Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02975/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02975-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
California Highway Patrol
Defendant
Joseph Farrow
Defendant
Nathan Osborn
Defendant
V. Sonny Sonia
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

V. SONNY SONIA,

Plaintiff,

v.

CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL, et 

al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:14-cv-2975-JAM-KJN PS

ORDER

Presently before the court is defendant Nathan Osborn’s (“Officer Osborn”) motion to 

dismiss plaintiff’s first amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) 

and 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 17.) Plaintiff filed an opposition and Officer Osborn filed a reply. (ECF 

Nos. 19, 21.) The court heard this matter on its September 3, 2015 law and motion calendar. 

Plaintiff appeared telephonically on her own behalf. Attorney Catherine Woodbridge Guess 

appeared on behalf of defendant Osborn. The undersigned has fully considered the parties’ 

briefs, the parties’ oral arguments, and appropriate portions of the record. For the reasons that 

follow, the motion to dismiss is granted, but with leave to amend.

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I. Relevant Allegations of the First Amended Complaint

Plaintiff alleges that on January 20, 2013, she was driving a vehicle with her two sisters 

along Highway 50 from Oakland, California to the Red Hawk Casino in Placerville, California. 

(ECF No. 13 at 3.) When she approached the exit ramp to the Red Hawk Casino Parkway Bridge,

plaintiff passed a California Highway Patrol cruiser parked on the side of the road and noticed 

Officer Osborn sit up in the car, grab the steering wheel, and begin to pull forward. (Id. at 5.) At 

that same time, plaintiff witnessed a vehicle several cars in front of her suddenly decelerate, 

nearly causing a multiple-car collision. (Id. at 6.) Despite witnessing this incident, Officer 

Osborne activated his cruiser’s lights and began to pursue plaintiff. (Id.) Plaintiff immediately 

pulled her vehicle off to the side of the road in response. (Id. at 6-7.) Officer Osborn then 

approached the passenger side of plaintiff’s vehicle and began to question plaintiff. (Id. at 7.) 

During this questioning, Officer Osborn advised plaintiff that he had stopped her “because she 

was driving ninety-one (91) miles per hour, in a sixty-five (65) mile per hour speed zone” but that 

he would “give [her] a break on speed.” (Id.) The traffic stop lasted roughly 20 minutes and 

plaintiff was ultimately released with a citation for a violation of California Vehicle Code § 

22349 for “traveling ‘65+’ in a sixty-five (65) mile per hour speed zone.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges 

that Officer Osborn’s claim that he stopped and cited plaintiff for speeding was pre-textual and 

that his actual reason for doing so was racially-motivated because plaintiff is a female of both 

African American and Native American descent and was not exceeding the speed limit prior to 

the stop because she was decelerating to take the exit to the Red Hawk Casino. (Id.) In essence, 

plaintiff alleges that Officer Osborn stopped and cited her solely because she was “Driving While 

Black.” (Id.)

Plaintiff further alleges that the stop was conducted pursuant to a California Highway 

Patrol (“CHP”) “sanctioned ‘racial profiling drag net’ operation.” (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff alleges that 

she is aware of four other racially-motivated stops conducted by Officer Osborn that also took 

place on the same section of Highway on January 20, 2013. (Id. at 8.) She also alleges that she 

anticipates traveling along that section of Highway 50 in the future and “has a valid and 

reasonable fear that she will be stopped by the CHP again in the future, solely on the basis of her 

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race, gender and ethnicity.” (Id.) With regard to defendant Joseph Farrow (“Commissioner 

Farrow”), plaintiff alleges that he acted in his official capacity as the CHP’s commissioner to 

promulgate racially discriminatory programs and procedures, including “drug interdiction 

methods employed by the CHP that have a discriminatory impact on motorists of color traveling 

through California, including [plaintiff].” (Id. at 2, 10.)

