Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-23-55088/USCOURTS-ca9-23-55088-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Does
Appellee
Yaakov Markel
Appellant
Nachum Rabinowitz
Appellee
The International Society for Krishna Consciousness
Amicus Curiae
Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

YAAKOV MARKEL, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

UNION OF ORTHODOX JEWISH 

CONGREGATIONS OF AMERICA, 

a corporation; NACHUM 

RABINOWITZ, an individual; DOES, 

1-100, 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 23-55088 

D.C. No. 

2:19-cv-10704-

JWH-SK 

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

John W. Holcomb, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted April 3, 2024

Pasadena, California

Filed December 30, 2024

Before: Ryan D. Nelson, Lawrence VanDyke, and Gabriel 

P. Sanchez, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge R. Nelson;

Concurrence by Judge Sanchez

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2 MARKEL V. UOJCA

SUMMARY*

First Amendment Ministerial Exception

The panel affirmed the district court’s summary 

judgment in favor of the Union of Orthodox Jewish 

Congregations of America (OU) and Rabbi Nachum 

Rabinowitz, holding that the First Amendment’s ministerial 

exception barred plaintiff Yaakov Markel, whom UO 

formerly employed as a mashgiach to supervise food 

preparation for kosher compliance, from bringing 

employment-related claims. 

The OU is organized as a not-for-profit corporation 

whose mission is to serve the Orthodox Jewish 

community. It runs the largest kosher certification program 

in the United States, and the program provides most of OU’s 

revenues. The district court held that OU is a religious 

organization and that a mashgiach is a “minister” within 

Orthodox Judaism. Markel’s employment-related claims, 

therefore, were categorically barred by the First 

Amendment’s ministerial exception, which precludes the 

application of “laws governing the employment relationship 

between a religious institution and certain key employees.” 

The panel agreed with the district court that the 

ministerial exception categorically barred Markel’s 

employment-related claims because UO is a religious 

organization and a mashgiach is a minister. The acceptance 

of revenue does not deprive an organization with a religious 

mission of First Amendment protections. Here, OU was 

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has 

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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MARKEL V. UOJCA 3

organized to support the Orthodox Jewish Community, its 

activities primarily serve this purpose, and it holds itself out 

to the public as religious. Markel’s role was essential to 

OU’s religious mission. Because only observant Orthodox 

Jews can serve as a mashgiach for the OU, and because they 

are necessary to carrying out OU’s religious mission of 

ensuring the wide availability of kosher food, a mashgiach is 

a minister for purposes of the ministerial exception.

The panel rejected Markel’s argument that the 

ministerial exception was inapplicable because his dispute 

involved only secular issues. A religious institution’s 

decisions, even if facially secular, are often intertwined with 

religious doctrine. Moreover, a religious organization need 

not provide any religious justification to invoke the 

ministerial exception. Finally, the panel held that given the 

broad purpose of the ministerial exception, it protects a 

religious organization’s supervisors and religious leaders 

from claims brought by ministerial employees.

Concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, 

Judge Sanchez agreed that the ministerial exception applied 

under the facts of this case. As a head mashgiach who 

ensured the kosher certification of grape products, Markel’s 

work was essential to the spiritual mission of UO. Because 

Markel qualified as a minister, his claims challenging UO’s 

tangible employment actions were barred under the 

ministerial exception. Judge Sanchez did not join Section 

III.C of the opinion or the majority’s conclusion that the 

Supreme Court has taken a broad view of who counts as a 

minister. This case did not require the panel to adopt either 

a broad or narrow view of the ministerial exception or to 

wade into questions about whether a court can differentiate 

between “secular” or “religious” decisions. To the extent the 

majority suggests that the ministerial exception also bars 

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4 MARKEL V. UOJCA

non-employment-related claims brought by a ministerial 

employee, that view is at odds with both Supreme Court and 

circuit precedent.

COUNSEL

Michael E. Friedman (argued) and Steven R. Friedman, 

Friedman2 LLP, Los Angeles, California, for PlaintiffAppellant. 

Leonora M. Schloss (argued), Jackson Lewis PC, Los 

Angeles, California; Dylan B. Carp, Jackson Lewis PC, San 

Francisco, California; James P. Carter, Jackson Lewis PC, 

Irvine, California; for Defendants-Appellees.

Daniel J. Feith, Gordon D. Todd, Alaric R. Smith, and Aaron 

P. Haviland, Sidley Austin LLP, Washington, D.C.; 

Nicholas R. Reaves, Yale Law School, Free Exercise Clinic, 

Washington D.C.; for Amicus Curiae the International 

Society for Krishna Consciousness. 

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MARKEL V. UOJCA 5

OPINION

R. NELSON, Circuit Judge:

We review the district court’s holding that the First 

Amendment’s ministerial exception applies to a 

mashgiach—an Orthodox Jew who supervises food 

preparation to ensure kosher compliance. Because the 

Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America is a 

religious organization and a mashgiach is a minister, we 

affirm. 

I

The undisputed evidence, with the facts construed in the 

light most favorable to Plaintiff Yaakov Markel, are as 

follows. From 2011 to 2018, Markel, an Orthodox Jewish 

man, worked for the Union of Orthodox Jewish 

Congregations of America (OU) as a mashgiach. A 

mashgiach is “an inspector appointed by a board of 

Orthodox rabbis to guard against any violation of the Jewish 

dietary laws”—colloquially known as “keeping kosher.” 

Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Washington, Inc., 

363 F.3d 299, 301 (4th Cir. 2004) (quotation marks omitted). 

OU is organized as a 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) not-for-profit 

corporation, and its mission is to serve the Orthodox Jewish 

community. It supports a network of synagogues, providing 

religious programming, advocacy, and youth programs. One 

of OU’s primary activities in service to its member

synagogues is ensuring that kosher food is widely available. 

