Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-00696/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-00696-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
McKinley Key
Petitioner
J. Solis
Respondent

Document Text:

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

McKINLEY KEY,

Petitioner,

 vs.

J. SOLIS, Warden,

Respondent. 

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No. C 04-0696 CRB (PR)

ORDER DENYING

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner, a state prisoner incarcerated at the Correctional Training

Facility in Soledad, California, seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §

2254 challenging the California Board of Prison Terms' ("BPT") decision of

November 6, 2001 finding him not suitable for parole. 

Per order filed on July 19, 2004, the court found that the petition appeared

to state cognizable due process claims under § 2254, when liberally construed,

and ordered respondent to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not be

granted. After seeking and obtaining an extension of time, respondent instead

filed a motion to dismiss the petition for failure to exhaust state judicial remedies

as to all claims. 

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Per order filed on May 2, 2005, the court granted respondent's motion and,

pursuant to the law of the circuit, directed petitioner to inform the court in writing

whether he wished to (1) withdraw his unexhausted claim and proceed only on

his exhausted claims, or (2) dismiss the entire mixed petition and return to federal

court with a new petition once all claims are exhausted. Petitioner chose the first

option and, per order filed on May 23, 2005, the unexhausted claim was stricken

and the court's original order to show cause was reinstated. 

Respondent has now filed an answer to the order to show cause and

petitioner has filed a traverse. 

BACKGROUND

Petitioner was convicted in the Superior Court of the State of California in

and for the County of Los Angeles of two counts each of kidnaping for robbery

and robbery with the enhancement of using a knife during each offense. On July

26, 1985, he was sentenced to a prison term of life plus one year, with the

possibility of parole.

Petitioner has been found not suitable for parole each time he has appeared

before the BPT. On November 6, 2001, petitioner appeared before the BPT for a

subsequent parole consideration hearing and again was found not suitable for

parole. 

Petitioner challenged the BPT's November 6, 2001 decision in the state

superior, appellate and supreme courts. After the Supreme Court of California

denied review of his final state habeas petition on December 17, 2003, the instant

federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 followed.

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DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus "in behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the

ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The writ may not be granted with respect to any claim that was

adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court's adjudication of the

claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented

in the State court proceeding." Id. § 2254(d). 

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ

if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] 

Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than

[the] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). “Under the ‘unreasonable application’

clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the

correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably

applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413.

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A federal habeas court

making the "unreasonable application" inquiry should ask whether the state

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court's application of clearly established federal law was "objectively

unreasonable." Id. at 409. 

The only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d) is in the holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme

Court as of the time of the state court decision. Id. at 412; Clark v. Murphy, 331

F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). While circuit law may be “persuasive

authority” for purposes of determining whether a state court decision is an

unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, only the Supreme Court’s

holdings are binding on the state courts and only those holdings need be

“reasonably” applied. Id.

B. Legal Claims

Petitioner seeks federal habeas corpus relief from the BPT's November 6,

2001 decision finding him not suitable for parole, and denying him a subsequent

hearing for one year, on the ground that the decision does not comport with due

process. Petitioner claims that the decision was "arbitrary and capricious" and

not supported by the evidence. 

California’s parole scheme provides that the board “shall set a release date

unless it determines that the gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses,

or the timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such

that consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of

incarceration for this individual, and that a parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed

at this meeting.” Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b). In making this determination, the

board must consider various factors, including the prisoner’s social history, past

criminal history, and base and other commitment offenses, including behavior

before, during and after the crime. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(b) – (d). 

/ 

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The Ninth Circuit has held that the parole scheme set forth in section 3041

and accompanying regulations “gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest in

release on parole” which cannot be denied without adequate procedural due

process protections. McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2002). 

It matters not that, as is the case here, a parole release date has never been set for

the inmate because “[t]he liberty interest is created, not upon the grant of a parole

date, but upon the incarceration of the inmate.” Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910,

914-15 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding initial refusal to set parole date for prisoner with

15-to-life sentence implicated prisoner’s liberty interest).

Respondent argues that the Ninth Circuit's holdings in McQuillon and

Biggs no longer control because the Supreme Court of California since held in In

re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061 (2005), that the language of section 3041 is not

mandatory and, therefore, California inmates cannot have a liberty interest in

early release on parole that is protected by federal due process. Unfortunately for

respondent, the Ninth Circuit recently rejected their no-liberty-interest argument

and made clear that "California inmates continue to have a liberty interest in

parole after In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061 (2005)." Sass v. California Bd.

of Prison Terms, No. 05-16455, slip op. 10563, 10566 (9th Cir. Aug. 31, 2006). 

