Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-03626/USCOURTS-ca7-15-03626-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Kenyon R. Walton
Appellant

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 15‐3626

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

KENYON R. WALTON,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Illinois.

No. 3:12‐cr‐30266‐MJR‐1 — Michael J. Reagan, Chief Judge.

ARGUED MAY 23, 2016 — DECIDED JUNE 30, 2016

Before BAUER, POSNER, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge.  Illinois State Trooper Nate McVicker

pulled over defendant‐appellant, Kenyon Walton, in Madison

County, Illinois, on August 29, 2012, for routine traffic viola‐

tions. During the course of the traffic stop, Officer McVicker

discovered that Walton possessed a large quantity of cocaine.

Walton was indicted on September 5, 2012, in a single count for

possession with intent to distribute cocaine in excess of five

Case: 15-3626 Document: 26 Filed: 06/30/2016 Pages: 14
2 No. 15‐3626

kilograms, inviolationof 21U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and(b)(1)(A)(ii)

and 18 U.S.C. § 2.

On October 22, 2012, Walton filed a motion to suppress the

cocaine, arguing that the traffic stop violated his Fourth

Amendment rights. There was a hearing on the motion on

January 29, 2015.1 At the hearing, Officer McVicker testified

regarding the incident and the government submitted an

audio/video recording captured on Officer McVicker’s dash‐

board camera. The district court denied Walton’s motion on

August 10, 2015, and Walton appealed. We affirm the denial of

the motion to suppress.

I.  BACKGROUND

At approximately 8:43 a.m. on August 29, 2012, Officer

McVicker pulled over a 2012 Chevrolet Suburban with Colo‐

rado license plates that was traveling eastbound on Interstate

70 in Madison County, Illinois. The vehicle contained two

people: Darrallyn Smoot, the driver, and Walton, a passenger.

Officer McVicker pulled the Suburban over because it was

traveling 68 mph in a 65 mph zone, it was following the vehicle

in front of it too closely, and it appeared that Walton was not

wearing his seatbelt, a violation of Illinois law.

As Officer McVicker exited his squad car and walked

towards the Suburban, he observed that it contained only two

1

   The district court originally ruled thatWalton lackedFourth Amendment

standing, which we reversed and remanded the case for further proceed‐

ings. See United States v. Walton, 763 F.3d 655, 656 (7th Cir. 2014). At that

time, we did not rule on whether the search and seizure were reasonable.

Id. at 657 n.2.

Case: 15-3626 Document: 26 Filed: 06/30/2016 Pages: 14
No. 15‐3626 3

people andone piece ofluggage.OfficerMcVicker approached

the passenger window and spoke to Smoot and Walton. He

informed them that he intended only to issue a written

warning, as opposed to a ticket. Walton told Officer McVicker

that they had been stopped by police in Kansas the previous

evening and had received a written warning for an improper

signal. Walton gave the written warning to Officer McVicker.

The warning noted that Walton was driving at that time with

a suspended driver’s license. Walton said that they were

stopped fortwo hours and thatthe police officers had searched

their vehicle. Walton also said that the Suburban was a rental

car, and he provided Officer McVicker with the rental agree‐

ment. Officer McVickerlearned from the rental agreement that

the Suburban had been rented at the Denver International

Airport, that the vehicle cost almost $1,000 to rent (including

the deposit), and that Smoot was not an authorized driver.

Since Walton had a suspended license and Smoot was not an

authorized driver, neither individual could legally drive the

Suburban. Officer McVicker informed Walton that he could

have the vehicle towed, but was not going to do so.

Officer McVicker then asked the two about their travel

plans. He learned that both Smoot and Walton were from

Ohio. According to Walton, Smoot had driven her own car

from Ohio to Colorado to visit her friends, but her car broke

down while she was in Colorado. Walton, her boyfriend, flew

to Colorado and rented the Suburban at the Denver Interna‐

tional Airport to drive them both back to Ohio.

