Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01218/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01218-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Capital One Bank (USA), N.A.
Appellee
Capital One Financial Corporation
Appellee
Capital One, N.A.
Appellee
Media Rights Technologies, Inc.
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

MEDIA RIGHTS TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORPORATION, 

CAPITAL ONE BANK (USA), N.A., 

CAPITAL ONE, N.A.,

Defendants-Appellees

______________________ 

2014-1218

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Virginia in No. 1:13-cv-00476-AJTTRJ, Judge Anthony J. Trenga.

______________________ 

Decided: September 4, 2015 

______________________ 

BYRON LEROY PICKARD, Sterne Kessler Goldstein & 

Fox, PLLC, Washington, DC, argued for plaintiffappellant. Also represented by ROBERT GREENE STERNE,

JONATHAN M. STRANG, JON WRIGHT; DANIEL LUKE GEYSER, 

McKool Smith, P.C., Dallas, TX; COURTLAND L.

REICHMAN, Redwood City, CA.

ROBERT A. ANGLE, Troutman Sanders LLP, Richmond, 

VA, argued for defendants-appellees. Also represented by 

DABNEY JEFFERSON CARR, IV, GEORGE A. SOMERVILLE,

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NICHOLAS RICHARD KLAIBER; DOUGLAS SALYERS, Atlanta, 

GA.

______________________ 

Before O’MALLEY, PLAGER, and TARANTO, Circuit Judges.

O’MALLEY, Circuit Judge.

Media Rights Technologies, Inc. (“Media Rights”) appeals the district court’s decision to grant judgment on the 

pleadings that all claims of U.S. Patent No. 7,316,033 (the 

“’033 Patent”) are invalid for indefiniteness. Because the 

trial court correctly determined that the term “compliance 

mechanism,” which is a limitation in every single claim, is 

a means-plus-function term that lacks sufficient structure, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

On April 19, 2013, Media Rights filed suit against

Capital One Financial Corporation; Capital One Bank 

(USA), N.A.; and Capital One, N.A. (collectively, “Capital 

One”) in the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, alleging infringement of the ’033 

Patent. The ’033 Patent is entitled “Method of Controlling Recording of Media” and is generally directed to 

methods, systems, and computer readable media related 

to the prevention of unauthorized recording of electronic 

media. ’033 Patent, Abstract. Specifically, the ’033 

Patent prevents unauthorized recording via a compliance 

mechanism, which diverts incoming media content protected by law or agreement from being output from a 

system in order to stop the illegal copying or sharing of 

that content. 

Claim 1 is illustrative of the invention, and it recites:

A method of preventing unauthorized recording of 

electronic media comprising:

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Activating a compliance mechanism in response to 

receiving media content by a client system, said 

compliance mechanism coupled to said client system, said client system having a media content 

presentation application operable thereon and 

coupled to said compliance mechanism; 

Controlling a data output pathway of said client 

system with said compliance mechanism by diverting a commonly used data pathway of said 

media player application to a controlled data 

pathway monitored by said compliance mechanism; and

Directing said media content to a custom media 

device coupled to said compliance mechanism via 

said data output path, for selectively restricting 

output of said media content.

’033 Patent col. 36:19–34 (emphases added).

After the filing of the complaint, the case proceeded 

normally and the district court scheduled a Markman

hearing for fall 2013. On the same day it filed its opening 

claim construction brief, Capital One also filed a motion 

for judgment on the pleadings that the ’033 Patent was 

invalid under 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 and 112(b). Because the 

motion largely turned on claim construction, the district 

court heard argument on the motion for judgment on the 

pleadings the same day as the Markman hearing. See 

Media Rights Techs., Inc. v. Capital One Fin. Corp., No. 

1:13-cv-00476 (Oct. 1, 2013), ECF No. 51. 

