Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-03342/USCOURTS-ca10-94-03342-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cynthia A. Anglemyer
Appellant
Larry Fallwell
Appellee
Zeno Gould
Appellee
Jimmy Grilliot
Appellee
Hamilton County Hospital
Appellee
Magdalene Haslett
Appellee
E. D. Reed
Appellee
Steve Schell
Appellee
Thelma Warner
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

CYNTHIA A. ANGLEMYER, 

Plaintiff - Appellant, 

vs. 

HAMILTON COUNTY HOSPITAL; 

E. D. REED, aka Skip Reed, 

STEVE SCHELL; LARRY FALLWELL; 

ZENO GOULD; JIMMY GRILLIOT; 

MAGDALENE HASLETT; and . 

THELMA WARNER, 

Defendants - Appellees. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

FILED 

United States Cour' or r\pp~•~t Tenth Clrcul~ · 

PATRICK PISHER 

Clerk 

No. 94-3342 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Kansas 

(D.C. No. 93-CV-1168) 

Larry G. Michel, Kennedy, Berkley, Yarnevich & 

Chartered, Salina, Kansas, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Williamson, 

Jonathan B. Sprague, Post & Schell, P.C., Philadelphia, 

Pennsylvania (A. James Johnston, Post & Schell, P.C., 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and Robert H. Gale, Jr., Syracuse, 

Kansas, with him on the brief), for Defendants- Appellees. 

Before MOORE, LOGAN, Circuit Judges, and COOK, District Judge.* 

MOORE, Circuit Judge. 

* Honorable H. Dale Cook, Senior.District Judge, United States 

District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, sitting by 

designation. 

Appellate Case: 94-3342 Document: 01019279515 Date Filed: 06/20/1995 Page: 1 
Cynthia A. Anglemyer brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 alleging that she was improperly terminated from her 

employment at Hamilton County Hospital. Ms. Anglemyer raised both 

federal and pendent state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1.367. 

Ms. Anglemyer's federal claims alleged her termination violated 

her Fourteenth Amendment procedural and substantive due process 

rights. Her state law claims alleged the hospital breached an 

implied employment contract between the parties, violated the 

Kansas Risk Management Act, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-4928(a) (1994) 1 

and terminated her in retaliation for her compliance with the Act. 

The district court granted summary judgment for the hospital on 

Ms. Anglemyer's federal claims and dismissed her pendent Kansas 

state law claims. We affirm. 

I. 

Hamilton County Hospital is organized under state law, 

thereby making it subject to § 1983. The hospital provides for 

the health care needs of the rural western Kansas community. 

During the course of her employment at the hospital, Ms. 

Anglemyer held a variety of positions with different job titles, 

duties, and responsibilities which she worked at simultaneously. 

Initially, she was hired as a staff nurse, and later was appointed 

Director of Nursing. Finally, she was assigned to three different 

positions -- Risk Manager, Quality Assurance Coordinator, and 

Infection Control Nurse. Ultimately, Ms. Anglemyer voluntarily 

resigned as Director of Nursing, but remained in her risk 

-2-

Appellate Case: 94-3342 Document: 01019279515 Date Filed: 06/20/1995 Page: 2 
management, quality assurance, infection control nurse, and staff 

nurse positions. 

Ms. Anglemyer's risk management activities included 

performing the initial investigation of risk· management problems 

and reporting to the risk management committee. In the summer of 

1992, Ms. Anglemyer became concerned whether one of Dr. Bruce 

Alter's employees was involved with some missing Demerol and 

contacted Mary Truhe, who assisted hospitals in investigating 

missing drugs. After investigation, Ms. Truhe informed Ms. 

Anglemyer there was no conclusive evidence that would substantiate 

Ms. Anglemyer's concerns. Ms. Anglemyer then terminated her 

investigation of the missing Demerol, although she remained 

concerned about the discrepancies in the employee's documentation 

of Demerol supplies. Ms. Anglemyer either showed Ms. Truhe's 

letter or conveyed its contents to other members of the Risk 

Management Committee, but did not inform the hospital's Board of 

Directors or Dr. Alter, who had previously been critical of Ms. 

