Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06556/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06556-32/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City Of Fresno
Defendant
Holly Louen
Plaintiff
Brian Twedt
Defendant

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HOLLY LOUEN, )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

)

FRESNO POLICE OFFICER BRIAN )

TWEDT, et al., )

)

)

Defendant. )

)

)

No. CV-F-04-6556 OWW/SMS 

ORDER DEEMING PLAINTIFF'S

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF (Doc.

266) TO BE MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER

DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS

IN LIMINE NOS. 1 & 2

REGARDING APPLICATION OF

COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING

IN PART MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION

On September 4, 2007 at 5:18 a.m., Plaintiff filed a

“Supplemental Brief in Support of Motion in Limine Re: Collateral

Estoppel” (Doc. 266). It is the Court’s recollection from the

hearing on August 27, 2007 that Plaintiff was to submit any

supplemental brief by Wednesday, August 29, 2007. Plaintiff did

not do so. Although Plaintiff’s Supplemental Brief speaks in

terms of the Court’s “tentative ruling”, the Court issued an

“Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motions in Limine Nos. 1 & 2" on

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August 29, 2007. Plaintiff’s supplemental brief in effect seeks

reconsideration of the “Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motions in

Limine Nos. 1 & 2 Regarding Application of Collateral Estoppel”,

(Doc. 257), filed on August 29, 2007 (the August 29 Order). 

Plaintiff’s Supplemental Brief is deemed a motion for

reconsideration of the August 29 Order. Defendants City of

Fresno and Brian Twedt filed Supplemental Oppositions to

Plaintiff’s Supplemental Brief on September 5, 2007.

In the Order denying Plaintiff’s Motions in Limine Nos. 1

and 2, the Court ruled:

For the reasons stated in open court on

August 24, 2007, Plaintiff's motions in

limine to preclude Defendant Twedt from

relitigating the factual findings of the

Fresno County Superior Court, Case N.

04CECG1034, and to prohibit Defendant Twedt

from introducing evidence with regard to

these findings are DENIED. Further, even if

Plaintiff dismisses this action against

Defendant City of Fresno, the Court concludes

that application of collateral estoppel to

Defendant Twedt will be inequitable because

of issues of state of mind and other elements

of the civil rights claims, supplemental

claims under state law, and punitive damages

not present in the state court injunctive

proceedings.

Plaintiff seeks to prevent Defendants from relitigating the

following factual findings made by Judge Putnam in issuing a

civil injunction against Brian Twedt and in favor of Plaintiff

pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 527.6: 

(1) Twedt had on several instances in

February and March of 2003 interfered with

the plaintiff’s movement of her vehicle; (2)

Twedt followed the plaintiff while in uniform

and on his department vehicle and passed her

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One of the cases cited by Plaintiff, Sosinsky v. Grant, 6 1

Cal.App.4th 1548, 1569 (1992), involved the propriety of taking

judicial notice and does not assist in resolving the collateral

3

on a one lane road on March 7, 2003; (3)

Twedt, while in uniform and on his department

motorcycle, shined his lights at plaintiff

and her mother for several minutes on March

16, 2004; (4) Twedt intentionally delayed

moving through an intersection and then sped

through a yellow light, in order to prevent

the plaintiff’s husband from progressing

through the intersection on April 30, 2004,

and, when this attempt was unsuccessful,

Twedt exited his vehicle at the gate of his

and plaintiff’s residential community and

assaulted her by charging toward her vehicle

and yelling obscenities; and (7) the April

30, 2004 event, which was partially depicted

by plaintiff on firm, was the subject of a

false and retaliatory police report of

collision, although his vehicle was

undamaged. The state court also made more

general findings of ongoing misconduct by

defendant Twedt intended to annoy and harass

plaintiff and her family. Finally, the court

found that there was no legitimate purpose

for any of defendant Twedt’s conduct.

“An earlier ruling ‘will be given collateral estoppel effect

when (1) the issue is identical to that decided in a former

proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated and (3)

necessarily decided; (4) the doctrine is asserted against a party

to the former action or one who was in privity with such a party;

and (5) the former decision is final and was made on the merits.’

....” Jenkins v. County of Riverside, 138 Cal.App.4th 591, 617

(2006). 

Plaintiff again argues that the difference in issues between

the two cases does not negate application of collateral

estoppel. Plaintiff cites Smith v. Exxon Mobil Oil Corp., 153 1

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estoppel issue.

