Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-02108/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-02108-17/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
CDCR
Defendant
Robin Gillen Starr
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBIN GILLEN STARR, ) 

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

) 

CDCR, et al., )

)

 ) 

Defendants. ) 

____________________________________)

1:11-cv-02108-AWI-GSA-PC 

 

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINTFOR

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AND

VIOLATION OF RULES 8 AND 18,

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

(Doc. 1.)

THIRTY DAY DEADLINE TO FILE

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

I. BACKGROUND

Robin Gillen Starr (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed the Complaint commencing this action on December 22,

2011. (Doc. 1.) The Complaint is now before the Court for screening. 

II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court

must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous

or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any

filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time

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if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

III. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

Plaintiff is presently incarcerated at California Men’s Colony East in San Luis Obispo,

California. The events at issue occurred at Sierra Conservation Center in Jamestown, California, and

Corcoran State Prison in Corcoran, California, when Plaintiff was incarcerated at those facilities. 

Plaintiff names as defendants CCII Bird, CCI Thompson, CCI Scott, and C/O Phelps.

Plaintiff’s Complaint consists of a rambling, largely undecipherable narrative. Plaintiff appears

to allege that he was issued a writ of habeas corpus by the Sacramento County Superior Court on

September 29, 2011, which prison counselors – CCII Bird, CCI Thompson, CCI Scott -- refuse to

acknowledge, and he is unable to obtain the copies he needs to be discharged. Plaintiff also appears to

allege that he was improperly placed in a mental health program (EOP) by CCI Scott; that C/O Phelps

did not properly lodge his outgoing mail; and that he was “denied religion since 7/5/2011.” (Complaint,

Doc. 1 at 1:28.) 

Plaintiff requests as relief monetary damages and an order releasing him. 

IV. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS -- FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 8 AND 18

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,

or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an

action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 . . . creates a cause of action for violations of the federal Constitution

and laws.” Sweaney v. Ada County, Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotations

omitted). 

Under federal notice pleading, a complaint is required to contain “a short and plain statement of

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual

allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U. S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949

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(2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007)). 

“While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted

inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted). To state a viable claim for relief, Plaintiff must set forth sufficient factual

allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U. S. at 679; Moss v. U.S. Secret

Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting

this plausibility standard. Id.

 Plaintiff may not proceed in one action on a myriad of unrelated claims against different staff

members. “The controlling principle appears in Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a): ‘A party asserting a claim to relief

as an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, may join, either as independent or

as alternate claims, as many claims, legal, equitable, or maritime, as the party has against an opposing

party.’ Thus multiple claims against a single party are fine, but Claim A against Defendant 1 should not

be joined with unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2. Unrelated claims against different defendants

belong in different suits, not only to prevent the sort of morass [a multiple claim, multiple defendant]

suit produce[s], but also to ensure that prisoners pay the required filing fees-for the Prison Litigation

Reform Act limits to 3 the number of frivolous suits or appeals that any prisoner may file without

prepayment of the required fees. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir.

2007). 

Plaintiff’s Complaint in this action is rambling and incoherent, and fails to state any cognizable

claims under federal law. Iqbal, 556 U. S. at 679; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Plaintiff claims that his

rights to due process, equal protection, outgoing mail, and rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,

Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments have been violated by defendants. However, Plaintiff fails to

make sufficient factual allegations to state any cognizable claim. Moreover, Plaintiff describes events

in the Complaint which appear to be unrelated, such as failure to acknowledge his writ of habeas corpus,

improper placement in a mental health program, violations of his right to practice religion, and failure

to process his outgoing mail. The Complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim; however,

the Court will grant Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. 

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In the paragraphs that follow, the Court will provide Plaintiff with the legal standards that appear

to apply to his claims. Plaintiff should carefully review the standards and amend only those claims that

he believes, in good faith, are cognizable.

A. Due Process

The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of liberty without due process

of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to state a cause of action for

deprivation of procedural due process, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a liberty interest

for which the protection is sought. Liberty interests may arise from the Due Process Clause itself or

from state law. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466-68 (1983). With respect to liberty interests arising

from state law, the existence of a liberty interest created by prison regulations is determined by focusing

on the nature of the deprivation. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-84 (1995). Liberty interests

created by prison regulations are limited to freedom from restraint which “imposes atypical and

significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484. 

The Due Process Clause itself does not confer on inmates a liberty interest in being confined in

the general prison population instead of administrative segregation. See Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 466-68; see

also May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir. 1997) (convicted inmate’s due process claim fails

because he has no liberty interest in freedom from state action taken within sentence imposed and

administrative segregation falls within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a sentence)

(quotations omitted); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) (plaintiff’s placement and

retention in the SHU was within range of confinement normally expected by inmates in relation to

ordinary incidents of prison life and, therefore, plaintiff had no protected liberty interest in being free

from confinement in the SHU) (quotations omitted). 

B. Equal Protection

The Equal Protection Clause requires that persons who are similarly situated be treated alike. 

City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249 (1985); Shakur

v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 891 (9th Cir. 2008). An equal protection claim may be established by showing

that Defendants intentionally discriminated against Plaintiff based on his membership in a protected

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class, Comm. ConcerningCmty. Improvement v. Cityof Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 702-03 (9th Cir. 2009);

Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071,1082 (9th Cir. 2003), Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686

(9th Cir. 2001), or that similarly situated individuals were intentionally treated differently without a

rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose, Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agr., 553 U.S. 591,

601-02, 128 S.Ct. 2146 (2008); Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564, 120 S.Ct. 1073

(2000); Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 592 (9th Cir. 2008); North Pacifica LLC v. City

of Pacifica, 526 F.3d 478, 486 (9th Cir. 2008).

