Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-12-03012/USCOURTS-caDC-12-03012-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sealed Case

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 18, 2013 Decided July 2, 2013

No. 12-3012

IN RE: SEALED CASE 

_____

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:99-cr-00265-01)

______

Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, and ROGERS and 

GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GRIFFITH.

GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge: Recent amendments to the 

United States Sentencing Guidelines provisions that apply to 

crack cocaine convictions have triggered a wave of motions 

under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). That statute allows prisoners 

whose sentences were based on guideline ranges that have 

since been lowered to petition the district courts for earlier 

release. See Dillon v. United States, __ U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 

2683, 2690 (2010). This appeal asks whether a crack offender 

sentenced below an otherwise applicable statutory mandatory 

minimum because he provided substantial assistance to law 

enforcement is eligible for a sentence reduction under 

§ 3582(c)(2). We hold that he is.

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I

In February 2000, the appellant pled guilty to possession 

with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of crack cocaine, in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(iii). Because he

had been convicted of a prior felony drug offense, he faced a 

statutory mandatory minimum prison term of twenty years. 21 

U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2006) (amended 2011).

The appellant subsequently provided substantial 

assistance in the prosecution of another case, and in return, the 

government filed a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) and 

§ 5K1.1 of the Guidelines, authorizing the district court to set 

his sentence below the mandatory minimum and the guideline 

range. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (“Upon motion of the 

Government, the court shall have the authority to impose a 

sentence below a level established by statute as a minimum 

sentence so as to reflect a defendant’s substantial assistance in 

the investigation or prosecution of another person who has 

committed an offense.”); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual

§ 5K1.1 [hereinafter U.S.S.G.] (“Upon motion of the 

government stating that the defendant has provided substantial 

assistance . . . the court may depart from the guidelines.”).

At sentencing on May 12, 2000, the district court granted 

the government’s substantial assistance motion and heard

argument on the nature, scope, and timeliness of the 

appellant’s assistance. The court then sentenced him to 135 

months’ imprisonment, explaining:

The guideline range, if there had not been the 

mandatory minimum, would have been the 151 to 188 

[months] based on the offense level and the category, 

which is in category 6, an offense level 29.

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I will do somewhat of a reduction, not only from 

the 20 years, looking to what he would have had [with]

the mandatory minimums, and then some reduction 

from what he would have gotten without the mandatory 

minimums, and I would do a sentence of 135 months, 

which I think is fair in the context of the record and 

what’s involved in the particular case.

Tr. 5/12/2000, at 32-33. Because the appellant did not begin 

serving this sentence until he had served out a separate 

sentence handed down by the D.C. Superior Court, he remains 

in prison today.

In 2007, the United States Sentencing Commission 

adopted Amendment 706, reducing the disparity between 

sentences for powder and crack cocaine offenses by lowering 

the offense levels associated with given quantities of crack. 

U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 706 (Nov. 1, 2007). The Commission 

subsequently made Amendment 706 retroactive, allowing 

prisoners sentenced before its passage to petition for earlier 

release. Id. amend. 713 (Mar. 3, 2008). On June 24, 2009, the 

appellant sought to take advantage of the amendment and 

moved for a sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3582(c)(2), which provides:

[I]n the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a 

term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that 

has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing 

Commission . . . the court may reduce the term of 

imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in 

section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if 

such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy 

statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).

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While the appellant’s motion was pending, the 

Commission adopted Amendment 750, which further reduced 

offense levels for crack crimes. U.S.S.G. supp. app. C, amend. 

750 (effective Nov. 1, 2011). As with Amendment 706, the 

Commission made Amendment 750 retroactive. Id. amend. 

759 (effective Nov. 1, 2011). On October 4, 2011, the appellant 

filed a second § 3582(c)(2) motion, which incorporated and 

subsumed his first, seeking the benefit of Amendment 750. 

Under that amendment, his offense level has been lowered 

from 29 to 23, yielding an amended guideline range of 92 to 

115 months. The appellant therefore requested that the district 

court reduce his sentence to 92 months, the low end of the 

amended guideline range. Reducing his sentence to 92 months 

would result in his immediate release from prison.

