Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-06-03139/USCOURTS-caDC-06-03139-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
David H. Safavian
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 8, 2008 Decided June 17, 2008

No. 06-3139

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

DAVID H. SAFAVIAN,

APPELLANT

Consolidated with

06-3169

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 05cr00370-01)

Lawrence S. Robbins argued the cause for appellant.

With him on the briefs were Donald J. Russell, Alice W. Yao,

and Daniel R. Walfish.

Nathaniel B. Edmonds, Trial Attorney, U.S. Department

of Justice, argued the cause and filed the brief for appellee.

Peter R. Zeidenberg and Roy W. McLeese, III, Assistant U.S.

Attorneys, entered appearances.

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1

He was acquitted of a second count of obstruction.

Before: RANDOLPH and ROGERS, Circuit Judges, and

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.

RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge: A jury convicted David H.

Safavian of three counts of concealing material facts and making

false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1) and one

count of obstructing justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1505.1

The prosecution arose from investigations into a golfing trip he

took with lobbyist Jack Abramoff in August 2002 while

Safavian was chief of staff of the General Services

Administration. We reverse on all counts.

I.

The evidence, viewed most favorably to the government,

showed as follows. Safavian and Abramoff met in 1994 when

Safavian joined a law firm in which Abramoff was a partner.

Abramoff became a mentor to Safavian there, and the two

remained close friends after Safavian left the firm. They

continued to play golf and racquetball together and saw each

other socially for drinks and dinner. And when Safavian was

looking to leave the congressman for whom he was working in

2002, Abramoff arranged for Safavian to interview at his new

firm, though he did not receive an offer.

Safavian instead became the General Services

Administration’s (GSA) deputy chief of staff in May 2002 and

was named chief of staff two months later. GSA is responsible

for procurement and property management on behalf of federal

agencies. Shortly after Safavian arrived at GSA, Abramoff

asked him for information about two GSA-controlled properties:

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2

It is unclear whether Abramoff had a client interested in

this property at the time. Safavian testified that “it’s my

understanding [Abramoff] didn’t have a client at that point, that

he was gathering information in hopes of potentially getting a

client in order to potentially bid.” But one of Abramoff’s

colleagues testified that “we were trying to ensure . . . that one

of our clients could be a part of the team that helped privatize

[the property],” and identified that client as “The Chitimatcha

tribe.”

the White Oak property in Silver Spring, Maryland, a 600-acre

former Naval facility; and the Old Post Office in Washington,

D.C.

Abramoff was interested in having a portion of the White

Oak property serve as a new location for the religious school his

children attended. As to the Old Post Office building, GSA was

considering redeveloping it and had been asking private parties

about that possibility. Abramoff thought opportunities for one

of his clients might develop.2

Safavian and Abramoff exchanged e-mails about these

properties between May and August 2002. Abramoff sent

messages to both Safavian’s work and home accounts,

sometimes e-mailing his work account only to inform him a

message was waiting on his home account. Safavian’s

assistance ranged from simply obtaining information that GSA

had already compiled for distribution to other parties, to more

involved support that Safavian could provide as a GSA insider.

For example, he supplied Abramoff with internal GSA

information, told Abramoff that he had “overruled” a GSA

employee who had “reservations,” reviewed and edited

Abramoff’s letters to GSA, and set up a meeting to discuss the

White Oak property. Nothing ever came of any of this and both

properties remained with GSA through Safavian’s tenure.

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While these discussions were ongoing, Abramoff invited

Safavian to join him on a five-day golfing trip to Scotland in

August 2002, to which Abramoff later added a weekend in

London. In addition to Abramoff and Safavian, the group

included Abramoff’s son and colleagues, a congressman and his

chief of staff, and the staff director for the House Administration

Committee. Abramoff arranged the schedule and

accommodations and chartered a plane for the group.

On July 25, 2002, Safavian requested an ethics opinion

from GSA’s general counsel about whether he could accept the

air transportation as a gift. His e-mail stated: 

I am in need of an ethics opinion. I (along with wto [sic]

members of Congress and a few Congressional staff)

have been invited by a friend and former colleague on a

trip to Scotland to play golf for four days. I will be

paying for all of my hotels, meals, and greens fees. The

issue is airfare.

