Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01186/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01186-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Adchemy, Inc.
Not party
LendingTree, LLC
Appellant
Nextag, Inc.
Not party
Zillow, Inc.
Cross-Appellant

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

LENDINGTREE, LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

ZILLOW, INC.,

Defendant-Cross-Appellant

NEXTAG, INC., ADCHEMY, INC.,

Defendants

______________________ 

2014-1435, 2014-1531, 2015-1186

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the 

Western District of North Carolina in No. 3:10-cv-00439-

FDW-DCK, Chief Judge Frank D. Whitney.

______________________ 

Decided: July 25, 2016

______________________ 

 STEPHEN S. KORNICZKY, Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & 

Hampton LLP, San Diego, CA, argued for plaintiffappellant. Also represented by MARTIN BADER, MICHAEL 

MURPHY; EDWARD V. ANDERSON, Palo Alto, CA.

J. DAVID HADDEN, Fenwick & West, LLP, Mountain 

View, CA, argued for defendant-cross-appellant. Also 

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2 LENDINGTREE v. ZILLOW, INC. 

represented by TODD RICHARD GREGORIAN, SAINA S.

SHAMILOV, CAROLYN CHANG, LYNN PASAHOW; RAVI 

RAGAVENDRA RANGANATH, San Francisco, CA. 

______________________ 

Before MOORE, SCHALL, and O’MALLEY, Circuit Judges.

SCHALL, Circuit Judge. 

DECISION

This is a patent infringement case. LendingTree, LLC 

(“LendingTree”) filed suit against Zillow, Inc. (“Zillow”) 

and other defendants in the United States District Court 

for the Western District of North Carolina, asserting 

claims 1 and 6 of U.S. Patent No. 6,385,594 (“the ’594 

patent”) and claims 1, 4, 5, 18–20, and 22–24 of U.S. 

Patent No. 6,611,816 (“the ’816 patent”) (collectively, “the 

patents in suit”). In due course, Zillow moved for summary judgment of invalidity under 35 U.S.C. § 101 with 

respect to the asserted claims of both patents. The district court delayed ruling on the motion until after trial, 

at which point the court orally denied it from the bench. 

Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 11346. Following trial, the jury 

returned a verdict finding that Zillow and the other 

defendants did not infringe the asserted claims of the 

patents in suit and that all claims of the patents in suit

were invalid for improper inventorship. Id. 7248–51. 

After entering final judgment based upon the jury’s 

verdict, id. 22, the court denied various post-trial motions, 

LendingTree, LLC v. Zillow, Inc., 54 F. Supp. 3d 444, 466 

(W.D.N.C. 2014).

On appeal, LendingTree argues that the district court 

erred in its construction of four claim terms, in certain of 

its evidentiary rulings, and in its decision not to vacate 

the jury’s finding of invalidity based upon improper 

inventorship. It therefore asks us to vacate the final 

judgment and remand the case for further proceedings. 

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LENDINGTREE v. ZILLOW, INC. 3

Zillow cross-appeals the district court’s denial of summary 

judgment of invalidity under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

For the reasons set forth below, we hold that the district court erred in denying Zillow’s motion for summary 

judgment of invalidity of the asserted claims of the patents in suit. In addition, we remand to permit LendingTree, if it chooses to do so, to file a motion under Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 60(b) to vacate the judgment of invalidity for 

improper inventorship with respect to the remaining 

claims of the patents in suit. Our resolution of the case 

renders moot the issues of claim construction and the 

district court’s evidentiary rulings.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(1). We turn first to Zillow’s cross-appeal.

DISCUSSION

I.

A. 

The patents in suit “relate[] to a process for coordinating loans on a loan processing computer over the Internet.” ’594 patent at 1:8–9.1 According to the ’594 patent, 

traditional methods of applying for a loan were “tedious 

and time consuming” because there was “no way to apply . 

. . without physically going to or calling each lender and 

filling out an application or credit qualification form.” Id. 

at 1:34–39. Recognizing that “[a]ll applications required 

substantially the same information,” the inventors sought 

to overcome those problems by “combin[ing] the vast 

resources and speed of the Internet with additional 

 

1 The ’816 patent is a continuation of the ’594 patent. ’816 patent at 1:7–9. Accordingly, because the 

patents in suit share a common specification, reference to 

the ’594 patent suffices for the purpose of providing 

background.