The district court denied the appellant’s motion, holding 

that the policy statement found at § 1B1.10 of the Guidelines 

Manual governing § 3582(c)(2) proceedings barred a prisoner 

who had been subject to a mandatory minimum from taking 

advantage of a retroactive amendment that lowered his 

guideline range. Tr. 1/18/2012, at 6-8. 

The appellant argues the district court erred and that he is

eligible for a sentence reduction. We have jurisdiction over his 

appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

Because the issues involved present questions of law only, our 

review is de novo. See United States v. Berry, 618 F.3d 13, 16 

(D.C. Cir. 2010).

II

A prisoner seeking a sentence reduction under 

§ 3582(c)(2) must show that his sentence was “based on” a 

guideline range that has since been lowered by the Sentencing 

Commission, and that the reduction he seeks comports with 

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U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2); see also Berry, 

618 F.3d at 16.

A

In United States v. Epps, this court held that the plurality 

opinion in Freeman v. United States, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 

2685 (2011), guides our determination whether a sentence was 

“based on” a subsequently-lowered range. 707 F.3d 337, 351 

(D.C. Cir. 2013). The prisoner in Freeman sought a reduction 

in a sentence that was a condition of a plea agreement he had 

entered pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C). A 

four-Justice plurality took a broad view of the matter and 

reasoned that a sentence is “based on” a guideline range “to 

whatever extent” that range “was a relevant part of the analytic 

framework the judge used to determine the sentence or to 

approve the agreement.” Freeman, 131 S. Ct. at 2692-93 

(plurality opinion). Using that approach, a sentence that 

emerges from a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement is always 

eligible for a subsequent reduction because “[t]he Guidelines 

require the district judge to give due consideration to the 

relevant sentencing range, even if the defendant and prosecutor 

recommend a specific sentence as a condition of the guilty 

plea.” Id. at 2692. 

Justice Sotomayor concurred in the plurality’s judgment 

but took a narrower view of the eligibility of Rule 11(c)(1)(C) 

sentences for reductions. She argued that the “term of 

imprisonment imposed by the sentencing judge [in the Rule 

11(c)(1)(C) context] is dictated by the terms of the agreement 

entered into by the parties, not the judge’s Guidelines 

calculation.” Id. at 2696 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). She

would have held that a sentence imposed pursuant to a Rule 

11(c)(1)(C) agreement is eligible for a reduction only where 

the agreement “expressly uses a Guidelines sentencing range 

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applicable to the charged offense to establish the term of 

imprisonment.” Id. at 2695.

The divergence between the approaches of the plurality 

and Justice Sotomayor left the Court without a majority 

opinion. The rule in Marks v. United States provides that

“[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single 

rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 

the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken 

by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the 

narrowest grounds.” 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). Every other circuit to 

consider the meaning of § 3582(c)(2)’s “based on” 

requirement has felt bound by Justice Sotomayor’s opinion. 

See United States v. Duvall, 705 F.3d 479, 483 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 

2013) (listing cases). But we read Marks differently and 

announced in Epps that we would follow the plurality’s view. 

Under our precedent in King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771 (D.C. 

Cir. 1991) (en banc), the rule in Marks applies only where the

narrowest opinion in a splintered decision “‘represent[s] a 

common denominator of the Court’s reasoning; it must 

embody a position implicitly approved by at least five Justices 

who support the judgment.’” Epps, 707 F.3d at 348 (quoting 

King, 950 F.2d at 781) (emphasis in Epps). No position in 

Freeman garnered the support of a majority of the court, 

binding us only to the result, “namely that § 3582(c)(2) relief is 

not invariably barred when a sentence was imposed pursuant to 

a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement.” Id. at 351. We adopted the 

plurality’s broader view, persuaded that it would reduce the 

disparities in sentencing that the statute was designed to 

correct. Id. at 351-52. 

Under Epps, it is clear that the appellant’s sentence was 

“based on” a subsequently-lowered range. Crucially, the 

district court explained during § 3582(c)(2) proceedings that, 

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as a result of granting the government’s § 3553(e) motion, the 

appellant’s guideline range was the basis for his sentence

because his mandatory minimum “no longer applied.” See Tr. 

1/18/2012, at 5. At sentencing, the court announced that it 

would “do somewhat of a reduction, not only from” the 

mandatory minimum, but also a further reduction from “what 

he would have gotten without the mandatory minimums.” Tr.

