Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-05066/USCOURTS-ca10-89-05066-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ricky E. Butler
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals Tenth circuit 

JUN 1 2 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

v. 

RICKY 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

) No. 89-5066 

) 

E. BUTLER, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. 87-CR-173-E) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Everett R. Bennett, Jr., of Frasier & Frasier, of Tulsa, Oklahoma, 

for the Defendant-Appellant. 

Tony M. Graham, United States Attorney, of Tulsa, Oklahoma, and 

Susan W. Pennington, Assistant United States Attorney, of Tulsa, 

Oklahoma, for the Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Before* TACHA and EBEL, Circuit Judges, and SAFFELS, District 

Judge. 

TACHA, Circuit Judge. 

* The Honorable Dale E. Saffels, District Judge, United States 

District Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 89-5066 Document: 01019867212 Date Filed: 06/12/1990 Page: 1 
. . 

Ricky E. Butler appeals his conviction for possession of 

hashish, a misdemeanor in violation of 21 U.S.C. section 844. A 

jury sitting before a United States magistrate handed down the 

verdict, and Butler appealed to the United States District Court, 

which affirmed his conviction. Butler now argues that: (1) the 

magistrate erred in overruling his motion to suppress; (2) the 

magistrate erred by failing to grant a mistrial on the basis of 

prosecutorial misconduct; (3) the Government's failure to provide 

Jencks Act material, see 18 U.S.C. § 3500, warrants reversal; and 

(4) .the magistrate's supplemental instruction given after the jury 

had begun deliberations warrants reversal. We affirm. 

I . 

During a routine customs inspection of incoming mail at the 

Dallas/Fort Worth Airport on October 29, 1987, a drug detection 

dog "alerted" to a package from West Germany addressed to Ricky 

' Butler in Hominy, Oklahoma. United States customs officials 

opened the package and found a wooden jewelry box containing a 

letter and several pieces of costume jewelry. The box had a false 

bottom, under which there were 45 grams of hashish wrapped in 

plastic. 

Customs officials rewrapped the package, transported it to 

Oklahoma, and arranged to deliver the package to Butler under 

conl:rolled conditions. After receiving a notice from the Hominy 

post office stating that the package could be picked up, Butler 

retrieved.the package from the post office while under the 

serveillance of federal and state law enforcement officials. 

Hominy Police Chief Charles Crawford and Agent Grady Lowrey of the 

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Oklahoma Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (OBNDD) followed 

Butler as he drove first to a hardware store, then to his mother's 

house, and finally to two more residences. At his mother's house, 

Butler entered the house with the package. There was some 

conflict in the testimony regarding how long Butler remained in 

the house, but the magistrate found that Butler remained in the 

house five to ten minutes before exiting with "something," which 

was in accord with Agent Lowrey's testimony. While in the 

hardware store and the other two residences, Butler left the 

package in his car. Agent Lowry arrested Butler when he reached 

the third residence. The authorities seized the jewelry box, 

which was on the front seat of Butler's pick-up truck. The 

jewelry box had been taken out of its mailing package. At the 

Hominy Police Department, the authorities searched the jewelry box 

and found that the the hashish was still under the false bottom of 

the jewelry box and that the jewelry and letter were missing. 

During questioning, Butler admitted that while he was 

stationed with the United States Armed Forces in West Germany he 

discussed smuggling contraband into the United States following 

his discharge from the Armed Forces. 

At trial, Butler admitted part of the prior discussion 

involving smuggling, but he denied that the conversation proceeded 

any further and he denied knowing that the jewelry box contained 

hashish. 

II. 

While Butler concedes that the search and seizure of the 

jewelry box at the Dallas/Fort Worth Airport was valid under the 

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"border exception," see United States~ Ramsay, 431 U;S. 606, 

616-22 (1977), he argues that the fourth amendment, see U.S. 

Const. amend. IV., to the U.S. Constitution barred the second 

search and seizure of the jewelry box following his arrest. 

Butler contends that the magistrate erred by denying his pre-trial 

motion to suppress evidence from the second search. We disagree. 

When we review a denial of a motion to suppress, we accept 

the trial court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. 