Anglemyer and the risk management program, about the letter. 

At an executive session of the hospital Board of Directors, 

Dr. Alter and Dennis Carter, a County Commissioner, voiced a 

variety of complaints about Ms. Anglemyer. Their principal 

criticisms were that Ms. Anglemyer failed to inform the Board 

about Ms. Truhe's letter, and that Ms. Anglemyer used her position 

as risk manager to retaliate against hospital employees. After 

considering Dr. Alter's and Commissioner Carter's allegations, the 

Board voted to terminate Ms. Anglemyer from her quality assurance 

and risk management positions. Ms. Anglemyer was not present at 

-3-

Appellate Case: 94-3342 Document: 01019279515 Date Filed: 06/20/1995 Page: 3 
the Board meeting, and was never given the opportunity to respond 

to the allegations leveled against her on that or any other 

occasion. Instead, she received notice of the Board's action when 

a letter by Skip Reed, Chairman of the Board, was pinned to the 

public bulletin board on the Director of Nurses door at the 

hospital. Ms. Anglemyer was only terminated from two of her 

positions at the hospital and was not asked to leave the 

hospital's employment entirely. She remained a staff nurse. Nine 

days after receiving Chairman Reed's letter, Ms. Anglemyer 

resigned from her staff nursing position because she believed the 

circumstances surrounding her termination from her quality 

assurance and risk management positions made it impossible for her 

to continue working at the hospital. Sh~ also believed she would 

not be able to work as a full-time staff nurse because the 

hospital's two such positions were currently occupied. 

In the fall of 1992, all hospital employees, including Ms. 

Anglemyer, received a personnel handbook. The handbook contained 

a disclaimer which noted the at-will nature of the employeremployee relationship at the hospital. The disclaimer explained 

the handbook was not intended to be a contract, and the hospital 

could unilaterally change any of its employment policies, 

procedures, and benefits at any time. Under the heading, "The 

Employment Relationship," the handbook explicitly provided, 

"Although we hope that your employment relationship with us will 

be long-term, either you or Hamilton County·Hospital and Extended 

Care Facility may terminate this agreement at any time, for any 

reason, with or without cause." Ms. Anglemyer also signed an 

-4-

Appellate Case: 94-3342 Document: 01019279515 Date Filed: 06/20/1995 Page: 4 
acknowledgment of receipt of the handbook which contained a 

similarly worded disclaimer. 

Prior to the effective date of the personnel handbook, 

however, Ms. Anglemyer was involved in a number of meetings with 

hospital department heads, administrators, and other employees 

regarding the wording of the handbook. During at least one of 

these meetings, hospital administrators Stephen Kralik and Terri 

Deuel, in response to the concerns of numerous hospital employees, 

informed Ms. Anglemyer the hospital would follow a policy of 

terminating employees only for cause despite the disclaimers in 

the handbook. Ms. Anglemyer repeated this representation to other 

employees at a meeting that included members of the Board of 

Directors and was not corrected when she did so. In addition, no 

employee was terminated without cause during Mr. Kralik's tenure· 

as chief hospital administrator. 

The district court granted summary judgment for the hospital 

on Ms. Anglemyer's due process claims and dismissed her pendent 

state claims. First, the court granted summary judgment on Ms. 

Anglemyer's procedural due process claim on the ground she had no 

property interest in her continued employment. Initially, the 

court concluded no implied contract was created by the policies 

and procedures contained in the hospital's personnel handbook. 

In addition, the court held the Kansas Risk Management Act also 

did not create a property interest. Second, after disposing of 

all Ms. Anglemyer's federal claims, the district court exercised 

-5-

Appellate Case: 94-3342 Document: 01019279515 Date Filed: 06/20/1995 Page: 5 
its discretion and dismissed her pendent state law claims without 

prejudice.l 

On appeal, Ms. Anglemyer raises three issues. First, she 

argues the court erred in concluding she did not have a property 

interest in continued employment at the hospital based on an 

implied contract theory. She also argues the court improperly 

resolved this issue on summary judgment because of the existence 

of a genuine issue of material fact in dispute. Second, she 

contends the Kansas Risk Management Act created a property 

interest entitled to procedural due process protection. Third, 

Ms. Anglemyer argues the court abused its discretion by dismissing 

her pendent state law claims. 