The host of the trip is chartering a private jet to take the

eight of us from BWI to Scottland [sic] and back. He is

paying the cost for the aircraft regardless of whether I go

or not. In fact, none of the other guest [sic] will be

paying a proportional share of the aircraft costs. I need

to know how to treat this activity.

One other point of relevance: the host is a lawyer and

lobbyist, but one that has no business before GSA (he

does all of his work on Capitol Hill).

The GSA ethics officer responded in part:

This is in response to your inquiry on whether you can

accept a gift of free air transportation from a friend to

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attend an [sic] golf trip. You stated that a friend and

former colleague, Jack Abramhoff [sic], invited you,

along with several members of Congress and a few

Congressional staff, to Scotland to play golf for four

days. You stated that you will be paying for all of your

hotel expenses, meals and greens fees. You noted,

however, that your friend would be providing the air

transportation at no cost to you and the other guests

attending the event. You stated that your friend, who is

a lawyer and lobbyist with Greenberg and Traurig, is

chartering a private jet to take you and the other

participants from BWI to Scotland and back. You stated

that neither Mr. Abramhoff [sic] nor his firm does

business with or is seeking to do business with GSA.

Based upon the information you have provided, you may

accept the gift of free transportation from your friend.

The ethics opinion recited information not provided in

Safavian’s e-mail request, such as Abramoff’s name and firm,

so it appears that further communications must have occurred.

Notably, the response also suggests that Safavian said Abramoff

is not “seeking to do business with GSA.” At trial the

government presented no evidence that Safavian had ever told

this to an ethics officer and the district judge therefore struck the

“seeking to do business” language from the indictment.

After receiving the ethics advice, Safavian forwarded a

copy to Abramoff, indicating that he would go on the trip.

Abramoff sent Safavian an itinerary showing the travel

schedule, hotels, golfing times, a dinner and a lunch with the

notation “included in package,” and several other scheduled

meals. Safavian told Abramoff he wanted to pay for his share

of the trip. On the evening of the departure date – August 3,

2002 – Safavian gave Abramoff a check for $3,100, the amount

Abramoff said would cover the costs.

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The chartered plane landed the morning of August 4th at

a small airport adjacent to the St. Andrews Links Old Course,

where the group’s hotel also was located. Most of their five

days in Scotland were spent golfing. They played at several

different courses and smoked cigars and drank while playing.

Some, including Safavian, played golf more than once per day

at various courses. At the Old Course greens fees and caddy tips

for one person totaled $400. The group also ate and had drinks

together. Meals – some at the hotel, some elsewhere – ranged

from $20-$100 a person, and sometimes a round of drinks

reached $100. The trip also provided an opportunity for the

congressman and his staff to meet with Scottish politicians; a

dinner with the Conservative Party and a military parade were

scheduled one evening.

The group flew from Scotland to London on Thursday

the 9th, using the same chartered plane. Upon landing, they

were driven to their hotel, the Mandarin Oriental. They had

drinks in the hotel bar that night and some planned on having

dinner and drinks together Friday night. However, they spent

less time as a group in London than they did in Scotland. For

instance, one participant testified that he spent Friday with

friends who lived there. At least four group members departed

Saturday morning, while Safavian and Abramoff remained.

Abramoff had meetings scheduled in London, so Safavian had

some time to himself. On Sunday, Safavian and Abramoff flew

back to the United States on the chartered jet.

Both Safavian and another participant testified that they

believed the trip was prepaid. Safavian also paid for some costs

himself. He withdrew $500 from his bank account before

leaving and $150 on the trip’s second day. He tipped the

caddies once for two people and bought a few rounds of drinks.

Safavian also used his credit card to buy some gifts, a few

meals, and some other goods.

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In March 2003, acting on an anonymous tip, the GSA

Office of Inspector General (GSA-OIG) began investigating the

trip. GSA agent Gregory Rowe interviewed Safavian twice.