United States v. Cooper, 733 F.2d 1360, 1364 (10th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 467 U.S. 1255 (1984). The ultimate determination of 

reasonableness under the fourth amendment is a conclusion of law, 

United States~ McKinnell, 888 F.2d 669, 672 (10th Cir. 1989), 

which we review de novo, I!! re Ruti-Sweetwater, Inc., 836 F.2d 

1263, 1266 (10th Cir. 1988), 

The fourth amendment bars "unreasonable searches and 

seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. As a general rule, a search 

and seizure becomes reasonable only if it is conducted pursuant to 

a valid search warrant. See New York~ Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457 

(1981). There are, however, several exceptions to the warrant 

requirement. The government argues that the second seizure and 

search of the jewelry box was valid under two of these exceptions: 

searches incident to arrests, see id. at 457-63, and ''controlled 

deliveries," see Illinois~ Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 769-73 (1983). 

We reject the government's contention that, pursuant to 

Belton, the subsequent search of the jewelry box at the Hominy 

Police Department was valid because the authorities were acting 

pursuant to Butler's arrest. Belton holds that "when a policeman 

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has made a lawful custodial arrest of .the occupant of an 

automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, 

search the passenger compartment of that automobile.'' Belton, 453 

U.S. at 460 (footnotes omitted). A lawful custodial arrest 

justifies not only the warrantless search of the person arrested 

but also the immediately surrounding area. It follows that if the 

police conduct a search that is not contemporaneous to arrest, a 

warrant will be necessary. Thus, the Belton Court reaffirmed 

United States:!...:._ Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), which held that the 

warrantless search of a footlocker conducted more than an hour 

after federal agents had taken it into their exclusive control, 

and long after the defendants were safely in custody, was not a 

search incident to arrest; therefore, a warrant was necessary for 

a valid search. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 457-62. See also Preston 

:!...:._ United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964) (search incident to 

arrest invalid if it "is remote in time or place from the 

arrest"). 

We conclude, based on Chadwick, that the warrantless search 

of the jewelry box at the Hominy Police Department, conducted 

after Butler was safely in custody, was not a valid search 

incident to arrest. However, we find that the seizure of the 

jewelry box was incident to arrest and, therefore, proper under 

the fourth amendment. 

We turn next to the government's argument that the second 

search was valid because, like the search in Illinois:!...:._ Andreas, 

463 U.S. 765 (1983), it followed a "controlled delivery." In 

Andreas, a customs inspector discovered marijuana concealed inside 

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a three-foot-wide wooden table, which was shipped in a locked, 

metal container. After the table and container were resealed, a 

special agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration and a Chicago 

police inspector delivered the container to the addressee. At the 

suspect's request, the officers left the container in the hallway 

outside the suspect's apartment. The suspect then pulled the 

container into the apartment and the police inspector left to 

obtain a search warrant for the premises. Meanwhile, the special 

agent remained in the building but did not keep the apartment door 

under constant surveillance. Between 30 and 45 minutes after the 

delivery, and before the police inspector returned with a warrant, 

the suspect left his apartment carrying the container and the 

special agent arrested him. At the police station, the officers 

reopened the container without a warrant and found the marijuana. 

See Andreas, 463 U.S. at 767-69. 

The Andreas Court noted that if an inspection by the police 

does not intrude upon a legitimate expectation of privacy, there 

is no "search" for purposes of the fourth amendment. The Court 

then concluded that there can be no protected privacy interest in 

contraband in a container once the police have lawfully opened it 

and identified its contents. Resealing the package and delivering 

it to the addressee under controlled conditions does not revive 

the extinguished privacy rights. See id. at 771. 

The Court recognized that the police cannot always achieve 

perfectly controlled deliveries. Conducting a controlled delivery 

surveillance undetected is "likely to render it virtually 

impossible for police so perfectly to time their movements as to 

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Appellate Case: 89-5066 Document: 01019867212 Date Filed: 06/12/1990 Page: 6 
avoid detection and also be able to arrest the owner and reseize 

the container the instant he takes possession." Id. at 772. At 

some time during the surveillance, the police may lose sight of 

the container they are trailing. During this gap in observation, 

it is possible that the container will be put to other uses. For 

example, the· suspect might remove the contraband or place other 

items inside the container. See id. However, the mere 

possibility that the contents of the container have changed is 

insufficient to create a protected privacy interest in the privacy 

of the container. See id. 

