Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-3_14-cv-00719/USCOURTS-almd-3_14-cv-00719-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Slocumb Law Firm, LLC
Plaintiff
Matthew Trollinger
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

SLOCUMB LAW FIRM, LLC, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. ) CASE NO. 3:14-CV-719-WKW

 ) [WO]

MATTHEW TROLLINGER, )

 )

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the court are Defendant Matthew Trollinger’s motion to dismiss for 

lack of personal jurisdiction, alternative motion to dismiss for lack of venue or to

transfer on grounds of forum non conveniens, and alternative motion to dismiss for 

failure to state claims upon which relief can be granted. (Docs. # 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 

13.) Plaintiff Slocumb Law Firm, LLC, has responded with a consolidated

opposition brief (Doc. # 17), to which Mr. Trollinger has replied (Doc. # 18). 

Upon consideration of the parties’ submissions, the court finds that Mr. 

Trollinger’s motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and venue are due 

to be denied and that this case should be transferred to either the United States 

District Court for the District of Maryland or the United States District Court for 

the District of Columbia.

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I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The court exercises subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 

As discussed infra, Mr. Trollinger disputes that this court has personal jurisdiction 

over him and that venue is proper in this district.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Rule 12(b)(2)

When considering a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, 

“[t]he court must construe the allegations in the complaint as true, to the extent 

they are uncontroverted by [the] defendant’s affidavits or deposition testimony.” 

Morris v. SSE, Inc., 843 F.2d 489, 492 (11th Cir. 1988). “[W]here the evidence 

presented by the parties’ affidavits and deposition testimony conflicts, the court 

must construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant plaintiff.” Id.

When no evidentiary hearing is held, the plaintiff need only establish a prima facie 

case of jurisdiction by presenting evidence sufficient to defeat a motion for 

judgment as a matter of law. Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1514 (11th Cir.

1990). By that standard, the plaintiff must offer evidence that creates a genuine 

dispute of material fact as to the court’s personal jurisdiction over the defendant.

B. Rule 12(b)(3)

The standard for deciding a motion to dismiss for improper venue is very 

similar to the standard articulated above for deciding a Rule 12(b)(2) motion. See 

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Wai v. Rainbow Holdings, 315 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1268 (S.D. Fla. 2004). The 

plaintiff carries the burden of showing that venue is proper in the chosen forum

once the defendant contests venue under Rule 12(b)(3). Id.; Pritchett v. Paschall 

Truck Lines, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1174 (M.D. Ala. 2010).

III. BACKGROUND

Slocumb Law Firm, LLC (hereinafter “Slocumb”), led by its founder and 

sole member, Mike Slocumb, is based in Auburn, Alabama, but Slocumb has

offices in Baltimore, Maryland, and Washington, D.C.1 Mr. Trollinger, who is not 

an Alabama citizen, was employed as an attorney in Slocumb’s Washington, D.C. 

office from February 2010 through July 2011. While an employee of Slocumb, 

Mr. Trollinger never visited or worked in Alabama, but he communicated daily 

with Mr. Slocumb, who was in Alabama, via telephone and computer. Mr. 

Trollinger represented clients in Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia.

Slocumb maintains its clients’ personal and case-related information in an 

electronic database called “Needles,” and the Needles computer server is located in 

Auburn. Slocumb claims that its Needles data – specifically the terms of its client 

retention agreements – constitutes a valuable trade secret. Mr. Trollinger allegedly 

retained information from the Needles database after he resigned his employment

with Slocumb. 

 

1 Mike Slocumb is a citizen of Alabama.

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Slocumb additionally alleges that Mr. Trollinger neglected his fiduciary 

duties to it during his employment by failing to pay liens against Slocumb’s clients 

out of settlement proceeds collected for clients. Slocumb did not know about the 

unpaid liens until Mr. Trollinger departed the firm. Slocumb has assumed 

responsibility for paying the liens and alleges that the sums owed exceed this 

court’s jurisdictional requirement of $75,000. The Complaint states claims for 

breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, and violation of the Alabama Trade Secrets 

Act. Mr. Trollinger moves to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2), (3), and (6). 