Rowe testified that Safavian told him that he “paid for the trip,”

including airfare, and that Abramoff did not have any business

with GSA. Safavian also provided Rowe with a copy of the

$3,100 check he had given to Abramoff on the day they had left

and a work attendance sheet showing that he took five days of

leave. Safavian did not mention the weekend in London or

Abramoff’s interest in the two GSA properties. Rowe closed the

investigation. Rowe did not review the ethics opinion Safavian

had received about the trip.

A year later, in March 2004, the Senate Committee on

Indian Affairs began investigating Abramoff. The Committee

asked Safavian to produce “all records reflecting, referring, or

relating to the 2002 Scotland golf trip.” Safavian’s letter

responded in part:

When the invitation was made, I was the chief of staff to

the U.S. General Services Administration (“GSA”). Mr.

Abramoff did not have any business before the agency

at that time. Prior to departure, I consulted the GSA

Office of General Counsel to obtain guidance on the

propriety of this trip. Counsel determined that I could

accept the value of the trip gratis; it did not meet the

definition of a ‘gift from a prohibited source’ under the

applicable regulations, nor was it considered a gift

because of my official position. Nevertheless, in the

exercise of discretion, I gave Mr. Abramoff a check for

the value of the trip prior to departure. In addition, I

took leave without pay to travel.

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Safavian also provided, among other things, his July 25 request

for the ethics opinion, the opinion, and a copy of the $3,100

check.

A grand jury indicted Safavian on October 5, 2005, on

three counts of “falsify[ing], conceal[ing] and cover[ing] up by

a trick, scheme, and device material facts” in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1) (Counts 2, 3, and 5) and two counts of

obstruction in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (Counts 1 and 4).

Counts 1 and 3 were based on Safavian’s interviews with GSA

inspector Rowe. Count 2 was based on Safavian’s request for

the ethics opinion. And Counts 4 and 5 related to his letter to

the Senate Committee. 

The trial began May 22, 2006, and included testimony

from Rowe, the ethics officer, the investigative counsel for the

Committee, and one of Abramoff’s colleagues who went on the

Scotland trip, among others. Safavian, testifying in his defense,

discussed the golf trip, his work at GSA, and his interactions

with Abramoff. Safavian testified that in his view, Abramoff

was “not doing business with GSA” because Abramoff “is not

a contractor, he is not exchanging property or services for

money, he does not have a business relationship with GSA.” As

to the golf trip, Safavian claimed that he thought it was a prepaid

package and that he was reimbursing Abramoff fully with the

$3,100 check. Cross examination covered a wide range of

subjects. With respect to the trip, for instance, the prosecutor

tried to show that Safavian must have known $3,100 was

inadequate and that Abramoff’s $3,100 estimate obviously

undercut the trip’s true value. In one exchange, the prosecutor

asked Safavian to compare greens fees at St. Andrews to the

Queens Harbor course he played in Maryland. When Safavian

responded, “That’s one of the top 20 golf courses in the country

. . . [but] I think they could have been in the ballpark,” the

prosecutor continued, “So you’re thinking the birthplace of golf,

USCA Case #06-3139 Document #1121949 Filed: 06/17/2008 Page 8 of 22
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where people fly overseas from all over the world to go golfing,

is going to charge you about what they cost over in Maryland?”

The prosecutor also asked, “back in 2002 . . . how much did you

think a cost of an airline ticket from Baltimore to Scotland

would have cost you if you had bought it yourself?” Safavian

continually maintained that he never saw and thus did not know

specific costs of items but that the $3,100 was reasonable for

him to believe.

On June 20, the jury convicted Safavian on Counts 1, 2,

3, and 5, and acquitted him on Count 4, the count charging

obstruction of the Senate Committee investigation. Count 1,

obstruction of the GSA-OIG investigation, was a general

verdict, based on the indictment’s charges that Safavian “falsely

stated . . . that [Abramoff] had no business with GSA” and “that

he had paid [Abramoff] for the total cost of the trip.” Count 2

was based on the exchange with the ethics officer. On a special

verdict form, the jury found that Safavian “concealed his

assistance to Mr. Abramoff in GSA-related activities”

(Specification A) and “falsely stated to the GSA ethics officer

that Mr. Abramoff did all his work on Capitol Hill”

(Specification C). Count 3 was based on Safavian’s statements

and omissions during his interviews with GSA-OIG agent Rowe.

