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Parties Involved:
General Services Administration
Appellee
Yasmin Saighi
Appellant

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

YASMIN SAIGHI,

Appellant

v.

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION,

Appellee

______________________ 

2015-1859

______________________ 

Appeal from the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals in 

No. 3693, Administrative Judges Jeri Kaylene Somers, 

Jerome M. Drummond, R. Anthony McCann.

______________________ 

Decided: April 12, 2016

______________________ 

MITCHELL E. SHAMAS, Shamas Law Office, Tulsa, OK, 

for appellant. 

ALBERT S. IAROSSI, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, for appellee. Also represented by 

BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., FRANKLIN 

E. WHITE, JR.

______________________ 

Case: 15-1859 Document: 31-2 Page: 1 Filed: 04/12/2016
2 SAIGHI v. GSA

Before WALLACH, BRYSON, and TARANTO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Appellant Yasmin Saighi seeks review of the decision 

of the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals (“CBCA”), 

granting the United States General Services Administration’s (“GSA”) motion for summary judgment1 in Saighi v. 

GSA, No. 3693, 2015 WL 1382046 (CBCA Mar. 25, 2015); 

see also J.A. 1–7.2 The CBCA denied Ms. Saighi’s claim 

for a refund of the purchase price of a boat Ms. Saighi 

purchased from GSA in an online auction. J.A. 7. For the 

reasons articulated below, we affirm the CBCA’s decision. 

BACKGROUND

I. Facts and Proceedings

A. Terms and Conditions of the Online Auction 

In May 2013, GSA conducted an online auction for the 

sale of the M/V Blankenship (“the Blankenship”), a 

fire/patrol boat docked at the Kaskaskia Regional Port 

District (“KRPD”) marina in Evansville, Illinois. See J.A. 

2. GSA’s online posting identified the Blankenship as the 

property to be sold, specified its location, and provided its 

description. See J.A. 32–33. The terms and conditions of 

the auction stated that the “[c]ondition of [the Blankenship] is not warranted. Deficiencies, when known, have 

been indicated in the property descriptions. However, 

absence of any indicated deficiencies does not mean that 

none exists. Therefore, the bidder should ascertain the 

 

1 In describing this motion, the CBCA uses the 

analogous term “summary relief.” J.A. 5. Throughout the 

remainder of this opinion, we use “summary judgment.” 

2 Because the electronic source does not include 

pagination, we cite the CBCA’s decision as it appears in 

the Joint Appendix. 

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SAIGHI v. GSA 3

condition of the item through physical inspection.” J.A. 

26. GSA also warranted that the Blankenship “will 

conform to its written description. Features, characteristics, deficiencies, etc. not addressed in the description are 

excluded from this warranty.” J.A. 26. Bidders were 

cautioned that the Blankenship’s description represented 

the “GSA’s best effort to describe the item based on information provided to it by the owning agency[,]” and that 

“gross omissions regarding the functionality of items, 

failures to cite major missing parts and/or restrictions 

with regard to usage may occur.” J.A. 26. The terms and 

conditions of the auction also provided that the “Government does not warrant the merchantability of the property or its purpose.” J.A. 26. Prospective bidders were 

provided with a document detailing the terms and conditions of the auction and were required to assent to them 

before being allowed to submit a bid on the Blankenship. 

See J.A. 22–30.

In addition to the warnings and disclaimers, the 

terms and conditions set forth a procedure for winning 

bidders to challenge GSA on the basis that the property 

purchased failed to conform to its description, and seek a 

refund of the purchase price. See J.A. 26. The contract 

states: “[a] request for refund must be substantiated in 

writing to the Contracting Officer for issues regarding 

mis-described property, missing property[,] and voluntary 

defaults within [fifteen] calendar days from the date of 

payment.” J.A. 26. 

Prior to the auction, with the help of her husband, Mr. 

Hassan Mahjoub, Ms. Saighi agreed to physically inspect 

the Blankenship. See J.A. 164. The KRPD marina, via its 

general manager, Mr. Ed Weilbacher, was listed as the 

inspection contact. See J.A. 32–33. Upon inspection, Ms. 

Saighi “did not advise GSA as to any problems with the 

[Blankenship].” See J.A. 2. On May 30, 2013, Ms. Saighi 

was notified that her bid of $30,056 to purchase the 

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4 SAIGHI v. GSA

Blankenship was the highest offer and was awarded the 

contract for the Blankenship. See J.A. 4. On June 6, 

2013, Ms. Saighi subsequently tendered payment and 

assumed possession of the Blankenship. See J.A. 134. 

