Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02107/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02107-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Manuel Castillo
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

' UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

FI LED 

United StaltF. CQu,r of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

OCT 15 1Q90 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

v. 

JOSE LUIS CASTILLO and 

MANUEL CASTILLO, 

Nos. 88-2106 

88-2107 

(D.C. No. CR-87-404-1 and 2) 

(D. New Mexico) 

Defendants-Appellants. 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * 

Before HOLLOWAY' Chief Judge, McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judge, and KANE, 

District Judge.* 

These separate appeals were companioned in this court for 

briefing and oral argument and both will be considered in this 

opinion. By their appeals, Jose Luis Castillo and Manuel 

Castillo, brothers, seek reversal of their respective judgments of 

conviction and the sentences imposed thereon for various drug 

charges. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

** Honorable John L. Kane, United States District Judge for the 

District of Colorado, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 88-2107 Document: 010110059631 Date Filed: 10/15/1990 Page: 1 
Jose Luis Castillo and Manuel Castillo, and five other 

defendants, were charged in count 1 of a multi-count indictment 

with conspiring from March 3, 1987, to September 16, 1987, to possess and distribute cocaine in an amount in excess of five 

kilograms, in violation of 21 u.s.c. § 841(a)(l), 21 u.s.c. § 

841(b)(l)(A) and 21 U.S.C. § 846. 

In count 3, Jose Luis Castillo and another co-defendant, Luis 

Corrales, were charged with the unlawful distribution of cocaine 

in an amount less than five hundred grams on May 5, 1987, in 

violation of 21 u.s.c. § 841(a)(l), 21 u.s.c. S 841(b)(l)(C), and 

18 u.s.c. § 2. 

In count 4, Jose Luis Castillo and Manuel Castillo were 

jointly charged with the unlawful distribution of cocaine in an 

amount greater than five hundred grams on August 8, 1987, in 

violation of 21 u.s.c. S 841(a)(l), 21 u.s.c. S 841(b)(l)(B), and 

18 u.s.c. § 2. 

In count 5, five defendants, including Jose Luis Castillo and 

Manuel Castillo, were charged with the unlawful possession of 

cocaine in an amount in excess of five kilograms with an intent to 

distribute the same on September 16, 1987, in violation of 21 

U.S.C. § 841(a)(l), 21 U.S.C. S 841(b)(l)(A), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. 

In counts 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12, Jose Luis Castillo was 

charged with the unlawful use of the telephone in committing a 

felony, in violation of 21 u.s.c. S 843(b) and (c). 

During trial, the district court dismissed counts 6, 9, and 

10 charging Jose Luis Castillo with the unlawful use of the 

telephone. A jury later convicted Jose Luis Castillo on all 

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Appellate Case: 88-2107 Document: 010110059631 Date Filed: 10/15/1990 Page: 2 
remaining counts, and Manuel Castillo on all counts involving him, 

namely counts 1, 4, and 5. 

The district court sentenced Jose Luis Castillo to ten years 

imprisonment on count 1 (conspiracy). In so doing, it is agreed 

that the district court and all the parties believed that, under 

the applicable statutes, it was mandatory that the district court 

sentence one convicted of conspiracy to possess cocaine in excess 

of five kilograms with an intent to distribute to at least a term 

of ten years. More will be said about this matter later. On 

counts 3 and 4, Jose Luis Castillo was sentenced to five years 

imprisonment on each count to be served concurrently with the tenyear sentence imposed on count 1. As to count 5, Jose Luis 

Castillo was sentenced to ten years imprisonment to be served 

consecutively to the ten-year sentence on count 1. He was given 

suspended sentences on the "use of a telephone" convictions. 

Manuel Castillo was sentenced to ten years on the conspiracy 

conviction, count 1, and received a five-year sentence on count 4 

and a ten-year sentence on count 5, all three sentences to be 

served concurrently. 

As indicated, count 1 charged all seven defendants with 

conspiring from March 3, 1987, to September 16, 1987, to possess 

cocaine in an amount in excess of five kilograms with an intent to 

distribute the same. The obvious purpose for thus charging the 

defendants was the mistaken belief by the prosecution, which was 

later concurred in by the court and trial counsel, that a conviction for conspiracy to possess over five kilograms of cocaine with 

an intent to distribute the same required, as a minimum sentence, 

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Appellate Case: 88-2107 Document: 010110059631 Date Filed: 10/15/1990 Page: 3 
, 

a sentence of ten years. The only attempted distribution of 

cocaine in excess of five kilograms occurred on September 16, 

1987. The initial distribution on March 3, 1987, was for less 

than 500 grams of cocaine. The second distribution on May 5, 

1987, was for less than 500 grams of cocaine. And the third 

distribution of cocaine on August 8, 1987, for more than 500 

grams. 

