Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-2_04-cv-00449/USCOURTS-alsd-2_04-cv-00449-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Selma Housing Development Corporation
Plaintiff
The Selma Housing Authority
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

SELMA HOUSING DEVELOPMENT )

CORPORATION, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 04-0449-WS-B

 )

THE SELMA HOUSING AUTHORITY, )

 )

Defendant. )

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on defendant Selma Housing Authority’s Motion to Award

Attorney’s Fees (doc. 53) and Motion to Tax or Re-Tax Costs (doc. 55). Both Motions have been

briefed and are now ripe for disposition.

I. Background.

This action arose from plaintiff Selma Housing Development Corporation’s (“SHDC”)

dissatisfaction with defendant Selma Housing Authority’s (“SHA”) administration of the Section 8

publicly assisted housing program in Selma, Alabama, as well as with SHA’s performance under a

property management agreement with SHDC. SHDC brought five causes of action against SHA,

including three claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged due process violations, as well as state-law

claims for breach of contract and fraud. The § 1983 causes of action were grounded in theories that

SHA had engaged in improper rent reasonableness determinations, had wrongfully cancelled housing

assistance payment contracts (“HAP contracts”) through which SHDC received payment for Section 8

tenants, and had wrongfully increased utility allowances.

On August 16, 2005, the undersigned entered an Order (doc. 49) granting SHA’s Motion for

Summary Judgment. Count I, the § 1983 claim premised on rent reasonableness issues, was dismissed

based on SHDC’s concession that it was time-barred. Count II, the § 1983 claim alleging wrongful

non-renewal of HAP contracts, was dismissed because (a) SHDC had no protected property interest

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in renewal of HAP contracts; (b) SHDC made an insufficient showing that such a property right was

created by estoppel; and (c) even if a property right existed, SHDC failed to show that the procedures

afforded it by SHA were constitutionally inadequate, inasmuch as SHDC was afforded both notice and

an opportunity to be heard as to the nonrenewal decision. Count III, the § 1983 claim alleging

improper adjustment of utility allowances, was rejected because SHDC did not demonstrate a

protectable property interest in maintaining utility allowances at a fixed level.

Similar conclusions were reached as to the two state-law causes of action. The Court

dismissed Count IV, which alleged that SHA had breached a management contract with SHDC,

because certain aspects of the claim were untimely and SHDC failed to establish that the complained-of

conduct breached the contract. Finally, as for Count V, alleging fraudulent representations by SHA

that SHDC would receive project-based Section 8 status for newly constructed housing units, the

Court deemed that claim untimely, inasmuch as it was initiated well outside the applicable limitations

period.

In the wake of the Court’s dismissal of this action via the August 16 Order, SHA comes

forward to request an award of attorneys’ fees of approximately $153,000, as well as taxation of costs

in the amount of $13,026.76. Each of these requests will be addressed in turn.

II. Motion to Award Attorney’s Fees.

A. Legal Standard.

As authority for its Motion to Award Attorney’s Fees, defendant relies on 42 U.S.C. §

1988(b), which provides that in § 1983 actions, “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing

party ... a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” Id. Case law interpreting § 1988 has made

clear that a prevailing § 1983 defendant can recover attorney’s fees only if “the plaintiff’s action was

frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.” Evans

v. Monroe County Sheriff's Dept., 2005 WL 2277467, *1 (11th Cir. Sept. 20, 2005) (quoting Baker

v. Alderman, 158 F.3d 516, 524-25 (11th Cir. 1998)); see also Quintana v. Jenne, 414 F.3d 1306,

1309 (11th Cir. 2005) (“prevailing defendants may receive attorney's fees only when the plaintiff's case

is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation”); Perry v. Orange County, 341 F. Supp.2d 1197,

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1 Courts have made clear that this test is, and is intended to be, a rigorous one that

parallels the threshold for a prevailing defendant to recover attorney’s fees in the Title VII context. See,

e.g., Perry, 341 F. Supp.2d at 1204 (“The standard for awarding attorneys' fees to a prevailing

defendant is a stringent one.”); Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 101 S.Ct. 173, 66 L.Ed.2d 163 (1980)

(adopting same “stringent standard” used in Title VII cases to determine when award of attorney's fees

is appropriate in § 1983 cases).

