Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cr-00095/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cr-00095-7/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Aly Mohsen
Defendant
Amr Mohsen
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

CASE NO. CR. 03-0095 WBS

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER RE: DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTS 11-19 

(DOUBLE JEOPARDY) 

AMR MOHSEN and ALY MOHSEN,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Defendant Amr Mohsen (“defendant”) moves to dismiss

Counts Eleven through Eighteen of the Superseding Indictment,

charging him with mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343,

and Count Nineteen, charging him with obstruction of justice in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503, upon the ground that the

prosecution on those charges is barred by the double jeopardy

clause of the Fifth Amendment. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The following is taken from Aptix v. QuickTurn, No.

98-00762, 2000 WL 852813 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2000) and Aptix v.

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QuickTurn, 269 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2001), except where otherwise

indicated by citation. On September 20, 1989, Aptix Corporation

(hereinafter “Aptix”) filed patent number 5,544,069 (hereinafter

“‘069 patent”). The ‘069 patent was issued by the United States

Patent and Trademark Office on August 6, 1996.

On February 26, 1998, Aptix sued QuickTurn Design

Systems (hereinafter “QuickTurn”) for infringement of its ‘069

patent. The Civil Local Rules of the Northern District required

Aptix to disclose the claims it would assert and the

corresponding dates on which those claims were invented. Aptix

disclosed that it would assert four claims (4, 5, 7, and 8) on

April 13, 1998, but stated that it was unable to provide the

dates of conception because the inventor (defendant) was out of

the country. Included in the initial disclosures were seventeen

pages from the “1989 Notebook”, and these pages contained

information about the process of invention.

Between April and December of 1988, defendant and his

brother Aly Mohsen allegedly engaged in a series of actions that

are the basis for the charges at issue in this motion. Defendant

claimed that he had found another engineering notebook that was

allegedly started in 1988 and that contained evidence of an

earliest date of conception. On May 4, 1998, based on the 1988

notebook, Aptix’s lawyer served a disclosure that listed the date

of conception for all the claims as July 31, 1988 (approximately

one year earlier than the filing date of the patent). On June 4,

1998, defendant brought the 1988 and 1989 notebooks to his

deposition as evidence of his research and development that led

to the ‘069 patent. Aptix only provided QuickTurn with copies of

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these notebooks. Quickturn moved for production of the originals

of the notebooks on November 24, 1998. Shortly thereafter,

defendant reported that the original notebooks had been stolen

from his car. 

Defendant took the stand at this hearing but asserted

his Fifth Amendment right and did not answer any questions. 

Following that hearing, Judge Alsup found that “Amr Mohsen, the

founder, chairman, chief executive officer, and lead inventor of

Aptix Corporation, fabricated the entire 1988 Notebook, numerous

entries in the 1989 Notebook, the three corroborative entries in

his Daytime and the rest of the post-theft ‘corroboration’ – all

in an effort to defraud defendant and this Court.” Aptix v.

QuickTurn, 2000 WL 852813 at *23. 

On June 14, 2000, Judge Alsup dismissed Aptix’s

complaint on the basis of Aptix’s unclean hands in falsifying

information in the notebooks, found the case to be exceptional as

a result of Aptix’s fraudulent actions such that Aptix was

required to pay attorney’s fees and costs, and further found the

patent to be unenforceable. The Federal Circuit upheld dismissal

of the suit and the award of fees and costs in November 2001, but

vacated the finding of unenforceability of the patent. In its

ruling, the court held that “ [t]he doctrine of unclean hands

does not reach out to extinguish a property right based on

misconduct during the litigation to enforce that right.” 

Finally, the court found that when defendant asserted a “security

interest” in Aptix’s assets, it was an attempt to make a

fraudulent transfer (presumably to protect the assets from the

judgment), and QuickTurn was thus still able to levy on Aptix’s

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The government notes that defendant’s claim of a 1

security interest in Aptix’s assets occurred after terminating

sanctions were awarded and was voided by Judge Alsup. (USA’s

Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss for Double Jeopardy 10.) It is unclear

how Judge Alsup’s finding that defendant had no security interest

in Aptix’s assets amounts to a criminal charge of mail fraud or

obstruction of justice. 

4

bank accounts in an attempt to satisfy a portion of the judgment

it obtained.1

II. Discussion

There are at least three fundamental reasons why Counts

Eleven through Nineteen are not barred by the Double Jeopardy

Clause.

A. No Criminal Punishment

The Double Jeopardy Clause “protects only against the

imposition of multiple criminal punishments for the same

offense.” Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 98 (1997)

(citations omitted). The punishment which defendant claims to

have been criminal - i.e., dismissal of Aptix’s lawsuit, award of

attorneys’ fees, and Judge Alsup’s invalidation of defendant’s

security interest in Aptix’s assets - was in fact civil.

In Hudson, the Supreme Court listed seven factors to

consider in determining whether the “clearest proof” has

established that penalties are criminal, rather than civil. In

applying these factors, a court should look to whether: (1) the

sanction involves affirmative disability or restraint, such as

imprisonment, (2) it has historically been regarding as

punishment, (3) scienter, or knowledge, is required for the

sanction, (4) its operation will promote the traditional aims of

punishment, namely retribution and deterrence, (5) the behavior

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to which it applies is already a crime, (6) it has a rational

alternative purpose, and (7) the sanction appears excessive in

relation to the alternative purpose. Hudson, 522 U.S. 93, 99-

100, 104 (1997).

The majority of the factors counsel against the court

finding that the “clearest proof” has demonstrated that the

finding of unclean hands was a criminal penalty levied against

defendant, as discussed below. 

