Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_19-cv-08239/USCOURTS-azd-3_19-cv-08239-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gerald Charley
Plaintiff
Ruby Charley
Plaintiff
United States of America
Defendant

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Ruby Charley,

Plaintiff,

v. 

United States of America,

Defendant.

No. CV-19-08239-PCT-GMS

ORDER 

Pending before the Court are Defendant United States’ Motion to Dismiss for 

Failure to State a Claim and Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (Doc. 7) and 

Plaintiff Ruby Charley’s Motion for Limited Discovery (Doc. 10). For the following 

reasons, the United States’ Motions are denied, and Plaintiff’s Motion is denied as moot. 

BACKGROUND

Gerald Vann Charley (“Deceased”) was found dead in Burnt Corn, Arizona on 

January 10, 2018. Plaintiff, Deceased’s mother, was properly appointed Administrator of 

Deceased’s estate. Plaintiff brings this wrongful death action against the United States 

pursuant to the Federal Torts Claim Act (“FTCA”). Plaintiff asserts that Deceased died 

because the Chinle Police Department, a federal contractor,1ignored “numerous calls 

requesting assistance for Mr. Charley and asking for a welfare check on Mr. Charley.” 

(Doc. 1 at 5.) Based on this assertion, Plaintiff alleges claims for Negligence (Count I) and

1 The complaint alleges that the Chinle Police Department operates under a contract with 

the federal government under the Indian Self Determination Assistance Act of 1968. Thus, 

the Court interprets any mention of “federal contractor” in the complaint as referring to the 

Chinle Police Department. Plaintiff’ confirms this interpretation in its reply. (Doc. 10 at 3.)

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Negligent Operation, Maintenance, Control, Supervision, Direction and Training (Count 

II).

2

The United States moves to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Plaintiff requests limited discovery “so that she may 

amend her complaint to identify the human beings who failed in this process.” (Doc. 1 at 

2.)

DISCUSSION

I. Negligence (Count I)

The United States argues that Count I must be dismissed because it fails to meet the 

requisite pleading standards.3

A party may move to dismiss a complaint for “failure to state claim upon which 

relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive dismissal for failure to state a 

claim, a complaint must contain more than a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a 

cause of action”; it must contain factual allegations sufficient to “raise the right of relief 

above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting 

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). When analyzing a complaint for failure to state 

a claim, “[a]ll allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most 

favorable to the non-moving party.” Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 1996). 

2 Plaintiff clarifies that the complaint does not assert a separate claim under Article I of the 

1868 Treaty with the Navajo Nation (“Bad Men Provision”). Plaintiff merely asserts the 

Bad Men provision as an alternative jurisdictional theory. However, because the Court has 

jurisdiction over both claims pursuant to the FTCA, the Court need not address Plaintiff’s 

assertion of jurisdiction under the Bad Men Provision.

3 While Defendant United States disputes this Court’s jurisdiction over Count II, it does 

not dispute this Court’s jurisdiction over Count I pursuant to the FTCA. The FTCA gives 

the district courts “exclusive jurisdiction of civil action on claims against the United States, 

for money damages . . . for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by 

the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting 

within the scope of his employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a

private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place 

where the act or omission occurred.” 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1). Count I asserts a civil claim 

against the United States for wrongful death caused by the negligence of “the employees, 

officials, and agents” of the United States. Moreover, the complaint alleges that the United 

States, if a private person, would be liable to Plaintiff for the alleged negligence under 

Arizona law. Thus, the complaint alleges sufficient facts to establish FTCA jurisdiction 

over Count I.

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Legal conclusions couched as factual allegations, however, are not given a presumption of 

truthfulness, and “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are not 

sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Pareto v. F.D.I.C., 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 

1998).

Under Arizona law, “[t]o establish a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must prove 

four elements: (1) a duty requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of care; 

(2) a breach by the defendant of that standard; (3) a causal connection between the 

defendant's conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual damages.” Diaz v. Phoenix 

Lubrication Serv., Inc., 224 Ariz. 335, 338, 230 P.3d 718, 721 (Ct. App. 2010). Here, the 

complaint asserts that the “employees, officials, and agents of the Defendant had a duty to 

act reasonably to avoid injury to Gerald Charley.” (Doc. 1 at 6). Plaintiff further alleges 

that Defendant breached that duty when the Chinle Police Department ignored “numerous 

calls requesting assistance for Mr. Charley.” (Doc. 1 at 5.) Plaintiff asserts that the alleged 

breach “directly and proximately resulted in the wrongful death of Gerald Charley.” (Doc. 

1 at 7.) These allegations are enough to state a plausible claim of negligence. The 

specificity demanded by Defendant United States, such as allegations of who placed the 

alleged welfare calls or when the alleged calls were made, will likely be necessary to prove 

Plaintiff’s claim but are not required at the pleading stage.

