Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00063/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00063-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
University Physicians Healthcare
Defendant
Pamela Ann Wood
Plaintiff

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Pamela Ann Wood, a married woman filing 

individually, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

University Physicians Healthcare, an 

Arizona corporation, 

Defendant.

No. CV-13-00063-PHX-JAT

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is Defendant University Physicians Healthcare’s 

(“UPH”) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Re: Counts I, IV, and VI of Plaintiff’s 

Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) and the parties’ Stipulated 

Motion to Dismiss Counts I and VI of Plaintiff’s Complaint with Prejudice. 

I. Background

 Plaintiff Pamela Ann Wood (“Wood”), a previous employee of UPH, has brought 

the present action against UPH alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress, 

negligent infliction of emotional distress,1

 disability discrimination under the Americans 

with Disabilities Act, constructive discharge, retaliation, and defamation. In the pending 

motions, the parties have stipulated to the dismissal of Wood’s claims for intentional 

infliction of emotional distress and defamation (Counts I and VI). UPH also seeks to 

dismiss Wood’s claim constructive discharge (Count IV). Wood has alleged (Doc. 1-1) 

 1

 Wood has already voluntarily dismissed her negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. (Doc. 11). 

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the following facts in her Complaint.2

 In the late 1990’s, Wood was diagnosed with Crohn’s disease. (Id. ¶ 8). Crohn’s 

disease is an incurable chronic disease of the intestinal tract that can cause pain, diarrhea, 

weight loss, bleeding, fevers, and fatigue. (Id.). The symptoms of Crohn’s disease vary 

in intensity, but stress can cause flair ups. (Id.). 

 In September 2008, UPH hired Wood as a case manager. (Id. ¶ 6). For the first 

three months of Wood’s employment, she was supervised by Deb Keller. (Id. ¶ 9). Ms. 

Keller was then promoted to “Director,” and Martha Rodriguez supervised Wood. (Id.). 

 Shortly after being hired, the Mayo Clinic accepted Wood for treatment of her 

Crohn’s disease. (Id. ¶ 10). Wood then informed Ms. Keller of her chronic illness for the 

first time. (Id. ¶ 11). Further, Wood explained that she may have to miss work for 

doctor’s appointments. (Id.).

 In fall of 2008, Ms. Keller completed an unfavorable “impromptu review” of 

Wood. (Id. ¶ 12). Following the review, Ms. Keller told Wood that she had discussed 

Wood’s medical condition with the UPH “Medical Director” and that they felt that Wood 

should take a lesser position. (Id.). Wood did not give Ms. Keller permission to discuss 

her medical history with anyone. (Id.). Wood was also informed that she would be 

unable to work from home. (Id. ¶ 13). Previously, during her hiring interview, Wood had 

been informed that she would be able to work from home. (Id.). Further, other 

employees of UPH were able to work from home. (Id.). 

 After Ms. Keller’s promotion, Wood was responsible for training two new case 

managers. (Id. ¶¶ 14,15). One of these new case managers, Dyana Cairns, was absent 

from work six times without reprimand within the “first months” of her employment. (Id. 

¶ 14). Ms. Cairns’ absences exceeded Wood’s absences due to doctor’s appointments “in 

any given month.” (Id.). The second case manager, Margarita Wellman, was receiving a 

higher wage than Wood despite the fact that Wood was training her. (Id. ¶ 15). 

 

2

 The Court construes all facts alleged in the Complaint in the light most favorable to the drafter. See Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000).

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 Shortly after learning that Ms. Wellman was receiving a higher wage, Wood 

reported her concerns to her supervisor, Ms. Rodriguez. (Id. ¶ 16). Ms. Rodriguez 

informed Wood that she had talked with Ms. Keller about Wood’s concerns and that 

nothing was going to change. (Id.) She also told Wood to “not get upset, you’ll make 

yourself sick.” (Id.) 

 A few days later, Wood called the UPH ethics and compliance hotline to report the 

pay discrepancies and the harassment concerning Wood’s doctor’s appointments. (Id. 

¶ 17). Wood obtained the hotline number from a break room poster that assured there 

would be no retaliation for calling. (Id.) 

