Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cv-01566/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cv-01566-17/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kim Erb
Defendant
David French
Defendant
Marty Heath
Defendant
John Murray
Defendant
Ernie Peters
Defendant
Deborah Stampfli
Plaintiff
Steve J. Stump
Defendant
Susanville Sanitary District
Defendant

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

DEBORAH STAMPFLI, an individual,

Plaintiff,

v.

SUSANVILLE SANITARY DISTRICT, a 

political subdivision of the 

State of California; STEVE J. 

STUMP, in his individual and 

official capacities; JOHN 

MURRAY, in his individual and 

official capacities; ERNIE 

PETERS, in his individual and 

official capacities; DAVID 

FRENCH, in his individual and 

official capacities; KIM ERB, in 

his individual and official 

capacities; MARTY HEATH, in his 

individual and official 

capacities; DOES I-V, inclusive; 

BLACK & WHITE CORPORATIONS I-V; 

and ABLE & BAKER COMPANIES, 

inclusive,

Defendants.

No. 2:20-cv-01566 WBS DMC 

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: 

DEFENDANT STEVE J. STUMP’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Deborah Stampfli brought this action 

Case 2:20-cv-01566-WBS-DMC Document 113 Filed 02/24/23 Page 1 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

containing numerous claims against the Susanville Sanitary 

District (“District”), Steve J. Stump, John Murray, Ernie Peters, 

David French, Kim Erb, Marty Heath, Black & White Corporations IV, Able and Baker Companies, and Does 1-5 inclusive. 

The court previously issued three orders on separate 

motions to dismiss, dismissing most of plaintiff’s claims. (See

Docket Nos. 34, 48, 66.) All that remains are plaintiff’s fifth 

claim, alleging deprivation of procedural due process under the 

Fourteenth Amendment by Steve J. Stump, and seventh claim, 

alleging failure to produce public records by the District, from 

the Third Amended Complaint. (See Third Am. Compl. ¶¶ 333-34, 

365-68; Order on Mot. to Dismiss Third. Am. Compl. (Docket No. 

66) at 18-19.) Defendant Steve J. Stump now moves for summary 

judgment on plaintiff’s fifth claim on the sole ground of 

qualified immunity. (Def. Steve J. Stump’s Mot. for Summ. J. 

(“Mot.”) (Docket No. 72).) Plaintiff opposes the motion and 

cross-moves for partial summary judgment establishing that 

plaintiff was not an at-will employee. (Pl.’s Suppl. Opp’n 

(Docket No. 102).)1

I. Facts

The District hired plaintiff as Treasurer in 2005. 

(Decl. of Susan Stampfli (“Stampfli Decl.”) (Docket No. 81-3) ¶ 

18.) At the time of her hiring, plaintiff became a member of 

Operating Engineers Local Union No. 3. (Id. ¶ 18.) Agreements 

between the union and the District established a number of 

1 Contrary to defendant’s argument, plaintiff complied 

with the timing requirements for filing a cross-motion under the 

Local Rules. See L.R. 230(e).

Case 2:20-cv-01566-WBS-DMC Document 113 Filed 02/24/23 Page 2 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

protections for union members, including the right to continued 

employment and termination only for good cause and after the 

satisfaction of procedural requirements. (Decl. of Art Frolli 

(Docket No. 102-7) ¶¶ 2-3.) From 2005 to 2013, plaintiff 

performed her assigned duties and a host of additional duties 

typically performed by supervisory personnel, and consistently 

received high performance evaluations. (See Stampfli Decl. ¶ 19; 

Decl. of Randy O’Hern (“O’Hern Decl.”) (Docket No. 102-4) ¶ 5.)

By October 2013, plaintiff was performing many 

management and administrative functions but, because she was a 

union member, she could not participate in confidential meetings 

of the District’s Board of Directors (“the Board”). (Stampfli 

Decl. ¶ 19.) Her inability to participate in these meetings was 

inconvenient because the Board frequently had to stop meetings or 

delay them to obtain information possessed only by plaintiff. 

(Id.) Because of these difficulties, the Board proposed the 

creation of a new management level position, entitled “Office 

Administrator,” which would allow plaintiff to participate in 

confidential board meetings but would require her to relinquish 

her union membership. (Id. ¶ 21.)

