Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca6-14-04197/USCOURTS-ca6-14-04197-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Svetislav Vujovic
Appellant

Document Text:

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

File Name: 15a0830n.06

Case No. 14-4197

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

SVETISLAV VUJOVIC,

Defendant-Appellant.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT FOR THE NORTHERN 

DISTRICT OF OHIO

O P I N I O N

BEFORE: BOGGS and McKEAGUE, Circuit Judges; BERTELSMAN, District Judge.*

McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. Over the course of five years, Svetislav Vujovic was 

engaged in a scheme to defraud the St. Paul Croatian Federal Credit Union in Cleveland, Ohio. 

He submitted false loan applications and bribed the credit union’s Chief Operating Officer to 

secure loans. After the collapse of the credit union in 2010, Vujovic was charged with one count 

of financial-institution fraud, one count of giving gifts for procuring loans, ten counts of making 

false statements to a federal credit union, and two counts of money laundering. He was 

convicted by a jury on all fourteen counts. Vujovic now appeals, arguing that (1) the 

government unconstitutionally suppressed exculpatory evidence; (2) new evidence warrants a 

 

*

The Honorable William O. Bertelsman, United States District Judge for the Eastern 

District of Kentucky, sitting by designation.

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new trial; (3) the district court infringed on his constitutional right to testify; (4) the district court 

interfered with his rights to allocute and call witnesses at sentencing; and (5) his trial counsel 

was unconstitutionally ineffective. We decline to address the merits of Vujovic’s ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claims without prejudice but otherwise affirm his conviction and sentence.

I

Svetislav Vujovic is an Ohio businessman who was involved in the construction business. 

From 2004 to 2008, Vujovic was engaged in a scheme to defraud the St. Paul Croatian Federal 

Credit Union (the Credit Union) in Cleveland, Ohio. Vujovic lied on loan applications to secure 

loans from the Credit Union. He lied about the purpose of these loans, stating that they were 

going to his businesses when they instead were used personally by Vujovic to support his 

lifestyle. He also lied on the applications about his monthly income so that he would appear to 

be a stronger candidate for loans. He intentionally left sections of the loan applications blank, 

but signed the applications verifying that the information contained within was true and 

complete. He used different methods to keep his loans current without making payments, such 

as redirecting the proceeds from one loan account to pay another and using a method called loan 

reset—rolling the principal and interest into a new loan so that it looks current even though no 

actual payments were made. To facilitate these fraudulent activities and continue to be approved 

for new loans, Vujovic bribed Anthony Raguz, the Chief Operating Officer of the Credit Union.

Vujovic’s theory at trial was that he was simply an unsuccessful businessman. 

He secured these business loans, but his construction projects were not always successful. He 

pointed the finger at Anthony Raguz and argued that the government’s evidence merely showed 

the attempts made by Raguz and other Credit Union employees to disguise their own culpability. 

Vujovic used evidence of the rampant fraud at the Credit Union to argue that, to the extent he 

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was a participant in the fraud, he was an unknowing one. The jury was unpersuaded and on May 

13, 2014 convicted Vujovic of all fourteen charges: one count of financial-institution fraud in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344; one count of giving commissions or gifts for procuring loans in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 215(a)(1); ten counts of making false statements to a federal credit union 

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014; and two counts of money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1957. Vujovic was sentenced to 109 months’ imprisonment on all counts to be served 

concurrently, followed by three years of supervised release, as well as a $1,400 special 

assessment and $2,950,541.56 restitution.

II

On appeal, Vujovic has identified numerous pieces of evidence that he claims were 

withheld from him prior to trial and sentencing in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 

(1963). Despite his litany of claims, he has not demonstrated that the prosecution violated its 

constitutional duty to disclose exculpatory evidence. “There is no general constitutional right to 

discovery in a criminal case, and Brady did not create one.” Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 

545, 559 (1977). To establish a Brady violation, a defendant has the burden of proving three 

elements: “The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is 

exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, 

either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 

263, 281–82 (1999). 

None of the evidence that Vujovic claims was unconstitutionally withheld constitutes 

Brady material. As an initial matter, several of the items of evidence that Vujovic has identified 

might not have been suppressed at all—either because the item may have never been in the 

government’s possession (such as Raguz’s day calendar and interview notes for bank teller 

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Katica Covic1) or because the information was available to the defendant by means other than 

disclosure by the government (such as matters of public record). See Carter v. Bell, 218 F.3d 

581, 601 (6th Cir. 2000) (“Further, there is no Brady violation if the defendant knew or should 

have known the essential facts permitting him to take advantage of the information in question, 

or if the information was available to him from another source.”). However, we need not 

determine which of the numerous pieces of evidence were, in fact, actually suppressed, because 

Vujovic has failed to show that the evidence is favorable to him or that its alleged withholding 

was prejudicial. 