Officer McVicker testified that during this conversation,

Smoot appeared “extremely nervous,” as “her heartbeat

[became] visible through her chest” and“her breathingpattern

Case: 15-3626 Document: 26 Filed: 06/30/2016 Pages: 14
4 No. 15‐3626

was extreme.” He testified that her nervousness did not

decrease even after he informed her that he was only issuing

a warning, instead of writing a ticket or having the vehicle

towed. Officer McVicker testified that in his experience, when

most innocent motorists are informed that they are only

receiving a warning, the general anxiety of getting pulled over

subsides.

Officer McVicker testified that in his training and experi‐

ence, he can determine within one minute of pulling a car over

whether there is anything that may build up or lead to reason‐

able suspicion of criminal activity. During that time, he looks

for numerous indicators that suggest eitherthat the motorist is

innocent or that the stop should continue to confirm or dispel

any notion of criminal activity. About three minutes into this

traffic stop, Officer McVicker testified that he could not dispel

the notion that Smoot and Walton were involved in criminal

activity. But rather than tow the car and conduct an inventory

search,OfficerMcVicker askedSmootto accompany him to his

squad car while he prepared the written warning.

Officer McVicker and Smoot both entered the squad car

approximately six minutes after he had initially pulled the

Suburban over. As he prepared the warning, Officer McVicker

continued to ask Smoot questions. Officer McVicker testified

that Smoot’s body language throughout this period exhibited

nervousness. He testified that she was breathing heavily, her

heart rate did not decrease, she was shivering despite the

summer weather, and she sat uncomfortably in the seat while

situating herself as close to the passenger door as possible.

Officer McVicker asked her what happened to her car. Smoot

explained that it broke down in Colorado and that she was

Case: 15-3626 Document: 26 Filed: 06/30/2016 Pages: 14
No. 15‐3626 5

afraid of flying, which was why Walton flew to Denver to

drive her back. Officer McVicker asked her why she was in

Colorado, and she said she drove out to visit friends.

Officer McVicker also asked why they rented such a large

and expensive car. Smoot replied that Walton rented the car,

not her, and that “guys like trucks.” Officer McVicker

commented that they could have rented a cheaper car to drive

back in. Smoot did notrespond to this comment, but noted that

Walton had to fly to Denver because she was unable to rent a

car. Officer McVicker testified that in his experience, criminals

generally rent luxury vehicles and that larger “SUV” vehicles

are better at concealing items because they have more “natural

voids.” Officer McVicker testified that the Suburban rental

caught his attention because the two did not have a need to

rent such a large and expensive vehicle; there were only two

occupants and one bag of luggage, yet the car cost nearly

$1,000 and seated seven to eight passengers.

Officer McVicker asked Smoot about the Kansas stop from

the previous evening. Smoot initially acknowledged that the

stop lasted two hours and said that the Kansas officers were

“being mean,” but then quickly said they were “just doing

their job.” Officer McVicker asked what the Kansas officers

were doing for two hours, Smoot responded that the stop did

not last two hours and that Walton was exaggerating when he

said it had lasted that long. Officer McVicker asked again what

the Kansas officers did during the stop, Smoot answered:

“Nothing. They gave us our ticket and told us to go.” Officer

McVicker asked whetherthe car was searched, and Smoot said

“No.” Officer McVicker informed her that Walton claimed the

car had been searched, but Smoot denied hearing Walton say

Case: 15-3626 Document: 26 Filed: 06/30/2016 Pages: 14
6 No. 15‐3626

that. Officer McVicker testified that he found the inconsisten‐

cies regarding whetherthe Suburban had been searched by the

Kansas police was indicative of criminal activity. He added

that in his experience, criminals claim their car was searched

earlier to deceive police officers into thinking that there is no

need to search the vehicle again.

OfficerMcVicker continued to prepare the written warning

for several minutes, while making casual conversation with

Smoot. Officer McVicker asked Smoot when she originally

went to Colorado, and she replied that she drove down three

days ago to see her friends. He continued to ask questions

about her trip. He learned that her car had broken down close

to her friend’s house, that she intended to stay in Colorado

longer before her car broke down, and that Walton flew down

the previous night to pick her up. He also asked what belong‐

ings were in the car. She responded there was nothing in the

car but her bag.

