Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-01125/USCOURTS-ca10-94-01125-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Roger L. Blair
Not Party
Florence J. Gilbert
Not Party
Loretta L. London
Not Party
Alvin L. Neal
Appellant
Eunice M. Robinson
Not Party
Donna E. Shalala
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH FILED 

Valted Statll CCMII't of Appeals T•th Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

JAN 171995 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

FLORENCE J. GILBERT, ROGER L. BLAIR, 

ALVIN L. NEAL, EUNICE M. ROBINSON, and 

LORETTA L. LONDON, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

vs. 

DONNA E. SHALALA, Secretary of the 

United States Department of Health 

and Human Services, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

PATRICK FISHER - Clerk 

Nos. 93-1399 

94-1125 

(D.C. No. 92-B-1464) 

(D. Colo.) 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 92-B-1464) 

Frederick W. Newall, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for PlaintiffsAppellants. 

Lowell V. Sturgill, Attorney, Civil Division (Frank W. Hunger, 

Assistant Attorney General, William Kanter, Attorney, Civil 

Division, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. and Henry L. 

Solano, United States Attorney, Denver, Colorado, with him on the 

brief) for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before MOORE, KELLY and BARRETT, Circuit Judges. 

KELLY, Circuit Judge. 

Plaintiffs-appellants Florence J. Gilbert, Roger L. Blair, 

Alvin L. Neal, Eunice M. Robinson, and Loretta L. London appeal 

from the district court's order granting the government's motion 

for summary judgment and dismissing the action for lack of 

Appellate Case: 94-1125 Document: 01019290274 Date Filed: 01/17/1995 Page: 1 
standing. Plaintiff-appellant Alvin L. Neal appeals from the 

district court's order denying his motion for attorney's fees 

under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. 

Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm. 

Background 

Plaintiffs each filed claims for social security benefits, 

were denied those benefits, and now allege that the denial notices 

they received were misleading and violated their Fifth Amendment 

right to due process. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that the 

notices did not clearly inform them of the res judicata effects of 

the denial when reapplying for benefits without appealing their 

initial denials. 

The district court held that Plaintiffs lacked standing to 

maintain the action because they had failed to show a causal 

connection between the language of the denial notices and their 

failure to appeal. See Gilbert v. Shalala, 828 F. Supp. 815, 818-

19 (D. Colo. 1993). Since the district court found that 

Plaintiffs failed to establish standing, it did not address 

Plaintiffs' motions for class certification and summary judgment. 

The district court also held that Plaintiff Neal's claim was 

moot because his application for benefits had been reopened and he 

had thus obtained all relief sought from the district court. 

Thereafter Plaintiff Neal requested attorney's fees and costs 

pursuant to the EAJA. The district court, however, denied his 

request on the grounds that the position of the United States 

regarding Plaintiff Neal's claim was substantially justified. 

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Appellate Case: 94-1125 Document: 01019290274 Date Filed: 01/17/1995 Page: 2 
I. Standing 

"Standing is a question of law for the court to determine," 

Motive Parts Warehouse v. Facet Enters., 774 F.2d 380, 389 (lOth 

Cir. 1985), thus we review the district court's determination of 

standing de novo. Hackford v. Babbitt, 14 F.3d 1457, 1465 (lOth 

Cir. 1994). Under Article III of the Constitution, jurisdiction 

of federal courts is limited to cases and controversies. U.S. 

Const. art. III, § 2. Standing is an essential part of the caseor-controversy requirement and involves three elements. Lujan v. 

Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992). First, the 

plaintiff must have suffered an invasion of a legally-protected 

interest that is "concrete and particularized," and "actual or 

imminent," not "conjectural or hypothetical." Id. (internal 

quotations omitted) (citations omitted). Second, there must be a 

causal connection between the injury and the complained of 

conduct; that is, the injury must be "'fairly . trace[able] to 

the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... th[e] result 

[of] the independent action of some third party not before the 

court.'" Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2136 (quoting Simon v. Eastern 

Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)). 

Finally, it must be likely, not merely speculative, that the 

injury will be "'redressed by a favorable decision.'" Lujan, 112 

S. Ct. at 2136 (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 38). 

Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving standing with the 

manner and degree of evidence required at the particular stage of 

the litigation. See Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2136. In response to a 

summary judgment motion, the nonmovant must present specific facts 

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Appellate Case: 94-1125 Document: 01019290274 Date Filed: 01/17/1995 Page: 3 
by affidavit or other evidence, which will be taken as true for 

purposes of the motion. Id. at 2137. Summary judgment is then 

proper if there is no genuine issue of material fact so that the 

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(c). 