2 As the Sullivan standard makes clear, a prevailing civil rights defendant is not entitled

to attorney’s fees as a matter of course, even when the plaintiff’s claims are denied on a motion for

summary judgment. See O’Neal v. DeKalb County, Ga., 850 F.2d 653, 658 (11th Cir. 1988)

(explaining that “[s]imply because the district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary

judgment does not mean that the plaintiffs’ action was frivolous”); Head v. Medford, 62 F.3d 351, 356

(11th Cir. 1995) (“Merely because plaintiff did not ultimately prevail on her federal claims does not

determine that her claims were groundless.”); Jerelds, 194 F. Supp.2d at 1310 (“the fact that a plaintiff

may ultimately lose his case is not in itself a sufficient justification for the assessment of fees”).

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1204 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (similar).1

In applying this test, the Eleventh Circuit has identified the following relevant factors: “(1)

whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case; (2) whether the defendant offered to settle; and (3)

whether the trial court dismissed the case prior to trial or held a full-blown trial on the merits.” Sullivan

v. School Bd. of Pinellas County, 773 F.2d 1182, 1189 (11th Cir. 1985); see also Quintana, 414

F.3d at 1309 (same). “While these general guidelines can be discerned from the case law, they are

general guidelines only and not hard and fast rules. Determinations regarding frivolity are to be made on

a case-by-case basis.” Bruce v. City of Gainesville, Ga., 177 F.3d 949, 952 (11th Cir. 1999)

(quoting Sullivan, 773 F.2d at 1189); see also Evans, 2005 WL 2277467, at *1 (explaining that “no

‘hard and fast’ rules exist for frivolity determinations”); Bonner v. Mobile Energy Services Co., 246

F.3d 1303, 1305 n.9 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Sullivan does not create a bright line checklist nor does it

permit of a mechanical application.”). The district court should always focus on whether the complaint

“is so lacking in arguable merit as to be groundless or without foundation.” Cordoba v. Dillard’s, Inc.,

419 F.3d 1169, 1176 (11th Cir. 2005); see also Jerelds v. City of Orlando, 194 F. Supp.2d 1305,

1311 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (in ascertaining whether to award fees, district court must focus on whether

case is “seriously lacking in arguable merit”).2

Courts construing the Sullivan factors have been circumspect about awarding attorney’s fees

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to a prevailing defendant absent egregious circumstances. See Cordoba, 419 F.3d at 1176 (“In the

cases in which we have sustained findings of frivolity, plaintiffs have typically failed to introduce any

evidence to support their claims.”); Perry, 341 F. Supp.2d at 1205 (explaining that courts generally do

not award fees “unless the plaintiffs refused to acknowledge clear precedent or asserted a claim which

was based knowingly on a nonexistent interest”). This reticence is animated by judicial recognition of

the potential chilling effect that widespread attorney’s fee awards to prevailing defendants might have on

the filing of meritorious civil rights actions. See Bonner, 246 F.3d at 1305 (noting that “[c]are must be

taken to remain sensitive to the policy considerations militating against imposing fees on unsuccessful

plaintiffs in discrimination claims which might discourage all but the most airtight claims and undercut the

efforts of Congress to promote the vigorous enforcement provisions of [Section 1983]”); Cordoba,

419 F.3d at 1181 (cautioning against post hoc logic that claims must have been unfounded because

plaintiff did not prevail, where such hindsight could chill all but the most airtight claims given

uncertainties inherent in litigation). Given these concerns and the Eleventh Circuit’s guidance that

requests for attorney’s fees by prevailing defendants in civil rights cases must be reviewed on a caseby-case basis, the Court will not mechanically apply the Sullivan factors to the exclusion of other

relevant considerations. See Perry, 341 F. Supp.2d at 1205 (“Rigid application of these factors would

lead to a result that Congress did not intend--that any defendant who prevailed on a dispositive motion

would be entitled to fees.”).