During this time, Officer McVicker checked Smoot and

Walton’s licenses through his dispatch and requested their

criminal histories. The radio operator read Walton’s criminal

history aloud over the dispatch, which included a drug

trafficking offense and multiple other offenses. Around this

time, Officer McVicker finished the paperwork for the written

warning. He gave Smoot a copy, but had her remain in the car

while he went to speak with Walton. Approximately 22

minutes had elapsed since the initial stop.

Officer McVicker approached Walton and asked him if the

Kansas police had pulled him over for two hours. Walton

confirmedthatthey had.OfficerMcVickerthenaskedhim why

Case: 15-3626 Document: 26 Filed: 06/30/2016 Pages: 14
No. 15‐3626 7

he rented such a large vehicle. Walton replied that it was the

only one available. Officer McVicker testified that he had been

to the Denver International Airport before and that there were

a large number of vehicles available to rent; thus he found

Walton’s explanation “implausible.”

Officer McVicker returned to his squad car and asked

Smoot if she had any questions. He then shook her hand, told

her to “drive safe,” and she exited. Officer McVicker waited a

few seconds after Smoot exited the car, then opened the door

and asked Smoot if he could ask her a few more questions

because he was “confused.” Smoot was near the back of the

Suburban at this point, and stopped to speak with Officer

McVicker. Officer McVicker asked whether the vehicle was

searched in Kansas, and she said that the police had a dog walk

around the car, but that they did not search inside the vehicle.

OfficerMcVickerthen asked herifthere was “anything illegal”

in the Suburban. Officer McVicker testified that Smoot hesi‐

tated and lookedback atthe Suburban before answering “no.”2

He then asked whether specific items were in the car, such as

“large sums of money,” “heroin,” “marijuana,” “cocaine,” or

“weapons.” Smoot answered “no” to each, but Officer

McVicker testified that she hesitated and looked back at the

Suburban again when he asked her if there was any “cocaine”

in the car.

Officer McVicker then asked for Smoot’s permission to

search inside the Suburban, as well as inside her bag. Smoot

consented to a search of her bag, but said that Officer McVicker

2

   This conversation occurred outside the dashboard camera’s view.

Case: 15-3626 Document: 26 Filed: 06/30/2016 Pages: 14
8 No. 15‐3626

needed Walton’s permission to search inside the Suburban.

Officer McVicker then approached Walton and asked for his

permission to search the vehicle. Walton refused. After Walton

refused, Officer McVicker informed him that he was calling a

canine unit to conduct a sniff around the vehicle, based on the

reasonable suspicion that he had developed by then that the

two were involved in criminal activity. This was approxi‐

mately 29 minutes after Officer McVicker initially pulled

Smoot and Walton over.

Officer McVicker then searched Smoot’s bag, which only

contained a change of clothes for one day. Officer McVicker

had Smoot accompany him back to the squad car. Once they

were both inside the car, he contacted dispatch to request a

canine unit. This was about 33 minutes after the initial stop.

The canine unit arrived approximately 22 minutes after

Officer McVicker’s request to dispatch. Officer McVicker had

Smoot and Walton stand away from the car so that the dog

could conduct the sniff. The canine officerthen walked the dog

around the Suburban, which took less than one minute to

complete. The dog alerted the officer that drugs were present

in the vehicle. Officer McVicker then searched the interior of

the Suburban. About seven minutes into the search, Officer

McVicker located cocaine concealed in bags hidden in a void

within the rear driver’s side quarter panel. Smoot and Walton

were arrested.

II.  DISCUSSION

Walton argues that the district court erred in denying his

motion to suppress the cocaine because there was no reason‐

able suspicion supporting his continueddetentionafterOfficer

Case: 15-3626 Document: 26 Filed: 06/30/2016 Pages: 14
No. 15‐3626 9

McVicker completed issuing the written warning to Smoot.

“When reviewing a district court’s decision on a motion to

suppress, we review findings of fact for clear error and

conclusions of law de novo.” United States v. Guidry, 817 F.3d

997, 1005 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).

Neither party disputes that Officer McVicker lawfully

pulled over the Suburban for perceived traffic violations:

driving 68 mph in a 65 mph zone, following the car in front of

it too closely, and improper seatbelt usage. The United States

Supreme Court has found that officers “may conduct certain

unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop.”

Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1615 (2015). “But ...

[an officer] may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop,

absentthe reasonable suspicionordinarilydemandedto justify

detaining an individual.” Id. If there is no reasonable suspicion

of criminal activity, a traffic stop can only last as long as it

takes to “address the traffic violation that warranted the stop”

and “attend to related safety concerns.” Id. at 1614 (citations

omitted). “[I]nformation lawfully obtained during that period

may provide the officer with reasonable suspicion of criminal

conduct that will justify prolonging the stop to permit a

reasonable investigation.” United States v. Figueroa‐Espana, 511

F.3d 696, 702 (7th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).

It was permissible for Officer McVicker to ask Smoot and

Walton questions unrelated to the traffic violations during the

traffic stop. See Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009) (“An

officer’s inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for

the traffic stop ... do not convert the encounterinto something

other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not

measurably extend the duration of the stop.”). The issue in this

Case: 15-3626 Document: 26 Filed: 06/30/2016 Pages: 14
10 No. 15‐3626

case is whetherOfficerMcVicker garneredenoughinformation

to establish reasonable suspicion of criminal activity that

justified further detaining Smoot and Walton after he com‐

pletedthe written warning.In analyzing this issue, we examine

the “totality of the circumstances” as they existed prior to the

time Officer McVicker finished issuing the written warning to

Smoot. See United States v. Hill, 818 F.3d 289, 294 (7th Cir. 2016)

(citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)).

Within three to four minutes of pulling over Walton and

Smoot, Officer McVicker observed that there were only two

passengers with one bag of luggage in a large Chevrolet

Suburban (which seated seven to eight passengers). In Officer

McVicker’s experience, criminals often rent large luxury

vehicles for the larger areas available to conceal contraband.

Officer McVicker also learned that the car was rented solely for

the purpose of driving two people from Colorado to Ohio at a

rental cost of almost $1,000, a price that seemed excessive to

Officer McVicker, who knew they could have rented a smaller

car that accomplished the same goal for around $100 or $200.

Officers may rely on their experience “to make inferences from

and deductions about the cumulative information available.”

Hill, 818 F.3d at 294 (citation omitted).

And,priorto issuing the written warning,OfficerMcVicker

discovered that neither Smoot nor Walton was legally entitled

to drive the car; Smoot was not authorized under the rental

agreement and Walton had a suspended license. Officer

McVicker could have towed the car and conducted an inven‐

tory search. We have previously noted that an officer’s right to

legally impound a rental car due to violations of the rental

agreement weakens a defendant’s argument that it was

Case: 15-3626 Document: 26 Filed: 06/30/2016 Pages: 14
No. 15‐3626 11

“unjustifiably seized.” See United States v. Sanford, 806 F.3d 954,

959 (7th Cir. 2015).

Further, by the time Officer McVicker issued the warning,

he had heard conflicting stories from Walton and Smoot

regarding how long the Kansas police officers had detained

them the previous evening and whether the car was searched

during that time. He found the inconsistency regarding the

search indicated criminal activity; in his experience, criminals

often claim their car was already searched to dissuade officers

from conducting a “second” search.

Officer McVicker also heard Walton’s lengthy criminal

history read overthe dispatch, which included a drug traffick‐

ing offense. United States v. Sanford is factually analogous. In

Sanford, a police officer pulled over a vehicle for speeding and

ran a criminal history check on the passengers. Sanford, 806

F.3d at 956. The check revealed that one of the passengers had

19 arrests for different offenses, including drug offenses. Id.

The officer then requested a canine unit and detained the

vehicle until it arrived. Id. We found that “[t]he criminal

histories that [the officer] uncovered in his computer search

made a compelling case to wait for the dog—the trooper had

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity at that point and so

was justified in prolonging the stop for a reasonable time to

confirm or dispel, with the dog’s assistance, his mounting

suspicions.” Id. at 959. In this case as well, Walton’s extensive

criminal history, which included a drug trafficking offense,

further justified extending the traffic stop beyond the point of

issuing the written warning, in order to further confirm or

dispel Officer McVicker’s “mounting” suspicion that the two

were involved in criminal activity.

