Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-15-15683/USCOURTS-ca9-15-15683-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Martin Biter
Appellee
Marcos Reis-Campos
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARCOS REIS-CAMPOS,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

MARTIN BITER, Warden,

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 15-15683

D.C. No.

3:12-cv-03369-SI

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Susan Illston, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted June 15, 2016

San Francisco, California

Filed August 8, 2016

Before: J. Clifford Wallace, Mary M. Schroeder,

and John B. Owens, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Owens

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2 REIS-CAMPOS V. BITER

SUMMARY*

Habeas Corpus

The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of a

California state prisoner’s habeas corpus petition challenging

his conviction by jury trial for second-degree murder.

The panel held that under Brady v. Maryland, the

prosecution concealed evidence that could have bolstered the

petitioner’s self-defense claim, but this error did not

sufficiently prejudice the defense to warrant habeas corpus

relief.

The panel also held that there was no error under the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act in the state

court’s rejection of a Napue claim of a violation of due

process in the presentation of false testimony.

COUNSEL

Dennis P. Riordan (argued) and Donald M. Horgan, Riordan

& Horgan, San Francisco, California, for PetitionerAppellant.

Gregory A. Ott (argued) and Michelle J. Swanson, Deputy

Attorneys General; Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior Assistant

Attorney General; Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General;

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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REIS-CAMPOS V. BITER 3

Office of the California Attorney General, San Francisco,

California; for Respondent-Appellee.

OPINION

OWENS, Circuit Judge:

Marcos Reis-Campos appeals from the district court’s

order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus

challenging his 2007 second-degree murder conviction. He

correctly argues that the prosecution concealed evidence that

could have bolstered his self-defense claim. However, the

immensely deferential standard of review mandates that we

affirm the district court.

I. Factual Background and Procedural History

On June 26, 2004, Reis-Campos—a Norteño gang

member—killed Luis Guillermo Fuentes—the head of the

local (and rival) MS-13 gang. The shooting occurred in

Norteño territory in San Francisco, where Reis-Campos

encountered Fuentes and his six-year-old son walking down

the sidewalk. Fuentes wore blue shoes, MS-13’s color. ReisCampos was not wearing or displaying anything red, his

gang’s color. Reis-Campos shot Fuentes six times, hitting

him in the face, back of the head, and back. After the

shooting, Reis-Campos ran away, tossed the gun, and entered

a laundromat, where he was arrested.

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A. Trial

1. The Prosecution Case

Reis-Campos was charged with first-degree murder in

violation of California Penal Code § 187. In his July 2007

jury trial, the prosecution argued that Reis-Campos executed

Fuentes to gain status in the Norteño gang, and that Fuentes

disrespected the Norteños by wearing blue shoes in Norteño

territory. The prosecution also contended that Fuentes was an

easy target because his six-year-old son was present. While

the prosecution acknowledged that Fuentes belonged to MS13, it downplayed his violent history, at one point

characterizing Fuentes as “a family man,” emphasizing that

“[h]e has kids and he’s a [house] painter.” The prosecution

contended that Reis-Campos’ self-defense claim was

“fabricated” and that his testimony about Fuentes’ prior

threats was not credible.

To support its case, the prosecution called, among other

witnesses: (1) Fuentes’ son; (2) an eyewitness to the shooting;

and (3) Reis-Campos’ cellmate, who testified that ReisCampos confided that he had confronted Fuentes, and after

Fuentes pulled a knife and told him to leave him alone,

chased down and shot Fuentes.

The prosecution also called San Francisco PoliceSergeant

Mario Molina, the case investigator and gang expert. Molina

testified about various gang practices. He opined that the

killing benefitted Reis-Campos by helping him rise in the

Norteño ranks, and the Norteños by providing recognition

and warning rival gangs.

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REIS-CAMPOS V. BITER 5

In addition, Molina testified about his relationship with

Fuentes. He claimed that he knew Fuentes primarily from

soccer games at a local playground, and did not know of

Fuentes’ high rank in MS-13 until after Fuentes was shot. On

direct examination, when asked about the March 2004

Norteño killing of an MS-13 member, Molina agreed that this

killing could lead to MS-13 retaliation against Norteños. 

When asked whether he knew of any such retaliation, Molina

first said that he did not recall any. Asked again, Molina said

that he could not “think of any incident right now.” And on

cross-examination, he again denied any knowledge of

retaliation: “I am not sure there was any specific retaliation

for his death that said we are going to go kill somebody

because [of the March 2004 killing]. I don’t have that

information.” Consistent with his professed lack of

knowledge, Molina said he was unaware of any specific MS13 calls to kill Norteños.

