Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01673/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01673-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Clark Davis
Appellant
Robert H. Henry
Appellee
Dan M. Reynolds
Appellee

Document Text:

CLARK DAVIS, 

PUBLISH 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

) 

} 

) 

) 

llttfJb 

Uf:itcd Srntti;; Coutt of Appeais 

·rf'nth Cir:1.iit 

NOV JO 1989 

.(OBERT L. HOECKlU{ 

Clerk 

v. ) · No. 88-1673 

DAN M. REYNOLDS, Warden; and 

ROBERT H. HENRY, Attorney 

) 

) 

) 

General, ) 

) 

Respondents-Appellees. ) 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. NO. 87-599-C) 

Gary Peterson, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, Attorney for PetitionerAppellant. 

Timothy S. Gilpin, Assistant Attorney General (Robert H. Henry, 

Attorney General of Oklahoma, and Rozia McKinney-Foster, Assistant 

Attorney General, Deputy Chief, Federal Division, on the brief), 

-Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, Attorneys for Respondents-Appellees. 

Before MCKAY and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, and BRATTON,* District 

Judge. 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge. 

* The Honorable Howard c. Bratton, Senior Judge, U.S. District 

Court for the District of New Mexico, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 88-1673 Document: 010110136495 Date Filed: 11/30/1989 Page: 1 
Clark A. Davis appeals from the district court's order 

dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He contends 

that the state trial court improperly excluded the general public 

and the press from his trial during a complaining witness's 

testimony, thereby violating his Sixth Amendment right to a public 

trial. That argument was presented to and rejected by the 

Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, which affirmed Davis' conviction in the state district court. Davis v. State, 728 P.2d 846 

(Okla. Crim. App~ 1986), cert. denied, 4·82 U.S. 916 (1987). Davis 

then filed a post-conviction application for relief in the 

Oklahoma trial court. The state trial court denied relief, and 

its decision was affirmed by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 

Appeals. Davis v. State, No. PC-87-810 (Okla. Crim. App. Nov. 9, 

1987). Davis then petitioned the federal district court for a 

writ of habeas corpus. The district court dismissed Davis' petition, and this appeal followed. After reviewing the record and 

examining Davis' arguments, we reverse the decision of the 

district court, and remand with instructions. 

BACKGROUND 

On April 10, 1984, · an Oklahoma jury found Davis guil.ty of 

three counts of rape in the first degree. The trial court 

sentenced Davis to three consecutive prison terms of thirty years 

each. ·According to the evidence at trial, three sixteen year old 

girls who had been roommates at a juvenile facility in Tahlequah, 

Oklahoma, walked and/or hitchhiked to Checotah, Oklahoma to the 

home of Carolyn Stevens, one of the girls' aunt. At that time, 

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Davis was living in the Stevens home. One of the girls testified 

that Davis raped her on three different occasions during their 

overnight stay in the Stevens home. 1 Although she testified that 

Davis had not actually wielded a weapon during any of these rapes, 

she testified that she was scared by Davis, and that she continued 

to object verbally and physically during each of the rapes. She 

also testified that she had witnessed Davis rape her companion, 

another sixteen year old girl, while the two girls were in the 

same bed together. 

At Davis' trial, before the jury was impaneled or any 

testimony had been taken, the prosecutor requested that "the 

public be excluded" during ~he complaining witness' testimony. R. 

Supp. Vol. I, Transcript of Jury Trial, at 3 (hereinaffer "Trial 

Tr."). The prosecutor noted that the judge at the preliminary 

hearing had cleared the courtroom during this witness' testimony, 

that the witness had experienced "some emotional and psychological 

1 There appears to have been some confusion at trial as to the 

exact age of the complaining witness. The trial court judge 

stated, as one of the reasons for closing the courtroom, that she 

was- fifteen years old. Although a state court's determination of 

a factual issue is entitled to a "presumption of correctness" on 

review ,in federal courts, Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 549 

(1981), the trial court's statement in this instance came before 

any evidence had been presented. Furthermore, the girl's own 

testimony, uncontradicted at trial; was that she was sixteen years 

old. Trial Tr. at 35. Under these circumstances, the trial 

court's statement was clearly erroneous. See Ewing v. Winans, 749 

F.2d 607, 609 (10th Cir. 1984) (where appellant proves by convincing evidence that state court's factual determination was 

wrong, federal courts may disregard state court's determination.) 

