Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-95-03114/USCOURTS-caDC-95-03114-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
William Roy Atkins
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 7, 1997 Decided July 11, 1997 

No. 95-3114

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLANT

v.

WILLIAM ROY ATKINS,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 92cr00431-01)

Gregg A. Maisel, Assistant United States Attorney, argued 

the cause for the appellant. Eric H. Holder, Jr., United 

States Attorney, and John R. Fisher and Thomas J. Tourish, 

Jr., Assistant United States Attorneys, were on briefs.

Gerald I. Fisher, appointed by the court, argued the cause 

for the appellee.

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1The district court credited the latter version of events at least to 

some extent. Appellant's R. Material I.13 (court observed Atkins, 

his wife and friends "were truly startled" and resistance was 

"understandable" reaction). 

Before: SILBERMAN, WILLIAMS and HENDERSON, Circuit 

Judges.

Opinion for the court filed PER CURIAM.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

PER CURIAM: The United States (Government) appeals the 

district court's decision to depart downward from the range 

specified in the United States Sentencing Guidelines 

(U.S.S.G. or Guidelines) to sentence William Atkins (Atkins) 

to five years of probation on his conviction of felon in possession of a firearm. Applying Guidelines section 5K2.13, the 

district court departed based on its finding that Atkins suffered from reduced mental capacity. We conclude that the 

district court's legal error requires vacatur and remand for 

resentencing.

I. FACTS

On March 18, 1992, District of Columbia police received a 

tip that Atkins, who was on escape status from federal 

custody, was spotted in The Guards restaurant in Georgetown. Several plain clothes officers entered the restaurant 

and approached Atkins. Whether they identified themselves 

as police officers first or instead shoved Atkins and attempted 

to arrest him without identifying themselves is disputed.1In 

either event, considerable effort was required to subdue 

Atkins. The police recovered a loaded .357 revolver from 

him.

As a result of the incident, Atkins was charged with one 

count of assault on a police officer while armed in violation of 

D.C. Code § 22-505(a) and (b), one count of felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(e) 

and one count of felon in possession of ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(e). Atkins pleaded guilty 

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2The Government characterizes this factor as two separate factorsAtkins's record and his age upon releasebut it is clear from 

the district court's findings of fact that Atkins's record had no 

independent significance and was relevant only in relation to his age 

upon release. Appellant's R. Material K.4 ("Mr. Atkins must still 

serve the balance of an undischarged term of imprisonment of 94 

months in an unrelated matter, and thus will not be released from 

prison for several years, at which time he will be in his middle 

50's."). 

3The court adopted Atkins's proposed findings of fact. 

to the section 922(g) violation involving the firearm. The 

count alleging the D.C. Code violation as well as the remaining portions of the other two counts were dismissed. Pursuant to Guidelines section 5K2.13 (Diminished Capacity), the 

district court departed from the Guidelines range of 37 to 46 

months' imprisonment and instead sentenced Atkins to five 

years' probation. In concluding that Atkins's criminal history 

did not indicate that incarceration was necessary to protect 

the public, the district court found the following: (1) Atkins's 

mental condition was treatable; (2) because of his uncompleted sentence, he would not be released from prison until his 

middle 50's;2(3) his record was based on an erroneous 

calculation of his criminal history score; and (4) he had never 

injured law enforcement officers despite repeated opportunities to do so.3 Appellant's R. Material K.4.

Atkins served as a special forces captain in Vietnam, a 

Prince George's County, Maryland police officer, a military 

trainer and counter-terrorism consultant in Saudi Arabia and 

elsewhere and a mercenary with the Rhodesian Army. According to the psychologist whose report the district court 

relied upon, Atkins suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and "survivor mode functioning" as a result of 

"his combat episodes and war trauma" in Vietnam. Appellant's R. Material F.7. In the psychologist's view, Atkins's 

condition compelled him to possess firearms.

