Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_09-cv-08226/USCOURTS-azd-3_09-cv-08226-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jerry James George
Petitioner
United States of America
Respondent

Document Text:

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

JERRY JAMES GEORGE, )

)

Defendant/Movant, )

) CR 05-00709 PCT MHM

v. ) CIV 09-08226 PCT NVW (MEA)

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

)

Plaintiff/Respondent )

)

_____________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE NEIL V. WAKE:

On or about December 14, 2009, Movant filed a Motion to

Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2255. Respondent filed a Response to Motion to Vacate Sentence

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on October 22, 2010. See Doc. 30

(“Response”). Movant filed a reply to the response on December

20, 2010. See Doc. 33.

I Procedural History

A complaint filed July 11, 2005, charged Movant with

two counts of sexual abuse of a minor under the age of twelve.

See Criminal Doc. 1. On July 19, 2005, a federal grand jury in

Phoenix, Arizona, returned an eight-count indictment against

Movant. See Criminal Doc. 8. Movant was charged with one count

of kidnaping (Count 1), in violation of 18 U.S.C. sections 1153

and 1201(a)(2), four counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a

minor (Counts 2 through 5), in violation of 18 U.S.C. sections

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1153, 2241(c), and 2246(2); and three counts of abusive sexual

contact (Counts 6 through 8), in violation of 18 U.S.C. sections

1153, 2244(a)(1), and 2246(3). The alleged victim in Counts 1

through 5 was S.B., an eight-year-old female; the victim in

Counts 6 through 8 was D.B., S.B.’s four-year-old sister. 

Movant’s trial counsel, Ms. Wilkinson, was appointed to

represent Movant on July 27, 2005. See Criminal Doc. 13. On

October 4, 2005, the government noticed that at Movant’s trial

the government intended to introduce evidence that Movant

confessed to law enforcement agents at the time of his arrest.

See Criminal Doc. 20. 

Movant’s trial counsel filed four motions to continue

his trial. On March 14, 2006, counsel filed a motion to

suppress evidence arising from a search of Movant’s truck at the

time of his arrest, arguing Movant’s consent to the search was

not voluntary. The motion sought a voluntariness hearing

regarding the search of Movant’s truck and regarding Movant’s

confession at the time of his arrest. After conducting a

hearing, the Court took under advisement the motion to suppress

the evidence of the confession and the evidence resulting from

the search of the truck. See Criminal Doc. 85. The motion to

suppress was denied on August 11, 2006. See Criminal Doc. 99.

Movant’s jury trial began on November 28, 2006. See

Criminal Doc. 160. At the end of the day on November 29, 2006,

the Court inquired of defense counsel as to whether Movant would

be testifying. Counsel responded: “Don’t know yet judge.”

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1 It is not completely clear from the limited transcript provided

by Respondents that the jury was not present at the time of this

interchange, however, the Magistrate Judge presumes the jury was not

present at the time of this query as it appears to have occurred at

the very end of the day when counsel and the Court were discussing the

scheduling of closing arguments and jury instructions.

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Response, Exh. A.1 The government rested on November 30, 2006.

On that day, outside the presence of the jury, the Court asked

defense counsel if Movant would testify. After conferring with

Movant, counsel informed the Court that Movant would not

testify. Id., Exh. A at 4. 

The jury returned a verdict on the afternoon of

December 1, 2006, finding Movant guilty of Counts 2, 3, 5 and 6,

and not guilty on the charge of kidnapping (Count 1), and not

guilty of Counts 4, 7 and 8. On or about December 13, 2006,

Movant sent a letter to the Court stating that he had wished to

testify at his trial and that his counsel had prevented him from

testifying. Id., Exh. B. 

Movant sought to change counsel prior to sentencing.

Id., Exh. B & Exh. D. A hearing was conducted by the Court on

December 19, 2006, with regard to the motion to change counsel.

At the hearing Movant’s trial counsel averred that, after

conducting a mock trial session, she and another attorney had

advised Movant not to testify at his trial. Id., Exh. D.

