gang code of conduct.

Avalos further testified that he “claimed” the Puro Sureño Cholo 

(PSC) set of the Sureño gang, which rival was the Norteño gang. 

The area around West Ninth Street in Santa Rosa was within PSC 

territory. PSC gang members gathered at Jacobs Park, drinking and 

using drugs. Norteños were not welcome near that park.

Avalos said that young teens were considered “pee wees” and were 

allowed to associate with gang members, and that those considered 

worthy were “jumped” into the gang. Defendant was a PSC gang 

member. Avalos also identified photographs of PSC gang members 

named Miguel and Jesus. At the time of the incident, Avalos said, 

defendant was 17 years old, and Miguel and Jesus were each 21.

On July 21, 2010, Avalos testified he went to Jacobs Park, where he 

heard that gang members had been jumping prospective members 

into the gang. He saw defendant, Miguel, and Jesus drinking beer, 

smoking marijuana, and ingesting cocaine, and joined them. A 

Case 3:14-cv-03106-JD Document 18 Filed 02/17/16 Page 4 of 14
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

young boy reported that there were Norteños down the street; there 

was some talk about confronting them, and some went off to 

confront them. About 10 or 15 minutes later, he saw police cars 

speed by and he, defendant, Miguel, and Jesus drove away in his 

car, a Honda, at Avalos’s suggestion.

Avalos further testified that, as he drove down West Ninth Street, 

near Saint Rose Church, he saw “an individual walking with his 

girlfriend” walking down the street and noticed that the female was 

wearing a “red flannel sweater,” and thought the male was dressed 

like a northerner. In the car, defendant said that he recognized the 

male because defendant had been previously “jumped” by him on a 

bus. Avalos joined the others in making hand gestures, and some 

may have flashed gang signs, at the couple. Avalos did a u-turn 

with his car to head back towards the couple and defendant jumped 

out of the car and chased the male down the street. Miguel and 

Jesus jumped out to join defendant as Avalos drove after him.

Avalos said he saw defendant attacking the victim, who was on the 

ground. Avalos parked his car and joined in, kicking and punching 

the victim. Miguel and Jesus arrived and attacked the victim as 

well. Avalos struck the victim with his fist and noticed that his 

hands were “real slippery.” He saw blood on his hands and realized 

that the victim was getting stabbed. He did not have a weapon and 

did not see the others with weapons. When he saw the blood, he 

said, “let's go,” and they all jumped in the car and left.

As they fled, Avalos asked defendant if he had “stuck” the victim, 

and defendant said, “Yeah, I stuck him.” Defendant had blood on 

his shirt and his hand was bleeding. Defendant was handling a 

folding knife with a dark-colored handle. Defendant buried the 

knife, left his bloody shirt on a roof, and got rid of the victim's 

phone, which he had taken during the assault.

The next day, Avalos testified, he received a call from a detective, 

who told him that the police had a video of the incident. Avalos told 

defendant. Avalos went to the police station, where he looked at the 

video and identified everyone, including defendant. He did so 

because he thought what had happened “wasn’t right,” as he 

expected a beating, but not a stabbing, was going to occur, and he 

had learned that the victim was his wife’s cousin. He admitted that 

he lied to police at first about where the four went after the attack, 

but said that he otherwise told them the truth.

Avalos also testified that after he made a court appearance in the 

case, defendant walked past him, said, “You fucking snitch,” and 

attacked him.

Avalos reviewed the home surveillance video, which consisted of 

two different views, at trial and testified that it showed him, his car, 

and the other participants in the attack, including depicting 

defendant stabbing the victim.

This court has reviewed the video as well. In the view that shows 

the most of the incident, an individual who appears to be male can 

be seen in the distance running down a sidewalk of a residential 

Case 3:14-cv-03106-JD Document 18 Filed 02/17/16 Page 5 of 14
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

neighborhood and turning into the street, where he falls, as he is 

chased by another person. That person, who also appears to be 

male, catches up to him and attacks him repeatedly with both hands 

around his head and body. Cries can be heard. As this is taking 

place, a car comes into the frame and another person, apparently 

male, gets out and begins kicking and hitting the victim. Two other 

individuals, also apparently male, run over to the victim and attack 

him as well. Moments later, there are shouts. The four attackers 

appear to get into the car, a light-colored sedan, and drive away. 

