Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-05410/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-05410-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Eliel E. Brown
Petitioner
David L. Runnels
Respondent

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ELIEL E. BROWN,

Petitioner,

 vs.

DAVID L. RUNNELS, Warden,

Respondent. 

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No C 03- 5410 JSW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

Eliel E. Brown, a prisoner of the State of California currently incarcerated

at High Desert State Prison in Susanville, California, has filed a pro se petition

for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Per order filed on April

20, 2004, this Court ordered Respondent to show cause as to seven claims raised

in the petition. Respondent filed an answer on November 24, 2004. Petitioner

filed his traverse to the answer on December 6, 2004. This order denies the

petition for writ of habeas corpus on the merits. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The parties agree on the following procedural history: on March 30, 2000,

a jury in the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of

Alameda found Petitioner guilty of second degree murder, with a personal

firearm use enhancement. On May 18, 2000, Petitioner was sentenced to a term

of nineteen years to life in state prison.

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Petitioner appealed to the California Court of Appeal, First District, which

affirmed the conviction in a reasoned opinion filed on June 25, 2002. On

September 11, 2002, the Supreme Court of California denied a petition for

review.

On November 18, 2002, Petitioner filed a writ of habeas corpus in the

California Supreme Court restating several claims that he had raised on direct

appeal and raising numerous additional claims. On June 18, 2003, the Supreme

Court of California denied the petition. Petitioner filed the instant matter on

December 2, 2003.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The facts of the case are summarized from the California Court of Appeal

opinion as follows:

Appellant and Daydrien Lamont Lee were employed as

movers at Nor Cal Moving Services (Nor Cal) in San Leandro. It is

undisputed that at the end of the workday on September 15, 1997,

appellant shot Lee multiple times, killing him. The question at trial

was whether the killing was murder or manslaughter.

Prosecution's Case

On the day of the shooting, appellant and Lee were part of a

ten-man crew who went to Stanford University for a moving job.

They traveled from the company's main office in two trucks and a

van. Appellant drove the van, and six or seven members of the

crew, including Lee, rode with him. Lee did not speak Spanish and

was the only person in the van who was not primarily

Spanish-speaking.

During the morning, Steve Martinez, one of the foremen,

noticed some friction between Lee and appellant. Lee was cursing

and urging appellant to work faster. Appellant said to Martinez

something like, “Tell this guy to get off my fucking back.” The

animosity between appellant and Lee continued that afternoon,

with the two men yelling and Lee complaining that none of the

men were working fast enough.

When the crew left Stanford, they headed first to Nor Cal’s

Doolittle Drive warehouse to unload furniture for storage. During

the unloading, Lee continued to complain vehemently that the

others were lazy. Before long appellant and Lee were cursing at

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each other, with Lee saying things like “mother fucker, ass holes,

lazy.” At some point appellant said, “‘We [sic] going to resolve

this. But this is not the time, and this is not the moment.’”

After the men finished unloading, Lee left the warehouse

and rode with Martinez in one of the trucks back to the main office. 

According to Martinez, Lee was “ranting and raving” about

appellant; he was particularly upset because appellant and others in

the crew had delayed the unloading by stopping at McDonald’s on

the way from Stanford to the warehouse.

Meanwhile, Richard Margie, the other foreman, started to

leave the warehouse in the other truck. Appellant and the other

men who had been riding in the van flagged him down. Appellant

was very agitated and irritated. He told Margie that Lee had stolen

the keys to the van. Appellant was certain Lee had taken the keys

because Lee’s jacket was gone from the van and the keys were

gone from the van’s ignition. According to Jorge Garcia, one of

the other movers, appellant said that the “fucking nigger” had taken

the key. Appellant complained that he was “tired of all this shit,

that always everybody wants to blame on Latin people that we’re

the lazies.”

Rather than wait for someone to return the keys, Margie

took appellant and the other men back to the main office in the

truck. Margie could tell that appellant was really “pissed off”

about the missing keys and tried to tell him to take it easy and

forget it. When they arrived at the main office, appellant was still

agitated and very upset. After appellant got out of the truck, Jorge

Garcia saw him walk toward the dispatch office.

Lee was in the dispatch office with another Nor Cal

employee, Robert Watson, checking on their assignments for the

following day. Appellant came to the office door, a gun in his

hand. Lee said, “It's cool man, it’s cool.” Appellant said

something and started shooting. Watson ducked for cover. He

heard at least five or six shots, one right after the other. When the

shooting stopped, Watson locked the door, saw that Lee had been

shot, and called 911.

Garcia saw the shooting from outside the office. He said

that appellant pulled a gun from the small of his back and pointed it

at Lee. When Lee saw appellant, he said “Hey, man, no. No, man.

Sorry.” Appellant said “Sorry madres,” and fired a shot from a

distance of five or six feet. Lee fell backward onto the floor and

appellant started shooting again, firing several times. When he

finally stopped shooting, he walked out of the building and headed

toward his car. He said, “I’ll see you tomorrow, primos,” referring

to his coworkers.

After receiving a dispatch about the shooting, Officer Brian

Sommer found appellant’s car parked in front of his apartment

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complex. As Sommer watched, appellant approached, got into the

car, and started to drive. Sommer stopped and arrested him.

Sommer found a Ruger .9 mm semiautomatic pistol in appellant’s

car, on the front floorboard. The capacity of the gun’s magazine

was 10 rounds of ammunition, but there were no rounds in either

the magazine or the chamber. Police also found a gun case on the

rear floorboard, with a trigger lock inside the case. In the trunk

were three 50-round boxes of ammunition, with some rounds

missing from one box.

Police interviewed appellant on the night of the shooting,

and a videotape of that interview was introduced into evidence; the

record also includes transcripts of that interview. Appellant told

the officers that he did not understand why the shooting happened;

he had never had problems with Lee before. On the day of the

shooting, he and Lee had “a discussion” and got “excited” and Lee

said something bad about appellant’s mother. Lee was angry

because appellant and the others were speaking Spanish. Lee also

wanted them to hurry up; he did not want to work overtime.

Appellant said that he lost his mind when Lee talked about

appellant’s mother.