Plaintiffs have failed to present evidence that they meet the 

Article III requirement of standing. Specifically, Plaintiffs 

have not shown a causal connection between their injury and the 

allegedly deficient denial notices. To the contrary, the record 

in this case clearly establishes a lack of reliance by the 

Plaintiffs upon the notices. In deposition testimony or 

affidavits, Plaintiffs stated either that they relied on sources 

other than the challenged language in believing that they could 

reapply and receive retroactive benefits, or could not remember 

reading the challenged language. Aplt. App. at 229, 150, 157-58, 

276, 291, 395, 532-33. 

Plaintiffs' argument that mere receipt of an allegedly 

defective denial notice is sufficient to establish standing is 

without merit. We believe that in order to satisfy the causal 

connection requirement set forth by Lujan, Plaintiffs must show 

that they relied on the challenged language in the denial notices. 

See Burks-Marshall v. Shalala, 7 F.3d 1346, 1349 (8th Cir. 1993); 

Day v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 1052, 1066 (6th Cir. 1994). 

Although this issue is one of first impression in this 

circuit, we agree with the holdings of other circuits that a 

plaintiff must demonstrate reliance on the allegedly defective 

denial notices. The Eighth Circuit has held that a plaintiff 

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Appellate Case: 94-1125 Document: 01019290274 Date Filed: 01/17/1995 Page: 4 
lacked standing where she failed to demonstrate that the "alleged 

deficiency in the notice had any connection in fact with her own 

failure to seek review of the two early denials." Burks-Marshall, 

7 F.3d at 1349. Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has held that the 

only claimants who could have been injured by deficient denial 

notices are those "who detrimentally relied on the inadequate 

denial notice." Day, 23 F.3d at 1066. Without such reliance, the 

injury is not fairly traceable to the challenged action. Since 

Plaintiffs have not made a showing of reliance on the denial 

notices, they have failed to meet the constitutional minimum 

required by Lujan and have no standing to maintain this action. 

II. Attorney's Fees 

Plaintiff Neal argues that the district court erred in 

denying his motion for attorney's fees and costs under the EAJA. 

The EAJA requires that a court "award to a prevailing party 

fees and other expenses . . . incurred by that party in any civil 

action ... , brought by or against the United States . unless 

the court finds that the position of the United States was 

substantially justified .. " 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (1) (A). The 

government bears the burden of showing that its position was 

substantially justified. Estate of Smith v. O'Halloran, 930 F.2d 

1496, 1501 (lOth Cir. 1991). We review the district court's 

determination of whether the government's position was 

substantially justified for abuse of discretion. Gutierrez v. 

Sullivan, 953 F.2d 579, 585 (lOth Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub 

nom. Shalala v. Gutierrez, 113 S. Ct. 3064 (1993). 

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The district court did not determine whether Plaintiff Neal 

was a prevailing party, but found that the position of the United 

States was substantially justified. See Aplt. App. at 1146. The 

test for substantial justification in this circuit is one of 

reasonableness in law and fact. Guiterrez, 953 F.2d at 584-85 

(quoting Fulton v. Heckler, 784 F.2d 348, 349 (lOth Cir. 1986)). 

We agree that the government was reasonable in its defense that 

Plaintiff Neal lacked standing to bring his claim. We have 

already determined in this opinion that he failed to meet the 

Lujan requirements of standing. We also find that the government 

was reasonable in its position that the denial notices were 

constitutionally adequate. Nothing in the record indicates that 

the government believed that Plaintiff Neal had a valid due 

process claim. 

Plaintiff Neal's contention that his claims were reopened as 

part of the government's litigation strategy fails. The record 

shows that the reopening was based on his mental impairment and 

lack of counsel at the time of his applications, not on grounds 

challenged in his suit. See Aplt. App. at 1118, 1121. Moreover, 

Plaintiff Neal has failed to refer to any evidence in the record 

supporting his assertion that the government admitted its 

prelitigation conduct was not substantially justified. See 

Appellant's Brief at 8. We will not search the record in order to 

find such evidence. SIL-FLO. Inc. v. SFHC, Inc., 917 F.2d 1507, 

1513 (lOth Cir. 1990). 

AFFIRMED. 

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