The government's theory of the case was that there was but 

one conspiracy commencing in February or March, 1987, when Agent 

Carrillo contacted Corrales and through Corrales' efforts was able 

to effect a sale of cocaine from Jose Luis Castillo and that this 

conspiracy continued up to the time of the attempted distribution 

of ten kilograms of cocaine on September 16, 1987, which was 

aborted when the authorities moved in and arrested five of the 

seven defendants and seized the ten kilograms of cocaine. 

It was defendants' theory of the case, joined in by the two 

appellants, that there were at least two conspiracies, the first 

involving Corrales and the present appellants, among others, but 

that this conspiracy came to an end no later than early August, 

1987, and that thereafter a second conspiracy was formed involving 

the present appellants, and others, but that Corrales was not a 

member of the second conspiracy. Therefore, by way of example, 

the appellants argue that it was improper to admit testimony of 

Agent Carrillo concerning statements made by Corrales in connection with the first conspiracy. We are not persuaded. 

In the first place, the question of one conspiracy vis-a-vis 

more than one conspiracy was presented to the jury under proper 

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Appellate Case: 88-2107 Document: 010110059631 Date Filed: 10/15/1990 Page: 4 
instructions, and by its verdict the jury has now found, in effeet, that there was but one continuing conspiracy. And the 

record, in our view, supports such a finding. In this regard, we 

note that in a separate order and judgment entered this date, we 

have held that Corrales did not withdraw from the conspiracy which 

he started in March 1987, and we have affirmed his conviction on 

the conspiracy count. 

The instant case is akin to United States v. Nunez, 877 F.2d 

1470 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 s. Ct. 513 (1989) and 

United States v. Martinez, 877 F.2d 1480 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. 

denied, 110 s. Ct. 513 (1989). Both involved a so-called drug 

ring wherein numerous persons were participants. In each 

instance, we upheld a conviction for conspiracy which was challenged on about the same grounds urged by appellants in the 

instant case. In Nunez, we spoke as follows: 

Corky Nunez, as well as Blackie Nunez and Anna 

Irene Martinez, assert that Count 1 charged a single 

conspiracy, but that the evidence showed two 

conspiracies, one involving the distribution of heroin 

at the state penitentiary, where Corky and Blackie Nunez 

were inmates, and another conspiracy to distribute 

heroin in the Metropolitan Denver area. Thus, Corky 

Nunez argues that he should have been granted a separate 

trial, and, further, since there was a variance between 

the charge and proof, his conviction under Count 1 

should not be permitted to stand. 

The government's position is that the indictment 

charged only a single conspiracy, and that indeed a 

single conspiracy is what its evidence established. 

Although the conspiracy involved many actors. great 

quantities of heroin emanating from a conunon source. and 

numerous distributions. all participants shared a conunon 

goal: namely. to possess and distribute heroin for 

profit. 

We are in accord with the government's view of its 

evidence ••• (emphasis added). 

Id. at 1473. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2107 Document: 010110059631 Date Filed: 10/15/1990 Page: 5 
In this same general vein, we spoke in Martinez as follows: 

Furthermore, it was not essential to the 

government's case that it establish that Martinez 

conspired with every one of her nineteen co-defendants. 

It is enough if the government established that she 

conspired with one of her co-defendants, possessing 

knowledge of the existence of the larger organization. 

Certainly the evidence showed, prima facie, that she 

conspired with "Pie" Nunez. So the fact that she 

herself was never at the state penitentiary dealing 

face-to-face with "Blackie" or Corky Nunez is not a 

defense. As a general proposition. if a person 

conspires with another knowing that the latter is 

conspiring with another person or persons to commit the 

same offense. he is guilty of conspiring with such other 

person or persons, whether or not he even knows their 

identity (emphasis added). See Model Penal Code§ 5.03 

comment (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985). 

Id. at 1482. 

The district court gave the jury an instruction on 

specific intent, but limited its application to count 1, the 

conspiracy count, and count 5, charging the possession of the 

ten kilograms of cocaine with an intent to distribute, on 

September 16, 1987. The appellants argue that limiting the 

specific intent instruction to counts 1 and 5 was error and 

that the specific intent instruction should have applied to 

counts 3 and 4, both of which charged an actual distribution 

of cocaine. 

Count 1 charged a conspiracy to possess "with an intent 

to distribute" and count 5 charged a possession "with an 

intent to distribute." Because of the "with an intent to 

distribute" language appearing in counts 1 and 5, the 

district court concluded that an instruction on specific 

intent was required. The district court, of course, gave the 

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Appellate Case: 88-2107 Document: 010110059631 Date Filed: 10/15/1990 Page: 6 
f usual instruction on general intent, advising the jury that 

to constitute the crimes charged in the indictment there had 

to be the joint operation of both the act forbidden by law 

and the intent to do the act, and further that the word 

"knowingly" means that the act was done voluntarily and 

intentionally and not because of mistake or accident. 

