Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-01326/USCOURTS-ca10-94-01326-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Abbott Washroom Systems, Inc.
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT 

FILED 

OF APPlfMtid Sc.tel COIIIi tl Appeall 

Tnth Cirt11lt 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT FEB 2 7 1995 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

ABBOTT WASHROOM SYSTEMS, INC., 

doing business as Abbott Fire 

Extinguisher Company, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

No. 94-1326 

APPEAL FROM THB UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THB DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 94-CR-30) 

Paula M. Ray, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Denver, Colorado (Henry L. 

Solano, United States Attorney, with her on the brief), for 

Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Dennis W. Hartley, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for DefendantAppellee. 

Before ANDERSON and HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judges, and DOWNES,* 

District Judge. 

HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judge. 

*Honorable William F. Downes, United States District Judge for the 

District of Wyoming, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 94-1326 Document: 01019283562 Date Filed: 02/27/1995 Page: 1 
In January 1994 defendant-appellee Abbott Washroom Systems, 

Inc., d/b/a Abbott Fire Extinguisher Company (Abbott), and a 

vice-president of Abbott, Roy A. Chambers, were indicted on three 

counts charging violations of the False Claims Act, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 287 and aiding and abetting those offenses, 18 U.S.C. § 2. The 

charges concerned presenting false, fictitious or fraudulent 

claims for services on fire extinguishers to government employees 

at Fort Carson, Colorado. The gist of the offenses alleged was 

that C02 and dry chemical fire extinguishers were stickered and 

stamped ("pencil-whipped") as if they had been serviced properly 

and that billings for services not properly performed were 

presented for November 1991 and later for September and October 

1992. 

Trial was held in the district court in April 1994 and 

verdicts of guilty as to Abbott were returned on the three counts; 

not guilty verdicts were returned as to Chambers. Abbott moved 

for a judgment of acquittal or a new trial on May 4, 1994. On 

July 11, 1994, the district judge declared a mistrial, set aside 

the verdict, and ordered a new trial by the following order: 

This matter is before the court on defendant's 

"Motion for Judgement of Acquittal and Motion for New 

Trial." Upon consideration of the motion, response, and 

reply, it appears that the jury verdict in this case is 

inconsistent with the verdict as to Roy A. Chambers and 

that there is no rational explanation for the verdict. 

Accordingly, the court declares a mistrial, sets aside 

the verdict, and orders a new trial. Within ten (10) 

days of the date of this Order, counsel shall appear 

together in chambers to obtain a new trial date. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

The government appeals pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3731. It 

asserts that the trial judge erred by granting a new trial on the 

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basis that the verdicts as to Abbott and Chambers were 

inconsistent and that, contrary to Abbott's contention, there was 

sufficient evidence to support Abbott's convictions. Abbott 

responds by noting that its post-trial motion for a judgment of 

acquittal challenged the sufficiency of the evidence as to Abbott. 

Abbott recognizes that the judge granted a new trial on the basis 

of inconsistent verdicts, but it maintains on appeal, as in its 

motion below, both that there was insufficient evidence to convict 

Abbott and that in the circumstances of this case, the 

inconsistent verdicts cannot stand. 

I 

We turn first to the judge's reliance on the inconsistent 

verdicts as the basis for his ruling. The government relies, 

inter alia, on United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57 (1984), which 

summarized the law on inconsistent verdicts: 

Inconsistent verdicts therefore present a situation 

where "error," in the sense that the jury has not 

followed the court's instructions, most certainly has 

occurred, but it is unclear whose ox has been gored. 

Given this uncertainty, and the fact that the Government 

is precluded from challenging the acquittal, it is 

hardly satisfactory to allow the defendant to receive a 

new trial on the conviction as a matter of course. 

Harris v. Rivera, [454 U.S. 339 (1981)], indicates that 

nothing in the Constitution would require such a 

protection, and we therefore address the problem only 

under our supervisory powers over the federal criminal 

process. For us, the possibility that the inconsistent 

verdicts may favor the criminal defendant as well as the 

Government militates against review of such convictions 

at the defendant's behest. This possibility is a 

premise of Dunn's [284 U.S. 390 (1932)] alternative 

rationale that such inconsistencies often are a 

product of jury lenity. Thus, Dunn has been explained 

by both courts and commentators as a recognition of the 

jury's historic function, in criminal trials, as a check 

against arbitrary or oppressive exercises of power by 

the Executive Branch. . . . 

