Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01161/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01161-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of the Army
Intervenor
Merit Systems Protection Board
Respondent
Thomas Turner
Petitioner

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

THOMAS TURNER,

Petitioner

v.

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,

Respondent

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,

Intervenor

______________________ 

2016-1161

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. SF-315H-15-0358-I-1.

______________________ 

Decided: September 26, 2016

______________________ 

 RONALD PAUL ACKERMAN, Law Offices of Ronald P. 

Ackerman, Culver City, CA, for petitioner.

 MICHAEL ANTON CARNEY, Office of the General Counsel, Merit Systems Protection Board, Washington, DC, for 

respondent. Also represented by BRYAN G. POLISUK. 

Case: 16-1161 Document: 46-2 Page: 1 Filed: 09/26/2016
2 TURNER v. MSPB

 ALEXANDER ORLANDO CANIZARES, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of 

Justice, Washington, DC, for intervenor. Also represented 

by REGINALD T. BLADES, JR., ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR.,

BENJAMIN C. MIZER. 

______________________ 

Before MOORE, TARANTO, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Thomas Turner appeals from a Merit Systems Protection Board (“Board”) decision dismissing his appeal for 

lack of jurisdiction. We affirm the dismissal of 

Mr. Turner’s appeal. 

BACKGROUND

Mr. Turner was selected for the position of IT Specialist, GS-12, Step 6 with the Department of the Army 

(“agency”) at the Hydrology and Hydraulics Branch, Los 

Angeles District. His start date was set for December 27, 

2013, but to accommodate Mr. Turner, the agency and 

Mr. Turner agreed to an enter-on-duty (“EOD”) date of 

January 13, 2014. The agency executed a Standard Form 

50 (“SF-50”) effective January 13, 2014. At Mr. Turner’s 

request, the agency and Mr. Turner agreed to again 

postpone his EOD date, this time to January 27, 2014. 

To cancel the January 13, 2014 SF-50, the agency executed a second SF-50 with the remark, “[a]ction cancel 

due to incorrect effective date.” Petr’s App. 117. A Human Resources (“HR”) Specialist submitted a declaration 

that the SF-50 was cancelled because Mr. Turner was 

unable to report at that time, and a new request was 

submitted for the new EOD date. The agency executed a 

third SF-50 that indicated that the effective date was 

January 27, 2014 and that Mr. Turner’s appointment was

Case: 16-1161 Document: 46-2 Page: 2 Filed: 09/26/2016
TURNER v. MSPB 3

subject to completion of a one-year probationary period

which begins on January 27, 2014. 

On January 27, 2014, Mr. Turner reported to work. 

Effective January 23, 2015, the agency terminated him

for failing to meet the performance standards of the 

position and obtain IT certifications in the mandated 

timeframe. On February 24, 2015, he appealed his termination to the Board. Two days later, the Administrative Judge (“AJ”) issued an Acknowledgement Order

notifying Mr. Turner that the Board may lack jurisdiction 

over his appeal and informing him of his burden to prove

Board jurisdiction. Mr. Turner argued that the effective 

date of his agency appointment was Sunday, January 26, 

2014, the start of his first pay period. He argued he had 

completed his one-year probationary period because his 

one-year anniversary date was Monday, January 26, 2015 

and he completed his tour of duty on Friday, January 23, 

2015.

In the Initial Decision, the AJ dismissed Mr. Turner’s 

appeal for lack of jurisdiction without a hearing because 

he failed to proffer non-frivolous allegations that he was 

an “employee” pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A)(i) or 

(ii). The AJ determined that Mr. Turner’s termination 

became effective Friday, January 23, 2015 and that

Mr. Turner’s one-year anniversary date was Tuesday, 

January 27, 2015. The AJ further determined that

Mr. Turner was not an “employee” for the purposes of 

5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A) because the agency terminated 

him during his one-year probationary period and before 

he had completed one year of current continuous service.

