Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-93-07043/USCOURTS-ca10-93-07043-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
James Norwood Hutching
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff - Appellee, 

VS. 

JAMES NORWOOD HUTCHING, 

also known as Norwood, 

also known as "Cowboy", 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

Defendant - Appellant. 

FILED 

United States Court c: Ap~:~:.:; 

Tenth Circuit 

FEB 0 5 1996 

PATRICK FISHER Cleri~ 

No. 93-7043 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. CR-92-32-S) 

Joseph (Sib) Abraham Jr., El Paso, Texas, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Robert J. Erickson, Attorney, Department of Justice, Washington, 

D.C. (John Raley, United States Attorney, Sheldon J. Sperling and 

Paul G. Hess, Assistant United States Attorneys, Muskogee, 

Oklahoma, with him on the brief), for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, ANDERSON and KELLY, Circuit Judges. 

KELLY, Circuit Judge. 

Defendant-appellant James Norwood Hutching challenges his 

convictions for drug conspiracy, 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count 1); 

possession with intent to distribute marijuana, 21 U.S.C. §§ 

841 (a) (1), (b) (1) (B) (vii), and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count 2); possession 

with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) (1), 

(b) (1) (A), and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Counts 3-5); attempt to possess with 

intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) (1), (b) (1) (A), 

Appellate Case: 93-7043 Document: 01019276433 Date Filed: 02/05/1996 Page: 1 
846, and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count 6); interstate travel to promote 

racketeering, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1952, 2 (Counts 7-12, 28); conspiracy, 

18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count 13); interstate travel with intent to 

commit murder, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1958, 2 (Count 14); continuing 

criminal enterprise, 21 U.S.C. § 848(a) (Count 15); killing of an 

individual in furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise, 21 

U.S.C. §§ 848 (a), (e) (1) (A), and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count 16); receipt 

or possession of an unregistered firearm, 26 U.S.C. § 586l(d) and 

18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count 17); possession of a firearm after a felony 

conviction, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922 (g), 924 (a) (2) (Counts 18-20); 

possession with intent to distribute marijuana, 21 U.S.C. § 

84l(a) (1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count 21); carrying a firearm during 

the commission of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) 

and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count 22); money laundering, 18 U.S.C. §§ 

1956 (a) (1) (A) (i), (a) (1) (B) (i), 2 (Counts 23-24); and distribution 

of marijuana, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1) (Count 29). Our jurisdiction 

arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We remand to the district court 

with instructions to vacate Mr. Hutching's conviction for drug 

conspiracy (Count 1); we affirm all the other convictions. 

Background 

The basic facts of this case are set out in United States v. 

McCullah, F.3d , No. 93-7118 (lOth Cir. 1996), and need not 

be restated here. 

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Discussion 

I. Caldwell Violation 

Mr. Hutching claims that the trial court erred by informing 

the jury of the possibility of appellate review. At the 

conclusion of voir dire, the trial judge, explaining side bar 

conferences to the jury, stated in part: 

So that's the reason we have this conference, but it's 

always about things that I have to decide, that I have 

to make decisions about. And the court reporter is 

always there so it's taken down. There aren't any 

secrets. That's an official record. And if I make a 

decision -- for example, if we are over here discussing 

whether or not some evidence ought to be admitted, some 

lawyer presents some evidence -- asks a question and 

there is an objection. And I say, "Well, let's talk 

about this over here." I seek their advice over here. 

And if I say, "No, that's not a proper question, I'm not 

going to ask it," but there is a record made of it, and 

if I was wrong about it, in error, then there is an 

official record made of it. Somebody could appeal on 

that basis, if I've made a big enough boo boo that the 

whole thing ought to be reversed, or a new trial, then 

it can be. So I want you to know that even though we 

talk out of your hearing, that a record is being made of 

everything that we talk about over here. 

32 R. 84-85. Defense counsel timely objected to these statements 

by the trial court. Mr. Hutching argues that these statements 

created the danger that the jury would minimize its own role in 

the criminal process and deprived him of due process and a fair 

trial. 

Mr. Hutching relies on Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 u.s. 320 

(1985), to support his contention that the trial court's remarks 

were prejudicial. In Caldwell, the prosecutor stated to the jury 

in closing argument of the penalty phase of a capital case: 

Now, [defense counsel] would have you believe that 

you're going to kill this man and they know--they know 

that your decision is not the final decision. My God, 

how unfair can you be? Your job is reviewable. They 

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know it .... For they know, as I know, and as Judge 

Baker has told you, that the decision you render is 

automatically reviewable by the Supreme Court. 

Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 325-26 (plurality opinion). Concluding that 

such remarks lessened the jury's sense of responsibility for its 

decision, the Supreme Court held that "it is constitutionally 

impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by 

a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility 

for determining the appropriateness of the defendant's death rests 

elsewhere." Id. at 328-39 (plurality opinion). 

As an initial issue, the government contends that Mr. 

Hutching lacks standing to raise a Caldwell claim. We agree. 

Caldwell was particularly directed to the unique nature of a death 

sentence, and the opinion in Caldwell was based upon the 

"quantitative difference of death from all other punishments 

[which] requires a correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of 

the capital sentencing determination." Id. at 329 (plurality 

opinion). Mr. Hutching was not sentenced to death and thus lacks 

standing to allege a Caldwell violation. Cf. Caldwell, 472 U.S. 

at 341 (the judgment in Caldwell was only "reversed to the extent 

that it sustains imposition of the death penalty"). The Supreme 

Court has not extended Caldwell beyond the capital sentencing 

realm, and we decline to do so here. 

Even if Mr. Hutching had standing to challenge the trial 

court's remarks (as his codefendant, Mr. McCullah, does), we do 

not find that the remarks constitute a Caldwell violation. The 

Supreme Court has "read Caldwell as 'relevant only to certain 

types of comment--those that mislead the jury as to its role in 

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the sentencing process in a way that allows the jury to feel less 

responsible than it should for the sentencing decision.'" Romano 

v. Oklahoma, 114 S. Ct. 2004, 2010 (1994) (quoting Darden v. 

Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 184 n.15 (1986)). See also Hopkinson v. 

Shillinger, 888 F.2d 1286, 1293 (lOth Cir. 1989) (en bane), cert. 

denied, 497 U.S. 1010 (1990). Here, the trial court was merely 

explaining how and why a record is made. The statements during 

voir dire did not tend to minimize the jury's responsibility with 

regard to the death sentence and referred only to the possibility 

of appellate review of the trial judge's errors during the trial, 

not the jury's responsibility during sentencing. In Dugger v. 

Adams, the Supreme Court stated, "[t]o establish a Caldwell 

violation, a defendant necessarily must show that the remarks to 

the jury improperly described the role assigned to the jury by 

local law." Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 407 (1989). Mr. 

Hutching makes no such claim. 

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

Mr. Hutching contends that there was insufficient evidence to 

support his convictions for engaging in a continuing criminal 

enterprise (Count 15) and for causing the intentional killing of 

an individual while engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise 

(Count 16) . 

In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence supporting a 

conviction, we examine the evidence, and all reasonable inferences 

to be drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the 

government and "'ask whether any rational juror could have found 

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the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" 

United States v. Levine, 41 F.3d 607, 610 (lOth Cir. 1994) 

(quoting United States v. Arutunoff, 1 F.3d 1112, 1116 (lOth 

Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 616 (1993)). "We consider both 

direct and circumstantial evidence and accept the jury's 

resolution of conflicting evidence and its assessment of the 

credibility of witnesses." Levine, 41 F.3d at 610. 

A. Count 15 

Mr. Hutching claims that the evidence fails to establish that 

he occupied "a position of organizer, a supervisory position, or 

any other position of management" with respect to five other 

persons in the criminal enterprise as required by the statutory 

definition of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise. See 

21 U.S.C. § 848(c) .* The terms "organizer," "manager," and 

"supervisor" as used in§ 848(c) are given their "nontechnical, 

* Section 848(c) provides: 

For purposes of subsection (a) of this section, a person 

is engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise if--

(1) he violates any provision of this subchapter or 

subchapter II of this chapter the punishment for which 

is a felony, and 

(2) such violation is a part of a continuing series 

of violations of this subchapter or subchapter II of 

this chapter--

(A) which are undertaken by such person in 

concert with five or more other persons with respect to 

whom such person occupies a position of organizer, a 

supervisory position, or any other position of 

management, and 

(B) from which such person obtains substantial 

income or resources. 