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We also reject, as imprudent and unworkable, a rule 

that would allow criminal defendants to challenge 

inconsistent verdicts on the ground that in their case 

the verdict was not the product of lenity, but of some 

error that worked against them. Such an individualized 

assessment of the reason for the inconsistency would be 

based either on pure speculation, or would require 

inqu1r1es into the jury's deliberations that courts 

generally will not undertake .... 

Finally, we note that a criminal defendant already 

is afforded protection against jury irrationality or 

error by the independent review of the sufficiency of 

the evidence undertaken by the trial and appellate 

courts. . . . The Government must convince the jury 

with its proof, and must also satisfy the courts that 

given this proof the jury could rationally have reached 

a verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We do not 

believe that further safeguards against jury 

irrationality are necessary. 

Respondent is given the benefit of her 

acquittal on the counts on which she was acquitted, and 

it is neither irrational nor illogical to require her to 

accept the burden of conviction on the counts on which 

the jury convicted. The rule established in Dunn v. 

United States has stood without exception in this Court 

for 53 years. If it is to remain that way, and we think 

it should, the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be 

Reversed. 

469 U.S. at 65-69. 

Abbott combines its challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence with its reliance on the inconsistency of the verdicts. 

It contends that we should conduct our review of the sufficiency 

of the evidence within a framework recognizing that the jury found 

the evidence insufficient as to Mr. Chambers. Abbott says this is 

the "appropriate scope of review" and thus we "may only consider 

evidence offered against Abbott alone and not against Mr. 

Chambers." Appellee's Brief at 10. And Abbott contends that 

4 

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Powell does not apply here because Abbott and its agent Chambers 

were charged in the same counts, not different counts as in 

Powell. 

We are not persuaded by these arguments. The difficulty of 

inconsist verdicts is present here as it was in Powell. 

the Court noted the defendant's argument that logically 

In Powell 

the jury 

could not have acquitted her of conspiracy to possess the drug and 

possession of it and still found her guilty of using the telephone 

to facilitate those offenses. Nevertheless the Court firmly held 

"there is no reason to vacate respondent's conviction merely 

because the verdicts cannot rationally be reconciled." 469 U.S. 

at 69. Moreover Powell pointed out that in United States v. 

Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 279 (1943), the general rule of Dunn v. 

United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393 (1932), that "[c]onsistency in 

the verdict is not necessary . ."was relied on to support a 

jury verdict finding the president and general manager of a 

corporation guilty of introducing adulterated or misbranded drugs 

into interstate commerce, but acquitting the corporation of the 

same charge. Powell, 469 U.S. at 63. Dotterweich involved two 

informations, one apparently against the company and one against 

Dotterweich, its president and general manager. Three counts of 

the informations went to the jury -- two for misbranded drugs and 

one for an adulterated drug. Dotterweich made an inconsistency 

argument which the Court bruskly rejected: "Equally baseless is 

the claim of Dotterweich that, having failed to find the 

corporation guilty, the jury could not find him guilty 

Juries may indulge in precisely such motives or vagaries. Dunn v. 

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Appellate Case: 94-1326 Document: 01019283562 Date Filed: 02/27/1995 Page: 5 
United States, 284 U.S. 390." Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 279. See 

United States v. Hill, 971 F.2d 1461, 1468-70 (lOth Cir. 1992) 

(en bane) . 

We do not feel that the distinction attempted by Abbott on 

the separate counts theory is persuasive. The thrust of the Dunn 

rule, reaffirmed in Powell, simply forecloses such arguments for a 

new trial based on inconsistency in the jury's verdicts. 

In United States v. Suntar Roofing, Inc., 897 F.2d 469, 475 

(lOth Cir. 1990), we stated "[t]he Powell decision reaffirmed the 

general rule that consistency in verdicts is not required." We 

noted, however, that it was unclear whether Powell had eliminated 

the "rule of consistency," previously recognized by the Court, 

see, e.g., Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 93 (1934); 

Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 123 (1932), which requires 

the reversal of a defendant's conspiracy conviction if all his 

coconspirators are acquitted of the same conspiracy charges. 897 

F.2d at 475. 