Plaintiff also contends that defendants falsified evidence by tampering with the video 

footage contained on a DVD provided to plaintiff by the CHP in response to a public information 

request she submitted that defendants alleged depicted the video captured by a camera system in 

Officer Osborn’s patrol car for the 24-hour period surrounding the alleged stop of plaintiff’s 

vehicle on January 20, 2013. (Id. at 17-21.) Plaintiff alleges that the video she was provided 

failed to accurately depict the events of the stop and was “manufactured and otherwise 

manipulated to distort the truth about the unlawful, racially motivated and discriminatory traffic 

stop initiated against Plaintiff by Officer Osborn.” (Id. at 19-20.) Finally, plaintiff alleges that 

Officer Osborn committed perjury by submitting “an affidavit or criminal complaint” that 

“falsified the facts and circumstances” of the stop involving plaintiff. (Id. at 17.)

Based on these allegations, plaintiff asserts 16 causes of action, consisting of both federallaw and California state-law claims. With regard to her claims under federal law, plaintiff asserts 

the following claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) violations Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of

1964 and 28 C.F.R. §§ 42.101 et seq. for racial discrimination in a federally-funded program 

against CHP and Commissioner Farrow (claims 1 and 2); (2) violations of the Fourteenth 

Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause against all defendants in their official and individual 

capacities except CHP (claim 3); (3) violations of the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against 

unreasonable searches and seizures against all defendants in their official and individual 

capacities except CHP (claim 4); and (4) violations of plaintiff’s right to interstate travel in 

violation of the federal Constitution’s Commerce Clause, Privileges and Immunities Clause, and 

the Fourteenth Amendment against all defendants in their official and individual capacities except

CHP (claim 5). Plaintiff also asserts federal claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1986 against all 

defendants in their official and individual capacities except CHP (claims 6 and 7). Plaintiff 

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further asserts the following state-law claims against all defendants except CHP: (1) violations of 

California Government Code §§ 1115, 11139 (claim 8); (2) violations of Article 1, sections 7 and 

13 of the California Constitution (claims 9 and 10); (3) violations of California Civil Code § 

52.1(b) (claim 11); (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress (claim 12); negligent infliction 

of emotional distress (claim 13); (5) false imprisonment (claim 14); and (6) perjury (claim 15). 

Finally, plaintiff alleges that all defendants falsified police records and tampered and otherwise 

manipulated evidence in violation of state law (claim 16).

II. Legal Standards for Motion to Dismiss

1. Rule 12(b)(1) Standards

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows for a motion to dismiss based on lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(1). Federal courts are courts of limited 

jurisdiction. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978); K2 Am. Corp. v. 

Roland Oil & Gas, 653 F.3d 1024, 1027 (9th Cir. 2011). “It is presumed that a cause lies outside 

this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting 

jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); K2 Am., 653 F.3d 

at 1027. 

Rule 12(b)(1) motions may be either facial, where the inquiry is confined to the 

allegations in the complaint, or factual, where the court is permitted to look beyond the complaint 

to extrinsic evidence.1 See Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014); Safe Air For 

Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). When a defendant makes a factual 

challenge “by presenting affidavits or other evidence properly brought before the court, the party 

opposing the motion must furnish affidavits or other evidence necessary to satisfy its burden of 

establishing subject matter jurisdiction.” Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1039; see also Leite, 749 F.3d at 

1121. The court need not presume the truthfulness of the plaintiff’s allegations under a factual 

attack. Wood v. City of San Diego, 678 F.3d 1075, 1083 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2011); Safe Air, 373 F.3d 

 

1 As discussed below, Officer Osborn has submitted, and the court has considered, extrinsic 

evidence in the form of the documents for which he seeks judicial notice. Thus, Officer Osborn is

mounting a “factual attack” to subject matter jurisdiction. See Leite, 749 F.3d at 1121.

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at 1039. The plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence each requirement for 

subject-matter jurisdiction, and as long as the dispute is not intertwined with an element of the 

plaintiff’s causes of action, the court may resolve any factual disputes itself. See Leite, 749 F.3d 

at 1121, n.3; Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1039-40.

