Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-50100/USCOURTS-ca9-14-50100-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Martin Vega-Ortiz
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MARTIN VEGA-ORTIZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 14-50100

D.C. No.

3:13-cr-01636-BTM-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Barry T. Moskowitz, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

October 19, 2015—Pasadena, California

Filed May 6, 2016

Before: Andrew J. Kleinfeld, Johnnie B. Rawlinson,

and Jacqueline H. Nguyen, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Rawlinson

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2 UNITED STATES V. VEGA-ORTIZ

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed a criminal judgment, and remanded

for correction of the judgment, in a case in which the district

court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss an

information charging him with being found in the United

States after removal, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326.

The panel held that the denial of the defendant’s motion

to dismiss was proper because his conviction under California

Health & Safety Code § 11378 constituted an aggravated

felony. The panel wrote that although a § 11378 conviction

is not categorically an aggravated felony, the modified

categorical approach applies because § 11378 is a divisible

statute. The panel wrote that there is no principled basis for

distinguishing this case fromdecisions holding that California

Health & Safety Code §§ 11377 and 11378 are divisible, or

from a decision assuming the divisibility of California Health

& SafetyCode § 11379. The panel wrote that the defendant’s

contention that a federal regulation excluding pharmaceutical

products containing L-meth from the federal schedules

renders California’s definition of methamphetamine

overbroad is not persuasive, because the defendant failed to

show a realistic probability of prosecution for possession of

the excluded product.

The panel held that for similar reasons the district court

did not err in applying a sentencing enhancement pursuant to

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. VEGA-ORTIZ 3

U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(B) on the ground that the defendant’s

§ 11378 conviction was a felony drug trafficking offense.

The panel remanded for correction of the judgment,

which erroneously states that the defendant pled guilty.

COUNSEL

Kara Hartzler (argued), Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc.,

San Diego, California, for Defendant-Appellant.

Laura Duffy, United States Attorney, Bruce R. Castetter,

Chief, Appellate Section, Anne Kristina Perry (argued), Peter

Ko, and Mark R. Rehe, Assistant United States Attorneys,

San Diego, California, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

RAWLINSON, Circuit Judge:

Petitioner Martin Vega-Ortiz (Vega-Ortiz) appeals the

district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss an information

charging him with being found in the United States after

removal, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Vega-Ortiz

contends that his underlying deportation was invalid because

his prior conviction for possession for sale of a controlled

substance in violation of California Health & Safety Code

§ 11378 was not an aggravated felony. This Court’s recent

precedent forecloses Vega-Ortiz’s claim.

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4 UNITED STATES V. VEGA-ORTIZ

I. BACKGROUND

In 2010, Vega-Ortiz pled guilty to possession for sale and

transportation of a controlled substance under California

Health & Safety Code §§ 11378 and 11379. In 2011, the

Department of Homeland Security placed Vega-Ortiz into

removal proceedings by filing a notice to appear (NTA). The

NTA charged Vega-Ortiz with removability as an alien who

entered the United States without permission, and who had

been convicted of a controlled substance offense and of an

“aggravated felony.” The Immigration Judge subsequently

ordered Vega-Ortiz removed from the United States, and

removal was effectuated in 2011.

Two years after his removal, a border patrol agent found

Vega-Ortiz and another individual hiding under some rocks

north of the U.S.-Mexico border. Vega-Ortiz acknowledged

to the agent that he was a native of Mexico and did not have

any documentation permitting his entry into this country. 

Vega-Ortiz was subsequently charged with being a deported

alien found in the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326.

Vega-Ortiz filed a motion to dismiss the information due

to the alleged invalidity of the underlying removal order. 

Vega-Ortiz asserted that his prior removal violated due

process because his convictions for violations of California

Health & Safety Code §§ 11378 and 11379 did not qualify as

aggravated felonies. According to Vega-Ortiz, the California

provisions criminalized a broader range of controlled

substances than those included in the Federal Controlled

Substances Act, and the modified categorical approach did

not apply because the statutes are not divisible.

