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Parties Involved:
Evelyne Broitman
Appellant
Christy Bates Kirkland
Debtor
Scott Frank Kirkland
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH FILED 

LJalttd Stltft Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit 

TENTH cmcmr 

IN RE: SCOTT FRANK KIRKLAND and 

CHRISTY BATES KIRKLAND, 

Debtors, 

EVEL YNE BROITMAN, 

Appellant, 

v. 

SCOTT FRANK KIRKLAND, 

Appellee. 

GEORGE HERMESTROFF and HELEN 

HERMESTROFF, 

Appellants, 

v. 

SCOTT FRANK KIR.KLAND, 

Appellee. 

JUN 12 1996 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

No. 95~4081 

No. 95-4131 

Appellate Case: 95-4081 Document: 01019756284 Date Filed: 06/12/1996 Page: 1 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 

(D.C. Nos. 95-CV-49, 95-CV-50) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Scott C. Pierce, of McKay, Burton & Thurman, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Appellants. 

Jerome Romero, of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, Salt Lake City, Utah, for 

Appellee. 

. Before ANDERSON, LOGAN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. 

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously to grant the parties' request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. 

~Fed R App. P. 34 (f) and lOth Cir. R 34.1.9. The cases are therefore ordered submitted 

without oral argument. 

Plaintiffs appeal from the district court's orders affirming the bankruptcy court's 

dismissals of their adversary proceedings. PlaintiffEvelyne Broitman (appeal No. 95-4081) 

and plaintiffs George and Helen Hermestroff (appeal No. 95-4131) brought separate 

proceedings, seeking judgments that debts owed to them were nondischargeable. The district 

court dismissed each of the proceedings for lack of timely service upon defendant/debtor 

Kirkland The order affinning the dismissal of plainti:ffEvelyne Broitman's complaint may 

2 

Appellate Case: 95-4081 Document: 01019756284 Date Filed: 06/12/1996 Page: 2 
be found at Broittnan v. Kirkland (In re Kirkland), 181 B.R 563 (Bankr. D. Utah 1995). The 

order from which the Hermestroffs appeal is unpublished This court consolidated these 

cases on its own motion, Fed. R App. P. 3(b), and affirms. 

l 

The facts are undisputed Plaintiffs filed their proceedings pro se in the bankruptcy 

court on May 20, 1994. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4Q), plaintiffs were required to serve 

defendant Kirkland with the summons and complaint in each proceeding on or before 

September 17, 1994.

1 Since that date fell on a Saturday, the time for service was extended 

until Monday, September 19, 1994. ~Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(a). 

Rule 7004(a) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure makes certain provisions 

of Fed R Civ. P. 4, including Rule 4(j), applicable to adversary proceedings. Rule 7004(g) 

specifies that the provisions of Rule 4 in effect on January 1, 1990, apply, notwithstanding 

any subsequent amendment to Rule 4. Rule 4(j) has subsequently been amended, with the 

new rule being found at Rule 4(m). Former Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(j), applicable 

here, stated: 

If a service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a defendant 

within 120 days after the filing of the complaint and the party on whose behalf 

such service was required cannot show good cause why such service was not 

made within that period, the action shall be dismissed as to that defendant 

without prejudice upon the court's own initiative with notice to each party or 

upon motion. This subdivision shall not apply to service in a foreign country 

pursuant to subdivision (I) of this rule. 

3 

Appellate Case: 95-4081 Document: 01019756284 Date Filed: 06/12/1996 Page: 3 
Each plaintiff failed to meet the deadline for service. Each summons and complaint 

was served one day late, on Tuesday, September 20, 1994. Defendant moved for dismissal 

of the complaints for untimely service. 

The bankruptcy court held a consolidated hearing on the motions to dismiss, at which 

plaintiffs argued that the proceedings should not be dismissed because there was "good 

cause" for their failure to timely serve the defendant. ~former Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(j). As 

evidence of good cause, plaintiffBroitman presented her affidavit, in which she described 

· her reasons for delay: 

2. I understood, under the law, that I had until September 20, 1994 in 

which to serve the Debtor with the Complaint and Summons. The Complaint 

and Summons was (sic) served by that date. 

3. I waited to serve the Complaint and Summons because there are 

ongoing legal proceedings in the State of California between myself and the 

Debtor's partnership and/or connected entities. These legal proceedings may 

have made it unnecessary for me to pursue this non-dischargeability action. 

However, these legal proceedings are continuing and have not been resolved, 

therefore making it necessary for me to pursue the Debtor in this nondischargeability action. 

Appellants' App. at 22. 

