Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-03074/USCOURTS-caDC-96-03074-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Wendell T. Jackson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 14, 1997 Decided May 20, 1997

No. 96-3074

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

WENDELL T. JACKSON,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(95cr00239-02)

Lisa B. Wright, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued 

the cause for appellant, with whom A.J. Kramer, Federal 

Public Defender, was on the briefs.

Eileen F. Sheehan, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for appellee, with whom Eric H. Holder, Jr.,

United States Attorney, John R. Fisher and Robert A. Spelke,

Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief.

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Before: SILBERMAN, RANDOLPH, and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SILBERMAN.

SILBERMAN, Circuit Judge: Appellant received a 15-year 

mandatory minimum sentence under the Armed Career 

Criminal Act after the police, during an investigatory stop of 

the car he was driving, found a firearm in his possession. 

Jackson now contests both the reasonableness of the stop and 

his sentence. We affirm.

I.

At approximately 8:20 p.m. on August 1, 1995, two District 

of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department officers on patrol observed appellant's car make a U-turn in front of the 

officers' vehicle. Noticing that the rear vent window on the 

passenger side of the vehicle was broken, the officers decided 

to stop the car to investigate whether it was stolen. After the 

patrol car's emergency lights were activated, the car began to 

pull over, and the officers noticed the passenger reach down 

and place something underneath his seat. One of the officers 

(Newsham) approached the vehicle and asked the driver, 

Jackson, for his license and vehicle registration. Newsham 

then noticed a beer bottle (which turned out to be nonalcoholic) on the seat between Jackson and the passenger, 

and asked Jackson to step out of the car. As Jackson left, 

Newsham saw him drop something back into the car and, as 

he escorted Jackson to the rear of the vehicle, Newsham saw 

a handgun between the sill of the door and the driver's seat. 

After turning Jackson over to the other officer, Newsham 

returned to the vehicle, removed the gun from the car, and 

placed Jackson under arrest. Jackson was subsequently 

charged with unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted 

felon, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (1994), unlawful possession of 

ammunition by a convicted felon, see id., and carrying a pistol 

without a license, see D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3204(a) (1996).

As it happens, the car was not stolen; it was owned by 

Jackson's sister. Jackson accordingly moved to suppress the 

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tional seizure of his automobile. At the suppression hearing, 

both officers testified that they pulled the car over because 

the side vent window appeared recently broken, it was uncovered and still had glass fragments in it. In their experience, 

a broken side vent window is indicative that a car may be 

stolen: car thieves often break the smallest window on a car 

to gain entry. Jackson testified on his own behalf. He 

admitted, of course, that the window was broken, but contested that it was, or appeared to be, recently broken. He 

claimed that the window had actually been broken more than 

three weeks before, that all of the glass had been removed, 

and that gray duct tape had been placed over the window.

The district court did not resolve this dispute. Instead, the 

court found that:

a broken rear window together with the officer's experience in other arrests is sufficient proof to support a 

reasonable suspicion that in the officer's mind the car 

was stolen. Here we have a high crime area in the 

evening hours to go with those other factors, and we 

have over 160 arrests or participation in arrests and 

recovery of stolen vehicles by these officers in their 

experience, and Officer Newsham almost on a daily basis 

is recovering stolen automobiles in that neighborhood.

Rejecting Jackson's other challenges to the stop and arrest

Jackson had argued inter alia that, during the stop, the 

police were permitted only to ask him for his driver's license 

and registrationthe district court declined to suppress the 

gun. After the suppression motion was denied, Jackson 

entered a guilty plea to the § 922(g) gun possession charge, 

explicitly preserving the right to appeal the denial of his 

suppression motion.

Appellant now contests only the original stop, and argues 

that under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and its progeny, 

the police did not have reasonable suspicion of unlawful 

conduct when they stopped his car. The district court, it is 

argued, was required to determine whether the window apUSCA Case #96-3074 Document #273075 Filed: 05/20/1997 Page 3 of 10
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peared recently broken because it is unreasonable for the 

police to suspect that a car has been stolen if it simply has a 

broken window. After all, many legitimate car owners drive 

cars with temporarily repaired side vent windows, whereas 

car thieves do not generally stop to repair the damage caused 

by their entry. According to Jackson, we must remand to the 

district court for a determination of whether the window was, 

or appeared to be, recently broken (which, Jackson appears 

to concede, would create reasonable suspicion).

