Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-01109/USCOURTS-ca10-89-01109-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Richard Bruce Cox
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

RICHARD BRUCE COX, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

FILED 

United States Co"lrt of Appeals 

Tenth circuit 

r-Hd 2 4 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 89-1109 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Colorado 

(D.C. No. 88-CR-270) 

Robert w. Cook (Kathy P. Bonham of Bonham, Peake & Hutchinson, 

Denver, Colorado, on the brief), Denver, Colorado, for defendantappellant. 

Stephen c. Peters, Assistant u.s. Attorney, (Michael J. Norton, 

United States Attorney, with him on the brief) for plaintiffappellee. 

Before LOGAN and TACHA, Circuit Judges, and GREENE, District 

Judge.* 

LOGAN, Circuit Judge. 

* The Honorable J. Thomas Greene, United States District Judge 

for the District of Utah, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 89-1109 Document: 01019292933 Date Filed: 05/24/1991 Page: 1 
Defendant Richard Bruce Cox was convicted by a jury of two 

counts involving illegal possession and transportation of 

firearms, and of six counts involving possession with intent to 

distribute and conspiracy to possess and distribute controlled 

substances. Defendant appeals his conviction, raising many issues 

which we discuss herein. 1 We affirm. 

On November 11, 1987, a Colorado state patrol trooper stopped 

defendant for speeding on a Colorado highway. The officer took 

defendant into custody after discovering that he was driving with 

a suspended license. As a passenger exited the vehicle defendant 

had been driving, the officer noticed a pistol butt protruding 

from a black bag on the front passenger seat floorboard. In front 

of the bag, the officer observed a large bucket containing a green 

leafy substance. A later search of the vehicle revealed that the 

bucket contained marijuana and several other controlled 

substances. The black bag contained a nine millimeter pistol, a 

.357 magnum revolver, and a .44 magnum revolver, all of which were 

loaded. As a result, defendant was charged with possessing and 

transporting in interstate commerce a firearm in violation of 18 

u.s.c. § 922(g)(1), and with carrying a firearm while committing a 

federal drug offense in violation of 18 u.s.c. §§ 2 and 924(c). 

Defendant made bond and was released from jail. 

On November 20, 1987, police arrested Thomas Sack in 

Colorado. During an ensuing search of Sack's motel room and 

truck, police discovered eleven bales of marijuana. Sack informed 

1 Although we will refer to all arguments as being raised by 

"defendant," we will address the arguments raised in both 

defendant's pro se briefs and his attorney's briefs. 

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the police that he, defendant, and Jerry Dale Peters were involved 

in selling the seized marijuana. Using this information, police 

eventually charged defendant and Peters with conspiracy to possess 

and distribute, and possession with intent to distribute, in 

excess of 100 kilograms of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C 

§§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B)(vii) and 846. 

On May 3, 1988, defendant again was arrested in Colorado 

after agreeing to distribute cocaine to a government informant. 

Based on this arrest, and a search of defendant's automobile, 

defendant was charged with possession with intent to distribute 

cocaine, ethchlorvynol, diethylpropin and codeine, in violation of 

21 u.s.c. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C), 841(b)(2) and 841(b)(1)(D). 

A federal grand jury indicted defendant on all eight charges, 

with counts one and two of the indictment (the marijuana offenses) 

naming both defendant and Peters, and counts three through eight 

(all other offenses) naming only defendant. Defendant and Peters 

were tried jointly and convicted by a jury on all counts. 

I 

A 

Defendant first contends that the district court erred when 

it denied his pretrial motion for severance under Fed. R. Crim. P. 

8. He argues that counts one and two (the marijuana offenses), 

counts three and four (the firearms offenses) and counts five 

through eight (the cocaine, ethchlorvynol, diethylpropin and 

codeine offenses) involve three distinct and unrelated sets of 

activities that should have been tried separately. 

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Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a), governing the joinder of offenses, 

provides in pertinent part: "Two or more offenses may be charged 

in the same indictment if the offenses charged . . . are of 

the same or similar character or are . . . parts of a common 

scheme or plan." 

