Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-57130/USCOURTS-ca9-12-57130-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Meagan Gordon
Intervenor
Christopher Mendoza
Appellant
Nordstrom, Inc.
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CHRISTOPHER MENDOZA, an

individual, on behalf of himself and

all other persons similarly situated,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

MEAGAN GORDON,

Plaintiff-Intervenor,

v.

NORDSTROM, INC., a Washington

Corporation authorized to do

business in the State of California,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 12-57130

D.C. No.

8:10-cv-00109-

CJC-MLG

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2 MENDOZA V. NORDSTROM

CHRISTOPHER MENDOZA, an

individual, on behalf of himself and

all other persons similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

and

MEAGAN GORDON,

Plaintiff/Intervenor-Appellant,

v.

NORDSTROM, INC., a Washington

Corporation authorized to do

business in the State of California,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 12-57144

D.C. No.

8:10-cv-00109-

CJC-MLG

ORDER

CERTIFYING

QUESTIONS TO

THE SUPREME

COURT OF

CALIFORNIA

Filed February 19, 2015

Before: Susan P. Graber, Ronald M. Gould,

and Consuelo M. Callahan, Circuit Judges.

Order

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MENDOZA V. NORDSTROM 3

SUMMARY*

Certification to California Supreme Court

The panel certified three questions to the Supreme Court

of California:

(A) California Labor Code section 551 provides that

“[e]very person employed in any occupation of labor is

entitled to one day’s rest therefrom in seven.” Is the

required day of rest calculated by the workweek, or is it

calculated on a rolling basis for any consecutive sevenday period?

(B) California Labor Code section 556 exempts

employers from providing such a day of rest “when the

total hours of employment do not exceed 30 hours in any

week or six hours in any one day thereof.” (Emphasis

added.) Does that exemption apply when an employee

works less than six hours in any one day of the applicable

week, or does it apply only when an employee works less

than six hours in each day of the week?

(C) California Labor Code section 552 provides that an

employer may not “cause his employees to work more

than six days in seven.” What does it mean for an

employer to “cause” an employee to work more than six

days in seven: force, coerce, pressure, schedule,

encourage, reward, permit, or something else?

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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4 MENDOZA V. NORDSTROM

COUNSEL

André E. Jardini (argued) and K.L. Myles, Knapp, Petersen

& Clarke, Glendale, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

R. Craig Clark (argued), James M. Treglio, and Laura M.

Cotter, Clark & Treglio,, San Diego, California; David Roger

Markham, The Markham Law Firm, San Diego, California,

for Plaintiff/Intervenor-Appellant.

Julie A. Dunne (argued), Dawn Fonseca, Lara K. Strauss,

Michael G. Leggieri, and Joshua D. Levine, Littler

Mendelson, P.C., San Diego, California, for DefendantAppellee.

ORDER

GRABER, Circuit Judge:

We respectfully ask the Supreme Court of California to

exercise its discretion to decide the three certified questions

set forth in Part II of this Order, below. See Cal. R. Ct. 8.548. 

The answers to these questions of California law would be

dispositive of the appeal before us, and no clear controlling

California precedent exists. Id. Moreover, because the

questions that we certify are of extreme importance to tens of

thousands of employees in California, considerations of

comity and federalism suggest that the court of last resort in

California, rather than our court, should have the opportunity

to answer the questions in the first instance. See Kilby v. CVS

Pharmacy, Inc., 739 F.3d 1192, 1196–97 (9th Cir. 2013);

Klein v. United States, 537 F.3d 1027, 1028 (9th Cir. 2008).

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MENDOZA V. NORDSTROM 5

I. Administrative Information

We provide the following information in accordance with

California Rule of Court 8.548(b)(1):

The consolidated caption for these cases is:

CHRISTOPHER MENDOZA, an individual, on behalf of

himself and all other persons similarly situated, PlaintiffAppellant,

MEAGAN GORDON, Plaintiff-Intervenor /Appellant,

v.

NORDSTROM, INC., a Washington Corporation

authorized to do business in the State of California,

Defendant-Appellee,

and the case numbers in our court are 12-57130 and 12-

57144.

The names and addresses of counsel are:

For Plaintiff-Appellant Mendoza: André Emilio Jardini,

K.L. Myles, Knapp, Petersen & Clarke, Glendale, California.

For Plaintiff /Intervenor-Appellant Gordon: R. Craig

Clark, Clark & Treglio, San Diego, California; David Roger

Markham, The Markham Law Firm, San Diego, California.

For Defendant-AppelleeNordstrom,Inc.: Julie A. Dunne,

Dawn Fonseca, Michael G. Leggieri, Joshua D. Levine,

Littler Mendelson, P.C., San Diego, California.

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6 MENDOZA V. NORDSTROM

As required by Rule 8.548(b)(1), we designate

Christopher Mendoza and Meagan Gordon as the petitioners,

if our request for certification is granted. They are the

appellants before our court.