To that end, it runs the largest kosher certification program 

in the United States. That program provides most of OU’s

revenues. It uses those revenues to support its youth, teen,

and educational programming, and to further its core 

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6 MARKEL V. UOJCA

religious mission of serving the Orthodox Jewish 

community.

A team administers OU’s kosher program. The team

includes poskim (preeminent scholars on Jewish law); senior 

administration; rabbinic coordinators; mashgichim (the 

plural of mashgiach), such as Markel; and rabbinic field 

representatives. Markel was responsible for the kosher 

integrity of grape products at two wineries, and thus served

OU’s kosher team. Grape products are unique in Jewish 

dietary law because—to be kosher—only Orthodox Jews 

can handle them until they are mevushal (sufficiently cooked 

or boiled). To qualify to serve as a mashgiach, Markel 

needed to submit a letter from an Orthodox rabbi certifying 

that he was Sabbath observant, knowledgeable about kosher 

law, and compliant with the same. If Markel had questions 

about Jewish law, he would often (though not always) ask 

poskim for instruction and direction.

After several years, Markel’s relationship with OU

soured. Markel claims that his supervisor, Rabbi Nachum 

Rabinowitz, promised him a promotion and a raise. He 

allegedly received neither. He also claims that OU withheld 

from him certain compensation for overtime. OU, in turn, 

denies that Markel was denied any owed compensation.

Markel resigned and filed suit, bringing wage and hour 

and fraud and misrepresentation claims against both OU and 

Rabbi Rabinowitz (collectively Appellees). Appellees

moved for summary judgment, invoking the ministerial 

exception. As a matter of first impression—at least in this 

circuit—the district court held that a mashgiach is a 

“minister” within Orthodox Judaism and that OU is a 

religious organization. Markel, 648 F. Supp. 3d at 1190–96. 

Given this, the district court held that Markel’s claims—

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MARKEL V. UOJCA 7

including those brought against Rabbi Rabinowitz—were 

categorically barred by the ministerial exception because 

they were employment related. Id. at 1195–96. Markel 

appealed.

II

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. San 

Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 

1029–30 (9th Cir. 2004). Summary judgment is appropriate 

when “there is no genuine dispute [of] material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(a); accord Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 

322 (1986). 

III

The First Amendment prohibits any “law respecting an 

establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 

thereof.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Religion Clauses

collectively “protect[] the right of religious institutions ‘to 

decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters 

of church government as well as those of faith and 

doctrine.’” Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 

591 U.S. 732, 737 (2020) (Our Lady) (quoting Kedroff v. 

Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. 

Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952)). From this general principle 

of church autonomy stems the “ministerial exception,” 

which precludes the application of “laws governing the 

employment relationship between a religious institution and 

certain key employees.” Id. 

The ministerial exception “protect[s] [a religious 

institution’s] autonomy with respect to internal management 

decisions,” which includes the “selection of the individuals 

who play key roles.” Id. at 746. “[A]ny attempt . . . to 

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8 MARKEL V. UOJCA

dictate or even to influence such matters would constitute 

one of the central attributes of an establishment of religion.” 

Id. Thus, the Religion Clauses require deference to a 

“religious institution’s explanation of the role of [its] 

employees in the life of the religion in question.” Id. at 757. 

As a result, “it is impermissible for the government to 

contradict a church’s determination of who can act” as one 

of these mission-critical employees. Hosanna-Tabor 

Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 

171, 185 (2012). “[C]ourts are bound to stay out of 

employment disputes involving those holding certain 

important positions with churches and other religious 

institutions.” Our Lady, 591 U.S. at 746. 

By its terms, the rule permits no exceptions. It is 

categorical. The ministerial exception encompasses all 

adverse personnel or tangible employment actions between 

religious institutions and their employees and disallows 

lawsuits for damages based on lost or reduced pay. See 

Alcazar v. Corp. of Cath. Archbishop, 627 F.3d 1288, 1293

(9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). Thus, if OU is a religious 

organization and Markel is its minister, the exception applies

to Markel’s claims, which are all employment related. We 

address each in turn.

A

Because the ministerial exception only applies to 

disputes between “religious institutions” and their 

“ministers,” see Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 705–06, we

first consider whether OU is a religious institution. Markel 

argues that OU is not religious because its kosher food 

certification program turns a profit and because OU 

competes with for-profit kosher certification companies in 

the market. The act of profiting, or competing with for-profit 

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MARKEL V. UOJCA 9

companies, however, does not inherently make an

organization non-religious for purposes of the ministerial 

exception. Nor does it do so on these facts. 

The Supreme Court has never defined what a “religious 

institution” is. Nor have we in the context of the ministerial 

exception. But the Court has declined to adopt a “rigid 

formula” for determining when an employee is a “minister.” 

Our Lady, 591 U.S. at 737 (citing Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. 

at 190–91). We likewise decline to adopt such a formula for 

determining whether an institution is religious. That said, 

the considerations below, though far from exhaustive, are

relevant metrics. 

We start with Our Lady, the Court’s most recent 

ministerial exception opinion in which the Supreme Court 

reversed two decisions that originated in the Ninth Circuit.

1 

The defendants were Our Lady of Guadalupe School and St. 

James School, both Catholic primary schools in Los 

Angeles. Id. at 738, 743. The Court implicitly held that both 

were “religious institutions” by holding the ministerial 

exception applied. Id. at 762. The Court explained that the 

schools had “religious mission[s] . . . of educating and 

forming students in the faith.” Id. Thus, “judicial 

intervention into disputes between the school and the teacher 

threatens the school’s independence in a way that the First 

Amendment does not allow.” Id. That these schools charged 

tuition fees or competed to some extent with other private 

schools in the market was of no moment. All that mattered 

was that the schools had a religious mission. We see no

reason to deviate from that broad understanding of what 

1 In the Supreme Court, Our Lady was considered together with St. James 

School v. Biel, No. 19-348, another case that originated in our court. Our 

Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 679 (2019).

