Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-03545/USCOURTS-ca7-14-03545-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sandra McGuire
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 14-3545 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

SANDRA MCGUIRE

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division. 

No. 2:08 CR 214 — James T. Moody, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED MAY 28, 2015 — DECIDED AUGUST 6, 2015

____________________ 

Before FLAUM, KANNE, and SYKES, Circuit Judges. 

KANNE, Circuit Judge. Defendant-Appellant Sandra 

McGuire entered into a plea agreement that contained a 

provision waiving her appellate rights. After the district 

court accepted her guilty plea, but before McGuire was sentenced, she filed a motion to withdraw her plea. The district 

court denied the motion, and McGuire appeals that denial. 

We dismiss the appeal, because we conclude that McGuire’s 

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waiver of appellate rights encompasses her appeal of the denial of the plea-withdrawal motion. 

I. BACKGROUND

In October 2009, a grand jury returned an indictment 

against McGuire charging her with multiple counts of concealing and laundering drug proceeds in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 1956(a), (h). The charges stemmed from allegations 

that over the course of several years, McGuire received the 

proceeds of marijuana and cocaine sales from her nephew. 

She then deposited them into her checking account and used 

those funds to pay the nephew’s living expenses. Prosecutors 

alleged that between 2006 and 2008, McGuire deposited over 

$141,000 of illegal drug proceeds into her account. When she 

was interviewed by federal agents, McGuire admitted knowing that the money came from marijuana sales, though she 

denied knowing that her nephew also sold cocaine. McGuire 

pled not guilty to the charges. 

On November 1, 2012, she entered into a binding written 

plea agreement. See Fed. R. Crim. Pr. 11(c)(1)(A), (C). She 

pled guilty to one count of violating 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1956(a)(1)(b)(i), admitting that she deposited $2,200 of 

drug proceeds into her checking account on December 1, 

2008. She faced maximum penalties of twenty years’ imprisonment and a $500,000 fine—penalties that she acknowledged in the plea agreement. The agreement specified that 

McGuire would receive a sentence that included no imprisonment, but instead a period of twelve months’ probation. 

The Assistant United States Attorney (“AUSA”) agreed to 

dismiss all remaining counts against her. The agreement 

specified that if the district court did not accept these sentencing recommendations, McGuire would be permitted to 

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No. 14-3545 3

withdraw her guilty plea and reinstate her prior not-guilty 

plea. 

The plea agreement also contained a provision involving 

the waiver of McGuire’s appellate rights. We reproduce the 

relevant portion of that waiver here: 

I understand that the law gives a convicted person 

the right to appeal the conviction and the sentence 

imposed; I also understand that no one can predict 

the precise sentence that will be imposed, and that 

the Court has jurisdiction and authority to impose 

any sentence within the statutory maximum set for 

my offense(s) as set forth in this plea agreement; 

with this understanding and in consideration of the 

government’s entry into this plea agreement, I expressly waive my right to appeal or to contest my 

conviction and my sentence or the manner in which 

my conviction or my sentence was determined or 

imposed, to any Court on any ground, including 

any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel unless 

the claimed ineffective assistance of counsel relates 

directly to this waiver or its negotiation. 

On November 1, 2012, McGuire appeared in the district 

court for her change of plea hearing. During that hearing, 

McGuire was placed under oath, and the court reviewed 

both the plea agreement and her appellate waiver. She 

acknowledged that she was giving up her appellate rights, 

and that she was doing so knowingly and voluntarily. The 

court established a factual basis for her plea, and then asked 

her to restate her plea to the charge. She responded, “Guilty, 

sir.” 

The following exchange then took place between the 

prosecutor, McGuire’s defense counsel, and the court: 

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Prosecutor: But the parties would ask Your Honor 

to withhold judgment until sentencing. 

The Court: I don’t have to. Why would I have to? 

Defense counsel: Your Honor, if I could. We concur 

in the request that you withhold the finding of 

guilty and that you take both the plea and the plea 

agreement under advisement. 

The Court: Well I’m gonna take the plea agreement 

under advisement, but I’m gonna adjudicate her 

guilty. Why should I not do that? 

Defense counsel: Our point of view—Sandra 

McGuire is a firefighter with the City of Gary. If 

you find her guilty, that could trigger employment 

consequences. 

The Court: She’d lose her job. 

Defense counsel: Yes. 

The Court: She’s gonna lose her job anyway. 

Defense counsel: Not if you don’t accept the plea 

agreement and then the matter pends while we 

await trial or some other sort of plea. Because you 

would be required under this agreement to allow 

her to withdraw the plea if you decline to accept 

the recommendation in the agreement. That 

would—but it—or ... 

