Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-14-20747/USCOURTS-ca5-14-20747-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Van Lee Brewer
Appellant
Lindsey J. Brown
Appellee
Tona R. Butler
Appellee
Lawanda Hightower
Appellee
Brad Livingston
Appellee
Jeremy T. Raymond
Appellee

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-20747

Summary Calendar

VAN LEE BREWER,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

LAWANDA HIGHTOWER; Property Officer; JEREMY T. RAYMOND, SOTP 

Case Manager; BRAD LIVINGSTON, Director of TX Department of Criminal 

Justice; TONA R. BUTLER; LINDSEY J. BROWN,

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:13-CV-94

Before SMITH, BENAVIDES, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Van Lee Brewer, Texas prisoner # 527494, appeals following the district 

court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint alleging a denial of property 

without due process and retaliation claims. We review the district court’s 

grant of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment de novo, applying the 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 6, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 14-20747

2

same standards as the district court. Dillon v. Rogers, 596 F.3d 260, 266 (5th 

Cir. 2010). 

For the intentional deprivation of property to give rise to a due process 

violation, the deprivation must have been officially authorized and the plaintiff 

must challenge both the deprivation and the procedure under which it was 

authorized. See Stotter v. Univ. of Tex. at San Antonio, 508 F.3d 812, 821-22 

(5th Cir. 2007) (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541-44 (1981), overruled 

in part by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986), and Hudson v. Palmer, 468 

U.S. 517, 533 (1984)). Brewer never asserted that he was deprived of his 

property as the result of an unconstitutional storage policy; therefore, his

argument that the district court erred by applying the Parratt/Hudson

analysis to his claim is without merit. See Allen v. Thomas, 388 F.3d 147, 148-

49 (5th Cir. 2004). 

Brewer’s argument that he had no adequate post-deprivation remedy is 

without merit. See Myers v. Klevenhagen, 97 F.3d 91, 94 (5th Cir. 1996). In 

addition to administrative relief, Texas’s tort of conversion provides adequate 

state post-deprivation remedies to prisoners who claim due process violations 

based on deprivation of their property. Murphy v. Collins, 26 F.3d 541, 543-44 

(5th Cir. 1994); see also TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 501.007, 501.008. 

As the party opposing summary judgment of his retaliation claim, 

Brewer was required to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate 

the precise manner in which the evidence supported his claim. See Ragas v. 

Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998). He was required 

to show, inter alia, a retaliatory adverse act and a retaliatory motive. See 

Bibbs v. Early, 541 F.3d 267, 270 (5th Cir. 2008). Brewer failed to make this 

showing; therefore, the district court properly granted the defendants’ motion 

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No. 14-20747

3

for summary judgment. See Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1325 (5th Cir. 

1996). 

In light of the foregoing, we do not reach the merits of Brewer’s 

arguments concerning Eleventh Amendment immunity and the exhaustion of 

administrative remedies. See Spiller v. City of Tex. City, Police Dep’t, 130 F.3d 

162, 167 (5th Cir. 1997). We find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s 

denial of Brewer’s discovery requests. See McCreary v. Richardson, 738 F.3d 

651, 654 (5th Cir. 2013). 

AFFIRMED.

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