Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-02105/USCOURTS-ca8-03-02105-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael Chapman
Appellant
Terri Lynn Chapman
Appellant
Lab One
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-2105

___________

Michael Chapman; Terri Lynn *

Chapman, *

*

Appellants, * Appeal from the United States 

* District Court for the 

v. * Southern District of Iowa.

*

Lab One, a Missouri Corporation; *

Lab One, Inc., a Delaware Corporation, *

 *

Appellees. *

___________

No. 03-2269

___________

Daniel Howell, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* District of Nebraska.

Lab One, Inc., a Missouri Corporation; *

Lab One, Inc., a Delaware Corporation; *

Union Pacific Railroad Company, a *

Delaware Corporation, *

*

Appellees. *

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___________

Submitted: February 13, 2004

Filed: November 30, 2004 (Corrected 12/7/04)

 (Corrected 12/21/04)

___________

Before MELLOY, McMILLIAN, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.

Michael and Terri Lynn Chapman and Daniel Howell brought actions in state

court alleging various state common-law causes of action against LabOne, Inc.

("LabOne") and Union Pacific Railroad Company ("Union Pacific"). The defendants

removed the actions to federal district courts in Iowa and Nebraska, respectively. The

district court in Iowa dismissed the Chapman case on the ground that the commonlaw claims were preempted by the Federal Railroad Safety Act ("FRSA"), as amended

by the Federal Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act of 1991 ("FOTETA"),

and the Railway Labor Act ("RLA"). The district court in Nebraska ruled that

removal of the Howell case was proper based on the doctrine of "complete

preemption" under the FRSA and the FOTETA, and then dismissed the case on the

ground that the FOTETA provided no private right of action. The Chapmans and

Howell appeal these dismissals, and we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I.

The facts of these two actions are similar. Both Daniel Howell and Michael

Chapman are former employees of Union Pacific. Howell was a freight conductor,

and Chapman was a switchman and freight conductor. Howell and Chapman each

were required to undergo a random drug test by providing a urine sample to their

employer on or about January 14, 1998, and August 26, 1999, respectively. The urine

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samples were forwarded to LabOne for testing. LabOne tested the samples, and

found that they were "not consistent with human urine." LabOne reported the results

to Union Pacific, and Union Pacific subsequently terminated Howell and Chapman.

Claiming that the test results were inaccurate, Howell and Chapman each filed an

action in state court alleging various state common-law theories, including

negligence, breach of contract, defamation, negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent

misrepresentation, interference with business relations, intentional infliction of

emotional distress, and invasion of privacy. The crux of each of these claims was that

LabOne did not properly test the urine samples and reported inaccurate results to

Union Pacific. 

The procedural postures of the two cases are slightly different. Howell brought

his action in Nebraska state court against both LabOne and Union Pacific. His

complaint alleged that Union Pacific was vicariously liable for the actions of its

agent, LabOne. The defendants removed the action to the United States District

Court for the District of Nebraska based on an assertion of federal question

jurisdiction. The district court denied Howell's motion to remand, concluding that

under the doctrine of "complete preemption," Howell's state-law claims should be

considered federal claims arising under federal law. The district court then granted

motions to dismiss filed by LabOne and Union Pacific on the ground that the

FOTETA does not provide for a private right of action. The court also granted Union

Pacific's motion for summary judgment on the alternative ground that Howell's claims

against Union Pacific were preempted by the RLA. 

Michael Chapman and his wife filed an action in Iowa state court against

LabOne only. LabOne removed the action to the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Iowa based on diversity and federal question jurisdiction. The

district court then granted LabOne's motion to dismiss. The court reasoned that the

Chapmans' claims were predicated on the manner in which LabOne tested the urine

specimen and reported the results to Union Pacific, and that the FRSA and its

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Howell does not argue that the district court erred in granting Union Pacific's

summary judgment motion on the alternative ground that his claims were preempted

by the RLA. Accordingly, the district court's judgment dismissing Union Pacific is

final. Fed. R. App. P. 28(a); Jasperson v. Purolator Courier Corp., 765 F.2d 736,

740 (8th Cir. 1985). We do not address Howell's argument that for purposes of

random drug testing, an employer is vicariously liable for a laboratory's improper

testing of urine samples. 

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corresponding regulations "'substantially subsumed the subject matter' of state tort

law regarding the standards for drug testing railroad employees." Accordingly, the

district court found that the Chapmans' state common-law claims were preempted. 