B. Analysis.

SHA urges the Court to exercise its discretion in favor of awarding attorney’s fees. In support

of this request, SHA correctly states that each of the three Sullivan criteria militates in favor of a fee

award in this case, inasmuch as the Order granting summary judgment necessarily concluded that

SHDC had failed to establish a prima facie case, the case was dismissed before trial, and SHA never

extended any settlement offers to SHDC.

In the Court’s view, however, a more nuanced analysis is required. As noted above, that a

defendant was granted summary judgment does not render an award of attorney’s fees automatic under

§ 1988(b). Neither Sullivan nor any other authority located by this Court mandates an award of

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3

Indeed, the lack of frivolity of those claims was underscored by SHA’s inability on

summary judgment to direct the Court to any clear-cut, well-settled lines of Eleventh Circuit or

Supreme Court precedent that were necessarily fatal to SHDC’s ability to establish a viable

constitutional claim.

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attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant in every civil rights case where (i) that defendant was granted

summary judgment and (ii) no any settlement offers were made. Something more is required to justify a

finding of frivolity or unreasonableness.

Notwithstanding the grant of summary judgment to SHA, the Court is of the opinion that SHDC

had at least colorable bases for its claims. As for Counts II and III (constitutional claims alleging

deprivation of a property interest without due process of law), SHDC offered creative and facially

plausible theories to support its contention that SHA’s conduct implicated a protectable property

interest. That the Court disagreed with SHDC’s position in no way translates into a conclusion that

those causes of action were frivolous.3 With respect to Count IV, SHDC offered substantial evidence

of what it perceived to be SHA’s inadequate performance under the management contract. In the

Court’s estimation, that evidence did not establish a breach of the contract, but SHDC’s showing was

not so threadbare as to warrant a finding of frivolity. As for Count V, SHDC offered a cogent (albeit

incorrect) argument for why that cause of action should be deemed timely brought. The Court’s

rejection of that theory in no way warrants a finding that Count V was frivolous. And finally, as for

Count I, the record reflects that SHDC withdrew that claim on summary judgment upon realizing that it

was untimely. Plaintiff’s decision to abandon Count I upon being confronted with evidence that it was

legally untenable is laudable, good-faith conduct that militates against an award of attorney’s fees. 

Compare Jerelds, 194 F. Supp.2d at 1310 (explaining that a civil rights plaintiff may be responsible for

the defendant’s attorney’s fees “if he continues to litigate a once colorable claim after it becomes

obvious that the claim is frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless”); Perry, 341 F. Supp.2d at 1205

(“where a plaintiff continues to litigate even after the claim was clearly groundless, frivolous, or

unreasonable, an award of fees may be proper”).

In short, the undersigned finds that SHDC’s claims were not frivolous and did not trigger

attorney’s fee liability under § 1988(b). The legal and factual issues litigated herein were quite complex,

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4

In reaching this disposition of SHA’s fee petition, the Court does not resolve the

parties’ skirmish over SHDC’s ability to pay. In its Motion, SHA maintained that SHDC “has the

means” to pay defendant’s attorney’s fees. (Motion, ¶ 10.) SHDC vigorously disputed this allegation

by suggesting that “requiring the plaintiff to pay the defendant’s attorney’s fees would likely be the death

knell for the plaintiff as an ongoing business.” (Opposition, ¶ 10.) SHA contested the veracity of

SHDC’s “death knell” contention by proffering evidence of plaintiff’s financial vigor. (Reply, at Exh. A

& B.) Neither party has offered any authority holding that a defendant’s ability to pay has any

relevance in the § 1988 fee award calculus; therefore, the Court does not weigh this factor in its

analysis. See Scelta v. Delicatessen Support Services, Inc., 203 F. Supp.2d 1328, 1339 (M.D. Fla.

2002) (“a losing party's financial status need not be considered in determining the amount of the award”

of costs awarded to a prevailing party).