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10 MARKEL V. UOJCA

constitutes a religious organization. The acceptance of 

revenue does not deprive an organization with a religious 

mission of First Amendment protections.

Other guiding principles can be found in our cases 

defining “religious organization” in statutes. There too, we 

have expressly rejected Markel’s limited understanding of

religious organizations. Consider Title VII. In Spencer v. 

World Vision, we considered whether a not-for-profit, faithbased, humanitarian organization was exempt from Title 

VII’s general prohibition against religious discrimination. 

633 F.3d 723, 724 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). Under 42 

U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a), Title VII does not apply to a “religious

corporation, association, educational institution, or society 

with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular 

religion.” This closely mirrors the ministerial exception. 

The majority explained that an entity is “religious” if (1) “it 

is organized for a religious purpose,” (2) it “is engaged 

primarily in carrying out that religious purpose,” (3) it

“holds itself out to the public as an entity for carrying out 

that religious purpose,” and (4) it “does not engage primarily 

or substantially in the exchange of goods or services for 

money beyond nominal amounts.” Spencer, 644 F.3d at 724. 

Though we do not adopt this test wholesale, it tracks the 

guidance in Our Lady and may be looked to when 

considering whether defendants are religious organizations.

Spencer’s first three prongs all point toward OU being a 

religious organization. First, it is undisputed that OU was 

organized to support the Orthodox Jewish community, as 

shown in its articles of incorporation. Indeed, OU’s 

activities primarily serve this purpose, including by 

providing religious programming to its community of 

synagogues to “promo[te] traditional, or Orthodox, Judaism 

worldwide.” For example, OU provides youth and teen 

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MARKEL V. UOJCA 11

programs, as well as educational services to special-needs 

students. And OU, of course, holds itself out to the public 

as religious. 

The last prong merits further discussion. Markel claims 

OU cannot satisfy prong four because OU’s kosher 

certification program generates revenue. But, as we 

discussed above, the presence of revenue does not make OU 

non-religious. For that reason, Spencer’s fourth prong, 

while helpful, should not be applied literally when analyzing 

whether a religious organization is protected under the First 

Amendment.2 OU may generate revenue, but it is still a taxexempt 501(c)(3) organization. So its revenue does not 

benefit any private interest.

3 Rather, like all 501(c)(3) 

organizations, any earnings must be used for exempt 

purposes. OU uses its earnings for religious and educational 

purposes, including supporting its “youth, teen, and 

educational programming” as well as its “core mission.” 

Markel’s claim that OU cannot be religious because it 

generates revenue conflicts with our tax code and would 

elevate one prong in Spencer above all the others. Nothing 

in Spencer compels such a result, which is inconsistent with 

2 The Supreme Court has held, for example, that persons are not stripped 

of statutory protections for religious beliefs simply because they 

organize their businesses as for-profit corporations. See Burwell v. 

Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 691 (2014) (The “plain terms 

of [the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993] make it perfectly 

clear that Congress did not discriminate in this way against [persons] 

who wish to run their businesses as for-profit corporations in the manner 

required by their religious beliefs.”). 

3 IRS, IRS Exemption Requirements – 501(c)(3) Organizations, 

https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/charitableorganizations/exemption-requirements-501c3-organizations (“no part of 

a section 501(c)(3) organization’s net earnings may inure to the benefit 

of any private shareholder or individual.”).

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12 MARKEL V. UOJCA

what happened in Our Lady. The essence of the Spencer

inquiry points in only one direction—OU is a religious 

organization.

B

Having decided that OU is a religious organization, we 

turn to whether Markel was its minister. We first recognize 

that the “ministerial exception encompasses more than a 

church’s ordained ministers.” Alcazar, 627 F.3d at 1291 

(collecting cases). Indeed, “most faiths do not employ the 

term ‘minister,’ and some eschew the concept of formal 

ordination.” Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 202 (Alito, J., 

concurring). Perhaps recognizing this, the Supreme Court 

has declined “to adopt a rigid formula for deciding when an 

employee qualifies as a minister.” Our Lady, 591 U.S. at

750 (quoting Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190). That said, 

the Court has provided ample guidance. We first review the 

Court’s recent precedent for how to assess whether Markel 

is a minister. 

We start with Hosanna-Tabor. There, Cheryl Perich was 

a “called teacher” employed by Hosanna-Tabor, a member 

congregation of the Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod. 

Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 177–78. “‘Called’ teachers are 

regarded as having been called to their vocation by God 

through a congregation.” Id. at 177. She taught elementary 

students multiple subjects, including “a religion class four 

days a week.” Id. at 178. She also “led the students in prayer 

and devotional exercises each day[] and attended a weekly 

school-wide chapel service.” Id. Twice a year, she led this 

chapel service herself. Id. Perich was terminated by 

Hosanna-Tabor because medical issues precluded her from 

doing her job. Id. at 179. She filed a charge with the Equal 

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MARKEL V. UOJCA 13

Employment Opportunity Commission, who then filed suit 

against Hosanna-Tabor. Id. at 180. Perich intervened. Id. 

The Supreme Court held that the ministerial exception 

barred consideration of Perich’s claims. Id. at 190. 

Ministers, the Court explained, are “not limited to the head 

of a religious congregation.” Id. Rather, Perich was a 

minister because she was chosen to “preach [a religious 

institution’s] beliefs, teach their faith, and carry out their 

mission.” See id. at 196.

