Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-3_05-cv-00962/USCOURTS-almd-3_05-cv-00962-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Florida Transformer, Inc.
Defendant
Lori Ann Morris
Plaintiff
Edward Neal Thompson
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, EASTERN DIVISION

LORI ANN MORRIS, as )

administratrix of the )

estate of Vernell Brian )

Morris, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

v. ) 3:05cv962-MHT

) (WO)

FLORIDA TRANSFORMER, INC., )

and EDWARD NEAL THOMPSON, )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION

In this lawsuit, which arises out of a collision

between two tractor-trailer trucks on an Alabama

interstate highway, plaintiff Lori Ann Morris, as

administratrix of the estate of the deceased Vernell Brian

Morris, charges defendants Edward Neal Thompson and

Florida Transformer, Inc. with the following state-law

claims: wrongful death; negligence; negligent hiring,

training, supervision, and retention; negligent

entrustment; and negligent and wanton violation of state

Case 3:05-cv-00962-MHT-SRW Document 76 Filed 10/05/06 Page 1 of 21
*The plaintiff alleges that the defendants violated

the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations developed

under the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of

1999, 49 U.S.C. § 101 et seq., as prescribed by the U.S.

Department of Transportation, 49 C.F.R. Part 107, Parts

171-180, Parts 382-384, and Parts 390-399. Although

Plaintiff does not cite to a statute that grants her a

private cause of action under the statute, 49 U.S.C. §

14704(a)(2) is the only provision on which the courts

have relied. Section 14704(a)(2) provides that, “a

carrier or broker providing transportation or service

subject to jurisdiction under chapter 135 is liable for

damages sustained by a person as a result of an act or

omission of that carrier or broker in violation of this

part.”

One court has found that § 14704(a)(2) creates a

private cause of action for personal injuries, Marrier v.

New Penn Motor Express, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 326 (D. Vt.

2001) (Sessions, J.), while others have held that it only

creates a cause of action for commercial disputes.

Stewart v. Mitchell Transp., 241 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1220

(D. Kan. 2002) (VanBebber, J.) (“Section 14704(a)(2)

creates a private right of action for damages in

commercial disputes involving violations of the Motor

Carrier Act and its regulations, but not for personal

injury actions such as the one in this case.”); Schramm

v. Foster, 341 F. Supp. 2d 536, 547-548 (D. Md. 2004)

(Motz, J.) (“[Section 14704(a)(2)] was intended to apply

only to commercial damages, not personal injuries.”);

Crosby v. Landstar, No. Civ. 04-1535-SLR, 2005 WL 1459484

(continued...)

2

regulations. The plaintiff also attempts to assert a

federal claim that the defendants negligently and wantonly

violated Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations.*

 The

Case 3:05-cv-00962-MHT-SRW Document 76 Filed 10/05/06 Page 2 of 21
*(...continued)

(D. Del. June 21, 2005) (Robinson, C.J.) (“Section 14704

does not give this court jurisdiction over negligence

claims.”). 

This court need not reach this issue.

3

plaintiff invokes the court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1331 (federal question), 1332 (diversity of

citizenship) and 1367 (supplemental). 

This case is currently before the court on the

defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The motion will

be granted. 

I. SUMMARY-JUDGEMENT STANDARD

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

provides that summary judgment is appropriate where “there

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of

law.” Once the party seeking summary judgment has

informed the court of the basis for its motion, the burden

shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate why summary

judgment would be inappropriate. Celotex Corp. v.

Case 3:05-cv-00962-MHT-SRW Document 76 Filed 10/05/06 Page 3 of 21
4

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); see also Fitzpatrick v.

City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115-17 (11th Cir. 1993)

(discussing how the responsibilities on the movant and the

nonmovant vary depending on whether the legal issues, as

to which the facts in question pertain, are ones on which

the movant or nonmovant bears the burden of proof at

trial). In making its determination, the court must view

all evidence and any factual inferences in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus.

Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

Thus, at the summary-judgment stage, the court assumes

that the facts are as the plaintiff alleges and makes all

reasonable inferences in favor of her as the nonmoving

party. 