Mr. Turner petitioned for review of the Initial Decision and, for the first time, argued that he was appointed 

to his position on January 13, 2014. He presented a copy 

of a Civilian Leave and Earnings Statement showing he 

was on leave without pay for the pay period ending January 25, 2014. The Board rejected Mr. Turner’s argument 

Case: 16-1161 Document: 46-2 Page: 3 Filed: 09/26/2016
4 TURNER v. MSPB

and affirmed the Initial Decision, relying on the HR 

Specialist’s declaration and the supporting SF-50s to find

the agency appointed Mr. Turner to his position on January 27, 2014. Mr. Turner appeals. We have jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9). 

DISCUSSION

Our review of the Board’s decision is limited by statute. We affirm a final decision of the Board unless it is 

“(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without 

procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having 

been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c). The Board’s decision to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction presents an issue of law that 

we review de novo. Campion v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 326 

F.3d 1210, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 2003). We review the factual 

findings underlying the Board’s decision for substantial 

evidence. Bolton v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 154 F.3d 1313, 

1316 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Substantial evidence “means such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.” Consol. Edison Co. v. 

Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). 

Mr. Turner bears the burden of establishing Board jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. 

5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(i)(A). 

The Board has jurisdiction to review an appeal from 

an agency’s termination decision from a competitive 

service position if the terminated individual raises nonfrivolous allegations and proves by a preponderance of the 

evidence that he is an “employee” within the meaning of 

5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A). 5 U.S.C. §§ 7512(1), 7513(d); 

5 C.F.R. §§ 315.803(b), 752.401(c)(1)–(2), (d)(13), 

752.405(a). An “employee” is an individual in the competitive service who is not serving a probationary or trial

period under an initial appointment or has completed one 

year of current continuous service under other than a 

Case: 16-1161 Document: 46-2 Page: 4 Filed: 09/26/2016
TURNER v. MSPB 5

temporary appointment limited to one year or less. 

5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A)(i)–(ii). 

On appeal, Mr. Turner argues “[t]he dispute is only 

about the date Petitioner began his employment.” Petr’s 

Br. 8. This is a fact question over which we must review 

the Board’s decision for substantial evidence. It is true 

under 5 C.F.R. § 315.802(c) that a period of leave without 

pay status counts toward completion of a probationary 

period up to a total of 22 workdays. This regulation 

draws no distinction between absence in nonpay status 

before or after an employee reports to work, but clearly 

only applies in the case of an appointed employee. 

Mr. Turner argues his time on leave without pay, before 

the first day he reported to work, credits toward the 

completion of his probationary period. Mr. Turner presented a Civilian Leave and Earnings Statement as 

evidentiary support. Relying upon the HR Specialist’s 

declaration and the supporting SF-50s which indicated 

that Mr. Turner’s appointment was effective January 27, 

2014 and that his probationary period began on that day, 

the Board found that Mr. Turner had not established that 

he was appointed on January 13, 2014. The HR Specialist 

explained that Mr. Turner’s January 13, 2014 SF-50 was 

cancelled because he was unable to report to duty. To 

cancel the January 13, 2014 SF-50, the agency executed 

another SF-50 that states, “[a]ction cancel due to incorrect 

effective date.” A later-issued SF-50 lists Mr. Turner’s 

effective date as January 27, 2014. This is substantial 

evidence to support the Board’s finding that the agency 

appointed Mr. Turner effective January 27, 2014. Because it is undisputed that the agency terminated 

Mr. Turner effective January 23, 2015, Mr. Turner did not 

complete his one-year probationary period or his one year 

of current continuous service. 

We have considered Mr. Turner’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.

Case: 16-1161 Document: 46-2 Page: 5 Filed: 09/26/2016
6 TURNER v. MSPB

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Board is 

affirmed. 

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs. 

Case: 16-1161 Document: 46-2 Page: 6 Filed: 09/26/2016