II. 

We review summary judgments de novo, applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56 in identical fashion as the district court. Hooks v. Diamond 

C~stal Special~ Foods, Inc., 997 F.2d 793, 7~6 (lOth Cir. 1993). 

On appeal, the evidence is considered in the light most favorable 

to the non-moving party. Applied Genetics Int'l v. First 

Affiliated Sec., Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (lOth Cir. 1990). 

Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine issue 

1 The district court has issued a series of different orders in 

this case. First, the court granted in part and denied in part 

the hospital's motion to dismiss. Angl~er v. Hamctlton County 

Hosp., 848 F. Supp. 938 (D. Kan. 1994). Second, the court issued 

its summary judgment order, at issue here. Angl~er v. Hamilton Coun~ Hosp., No. 93-1168, 1994 WL 409618 (D. Kan. July 5, 1994) 

(unpublished). Finally, the court denied Ms. Anglemyer's motion 

to reconsider. Angl~er v. Hamilton County Hosp., No. 93-1168, 

1994 WL 531414 (D. Kan. Sept. 16, 1994) (unpublished). 

-6-

Appellate Case: 94-3342 Document: 01019279515 Date Filed: 06/20/1995 Page: 6 
of material fact for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith 

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-87 (1986). 

The Fourteenth Amendment's procedural due process protections 

apply only to an individual deprived of a recognized property or 

liberty interest. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 

(1972). Property interests are created not by the Constitution 

itself, but may be defined by independent sources such as state 

statutes, regulations, municipal ordinances, university rules, and 

even express or implied contracts. Id. at 577; Perry v. 

Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601-02 (1972); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 

341, 344-45 (1976); Carnes v. Parker, 922 F.2d 1506, 1509 (lOth 

Cir. 1991). In this case, Kansas contract law determines whether 

a public employee like Ms. Anglemyer has a legitimate entitlement 

to continued employment based on an implied contract theory. Id. 

at 1510. 

Like most states, Kansas historically has followed the common 

law doctrine of employment at-will. Johnson v. National Beef 

Packing Co., 551 P.2d 779 (Kan. 1976); Swart v. Huston, 117 P.2d 

576 (Kan. 1941) . Employees are considered to be at-will in the 

absence of an express or implied contract. Johnson, 551 P.2d at 

781. The existence of an implied contract depends on the intent 

of the parties, divined from the totality of the circumstances. 

Where it is alleged that an employment contract is one 

to be based upon the theory of "implied in fact," the 

understanding and intent of the parties is to be 

ascertained from several factors which include written 

and oral negotiations, the conduct of the parties from 

the commencement of the employment relationship, the 

usages of the business, the situation and objective of 

the parties giving rise to the relationship, the nature 

of the employment, and any other circumstances 

surrounding ~he employment relationship which would tend 

-7-

Appellate Case: 94-3342 Document: 01019279515 Date Filed: 06/20/1995 Page: 7 
to explain or make clear the intention of the parties at 

the time said employment commenced. 

Morriss v. Coleman Co., 738 P.2d 841, 848-49 (Kan. 1987) (quoting 

Allegri v. Providence-St. Margaret Health Ctr., 684 P.2d 1031 

(Kan. Ct. App. 1984)). In Morriss, the Kansas Supreme Court 

concluded, "Allegri is important because it established clearly 

the rule that intent of the contracting parties is normally a 

question of fact for the jury and that the determination of 

whether there is an implied contract in employment requires a 

factual inquiry." Morriss, 738 P.2d at 848. This court has 

interpreted Morriss and its progeny as standing for the principle 

that, "whether an implied contract exists which creates a property 

interest in employment normally is a question of fact for the 

jury." Koopman v. Water Dist. No. ~, 972 ·F.2d 1160, 1164 (lOth 

Cir. 1992) . 