We disagree. Although it is not a necessary inference from 

a broken side vent window that a car has been stolen, it is, as 

the officers testified, a reasonable inference. See In re 

C.A.P., 633 A.2d 787, 789 (D.C. 1993) ("smashed rear vent 

window, taken together with the officer's experience ... was 

sufficient to support a reasonable suspicion"); Commonwealth v. Epps, 608 A.2d 1095, 1097 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) 

("broken rear vent window, as understood by those versed in 

the field of law enforcement, constituted sufficient grounds to 

give rise to reasonable suspicion"). To be sure, as a New 

York court has noted, see People v. Elam, 584 N.Y.S.2d 780, 

781-82 (N.Y. App.Div. 1992), it may be equally consistent with 

other possibilitiessuch as theft of a car's contents or vandalismbut we disagree with Elam that it is therefore unreasonable for the police to infer that a car with a broken rear 

side vent window may be stolen. The officers had "a reasonable, articulable suspicion sufficient to stop the car." United 

States v. Mangum, 100 F.3d 164, 169 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

II.

Jackson also contests his sentence under the Armed Career 

Criminal Act, which imposes a minimum 15-year sentence on 

any person who violates 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1994) and who 

"has three previous convictions by any court ... for a violent 

felony or serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different from one another." 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (1994). 

Jackson's presentence report noted that he had convictions in 

the District of Columbia in 1986 and 1992 for attempted 

robbery, in violation of D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-2901 (1996); two 

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1

Jackson's plea agreement indicated that "since Mr. Jackson 

has three prior felony convictions, he is subject to ... a mandatory 

period of incarceration of not less than fifteen (15) years." Several 

times during the plea proceeding the district court noted that 

Jackson would be subject to the Act's 15-year mandatory minimum, 

and Jackson twice expressed assent. 

District of Columbia shoplifting convictions under D.C. CODE 

ANN. § 22-3813 (1996); District of Columbia drug convictions 

for simple possession of PCP, see D.C. CODE

§ 33-541(d) (1993), and possession with intent to distribute 

marijuana, see D.C. CODE § 33-541(a)(2)(D) (1993); and three 

housebreaking and one attempted housebreaking convictions 

in Maryland under former MD. ANN. CODE of 1957 art. 27 

§ 30(b) (1976). With a two-point reduction for acceptance of 

responsibility, the presentence report indicated that a Sentencing Guidelines range of 188-235 months was appropriate, 

but the district court sua sponte awarded Jackson a threepoint reduction for acceptance of responsibility, thereby decreasing Jackson's Sentencing Guidelines range to 168-210 

months. Because Jackson had not challenged "the prior 

crimes of violence under the D.C. Code that [he had] been 

convicted of," and because "the plea [was] to a minimum of 15 

years,"1the district court thought the Armed Career Criminal Act applicable. The court accordingly sentenced Jackson 

to 180 months, which placed Jackson in "the middle range of 

[the] guideline."

Jackson now argues that, although he never objected to the 

15-year minimum sentence, it was plain error to impose the 

mandatory minimum because his District of Columbia drug 

convictions were not for "serious drug offense[s]" and his 

other convictions were not "violent felon[ies]." 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(e). Alternatively, Jackson claims that even if the error 

were not plain, his counsel below was ineffective in failing to 

object to the terms of his plea agreement and his sentence. 

Since the crucial issue is strictly a question of law, and if 

Jackson is incorrect it is unnecessary to determine whether 

the plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel tests were 

met, we consider the underlying legal issue first: whether 

any three of Jackson's prior convictions qualify as "serious 

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drug offense[s]" or "violent felon[ies]" such that he is subject 

to § 924(e).

Jackson argues, and the government concedes, that neither 

of Jackson's District of Columbia drug convictions was for a 

"serious drug offense": neither was an offense "for which a 

maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more [was] 

prescribed by law." 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). See D.C.

