Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02252/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02252-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Claude Yarter
Appellant

Document Text:

UNITED STATES 

. FILED 

lhiited ~tares Coun @f A . . COURT OF APPEALS · ~0 nrh Circuit ppeq 

TENTH CIRCUIT '-'MIV 9 79gy 

.ROBERT L. HO.EC!cER 

Clerk UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

ROBERT E. BENAVIDEZ, a/k/a. 

Conejo, a/k/a Tony, 

CLAUDE YARTER, DON MCENTIRE, 

JOHN M. WYATT, HENRY M. 

GARDNER, RONALD A. TAFOYA, 

a/k/a Ron Tafoya, 

MIKE ARCHULETA, JR, 

and JAY JONAS, 

Defendants-Appellants. 

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Nos. 89-2285, 89-2252, 89-2185, 

89-2166, 89-2224, 89-2165, 

89-2158 and 89-2157 

(D.C. No. CR-88-458-JC) 

(D.N .M.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, SETH, Circuit Judge, and BROWN, 

District Judge**· 

Eight appellants appeal their convictions by jury under a 

single indictment for various charges arising out of a marijuana 

distribution scheme active from October 29, 1986 to January 8, 

1988. Appellants Benavidez, Archuleta, Jonas, McEntire, Tafoya 

and Wyatt appeal conspiracy convictions under 21 u.s.c. S 846 and 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppal. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

**Honorable Wesley E. Brown, United States District Judge for the 

District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

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' individual convictions for possession with intent to distribute 

marijuana in excess of one hundred kilograms in violation of 21 

U.S.C. § 841(a)(l) and 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(l)(B). Appellants 

Gardner and Tafoya, acquitted on conspiracy charges, appeal their 

possession with intent to distribute charges. Appellants as a 

group and individually raise numerous issues on appeal which we 

address in turn. 

Statement of the Facts 

Due to the complex and extensive nature of this conspiracy we 

limit our discussion of the facts to those particularly relevant 

to the parties charged. The marijuana network uncovered by 

United States Customs agents involved a distribution scheme 

running between Mexico, Texas and New Mexico. According to James 

Goodin, a former member of the conspiracy testifying for the 

government, the primary participant in the scheme was Dominguez 

who ran the conspiracy from the Mexico side. He was assisted by 

Robert Benavidez who ran the operation in the United States. The 

eight convicted defendants, including Benavidez, participated in 

one or more of the marijuana loads charged in the indictment. 

Carlos Dominguez was a fugitive at the time of the trial. 

The first evidence that a conspiracy existed involved a 

shipment of marijuana on December 25, 1986 known as the "Christmas 

Load." Goodin, Dominguez and Phelps (who was ultimately severed 

from the trial) unloaded marijuana from a plane at a landing strip 

near Truth or Consequences, New Mexico (the "Coyote Strip"). The 

marijuana was then transported to Albuquerque. 

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According to Goodin, his next contact with Dominguez was in 

August of 1987. Goodin testified that he, Dominguez and Don 

McEntire loaded a plane with marijuana in Mexico. Goodin was told 

by Dominguez to contact Jay Jonas in El Paso to determine if the 

load successfully reached the United States. Dominguez told 

Goodin that Jonas was in charge of the ground crew unloading the 

marijuana in El Paso. Goodin contacted Jonas, learned that the 

load arrived, and then traveled to El Paso to help Ronald Tafoya 

transport the load. 

On September 22, 1987, Goodin, Jonas and Dan Williams worked 

as ground crew for a load flown into the Coyote Strip. They 

unloaded the marijuana and transported it to Albuquerque. After 

delivering the load, they traveled to Juarez in Jonas' BMW· 

automobile to receive payment for their services. In Juarez they 

met with Dominguez and his associate. Benavidez later met them 

and paid them a portion of the money owed. 

In early November 1987, Goodin again met with Dominguez to 

collect the money owed to him. Dominguez told Goodin to collect 

from Benavidez because Benavidez was running the northern side of 

the operation. 

Later in November, Dominguez contacted Goodin and told him to 

ask Williams and Jonas to act as ground crew for two loads at the 

Coyote Strip. Because Williams and Jonas were away on a deer 

hunting trip, Goodin asked his cousin, defendant Wyatt, to assist. 

On November 10, 1987 Goodin and Wyatt spent the night waiting for 

a load to arrive at the Coyote Strip. The plane never arrived. 

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The delay was the result of complications with the aircraft. 

Keith Darr, a participant in the marijuana scheme who testified 

for the government, and Aaron Hadida, a fugitive in Israel at the 

time of the trial, stole an airplane in Las Vegas and flew it to 

El Paso where they were met by Archuleta. A meeting occurred 

among Dominguez, Archuleta, Darr and Hadida at Archuleta's 

business in El Paso where it was decided that a new tail number 

was needed for the stolen plane. Archuleta found a tail number 

from a similar model airplane in a magazine selling used 

airplanes, and Archuleta painted the new number on the plane. 

While Darr was filling the plane with gasoline for the 

planned flight to the Coyote Strip, a United States Customs agent 

spotted the new paint on the plane and became suspicious. Darr 

and Hadida, nervous after being spotted, abandoned the plane and 

left on a commercial flight for Las Vegas. At a layover in 

Phoenix, they had second thoughts and flew back to El Paso where 

they went to the stolen plane. During takeoff, the plane was 

chased by Customs agents and one wing damaged. Darr and Hadida 

managed to get the plane to Dominguez' ranch in Mexico. 

Goodin, unaware of the incident with the stolen plane, met 

with Dominguez in Juarez to discuss shipment of the two additional 

loads to the United States. Dominguez told Goodin to find 

additional ground crew. Goodin recruited Claude Yarter to assist 

Wyatt with unloading and Henry Gardner was recruited to serve as a 

lookout. 

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The first load of marijuana arrived at the Coyote Strip on 

November 19, 1987. It was loaded into Yarter's truck and Yarter 

was told to deliver the load to Tafoya in Albuquerque. The second 

load arrived early the next morning (November 20, 1987) and was 

loaded into Wyatt's truck and delivered to Tafoya. The next day 

Goodin went to Juarez and was paid $10,000 by Dominguez. The 

$10,000 was divided among Yarter, Wyatt and Gardner. 