The question for the reviewing court is whether "there is a 

substantial likelihood that the contents of the container have 

been changed during the gap in surveillance." Id. at 773. This 

is an objective standard that turns on "all the facts and 

circumstances, including the nature and uses of the container, the 

length of the break in surveillance, and the setting in which the 

events occur." Id. at 772. Based on this standard, the Andreas 

Court concluded that: "The unusual size of the container, its 

specialized purpose, and the relatively short break in 

surveillance combine to make it substantially unlikely that the 

respondent removed the table or placed new items inside the 

container while it was in his apartment." Id. at 773. 

In our application of Andreas to this case, we stress several 

factors. The small, unusual size of the jewelry box decreased the 

probability that Butler placed other objects in the box while he 

was inside his mother's house. Furthermore, the magistrate founq 

that the jewelry box was outside of police observation for five to 

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ten minutes, far less than the thirty to forty-five minutes that 

the police in Andreas lost sight of the container. Finally, while 

Butler, unlike the suspect in Andreas, discarded the shipping 

container prior to the police siezure, we reject any argument that 

this action made it substantially likely that the contents of the 

jewelry box were changed. It is at least equally plausible that 

Butler discarded the packaging material in order to ascertain 

whether this package contained the jewelry box. Moreover, because 

the jewelry box was designed for the specialized purpose of 

transporting contraband, it was likely that the jewelry box 

contained contraband as long as Butler still possessed it. The 

combination of all these factors lead us to conclude that it was 

not substantially likely that Butler changed the contents of the 

jewelry box during the break in surveillance. 1 We hold that the 

second search of the jewelry box at the Hominy Police Department 

was not barred by the fourth amendment. The magistrate did not 

err in denying Butler's motion to suppress. 

I I . 

At trial, Butler twice moved for a mistrial. Each time, the 

magistrate denied the motion and gave a curative instruction. 

1 Because Andreas prescribes an inquiry into objective factors 

ascertainable by the police officer before he opens the package in 

question, see Andreas, 463 U.S. at 772-73, we do not consider 

relevant the discovery, following the opening of the box, that the 

letter and the jewelry were missing. Thus, we need not decide 

whether removing these non-contraband items from the package renew 

Butler's privacy interest in the remaining contents of the 

package. 

8 

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Butler now argues that the magistrate erred in denying-his motions 

for mistrial. We disagree. 

On the first day of trial, Butler objected to the 

prosecutor's questioning of a witness regarding the substance of 

any prior conversations between the witness and Butler relating to 

comparisons between European and American hashish. After Butler's 

objection and before the witness could answer the question, the 

prosecutor told the judge that her question went "directly to 

intent, to willingness to deal with drugs." The judge instructed 

the jury to "diregard any remarks regarding dealing in drugs. The 

charge before this Court which you are to consider is the question 

of whether or not the Defendant knowingly possessed a schedule one 

controlled substance, not whether or not he was a dealer or 

dealing per se. Any such remark must be disregarded by you." 

On the next day of trial, the prosecutor asked Butler's 

mother if she knew whether or not Antwan Humphreys had been 

arrested for violating the drug laws. At the bench conference 

following Butler's objection, the prosecutor stated that Humphreys 

resided at the house where the police arrested Butler and that the 

government had evidence that Humphreys had been arrested for drug 

offenses. The magistrate ruled that he would not permit the 

question unless the government could show a link between Humphreys 

and Butler. The magistrate then admonished the jury to: 

"disregard any remarks of other persons who may be alleged by the 

implication of the question . . I remind you again of my earlier 

instruction. A question is not evidence to have been involved in 

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Appellate Case: 89-5066 Document: 01019867212 Date Filed: 06/12/1990 Page: 9 
other crimes. Such issues are not before us and may not be 

considered by you." 

