Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-15-05238/USCOURTS-caDC-15-05238-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lawrence O. Anyaso
Appellee
Corey Rogers
Appellee
Ronald M. Smith
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 9, 2016 Decided December 9, 2016

No. 15-5238

RONALD M. SMITH,

APPELLANT

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:12-cv-01679)

Gregory L. Lattimer argued the cause and filed the briefs

for appellant.

W. Mark Nebeker, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellees. With him on the brief were R. Craig

Lawrence and Marian L. Borum, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: PILLARD, Circuit Judge, and EDWARDS and

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

RANDOLPH.

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Concurring opinion filed by Senior Circuit Judge

EDWARDS. 

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge: Ronald M. Smith sued

the United States and two United States Capitol Police Officers –

Corey Rogers and Lawrence O. Anyaso. Smith’s complaint

alleged false arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional infliction

of emotional distress, and, against the officers, a violation of his

rights under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. He

sought $5,000,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. 

The district court, K.B. Jackson, J., in a comprehensive

opinion, granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. 

Smith v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 3d 112, 115 (D.D.C. 2015). 

Smith’s main arguments on appeal are that the court erred in

deciding that no material facts were in dispute and in refusing to

allow Smith to conduct discovery before the court ruled on the

defendants’ summary judgment motion. 

Smith’s complaint alleged that while he was working for

a federal agency, he drove several agency officials to Capitol Hill

on November 5, 2009. The area surrounding the Capitol and the

Senate and House office buildings is heavily guarded, with

barricades at the entrances to the Capitol grounds, some of which

are retractable to allow authorized vehicles to enter. When Smith

pulled into the driveway approaching one of these attended

barricades to drop off his passengers, Officer Rogers walked over

to him. According to the complaint, Officer Rogers “began to

chastise and yell at him for dropping off his passengers at that

location.” Compl. ¶ 7. A heated conversation ensued. Smith

then made a U-turn and left the area. Officer Rogers radioed

other officers, stating – according to the complaint – that Smith’s

car struck the officer’s leg as Smith drove away. A few minutes

later, Officer Anyaso arrested Smith for assault with a deadly

weapon and assault on a police officer. The complaint further

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alleged that Smith spent the night in jail. The United States

Attorney charged Smith with assault on a police officer, a

misdemeanor offense, D.C. CODE § 22-405, and offered him a

plea bargain, reducing the crime to simple assault, which Smith

did not accept. Five months later, in April 2010, the government

moved to dismiss the charges against Smith, a motion the

Superior Court granted with prejudice.

The defense filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative,

for summary judgment, countering the complaint with a video

recording (no audio) of the incident and an audio recording of

Officer Rogers’ radio transmission. The government had

provided Smith with copies of these recordings while his criminal

case was pending and Smith’s complaint in this case relied on

some of this material. The audio recording, which triggered

Smith’s arrest, contradicted what Smith alleged in his complaint,

as he later admitted. Smith, 121 F. Supp. 3d at 116 n.2. Officer

Rogers did not report on the audiotape that Smith’s car hit him. 

In the recording, Officer Rogers stated that Smith “intentionally

almost struck this officer.” Audio tape: U.S. Capitol Police

Dispatch (Nov. 5, 2009). The video also contradicted Smith’s

complaint. It shows Officer Rogers, in full uniform, turning away

from Smith’s car and walking back toward his duty post. At this

moment, the video “captured Smith looping around and pulling

away aggressively . . . [clearly showing] that Smith drove the car

toward [Officer] Rogers, and that the passenger side of Smith’s

car was close to [Officer] Rogers when the car passed by.” Smith,

121 F. Supp. 3d at 115-16. Smith pulled away from the driveway

“much faster than he pulled in, and . . . drove in the confined area

aggressively and at a higher rate of speed than either of the two

vehicles that had entered the checkpoint” during the encounter. 

Id. at 120-21. 

Smith sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1346(b), 2674, in his action against the United States, and

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pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal

Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971), in his Fourth

Amendment claim against the officers. Under District of

Columbia law, simple assault has three elements: “(1) an act on

the part of the accused (which need not result in injury); (2) the

apparent present ability to injure the victim at the time the act is

committed; and (3) the intent to perform the act which constitutes

the assault at the time the act is committed.” Ruffin v. United

States, 642 A.2d 1288, 1295 (D.C. 1994). Physical contact is not

required. As to assault with a dangerous weapon, the dangerous

weapon can be a vehicle. See Frye v. United States, 926 A.2d

1085, 1096-97 (D.C. 2005). As to assault on a police officer,

there is the added element “that the defendant knew or should

have known the victim was a police officer.” In re J.S., 19 A.3d

328, 330 (D.C. 2011) (internal quotation marks eliminated). 

