Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-09572/USCOURTS-ca10-90-09572-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of Interior
Respondent
Federal Labor Relations Authority
Petitioner

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

FIL~ . J._,. Unltld State& Ciourt£APi-w 

APPEALS Tenth Circuit 

JAN 2 0 1993 

OBERT L. HOECKER 

FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS ) Clerk 

AUTHORITY, ) 

) 

Petitioner/ Cross- ) 

Respondent, ) 

) 

vs. ) 

) 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT ) 

OF DEFENSE, Army and Air ) 

Force Exchange Service, ) 

Dallas, Texas; UNITED ) 

STATES DEPARTMENT OF ) 

DEFENSE, Army and Air ) 

Force Exchange Service, ) 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, ) 

) 

Respondents/Cross- ) 

Petitioners. ) 

) 

) 

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF ) 

GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (AFGE), ) 

) 

Intervenor. ) 

) 

) 

NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES ) 

UNION, ) 

) 

Amicus Curiae. ) 

FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS ) 

AUTHORITY, ) 

) 

Petitioner/Cross- ) 

Respondent, ) 

) 

~- ) 

) 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT ) 

OF VETERANS AFFAIRS , ) 

Washington, D. C. ; UNITED ) 

STATES DEPARTMENT OF ) 

VETERANS AFFAIRS, Medical ) 

Center, Denver, Colorado, ) 

-1-

Nos. 90-9561 

90-9569 

Nos. 90-9562 

90 - 9570 

Appellate Case: 90-9572 Document: 010110157288 Date Filed: 01/20/1993 Page: 1 
) 

Respondents/ Cross- ) 

Peti tioners. ) 

) 

) 

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF ) 

GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (AFGE ) , ) 

) 

Interveno r . ) 

FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS ) 

AUTHORITY, ) 

) 

Petitioner/ Cross- ) 

Respondent, ) 

) 

vs. ) 

) 

DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, ) 

) 

Respondent/Cross- ) 

Petitioner. ) 

FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS ) 

AUTHORITY, ) 

) 

Petitioner/Cross- ) 

Respondent, ) 

) 

vs. ) 

) 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT ) 

OF THE AIR FORCE, Tactical ) 

Air Command, 27th Combat ) 

Support Group (TAC), Cannon ) 

Air Force Base, New Mexico, ) 

) 

Respondent/Cross- ) 

Petitioner. ) 

FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS ) 

AUTHORITY, ) 

) 

Petitioner/Cross- ) 

Respondent, ) 

) 

vs. ) 

) 

FEDERAL AVIATION ) 

ADMINISTRATION, AVI ATION ) 

STANDARDS NATIONAL FIELD ) 

-2-

Nos. 90 - 9572 

90-9578 

Nos . 90-9573 

90-9579 

Nos. 91-9509 

91 - 9517 

Appellate Case: 90-9572 Document: 010110157288 Date Filed: 01/20/1993 Page: 2 
OFFICE, AIRCRAFT AND 

ENGINEERING DIVISION, 

OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA, 

Respondent/CrossPetitioner. 

ON PETITION FOR REVIEW AND CROSS-APPLICATION FOR 

ENFORCEMENT OF AN ORDER BY THE 

FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY 

(Nos . 7-CA-90064, 7-CA-80500, 

7-CA-80556, 6-CA-70450, 

37 F . L . R.A. No. 97, 37 F.L.R. A. No. 100, 

76-CA-00275, 39 F . L.R.A. 61) 

Pamela P . Johnson (William E. Persina, Solicitor, William R. 

Tobey, Deputy Solicitor, with her on the brief), Federal Labor 

Relations Authority, Washington, D.C. , for Federal Labor Relations 

Authority. 

Sandra Wien Simon (Leonard Schaitman and Stuart M. Gerson with her 

on the brief), United Stat.es Department of Justice, Civil 

Division--Appellate Staff, Washington, D.C., for the United States 

Department of Defense and other United States agencies. 