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UNITED STATES V. VEGA-ORTIZ 5

The district court denied Vega-Ortiz’s motion to dismiss

the information. The court agreed with Vega-Ortiz that

§ 11378 was broader than the generic offense because it

criminalized “a broader swath” of drugs than the Federal

Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 802.1 However, the

court also determined that the statute was divisible and

subject to application of the modified categorical approach. 

Because the statute was divisible and the record of conviction

established that Vega-Ortiz was convicted of possession for

sale and transportation of a federallycontrolled substance, the

court found no defect in the underlying removal order.

After denying Vega-Ortiz’s motion to dismiss the

information, the court presided over a bench trial, finding

Vega-Ortiz guilty of the charged offense.2 Vega-Ortiz then

filed a motion to reconsider, maintaining that even under the

modified categorical approach, the California statute

remained overbroad because the schedule of controlled

substances did not distinguish among the categories of

“methamphetamine” covered by the offense, while federal

law contained an exception for the category of “L-meth.” 

Vega-Ortiz’s argument is premised on the content of 21

C.F.R. § 1308.22, which provides: “The following

nonnarcotic substances which may, under the Federal Food,

Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. § 301), be lawfully sold

over the counter without a prescription, are excluded from

all schedules pursuant to section 201(g)(1) of the Act

(21 U.S.C. § 811(g)(1)): . . . [50.00 mg or mg/ml of]

Levmethamfetamine (l-Desoxyephedrine)[.]” After the court

 

1

 The court’s analysis applied equally to § 11379.

2 The judgment of conviction erroneously states that Vega-Ortiz pled

guilty. We remand for correction of this document.

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6 UNITED STATES V. VEGA-ORTIZ

denied Vega-Ortiz’s motion for reconsideration, he filed a

timely notice of appeal.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“We review de novo the denial of a motion to dismiss an

indictment under 8 U.S.C. § 1326 when the motion is based

on alleged due process defects in an underlying deportation

proceeding.” United States v. Alvarado-Pineda, 774 F.3d

1198, 1201 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). To sustain a

collateral attack predicated on a due process claim, a

defendant must establish that the underlying removal order

was “fundamentally unfair” due to: (1) defects in the

deportation proceedings that violated his or her due process

rights; and (2) prejudice from the defects. Id. (citation

omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Vega-Ortiz’s Removal Order was Validly

Premised on His Conviction for Violating

California Health and Safety Code § 11378.

Vega-Ortiz contends that his prior deportation was invalid

because California Health & Safety Code § 11378 does not

categorically qualify as an aggravated felony, is not divisible,

and is not subject to application of the modified categorical

approach. In his view, the statute is fatally overbroad because

it criminalizes methamphetamine in all its forms, including its

salts, isomers, and salts of its isomers without containing an

exception for pharmaceutical products that contain “L-meth,”

although federal law excludes a particular product containing

L-meth.

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UNITED STATES V. VEGA-ORTIZ 7

To determine whether Vega-Ortiz’s deportation was

validly premised on commission of an aggravated felony, we

first apply the “categorical approach” set forth in Taylor v.

United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990). Descamps v. United

States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2283 (2013). Under this approach we

“compare the elements of the statute forming the basis of the

defendant’s conviction with the elements of the ‘generic’

crime . . .” Id. at 2281. It is undisputed by the parties and

settled by past precedent that Vega-Ortiz’s conviction is not

categorically an aggravated felony because the “full range of

conduct covered by [California Health & Safety Code]

§11378” does not “fall[] within” the Controlled Substances

Act schedules. United States v. Valdavinos-Torres, 704 F.3d

679, 688 (9th Cir. 2012) (alteration omitted).