People come out of houses and the victim gets up and walks toward 

a house, apparently seeking help; the victim appears to twice shout 

in a particular direction, “He stuck me.” A few moments later, a 

female in a red top of some kind approaches him from that direction. 

No one’s face can be seen distinctly in the video.

Testimony Regarding Defendant’s Arrest

Manuel Acevedo, with United States Customs Border Protection, 

testified that on July 28, 2010, he was informed by Mexican 

authorities that they were turning over an individual to United States 

authorities at the port of entry. Acevedo, who learned this 

individual was defendant, took custody of him and booked him into 

the San Diego County Jail based on a pending felony warrant.

. . . 

Serrano, 2013 WL 441960, at *1-5.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the 

basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication 

of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 

States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first 

prong applies both to questions of law and to mixed questions of law and fact, Williams v. Taylor, 

529 U.S. 362, 407-09 (2000), while the second prong applies to decisions based on factual 

determinations, Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court authority only if “the state court 

arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if 

the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially 

indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. A state court decision is an “unreasonable 

application of” Supreme Court authority if it correctly identifies the governing legal principle from 

Case 3:14-cv-03106-JD Document 18 Filed 02/17/16 Page 6 of 14
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

the Supreme Court's decisions but “unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the 

prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. The federal court on habeas review may not issue the writ “simply 

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision 

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, the 

application must be “objectively unreasonable” to support granting the writ. Id. at 409.

Under Section 2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual determination will not 

be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence 

presented in the state-court proceeding.” See Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340; see also Torres v. 

Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000). In conducting its analysis, the federal court must 

presume the correctness of the state court’s factual findings, and the petitioner bears the burden of 

rebutting that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

The state court decision to which § 2254(d) applies is the “last reasoned decision” of the 

state court. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991); Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 

1085, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2005). When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state court to 

consider the petitioner’s claims, the court looks to the last reasoned opinion. See Nunnemaker at 

801-06; Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000).

DISCUSSION

I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Serrano’s sole ground for federal habeas relief is that there was insufficient evidence to 

support aggravated assault. He argues that there was insufficient independent proof or 

corroboration of the incriminating testimony from Lorenzo Medina Avalos, who was his 

accomplice in the assault but testified against him.

Background

California Penal Code section 1111 provides:

A conviction can not be had upon the testimony of an accomplice 

unless it be corroborated by such other evidence as shall tend to 

connect the defendant with the commission of the offense; and the 

corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of 

the offense or the circumstances thereof.

An accomplice is hereby defined as one who is liable to prosecution 

Case 3:14-cv-03106-JD Document 18 Filed 02/17/16 Page 7 of 14
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

for the identical offense charged against the defendant on trial in the 

cause in which the testimony of the accomplice is given.

The jury was instructed that Avalos was an accomplice under state law. CT at 641; 

Reporter’s Transcript (“RT”) at 1017. The prosecutor argued in closing argument that:

“[C]ommon sense dictate[ed]” that [the jury] should view Avalos’s 

testimony “with caution” because of his criminal and gang 

background and the agreement he had entered into with the 

prosecution to limit his potential exposure in return for his 

testimony.

The prosecutor then argued that there was “substantial 

corroboration” of Avalos’s testimony. This included the home 

surveillance video that showed four individuals pursuing a man, 

including one individual who appeared to be consistent in 

appearance to the description of a young, light-skinned Hispanic 

male identified by Baer in her testimony, and a vehicle that was 

consistent in color and appearance with Avalos’s car, on the outside 

rear window of which a partial palm print of defendant was found. 

Also, another individual appearing in the video was consistent in 

appearance to Avalos and could be seen hitting the victim’s head. 

The video depicted an incident that was consistent with that 

described by Taylor, Lee, and Sarabia. Also, Sarabia’s account of 

the gang references made during the incident was consistent with 

Avalos’s account. There was also evidence that defendant had fled 

after the incident to Mexico. Finally, there was expert testimony 

regarding the gang motivation involved in defendant’s actions.

Serrano, 2013 WL 441960, at *6.

Legal Standard

The Due Process Clause “protects the accused against conviction except upon proof 

beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is 

charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). A state prisoner who alleges that the 

evidence in support of his state conviction cannot be fairly characterized as sufficient to have led a 

rational trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt therefore states a constitutional claim, 

see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 321 (1979), which, if proven, entitles him to federal habeas 

relief, see id. at 324. 

