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Parties Involved:
Heller Bros. Packing Corp.
Appellant
Illinois Union Insurance Company
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-12060

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

HELLER BROS. PACKING CORP., 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

ILLINOIS UNION INSURANCE COMPANY, 

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 6:18-cv-01668-WWB-DCI

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-12060

Before GRANT, BRASHER, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Heller Bros. Packing Corp. (“Heller”) filed suit against its insurer, Illinois Union Insurance Company (“Illinois Union”), alleging that Illinois Union had improperly denied Heller insurance coverage for pollution-related violations and fines that Florida’s Department of Environmental Protection (“FDEP”) had levied 

against the company. The district court held a bench trial and ruled

that Heller’s insurance policy with Illinois Union covered the disputed insurance claims. However, the district court dismissed the 

remainder of Heller’s suit without prejudice and closed the case, 

concluding that “the extent of the damages” that Heller had suffered was “unknown and not yet ripe for adjudication.” Heller appeals, arguing that the issue of damages is ripe for the district 

court’s consideration. After careful review, we vacate the district 

court’s decision and remand the case for further proceedings. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In October 2018, Heller filed this suit.1 In its amended complaint, Heller alleged that it had purchased—and was a named insured for—several claims-made pollution liability insurance policies that Illinois Union issued. Specifically, Illinois Union had issued one policy that was in effect from April 1, 2016, to April 1, 

2017 (the “2016-17 Policy”), and one that was in effect from April 

1, 2017, to April 1, 2018 (the “2017-18 Policy”). Each policy had a 

1 We include a brief factual background because we write only for the parties.

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23-12060 Opinion of the Court 3

limit of $1,000,000 liability per pollution condition and a $3,000,000 

pollution condition aggregate limit. 

Heller had received notice in January 2017 from FDEP that 

its property was a likely source for “a chlorinated solvent and benzene groundwater contamination plume” discovered in the area. 

After Heller informed Illinois Union of the FDEP’s notice, Illinois 

Union denied the claim. FDEP later informed Heller that it was 

potentially responsible for the contamination and that it planned to 

initiate formal enforcement proceedings. The agency also notified 

Heller that it needed to investigate the contamination and begin 

remedial actions. Heller again submitted this information to Illinois Union which again denied its claim. Heller admitted that the 

cost of the “assessment and clean-up” of the property was “unknown” at the time it filed suit. Still, it alleged that it had “already 

incurred assessment costs in excess of $100,000” as well as attorney’s fees and “natural resource damage” due to the contamination. 

Heller’s amended complaint sought several forms of relief. 

First, it sought a declaratory judgment stating, among other things, 

that: (i) its claims were covered by the 2016-17 Policy; (ii) Illinois 

Union must indemnify it “and pay for all claims, remediation costs, 

natural resource damage and legal defense expense as defined by 

the policies”; (iii) Illinois Union had a duty to defend it; and (iv) Illinois Union had wrongly denied its claim. Second, and alternatively, Heller sought similar declaratory relief under the 2017-18 

Policy. Third, Heller alleged that Illinois Union had breached the 

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4 Opinion of the Court 23-12060

parties’ contract (the 2016-17 Policy), causing it to “suffer[] damages that were the direct and proximate result of the Insurer’s material breaches” in the past. Heller also alleged that it would “continue to suffer damages in the future until [Illinois Union’s] 

breaches are cured.” Fourth, Heller alleged that Illinois Union had 

breached the parties’ 2017-18 contract (the 2017-18 Policy), causing 

it to suffer damage in the past that it would continue to suffer until 

Illinois Union cured its breach. In sum, Heller’s four counts sought 

declaratory relief, damages, prejudgment interest, and attorney’s 

fees and costs, along with any other relief the court found appropriate. 

In 2019, the district court granted the parties’ joint motion 

to bifurcate the issue of coverage and the issue of damages. The 

court also stayed discovery on damages until the resolution of the 

coverage issue. The case ultimately proceeded to a bench trial on 

several issues, including whether Heller’s damages were covered 

by the 2016-17 Policy. At the close of trial, the district court ruled 

that Illinois Union had breached the 2016-2017 policy by declining 

Heller’s requests for coverage, and that Illinois Union had not 

shown that the claims were excluded. 

