Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-02501/USCOURTS-ca8-03-02501-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Angelo Barnes
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Thomas M. Shanahan, United States District Judge for the

District of Nebraska.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-2501

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the District

* of Nebraska.

Angelo Barnes, *

 *

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: February 11, 2004

Filed: July 6, 2004 

___________

Before MELLOY, SMITH, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.

Angelo Barnes was charged with possession with intent to deliver cocaine in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Barnes moved to suppress evidence that was

seized after a traffic stop during which he was arrested. After the district court1

denied Barnes's motion, Barnes entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right

to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. We affirm.

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I.

On the evening of February 18, 2002, Sergeant Van Buren of the Douglas

County, Nebraska Sheriff's Department initiated a traffic stop of a Chevrolet Blazer

on Interstate 80 in Omaha. The Blazer was driven by Barbara Alstyne, and Barnes

was in the passenger seat. 

During the traffic stop, Van Buren learned that Barnes was subject to arrest for

manslaughter based on an outstanding warrant from New York. He ordered Barnes

out of the Blazer, handcuffed him, and placed him in a patrol car for officer safety.

Van Buren and two other officers then patted down Alstyne for weapons, and began

to search the vehicle. 

While searching, Deputy Degan opened the driver's side door and thought that

it seemed unusually heavy. Degan then parted the rubber seal over the window well

with two fingers, and looked inside with a pen light. Inside the door, Degan saw

packages of the type that are used to transport illegal drugs. The deputies then pulled

open the plastic interior door panel, and removed a kilo-sized package of cocaine.

The officers eventually found twelve kilo-sized packages in door panels of the Blazer.

The front driver's side and passenger doors each contained four kilo-sized packages,

while the rear doors contained two packages each.

Barnes moved to suppress the cocaine. The district court found that the

window well was within the scope of a permissible search incident to Barnes's lawful

arrest. Alternatively, the district court found that the police had probable cause to

search the door panel based on the deputy's observation that the driver's side door was

unusually heavy.

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II.

In New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981), the Supreme Court held that

"when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an

automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the

passenger compartment of that automobile." The Court observed that although it was

settled that the police, to protect officer safety and preserve evidence, may search the

person of an arrestee and the area within his immediate control, see Chimel v.

California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), no

straightforward rule had emerged concerning searches incident to the arrest of

occupants of an automobile. The Court then identified the problem with the extant

state of affairs: "When a person cannot know how a court will apply a settled

principle to a recurring factual situation, that person cannot know the scope of his

constitutional protection, nor can a policeman know the scope of his authority."

Belton, 453 U.S. at 459-60. 

To establish a workable rule, the Court relied on the "generalization" that

articles inside the passenger compartment of an automobile are generally, if not

inevitably, within the area into which an arrestee might reach to grab a weapon or

evidence. Thus, the Court held that the police, incident to an arrest, may search the

passenger compartment of an automobile, and all containers within that compartment.

Id. at 460. The holding of Belton encompassed "only the interior of the passenger

compartment of an automobile and [did] not encompass the trunk." Id. at 460 n.4.

Since 1981, courts have sought to apply the bright-line rule of Belton according

to whether an area searched by the police is best characterized as part of the

"passenger compartment" of an automobile or more akin to the "trunk." Courts have

held that Belton permits the search of the rear compartment of a hatchback car or

station wagon, United States v. Caldwell, 97 F.3d 1063, 1067 (8th Cir. 1996); United

States v. Pino, 855 F.2d 357, 363-64 (6th Cir. 1988), the area beneath a vinyl cargo

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cover in the back of a sports utility vehicle, United States v. Olguin-Rivera, 168 F.3d

1203, 1206 (10th Cir. 1999), locked and unlocked glove compartments, United States

v. Woody, 55 F.3d 1257, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995), a secret compartment in the back seat

of a car, United States v. Veras, 51 F.3d 1365, 1372 (7th Cir. 1995), space behind a

radio or heating vent in a dashboard, United States v. Willis, 37 F.3d 313, 317 (7th

Cir. 1994); United States v. Patrick, 3 F. Supp. 2d 95, 99 (D. Mass. 1998), and the

area underneath a "gearshift boot" or plastic gear shift housing. State v. Homolka,

953 P.2d 612, 614 (Idaho 1998); People v. Eaton, 617 N.W.2d 363, 367 (Mich. Ct.

App. 2000). On the other hand, Belton has been deemed insufficient authority to

justify searching the engine compartment of a van, United States v. Marchena-Borjas,

209 F.3d 698, 700 (8th Cir. 2000), searching the trailer compartment of a tractortrailer, United States v. Hernandez, 901 F.2d 1217, 1220 (5th Cir. 1990),

disassembling the tailgate of a sports utility vehicle, United States v. Patterson, 65

F.3d 68, 71 (7th Cir. 1995), and (at least by distinguished commentators) dismantling

a vehicle to get inside door panels. See 2 Wayne R. LaFave, et al., Criminal

Procedure § 3.7(a), at 203 (2d ed. 1999).