Appellant explained that he went to his car, took the loaded

magazine from the glove box, took the gun from trunk, and

inserted the magazine. He got the gun because he was angry and

wanted to hurt Lee for what he had said, but “not very much.” At

the same time, he acknowledged that it was wrong to shoot Lee. He

thought he fired three or four rounds, but did not think all the shots

hit Lee. After shooting Lee, he went home, woke up his brother,

and said he had “a problem.”

Asked whether he had ever suffered any mental illness,

appellant said that sometime between the ages of 10 and 13, when

he was in Cuba, he had “a disease from the horses” and was

“crazy” for two months, but after that has been okay.

According to the physician who performed the autopsy, Lee

died of multiple gunshot wounds. He suffered 16 entrance wounds,

including four on his head and face, five on the front side of his

torso, one on his back, and several on his arms and hands.

Defense Case

Appellant’s wife testified that she and appellant were

married in Cuba over 15 years ago. She described him as a very

loving and gentle and non-violent person, who maintained close

contact with his mother in Cuba by telephone and letters and by

sending money and presents. She said that in Cuba, a mother is

always respected; insulting someone’s mother is not allowed. She

also said that appellant had complained of frequent headaches and

sometimes has memory problems. Numerous defense witnesses

testified that appellant was non-violent and that they had never

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seen him strike anyone, act aggressively, or speak harshly.

Dr. Nell Riley, a clinical neuropsychologist, testified that

she had evaluated appellant by conducting a clinical interview,

administering approximately 20 psychological tests, and reviewing

various records and documents. Appellant’s medical records from

Cuba indicated that in 1980, when he was 16, he was hospitalized

with severe bacterial meningoencephalitis, with associated

epileptic seizures and severe memory problems. Several years

later, in 1988 and 1990, he had more seizures, but has had no

seizures since then and no longer takes medication for epilepsy. 

Nevertheless, an electroencephalogram in 1999 revealed a “subtle

nonspecific intermittent focal abnormality localized in the left

temporal head region.”

Dr. Riley concluded that appellant suffers from a

neuropsychological impairment or organic brain disease or disorder

that is “fairly diffuse,” by which she meant that the impairment

affected “a variety of different aspects of mental cognitive

processing.” Solving a problem takes appellant longer than it

would an ordinary person, and his memory is poor. A person with

organic brain damage may have a problem with decision- making

because that person may process information slowly.

The court precluded Dr. Riley from testifying that

symptoms of organic brain damage may include reduced impulse

control. Before Dr. Riley testified, the court held a hearing under

Evidence Code section 402 to consider the admissibility and

relevance of her proposed testimony. Dr. Riley testified at that

hearing about her conclusions that appellant suffered from a “postencephalitic condition, generalized organic brain condition” and

that he was impaired in a number of areas. She explained that

persons with certain types of brain damage often display

impulsivity or “episodic emotional discontrol,” meaning an

abnormally low ability to regulate one’s behavior. Impulsive

behavior is seen more frequently in brain-damaged persons. Asked

to explain “neurogenic impulsivity,” she said, “Impulsivity is sort

of used in the standard . . . sense of--again, the same sort of basic

idea of people who are less likely to be inhibited in their behavior,

behaviors that could get them in trouble instead of suppressing

them. [P] Like thinking you want to do that but be able to inhibit or

suppress it.

The prosecutor acknowledged that evidence of mental

defect may be relevant to whether a defendant actually

premeditated and deliberated. He conceded that Dr. Riley could

testify that appellant “suffered from some brain disorder and talk

about the disorder somewhat.” He objected, however, to any

testimony that the disorder could result in “lack of . . . impulse

control,” reasoning that such testimony was a synonym for

diminished capacity. Defense counsel argued that Dr. Riley should

be allowed to testify about the effect of brain damage on

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subsequent activity, and he assured the court that her testimony

would not touch on the subject of diminished capacity.

The court ruled that Dr. Riley could not testify about

episodic emotional discontrol, explaining that such evidence “does

equate to diminished capacity” and would be “an attempt to

diminish his capacity or his ability to form the proper intent for

murder.” 

People v. Brown, No. A091940, slip op. 2-10 (Cal. Ct. App. June 25, 2002). 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court only on the

ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A district court may grant a petition

challenging a state conviction or sentence on the basis of a claim that was

“adjudicated on the merits” in state court only if the state court’s adjudication of

the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if

a state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme

Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the

Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). “Under the ‘unreasonable application’

clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if a state court identifies the

correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Williams,

529 U.S. at 413. As summarized by the Ninth Circuit: “A state court’s decision

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can involve an ‘unreasonable application’ of federal law if it either 1) correctly

identifies the governing rule but then applies it to a new set of facts in a way that

is objectively unreasonable, or 2) extends or fails to extend a clearly established

legal principle to a new context in a way that is objectively unreasonable.” Van

Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000) overruled on other

grounds; Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-73 (2003) (citing Williams, 529

U.S. at 405-07). 

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 411; accord

Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 436 (2004) (per curiam) (challenge to state

court’s application of governing federal law must not only be erroneous, but

objectively unreasonable); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002) (per

curiam) (“unreasonable” application of law is not equivalent to “incorrect”

application of law). In deciding whether a state court’s decision is contrary to, or

an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, a federal court

looks to the decision of the highest state court to address the merits of th

Petitioner’s claim in a reasoned decision. LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663,

669 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000). Where the state court gives no reasoned explanation of

its decision on a Petitioner’s federal claim and there is no reasoned lower court

decision on the claim, a federal habeas court should conduct an independent

review of the record. See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir.

2003). 

The only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is in the holdings of the Supreme Court as of the time of the

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state court decision. Williams 529 U.S. at 412; Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062,

1069 (9th Cir. 2003). While the circuit law may be “persuasive authority” for

the purposes of determining whether a state court decision is an unreasonable

application of Supreme Court precedent, only the Supreme Court’s holdings are

binding on the state courts and only those holdings need be “reasonably” applied. 

Id.