Counts one, two and five through eight are of the same or 

similar character; all involve either possession with intent to 

distribute or conspiracy to possess and distribute a controlled 

substance. Counts three and four, on the other hand, involve 

defendant's illegal possession of firearms. We conclude that the 

government adequately demonstrated that defendant possessed these 

firearms as part of a scheme or plan to possess and distribute 

drugs. Police seized these weapons on November 11, 1987, a date 

that falls within the time frame of the drug conspiracy alleged in 

count one;

2 and coincides with count two's allegation that 

defendant possessed and intended to distribute marijuana on 

November 11, 1987. Moreover, police seized the weapons at the 

same time and from the same vehicle that they seized quantities of 

marijuana and other controlled substances. Accordingly, joinder 

of the charges in a single indictment was proper. See United 

States v. Valentine, 706 F.2d 282, 289 (lOth Cir. 1983) (joinder 

of weapons and drug charges proper when weapons seized at same 

time and place as drugs and drug paraphernalia). 

2 Count one alleges that between April 1, 1987, and November 20, 

1987, defendant and Peters conspired to possess with intent to 

distribute in excess of one hundred kilograms of marijuana. I R. 

tab 6 at 1. 

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Defendant alternatively contends that the district court 

violated Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(b) by refusing to grant defendant and 

Peters separate trials. we disagree. Defendant was charged in 

every count of the indictment; therefore, he was not entitled to 

severance under Rule 8(b). See United States v. Eagleston, 417 

F.2d 11, 14 (lOth Cir. 1969). 

B 

Defendant next contends that even if joinder was proper under 

Rule 8, the district court erred by denying his motion for a 

separate trial under Fed. R. Crim. P. 14. Under Rule 14, if a 

defendant "is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants 

in an indictment . . the court may order • . . separate trials 

of counts, grant a severance of defendants or provide whatever 

other relief justice requires." The decision to grant separate 

trials under Rule 14 is "within the sound discretion of the trial 

court and its decision will not ordinarily be reversed in the 

absence of a strong showing of prejudice." Valentine, 706 F.2d at 

289-90. Defendant's burden to show an abuse of discretion is a 

difficult one. Id. at 290. He has not met this burden. 

Defendant argues that he was prejudiced and ultimately 

convicted on counts one and two (the marijuana offenses) because 

of lengthy testimony about Peters' marijuana smuggling activities. 

Absent an actual showing of prejudice, however, such an allegation 

does not warrant reversal. See United States v. Hack, 782 F.2d 

862, 870 (lOth Cir.) ("Neither a mere allegation that defendant 

would have a better chance of acquittal in a separate trial, nor a 

complaint of the 'spillover effect' from the evidence that was 

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overwhelming or more damaging against the co-defendant than that 

against the moving party is sufficient to warrant severance.") 

(citation omitted), cert. denied, 476 u.s. 1184 (1986). We are 

not persuaded that defendant was prejudiced by the district 

court's refusal to grant defendant and Peters separate trials. 

Defendant alternatively argues that he was prejudiced because 

he wished to remain silent on counts one and two (the marijuana 

offenses), but testify and mount an entrapment defense on counts 

five through eight (the other drug offenses). When the district 

court refused to sever these offenses, defendant was forced either 

to testify or to remain silent on all counts. 

In Valentine, 706 F.2d at 291, we discussed what a defendant 

who wishes to remain silent on some counts and testify on others 

must do before he is entitled to severance under Rule 14: 

"[N]o need for a severance exists until the defendant 

makes a convincing showing that he has both important 

testimony to give concerning one count and strong need 

to refrain from testifying on the other. In making such 

a showing, it is essential that the defendant present 

enough information--regarding the nature of the 

testimony he wishes to give on one count and his reasons 

for not wishing to testify on the other--to satisfy the 

court that the claim of prejudice is genuine and to enable it intelligently to weigh the considerations of 

'economy and expedition in judicial administration' 

against the defendant's interest in having a free choice 

with respect to testifying." 

Id. (quoting Baker v. United States, 401 F.2d 958, 977 (D.C. Cir. 