Upon consideration, the district court issued a decision, concluding that (1) the terms “compliance mechanism” and “custom media device” are indefinite and, (2)

because every claim of the ’033 Patent contained both 

terms, all of the claims of the ’033 Patent, claims 1–27,

are invalid. Media Rights Techs., Inc. v. Capital One Fin. 

Corp., No. 1:13-cv-00476, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176475, 

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at *2 (E.D. Va. Dec. 9, 2013). Specifically, with respect to 

the “compliance mechanism” term, the district court first 

noted that the parties disputed whether this term was a 

means-plus-function term. Id. at *8. Because the term 

did not use the word “means,” Media Rights argued that it 

was not a means-plus-function term, while Capital One 

disagreed. The district court found that the claim language itself stated that the “compliance mechanism” was 

activated in response to the client system receiving media 

content, that it controlled a data output path, and that it 

monitored a controlled data pathway. Id. at *10. Because 

this language only describes how the components of 

invention are combined and the functions performed by 

the “compliance mechanism,” without suggesting anything about the structure of the mechanism itself, the 

district court determined that the claim language did not 

recite sufficient structure for the “compliance mechanism”

term. Id. Thus, the district court concluded that the

‘“compliance mechanism’ must be a means-plus-function 

term.” Id. at *10–11. 

Having concluded that the term is a means-plusfunction term, the district court next considered what 

functions it performs, and then determined what structure identified in the specification performs these functions. Id. at *11. The district court concluded that 

“compliance mechanism” performs four functions: 

(1) “controlling a data output of [the] client system . . . by diverting a commonly used data

pathway of [the] media player application to a 

controlled data pathway” (Claim 1); 

(2) monitoring the controlled data pathway 

(Claims 1, 10 and 19); 

(3) “managing an output path of [the] client system . . . by diverting a commonly used data 

pathway of [the] media player application to a 

controlled data pathway” (Claim 10); and

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(4) “stop[ping] or disrupt[ing] the playing of [the] 

media content at [the] controlled data pathway 

when said playing of said media file content is 

outside of [the] usage restriction applicable to 

said media file” (Claims 10 and 19).

Id. (quoting ’033 Patent at col. 36-37).

The court found that a term from the written description—the “copyright compliance mechanism 300”—

generally discloses the structure of a “compliance mechanism,” and that “copyright compliance mechanism 300” 

includes “one or more coder/decoders, one or more agent 

programs, and one or more skins, but not instructions, a 

user ID generator, system hooks, a wave shim, or a custom media device driver.” Id. at *14. The district court 

found that this description did not constitute a sufficiently 

definite structure. Id. at *18. Specifically, it determined 

that, although the structure included various components, 

only one—the skins—provided some idea as to how the 

compliance mechanism achieves its functions. The district court focused on the fact that, while the specification 

identified various components of a possible structure, 

Media Rights disclaimed that all those components, or 

even any specific subsection of them, are necessary to 

perform the recited functions. Because the structure for 

computer-implemented functions must be an algorithm, 

and the specification here failed to describe “an algorithm 

whose terms are defined and understandable,” the district 

court determined that the “compliance mechanism” term 

is indefinite. Id. at *17–18 (quoting Ibormeith IP, LLC v. 

Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 732 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 

2013)). 

The district court also concluded that the term “custom media device” is indefinite. Id. at *25. Looking at 

the specification, the court noted that it was unclear 

whether “custom media device” was hardware or software. For example, in one embodiment, the specification 

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stated that the device can emulate a custom media device 

driver, which is considered hardware, while, in another 

embodiment, the “custom media device” is equated to a 

custom media device application, i.e. software. Id. at *20–

21. Further complicating matters was the lack of clarity 

as to what “custom” means. Id. at *21. At the Markman

hearing, Media Rights attempted to define “custom” as 

being specific to the particular media content, and cited to 

the specification’s discussion of “custom media player” for 

support. The district court found this argument unconvincing, however, explaining that “custom media device” 

cannot be equated with “custom media player” because 

the player is not required for every embodiment of the 

invention, while the “custom media device” is. Id. at *24–

25. Additionally, the district court found that it would be 

improper to equate the two because “custom media player” is defined only as an application in the specification, 

whereas “custom media device,” according to Media 

Rights, also encompasses a driver. Id. at *25. Because 

“the bounds of the term ‘custom media device”’ are unclear, the district court concluded that the term “custom 

media device” is indefinite. Id. 