When plaintiff was offered this new position, she 

declined it because she did not wish to lose the job security 

offered by her union affiliation. (Id. ¶ 22.) In response to 

her concerns, plaintiff was advised by the General Manager and 

the District’s General Counsel that although she could not remain 

a union member, plaintiff would not become an at-will employee 

and would be afforded all the job security rights and benefits 

Case 2:20-cv-01566-WBS-DMC Document 113 Filed 02/24/23 Page 3 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

available to union members. (Id. ¶ 24; Decl. of Jaimee Jones 

(“Jones Decl.”) (Docket No. 102-2) ¶ 6.) Plaintiff was promised 

that her employment with the District would only be terminated 

for cause and in accordance with established Skelly procedures.2

(See Stampfli Decl. ¶ 24; Jones Decl. ¶ 6.) Based on these 

representations, plaintiff relinquished her position as Treasurer 

and accepted the new position of Office Administrator. (Stampfli 

Decl. ¶ 25.)

During 2017, plaintiff performed many duties typically 

performed by the General Manager, a position held at that time by 

Randy O’Hern. (Id. ¶ 30.) In October 2017, General Manager 

O’Hern recommended to the Board that plaintiff be provided a 20% 

salary increase to account for the additional duties she 

performed and that she receive the additional title of Assistant 

General Manager. (Id. ¶ 34; O’Hern Decl. ¶ 14.) O’Hern 

presented his proposal for the title change and salary increase 

to the Board at a board meeting on October 10, 2017. (O’Hern 

Decl. ¶ 17.) During the meeting, O’Hern described plaintiff as 

an “at-will” employee and explained that in the new proposed 

position, she would “serve at the pleasure of the Board and the 

new hire.” (Id. ¶ 19.) The official meeting minutes, which were 

signed by plaintiff, memorialize O’Hern’s comment that plaintiff 

was “at will.” (Minutes of Adjourned Regular Meeting of the Bd. 

2 “Skelly procedures” refers to the case Skelly v. State 

Personnel Bd., 15 Cal. 3d 194 (1975). In Skelly, the California 

Supreme Court held that an employer cannot take away a permanent 

public employee’s property rights (i.e., their vested right to 

continued employment) without certain procedural safeguards. See

id. at 215.

Case 2:20-cv-01566-WBS-DMC Document 113 Filed 02/24/23 Page 4 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

of Directors, Oct. 10, 2017 (“Oct. 10, 2017 Minutes”) (Docket No. 

81-6) at 139-2-483.) Following a discussion of the proposal, 

the Board approved a motion to “change [plaintiff’s] title to 

include Assistant General Manager with a 20% salary increase 

effective October 1, 2017.” (Id. at 140-1-117.) 

Plaintiff knew that there might come a time when the 

new General Manager no longer needed her assistance in performing 

the duties and functions of General Manager, and states that she 

was led to believe that if this change occurred, she would be 

relieved of any additional Assistant General Manager duties, but 

would continue to perform all the functions she previously 

performed as Office Administrator. (Stampfli Decl. ¶ 39.) 

Plaintiff states that she was never told that her position as 

Office Administrator had been converted to a position terminable 

at will or that she could summarily be deprived of her permanent 

position as Office Administrator. (Id.) 

In March 2018, the District hired defendant Steve Stump 

to the position of probationary General Manager. (Decl. of Steve 

Stump (“Stump Decl.”) (Docket No. 72-2) ¶ 1.) Plaintiff contends 

that following the completion of defendant Stump’s probationary 

period, he became increasingly hesitant to work in conjunction 

with her. (Stampfli Decl. ¶ 46.)

In April 2019, defendant Stump wanted plaintiff to 

shift funds from various accounts to allow for the purchase of a 

portable generator. (Id. ¶¶ 49-50.) Given plaintiff’s 

instructions from several board members regarding the financial 

affairs of the District, she requested that defendant Stump delay 

Case 2:20-cv-01566-WBS-DMC Document 113 Filed 02/24/23 Page 5 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

this purchase until after a new budget for 2020 was created or 

seek approval from the Board for the purchase. (Id. ¶ 50.) On 

or about January 8, 2020, defendant Stump directed plaintiff to 

have financial computer programs placed on his office computer. 