Atkins's criminal history attests to his attachment to firearms; he has been convicted of firearms offenses at least four 

times. Atkins's previous offenses also involved assaults on or 

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4Although the Government contested other elements of a section 

5K2.13 departure below (e.g., whether the offense was non-violent), 

threats against law enforcement officers. After a December 

1980 traffic accident in England, Atkins threatened another 

motorist with a .38 caliber handgun. Atkins fled the scene 

and, when cornered by two police officers, threatened to kill 

them and managed to take one of them hostage at gun point. 

After a November 1986 arrest for driving while intoxicated, 

Atkins freed himself from handcuffs, recovered his loaded 

9mm handgun, held the handgun at the arresting officer's 

side and said "Gotcha." In November 1988, Atkins reached 

for a .32 caliber revolver concealed at his ankle when stopped 

by agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. 

In April 1990, Atkins was mistakenly released from the 

Federal Correctional Institute in Butner, North Carolina 

after completing his sentence for the 1986 offense but before 

he had served a 94-month consecutive sentence for the 1988 

offense. Presentence Investigation Report at 6. Since his 

arrest in this case, Atkins has been serving the latter sentence.

II. DISCUSSION

Section 5K2.13 authorizes a sentencing judge to grant a 

downward departure as follows:

If the defendant committed a non-violent offense while 

suffering from significantly reduced mental capacity not 

resulting from voluntary use of drugs or other intoxicants, a lower sentence may be warranted to reflect the 

extent to which reduced mental capacity contributed to 

the commission of the offense, provided that the defendant's criminal history does not indicate a need for 

incarceration to protect the public.

U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13. The Government contends that the district court considered impermissible factors in deciding that 

Atkins's criminal history indicated no need for incarceration 

to protect the public.4 Specifically, the Government argues 

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that "criminal history" as defined in Chapter 4, Part A of the 

Guidelines is the only relevant factor in assessing whether a 

defendant poses a threat to public safety such that he should 

be imprisoned and that, even if a broader range of factors 

may be considered, the factors the district court considered 

were improper.

The defendant's criminal history is the only explicit criterion for determining whether the defendant's imprisonment is 

necessary to protect the public. And, as the Government 

observes, the United States Sentencing Commission (Commission) knows how to use broader language when it so 

intends. Cf. U.S.S.G. § 5D1.5 (court is to evaluate defendant's "history and characteristics" in considering supervised 

release). Nevertheless, at least one court has held that 

whether a defendant must be incarcerated to protect the 

public can be determined only after a "precise and factspecific" evaluation not limited to his "criminal history" as 

reflected by the numerical calculation laid out in Chapter 4, 

Part A. United States v. Cantu, 12 F.3d 1506, 1516 (9th Cir. 

1993). As the Ninth Circuit observed, "the purpose of this 

departure is lenity." Id. Chapter 4, Part A, on the other 

hand, recognizes that "[a] defendant with a record of prior 

criminal behavior is more culpable than a first offender and 

thus deserving of greater punishment" and that greater punishment for repeat offenders furthers deterrence of crimes. 

U.S.S.G. Ch. 4, Pt. A, intro. comment. In United States v. 

Chatman, 986 F.2d 1446 (D.C. Cir. 1993), we analyzed whether section 5K2.13's "non-violent offense" language should be 

read as a contrapositive of section 4B1.2's definition of "crime 

of violence" and concluded that, in the absence of a crossreference, the lenity factor undergirding section 5K2.13 suggests that the application of that section should not be 

controlled by section 4B1.2. Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1450-53. 

The different purposes behind section 5K2.13 and Chapter 4, 

Part A likewise suggest that the latter should not control the 

meaning of "criminal history" as used in the former.

________

it has narrowed its focus on appeal to whether incarceration is 

needed to protect the public. 