2. The Defense Case

Reis-Campos testified in his own defense, and claimed

that Fuentes was out to get him. While the two had started

out on friendly terms, their relationship quickly deteriorated

once Reis-Campos rejected Fuentes’ attempt to recruit him to

MS-13. Reis-Campos’ dating a woman who was carrying the

child of another MS-13 member only made things worse. 

Reis-Campos claimed that by December 2003, he was told

that MS-13 wanted to kill him, so he shortly thereafter joined

the Norteños for protection.

Reis-Campos also claimed that Fuentes threatened his life

on several occasions before the June 2004 shooting. These

incidents included: (1) in March 2004, an MS-13 member

shot at him (wounding his female companion); (2) in May

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6 REIS-CAMPOS V. BITER

2004, Fuentes and his associates driving in a car chased down

Reis-Campos and his associates and shot at them; (3) in early

June 2004, Fuentes pointed a long-barreled gun at ReisCampos outside a pizzeria; and (4) shortly after the pizzeria

incident, Reis-Campos encountered Fuentes at the Hall of

Justice, where Fuentes and an associate flashed gang tattoos

and colors at Reis-Campos.

On the night of the shooting, Reis-Campos said that he

was walking towards a tattoo parlor in Norteño territorywhen

he saw Fuentes, in blue shoes, walking with his son. His son

then walked away, leaving the two alone. Fuentes, “looking

mad,” approached Reis-Campos and backed him up towards

a wall. A few feet away from Reis-Campos, Fuentes bent

over. Fearing that Fuentes was reaching for a weapon, ReisCampos pulled out his gun. And when Fuentes reached for

Reis-Campos’ gun, Reis-Campos opened fire. He testified

that he acted in self-defense, and not to boost his profile

among the Norteños. As Reis-Campos put it: “Could be me

or him. He had tried to kill me in the past.” He said he shot

Fuentes because “[h]e could take the gun away from me and

kill me. He was bigger and stronger than me.”

The juryrejected Reis-Campos’ claim of self-defense, and

found him guilty of second-degree murder (with

enhancements for acting for the benefit of a criminal street

gang and using a firearm),1

as well as active participation in

a street gang.

2

 

1

 Cal. Penal Code §§ 186.22(b)(1), 12022.5(a), 12022.53(d).

 

2

 Cal. Penal Code § 186.22(a).

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REIS-CAMPOS V. BITER 7

3. Post-Trial Motions

In November 2007, Reis-Campos filed a motion for a new

trial. Before filing its opposition, the prosecution sent this

letter to defense counsel:

It has come to my attention that there may be

a federal informant who provided information

to the Daly City Police Department about a

shooting and that this informant provided

information that “Memo” [Fuentes] was the

purported driver of the vehicle. I have nothing

in writing regarding this.

I have contacted Inspector Draper of the Daly

City Police Department who declined to

provide any documentation concerning this as

there is an ongoing investigation. 

I am sharing this information with you in an

abundance of caution.

After this disclosure, Reis-Campos filed a motion for an

evidentiary hearing based on this new information about

Fuentes’ violent past. The trial court denied both motions in

January 2008, and sentenced Reis-Campos to 50 years to life.

B. State Court Appeal and Habeas Proceedings

Reis-Campos timely appealed in March 2008. Among

other arguments, he contended that: (1) the prosecution

suppressed material information favorable to the defense and

the trial court erred in denying him a related evidentiary

hearing, violating his rights to due process and a fair trial

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8 REIS-CAMPOS V. BITER

under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and (2) the

trial court erroneously curtailed his cross-examination of

Officer Molina. The California Court of Appeal rejected his

claims in a reasoned decision in December 2010, and the

California Supreme Court denied review in March 2011.

Through defense investigative efforts, Reis-Campos

obtained new information about Fuentes’ violent past and

Molina’s knowledge of it prior to trial. First, Reis-Campos

discovered that Molina participated in a multi-agency

investigation into MS-13 (“Operation Devil Horns”), which

lasted from 2005 to 2008 and led to a multi-count and multidefendant indictment. While working on Operation Devil

Horns and prior to his testimony, Molina learned from an

informant that Fuentes orchestrated the murder of a Norteño

in Daly City to avenge the March 2004 killing of an MS-13

member by a Norteño. This information about the Daly City

murder conflicted with Molina’s trial testimony, where he

claimed no knowledge of any MS-13 retaliation in response

to the March 2004 killing. According to Reis-Campos, not

only did the prosecution withhold this exculpatory evidence,

but Molina perjured himself when he stated that he was

unaware of any retaliation for the March 2004 murder, and

the prosecutor failed to correct his false testimony.