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as evidenced by the more than 75 pages of briefing submitted by the parties on summary judgment, the

dozens of accompanying exhibits, and the 41-page Order granting summary judgment. This case was

not one in which SHA had a slam-dunk, airtight, surefire defense; rather, the legal status of SHDC’s

causes of action was far more uncertain. This action is akin to O’Neal, wherein the Eleventh Circuit

explained that “although the plaintiffs’ section 1983 suit does not merit relief, their causes of action were

plausible.” O’Neal v. DeKalb County, Ga., 850 F.2d 653, 658 (11th Cir. 1988) (finding that district

court did not err in denying attorney’s fees under § 1988); see also Cordoba, 419 F.3d at 1182

(“Even when the law or the facts appear questionable or unfavorable at the outset, a party may have an

entirely reasonable ground for bringing suit.”). Accordingly, SHA’s Motion to Award Attorney’s Fees

is denied on the ground that SHDC’s claims, while not sustainable in the context of this action, were

not frivolous.4

III. Analysis of Motion to Tax or Re-Tax Costs.

Separate and apart from its request for attorney’s fees, defendant asks that costs in the amount

of $13,026.76 be taxed against plaintiff. Pursuant to Rule 54(d), Fed.R.Civ.P., costs “shall be allowed

as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs.” Id. Clearly, SHA is a prevailing

party in this case, given the dismissal of SHDC’s claims on summary judgment. However, Rule 54(d)

does not confer upon this Court unfettered discretion to “tax costs to reimburse a winning litigant for

every expense he has seen fit to incur in the conduct of his case.” Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co.,

379 U.S. 227, 235, 85 S.Ct. 411, 415, 13 L.Ed.2d 248 (1964). Rather, statutory authorization is a

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5 Defendant’s summary judgment motion also cited to the deposition of Joseph

Smitherman, but solely for the proposition that Stephen Smitherman was Joseph’s son, and that Joseph

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necessary condition to the shifting of litigation costs. West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey,

499 U.S. 83, 86, 111 S.Ct. 1138, 113 L.Ed.2d 68 (1991). “[A]bsent explicit statutory or contractual

authorization, federal courts are bound by the limitations set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1920” in awarding costs

to a prevailing party. Arcadian Fertilizer, L.P. v. MPW Indus. Services, Inc., 249 F.3d 1293, 1296

(11th Cir. 2001).

SHA’s request for an award of costs encompasses the following four components: (1) fees for

service of summonses and subpoenas ($75.14); (2) court reporter fees for transcripts ($9,348.62); (3)

witness fees ($40.00); and (4) fees for exemplification and copying of papers ($3,563.00). In response

to the Motion, SHDC concurs that items (1) and (3) are properly taxed, but disputes the propriety and

amount of items (2) and (4).

A. Court Reporter Fees.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1920(2), court reporter fees are properly taxed as costs for “any part of

the stenographic transcript necessarily obtained for use in the case.” Id. Although the Eleventh Circuit

has acknowledged that taxation of deposition costs is authorized by statute, it has cautioned that such

costs are not recoverable where “the deposition costs were merely incurred for convenience, to aid in

thorough preparation, or for purposes of investigation only.” U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission v. W&O, Inc., 213 F.3d 600, 621 (11th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). Pursuant to §

1920(2), defendant seeks taxation of $9,348.62 for fees and costs associated with nearly a dozen

depositions taken in this case.

Plaintiff opposes this request, maintaining that none of these depositions were “necessarily

obtained” because the Motion for Summary Judgment “did not turn upon any matter uncovered during

the course of the depositions,” but rather was “entirely based upon a legal analysis” of SHDC’s

property rights. (Plaintiff’s Response (doc. 58), at 2.) The Court cannot agree. Defendant’s Rule 56

Motion relied substantially on the depositions of Stephen Smitherman (both depositions), Greg Price,

Jacqueline Peake, Johnny Moss and Boyd Pugh.5 The summary judgment Order specifically cited to

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is a former mayor of Selma, Alabama. (Defendant’s Brief, at 1 & Exh. 36.) If this largely irrelevant

tidbit needed to be included at all, surely it could have been culled from Stephen’s depositions, without

separate citation to Joseph’s deposition.