1968), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970)). Accord United States 

v. Hayes, 861 F.2d 1225, 1231 (lOth Cir. 1988). Defendant failed 

to make such a showing. From the record before us on appeal, it 

appears that defendant did not even inform the court of his desire 

to testify on some counts and remain silent on others. At most, 

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he may have informed the court of his intention to mount an 

entrapment defense on counts five through eight. See I R. tab 8 

at 3 11 5; IV R. 57; Pro Se Brief of Defendant/Appellant at 4. 

Such a showing is plainly insufficient. See Valentine, 706 F.2d 

at 290-91 (although defendant informed district court that he 

wished to testify on some counts and remain silent on others, 

severance motion properly denied for failure to indicate nature of 

testimony to be given). 

Finally, defendant argues that he was prejudiced because the 

jury, viewing the conclusive evidence presented on counts five 

through eight, may have "inferred a criminal disposition on the 

part of [defendant] and because of this," convicted him on counts 

one and two. Pro Se Brief of Defendant/Appellant at 4-5. Again 

we disagree; that the government's evidence was stronger on some 

counts than on others does not mandate severance under Rule 14. 

See United States v. Eades, 615 F.2d 617, 624 (4th Cir. 1980), 

modified on other grounds, 633 F.2d 1075, cert. denied, 450 u.s. 

1001 (1981). We find no indication that joinder of these offenses 

prejudiced defendant. 

II 

Defendant next argues that the government presented insufficient evidence to support his conviction on counts one through 

four and six through eight. In evaluating this claim we must 

decide whether a reasonable jury, viewing all evidence in the 

light most favorable to the government, could find defendant 

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Culpepper, 

834 F.2d 879, 881 (lOth Cir. 1987) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 

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443 u.s. 307 (1979)). 

A 

Defendant first attacks his conviction on count one, 

conspiracy to possess and distribute marijuana. Although he 

concedes that the evidence presented at trial proves beyond a 

reasonable doubt that a conspiracy existed between Sack and Peters 

to distribute marijuana in Colorado, defendant contends that the 

mere testimony of Sack--an unindicted co-conspirator--is insufficient to prove that defendant participated in the . 3 consp1.racy. 

This is not true. It is the right of the jury to determine the 

credibility of each witness, see United States v. White, 673 F.2d 

299, 301 (lOth Cir. 1982), and a jury may convict based on the 

uncorroborated testimony of a co-conspirator, see United States v. 

DuFriend, 691 F.2d 948, 953 (lOth Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 

U.S. 1173 (1983); United States v. Gunter, 546 F.2d 861, 869 (lOth 

Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 920 (1977). We therefore must 

affirm the jury's verdict as to count one. 

B 

Defendant next contends that the government failed to prove 

an element of the offense necessary for conviction on count two, 

namely, that police seized more than 100 kilograms of marijuana. 

We disagree. The quantity of the marijuana possessed by defendant 

is not an element of the substantive offense as defined in 21 

U.S.C. § 84l(a). See United States v. Jenkins, 866 F.2d 331, 334 

3 Although federal officials did not prosecute Sack for his role 

in the marijuana conspiracy, a Colorado court convicted and 

sentenced him to sixteen years for his involvement in the 

conspiracy. 

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(lOth Cir. 1989). Thus, the question of defendant's guilt on 

count two does not turn on the amount of marijuana seized by the 

police, and the government was not bound to prove the quantity 

seized beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Although the exact weight 

of the marijuana was never established and the approximate weight 

was very close to 100 kilograms, the evidence is sufficient to 

support the court's finding that it weighed in excess of 100 

kilograms. See X R. 11-12, 33. 

c 

Defendant next challenges his convictions on counts three and 

four (the weapons offenses). He argues that the evidence is 

insufficient to support the convictions because "there was no 

proof that either the car, the drugs or the guns belonged to 

[defendant]." Appellant's Opening Brief at 13. We conclude that 

ample evidence supports the jury's verdict. Police recovered the 

drugs and the guns from the front passenger seat floorboard of a 

car that defendant was driving, and a witness testified that he 

had seen defendant with two of the three guns before their seizure 

and that defendant owned those guns. See VI R. 44-45. 

