Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-56130/USCOURTS-ca9-12-56130-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
CVS Pharmacy, Inc.
Appellee
Nykeya Kilby
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NYKEYA KILBY, individually and on

behalf of all others similarly

situated,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CVS PHARMACY, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 12-56130

D.C. No.

3:09-cv-02051-

MMA-KSC

KEMAH HENDERSON, individually

and on behalf of all others similarly

situated; TAQUONNA LAMPKINS,

individually and on behalf of all

others similarly situated; CAROLYN

SALAZAR, individually and on behalf

of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NA,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 13-56095

D.C. No.

2:11-cv-03428-

PSG-PLA

ORDER

Filed December 31, 2013

Before: Barry G. Silverman, Consuelo M. Callahan,

and N. Randy Smith, Circuit Judges.

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2 KILBY V. CVS

SUMMARY*

Certification to California Supreme Court 

The panel certified questions to the California Supreme

Court concerning the proper interpretation of Section 14 in

California Wage Order 4-2001 and California Wage Order 7-

2001.

The panel certified the following questions to the

California Supreme Court regarding Section 14(A) of

California Wage Order 4-2001 and California Wage Order 7-

2001:

1. Does the phrase “nature of the work” refer to an

individual task or duty that an employee performs

during the course of his or her workday, or should

courts construe “nature of the work” holistically

and evaluate the entire range of an employee’s

duties?

a. If the courts should construe “nature of the

work” holistically, should the courts consider

the entire range of an employee’s duties if

more than half of an employee’s time is spent

performing tasks that reasonablyallow the use

of a seat?

2. When determining whether the nature of the work

“reasonably permits” the use of a seat, should

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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KILBY V. CVS 3

courts consider any or all of the following: the

employer’s business judgment as to whether the

employee should stand, the physical layout of the

workplace, or the physical characteristics of the

employee?

3. If an employer has not provided any seat, does a

plaintiff need to prove what could constitute

“suitable seats” to show the employer has violated

Section 14(A)?

ORDER

These cases require us to decide, as a matter of California

law, the proper interpretation of Section 14 in California

Wage Order 4-2001 and California Wage Order 7-2001.1

Both sections address the circumstances under which an

employer has an obligation to provide an employee with a

seat. We respectfully request that the California Supreme

Court exercise its discretion to decide the certified questions

set forth below.

I. Questions Certified

The applicable Wage Orders require that an employer

provide “suitable seats” to employees “when the nature of the

work reasonably permits the use of seats.” IWC Wage Order

1 The language of Section 14 is identical in both Wage Orders. Wage

Order 4-2001 covers professional, technical, clerical, mechanical, and

similar occupations and is codified at California Code of Regulations,

Title 8, Section 11040. Wage Order 7-2001 covers the mercantile industry

and is codified at California Code of Regulations, Title 8, Section 11070.

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4 KILBY V. CVS

4-2001 § 14(A); IWC Wage Order 7-2001 § 14(A). Pursuant

to Rule 8.548 of the California Rules of Court, we request

that the California Supreme Court answer the following

questions regarding Section 14(A) of these Wage Orders:

1. Does the phrase “nature of the work” refer to an

individual task or duty that an employee performs

during the course of his or her workday, or should

courts construe “nature of the work” holistically

and evaluate the entire range of an employee’s

duties?

a. If the courts should construe “nature of the

work” holistically, should the courts consider

the entire range of an employee’s duties if

more than half of an employee’s time is spent

performing tasks that reasonablyallow the use

of a seat?

2. When determining whether the nature of the work

“reasonably permits” the use of a seat, should

courts consider any or all of the following: the

employer’s business judgment as to whether the

employee should stand, the physical layout of the

workplace, or the physical characteristics of the

employee?

3. If an employer has not provided any seat, does a

plaintiff need to prove what would constitute

“suitable seats” to show the employer has violated

Section 14(A)?