Counsel averred she had not prevented Movant from testifying,

but she advised the Court that, because Movant had apparently

lost faith in her, the motion to change counsel should be

granted. At the hearing the Court noted that, during Movant’s

trial, on the second occasion on which the Court had inquired

about Movant testifying, Movant had visibly indicated he would

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not testify by shaking his head. Id., Exh. D at 9-10. At the

conclusion of the hearing, after allowing Movant to address the

Court, the Court granted the motion to change counsel. 

On May 15, 2007, the Court sentenced Movant to

concurrent terms of imprisonment of 236 months on Counts 2, 3

and 5, and to a concurrent term of 120 months imprisonment on

Count 6, to be followed by concurrent life terms of supervised

release on each count of conviction. The Court also imposed a

special assessment and ordered restitution.

Movant initiated a timely direct appeal of his

conviction and sentences. In his direct appeal Movant asserted

that: (1) his right to due process was violated by the Court’s

refusal to dismiss the jury panel after several prospective

jurors saw him in shackles; (2) the victims’ statements that

Movant had hurt them, detailed in the testimony of the victims’

mother, were inadmissible hearsay; (3) the admission of a

victim’s statement to a nurse that Movant had inappropriately

touched the victim, introduced through the nurse’s testimony,

was inadmissible hearsay; (4) the Court erred by denying a

motion to preclude proffered testimony regarding the victims’

brother and the brother’s sexual contact with the victims; (5)

the Court violated Movant’s constitutional rights by allowing

the introduction as evidence of photographs of one victim’s

medical examination, the introduction of testimony of FBI

agents, and a victim’s testimony; (6) the Court committed

manifest injustice by denying the defense’s motion to strike a

victim’s testimony; and (7) there was insufficient evidence to

support the convictions.

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Movant’s conviction was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals on August 14, 2008. See United States v.

George, 291 Fed. App. 803 (9th Cir. 2008). A petition for

certiorari was denied December 1, 2008. See George v. United

States, 129 S. Ct. 659. 

In this section 2255 action Movant asserts he was

denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of

trial counsel. Inter alia, Movant contends his trial counsel

prevented him from testifying at his trial. Movant also alleges

he was subjected to an unreasonable search and seizure. Movant

further avers that he never waived his Miranda rights or signed

such a waiver and that he never consented to the taking of a DNA

sample. Movant alleges that testimony to the contrary regarding

the waiver of his rights was perjured and that the waiver form

produced by the government was a forgery. Additionally, Movant

asserts he is entitled to relief from his convictions because of

prosecutorial misconduct, i.e., he alleges that the prosecutor

knowingly presented perjured testimony. 

Respondents argue Movant has not established that he

was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel.

Attached to the response to the section 2255 motion is a letter

from Movant’s trial counsel dated October 1, 2010. Counsel

avers that, had Movant testified at his trial, Movant would have

testified that the FBI planted a plastic bag in his truck that

was introduced at Movant’s trial as evidence seized from the

truck. Response, Exh. F.

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II Analysis

Relief is precluded on a section 2255 claim that was

raised and decided in the movant’s direct appeal. See, e.g.,

United States v. Scrivner, 189 F.3d 825, 282 (9th Cir. 1999);

United States v. Redd, 759 F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 1985); Odom

v. United States, 455 F.2d 159, 160 (9th Cir. 1972).

Additionally, because “[h]abeas review is an

extraordinary remedy and will not be allowed to do service for

an appeal,” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621, 118 S.