The Court: You’re not making a lot of sense, Mr. 

Vanes. Sorry. 

Defense counsel: She would have lost her job for a 

finding of guilty that is vacated. 

The Court: Yeah, but, you know, if I do accept the 

plea agreement ... 

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Defense counsel: Then she’s judged guilty. Then 

she faces the consequences. But we are not at that 

stage. 

The Court: All right. Her guilty plea is accepted, 

but I do withhold adjudication of guilt until her 

sentencing. That’s basically—protects her, right? 

Defense counsel: Yes. 

Defense counsel’s somewhat confusing exchange reflects an 

understanding that McGuire appears to have had at the time 

of the plea hearing. The district court was not required to accept the agreement’s sentencing recommendation. If the district court rejected the plea agreement, then by its terms, 

McGuire would be permitted to withdraw her guilty plea. 

But as soon as McGuire was adjudicated guilty, she 

would likely lose her job, and maybe her pension. McGuire 

served as a firefighter for many years with the Gary, Indiana 

Fire Department, and both sides appear to agree that a felony conviction would have mandatorily resulted in a termination of McGuire’s employment. So if the court waited until 

sentencing to adjudicate her guilty, she would be able to 

maintain her job in the interim. In addition, in the event that 

her plea agreement was rejected, she could continue her employment through trial, if one were to take place. McGuire’s 

request appears to have been motivated by her understandable desire to remain employed as long as possible. The district court appeared sympathetic and accommodated her request. 

On May 24, 2013, her attorney filed a motion to withdraw, and McGuire retained new counsel. On July 23, 2014, 

McGuire filed a motion to withdraw her guilty plea. The district court denied the motion on August 6, 2014. On October 

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31, 2014, following a sentencing hearing, the district court 

adjudicated McGuire guilty and sentenced her in accordance 

with the written plea agreement. McGuire appeals the denial 

of her motion to withdraw the guilty plea. 

II. ANALYSIS

It is well-settled that a defendant may waive her right to 

appeal. United States v. Wooley, 123 F.3d 627, 631 (7th Cir. 

1997). We will enforce such a waiver “so long as the record 

clearly demonstrates that it was made knowingly and voluntarily.” United States v. Williams, 184 F.3d 666, 668 (7th Cir. 

1999). A waiver is knowing and voluntary if it “substantially 

complied with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.” United States v. Zitt, 714 F.3d 511, 515 (7th Cir. 2013). When a defendant waives his right to appeal in a plea, “he also waives 

his right to appeal a denial of his motion to withdraw that 

plea.” United States v. Alcala, 678 F.3d 574, 578 (7th Cir. 2012). 

We review de novo whether a waiver is enforceable. United 

States v. Quintero, 618 F.3d 746, 750 (7th Cir. 2010). 

We find that McGuire waived her right to appeal her 

conviction, and that waiver encompasses the ability to challenge the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea. Because we 

conclude that her appeal must be dismissed, we need not 

address McGuire’s arguments regarding the denial of her 

plea withdrawal motion. We focus instead on her arguments 

concerning waiver. 

A. Voluntariness of Waiver 

McGuire argues that her appellate waiver was made involuntarily, and thus is invalid. Her argument proceeds as 

follows: (1) the court withheld adjudication of guilt until 

sentencing; (2) therefore, the plea agreement was not “in efCase: 14-3545 Document: 26 Filed: 08/06/2015 Pages: 10
No. 14-3545 7

fect” until sentencing; (3) she filed her motion to withdraw 

her plea agreement before sentencing; (4) therefore, the plea 

agreement and appellate waiver were not “in effect” when 

she filed her motion to withdraw, and were subsequently 

applied to her involuntarily. 

McGuire argues that the language of the agreement itself 

either suggests that the agreement was not “in effect” at the 

time that she filed her motion to withdraw, or it confused 

her as to the finality of her guilty plea. She argues that the 

agreement “on its face suggests that the finality of the 

agreement was to be held in abeyance until sentencing.” She 

adds that this confusion was exacerbated by the fact that the 

court withheld judgment until sentencing. We disagree. 

First, the language in the agreement did not “hold the 

agreement in abeyance” until sentencing—it merely underscored that the court was not required to accept the agreement. The court’s acceptance or rejection of the agreement 

would be resolved at sentencing, and that is what happened 

here. 

