Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-15-02742/USCOURTS-ca3-15-02742-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Edwin Fernandez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 15-2742

_____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

EDWIN FERNANDEZ, 

Appellant

_______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(E.D. Pa. No. 2-13-cr-00402-002)

District Judge: Honorable Stewart Dalzell

_______________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

June 17, 2016

Before: AMBRO, NYGAARD and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: June 20, 2016)

______________

OPINION*

_____________

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 

does not constitute binding precedent.

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VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge.

Edwin Fernandez appeals his conviction for one count of conspiracy to import five

kilograms or more of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963, one count of conspiracy to 

distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, one count of 

importation of five kilograms or more of cocaine and aiding and abetting in violation of 

21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 960(a) & (b)(1)(B)(ii) and 18 U.S.C. § 2, two counts of attempted 

possession with the intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and aiding and 

abetting in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and 18 U.S.C. § 2, and one count of attempted 

importation of five kilograms or more of cocaine and aiding and abetting in violation of 

21 U.S.C. § 963 and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Fernandez also appeals his sentence of 300 months’ 

imprisonment and 120 months’ supervised release. Fernandez raises two primary 

arguments: 1) the District Court erred in denying his Motion to Suppress the two cell 

phones, and the data they contained, retrieved after an unrelated arrest because the stop 

and arrest were merely pretextual and not supported by reasonable suspicion or probable 

cause, and 2) the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”) sentence imposed 

by the District Court is substantively unreasonable. For the following reasons, we will 

affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence imposed by the District Court. 

I.

Beginning in August 2011, Edwin Fernandez and his coconspirators engaged in a 

scheme to import cocaine from Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic to Philadelphia, 

Pennsylvania. (Presentence Report “PSR” ¶¶ 11–12). The scheme used baggage handlers 

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employed by US Airways at Philadelphia International Airport to divert luggage 

containing the imported cocaine from international baggage claim to domestic baggage 

claim. (PSR ¶¶ 12–13). Fernandez and his coconspirators successfully imported cocaine 

through this scheme on five separate occasions in November and December 2011.1(PSR

¶ 13). On January 7, 2012, Rolston Abbott, a US Airways baggage handler involved in 

the conspiracy, was unable to divert cocaine imported through the scheme because of the 

presence of United States Customs and Border Protection officials. Customs officials 

discovered three bags containing approximately fifty-nine kilograms of cocaine. (PSR ¶ 

14). Federal agents from Homeland Security Investigations discovered frequent cell 

phone communication between Abbott and Jose Rodriguez, Fernandez’s coconspirator, 

as well as between Abbott and an unknown number in the Dominican Republic. (A-45–

A-48). An analysis of the two cell phones utilized by Rodriguez revealed frequent contact 

on the day before and the day of the seizure with a number issued to “Fat Boy.” (A-48).

A subpoena response from Sprint on February 9th indicated that “Fat Boy” was 

Fernandez and provided his address. (A-115–A-116).

Concurrently, in January 2012, the Philadelphia Police Department Narcotics 

Field Unit (“PPD-NFU”) received an anonymous tip regarding marijuana sales out of a 

residence at 5049 Lancaster Avenue. (A-48). On two separate occasions, PPD-NFU 

officers conducting surveillance at that address observed an individual named Frederick 

 

1 Subsequent to the January 7th seizure by Custom and Border Patrol officials, 

Fernandez and his coconspirators attempted twice, unsuccessfully, to import cocaine 

again through the scheme. (PSR ¶¶ 15–16).

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Foster leave the residence, drive to another location, and meet with individuals who 

entered his vehicle briefly. (A-48–A-49). On February 1, 2012, the second day of 

surveillance, officers observed Foster leave the residence with a small black bag, drive to 

meet a male, later identified as Jeffrey Burns, who entered Foster’s car briefly before reentering his own. (A-80–A-81). When officers approached Burns’ vehicle they saw what 

they believed to be marijuana in plain view and placed Burns under arrest. (A-81). 

On February 7, 2012, PPD-NFU officers on surveillance at 5049 Lancaster 

Avenue observed Foster again leave the residence with a black bag and drive to a lunch 

truck which Fernandez operated. (A-82). Officer Jose Candelaria followed Foster and 

observed the following without obstruction. (A-83). Foster exited his vehicle and 

engaged in a brief conversation with Fernandez, at the conclusion of which Fernandez 

handed Foster money in exchange for the black bag Foster had brought from his 

residence. (A-83–A-84). Believing that he had just seen a narcotics transaction, Officer 

Candelaria and a fellow PPD-NFU officer stopped and arrested Fernandez.