In his petition for writ of habeas corpus, Petitioner asserts seven claims

for relief: (1) the trial court violated his rights to due process and to present a

defense by excluding evidence regarding the effects of his organic brain disease;

(2) the trial court violated his rights to due process and to present a defense by

erroneously excluding evidence regarding alleged prior violent acts committed

by the victim; (3) prosecutorial misconduct deprived him of his Fourteenth

Amendment right of due process; (4) the trial court’s inclusion of a biased juror

violated his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury; (5) a juror’s inability to

comprehend English violated his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial; (6) the

trial counsel’s deficiencies deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to

effective assistance of counsel, and (7) the appellate counsel’s deficiencies

deprived him of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to effective

assistance of counsel. 

DISCUSSION

1. Trial Court’s Exclusion of Defense Testimony

Petitioner alleges that the trial court violated his rights to due process and

to present a defense by precluding Dr. Riley from testifying about the potential

effects of Petitioner’s organic brain disease. Petitioner alleges that Dr. Riley’s

excluded testimony would have established that he lacked malice, an element of

the murder conviction. 

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At the trial court’s hearing under California Evidence Code section 402,

Dr. Riley testified that Petitioner suffered from a “post-encephalitic condition,

generalized organic brain condition.” Reporter’s Transcript (“RT”),

Respondent’s Exhibit B, 841. Dr. Riley noted that the condition can lead to

“impulsivity” or “episodic emotional discontrol,” meaning an abnormally low

ability to regulate one’s behavior. RT 849.

“The prosecutor acknowledged that evidence of mental defect may be

relevant to whether a defendant actually premeditated and deliberated. He

conceded that Dr. Riley could testify that appellant ‘suffered from some brain

disorder and talk about the disorder somewhat.’ He objected, however, to any

testimony that the disorder could result in ‘lack of . . . impulse control,’

reasoning that such testimony was a synonym for diminished capacity.” Brown,

slip op. 9-10. Defense counsel argued that Dr. Riley’s testimony regarding the

potential effects of brain damage on subsequent activity would be relevant to the

specific intent element of the charges. RT 825-826. 

The trial court ruled that Dr. Riley could testify that Petitioner suffered

from organic brain damage and could describe some of the consequences of such

damage. The court, however, precluded Dr. Riley from testifying that persons

with brain damage can display impulsivity or episodic emotional discontrol. The

trial court reasoned that such testimony would be an attempt to diminish

Petitioner’s capacity or his ability to form the proper intent for murder, a

violation of California Penal Code sections 28 and 29. RT 869-870.

In considering the claim, the California Court of Appeal analyzed the

difference between impermissible and permissible opinion testimony under

California Penal Code Sections 28 and 29:

“Sections 28 and 29 govern the admissibility of expert

testimony on the effect of a defendant’s mental disease or disorder.

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Under sections 28 and 29, expert opinion on whether a defendant

had the capacity to form a mental state that is an element of a

charged offense or actually did form that mental state is

inadmissible. At the same time, those statutes permit introduction

of evidence of a mental illness, defect, or disorder when relevant to

whether a defendant actually formed a mental state that is an

element of a charged offense. “An expert's opinion that a form of

mental illness can lead to impulsive behavior is relevant to the

existence vel non of the mental states of premeditation and

deliberation regardless of whether the expert believed [the

defendant] actually harbored those mental states at the time of the

killing.” ( People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 582-583,

overruled on another ground in Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25

Cal.4th 1046, 1069, fn. 13.)

Brown, slip op. 11. The court then discussed the holding of People v. Nunn, 50

Cal.App.4th 1357 (1996), finding it instructive on the issue of opinion testimony

relating to a criminal defendant’s mental state:

“The appellate court explained that under sections 28 and

29, it was permissible for the expert to testify that defendant’s

history of psychological trauma could cause him to overreact to

stress and apprehension and to act impulsively under certain

circumstances. The expert could also have evaluated the

psychological setting of defendant’s encounter with the men and

offered an opinion about whether it was the type that could result

in an impulsive reaction from a person with defendant’s mental

condition. What the expert could not do was conclude that the

defendant had “acted impulsively, that is, without the intent to kill,

that is, without express malice aforethought.” ( People v. Nunn,

supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 1365.)

Brown, slip op. 12. The court then addressed the trial court’s limitation on Dr.

Riley’s testimony and found the exclusion was error under state law:

“While sections 28 and 29 foreclosed any testimony by Dr.

Riley in this case about appellant’s capacity to form the particular

mental states at issue, the trial court’s limitation on her testimony

was unduly restrictive. The court correctly allowed Dr. Riley to

testify that appellant suffered from organic brain damage and to

describe some of the consequences of such damage. The court

erred, however, when it precluded her from testifying that the

disorder can result in impulsivity or episodic emotional discontrol. 

At a minimum, the excluded evidence was unquestionably relevant

to the premeditation and deliberation elements of the first degree

murder charge. ( People v. Coddington, supra, 23 Cal.4th at ¶.

582-583.) People v. Nunn, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th 1357, supports a

conclusion that the excluded evidence also had at least some

relevance to whether appellant acted with express malice, i.e., with

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the intent to kill.”

Brown, slip op. 12-13. The Court of Appeal found that the error was not of

constitutional dimension. The court stated that “[Petitioner’s] defense was that

he acted without premeditation and deliberation and without malice, making his

crime manslaughter, not murder.” Id. at 14. The court found that by restricting

Dr. Riley’s testimony the trial court excluded some evidence relevant to this

defense but did not completely preclude petitioner from presenting that defense.

Id. at 16: 

The trial court’s limitation on Dr. Riley’s testimony did not

completely preclude him from presenting that defense. The court

did permit Dr. Riley to testify in considerable detail about

appellant’s medical and family history, the results of her evaluation

and testing, her diagnosis that he suffered from neuropsychological

impairment or organic brain damage, and certain of the symptoms

of that brain damage. Other witnesses described their perceptions

of appellant's mental state on the day of the shooting. Richard

Margie testified that appellant had “weirded out” over the incident

with the keys to the van. Jorge Garcia described appellant as

seeming to be “in another world” when he pointed his gun at Lee. 