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Whether an individual such as Atkins is dangerous to the 

public turns, to some degree, on the circumstances of his 

mental disorder. Psychiatric treatment, for instance, may 

reduce the risk that the offender will continue to commit 

crimes that put the safety of others in jeopardy. Normally, 

of course, a pattern of past criminal activity warrants an 

inference that the offender is unlikely to mend his ways and 

therefore that incapacitation, i.e., a long sentence, is the only 

effective means of safeguarding society. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 4, 

Pt. A, intro. comment ("To protect the public from further 

crimes of the particular defendant, the likelihood of recidivism 

and future criminal behavior must be considered."); Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1451. Here, Atkins's history is the history 

of a mentally ill criminal and therefore his sentence must 

reflect the extent to which that additional characteristic, 

together with those normally taken into consideration, may 

increase or decrease the likelihood that he will be a danger to 

society. Cf. Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1451-52 (purposes of just 

desert and deterrence that justify longer sentences and definition of "crime of violence" in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 lose some 

relevance in context of diminished mental capacity).

Moreover, the Commission could have provided that certain 

repeat offenders are ineligible for a departure under section 

5K2.13. That it chose not to reinforces the view that "criminal history" means something more in section 5K2.13 than it 

does in Chapter 4, Part A. Section 5K2.13 might, for example, have provided that a defendant with a certain number of 

criminal history points as calculated pursuant to Chapter 4, 

Part A is not eligible for a downward departure under section 

5K2.13. In that case, the sentencing court would simply do a 

little math to determine a defendant's eligibility for the 

departure; it would not have to assess the "need for incarceration to protect the public."

Indeed, the Government itself acknowledges that evaluating the factors identified in Cantu is a "common-sense approach" to determining whether the defendant should be 

imprisoned to protect the public. Appellant's Br. 21. Even 

more to the point, the Government concedes that " 'criminal 

history' as used in section 5K2.13 may have a broader meanUSCA Case #95-3114 Document #283933 Filed: 07/11/1997 Page 6 of 14
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ing than the numerical 'criminal history category' calculated 

for a defendant under § 4A." Appellant's Reply Br. 7 n.4. 

We agree and conclude that the "criminal history" referred to 

in section 5K2.13 is not limited to the meaning Chapter 4, 

Part A gives it. This is not to say, however, that anything is 

fair game. Rather, the sentencing court may consider only 

those factors that bear on whether "the defendant's criminal 

history ... indicate[s] a need for incarceration to protect the 

public." U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13. The Ninth Circuit identified 

four factors: psychiatric or other medical treatment the 

defendant is receiving and its likelihood of success, the defendant's likely circumstances upon release, the defendant's 

overall criminal record and the "nature and circumstances" of 

the current offense. Cantu, 12 F.3d at 1516.

The sentencing court here strayed far from these factors. 

In determining that Atkins did not pose a threat requiring 

imprisonment, the court first found that PTSD is a treatable 

disorder. Absent a finding that Atkins would in fact receive 

(or even seek) treatment, however, his condition's amenability 

to treatment has no relevance. Cf. United States v. Webb, 49 

F.3d 636, 639 (10th Cir.) (evidence of mental disorder insufficient to justify downward departure if sentencing court does 

not explain disorder's significance), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 

121 (1995). Indeed, not only was there no indication that 

Atkins was receiving treatment that had some likelihood of 

success, cf. Cantu, 12 F.3d at 1516, Atkins previously had 

terminated court-ordered therapy, Presentence Investigation 

Report at 11. Without going further, e.g., by finding that 

Atkins would receive treatment and that it had some chance 

of success, the district court improperly considered the theoretical treatability of Atkins's condition.

