Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-07043/USCOURTS-ca10-91-07043-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Nestor Londono
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT APR 03 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKEF.. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

NESTOR LONDONO, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Clerl: 

No. 91-7043 

(D.C. No. CR-90-057-8) 

( E • D. Okla. ) 

Before TACHA and EBEL, Circuit Judges and ROGERS, District Court 

Judge.** 

This appeal arises out of Nestor Londono's conviction for 

conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine in 

violation of 21 U.S . C. §§ 841(a)(l) & 853 and for travelling in 

interstate commerce to promote a narcotics business enterprise in 

violation of 18 U. S.C. § 1952(a)(3) and 18 U.S.C . § 2. On appeal, 

Londono raises five arguments: (1) the district court abused its 

discretion in denying the motion for mistrial based upon the 

inability of the jury to reach a verdict; (2) Londono was denied 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3 . 

** The Honorable Richard D. Rogers, Senior District Judge, 

United States District Court for the District of Kansas, sitting 

by designation. 

Appellate Case: 91-7043 Document: 010110239126 Date Filed: 04/03/1992 Page: 1 
his right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment by the 

admission of hearsay evidence at sentencing; (3) the evidence was 

insufficient to sustain Londono's conviction under the Travel Act; 

(4) prosecutorial misconduct in opening and closing statements 

deprived Londono of a fair trial; and (5) the trial court erred in 

refusing one of Londono's tendered jury instructions. We exercise 

jurisdiction under 28 u.s.c. § 1291 and affirm. 

We review the district court's decision to deny a motion for 

a mistrial under an abuse of discretion standard. See United 

States Y..:.. Novak, 918 F.2d 107, 108-09 (10th Cir. 1990). In this 

case, Londono moved for a mistrial when the jury indicated it 

could not reach a verdict. The district court declined to grant 

the motion. After reviewing the record, we agree that there was 

no "manifest necessity" to declare a mistrial after only a few 

hours of deliberation. See United States Y..:.. Horn, 583 F.2d 1124, 

1127 (10th Cir. 1978). We also conclude that the district court's 

decision did not impermissibly coerce the jury into reaching a 

verdict. 

Londono also asserts that he was denied his right to 

confrontation at the sentencing hearing under the Sixth Amendment 

by the admission of hearsay evidence. Londono recognizes that 

this circuit permits consideration of hearsay evidence at 

sentencing hearings under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. 

- United States Y..:.. Reid, 911 F.2d 1456, 1461 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. 

denied, 111 S. Ct. 990 (1991); Unitea States Y..:.. Beaulieu, 893 F.2d 

1177 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3302 (1990). Londono 

urges us to adopt a new standard based on a decision of the Eighth 

-2-

Appellate Case: 91-7043 Document: 010110239126 Date Filed: 04/03/1992 Page: 2 
Circuit. See United States Y.!.. Fortier, 911 F.2d 100 (8th Cir. 

1990). After reviewing our earlier decisions and the decision of 

the Eighth Circuit, we decline to adopt a new standard. 

Londono also asserts that the evidence introduced at trial 

was insufficient as a matter of law to sustain his conviction 

under the Travel Act. Londono argues that the isolated activities 

in this case fail to establish the foreseeability of the 

interstate travel and cannot support a conviction under the Travel 

Act. "[A]n involved party who should have reasonably foreseen the 

use of interstate facilities in furtherance of a shared criminal 

scheme can be held under the Travel Act." United States Y.!.. 

Barbieri, 614 F.2d 715, 720 (10th Cir. 1980). After reviewing all 

the evidence, we conclude that Londono could have reasonably 

foreseen the use of interstate facilities. 

Londono argues further that prosecutorial conduct during the 

opening and closing statements deprived him of a fair trial. 

Because Londono did not object to these statements at trial, we 

review these statements for plain error. See United States Y.!.. 

Abella-Silva, 948 F.2d 1168, 1182 (10th Cir. 1991). After 

reviewing the statements of the prosecutor and the entire record, 

we cannot conclude that there was plain error. 

Finally, Londono argues that the trial court erred in 

rejecting his tendered instruction number two. To assess a 

district court' s rejection of a tendered instruction, we review 

the instructions as a whole to determine whether the jury was 

adequately advised regarding all pertinent issues in the case. 

See United States Y.:.. Haar, 931 F.2d 1368, 1371 (10th Cir. 1991). 

-3-

Appellate Case: 91-7043 Document: 010110239126 Date Filed: 04/03/1992 Page: 3 
After reviewing all of the evidence presented at trial and the 

jury instructions as a whole, we conclude that the district court 

did not err in rejecting Londono's proposed instruction. 

AFFIRMED 

-4-

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Deanell Reece Tacha 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 91-7043 Document: 010110239126 Date Filed: 04/03/1992 Page: 4