Because these two indefinite terms, “compliance 

mechanism” and “custom media device” are included in 

every claim, the court concluded that the entire patent is 

invalid. Given this conclusion, the district court declined 

to reach Capital One’s § 101 argument. Id. at *25–28. 

The district court then entered final judgment in favor of 

Capital One.

Media Rights timely appealed to this court. We have 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Media Rights argues that the district court 

erred when it determined that both “compliance mechanism” and “custom media device” are invalid for indefiniteness. A patent must “conclude with one or more 

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claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming 

the subject matter which the applicant regards as [the] 

invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 (2006).1 A claim fails to 

satisfy this statutory requirement and is thus invalid for 

indefiniteness if its language, when read in light of the 

specification and the prosecution history, “fail[s] to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art 

about the scope of the invention.” Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig 

Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014). Notably, 

a claim is indefinite if its language “might mean several 

different things and no informed and confident choice is 

available among the contending definitions.” Id. at 2130

n.8 (quotation omitted). We review the district court’s 

indefiniteness determination de novo. See Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 766 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed Cir. 

2014). Because the indefiniteness issue in this case is 

intertwined with claim construction, we review any 

factual determinations for clear error. See Atmel Corp. v. 

Info. Storage Devices, Inc., 198 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 

1999) (“[A] court’s determination of the structure that 

corresponds to a particular means-plus function limitation 

is indeed a matter of claim construction.”); see also Teva 

Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 836 

(2015). 

A. “Compliance Mechanism”

The parties first dispute whether “compliance mechanism” is a means-plus-function term. Means-plusfunction claim limitations, authorized by 35 U.S.C. § 112, 

1 Paragraph 2 and Paragraph 6 of 35 U.S.C. § 112 

were replaced by § 112(b) and § 112(f) respectively when 

the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 

112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) took effect on September 16, 

2012. Because the application resulting in the asserted 

patent was filed before that date, we refer to the pre-AIA

version of § 112. 

 

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¶ 6, allow a patentee to draft claim terms “as a means or 

step for performing a specified function without the 

recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof.”

35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6. But this flexibility in claim drafting 

comes at a price. Such claims are construed to cover only 

“the structure, materials, or acts described in the specification as corresponding to the claimed function and 

equivalents thereof.” Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, _ 

F.3d _, No. 2013-1130, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 10082, at 

*15 (Fed. Cir. June 16, 2015).

“It is well settled that [a] claim limitation that actually uses the word ‘means’ invokes a rebuttable presumption that § 112, [¶] 6 applies.” Apex Inc. v. Raritan 

Comput., Inc., 325 F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted). And, it is equally understood that “a 

claim term that does not use ‘means’ will trigger the 

rebuttable presumption that § 112, [¶] 6 does not apply.” 

Id. at 1371 (quotation omitted). But this presumption 

against the application of § 112, ¶ 6 to a claim term 

lacking the word “means” can be overcome if a party can 

“demonstrate[] that the claim term fails to ‘recite sufficiently definite structure’ or else recites ‘function without 

reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.’” 

Williamson, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 10082, at *19 (quoting

Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 880 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). 

“In undertaking this analysis, we ask if the claim language, read in light of the specification, recites sufficiently 

definite structure to avoid § 112, ¶ 6.” Robert Bosch, LLC 

v. Snap-On Inc., 769 F.3d 1094, 1099 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 

(citing Inventio AG v. Thyssenkrupp Elevator Ams. Corp., 

649 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). 

In this case, there is no dispute that the term “compliance mechanism” does not include the word “means.” 