II. Certified Questions

We certify to the California Supreme Court the following

three questions of state law that are now before us:

(A) California Labor Code section 551 provides that

“[e]very person employed in any occupation of labor is

entitled to one day’s rest therefrom in seven.” Is the required

day of rest calculated by the workweek, or is it calculated on

a rolling basis for any consecutive seven-day period?

(B) California Labor Code section 556 exempts

employers from providing such a day of rest “when the total

hours of employment do not exceed 30 hours in any week or

six hours in any one day thereof.” (Emphasis added.) Does

that exemption apply when an employee works less than six

hours in any one day of the applicable week, or does it apply

only when an employee works less than six hours in each day

of the week?

(C) California Labor Code section 552 provides that an

employer may not “cause his employees to work more than

six days in seven.” What does it mean for an employer to

“cause” an employee to work more than six days in seven: 

force, coerce, pressure, schedule, encourage, reward, permit,

or something else?

Our phrasing of the questions should not restrict the

California Supreme Court’s consideration of the issues

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MENDOZA V. NORDSTROM 7

involved; that court may reformulate the questions. Cal. R.

Ct. 8.548(f)(5).

We agree to accept and to follow the decision of the

California Supreme Court. Cal. R. Ct. 8.548(b)(2). See also

Klein, 537 F.3d at 1029 (holding, with respect to a certified

question, that the Ninth Circuit is bound by the California

Supreme Court’s interpretation of California law).

III. Statement of Facts

Christopher Mendoza and Meagan Gordon are former

employees of Nordstrom, Inc., in California. Nordstrom is a

retail department store that operates in many locations

throughout the state of California, employing more than

11,000 people statewide. Mendoza worked for Nordstrom

from March 2007 to August 2009, first as a barista and later

as a sales representative in one of Nordstrom’s San Diego

locations. Gordon worked in the fitting room at one of

Nordstrom’s “Rack” locations from July 2010 to February

2011.

While employed at Nordstrom, Mendoza worked more

than six consecutive days on three occasions: (1) between

January 26 and February 5, 2009, he worked 11 consecutive

days, on two of which he worked less than six hours;

(2) between March 23 and 29, 2009, he worked seven

consecutive days, on three of which he worked less than six

hours; and (3) between March 31 and April 7, 2009, Mendoza

worked eight consecutive days, on five of which he worked

less than six hours. On each of those occasions, Mendoza

was not originally scheduled to work more than six

consecutive days, but he did so after being asked by either his

supervisor or a co-worker to fill in for another employee.

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8 MENDOZA V. NORDSTROM

Gordon worked more than six consecutive days on one

occasion, from January 14 to 21, 2011. On two of those days,

Gordon worked less than six hours.

Mendoza sued Nordstrom, alleging that it had violated

California Labor Code sections 551 and 552 by failing to

provide him with one day’s rest in seven on three occasions. 

He brought the action in California state court; Nordstrom

removed to federal court. Mendoza also pleaded other claims

that are not at issue in the present appeal. He filed his

complaint on behalf of a class of similarly situated hourly,

non-exempt Nordstrom employees in California, and he

brought the relevant claim pursuant to the California’s Labor

Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004. See Cal. Lab.

Code §§ 2698–2699.5. Gordon’s complaint in intervention

alleged the same causes of action as those in Mendoza’s

complaint.

With respect to the day-of-rest claims, the district court

held a bench trial. The district court then ruled: (1) the dayof-rest statute, California Labor Code section 551, applies on

a rolling basis to any consecutive seven-day period, rather

than by the workweek; (2) but California Labor Code section

556 exempts Nordstrom from that requirement, because each

plaintiff worked less than six hours on at least one day in the

consecutive seven days of work; and (3) even if the

exemption did not apply, Nordstrom did not “cause”

Mendoza or Gordon to work more than seven consecutive

days, within the meaning of California Labor Code section

552, because there was no coercion; Plaintiffs waived their

rights under California Labor Code section 551 by accepting

additional shifts when they were offered. The court

dismissed the action; a timely appeal to this court followed,

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MENDOZA V. NORDSTROM 9

raising the certified questions of law described in Part II,

above.

IV. Explanation of Certification

As noted, no controllingCalifornia precedent answers any

of the certified questions of statutory interpretation. We

recognize that, under California law, statutory interpretation

begins with the text. People v. Scott, 324 P.3d 827, 829 (Cal.

2014). But the text of the applicable statutes is ambiguous;

we are aware of no pertinent legislative history; and the

answer to the certified questions is not obvious, for the

reasons given below.

A. Day of Rest

California Labor Code section 551 provides that “[e]very

person employed in any occupation of labor is entitled to one

day’s rest therefrom in seven.” Section 552 safeguards that

statutory entitlement by providing that “[n]o employer of

labor shall cause his employees to work more than six days

in seven.”