Steve Martinez said that appellant had “a staring look” on his face

after the shooting, as if he did not know Martinez was there and

had just “wandered off” in his mind. During appellant’s interview

with police, he said repeatedly that he had lost his mind, lost

control, could not explain what he did, lost his head, and was

crazy. Defense counsel emphasized during argument that

appellant’s state of mind and intent were at issue. He relied on all

this evidence to urge that appellant would not have made a

knowing judgment based upon careful thought and analysis,

weighing the consequences for and against, “whether or not to kill

or not to kill . . . if he were thinking in his right mind.” He argued

that appellant's statements to the police after the shooting regarding

his mental state were directly relevant to whether there was malice. 

He urged that the evidence demonstrated that appellant was not

thinking properly, that his actions were not those of a “rational

thinking person,” that he was blinded by rage and did not know

what was going on, that his thinking was “deranged” and not

consistent with malice, and that he had acted in the heat of passion.

Brown, slip op. 15-16. The Court of Appeal concluded that because the

defendant was not completely deprived of presenting the defense that he acted

without the requisite intent, the error did not constitute federal constitutional

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error. Accordingly, the “harmless beyond reasonable doubt” standard as applied

to federal constitutional error under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24

(1967) did not apply. Id. at 13. 

The court then evaluated the error under the less stringent state standard

of review explained in People v. Watson, 46 Cal.2d 818, 835-836 (1956), “this

court will reverse only if it finds a reasonable probability that a result more

favorable to the defendant would have resulted absent the error.” Id. The Court

of Appeal explained that the effect of the error was reduced by Petitioner’s

conviction for second degree murder, instead of first degree: “[t]o the extent that

the excluded evidence was relevant to premeditation and deliberation, its

exclusion was of no consequence because the jury convicted [petitioner] of

second degree murder, not first. Id. at 16. 

The court pointed out that under the instructions given, the jury’s second

degree murder verdict could have been based on either express malice or implied

malice. Id. The Court determined that there was “overwhelming” evidence

showing defendant acted with either express or implied malice when he shot Lee:

“The overwhelming weight of the evidence indicated that

when appellant shot Lee, he acted either with express or implied

malice. The evidence was undisputed that appellant and Lee had

exchanged angry, hostile comments throughout the workday. The

evidence also was undisputed that appellant became extremely

angry when he discovered that Lee had apparently taken the keys

to the van; that anger persisted during the ride back to the Nor Cal

main yard. Witnesses to the shooting testified that appellant

ignored Lee's attempt to apologize just before the shooting and that

he shot Lee from a distance of only five or six feet. After the first

shot, when Lee fell backward to the floor, appellant shot him again

repeatedly, inflicting multiple wounds to Lee's head, face, and

body.

Appellant’s own account of the shooting established that

after arriving at the yard, he walked a distance to his parked car,

retrieved his gun case from the locked trunk, removed the Ruger

from the case, took the magazine from the glove box, walked back

to the office, and loaded the gun. He acknowledged that he stood

face-to-face with Lee, held his gun chest high with both hands,

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fired at Lee, and kept shooting until the gun was empty. He

acknowledged that he was angry and wanted to hurt Lee. He said

that he knew it was wrong to shoot a person and that he had made a

mistake.”

Brown, slip op. 17-18. The court concluded that, due to the overwhelming

evidence that Petitioner acted with either express or implied malice when he shot

Lee, it was not reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the Petitioner

would have been reached in the absence of the error. Id. at 15-18.

A. Legal Standard

A state court’s evidentiary ruling is not subject to federal habeas review

unless the ruling violates federal law, either by infringing upon a specific federal

constitutional or statutory provision or by depriving the defendant of the

fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by due process. See Pulley v. Harris, 465

U.S. 37, 41 (1984). The exclusion of evidence constitutes a Due Process Clause

violation only when “it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the

traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” 

Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 43 (1996). The defendant must therefore

establish that his right to have the jury consider the excluded evidence implicated

a “fundamental principle of justice.” See id.

One of the fundamental rights that may be violated by the erroneous

exclusion of critical corroborative evidence is the right to present a defense

guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. DePetris v. Kuykendall, 239 F.3d 1057,

1062 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973),

and Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1967)). 

While the only definitive source of clearly established federal law is in the

holdings of the Supreme Court as of the time the state court decision, circuit law

may be persuasive authority for purposes of determining whether a state court

decision is an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. Clark v.

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Murphy, 331 F.2d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The Ninth Circuit has developed a framework for deciding whether the

exclusion of evidence violates the due process right to a fair trial or the Sixth

Amendment right to present a defense under Chambers and its progeny. Chia v.

Cambra, 360 F.3d 997, 1004-05 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding the exclusion of certain

critical defense evidence an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law); Drayden v. White, 232 F.3d 704, 711 (9th Cir. 2000). In evaluating

such a claim, Chia instructs courts to balance the following five factors: (1) the

probative value of the excluded evidence as to the central issue; (2) the reliability

of such evidence; (3) whether it is capable of evaluation by the trier of fact; (4)

whether it is the sole evidence on the issue or is merely cumulative; and (5)

whether it constitutes a major part of the defense. Chia, 360 F.3d 1004.

But even if the exclusion amounted to constitutional error, the erroneous

exclusion of the evidence must have had “a substantial and injurious effect” on

the verdict in order to justify federal habeas relief. Brecht, 507 U.S. 619, 623

(1993). Habeas petitioners must therefore establish that the error resulted in

“actual” prejudice. See id.

B. Analysis

Analyzing Petitioner’s claim under the factors enumerated in Chia

establishes that the Court of Appeal’s decision finding no constitutional error

was an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. See Chia, 360

F.3d at 1004. 

Petitioner’s defense was that he acted without premeditation and

deliberation and without malice, making his crime manslaughter, not murder. 

Brown, slip op. 14. Dr. Riley’s testimony that organic brain disease can result in

impulsivity was relevant to the issue of whether Petitioner acted with

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premeditation, deliberation and malice. Id. Accordingly, the precluded

testimony constitutes a major part of Petitioner’s defense. 

The excluded evidence was reliable. Dr. Riley was an expert in

neurology. She examined petitioner and administered valid neuropsychological

tests. She was qualified to give an expert opinion as to a diagnosis of

Petitioner’s organic brain disease and its potential effects.