It also held that the "some evidence" standard identified in Superintendent v. Hill,

472 U.S. 445 (1985), is clearly established federal law in the parole context for

AEDPA purposes. Id. at 10572-73. 

Due process requires that "some evidence" support the parole board's

decision not to release the prisoner. Id. (holding that Hill, which required “some

evidence” to support revocation of inmate's good-time credits, applies to

decisions to deny parole reviewed in § 2254 habeas petition); Biggs, 334 F.3d at

915 (same); McQuillion, 306 F.2d at 904 (same); Jancsek v. Oregon Bd. of

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Parole, 833 F.2d 1389, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987) (same). The "some evidence"

standard is minimally stringent: The "Due Process Clause does not require courts

to set aside decisions of prison administrators that have some basis in fact." Hill,

472 U.S. at 456 (emphasis added). The relevant question for the court is

"whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion

reached by the [BPT]." Id. at 455-56. The court "cannot reweigh the evidence;"

it only looks "to see if 'some evidence' supports the BPT's decision." Powell v.

Gomez, 33 F.3d 39, 42 (9th Cir. 1994).

Due process also requires that the evidence underlying the parole board's

decision have some indicia of reliability. Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915; McQuillion,

306 F.3d at 904; Jancsek, 833 F.3d at 1390. Relevant in this inquiry is whether

the prisoner was afforded an opportunity to appear before, and present evidence

to, the board. See Pedro v. Oregon Parole Bd., 825 F.2d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir.

1987); see also Morales v. California Dep't of Corrections, 16 F.3d 1001, 1005

(9th Cir. 1994) (court may consider whether a prisoner's allegations of any

violations by the board are of a "minor" nature, whether they are supported in

fact, whether the prisoner had an opportunity to participate, and whether he took

full advantage of that opportunity), rev'd on other grounds, 514 U.S. 499 (1995).

In sum, if the parole board's determination of parole unsuitability is to

satisfy due process, there must be some evidence, with some indicia of reliability,

to support the decision. Rosas v. Nielsen, 428 F.3d 1229, 1232 (9th Cir. 2005).

Here, the record shows that on November 6, 2001, petitioner appeared

with counsel before a BPT panel for a subsequent parole consideration hearing. 

The presiding commissioner explained that in assessing suitability for parole the

panel would consider petitioner's commitment offense, prior criminal and social

history, and his programming and behavior since commitment, including progress

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since petitioner's last hearing, any new psychiatric reports and any other

information that may have a bearing on parole suitability. Accord Cal. Code

Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(b) (setting out factors to be considered in determining

suitability for parole). The commissioner also explained that the panel had

reviewed petitioner’s central file and prior transcripts, that it would afford

petitioner an opportunity to make corrections to the record, and that petitioner

would be given an opportunity to make a final statement regarding parole

suitability. 

The panel then discussed with petitioner the evidence relevant to each of

the factors to be considered in determining his suitability for parole, and provided

him with ample opportunity to be heard on every issue. The panel also heard

final statements from a deputy district attorney and petitioner’s attorney.

The panel recessed to deliberate and, after the hearing resumed, concluded

that although petitioner was "headed in the right direction," his "release at this

point would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society.” Nov. 6, 2001 Hr’g

Tr. at 35 (Resp’t Ex. 3). The panel explained that it had considered all relevant

evidence and concluded that the factors suggesting unsuitability outweighed

those suggesting suitability. 

The panel found that the commitment offense was carried out in a "cruel

manner, a manner which demonstrates a callous disregard for human suffering." 

Id. at 35-36. Using a knife, petitioner kidnaped two women in a car, took money

and a necklace from them, tied them up with their purse straps and pantyhose,

and put one of them into the trunk of the car. The panel also found that petitioner

has an unstable social history and prior "criminality," including substance abuse,

gang activity and multiple arrests for theft crimes and assault with a deadly

weapon. Id. at 37. He was shot in the head by a rival gang member and, after the

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leaving the hospital, committed the kidnaping for robbery offense for which he is

now serving time. 