On appeal, the Chapmans and Howell contend that the district courts erred in

holding that their state law claims were preempted by the FRSA, the FOTETA, and

their implementing regulations.1

 In addition, Howell asserts that because his claims

are not preempted by federal law, his case was improperly removed to federal court

and his motion to remand the case to state court should have been granted. Because

the two cases present closely related issues, we consolidated their appeals. See Fed.

R. App. P. 3(b)(2). We review de novo a district court's decision that state commonlaw claims are preempted by federal law. Thacker v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co.,

257 F.3d 922, 923 (8th Cir. 2001).

II.

In 1985, the Secretary of Transportation, through the Federal Railroad

Administration ("FRA"), adopted regulations to control the use of alcohol and drugs

in the operation of our nation's railroads. Control of Alcohol and Drug Use in

Railroad Operations, 50 Fed. Reg. 31,508 (Aug. 2, 1985) (to be codified at C.F.R. pts.

212, 217-219, 225). These initial regulations required toxicological testing of

railroad employees under certain circumstances, such as after an accident or upon

reasonable cause. Id. at 31,531. The regulations required an employee to sign a

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consent form in connection with drug testing, but the FRA commented that

"[o]bviously, this requirement does not require an employee to waive any claim for

malpractice with respect to the drawing of blood or proper handling of the samples

(matters for which the practical exposure is, in any event, negligible)." Id. at 31,532.

The FRA implemented the random drug testing program in 1988. Random

Drug Testing, 53 Fed. Reg. 47,102 (Nov. 21, 1988) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts.

217, 219). The FRA's discussion of preemption in connection with its regulations

focused on state legislation. After observing that "some states have enacted laws

which limit or regulate drug testing by private employers," the FRA explained that

"issuance of this random drug testing rule will preempt any state legislation regarding

random drug testing for railroad employees, whether or not inconsistent with the final

rule." 53 Fed. Reg. at 47,122.

The FRA amended its drug testing regulations in 1989, in part to remain

consistent with the drug testing procedures issued by the Department of

Transportation. Alcohol/Drug Regulations, 54 Fed. Reg. 53,238 (Dec. 27, 1989) (to

be codified at C.F.R. pts. 217, 219, 225). At that time, the FRA added the following

anti-waiver provision: 

An employee required to participate in body fluid testing . . . shall . . .

evidence consent to taking of samples . . . . The employee is not required

to execute any document or clause waiving rights that the employee

would otherwise have against the employer, and any such waiver is

void. The employee may not be required to waive liability with respect

to negligence on the part of any person participating in the collection,

handling, or analysis of the specimen or to indemnify any person for the

negligence of others. 

Id. at 53,261 (emphasis added); see also 49 C.F.R. § 219.11(d) (1989). The FRA

believed that "as a practical matter, the employee will be fully protected from possible

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harm by virtue of the employer's responsibility for selection of the collection entity

and the provision of clear standards for acceptable collections," but also recognized

that "FRA cannot require that employees sign away their rights against third parties."

54 Fed. Reg. at 53,242. In addition, the FRA incorporated the Secretary of

Transportation's scientific and technical drug testing guidelines set forth in 49 C.F.R.

pt. 40, which by then included an identical anti-waiver provision at 49 C.F.R.

§ 40.25(f)(22)(ii) (1989). 54 Fed. Reg. at 53,273; see also 49 C.F.R. § 219.701(c)

(1989). 

The FRA anti-waiver provision is still in effect. 49 C.F.R. § 219.11(d) (2004).

The Department of Transportation revised its general drug testing regulations in

2001, but continues to prohibit employers from requiring an employee to sign a

"waiver of liability . . . with respect to any part of the drug or alcohol testing process."

49 C.F.R. § 40.27 (2004). 

In 1991, Congress for the first time mandated drug testing in the railroad

industry by passing the FOTETA, which amended the FRSA and required the

Secretary of Transportation to promulgate regulations establishing programs for drug

testing railroad employees. 49 U.S.C. § 20140(b); see also Omnibus Transportation

Employee Testing Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-143, § 4, 105 Stat. 917, 957-59

(1991). Congress specifically required the Secretary of Transportation to develop

comprehensive regulations regarding controlled substance testing and laboratory

procedures. 49 U.S.C. § 20140(c). The statute provided, however, that its mandate

of drug testing did not prevent the Secretary of Transportation from continuing in

effect, amending, or supplementing any of the drug testing regulations that were in

effect prior to the FOTETA. 49 U.S.C. § 20140(f). 

