Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-06-03143/USCOURTS-caDC-06-03143-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Timothy McCrae Walker
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 3, 2008 Decided November 14, 2008

No. 06-3143

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

TIMOTHY MCCRAE WALKER,

ALSO KNOWN AS TIMOTHY SCORPIO WALKER,

 ALSO KNOWN AS TIMOTHY MCCREE WALKER,

ALSO KNOWN AS TIMOTHY MCCREE JOHNSON,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 05cr00139-02)

Robert S. Becker, appointed by the court, argued the cause

for the appellant.

Stephanie Brooker, Assistant United States Attorney,

argued the cause for the appellee. Jeffrey A. Taylor, United

States Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese, III and Thomas J.

Tourish, Jr., Assistant United States Attorneys, were on brief.

Before: HENDERSON, RANDOLPH, and GARLAND, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

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2

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Timothy

McCrae Walker appeals his convictions on one count of

violating 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (possession of unregistered

firearm) and one count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (felon

in possession of firearm). Walker argues that (1) he was not

afforded a speedy trial under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C.

§ 3161; (2) the jury was improperly instructed on the elements

of constructive possession; (3) both convictions were based on

insufficient evidence; and (4) his jury venire did not represent a

“fair cross section of the community.” Because our holding in

United States v. Bryant, 523 F.3d 349 (D.C. Cir. 2008), requires

the reversal of the section 5861(d) conviction, we remand the

section 5861(d) count for dismissal with or without prejudice at

the district court’s option. Id. at 361. We reject Walker’s

Speedy Trial Act challenge to the section 922(g)(1) conviction

and affirm that conviction as against the other challenges as

well.

I.

At about 3:00 a.m. on February 9, 2005, Officer Charles

Monk, an off-duty Metropolitan Police Department (MPD)

patrolman working as a part-time security guard, observed the

driver of a black Land Rover sport utility vehicle (SUV)

illegally park in a bus zone in the 800 block of 5th Street, N.W.

Bryant, 523 F.3d at 351. Monk saw two young black males exit

the vehicle. They were both wearing ski masks and, although

the weather was “unusually mild” that night, both wore “heavy

black winter coats.” Id. Monk watched as the driver (later

identified as Walker) reached into the SUV, retrieved a bulky

item and slid it into his coat. Id. The driver walked, “kind of

limping,” across the street and motioned to the passenger to join

him. Id. at 352; see also Transcript of Trial at 50, United States

v. Walker, Cr. No. 05-139 (D.D.C. Mar. 21, 2006) (Tr.). They

walked up to a charter bus parked in the 500 block of H Street,

N.W. but the bus driver would not let them on the bus. Bryant,

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523 F.3d at 352. The two then walked back towards the SUV,

passed it and continued into a nearby alley where they stopped

and looked around. Id.; Tr. at 53-54. They then returned to the

SUV and Walker took the item out of his coat, put it back into

the vehicle and the two drove away. Bryant, 523 F.3d at 352.

Not more than five minutes later, however, they returned and

this time Walker parked the SUV legally. Id. They exited the

vehicle, Walker again retrieved the item and put it inside his

coat, pulled a ski mask down over his face (as did his passenger,

later identified as William Bryant), and both he and Bryant

started walking across the street. Id.

Given this suspicious activity, Monk called for back-up to

investigate the two men. Id. Both men were “looking around

nervously.” Id. When a marked FBI vehicle drove by them, the

two men lifted their ski masks. Id. Then two marked MPD

vehicles arrived at the scene, one driven by Officer James

Burgess. Id. Burgess's partner, Officer Steven Greene, testified

that once the two men saw the MPD patrol car, they began to

walk away from it and, on turning the corner, began to walk at

a faster than normal pace. Id. Walker walked stiff legged, with

a limp, as if trying to conceal the item inside his coat. Id.

Burgess and Greene pulled their patrol car up behind the two

men and got out to approach them. Id. Walker began running

away and Greene followed him. Id. When Walker was finally

cornered, he was ordered to lie down and, as he was lowering

himself to the ground, Greene saw him drop what he was

carrying under his coat into an exterior window basin. Id.

Another MPD officer later retrieved a sawed-off Stevens .12-

gauge shotgun loaded with one .12-gauge shotgun shell from the

basin. Id. at 352-53. An MPD officer, examining the SUV,

looked in the passenger window and saw a sawed-off shotgun on

the passenger side floorboard partially covered by some objects.

