Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-14-12594/USCOURTS-ca11-14-12594-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Calvin Boyd
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14–12594

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 5:92–cr–00082–CAR–CHW–8

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

CALVIN BOYD,

a.k.a. Mee Tee,

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Georgia

________________________

(April 1, 2015)

Before TJOFLAT, WILSON, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Defendant Calvin Maurice Boyd (“Defendant”), proceeding pro se, appeals 

the denial of his 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1) motion for early termination of supervised 

release. Defendant argues that the district court erred by failing to give “equitable” 

consideration to the excess time he spent in prison and by neglecting to consult his 

probation officer, thereby failing to take into account his conduct and progress 

while serving his term of supervised release. After review of the record and the 

parties’ briefs, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted on three counts: (1) conspiracy 

to distribute cocaine and cocaine base; (2) conspiracy to violate the Hobbs Act, 

through a series of robberies and threats of physical violence; and (3) conspiracy to 

use firearms during a drug-trafficking crime. The presentence report in this case 

sets out the following facts.1

 Upon his release from state custody in November 

1990, Defendant became involved in a violent drug distribution organization. To 

finance their operation and obtain drugs, organization members would rob other 

drug dealers, “shot house” operators, and gambling establishments—often while 

dressed as police officers. On several occasions, organization members shot or 

 1

 At sentencing, Defendant’s primary objection to the presentence report focused on the 

latter’s calculation of drug quantity. He also objected to any consideration by the district court 

of the two counts on which he was acquitted, which counts charged Defendant with possession 

of a firearm during a drug trafficking crime or a crime of violence on July 21, 1991 and 

November 21, 1991, respectively, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). At sentencing, the district 

court indicated that it would not consider any conduct for which Defendant was acquitted. 

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otherwise injured their victims, and in December 1991, they killed a drug dealer

from whom they had just taken “crack cocaine and cash.” 

Having joined the conspiracy late, Defendant’s known involvement in the

organization’s drug trade was limited to three deliveries of cocaine base (“crack 

cocaine”), the total amount of which the district court found to be between 50 and 

150 grams. 

The presentence report further concluded that Defendant not only delivered

drugs for the organization, but he had also involved himself in three violent 

incidents on its behalf. First, on July 21, 1991, he participated in the robbery of a 

“high stakes gambling house[,]” during which he was armed with a shotgun. 

Notably, one of the victims of the robbery was instructed to kneel on the floor, 

where he was shot in the arm and side with a shotgun. Second, on November 21, 

1991, Defendant and a number of co-conspirators “fired shotguns and pistols” into 

the residence of an individual who owed them $2,400. While the gunfire did not 

injure anyone, it narrowly missed the debtor’s wife and children. 

But it should be noted that Defendant was acquitted of the § 924(c) counts

(Counts 11 and 14), which charged him with the substantive offense of using and 

carrying a firearm during a drug trafficking crime and during a crime of violence 

offense, as charged in Counts 1 and 2, respectively. Count 11 presumably 

references the July 21 armed robbery and Count 14 presumably references the 

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November 21 shooting as those dates are listed as the dates the offenses were

committed. Nevertheless, he was convicted of Counts 1 and 2, which charged him, 

respectively, with conspiracy to distribute drugs and conspiracy to violate the 

Hobbs Act through a series of robberies and violent threats. Further, of the overt 

acts listed in Count 2, Defendant was listed in only one: the November 21 incident 

where he and co-defendant Clowers were alleged to have shot at Jesse Moseley.

The presentence report also indicated that Defendant was present for the

planning of a December 1991 robbery in which the victim was killed, and that he 

possibly even participated in the crime. The latter incident signaled the beginning 

of the end for the drug distribution organization. Within two weeks, the 

organization kidnapped, shot, and killed one of its own members, after learning 

that this member intended to inform police about the organization’s crimes. This

event precipitated the flight to New York of some members of the organization, 

and the arrests of others. Then, in 1992, a grand jury returned an indictment 

against various members of the drug distribution organization, including

Defendant. 