2

(A-84–A85). Incident to the arrest, the officers recovered the black bag, which contained small, 

clear baggies of marijuana totaling 125.2 grams, approximately $2,700 in cash, and two 

cell phones. (A-84–A-86). Approximately seven months later, federal agents discovered

Fernandez’s role in the drug importation scheme and secured search warrants for the cell 

phones seized at the time of his arrest by the PPD. (A-52–A-53). 

 

2 Fernandez pleaded guilty to intentional possession of a controlled substance in 

Philadelphia County Municipal Court and received one-year of probation. (PSR ¶ 38). 

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A grand jury returned a superseding six-count indictment charging Fernandez with 

the counts described supra. (PSR ¶ 4). Fernandez filed a Motion to Suppress the cell 

phones and the data from the phones recovered subsequent to his February 7th arrest by 

PPD-NFU. (A-41–A-43). The United States District Court for the Eastern District of 

Pennsylvania (Dalzell, J.) denied the motion after a hearing, finding that the arrest was 

supported by probable cause, that the cell phones were properly seized incident to the 

lawful arrest, and that the phones were searched pursuant to a lawfully obtained warrant. 

(A-2, A-125–A-127). Fernandez pleaded guilty to all six counts. (Supp. App. 58–Supp. 

App. 81). The District Court (Dalzell, J.), sentenced Fernandez to 300 months’ 

imprisonment and 120 months’ supervised release. (A-3–A-5). This timely appeal 

followed. (A-1). 

II.

3

A.

We review the denial of a motion to suppress under a mixed standard of review. 

United States v. Lewis, 672 F.3d 232, 236–37 (3d Cir. 2012). We exercise plenary review 

over legal determinations and clear error review for factual findings. Id at 237. We 

exercise plenary review over an officer’s reasonable suspicion or probable cause 

determination. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996). 

A warrantless arrest “is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment where there is 

 

3 The District Court had jurisdiction over Fernandez’s case pursuant to 18 U.S.C 

§ 3231. We have jurisdiction to review final orders of a district court pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1291 and jurisdiction to review the sentence the District Court imposed pursuant 

to 18 U.S.C § 3742.

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probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being committed.” 

Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004). “Probable cause exists whenever 

reasonably trustworthy information or circumstances within a police officer’s knowledge 

are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to conclude that an offense has 

been committed by the person being arrested.” United States v. Myers, 308 F.3d 251, 255 

(3d Cir. 2002). On appeal, our task is “to determine whether the facts available to the 

officers at the moment of the arrest” would allow a reasonable person to find that 

probable cause, as defined above, existed. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964).

While probable cause is a determination only courts can ultimately make, we give 

deference to the “on-the-scene conclusion[s]” of officers. Myers, 308 F.3d at 255. In 

reviewing these conclusions, we must consider the demands officers face, in which they 

may “draw inferences and make deductions . . . that might well elude an untrained 

person.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418

(1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The subjective motivations of an officer do 

not render an arrest unconstitutional if it is supported by probable cause. Whren v. United 

States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). 

Fernandez asserts that the District Court erred by denying his Motion to Suppress 

because the arrest was pretextual and not supported by probable cause. (Appellant’s Br. 

15–20). For a pretextual arrest to conform to the protections afforded by the Fourth 

Amendment, Fernandez maintains that the arresting officers must have observed an 

actual violation of the law, which he contends they did not. (Id. at 13). The Government 

points to the officers’ investigation, including surveillance of Foster, and Officer 

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Candelaria’s observation, based on his fifteen years of narcotics experience, as 

supporting probable cause to arrest.4(Government’s Br. 19–20). Even if it was pretextual, 

the Government asserts that because the arrest was supported by probable cause, there is 

no Fourth Amendment violation. (Id. at 23–24). 

The District Court denied Fernandez’s Motion to Suppress, finding probable cause

to arrest. (A-125–A-126). The District Court also found that the cell phones were seized 

pursuant to a search incident to lawful arrest, provided for by the Supreme Court in 

Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), and not searched until this warrant was secured

(A-126). 