B. Ms. Saighi’s Refund Request

On October 27, 2013, Ms. Saighi sent an email to Victoria Knotts, a GSA contracting officer, stating that she 

was informed by local residents that the Blankenship 

sank a few years before the sale. See J.A. 58. Ms. Saighi 

claimed that upon discovering this “undisclosed fact by []

GSA[] in the auction’s item description,” she contacted an 

engine company, which asserted that both engines of the 

Blankenship needed to be overhauled at a cost of $96,000. 

J.A. 58. 

By letter dated November 19, 2013, Ms. Knotts responded to Ms. Saighi’s email. See J.A. 73–75. Ms. 

Knotts asserted she “contacted [Mr.] Weilbacher . . . and 

he confirmed the Blankenship was in sound condition and 

afloat at dock for [two] years prior to th[e] sale.” J.A. 73. 

Ms. Knotts also stated that Mr. Weilbacher “confirmed 

that all bidders were made aware of the condition and he 

made no assurances or guarantees that the engine ran.” 

J.A. 73. Finally, Ms. Knotts stated that Ms. Saighi 

“agreed to the . . . terms and conditions of the sale prior to 

becoming an active bidder.” J.A. 73. 

In response, Ms. Saighi reasserted her initial complaint that the Blankenship sank before the auction and 

claimed that the failure of Mr. Weilbacher to inform GSA 

about the condition of the Blankenship, even though he 

possessed knowledge that it sank, resulted in a bid greater than the actual value of the Blankenship. J.A. 76. As 

a result, Ms. Saighi suggested two options that may be 

taken by GSA to resolve the issue: 1) “refund [the] full 

purchase price and money invested by [Ms. Saighi] so far 

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SAIGHI v. GSA 5

on the Blankenship,” or 2) “refund [fifty] percent of the 

purchase price.” J.A. 76. 

On December 11, 2013, Ms. Knotts issued a formal 

decision denying Ms. Saighi’s claim. See J.A. 78–80. The 

decision repeated the terms and conditions of the online 

auction, asserted that Ms. Saighi’s claim was not timely 

submitted, and refuted Ms. Saighi’s contention that the 

Blankenship was inaccurately described in the sales 

information. See J.A. 80. 

C. CBCA Decision 

Following GSA’s decision, Ms. Saighi appealed to the 

CBCA. Similar to her arguments before Ms. Knotts, Ms. 

Saighi argued that “agents of GSA in possession of the 

[Blankenship] knew” that it sank and “failed to disclose 

[this] fact in order to deter from devaluing the [Blankenship].” J.A. 82. However, unlike her claim before Ms. 

Knotts, Ms. Saighi “allege[d] . . . that the contract is 

voidable based on agency and joint venture theories.” J.A. 

5. According to Ms. Saighi, an agency relationship existed 

between GSA and Illinois Contract Management Services 

(“CMS”), (i.e., the state agency that placed the Blankenship with KRPD) and CMS “failed to disclose to GSA that 

the [Blankenship] sank prior to the sale and that both 

engines had been submerged.” J.A. 5. 

GSA moved for summary judgment, and Ms. Saighi 

filed a cross-motion seeking the same relief. See J.A. 5. 

The CBCA granted GSA’s motion, finding that no genuine 

issue of material fact existed because Ms. Saighi alleged a 

breach of contract before Ms. Knotts, but raised a different claim on appeal to the CBCA (i.e., that the contract 

with GSA is voidable). See J.A. 5–7. The CBCA asserted 

that there is no basis for it “to decide [Ms. Saighi’s] allegations that the contract is voidable based on agency and 

joint venture theories, because the[] allegations involve 

different operative facts from those presented to [Ms. 

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6 SAIGHI v. GSA

Knotts].” J.A. 7 (citation omitted). Accordingly, the 

CBCA denied Ms. Saighi’s cross-motion seeking a refund 

for the purchase price of the Blankenship. 

Ms. Saighi appeals the CBCA’s decision. This court 

possesses jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(10)

(2012). 

DISCUSSION 

I. Standard of Review and Legal Framework

We review the CBCA’s conclusions of law without deference. Reliable Contracting Grp., LLC v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 779 F.3d 1329, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2015). This 

court will uphold the CBCA’s factual findings unless those 

findings are “(A) fraudulent, arbitrary, or capricious; (B) 

so grossly erroneous as to necessarily imply bad faith; or

(C) not supported by substantial evidence.” 41 U.S.C. 

