Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-50183/USCOURTS-ca9-12-50183-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
David McElmurry
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

DAVID MCELMURRY,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 12-50183

D.C. No.

3:10-cr-05096-JAH-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

John A. Houston, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

October 7, 2013—Pasadena, California

Filed January 26, 2015

Before: Stephen Reinhardt, Andrew J. Kleinfeld,

 and Morgan Christen, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Kleinfeld;

Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Christen

 Case: 12-50183, 01/26/2015, ID: 9394790, DktEntry: 40-1, Page 1 of 29
2 UNITED STATES V. MCELMURRY

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel vacated a criminal judgment and remanded in

a case in which the defendant was convicted of possessing

child pornography, and distributing it through an online peerto-peer file-sharing network.

The panel rejected the defendant’s contention that

convicting him of possessing and distributing the same

images amounted to double jeopardy. The panel explained

that neither possession nor distribution of child pornography

is necessarily a lesser-included offense of the other.

The panel held that, as the defendant concedes, conduct

such as his constitutes distribution under United States v.

Budziak, 697 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2012), which held that

maintaining child pornography in a shared folder, knowing

that doing so will enable others to download it, if another

person does download it, amounts to sufficient evidence to

sustain a conviction for distribution. 

The panel rejected the government’s contention that the

defendant waived his Fed. R. Evid. 403 objection to the

district court’s admission pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) of

interview statements he made in connection with a prior state

law child-pornographyconviction, and in a letter written to an

inmate a few months before the present crime was charged. 

The panel explained that a trial objection to what the court

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

 Case: 12-50183, 01/26/2015, ID: 9394790, DktEntry: 40-1, Page 2 of 29
UNITED STATES V. MCELMURRY 3

had already definitively ruled unobjectionable, on the

defendant’s in limine motion, would have amounted to taking

exception to an evidentiary ruling already made, which Fed.

R. Evid. 103 says is unnecessary.

The panel explained that because remand is necessary

under Rule 403, it did not need to decide whether the

government correctly invoked Rule 404(b). The panel held

that United States v. Curtin, 489 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2007) (en

banc), requires reversal in this case under Rule 403 because

the record, briefs and oral argument establish that the district

court admitted the statements and the letter without reading

or listening to the material. The panel wrote that the

government has not claimed that the error was harmless,

much less borne its burden of proof of harmlessness.

Judge Christen concurred in part and dissented in part. 

She concurred in the portions of the majority opinion

regarding double jeopardy and sufficiency of evidence to

support the distribution conviction, as well as the majority’s

conclusion that the district court erred by making a Rule 403

determination with respect to the interview statements

without reviewing them. She dissented from the majority’s

conclusion that the district court made a similar error with

respect to the letter. She wrote that because the district

court’s pretrial ruling did not definitively address the specific

letter exhibit that the government ultimately sought to

introduce and because the defendant did not object at trial

under Rule 403, she would review for plain error the district

court’s determination that the probative value of the letter

outweighed its prejudicial effect, and would affirm the district

court’s ruling.

 Case: 12-50183, 01/26/2015, ID: 9394790, DktEntry: 40-1, Page 3 of 29
4 UNITED STATES V. MCELMURRY

COUNSEL

John Balazs, Sacramento, California, for DefendantAppellant.

Alessandra P. Serano, Assistant United States Attorney, San

Diego, California, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

KLEINFELD, Senior Circuit Judge:

We address double jeopardy and evidentiary issues in a

child pornography case.

Facts

FBI agents used the identity of a member of an online

file-sharing group, “GigaTribe,” to find possessors and

sharers of child pornography. They downloaded a large

number of such images and videos from a GigaTribe user

who called himself “Teentrade.” They tracked the IP address

of Teentrade to a house where McElmurry’s mother and

grandmother lived and which McElmurry frequented. After

getting a search warrant, they waited until they saw that

Teentrade was online, and knocked on the door. They

pretended there was a package McElmurry had to sign for, to

draw him away from the computers in hopes that he would

not have time to delete or encrypt the data. Once McElmurry

got to the door, the agents executed the search warrant.

The FBI agents located and seized three computers, two

of which were running, but could not get into the computers

 Case: 12-50183, 01/26/2015, ID: 9394790, DktEntry: 40-1, Page 4 of 29
UNITED STATES V. MCELMURRY 5

because they did not have the passwords. The agents were

still able to connect to Teentrade online from their own

devices. To figure out which computer, if any, was

associated with Teentrade, they disconnected one computer

at a time. When the agents unplugged the desktop computer,

the downloads from Teentrade immediately stopped. After

forensic analysis, the FBI agents still could not access data on

the desktop because it was entirely encrypted. But based on

what appeared to be McElmurry’s soft drink by the desktop

computer, the extensive downloads from Teentrade, the

online presence of Teentrade at the moment before they

knocked, and the name “Super Dave” on the desktop screen

saver (McElmurry’s first name is David), they inferred that

Teentrade was McElmurry and that the desktop computer had

child pornography on it.

McElmurry was charged in two counts, one for

possessing child pornography,

1

one for distributing it.2

1

18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B), applies to any person who, “knowingly

possesses 1 or more books, magazines, periodicals, films, video tapes, or

other matter which contain any visual depiction that has been mailed, or

has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce, or

which was produced using materials which have been mailed or so

shipped or transported, by any means including by computer, if—(i) the

producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging

in sexually explicit conduct; and (ii) such visual depiction is of such

conduct.” (emphasis added).

