Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-03-71743/USCOURTS-ca9-03-71743-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alberto R. Gonzales
Respondent
Maria Dolores Ramirez-Landeros
Petitioner

Document Text:

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARIA DOLORES RAMIREZLANDEROS,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ALBERTO R. GONZALES, * * Attorney

General,

 Respondent.

No. 03-71743

Agency No. A78-754-557

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued & Submitted February 10, 2005

Submission Withdrawn February 17, 2005

Resubmitted September 8, 2005

Pasadena, California

Before: HUG, THOMPSON, and HAWKINS, Circuit Judges.

FILED

SEP 12 2005

CATHY A. CATTERSON, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited

to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** Alberto R. Gonzales is substituted for his predecessor, John Ashcroft, 

as Attorney General of the United States, pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2). 

 Case: 03-71743, 09/12/2005, ID: 5558389, DktEntry: 35, Page 1 of 12
Maria Dolores Ramirez-Landeros petitions for review of the Board of

Immigration Appeals’ denial of her application for cancellation of removal and

adjustment of status. We hold that the Board’s application of its precedent

governing cancellation of removal to her case violated her constitutional right to

equal protection. Accordingly, we grant her petition.

I. Factual Background

Ramirez-Landeros, a Mexican national, has resided in the United States

since October, 1989. She has two children, both born in the United States, and her

husband recently became a permanent resident. Her teenage son Eric suffers from

total blindness and various other disabilities requiring continuous therapeutic

intervention. Although Eric is able to obtain state-of-the-art care in the United

States, the treatment he needs is scarce or unavailable in Mexico. For several years,

Ramirez-Landeros has volunteered her time on behalf of organizations caring for

blind and disabled children like her son.

Following a brief trip to Mexico to visit her ailing father, Ramirez-Landeros

was intercepted at the border on August 25, 2000, placed in expedited removal

proceedings, and ordered removed under 8 U.S.C. § 1225. She tried to enter the

country again on August 31, 2000, but was ordered removed a second time.

Following a third attempt on September 4, 2000, Ramirez-Landeros was detained

2

 Case: 03-71743, 09/12/2005, ID: 5558389, DktEntry: 35, Page 2 of 12
and placed in removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. She filed an

application for cancellation of removal and adjustment of status based on her long

residency in the United States and the extreme hardship her son would suffer if she

were removed. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1).

Although the immigration judge found Ramirez-Landeros otherwise eligible

for cancellation, especially given the difficulties her disabled son would face were

she removed, the judge concluded that the prior expedited removal orders

prevented her from demonstrating good moral character as required by 8 U.S.C. §

1229b(b)(1)(B). The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the judgment of the

immigration judge on an alternate ground: that the expedited removal orders

interrupted the accrual of continuous physical presence for purposes of

cancellation. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A). Ramirez-Landeros timely petitioned

for review.

II. Standard of Review

Because the Board reviewed the Immigration Judge’s decision de novo

rather than adopting that decision as its own, we consider only the decision of the

Board. Kankamalage v. INS, 335 F.3d 858, 861 (9th Cir. 2003). We review purely

legal questions concerning the meaning of immigration statutes de novo,

Lagandaon v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 2004), although we must defer

3

 Case: 03-71743, 09/12/2005, ID: 5558389, DktEntry: 35, Page 3 of 12
to an agency interpretation that is “based on a permissible construction” of an

ambiguous statute. Avendano-Ramirez v. Ashcroft, 365 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir.

2004) (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837,

843 (1984)).

III. Discussion

A. Good Moral Character Requirement

Ramirez-Landeros argues that the Immigration Judge erred in finding her

statutorily ineligible for cancellation based on a lack of good moral character,

because Congress erred in failing to fix a cross-reference in the statute. See 8

U.S.C. § 1101(f)(3) (precluding good moral character finding for “a member of

one or more of the classes of persons, whether inadmissible or not, described in [8

U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)],” i.e., persons previously ordered removed). Because the

Board did not rely on this conclusion in its decision, we need not address it. See

Kankamalage, 335 F.3d at 861.

B. Expedited Removal Orders

Ramirez-Landeros contends that she was not an “arriving alien” for purposes

of expedited removal, but rather one of the “certain other aliens” described in 8

U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II), to which expedited removal does not apply. She

also argues that this same statute gave the immigration judge authority to review

4

 Case: 03-71743, 09/12/2005, ID: 5558389, DktEntry: 35, Page 4 of 12
and vacate the expedited removal orders underlying her ineligibility for

cancellation of removal.