Ct. 1604, 1610 (1998), absent a showing of cause and prejudice,

a section 2255 movant procedurally defaults all claims which

were not raised in his direct appeal, other than claims

asserting the movant was deprived of the effective assistance of

counsel. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68, 102

S. Ct. 1584, 1594 (1982); United States v. Johnson, 988 F.2d

941, 945 (9th Cir. 1993). “[T]o obtain collateral relief based

on trial errors to which no contemporaneous objection was made,

a convicted defendant must show both (1) ‘cause’ excusing his

double procedural default, and (2) ‘actual prejudice’ resulting

from the errors of which he complains.” Frady, 456 U.S. at 167-

68, 102 S. Ct. at 1594. See also United States v. Ratigan, 351

F.3d 957, 964 (9th Cir. 2003). The alleged ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel does not establish cause for the

default of claims if the claims the movant asserts his counsel

was ineffective for not asserting would not have succeeded on

appeal. See United States v. Withers, ___ F.3d ___, 2011 WL

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2

 Withers claimed that his appellate counsel was

ineffective-a claim that, if successful, would satisfy the

cause requirement that is necessary to overcome procedural

default. [] To establish ineffective assistance of counsel,

Withers must show that his “counsel’s representation fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and that

there is a “reasonable probability” that the deficient

performance prejudiced the defense. []

 Assuming that Withers’s public trial claim was viable-as

we must because the record contains no indication that the

closure of the courtroom satisfied constitutional

requirements-appellate counsel’s failure to raise it likely

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. ... [].

Because Withers’s public trial claim is not palpably

incredible or patently frivolous, neither is his claim that

his appellate counsel performed deficiently by failing to

raise it on direct review.

 Withers’s claim that there is a “reasonable probability”

that his appellate counsel’s failure to raise this claim

prejudiced him is similarly not palpably incredible or

patently frivolous. Again assuming that his public trial

claim was viable, his counsel’s failure to raise it almost

certainly prejudiced him: Because violation of the public

trial right is a structural error, Withers would have been

entitled to automatic reversal of his conviction and a new

trial had he established a violation. []

(internal citations omitted).

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6184, at *6 (9th Cir.).2 See also United States v. Cook, 45 F.3d

388, 393 (10th Cir. 1995) (“If the omitted issue is without

merit, counsel’s failure to raise it does not constitute

constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel.”). To

constitute cause and prejudice for the default of a claim by

failing to raise it in a direct appeal, an appellate counsel’s

error must itself rise to the level of an ineffective assistance

of counsel claim, i.e., appellate counsel’s error must be both

deficient performance and prejudicial. See, e.g., United States

v. Challoner, 583 F.3d 745, 749 (10th Cir. 2009).

In reply to the answer to his section 2255 motion,

Movant asserts he was intoxicated at the time of the crimes,

that he could not fully consent to the search of his truck

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because the truck was also owned by his wife, and that he was

denied his right to a speedy trial. Movant contends his trial

was purposefully delayed by the government until after Movant’s

wife died because the wife would have testified that Movant did

not consent to the search of the truck. Additionally, Movant

avers his wife would have testified that the FBI did not

retrieve evidence from Movant’s truck. Movant argues that the

transcripts provided by Respondent indicate he wished to testify

at his trial. Movant asserts that he was denied his right to

the effective assistance of counsel because counsel did not

protect his right to a speedy trial and because counsel refused

to do the things Movant asked her to do. In his reply Movant

also contends his appellate counsel was unconstitutionally

ineffective because counsel did not raise arguments Movant

thought would be successful.

Movant has not presented evidence that he is entitled

to a hearing on the merits of his procedurally precluded claims.

Movant has not established cause for, nor prejudice arising

from, any procedural default of any claims stated in his section

2255 motion which were not raised in his direct appeal.

Accordingly, the only claims in Movant’s section 2255 which are

not precluded by means of procedural default or previous

presentation would be Movant’s claims of ineffective assistance

of counsel.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal

defendants the right to effective assistance

of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674

(1984).... To prevail on a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel, petitioner

must show 1) his attorney’s performance was

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3 The Magistrate Judge further notes that a District Court

judge’s finding regarding the credibility of a movant in a prior

proceeding is entitled to exceptional deference. See Gant v. United

States, ___ F.3d ___, 2010 WL 5019968, at *4 (7th Cir.) (regarding

the District Court’s finding that a movant was not credible when they

averred they had directed counsel to file an appeal upon resentencing

and counsel contradicted that statement)

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unreasonable under prevailing professional

standards; and 2) there is a reasonable

probability that but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the results would have

been different. United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at

2064). “Strickland defines a reasonable

probability as ‘a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome.’” Id.