The jury found that Safavian “concealed his assistance to Mr.

Abramoff in GSA-related activities” (Specification A). Count

5 was based on Safavian’s letter to the Committee. The jury

found that he “falsely stated in a letter to the Committee that Mr.

Abramoff did not have any business with GSA at the time Mr.

Safavian was invited on the trip to Scotland” (Specification C).

Safavian moved for a judgment of acquittal on all four

counts. See United States v. Safavian, 451 F. Supp. 2d 232, 238

(D.D.C. 2006). His motion set forth several arguments that he

renews on appeal. Safavian contended that Specification A of

Count 2 and Count 3 should be vacated “because he had no legal

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3

Section 1001(a) in its entirety provides:

Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever,

in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive,

legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the

United States, knowingly and willfully –

(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme,

or device a material fact;

(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent

duty to disclose the information concealed.” Id. at 240. He

argued that all the § 1001(a)(1) convictions should be vacated

because there was insufficient evidence that his statements were

not true as he meant them (i.e., that they were literally true). Id.

at 242. Also regarding § 1001(a)(1) he claimed that there was

insufficient evidence for the jury to determine that he had the

requisite specific intent to commit the false statement offenses.

Id. at 244. As to the obstruction conviction, Safavian argued

that his statements were fundamentally ambiguous. Id. at 248.

The district judge rejected all these arguments, as well as a

number of others not raised on appeal. 

The court sentenced Safavian to concurrent terms of 18

months imprisonment on each count, followed by two years of

supervised release. He was released on bond pending appeal

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b).

II.

We will begin with Safavian’s convictions on Counts 2

and 3. Each of these counts, and Count 5, charged violations of

18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1): a person “in any matter within the

jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the

Government of the United States,” commits an offense if he

“knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any

trick, scheme, or device a material fact.” Id.

3

 On Count 2,

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statement or representation; or

(3) makes or uses any false writing or document

knowing the same to contain any materially false,

fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry;

shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than

5 years or, if the offense involves international or

domestic terrorism (as defined in section 2331),

imprisoned not more than 8 years, or both. If the matter

relates to an offense under chapter 109A, 109B, 110, or

117, or section 1591, then the term of imprisonment

imposed under this section shall be not more than 8

years.

4

The jury also found, under what the parties term

specification C of Count 2, that Safavian violated § 1001(a)(1)

when he “falsely stated” that Abramoff “did all his work on

Capitol Hill.” 

which dealt with Safavian’s request for a GSA ethics opinion,

the jury found that he violated § 1001(a)(1) when he “concealed

his assistance to [Abramoff] in official GSA-related activities.”4

On Count 3, which dealt with the GSA Inspector General’s

investigation, the jury found that Safavian violated § 1001(a)(1)

when he “concealed his assistance to [Abramoff] in official

GSA-related activities,” the same concealment allegation

contained in Count 2.

 

Safavian raises several serious objections to his

convictions on the concealment charges, though we only reach

the question whether he had a duty to disclose his assistance. As

to Count 2, he points out that officers and employees of the

executive, judicial, and legislative branches regularly seek

advice from their respective ethics committees. They are

encouraged to do so. The value of the advice they receive

depends upon the accuracy and fullness of the information they

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5

Disclosing all relevant circumstances merely offers the

employee protection from disciplinary action: “Disciplinary

action for violating this part or any supplemental agency

regulations will not be taken against an employee who has

engaged in conduct in good faith reliance upon the advice of an

agency ethics official, provided that the employee, in seeking

such advice, has made full disclosure of all relevant

circumstances.” 5 C.F.R. § 2635.107(b).

