Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02527/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02527-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Victor Gomez-Cazares
Petitioner
USA
Respondent

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WO SC

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America, 

Plaintiff,

v.

Victor Gomez-Cazares, 

Defendant/Movant. 

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No. CV 12-2527-PHX-JAT (DKD)

No. CR 10-0666-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Movant Victor Gomez-Cazares, who is confined in the Federal Correctional

Institution in Safford, Arizona, filed a pro se Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct

Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Movant

subsequently filed a motion to supplement his § 2255 motion to add a second ground. (Doc.

3.) The Court will grant the motion to supplement. So supplemented, the Court will

summarily dismiss the motion.

I. Procedural History

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Movant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with

intent to distribute 50 grams or more of actual methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(viii) and 846. Under the plea agreement, the parties agreed to the

amount of actual methamphetamine that was readily provable as being in the possession and

control of Movant and/or his co-defendants and the United States agreed to recommend up

to a three level reduction in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines offense level for acceptance of

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responsibility, depending upon Movant’s criminal history. On January 25, 2012, the Court

sentenced Movant to a 188-month term of imprisonment followed by five years on

supervised release.

Movant asserts two grounds for ineffective assistance of counsel. In Ground One, he

alleges that he instructed his attorney to file a notice of appeal, but counsel refused to do so.

In Ground Two, he alleges that counsel failed to advise him that he would face an

enhancement for his leadership role, which would raise his offense level above level 36.

According to Plaintiff, his attorney explained that “with a level 36 as contained in the Plea

Agreement, minus 3 points for acceptance of responsibility, [Movant] would be at Guideline

level 13.” (Doc. 3 at 1.)

II. Summary Dismissal

A district court must summarily dismiss a § 2255 application “[i]f it plainly appears

from the motion, any attached exhibits, and the record of prior proceedings that the moving

party is not entitled to relief.” Rule 4(b), Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the

United States District Courts. When this standard is satisfied, neither a hearing nor a

response from the government is required. See Marrow v. United States, 772 F.2d 525, 526

(9th Cir. 1985); Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 571 (9th Cir. 1982). In this case,

the record shows that summary dismissal under Rule 4(b) is warranted because Movant has

waived the right to bring a § 2255 motion.

III. Waiver

Movant has waived challenges to his sentence. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

has found that there are “strict standards for waiver of constitutional rights.” United States

v. Gonzalez-Flores, 418 F.3d 1093, 1102 (9th Cir. 2005). It is impermissible to presume

waiver from a silent record, and the Court must indulge every reasonable presumption

against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights. United States v. Hamilton, 391 F.3d

1066, 1071 (9th Cir. 2004). In this action, Movant’s waiver was clear, express, and

unequivocal.

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Plea agreements are contractual in nature, and their plain language will generally be

enforced if the agreement is clear and unambiguous on its face. United States v. Jeronimo,

398 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005). A defendant may waive the statutory right to bring a

§ 2255 action challenging the length of his sentence. United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431,

433 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1992). The only

claims that cannot be waived are claims that the waiver itself was involuntary or that

ineffective assistance of counsel rendered the waiver involuntary. See Washington v.

Lampert, 422 F.3d 864, 871 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a plea agreement that waives the

right to file a federal habeas petition pursuant to § 2254 is unenforceable with respect to an

ineffective assistance of counsel claim that challenges the voluntariness of the waiver); Pruitt,

32 F.3d at 433 (expressing doubt that a plea agreement could waive a claim that counsel

erroneously induced a defendant to plead guilty or accept a particular plea bargain); Abarca,

985 F.2d at 1014 (expressly declining to hold that a waiver forecloses a claim of ineffective

assistance or involuntariness of the waiver); see also Jeronimo, 398 F.3d at 1156 n.4

(declining to decide whether waiver of all statutory rights included claims implicating the

voluntariness of the waiver). 

“Collateral attacks based on ineffective assistance of counsel claims that are

characterized as falling outside [the category of ineffective assistance of counsel claims

challenging the validity of the plea or the waiver] are waivable.” United States v.

Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 2001). See also Williams v. United States, 396

F.3d 1340, 1342 (11th Cir. 2005) (joining the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth

Circuits in holding that “a valid sentence-appeal waiver, entered into voluntarily and

knowingly, pursuant to a plea agreement, precludes the defendant from attempting to attack,

in a collateral proceeding, the sentence through a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

during sentencing.”).

As part of his plea agreement, Movant made the following waiver:

Providing the defendant’s sentence is consistent with this agreement,

the defendant waives (1) any and all motions, defenses, probable cause

determinations, and objections that the defendant could assert to the indictment

or information; and (2) any right to appeal, any collateral attack, and any

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other writ or motion that challenges the conviction, an order of restitution

or forfeiture, the entry of judgment against the defendant, or any aspect

of the defendant’s sentence, including the manner in which the sentence

is determined, including but not limited to any appeals under 18 U.S.C. §

3742 and motions under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2255. The defendant

acknowledges that if the Court has sentenced the defendant according to the

terms of this agreement, this waiver shall result in the dismissal of any

appeal, collateral attack, or other motion the defendant might file

challenging the conviction, order of restitution or forfeiture, or sentence

in this case.

(Doc. 176 at 4) (emphasis added). Movant indicated in his plea agreement that he had

discussed the terms with his attorney, agreed to the terms and conditions, and entered into

the plea voluntarily. (Id. at 9-11.) Specifically, Movant agreed that “promises, including any

predictions as to the Sentencing Guideline range or to any Sentencing Guideline factors that

will apply, made by anyone (including my attorney) that are not contained within this written

plea agreement, are null and void and have no force and effect.” (Id. at 10.) 

Movant’s assertions in his § 2255 motion pertain to counsel’s alleged refusal to file

a notice of appeal and to his sentence. Movant expressly waived issues regarding the

imposition of sentence and expressly waived the right to bring a § 2255 motion. Movant

does not challenge the voluntariness of the waiver and his express waiver of the right to bring

a § 2255 motion. The Court accepted his plea as voluntarily made. The alleged

post-judgment failure of Movant’s attorney to file an appeal does not affect the validity of

his waiver of the right to file a § 2255. Movant was sentenced in accordance with the terms

of the plea agreement. Consequently, the Court finds that Movant waived the right to file a

§ 2255 motion concerning the issue raised. Thus, the Court will summarily dismiss the

motion. Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) Movant’s motion to supplement his § 2255 motion is granted. (Doc. 3.)

(2) The Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255 as supplemented (Doc. 223 in CR10-0666-PHX-JAT) is denied and the civil action

opened in connection with this Motion (CV12-2527-PHX-JAT (DKD)) is dismissed with

prejudice. The Clerk of Court must enter judgment accordingly.

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(3) Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases, in the event

Movant files an appeal, the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability because

reasonable jurists would not find the Court’s procedural ruling debatable. See Slack v.

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

DATED this 31st day of January, 2013.

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