Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02447/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02447-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Patrick James McMannus
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 06-2447

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United States of America,

Appellant,

v.

Patrick James McMannus,

Appellee.

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No. 06-2555

___________ 

United States of America,

Appellant,

v.

Sheri Brinton,

Appellee.

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Appeals from the United States

District Court for the 

Northern District of Iowa.

________________

 Submitted: June 13, 2007 

 Filed: August 2, 2007 

________________

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1

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).

2

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).

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Before MELLOY, SMITH and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges. 

________________

GRUENDER, Circuit Judge. 

Patrick James McMannus and Sheri Brinton pled guilty to conspiracy to

distribute methamphetamine and other offenses. On a prior appeal by the

Government, a panel of this court vacated the sentences initially imposed on

McMannus and Brinton as unreasonable. The Government now appeals the sentences

imposed by the district court on remand. For the reasons discussed below, we vacate

both sentences and remand to the district court for resentencing.

I. BACKGROUND

McMannus and Brinton were two of sixteen individuals charged in an eightcount drug-conspiracy indictment. McMannus pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute

50 grams or more of methamphetamine mixture and conspiracy to distribute marijuana

in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B) and 846. Brinton pled guilty to

conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine mixture, and

conspiracy to distribute marijuana, in violation of §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A) and 846,

plus conspiracy to use a communication facility (the U. S. Postal Service) and to use

a person under the age of 18 to distribute methamphetamine and marijuana in

violation of §§ 843(b), 861 and 846.

At Brinton’s first sentencing, post-Blakely1

 but pre-Booker,

2

 the district court

held that the sentencing guidelines were unconstitutional under Blakely and sentenced

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Brinton to the statutory mandatory minimum of 120 months. Although the district

court did not attempt to calculate Brinton’s sentencing guidelines range, it did note

that she had no prior criminal history points. Her Presentence Investigation Report

(“PSIR”) suggested a guidelines range of 262 to 327 months, including a two-level

increase for obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 based on her pleaagreement stipulation that she “contacted her daughter . . . and told her to not tell law

enforcement anything about the defendant’s involvement in drug distribution and

about defendant’s utilization of her juvenile daughter in the distribution of controlled

substances.” Brinton Plea Agreement ¶ 34F. 

At McMannus’s first sentencing (also post-Blakely but pre-Booker), the district

court calculated a sentencing guidelines range of 57 to 71 months but held that the

guidelines were unconstitutional under Blakely. The district court found that

McMannus was eligible for 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) safety-valve relief from the 60-month

statutory mandatory minimum. Utilizing its discretion within the statutory range of

zero to forty years, the district court sentenced McMannus to 24 months. The district

court pronounced alternative sentences at the low end of the guidelines range for each

defendant in the event the guidelines were held to be constitutional.

On consolidated appeals, post-Booker, a panel of this court vacated both

sentences as unreasonable and remanded for resentencing. With respect to Brinton,

the panel stated: 

[W]e do not believe that Brinton’s lack of criminal history, which is one

of the considerations that determined her advisory guidelines range, see

U.S.S.G. ch. 4, or anything else in the record justifies a variance of this

magnitude. The sentence selected by the district court, a 54 percent

variance, was outside the range of reasonableness.

United States v. McMannus, 436 F.3d 871, 875 (8th Cir. 2006). Similarly, with

respect to McMannus, the panel stated:

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While we can identify factors that may warrant a minor variance from

the guidelines range, e.g., McMannus put himself through community

college while on pretrial release, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), we find

nothing in the record which would justify a variance of this magnitude

under § 3553(a). The sentence selected by the district court, a 58 percent

variance, was outside the range of reasonableness.

Id.

At Brinton’s resentencing hearing, the district court first rejected the plea

agreement stipulation regarding Brinton’s sentencing guidelines enhancement for

obstruction of justice. The district court stated that “the one sentence in [the PSIR,

copied from the plea agreement stipulation] does not constitute obstruction of justice.”

Brinton Resent. Tr. at 13. Without that two-level enhancement, Brinton’s advisory

sentencing range decreased from 262 to 327 months to 210 to 262 months. The

district court indicated that were this court to hold on appeal that the obstruction-ofjustice enhancement should have been applied, the district court would, in the

alternative, vary downward “not down to 210 but down to something close to 210”

based on the non-threatening nature of the obstruction. Id. at 25.

The district court then proceeded to hear evidence in support of a downward

variance. Brinton introduced evidence of her positive activities while in prison after

her original sentencing, as well as supportive letters from her family. Brinton also

cited the relatively low sentences received by others in the same conspiracy who

played more significant roles than Brinton. The district court varied downward to 160

months, citing the need to avoid unwarranted disparity with the 180-month sentence

imposed on the “kingpin” of the operation, Raul Canales, Sr. The district court also

stated that if that ground for variance was overturned on appeal, it instead would vary

downward to 180 months based on Brinton’s uncredited cooperation and lack of

criminal history.