In Hartzel v. United States, 322 U.S. 680 (1944), the Supreme 

Court reversed convictions on seven counts of an indictment 

charging the defendant with various offenses under the Espionage 

Act of 1917, including conspiracy. Although the Court found the 

evidence insufficient to support the convictions, in a footnote it 

stated that because the convictions of Hartzel's coconspirators 

had been set aside, it was "impossible to sustain [the] conviction 

upon the basis of . the conspiracy count." 322 U.S. at 682 

n.3. Our decision in Romontio v. United States, 400 F.2d 618 

(lOth Cir. 1968), cert. dismissed, 402 U.S. 903 (1971), reversed a 

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Appellate Case: 94-1326 Document: 01019283562 Date Filed: 02/27/1995 Page: 6 
defendant's conspiracy conviction because his coconspirators had 

been acquitted of the conspiracy charge. In so holding we noted, 

citing Hartzel inter ~. that our circuit and many other courts 

followed this rule of consistency. Romontio, 400 F.2d at 619 and 

619 n.3. 

In Suntar Roofing, supra, we said that Powell did not 

expressly overrule Hartzel. 897 F.2d at 475. However, we noted 

that we did not have to resolve any conflict between Powell and 

Hartzel because the government identified unindicted 

coconspirators, and under our circuit precedents, United States v. 

Howard, 751 F.2d 336 (lOth Cir. 1984), and Romontio, all alleged 

coconspirators had to be acquitted before the rule of consistency 

could apply. Suntar Roofing, 897 F.2d at 475-76. 

Similarly, in United States v. Howard, 966 F.2d 1362 

(lOth Cir. 1992), we upheld a conspiracy conviction despite the 

fact that the codefendant was acquitted of conspiracy. We 

distinguished Romontio "because defendant was charged with 

conspiring not only with his codefendant but also 'with others 

both known and unknown to the Grand Jury.'" 966 F.2d at 1363. 

Because of the distinction, we again found it unnecessary to 

decide the validity of this limited rule of consistency. Id. at 

1364. Also, in United States v. Sasser, 974 F.2d 1544, 1561 

(lOth Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1063 (1993), we found 

no inconsistency in the verdicts and thus again declined to decide 

whether Powell abrogated our Romontio decision. 

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Nor does the instant case require us to decide whether the 

limited rule of consistency remains valid.1 That rule of 

consistency has always been limited to conspiracy convictions and 

therefore is inapplicable here because the guilty verdicts against 

Abbott were not for conspiracy. Instead Abbott was found guilty 

of knowingly presenting false claims to the government and/or 

aiding and abetting that offense.2 Abbott's conviction falls 

squarely within the general rule of Powell and Standefer v. United 

States, 447 U.S. 10 (1980). In Standefer, the Court upheld a 

conviction for aiding and abetting despite the fact that the 

principal had been acquitted of the substantive offense. 

1 

We note as we did in Howard, 966 F.2d at 1363, that the other 

circuits which have decided this issue have held that after Powell 

the rule of consistency is no longer the law. See United States 

v. Acosta, 17 F.3d 538, 545 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. 

Zuniga-Salinas, 952 F.2d 876, 877-78 (5th Cir. 1992) (en bane); 

United States v. Bucuvalas, 909 F.2d 593 (1st Cir. 1990); United 

States v. Thomas, 900 F.2d 37 {4th Cir. 1990); United States v. 

Andrews, 850 F.2d 1557 (11th Cir. 1988) {en bane), cert. denied, 

488 U.S. 1032 {1989); United States v. Valles-Valencia, 823 F.2d 

381 (9th Cir. 1987); but see Andrews, 850 F.2d at 1571 

{Clark, J., dissenting) (rule of consistency valid after Powell). 

Other circuits indicate that Powell probably eliminates the rule 

of consistency. See United States v. Dakins, 872 F.2d 1061, 1065 

{D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 493 u.s. 966 (1989); United States v. 

Mancari, 875 F.2d 103 (7th Cir. 1989); Government of the Virgin 

Islands v. Hoheb, 777 F.2d 138, 142 n.6 (3d Cir. 1985); see also, 

Hoheb, 777 F.2d at 142-43 (Garth, J., concurring) {Powell and 

Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10 (1980), undercut the rule 

of consistency) . Again, we leave for another day the 

consideration of the continued validity of the limited rule of 

consistency. 

2 

No question is raised as to whether Abbott was convicted of 

aiding and abetting or the substantive offense. The judge 

instructed the jury on aiding and abetting, but the general 

verdicts returned did not distinguish between the principal 

offense and aiding and abetting. Because of Powell and Standefer, 

however, our decision is the same regardless. 