Consider the following example. An employer whose

workweek (like Nordstrom’s) begins each Sunday schedules

a full-time employee to work as follows:

Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday

OFF WORK WORK WORK WORK WORK WORK

WORK WORK WORK WORK WORK WORK OFF

If the statutes apply to any consecutive seven days, the

employer has violated them. If, on the other hand, the

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10 MENDOZA V. NORDSTROM

statutes apply to each workweek, the employer has not

violated them.1

Each interpretation finds some support in the ambiguous

text and in policy considerations.

On the one hand, neither section 551 nor section 552 uses

the word “workweek” to suggest a measuring period. Yet the

term “workweek” is used in surrounding provisions of the

Labor Code—such as section 510 (requiring overtime pay),

section 511 (permitting alternative workweeks), section 513

(governing makeup work time), and section 556 (setting forth

an exemption from sections 551 and 552)—demonstrating

that the legislature could have used the workweek concept

had it intended to do so. We may not insert a term that the

California legislature chose to omit. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code

§ 1858 (“In the construction of a statute . . . , the office of the

Judge is . . . not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit

what has been inserted . . . .”). Moreover, the purpose of the

law plainly is to avoid overworking employees by providing

a regular day of rest in most circumstances. Allowing 12

consecutive days of work every two weeks could run counter

to that purpose.

On the other hand, section 510(a), pertaining to overtime,

provides in part that “any work in excess of eight hours on

any seventh day of a workweek shall be compensated at the

rate of no less than twice the regular rate of pay of an

employee.” That wording hints both that the concept of

working a seventh day encompasses the concept of the

1 Given the facts alleged by Mendoza, the answer to this question will

determine whether Nordstrom did or did not violate these provisions on

some occasions.

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MENDOZA V. NORDSTROM 11

workweek, and that the prohibition on working seven days is

not absolute. In addition, Wage Order No. 7 provides:

The provisions of Labor Code Sections

551 and 552 regarding one (1) day’s rest in

seven (7) shall not be construed to prevent an

accumulation of days of rest [in circumstances

not applicable here]; provided, however, that

in each calendar month, the employee shall

receive the equivalent of one (1) day’s rest in

seven (7).

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8, § 11070(3)(H). The Wage Order also

states that “[a]n employee may be employed on seven (7)

workdays in one workweek when the total hours of

employment during such workweek do not exceed 30 and the

total hours of employment in any one workday thereof do not

exceed six (6).” Id. § 11070(3)(F) (emphasis added). The

Wage Order is “to be accorded the same dignity” as a statute

and is “presumptively valid.” Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Superior

Court, 273 P.3d 513, 527–28 (Cal. 2012). The phrasing of

the Wage Order suggests obliquely—but by no means

directly—that sections 551 and 552 apply to a “workweek”

and that the overarching purpose of the law can be met when

an employee receives four days off per month.

We find both interpretations plausible. We have found no

legislative history that bears on this question, which affects

nearly all California employers. Nor have we found any

California appellate case that answers it.

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12 MENDOZA V. NORDSTROM

B. Exemption

California Labor Code section 556 exempts an employer

from the day-of-rest requirement “when the total hours

[worked by an employee] do not exceed 30 hours in any week

or six hours in any one day thereof.” Grammatically, the

second half of that formulation is ambiguous. Consider this

example; an employee must work for seven consecutive days

in one single workweek, as follows: 8 hours, 9 hours, 5

hours, 8 hours, 8 hours, 8 hours, and 9 hours. Has the

employer violated the statute?2

On the one hand, the more natural reading of the words is

that an employer need not provide a day of rest if an

employee works less than six hours in “any” single day of the

applicable week. The district court adopted that reading by

emphasizing the word “any,” which very often means “one.” 

(“Pick any card from the deck.”)

On the other hand, “any” can mean “each” or “all”: “any

child knows the answer to that simple question.” The

purpose of the statute is to exempt an employer from

providing a day of rest only with respect to part-time

employees. For example, citing section 556, Witkin refers to

“part-time employees” as employees “whose work hours [do]

not exceed 6 hours per day or 30 hours per week.” 3 B.E.

2 The answer to this question governs a portion of the outcome here, for

two reasons. First, both Mendoza and Gordon worked less than six hours

in at least one day of the seven-day period (however defined), but neither

worked less than six hours in all seven days of the applicable period

(however defined). Second, the evidence in the record suggests that some

hourly, non-exempt employees worked more than 14 consecutive days; as

to some of them, the answer to this question may dispose of the day-ofrest claim.

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MENDOZA V. NORDSTROM 13

Witkin, Summary of California Law, Agency and

Employment § 361(2), at 456 (10th ed. 2005); see also Cal.