Defendant United States further asserts that under the FTCA, “Plaintiff must specify 

which employees acted and what their role was” because the FTCA only waives the 

Government’s sovereign immunity for negligent acts of its employees made within the 

scope of their employment. However, Plaintiff satisfies this burden by alleging that the 

Chinle Police Department operates “pursuant to a contract authorized under the Indian Self 

Determination Assistance Act of 1968, P.L. 93–638” and the alleged negligence concerns 

the actions or omissions of Defendant United States’ “employees, officials, and agents” 

working under the alleged contract. See Shirk v United States, 773F.3d 999, 1003 (9th Cir. 

2014) (“Congress extended the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity to claims “resulting 

from the performance of functions . . . under a contract, grant agreement, or cooperative 

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agreement authorized by the [Indian Self Determination Assistance Act] of 1975, as 

amended.”) (citing 25 U.S.C. § 450f (note)). The scope of employment is a factual question 

that cannot be appropriately resolved on a motion to dismiss. Thus, contrary to Defendant’s 

assertions, Plaintiff has pled a plausible negligence claim properly asserted under the 

FTCA. No more is required to survive dismissal. Defendant United States Motion to 

Dismiss with respect to Count I is denied.

II. Negligent Operation, Maintenance, Control, Supervision, Direction and 

Training (Count II).

The United States argues that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Count 

II because Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies and, in the alternative, the 

FTCA does not waive the Government’s sovereign immunity for claims of institutional 

negligence. The United States further asserts that Count II, as alleged, fails to meet the 

pleading standards set forth in Twombly and Iqbal and must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 

12(b)(6).

A. Administrative Exhaustion 

The United States argues that Plaintiff’s institutional negligence claim should be 

dismissed because her “SF Notice of Claim did not include any allegations of negligent 

hiring, training, supervision or control.” (Doc. 7 at 8.)

The FTCA provides that “an action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the 

United States for money damages . . . unless the claimant shall have first presented the 

claim to the appropriate Federal agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by the 

agency in writing and sent by certified or registered mail.” 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a)). A claim 

is considered “presented for purposes of § 2675 when a party files (1) a written statement 

sufficiently describing the injury to enable the agency to begin its own investigation, and 

(2) a sum certain damages claim.” Blair v. United States, 304 F.3d 861, 863–64 (9th Cir. 

2002).

Plaintiff timely submitted a written statement of his claims to the Bureau of Indian 

Affairs (“BIA”). The statement explained the basis of Plaintiffs claim as follows:

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/ / /

Gerald Vann Charley was found dead at .25 miles north of mile post 26, off 

Navajo Rouge 4, in Burnt Corn, Arizona. This occurred despite the fact that 

the Chinle Police Department, a contractor of the BIA, received numerous 

calls requesting assistance for Mr. Charley and asking for a welfare check on 

Mr. Charley. The Department ignored those calls, and, due to its negligence, 

Mr. Charley passed away. The BIA is liable for the wrongful death of 

Mr. Charley.

(Doc. 7-1 at 3.) This description of Plaintiff’s claim is sufficient to satisfy the presentation 

requirement under the FTCA. Plaintiff relies on a case from the First Circuit which explains 

that the notice requirement is approached leniently, “recognizing that individuals wishing 

to sue the government must comply with the details of the law, but also keeping in mind 

that the law was not intended to put up a barrier of technicalities to defeat their claims.” 

Santiago-Ramirez v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Def., 984 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1993) (internal 

quotations omitted). Although not raised by the parties, this Circuit applies a similar 

standard. See Blair v. I.R.S. 304 F.3d 861, 868 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The claim presentation 

requirement of the FTCA is designed to ensure that compensation is provided in a fair and 

equitable manner, not to provide a basis for a regulatory checklist which, when not fully 

observed, permits the termination of claims regardless of their merits.”); see Goss v. United 

States, 353 F. Supp. 3d 878, 885 (D. Ariz. 2018) (holding that a statement “seeking 

compensation for emotional distress”, without more, “placed the government on notice of 

his emotional distress claim”). Thus, Plaintiff’s statement provided the BIA enough 

information to investigate her claim.

B. FTCA Jurisdiction

The United States asserts that “this Court has no jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims 

for direct liability or institutional negligence since the United States has not waived 

sovereign immunity for these claims.” (Doc. 7 at 6.)

“An action can be brought by a party against the United States only to the extent that 

the Federal Government waives its sovereign immunity.” Blackburn v. United States, 100 

F.3d 1426, 1429 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Valdez v. United States, 56 F.3d 1177, 1179 (9th 

Cir.1995)). “The FTCA waives the Government’s sovereign immunity for tort claims 

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arising out of the negligent conduct of government employees acting within the scope of 

their employment.” Id. The waiver, however, only extends to claims for which an 

individual person would be liable under state tort law. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).

Defendant United States asserts that a recent Ninth Circuit decision holds that “the 

FTCA’s liability provisions for individual employee conduct do not apply to institutional 

entities such [as] the United States.” (Doc. 7 at 5.) (citing Meier v. United States, No. C 

05-04404 WHA, 2006 WL 3798160, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2006) aff’d, 310 Fed. Appx. 