The court ordered the parties to submit a joint status report 

regarding damages and proposed discovery deadlines for addressing the damages issue. However, the parties could not agree on

discovery deadlines because Illinois Union did not believe a trial on 

damages was appropriate at that stage of the litigation. Illinois Union emphasized that FDEP had not yet determined whether Heller 

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23-12060 Opinion of the Court 5

would be subject to costs for clean-up or remediation and, therefore, discovery on damages would be “premature and not ripe.” 

Heller contended that a trial on damages indeed was warranted because it had already incurred significant damages and future damages “up to the policy limits [we]re reasonably certain to be incurred . . . .” 

The district court ordered Hellerto show cause why the case 

should proceed to the damages stage because, after reviewing the 

record, it was “not clear as to why [Heller] should not simply be 

ordered to resubmit its claims for the costs [it] has incurred related 

to the contamination to date, as opposed to proceeding to trial on 

that issue.” As for future damages, the court reasoned, “the FDEP 

is still conducting its investigation” so “it appears the extent of the 

damages is unknown and not yet ripe for adjudication.” 

Heller responded, arguing the case should proceed to trial 

on damages because the district court’s order had found that Illinois Union was liable but Illinois Union had not paid “a penny towards the significant damages [it] already incurred, nor ha[d] it 

agreed to pay any future costs up to policy limits, upon submission 

of” those expenses. Heller contended that it had suffered recoverable damages “in the approximate amount of $407,000” and recoverable attorney’s fees “of approximately $188,000.” In Heller’s 

view, even if its future damages were not fully predicable, it had 

already incurred damages for past injuries and a declaratory judgment regarding coverage for future damages would address its anticipated future injuries, given the FDEP’s ongoing investigation. 

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In May 2023, the district court ruled in Illinois Union’s favor, 

finding that the extent of Heller’s damages was unknown and not 

yet ripe for adjudication. Accordingly, the district court dismissed 

Heller’s claims for damages without prejudice and directed the 

Clerk of Court to close the case. The district court did not enter a 

declaratory judgment on any of Heller’s claims nor did it otherwise 

memorialize its ruling on liability in any judgment. Heller timely 

appealed. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“The doctrines of standing and ripeness ‘originate’ from the 

same Article III limitation.” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 

573 U.S. 149, 157 n.5 (2014) (quoting DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 

547 U.S. 332, 335 (2006)). We review standing and ripeness determinations de novo. Club Madonna, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 

924 F.3d 1370, 1378 (11th Cir. 2019). 

III. DISCUSSION

“Ripeness is peculiarly a question of timing.” Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580 (1985) (alteration 

adopted) (quoting Reg’l Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 

140 (1974)). “Its basic rationale is to prevent the courts, through 

premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract 

disagreements.” Id. (alteration adopted) (quoting Abbott Labs. v. 

Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967)). 

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Heller makes several arguments about ripeness in its initial 

brief, but we need not address all of them.2 We agree with Heller 

that the district court erred in determining that Heller’s claims for 

past damages were not ripe. And regarding future damages, we 

also agree that the district court’s order did not adequately explain 

the basis for its decision. See Clay v. Equifax, Inc., 762 F.2d 952, 

957-58 (11th Cir. 1985) (collecting cases); In re Ford Motor Co., 

345 F.3d 1315, 1317 (11th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, we vacate and 

remand. 

First, and importantly, the district court’s order fails to disaggregate the portions of Heller’s suit which were indisputably 

ripe—and fully resolved in the liability-stage bench trial—from 

those which the court determined were not ripe for adjudication. 

See, e.g., I.L. v. Alabama, 739 F.3d 1273, 1279 (11th Cir. 2014) (standing context) (“Because standing cannot be dispensed in 

gross . . . we address standing for each category of claims separately.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)); Behr v. Campbell, 8 F.4th 1206, 1213 (11th Cir. 2021) (similar); Huawei Techs. USA, 

Inc. v. FCC, 2 F.4th 421, 434 n.27 (5th Cir. 2021) (“We assess ripeness 

claim by claim.”). In addition to future harms, Heller’s suit sought 

damages for injuries it already suffered, and a dispute over those 

damages is ripe even if the parties’ dispute about future damages is 

not. See Elend v. Basham, 471 F.3d 1199, 1205 (11th Cir. 2006) (noting the difficulty of determining ripeness in pre-enforcement review challenges, rather than in cases where “damages [are] already 

2 Illinois Union did not file a response brief. 

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sustained”); Baughcum v. Jackson, 92 F.4th 1024, 1036-37 (11th Cir. 

