Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-02233/USCOURTS-ca10-90-02233-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Ronnie G. Wiggins
Appellant

Document Text:

FILED IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPF.ffntl.ed States Q>μrt~ Appc&l& 

Tenth Circuit 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

RONNIE G. WIGGINS, also known as 

Clifton Mack Wiggins, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

AUG 2 8 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-2233 

(D.C. No. CR-89-517-02 JC} 

(D. New Mexico} 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before ANDERSON, TACHA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a}; 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

On November 10, 1989 the appellant, Ronnie Wiggins, along 

with Michael William Gardner and Larry Walton, escaped from the 

county jail in Grants, New Mexico. They took a correctional 

guard's vehicle and drove to Albuquerque, New Mexico where they 

robbed a Circle K Store. Three days later, the three allegedly 

robbed the United New Mexico Bank in Albuquerque. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-2233 Document: 010110133314 Date Filed: 08/28/1991 Page: 1 
On May 30, 1990, Wiggins pled guilty to the offense of bank 

robbery. Subsequently, the United States Probation Office 

prepared a revised presentence report dated July 18, 1990, which 

proposed certain departures increasing Wiggins's criminal history 

category from IV to VI, with a resulting sentencing guideline 

range of 70 to 87 months, compared to a range of 51 to 63 months 

without the recommended departure. On September 20, 1990, almost 

four months after he entered his guilty plea, and less than two 

weeks prior to, and in anticipation of, his sentencing hearing, 

Wiggins filed a motion to withdraw his plea. As grounds for 

withdrawal, Wiggins alleged that the only reason he pled guilty 

was because the plea agreement in his case and that of his codefendant, Gardner, "was a 'package deal', and because [Wiggins] 

felt pressured to take the plea so that his co-defendant would 

receive a favorable disposition of his case .... " R. Vol. I, 

Tab 65 at 2. Because of this alleged pressure to assist his codefendant, Wiggins asserted "that he entered his guilty plea as a 

result of coercion." Id. He did not directly assert his 

innocence in his motion, but essentially did so at the sentencing 

hearing. The district court denied the motion and sentenced 

Wiggins to 87 months imprisonment. Wiggins appeals the denial of 

his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Alternatively, he 

contends that the court erred in departing upward for sentencing 

purposes. We affirm. 

-2-

Appellate Case: 90-2233 Document: 010110133314 Date Filed: 08/28/1991 Page: 2 
A. 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(d) governs plea withdrawals. In the 

event a motion for withdrawal of a plea of guilty is made before 

sentence is imposed the rule provides that "the court may permit 

withdrawal of the plea upon a showing by the defendant of any fair 

and j~st reason." Id. (emphasis added). The defendant bears the 

burden of demonstrating a fair and just reason for withdrawal of 

his guilty plea. United States v. Hickok, 907 F.2d 983, 985 (10th 

Cir. 1990). In Hickok we noted certain factors taken into account 

by various circuits in evaluating the "fair and just reason" 

requirement, but imposed no fixed rule by which such reason is or 

is not established, or by which the district court is fettered. 

Plea withdrawals are discretionary with the sentencing court. We 

review the district court's denial of a plea withdrawal for abuse 

of discretion. Id. at 984. 

Wiggins asserts that his withdrawal motion is justified by 

the coercion he felt because of the package deal which included 

his co-defendant. He states that his co-defendant's liberty was 

partially in his hands and that he feared retaliation if he 

impaired his co-defendant's opportunity to strike a plea bargain. 

He also asserts his innocence, although somewhat ambiguously, by 

stating how his defense would proceed at a trial. The district 

court did not permit Wiggins to put on evidence with respect to 

these contentions, but his counsel made the contentions, partly in 

the written motion to withdraw the plea, and more fully in a 

proffer to the court at the sentencing hearing. After hearing 

-3-

Appellate Case: 90-2233 Document: 010110133314 Date Filed: 08/28/1991 Page: 3 
that proffer, and considering the written motion, the court 

stated: 

THE COURT: No, that's fine. I frankly see no 

legal basis, assuming everything you say is correct, I 

see no legal basis to allow him to withdraw his plea. 

Further, for the record, I am going to find that there 

is no coercion on the part of the government; if they 

want to try -- make the type of agreement with the 

defendant that you either all plea or we go to trial, 

that is just a matter of conserving their resources and 

the court's resources. If he accepts that plea, he 

understands what the consequences are. 

So your motion to withdraw the plea will be denied. 

Now let's go to your objections to the presentence 

report. 

R. Vol. IV at 29. 

Wiggins's guilty plea came in two ways, by written 

"Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Guilty Plea," entered into 

with the government, and signed by both Wiggins and his counsel, 

and by way of oral representations, under oath in open court, at 

the hearing on the entry of his guilty plea. 

The written "Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Guilty 

Plea," entered into between Wiggins and his counsel, and the 

government, recites, in part: 

The defendant, RONNIE G. WIGGINS, a/k/a Clifton 

Mack Wiggins, after consulting with his attorney, TERESA 

STORCH, desires and agrees to enter a plea of guilty to 

a violation of 18 U.S.C. 2113 (a), based on the robbery 

of the United New Mexico Bank, Albuquerque, New Mexico, 

on or about November 13, 1989, in the District of New 

Mexico as charged in Information No. 89-517-JC. 