(Docs. # 8–13.)

In his Affidavit, Mr. Trollinger claims that this suit is Slocumb’s retaliatory 

response to Mr. Trollinger’s Maryland lawsuit against Slocumb for unpaid wages. 

(See Trollinger Aff., Doc. # 8-1.) Mr. Trollinger obtained a default judgment in

Maryland against Slocumb in 2012 and domesticated it in Lee County, Alabama,

in 2013. Slocumb’s claims raised in this suit were not raised as counterclaims to 

the Maryland action.

IV. DISCUSSION

The court is obligated to address the question of personal jurisdiction prior 

to Defendants’ alternative arguments for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(3) and (6).

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A. Personal Jurisdiction

A personal jurisdiction challenge in a federal court requires a two-part 

analysis. The court must first determine its jurisdiction under the forum state’s 

long-arm statute; second, it must decide whether exercising jurisdiction is in 

agreement with principles of constitutional due process. Alabama’s long-arm 

statute permits state and federal courts in Alabama to exercise personal jurisdiction 

“to the fullest extent constitutionally permissible.” Sloss Indus. Corp. v. Eurisol, 

488 F.3d 922, 925 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Ala. R. Civ. P. 4.2(b)). Thus, only one 

analysis is necessary because the limits of Alabama’s long-arm jurisdiction are 

coterminous with constitutional due process requirements.

The Due Process Clause requires that (1) a defendant have “minimum 

contacts” with the forum state and that (2) a court’s exercise of jurisdiction 

conform to “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Burnham v. 

Superior Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 618 (1990).

1. Minimum Contacts

When considering “minimum contacts” in support of personal jurisdiction, it 

is imperative to observe the distinction between general and specific jurisdiction. 

“General jurisdiction” over a defendant arises from the defendant’s continuous and 

systematic contacts with the forum state that are unrelated to the suit, while 

“specific jurisdiction” arises from a defendant’s sporadic or limited contacts with 

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the forum state that are at issue in the plaintiff’s cause of action. Helicopteros 

Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414–15 nn.8–9 (1984). 

Slocumb argues that Alabama courts have specific jurisdiction over Mr. Trollinger. 

In a case premised on specific jurisdiction, 

[the] defendant’s contacts with the forum state must satisfy three 

criteria: [(1)] they must be related to the plaintiff’s cause of action or 

have given rise to it; [(2)] they must involve some act by which the 

defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting 

activities within the forum; and [(3)] they must be such that the 

defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there. 

Sloss, 488 F.3d at 925 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A]ll contacts between 

a nonresident defendant and a forum state” should be considered to see whether, 

“individually or collectively, [they] satisfy these criteria.” Louis Vuitton Malletier, 

S.A. v. Mosseri, 736 F.3d 1339, 1357 (11th Cir. 2013).

“[A] minimum contacts analysis is immune to solution by checklist,” and 

“contacts must be viewed both quantitatively and qualitatively.” Sloss, 488 F.3d 

at 925 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Significantly, technological 

sophistication which allows interstate business to be facilitated by mail, wire, or 

satellite may render a nonresident defendant’s physical presence in the forum state 

unnecessary for a court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over him. Cable/Home 

Commc’n Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 858 (11th Cir. 1990).

Slocumb does not dispute Mr. Trollinger’s argument that the court lacks 

general jurisdiction. Instead, Slocumb asserts that specific jurisdiction exists. 

