Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_10-cr-00108/USCOURTS-cand-3_10-cr-00108-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Stephen Richard Holmes
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

USA,

Plaintiff,

v.

STEPHEN RICHARD HOLMES,

Defendant.

Case No. 10-cr-00108-SI-1 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 

VACATE, SET ASIDE OR CORRECT 

SENTENCE

Re: Dkt. No. 2532

On March 4, 2010, Stephen Richard Holmes (“defendant”) was charged by superseding 

information of one count of unarmed bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), and one 

count of escape from custody in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 751(a), 4082(a). Docket 9. On March 

5, 2010, defendant waived indictment. Docket 11. On March 9, 2010, defendant pled guilty to the 

two counts pursuant to a plea agreement made under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 

11(c)(1)(C). Docket 13. For the bank robbery count, the parties stipulated to a criminal history 

category of VI and an adjusted base offense level of 29 under the Career Offender guideline, 

United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G”) § 4B1.1(b), based on defendant’s two prior 

convictions for “crimes of violence.” Id. ¶ 7. The parties agreed to a total sentence of 151 

months. Id. ¶ 8. On March 31, 2010, the Court entered judgment and sentenced defendant to the 

agreed-upon 151 months. Docket 21. According to previous filings, defendant currently has an 

estimated release date of May 3, 2021. Docket 33, Oppo. to Mot. to Stay at 5. 

On May 23, 2016, defendant filed a motion to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 based on Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (“Johnson II”). 

Docket 25. On August 25, 2016, the Court denied the government’s request to stay the motion. 

Docket 36. Pursuant to Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court finds this matter appropriate for decision 

without oral argument. Based on the arguments presented in the papers, the Court DENIES

defendant’s motion. 

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LEGAL STANDARD

A prisoner in custody under sentence of a federal court who wishes to attack collaterally 

the validity of his conviction or sentence must do so by filing a motion to vacate, set aside or 

correct the sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the court which imposed the sentence. 28 

U.S.C. § 2255(a). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the federal sentencing court is authorized to grant 

relief if it concludes that “the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the 

United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the 

sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral 

attack.” Id. § 2255(a). If the court finds that relief is warranted under section 2255, it must 

“vacate and set the judgment aside” and then do one of four things: “discharge the prisoner[, ]

resentence him[, ] grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate.” Id. § 

2255(b); United States v. Barron, 172 F.3d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1999). 

DISCUSSION

Defendant seeks to vacate or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Defendant 

challenges the Court’s sentence in light of the recent Supreme Court decision in Johnson v. United 

States (“Johnson II”), 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). In Johnson II, the Supreme Court held that the 

residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) is unconstitutionally vague, and 

therefore void. 135 S. Ct. at 2557. The ACCA defines a “violent felony” as: 

any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, or any 

act . . . that-- (i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of 

physical force against the person of another; or (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, 

involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious 

potential risk of physical injury to another.

18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added). The portion italicized above is known as the ACCA’s 

“residual clause.” The Johnson II Court held that the ACCA’s residual clause “fails to give 

ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes” and “invites arbitrary enforcement,” thereby 

“violat[ing] the first essential of due process.” 135 S. Ct. at 2556-57 (citations and internal 

quotation marks omitted). The requirements of fair notice and enforcement standards “apply not 

only to statutes defining elements of crimes, but also to statutes fixing sentences.” Id. at 2557. 

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For these reasons, Johnson II found that “increasing a defendant’s sentence under the [ACCA’s 

residual] clause denies due process of law.” Id. 

Defendant argues that he is entitled to relief because the U.S.S.G. calculation underlying 

his sentence relied on the same definition of “crime of violence” that the Supreme Court found

unconstitutionally vague in Johnson II. Docket 25, Motion at 4. Defendant’s sentence was 

enhanced under the Career Offender guideline, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b), based on his prior 

convictions for crimes of violence. See Presentence Report (“PSR”) ¶ 4. Section 4B1.2(a) defines 

a “crime of violence” as follows:

[A]ny offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term 

exceeding one year, that – (1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or 

threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or (2) is burglary of a 

dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves 

conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.