Dominguez and Goodin scheduled the next load for November 27, 

1987. Yarter told Goodin that he no longer would participate in 

unloading so Goodin asked Williams to take Yarter's place on the 

' ground crew. Goodin, Wyatt, Williams, Gardner and Benavidez acted 

as ground crew that evening. 

Between the November 1.9 and November 27 loads, Darr became an 

informant for the government. On November 27, Darr had informed 

Customs officials that he was delivering a load of marijuana and 

the plane flown by Darr that evening was being followed when it 

landed and unloaded the marijuana. Law enforcement officials, 

aware of the location of the landing strip, descended on the scene 

and were able to apprehend Williams and seize Wyatt's truck. 

Goodin, Wyatt, Gardner and Benavidez escaped. 

Over the next month, Dominguez held several meetings to 

determine what strategy to follow. Some of these meetings were 

monitored and photographed by United States Customs agents. 

Williams was ultimately released from custody and traveled with 

Wyatt and Goodin back to Mexico. At the time of the trial, 

Williams remained a fugitive apparently in Mexico. 

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Bill of Particulars 

Appellants argue that the trial court erred by denying their 

Motion for a Bill of Particulars. They contend that the 

indictment charging them under 21 u.s.c. § 846 lacked sufficient 

facts to allow them to prepare their defense at trial and did 

nothing more than inform them of the statute under which they were 

being charged. The government replies that the indictment was 

sufficient because it substantially tracks the language of§ 846. 

We will only reverse the trial court's denial of appellants' 

Motion for a Bill of Particulars if we find both an abuse of 

discretion by the trial court and prejudice to appellants. 

United States v. Wright, 826 F.2d 938 (10th Cir.). We find 

neither in the present case. 

The indictment charging the appellants under§ 846 contained 

enough information to satisfy Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(l). We have 

previously held: 

"that an indictment under section 846 need not 

allege overt acts and is basically sufficient 

if set out substantially in the words of the 

statute." 

United States v. Smith, 692 F.2d 693, 696 (10th Cir.) (quoting 

United States v. King, 521 F.2d 61, 63 (10th Cir.)). Appellants' 

indictment provided the time frame of the conspiracy, contained 

specific references to marijuana shipments carried out during this 

time frame, and named the statute under which appellants were 

being charged. The fact that the indictment did not specifically 

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refer to all of the marijuana shipments which occurred during the 

stated time period does not render it defective. 

The indictment stated the various dates, times and places 

where the drug was possessed. The defendants received police 

reports and other documents relating to the charges. No overt 

acts under the conspiracy were alleged, but this is not required. 

United States v. Saviano, 843 F.2d 1280 (10th Cir.). The 

substantive charges were directed to particular shipments and 

named defendants. 

Severance 

Appellant Wyatt alleges that the trial court erred by failing 

to grant his motion for severance. He contends that because his 

level of participation was ~inimal, and there was a significant 

difference in the acts charged against him as compared with the 

other co-conspirators, he was forced to contend with the "spillover" effect of evidence introduced against the other defendants. 

Further, he argues that the jurors were unable to distinguish and 

separate all of the defendants and their acts. We disagree. 

Defendants charged jointly "are not entitled to separate 

trials as a matter of right." Bailey v. United States, 410 F.2d 

1209, 1213 (10th Cir.). However, the trial court has the 

discretion to grant a severance where joinder would prejudice one 

of the parties. Fed. R. Crim. P. 14. The decision to grant or 

deny a motion for severance requires the trial court to weigh the 

prejudice to the defendant against "considerations of economy and 

expedition in judicial administration." United States v. 

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Petersen, 611 F.2d 1313, 1331 (10th Cir.). The defendant bears a 

heavy burden of showing actual prejudice as a result of the 

denial, United States v. Hack, 782 F.2d 862, 870 (10th Cir.), and 

on appeal, this decision will not be disturbed absent an abuse of 

discretion. United States v. Cardall, 885 F.2d 656, 667 (10th 

Cir.) • 

We find none of Wyatt's contentions persuasive. His minimal 

level of participation and his "spill-over" effect arguments are 

not persuasive. In Cardall, we held that severance is not 

warranted on the speculation that a defendant would have a better 

chance of acquittal without the "spill-over" effect. Id. at 668. 

See also United States v. Mabry, 809 F.2d 671, 682-83 (10th Cir.) 

(citing United States v. Diil, 693 F.2d 1012 (10th Cir.)) ("The 

fact that evidence against one defendant is more incriminating 

than another is not, standing alone, a basis for severance."). 

Therefore, Wyatt's first argument fails. 

Wyatt's contention that the jury was unable to distinguish 

and separate the acts of the co-defendants is equally 

unpersuasive. A fundamental premise of our judicial system is 

that the jury can and will follow the instructions given by the 

trial court. Cardall, 885 F.2d at 668 (citing Parker v. Randolph, 

442 U.S. 62, 73). The trial court instructed the jury to 

determine the guilt or innocence of each conspirator. We believe 

that the jury fulfilled its task. We find that the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion in denying Wyatt's motion for 

severance. 

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Variance 

Appellants Archuleta, Benavidez, Jonas, McEntire, Wyatt, 

Yarter, Gardner and Tafoya claim that evidence introduced at trial 

constituted a variance from the allegations charged in the 

superseding indictment. A variance occurs when the facts charged 

in the indictment are different from those established during 

trial. United States v. Record, 873 F.2d 1363, 1366 (10th Cir.). 

A variance is only prejudicial if it "affects the substantial 

rights of the accused." Id. (quoting United States v. Morris, 623 

F.2d 145, 149 (10th Cir.)). 

Appellants make several arguments that the evidence 

introduced at trial exceeded the charges in the indictment. 

Count I of the indictment states that defendants: 

"unlawfully, willfully, knowingly and 

intentionally combined, conspired, 

confederated, and agreed together and with one 

another ... to commit an offense against the 

United States to wit: Possession with intent 

to distribute marijuana .... " 

Central to all appellants' arguments is the assertion that facts 

introduced at trial proved multiple conspiracies, not the single 

conspiracy charged in Count I. 

Appellants' first contention is that the testimony regarding 

the early "Brown Load" shipment of marijuana proves a conspiracy 

separate from that charged in the indictment. This "Brown Load" 

is described hereinafter. Appellants argue that although the 

Brown Load testimony was ultimately excluded it constitutes a 

variance from Count I of the indictment because the Brown Load 

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shipment occurred in August 1986, before the date appellants claim 

the actual conspiracy began. Appellants believe that this 

variance prejudiced their case. We disagree. 

