Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01293/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01293-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ann Victoria Ellefson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 04-1293

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United States of America,

Appellee,

v.

Ann Victoria Ellefson,

Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States

District Court for the

Northern District of Iowa.

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Submitted: October 19, 2004

 Filed: August 23, 2005

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Before COLLOTON, LAY, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges. 

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GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

Ann Victoria Ellefson was convicted of distributing and aiding and abetting the

distribution of 2,887 pseudoephedrine pills knowing, or having a reasonable cause

to believe, the pseudoephedrine would be used to manufacture methamphetamine, in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count 1); possession with intent

to distribute and aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute 260.5 grams

of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C) and 18 U.S.C. §

2 (Count 2); and possession of methamphetamine and marijuana, in violation of 21

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The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Judge for the Northern

District of Iowa. 

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U.S.C. § 844(a) (Count 3). The district court1 sentenced Ellefson to 188 months’

imprisonment pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual §§ 2D1.1 and 2D1.11.

Ellefson appeals her conviction as to Counts 1 and 2, claiming that there was

insufficient evidence to support the jury verdicts. She also appeals her sentence,

claiming that the lack of a “mitigating-role cap” in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.11 violated her

rights to due process and equal protection, and that she should be resentenced under

advisory guidelines. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Ellefson’s convictions arose from her involvement with the drug-related

activities of her then boyfriend, Ryan Buchheim. The case against Ellefson centered

around a September, 2002, transfer of 2,887 pseudoephedrine pills from Ellefson and

Buchheim to undercover police officer Josh Lupkes and confidential informant Flint

Hillman in exchange for two tanks purportedly containing anhydrous ammonia. 

Lupkes and Hillman met Buchheim and Ellefson outside of her residence in

Cedar Rapids, Iowa. With Ellefson present, Hillman helped Buchheim move the

purported anhydrous ammonia tanks from his car into Buchheim’s van. Hillman,

Buchheim and Ellefson then went into her apartment, leaving Lupkes in Hillman’s

car. Inside her apartment, Ellefson quizzed Hillman about how well he knew Lupkes.

Ellefson asked Hillman: “Why are you afraid to bring him up?”; “How long have you

known him?”; “Does he know what you’re coming here for?”; “Then it doesn’t really

matter, does it?” Hillman told Ellefson that Lupkes was “where I got all my crank

from” and that Lupkes knew why Hillman was in her apartment.

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While Hillman was in Ellefson’s apartment, Buchheim spoke on the telephone

with his pseudoephedrine supplier to set up a delivery of pseudoephedrine. As soon

as Buchheim hung up the phone, Ellefson asked him “Do you know when?” and

“Who? When? Where?” Buchheim replied, “At my place, about half an hour and a

case. It’s like 8,640 pills.” Ellefson then asked to use Buchheim’s van to run an

errand. Buchheim noted that the purported anhydrous ammonia tanks were in the

back and stated, “See, unless you want to take them and drop them off at [his storage

garage] . . . .” Ellefson responded, “You want me to?” and Buchheim replied,

“Actually, I kinda want to go with you, if you go.” Ellefson replied, “Okay,” but

Buchheim ultimately decided to drive because Ellefson might “take a wrong turn or

something.”

Still inside Ellefson’s apartment, Ellefson and Buchheim agreed to meet

Hillman later that day at Buchheim’s apartment to deliver the pseudoephedrine.

Buchheim kept his pseudoephedrine in a garage he rented for storage. Aware of the

reason for their trip, Ellefson rode with Buchheim to the garage in which Buchheim

kept a safe containing cocaine, pseudoephedrine, a triple-beam scale, numerous glass

pipes and other items related to the production of methamphetamine, such as starter

fluid, rubber tubing and empty tanks for storing anhydrous ammonia. Buchheim

placed the anhydrous ammonia tanks in the garage and retrieved pseudoephedrine and

cocaine to give to Hillman. 