C. First Amendment - Free Exercise

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no

law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” U.S. Const.

amend. I. Prisoners “retain protections afforded by the First Amendment,” including the free exercise

of religion. O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987). However, “‘[l]awful incarceration

brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified

by the considerations underlying our penal system.’” Id. (quoting Price v. Johnson, 334 U.S. 266, 285

(1948)). 

The protections of the Free Exercise Clause are triggered when prison officials substantially

burden the practice of an inmate’s religion by preventing him from engaging in conduct which he

sincerely believes is consistent with his faith. Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884-85; Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d

732, 737 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part by Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884-85. “In order to establish a free

exercise violation, [a prisoner] must show the defendants burdened the practice of his religion, by

preventing him from engaging in conduct mandated by his faith, without any justification reasonably

related to legitimate penological interests.” Freeman,125 F.3d at 736. “In order to reach the level of a

constitutional violation, the interference with one’s practice of religion ‘must be more than an

inconvenience; the burden must be substantial and an interference with a tenet or belief that is central

to religious doctrine.’” Id. at 737 (quoting Graham v. C.I.R., 822 F.2d 844, 851 (9th Cir. 1987)). 

///

///

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D. Habeas Corpus

When a prisoner challenges the legality or duration of his custody, or raises a constitutional

challenge which could entitle him to an earlier release, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus. 

Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973); Young v. Kenny, 907 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied

11 S.Ct. 1090 (1991). “[A] state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation) - no matter

the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct

leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings) - if success in that action would necessarily

demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-2, 125

S.Ct. 1242, 1248 (2005). Where the complaint states a habeas claim instead of a § 1983 claim, the court

should dismiss the claim without prejudice for failure to exhaust, rather than converting it to a habeas

and addressing it on the merits. See Blueford v. Prunty, 108 F.3d 251, 255 (9th Cir. 1997); Trimble v.

City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 586 (9th Cir. 1995).

E. Outgoing Mail

Prisoners have “a First Amendment right to send and receive mail.” Witherow v. Paff, 52 F.3d

264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995). Censorship of outgoing prisoner mail is justified if the following criteria are

met: (1) the regulation furthers “an important or substantial government interest unrelated to the

suppression of expression” and (2) “the limitation on First Amendment freedoms must be no greater than

is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest involved.” Procunier

v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974) (overturned by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413-14

(1989) only as test relates to incoming mail - Turner test applies to incoming mail). Isolated incidents

of mail interference or tampering will not support a claim under section 1983 for violation of plaintiff’s

constitutional rights. See Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 351 (2d. Cir. 2003); Gardner v. Howard, 109

F.3d 427, 431 (8th Cir. 1997); Smith v. Maschner, 899 F.2d 940, 944 (10th Cir. 1990). 

F. Adverse Conditions of Confinement

The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment and from

inhumane conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions of confinement claim, and only those

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deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to form

the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9, 112 S.Ct. 995 (1992)

(citations and quotations omitted). In order to state a claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment, the

plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to support a claim that prison officials knew of and disregarded a

substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff. E.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847, 114 S.Ct.

1970 (1994); Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). The circumstances, nature, and

duration of the deprivations are critical in determining whether the conditions complained of are grave

enough to form the basis of a viable Eighth Amendment claim. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731

(9th Cir. 2006). “[R]outine discomfort inherent in the prison setting” does not rise to the level of a

constitutional violation. Id. at 731. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state any cognizable claims

in the Complaint upon which relief may be granted under § 1983. Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure, leave to amend ‘shall be freely given when justice so requires.’” The Court will

provide Plaintiff with time to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified above. Lopez

v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-30 (9th Cir.2000). Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended

complaint within thirty days.

The amended complaint should be brief, but must state what each named defendant did that led

to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or other federal rights. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 679; Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). There is no respondeat superior

liability, and each defendant is only liable for his or her own misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. 

Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Id.

at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Plaintiff must also demonstrate that each defendant

personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones, 297 F.3d at 934 (emphasis added). 

Plaintiff should note that although he has been given the opportunity to amend, it is not for the

purpose of adding new defendants relating to issues arising after December 22, 2011. In addition,

Plaintiff should take care to include only those claims that have been exhausted prior to the initiation

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of this suit on December 22, 2011. Plaintiff is also reminded that he must comply with Rules 8 and 18

as discussed above.

Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint, Lacey v.

Maricopa County, 693 F 3d. 896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), and it must be complete in itself

without reference to the prior or superceded pleading. Local Rule 220. Therefore, in an amended

complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be

sufficiently alleged. The amended complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “First Amended

Complaint,” refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original signed under penalty of perjury. 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Complaint, filed on December 22, 2011, is dismissed for violation of Rules

8(a) and 18(a), and for failure to state a claim, with leave to amend;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file a First

Amended Complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in this order;

4. Plaintiff shall caption the amended complaint “First Amended Complaint” and refer to

the case number 1:11-cv-02108-AWI-GSA-PC; and

5. If Plaintiff fails to complywith this order, this action will be dismissed for failure to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: January 23, 2013 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

6i0kij UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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