We review the magistrate's refusal to grant a mistrial for an 

abuse of discretion. See United States v. Day, 830 F.2d 1099, 

1106 (10th Cir. 1987). We find no abuse of discretion. Both of 

the prosecutor's improper comments were followed by the 

magistrate's curative instructions. Moreover, the magistrate 

refused to allow the witnesses to answer the improper questions. 

We hold that the magistrate properly denied Butler's motions for 

mistrial. 

I II. 

We next address Butler's argument that the government failed 

to release Jencks Act 2 material. At_ trial, the government called 

Police Chief Crawford to the stand to testify to Butler's 

interview following his arrest. Prior to the police chief's 

testimony, the government gave defense cousel page two of a two 

page report that the police chief had made following the 

interview. Defense counsel requested page one of the report and 

the prosecutor stated that she could not honor _this request 

because she had never possessed page one of the report. The 

prosecutor stated that because of her failure to locate the first 

page of the report, she would only question Crawford about the 

second page of the report. 

2 The Jencks Act is codified at 18 u.s.c. § 3500. Its provisiorr~ 

are also included, without substantial change 7 in Federal Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 26.2. 

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Butler argues that the government violated an implied duty 

under Rule 26.2(a) 3 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to 

preserve potential Jencks Act material. Butler further alleges 

that the prosecutor's failure to produce the first page of the 

report possibly prejudiced him. Butler contends that the 

prosecutor could not be certain that she successfully limited her 

questioning of the police chief to subjects that were not 

discussed in the first page of the report if the prosecutor never 

saw the first page of the report. 

We need not decide whether Rule 26.2 imposes a duty on the 

government to preserve possible Jencks Act material because we 

conclude that even if the government's failure to preserve page 

one of the report was a violation of the Jencks Act, it did not 

result in any prejudice to Butler. See United States~ Winner, 

666 F.2d 447, 447-49 (10th Cir. 1981) (suggesting that courts must 

apply harmless error analysis to violations of the Jencks Act). 

The attorney representing Butler admitted both at trial and at the 

motion for bond pending appeal that he possessed the first page of 

the report. We hold that the failure of the government to produce 

page one of the police chief's report does not warrant reversal of 

Butler's conviction. 

3 Rule 26.2(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 

provides in pertinent part that upon the motion of an opposing 

party, the court shall order the party calling a witness to 

produce "any statement of the witness that is in their possession: 

and that relates to the subject matter concerning which the 

witness has testified." Fed. R. Crim. P. 26.2(a). 

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IV. 

Butler next argues that the supplemental Allen instruction in 

this case was coercive and warrants reversal. We disagree. 

After approximately nine hours of deliberations, the jury 

sent the following note to the magistrate: "The jury has been 

polled. All have voted to state that we cannot reach a verdict of 

guilty or not guilty." The magistrate then gave the following 

Allen instruction: 

Members of the Jury, I'm going to ask that you 

continue your deliberations in an effort to agree on a 

verdict and dispose of this case, and I have a few 

additional comments I would like for you to consider as 

you do so. 

First, this is an important case. The trial has 

been expensive in time, effort and money to both the 

defense and the prosecution. If you should fail to 

agree on a verdict, the case is left open and may be 

tried again. Obviously another trial would only serve 

to increase the cost to both sides, and.there is no 

reason to believe that the case would [be] tried again 

by either side better or more exhaustively than it has 

bein tried before you. Any further jury must be 

selected in the same manner and from the same source as 

you were chosen, and there is no reason to believe that 

the case would go to 12 men and women more 

conscientious, more impartial or more competent to 

decide it, or that more or clearer evidence could be 

produced. 

If a substantial majority of your number are for a 

conviction, each dissenting juror ought to consider 

whether a doubt in his or her mind is a reasonable one, 

since it appears to make no effective impression on the 

minds of the others. On the other hand, if a majority 

or even a lessor number of you are for acquittal, the 

other jurors ought seriously to ask themselves again and 

most thoughtfully, whether they do not have a reasonable 

doubt, the correctness of a judgment which is not shared 

by several of their fellow jurors and whether they 

should distrust the weight and sufficiency of the 

evidence which failed to convince several of their 

fellow jurors beyond a reasonable doubt. Remember at 

all times that no juror is expected to yield a 

conscientious conviction.he or she may have as to the 

weight or effect of the evidence, but remember also that 

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consideration of the 

is your duty to agree on a 

without surrendering your 

after full deliberation and 

evidence in the case, it 

verdict if you can do so 

conscientious conviction. 