Stuart A. Kirsch and Mark D. Roth, American Federation of 

Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Washington, D.C., for Intervenor. 

Gregory O'Duden and Elai ne Kaplan, National Treasury Employees 

Union, Washington, D.C. , for Amicus Curiae. 

Before BALDOCK and KELLY, Circuit Judges, and CAUTHRON, District 

Judge.* 

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge. 

The sole issue in these consolidated appeals is whether 

federal agencies are required to release their employees' home 

* Honorable Robin J . Cauthron, District Judge for the Western 

District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation. 

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Appellate Case: 90-9572 Document: 010110157288 Date Filed: 01/20/1993 Page: 3 
addresses1 to the unions which are the exclusive representatives 

of the employees' bargaining units. Virtually every federal 

circuit court of appeals has addressed this issue within the last 

few years, and a split has emerged. The District of Columbia 

Circuit, as well as the First, Second, Sixth, Seventh and Eleventh 

Circuits, have held that disclosure of federal employees' home 

addresses is prohibited by law. See FLRA v. U.S . Dep't of 

Defense, 977 F.2d 545 (11th Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Eleventh 

Circuit Defense]; United States Dep't of the Navy v. FLRA, 975 

F.2d 348 (7th Cir. 1992 ) [hereinafter Seventh Circuit Navy]; FLRA 

v. Department of the Navy, 963 F.2d 124 (6th Cir. 1992) 

[hereinafter Sixth Circuit Navv]; FLRA v. United States Dep't of 

Veterans Affairs, 958 F . 2d 503 (2d Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Second 

Circuit Veterans]; FLRA v. U.S. Dep't of the Navy. 941 F.2d 49 

(1st Cir. 1991) [hereinafter First Circuit Navyl; FLRA v. U.S. 

Dep't of the Treasury. 884 F.2d 1446 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. 

denied, 493 U.S. 1055 (1990) [hereinafter D. C. Circuit Treasury] . 

The Ninth, Third and Fifth Circuits have held that federal unions 

are entitled to the addresses of their bargaining unit employees. 

See FLRA v. United States Dep't of Defense, 975 F . 2d 1105 (5th 

Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Fifth Circuit Defense]; FLRA v . U.S . Dep't 

of the Navy. 966 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1992) (,en bane) [hereinafter 

Third Circuit Navy]; FLRA v. U.S. Dep't of the Navy. 958 F . 2d 1490 

1 The petitions for review filed in these consolidated cases 

involve the release of home addresses only. Although the Federal 

Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) decisions and orders involved the 

release of names as well as addresses, names and duty stations of 

federal employees are available to the general public pursuant to 

5 C.F.R. 293.311(a) (1) (5). 

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Appellate Case: 90-9572 Document: 010110157288 Date Filed: 01/20/1993 Page: 4 
(9th Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Ninth Circuit Nayyl. The Fourth 

Circuit has vacated its 2 - 1 panel decision, which enforced 

disclosure of federal employees' home addresses, pending a 

rehearing en bane. FLRA v. Department of Commerce , 954 F . 2d 994 

(4th Cir.), vacated, 966 F . 2d 134 (4th Cir. 1992 ) [hereinafter 

Fourth Circuit Commerce]. We have jurisdiction under 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7123 (a ) and (b), and we join the majority of the circuits in 

holding that disclosure of federal employees' home addresses is 

prohibited by law, denying enforcement of the Federal Labor 

Relations Authority (FLRA) decisions ordering disclosure. 

Under the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute 

(the Labor Statute), 5 U.S . C. §§ 7101-7135, a federal agency must 

furnish to the exclusive bargaining representative information 

which is "normally maintained by the agency in the regular course 

of business," which is "reasonably available and necessary for 

full and proper discussion, understanding, and negotiation of 

subjects within the scope of collective bargaining," and which is 

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Appellate Case: 90-9572 Document: 010110157288 Date Filed: 01/20/1993 Page: 5 
"not prohibited by law. " 5 U.S . C. § 7114 (b ) (4 ) .