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See 18 U.S.C. § 4046 (giving the Bureau of Prisons discretion to adjust the

term and conditions of incarceration of inmates who complete a “shock incarceration

program”); Castellini v. Lappin, 365 F. Supp. 2d 197, 199 (D. Mass. 2005) (“A shock

incarceration program is based upon an inmate serving a shorter, but more arduous,

term.”). The Bureau of Prisons has since discontinued the boot camp program. See

United States v. Fason, 2006 WL 751282 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 21, 2006).

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By the time of McMannus’s resentencing, he had already discharged his

originally pronounced 24 months’ imprisonment by completing a six-month Intensive

Confinement Center or “boot camp” program followed by almost eight months at a

halfway house.3

 At the resentencing hearing, the parties agreed that the advisory

guidelines range was 57 to 71 months. McMannus reintroduced his exhibits from the

original sentencing proceeding. He then presented testimony from probation officer

Sandra Dodge, who supervised him during his original pretrial release and after his

release from the halfway house. Dodge testified that McMannus passed all his

urinalysis drug testing and found employment during his pretrial release. She then

testified at length regarding his exemplary conduct since the first sentencing, noting

his full-time employment after his release. She opined that, based on his postsentence rehabilitation, further prison time would not “help [McMannus] any or help

society.” McMannus Resent. Tr. at 8. On cross-examination by the Government,

Dodge stated that she also based her opinion on McMannus’s behavior “prior to going

to prison” and her “years of being a probation officer.” Id. at 9.

McMannus next presented testimony from Steven Korger, a residential officer

at the halfway house. Korger also met McMannus before his first sentencing because

McMannus had reported to the halfway house for some of his urinalysis testing during

pretrial release. Korger stated that while McMannus was on pretrial release, he

complied with program requirements, was employed by an employer that usually did

not hire from the halfway house and was enrolled in community college. Korger then

testified at length about McMannus’s positive post-sentencing impact on the

community and concluded that returning McMannus to prison would have a “very

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negative impact on his recovery program.” Id. at 15. On cross-examination, Korger

admitted that his “in-depth” contact with McMannus began post-sentencing. Id. at 18.

McMannus’s uncle, Troy Deal, testified that McMannus stopped using drugs

after his arrest in 2001, that McMannus had developed a bond with Deal’s daughter

that would be damaged if he returned to prison, and that McMannus graduated from

community college while on pretrial release. McMannus’s step-father also testified

to his rehabilitation. Finally, probation officer Stacy Koolstra recommended no

further prison time as well, based on all the above-mentioned factors plus

McMannus’s uncredited cooperation with investigators.

The district court pronounced a sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment, identical

to McMannus’s original sentence. The district court found that, because of the new

evidence introduced during the resentencing hearing, this court’s previous opinion did

not preclude the district court from pronouncing a term of imprisonment identical to

the one vacated previously as unreasonable. The district court stated that it considered

McMannus’s post-sentencing conduct in determining the extent of the variance, but

it also stated that it would pronounce the same sentence even if it had not considered

that conduct. Finally, the district court clarified that it was not considering

McMannus’s uncredited cooperation as a factor in the variance, because the district

court recognized that the cooperation already had been considered in granting

McMannus’s safety-valve reduction.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Brinton

The Government argues that the district court erred in rejecting the obstructionof-justice enhancement for Brinton. “We review de novo a sentencing court’s

determination that section 3C1.1 applies to specific conduct, but we review for clear

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error the court’s factual findings.” United States v. Hare, 49 F.3d 447, 453 (8th Cir.

1995) (quoting United States v. McCoy, 36 F.3d 740, 742 (8th Cir. 1994)). Section

3C1.1 applies if “the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to

obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the investigation,

prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction . . . .” U.S.S.G.

§ 3C1.1. In this case, Brinton stipulated that she told her daughter to withhold

information regarding Brinton’s involvement in the criminal enterprise from

investigators. The district court accepted the factual basis of the stipulation but

determined that § 3C1.1 did not apply to this specific conduct. Therefore, our review

is de novo.