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First, Slocumb argues, Mr. Trollinger’s contact with Alabama is “related to” this 

case because Mr. Trollinger accessed Slocumb’s Needles server, located in 

Auburn, Alabama, without authorization. Other courts have asserted personal 

jurisdiction where parties electronically access servers in the forum state. For 

instance, in MacDermid, Inc. v. Deiter, 702 F.3d 725 (2d Cir. 2012), the Second 

Circuit held that Connecticut’s courts had personal jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s 

former employee who allegedly accessed and misused her work emails from a 

computer in Canada. Id. at 727. In reaching its decision, the court applied a 

computer-specific provision of Connecticut’s long-arm jurisdiction statute. Id.

at 728 (citing Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 52-59b(a) and 53-451(a), which authorize courts 

to exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresident individuals who use computers 

or computer networks located within Connecticut). The Second Circuit was 

persuaded that the defendant had used Connecticut-based servers to access her 

work email account. Id. at 729.2

As Mr. Trollinger points out, there is no similar Alabama statute specifically

creating long-arm personal jurisdiction over a person’s remote use of an Alabamabased computer network. (See Doc. # 18, at 3.) However, courts have reached the 

same result as MacDermid without the aid of a long-arm statute like Connecticut’s 

 

2

Slocumb cites a number of similar cases from other jurisdictions in which courts 

extended long-arm jurisdiction over defendants who accessed or otherwise made use of servers 

in the forum state. (Doc. # 17, at 9 (collecting cases).)

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by applying traditional due process principles, just as an Alabama court would. 

See, e.g., CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1264 (6th Cir. 1996)

(following Ohio law); Rhapsody Solutions, LLC v. Cryogenic Vessel Alternatives, 

Inc., No. CIV.A. H-12-1168, 2013 WL 820589, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 2013). 

Assuming that Mr. Trollinger’s wrongful access and appropriation of information

from Slocumb’s Needles server is sufficient to support a finding of minimum 

contacts, this fact would only support Slocumb’s Alabama Trade Secrets Act claim 

against Mr. Trollinger. Mr. Trollinger’s access of the Needles server is unrelated 

to Slocumb’s allegations of Mr. Trollinger’s negligence and breach of fiduciary 

duty. Slocumb must show facts that support personal jurisdiction as to each of its 

claims. See Turner v. Regions Bank, 770 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1248 (M.D. Ala. 2011) 

(“[S]pecific personal jurisdiction is a claim-specific inquiry.”) (quoting Seiferth v. 

Helicopteros Atuneros, Inc., 472 F.3d 266, 274 (5th Cir. 2006) (alteration 

omitted)). Indeed, there must be a “direct[,] causal relationship between the 

defendant, the forum, and the litigation.” Louis Vuitton, 736 F.3d at 1355–56.

Thus, Slocumb further relies on the following additional contacts with 

Alabama, which it says relate to the breach of fiduciary duty and negligence causes 

of action: (1) Mr. Trollinger’s general employment for Slocumb, an Alabama 

firm; (2) Mr. Trollinger’s receipt of compensation from Slocomb’s funds drawn on 

an Alabama bank account; (3) Mr. Trollinger’s daily electronic and telephonic 

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communications with Mr. Slocomb; (4) Mr. Trollinger’s online training to use 

Needles, which originated in Alabama; and (5) Mr. Trollinger’s submission of 

expense reports to Slocomb in Alabama. (See Doc. # 17, at 3 (“[A]ny of Mr. 

Trollinger’s many contacts with Alabama . . . could give rise to [Slocumb’s] claims 

against him. . . .” (referencing activities described at 4, 6, and 10)).) These facts 

are supported by Attorney Michael W. Slocumb’s Affidavit. (See Slocumb Aff., 

Doc. # 17-1.)

Slocumb explains that each of these specific actions – and more – were

found to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant 

in Molex Co. v. Andress, 887 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1203 (N.D. Ala. 2012) (Smith, J.)

(finding that the defendant’s regular consultant work for the Alabama plaintiff and 

another Alabama business, his frequent communication with plaintiff’s staff by 

telephone, fax, and email, his receipt of multiple payments from plaintiff’s 

Alabama financial institution, and his request for products and reimbursement from

plaintiff’s Alabama office were sufficient to establish the defendant’s minimum 

contacts). Similarly, another federal district court concluded that it had personal 

jurisdiction over individuals who had voluntarily faxed non-compete agreements to 

the plaintiff at its Alabama corporate headquarters and participated in “extensive 

training, via the internet and conference calls that originated from [Alabama],”

although that court admitted that the question of personal jurisdiction was a close 

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call. DocRX, Inc. v. DOX Consulting, LLC, 738 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1248–49 (S.D. 

