Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_07-cv-00389/USCOURTS-alsd-1_07-cv-00389-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
GSJ Limited Liability Company
Defendant
Jill Kilbride
Plaintiff
Kokomos Water Sports, Inc.
Defendant
Perdido Beach Parasailing
Defendant
Steve Vrondran
Defendant

Document Text:

1 It appears that defendants filed identical copies of the Answer as two separate

docket entries, as documents 16 and 17 appear to be entirely duplicative. To eliminate such

redundancy in the court file, document 17 is hereby stricken.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JILL KILBRIDE, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 07-0389-WS-M

 )

STEVE VRONDRAN, et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court based on sua sponte review of the court file.

The record reflects that plaintiff Jill Kilbride perfected service of process on defendants

Stephen W. Vrondran, Kokomos Water Sports, Inc., GSJ Limited Liability Company, and

Perdido Beach Parasailing via personal service on June 26, 2007. (Docs. 9-12.) When

defendants failed to file a responsive pleading or otherwise to appear in this action for the next

30 days, plaintiff filed an application for entry of default (doc. 14) on July 27, 2007. A Clerk’s

Entry of Default (doc. 15) was entered as to all four defendants on July 30, 2007. More than

three weeks later, on August 23, 2007, defendants filed an Answer (doc. 16) without seeking

leave of court or otherwise making any attempt to lift the default against them.1

This is improper. Defendants continue to labor under the Clerk’s Entry of Default

entered because of their failure to answer the Complaint within the time provided by the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. Unless and until it is set aside, “[t]he entry of a default against a

defendant ... severely limits the defendant’s ability to defend the action.” Tyco Fire & Sec., LLC

v. Alcocer, 2007 WL 542583, *3 (11th Cir. Feb. 22, 2007). “The defendant, by his default,

admits the plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations of fact.” Nishimatsu Const. Co., Ltd. v. Houston

Nat. Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975); see also Twist and Shout Music v. Longneck

Case 1:07-cv-00389-WS-M Document 18 Filed 08/27/07 Page 1 of 3
2 The Court notes that, aside from the obvious procedural infirmities in defendants’

attempt to file a responsive pleading after entry of default, their Answer is flawed for another

reason. Rather than setting forth a paragraph-by-paragraph admission or denial of the factual

allegations of the Complaint, defendants resort to a blanket denial in which they deny “each and

every material allegation and demand[] strict proof thereof.” (Answer, at 1.) Such general

denials of all allegations in a complaint are almost never appropriate under the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. See Matter of Crawford, 2 B.R. 589, 592 (Bankr. Ill. 1980) (“A general denial

is appropriate only where the pleader intends in good faith to controvert the preceding

pleading.”); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Bill's Farm Center, Inc., 52 F.R.D. 114, 118-19 (W.D. Mo. 1970)

(declaring that “[g]eneral denials or the equivalent are no longer permitted under the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure”). Under Rule 8(b), Fed.R.Civ.P., denials set forth in an answer “shall

fairly meet the substance of the averments denied.” Id. Moreover, a general denial such as that

offered by defendants is appropriate only when “the pleader intends in good faith to controvert

all the averments of the preceding pleading.” Id. Any such general denial is expressly made

“subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 11.” Id. By all appearances, the current form of

Answer proffered by defendants is in violation of Rules 8(b) and 11(b)(4), Fed.R.Civ.P. For that

reason, if the default is lifted, defendants will be required either to file an amended answer or to

show cause why their blanket denial of all factual allegations in the Complaint is justified here

after reasonable investigation by defendants’ counsel.

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Xpress, N.P., 441 F. Supp.2d 782, 783 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (“The effect of the entry of default is

that it cuts off the defendants’ right to appear in the case with respect to liability issues.”). Thus,

the legal effect of defendants’ default in this case is that they have admitted all well-pleaded

facts in the Complaint. Their mere filing of an Answer in which they categorically “den[y] each

and every material allegation” of the Complaint in no way operates to mitigate the default or to

counteract its debilitating effects on their ability to defend against plaintiff’s allegations.

To the extent that defendants wish to participate in these proceedings and to contest the

well-pleaded facts set forth in the Complaint, they cannot do so unless they meet their burden of

showing why the Clerk’s Entry of Default should be set aside pursuant to Rule 55(c),

Fed.R.Civ.P. Any such request by defendants will be assessed in accordance with the legal

principles set forth in Compania Interamericana Export-Import, S.A. v. Compania Dominicana

de Aviacion, 88 F.3d 948, 951 (11th Cir. 1996), and its progeny. Unless and until defendants file

such a motion to set aside the default, they remain vulnerable to entry of default judgment upon

proper application by plaintiff.2

For all of these reasons, defendants are ordered, on or before September 4, 2007, to

show cause why the Clerk’s Entry of Default should be set aside pursuant to Rule 55(c),

Case 1:07-cv-00389-WS-M Document 18 Filed 08/27/07 Page 2 of 3
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Fed.R.Civ.P. Failing a timely submittal by defendants, the Court will entertain any motion for

default judgment that plaintiff may submit after that date.

DONE and ORDERED this 27th day of August, 2007.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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