Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01537/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01537-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Delton Lamon Alexander
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-1537

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States 

v. * District Court for the Southern

* District of Iowa.

Delton Lamon Alexander, *

 *

Defendant - Appellant. *

*

___________

Submitted: November 15, 2004

 Filed: June 3, 2005 (Corrected: 06/14/05) 

___________

Before MURPHY, HANSEN, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________

MELLOY, Circuit Judge.

Defendant-Appellant Delton Alexander appeals his conviction for conspiracy

to distribute methamphetamine and the attribution of twelve pounds of

methamphetamine to him for sentencing purposes. 21 U.S.C §§ 846, 841(a), and

841(b)(1)(B)(viii).

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In the fall of 2002, Captain David Henderson of the Johnson County Iowa Drug

Task Force interviewed Brooke Walton. Walton identified a person involved in the

distribution of drugs in and around Johnson County. Walton knew this person as

“Cholo.” In court Walton identified Macedonio Castillo Hernandez as “Cholo.”

At the direction of law enforcement, Walton arranged for Special Agent Chuck

Pettrone of the Iowa Division of Narcotics Enforcement to meet with Hernandez in

an effort to purchase methamphetamine. On March 12, 2003, Hernandez agreed to

distribute two ounces of methamphetamine to Pettrone in exchange for $1,700. At

their meeting, Hernandez introduced Pettrone to Raul Munoz Lopez, also known as

Tony Zuniga. Hernandez requested that Pettrone deal directly with Lopez in the

future. During Pettrone and Lopez’s initial conversation, Lopez asked Pettrone if he

was a police officer. Despite his concerns that Pettrone was affiliated with law

enforcement, Lopez eventually distributed two ounces of methamphetamine to

Pettrone. 

On March 19, 2003, Lopez sold Pettrone three more ounces of

methamphetamine. On March 25, 2003, Lopez sold an additional pound of

methamphetamine to Pettrone. In each of these ensuing transactions, Lopez became

increasingly nervous and jittery, continually asking Pettrone if he was associated with

law enforcement. Despite Lopez’s growing concerns, Pettrone and Lopez began to

negotiate the purchase of ten pounds of methamphetamine. 

On April 3, 2003, Pettrone and another agent met with Lopez and an unknown

black male to discuss future transactions. At the end of this meeting, law

enforcement officials followed Lopez and the unknown male to the apartment of

Delton Alexander.

On April 8, 2003, Pettrone spoke with Lopez over the telephone. Lopez was

agitated and suspicious. Lopez asked to meet with Pettrone in person. Pettrone and

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Lopez agreed to meet in the parking lot of a mall. Surveillance officers observed the

meeting. They also audio- and videotaped the meeting. Before the meeting, the

surveillance officers observed a blue Chrysler arrive at the mall. Delton Alexander

was a passenger in the car. Alexander got out of the car and walked to the entrance

of the mall. Alexander stood outside the entrance to the mall and watched the parking

lot. Alexander did not ever enter the mall. According to Captain Henderson,

Alexander stood approximately fifty yards from where Lopez and Pettrone met.

During the meeting, Alexander appeared to be scanning the parking lot, focusing in

particular on where Lopez and Pettrone were meeting. Just before the conclusion of

the meeting, Alexander started to walk across the parking lot towards a McDonald’s

restaurant, scanning the parking lot as he walked. Following the meeting, Lopez

picked up Alexander near the McDonald’s. 

After picking up Alexander, Lopez and Alexander approached one of the

surveillance officers in the mall parking lot, Officer David Coffman. Coffman rolled

down his window to speak to Lopez. Lopez told Coffman that he was driving a

“cop’s van.” Lopez asked about the contents of the van and commented on the tinted

windows. Based on this exchange, Coffman identified Alexander as the sole

passenger in Lopez’s vehicle. Alexander did not speak during the exchange. 

Pettrone and Lopez continued to negotiate the purchase of more

methamphetamine. Lopez agreed to deliver twelve pounds of methamphetamine to

Pettrone on April 14, 2003. On April 14, Lopez drove a silver Chevy Prism to the

prearranged location of the drug transaction. Earlier in the day, officers observed

Alexander working on the undercarriage of the same car while it was parked by his

apartment. Lopez had also been observed carrying a laundry basket from the

apartment building to an orange Ford van in the apartment’s parking lot that day.

