Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-01011/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-01011-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
C&S Logistics of Fresno LLC
Defendant
C&S Logistics of Sacramento/Tracy LLC
Defendant
C&S Wholesale Grocers Inc.
Defendant
C&S Wholesale Grocers, LLC
Defendant
Fresno Logistics LLC
Defendant
Sacramento Logistics LLC
Defendant
Travis Shanley
Plaintiff
Stockton Logistics LLC
Defendant
Tracy Logistics LLC
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TRAVIS SHANLEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

TRACY LOGISTICS LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:24-cv-01011-DC-JDP 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL 

ARBITRATION OF PLAINTIFF’S 

INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS, AND STAYING

THE ACTION IN ITS ENTRIETY PENDING 

COMPLETION OF ARBITRATION

(Doc. No. 20)

This matter is before the court on Defendants C&S Wholesale Grocers, LLC, formerly 

C&S Wholesale Grocers Inc.; Tracy Logistics LLC; and Sacramento Logistics LLC’s

(collectively, “Defendants”) motion to compel arbitration of Plaintiff Travis Shanley’s individual 

claims brought against them. (Doc. No. 20.) The pending motion was taken under submission to 

be decided on the papers pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). (Doc. No. 22.) For the reasons explained 

below, the court will grant, in part, Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration.

BACKGROUND

Defendant C&S Wholesale Grocers, LLC (“C&S”) is a nationwide supply chain services 

and wholesale grocery supply company that, through its operating subsidiary entities, supplies 

grocery products to more than 6,000 independent supermarkets, chain stores, military bases, and 

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institutions in California and throughout the United States. (Doc. Nos. 20-1 at ¶ 5; 25 at ¶ 4.) 

Defendant Tracy Logistics LLC (“Tracy”), a subsidiary of Defendant C&S, is one of the largest 

wholesale grocery suppliers on the West Coast and operates a facility in Stockton, California. 

(Doc. Nos. 20-1 at ¶¶ 5–6; 25 at ¶¶ 2–4.)

Individuals working in the Stockton facility may be employed as order selectors, 

receivers/unloaders, or loaders. (Doc. No. 28-1 at ¶ 6.) Order selectors receive assignments 

through order sheets or an audio headset system to pick grocery items from storage rack systems 

in the Stockton facility. (Doc. Nos. 26-1 at ¶ 3; 28-1 at ¶ 6.) The order selector then stacks the 

selected items on a pallet, wraps or bags the items on the pallet as necessary, prints out a shipping 

label that identifies the customer’s name, city, and state, and attaches the label to the shipment. 

(Doc. Nos. 26-1 at ¶¶ 3–6; 28-1 at ¶ 6.) According to Defendants, there are three categories of 

order selectors for the three general categories of products received and stored at the Stockton 

facility: perishable order selectors, frozen order selectors, and non-perishable grocery order 

selectors. (Doc. No. 28-1 at ¶ 6.) Perishable order selectors procure only perishable produce, 

dairy, meat, poultry, and seafood items for customer orders. (Id.) 

On May 13, 2022, Plaintiff filed an application for employment with Defendant Tracy.

(Doc. No. 20-1 at ¶ 30.) As part of the application process, on May 16, 2022, Plaintiff reviewed 

and electronically signed Defendant C&S’s mutual arbitration agreement regarding wage and 

hour claims (“the C&S MAA”). (Id. at ¶¶ 8, 19, 29, 38.)1 Plaintiff began working in Defendant 

Tracy’s Stockton facility on or around May 23, 2022, and worked until on or about December 14, 

2022. (Doc. No. 25 at ¶ 5.) Plaintiff worked as an order selector. (Doc. 26-1 at ¶ 2.) According to 

1 On May 23, 2022, as part of the onboarding process, Plaintiff was presented with and signed 

Defendant Tracy’s mutual voluntary arbitration agreement (“the Tracy MVAA”). (Doc. No. 20-2 

at ¶ 9.) In a related declaratory relief action, Plaintiff challenges the formation and enforceability 

of the Tracy MVAA. Shanley v. Tracy Logistics LLC et al., No. 23-cv-02608-DC-JDP. The Tracy 