Defendant Twedt asserts that Smith v. Exxon Mobil Oil Corp. 2

is an unpublished, uncitable decision. Although Plaintiff cited

only the Westlaw citation, the case has been officially published

as cited above.

4

Cal.App.4th 1407 (2007), which in turn quotes Vandenberg v.

Superior Court, 21 Cal.4th 815 (1999):2

[R]es judicata does not merely bar

relitigation of identical claims or causes of

action. Instead, in its collateral estoppel

aspect, the doctrine may also preclude a

party to prior litigation from redisputing

issues therein decided against him, even when

those issues bear on different claims raised

in a later case.

Plaintiff also cites Ritchie v. Konrad, 115 Cal.App.4th 1275,

1290 (2004), which addressed renewal of a domestic violence

protective order and held that an objective test governs before a

protective order is renewed in contested cases and stated:

[T]he trial judge ordinarily should consider

the evidence and findings on which that

initial order was based in appraising the

risk of future abuse should the existing

order expire.

On the other hand, the trial court should not

permit the restrained party to challenge the

trust of the evidence and findings underlying

the initial order ... This would contradict

principles of collateral estoppel and

undercut the policies supporting those

principles. But this does not mean that the

trial court should be prohibited from looking

behind the order itself when evaluating

whether that order, often three years old,

should be extended another three years or

even, as here permanently.

Here, Plaintiff argues the factors supporting application of

collateral estoppel have been satisfied, including that Defendant

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5

Twedt had a full and fair opportunity to litigate against

Plaintiff in state court the issues for which preclusion is

sought. Plaintiff cites to the unpublished state Court of Appeal

decision affirming the trial court injunction that rejected

Twedt’s arguments that denial of his requests for continuance to

obtain counsel did not deny him due process. Plaintiff cites

Last Chance Water-Ditch Co. v. Heilbron, 86 Cal. 1 (1890), as

authority that a proceeding for injunctive relief, so long as

embodied in a final order or judgment, may be the basis for claim

or issue preclusion. 

Defendants argue that the procedures applicable to

California Code of Civil Procedure § 527.6 are expedited and

self-contained. Citing Nora v. Kaddo, 116 Cal.App.4th 1026, 1028

(2004), Defendants contend that there is no full due process 

trial on the merits following the issuance of the injunction

pursuant to Section 527.6 and the order and supporting facts

should not be given preclusive effect. 

The Kaddo Court addressed the propriety of a trial court’s

ruling on a Section 527.6 petition on the papers without taking

testimony. In ruling that the decision was error, the Court of

Appeal stated:

This ruling deprived both parties of

important rights that the statute expressly

preserved to them ....

‘[T]he procedure for issuance of an

injunction prohibiting harassment is selfcontained. There is no full trial on the

merits to follow the issuance of the

injunction after the hearing provided by Code

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of Civil Procedure section 527.6, subdivision

(d). That hearing therefore provides the

only forum the defendant in a harassment

proceeding will have to present his or her

case. To limit a defendant’s right to

present evidence and cross-examine as 

respondents would have us to do would run the

real risk of denying such a defendant’s due

process rights. ...’ .... 

Defendants also cite Byers v. Cathcart, 57 Cal.App.4th 805,

811 (1997). In Byers, the Court of Appeal held that a trial

court’s Section 527.6 order

did not, and could not, finally determine the

parties’ respective rights and duties

regarding use of the easement. The lack of

finality of a section 527.6 order underscores

that section 527.6 was never intended to

provide an expedited procedure for resolving

real property disputes ....

Section 527.6 was enacted to provide an

expedited procedure for preventing

‘harassment’ as defined ... The motivation

for the statute was the was the experience of

a young woman who was hounded by a male

admirer who followed her, incessantly

telephoned her, etc. ... The statute was

designed to provide a quick and simple

procedure by which this type of wholly

unjustifiable conduct, having no proper

purpose, could be enjoined. The statute is

limited to protecting only those who have

suffered ‘substantial emotional distress’

caused by conduct ‘which serves no legitimate

purpose.’ (§ 527.6, subd. (b), defining

‘harassment.’) Nothing in the statute

indicates that it was intended to supplement

normal injunctive procedures applicable to

cases concerning issues other than’

harassment’ as statutorily defined.

...

Normal injunctive procedures allow time for

research and investigation, pleading and

other motions if necessary, discovery and

preparation, etc., followed by opportunity

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for a full trial ....