The district court analyzed the governing law of the

District of Columbia regarding the crime of assault and carefully

reviewed the recordings, taking note of how they contradicted

Smith’s version of the events in his complaint. Smith, 121 F.

Supp. 3d at 120-124. The court concluded that the defendant

officers had probable cause to arrest Smith for assault with a

deadly weapon and assault on a police officer. A “reasonable

officer,” the court concluded, “would have felt threatened by the

proximity of the fast-moving vehicle” to his body. Id. at 121. 

The fact that Officer Rogers was in uniform was more than

enough to establish the additional element of assault on a police

officer. The existence of probable cause foreclosed not only

Smith’s false arrest, malicious prosecution and Fourth

Amendment claims, but also his claim of intentional infliction of

emotional distress based on his arrest. See Amobi v. D.C. Dep’t

of Corr., 755 F.3d 980, 989-90, 992-93 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Kotsch

v. District of Columbia, 924 A.2d 1040, 1046 (D.C. 2007). The

court also held that Smith had failed to allege any facts

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outrageous enough to constitute intentional infliction of emotional

distress. Smith, 121 F. Supp. 3d. at 125-26.

Smith argues that the court should not have granted

summary judgment without giving him an opportunity to engage

in discovery. Under Rule 56(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure,

if a party opposing summary judgment submits an affidavit

showing that he cannot present facts justifying his opposition, the

court “may” allow time for discovery. Convertino v. U.S.

Department of Justice, 684 F.3d 93, 99-100 (D.C. Cir. 2012),

holds that a Rule 56(d) affiant must, among other things, “outline

the particular facts he intends to discover and describe why those

facts are necessary to the litigation,” and he must explain why he

cannot provide evidence to counter his opponent’s summary

judgment motion. Smith did neither.

Smith had already been provided with the police reports

and documents, statements, photographs, and audio and video

recordings in connection with the case. But in his Rule 56(d)

affidavit, Smith’s lawyer stated only that the “plaintiff, at a

minimum, needs to depose the named defendants, and the

individuals who claim to be eyewitnesses.” Joint Appendix 142. 

The affidavit gave no further explanation. Smith’s memorandum

opposing summary judgment stated: “At a minimum, the plaintiff

needs to depose the two(2) [sic] named defendant officers to

ascertain why they took the actions that they took at the time that

they did so; and the plaintiff needs to depose [a non-party

witness] about her actual observations which are somewhat at

odds with the video.” Id. at 116. (After viewing the video, this

witness stated that it fairly reflected what she had seen.) Smith

does not specify how, on this record with its undisputed facts

showing probable cause, discovery regarding the officers’ state of

mind could create a material factual dispute. When pressed at

oral argument, Smith’s lawyer could offer no details about what

additional material facts he expected to discover.

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Because the affidavit failed to state with “particularity

why additional discovery[was] necessary,” the district court acted

well within its discretion in denying Smith’s request. U.S. ex rel.

Folliard v. Gov’t Acquisitions, Inc., 764 F.3d 19, 26 (D.C. Cir.

2014) (quoting Convertino, 684 F.3d at 99). His lawyer’s

affidavit explained neither what Smith hoped to discover nor why

such discovery was necessary. Such “vague” requests do not

suffice under Rule 56(d). See Folliard, 764 F.3d at 29.

Smith also contends that the undisputed evidence shows

that he drove away from, not toward, Officer Rogers. But he does

not materially dispute what the video depicts – namely, that from

right where Smith had parked facing the barricade, he pulled

away from the curb and made a hasty U-turn to exit the driveway. 

In one sense, as Smith insists, he was driving “away” from

Officer Rogers when he turned to exit. But the key point in

support of the assault charge is that Smith quickly pulled forward

and to the left, passing very close to the officer, before continuing

his leftward 180 degree arc to exit the driveway. He did not

adjust for the safety of the officer attending on foot by, for

example, backing up first to leave a wider berth, or edging his car

very slowly around until it was clear of the confined area. The

video confirms as much, and Smith’s claim of a “dispute” over

whether he drove “toward” or “away” from the officer is about

nomenclature, not evidence. There is no question that his car

swiftly approached dangerously close to Officer Rogers. 

Smith similarly argues that the district court erred in

granting summary judgment because the video does not

conclusively establish probable cause to arrest and charge him

with assault. He emphasizes that the video does not show him

striking Officer Rogers with his car. He disputes the speed of the

car and its proximity to Officer Rogers and he denies that he

intentionally drove his car toward the officer. These disputes, he

argues, should have precluded summary judgment. 