After retrieving the pseudoephedrine, Ellefson and Buchheim met Hillman at

Buchheim’s apartment. Upon arrival, both Ellefson and Buchheim described two

surveillance vehicles that followed them from the garage. Ellefson stated that one of

the vehicles following them was a blue or black Dodge. Before leaving Buchheim’s

apartment, Hillman received 2,887 pseudoephedrine tablets (60mg each) and some

cocaine.

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On December 2, 2002, Police executed an arrest warrant on Buchheim at

Ellefson’s residence. When Buchheim was arrested, he informed officers that he

lived at Ellefson’s apartment. Police allowed Ellefson to leave while they secured the

apartment and applied for a search warrant. Before leaving, Ellefson removed $3,500

of drug proceeds from Buchheim’s duffle bag and tried to hide the money in the

waistband of her jeans. An officer stopped Ellefson and removed the money from her

waistband. The officer asked Ellefson whether there was anything else in the bag he

needed to know about. Ellefson replied, “Drugs.” 

While executing the search warrant, police found a large vacuum-sealed bag

of cocaine, smaller amounts of cocaine, methamphetamine and marijuana in

Buchheim’s duffle bag. Police also found numerous drug-related materials scattered

and readily accessible throughout Ellefson’s apartment, including a small scale, an

electronic scale, a box of small sandwich bags, a partially burnt marijuana cigarette,

rolling papers, several marijuana “bongs,” torches and glass pipes used to ingest

methamphetamine, and methamphetamine. 

An investigating officer testified that Buchheim told police that his source

delivered large amounts of pseudoephedrine to Ellefson’s apartment and that Ellefson

was present when he repackaged the pills. Buchheim testified that he packed the

drugs found in his duffle bag for a recent weekend stay at a hotel, where he and

Ellefson consumed drugs from the bag. Buchheim testified that he sometimes stayed

at Ellefson’s apartment and that she knew he was selling pseudoephedrine, marijuana,

cocaine and methamphetamine from her apartment. 

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Ellefson does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the

jury’s verdict on Count 3 regarding possession of methamphetamine and marijuana.

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II. DISCUSSION

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Ellefson argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict her of aiding and

abetting the distribution of pseudoephedrine with intent to manufacture

methamphetamine (Count 1) and aiding and abetting possession with intent to

distribute cocaine (Count 2).2

 Ellefson contends that, at most, the evidence

demonstrated that she knew of Buchheim’s activities but did not participate in those

activities as required to sustain an aiding and abetting conviction. We disagree.

When reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to support a jury verdict, this

Court “views the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, resolving

evidentiary conflicts in favor of the government, and accepting all reasonable

inferences drawn from the evidence that support the jury’s verdict.” United States v.

Espino, 317 F.3d 788, 791 (8th Cir. 2003). This standard of review is very strict, and

a jury verdict will not be overturned lightly. United States v. Crossland, 301 F.3d

907, 913 (8th Cir. 2002). We may reverse a jury’s verdict only if “no reasonable jury

could have found the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v.

Collins, 340 F.3d 672, 678 (8th Cir. 2003). A jury verdict may be based on

circumstantial as well as direct evidence, and “[t]he evidence need not exclude every

reasonable hypothesis except guilt.” United States v. Williford, 309 F.3d 507, 509

(8th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Erdman, 953 F.3d 387, 389 (8th Cir. 1992))

(internal quotations omitted). 

There are three elements for aiding and abetting distribution of controlled

substances: “(1) the defendant associated herself with the unlawful venture; (2) the

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defendant participated in it as something she wished to bring about; and (3) the

defendant sought by her actions to make it succeed.” United States v. Mitchell, 388

F.3d 1139, 1143-44 (8th Cir. 2004); United States v. Rojas, 356 F.3d 876, 878 (8th

Cir. 2004). This Court has acknowledged that “[m]ere association between the

principal and those accused of aiding and abetting is not sufficient to establish guilt;

nor is mere presence at the scene and knowledge that a crime was to be committed

sufficient to establish aiding and abetting.” Snyder v. United States, 448 F.2d 716,

718 (8th Cir. 1971) (citations omitted). Nonetheless, “[j]urors can be assumed to

know that criminals rarely welcome innocent persons as witnesses to serious crimes

and rarely seek to perpetrate felonies before larger-than-necessary audiences.” United

States v. Baker, 98 F.3d 330, 338 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Ortiz, 966

F.2d 707, 712 (1st Cir. 1992)) (internal quotations omitted). 