To arrive at this conclusion for Perich, the Court 

“identified four relevant circumstances but did not highlight 

any as essential.” Our Lady, 591 U.S. at 750 (discussing 

Hosanna-Tabor). First, Hosanna-Tabor “held Perich out as 

a minister, with a role distinct from that of most of its 

members.” Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 191. Second, 

“Perich’s title as a minister reflected a significant degree of 

religious training followed by a formal process of 

commissioning.” Id. Third, Perich “held herself out as a 

minister of the Church by accepting the formal call to 

religious service.” Id. at 191–92. Finally, Perich’s “job 

duties reflected a role in conveying the Church’s message 

and carrying out its mission.” Id. at 192. This conclusion 

held even though “others not formally recognized as 

ministers by the church perform the same functions.” Id. at 

193. Nor did it matter that “her religious duties consumed 

only 45 minutes of each workday” while the rest was

“devoted to teaching secular subjects.” Id. 

The Court next applied the ministerial exception in Our 

Lady. There, the Court considered whether two Catholic 

school teachers were mission-critical employees. 591 U.S. 

at 738. The Court held that they were. Id. at 762. In the 

process, the Court did not mechanically apply HosannaCase: 23-55088, 12/30/2024, ID: 12917995, DktEntry: 51-1, Page 13 of 30
14 MARKEL V. UOJCA

Tabor’s factors, and thus did not “demand[] . . . a ‘carbon 

copy’ of the [same] facts.” Id. at 745–46 (citing Biel v. St. 

James Sch., 926 F.3d 1238, 1239 (9th Cir. 2019) (R. Nelson, 

J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)). The Court 

explained that such an approach would be “contrary to [the 

Court’s] admonition” not to “impos[e] any ‘rigid formula.’” 

Id. at 757–58 (quoting Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190).

To make this clear, the Court identified ways that strict 

application of Hosanna-Tabor did not dictate the outcome. 

For example, the Court acknowledged that both plaintiffs 

had “less religious training than Perich,” but did not regard 

this as dispositive. Id. at 738. The Court also explained that 

“[s]imply giving an employee the title of ‘minister’ is not 

enough to justify the exception,” and “by the same token, 

since many religious traditions do not use the title ‘minister,’ 

it cannot be a necessary requirement.” Id. at 752. Requiring 

such a title would likely “constitute impermissible 

discrimination.” Id.

Our Lady thus rejected attempts in the lower courts to 

turn the Hosanna-Tabor guideposts into a one-size-fits-all

test. Id. But Our Lady extols one of its factors above all—

the one that concerns the employee’s “role” within the 

religious organization. See id. at 757. As the Court 

explained, “[t]he circumstances that informed [the Court’s] 

decision in Hosanna-Tabor were relevant because of their 

relationship to Perich’s ‘role in conveying the Church’s 

message and carrying out its mission.’” Id. at 751–52 

(quoting Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 192). Put differently, 

those factors showed Perich’s mission-critical role and 

purpose, but they were not “necessarily important[] in all 

other cases.” Id. at 752. “What matters, at bottom, is what 

an employee does.” Id. at 753.

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MARKEL V. UOJCA 15

Our Lady thus clarifies that a faith’s minister broadly 

includes any individual “essential to the institution’s central 

[religious] mission.” Id. at 746. Since the “very reason for 

the existence” of Catholic schools was the “religious 

education and formation of students,” the “selection and 

supervision of the teachers upon whom the schools rely to 

do this work lie at the core of their mission.” Id. at 738. 

Thus, because the school’s “religious mission entrusts [its] 

teacher[s] with [such] responsibility,” “judicial intervention 

into disputes between the school and teacher threatens the 

school’s independence in a way that the First Amendment 

does not allow.” Id. at 762. 

Our Lady thus recognized a broad view of who counts as 

a minister for purposes of the ministerial exception. Indeed, 

the Supreme Court reversed our prior narrow view of who 

counts as a minister. Id. at 758, 760–61 (rejecting the Ninth 

Circuit’s prior test as “rigid” and “distorted”); see also Biel, 

926 F.3d at 1239–40 (R. Nelson, J., dissenting from denial 

of rehearing en banc) (noting the “narrow construction” 

adopted in Biel v. St. James Sch., 911 F.3d 603 (9th Cir. 

2018), and Morrissey-Berru v. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 

769 F. App’x 460 (9th Cir. 2019), should be reversed). If 

individuals “perform[] vital religious duties,” they are 

“ministers” of that faith for purposes of the ministerial 

exception. See Our Lady, 591 U.S. at 756. 

Applying both Hosanna-Tabor and Our Lady, and 

considering the Religion Clauses, Markel was OU’s 

minister, and thus the ministerial exception applies. We first 

recognize, as the Supreme Court did, that “Judaism has 

many ‘ministers’” because “the term ‘minister’ encompasses 

an extensive breadth of religious functionaries in Judaism.” 

Id. at 752 (internal citation omitted). And we conclude that

Markel’s role as a mashgiach was “essential to [OU’s] 

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16 MARKEL V. UOJCA

[religious] mission.” Id. at 746. It thus follows that he was 

OU’s minister. 

As a head mashgiach for two wineries, Markel was 

responsible for the kosher integrity of its grape products. 

Kashruth, or “keeping kosher,” is essential to observing 

Orthodox Judaism, and OU’s central mission is to support 

Orthodox Jews as they strive to fully live their faith. To fill

that role, Markel had to submit a letter from an Orthodox 

rabbi certifying that he was an observant Jew, including that 

he kept the Sabbath and followed kosher laws. A core part 

of the ministerial exception’s purpose is to protect a religious 

institution’s autonomy to “select[] . . . the individuals who 

play certain key roles” that are “essential to the institution’s 

central mission.” Id. Because only observant Orthodox 

Jews can serve as a mashgiach for the OU, and because they 

are necessary to carrying out OU’s religious mission of 

“ensuring the wide availability of kosher food,” a mashgiach

is a minister for purposes of the ministerial exception. 