MVAA covers wage and hour claims and broadly extends its coverage to claims including, but 

not limited to, discrimination, harassment, retaliation, and breach of contract. (Doc. No. 20-2 at 

6–7.) In contrast, the C&S MAA narrowly applies to statutory and common law wage and hour 

claims and excludes many of the categories of claims the Tracy MVAA covers. (Doc. No. 20-1 at 

21–22.) Notwithstanding the C&S MAA’s limited coverage of claims, both this case and the 

declaratory relief action center around alleged violations of California’s wage and hour laws—the 

types of claims that are covered by both arbitration agreements.

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Defendants, Plaintiff worked exclusively with perishable products. (Doc. 28-1 at ¶¶ 13, 15.)

Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit by filing a wage-and-hour class action complaint on April 3, 

2024, bringing eight causes of action against seven defendants: Tracy Logistics LLC; Stockton 

Logistics LLC; Fresno Logistics LLC; C&S Wholesale Grocers, LLC, formerly C&S Wholesale 

Grocers Inc.; C&S Logistics of Sacramento/Tracy LLC, and C&S Logistics of Fresno LLC. (Doc. 

No. 1.)

On July 12, 2024, Defendants filed the pending motion to compel arbitration of Plaintiff’s 

individual claims and to stay all proceedings pending resolution of the arbitration under the 

Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), and in the alternative, the California Arbitration Act (the 

“CAA”) to the extent the CAA is applicable and not preempted by the FAA. (Doc. No. 20 at 9.) 

Defendants assert Plaintiff must submit all his individual claims arising out of or relating to his 

employment to arbitration. (Id.) On July 24, 2024, Plaintiff filed the operative first amended 

complaint raising the same eight causes of action, but this time only naming Defendants C&S;

Tracy; and Sacramento Logistics LLC. (Doc. No. 25.)

On July 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration

and supporting declaration. (Doc. Nos. 26; 26-1.) In his opposition, Plaintiff contends

Defendants’ pending motion was mooted by the filing of the first amended complaint. (Id. at 4.) 

Plaintiff also asserts that although he agreed to the C&S MAA, the C&S MAA provides that it is 

governed by the FAA, and the FAA does not apply to him because he is a transportation worker 

and is therefore exempt under 9 U.S.C. § 1. (Id. at 5–7.) Separately, Plaintiff argues the C&S 

MAA cannot be enforced under the CAA. (Id. at 7–9.)

On August 5, 2024, Defendants filed a reply to Plaintiff’s opposition and evidentiary 

objections to Plaintiff’s declaration. (Doc. Nos. 28; 28-2.) On August 12, 2024, Plaintiff filed 

objections to Defendants’ reply and Defendants filed a response the following day. (Doc. Nos.

30–31.)

 LEGAL STANDARDS

“The threshold issue in deciding a motion to compel arbitration is ‘whether the parties 

agreed to arbitrate.’” Quevedo v. Macy’s, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1133 (C.D. Cal. 2011) 

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(quoting Van Ness Townhouses v. Mar Indus. Corp., 862 F.2d 754, 756 (9th Cir. 1988)). “When 

determining whether a valid contract to arbitrate exists, we apply ordinary state law principles 

that govern contract formation.” Davis v. Nordstrom, Inc., 755 F.3d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(citing Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 298 F.3d 778, 782 (9th Cir. 2002)). The 

party seeking to compel arbitration “bears the burden of proving the existence of an agreement to 

arbitrate by a preponderance of the evidence.” Johnson v. Walmart Inc., 57 F.4th 677, 681 (9th 

Cir. 2023). 

A. Federal Arbitration Act

The FAA governs written arbitration agreements affecting interstate commerce and 

provides that written arbitration agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save 

upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” Circuit City 

Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 111–12 (2001); 9 U.S.C. § 2. “By its terms, the [FAA] leaves 

no place for the exercise of discretion by a district court, but instead mandates that district courts 

shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has 

been signed.” Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 479 U.S. 213, 218 (1985) (citing 9 U.S.C. 