The organizing principle of these cases, with which we agree, is that areas

reachable by an occupant without exiting the automobile may be searched incident

to arrest, but an area that is outside any occupant's reach or that could be reached only

through an elaborate dismantling of the vehicle may not be searched. See United

States v. Thompson, 906 F.2d 1292, 1298 (8th Cir. 1990) ("'Passenger compartment'

has been interpreted broadly by most courts . . . and generally includes whatever area

is within a passenger's reach."); United States v. Infante-Ruiz, 13 F.3d 498, 502 n.1

(1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Russell, 670 F.2d 323, 326-27 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The

lawfulness of the search does not depend on whether the occupant was actually

capable of reaching the area during the course of the police encounter. Belton's

bright-line rule did away with that fact-specific inquiry into reachability, and we have

held that Belton applies even after the arrestee has been taken into custody and

removed from the scene. United States v. McCrady, 774 F.2d 868, 871-72 (8th Cir.

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The deputies testified that they were able to pry the plastic and vinyl away

from the interior frame of the door to gain access to the packages of the cocaine. The

record does not reveal precisely how much time was required to access the

compartment behind the door panel, or whether the deputies needed any special tools

to access the area. It may well be that if the compartment could have been opened

quickly by an occupant simply by peeling away plastic and vinyl with his bare hands,

rather than elaborately dismantling the vehicle, then removal of the door panels

would be permissible under Belton. In the circumstances of this case, however, we

need not reach that question.

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1985). As long as an occupant could have reached an area while inside the vehicle,

then the police may search that area incident to a lawful arrest. "The need for a clear

rule, readily understood by police officers and not depending on differing estimates

of what items were or were not within reach of an arrestee at any particular moment,

justifies the sort of generalization which Belton enunciated." Thornton v. United

States, 124 S. Ct. 2127, 2132 (2004).

The search incident to arrest in this case involved the area immediately inside

the rubber window seal, where Deputy Degan placed his pen light. That area is

reachable by an occupant without exiting the vehicle, and an occupant could conceal

contraband, evidence, and certain weapons inside the window seal. Small packages

of drugs, drug paraphernalia such as syringes or razors, documentary evidence, and

potential weapons such as small knives or letter openers could fit inside that area.

While seated in the driver's seat, one could easily part the rubber strips with two

fingers, just as Deputy Degan did, to hide or retrieve such objects. Accordingly, we

hold that the deputy's parting of the window seal and intrusion into the area

immediately below the seal falls within the scope of a lawful search incident to arrest.

Once Officer Degan placed his pen light inside the window seal, he was able

to illuminate the compartment within the door panel. Even if the officer were not

permitted to remove the door panels themselves pursuant to Belton2

, nothing prohibits

him from using his lawful access to the area inside the window seal to gain a view

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into the compartment behind the panels. United States v. Beatty, 170 F.3d 811, 814

(8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Hatten, 68 F.3d 257, 261 (8th Cir. 1995). From his

lawful vantage point, the deputy immediately recognized the packages hidden inside

the door panels as probable contraband. At that juncture, he had probable cause to

search the entire vehicle, and he was permitted to do so without a warrant.

Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996) (per curiam). Thus, the cocaine

was lawfully seized, and it does not represent the fruit of an illegal search.

Because we conclude that the officer's disputed conduct was based on a lawful

search incident to arrest, we need not reach the district court's alternative holding that

the entire search was justified by probable cause. The judgment of the district court

is affirmed.

SMITH, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

I believe the search inside the door panels in this case exceeded the scope of

a search incident to a valid arrest. Police authority to search the passenger

compartment of an automobile after the lawful arrest of its occupants is clear. New

York v. Belton, 526 U.S. 295 (1981). The scope of the search includes the passenger

compartment and any containers within the compartment. United States v. Wells, 347

F.3d 280, 287-288 (8th Cir. 2003). As noted by the majority, the area that constitutes

the passenger compartment has been interpreted broadly–however, it does have

limits. United States v. Marchena-Borjas, 209 F.3d 698 (8th Cir. 2000) (a search

incident to arrest under the hood of the defendant’s van did not comport with Belton's

principles). 

At the time Officer Degan parted the window well's rubber seal and peered in

with a penlight, Barnes was in handcuffs in the back of a patrol car, and Alstyne, who

had also been searched for weapons, was well outside of the vehicle. There simply

was no exigency. The majority justifies the search based upon Officer Degan's

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suspicions aroused by a heavy door. The majority notes that the area immediately

inside the rubber seal was reachable by an occupant and could conceivably conceal

prohibited items including weapons. I do not believe that either Barnes or Alstyne

posed any threat to the officers by their hypothetical ability to pry back the rubber

seal of the car window and retrieve a weapon or deposit contraband. I share the

concern expressed by Justices O'Connor and Scalia in Thornton that some may view

a search incident to an arrest as "a police entitlement." Thornton v. United States, ___

U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 2127, 2133 (2004) (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at ___, 124

S.Ct. at 2134 (Scalia, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., concurring separately). I cannot agree

that the facts of this case bring this search within the bounds of a Belton search

incident to arrest.

______________________________

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