In so holding, we join the Fourth Circuit, which held that 

a mashgiach is a Jewish minister. See Shaliehsabou, 363 

F.3d at 301. There, the plaintiff, Shaliehsabou, worked as a 

mashgiach at Hebrew Home, a Jewish-affiliated elder care 

home. Id. at 308–09. His “basic responsibility [at the 

Hebrew Home] was to guard against any violations of 

Jewish dietary law.” Id. at 303 (citation omitted) (alteration 

in original). Shaliehsabou “alleged that [] Hebrew Home 

failed to pay him overtime wages as required by federal and 

state laws.” Id. at 304. The Fourth Circuit held that the 

ministerial exception barred Shaliehsabou’s claims. Id. at 

311. 

Shaliehsabou raised the same objections to the 

ministerial exception as Markel does here. These were that 

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(1) “his primary duties [were] not ministerial,” id. at 307–

08, and (2) “the Hebrew Home [was] not a religious 

institution,” id. at 308. Markel argues similarly that his job 

did not involve any religious duties, but was factory or food 

services work, not religious work. Shaliehsabou also argued 

that “apart from being an Orthodox Jew, no special training 

is required to serve as a mashgiach.” Id. (emphasis added). 

Markel claims the same.

The Fourth Circuit agreed with Hebrew Home. 

Comparing Shaliehsabou’s role to others deemed to be 

ministerial, such as music ministers or communications 

managers, the court did not “see any meaningful 

distinction.” Id. at 308–09. “Shaliehsabou’s duties required 

him to perform religious ritual,” and he “occupied a position 

that is central to the spiritual and pastoral mission of 

Judaism.” Id. at 309. Because of this, “failure to apply the 

ministerial exception [to a mashgiach] would denigrate the 

importance of keeping kosher to Orthodox Judaism.” Id. 

Shaliehsabou’s reasoning—which predated HosannaTabor and Our Lady—is even more compelling considering 

the Supreme Court’s subsequent decisions. Our holding 

today thus squarely follows the Fourth Circuit’s lead twenty

years ago. Failing to apply the ministerial exception here 

would inappropriately denigrate the Jewish faith. Just like 

Hebrew Home, OU has represented that Markel served as

“the vessel through whom compliance with the kashruth was 

ensured” for those that purchased OU’s kosher grape 

products. Thus, while Markel identifies ways that this case 

is dissimilar to Hosanna-Tabor, such as that he was not a 

Rabbi, had no formal title, and did not receive religious 

training from OU, these distinctions do not control our 

analysis. It would be inappropriate to require the same

factors be met here as in Hosanna-Tabor, given the 

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18 MARKEL V. UOJCA

differences between Lutheranism and Orthodox Judaism. 

Cf. Our Lady, 591 U.S. at 752–53. All that matters is that 

Markel played a role in “carrying out [OU’s religious] 

mission,” see id. at 752, of providing kosher-certified foods 

so that Orthodox Jews could observe their faith. There is no 

material dispute of fact that he did. He is thus a minister.

C

Finally, we clarify the scope and purpose of the 

ministerial exception. Markel argues that it should not apply 

here because his dispute with OU is secular. Put differently, 

Markel invites us to create a rule that if a religious purpose 

did not animate the relevant employment decisions, then the 

ministerial exception should not apply, and the case should 

be allowed to proceed to discovery. Markel claims 

discovery would not create a constitutional issue here 

because no “religious decision” was involved.

Markel’s argument raises two separate, but related 

issues. First, can issues involving a religious institution ever 

be bifurcated into being either “religious” or “nonreligious?” And second, does a religious institution need to 

identify a “religious” justification for its employmentrelated decisions to invoke the ministerial exception? The 

answer to both questions is no. Delineating a religious 

organization’s decisions between religious and secular

would create excessive entanglement between the church 

and state, given the coercive nature of the discovery process. 

Nor would it be appropriate. A religious institution’s 

decisions, even if facially secular, are often intertwined with 

religious doctrine. By that same token, our cases forbid 

religious institutions from requiring a religious justification 

for their decisions. We thus reiterate that a religious 

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MARKEL V. UOJCA 19

organization need not provide any religious justification to 

invoke the ministerial exception.

1

To address the first question, we look to the 

Establishment Clause’s original public meaning. See Am. 

Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 588 U.S. 29, 60 (2019) 

(“look[ing] to history for guidance” to interpret the 

Establishment Clause); see also Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. 

Dist., 4 F.4th 910, 950 (9th Cir. 2021) (R. Nelson, J., 

dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (A “historybased test is not a way to approach Establishment Clause 

cases . . . [but] the way.” (citation omitted) (emphasis in 

original)). As explained earlier, its fundamental purpose was

to disentangle government and religion, or to prevent 

excessive entanglement. It was drafted under the backdrop 

of the established Church of England, over which the King 

of England and Parliament exercised significant control, not 

only in matters of personnel, but also in matters of doctrine 

and worship. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 182–83. This 

type of established religion was present in the colonies too. 

“[F]or example, in the Colony of Virginia, where the Church 

of England had been established, ministers were required by 

law to conform to the doctrine and rites of the Church of 

England.” Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 641 (1992) 

(Scalia, J., dissenting). 

“The Framers”—and the American public—thus 

“understood an establishment necessarily to involve actual 

legal coercion.” Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 693 

(2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) (cleaned up); see District of 

Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576 (2008) (“the 

Constitution was written to be understood by the voters” at 

the time it was ratified). And the “coercion that was a 

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20 MARKEL V. UOJCA

hallmark of historical establishments was coercion of 

religious orthodoxy.” Lee, 505 U.S. at 640 (Scalia, J., 

dissenting); see Our Lady, 591 U.S. at 747 (“The 

constitutional foundation for our holding was the general 

principle of church autonomy to which we have already 

referred: independence in matters of faith and doctrine.”). 