The preemptive effect of the FRA's regulations is governed by 49 U.S.C.

§ 20106, which provides that a state may "adopt or continue in force a law,

regulation, or order related to railroad safety" until the Secretary of Transportation

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2

The current version of the statute, as amended in 2002, reads as follows:

§ 20106. National uniformity of regulation

Laws, regulations, and orders related to railroad safety and laws,

regulations, and orders related to railroad security shall be nationally

uniform to the extent practicable. A State may adopt or continue in force

a law, regulation, or order related to railroad safety or security until the

Secretary of Transportation (with respect to railroad safety matters), or

the Secretary of Homeland Security (with respect to railroad security

matters), prescribes a regulation or issues an order covering the subject

matter of the State requirement. A State may adopt or continue in force

an additional or more stringent law, regulation, or order related to

railroad safety or security when the law, regulation, or order –

(1) is necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety

or security hazard;

(2) is not incompatible with a law, regulation, or order of the

United States Government; and

(3) does not unreasonably burden interstate commerce.

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"prescribes a regulation or issues an order covering the subject matter of the State

requirement."2

 In its regulations regarding drug testing of railroad employees, the

FRA provides that "issuance of these regulations preempts any State law, rule,

regulation, order or standard covering the same subject matter," except for certain

provisions directed at local hazards. 49 C.F.R. § 219.13(a) (2004). 

III. 

The doctrine of preemption arises from the Supremacy Clause of the

Constitution, which requires that state law must give way when it conflicts with or

frustrates federal law. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.; CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood,

507 U.S. 658, 663 (1993). State law is preempted when Congress expressly prohibits

state regulation, when Congress implicitly leaves no room for state involvement by

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pervasively occupying a field of regulation, and when state law directly conflicts with

federal law. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995) (internal citation

omitted); Heart of Am. Grain Inspection Serv. v. Mo. Dept. of Agric., 123 F.3d 1098,

1103 (8th Cir. 1997). Federal regulations also may preempt state law, if the agency

intends its regulations to have preemptive effect, and the agency is acting within the

scope of its delegated authority. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691,

699 (1984); Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153-54

(1982). In the ordinary case, federal preemption is merely a defense to a plaintiff's

state-law claim, and it does not alter the jurisdiction of the federal court. See

Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987).

The doctrine of "complete preemption" establishes more than a defense to a

state-law claim. On occasion, the Supreme Court has concluded that "the pre-emptive

force of a statute is so 'extraordinary' that it 'converts an ordinary state common-law

complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint

rule." Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987) (quoting Metropolitan

Life, 481 U.S. at 65). When an area of state law has been "completely preempted,"

then any claim "purportedly based on that pre-empted state law is considered, from

its inception, a federal claim, and therefore arises under federal law." Id. As such,

"complete preemption" of a state-law cause of action provides a basis for removal of

an action to federal court.

A.

We address first whether federal preemption is a defense to the state commonlaw claims advanced in the complaint filed by the Chapmans. Because the FOTETA

contains an express preemption clause, we focus in the first instance on the plain

language of the statute, because it "necessarily contains the best evidence of

Congress' pre-emptive intent." Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 664. The preemption clause

in § 20106 applies to "a law, regulation, or order relating to railroad safety," which

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A report of the House Judiciary Committee concerning the 1994 amendments

to the FOTETA explains the changes in text by stating that "the word 'rule' is omitted

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may remain in effect until the Secretary of Transportation "prescribes a regulation or

issues an order that covers the subject matter of the State requirement." 

In Easterwood, the Supreme Court held that the preemption clause of the FRSA

(as then in effect) authorized the Secretary to preempt common-law claims. 507 U.S.

at 675. According to former 45 U.S.C. § 434, applicable regulations could preempt

any state "law, rule, regulation, order, or standard relating to railroad safety." The

Court held that "these broad phrases" encompassed common-law duties, 507 U.S. at

664, and that power to preempt state common law was "clearly conferred" on the

Secretary by § 434. Id. at 675.

After Easterwood, Congress superseded § 434 in the 1994 amendments to the

FOTETA. The current preemption clause omits the terms "rule" and "standard," thus

narrowing the preemption clause to "a law, regulation, or order" relating to railroad

safety. Our court has said in dicta, however, that although § 20106 is "worded

slightly differently" than § 434, it is "identical in substance." Cearley v. Gen. Am.