2

18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), applies to any person who “knowingly

receives, or distributes, any visual depiction that has been mailed, or has

been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce, or which

contains materials which have been mailed or so shipped or transported,

by any means including by computer, or knowingly reproduces any visual

depiction for distribution in interstate or foreign commerce or through the

mails, if—(A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of

 Case: 12-50183, 01/26/2015, ID: 9394790, DktEntry: 40-1, Page 5 of 29
6 UNITED STATES V. MCELMURRY

Having been convicted in a jury trial, he appeals on the

grounds discussed below. We have jurisdiction over this

direct appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

Analysis

I. Double Jeopardy 

McElmurry argues that convicting him of two crimes,

possessing child pornography and also distributing it,

amounts to double jeopardy. His theory is that both counts

involved the same images, and that possession is a lesserincluded offense of distribution.

Since the double jeopardy issue was not raised in district

court, we review for plain error,3but the standard of review

does not in this case affect the analysis. We have controlling

precedents in which we have concluded that convictions for

both receiving and possessing such images did indeed violate

the Double JeopardyClause, despite applicability of the plain

error standard, so the standard does not save the convictions.4

And because double jeopardy would require at least one

a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and (B) such visual

depiction is of such conduct.” (emphasis added).

3

See United States v. Davenport, 519 F.3d 940, 943 (9th Cir. 2008)

(“Although we normally review de novo claims of double jeopardy

violations, we review issues, such as the present one, not properly raised

before the district court for plain error.”) (internal citation omitted).

4

See United States v. Schales, 546 F.3d 965, 977–81 (9th Cir. 2008);

United States v. Giberson, 527 F.3d 882, 891 (9th Cir. 2008); Davenport,

519 F.3d at 943–48.

 Case: 12-50183, 01/26/2015, ID: 9394790, DktEntry: 40-1, Page 6 of 29
UNITED STATES V. MCELMURRY 7

conviction to be vacated on remand, without the possibility of

retrial,5 we address this issue first.

McElmurry relies on three decisions6in which we have

held that separate convictions and sentencing for receiving

and possessing do indeed violate the Double JeopardyClause

where the convictions are predicated on the same images. 

The theory of all these cases is that under the Blockburger v.

United States “same elements” test,7

receiving necessarily

includes possessing. As we stated in Davenport, “[i]t is

impossible to ‘receive’ something without, at least at the very

instant of ‘receipt,’ also ‘possessing’ it.”8 We therefore have

concluded that possessing is a lesser-included offense of

receiving child pornography.

This case is distinguishable because McElmurry’s

convictions are for possessing and distributing, not possessing

and receiving. The question this case raises is whether the

distinction makes a difference. We conclude that it does.

The Blockburger test, “where the same act or transaction

constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, . . .

5

See Schales, 546 F.3d at 980 (“[T]he only remedy consistent with the

congressional intent is for the [d]istrict [c]ourt, where the sentencing

responsibility resides, to exercise its discretion to vacate one of the

underlying convictions.”) (quoting Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856,

864 (1985)) (alteration in original).

6

See Schales, 546 F.3d at 977–81; Giberson, 527 F.3d at 891;

Davenport, 519 F.3d at 943–48.

 

7

See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).

 

8 Davenport, 519 F.3d at 943.

 Case: 12-50183, 01/26/2015, ID: 9394790, DktEntry: 40-1, Page 7 of 29
8 UNITED STATES V. MCELMURRY

is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the

other does not.”9 Where the charges are receiving and

possessing, the statutes do not each require such proof,

because receiving means taking into one’s possession, and

therefore implies possession at least at the moment of

receipt.10 Not so for distribution. Suppose Tom, Dick and

Harry are involved. Tom asks Dick for a prohibited image. 

Dick says, “I don’t have it, but Harry does, and I’ll ask him

to send it to you.” Dick does not possess,11

 but nevertheless

distributes, because he brought about Harry’s distribution. 

One statute says “knowingly possesses,”12

the other says

“knowingly . . . distributes,”13and either crime can be

accomplished without the other. Each crime requires proof

of a fact that the other does not, possession for one and

distribution for the other. A possessor of prohibited images

 

9 Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.

10 See Davenport, 519 F.3d at 943. See also United States v. Romm,

455 F.3d 990, 1001 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Generally, federal statutes

criminalizing the receipt of contraband require a ‘knowing acceptance or

taking of possession’ of the prohibited item.”); United States v.

Mohrbacher, 182 F.3d 1041, 1048 (9th Cir. 1999) (defining “receive” as

“[t]o take into one’s hand, or into one’s possession”) (alteration in

original).

11 See Romm, 455 F.3d at 999 (defining “possession” as used in

18 U.S.C. § 2252A, a statute materially identical to the one at issue here,

as “[t]he fact of having or holding property in one’s power; the exercise

of dominion over property”) (alteration in original) (quoting BLACK’S

LAW DICTIONARY 1183 (7th ed. 1999)).

 

12 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B).

 

13 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2).