“Orthodoxy” is broad and includes a religion’s “belief[s] or 

practice[s].”4 The ministerial exception thus must be robust 

enough to disallow the government, including the judiciary, 

from ever parsing out or defining for any religion what its 

beliefs or practices are. 

Here, OU represents that it is generally recognized 

within Orthodox Judaism that a mashgiach fills a key role in 

helping Orthodox Jews practice their religion. This 

representation falls within the scope of “orthodoxy,” given 

that it touches on both Jewish beliefs, including about Jewish 

law, and Jewish practices—“keeping kosher.” Thus, since 

OU’s representation concerns its “orthodoxy,” this ends our 

inquiry into whether OU’s practices are central to its 

religious mission. Any other approach would permit the 

government to involve itself in matters of a religion’s 

orthodoxy. “The First Amendment outlaws such intrusion.” 

Our Lady, 591 U.S. at 746. 

Consider the Supreme Court’s decision in National 

Labor Relations Board v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 

U.S. 490 (1979). There, the Court considered whether 

teachers in religious schools who taught both religious and 

secular subjects are subject to the National Labor Relations 

Act, and if so, whether this violated the First Amendment. 

Id. at 491. At the time, the Board distinguished between 

“completely religious” and “merely religiously associated” 

4 Webster’s New International Dictionary 1594 (3d ed. 2002). 

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MARKEL V. UOJCA 21

schools, exercising jurisdiction only over the latter. The 

Court rejected this binary, explaining that “religious 

doctrine” can always be—and often is—intertwined with 

“secular” things. See id. at 501–03. Put differently, 

excessive entanglement is unavoidable, because even if an 

issue seems secular, a minister’s “handling of the subject 

[may] not [be].” Id. at 501. And the harm would not just 

stem from the government reaching conclusions about a 

religion and its ministers. Instead, “the very process of 

inquiry leading to findings and conclusions” “may [itself] 

impinge on rights guaranteed by the Religion Clauses.”5 Id.

at 502. 

Later cases raised similar concerns with allowing the 

government—including the courts—to scrutinize religious 

decisions. The Supreme Court explained that “[i]t is a 

5 This is not, of course, to say that all discovery is impermissible. As the 

Seventh Circuit recently explained, “The ministerial exception’s status 

as an affirmative defense makes some threshold inquiry 

necessary . . . [but] discovery to determine who is a minister differs 

materially from discovery to determine how that minister was treated.” 

Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., 3 F.4th 968, 983 (7th Cir. 

2021) (en banc). Discovery must be limited to whether an employee is 

ministerial—the First Amendment generally prohibits merits discovery 

and trial. 

We also agree with other courts who have recognized that the ministerial 

exception can be raised by courts sua sponte if considering a claim would 

risk entangling the judiciary in religious issues in violation of the 

Religion Clauses. See Billard v. Charlotte Cath. High Sch., No. 22-

1440, slip op. at 15 (4th Cir. 2024) (“because the ministerial exception 

‘implicate[s] important institutional interests of the court,’ we retain 

discretion to raise and consider it sua sponte – even if waived”); see also

Lee v. Sixth Mount Zion Baptist Church, 903 F.3d 113, 118 n.4 (3d Cir. 

2018) (“the exception is rooted in constitutional limits on judicial 

authority”); EEOC v. Cath. Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 459–60 (D.C. Cir. 

1996) (same). 

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22 MARKEL V. UOJCA

significant burden on a religious organization to require it, 

on pain of substantial liability, to predict which of its 

activities a secular court will consider religious. . . . [A]nd 

an organization might understandably be concerned that a 

judge would not understand its religious tenets and sense of 

mission.” Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of 

Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 336 

(1987). 

We decline to impose such a burden on religious 

organizations or to subject them to a concern that their 

religious beliefs are being judicially misunderstood or 

unfairly maligned. To conclude otherwise could mean that 

“[f]ear of potential liability [would] affect the way an 

organization carried out what it understood to be its religious 

mission,” id., contrary to the First Amendment’s protections. 

Given the risk that stems from the process of judicial inquiry 

itself, we reject Markel’s argument that the ministerial 

exception is inapplicable because his dispute involves only 

“secular” issues. This distinction not only lacks 

constitutional significance but would lead to 

unconstitutional judicial action. 

2 

Having clarified that a religious institution’s decisions 

should not be delineated between “religious” and “secular,” 

we reiterate that the ministerial exception forbids courts 

from requiring religious institutions to proffer a religious 

justification before invoking the exception. 

We decided this issue in Bollard v. California Province 

of the Society of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 1999). There, 

the plaintiff, who was training to be a priest, sued his 

religious employer alleging severe sexual harassment. Id. at 

944. The defendants did not offer a religious justification 

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MARKEL V. UOJCA 23

for the harassment the plaintiff experienced. Id. at 947. To 

the contrary, “they condemn[ed] it as inconsistent with their 

values and beliefs.” Id. And the defendants wanted plaintiff 

as a minister of the Catholic faith and “enthusiastically 

encouraged [his] pursuit of the priesthood.” Id. But the 

sexual harassment was so severe that the plaintiff alleged he 

was constructively discharged. Id. at 944. 