R. Vol. I, Tab 52 at 1 (emphasis in original). 

The Rule 11 hearing on Wiggins's guilty plea is relevant in 

its entirety. It is attached hereto and made a part of this 

opinion. Wiggins was directly questioned with respect to the 

"package deal" of plea agreements that he and his co-defendants 

-4-

Appellate Case: 90-2233 Document: 010110133314 Date Filed: 08/28/1991 Page: 4 
were making with the government, and both Wiggins and his counsel 

stated that it did not make any difference to them whether a codefendant went to trial. They represented to the court that 

Wiggins's plea ''is not in any way conditional on what happens to 

this other fellow.'' R. Vol. III at 10. The court asked Wiggins 

directly whether anyone had attempted in any way to force him to 

plead guilty, and he answered "no." Id. 

The court then carefully went through a detailed Rule 11 

colloquy at the conclusion of which he asked the Assistant United 

States Attorney what the government would show if the case went to 

trial. At that point the Assistant United States Attorney outl i ned the facts of the crime which included an eyewitness identification of Wiggins as one of the individuals who robbed the bank. 

Mr. Wiggins agreed that those facts were essentially accurate, and 

pled guilty to the charge and the facts as recited. Id. at 14-15. 

After the many representations by Wiggins and his counsel, 

the court, having had a full opportunity to observe and evaluate 

Wiggins and his plea, found that "the defendant is fully competent 

and capable of entering an informed plea; that his plea of guilty 

is a voluntary and knowing plea supported by an independent basis 

in fact containing each of the essential elements of the offense." 

Id. at 15. 

We note in particular that Wiggins was represented throughout 

these proceedings by experienced defense counsel, to whom we do 

not attribute any complicity in deliberately misleading the court. 

Once such wrongful conduct is ruled out, we have a situation where 

highly experienced counsel, after consultation with the client, 

-5-

Appellate Case: 90-2233 Document: 010110133314 Date Filed: 08/28/1991 Page: 5 
permitted the entry of a plea of guilty on findings that the plea 

was knowing, intelligent and voluntary, and not conditional in any 

way. The plea included an admission with respect to the 

commission of the crime, as charged. If neither the court, nor 

defense counsel, could detect any deficiency whatsoever in 

Wiggins's guilty plea, it makes Wiggins's current self-serving 

position seem even more certainly to be either an afterthought or 

a manipulation of the judicial process. That conclusion is 

supported by the fact that Wiggins did not move to withdraw his 

plea until after receipt of the presentence report, with its 

suggested sentence, and after the lapse of almost four months. 

See United States v. Vidakovich, 911 F.2d 435, 439 (10th Cir. 

1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 968 (1991). 

After a review of the record we cannot conclude that the 

district court acted unjustly or unfairly. Id. (quoting 

authorities). We hold that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying Wiggins's motion to withdraw his guilty 

plea. 

B. 

The district court, following the recommendation of the 

United States Probation Office, departed upward from Criminal 

History Category IV to Category VI, and sentenced Wiggins to 87 

months imprisonment, the top of the Guideline range. The 

departure resulted from taking into account separate state charges 

to which Wiggins had pled guilty with one of the conditions of the 

guilty pleas being that the formal judgments of conviction would 

-6-

Appellate Case: 90-2233 Document: 010110133314 Date Filed: 08/28/1991 Page: 6 
not be entered until after sentencing on the federal bank robbery 

charge. Wiggins contends that because the judgments of conviction 

and sentences in the state cases had not been filed at the time of 

sentencing in this case, they could not be used as "prior 

sentences" under U.S.S.G. § 4Al.3(b). He also contends that the 

state charges did not constitute independent crimes committed on 

different occasions but, rather, were all part of his escape. 

The state charges and facts regarding Wiggins's guilty pleas 

and proposed sentences, are detailed at paragraphs 59 and 60 of 

the presentence report, as follows: 

59. On June 28, 1990, defendant appeared for arraignment in State District Court in Grants, New Mexico, 

on a twelve count Indictment charging him with the 

following: Escape from Jail, Aggravated Burglary, 

Unlawful Taking of a Motor Vehicle, Larceny of a 

Firearm, False Imprisonment, Battery on a Peace 

Officer, Criminal Damage to Property, Breaking and 

Entering, Robbery, Felon in Possession of a 

Firearm, Theft of Credit Cards. On June 29, 1990, 

defendant pled guilty to Theft of a Motor Vehicle, 

False Imprisonment and Breaking and Entering. The 

Court pronounced sentence of six years imprisonment 

on each count to run concurrent, and said period of 

imprisonment to run concurrent with his pending 

federal sentence. It was a further order of the 

Court that the filing of the Judgement and Sentence 

be withheld until the defendant is sentenced on the 

instant offense. 

60. On August 15, 1990, the defendant appeared for plea 

and sentencing in State District Court in 

Albuquerque, New Mexico. The defendant pled guilty 

to Armed Robbery on Indictment 90-165. The Court 

imposed a nine year period of incarceration to run 

concurrent with his pending federal sentence. It 

was further ordered that the filing of the Judgment 

and Sentence be withheld until the defendant is 

sentenced on the instant offense. 