 Case: 12-50183, 01/26/2015, ID: 9394790, DktEntry: 40-1, Page 8 of 29
UNITED STATES V. MCELMURRY 9

may choose not to share,14and a distributor, as in the Tom,

Dick and Harry hypothetical, need not himself possess

them.15 For another sort of contraband, narcotics, we held in

Mincoff that possession is not an element of distribution,16

and the same principle applies to the type of contraband at

issue here. One need not even have constructive possession

to be a distributor. Dick, in the hypothetical, does not need

“dominion and control”17over Harry’s image to arrange for

Harry’s distribution to Tom. Neither possession nor

distribution of child pornography is necessarily a lesserincluded offense of the other. Two of our sister circuits have

reached the same conclusion,18and none, to our knowledge,

disagree.

 

14 See Romm, 455 F.3d at 999.

15 Our precedents establish that “distribution” is defined broadly to

encompass “participation in the transaction viewed as a whole.” United

States v. Ahumada-Avalos, 875 F.2d 681, 683 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding

defendant participated in distribution of cocaine because he “arranged for

delivery of the drugs, made phone calls negotiating the price, amount,

place of delivery, and payment, and traveled in furtherance of the crime”).

16 See United States v. Mincoff, 574 F.3d 1186, 1198 (9th Cir. 2009)

(“We adopt the rule articulated by our sister circuits that a narcotics

distribution charge may be established without proof of possession.”).

17 See United States v. Terry, 911 F.2d 272, 278 (9th Cir. 1990) (“To

prove constructive possession, the government must prove a sufficient

connection between the defendant and the contraband to support the

inference that the defendant exercised dominion and control over the

substance.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

18 See United States v. Chiaradio, 684 F.3d 265, 280 (1st Cir. 2012)

(holding that possession of child pornography is not a lesser-included

offense of distribution of the same); United States v. Woerner, 709 F.3d

527, 539 (5th Cir. 2013) (following Chiaradio).

 Case: 12-50183, 01/26/2015, ID: 9394790, DktEntry: 40-1, Page 9 of 29
10 UNITED STATES V. MCELMURRY

II. Sufficiency of Evidence

McElmurrymoved for a judgment of acquittal because he

did not actively do anything to distribute the images that were

used to prove his crime. The government proved distribution

with the images one of the agents had downloaded from the

“Teentrade” account. The account was on a file-sharing

program, so the only person who had to press a button to

transfer an image was the FBI agent. The FBI agent

downloaded, McElmurry did not upload or email the images.

McElmurryconcedes, however, that we have alreadyheld

in Budziak that conduct such as his constitutes distribution,19

and he merely wishes to preserve the issue. Budziak holds

that maintaining child pornography in a shared folder,

knowing that doing so will enable others to download it, if

another person does download it, amounts to sufficient

evidence to sustain a conviction for distributing the child

pornography.

20

The testimony at McElmurry’s trial sufficed to show

distribution under Budziak. The evidence was that sharing

through GigaTribe could only be accomplished if the owner

of the shared folder permitted it for a particular user, and an

FBI agent impersonating one of McElmurry’s permitted users

downloaded contraband imagesfromMcElmurry’s Teentrade

account.

 

19 See United States v. Budziak, 697 F.3d 1105, 1109 (9th Cir. 2012).

 

20 Id.

 Case: 12-50183, 01/26/2015, ID: 9394790, DktEntry: 40-1, Page 10 of 29
UNITED STATES V. MCELMURRY 11

III. Rule 403

McElmurry raises a more troubling issue under Federal

Rule of Evidence 403. The prosecution was not content to

prove, with its evidence about his acts at the time charged,

that McElmurry possessed and distributed the contraband

images. Instead, the prosecutor emphasized statements

McElmurry had made four years earlier, in 2006, in

connection with a state law conviction for child pornography,

and in a letter written a few months before the present crime

was charged to an inmate he evidently knew from his prior

imprisonment. In 2007 McElmurry had pleaded guilty to

violating Cal. Penal Code § 311.11 (possession or control of

matter depicting minor engaging in or simulating sexual

conduct), and gone to prison for the crime.

Federal agents recorded an interview with McElmurry in

2006, and the portions helpful to the prosecution were played

for the jury. As the interview went on, McElmurry admitted

that he had been looking at child pornography since he was

15-years-old (he was 30 at the time of the interview), looked

at child pornography daily, traded images with people, and

was indeed probably addicted to child pornography. 

McElmurry admitted in the 2006 interview that his

pornography collection was around 40 or 50 gigabytes and

included images of children as young as babies and images of

bondage using children.

The government also provided the jury with a letter

McElmurry had written to a prison inmate he evidently knew

from his imprisonment for his 2006 crime. The letter calls

the police, probation officers and other authorities a series of

obscene and insulting names, and brags that they will never

find “the vast majority of what I located for you,” because

 Case: 12-50183, 01/26/2015, ID: 9394790, DktEntry: 40-1, Page 11 of 29
12 UNITED STATES V. MCELMURRY

“everything computer related was very securely encrypted.” 

McElmurry also argued in the letter against the laws treating

persons under 18-years-old as children with respect to

sexuality and adult relationships with them. Various parts of

the letter made it clear that he was writing to a friend “in

County” and was on parole himself.