2. Rule 12(b)(6) Standards

A motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 

challenges the sufficiency of the pleadings set forth in the complaint. Vega v. JPMorgan Chase 

Bank, N.A., 654 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1109 (E.D. Cal. 2009). Under the “notice pleading” standard 

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff’s complaint must provide, in part, a “short and 

plain statement” of plaintiff’s claims showing entitlement to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); see 

also Paulsen v. CNF, Inc., 559 F.3d 1061, 1071 (9th Cir. 2009). “To survive a motion to dismiss, 

a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that 

is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court accepts all of the 

facts alleged in the complaint as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff. Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 503 F.3d 974, 977 (9th Cir. 2007). The court is “not, 

however, required to accept as true conclusory allegations that are contradicted by documents 

referred to in the complaint, and [the court does] not necessarily assume the truth of legal 

conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations.” Paulsen, 559 F.3d at 

1071. The court must construe a pro se pleading liberally to determine if it states a claim and, 

prior to dismissal, tell a plaintiff of deficiencies in his complaint and give plaintiff an opportunity 

to cure them if it appears at all possible that the plaintiff can correct the defect. See Lopez v. 

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); accord Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 

Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that “pro se pleadings are liberally construed, 

particularly where civil rights claims are involved”); see also Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 

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& n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating that courts continue to construe pro se filings liberally even when 

evaluating them under the standard announced in Iqbal). 

In ruling on a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court “may generally 

consider only allegations contained in the pleadings, exhibits attached to the complaint, and 

matters properly subject to judicial notice.” Outdoor Media Group, Inc. v. City of Beaumont, 506 

F.3d 895, 899 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Although the court may not 

consider a memorandum in opposition to a defendant’s motion to dismiss to determine the 

propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, see Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrections, 151 F.3d 1194, 

1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998), it may consider allegations raised in opposition papers in deciding 

whether to grant leave to amend, see, e.g., Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1026 n.2 (9th Cir. 

2003).

III. Request for Judicial Notice

As an initial matter, Officer Osborn requests the court to take judicial notice of plaintiff’s 

original complaint filed in this action and a “case print” of the docket in the El Dorado County 

Superior Court case People v. Sonia, Case No. 03673QKVS. 

A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either 

(1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate 

and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” 

Fed. R. Evid. 201(b) (1984). “A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a party and 

supplied with the necessary information.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(d) (1984). Judicially noticed facts 

often consist of matters of public record, such as prior court proceedings, see, e.g., Emrich v. 

Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 1988); administrative materials, see, e.g., 

Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1377 (9th Cir. 1994); or other court documents, see, e.g., 

Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 92 (2d Cir. 2000) (taking judicial notice of a filed complaint as 

a public record). Federal courts may “take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and 

without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to the matters at 

issue.” U.S. ex rel Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th 

Cir. 1992). 

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Generally, a court may not consider material beyond the complaint in ruling on a motion 

to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 

F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). “However, ‘[a] court may take judicial notice of ‘matters of public

record’ without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment,’ as long as 

the facts noticed are not ‘subject to reasonable dispute.’” Intri-Plex Technologies, Inc. v. Crest 

Grp., Inc., 499 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Lee, 250 F.3d at 689 (citation omitted)); 

see also United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908-09 (9th Cir. 2003).

The court grants Officer Osborn’s request for judicial notice with respect to both 

documents. It is proper for the court to take judicial notice of court records in the present case, 

such as plaintiff’s original complaint, and in related actions in other courts, such as the docket in 

the state court action. See Coats v. McDonald, 2010 WL 2991716, at *2 (E.D. Cal. July 29, 

2010) (noting “[a] court may take judicial notice of court records” and taking judicial notice of 

the plaintiff’s original complaint); Emrich, 846 F.2d at 1198; MGIC Indem. Co. v. Weisman, 803 

F.2d 500, 505 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980).

Furthermore, plaintiff does not genuinely dispute the facts Officer Osborn seeks to judicially 

notice. Accordingly, judicial notice of both documents is proper.