Because the recorded testimony proves convincingly that the 

witness was sixteen years old, the facts recited in this opinion 

reflect .the witness' age as sixteen. 

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trauma assodiated with this incident,~ 2 and that the defendant· 

would not be prejudiced by clearing the courtroom. The prosecutor 

summarized: "it is just the matter of saving her some embarrassment and humiliation; we feel· it is purely discretionary with the 

court and since there is no prejudice to the defendant we would 

urge the motion b_e granted." Trial Tr. at 4. 

Davis' attorney objected, asserting: 

"[T]here is no evidence or doctor's report or psychologist or psychiatrist report which would indicate her 

testifying in court is going to cause any traumatic harm 

to her mental condition. If there was a report in the 

record stating that was the case it might be a different 

story, but I think she is the complaining witness and I 

think she is not entitled to have the exclusion of all 

members of the general public from the courtroom. The 

defendant is ~ntitled to a speed[y] public trial, if you 

exclude [the] public [from] portions of ~he trial I 

think all it would do really would be to facilitate or 

2 In discussing the motion to close the courtroom, both at the 

preliminary hearing, and again at trial, some reference was made 

by both attorneys to a clinical psychologist whom the complaining 

witness had apparently consulted. R. Supp. Vol. I, Transcript of 

Preliminary Hearing at 39: Trial Tr. at A. The psychologist was 

not identified, and the nature or extent of the consultation was 

never disclosed. Although the prosecutor made representations at 

the time of the preliminary hearing that the psychologist was of 

the opinion that in camera examination of _the witness would be 

beneficial to her, no actual report or testimony was offered to 

either support or explain this broad representation 0 nor did the 

judge at the preliminary hearing request such evidence. Davis' 

counsel repeatedly objected to any inference that might be drawn 

from the mere fact that the witness had consulted a psychologist: 

"Your Honor, of course, [the prosecutor] says there is a 

possibility [of harm to the witness], that is not good 

enough; if they want to bring the clinical psychologist 

and let her testify ••• that it is going to have a 

detrimental effect on that young lady, fine, but until 

such time as you have some testimony ••• we are going 

to object to excluding anybody from the courtroom." 

Prelim. Tr. at 40. The trial court, in its explanation for granting the closure motion, neither referred to no_r relied upon this 

fact or the prosecutor's representations at the preliminary 

hearing concerning the psychologist's opinion. 

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cause people to ••• tell less of the truth, .•• not 

[to] be fair and cand[id] in their testimony in open 

court • " 

Id. at 5, 6. Finally, the prosecutor informed the judge that "the 

witness we are talking about is under the age of sixteen, she is a 

minor • . . . II Id. 

Without taking any evidence concerning the witness' condition, and without interviewing the witness or her parents, the 

trial court granted the motion to exclude the public during the 

complaining witness' testimony. The court cited its reasons for 

the closure: "one, the age of the alleged victim is fifteen years, 

if she was in a juvenile proceedings the public would be excluded 

anyway; secondly, the defendant will have a right to confrontation, the jury will be there and can observe the demeanor and 

trustworthiness of the witness and I don't see that the defendant 

is prejudiced by it •• . . II Id. at 6. When the prosecution 

called the complaining witness to take the stand, the trial court 

ordered that "all the spectators will have to leave the courtroom; 

the courtroom will be closed for purpose of taking testimony of 

this witness only." Id. at 32. 

· SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A PUBLIC TRIAL 

A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to insist on 

a public trial. 3 The explicit language of the Sixth Amendment 

3 The Sixth Amendment states: "In all criminal prosecutions, 

the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by 

an impartial jury ••• "·U.S. Const. amend. VI. We discuss only 

the· federal constitutional issues involved in this case. Alternative state claims, whether grounded ~n state statutes or the State 

Constitution, are not cognizable under 28 u.s.c. § 2254(a). 

Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1983). 

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guaranteeing every criminal defendant a "speedy and public trial," 

is undoubtedly for the protection of the accused. Gannett Co., 

Inc. v. DePasguale, 443 U.S. 368, 380 (1979); In re Oliver, 333 

U.S. 257 (1948). One of the major purposes for the public trial 

guarantee, as Davis' counsel correctly stated, is to safeguard the 

defendant from potentially perjurious or abusive testimony. See 

Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 588 (1965) (Harl~n, J., concurring) 

("[T]he public-trial guarantee embodies a view of human nature, 

true as a general rule, that judges, lawyers, witnesses, and 

jurors will perform their respective functions more responsibly in 

an open court than in secret proceedings."). 

Although the right to an open trial is not absolute, that 

right will only rarely give way to other interests. Waller v. 

Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 45 (1984} ("[T]he right to an open trial may 

give way in certain cases to other rights or interests • • • 0 

Such circumstances will be rare however ••• . II ) . An accused's 

right under the Sixth Amendment must be carefully balanced against 

the government's competing interest in protecting vulnerable witnesses from embarrassment and harm. Speaking of the right to a 

public trial, the United States Supreme Court has said: 

"The presumption of openness ma·y be overcome only by an 

overriding interest based on findings that closure is 

essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly 

tailored to serve that interest. The interest is to be 

articulated along with findings specific enough that a 

reviewing court can determine whether the closure order 

was properly entered." 

Waller, 467 U.S. at 45 (1984) (quoting Press-Enterprise Co. v. 

Superior Court of California, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984)); Richmond 

Newspape~s, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581 (1980) ("Absent an 

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overriding interest, articulated in findings, the trial of a 

criminal case must be open to the public."). 4 

Recent decisions have developed a more lenient standard for 

closure orders which only partially exclude the public or are 

otherwise narrowly tailored to specific needs. See Nieto v. 

Sullivan, 879 F.2d at 753 (Where state appeals court observed that 

only the defendant's relatives were excluded, and only during one 

witness' testimony, such a partial closure is subject to a lesser, 

"substantial reason'' standard rather than the strict "overriding 

interest" standard applicable to total closures.); United States 

v. Sherlock, 865 F.2d 1069, 1077 (9th Cir. 1989) (trial court's 

exclusion of defendant's relatives during portions of trial upheld 

under more lenient test for partial closures); Douglas v. 

Wainwright, 739 F.2d 531, 532-33 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 

469 U.S. 1208 (1985) ("impact of partial closure is 'not a kind 

presented when a proceeding is totally closed to the public, and 

therefore only a "substantial" rather than ''compelling" reason for 

the closure is necessary.'"). 

The trial court's order in this case ma~e no exceptions for 

members of the press or for relatives of the defendant. We are 

not faced, ther~fore, with a partial closure or a closure tailored 

to protect the conflicting interests of the defendant in a public 

hearing and the government's interest in protecting a susceptible 

4 Waller applies to this case even though the jury verdict 

predated the May 1984 Supreme Court Waller decision. The State 

Court of Criminal Appeals' decision affirming the conviction was 

filed on October 7, 1986. Under the test of finality in Teague v. 

Lane, 109 s.ct. 1060, 1067 (1989)., Davis' conviction wa~ not final 

until after the Waller decision, and Waller applies. See Nieto v. 

Sullivan, 879 F.2d 743, 751 n. 14 (10th Cir. 1989). 

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or vulnerable witness. We therefore apply the "overriding 

interest" standard art~culated in Waller to the trial court's 

order. 