§§ 3–4); see also AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011) (“[C]ourts must 

place arbitration agreements on equal footing with other contracts and enforce them according to 

their terms.”).

Under the FAA, a court’s role is limited to determining (1) whether a valid agreement to 

arbitrate exists and, if it does (2) whether the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue. Bielski 

v. Coinbase, Inc., 87 F.4th 1003, 1009 (9th Cir. 2023) (Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., 

Inc., 207 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000)). If both conditions are met, the FAA requires the court

to enforce the parties’ arbitration agreement by its terms. Chiron, 207 F.3d at 1130. In ruling 

upon a motion to compel arbitration, “district courts rely on the summary judgment standard of 

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Hansen v. LMB Mortg. Servs., Inc., 1 F.4th 

667, 670 (9th Cir. 2021). The party seeking to compel arbitration bears the burden of proving the 

existence of an agreement and the party opposing bears the burden of proving any defense. 

Norcia v. Samsung Telecoms. Am., LLC, 845 F.3d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 2017); Lim v. TForce 

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Logistics, LLC, 8 F.4th 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2021).

B. California Arbitration Act

Under the CAA, arbitration agreements are “valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon 

such grounds as exist for the revocation of any contract.” See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1281; 

Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83, 99 (2000) (California law, 

like federal law, generally “favors enforcement of valid arbitration agreements.”); see OTO, 

L.L.C. v. Kho, 8 Cal. 5th 111, 125 (2015) (“California law strongly favors arbitration.”). As with 

motions to compel arbitration under the FAA, courts evaluate motions to compel arbitration 

brought under the CAA using a summary judgment standard. Lane v. Francis Cap. Mgmt. LLC, 

224 Cal. App. 4th 676, 683 (2014). Unlike the FAA, the CAA as a state statute, “obviously does 

not prevent [California’s] Legislature from selectively prohibiting arbitration in certain areas.” 

Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 98.

 DISCUSSION

A. Defendants’ Evidentiary Objections

“[A] court ruling on a motion to compel arbitration reviews the evidence on the same 

standard as for summary judgment under Rule 56.” Alkutkar v. Bumble Inc., No. 22-cv-00422-

PJH, 2022 WL 16973253, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2022). Under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 56, which governs summary judgment, “[a] supporting or opposing affidavit must be 

made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that 

the affiant is competent to testify on the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

In connection with Defendants’ reply in support of their pending motion, Defendants 

object to certain portions of Plaintiff’s declaration based on lack of personal knowledge, 

foundation, relevance, hearsay, and speculation. First, Defendants object that Plaintiff’s 

statements referring to shipments of goods other than perishable goods are irrelevant because 

Plaintiff and the class of workers to which he belongs worked exclusively with perishable 

products. (Doc. No. 28-2 at 2–3.) Defendants’ objection is well-taken because statements about 

products Plaintiff did not handle are not relevant to the analysis of the pending motion. Thus, the 

court sustains this objection, and the court will not consider those statements. 

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Second, Defendants object to Plaintiff’s statements that he knew where shipments were 

going and where some of the groceries had come from because he saw shipping labels. (Id. at 2–

3.) Defendants asserts these statements lacks foundation, personal knowledge, and constitute 

inadmissible hearsay. (Id.) Defendants’ objections are not well founded, however, because 

foundation, personal knowledge, and hearsay evidence may be considered by the court in ruling 

on a motion to compel arbitration (and summary judgment) so long as the evidence could be 

presented in an admissible form at trial. See Pierre v. Iec Corp., No. 22-cv-01289-FWS-JDE, 

2023 WL 3551962, at *4, n. 1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2023) (finding at the motion to compel 

arbitration stage that “except in the rare instances in which the objecting party demonstrates with 

specificity that the subject evidence could not be produced in a proper format at trial, the court 

does not consider any objections on the grounds that the evidence ‘constitutes hearsay or 

inadmissible lay opinion, or that there is a lack [of] personal knowledge.’”) (citing Holt v. Noble 

House Hotels & Resort, Ltd, 370 F. Supp. 3d 1158, 1164 (S.D. Cal. 2019)); see also Morton v. 