Plaintiff George Hermestroff presented his own, identically-worded affidavit. See id. 

at 34-35. The bankruptcy court considered the affidavits and determined that plaintiffs had 

failed to show good cause for failure to timely serve defendant. ~ Court's Ruling, 

Appellees' Supp. App. at 5. The court granted defendant's motions to dismiss, and the 

district court affirmed. 

4 

Appellate Case: 95-4081 Document: 01019756284 Date Filed: 06/12/1996 Page: 4 
II. 

In reviewing a district courf s decision affinning the decision of a bankruptcy court, 

this court applies the same standards of review which governed the district court. In r~ 

Tanaka Bros. Farms, Inc., 36 F.3d 996, 998 (lOth Cir. 1994). The bankruptcy court's 

findings of fact will be rejected only if clearly erroneous. In re Mama D'Angelo, Inc., 55 

F.3d 552, 555 (1Oth Cir. 1995). Its conclusions oflaw, however, are reviewed de !!QYQ. In 

re Davidovich, 901 F.2d 1533, 1536 (1Oth Cir. 1990). Dismissal of a complaint for failure 

to comply with Rule 4(j)'s 120-day time limit for service is committed to the bankruptcy 

court's discretion and will be set aside only for an abuse of that discretion. See Putnam v. 

Morris, 833 F.2d 903, 904 (lOth Cir. 1987). 

m. 

Rule 4(j) requires the court to dismiss a proceeding if service has not been made upon 

the defendant within 120 days after filing and the party responsible for service cannot show 

good cause why it was not made. Rule 4(j) does not define "good cause." ~ Cox v. Sandia 

~. 941 F.2d 1124, 1125 (lOth Cir. 1991). This court has interpreted the phrase narrowly, 

rejecting inadvertence or neglect as "good cause" for untimely service. See, e.g., Despain 

v. Salt Lake Area Metro Gang Unit, 13 F.3d 1436, 1438 (lOth Cir. 1994); Putnam v. Morris, 

833 F.2d 903, 905 (lOth Cir. 1987); see generally Cloyd v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 151 

F.RD. 407,411 (D. Utah 1993)(summarizing cases), .aff_d, No. 93-4199, 1994 WL 242184 

(lOth Cir. June 7, 1994). 

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Appellate Case: 95-4081 Document: 01019756284 Date Filed: 06/12/1996 Page: 5 
Plaintiffs argue that the Supreme Court's decision in Pioneer Investment Services Co. 

v. Brunswick Associates Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380 (1993), requires the application of 

a more flexible standard in evaluating "good cause." In Pioneer, the Supreme Court 

considered the meaning of the phrase "excusable neglect" contained in Bankruptcy Rule 

9006(b )(1 ). 2 Prior to Pioneer, some circuits interpreted "excusable neglect" to require proof 

that failure to timely perform a duty was due to circumstances beyond the party's control. 

Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 387 n.3. The Supreme Court rejected this narrow interpretation, holding 

that the plain meaning of the word "neglect" includes inadvertent or negligent omissions. 

M.. at 394-95. The court determined that "excusable neglect" could include attorney 

2 Banlcruptcy Rule 9006(b)(l) reads as follows: 

(b) Enlargement 

(1) In General. Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3) of this 

subdivision, when an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a 

specified period by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of 

court. the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with or 

without motion or notice order the period enlarged if the request therefor is 

made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended 

by a previous order or (2) on motion made after the expiration of the specified 

period pennit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of 

excusable neglect 

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Appellate Case: 95-4081 Document: 01019756284 Date Filed: 06/12/1996 Page: 6 
inadvertence or negligence, provided certain mitigating circumstances were present. Id.. at 

395-97. 

The circuits mentioned in Pioneer rejected inadvertence as a basis for showing 

"excusable neglect," just as this court has also rejected it as a sufficient showing of "good 

cause." Plaintiffs seize on this similarity and urge application of Pioneer's flexible approach 

to the interpretation of "good cause." 

The Pioneer Court did not in any way link its discussion of "excusable neglect" with 

"good cause" under Rule 4G). Plaintiffs attempt to show that the standards are similar, citing 

Putnam, 833 F.2d at 905, in which this court stated that the two standards are interrelated. 

A careful reading of Putnam discloses, however, that the court clarified the interrelationship 

with a telling quotation from Winters v. Teledyne Movible Offshore. Inc., 776 F.2d 1304, 

1306 (5th Cir. 1985): 

Without attempting a rigid or all-encompassing definition of "good cause," it 

would appear to require at least as much as would be required to show 

excusable neglect, as to which simple inadvertence or mistake of counsel or 

ignorance of the rules usually does not suffice, and some showing of "good 

faith on the part of the party seeking the enlargement and some reasonable 

basis for noncompliance within the time specified" is normally required 1 0 

Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 1165 at 622 

(emphasis added). The district court is clearly not compelled to accept a lesser 

"excusable neglect" showing. 