Id.; Tr. at 210. The shotgun was later identified as a sawed-off

Harrington & Richardson .20-gauge shotgun. Bryant, 523 F.3d

at 352-53. The Harrington & Richardson shotgun had been

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1

Fed. R. Crim. P. 48(a) provides in part: “The government may,

with leave of court, dismiss an indictment, information, or

complaint . . . .”

2

As we noted in Bryant, “[t]his indictment was defective, because

it specified that [Bryant] and Walker had possessed both shotguns

without properly registering them; however, only the Harrington and

Richardson shotgun had to be registered . . . .” 523 F.3d at 353.

modified such that it was required to be registered in the

National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record but was not

so registered. Id. at 353.

Both men were arrested at the scene and appeared before a

magistrate judge the next day, February 10, 2005. On that day,

the government filed a complaint against Walker and Bryant

charging each with a violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) for

possessing both sawed-off shotguns without having registered

the weapons. On March 16, 2005, pursuant to Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 48(a),

1

 the government moved to dismiss the

complaint without prejudice. The district court granted the

motion but the record does not reveal the reason therefor. On

April 21, 2005, the grand jury indicted Walker and Bryant on

one count of unlawful possession of two unregistered firearms

in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d).2

 Walker was arraigned on

June 10, 2005. On September 1, 2005, Walker moved to sever

his case from Bryant’s, which motion was denied on October 7,

2005. 

On February 16, 2006, the government filed a superseding

indictment charging both Walker and Bryant with one count of

possessing an unregistered firearm (the Harrington &

Richardson shotgun) in violation of section 5861(d) and one

count of felon in possession (of both shotguns) in violation of

section 922(g)(1). Arraignment on the superseding indictment

occurred on February 17, 2006, at which time Walker moved to

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3

The Speedy Trial Act provides in part:

In any case in which a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial

of a defendant charged in an information or indictment with

the commission of an offense shall commence within

seventy days from the filing date (and making public) of the

information or indictment, or from the date the defendant

has appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which

such charge is pending, whichever date last occurs. 

18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). 

dismiss it, alleging the violation of his right to a speedy trial.

The district court denied the motion on March 14, 2006.

Following the trial, which commenced on March 20, 2006,

Walker was convicted on both counts and, on August 29, 2006,

was sentenced to 60 months’ imprisonment. Walker now

appeals.

II.

A. Speedy Trial Act

We first address Walker’s claim that both his

section 5861(d) and section 922(g)(1) convictions should be

reversed because over 70 non-excludable days elapsed between

the original indictment and his trial in violation of the Speedy

Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (STA).3 We review a STA

challenge “de novo on matters of law and for clear error as to

findings of fact.” United States v. Sanders, 485 F.3d 654, 656

(D.C. Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). The parties agree that our

decision in United States v. Bryant, 523 F.3d 349 (D.C. Cir.

2008), controls Walker’s section 5861(d) conviction. In that

case, we reversed Bryant’s section 5861(d) conviction because

“both parties agree that at least 32 days had accrued on the

speedy trial clock as of August 8, [2005] and it is clear that at

least 39 additional, non-excludable days accrued between

November 27, 2005 and February 16, 2006.” Id. at 361.

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4

The Double Jeopardy Clause bars any person from being

“subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or

limb.” 

Because “[a]ll defendants who are joined for trial generally fall

within the speedy trial computation of the latest codefendant,”

Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321, 323 n.2 (1986),

Walker’s section 5861(d) conviction must also be reversed. 

Unlike Bryant, however, Walker challenges the section

922(g)(1) count on the ground that his conviction thereon

violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to

the United States Constitution.4

 He argues that the section

922(g)(1) count in the superseding indictment is an “offense

required to be joined” with the section 5861(d) count charged in

the original indictment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(5),

which excludes from speedy trial calculation “any period of

delay from the date the [original] charge was dismissed to the

date the time limitation would commence to run as to the

subsequent charge had there been no previous charge” so long

as “the information or indictment is dismissed upon motion [by

the government] and thereafter a charge is filed against the

defendant for the same offense, or any offense required to be

joined with that offense.” Walker claims the section 922(g)(1)

count was required to be joined with the section 5861(d) count

because “the Double Jeopardy Clause . . . would have precluded

the government from trying him serially for violations of

[section] 5861(d) and [section] 922(g).” Brief of Appellant at

23 (Br. of Appellant).

