Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-05955/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-05955-15/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
BNSF Railway Company
Defendant
Neil A. Jensen
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NEIL A. JENSEN,

Plaintiff,

v.

BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY,

Defendant.

Case No. 13-cv-05955-HSG 

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR NEW 

TRIAL

Re: Dkt. No. 225

A seven-day jury trial in this action brought under the Federal Railway Safety Act 

(“FRSA”) began on October 26, 2015. Dkt. No. 169. On November 3, 2015, the jury returned a 

verdict in favor of Defendant BNSF Railway Co., finding that Plaintiff Neil Jensen failed to prove 

a violation of the FRSA. Dkt. No. 210.

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for new trial. Dkt. No. 225. Pursuant to 

Civil Local Rule 7–1(b), the Court finds this matter appropriate for resolution without oral 

argument, and hereby VACATES the hearing on this matter currently scheduled for February 4, 

2016, at 2:00 p.m. For the reasons articulated below, Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleged a single cause of action for violation of § 20109(c)(2) of the FRSA. Dkt. 

No. 1. To prevail, Plaintiff had to show by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) he engaged in 

protected activity; (2) his employer knew that he engaged in the protected activity; (3) he suffered 

an adverse personnel action; and (4) the protected activity was a contributing factor to the adverse 

action. Araujo v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, 708 F.3d 152, 157 (3d Cir. 2013); see also Dkt. 

No. 139-1 at 29 (Plaintiff’s proposed jury instruction agreeing in substance with this 

characterization of the elements of his FRSA claim). If Plaintiff satisfied this burden, Defendant

Case 4:13-cv-05955-HSG Document 235 Filed 01/15/16 Page 1 of 4
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

could avoid liability if it proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would have terminated 

Plaintiff even if he had not engaged in protected activity. Araujo, 708 F.3d at 157. Plaintiff 

sought compensatory damages—including back pay, front pay, lost benefits, and damages for 

emotional distress—and punitive damages.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(1), a court “may, on motion, grant a new trial 

on all or some of the issues.” A court may grant a new trial “if the verdict is contrary to the clear 

weight of the evidence, is based upon false or perjurious evidence, or to prevent a miscarriage of 

justice.” Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). A judge should not grant a new trial unless “left with the definite and firm conviction 

that a mistake has been committed.” Landes Constr. Co. v. Royal Bank of Can., 833 F.2d 1365, 

1372 (9th Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). In considering a Rule 59(a) motion for a 

new trial, the Court “is not required to view the trial evidence in the light most favorable to the 

verdict. Instead, the district court can weigh the evidence and assess the credibility of the 

witnesses.” Experience Hendrix LLC v. Hendrixlicensing.com Ltd, 762 F.3d 829, 842 (9th Cir. 

2014).

B. Analysis

Plaintiff presents three arguments in support of its motion for new trial: (1) defense 

counsel misstated the applicable law during closing argument; (2) defense counsel engaged in 

attorney misconduct; and (3) the verdict rendered was against the clear weight of the evidence.

1. Misstatement of Applicable Law

Plaintiff first argues that defense counsel misstated the applicable law regarding the 

protected activity at issue in this case—namely, “following orders or a treatment plan of a treating 

physician.” FRSA § 20109(c)(2). In closing argument, defense counsel argued at times that the

doctor’s note presented by Plaintiff at trial was not a treatment plan because it was not “by” 

Plaintiff’s treating physician. Tr. at 1135:6-7. In other words, defense counsel substituted “by a 

treating physician” for “of a treating physician.”

Case 4:13-cv-05955-HSG Document 235 Filed 01/15/16 Page 2 of 4
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

To clarify defense counsel’s misstatement—which by all indications was inadvertent—the 

Court read the following jury instruction:

Instruction Number 13 [which provided the correct statement of 

applicable law regarding FRSA treatment plans] provides the entire 

legal instruction that you must follow to determine liability under 

the FRSA. You should disregard any suggestion made in closing 

arguments that any different legal standard applies other than the 

one contained in Instruction Number 13.

Id. at 1222:16-20. The jury had paper copies of Instruction Number 13 to reference during its 

deliberations. Additionally, the Court separately instructed the jury that closing arguments were 

not evidence. See id. at 1190:1-7.

“District courts have wide discretion in crafting jury instructions, and this wide discretion 

carries over to a trial judge’s response to a question from the jury.” United States v. Humphries, 

728 F.3d 1028, 1032 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). A party “is entitled to a 

new trial if the instruction actually given was misleading or inadequate to guide the jury’s 

deliberation.” United States v. Renzi, 769 F.3d 731, 755 (9th Cir. 2014). Here, the Court’s 

supplemental instruction clearly pointed the jury to the correct statement of law. The jury was 

properly instructed to consider the law as described by the Court, not counsel. The Court finds 

that the curative jury instruction was sufficient, and therefore finds that Plaintiff is not entitled to a 

new trial.1

2. Attorney Misconduct

Second, Plaintiff argues that, in addition to the purported misstatement of law described 

above, defense counsel committed egregious attorney misconduct by personally attacking 

Plaintiff’s counsel, maligning Plaintiff’s character, discrediting Dr. Galli, Plaintiff’s treating 

physician who testified at trial, and misrepresenting another witness’ testimony. The Court finds 

that all of the alleged misstatements of fact described by Plaintiff were fair characterizations of the 

 

1

Plaintiff’s proposed jury instruction was supported by neither the evidence introduced at trial nor 

the law. Plaintiff requested the Court to instruct the jury, based on the California Business and 

Professions Code, that “‘of a treating physician’ includes the plan of an authorized physician’s 

assistant.” Tr. at 1215:21-24. Plaintiff offered no evidence whatsoever or relevant FRSA 

authority on this point.

Case 4:13-cv-05955-HSG Document 235 Filed 01/15/16 Page 3 of 4
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

evidence produced at trial and therefore did not prejudice Plaintiff in any way warranting a new 

trial. 

3. Clear Weight of the Evidence

Finally, Plaintiff argues that the jury’s verdict goes against the clear weight of the 

evidence. Plaintiff’s arguments in this regard overlap substantially with those advanced in support 

of its motion for judgment as a matter of law, which the Court denied. Dkt. No. 226. The Court 

has considered the evidence and argument presented at trial, and concludes that the jury’s verdict 

is not contrary to the clear weight of the evidence. As detailed in the order denying Plaintiff’s 

motion for judgment as a matter of law, the Court finds that the evidence presented at trial 

reasonably supported the jury’s verdict, which the Court is firmly convinced was not mistaken.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for new trial is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

1/15/2016

Case 4:13-cv-05955-HSG Document 235 Filed 01/15/16 Page 4 of 4