2 It is 

undisputed that the home addresses of agency employees are 

"normally maintained by the age:::icy in the regular course of 

business . " Therefore, we are faced with two issues: (1 ) whether 

the home addresses of federal employees are "necessary" f o r 

collective bargaining; and (2 ) whether disclosure is prohibited by 

law. 

Because the Labor Statute does not speak to the issue of 

whether the addresses of federal employees are "necessary" for 

collective bargaining, we must determine whether the FLRA's 

interpretation, that the name and address list is necessary for 

collective bargaining, is "based on a permissible construction of 

the statute." Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 

Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). In Farmers Home 

Administration Finance Office. St. Louis, Missouri, 23 F.L. R.A. 

(No. 101) 788, 796 (1986), the FLRA outlined its reasons for 

2 Relevant portions of 5 U.S.C. § 7114(b) read as follows: 

(b) The duty of an agency and an exclusive 

representative to negotiate in good faith under 

subsection (a) of this section shall include the 

obligation . . . 

(4) in the case of an agency, to furnish to 

the exclusive representative involved, or its 

authorized representative, upon request and, to the 

extent not prohibited by law, data --

(A) which is normally maintained by the 

agency in the regular course of business; 

(B) which is reasonably available and 

necessary for full and proper discussion, 

understanding, and negotiation of subjects 

within the scope of collective bargaining; and 

(C) which does not constitute guidance, 

advice, counsel, or training provided for 

management officials or supervisors, relating 

to collective bargaining; ... 

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Appellate Case: 90-9572 Document: 010110157288 Date Filed: 01/20/1993 Page: 6 
finding the name and address list to be necessary: 

[W]e find that the mere existence of alternative means 

of communication is insufficient to justify a refusal to 

release the information. Further, we find that it is 

not necessary for us to examine the adequacy of 

alternative means in cases involving requests for . . 

home addresses because the communication between unit 

employees and their exclusive representative which would 

be facilitated by release of . . . home addresses [sic] 

information is fundamentally different from other 

communication through alternative means which are 

controlled in whole or in part by the agency . When 

using direct mailings, the content, timing, a nd 

frequency of the communication is completely within the 

discretion of the union and there is no possibility of 

agency interference in the distribution of the message. 

Further, direct mailings reach unit employees in 

circumstances where those employees may consider the 

union's communication without regard to the time 

constraints inherent in their work environments, and in 

which any restraint the employee may feel as a result of 

the presence of agency management in the workplace is 

not present. We find that the ... home addresses of 

unit employees are necessary and should be provided 

whether or not alternative means of communication are 

available. 

Id. at 796-97. See also United States Dep't of the Navy. 

Portsmouth Naval Shipyard v. International Federation of 

Professional & Technical Engineers. Local 4, 37 F . L.R. A. 515, 523 

(1990). Giving due deference to the FLRA's interpretation of its 

own enabling statute, the Labor Statute, and finding that the 

interpretation is based on a permissible construction of the 

statute, Chevron U. S.A .• Inc., 467 U.S. at 842-43, we conclude 

that the disclosure of employee home addresses is "necessary" for 

the collective bargaining process under§ 7114(b) (4) . See Second 

Circuit Veterans, 958 F.2d at 507-08; D.C. Circuit Treasury. 884 

F.2d at 1449. 

The final inquiry for determining whether the FLRA is 

entitled to disclosure of federal employee home addresses is an 

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Appellate Case: 90-9572 Document: 010110157288 Date Filed: 01/20/1993 Page: 7 
examination of whether the request is "prohibited by law." The 

Privacy Act generally prohibits disclosure of personnel 

information of federal employees without their consent, and lists 

exceptions to this general prohibition. 3 5 U.S.C. § 552a (b ) . The 

FLRA does not dispute that the home addresses of federal employees 

are protected by the Privacy Act's general prohibition but asserts 

that the disclosure falls within two Privacy Act exceptions. The 

two exceptions the FLRA asserts as applicable are the exception 

for information requested under the Freedom of Information Act 

(FOIA) and the exception for infonnation disclosed for "routine 

use." 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (2) and (3). 

