Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-11-73924/USCOURTS-ca9-11-73924-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Association of Irritated Residents
Petitioner
Jared Blumenfeld
Respondent
Comite Residentes Organizados Al Servicio Del Ambiente Sano
Petitioner
Committee For A Better Arvin
Petitioner
Lisa P. Jackson
Respondent
San Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control District
Respondent-Intervenor
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Respondent

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

COMMITTEE FOR A BETTER ARVIN, a

California nonprofit corporation;

COMITE RESIDENTES ORGANIZADOS

AL SERVICIO DEL AMBIENTE SANO,

an unincorporated association;

ASSOCIATION OF IRRITATED

RESIDENTS, an unincorporated

association,

Petitioners,

v.

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

AGENCY; LISA P. JACKSON,

Administrator, U.S. Environmental

Protection Agency; JARED

BLUMENFELD, Regional

Administrator, Region IX, U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency,

Respondents,

SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY UNIFIED AIR

POLLUTION CONTROL DISTRICT,

Respondent-Intervenor.

No. 11-73924

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2 COMM. FOR A BETTER ARVIN V. EPA

COMMITTEE FOR A BETTER ARVIN, a

California nonprofit corporation;

COMITE RESIDENTES ORGANIZADOS

AL SERVICIO DEL AMBIENTE SANO,

an unincorporated association;

ASSOCIATION OF IRRITATED

RESIDENTS, an unincorporated

association,

Petitioners,

v.

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

AGENCY; GINA MCCARTHY,

Administrator, U.S. Environmental

Protection Agency; JARED

BLUMENFELD, Regional

Administrator, Region IX, U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency,

Respondents,

SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY UNIFIED AIR

POLLUTION CONTROL DISTRICT,

Respondent-Intervenor.

No. 12-71332

OPINION

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

United States Environmental Protection Agency

Argued and Submitted

October 22, 2014—Pasadena, California

Filed May 20, 2015

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COMM. FOR A BETTER ARVIN V. EPA 3

Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Chief Judge, and Alex Kozinski

and Ronald M. Gould, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Gould

SUMMARY*

Environmental Law

The panel granted in part, and denied in part, a petition

for review brought by several environmental and community

organizations challenging the Environmental Protection

Agency’s approval of California’s State Implementation

Plans to comply with National Ambient Air Quality

Standards enacted under the federal Clean Air Act,

concerning ozone and fine particulate matter in the San

Joaquin Valley.

The panel held that the EPA violated the Clean Air Act by

approving California’s plans even though the plans did not

include the state-adopted mobile emissions standards on

which those plans relied to achieve their emission reduction

goals. The panel further held that the EPA did not violate the

Clean Air Act by not requiring inclusion of other state

mechanisms in its plans. The panel also held that other

control measures approved by the EPA were enforceable

commitments as the Clean Air Act required. The panel

remanded to the EPA for further proceedings.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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4 COMM. FOR A BETTER ARVIN V. EPA

COUNSEL

Brent Newell (argued), Sofia L. Parino, Center on Race,

Poverty& the Environment, San Francisco, California; Laura

Baker, Center on Race, Poverty & the Environment, Delano,

California, for Petitioners.

Heather E. Gange (argued), Ignacia S. Moreno, Dustin J.

Maghamfar, United States Department of Justice,

Washington, D.C.; Jeanhee Hong, Jefferson Wehling, United

States Environmental Protection Agency, San Francisco,

California; Jan Tierney, Geoffrey L. Wilcox, United States

Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C., for

Respondents.

Annette A. Ballatore-Williamson (argued), Catherine T.

Redmond, San Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control

District, Fresno, California, for Respondent-Intervenor.

OPINION

GOULD, Circuit Judge:

Petitioners, a contingent of environmental and community

groups, bring serious challenges to the State of California’s

plans to improve air quality in the San Joaquin Valley, an

area with some of the worst air quality in the United States. 