Cnty. of San Diego, No. 21-cv-01428-MMA-DDL, 2024 WL 5126281, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 

2024) (“objections for lack of foundation or relevance are not appropriate at summary judgment). 

Therefore, the court overrules Defendants’ evidentiary objection based on foundation, personal 

knowledge, and hearsay.

Lastly, Defendants object to Plaintiff’s statements he knew where shipments were going 

and where some of the groceries had come from because he saw shipping labels on the grounds 

that such statements are pure speculation. (Doc. No. 28-2 at 2–3.) The court finds Defendants 

objection is unfounded as Plaintiff has provided sufficient facts to substantiate his conclusion that 

some groceries had come from outside of California and shipments were leaving California. 

Accordingly, the court overrules Defendants’ evidentiary objection based on speculation. 

B. Defendants’ Motion is Not Rendered Moot by the Filing of the First Amended 

Complaint 

An “amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as nonexistent.” Ramirez v. County of San Bernardino, 806 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation 

omitted). Generally, courts deny a motion that targets a complaint that is no longer in effect. See

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Lemberg v. Lularoe, No. 17-cv-02102-AB-SHK, 2018 WL 6927836, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 

2018) (denying the motion to compel arbitration as moot because the motion was targeted at a 

previous iteration of the complaint and plaintiff’s first amended complaint added new plaintiffs 

and causes of action); W. Air Charter, Inc. v. Sojitz Corp., No. 18-cv-07361-JGB-MAA, 2019 

WL 6998765, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2019) (finding that upon plaintiff filing a third amended 

complaint, defendant’s arbitration motion no longer pertained to the operative pleading because 

the third amended complaint eliminated all reference to the agreement defendants cited as the 

basis for their arbitration motion).

Here, Plaintiff amended his pleadings only to remove four previously named defendants, 

and he did so in reaction to Defendants’ filing of a motion to dismiss on the basis of this court’s 

lack of personal jurisdiction over them. (Doc. No. 25.) Plaintiff’s first amended complaint still 

asserts the exact same claims as in the initial complaint, is based on the same factual allegations, 

and it is those same claims that Defendants seek to compel Plaintiff to arbitrate. (Compare Doc. 

No. 1 with Doc. No. 25.) Thus, the court finds Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration of 

Plaintiff’s individual claims is not rendered moot by Plaintiff’s filing of the first amended 

complaint. 

C. An Arbitration Agreement Exists Between the Parties

The party seeking to compel arbitration bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of 

the evidence that an agreement to arbitrate exists. Norcia v. Samsung Telecomms. Am., LLC, 845 

F.3d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 203 (2017). “With respect to the moving 

party's burden to provide evidence of the existence of an agreement to arbitrate, it is generally 

sufficient for that party to present a copy of the contract to the court.” Baker v. Italian Maple 

Holdings, LLC, 13 Cal. App. 5th 1152, 1160 (2017). As stated above, Defendants have presented 

a copy of the C&S MAA, which Plaintiff electronically signed on May 16, 2022. (Doc. No. 20-1

at ¶ 38.) Therefore, Defendants have met their burden to provide evidence that an arbitration 

agreement existed between the parties. 

D. The FAA’s Transportation Worker Exemption

The FAA does not apply to employment contracts of “any . . . class of workers engaged in 

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foreign or interstate commerce.” 9 U.S.C. § 1. This exemption has been construed to encompass 

“transportation workers” who are “actively engaged” and “play a direct and necessary role in the 

free flow of goods across borders.” Sw. Airlines Co. v. Saxon, 596 U.S. 450, 458 (2022) (citing 

Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 121 (2001)). A transportation worker is not required 

to work for a company in the transportation industry to be exempt under § 1 of the FAA. 

Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC, 601 U.S. 246, 252 (2024). Further, the 

transportation worker does not have to cross state borders. See Saxon, 596 U.S. at 458 (holding 

“one who loads cargo on a plane bound for interstate travel” is a transportation worker); Lopez v. 