 On August 24, 2009, Wood met with Ms. Keller to discuss her concerns. (Id. ¶ 

19). Ms. Keller stated that Wood’s illness was affecting her work, including the time that 

she had missed for doctor’s appointments. (Id.). Ms. Keller requested that Wood take a 

form to her doctor. (Id.). Wood’s doctor could then fill out the form with how much 

work Wood was going to miss and what accommodations Wood might need. (Id.). Ms. 

Keller also requested that Wood take a copy of her position description to her doctor to 

help her doctor to fill out the form. (Id.). Finally, Ms. Keller required Wood to attend a 

weekly one-on-one meeting with her supervisor because she called the ethics hotline and 

“failed to follow the chain of command.” (Id.). Rather than comply with Ms. Keller’s 

request, Wood gave three weeks’ notice and then resigned her employment. (Id. ¶ 20). 

II. Legal Standard 

 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(c) is “functionally identical” to Rule 

12(b)(6). The same legal standard therefore applies to motions brought under either rule. 

Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., 637 F.3d 1047, 1055 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011); 

Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 1989) (“The principal 

difference between motions filed pursuant to Rule 12(b) and Rule 12(c) is the time of 

filing. Because the motions are functionally identical, the same standard of review 

applicable to a Rule 12(b) motion applies to its Rule 12(c) analog.”). 

 The standard for deciding Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 12(c) is established in the 

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Supreme Court’s decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).3

 To survive a motion for failure to state a claim, 

a complaint must meet the requirements of Rule 8(a)(2). Rule 8(a)(2) requires a “short 

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” so that the 

defendant has “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 

Although a complaint attacked for failure to state a claim does not need detailed 

factual allegations, the pleader’s obligation to provide the grounds for relief requires 

“more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 

of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations omitted). The factual 

allegations of the complaint must be sufficient to raise a right to relief above a 

speculative level. Id. Rule 8(a)(2) “requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, 

of entitlement to relief. Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see 

how a claimant could satisfy the requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the 

nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.” Id. (citing 5 C. Wright 

& A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1202, pp. 94, 95 (3d ed. 2004)). 

 Rule 8’s pleading standard demands more than “an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

555). A complaint that offers nothing more than naked assertions will not suffice. To 

survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, which, if 

accepted as true, states a claim to relief that is “plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

677. Facial plausibility exists if the pleader pleads factual content that allows the court to 

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. 

Plausibility does not equal “probability,” but plausibility requires more than a sheer 

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Id. “Where a complaint pleads facts 

that are ‘merely consistent’ with a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between 

 

3

 The Ninth Circuit has applied Iqbal to Rule 12(c) Motions. Cafasso, 637 F.3d at 

1055 n.4.

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possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’ ” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

557). 

 In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court must construe the facts alleged in the 

complaint in the light most favorable to the drafter of the complaint and must accept all 

well-pleaded factual allegations as true. See Shwarz, 234 F.3d at 435. Nonetheless, the 

Court does not have to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation. 

Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). The Court may dismiss a complaint for 

failure to state a claim for two reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory; and (2) 

insufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 

Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

III. Analysis 

The parties have already stipulated to the dismissal of Counts I and VI. Thus, 

UPH’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on Counts I and VI is denied as moot. The 

Court will thus examine the only remaining count addressed by UPH’s motion for 

judgment on the pleadings, Count IV. 

 A. Count IV, Constructive Discharge

 UPH argues that Wood has failed to allege a successful constructive discharge 

claim because constructive discharge is not an independent cause of action under Arizona 

law. (Doc. 13 at 8–12). In particular, UPH contends that Arizona’s constructive 

discharge statute, A.R.S. § 23-1502, does not create a cause of action distinct from 

Arizona’s wrongful termination statute, A.R.S. § 23-1501. (Id. at 8–9). Instead, UPH 

argues that A.R.S. § 23-1502 allows employees to assert a wrongful termination action 

when they have not been expressly fired. (Id. at 9). UPH asserts that Wood has failed to 

allege a cause of action under A.R.S. § 23-1501 and thus cannot allege a violation of 

A.R.S. § 23-1502. (Id. at 12). 

 In response, Wood argues that Arizona courts have recognized constructive 

discharge as a separate cause of action. (Doc. 17 at 6–7). But, if the Court is not 

persuaded by this argument, Wood asks for leave to amend her complaint to include an 

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Arizona statutory cause of action. (Id. at 7). 