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Standefer and Powell mandate that we reinstate the guilty verdicts 

so long as they were supported by sufficient evidence. We 

therefore must examine the sufficiency of the evidence. 

II 

A 

For reasons given above, we cannot agree with defendant 

Abbott that in judging the sufficiency of the evidence, we may 

only consider evidence offered against Abbott alone due to the 

verdict rendered in Chambers' favor. We will, however, consider 

Abbott's general challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support the conviction of Abbott on the three counts of the 

indictment. We will examine all of the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the government, together with the reasonable 

inferences to be drawn therefrom, to determine whether a rational 

juror could have found the essential elements of the offenses 

beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Levine, 41 F.3d 607, 

610 (lOth Cir. 1994). Here the essential elements are that (1) 

the defendants knowingly made and presented to a department or 

agency of the United States a false, fraudulent or fictitious 

claim against the United States; and (2) the defendant acted with 

knowledge that the claim was false, fraudulent or fictitious. 

United States v. Kline, 922 F.2d 610, 611 (lOth Cir. 1990); 

United States v. Causey, 835 F.2d 1289, 1292 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Abbott makes a general challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence, with prominent emphasis on its position based on the 

inconsistency of the verdicts as to Chambers and Abbott. We have 

rejected that theory but will now consider the overall attack on 

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the sufficiency of the evidence with our focus being on proof or 

lack of it on the essential elements of the offenses charged in 

the three counts of the indictment. 

B 

Count I of the indictment alleged that on or about 

December 2, 1991, Roy Chambers and Abbott made and presented to 

the Army a claim against the United States, an invoice requesting 

payment of $9,039.86 for services allegedly provided to the Army 

between October 31 and November 27, 1991,3 knowing such claim to 

be false, fictitious and fraudulent in that the services had not 

been provided as claimed, all in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 287 and 

2. 

In response to the general attack on the sufficiency of the 

proof, the government points to the testimony of Ms. Eleanor 

Regina Edwards, an Abbott employee from 1988 until April or May 

1992, when she was discharged. App. at 52. Since Edwards was 

discharged in the spring of 1992, her testimony deals only with 

count I. Specifically, Ms. Edwards testified about shortcuts that 

were taken on extinguishers between November and December of 1991. 

Id. at 64. She said they would get frustrated and not follow the 

procedures for servicing the fire extinguishers. They would 

nevertheless put a sticker on the extinguishers indicating that 

the six-year maintenance had been done, when actually it had not 

been performed. On extinguishers that were harder to service, Bob 

Greene, the former owner, had told the employees just to sticker 

3 

Roy and Regina Chambers took title to Abbott on November 1, 

1991. Id. at 93. 

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an extinguisher and send it on to Fort Carson without doing the 

required work. The employees called this process 

"pencil-whipping." The employees would simply pencil in or stamp 

the date to indicate the work had been done. They would then put 

a sticker on the extinguisher showing that it had been serviced 

when in fact it had not. Id. at 65. 

Greene began this pencil-whipping when the employees had a 

lot of trouble with the Kiddie extinguishers. And Chambers told 

the employees to keep following this procedure because they were 

having too much trouble with them. When the employees became 

swamped in the shop, they pushed the work through to get the 

extinguishers back to Fort Carson "to get that money on the 

accounts." Id. at 64. Edwards personally stickered an 

extinguisher without actually performing the required maintenance, 

as did other employees. Id. at 65-66. 

Ms. Edwards described the difference in pencil-whipping the 

C02 extinguishers and the dry chemical extinguishers. The C02 

extinguisher had to be put in a big pressure tank, while a 

dry chemical extinguisher did not. Id. at 65-66. Roy Chambers 

instructed Edwards to continue pencil-whipping the extinguishers, 

and Edwards saw employees Stevens, Neice and Perea pencil-whip 

extinguishers. Edwards said that pencil-whipping occurred because 

when she was working on extinguishers in the back along with the 

other employees, "we did it together." Id. at 66. Edwards said 

that in the timeframe of November and December 1991, there were 

days when Abbott would pick up 20, 30, 40 or SO extinguishers at a 

time. Id. at 71-72. While Edwards expressed some uncertainty, 

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she did testify that during the month of November there were some 

extinguishers that had been pencil-whipped. Id. at 77. In 

November and December of 1991, On Roy Chambers' instructions, 

Ms. Edwards took the billings to Brown and Clarose at Fort Carson. 

Id. at 73-75. 