Ala. 2010) (Cassady, M.J.).

In reply, Mr. Trollinger does not contradict Slocumb’s facts, supported by 

affidavit testimony. Instead, he distinguishes Molex and DocRX from this case by

asserting that there is no evidence that he reached out to Slocomb for employment

or business. Mr. Trollinger stresses that, unlike the defendants in Molex and 

DocRX, he provided no service or product in Alabama. (Indeed, he was legally 

unable to practice law in Alabama.) He argues that his receipt of compensation or

reimbursement from Slocumb’s Alabama bank, the origination of any training 

from Alabama, and his daily communication with Slocumb in Alabama “relate to 

his responsibilities which were, and only could have been, performed outside of 

Alabama.” (Doc. # 18, at 4 (italics omitted).)

Upon consideration of the parties’ arguments and the evidence, the court 

concludes that Slocumb has established a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction 

by demonstrating that Mr. Trollinger has sufficient minimum contacts with 

Alabama. Slocumb’s claims of trade secret misappropriation, breach of fiduciary

duty, and negligence may arise from Mr. Trollinger’s work-related activities in 

Maryland, but they are causally related to Mr. Trollinger’s acceptance of 

employment with an Alabama-based law firm. Further, the employment-related

activities cited by Slocumb indicate that Mr. Trollinger purposefully availed 

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himself of the privilege of being employed by an Alabama firm, and for that 

reason, Mr. Trollinger should have reasonably anticipated being brought into court 

in Alabama arising from any employment-related disputes with Slocumb. Having 

found minimum contacts, the court inquires whether exercising jurisdiction over 

Mr. Trollinger comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

2. Traditional Notions of Fair Play and Substantial Justice

To decide whether the exercise of jurisdiction is fair and just to Mr. 

Trollinger, the court should consider: (1) the burden to Mr. Trollinger in defending 

suit in Alabama; (2) Alabama’s interest in adjudicating this dispute; (3) Slocumb’s

interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief; (4) the interstate judicial 

system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of this controversy; and 

(5) the shared interest of the states in furthering substantive social policies. Cronin 

v. Wash. Nat’l Ins. Co., 980 F.2d 663, 671 (11th Cir. 1993). First, Mr. Trollinger 

contends that he merely is an individual attorney residing in Maryland, in contrast 

to Slocumb’s status as a “national law firm” with a presence in multiple 

jurisdictions. Hence, Mr. Trollinger argues, his burden in defending suit in 

Alabama allegedly is higher than Slocumb’s burden of suing in Maryland. Next, 

Mr. Trollinger contends that Alabama lacks an interest in a dispute arising from 

conduct committed in Maryland or the District of Columbia. Finally, Mr. 

Trollinger posits that it would be more convenient and more efficient for Slocumb 

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to sue in Maryland because any judgment against Mr. Trollinger obtained in 

Alabama would need to be domesticated in Maryland.

As for Mr. Trollinger’s first objection, the burden on the defendant in 

litigating in the plaintiff’s chosen forum is “always a primary concern.” WorldWide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). However, 

“modern transportation and communication have made it much less burdensome” 

for nonresident defendants to defend themselves in distant forums. McGee v. Int’l 

Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957). Further, “due process is only offended 

when the burden placed upon the defendant is incommensurate with the benefits 

and protections the defendant has received within the forum.” Oldfield v. Pueblo 

De Bahia Lora, S.A., 558 F.3d 1210, 1221 n.30 (11th Cir. 2009). Altogether, the

court finds that the burden upon Mr. Trollinger of defending suit in Alabama is 

commensurate with the benefits and protections that Mr. Trollinger has received 

from his employment-related contact with Alabama.3

As for Mr. Trollinger’s second objection, the court cannot agree that 

Alabama lacks an interest in resolving three claims raised by one of its own citizen 

business entities involving allegations of misconduct and injury occurring, in part, 

in Alabama, in violation of an Alabama trade secret statute. Finally, Mr. 