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, there was sufficient evidence

for a reasonable jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Ellefson aided and

abetted both the distribution of pseudoephedrine and possession with intent to

distribute cocaine. That Ellefson associated herself with Buchheim’s unlawful

activities is undeniable, and the prosecution presented ample evidence that Ellefson

both participated in those activities and sought by her actions to make them succeed.

With regard to the distribution of pseudoephedrine, the jury heard testimony

that Ellefson allowed Buchheim to receive and package large amounts of

pseudoephedrine in her apartment. The jury also learned that Ellefson believed the

tanks contained anhydrous ammonia to be used in the manufacture of

methamphetamine and that she not only allowed the tanks to be exchanged outside

of her apartment but also that she invited Hillman into her apartment to discuss when

and where they would complete the transaction. See Rojas, 356 F.3d at 879 (holding

that there was sufficient evidence for aiding and abetting where the jury could

reasonably conclude that the defendant “knew that drugs were being sold and that he

intentionally provided his apartment as a location for their sale”). 

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Moreover, the jury heard a recording on which Ellefson grilled Hillman about

the extent of the knowledge of the undercover officer in his car and testimony that she

described the vehicles that she understood to be police surveillance following her

when she accompanied Buchheim to retrieve the pseudoephedrine. This evidence

demonstrated that she understood the illegal nature of the activity and sought to

protect the operation. In addition, the jury learned that Ellefson offered to transfer

the purported anhydrous ammonia tanks to Buchheim’s storage locker, which

provided further evidence of her willingness to participate. Based on this evidence,

a reasonable jury could have found that Ellefson wished to bring about this transfer

of pseudoephedrine and acted to make it succeed.

The jury also could have reasonably found that she aided and abetted

possession with intent to distribute the large amount of cocaine that she knew was

stored in her bedroom. The police search of Ellefson’s apartment produced

substantial evidence from which a jury could have reasonably inferred Ellefson’s

intent to participate in Buchheim’s illegal drug distribution. This evidence included

large quantities of assorted controlled substances and drug paraphernalia, including

a vacuum-sealed bag containing 260.5 grams of cocaine, two scales for weighing

controlled substances and a large amount of money stored with controlled substances.

See United States v. Brett, 872 F.2d 1365, 1370 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that intent

to distribute “may be inferred solely from the possession of large quantities of

drugs”); United States v. LaGuardia, 774 F.2d 317, 319 (8th Cir. 1985) (“The

presence of equipment to weigh and measure cocaine may be viewed as evidence of

intent to distribute.”); United States v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 457, 458 (8th Cir. 1992)

(“[I]ntent to distribute ‘may be inferred from circumstantial evidence such as a large

sum of cash, and a quantity of a controlled substance.’”) (quoting United States v.

Knox, 888 F.2d 585, 588 (8th Cir. 1989)).

Ellefson also argues that because Buchheim had already been arrested when he

asked her to remove the money from his duffle bag before police could seize it, she

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could only be found guilty as an accessory after the fact. See United States v. Delpit,

94 F.3d 1134, 1150 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that co-conspirator whose role began

after the crime was completed could only be an accessory after the fact). This

argument fails as there was more than sufficient evidence presented at trial, including

Buchheim’s testimony that Ellefson used drugs stored in his bag during a recent

weekend trip, that Ellefson knew the drugs were in his bag in the bedroom of her

apartment. United States v. McCracken, 110 F.3d 535, 541 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding

that a person has constructive possession if she has “dominion over the premises in

which the contraband is concealed”); United States v. Cruz, 285 F.3d 692, 697 (8th

Cir. 2002) (noting that “knowledge of presence, combined with control over the thing

is constructive possession”) (internal quotations omitted).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we hold

that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find Ellefson guilty beyond

a reasonable doubt of aiding and abetting the distribution of pseudoephedrine and

aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute cocaine. Therefore, we affirm

her convictions on Count 1 and Count 2.