Second, McGuire’s argument regarding the delayed adjudication of guilt brings to mind the unclean hands doctrine. We note that it was by McGuire’s own request that the 

court took the unusual step of withholding the adjudication 

of guilt until sentencing. It made clear, however, that it “accepted” McGuire’s guilty plea. While McGuire may not have 

known the difference between accepting a plea and withholding judgment, her attorney certainly did: that’s why he 

made the unusual request, which, we add, inured to her 

benefit. McGuire has presented no evidence to suggest that 

her attorney misled her or otherwise represented that her 

plea was somehow “revocable” prior to sentencing. 

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In Alcala, the court “accepted” the defendant’s guilty 

plea. Alcala, 678 F.3d at 576. The defendant, before sentencing, then filed a motion to withdraw his plea. Id. And in that 

case, we held that the appellate waiver contained in Alcala’s 

plea agreement encompassed a waiver of his right to appeal 

a denial of a motion to withdraw the plea. Id. at 578. The 

same chain of events occurred here. McGuire has pointed to 

no authority, case law or statutory, to suggest that a defendant must be adjudicated guilty before the provisions of her 

plea agreement are “in effect.” 

Indeed, McGuire does not specify what she means by “in 

effect” in the context of plea agreements. It is not clear to us 

that an adjudication of guilt has much impact on the plea 

agreement, at least as far as McGuire’s argument is concerned. For one thing, courts remain free to reject plea 

agreements even after an adjudication of guilt. And for another, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, the rule governing pleas, includes the following statement regarding a 

defendant’s ability to withdraw a guilty plea: “[a] defendant 

may withdraw a plea of guilty ... before the court accepts the 

plea, for any reason or no reason; or ... after the court accepts 

the plea, but before it imposes sentence.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 

(emphasis added). This rule does not mention when a defendant has been “adjudicated guilty;” it mentions when the 

court “accepts” the plea. In this case, the court stated at the 

plea hearing that it “accepted” the plea. 

We therefore conclude that McGuire voluntarily waived 

her appellate rights. 

 

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No. 14-3545 9

B. Contract of Adhesion 

McGuire also argues that her appellate waiver should be 

considered void because it amounts to a contract of adhesion 

that is contrary to public policy. We held in United States v. 

Hare that the appellate waiver provision at issue in that case 

did not render its attendant plea agreement a contract of adhesion. 269 F.3d 859, 862 (7th Cir. 2001). McGuire takes issue 

with one statement in that opinion, in which we noted that 

many defendants plead guilty without waiving their rights 

to appeal. We stated that, at least in that case, “the prosecutor said that his office always seeks waivers as a negotiating 

position, but that it makes some plea agreements without 

waivers when defendants refuse to consent.” Hare, 269 F.3d 

at 862. 

Not so in the Northern District of Indiana, McGuire argues. She alleges that every plea agreement in that district 

includes, as a non-negotiable provision, a waiver of appellate rights. The government neither disputes nor concedes 

this point. We note that McGuire provides scant evidence of 

such a policy: she cites only the plea agreements of her codefendants in this case. Nor does she argue that she was rebuffed in any attempts to negotiate the appellate waiver 

with the AUSA. 

But, setting the evidentiary issues aside, we note that the 

“offending” entity McGuire refers to is a contract of adhesion—not a provision of adhesion. In the typical scenario, a 

contract is “offered by the authoring party on a take it or 

leave it basis rather than being negotiated between the parties.” Dugan v. R.J. Corman R. Co., 344 F.3d 662, 668 (7th Cir. 

2003) (quoting Northwestern National Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 

F.3d 372 at 377 (7th Cir. 1990)). McGuire does not argue that 

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10 No. 14-3545 

the Northern District of Indiana’s policy is to offer take-it-orleave-it plea agreements, not subject to negotiation. Nor does 

she argue that such an offer happened in her case. Instead, 

she disputes one specific provision. 

The presence of non-negotiated terms does not automatically transform an agreement into a contract of adhesion that 

will not be enforced. As we noted in Hare, “[m]any contracts 

have standard terms that are not open to negotiation yet are 

routinely enforced.” 269 F.3d at 862; see also, e.g., Carnival 

Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 597 (1991) (enforcing a 

forum-selection clause that was included among three pages 

of terms attached to a cruise ship ticket); Hill v. Gateway 2000, 

Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1151 (7th Cir. 1997) (enforcing an arbitration clause in a form contract). We can only assume that 

many prosecutors, and perhaps many defendants, enter plea 

negotiations with certain terms about which they are unwilling to bargain. 

Even if the government had been unwilling to negotiate 

the appellate waiver provision, such a refusal would not 

render the provision void. McGuire raises no other arguments regarding the enforceability of her appellate waiver. 

We conclude that the waiver of appellate rights provision is 

valid and enforceable. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, this appeal is DISMISSED. 

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