5/12/2000, at 32-33. In other words, a further reduction from 

the guideline range. After taking that reduction, the court 

arrived at a sentence of 135 months. Id. The record leaves no 

doubt that the appellant’s guideline range was “a relevant part 

of the analytic framework” used in the district court’s 

sentencing calculus, and that his sentence was therefore “based 

on” his guideline range.

1

Relying on our decision in United States v. Cook, 594 F.3d 

883 (D.C. Cir. 2010), the government argues that the

appellant’s sentence was not “based on” the guideline range, 

but on his mandatory minimum. Cook is easily distinguished. 

Unlike the appellant, the defendant in Cook faced a mandatory 

minimum but did not provide substantial assistance to law 

enforcement; therefore, the government made no § 3553(e) 

motion, and he was actually sentenced to the mandatory 

minimum. Id. at 885. Although the Guidelines require a 

sentencing court to calculate, as a matter of course, a guideline 

range before determining whether a mandatory minimum 

applies, we concluded in Cook that this routine and required 

 1 Even if the Freeman concurrence were controlling, it would 

be unlikely to affect our analysis in this case. Justice Sotomayor did 

not disagree with the plurality’s general interpretation of 

§ 3582(c)(2); her disagreement was limited to the specific context of 

“binding” Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreements. See Freeman, 131 S. 

Ct. at 2695 (“Sentencing under [Rule 11(c)(1)(C)] agreements . . . is 

different.”).

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calculation did not mean that the defendant was sentenced 

“based on” his guideline range. Id. at 887. The mandatory 

minimum “trumped” and “rendered irrelevant” the guideline 

range, which played no role in “determin[ing] the defendant’s 

sentence.” Id. at 888. Where a defendant actually receives a 

mandatory minimum sentence, as he did in Cook, the sentence 

is not “based on” his guideline range, and he is ineligible for 

§ 3582(c)(2) relief. By contrast, in this case, granting the 

§ 3553(e) motion freed the district court to use the guideline 

range and disregard the mandatory minimum. In Cook, the 

guideline range was calculated, as required, but was never a 

factor in arriving at the sentence; in our case, the appellant’s 

guideline range was the very basis for his sentence.

As the Freeman plurality observed, the Commission 

“determined that [the crack Guidelines] were flawed, and 

therefore that sentences that relied on them ought to be 

reexamined.” 131 S. Ct. at 2694. It is clear to us that the 

sentencing court relied on the appellant’s “flawed” guideline

range in this case, opening the door to “reexamin[ation]” of his 

sentence in a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding.

B

Having demonstrated that his sentence was “based on” a 

subsequently-lowered guideline range, the appellant must also 

show that the sentence reduction he seeks is consistent with 

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, the policy statement governing 

§ 3582(c)(2) proceedings. See Dillon, 130 S. Ct. at 2691 

(holding that the policy statement is binding on the courts in 

“determin[ing a] prisoner’s eligibility for a sentence 

modification and the extent of the reduction authorized”); see 

also Berry, 618 F.3d at 17 (observing that a defendant’s 

“eligibility turns on whether a reduction is consistent with the

Guidelines policy statement”). Under § 1B1.10, a defendant is 

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eligible for a sentence reduction if “the guideline range 

applicable to the defendant has subsequently been lowered as a 

result of an amendment to the Guidelines Manual” that the 

Commission has determined should apply retroactively. 

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(1). For our purposes, this requirement 

largely tracks the language of the statute and is satisfied by 

facts discussed in the previous section: the appellant’s original 

guideline range, 151 to 188 months, has since been reduced by 

Amendment 750. But the policy statement imposes an 

additional requirement. It bars a defendant from receiving a 

reduction where the relevant Guidelines amendment does not 

have “the effect of lowering the defendant’s applicable 

guideline range” because another Guidelines or statutory 

provision prevents it from doing so. Id. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B).

According to the government, the appellant’s mandatory 

minimum prevents Amendment 750 from having “the effect of 

lowering” his guideline range. The government relies 

principally upon commentary to the policy statement, which 

provides that “the operation of . . . a statutory mandatory 

minimum term of imprisonment” prevents a retroactive 

amendment that otherwise applies to a defendant from having 

“the effect of lowering the defendant’s applicable guideline 

range.” Id. § 1B1.10, cmt.1(A). The district court relied upon 

this language to hold that it could not grant the appellant a 

reduction.