We similarly reject defendant's argument that he lacked 

dominion or control over the weapons, and thus was not "carrying" 

them for § 924(c) purposes, because he was not carrying them on 

his person. It is enough that they were found on the passenger's 

seat floorboard of the automobile that he had been driving. See 

United States v. Cardenas, 864 F.2d 1528, 1535-36 (lOth Cir.), 

cert. denied, 491 u.s. 909 (1989). 

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Defendant also argues that the guns were not proved to be 

"firearms" as defined by 18 u.s.c. § 921(a)(3). This contention 

is frivolous; an Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms agent testified 

that the weapons had been test fired, were operable and that, in 

his opinion, they were firearms as defined by § 921(a)(3). See 

VII R. 316-19. 

D 

Defendant attacks his conviction on counts six through eight, 

arguing that the quantity of drugs seized from defendant's car--60 

ethchlorvynol tablets, 98 diethylpropin tablets, and over 175 

tablets containing codeine--cannot support distribution charges. 

The government offered ample evidence that defendant intended 

to distribute the drugs seized from his car. In addition to the 

drugs, police found a pager and $20,000 in cash in the car. A 

witness also testified at trial that defendant previously had sold 

"a variety of pills." VIR. 36. We therefore must affirm the 

jury's verdict on counts six through eight. 

III 

Defendant next seeks reversal of his 18 u.s.c. § 922(g)(1) 

conviction arguing that the government failed to prove an essential element of the crime charged. Under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g)(1), it is unlawful for an individual to transport 

firearms in interstate commerce if he previously "has been 

convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for 

a term exceeding one year." A conviction may not serve as a 

predicate offense, however, if it has been "expunged, or set 

aside." Id. § 921(a)(20). Defendant argues that we must reverse 

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his§ 922(g)(1) conviction because the predicate conviction was 

set aside before the instant case arose, and expunged after he was 

convicted and sentenced for violating§ 922(g)(1). 

In 1978, defendant was convicted of transporting and selling 

controlled substances in violation of California law. Defendant's 

18 U.S.C § 922(g)(1) conviction in the instant case, based on the 

1978 California conviction, came at the end of trial, on February 10, 1989. Although the record before us on appeal is unclear, 

it appears that the 1978 California conviction may have been set 

aside in 1982. 4 Five months after his conviction, on July 14, 

1989, defendant petitioned a California court to have his conviction expunged; the petition was granted on August 17, 1989. See 

ProSe Brief of Defendant/Appellant, ex. E. 5 

Whether a conviction may serve as a predicate offense for 

§ 922(g)(1) purposes is "determined in accordance with the law of 

the jurisdiction" in which the conviction was secured. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 921(a)(20). Under California law, a conviction is not 

automatically expunged upon expiration of a defendant's period of 

probation. See Cal. Penal Code § 1203.4; People v. Chandler, 250 

Cal. Rptr. 730, 734 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). Rather, a defendant 

4 At trial, defendant's counsel stipulated to the use of 

defendant's 1978 California conviction as a predicate offense for 

§ 922(g)(1) purposes. Defendant's presentence report, however, 

notes that the 1978 California conviction was set aside in 1982. 

See Pro Se Brief of Defendant/Appellant, ex. D at 7 ~ 53. If the 

1978 California conviction was set aside in 1982, it appears that 

action was accomplished pursuant to California Penal Code 

§ 1203.4. See X R. 17-21. 

5 Although 

leading to 

conviction, 

expungement 

the record is silent on the nature of the proceedings 

the 1989 expungement of defendant's 1978 California 

we assume that defendant sought and received such 

under California Penal Code § 1203.4. 

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must petition the court and demonstrate that he has fulfilled the 

conditions of his probation. See Cal. Penal Code § 1203.4; People 

v. Ignazio, 290 P.2d 964, 965-66 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 

1955). Defendant's expungement petition was not filed before his 

conviction and sentencing in the instant case. 