IV. Discussion

1. Rooker-Feldman

First, Officer Osborn claims that the court lacks jurisdiction over any of the plaintiff’s 

claims asserted against him under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. This argument is well taken.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine occupies “narrow ground.” Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 

521 (2011). “‘The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that federal district courts lack jurisdiction 

to exercise appellate review over final state court judgments.’” AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. 

Roden, 495 F.3d 1143, 1153 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 

609, 613 (9th Cir. 2007)). “Essentially, the doctrine bars ‘state-court losers complaining of 

injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings 

commenced’ from asking district courts to review and reject those judgments.” Henrichs, 474 

F.3d at 613 (quoting Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)); 

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accord Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 525 F.3d 855, 859 (9th Cir. 2008).

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine may also apply, however, where the parties do not directly 

contest the merits of a state court decision, but file an action that constitutes a “de facto” appeal 

from a state court judgment. Reusser, 525 F.3d at 859. Such a de facto appeal exists where 

“claims raised in the federal court action are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court’s 

decision such that the adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the state ruling or require 

the district court to interpret the application of state laws or procedural rules.” Id. (citation and 

quotation marks omitted). “Once a federal plaintiff seeks to bring a forbidden defacto appeal . . . , 

that federal plaintiff may not seek to litigate an issue that is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the 

state court judicial decision from which the forbidden de facto appeal is brought.” Noel v. Hall, 

341 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 900 n.4 (9th 

Cir. 2003) (“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents lower federal courts from exercising 

jurisdiction over any claim that is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the decision of a state court, 

even where the party does not directly challenge the merits of the state court’s decision but rather 

brings an indirect challenge based on constitutional principles.”). “Where the district court must 

hold that the state court was wrong in order to find in favor of the plaintiff, the issues presented to 

both courts are inextricably intertwined.” Doe & Associates Law Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 

1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Here, although plaintiff does not specifically seek to overturn her state court conviction on 

the speeding citation, her claims are clearly “inextricably intertwined” with that conviction 

because a decision in this case favorable to plaintiff would necessarily require this court to make 

determinations inconsistent with the state court’s judgment regarding the existence of probable 

cause to support Officer Osborn’s stop of plaintiff’s vehicle and the validity of the speeding 

citation he issued to plaintiff. The judicially-noticed facts show that plaintiff was convicted on 

the speeding citation by a state trial court on April 24, 2013, and that, while an appeal of this 

conviction is pending before a state appellate court, this conviction has not been overturned. 

(ECF No. 17-1 at Exhibit 2.) Because the state court found plaintiff guilty of the speeding 

violation she was charged with in Officer Osborn’s citation, it necessarily follows from this 

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determination that the state court also found that Officer Osborn had probable cause to initiate the 

stop and issue plaintiff the speeding citation. Plaintiff’s claims against Officer Osborn in this 

action would require this court to make findings contrary to these determinations made by the 

state court. For instance, plaintiff’s claims premised on violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth 

Amendments, the Commerce Clause, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1986, Article 1, §§ 7, 13 of the 

California Constitution, and false imprisonment, if meritorious, would all require this court to 

determine that Officer Osborn lacked probable cause to initiate the stop and issue the speeding 

citation. Accordingly, such causes of action are “inextricably intertwined” with the prior state 

court conviction and, therefore, are barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Doe & 

Associates Law Offices, 252 F.3d at 1030.

2. Heck Abstention

Second, Officer Osborn argues that the court should abstain from hearing plaintiff’s 

claims under the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 

(1994). Specifically, he contends that a verdict in this civil action in plaintiff’s favor would 

conflict with plaintiff’s prior speeding conviction in state court, which the abstention doctrine 

developed in Heck is intended to prevent. This argument is meritorious.

Under the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Heck, “a § 1983 action that would 

call into question the lawfulness of a plaintiff’s conviction or confinement is not cognizable[.]” 

Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F.3d 1008, 1013 (9th Cir. 2000). Thus, when a plaintiff files a Section

1983 action concerning alleged conduct leading to a criminal conviction of plaintiff, courts must 

“determine whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of 

his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed[.]” Heck, 512 U.S. at 

487. Conversely, “if the plaintiff’s action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity 

of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to 

proceed[.]” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. 