II. FACTS

At approximately 3:25 on the morning of September 4,

2004, while traveling north on I-85 in Macon County,

Alabama, the decedent’s tractor-trailer truck swerved into

Case 3:05-cv-00962-MHT-SRW Document 76 Filed 10/05/06 Page 4 of 21
5

the median, struck a road sign and drainage ditch, came

back up the embankment onto the north-bound lane of I-85,

and rolled over onto the driver’s side. When the truck

came to rest, part of the tractor was on I-85 and part of

the trailer had come to rest off the highway, on the

median.

Thompson was traveling north on I-85 when he noticed

the decedent’s truck blocking the road. He slammed on his

brakes, but his tractor-trailer nonetheless collided with

the decedent’s disabled tractor-trailer in the left lane

of the two lanes. At the time he saw the decedents’s

truck, Thompson was driving within the 70-mile-per-hour

speed limit, his headlights were on, and the road was dry;

Thompson was an employee of Florida Transformer, Inc. and

had a co-employee in his truck at the time of the

accident. 

Case 3:05-cv-00962-MHT-SRW Document 76 Filed 10/05/06 Page 5 of 21
6

III. DISCUSSION

With this lawsuit, as stated, the plaintiff attempts

to assert a number of state and federal claims, based on

wrongful death, negligence, wantonness, and violation of

various regulations. Critical to all these claims is

whether Thompson was the proximate cause of the decedent’s

death; absent this proximate cause all the claims must

fail. 

The only evidence the plaintiff submits to support

that Thompson’s collision with the decedent’s truck, and

not the roll-over accident, was the proximate cause of the

decedent’s death is the testimony of her accidentreconstruction expert, Edward L. Robinson, Ph.D. Robinson

states that, with his “general experience with overturned

trucks,” he has never seen injuries as severe as the

decedent’s in an overturned truck accident; that it is,

therefore, highly unlikely that the decedent’s injuries

were associated with the overturn; and that, instead, the

impact with Thompson’s vehicle at 60 or 70 m.p.h. “would

Case 3:05-cv-00962-MHT-SRW Document 76 Filed 10/05/06 Page 6 of 21
7

be expected to cause some very similar injuries.”

Robinson Depo. p. 19. The defendants object to Robinson’s

testimony as inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 702.

The Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility

of expert testimony. Daubert v. Merrell Dow

Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993). Under the

federal rules, the trial judge serves a gatekeeping

function, making both a ‘relevance’ and a ‘reliability’

determination, that is, disallowing expert testimony when

it will not be helpful to the trier of fact or when it

lacks a reliable foundation. Id. at 589. A trial judge

performs this gatekeeping function by applying the Federal

Rules of Evidence, particularly Rule 702. Rule 702, as

amended effective December 1, 2000, provides:

“If scientific, technical, or other

specialized knowledge will assist the

trier of fact to understand the evidence

or to determine a fact in issue, a

witness qualified as an expert by

knowledge, skill, experience, training,

or education, may testify thereto in the

form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1)

the testimony is based upon sufficient

facts or data, (2) the testimony is the

Case 3:05-cv-00962-MHT-SRW Document 76 Filed 10/05/06 Page 7 of 21
8

product of reliable principles and

methods, and (3) the witness has applied

the principles and methods reliably to

the facts of the case.”

The burden is traditionally placed on the proponent

of expert testimony to establish that such admissibility

requirements have been met by a “preponderance of the

evidence.” Allison v. McGhan Medical Corporation, 184

F.3d 1300, 1312 (11th Cir. 1999) (“the proponent of the

testimony does not have the burden of proving that it is

scientifically correct, but that by a preponderance of the

evidence, it is reliable”); Fed. R. Evid. 702, advisory

committee notes, 2000 amendment.