In this case, the district court concluded summary judgment 

was appropriate despite the general rule. The court reasoned: 

The only evidence that plaintiff has to establish 

an implied contract is her own subjective belief that 

she would not be terminated except for cause, testimony 

that while Steve Kralik was CEO, employees were not 

terminated at random, and the fact that the hospital is 

located in a remote area of the state. This evidence is 

insufficient for a jury to find intent to contract for a 

term of employment or termination only for cause. 

Angl~er v. Hamilton Coun~ Hasp., No. 93-1168, 1994 WL 409618, 

at *4 (D. Kan. July 5, 1994) (unpublished). 

We believe the district court erred in granting summary 

judgment on this basis, although, as we discuss below, we believe 

the court reached the correct result. We have only been able to 

find two Kansas decisions which disposed of an implied contract 

-8-

Appellate Case: 94-3342 Document: 01019279515 Date Filed: 06/20/1995 Page: 8 
claim on summary judgment. In Dickens v. Snodgrass, Dunlap & Co., 

872 P.2d 252 (Kan. 1994), the Kansas Supreme Court upheld a grant 

of summary judgment for the employer when the employee failed to 

present any evidence contradicting a written, express contract 

specifying her at-will status. Id. at 260. Similarly, in Kastner 

v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., P.2d , No. 

71659, 1995 WL 259843 (Kan. Ct. App. May 5, 1995), the court 

concluded summary judgment in favor of the employer was 

appropriate when the employee "failed to come forward with 

evidence to establish a material issue of fact regarding the 

intent of the parties to form an implied-in-fact contract of 

employment." Id., at *9. Despite these two decisions, under 

Kansas law, summary judgment remains "rarely appropriate" in 

implied contract cases because of the necessity of determining 

both parties subjective intent to form a contract. Id., at *7. 

The majority of other Kansas decisions have concluded the 

existence of an implied contract needed to be decided by the jury. 

See, e.g., Brown v. United Methodist Homes for the Aged, 815 P.2d 

72 (Kan. 1991); Morriss, 738 P.2d at 849; Wiggins v. Housing Auth. 

of Kansas Ci~, 873 P.2d 1377 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994); Masterson v. 

Boliden-Allis, Inc., 865 P.2d 1031 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993). 

In contrast, the federal courts have been more willing to 

grant summary judgment in favor of employers when applying Kansas 

law. In Farthing v. Ci~ of Shawnee, Kan., 39 F.3d 1131 (lOth 

Cir. 1994), this court upheld the district court's grant of 

summary judgment on the ground the plaintiff had failed to present 

any evidence adding "anything above and beyond the terms of the 

-9-

Appellate Case: 94-3342 Document: 01019279515 Date Filed: 06/20/1995 Page: 9 
personnel manual. 11 Id. at 1140. Similarly, in Bullock v. Dillard 

Dep't. Stores, Inc., No. 91-2474-0, 1992 WL 350229 (D. Kan. 

Oct. 20, 1992) (unpublished); the court concluded the plaintiff 

had failed to present any specific evidence in addition to the 

personnel manual raising a genuine issue of material fact. Id., 

at *9-14. Finally, in Jonker v. Melvin Simon & Assoc., No. 86-

1654, 1989 WL 31402 (D. Kan. 1989) (unpublished) , the court 

concluded neither the personnel manual nor the plaintiff's 

additional evidence established an implied contract between the 

parties as a matter of law. Id., at *8-10. But see Berry v. 

General Motors Corp., 838 F. Supp. 1479 (D. Kan. 1993) (resolving 

implied contract of employment claim not on summary judgment, but 

after judicial fact-finding). 

