Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-03341/USCOURTS-ca10-95-03341-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lamar M. Moore
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

( 

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

No. 95-3341 

LAMAR M. MOORE, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

. FILED 

Umted States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

JUL 2 6 1996 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D.C. No. 95-10021-01) 

MontieR. Deer, Assistant United States Attorney (Jackie N. Williams, United States 

Attorney, with him on the brief), Wichita, Kansas, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Kurt P. Kerns, The Law Offices of Leslie F. Hulnick, P .A., Wichita, Kansas, for 

Defendant-Appellee. 

Before ANDERSON, BALDOCK, and HENRY, Circuit Judges. 

HENRY, Circuit Judge. 

The United States appeals from the district court's order suppressing evidence 

obtained during a search of the residence of defendant-appellee Lamar M. Moore. The 

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central issue in this appeai is whether the government met its burden of demonstrating 

that state law enforcement officers were excused from the "knock and announce" 

requirement explicitly incorporated into our Fourth Amendment "reasonableness" inquiry 

by Wilson v. Arkansas, 115 S. Ct. 1914, 1916 (1995). We exercise jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm. 

Mr. Moore was indicted on one count of possession with intent to distribute 

approximately eleven grams of crack cocaine, in violation of21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(l), and 

one count of carrying and using a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking 

crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Prior to trial, he moved to suppress all evidence 

obtained in the execution of a search warrant for his Wichita, Kansas residence. 

"On appeal from a motion to suppress, we accept the district court's factual 

findings unless clearly erroneous, review questions of law de novo, and view the evidence 

in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. The question whether exigent 

circumstances exist ... presents a mixed question of fact and law which we review de 

novo." United States v. Maden, 64 F.3d 1505, 1508 (lOth Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). 

"The reasonableness of a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment is a question of 

law we review de novo." United States v. McCarty, 82 F.3d 943, 947 (lOth Cir. 1996). 

The following facts are either uncontested or are presented, as required by our 

cases, in the light most favorable to Mr. Moore. On December 29, 1994, members of the 

Wichita Police Department executed a search warrant for Mr. Moore's residence. One 

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officer opened the screen door and then stepped aside as another officer announced their 

presence and indicated that they had a search warrant. "[N]early sirnultaneous[ly ]" with 

their announcements, the officers forced open the door with a steel battering ram. Rec. 

vol. I, doc. 28 at 1 (Order of Suppression). The time that elapsed between announcement 

and battering was no more than three seconds. I d. 

State law enforcement officers are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment from 

conducting "unreasonable searches and seizures." Although the federal "knock and 

announce" statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3109, does not directly apply to state actors, we use§ 

31 09 as a guide in conducting the "reasonableness" inquiry dictated by the Fourth 

Amendment. United States v. Smith, 63 F.3d 956, 962 (lOth Cir. 1995), cert. granted and 

judgment vacated on other grounds, 116 S. Ct. 900 (1996). The Fourth Amendment, 

reflecting the long common law tradition protecting the sanctity of the horne, includes a 

general presumption that police officers executing a search warrant for a residence must 

announce their presence and authority before entering. Wilson, 115 S. Ct. at 1918 (citing 

"the presumption in favor of announcement"). If the occupants do not admit the officers 

within a reasonable period of time, the officers may be deemed to be constructively 

refused admittance, and they may then enter by force. United States v. Knapp, 1 F.3d 

1026, 1031 (1Oth Cir. 1993) ("It was plausible for the officers to conclude that they were 

affirmatively refused entry after a ten to twelve second interval .... "). Here, however, 

the district court found that the forced entry was "virtually instantaneous" and correctly 

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concluded that this precluded any claim that the officers were constructively refused 

admittance. Rec. vol. I, doc. 28 at 1-2. At most, the officers waited three seconds: 

significantly less time than in prior cases in which constructive refusal has been found. 

Compare United States v. Lucht, 18 F.3d 541, 550-51 (8th Cir.) (waiting three to five 

seconds before entering was not long enough to find constructive refusal to admit), cert. 

denied, 115 S. Ct. 363 (1994); United States v. Marts, 986 F.2d 1216, 1218 (8th Cir. 

1993) (less than five seconds was not sufficient to find constructive refusal to admit); and 

United States v. Rodriguez, 663 F. Supp. 585, 587-88 (D.D.C. 1987) (three to five second 

delay was insufficient to find constructive refusal to admit) with Smith, 63 F.3d at 962 

(forty-five seconds was sufficient to find constructive refusal to admit) and Knapp, 1 F.3d 

at 1030-31 (ten to twelve seconds was sufficient to find constructive refusal to admit). 

The government argues, as an exception to the "knock and announce" rule, that 

there were "exigent circumstances" which justified immediate entry, citing the averment 

in the application for the search warrant by Officer Mitchell that a confidential informant 

had "stated that the black male that sold the crack cocaine and another black male in the 

premises were armed with an unknown type of firearm." Rec. vol. III, Ex. 2 at 2 

(Application for Search Warrant). Officers may indeed be excused from the usual "knock 

and announce" rule if exigent circumstances attended the search. However, this 

exception applies only when "the law enforcement officers in question held an objectively 

reasonable belief that an emergency situation existed." United States v. Maden, 64 F.3d 

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Appellate Case: 95-3341 Document: 01019292011 Date Filed: 07/26/1996 Page: 4 
1505, 1509 (lOth Cir. 1995). The mere statement that firearms are present, standing 

alone, is insufficient. The government must go further and demonstrate that the presence 

of firearms raised a concern for the officers' safety. Lieutenant Atnip testified that 

officers are concerned about an armed response when they execute any narcotics search 

warrant. Rec. vol. II at 14. Clearly, though, to expand the exigent circumstances 

exception to that extent would completely swallow the rule. 

The government presented no evidence that the officers were particularly 

concerned for their safety in this case. See United States v. Becker, 23 F.3d 1537, 1541 

(9th Cir. 1994) ("[W]hile peril to officers ... may well demonstrate an exigency, mere 

unspecific fears about [this ]possibilit[y] will not."). As the district court observed, the 

government did not even raise an exigent circumstances argument at the suppression 

hearing. Rec. vol. I, doc. 28 at 2. In its motion to reconsider the order of suppression, the 

government argued that "the presence of firearms inside the residence and the probability 

of the destruction of evidence by the drug dealers if an extensive period of time elapsed 

between the announcement and the forcible entry" created an exigency justifying the 

entry. See Rec. vol. I, doc. 29 at 2. However, it failed to cite any further support in the 

record for this claim. See United States v. Moreno, 701 F.2d 815, 818 (9th Cir. 1983) 

(finding no exigent circumstances where the record did not contain specific evidence that 

contraband might be destroyed), cert. granted and judgment vacated on other grounds, 

469 U.S. 913 (1984). Because the government failed even to allege that the Wichita 

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police officers harbored a concern for their safety, the mere fact that firearms were 

present was insufficient to demonstrate exigent circumstances justifying the "virtually 

instantaneous" battering down of the door of a private home. 

The government further argues for the first time on appeal that, even if the search 

violated the Fourth Amendment, the doctrine of"inevitable discovery" compels the 

conclusion that the seized evidence should not have been suppressed. See Nix v. 

Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444-46 (1984). This issue was not raised below, and we decline 

to consider it. See Lyons v. Jefferson Bank & Trust, 994 F.2d 716, 721 (lOth Cir. 1993) 

("[W]e have exercised our discretion to hear issues for the first time on appeal only in the 

most unusual circumstances."). 

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the order of the district court granting Mr. 

Moore's motion to suppress all evidence seized as a consequence of the search of his 

residence. 

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