 

3

The court is unaware of any authority, and Mr. Trollinger has provided none, that 

advises that a court should consider the comparative wealth or status of the plaintiff and 

defendant. Hence, Mr. Trollinger’s nod toward a Goliath versus David argument is without 

merit. 

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Trollinger’s argument that it would be more efficient for purposes of judgment 

collection if Slocumb sued him in Maryland as opposed to Alabama is belied by 

Mr. Trollinger’s own decision to sue Slocumb in Maryland, rather than Alabama, 

knowing that he might have to domesticate a foreign judgment in Alabama. For 

these reasons, and in the absence of any other proper objections, the court finds 

that requiring Mr. Trollinger to defend this suit in Alabama does not offend 

traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

B. Venue

Mr. Trollinger contends that the Complaint lacks well-pleaded allegations 

connecting his alleged misconduct with the Middle District of Alabama. Slocumb 

claims that venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2), which provides that

a civil action may be filed in “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the 

events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of 

property that is the subject of the action is situated.”

4

 Under this transactional 

venue provision, “[o]nly the events that directly give rise to a claim are relevant. 

And of the places where the events have taken place, only those locations hosting a 

‘substantial part’ of the events are to be considered.” Jenkins Brick Co. v. Bremer, 

321 F.3d 1366, 1371 (11th Cir. 2003).

 

4 No party has argued that venue in this district lies under § 1391(b)(1) or (b)(3).

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Mr. Trollinger asserts that all events that gave rise to each of Slocumb’s 

claims (i.e., Mr. Trollinger’s alleged failure to satisfy Slocumb’s clients’ liens 

against Slocumb’s clients and Mr. Trollinger’s alleged misappropriation of

information from the Needles server) must have occurred outside of Alabama in 

either Maryland or Washington, D.C. (See Trollinger Aff. at ¶¶ 5–9, 11–12.) 

Slocumb disagrees, arguing that Mr. Trollinger should have reported the clients’ 

liens to Slocumb’s Alabama office. Moreover, with respect to Mr. Trollinger’s 

alleged violation of the Alabama Trade Secrets Act, Slocumb asserts that venue is 

proper in Alabama where the Needles server is maintained.5 (Doc. # 17, at 14.) 

Slocumb relies on an unpublished opinion from the Northern District of Georgia 

for its conclusion that “the situs of [a] tort [occurring over an internet website] is 

considered to be where the website, or servers which maintain the website, are 

located.” Paradise Media Ventures, LLC v. Mills, No. 1:13-CV-1003-TWT, 2013 

WL 6388627, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 5, 2013) (quoting Gucci Am., Inc. v. Frontline 

Processing Corp., 721 F. Supp. 2d 228, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)).

Mr. Trollinger replies that regardless of whether he should have reported the 

liens to his employer in Alabama, his alleged failure to pay the liens on behalf of 

Slocumb’s clients occurred in Maryland or Washington, D.C., where he practiced 

 

5

Slocumb does not dispute Mr. Trollinger’s representation that any alleged remote,

electronic access of the Needles server must have occurred in Maryland, either at Mr. 

Trollinger’s law practice or personal residence. (See Doc. # 11, at 3 (citing Trollinger Aff.).)

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law and represented the clients. (Doc. # 18, at 5, 6.) Mr. Trollinger distinguishes 

Paradise Media and Gucci on the grounds that each case confronted whether the 

courts of other states (Georgia and New York, respectively) could exercise 

personal jurisdiction over defendants who allegedly committed trademark 

infringement outside of those states. While the court understands Slocumb’s 

argument that tortious conduct occurred in Alabama where the server is located, 

Mr. Trollinger is correct that personal jurisdiction and venue are distinct inquiries. 