A

The allegedly withheld evidence was not exculpatory. In order to constitute Brady

material, “[t]he evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is 

exculpatory, or because it is impeaching.” Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281–82. Vujovic argues that his 

failure to provide complete information on his applications was because they were computergenerated, but this is not exculpatory given that Vujovic signed these false loan applications to 

verify that the applications were complete and accurate. Most of the other evidence that Vujovic 

has identified is only useful to show that others were guilty of separate criminal acts—but such 

evidence would not show that Vujovic was innocent. For example, Vujovic refers to loans that 

“were secured by the assignment of shareholder accounts, some of which were nonexistent” to 

show that credit-union employees were creating fake loans. R. 81-2, Gojevic Investigative 

Interview at 1–2, Page ID 1853–54. Vujovic also points to Raguz’s day calendar, which he 

claims would be exculpatory because it would show the names of other customers who, like 

 

1

The prosecution claims that “the government has never seen nor had possession of any such 

calendars, much less any during the relevant time period years before [the Credit Union’s] 

closure, if they even exist.” Appellee Br. 27. The prosecution also claims that Katica Covic was 

never interviewed by the government. 

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Vujovic, met with Raguz on the days Raguz took envelopes of cash to his bank. But the 

government never disputed that others were also bribing Raguz. Moreover, the evidence at trial 

focused not only on meetings between Vujovic and Raguz and cash bribes, but also bribes 

Vujovic made by check.

Vujovic further refers to bank applications for other individuals that had sections left 

blank and argues that the government failed to turn over “bank teller interview information” for 

Katica Covic, Linda Fuduric, and Debbie Politi that would have corroborated this. Vujovic has 

provided no evidence of what this “interview information” of Katica Covic and Linda Fuduric 

would contain, let alone how the information would have helped his case. As for Debbie Politi, 

he only refers this court to his investigator’s interview notes. None of the information Politi told 

the investigator is exculpatory. Politi “handled car loan applications” for the Credit Union and 

said that “the computer generated a loan application printout for individuals who previously had 

loans with the credit union, and the borrower signed the application.” R. 81-1, Politi 

Investigative Interview at 1, Page ID 1852. She had never handled any loans for Vujovic. 

Regardless, it is not exculpatory that other borrowers may have applied for and received loans 

based on submitting incomplete loan applications. 

B

Moreover, Vujovic also fails to prove that “there is a reasonable probability that . . . the 

result of the proceeding would have been different” had the prosecution turned over the evidence 

he identified. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). A reasonable probability of a 

different result is shown “when the government’s evidentiary suppression ‘undermines 

confidence in the outcome of the trial.’” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995) (quoting 

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Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678). In conducting this assessment, we consider all of the undisclosed 

evidence “collectively, not item by item.” Id. at 436. 

At Trial. Vujovic has not demonstrated that there is a reasonable probability that he 

would not have been convicted, even if the government had turned over to him all of the items he 

has identified. Again, demonstrating other individuals’ guilt for separate crimes would not have 

had any effect on the determination of Vujovic’s culpability in this case. And the alleged Brady

material “must be evaluated in the context of the entire record.” United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 

97, 112 (1976). “[W]here the undisclosed evidence merely furnishes an additional basis on 

which to challenge a witness whose credibility has already been shown to be questionable or 

who is subject to extensive attack by reason of other evidence, the undisclosed evidence may be 

cumulative, and hence not material.” Byrd v. Collins, 209 F.3d 486, 518 (6th Cir. 2000). The 

jury was already made aware that Raguz was heavily involved in the fraud that ran rampant in 

the Credit Union and that Raguz had tried to conceal his own crimes. Thus, Vujovic has failed to 

show that there is a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would be different if the 

government had turned over information that Raguz periodically altered loans, the fact that 

Raguz had lied to the Board of Directors about whether the credit union’s computers were 

capable of generating loan rates of return, and the names of Credit Union members disputing 

their loans. 