The Supreme Court has emphasized that “Jackson claims face a high bar in federal habeas 

proceedings . . . .” Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S. Ct. 2060, 2062, 2064 (2012) (per curiam) (finding 

that the Third Circuit “unduly impinged on the jury’s role as factfinder” and failed to apply the 

deferential standard of Jackson when it engaged in “fine-grained factual parsing” to find that the 

Case 3:14-cv-03106-JD Document 18 Filed 02/17/16 Page 8 of 14
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

evidence was insufficient to support petitioner’s conviction). A federal court reviewing 

collaterally a state court conviction does not determine whether it is satisfied that the evidence 

established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Payne v. Borg, 982 F.2d 335, 338 (9th Cir. 1992). 

The federal court “determines only whether, ‘after viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of 

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Payne, 982 F.2d at 338 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 

319). If no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, only 

then has there been a due process violation. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324; Payne, 982 F.2d at 338.

Discussion

The California Court of Appeal discussed applicable state law and denied this claim:

“To corroborate the testimony of an accomplice, the prosecution 

must present ‘independent evidence,’ that is, evidence that ‘tends to 

connect the defendant with the crime charged’ without aid or 

assistance from the accomplice's testimony. [Citation.] 

Corroborating evidence is sufficient if it tends to implicate the 

defendant and thus relates to some act or fact that is an element of 

the crime. [Citations.] ‘“[T]he corroborative evidence may be 

slight and entitled to little consideration when standing alone.” 

[Citation.]’” (People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal. 4th 491, 562–563.) 

“‘“Corroborating evidence ‘must tend to implicate the defendant and 

therefore must relate to some act or fact which is an element of the 

crime but it is not necessary that the corroborative evidence be 

sufficient in itself to establish every element of the offense 

charged.’”’” “‘“Corroborating evidence is sufficient if it 

substantiates enough of the accomplice’s testimony to establish his 

credibility.”’” (People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal. 4th 1060, 1128.) 

“‘“The requisite corroboration may be established entirely by 

circumstantial evidence.”’” (ibid), including “‘evidence of the 

defendant’s conduct or his declarations.’” (People v. Douglas

(1990) 50 Cal. 3d 468, 507.)

Accordingly, we are called upon to review the evidence independent 

of Avalos’s testimony to determine whether it meets the standard 

required by section 1111. In doing so, we apply the general rules 

that apply to a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence. That is, we 

“‘“must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the 

judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial 

evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of 

solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the 

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Citation.]’ 

[Citations.] ‘Substantial evidence includes circumstantial evidence 

and any reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence. 

[Citation.]’ [Citation.] We ‘“‘presume in support of the judgment 

the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from 

the evidence.’” [Citation.]’” (People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal. 4th 

Case 3:14-cv-03106-JD Document 18 Filed 02/17/16 Page 9 of 14
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

856, 942–943.)

Furthermore, “‘[c]onflicts and even testimony [that] is subject to 

justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it 

is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the 

credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon 

which a determination depends. [Citation.] We resolve neither 

credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts; we look for substantial 

evidence. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] A reversal for insufficient 

evidence ‘is unwarranted unless it appears “that upon no hypothesis 

whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support”’ the 

jury’s verdict.” (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.)

C. Aggravated Assault

Defendant argues there was “no sufficient and independent 

corroboration of [Avalos’s] incriminating testimony.” Specifically, 

he contends, citing People v. Bowley (1963) 59 Cal. 2d 855, that the 

home surveillance video “did not provide corroboration because it 

had no meaning other than what was read into it” by Avalos because 

it “showed nothing specific.” Baer’s testimony also “provided no 

corroboration” connecting defendant to the commission of the 

crime, as her “description of the stabber remained both generic and 

subjectively vague” and should be considered in the context of 

evidence that very young “pee wees” associated with gangs, 

Cregan’s testimony that none of the persons identified by Avalos 

were pee wees, and the “lighting, angle of view and subjective 

perceptions,” such as about age. Thus, defendant argues “while

Baer’s description of the stabber could be interpreted in a way which 

allowed for the possibility of [defendant’s] inclusion in the class of 

possible participants, it did not immediately and directly connect 

him to anything.” Although defendant concedes that among the four 

alleged attackers, defendant appeared to be the youngest, he asserts 

this fact is not significant because it presumes the attackers were as 

testified to by Avalos. As defendant correctly points out, evidence 

is not sufficient corroboration if its meaning can only be discerned 

by relying on the testimony of the accomplice.

