Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-05-07123/USCOURTS-caDC-05-07123-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
District of Columbia
Appellee
Lakeisha Lesesne
Appellant
Elfreda Massie
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 20, 2006 Decided May 19, 2006

No. 05-7123

LAKEISHA LESESNE, AS PARENT OF B.F., OF MINOR,

APPELLANT

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AND

ELFREDA MASSIE, INTERIM SUPERINTENDENT, DISTRICT OF

COLUMBIA PUBLIC SCHOOLS,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 04cv00620)

Douglas W. Tyrka argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant.

Mary T. Connelly, Assistant Attorney General, Office of

Attorney General for the District of Columbia, argued the cause

for appellees. With her on the brief were Robert J. Spagnoletti,

Attorney General, and Edward E. Schwab, Deputy Attorney

General.

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and SENTELLE and

GARLAND, Circuit Judges.

USCA Case #05-7123 Document #969253 Filed: 05/19/2006 Page 1 of 12
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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.

SENTELLE, Circuit Judge: Lakeisha Lesesne claims the

District of Columbia Public Schools (“DCPS”) violated the

rights of her disabled son, “B.F.,” under the Individuals with

Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (“IDEA” or

“the Act”). Alleging that DCPS failed to create an

individualized education program (“IEP”) for B.F., Lesesne filed

a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of

Columbia seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against

DCPS. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor

of DCPS, and Lesesne appealed. Because Lesesne has failed to

demonstrate that B.F. was harmed by any statutory violations

DCPS might have committed, we affirm. 

I

B.F. is a mentally retarded and cannabis-dependent sixteenyear-old boy. During the fall of 2003, the Social Services

Division of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia

referred B.F. to DCPS for an “evaluation” to determine whether

he was covered by IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1) (requiring

an initial evaluation to determine whether a child is covered by

IDEA); 34 C.F.R. § 300.320 (prescribing procedures for an

“initial evaluation”); D.C. Code § 38-2501(a) (2001) (requiring

an “initial evaluation” within 60 days of a “referral”), as

amended by D.C. L. 15-39 (eff. Nov. 13, 2003) (requiring an

“initial evaluation” within 120 days of a “referral”). The Act

guarantees “that all children with disabilities have available to

them a free appropriate public education [“FAPE”] that

emphasizes special education and related services designed to

meet their unique needs.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A); see also

34 C.F.R. § 300.7 (defining “child with a disability”). If a

child’s initial evaluation suggests he is entitled to a FAPE,

IDEA then requires the school district to create and implement

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an IEP, which is the “primary vehicle” for implementing the

Act. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988). The IEP is

“[p]repared at meetings between a representative of the local

school district, the child’s teacher, the parents or guardians, and,

whenever appropriate, the disabled child.” Id. It “sets out the

child’s present educational performance, establishes annual and

short-term objectives for improvements in that performance, and

describes the specially designed instruction and services that

will enable the child to meet those objectives.” Id.; see also 34

C.F.R. § 300.343(b)(2) (requiring a “meeting to develop an IEP”

within 30 days following the completion of a disabled student’s

initial evaluation). 

B.F. was referred to DCPS for an initial “evaluation” on

October 30, 2003. Over the following four months, DCPS

attempted to test B.F.’s speech as part of his evaluation, but its

efforts were repeatedly thwarted by B.F.’s truancy and

Lesesne’s refusals to facilitate the process. In early February

2004, Lesesne and B.F. finally reported for speech testing, but

before B.F. could complete the test, a police officer arrested him

for assaulting his girlfriend. At some point thereafter (the record

is unclear as to exactly when), B.F. finally completed his speech

test and his “evaluation.” 

Given the practical difficulties associated with conducting

B.F.’s evaluation, DCPS decided to begin planning his IEP

meeting, see 34 C.F.R. § 300.343(b)(2), even before B.F. had

completed his testing (and thus even before DCPS was sure that

he was covered by IDEA). On February 10, 2004—while DCPS

was struggling to complete B.F.’s evaluation, and while DCPS

was making preliminary plans for B.F.’s IEP meeting—Carolyn

W. Houck (Lesesne’s attorney at the time) contacted DCPS

about the need for an IEP meeting. DCPS told Lesesne’s

attorney about B.F.’s pattern of uncooperative behavior,

described the portions of his evaluation that remained

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incomplete, and told her about DCPS’s plans to convene an IEP

meeting anyway. 

Rather than facilitate DCPS’s efforts to help B.F., Lesesne

and her attorney instead focused their energies on litigation. On

February 11, 2004—the day immediately following her first

conversation with DCPS—Lesesne’s attorney filed a request for

a due process hearing with an independent hearing officer

(“HO”), pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6), (f)(1). Alleging

that DCPS had made no attempt to provide a FAPE for B.F.,

Lesesne demanded a hearing officer’s decision (“HOD”)

requiring DCPS to perform all necessary evaluations of B.F.,

develop his IEP, determine an appropriate educational

placement for him, and provide him with compensatory

education. 