The government and the district court would both be 

correct if the appellant had been subject to the twenty-year 

mandatory minimum when he was sentenced. The mandatory 

minimum would have prevented Amendment 750 from 

lowering the appellant’s guideline range, because of the way 

the Guidelines treat the interaction between a defendant’s 

guideline range and any statutory minimum the court must 

apply. A sentencing court calculates a guideline range using

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the “Application Instructions” at § 1B1.1 of the Guidelines 

Manual. See Berry, 618 F.3d at 14. That provision has eight 

steps. The first five steps produce the defendant’s offense 

level. U.S.S.G. §§ 1B1.1(a)(1)-(5). At the sixth step, the court 

finds the defendant’s criminal history category. Id.

§ 1B1.1(a)(6). And at step seven the court “[d]etermine[s] the

guideline range . . . that corresponds to the offense level and 

criminal history category determined above.” Id.

§ 1B1.1(a)(7); see also Berry, 618 F.3d at 18 (explaining that 

the sentencing court calculates the guideline range applicable 

to a defendant at the seventh step of § 1B1.1(a)). Once the 

guideline range has been determined, the district court asks at 

step eight whether it is subject to any “sentencing 

requirements” from Chapter Five of the Guidelines, as well as 

“options related to probation, imprisonment, supervision 

conditions, fines, and restitution.” Id. § 1B1.1(a)(8). Those 

“sentencing requirements” include statutory mandatory 

minimums. See id. § 5G1.1. And, “[w]here a statutorily 

required minimum sentence is greater than the maximum of the 

applicable guideline range, the statutorily required minimum 

sentence shall be the guideline sentence.” U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b).

In other words, where the mandatory minimum calls for a 

sentence longer than anything in the guideline range, the 

statute replaces the guideline range and becomes the guideline 

sentence. With the guideline range supplanted, the defendant 

cannot receive the benefit of an amendment that lowers that 

range.

The Commission allows courts to reduce sentences only 

where the amended, lower guideline range would have made a 

difference in the original sentencing. But where a defendant 

faced a mandatory minimum that trumped his original 

guideline range, the lowering of that range would have had no 

effect on the sentence received. Cf. United States v. Glover, 

686 F.3d 1203, 1206 (11th Cir. 2012) (“[Section 3582(c)(2)] 

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gives the defendant an opportunity to receive the same 

sentence he would have received if the guidelines that applied 

at the time of his sentencing had been the same as the 

guidelines that applied after the amendment.”).

In this case, however, the appellant’s sentencing involved 

an additional variable. The government’s substantial assistance 

motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) “waived” the statutory 

minimum and permitted the district court to impose a lower 

sentence based on the appellant’s applicable guideline range. 

See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt.23 (explaining that a mandatory 

minimum may be “‘waived’ and a lower sentence imposed” 

based upon a defendant’s substantial assistance); see also

United States v. Auld, 321 F.3d 861, 866 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(observing that under § 3553(e), “the mandatory nature of the 

statutory minimum is dispensed with”). Because of the 

government’s substantial assistance motion, no mandatory 

minimum was at work when the district court sentenced the 

appellant. And without the bar of the mandatory minimum, no 

provision kept Amendment 750 from having “the effect of 

lowering” the appellant’s applicable guideline range, leaving 

the appellant eligible under the policy statement to pursue a 

sentence reduction.

C

The government maintains that § 3582(c)(2) relief is never 

available to those who avoided a mandatory minimum 

sentence because of their substantial assistance. See Appellee’s 

Br. at 8; Tr. 4/18/2013 at 18. That categorical position has been 

upheld by other circuits. See United States v. Glover, 686 F.3d 

1203 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v. Roa-Medina, 607 F.3d 

255 (1st Cir. 2010); United States v. Carter, 595 F.3d 575 (5th 

Cir. 2010); United States v. Monroe, 580 F.3d 552 (7th Cir. 

2009); United States v. Jackson, 577 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2009); 

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United States v. Johnson, 564 F.3d 419 (6th Cir. 2009); United 

States v. Byers, 561 F.3d 825 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. 