Aircraft Serv. Int’l Inc., 107 F. 4th 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 2024) (concluding a fuel technician who 

places fuel in a plane used for foreign and interstate commerce is a transportation worker);

Rittmann v. Amazon.com, Inc., 971 F.3d 904, 909 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding drivers who made the 

“last mile” deliveries of packaged products from Amazon warehouses were engaged in the 

movement of interstate commerce and were transportation workers). The party resisting 

arbitration under this exemption “bear[s] the burden of proving that [the] exemption applies.”

Rogers v. Lyft, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 3d 904, 913 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (citing Rogers v. Royal Caribbean 

Cruise Line, 547 F.3d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 2008)).

In assessing whether an employment contract comes within the scope of the FAA’s 

transportation worker exemption, a court engages in a two-step analysis. Ortiz v. Randstad 

Inhouse Servs., LLC, 95 F. 4th 1152, 1159 (9th Cir. 2024). First, the court defines the “relevant 

class of workers” to which the employee belongs. Id. (citing Saxon, 596 U.S. at 455). The 

relevant class of workers is determined with reference to “the specific nature of [the employee’s] 

work, not [the] employer’s status . . .” Id.; see also Saxon, 596 U.S. at 456 (holding an employee 

“is [] a member of a ‘class of workers’ based on what she does . . ., not what [her employer] does 

generally”). Second, the court determines whether that class of workers is actively engaged in 

foreign or interstate commerce and plays a tangible and meaningful role in the movement of 

goods across borders. Ortiz, 95 F.4th at 1159–60, 1162.

At the first step, the parties provide competing definitions of the relevant class of worker. 

Plaintiff contends he “belongs to a class of workers whose role is exclusively warehouse duties, 

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involving handling, organizing, and staging products in the flow of interstate commerce, but not 

moving them on the road or rail themselves.” (Doc. No. 26 at 6.) In response, Defendants argue

Plaintiff’s class of workers should be limited to “warehouse workers who select from warehouse 

inventory predominantly locally-sourced, perishable inventory products for orders from 

predominantly in-state grocery stores.” (Doc. No. 28 at 9.) The court finds neither of the parties’ 

definitions properly define the relevant class. As Saxon instructs, Plaintiff’s class of worker can 

be properly defined by reference to his job description, and entirely without reference to 

Defendants’ line of business. Ortiz, 95 F.4th at 1162. According to Plaintiff, as an order selector 

he would find or pick specific groceries, sometimes wrap and bag groceries, assemble groceries 

for shipment on pallets, print and attach shipping labels to the groceries, and place the shipment at 

a bay door. (Doc. No. 26-1 at ¶¶ 3–6.) Similarly, according to Defendants, Plaintiff was 

responsible for selecting only perishable products for customer orders, stacking those selected 

items, wrapping the items on a pallet as necessary, attaching a shipping label to the pallet, and 

leaving the pallet in a staging area. (Doc. No. 28 at ¶ 6.) These job descriptions capture the 

undisputed work Plaintiff performed as an employee. Therefore, the court finds Plaintiff belonged 

to a class of workers that handled and prepared perishable products for shipment.

Turning to step two, the court must address whether an order selector that handled 

perishable products is actively engaged in foreign or interstate commerce. First, Defendants argue

order selectors are not transportation workers because their work is not similar to that of a seamen 

or railroad worker. (Doc. No. 28 at 12.) Defendants contend the exemption was not meant to 

extend to warehouse workers who merely move products within a warehouse. (Id. at 12, n. 7.)

In his opposition, Plaintiff argues this case parallels the facts of Ortiz, in which the Ninth 

Circuit found warehouse workers who transported packages only within the warehouse were 

exempt from the FAA. (Doc. No. 26 at 6.) In Ortiz, the Ninth Circuit found that although the 

warehouse workers transported Adidas products only within the warehouse—to and from storage 

racks—the workers “fulfilled an admittedly small but nevertheless ‘direct and necessary’ role” in 

the interstate commerce of Adidas products. 95 F.4th at 1157–58, 1162, 1166.