Section 527.6, by contrast, provides a quick

and truncated procedure. Offsetting the

truncated nature of the procedure is the

limited scope of the antiharassment orders

which can legitimately follow. Section 527.6

provides for temporary restraining orders to

handle immediate problems, followed quickly

by a court hearing on a limited-scope

antiharassment injunction - normally with 15

days, but in no case more than 22 days even

if time is extended for good cause. (§

527.6, subds. (c) & (d).) This expedited and

summary proceeding is subject to several

limitations designed to confine it to its

proper scope. One such limitation is that

any injunction which results cannot exceed

three years in duration. Section 527.6 hence

does not allow for final resolution of

disputed rights. Another limitation is that

‘harassment’ must be found by clear and

convincing evidence before future conduct may

be enjoined. (§ 527.6, subd. (d).) Another

limitation is that a section 527.6 injunction

may enjoin only ‘harassment’ as defined. (§

527.6, subd. (b).) Conduct which serves a

legitimate purpose is outside the definition

of ‘harassment’ and cannot be enjoined

pursuant to the summary procedures of section

527.6, even if such conduct might ultimately

be enjoinable according to normal injunctive

procedures after full development of the

facts and law. 

Defendants also cite Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop

Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc., 129 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1248-

1249 (2005):

A preliminary injunction is a provisional

remedy, and the trial court ‘possesses the

inherent power to modify its preliminary

injunction which is of a continuing or

executory nature.’ ... ‘There is no

inflexible rule as to the effect of the

granting or denial of a preliminary

injunction on subsequent litigation, but

unless it appears that the court intended a

final adjudication of the issue involved, a

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decision on an application for a preliminary

injunction does not amount to a decision on

the ultimate rights in controversy.’ 

Plaintiff complains that the equitable exception to

application of the collateral estoppel doctrine was not raised by

Defendants in opposition to her motions in limine, but by the

Court sua sponte “in the absence of any record or specific data.” 

Plaintiff cites In re Perez, 30 F.3d 1209, 1213 (9 Cir.1994), a th

decision involving whether to address an issue raised for the

first time on appeal, wherein the Ninth Circuit commented:

In normal adversarial litigation, neither the

trial judge nor opposing counsel have the

responsibility to raise issues a party fails

to raise; if the affected party fails to

object, the issue never comes before the

court.

Plaintiff also cites Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 10

F.3d 155, 166 (9 Cir.1993): “[A] judge’s participation in a th

case must never reach the point where it appears, or is even

perceived to appear, that the judge is aligned with any party in

the pending litigation.”

Plaintiff’s suggestion that the Court’s ruling is the result

of bias on the part of Defendants is misplaced. Before the Court

at the hearing on August 27, 2007 was Plaintiff’s second

objection to the Court’s ruling that the doctrine of collateral

estoppel did not apply. Plaintiff moved for reconsideration of

the denial of Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. The 

motion in limine raised whether or not certain evidence should be

admitted. The Court was required to rule on the evidentiary

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issue presented by Plaintiff’s motions in limine nos. 1 and 2. 

Plaintiff referred the Court to a case which discussed the

equitable exception to the collateral estoppel doctrine. As

stated in open court and in the August 29 Order, quoting directly

from the case, the Court did not believe the doctrine of

collateral estoppel urged by Plaintiff applied, especially when

the equities and circumstances of this case are considered. 

Because the Court Court had already twice ruled that collateral

estoppel did not apply, Plaintiff’s contention that the Court’s

conclusion that the equities also preclude the application of the

doctrine manifests bias for Defendants merely reflects

Plaintiff’s disagreement with the Court’s rulings and

unwillingness to accept any contrary interpretation of the law.

Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of the Court’s ruling that

the interests of justice preclude application of the collateral

estoppel doctrine. Plaintiff cites Wright, Miller & Cooper,

Federal Practice and Procedure, Jurisdiction 2d § 4426:

A final limitation on issue preclusion may be

found in occasional statements that it

‘should not be exercised in such a manner as

to work an injustice.’ Such general

statements should be approached with great

caution. The premise of preclusion itself is

that justice is better served in most cases

by perpetuating a possibly mistaken decision

than by permitting relitigation. If

relitigation were permitted whenever it might

result in a more accurate determination in

the name of ‘justice,’ the very values served

by preclusion would be quickly destroyed. 