B. Sentencing

Ellefson also appeals her sentence on two grounds: first, that the district court’s

failure to apply the “mitigating-role cap” of U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 to her sentence under

Count 1 violated her constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the

law under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and second, that the district

court committed plain error by sentencing her under advisory guidelines. We reject

both of these arguments and affirm Ellefson’s sentence.

The district court determined Ellefson’s sentence for her convictions on Counts

1 and 2 utilizing U.S.S.G. § 2D1.11 and U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. The district court applied

§ 2D1.11 to her conviction on Count 1 because that section covers convictions

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The district court also sentenced Ellefson to 24 concurrent months’

imprisonment for her conviction on Count 3, but Ellefson does not appeal that part

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involving methamphetamine and amphetamine precursor chemicals, including

pseudoephedrine. The district court applied 2D1.1 to Ellefson’s conviction on Count

2 because that conviction involved possession with intent to distribute an actual

controlled substance, which in this case was cocaine. Section 2D1.1 caps the offense

level at 30 for any person, such as Ellefson, who receives a two-level “minor-role”

adjustment under § 3B1.2. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(3). Unlike § 2D1.1, § 2D1.11 does

not have a similar mitigating-role cap. 

Applying § 2D1.1 to Count 2, the district court found Ellefson responsible for

260.5 grams of cocaine and relevant conduct involving 2,494.32 grams of

pseudoephedrine. These drug quantities would have produced a base offense level

of 36, but Ellefson’s base offense level was capped at 30 under the mitigating-role

cap of § 2D1.1(a)(3). The district court also subtracted two levels for a § 3B1.2

minor-role adjustment, giving Ellefson a total offense level of 28 for Count 2.

Applying § 2D1.11 to Count 1, the district court found Ellefson’s relevant conduct

involved the same 2,494.32 grams of pseudoephedrine, which also produced a base

offense level of 36. Because § 2D1.11 does not have a mitigating-role cap, Ellefson’s

base offense level for Count 1 remained 36. The district court likewise subtracted

two offense levels for a minor-role adjustment pursuant to § 3B1.2, which gave

Ellefson an offense level of 34 for Count 1. 

Because Count 1 and Count 2 were closely related counts, the grouping rules

of § 3D1.2 and § 3D1.3 required the district court to use the higher of the two base

offense levels to calculate Ellefson’s sentence. U.S.S.G. §§ 3D1.2(d) and 3D1.3(b).

Ellefson’s final offense level of 34 combined with her criminal history category of III

to produce a sentencing range of 188-235 months. The district court sentenced

Ellefson to concurrent 188-month sentences for both Count 1 and Count 2.3

 

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of her sentence.

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We review a sentencing court’s interpretation and application of the guidelines

de novo. United States v. Mashek, 406 F.3d 1012, 1017 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that

United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), did not affect this Court’s de novo

standard of review for the interpretation and application of the sentencing guidelines).

“‘When construing the Guidelines, we look first to the plain language, and where that

is unambiguous we need look no further.’” United States v. Ashley, 342 F.3d 850,

852 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Andreas, 216 F.3d 645, 676 (7th Cir.

2000)). We review constitutional challenges to the guidelines de novo. United States

v. Martinez, 339 F.3d 759, 761 (8th Cir. 2003).