But even if defendant's 1978 California conviction was set 

aside in 1982, the conviction properly was treated as a predicate 

offense for§ 922(g)(1) purposes. Defining what qualifies as a 

"crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year," 

18 u.s.c. § 921(a)(20) provides in pertinent part: "Any conviction which has been expunged, or set aside • shall not be 

considered a conviction . . . unless such . . . expungement • 

expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms." As previously noted, defendant's 1978 

California conviction apparently was set aside, if at all, under 

California Penal Code § 1203.4. Under that section, a defendant 

whose sentence is set aside is expressly prohibited from owning or 

possessing firearms. See Cal. Penal Code§ 1203.4 ("Dismissal of 

an accusation or information pursuant to this section does not 

permit a person to own, possess, or have in his or her custody or 

control any firearm capable of being concealed upon the person or 

prevent his or her conviction under Section 12021 [forbidding possession of a firearm by a convicted felon]."). We therefore affirm defendant's § 922(g)(1) conviction. 

IV 

Defendant next challenges his conviction under 18 u.s.c. 

§ 924(c) for carrying a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking 

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crime. He argues that because he was not charged with trafficking 

the drugs found with the weapons seized from the car he was driving at the time of the November 11, 1987 stop, his conviction cannot stand. 

Defendant correctly asserts that a§ 924(c)(1) conviction 

cannot stand absent a conviction on the predicate drug trafficking 

offense. See United States v. Onick, 889 F.2d 1425, 1431 (5th 

Cir. 1989). We disagree, however, with defendant's assertion that 

no such predicate conviction was secured in the instant case. 

Count four charges that on November 11, 1987, defendant carried 

three firearms during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense (possession with intent to distribute marijuana) in violation of 18 u.s.c. § 924(c). Although defendant was not charged 

with trafficking the marijuana found with those firearms, 6 count 

two charges that on November 11, 1987, defendant possessed and 

intended to distribute over 100 kilograms of marijuana. Defendant 

was convicted on both counts. 

Given the nexus between the § 924(c) and drug trafficking 

offenses that were charged and proved, the government's decision 

not to pursue a drug trafficking charge in relation to the 

marijuana found in defendant's car does not warrant reversal. 

6 Apparently, the government initially charged defendant with 

possession with intent to distribute the marijuana found during 

the November 11, 1987 search. The charge eventually was dropped, 

however, when the district court granted the government's motion 

to consolidate the remaining charges with several new charges in 

the instant case. Count two in the instant case charges that on 

November 11, 1987, defendant possessed with intent to distribute 

over 100 kilograms of marijuana. Evidence produced at trial, 

however, suggests that the marijuana seized from defendant's car 

was not part of the marijuana charged in count two. 

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Both the drug trafficking offense and the§ 924(c)(l) offense occurred on November 11, 1987. Both charge that defendant possessed 

and intended to distribute marijuana. Defendant does not dispute 

that police recovered over three pounds of marijuana and three 

loaded weapons from the front passenger seat floorboard of the car 

he was driving. Such evidence adequately establishes that 

defendant had ready access to the firearms and that they played an 

integral role in the crimes alleged and proved in count two. See 

United States v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 1403, 1431 (lOth Cir. 1990) 

("uses" element of§ 924(c)(l) satisfied when defendant has ready 

access to weapon that was integral part of criminal undertaking); 

United States v. Henning, 906 F.2d 1392, 1397-98 (lOth Cir. 1990) 

(individual carries firearm "during and in relation to" commission 

of drug trafficking crime if it facilitates or has a role in that 

crime), cert. denied, 111 s. Ct. 789 (1991). 

v 

Defendant next argues that his conviction should be 

overturned because his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Our review of the record does not reveal 

that defendant's counsel made any errors warranting reversal. See 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 

VI 

Defendant further argues that the district court incorrectly 

applied the Sentencing Guidelines when it calculated his criminal 

history category and offense level. 

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A 

In calculating defendant's criminal history category, the 

district court assigned two points for his 1978 California conviction. Defendant contends that is an incorrect application of the 

guidelines because "[s]entences for expunged convictions are not 

counted" in computing a defendant's criminal history category. 

U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(j). 