We must consider whether these state plans are sufficient in

law, specifically, whether the regulating United States

Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) erred in

approving California’s State Implementation Plans (“SIPs”)

to comply with National Ambient Air Quality Standards

(“NAAQS”) enacted under the federal Clean Air Act

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COMM. FOR A BETTER ARVIN V. EPA 5

(“CAA”) concerning ozone and fine particulate matter in the

San Joaquin Valley. We do this in the context of a

cooperative federalism regime in which the federal agency

sets required air quality standards but the state is a primary

actor in creating plans to achieve them, followed by potential

enforcement at both state and federal levels and by private

citizens.

Petitioners contend: (1) that the approved plans calculate

the necessaryemissions reductions and forecasts in part based

on state-adopted measures that are not themselves

incorporated into the federally enforceable plan, in violation

of the CAA; (2) that other strategies to gain compliance with

the NAAQS proposed by the California Air Resources Board

(“CARB”) and Intervenor San Joaquin Valley Unified Air

Pollution Control District (“the District”) that are in the EPAapproved plans are unenforceable goals, rather than the

enforceable commitments that the CAA requires; (3) that

EPA unlawfully approved the plan relating to ozone insofar

as that plan lacked enforceable transportation control

measures; and (4) that the D.C. Circuit’s holding in NRDC v.

EPA, 706 F.3d 428 (D.C. Cir. 2013), that EPA relied on the

wrong statutory provision of the CAA in crafting its fine

particulate matter implementation rule, pursuant to which the

fine particulate matter plan at issue was approved, gives

another important reason to grant the petition.

We hold that by approvingCalifornia’s plans even though

the plans did not include the state-adopted mobile emissions

standards on which those plans rely to achieve their emissions

reductions goals, EPA violated the CAA. We also hold that

EPA did not violate the CAA by not requiring inclusion of

other state mechanisms in its plans, and that other control

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6 COMM. FOR A BETTER ARVIN V. EPA

measures approved by EPA are enforceable commitments as

the CAA requires.1

I

States and the federal government must work together to

improve air quality for individuals nationwide. This is so

because the CAA has established a uniquelyimportant system

of cooperative federalism in the quest for clean air. “The

CAA makes the States and the Federal Government partners

in the struggle against air pollution.” Jensen Family Farms,

Inc. v. Monterey Bay Unified Air Pollution Control Dist.,

644 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Gen. Motors

Corp. v. United States, 496 U.S. 530, 532 (1990) (internal

quotation marks omitted)). The CAA protects the nation’s air

quality by authorizing EPA to establish NAAQS that apply to

air pollutants. 42 U.S.C. § 7409.2 EPA designates areas that

fail to attain the NAAQS as “nonattainment areas.” Id.

§ 7407(d)(1).

A

The CAA requires states to address nonattainment areas

by developing a SIP that lays out a plan for how a

nonattainment area will eventually comply with the NAAQS. 

42 U.S.C. §§ 7407(a), 7410. After public notice and

hearings, a state must adopt the SIP and submit it to EPA for

1 Because EPA must reconsider the two plans and only approve them

with the necessarymeasures included, we need not reach Petitioners’ other

arguments, which Petitioners are free to raise again after EPA’s

reconsideration and subsequent final action.

 

2

 All citations to the United States Code refer to the 2012 edition.

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COMM. FOR A BETTER ARVIN V. EPA 7

review and approval. Id. § 7410(a). EPA must then act on

the SIP, approving or disapproving it in part or in whole. 

42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(3). Once approved by EPA, a “SIP

bec[o]me[s] federal law . . . , and c[annot] be changed unless

and until EPA approve[s] any change.” Safe Air for Everyone

v. EPA, 488 F.3d 1088, 1097 (9th Cir. 2007) (emphasis

omitted). The CAA provides a private right of action for

citizens to enforce a SIP by bringing a civil action in federal

district court. 42 U.S.C. § 7604.

B

The CAA also regulates mobile source emissions, such as

those from cars and trucks. Congress has generally

preempted states from setting mobile source emissions

standards. Jensen, 644 F.3d at 938 (citing 42 U.S.C.

§ 7543(a)). California, however, may set its own mobile

source emissions standards, with EPA approval. Id. at 938

n.3 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (motor vehicles); § 7543(e)(2)

(nonroad sources)). California thus relies on its own mobile

source standards in the development of its SIPs.

C

The present challenge relates to EPA’s approval of

revisions to California’s 2007 SIP, and specifically to plans

for achieving compliance with national standards for two

pollutants: fine particulate matter (“PM2.5”) and ozone.