After placing the basket in the van, Lopez returned to the apartment building. Lopez

delivered the twelve pounds of methamphetamine to Pettrone and Stapleton later that

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day. Alexander was not present during this transaction, nor was he directly involved

in any other transaction.

After Lopez’s arrest, officers searched Alexander’s apartment. Alexander was

present at the time of the search. He had arrived at the apartment driving a gold car.

The orange Ford van was in the apartment building parking lot at that time. Officers

searched the car and the van. Investigators found two baggies of marijuana in the

front seat area of the car. In a drawer next to the kitchen sink, investigators found a

baggie that contained marijuana and a baggie of methamphetamine. Investigators

found a glass tube used to smoke cocaine or methamphetamine on the floor of the

bathroom and two digital scales commonly used to weigh controlled substances in the

living room closet. In the orange van, investigators found a laundry basket containing

four bags of marijuana, two bags of methamphetamine, a scale commonly used to

weigh controlled substances, a drug ledger, and packaging material. 

Alexander was interviewed by law enforcement at the residence. According

to the police officer, Alexander stated that Lopez asked him to serve as a lookout, and

that he had agreed to do so. The officer testified that Alexander was supposed to look

for police or anyone else who might cause Lopez problems. If a problem arose,

Alexander was to contact Lopez on his cellular telephone. Alexander also told the

officer that he was present when Lopez confronted an individual in the mall parking

lot. 

On June 12, 2003, a federal grand jury returned a superseding indictment

against Alexander. The indictment charged him with one count of conspiracy to

distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C §§ 846, 841(a), and

841(b)(1)(B)(viii). At trial, Alexander testified in his own defense. Alexander denied

making any admissions to the police officer regarding why he was at the mall.

Alexander testified that he was not familiar with any of the items seized in his

apartment on April 14, 2003. He denied acting as a lookout for Lopez. Alexander

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1

 The Honorable Ronald E. Longstaff, Chief United States District Judge

for the Southern District of Iowa.

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testified that he went to the mall to obtain his apartment key from Lopez and to ask

for a ride home. He stated that he went into the mall after observing Lopez meet with

another individual in the parking lot and that he waited until the meeting between

Lopez and Agent Pettrone was finished to ask for the key because he did not want to

be involved in Lopez’s conversation. Alexander asserted that he was unaware that

Lopez used drugs or was involved in the distribution of drugs. 

On October 3, 2003, the jury found Alexander guilty of one count of

conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and that the quantity of methamphetamine

involved in the conspiracy was equal to or over fifty grams. On March 2, 2004, the

district court1

 imposed a sentence of seventy-eight months. Alexander brings this

timely appeal. 

I.

Alexander asserts that insufficient evidence supports his conviction for

conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. “The standard of review . . . is very

strict.” United States v. Sanders, 341 F.3d 809, 815 (8th Cir. 2003). We review “the

evidence in the light most favorable to the government, resolving evidentiary

conflicts in favor of the government, and accepting all reasonable inferences drawn

from the evidence that support the jury’s verdict.” Id. (quoting United States v.

Espino, 317 F.3d 788, 792 (8th Cir. 2003)). We reverse the jury’s verdict “only if no

reasonable jury could have found [Alexander] guilty.” United States v. Dabney, 367

F.3d 1040, 1042 (8th Cir. 2004). 

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“To establish that [Alexander] conspired to distribute [methamphetamine,]

 . . . the government must prove: (1) that there was a conspiracy, i.e., an agreement

to distribute [methamphetamine]; (2) that the defendant knew of the conspiracy; and

(3) that the defendant intentionally joined the conspiracy.” Espino, 317 F.3d at 792.

“A conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence, it may be inferred from

circumstantial evidence.” United States v. Garrison, 168 F.3d 1089, 1095 (8th Cir.

1999). “Tacit understanding – as opposed to mere presence at and knowledge of an

intended drug sale – will suffice; a formal agreement is unnecessary.” Espino, 317

F.3d at 792. Furthermore, “[e]vidence of association or acquaintance, though

relevant, is not enough by itself to establish a conspiracy.” Id. 

The evidence in this case supports the jury’s finding that Alexander knowingly

joined the agreement to distribute methamphetamine. A police officer, Officer Akers,

testified that during his interview, Alexander stated Lopez asked him to serve as a

lookout for the April 10, 2003 meeting with Pettrone. Akers also testified that

Alexander said he was keeping an eye out for the police in particular as well as

“anyone else who could cause [Lopez] problems.” At trial, Alexander denied making

these statements. 