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4 LENDINGTREE v. ZILLOW, INC. 

knowledge of various lending institution’s selection criteria to create a simple mechanism whereby an Internet 

user can . . . submit a single credit application to a plurality of lending institutions who then make offers to the 

customer via the Internet.” Id. at 1:38–43, 1:55–57. The 

loan-coordination process of the ’594 patent includes ten 

general stages. Id. at 2:66–3:1, Fig. 1.

Independent claims 1 and 22 of the ’594 patent and 

’816 patent, respectively, are representative of the 

claimed subject matter. They provide as follows:

1. A method for coordinating an electronic credit 

qualification form between an Internet user and a 

plurality of lending institutions via the Internet, 

comprising the steps of:

a) receiving selection criteria from the plurality of 

lending institutions;

b) storing the selection criteria in a database;

c) displaying a plurality of documents in a web 

site;

d) receiving a plurality of credit data sent from 

the Internet user;

e) applying said credit data to a filter comprising 

the plurality of selection criteria of the database 

to select without manual intervention each one of 

said plurality of lending institutions associated 

with a match of said credit data to said selection 

criteria;

f) determining an appropriate transfer method to 

transmit said electronic credit qualification form 

to the lending institutions associated with a 

match of said credit data;

g) transmitting said electronic qualification form 

comprising said credit data to said plurality of 

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LENDINGTREE v. ZILLOW, INC. 5

lending institutions associated with a match of 

said credit data via said appropriate transfer 

method, the transmission of said electronic qualification form comprising said credit data occurring 

without a delay for reception of any credit decisions from said lending institutions;

h) receiving a plurality of positive credit decisions 

from said plurality of lending institutions associated with a match of said credit data regarding an 

offer of credit or a loan to the Internet user;

i) simultaneously displaying the plurality of positive credit decisions to the Internet user on the web 

site; 

j) receiving via the web site at least one decision 

from the Internet user regarding at least one of 

the positive credit decisions, the Internet user’s

decision comprising an acceptance, denial or request for more information regarding a positive 

decision for one of said lending institutions associated with a match of said credit data; and

k) transmitting the at least one Internet user’s decision to at least one lending institution corresponding with a positive credit decision so that 

said Internet user can obtain credit or a loan from 

one of said lending institutions associated with a 

match of said credit data,

whereby said lending institutions associated with a match of said credit data compete with each other for business with the 

Internet user. 

’594 patent at 7:15–62 (emphases added).

22. A system for coordinating business between a 

computer user and a plurality of lending institutions comprising:

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6 LENDINGTREE v. ZILLOW, INC. 

a processing unit;

a memory storage device; and

a program module, stored in said memory storage 

device for providing instructions to said processing unit;

said processing unit responsive to said instructions of said program module, operable for 

receiving selection criteria from a plurality of lending institutions;

receiving credit data sent from the computer user;

employing the selection criteria to filter 

the credit data and to automatically select 

one or more lending institutions from the 

plurality of lending institutions; and

forwarding the credit data to the selected 

one or more lending institutions;

whereby the selected lending institutions 

compete with each other for business with 

the computer user.2

’816 patent at 10:1–20 (emphasis added).

LendingTree sued Zillow in the Western District of 

North Carolina, alleging that Zillow’s operation of a 

“Mortgage Marketplace” on its website infringed claims 1 

and 6 of the ’594 patent and claims 1, 4, 5, 18–20, and 22–

 

2 The district court construed the “whereby” clauses 

in claims 1 and 22 to mean “the selected lending institutions simultaneously compete by providing offers for 

credit to the computer user via the [computer network 

(‘816 patent)/Internet (‘594 patent)].” J.A. 12 (alteration 

in original).

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LENDINGTREE v. ZILLOW, INC. 7

24 of the ’816 patent. Zillow denied infringement and 

asserted various counterclaims and affirmative defenses, 

based on its view that the patents in suit were neither 

infringed nor valid. After the case was underway, Zillow 

moved for summary judgment of invalidity of the asserted 

claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The district court held a 

hearing on the motion but delayed ruling on it until after 

trial. The court ultimately denied the motion from the 

bench without a written decision.3

B. 

We review a district court’s denial of summary judgment under the law of the regional circuit. Broad. Innovation, L.L.C. v. Charter Commc'ns, Inc., 420 F.3d 1364, 

1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Under the law of the Fourth Circuit, the denial of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. 