Ms. Anglemyer has presented evidence in addition to the 

contents of the hospital's personnel handbook to support her 

implied contract theory. Mr. Kralik's testimony indicates the 

hospital's past business practice was only to terminate employees 

for cause. In addition, the fact Ms. Anglemyer repeated the 

representation made to her by Ms. Deuel and Mr. Kralik that 

employees would only be fired for cause in a meeting which 

included members of the Board of Directors is critical. No one at 

that meeting corrected Ms. Anglemyer's probable misperception. We 

believe this evidence may indicate a general belief that the 

hospital only terminated its employees for cause. Typically, this 

evidence would be sufficient to present a jury question of whether 

-10-

Appellate Case: 94-3342 Document: 01019279515 Date Filed: 06/20/1995 Page: 10 
an implied contract of employment existed. Morriss, 738 P.2d at 

848; Koopman, 972 F.2d at 1164. 2 

However, the facts of this case distinguish it from the 

typical implied contract case because Ms. Anglemyer was not 

terminated by the Board's decision. Instead, her removal from her 

quality assurance and risk management positions merely resulted in 

a job reassignment because she remained employed at the hospital 

as a staff nurse. Therefore, the question becomes whether Ms. 

Anglemyer has a property interest amenable to procedural due 

process protection in her continued employment in a particular 

position under Kansas law. We believe she does not. 

2 The hospital argues the existence of the disclaimers in the 

personnel handbook and the receipt Ms. Anglemyer signed indicate 

it had no intent to form an implied contract. Because the 

disclaimer was specifically brought to Ms. Anglemyer's attention, 

it nullifies the hospital's intent as a matter of law. We 

disagree. In Morriss, the Kansas Supreme Court noted: 

The disclaimer in the supervisor's manual quoted above 

does not as a matter of law determine the issue. It has 

not been established that the disclaimer was brought to 

the personal attention of its employees or that it was 

intended by Coleman to create an unqualified employmentat-will relationship, especially in view of the other 

provisions in the manual and the statements made by 

Coleman's supervisors to the employees. 

Morriss v. Coleman Co., 738 P.2d 841, 849 (Kan. 1987) (emphasis 

added). Ms. Anglemyer has presented evidence other than the terms 

of the handbook in support of her implied contract claim. In 

particular, Ms. Anglemyer's unchallenged statement at the meeting 

attended by members of the Board of Directors strongly suggests 

the hospital administration did not intend to follow an at-will 

employment policy. Because of this additional evidence, the 

disclaimers are not dispositive as a matter of law. In the 

ordinary case, the jury would evaluate the two disclaimers in 

conjunction with this extrinsic evidence to determine whether the 

parties intended to form an implied contract. Both would be part 

of the totality of circumstances analysis contemplated by Morriss 

and its progeny. 

-11-

Appellate Case: 94-3342 Document: 01019279515 Date Filed: 06/20/1995 Page: 11 
Ordinarily, we must apply Kansas law in determining whether a 

property interest exists. However, the parties have not cited any 

Kansas cases on this issue.3 "Where no state cases exist on a 

point, we turn to other 'state court decisions, federal decisions, 

and the general weight and trend of authority.'" Barnard v. 

Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 996 F.2d 246, 248 (lOth Cir. 1993) 

(quoting Armdjo v. Ex Cam, Inc., 843 F.2d 406, 407 (lOth Cir. 

1988)). See also Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bakke, 619 

F.2d 885, 888 (lOth Cir. 1980); Hartford v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 

617 F.2d 567, 569 (lOth Cir. 1980) .4 

3 The hospital does cite Hullman v. Board of Trustees of Pratt 

Communi~ College, 725 F. Supp. 1536 (D. Kan. 1989), aff'd on 

other grounds, 950 F.2d 665 (lOth Cir. 1991). The court in 

Hullman cited several courts of appeqls cases for the general 

proposition that "[c]ourts have been particularly reluctant to 

recognize a school employee's property interests in particular 

assignments." Id. at 1548. While, as we discuss below, Hullman 

is correct that generally no property interest in a particular job 

assignment exists, its legal analysis misses the mark. It seems 

clear the analytical structure of procedural due process 

jurisprudence drawn from Roth and Sindermann requires the question 

of whether a job reassignment or demotion implicates a property 

interest be one of state law. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 

564 (1972); Per~ v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). Under Roth, 

and its progeny, there simply cannot be a general federal rule on 

this issue. Because state law establishes the property interests 

which trigger procedural due process protections, crafting federal 

common law rules in this area implicates similar federalism and 

comity concerns as in diversity cases. See generally Erie R.R. 

Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 

326 u.s. 99 (1945). 

4 This rule originated in diversity actions. We find it 

appropriate to adopt it in this context as well because Roth and 

Sindermann require a federal court to look to state law to provide 

the content of a property interest. Only after the question of 

whether a property interest exists is resolved does the federal 

court then address what process is due. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 

U.S. 319, 332-49 (1976). The Court has made clear that this issue 

is one of federal law. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 

u.s. 532, 538-41 (1985). 

-12-

Appellate Case: 94-3342 Document: 01019279515 Date Filed: 06/20/1995 Page: 12 
We believe the overwhelming weight of authority holds that no 

protected property interest is implicated when an employer 

reassigns or transfers an employee absent a specific statutory 

provision or contract term to the contrary. All of the courts of 

appeals that have addressed this issue have reached an identical 

conclusion. See, e.g., Clark v. Township of Falls, 890 F.2d 611, 

617-19 (3d Cir. 1989) (temporary six-week reassignment of police 

officer was not a constructive reduction in rank; therefore, no 

property interest was implicated under Pennsylvania law); Huang v. 

Bd. of Governors of Univ. of North Carolina, 902 F.2d 1134, 1141-

44 (4th Cir. 1990) (tenured college professor had no property 

interest in particular departmental assignment under North 

Carolina law); Kelleher v. Flaw.n, 761 F.2d 1079, 1087 (5th Cir. 

1985) (no property interest in a particular teaching assignment 

under Texas law); Garvie v. Jackson, 845 F.2d 647, 651-52 (6th 

Cir. 1988) (no property interest under Tennessee law in university 

department head position); Volk v. Coler, 845 F.2d 1422, 1430 (7th 

Cir. 1988) (no property interest in a particular employment 

position under Illinois law); Raposa v. Meade Sch. Dist. 46-1, 790 

F.2d 1349, 1353 (8th Cir. 1986) (no property interest in a 

particular teaching assignment pursuant to South Dakota law) ; 

Lagos v. Modesto City Sch. Dist., 843 F.2d 347, 349-50 (9th Cir.) 

(tenured high school mathematics teacher had no property interest 

in his additional school position as baseball coach under 

California law), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 926 (1988); Childers v. 

Independent Sch. Dist. No. 1, 676 F.2d 1338, 1340-41 (lOth Cir. 

-13-

Appellate Case: 94-3342 Document: 01019279515 Date Filed: 06/20/1995 Page: 13 
1982) (high school teacher had no property interest in vocationalagriculture teaching assignment under Oklahoma law); Maples v. 

Martin, 858 F.2d 1546, 1550-51 (11th Cir. 1988) (job transfer or 

reassignment did not implicate a property interest under Alabama 

law) . These cases indicate that an administrative decision to 

reassign or transfer a particular employee absent a statutory or 

contractual provision to the contrary is left to the 11 Unfettered 

discretion 11 of the employer. Roth, 408 U.S. at 567. We believe 

the Kansas Supreme Court would adopt a similar rule. 

The cases we have catalogued are split on the relevance of a 

loss of rank, status, or salary as a result of the reassignment or 

transfer. Compare, e.g., Childers, 676 F.2d at 1341 (salary 

decrease and loss of other benefits irrelevant under Oklahoma law) 

with Clark, 890 F.2d at 617-19 (holding no reduction in rank 

occurred which was relevant under Pennsylvania law). Ms. 

Anglemyer argues her termination from her quality assurance and 

risk management positions would have resulted in a reduction of 

hours and salary. She bases this contention on the fact that at 

the time of her reassignment, the hospital's two full-time staff 

nursing positions were filled. These are not evidentiary facts, 

however, but merely her own speculation. 