Hood, 556 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Williams, 

551 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2009). But see United States v. Savani, 

__ F.3d __, 2013 WL 2462941 (3d Cir. Jun. 10, 2013) 

(holding, on rule of lenity grounds, that § 1B1.10 is ambiguous 

and § 3553(e) defendants are eligible for sentence reductions).

Several of these other courts have held that § 3553(e) 

defendants were sentenced “based on” their mandatory 

minimums, not their subsequently-lowered guideline ranges, 

despite the fact that sentencing courts used the defendants’ 

guideline ranges after granting § 3553(e) motions. See, e.g., 

Roa-Medina, 607 F.3d at 259-60; Hood, 556 F.3d at 235-36. 

But these courts lacked Freeman’s guidance that a defendant’s 

sentence is “based on” a subsequently-lowered guideline range 

“to whatever extent” that range “was a relevant part of the 

analytic framework the judge used to determine the 

sentence . . . .” Freeman, 131 S. Ct. at 2692-93 (plurality 

opinion). In at least two additional cases, sentencing courts 

explicitly stated that they were not relying upon defendants’ 

guideline ranges to determine the extent of substantial 

assistance departures. See Jackson, 577 F.3d at 1035-36; 

Williams, 551 F.3d at 186.

Likewise, to the extent these courts held that sentence 

reductions for § 3553(e) defendants are never consistent with 

§ 1B1.10, their reasoning proceeded from the flawed premise 

that these defendants’ “applicable guideline ranges” are their

mandatory minimum “guideline sentences,” which 

amendments to the Guidelines cannot lower. See, e.g., Hood, 

556 F.3d at 234-35 (“[T]he only ‘guideline range 

applicable’ . . . was the statutorily mandated ‘guideline 

sentence’ . . . .”); see also Glover, 686 F.3d at 1204-05; 

Johnson, 564 F.3d at 423.

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The government has advanced the same argument here,

relying upon U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b), which, as we have seen, 

provides that a defendant’s “statutorily required minimum 

sentence shall be [his] guideline sentence.” U.S.S.G.

§ 5G1.1(b). According to the government, a mandatory 

minimum “guideline sentence” does not just defeat a 

defendant’s “applicable guideline range”; it becomes the 

defendant’s applicable guideline range. Cf. Glover, 686 F.3d at 

1204 (“Because the statutory mandatory minimum sentence 

was greater than the otherwise applicable guidelines range, the 

statutory mandatory minimum of life imprisonment became 

the guidelines range of life in prison.”). This distinction is 

significant. According to the government, § 3553(e) did not 

“waive” the mandatory minimum so that no “guideline 

sentence” trumped the appellant’s applicable guideline range. 

Instead, the government argues, § 3553(e) authorized the 

sentencing court to depart below the appellant’s mandatory 

minimum “guideline sentence,” which was also his applicable 

guideline range.

We reject the government’s argument because it runs

counter to the plain language of the Guidelines. The 

Commission defines “applicable guideline range” as “the 

guideline range that corresponds to the offense level and 

criminal history category determined pursuant to 1B1.1(a), 

which is determined before consideration of any departure 

provision in the Guidelines Manual or any variance.” U.S.S.G. 

§ 1B1.10, cmt.1(A). A sentencing court uses a defendant’s 

offense level and criminal history category to find a guideline 

range at step seven of the Application Instructions, see id.

§ 1B1.1(a)(7), prior to determining whether a mandatory 

minimum applies at step eight. See id. § 1B1.1(a)(8). The 

appellant’s twenty-year mandatory minimum cannot

“correspond to” his offense level and criminal history category 

under the Guidelines because it is a creature of statute,

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unaffected by those variables. See Savani, 2013 WL 2462941, 

at *5 n.5 (“A defendant is not assigned a new offense level or 

criminal history category by operation of the mandatory 

minimum. Rather, the guideline range that is applicable to that 

offense level and criminal history category is simply trumped 

by the mandatory minimum . . . .”). 