In sentencing Defendant, the district court determined his Sentencing 

Guidelines’ range to be 360 months to life,

2 and sentenced him to the low-end of 

 2

 In calculating the Guidelines’ range for Defendant’s Count 1 conviction, the district 

court began with a base offense level of 32, pursuant to U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1(a)(3) and (c)(6), 

which apply to offenses involving the unlawful manufacturing, importing, exporting, or 

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the Guidelines’ range: 360 months in prison, followed by a five-year term of 

supervised release. We affirmed Defendant’s conviction and sentence on appeal. 

United States v. Boyd, 131 F.3d 951, 952, 956 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied 525 

U.S. 892 (1998). 

In February 2008, Defendant moved the district court to reduce his sentence 

in light of Amendment 706 to the Sentencing Guidelines, which lowered the 

offense level for specified thresholds of crack cocaine. The court granted 

Defendant’s motion, lowering his total offense level to 35 and imposing a sentence 

at the low-end of the Guidelines’ range of 292 months’ imprisonment. Then, in 

October 2011, after a second, similar amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines—

Amendment 750—Defendant again moved the district court to modify his 

sentence. Once again, the court granted Defendant’s motion, reducing his offense 

level for the drug trafficking count of conviction. The court’s grant of Defendant’s 

second motion resulted in the lowering of the base offense level for his Count 1

 

trafficking of 50 to 150 grams of cocaine base, or attempts or conspiracies to engage in such 

offenses. Because Defendant possessed firearms during the conspiracy, the court then added a 

two-level enhancement pursuant to §§ 1B1.3 and 2D1.1(b)(1), taking the adjusted offense level 

to 34. 

At the time, this Count 1 drug trafficking conspiracy count of conviction gave rise to 

Defendant’s highest adjusted offense level. See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4. Then, to account for 

Defendant’s multiple offenses, the court added three levels pursuant to § 3D1.4, arriving at a

total offense level of 37. Because Defendant had 13 criminal history points and a criminal 

history category of VI, the above calculation yielded a sentencing range of 360 months to life. 

U.S.S.G. § 5A. 

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drug conspiracy conviction to 28. Two levels were then added, pursuant to the 

dangerous weapon enhancement, § 2D1.1(b)(1), to arrive at an adjusted offense 

level of 30. However, with this latest reduction, the crack cocaine count of 

conviction no longer gave rise to Defendant’s highest adjusted offense level. 

Rather, at 31, the adjusted offense level for Defendant’s Hobbs Act conspiracy 

conviction achieved that distinction. Consequently, the court added three levels to 

this latter adjusted offense level to account for Defendant’s multiple offenses, 

pursuant to § 3D1.4. Because Defendant had 13 criminal history points and a 

criminal history category of VI, his Guidelines’ range became 262 to 327 months’ 

imprisonment. U.S.S.G. § 5A. The district court imposed a 262-month sentence. 

Notably, the term of Defendant’s supervised release did not change with either 

modification of his sentence.

After serving 228 months of this 262-month sentence, Defendant was 

released on January 24, 2012,

3 at which point he began serving his five-year term 

of supervised release. Nearly two-and-a-half years into that term, Defendant 

requested that the district court terminate early his supervised release, pursuant to 

18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1). In support of his request, Defendant argued that (1) given 

 3

 The Government suspects that Defendant was released after serving only 228 months 

of his 262-month sentence because of “good time credits earned . . . in prison.” From a rough 

calculation of the allowable reduction of 54 days a year that good time credit would achieve, the 

Government’s hypothesis seems likely. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1) (allowing up to 54 days a 

year credit on a person’s sentence based on satisfactory behavior).

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the reductions triggered by Amendments 706 and 750, he had spent five extra 

years in prison; (2) he has fulfilled the conditions of his supervised release; (3) he 

has held steady employment since his release from prison; (4) he is pursuing a 

degree at a technical college; and (5) he is not a risk to public safety. 