In 1997, EPA promulgated 24-hour and annual standards

for PM2.5

. The relevant parts of California’s plan to meet

these requirements are: (1) the District’s 2008 PM2.5 Plan,

revised in 2010 and 2011; and (2) provisions of CARB’s

2007 State Strategy, as revised in 2009 and 2011, that relate

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8 COMM. FOR A BETTER ARVIN V. EPA

to the San Joaquin Valley (collectively, “the PM2.5 Plan”). 

The PM2.5 Plan was proposed for inclusion in California’s

SIP. On November 9, 2011, EPA approved in part and

disapproved in part the PM2.5 Plan in a final rulemaking, and

the timely petition for review in case number 11-73924

followed.

As to ozone, EPA promulgated the 8-hour ozone standard

to replace the 1-hour standard in 1997, and adopted a more

stringent 8-hour ozone standard in 2008. The 8-hour standard

refers to the average concentration of ground-level ozone,

which can contribute to lung disease, as measured over an 8-

hour period in a given area. The key parts of California’s

plan to meet the 8-hour ozone standard are: (1) the District’s

2007 Ozone Plan, as revised in 2008 and 2011; and (2) the

provisions of CARB’s State Strategy, as revised in 2009 and

2011, that pertain to the San Joaquin Valley (collectively,

“the 8-Hour Plan”). EPA approved the 8-Hour Plan on

March 1, 2012, and the timely petition for review in case

number 12-71332 followed.

We refer collectively to the PM2.5 and 8-Hour Plans as

“the Plans.” Because the two petitions are closely related and

involve the same parties, we address the petitions together.

II

We have jurisdiction to review EPA’s action pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1). We review approval of a SIP by

considering whether the EPA’s decision was arbitrary,

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or contrary to law. Sierra

Club v. EPA, 671 F.3d 955, 961 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that

when assessing CAA challenges, we apply the general

standard of review for agency decisions set forth in the

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COMM. FOR A BETTER ARVIN V. EPA 9

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–06). “With

respect to the CAA, Congress has given EPA general

rulemaking authority, 42 U.S.C. § 7601(a)(1), which, when

exercised, requires our deference in accordance with

Chevron.” Id. at 962.

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)[,]

generally sets forth the framework by which

we review an agency’s interpretation of a

statute. Id. at 842–44. Under this framework

at the first step we determine “whether

Congress has directly spoken to the precise

question at issue. If the intent of Congress is

clear, that is the end of the matter; for the

court, as well as the agency, must give effect

to the unambiguously expressed intent of

Congress.” Id. at 842–43. “[I]f the statute is

silent or ambiguous with respect to the

specific issue, the question for the court is

whether the agency’s answer is based on a

permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at

843.

Sierra Club, 671 F.3d at 961–62. EPA’s interpretation of its

own regulations is given considerable deference and “must be

given controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or

inconsistent with the regulation.” Thomas Jefferson Univ. v.

Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (internal quotation marks

omitted); see also Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).

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10 COMM. FOR A BETTER ARVIN V. EPA

III

A

Because the language and structure of the CAA demand

that all control measures on which the Plans rely to attain the

NAAQS be included in the SIP and subject to enforcement by

individuals and by EPA, we grant the petition for review in

part.

As explained above, the CAA makes “the regulation of

mobile source emissions . . . a federal responsibility, [and]

Congress has expressly preempted states from setting

emissions standards for mobile sources.” Jensen, 644 F.3d at

938 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7543). “The notable exception to this

general rule is that California is permitted to set its own

mobile emissions standards so long as it obtains EPA

approval.” Id. at 938 n.3 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7543). Once

approved, these state-adopted measures (“waiver measures”),

which are more stringent than federal alternatives, allow the

state to avoid the preemptive federal emissions standards. 42

U.S.C. § 7543(b).

A SIP must “include enforceable emission limitations and

other control measures . . . as may be necessary or appropriate

to meet the applicable requirements of this chapter.” Id.

