Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-15-41101/USCOURTS-ca5-15-41101-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dish Network Service, L.L.C.
Appellee
Larry Mark Polsky
Appellant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-41101

Summary Calendar

LARRY MARK POLSKY, et al, Member of a "Class", 

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

DISH NETWORK SERVICE, L.L.C., 

 Defendant - Appellee

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:14-CV-64

Before DAVIS, JONES, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Plaintiff-Appellant Larry Mark Polsky appeals the district court’s final 

judgment dismissing his action with prejudice on cross-motions for summary 

judgment. In brief, Polsky, a licensed attorney, brought this action against 

Defendant-Appellee Dish Network Service, L.L.C. (“Dish”), eventually 

asserting, after several amendments to his complaint, three fundamental 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 2, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 15-41101

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claims arising out of Dish’s internet and television services. On de novo review, 

applying the same Rule 56 standards as the district court,1 we affirm 

essentially for the reasons set out by the district court in its August 7, 2015 

memorandum opinion and order granting Dish’s motion for summary 

judgment and denying Polsky’s motion.

Polsky asserted claims against Dish under what is currently Section 

17.46(b)(24) of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“TDTPA”) based on 

Dish’s internet and television service, for which he entered into a contract in 

late 2013. Polsky signed up for an internet plan that allowed him to use up to 

30 gigabytes per month divided equally between two time periods: 15 gigabytes 

per month between 8:00 a.m. and 2:00 a.m. (“peak hours”), and 15 gigabytes 

per month between 2:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m. (“off-peak hours”). As part of his 

television service, he gained access to a Dish feature called the Hopper, which 

would allow him to skip commercials under some circumstances. The Hopper 

also allowed the user to view recorded television content in multiple locations.

First, although Polsky conceded he received the service for which he 

paid, he argued Dish somehow harmed him by failing to inform him that it did 

not actually monitor customers’ usage during non-peak hours—a fact Polsky 

learned during discovery. Polsky claimed that if he had known Dish did not 

monitor off-peak usage, he would have signed up for a lower tier of service and 

simply used the internet more during off-peak hours, saving himself money.

The district court rejected this claim using an apt analogy:

During oral arguments, this Court searched without total success 

to come up with an analogy to accurately portray this claim, but, 

placed in a fast food context, Polsky’s complaint is as follows. A 

consumer goes into a fast food restaurant and orders a large drink, 

pays for a large drink, and receives a large drink. The restaurant 

charges a fee for refills. After purchasing and receiving that drink, 

 

1 Berquist v. Washington Mut. Bank, 500 F.3d 344, 348 (5th Cir. 2007).

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the consumer notices that the employees are too busy doing other 

duties to monitor whether individuals are paying for refills or just 

getting their own refills without paying. The purchaser of the large 

drink then sues the restaurant, not for its failure to provide him 

with the very item he ordered, but, instead, for not telling him that 

they were too busy to see who got refills and who did not. If he had 

been told this facet, he could have ordered a medium drink and 

then just pilfered a refill without paying, thereby saving money. 

This Court finds that there is no cause of action, regardless of 

whether it is based in contract, tort, upon a consumer protections 

statute, or in law or equity, that would lie against a merchant 

because it did not disclose to a consumer a way in which, instead 

of honestly paying for a good or service, that consumer could 

surreptitiously obtain that good or service. No merchant is 

required to inform a consumer that there is a way in which its 

products or services can be bootlegged to avoid a lawful payment.

The Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Polsky’s 

Internet claim is granted.2

We agree. There is no merit whatsoever to Polsky’s internet claim.

Second, Polsky argued that Dish wrongfully failed to disclose facts about 

the Hopper’s limitations. Specifically, he claimed he was led to believe that he 

could use the feature to skip commercials in a wide variety of television shows 

when it fact the feature was limited to certain television programs from a 

handful of television networks, and the feature usually was only available the 

day after the program originally aired. As the district court noted, Dish’s 

advertisements featuring the Hopper were replete with references to the 

Hopper’s limitations, statements that restrictions applied, and notices that

potential customers should contact Dish for more details. Polsky conceded that 

he never asked about the Hopper’s limitations, and he failed to point out any 

affirmative misstatement by Dish regarding its service.

 

2 Polsky v. Dish Network Service, L.L.C., No. 1:14-cv-00064, slip op. at 3-4 (S.D. Tex. 

Aug. 7, 2015).

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As the district court noted in its well-reasoned opinion, for Hopper to 

prevail on his TDTPA claim, he would have to show, among other things, that 

Dish failed to disclose information about the Hopper and that Dish intended to 

dupe consumers by failing to disclose that information.3 The district court 

concluded that Polsky failed to present evidence on either of one of these points. 

To the contrary, the record unequivocally shows that Dish plainly disclosed the 

Hopper’s limitations, and Polsky has presented no competent summary 

judgment evidence of any intent to deceive consumers. Thus, we necessarily 

reach the same conclusion as the district court and affirm the dismissal of 

Polsky’s Hopper claim.

Third and finally, Polsky argues that he is entitled to relief under Tex. 

Bus. & Comm. Code § 17.50(a)(3), which provides: “(a) A consumer may 

maintain an action where any of the following constitute a producing cause of 

economic damages or damages for mental anguish: . . . (3) any unconscionable 

action or course of action by any person . . . .” We concur with the district 

court’s assessment:

The plaintiff’s assertions in this regard are at best hypothetical 

and at worse made in bad faith. Plaintiff has suffered no injury 

whatsoever from Dish’s conduct that was not precipitated by his 

own actions. Thus, the plaintiff has no damages and thus lacks 

standing to make the claim he has.4

The district court set out other valid reasons for denying Polsky’s third claim, 

but this is sufficient to bar relief. 

In sum, Polsky’s claims are contrary to common sense and good faith, are 

not supported by record evidence, and are frivolous. We conclude the district 

 

3 Id. at 5 (citing, inter alia, Gill v. Boyd Distrib. Ctr., 64 S.W.3d 601, 604 (Tex. App. 

2001)).

4 Id. at 7.

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court properly dismissed them, and we affirm essentially for the reasons given 

by the district court.

AFFIRMED.

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