We can easily conclude that the District Court properly denied Fernandez’s 

Motion to Suppress. The facts elicited through Officer Candelaria’s testimony at the 

hearing establish that he had probable cause to arrest under this Court’s precedent. (A78–A-85). At the time of the arrest, Officer Candelaria articulated that he believed, based 

on his fifteen years of experience in narcotics, that he had just witnessed a narcotics 

transaction. (A-84), Officer Candelaria based this this belief not only on his observation, 

but also on the information he learned about Foster through Officer Elliot, who was 

leading the investigation. (A-84). Officer Candelaria’s observations matched the 

information he received from Officer Elliott regarding Foster’s narcotic transaction 

practices. As this Court has acknowledged, Officer Candelaria correctly relied on the

 

4 At the time of the Motion to Suppress hearing Officer Candelaria was a nineteenyear veteran of the PPD. (A-78). Officer Candelaria had been in the PPD-NFU since 

2005, prior to which he served in the PPD’s Narcotics Strike Force for five years. (Id.). 

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information obtained through this investigation because the “collective knowledge” 

doctrine applies. United States v. Whitfield, 634 F.3d 741, 745–46 (3d Cir. 2010). Under

this doctrine, “the knowledge of one law enforcement officer is imputed to the officer 

who actually conducted the . . . arrest.” Id. at 745. 

Fernandez has failed to point to any evidence to support his assertion that the 

arrest was pretext for the PPD to secure his cell phones for the federal investigation. 

(Appellant’s Br. 14). Testimony from two PPD officers and a federal agent, which the 

District Court found credible, indicated that there was no interaction between the two 

entities prior to September 2012, nearly seven months after Fernandez’s arrest. (A-102–

A-105). Federal agent Brian Ressler testified that Fernandez had not been identified as a 

coconspirator in the cocaine importation scheme at the time of his arrest by the PPD. (A108). The subpoena response from Sprint which identified Fernandez as a contact from 

Rodriguez’s phone came two days after the PPD arrest. (A-115–A-116). As the District 

Court noted, while the chronology of events might invite conjecture, the record indicates 

that the federal agents and the PPD acted properly as “two sovereigns.” (A-125.). Even 

assuming, arguendo, that Officer Candelaria arrested Fernandez to advance the federal 

investigation, the District Court properly denied the Motion to Suppress because it 

correctly determined that probable cause to arrest existed based on the totality of the 

circumstances. See United States v. Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d 392, 398 (3d Cir. 2006) 

(quoting Whren, 517 U.S. at 813, for the proposition that the Supreme Court “ha[s] been 

unwilling to entertain Fourth Amendment challenges based on the actual motivations of

individual officers”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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Fernandez’s contention that Officer Candelaria’s observation could not give rise to 

probable cause to arrest because the interaction between Foster and Fernandez could have 

been an innocent one is unavailing. (Appellant’s Br. 17). We do not consider whether 

probable cause existed based on a single aspect of an arrest. Rather, we apply a totalityof-the-circumstances approach to determine whether the collective facts available to the 

officer constituted probable cause. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230–31 (1983). We 

have no difficulty concluding on these facts that there was probable cause to arrest 

Fernandez. 

B.

We review the sentence imposed by a district court for abuse of discretion, which 

is limited to determining whether the sentence is reasonable. Gall v. United States, 552 

U.S. 38, 46 (2007); United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 564–65 (3d Cir. 2009) (en 

banc).

Our reasonableness review is comprised of both a procedural and a substantive 

element. United States v. Lychock, 578 F.3d 214, 217 (3d Cir. 2009). The party 

challenging the reasonableness of the sentence bears the burden of demonstrating 

unreasonableness. United States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 543 (3d Cir. 2007). Because 

we are satisfied that the sentence at issue meets the requirements of procedural 

reasonableness, we focus on the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, which 

Fernandez challenges on appeal. For our review of substantive reasonableness, we “take 

into account the totality of the circumstances.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. A sentence outside 

the Guidelines is substantively reasonable if, based on the sentencing judge’s 

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“individualized assessment based on the facts presented,” there is a “justification [that] is 

sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance.” Id. at 50. We have stated 

that “a district court’s failure to give mitigating factors the weight a defendant contends 

they deserve [does not] render[] the sentence unreasonable.” Bungar, 478 F.3d at 546. A 

within-Guidelines sentence may be presumed reasonable. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 

338, 347 (2007). 

If a sentence is outside the Guidelines range, we “must give due deference to [a] 

district court's decision that the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the 

extent of the variance.”5 Gall, 552 U.S. at 51; see United States v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 

204 (3d Cir. 2007). We may not reverse simply because we “might reasonably have 

concluded that a different sentence was appropriate.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. Only if “no 

reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular 

defendant for the reasons the district court provided” will we reverse. Tomko, 562 F.3d at 

568.