§ 7410(a)(2)(A). The CAA provides a private right of action

for citizens to enforce a SIP’s provisions through a civil

action in federal court, 42 U.S.C. § 7604, but only those

provisions actually included in the SIP are subject to such

enforcement, see El Comite Para El Bienestar de Earlimart

v. Warmerdam, 539 F.3d 1062, 1069–70 (9th Cir. 2008).

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COMM. FOR A BETTER ARVIN V. EPA 11

Here, the Plans’ control strategies are based in significant

part on reductions that will be achieved through waiver

measures, which allow consideration of the stricter state

standards rather than federal standards. Thus, although EPA

approved the waiver measures such that they are not subject

to federal preemption, 42 U.S.C. § 7543, EPA approved the

Plans at issue here without including those waiver measures

on which the State’s strategy to comply with the NAAQS for

PM2.5 and 8-hour ozone partially relied. Petitioners argue that

in so doing, EPA violated the plain terms of the CAA. We

agree.

EPA acknowledges that the Plans rely in part on waiver

measures but argues that because of EPA’s longstanding

policy of not requiring waiver measures to be specifically

included in California SIPs and because of Congress’s alleged

ratification of that practice under the so-called “savings

clause” in the CAA, see 42 U.S.C. § 7515, the CAA does not

require waiver measures, which have already been subject to

an EPA approval process, to undergo an additional approval

process by being included in a SIP.

 But, to the contrary, the plain language of § 7410(a)

refutes EPA’s position. The statute makes clear that SIPs

“shall include” all emissions limitations, control measures,

means, and techniques on which the state relies to assure

compliance with the CAA. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(A)

(emphasis added). The language associated with “include” is

mandatory. Moreover, the phrase “necessary or appropriate

to meet the applicable requirements of this chapter” refers to

the CAA as a whole (a chapter of Title 42 of the U.S. Code,

rather than the section relating to SIPs). 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a). 

There is no viable justification for reading this section to

simply permit, rather than affirmatively mandate, a SIP to

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12 COMM. FOR A BETTER ARVIN V. EPA

include all measures required to achieve compliance with the

NAAQS. Instead, common sense tells us that a SIP must

include waiver measures to the extent that they are needed to

achieve a state’s compliance with the federally required air

quality standards.

As for EPA’s ratification argument, the CAA’s savings

clause states in relevant part:

Each regulation, standard, rule, notice, order

and guidance promulgated or issued by the

Administrator under this chapter, as in effect

before November 15, 1990, shall remain in

effect according to its terms, except to the

extent otherwise provided under this chapter,

inconsistent with any provision of this

chapter, or revised by the Administrator.

Id. § 7515 (emphasis added). The plain language of this

section says that only official policies set forth in a pre-1990

regulation, standard, rule, notice, order, and guidance, and

that are not inconsistent with the CAA remain in effect. But,

as noted, the EPA’s interpretation that waiver measures need

not be included in SIPs does contradict the plain language of

§ 7410(a). Because the meaning of the statutory language is

clear, it is unnecessary to consider whether EPA’s

interpretation is reasonable. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.

NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (“If the intent of Congress

is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as

the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed

intent of Congress.”).

This plain language reading is further supported by the

most basic of principles. If the state standards that are

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COMM. FOR A BETTER ARVIN V. EPA 13

necessary for meeting federal requirements are not a part of

the SIP, then, while the state agency, CARB, perhaps could

enforce them, the responsible federal agency, EPA, would not

be able to bring an action directly challenging violation of

those state standards. It is the primary responsibility of EPA

to ensure that Congress’s aims to ensure healthy air quality

have been carried out, and it is fundamentally error if any of

the standards necessary for federal compliance are not within

the SIP so as to be enforceable directly by the responsible

federal agency. The federal agency, EPA, not the state

agency, CARB, has the fundamental duty to carry the ball

across the goal line to achieve compliant air quality levels or

satisfactory progress toward that end.