833 F.2d at 905 (emphasis added). 

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Appellate Case: 95-4081 Document: 01019756284 Date Filed: 06/12/1996 Page: 7 
Putnam thus recognized that the two standards, although interrelated, are not identical 

and that "good cause" requires a greater showing than "excusable neglect. "3 In CQx, 941 

F.2d at 1125, the court also acknowledged that "good cause" under Rule 4 and "excusable 

neglect" under Rule 60 were not identical. Thus, the cases do not support plaintiffs' 

position. 

Considering this issue anew in light offioneer, there are several reasons not to apply 

its flexible test concerning excusable neglect to the "good cause" standard under Rule 4(j). 

First, in reaching its result in Pioneer, the Supreme Court relied upon the plain meaning of 

the term "neglect," which can connote negligence or inadvertence. 507 U.S. at 394-95. The 

plain meaning of the phrase "good cause" has no such connotation. Second, the Supreme 

Court relied upon use of the term "excusable neglect" in a broad sense in Rules 6(b ), 13(f), 

60(b)(l), and 60(b)(6). 507 U.S. at 392-93. This phrase is not, however, used in Rule 4(j). 

Had the drafters of the federal rules intended to include an excusable neglect standard in 

Rule 4(j), they could certainly have done so. Third, the Supreme Court noted that Rule 

9006's allowance for late filings due to "excusable neglect" serves an equitable purpose in 

Chapter 11 proceedings. Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 389. Rule 4(j), by contrast, applies to a wide 

variety of proceedings and does not have a similar, equitable purpose. Finally, Rule 4(j) is 

a separate rule and operates independently from Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b )(1 ); Rule 

3 It should be noted that in Putnam, the court discussed "excusable neglect" under 

Fed R Civ. P. 6(b). Banlcruptcy Rule 9006(b)(1) is patterned after Rule 6(b) and serves a 

similar purpose. ~Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 391. 

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Appellate Case: 95-4081 Document: 01019756284 Date Filed: 06/12/1996 Page: 8 
9006(b )(1) may actually relieve litigants from the harsh consequences of Rule 4G). 4 The 

standard for evaluating "good cause" contained in Rule 4G) is not affected by the Supreme 

Court's decision in Pioneer. See also Dederick & Himlie. P.A. v. DuFour an re Dufour), 

153 B.R 853, 857 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1993). 

IV. 

The ultimate question is whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in finding 

that plaintiffs failed to show good cause for ~eir failure to timely serve defendant. The court 

noted that, although plaintiffs filed their complaints prose, they had some familiarity with 

the bankruptcy process, and had some access to legal counseL Court's Ruling, Appellees' 

Supp. App. at 3. It further found that the plaintiffs made a strategic or economic decision, 

based upon other litigation, to wait until the last minute to serve defendant. Id. Plaintiffs 

showed that they miscalculated or neglected the filing date, but failed to show good cause 

for their error. Id.. 

Prose litigants must follow the requirements of Rule 4(j). DiCesare v. Stuart, 12 F.3d 

973, 980 (lOth Cir. 1993). As stated above, inadvertence or negligence alone do not 

constitute "good cause" for failure of timely service. Mistake of counsel or ignorance of the 

rules also usually do not suffice. Putnam, 833 F.2d at 905; Despain, 13 F.3d at 1439. 

4 The interrelationship of these two rules suggests that plaintiffs might have brought 

themselves within the "excusable neglecf' standard by filing a motion requesting extension 

of time for service under Rule 9006(b )(1 ). & Kacesse. Inc. v. Williams an re Williams), 

178 B.R 255, 258-59 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1995). However, the district court found that there 

was no evidence that they did so. ~Kirkland, 181 B.R. at 567. 

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Appellate Case: 95-4081 Document: 01019756284 Date Filed: 06/12/1996 Page: 9 
Plaintiffs testified to their understanding that they had until September 20, 1994, to 

achieve service on defendant. They failed, however, to supply any explanation for this 

misunderstanding. Unexplained assertions of miscalculation do not constitute "good cause." 

~ Yosefv. Passamaquoddy Tribe, 876 F.2d 283, 287 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 

U.S. 1028 (1990). Although a small delay in achieving service may not prejudice the 

defendant, absence of prejudice alone does not constitute good cause. Despain, 13 F.3d at 

1439. Moreover, plaintiffs' affidavits reveal that they waited, apparently for strategic 

reasons, until the perceived last JX>Ssible moment to serve defendant. The plaintiff who seeks 

to rely on the good cause provision must show meticulous efforts to comply with the rule. 

Id. at 1438. 

In sum, the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing this action. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Utah is AFFIRlv:IED. 

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