We note that Brinton did not challenge the obstruction-of-justice enhancement,

as it would have been a breach of her plea agreement to do so; the district court raised

the issue sua sponte. The district court, citing the Fifth Amendment, held that the

enhancement should not apply where a mother simply advises her daughter to remain

silent about criminal activity. However, the stipulation states that Brinton, “after

being approached by law enforcement and knowing that there was an investigation in

this matter,” attempted to influence her daughter not to reveal Brinton’s involvement

in the criminal enterprise to law enforcement: “[Brinton] told her to not tell law

enforcement anything about the defendant’s [i.e., Brinton’s] involvement in drug

distribution and about defendant’s [i.e., Brinton’s] utilization of her juvenile daughter

in the distribution of controlled substances.” Brinton Plea Agreement ¶ 34F

(emphases added). In other words, the stipulation demonstrates not advice to the

daughter to keep silent to protect herself, but instructions to the daughter to conceal

Brinton’s involvement in the illegal activity, including Brinton’s use of a juvenile,

from investigators. This specific conduct certainly qualifies as an “attempt[] to

obstruct or impede . . . the administration of justice with respect to the investigation

. . . of the instant offense of conviction . . . .” § 3C1.1.

The district court also relied on the absence of any evidence of threats or

intimidation in the stipulation. The commentary to § 3C1.1 provides a “nonAppellate Case: 06-2447 Page: 7 Date Filed: 08/02/2007 Entry ID: 3336457
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exhaustive list of examples” of applicable obstructive conduct including “(a)

threatening, intimidating, or otherwise unlawfully influencing a co-defendant, witness,

or juror, directly or indirectly, or attempting to do so.” § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4. Because the

list of examples is non-exhaustive, the district court erred to the extent it held that

evidence of overt threats or intimidation is required in order to apply the enhancement.

See, e.g., United States v. Holland, 884 F.2d 354, 358-59 (8th Cir. 1989) (affirming

application of the enhancement where the “defendant requested a co-defendant not to

mention the involvement of two individuals when making statements to law

enforcement officials”). We conclude that the district court erred in not applying the

§ 3C1.1 two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice to the stipulated conduct.

An error in the advisory guidelines calculation requires remand unless the error

is harmless. United States v. Mashek, 406 F.3d 1012, 1017 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing 18

U.S.C. § 3742(f)(1)). A district court’s pronouncement of an alternative sentence may

allow for such a finding of harmless error. United States v. Icaza, Nos. 06-

2882/2883/3003, slip op. at 7 (8th Cir. Jul. , 2007). “[T]o support a finding of

harmless error, the record clearly must show not only that the district court intended

to provide an alternative sentence, but also that the alternative sentence is based on an

identifiable, correctly calculated guidelines range.” Id. at 8. In this case, the district

court stated that were this court to hold on appeal that the obstruction-of-justice

enhancement should have been applied, the district court would, in the alternative,

vary downward “not down to 210 but down to something close to 210” months based

on the non-threatening nature of the obstruction. Brinton Resent. Tr. at 25. This

statement, while suggesting an intent to pronounce an applicable alternative sentence,

does not indicate precisely what the variance based on the non-threatening nature of

the obstruction would have been. Moreover, it is unclear whether the district court

would have increased the portion of the downward variance based on other factors to

arrive at the same 160-month sentence. Because we have no specific alternative

sentence to review, we must vacate Brinton’s sentence based on the advisory

guidelines calculation error and remand for resentencing without reaching the

reasonableness of her sentence. See Mashek, 406 F.3d at 1017.

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B. McMannus

McMannus received a downward variance from an advisory guidelines range

of 57 to 71 months to a sentence of 24 months, a 58 percent reduction, equivalent to

a decrease of eight offense levels. The Government argues that the district court erred

in relying on evidence of McMannus’s post-sentencing rehabilitation at the

resentencing hearing. Where this court vacates a sentence and remands for

resentencing, the district court upon resentencing may “hear any relevant evidence

that it could have heard at the first sentencing hearing.” United States v. Jenners, 473

F.3d 894, 899 (8th Cir. 2007). “However, evidence of . . . post-sentencing

rehabilitation is not relevant and will not be permitted at resentencing because the

district court could not have considered that evidence at the time of the original

sentencing.” Id.

 In McMannus’s case, the district court heard extensive and compelling

evidence about McMannus’s post-sentencing rehabilitation and admittedly relied on

that evidence in pronouncing his new sentence. McMannus Resent. Tr. at 65, 72.

Because the district court gave significant weight to McMannus’s post-sentencing

rehabilitation, an impermissible factor, we must vacate McMannus’s sentence and

remand for resentencing. See United States v. Bonahoom, 484 F.3d 1003, 1006 (8th

Cir. 2007) (“A sentencing court abuses its discretion if it fails to consider a relevant

factor that should have received significant weight, gives significant weight to an

improper or irrelevant factor, or considers only the appropriate factors but commits

a clear error of judgment in weighing those factors.”) (quotation omitted).