The panel found that the most recent psychiatric report of petitioner was

inconclusive. Id. at 38-39. Although Dr. Carswell diagnosed petitioner as having

an antisocial personality disorder that was improving, and estimated petitioner's

potential for violence to be no higher than the average citizen in the community,

Carswell noted that petitioner's potential for violence may be affected by his

return to the gang and/or substance-abuse lifestyle. 

The panel found that petitioner's parole plans had been made too hastily

and that additional time was needed to confirm their substance. Id. at 39.

Petitioner's plans had changed since he had recently spoken with his counselor

and his cousin's offer of a job was written only in an informal letter to petitioner

and not on any sort of company letterhead.

The panel commended petitioner for doing "some good things in the last

few years," including completing a vocation graphic arts program, obtaining his

GED, participating in AA and NA, and taking some self-help in salesmanship. 

Id. at 40. However, it made clear that in its judgment "[t]he positive factors of

your behavior do not outweigh the factors of [un]suitability." Id. The panel

encouraged petitioner to "remain disciplinary free" and "[c]ome "back in a year,"

and "your chances will certainly be enhanced by that." Id.

The state courts denied petitioner's request for state habeas relief from the

BPT's determination that he was not suitable for parole. The California Court of

Appeal stated:

We have independently reviewed the record before the

Board with deference to the Board's "broad discretion" in parole

matters (In re Rosenkrantz (2002) 29 Cal.4th at p. 656), and

conclude "some evidence" supports each of the Board's findings,

including the Board's findings with regards to Key's commitment

offense, his pattern of escalating criminal behavior, the 1999

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psychiatric report, the hastily prepared nature of Key's parole plans

and the relatively recent improvement in Key's institutional

behavior. (In re Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 652.) Thus,

the petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.

In re McKinley Key, No. B169782, slip op at 1 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 2003)

(Resp't Ex. 10).

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief because the state courts'

rejection of his federal claim was not contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent, or was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The BPT’s

November 6, 2001 decision to deny petitioner parole is supported by some

evidence in the record and that evidence bears some indicia of reliability. See,

e.g., Sass, slip op. at 10573-74 (upholding denial of parole based solely on

gravity of offense and pre-conviction offenses); Rosas, 428 F.3d at 1232-33

(upholding denial of parole based on gravity of offense and psychiatric reports);

Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916 (upholding denial of parole based solely on gravity of

offense and conduct prior to imprisonment); Morales, 16 F.3d at 1005 (upholding

denial of parole based on criminal history, cruel nature of offense, and need for

further psychiatric treatment). Petitioner’s disagreement with the BPT’s

assessment of the evidence does not compel a different result. Our inquiry here

is simply "whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the

conclusion reached by the [BPT]." Hill, 474 U.S. at 455-56 (emphasis added). 

There is – the kidnaping for robbery offense was cruel and callous; petitioner has

a pre-commitment history of substance abuse and gang-related criminal activity;

his parole plans did not appear firm and his institutional gains were relatively

recent. Cf. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(c) & (d) (listing circumstances

tending to show unsuitability and circumstances tending to show suitability). It is

not up to this court to “reweigh the evidence." Powell, 33 F.3d at 42.

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Petitioner claims that the BPT's continued reliance on his committing

offense and prior history violates his due process rights. But even if none of the

post-commitment factors relied upon by the BPT constitute "some evidence," the

Ninth Circuit recently made clear that evidence of a prisoner's "prior offenses and

the gravity of his convicted offense[]" may "constitute some evidence to support

the [BPT's] decision." Sass, slip op. at 10573. It simply cannot be said that in

"making a judgment call based on evidence of pre-conviction recidivism and the

nature of the conviction offense," the BPT acted "arbitrarily." Id.

The court is satisfied that the BPT gave petitioner individualized

consideration and that there is “some evidence” in the record to support the

panel's decision to deny petitioner parole for one year after the November 6, 2001

subsequent hearing. It simply cannot be said that the state courts' rejection of

petitioner’s challenge to the BPT’s November 6, 2001 decision was contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court

precedent, or that it was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Sass, slip op. at 10573-74. Petitioner is not entitled to

federal habeas relief. 

 CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is

DENIED. 

The clerk shall enter judgment in favor of respondent and close the file. 

SO ORDERED.

DATED: Sept. 22, 2006 CHARLES R. BREYER

United States District Judge

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