Appellants correctly point out that the Brown Load evidence 

was not considered by the jury in reaching its verdict. The trial 

court specifically instructed the jury that it was not to refer to 

any of such testimony. We have no indications that the jury 

ignored the instructions, and thus must presume the trial court's 

instructions were followed. See United States v. Lane, 883 F.2d 

1484, 1498 (10th Cir.). This evidence, as mentioned, was ruled 

inadmissible and excluded from the jury. It cannot create a 

variance from the facts charged in the indictment. 

The second argument that a variance exists is made by 

appellant Archuleta. He argues that he was involved in a separate 

"stolen/hot plane conspiracy" which was prejudicially joined with 

the "global conspiracy." He argues that the facts at trial, 

established primarily through the testimony of the government's 

witness, Keith Darr, were insufficient to bring the two separate 

conspiracies under the one conspiracy count charged in the 

indictment. We again must disagree. 

A review of the facts considered by the jury taken in the 

light most favorable to the government shows sufficient evidence 

to support the jury's finding. Keith Darr testified that 

Archuleta not only provided the aircraft to members of the 

conspiracy, but relayed information between key participants in 

the conspiracy. Darr testified that it was Archuleta who 

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introduced him to Dominguez, and it was Archuleta who told Darr 

that Dominguez wanted Darr to transport a load of marijuana. From 

this a jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Archuleta's 

"aircraft conspiracy" was not separate, but an integral part of 

the overall charged conspiracy. 

The third argument for a variance is made by appellant 

Yarter. Yarter claims that he withdrew from the overall 

conspiracy on November 26, 1987 and that his withdrawal is 

evidence that multiple conspiracies existed. Under Yarter's 

theory, one conspiracy ran from October 1986 to November 26, 1987, 

the date he allegedly withdrew, and a second conspiracy ran from 

October 1986 to January 1988, the dates charged in the indictment. 

We do not address the merits of this argument, however, because we 

find that Yarter does not have standing to bring this appeal. 

Yarter was acquitted of the conspiracy charge in Count I of 

the indictment and found guilty of Count VI charging him with 

specific involvement (possession) in the November 19, 1987 load. 

Yet on appeal, Yarter bases his variance argument on the 

conspiracy charge for which he was acquitted, going so far as 

admitting that he was involved in a conspiracy from October 1986 

to November 1987. We dismiss this claim because we will not allow 

a defendant to base an appeal on a charge for which he was 

acquitted, even if it might benefit his co-defendants. 

The final argument on this point is made by appellant 

McEntire. McEntire claims that Goodin's testimony for the 

government regarding the August 1987 loading of a plane with 

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marijuana in Mexico was uncharged in the indictment, violated 

Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), and prejudiced his case. The 

government's brief indirectly responds to these arguments. From 

the record and different portions of the government's brief, 

however, the government's position on this issue is clear. The 

government contends that the August 1987 evidence was not evidence 

of a separate crime but an act covered by the overall conspiracy 

charged in Count I of the indictment. We agree. 

After review of the record, we must conclude that this 

August 1987 evidence does not constitute a variance from the 

indictment or Rule 404(b) evidence. Contrary to McEntire's 

contention it appears from the record that the government 

consistently argued that this evidence was proof of an additional 

act undertaken by the conspiracy. For example, the prosecutor 

stated in response to Jonas' motion to exclude the August 1987 

testimony: 

"[T]he August incident that is charged in the 

indictment falls within the parameters of the 

conspiracy and is not a 404(b) statement, but 

is part and parcel of this conspiracy." 

As stated earlier, an indictment charging conspiracy is not 

insufficient because it does not include every overt act forming 

the conspiracy. See Smith, 692 F.2d at 696. Likewise, specific 

facts not set out in the indictment can be used to form the 

underlying basis for a single charge of conspiracy without 

constituting a variance. The jury could reasonably find that the 

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August 1987 incident was part of the overall conspiracy. We 

reject McEntire's argument. 

The "Brown Load" Testimony 

We next address the claim by all appellants that the trial 

court erred in allowing the jury to hear testimony concerning the 

October 29, 1986 load of marijuana referred to as the "Brown 

Load." On that date, a plane piloted by Ken Brown crashed with 

200 pounds of marijuana. The government sought to connect this 

marijuana to the overall conspiracy charged in Count I of the 

indictment and the specific charge in Count II. Count II charged 

Dominguez with possession with intent to distribute based on this 

load. No other defendants were charged in Count II. 

The trial court initially allowed testimony to be heard on 

the "Brown Load" based on the government's assertion that it would 

introduce evidence to tie this marijuana to the overall 

conspiracy. The government argues on appeal that it planned to 

connect the Brown Load to the conspiracy through defendant Phelps. 

Phelps, the government contends, participated in loading the plane 

and searching for the marijuana after the plane crashed. Once 

Phelps was severed from the trial, however, the government was no 

longer able to connect the Brown Load to the conspiracy. Although 

the trial court instructed the jury not to consider the Brown Load 

testimony, appellants now argue that this evidence was so 

prejudicial to their case that a mistrial should have been 

granted. We disagree. 

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The decision to grant or deny a motion for a mistrial is 

within the discretion of the trial court, and we will reverse only 

if there is a showing that the trial court abused that discretion. 

United States v. Peveto, 881 F.2d 844, 859 (10th Cir.). We will 

find an abuse of discretion if a judicial action is "arbitrary, 

capricious, or whimsical." Pelican Production Corp. v. Marino, 

893 F.2d 1143, 1146 (10th Cir.). Such an abuse can occur if there 

is "an overriding of the law by the exercise of manifestly 

unreasonable judgment or the result of impartiality, prejudice, 

bias or ill-will as shown by evidence or the record of 

proceedings." Wright, 826 F.2d at 943. No such abuse occurred in 

the present case. 