R. Vol. II at 12-13. 

As noted in the presentence report, par. 62, if the state 

crimes to which Wiggins had pled guilty, as described above, were 

-7-

Appellate Case: 90-2233 Document: 010110133314 Date Filed: 08/28/1991 Page: 7 
included in the initial computation of Wiggins's criminal history 

category, he would have received an additional six criminal 

history points, totalling 13 points for his total criminal 

history, thus establishing a criminal history category of VI. His 

initially computed base offense level of 20 (which is undisputed 

here)~ when combined with a criminal history category of VI, 

results in a guideline imprisonment range of 70 to 87 months. 

Sentencing Guideline§ 4Al.3 provides, in part, as follows: 

§ 4Al.3. Adequacy of Criminal History Category (Policy 

Statement) 

If reliable information indicates that the 

criminal history category does not adequately 

reflect the seriousness of the defendant's 

past criminal conduct or the likelihood that 

the defendant will commit other crimes, the 

court may consider imposing a sentence 

departing from the otherwise applicable 

guideline range. Such information may 

include, but not limited to, information 

concerning: 

(a) prior sentence(s) not used in computing 

the criminal history category(~, 

sentences for foreign and tribal 

offenses); 

(b) prior sentence(s) of substantially more 

than one year imposed as a result of 

independent crimes committed on different 

occasions; 

(c) prior similar misconduct established by a 

civil adjudication or by a failure to 

comply with an administrative order; 

(d) whether the defendant was pending trial, 

sentencing, or appeal on another charge 

at the time of the instant offense; 

(e) prior similar adult criminal conduct not 

resulting in a criminal conviction. 

A departure under this provision is warranted when 

the criminal history category significantly underrepresents the seriousness of the defendant's 

-8-

Appellate Case: 90-2233 Document: 010110133314 Date Filed: 08/28/1991 Page: 8 
criminal history or the likelihood that the 

defendant will commit further crimes. 

United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 4Al.3 

(Nov. 19 9 0) . 

Contrary to Wiggins's assertion, § 4Al.3 does not exclude 

''related crimes committed substantially contemporaneously to the 

federal offense .... " Appellants Brief-in-Chief at 26. To the 

extent that the section refers to conduct which is not part of the 

offense charged, we are satisfied that Wiggins's robbery of the 

Circle K Store, and his- crimes arising from the escape itself --

all of which were the subject of separate charges -- were criminal 

acts independent of one another. Cf. United States v. Tisdale, 

921 F.2d 1095 (10th Cir. 1990) (three burglaries of three 

different businesses in a shopping mall, committed on one night, 

constituted three separate convictions for the purpose of enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(l). 

Wiggins's second argument, that the sentences for the state 

crimes to which he had pled guilty had not been "imposed,'' stems 

mostly from the fact that the presentence report continually 

refers to subparagraph (b) of§ 4Al.3. But the probation officer 

also made clear that the state offenses were not being considered 

as prior criminal convictions for basic criminal history category 

computations, because judgment and sentences had not been formally 

entered. R. Vol. II at "Sentencing Recommendation." And, the 

probation officer, while citing to§ 4Al.3(b), quotes the 

governing general provision, contained in the first paragraph, of 

§ 4Al.3. Id. at 12, par. 58, and "Sentencing Recommendation." 

-9-

Appellate Case: 90-2233 Document: 010110133314 Date Filed: 08/28/1991 Page: 9 
In short, it is not necessary to be drawn into analysis of 

the word "imposed'' as contained in subparagraph (b). The criminal 

conduct in question constitutes ''reliable information" which 

indicates that Wiggins's "criminal history category does not 

adequately reflect the seriousness of [his] past criminal conduct 

or the likelihood that [he] will commit other crimes." U.S.S.G. 

§ 4Al.3. We disagree with Wiggins's argument that the state 

crimes, to which Wiggins had pled guilty on the condition that the 

formal judgment of conviction and sentence not be entered until 

sentence was imposed for the federal charge, constituted criminal 

conduct which the sentencing commission fully took into account in 

establishing the offense level and criminal history category 

otherwise applicable to Wiggins. 

Applying the analysis and standards of review required by our 

decisions in United States v. Jackson, 921 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 

1990) (en bane); United States v. White, 893 F.2d 276 (10th Cir. 

1990); and United States v. Kalady, F.2d (10th Cir. No. 

90-8087, filed August , 1991), we hold that the circumstances of 

this case warranted an upward departure, that the degree of 

departure (analogized to the three point addition for prior 

sentences provided in U.S.S.G. § 4Al.2(a)(2)) is reasonable, and 

that the explanation of the district court with respect both to 

the justification for departure, and the degree of departure, is 

proper. Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not err 

in the imposition of Wiggins's sentence. 

-10-

Appellate Case: 90-2233 Document: 010110133314 Date Filed: 08/28/1991 Page: 10 
For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM Wiggins's conviction 

and sentence. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Stephen H. Anderson 

Circuit Judge 

-11-

Appellate Case: 90-2233 Document: 010110133314 Date Filed: 08/28/1991 Page: 11 
-

I 

I 1 

2 

' 3 

4 

I 5 

I 6 

7 

I 8 

9 

I 1 0 

11 

I 12 

13 

I 14 

15 

I 16 

I 17 

18 

I 19 

20 

I 21 

22 

I 23 

I 24 

25 

I 

I 

I 

UNITID 

RONNIE 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

HONR. JOHN E. CONWAY, JtDGE PRESIDING 

STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff, ) 

) 

vs. ) No. CR 8 9-517 JC 

) 

WIGGINS, ) 

) 