(Id. ¶ 54.) Plaintiff told defendant Stump that she wished to 

meet with certain board members to determine whether it was 

necessary for the programs to be placed on his computer. (Id. ¶¶ 

55-56.)

On January 9, 2020, defendant Stump placed plaintiff on 

unpaid administrative leave. (Stump Decl. ¶ 5.) On January 13, 

2020, defendant Stump sent plaintiff a text message offering to 

allow plaintiff to return to work if she promised not to be 

insubordinate to him. (Id. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff did not respond to 

the text message. (Id.) On January 14, 2020, defendant Stump 

informed plaintiff that her administrative leave would be paid, 

but not the reason she was placed on leave. (Stampfli Decl. ¶ 

59.) On March 6, 2020, defendant Stump sent plaintiff a letter 

releasing her from her “at-will” employment as Office 

Administrator/Assistant General Manager. (Stump Decl ¶ 12.) 

Plaintiff was never afforded an appeal process or other 

procedural safeguards. (See Stampfli Decl. ¶¶ 60-62; Stump Decl. 

¶¶ 12-13.)

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that 

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(a). A party may move for summary judgment either for one 

Case 2:20-cv-01566-WBS-DMC Document 113 Filed 02/24/23 Page 6 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

or more claims or defenses, or for portions thereof. Id. Where 

a court grants summary judgment only as to a portion of a claim 

or defense, it “may enter an order stating any material fact . . 

. that is not genuinely in dispute and treating the fact as 

established in the case.” Id. at 56(g). 

III. Discussion

Defendant moves for summary judgment solely on the 

basis that he is entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiff 

argues that defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity and 

cross-moves for partial summary judgment establishing that she 

was not an at-will employee. The court will first address 

plaintiff’s cross-motion.

A. Plaintiff’s Employment Status

Under multiple employment policies promulgated by the 

District, plaintiff was dismissible only for cause and in 

accordance with Skelly procedures. (See Resol. 4.06 (Docket No. 

81-11) at Ex. A, § 1; Ordinance No. 17 (Docket No. 81-9) § 8; 

Admin. Policies Manual (Docket No. 81-13) at 26.3) Additionally, 

according to O’Hern and then-General Counsel Jaimee Jones, the 

District promised plaintiff that she would continue to receive 

the rights afforded to union members (including for-cause and 

procedural due process protections) despite plaintiff forfeiting 

her union membership when she received the Office Administrator 

3 The Administrative Policies Manual establishes Skelly

rights for “permanent” employees, i.e., employees who had 

completed their probationary period. See Admin. Policies Manual 

at 6, 26. Plaintiff, as an employee of the District for over 

fourteen years, was clearly a permanent employee, which defendant 

does not seem to dispute. 

Case 2:20-cv-01566-WBS-DMC Document 113 Filed 02/24/23 Page 7 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

position. (See O’Hern Decl. ¶ 9; Jones Decl. ¶ 6; Minutes of 

Adjourned Regular Meeting of the Bd. of Dirs., Oct. 8, 2013

(Docket No. 102-18) at 114-1-368 to 114-1-383.) By virtue of 

these rights, plaintiff was not an at-will employee. See Guz v. 

Bechtel Nat. Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 335 (2000) (citing Cal. Lab.

Code § 2922).4

Defendant argues that the Board’s actions at the 

October 10, 2017 meeting implicitly repealed all of these 

existing protections. However, the relevant District policies 

were not even mentioned at the October 10, 2017 meeting, and 

there was no discussion of plaintiff’s employment status and 

protections beyond O’Hern’s comments. (See generally Pl.’s Ex. 

4, Partial Tr. of Oct. 10, 2017 Board Meeting (Docket No. 81-4); 

Oct. 10, 2017 Minutes.) Importantly, the motion approved by the 

Board made no mention of plaintiff’s employment type, only the

title change and compensation increase. (See Oct. 10, 2017 

Minutes at 140-1-117.) 