The excluded evidence was capable of evaluation by the jurors. If Dr.

Riley’s precluded testimony was introduced, the jury would have been called

upon to assess Dr. Riley’s testimony regarding the effects of Petitioner’s brain

disorder alongside other evidence showing whether or not Petitioner actually

formed the requisite intent when he shot Lee. Such determinations are within the

province of the jury as fact-finder. 

Dr. Riley’s excluded testimony was probative of the central issue in the

case: whether Petitioner acted with express or implied malice. Brown, slip op. at

18-19. While the Court of Appeal found that Dr. Riley’s precluded testimony

was not specific to Petitioner, a review of the record shows that counsel made an

offer of proof of Dr. Riley’s written evaluation of Petitioner as testimony at trial,

before the Court limited Dr. Riley’s testimony at the 402 hearing. RT at 817-18. 

In Dr. Riley’s evaluation, she found that episodic emotional discontrol and

Petitioner’s “neuropsychological dysfunction played a central role in his actions”

on the date of the murder (Riley Evaluation at 8), see, Clerk’s Transcript (“CT”),

Respondent’s Exhibit A, at 94-102, finding that the incident (“conditions of

intense emotional arousal,” id.) was the type that could result in an impulsive

reaction from a person with Petitioner’s impaired mental condition. Nunn, 50

Cal.App.4th at 1357. The testimony therefore had probative value on this central

issue. 

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Notably, during deliberations, the jury requested that the trial court

provide read-back of Dr. Riley’s testimony, specifically requesting “the end of

the testimony where she discussed test results [and] conclusions.” In the same

request, the jury asked the court to provide “clarification of [CALJIC] 3.32.” CT

at 174. Given the jury’s request for read-back of Dr. Riley’s conclusions and for

clarification of the jury instruction which describes the effect to be given to such

evidence, it is apparent that the jury considered this evidence at a minimum to

some degree in rendering its verdict. 

Dr. Riley’s precluded testimony also was the sole evidence on this issue. 

While the trial court allowed Riley to explain certain symptoms of Petitioner’s

brain disease, the jury was unable to hear evidence of Petitioner’s impulsivity or

emotional discontrol. This was the best and only evidence that Brown possessed

to substantiate his claim that he acted without malice. See Chia, 360 F.3d 1005. 

Accordingly, the trial court’s limitation of Dr. Riley’s testimony constitutes

constitutional error and the state courts denial of the claim is an unreasonable

interpretation of clearly established federal law. Chia, 360 F.3d 997 at 1005. 

Habeas relief, however, would only be appropriate if the exclusion had

“substantial and injurious effect” on the verdict. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623. In

determining the likely impact of a constitutional error, the reviewing court

should review the strength of the prosecution’s case. Gray v. Klauser, 282 F.3d

633, 653 n.16 (9th Cir. 2002), vac’d on other grounds in Klauser v. Gray, 537

U.S. 1041 (2002). Where properly-admitted evidence overwhelmingly supports

a jury finding of guilt, a trial error will not be deemed to have had a substantial

influence on a verdict. Lawson v. Borg, 60 F.3d 608, 613 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting

that constitutional error could be “rendered insignificant by overwhelming

evidence of guilt”). 

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This Court agrees with the Court of Appeal that there was an

overwhelming amount of evidence in the record showing that when Petitioner

shot Lee, he was acting with either express or implied malice. Throughout the

workday, Petitioner and Lee had exchanged hostile comments. When he

discovered that Lee had taken the keys to the work van, Petitioner became

enraged. Petitioner ignored his co-workers’ advice to calm down on the ride

back to the work yard. Upon arriving at the work yard, petitioner walked to his

car, grabbed his semiautomatic pistol from his trunk, loaded it and walked over

to the dispatch office. After entering the office, Petitioner ignored Lee’s attempt

to apologize and shot him from a distance of only five or six feet. When Lee fell

backward to the floor, Petitioner shot Lee again repeatedly, inflicting multiple

wounds to Lee’s head, face, and body. After the murder, Petitioner admitted to

police officers that when he got the gun he was angry and wanted to hurt Lee. 

Brown, slip op. 17-18. 

In light of the overwhelming weight of evidence that Petitioner acted with

malice when he shot Lee, it cannot be said that the trial court’s limitation on Dr.

Riley’s testimony had a “substantial and injurious effect” on the verdict and

resulted in “actual” prejudice. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623. Petitioner is

therefore not entitled to federal habeas relief on this claim.

2. Exclusion of Evidence of Lee’s Prior Violent Acts

Petitioner contends that the trial court denied him his right to present a

defense by excluding evidence of the prior violent acts of Lee, the victim. 

Before trial, the prosecutor filed a motion in limine to exclude introduction of

evidence regarding Lee’s alleged character for violence. The prosecutor argued

that because Petitioner had never made a claim of self-defense, evidence

concerning Lee’s prior bad acts should be excluded because it was irrelevant. 

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CT 109-110. Defense counsel contended that the motion was “premature”

because “whether or not those incidents should come into evidence would

depend upon what testimony is presented and exactly what the testimony is.” RT

44. Additionally, defense counsel maintained repeatedly that the relationship

between Petitioner and Lee was relevant. RT 45-49. 

The trial court granted the prosecutor’s motion in part. The trial court

ruled, that “unless there is going to be some evidence with respect to selfdefense, we really don’t need to get into the character of the victim with respect

to his character traits for violence per se.” RT 49. The trial court stated that

before the defense could introduce evidence of Lee’s prior bad acts, a hearing

under California Evidence Code section 402 would be held to determine the

relevance of such evidence. RT 49-50.

The trial court found, however, that the relationship between Petitioner

and Lee was relevant and that defense counsel could elicit information regarding

the direct relationship between Petitioner and Lee. Id. The court acknowledged

the potential for such testimony to “slide” into the area of prior bad acts. RT 49-

50. Nevertheless, the trial court expressed its intention to deal with the issue “on

a question and answer/objection basis. Id.