Defendant. ) 

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 

May 3 0, 19 9 0 

VOLUME 1 

2 

Ba rb a r a K • Ha r r is 

Official court Reporter 

(5 05) 8 4 2-9 494 

N 

ARRIS --4&. CO<IIIT aa,on1111c;; lt&VICt 

Maia Office: 

~~NW 

Albuquerque, NM 17112 

(515)MUe4 

FAX (915)MU499 

UplDWIIOffice: 

6565Americul'ut-NE 

All,,,querque, NM171IO 

151511114W 

FAX(595)11M18 

- ""Office: )0() l'ucock Poraha 

Saaaf't, NMl7501 

(JDS)~ 

FAX (915) ,._,., 

Appellate Case: 90-2233 Document: 010110133314 Date Filed: 08/28/1991 Page: 12 
-

I 

I 

l 

2 

I 3 

4 

I 5 

6 

I 7 

I 8 

9 

1 0 

I· 11 

I 1 2 

13 

I 14 

15 

I 16 

I 

17 

18 

I 19 

20 

I 21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

A P P E A R A N C E S 

FOR THE PLAINTIFF: 

ROBE RT BACA 

As sis tan t Un it ed St ates Attorney 

FOR THE DEFEND ANT: 

TERESA E. STORCH 

Deputy Federal Public Defender 

N 

ARRIS 

M>f'l:DIQNAl.COllllT 

&1:POSTINC ll ■W'ICl 

* * * * * * * * 

Maill Office: 

50ll~NW 

A~.NMl!m 

(915)~ 

'"" (915)~ 

u.,....... Office : 

6565 Am<ncu Put...,. NE 

Al"'-1qu,t. NM fflll 

(515)11MW 

FAX(J05)~ 

3 

Sallla Fe Offic,: 

JOO_, ... ,.,.111 S.-Fe. NMIMI 

(915),.,...., 

FAX (!15),....., 

Appellate Case: 90-2233 Document: 010110133314 Date Filed: 08/28/1991 Page: 13 
I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

0 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

10 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

THE COURT: The first matter today is United 

States v. Ronnie G. Wiggins, 09-517 JC. 

MR. BACA: Robert Baca for the United 

States. 

MS. STORCH: Teresa Storch, with the 

defendant who is present in court, your Honor. 

THE COURT: It is my understanding he is 

going to plead guilty to an information. 

MS. STORCH: That's correct, your Honor. 

THE COURT: Please swear in the defendant. 

(WHEREUPON, the defendant was duly sworn.) 

EXAMINATION 

BY THE COURT: 

Q. Do you understand that you are now under oath and 

if you answer any of my questions falsely you may later be 

prosecuted in another prosecution for perjury or making a 

false statement? 

A. 

Q. 

A. 

Q. 

A. 

Q. 

A. 

Q. 

I do. 

What is your full name? 

Ronnie Gerald Wiggins. 

What is your date of birth? 

6/15/64. 

What is your education? 

I have a semester of college. 

Where was that? 

N 

ARRIS 

Main Offia:: 

500M.....-NW 

A~. NM 1171)2 

(505)~ 

fAX (515)~ 

PIIOf'DIION4l. C'OIIST &IIPOaTINC IIRVICI 

U.,._aOffia:: 

6565 Amcncu--- NE 

Albucpielque, NM 171Ml 

(515)111-4W 

fAX(505JIIMIM 

SlalafeOff,cc: 

)00 Pueo cle P<nlla · 

SaMa Fe, NM ~I 

(505)~ 

fAX (515) ...,__ 

Appellate Case: 90-2233 Document: 010110133314 Date Filed: 08/28/1991 Page: 14 
I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

T 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

0 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

10 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

..J 

A. Texas. 

Q. Have you been treated for any mental illness or 

addiction to narcotic drugs of any kind? 

A. No, I haven't. 

Q. Are you presently under the influence of any drug 

or medication or alcoholic beverage of any kind? 

A. No, none. 

Q. Have you received a copy of the information, the 

written charges filed by the United States Attorney? 

A. I have. 

Q. Have you had an opportunity to discuss those with 

Ms. Storch, your attorney? 

A. I have. 

Q. Are you fully satisfied with the representation 

that you have received from Ms. Storch as your attorney? 

A. Yes, I have. 

Q. Do you have any complaints whatsoever about her 

representation of you? 

A. I do not. 

Q. I am going to ask you a series of questions about 

waiving your right to be indicted by a grand jury. Do you 

understand you have a constitutional right to be charged by 

an indictment of a grand jury, but that you can waive that 

right and consent to being charged by an information filed 

by the United States Attorney? Do you understand that? 

N 

ARRIS 

raorDIIONAL C'OUWT 

. IPOtTING 111\"ICI 

Maiaotra: 

500 Marqueao NW 

~ . NMml2 

(915}~ 

FAX(515)~ 

u..,....otra: 

6563 Americas Park- NE 

Albuquerque. NM rmo (515)11MW 

FAX(515)11WNO 

S...PoOffice: JOO-•- SaMlfot, NMlTMll 

(.9115)~ 

FAX (915),.,_.., 

Appellate Case: 90-2233 Document: 010110133314 Date Filed: 08/28/1991 Page: 15 
I 

I 

1 

I 2 

I 3 

4 

I 5 

6 

I 7 

0 

I 9 

I.· 

10 

11 

I 12 

13 

I 14 

15 

I 16 

I 17 

10 

I 19 

20 

I 21 . 22 

23 

24 

25 

A. I do. 

Q. Instead of an indictment, the felony charges 

against you are being brought by the United States Attorney 

by the filing of an information. 