As we discussed in Part III, it is unclear whether 

defendant's 1978 California conviction had been "set aside" at the 

time he was sentenced in the instant case. But even if it had 

been, the district court correctly counted that conviction in 

computing defendant's criminal history category. The application 

notes to u.s.s.G. § 4A1.2 explain that: 

"A number of jurisdictions have various procedures 

pursuant to which previous convictions may be set aside 

or the defendant may be pardoned for reasons unrelated 

to innocence or errors of law, ~' in order to restore 

civil rights or to remove the stigma associated with a 

criminal conviction. Sentences resulting from such 

convictions are to be counted. However, expunged 

convictions are not counted." 

Id. § 4A1.2, comment. (n.10). Defendant does not contend that his 

1978 California conviction was set aside because of an error of 

law or his innocence, but rather because he had successfully 

completed probation. Although the conviction may have been 

expungeable before sentencing in the instant case, expungement 

does not occur automatically under California law. See Cal. Penal 

Code § 1203.4. Defendant's own evidence establishes that the 

conviction was not expunged until after he was sentenced in the 

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case at hand. We therefore conclude that at the time of sentencing, defendant's 1978 California conviction was a "prior conviction" for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1. See United States v. 

Bucaro, 898 F.2d 368, 372 n.6 (3d Cir. 1990) (affirming use of 

previous criminal conviction to enhance criminal history category 

calculation though previous conviction could have been expunged 

before sentencing); United States v. Ruiz, 734 F. Supp. 312, 313-

14 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (though previous criminal conviction could 

have been expunged before sentencing, it had not been formally 

expunged and thus could not be treated as expunged under 

§ 4A1.2(j)). See also United States v. Jones, 907 F.2d 456, 472 

(4th Cir. 1990) (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting 

in part) ("As the past tense adjective 'expunged' indicates, 

§ 4A1.2(j) prohibits a sentencing court from counting convictions 

that have been invalidated prior to their use as sentencing factors."), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 683 (1991). 

B 

Defendant next argues that the district court erred in assigning one criminal history point for defendant's 1984 Colorado 

misdemeanor menacing conviction. Under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c), prior 

misdemeanor convictions are counted in computing a defendant's 

criminal history category unless excepted by that section. 

Defendant contends that his 1984 Colorado conviction falls within 

two of § 4A1.2(c)'s exceptions: conviction of a minor traffic 

infraction and conviction of a crime similar to disorderly 

conduct. See u.s.s.G. § 4A1.2(c)(1-2). 

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Under Colorado law, misdemeanor menacing is neither a minor 

traffic infraction nor similar to the offense of disorderly 

conduct. Menacing is a crime against the person, see Colo. Rev. 

Stat. § 18-3-206, and disorderly conduct is a crime against the 

public peace, order, and decency. See id. § 18-9-108. We 

therefore affirm the district court's decision to assign one 

criminal history point under u.s.s.G. § 4A1.1(c). 

c 

Defendant next argues that the district court erred in assessing one criminal history point because of a 1984 Colorado 

deferred judgment for unlawful use of a controlled substance. 

Defendant argues that the offense actually resulted in a "deferred 

prosecution" that should not have been counted in computing his 

criminal history category. See u.s.s.G. § 4A1.2(f). 

Defendant's 1984 Colorado drug offense resulted in a deferred 

judgment that properly was included in computing his criminal history category. Defendant's appellate counsel concedes that the 

1984 Colorado conviction properly was counted as a prior sentence 

in computing defendant's criminal history score. See Supp. Auth. 

2 at , D. Moreover, defendant admits that he tendered a plea of 

guilty to the offense. Pro Se Brief of Defendant/Appellant at 22. 

Under Colorado law, a defendant does not enter a plea in the case 

of a deferred prosecution, see Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-7-401, but 

must enter a plea in the case of a deferred judgment, ~ id. 

§ 16-7-403. Under the Sentencing Guidelines, such a deferred 

judgment properly is counted in computing a defendant's criminal 

history category. See u.s.s.G. § 4A1.2(f); id., comment. (n.9) 

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("Section 4A1.2(f) requires counting prior adult diversionary 

dispositions if they involved . . . an admission of guilt in open 

court. This reflects a policy that defendants who receive the 

benefit of a rehabilitative sentence and continue to commit crimes 

should not be treated with further leniency."). 