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passages from each of those depositions. Because the Court expressly relied on these deposition

transcripts in its ruling on summary judgment, these transcripts were clearly “necessarily obtained for

use in the case,” and the associated transcription costs are properly taxed against plaintiff. See Tilton

v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 115 F.3d 1471 (10th Cir. 1997) (“A district court does not abuse its

discretion in taxing transcription costs associated with depositions that were actually utilized by the

court in considering the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.”); W&O, 213 F.3d at 621 (“A

district court may tax costs associated with the depositions submitted by the parties in support of their

summary judgment motions.”).

The depositions of Nancy Rives, Hugh Staub, Rex Waldrop, Erika Smitherman and Joseph

Smitherman stand on a different footing because they did not factor into either the summary judgment

ruling or defendant’s summary judgment arguments in any meaningful way. Nonetheless, the law is

clear that there is no per se prohibition against taxation of costs for depositions not used at summary

judgment or trial. See W&O, 213 F.3d at 621-22 (affirming award of costs for deposition transcripts

not used at summary judgment or at trial, where “there is no evidence showing that their depositions

were not related to an issue in the case when the depositions were taken”); Murphy v. City of Flagler

Beach, 761 F.2d 622, 631 (11th Cir. 1985) (rejecting as abuse of discretion trial court’s blanket rule

against awarding costs for all depositions not used at trial). SHA represents, without contradiction, that

each of these deponents was listed on SHDC’s initial disclosures as a prospective fact or expert

witness. The W&O panel explained that taxation of deposition costs for witnesses on a losing party’s

witness list is reasonable because such listing shows that (i) the prevailing party might need deposition

transcripts to cross-examine the witnesses effectively, and (ii) the information possessed by those

witnesses was not so irrelevant or unimportant as to render their depositions outside the realm of

discovery. See W&O, 213 F.3d at 621. Absent any showing by SHDC that any portion of these

depositions was “not related to an issue which was present in the case at the time the deposition was

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6 This conclusion is bolstered by SHA’s uncontroverted explanation that the Waldrop

and E. Smitherman depositions were reasonably necessary because SHDC designated them as

30(b)(6) deponents on certain factual issues related to SHDC’s claims, that the Staub deposition was

reasonably necessary because SHDC designated him as a utilities expert concerning the utility

allowance claim, and that Rives was the secretary of SHDC and a manager of Minnie B. Anderson

Homes, such that she would be expected to have substantial knowledge relating to many pertinent

issues in this case. Given these witnesses’ clear link to SHDC’s allegations, the Court is persuaded that

their depositions were “necessarily obtained for use in the case,” notwithstanding SHA’s failure to rely

on those depositions on summary judgment.

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taken,” W&O, 213 F.3d at 621, the Court finds that the Rives, Staub, Waldrop, E. Smitherman and J.

Smitherman depositions were “necessarily obtained for use in the case,” and that the costs incurred by

SHA in connection with those depositions are properly taxable.6

Even though all of the depositions were reasonably necessary, the Court cannot confer acrossthe-board approval to the entire array of deposition costs claimed by SHA for two reasons. First,

among the court reporter fees for which SHA seeks reimbursement are $925.00 for video expenses

associated with Greg Price’s deposition, and $737.52 for video expenses associated with Joseph

Smitherman’s deposition. Defense counsel incurred these video expenses in addition to regular court

reporter transcription expenses for the deposition. SHA’s submission offers no explanation for why

duplicate methods of recording these depositions were reasonably necessary. Certainly, it might have

been convenient for defense counsel to record the depositions of Messrs. Price and Smitherman in both

video and paper form; however, there is no explanation why the videos were “necessarily obtained for

use in the case,” given the existence and availability of paper transcripts of those very depositions. As

one court explained, “[t]he concept of necessity for use in the case connotes something more than

convenience or duplication to ensure alternative methods for presenting materials at trial.” Cherry v.