When Edwards was asked 

that Fort Carson was billed 

whether she had personal knowledge 

for extinguishers that had been 

pencil-whipped and not had the work done on them, she explained 

that the employees set the extinguishers all in a pile and sent 

them back. When the extinguishers were placed in a pile to be 

sent out, they were marked on the billing sheet as being 

accomplished and finished and billed for. The extinguishers were 

not delivered to Fort Carson unless they were billed for. Id. at 

71. 

Abbott particularly argues that there was no evidence that 

the company's acts were such that Abbott could be found guilty 

because there was a lack of proof that Abbott acted with knowledge 

of the fact that the claims were false, fraudulent or fictitious. 

Appellee's Brief at 5-6. We disagree. While there is 

contradictory evidence and some of MS. Edwards' testimony was 

undermined on cross-examination, the credibility and weight of her 

testimony were for the jury. We feel that, as a whole, the record 

permitted the inference that the company was guilty as to count I 

in light of the knowledge of its part owner, Mr. Chambers, and the 

transactions described. 

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c 

Count II charged that Roy Chambers and Abbott presented a 

claim against the United States on or about September 30, 1992, by 

an invoice requesting payment of $7,454.87 for services allegedly 

provided to the Army between September 1 and September 29, 1992, 

knowing such claim to be false, fictitious and fraudulent in that 

the services had not been provided as claimed, all in violation of 

18 U.S.C. §§ 287 and 2. 

In September 1992, Charles Huggins, an employee of the 

Department of Defense, investigated Abbott. He received a report 

on September 8 that there was a chance that Abbot was not 

performing all required work on extinguishers. Id. at 95-96. The 

contract with Abbott provided that servicing, testing and 

refilling of extinguishers would be in accordance with the 

National Fire Protection Association Pamphlet 10. Id. at 97, 99. 

Huggins marked some extinguishers going to Abbott so that he 

could tell whether they had been opened and thus whether the work 

had been done on them. 

was a five pound C02 

hydrotest. Id. at 

He marked 30 extinguishers. 

fixed-head extinguisher that 

Of those, one 

required a 

99. Each of the dry chemical extinguishers 

needed at least a six-year maintenance and one needed a hydrotest. 

Huggins used a fluorescent paste around the threads of the head 

where the head screws into the neck of the cylinder. Id. at 100. 

Huggins did this because to perform a hydrotest on a six-year 

maintenance, the head has to be removed and cleaned; that way 

Huggins could tell when the extinguisher came back whether there 

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was still paste on the extinguisher. Huggins checked under a 

black light to see whether the paste was present. Id. at 100. 

Huggins testified that Exhibit 3-I was a five pound 

fixed-head extinguisher which he marked on October 1. It was 

returned to Fort Carson and had not been opened. This 

extinguisher had been selected because it had a rattle, indicating 

something was apparently loose inside it. At trial, the 

extinguisher still had the rattle. at 100-01. On 

September 25, 1992, Huggins had marked 16 extinguishers in the 

manner he had described and put them with others that were to be 

picked up by Abbott. Mike Perea and Troy Bloom picked up the 

extinguishers that day. Id. at 102. 

On September 29, Huggins saw Perea make a delivery of 

extinguishers. As soon as Perea left, Huggins recovered all of 

the extinguishers Perea had delivered. Eight of them were 

extinguishers that Huggins had previously marked. Id. at 103. 

Huggins took these extinguishers into the workroom where he put 

them under the black light and found that three of the eight had 

not been opened. There were also three two-and-one-half pound dry 

chemical extinguishers which came back that still had the paste on 

them and had not been opened. These all required a six-year 

maintenance, which required that the head be removed. 

Exhibits 3-A through 3-C were three dry chemical 

extinguishers that came back on the 29th of September, which had 

not been opened. Id. at 105. Exhibit 3-A required a six-year 

maintenance with the head removed; it came back on September 29 

and had not been opened. Id. at 104-05. Exhibit 3-B needed a 

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six-year maintenance and the extinguisher was affixed with a 

sticker saying a six-year maintenance was accomplished during 

September 1992 by Abbott. However, it came back on September 29 

and had not been opened. Exhibit 3-C came back on September 29 

and it had not been opened. It had a sticker indicating that a 

six-year maintenance was done by Abbott during September 1992. 

Id. at 106-07. 