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Smith again misunderstands both the elements of assault

and effect of the video. As we have already mentioned, physical

contact is not an element of the offense of assault. Smith’s

assertion about his intent is beside the point. What matters is not

the “secret intent of the assaulting party,” but instead how the

“conduct and the attending circumstances” affect the assaulted

party. Sousa v. United States, 400 A.2d 1036, 1044 (D.C. 1979)

(internal quotation marks eliminated). Did Smith have an

“apparent present ability to injure” Rogers? Ruffin, 642 A.2d at

1295. For probable cause, the officers needed only a reasonable

belief that he did. Brown v. United States, 590 A.2d 1008, 1012

(D.C. 1991); Nichols v. Woodward & Lothrop, Inc., 322 A.2d

283, 285 (D.C. 1974). 

That the officers had such a reasonable belief is plain. We

do not suggest that videos are always conclusive, because even a

video can give a distorted view of a disputed scene. Nevertheless,

in this case, the video indisputably shows Smith accelerating his

cartoward Rogers and nearly hitting him. Probable cause did not

depend on how many miles per hour the car was traveling or

whether the car actually touched the officer’s leg. Smith may

claim that he drove away from rather than toward Officer Rogers,

but as we have said, this claim merely recharacterizes the events

depicted in the video. The district court properly relied on the

video, and we do as well. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,

380-81 (2007). With no material facts in dispute, probable cause

became a question of law. See Amobi, 755 F.3d at 990; Enders v.

District of Columbia, 4 A.3d 457, 469 (D.C. 2010). The district

court’s finding of probable cause, a finding with which we agree,

foreclosed at least Smith’s claims of false arrest, malicious

prosecution and a violation of the Fourth Amendment’s

proscription against seizure of the person without probable cause. 

Smith, 121 F. Supp. 3d at 119-24; Pitt v. District of Columbia,

491 F.3d 494, 502 (D.C. Cir. 2007).

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Smith devotes much of his attention – and attempts to

escape the force of the video – by focusing on a supposed

inconsistency in Officer Rogers’ accounts of what happened. He

points out that Officer Rogers stated on the police radio that

Smith “intentionally almost struck” him, but later reported that

Smith’s car “brush[ed] the back” of his leg. Officer Rogers also

sought medical care and claimed temporary disability. Smith

contends that because the video shows that his car did not strike

Officer Rogers, the officer’s claims to the contrary are evidence

of bad faith. That Officer Anyaso knew of these discrepancies

and still made the arrest supposedly shows his own bad faith as

well.

Yet Smith fails to connect any of this to the relevant legal

doctrine. Citing Edmond v. U.S. Postal Service General Counsel,

949 F.2d 415, 419 (D.C. Cir. 1991), he tells us that his Bivens

claims rely on something called “perjurer’s liability.” Edmond

coined this phrase in a false arrest case, using it as a shorthand for

an alleged Fourth Amendment violation by an official “who

causes an indictment and consequent arrest by perjuring himself

or arranging for the submission of perjured testimony before the

grand jury.” Id. No such circumstances are present in this case. 

Neither Officer Rogers nor Officer Anyaso testified before a

grand jury and the video and the audio recording belie any claim

that they did not have probable cause to arrest Smith. In addition,

after a later phase of Edmond, which wound up in the Fourth

Circuit for reasons unnecessary to describe, the court held that

government officials have absolute immunity from civil liability

for their grand jury testimony. Lyles v. Sparks, 79 F.3d 372,

378-79 (4th Cir. 1996). The Supreme Court has now agreed. 

Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1506 (2012). And so we

analyze Smith’s Bivens action as one for unconstitutional false

arrest and malicious prosecution. Like their common law

counterparts, both of these claims require the absence of probable

cause. See Amobi, 755 F.3d at 989, 993.

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As to Smith’s contentions regarding probable cause, he

neglects the critical point that the “assessment of probable cause

is an objective one. An arrest is supported by probable cause if,

‘at the moment the arrest was made, . . . the facts and

circumstances within [the arresting officers’] knowledge and of

which they had reasonably trustworthy information were

sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing’ that the suspect

has committed or is committing a crime.” Wesby v. District of

Columbia, 765 F.3d 13, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting Beck v.

Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)) (alteration in original). Even if

Officer Rogers’ post-arrest statement that Smith’s car “brushed”

his leg meant something different than his pre-arrest radio

transmission that Smith “almost struck” him, this would not affect

the existence of probable cause to arrest and prosecute Smith

based on the video. See Wardlaw v. Pickett, 1 F.3d 1297, 1304-05

(D.C. Cir. 1993); District of Columbia v. Murphy, 635 A.2d 929,

932 (D.C. 1993). The prosecutor’s awareness of Officer Rogers’

differing accounts also forecloses any argument that the officer’s

statement about being “brushed,” as opposed to the video and

audio recordings, led to the assault charge against Smith. The

district court therefore properlygranted summaryjudgment on the

false arrest, malicious prosecution and Bivens claims. 

