Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca6-18-05705/USCOURTS-ca6-18-05705-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Brian David Brumbach
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)

File Name: 19a0154p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

18-5703

BRIAN DAVID BRUMBACH,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent-Appellant.

18-5705

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

BRIAN DAVID BRUMBACH, 

Respondent-Appellee.

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Nos. 18-5703/5705

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville.

Nos. 3:09-cr-00227-1; 3:16-cv-00776—David M. Lawson, District Judge.

Argued: June 27, 2019

Decided and Filed: July 11, 2019

Before: SILER, BATCHELDER, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Luke A. McLaurin, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Knoxville, 

Tennessee, for Appellant. Michael C. Holley, FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Nashville, 

Tennessee, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Cecil W. VanDevender, UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant. Michael C. Holley, FEDERAL 

PUBLIC DEFENDER, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellee.

>

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_________________

OPINION

_________________

BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge. Brian David Brumbach (“Brumbach”) 

filed for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing that his sentence had been improperly enhanced 

under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) because his twelve prior convictions for 

Tennessee aggravated burglary did not qualify as violent felonies under the ACCA. The district 

court stayed his petition until this court issued a ruling in United States v. Stitt, where we held 

that Tennessee’s aggravated burglary statute did not qualify as an enumerated offense under the 

ACCA. United States v. Stitt, 860 F.3d 854, 860–61 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (“Stitt I”). 

Applying Stitt I, the district court granted Brumbach’s § 2255 petition. However, the Supreme 

Court ultimately reversed Stitt I in United States v. Stitt, 139 S. Ct. 399, 408 (2018) (“Stitt II”). 

Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s order granting Brumbach’s petition, and remand for 

reinstatement of his original sentence.

I. Background

On May 23, 2009, Brumbach was arrested for pointing a gun at a man who had been 

talking to Brumbach’s girlfriend. Brumbach was charged with one count of being a felon in 

possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), to which he pleaded guilty under a 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement in 2011. Brumbach agreed that because he had at 

least three previous convictions for violent felonies and possessed a gun, he qualified as an 

armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The parties agreed to a mandatory minimum

sentence of 180 months’ imprisonment.

The United States Probation Office prepared a Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), 

within which the Probation Office explained that Brumbach had twelve prior convictions for 

aggravated burglary under Tennessee law, and classified him as an armed career criminal. At 

sentencing, Brumbach raised no objections to the PSR, and the district court accepted the plea 

agreement and imposed a sentence of 180 months in prison.

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After the Supreme Court struck down the ACCA’s residual clause in Johnson v. United 

States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), Brumbach filed a timely § 2255 motion to vacate or correct his 

sentence. Brumbach asserted that his convictions for aggravated burglary could no longer count 

as violent felonies under the ACCA, and he was thus no longer subject to the mandatory 

minimum sentence set for armed career criminals.

The district court granted Brumbach’s motion to stay those proceedings until our en banc 

court ruled in Stitt I. In that case, we considered whether a conviction under Tennessee’s 

aggravated burglary statute constitutes a violent felony under the ACCA. We ruled that it did 

not. Stitt I, 860 F. 3d at 856, 860–61.

The government conceded that, in light of Stitt I, Brumbach no longer qualified as an 

armed career offender, but maintained that Stitt I was wrongly decided. Applying our holding in 

Stitt I, the district court granted Brumbach’s habeas petition, and on June 25, 2018, imposed a 

new sentence of time served, which equated to 105 months in prison. The government notified 

the district court of its intent to appeal its order should the Supreme Court reverse Stitt I.

In December 2018, the Supreme Court reversed Stitt I. Stitt II, 139 S. Ct. at 408. As 

promised, the government appealed the district court’s order granting Brumbach’s § 2255 

petition. 

II. Analysis

“The ACCA imposes a fifteen-year mandatory-minimum prison sentence on persons who 

violate 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the federal felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute, and who have 

three previous state or federal convictions for ‘violent felon[ies] or serious drug offense[s].’” 

United States v. Burris, 912 F.3d 386, 391–92 (6th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (quoting 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(e)(1)). As relevant here, the ACCA defines a “violent felony” as “any crime punishable 

by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” that “is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves 

use of explosives.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). To determine whether a prior conviction for 

Tennessee aggravated burglary qualifies as a violent felony, we apply the “categorical approach” 

by comparing the statutory elements of Tennessee aggravated burglary with the elements of 

“generic” burglary. Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 257 (2013). “The prior conviction 

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qualifies as an ACCA predicate only if the statute’s elements are the same as, or narrower than, 

those of the generic offense.” Id.

“Tennessee defines aggravated burglary as the ‘burglary of a habitation,’ Tenn. Code 

Ann. § 39-14-403, and defines ‘habitation’ as ‘any structure . . . which is designed or adapted for 

the overnight accommodation of persons,’ id. § 39-14-401(1)(A).” Stitt I, 860 F.3d at 857. 

Under Tennessee law, “‘habitation’ includes ‘mobile homes, trailers, and tents,’ as well as any 

‘self-propelled vehicle that is designed or adapted for the overnight accommodation of 

persons[.]’” Id. In contrast, “‘generic burglary’ means ‘an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, 

or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.’” Id. (quoting 

Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990)). 