Second, Reis-Campos learned new information

concerning a redacted FBI report about Fuentes that was

disclosed prior to trial. The report stated that an informant

revealed Fuentes had posed as a homeless person to kill

unsuspecting rival gangmembers, and had taught fellow gang

members this technique. The prosecution convinced the trial

court to prohibit the defense from cross-examining Molina

with the report, reasoning that the report was unreliable

because the source was unknown. After learning about

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REIS-CAMPOS V. BITER 9

Operation Devil Horns, Reis-Campos argued that Molina

knew who the source was—the same informant who revealed

Fuentes’ role in avenging the March 2004 murder. ReisCampos argued that he could have cross-examined Molina

with the report to establish Fuentes’ reputation for violence,

and also called the informant to testify about Fuentes’

homeless murder ruse and the Daly City killing, again

evincing Fuentes’ violent nature.3

With this new information, Reis-Campos filed a habeas

petition in state court. He argued that the new information

supported his claims that the prosecution had suppressed

evidence, presented false testimony, and failed to correct

false testimony in violation of his federal constitutional rights

under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), Alcorta v.

Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957), and Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S.

264 (1959).

Reis-Campos also filed a federal habeas petition which

contained both exhausted claims (rejected on direct appeal)

and unexhausted claims (founded on the new evidence that

surfaced after the direct appeal became final). The district

court stayed proceedings for him to exhaust his state court

remedies. The California Court of Appeal summarily denied

his state habeas petition, as did the California Supreme Court.

3 The parties disagree as to whether, under California law, Fuentes’

previous acts of violence were relevant and admissible and whether the

identity of the informant would have been withheld as privileged. We

need not reach these issues; even if we assume all of the contested

evidence was relevant and admissible, it does not meet the materiality

standard required for reversal.

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The district court then permitted Reis-Campos to reopen

the case, and he filed an amended federal habeas petition in

April 2013. The district court ultimately denied the petition

on materiality grounds, holding that: (1) his Brady claim

failed because the state court could have reasonably

concluded that the evidence concerningFuentes’ involvement

in the Daly City killing and the FBI report was not material

to Reis-Campos’ defense; and (2) his Napue claim failed

because, assumingOfficer Molina had committed perjurythat

the prosecutor knowingly left uncorrected, this too was not

material to Reis-Campos’ defense. The district court issued

a certificate of appealability for all of Reis-Campos’ claims,

and he timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 2253(a).

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

We review the district court’s denial of a petition for

habeas relief de novo, and its findings of fact for clear error. 

Christian v. Frank, 595 F.3d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 2010).

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (AEDPA) limits our review of Reis-Campos’ claims. 

AEDPA mandates a “‘highly deferential standard for

evaluating state-court rulings,’ which demands that statecourt decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford

v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (quoting

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n.7 (1997)). Under

AEDPA, to obtain habeas relief a petitioner must demonstrate

that the last reasoned state court decision on the merits was

either: (1) “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law” or (2) “based

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REIS-CAMPOS V. BITER 11

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d).

Because the state courts summarily denied all of ReisCampos’ post-conviction claims, the last reasoned state court

decision was on direct appeal. This impacts our review in

several ways. First, we presume that the state courts

adjudicated Reis-Campos’ habeas claims on the merits. See

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011) (“When a

federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state

court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state

court adjudicated the claim on the merits.”). Second, under

California law, we assume that the factual allegations in ReisCampos’ habeas petition are true. See Cullen v. Pinholster,

563 U.S. 170, 188 n.12 (2011) (citing People v. Duvall,

886 P.2d 1252, 1258–59 (Cal. 1995) (en banc)) (explaining

that under California law, a summary dismissal indicates that

the court found the factual allegations, taken as true except

for wholly conclusory allegations, did not establish a prima

facie case for relief).

Finally, with respect to evaluating the state court’s

reasoning, where a federal claim has been adjudicated in a

reasoned decision, we “look through” subsequent summary

denials and review the last reasoned decision. See Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991) (“Where there has

been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim,

later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting

the same claim rest upon the same ground.”). However,

where there is no reasoned decision on a particular claim, a

petitioner must show that “there was no reasonable basis for

the state court to deny relief.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 98.

