Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-05244/USCOURTS-ca10-90-05244-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Helen Jeanean Burk
Appellant
K Mart Corporation
Appellee

Document Text:

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Q.ERI< 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE 

DENVER, COLORADO 802tl4 

January 28, 1992 

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED ORDER AND Jl.JIX3MENT 

RE: 90-5244, Burk v. K Mart Corporation 

(Lower docket: 86-C-440-B,) 

The captioned order and judgment, filed November 12, 1991, by 

Judge Brorby, has been ordered published. 

PF:tl 

Enclosure 

Sincerely, 

( 303) 844-3157 

FTS 564-3157 

Appellate Case: 90-5244 Document: 010110096856 Date Filed: 01/28/1992 Page: 1 
HELEN JEANEAN BURK, 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

Plaintiff - Appellant, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

v. No. 90-5244 

KMART CORPORATION, 

Defendant - Appellee. 

ORDER 

Filed January 28, 1992 

Before ANDERSON, BARRETT, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

The court grants appellee 1 s motion to publish the court's decision in 

this case and orders that the court's order and judgment of November 12, 

1991, is reissued as a published opinion. 

Entered for the Court 

By: 

Appellate Case: 90-5244 Document: 010110096856 Date Filed: 01/28/1992 Page: 2 
HELEN 

v. 

KMART 

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

JEANEAN BURK, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

FIL~D 

U 'ted S'""t.eB Court of Appeals m ""' c· •i- Tcnth •tr.cut., 

NOV 1 2 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

) No. 90-5244 

) 

CORPORATION, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee. ) 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. 86-C-440-B) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Earl w. Wolfe, Earl w. Wolfe & Associates, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for 

Plaintiff-appellant. 

Lynn Paul Mattson, Kathy R. Neal, and Richard J. Eagleton, 

Doerner, Stuart, Saunders, Daniel & Anderson, Tulsa, Oklahoma for 

Defendant-appellee. 

Before ANDERSON, BARRETT, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

Appellate Case: 90-5244 Document: 010110096856 Date Filed: 01/28/1992 Page: 3 
34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Plaintiff-appellant Helen Jeanean Burk brought this action 

against K-Mart Corporation, alleging constructive discharge 

resulting from sexual discrimination and retaliatory harassment 

for whistleblowing. K-Mart moved for partial summary judgment on 

Appellant's claims that she was retaliated against for 

whistleblowing. Appellant failed to respond, and the district 

court granted summary judgment based on Local Rule 15(A). 

Following a pretrial conference and K-Mart's Request for 

Clarification, the district court issued an Order confirming that 

all of Appellant's claims relating to whistleblowing had been 

disposed of in its grant of summary judgment to K-Mart on that 

point, leaving only Appellant's claims regarding sexual 

discrimination. K-Mart subsequently moved for summary judgment on 

Appellant's sexual discrimination claims. Again, Appellant failed 

to respond. The district court, looking to the merits of the 

claims, granted summary judgment to K-Mart. Appellant appeals the 

district court's orders. We affirm, but on different bases than 

those relied on by the district court. See Bath v. National Ass'n 

of Intercollegiate Athletics, 843 F.2d 1315, 1317 (10th Cir. 

1988) (appellate court can affirm on any grounds that find support 

in the record). 

Our review of a district court's grant of summary judgment is 

de novo, applying the same standards used by the trial court under 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Applied Genetics Int'l, Inc. v. First 

Affiliated Sec •• Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir. 1990). 

2 

Appellate Case: 90-5244 Document: 010110096856 Date Filed: 01/28/1992 Page: 4 
( 

"Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute 

over a material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law." Russillo v. Scarborough, 935 F.2d 1167, 1170 

(10th Cir. 1991). Having failed to respond to either of K-Mart's 

summary judgment motions, Appellant has pointed to no disputed 

issues of fact which might preclude summary judgment. In any 

case, the parties appear to agree on the material facts. Our 

review, then, is limited to whether the district court correctly 

applied the substantive law. See Railhead Freight Sys., Inc. v. 

United States Fire Ins. co., 924 F.2d 994, 995 (10th cir. 1991). 

Regarding her whistleblowing claims, Appellant alleges that 

she was harassed in retaliation for her reporting of several 

incidents of wrongdoing by other K-Mart employees. Appellant, 

formerly an at-will employee, can prevail on these claims only if 

she can show that Oklahoma has a "clear mandate of public policy" 

against terminating employees for this type of whistleblowing. 1 

Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24, 29 (Okla. 1989). 

We do not find such a mandate in either Oklahoma's decisional 

or statutory law, and Appellant, in failing to respond to K-Mart's 

motion, did not argue before the district court that one existed. 

on appeal, Appellant cites to several cases, contending that such 

a public policy exception to Oklahoma's termination-at-will 

doctrine exists. Those cases are inapposite or distinguishable. 