A. Legal Standard

A defendant’s right to present relevant evidence is not unlimited, but

rather is subject to reasonable restrictions. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410

(1988). States have broad latitude under the Constitution to establish rules

excluding evidence from criminal trials. United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303,

308 (1998). While the U.S. Constitution prohibits the exclusion of defense

evidence under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate

to the ends that they are asserted to promote, well-established rules of evidence

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permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by

certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential

to mislead the jury. Holmes v. South Carolina, 126 S. Ct. 1727 (2006). Plainly

referring to rules of this type, the United States Supreme Court has stated that the

U.S. Constitution permits judges to exclude evidence that is only marginally

relevant or poses an undue risk of prejudice. Id.

As noted previously, in order to determine whether there has been a

constitutional violation in a case involving the exclusion of evidence, the court

must balance the five factors set forth in Chia v. Camra, 281 F.3d at 1004. The

court also must consider the state interests underlying the evidentiary rules. Id.

at 1006. In order to establish a claim for relief, a petitioner must establish

constitutional error, as well as show that the error had a substantial and injurious

effect on the jury’s verdict. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623.

B. Analysis

Petitioner is unable to establish that his due process right to a fair trial or

his Sixth Amendment right to present a defense were denied as a result of the

trial court’s decision to exclude evidence of Lee’s prior violent acts. Evidence of

Lee’s prior violent acts did not play a central role in Petitioner’s defense. 

Petitioner’s defense was that he acted without premeditation, deliberation or

malice, making his crime manslaughter, not murder. Brown, slip op. 14. 

Petitioner never asserted self-defense as a defense theory at trial. 

The probative value of allowing Petitioner to inform the jury of Lee’s

violent acts would have been marginal at best. The mere fact that Lee had

committed violent acts in the past was not relevant to the central issue in the case

in that it did not have a tendency to prove or disprove whether petitioner acted

without premeditation and deliberation and without malice.

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The state’s interest in excluding the evidence was strong. The state has an

obvious interest in excluding irrelevant evidence. See Chia, 360 F.3d at 1004. 

On this record, the trial court’s decision to exclude Lee’s prior violent acts

did not amount to constitutional error, nor was the state court’s exclusion was

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. 

See 28 USC § 2254(d). Because the evidence was mostly, if not entirely,

irrelevant, Petitioner is also unable to establish that excluding Lee’s violent acts

had a substantial and injurious effect on his ability to prevail at trial. See Brecht,

507 U.S. at 623.

3. Prosecutorial Misconduct

Petitioner claims the prosecution’s withholding of material evidence 

violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Petitioner

alleges two separate instances of prosecutorial misconduct: (1) the prosecution

failed to disclose material evidence when it intentionally deleted portions of

Petitioner’s videotaped and audiotaped statement to police after his arrest, which 

would have shown that Petitioner told the police that he was scared of Lee, that

Lee had committed various prior violent acts, and that Lee “was going toward

him when [Petitioner] pulled the gun from his waist and shot at [Lee]”; and (2)

the prosecution withheld police reports that might have shown Lee’s prior violent

acts.

A. Legal Standard

Due process requires the prosecutor to disclose information that might

create a reasonable doubt, that is, information that might lead to discovery of

favorable evidence “material either to guilt or to punishment.” Brady v.

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). “Evidence is material only if there is a

reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the

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result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” United States v.

Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985): see also United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97,

103-07 (1976) (holding constitutional standard of materiality imposes higher

burden on defendant than ordinary harmless error standard).

In order to establish that the prosecutor’s withholding of evidence

constituted a due process violation, Petitioner must therefore prove three things:

the evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is

exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been

suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must

have ensued. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999).

B. Analysis

Petitioner’s claim that the prosecution withheld police reports that might

have shown Lee’s prior violent acts is without merit because a review of the

record clearly shows that the prosecution provided the defense with the police

reports at issue. At the pre-trial hearing on whether to exclude evidence of Lee’s

prior bad acts, defense counsel stated he had received the police reports at issue:

“I think in regard to the police reports that have been

provided to me by the district attorney’s office regarding prior acts

of violence, some of which involved guns, some of which involved

assault on a police officer with an automobile, these things that I

have learned about the complaining witnesses thorough district

attorney police reports, I would agree that as to those items, we

will have further discussion.”

RT 46. Given the fact that the record refutes Petitioner’s assertion, Petitioner is

unable to establish a due process violation on this claim.

As to the alleged deletion of Petitioner’s statements to the police, a review

of the record shows that the defense was involved in editing the videotape before

it was shown to the jury. RT 34-40. The prosecution provided the defense with

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a transcript of the interview. RT 42. Defense counsel stated that he would

review the transcript and determine that if it was an accurate statement of what

was on the audio or videotape. Id. Petitioner and his counsel viewed the

videotape, along with the jury, and made no objection complaining that the tape

provided was missing any necessary communications. RT 482, 490. Detective

Willis authenticated the videotape as a true and accurate videotape of the

interview. RT 490-491. Defense counsel, in fact, made repeated use of the tape

in supporting the theory that Petitioner acted without malice aforethought when

he killed the victim and that he was only guilty of voluntary manslaughter. 

Brown, slip op. 16.

Without some factual support, Petitioner’s speculation that there were

material parts of the interview left out is insufficient to merit relief. See Wood v.

Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1995) (suppression of evidence claim cannot be

based on mere speculation without adequate support). 

Petitioner also does not show prejudice under the standard of review

applicable to Brady claims. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995) (a

violation will be found under Brady by simply showing that the favorable

evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light

as to undermine confidence in the verdict). No evidence on the record suggests

that Lee was acting aggressively toward petitioner when he was shot. On the

contrary, all witnesses to the incident testified that just before the shooting, Lee

attempted to apologize; that Petitioner ignored Lee’s attempt to apologize and

shot Lee from a distance of only five or six feet; and after the first shot, when

Lee fell backward to the floor, Petitioner shot Lee again repeatedly, inflicting

multiple wounds to Lee’s head, face, and body. In light of the overwhelming

evidence tending to disprove petitioner’s allegation of self-defense, there is no

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reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different if

Petitioner had been able to introduce the portions of the videotape and audiotape

he claims he did not receive. See United States v. Golb, 69 F.3d 1417, 1430 (9th

Cir. 1995) (ultimate question is whether there is reasonable probability that had

material been disclosed, result of proceeding would have been different such that

confidence in outcome is undermined).