Although the FLRA was entitled to due deference with regard 

to its interpretation of the Labor Statute, it is not entitled to 

such deference with regard to the Privacy Act and FOIA, because 

these statutes are not within the FLRA's area of expertise. 

Therefore, we review the FLRA's interpretations of these two 

statutes de nova. See Department of Justice v. Reporters 

Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 755 (1989) 

3 The relevant portions of the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 

§ 552a(b) (2) and (3), provide as follows: 

(b) Conditions of Disclosure. No agency shall disclose 

any record which is contained in a system of records by 

any means of communication to any person, or to another 

agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or with 

the prior written consent of, the individual to whom the 

record pertains, unless the disclosure of the record 

would be . . . 

(2) required under section 552 of this title 

[FOIA] ; [or] 

(3) for a routine use as defined in subsection 

(a) (7) of this section and described under 

subsection (e) (4) (D) of this section; ... 

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Appellate Case: 90-9572 Document: 010110157288 Date Filed: 01/20/1993 Page: 8 
[hereinafter Reporters Committee] ("[u]nlike the review of other 

agency action that must be upheld if supported by substantial 

evidence and not arbitrary or capricious, the FOIA expressly 

places the burden 'on the agency to sustain its action' and 

directs the district courts to 'determine the matter de novo'"). 

See also Seventh Circuit Navy, 975 F.2d at 351; Ninth Circuit 

~. 958 F.2d at 1493-94; First Circuit Navy, 941 F . 2d at 55; 

D.C . Circuit Treasury. 884 F.2d at 1451 . 

FOIA, 5 U.S . C. § 552, generally requires disclosure of 

information but exempts information in "personnel and medical 

files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a 

clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." Id. at 

§ 552 (b) (6). To determine whether disclosure constitutes a 

"clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy," we must 

balance the harm to the individual whose privacy interest is 

breached against the public interest served by disclosure. See 

Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U. S. 352, 372 (1976); 

Andrews v. Veterans Administration of the United States, 838 F.2d 

418, 422 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 817 (1988). 

Although this c i rcuit has not addressed the issue of whether 

individuals have a privacy interest in their home addresses, other 

circuits have held that such a privacy interest exists. Multnomah 

Co . Medical Society v. Scott, 825 F.2d 1410, 1415-16 (9th Cir. 

1987); Heights Community Congress v. Veterans Administration, 732 

F.2d 526, 529 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1034 (1984); 

United States v. Liebert, 519 F.2d 542, 548 (3d Cir.), cert. 

denied, 423 U.S . 985 (1975); Wine Hobby USA, Inc . v. Internal 

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Appellate Case: 90-9572 Document: 010110157288 Date Filed: 01/20/1993 Page: 9 
Revenue Service, 5 02 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1974 ) . These circuits have 

given varying degrees to that privacy interest, from "minimal" to 

"weighty ." Mul t nomah, 825 F.2d at 1416 (privacy interest in one 's 

home address is "more than minimal"); Heights Community, 732 F.2d 

at 529 (privacy interest in one's home address is an "impo rtant 

privacy interest" ) ; Liebert, 519 F.2d a t 548 (privacy interest in 

one ' s home address is a "weighty interest" ) ; Wine Hobby, 502 F.2d 

at 137 (privacy interest in one's home address is "not as s trong " 

as other interests considered by the circuit to date ) . Mo reover, 

the majority of circuits that have examined the precise issue 

before this court today have determined that federal employees 

possess more than a de minimus privacy interest in their home 

addresses. See,~. Seventh Circuit Nayy. 975 F.2d at 353; 

Third Circuit Nayy, 966 F.2d at 754; Ninth Circuit Nayy. 958 F . 2d 

at 1496; D. C. Circuit Treasury, 884 F.2d at 1453. 

