Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca6-18-05894/USCOURTS-ca6-18-05894-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Courtney Shea Gillispie
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)

File Name: 19a0150p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

COURTNEY SHEA GILLISPIE,

Defendant-Appellant.

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No. 18-5894

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Kentucky at Lexington.

No. 5:17-cr-00126-1—Joseph M. Hood, District Judge.

Decided and Filed: July 10, 2019

Before: ROGERS, GRIFFIN, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ON BRIEF: Dori H. Thompson, THOMPSON LAW OFFICE, Lexington, Kentucky, for 

Appellant. Charles P. Wisdom, Jr., John Patrick Grant, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S 

OFFICE, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellee.

_________________

OPINION

_________________

GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge.

Defendant, Courtney Gillispie, appeals the district court’s decision to depart upward at 

sentencing because his crime resulted in significant physical injury to his victim. Finding no 

abuse of discretion in the court’s sentencing decision, we affirm. 

>

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I.

Defendant was indicted on one count of distributing fentanyl in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(a)(1). This charge arises out of one sale of fentanyl to Jerry Brice, who had been 

purchasing heroin from defendant “[o]ff and on, for maybe a year and a half.” Admittedly, Brice 

was not a healthy man. He suffered from hypertension and a mild arrhythmia, tested positive for 

hepatitis C, and had been an opioid addict for years. In the drug sale in question, Brice 

purchased from defendant half a gram of what he believed to be heroin, but what turned out to be 

fentanyl. Brice then took approximately a quarter of that half gram and injected it intravenously. 

Brice had a stroke and entered a coma; he was discovered unresponsive on his parents’ front 

porch and doses of Narcan were unsuccessful at resuscitating him. He was taken to the hospital 

and kept in a medically induced coma for over two weeks, but luckily he survived. It was later 

determined that Brice suffered a subarachnoid hemorrhage and anoxic brain injury causing his 

brain to lose oxygen. He also suffered liver failure, kidney failure, and heart failure, and only 

recovered his day-to-day functioning after six months of intensive physical, speech, and 

occupational therapies. 

After Brice awoke from his coma, he spoke with police and identified “Corey” as his 

drug dealer. Police determined that “Corey” was defendant, and upon questioning he admitted 

selling Brice the fentanyl. Defendant was charged with distribution of fentanyl as a result. He 

pleaded guilty to the charge, admitting that he knowingly and intentionally sold fentanyl to 

Brice. 

Defendant’s presentence report acknowledged the possibility that the district court could 

increase his sentence above the authorized range based upon USSG § 5K2.2, which authorizes 

departures when “significant physical injury result[s]” from the crime. He objected to this 

portion of the report because the victim had an “extensive and serious history of pre-existing 

medical conditions” making it likely that the fentanyl he injected was not the sole cause of his 

overdose and injuries. The parties appeared for sentencing, at which Brice testified about his 

overdose and resulting ailments. Defendant called Dr. Dave Feola, a doctor of pharmacy, to 

testify at the hearing. Dr. Feola testified that it was possible Brice’s pre-existing health status 

affected his likelihood of experiencing a drug overdose, and that it was possible that his 

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condition could have increased the likelihood of overdose symptoms. Ultimately, the district 

court concluded that defendant’s fentanyl caused Brice’s overdose and increased defendant’s 

offense level by six points, from 17 to 23. This increased defendant’s Guidelines range to 51 to 

63 months, and the district court sentenced him to the bottom of that range, for a sentence of 51 

months. 

Defendant now appeals his sentence. 

II.

We review sentencing determinations for abuse of discretion. Gall v. United States, 552 

U.S. 38, 41 (2007). We similarly review a district court’s decision to depart upward from the 

Guidelines for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Robinson, 892 F.3d 209, 212 (6th Cir. 

2018). And this abuse-of-discretion standard even applies to whether “the [court’s] discretion 

was . . . guided by erroneous legal conclusions.” Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996). 

III.

This appeal centers entirely on the interpretation of § 5K2.2 of the United States 

Sentencing Guidelines. That section provides, in pertinent part:

If significant physical injury resulted, the court may increase the sentence above 

the authorized guideline range. The extent of the increase ordinarily should 

depend on . . . the extent to which the injury was intended or knowingly risked. 

When the victim suffers a major, permanent disability and when such injury was 

intentionally inflicted, a substantial departure may be appropriate. If the injury is 

less serious or if the defendant (though criminally negligent) did not knowingly 

create the risk of harm, a less substantial departure would be indicated.

USSG § 5K2.2 (emphasis added). Defendant does not contest that Brice suffered significant 

physical injury. In this regard, the unrebutted testimony at sentencing showed that as a result of 

injecting the fentanyl he purchased from defendant, Brice: (1) had a stroke; (2) went into a coma 

for over two weeks; (3) suffered a brain hemorrhage, kidney failure, heart failure, liver failure, 

and rhabdomyolysis; and (4) had to relearn how to walk and write. All in all, it took Brice over 

six months of various therapy treatments to recover most of his functioning. 

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On appeal, defendant contends that the district court erred by failing to consider Brice’s 

“own choice to engage in the intravenous ingestion of street drugs and the knowing risk that he 

engaged in.” Because § 5K2.2 notes that any departure under this section should take into 

account “the extent to which the injury was . . . knowingly risked,” he argues that it “is not clear 

as to whether the [Sentencing Commission] is discussing the ‘knowing risk’ entered into by the 

victim or the Defendant.” Defendant does not cite any support for this argument and, in fact, 

admits that there is no precedent interpreting this language. But even more problematic for his 

contention is that it runs headlong into the plain language of the sentencing provision when read 

as a whole. 

It is a fundamental canon of construction that the words of a text must be read in their 

context and with a view to their place in the overall scheme. Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 

489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The 

Interpretation of Legal Texts 167 (2012) (“[T]he whole-text canon . . . calls on the judicial 

interpreter to consider the entire text, in view of its structure and of the physical and logical 

relation of its many parts.”). While the language defendant quotes is in the passive voice and 

specifies no actor, § 5K2.2 clarifies that language’s subject only two sentences later: “If . . . the 

defendant . . . did not knowingly create the risk of harm, a less substantial departure would be 

indicated.” USSG § 5K2.2 (emphasis added). In other words, when reading the entire 

Guidelines provision, it is the defendant’s intent or knowing risk—not the victim’s—that is 

relevant. 

Furthermore, defendant not only has to overcome this textual barrier but also our 

deferential standard of review. As noted above, the evidence presented at sentencing clearly 

established that Brice suffered significant physical injury causing hospitalization, and which 

could likely have led to death if not for the medical intervention. Given that defendant sold 

Brice fentanyl that defendant told him was heroin, the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

determining that defendant knowingly risked this significant physical injury to Brice. Robinson, 

892 F.3d at 212. His 51-month sentence—falling at the very bottom of the properly scored 

range—was reasonable and not an abuse of discretion. 

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IV.

For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

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