A. Yes. 

Q. Unless you waive indictment you may not be charged 

with a felony, unless a grand jury finds by return of an 

indictment that there is probable cause to believe that a 

crime has been committed and that you committed the crime? 

A. I understand that. 

Q. If you do not waive indictment the government may 

present the case to the grand jury and request that it 

indict you. 

A. I do. 

Q. That a grand jury is composed of at least 16 and 

not more than 23 persons and at least twelve grand jurors 

must find that there is probable cause to believe that you 

committed the crime with which you are charged before you 

may be indicted? 

A. I do. 

Q. The grand jury might or might not indict you? 

A. I understand that. 

Q. If you waive indictment by the grand jury the case 

will proceed against you today just as though you had been 

indicted by a grand jury. 

N 

ARRIS 

PIIIWUIK»fALC"OUaT 

&IIPOaTINC 11. VICl 

MaillOffi<c: 

500Ma...-NW 

Al~. NM17112 

(515)1G-MN 

FAX (515) ~ 

u.,.,.... Offi<c: 

656.5 Americu Put1101Y NE 

Albuque,-. NM 1711) 

(515)11MW 

fAX(9115)~ 

Sulla Fe Office: 

JOO,-..,clcl'l:talll 

S-.fe. NMl7501 

(se5)-

""' (515)---

Appellate Case: 90-2233 Document: 010110133314 Date Filed: 08/28/1991 Page: 16 
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

0 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

10 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

A. I understand. 

Q. Have you discussed the matter of waiving.your 

right to be indicted by a grand jury with your attorney? 

A. I have. 

Q. Do you understand your right to be indicted by a 

grand jury? 

A. I do. 

Q. Have there been any threats or promises made to 

you to induce you to waive indictment by a grand jury? 

A. There has not. 

Q. Do you wish to waive your right to be indicted by 

a grand jury? 

A. Yes, I do. 

THE COURT: Ms. Storch, do you know of any 

reason why he should not waive his right to be indicted by a 

grand jury? 

MS. STORCH: No, your Honor. 

THE COURT: I find that he has competently 

waived his right to be indicted by a grand jury. 

MR. BACA: I have filed with the Court the 

waiver of the indictment and the original of the plea 

agreement. The information has been filed by the Court. 

THE COURT: According to the terms of your 

plea agreement, you will enter a plea of guilty to robbery 

of United New Mexico.Bank on November 13, 1909. After you 

N 

ARRIS 

NOf'DIIONI\L C"Ollff IPO TINC l[■VIC[ 

Mun Oll",ce: 

500Ma,...-NW 

Al~NMl7m 

(515)1,Q."'4 

FAX (915)~ 

Upoawn Office: 

6'65 Amm:u l'ari<""'Y NE 

Al~.NMl700 

1915)1n4W 

FAX(915)~ 

Sanca Fe Off occ : 

.lOO .,._,de Pl:nlla 

Sa• Fe. NM l7501 

<5851~ 

FAX (505) IIM009 

Appellate Case: 90-2233 Document: 010110133314 Date Filed: 08/28/1991 Page: 17 
-

~ 

■ 

• 

• 

' ' I 

I 

' I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

( 

r 

r 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

0 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

10 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

have been sentenced the superseding indictment in this case 

will be dismissed. The government makes no agreement as to 

the sentence that you will receive. You and the United 

states stipulate that you have demonstrated a recognition of 

your criminal conduct and take a personal responsibility for 

it and that you are entitled to a reduction of two levels 

under the sentencing guidelines. You and the United States 

acknowledge that that is not binding on me at the time of 

sentencing. 

Do you understand that to be the terms of your plea 

agreement? 

THE DEFENDANT: I do. 

THE COURT: Ms. Storch, have I correctly 

summarized the terms of the plea agreement? 

MS. STORCH: Yes, your Honor, you have. 

THE COURT: Has anyone made any other or 

different promise or assurance to you of any kind in an 

effort to induce to you enter a plea of guilty in this 

case? 

MS. STORCH: Your Honor, I would state at 

this point in time that this plea agreement is really a 

package deal with three codefendants in the case, and one 

codefendant is pleading guilty today and one codefendant is 

going to be pleading guilty within the next couple of weeks, 

and my client has entered the plea agreement in this case 

N 

ARRIS 

PIIOfUSIONAL C'Olll'T &[POaTlflrllC S£1\'ICE 

Maio OfflC<: 

500Ma,quea,NW 

Albuquerque, NM l7ll2 

(515)142-MM 

FAX (505)W-,.,, 

Upoown0ff1C<: 

6S65 Americu Pui,:'M)' NE 

Al_,.__, NM 17\Jl 

(515)11MW 

FAX(515)111.eM 

SanlafcOfficc : 

JOOPaaeod,l'l:nJla 

Sonia Fe, NM 11750t 

(505)M;MM9 

FAX (505).._, 

ia, ,aasftJfo.,! ..... £'~' J.£ 

Appellate Case: 90-2233 Document: 010110133314 Date Filed: 08/28/1991 Page: 18 
" 

-

-

1 

2 

I 3 

4 

I 5 

6 

I 7 

I 0 

9 

I· 10 

11 

I 12 

I 

13 

14 I 

I 15 

16 

I 17 

10 

I 19 

I 20 

- 21 

I 22 

23 

I 24 

I 

25 

I 

I 

with the understanding that all three codefendants are going 

to be pleading under this package deal. 