On February 24, 2004—while Lesesne’s request for a due

process hearing was pending—DCPS faxed a “Letter of

Invitation” to Lesesne’s attorney, proposing three possible dates

for an IEP meeting. Lesesne rejected all three dates by fax on

February 26, 2004. That same day, DCPS responded by

suggesting three more dates, which it hoped would be more

convenient for Lesesne and her attorney. However, Lesesne and

her new attorney (Douglas W. Tyrka) offered no response before

the HO held an administrative hearing on March 5, 2004.

On March 19, 2004, the HO issued his final ruling, which

dismissed the case and denied Lesesne’s requests for relief. The

HO found that the proceeding was moot because DCPS had

made reasonable efforts to evaluate B.F. and to schedule an IEP

meeting, but both Lesesne and her attorney had frustrated those

efforts. The HO explained: 

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My only complaint is that when it looks like a solution is in

play I’m still sitting here despite the fact that you’re here

looking for an IEP meeting, an invitation has been sent and

rather than calling . . . the school, apparently Ms. Houck

wrote a letter and complained about the dates instead of

picking up the phone and working out dates. So I’ve got to

sit here and referee what seems not to be a very serious

[denial of a] FAPE.

Accordingly, the HO denied Lesesne’s requests for relief and

dismissed her due process request with prejudice. 

On April 1, 2004, DCPS again tried to contact Lesesne to

schedule an IEP meeting. DCPS wrote: “[t]his is the (4th)

attempt to meet with you and your Educational Advocate in

regards to your son [sic] evaluations [sic] we are submitting

another Letter of Invitation. This is the final Letter of Invitation.

We will move forward with the meeting to insure his academic

success.” Instead of responding to DCPS’s fourth and final

invitation to convene an IEP meeting, on April 14, 2004,

Lesesne filed a complaint in the District Court as a parent

“aggrieved by” the HOD, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2). Reiterating

her allegations that DCPS failed to provide B.F. with a FAPE,

Lesesne’s complaint sought various forms of injunctive and

declaratory relief, including an IEP and an alternative

educational placement for her son. After Lesesne filed her

complaint in the District Court, she then filed two more due

process requests with a second HO.

At some point amidst Lesesne’s flurry of litigation activity,

the parties reached an “agreement . . . on the record” that

purported to resolve this case. Second HOD at 2. Unhelpfully,

the parties failed to provide us with the text of their agreement.

However, the record does reveal that the parties reached an

agreement; pursuant to that agreement, B.F. was transferred to

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1

As of the end of April 2004—when Lesesne’s attorneys

acknowledged receiving and “review[ing]” B.F.’s IEP—the record

suggests that Lesesne was represented by both Mr. Tyrka and Ms.

Houck: The former represented her at the administrative hearing on

March 5, 2004 and continued to represent her before both the District

Court and our court, while the latter demanded the administrative

hearing in February 2004 and signed two letters acknowledging

receipt of the IEP on April 21 and April 27, 2004.

an alternative educational placement; DCPS created and

implemented an interim IEP, which the parties agreed to “review

and revise . . . as necessary,” id.; Lesesne’s attorneys1 sent two

written acknowledgments to DCPS, confirming the fact that they

had received and “reviewed” the IEP; and B.F.’s IEP was in

place before the beginning of the 2004-2005 school year. The

record contains no evidence that the parties ever revised B.F.’s

IEP. 

On July 26, 2005, the District Court entered summary

judgment in favor of DCPS. After emphasizing that “B.F. is

currently in a new educational placement following a second

due process hearing,” and after noting that “the record provides

no indication that either the placement is inappropriate, or that

an IEP has not been created,” the District Court held the case

moot. The court further held that even if the case was not moot,

violations of IDEA’s procedural requirements are actionable

only if they affect a student’s substantive rights. Because

Lesesne failed to show that B.F. had been harmed by any

procedural violations DCPS might have committed, the District

Court granted summary judgment in favor of DCPS. Lesesne

filed a timely notice of appeal. Our review is de novo. See, e.g.,

Goldring v. District of Columbia, 416 F.3d 70, 73 (D.C. Cir.

2005). 

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II

Lesesne’s appeal presents two issues. First, she argues that

this case is not moot. Second, Lesesne argues that the District

Court inappropriately exercised “hypothetical jurisdiction” over

the merits of her claim. While we agree with Lesesne’s first

argument, we reject the second. Because the District Court

erred in concluding this case is moot, both it and we have

jurisdiction to review Lesesne’s claim on the merits. And

because we agree with the District Court’s merits holding, we

affirm. 