The California Supreme Court shall not be bound by our

phrasing of the questions. Cal. R. Ct. 8.548(f)(5). We agree

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KILBY V. CVS 5

to accept and follow the court’s decision. Cal. R. Ct.

8.548(b)(2).

II. Statement of Facts

Kilby v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., Case No. 12-56130

Nykeya Kilby (“Kilby”) worked for CVS Pharmacy, Inc.

(“CVS”) as a Clerk/Cashier for an eight-month period in

2008. Her primary responsibility was to operate a cash

register at the front of the store. This responsibility included

scanning merchandise, bagging merchandise, and processing

customer payments. Kilby spent about ninety percent of her

time operating the cash register. The rest of the time she

performed tasks that required her to move around the store,

such as gathering shopping carts and restocking displaycases.

CVS informed Kilby during her training that she would

be expected to stand for long periods of time. CVS has a

policy of not providing seats to Clerk/Cashiers because, in

CVS’s judgment, standing while operating the cash register

promotes excellent customer service. Pursuant to this policy,

CVS did not furnish Kilby with a seat while she operated the

cash register.

Kilby brought a putative class action in the U.S. District

Court for the Southern District of California on behalf of

current and former employees of CVS who held the position

of Clerk/Cashier. Kilby alleged a violation of California

Wage Order 7-2001 Section 14(A). The district court found

that the “‘nature of the work’ performed by an employee must

be considered in light of that individual’s entire range of

assigned duties” and that “courts should consider an

employer’s ‘business judgment’ when attempting to discern

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6 KILBY V. CVS

the nature of an employee’s work.” Using this interpretation

of Section 14, the district court denied class certification

because the duties of Clerk/Cashiers are inconsistent from

day to day, from shift to shift, and from employee to

employee. The district court also granted summary judgment

to CVS, because many of Kilby’s duties required her to stand,

CVS expects its Clerk/Cashiers to stand, and CVS informed

Kilby of that expectation.

Henderson v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, Case No. 13-56095

KemahHenderson,Taquonna Lampkins, Carolyn Salazar,

and Tamanna Dalton (together “Henderson”), all former

tellers employed by JPMorgan Chase Bank (“JPMorgan”),

brought a putative class action on behalf of current and

former tellers of JPMorgan. Henderson alleged a violation of

California Wage Order 4-2001 Section 14(A). Pursuant to its

company policy, JPMorgan does not provide its tellers with

seats.

All tellers spend a majority of their time at their teller

station accepting deposits, cashing checks, and handling

withdrawals. Tellers may also have additional duties, such as

escorting customers to safety deposit boxes, working the

drive-up teller window, or checking if ATMs are working

properly. In addition, some of JPMorgan’s banks have

physical differences in their layouts. The district court denied

class certification, because it interpreted Section 14 to mean

that the nature of a teller’s work could change based on the

tasks the teller performs while away from the teller station,

the bank at which the teller works, and which shift the teller

works.

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KILBY V. CVS 7

III. Explanation of Certification

This request satisfies the requirements of Rule 8.548(a) of

the California Rules of Court, because there is no controlling

California precedent explaining how Section 14 of California

Wage Order 4-2001 and Wage Order 7-2001 should be

interpreted, and this question will determine the issues on

appeal in these cases. The ambiguity of Section 14 and the

consequences of its meaning to the citizens of California lead

us to conclude that its interpretation should be left to the

California Supreme Court.

Section 14(A) requires that “[a]ll working employees

shall be provided with suitable seats when the nature of the

work reasonably permits the use of seats.” IWC Wage Order

4-2001 § 14; IWC Wage Order 7-2001 § 14. The Wage

Orders provide no definitions for “nature of the work,”

“reasonablypermits,” or “suitable seats.” Thus, we must start

with the text of Section 14 to find the meaning of these

phrases. See Martinez v. Combs, 231 P.3d 259, 268 (Cal.

2010).

Kilby and Henderson contend that Section 14 refers to

discrete tasks performed by employees. In their view, if an

employee is engaged in a task that can objectively be

performed while seated, the employer must provide the

employee with a suitable seat. Under this interpretation,

neither the employee’s other tasks nor the employer’s

business judgment would affect whether the nature of the

work reasonably permits the use of seats.