In Daubert, the Supreme Court set forth a list of

factors that may guide the trial judge's Rule 702 decision

as to whether expert testimony might reliably assist the

factfinder, including: whether a theory or technique can

be or has been tested; whether a theory or technique has

been subjected to peer review or publication; whether a

theory or technique has gained widespread acceptance

within a relevant community of experts, or, rather, has

Case 3:05-cv-00962-MHT-SRW Document 76 Filed 10/05/06 Page 8 of 21
9

been unable to garner more than minimal support; and the

known or potential rate of error of a technique, and the

existence and maintenance of standards controlling the

technique’s operation. 509 U.S. at 593-594.

These Daubert factors are not, the Supreme Court has

emphasized, appropriately used as a “definitive checklist”

but should instead be understood as non-exclusive,

nondispositive considerations that may shape the trial

judge’s “flexible inquiry” under Rule 702. Id. at 594.

Moreover, the trial court's Rule 702 gatekeeping

responsibilities obtain equally for all expert testimony,

not just scientific testimony. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v.

Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 142 (1999). The Daubert-type

analysis should not be used to disfavor expert testimony

grounded in experience or engineering practice rather than

in pure scientific theory. Id. at 150. However, “if the

witness is relying solely or primarily on experience, then

the witness must explain how that experience leads to the

conclusion reached, why that experience is a sufficient

Case 3:05-cv-00962-MHT-SRW Document 76 Filed 10/05/06 Page 9 of 21
10

basis for the opinion, and how that experience is reliably

applied to the facts. The trial court’s gatekeeping

function requires more than simply taking the expert's

word for it.” Fed. R. Evid. 702, advisory committee

notes, 2000 amendment (internal citations and quotations

omitted). 

“While the inquiry into ‘reliable principles and

methods’” has been a familiar feature of admissibility

analysis under Daubert, Rule 702 appears to require a

trial judge to make an evaluation that delves more into

the facts than was recommended in Daubert, including as

the rule does an inquiry into the sufficiency of the

testimony’s basis (‘the testimony is based upon sufficient

facts or data’) and an inquiry into the application of a

methodology to the facts (‘the witness has applied the

principles and methods reliably to the facts of the

case’).” Rudd v. General Motors Corp., 127 F.Supp.2d

1330, 1336 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (Thompson, J.). “Neither of

these two latter questions that are now mandatory under

Case 3:05-cv-00962-MHT-SRW Document 76 Filed 10/05/06 Page 10 of 21
11

the rule--the inquiries into the sufficiency of the

testimony’s basis and the reliability of the methodology’s

application--were expressly part of the formal

admissibility analysis under Daubert.” Id.

Despite this express provision for judicial evaluation

of such factually entwined matters, however, the advisory

committee notes caution that the trial judge must still

avoid usurping the role of the trier of fact: 

“[The revised rule] is not intended to

authorize a trial court to exclude an

expert's testimony on the ground that

the court believes one version of the

facts and not the other.... [T]he

rejection of expert testimony is the

exception rather than the rule. Daubert

did not work a seachange over federal

evidence law, and the trial court's role

as gatekeeper is not intended to serve

as a replacement for the adversary

system. Vigorous cross-examination,

presentation of contrary evidence, and

careful instruction on the burden of

proof are the traditional and

appropriate means of attacking shaky but

admissible evidence.” 

Fed. R. Evid. 702, advisory committee notes, 2000

amendment (internal citations and quotations omitted).

Case 3:05-cv-00962-MHT-SRW Document 76 Filed 10/05/06 Page 11 of 21
12

The court also appreciates that it is engaging in its

Rule 702 analysis on a summary-judgment motion. As a

result, two additional points must be made. First, while

the court is making its admissibility decision on the

basis of the record already before it and without a

hearing, the parties have had an adequate opportunity to

submit arguments and evidence. A trial court is entitled

to make a decision on the admissibility of expert

testimony without a hearing, on a summary-judgment motion,

if the parties have had an adequate opportunity to present

evidence and argument on the issue and the record

reflects, as it does here, that the material facts related

to the admissibility issue are not in dispute. Rudd, 127

F.Supp.2d at 1334 n. 3 (“For purposes of the present

summary-judgment motion ..., this court will make the

[Rule 702] admissibility decisions ... on the basis of the

record already before it.”) (citations omitted). Indeed,

it is evident from the parties’ submissions that they

Case 3:05-cv-00962-MHT-SRW Document 76 Filed 10/05/06 Page 12 of 21
13

expected the court to make its Rule 702 decision without

an evidentiary hearing on the current record.