6

See, e.g., United States v. Blackley, 167 F.3d 543, 550

(D.C. Cir. 1999); United States v. Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518, 526

(11th Cir. 1996); United States v. Irwin, 654 F.2d 671, 679 (10th

Cir. 1981).

provide. At GSA, as elsewhere in the federal government, the

officer or employee making the inquiry may or may not follow

the advice of the ethics committee. That he did not follow that

advice does not in itself constitute an ethical transgression. The

prosecutors in this case are mistaken when they write that the

GSA “ethics opinion . . . permitted [Safavian] to engage in

behavior that would be prohibited if he had disclosed all relevant

information.” Gov’t Br. 28–29. The ethics opinion did no such

thing. It was not up to the GSA ethics officers to permit or

forbid; their function was to offer advice. It is not apparent how

this voluntary system, replicated throughout the government,

imposes a duty on those seeking ethical advice to disclose – in

the government’s words – “all relevant information” upon pain

of prosecution for violating § 1001(a)(1).5

 As Safavian argues

and as the government agrees, there must be a legal duty to

disclose in order for there to be a concealment offense in

violation of § 1001(a)(1),6

 yet the government failed to identify

a legal disclosure duty except by reference to vague standards of

conduct for government employees.

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These standards are formulated as fourteen “general

principles” that executive branch “employees shall apply . . . in

determining whether their conduct is proper.” 5 C.F.R.

§ 2635.101(b). They range from exceedingly vague –

“Employees shall put forth honest effort in the performance of

their duties,” § 2635.101(b)(5) – to somewhat more descriptive

– “Employees shall not use public office for private gain.”

§ 2635.101(b)(7). Only one has anything to do with disclosure.

See § 2635.101(b)(11) (“Employees shall disclose waste, fraud,

abuse, and corruption to appropriate authorities.”). These

strictures are of no more help to the government’s argument than

the regulation on seeking ethics advice. Their relationship to

Safavian’s duty under § 1001(a)(1) is tenuous at best. If an

employee violates a standard of conduct, he may be subject to

disciplinary action. § 2635.106(a). We cannot see how this

translates into criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1)

whenever someone seeking ethical advice or being interviewed

by a GSA investigator omits “relevant information.”

Concealment cases in this circuit and others have found

a duty to disclose material facts on the basis of specific

requirements for disclosure of specific information. See, e.g.,

United States v. Moore, 446 F.3d 671, 678 (7th Cir. 2006);

United States v. Kanchanalak, 192 F.3d 1037, 1046 (D.C. Cir.

1999); Blackley, 167 F.3d at 550 (D.C. Cir. 1999); United States

v. Dale, 140 F.3d 1054, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Calhoon, 97

F.3d at 526. There is good reason for demanding such

specificity: to comply with Fifth Amendment due process, the

defendant must have “fair notice . . . of what conduct is

forbidden. . . . [T]his ‘fair warning’ requirement prohibits

application of a criminal statute to a defendant unless it was

reasonably clear at the time of the alleged action that

defendants’ actions were criminal.” Kanchanalak, 192 F.3d at

1046 (citing United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997)).

The ethical principles give no indication of the particular facts

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7

The government cites United States v. Moore, 446 F.3d

671 (7th Cir. 2006), and United States v. Cisneros, 26 F. Supp.

2d 25 (D.D.C. 1998), as supporting its position. Gov’t Br. 24.

However, the jury instructions in Moore stated, “The duty to

disclose a particular fact to the executive branch of the federal

government or its agent arises from requirements in federal

statutes, regulations, or government forms.” 446 F.3d at 680;

see also id. at 678. In Cisneros, the questions posed to the

defendant by the FBI agent were rooted in a government form

that the defendant had filled out. See 26 F. Supp. 2d at 32.

or information an executive employee must disclose. Nor do

they suggest that they have any bearing on conduct during a

GSA investigation or a request for an ethics opinion. 

The government also invoked, in support of the verdict

on the concealment charges in Count 2 and Count 3, “the

principle that once one begins speaking when seeking

government action or in response to questioning, one must

disclose all relevant facts.” Gov’t Br. 23. The government cites

no regulation or form or statute to this effect and the defense

maintains that no such general principle exists. Attorneys

commonly advise their clients to answer questions truthfully but

not to volunteer information. Are we to suppose that once the

client starts answering a government agent’s questions, in a

deposition or during an investigation, the client must disregard

his attorney’s advice or risk prosecution under § 1001(a)(1)?