We concluded in Stitt I that a conviction under the Tennessee statute is not a violent 

felony for ACCA purposes because we found that “Tennessee’s aggravated-burglary statute 

sweeps more broadly than generic burglary[.]” Stitt I, 860 F.3d at 860–61. We also overruled 

our previous decision in United States v. Nance, “which held that the statute matches the 

ACCA’s definition of generic burglary.” Id. at 861 (citing United States v. Nance, 481 F.3d 882, 

888 (6th Cir. 2007)).

The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari in Stitt I to consider whether “burglary of 

a nonpermanent or mobile structure that is adapted or used for overnight accommodation can 

qualify as ‘burglary’ under the [ACCA].” Stitt II, 139 S. Ct. at 404 (citation omitted). The 

Supreme Court found that “[t]he relevant language of the Tennessee . . . statute[] falls within the 

scope of generic burglary’s definition as set forth in Taylor,” and thus reversed Stitt I. Id. at 406, 

408. Given this history, we now turn to Brumbach’s claim that his previous convictions for 

aggravated burglary are not violent felonies under the ACCA.

We review “de novo a district court’s determination regarding whether a prior conviction 

constitutes a ‘violent felony’ under the ACCA.” Braden v. United States, 817 F.3d 926, 930 (6th 

Cir. 2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

The government argues that because Stitt I—the basis for originally vacating Brumbach’s 

sentence—was reversed by the Supreme Court, his original 180-month sentence should be 

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reinstated. This reversal, according to the government, necessarily undid this court’s overruling 

of Nance. Brumbach contends that the Supreme Court, however, did not determine that 

Tennessee aggravated burglary is necessarily a generic burglary because it did not examine all 

aspects of the Tennessee statute. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court did reverse the rationale by 

which we overruled Nance. Although this court has never ruled as such, it necessarily follows 

that Nance’s holding, which is directly on point, is once again the law of this circuit. Nance, 481 

F.3d at 888 (ruling that “Tennessee aggravated burglary represents a generic burglary capable of 

constituting a violent felony for ACCA purposes.”). Indeed, courts within this circuit have 

followed such reasoning. See, e.g., Patterson v. United States, No. 1:15-CV-01300, 2019 WL 

472257 at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 6, 2019) (recognizing that because Stitt II reversed Stitt I, the 

petitioner’s “two aggravated burglary convictions qualify as violent felonies under the ACCA.”); 

Shelton v. United States, No. 1:18-CV-287-CLC, 2019 WL 1556670 at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 10, 

2019) (concluding that petitioner’s conviction for aggravated burglary is a violent felony because 

“[t]he Supreme Court has held that aggravated burglary under Tennessee law is generic burglary 

within the meaning of the ACCA.”); Melton v. United States, No. 3:18-CV-347-TWP, 2019 WL 

2114180 at *7 (E.D. Tenn. May 14, 2019) (observing that after Stitt II “the Sixth Circuit’s 

decision in Stitt [I], although binding law at the time when Petitioner filed his § 2255 motion, is 

no longer valid.”). 

Notably, Tennessee’s aggravated burglary statute directly references Tennessee’s simple 

burglary statute. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-402 (“Aggravated burglary is a burglary of a 

habitation as defined in §§ 39-14-401 and 39-14-402.”). Since the Supreme Court issued Stitt II, 

courts in the Sixth Circuit have cited United States v. Ferguson, 868 F.3d 514, 515 (6th Cir. 

2017) (relying on United States v. Priddy, 808 F.3d 676, 684 (6th Cir. 2015)), which held, 

broadly, that “convictions under subsections (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3) of the Tennessee burglary 

statute [Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-402] fit within the generic definition of burglary and are 

therefore violent felonies for purposes of the ACCA.” One district court explained: 

At the time the Sixth Circuit issued its decision in Ferguson[], there may have 

been some uncertainty as to the continued import of Priddy, due to the Sixth 

Circuit’s decision in Stitt [I], which overruled Nance[], a case on which Priddy 

had placed significant reliance. Those concerns likely have been resolved, as the 

Supreme Court has unanimously reversed . . . Stitt [I]. 

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Jenkins v. United States, No. 3:10-CR-435, 2019 WL 460493, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 6, 

2019). No one contends that Ferguson is not binding precedent, and as the district court in 

Jenkins observed, any concerns about the relationship between Ferguson, Priddy, and Nance

have been resolved with Stitt II.

Brumbach also argues that reversal is not warranted on a separate ground. Although the 

district court did not explicitly recognize it, Brumbach contends that Tennessee’s definition of 

“entry” is so broad that it treats an attempted burglary as a completed burglary. According to 

Brumbach, because the Supreme Court has held that an attempted burglary is not a generic 

burglary, a conviction under Tennessee’s burglary statute does not qualify as a violent felony 

under the ACCA. (Response Brief at 11, citing James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 198 (2007) 

(holding that a conviction under Florida’s attempted burglary statute could only qualify as a 

violent felony under the residual clause, which was struck down in Johnson v. United States, 135 

S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015))). Even if there is merit to Brumbach’s arguments concerning 

Tennessee’s definition of entry, a panel of this court cannot overrule Nance. This can only be 

done by an “inconsistent decision” of the Supreme Court or, like we did briefly with Stitt I, a 

decision of the en banc court. Salmi v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 774 F.2d 685, 689 (6th 

Cir. 1985). 

III. Conclusion

For the aforementioned reasons, we reverse the district court’s grant of habeas relief, and 

remand with instructions to reinstate the original sentence.

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