Raynor v. Pugh, 817 F.3d 123, 128 (4th Cir. 2016). Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant shows 

that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 

that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 

matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322

(1986) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)). “The evidence of the 

non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences 

are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Patent eligibility under 

§ 101 is an issue of law reviewed de novo. Intellectual 

Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 

1363, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2015).

 

3 LendingTree agreed at oral argument before us 

that we may reach the merits of the § 101 dispute, even 

though the district court did not offer an explanation for 

its denial of Zillow’s summary-judgment motion. Oral 

Arg. at 18:33–49, available at http://oralarguments.

cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=2014-1435.mp3.

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8 LENDINGTREE v. ZILLOW, INC. 

To determine whether a patent claims ineligible subject matter, we engage in a two-step process. First, “we 

determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one 

of [the] patent-ineligible concepts”—laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. 

v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014) (citing 

Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 

S. Ct. 1289, 1296–97 (2012)). “The ‘abstract ideas’ category embodies ‘the longstanding rule’ that ‘[a]n idea of itself 

is not patentable.’” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (quoting 

Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)) (alteration 

in original). Although “[t]he Supreme Court has not 

established a definitive rule to determine what constitutes an ‘abstract idea’ sufficient to satisfy the first step of 

the Mayo/Alice inquiry[,] . . . both this court and the 

Supreme Court have found it sufficient to compare claims 

at issue to those claims already found to be directed to an 

abstract idea in previous cases.” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft 

Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2016). We know 

that “fundamental economic and conventional business 

practices are often found to be abstract ideas, even if 

performed on a computer.” Id. (citing OIP Techs., Inc. v. 

Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 

2015)). We also know that a claim directed to an abstract 

idea is not eligible merely by limiting the invention to a 

particular field of use or technological environment. See

Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358 (stating that limiting an abstract 

idea to a particular technological environment, such as a 

computer, does not confer patent eligibility); Bilski v. 

Kappos, 561 U.S. 604, 612 (2010) (explaining that “limiting an abstract idea to one field of use . . . d[oes] not make 

the concept patentable”).

If we determine that the claims at issue recite an abstract idea, we must proceed to step two, where we analyze whether the claims contain “additional features” that 

embody an “inventive concept.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357. 

In other words, we “consider the elements of each claim 

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LENDINGTREE v. ZILLOW, INC. 9

both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to 

determine whether the additional elements ‘transform the 

nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Id. 

(quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297–98). These “additional 

features” must be more than “well-understood, routine, 

conventional activit[ies].” Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1298.

Zillow contends that the patents in suit are directed to 

the idea of “comparing credit information to lending 

criteria” (i.e., a “credit application clearinghouse”). In 

Zillow’s view, that idea represents a fundamental economic practice not meaningfully different from practices 

previously found by us and the Supreme Court to be 

abstract and is thus ineligible for patenting under § 101. 

As for step two, Zillow asserts that the claims at issue 

merely automate the clearinghouse concept using conventional methods and generic technology and therefore do 

not present an inventive concept.

According to LendingTree, the claims pass muster at 

step one of the Mayo/Alice framework because they are 

directed to “a specific method of employing a filter and 

engendering simultaneous competition among lenders.” 

Regarding step two, LendingTree asserts that the inventive concept here is “simultaneous real-time competition among credit providers in favor of borrowers.” This 

“timing step,” LendingTree argues, is “a feature new in 

the art.” In LendingTree’s view, the claims of the patents 

in suit are like those found to be patent eligible in Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).

C. 

We begin our analysis at step one. On its face, representative method claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea; 

namely, a loan-application clearinghouse or, more simply, 

coordinating loans. Indeed, claim 1 is directed to a practice similar to “fundamental economic practice[s]” found 

abstract by the Supreme Court. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357. 

Like the concepts of risk hedging in Bilski, 561 U.S. at 

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10 LENDINGTREE v. ZILLOW, INC. 

611, and intermediated settlement in Alice, 134 S. Ct. 

2356, the concept of applying for loans and receiving 

offers is also long prevalent in our financial system. That 

the patents in suit use a broker (i.e., a computer program 

on a loan-processing computer, see ’594 patent at 3:26–30) 

to organize the process is of no consequence, for “[t]he use 

of a third-party intermediary (or ‘clearing house’) is also a 

building block of the modern economy.” See Alice, 134 S.