You 

£ails to 

accused 

guilty. 

must also remember if evidence in the case 

establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt the 

should have your unanimous verdict of not 

Two hours later the jury returned a verdict of guilty and 

presented a note to the magistrate~ which read: "We the jury 

thank you, your Honor, for your further instructions and comments, 

without which we would have failed." 

In our review of Allen instructions, we have urged caution in 

their use. "If the instruction is given at all, it should be 

incorporated into the body of the court's original instructions to 

the jury. It should not be given during the course of 

deliberations." United States v. Blandin, 784 F.2d 1048, 1050 

(10th Cir. 1986). However, "although it is a preferred rule of 

procedure that an Allen instruction be given the jury at the same 

time as other instructions, it is not a~ se rule." United 

States Y..!. McKinney, 822 F.2d 946, 951 (10th Cir. 1987) (emphasis 

in original). To ascertain whether an Allen instruction is 

permissible, we conduct a case by case determination to determine 

whether the taint of coercion was present. See United States v. 

Porter, 881 F.2d 878,888 (10th Cir. 1989). 

In our determination of whether the supplemental Allen 

instruction in this case is proper, we find McKinney particularly 

illuminating. After approximately fourteen hours of 

deliberations, the jury in McKinney returned a guilty verdict on 

three counts and advised the court that it was unable to reach a 

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unanimous verdict on the remaining twenty-nine counts.~ The 

district court then administered a supplemental Allen instruction.· 

One hour and twenty minutes later the jury unanimously determined 

that the defendant was guilty on the remaining twenty-nine counts. 

See McKinney, 822 F.2d at 950. 

Having assessed the circumstances of this case, and because 

we cannot distinguish them from those present in McKinney, we 

conclude that the Allen charge was not coercive. Both here and in 

McKinney the trial court administered a supplemental Allen 

instruction only after the jury informed the court that it was 

unable to reach a verdict. See id. In both cases the trial court 

administered a full Allen charge, stating inter alia that although 

no juror should yield any conscientious objection, each dissenting 

juror should consider whether his or her doubts were reasonable. 

See McKinney, 822 F.2d at 950 n.2. We hold that the magistrate 

did not commit reversible error by administering the supplemental 

Allen charge. 

v. 

The order of the district court affirming Butler's conviction 

before the magistrate is AFFIRMED. 

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SAFFELS, District Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 

Although this judge concurs with the majority of the panel 

regarding most of its decisions on the issues raised in this 

appeal, I must write separately to express my disagreement with the 

majority on the issue of the Allen1 charge given in this case. 

The majority relies on United States v. McKinney, 822 F.2d 946 

(10th Cir. 1987), to support its holding that the trial court did 

not commit error in giving an Allen instruction to the deliberating 

jury in this case. The majority reads McKinney as a blanket 

approval of the Allen instruction given to the deliberating jury 

in this case. This judge reads McKinney to simply stand for the 

proposition that the use of an Allen instruction after a jury has 

begun deliberating must be reviewed on a case-by-case basis to 

determine whether the instruction had a coercive effect on. the 

jury. See United States v. Porter, 881 F.2d 878, 888 (10th Cir.), 

cert. denied 107 L. Ed. 2d 336 (1989) and United States v. Mobile 

Materials, Inc., 881 F.2d 866, 878 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied 

Philpot v. United States, 107 L. Ed. 2d 833 (1990). If an Allen 

instruction is to be given, the preferred procedure in this circuit 

is to give it at the same time as the other instructions and not 

after the jury has begun deliberating. See United States v. 

Blandin, 784 F.2d 1048, 1050 (10th Cir. 1986), construed in 

McKinney, 822 F.2d at 951. The trial judge, however, may give an 

Allen instruction to a deliberating jury only if the instruction 

An Allen charge derives its name from jury instructions 

approved in Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896). 