The district court denied Defendant’s motion in a summary order issued 

May 28, 2014. Defendant moved for reconsideration, which the court granted “for 

the limited purpose of clarifying [its] previous order.” Specifically, the district 

court responded that it had denied Defendant’s motion for early termination of 

supervised release because of “particular concern[] about the violent nature of the 

crimes for which Defendant was convicted and the overarching need to protect the 

public from further crimes by Defendant.” This appeal followed.4

II. ANALYSIS

We review a district court’s revocation of supervised release, pursuant to 18 

U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Cunningham, 607 

F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir. 2010). In addition, we ordinarily review the imposition 

 4

 Actually, Defendant filed his motion for reconsideration and notice of appeal on the 

same day. Ordinarily, “the filing of a notice of appeal deprives the district court of jurisdiction 

over all issues involved in the appeal.” Mahone v. Ray, 326 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 2003) 

(citing Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982) and Doe v. Bush, 261 

F.3d 1037, 1064 (11th Cir. 2001)). But where, as here, a party timely files a motion for 

reconsideration before filing a notice of appeal, the latter is tolled until the district court rules on 

the former. United States v. Glover, 686 F.3d 1203, 1205–06 (11th Cir. 2012); see Fed. R. App. 

P. 4(b)(3). Thus, the court below possessed jurisdiction to rule on the merits of Defendant’s 

motion for reconsideration.

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of a special condition of supervised release for abuse of discretion. United States 

v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1087-88 (11th Cir. 2003). For that reason, we will assume 

that review of the denial of a motion for early termination of supervised release 

should likewise be subject to an abuse of discretion standard.

5

In challenging the denial of his motion for early termination, Defendant 

argues that the district court erred (1) by failing to give equitable consideration to 

the excess time he spent in prison and (2) by neglecting to consult Defendant’s

probation officer, thereby failing to take into account Defendant’s conduct and 

progress while serving his term of supervised release. We address each of 

Defendant’s arguments in turn. 

A. Equitable Consideration of Excess Prison Time

Defendant’s first argument, that the district court erred by failing to give 

equitable consideration to any excess time he spent in prison, is premised on

United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53 (2000). There, the Supreme Court 

considered whether a defendant’s excess imprisonment should be credited to his 

supervised release term, thereby reducing its length. Id. at 54. Reciting the 

language of 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e), the Court noted that, with limited, inapplicable 

exceptions, a term of supervised release does not “commence until an individual is 

 5

 While unpublished, and therefore non-precedential, decisions of this Court have 

applied this standard to rulings on motions to modify terms of supervised release, we have found 

no published (precedential) cases on this issue. But we can discern no good reason why an abuse 

of discretion standard would not be applicable here.

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‘released from imprisonment.’” Id. at 57–59. The Court further emphasized that 

imprisonment and supervised release serve separate and distinct ends. Id. at 59–

60. Consequently, the Court held that a term of supervised release is not required 

to be shortened by excess time an individual spends in prison. Johnson, 529 U.S.

at 54, 58, 60. 

That said, though, the Supreme Court acknowledged that “equitable 

considerations of great weight exist when an individual is incarcerated beyond the 

proper expiration of his prison term.” Id. at 60. Thus, while incarceration in 

excess of the appropriate sentence does not require a court to shorten a term of 

supervised release, a district court can certainly take that fact into account when 

deciding whether to terminate early the defendant’s supervised release. Id. 

Here, Defendant asserts that he was in prison five-and-a-half years longer 

than he should have been. This is so because, in Defendant’s view, Amendment 

750 directed that his sentence should have been between 140 and 175 months, 

rather than the 262-month sentence he ultimately received. Even though

Defendant actually served only 228 months, he notes that this period of time also 

exceeds the amended Guidelines’ range that he says should have applied. 

Accordingly, Defendant argues that the district court should have taken this excess 

imprisonment into account when ruling on his motion for early termination of 

supervised release, and that the court erred by not doing so.

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Contrary to Defendant’s assertion, however, the district court did not err by 

refusing to give dispositive effect to Defendant’s allegedly excessive incarceration.