In California, collateral estoppel will not be applied “‘if

injustice would result or if the public interest requires that

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relitigation not be foreclosed.’” Rodgers v. Sargent Controls &

Aerospace, 136 Cal.App.4th 82, 90 (2006), quoting Consumers Lobby

Against Monopolies v. Public Utilities Com., 25 Cal.3d 891, 902

(1979). This ignores the concerns that most of the issues in

each of Plaintiff’s three claims were not presented to or decided

by the state court; i.e., violation of First, Fourth or

Fourteenth Amendments; state civil rights acts; intimidation or

coercion; whether Defendant Twedt acted with malice, oppression,

or reckless disregard of Plaintiff’s rights. 

To the extent that the Court declined to apply the doctrine

because of Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages against

Defendant Twedt, Plaintiff contends that he has not found “a

single state or federal decision in these United States holding

that the prospect of punitive damages in subsequent litigation

justifies an equitable exception to collateral estoppel.” 

Plaintiff cites several decisions which she asserts have applied

collateral estoppel to preclude parties from either seeking or

defending punitive damages in subsequent litigation. 

Plaintiff cites Muegler v. Bening, 413 F.3d 980 (9th

Cir.2005). In Muegler, creditors had obtained a judgment for

compensatory and punitive damages in an intentional fraud action

against the debtor. The creditors then filed a complaint in

federal bankruptcy court seeking determination of the

nondischargeability of that damages award. The bankruptcy court

granted summary judgment for the creditors, ruling that the

debtor was estopped from relitigating the issue of fraud. The

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Ninth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court ruling. Muegler does

not discuss the equitable exception to application of the

doctrine of collateral estoppel. Muegler is wholly

distinguishable, as the issue of punitive damages was actually

and finally litigated in the prior intentional fraud case.

Plaintiff also cites In re Cantrell, 329 F.3d 1119 (9 Cir. th

2003). 

In In re Cantrell, creditors filed an action in state court

alleging that Cantrell had breached fiduciary duties while

serving as an officer of a corporation, seeking compensatory and

punitive damages. Default judgment was entered in favor of the

creditors and against Cantrell awarding compensatory and punitive

damages. The judgment creditors filed an adversary proceeding in

Cantrell’s Chapter 7 proceeding seeking to except the judgment

from discharge. The bankruptcy court granted the creditors’

motion for summary judgment and denied Cantrell’s cross-motion

for summary judgment on the collateral estoppel effect of the

default judgment. The BAP reversed the bankruptcy court,

concluding that Cantrell had not been personally served or

received actual notice of the state court action, and further

concluding that Cantrell, in his role as a corporate officer was

not a fiduciary within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4).

The Ninth Circuit reversed the BAP’s holding on collateral

estoppel because Cantrell had received actual notice of the state

court action and because the record in the state court action

established that the state court’s award of punitive damages

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could only have been based Cantrell’s fraudulent withdrawal and

use of corporate assets for his own benefit. 329 F.3d at 1125. 

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the BAP’s ruling that Cantrell was not

a fiduciary within the meaning of Section 523(a)(4), concluding

that Cantrell was entitled to summary judgment on the nondischargeability claim. Cantrell does not discuss the equitable

exception to the collateral estoppel doctrine and the issue of

punitive damages was actually and finally litigated in the prior

state court proceeding before it was given preclusive effect in

the bankruptcy case.

Plaintiff cites Peterson v. State of California Dept. of

Corrections, 451 F.Supp.2d 1092, 1110 (E.D.Cal.2006). In

Peterson, the Court held:

The issue of whether Plaintiff’s promotion

was racially motivated was decided in the SPB

proceeding. This is the same issue that

would need to be determined in a section 1981

claim, which requires intentional

discrimination by the defendant. 

Consequently, Plaintiff’s section 1981 claim

is also barred by collateral estoppel.

There is no discussion in Peterson of the equitable exception to

the collateral estoppel doctrine and, contrary to our case, the

exact same issue as involved in the federal proceeding, i.e.,

intentional discrimination based on race was actually litigated

in the prior proceeding.

Finally, Plaintiff cites Garcia v. Los Banos Unified School

Dist., 418 F.Supp.2d 1194, 1211-1212 (E.D.Cal.2006). In Garcia,

the Court ruled:

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Here, the complaints that Plaintiff submitted

to Defendant LB were essentially complaints

by Plaintiff against Defendant Heid; thus,

the same parties are involved. The conduct

covered by the complaint included all the

factual matters covered by the instant claim,

including Heid’s yelling and threats in

October 2002, retaliation for complaining

about the yelling, Heid’s November 2002

comments regarding wiping Plaintiff’s ass,

retaliation for complaining regarding that

incident, the evaluations, screaming, and the

sexual harassment in May 2003 ....