Fernandez asks this Court to vacate and remand for resentencing on the basis that 

the District Court erred in failing to adequately consider mitigating factors which he 

 

5 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sets forth the factors a district court must consider in 

imposing a sentence. These include, in relevant part:

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and 

characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed . . .;

(3) the kinds of sentences available; (4) the kinds of sentence and the 

sentencing range established . . . ; (5) any pertinent policy statement; (6) the 

need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with 

similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and (7) the 

need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.

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asserts should reduce his sentence. (Appellant’s Br. 22–23). Two factors merit a reduced 

sentence according to Fernandez: the nonviolent nature of the charged offenses and the 

low rate of recidivism for men the age Fernandez will be when released from prison.

(Id.). Fernandez asserts that the mandatory minimum of 240 months’ imprisonment

sufficiently addresses the aims of the Sentencing Guidelines. (Id.). The Government 

maintains that the sentence is reasonable based on the facts of this case, which the 

District Court adequately applied to the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. (Government’s Br. 

27). 

At sentencing, the District Court correctly calculated Fernandez’s Guideline range 

as 324 to 435 months’ imprisonment. 6(A-142). The District Court also noted that,

pursuant to the information the Government filed charging a prior drug trafficking 

conviction, the mandatory minimum was 240 months’ imprisonment under 21 U.S.C. § 

851. (A-142); (PSR ¶ 2). Weighing the facts of the case, the District Court imposed a 

below-Guidelines sentence of 300 months’ imprisonment. (A-176–A-177). 

Fernandez’s assertion that the below-Guidelines sentence is greater than necessary

to accomplish the goals of sentencing for the charged offenses is unpersuasive. The 

District Court’s statement of reasons evinced a reasonable application of the 18 U.S.C. §

3553(a) factors, such as: Fernandez’s age, his “relatively modest criminal history,” and 

 

6 After initially referencing the Guidelines range calculated by the Probation 

Office as 324 to 405, the District Court misspoke and indicated the upper end of the 

range to be 435. Compare (A-142), with (A-177); (PSR ¶ 88). Because the misstatement 

of the upper end of the range did not impact the District Court’s reasoning in anyway and 

the sentence imposed is below-Guidelines range, this is harmless error. 

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“expressions of remorse” along with the “very serious criminality” of the instant offenses 

and Fernandez’s “perjur[y] . . . at the expense of his seasoned former counsel.”

7

(A-177). 

This well-reasoned application of “the § 3553(a) factors . . . to the circumstances of the 

case” satisfies our requirement for substantive reasonableness. Lessner, 498 F.3d at 204. 

Simply because Fernandez wishes that the District Court had imposed a lower 

sentence does not render its sentence an abuse of discretion. Fernandez asks this Court to 

disregard the deference afforded a sentencing judge without articulating how this belowGuidelines sentence is substantively unreasonable. Asserting that the District Court did 

not give enough weight to arguments for further leniency is insufficient under our 

precedent. (Appellant’s Br. 22–23). We give due deference to the weight the District 

Court applied to the sentencing factors and its consideration of Fernandez’s arguments 

for further downward variance. See Tomko, 562 F.3d at 561; United States v. Dragon, 

471 F.3d 501, 506 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that “we afford deference to the District Court 

because it is in the best position to determine the appropriate sentence in light of the 

particular circumstances of the case”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the 

record demonstrates that the District Court considered the mitigating factors in imposing 

a sentence that, “while slightly below the Advisory Guideline range, is nevertheless a 

 

7

Initially Fernandez pleaded not guilty. (Supp. App. 80). He changed his plea to a 

conditional plea following a hearing at which he testified in support of his motion to limit 

the Government’s use of his previously made proffers on the ground that his former 

counsel did not adequately explain the ramifications. (Supp. App. 54–Supp. App. 80).

Fernandez’s former counsel testified to the full explanations he provided about the 

proffer statements, which Fernandez denied ever receiving. (Supp. App. 10–Supp. App. 

23). Characterizing the “credibility contest” between Fernandez and his former counsel as 

“not even close,” the District Court denied the motion. (Supp. App. 45–Supp. App. 46).

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serious number.” (A-176). We decline to find that the District Court’s imposition of 300 

months’ imprisonment is substantively unreasonable. 

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence 

imposed by the District Court on July 17, 2015. 

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