CVS and JPMorgan contend that the language of Section

14 requires courts to take a holistic approach. Under this

approach, courts should discern the nature of an employee’s

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8 KILBY V. CVS

work by considering the entire range of tasks the employee

actually performs in combination with the employee’s job

description, the layout of the workplace, the employer’s

business judgment concerning the employee’s job, and any

other factors the court deems relevant. An employer would

only be subject to Section 14(A) when all of these factors

taken together reasonably permit the use of a seat.

The district courts in both cases adopted a holistic

approach. The district court in Kilby v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc.

read Section 14(A) to require an inquiry into how an

employee spends his or her time during the workday. The

district court applied the holistic approach by asking whether

“the majority of an employee’s assigned duties must

physically be performed while standing[;]” if the answer is

yes, then “the ‘nature of the work’ requires standing.”2 The

district court in Henderson v. JPMorgan Chase Bank cited

Kilby v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc. in its interpretation of Section

14(A).

Even though the holistic approach and the individual task

approach would produce drastically different results, the text

of the regulation precludes neither. Because “the language

allows more than one reasonable construction, we may look

to such aids as the legislative history of the measure and

maxims of statutory construction.” Martinez, 231 P.3d at

2 Even if the proper interpretation of Section 14(A) requires a holistic

approach, Kilby and JPMorgan disagree with the “majority of an

employee’s assigned duties” application of that approach. Kilby contends

that an employee may be entitled to a seat even if all of the employee’s

tasks that reasonably permit the use of a seat consume less than a majority

of the employee’s time. JPMorgan contends that an employee may not be

entitled to a seat, even if tasks that reasonably permit the use of a seat

consume the majority of an employee’s time.

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KILBY V. CVS 9

268. “In cases of uncertain meaning, we may also consider

the consequences of a particular interpretation, including its

impact on public policy.” Id. (quoting Wells v. One2One

Learning Found., 141 P.3d 225, 236 (Cal. 2006)). “We are

hesitant, however, to speculate about which general maxims

of statutory construction the [California Supreme Court]

would use to interpret [these Wage Orders] and what result

that court would reach.” See Doyle v. City of Medford,

565 F.3d 536, 542 (9th Cir. 2009).

Section 14 could have a dramatic impact on public policy

in California as well as a direct impact on countless citizens

of that state, both as employers and employees. Even a

conservative estimate would put the potential penalties in

these cases in the tens of millions of dollars. See Cal. Lab.

Code § 2699(f)(2) (“If, at the time of the alleged violation,

the person employs one or more employees, the civil penalty

is one hundred dollars ($100) for each aggrieved employee

per pay period for the initial violation and two hundred

dollars ($200) for each aggrieved employee per pay period

for each subsequent violation.”); see also Home Depot

U.S.A., Inc. v. Super. Ct., 120 Cal. Rptr. 3d 166, 177 (Cal. Ct.

App. 2010) (finding California Labor Code § 2699(f)(2)

applies to Section 14 of Wage Order 7-2001); Bright v.

99cents Only Stores, 118 Cal. Rptr. 3d 723, 730 (Cal. Ct.

App. 2010) (same).

Such liability could be imposed upon a large number of

employers throughout California, depending on the

interpretation given to Section 14. Indeed, in addition to the

three employers now before this panel facing potential

penalties for violating Section 14, numerous actions have

been brought against other employers in California state

courts based on the same claim. See, e.g., Hall v. Rite Aid

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10 KILBY V. CVS

Corp., Case No. D062909 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013). Moreover,

were Section 14 given an interpretation that imposed liability

on these employers, it would also mean thousands of

California’s employees would be entitled to seats. These

“consequences of a particular interpretation,” Martinez,

231 P.3d at 268, would most appropriately be considered and

weighed by California’s highest court.