In response, Defendants argue Ortiz is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent and 

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was decided in error. (Doc. No. 28 at 12, n. 7.) The court finds Defendants argument is 

unavailing. The Supreme Court expressly declined to review the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Ortiz. 

See Ortiz v. Randstad Inhouse Serv., No. 23-1296, 2024 WL 4426655 (2024) (petition for writ of 

certiorari denied). This court must follow binding precedent. Mohamed v. Uber Techs., Inc., 848 

F.3d 1201, 1211 (9th Cir. 2016). Thus, under Ortiz, warehouse workers who move products 

within a warehouse may qualify as a transportation worker under § 1.

Next, Defendants contend Plaintiff’s class of workers were not actively engaged in foreign 

or interstate commerce because a majority of the products handled by Plaintiff never entered 

interstate commerce. (Doc. No. 28 at 10–11.) Plaintiff asserts he engaged in interstate commerce 

because he handled groceries that traveled interstate. (Doc. No. 26 at 7.). In support, Plaintiff 

declares he knew some of the groceries had come from California, Idaho, and Oregon and the 

“shipments would go to grocery retailers across the western states, including California, Nevada 

(both Vegas and Reno), and Utah.” (Doc. 26-1 at ¶¶ 7–8.) 

In response, Defendants acknowledge some of the products it delivered from the Stockton 

facility originate from suppliers outside of California. (Doc. No. 20-1 at ¶ 6.) However, 

Defendants estimate approximately 80–85% of the perishable food items received, stored, and 

selected for fulfilling customer orders from the Stockton facility originate from suppliers/vendors 

in California. (Doc. No. 28-1 at ¶ 10.) The Stockton facility has approximately 750 active 

customers comprised of both chain grocery stores and independent, “mom and pop” grocery 

stores. (Id. at ¶ 12.) Defendants estimate “[a]pproximately 85% of those customers operate 

entirely within California and thus receive deliveries from the Stockton [f]acility only within 

California.” (Id.) According to Defendants, approximately 15% or less of those customers have 

locations outside of California that order products from the Stockton facility. (Id.) Further, 

Defendants assert the Stockton facility has approximately 700 customer delivery routes per week, 

and approximately 90% of those routes are for customer deliveries located only within California. 

(Id.) Defendants argue Plaintiff did not actively engage in interstate commerce because he did not 

handle products that came from or went to other states “on a frequent basis.” (Doc. No. 28 at 10–

11.)

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The court recognizes that “[s]omeone whose occupation is not defined by its engagement 

in interstate commerce does not qualify for the exemption just because she occasionally performs 

that kind of work.” Wallace v. Grubhub Holdings, Inc., 970 F.3d 798, 800 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing 

Hill v. Rent-A-Center, 398 F.3d 1286, 1289-90 (11th Cir. 2005)); see Capriole v. Uber Techs., 

Inc., 7 F.4th 854, 864 (9th Cir. 2021) (drivers who predominantly engaged in intrastate trips were 

not actively engaged in interstate commerce, “even though some [] drivers undoubtedly cross 

state lines in the course of their work.”) (citing Rogers v. Lyft, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 3d 904, 916 

(N.D. Cal. 2020)); see also Nair v. Medline Indus., No. 22-cv-00331-DAD-JDP, 2023 WL 

2636464, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2023) (“The question then is whether the interstate movement 

of goods was a “central part of the class members’ job description.”) (citing Capriole, 7 F.4th at 

865). 

Here, even if the court adopts Defendants’ estimates, the court finds Plaintiff’s class of 

workers frequently and actively engaged in interstate commerce. By Defendants’ own estimate, 

approximately 15–20% of the perishable products Plaintiff’s class of workers may have handled 

came from outside California. (Doc. No. 28-1 at ¶ 10.) This estimate stands in stark contrast to 

other cases in which courts have found a worker only engaged in interstate commerce 

occasionally. See Capriole, 7 F.4th at 864 (“Only 2.5% of ‘all trips fulfilled using the Uber Rides 

marketplace in the United States between 2015 and 2019 . . . started and ended in different states’ 

. . . [o]verall interstate trips, even when combined with trips to the airport, represent a very small 

percentage of Uber rides.”); Burns v. Maplebear, Inc., No. 24-cv-04618, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

158161, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 2024) (“Instacart produced data showing that, on average, over 

the last three years, approximately 99.6% of Instacart orders in the United States were 

intrastate”); See Walz v. Walmart Inc., No. 23-cv-06083-BHS, 2024 WL 2864230, at *7 (W.D. 