Even if the Kansas courts were to conclude a reduction of 

rank, status, or salary due to a job reassignment implicates a 

property interest, Ms. Anglemyer has not presented sufficient 

evidence that such a result occurred here. ·The central difficulty 

with Ms. Anglemyer's argument is she resigned from her staff 

nursing position nine days after the Board's reassignment. As a 

-14-

Appellate Case: 94-3342 Document: 01019279515 Date Filed: 06/20/1995 Page: 14 
result, there is no evidence in the record which confirms Ms. 

Anglemyer's hypothesis that the hospital would not need her 

services as a full-time staff nurse. To the contrary, the record 

points in the opposite direction. 

Chairman Reed's affidavit specifically states, "Mrs. 

Anglemyer could have continued to work at Hamilton County Hospital 

as a Staff Nurse, full time, subsequent to the decision to relieve 

her of her duties as Risk Manager with no loss of earnings." 

Further, Ms. Anglemyer herself testified in her deposition that no 

hospital representative ever informed her she no longer was needed 

as a full-time staff nurse. As a result of this evidence, Ms. 

Anglemyer's 

diminishment 

contention she 

remains only mere 

would have 

speculation. 

suffered a salary 

Because of Ms. 

Anglemyer's precipitous resignation, we have no way of determining 

the validity of her contentions. We lack ·a crystal ball to 

enlighten us to what might have been had Ms. Anglemyer stayed at 

the hospital longer. 

We hold Ms. Anglemyer does not have a protected property 

interest in her quality assurance and risk management job 

assignments at the hospital. Furthermore, Ms. Anglemyer has 

failed to present sufficient evidence she would have suffered a 

salary decrease as a result of her reassignment to a staff nursing 

position. 

III. 

Next, Ms. Anglemyer argues the Kansas Risk Management Act, 

Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 65-4921 - 65-4930 (1994), creates a property 

-15-

Appellate Case: 94-3342 Document: 01019279515 Date Filed: 06/20/1995 Page: 15 
interest in the continued retention of her quality assurance and 

risk management positions at the hospital. The Kansas Risk 

Management Act was enacted as part of comprehensive medical 

malpractice legislation in 1986. The Act requires Kansas health 

care facilities to create internal risk management review systems 

of their operations with reporting requirements to a state agency. 

Ms. Anglemyer relies upon § 65-4928 which prohibits discriminatory 

retaliation for compliance with the Act. This provision reads: 

65-4928. Employer 

prohibition; remedy. 

retribution for reporting; 

(a) No employer shall discharge or otherwise 

discriminate against any employee for making any report 

pursuant to K.S.A. 65-4923 or 65-4924. 

(b) Any employer who violates the provisions of 

subsection (a) shall be liable to the aggrieved employee 

for damages for any wages or other benefits lost due to 

the discharge or discrimination plus a civil penalty in 

an amount not exceeding the amount of such damages. 

Such damages and civil penalty shall be · recoverable in 

an individual action brought by the aggrieved employee. 

If the aggrieved employee substantially prevails on any 

of the allegations contained in the pleadings in an 

action allowed by this section, the court, in its 

discretion, may allow the employee reasonable attorney 

fees as part of the costs. 

Subsection (a) refers to two other provisions of the Act. Kan. 

Stat. Ann. § 65-4923 concerns the Act's requirement that health 

care providers have a duty to disclose 11 reportable incidents 11 to 

the internal review committee who in turn must report to a state 

agency. Similarly, § 65-4924 creates a specific reporting 

requirement and procedures for 11 impaired 11 health care providers. 

An impaired provider is someone who cannot perform her 

professional duties and responsibilities with reasonable skill and 

safety. Section 65-4928 prevents retaliation against a risk 

-16-

Appellate Case: 94-3342 Document: 01019279515 Date Filed: 06/20/1995 Page: 16 
management employee for her compliance with these two reporting 

requirements. Overall, the Act is structured like many 

whistleblower statutes to ·prevent an employer from retaliating 

against an employee for reporting incidents the Kansas legislature 

wanted reported in the public interest. See, e.g., Whistleblower 

Protection Act of 1989, 5 U.S.C.A. § 1213 (Supp. 1995). 