A cursory remark by O’Hern--who was a manager and not a 

member of the Board--that plaintiff was “at-will” did not serve 

to repeal the procedural protections established by the 

District’s ordinances, policies, and explicit promises to 

plaintiff. See McGraw v. City of Huntington Beach, 882 F.2d 384, 

388 (9th Cir. 1989) (concluding, in light of the “City Council’s 

stated purpose of protecting City employees from dismissal 

4 Defendant testified that he understood plaintiff to not 

be an at-will employee prior to the October 10, 2017 board 

meeting. (See Dep. of Steve Stump (“Stump Dep.”) (Docket No. 

102-12) at 254.)

Case 2:20-cv-01566-WBS-DMC Document 113 Filed 02/24/23 Page 8 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

without ‘just cause,’” that City Council did not terminate

employee’s “permanent” status “sub silentio upon promotion, once 

again subjecting the promoted employee to the risks of . . . ‘atwill’ employment status”); City & County of San Francisco v. All 

Persons Interested in Matter of Proposition C, 51 Cal. App. 5th 

703, 715 (1st Dist. 2020) (quoting Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. v. 

State Bd. of Equalization, 53 Cal. 3d 245, 249, 279 (1991))

(because “‘the law shuns repeals by implication,’” there was no 

implied repeal by subsequent legislative action that did “‘not 

even mention’” the earlier legislative action).

Defendant relies on Iscoff v. Police Commission of City 

& County of San Francisco, which held that “where a subsequent 

ordinance is so conflicting with and repugnant to an earlier one 

that the two cannot stand together, the later enactment is 

controlling and the earlier one is repealed by implication.” 222 

Cal. App. 2d 395, 409 (1st Dist. 1963). This case is not on 

point for two reasons. First, O’Hern’s comments cannot be 

equated with a binding action of the Board. Second, even if 

O’Hern’s comments had legal effect, taken in context they are not 

wholly inconsistent with plaintiff’s pre-existing employment 

protections. O’Hern intended the “at-will” and “at the pleasure 

of” descriptions to apply to the title change and salary 

increase, which would only be in effect so long as the Board felt 

it necessary, at which time plaintiff would revert to her 

previous position. (See O’Hern Decl. ¶¶ 17-20; see also Oct. 10, 

2017 Minutes at 140-1-055 (indicating that plaintiff could revert 

to former position once the new General Manager was capable of 

Case 2:20-cv-01566-WBS-DMC Document 113 Filed 02/24/23 Page 9 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

performing all duties).)5

The court therefore concludes that there is no genuine 

dispute of material fact as to plaintiff’s employment status and

grants plaintiff’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment,

establishing that plaintiff was not an at-will employee and had 

for-cause and procedural protections according to the District’s 

policies and the terms of her employment.

B. Qualified Immunity

The court next turns to the question of whether 

defendant Stump is entitled to qualified immunity. “Qualified 

immunity is applicable unless the official’s conduct violated a 

clearly established constitutional right.” Pearson v. Callahan, 

555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009).

In determining whether a state official is entitled to 

qualified immunity on summary judgment, the court first 

determines “whether the evidence viewed in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiff is sufficient to show a violation of a

constitutional right.” Sandoval v. County of San Diego, 985 F.3d 

657, 671 (9th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The court then determines “whether the right was 

clearly established such that a reasonable official would [have] 

known that he was engaging in unlawful conduct.” Levine v. City 

of Alameda, 525 F.3d 903, 906 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Pearson, 

5 Defendant also cites Blotter v. Farrell, 42 Cal. 2d 

804, 811 (1954), for the proposition that “the power to enact 

ordinances implies power, unless otherwise provided in the grant, 

to repeal them.” The relevance of this case is unclear, as the 

Board’s general ability to repeal prior ordinances is not in 

question here.

Case 2:20-cv-01566-WBS-DMC Document 113 Filed 02/24/23 Page 10 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

555 U.S. at 244. If the right was clearly established, the court 

evaluates whether a reasonable person in the position of the 

defendant would know that the conduct at issue violated that 

right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001), overruled on 

other grounds by Pearson, 555 U.S. 223; Levine, 525 F.3d at 906.

Plaintiff alleges that defendant violated her right to 

procedural due process. “The requirements of procedural due 

process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by 

the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property.” 

Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). The existence 

of a property interest is determined by sources independent of 

the Constitution, for instance state law or the terms of an 

individual’s employment. See id. at 578; Dorr v. Butte County, 

795 F.2d 875, 876 (9th Cir. 1986). Under California law, a 

permanent public employee “dismissible only for cause” possesses 

a “‘property interest in his continued employment which is 

protected by due process.’” Dorr, 795 F.2d at 876 (quoting

Skelly, 15 Cal. 3d at 207–08). As explained above, plaintiff was 

a permanent public employee dismissible only for cause. 

Accordingly, plaintiff held a constitutionally protected property 

interest in her continued public employment and was entitled to 

procedural due process. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 569; Dorr, 795 

F.2d at 876.

Plaintiff was summarily terminated without any 

opportunity to be heard, which defendant does not dispute. (See

Stampfli Decl. ¶¶ 61-62; Mot. at 7-12; Stump Decl. ¶¶ 12-13.) 

The court thus concludes that there is sufficient evidence to 

Case 2:20-cv-01566-WBS-DMC Document 113 Filed 02/24/23 Page 11 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

establish that plaintiff’s procedural due process rights were 

violated. See Austin v. Univ. of Oregon, 925 F.3d 1133, 1139 

(9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333

(1976)) (“‘some form of hearing is required before an individual 

is finally deprived of a property interest’”).

The court next considers whether the procedural due 

process right at issue was clearly established. A right is 

clearly established for purposes of determining qualified 

immunity if the “contours of the right were sufficiently clear 

that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing 

violates that right.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. In determining 

whether the right at issue was clearly established, the court may 

not “define clearly established law at a high level of 

generality.” See Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011). 

Rather, “the clearly established law must be particularized to

the facts of the case.” White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017) 

(internal quotation marks omitted).

As this court previously found (see Docket No. 48 at 

11), the right to procedural protections for permanent public 

employees who are dismissible only for cause according to the 

terms of their employment is well-established under federal law. 

See Roth, 408 U.S. at 569; Dorr, 795 F.2d at 876; Skelly, 15 Cal. 

3d at 207–08. This formulation of the right at issue is 

appropriately tailored to the facts here. Cf. Flores v. Von 

Kleist, 739 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1255 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (Burrell, J.)

(defining the relevant right for purposes of “clearly 

established” analysis as whether “due process protections are 

Case 2:20-cv-01566-WBS-DMC Document 113 Filed 02/24/23 Page 12 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

implicated where the plaintiff has a legitimate expectation of 

continued employment stemming from a mutually explicit 

understanding”) (internal quotation marks omitted).6

The outcome here thus turns on whether a reasonable

official in defendant’s position could have “reasonably believed” 

that his conduct did not violate a clearly established 

constitutional right. See Levine, 525 F.3d at 906; see also

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 199. If so, defendant will be entitled to 

qualified immunity. See id.

Defendant’s counsel argues that defendant “considered 

what legal effect prior resolutions, practices, or policy manuals 

of the District might have” on plaintiff’s employment status. 

(Mot. at 12.) However, defendant himself testified otherwise, 

explaining that once he learned that plaintiff was referred to as 

an “at-will employee” during the October 10, 2017 meeting, 

defendant concluded that he could terminate plaintiff without 

cause or procedural protections. (See Stump Dep. at 94, 102, 

131, 266.) In coming to this conclusion, defendant did not 

consider the effect of any sources other than the October 10, 

6 Defendant proposes that the court define the issue as 

whether “a public employee who was told that they are ‘at will’ 

and serve at the ‘pleasure of’ the appointing authority during 

the creation of their management-level position possess [sic] a 

constitutionally protected interest in their continued 

employment.” (See Def.’s Reply (Docket No. 107) at 20.) This 

formulation is too factually granular. See Bonivert v. City of 

Clarkston, 883 F.3d 865, 872 (9th Cir. 2018) (officials may 

“still be on notice that their conduct violates established law 

even in novel factual circumstances”). Further, this formulation 

is inappropriately skewed in favor of defendant, as it

misconstrues the facts and fails to account for the litany of 

evidence establishing that plaintiff was not an at-will employee.

