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Parties Involved:
In Re: Edward Earl Robinson
Not Party
Charlotte M. Robinson
Appellee
Edward Earl Robinson
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FI LED 

United Sta~ O)ur! {)f Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 2 8 1990 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

In re: EDWARD EARL ROBINSON, ) 

) 

Debtor. ) 

) 

) 

CHARLOTTE M. ROBINSON, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

EDWARD EARL ROBINSON, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant.) 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-1130 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Colorado 

(D.C. No. 88-K-1795) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Milnor H. Senior, III, Robert I. Cohen and Michael J. Vos, Denver, 

Colorado, for defendant-appellant. 

Jorge E. Cast'illo, Denver, Colorado, for plaintiff-appellee. 

Before LOGAN, SEYMOUR, and TACHA, Circuit Judges. 

LOGAN, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 90-1130 Document: 01019956436 Date Filed: 11/28/1990 Page: 1 
.. This appeal arises out of a bankruptcy proceeding in which 

Edward Earl Robinson sought relief in the form of discharge from 

an obligation imposed upon him in the divorce proceeding 

dissolving his marriage with Charlotte Robinson. That proceeding 

ordered that the family home be assigned to Charlotte, who would 

have to take over payments on the first deed of trust secured by a 

mortgage on which both were liable, but that payments on the 

second deed of trust (executed to help finance purchase of assets 

assigned to Edward) of $360.37 per month would have to be paid by 

Edward. The court not only ordered Edward to "pay all 

indebtedness" on the second deed of trust but "to hold [Charlotte] 

harmless." V R. pl. ex. 4. When Edward failed to make his 

payments on the debt, Charlotte refinanced by entering into a new 

second deed of trust for which she was solely liable, but at a 

reduced interest rate. 1 

In the bankruptcy proceeding, objecting to discharge, 

Charlotte asserted that the $360.37 per month Edward was required 

to pay was in the nature of support, maintenance, or alimony and 

thus was nondischargeable under 11 u.s.c. § 523(a)(5). In 

opposition, Edward asserted that the o~ligation was part of a 

property settlement, hence dischargeable, and additionally that 

the debt no longer existed because of Charlotte's action in 

refinancing, which removed his personal guaranty and allegedly 

extinguished his obligation. 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has 

determined unanimously to honor the parties' request for a 

decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

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Appellate Case: 90-1130 Document: 01019956436 Date Filed: 11/28/1990 Page: 2 
We agree with the district court that the bankruptcy judge 

did decide that the obligation was in the nature of alimony, 

maintenance or support. See III R. 39-41. We reject Charlotte's 

contention that Edward failed to preserve this issue on appeal to 

the district court. An appellee may defend the judgment won below 

on any ground supported by the record without filing a cross 

appeal. See Koch v. City of Hutchinson, 847 F.2d 1436, 1441 n.14 

(10th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 909 (1988). The 

district court found the ruling on the nature of the obligation to 

be a fact finding that was sufficiently supported by the record 

such that it could not be found to be clearly erroneous. In re 

Robinson, 113 B.R. 687, 689-90 (D. Colo. 1990). After reviewing 

the record, we agree. 

The district court reversed the bankruptcy court's finding, 

reviewable on a de novo standard, that the obligation to the wife 

was extinguished by the refinancing. See id. at 690-91. Edward 

challenges this holding, arguing that it permits Charlotte to 

alter his obligations without court approval. Brief of Appellant 

at 15. W d . 2 e 1.sagree. The district court, and the cases cited in 

its opinion, hold that the status of the underlying debt has no 

effect on the original obligation to hold one's spouse harmless. 

See In re Robinson, 113 B.R. at 691. Thus, Charlotte's act of 

refinancing has no effect on the terms of Edward's obligation to 

2 Charlotte apparently has never suggested that Edward is 

obligated according to the terms of the new second deed of trust. 

See Brief of Appellee at 15-16 ("We do not contend, and we have 

never contended, that the Husband's liability to the Wife should 

be measured by any yardstick other than the one defined by the 

original obligation."). 

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Appellate Case: 90-1130 Document: 01019956436 Date Filed: 11/28/1990 Page: 3 
hold Charlotte harmless on the original second deed of trust; he 

continues to be obligated according to the terms of that 

instrument. We believe the "hold harmless" language is not 

essential to a finding of Edward's continuing liability, inasmuch 

as he was also ordered to make the payments. Nevertheless, the 

order to pay does define the amount of the monthly payments and 

the period over which they are to be paid. Charlotte's act of 

refinancing, when Edward defaulted on his obligation, simply 

allows her to stand in the place of Finance America, original 

holder of the second deed of trust. Accordingly, we affirm the 

district court's decision that Edward's obligation was not 

extinguished by refinancing and the payments he was ordered to pay 

to Finance America he now must make to Charlotte. 

AFFIRMED. 

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Appellate Case: 90-1130 Document: 01019956436 Date Filed: 11/28/1990 Page: 4