Here, plaintiff’s claims asserted under Section 1983, if successful, would require this court 

to make factual findings that would imply that the state court’s conviction of plaintiff on the 

speeding citation issued by Officer Osborn was invalid. In order to deem plaintiff’s claims

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meritorious, the court would need to determine that Officer Osborn lacked probable cause to stop 

plaintiff and issue her the citation and that the sole reason for Officer Osborn’s stop and citation 

was race-based rather than for speeding. Such findings would directly conflict with the state 

court’s implied determinations that Officer Osborn had probable cause to issue the citation and 

that plaintiff was speeding when it found plaintiff guilty in her criminal action. To make such 

conflicting determinations would constitute a determination by this court that plaintiff’s state 

court conviction is invalid. Accordingly, the court is barred from considering these claims under 

Heck.

2

V. Conclusion

While Officer Osborn’s motion to dismiss is well taken and plaintiff’s claims against him, 

as alleged, are barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and Heck abstention, the court will 

grant plaintiff one final opportunity to amend her complaint in light of her pro se status and 

because it appears from the allegations of the first amended complaint at least possible that 

plaintiff might be able to allege facts demonstrating that at least some of her claims against 

Officer Osborn and the other named defendants are not jurisdictionally barred by these doctrines.3 

However, plaintiff is cautioned that if she elects to file a second amended complaint, she must 

articulate her claims through factual allegations that address the deficiencies outlined above. 

More importantly, plaintiff must have a good faith basis for making such allegations. See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 11(b). If after reviewing this order, plaintiff determines that she cannot in good faith 

allege facts that would address the deficiencies with respect to a particular claim or claims, then 

 

2

Furthermore, with regard to Officer Osborn’s motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(1), plaintiff’s opposition fails to even address the motion’s arguments 

concerning lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman and Heck doctrines or 

otherwise demonstrate that the court has subject matter jurisdiction over her claims. (See ECF 

No. 19.) Accordingly, plaintiff fails to meet her burden in opposing defendants Rule 12(b)(1) 

facial attack. See Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1039; Leite, 749 F.3d at 1121. 

3

The court also notes, without deciding, that at least some of plaintiff’s claims asserted against 

defendants CHP and Commissioner Farrow also appear to be barred under Rooker-Feldman and 

Heck for the same reasons they are barred against Officer Osborn. While plaintiff is under no 

obligation to amend her allegations as to these defendants, it may be in her interest to also 

consider those allegations in light of this order if she decides to file a second amended complaint.

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she may wish to omit such claims from a future amended complaint as failure to make allegations 

on a good faith basis may be grounds for the imposition of sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c). If plaintiff decides to file a second 

amended complaint, it shall be captioned “Second Amended Complaint” and shall not exceed 30

pages, including attachments.

Plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior complaint, brief, exhibits, or 

other filings to make her second amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an 

amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. Thus, once the 

second amended complaint is filed, it supersedes the first amended complaint, which no longer 

serves any function in the case.

Plaintiff is further informed that she is not required to file a second amended complaint. If 

plaintiff determines that she does not wish to pursue the action at this juncture or that she cannot 

in good faith allege any facts asserting cognizable claims against defendants that are not barred, 

she may instead file a request for voluntary dismissal of the action without prejudice pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i).

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendant Nathan Osborn’s motion to dismiss the first amended complaint (ECF 

No. 17) is GRANTED.

2. Plaintiff’s first amended complaint is dismissed, but with leave to amend.

3. Within 30 days of the date of this order, plaintiff shall file either a second amended 

complaint or a request for voluntary dismissal of the action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i).

4. Because it appears that neither defendant CHP nor Joseph Farrow have been 

served with process or otherwise have appeared in this action to date and the fact that plaintiff’s 

first amended complaint is dismissed with leave to amend, the United States Marshall’s Service is 

directed not to serve process on these defendants pursuant to the court’s April 9, 2015 order (ECF 

No. 4) until directed to do so by future court order.

////

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 4, 2015

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