Case 2:20-cv-01566-WBS-DMC Document 113 Filed 02/24/23 Page 13 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

2017 meeting. (See id.) 

Defendant’s assertion that he reasonably believed his 

conduct was lawful is thus entirely based on O’Hern’s comments at 

the board meeting. Defendant’s alleged conclusion about 

plaintiff’s employment status was not reasonable given the 

circumstances here. For instance, defendant was aware that 

plaintiff’s title and salary change were only a temporary “stop 

gap measure.” (See Stump Decl. ¶ 9.) Defendant was also aware 

that the District’s at-will employees, including plaintiff, could 

retain some of the rights laid out in the union contract. (See

Stump Dep. at 285.) A reasonable official in defendant’s 

position would not have drawn conclusions about plaintiff’s 

employment status based solely on offhand comments made by a 

manager--not a member of the Board--during a presentation. 

Rather, a reasonable official would have investigated plaintiff’s 

employment status and based his decision upon the available 

information. Had defendant properly investigated the issue, he 

would have considered the applicable ordinances and information 

concerning the promises made to plaintiff, which establish that 

plaintiff was not an at-will employee.

Defendant’s failure to properly investigate is 

especially glaring given that both the District and defendant had

retained legal counsel in response to the litigation risk 

occasioned by defendant’s actions in placing plaintiff on leave. 

(See Minutes of Adjourned Special Board Meeting, Jan. 17, 2020 

(Docket No. 102-25 at 2-3) ¶ 9; Minutes of Adjourned Special 

Board Meeting, Feb. 5, 2020 (Docket No. 102-25 at 4-5) ¶ 5.) 

Case 2:20-cv-01566-WBS-DMC Document 113 Filed 02/24/23 Page 14 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

Defendant participated in multiple board meetings where both the 

District’s counsel and his counsel discussed that litigation 

risk. (See id.; Stump Dep. at 258-59.) Despite all this, 

defendant failed to inquire about the legality of his intended 

conduct with either the District’s lawyer or his own lawyer, 

instead basing his conclusions entirely on a few words in the 

October 10, 2017 board meeting minutes. (See Stump Dep. at 102-

03, 107-09.)

In Levine, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the 

defendant supervisor had qualified immunity based on a reasonable 

but mistaken belief that he was acting lawfully in terminating 

the plaintiff, a public employee, without a pretermination 

hearing. 525 F.3d at 906-07. This belief was reasonable because 

the supervisor instructed his agent to ensure that the 

plaintiff’s due process rights were respected, and because the 

plaintiff’s union contract stated that he was not entitled to a 

pretermination hearing. Id. at 907.

Unlike the supervisor in Levine, it does not appear 

that defendant was endeavoring to respect plaintiff’s rights; on 

the contrary, it seems that rather than attempting to truly 

discern plaintiff’s employment status and protections, defendant 

was searching for any basis to support his desire to oust 

plaintiff. In defendant’s words, once he saw the term “at-will” 

in the meeting minutes, that was “all [he] needed”--he “[could 

not] get any better luck than that.” (Stump Dep. at 94, 121.) 

Further, unlike the union contract in Levine, a 

manager’s comments during a meeting cannot be reasonably 

Case 2:20-cv-01566-WBS-DMC Document 113 Filed 02/24/23 Page 15 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

considered to have binding legal effect. And in contrast to the 

instant case, there was no indication in Levine that 

investigation of the plaintiff’s employment rights would have 

yielded evidence clearly showing that the plaintiff had the right 

to a pretermination hearing. See 525 F.3d at 907.

Because there is sufficient evidence to establish a 

constitutional violation and a reasonable official in defendant’s 

position would have known he was violating a clearly established 

right, defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity. See

Sandoval, 985 F.3d at 671; Levine, 525 F.3d at 906.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant Steve J. Stump’s 

motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 72) be, and hereby is, 

DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s cross-motion for 

partial summary judgment (Docket No. 102) be, and hereby is, 

GRANTED, establishing that plaintiff was not an at-will employee 

and had for-cause and procedural protections according to the 

District’s policies and the terms of her employment.

Dated: February 23, 2023

Case 2:20-cv-01566-WBS-DMC Document 113 Filed 02/24/23 Page 16 of 16