First, Ellefson contends that Amendment 640 to the sentencing guidelines,

which enacted the mitigating-role cap for offenses involving actual controlled

substances but not for offenses involving methamphetamine precursors, amounts to

a denial of substantive due process and equal protection of the law under the Fifth

Amendment. Ellefson does not argue that Amendment 640 discriminated against a

protected class or affected a fundamental right. Thus, under both due process and

equal protection, Ellefson bears the burden of proving that the unavailability of the

mitigating-role cap for sentences calculated under § 2D1.11 is not rationally related

to a legitimate governmental purpose. See United States v. Buckner, 894 F.2d 975,

978 (8th Cir. 1990) (rejecting due process challenge to the guidelines because “[a]cts

do not offend principles of substantive due process if they bear a reasonable relation

to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary or discriminatory”) (internal

quotations omitted); United States v. House, 939 F.2d 659, 664 (8th Cir. 1991)

(rejecting equal protection challenge to the guidelines because when a statute does

not discriminate on the basis of race or affect a fundamental right, “the distinction

between penalties need only be rationally related to a legitimate governmental

objective”). Ellefson contends that there is no rational basis for imposing a harsher

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sentence on the possession of precursor chemicals such as pseudoephedrine than on

the possession of the actual controlled substance. 

It is unclear whether amendments to the sentencing guidelines are subject to

a substantive due process challenge. See United States v. Fortney, 357 F.3d 818, 821

(8th Cir. 2004). Assuming without deciding that they are, Ellefson fails to meet her

burden of proof under either due process or equal protection. 

Ellefson argues that Amendment 640 lacked a rational basis because the

Sentencing Commission did not find that offenses involving precursor chemicals are

more harmful than offenses involving the final product. Courts, however, do not

require the Sentencing Commission to provide reasons for its actions. See United

States v. Anton, 380 F.3d 333, 336 (8th Cir. 2004) (“Although § 2D1.1 expressly

provides for a possible two-level reduction, the plain language of the applicable

Guideline section – § 2D1.11 – makes no mention of the two level safety valve

reduction. We will not presume the Sentencing Commission intended otherwise.”).

In addition, there is nothing patently irrational about sentencing similar, but distinct,

offenses differently. See Buckner, 894 F.2d at 978-79 (holding that the “100 to 1”

sentencing ratio for cocaine to cocaine base is not irrational and does not violate due

process); House, 939 F.2d at 664 (holding that the “100 to 1” ratio is not irrational

and does not violate equal protection). This Court has recognized that the Sentencing

Commission did not intend § 2D1.1 and § 2D1.11 to produce identical results in all

circumstances. See United States v. Frazier, No. 04-1005, slip op. at 14 (8th Cir.

May 31, 2005) (holding that the district court properly refused to apply a mitigatingrole cap to a sentence calculated under § 2D1.1); Anton, 380 F.3d at 335-36 (holding

that under the plain language of the guidelines, the “safety-valve reduction” of §

2D1.1 does not apply to sentences calculated under § 2D1.11). Because she failed

to prove more than the disparate impact on her sentence, Ellefson fails to carry her

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Amendment 668 to the sentencing guidelines, which took effect on November

1, 2004, eliminated this disparity between § 2D1.1 and § 2D1.11 by eliminating the

mitigating-role cap of § 2D1.1(a)(3), and inserting in both § 2D1.1 and § 2D1.11 a

sliding scale, in which increased sentence-level reductions correspond to increased

base offense levels. See U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1(a)(3), 2D1.11(a) (2004). Although

Amendment 668 does not apply to Ellefson, who was properly sentenced under the

guidelines in effect at the time of her sentencing, the amendment removes this

divergence for future cases.

In any event, we do not find the differences between § 2D1.1 and § 2D1.11 that

were applicable to Ellefson to be without rational justification. For example, both

Congress and the courts have recognized that the manufacture of methamphetamine

is an inherently dangerous activity that creates substantial risks to public health and

safety. See, e.g., Fortney, 357 F.3d at 821 n.5 (“Congress found that

methamphetamine manufacturing ‘poses serious dangers to both human life and to

the environment,’ and that the manufacturing process is ‘unstable, volatile, and highly

combustible.’”); United States v. Walsh, 299 F.3d 729, 734 (8th Cir. 2002) (noting

that the “potential hazards of methamphetamine manufacture are well documented”).