If a conviction does not qualify as an aggravated felony

under the categorical approach, we proceed in a “narrow

range of cases” to apply the “modified categorical approach,”

which allows courts to “look beyond the statutory elements”

to a specified set of documents to determine whether a

defendant was convicted of an aggravated felony. Descamps,

133 S.Ct. at 2283–84 (citation omitted); see also Rendon v.

Holder, 764 F.3d 1077, 1083 (9th Cir. 2014). Importantly,

the modified categorical approach may be utilized only if the

statute of conviction is divisible. See Rendon, 764 F.3d at

1083. A statute is divisible if it sets forth multiple

“alternative elements” that create different crimes. Id. We

must examine the text of the statute to make this

determination. See id. at 1088 & n.12. We now proceed to

that examination. At the time of Vega-Ortiz’s conviction, the

text of California Health & Safety Code § 11378 provided in

pertinent part:

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8 UNITED STATES V. VEGA-ORTIZ

Except as otherwise provided in Article 7

(commencing with Section 4211) of Chapter

9 of Division 2 of the Business and

Professions Code, everyperson who possesses

for sale any controlled substance which is

(1) classified in Schedule III, IV, or V and

which is not a narcotic drug, except

subdivision (g) of Section 11056, (2) specified

in subdivision (d) of Section 11054, except

paragraphs (13), (14), (15), (20), (21), (22),

and (23) of subdivision (d), (3) specified in

paragraph (11) of subdivision (c) of Section

11056, (4) specified in paragraph (2) or (3) of

subdivision (f) of Section 11054, or

(5) specified in subdivision (d), (e), or (f),

except paragraph (3) of subdivision (e) and

subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (2) of

subdivision (f), of Section 11055, shall be

punished by imprisonment in the state prison.

Cal. Health & Saf. Code § 11378 (2010).

We have previously held that § 11378 is a divisible

statute. See Padilla-Martinez v. Holder, 770 F.3d 825, 831

n.3 (9th Cir. 2014). We reasoned that § 11378 lists five

alternative categories of controlled substances in the

disjunctive and that under California law the type of

controlled substance is a separate element of a drug offense. 

See id.

As we recognized in Coronado, the text of the statute is

not particularly helpful to our analysis because it defines

offenses through reference to other statutes. See 759 F.3d at

983. We noted that the text of California Health & Safety

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UNITED STATES V. VEGA-ORTIZ 9

Code § 11377 is virtually identical to the language of the

Federal Controlled Substances Act. See id. & Appendix 1. 

Similarly, the language of § 11377 is virtually identical to the

language of § 11378. Compare Cal. Health & Saf. Code

§ 11377 with Cal. Health & Saf. Code § 11378. In Coronado,

we concluded that § 11377 is divisible because it “effectively

creates several different crimes . . .” 759 F.3d at 985

(citations omitted); see also Ruiz-Vidal v. Lynch, 803 F.3d

1049, 1054 (9th Cir. 2015) (assuming the divisibility of

California Health & Safety Code § 11379). No principled

basis exists for distinguishing this case from our holdings in

Coronado and Padilla-Martinez and our reasoning in RuizVidal.

Nevertheless, Vega-Ortiz rests his challenge to the

divisibility of § 11378 primarily on the existence of a federal

regulation he describes as excluding a particular product

containing L-meth from the definition of methamphetamine

salts, isomers and salts of its isomers. See 21 C.F.R.

§§ 1308.12(d)(2); 1308.22. According to Vega-Ortiz, this

discrepancyprecludes application of the modified categorical

approach to § 11378. We disagree. The conclusion that

§ 11378 is divisible is consistent with our analysis in Rendon,

where we explained that “the Supreme Court regards

elements as those circumstances on which the jury must

unanimously agree . . .” 764 F.3d at 1086 (emphasis in the

original). In keeping with this analysis, § 11378 has been

interpreted to require a jury to specify the substance a

defendant possessed. See e.g., 2 Witkin & Epstein, California

Criminal Law § 102 (4th ed. 2012) (“The possession offenses

all involve the following elements: (a) A specified controlled

substance in a sufficient quantity and in a usable form . . . ”);

see also California Criminal Jury Instruction 2302 (“The

defendant is charged in [Count __] with possession for sale

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10 UNITED STATES V. VEGA-ORTIZ

of ____ <insert type of controlled substance> . . .). The

California courts adhere to this instruction. See e.g., People

v. Montero, 155 Cal. App. 4th 1170, 1175–77 (2007). 