4. Claim of Juror Bias

Petitioner claims that his Sixth Amendment and due process rights were

violated by the inclusion of an allegedly biased juror. During voir dire, Juror No.

1 indicated to the court that his eighteen month old nephew had his throat slit by

an intruder who was on PCP. RT 258-259. Juror No. 1 noted that the court

proceedings took place in San Francisco and that “[t]he judicial system” released

the assailant after six months. Id. The prosecutor asked Juror No. 1, “what I

need to know is whether or not you think any feelings you may have about

what’s happened in the past in the system would affect the way you would judge

the evidence in this case and render a verdict?” Id. The juror replied, “No, it

wouldn’t. It would just have to be that the plaintiff would have to prove to me

that the defendant is guilty.” RT 259. When later asked by defense counsel

whether he could be fair and impartial, Juror No. 1 replied, “I think I can be.” 

RT 263. 

Defense counsel did not move to excuse Juror No. 1 for cause or use one

of its peremptory challenges to remove the juror. At the end of jury selection,

defense counsel stated, “Your Honor, defense is satisfied with the jury as

constituted and we pass.” RT 361.

A. Legal Standard

The right to a jury trial guarantees the accused “a fair trial by a panel of

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impartial, ‘indifferent jurors.’” Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S.

539, 551 (1976) (citing In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)); Dyer v.

Calderon, 151 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 1998). The bias or prejudice of even a

single juror violates a defendant’s right to a fair trial. United States v. Hendrix,

549 F.2d 1225, 1227 (9th Cir. 1977). The presence of a biased juror cannot be

harmless; the error requires a new trial without a showing of actual prejudice.

Calderon, 151 F.3d at 973. 

A juror is considered to be impartial “only if he can lay aside his opinion

and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.” Patton v. Yount,

467 U.S. 1025, 1037 n. 12 (1984). The Constitution lays down no particular tests

and procedure to ascertain impartiality. Courts therefore have “broad discretion

and duty . . . to see that the jury as finally selected is subject to no solid basis of

objection on the score of impartiality.” Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497,

511 (1948); United States v. Torres, 128 F.3d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1997) (the trial

judge has the authority and responsibility, either sua sponte or upon counsel’s

motion, to dismiss prospective jurors for cause). Because determinations of

impartiality may be based in large part upon demeanor, federal habeas relief may

only be granted for a state court’s failure to strike a juror for cause where there is

no fair support in the record for the trial court’s determination that the juror was

unbiased. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985).

B. Analysis

 Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim because there is ample

support for the trial court’s determination that the juror was unbiased. The juror

was subjected to the rigors of voir dire, during which he indicated to the court, to

prosecution and to the defense that he would be fair and impartial if seated on the

jury. Neither the court, counsel, court personnel, nor other jurors reported

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inappropriate behavior by the juror. Given these facts, it cannot be said that

there was no fair support in the record for the trial court’s determination that the

juror was unbiased. See Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 424. 

5. Juror No. 3's Inability to Comprehend English

Petitioner contends that Juror No. 3's alleged inability to comprehend

English deprived him of his right to a fair trial. During voir dire, defense counsel

questioned Juror No. 3 and the juror responded in English. RT 343. The juror

stated that he was born outside of the United States, that English was his second

language, that he had no problem with the English language, and that he learned

English in his native country. Id.

During deliberations, the trial court received a note from the jury

foreperson indicating that two jurors had expressed that another juror was

“having some difficulty with the instructions and the evidence due to the fact that

English is not the juror's first language.” RT 1235. Both counsel and

prosecution met with the court outside the jury's presence. The prosecutor

moved for a hearing and investigation into the juror’s ineligibility to serve based

on insufficient knowledge of the English language. RT 1235. The court

decided to voir dire the foreperson on this issue. RT 126. Defense counsel

objected, arguing that pretrial voir dire demonstrated that no juror seated in the

case had problems with the English language. RT 1240. The defense counsel

then motioned for a mistrial, arguing that the note from the foreperson showed

that there had been private communications between the jurors, about either the

substance of the case or the nature of the deliberation process. RT 1237. 

Over defense counsel’s objection, the court inquired of the foreperson

about the juror's knowledge of the English language. RT 1241. In response to

questioning by the court and the prosecutor, the foreperson stated that Juror No.

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3 had shown some difficulty with the nuances of the English language and

confusion over the instructions. RT 1244. The foreperson stated that the juror

needed explanation on the difference between ordinary and ordinarily, and that

the juror had misspelled prosecution. RT 1244-1248. The foreperson stated that

“occasionally confusion has happened,” but that the jury “could work through

the problems.” RT 1247-1249. After the questioning, defense counsel renewed

his objection to the counsel’s voir dire, contending that deliberation is a very

delicate stage of the proceedings and that such questioning implied subtle

coercion. RT 1250. 

The prosecutor requested that the court examine Juror No. 3 individually. 

RT 1250-1251. Defense counsel argued that questioning the juror would be

coercive and that “there was nothing on the record to indicate there was a

language problem.” RT 1253.

The trial court denied the prosecutor’s request to voir dire Juror No. 3. 

RT 1253. The trial court also denied the defense’s motion for mistrial. Id. The

court pointed out that the foreperson stated that there were no “insurmountable”

problems, that the jury was working through the problems and denied any further

inquiry into the issue. Id.

A. Legal Standard

“Due process means a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely

on the evidence before it.” See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982). 

Persons who are not possessed of sufficient knowledge of the English language

are incapable of discharging the duties of a juror. See e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§

1865(b)(2)-(3); People v. Szymanski, 109 Cal. App. 4th 1126 (2003)

(“Insufficient command of the English language to allow full understanding of

the words employed in instructions and full participation in deliberations clearly

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renders a juror unable to perform his duty within the meaning of Cal. Penal Code

§ 1089.”). 