21 U.S.C. § 848 (c). 

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'everyday meanings.'" United States v. Jenkins, 904 F.2d 549, 553 

(lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 962 (1990). See also United 

States v. Smith, 24 F.3d 1230, 1233 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 115 

s. Ct. 270 (1994). "[T]he defendant need not be the dominant 

organizer or manager of the enterprise; he need only occupy some 

managerial position with respect to five or more persons." 

Jenkins, 904 F.2d at 553 (emphasis in original). "An organizer 

arranges a number of people engaged in separate activities into an 

essentially orderly operation," and a supervisor gives orders or 

directions to another person who carries them out. Smith, 24 F.3d 

at 1233. See also United States v. Apodaca, 843 F.2d 421, 426 

(lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 932 (1988). "'The defendant's 

relationships with the other persons need not have existed at the 

same time, the five persons involved need not have acted in 

concert at the same time or with each other, and the same type of 

relationship need not exist between the defendant and each of the 

five.'" Smith, 24 F.3d at 1233 (quoting Apodaca, 843 F.2d at 

426) . 

The evidence at trial established that Mr. Hutching acted 

both as an organizer and as a supervisor or manager. He oversaw 

the cross-country transportation of drugs for the Arvizu 

enterprise, and he helped arrange the drug-recovery operation. 

Mr. Hutching concedes that there was sufficient evidence of his 

supervision or management of at least three individuals: James 

Shiew, Herman "Buck" Thornton, and Ed Thayer. However, contrary 

to Mr. Hutching's contention, there was also sufficient evidence 

that he supervised at least two other members of the criminal 

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enterprise: Claude "Gary" Bell and Melva Ford, and there was also 

substantial evidence of his organizational, supervisory and 

managerial role in the attempts to recover the stolen drugs. 

i. Claude Bell 

The evidence shows that Mr. Hutching employed Claude Bell as 

a bodyguard. Mr. Bell accompanied Mr. Hutching on several drugconspiracy related trips and performed or helped perform various 

conspiracy-related tasks at Mr. Hutching's direction, including 

aiding in the transport of guns from the Oklahoma lake house to 

Tennessee. Although there was no direct evidence that Mr. Bell 

knew the drug-related nature of his activities, such knowledge can 

be inferred from the large amount of money Mr. Bell was promised 

for his efforts and the furtive nature of his trips with Mr. 

Hutching. 

ii. Melva Ford 

The evidence similarly indicates that Mr. Hutching supervised 

or managed Melva Ford. Mr. Hutching stored the pickup truck 

containing the cocaine at her residence after telling her that 

"[t]he truck is loaded." Even if the period of supervision may 

have been "quite brief" in duration, "someone who stores drugs for 

[a] defendant . . . is also within the ambit of the [continuing 

criminal enterprise] statute." United States v. Ward, 37 F.3d 

243, 247 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1388 (1995). 

The evidence indicated that Ms. Ford knew the drug-related nature 

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• 

of the shipment in her care; in fact her knowledge was what made 

her a prime suspect in the truck's disappearance. 

iii. Drug Recovery Attempts 

The evidence clearly revealed that Mr. Hutching played a 

pivotal role in the drug recovery efforts of the Arvizu 

organization. Mr. Wiscowiche testified that Mr. Hutching helped 

plan the initial drug recovery efforts and that Mr. Hutching 

personally led the group, which included Mr. Wiscowiche, Mr. 

Molina, and Mr. Sanchez, which attempted to kidnap Mr. Rogers from 

his home but was thwarted by the noises of farm animals. The 

evidence also indicated that Mr. Hutching supplied the weapons to 

the group at the lake house and participated in a planning meeting 

with Mr. Arvizu and Mr. Molina. 

B. Count 16 

Mr. Hutching argues that because the evidence was not 

sufficient to establish that he was engaged in a continuing 

criminal enterprise, an essential element of the crime charged in 

Count 16 is lacking. Given our previous discussion holding there 

was sufficient evidence, we reject that argument. Mr. Hutching 

was indeed engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise, and the 

murder of Mr. Collins was part of that enterprise. Furthermore, 

the evidence was overwhelming that he was "working in furtherance" 

of the enterprise and that he "counsel[led], command[ed], 

induce[d], procure[d], or cause[d] the intentional killing" of Mr. 

Collins. 