Two government witnesses testified exclusively about the 

Brown Load--Scott Brown, the pilot's son, and Officer Tom Meserve, 

the state police officer who located the crashed plane. No 

objection was made to the testimony of Brown. During Meserve's 

testimony, however, the prosecutor sought to introduce two 

photographs of the crash site. Phelps' attorney objected based on 

relevance. The trial court questioned the relevance of the 

evidence but allowed its admission on the condition that the 

government introduce additional evidence linking the Brown Load to 

the charges in the indictment. The trial court stated to the 

jury: 

"What I am saying, ladies and gentlemen, is in 

the event the government does not tie up this 

testimony with this case, that then I will 

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order it stricken at that time. So keep that 

in mind, that I may strike this testimony at a 

later time. " 

The jury was allowed to see the pictures of the crash site and 

also heard additional testimony from Meserve regarding the amount 

of marijuana found in the wrecked plane. 

Due to the severance of Phelps from the case, the government 

never introduced evidence linking the Brown Load to the conspiracy 

or any charged defendants. The judge instructed the jury at the 

end of the government's case-in-chief to disregard the testimony 

of Brown and Meserve because it had "no bearing whatsoever in this 

case." Thus, the jury was cautioned when the evidence initially 

came in, and again when the evidence was stricken. 

Such cautionary instructions are usually sufficient to cure 

any prejudice alleged by the defendant. Peveto, 881 F.2d at 859. 

We have no indication from the record that the jury ignored the 

judge's instructions; and therefore, we can presume the 

instructions were followed. See Lane, 883 F.2d at 1498; Morris, 

623 F.2d at 148. Under these circumstances, we will only find an 

abuse of discretion if we find that the judge's instructions, even 

assuming they were followed, did not cure the prejudicial effect 

of the stricken testimony. Peveto, 881 F.2d at 859. 

We do not find that the Brown Load testimony resulted in such 

prejudice. Both Darr and Goodin provided sufficient testimony 

regarding the other charged marijuana loads in the conspiracy for 

the jury to determine the guilt or innocence of the appellants 

without referring to the stricken Brown Load evidence. There is 

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no merit to Benavidez' claim that Goodin's testimony was somehow 

"marginal." 

Moreover, we do not believe the prosecutor's indirect 

reference to the Brown Load in closing caused sufficient prejudice 

to find an abuse of discretion. The prosecutor stated: 

"The starting point is sometime, we have 

outlined ... October 26, 1986. We have 

brought through the testimony of Mr. Darr that 

Mr. Dominguez said that he lost an aircraft 

the year previous •••• You have that 

testimony before you." 

The prosecutor did not refer to the excluded testimony of Brown or 

Meserve but to Darr's testimony of what Dominguez told him about 

the Brown Load. This testimony was introduced at trial without 

objection. While we think the prosecutor pushed the limits of the 

trial court's ruling excluding the testimony of Brown and Meserve, 

we do not find that this affected the ultimate outcome of the 

case. See United States v. Martinez-Nava, 838 F.2d 411, 416 (10th 

Cir.). 

Therefore, given the two limiting instructions and the 

absence of any manifestly unjust prejudice, we conclude that the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion. 

Brady Material 

Appellant Jonas asserts that the trial court committed 

reversible error in denying his motion for the production of a 

statement given by a co-conspirator, Dan Williams, shortly after 

Williams' arrest. As mentioned, Williams was a fugitive at the 

time of trial. Prior to trial, the trial court reviewed Williams' 

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statement in camera and concluded that it was not exculpatory. 

During the trial, Jonas requested Williams' statement. The trial 

court again reviewed Williams' statement in camera and determined 

that the statement was neutral, neither inculpatory or 

exculpatory. We agree. 

The omission of undisclosed evidence requires reversal only 

when such evidence is "material in the sense that its suppression 

undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial." United States 

v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678. "[E]vidence is material only if 

there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been 

disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have 

been different." Id. at 682. 

We cannot say that the omission of Williams' statement was 

material to Jonas' defense so as to undermine confidence in the 

outcome of the trial. The trial court concluded after two in 

camera reviews that the SO-page statement was neutral as to Jonas 

because his name was not mentioned anywhere. In the statement, 

Williams confessed to being involved in two loads, one in August 

and one in November. In the statement Williams said that during 

one load only Goodin, a pilot whom he was unable to identify and 

himself were present, and in the other load only Goodin and 

himself were present. Jonas was not charged for either of these 

loads. Instead, Jonas was convicted for a load which occurred in 

September 1987 and for being a member of the overall conspiracy. 

The admission of Williams' statement would not have changed the 

outcome of the trial; therefore, we affirm. 

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Expert Testimony 

Appellants Benavidez, Wyatt, Gardner and Tafoya assert that 

the trial court committed reversible error when it excluded 

proffered expert testimony that the government's witness was an 

addict and addicts have a propensity to lie. 

Generally, expert testimony is admissible if it "will assist 

the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a 

fact in issue • • " Fed. R. Evid. 702. "[T]he admission of 

expert testimony is within the sound discretion of the trial 

court, and its rulings will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse 

of discretion." United States v. Barton, 731 F.2d 669, 672 (10th 

Cir.) • 

Here, we cannot say that the trial court abused its 

discretion in refusing to allow the expert testimony. During 

trial, Benavidez requested that the trial court admit expert 

testimony that anyone using two or three grams of cocaine per week 

is an addict; addicts have a propensity to lie; and over 80% of 

cocaine users who quit without professional assistance relapse. 

The trial court denied this request and reaffirmed its decision 

upon hearing the proffered testimony outside the presence of the 

jury. The trial court concluded that the testimony of the two 

doctors would not be of benefit to the jury because the jury had 

seen and heard Goodin testify, and they could make up their own 

minds as to whether Goodin was telling the truth based on the 

conflicts in his testimony; each defendant had the opportunity to 

cross-examine Goodin extensively; and there was no probative value 

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in such testimony. Further, the jury was instructed to examine 

Goodin's testimony with caution and determine whether Goodin's 

testimony was affected by his drug usage, his role as an 

accomplice and the benefits he received from the government as a 

result of his testimony. The jury was also cautioned to never 

convict a defendant upon the unsupported testimony of such a 

witness unless they believed that testimony beyond a reasonable 

doubt. The essence of the trial court's comments is that the jury 

did not need the expert testimony to assist them in determining 

Goodin's credibility. We agree. 

In this circuit, we have held that opinion evidence is 

admissible only up to the point that it "would require the expert 

to pass upon the weight or credibility of the evidence." Frase v. 

Henry, 444 F.2d 1228, 1231 (10th Cir.). Specialized testimony is 

improper if the average person is able to understand the evidence. 