The district court also announced that it would impose the same sentence on

McMannus even had it not considered the evidence related to his post-sentencing

rehabilitation. McMannus Resent. Tr. at 72. However, any harmless error analysis is

precluded because the record on resentencing (excluding the impermissible evidence

of post-sentencing rehabilitation) is substantially identical to the record at

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With regard to the permissible factors in the resentencing record that might

justify a downward variance, the record at the first sentencing already established that

McMannus quit using drugs after his first arrest in 2001, McMannus Sent. Tr. at 6;

that he put himself through community college while on pre-trial release, id. at 6, 8;

that he was employed while on pretrial release and was highly commended by his

employer, McMannus PSIR ¶ 69; that he was a “model” citizen while on pretrial

release and never failed a urinalysis drug test, McMannus Sent. Tr. at 6; and that he

cooperated to some extent, but not enough to merit a substantial assistance motion, id.

at 11.

While the probation officers’ opinion testimony at the resentencing hearing had

not been presented at McMannus’s first sentencing, the record reflects that those

opinions also were based for the most part on the officers’ observations of

McMannus’s post-sentencing rehabilitation. While it is difficult not to be swayed by

McMannus’s post-sentencing rehabilitation successes, allowing this evidence to

influence his sentence would be grossly unfair to the vast majority of defendants who

receive no sentencing-court review of any positive post-sentencing rehabilitative

efforts.

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McMannus’s first sentencing.4

 A panel of this Court has already held that a 24-month

sentence is unreasonable based on that record. See McMannus, 436 F.3d at 875.

Therefore, a 24-month sentence on the same record cannot be affirmed by a new

panel. See United States v. Collins, 321 F.3d 691, 698 n.5 (8th Cir. 2003). We

reiterate the prior panel’s holding that, while a downward variance from the advisory

guidelines range certainly may be warranted, the 58 percent or eight-level reduction

pronounced by the district court is unreasonable on this record. Cf. United States v.

Jensen, Nos. 06-2284/2497, slip op. at 5 (8th Cir. June 28, 2007) (“A reduction of six

guideline ranges is significant in the context of an advisory guideline system where

the degree of most aggravating and mitigating adjustments is two, three, or four

offense levels.”). 

III. CONCLUSION

We hold that the district court erred in not including an obstruction-of-justice

enhancement in Brinton’s advisory guidelines calculation and in giving significant

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weight to evidence of McMannus’s post-sentencing rehabilitation. Accordingly, we

vacate the sentences of Brinton and McMannus and remand to the district court for

resentencing. 

MELLOY, Circuit Judge, with whom SMITH, Circuit Judge, joins, concurring.

Based on current Eighth Circuit precedent, I concur in the judgment in this case.

As to appellee Sheri Brinton, I concur fully in the analysis and discussion by the

majority. As to appellee Patrick James McMannus, I agree that our prior decision in

this case, United States v. McMannus, 436 F.3d 871 (8th Cir. 2006), has previously

determined that absent consideration of post-sentencing rehabilitation, the sentence

of twenty-four months was outside the range of reasonableness. There is nothing I can

see in the record, other than post-sentencing rehabilitation, that was not before the

circuit panel in the previous McMannus appeal. If we must exclude any consideration

of post-sentencing rehabilitation, as the majority rightly notes we must under current

circuit precedent, then the unreasonablenss of a twenty-four month sentence has

already been determined by a prior panel of this court.

My concern with this case, and the reason for my concurrence, is the binding

precedent upon which the McMannus decision rests, that is, the inability to consider

post-sentencing rehabilitation. I would join the Third Circuit and hold that postsentencing rehabilitation is not normally relevant, however, there are exceptional

cases in which it may be considered. United States v. Lloyd, 469 F.3d 319, 325 (3rd

Cir. 2006); see also, United States v. Butler, 221 Fed. Appx. 616, 617 (9th Cir. 2007)

(unpublished). I would also find that this is such an exceptional case and that if we

could consider post-sentencing rehabilitation, the sentence in this case would be

reasonable. The majority has outlined the post-sentencing rehabilitation testimony

and characterizes the evidence the district court heard as “ . . extensive and compelling

. . .” ante at 9. While I do not disagree with the concept that post-sentencing

rehabilitation should not normally be considered because of the potential windfall to

those defendants who are the beneficiaries of resentencings, I also do not believe that

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we should have a rule that never allows an experienced district judge to consider that

evidence. Certainly, such evidence is valuable in a case such as this where the postsentencing rehabilitation not only involves conduct while incarcerated, but exceptional

performance while in a half-way house and then following release to the community.

Both the state probation officer who supervised Mr. McMannus in the half-way house

and the federal probation officer who is currently supervising him on supervised

release testified to his exceptional conduct.

In assessing at least three of the Section 3553(a) factors, deterrence, protection

of the public and rehabilitation, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B)(C) & (D), there would

seem to be no better evidence than a defendant's post-incarceration conduct. In an

exceptional case, such as this, I would permit the district court to consider that

evidence in fashioning a reasonable sentence.

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