In considering the evidence, the jury weighed the conflicting testimony of

Akers and Alexander. It determined that Officer Akers’s testimony was more

credible. We give significant weight to the jury's credibility determination. United

States v. Meza-Gonzalez, 394 F.3d 587, 592 (8th Cir. 2004); Espino, 317 F.3d at 794.

Given the absence of evidence to contradict Akers’s testimony, a jury could

reasonably rely on Akers’s testimony to find that Alexander conspired with Lopez

despite Alexander’s denials. See Meza-Gonzalez, 394 F.3d at 592; United States v.

Reed, 297 F.3d 787, 789 (8th Cir. 2002) (permitting juries to “draw an inference of

guilt” based on “disbelief of defendant’s denials” when corroborated by other

evidence). 

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Alexander’s actions support the reasonableness of the jury’s findings.

Alexander sat in Lopez’s car when Lopez confronted an individual he believed to be

a law enforcement official. A jury could reasonably conclude that Lopez would not

have confronted the officer in the presence of Alexander if Alexander was not

participating in the conspiracy. 

In addition, the evidence seized from the apartment and vehicles support the

conclusion that Alexander knew of, and intentionally joined, the conspiracy. During

the search of the apartment and the cars, investigators found methamphetamine,

marijuana, drug paraphernalia, and digital scales. Officers found additional quantities

of marijuana and methamphetamine, a scale, and a drug ledger in the Ford van

Alexander was seen driving on April 10, 2003. Officers found two baggies of

marijuana in the car Alexander drove on April 14, 2003. This evidence makes a

jury’s inference that Alexander acted knowingly in furtherance of the conspiracy

reasonable.

Prosecutors entered into evidence the videotape of the meeting in the mall

parking lot. This tape and the testimony of Captain Henderson provide evidence of

Alexander’s participation in the conspiracy. This evidence places Alexander at the

mall entrance approximately fifty yards from the meeting between Lopez and

Pettrone, continuously scanning the parking lot. It shows he never entered the mall.

It also demonstrates that Alexander’s actions ceased once the meeting concluded.

Alexander argues that this circumstantial evidence merely shows that he was

present, not that he was a part of a conspiracy. Alexander correctly states that we

have long held that evidence of “mere presence,” “even when coupled with

knowledge” that someone else present intends to sell drugs, is insufficient to establish

participation in a conspiracy. United States v. Cruz, 285 F.3d 692, 701 (8th Cir

2002). The evidence in this case, when taken as a whole, is sufficient to establish

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participation in a conspiracy. Alexander was not only present, he actively served as

a lookout. 

II.

The district court imposed a sentence of seventy-eight months. In imposing

that sentence, the court attributed twelve pounds of methamphetamine to Alexander.

Alexander maintains that the evidence does not support the district court’s drug

quantity attribution.

“We review the district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines de

novo.” United States v. Johnston, 353 F.3d 617, 625 (8th Cir. 2003). “The district

court’s factual findings in relation to drug quantity are reviewed for clear error.” Id.

“We can disturb the district court’s drug quantity calculation only if the entire record

definitely and firmly convinces us that a mistake has been made.” United States v.

Titlbach, 300 F.3d 919, 923 (8th Cir. 2002). 

The district court’s finding that twelve pounds of methamphetamine were

attributable to Alexander was not clearly erroneous. Alexander was convicted of

conspiracy. “In jointly-undertaken criminal activity, a defendant is accountable for

his own conduct as well as conduct taken by others that was in furtherance of the

activity and reasonably foreseeable.” United States v. Francis, 367 F.3d 805, 821 (8th

Cir. 2004); see U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). Accordingly, to attribute a quantity of

drugs to Alexander, the factfinder must “find by a preponderance of the evidence that

the transaction or activity” was: 1) “in furtherance of the conspiracy;” and 2) “either

known to that defendant or reasonably foreseeable to him.” United States v. Atkins,

250 F.3d 1203, 1212 (8th Cir. 2001). Under this calculus, the factfinder may consider

drug amounts from transactions that Alexander was not directly involved in, so long

as the other transactions were “part of the same course of conduct or scheme.” Id.