United States v. Affleck, 776 F.2d 1451, 1458 (10th Cir.). See 

United States v. Esch, 832 F.2d 531, 535 (10th Cir.) (jury was 

capable of making an intelligent evaluation of testimony 

concerning defendant's attitudes towards sexuality and nudity 

without the assistance of an expert); United States v. Brown, 540 

F.2d 1048 (10th Cir.) (court properly refused the proffered expert 

testimony describing problems of eyewitness identifications 

because it would invade the province of the jury). 

In United States v. Rohrer, 708 F.2d 429 (9th Cir.), the 

Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court's refusal in allowing 

expert testimony on a witness' drug usage. The trial court 

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recognized that determining the credibility of a witness is a 

matter for the jury, and the admission of expert testimony bearing 

on credibility lies in the judge's discretion. The court believed 

that the admission of such testimony would usurp the jury's 

function of determining guilt. Further, the court found that the 

prejudicial value of the expert's speculation on the effects of 

the witness' drug usage outweighed the probative value of the 

testimony because two of the psychiatrists had never met the 

witness and the other expert had only met the witness once in a 

social setting. 

We find the case at bar to be similar to that of Rohrer. The 

two proffered experts in the cases before us had never met Goodin 

or had an opportunity to evaluate him. As in Rohrer, we believe 

that the experts' testimony would have constituted mere 

speculation as to the effects of Goodin's drug usage on his 

ability to tell the truth and its prejudicial value would have 

outweighed its probative value. Further, we find that the 

admission of such testimony would have invaded the province of the 

jury and usurped its job of determining credibility. 

When a trial court excludes evidence tending to impeach a 

witness, no abuse of discretion results as long as the jury has 

"sufficient information to make a discriminating appraisal of the 

witness' motives and bias." United States v. Larranaga, 787 F.2d 

489, 498 (10th Cir.) (quoting United States v. DeGudino, 722 F.2d 

1351, 1354 (7th Cir.)). 

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Here, the jury had sufficient information to appraise the 

biases and motivation of Goodin. Appellants were permitted to 

thoroughly and extensively cross-examine Goodin. Given this 

thorough cross-examination, we believe that the jury was fully 

informed about his drug usage, biases, and motivation for 

testifying and weighed his testimony accordingly. Finding no 

abuse of discretion, we affirm. 

Sufficiency of Cross-Examination 

Appellants Gardner and Tafoya argue that the trial court 

abused its discretion by refusing to allow their counsel to bring 

out on cross-examination the sentence Goodin was avoiding by 

testifying against his co-conspirators. Appellants contend that 

the trial court violated their Sixth Amendment right to 

confrontation or in the alternative abused its discretion. They 

claim Goodin's potential sentence should have been subject to 

cross-examination because it was highly relevant to determining 

his credibility. While we agree with appellants that an accused 

has a right to effective cross-examination, see Larranaga, 787 

F.2d at 498, we disagree with appellants' interpretation of the 

scope of cross-examination when applied to this case. 

On the first day of trial, Goodin testified on direct 

examination that he was receiving immunity by testifying against 

his co-conspirators. Later, on cross-examination he stated that 

he was involved in seven of the eight marijuana shipments charged 

in the indictment; knew he was facing prison time if he did not 

cooperate with the government; and entered the agreement with the 

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government because he felt the prosecutor had power over him. We 

believe this testimony was more than sufficient to satisfy 

appellants' due process rights under the Sixth Amendment. See 

United States v. Valentine, 706 F.2d 282, 287 (10th Cir.) (Sixth 

Amendment violation occurs when cross-examination is precluded 

from an entire area of relevant evidence). 

The trial court's actions did not constitute an abuse of 

discretion. The fact scenario in the present case is closely 

analogous to the facts in Larranaga. In Larranaga, appellant 

claimed that the trial court erred by refusing to allow a written 

immunity agreement into evidence. We stated that although the 

agreement was somewhat relevant because it shed light on the 

witness' possible bias, the inferences of bias that the jury was 

to consider came not from the actual document but from how the 

witness perceived the benefits of the agreement. We noted that 

the trial court did nothing to restrict inquiry into the witness' 

understanding of the agreement. 

Likewise, the trial court in the present case did not 

restrict inquiry into Goodin's understanding of his agreement with 

the government, namely that he would not be charged, or his 

motives for entering into the agreement, namely that he would be 

avoiding prison time. As in Larranaga, this action by the trial 

court distinguishes this case from Hoover v. State of Maryland, 

714 F.2d 301 (4th Cir.), relied on by appellants. See Larranaga 

787 F.2d at 499, n.3. We believe Goodin's testimony gave the jury 

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sufficient evidence to weigh Goodin's testimony for potential 

bias. 

This case is unlike United States v. Roan Eagle, 867 F.2d 436 

(8th Cir.), where the court required cross-examination into the 

potential sentence under a plea agreement. Here, Goodin did not 

enter into a written plea or immunity agreement and was not 

charged under any of the counts in the indictment. Any attempt by 

defense counsel to attribute a length of prison time to Goodin's 

involvement in the overall conspiracy and specific charges in the 

indictment would be gross speculation, particularly in light of 

the federal sentencing guidelines. 

Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion and the appellants were not prejudiced by his action. 

Evidentiary Errors 

Appellant Wyatt alleges several evidentiary errors concerning 

the admission of photographs, irrelevant testimony and hearsay 

testimony. Further, he contends that the trial court erred in 

excluding Goodin's juvenile record. 

In reviewing evidentiary rulings, this court will reverse 

only for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Alexander, 849 

F.2d 1293, 1301 (10th Cir.) (citing United States v. RodriguezPando, 841 F.2d 1014, 1018 (10th Cir.)). 

Wyatt first contends that the trial court erred in admitting 

photographs of his truck. These photographs were taken at the 

airstrip in November 1987 after law enforcement officials 

descended on the scene. Wyatt asserts that the admission of the 

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photographs violated Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(l)(C) and prejudiced 

his defense because the government did not disclose the 

photographs until three days prior to trial. We disagree. 