EPA’s interpretation of the savings clause as ratifying its

practice of approvingCalifornia’s SIPs without subjecting the

waiver measures to review when the SIP is approved is also

inconsistent with citizens’ private right of action to enforce

SIP provisions. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604. Citizens cannot

enforce provisions that are not a part of the SIP. EPA in its

briefing concedes that its interpretation would prevent both

citizens and EPA itself from enforcing the California’s waiver

measures under the CAA in the context of a SIP “because

they are not in the SIP.” EPA argues, however, that citizens

have recourse under the CAA to enforce federal standards,

and that CARB itself can enforce the waiver measures. But

this frustrates congressional intent as expressed in the CAA’s

provision of a private right of action through which citizens

may enforce SIPs and their constituent parts, and not merely

enforce federal baseline standards for emissions generally. 

Also, as Petitioners point out, the federal standards are less

stringent than California’s standards. This means that the SIP

provisions themselves, which depend on the more stringent

waiver measures, can be only incompletely enforced by

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14 COMM. FOR A BETTER ARVIN V. EPA

citizens in federal court, insofar as emission reductions in the

Plans depend on reductions created by the gap between

federal measures and the waiver measures.

Having any state law standards that are necessary for

compliance with the federal law requirements incorporated as

part of the SIP, so as to be directly enforceable by EPA and

by citizens, is a more safe and sensible system of enforcement

than that urged by EPA. We conclude that the enforcement

gap for private citizens and EPA in the present SIP is

inconsistent with the CAA’s requirements and the express

aims of Congress. Because the plain language of the CAA

does not support EPA’s interpretation that waiver measures

need not be included in SIPs that depend on them, we

conclude that EPA violated the CAA by approving the Plans

without the inclusion of the waiver measures on which they

relied.

B

Petitioners also contend that EPA erred when it did not

require the Plans to include so-called “non-waiver measures.” 

These are other state enforcement measures that are not a part

of the SIP but that Petitioners claim are also needed to meet

attainment standards. For the reasons explained below, we

reject this challenge.

Specifically, Petitioners challenge EPA’s failure to

require the SIP to include three non-waiver measures: (1) the

Heavy Duty Diesel Engine-Chip Reflash measure; (2) the

Diesel Particulate Matter Control Measure for On-Road

Heavy-Duty Diesel-Fueled Vehicles Owned or Operated by

Public Agencies and Utilities (“Diesel Particulate Matter

Rule”); and (3) the Solid Waste Collection Vehicle Rule.

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COMM. FOR A BETTER ARVIN V. EPA 15

Regarding the Heavy Duty Diesel Engine-Chip Reflash

measure, EPA explains that because that rule was partially

invalidated by the California Supreme Court and repealed

four years before EPA approved the PM2.5 Plan, that rule

could not have been included in the PM2.5 Plan. See Approval

of 2008 San Joaquin Valley PM2.5 Plan and 2007 State

Strategy, 76 Fed. Reg. 69,896, 69,908 (Nov. 9, 2011) (to be

codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52) (noting that any emissions

reduction credit related to diesel engine chip reflashes were

from those vehicles whose engine chips were “reflashed”

before the rule was invalidated and adding that attempts to

invalidate those “reflashes” could be prosecuted under CAA

anti-tampering provisions). EPA did not give emission

reduction credit based on the chip reflash rule itself, but

instead based on actions taken under the rule before the

California Supreme Court invalidated it. Petitioners’

argument related to this non-waiver measure fails.

Regarding the Diesel Particulate Matter Rule and the

Solid Waste Collection Vehicle Rule, EPA did not approve

those mobile source measures into the Plans because their

overall emission reduction effects were de minimis and did

not affect EPA’s overall evaluations of California’s ability to

meet the relevant air quality standards by the statutory

deadline. See id.

We have applied in statutory interpretation the ancient

principle that the law does not care about trifles. See, e.g.,

Skaff v. Meridien N. Am. Beverly Hills, LLC, 506 F.3d 832,

839–40 (9th Cir. 2007).3 We conclude that the CAA allows

3

In Skaff we pointed to both the substance of the Latin maxims de

minimis non curat lex and lex non curat de minimis, and also cases in

which those principles had been applied by English and American courts,

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16 COMM. FOR A BETTER ARVIN V. EPA

EPA to ignore trifling emission control measures when EPA

evaluates SIPs. Here, EPA has urged that these state law

measures were not included in the SIP because they had no

measurable impact on California’s ability to meet required air

quality levels. We cannot say on the record before us that

EPA’s conclusion that these standards have de minimis

impact on the relevant issue is arbitrary and capricious, or

contrary to law. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Further, the CAA

requires SIPs to include any of a variety of enforceable

emission control measures “as may be necessary or

appropriate” to meet the CAA’s general requirements. 