Ct. at 2357. We too have held that similar claims are 

directed toward abstract ideas. See, e.g., Mortg. Grader, 

Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1318, 

1324 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding claims directed to the idea

of “anonymous loan shopping” to be abstract); Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1331, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 

2012) (deeming claims directed to the concept of “processing information through a clearinghouse” to be abstract); OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at 1361–62 (concluding that 

offer-based price optimization in an e-commerce environment is abstract); Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 

F.3d at 712, 715–16 (finding the claims at issue recited 

the abstract idea of using advertising as a currency as 

applied to the particular technological environment of the 

Internet). Because claim 1 of the ’594 patent is directed 

to an abstract idea, we turn to step two.

We find that claim 1 does not recite any elements that 

individually, or as an ordered combination, transform the 

abstract idea of coordinating loans into a patent-eligible 

application of that idea. “At best, the claim[] describe[s]

the automation of [a] fundamental economic concept . . . 

through the use of generic-computer functions.” OIP 

Techs., 788 F.3d at 1363. It is well settled, though, that 

automating conventional activities using generic technology does not amount to an inventive concept. See Alice, 

134 S. Ct. at 2358 (explaining that “if a patent’s recitation 

of a computer amounts to a mere instruction to implement an abstract idea on . . . a computer, that addition 

cannot impart patent eligibility”) (internal alteration, 

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LENDINGTREE v. ZILLOW, INC. 11

citation, and quotations omitted); Intellectual Ventures, 

792 F.3d at 1367 (“claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a 

computer [does not] provide a sufficient inventive concept”); Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of 

Can. (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[T]he 

fact that the required calculations could be performed 

more efficiently via a computer does not materially alter 

the patent eligibility of the claimed subject matter.”).

LendingTree contends that the particular limitation 

relating to “simultaneous competition” amounts to an

inventive concept sufficient to render the claims patent

eligible. We do not agree. This court and the Supreme 

Court have addressed claims with similar limitations and

have found that they lack an inventive concept. In Mortg. 

Grader, the representative claim of the patents at issue 

required a computer system that was configured to enable 

a borrower “to search [a] database to identify a set of loan 

packages” from a plurality of lenders and “to compare the 

loan packages within the set,” and that also was configured “to display to the borrower an indication of a total 

cost of each loan package in the set.” See Mortg. Grader, 

811 F.3d at 1318. Viewed another way, through the 

claimed computer system, multiple lenders could compete 

simultaneously for the potential borrower’s business. We 

concluded in that case that the claims did not include an 

inventive concept. Id. at 1324. In Alice, “the claimed 

method require[d] the use of a computer to create electronic records, track multiple transactions, and issue 

simultaneous instructions.” 134 S. Ct. 2359 (emphasis 

added). The Supreme Court found that such claims 

lacked an inventive concept because they did no more 

than “simply instruct the practitioner to implement the 

abstract idea . . . on a generic computer.” Id. In our view, 

using a generic computer to display a “plurality of positive 

credit decisions,” as recited in claim 1 of the ’594 patent, 

is not meaningfully different from using a generic comCase: 15-1186 Document: 4-2 Page: 11 Filed: 07/25/2016
12 LENDINGTREE v. ZILLOW, INC. 

puter to display competing loan packages or to issue 

instructions. Consequently, we think that, like the claims 

in Mortg. Grader and Alice, claim 1 is patent ineligible 

because it does nothing more than facilitate the claimed 

loan-application process using generic technology.4

LendingTree also argues that the claimed invention is 

comparable to the invention found patent eligible by the 

Supreme Court in Diehr. LendingTree’s reliance on Diehr

is misplaced. Contrary to LendingTree’s assertion, the 

claims at issue are not like those in Diehr. The pertinent 

claim in that case “employed a ‘well-known’ mathematical 

equation . . . used . . . in a process designed to solve a 

technological problem in ‘conventional industry practice.’” 

Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358 (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 177, 

178) (emphasis added). The claims here, however, are not 

designed to solve a technological problem. Rather, they 

merely provide a generic, technological environment (i.e., 

computers and the Internet) in which to carry out the 

abstract idea of coordinating loans.5 The specification

 

4 Because system claim 22 of the ’816 patent does 

not differ in any meaningful way from method claim 1 of 

the ’594 patent, we conclude that it too is directed to

patent-ineligible subject matter. See Accenture Glob. 

Servs., GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 

1342–46 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (finding that system claims fall 

with patent-ineligible method claims when “the system 

claims offer no meaningful limitations beyond the method 

claims”). Additionally, LendingTree does not contend that 

our analysis should differ for any of the other challenged 

claims (i.e., claim 6 of the ’594 patent and claims 1, 4, 5, 

18–20, 23, and 24 of the ’816 patent). Consequently, those 

claims also fall with claims 1 and 22.