976, 979 (9th Cir. 2009)). The Court, however, does not interpret Meir so broadly. In Meir, 

the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of a negligent hiring, training, and 

supervision claim asserted against the Veterans Administration. Meir v United States, 310 

Fed. Appx. 976, 979 (9th Cir. 2009). The district court explained that California case law 

permitted a hospital to be held liable for failing to ensure the competence of its employees 

under the doctrine of corporate negligence. This particular theory of liability, however, did 

not extend to individual persons. Meir, 2006 WL 3798160, at *4. The court held that 

“because California law does not impose liability on a private person for a hospital’s 

negligent hiring or supervision of medical staff, no liability can be imposed on the 

government on the theories alleged.” Id. Accordingly, Meir merely holds that the United 

States “will not be liable under the FTCA when a plaintiff’s claim is based on a state law 

that that would only hold a corporation—and not an individual person—liable.” Id. at *3. 

Here, Arizona law does impose liability on a private person for the tortious conduct 

presented—negligent operation, maintenance, control, supervision, directing, and training.

See Leibel v. City of Buckeye, 364 F.Supp.3d 1027, 1045 (holding that a complaint 

plausibly alleged an Arizona state law claim of negligent training and supervision against 

an individual lieutenant, and the chief of police); Mulhern v. City of Scottsdale, 165 Ariz. 

395, 398, 799 P.2d 15, 18 (Ct. App. 1990) (dismissing on other grounds a state law claim 

for negligent assignment of duties asserted against the police chief). Arizona follows the 

Restatement (Second) of Agency § 213 (“Restatement”) for negligent hiring, supervision, 

and training claims, Kassman v. Busfield Enterprise, Inc., 131 Ariz. 163, 166, 639 P.2d 

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353, 356 (Ct. App. 1981), which provides that “[a] person conducting an activity through 

servants or other agents is subject to liability for harm resulting from his conduct if he is 

negligent” in giving improper instruction, in the employment of improper persons, or in 

the supervision of the activity. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 213 (emphasis added). 

Defendants do not provide, and the Court has not found, any authority suggesting that 

Plaintiff’s claim is rooted in and/or limited to the doctrine of corporate negligence like the 

claim asserted in Meir. Because Arizona law recognizes a tort for negligent supervision, 

hiring, or training that would apply to a private person in the circumstances presented here, 

the Court declines to dismiss Count II for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

C. Rule 12(b)(6)

For an employer to be held liable for negligent supervision under Arizona law, a 

plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that the employer knew or should have known that the 

employee was not competent to perform the assigned task and (2) that the employer’s 

failure to supervise the employee caused the plaintiff’s injury. Sloan v. United States, No. 

CV-16-08059-PCT-DGC, 2016 WL 3548766, at *2 (D. Ariz. June 30, 2016). “To prevail 

on a negligent training claim, a plaintiff must show a defendant’s training or lack thereof 

was negligent[.]” Guerra v. State, 234 Ariz. 482, 490, 323 P.3d 765, 772 (Ct. App. 2014), 

vacated on other grounds, 237 Ariz. 183, 348 P.3d 423 (2015).

Here, the complaint asserts that Defendant United States has a duty to “properly 

screen, hire, control, direct, train, monitor, supervise and/or discipline employees, 

terminate, or otherwise take remedial action against its agents and contractors.” (Doc. 1 at 

7.) “Defendant knew or reasonably should have known that subordinate employees, agents 

or contractors were acting improperly, negligently, that they had not provided sufficient 

training and supervision to act reasonably . . .” (Doc. 1 at 8.) Defendant allegedly breached 

its duty by “failing to properly screen, hire, train, monitor, supervise and/or discipline 

subordinate employees, agents and contracts.” (Doc. 1 at 8-9.) And Defendant’s conduct 

“was a direct and proximate cause of the wrongful death of Gerald Charley.” (Doc. 1 at 9.)

These allegations, when considered in the entire factual context, are sufficiently plausible 

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to maintain Plaintiff’s claim at this stage. 

Defendant United States asserts that “Plaintiff must specify which employees acted 

and what their role was” to adequately state a claim under the FTCA. However, Defendant 

United States fails to provide authority to support this standard. More specific factual 

allegations will be required to prove Plaintiff’s claim, however, the allegations provided 

are sufficient to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim. Defendant United States’ 

Motion to Dismiss with respect to Count II is denied.

CONCLUSION

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims are properly before the Court pursuant to the 

FTCA. Moreover, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged claims for negligence and negligent 

supervision, training, etc. against the United States in accordance therewith. Accordingly, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant United States’ Motion to Dismiss for 

Failure to State a Claim and Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (Doc. 7) are

DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Limited Discovery (Doc. 

10) is DENIED as moot.

Dated this 5th day of February, 2020.

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