The United States Supreme Court has held regarding the

Double Jeopardy Clause that if “the same act or transaction

constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the

test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or

only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact

which the other does not.” Blockburger v. United States, 284

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U.S. 299, 304 (1932), cited in United States v. Weathers, 186

F.3d 948, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1999). A violation of section 922(g)(1)

requires the government to prove that a defendant was

“convicted in any court [of] a crime punishable by imprisonment

for a term exceeding one year” and that the defendant possessed

(or shipped or transported) “in or affecting commerce, any

firearm or ammunition.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). To violate

section 5861(d) the defendant must “receive or possess a firearm

which is not registered to him in the National Firearms

Registration and Transfer Record.” 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d).

Plainly, the government must prove different facts to establish

each crime. Section 5861(d) requires that the firearm be

unregistered while section 922(g)(1) does not; section 922(g)(1)

requires that the defendant be a felon and section 5861(d) does

not. Accordingly, the section 922(g)(1) count was not an

“offense required to be joined” with the section 5861(d) count

under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(5) and a new speedy trial clock

began for the section 922(g)(1) charge on February 16, 2006, the

date of the superseding indictment. See United States v. Alford,

142 F.3d 825, 829 (5th Cir. 1998) (new speedy-trial clock

“‘beginsfor new offenses charged in the superseding indictment

[that the double jeopardy clause would not require the

government to join with the original charges], when the

indictment retains some of the original charges’” (quoting

United States v. Gonzalez, 897 F.2d 1312, 1316 (5th Cir. 1990)))

(alteration in original); United States v. Lattany, 982 F.2d 866,

872 n.7 (3d Cir. 1992) (“If the subsequent [indictment] charges

a new offense that did not have to be joined with the original

charges, then the subsequent [indictment] commences a new,

independent speedy trial period.”).

Walker also argues that his section 922(g)(1) conviction

should be reversed because the STA barred the filing of the

charge via a superseding indictment on February 16, 2006.

Specifically, Walker argues that “if the 70-day speedy trial clock

expired as to the § 5861(d) count before [the government] filed

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the superseding indictment adding the § 922(g) count, the

§ 922(g) count was not saved from dismissal because it was

filed more than 30 days after [Walker’s] arrest.” Reply Br. of

Appellant at 7. Walker is correct that the speedy trial clock

expired as to the section 5861(d) count before the government

filed the superseding indictment. In Bryant, we held that even

if the speedy trial clock began as late as June 11, 2005–almost

six weeks later than Walker alleges it should have begun–over

70 days had elapsed by February 16, 2006. Bryant, 523 F.3d at

357-58, 361. But the expiration of the speedy trial clock before

February 16, 2006 does not mean that the section 922(g)(1)

count of the superseding indictment should have been dismissed.

18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) provides that “[a]ny information or

indictment charging an individual with the commission of an

offense shall be filed within thirty days from the date on which

such individual was arrested or served with a summons in

connection with such charges.” If no indictment is filed within

this time period, 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(1) provides that “such

charge against that individual . . . shall be dismissed or

otherwise dropped.” A superseding indictment filed more than

thirty days after arrest, however, does not violate section

3161(b) so long as the original indictment was filed within the

required thirty-day time frame. See United States v. Hemmings,

258 F.3d 587, 591-92 (7th Cir. 2001) (listing cases). In that

case, the Seventh Circuit held that a superseding indictment filed

after the thirty-day time period specified in section 3161(b)

elapsed did not violate the STA because a timely indictment had

originally been filed within the thirty-day period and thus the

case was not one “in which no indictment was filed within the

thirty-day period.” Id. at 592 (emphasis in original). Likewise,

in United States v. Mosquera, 95 F.3d 1012, 1013 (11th Cir.

1996), the Eleventh Circuit held that a superseding indictment

filed on March 23, 1995 did not violate section 3161(b) when

the original indictment was filed on November 3, 1994, the trial

on the original indictment (resulting in a hung jury) was held on

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March 16, 1995, and the superseding indictment alleged new

counts against the defendant. Id. at 1013-14. The court

reasoned that the STA is not a “statute of limitations” and does

not require that an individual under arrest be indicted within

thirty days on “every crime known to the government.” Id. at

1013. 