D 

Defendant further challenges the district court's reliance on 

u.s.s.G. § 4A1.1(d) in assigning two additional criminal history 

points for the 1984 Colorado drug offense. Under§ 4A1.1(d), two 

points are added to a defendant's criminal history category "if 

the defendant committed the instant offense while under any 

criminal justice sentence ..•. " Relying on the presentence 

report's indication that defendant's deferred sentence for the 

1984 Colorado drug offense did not terminate until after defendant 

committed the first of the instant offenses, see Pro Se Brief of 

Defendant/Appellant, ex. D at ~ 58, the district court assessed 

two criminal history points under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d). 

Under Colorado law in effect at the time of defendant's 1984 

sentencing, a sentence ordinarily could be deferred only "for a 

period not to exceed two years from the date of entry of 

[defendant's) plea ...• " Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-7-403 (before 

1987 amendment). Defendant entered his plea and received a 

deferred sentence in 1984. Thus, although termination of 

defendant's deferred sentence was not recorded until November 13, 

1987, that sentence essentially terminated by operation of law in 

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1986. 7 Because defendant did not commit any of the instant offenses until April 1, 1987, such offenses were not committed while 

"under any criminal justice sentence." u.s.s.G. § 4Al.l(d). We 

therefore conclude that the district court erred in assigning two 

criminal history points under§ 4Al.l(d). See United States v. 

Dillon, 905 F.2d 1034, 1036-37 (7th Cir. 1990) (current conviction 

was not committed while under criminal justice sentence when prior 

sentence was for a fixed term and term had expired without state 

action before commission of instant offense). This mistake, 

however, does not affect defendant's appropriate guideline 

sentencing range. As calculated by the district court, defendant 

had nine criminal history points and thus fell within criminal 

history category IV. See X R. 33; Pro Se Brief of Defendant/ 

Appellant, ex. D at 9. Defendant's corrected criminal history 

score of seven still falls within criminal history category IV. 

u.s.s.G. ch. s, pt. A. We therefore need not remand for 

resentencing. See United States v. Williams, 919 F.2d 1451, 1458 

(lOth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 59 u.s.L.W. 3702 (Apr. 15, 1991). 

E 

Defendant next challenges the assignment of three criminal 

history points for his March 6, 1989, Colorado felony conviction 

for attempting to possess cocaine. Defendant argues that the 

Colorado conviction cannot be used to increase his criminal history category because the cocaine that is the basis of the 

Colorado case was found with the guns charged in counts three and 

7 The record before us on appeal contains no indication that 

defendant was placed on probation as a result of his deferred 

sentence or that his deferred sentence was ever revoked. 

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four of the instant case, and admitted into evidence in the 

instant case. 

The Colorado conviction properly was included in computing 

defendant's criminal history category. Under u.s.s.G. § 4A1.2, a 

prior sentence imposed upon a defendant is included in computing 

the defendant's criminal history category unless the prior 

sentence is "for conduct that is part of the instant offense." 

u.s.s.G. § 4A1.2, comment. (n.l). Although police seized the 

cocaine underlying the Colorado conviction and the guns underlying 

counts three and four from the same car, and the cocaine was 

admitted into evidence in the instant case, the presence of the 

cocaine was not part of the instant offense. The government did 

not tie the weapons offenses to the cocaine nor charge defendant 

with possessing that cocaine. Instead, the government charged 

defendant in count three with carrying a weapon in relation to 

trafficking marijuana. Accordingly, the Colorado conviction 

properly was included in defendant's criminal history category. 

See United States v. Garcia, 909 F.2d 389, 392 (9th Cir. 1990) 

(though police seized methamphetamine and counterfeit notes at 

same tLffie and place, state conviction for methamphetamine possession properly counted as a prior conviction in federal prosecution 

charging defendant with possession of counterfeit notes). 