This privacy interest must be balanced against the public 

interest served by disclosure of the employees' h ome addresses. 

As the D.C. Circuit observed, the Supreme Court's recent decision 

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in Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. 749 (1989) ,

4 limits the public 

interest inquiry to the specific public interest that FOIA was 

enacted to serve i.e., "ensur[ing] that the Government's 

activities be opened to the sharp eye of public scrutiny." Id. at 

774 . See also D.C . Circuit Treasury, 884 F . 2d at 1452-53. 

Because disclosure of federal employees' home addresses has 

nothing to do with public scrutiny of government activities, 

"there is no relevant public purpose to be weighed" against the 

invasion of federal employee privacy. Second Circuit Veterans, 

958 F.2d at 513 . Therefore, even a "minimal" privacy interest in 

an employee's name and home address outweighs a nonexistent public 

interest, id., and we join the D.C., First, Second, Sixth, 

Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits in concluding that the FOIA 

4 In Reporters Committee, the media requested rap sheets under 

FOIA. The FBI denied the request, relying in part on FOIA's 

exemption for "records ... compiled for law enforcement 

purposes," the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to 

constitute an "unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 489 

U.S. at 756 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (7) (C)). The Supreme Court 

defined the public interest in rap sheet disclosure, stating that 

"FOIA's central purpose is to ensure that the Government's 

activities be opened up to the sharp eye of public scrutiny, not 

that information about private citizens that happens to be in the 

warehouse of the Government be so disclosed." Id. at 774. The 

Court further stated that FOIA's purpose, to allow citizens to 

know "what their government is up to," is not "fostered by 

disclosure of information about private citizens that is 

accumulated in various governmental files but that reveals little 

or nothing about an agency's own conduct." Id. at 773 . In 

conclusion, the Court found that because the rap sheet's 

disclosure would reveal no information regarding federal agency 

activities, no public interest cognizable under FOIA existed to be 

balanced against the privacy invasion likely to result from such 

disclosure. See id. at 773-75 . 

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exception to the Privacy Act does not allow disclosure .

5 I d. 

The only other Privacy Act exception to presumed 

nondisclosure asserted by the FLRA is the reasonable use 

exception. In order to fall within the reasonable use exception, 

disclosure must be "compatible with the purpose for which [the 

information] was collected," 5 U.S.C. § 552a (a ) (7) , and be in 

accordance with a routine use notice published by the agency in 

the Federal Register, which describes the routine use, the 

categories of users, and the purpose of such use, 5 U.S.C. 

§ 552a (e) (4) (D). The applicability of this exception turns on the 

interpretation of a routine use notice published by the Office of 

Personnel Management (OPM), which maintains "Official Personnel 

Files" that contain federal employees' home addresses. See First 

Circuit Navy, 941 F.2d at 58-60 . OPM has promulgated the 

following routine use notice: 

j. To disclose information to officials of labor 

organizations recognized under 5 U.S.C. Chapter 71 when 

relevant and necessary to their duties of exclusive 

representation concerning personnel policies, practices, 

5 The FLRA argues that Reporters Committee should not be 

applied in this case because the union requested disclosure under 

the Labor Statute, whereas the rap sheet request in Reporters 

Committee was made directly pursuant to FOIA. "The problem with 

this approach ... is that the Labor [Statute] itself by 

authorizing disclosure 'not prohibited by law' directs us to the 

Privacy Act, which in turn directs us to FOIA." Seventh Circuit 

lli!vy, 975 F.2d at 354 (citing D. C. Circuit Treasury, 884 F.2d at 

1457 (Ginsburg, J., concurring)). Although the Privacy Act 

contains an exception to its general rule against disclosure for 

information available under FOIA, neither the Privacy Act nor FOIA 

makes a further exception for information requests that originate 

under another federal statute, such as the Labor Statute . Id. 