Champion Int’l Corp., 186 F.3d 442, 449 (4th Cir. 1999). In the absence of a showing by SHA why

either a transcript or a videotape would not have been sufficient for its purposes, the Court cannot find

that the costs of both recording methods were reasonably incurred. Accordingly, only the transcription

costs for those two depositions will be allowed, and SHA’s request for recovery of redundant,

duplicative videotaping expenses for those same depositions is denied. See Cherry, 186 F.3d at 449

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7 An itemized breakdown of these non-compensable deposition costs is as follows: (a)

$90 for condensed, ASCII, and E-Tran services in the Stephen Smitherman deposition; (b) $100 for

ASCII, condensed, E-transcript and Federal Express services in the Stephen Smitherman Volume I

deposition; (c) $65 for ASCII, condensed, and E-transcript services in the Stephen Smitherman

Volume II deposition; (d) $45 for ASCII and condensed services in the Price deposition; (e) $65 for

condensed and Federal Express services in the Staub deposition; (f) $65 for ASCII, condensed, and

E-transcript services in the Rives deposition; (g) $85 for condensed, E-transcript and Federal Express

services in the J. Smitherman deposition; and (h) $25 for condensed and ASCII services in the Peake,

Moss and Pugh depositions.

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(excluding video costs where prevailing party did not demonstrate that costs of both transcribing and

videotaping plaintiff’s deposition were necessarily obtained).

Second, the court reporter invoices reflect that SHA spent hundreds of dollars on ancillary,

add-on services for the convenience of counsel. Such expenses included extra fees for condensed

transcripts, ASCII computer disks, e-mailed copies of transcripts, and Federal Express delivery. Such

supplemental services may be helpful and convenient, but they are unquestionably not necessary. In the

Court’s view, these types of expenses epitomize costs “merely incurred for convenience” or “to aid in

thorough preparation,” and are therefore not recoverable under the § 1920 scheme pursuant to W&O. 

See also Harkins v. Riverboat Services, Inc., 286 F. Supp.2d 976, 980-81 (N.D. Ill. 2003)

(disallowing deposition costs for ASCII disks, “minuscripts,” and shipping/delivery as being for the

convenience of counsel and/or ordinary business expenses). These ancillary fees total $540 for all of

the depositions.7 The award of deposition costs will be adjusted downward by that amount to exclude

these non-reimbursable expenses.

After subtracting $1,662.52 for duplicative video deposition services and $540 for

convenience-based add-on products and services, the total taxable costs for court reporter fees in this

case are $7,146.10.

B. Fees for Copies of Papers.

Defendant also requests taxation of $3,563 in costs for copies of papers obtained by SHA in

connection with this matter. By statute, “[f]ees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily

obtained for use in the case” are properly taxable. 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4).

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8 Because the invoices include a separate fee of 25 cents per page for photocopying, the

Court assumes that the labor costs do not include time spent by the third parties’ employees copying

the documents. To the extent that those invoices do include labor costs for actual operation of the

copying machines, in addition to a 25 cents per page fee, they are unreasonable charges for which

double taxation of costs is not appropriate. Any reasonable outside copy shop almost certainly could

have copied the records at issue for 25 cents per page or less, inclusive of labor costs. That SHA may

have incurred unreasonable expenses in obtaining photocopies is not a valid ground for passing such

expenses along to SHDC.

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 Under well-established law in this circuit, “[u]nsubstantiated claims that particular documents

were necessary are insufficient to permit recovery. [Movants] must come forward with evidence

showing the nature of the documents copied, including how the copies were used or intended to be

used in the case.” Grady v. Bunzl Packaging Supply Co., 161 F.R.D. 477, 479 (N.D. Ga. 1995)

(citations omitted); see also Cullens v. Georgia Dep’t of Transportation, 29 F.3d 1489, 1494 (11th

Cir. 1994) (district court properly disallowed photocopying costs where prevailing party failed to

present required evidence regarding documents copied, including their use or intended use). Thus,

photocopies are only taxable as costs in certain circumstances. See Grady, 161 F.R.D. at 479 (copy

charges are not taxable if copies were made for convenience, preparation, research, or records of

counsel; rather, party seeking to recover costs must show that the copies were necessary). “The

burden of establishing entitlement to photocopying expenses lies with the prevailing party.” Scelta v.

Delicatessen Support Services, Inc., 203 F. Supp.2d 1328, 1340 (M.D. Fla. 2002).