McElmurry strenuously objected to this material in an in

limine motion and in arguments on his and the government’s

in limine motions addressing admissibility of evidence.21 The

government argued that the material should come in to prove

“knowledge” and “lack of mistake.” Its theory was that the

2006 material would prove that McElmurry knew the images

downloaded by the FBI were on the computer, the reference

to encryption would prove that he knew how to encrypt, and

both would tend to prove that he was the user of the computer

linked to Teentrade. McElmurry had lived in the house but

no longer did. The government purported to be concerned

that he would raise a reasonable doubt about whether his 68-

year-old mother or 104-year-old grandmother, still living in

the house, were responsible for the child pornography, not

him. McElmurry argued that the 2006 interview was

evidence of propensity to commit child pornography crimes

rather than of one of the legitimate Rule 404(b) purposes, that

the letter was irrelevant, and that the risk of unfair prejudice

of both substantially outweighed their probative value under

Rule 403.

The district court ruled that the probative value was not

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,

and overruled the Rule 403 objections. The government

21 We and our dissenting colleague differ on whether McElmurry

sufficiently made and preserved this objection. Dis. Op. at 27. 

 Case: 12-50183, 01/26/2015, ID: 9394790, DktEntry: 40-1, Page 12 of 29
UNITED STATES V. MCELMURRY 13

argues in its appellee’s brief that the interview was admissible

under Federal Rule of Evidence 414, but the record does not

suggest the district court admitted it on that theory, and Rule

403 analysis would be required even if it had.22 We therefore

do not address Rule 414. The government also urges that

appellant did not preserve the Rule 403 objection at trial, so

he should be deemed to have waived it. But the point of in

limine resolution of objections is to enable planning and

avoid interruptions to a jury trial. Arguing and losing on the

403 objection sufficed to preserve it.23 An objection to what

the court had already ruled unobjectionable would have

amounted to taking exception to an evidentiary ruling already

made, which Federal Rule of Evidence 103 says is

unnecessary.

24

Our disagreement with our dissenting colleague is limited

to the narrow question of whether the district court’s ruling

on the in limine objection was “definitive.” We are agreed

that under Federal Rule of Evidence 103(b) that “[o]nce the

court rules definitively on the record, either before or at trial,

a party need not renew an objection or offer of proof to

preserve a claim of error for appeal.” When he first ruled

22 See United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1026 (9th Cir. 2001)

(holding that evidence admitted under Rule 414 must still be evaluated

under Rule 403).

23 See United States v. Varela-Rivera, 279 F.3d 1174, 1178 (9th Cir.

2002) (holding even when it is “questionable how thoroughly the motion

is explored,” if the denial of the motion is “definitive,” as it was here, the

objection is preserved and reviewed for an abuse of discretion).

24

See Fed. R. Evid. 103(b) (“Once the court rules definitively on the

record—either before or at trial—a party need not renew an objection or

offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal.”).

 Case: 12-50183, 01/26/2015, ID: 9394790, DktEntry: 40-1, Page 13 of 29
14 UNITED STATES V. MCELMURRY

during the hearing on in limine objections, the judge said,

“My tentative is to allow the letters, providing that they can

be proven up, provided there is a foundation for

admissibility.” Subsequently, the judge interrupted himself

in the discussion of another matter, to make this ruling

definitive. This subsequent ruling was that “the motion to

exclude irrelevant evidence or marginally relevant evidence

[the letters at issue] is denied based upon the proffer from the

United States.” The court could have denied an in limine

ruling and left the matter open until seeing what letters the

government proposed to admit, but by this definitive ruling,

it did not. Defense counsel could not have made the

objection any more specific because the government had still

not stated what it would introduce. In this respect, this case

resembles United States v.Varela-Rivera, where we held that

an in limine objection not stating the precise content of what

was objected to nevertheless sufficed where the government

had not clearly said precisely what it was going to offer.25In

this case, the judge’s ruling was definitive and not tentative,

after he so stated, and the defendant’s in limine objection was

as clear as it could be in light of the government’s failure to

state exactly what it proposed to offer. Though the court

could have denied an in limine ruling altogether and left the

matter for trial, it did not, so its definitive in limine ruling

preserved the matter without the need for further objection.

Much of the argumentation in this case, and in the district

court’s evaluation, focuses on Rule 404(b). Rule 404(b)

 

25 Varela-Rivera, 279 F.3d at 1178.

 Case: 12-50183, 01/26/2015, ID: 9394790, DktEntry: 40-1, Page 14 of 29
UNITED STATES V. MCELMURRY 15

contains two subsections.26 Subsection (1) is a rule of

exclusion, establishing that “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or

other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in

order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted

in accordance with the character.”27 Subsection (2) is a rule

of inclusion, allowing discretionary admission of evidence of

acts extrinsic to the crime charged for a purpose other than to

prove character, such as “motive, opportunity, intent,

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or

lack of accident.”28 Even if the trial court determines that the

evidence at issue does indeed tend to prove knowledge or one

of the other subsection (2) grounds, a defendant is entitled to

have the probative value weighed against the risk of unfair

prejudice under Rule 403.29 Rule 404(b)(2) functions as an

exception to 404(b)(1), but not as an exception to Rule 403. 

We need not decide whether the government correctly

invoked Rule 404(b) because remand is necessary regardless,

under Rule 403.

26 Citations are to the Rules of Evidence as amended in 2011. The

district court and the briefs before us cite to the previous version of the

Rules, but the difference is merely stylistic. As the Advisory Committee

Notes explain, the amendments are not substantive or intended to change

any ruling on evidence admissibility.

 

27 Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1).

 

28 Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2).

