Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02356/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02356-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Antonio Gromyko Reeves
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable E. Richard Webber, United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of Missouri. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-2356

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

*

v. * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

Antonio Gromyko Reeves, also known * Eastern District of Missouri.

as, Meckeo O. Scott, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: February 14, 2005 

Filed: June 10, 2005

___________

Before WOLLMAN, McMILLIAN and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge.

Antonio Gromyko Reeves appeals from a final judgment entered in the District

Court1

 for the Eastern District of Missouri following his plea of guilty to distribution

of 5 or more grams of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. Reeves argues

that the district court erred in sentencing him as a career offender under U.S.S.G.

§ 4B1.1. We dismiss the appeal. 

Appellate Case: 04-2356 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/10/2005 Entry ID: 1914099
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In January 2004, Reeves and the government entered into a written plea

agreement, in which Reeves admitted that he had sold over 6 grams of crack cocaine

to an undercover officer. Reeves also "admitt[ed] that he ha[d] two prior felony

convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense," citing a

1997 conviction for attempted arson and a 1997 conviction for sale of a controlled

substance. In the plea agreement, the government noted its belief that Reeves should

be sentenced under § 4B1.1, which, as relevant here, provides that a defendant shall

be sentenced as a career offender if the offense of conviction is a felony drug

conviction and the defendant has "at least two prior felony convictions of either a

crime of violence or a controlled substance offense." As applied to Reeves,

application of § 4B1.1 resulted in an offense level of 34 and a criminal history

category of VI, with a sentencing range of 262 to 327 months. Despite the admission

of his two prior felony convictions, in the plea agreement, Reeves reserved the "right

to argue the applicability of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 at the time of sentencing." 

In relevant part, the plea agreement also provided:

The defendant has been fully apprised by defense counsel of [his] rights

to appeal and fully understands the right to appeal the sentence under

Title 18, United States Code, Section 3742. However, in the event the

Court accepts the plea, as part of this agreement, both the defendant and

the government hereby waive all rights to appeal all non-jurisdictional

issues including, but not limited to . . . whatever sentence is imposed,

any issues relating to the establishment of the Total Offense Level or

Criminal History Category determined by the Court, except that the

parties reserve the right to appeal from any Chapter 5 upward or

downward departure from the Guidelines range if such departure is not

agreed to in this document . . . The Guidelines range will be determined

by the District Court and shall not be subject to appeal. 

(emphasis added). 

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At the change of plea hearing, the following colloquy occurred:

Court: By signing this [plea] agreement, Mr. Reeves, you have waived

a number of your appellate rights. You still reserve the right to appeal

if I should sentence you in an upward departure from the Sentencing

Guidelines range. You still have that right to appeal. Do you

understand?

Reeves: Yes, sir.

 

Court: You, by signing this agreement, waive all rights to contest the

conviction or sentence except for grounds of prosecutorial misconduct

or ineffective assistance of counsel at the time of sentencing in any postconviction . . . or by means of any petition for relief of any description.

Other than those reserved rights, all of your appellate rights are waived.

Do you understand?

Reeves: Yes, Sir. 

Over Reeves's objection, the district court sentenced Reeves as a career

offender under § 4B1.1. The district court rejected his argument that the 1997

conviction for attempted arson was not a crime of violence, noting that § 4B1.2 listed

arson as a crime of violence and provided that a crime of violence included an

"attempt[] to commit such an offense." After deducting three levels for acceptance

of responsibility, the district court calculated Reeves's sentencing guidelines range

(based on an offense level of 31 and criminal history category of VI) as 188 to 235

months and sentenced him to 188 months imprisonment. 

On appeal, Reeves challenges his sentence, arguing that the district court erred

in applying § 4B1.1. The government argues that Reeves waived his right to appeal

his sentence. We agree with the government. "When reviewing a purported waiver,

we must confirm that the appeal falls within the scope of the waiver and that both the

waiver and plea agreement were entered into knowingly and voluntarily." United

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States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 889-90 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 997

(2003) (Andis). In determining the scope of an appeal waiver, we, of course, must

look to the language of the waiver. For example, in United States v. Lea, 400 F.3d

1115, 1116 (8th Cir. 2005), this court held that the language of a waiver that allowed

the defendant to appeal a sentencing issue not specifically addressed in the waiver did

not preclude a challenge to his sentence under United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738

(2005) (Booker). In contrast, the language of the waiver in this case is very broad.

Reeves agreed that the "Guidelines range . . . shall not be subject to appeal" and to

"waive all rights to appeal . . . whatever sentence is imposed," reserving only the

right to appeal a Chapter 5 upward departure. Thus, Reeves's challenge to the

application of § 4B1.1 falls within the scope of the waiver. See Andis, 333 F.3d at

892 (waiver of "all rights to appeal whatever sentence is imposed" foreclosed

challenge to conditions of supervised release). 

In addition, Reeves does not dispute that at the time he entered into the plea

agreement and waiver, he did so knowingly and voluntarily. As noted above, at the

change of plea hearing the district court engaged in a colloquy pursuant to Fed. R.

Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(N) to ensure that the "plea agreement and corresponding waiver

[were] entered into knowingly and voluntarily." Id. at 890.

Reeves suggests that the waiver is no longer valid in light of United States v.

Booker. His argument is without merit. "Unless expressly reserved, . . . , the right

to appellate relief under Booker is among the rights waived by a valid appeal waiver,

even if the parties did not anticipate the Blakely/Booker rulings." United States v.