§ 7107(b)(2) (2012). 

The decision to grant summary judgment is a legal 

conclusion, which we review without deference. See 

Cessna Aircraft Co. v. Dalton, 126 F.3d 1442, 1446 (Fed. 

Cir. 1997). Summary judgment is appropriate when 

material facts are undisputed, or if, when disputed facts 

are resolved in favor of the non-movant, judgment in law 

is nonetheless required in favor of the movant. Anderson 

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986); Cooper 

v. Ford Motor Co., 748 F.2d 677, 679 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“We 

determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the non-movant and drawing all reasonable 

inferences in favor of the non-movant, the moving party 

was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”). 

“A contract is read in accordance with its express 

terms and the plain meaning thereof.” C. Sanchez & Son, 

Inc. v. United States, 6 F.3d 1539, 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1993) 

(citations omitted). We must interpret the contract in a 

manner that gives meaning to all of its provisions and 

makes sense. Hughes Commc’ns Galaxy, Inc. v. United 

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SAIGHI v. GSA 7

States, 998 F.2d 953, 958 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Accordingly, if 

the “provisions are clear and unambiguous, they must be 

given their plain and ordinary meaning[.] . . . ” Alaska 

Lumber & Pulp Co. v. Madigan, 2 F.3d 389, 392 (Fed. Cir. 

1993) (citation omitted). 

II. The CBCA Properly Granted Summary Judgment to 

GSA 

A. Ms. Saighi’s Agency/Joint Venture Arguments Are 

Waived

Ms. Saighi disputes the CBCA’s summary judgment 

determination. In particular, she asserts that “the CBCA 

erred as a matter of law in failing to sustain [her] crossmotion for summary [judgment].” Saighi Br. 26 (capitalization modified). The crux of Ms. Saighi’s appeal rests on 

showing that the contract with GSA is voidable due to 

GSA’s material omissions (i.e., that the Blankenship sank 

and GSA knew that its engines had been submerged) 

about the condition of the Blankenship.3 See id. at 12, 22. 

Although Ms. Saighi does not present evidence that any 

member of GSA possessed knowledge of the Blankenship’s 

sinking, via an agency or joint venture theory, she seeks 

to impute knowledge of KRPD marina’s general manager 

Mr. Weilbacher to GSA. See id. at 18 (where Ms. Saighi 

argues that (1) “[e]ither GSA and CMS were engaged in a 

joint venture for the sale [of the Blankenship],” (2) “CMS 

was the principal and GSA act[ed] as its agent,” or (3)

“GSA [was] . . . the principal and CMS an agent”). Ms. 

Saighi further asserts that “under each possible business 

relationship[,] GSA is imputed to have the knowledge of 

[Mr.] Weilbacher regarding the condition of the [Blankenship].” Id. 

 

3 “[A] Government contract tainted by fraud or 

wrong-doing is void ab initio.” Godley v. United States, 5 

F.3d 1473, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). 

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8 SAIGHI v. GSA

The entirety of Ms. Saighi’s contention is predicated 

on showing that Mr. Weilbacher possessed knowledge of 

the sinking of the Blankenship, and that his knowledge 

should be imputed to GSA. See id. at 13, 15, 17, 20, 26. 

However, the CBCA did not address this issue because it 

determined that it had “no basis . . . to decide [Ms. 

Saighi’s] allegations” because they “involve different 

operative facts from those presented to [Ms. Knotts].” 

J.A. 7 (citation omitted). Instead, the CBCA grounded its 

summary judgment determination on the fact that “[t]he 

terms and conditions of the auction in which Ms. Saighi 

purchased the [Blankenship] preclude the relief she 

seeks.” J.A. 6. 

We agree with the CBCA’s conclusion. Ms. Saighi’s 

claim that the contract was voidable on the basis of an 

agency or joint venture theory involves different operative 

facts from those presented to the contracting officer. For 

example, contrary to Ms. Saighi’s assertion, her initial 

letter to Ms. Knotts did not assert that Mr. “Weilbacher 

was acting as an agent of CMS [or that] his knowledge 

[should be] imputed to GSA.” Saighi Br. 11. In fact, her 

only mention of Mr. Weilbacher was in regard to his 

conduct in helping her inspect the physical condition of 

the Blankenship. See J.A. 58 (stating that “the custodian 

of the Blankenship[,] Mr. Ed Weilbacher[,] was courteous, 

hand[ed] out the vessel logbooks in time, and went out of 

his ordinary duty to extend help”). Moreover, although 

Ms. Saighi’s reply to Ms. Knotts’s November 19, 2013 

response suggests that Mr. Weilbacher knew that the 

Blankenship sank, she did not proffer any claim before 

Ms. Knotts suggesting that his knowledge should be 

imputed to GSA because he served as its agent, nor does 

she assert that GSA and CMS engaged in an agency or 

joint venture relationship. See J.A. 76 (asserting that 

“what [is] at stake . . . is the failure of [] GSA/custodian of 

the Blankenship to inform GSA about the accurate condition of the Blankenship although the custodian [and] the 