We also agree with the district court’s dismissal of

Smith’s claim that he was subjected to intentional infliction of

emotional distress. The elements of this tort are: “(1) extreme

and outrageous conduct on the part of the defendant which (2)

intentionally or recklessly (3) causes the plaintiff severe

emotional distress.” Minch v. District of Columbia, 952 A.2d

929, 940 (D.C. 2008) (quoting District of Columbia v. Thompson,

570 A.2d 277, 289-90 (D.C. 1990)). Smith’s distress from the

arrest would not suffice because the officers had probable cause

to arrest him. Kotsch, 924 A.2d at 1046. Nor is distress from the

prosecution sufficient: the prosecutor charged Smith with assault

on a police officer because of the evidence that Smith had

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committed that offense. Smith cites District of Columbia v. Tulin,

994 A.2d 788 (D.C. 2010), arguing that the actions of Officers

Rogers and Anyaso are highly similar to the offending conduct of

the officer in that case. We disagree. In Tulin, an off-duty officer

rear-ended the plaintiff, falsely reported on her radio that she was

in distress, and pressured her subordinate to make an arrest. Id.

at 800-01. Unlike in Tulin, however, there is undisputed evidence

here establishing that the police had probable cause to arrest

Smith. And, we agree with the district court that nothing here

“rises to the level of ‘outrageousness’ as to be beyond all possible

levels of decency and utterly incomprehensible in a civilized

society.” Smith, 121 F. Supp. 3d at 125 (quoting Lyles v.

Micenko, 404 F. Supp. 2d 182, 187 (D.D.C. 2005)); see, e.g.,

Ortberg v. Goldman Sachs Grp., 64 A.3d 158, 163 (D.C. 2013).

 

Affirmed.

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EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring: It is clear 

that the existence of probable cause defeats Smith’s claims of 

false arrest/imprisonment and malicious prosecution. In my 

view, the question regarding Smith’s claim of intentional 

infliction of emotional distress is more difficult, although I 

ultimately agree that we must dismiss this claim as well.

Nevertheless, there are aspects of this case that distress 

me, so I am stirred to write separately. The law does not 

always produce just results and this case may be a good 

example. As I see it, the incident between Smith and Officer 

Rogers was much ado about nothing — a needlessly absurd

faceoff between a seemingly hot-headed citizen and a 

seemingly impetuous police officer. The citizen invariably 

loses in such exchanges, as Smith found out. Smith’s

imprudent action gave Officer Rogers just enough to assert 

probable cause, and the officer acted on it. 

I do not doubt that Officer Rogers was within his rights to 

pursue someone like Smith, who appeared to have violated 

the law. What is distressing here is that, although he had 

probable cause to arrest Smith, Officer Rogers did much 

more. The officer embellished and fabricated his official 

reports and post-arrest statements, claiming that Smith’s car 

brushed or grazed his leg. See JA 84, 130–32. These claims 

were untrue. And, of course, as the officer had reason to 

know, his fabrications were included in the papers filed with 

the prosecutor who ultimately charged Smith. See JA 72–76.

In these circumstances, it would not have been implausible for 

Smith to claim that, separate and apart from the events giving 

rise to his arrest, Officer Rogers’ dishonesty in recounting 

those events caused him great emotional distress.

A prosecutor is not obliged to charge a person merely 

because he has been arrested pursuant to probable cause. The 

prosecutor has discretion to weigh the evidence before her 

and decide whether to pursue the matter. Many factors may 

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affect a prosecutor’s decision to press criminal charges. 

Therefore, in a case such as this, Smith might have reasonably 

claimed that Rogers’ fabrications unduly influenced the 

prosecutor, resulting in him being charged, and then causing 

him to be engaged with the criminal justice system for months 

before the prosecution was finally dismissed as meritless. The 

net result of Smith’s prolonged encounter with the criminal 

justice system – arguably attributable in no small part to 

Rogers’ fabrications – was that he lost his job and his security 

clearance. Surely some might view this as enough to produce 

great emotional distress. In other words, given the impact that 

the criminal prosecution had on his life, Smith might have 

raised an emotional distress claim even if there was probable 

cause for arrest. 

There are three problems with my analysis. First, the 

theory that I have propounded was not raised by Smith. So the 

issue was never joined, either at the trial court or on appeal. 

Second, because the issue was not properly raised, I have no 

grounds upon which to conclude that the prosecutor was 

duped by Rogers’ fabrications. In other words, there is 

nothing in the record to indicate that the prosecutor relied on 

anything other than the original reason given by Rogers to 

support probable cause for Smith’s arrest. Third, the standard 

for intentional infliction of emotional distress is very high and 

it is far from clear that Smith could meet this standard even on 

the most generous view of my theory of emotional distress. I 

am therefore obliged to concur in the judgment of the court.

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