Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-04058/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-04058-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael Ray Kitterman
Plaintiff
Jermel Thomas
Defendant

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL RAY KITTERMAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

JERMEL THOMAS,

Defendant.

Case No. 16-cv-04058-SI 

ORDER DISMISSING SECOND 

AMENDED COMPLAINT

Re: Dkt. No. 15

Pro se plaintiff Michael Kitterman filed this action on July 19, 2016 and proceeds in forma 

pauperis. See Dkt. Nos. 1, 5. Now before the Court is plaintiff‟s Second Amended Complaint, 

Dkt. No. 15, which the Court reviews prior to ordering service of process pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915. For the reasons set forth below, the Court hereby DISMISSES this action, with prejudice.

BACKGROUND

In his Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), Dkt. No. 15, plaintiff has removed nearly all 

factual allegations and replaced them with legal argument. Because the SAC is virtually devoid of 

facts, and only for the purposes of this order, the Court will set forth the factual allegations from

plaintiff‟s First Amended Complaint.

The Antioch Police Department seized plaintiff Michael Kitterman‟s personal computer on 

August 22, 2013, and the police continued to hold his computer while they “were investigating 

Plaintiff‟s sister who was arrested for drug sales.” Am. Compl. (Dkt. No. 13) at 4. Defendant 

Jermel Thomas, a public defender, represented plaintiff in the related state court criminal case in 

Contra Costa County. Id. at 3. Defendant argued “in a Motion to Traverse and Quash Document” 

filed in plaintiff‟s state criminal case “that there was never a showing of probable cause for 

Case 3:16-cv-04058-SI Document 16 Filed 11/21/16 Page 1 of 6
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

suspicion of her client Michael Kitterman, the Plaintiff, and that police had illegally seized the 

computer in question and other property owned by the Plaintiff.” Id. at 4.

“[I]n the midst of plea bargain negotiations,” on June 12, 2015, plaintiff emailed defendant 

and asked whether the district attorney had agreed to return his personal computer upon a guilty 

plea. Id. at 3-4. Defendant “informed . . . Plaintiff several days later that she had „ordered‟ the 

police to search his computer and the police had decided that the computer would not be returned . 

. . .” Id. at 4. The search took place after plaintiff met with defendant and she “questioned [him] 

regarding the existence of any information on the seized computer that . . . Plaintiff might be able 

to use for criminal activity.” Id. Defendant “initiated the search without seeking the consent of 

the Plaintiff[,] . . . without [his] knowledge,” and the search was of no value to his defense. Id.

at 5. Defendant “ordered” officers to conduct the search “without judicial authority or a valid 

search warrant.” Id.

In the Order Dismissing Plaintiff‟s Amended Complaint, the Court stated that plaintiff 

must plead additional facts “to the extent he is able, describing his state court criminal proceeding, 

the seizure and subsequent search of his personal computer during the state court proceeding, and 

facts demonstrating a conspiracy between police and Defendant to conduct the unlawful 

search . . . .” Order on Am. Compl. (Dkt. No. 14) at 5. Because plaintiff has not done so, and for 

the reasons set forth in this order, plaintiff‟s complaint is DISMISSED, with prejudice.

LEGAL STANDARD

When a plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the court may screen the complaint and 

dismiss the action where the action is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which 

relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such 

relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Dismissal on these grounds often occurs prior to the issuance of 

process, “so as to spare prospective defendants the inconvenience and expense of answering such 

complaints.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989). For purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, a 

frivolous claim is one that lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. Id. at 325. 

In order to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a plaintiff must allege “enough 

Case 3:16-cv-04058-SI Document 16 Filed 11/21/16 Page 2 of 6
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 570 (2007). This “facial plausibility” standard requires plaintiff to allege facts that add up to 

“more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009). While courts do not require “heightened fact pleading of specifics,” plaintiff 

must allege facts sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 555, 570. In deciding whether plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be 

granted, the court must assume that plaintiff‟s allegations are true and must draw all reasonable 

inferences in plaintiff‟s favor. See Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 

1987). 

Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th 

Cir. 2010) (citations omitted) (“[W]here the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, 

[our obligation is] to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any 

doubt.”). “A district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend unless „it 

is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.‟” 

Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 

1202, 1203-04 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)). 

DISCUSSION

The Court permitted plaintiff to amend his allegations as to a single cause of action under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983, for the alleged violation of plaintiff‟s Fourth Amendment rights. See Order on 

Am. Compl. (Dkt. No. 14). Plaintiff‟s claims under 42 U.S.C § 1985, 18 U.S.C. § 242, and 

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) will be disregarded, as the Court previously dismissed these claims with 

prejudice. See id.; Order Adopting Report and Recommendation (Dkt. Nos. 10, 12). Plaintiff

alleges that defendant, his attorney in a prior state court criminal case, conspired with “at least one 

police officer of the Antioch Police Department” to conduct an unlawful search of plaintiff‟s 

personal computer. SAC (Dkt. No. 15) at 3.