Although delay in disclosure may violate Rule 16, Wyatt has 

not demonstrated a showing of substantial prejudice as a result of 

the delay. See United States v. Bridwell, 583 F.2d 1135, 1141 

(10th Cir.). His alibi defense was not affected by the admission 

of the photographs. In fact, he used one of the photographs in 

his defense. See United States v. Giraldo, 822 F.2d 205, 212 (2d 

Cir.) (delay alone is not enough to create prejudice to the 

defendant especially when the defendant receives the materials in 

time for effective use at trial). In addition, Wyatt failed to 

move for a continuance when the photographs were introduced and 

merely requested that the photographs be excluded. See 

United States v. Glover, 846 F.2d 339, 342 (6th Cir.) (where 

defendant made no motion for a continuance but merely urged the 

trial court to exclude the government's previously undisclosed 

evidence, no abuse of discretion was found). We find that Wyatt 

was not prejudiced by the government's delay in releasing the 

photographs; therefore, the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in admitting the photographs. 

Secondly, Wyatt asserts that the trial court abused its 

discretion in permitting the government to bring the seized 

marijuana into the courtroom. We find no merit to Wyatt's 

contention. 

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Thirdly, Wyatt.asserts that the trial court abused its 

discretion in admitting Officer West's testimony regarding the 

Phelps search. As a result of the search, drug notes indicating 

the quality and quantity of the marijuana were seized. Wyatt 

contends that this testimony was irrelevant because Phelps was 

severed from the trial. The government contends that the 

testimony was relevant because McEntire was living there at the 

time and the drug notes were essential to link the entire 

conspiracy. We find that Officer West's testimony was relevant. 

The drug notes were admitted into evidence. Officer West's 

testimony consisted of her interpretation of the notes based on 

her experience in investigating criminal activity for the 

New Mexico State Police. Therefore, we find that the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion in admitting her testimony. 

Further, we find no merit in Wyatt's contention that Officer 

West's testimony constituted hearsay. Wyatt contends that the 

trial court erroneously permitted Officer West to testify that a 

confidential informant told the government that a radio scanner 

tuned to the Customs Service frequency could be found in the 

Phelps residence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

admitting this testimony. The government introduced this 

testimony merely to show that the government relied on the 

information. When a search of the residence was implemented, a 

radio scanner was found in the Phelps residence tuned to the 

Customs frequency. Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion in 

admitting that testimony. As to Officer West's testimony that a 

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cab driver dropped a man off at the Phelps residence fitting 

McEntire's description, we find no abuse of discretion. Officer 

west testified that she saw a man get out of the cab and walk into 

the Phelps residence. She then contacted the cab driver and based 

upon the description, she believed it was McEntire. The following 

day she observed McEntire at the Phelps residence. There was 

sufficient evidence linking McEntire to the Phelps residence 

without the statement of the cab driver because Officer West saw 

McEntire at the Phelps residence. Therefore, even if the 

testimony about the cab driver was erroneously admitted, it was 

harmless. See United States v. Markopoulos, 848 F.2d 1036, 1039 

(10th Cir.) (admission of hearsay documents did not warrant 

reversal where error was harmless). See also United States v. 

Wolf, 839 F.2d 1387, 1395-1396 (10th Cir.) (hearsay statement 

erroneously admitted constituted harmless error where there was 

overwhelming evidence). Because of the overwhelming evidence 

against appellants, we find that the trial court's admission of 

Officer West's testimony was harmless. 

Lastly, Wyatt alleges that the trial court erred in excluding 

Goodin's juvenile record for possession of marijuana and 

possession of a deadly weapon. Although, "[e]vidence of juvenile 

adjudications is generally not admissible," the court may allow 

such evidence if it "would be admissible to attack the credibility 

of an adult and the court is satisfied that admission in evidence 

is necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or 

innocence." Fed. R. Evid. 609(d). We are satisfied that the 

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admission of Goodin's juvenile record was not necessary. Given 

the thorough cross-examination of Goodin as to his drug usage, 

motives and biases, we believe that the cross-examination was 

sufficient to attack his credibility without the admission of his 

juvenile record. The admission of his juvenile record was not 

necessary for the jury to determine guilt or innocence. 

Therefore, we are satisfied that the trial court's exclusion of 

Goodin's juvenile record was proper and did not amount to an abuse 

of discretion. 

Sufficiency of the Evidence 

Appellants Jonas, Archuleta and Yarter challenge the 

sufficiency of the evidence supporting their convictions. Jonas 

and Archuleta argue that there was insufficient evidence to 

connect them to the overall conspiracy. Jonas and Yarter also 

argue that there was not enough evidence to prove that the 

marijuana forming the basis of Count VI of the indictment weighed 

over 100 pounds. 

In reviewing the record, we take all evidence in the light 

most favorable to the government together with the reasonable 

inferences drawn therefrom. United States v. Fox, 902 F.2d 1508, 

1513 (10th Cir.). We are mindful that a conviction in a 

conspiracy trial cannot be based on a mere suspicion or obtained 

through an accumulation of inferences. Id. (citing United States 

v. Butler, 494 F.2d 1246, 1252 (10th Cir.)). Thus, the government 

must prove that the defendant had a common purpose with his coconspirators to possess and distribute the marijuana. 

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United States v. Kendall, 766 F.2d 1426, 1431 (10th Cir.); Dickey, 

736 F.2d at 582. At the same time, however, we recognize that 

once an overall conspiracy is established, a jury need only find 

"slight evidence" to implicate a co-conspirator. United States v. 

Troutman, 814 F.2d 1428, 1446 (10th Cir.). 

For the reasons stated in our discussion regarding the 

variances, we reject Archuleta's claim that there was insufficient 

evidence to connect him to the conspiracy charged in the 

indictment. Sufficient direct evidence was introduced through the 

testimony of Goodin to support the jury's finding that Archuleta 

participated in the overall charged conspiracy. 

We reach a similar result with appellant Jonas. Jonas argues 

that "the evidence demonstrates little more than the fact that the 

appellant knew, called, and occasionally associated with one or 

more of the conspirators." Although Jonas correctly points out 

that mere association with conspirators is insufficient to support 

a conviction for conspiracy,~ Dickey 736 F.2d at 585, we 

believe Jonas' involvement exceeded mere association. 

First, Goodin testified that in August 1987, he, McEntire, 

and Carlos Dominguez loaded a plane full of marijuana in Mexico. 

Goodin stated that the next day, Carlos Dominguez told him to 

contact Jonas in El Paso to determine if the load made it to the 

United States. Dominguez told Goodin that Jonas was the ground 

crew for the load. When contacted, according to Goodin, Jonas 

stated that to his knowledge the load did arrive in the 

United States. This evidence shows that Jonas actively 

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participated in the August 1987 load. The fact that no specific 

charges were filed regarding this activity does not affect the 

jury's use of these facts to find Jonas guilty of the overall 

conspiracy. 