Defendant similarly argues that the other corroborating evidence is 

not significant. As he correctly notes, “‘evidence independent of the 

testimony of the accomplice must tend to connect a defendant with 

the crime itself, and not simply with its perpetrators. It is not with 

the thief that the connection must be had but with the commission of 

the crime itself.’” (People v. Robinson (1964) 61 Cal. 2d 373, 400.) 

Defendant also correctly points out that a finding of fact must be an 

inference drawn from evidence rather than on mere speculation. 

(Reese v. Smith (1937) 9 Cal. 2d 324, 328, Gyerman v. United States

Lines Co. (1972) 7 Cal. 3d 488, 503.) He contends that Cregan’s 

testimony about defendant’s involvement with PSC, and his 

testimony about the gang affiliations of Jesus, Miguel, and Avalos, 

arguably create an inference that they were acquainted with each 

other, but do not connect defendant to the crime. He also contends 

that nothing but speculation can be drawn from defendant’s arrest a 

week later at the Mexican border.

Defendant’s arguments and contentions, while appropriate at trial, 

are unpersuasive under our substantial evidence standard of review 

Case 3:14-cv-03106-JD Document 18 Filed 02/17/16 Page 10 of 14
11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

because he ignores the inferences that can be reasonably inferred 

from each piece of evidence and their totality, independent of 

Avalos’s testimony. From the testimony of Cregan, Sarabia, Cortez, 

Baer, Taylor, and Lee, the surveillance home video, and the other 

evidence, such as the quick discovery by police of the video and 

Avalos’s car, the partial palm print of defendant found on that car, 

and the circumstances of defendant’s arrest, the jury could 

reasonably infer that defendant was in a gang with Avalos and two 

other members named Miguel and Jesus that claimed the area of the 

attack as its territory against its rival gang, that Cortez was a 

member of that rival gang and was attacked as he walked with his 

girlfriend, whose clothing displayed that gang’s colors, that the 

attack on Cortez was gang-related, that Avalos’s car was used in the 

attack and that defendant had been in or around the car, that the 

chief attacker repeatedly stabbed Cortez and was a young-looking, 

light-skinned Hispanic male whose physical appearance defendant 

does not challenge was consistent with his own, that three others 

participated in the attack and that one of them appeared to be Avalos 

(defendant does not challenge that the video depicted an attacker 

whose physical appearance was consistent with Avalos’s 

appearance), that police immediately obtained a video of the 

incident and began an investigation based on what was depicted that 

quickly led them to Avalos and his car, and that defendant left the 

area for Mexico very soon after the incident, turning up a week later 

in the custody of Mexican authorities.

Defendant does not effectively discount this evidence. He essentially 

argues that each piece of evidence could be interpreted in a way that 

does not necessarily incriminate him, but this is not the issue under 

our substantial evidence standard of review. As the People note, 

whether corroboration is “as compatible with innocence as it is with 

guilt is a question of weight for the trier of fact.” (People v. 

Gallardo (1953) 41 Cal. 2d 57, 63, disapproved on other grounds in

People v. Chapman (1959) 52 Cal. 2d 95; People v. Ruscoe (1976) 

54 Cal. App.3d 1005, 1012 [quoting Gallardo]; In re B.D. (2007) 

156 Cal. App.4th 975, 985 [quoting Ruscoe].) For example, the 

video and Baer’s testimony each provides some support, however 

slight, that defendant committed aggravated assault because it was 

not disputed that the subject person depicted or described had 

features consistent with defendant’s, and the events depicted or 

described were consistent with those described by Avalos.