In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: 

(1) violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the 

Case 3:16-cv-04058-SI Document 16 Filed 11/21/16 Page 3 of 6
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 

42, 48 (1988) (citations omitted). Plaintiff has alleged that defendant ordered police to search his 

computer without a warrant and without his consent in violation of the Fourth Amendment. As 

such, the Court's analysis focuses on the second element; namely, whether plaintiff has alleged 

sufficient facts to state a plausible claim that defendant was acting under color of state law.

“[A] public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer‟s 

traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding” and is therefore not 

subject to suit under section 1983 based on actions performed in this capacity. Polk Cnty. v. 

Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981). Even if a public defender was negligent in her representation 

of a defendant, the public defender is not liable under section 1983. See Miranda v. Clark Cnty., 

Nev., 319. F.3d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding state public defender, although grossly 

deficient in performing traditional lawyer functions, was not state actor subject to liability under 

section 1983).

Public defenders are not immune from liability under section 1983, however, for certain 

intentional misconduct, such as conspiring with prosecutors to wrongfully convict a defendant. 

See Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 923 (1984); see also Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th 

Cir. 2002) (“A private individual may be liable under § 1983 if she conspired or entered joint 

action with a state actor.”). To state a claim for conspiracy to violate one‟s constitutional rights 

under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege “specific facts to support the existence of the claimed 

conspiracy.” Burns v. Cnty. of King, 883 F.2d 819, 821 (9th Cir. 1989); Buckey v. Cnty. of L.A., 

968 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir. 1992). To prove a conspiracy, the plaintiff “must show an agreement 

or meeting of the minds to violate constitutional rights.” Franklin, 312 F.3d at 441 (citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted). “To be liable, each participant in the conspiracy need not know 

the exact details of the plan, but each participant must at least share the common objective of the 

conspiracy.” Id. (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 

1541 (9th Cir. 1989)).

Plaintiff asserts that his attorney conspired with the police to order an unlawful search of 

his computer. In support of his conspiracy allegation, plaintiff essentially argues that there must 

Case 3:16-cv-04058-SI Document 16 Filed 11/21/16 Page 4 of 6
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

have been a meeting of the minds, because without defendant and the Antioch Police sharing a 

common objective, a search never would have occurred. See SAC (Dkt. No. 15) at 4. “As such,” 

alleges plaintiff, “it is fairly reasonable to presume that [defendant] and the officer who performed 

the search [of plaintiff‟s computer] had engaged in a meeting of the minds.” Id. Such conclusory 

allegations are not sufficient to state a claim in federal court where, in order to state a facially 

plausible claim for relief, a plaintiff must allege “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has 

acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Plaintiff has now had three attempts to plead facts stating a cause of action against 

defendant. In plaintiff‟s Second Amended Complaint, he has removed virtually all factual 

allegations contained in previous complaints. While not immediately clear, plaintiff‟s suit appears 

to arise out of what he views was defendant‟s ineffective representation,1rather than a conspiracy 

with Antioch Police to violate plaintiff‟s constitutional rights. Plaintiff alleges no specific facts 

demonstrating that defendant conspired with the police, only that defendant failed to properly 

contest the search in court and that plaintiff did not consent to the search. See SAC (Dkt. No. 15) 

at 6-7. 

Plaintiff has failed to state a legally cognizable claim under section 1983. The Court 

remains mindful that plaintiff is unrepresented in this matter. After multiple attempts, however, 

plaintiff alleges fewer facts and more unsubstantiated legal conclusions. At this stage, the Court is 

convinced that the deficiencies of plaintiff‟s complaint cannot be cured by amendment. 

Accordingly, plaintiff‟s complaint is DISMISSED, with prejudice.

/ / / / /

/ / / / /

 

1

Some of plaintiff‟s allegations in this case appear to be based in negligence or ineffective 

representation. See SAC (Dkt. No. 15) at 9-10. Plaintiff cannot state a claim against his defense 

attorney for negligent representation under section 1983. See Miranda, 319 F.3d at 468. 

Case 3:16-cv-04058-SI Document 16 Filed 11/21/16 Page 5 of 6
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, plaintiff‟s complaint is hereby DISMISSED, with 

prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 21, 2016

______________________________________

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:16-cv-04058-SI Document 16 Filed 11/21/16 Page 6 of 6