Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_23-cv-00690/USCOURTS-caed-1_23-cv-00690-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
T. Allen
Respondent
Lachance L. Thomas
Petitioner

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LACHANCE L. THOMAS,

Petitioner,

v.

T. ALLEN,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:23-cv-00690-EPG-HC

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY 

PETITION SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED 

FOR FAILURE TO EXHAUST STATE 

JUDICIAL REMEDIES

Petitioner Lachance L. Thomas is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for 

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

I.

BACKGROUND

On December 29, 2022, Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas petition challenging his 

2017 Fresno County Superior Court convictions in the Sacramento Division of the United States 

District Court for the Eastern District of California. (ECF No. 1.) Subsequently, the petition was 

transferred to the Fresno Division. (ECF No. 11.) Petitioner has moved for stay and abeyance of 

his petition while his unexhausted claims are pending in state court. (ECF Nos. 7, 14.)

II.

DISCUSSION

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases requires preliminary review of a 

habeas petition and allows a district court to dismiss a petition before the respondent is ordered 

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to file a response, if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the 

petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” Rule 4, Rules Governing Section 2254

Cases in the United States District Courts, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254.

A. Exhaustion

A petitioner in state custody who is proceeding with a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The exhaustion doctrine is based 

on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial opportunity to correct the state’s 

alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. 

Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982). A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by 

providing the highest state court with a full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before 

presenting it to the federal court. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999); Duncan v. 

Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971).

In the petition, Petitioner appears to raise the same claims that were raised on direct 

appeal to the California Court of Appeal by Petitioner and his codefendant,1 which include: 

sufficiency of the evidence regarding the first-degree murder convictions, erroneous admission 

of hearsay from an investigator and text messages from a cellphone, erroneous admission of 

irrelevant testimony, failure to instruct on the lesser-included offense of involuntary 

manslaughter, and erroneous instruction regarding witness identification. (ECF No. 1 at 56–57.) 

The petition specifically notes that Petitioner’s fourth ground for relief is regarding his California 

Penal Code section 1170.95 petition and is not exhausted. (ECF No. 1 at 5.)2It is unclear 

whether the claims raised on direct appeal to the California Court of Appeal were also raised in a 

petition for review in the California Supreme Court. 

If Petitioner has not sought relief in the California Supreme Court for the claims that he 

raises in the petition, the Court cannot proceed to the merits of those claims. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(b)(1). It is possible, however, that Petitioner has fairly presented his claims to the 

1 On the petition form itself, Petitioner writes “See Attached (Exhibit A)” for Grounds One through Three. (ECF No. 

1 at 4–5.) Attached to the petition are the various briefs filed in the California Court of Appeal on direct appeal by 

Petitioner and his co-defendant and the California Court of Appeal’s opinion. (Id. at 8–152.)

2 Page numbers refer to the ECF page numbers stamped at the top of the page.

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California Supreme Court and failed to indicate this to the Court. Thus, Petitioner must inform 

the Court whether his claims have been fairly presented to the California Supreme Court, and if 

possible, provide the Court with a copy of the petition filed in the California Supreme Court that 

includes the claims now presented and a file stamp showing that the petition was indeed filed in 

the California Supreme Court.

In the event that Petitioner has not fairly presented his claims to the California Supreme 

Court, Petitioner may, at his option, withdraw the unexhausted claims and go forward with the 

exhausted claims. See Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568, 574 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[D]istrict courts 

must provide habeas litigants with the opportunity to amend their mixed petitions by striking 

unexhausted claims as an alternative to suffering dismissal.”).3 Petitioner may also move to 

withdraw the entire petition and return to federal court when he has finally exhausted his state 

court remedies.4 Additionally, Petitioner may move to stay and hold in abeyance the petition 

while he exhausts his claims in state court pursuant. Here, Petitioner has filed motions for stay, 

which are addressed in section II(B), infra. 

B. Motion for Stay

In the motion for stay, Petitioner indicates that claims regarding the 1170.95 petition, 

ineffective assistance of counsel, and actual innocence are unexhausted. (ECF No. 7.) Under 

Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005), “stay and abeyance” is available only in limited 

circumstances, and only when: (1) there is “good cause” for the failure to exhaust; (2) the 

unexhausted claims are not “plainly meritless”; and (3) the petitioner did not intentionally 

engage in dilatory litigation tactics. 544 U.S. at 277–78. Under Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063 

(9th Cir. 2002), a three-step procedure is used: (1) the petitioner amends his petition to delete any 

unexhausted claims; (2) the court in its discretion stays the amended, fully exhausted petition, 

and holds it in abeyance while the petitioner has the opportunity to proceed to state court to 

3 The Court notes that “prisoners filing mixed petitions may proceed with only the exhausted claims, but doing so 

risks subjecting later petitions that raise new claims to rigorous procedural obstacles,” such as the bar against second 

or successive petitions. Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 154 (2007).

4 Although the limitation period tolls while a properly filed request for collateral review is pending in state court, 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), it does not toll for the time a federal habeas petition is pending in federal court. Duncan v. 

Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181–82 (2001). 

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exhaust the deleted claims; and (3) once the claims have been exhausted in state court, the 

petitioner may return to federal court and amend his federal petition to include the newlyexhausted claims. 315 F.3d at 1070–71 (citing Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Taylor), 

134 F.3d 981, 986 (9th Cir. 1998)).5

Here, Petitioner does not provide any explanation whatsoever regarding his failure to 

exhaust. Additionally, it is unclear to the Court whether any of Petitioner’s claims are exhausted. 

Therefore, based on the record before the Court, a stay pursuant either to Rhines or Kelly is not 

warranted at this time. However, Petitioner may renew his request for a stay and address the 

legal standards set forth above. 

III.

ORDER

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner SHALL SHOW CAUSE why 

the petition should not be dismissed for failure to exhaust state court remedies within THIRTY 

(30) days from the date of service of this order.

Petitioner is forewarned that failure to follow this order may result in dismissal of the 

petition pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) (a petitioner’s failure to prosecute or 

to comply with a court order may result in a dismissal of the action).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 12, 2023 /s/

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

5 A petitioner’s use of Kelly’s three-step procedure, however, is subject to the requirement of Mayle v. Felix, 545 

U.S. 644, 664 (2005), that any newly exhausted claims that a petitioner seeks to add to a pending federal habeas

petition must be timely or relate back, i.e., share a “common core of operative facts,” to claims contained in the 

original petition that were exhausted at the time of filing. King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133, 1143 (9th Cir. 2009).

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