United States v. Span, 75 F.3d 1383, 1386-87 (9th Cir. 1996).

In order to find that Movant was deprived of the

effective assistance of counsel and grant him habeas relief, the

Court must conclude trial counsel’s performance was incompetent

and that her deficient trial performance prejudiced Movant.

Movant bears the burden of providing sufficient evidence from

which the Court can conclude his counsel was ineffective. See

Turner, 281 F.3d at 878.3

[N]ot every case of deficient performance

under Strickland represents a constructive

denial of the right to counsel. In fact, it

will be the rare claim of ineffective

assistance that is tantamount to a

constructive denial of counsel. Strickland

remains the norm for ineffective assistance

claims, and the Supreme Court has made clear

that it will not countenance a per-se

prejudice exception which will swallow the

actual prejudice Strickland rule.

Glover v. Miro, 262 F.3d 268, 276-77 (4th Cir. 2001). See also

Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2001); United

States v. Cruz-Mendoza, 147 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 1998).

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Counsel’s performance is deficient when it is

unreasonable, or not “within the range of competence demanded of

attorneys in criminal cases.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104

S. Ct. at 2054. Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must

be “highly deferential.” Id., 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at

2065. See also Carter v. Lee, 283 F.3d 240, 248-49 (4th Cir.

2002). There is a “strong presumption” that trial counsel’s

conduct and strategy falls “within the wide range of reasonable

professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.

Ct. at 2065. Movant must overcome a strong presumption that his

counsel’s representation was within a wide range of reasonable

professional assistance. See United States v. Ferreira-Alameda,

815 F.2d 1251, 1253 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Molina,

934 F.2d 1440, 1447 (9th Cir. 1991). 

With regard to the prejudice prong of the Strickland

analysis, the probability of prejudice may not be based merely

upon conjecture or speculation. See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S.

162, 175-76, 122 S. Ct. 1237, 1246 (2002) (Kennedy, J.

concurrence). A criminal defendant is prejudiced by counsel’s

conduct when there is a “reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94, 104

S. Ct. at 2067-68 (noting further that errors are not

prejudicial if they only have “some conceivable effect on the

outcome of the proceeding”).

The decision whether or not to testify in his own

defense was Movant’s alone. See, e.g., Rock v. Arkansas, 483

U.S. 44, 51-53, 107 S. Ct. 2704, 2708-10 (1987); United States

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v. Curtis, 742 F.2d 1070, 1076 (7th Cir. 1984). “It cannot be

permissible trial strategy, regardless of its merits otherwise,

for counsel to override the ultimate decision of a defendant to

testify contrary to his advice.” United States v. Mullins, 315

F.3d 449, 453 (5th Cir. 2002); Brown v. Artuz, 124 F.3d 73, 80

(2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Ailemen, 710 F. Supp. 2d 960,

969-70 (N.D. Cal. 2008). Although the decision as to whether a

criminal defendant will testify at trial rests with the

defendant, not defense counsel, Chang v. United States, 250 F.3d

79, 82-83 (2d Cir. 2001), it is proper for defense counsel to

give his views and advice as to the advisability of testifying

at trial. Brown, 124 F.3d at 79 (“counsel should always advise

the defendant about the benefits and hazards of testifying and

not testifying, and may strongly advise the course that counsel

thinks best”). 

The record in this matter indicates that, as a matter

of fact, counsel did not prohibit Movant from testifying, it

appears that counsel had previously advised Movant about the

negative consequences of testifying and that, at the time of his

trial, Movant agreed with his counsel that he should not

testify. At a hearing conducted after Movant’s conviction the

Court recalled that, at the conclusion of the trial proceedings,

when the Court inquired whether Movant would testify, counsel

conferred with Movant and the Court observed Movant shaking his

head, indicating that he would not testify.