At Sentencing. Similarly, Vujovic has not shown that there is a reasonable probability of 

a different sentence had the government turned over the evidence he has identified. Vujovic 

argues that the government unconstitutionally suppressed the following evidence at sentencing: 

blank bank applications, the names of Credit Union members who disputed their loans, and 

information that Raguz and some tellers would “periodically alter[]” or create loan documents to 

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make it appear that loans were current. Appellant Br. 24. But Vujovic fails to raise any 

compelling arguments as to how this evidence would have impacted his sentence. He also 

argues that he should have had access to other customers’ loan applications that were either 

incomplete or contained information that had been “whited out,” Appellant Br. 38, claiming that 

he would have been able to use this information to argue more effectively that his loss 

calculation was less than $2.5 million, which would have resulted in a lower Sentencing 

Guidelines range. Another borrower’s false or incomplete loan application, however, would not 

mitigate Vujovic’s loss calculation, and so Vujovic has not shown that there is a reasonable 

probability that he would have received a different sentence.

III

After he was convicted on all counts, Vujovic filed a motion for a new trial on May 28, 

2014. His motion for a new trial alleged: a series of Brady violations, that the verdict was 

against the manifest weight of the evidence, that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the 

conviction, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. On appeal, he argues that his 

motion for new trial should have been granted because of the following, allegedly new, evidence: 

investigative interview notes for Josip Gojevic and Debbie Politi from July 2014, Raguz’s day 

calendar, and blank computer-generated printouts for other Credit Union loan applications—the 

same evidence on which he bases several of his Brady claims on appeal. 

To obtain a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, a party must show that “the 

new evidence (1) was discovered after the trial, (2) could not have been discovered earlier with 

due diligence, (3) is material and not merely cumulative or impeaching, and (4) would likely 

produce an acquittal.” United States v. Hanna, 661 F.3d 271, 297–98 (6th Cir. 2011). We need 

not assess whether the pieces of evidence that Vujovic has identified meet the first three 

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elements, because they clearly fail to meet the fourth. As we determined above, Vujovic did not 

establish a reasonable probability of a different result even if he had had access to all of his 

claims for Brady material. It must logically follow, then, that he cannot meet the more exacting 

standard that he would have likely been acquitted if he had had access to only some of that 

evidence. 

IV

Vujovic argues that the district court interfered with his right to testify by impeding his 

attempts to explain his lack of involvement in preparing the loan applications. A criminal 

defendant has a fundamental right to testify in his own defense. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 

50–53 (1987). But the right to testify is not absolute. Id. at 64. Vujovic “does not dispute that a 

trial judge has wide discretion to manage proceedings,” but argues that these instances of 

interference “prevent[ed] him from providing complete and accurate testimony to the jury.” 

Reply Br. 8; Appellant Br. 32. 

Vujovic cites five instances of alleged interference. A review of the transcript, however, 

reveals that three of the times the trial judge stepped in were when Vujovic gave nonresponsive 

or narrative answers. R. 70, Trial Tr. Vujovic at 100–01, Page ID 1594–95; R. 70, Trial Tr. 

Vujovic at 174–75, Page ID 1668–69; R. 70, Trial Tr. Vujovic at 180–81, Page ID 1674–75. 

One of the times, the district court stepped in to ask Vujovic a clarifying question. R. 70, Trial 

Tr. Vujovic at 163–65, Page ID 1657–59. In Vujovic’s remaining case of alleged interference, 

the district court did not interject at all. R. 70, Trial Tr. Vujovic at 147–48, Page ID 1641–42.

The district court was only managing proceedings and thus did not unconstitutionally 

interfere with Vujovic’s right to testify. Nor do these five interruptions rise to the level of 

improperly influencing the jury during his testimony, as Vujovic claims. Moreover, Vujovic was

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given a chance to explain his level of involvement in preparing the business-loan applications on 

redirect examination. 

Vujovic argues further that the district court improperly asked his counsel to “reel him 

in.” This one comment, however, did not affect the jury’s ability to independently assess 

Vujovic’s credibility, as Vujovic claims. The district judge was merely instructing Vujovic and 

his attorney that Vujovic needed to answer the questions posed to him without editorializing. 

Given that there was only a single instance of such a comment and given the context in which the 

comment was made, there is no reason to believe that the district court’s comment “let’s reel him 

in” usurped the jury’s role in determining Vujovic’s credibility. See also R. 71, Trial Tr. Jury 

Instructions at 3, Page ID 1722 (“Deciding what the facts are is your job, not mine, and nothing 

that I have said or done during this trial was meant to influence your decision about the facts in 

any way.”).