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burden of proving an irrational basis necessary to prevail on her due process and

equal protection arguments.4

Second, in supplemental briefs Ellefson challenges the district court’s

mandatory application of the sentencing guidelines under United States v. Booker.

Because Ellefson failed to argue Apprendi or Blakely error or that the guidelines were

unconstitutional before the district court, we review for plain error. United States v.

Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 549 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc). 

We evaluate plain error under the four-part test of United States v. Olano, 507

U.S. 725, 732-36 (1993), as stated in Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67

(1997):

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[B]efore an appellate court can correct an error not raised at trial, there must

be (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. If all three

conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice

a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity,

or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

Following Pirani, Ellefson has established the first two parts of the Olano test. See

Pirani, 406 F.3d at 550 (“The district court (understandably) committed Booker error

by applying the Guidelines as mandatory, and the error is plain, that is, clear or

obvious, at this time.”). To establish the third part, Ellefson bears the burden of

demonstrating “a reasonable probability that [she] would have received a more

favorable sentence with the Booker error eliminated by making the Guidelines

advisory.” Id. at 551.

Ellefson cannot establish a reasonable probability that the district court would

have imposed a more favorable sentence under advisory guidelines. The district court

stated that in determining where to sentence Ellefson within the applicable guidelines

range, it considered the nature and circumstances of Ellefson’s offense as well as her

history and character and imposed a sentence “to afford adequate deterrence to

criminal conduct and protect the public.” In addition, that Ellefson was sentenced at

the bottom of the applicable guidelines range “is insufficient, without more, to

demonstrate a reasonable probability that the court would have imposed a lesser

sentence absent the Booker error.” Pirani, 406 F.3d at 553. After a careful review of

the record, we find no evidence indicating that the district court would have imposed

a lesser sentence under advisory guidelines. The arguments Ellefson makes regarding

the probability of receiving a lesser sentence on remand are based only on speculation

about the effect of Booker error on her sentence, and, therefore, she “‘has not met

[her] burden of showing a reasonable probability that the result would have been

different but for the error.’” Id. at 553 (quoting United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d

1291, 1301 (11th Cir. 2005)).

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III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we affirm both Ellefson’s convictions and her

sentence.

LAY, Circuit Judge, concurring.

Ann Ellefson was addicted to drugs. During her addiction, she allowed her

boyfriend to use her apartment as a storage and distribution center for his business in

illegal narcotics. The evidence showed that she was aware of his activities,

accompanied him on a delivery of illegal materials, and independently offered to aid

him in carrying out his business. Under these circumstances, the jury reasonably

found her guilty of aiding and abetting the sale of illegal narcotics. Yet I wonder the

extent to which her drug addiction contributed to her crimes and I find myself

doubting whether the interests of society – let alone those of Ellefson – are served by

her 188-month sentence (almost sixteen years in prison). To the extent that her

addiction caused her actions, a sentence addressing her underlying addiction would

better serve the interests of society. 

Unfortunately, our inflexible federal criminal justice policy responds to the

epidemic of drug crimes without adequately providing federal judges with the ability

to address drug addiction – the root cause of this epidemic. In contrast, many states

have created specialized drug courts that approach this epidemic with much greater

success. In most drug courts, nonviolent, substance-abusing offenders charged with

drug-related crimes are channeled into judicially supervised substance abuse

treatment, mandatory drugs testing, and other rehabilitative services in an effort to

reduce recidivism. Eligible offenders typically have the charges against them stayed

and dropped if treatment is successful, or plead guilty with prosecution deferred and

criminal punishment withheld if treatment is successful. Evidence shows that the

flexible and pro-active approach of drug courts reduces recidivism rates to less than

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half of the recidivism rate of those offenders who are simply imprisoned for their drug

crimes. Unfortunately, the federal criminal justice system offers no such alternatives

for nonviolent, substance-abusing offenders. Given the tremendous economic and

human costs of imprisoning nonviolent drug offenders, Congress should seriously

consider creating federal drug courts. Federal drug courts would save a significant

amount of money for taxpayers.

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