To justify an order completely excluding the public from 

portions of a criminal proceeding, "the party seeking to close the 

hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be 

prejudiced, the closure must be no broader than necessary to , 

protect that interest, the trial court must consider reasonable 

alternatives to closing the proceeding, and it must make findings 

adequate to support the closure." Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. at 

48. The prosecutor's best articulation of the government's 

interest in the closure of Davis' trial was that "we are trying to 

save [the witness] some problem and embarrassment." Trial Tr. at 

6. Although the prosecutor hinted at some vague psychological 

problems that could possibly accompany the witness' testifying, it 

is not clear from the record what specific problems were foreseen, 

why they would have occurred, or whether those problems would in 

any way be ameliorated by closing the courtroom. 

Applying the test developed in Waller to the case before us, 

the record reveals that the trial court failed to inquire into the 

factual basis for the government's assertion that the witness' 

emotional and psychological condition warranted the extraordinary 

precaution of courtroom closure. The court made no findings in 

support of its order to exclude all spectators during the 

testimony, except to take notice of the witness' age. As 

previously noted, the court did not narrowly tailor its order to 

protect the witness from psychological or emotional harm; the 

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court failed to consider any alternatives to a blank~t exclusion 

of the entire audience during the witness' testimony. 

The government clearly has a compelling interest in protecting youthful witnesses who are called upon to testify in cases 

involving sensitive and painful issues; those types of issues are 

very likely to appear in cases involving alleged sexual offenses. 

See,~, Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct. for Norfolk County, 

457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982) ("[S]afeguarding the physical and 

psychological well-being of a minor .•• is a compelling 

[interest]~''); United States ex rel. Latimore v. Sielaff, 561 F.2d 

691 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1076 (1978) (recognizing that prolection of rape victim's dignity is a substantial 

governmental interest). The Supreme Court has acknowledged that 

the age of a victim and the type of the offense alleged are valid 

considerations in weighing the accused's right to a public trial 

and the government's interest in protecting the victim from undue 

harm. Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 608. 

Considerations of a victim's age and the nature of the 

offense involved support a closure only when they form part of a 

careful case-by-case analysis of each individual situation. They 

do not justify an automatic; general exclu~ion--0f the public in 

every case involving a young victim and sordid or heinous 

allegations. Thus, the Supreme Court rejected a Massachusetts 

statute requiring mandatory courtroom closure in cases involving 

minor victims of sexual crimes. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior 

Court for Norfolk County, 457 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1982) (mandatory 

blanket closure violates First Amendment right to access to 

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criminal proceedings); see Waller v. Georgi~, 467 U.S. at 46 

("[T]he explicit Sixth Amendment right of the accused is no less 

protective of a public trial than the implicit First Amendment 

right of the press and public."). 

The trial court's order excluding the public from the witness' testimony, without any inquiry or findings concerning the 

specific condition of the witness in this case, is essentially 

equivalent to the blanket legislative closure rejected in Globe 

Newspaper. 

Improper denial of a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment 

right to a public trial ordinarily constitutes reversible error; 

the defendant need not show any resulting prejudice from the 

closure. See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. at 49 n.9 (~[T]he 

settled rule of the federal courts [is] that a showing of 

prejudice is not necessary for reversal of a conviction not had in 

public ptoceedings.")(quoting Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 

610, 627 n. (1960) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). Because the right 

to a public trial protects the defendant from very subtle but very 

real injustices, "it would be difficult to envisage a case·in 

which [the defendant] would have evidence available of specific 

-4njury" resulting from denial of that right. Waller v. Georgia, 

467 U.S. at 49 n. 9 (quoting United States ex rel. Bennett v. 

Rundle, 419 F.2d 599, 608 (3d Cir. 1969)). Requiring such a 

defendant to prove actual prejudice would deprive most defendants 

of the right to a public trial. Nieto v. Sullivan, 879 F.2d at 

753 n.15 ("We are persuaded that once a violation is found 

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of a defendant's right to a public trial, the defendant should not 

be required to prbve prejudice •• . . II ) . 

Davis raises two additional grounds for reversing the 

district court's order. His first additional claim is that his 

right to a public hearing was also violated when the preliminary 

hearing was closed to the public during the testimony of the same 

complaining witness discussed above. We find that Davis has 

waived any objection to errors and irregularities of this 

character that may have arisen in the preliminary hearing by 

proceeding to trial on the merits of his case without filing a 

motion to, quash or otherwise objecting to the preliminary hearing 

findings. 5 See Cindle v. Page, 452 F.2d 752, 53-54 (10th Cir. 