The government presented testimony by Troy Bloom, an employee 

of Abbott under Roy Chambers. Id. at 173. While at Abbott, Bloom 

said he recharged, refilled and did maintenance and repair of dry 

chemical extinguishers. Id. at 174. He testified that to do a 

six-year or 12-year maintenance, the head on the cylinders had to 

be actually broken, which meant screwing off the top of the 

cylinder head. Id. at 175. He said that he did not always 

properly service fire extinguishers for Fort Carson while working 

at Abbott. Instead, Bloom remembered Chambers saying that if you 

could look at an extinguisher and it looked "okay," he could put a 

sticker on it and send it back without breaking the head or fixing 

it. Bloom did this on maybe a dozen extinguishers in September or 

October 1992. Id. at 176-77. Bloom did not recall seeing anyone 

else at Abbott stamp an extinguisher without doing the proper 

service. Id. at 178. Bloom gave a statement to Roy Chambers' 

attorney which was untruthful. This was because he had not done 

the work on the extinguishers which he was supposed to do. Id. at 

179. He was told by Roy Chambers not to do the work. Id. at 180. 

Again there were contradictions and uncertainties developed 

in Bloom's testimony which were revealed during cross-examination. 

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Nevertheless, as to count II, we are again satisfied that the 

record evidence as a whole, taken in the light most favorable to 

the government, supports the jury's verdict of guilt on count II. 

D 

Count III charged that Chambers and Abbott made and presented 

to the Army a claim against the United States, to wit: an Abbott 

invoice requesting payment of $9,949.43 for services allegedly 

provided to the Army between October 1 and October 29, 1992, 

knowing such claim to be false, fictitious and fraudulent in that 

the services had not been provided as claimed, all in violation of 

18 U.S.C. §§ 287 and 2. 

On October 5, 1992, Huggins again went down to Fort Carson. 

He marked two more extinguishers, one five pound C02 and one ten 

pound dry chemical extinguisher. He set them out with others for 

pick up and that day Mr. Chambers made the delivery and picked the 

extinguishers up. Id. at 117-18. After Chambers left the 

premises, Huggins recovered five extinguishers that had previously 

been marked. Of these, three appeared to Huggins to have been 

opened and worked on. However, two of the extinguishers had not 

been opened. Id. at 118. One was a ten pound dry chemical 

extinguisher that Huggins had submitted on October 1, and the 

other was a five pound fixed-head co2 extinguisher also submitted 

on October 1. This C02 extinguisher was the one that had the 

rattle. Id. at 118. Huggins determined that three extinguishers 

appeared to have been worked on by observing the threads of the 

head that had been wrapped with tape before being inserted in the 

cylinder. 

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Huggins said that one five pound fixed-head C02 extinguisher 

that appeared unopened was put under the black light and the 

fluorescent paste was still on the threads near the neck and it 

did not have the teflon tape. Id. at 118-19. Exhibit 3-I was the 

five pound fixed-head extinguisher that he described with the 

rattle, and it still had paste on the threads. That Exhibit 3-I 

was admitted in evidence. Id. at 119. Exhibit 3-J was the ten 

pound dry chemical extinguisher which Huggins had submitted on 

October 1 and was returned on October 5, and it too was received 

in evidence. Id. at 119. The paste on the head and the cylinder 

was still in place on that extinguisher. It had no sticker to 

indicate that either six-year or hydrostatic testing was done. 

Id. at 119-20. 

Huggins went down to Fort Carson on October 7, 1992, and 

marked four extinguishers, two five pound fixed-head C02s and two 

two-and-one-half pound dry chemical extinguishers. These were set 

out for collection with the rest of the extinguishers but were not 

picked up on October 7. On October 8, they were placed out for 

collection and Mr. Chambers and Troy Bloom made a delivery and 

picked up all of the extinguishers. After they left, Huggins 

checked and all of the extinguishers were gone. 

On October 8, Huggins took possession of all the 

extinguishers that had been delivered and he separated out those 

which he had marked, which were three that day. He examined these 

under the black light, and one, a ten pound dry chemical 

extinguisher, no longer had the fluorescent paste and thus 

appeared to have been opened and serviced. However, a 

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two-and-one-half pound dry chemical extinguisher and a five pound 

fixed-head C02 extinguisher appeared not to have been opened. 

Huggins examined Exhibit 3-K, which he said was a two-and-one-half 

pound dry chemical extinguisher that he had marked on September 25 

and which was returned to Fort Carson on October 8. Id. at 121. 