The instruction on specific intent advised the jury that 

to establish "specific intent" the government must prove that 

the defendant knowingly did an act which the law forbids 

"purposely intending to violate the law." The only provision 

in the specific intent instruction not present in the other 

instructions given the jury on general intent is the phrase 

"purposely intending to violate the law." We doubt that it 

was really necessary to give an instruction on specific 

intent, but in any event it was not necessary to make it apply to all counts in the indictment. Failure to give any 

instruction on specific intent is not reversible error so 

long as a district court's general instructions on intent 

sufficiently define the appropriate mental state. United 

States v. Brown and Kenngott, 739 F.2d 1136, 1143 (7th Cir. 

1984), cert. denied, Kenngott v. United States, 469 U.S. 933 

(1984). 

The appellants also claim that the district court erred 

in refusing to declare a mistrial on the grounds of alleged 

prosecutorial misconduct. The alleged misconduct is .based on 

Agent Carrillo's unresponsive answers to questions, evidence 

of other "bad acts" by appellants, and improper closing argu-

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Appellate Case: 88-2107 Document: 010110059631 Date Filed: 10/15/1990 Page: 7 
ment by the prosecutor. Our review of this matter leads us 

to conclude that there was no improper conduct on the part of 

the prosecutor that would require the drastic remedy of 

declaring a mistrial. In several instances, the district 

court instructed the jury to disregard volunteered responses 

by Agent Carrillo, and such was sufficient. 

The one appellant, Jose Luis Castillo, also argues that 

the - district court erred in limiting the testimony of his 

wife. Jose Castillo did not testify. As indicated, his 

defense, however, was entrapment. Counsel called Evangelina 

Castillo and attempted to establish entrapment by having her 

relate what her husband had told her. The district court, on 

objection, sustained the prosecutor's objections to certain 

questions on the ground of the hearsay rule. We agree. 

As indicated at the outset, both appellants received 

ten-year sentences on count 1, the conspiracy count. On appeal, both government counsel and defense counsel agree that 

at sentencing all concerned mistakenly believed that the 

district court could not impose a sentence of less than ten 

years on the conspiracy count. The statute in effect on the 

dates of the conspiracy, 21 u.s.c. S 846, read as follows: 

Any person who attempts or conspires to conunit 

any offense defined in this subchapter is 

punishable by imprisonment or fine or both 

which may not exceed the maximum punishment 

prescribed for the offense, the conunission of 

which was the object of the attempt or 

conspiracy. 

21 u.s.c. S 84l(b)(l)(A)(ii) provides, in part, that one who 

possesses more than five kilograms of cocaine with an intent to 

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Appellate Case: 88-2107 Document: 010110059631 Date Filed: 10/15/1990 Page: 8 
• · distribute the same "shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment 

which may not be less than 10 years or more than life" and a fine. 

Thus, "the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt _or conspiracy," was 

"imprisonment which may not be ... more than life" and a fine. 

The statute, 21 U.S.C. S 846, merely states that one convicted for 

conspiracy is punishable by imprisonment which will not exceed the 

maximum punishment prescribed by 21 u.s.c. § 841(b)(l)(A)(ii). 

So, although actual commission of the object of the conspiracy 

does involve a mandatory minimum of ten years imprisonment, such 

does not, under the statutes then in effect, attach to a sentence 

upon a conspiracy conviction. As indicated, the government 

concedes this. See Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381 (1980). 

In Bifulco, the Supreme Court held that 21 u.s.c. S 846 does not 

permit the imposition of a special parole term permitted by 21 

u.s.c. S 841(b) as a punishment for one convicted of the "target 

offense." 1 

Jose Luis Castillo received a ten-year sentence on count 1, 

five-year sentences on counts 3 and 4 to be served concurrently 

with the sentence on count 1, but a ten-year sentence on count 5, 

to be served consecutively with the sentence imposed on count 1. 

1 On November 18, 1988, 21 u.s.c. S 846 was amended and now reads 

as follows: 

Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any 

offense defined in this subchapter shall be subject to 

the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, 

the commission of which was the -object of the attempt or 

conspiracy. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2107 Document: 010110059631 Date Filed: 10/15/1990 Page: 9 
• 

• • The government agrees that Castillo should be resentenced on count 

1, since he might, on resentencing, be sentenced to something less 

than ten years. 

Manuel Castillo was sentenced to ten years imprisonment on 

count 1, a five-year sentence on count 4, and a ten-year sentence 

on count 5, all three to be served concurrently. The government 

argues that Manuel Castillo need not be resentenced on count 1, 

since he also has a concurrent ten-year sentence on count 5. 

That, perhaps, is one way of looking at it. However, we think 

since the ten-year sentence imposed on Manuel Castillo on count 1 

was not required by statute, he, too, should be resentenced on 

count 1. 

Accordingly, the sentences imposed on Jose Luis Castillo and 

Manuel Castillo on count 1 are vacated and the cases are remanded 

for resentencing of both appellants on count 1 only. In all other 

respects the judgments of conviction and the sentences imposed 

thereon are affirmed. 

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Entered for the Court 

Robert H. Mcwilliams 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 88-2107 Document: 010110059631 Date Filed: 10/15/1990 Page: 10