Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-14-14779/USCOURTS-ca11-14-14779-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Baldwin County Public Schools
Appellee
Beverly J. Bolton
Appellant

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14-14779

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cv-00548-C

BEVERLY J. BOLTON, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

 versus

BALDWIN COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 

 Defendant-Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Alabama

________________________

(September 24, 2015)

Before MARTIN, ANDERSON, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.

USCA11 Case: 14-14779 Date Filed: 09/24/2015 Page: 1 of 8
2

PER CURIAM: 

Beverly Bolton, an African American woman proceeding pro se, appeals the 

grant of summary judgment in favor of Baldwin County Board of Education 

(“Board”) on her claims of race discrimination and retaliation, in violation of 42 

U.S.C. § 2000e-2, 3 (“Title VII”) and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. No reversible error has 

been shown; we affirm.

Briefly stated, Bolton’s claims arise from the Board’s refusal to hire Bolton 

as a full-time teacher. Following an interview, the school principal recommended 

Bolton for an open special-education teaching position at Baldwin County High 

School. Shortly thereafter, Bolton attended a new hire orientation, received keys to 

her classroom, and began reporting to work.

Under the Board’s standard practice -- of which Bolton was made aware -- a 

teacher is not employed formally until her hiring is approved by the Board at a 

public meeting. In addition, teachers who have not yet been hired formally by the 

Board are considered substitute teachers and are compensated accordingly. 

As part of the Board’s approval process, the Board’s Human Resources 

Office began working to verify Bolton’s teaching credentials. Bolton was not yet 

certified to teach in Alabama; she was instructed and required to register for two 

state certification tests: a basic skills test and Praxis II. Bolton was told she needed 

USCA11 Case: 14-14779 Date Filed: 09/24/2015 Page: 2 of 8
3

to register for the next administration of each test before the Board’s next meeting 

so that the Board could approve formally Bolton’s hiring. Although Bolton 

registered for the state-required certification tests, she failed to register for the next 

available testing date, as instructed.

The Human Resources Office also concluded that Bolton failed to provide 

proper professional references in support of her employment application. All 

applicants were required to submit professional references, defined as references 

from “previous supervisors or coworkers.” On her application, however, Bolton 

identified her references only as “friends.” 

As a result of Bolton’s failure to register properly for the state-required 

certification tests and her failure to provide proper professional references, the 

Human Resources Office was unable to process Bolton’s application in time for 

the Board’s next meeting. The Human Resources Office, together with the school 

principal, then decided to cancel Bolton’s recommendation for employment. 

Bolton received substitute teacher pay for the days she worked. 

Bolton filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission (“EEOC”), alleging race discrimination. The EEOC dismissed the 

complaint and issued Bolton a right-to-sue letter. 

Bolton then filed this civil action against the Board, alleging both race 

discrimination and retaliation. The district court concluded that Bolton failed to 

USCA11 Case: 14-14779 Date Filed: 09/24/2015 Page: 3 of 8
4

establish a prima facie case of race discrimination because she failed to show that 

she was treated differently than a similarly-situated person outside her protected 

class. The district court also determined that the Board had identified legitimate, 

non-discriminatory reasons for refusing to hire Bolton full-time and that Bolton 

failed to show that the Board’s reasons were pretexts for race discrimination. The 

district court next concluded that Bolton failed to establish a prima facie case of 

retaliation because she had engaged in no statutorily-protected activity. 

We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment, 

“construing all facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the 

nonmoving party.” Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283, 1291-92 (11th 

Cir. 2012). We construe liberally pro se pleadings. Tannenbaum v. United States, 

148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). 

I.

To establish a prima facie case of race discrimination under both Title VII 

and section 1981,1 a plaintiff must prove (1) that she belongs to a protected class; 

(2) that she suffered an adverse employment action; (3) that the employer treated 

 1 “The elements of a claim of race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 are also the same as a 

Title VII disparate treatment claim in the employment context.” Rice-Lamar v. City of Fort 

Lauderdale, 232 F.3d 836, 843 n.11 (11th Cir. 2000). 

USCA11 Case: 14-14779 Date Filed: 09/24/2015 Page: 4 of 8
5

similarly-situated people outside her protected class more favorably; and (4) that 

she was qualified to do the job. McCann v. Tillman, 526 F.3d 1370, 1373 (11th 

Cir. 2008). To satisfy this initial burden, a plaintiff must show she and the nonminority employees, whom plaintiff alleges were treated more favorably, are 

similarly situated in all pertinent respects. Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 

(11th Cir. 1997). Summary judgment is proper if a plaintiff fails to show the 

existence of a similarly-situated employee and no other evidence of discrimination 

exists. Id. 