§ 4B1.2(a) (emphasis added). A defendant’s prior conviction can qualify as a “crime of violence” 

in one of three ways: (1) by satisfying the “force clause” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1); (2) if the 

offense is an enumerated offense under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2); or (3) by satisfying the residual 

clause under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2). 

Defendant’s two prior convictions, which led to the career offender enhancement, were 

also for federal bank robbery. PSR ¶¶ 17-18. Defendant argues that the Court should vacate and 

correct his sentence because his sentence is now invalid under Johnson II. Defendant argues that 

without the career offender enhancements for his prior convictions, his criminal history category 

would have been IV, his adjusted base offense level would have been 19 (including a 3-level 

deduction for acceptance of responsibility), and his sentencing range 46-57 months. Motion at 2; 

PSR ¶¶ 21-22; U.S.S.G. §§ 2B3.1(a), (b)(1). The government does not dispute this calculation. 

See Docket 32, Oppo. at 2. 

The government argues that defendant is not entitled to relief for four reasons. First, the 

government argues that defendant waived his right to seek relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 pursuant 

to his plea agreement. Docket 13 ¶ 5. Second, the government argues that defendant procedurally 

defaulted his Johnson II claim and cannot show cause and prejudice. Oppo. at 7. Third, the 

government contends that Johnson II “is not retroactive to challenges to the career offender 

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Guidelines.” Id. at 10. Lastly, the government argues that despite the recent invalidation of 

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2)’s residual clause, federal bank robbery through intimidation is a crime of 

violence that falls under the “force clause” of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1) . Id. at 15-17. The Court 

declines to reach the government’s first three arguments because it agrees that federal bank 

robbery is a crime of violence under the force clause. For the reasons set forth below, the Court 

DENIES defendant’s motion. 

Defendant argues that his “unarmed bank robbery convictions [under the Federal Bank 

Robbery Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)] do not qualify as a crime of violence under the force clause 

of section 4B1.2(a)(1) because unarmed bank robbery does not require the intentional use of 

violent physical force and instead may be accomplished through unintentional or non-violent 

‘intimidation.’” Motion at 7. Defendant acknowledges that in United States v. Selfa, the Ninth 

Circuit explicitly held that “persons convicted of robbing a bank ‘by force and violence’ or 

‘intimidation’ under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) have been convicted of a ‘crime of violence’ within the 

meaning of Guideline Section 4B1.1.” 918 F.2d 749, 751 (9th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 498 U.S. 

986 (1990). However, defendant argues that this holding is no longer binding on the Court

because the reasoning of Selfa is “clearly irreconcilable with the reasoning of intervening higher 

authority,” and the Court is “bound by the later and controlling authority, and should reject the 

prior circuit opinion as having been effectively overruled.” Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 893 

(9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 

To argue that Selfa has been effectively overruled, defendant relies on Johnson v. United 

States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (“Johnson I”) and United States v. Parnell, 818 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 

2016). Johnson I held that under the “force clause” of the ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), 

“the phrase ‘physical force’ means violent force—that is, force capable of causing physical pain or 

injury to another person.” 559 U.S. at 140. Parnell, which also analyzed the ACCA’s force 

clause, applied Johnson I and held that the Massachusetts armed robbery statute does not have as 

an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another 

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because “the degree of force [required] is immaterial[.]”1 818 F.3d at 979 (citations and internal 

quotation marks omitted). “[T]he force clause requires the actual, attempted or threatened use of 

physical force, . . . not a mere uncommunicated willingness or readiness to use such force.” Id. at 

980 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). A threat to use physical force “requires some 

outward expression or indication of an intention to inflict pain, harm or punishment.” Id. The 

court held that an offense of armed robbery under the Massachusetts statute does not qualify as a 

“violent felony” under the ACCA because any amount of force “so long as the victim is aware of 

it” will suffice. Id. at 981. 