The Court must entertain a strong presumption that

trial counsel adhered to the requirements of professional

conduct and left the final decision about whether to testify

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with Movant. United States v. Webber, 208 F.3d 545, 551 (6th

Cir. 2000). To overcome this presumption, Movant would need to

present record evidence that, during his trial he somehow

alerted the trial court to his desire to testify. Hodge v.

Haeberlin, 579 F.3d 627, 639 (6th Cir. 2009). Movant’s present

allegations that he wanted to testify and was prevented from

doing so do not suffice to overcome the presumption that he

assented to the tactical decision that he not testify. 

Movant has not established that his counsel prohibited

him from testifying, nor has he established that counseling

Movant not to testify was deficient performance. Neither has

Movant established prejudice. There was substantial evidence

against Movant. Although Movant asserts that his testimony

would have altered the verdict, after a review of the record and

Movant’s pleadings the Magistrate Judge concludes that Movant’s

testimony would not have altered the verdict, given the amount

of evidence introduced regarding his guilt. Additionally, the

Magistrate Judge notes Movant was not convicted on several

counts, indicating his counsel performed competently.

Accordingly, Movant has not shown that any alleged “failure” by

his counsel in “prohibiting” Movant from testifying, even if

factually true, was not prejudicial. See Hodge, 579 F.3d at

639-40.

Additionally, a defendant’s acceptance of counsel’s

advice not to testify involves a matter of trial strategy and

“will not be considered ineffective assistance of counsel.”

Hooks v. Ward, 184 F.3d 1206, 1218-19 (10th Cir. 1999)

(providing that if a defendant follows counsel’s advice not to

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testify, the defendant cannot later claim ineffective assistance

on that ground). Other federal courts have concluded that there

is no cognizable federal habeas claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel predicated on counsel’s advice to the defendant that

they not testify. These courts have reasoned that defense

counsel’s advice concerning whether a defendant should testify

in his defense is a fundamental trial decision, which cannot be

challenged as evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Carter v. Lee, 283 F.3d 240, 249 (4th Cir. 2002). But see

United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1534 (11th Cir. 1992).

Although the right to testify is a fundamental right

subject only to knowing and intelligent waiver, “waiver of

certain fundamental rights can be presumed from a defendant’s

conduct alone, absent circumstances giving rise to a contrary

inference.” United State v. Stover, 474 F.3d 904, 908 (6th Cir.

2007). Notably, Movant has not stated that he was unaware of

his right to testify or that he was somehow prevented from

seeking the Court’s assistance in overcoming counsel’s allegedly

unilateral decision prior to the conclusion of his criminal

proceedings. “Although the ultimate decision whether to testify

rests with the defendant, when a tactical decision is made not

to have the defendant testify, the defendant’s assent is

presumed.” Webber, 208 F.3d at 551.

Movant does not point to anything in the record to

support his claim that, prior to the conclusion of his trial, he

wanted to testify, nor has he produced any evidence that trial

counsel prevented him, rather than counseling him, from

testifying at his trial. When initially considering this claim

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at the hearing conducted prior to Movant’s sentencing, the Court

concluded that, based on her observations, Movant had elected

not to testify and that counsel had not prevented Movant from

testifying.

III Conclusion

Movant has not established that he was deprived of his

constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel

because he offers no evidence his counsel’s performance was

deficient or that he was prejudiced by any alleged deficiency.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. George’s motion

for relief from his convictions and sentences pursuant to

section 2255 be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter,

the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a

response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local

Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona, objections to the Report and

Recommendation may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length.

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Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a

waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration of

the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District

Court must “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The undersigned

recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted

and, should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a

certificate of appealability should be denied because Petitioner

has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right as required by 28 U.S.C.A § 2253(c)(2).

DATED this 20th day of January, 2011.

Case 3:09-cv-08226-NVW Document 36 Filed 01/21/11 Page 15 of 15