V

Vujovic next argues that the district court unreasonably interfered with his right to 

allocute and call witnesses in mitigation at sentencing in violation of his First, Fifth, Sixth, and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court did not err in focusing Vujovic’s allocution to 

relevant sentencing factors nor did it err in refusing to allow irrelevant witness testimony at 

sentencing.

A

Vujovic argues that the district court unconstitutionally interfered with his right to 

allocute at sentencing. There is no constitutional right to allocution. Pasquarille v. United 

States, 130 F.3d 1220 (6th Cir. 1997); see also Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962) 

(“The failure of a trial court to ask a defendant represented by an attorney whether he has 

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anything to say before sentence is imposed is not of itself an error of the character or magnitude 

cognizable under a writ of habeas corpus. It is an error which is neither jurisdictional nor 

constitutional.”). But there is a right to allocution under the Federal Rules of Criminal 

Procedure. The court must “address the defendant personally in order to permit the defendant to 

speak or present any information to mitigate the sentence.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(A)(ii). 

Vujovic alleges that the district court placed an inappropriate limitation on his exercise of that 

right. Because he did not lodge an objection during sentencing, we review his allocution claim 

only for plain error. United States v. Carter, 355 F.3d 920, 926 (6th Cir. 2004). 

The right to allocution is not unlimited. “Defendants may address the amount or quality 

of evidence adduced at trial to explain their role in an offense or the severity of their conduct, but 

not merely to continue to deny guilt.” Id. Vujovic began his allocution by discussing his work 

ethic and his family background, but he quickly transitioned into a lengthy criticism of the 

evidence presented at trial. He particularly protested the characterization of his lavish lifestyle; 

the allegation that he had given bribes to employees of the Credit Union; and the credibility of 

trial witnesses. Eventually, the district court interrupted:

Mr. Vujovic, I have to cut you off at this point. Everything you are testifying to 

right now or giving me a statement is directly contrary to the jury’s findings. I 

cannot accept this any longer. Even though the Government is not objecting, and 

I give them a lot of credit for sitting there and not doing anything, you cannot 

rehash the trial. This is for mitigation. This is not to go ahead and give a closing 

argument against the Government’s evidence, and that is exactly what you are 

doing. We’re done with that.

R. 94, Sentencing Transcript at 19, Page ID 1959. As in Carter, the trial court here “merely 

informed [the defendant] it did not wish to hear an irrelevant sentencing argument which had 

already been properly made before the court during [his] closing argument.” Carter, 355 F.3d at 

926. The jury had already assessed the trial witnesses’ credibility and the other evidence 

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presented, and it had found beyond a reasonable doubt that Vujovic had given bribes and that he 

had submitted false loan applications with the requisite intent to defraud. The district court 

correctly asserted that, instead of arguing his innocence, Vujovic should focus his allocution on 

relevant sentencing factors, including his family and his work ethic. 

After the district court directed Vujovic’s allocution to relevant sentencing factors, 

Vujovic spoke of being a loving father and his close family relationships. Though he continued 

to deny wrongdoing, he apologized to the Credit Union’s members for his role in its collapse. 

He described his hard work and efforts to provide for his family. The district court was attentive 

to Vujovic’s allocution, noting in particular his strong family ties and his apology to the credit 

union members when imposing his sentence. Vujovic was personally invited to address the court 

and was permitted to discuss any relevant matters desired in relation to his sentencing and 

therefore was not denied his right of allocution. 

B

Vujovic argues that the district court unreasonably interfered with his right to present 

testimony from Josip Gojevic and Deborah Politi at sentencing. He claims this violated his First, 

Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, but cites to no case recognizing a constitutional 

right to call witnesses in mitigation during non-capital sentencing. We evaluate his claim in the 

context of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which require the court to “address the 

defendant personally in order to permit the defendant to . . . present any information to mitigate 

the sentence.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(A)(ii). We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings 

for abuse of discretion. United States v. Morales, 687 F.3d 697, 701 (6th Cir. 2012). “A district 

court abuses its discretion when it relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact, when it improperly 

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applies the law, or when it employs an erroneous legal standard.” United States v. Cline, 

362 F.3d 343, 348 (6th Cir. 2004).

No abuse of discretion occurred. Vujovic wanted to present testimony from Gojevic and 

Politi. The parties discussed this in chambers, and the district court refused to permit these two 

witnesses to testify. When they returned to the courtroom, Vujovic did not object to the ruling 

but proffered that the witnesses’ testimony would have been consistent with their investigative 

interview notes. There is no information in the investigative interview notes or in Vujovic’s 

brief indicating that this testimony would have been relevant to sentencing. 