Charles Alan Wright, et al., 14D Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 3806 (4th ed.) (“[P]ersonal 

jurisdiction and venue protect different interests and therefore may be interpreted 

differently. . . . For example, the constitutional test for personal jurisdiction 

requires ‘minimum’ contacts between the defendant and the forum. Section 

1391(b)(2), in contrast, requires that a ‘substantial’ part of the claim arise in the 

district. . . . [Thus,] the two doctrines should not be equated.”).

Upon review of the allegations of the Complaint and the parties’ arguments, 

the court finds that none of the “events or omissions giving rise to” each of 

Slocumb’s three claims – much less a “substantial part” of those events or 

omissions – “occurred” in Alabama. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2); Jenkins Brick, 

321 F.3d at 1371–72. Mr. Trollinger’s alleged acts of negligence and breach of 

fiduciary duty are “omissions” which occurred outside this district because Mr. 

Trollinger practiced law outside this district. Additionally, Mr. Trollinger’s 

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alleged violation of the Alabama Trade Secrets Act is an “event” which occurred, 

on Mr. Trollinger’s part, outside this district when he accessed the Needles server. 

Slocumb has not met its burden of showing that venue in this district is proper.

Mr. Trollinger’s motion to dismiss for lack of venue includes an alternative 

motion to transfer venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404 and the doctrine of forum 

non conveniens. However, this argument need not be reached, as the court has 

determined that venue is improper under § 1391(b).

Although venue in this district is improper, the court need not dismiss the 

case pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3). When a case is filed “laying venue in the wrong 

division or district,” the court “shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, 

transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.” 

28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). “[T]he venue statutes reflect Congress’ intent that venue 

should always lie in some federal court whenever federal courts have personal 

jurisdiction over the defendant.” Atl. Marine Const. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for W. 

Dist. of Tex., 134 S. Ct. 568, 578 (2013). Mr. Trollinger suggests either the United 

States District Court for the District of Maryland or the United States District 

Court for the District of Columbia in his arguments for a more convenient forum. 

(Doc. # 11, at 5.) Regardless of which one of those forums is more appropriate, 

Mr. Trollinger acquiesces to venue in either of those fora, and venue would clearly 

lie in Maryland, assuming Mr. Trollinger continued his residence there. See 28 

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U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1). Slocumb has not taken a position on whether Maryland or 

the District of Columbia is the more appropriate forum in the event Mr. 

Trollinger’s objection to venue was found to be meritorious. Furthermore, the 

facts are not clear as to whether it would be more appropriate for this case to be 

heard in Maryland or in the District of Columbia. For instance, Mr. Trollinger 

worked at Slocumb’s Washington, D.C. office, but represented clients in 

Washington D.C., Maryland, and Virginia. Additionally, Mr. Trollinger claims

that his alleged access of the Needles server would have occurred in Maryland at 

his law practice or home. 

Because of the ambiguity about which forum is proper, and because the 

court has not heard Slocumb’s position, the parties shall offer their positions on 

transfer prior to the court’s entry of a transfer order pursuant to § 1406(a).

V. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing analysis, it is ORDERED that:

(1) Mr. Trollinger’s Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal 

jurisdiction (Doc. # 8) is DENIED;

(2) Mr. Trollinger’s Rule 12(b)(3) motion to dismiss for improper venue 

and alternative motion to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens (Doc. # 10) 

is DENIED, but Mr. Trollinger’s objection to venue in this district is well founded 

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and the court therefore will enter a separate order transferring this case pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1406(a);

(3) Mr. Trollinger’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss (Doc. # 12) is 

DENIED without prejudice;

(4) On or before August 14, 2015, the parties shall file a response to this

order indicating whether this case should be transferred to the District of Maryland 

or to the District of Columbia.

DONE this 7th day of August, 2015.

 /s/ W. Keith Watkins

 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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