Even though there was no religious justification offered, 

we explained that the “ministerial exception lies so close to 

the heart of the church that it would offend the Free Exercise 

Clause simply to require the church to articulate a religious 

justification for its personnel decision.” Id. We explained 

that “[t]he free exercise clause of the First Amendment 

protects the act of a decision rather than a motivation behind 

it.” Id. (citation omitted). Thus, Bollard recognized that any 

inquiry or scrutiny into a religious justification (or lack 

thereof) for a tangible employment action is per se 

unconstitutional.6

6 Even so, Bollard did not apply the ministerial exception. It concluded 

that the damages the employee sought were “limited and retrospective” 

and therefore did not intrude into the religious organization’s religious 

decisions. Id. at 950. Hosanna-Tabor has since made clear that the 

ministerial exception bars damages claims for adverse employment 

actions that fall under the ministerial exception since “[a]n award of such 

relief would operate as a penalty on the Church for terminating an 

unwanted minister.” 565 U.S. at 194. Bollard’s suggestion that damages 

are permissible against religious organizations where the ministerial 

exception is triggered is impossible to reconcile with Hosanna-Tabor. 

To the extent there is any debate about that question, that portion of 

Bollard is overruled. See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 

2003). Judge Sanchez addresses a different issue—whether the 

ministerial exception bars all damages actions against a religious 

institution by a ministerial employee. Concurrence at 28–29 n.1. That 

issue is neither raised nor addressed in this case. 

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24 MARKEL V. UOJCA

The Seventh Circuit in Demkovich, 3 F.4th at 973, 

reached a similar conclusion. There, the plaintiff, a music 

director for a Catholic parish, was fired allegedly because he 

was gay. Id. He sued, and the defendants invoked the 

ministerial exception. Id. at 973–74. The district court held 

that the ministerial exception did not apply because the 

religious organization did not “proffer[] a religious 

justification for [its] alleged conduct.” Id. at 974. 

The Seventh Circuit reversed. It recognized that “a 

minister’s legal status . . . differs from nonreligious 

employment, or even from nonministerial employment 

within a religious organization,” because “[r]eligion 

permeates the ministerial workplace.” Id. at 978–79. So, 

“[t]he contours of the ministerial relationship are best left to 

a religious organization, not a court.” Id. at 979. The court 

thus rejected the idea that a religious organization needed to 

provide any religious justification for its ministerial 

relationships, explaining that “[t]o do so would contravene 

the Religion Clauses” and “lead to impossible intrusion into, 

and excessive entanglement with, the religious sphere.” Id.

at 980. We agree.

Both Bollard and Demkovich show that religious

organizations need not have a specific religious purpose to 

invoke the ministerial exception. Such a narrow conception 

of religiousness would contradict Supreme Court precedent, 

cf. Cath. Bishop, 440 U.S. at 501–03; see also HosannaTabor, 565 U.S. at 194 (“The purpose of the ministerial 

exception is not to safeguard a church’s decision to fire a 

minister only when it is made for a religious reason.”), and

our own. Having determined that Markel was a ministerial 

employee, we also conclude that OU was not required to 

provide a religious reason for its actions.

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IV

Finally, we address who the ministerial exception

protects. Markel brings claims against both his former 

employer and his former supervisor. We have not yet 

considered whether the exception protects a plaintiff 

employee’s supervisor or other religious leaders as well as 

the plaintiff’s religious employer. Given the broad purpose 

of the ministerial exception, however, we conclude that it 

protects a religious organization’s supervisors and religious 

leaders from claims brought by ministerial employees.

The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Demkovich is again 

helpful in answering this question. There, the plaintiff’s 

allegations “center[ed] on his relationship with his fellow 

minister and supervisor,” and what “one minister[] said to 

another,” 3 F.4th at 977–80, just as Markel’s allegations do 

here. The court recognized that “[h]ow one minister 

interacts with another, and the employment environment that 

follows, is a religious, not judicial, prerogative.” Id. at 980.

Thus, “[a]djudicating [the plaintiff’s] allegations of 

minister-on-minister [misconduct] would not only undercut 

a religious organization’s protected relationship with its 

ministers, but also cause civil intrusion into, and excessive 

entanglement with, the religious sphere.” Id. at 977–78.

Nothing about the constitutional analysis changes if the 

defendant is another minister. Substantively, litigation 

would still permit a court to “prob[e] the ministerial work 

environment,” which would “interfere[] with the Free 

Exercise Clause.” Id. at 980. Procedurally, discovery would 

still result in “depositions of fellow ministers and the search 

for a subjective motive behind the alleged hostility,” which 

would create excessive government entanglement, no matter

who the defendant was. See id. at 983. Once more, “the very 

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26 MARKEL V. UOJCA

process of inquiry” in considering claims brought by one 

minister against another regarding tangible employment 

actions “may impinge on rights guaranteed by the Religion 

Clauses.” Cath. Bishop, 440 U.S. at 502. 

Since the same constitutional harm looms regardless of 

whether an employee-plaintiff’s employment-related claims 

are against the religious organization or its leaders, we hold 

that the ministerial exception protects both. Given this, we 

affirm the district court’s dismissal of the claims against 

Rabbi Rabinowitz.7

V

OU is a religious organization and Markel is its minister. 

Markel’s claims implicate a tangible employment decision. 

And the ministerial exception protects both religious 

organizations and religious leaders. Accordingly, the 

ministerial exception bars claims brought by Markel against 

either OU or its leadership. 

AFFIRMED.

7 We grant Appellees’ motion for judicial notice of an amicus brief filed 

with the Supreme Court in Our Lady, 591 U.S. 732. See Reyn’s Pasta 

Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006).