THE COURT: What if one of them decides not 

to plea? 

MS. STORCH: I believe that it is all set, 

your Honor. 

MR. BACA: Your Honor, the two individuals 

who are pleading today, should the third one not plead, we 

could take him to trial without affecting this plea 

agreement. The package deal was the Government's 

requirement originally. Since these two are pleading the 

third one would not make any difference, and that is the one 

we could take to trial if necessary. 

MS. STORCH: I am just making it clear for my 

client's sake that actually the third codefendant stood to 

lose a lot more under a conviction in this case. The plea 

agreement in this case is to something that gets him 

underneath the maximum amount of time as a career offender. 

And my client's understanding is that the government has 

offered that plea to him and that he has accepted and that 

is what I mean by a package deal. 

THE COURT: But it doesn't make any 

difference to your client whether this other fellow pleads 

or not. 

N 

ARRIS 

PWJf'ISSION4L COllWT IPOITIJIIII(; ll ■VICI 

MS. STORCH: If the other gentleman decides 

Maia Office : 

D>MmqllolltNW 

Albuquaquc, NM 17¥)2 

(515)142-MM 

f.U (515)1C-M,9 

Upu,wn Office: 

6565 Amcnc:ao Parit-,, NE 

Al~. NM 17\IO 

(515)..WW 

fAX(515)11J.,6M 

Sanll Fe Office: 

JOOl'ueodel'l,nlll 

S.-Fc. NMll7501 

(SIS)tl3,,4Mf 

f.U (505)---

Appellate Case: 90-2233 Document: 010110133314 Date Filed: 08/28/1991 Page: 19 
Ill 

• 1 

• 2 

' 

J 

4 

' 5 

6 

' 7 

I 

0 

9 

I 10 

11 

I 12 

13 

I 14 

I 15 

16 

I 17 

10 

I 19 

20 

I 21 

I 22 

23 

I 24 

25 

I 

t 

. to go to trial, that is the other gentleman's case 

decision, rather. My client's concern is that the 

government does not proceed against the third codefendant 

~ith the indictment of a bank robbery to trial and that is 

-- my client's understanding is that the government is not 

going to be doing that and is offering this plea. If the 

codefendant decides not to take that, that does not affect 

my client's plea in this case. 

My client has entered a plea with the understanding 

the codefendant has been offered this plea and is going to 

and whether the codefendant takes it or not is 

immaterial, just that that offer has been made, and I am 

satisfied and I believe my client is satisfied that that is 

the case. Correct? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 

MS. STORCH: He asked me to state it on the 

record, your Honor. 

THE COURT: Your client pleading is not in 

way conditional on what happens to this other fellow. 

MS. STORCH: No, it is not. 

BY THE COURT: 

Q. All right. Has anyone attempted in any way to 

force you to plead guilty in this case? 

A. No. 

Q. Do you understand that the offense to which you 

N 

ARRIS 

PIIOfDIIONAl C'Ollff llPORTIJIIIG S[l~ICE 

Matl>Officc: 

,OOM..,..-NW 

AI .......... NMl!m 

(515)1G-MM 

FAX (905) MUM 

UP"""" Office: 

6565-'-"<ul'utt-,,NE 

Allluq,laquc. NM fflll 

(505IIIMW 

FAX1515111WNO 

San&a Fe Ofra: 

lOOl'Meodel'l,nlll 

Sual'c.NMl7501 

(515)~ 

FAX15'5l..,_ 

Appellate Case: 90-2233 Document: 010110133314 Date Filed: 08/28/1991 Page: 20 
I 

I 

1 

I 2 

I 3 

4 

I 5 

6 

I 7 

I 

0 

9 

I 10 

11 

I 12 

13 

I 14 

I 15 

16 

I 17 

10 

I 19 

I 20 

21 ~ 

I 22 

23 

I 24 

25 

I 

I 

I 

are pleading guilty is a felony offense? 

A. I do. 

Q. That if your plea is accepted you will be adjudged 

guilty of that offense? 

A. I understand. 

Q. Such adjudication may deprive you of valuable 

civil rights. Such as the right to vote, the right to hold 

public office, the right to serve on a jury, and the right 

to possess a firearm of any kind. 

A. I understand. 

Q. The maximum sentence that you can receive is up --

is not more than 20 years in prison, not more than a 

$250,000 fine or any combination thereof, plus a special 

penalty assessment of fifty dollars. Do you understand 

those to be the maximum sentence -- that to be the maximum 

sentence that you can receive? 

A. I understand. 

Q. You will be sentenced under the Sentencing Reform 

Act of 1904, and the United States Sentencing Commission has 

formulated guidelines for judges· to follow in determining 

the sentence in a ·cri~{nal case. Have you and Ms. Storch 

talked about how the Sentencing Commission guidelines might 

apply to your case? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Do you understand that the court will not be able 

N 

ARRIS 

~•L l"OlJff &IPOaTIHC 1[8\'IC[ 

Maill Olfia:: 

500Muquca,,NW 

"'"'-"""· NM 17112 (515)~ 

FAXC5151W...... 