5 Likewise, we also do not think the claims are directed to “improvements in computer-related technology,” 

Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335, or to solving “a challenge parCase: 15-1186 Document: 4-2 Page: 12 Filed: 07/25/2016
LENDINGTREE v. ZILLOW, INC. 13

underscores this point by emphasizing that the aim of the 

invention is speeding up the loan-application process by 

enabling borrowers to avoid “physically going to or calling 

each lender and filling out an application.” See ’594 

patent at 1:34–44. 

We have considered all of LendingTree’s remaining 

arguments and have found them unpersuasive. Accordingly, because the asserted claims of the patents in suit 

are directed to an abstract idea and do not present an

“inventive concept,” we hold that they are directed to 

ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. We

therefore reverse the district court’s denial of Zillow’s 

motion for summary judgment. We turn next to the issue 

of inventorship.

II. 

As noted, the jury found all claims of the patents in 

suit invalid for improper inventorship. J.A. 7250. Our 

conclusion on the § 101 issue—that claims 1 and 6 of the 

’594 patent and claims 1, 4, 5, 18–20, and 22–24 of the 

’816 patent are invalid—still leaves a number of claims 

intact; namely, claims 2–5 and 7–36 of the ’594 patent 

and claims 2, 3, 6–17, and 21 of the ’816 patent. We must 

therefore address inventorship as it relates to those

claims.

A.

After the jury returned its verdict, LendingTree renewed its previous motion for judgment as a matter of 

law, based on its view that the patents in suit are not 

invalid for failing to identify the correct inventors. LendingTree, LLC v. Zillow, Inc., 54 F. Supp. 3d 444, 449 

(W.D.N.C. 2014). LendingTree also moved to correct

 

ticular to the Internet,” DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2014).

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14 LENDINGTREE v. ZILLOW, INC. 

inventorship of the patents in suit pursuant to 35 U.S.C. 

§ 256.6 Id. at 451. The district court ruled on the motions 

together, denying both. See id. at 449–52. In doing so, 

the court noted that the jury’s verdict form did not specify 

the particular error(s) on which the jury based its determination of improper inventorship. See id. at 451–52. In 

addition, the court determined that, based on the evidence 

before it, there were “several combinations of inventors” 

that the jury could have reasonably concluded should be 

listed on the patents in suit (instead of the originally 

listed inventors). See id. Concluding that “the inventorship dispute may be resolved by the [U.S. Patent and 

Trademark Office (“PTO”)],” the court “decline[d] to make 

a determination as to inventorship.” Id. at 452. Following the court’s denial of its § 256 motion, LendingTree 

petitioned the PTO to correct inventorship by adding 

James F. Bennett, Jr. as a named inventor. J.A. 12511–

12. 

On appeal, LendingTree initially asserted that the 

district court erred by not considering whether inventorship could be corrected. However, after LendingTree filed 

its opening brief, the PTO issued Certificates of Correction (adding James F. Bennett, Jr. as a named inventor) 

for the patents in suit.7 Id. 13207–08. In LendingTree’s 

view, the PTO’s actions rendered moot the inventorship 

dispute. LendingTree thus urges that we vacate the 

jury’s finding of improper inventorship. Zillow contends 

that the jury’s general verdict form forecloses a remand 

because it leaves open the question of whether the jury 

found that Mr. Stiegler was improperly named as an 

 

6 When the patents in suit first issued, they both 

listed two named inventors: Douglas Lebda and Richard 

Stiegler. 

7 On May 12, 2016, we took judicial notice of the 

PTO’s issuance of Certificates of Correction.

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LENDINGTREE v. ZILLOW, INC. 15

inventor, that Mr. Bennett was improperly omitted as an 

inventor, or that both errors occurred.8

B.

In light of the PTO’s corrections to the patents in suit, 

we think a remand is appropriate. 35 U.S.C. § 256(b)

provides as follows:

The error of omitting inventors or naming persons 

who are not inventors shall not invalidate the patent in which such error occurred if it can be corrected as provided in this section. The court before 

which such matter is called in question may order 

correction of the patent on notice and hearing of 

all parties concerned and the Director shall issue 

a certificate accordingly.