Therefore, it is well-settled that California treats the identity

of a controlled substance as an element that must be found by

the jury, further supporting the conclusion that § 11378 is

divisible. See Rendon, 764 F.3d at 1088–89.

Vega-Ortiz nevertheless maintains that the federal

regulation excluding a particular product containing L-meth

from the schedule of federal controlled substances renders

California’s definition of methamphetamine broader than the

definition of controlled substances in the Controlled

Substances Act. However, in addressing a similar argument

regarding an exemption for “administering” controlled

substances that existed under federal law but not Washington

state law, we focused on whether the defendant showed a

“realistic probability” that a person would be prosecuted for

the offense that assertedly rendered the state statute

overbroad. United States v. Burgos-Ortega, 777 F.3d

1054–55 (9th Cir. 2015); see also Gonzales v. DuenasAlvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007) (“[T]o find that a state

statute creates a crime outside the generic definition of a

listed crime in a federal statute requires . . . a realistic

probability . . . that the state would apply its statute to

conduct that falls outside the generic definition of a

crime. . . .”). Applying this analysis to the facts here, to

succeed on his claim Vega-Ortiz would need to show a

“realistic probability” that he would be prosecuted under

§ 11378 for possession of the excluded product containing Lmeth. Burgos-Ortega, 777 F.3d at 1054. He has failed to do

so. As in Burgos-Ortega, § 11378 is not “overbroad on its

face” and “does not expressly include conduct not covered by

the generic offense, but rather is silent as to the existence of

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UNITED STATES V. VEGA-ORTIZ 11

a parallel [L-meth] exception.” 777 F.3d at 1055. Thus,

Vega-Ortiz’s overbreadth arguments are unavailing, and we

conclude that the district court properly applied the modified

categorical approach to § 11378.

B. The District Court Correctly Imposed a

Sentencing Enhancement for Drug Trafficking.

For the same reasons that Vega-Ortiz’s conviction under

§ 11378 qualified as an aggravated felony, the district court

properly imposed a drug trafficking sentence enhancement. 

Section 2L1.2 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines,

permits a 12-level increase to the base offense level if a

defendant was convicted of a “felony drug trafficking

offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(B). A drug trafficking

offense is “an offense under federal, state, or local law that

prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or

dispensing of, or offer to sell a controlled substance . . . or the

possession of a controlled substance . . . with intent to

manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense.” Id.

§ 2L1.2, Application Note 1(B) (2013). As previously

discussed, the California statute of conviction prohibits

possession of a controlled substance with the intent to

distribute. See Cal. Health & Saf. Code § 11378. Thus, the

district court’s application of the 12-level sentencing

enhancement was permissible.

IV. CONCLUSION

The district court’s denial of Vega-Ortiz’s motion to

dismiss was proper because his conviction under California

Health & Safety Code § 11378 constituted an aggravated

felony. The court correctly concluded that although § 11378

was not categorically an aggravated felony, application of the

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12 UNITED STATES V. VEGA-ORTIZ

modified categorical approach resulted in a determination that

Vega-Ortiz was indeed convicted of an aggravated felony. 

Vega-Ortiz’s reliance on the federal regulation excluding a

particular product containing L-meth from inclusion in the

federal schedules is not persuasive, because Vega-Ortiz failed

to show a “realistic probability” of prosecution for possession

of the excluded product. Finally, for similar reasons the

district court did not err in applying a sentencing

enhancement for a prior drug trafficking conviction.

AFFIRMED and REMANDED for correction of

judgment.

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