Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-56379/USCOURTS-ca9-13-56379-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
ADT Security Services Pension Plan
Appellee
Bruce H. Barton
Appellant
Estate of Bruce H. Barton
Appellant
Tyco International Management Company
Appellee
Tyco International Management Company, LLC
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ESTATE OF BRUCE H. BARTON,

*

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ADT SECURITY SERVICES PENSION

PLAN, a pension plan; TYCO

INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT

COMPANY, as plan sponsor; TYCO

INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT

COMPANY, LLC, Administrative

Committee,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 13-56379

D.C. No.

2:12-cv-06971-

BRO-CW

ORDER

Filed September 20, 2016

Before: Alex Kozinski, Sandra S. Ikuta,

and John B. Owens, Circuit Judges.

Order;

Dissent by Judge N.R. Smith

* The Estate of Bruce H. Barton is substituted as Plaintiff-Appellant

pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(a).

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2 ESTATE OF BARTON V. ADT

SUMMARY**

Employee Retirement Income Security Act

The panel denied a petition for panel rehearing and, on

behalf of the court, denied a petition for rehearing en banc in

an ERISA case.

Dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc, Judge

N.R. Smith, joined by Judges O’Scannlain, Tallman, Gould,

Bybee, Callahan, Bea and Ikuta, wrote that the panel’s

opinion ignored Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent

in placing on the ERISA plan administrator the burden of

proof regarding the plaintiff’s eligibility for pension benefits.

COUNSEL

Morris S. Getzels (argued), Morris S. Getzels Law Office,

Tarzana, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Stuart D. Tochner (argued), Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak

& Stewart, P.C., Los Angeles, California, for DefendantsAppellees.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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ESTATE OF BARTON V. ADT 3

ORDER

Judges Kozinski and Owens have voted to deny the

petition for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc. Judge

Ikuta has voted to grant the petition for panel rehearing and

rehearing en banc.

The full court was advised of the petition for rehearing en

banc. A judge requested a vote on whether to rehear the

matter en banc. The matter failed to receive a majority of the

votes of the nonrecused active judges in favor of en banc

consideration. Fed. R. App. P. 35.

The petition for panel rehearing and the petition for

rehearing en banc are DENIED.

N. R. SMITH, Circuit Judge, with whom O’SCANNLAIN,

TALLMAN, GOULD, BYBEE, CALLAHAN, BEA, and

IKUTA, Circuit Judges, join, dissenting from the denial of

rehearing en banc:

A party may petition for rehearing en banc when “the

panel decision conflicts with a decision of the United States

Supreme Court or of the court to which the petition is

addressed . . . and consideration by the full court is therefore

necessary to secure and maintain uniformity of the court’s

decisions.” Fed. R. App. P. 35(b)(1)(A).

In this case, the majority ignores United States Supreme

Court precedent and our own Employee Retirement Income

Security Act (“ERISA”) precedent and thus fails to maintain

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4 ESTATE OF BARTON V. ADT

the uniformity of the courts’ decisions. Therefore, I must

dissent from our court’s refusal to rehear this case en banc.

The United States Supreme Court mandated the standard

for reviewing the decisions of ERISA plan administrators in

Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 111,

115–16 (1989). It stated that courts should apply an abuse of

discretion standard where, as here, the plan administrator had

discretionary authority to determine the claimant’s eligibility

for benefits. See id. at 115 (citing Restatement (Second) of

Trusts § 187 cmt. d (1959)). In Metropolitan Life Insurance

Co. v. Glenn, the Supreme Court applied Firestone’s

deferential standard, even where the plan administrator had

a conflict of interest arising from her dual role of both

evaluating and paying benefits claims. 554 U.S. 105, 108

(2008). The Court refused to create special burden-of-proof

rules, or other special procedural or evidentiary rules, as an

exception to Firestone deference. Id. at 116. In Conkright v.

Frommert, the Court reaffirmed the “broad standard of

deference” accorded to plan administrators under Firestone

and concluded this deference was not “susceptible to ad hoc

exceptions.” 559 U.S. 506, 513 (2010).

Under the Firestone abuse of discretion standard, the “test

for abuse of discretion . . . is whether ‘we are left with a

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been

committed.’” Salomaa v. Honda Long Term Disability Plan,

642 F.3d 666, 676 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v.

Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1262) (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc)).

Thus, we should only overrule the plan administrator’s

decision if it is “(1) illogical, (2) implausible, or (3) without

support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the

record.” Salomaa, 642 F.3d at 676 (quoting Hinkson,

585 F.3d at 1262). This standard of review applies to the plan

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ESTATE OF BARTON V. ADT 5

administrator’s factual determinations as well as to her

ultimate decision. Walker v. Am. Home Shield Long Term

Disability Plan, 180 F.3d 1065, 1069–70 (9th Cir. 1999).

Here, the majority agrees the plan gave discretion to the

plan administrator to determine Barton’s eligibility for

benefits. The majority does not fault the district court in

reviewing the administrator’s decision with a low degree of

skepticism. The majority agrees that the review in this case is

limited to the administrative record. Judge Ikuta’s dissent

outlines the evidence in the record, demonstrating that the

evidence therein is more than adequate to support the plan

administrator’s decision. Thus, the decision is not illogical,

implausible, or without support in the record. See Hinkson,

585 F.3d at 1262. No one argues that the plan administrator

was aware of additional evidence that would change the

decision. The recordkeeping and disclosure requirements

imposed on the plan administrator by 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(4)

were met, and the plan administrator provided all the required

information to Barton. The majority provides no authority for

the proposition that ADT had a legal duty to maintain the

other information sought here. Under this deferential abuse of

discretion standard of review, there exists no clearer case to

affirm the district court.

The majority even admits that, “[t]he district court

faithfullyapplied our precedent in reviewing the Committee’s

denial of benefits for abuse of discretion.” Estate of Barton v.

ADT Sec. Servs. Pension Plan, 820 F.3d 1060, 1065 (9th Cir.

2016). However, the majority then abandons the abuse of

discretion standard. It invents an unprecedented burden-ofproof standard that only it seems to have had the foresight to

impose on plan administrators. Never mind that (1) Supreme

Court precedent doesn’t permit for ad hoc exceptions to this

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6 ESTATE OF BARTON V. ADT

standard of review; (2) our precedent requires that Barton

show the administrator’s decision was illogical, implausible,

or without any support of inferences in the record; (3) even

reviewing a plan administrator’s decision de novo, the burden

of proof remains on the claimant; (4) there is no precedent for

shifting the burden of proof to the administrator; and

(5) circuit precedent clearly bars this burden shifting. See

Muniz v. Amec Constr. Mgmt., Inc., 623 F.3d 1290, 1294–95

(9th Cir. 2010).

Why have the Supreme Court and our circuit mandate

standards of review if judges can ignore them at any time

they are so inclined? Our circuit has inexplicably turned its

back on the principle of stare decisis in this case. From this

time forward, can each panel decide the law on its own,

provided enough active judges are willing to live with it?

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