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1. Brady Claim

Reis-Campos’ Brady-related claim has a muddled

procedural history.

4 Ultimately, as the state court effectively

rejected Reis-Campos’ evidentiary hearing claim based on a

substantive analysis of the potential Brady material, we

employ the “look through” approach here.5

See, e.g.,

Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079 n.2 (9th Cir.

2000) (“The California Supreme Court denied review of [the]

direct appeal and habeas petition without comment. In this

circumstance, we ‘look through’ the unexplained . . .

decisions to the last reasoned decision, the state appellate

court’s decision, as the basis for the state court’s judgment.”).

Additionally, our review under § 2254(d)(1) is “limited to

the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the

claim on the merits.” Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 181. As ReisCampos provided further evidence in support of his claim to

4

In the trial court, Reis-Campos “did not assert a Brady violation as an

independent ground for a new trial and sought only an evidentiary hearing

to develop a factual record regarding the new evidence.” As such, the

direct appeal order did not consider the argument, “to the extent Campos

assert[ed] it on appeal, that the prosecution failed to meet its Brady

obligations.” Instead, the state appeal court purported to limit its review

“to the trial court’s denial of his request for an evidentiary hearing.” Even

so, the state court effectively analyzed the merits of a Brady claim,

framing the issue as follows: “[t]he trial court concluded an evidentiary

hearing would not establish a Brady violation regardless of what it showed

because the undisclosed evidence was not material. This is a question of

law that we review independently.”

5 The “look through” approach is more restrictive as it requires that we

assess the reasonableness of the state court’s decision. The result here

would be the same under Harrington, where we consider any reasonable

explanation.

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REIS-CAMPOS V. BITER 13

the state habeas court, we review “the reasonableness of the

California Supreme Court’s decision by the evidence that was

before it, and [use] the Court of Appeal’s reasoning in

accordance with our usual practice of ‘looking through’

summary denials to the last reasoned decision.” Cannedy v.

Adams, 706 F.3d 1148, 1159 n.5 (9th Cir. 2013) (emphasis

omitted). We do this because “[h]ad the state supreme court

intended different reasoning because of the newly added

facts, the court could have provided it.” Id.

2. Napue Claim

There is no reasoned state court decision on the Napue

claim because it was not raised on direct appeal. As such, if

there were any reasonable basis for the California Supreme

Court to deny the Napue claim, habeas relief is unwarranted. 

See Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102 (“Under § 2254(d), a habeas

court must determine what arguments or theories supported

or, as here, could have supported, the state court’s decision;

and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists

could disagree that those arguments or theories are

inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of this

Court.”).

B. No AEDPA Error in Rejecting Brady Claim

Under Brady, “suppression bythe prosecution of evidence

favorable to an accused upon request violates due process

where the evidence is material either to guilt or to

punishment.” 373 U.S. at 87. It follows that there are three

elements to a Brady violation: (1) “the evidence at issue must

be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory,

or because it is impeaching,” (2) “that evidence must have

been suppressed by the State, either willfully or

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inadvertently,” and (3) “prejudice must have ensued.”6

Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999). With

respect to the prejudice element, “evidence is material only if

there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been

disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would

have been different.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,

682 (1985). “A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.

Materiality is considered “collectively, not item by item.” 

Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436.

Reis-Campos alleges that the state suppressed two pieces

of evidence in violation of Brady: (1) information possessed

by Officer Molina that Fuentes participated in the Daly City

revenge killing, and (2) information that the prosecution

knew and trusted the informant identified in the FBI report. 

As described above, we assume that the prosecution should

have disclosed this additional information about Fuentes’

violent nature, and the State has no good answer as to why it

did not. Indeed, the government’s attempts to explain the

letter that the prosecutor sent to Reis-Campos—both in its

briefing and at oral argument—have fallen short of what we

expect.

Still, the more difficult issue is whether, under AEDPA’s

extremely deferential standard, this error mandates

relief—i.e., whether it sufficiently prejudiced Reis-Campos’

defense. Ultimately, we conclude it does not.

6 As the prosecution’s lead investigator, Officer Molina is a member of

the prosecution team for Brady purposes. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,

437 (1995).