"'We do not believe we are entitled to engage in the sort of 

imaginative reconstruction that would be necessary to introduce 

collective bargaining values into the FOIA balancing process.'" Id. at 354 - 55 (quoting D.C. Circuit Treasury, 884 F.2d at 1453). 

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Appellate Case: 90-9572 Document: 010110157288 Date Filed: 01/20/1993 Page: 12 
and matters affecting working conditions. 

Privacy Act of 1974; Publication of Notices of Systems of Records 

and Proposed New Routine Use, 49 Fed. Reg. 36,949, 36,956 (Sept. 

20, 1984) (emphasis added). In light of this routine use notice, 

we must now inquire into the meaning of "relevant and necessary. " 

OPM defines "relevant 11 as requiring that 11 the nature of the 

information [must bear] a traceable, logical, and significant 

connection to the purpose to be served, 11 and defines 11 necessary11 

as requiring that there be 11 no adequate alternative means or 

'f' h ' 'f ' d 6 

sources for satis ying t e union's in ormat1.on nee s. 11 Office of 

Personnel Management, FPM Letter 711-164 (Sept. 17, 1992). 

Because OPM is interpreting its own regulation or notice, we must 

6 Prior to September 17, 1992, OPM's only interpretation of 

"relevant and necessary" was contained in its amicus brief in D.C. 

Circuit Treasury. which also stated that "[a] major component in 

determining the labor organization's need for the names and home 

addresses of bargaining unit employees is whether adequate 

alternative means exist for contacting them. 11 OPM Arnicus Brief to 

the FLRA at 9 (July 14, 1986) (provided in Addendum E to the Brief 

of the United States Department of Defense). By subsequent letter 

to Assistant Attorney General Richard Willard dated June 25, 1987, 

then-Director of OPM, Constance Horner, adopted the amicus brief 

interpretation, stating that "[i]f adequate alternative means 

exist for communicating with bargaining unit employees, disclosure 

of home addresses is not 'necessary,' and the routine use does not 

apply." Letter of OPM Director Horner (June 25, 1987) (provided 

in Addendum F to the Brief of the United States Department of 

Defense). The en bane court in Third Circuit Navy, which enforced 

address disclosure, had only the 1986 arnicus brief and the 1987 

director's letter before it in deciding whether OPM had a 

definitive interpreti ve rule to which to defer. The Third Circuit 

stated that "until the OPM publishe[d] its interpretation in a 

manner sufficient to place the public on notice of both the 

existence and content of that interpretation," it would not defer 

to the OPM's interpretation. Third Circuit Navy. 966 F.2d at 762 . 

In today's decision, however, we are not confronted with the same 

problem that faced the Third Circuit, because the OPM placed the 

public on notice of its position in its September 17, 1992 letter. 

See Office of Personnel Management, FPM Letter 711-164 (Sept. 17, 

1992) . 

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defer to its interpretation unless it is "plainly erroneous or 

inconsistent" with that regulation or notice. See Robertson v. 

Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989 ) . See 

also Second Circuit Veterans, 958 F.2d at 514; D.C. Circuit 

Treasury, 884 F.2d at 1454. Therefore, federal employees' home 

addresses are not available under the Privacy Act's routine use 

exception, unless it is shown that alternative means of 

cormnunication are inadequate. Because the FLRA has made "no such 

showing" in this case and "has previously conceded that such 

alternative means do exist," Second Circuit Veterans, 958 F.2d at 

515-16 (quoting Farmers Home, 23 F.L.R.A. at 796), we hold that 

the routine use exception to the Privacy Act does not allow 

disclosure. 

The petitions for review by the United States Department of 

Defense and other United States Agencies are GRANTED, and the 

FLRA's applications for enforcement of its disclosure orders are 

DENIED. 

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