CODE ANN. § 33-541(d) (maximum sentence of one year 

for possession of controlled substance); D.C. CODE

§ 33-541(a)(2)(D) (maximum sentence of one year for possession with intent to distribute marijuana). Nor does the 

government contend that shoplifting in the District of Columbia qualifies as a "violent felony." The question then becomes whether any three of Jackson's other convictionsfor 

attempted robbery in the District of Columbia in 1986 and 

1992, and for housebreaking and attempted housebreaking in 

Maryland in 1982were for a "violent felony," which the 

Armed Career Criminal Act defines as "any crime punishable 

by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" that

(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; 

or

(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves the use of 

explosive, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a 

serious potential risk of physical injury to another.

18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added).

Jackson contends that we may look only to his District of 

Columbia convictions, and not to those in Maryland, in determining if his sentence were proper because the district court 

referenced only the "prior crimes of violence under the D.C. 

Code" in imposing the mandatory minimum. But as Jackson 

conceded at oral argument, the minimum sentence under 

§ 924(e) is required whenever a person has any three qualifying convictions; therefore, if any three of Jackson's convictions, in the District of Columbia or elsewhere, qualify as 

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"serious drug offense[s]" or "violent felon[ies]," the sentence 

was appropriate.

In 1982, Maryland defined housebreaking as:

the crime of breaking a dwelling house in the daytime 

with intent to commit murder or felony therein, or with 

intent to steal, take or carry away the personal goods of 

another of any value therefrom.

MD. ANN. CODE art. 27 § 30(b). See also Hawkins v. State,

436 A.2d 900, 902 (Md. 1981). It might have been thought 

that Jackson's housebreaking convictions would qualify as 

"burglary" under § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), but in Taylor v. United 

States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), the Court held that to qualify as 

"burglary" under § 924(e), a crime must have "the basic 

elements of unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining 

in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a crime." 

Id. at 599. A crime thus constitutes "burglary" only if "its 

statutory definition substantially corresponds to "generic burglary,' " or if "the charging paper and jury instructions 

actually required the jury to find all the elements of generic 

burglary in order to convict the defendant." Id. at 602.

The government concedes that Jackson's housebreaking 

(and attempted housebreaking) convictions do not fall within 

Taylor's generic definition of "burglary": the statute required 

"breaking" only, and not "entering," see Hawkins, 436 A.2d at 

902. Instead, it is argued that housebreaking so defined 

"otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential 

risk of physical injury to another." 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). In Taylor, the Court had noted that the 

government "is free to argue that any offense"including 

offenses similar to generic burglaryshould count toward 

enhancement as falling within the "otherwise" clause under 

§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). 495 U.S. at 600 n.9. The government 

therefore contends that the breaking of a dwelling house, 

even where entry is not effected, presents a risk of a violent 

confrontation between the criminal and the occupant.

To be sure, a confrontation may be more likely to occur, as 

Jackson argues, if the perpetrator has actually entered the 

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dwelling, and such a confrontation may be more likely to 

result in violence if it occurs while the perpetrator is inside 

the dwellingbecause the perpetrator is likely to cause 

greater alarm to whomever he confronts and is likely to have 

no easy way out. Still, that a breaking and entering may 

create a greater risk than a mere breaking does not mean 

that breaking itself, which requires the "unloosing, removing, 

or displacing of any covering or fastening of the premises," 

Reagan v. State, 234 A.2d 278, 281 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1967) 

(citations and quotations omitted), does not involve "a serious 

potential risk of physical injury to another." 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). Breaking a dwelling housei.e., a house 

that is likely to be occupiedcreates a substantial risk of 

confrontation between the perpetrator and an occupant, or 

perhaps a passerby. And where such a confrontation occurs, 

there is a substantial risk that serious injury to the occupant 

or passerby will occur. The Maryland statute thus prescribes 

generic conduct with the (serious potential) risk of physical 

injury to another.

