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Parties Involved:
Donald A. Dorsey
Appellee
Laurence Hurd
Appellant

Document Text:

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FI LED 

Uflited States C.Ourt of Appeals 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

LAURENCE HURD, 

Petitioner/Appellant, 

v. 

DONALD A. DORSEY, Warden, 

Respondent/Appellee. 

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MAY 3 - 1991 

.ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-2229 

(D.C. No. 89-1113-M) 

(Dist. N .M.) 

ORDER ARD JUDGNBN'l'* 

Before McKAY, SEYMOUR, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Therefore, the case is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

BACKGROUND 

Appellant was tried and convicted of bank robbery. Two of 

his jurors were Ms. Rogers and Ms. Johnson. On voir dire, it was 

shown that Ms. Rogers was an acquaintance of the prosecutor's 

wife, and that Ms. Johnson was an employee of the bank in a branch 

separate from the one which was robbed. At trial, the defendant 

attempted to have Ms. Rogers removed for cause, but the court 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within. the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppal. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-2229 Document: 010110106459 Date Filed: 05/03/1991 Page: 1 
denied the request. Thereafter, defendant used all his peremptory 

challenges without excusing Ms. Rogers. The record shows that 

defendant apparently did not attempt to remove Ms. Johnson. 

On direct appeal, appellant argued that Ms. Rogers should 

have been stricken from the jury for cause, but he did not argue 

anything concerning Ms. Johnson. Thereafter, appellant petitioned 

for a state writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his 

constitutional rights were violated by the presence of both Ms. 

Rogers and Ms. Johnson on his jury. The Fifth Judicial District 

of New Mexico dismissed appellant's petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus, and the New Mexico Supreme Court denied appellant's 

request for a writ of certiorari. Appellant now brings what is 

his third federal habeas petition concerning his conviction, 

alleging that "he was denied his right to a trial by an impartial 

jury because the jury was composed of two biased jurors," Ms. 

Rogers and Ms. Johnson. See Hurd v. Dorsey, Magistrate's Proposed 

Findings and Recommended Disposition, No. 89-1113-M at 7 (D. N.M. 

Aug. 2, 1990). We grant the certificate of probable cause and 

affirm. 

ANALYSIS 

Two preliminary matters must be addressed. The first is 

whether the district court was correct in finding that Rule 9(b) 

of the Rules Governing Habeas Proceeding did not bar petitioner's 

petition. The second is whether it was error for the district 

court to dismiss part of petitioner's petition on the ground that 

the claim was barred by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). 

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I. Whether Rule 9(b) Bars Petitioner's Petition 

The first issue concerns whether or not this petition is 

barred under Rule 9(b) of the Rules Governing Habeas Proceedings: 

A second or successive petition may be dismissed if the 

judge finds that it fails to allege new or different 

grounds for relief and the prior determination was on 

the merits or, if new and different grounds are alleged, 

the judge finds that the failure of the petitioner to 

assert those grounds in a prior petition constituted an 

abuse of the writ. 

As Magistrate Buell stated, "Rule 9(b) applies to ..• successive 

claims and new claims. Successive claims are claims raised and 

considered on their merits in an earlier petition. New claims are 

claims being raised for the first time in a subsequent 

proceeding .... Petitioner is raising a new claim." Hurd v. Dorsey. 

Magistrate's Proposed Findings and Recommended Disposition, No. 

89-1113-M at 3-4 (D.N.M. Aug. 2, 1990). 

On appeal, the government maintains that Magistrate Buell, 

through the district court's adoption in its order of the Proposed 

Findings and Recommended Disposition, found that the petition was 

barred under Rule 9(b). We note that Magistrate Buell reached the 

merits of the claim, and apparently did not find an abuse of the 

writ even though he found that petitioner did not advance adequate 

justification for not previously asserting this claim: 

In conclusion, this Court finds that Petitioner has 

not provided adequate justification for not asserting 

his claims in his two earlier petitions • ... Despite this Finding, this Court may consider 

the merits of Petitioner's claim when the ends of 

justice so demand •... Since Petitioner completed his 

response without assistance of counsel, this Court will 

address the merits of Petitioner's claim. 

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• 

See Hurd v. Dorsey, Magistrate's Proposed Findings and Recommended 

Disposition, No. 89-1113-M at 7. 

Clearly, therefore, the Magistrate reached the merits, and 

the district court adopted the Magistrate's Proposed Findings and 

Recommended Disposition in denying the petition. See Hurd v. 

Dorsey, District Court Order, 89-1113-M (D. N.M. Oct. 3, 1990). 

The United States Supreme Court has recently held, in Mccleskey v. 

Zant, 89-7024, U.S., April 16, 1991 (1991 WL 53826), that a 

successive petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus cannot be 

maintained in the absence of a showing of "cause and prejudice" or 

a showing "that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result 

from a failure to entertain the claim." Here, there were no such 

showings and the magistrate, in fact, explicitly found that there 

was no cause shown why the issue now asserted was not raised 

previously in one of petitioner's earlier petitions. However, 

because the rules announced by the Supreme Court in Mccleskey v. 

Zant for successive writs were not necessarily anticipated by 

petitioner below, we would have to remand for a further hearing in 

order fairly to give petitioner an opportunity to meet the tests 

articulated in Mccleskey v. Zant. Because we determine that 

petitioner's claim was properly dismissed on the merits, it seems 

to us to be a waste of judicial resources to remand for such a 

hearing. Accordingly, we reach the merits in this particular 

case, and we affirm. 