The district court next found that, because Atkins would be 

in his 50's when he completed his prior sentence, he was not 

likely to pose a threat when released. Because the defendant's criminal history involves the use and abuse of firearms, 

whose exercise requires no youthful vigor, his age on release 

is relevant only insofar as it points to a materially diminshed 

inclination to commit such crimes. Although the historic 

fact that the young commit the overwhelming majority of 

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5Atkins asserts that the district court used the sentencing mistake to grant a separate departure under section 4A1.3 on the 

ground that Atkins's criminal history category over-represents the 

seriousness of his criminal history. His assertion is not borne out 

by the record. In its findings of fact, the court discussed the 

alleged sentencing error expressly and exclusively as a factor 

bearing on whether he posed a threat to the public if not imprisoned. Appellant's R. Material K.4. 

crimes may support such a prediction, reliance on it under 

§ 5K2.13 is undermined by the central role of reduced mental 

capacity, which suggests that the normally beneficent effects 

of aging may be ineffective. Further, the Guidelines indicate 

a general reluctance to place much weight on age. See

§ 5H1.1 ("Age ... is not ordinarily relevant in determining 

whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline 

range.") Thus age would appear relevant only to the extent 

that, in combination with some reasonable prediction about 

the course of the mental ailment, it supports a prediction that 

there is no "need for incarceration to protect the public" from 

the sort of crimes that the defendant has shown some propensity to commit.

The district court also based the downward departure on a 

possible miscalculation in Atkins's prior sentence. We disagree that the alleged sentencing mistake was an appropriate 

fact for the district court to consider.5 The remedy for an 

error occurring in a different court lies with that court or the 

appropriate appellate court, not collaterally with the district 

court. Cf. Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 497 (1994) 

(no right under Armed Career Criminal Act or Constitution 

to challenge prior convictions during sentencing except on 

sixth amendment ground); United States v. Mitchell, 18 F.3d 

1355, 1360 (7th Cir.) ("[W]e agree with the result reached by 

the First, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits, and 

hold that a defendant may not collaterally attack his prior 

state convictions at sentencing unless that conviction is presumptively void ....") (footnote omitted)), cert. denied, 115 

S. Ct. 640 (1994). The district court thus should not have 

considered another court's alleged mistake in deciding whether Atkins's imprisonment was necessary to protect the public.

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6No one suggests that threatening police officers does not implicate public safety. 

7Even were we to accept the district court's finding on the point, 

its consideration of the other factors we have discussed would 

require remand. 

8The Government also argues that, even if Atkins is eligible for a 

downward departure, the size of the departurefrom the Guidelines range of 37 to 46 months' imprisonment to five years' probationconstitutes an abuse of discretion. Because of our resolution 

of the case, we need not reach the issue. For the purpose of 

remand, however, we note that a departure from the applicable 

Guidelines range must be supported by "specific reasons explaining 

the extent of [the] departure." United States v. Perkins, 963 F.2d 

1523, 1528 (D.C. Cir. 1992); see also United States v. Molina, 952 

F.2d 514, 522 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (extent of departure must be supported on "reasoned basis"). 

The district court found finally that, by not actually injuring law enforcement officers despite numerous opportunities 

to do so, Atkins demonstrated that he is not a threat to the 

public. Although the nature of Atkins's prior offenses may 

be a legitimate subject of inquiry bearing on whether Atkins's 

criminal history indicates "a need for incarceration to protect 

the public," U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13, the district court's assessment 

of that factor amounted to an abuse of discretion. It is 

undisputed that Atkins did not seriously injure or kill a law 

enforcement officer or bystander during any of his numerous 

arrests. Nevertheless, Atkins's pattern of violent resistance 

to arrest, hostage-taking and armed threats against law enforcement officers manifests that he should be incarcerated to 

protect the public, not the converse.6 This, then, is that rare 

case in which the district court exceeded its discretion.7

Accordingly, while the district court was entitled to look 

beyond Atkins's criminal history score as calculated under 

Chapter 4, Part A of the Guidelines in assessing the need to 

incarcerate him, it both considered improper factors and 

abused its discretion with regard to the one legitimate factor 

it considered.8 A district court's decision to depart from the 

Guidelines is due substantial deference and should be reversed only when the court abuses its discretion, Koon v. 