(quoting United States v. Brown, 148 F.3d 1003, 1008 (8th Cir. 1998)). In this case,

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the district court only considered those quantities of methamphetamine that were

distributed by Lopez after Alexander acted as a lookout for the meeting in which

Pettrone and Lopez met to discuss future drug transactions. The delivery of twelve

pounds of methamphetamine occurred four days after Alexander became involved in

the conspiracy. The delivery of that amount of methamphetamine was reasonably

foreseeable to him given his participation as a lookout for the earlier negotiations.

Although Alexander did not participate directly in the sale of twelve pounds of

methamphetamine, Alexander’s actions were part of the same conspiracy. 

Alexander argues that the district court erred because there was no factual basis

for concluding that he knew of, or could have reasonably foreseen, the amount of

drugs involved. The district court’s finding that the amount was reasonably

foreseeable does not constitute clear error. The drug paraphernalia found in

Alexander’s apartment, including digital scales commonly used to weigh controlled

substances, provide evidence that Alexander was aware of the size of Lopez’s drug

transactions. Alexander knew that Lopez’s deal was sufficiently valuable and

dangerous to attract the attention of the police and therefore require a lookout.

Further, the baggies of drugs found throughout the apartment and vehicles

demonstrate that Alexander was aware of the presence of drugs in varying amounts

throughout his apartment. This evidence, along with his service as a lookout and

willingness to confront the police show a “substantial level of commitment to the

conspiracy.” Brown, 148 F.3d at 1008. Commitment to the conspiracy, along with

degree to which a defendant benefitted from his co-conspirators actions, are “factors

relevant to foreseeability.” Id. This evidence shows a sufficient level of commitment

to make the amount attributed to Alexander reasonable. This is not a case where

paraphernalia and other evidence suggest a certain quantity range and a sentencing

court finds a quantity disproportionate to what the evidence suggests. Rather, this

situation is analogous to the person who transports a quantity of drugs in a suitcase

without knowing the amount in the suitcase. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 n. 2(a)(1). While

Alexander may not have known the precise quantity of drugs involved in the

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transaction for which he was a lookout, the amount attributed to him was reasonably

foreseeable to Alexander. We hold, therefore, that the district court’s attribution of

twelve pounds of methamphetamine to Alexander does not constitute clear error.

III.

Alexander asserts that the district court’s drug quantity calculation violated his

rights under Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004), because those findings

were neither admitted by him nor made by a jury based upon proof beyond a

reasonable doubt. 

In Blakely, the Supreme Court held that the imposition of a sentence

enhancement above the State of Washington’s Sentencing Reform Act’s range, based

solely on the factual findings of the sentencing judge, violated the defendant’s Sixth

Amendment rights. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2537. The imposition constituted a Sixth

Amendment violation because the findings were neither admitted by the defendant

nor found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Following Blakely and while this

appeal was pending, the Court held in United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005),

that “the Sixth Amendment as construed in Blakely does apply to the [Federal]

Sentencing Guidelines.” Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 746. Under the Booker regime, “[a]ny

fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence

exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by . . . a jury verdict must

be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at

756. 

Although Alexander did object to the district court’s finding of sufficient

evidence to support his conviction and the quantity of drugs attributed to him, he did

not raise a Sixth Amendment objection. Accordingly, our review is limited to

determining whether Alexander’s sentence constitutes plain error. See United States

v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 2005 WL 1039976, *4 (8th Cir. Apr. 29, 2005). To establish

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plain error, Alexander must show that (1) there was an error; (2) the error was plain;

and (3) that the error affected substantial rights. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S.

461, 466-67 (1997). “If all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then

exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if the error seriously

affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id.

(internal quotations omitted). Further, the defendant has the burden of proving plain

error. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734-35 (1993).

In Pirani, we held that a Booker/Blakely error “affects substantial rights” if

there is a reasonable probability that but for the error he would have received a more

favorable sentence. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, at *6. In this case, Alexander, like the

defendant in Pirani, has not shown a “reasonable probability” the district court would

have imposed a more favorable sentence if the Guidelines had been applied in an

advisory manner, rather than in a binding fashion. The fact that Alexander was

sentenced at the bottom of the Guideline range “is insufficient, without more, to

demonstrate a reasonable probability that the court would have imposed a lesser

sentence absent the Booker error.” Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, at *7. Because the record,

when taken as a whole, does not indicate that the district court would have imposed

a more favorable sentence under the new sentencing regime, Alexander cannot

establish the substantial rights prong of the analysis. Accordingly, he fails to meet

his burden to prove that the district court committed plain error in imposing the

sentence enhancements. 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Alexander’s conviction and sentence. 

______________________________

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