The parties also agree that the claim language recites 

functions for the “compliance mechanism” term. But, the 

parties dispute whether the claims, read in light of the

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cient structure for performing that function.” Williamson, 

2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 10082, at *19.2 

Media Rights does not dispute that “compliance 

mechanism” has no commonly understood meaning and is 

not generally viewed by one skilled in the art to connote a 

particular structure. To prevent the application of § 112, 

¶ 6, Media Rights analogizes the “compliance mechanism”

term to the “modernizing device” term described in Inventio, which we held was not a means-plus-function term

based on extensive structural description in the specification. 649 F.3d at 1357–59. In Inventio, we found that the 

term “modernizing device”—not a commonly understood

term—was used to describe an electrical circuit, which we 

found connotes sufficient structure when coupled with a 

detailed description of the circuit’s operation. Id. at 1358

(citing Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. Abacus Software, 462 F.3d

1344, 1355–56 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). Because “the claims 

indicate[d] that ‘modernizing device’ functions as an 

electrical circuit that receives signals, processes signals, 

and outputs signals to other components” and the specification “depict[ed] the modernizing device and its internal 

components,” “show[ed] how the elements were connected 

together,” and further described how these components 

2 Media Rights also argues that the district court 

erred in its analysis because it failed to consider the claim 

language in light of the specification when determining 

that “compliance mechanism” was a means-plus-function

term. Media Rights is correct that the district court 

should have considered the entire intrinsic record when 

assessing whether “compliance mechanism” invokes 

§ 112, ¶ 6. But, as discussed below, because the specification does not recite any identifiable structure for the 

“compliance mechanism” term, the district court’s failure 

to consider the intrinsic record at that initial stage was 

harmless.

 

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perform the claimed functions, we concluded that “modernizing device” was not a means-plus-function limitation. 

Id. at 1358–59.

Here, unlike Inventio, the claims do not use the term 

“compliance mechanism” as a substitute for an electrical 

circuit, or anything else that might connote a definite 

structure. Rather, the claims simply state that the “compliance mechanism” can perform various functions. A 

review of the intrinsic record does not change this conclusion. The written description only depicts and describes 

how what is referred to as the “copyright compliance 

mechanism” is connected to various parts of the system, 

how the “copyright compliance mechanism” functions, and 

the potential—though not mandatory—functional components of the “copyright compliance mechanism.” See ’033 

Patent col. 18:57–col. 19:5; col. 20:32–49; Fig. 3; Fig. 5B. 

None of these passages, however, define “compliance 

mechanism” in specific structural terms. And, the addition of the term “copyright compliance mechanism” in the 

specification only confuses the issue further. Media 

Rights does not contend that “copyright compliance mechanism” is the equivalent of the electrical circuit detailed 

in the written description at issue in Inventio. Indeed, 

Media Rights asserts that the “copyright compliance 

mechanism”—the only “compliance mechanism” referenced outside the claims and the summary of the invention, and the only one depicted in the figures to which it 

points—is narrower than the structure it claims as the 

“compliance mechanism.” Without more, we cannot find 

that the claims, when read in light of the specification, 

provide sufficient structure for the “compliance mechanism” term.

Media Rights attempts to avoid this conclusion by arguing that the specification recits sufficient structure 

under Inventio because it describes how the “compliance 

mechanism” is connected to and interacts with the other 

components of the system, what processes the “compliance 

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mechanism” performs, and what structural subcomponents might comprise the “compliance mechanism.” We 

disagree. Media Rights is correct that the Court in Inventio considered how the “modernizing device” was connected to other claimed components of the system. Id. at 

1358. But this description alone was not sufficient to 

avoid the application of § 112, ¶ 6. Rather, it was the 

specification’s disclosure regarding how the “modernizing 

device” and its internal components operated as a circuit, 

which we had recognized in prior cases to connote sufficient structure, that was the basis for this Court’s conclusion that “modernizing device” was not a means-plusfunction term. Id. at 1358–59. In Inventio, moreover, the 

Court was applying our now-superseded case law, which 

imposed a heavy presumption against finding a claim 

term to be in means-plus-function format. Id. at 1356 

(noting that “the presumption flowing from the absence of 

the term ‘means’ is a strong one that is not readily overcome”). Because we apply no such heavy presumption 

here, and the description of the structure to which Media 

Rights points is far less detailed than in Inventio, we do 

not believe Inventio carries the weight Media Rights 

attaches to it.

