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Parties Involved:
Humberto Fierro-Rascon
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted October 20, 2015

Decided October 20, 2015

Before

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 15-1626

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

HUMBERTO FIERRO-RASCON,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 3:14CR00013-2

James D. Peterson,

Judge.

O R D E R

Humberto Fierro-Rascon ran a small marijuana-trafficking organization from 

inside a federal prison in Colorado. Fierro-Rascon ordered marijuana from Mexican 

suppliers and arranged its transportation to Minnesota, where Christopher Johnson, a 

mid-level dealer who financed the operation, resold the marijuana to other dealers. The 

scheme unraveled after prison authorities began monitoring Fierro-Rascon’s phone 

calls. A jury found Fierro-Rascon guilty of conspiracy to possess with intent to 

distribute marijuana, 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and the district court sentenced him to 

92 months’ imprisonment. Fierro-Rascon filed a notice of appeal, but his appointed 

attorney, who also represented him in the district court, asserts that the appeal is 

frivolous and seeks to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). 

Fierro-Rascon has responded to counsel’s motion, see CIR. R. 51(b), by asking that we 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 15-1626 Page 2

permit him to proceed with his appeal pro se. Counsel has submitted a brief that 

explains the nature of the case and addresses potential issues that an appeal of this kind 

might be expected to involve. Because the analysis in the brief appears to be thorough, 

we limit our review to the subjects counsel discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 

774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996).

Counsel begins by considering whether Fierro-Rascon could argue that the 

district court abused its discretion at trial by limiting cross-examination of Johnson, who 

was charged as a coconspirator but pleaded guilty and testified for the government. 

Johnson had described the workings of the operation and his distribution of marijuana

to lower-level dealers in Minnesota, and Fierro-Rascon wanted to elicit the names of 

Johnson’s customers on the belief that the list would be much longer than what Johnson 

had disclosed to investigators. The government opposed this inquiry as irrelevant, but 

Fierro-Rascon argued that forcing Johnson to name his customers would discredit his 

direct testimony that he had fully and truthfully cooperated. In this court, however, 

counsel acknowledges that trial judges have discretion to reasonably restrict 

cross-examination if, as in this instance, the limitation does not impede the 

Confrontation Clause’s “core” concern for exposing a witness’s biases or motivations for

testifying. See United States v. Kielar, 791 F.3d 733, 743 (7th Cir. 2015); United States v. 

Sanders, 708 F.3d 976, 990 (7th Cir. 2013). The judge had given defense counsel a lot of 

latitude already in cross-examining Johnson to expose any bias, so the judge did not 

abuse his discretion in giving Fierro-Rascon less leeway than he wanted. See Kentucky v. 

Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739 (1987) (noting that Confrontation Clause guarantees opportunity 

for effective cross-examination, not unlimited cross-examination); United States v. Linzy, 

604 F.3d 319, 324 (7th Cir. 2010) (same). And even if further questioning would have 

been relevant by revealing that Johnson had withheld from investigators information 

about some of his customers, knowledge of that revelation would have done little to 

undermine the jury’s confidence in Johnson’s testimony about his dealings with the 

defendant, since those interactions were by telephone and the intercepted calls were 

played for the jury. See United States v. Smith, 454 F.3d 707, 715 (7th Cir. 2006) (explaining 

that judge’s erroneous restriction of cross-examination on ground of relevance was 

harmless in light of government’s strong case). We therefore agree with counsel that it 

would be frivolous to argue that limiting the cross-examination amounted to reversible 

error. 

Counsel next questions whether Fierro-Rascon could challenge the district 

court’s finding that, for purposes of calculating the guidelines range, he was responsible 

for nearly 400 kilograms of marijuana. The district court based that finding on Johnson’s 

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No. 15-1626 Page 3

statements to investigators and trial testimony, which the district court credited. 

Counsel is unable to articulate a basis for disturbing the court’s credibility assessment, 

and thus he correctly concludes that an appellate claim about the drug quantity would 

be frivolous. See United States v. McCauley, 659 F.3d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 2011).

Also frivolous, as counsel recognizes, is a proposed challenge to the district 

court’s addition of 4 offense levels upon finding that Fierro-Rascon “was an organizer 

or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants.” See U.S.S.G. 

§ 3B1.1(a). Fierro-Rascon does not dispute that the conspiracy involved five or more

participants (aside from Johnson, one other participant testified against Fierro-Rascon at 

trial, and several other participants were named at trial or in the presentence 

investigation report). And although Fierro-Rascon’s lawyer argued at sentencing that 

the defendant had acted at the direction of unnamed persons in Mexico, Fierro-Rascon 

did not testify, and counsel’s representations were not evidence. See United States v. 

Chapman, 694 F.3d 908, 913–16 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Diaz, 533 F.3d 574, 578 

(7th Cir. 2008). More importantly, a criminal organization can have multiple 

participants with a leadership role, see U.S.S.G § 3B1.1 cmt. n.4; United States v. Vallar,

635 F.3d 271, 281 (7th Cir. 2011), and a 4-level upward adjustment is warranted so long 

as the defendant was an organizer or leader of at least one other person, see U.S.S.G 

§ 3B1.1 cmt. n.2; United States v. Cooper, 767 F.3d 721, 733 (7th Cir. 2014). And 

Fierro-Rascon has never disputed that he was the leader of Johnson and the drivers who 

transported marijuana from the Mexican border to Minnesota, so we agree with counsel 

that an appellate claim disputing the increase under § 3B1.1(a) would be frivolous.

And last, as to the sentence, counsel considers whether Fierro-Rascon could 

challenge the reasonableness of the prison term. That term, 96 months, is 72 months 

below the minimum of the guidelines range, and counsel gives no reason to disregard 

our presumption that this below-guidelines sentence is reasonable. See United States v. 

Womack, 732 F.3d 745, 747 (7th Cir. 2013). The district court adequately discussed the 

sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including the nature of the offense 

(emphasizing that the conspiracy was nonviolent and limited to marijuana), the 

defendant’s personal circumstances (reasoning that his close ties to the United States 

explained his impulse to return to the country unlawfully after being removed to 

Mexico), his criminal history (characterizing it as exaggerated by multiple convictions 

for immigration offenses), and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities

(reasoning that a guidelines sentence would make Fierro-Rascon’s punishment

disproportionate to those received by his accomplices). Any argument that 96 months is 

too long would be frivolous.

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Finally, Fierro-Rascon has told counsel that he is dissatisfied with the lawyer’s 

performance at trial, and he tells us in his Rule 51(b) response that he prefers to 

prosecute this appeal pro se. Neither counsel nor Fierro-Rascon has identified any 

deficiency in the lawyer’s performance, which by itself would make a claim of ineffective 

assistance frivolous. See United States v. Turcotte, 405 F.3d 515, 537 (7th Cir. 2005). In 

addition, we have emphasized repeatedly that claims of ineffective assistance are best 

reserved for collateral review, since on direct appeal the record is rarely developed 

sufficiently to substantiate the claim. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504–05 

(2003); United States v. Flores, 739 F.3d 337, 341 (7th Cir. 2014). That appellate counsel also 

represented Fierro-Rascon at trial provides another reason to reserve any claim of 

ineffective assistance for collateral review. See United States v. Rezin, 322 F.3d 443, 445 

(7th Cir. 2003). As for continuing on pro se, a defendant does not have a right to pursue a 

frivolous direct appeal, with or without counsel, see Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 278 

(2000), and we agree with the defendant’s lawyer that this appeal is frivolous.

Accordingly, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw, DENY Fierro-Rascon’s

motion to proceed pro se, and DISMISS the appeal. 

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