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First, the jury heard expert testimony that Fuentes was the

“shot caller” of MS-13, a vicious street gang responsible for

murders and violence in San Francisco. The jury learned that

to become the shot caller, Fuentes necessarily had a

“readiness to use violence.” And as the shot caller, Fuentes

would have initiated and organized gang killings. While the

prosecutor’s closing argument portraying Fuentes as a

“family man” and a “painter” was a poor attempt to

whitewash his true nature, we cannot say that it was

unreasonable for the state court to conclude that the jury had

still heard sufficient information regarding Fuentes’ history

of violence.7

Second, and more importantly, the jury heard from ReisCampos about why he was so scared of Fuentes, and a police

officer corroborated one of the incidents at trial. Assuming

that California law permits a defendant to introduce a

victim’s prior bad acts to corroborate a defendant’s belief that

the victim was violent, the ultimate effect of that evidence

here is not enough to warrant relief. The most persuasive

evidence that Reis-Campos felt compelled to shoot Fuentes

in self-defense necessarilycame from Reis-Campos. The fact

that Fuentes, on other occasions, was a violent person has

more limited application to Reis-Campos’ state of mind at the

time of the shooting.

7 We disagree with the state court’s observation that because Fuentes

was not the shooter in the Daly City murder, it “would have done little to

undermine the prosecution’s attempt to paint Fuentes as a ‘benign’ gang

member.” Though Fuentes did not pull the trigger, he ordered a fifteenyear-old member of his gang to do so, and apparently then disciplined that

teenager for not following particular orders. Still, this one point of

disagreement does not render the state court’s overall determination

unreasonable.

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16 REIS-CAMPOS V. BITER

Third, the overall evidence in the case supports the state

court’s determination. Reis-Campos shot Fuentes, a rival

gang member, six times in Norteño territory, even though

Fuentes was walking with his six-year-old son. No weapon

was recovered from Fuentes, and no other witness

corroborated Reis-Campos’ testimony that Fuentes initiated

their encounter or reached for Reis-Campos’ gun. Cf. Benn

v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1062 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining

that undisclosed evidence was material where it “would have

substantially undermined the state’s principal theory of

motive and its main support for the aggravating factor . . . , as

well as its contention that the killings were premeditated”).

Finally, contrary to Reis-Campos’ contention, the

withheld evidence had inadequate impeachment value. 

Assuming that the undisclosed evidence would have

impeached Molina’s somewhat equivocal testimony, it was

not unreasonable for the state court to determine that it would

not have sufficiently undermined his testimony or credibility. 

As the state court observed, Molina “did not testify that

Fuentes was nonviolent or deny that Fuentes was involved in

gang activity”—he was brought in to opine whether the

killing was gang related. While Molina discussed the violent

activities and tendencies of gangmembers, including Fuentes,

the undisclosed evidence would not have “lent significant

force to [Reis-Campos’] impeachment of Officer Molina.” 

Cf. Horton v. Mayle, 408 F.3d 570, 578–79 (9th Cir. 2005)

(holding that failing to disclose a leniency deal was material

because the witness’s testimony was “central to the

prosecution’s case” and “the deal would have provided

powerful and unique impeachment evidence demonstrating

that [the witness] had an interest in fabricating his

testimony”).

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In sum, the state court did not err under AEDPA in

rejecting Reis-Campos’ Brady claim and concluding that it

would be extremely unlikely that Fuentes would launch an

unarmed attack against a rival (and likely armed) gang

member, placing his own child in danger. Reis-Campos’

additional evidence did not “undermine confidence in the

outcome” of the trial. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.

C. No AEDPA Error in Rejecting Napue Claim

“[A] criminal defendant is denied due process of law

when a prosecutor either knowingly presents false evidence

or fails to correct the record to reflect the true facts when

unsolicited false evidence is introduced at trial.” Hayes v.

Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 984 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc); see also

Napue, 360 U.S. at 269; Alcorta, 355 U.S. at 29–30.

“A claim under Napue will succeed when ‘(1) the

testimony (or evidence) was actually false, (2) the

prosecution knew or should have known that the testimony

was actually false, and (3) the false testimony was material.’” 

Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1071–72 (9th Cir. 2008)

(quoting Hayes, 399 F.3d at 984). The Napue materiality

standard is less demanding than Brady. Under Napue, a

conviction must be set aside “whenever there is ‘any

reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have

affected the judgment of the jury.’” Id. at 1076 (quoting

Hayes, 399 F.3d at 985).

Reis-Campos did not adequately allege a violation of

clearly established federal law with respect to his Napue

claim. He alleged only that Molina knew the testimony was

false, not that the prosecutor had such knowledge. While the

Supreme Court has clearly established that the prosecution’s

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Brady duty encompasses evidence “known only to police

investigators and not to the prosecutor,” Kyles, 514 U.S. at

437–38, it is not clearly established that a police officer’s

knowledge of false testimony may be attributed to the

prosecution under Napue. See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S.