Where jurors have been subjected to careful questioning there is a strong

presumption of juror competence. See Smith, 455 U.S. 209; Tinsley v. Borg, 895

F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1990). When a party fails to challenge the juror at the time of

trial, “in order to prevail she must show cause for her failure to object and actual

prejudice due to the juror’s presence.” Kimes v. United States, 939 F.2d 776, 779

(9th Cir. 1991). 

B. Analysis

Petitioner’s claim is without merit because he does not show cause for his

failure to object, nor demonstrate actual prejudice due to Juror No. 3's presence

on the jury. See Kimes, 939 F.2d at 779. Petitioner was present during voir dire,

at which time Juror No. 3 was questioned about his proficiency in English. The

juror responded to questions in English and answered in the affirmative when

asked if English was his second language. RT 343. Petitioner had the

opportunity at that time to object for cause or, alternatively, to use a peremptory

strike. When the issue of Juror No. 3's ability to comprehend English was before

the court, instead of objecting to the juror's presence, defense counsel stated that

Juror No. 3 spoke English “very well” and insisted that the court refrain from

questioning the juror on his comprehension of the English language. Petitioner

therefore cannot show “cause” for her failure to object. Due to Petitioner’s

inability to show cause for his failure to object, the court need not further

consider the merits of his argument. See United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528

U.S. 304 (2000) (implying that defendant must object to court's denial of

for-cause challenge in order to preserve Sixth Amendment challenge to juror's

service on petit jury). But even if the court were to consider the merits, there is

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nothing to suggest that Juror No. 3's inclusion on the jury prejudiced petitioner.

See Kimes, 939 F.2d at 779. Nothing on the record compels the conclusion that

the Juror No. 3 was incompetent.

6. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

Petitioner contends that trial counsel’s ineffective performance deprived

him of his Sixth Amendment right of effective assistance of counsel. Petitioner

alleges two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel: (1) trial counsel was

ineffective for preventing Petitioner from testifying at trial; and (2) trial counsel

was ineffective for failing to move to introduce police reports showing the

victim's prior violent acts.

A. Legal Standard

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel guarantees not only assistance, but

effective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686

(1984). To prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel

claim, Petitioner must establish that counsel’s performance was deficient and fell

below an “objective standard of reasonableness” under prevailing professional

norms. Id. at 687-88. Petitioner also must establish that he was prejudiced by

counsel’s deficient performance and that “there is a reasonable probability that,

but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different.” Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceedings. Id.

A difference of opinion as to trial tactics does not constitute denial of

effective assistance. United States v. Mayo, 646 F.2d 369, 375 (9th Cir. 1981). 

A trial attorney has wide discretion in making tactical decisions. Turk v. White,

105 F.3d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 1997) (deference to trial counsel's discretion includes

decision to abandon inconsistent or unsupported defenses).

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B. Analysis

When a defendant, “on advice of counsel, knowingly and voluntarily, if

reluctantly, refrained from testifying in his own defense,” no constitutional error

occurs. Campbell v. Vaughn, 209 F.3d 280, 291 (3rd Cir. 2000). Even if

Petitioner’s counsel forcefully urged Petitioner not to testify, the record

establishes that Petitioner was repeatedly made aware that only he could make

the final decision. During voir dire, with Petitioner in attendance, defense

counsel and the trial judge on several occasions explained to prospective jurors

of Petitioner’s right not to testify at trial. In one exchange, defense counsel

stated, “If Mr. Brown chose not to testify, and the judge instructed you that you

couldn’t consider that, would you follow that rule of law?” RT 261. Moreover,

at defense counsel’s request, the trial court instructed the jury in the language of

CALJIC Nos. 2.60 (Defendant Not Testifying-No Inference of Guilt May Be

Drawn”). RT 1211-12. On this record, Petitioner cannot establish constitutional

error.

Petitioner’s argument with respect to counsel’s failure to introduce police

reports showing the victim’s prior violent acts is also without merit. A court

need not address the question of counsel’s deficient performance if it finds that

the Petitioner was not prejudiced thereby. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. The

Court denied this claim on the merits in section 2, above, finding the evidence

was mostly irrelevant, and that its exclusion did not prejudice Petitioner at trial. 

As such, no prejudice is found with regard to this claim.

7. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

Petitioner claims that appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance of

counsel for failing to raise on appeal the claims Petitioner now raises in his

habeas petition.

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A. Legal Standard

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a

criminal defendant the effective assistance of counsel on his first appeal as of

right. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 391-405 (1985). Claims of ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel are reviewed according to the standard set out in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d

1428, 1433 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Birtle, 792 F.2d 846, 847 (9th Cir.

1986). A defendant must therefore show that appellate counsel’s advice fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a reasonable

probability that, but for appellate counsel's unprofessional errors, he would have

prevailed on appeal. Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688,

694; Birtle, 792 F.2d at 849).

An appellate counsel does not have a constitutional duty to raise every

nonfrivolous issue requested by the defendant. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S.

745, 751-54 (1983); Gerlaugh v. Stewart, 129 F.3d 1027, 1045 (9th Cir. 1997);

Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434 n.10. The weeding out of weaker issues is widely

recognized as one of the hallmarks of effective appellate advocacy. See Miller,

882 F.2d at 1434 (footnote and citations omitted). Appellate counsel therefore

will frequently remain above an objective standard of competence and have

caused his client no prejudice for the same reason--because he declined to raise a

weak issue. See id.

B. Analysis

Appellate counsel did not raise on appeal Petitioner’s claims of

prosecutorial misconduct, juror bias, juror incompetence and ineffective

assistance of trial counsel. As discussed above, however, these claims are

without merit. An appellate lawyer’s failure to raise a meritless claim is neither

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unreasonable nor prejudicial. See Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434 (footnote and

citations omitted). Petitioner accordingly did not receive ineffective assistance

of appellate counsel nor was he prejudiced by the manner in which his appeal

was conducted. Habeas relief is therefore denied as to this claim. See id.

CONCLUSION

After a careful review of the record and pertinent law, the petition for writ

of habeas corpus is DENIED. The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of

Respondent and close the file.

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 30, 2007 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

United States District Judge

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