First, and importantly, Defendant did not spend any excess time in prison, albeit he 

persists in claiming that he did. See infra at 12–13. Contrary to his contention, 

application of Amendment 750 to his case in 2011 did not mean that Defendant’s

sentencing range was to be between 140 and 175 months.

6

 The November 2011

resentencing did lower the adjusted offense level for Defendant’s Count 1 drug 

conspiracy conviction to 30. However, this adjustment meant that the offense level 

for Defendant’s Hobbs Act conspiracy conviction, which was 31, now became the 

highest offense level for a count of conviction. See discussion supra at 6. 

Consequently, when the district court calculated Defendant’s new Guidelines’

range, it did so based upon this latter offense level of 31. See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4. 

Given Defendant’s criminal history category of VI, the resulting Guidelines’ range 

for Defendant’s Hobbs Act conspiracy conviction was 262 to 327 months. 

U.S.S.G. § 5A. The district court then sentenced Defendant to the low-end of this

Guidelines’ range, 262 months, of which he served 228 months. In short, 

Defendant served no excess time in prison.

 6 Leaving aside the fact that, with the second reduction, the Hobbs Act conspiracy 

conviction became the determiner of the base offense level, see infra, Defendant’s calculation of 

a Guidelines’ range dictated by his drug conspiracy conviction is still incorrect. With a reduced 

offense level of 28, enhanced by two levels to level 30, and adding three more levels for 

Defendant’s additional counts of conviction, Defendant’s total offense level would have been a 

33. With Defendant’s criminal history, his resulting range would have been 235–293 months, 

not 140–175 months.

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Second, while Johnson permits a district court to consider excess 

imprisonment when ruling on a motion to terminate early an individual’s 

supervised release, it does not require the court to end supervision early, based just 

on that fact. Johnson, 529 U.S. at 60 (“The statutory structure provides a means to 

address [equitable considerations] . . . the court may terminate an individual’s 

supervised release obligations . . . ‘if it is satisfied that such action is warranted by 

the conduct of the defendant released and the interest of justice.’”) (internal 

citation omitted) (emphasis added); Reynolds v. Thomas, 603 F.3d 1144, 1148 (9th 

Cir. 2010) (“A court could consider this alleged period of over-incarceration under 

18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) as a factor weighing in favor of reducing the term of 

supervised release.”) (emphasis added), abrogated on other grounds by Setser v. 

United States, 566 U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1463 (2012). Indeed, consistent with the 

structure of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), a district court’s consideration of excess prison 

time is discretionary. See Rhodes v. Judiscak, 676 F.3d 931, 933–35 (10th Cir. 

2012) and Johnson v. Pettiford, 442 F.3d 917, 918 (5th Cir. 2006) (“[A] district 

court may exercise its discretion to modify an individual’s term of supervised 

release, taking into account that an individual has been ‘incarcerated beyond the 

proper expiration of his prison term.’”).

What’s more, there is no indication here that when ruling on his motion for 

early termination of supervised release, the district court failed to take into 

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consideration Defendant’s claim that he had spent excess time in prison. 

Defendant raised that claim in both his initial motion to terminate supervision and 

in his motion for reconsideration, and the court’s order granting in part the latter 

motion stated that it “considered all the relevant factors and determined that early 

termination was inappropriate in this case.” Notably, the district court had 

previously rejected, on at least two other occasions, Defendant’s very same 

argument that Amendment 750 dictated that his sentence must fall within the 

Guidelines’ range of 140 to 175 months.

And finally, although excess imprisonment is an “equitable consideration[] 

of great weight” under Johnson, it does not automatically override other factors the 

district court must consider. Incarceration and supervised release serve different 

purposes: imprisonment is punitive, whereas supervised release aims to “assist 

convicted felons in their transitions to community life.” Johnson, 529 U.S. at 55, 

59. On this latter point, Congress acknowledged that a successful transition to 

community life depends upon a number of factors, and it left it to the district court

to use its discretion in balancing those factors. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e)(1); 

see Zinn, 321 F.3d at 1089 (“[E]ach [§ 3553(a) factor] is an independent 

consideration to be weighed.”) and United States v. Pregent, 190 F.3d 279, 282–83 

(4th Cir. 1999) (discussing, before issuance of Johnson, the factors a court 

considers when contemplating early termination of supervised release). To require 

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early termination of release because of excess time served in prison would 

undermine this statutory framework. 

Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s 

motion for early termination based on the latter’s allegation that he had served 

more prison time than the Guidelines’ range called for. 

B. Failure to Consider § 3553(a) Factors

Defendant’s second argument on appeal is that the district court did not 

“fulfill its obligations under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)[.]” As discussed below, he 

supports that argument with four related contentions. We are not persuaded by 

Defendant’s contentions.

Section 3583(e) allows for early termination of supervision. It provides that 

a district court may, after considering certain enumerated provisions of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a), 

terminate a term of supervised release and discharge the defendant 

released at any time after the expiration of one year of supervised 

release, pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Rules of Criminal 

Procedure relating to the modification of probation, if it is satisfied 

that such action is warranted by the conduct of the defendant released 

and the interest of justice[.]

18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1) (emphasis added). The § 3553(a) factors that the district

court must consider are: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the 

history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed 

to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (3) the need for the sentence 

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imposed to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; (4) the need for 

the sentence imposed to provide the defendant with needed educational or 

vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most 

effective manner; (5) the kinds of sentence and sentencing range established for the 

applicable category of offense committed, as set forth in the Sentencing 

Guidelines; (6) pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission; 

(7) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with 

similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and (8) the need to 

provide restitution to any victims of the offense. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(e), 3553(a)(1), 

(a)(2)(B)–(D), (a)(4)–(7). As a general matter, in weighing the above

considerations, the court need not “‘articulate the applicability of each factor, as 

long as the record demonstrates that the pertinent factors were taken into 

account[.]’” United States v. Douglas, 576 F.3d 1216, 1219 (11th Cir. 2009) 

(quoting United States v. Williams, 557 F.3d 1254, 1256 (11th Cir. 2009)).

Defendant argues that the district court’s denial of his motion constituted an 

abuse of discretion, and non-compliance with § 3553(a), because: (1) the court 

“failed to consider any of [Defendant’s] post-release conduct”; (2) neither the 

Government nor Defendant’s probation officer opposed the motion; (3)

Defendant’s probation officer “stated repeatedly [] that[,] as f[a]r as he is 

concerned[, Defendant] has fulfilled all the obligations of supervised release and 

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[that] he did not oppose [Defendant’s] supervised release being terminated, and [] 

would state the same to the district court if consulted”; and (4) no factual basis 

exists from which to conclude that continued supervised release is required to 

assuage concerns about the violent nature of Defendant’s offenses or to protect the 

public from future crimes by him. 

First, we disagree that the district court failed to consider the § 3553(a) 

factors, or more particularly the factor that Defendant urges the court should have 

most considered: Defendant’s post-release conduct. While it is true that the 

district court’s initial order denying Defendant’s initial motion for early 

termination of supervised release failed to state that it had considered the § 3553(a) 

factors when ruling on the motion, its order granting in part Defendant’s motion 

for reconsideration indicates that the court had considered these factors. See 

Douglas, 576 F.3d at 1219 (a district court need not articulate the applicability of 

each § 3553(a) factor as long as the record demonstrates that the pertinent factors 

were taken into account.) 

Indeed, that order was issued in response to Defendant’s motion for 

reconsideration, which specifically argued that the court had not considered 

§ 3553(a) factors or Defendant’s post-release conduct. Specifically, the district 

court acknowledged this allegation, noting “Although not explicitly stated, the 

Court did rely on the § 3553(a) factors in its Order denying Defendant’s [initial 

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motion] ... [and] the Court considered all the relevant factors [when it] determined 

that early termination was inappropriate in this case.” The district court then went 

on to identify the primary reason for its denial of early termination of supervision: 

that is, its “particular[] concern[] about the violent nature of the crimes for which 

Defendant was convicted and the overarching need to protect the public from 

further crimes by Defendant.” In so clarifying, the court explicitly cited 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 3553(a)(1) and (a)(2)(C) in support. 

