Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-04084/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-04084-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John Gephart
Defendant
Anthony Marvell Semien
Plaintiff
C. Streeter
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY MARVELL SEMIEN,

Plaintiff,

 v.

JOHN GEPHART & C. STREETER,

Defendants. /

No. 08-04084 CW

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS'

MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(Docket No. 14)

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Anthony Marvell Semien, a state prisoner currently

incarcerated at Pelican Bay State Prison (PBSP), brings this 42

U.S.C. § 1983 action against John Gephart and C. Streeter,

correctional officers at PBSP. Plaintiff alleges that on December

7, 2007, Defendants used excessive force against him in violation

of the Eighth Amendment. In an Order dated July 6, 2009, the Court

found that Plaintiff’s allegations stated a cognizable excessive

force claim against Defendants. 

Defendants move for summary judgment on two grounds. First,

they argue that their use of force was not excessive and thus did

not violate Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights. Second, they

argue that, even if their use of force was excessive, they are

entitled to qualified immunity because reasonable officers would

not have known their actions were unlawful. Plaintiff has not

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1The Court GRANTS Defendants’ request for judicial notice of

the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

Operations Manual, Chapter 5, section 52020.1.

2

filed an opposition to the motion.

For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’

motion for summary judgment.1

FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

According to Plaintiff's verified complaint, on December 7,

2007, Plaintiff was handcuffed and told to exit his cell. Comp. 3. 

Plaintiff complied without resistance. Id. Plaintiff's cell was

being "stripped" (cleared and searched). Id. After Plaintiff

exited the cell, he was placed against the wall, facing it. Id.

Correctional Officer Streeter was on Plaintiff's left, with Officer

Gephart on Plaintiff's right; both officers were holding Plaintiff

in place. Id. When Plaintiff asked why his cell was being

stripped, Officer Streeter told him to "shut up and face the wall." 

Id. Plaintiff replied, "I'm not even talking to you I'm talking to

the sgt. [sic] so you shut up." Id. Officer Streeter then pushed

Plaintiff towards Officer Gephart, who pulled Plaintiff down to the

floor. Id. Plaintiff's face struck the floor, producing a two

inch cut across his chin. Id. 

According to Defendants, on December 7, 2007, Plaintiff

covered up the front window of his cell with a sheet, and began

kicking his cell door and flooding the surroundings with water from

his cell. Brinkman Decl. ¶ 2.c., Ex. A., Rules Violation Report,

at 40-41. Following the orders of Sergeant Frisk, Defendants and

Officer Gardner handcuffed Plaintiff through the food port of the

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cell door; Plaintiff did not resist. Id. at 38-39. 

Plaintiff was escorted out of his cell by Officers Streeter

and Gephart so that another officer could remove the sheet from

Plaintiff’s cell window. Id. at 40-41, 45-46. Plaintiff was

facing a wall in the corridor, with Officer Streeter on Plaintiff's

left side and Officer Gephart on Plaintiff's right. Id. Plaintiff

began to resist, and Sergeant Frisk heard Plaintiff say, "I'm not

going back to my cell, you'll have to take me to the hole." Id. at

36-37, 45-46. Plaintiff then lunged at Officer Gephart and tried

to bite his hand or arm. Id. at 36-37, 40-41. 

Defendants guided Plaintiff to the ground using his own

momentum and the application of their body weight. Id. at 36-37,

40-41, 45-46. After Plaintiff was on the ground, he ceased

resisting and Officer Gardner placed restraints on Plaintiff’s

legs. Id. at 39. Defendants assisted Plaintiff to his feet and

escorted him to the medical office. Id. at 40-41, 45-46. The

nurse who examined Plaintiff noted a two-inch laceration on his

chin, and treated it. Id. at 47. On December 11, 2007, when

Plaintiff returned to the medical office, he refused medical

treatment, and the next day an examining nurse indicated that the

wound on his chin had completely healed. Brinkman Decl. ¶ 3.a.,

Ex. B. at 1, 6. 

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and

disputed issues of material fact remain and when, viewing the

evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is

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clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir.

1987). 

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no

material factual dispute. Therefore, a court must regard as true

the opposing party's evidence, if supported by affidavits or other

evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, 815

F.2d at 1289. A court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor

of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. Matsushita

Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587

(1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d

1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). A verified complaint may be used as an

opposing affidavit under Rule 56, as long as it is based on

personal knowledge and sets forth specific facts admissible in

evidence. Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 & nn.10-11 (9th

Cir. 1995); Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1090 n.1 (9th Cir. 1996),

amended, 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof on an

issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of

production by either of two methods: 

The moving party may produce evidence negating an

essential element of the nonmoving party’s case, or,

after suitable discovery, the moving party may show that

the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an

essential element of its claim or defense to carry its

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial. 

Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd., v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d

1099, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000).

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If the moving party discharges its burden by showing an

absence of evidence to support an essential element of a claim or

defense, it is not required to produce evidence showing the absence

of a material fact on such issues, or to support its motion with

evidence negating the non-moving party’s claim. Id.; see also

Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990); Bhan v.

NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991). If the

moving party shows an absence of evidence to support the non-moving

party’s case, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to

produce “specific evidence, through affidavits or admissible

discovery material, to show that the dispute exists.” Bhan, 929

F.2d at 1409. 

If the moving party discharges its burden by negating an

essential element of the non-moving party’s claim or defense, it

must produce affirmative evidence of such negation. Nissan, 210

F.3d at 1105. If the moving party produces such evidence, the

burden then shifts to the non-moving party to produce specific

evidence to show that a dispute of material fact exists. Id.

If the moving party does not meet its initial burden of

production by either method, the non-moving party is under no

obligation to offer any evidence in support of its opposition. Id.

This is true even though the non-moving party bears the ultimate

burden of persuasion at trial. Id. at 1107.

Material facts which would preclude entry of summary judgment

are those which, under applicable substantive law, may affect the

outcome of the case. The substantive law will identify which facts

are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

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(1986). 

II. Eighth Amendment Excessive Force Claim

A. Applicable Legal Standard

The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions

under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth

Amendment. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). "After

incarceration, only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain

. . . constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the

Eighth Amendment." Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)

(ellipsis in original). A prison official violates the Eighth

Amendment when two requirements are met: (1) the deprivation

alleged must be objectively, sufficiently serious, Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501

U.S. 294, 298 (1991)), and (2) the prison official must possess a

sufficiently culpable state of mind, i.e., the offending conduct

must be wanton. Id. (citing Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297); LeMaire v.

Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1451 (9th Cir. 1993).

Whenever prison officials stand accused of using excessive

force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, the core judicial

inquiry is whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to

maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to

cause harm. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992).

In determining whether the use of force was for the purpose of

maintaining or restoring discipline, or for the malicious and

sadistic purpose of causing harm, a court may evaluate the need for

application of force, the relationship between that need and the

amount of force used, the extent of any injury inflicted, the

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threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and any

efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response. 

Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7; LeMaire, 12 F.3d at 1454; see also Spain v.

Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 195 (9th Cir. 1979) (guards may use force

only in proportion to need in each situation).

Although the extent of injury suffered by a prisoner is one of

the factors to be considered in determining whether the use of

force is wanton and unnecessary, the absence of serious injury does

not end the Eighth Amendment inquiry. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. 

Whether the alleged wrongdoing is objectively "harmful enough" to

establish a constitutional violation is contextual and responsive

to contemporary standards of decency. Id. at 8 (citing Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)). Such standards are always

violated when prison officials maliciously and sadistically use

force to cause harm, whether or not significant injury is evident. 

Id.; see Felix v. McCarthy, 939 F.2d 699, 701-02 (9th Cir. 1991)

(it is not degree of injury which makes out violation of Eighth

Amendment but use of official force or authority that is

intentional, unjustified, brutal and offensive to human dignity). 

This is not to say that the "absence of serious injury" is not

relevant to the Eighth Amendment inquiry. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. 

The extent of injury suffered by an inmate is one factor that may

suggest whether the use of force could possibly have been thought

necessary in a particular situation. Id. The extent of injury may

also provide some indication of the amount of force applied. 

Wilkins v. Gaddy, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 1175, 1178 (2010). But

not every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a

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federal cause of action. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9. The Eighth

Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment necessarily

excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of

physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort

repugnant to the conscience of mankind. Id. An inmate who

complains of a push or shove that causes no discernable injury

almost certainly fails to state a valid excessive force claim. Id.

B. Plaintiff’s Excessive Force Claim 

Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment because

they were reasonably responding to Plaintiff’s attempt to bite

Officer Gephart when they forced Plaintiff to the ground.

Although Plaintiff did not submit an opposition to the motion,

Plaintiff's complaint was signed under penalty of perjury, was

based on personal knowledge, and set forth specific facts

admissible in evidence. Accordingly, the complaint may serve as an

affidavit in opposition to the motion. See Schroeder v. McDonald,

55 F.3d at 460 nn.10-11. The Court must therefore determine

whether Plaintiff’s verified complaint sets forth specific facts

sufficient to show that a dispute of material fact exists.

The facts in Plaintiff’s verified complaint are not sufficient

to establish a genuine dispute of material fact. Although

Plaintiff states that he cooperated with the officers when they

handcuffed him, he does not state that he continued to cooperate

with them throughout the course of the incident, nor does he state

that he did not lunge at Officer Gephart and try to bite him. See

Comp. at 3. Plaintiff contends that the officers’ actions were

“uncalled for” and “evil and sadistic.” Comp. at 3. However,

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these statements are conclusory, and he fails to state that

Officers Gephart and Streeter applied force against him in anything

other than a good-faith effort to control a physically threatening

prisoner. Thus, Plaintiff has not raised a genuine dispute of

material fact, and Defendants are entitled to summary judgment. 

Because the Court concludes that Defendants did not violate

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights, it does not reach the merits

of Defendants’ claim of qualified immunity.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment and

close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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