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Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Robert Stewart Wright
Appellant

Document Text:

., UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

. FILED 

Umced Scares Court of A :Peals 

Tenth Ch:uit p 

APR 101991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. ) No. 90-2067 

) (D.C. No. 89-208 JB) 

ROBERT STEWART WRIGHT, a/k/a 

PAUL D. SHUBERT 

Defendant-Appellant. 

) (D. N.M.) 

) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before McKAY, SEYMOUR, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

On December 5, 1989, defendant-appellant Robert Stewart 

Wright pled guilty to one count of bank fraud in violation of 

18 u.s.c. S 1344 (1988) in return for dismissal of a second count 

of bank fraud. On March 6, 1990, Wright moved to withdraw this 

plea on the grounds that: (1) he had been misinformed that the 

applicable sentencing guideline range for his offense was 6-12 

months, when it was actually 10-16 months; (2) he had not been 

informed that his sentence could include a period of supervised 

probation and (3) he did not believe that he was criminally 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-2067 Document: 010110031889 Date Filed: 04/10/1991 Page: 1 
1' 

• 

culpable of the offense. Doc. 88. The district court denied this 

motion on March 9, 1990, and sentenced Wright to fourteen months 

confinement, three years of post-confinement supervised probation 

and payment of restitution. Wright appeals the district court's 

denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We affirm. 1 

On appeal, Wright argues based on several theories that 

reversal is required because his counsel failed to inform him 

accurately of the possible length and scope of his sentence. 

First, Wright contends that these omissions amounted to 

ineffective assistance of counsel and led him to plead guilty 

without the necessary "awareness of the relevant circumstances and 

likely consequences." Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 

( 1970). Next, Wright argues that his counsel's inaccurate 

sentence prediction rendered his plea involuntary as a matter of 

law. Finally, Wright claims that his counsel's error, coupled 

with Wright's post-plea denial of "criminal culpability," 

compelled the court to exercise its discretion to allow Wright to 

withdraw his plea. We reject each of these arguments. 

To succeed in his first claim, Wright must both "overcome the 

'strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide 

range of reasonable professional assistance,'" Laycock v. New 

Mexico, 880 F.2d 1184, 1187 (10th Cir. 1989)(quoting Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984)), and prove that "[']there is 

a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate 

has determined unanimously that oral argument 

assist the determination of this appeal. 

P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause 

submitted without oral argument. 

2 

record, this panel 

would not materially 

See Fed. R. App. 

is therefore ordered 

Appellate Case: 90-2067 Document: 010110031889 Date Filed: 04/10/1991 Page: 2 
) 

' 

not have pleaded guilty.[']" Laycock, 880 F.2d at 1187 (quoting 

Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). Wright claims that his 

reliance on defense counsel's incorrect sentencing estimate meets 

this standard. It is well established, however, that "a mere 

inaccurate prediction [of the defendant's sentence], standing 

alone, [does] not constitute ineffective assistance" of counsel. 

United States v. Arvanitis, 902 F.2d 489, 494 (7th Cir. 1990); 

Iaea v. Sunn, 800 F.2d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 1986); see also 

Doganiere v. United States, 914 F.2d 165, 168 (9th Cir. 

1990)(inaccurate sentencing prediction that was not "a gross 

mischaracterization of the likely outcome of [defendant's] case" 

was not ineffective assistance of counsel), cert. denied, 

U.S. (1991). We . find no merit, therefore, in Wright's 

claim that the district court should have allowed his guilty plea 

to be withdrawn due to ineffective assistance of counsel. 

We also reject Wright's contention that his plea was 

involuntary because his counsel failed to accurately predict the 

precise length and form of his sentence. In general, an 

inaccurate sentence prediction by defense counsel does not render 

a guilty plea involuntary. See Laycock, 880 F.2d at 1186; 

Wellnitz v. Page, 420 F.2d 935, 936 (10th Cir. 1970). A plea may 

be held invalid on this basis, however, if the defendant proves 

both that his counsel materially misinformed him of the 

consequences of the plea or the court's probable disposition and 

that he relied on this misrepresentation. United States v. 

Williams, 919 F.2d 1451, 1456 (10th Cir. 1990). 

3 

Appellate Case: 90-2067 Document: 010110031889 Date Filed: 04/10/1991 Page: 3 
In this case, we have some difficulty in accepting Wright's 

assertion that defense counsel's prediction of Wright's sentence 

was materially different from the sentence ultimately imposed by 

the district court. Even assuming that Wright was "materially 

misinformed" by defense counsel, however, we cannot agree that 

Wright relied on this estimate and thus remained ignorant of the 

consequences of his plea. The record in this case reveals that 

the district court informed Wright that he faced a maximum 

possible sentence of five years, that his precise sentence would 

be determined by application of the federal sentencing guidelines 

to the facts identified in the not-yet-completed presentencing 

report and that Wright's sentence could be more or less severe 

than that predicted by Wright's counsel. 2 Tr. 12/5/89 at 11-12. 

In response to the court's questioning, Wright stated that he 

understood each of these provisions. Under these 

circumstances, we cannot agree with Wright's claim that his plea 

was involuntary because he did not understand the consequences of 

his plea. See Williams, 919 F.2d at 1456-57 (plea was not 

involuntary when district court imposed more severe sentence on 

defendant than predicted by both prosecutor and defense counsel 

when court had informed defendant that it was not bound by these 

estimates) • 

We also reject Wright's argument that the district court 

abused its discretion under Rule 32(d) of the Federal Rules of 

2 In fact, the principal reason for the discrepancy between 

defense counsel's estimated sentencing range of 6-12 months and 

the court's determination of a 10-16 month range was Wright's 

failure to inform his counsel of his prior criminal history. See 

Doc. 88 at 2. 

4 

Appellate Case: 90-2067 Document: 010110031889 Date Filed: 04/10/1991 Page: 4 
Criminal Procedure in failing to allow Wright to withdraw his 

plea. This rule authorizes a district court to allow withdrawal 

of a plea before sentencing "upon a showing by the defendant of 

any fair and just reason." Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(d). In 

determining whether the defendant has made the necessary showing, 

the following seven factors are considered: 

(1) whether the defendant has asserted his innocence; 

(2) whether withdrawal would prejudice the government; 

(3) whether the defendant delayed in filing his motion, 

and if so, the reason for delay; (4) whether withdrawal 

would substantially inconvenience the court; (5) whether 

close assistance of counsel was available to defendant; 

(6) whether the plea was knowing and voluntary; 

(7) whether the withdrawal would waste judicial 

resources. 

United States v. Rhodes, 913 F.2d 839, 845 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. 

denied, 111 s. Ct. 1079 (1991). 

In this case, the district court denied Wright's motion to 

withdraw his plea on the grounds that Wright admitted his guilt at 

the time of pleading and that his plea was knowingly and 

voluntarily entered. Tr. 12/9/90 at 2-3. Given the standard 

cited above and the facts of this case, we find no abuse of 

discretion in this decision. See United States v. Hickok, 

907 F.2d 983, 986 (10th Cir. 1990)(defendant's change of heart, 

without more, does not warrant withdrawal of plea). 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of New Mexico is therefore AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue 

forthwith. 

Entered for the Court 

by Judge David M. Ebel 

5 

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