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SANCHEZ, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and concurring 

in the judgment: 

I agree with my colleagues that the ministerial exception 

applies under the facts of this case. As a head mashgiach 

who ensured the kosher certification of grape products, 

Yaakov Markel’s work was essential to the spiritual mission 

of his employer, the Union of Orthodox Jewish 

Congregations of America (“Orthodox Union”). The record 

makes clear that the Orthodox Union is a not-for-profit 

religious organization whose purpose is to promote and 

serve the Orthodox Jewish community, including by 

fostering a central tenet of Orthodox Jewish faith—the 

observance of dietary laws. Because Markel qualifies as a 

minister, his claims challenging the Orthodox Union’s 

“tangible employment actions” are barred under the 

ministerial exception. See Alcazar v. Corp. of Cath. 

Archbishop of Seattle, 598 F.3d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(Alcazar I), adopted in part, 627 F.3d 1288 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(en banc) (Alcazar II); see also Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew 

Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299, 308-09 (4th Cir. 

2004). 

I do not join Section III.C. or in the majority’s conclusion 

that the Supreme Court has taken a “broad” view of who 

counts as a minister in Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. 

Morrissey-Berru, 591 U.S. 732 (2020). Our Lady counsels 

a “flexible” approach for determining when a religious 

organization’s employee may qualify as a minister, but the 

exception itself is neither broad nor narrow. See id. at 752-

53. Indeed, Our Lady recognized that “[t]his does not mean 

that religious institutions enjoy a general immunity from 

secular laws, but it does protect their autonomy with respect 

to internal management decisions that are essential to the 

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28 MARKEL V. UOJCA

institution’s central mission.” Id. at 746; see also HosannaTabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 565 

U.S. 171, 196 (2012) (“express[ing] no view on whether the 

[ministerial] exception bars other types of suits, including 

actions by employees alleging breach of contract or tortious 

conduct by their religious employers.”). 

Nor have our own cases read the ministerial exception 

broadly. In Bollard v. California Province of the Soc’y of 

Jesus, 196 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 1999), we held that a Title VII 

claim of sexual harassment against a Jesuit order was not 

barred under the ministerial exception because the claim did 

not involve the Church’s “choice of representative” or any 

other “adverse personnel action.” Id. at 947. Nor was the 

Church “offer[ing] a religious justification for the 

harassment Bollard alleges,” and there was thus “no danger 

that, by allowing this suit to proceed, we will thrust the 

secular courts into the unconstitutionally untenable position 

of passing judgment on questions of religious faith or 

doctrine.” Id.1 

1 The majority’s assertion that Bollard was overruled in part by 

Hosanna-Tabor is wrong in its characterization of both Bollard and 

Hosanna-Tabor. See Maj. Op. at 23, n.6. As the majority acknowledges 

in the same footnote, Bollard did not apply the ministerial exception 

because “the issue in [that] case [was] whether Bollard was subjected to 

sex-based harassment by his superiors that was sufficiently severe or 

pervasive as to be actionable under Title VII.” 196 F.3d at 949. Bollard

does not suggest, as the majority contends, that damages are permissible 

where the ministerial exception is triggered because the ministerial 

exception was never triggered. See id. at 947. Nor did Hosanna-Tabor 

overrule Bollard in any way. Hosanna-Tabor expressly did not address 

whether the ministerial exception applies in suits involving tortious 

conduct by a religious employer, 565 U.S. at 196, and indeed, the Court 

cited Bollard with approval in concluding that the ministerial exception 

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MARKEL V. UOJCA 29

In Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951 

(9th Cir. 2004), we similarly did not adopt a broad or narrow 

view of the ministerial exception. The plaintiff, an ordained 

minister, alleged she was sexually harassed by the Church’s 

pastor and fired for reporting it. Id. at 953-54. To the extent 

her claims involved an inquiry into the Church’s decision to 

terminate her employment, that inquiry was foreclosed 

because it involved “the Church’s decision-making about 

who shall be a minister of the Church—a decision clearly 

within the scope of the ministerial exception.” Id. at 958 

(citing Bollard, 375 F.3d at 947). But the plaintiff’s 

narrower sexual harassment and retaliation claims were 

allowed to proceed because they did not implicate a 

protected employment decision, and as in Bollard, the 

Church did not offer a religious justification for the alleged 

sexual harassment. Id. at 959, 962. 

The ministerial exception thus requires a nuanced 

analysis “that respects both the individual rights Congress 

enacted and a church's constitutional right to be free of 

doctrinal interference.” Id. at 969. Under the exception, 

“courts are bound to stay out of employment disputes 

involving those holding certain important positions with 

churches and other religious institutions,” such as in “the 

selection of the individuals who play certain key roles” 

within the institution. Our Lady, 591 U.S. at 746 (emphasis 

added). As the majority notes, if individuals “perform[] vital 

religious duties” that lie “at the core of the mission” of the 

operates as an affirmative defense to an otherwise cognizable claim. See 

id. at 195 n.4. Hosanna-Tabor does not address—much less 

undermine—Bollard’s conclusion that a retrospective damages suit for 

sexual harassment against a religious employer was not barred by the 

First Amendment. See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 

2003) (explaining “clearly irreconcilable” standard). 

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30 MARKEL V. UOJCA

religious institution, they are “ministers” for purposes of the 

ministerial exception. Id. at 756. 

This case does not require us to adopt either a broad or 

narrow view of the ministerial exception, or to wade into 

questions about whether a court can differentiate between 

“secular” or “religious” decisions.2 To the extent the 

majority suggests that the ministerial exception also bars 

non-employment-related claims brought by a ministerial 

employee, that view is at odds with both Supreme Court and 

circuit precedent. 

2 Such analysis is unnecessary because once an employee is determined 

to be a minister, it does not matter whether the religious institution 

invokes a religious justification for its employment decision. See 

Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 194-95 (“The purpose of the exception is 

not to safeguard a church’s decision to fire a minister only when it is 

made for a religious reason. The exception instead ensures that the 

authority to select and control who will minister to the faithful—a matter 

‘strictly ecclesiastical’—is the church’s alone.”) (cleaned up). 

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