2024) (similar).3 We conclude that the district court erred when it 

failed to conduct its ripeness analysis claim by claim, and that at 

least some of Heller’s claims were ripe. See Clay, 762 F.2d at 957. 

We, accordingly, remand this issue to the district court for it to do 

the requisite analysis in the first instance. 

Second, the district court cited two cases in support of its 

conclusion that the case was not ripe—Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. Imperial Premium Finance, LLC, 904 F.3d 1197 (11th Cir. 2018), 

and Valley Creek Land & Timber, LLC v. Colonial Pipeline Co., 

432 F. Supp. 3d 1360 (N.D. Ala. 2020)—but our review of those 

cases shows that they stand for two different propositions and are 

distinguishable from the facts of this case. In Sun Life, we ruled that 

certain claims were not sufficiently foreseeable under Florida law, 

and we affirmed the dismissal of those claims at summary judgment. See Sun Life, 904 F.3d at 1222. In other words, Sun Life did 

not address ripeness. Id. In Colonial Pipeline, which arose under 

Alabama law, the district court concluded that all of the damages 

claims in a suit were prudentially unripe because the defendant was 

still engaged in contractual mitigation efforts. See Colonial Pipeline, 

432 F. Supp. 3d at 1365-70. The lack of discussion from the district 

court on these cases makes it difficult to determine why the district 

3 In fact, in a joint status report the parties filed before the bench trial on liability, they agreed that Heller had incurred “approximately $197,100” in “[p]ollution assessment costs to date” as well as attorney’s fees. While this joint status 

report noted that future damages were unknown, the parties apparently 

agreed that some of Heller’s damages were ascertainable.

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court saw these two cases as dispositive here. See, e.g., Mosley v. 

Ogden Marine, Inc., 480 F.2d 1226, 1227 (5th Cir. 1973)4 (remanding 

when the “appellate court cannot ascertain which of several theories formed the basis for the entry” of judgment).5 

Third, the district court’s order appears to have conflated

the issue of whether the suit is ripe with the issue of whether Heller

had established damages sufficient for it to succeed on the merits. 

The order—in its citation to cases addressing the merits of such a 

claim—suggests that Heller had not sufficiently shown the amount 

of liability so there was no dispute to adjudicate. This would be 

inconsistent with our precedent which consistently distinguishes 

between a court’s ability to hear a case and that same case’s 

strength on the merits. See Moody v. Warden, Holman CF, 887 F.3d 

1281, 1285 (11th Cir. 2018) (“The Supreme Court has cautioned 

that federal courts ‘must not confuse weakness on the merits with 

absence of Article III standing.’” (quoting Ariz. St. Leg. v. Ariz. Indep. 

Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 800 (2015))); Club Madonna, 

924 F.3d at 1382 (same); Pedro v. Equifax, Inc., 868 F.3d 1275, 1279 

(11th Cir. 2017) (explaining that Article III must be satisfied “prior 

to and independent of the merits of a party’s claims” (quoting 

4 All Fifth Circuit decisions issued by the close of business on September 30, 

1981, are binding precedent in this Court. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 

1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).

5 For the same reason, we are also uncertain whether the district court ruled 

that the case was unripe under Article III or “prudentially unripe.” See Susan 

B. Anthony List, 573 U.S. at 167 (addressing prudential ripeness and calling the 

continuing viability of that doctrine into question). 

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Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 554 F.3d 1340, 1349 (11th Cir. 

2009))). Typically, a lack of proof is a merits issue, not a justiciability issue. Moreover, because the case was bifurcated into a liability 

phase and a damages phase, the district court proceedings thus far 

have related to liability, not to damages. However, the lack of discussion from the district court on this point as well makes it difficult to understand whether the district court concluded that Heller 

had not yet proven all its damages—even though it was not yet 

obligated to prove damages. On remand, the district court should 

further explain the bases for its decision in this respect as well. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, we vacate the judgment 

below and remand the case for further proceedings. We express 

no position on the merits of Heller’s damages claims. Instead, consistent with general practice, we leave those questions to the district court in the first instance. See MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC 

v. Metro Gen. Ins. Co., 40 F.4th 1295, 1306 (11th Cir. 2022) (“[W]e 

generally ‘will not consider issues which the district court did not 

decide.’” (quoting McKissick v. Busby, 936 F.2d 520, 522 (11th Cir. 

1991))). 

VACATED AND REMANDED.

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