Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01750/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01750-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
J. Macomber
Respondent
Demetri Kay Madden
Petitioner

Document Text:

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DEMETRI KAY MADDEN, No. 2:15-cv-1750-JAM-CMK-P

Petitioner, 

vs. ORDER

J. MACOMBER,

Respondent.

 /

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this petition for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pending before the court is respondent’s

unopposed motion to dismiss the petition on the grounds that it is not fully exhausted (Doc. 15). 

I. MOTION TO DISMISS

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to

dismiss a petition if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the

petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing

Section 2254 Cases. The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss in

lieu of an answer if the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being

in violation of the state's procedural rules. See, e.g., O'Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th

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Cir. 1990) (using Rule 4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to exhaust state

remedies); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989) (using Rule 4 as procedural

grounds to review motion to dismiss for state procedural default); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F. Supp.

1189, 1194 & n. 12 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). Thus, a respondent can file a motion to dismiss

after the court orders a response, and the Court should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion.

See Hillery, 533 F. Supp. at 1194 & n.12. The petitioner bears the burden of showing that he has

exhausted state remedies. See Cartwright v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Here, respondent argues that one of the claims raised in petitioner’s federal habeas

petition is unexhausted as petitioner failed to present the claim to the California Supreme Court.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), the exhaustion of available state remedies is required

before the federal court can grant a claim presented in a habeas corpus case. See Rose v. Lundy,

455 U.S. 509 (1982); see also Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003); Hunt v.

Pliler, 336 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 2003). “A petitioner may satisfy the exhaustion requirement in

two ways: (1) by providing the highest state court with an opportunity to rule on the merits of the

claim . . .; or (2) by showing that at the time the petitioner filed the habeas petition in federal

court no state remedies are available to the petitioner and the petitioner has not deliberately

by-passed the state remedies.” Batchelor v. Cupp , 693 F.2d 859, 862 (9th Cir. 1982) (citations

omitted). The exhaustion doctrine is based on a policy of federal and state comity, designed to

give state courts the initial opportunity to correct alleged constitutional deprivations. See Picard

v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971); see also Rose, 455 U.S. at 518. 

Regardless of whether the claim was raised on direct appeal or in a postconviction proceeding, the exhaustion doctrine requires that each claim be fairly presented to the

state’s highest court. See Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346 (1989). Although the exhaustion

doctrine requires only the presentation of each federal claim to the highest state court, the claims

must be presented in a posture that is acceptable under state procedural rules. See Sweet v.

Cupp, 640 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1981). Thus, an appeal or petition for post-conviction relief that is

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denied by the state courts on procedural grounds, where other state remedies are still available,

does not exhaust the petitioner’s state remedies. See Pitchess v. Davis, 421 U.S. 482, 488

(1979); Sweet, 640 F.2d at 237-89.1

In addition to presenting the claim to the state court in a procedurally acceptable

manner, exhaustion requires that the petitioner make the federal basis of the claim explicit to the

state court by including reference to a specific federal constitutional guarantee. See Gray v.

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996); see also Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 998 (9th

Cir. 2000). It is not sufficient for the petitioner to argue that the federal nature of the claim is

self-evident. See Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 2000), amended by 247 F.3d

904 (9th Cir. 2001). 

When faced with petitions containing both exhausted and unexhausted claim

(mixed petitions), the Ninth Circuit held in Ford v. Hubbard that the district court is required to

give two specific warnings to pro se petitioners: (1) the court could only consider a stay-andabeyance motion if the petitioner chose to proceed with his exhausted claims and dismiss the

unexhausted claims; and (2) federal claims could be time-barred upon return to federal court if he

opted to dismiss the entire petition to exhaust unexhausted claims. See 330 F.3d 1086, 1099 (9th

Cir. 2003). However, the Supreme Court held in Pliler v. Ford that the district court is not

required to give these particular warnings. See 542 U.S. 225, 234 (2004).2 Furthermore, the

district court is not required to sua sponte consider stay and abeyance in the absence of a request

1 This situation of procedural deficiency is distinguishable from a case presented to

the state court using proper procedures but where relief on the merits is precluded for some

procedural reason, such as untimeliness or failure to raise the claim on direct appeal. The former

represents an exhaustion problem; the latter represents a procedural default problem. 

2 The Supreme Court did not address the propriety of Ninth Circuit’s three-step

stay-and-abeyance procedure which involves dismissal of unexhausted claims from the original

petition, stay of the remaining claims pending exhaustion, and amendment of the original petition

to add newly exhausted claims that then relate back to the original petition. See Pliler, 542 U.S.

at 230-31 (citing Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Taylor), 134 F.3d 981, 986-88 (9th Cir.

1998)). 

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from the petitioner, see Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir. 2007), or to inform the

petitioner that stay and abeyance may be available, see Brambles v. Duncan, 412 F.3d 1066,

1070-71 (9th Cir. 2005). Therefore, in the absence of a stay-and-abeyance motion, the district

court should dismiss mixed petitions and need not provide any specific warnings before doing so. 

See Robbins, 481 F.3d at 1147 (citing Rose, 455 U.S. at 510 (holding that the petitioner has the

“choice of returning to state court to exhaust his claims or of amending or resubmitting the

habeas petition to present only exhausted claims to the district court”)).

In the instant case, respondent argues claim four of petitioner’s petition is

unexhausted, as he failed to present the claim to the California Supreme Court. Specifically,

respondent contends that petitioner only filed a direct appeal, including a petition for review in

the California Supreme Court, but no state petitions for writ of habeas corpus. In the petition for

review filed with the California Supreme Court, petitioner raised three of the claims in his federal

petition (two due process claims, and a failure to arraign), but he did not raise his fourth claim,

ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. As petitioner has not filed an

opposition to the motion to dismiss, it appears he concedes that his petition is not fully

unexhausted. In addition, due to his lack of opposition, he fails to make any request that the

court enter a stay and abeyance order. Thus, dismissal of his petition is appropriate. Petitioner

has the choice whether to return to the state court to exhaust his claims, or file an amended

petition presenting only exhausted claims to this court.

II. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that respondent’s

unopposed motion to dismiss (Doc. 15) be granted.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of

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objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal. 

See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: October 27, 2016

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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