In summary, the Court concludes that

Plaintiff’s failure to obtain reversal of the

findings of the Board by way of

administrative mandamus bars Plaintiff’s FEHA

action against Heid with respect to the

conduct encompassed by the present FEHA claim

against Heid.

Garcia does not involve the equitable exception to the collateral

estoppel doctrine, but rather involved identical claims in both

the state and federal proceedings.

Plaintiff’s contention that the cited case law negates

application of the equitable exception to the collateral estoppel

doctrine when punitive damages are sought in the subsequent

proceeding is unsupported. Here Plaintiff seeks to use

collateral estoppel offensively. In Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc.

v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330 (1979), the Supreme Court commented:

A second argument against offensive use of

collateral estoppel is that it may be unfair

to a defendant. If a defendant in the first

action is sued for small or nominal damages,

he may have little incentive to defend

vigorously, particularly if future suits are

not foreseeable. 

Plaintiff argues that, even if the prospect of punitive

damages is a valid equitable exception, “the factual data and

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regarding the likelihood of punitive damages, and not merely the

theoretical possibility of unspecified punitive damages, must be

considered.” Plaintiff’s counsel, Mr. Little, asserts that he

has never obtained more than $15,000 in punitive damages against

a police officer in this Court, “and only in far more egregious

cases where there were, unlike here, catastrophic injuries.” 

Plaintiff contends:

Is the Court really saying that the

possibility that Twedt might realistically

incur up to $15,000 in punitive damages

outweighs the inequity of plaintiff’s having

to re-litigate facts that cost her more than

$60,000 to establish in state court and

nearly 1,000 legal hours to seek to have

applied in this forum? Further, is the Court

saying that this mere possibility justifies

the expenditure of tens of thousands of

taxpayer dollars so that these redundant

proceedings may proceed in federal court? No

reasonable balancing of the equities supports

applying an exception to collateral estoppel

in this instance.

Plaintiff further contends that “it is unfair to minimize the

stakes of the underlying state proceeding in order to make it

seem so different in magnitude than the current action.” In the

state court proceeding, Defendant Twedt was facing the potential

loss of the right to carry a firearm, which could have endangered

his ability to continue working as a police officer and he had to

undergo a court-ordered psychological evaluation prior to being

permitted to retain a limited right to possess firearms. 

Plaintiff contends Twedt had more at stake in the state

proceeding than he does in this federal action and “any

distinction between the two provides no justification for

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applying an equitable exception to collateral estoppel.” 

Plaintiff again represents that he intends to dismiss the

federal claims against the City of Fresno if the Court applies

collateral estoppel to Defendant Twedt. 

Plaintiff, citing People v. Sims, 32 Cal.3d 468, 486-487

(1982) and Miller v. Superior Court, 168 Cal.App.3d 376, 381-384

(1985), contends that the City of Fresno is collaterally estopped

to relitigate the facts established in the state court action

because the City of Fresno is “not merely in privity vis á vis

the state proceeding but are the same exact parties.” 

In People v. Sims, the Supreme Court held:

[T]he district attorney’s office, which

represents the party to be estopped, and the

County, the unsuccessful party in the prior

litigation, are ‘sufficiently close’ to

warrant applying collateral estoppel. Both

entities are county agencies that represented

the State of California at the respective

proceedings. The district attorney’s office 

represents the State of California in the

name of the ‘People’ at criminal prosecutions

... At fair hearings, the county welfare

department act [sic] as the ‘agent’ of the

state. ‘[T]he courts have held that the

agents of the same government are in privity

with each other, since they represent not

their own rights but the right of the

government.

32 Cal.3d at 487.

In Miller v. Superior Court, the plaintiff, a victim of a

rape committed by a police officer who was convicted of the

criminal charge of rape, filed a civil action for damages arising

out of the rape in state court against the police officer and the

City which employed the officer. The plaintiff petitioned for a

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writ of mandate directing the Superior Court to vacate its orders

denying her motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of

rape in the underlying civil action against the city. The Court

of Appeal held in pertinent part:

The modern view is stated in Lynch v. Glass,

supra, 44 Cal.App.3d 943, at pages 947-948:

‘Three factors may favor the application of

collateral estoppel in a given case even

though the precise identity of parties and

issues may be lacking. The principle may be

invoked to protect against vexatious

litigation ..., to further the finality of

litigation in which public interests are

involved ..., or to promote the stability of

adjudications in prior criminal actions ...

