Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cr-00462/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cr-00462-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Angel Garcia-Taboada
Defendant
United States of America
Plaintiff

Document Text:

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KM

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America, 

Plaintiff,

v.

Angel Garcia-Taboada, 

Defendant/Movant. 

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No. CR 05-462-PHX-DGC

No. CV 05-3761-PHX-DGC (CRP)

ORDER

Movant Angel Garcia-Taboada, confined in the United States Penitentiary in Atwater,

California, filed a pro se Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in

Federal Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (CR Doc. #18). The Court dismissed the

Motion with leave to amend. Movant filed a First Amended Motion (Doc. #29) on

August 18, 2006. The Court will summarily dismiss the Amended Motion.

I. Procedural History

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Movant pled guilty to Reentry After Deportation, in

violation of 8 U.S.C. §1326(a), enhanced by § 1326(b)(2). On September 19, 2005, the

Court sentenced Movant to a 46-month term of imprisonment, followed by 3 years of

supervised release.

In his Motion, Movant seeks a reduction of his sentence. He argues that the sentence

he received exceeds the 37 month sentence he expected to receive.

Case 2:05-cr-00462-DGC Document 30 Filed 11/14/06 Page 1 of 4
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II. Summary Dismissal

A district court must summarily dismiss a § 2255 application “[i]f it plainly appears

from the motion, any attached exhibits, and the record of prior proceedings that the moving

party is not entitled to relief.” Rule 4(b),Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the

United States District Courts. When this standard is satisfied, neither a hearing nor a

response from the government is required. See Marrow v. United States, 772 F.2d 525, 526

(9th Cir. 1985); Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 571 (9th Cir. 1982). Moreover,

if there has been a valid waiver of the right to file a federal habeas corpus petition, a court

lacks jurisdiction to hear the case. See Washington v. Lampert, 422 F.3d 864, 869 (9th Cir.

2005).

In this case, the record shows that summary dismissal under Rule 4(b) is warranted

and the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the Motion because Movant has waived the right to

bring a § 2255 motion.

III. Waiver

Movant has waived challenges to his sentence. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

has found that there are “strict standards for waiver of constitutional rights.” United States

v. Gonzalez-Flores, 418 F.3d 1093, 1102 (9th Cir. 2005). It is impermissible to presume

waiver from a silent record, and the Court must indulge every reasonable presumption

against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights. United States v. Hamilton, 391 F.3d

1066, 1071 (9th Cir. 2004). In this action, Movant’s waiver was clear, express, and

unequivocal.

Plea agreements are contractual in nature, and their plain language will generally be

enforced if the agreement is clear and unambiguous on its face. United States v. Jeronimo,

398 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005). A defendant may waive the statutory right to bring a

§ 2255 action challenging the length of his sentence. United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431,

433 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1992). The only

claims that cannot be waived are claims that the waiver itself was involuntary or that

ineffective assistance of counsel rendered the waiver involuntary. See Washington, 422 F.3d

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at 871(holding that a plea agreement that waives the right to file a federal habeas petition

pursuant to § 2254 is unenforceable with respect to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim

that challenges the voluntariness of the waiver); Pruitt, 32 F.3d at 433 (expressing doubt that

a plea agreement could waive a claim that counsel erroneously induced a defendant to plead

guilty or accept a particular plea bargain); Abarca, 985 F.2d at 1014 (expressly declining to

hold that a waiver forecloses a claim of ineffective assistance or involuntariness of the

waiver); see also Jeronimo, 398 F.3d at 1156 n.4 (declining to decide whether waiver of all

statutory rights included claims implicating the voluntariness of the waiver). 

As part of his plea agreement, Movant made the following waiver:

Defendant waives any and all motions, defenses, probable cause

determinations, and objections which the defendant could assert

to the information or indictment, or to the petition to revoke, or

to the court’s entry of judgment against defendant and

imposition of sentence upon defendant, provided the sentence is

consistent with this agreement. Defendant further waives:

(1) any right to appeal the court’s entry of judgment against

defendant; (2) any right to appeal the imposition of sentence

upon defendant under Title 18, United States Code, Section

3742 (sentence appeals); and (3) any right to collaterally attack

defendant’s conviction and sentence under Title 28, United

States Code, Section 2255, or any other collateral attack.

Defendant acknowledges that this waiver shall result in the

dismissal of any appeal or collateral attack defendant might file

challenging his conviction or sentence in this case.

(CR Doc. #17). Movant indicated in his plea agreement that he had discussed the terms with

his attorney, agreed to the terms and conditions, and entered into the plea voluntarily. (Id.)

Moreover, the plea agreement provides states that “the Court may be free to exercise its

discretion to impose any reasonable sentence up to the maximum set by statute for the crimes

of conviction.” (Id. at 3). The maximum term of imprisonment for a violation of 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326(a), enhanced by § 1326(b)(2), is 20 years (240 months). Finally, Movant specifically

acknowledged in the agreement that “I agree that any guideline range discussed with my

attorney is not binding on the court and is merely an estimate.” (Id. at 7.)

Movant’s assertions in his § 2255 Motion all pertain to sentencing and do not pertain

to the voluntariness of the waiver. Movant expressly waived issues regarding the imposition

of sentence and expressly waived the right to bring a § 2255 motion. The Court accepted his

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plea as voluntarily made. Consequently, the Court finds that Movant waived the sentencing

issues raised in his § 2255 Motion. Thus, the Court will summarily dismiss the Motion for

lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the Amended Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct

Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (CR Doc. #29 in CR 05-462-PHX-DGC) is denied

and that the civil action opened in connection with this Motion (CV 05-3761-PHX-DGC

(CRP)) is dismissed. The Clerk of Court must enter judgment accordingly.

DATED this 13th day of November, 2006.

Case 2:05-cr-00462-DGC Document 30 Filed 11/14/06 Page 4 of 4