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United States, 116 S. Ct. 2035, 2046-47 (1996), but an error of 

law (here, considering improper factors) is an abuse of discretion "by definition," id. at 2047. We therefore vacate Atkins's 

sentence and remand for resentencing consistent with this 

opinion.

So ordered.

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1Medical treatment might have some bearing on how the defendant's criminal history reflects on his dangerousness in an exceptional case. For example, treatment might be relevant in the case 

of a defendant whose past crimes occurred before treatment began 

and whose offense of conviction occurred during a temporary and 

singular lapse in that treatment. 

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I disagree with the majority's view of what a sentencing 

judge may consider when evaluating "criminal history" under 

section 5K2.13. I agree that "criminal history" is not simply 

the defendant's numerical score as calculated in accordance 

with Chapter 4, Part A of the Guidelines. I fail to see, 

however, how the defendant's circumstances upon release 

have anything to do with his "criminal history." Similarly, 

psychiatric or other medical treatment the defendant is receiving or will receive and the treatment's chance of success 

ordinarily have no connection to criminal history.1 Although 

United States v. Cantu, 12 F.3d 1506, 1516 (9th Cir. 1993), 

identifies these factors as relevant to whether a defendant's 

criminal history indicates a need for incarceration, they are 

inconsistent with the Ninth Circuit's own reasoning. Cantu

describes section 5K2.13 as being motivated by the fact that, 

"[w]hen defendants with reduced mental capacity do not 

exhibit violent conduct, ... incapacitation is not such an 

important goal." Id. But Cantu's criminal record contained 

"four convictions for differing degrees of assault." Id. at 

1515-16. Far from "presum[ing] that a defendant with reduced mental capacity is more dangerous than other offenders," id. at 1516, the sentencing court (and the circuit court, 

for that matter) had unequivocal proof that Cantu had exhibited violent conduct and thus that incapacitation was an 

important goal in his case. Regardless of treatment he might 

receive or his circumstances upon release, Cantu's record 

demonstrated a need for incarceration to protect the public

a conclusion the Ninth Circuit itself would have reached had 

it heeded its own words.

"Criminal history" comprises the defendant's record of 

offensesno more, no less. When a term defined in one 

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2

"Expressly charged" conduct is plainly a narrower category of 

conduct than "relevant conduct," i.e., "all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or 

section is used identically in another, we cannot simply ignore 

the overlap. Section 5K2.13 uses "criminal history"the 

same term used in Chapter 4, Part A to determine the 

defendant's location on the horizontal axis of the Guidelines' 

sentencing table. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1. If the Commission did 

not intend Chapter 4, Part A's definition of "criminal history" 

to apply to the sentencing court's determination whether the 

defendant's incarceration is, based on his "criminal history," 

necessary to protect the public, it could easily have chosen a 

different term. See, e.g., id. § 5D1.5 (court is to evaluate 

defendant's "history and characteristics" in considering supervised release); cf. United States v. Chatman, 986 F.2d 

1446, 1451 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("crime of violence" in section 

4B1.2 is "distinctively crafted 'term of art' " and does not 

guide interpretation of "non-violent offense" in section 

5K2.13).

Accordingly, a sentencing judge evaluating whether the 

defendant's "criminal history" indicates a need for incarceration to protect the public should look to how the defendant's 

past crimes are classified under Chapter 4, Part Athe 

Guidelines provisions covering "criminal history." Section 

4A1.2(p) adopts section 4B1.2(1)'s definition of "crime of 

violence" for the purpose of determining the defendant's 

criminal history under section 4A1.1. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(p). 

Section 4B1.2(1) in turn defines "crime of violence" as a 

felony having "as an element the use, attempted use, or 

threatened use of physical force against the person of another" or burglary, arson or extortion involving explosives or 

"conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical 

injury to another." Id. § 4B1.2(1). The Guidelines emphasize that the "conduct that presents a serious potential risk of 

physical injury to another" means only "the conduct set forth 

(i.e., expressly charged) in the count of which the defendant 

was convicted." Id. § 4B1.2 application n.2 (emphasis added). 