We find no cases where the Oklahoma Supreme Court has held that 

1 The parties argue about the nature of these infractions, 

whether simply violative of K-Mart's internal policies or also 

violative of law. That argument is not relevant, however, in 

light of our disposition. 

3 

Appellate Case: 90-5244 Document: 010110096856 Date Filed: 01/28/1992 Page: 5 
termination in retaliation for whistleblowing violates Oklahoma's 

public policy, and we decline to fashion such a ruling. ~ Burk, 

770 P.2d at 29 ("(T)he public policy exception must be tightly 

circumscribed."). Accordingly, we affirm the district court's 

grant of summary judgment on Appellant's whistleblowing claims. 2 

Following the district court's grant of summary judgment on 

her whistleblowing claims, Appellant argued, apparently at a 

pretrial conference, that some of her whistleblowing claims 

remained because they were connected to and encompassed her sexual 

discrimination claims. 

September 24, 1989, noted: 

The district court, in its Order dated 

"There has been no allegation by 

Plaintiff that she filed, under state and/or federal statutes, a 

sexual discrimination claim and was thereafter retaliated against 

by Defendant." We agree. Appellant alleged no facts in support 

of a claim that her constructive discharge was based, even in 

part, on retaliatory harassment in connection with sexual 

discrimination. Absent such pleading, Appellant cannot prevail in 

her attempt to raise this claim. See Jacobs, Visconsi & Jacobs. 

Co. v. City of Lawrence, 927 F.2d 1111, 1115 (10th Cir. 

1991) (sufficiency of complaint to state a claim). 

Finally, Appellant argues that the district court erred in 

granting summary judgment to K-Mart on her sexual discrimination 

claims. K-Mart asserted that Appellant was impliedly arguing that 

2 In light of this disposition, we need not review the 

propriety of the district court's reliance on its local rule in 

this case. But see John v. Louisiana, 757 F.2d 698, 709 (5th Cir. 

1985) ("summary judgment cannot be supported solely on the ground 

that (plaintiff] failed to respond to defendants' motion for 

summary judgment."). 

4 

Appellate Case: 90-5244 Document: 010110096856 Date Filed: 01/28/1992 Page: 6 
she failed to receive a promotion as a result of discrimination. 

We disagree. Appellant alleged only that she was constructively 

discharged. Nonetheless, once K-Mart moved for summary judgment, 

Appellant had "the obligation to come forward with evidence, more 

than mere conclusory allegations •••• 11 Metro Oil Co. v. Sun 

Ref. & Mktg. Co., 936 F.2d 501, 504 (10th Cir. 1991). "One of the 

purposes of a motion for summary judgment is to pierce the 

pleading and to assess the proof in order to ascertain whether 

there exists a genuine need for trial." Id. In failing to 

respond to K-Mart's motion, Appellant failed to come forward with 

any specific facts or evidence supporting her sexual 

discrimination claim or connecting that claim to her allegation of 

constructive discharge. Appellant cannot rest on her pleadings to 

avoid summary judgment. Bacchus Indus •• Inc. v. Arvin Indus .• 

Inc., 939 F.2d 887, 891 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). Because Appellant 

has failed to make a showing sufficient to establish elements 

essential to her case, we affirm the district court's grant of 

summary judgment. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 

(1986). 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. 

5 

Appellate Case: 90-5244 Document: 010110096856 Date Filed: 01/28/1992 Page: 7 
( 

· FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS United States Court of AppealG Tenth Circuit 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

HELEN JEANEAN BURK, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

KMART CORPORATION, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

,~ov 12 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-5244 

(D.C. No. 86-C-440-B) 

(N.D. Okla.) 

Before ANDERSON, BARRETT, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Plaintiff-appellant Helen Jeanean Burk brought this action 

against K-Mart Corporation, alleging constructive discharge 

resulting from sexual discrimination and retaliatory harassment 

for whistleblowing. K-Mart moved for partial summary judgment on 

Appellant's claims that she was retaliated against for 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case,· res judicata, or collateral estoppal. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-5244 Document: 010110096856 Date Filed: 01/28/1992 Page: 8 
whistleblowing. 

court granted 

Following a 

Appellant failed to respond, and the district 

summary judgment based on Local Rule 15(A). 

pretrial conference and K-Mart's Request for 

Clarification, the district court issued an Order confirming that 

all of Appellant's claims relating to whistleblowing had been 

disposed of in its grant of summary judgment to K-Mart on that 

point, leaving only Appellant's claims regarding sexual 

discrimination. K-Mart subsequently moved for summary judgment on 

Appellant's sexual discrimination claims. Again, Appellant failed 

to respond. The district court, looking to the merits of the 

claims, granted summary judgment to K-Mart. Appellant appeals the 

district court's orders. We affirm, but on different bases than 

those relied on by the district court. See Bath v. National Ass'n 

of Intercollegiate Athletics, 843 F.2d 1315, 1317 (10th Cir. 

1988)(appellate court can affirm on any grounds that find support 

in the record). 