The government essentially asks us to hold that once an

individual starts talking, he cannot stop. We do not think § 1001

demands that individuals choose between saying everything and

saying nothing. No case stands for that proposition.7

 We

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8

The district court’s instructions permitted the jury to

find Safavian guilty of violating § 1001(a)(1) if he committed

“any knowing omission designed to deceive others by

preventing or delaying the discovery of information.” As a

result, Safavian’s concealment convictions on Counts 2 and 3

could have rested simply on his nondisclosure of material facts.

Yet concealment must be accomplished in a particular way: by

a “trick, scheme, or device.” United States v. Woodward, 469

U.S. 105, 108 (1985) (per curiam), so holds, as does United

States v. London, 550 F.2d 206, 213 (5th Cir. 1977), which the

Supreme Court cited with approval. 469 U.S. at 108 n.5.

Because Safavian’s concealment convictions must be reversed

for lack of a duty to disclose, we place our decision on that

ground and do not address whether, as the government argues,

the erroneous jury instruction was harmless.

9

Safavian argues that his statements should not have

been submitted to the jury because they were fundamentally

ambiguous and thus the jurors “could only guess what he may

have meant.” Safavian Br. 33. Assuming arguendo that the

doctrine of fundamental ambiguity applies to false statements

such as these, it was well within the province of the jury to

determine what Safavian meant. Likewise, we reject Safavian’s

argument that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to

conclude that the statements were false as Safavian intended

them. See, e.g., United States v. Milton, 8 F.3d 39, 45–46 (D.C.

therefore conclude that Safavian had no legal duty to disclose

and that his concealment convictions cannot stand.8

 

III.

The remaining charges are the alleged false statements

Safavian made, as specified in Count 1 (obstruction of justice,

18 U.S.C. § 1505) and Counts 2 and 5 (§ 1001(a)(1)).9 Each of

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16

Cir. 1993).

10The false statement charge in Count 2 was worded a bit

differently than the charge in Counts 1 and 5: it alleged that

Safavian falsely told the GSA ethics official that Abramoff “did

all his work on Capitol Hill.” Safavian’s written request for an

ethics opinion did state that the “host” of the golfing trip to

Scotland, “a friend and former colleague,” “is a lawyer and

lobbyist, but one that has no business before GSA (he does all

of his work on Capitol Hill).” The GSA ethics officer, in

rendering the opinion, took this as meaning that “neither Mr.

Abramoff nor his firm does business” with GSA. That of course

was the material question. If, for instance, it turned out that

Abramoff transacted business with other parts of the Executive

Branch and not just on Capitol Hill, Safavian’s parenthetical

statement would have been inaccurate, but we cannot see how

the inaccuracy would have been material. Safavian maintained

that he meant the same thing when he wrote to the ethics officer

that Abramoff had no business before GSA and when he implied

that Abramoff did no work with or at GSA.

the statements was to the effect that Abramoff had no business

with GSA at the time of the golf trip.10 In defense of these

charges, Safavian maintained that when he made the statements

he intended the meaning common to government contracts

professionals – that is, someone who does not have a contract

with GSA is not doing business or working with GSA. Safavian

contended that his statements were truthful because Abramoff

never secured any GSA contract. With respect to the White Oak

property, the headmaster of the school never requested a lease

and GSA never transferred the property to the school. As to the

Old Post Office, GSA issued no proposal during the tenure of

the GSA Administrator for whom Safavian worked.

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We agree with Safavian that the district court abused its

discretion in excluding favorable expert testimony on how

government contracting professionals view having business or

working with GSA. See United States v. Washington, 106 F.3d

983, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Federal Rule of Evidence 702

permits an expert to “assist the trier of fact to understand the

evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” The court may refuse

to admit testimony whose “probative value is substantially

outweighed by the danger of . . . confusion of the issues[] or

misleading the jury.” FED. R. EVID. 403. Safavian’s expert

would have testified that an individual is not doing business with

GSA until a contract is awarded and that getting information

from GSA is simply that, getting information. Defense counsel

offered this testimony to show that Safavian’s definition “isn’t

made up out of whole cloth.” The testimony would have

bolstered Safavian’s contention that, as a government contracts

professional himself, he had this meaning in mind when he

communicated with the GSA ethics official, Rowe, and with the

Senate Committee. 