Trans. Corp., 186 F.3d 887, 890 n.5 (8th Cir. 1999). Without discussing the change

in text, both the Supreme Court and our court have applied § 20106, in conjunction

with federal regulations, to find preemption of state common-law claims. Norfolk S.

Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344, 358 (2000); Bryan v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 154

F.3d 899, 903 (8th Cir. 1998).

One might question whether the text of § 20106 provides authority for the

Secretary to preempt state common law. While the terms "standard" and "rule" seem

naturally to encompass the common law, and thus support the Supreme Court's

conclusion in Easterwood, the revised text extends only to "a law, regulation, or

order."3

 In Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 63 (2002), the Supreme Court

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as being synonymous with 'regulation[,]'" and "[t]he word 'standard' is omitted as

being included in 'regulation.'" H.R. Rep. No. 103-180, at 80 (1994). By equating

"standard" and "rule" with "regulation," and deleting the former terms, the report may

suggest that the Committee did not believe the preemption clause was designed to

extend beyond "regulations" and other positive enactments to the common law. The

same report, however, also characterized the legislation as a "codification bill" that

makes "no substantive changes in the law." Id. at 5. There is no indication whether

the Senate or the President held this view.

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held that a preemption clause in the Federal Boat Safety Act that applied to "a [state

or local] law or regulation" was "most naturally read as not encompassing commonlaw claims for two reasons." Id. The Court observed that the article "a" before "law

or regulation" implied a "discreteness" that is not present in the common law. The

Court also concluded that statute's use of the terms "law" and "regulation" together

showed that Congress intended to preempt only positive enactments, because a

broader reading of "law" that encompassed the common law would have rendered the

term "regulation" unnecessary.

Nonetheless, the Chapmans and Howell have not urged that the text of § 20106

alters the authority of the Secretary, recognized in Easterwood under former 45

U.S.C. § 434, to preempt state common law. Therefore, particularly in light of our

court's previous statement in Cearley, we will assume for purposes of this decision

that there is a "clear and manifest purpose of Congress" in the FRSA and the

FOTETA to authorize preemption of state common-law claims relating to drug

testing. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).

B.

Assuming the Secretary has authority to preempt state common-law claims

concerning drug testing, a common-law cause of action is preempted when the

Secretary prescribes a regulation or issues an order "that covers the subject matter of

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the State requirement." 49 U.S.C. § 20106. Under this standard, "pre-emption will

lie only if the federal regulations substantially subsume the subject matter" of the

state common law. Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 664. 

LabOne points to federal drug testing regulations that set forth requirements

for federally mandated drug testing, including preparation for testing, specimen

collection procedures, laboratory analysis procedures, quality assurance and quality

control, and requirements for reporting of test results. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 40.21- 40.39

(1999); 49 C.F.R. § 219.701. LabOne asserts that these regulations "substantially

subsume" the subject matter of the state common-law claims brought by the

Chapmans and Howell, or demonstrate an intent by the Secretary impliedly to

preempt the field of drug testing regulation.

In considering whether the regulations preempt state common law, we bear in

mind that as with the original FRSA provision before it, the FOTETA preemption

provision is "employed within a provision that displays considerable solicitude for

state law in that its express pre-emption clause is both prefaced and succeeded by

express savings clauses." Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 665. That solicitude for state law,

together with the "presumption against pre-emption" in an area traditionally governed

by state law, id. at 668, counsels hesitation before we conclude that a subject matter

governed by state law is substantially subsumed by federal regulations. 

We conclude that the Secretary's regulations do not preempt the common-law

claims pleaded by the Chapmans. Important to our decision is a drug testing

regulation promulgated by the Secretary that specifically contemplates the existence

of common-law negligence actions arising from the drug testing process. In 1989,

the Secretary directed that a federal employee required to participate in body fluid

testing "may not be required to waive liability with respect to negligence on the part

of any person participating in the collection, handling or analysis of the specimen or

to indemnify any person for the negligence of others." 49 C.F.R. § 219.11(d) (1989)

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(emphasis added). When Congress passed the FOTETA in 1991, this anti-waiver

provision already was in effect, and Congress provided that the FOTETA did not

prevent the Secretary of Transportation from "continuing in effect, amending, or

further supplementing a regulation prescribed or order issued before October 28,

1991, governing the use of alcohol or a controlled substance in railroad operations."

49 U.S.C. § 20140(f); see also S. Rep. No. 102-54, at 24. Thereafter, the Secretary

continued in effect this regulatory provision, which prohibits a service agent like

LabOne from requiring an employee to waive "liability with respect to negligence."