Defendant argues in various ways that the evidence, while 

“consistent with an hypothesis of possible guilt . . . is not sufficient 

to provide corroboration” because it does not connect defendant 

directly to the crime. We disagree. It does so in several respects 

regarding both motive and actual commission of the aggravated 

assault. The evidence was consistent with, and corroborative of, 

Avalos’s account regarding defendant’s active gang participation, 

the gang-related circumstances of the crime, defendant's connection 

to Avalos and the car that appeared to have been used in the 

incident, defendant’s engagement in the crime as the chief attacker 

who stabbed Cortez, the police investigation that almost 

immediately led to Avalos, and defendant’s quick departure from 

the area. It could reasonably be interpreted by a jury as tending to 

implicate defendant in the aggravated assault, and substantiates 

Case 3:14-cv-03106-JD Document 18 Filed 02/17/16 Page 11 of 14
12

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

enough of Avalos’s testimony to establish his credibility.

We conclude, therefore, pursuant to People v. Rodrigues, supra, 8 

Cal. 4th at page 1128 and the other case law discussed herein, and 

based on our substantial evidence standard of review, that the

evidence independent of Avalos’s testimony satisfies the 

corroboration requirements of section 1111 regarding his testimony. 

Defendant’s appellate claim lacks merit.

Serrano, 2013 WL 441960, at *7-9.

Serrano has failed to demonstrate that the state court opinion was an unreasonable 

application of Supreme Court authority. In federal court “a conviction may be based on the 

uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.” United States v. Turner, 528 F.2d 143, 161 (9th Cir.

1975); United States v. Necoechea, 986 F.2d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1993) (“The uncorroborated 

testimony of an accomplice is sufficient to sustain a conviction unless it is incredible or 

insubstantial on its face”). California Penal Code section 1111, which requires corroboration of 

accomplice testimony, is a “state law requirement” which is “not required by the Constitution or 

federal law.” Laboa v. Calderon, 224 F.3d 972, 979 (9th Cir. 2000); Barco v. Tilton, 694 F. Supp.

2d 1122, 1136 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (noting that requirement under Cal. Penal Code § 1111 that 

accomplice testimony be corroborated “is a matter of state law, which does not implicate a federal 

constitutional right”); Jones v. Arnold, 593 Fed. Appx 674, 674-75 (9th Cir. 2015). Serrano’s 

claim that uncorroborated accomplice testimony was improperly used to support his conviction is 

based solely on a perceived error of state law and is therefore not cognizable on federal habeas 

review. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984) (“A federal court may not issue the writ on the 

basis of a perceived error of state law.”).

The testimony of Avalos was neither incredible nor insubstantial on its face; therefore, 

Serrano is only entitled to habeas corpus relief if the state court’s alleged violation of state law 

violated his right to fundamental fairness. Laboa, 224 F.3d at 979. Serrano has failed to show any 

such violation. The California Court of Appeal conducted a thorough and detailed analysis and 

found sufficient evidence that corroborated the accomplice testimony including the videotape 

evidence, eyewitness testimony, fingerprints, and gang motive. This determination was not 

unreasonable and does not constitute an arbitrary denial of a state law entitlement. Any rational 

trier of fact could have relied on the evidence presented to corroborate Avalos’s testimony. This 

Case 3:14-cv-03106-JD Document 18 Filed 02/17/16 Page 12 of 14
13

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

claim is denied. 

II. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners require a district court 

that issues an order denying a habeas petition to either grant or deny therein a certificate of 

appealability. See Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 11(a).

A judge shall grant a certificate of appealability “only if the applicant has made a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), and the 

certificate must indicate which issues satisfy this standard. Id. § 2253(c)(3). “Where a district 

court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) 

is straightforward: [t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district 

court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 

473, 484 (2000).

Here, petitioner has made no showing warranting a certificate and so none is granted.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. A Certificate 

of Appealability is DENIED. See Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 17, 2016

JAMES DONATO

United States District Judge

Case 3:14-cv-03106-JD Document 18 Filed 02/17/16 Page 13 of 14
14

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRANCISCO J. SERRANO,

Plaintiff,

v.

JEFF MACOMBER,

Defendant.

Case No. 14-cv-03106-JD 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. 

District Court, Northern District of California.

That on February 17, 2016, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by 

placing said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by 

depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery 

receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Francisco J. Serrano ID: AK7419

CSP-SAC C-2-226

P.O. Box 290066

Represa, CA 95671 

Dated: February 17, 2016

Susan Y. Soong

Clerk, United States District Court

By:________________________

LISA R. CLARK, Deputy Clerk to the 

Honorable JAMES DONATO

Case 3:14-cv-03106-JD Document 18 Filed 02/17/16 Page 14 of 14