United States v. Martinez, 954 F.2d 1050 (5th Cir. 1992), 

and United States v. Strahl, 958 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1992), on 

which Jackson relies, are distinguishable. In each case, the 

court held that attempted burglary (in Texas and Utah, 

respectively) does not involve serious potential risk of physical injury to another because a defendant could be convicted 

without even being in the vicinity of a building. See Martinez, 954 F.2d at 1054 (Under Texas law, a defendant "who 

had taken steps which tended to effect the commission of a 

burglary could be arrested far from the target of the burglary 

and still be convicted of the attempt.") (internal quotation 

marks omitted); Strahl, 958 F.2d at 986 (Under Utah law, 

"an attempted burglary conviction may be based upon conduct such as making a duplicate key, "casing' the targeted 

building, obtaining floor plans of a structure, or possessing 

burglary tools."). In Maryland, however, Jackson's housebreaking convictions required that he actually "break" a 

dwelling, placing him in direct proximity to the home, an 

action we believe involves a "serious potential risk of physical 

injury to another." 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). Cf. United 

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2 Compare United States v. Balascsak, 873 F.2d 673, 682 (3d 

Cir. 1989) (en banc) (plurality holding that "first conviction must 

have been rendered before the second crime was committed"), cert. 

denied, 498 U.S. 864 (1990) with United States v. Schoolcraft, 879 

F.2d 64, 73-74 (3d Cir.) (rejecting the plurality's reasoning in 

Balascsak and finding "persuasive" the view that the criminal 

episodes must be "distinct in time"), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 995 

(1989). 

States v. Payne, 966 F.2d 4, 9 (1st Cir. 1992) (Under Massachusetts law, attempted burglary qualifies under 

§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) because "the defendant will have come close 

enough to someone else's premises to risk a confrontation 

likely to result in violence."). Jackson's attempted housebreaking conviction might not qualify, but we need not reach 

that issue if Jackson has three qualifying housebreaking 

convictions.

Jackson's last argument against the use of his Maryland 

housebreaking convictions is that these convictions were not 

for offenses "committed on occasions different from one another," 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), because they were committed 

close together in time (on September 22, 24, and 30, 1982) in 

the same neighborhood, and because they were adjudicated 

together, with concurrent sentences of probation imposed on 

each. These events, he argues, were part of a single "spree 

of criminal activity" that cannot count as three distinct predicate convictions under § 924(e).

This is a question of first impression for us. But our sister 

circuits, save perhaps one,2have held uniformly that offenses 

were "committed on occasions different from one another" if 

they arose out of "separate and distinct criminal episode[s]." 

United States v. Hudspeth, 42 F.3d 1015, 1019 (7th Cir. 1994) 

(en banc) (collecting cases), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2252 

(1995). Although the courts have not settled on a precise test 

for determining what are separate and distinct criminal episodes, compare, e.g., Hudspeth, 42 F.3d at 1021 (multiple 

criminal episodes where "crimes were committed sequentially, 

against different victims, at different times, and at different 

locations") with United States v. Tisdale, 921 F.2d 1095, 

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3 We thus do not decide whether Jackson's District of Columbia 

attempted robbery convictions qualify as § 924(e) predicateseither because they were for offenses that "otherwise involve conduct 

that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another," 

18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), or because the sentencing materials 

indicate that the convictions satisfied Taylor's generic definition of 

burglary. Cf. United States v. Harris, 964 F.2d 1234, 1237 (1st Cir. 

1992) (where it is unclear from an indictment whether the defendant 

was charged with the "generically violent crime ... rather than the 

generically nonviolent crime," sentencing court may look to presentence report to determine with which crime the defendant was 

charged). 

1098-99 (10th Cir. 1990) (three separate criminal episodes 

where defendant burgled three stores in one mall on the same 

evening because the burglaries were "distinct in time" and 

the defendant was free to end his criminal activity after each), 

cert. denied, 502 U.S. 986 (1991), Jackson's Maryland housebreaking convictions would meet any of the tests relied upon 

by other courts: the housebreakings were committed at 

different times (on September 22, 24, and 30, 1982), at 

different locations and against different victims, and Jackson 

was clearly free to desist from the subsequent criminal activity after each breaking.

Accordingly, we reject appellant's argument that his three 

Maryland housebreaking convictions are not § 924(e) predicates,3

and the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

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