Bolton has failed to identify a similarly-situated applicant that was treated 

more favorably. First, the Board imposed the same procedural requirements on 

Bolton as it did on other non-minority teacher applicants. The record shows that 

Melissa Miller,2

a white applicant, was required -- like Bolton -- to register for the 

next administration of required certification tests before the Board’s next public 

meeting.3

 Miller was also required to submit professional references in support of 

her application. And Miller was entitled only to substitute teacher pay until she 

was hired formally by the Board. 

 2 Bolton raises no challenge to the district court’s determination that Carolina Smoak was no 

valid comparator. Bolton has abandoned this argument on appeal. See Timson v. Sampson, 518 

F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). 

3 Bolton provides no record evidence supporting her contention that Miller needed to take and 

was not required to register for the basic skills test. Although we must construe the evidence in 

the light most favorable to Bolton, mere conclusions and unsupported factual allegations raise no 

genuine issue of fact sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. See Ellis v. England, 

432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2005). 

USCA11 Case: 14-14779 Date Filed: 09/24/2015 Page: 5 of 8
6

Unlike Bolton, however, Miller complied in full with the Board’s 

application instructions and requirements. As a result, Miller’s employment 

application was submitted in time for the Board’s next meeting, during which 

Miller’s full-time employment was approved. Because Bolton failed to follow 

instructions and to satisfy the Board’s application requirements, Miller and Bolton 

are not similar in all pertinent respects; and Miller is no valid comparator. See 

Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1562. Bolton failed to identify a valid comparator and has 

presented no other evidence of discrimination and, thus, has failed to establish a 

prima facie case of discrimination.4

 The district court committed no error in 

entering summary judgment on Bolton’s race discrimination claim. 

II.

About Bolton’s retaliation claim, employers are barred under both Title VII 

and section 1981 from retaliating against an employee or an applicant for 

employment who engages in statutorily-protected activity. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e3(a); Chapter 7 Tr. v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 683 F.3d 1249, 1257-58 (11th Cir. 

 4 Moreover, even if we assume -- without deciding -- that Bolton could establish a prima facie

case of race discrimination, Bolton has raised no challenge to the district court’s alternative 

independent ruling that Bolton failed to show that the Board’s legitimate, non-discriminatory 

reasons -- including failure to follow instructions -- for not hiring Bolton were a pretext for race 

discrimination. Bolton has abandoned that argument, see Timson, 518 F.3d at 874, and can show 

no reversible error. 

USCA11 Case: 14-14779 Date Filed: 09/24/2015 Page: 6 of 8
7

2012). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that she 

engaged in a statutorily-protected activity and suffered an adverse employment 

action that was causally related to the protected activity. Id. at 1258. Protected 

activities include the filing of a formal complaint, the voicing informally of a 

complaint to superiors, or the use of an employer’s internal grievance procedure to 

report alleged discrimination. See Rollins v. Fla. Dep’t of Law Enf’t, 868 F.2d 

397, 400 (11th Cir. 1989). 

Bolton has failed to demonstrate that she engaged in a statutorily-protected 

activity. Bolton contends that the Board retaliated against her because she failed to 

register properly for the state-required certification tests and retaliated based on 

unspecified statements from Bolton’s former employer. Neither of these acts 

shows or constitutes statutorily-protected activity. And nothing evidences that 

Bolton complained about the Board’s alleged discrimination -- either formally or 

informally -- before Bolton’s recommendation for employment was cancelled.5

 

Because Bolton has failed to show that she engaged in a statutorily-protected 

activity or that the Board’s failure to hire her full-time was causally related to a 

 5 Although Bolton filed ultimately a complaint of race discrimination with the EEOC, she did so 

after the Board had already refused to hire her as a full-time teacher. And Bolton makes no 

allegations that she suffered an adverse employment action after, or as a result of, her filing the 

EEOC complaint.

USCA11 Case: 14-14779 Date Filed: 09/24/2015 Page: 7 of 8
8

statutorily-protected activity, she has failed to establish a prima facie case of 

retaliation. Summary judgment was proper.

AFFIRMED. 

USCA11 Case: 14-14779 Date Filed: 09/24/2015 Page: 8 of 8