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SAIGHI v. GSA 9

long time Kaskaskian port secretary were fully aware of 

the sunken events”). 

Accordingly, Ms. Saighi did not present any claims to 

Ms. Knotts that can reasonably be interpreted to support 

the claims she now proffers before the CBCA (that Mr. 

Weilbacher served as an agent for GSA and that GSA and 

CMS were engaged in an agency or joint venture relationship). Because Ms. Saighi failed to present these arguments before the contracting officer, she has waived them. 

See Gant v. United States, 417 F.3d 1328, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 

2005) (“Arguments not made in the court or tribunal 

whose order is under review are normally considered 

waived.” (citation omitted)). Thus, the only issue before 

us is whether the CBCA is correct in finding that Ms. 

Saighi’s contract with GSA precludes her claim for a

refund of the purchase price of the Blankenship. 

B. The Terms and Conditions of the Contract Preclude Ms. Saighi’s Refund Request

Ms. Saighi does not dispute that the plain terms and 

conditions of the contract foreclose the relief she seeks. 

The contract explained that the only warranty with 

regard to the condition of the Blankenship was that it 

would conform to its written description. See J.A. 26 

(“Features, characteristics, deficiencies, etc. not addressed 

in the description are excluded from this warranty.”). 

However, Ms. Saighi does not point to any aspect of the 

Blankenship’s sale description that may be characterized 

as inaccurate. The Blankenship’s description states that 

it has “twin draft V6-92TA Detroit diesel engines.” J.A. 

32 (capitalization modified). However, the description 

makes no statement regarding their functionality. Moreover, the terms and conditions of the contract include a 

provision titled “Description Warranty [and] Refunds,” 

which expressly “cautions bidders that GSA’s written 

description represents [its] best effort to describe the 

[Blankenship]” based on available information and that 

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10 SAIGHI v. GSA

“gross omissions regarding the functionality of items, 

failures to cite major parts and/or restrictions with regards to usage may occur.” J.A. 26 (emphases added). 

In any event, if, after winning the online auction and 

taking possession of the property, the winning bidder 

concluded that the Blankenship had been inaccurately 

described, the terms and conditions of the contract provided a procedure whereby the winning bidder was required to inform GSA within a specific period of time of 

the misdescription. Specifically, under the “Claims of 

Misdescription” provision of the contract, once the property had been moved by the winning bidder, as is the case 

here,4 a refund is available only if the successful bidder:

1) “submit[s] a written notice to the Sales Contracting 

Officer within [fifteen] calendar days from the date of 

payment email notification (the Purchaser’s Receipt)”; 2) 

“maintain[s] the property in its purchased condition”; and 

3) “return[s] [the property] at [his or her] expense to the 

location designated by the Sales Contracting Officer or 

any other federal official.” J.A. 27. 

Ms. Saighi failed to satisfy any of these requirements. 

See J.A. 6. In particular, she tendered payment for the 

Blankenship on June 6, 2013. See J.A. 80. However, her 

email to Ms. Knotts asserting that the Blankenship was 

inaccurately described was dated October 27, 2013, five 

months after the sale closed, see J.A. 58. Accordingly, the 

terms and conditions of the online auction foreclose Ms. 

Saighi’s claim. See George Hyman Constr. Co. v. United 

States, 832 F.2d 574, 581 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (asserting that 

contract language should be given its plain meaning 

without rewriting or varying terms of the contract). 

 

4 On June 29, 2013, Ms. Saighi authorized her husband to move the Blankenship on her behalf. See J.A. 73. 

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SAIGHI v. GSA 11

Because Ms. Saighi did not point to any aspect of the 

Blankenship’s written description that was inaccurately 

described, nor did she satisfy the procedural requirements 

of the contract with regard to establishing a claim for 

misdescription, we affirm the CBCA’s summary judgment 

determination. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Civilian 

Board of Contract Appeals is

AFFIRMED

COSTS

Each party shall bear its own costs.

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