Although here, unlike in Hemmings, no indictment was filed

within 30 days of Walker’s February 9, 2005 arrest, Walker did

not challenge the original indictment as untimely in the district

court and therefore “we review the district court’s decision not

to dismiss (sua sponte) on [this ground] for plain error only.”

United States v. Taylor, 497 F.3d 673, 676 (D.C. Cir. 2007).

Under that standard, “we will correct a district court’s error only

if (1) there is in fact an error to correct; (2) the error is ‘plain’;

(3) it ‘affects substantial rights’; and (4) it ‘seriously affects the

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’”

Id. (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67

(1997)). Walker was arrested on February 9, 2005 and appeared

before the magistrate judge the next day at which time the

government filed the complaint against them both. See Fed. R.

Crim. P. 5(b). The government moved to dismiss the complaint

on March 17, 2005, which motion the district court granted

without prejudice. The original indictment, filed April 21, 2005,

was therefore untimely under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) because it

was filed over 30 days from the date of arrest. 

In United States v. Bittle, 699 F.2d 1201, 1205 (D.C. Cir.

1983), we held that “after the dismissal of a complaint, the Act’s

time limits run anew from the date of the filing of the

subsequent complaint or indictment.” In that case, defendant

Bittle was arrested on December 10, 1981 and charged with

violating 18 U.S.C. § 495 (forging and uttering a check) by

complaint the following day. Id. at 1202. On January 22, 1982,

the complaint was dismissed but on January 28, 1982, an

“original indictment” was returned charging Bittle with two

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5

18 U.S.C. § 3161(d)(1) provides:

If any indictment or information is dismissed upon motion

of the defendant, or any charge contained in a complaint

filed against an individual is dismissed or otherwise

dropped, and thereafter a complaint is filed against such

defendant or individual charging him with the same offense

or an offense based on the same conduct or arising from the

same criminal episode, or an information or indictment is

filed charging such defendant with the same offense or an

offense based on the same conduct or arising from the same

criminal episode, the provisions of subsections (b) and (c)

of this section shall be applicable with respect to such

subsequent complaint, indictment, or information, as the

case may be.

Subsection (b) requires “[a]ny information or indictment charging

an individual with the commission of an offense” to be filed within

thirty days of the date of arrest or the date the defendant was served

with a summons. Id. § 3161(b). Subsection (c) requires the trial to

commence within seventy days from either the date of filing and

making public the information or indictment or “from the date the

defendant has appeared before a judicial officer . . . , whichever date

last occurs.” Id. § 3161(c)(1).

violations of section 495 and, additionally, one violation of 18

U.S.C. § 1708 (possession of stolen mail matter). Id. Bittle

moved to dismiss the indictment under the STA, which motion

the court denied. Id. Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 3161(d)(1),5 we

upheld the conviction, concluding that even though the

indictment was filed more than thirty days after the arrest, it was

timely under section 3161(b) because the complaint should have

been dismissed without prejudice and, under section 3161(d)(1),

the thirty-day period described in section 3161(b) began to run

anew from the date of the indictment. Id. at 1204, 1208. The

chronology here is similar (the district court also dismissed the

complaint without prejudice) and, consequently, the district

court did not commit plain error in failing to dismiss Walker’s

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6

 Although Walker argued that his section 5861(d) conviction

should also be reversed based on insufficient evidence, Br. of

Appellant at 23-32, that conviction, as already noted, is vacated per

our Bryant holding.

original indictment sua sponte on this ground. As in Bittle,

section 3161(b)’s thirty-day clock began anew as of the date of

the original indictment. The superseding indictment likewise

did not violate section 3161(b). Because the STA is not “a

statute of limitations,” the fact that the speedy trial clock had run

on the original indictment does not make the superseding

indictment charging a different offense untimely under the STA.

B. Sufficiency of Evidence 

We next address Walker’s argument that there was

insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that he

possessed the Harrington & Richardson shotgun located in the

SUV.6

 In reviewing for sufficiency of the evidence, the court’s

“inquiry is limited to the question of whether ‘any rational trier

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” United States v. Dingle, 114 F.3d

307, 310 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307, 319 (1979)). The court “views the evidence in the light

most favorable to the government, drawing all reasonable

inferences in its favor.” Id.