F 

Defendant next challenges the district court's decision to 

increase his base offense level by four points based on its finding that defendant was a leader or organizer of the marijuana 

conspiracy. The district court's determination that defendant was 

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an organizer is a factual finding subject to the clearly erroneous 

standard of review. United States v. Williams, 897 F.2d 1034, 

1040 (lOth Cir. 1990). Given the evidence that extensive 

marijuana transfers took place at a business that defendant owned, 

we cannot declare the district court's finding to be clearly erroneous. See u.s.s.G. § 3Bl.l(a) and comment. (n.3). 

G 

Finally, defendant challenges the district court's finding 

that the amount of the marijuana involved in counts one and two 

did not exceed 100 kilograms as to Peters, but did exceed 100 

kilograms as to defendant. After sentencing Peters, but before 

sentencing defendant, the court heard supplemental testimony as to 

the weight of that marijuana. Defendant contends that this was 

improper because "The court may not . weigh the same evidence 

with respect to each defendant differently." Appellant's Opening 

Brief at 12. 

Our review of the record indicates that the district court's 

disparate findings are not based on different interpretations of 

the ~ evidence. In determining the weight of the marijuana 

applicable to defendant, the court explained that its finding was 

supported by evidence not applicable to Peters. All marijuana 

transfers took place at defendant's place of business and thus 

applied to defendant. See X R. 33-34. In contrast, Peters was a 

mere "courier and may or may not have been involved in other 

transfers." Id. at 33. We therefore affirm the district court's 

disparate findings regarding the marijuana's weight. 

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VII 

Finally, defendant argues that we must remand his case for 

resentencing because the district court failed to comply with the 

requirements of Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)(D). Under that rule, if 

a defendant contests the factual accuracy of any part of his 

presentence investigation report, the district court must either 

make a finding as to the accuracy of the allegation or expressly 

state that the controverted matter will not be taken into account 

in sentencing. Defendant argues that the district court violated 

Rule 32(c)(3)(D) when it failed to expressly address the following 

claimed inaccuracies in his presentence investigation report: 

(1) that the crimes of misdemeanor menacing and disorderly conduct 

are not similar under Colorado law for purposes of U.S.S.G. 

§ 4Al.2(c)(l); (2) that his 1984 Colorado deferred judgment was a 

valid criminal justice sentence for purposes of u.s.s.G. 

§ 4Al.l(d); and (3) that his 1989 Colorado conviction was "not 

part of the instant offense" under u.s.s.G. § 4Al.2(a)(l). See 

Supp. Auth. We disagree. 

"[O]nly historical, objectively verifiable information 

reported in the PSI, antedating the report and existing 

independent of it, can properly be contested as a 'fact' under 

Rule 32." United States v. Jones, 856 F.2d 146, 150 (11th Cir. 

1988). The instant defendant fails to allege any such "factual 

inaccuracy" in his presentence investigation report. Instead, he 

attacks the district court's application of the Guidelines to an 

uncontested set of facts. Such an attack does not implicate Rule 

32(c)(3)(D). Compare United States v. Alvarado, 909 F.2d 1443, 

1445 (lOth Cir. 1990) (defendant contesting factual accuracy of 

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confidential informant's report contained in PSI entitled to 

32(c)(3)(D) findings) with United States v. Hand, 913 F.2d 854, 

857 (lOth Cir. 1990) (whether defendant was a minor participant, 

though based on facts contained in PSI, was a legal conclusion not 

implicating Rule 32(c)(3)(D)) and United States v. Rutter, 897 

F.2d 1558, 1566 (lOth Cir.) (questions concerning parameters of 

guidelines were legal in nature and thus did not invoke Rule 

32(c)(3)(D)), cert. denied, 111 s. Ct. 88 (1990). We hold, 

therefore, that the district court was not obligated to make Rule 

32(c)(3)(D) findings with regard to the disputed matters. 

We have considered the other arguments and contentions made 

in the pro se briefs and supplemental brief, and made by the two 

different lawyers who filed briefs or argued on behalf of 

defendant. We conclude none are sufficient to require further 

discussion. 

AFFIRMED. 

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