UP""'• OlflCC: 

6565 Ameri<u Part"">' NE 

"""--• NM 17110 (!OS)IIMW 

FAX(515)m-. 

SU.FeOl!ice: 

JOO Pueo de l'l:1Mla 

S.. Fe. NM S,,OJ 

(915)~ 

FAX (9151 .,._ 

Appellate Case: 90-2233 Document: 010110133314 Date Filed: 08/28/1991 Page: 21 
I 

I 

1 

I 2 

I 3 

4 

I 5 

6 

I 7 

I 

0 

9 

I 10 

11 

I 12 

13 

I 14 

I 15 

16 

I 17 

10 

I 19 

I 

20 

21 

I 22 

23 

I 24 

25 

I 

I 

I 

to determine the guideline sentence for your case until 

after the presentence report has been completed and you and 

the government have had an opportunity to challenge the 

facts reported by the probation office? 

A. I understand. 

Q. Do you also understand that, after it has been 

determined what guideline applies to a case, the judge has 

the authority in some circumstances to impose a sentence 

that is more severe or less severe than that sentence called 

for in the guidelines? 

A. I understand. 

Q. Do you also understand that under some 

circumstances you or the government may have the opportunity 

to appeal the sentence that I impose? 

A. I do. 

Q. Do you also understand that parole has been 

abolished and if you are sentenced to prison you will not be 

released on parole? 

A. I do. 

Q. Do you understand that you have a right to plead 

not guilty to any offense charged against you and to persist 

in that plea? 

A. I do. 

Q. You would then have the right to a trial by jury 

during which you would also have the right to the assistance 

N 

ARRIS 

~Al. COUaT IPOaTINC 111avtc[ 

MaiaOff"ice: 

,OOMa,quea,NW 

~.NMllm 

(515)W..... 

FAX (!e5)~ 

UJr-)WIIOffic:c: 

6565 ,._ricu Pllt<MY NE 

A"""'-- NM 17W 

(505lllMW 

t'AX(515)~ 

-FeOff,u: 

]00 ,._ de !'trail& 

S.-Fe. NMll7501 

(515)-

t'AX 1515)--

Appellate Case: 90-2233 Document: 010110133314 Date Filed: 08/28/1991 Page: 22 
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

0 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

10 

19 

20 

.. 21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

of counsel for your defense? 

A. I understand. 

Q. That you would have the right to see and hear all 

of the witnesses and have them cross-examined in your 

defense? 

A. I do. 

Q. That you would have the right on your own part to 

decline to testify unless you voluntarily elected to do so 

in your own defense? 

A. I understand. 

Q. You would have the right to the issuance of 

subpoenas or compulsory process to compel the attendance of 

witnesses to testify on your behalf? 

A. I do. 

Q. Do you further understand that, by entering a plea 

of guilty, if that plea is accepted by the Court, there will 

be no trial and you will have waived or given up your right 

to a trial by jury, as well as those other rights as I have 

just stated them? 

A. I understand. 

Q. The charge against you is that you by force or 

intimidation did willfully take from a person or presence of 

Terry Klaus, a teller at the United New Mexico Bank, money 

in the approximate amount of $2007 belonging to the bank, 

and that it was insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance 

N 

ARRIS 

NOfu.stoN4L C'OOIIT ltfflaTING S[IVI C" [ 

MainOff"oce : 

~~NW 

Al"'-""'· NM 17m ("5)142-MM 

FAX ("5)-

UplDWft Offic, ; 

6565 Amoricu Pan:"'")' NE 

Al~. NMrmo 

(585JIIMIW 

FAX(!O!I~ 

Sura Fe Off occ : 

JOO Po-, de Ptralia 

Sanl&F<, NM(l75()1 

(505)~ 

FAX (585) ,.._9009 

Appellate Case: 90-2233 Document: 010110133314 Date Filed: 08/28/1991 Page: 23 
I 

' 1 

I 2 

' 

3 

4 

' 5 

6 

,. 7 

0 

' 9 

' 10 

11 

' 12 

13 

I. 14 

' 

15 

16 

I 17 

10 

I 19 

20 

I 21 

I 22 

23 

I 24 

25 

I 

I 

I 

Corporation. 

I What would the government be able to prove if we 

went to trial in this matter? 

MR. BACA: Your Honor, if this matter were to 

go to trial, the United States would show that on the 13th 

day of November, 1909, in Albuquerque, two individuals 

entered the United New Mexico Bank at 9700 Montgomery, 

Northeast, and handed Terry Klaus a note, told her to put 

the money on the counter and nobody would get hurt. That 

following the -- the day following the bank robbery three 

individuals were arrested and on them was found bait money. 

And their photographs were shown to Terry Klaus, the bank 

teller who identified Mr. Wiggins and Mr. Gardener as the 

individuals who robbed her on November 13, 1909. 

The note was taken to the crime lab of the FBI and 

fingerprints of two of the defendants were found on it. The 

paper that.was found, which was part of the note, they found 

in the car where the individuals were arrested, matched the 

paper that was found that came from the bank note. And the 

bank is insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance 

Corporation, your Honor. 

BY THE COURT: 

Q. Mr. Wiggins, how do you plead to the information, 

guilty or not guilty? 