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II. Whether Wainwright v. Sykes Bars Petitioner's Claim 

The second preliminary issue is whether petitioner is barred 

from raising one of his claims collaterally in federal court. 

Petitioner did not raise the issue of Ms. Johnson's jury service 

at trial or on appeal, but did assert it in his state habeas 

petition. Magistrate Buell found that "Petitioner's procedural 

default bars consideration of this claim," see Hurd v. Dorsey. 

Magistrate's Proposed Findings and Recommended Disposition, No. 

89-1113-M at 9 n.1 (D. N.M. Aug. 2, 1990), and that "Petitioner 

ha[d] not demonstrated cause or prejudice to overcome the 

default." Id., citing, Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). 

Clearly, petitioner did not raise this issue either at trial 

or appeal and, therefore, petitioner cannot raise this claim on 

collateral review in New Mexico. See State v. Gilihan, 524 P.2d 

1335, 1336 (N.M. 1974). The New Mexico court's holding in this 

case was on the ground that petitioner's claim was procedurally 

barred and that holding was set forth with sufficient clarity as 

required by Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255 (1990). In relevant 

parts, the state court held 

[t]hat petitioner failed to comply with SCRA 5-802 

B4 in that he failed to include a statement regarding 

the appeal he filed or his prior Petition for Habeas 

Corpus nor did he provide the Court with a statement of 

why the claim now being raised was not raised in such 

prior proceedings. 

The record clearly shows that the witness [sic] 

being objected to ..• was questioned about her employment 

with First Interstate Bank and any bias or difficulties 

she would have being fair and impartial. Petitioner did 

not request that she be excused for cause. Therefore, 

he did not obtain a ruling from the Court. 

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The Petitioner filed an appeal with Court of 

Appeals of New Mexico and he did not raise this issue in 

the appeal. However, the record is clear that he could 

have done so had that been a concern at the time. The 

evidence was readily available regarding voir dire of 

the jury and the empaneling of the jury. Further, 

Petitioner was present with counsel during voir dire and 

in chambers when the jury was selected. 

In Fuson v. State, 105 N.M. 632, 735 P.2d 1138 (NM 

1987) the defense counsel requested the Court to excuse 

the person in question for cause and the Court denied 

the request. In this case, defense counsel did not 

request the Court to excuse the prospective juror, Sara 

Johnson, so we do not know whether the Court would have 

granted or denied the request. Therefore, in this case 

it must be presumed that Petitioner and his counsel were 

satisfied with the answers she gave during voir dire and 

felt she could be a fair and impartial juror. 

Petitioner raises further issues in his Travers to 

the State's Response regarding the selection of the 

jury. Again, these matters were readily available to 

Petitioner and he failed to raise them on appeal. 

That the Petitioner claims that his Writ of Habeas 

Corpus was brought on newly-discovered evidence is not 

valid. Newly discovered evidence is evidence that was 

(1) discovered since the trial; and (2) it must be such 

that it could not have been discovered before trial by 

the exercise of due diligence. Petitioner's claim is 

based on matter that are clearly in the record and have 

been since the day of trial, the day notice of appeal 

was filed and on March 25, 1986 when Petitioner filed a 

previous Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 

That it appears that an evidentiary hearing is not 

required. 

Hurd v. New Mexico, Order Dismissing Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus, No. CR-84-169-G. 

This appears to be a clear statement that petitioner's claim 

was procedurally barred because he failed to raise the claim at 

trial or on direct appeal. That conclusion is buttressed because 

here, unlike in Harris, the state court offered no reason other 

than procedural bar to deny the petitioner's requested habeas 

relief. 

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Therefore, Magistrate Buell correctly reached an analysis of 

the Wainwright test because the invocation of that exception is 

necessary when a procedural default has been found to have been 

unambiguously relied upon by the last state court. See Harris, 489 

U.S. 255. We have reviewed the record on appeal and agree with 

the Magistrate that at this stage the petitioner has not alleged 

sufficient cause and prejudice to overcome the procedural default. 

III. Whether Ms. Roger's Jury Service Was Unconstitutional 

Having addressed the preliminary matters, we must now rule on 

the constitutionality of Ms. Roger's presence on the jury. This 

issue was raised at trial and on direct appeal, and so is properly 

preserved for a collateral attack. We agree with the Magistrate 

that, in general, fact issues determined by the state trial court 

are "entitled to the presumption of correctness of 28 u.s.c. 

S 2254(a)." Magistrate's Proposed Findings and Recommended 

Disposition at 7. The trial judge denied a request to have Ms. 

Rogers removed for cause, finding that her acquaintance with the 

prosecutor's wife "didn't make such a close relationship ••• that 

she could [sic] be fair and impartial, and I believe that would be 

correct •... " R. Vol. I, Doc. 8, Exh. Mat 5. We have reviewed the 

evidence and arguments presented on appeal and agree with the 

Magistrate that Mrs. Rogers' presence on the jury did not 

"violate[] some right which was guaranteed to the defendant by the 

Fourteenth Amendment." Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973). 

Additionally, her relationship to the prosecutor's wife was not 

one of the "extreme situations that would justify a finding of 

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j implied bias •••• [w]hether or not the state proceedings result[ed] 

in a finding of 'no bias.'" Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 222 

(1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 

Therefore, we AFFIRM the order of the district court. The mandate 

shall issue forthwith. 

Entered for the Court, 

David M. Ebel 

Circuit Judge 

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