Second, the Rule 702 “sufficiency-of-basis inquiry is

formally quite distinct from the [Fed. R. Civ. P. 56]

sufficiency-of-evidence inquiry involved in summaryjudgment analysis, that is, Rule 702 mandates a

determination of whether the expert had sufficient

evidence (evidence which itself may or may not be

admissible) to support his or her testimony, not a

determination of whether that testimony standing alone

provides sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable factfinder to find for the plaintiff on an issue of

substantive law. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 702, advisory

committee notes, 2000 amendment (under the new rule, for

purposes of determining the sufficiency of the basis of an

expert’s testimony, the expert’s ‘facts or data’ may

include inadmissible testimony, hypothetical facts and the

reliable opinions of other experts). Rudd, 127 F.Supp.2d

at 1336-1337 n. 5. Although these two inquiries may often

Case 3:05-cv-00962-MHT-SRW Document 76 Filed 10/05/06 Page 13 of 21
14

turn out to resemble each other, they must be kept

separate if the court is to remain faithful to Rule 702's

and Rule 56's separate purposes. 

Applying these principles and in performance of its

gatekeeping function, this court concludes that

Robinson’s expert testimony is inadmissible, for it

fails to meet any of Rule 702’s requirements. First,

Robinson has not been qualified as an expert on cause of

death by “knowledge, skill, ... training, or education.”

Fed. R. Evid. 702. Robinson admitted in his deposition

that he is not a medical doctor; he has no formal

medical training; he is not a cause-of-death expert; he

has no training, and is not an expert, in biomechanics;

he does not hold himself out as an expert on what

specific injuries cause death; and, here, he has no

opinion to a reasonable degree of medical/biomechanical

engineering certainty as to what caused the decedent’s

death. Robinson Depo. p. 17-20; 85-88. 

Case 3:05-cv-00962-MHT-SRW Document 76 Filed 10/05/06 Page 14 of 21
15

Instead, Robinson attempts to rely on his

experience to conclude that Thompson’s collision with

the decedent’s truck caused the decedent’s death.

However, his experience is also inadequate to qualify

him under Rule 702. Although he seems to have extensive

experience as an accident reconstructionist, he has not

demonstrated adequate experience in determining cause of

death. There is no evidence of the nature and types of

accidents Robinson has investigated in the past and,

specifically, of what he learned, through his

experience, about the various and differing causes of

death in accidents similar to one in which the decedent

died. In fact, as already stated and as indicated in

his deposition, Robinson does not even consider himself

to be an expert in determining cause of death:

“Q: You don’t hold yourself out as an

expert in this case being able to

determine cause of death?

“A: Oh, no. No.”

Case 3:05-cv-00962-MHT-SRW Document 76 Filed 10/05/06 Page 15 of 21
16

Robinson Depo. p. 17. See Montgomery v. Noga, 168 F. 3d

1282 (11th Cir. 1999) (excluding an expert’s opinion

because the issues to which the expert testified were

distinct from his area of expertise); Kyser v. Harrison,

908 So. 2d 914, 919-920 (Ala. 2005) (“an expert may not

testify to his opinion on matters outside of his field

of training and experience”). 

Second, Robinson’s “testimony is [not] based upon

sufficient facts or data.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. His

conclusion, as indicated in his deposition, is simply

based on the facts that he gleaned from his review of

the decedent’s injuries in the autopsy report:

“Q: But you don’t know what injuries

caused his death?

“A: I haven’t--all I've done is look

at the autopsy report. I haven’t tried

to make any determination beyond that.”

