Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03910/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03910-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
James Glen Clawson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable George Howard, Jr., United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of Arkansas.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-3910

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the Eastern 

v. * District of Arkansas. 

*

James Glen Clawson, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: September 14, 2004

Filed: May 31, 2005

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, BEAM, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

BEAM, Circuit Judge.

James Clawson pleaded guilty to receiving and possessing child pornography.

At sentencing,1

 Clawson received a five-level enhancement for distribution of child

pornography to a minor, and he appeals that enhancement. For the reasons stated

below, we affirm the district court.

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I. BACKGROUND

Clawson was charged with receiving and possessing child pornography as a

result of an undercover operation targeting individuals who had previously expressed

an interest in such material. In short, Clawson ordered child pornography videos

through a website set up by law enforcement. On January 19, 2001, postal inspectors

conducted a controlled delivery of the videos and executed a search warrant at

Clawson's residence. During a consensual interview, Clawson admitted he had

ordered the videos and that he had child pornography on computer media and in

pamphlets at his residence. The inspectors also learned that additional diskettes

containing child pornography would be found at the home of Clawson's co-worker

and friend, for whom he had babysat. 

 Inspectors then went to the co-worker's residence, accompanied by Clawson,

to retrieve the diskettes. The co-worker denied having any knowledge of the disks,

but her ten-year-old daughter informed the authorities she knew where the zip disks

were located, and went to the closet to retrieve a box containing the disks. The

daughter told authorities that she had not seen the images contained on the disks.

Later, the co-worker informed authorities that her daughter revealed that Clawson had

sexually abused her on several occasions. Clawson has already faced state charges

for that crime. 

The minor's retrieval of the disks formed the basis of the five-level

enhancement for distribution of child pornography to a minor. Clawson argues on

appeal that (1) the plain meaning of the word "distribution" precludes application of

the five-level enhancement because he did not "deliver" any illicit images to this

minor, (2) the statute was intended to criminalize the use of such material to

desensitize children to sexual activity, and this minor never even viewed the images

on the disks, and (3) the rule of lenity should apply because there is more than one

reading of this guideline provision. The government responds that distribution of

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Under the current version of the guidelines, this enhancement is found at

section 2G2.2(b)(3)(C). 

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child pornography can take place even though the files containing the child

pornography are never opened or viewed by the recipient.

II. DISCUSSION

We review the district court's findings of fact in sentencing guideline cases for

clear error and the district court's interpretation and application of the guidelines to

those facts de novo. United States v. Stulock, 308 F.3d 922, 925 (8th Cir. 2002). 

A. Distribution Enhancement

The question in this case is whether the presence of the disks in the minor's

home, along with her knowledge of their presence, and the fact that Clawson placed

the disks in the closet where they were later retrieved by the minor, is enough to

support an enhancement under section 2G2.2(b)(2)(C)2

 for distributing child

pornography to a minor. We find that it is. 

In 2000, the definition of "distribution" under section 2G2.2 was amended and

clarified in the guidelines. That revision, in effect at the time of Clawson's crime and

sentencing, stated "'[d]istribution' means any act, including production,

transportation, and possession with intent to distribute, related to the transfer of

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Since Clawson's sentencing hearing, this definition has been amended yet

again and now states: "'Distribution' means any act, including possession with intent

to distribute, production, advertisement, and transportation, related to the transfer of

material involving the sexual exploitation of a minor. Accordingly, distribution

includes posting material involving the sexual exploitation of a minor on a website

for public viewing but does not include the mere solicitation of such material by a

defendant." U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2, cmt. n.1 (2004). 

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material involving the sexual exploitation of a minor."3

 U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2, cmt. n.1

(2000). 

Here, applying the ordinary meaning of the term "distribute," the district court

found that Clawson distributed the disks to the girl based on her immediate

knowledge of the disks' existence and location. She was the one person in the house

who knew immediately what the agents were seeking when they asked about the disks

and knew where the disks were. We agree with the district court. The facts here

support the inference that Clawson distributed disks that contained images of sexual

exploitation of minors, to a minor, for purposes of the five-level enhancement under

section 2G2.2(b)(2)(C). 

The parties focused on whether the minor needed to view the images contained

on the disks to support the enhancement under the guidelines. However, the

guidelines do not require such an inquiry. 

We also reject Clawson's argument that the district court failed to apply the rule

of lenity. The rule of lenity only applies if there is a grievous ambiguity or

uncertainty in the language or structure of a statute. United States v. Kirchoff, 387

F.3d 748, 752-53 (8th Cir. 2004). There is no such ambiguity or uncertainty in

section 2G2.2(b)(2)(C). 

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B. Sentencing Issue 

Clawson also argues that the district judge enhanced his sentence for

distribution to a minor in violation of Clawson's Sixth Amendment right to be judged

by a jury of his peers, citing Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). We now

know that sentencing under a mandatory guidelines scheme based upon judge-found

facts does, in fact, violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights. United States v.

Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 756 (2005). Here, Clawson's sentence was based in part on

the court's determination that he distributed child pornography to a minor. However,

Clawson did not raise an objection before the district court. Thus, we review only for

plain error. United States v. Pirani, No. 03-2871, 2005 WL 1039976, *3 (8th Cir.

Apr. 29, 2005) (en banc). 

To demonstrate plain error, Clawson must show "'(1) error, (2) that is plain,

and (3) that affects substantial rights. If all three conditions are met, an appellate

court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the

error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

proceedings.'" Id. at *4 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67

(1997)). It is undisputed that the first two factors are satisfied given the district

court's understandable application of mandatory guidelines. Id. However, Clawson

is unable to demonstrate a reasonable probability that he would have received a more

favorable sentence had the judge sentenced him under the advisory guidelines system.

Id. at *6. Based on our review of the record as a whole, nothing indicates the district

court would have imposed a more favorable sentence under any other circumstance.

Thus, Clawson cannot establish the error affected his substantial rights, or that the

court committed plain error in sentencing. 

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III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.

______________________________

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