Appellate Case: 89-5066 Document: 01019867212 Date Filed: 06/12/1990 Page: 15 
will not have a coercive effect on the jury. McKinney, 822 F.2d 

at 951. 

This court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals have 

enumerated some factors that should be examined to determine 

whether an Allen instruction has a coercive effect: ( 1) the 

language of the instruction; (2) the instruction's incorporation 

with other instructions; (3) the timing of the instruction, for 

example, whether given before the jury has commenced deliberation 

and whether given before the jury has reached an impasse or 

deadlock; (4) the total time of jury deliberation; and (5) the 

indicia of coercion or pressure on the jury. See Porter, 881 F.2d 

at 888 and United States v. Foster, 711 F.2d 871, 884 (9th cir. 

1983), cert. denied 465 U.S. 1103 (1984). These factors are 

relevant to the coercive or noncoercive nature of an Allen 

instruction. 

After considering these factors, it is clear that the Allen 

instruction in this case was coercive. The jury's note to the 

court is of particular relevance in indicating the instruction's 

coercive effect. Upon reaching a verdict, the jury presented the 

following note to the court: 

We the jury thank you, Your Honor, for your further 

instruction and comments, without which we would have 

failed. Jim McGraw. (emphasis added). 

This last note from the jury provides a clear indication that the 

Allen instruction was coercive. In addition, the instruction was 

given after the jury had reached an impasse and was obviously 

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deadlocked. 2 ·Also, the jury had deliberated for a substantial 

time, considering that the trial lasted only a day and a half, 

before reporting the deadlocked nature of their deliberations. 

Finally, the instruction given in this case was the traditional 

Allen instruction which encourages those jurors in the minority to 

reexamine their position; instead of a less coercive, modified 

Allen charge, which encourag~s each juror, whether in the majority 

or minority, to reconsider his or her position. See Porter, 881 

F.2d at 889 (citing Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988)). 

After reviewing these factors, this judge is firmly convinced 

that the facts in the present case reflect that the Allen 

instruction had a coercive effect on this jury. Thus, a new trial 

is warranted. For the foregoing reasons, I cannot agree with the 

majority's decision to the extent it approves the use of the Allen 

instruction under the particular facts of this case. I do agree, 

however, that the other decisions of the trial court, challenged 

in this appeal, should be affirmed. 

Finally, this judge believes that, at some future time, the 

Tenth circuit Court of Appeals should adopt the modern trend of 

prohibiting the use of Allen instructions, as a per se rule, once 

a jury commences its deliberations. 

Circuit Court of Appeals has observed: 

As a panel of the Eleventh 

2 After nearly nine hours of deliberation in a case that took 

only a day and a half to try, the jury sent the following note to 

the court: 

The jury has been polled. All have voted to 

state we cannot reach a verdict of guilty or 

not guilty. James McGraw. February 24, 1988. 

Thereafter, the magistrate presiding over the trial of this case 

gave the jury the Allen charge in question. 

Appellate Case: 89-5066 Document: 01019867212 Date Filed: 06/12/1990 Page: 17 
, r 

The modern judicial trend, however, is against the 

Allen charge. In the exercise of their supervisory 

power, three federal circuit courts have prohibited Allen 

charges since 1969; and four other federal circuit courts 

have sharply curtailed their use. Moreover, during the 

last twenty-seven years, at least eighteen states have 

rejected the Allen charge. 

Scholars have sharply criticized the Allen charge 

because of its coercive impact on juries. 

United States v. Rey, 811 F.2d 1453, 1458 (11th Cir.), cert. denied 

484 U.S. 830 (1987) (footnotes omitted). Such a per se rule would 

prevent any unwarranted intrusion by the court into the province 

of the jury. 

Regardless of the fact that this court has not yet adopted the 

modern trend of prohibiting Allen charges, I remain convinced that 

under the particular facts of this case, the Allen charge had a 

coercive effect on the jury. Thus, applying the present law of 

this circuit, I would reverse the conviction and remand the case 

for a new trial. 

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