Jun. 6, 2024) (“At most, Walz plausibly alleges that he and some other Spark Driver workers 

have only occasionally delivered products across state lines. This does not demonstrate that he 

belongs to a class of transportation workers that is defined by its engagement in interstate 

commerce.”); Carr v. Traffic Mgmt., Inc., No. 24-cv-01333-HDV-JC, 2024 WL 4329070, at *3 

(C.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2024) (“Plaintiff points to the instances when he delivered traffic safety 

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equipment from TMI's facility in Michigan to customers in Indiana . . .[b]ut such instances 

occurred merely twice over the course of four years, and was not part of his paid job duties.”).

Thus, contrary to Defendants’ characterization, the court finds that Plaintiff was actively engaged 

in handling perishable products that came from out of state. 

Defendants also contend Plaintiff’s class of workers did not engage in interstate 

commerce because any products they handled that came from outside of California were not a

part of a single, unbroken chain of interstate commerce. (Doc. No. 28 at 11.) Defendants assert 

out-of-state goods “came to rest” at the Stockton facility, and any subsequent transaction to a 

California customer was “functionally” a separate “local transaction.” (Id.) The court finds 

Defendants’ argument unpersuasive. The flow of interstate commerce ceases when the goods in 

question have come to a permanent rest. Rittmann, 971 F.3d at 916 (emphasis added). When 

goods are “inevitably destined from the outset of the interstate journey” for delivery to known 

customers, the fact that goods may “pause” at a warehouse does not “remove them from the 

stream of interstate commerce.” Carmona Mendoza v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 73 F.4th 1135, 1138 

(9th Cir. 2023). Defendants do not dispute that the perishable products were inevitably destined

for the Stockton facility’s customers, independent and chain grocery stores. (Doc. No. 28-1 at ¶ 

12.) Thus, the fact perishable products paused their journey at the Stockton facility until they 

were inevitably delivered to Defendants’ known customers did not remove them from the flow of 

interstate commerce. 

Accordingly, the court finds Plaintiff has made a sufficient showing that he is a 

transportation worker under § 1 and, consequently, is exempt from coverage under the FAA. In 

light thereof, Defendants are not entitled, under the FAA, to an order compelling plaintiff to 

arbitrate his individual claims.

E. The CAA Applies

In the alternative, Defendants ask the court to compel arbitration under the CAA, to the 

extent the CAA is applicable. (Doc. No. 20.) As discussed above, Plaintiff does not dispute that 

an arbitration agreement exists, or that he signed the C&S MAA. Instead, Plaintiff argues the 

C&S MAA cannot be enforced under California law. (Doc. No. 26 at 7–9.)

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First, Plaintiff argues the C&S MAA cannot be enforced under California law because the 

agreement made the application of the FAA an essential term and “offer no application of state 

law in the alternative.” (Id. at 7–8.) The court finds Plaintiff’s argument unavailing. Courts have 

consistently determined an arbitration agreement’s explicit selection of the FAA does not 

invalidate the entire agreement in the event the plaintiff is found to qualify for the FAA’s 

transportation worker exemption. See Breazeale v. Victim Servs., Inc., 198 F. Supp. 3d 1070, 

1079 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (noting that “when a contract with an arbitration provision falls beyond the 

reach of the FAA, courts look to state law to decide whether arbitration should be compelled 

nonetheless”); Garrido v. Air Liquide Indus. U.S. LP, 241 Cal. App. 4th 833, 841 (2015) 

(applying California law to an arbitration agreement with a choice-of-FAA provision where the 

plaintiff was exempt from the FAA); Lagatree v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 74 Cal. 

App. 4th 1105, 1121 (1999) (“Assuming arguendo that the FAA does not apply, we would assess 

the validity of the parties’ arbitration agreements under the California Arbitration Act.”).