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" 

III. Multiplicity of Counts 18, 19, and 20 

Mr. Hutching claims that Counts 18, 19, and 20 are 

multiplicitous and consequently, convictions on all three counts 

cannot be upheld. Counts 18, 19, and 20 each charged Mr. Hutching 

with unlawfully possessing a firearm as a previously convicted 

felon under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g), 924(a) (2), but each count charged 

Mr. Hutching with possession of a different firearm. Claims of 

multiplicity are subject to de novo review. United States v. 

Wall, 37 F.3d 1443, 1446 (lOth Cir. 1994). 

The "simultaneous possession" of multiple firearms generally 

"constitutes only ... one offense" unless there is evidence that 

the weapons were stored in different places or acquired at 

different times. United States v. Jones, 841 F.2d 1022, 1023 

(lOth Cir. 1988). See also United States v. Bonavia, 927 F.2d 

565, 568-69 (11th Cir. 1991). In this case, the three weapons, 

while all seized on the same day, were located at different sites; 

one was in Mr. Hutching's bedroom, one was in a car parked in his 

garage, and the other was in his pickup truck. The scattered 

locations of the guns constituted separate storages that permitted 

possession of each firearm to constitute a separate offense. 

Accord United States v. Gann, 732 F.2d 714, 721 (9th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 469 U.S. 1034 (1984) (separate counts for firearms 

separately stored or acquired) . 

IV. Comments by Prosecutor and Trial Court 

Mr. Hutching argues that certain comments by the prosecutor 

and by the trial court were highly prejudicial and denied him a 

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fair trial. Mr. Hutching concedes that the two statements he 

complains of, standing alone, would not warrant reversal of his 

convictions, but contends that the cumulative effect of the 

statements, coupled with the other errors he alleges, constitutes 

reversible error. United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1469 

(lOth Cir. 1990). We disagree. 

In his opening statement, the prosecutor, in introducing his 

trial team to the jury, introduced Assistant United States 

Attorney Paul Hess as "chief of our organized crime and drug 

enforcement task force." Mr. Hutching does not dispute that this 

was a true statement of Mr. Hess' position within the United 

States Attorney's Office, but objected to the description as 

unnecessary and prejudicial because of the sinister connotations 

of "organized crime. 11 The prosecutor's statement, accurate albeit 

unnecessary, was not prejudicial. 

Mr. Hutching also takes issue with a statement made by the 

trial judge after both sides had rested and the jury was about to 

begin its deliberations. The judge stated to the jury: 

It's about 10:30 [A.M], and I don't know how long it 

will take you to make a decision in this case. It may 

take just an hour or so. I mean it's conceivable you 

could make a decision before noon. 

We have ordered lunch for you, I guess . 

. . . [I]f for some reason you make a decision 

before noon, well, we'll stay for it and you can go on, 

or you stay here and eat it, if you want to, if that's 

what you want to do afterwards. 

It may take you on into the afternoon. It's always 

possible it could take you on longer than that. If you 

should deliberate past another meal hour, you let us 

know. 

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( 

56 R. 3838-39. The judge was seeking to make proper meal 

arrangements for the jury, rather than commenting on the evidence 

or the case. We find no error in the judge's remarks. 

V. Issues Raised by Codefendants 

Mr. Hutching adopts all arguments advanced by his 

codefendants applicable to him and reasserts some arguments raised 

by his codefendants. We find merit in only one of these 

arguments. 

Mr. Hutching, unlike his codefendants, was convicted of both 

drug conspiracy, 21 U.S.C. § 846, and continuing criminal 

enterprise, 21 U.S.C. § 848(a). The drug conspiracy count is a 

lesser included offense of the continuing criminal enterprise 

count, and thus we vacate the drug conspiracy conviction. United 

States v. Stallings, 810 F.2d 973, 975-76 (lOth Cir. 1987). We 

note that drug conspiracy is not a lesser included offense of 

Count 16, killing in furtherance of a continuing criminal 

enterprise, for the reasons set out in United States v. McCullah, 

F.3d , No. 93-7118 (lOth Cir. 1996). 

We have carefully considered the other arguments and find 

them without merit both individually and cumulatively. See United 

States v. McCullah, F.3d , No. 93-7118 (lOth Cir. 1996). 

Accordingly, we remand to the district court with 

instructions to VACATE the conviction and sentence on Count 1; we 

AFFIRM the remaining convictions and sentences. 

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