29 See United States v. Cherer, 513 F.3d 1150, 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (“If

evidence satisfies Rule 404(b), the court must then decide whether the

probative value is substantially outweighed by the prejudicial impact

under Rule 403.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

 Case: 12-50183, 01/26/2015, ID: 9394790, DktEntry: 40-1, Page 15 of 29
16 UNITED STATES V. MCELMURRY

We addressed how the Rule 403 weighing must be done

in our en banc decision in United States v. Curtin.

30 That

decision requires that we reverse in this case. Curtin

involved a defendant’s massive collection of disgusting

pornographic stories used to prove that he probably intended

to commit a sex crime with a minor. The district judge was

furnished with more than seventeen stories the prosecutor

proposed to use as evidence, admitted five,31but could not

bring himself to read more than two and snippets of the

others.32 Despite holding that on the facts of that case the

stories were relevant to show intent, we reversed and

remanded.33 We held that the district court had failed to

properly exercise its discretion because the judge “did not

read every word of the five disputed stories in preparation for

making its balancing decision.”34 The reason for our “every

word” requirement was that “[t]he inflammatory nature and

reprehensible nature of these abhorrent stories, although

generally relevant, is such that a district court making a Rule

403 decision must know precisely what is in the stories.”35

The right way to rule on such evidence, we held, is first

for the government to “identify the specific purpose or

purposes” for which admission was sought under Rule

 

30 489 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc).

 

31 Id. at 942.

 

32 Id. at 956, 956 n.8.

 

33 Id. at 956, 959.

 

34 Id. at 956.

 

35 Id. at 957.

 Case: 12-50183, 01/26/2015, ID: 9394790, DktEntry: 40-1, Page 16 of 29
UNITED STATES V. MCELMURRY 17

404(b)(2).36 Then the court must determine whether that

specific purpose is an element of the crime or is a fact that the

defendant has or will put at issue. If so, “the court must then

determine, before admitting the other acts evidence, whether

the probative value of the evidence is substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice under Rule

403,”37

“in order for its weighing discretion to be properly

exercised and entitled to deference on appeal.”38“In this

context, reliance on an offer of proof simply is not enough.”39

The district court must “read every word” of what will be

before the jury. The district court cannot very well decide

that words it has not read or heard will not be unduly

prejudicial, because the court does not know what the words

will be, and a prosecutor’s offer of proof about the words will

not suffice.

We faced similar issues in United States v. Waters, albeit

about radical environmentalists burning down buildings

rather than about sex, and the admission of anarchist

literature to prove the acts charged.

40

In Waters, the district

court admitted a folder of articles the defendant had

apparently given to an alleged co-conspirator. The record did

not establish as unambiguously as in Curtin that the district

judge had not read the material. But the judge did not say he

had read them, the record suggested that the court made its

 

36 Id. (emphasis in original).

 

37 Id. at 958 (emphasis in original).

 

38 Id. at 957.

 

39 Id.

 

40 United States v. Waters, 627 F.3d 345 (9th Cir. 2010).

 Case: 12-50183, 01/26/2015, ID: 9394790, DktEntry: 40-1, Page 17 of 29
18 UNITED STATES V. MCELMURRY

ruling before they were provided for reading, and at oral

argument the government confirmed what the record

suggested, that the district judge had not read them.41

In this case, as in Waters, the judge did not say in so

many words that he had not read the material, but the record,

briefs and oral argument appear to establish that he did not. 

The government’s motion in limine did not attach a transcript

or copy of the 2006 interview clips or the 2010 letter. The

judge could not listen to or read the interview and read the

letter if he did not have them, and it appears from the record

that the prosecutor did not submit them to the court prior to

the in limine Rule 403 ruling. And unfortunately, counsel did

not cite or otherwise alert the district court to Curtin. During

the hearing on the in limine motions, the judge said he would

appreciate a “proffer” from the government of the 2006

interview and the related conviction. The oral argument

largely focused on the prosecutor’s suggestion that she was

entitled to prove McElmurry’s prior conviction because it was

an element the jury had to decide for sentencing purposes. 

The prosecutor briefly summarized the 2006 interview42and

 

41 See id. at 356 n.4.

42 The prosecutor described the 2006 interview statements she

“anticipate[d] using”:

Let me give you a little bit of background about this

defendant. This defendant was apprehended in 2006

for basically the same type of conduct. During that

conduct, he admitted post-Miranda, which was

recorded. That statement was—has been turned over to

defense counsel, and he admitted that he uses file

sharing to share child pornography files. He admitted

he uses encryption, which prevents individuals or

anybody to get inside his computer. He admitted the

 Case: 12-50183, 01/26/2015, ID: 9394790, DktEntry: 40-1, Page 18 of 29
UNITED STATES V. MCELMURRY 19

said she sought to use it to show knowledge of the child

pornography and encryption, and “lack of mistake.” Defense

counsel conceded that the defense would be that McElmurry

did not know the images were on the computer and that it was

not his computer. The court ruled that the 2006 interview

statements could come into evidence because they were

relevant and were “more probative than prejudicial.”

Defense counsel also objected to the letter to the inmate

on the grounds that it was not relevant, was improper

propensity evidence, lacked foundation, and was more

prejudicial than probative. At the hearing, defense counsel

asked what evidence the government sought to introduce, and

for what purpose. The prosecutor replied that she had turned

over to defense counsel a disc full of letters McElmurry

type of child pornography that he likes; the age, the sex,

the types of acts.