Defendant contends that under Johnson I and Parnell, “federal unarmed bank robbery does 

not qualify as a crime of violence under the force clause because it does not require proof of the 

use or threatened use of violent physical force” and that the federal bank robbery statute, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2113(a), “merely requires that a defendant take property through ‘intimidation.’” Motion at 7-8. 

Defendant argues that “nothing in the term ‘intimidation’ . . . requires a threat of violent physical 

force” and that an “uncommunicated willingness or readiness to use [physical] force . . . is not the 

same as a threat to do so.” Motion at 8 (citing Parnell, 818 F.3d at 980). 

While defendant makes strong arguments, the Ninth Circuit has not extended the reasoning 

from Johnson I and Parnell to either the Career Offender Guideline or the federal robbery statute 

at issue here. Johnson I and Parnell do not overrule and are not “clearly irreconcilable” with the 

holding in Selfa. The Ninth Circuit’s holding in Selfa is not only directly on point, but the facts 

are similar to those here. In Selfa, the defendant was “declared a career criminal pursuant to 

Sentencing Guidelines § 4B1.1 on the basis of two prior convictions of bank robbery under 18 

U.S.C. § 2113(a).” 918 F.2d at 750. The defendant argued “that since he was unarmed and he 

neither harmed nor threatened to harm anyone in any way during the robberies, they were not 

 

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The Massachusetts statute prohibits robbery: “(1) ‘by force and violence’ (i.e., the actual 

force prong) or (2) ‘by assault and putting in fear’ (i.e., the constructive force prong).” Parnell, 

818 F.3d at 978 (citing Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 265, § 19(b)). Under Massachusetts law, the 

degree of force under either prong need only be “sufficient to obtain the victim’s property against 

his will.” Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Jones, 362 Mass. 83, 283 N.E.2d 840, 843 (1972)). Under 

the Massachusetts statute, force is sufficient “[s]o long as the victim is aware of the application of 

force which relieves him of his property[.]” Id.; see also id. at 979-80 (discussing nonviolent 

purse snatchings found to satisfy actual force prong of Massachusetts statute). 

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crimes of violence.” Id. The court noted that “the elements of the crimes of which the defendant 

was previously convicted . . . not the particular conduct of the defendant on the day the crimes 

were committed, should control.” Id. at 751. The court stated that robbery by intimidation under 

section 2113(a) means “‘willfully to take, or attempt to take, in such a way that would put an 

ordinary, reasonable person in fear of bodily harm.” Id. (quoting United States v. Hopkins, 703 

F.2d 1102, 1103 (9th Cir. 1983)). As such, the court held that the definition of intimidation was 

“sufficient to meet the section 4B1.2(a)(1) requirement of ‘threatened use of physical force’” and 

that “persons convicted of robbing a bank ‘by force and violence’ or ‘intimidation’ under 18 

U.S.C. § 2113(a) have been convicted of a ‘crime of violence’ within the meaning of Guideline 

Section 4B1.1” Id. 

Furthermore, other district courts in the Ninth Circuit have recently determined that Selfa

remains good law. Gilbert v. United States affirmed that “bank robbery [under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2113(a)] is a crime of violence by its elements, per U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1), without reference to 

the residual clause in § 4B1.2(a)(2).” No. 16-cv-1448-W, 2016 WL 5807910, at *1 (S.D. Cal. 

Oct. 4, 2016), appeal docketed, No. 16-56554 (9th Cir. Oct. 20, 2016); see also United States v. 

Bailey, No. 14-cr-328-CAS, 2016 WL 3381218, at *6 (C.D. Cal. June 8, 2016) (citing United 

States v. Howard, 650 Fed. Appx. 466, 468 (9th Cir. 2016)) (analogizing the “fear of injury” 

element of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b), to “intimidation” of federal bank robbery, 18 

U.S.C § 2113(a), and finding both qualify as “crimes of violence”). 

The Court agrees with the government that it must follow Selfa, which held that federal 

bank robbery is a “crime of violence” under the “force clause” of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1). 

Accordingly, defendant’s motion is DENIED.

IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 28, 2016

______________________________________

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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