Fogg, No. 04-2723, 2005 WL 1186535, at *2 (8th Cir. May 20, 2005) (citing United

States v. Killgo, 397 F.3d 628, 629 n.2 (8th Cir. 2005) ("fact that [a defendant] did not

anticipate the . . . Booker ruling[] does not place the issue outside the scope of his

waiver")). Thus, Reeves's waiver of "all rights . . . to appeal any sentence imposed

. . . certainly is broad enough to cover any issues arising from . . . Booker." United

States v. Rubbo, 396 F.3d 1330, 1334 (11th Cir. 2005) (Rubbo); see also United States

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v. McKinney, No. 04-41223, 2005 WL 997153, at *3 n.5 (5th Cir. Apr. 15, 2005)

("Blakely and Booker do not alter the plain meaning of appeal-waiver provisions in

valid plea agreements"); United States v. Lockett, 406 F.3d 207, 213-14 (3rd Cir.

2005) (Lockett) (broad appeal waiver foreclosed Booker claim); United States v.

Morgan, 406 F.3d 135, 137 (2d Cir. 2005) ("appeal waiver is enforceable and

forecloses the right to appeal under Booker/FanFan"); United States v. Green, 405

F.3d 1180, 1189 (10th Cir. 2005) (Green) ("Booker arguments may fall within the

scope of a defendant's waiver of his or her appellate rights"); United States v.

Bownes, 405 F.3d 634, 636 (7th Cir. 2005) ("appeal waivers worded as broadly as

this one are effective even if the law changes in favor of the defendant after

sentencing"); United States v. Bradley, 400 F.3d 459, 465 (6th Cir. 2005) (Bradley)

(enforcing appeal waiver in the "aftermath of Booker"). 

In addition, Booker does not render Reeves's plea involuntary or unintelligent.

"'[A] voluntary plea of guilty intelligently made in the light of the then applicable law

does not become vulnerable because later judicial decisions indicate that the plea

rested on a faulty premise.'" United States v. Morgan, 958 F.2d 847, 849 (8th Cir.

1992) (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757 (1970)); see also Lockett,

406 F.3d at 213 (rejecting argument that appeal waiver was unknowing "because

[defendant] did not know at the time he pleaded guilty that the Supreme Court would

later hold [in Booker] that the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory"); Green, 405 F.3d

at 1191 (holding "pre-Booker waiver of right to appeal was knowing and voluntary");

Bradley, 400 F.3d at 464-65 (having obtained decrease in number of counts against

him, defendant cannot undo appeal waiver on basis of Booker); United States v.

Sahlin, 399 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 2005) (argument that "Booker renders [a] plea

involuntary" was frivolous). 

Reeves also suggests that this court should not enforce the waiver because his

sentence is illegal under Booker. It is true that we will "refuse to enforce an

otherwise valid waiver if to do so would result in a miscarriage of justice," Andis, 333

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2

In United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), as in Blakely v.

Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2537 (2004), the Supreme Court "ma[de] clear that the

'statutory maximum' for Apprendi [v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000)] purposes is

the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of facts reflected in

the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant." 125 S. Ct. at 749. Because this case

does not implicate the Sixth Amendment concerns of Booker, we do not address

whether the Apprendi/Booker definition of the term "statutory maximum" alters the

plain meaning of the term (i.e., the maximum sentence a statute authorizes a court to

impose) as used in the appellate waiver context. However, we note courts have held

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F.3d at 891, and that a "defendant has the right to appeal an illegal sentence." Id. at

891. However, contrary to Reeves's argument, the district court did not violate his

Sixth Amendment rights by sentencing him as a career offender under § 4B1.1 based

on its finding that the 1997 conviction for attempted arson was a crime of violence.

In Booker, the Supreme Court "expressly confirmed the continuing validity of its

holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), that the fact of a prior

conviction need not be submitted to a jury or proved beyond a reasonable doubt."

United States v. Marcussen, 403 F.3d 982, 984 (8th Cir. 2005). We also "have

rejected the argument that the nature of a prior conviction is to be treated differently

from the fact of a prior conviction." Id. Indeed, "[t]he Supreme Court's post-Booker

opinion in Shepard v. United States[, 125 S. Ct. 1254 (2005),] lends further support

to the rule that the sentencing court, not a jury, must determine whether prior

convictions qualify as violent felonies." Id. 

Reeves also argues that after Booker his sentence was illegal because the

district court sentenced him under a mandatory Guidelines system, rather than under

an advisory Guidelines system, as Booker directs. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 757. We

cannot address this argument. This court has made clear that "the illegal sentence

exception to the general enforceablility of an appeal waiver is an extremely narrow

exception." 333 F.3d at 892. In Andis, we stated: "Any sentence imposed within the

statutory range is not subject to appeal." Id. Here, Reeves's sentence of 188 months

is within the statutory range of 5 to 40 years specified in § 841(b)(1)(B).2

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that Apprendi/Booker definition of the term does not apply in the context of

enforceability of appeal waivers. See United States v. Green, 405 F.3d 1180, 1192

(10th Cir. 2005) (noting Supreme Court qualified definition "with the phrase 'for

Apprendi purposes'" and definition "has only been applied in sentencing guidelines

cases"); United States v. Rubbo, 396 F.3d 1330, 1334 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting

Apprendi/Booker definition "had nothing to do with the scope of appeal waivers");

United States v. West, 392 F.3d 450, 460 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (rejecting "exceedingly

subtle" Apprendi definition in favor of plain meaning of "statutory maximum" in

interpreting appeal waiver).

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 Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. 

 ______________________________

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