Second, Goodin testified that Jonas played an active role in 

the September 1987 load. Goodin testified that Jonas unloaded the 

plane, and traveled with Goodin to Albuquerque. Jonas was to 

receive $5,000 for this work and traveled with Williams and Goodin 

to Juarez, Mexico to be paid. In Juarez, the three met with 

Dominguez and Tavo, Dominquez' associate, while waiting for 

Benavidez who was to deliver the money. 

Third, Goodin testified that in November 1987, Dominguez 

contacted him and asked him .to find a ground crew to bring in two 

additional loads. He specifically asked for Williams and Jonas 

because he felt safe with them. Although both Williams and Jonas 

were not available to participate in the November load, Dominguez' 

reliance on Jonas demonstrates that Jonas was an integral player 

in the United States side of the conspiracy. 

Jonas' direct involvement in two loads and potential 

involvement in a third is sufficient evidence for a jury to find 

him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In Dickey we reached a 

similar conclusion with a defendant who participated in two large 

cocaine transactions. We stated that "[t]hese two acts • are 

such that his knowledge of the broader conspiracy may be inferred. 

Hence, these acts are sufficient to draw him into the broad scheme 

to violate the drug laws." Dickey, 736 F.2d at 585. Moreover, 

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because the marijuana involved in the present case was in 

extremely large quantities, we can presume that Jonas had 

knowledge of his part in a broad venture. Id. 

We address appellants Jonas and Yarter's argument regarding 

the weight of the marijuana used to convict them under our 

discussion on sentencing. 

Sentencing 

Appellants raise several issues with respect to their 

sentencing. First, appellants allege that during sentencing the 

trial court incorrectly relied on the trial testimony and on an 

uncorroborated hearsay statement of the informant, Goodin. 

In United States v. Beaulieu, 893 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir.), this 

court outlined what information a trial court may consider when 

resolving factual disputes at sentencing. We stated that: 

"Plainly, the Federal Rules of Evidence do not 

apply at sentencing. Fed. R. Evid. 1101 

(d)(3). Moreover, courts have traditionally 

been allowed to consider all sources of 

information in formulating an appropriate 

sentence •••• " 

Id. at 1179. Any information may be considered during sentencing 

so long as it has a "sufficient indicia of reliability to support 

its probable accuracy." United States Sentencing Commission, 

Guidelines Manual, S 6Al.3, comment. (backg'd.) (quoting 

United States v. Marshall, 519 F. Supp. 751 (D. Wis.), aff'd, 719 

F.2d 887 (7th Cir.)). In Beaulieu, we allowed evidence of another 

trial to be considered in sentencing the defendant and recognized 

that "a defendant at sentencing does not have an absolute right to 

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confront witnesses whose information is made available to the 

court." Id. at 1180 (citing United States v. Sunrhodes, 831 F.2d 

1537, 1543 (10th Cir.)). 

In applying the principles set forth above, it is clear that 

the trial court did not err in relying on the trial testimony 

generally and on Goodin's debriefing statement for the amount of 

marijuana. We believe that Goodin's statement bore the 

"sufficient indicia of reliability" necessary for the trial court 

to consider it; therefore, the statement was proper for purposes 

of sentencing. 

Second, appellants assert that the trial court erred in 

failing to hold an evidentiary hearing before sentencing. Prior 

to sentencing, a defendant _must be given an opportunity to review 

and comment on the Pre-Sentence Report ("PSR"), but the decision 

of whether to hold an evidentiary hearing lies within the sound 

discretion of the trial court. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)(A); 

United States v. Peterman, 841 F.2d 1474, 1484 (10th Cir.). 

A review of the record reveals that appellants were given the 

opportunity to review the PSR and supplement the material with 

written objections. The probation personnel responded to the 

written objections. Before sentencing, appellants were given an 

opportunity to comment at length on their objections to the PSR. 

In fact, the trial court continued McEntire's sentencing to 

further consider objections and affidavits. A review of the 

record indicates that the trial court considered Tafoya's and 

Benavidez' objections to the PSR and adjusted their offense levels 

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accordingly. This was a "hearing" for all practical purposes per 

Peterman. The trial court properly considered the trial 

testimony, the PSRs (with objections and responses), Goodin's 

debriefing statement and the parties' comments. The trial court 

had sufficient facts based upon reliable information to determine 

appellants' involvement; therefore, we conclude that the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion in not holding a typical 

evidentiary hearing. 

Third, appellants contend that the trial court failed to 

fulfill the requirements of Rule 32(c)(3)(D) and request 

resentencing. Where there are disputed facts which are important 

to the sentencing decision, the trial court must resolve them 

prior to imposing sentence. United States v. Rutter, 897 F.2d 

1558, 1565 (10th Cir.) (citing United States v. Warters, 885 F.2d 

1266, 1272 (5th Cir.)); u.s.s.G. S 6Al.3; Fed. R. Crim. P. 

32(c)(3)(D). A written resolution of the factual matter must be 

attached to the PSR before it is given to the prison or parole 

authorities. United States v. Strayer, 846 F.2d 1262, 1267 (10th 

Cir.). Failure to file a written resolution of the factual 

matter, however, does not mandate resentencing. See Rutter, 897 

F.2d at 1566. 

It is clear from the sentencing transcript that the trial 

court relied on the trial testimony, the PSR and appellants' 

objections to the PSR prior to imposing sentence as above 

described. The record shows that some of the factual disputes 

were resolved in favor of appellants while some were resolved 

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against them. The trial court's failure to attach a written 

resolution of the factual disputes to the PSR for the prison 

authorities does not mandate resentencing. We are satisfied that 

the trial court will fulfill the requirements of Rule 32(c)(3)(D) 

as set out in Rutter in due course. 

Fourth, appellants Jonas and McEntire assert that the trial 

court erred in applying the sentencing guidelines to their 

sentences because they withdrew from the conspiracy prior to the 

effective date of the guidelines. When a defendant fails to 

withdraw from a conspiracy and that conspiracy extends beyond the 

effective date of the act, the sentencing guidelines apply to that 

defendant even if the last conspiratorial act that affected the 

defendant personally occurred prior to November 1, 1987. 

United States v. Williams, 897 F.2d 1034, 1040 (10th Cir.). 