First, the dismiss the civil lawsuit and the

requirement of paying attorneys’ fees did not involve affirmative

disability or restraint, such as the “infamous punishment of

imprisonment.” Second, these civil and equitable remedies have

not historically been regarded as punishment. Repub. Molding

Corp. v. B. W. Photo Util., 319 F.2d 347, 349 (1963)(“The concept

[of unclean hands] invoking the denial of relief is not intended

to serve as punishment for extraneous transgressions . . . ”). 

Thus, the first two factors counsel in favor of finding the

remedies to be civil in nature. 

Third, arguably, finding that a defendant has unclean

hands requires knowledge, or scienter, so this factor cuts

against a determination that the sanction was civil. Fourth, the

award of attorneys fees was for the primary purpose of

compensating opposing counsel rather than to promote the

traditional aims of punishment - retribution and deterrence. See

Repub. Molding Corp. v. B. W. Photo Util., 319 F.2d 347, 349

(1963). Thus, this factor counsels in favor of a determination

that the sanctions were civil in nature. 

Fifth, because perjury and obstruction of justice are

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The defendant notes that in Keystone, the court 2

dismissed a patent case without prejudice, and here, the court

dismissed Aptix’s complaint with prejudice. (Def.’s Reply 2.) 

However, the court’s explanation in Keystone of the doctrine of

unclean hands is still instructive. 

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also crimes, this factor weighs in favor of determining that the

sanctions are criminal. Sixth, the civil sanctions imposed had a

more compelling alternative purpose. “What does seem clear is

that misconduct in the abstract . . . does not constitute unclean

hands. The concept invoking the denial of relief is not intended

to serve as punishment for extraneous transgressions, but instead

is based upon ‘considerations that make for the advancement of

right and justice.’” Repub. Molding Corp. v. B. W. Photo Util.,

319 F.2d 347, 349 (1963)(quoting Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen.

Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245, (1933)). 

Finally, dismissal of the civil lawsuit for equitable

considerations was not excessive to meet its aim; rather, it was

an appropriate way for the court to ensure “that equity will not

lend its aid to enable a party to reap the benefit of its

misconduct.” Keystone, 290 U.S. at 245. A court’s attempt to 2

strike an equitable balance and render a just outcome does not

translate into a punishment upon a defendant who was not even a

party to the suit. 

In sum, five factors suggest that the sanction at issue

is civil, and only two weigh in favor of the sanction being

considered criminal. Thus, balancing the factors delineated in

Hudson demonstrates that defendant failed to show the “clearest

proof” that dismissal of Aptix’s lawsuit amounted to a criminal

punishment, and that, by extension, the current charges violate

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the Double Jeopardy Clause.

B. Not the Same Offense

The charges in Counts Eleven through Nineteen of the

Superseding Indictment are not the same as any offenses for which

defendant was previously punished. The Double Jeopardy Clause in

the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides

that, “No person shall . . . be subject for the same offence to

be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” A defendant is not

impermissibly punished for the “same offense” twice if each

offense contains at least one element that is not contained in

the other. United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993);

Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). Additionally,

it is not sufficient to establish a double jeopardy violation

that the same conduct was the basis for the offenses – the

offenses charged must be the same in order to establish a double

jeopardy violation. Id. at 704. 

Preliminarily, Judge Alsup’s evidentiary finding

relating to the falsification of information in “an effort to

defraud the defendant and [the c]ourt” in Aptix v. Quickturn,

2000 WL 852813 at *23, hardly equates to a criminal conviction

for fraud. Even if it did, the elements of the court’s finding

of “unclean hands” are not the same as the elements of any of the

charges in Counts Eleven through Nineteen of the Superseding

Indictment in this case. This court is hard-pressed to denote

the “elements” of the doctrine of unclean hands, but the

government suggests these two: “(1) an unconscionable act; (2) in

relation to a matter in litigation,” and the defense appears to

find them acceptable. (USA’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss for

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Double Jeopardy 2.) At least one “element” of the doctrine of

unclean hands, unconscionability, is not an element of mail fraud

or obstruction of justice. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341; 18 U.S.C. §§

1503. Further, mail fraud need not occur “in relation to a

matter in litigation.” Conversely, at least one element of mail

fraud (use of the mails) and at least one element of obstruction

of justice (corruption) is not an “element” of a finding of

unclean hands. 

C. The United States Not a Party

When the United States is not a party to the first

action, the action cannot be subject to the Constitutional

protection against double jeopardy in a subsequent prosecution

brought by the United States. United States v. Ely, 142 F.3d

1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Heffner, 85

F.3d 435, 439 (9th Cir. 1996)). Even if the court were to find

that defendant was a party in the civil patent litigation,

because the government was not a party to that litigation, the

Double Jeopardy Clause cannot now be invoked against the

government for the charges currently pending before the court. 

Ely, 142 F.3d at 1121 (finding that even when the FDIC, a federal

agency acting as a receiver for a private party, sought punitive

damages against the defendant, the defendant could not later

allege double jeopardy based on that action).

In United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993), the

Court applied double jeopardy protection to bar a subsequent

prosecution where the first prosecution was for criminal

contempt. The holding in that case, however, does not affect the

rule that the United States must be a party to both prosecutions

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in order for double jeopardy to apply. The Court in Dixon

emphasized that the first prosecution was for nonsummary criminal

contempt, which does constitute a crime against the United States

under 18 U.S.C. § 402 (See Steinert v. United States District

Court, 543 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1976)), and the United States was a

party to the underlying action in which the contempt was

adjudicated.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT defendants’ motion to

dismiss Counts Eleven through Nineteen for violation of the

Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment be, and the same

hereby is, DENIED.

DATED: December 21, 2005

 

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