SHA seeks to recover payments to various third parties from whom it subpoenaed and

received financial records of SHDC, Deer Ridge, Ltd., Deer Ridge, Inc., and Stephen and Erika

Smitherman. In that regard, defendant is requesting not only the cost of photocopying the documents,

but also the labor costs billed by the third parties, presumably for time spent locating, gathering and

organizing those documents.8 The latter category of costs is not taxable under § 1920(4), as a matter

of law. Indeed, “the fees for ‘copies of papers’ permitted under § 1920(4) allows recovery only for the

reasonable costs of actually duplicating documents, not for the cost of gathering those documents as a

prelude to duplication.” Allen v. U.S. Steel Corp., 665 F.2d 689, 697 n.5 (5th Cir., Unit B 1982)

(denying reimbursement of paralegal expenses incurred in gathering records for copying); see also

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Arcadian Fertilizer, 249 F.3d at 1296 (narrowly defining “copies of papers” under § 1920(4) as

being confined to “reproductions involving paper in its various forms”). The five photocopy invoices in

this case include $1,728 in fees for labor charges incurred by the third parties in gathering and

organizing the subpoenaed documents. Such fees are not taxable under § 1920(4) and will be

deducted from the award of costs.

The copy invoices also include a total of $26 in charges for mailing documents to SHA. Such

mailing charges are not “[f]ees for ... copies of paper” and therefore are not recoverable under §

1920(4). See Zeuner v. Rare Hospitality Intern., Inc., 386 F. Supp.2d 635, 640 (M.D.N.C. 2005)

(postage expenses are not taxable as costs under § 1920); Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 117

F. Supp.2d 1247, 1266 (M.D. Ala. 2000) (“Pursuant to § 1920, costs for postage ... are clearly

nonrecoverable.”); see generally Harkins, 286 F. Supp.2d at 980-81 (postage, shipping and delivery

charges are ordinary business expenses that are not taxable).

Finally, SHDC objects that the copy charges are nontaxable because “defendant has failed to

show that the documents were in any way necessary to the case.” (Plaintiff’s Response, at 4.) In

response, SHA argues that it reasonably required a complete set of SHDC’s financial records for use in

assessing SHDC’s damages claims, particularly those for lost rental income arising from increases in

utility allowances. (Reply Brief (doc. 61), at 5.) This explanation satisfies SHA’s burden of showing

the necessity of photocopy charges from financial institutions for SHDC’s financial records; however, it

in no way explains why SHA needed 2,708 pages of the personal financial records of Stephen and

Erika Smitherman from People’s Bank dating back to 1996, or why it needed 830 pages of the

financial records of Deer Ridge, Ltd., and Deer Ridge, Inc. Furthermore, two of the copy invoices

(those from SouthTrust Bank and Wilson Price) do not identify the individual(s) or entity (-ies) whose

financial records were produced. The Court therefore has no way of knowing whether these

photocopies were for SHDC financial records or for someone or something else’s. Simply put, the

Court cannot determine from this record whether SHA “could have reasonably believed that it was

necessary to copy the papers at issue,” for any documents except for SHDC’s financial records. 

W&O, 213 F.3d at 623. In these important respects, SHA has failed to meet its burden of showing

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that these specific photocopy charges were necessarily obtained for use in this case.

In light of these considerations, the Court will tax photocopying charges of $208.00 to SHDC,

representing the invoiced charge from Peoples Bank for 832 pages of financial records relating to

SHDC, from 1996 through April 1995. All other photocopying charges claimed by SHA are

excluded.

IV. Conclusion.

For all of the foregoing reasons, defendant’s Motion to Award Attorney’s Fees (doc. 53) is

denied because plaintiff’s claims, while nonmeritorious, were not frivolous. Defendant’s Motion to Tax

or Re-Tax Costs (doc. 55) is granted in part, and denied in part. After disallowing certain

categories of costs as identified herein, costs are hereby taxed against plaintiff in the amount of

$7,469.24, including $75.14 in fees for services of summons and subpoenas, $40.00 for witness fees,

$7,146.10 for court reporter fees, and $208.00 for photocopying expenses.

DONE and ORDERED this 24th day of October, 2005.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:04-cv-00449-WS-B Document 62 Filed 10/24/05 Page 13 of 13