We have never found that the term “mechanism”— 

without more—connotes an identifiable structure; certainly, merely adding the modifier “compliance” to that term 

would not do so either. See Mass. Inst. of Tech, 462 F.3d 

at 1354 (explaining that “[t]he term ‘mechanism’ standing 

alone connotes no more structure than the terms ‘means,’” 

and thus, the Court should consider whether the adjectival modifier carries a generally understood structural 

meaning in the art). Nothing in the written description of 

the ’033 Patent adds sufficiently to the meaning of the 

term’s structure; it only describes the term’s function and 

interaction with other parts in the system. See ’033 

Patent col. 3:41–43 (noting that Fig. 3 depicts a diagram 

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ance mechanism); col. 8:32–63 (describing the functions of 

the copyright compliance mechanism’s components); col. 

13:20–55 (detailing the use of custom media device drivers in a copyright compliance mechanism that receives a 

media file); col. 21:14–46 (explaining that Fig. 5B illustrates the computer system used to implement the invention, wherein the copyright compliance mechanism is 

coupled to playback application and the wave shim driver). This disclosure fails to provide sufficient structure for 

“compliance mechanism.” See Robert Bosch, 769 F.3d at 

1099–1100 (finding that the specification’s description of 

how the “program recognition device” connects and functions with various components was insufficient to provide 

structure to the “program recognition device” term). 

Accordingly, we find that the district court was correct to 

conclude “compliance mechanism” is a means-plusfunction limitation.

Because “compliance mechanism” is a means-plusfunction term, we now must “attempt to construe the 

disputed claim term by identifying the ‘corresponding 

structure, material, or acts described in the specification’ 

to which the claim term will be limited.” Id. at 1097 

(quoting Welker Bearing Co. v. PHD, Inc., 550 F.3d 1090, 

1097 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). Where there are multiple claimed 

functions, as there are in this case, the patentee must 

disclose adequate corresponding structure to perform all

of the claimed functions. Noah Sys., Inc. v. Intuit Inc., 

675 F.3d 1302, 1318–19 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[W]here a 

disclosed algorithm supports some, but not all, of the 

functions associated with a means-plus-function limitation, we treat the specification as if no algorithm has been 

disclosed at all. In such instances, we are not faced with

a disclosure which addresses itself to an identifiable 

function, but arguably does so inadequately.”). “If we are 

unable to identify any ‘corresponding structure, material, 

or acts described in the specification,’ the claim term is 

indefinite.” Robert Bosch, 769 F.3d at 1097 (quoting Noah 

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Sys., 675 F.3d at 1312); see also EON Corp. IP Holdings, 

LLC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 785 F.3d 616, 621 (Fed. Cir. 

2015) (“Means-plus-function claim limitations under § 112 ¶ 6 must satisfy the definiteness requirement 

of § 112 ¶ 2.”). 

Here, the parties agree that the “compliance mechanism” performs four functions: controlling data output by 

diverting a data pathway; monitoring the controlled data 

pathway; managing an output path by diverting a data 

pathway; and stopping the play of media content. See 

Media Rights, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176475, at *11. The 

question is whether the specification discloses adequate 

structure to achieve all four of the claimed functions. See 

Noah Sys., 675 F.3d at 1311 (“Even if the specification 

discloses a ‘corresponding structure,’ the disclosure must 

be adequate; the patent’s specification must provide ‘an 

adequate disclosure showing what is meant by that 

[claim] language.’” (quoting In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 

1189, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 1994))). Because these functions are 

computer-implemented functions, moreover, the structure 

disclosed in the specification must be more than a general 

purpose computer or microprocessor. Aristocrat Techs. 