We want to admit those statements to show knowledge

in this case. Because in this case, we also have a filesharing program, albeit a different one. In this case we

have encryption. And to date, we still haven’t been

able to crack his computer. And the images that the

agent was able to download through the file-sharing

program are of the same nature, age, sex of the

children.

So it’s the government’s position that the statements

that he made fromthe prior incident in 2006 are directly

relevant under 404(b) to prove knowledge, lack of

mistake, some other type of defense like it wasn’t me,

that sort of thing.

 Case: 12-50183, 01/26/2015, ID: 9394790, DktEntry: 40-1, Page 19 of 29
20 UNITED STATES V. MCELMURRY

wrote,43 mentioning encryption and the type of material he

has, which, she contended went to prove that the computer

was his, not his mother’s or grandmother’s.44 She said she

would have her exhibits in order the Friday before trial and

defense counsel could then come over to her office and look

at them. The judge confirmed his Rule 403 ruling, and said

the denial was “based upon the proffer,” not that it was based

on examining the evidence, which the court evidently did not

have. At a second in limine hearing, the judge said that with

respect to presenting to the jury the images downloaded by

the FBI agent from the desktop computer, “I may want to see

the images beforehand so I can just have an idea of what I’m

talking to the jury about,” but he did not ask to see the 2006

interview transcript or the letter to the inmate.

43 The prosecutor initially told defense counsel and the court that she

intended to introduce letters written by McElmurry. At trial, however,

only one letter from 2010 was admitted along with envelopes addressed

to McElmurry at the street address of his mother’s house.

44 The prosecutor described to the district court the letters she anticipated

introducing at trial:

What I turned over in discovery weeks ago to counsel

were—was a disc full of typed letters that Mr.

McElmurry wrote. And within the letters, he talks

about how he encrypts his computer and that law

enforcement will never find it. He talks about the type

of material that he has.

All goes, again, to knowledge that it wasn’t his

grandmother’s computer, it wasn’t his mother’s

computer, it wasn’t some other person’s computer, it

was his. And the material on the computer belongs to

him.

 Case: 12-50183, 01/26/2015, ID: 9394790, DktEntry: 40-1, Page 20 of 29
UNITED STATES V. MCELMURRY 21

Appellant’s brief argues that we must reverse under

Curtin because the district court had not read the material

when it ruled, and relied merely on the proffer. Although

McElmurry’s brief discusses Curtin in five places, the

government’s brief does not discuss or even cite it, and offers

no argument that the district court proceeded correctlydespite

Curtin. At oral argument, government counsel conceded that

the district court had not read the inmate letter before

admitting it and did not review the 2006 interview clips

published to the jury before admitting them. Thus, as in

Waters, the record, briefs and argument establish that the

district court admitted the evidence without reading it or

listening to it.

In Waters, we reversed under Curtin because the district

court had not read the anarchist articles submitted as evidence

before ruling for the prosecution on the Rule 403 objection. 

We held in Waters that the “district court had the

responsibility to read every page of the articles” to properly

weigh unfair prejudice against probative value under Rule

403,45thereby extending the “read every word” Curtin

requirement beyond disgusting and inflammatory child

pornography to “all district courts when performing the 403

balancing test.”46 In Curtin, we held that we would not give

deference to the district court’s Rule 403 ruling, as we

ordinarilywould for an evidentiaryruling, because the district

court had not read the evidence before admitting it over the

Rule 403 objection, so we cannot do so here.47 And we

 

45 Waters, 627 F.3d at 357.

 

46 Id.

 

47 See Curtin, 489 F.3d at 957.

 Case: 12-50183, 01/26/2015, ID: 9394790, DktEntry: 40-1, Page 21 of 29
22 UNITED STATES V. MCELMURRY

expressly held that “reliance on an offer of proof simply is

not enough,”48so the ruling in this case could not properly be

made based on the prosecutor’s description of the evidence at

the in limine hearing.

Ordinarily the next step of our analysis would be deciding

whether the government successfully bore its burden of proof

that the error in admitting the evidence was harmless.49 That

would be a hard argument to make. The first thing the

prosecutor said, even before stating his name, was that, “In

his own words, the defendant, David McElmurry, is addicted

to child pornography.” That line came from the 2006

interview. In closing argument, the prosecutor played clips

from the 2006 interview, and emphasized that “for half his

life, [McElmurry] had been interested in viewing child

pornography. Half of his life. He admitted that he was

addicted.” An “addiction,” of course, implies something that

an individual cannot stop doing. Another clip from the

interview was played, prompting the prosecutor to conclude:

“He likes all sorts of child pornography, including images

involving babies.”

The government in this case does not attempt to argue

harmless error. The government’s position appears to have

been that the evidence was needed to show that McElmurry

knew what was on the computer and had encrypted it, in

order to prove that what the FBI agent had downloaded came

 

48 Id.

49 See Waters, 627 F.3d at 358 (“The government bears the burden of

proving harmlessness, and must demonstrate that it is more probable than

not that the errors did not materially affect the verdict.”) (internal

quotation marks and alteration omitted).