A. Guilty. 

N 

ARRIS 

raorDIION4LC'OUIT 

aroanNC S~l\' IC[ 

MaiaOl'ficc : 

~ Marqueao NW 

Albuquerquo, NM rm2 

(515)~ 

FAX (515)~ 

Upoown Office: 

6565 Amoricu l'vtl:woy NE 

AlbuqueTque. NM 17UO 

1!15lllMW 

FAX(515)._ 

Sanu ~ ()ff',ce: 

lOO ""-de Pe111l1a 

Sanu Fe. NM 17501 

(515)"3-4Mf 

FAX (505)---

Appellate Case: 90-2233 Document: 010110133314 Date Filed: 08/28/1991 Page: 24 
p 

" 1 

• 2 

I 3 

4 

• 5 

6 " 

-- 7 

0 

I 9 

I 10 

11 

I 12 

13 

I 14 

• 

15 

16 

I 17 

10 

I 19 

20 

I 21 

I 2_2 

23 

I 24 

25 

II 

II 

' 

Q. Tell me in your own words what it is you 

understand you are pleading guilty to. 

A. I am pleading guilty to participation in the 

robbery of United New Mexico Bank, Albuquerque, on November 

13, 1909. 

Q. Pretty much what the United States Attorney said? 

A. What? 

Q. Pretty much what the United States Attorney said? 

A. Yeah, pretty much. 

THE COURT: It is the finding of the court in 

the case of United States v. Ronnie G. Wiggins that the 

defendant is fully competent and capable of entering an 

informed plea; that his _plea of guilty is a voluntary and 

knowing plea supported by an independent basis in fact 

containing each of the essential elements of the offense • 

Your plea is therefore accepted and you are now adjudged 

guilty of that offense. 

There will be a written presentence report prepared 

by the probation office and you will be requested to give 

them information. At such time as you give them that 

information your attorney may be present if you so desire. 

Prior to the time of sentencing you and your 

attorney will be given an opportunity to review the 

presentence report. At the time of sentencing you and your 

attorney will be given an opportunity to speak on your 

N 

ARRIS 

ra<>n:sllON.U. <.'Oliff IIEPORTINC 5£1\IICl 

MainOlfa: 

,OOMA,q,,ea,NW 

A~. NMl7l02 

(515)~ 

FAX (M5)~ 

u,,....notriu: 656$ Aml:ricu Part"'")' NE 

Alt.>qllerqo,e. NM 171ll 

(M5)11J.tW 

FAX(!05)•-

Santa Fe 0/fic,: 

300 l'ueo de l'tralll 

Sonl&Fo. NMl7501 

(5115)~ 

FAX (5e5}-9009 

Appellate Case: 90-2233 Document: 010110133314 Date Filed: 08/28/1991 Page: 25 
..I. lJ 

p 

st 

1 behalf. 

' 2 Sentencing will be August 0, 1990 at 1:15 p.m. You 

' 3 will be remanded to the custody of the United States 

4 Marshal. 

., 5 MS. STORCH: Thank you. 

6 (WHEREUPON, there were other court matters.) 

I 7 

I 0 

9 

I 10 

11 

I 12 

13 

- 14 

I 15 

16 

-

17 

10 

I 19 

' 

20 

21 

I 22 

23 

I 24 

25 

~ 

- l\r . MainOffice: u.,......o,r.,., SanlafeOffou: 

500MuquolltNW 6565 Amoncu Plr'<WI)' NE )00 l'UclO de Ptrahl 

. ARRIS Albuqueniuc, NM 117102 Albuquerque. NM 17110 Sanlafc, NMfflOI 

(505)~ C505)aa..W (505)~ 

FAX (505)~ FAX(505)111.-o r.u <505)--

- PIIOFDSIONAL COIJWT &£,OIITINC S[IVICE 

Appellate Case: 90-2233 Document: 010110133314 Date Filed: 08/28/1991 Page: 26 
.II 

- ., 

' 

l 

2 

I 3 

4 

I 5 

6 

I 7 

I 8 

9 

I 10 

11 

-

l 2 

-

13 

14 

-

15 

16 

I 17 

18 

I 19 

20 

I 21 

22 

I 23 

I 24 

25 

I 

I 

I 

17 

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 

I, Barbara K. Harris, a Certified Shorthand 

Reporter for the United States, DO HEREBY CERTIFY that 

I reported the foregoing case in stenographic shorthand 

and trans er ibed, or had the same trans er ibed under my 

supervision and direction, the foregoing matter, and that 

the same is a true and correct record of the proceedings 

had at that tine and place. 

I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am neither employed 

by nor related to any of the parties or attorneys in this 

case, and that I have no interest whatsoever in the final 

disposition of this case in any court. 

WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL this 5th day of 

Decenber, 1990. 

N 

ARRIS 

PIIOPUIIONAL coun IPOa_TINC 111\IICI 

Certified Shorthand Reporter 

Barbara R. Harris 

MaillOl!i<,e: 

,OOM.....-NW 

~ . NM171ll 

(515)Ml-NN 

FAX(515)~ 

u.,...,,Offia:: 

6'65 Amoricu --NE Alblaql>erque, NM 17110 

(5'!)11MW 

FAXC505ID~ 

S.-FeOffia:: 

JOO PISeo de hralla 

Sonlafc:, NMl!50l 

(505)-

FAX (505),.,_ 

Appellate Case: 90-2233 Document: 010110133314 Date Filed: 08/28/1991 Page: 27