Application note 2 repeats: "[T]he conduct of which the 

defendant was convicted is the focus of the inquiry."2Id.

(emphasis added). Ignoring the directive, the majority today 

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willfully caused by the defendant ... that occurred during the 

commission of the offense of conviction." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1); 

see generally United States v. Valdez-Torres, 108 F.3d 385, 387-88 

(D.C. Cir. 1997). 

3We have held that, in determining whether a past crime is a 

"crime of violence," the sentencing court may consider "the facts of 

the case." United States v. Baskin, 886 F.2d 383, 390 (D.C. Cir. 

1989); see also United States v. Bradshaw, 935 F.2d 295, 303 (D.C. 

Cir. 1991). Baskin, however, was decided before the Commission 

amended the commentary by expressly limiting the sentencing 

court's review of the facts to "the conduct set forth (i.e., expressly 

charged) in the count of which the defendant was convicted" and by 

emphasizing that "the conduct of which the defendant was convicted 

is the focus of inquiry." U.S.S.G. App. C, amend. 433 (amending 

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 application n.2). Curiously, although Chatman

observes that section 4B1.2 and its commentary had been amended 

twice in the prior two years, Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1450, the opinion 

overlooks the effect of the amendments which seriously erode 

Baskin's authority. Id. at 1453 n.7. The majority in Chatman

expressly disavows reliance on Baskin, id., but Judge Ginsburg's 

concurrence explains that "the result in [Chatman] would not obtain 

if [Baskin] were not the law of this circuit." Id. at 1454 (Ginsburg, 

J., concurring). Accordingly, I question Baskin's continuing vitality. Cf. id. at 1455 (questioning Baskin on different ground). 

4Atkins's arrest in England also resulted in his conviction of, 

inter alia, common assault and using a firearm with the intent to 

resist arrest. Presentence Investigation Report at 8. 

sanctions the examination of facts underlying the defendant's 

criminal record without regard toindeed without knowing

whether the facts were part of the charged conduct.3 This is 

in addition to its examination of facts unrelated even to 

"criminal history." The record, namely the presentence investigation report, does not reflect what conduct was "expressly charged" in Atkins's past crimes. Nevertheless Atkins's criminal history does include at least one offense

assault on a law enforcement officerthat, based on its 

elements alone, is indisputably violent.4 Presentence Investigation Report at 7. In my view, a departure under section 

5K2.13 is unauthorized.

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5Atkins did not receive a two-level decrease in the base offense 

level for acceptance of responsibility even though he pleaded guilty 

in accordance with the plea bargain and "indicated through his 

attorney [that] he accepted responsibility for the offense of conviction." Presentence Investigation Report at 3. Although the probation officer did not recommend a downward adjustment on the 

ground that Atkins "declined to discuss the issue with the probation 

office," id., it remains within the district court's discretion to grant 

the adjustment. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a); id. § 3E1.1 application 

n.5 ("The sentencing judge is in a unique position to evaluate a 

defendant's acceptance of responsibility."). 

In addition, I believe that Guidelines section 5H1.1 bars the 

district court from considering Atkins's age upon release 

under any theory. That section provides that age "is not 

ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence should 

be outside the applicable guideline range" but may become 

relevant "when the defendant is elderly and infirm." 

U.S.S.G. § 5H1.1. There is nothing so extraordinary about 

his being in his 50's when released that makes Atkins's age 

relevant to a departure decision. As the majority observes, 

neither Atkins's repeat offensepossession of a firearm by a 

felonnor the use of a firearm requires "youthful vigor." 

Maj. Op. at 7. Moreover, Atkins cannot reasonably claim 

that he either is or at the time of his release will be elderly 

and infirm.

Accordingly, I respectfully dissentI would remand with 

instructions to sentence Atkins within the applicable Guidelines range.5

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