It is undisputed that both guns were transported in or

affected interstate commerce and that Walker had been

convicted of a felony. Thus, the government need only show

that Walker knowingly possessed the Harrington & Richardson

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7

Although there was plainly sufficient evidence to support

Walker’s actual possession of the Stevens .12-gauge shotgun

recovered from the window basin, we review the sufficiency of the

evidence regarding the Harrington & Richardson shotgun because, at

sentencing, possession of the latter increased the base offense level

inasmuch as it had been modified to require registration. See U.S.

Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(a)(3), (4) (2007); Reply Br. of

Appellant at 9 (noting that district court applied base offense level of

22–subsequently reduced two levels for acceptance of

responsibility–but, if this Court determined there was insufficient

evidence to support Walker’s possession of Harrington & Richardson

shotgun, base offense level would be reduced to 20).

shotgun to sustain his section 922(g)(1) conviction as to that

gun.7

“Criminal possession of a firearm may be either actual or

constructive.” United States v. Alexander, 331 F.3d 116, 127

(D.C. Cir. 2003). To prove constructive possession, the

government must show that Walker “knew of, and was in a

position to exercise dominion and control over, the contraband,

either personally or through others.” Bryant, 523 F.3d at 354-

55 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in

original). Proximity to a weapon, coupled with some other

factor such as “connection with a gun, proof of motive, a gesture

implying control, evasive conduct, or a statement indicating

involvement in an enterprise” may suffice to show dominion and

control over a weapon. Alexander, 331 F.3d at 127 (quoting

United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 381 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).

We have already determined that Bryant possessed both the

Harrington & Richardson shotgun and the Stevens .12-gauge

shotgun. Bryant, 523 F.3d at 356. In reaching this conclusion,

we noted “[Bryant’s] proximity to both guns, coupled with his

suspicious attire, his initial evasive conduct towards the police

officers, and the evidence that [he] was acting in concert with

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[Walker,] who was actually carrying one of the weapons on his

person.” Id. at 356. 

Likewise, there was sufficient evidence to show that Walker

too was in “close proximity” to, and exercised dominion and

control over, the Harrington & Richardson shotgun. Although

the weapon was located on the passenger’s side floorboard of

the SUV, Walker, the driver, was in close proximity to it.

Moreover, as the driver, Walker “is held to a higher level of

accountability for [the vehicle’s] contents.” United States v.

Gibbs, 904 F.2d 52, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Indeed, Walker had

control over the SUV at all times during the incident (as shown

by his driving and parking the vehicle). When coupled with the

fact that there was ample evidence that Walker and Bryant were

working in concert, see Bryant, 523 F.3d at 356, a rational juror

could find that Walker constructively possessed the Harrington

& Richardson shotgun. 

C. Walker’s Remaining Arguments 

Bryant disposes of Walker’s remaining arguments that (1)

the district court erred in instructing the jury on the element of

“control” in the context of constructive possession, and (2) his

jury venire was not representative of the community in violation

of the Jury Selection and Service Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1861. In

Bryant, we held that the district court’s supplemental jury charge

in which it reread the original jury instruction and also recited

language from three of this Court’s opinions discussing

“control” did not confuse the jury. Id. at 357. Walker raises the

same argument and, similarly, it fails.

In Bryant, we held that Bryant failed to show a violation of

the “right to grand and petit juries selected at random from a fair

cross section of the community in the district or division

wherein the court convenes” under the Jury Selection and

Service Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1861. Bryant, 523 F.3d at 361-62. We

reached this conclusion after finding that Bryant had failed to

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prove that the underrepresentation of blacks in the venire was

due to a “‘systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection

process,’” id. at 362 (quoting Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357,

364 (1979)), because both of the cases Bryant relied on

“concerned an alleged underrepresentation of whites, whereas

this case involves an alleged underrepresentation of blacks,” and

Bryant relied on “two cases decided more than 10 years ago, in

combination with [his] own single venire.” Id. Walker argues

that “[viewing] this case with [the cases relied on in Bryant] it

is clear that the procedure for empaneling venires in the District

Court is seriously flawed [because the] failure to produce

venires representing a ‘fair cross section of the community’ is

not isolated to a few cases and is not the result of case-specific

factors.” Br. of Appellant at 37. We rejected this argument in

Bryant. 523 F.3d at 362.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Walker’s section

922(g)(1) conviction. We remand Walker’s section 5861(d)

conviction for the district court to “dismiss Count One of the

superseding indictment after determining whether the dismissal

should occur with or without prejudice.” Id. 

So ordered.

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