Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_10-cv-01382/USCOURTS-cand-3_10-cv-01382-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert Alvarado
Defendant
John Bullock
Defendant
Carpenters 46 Northern California Counties - Joint Apprenticeship Training Committee (JATC)
Defendant
Gustave W. Link
Plaintiff
Northern California Carpenters Regional Council Trust Fund (ERISA)
Defendant
Pile Drivers Union Local 34
Defendant
Steve Tilton
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GUSTAVE W. LINK,

Plaintiff,

 v.

PILE DRIVERS UNION LOCAL 34;

NORTHERN CALIFORNIA CARPENTERS

REGIONAL COUNCIL TRUST FUND

(ERISA); CARPENTERS 46 NORTHERN

CALIFORNIA COUNTIES - JOINT

APPRENTICESHIP TRAINING

COMMITTEE (JATC); STEVE TILTON;

JOHN BULLOCK; and ROBERT

ALVARADO,

Defendants. /

No. C 10-1382 MHP

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Re: Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff Gustave Link (“Link”) filed this action against various defendants alleging that they

retaliated against him because he publicly criticized union officials. Now before the court is

defendants’ motion to dismiss Link’s complaint. The court finds this motion suitable for decision

without oral argument. Civil L.R. 7-1(b). Having considered the parties’ submissions, and for the

reasons set forth below, the court enters the following order.

BACKGROUND

Link was a member of the Pile Drivers Union Local 34. Docket No. 1 (“Complaint”) ¶ 5. 

He received training as a pile driver through the Carpenters 46 Northern California Counties - Joint

Apprenticeship Training Committee (“JATC”), a joint labor and management sponsored

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apprenticeship training program. Id. As an apprentice pile driver and member of the local union,

Link was employed by KFM Joint Venture (“KFM”) to perform construction work on the San

Francisco Bay Bridge. Id. While working at KFM and attending apprenticeship training classes,

Link voiced complaints against union officials for ignoring unsafe working conditions. Id. ¶ 6. In

early 2004, Link stopped attending classes at the apprenticeship school because of a work-related

heart condition. Id. ¶ 8. On March 11, 2005, Link was informed that he would be terminated if he

failed to provide proof of his medical condition. Id. ¶ 12. On July 22, the JATC terminated Link’s

apprenticeship agreement and removed him from the apprenticeship program. Link alleges that the

JATC terminated him as retaliation for his complaints against union officials. Id. ¶ 36.

On January 20, 2006, Link filed a complaint claiming he was entitled to relief for alleged

violations of his constitutional rights, disability discrimination, violations of the Labor-Management

Relations Act, violations of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (“LMRDA”),

breach of fiduciary duty, breach of union contract, legal malpractice, violations of the California

Labor Code, negligence and conspiracy by the Pile Drivers Union Local 34 and numerous associated

individuals. This court dismissed Link’s complaint and granted him leave to amend. Link v.

Rhodes, No. C 06-0386, 2006 WL 1348424 (N.D. Cal. May 17, 2006) (Patel J.). On July 5, 2006

Link filed an amended complaint alleging violations of his constitutional rights, the LMRDA, the

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations

Act (“RICO”) and the Hobbs Act. All claims in Link’s amended complaint save the ADA claims

alleged against institutional defendants were dismissed. Link v. Rhodes, No. C 06-0386, 2006 WL

3050859 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2006) (Patel, J.) (Link I). Link was ordered to file with this court a

copy of the Equal Employment Opportunity Charge he filed with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission in order to ensure that his ADA claims were properly pled. Id. at *4. 

Link’s amended complaint was thereafter dismissed in its entirety because he failed to follow the

court’s order. Link appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which

affirmed this court. Link v. Rhodes, 315 Fed. Appx. 624 (9th Cir. 2009). Link then filed a petition

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for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, which was denied on October 28, 2009. Link v.

Rhodes, 130 S. Ct. 117 (2009).

On April 1, 2010, Link filed the instant action against effectively the same defendants as in

his 2006 complaints. See Complaint. Link now claims various violations of the LMRDA and the

Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”). 

LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint may be dismissed against a

defendant for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against that defendant. A

motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) “tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.” Navarro v. Block,

250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). “Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory

or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica

Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A motion to dismiss should be granted if a plaintiff

fails to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This “plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability

requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at

556). “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific

task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.,

129 S. Ct. at 1950.

DISCUSSION

Defendants claim that Link’s complaint is barred by res judicata because of Link I. Res

judicata, or claim preclusion, prevents the re-litigation of a claim previously tried and decided. 