 Case: 12-50183, 01/26/2015, ID: 9394790, DktEntry: 40-1, Page 22 of 29
UNITED STATES V. MCELMURRY 23

from McElmurry and not his 68-year-old mother or his 104-

year-old grandmother. The importance, rather than the

marginality, of the evidence at issue appears to have been the

government’s basis for seeking its admission. The

government has not claimed that the error was harmless,

much less borne its burden of proof of harmlessness.

* * *

McElmurrymakes several additional arguments. First, he

argues that the district court abused its discretion when it

admitted the 2006 interview clips, the letter to the inmate, and

the facts he admitted in his plea agreement for the 2006

crime, because the danger of unfair prejudice substantially

outweighs their probative value. He also argues that this

evidence was improper propensity evidence under 404(b). In

light of our decision to reverse under Curtin-Waters, we

decline to reach these issues.

Since we reverse on 403 error and do not decide on 404

error, the district court will have to analyze the evidence

under both rules, with knowledge of what the evidence is. If

the government makes a Rule 414 argument in district court,

analysis under United States v. LeMay will be required.50

Because we reverse and remand for 403 error, we need

not reach McElmurry’s argument that the government

50 United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1027–28 (9th Cir. 2001)

(noting that a court must “pay careful attention to both the significant

probative value and the strong prejudicial qualities” of Rule 414 evidence

and articulating “several factors that district judges must evaluate in

determining whether to admit evidence of a defendant’s prior acts of

sexual misconduct”) (emphasis added) (internal quotationmarks omitted).

 Case: 12-50183, 01/26/2015, ID: 9394790, DktEntry: 40-1, Page 23 of 29
24 UNITED STATES V. MCELMURRY

committed misconduct during opening and closing arguments

by emphasizing the disputed evidence.

Conclusion

Convictions for possessing child pornography and

distributing the same child pornography do not amount to

double jeopardy. Sharing the child pornography through a

peer-to-peer network amounts to distribution, even though the

distributor does not take some concrete affirmative action for

the particular download that is charged as the distribution. 

The Curtin-Waters error compels reversal. A district court

cannot properly exercise its discretion to decide whether the

probative value of evidence objected to under Rule 403

outweighs the risk of unfair prejudice without examining the

evidence.

The judgment is VACATED and this case is

REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

CHRISTEN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting

in part:

I concur in Parts I and II of the majority opinion. 

McElmurry’s convictions for distributing and possessing

child pornography do not violate double jeopardy, and the

district court correctly denied McElmurry’s motion for a

judgment of acquittal on the distribution charge. I also

concur in Part III of the majority opinion with respect to the

2006 interview statements. Under United States v. Curtin,

489 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc), and United States v.

 Case: 12-50183, 01/26/2015, ID: 9394790, DktEntry: 40-1, Page 24 of 29
UNITED STATES V. MCELMURRY 25

Waters, 627 F.3d 345 (9th Cir. 2010), the district court erred

by making a Rule 403 determination with respect to the

interview statements without reviewing them. I dissent,

however, from the portion of Part III that concludes that the

district court made a similar error with respect to the letter

exhibit that was introduced at trial.

The defendants in both Curtin and Waters objected at

trial under Rule 403 to specific pornographic stories and

specific pieces of anarchist literature, respectively, that the

government sought to introduce. See Waters, 627 F.3d at 356

n.4; Curtin, 489 F.3d at 942. We held in each case that the

district court abused its discretion by making a Rule 403

determination without having read the challenged material. 

Waters, 627 F.3d at 357; Curtin, 489 F.3d at 958. Thus, I

understand Curtin and Waters to apply when a Rule 403

objection is raised regarding a specific piece of evidence, and

the court definitively rules on the objection without reviewing

that piece of evidence. That did not happen with respect to

the letter in this case.

During execution of the search warrant at McElmurry’s

mother’s house, FBI agents seized several items, one of

which was a “disc full of typed letters that Mr. McElmurry

wrote.” McElmurry’s pretrial motion in limine was quite

general, arguing that “the government should not be allowed

to introduce irrelevant or marginally relevant prejudicial

evidence obtained” during the execution of the warrant,

including “letters from an inmate” and “letters (presumably

to an inmate).” In its opposition to McElmurry’s motion, the

government stated its intent to seek admission of “letters

written by Defendant to others about his sexual interest in

children.” Neither McElmurry nor the government specified

 Case: 12-50183, 01/26/2015, ID: 9394790, DktEntry: 40-1, Page 25 of 29
26 UNITED STATES V. MCELMURRY

which letter or letters they sought to introduce, or exclude, at

trial.

The district court held a hearing on the motion in limine

approximately two weeks before trial. McElmurry’s counsel

stated that his “question with regard to [the letters] is the

relevance.” Notably, he did not clearly articulate a prejudice

objection or otherwise invoke Rule 403. The prosecutor

extended an invitation to McElmurry’s counsel “to come over

to my office” and “look through all the items that were

seized.” The prosecutor also stated: “The Friday before trial,

I’ll have all of my exhibits in order and he can take a look at

them at his leisure.” From this, I understand that the

government had not yet identified or marked its exhibits at

the time of the pretrial hearing, and that the district court did

not know which letters or excerpts of letters the government

planned to introduce. The majority reaches the same

conclusion.

It appears the court reasonably relied on McElmurry’s

counsel to take up the offered opportunity to review all the

materials seized from McElmurry’s mother’s house and

confer with the government about trial exhibits and possible

redactions. Indeed, at a status conference held the day before

trial, the prosecutor confirmed that McElmurry’s counsel

“came over to my office and viewed all of our exhibits.” 