Josip Gojevic worked at the Credit Union and became aware of Raguz’s loan fraud 

scheme when the government began investigating. Gojevic did not know Vujovic. He testified 

at trial that he had seen Raguz deposit envelopes with cash after meeting with Vujovic, but told 

the investigator that because Raguz met with more than one customer throughout the day “it 

would not be fair to conclude the cash in the envelopes Raguz took to the bank came from 

Vujovic.” R. 81-2, Gojevic Invesigative Interview at 2–3, Page ID 1854–55. Thus, the only 

reason Vujovic could have wanted Gojevic to testify at his sentencing was to continue to argue 

that he was not guilty of the crimes for which he had been convicted. A defendant, however, 

cannot continue to present evidence of innocence at sentencing. In fact, it would have been 

reversible error for the sentencing judge to consider Vujovic’s claims of innocence. United 

States v. Hunt, 521 F.3d 636, 649 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding defendant’s sentence to be 

substantively unreasonable because “the judge in sentencing [relied] on facts directly 

inconsistent with those found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt”). Here, the jury had 

already found beyond a reasonable doubt that Vujovic had given commissions or gifts for 

procuring loans. And, to the extent that Vujovic wanted to use Gojevic’s testimony to argue that 

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there was a policy at the Credit Union that instructed him to fill out the loan applications as he 

did, this testimony would have been irrelevant. The jury had found beyond a reasonable doubt 

that Vujovic had knowingly executed or attempted to execute a scheme to defraud a financial 

institution or to obtain money or other property owned by or in the control of the financial 

institution, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises. “Nothing in § 

3553(a) suggests that Congress intended that sentencing judges should rely on a defendant’s 

innocence when the defendant has already been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 

649.

Likewise, there is no evidence that Deborah Politi could have testified to any relevant 

information at sentencing. Politi worked at the Credit Union handling car-loan applications but 

did not process any loans for Vujovic. Neither the notes from her investigative interview nor 

Vujovic’s brief reveal any information that would have been pertinent to Vujevic’s sentencing. 

Therefore, it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to prevent Gojevic and Politi 

from testifying at Vujevic’s sentencing hearing.

VI

In this direct appeal, Vujovic argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. 

He identifies seven areas of inadequacy: (1) failure to investigate the Credit Union’s loanapplication procedures and the deceptive conduct of the Credit Union’s employees, (2) failure to 

file any pretrial motions, (3) failure to object to leading questions on direct examination, 

(4) failure to effectively cross-examine witnesses, (5) using “pejorative” terms regarding Vujovic 

during opening statements, (6) agreeing to “hamstring” Vujovic’s testimony, and (7) a general 

lack of preparation. 

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Generally, we do not review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, 

“since there has not been an opportunity to develop and include in the record evidence bearing 

on the merits of the allegations.” United States v. Martinez, 430 F.3d 317, 338 (6th Cir. 2005) 

(quoting United States v. Wunder, 919 F.2d 34, 37 (6th Cir. 1990)); see also Massaro v. United 

States, 538 U.S. 500, 504–05 (2003) (“When an ineffective-assistance claim is brought on direct 

appeal, appellate counsel and the court must proceed on a trial record not developed precisely for 

the object of litigating or preserving the claim and thus often incomplete or inadequate for this 

purpose.”). A rare exception to our general rule exists “when a record is adequate enough to 

address the merits.” Carter, 355 F.3d at 924. That is not the case here. Without additional 

factual development, Vujovic cannot show that his counsel’s actions were not supported by 

reasonable strategy or that the alleged errors were prejudicial. See Massaro, 538 U.S. at 505. 

Thus, we decline to address the merits of Vujovic’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims 

without prejudice, allowing him to raise these claims in a post-conviction proceeding under 28 

U.S.C. § 2255. 

CONCLUSION

Although he has brought numerous claims on appeal, Vujovic does not prevail on any of 

them. He has not demonstrated that the government unconstitutionally suppressed exculpatory 

evidence, nor has he shown that he is entitled to a new trial because of newly discovered 

evidence. The district court did not unreasonably interfere with Vujovic’s constitutional right to 

testify. Vujovic’s right to allocution was not infringed, and the district court properly denied his 

request to admit irrelevant witness testimony at sentencing. We need not reach his ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claim on direct appeal. Accordingly, we decline to address the merits of 

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the defendant’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims without prejudice and otherwise 

AFFIRM the defendant’s conviction and sentence.

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