The government’s argument also clashes with the text of 

§ 5G1.1, which by its own terms distinguishes between an 

“applicable guideline range” and a “guideline sentence.” See

U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b) (“Where a statutorily required minimum 

sentence is greater than the maximum of the applicable 

guideline range, the statutorily required minimum sentence 

shall be the guideline sentence.”); see also Berry, 618 F.3d at 

18 (“Chapter 5 of the Guidelines repeatedly uses ‘applicable 

guideline range’ to describe the guideline range resulting from 

application of steps [one] through [seven] of the Guidelines’ 

Application Instructions in § 1B1.1.”). Section 5G1.1

juxtaposes the terms “applicable guideline range” and 

“statutorily required minimum sentence” in several examples 

to illustrate how a mandatory minimum can either restrict or 

trump a defendant’s applicable guideline range. U.S.S.G. 

§ 5G1.1, cmt. The mandatory minimum, in other words, acts 

upon the already-determined “applicable guideline range”; it 

does not become the guideline range. The policy statement 

does not foreclose § 3553(e) defendants from receiving 

reductions on that basis.2

 2 In a recent decision, the Third Circuit overruled its own 

precedent and became the first appeals court to hold that § 1B1.10 

does not categorically block § 3553(e) defendants from receiving 

sentence reductions. Savani, 2013 WL 2462941, at *1. But it did so 

by applying the rule of lenity, after concluding that the Guidelines 

are ambiguous as to whether a defendant’s “applicable guideline 

range” includes his mandatory minimum, and that the defendant 

should get the benefit of that ambiguity. Id. at *9. A concurring 

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Indeed, elsewhere the policy statement implicitly confirms 

that § 3553(e) defendants may be eligible for sentence 

reductions. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b) states that the maximum 

reduction a defendant may receive is a reduction to the low end 

of his new, post-amendment guideline range, unless he was 

sentenced below his applicable guideline range pursuant to one 

of several government motions that may be filed to reward 

substantial assistance. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B). Those 

motions, according to the Guidelines commentary, are 

U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b), and 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(e). Id. § 1B1.10, cmt.3. The Commission, in other 

words, clearly anticipated that some prisoners who received 

sentences lower than their mandatory minimums thanks to 

§ 3553(e) motions would nevertheless be eligible for sentence 

reductions. Cf. Savani, 2013 WL 2462941, at *7 (observing 

that this section of the commentary “appears to contemplate 

that a defendant who was sentenced below his applicable 

mandatory minimum because he received a § 3553(e) 

reduction for substantial assistance, might be eligible for a 

sentencing reduction”).

III

Because the district court has authority to reduce the 

appellant’s sentence, we remand for further § 3582(c)(2) 

proceedings.

Of course, the appellant’s eligibility for a reduction does 

not entitle him to a lower sentence. “[W]hether, and to what 

extent, a reduction . . . is warranted,” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(1), 

 

member of the Savani panel would not have resorted to the rule of 

lenity, because it “could not be clearer” from the definition of the 

term in § 1B1.10 that a defendant’s “applicable guideline range” is 

determined without reference to any mandatory minimum. Id. at *11 

(Fuentes, J., concurring).

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are decisions left to the discretion of the district court, as 

guided by the policy statement and the sentencing factors listed 

at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b); 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3582(c)(2) (providing that “the court may reduce the term of 

imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in section 

3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable”). 3 As the 

Freeman plurality observed:

What is at stake in this case is a defendant’s eligibility 

for relief, not the extent of that relief. Indeed, even 

where a defendant is permitted to seek a reduction, the 

district judge may conclude that a reduction would be 

inappropriate. District judges have a continuing 

professional commitment, based on scholarship and 

accumulated experience, to a consistent sentencing 

policy. They can rely on the frameworks they have 

devised to determine whether and to what extent a 

sentence reduction is warranted in any particular case.

131 S. Ct. at 2694 (plurality opinion). With that in mind, we 

remand so that the district court may consider whether the facts 

of the appellant’s case warrant a reduced sentence.

 3 “Section 3553(a) provides that a ‘court shall impose a 

sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with 

the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection,’ and it 

enumerates several factors a court ‘shall consider’ in determining an 

appropriate sentence, including ‘the nature and circumstances of the 

offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.’” Dillon, 

130 S. Ct. at 2688 n.2 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)).

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17

IV

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand to the 

district court for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion.

So ordered.

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