Case: 15-3626 Document: 26 Filed: 06/30/2016 Pages: 14
12 No. 15‐3626

Finally, after Officer McVicker completed the written

warning, he asked Smoot to remain in the vehicle while he

askedWalton a few more questions.We have previously found

that officers have a “grace period” to ask investigatory ques‐

tions following the completion of a traffic stop, provided that

it does not impose an “inconvenience.” United States v. McBrid‐

e, 635 F.3d 879, 882 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. Childs,

277 F.3d 947, 954 (7th Cir. 2002) (en banc)). Since Officer

McVicker only spoke with Walton for about two minutes, it

did not constitute an inconvenience. Id. During this brief

questioning, Officer McVicker heard inconsistent stories

regarding why Walton rented the Suburban; Smoot claimed

that Walton rented it because “guys like trucks,” while Walton

provided the implausible explanation that it was the only car

available at the Denver International Airport. Walton also

confirmed that the Kansas stop lasted for two hours, again

conflicting with Smoot’s story.

Walton argues that Officer McVicker did not have reason‐

able suspicion of criminal activity prior to issuing the written

warning. Thus, Walton claims that Officer McVicker violated

his Fourth Amendment rights by continuing to detain him

after handing Smoot the completed written warning and

allowing her to exit the squad car. Walton supports his

argument by focusing on the above events in isolation and

providing an innocent explanation for each. However, we

determine reasonable suspicion based on the totality of the

circumstances; defendants cannot show that a detainment was

unreasonable by simply engaging in a “divide‐and‐conquer”

analysis. See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274; see also United States v.

Baskin, 401 F.3d 788, 793 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[B]ehavior which is

Case: 15-3626 Document: 26 Filed: 06/30/2016 Pages: 14
No. 15‐3626 13

susceptible to an innocent explanation when isolated from its

context may still give rise to reasonable suspicion when

considered in light of all of the factors at play.”). In considering

the situation in its entirety, we find that Officer McVicker had

reasonable suspicion that Smoot and Walton were engaged in

criminal activity by the time he issued the written warning to

Smoot. Therefore, he was justified in detaining them beyond

the time necessary to complete the written warning in orderto

confirm or dispel this suspicion, which ultimately led to the

discovery of the cocaine. The district court properly denied

Walton’s motion to suppress.

Walton argues in the alternative that if there was reason‐

able suspicion to detain him afterissuing the written warning,

Officer McVicker still unreasonably prolonged the stop by

failing to diligently request a canine unit to search the vehicle.

He alleges that this unreasonable delay constituted an arrest

without probable cause.

There is no evidence that Officer McVicker did not act

diligently in requesting a canine unit. After he gave Smoot the

written warning, he went to speak with Walton to confirm

whether his story was consistent with Smoot’s, as well as

inquire more about the rental car. He then returned to the car,

told Smoot she could leave, then stopped her to confirm more

details about the Kansas stop as well as ask whetherthere were

illegal items in the car. He then asked if he could search the car,

to which she deferred to Walton. He asked Walton for his

consent, but was denied. At that point Officer McVicker

informed them he was going to request a canine unit. This all

occurred withinroughly tenminutes of whenOfficerMcVicker

gave Smoot the written warning. After that, he searched

Case: 15-3626 Document: 26 Filed: 06/30/2016 Pages: 14
14 No. 15‐3626

Smoot’s bag and accompanied her back into his squad car, at

which point he contacted dispatch to request a canine unit.

This took approximately four minutes. Nothing about this

timeline suggests that Officer McVicker did not act diligently

in requesting the canine unit.3

III.  CONCLUSION

Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, the ruling of the

district court is AFFIRMED.

3

   Furthermore, in the interest of completeness, we note that there was

nothingunreasonable about waiting an additional 22 minutes forthe canine

unit to arrive at the scene. See United States v. Martin, 422 F.3d 597, 602 (7th

Cir. 2005) (finding that the canine unit’s approximately 20 minute response

time was not an unreasonable delay).

Case: 15-3626 Document: 26 Filed: 06/30/2016 Pages: 14