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Parties Involved:
Lewis Nathaniel Dixon
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals Tent.li Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT OCT O 11991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

LEWIS NATHANIEL DIXON, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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No. 90-1197 

(D.C. No. 89-CR-379-1) 

(District of Colorado) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before McKAY, Chief Judge, BARRETT and HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judges. 

Mr. Lewis Nathaniel Dixon was found guilty by a jury of one 

count of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute 

and to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 u.s.c. S 846, and 

six counts of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, in 

violation of 21 u.s.c. S 84l(a)(l). Mr. Dixon now appeals that 

conviction. He asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction on any of the counts and that the court committed reversible error by admitting certain evidence in violation 

of Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and 404(b). 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

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I. FACTS 

The Drug Enforcement Administration received information 

through a confidential informant that one Whittier Buchanan was 

distributing cocaine. The informant took an undercover agent to 

Mr. Buchanan and introduced her as a friend. The undercover agent 

made four separate purchases of cocaine from Mr. Buchanan. Mr. 

Buchanan spoke freely to the agent about his source of supply, 

whom he identified as his brother. Mr. Dixon was the only sibling 

of Mr. Buchanan who lived in the area. Mr. Buchanan also spoke to 

the agent about previous drug transactions involving his brother 

and the fact that his brother had forced Mr. Buchanan to absorb 

losses for cocaine sales that Mr. Buchanan had made on credit. 

Each time that the agent wished to make a purchase from 

Mr. Buchanan, Mr. Buchanan made a telephone call. Mr. Buchanan 

said he made the call to a pager. A few minutes later, 

Mr. Buchanan got a return call. Mr. Buchanan and the agent then 

drove to another location. Each time, Mr. Dixon appeared at the 

location. Each time, Mr. Buchanan left the agent to talk with 

Mr. Dixon before delivering the cocaine to the agent. 

Neither the agent nor other surveillance teams ever saw 

Mr. Dixon actually hand the cocaine to Mr. Buchanan. However, on 

one occasion, when Mr. Buchanan handed the agent less cocaine than 

she paid for, Mr. Buchanan walked back to Mr. Dixon's car, reached 

in, returned to the agent and handed her the rest of the cocaine. 

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On another occasion, the agent actually spoke to Mr. Dixon, 

but he refused to give his name. He observed the exchange of 

cocaine and money between Mr. Buchanan and the agent. Holding the 

cocaine in her hand, the agent told Mr. Dixon that she wished to 

do more business. Mr. Dixon handed her a business card for a 

legitimate vending machine business which he owned and told the 

agent to call him if Mr. Buchanan was unavailable. 

The agent arranged a meeting with Mr. Dixon. At that meeting, he denied any involvement in the drug business, claiming only 

to be interested in the vending machine business. However, just 

prior to meeting with the agent, Mr. Dixon noticed a surveillance 

car containing two more agents and stared at it. Shortly after 

that meeting, Mr. Buchanan told the informant that 

Mr. Dixon had identified the undercover agent as law enforcement. 

He arrived at this conclusion because of the cars that were following her. 

After hearing that she had been identified, the agent made no 

further purchases through Mr. Buchanan. However, the informant 

next approached a Mr. Louis Fennell, whom she had identified to 

the DEA as another cocaine dealer, and asked to make a cocaine 

purchase. The informant met Mr. Fennell at his apartment. 

According to the informant, Mr. Fennell placed a telephone call to 

a pager. In a few minutes, Mr. Fennell received a telephone call. 

Mr. Dixon's cellular phone record shows a call to Fennell's apartment. Mr. Fennell then left the apartment, and returned after a 

period of time with the cocaine. The agents who had Mr. Fennell 

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under surveillance testified that he met with a man driving a 

white Corvette. Mr. Dixon was seen leaving the area in a white 

Corvette, one of several cars in his possession. 

The informant attempted to make another purchase from 

Mr. Fennell, but he refused. When the informant asked why, 

Mr. Fennell told her it was "because my man says you hang out with 

too many police." Record, vol. 7 at 592. Mr. Fennell then 

described the undercover agent, whom he had never met. 

Mr. Fennell said that he knew she was police. The undercover 

agent had previously dealt only with Mr. Buchanan and Mr. Dixon. 