In excluding this testimony, the district court reasoned

that it would not help the jury and would be confusing. The

court asserted that the meaning of “business” “is within the

common parlance of the jury,” and thus “the layman’s definition

of these terms are the best guide for the jury. There’s no need

for expert testimony.” This ruling usurped the jury’s role by

deciding that the lay meaning of “business” is what Safavian

meant to convey. The court at one point recognized that “[w]hat

was in the defendant’s mind is at issue in this case.” But

excluding the expert testimony effectively preempted the jury’s

conclusion on this issue.

In support of the district court’s ruling the government

takes inconsistent positions. On the one hand, it tells us that

“the meaning of ‘business’ and ‘work’ were properly left for the

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11It is unclear from the transcript whether the district

court also relied on this ground. The court cited and discussed

cases precluding experts from “offering an impermissible legal

conclusion” but later stated that here “we have the converse or

the inverse of that situation” because business and work “are not

defined terms.”

12Not until his reply brief did Safavian argue that under

§ 1001(a)(1) a false statement alone cannot constitute a “trick,

scheme, or device.” While he is doubtless correct on the law,

see Woodward, 469 U.S. at 108 n.4 (1985); United States v. St.

Michael’s Credit Union, 880 F.2d 579, 589-90 (1st Cir. 1989);

jury’s determination in assessing Safavian’s criminal intent.”

Gov’t Br. 41. If the meanings of these terms were appropriate

“for the jury’s determination” – as we believe they were – then

they are not legal terms to be defined by the court. Yet the

government also claims that the district court’s exclusion of the

expert testimony was proper because the expert would have

opined on the meaning of specific legal terms.11 Gov’t Br.

47–48. The phrases “does business” and “seeks to do business”

do appear in the regulations regarding gifts from prohibited

sources. See 5 C.F.R. § 2635.203. But whether Abramoff was

or was not a prohibited source misses the point. The question

for the jury was what Safavian meant when he communicated

with government officials. The expert would not have

expounded on how § 2635.203 operates or should operate, but

rather on the common usage of the terms in the government

contracts industry. 

We do not find the exclusion of the expert’s testimony

harmless. With respect to Counts 2 and 5, which charged

violations of § 1001(a)(1), literal truth would have been a

complete defense. See Milton v. United States, 8 F.3d 39, 45

(D.C. Cir. 1993).12 If Safavian intended having business or

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London, 550 F.2d at 212; United States v. Diogo, 320 F.2d 898,

902 (2d Cir. 1963), his argument comes too late and was

apparently not made in his motion for judgment of acquittal.

See, e.g., Students Against Genocide v. Dep’t of State, 257 F.3d

828, 835 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wash.

v. EPA, 86 F.3d 1214, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1996). (Safavian was not

charged with violating § 1001(a)(2), the subsection proscribing

the making of “any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent

statement or representation” within the jurisdiction of the three

branches of government. Nor was he charged with violating

§ 1001(a)(3), under which it is a criminal offense to make or use

“any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any

materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry.”) 

working with GSA to have the meaning used by government

contract professionals, then he did not knowingly and willfully

make a false statement to the GSA ethics officer (Count 2) or the

Senate Committee (Count 5). See, e.g., United States v.

Gahagan, 881 F.2d 1380, 1384 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v.

Anderson, 579 F.2d 455, 460 (8th Cir. 1978). The jury’s duty

was to decide which meaning Safavian intended – the

contracting meaning or the “lay” meaning – “by considering the

term in context, taking into account the setting in which it

appeared and the purpose for which it was used.” Milton, 8 F.3d

at 45. Evidence showed that Safavian had substantial

experience in the field of government contracts. The expert’s

testimony would have supplied crucial context and support for

Safavian’s proposed meaning. This testimony would have been

especially important in light of the fact that two government

witnesses, though not appearing as experts, testified regarding

their own interpretations of the phrase “doing business.”