Furthermore, “the existence of parallel state and federal

proceedings that address the same legal question presents the

risk of inconsistent judgments as to the proper interpretation

of [the Wage Orders].” See Doyle, 565 F.3d at 544. Due to

the operation of the federal Class Action Fairness Act, many

cases of this type have been and likely will continue to be

removed to federal court and thus evade review by California

courts. A definitive decision from the California Supreme

Court would avert the potential uncertainty of federal courts

and state courts adopting different interpretations of Section

14 and would provide businesses in California with clear

guidance on how to comply with the Wage Orders.

In sum, we do not think it is appropriate to substitute our

judgment for that of the California Supreme Court in

interpreting California Wage Orders that could have farreaching effects on California’s citizens and businesses. 

Instead, “[i]n a case such as this one that raises a new and

substantial issue of state law in an arena that will have broad

application, the spirit of comity and federalism cause us to

seek certification.” Kremen v. Cohen, 325 F.3d 1035, 1038

(9th Cir. 2003).

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KILBY V. CVS 11

IV. Administrative Information

The title and number of the cases are as follows: Kilby v.

CVS Pharmacy, Inc., Case No. 12-56130 and Henderson v.

JPMorgan Chase Bank, Case No. 13-56095.

The name and address of counsel for the parties are as

follows:

Kilby v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., Case No. 12-56130

Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant Nykeya Kilby

Michael Rubin

Connie K. Chan

Altshuler Berzon LLP

177 Post Street, Suite 300

San Francisco, CA 94108

Kevin J. McInerney

McInerney & Jones

18124 Wedge Parkway, Suite 503

Reno, NV 89511

James F. Clapp

James T. Hannink

Zach P. Dostart

Dostart Clapp & Coveney, LLP

4370 La Jolla Village Drive, Suite 970

San Diego, CA 92122

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12 KILBY V. CVS

Matthew Righetti

Righetti Glugoski, PC

456 Montgomery Street, Suite 1400

San Francisco, CA 94104

Counsel for Defendant-Appellee CVS Pharmacy, Inc.

Timothy J. Long

Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP

400 Capitol Mall, Suite 3000

Sacramento, CA 95814

Michael D. Weil

Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP

The Orrick Building

405 Howard Street

San Francisco, CA 94105

Henderson v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, Case No. 13-56095

Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellants Henderson and

Lampkins

Kevin J. McInerney

18124 Wedge Parkway, 503

Reno, NV 89511

Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant Dalton

Mark A. Ozzello

Arias Ozzello & Gignac LLP

6701 Center Drive West, Suite 1400

Los Angeles, CA 90045

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KILBY V. CVS 13

Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant Salazar

Raul Perez

Capstone Law APC

1840 Century Park East, Suite 450

Los Angeles, CA 90067

Counsel for Defendant-Appellee JPMorgan Chase Bank

Carrie A. Gonell

John A. Hayashi

Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP

5 Park Plaza, Suite 1750

Irvine, CA 92614

Samuel S. Shaulson

101 Park Avenue

New York, NY 10178

As required by Rule 8.548(b)(1), we designate PlaintiffsAppellants Nykeya Kilby, Kemah Henderson, Taquonna

Lampkins, Carolyn Salazar, and Tamanna Dalton as

petitioners if the request is granted.

The Clerk of the Court is hereby directed to immediately

transmit to the Supreme Court of California, under official

seal of the Ninth Circuit, an original and ten copies of this

order and request for certification, a certificate of service on

the parties, and all relevant briefs and excerpts of record

pursuant to California Rules of Court 8.548(c)–(d). The

Clerk shall provide additional record materials if so requested

by the Supreme Court of California. Cal. R. Ct. 8.548(c).

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14 KILBY V. CVS

These cases are withdrawn from submission, and further

proceedings in this court are stayed pending final action by

the Supreme Court of California. The parties shall notify the

Clerk of this Court within seven days after the Court accepts

or rejects certification, and again within seven days if the

Court renders an opinion. The panel retains jurisdiction over

further proceedings.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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