5 Under Oklahoma law, a preliminary hearing is waived by proceeding to trial on the merits. Likewise, irregularities during 

the preliminary hearing are ordinarily waived unless raised by a 

motion to quash the information. Martin v. State, 463 P.2d 995, 

997 (Okla. Crim. App. 1970) ("The entire preliminary proceedings 

may be waived in the trial court and is waived by failure to file 

motion to quash or set aside as provided by the statute before 

entering a plea on the merits.") (quoting Parker v. State, 330 

P.2d 1049 (Okla. Crim. App. 1958)); Blake v. State, 375 P.2d 270, 

273 (Okla. Crim. App. 1962) ("If the defendant upon arraignment 

pleads to the merits and enters on the trial, he waives the right 

to pr·eliminary examination, or if one was held, any irregularities 

therein.") (quoting Mudrow v. State, 185 P. 332 (Okla. Crim. App. 

1919)); see also Sparks v. State, 112 P.2d 434 (Okla. Crim~ App. 

1941) (where one is charged in the district court by information, 

and desires to raise the question of not having had a preliminary 

examination ••. this should be done by a plea in abatement, or 

by motion to quash the information.). Davis made no motion prior 

to trial to quash or set aside the findings of the prelim~nary 

hearing, he has therefore waived the objection he may otherwise 

have had. Additionally, because any resulting retrial will 

appropriately safeguard Davis' Sixth Amendment right to a public 

trial, it is difficult to envision any prejudice resulting from 

the original preliminary hearing which will not be cured by a 

proper public trial. If a retrial, held in conformance with the 

Sixth Amendment's requirements, results in a verdict of guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt, it can hardly be said that a second 

preliminary hearing may not support a finding of probable cause to. · [footnote continued .•• ] 

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1971) (Oklahoma trial court was correct in holding that defendant 

had waived objections to defects in preliminary proceedings by 

entering plea in state district court). Davis' final claim is 

based on his allegation that he was denied his choice of counsel 

at trial. Because our decision entails a new state court trial as 

a precondition to Davis' further incarceration, Davis' choice of 

counsel claim is now moot. We therefore do not address that 

issue. 

CONCLUSION 

The trial court-improperly violated Davis' Sixth Amendment 

right to a public trial by failing to articulate specific, reviewable findings adequate to support the general closure of the 

courtroom during the complaining witness' testimony. Davis is 

therefore entitled to habeas corpus relief. We are free, however, 

to fashion the remedy as law and justice require; 6 we are not 

required to order Davis' immediate release from physical custody. 

See Carafas v. Lavallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238-39 (1968) ("The federal 

habeas corpus statute • does not limit the relief that may be 

granted to discharge of the applicant from physical custody. Its 

[ ••• footnote continued] 

bind Davis over for trial. Therefore, to order a new preliminary 

hearing at this late stage would merely be a "wipdfall" for Davis; 

a remedy not required by the Sixth Amendment. See Wall'er, 467 

U.S. at 50 ("[T]he remedy [for a pretrial Sixth Amendment public 

trial violation] should be appropriate to the violation." A new 

trial in that case would have been a "windfall for the defendant, 

and not in the public interest."). 

6 The federal habeas statute empowers the federal courts to 

dispose of the matter "as law and justice require." 28 u.s.c. 

§ 2243; Parks v. Brown, 860 F.2d 1545, 1559 n. 15 (10th Cir.· 

1988), cert. granted, Saffle v. Parks, 109 s.ct. 1930 (1989). 

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mandate is broad with respect to the relief that may be 

granted."). We therefore reverse the district court's decision 

and remand the case for further proceedings as follows: judgment 

to be entered granting habeas relief and vacating Davis' 

conviction if the state has not elected to retry him within a 

reasonable period of time to be determined by the district court. 

REVERSED AND REMANDED 

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