As to Defendant’s argument that the district court should have allowed early 

termination because neither the Government nor Defendant’s probation officer 

opposed the motion, we can identify no authority—nor does Defendant cite any—

that requires a court to grant an unopposed motion for early termination of 

supervised release. Just as a federal prosecutor or probation officer cannot dictate 

a district court’s sentence, they likewise do not call the shots concerning a court’s 

decision whether to terminate early a term of supervised release. A criminal 

sentence is the court’s sentence, not the prosecutor’s and not the probation 

officer’s. 

As to Defendant’s related argument that the district court must not have 

consulted with the probation officer before making his decision, and that such 

consultation was required, Defendant cites no authority that mandates a court to 

consult a defendant’s probation officer when reviewing a motion for early 

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termination of supervised release. Moreover, Defendant’s reliance on the likely 

positive recommendation of his officer seems greatly overstated. Specifically, 

Defendant avers only that, after the initial denial of his motion by the court, the 

probation officer indicated that “if he was asked,” he would advise the court that 

Defendant “had complied with all conditions of supervised release.” Inasmuch as 

many, if not most, offenders presumably complete the full term of their release 

having fully complied with all their conditions, the officer’s statement hardly 

suggested an enthusiastic recommendation that supervision be terminated. Further, 

in his own motion, Defendant had noted the factors that should guide probation 

officers in determining whether to recommend early termination. One of those 

factors was “no history of violence” and “no identifiable risk to public safety based 

on the Risk Prediction Index.” Consideration of those factors suggests that the 

probation officer should not have, and actually did not, recommend early 

termination.

Finally, Defendant argues that no factual basis exists from which to 

conclude that continued supervision is necessary given concerns about the violent 

nature of Defendant’s offenses or to protect the public from future criminal acts by 

him. We disagree that there is no basis for continued concern. Not only was 

Defendant actively associated with an extremely blood-thirsty band of criminals—

and was convicted of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act violations—his presentence 

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report also details a very troubling past for which he was assigned a criminal 

history category of VI, the highest criminal history category in the Sentencing 

Guidelines.7

 Moreover, Defendant’s criminal history shows that he had previously 

committed three offenses while on parole, and had his probation revoked on 

another occasion for a technical violation. Thus, an adequate basis exists in the 

record to support the district court’s concern over the violent nature of Defendant’s 

offenses and its conclusion that completion by Defendant of his full supervised 

release term was necessary to protect the public.

That said, nothing in our opinion should detract from Defendant’s compliant 

behavior during his release. He is to be congratulated for maintaining steady 

employment and pursuing an education since his release from prison. Indeed, 

Defendant notes that he has done so well on release, he is no longer even required 

to report to his probation officer. In other words, it appears that Defendant is 

operating under a non-reporting term of supervision. If accurate, what this means 

in practical terms is that the only potential ramification posed by continuing 

supervised release of Defendant is the possibility of revocation, and perhaps a 

return to prison, should he violate the law during the remainder of his term. Unless 

Defendant intends to break the law again, this incentive to continue his good 

 7

 Of note, Defendant’s Hobbs Act conspiracy conviction includes seven violent 

“shadow” or “pseudo” counts for sentencing purposes; his Count 3 conviction pertains to the 

possession and use of firearms “in relation to drug trafficking crimes and crimes of violence” and 

outlines seven overt acts of such conduct. 

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behavior should not pose an unreasonable burden and, in fact, it is arguably a 

helpful nudge to encourage the Defendant to continue being a law-abiding citizen.

In short, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

deciding against an early termination of Defendant’s supervised release.

III. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the district court’s order denying Defendant’s motion 

for early termination of supervised release is hereby AFFIRMED.

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