Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00952/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00952-6/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Calamco
Defendant
California Ammonia Company
Defendant
California Sportfishing Protection Alliance
Plaintiff
United States
Amicus

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

CALIFORNIA SPORTFISHING

PROTECTION ALLIANCE, a nonprofit corporation,

NO. CIV. S-05-0952 WBS JMF

Plaintiff,

v.

ORDER RE: MOTION FOR

CALIFORNIA AMMONIA COMPANY CERTIFICATION OF ORDER FOR

d/b/a CALAMCO, a non-profit APPEAL

corporation, 

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff California Sportfishing Protection Alliance

(“CSPA”) filed this action against defendant California Ammonia

Company d/b/a Calamco (“Calamco”) alleging four causes of action

under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, commonly known as

the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. (“CWA” or “Act”). 

Currently before the court is defendant’s motion requesting the

court to certify its order of January 26, 2007, denying

defendant’s motion for summary judgment, for interlocutory

appeal, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

Case 2:05-cv-00952-WBS -JFM Document 139 Filed 06/20/07 Page 1 of 5
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Orders denying motions for summary judgment are not

ordinarily final decisions from which appeal may be taken under

28 U.S.C. § 1291. Oppenheimer v. Los Angeles County Flood

Control District, 453 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1972). However, under

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), “[w]hen a district judge, in making in a

civil action an order not otherwise appealable under [section

1292], shall be of the opinion that such order involves a

controlling question of law as to which there is substantial

ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal

from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of

the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order.” 

When the district judge so states, it is then up to the Court of

Appeals, in its discretion, to determine whether to permit an

appeal to be taken from that order. Id.

This court is therefore called upon to determine

whether its otherwise unappealable order: 1) involves a

controlling question of law as to which (2) there is substantial

ground for difference of opinion and that (3) an immediate appeal

from the order may materially advance the ultimate outcome of the

litigation. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); In re Cement Antitrust Litig.,

673 F.2d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 1982).

First, almost by definition, all motions for summary

judgment sufficiently involve a controlling question of law in

the sense that deciding the issue in favor of the moving

defendant would likely dispose of the case or materially affect

the outcome of litigation. In re Cement Antitrust Litigation,

673 F.2d at 1026 (“all that must be shown in order for a question

to be ‘controlling’ is that resolution of the issue on appeal

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could materially affect the outcome of litigation in the district

court.” (citing United States Rubber Co. v. Wright, 359 F.2d 784,

785 (9th Cir. 1966)(per curiam))). This case is no exception. 

The question of law raised by defendant, whether any additional

criterion must be considered when invoking waste treatment system

exemption aside from the issuance of a valid National Pollutant

Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit, would dispose of

this action if decided in its favor. 

Second, in most seriously contested summary judgment

motions there is substantial ground for a difference of opinion. 

Filing a motion for summary judgment involves the expenditure of

substantial attorney time and client resources. Such motions are

not generally pursued by competent attorneys unless there is a

substantial basis to believe they may be granted. This case,

again, is no exception. The Court of Appeals does not always

agree with the opinions of the district courts on the issues of

law determinative to summary judgment motions. In this case, as

in most others, there is substantial ground for a difference of

opinion

Third, whether an immediate appeal would materially

advance the ultimate outcome of this litigation depends, of

course, on whether the appeal is successful. If it is, the

effect will be to most likely terminate this litigation

altogether. Thus, a strong argument can be made that an

immediate appeal from this court’s order “may” materially advance

the ultimate outcome of this litigation. However, the same could

be said in practically every case where a district court has

denied a dispositive motion for summary judgment.

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As can readily be seen, if that were all that there was

to the analysis, the district courts would authorize appeals from

just about every denial of a motion for summary judgment. But

there is more to the analysis than that. The Supreme Court has

construed the 1958 amendments to section 1292(b) “to confer on

district courts first line discretion to allow interlocutory

appeals.” Swint v. Chambers County Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 47

(1995). The Ninth Circuit further tells us that section 1292 is

to be used “only in exceptional situations in which allowing an

interlocutory appeal would avoid protracted and expensive

litigation.” In re Cement, 673 F.2d at 1026 (citing United

States Rubber Co., 359 F.2d at 785).

Here, discovery will close November 30, 2007. The

trial set to commence June 24, 2008. Counsel disagree on the

length of trial. Plaintiff estimates two to three days, whereas

defendant estimates one or two weeks. The parties also disagree

on the number of witnesses and the amount of work involved in

preparing for the trial. While permitting an interlocutory

appeal could avoid protracted and expensive expert discovery and

other litigation-related expenses, it could also require a

continuance of the trial date and result in two separate appeals. 

Put simply, if we knew that defendant would be successful,

certifying the issue for interlocutory appeal would result in the

saving of considerable time and expense; but if plaintiff does

not appeal it will only result in the considerable loss of time

and additional expense. 

Because these problems occur whenever a district court

grants an interlocutory appeal, it is important that a district

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court only grant such motions in exceptional circumstances. In

re Cement, supra. This case does meet that high threshold. 

There does not appear there will be any undue burden on the

parties or potential witnesses in preparing this case for trial

and trying it as scheduled. The court cannot conclude from the

representations of counsel that the costs of preparing the case

for trial from this point forward will be any greater than in the

typical case. If plaintiff prevails at trial, the issues it

seeks to raise on appeal will be moot. If, on the other hand,

defendant prevails at trial, plaintiff may raise the issues now

sought to be appealed along with any other appealable issues

resulting from the trial in one single appeal. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant’s motion to

certify this court’s January 26, 2007, order for interlocutory

appeal be, and the same hereby is, DENIED. 

DATED: June 19, 2007

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