A

Lesesne argues that this case is not moot because “effectual

relief [i]s possible.” Pet. Br. at 15. Specifically, Lesesne points

out that her complaint includes requests for an IEP, “a

declaratory judgment that DCPS denied B.F. FAPE,” and “any

other relief the Court deems just.” Claiming that DCPS has

never complied with any of her prayers for relief, Lesesne offers

two arguments against mootness. While we conclude that both

are without merit, we nonetheless agree that this case is not

moot. 

Lesesne’s first argument is unavailing. In her briefs,

Lesesne makes repeated assertions that this case is not moot

because DCPS never created an IEP for B.F. See Pet. Br. at 8,

12 (two assertions), 13, 15, 16 (five assertions), 17, 24; Reply

Br. at 1, 2 (four assertions), 3. Then at oral argument, Lesesne’s

attorney made repeated assertions that DCPS failed to create an

IEP for B.F. (We have reproduced the relevant portions of the

transcript in the Appendix attached hereto.) Five days after oral

argument, however, DCPS submitted evidence documenting the

fact that an IEP was developed on April 16, 2004. Moreover, in

two separate letters to DCPS (dated April 21 and April 27,

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2004), Lesesne and her attorney acknowledged having received

and “reviewed” the IEP, although they declined to accept it.

Notwithstanding the existence of the IEP and their documented

knowledge of it, Lesesne’s counsel steadfastly insisted—before

the District Court and this Court—that an IEP had not been

created. Regardless of whether Lesesne’s assertions are amnesic

oversights or unseemly pettifogging, there is no doubt that

DCPS did develop an IEP. Accordingly, Lesesne’s demand for

an IEP is moot. 

Lesesne’s second argument against mootness is that her

request for a declaratory judgment, combined with her

boilerplate request for “any other relief the Court deems just,”

entitles B.F. to receive “compensatory education.” See Pet. Br.

at 12; Reply Br. at 3-4; see also Reid ex rel. Reid v. District of

Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 518 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“When a school

district deprives a disabled child of [FAPE] in violation of

[IDEA], a court fashioning ‘appropriate’ relief [under 20 U.S.C.

§ 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii)], may order compensatory education, i.e.,

replacement of educational services the child should have

received in the first place.”). In Lesesne’s view, this implied

request for “compensatory education” is sufficient to forestall

mootness. While we reject Lesesne’s rationale, we agree that

this case is not moot. 

Although Lesesne’s own attorney fails to notice it, the very

first paragraph on the very first page of her complaint contains

an explicit demand for compensatory education. Because it does

not appear that the parties’ “agreement . . . on the record”

addresses Lesesne’s demand for compensatory education, her

complaint presented the District Court with a live controversy.

Compare DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316-17 (1974)

(per curiam). Accordingly, we proceed to consider the merits of

the District Court’s decision to enter summary judgment for

DCPS. 

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B

Lesesne argues that this case must be reversed and

remanded to the extent it is not moot because the District

Court’s treatment of the merits constituted an unlawful

assumption of “hypothetical jurisdiction.” See Steel Co. v.

Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998)

(“Hypothetical jurisdiction produces nothing more than a

hypothetical judgment—which comes to the same thing as an

advisory opinion, disapproved by this Court from the

beginning.”). In Lesesne’s view, the District Court’s mootness

holding rendered its alternative holding on the merits an

unconstitutional advisory opinion. We disagree.

Because this case is not moot, both the District Court and

this Court have jurisdiction to reach the merits. See Info.

Handling Servs., Inc. v. Def. Automated Printing Servs., 338

F.3d 1024, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“Although the district court

would have been without jurisdiction to consider the merits had

[the plaintiff] truly lacked standing, because we have concluded

that [the plaintiff] does have standing, we now proceed to

consider the court’s decision to grant summary judgment.”

(citing Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 93-94)); see also Utah Animal

Rights Coal. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 371 F.3d 1248 (10th Cir.

2004) (reviewing district court’s alternative holdings on

mootness and the merits and affirming only the latter);

Verhoeven v. Brunswick Sch. Comm., 207 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.

1999) (“[I]t appears that the district court reached the merits of

the [appellants’ claim], despite its mootness conclusion.

Therefore, we treat the district court’s decision on the merits as

an alternative ground for the denial and review it accordingly.”);

id. at 7-11 (rejecting the district court’s conclusion that the case

was moot but affirming the district court on the merits). Given

that the District Court did, in fact, have jurisdiction, it did not err

in reaching the merits of this case. 

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2

We hasten to add that we do not think DCPS violated any of its

procedural obligations. Lesesne’s only argument to the contrary (Pet.