Exhibit 3-K had a sticker indicating that a hydrotest was 

performed by Abbott during October 1992. This was one of the 

extinguishers that came back with fluorescent paste on the neck. 

Id. at 121-22. 

Huggins also identified Exhibit 3-L, a five pound fixed-head 

co2 extinguisher submitted to Abbott on October 5 and returned by 

Abbott on October 8. It was examined under the black light and 

the fluorescent paste was still on the threads and it had no 

teflon tape. It had been stamped as if the hydrostatic test was 

done during October 1992. Id. at 122. 

Huggins was down at Fort Carson again on October 13, 1992. 

Huggins identified Exhibit 3-0 as a two-and-one-half pound dry 

chemical extinguisher he marked on October 1, which was returned 

to Fort Carson on October 13, 1992. Huggins examined this 

extinguisher under the light and the fluorescent paste was 

visible. There was a sticker on the extinguisher indicating that 

a six-year maintenance was performed by Abbott during the month of 

October 1992. Id. at 125-26. 

On October 19, 1992, Huggins went down to Fort Carson again. 

Bloom made the delivery that day. After he left, Huggins 

recovered the extinguishers that were delivered to Fort Carson. 

There were three that had previously been marked, two five pound 

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Appellate Case: 94-1326 Document: 01019283562 Date Filed: 02/27/1995 Page: 18 
fixed-head C02 extinguishers and one two-and-one-half pound dry 

chemical extinguisher. Exhibit 3-P was identified by Huggins as a 

five pound fixed-head C02 extinguisher returned to Fort Carson on 

October 19. It was examined under the light and Huggins observed 

that the paste was still on the threads and the teflon tape was 

not there. However, it had not been stamped as having received a 

hydrostatic test. Likewise, Exhibit 3-Q was a five pound C02 

extinguisher that still had the fluorescent paste but no teflon 

tape, and it had not been stamped as if it received a hydrotest. 

Id. at 127-28. However, Huggins testified that Exhibit 3-R was a 

two-and-one-half pound dry chemical extinguisher returned to 

Fort Carson on October 19. It was examined and the fluorescent 

paste was still there but it had a sticker indicating that a 

six-year maintenance was performed by Abbott during the month of 

October 1992. Id. at 128-29. 

Huggins testified that on October 22, Exhibit 3-S, a five 

pound fixed-head C02 extinguisher, was returned to Fort Carson. 

It was examined under the light and the fluorescent paste could be 

seen on the threads and the tape was gone. This one was marked as 

if the extinguisher had received a hydrostatic test during October 

1992. 

Huggins summarized his findings. In the October period there 

were five fixed-head C02 extinguishers that came back on October 1 

which Huggins had not marked and which appeared not to have been 

opened. He found seven fixed-head five pound C02s that had been 

marked which had not been opened. There were six two-and-one-half 

pound dry chemical extinguishers Huggins had marked which he found 

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not to have been opened, and there was one ten pound dry chemical 

extinguisher Huggins had marked which he found was unopened. Id. 

at 130. Huggins identified checks to Abbott dated December 14, 

1991, for $7,662.46 for the November 1991 invoice; one dated 

October 8, 1992, for $7,380.92 for the September 1992 invoice; 

and one dated November 6, 1992, for $9,849.94 for the October 1992 

invoice. 

We are satisfied that the evidence as to count III, taken in 

the light most favorable to the government, amply supports the 

verdict of guilty against Abbott. We therefore reject that 

remaining challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, which we 

find adequate to support the guilty verdicts on all three counts 

against Abbott. 

III 

The defendant-appellant Abbott argues that the proper course 

for the trial judge would have been to grant its motion for a 

judgment of acquittal on the basis of insufficiency of the 

evidence, rather than ordering a new trial. Appellee's Brief at 

5, 11. As we have explained, we reject both arguments made by 

Abbott, those based on inconsistent verdicts, and those asserting 

insufficiency of the evidence. We find no error in the record due 

to the divergence between the verdicts as to appellant Chambers 

and Abbott, and we hold that the evidence was sufficient to 

support the guilty verdicts against Abbott on all three counts of 

the indictment. 

Accordingly, we REVERSE the order declaring a mistrial, 

setting aside the verdicts and ordering a new trial. The case is 

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REMANDED with directions that the guilty verdicts against Abbott 

on the three counts be reinstated and that the district court 

proceed with the imposition of convictions and sentences on the 

three counts. 

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