325, 326 n.1 (1983) (noting that while the Supreme Court had

“held that the prosecutor’s knowing use of perjured testimony

violates due process,” the Court had “not held that the false

testimony of a police officer in itself violates constitutional

rights”). Several of our sister circuits have recognized this

lack of clarity.

8

See, e.g., Smith v. Massey, 235 F.3d 1259,

1272 (10th Cir. 2000), abrogated on other grounds by Neill

v. Gibson, 278 F.3d 1044, 1057 (10th Cir. 2001); Sargent v.

Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 480 F. App’x 523, 530 (11th Cir.

June 25, 2012).

Even if we assume that Reis-Campos sufficiently alleged

that Molina knowingly perjured himself and the prosecutor

suborned such perjury, his claim still fails on materiality

grounds for the same reasons we previously explained.

8 Further, the federal courts of appeal are split on the substantive issue. 

The Fourth and Second circuits have held that “knowingly false or

misleading testimony by a law enforcement officer is imputed to the

prosecution” for purposes of determining whether there has been a Napue

violation. Boyd v. French, 147 F.3d 319, 329 (4th Cir. 1998); Wedra v.

Thomas, 671 F.2d 713, 717 n.1 (2d Cir. 1982) (same). The Tenth and

Fifth Circuits have declined to impute the knowledge of a law

enforcement officer to the prosecution where there has been an alleged

Napue violation. See Smith v. Sec’y of N.M. Dep’t of Corr., 50 F.3d 801,

830–31 (10th Cir. 1995); Koch v. Puckett, 907 F.2d 524, 531 (5th Cir.

1990). Our court has not yet addressed the question. See, e.g., Henry v.

Ryan, 720 F.3d 1073, 1084 (9th Cir. 2013) (“We need not reach the

question of whether Detective Patterson’s knowledge must be imputed to

the prosecution.”).

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REIS-CAMPOS V. BITER 19

As we outlined in Jackson, analyzing collective prejudice

for concurrent Brady and Napue violations requires a special

framework because the materiality standards differ:

The Napue and Brady errors cannot all be

collectively analyzed under Napue’s

“reasonable likelihood” standard, as that

would overweight the Brady violations. On

the other hand, they cannot be considered in

two separate groups, as that would fail to

capture their combined effect on our

confidence in the jury’s decision. To resolve

this conflict, we first consider the Napue

violations collectively and ask whether there

is “any reasonable likelihood that the false

testimony could have affected the judgment of

the jury.” If so, habeas relief must be granted.

However, if the Napue errors are not material

standing alone, we consider all of the Napue

and Brady violations collectively and ask

whether “there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,

the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” At both stages, we must ask

whether the defendant “received . . . a trial

resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.”

513 F.3d at 1076 (citations omitted). The Jackson analysis

does not change the result here. First, considering only the

Napue violation, there is no “reasonable likelihood that the

false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.” 

Id. (emphasis and citation omitted). Standing alone, Molina’s

testimony that he did not know of any retaliation for a

particular gang-related killing would not have affected the

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20 REIS-CAMPOS V. BITER

jury’s determination of whether Reis-Campos feared for his

life when he encountered Fuentes, nor would the prosecutor’s

correction of Molina’s perjury have cast significant doubt on

Molina’s credibility or testimony. Second, even when

combined with the Brady violations, there is no reasonable

probability that the result of the proceeding would have been

different. As we previously explained, the jury already had

heard significant testimony about Fuentes’ violent tendencies

and status as the leader of a vicious gang, and the incentives

for Reis-Campos to attack Fuentes to gain status in his own

gang.

The prosecutor’s withholding of information and

Molina’s false testimony are very troubling. Yet “troubling”

is not the relevant standard. It is materiality, evaluated in

light of AEDPA deference, that controls. Ultimately, these

failures do not materially change the already negative and

violent depiction of Fuentes. It was not unreasonable for the

state court to determine that nothing that the government

suppressed or falsely proffered addressed the most

fundamental question before the jury—whether Reis-Campos

shot Fuentes because he feared for his life on June 26, 2004. 

As such, though the prosecution’s tactics were suspect, the

state court did not err under AEDPA in rejecting ReisCampos’ claims.

For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial

of Reis-Campos’ petition for habeas relief.

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