42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2). This language implies that some

emission control measures may not be necessary or

appropriate to meet the CAA’s requirements—although, as

we held above, those measures upon which compliance plans

rely must be included. EPA expressly stated that when it

approved the Plans, it determined that the Diesel Particulate

Matter Rule and the Solid Waste Collection Vehicle Rule

produced only de minimis emission reductions and so did not

affect EPA’s overall attainment and reasonable further

progress evaluations. Approval of 2008 San Joaquin Valley

PM2.5 Plan and 2007 State Strategy, 76 Fed. Reg. 69,896

69,908 (Nov. 9, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52). 

Those two rules, then, were not necessary or appropriate to

meet the CAA’s requirements according to EPA, and EPA

did not err in approving the Plans without incorporating these

emission control measures. We conclude that EPA’s decision

not to approve the three specific non-waiver measures into

the Plans was not arbitrary or capricious and did not violate

the CAA.

including the United States Supreme Court. 506 F.3d at 839–40.

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IV

The control strategies for both Plans in part rely on state

commitments to propose and adopt emission control

measures and to achieve aggregate emission reductions

sufficient to comply with the NAAQS. The CAA does not

specifically address commitments by states to propose or

adopt emission control measures or to achieve additional

emissions reductions. See BCCA Appeal Grp. v. EPA,

355 F.3d 817, 839–40 (5th Cir. 2003). But the CAA does

allow a variety of “other control measures, means, or

techniques . . . as well as schedules and timetables for

compliance” to comprise an enforceable control strategy. Id.

at 839; see also 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(A). Where EPA has

previously relied on such commitments, courts have upheld

their inclusion in SIPs. See BCCA, 355 F.3d at 838 n.25

(collecting cases); Envtl. Def. v. EPA, 369 F.3d 193, 209 (2d

Cir. 2004).

Petitioners do not challenge the validity of enforceable

commitments generally. Instead, they argue that California’s

commitments to propose and adopt emission control

measures and to achieve aggregate emission reductions are

merelyaspirational goals and are unenforceable, because they

contain no specific strategies or measures, and they

impermissibly allow specific measures to fail to meet their

individual emission reduction targets so long as the aggregate

emission reduction commitment is met. Alternatively,

Petitioners argue that even if the commitments are not merely

aspirational goals, they are still unenforceable because:

(1) California has discretion whether to change or honor

them; and (2) it is practically impossible to bring a timely

enforcement action if commitments remain unfulfilled by

their deadlines. We reject these arguments and conclude that

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18 COMM. FOR A BETTER ARVIN V. EPA

California’s commitments are enforceable. EPA’s approval

of the commitments to propose and adopt emission control

measures and to achieve aggregate emission reductions was

not arbitrary or capricious and did not violate the CAA.

A

Petitioners analogize California’s commitments to

achieve aggregate emission reductions to the public transit

ridership target in Bayview Hunters Point Community

Advocates v. Metropolitan Transportation Commission,

where we held that a “target” to increase ridership by 15%

was not a binding obligation and could not be enforced

against the public transportation agency. 366 F.3d 692, 695

(9th Cir. 2004). But the analogy fails. In Bayview, our

conclusion that the ridership target was an unenforceable goal

relied on two primary aspects of the transportation control

measure at issue—its language and logic. Id. First, we noted

that nothing in the transportation control measure’s language

actually required a ridership increase by any amount, and that

instead, the “expected ridership increase was never described

as anything more than a ‘target[.]’” Id. at 698. The word

“target” was significant, because agreeing to establish one

was “not the same as promising to attain” that ridership

increase. Id. Here, however, the Plans use mandatory and

non-discretionary language to “commit[] . . . to adopt[ing]

and implement[ing] measures that will achieve specific

[emissions] reductions by specific years.” Approval of 8-

Hour Ozone Plan for San Joaquin Valley, 77 Fed. Reg.