We lack jurisdiction to review “any individual determination or to entertain

any other cause or claim arising from or relating to the implementation or

operation of an order of [expedited] removal . . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A)(i); see

also Avendano-Ramirez, 365 F.3d at 818-19. Moreover, the REAL ID Act of 2005,

Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302 (2005) (“REAL ID Act”), did not restore our

jurisdiction to consider questions of law and constitutional claims arising out of

expedited removal orders. In the pertinent provision of the REAL ID Act, 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a)(2)(D), Congress repealed “all jurisdictional bars to our direct review of

final removal orders other than those remaining in 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (in provisions

other than(a)(2)(B) or (C)) following the amendment of that section by the REAL

ID Act.” Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 410 F.3d 585, 587 (9th Cir. 2005) (emphasis

added). Section 1252(a)(2)(A), barring review of expedited removal orders, is just

such a provision. Indeed, Congress seems to have taken great care to exclude

subparagraph (A) from the provision restoring jurisdiction over constitutional and

legal claims. Accordingly, we do not have jurisdiction to consider these arguments.

C. Equal Protection

5

 Case: 03-71743, 09/12/2005, ID: 5558389, DktEntry: 35, Page 5 of 12
Ramirez-Landeros also argues that the Board’s decision violated her

constitutional right to equal protection by treating her differently from similarly

situated aliens who, having managed to reenter the United States illegally after a

short absence, would still be eligible for cancellation of removal. Although her

argument has substantial force, we must first examine whether we have jurisdiction

to consider it.

The REAL ID Act clearly restored our jurisdiction to review “constitutional

claims or questions of law” raised in a petition for review of a final order of

removal, notwithstanding any contrary suggestion in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) or

(C). Fernandez-Ruiz, 410 F.3d at 587. Our jurisdiction is not foreclosed by §

1252(a)(2)(A), which prohibits review of expedited removal orders, because

Ramirez-Landeros’s equal protection argument goes to whether the Board erred in

6

 Case: 03-71743, 09/12/2005, ID: 5558389, DktEntry: 35, Page 6 of 12
determining that she was ineligible for cancellation of removal under § 1229b(b).1

Our decision in Avendano-Ramirez does not dictate otherwise. The petitioner in

that case raised two arguments identical to those we have already rejected here:

that Congress erred in denying good moral character to aliens previously removed,

and that expedited removal was improper under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii). See

Avendano-Ramirez, 365 F.3d at 818, 819 n.19. We faithfully follow AvendanoRamirez in concluding that we lack jurisdiction to consider Ramirez-Landeros’s

statutory attacks on her expedited removal orders. Her constitutional argument,

however, is distinct in that it pertains primarily to the Board’s application of its

own precedent in determining her eligibility for cancellation of removal. We

neither faced nor foreclosed such an argument in Avendano-Ramirez. Accordingly,

1

 The Board relied on Matter of Romalez-Alcaide, 23 I. & N. Dec. 423 (BIA

2002) (en banc), in concluding that Ramirez-Landeros’s expedited removal orders

terminated her physical presence in the country and thus rendered her statutorily

ineligible for cancellation of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A) (requiring ten

years’ continuous physical presence). We have found this reading of the statute to

be “a reasonable one, worthy of our deference.” Vasquez-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 343

F.3d 961, 973 (9th Cir. 2003) (as amended on denial of rehearing en banc).

Ramirez-Landeros does not dispute the Board’s statutory conclusion that an order

of removal interrupts the accrual of physical presence. Rather, she raises a distinct

constitutional claim: that the Board’s application of its precedent to her case results

in an irrational distinction that violates equal protection.

7

 Case: 03-71743, 09/12/2005, ID: 5558389, DktEntry: 35, Page 7 of 12
we conclude that our jurisdiction to review Ramirez-Landeros’s constitutional

claim was confirmed by the REAL ID Act.2

Although we have jurisdiction to review this claim, the scope of our review

is “very limited.” Taniguchi v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 950, 957 (9th Cir. 2002). So long

as there is a “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” for a discriminatory rule, the

rule must be upheld, even if the reason offered by the government is not the reason

that led to the legislative classification in the first place. Id. (quoting United States

v. Viramontes-Alvarado, 149 F.3d 912, 916 (9th Cir. 1998)). Our inquiry is thus

akin to the rational basis review generally employed in equal protection challenges

not involving suspect classifications or fundamental rights. See Cordes v.

Gonzales, __ F.3d __, No. 04-15988, 2005 WL 2060851, *5 (9th Cir. Aug. 24,

2005) (“The government must therefore demonstrate a rational basis for treating

aliens disparately.”); see also Wauchope v. United States Dep’t of State, 985 F.2d

1407, 1414 n.3 (9th Cir. 1993). We need not accept, however, an assertion of

legislative purpose that could not have been a goal of the legislation, nor may we

2

 Even before passage of the REAL ID Act, we retained jurisdiction to

review the Board’s interpretation of the statutory prerequisites for cancellation of

removal, despite the bar against review of any “judgment” regarding the granting

of such relief in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). See, e.g., Gomez-Lopez v. Ashcroft,

393 F.3d 882, 884 (9th Cir. 2005). 

8

 Case: 03-71743, 09/12/2005, ID: 5558389, DktEntry: 35, Page 8 of 12
attribute to the government purposes which it cannot reasonably have entertained.