35 U.S.C. § 256 (2012) (emphasis added). In this case,

absent a remand, the judgment of invalidity will remain 

in place, which would appear to violate the letter and 

spirit of § 256, for one or more alleged errors will have 

invalidated the patents in suit notwithstanding that they 

could have been (and in fact might have been) fully corrected. A remand is also consistent with our approach in 

Airbus DS Commc’ns, Inc. v. Microdata GIS, Inc., (Case 

No. 15-1037, Dkt. No. 28) (nonprecedential). In that case, 

the district court entered judgment against Airbus “based 

on a jury verdict that a co-inventor . . . was omitted from 

the patent.” Id. at 2. After Airbus filed its notice of 

appeal, the PTO issued a Certificate of Correction that 

added the omitted inventor. Id. We granted a limited 

remand to allow the district court to determine whether to 

vacate the invalidity judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 60(b). Id. As in Airbus, we think that, upon motion by 

 

8 There is no dispute that Mr. Lebda is properly 

named as an inventor.

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16 LENDINGTREE v. ZILLOW, INC. 

LendingTree,9 the district court in this case should be 

given the opportunity to consider vacatur.10

We do not agree with Zillow that the jury’s general 

verdict form forecloses a remand. Zillow cites no case 

establishing that an ambiguous jury form precludes 

inventorship from being corrected under § 256. However, 

given that the district court found “there [were] several 

combinations of inventors that the jury could have reasonably concluded should be listed on the [patents in 

suit],” and given that LendingTree did not timely request 

identification of the inventors by the jury, LendingTree, 

54 F. Supp. 3d at 451, the district court may decide that 

vacatur is inappropriate. See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) 

(providing that a district court “may relieve a party . . . 

from a final judgment” when “[(5)] applying it prospectively is no longer equitable” or there is “(6) any other reason 

that justifies relief”); Nat’l Org. for Women v. Operation

Rescue, 47 F.3d 667, 669 (4th Cir. 1995) (“The power of a 

district court to vacate a judgment under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 60(b) rests within the district court’s 

equitable powers.”); Am. Games, Inc. v. Trade Prods., Inc., 

 

9 A motion to vacate a judgment under Rule 

60(b)(4)-(6) must be brought “within a reasonable time . . . 

after the entry of the judgment or order.” FED. R. CIV. P.

60(c)(1).

10 Without a remand, the district court will not have 

jurisdiction to consider a Rule 60(b) motion. S & E Shipping Corp. v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co., 678 F.2d 636, 641 

n.10 (6th Cir. 1982) (explaining that “absent a remand by 

[an] appellate court, a district court may not decide a 

[Rule] 60(b) motion to vacate judgment after notice of 

appeal has been filed”); see also Russell v. Lane, 890 F.2d 

947, 949 (7th Cir. 1989) (remanding to provide appellant 

“a reasonable opportunity to file a motion under Rule 

60(b)(6) to vacate . . . [a] judgment”).

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LENDINGTREE v. ZILLOW, INC. 17

142 F.3d 1164, 1168 (9th Cir. 1998) (explaining that “Rule 

60 provides the basis for a district courts’ vacation of 

judgments when the equities so demand”); Liljeberg v. 

Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 864 (1988)

(stating that Rule 60(b)(6) “provides courts with authority

adequate to enable them to vacate judgments whenever 

such action is appropriate to accomplish justice”) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

Accordingly, we grant a remand to allow LendingTree 

to file, and the district court to consider, a motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) to vacate the judgment of 

invalidity on account of incorrect inventorship.

CONCLUSION

We hold that claims 1 and 6 of the ’594 patent and 

claims 1, 4, 5, 18–20, and 22–24 of the ’816 patent are 

directed to patent-ineligible subject matter and are therefore invalid. We therefore reverse the district court’s 

denial of Zillow’s motion for summary judgement under 

35 U.S.C. § 101. At the same time, we remand in order to 

permit LendingTree to file a motion pursuant to Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 60 to vacate the judgment of invalidity on account 

of improper inventorship as to claims 2–5 and 7–36 of the 

’594 patent and claims 2, 3, 6–17, and 21 of the ’816 

patent. Our resolution of the case renders moot the issues 

of claim construction and the district court’s evidentiary 

rulings. We therefore do not reach them. 

AFFIRMED IN PART AND REMANDED IN PART

COSTS

Each party shall bear its own costs.

Case: 15-1186 Document: 4-2 Page: 17 Filed: 07/25/2016