The circumstances must also have been such

that the nonparty should reasonably have been

expected to be bound by the prior

adjudication.’ Finally, in Clemmer v.

Hartford Insurance Co., supra, 22 Cal.3d 865,

the Supreme Court said, ‘Thus, in deciding

whether to apply collateral estoppel, the

court must balance the rights of the party to

be estopped against the need for applying

collateral estoppel in the particular case,

in order to promote judicial economy by

minimizing repetitive litigation, to prevent

inconsistent judgments which undermine the

integrity of the judicial system, or to

protect against vexatious litigation ....’

....

We have found the issue of rape, finally

decided in the prior criminal case, to be

identical with the rape issue presented in

the instant civil litigation, and that City,

against which collateral estoppel is

asserted, was in privity with the People of

the State of California, party plaintiff to

the prior criminal case. But in addition,

considerations of public policy, principles

of equity, established precedent, finality of

criminal adjudications and a balancing of the

rights of City against the need for

precluding City from relitigating the issue

of fact, impel us to the conclusion that City

is precluded from retrying the essential

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issue of rape. The need for applying the

principle of preclusion against City is

reflected in a variety of circumstances. If

the actions were severed, repetitive

litigation would result, for two trials

arising out of the same facts would be

required; in a joint trial, to allow City to

relitigate the rape issue would not only

result in a waste of judicial time and

resources, but permit vexatious litigation by

again exposing petitioner to a retrial of the

rape issue with its attendant humiliation and

expense both to the parties and to the

public. Further, in the sense that the

interest in prosecuting Schroyer was not only

to bring a police officer who had breached a

substantial public trust to justice but to

protect other members of the public from any

future illegal conduct while on duty, we, as

in Drinkhouse [there the public interest was

the validity of deeds to land], are ‘dealing

with a public interest’ ..., i.e., a public

trust, the integrity of a police force that

serves a large city and the protection the

members of the public have a right to expect

which in Drinkhouse justified invocation of

collateral estoppel to further final

litigation in which public interests are

concerned. But the area of most of our

concern lies in the necessity for stability

of adjudication in prior criminal actions. 

If City is permitted to challenge the

critical fact of Schroyer’s rape of

petitioner, and if by reason of failure of

proof or otherwise on the part of petitioner

the fact was not proved, several anomalies

unsettling to public confidence in the

judicial process would appear. First, there

would be presented the repugnancy that a

police officer would have been convicted,

jailed and removed from office for forcible

sexual conduct which in a civil suit would be

found not to have occurred. Second, not only

would inconsistent judgments threaten public

confidence in our judicial system and

undermine the integrity of our system of

justice but would also have a devastating

effect on Schroyer’s concept of justice as he

serves out his term in state prison, suffers

removal from office and possible denial of

pension, not to mention loss of reputation. 

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The issue of whether the City was vicariously liable for 3

civil damages for the officer’s rape was discussed in Mary M. v.

City of Los Angeles, 54 Cal.3d 202 (1991). That issue is not

presently before the Court.

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168 Cal.App.3d at 385-386.3

Plaintiff states that “the only evidence she intends to

present to prove the facts found by Judge Putnam were those

findings themselves.” Plaintiff represents:

Indeed, plaintiff intended to read verbatim

from said ruling to advise the jury of the

various findings set forth [in Judge Putnam’s

ruling]. Thus, without the requested

application of collateral estoppel, plaintiff

lacks any evidence to proceed to trial or

even make it past the opening statement phase

of the case. Therefore, the plaintiff

requests, if this Court’s tentative [sic]

ruling becomes its final ruling, that it be

certified for immediate appeal or that the

Court enter a directed verdict or involuntary

dismissal based on the plaintiff’s proposed

opening statement.

Upon reanalysis in open court on September 5, 2007, the

parallels with Miller are persuasive. Except for the City, the

parties are identical. The judgment in the Section 527.6 case is

final. There is no justifiable reason to retry the underlying

harassment and annoyance case. However, even affording

collateral estoppel effect to the factual (not legal) findings by

the state court, none of the elements of the claims in this case

were decided.

As to Defendant Brian Twedt, the motion for reconsideration

is GRANTED. As to the City of Fresno, the motion for

reconsideration is DENIED. The Court has by separate ruling 

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formulated the form in which the findings have been presented to

the jury with appropriate admonitions as to the City of Fresno.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 12, 2007 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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