Br. at 4) rests on the version of the District of Columbia’s special

education law that was in effect on October 30, 2003, when B.F. was

first “referred” to DCPS for an “evaluation.” See D.C. Code §

38-2501(a) (2001) (requiring an “evaluation” within 60 days of a

“referral”). On November 13, 2003—before the 60-day period

expired and thus before B.F. was entitled to an “evaluation”—an

amendment to D.C. Code § 38-2501(a) became effective and extended

the “evaluation” deadline. See D.C. L. 15-39 (requiring an

“evaluation” within 120 days of a “referral”). The record does not

suggest that DCPS failed to complete B.F.’s “evaluation” before the

new deadline, February 27, 2004.

Upon de novo review, we conclude that Lesesne’s claims

fall short on the merits. In a lone footnote on the last page of her

opening brief, Lesesne argues that “B.F. was per se harmed” by

DCPS’s alleged failure to meet some of IDEA’s procedural

deadlines. Pet. Br. at 26 n.6. We disagree. Even assuming

Lesesne has not waived her argument on the merits, see Sugar

Cane Growers Co-op. of Fla. v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 89, 93 n.3

(D.C. Cir. 2002), and even assuming that DCPS violated its

procedural obligations,2 an IDEA claim is viable only if those

procedural violations affected the student’s substantive rights.

See, e.g., Kruvant v. District of Columbia, 99 Fed. Appx. 232,

233 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (denying relief under IDEA because

“although DCPS admits that it failed to satisfy its responsibility

to assess [the student] for IDEA eligibility within 120 days of

her parents’ request, the [parents] have not shown that any harm

resulted from that error”); C.M. v. Bd. of Educ., 128 Fed. Appx.

876, 881 (3d Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (“[O]nly those procedural

violations of the IDEA which result in loss of educational

opportunity or seriously deprive parents of their participation

rights are actionable.”); M.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Sch. Dist., 303 F.3d

523, 533-34 (4th Cir. 2002) (“If a disabled child received (or

was offered) a FAPE in spite of a technical violation of the

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IDEA, the school district has fulfilled its statutory

obligations.”); Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983,

994 (1st Cir. 1990) (en banc) (“[P]rocedural flaws do not

automatically render an IEP legally defective. Before an IEP is

set aside, there must be some rational basis to believe that

procedural inadequacies compromised the pupil’s right to an

appropriate education, seriously hampered the parents’

opportunity to participate in the formulation process, or caused

a deprivation of education benefits.” (citations omitted)); W.G.

v. Bd. of Trustees, 960 F.2d 1479, 1484 (9th Cir. 1992)

(rejecting the proposition that procedural flaws “automatically

require a finding of a denial of a FAPE”); Thomas v. Cincinnati

Bd. of Educ., 918 F.2d 618, 625 (6th Cir. 1990) (rejecting an

IDEA claim for technical noncompliance with procedural

requirements where the alleged violations did not result in a

“substantive deprivation” of the student’s rights); Burke County

Bd. of Educ. v. Denton, 895 F.2d 973, 982 (4th Cir. 1990)

(refusing to award compensatory education where procedural

faults committed by Board did not cause the child to lose any

educational opportunity). 

Lesesne has made no effort to demonstrate—much less

demonstrated—that B.F.’s education was affected by any

procedural violations DCPS might have committed. Cf. Reid,

401 F.3d at 519-20 (chronicling substantive deprivations of a

disabled student’s rights). Accordingly, her claims fail on the

merits. 

III

For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the District

Court is 

Affirmed.

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APPENDIX

* * *

Mr. Tyrka: “The District Court did find that there was an IEP,

and that was a major error on the District Court’s part.” (Tr.

of Oral Argument at 2:42)

* * *

Mr. Tyrka: “The District Court found that an IEP had been

developed and that a placement had been made.” 

The Court: “They had, hadn’t they?” 

Mr. Tyrka: “Excuse me, your Honor?” 

The Court: “That’s correct, isn’t it?” 

Mr. Tyrka: “That’s absolutely incorrect.” (Tr. of Oral

Argument at 3:18 (emphasis in original))

* * * 

The Court: “You’re saying they didn’t [create an IEP]?”

Mr. Tyrka: “They did not do that.” (Tr. of Oral Argument at

6:05)

* * *

The Court: “Was there never an IEP of any kind?”

Mr. Tyrka: “I know of no IEP.” (Tr. of Oral Argument at

6:51)

* * *

Mr. Tyrka: “Again, there has been no suggestion that there

was any IEP developed.” (Tr. of Oral Argument at 7:43)

* * *

Mr. Tyrka: “What is alleged is they failed to develop an IEP

in a timely fashion.” (Tr. of Oral Argument at 14:22)

* * *

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