12,652, 12,653–54 (Mar. 1, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.

pt 52); see 40 C.F.R. § 52.220(c)(356)(ii)(B)(2) and (4),

(392)(ii)(A)(2), (395)(ii)(A)(2), (397)(ii)(B)(2) (codifying by

reference both CARB’s and the District’s commitments to

propose and adopt emission control measures by specific

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years and to achieve specific amounts of aggregate emission

reductions by specific years). The language differences

between the ridership target in Bayview and California’s

commitments here support the conclusion that California’s

commitments are not merely aspirational goals.

Second, we concluded in Bayviewthat the ridership target

relied on “hoped-for increases in productivity” to boost public

transit use. Bayview, 366 F.3d at 698. But predicting public

human behavior is unreliable. Id. at 699. Here, by contrast,

state commitments to propose and adopt emission control

measures require government agencyaction, not action by the

public. Commitments by the state of California to reduce

aggregate emissions reductions by specially tailored methods

are reasonably within the control of state agencies. The idea

that the public transportation agency in Bayview might

control ridership increases “impli[ed] the implausible

proposition” that a “target” for anticipated public

participation compelled compliance. Id. But the idea that

California here can and will propose and adopt emission

control measures and achieve aggregate emission reductions

by specific amounts and within specific time-frames is

plausible and consistent with commitments by other states

that other circuits have upheld. See BCCA, 355 F.3d at 841

(upholding EPA’s approval, into the Houston, Texas SIP, of

commitments to adopt and implement additional emission

controls on a fixed schedule and to achieve additional

emission reductions); Envtl. Def., 369 F.3d at 209–10

(upholding EPA’s approval of enforceable commitments into

New York’s one-hour ozone SIP). Because the commitments

in both Plans require California to meet specific reductions by

specific deadlines, we conclude that California’s

commitments to propose and adopt emission control

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20 COMM. FOR A BETTER ARVIN V. EPA

measures and to achieve aggregate emission reductions are

not merely aspirational, unenforceable goals.

B

Alternatively, Petitioners argue that even if California’s

commitments to achieve aggregate emission reductions are

not merely aspirational goals, they remain unenforceable

because: (1) California has ultimate discretion to determine

whether the aggregate emission reduction commitments are

met; and (2) enforcement is impractical because it is

“virtually impossible” to determine, based on limited and

difficult-to-accessinformation, whether California has met its

aggregate emission reduction commitments. Even if citizens

could access such information, Petitioners argue,

“enforcement would be delayed until it was too late to meet

the attainment deadline.” We disagree.

Petitioners’ discretion argument focuses on the way

California calculates the amount of emission reductions it

must achieve to meet the relevant NAAQS and on

California’s determinations whether adopted emission control

measures actually achieve claimed reductions. Petitioners

contend that by reducing the baseline inventory, which is an

estimate of future emissions assuming no control strategies

are adopted, California can claim that fewer or less stringent

control measures than those approved in the SIP are required

to reduce emissions to the necessary levels.

While we did conclude in Warmerdam that neither a

baseline inventory nor the methodology used to calculate it is

independently enforceable, 539 F.3d at 1072–73, that does

not mean that California’s emissions reduction strategies here

are unenforceable. The reason is simple: Once approved into

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a SIP, the measures and the emissions reduction

requirements, as well as the relevant deadlines, are binding on

the state, and can only be altered through a SIP revision

approved by EPA in another notice-and-comment

rulemaking. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(l); 5 U.S.C. § 553. 

Moreover, EPA may not approve any SIP revision that would

interfere with California’s ability to meet the air quality

requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(l). Even if California sought

to revise its commitments, it would need to obtain EPA’s

approval, which could only be forthcoming following a

notice-and-comment period in which Petitioners could

participate.

Finally, Petitioners argue that California’s commitments

to propose and adopt emission control measures and to

achieve aggregate emission reductions are unenforceable as

a practical matter, because “EPA and citizens would be left

to determine, based on information exclusively held and

maintained by CARB and the District” whether the state

agencies have fulfilled their commitments. Petitioners further

contend that even if one could determine whether California’s

commitments were fulfilled, such a determination could not

be made until after milestone dates and shortly before the

attainment deadline, which in turn would delay enforcement

and remedy until “well after the attainment date.” We reject

Petitioners’ practicality argument.