One thing is certain: before trial, the district court did not

make a definitive Rule 403 determination with respect to any

of the letters. At the motion in limine hearing, the court

stated: “My tentative [ruling] is to allow the letters, providing

they can be proven up, provided there is a foundation for

admissibility.” (Emphasis added.) The court also denied

McElmurry’s “motion to exclude irrelevant evidence or

 Case: 12-50183, 01/26/2015, ID: 9394790, DktEntry: 40-1, Page 26 of 29
UNITED STATES V. MCELMURRY 27

marginally relevant evidence.” In doing so, the court

signaled it was unwilling to categorically exclude evidence

obtained during the execution of the search warrant, but it did

not rule that the evidence would be admitted, or determine

whether the probative value of any particular piece of

evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect. The government

acknowledged: “[The letters are] like any other . . . piece of

evidence. Obviously, the United States has to lay the

foundation, and to the extent [McElmurry] objects, he can

object.”

The actual exhibit had been marked by the time of the

status conference held the day before trial. There was no

objection to the exhibit and the court made no additional

ruling at that time. Given this record, if McElmurry had a

Rule 403 objection to the specific letter exhibit that was

ultimately proffered at trial, it was his responsibility to

articulate it. See United States v. Lui, 941 F.2d 844, 846 (9th

Cir. 1991) (“A pretrial motion in limine preserves for appeal

the issue of admissibility of that evidence if the substance of

the objection has been thoroughlyexplored during the hearing

and the district court’s ruling permitting introduction of

evidence was explicit and definitive.”). He did not do so.1

1 The letter that was eventually proffered as an exhibit consisted of

seven, single-spaced typed pages. When the government offered it at trial,

McElmurry’s only objection was lack of foundation. That objection was

overruled. The second page of the letter was briefly published to the jury

on an overhead screen. The government emphasized a highlighted portion

regarding computer encryption before taking the letter down. It does not

appear from the trial transcript that any other pages of the letter were

published to the jury during the presentation of the evidence. The entire

letter was eventually sent to the jury room, but before that, outside the

presence of the jury, the government stated it would meet and confer with

McElmurry’s counsel about which parts ofthe letter McElmurry’s counsel

 Case: 12-50183, 01/26/2015, ID: 9394790, DktEntry: 40-1, Page 27 of 29
28 UNITED STATES V. MCELMURRY

The majorityopinion concludesthat McElmurry’s motion

in limine and his argument at the pretrial hearing preserved a

Rule 403 objection to the letter exhibit that was ultimately

introduced, citing Federal Rule of Evidence 103(b) and

United States v. Varela-Rivera, 279 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir.

2002). But these sources make clear that a party is required

to renew an objection at trial when the pretrial ruling is not

definitive. See Fed. R. Evid. 103(b); Varela-Rivera, 279 F.3d

at 1177.2 Here, because the district court’s pretrial ruling did

not definitively address the specific letter exhibit that the

government ultimately sought to introduce and because

McElmurry did not object at trial under Rule 403, I would

review for plain error the district court’s determination that

wanted to redact. The district court directed that any reference to jail time

and a prior arrest be redacted and then asked, “Is there anything else?”

McElmurry’s counsel did not respond. It appears the meet and confer in

fact took place, because the record shows the letter sent to the jury room

as Exhibit 32A had been redacted.

 

2

In Varela-Rivera, the government sought to introduce expert witness

testimony concerning the modus operandi of drug couriers. 279 F.3d at

1176. The defendant objected to the introduction of this type of expert

testimony twice before trial and was overruled each time. Id. The

defendant did not object at trial to the government’s expert’s testimony on

“methods and techniques used by narcotics smugglers.” Id. at 1176–77. 

On this record, we held that the defendant had preserved an objection to

the trial testimony because the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s

pretrial objections was “explicit and definitive.” Id. at 1178. In other

words, the court’s denial was clearly a decision to permit modus operandi

expert testimony, even though the precise content of that testimony was

unclear. See id. On the facts of this case, by contrast, the district court’s

denial of McElmurry’s pretrial motion in limine concerning physical

evidence seized during the search of his mother’s house was not a decision

to permit the introduction of the specific letter exhibit that was ultimately

proffered at trial.

 Case: 12-50183, 01/26/2015, ID: 9394790, DktEntry: 40-1, Page 28 of 29
UNITED STATES V. MCELMURRY 29

the probative value of the letter outweighed its prejudicial

effect, and affirm the district court’s ruling.

By applying the “read every word” rule from Curtin and

Waters to the letter in this case, the majority opinion expands

the rule in a way I fear will be unworkable. As the majority

opinion acknowledges, “the point of in limine resolution of

objections is to enable planning and avoid interruptions to a

jury trial.” But the court’s opinion arguably requires district

courts to review all materials the government might introduce

at trial—before the government has even specifically

identified them—in order to give even a tentative ruling on a

pretrial motion in limine. Such a time-consuming burden will

almost certainly delay pretrial rulings and deprive trial

counsel of helpful guidance needed for trial preparation and

settlement negotiations. For these reasons, I respectfully

dissent.

 Case: 12-50183, 01/26/2015, ID: 9394790, DktEntry: 40-1, Page 29 of 29