Absent an affirmative withdrawal, a defendant remains part of the 

conspiracy. Record, 873 F.2d at 1368. See United States v. 

Brewer, 630 F.2d 795, 800 (10th Cir.) (individual who participated 

in initial drug deal remains part of the conspiracy despite being 

excluded from future deals). The burden of showing that the 

guidelines are not applicable is placed on the defendant. 

Williams, 897 F.2d at 1040. 

Jonas and McEntire have not met their burden. Jonas has 

failed to direct us to the portion of the trial transcript which 

supports his contention that he withdrew from the conspiracy. 

Further, a review of the transcript does not indicate that he 

affirmatively withdrew. McEntire also failed to withdraw from the 

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conspiracy. He was present during meetings with other coconspirators during the month of November. This is sufficient to 

support the trial court's determination that he remained a member 

of the conspiracy. Because the conspiracy continued until 

January 8, 1988, which was after the effective date of the 

guidelines, and neither Jonas nor McEntire withdrew from the 

conspiracy, the trial court properly applied the guidelines to 

their sentences. 

Lastly, appellants Archuleta, Jonas and Benavidez dispute the 

trial court's factual findings. Archuleta and Jonas allege that 

the trial court erred in failing to classify their participation 

as either minimal or minor. Benavidez asserts that the trial 

court incorrectly characterized him as a manager or supervisor. 

Benavidez also urges that his base offense level is incorrect 

because the drug quantity computations were inaccurate. 

We review a trial court's factual determinations under the 

"clearly erroneous" standard, and we must give due deference to 

the trial court's application of the facts to the sentencing 

guidelines. Rutter, 897 F.2d at 1560. 

We cannot say that the trial court's findings were clearly 

erroneous. The testimony at trial revealed that Archuleta was a 

key figure. He provided the airplane and developed a 

communication network among the co-defendants. As a provider of 

the aircraft and communication facilitator, he played an 

indispensable role in the drug smuggling operation. There is 

ample evidence to support the trial court's determination that 

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Archuleta played more than a minor or minimal role in the 

conspiracy. 

We also affirm the trial court's determination that Jonas 

played more than a minor or minimal role in the conspiracy. 

Testimony at trial revealed that Jonas was in charge of the ground 

crew, participated in unloading the marijuana, and collected and 

disbursed money. We cannot say that the trial court's findings 

were clearly erroneous as to Jonas' role in the conspiracy. 

We also affirm the trial court's determination that 

Benavidez' role was that of a manager or supervisor. Benavidez 

served as a partner of Dominguez. He was responsible for the 

northern side of the operation and at times handled payment for 

the loads. There is ample evidence to support the trial court's 

determination that Benavidez was an organizer or manager. 

Benavidez' contention that the trial court erred in 

calculating his base offense level is without merit. He contends 

that the trial court incorrectly included the amount of marijuana 

in Counts III, VI and VII and the amount of marijuana in two 

August loads which were uncharged. A review of the transcript 

reveals that the trial court excluded Count III from its 

computation. Count VI and VII were properly included pursuant to 

u.s.s.G. S lBl.3(1). Benavidez contends that he was not involved 

in those loads and could not have reasonably foreseen the 

involvement of his co-conspirators. We disagree. 

In calculating Benavidez' base offense level, the trial court 

included all of the drug amounts involved in the conspiracy. 

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Because Benavidez was viewed as a manager of the overall 

conspiracy and financial partner of Dominguez, the trial court 

concluded that the conduct of the other co-conspirators should 

have been known or~ reasonably foreseeable to him. Further, as 

a member of the ongoing conspiracy, Benavidez was subject to a 

sentence based upon the actual quantity of drug involved in the 

entire conspiracy. See Rutter, 897 F.2d at 1562 (trial court 

properly considered drug amounts of the entire conspiracy 

regardless of whether defendant was convicted of the underlying 

offenses). 

When calculating a defendant's base offense level, a trial 

court is not limited to the quantity of the drugs charged in the 

indictment where the proof at trial establishes that a larger 

quantity was involved. United States v. Ware, 897 F.2d 1538, 1542 

(10th Cir.) (citing United States v. Roberts, 881 F.2d 95, 104 

(4th Cir.)). Benavidez correctly points out that the trial court 

did not consider any evidence about the two August loads at trial. 

In any event, as the trial court recognized and Benavidez 

concedes, the exclusion of the two August loads would not have 

affected his base offense level anyway; therefore, Benavidez' 

sentence is proper. 

Transcripts 

Appellants Jonas, Archuleta and McEntire allege that their 

sentencing transcripts are unintelligible, inaccurate and 

nonsensical; therefore, they request new sentencing hearings. 

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After reviewing their sentencing transcripts, we find their 

contentions meritless. 

A criminal defendant has a right to a complete transcript for 

purposes of appeal. United States v. Selva, 559 F.2d 1303, 1305 

(5th Cir.) (citing Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277). "[I]t 

constitutes error to fail to report any portion of the proceedings 

in a criminal case where the unavailability of a transcript makes 

it impossible for the appellate court to determine whether or not 

prejudicial error was conunitted." Edwards v. United States, 374 

F.2d 24, 26 (10th Cir.). However, failure to comply with 28 

u.s.c. S 753 is not prejudicial error per se. Id. Where the 

defendant is represented by the same attorney throughout the 

entire trial and on appeal, the defendant must articulate the 

prejudice that resulted from the missing portion of the transcript 

to mandate reversal. Selva, 559 F.2d at 1306. 

Appellants have failed to meet their burden. Jonas and 

Archuleta were represented by the same attorneys throughout the 

trial, sentencing and on appeal. From the record, it appears that 

McEntire was represented by two attorneys, an out-of-state 

attorney and local counsel. The out-of-state attorney represented 

McEntire during the trial and the local counsel represented him 

during the sentencing phase and on appeal. Because the same 

attorney represented McEntire for the sentencing portion and the 

appeal itself, the principle set forth in Selva applies to him as 

well. Appellants have failed to articulate the prejudice they 

suffered as a result of any missing portion of the transcript. 

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They have merely asserted that their transcripts are 

incomprehensible. Our review of their transcripts indicates 

otherwise. We find that the sentencing transcripts were adequate 

and intelligible. 

AFFIRMED. 

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Entered for the Court 

Oliver Seth 

Circuit Judge 

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