Forsupport, Petitioners cite EPA’s published fundamental

principles for effective SIPs and control strategies. One of

these principles is enforceability, which requires that SIPs

(1) be “duly adopted, and specify clear, unambiguous, and

measurable requirements”; (2) contain a “legal means for

ensuring that sources [comply] with the control measure”;

and (3) be “enforceable in practice.” State Implementation

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22 COMM. FOR A BETTER ARVIN V. EPA

Plans, 57 F3d. Reg. 13,498, 13568 (proposed Apr. 16, 1992)

(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52). Specifically, a

“regulatory limit is not enforceable if, for example, it is

impractical to determine compliance with the published

limit.” Id. Petitioners fail to show how California’s

commitments fall short of this standard. As EPA and the

District explain, the information that Petitioners contend is so

difficult to know or retrieve is readily available throughout

the regulatory processes preceding adoption of emission

control measures into the SIP. See Cal. Gov’t Code

§§ 11340, 11343–49.6 (listing notice and information

requirements for California agencies when considering and

adopting regulations); Cal. Health & Safety Code

§§ 40725–28.5 (listing public hearing and record

requirements for rules or regulations to be considered and

adopted by California Air Pollution Control Districts).4

CARB itself prepares assessments of the potential for

significant environmental impacts of proposed regulations. 

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 17, § 60005 (2015). CARB and the

District must also analyze “reasonably foreseeable methods”

for how compliance will be achieved with certain

environmental regulations. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 14, § 15187

(2015). And EPA’s own notice-and-comment rulemaking

procedures to determine whether measures will receive SIP

credit present another opportunity for citizens to track the

development of emission control measures. Aside from

information available from or produced as a result of

administrative rulemaking at the state and federal levels, the

public can also seek information within the control of

California agencies through the California Public Records

Act. See Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 6250–6276.48. We conclude

that California’s commitments to propose and adopt emission

 

4

 All citations to the California Code refer to the West 2014 edition.

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COMM. FOR A BETTER ARVIN V. EPA 23

control measures and to achieve aggregate emission

reductions are not unenforceable for lack of publiclyavailable

information.

We also conclude that Petitioners can seek timely

remedies under the CAA if California does not fulfill its

commitments to propose and adopt emission control

measures or to achieve aggregate emission reductions. 

Because the public cannot sue to enforce a commitment until

after a commitment deadline has passed does not negate a

commitment’s enforceability. As EPA notes, this argument

conflates enforcing specific commitments, which would be

independently enforceable emission control measures in a

SIP, with the more general requirement that states attain

national air quality standards by specific dates. We decline

to extend the CAA’s citizen-suit provision beyond what it

says by providing for general attainment-forcing remedies

when the CAA does not. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)

(authorizing citizen suits to obtain remedies for, among other

things, violations of “emission standard[s] or limitation[s].”). 

If California does not fulfill a commitment to propose and

adopt emission control measures or to achieve aggregate

emission reductions, the public can seek a remedy for such

specific violations. If, on the other hand, California does not

attain required air quality standards, EPA may use means

available under other parts of the CAA to ensure that the state

attains the relevant national air quality standard. See, e.g.,

42 U.S.C. §§ 7413, 7509.

Because California’s commitments to propose and adopt

emission control measures and to achieve aggregate emission

reductions are neither aspirational goals nor unenforceable as

a matter of discretion or practicality, we conclude that these

commitments are enforceable emission standards or

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24 COMM. FOR A BETTER ARVIN V. EPA

limitations, and that EPA’s approval of them into the Plans

was not arbitrary or capricious and did not violate the CAA. 

We deny this portion of the petition for review.

V

We grant the petition for review in part and remand the

matter to EPA for further proceedings consistent with our

decision.

Petitioners may recover from EPA the costs and fees

incurred in this litigation. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(f). 

Determination of an appropriate amount of fees and costs is

referred to the Appellate Commissioner, who shall conduct

whatever proceedings he deems appropriate, and who shall

have authority to enter an order awarding the same. See Ober

v. EPA, 84 F.3d 304 316 (9th Cir. 1996).

PETITION GRANTED in part, DENIED in part, and

REMANDED.

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