Dep’t of Industrial Relations, Div. of Labor Standards

Enforcement, Understanding AB 60: An In Depth Look at

the Provisions of the “Eight Hour Day Restoration and

Workplace Flexibility Act of 1999” (Dec. 23. 1999),

available at https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/AB60update.htm

(referring to employees whose “total hours of employment do

not exceed . . . six hours in any one day of th[e] week” as

working “a part-time schedule”).

Once again, we find both interpretations plausible, have

discovered no useful legislative history, and have unearthed

no California appellate case to guide us. And once again, the

obligations of thousands of California employers, and the

rights of tens of thousands of California workers, are at stake.

C. “Cause” to Work

Under section 552, Nordstrom may not “cause” its

employees to work more than six days in seven. That

provision dates back to 1893, when it was enacted as part of

the California Penal Code. See 1893 Cal. Stat. 54, § 301(1);

Cal. Penal Code § 301(1), at 1044 (Deering 1893). But the

legislative history sheds no light on the precise meaning of

“cause” in this context.3

In Brinker, a putative class of hourly restaurant

employees sued Brinker Restaurant Corporation, alleging that

 

3

 The answer to this question may determine the outcome of Plaintiffs’

claims because, depending on the definition of “cause,” the employer may

or may not have “cause[d]” them to work more than the requisite number

of days.

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14 MENDOZA V. NORDSTROM

Brinker had failed to provide its employees with the meal and

rest breaks required under California state law. 273 P.3d at

521. The question for decision was whether an implicit

waiver, as distinct from a mutual written waiver, was

effective to relieve the employer of liability for failure to

provide such a break. The California Supreme Court held

that an employer must relieve the employee of all duty during

the requisite break, but that the employer has no duty to

ensure that the employee does not in fact choose to continue

to work during that time. Id. at 537–38.

The district court relied on Brinker to conclude that, so

long as an employee is not compelled to work in violation of

the day-of-rest statute, the employer has not violated the

statute. We are not persuaded that Brinker provides guidance

here.

The statutory text is different. California Labor Code

section 512(a) prohibits an employer from employing

someone for more than five hours per day “without

providing” a meal period, for example. The verb to “provide”

generally means to “supply.” Webster’s Third New

International Dictionary 1827 (unabridged ed. 1961) (noting

that “PROVIDE and SUPPLY are often interchangeable”). 

The employer had only to “supply” a break, not also to ensure

that each employee used what was supplied. By contrast, the

question here is what act on the part of an employer counts as

“causing” an employee to work more than the day-of-rest

statutes allow. To “cause” can mean to “induce,” see id. at

356, so is it enough for an employer to encourage or reward

an employee who agrees to work additional consecutive

days? In another context, causation is defined in terms of the

“natural and probable consequence” of one’s action. People

v. Roberts, 826 P.2d 274, 300 (Cal. 1992). Is it enough for an

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MENDOZA V. NORDSTROM 15

employer to permit employees to trade shifts voluntarily,

when a natural and probable consequence may be that an

employee works more than the day-of-rest statutes allow?

Brinker does not suggest an answer. Cf. Cal. Lab. Code

§ 513 (prohibiting an employer from “encouraging or

otherwise soliciting” a request for makeup work time).

In addition to the linguistic distinctions found in the

relevant statutes, there are practical distinctions between meal

and rest breaks and days of work. An employer knows that

an employee is working on a particular day. But an employer

may or may not know, and may even have no way to know,

whether a particular employee chooses to keep working

through a lunch break or rest break.

As is the case with the other questions, the statutory text

is unclear. California employers and employees need to know

what the statute means. No legislative history or appellate

decision clarifies the issue.

D. Summary

As we read California law, we are uncertain whether the

district court correctly or incorrectly interpreted the relevant

statutes. The consequences of any interpretation of the dayof-rest statutes will have profound legal, economic, and

practical consequences for employers and employees

throughout the state of California and will govern the

outcome of many disputes in both state and federal courts in

the Ninth Circuit. We therefore submit that these questions

are worthy of decision by the California Supreme Court. 

Because the outcome of this case depends on the answers, we

also submit that this case presents a suitable vehicle for the

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16 MENDOZA V. NORDSTROM

California Supreme Court to address these questions. Cal. R.

Ct. 8.548(a).

V. Accompanying Materials

The clerk of this court is hereby directed to file in the

California Supreme Court, under official seal of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, copies of all

relevant briefs and excerpts of the record, and an original and

ten copies of this order and request for certification, along

with a certification of service on the parties, pursuant to

California Rule of Court 8.548(c), (d).

This case is withdrawn from submission. Further

proceedings before us are stayed pending final action by the

California Supreme Court. The parties shall notify the clerk

of this court within seven days after the California Supreme

Court accepts or rejects certification, and again within seven

days if that court renders an opinion. The panel retains

jurisdiction over further proceedings.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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