Id. at 1415.

Even on such deferential review, we must conclude that the Board’s

application of its precedent in this case leads to an irrational result. In general, an

alien may establish the ten years’ physical presence required for cancellation of

removal so long as her departures from the United States during that time did not

exceed 90 days per departure or 180 days in the aggregate. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(2).

In other words, Congress anticipated that aliens not lawfully present in the United

States would still be able to cancel removal and adjust status despite brief sojourns

outside the country. It is undisputed that Ramirez-Landeros’s departures from the

United States were brief and infrequent enough to fall within this exception. It is

also beyond question that she would have been eligible for relief, had she only

been able to evade immigration authorities upon her last return from Mexico.

This perverse result is “wholly irrational” in light of the purposes of the

Immigration and Nationality Act. The Board’s application of its precedent here

creates two classes of similarly situated aliens who are treated very differently for

purposes of cancellation of removal: (1) aliens like Ramirez-Landeros, who leave

the country briefly with the expectation that their eligibility for cancellation will

not be affected, but are detained at the border upon their return and ordered

9

 Case: 03-71743, 09/12/2005, ID: 5558389, DktEntry: 35, Page 9 of 12
removed, thus interrupting the accrual of physical presence and precluding a

finding of good moral character; and (2) aliens who leave the country for brief

periods of time, but successfully evade detection upon their return and thus remain

eligible for cancellation of removal. These two groups of aliens are situated

identically save for one difference: the aliens who succeed in reentering the

country illegally are rewarded with eligibility for relief, while those who fail are

deemed ineligible. We can conceive of no rational basis for a rule that rewards

successful lawbreakers yet punishes those unfortunate enough to get caught. 

Indeed, the government has offered no reason at all for this different

treatment. The government instead suggests that American Immigration Lawyers

Association v. Reno, 18 F. Supp. 2d 38 (D.D.C. 1998), aff’d, 199 F.3d 1352 (D.C.

Cir. 2000), forecloses Ramirez-Landeros’s equal protection claim. The individual

plaintiffs in that case, however, were unable to demonstrate any “substantial

connection” to the United States. See id. at 59-60 & n.17. Ramirez-Landeros, in

contrast, has significant long-term family and community connections to the

United States. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (“[O]nce an alien

enters the country, the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause

applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their

presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”); see also Landon v.

10

 Case: 03-71743, 09/12/2005, ID: 5558389, DktEntry: 35, Page 10 of 12
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32-33 (1981) (recognizing change in constitutional status

attending development of “ties that go with permanent residence,” and assimilating

status of permanent resident alien detained at border to that of permanent resident

alien continuously residing and present in the United States). We have recognized

that “aliens who have once passed through our gates, even illegally,” are entitled to

due process, while only aliens “on the threshold of initial entry stand[] on a

different footing.” Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 971 (9th Cir. 2004)

(quoting Shaughnessy v. U.S. ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953)) (emphasis

added). Even though Ramirez-Landeros has not been admitted to the United States

as a permanent resident, her long presence here has allowed her to develop

substantial family and community ties to this country. The American Immigration

Lawyers Association case is thus readily distinguishable.

Accordingly, we hold that the Board’s application of its precedent to this

case creates a “wholly irrational” distinction between two similarly situated groups

of aliens and thus violates equal protection. See Cordes, 2005 WL 2060851, *5.

Neither the physical presence requirement nor the good moral character

determination should stand in the way of Ramirez-Landeros’s eligibility for

cancellation of removal. Cf. Wauchope, 985 F.2d at 1416-17 (proper remedies for

11

 Case: 03-71743, 09/12/2005, ID: 5558389, DktEntry: 35, Page 11 of 12
injuries caused by a constitutionally underinclusive rule include extending the

benefits of the rule to those aggrieved by exclusion).3

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Ramirez-Landeros’s petition for review is

GRANTED, and her case is REMANDED to the Board of Immigration Appeals

for further proceedings consistent with this disposition.

3

 We also note that the equities in this case strongly favor allowing RamirezLanderos to seek cancellation of removal. See Cordes, 2005 WL 2060851, *7

(noting petitioner’s long residence in the United States, negligible criminal record,

short departures for family-related reasons, and extensive volunteer service in her

community). By all accounts, Ramirez-Landeros is an exemplary member of her

community. Nor should it be forgotten that the brunt of the hardship stemming

from her removal would be borne by a vulnerable United States citizen: her

severely disabled son. As we did in Cordes, we take note of these equitable

considerations here.

12

 Case: 03-71743, 09/12/2005, ID: 5558389, DktEntry: 35, Page 12 of 12