Second, Plaintiff cites to the decision in Gentry v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 4th 443 (2007) 

to support his argument that the C&S MAA is unenforceable because California law does not 

allow class action waivers. (Doc. No. 26 at 9.) In Gentry, the court identified four factors that 

must be considered to determine whether a class action waiver in an arbitration agreement is

unenforceable. 42 Cal. 4th at 463. The factors include: “the modest size of the potential recovery, 

the potential for retaliation against members of the class, the fact that absent members of the class 

may be ill informed about their rights, and other real-world obstacles to the vindication of class 

members’ right to [wages] through individual arbitration.” Id. To be entitled to a finding that a 

class action waiver is unenforceable a plaintiff must make a “proper factual showing” as to those

four factors. Id.; Compare Garrido, 241 Cal. App. 4th at 846–47 (affirming the trial court’s 

finding that a class action waiver was unenforceable when plaintiff submitted evidence as to each 

of the four factors) with Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 197 Cal. App. 4th 489, 496–97 (2011) 

(reversing trial court’s finding that a class action waiver was unenforceable when plaintiff failed 

to provide any evidence as to the four factors). Here, Plaintiff summarily concludes a class action 

waiver could be found unenforceable under Gentry. (Doc. No. 26 at 9.) However, Plaintiff has not 

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identified, what evidence, if any, supports his conclusion. Plaintiff has not met his burden of

providing evidence that satisfies any of the four factors under Gentry. Therefore, the court finds 

the presence of class action waivers in the arbitration agreements does not render the agreements 

unenforceable.

Third, Plaintiff contends his wage and hour claims are not subject to arbitration under 

California Labor Code Section 229. (Doc. No. 26 at 8–9.) Section 229 states that “[a]ctions to 

enforce the provisions of this article [Cal. Lab. Code § 200–244] for the collection of due and 

unpaid wages claimed by an individual may be maintained without regard to the existence of any 

private agreement to arbitrate.” See Cal. Lab. Code § 229; Lane v. Francis Cap. Mgmt, LLC, 224 

Cal. App. 4th 676, 684 (2014). Only three of Plaintiff’s eight causes of action are brought under 

the subject article. Specifically, Plaintiff’s first three claims for failure to pay regular wages, 

failure to provide meal breaks or compensation in lieu thereof, and failure to authorize and permit 

rest breaks or compensation in lieu thereof, are brought under that article. (Doc. No. 25 at 15–20.)

Therefore, the court shall stay Plaintiff’s first three claims pending arbitration of Plaintiff’s 

remaining individual claims. See Neims v. Neovia Logistics Distrib., LP, No. 23-cv-00716, 2023 

WL 6369780, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2023) (ordering some claims to arbitration and staying 

proceedings with respect to the remaining claims that were not arbitrable).

 CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above:

1. Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration of Plaintiff’s individual causes of action 

(Doc. No. 20) is granted in part;

2. Plaintiff shall be and hereby is ordered to submit his fourth through eighth

individual causes of action brought against Defendants in this action to arbitration;

3. Plaintiff’s first through third individual causes of action are stayed pending 

completion of the arbitration proceedings on Plaintiff’s other individual claims;

4. Plaintiff’s class causes of action are stayed pending completion of the arbitration 

proceedings; 

5. The parties shall file a joint status report ninety (90) days from the date of entry of 

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this order, and every 90 days thereafter, regarding the status of the arbitration 

proceedings; 

6. Within fourteen (14) days of the completion of the arbitration proceedings, the 

parties shall file a joint status report to notify the court of the arbitrator’s decision 

and request that the stay of this case be lifted; and

7. The Clerk of the Court is directed to update the docket to reflect that Defendants 

Stockton Logistics LLC, Fresno Logistics LLC, C&S Logistics of 

Sacramento/Tracy LLC, and C&S Logistics of Fresno LLC have been terminated 

from this action as of July 24, 2024, the date Plaintiff filed the first amended 

complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 30, 2024 ___________________________

Dena Coggins

United States District Judge

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