See 49 C.F.R. § 219.11(d); 49 C.F.R. § 40.25(f)(22)(ii) (1989). In 2001, the Secretary

went further, amending the regulations to ensure that an employer, acting on behalf

of a service agent, could not require such a waiver. 66 Fed. Reg. 41,944 (Aug. 19,

2001) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 40); 49 C.F.R. §§ 40.27, 40.355(a) (2003).

We agree with the Ninth Circuit that "[n]egligence is a state common law tort,

and it would make no sense for the regulation to prohibit requiring the employee to

waive negligence claims if those claims were preempted and could not be made."

Ishikawa v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 343 F.3d 1129, 1133 (9th Cir.), amended, 350 F.3d

915 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Drake v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 290 F.Supp.2d

352, 373 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). Because the regulations specifically contemplate the

existence of a common-law cause of action for negligence, we do not interpret them

to subsume substantially the subject matter of common-law negligence. Nor do we

discern an intent of the Secretary impliedly to preempt such causes of action,

particularly since an express preemption clause gives rise to an inference that implied

preemption is foreclosed. Freightliner Corp., 514 U.S. at 289.

 At oral argument, LabOne contended that the FRA's comments to the final rule

when promulgated in 1989, see 54 Fed. Reg. at 53,241, make it clear that the antiwaiver provision regarding liability for negligence applies to non-regulated hospitals

and medical clinics, but not to regulated entities such as LabOne. We disagree.

Nowhere does the regulatory history state that the anti-waiver provision applies only

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to hospitals, medical clinics, or non-regulated entities. 54 Fed Reg. at 53,241-42.

The FRA comments do discuss the effect, if any, of the regulation on non-regulated

entities, id., but this does not imply that the anti-waiver provision is inapplicable to

other entities involved in the process of collection and analysis. More telling is the

text of the anti-waiver provision itself, which applies to "any person participating in

the collection, handling or analysis of the specimen," 49 C.F.R. § 219.11(d)

(emphasis added), a broad class that easily encompasses an entity such as LabOne.

See 49 C.F.R. § 219.9(a); 1 U.S.C. § 1.

We are not persuaded that the principal authorities cited by LabOne, Peters v.

Union Pacific Railroad Co., 80 F.3d 257 (8th Cir. 1996), and Frank v. Delta Airlines,

Inc., 314 F.3d 195 (5th Cir. 2002), require a different result. Although Frank did

construe the Department of Transportation's drug testing regulations to preempt

certain common-law claims, that case involved an action against an employer. Id. at

197. The court thus did not take into account the anti-waiver provision, which is

directed to negligence on the part of others involved in the collection, handling, and

analysis of specimens. See Ishikawa, 350 F.3d at 916. Our decision in Peters

addressed whether regulations concerning the certification of train engineers by

railroad companies preempted an employee's claim against a railroad company for

alleged conversion of his engineer certificate in violation of state law. 80 F.3d at

260-61. Unlike the drug testing regulations, the rules at issue in Peters did not

contain a provision that could be construed as a savings clause through which the

Secretary preserved state common-law claims, and Peters is thus distinguishable. 

In addition to their common-law negligence claims, the Chapmans also brought

common-law claims alleging breach of contract, defamation, negligent

misrepresentation, fraudulent misrepresentation, interference with business relations,

intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and loss of spousal

consortium. As the FRA anti-waiver provision specifically addresses only

negligence, there remains the question whether other common-law claims are

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4

The report of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and

Transportation observed that "[s]everal States have enacted legislation, or are

considering doing so, to prohibit or restrict drug and alcohol testing of certain classes

of individuals." S. Rep. No. 102-54, at 23 (1991) (emphasis added). The Senate

Committee expressed concern that "these restrictions may impinge upon the ability

of the Secretary to ensure effective implementation" of mandatory drug testing of

railroad employees, and the Committee therefore "reaffirm[ed] the provisions of

current law which would serve to preempt such State or local government

restrictions." Id. at 28.

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preempted by the federal regulations. One district court, noting the legislative history

of the FOTETA (which expressed concern about state legislation that might preclude

drug testing)4

 and the several regulatory provisions that contemplate potential

lawsuits by aggrieved employees, has held that analogous drug testing regulations of

the Federal Aviation Administration were only intended to preempt positive state

enactments. Drake, 290 F.Supp.2d at 373-74 (citing S. Rep. 102-54, at 23; 40 C.F.R.

§ 40.29(g)(3); 49 C.F.R. §§ 40.29(h), 40.29(m), 40.35). 