Our review of a district court's grant of summary judgment is 

de novo, applying the same standards used by the trial court under 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Applied Genetics Int'l, Inc. v. First 

Affiliated Sec., Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir. 1990). 

"Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute 

over a material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law." Russillo v. Scarborough, 935 F.2d 1167, 1170 

(10th Cir. 1991). Having failed to respond to either of K-Mart's 

summary judgment motions, Appellant has pointed to no disputed 

issues of fact which might preclude summary judgment. In any 

case, the parties appear to agree on the material facts. Our 

2 

Appellate Case: 90-5244 Document: 010110096856 Date Filed: 01/28/1992 Page: 9 
review, then, is limited to whether the district court correctly 

applied the substantive law. See Railhead Freight Sys., Inc. v. 

United States Fire Ins. Co., 924 F.2d 994, 995 (10th Cir. 1991). 

Regarding her whistleblowing claims, Appellant alleges that 

she was harassed in retaliation for her reporting of several 

incidents of wrongdoing by other K-Mart employees. Appellant, 

formerly an at-will employee, can prevail on these claims only if 

she can show that Oklahoma has a "clear mandate of public policy" 

against terminating employees for this type of whistleblowing. 1 

Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24, 29 (Okla. 1989). 

We do not find such a mandate in either Oklahoma's decisional 

or statutory law, and Appellant, in failing to respond to K-Mart's 

motion, did not argue before the district court that one existed. 

On appeal, Appellant cites to several cases, contending that such 

a public policy exception to Oklahoma's termination-at-will 

doctrine exists. Those cases are inapposite or distinguishable. 

We find no cases where the Oklahoma Supreme Court has held that 

termination in retaliation for whistleblowing violates Oklahoma's 

public policy, and we decline to fashion such a ruling. See Burk, 

770 P.2d at 29 ("[T]he public policy exception must be tightly 

1 The parties argue about the nature of these infractions, 

whether simply violative of K-Mart's internal policies or also 

violative of law. That argument is not relevant, however, in 

light of our disposition. 

3 

Appellate Case: 90-5244 Document: 010110096856 Date Filed: 01/28/1992 Page: 10 
circumscribed."). Accordingly, we affirm the district court's 

grant of summary judgment on Appellant's whistleblowing claims. 2 

Following the district court's grant of summary judgment on 

her whistleblowing claims, Appellant argued, apparently at a 

pretrial conference, that some of her whistleblowing claims 

remained because they were connected to and encompassed her sexual 

discrimination claims. The district court, in its Order dated 

September 24, 1989, noted: "There has been no allegation by 

Plaintiff that she filed, under state and/or federal statutes, a 

sexual discrimination claim and was thereafter retaliated against 

by Defendant. 11 We agree. Appellant alleged no facts in support 

of a claim that her constructive discharge was based, even in 

part, on retaliatory harassment in connection with sexual 

discrimination. Absent such pleading, Appellant cannot prevail in 

her attempt to raise this claim. See Jacobs, Visconsi & Jacobs, 

Co. v. City of Lawrence, 927 F.2d 1111, 1115 (10th Cir. 

1991)(sufficiency of complaint to state a claim). 

Finally, Appellant argues that the district court erred in 

granting summary judgment to K-Mart on her sexual discrimination 

claims. K-Mart asserted that Appellant was impliedly arguing that 

she failed to receive a promotion as a result of discrimination. 

We disagree. Appellant alleged only that she was constructively 

2 In light of this disposition, we need not review the 

propriety of the district court's reliance on its local rule in 

this case. But see John v. Louisiana, 757 F.2d 698, 709 (5th Cir. 

1985)( 11 summary judgment cannot be supported solely on the ground 

that [plaintiff] failed to respond to defendants' motion for 

summary judgment."). 

4 

Appellate Case: 90-5244 Document: 010110096856 Date Filed: 01/28/1992 Page: 11 
discharged. Nonetheless, once K-Mart moved for summary judgment, 

Appellant had "the obligation to come forward with evidence, more 

than mere conclusory allegations II Metro Oil Co. v. Sun 

Ref. & Mktg. Co., 936 F.2d 501, 504 (10th Cir. 1991). "One of the 

purposes of a motion for summary judgment is to pierce the 

pleading and to assess the proof in order to ascertain whether 

there exists a genuine need for trial." Id. In failing to 

respond to K-Mart's motion, Appellant failed to come forward with 

any specific facts or evidence supporting her sexual 

discrimination claim or connecting that claim to her allegation of 

constructive discharge. Appellant cannot rest on her pleadings to 

avoid summary judgment. Bacchus Indus., Inc. v. Arvin Indus., 

Inc., 939 F.2d 887, 891 (10th Cir. 1991)(citing Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). Because Appellant 

has failed to make a showing sufficient to establish elements 

essential to her case, we affirm the district court's grant of 

summary judgment. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 

(1986). 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

Wade Brorby 

Circuit Judge 

5 

Appellate Case: 90-5244 Document: 010110096856 Date Filed: 01/28/1992 Page: 12