Robinson Depo. p. 86. The evidence does not show how

the autopsy report, standing alone, is sufficient to

allow Robinson to opine what caused the decedent’s fatal

injuries--that is, whether it was the initial rollover

Case 3:05-cv-00962-MHT-SRW Document 76 Filed 10/05/06 Page 16 of 21
17

of the decedent’s truck or Thompson’s collision with the

decedent’s disabled truck sprawled across the roadway.

To conclude from the autopsy report that the decedent’s

death was caused by the collision between the decedent’s

and Thompson’s trucks, rather the earlier rollover of

the decedent’s truck, would be a leap based on faith

rather than any evidence.

Third, there is no evidence that Robinson used

“reliable principles and methods” to reach his

conclusion on cause of death. Fed. R. Evid. 702.

Robinson analyzed the force of the Thompson collision on

the decedent’s truck to conclude that such a tremendous

force was greater than what his seatbelt was designed to

withstand. Robinson also opines that, based on his

experiences with roll-over accidents, he has never seen

injuries as severe as those sustained by the decedent.

Therefore, according to Robinson, the second collision

is likely to have caused the injuries indicated in the

decedent’s autopsy report. This methodology might have

Case 3:05-cv-00962-MHT-SRW Document 76 Filed 10/05/06 Page 17 of 21
18

been sufficient if there was only one accident.

However, when looking at cause of death in a multipleaccident scenario, it makes sense to look at each

accident separately in order to determine which

collision caused the fatal injury. Robinson’s

methodology is inadequate to determine, with sufficient

certainty, that the decedent should have survived the

rollover and thus must have died from the collision. In

deed, Robinson admits that people have been fatally

injured in roll-over accidents.

Moreover, instead of clarifying this significant

issue, the plaintiff merely suggests that Robinson’s

testimony creates a factual issue for the jury to

decide. But, as explained earlier, the plaintiff

confuses the different purposes of Rule 702 and Rule 56.

Robinson’s testimony could create a Rule 56 factual

issue only if it has first passed Rule 702's reliability

requirement.

Case 3:05-cv-00962-MHT-SRW Document 76 Filed 10/05/06 Page 18 of 21
19

Finally, the plaintiff having failed to meet Rule

702's first requirements (that Robinson is “qualified as

an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or

education” and that his “testimony is based upon

sufficient facts or data” and “is the product of

reliable principles and methods”), it follows perforce

that she cannot meet Rule 702's last requirement that it

be shown that Robinson “applied the principles and

methods reliably to the facts of the case.” Fed. R.

Evid. 702. 

Accordingly, Robinson’s expert testimony on the

decedent’s cause of death is inadmissible under Rule 702

and will not be considered by the court. In short, the

plaintiff has not, among other things, explained “how

[Robinson’s] experience leads to the conclusion reached,

why that experience is a sufficient basis for [his]

opinion, and how [his] experience is reliably applied to

the facts.” Fed. R. Evid. 702, advisory committee

notes, 2000 amendment (internal citations and quotations

Case 3:05-cv-00962-MHT-SRW Document 76 Filed 10/05/06 Page 19 of 21
20

omitted). “The trial court’s gatekeeping function

requires more than simply taking the expert's word for

it.” Id.

The court’s Rule 702 conclusion to exclude the

plaintiff’s expert testimony on causation leaves the

separate Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 question of whether the

remaining evidence is sufficient to create a triable

issue of fact. Because the defendants have met their

burden of showing there is no admissible evidence to

show that Thompson caused the decedent’s death, the

defendants are entitled to summary judgment of the

causation issue, and thus on all claims. Fitzpatrick, 2

F.3d at 1115-16 (“For issues ... on which the non-movant

would bear the burden of proof at trial, ... the moving

party [for summary judgment] simply may show[]--that is,

point[] out to the district court--that there is an

absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's

case.”) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 

Case 3:05-cv-00962-MHT-SRW Document 76 Filed 10/05/06 Page 20 of 21
An appropriate summary judgment in favor of the

defendants will be entered.

DONE, this the 5th day of October, 2006.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:05-cv-00962-MHT-SRW Document 76 Filed 10/05/06 Page 21 of 21