At least with respect to the common-law claims asserted in these actions, all

of which arise from LabOne's alleged deficient performance in the drug testing

process, we conclude that there is no clear and manifest purpose of the Secretary to

preempt these related common-law claims. In addition to the considerations cited in

Drake, we note that when the FRA first adopted its drug testing rule in 1988, it

expressed concern about positive state enactments. The agency's final commentary

observed that "some states have enacted laws which limit or regulate drug testing by

private employers," and explained that "issuance of this random drug testing rule will

preempt any state legislation regarding random drug testing for railroad employees,

whether or not inconsistent with the final rule." 53 Fed. Reg. at 47,122 (emphasis

added). The commentary to the anti-waiver provision at the time of its promulgation

in 1989 suggests a broad interpretation of the rights retained by the employee,

indicating that "the consent form should not waive any legitimate rights that the

employee may have, including the right to contest the basis of the test and to insist

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that the collection or analysis be done professionally and with reasonable care." 54

Fed. Reg. at 53,241. Furthermore, limitations on employers and service agents now

included in the Department of Transportation regulations extend to securing any

"waiver of liability" from an employee, not merely to a waiver of liability for

negligence. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 40.27, 40.355(a) (2003); 49 C.F.R. § 219.701(a) (FRA

regulation incorporating part 40). 

In light of the presumption against preemption that we are bound to apply in

this area, and the overall structure and history of the FRA's drug testing regulations,

we conclude that the common-law claims alleged by the Chapmans are still available.

C.

With respect to Howell's case, it follows naturally from our previous discussion

that we also do not believe this is an area where the preemptive force of a federal

statute is so extraordinary that it not only provides a federal defense to a state

common-law claim, but also converts any state-law cause of action into a federal

claim from its inception. The doctrine of "complete preemption" has been applied

primarily in cases arising under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of

1947 (LMRA), see Avco Corp. v. Machinists, 390 U.S. 557 (1968), and the Employee

Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), which was modeled after the

LMRA. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life, 481 U.S. at 64-65. In those areas, Congress

intended for the federal courts to fashion a body of "federal common law" that would

govern disputes arising under the federal statutes. E.g., Allis-Chalmers Corp. v.

Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 209 (1985). Given our conclusion that the applicable statute

and regulations concerning drug testing do not establish an intent to preempt the

substantive common law at issue, however, we also believe that Congress did not

"completely preempt" the state causes of action. See Magee v. Exxon Corp., 135 F.3d

599, 601-02 (8th Cir. 1998).

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Moreover, we find the FRSA and the FOTETA to be distinguishable from other

statutory schemes in which courts have found complete preemption. Both the ERISA

and the LMRA include a specific jurisdictional provision stating that the district

courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to grant relief based on the private

right of action created elsewhere in the statutes. Metropolitan Life, 481 U.S. at 65.

We relied on the existence of similar provisions in finding complete preemption by

the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. Gaming Corp. of Am. v. Dorsey & Whitney, 88

F.3d 536, 545 (8th Cir. 1996). As the district court observed, however, neither the

FRSA nor the FOTETA provides a private right of action for a person aggrieved by

negligence in the analysis of a drug test, and the absence of an alternative cause of

action militates against a finding of complete preemption. See Franchise Tax Bd. v.

Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 26 (1983). While LabOne argues that

there existed a "comprehensive regulatory scheme" by which Howell could challenge

the result of his drug test, the regulations themselves declare that "[n]othing in this

part may be deemed to abridge any additional procedural rights or remedies not

inconsistent with this part that are available to the employee . . . at common law with

respect to the removal or other adverse action taken as a consequence of a positive

test result . . . ." 49 C.F.R. § 219.104(c)(4) (2003). This solicitude for state common

law again distinguishes the drug testing regulatory scheme from the comprehensive

administrative adjudication system for handling certification disputes that influenced

our court's complete preemption analysis in Peters. See 80 F.3d at 262. 

Having explored the statutory and regulatory schemes involving drug testing

of railroad employees, we are not persuaded that Congress intended to "completely

preempt" state law causes of action in this area. Therefore, we conclude that Howell's

action should not be removed to federal court based on the existence of federal

question jurisdiction.

* * *

Appellate Case: 03-2105 Page: 16 Date Filed: 11/30/2004 Entry ID: 1839086 
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For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgments of the district courts and

remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

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Appellate Case: 03-2105 Page: 17 Date Filed: 11/30/2004 Entry ID: 1839086