Austl. Pty Ltd. v. Int’l Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328, 1333 

(Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int’l Game 

Tech., 184 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Instead, we require that the specification disclose an algorithm for 

performing the claimed function. See Net MoneyIN, Inc. 

v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 

The algorithm may be expressed as a mathematical 

formula, in prose, as a flow chart, or in any other manner 

that provides sufficient structure. Noah, 675 F.3d at 1312 

(citing Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 

1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).

Here, the specification fails to disclose an operative 

algorithm for both the “controlling data output” and 

“managing output path” functions. These two functions 

both require diverting a data pathway. Media Rights 

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argues that the specification discloses an algorithm for 

performing this diversion at col. 11:37–12:20, with its 

recitation of C++ source code that can be implemented to 

perform the function. To determine if this disclosure of 

software code is sufficient, the Court in this case “needs 

expert witness testimony to determine what that source 

code discloses at an algorithmic level,” as Media Rights 

conceded at oral argument. Oral Arg. at 14:40–47, available at http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default

.aspx?fl=2014-1218.mp3. Here, there is unrebutted

expert testimony that this code only returns various error

messages. The cited algorithm does not, accordingly, 

explain how to perform the diverting function, making the 

disclosure inadequate. See Typhoon Touch Techs., Inc. v. 

Dell, Inc., 659 F.3d 1376, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[T]he 

patent need only disclose sufficient structure for a person 

of skill in the field to provide an operative software program for the specified function.”). Because it fails to 

disclose any other algorithm that performs the diversion 

function, the specification of the ’033 Patent fails to 

disclose sufficient structure for the “compliance mechanism” term. 

Additionally, the specification does not disclose sufficient structure for the “monitoring” function. Media 

Rights alleges that the specification discloses a set of 

rules at col. 18:33–48, which the “copyright compliance 

mechanism” applies to monitor the data pathway to 

ensure there is no unauthorized recording of electronic 

media. But, this cited portion of the specification provides 

no detail about the rules themselves or how the “copyright 

compliance mechanism” determines whether the rules are 

being enforced. ’033 Patent col. 18:38–41 (explaining that 

the copyright compliance mechanism will review a portion 

of a media file in order to verify that the rules are enforced); col. 18:42–44 (explaining that this process will 

continue “until the media file’s contents have been presented in their entirety”). In the absence of any further 

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disclosure, we also find that the specification fails to 

disclose sufficient structure for the “monitoring” function. 

Accordingly, the district court did not err when it determined that this term is indefinite.3

CONCLUSION

Here, the district court properly determined that 

“compliance mechanism” is a means-plus-function term, 

and that the specification fails to adequately disclose the 

structure to perform all four of its functions. We agree 

with the district court that this fact renders all claims in 

the ’033 Patent indefinite. Accordingly, we affirm the 

district court’s grant of judgment of invalidity as to claims

1–27 of ’033 Patent. 

AFFIRMED

3 Because we affirm the district court’s decision 

that the “compliance mechanism” limitation is indefinite, 

we need not reach Media Rights’s additional argument 

that the “custom media device” term is not indefinite. See 

Orion Tech., Inc. v. United States, 704 F.3d 1344, 1350 

(Fed. Cir. 2013) (“An appellate court can affirm a decision 

of the trial court upon any ground supported by the 

record.”) (citing Datascope Corp. v. SMEC, Inc., 879 F.2d 

820, 822 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1989)). Additionally, we need not 

reach Capital One’s alternative argument that the district 

court’s invalidity decision also can be affirmed on 35 

U.S.C. § 101 grounds. As Capital One itself acknowledges, “the district court did not address [its] motion for 

judgment on the pleadings under § 101.” Appellees’ Br. at 

2. We decline to do so in the first instance. 

 

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