Clark v. Bear Stearns & Co., Inc., 966 F.2d 1318, 1320 (9th Cir. 1992); see Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp,

297 F.3d 953, 957 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Supreme Court precedent confirms that a dismissal for failure to

state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is a ‘judgment on the merits’ to which res judicata applies.” (citing

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Federated Dep’t Stores v. Moite, 452 U.S. 394, 399 n.3 (1981))). Res judicata also “bars all grounds

for recovery which could have been asserted, whether they were or not, in a prior suit between the

same parties on the same cause of action.” McClain v. Apodaca, 793 F.2d 1031, 1033 (9th Cir.

1986). Accordingly, any claim which was either brought or could have been brought in Link I “with

respect to all or any part of the same transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which

the action arose,” is bared by res judicata. Restatement (Second) of Judgements § 24(1) (1981).

All allegations in Link’s complaint arise out of the same transaction, or series of transactions,

as the claims in his 2006 complaints. There, he alleged that the union and other defendants

conspired to terminate him from the apprenticeship program because of his criticism of union

leadership. Link I, 2006 WL 3050859 at *3. Here, Link alleges identical facts as the basis for all his

causes of action. Specifically, he alleges that his “termination from the Apprenticeship Program was

motivated and instigated by individual union officials . . . in ‘retaliation’ to [his] criticism of union

official Rhodes and others failure to protect the safety and jobs of union members working for

KFM.” Complaint ¶ 36; see id. ¶ 48 (“individual[] union officials . . . were motivated to terminate

Link from apprenticeship program in retaliation for criticism of union officials”); ¶ 54 (union

officials “all conspired to terminate Link from the apprenticeship program in retaliation for

criticizing union officials . . . .”). He now also alleges that this termination violated his rights under

the LMRDA and ERISA. Id. ¶ 39 (union officials “all jointly conspired together . . .” to terminate

Link’s apprenticeship program “. . . because of his criticism of union officials . . .” which

“. . . violated Link’s rights under 29 U.S.C. sec[tions] 411(a)(2)and . . . 529.”); ¶ 49 (“individual

JATC and Local 34 members in their individual capacity as union officials and trustees violated the

[LMRDA] by terminating Link from the apprenticeship program . . . .”); ¶ 51 (“JATC violated

ERISA by terminating his membership from the apprenticeship program . . . because [he] exercised

his freedom of speech under 411(a)(2)”); ¶ 53 (“the Union Local 34 . . . continues to retaliate . . .”

which “. . . violates ERISA and LMRDA.”); ¶ 56 (termination and resulting benefits determination

breached union officials fiduciary duty and violated ERISA and the LMRDA). Link’s claims here

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thus arise out of the same transaction, or series of transactions, as the claims in his 2006 complaints;

consequently, they are all barred by res judicata.

Res judicata “provides that when a court of competent jurisdiction has entered a final

judgment on the merits of a cause of action, the parties to the suit and their privies are thereafter

bound not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or

demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose.” 

Comm’n v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 587 (1948) (internal quotations omitted). In 2006, Link’s

LMRDA claims were dismissed because he failed “to allege that he exhausted all intraunion

remedies, or that pursuing such remedies would be inadequate or futile.” Link I, 2006 WL 3050859

at *4. Link now alleges that there are no intraunion grievance procedures for union members against

union officials; allegations that would have cured his deficient 2006 complaints. Link’s failure to

cure his LMRDA claims in 2006 constitutes “other admissible matter[s]” which might have been

offered to sustain his claim. Sunnen, 333 U.S. at 587. Accordingly, because all of the LMRDA

claims alleged here could have been brought in 2006, those claims are barred by res judicata.

Similarly, Link’s argument that his ERISA claims are not barred by res judicata because they

were not raised in Link I also fails. Just as with his LMRDA claims, Link’s ERISA claims rely upon

the alleged conspiracy to terminate Link’s apprenticeship agreement because of his criticism of

union officials. Complaint ¶ 51. Link provides no reason as to why he could not have brought these

claims in his 2006 action. Accordingly, Link’s ERISA claims are barred by res judicata.

Finally, Link’s claim that defendants’ ex parte application violates due process has no merit. 

The application gave defendants leave to file a motion to dismiss, as allowed by the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. Link filed a lengthy opposition to the motion to dismiss; consequently, no due

process violation exists.

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons forgoing reasons defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint is

GRANTED and plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 29, 2010 

MARILYN HALL PATEL

United States District Court Judge

Northern District of California

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