After Mr. Dixon was arrested, his wife provided keys to a 

Blazer in Mr. Dixon's possession. Mr. Dixon drove the Blazer at 

two of the meetings with Mr. Buchanan which occurred when the 

undercover agent was making cocaine purchases. While a Motorola 

technician was removing the cellular phone from the Blazer, he 

found a package of cocaine weighing over a pound. Of the six 

counts of possession on which Mr. Dixon was convicted, four have 

to do with the four purchases made by the undercover agent from 

Mr. Buchanan, one is for the purchase made by the informant from 

Mr. Fennell and the last count is for the cocaine found in the 

Blazer. 

II. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE 

"Evidence is considered sufficient to support a criminal conviction if, viewing all the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, in the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable 

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trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Culpepper, 834 F.2d 

879, 881 (10th Cir. 1987). Mr. Dixon points out that no one ever 

actually saw him in possession of cocaine and that he denied trading in cocaine when he met with the undercover agent. He further 

argues that his meetings with Mr. Buchanan and Mr. Fennell were 

consistent with the innocent conduct of his vending machine business. However, the facts recited above, even without the remaining incriminating details presented at trial, are clearly sufficient to support the jury's verdict. 

Mr. Dixon also argues that the indictment alleges a single 

conspiracy while the evidence showed, if anything, two separate 

conspiracies. He claims that this variance is fatal to the 

indictment. He also points out that his co-defendant, 

Mr. Fennell, was convicted of conspiracy, but was acquitted of the 

single possession count against him. That possession count arose 

out of the single purchase allegedly made by the informant from 

Mr. Fennell, which was allegedly supplied by Mr. Dixon. Mr. Dixon 

contends that "the acquittal of Fennell factually precludes 

Dixon's conviction on Count 6 (possession) and would create a 

fatal variance between the conspiracy count (count one) contained 

in the indictment and the proof at trial." Brief for Appellant at 

29. 

A variance between indictment and proof may be fatal "if it 

'affects the substantial rights of the accused.'" United States 

v. Record, 873 F.2d 1363 (10th Cir. 1989) (quoting United States 

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v. Morris, 623 F.2d 145, 149 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 

1065 (1980). Here, even assuming that the indictment should have 

charged two conspiracies, Mr. Dixon was not prejudiced. Disregarding the evidence suggesting a conspiracy between Mr. Dixon 

and Mr. Fennell, overwhelming evidence was presented of a conspiracy between Mr. Dixon and Mr. Buchanan. If the conspiracy 

with Mr. Fennell had been separately charged, as Mr. Dixon contends it should have been, he may have been convicted of two 

counts of conspiracy, rather than one. Thus, even if a variance 

existed, the net result is that he was convicted of only one count 

of conspiracy--not two. Mr. Dixon's substantial rights were not 

affected by this result. 

We similarly reject Mr. Dixon's argument that his conviction 

on the possession count for which Mr. Fennell was acquitted cannot 

stand. Verdicts which are inconsistent or logically incompatible 

are not rendered invalid. See United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 

57; United States v. Beitcher, 467 F.2d 269, 274 (10th Cir. 1972). 

Sufficient evidence existed to convince a jury that Mr. Dixon participated in the drug transaction charged. 

III. PRIOR BAD ACTS EVIDENCE 

Mr. Dixon claims that the government introduced evidence of 

other bad acts occurring outside the conspiracy charged. He further claims that even if the evidence was properly admitted under 

Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), it was prejudicial under Fed. R. Evid. 403. 

The evidence to which he refers is testimony regarding 

Mr. Buchanan's statements to the undercover agent during the first 

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drug sale. Mr. Buchanan discussed drug transactions which had 

occurred in a four-month period prior to the first sale to the 

agent. 

Mr. Dixon objected to the admission of Mr. Buchanan's coconspirator statement in a pre-trial motion, but not on 404(b) or 

403 grounds. Thus, we review for plain error. Smith v. Atlantic 

Richfield Co., 814 F.2d 1481, 1486 (10th Cir. 1987). The first 

drug purchase by the undercover agent took place on May 1, 1989. 

At that time, Mr. Buchanan spoke of prior sales which had taken 

place in the previous four-month period. The indictment charged 

Mr. Dixon with a conspiracy "[f]rom an unknown date but at least 

by the month of January 1989 .... " Record, vol. 1, doc. 1 at 

1; doc. 31 at 1. Thus, the co-conspirator statements admitted 

were direct evidence of the conspiracy charged, and their admission was not plain error. Nor was there plain error based on 

prejudice to Mr. Dixon. 

The order of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

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Entered for the Court 

Monroe G. McKay 

Chief Judge 

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