Excluding the expert’s testimony thus was not harmless. 

Count 1, the obstruction of justice charge, presents a

closer question. The jury rendered a general verdict of guilty on

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13The government, in arguing generally that exclusion of

the expert’s testimony was harmless because the jury learned of

Safavian’s “understanding of the terms ‘business’ and ‘work’,”

does not direct its contentions specifically to Count 1. Gov’t Br.

50.

that count. The indictment charged that Safavian obstructed

GSA’s investigation in two ways: by “falsely stat[ing] in

substance and in part that [Abramoff] had no business with

GSA” and by stating “in substance that he had paid [Abramoff]

for the total cost of the trip . . ..” The excluded testimony related

to only one of these allegations, but reversal is still required

unless the court’s ruling constituted harmless error. See Griffin

v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 59 (1991); Yates v. United States,

354 U.S. 298 (1957). One is guilty of obstruction if he

“corruptly . . . influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to

influence, obstruct, or impede” an investigation. 18 U.S.C.

§ 1505. Section 1515 defines “corruptly” as “acting with an

improper purpose . . . including making a false or misleading

statement, or withholding, [or] concealing” information. Even

a literally true statement may be misleading and so, unlike

§ 1001(a)(1), literal truth may not be a complete defense to

obstruction. See United States v. Browning, 630 F.2d 694, 699

(10th Cir. 1980). Even so, if Safavian’s expert witness had

convinced the jury of the truth of his statements, this would have

gone at least part of the way to convincing the jury that he had

not obstructed justice. We therefore believe that excluding the

expert’s testimony had “a substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury’s verdict” on Count 1,

particularly since the audience for his statement about

Abramoff’s lack of “business” at GSA was a GSA official

presumably versed in the technical meaning of the term.

Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946).13

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14Though we have already ordered a new trial on Count

1, we address this issue to determine whether the government

may include this charge if it chooses to retry Safavian for

obstruction.

IV.

Safavian claims that there was insufficient evidence to

support the jury’s verdict on Count 1’s alternative allegation that

he obstructed justice by telling GSA investigator Rowe “in

substance” that he paid for the full cost of the trip including

airfare.14 Safavian’s argument is that the evidence shows only

that he said he paid the amount Abramoff specified, not that he

paid the total cost of the trip. At trial, however, Safavian

equated the two, admitting that he “said that [his] $3,100

covered [his] full share.” Safavian also conceded that he “told

Special Agent Rowe that [he] paid for all the costs associated

with the trip.” There was more than enough evidence that

Safavian caused Rowe to believe that he had paid for all his

costs. 

There was also sufficient evidence for the jury to

conclude that Safavian knew the true cost of his share was

greater than $3,100. For instance, another trip participant

testified at length about the group’s activities. He stated that the

total cost for a round of golf on the St. Andrews Old Course was

$400 per person and that Safavian played golf at least six times

(though did not specify on which of the courses). He also

discussed the expensive meals and drinks the group had. There

was additional evidence of specific costs for certain members of

the group: testimony indicated that the two nights in the London

Mandarin Oriental hotel cost $1,000 and that the commercial

value of a return flight was $850 or $900. The government also

introduced invoices showing costs of the hotel in Scotland. All

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15Safavian told the Senate Committee that he did not pay for

the flight, and the jury acquitted him of obstructing that

investigation.

of this provides circumstantial evidence of Safavian’s

knowledge. 

Safavian responds that there was no evidence that his

costs were comparable to the other travelers or that he ever saw

the invoices or knew what the costs were. But that only shows

that he did not know the precise cost of his share. There was

sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Safavian knew

$3,100 was too low but that he told Rowe $3,100 was enough.

The jury did not need to address Safavian’s knowledge of

exactly how low $3,100 was. Moreover, the jury could have

credited Rowe’s testimony that Safavian said he paid for his

share of the cost of the flight, which is conceded to be false.15

* * * 

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse Safavian’s

convictions on Counts 2A and 3, and vacate his convictions on

Counts 1, 2C, and 5 and remand for a new trial.

So ordered.

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