The district court concluded the Act did not establish a 

property interest. The court reasoned the Act prohibits only 

retaliatory terminations and does not require termination for 

cause or otherwise limit a hospital's employment decisions. We 

agree with that analysis. One cannot reasonably read the Act as 

creating a generalized property interest in continued employment 

for risk managers or establishing that a risk manager may only be 

terminated for cause. Ms. Anglemyer's statutory interpretation 

reads more into the Act than is there. We hold the Kansas Risk 

Management Act does not create a property interest for procedural 

due process purposes.5 

IV. 

Last, Ms. Anglemyer argues the district court improperly 

dismissed her pendent state law claims. After resolving all her 

federal claims, the district court exercised its discretion and 

dismissed Ms. Anglemyer's remaining state law claims. See 28 

5 Whether the hospital's reassignment of Ms. Anglemyer violated 

the Act presents a distinct inquiry. Nothing in our discussion 

should be read as prejudging this issue, since that particular 

question is not before us. 

-17-

Appellate Case: 94-3342 Document: 01019279515 Date Filed: 06/20/1995 Page: 17 
U.S.C. § 1367(c) (3); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 

(1966). We review the court's decision for an abuse of its 

discretion. Blake v. Dickason, 997 F.2d 749, 751 

1993) . 

(lOth Cir. 

We have previously discussed the appropriate analysis for a 

district court considering dismissing pendent state claims. 

Thatcher Enter. v. Cache County Corp., 902 F.2d 1472 (lOth Cir. 

1990). In Thatcher, we noted a 11 district court has discretion to 

try state 

Id. at 1478. 

claims in the absence of any triable federal claims. 11 

11 [H]owever, that discretion should be exercised in 

those cases in which, given the nature and extent of pretrial 

proceedings, judicial economy, convenience, and fairness would be 

served by retaining jurisdiction... Id. The district court 

determined dismissal was appropriate after concluding none of the 

four Thatcher factors would be served by its retaining 

jurisdiction. Angl~er, 1994 WL 409618, at *5. 

Ms. Anglemyer argues dismissal was inappropriate because the 

parties had completed all the necessary pretrial proceedings; 

therefore, judicial economy and convenience would be served by the 

district court retaining jurisdiction to avoid the expense and 

delay of another round of pretrial proceedings in state court. 

Ms. Anglemyer's argument is not unsound. The district court 

itself concluded dismissal was appropriate despite the fact that 

11 discovery has been completed. 11 Id. 

We have previously expressed concern that district courts be 

aware of the extent of the litigants' pretrial efforts. 11 A 

federal court justifiably may retain jurisdiction of the pendent 

-18-

Appellate Case: 94-3342 Document: 01019279515 Date Filed: 06/20/1995 Page: 18 
claims when substantial time and energy have been expended on the 

case prior to the disposition of the federal claims." Jones v. 

Intermountain Power Project,·794 F.2d 546, 550 (lOth Cir. 1986) 

(citing Transok Pipeline Co. v. Darks, 565 F.2d 1150, 1155 (lOth 

Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1006 (1978)). However, we do 

not have to decide whether the court insufficiently took the 

extent of the pretrial proceedings into consideration because 

there is an independent reason for dismissing Ms. Anglemyer's 

pendent state claims. In her complaint (Count III), she alleged 

the hospital violated the Kansas Risk Management Act. We believe 

the Kansas courts are the appropriate forum to decide this novel 

and complex issue of state law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (1) 

(federal courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 

in cases raising novel or complex issues of state law) . We hold 

the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Ms. 

Anglemyer's pendent state law claims.6 

For the foregoing reasons, the district court's judgment is 

AFFIRMED. 

6 Although the hospital and the individual defendants raise 

additional arguments, our disposition of this appeal renders them 

moot. 

-19-

Appellate Case: 94-3342 Document: 01019279515 Date Filed: 06/20/1995 Page: 19