 A.R.S. § 23-1502 provides that “[i]n any action under the statutes of this state or 

under common law, constructive discharge may only be established by either”: (1) 

“[e]vidence of objectively difficult or unpleasant working conditions to the extent that a 

reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign”; or (2) “[e]vidence of outrageous 

conduct by the employer or a managing agent of the employer, . . . if the conduct would 

cause a reasonable employee to feel compelled to resign.” If the employee alleged 

“objectively difficult or unpleasant working conditions,” the employee must also comply 

with the procedural requirements of A.R.S. § 23-1502(B), which largely consist of fifteen 

days written notice to the employer. 

 As an initial matter, the statutory text refutes UPH’s argument that a constructive 

discharge action must be based in an underlying wrongful discharge action under A.R.S. 

§ 23-1501. The statute explicitly contemplates that constructive discharge can be 

established “in any action under the statutes of this state or under common law.” A.R.S. 

§ 23-1501 (emphasis added). Thus, constructive discharge is clearly available to 

plaintiffs alleging violations of law other than A.R.S. § 23-1501, i.e., common law causes 

of action. Further, “statutes of this state” implies that multiple state statutes could form 

the basis of the claim. This understanding of the statute is in accord with Arizona case 

law. See Barth v. Cochise Cnty., Arizona, 138 P.3d 1186, 1189 ¶ 11 (Ariz. Ct. App. 

2006) (examining the procedural requirements of a constructive discharge claim when 

wrongful termination was not alleged). 

 But, the fact that A.R.S. § 23-1502 is distinct from wrongful termination under 

A.R.S. § 23-1501 does not necessarily mean that A.R.S. § 23-1502 creates a truly 

independent cause of action, i.e., that constructive discharge can be alleged without any 

other claims. On the one hand, the statutory language appears to subordinate constructive 

discharge claims to actions under state statutes or common law. A.R.S. § 23-1502 (“[i]n 

any action under the statutes of this state or under common law, constructive discharge 

may only be established by either . . .”). Further, A.R.S. § 23-1502 does not specify any 

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remedy for constructive discharge, which is typically required in an independent tort. 

Finally, for comparison, the federal law doctrine of constructive discharge is not a cause 

of action in its own right. See Penn. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 141 (“Under 

the constructive discharge doctrine, an employee’s reasonable decision to resign because 

of unendurable working conditions is assimilated to a formal discharge for remedial 

purposes.”) 

 On the other hand, Arizona courts have discussed A.R.S. § 23-1502 constructive 

discharge as if it were a separate cause of action. See Barth, 138 P.3d at 1189 ¶ 11 

(stating that A.R.S. § 23-1502 “sets out the procedural requirements for bringing a 

constructive discharge action”).4

 Further, the Revised Arizona Jury Instructions (Civil) 

provides a model jury instruction for A.R.S. § 23-1502 constructive discharge, though it 

notes that “[t]here is an active debate among labor and employment practitioners as to 

whether constructive discharge is an independently actionable cause of action.” Revised 

Arizona Jury Instructions (Civil), Employment Law Instructions 11 (4th ed. rev. 2005). 

Here, Wood has asked for leave to amend her complaint to include a charge under 

a “similar state statute” in Arizona to her “Title VII” claim. (Doc. 17 at 7). Assumedly, 

Wood means to amend her complaint to bring a claim under Arizona Civil Rights Act 

(“ACRA”), A.R.S. §§ 41-1401 through 1492. In an abundance of caution, the Court will 

allow leave to amend.5

 In her amended complaint, Wood should make clear whether she 

is alleging constructive discharge as part of her ACRA claim or as a completely separate 

cause of action. If Wood chooses to bring constructive discharge as an independent 

 

4

 This Court has also discussed A.R.S. § 23-1502 constructive discharge as if it were a separate cause of action, without expressly deciding so. See Biggs v. Town of Gilbert, CV11-330-PHX-JAT, 2012 WL 94566 at **8–9 (D. Ariz. Jan. 12, 2012) 

(dismissing a constructive discharge claim for failing to meet the procedural requirements).

5

 UPH argues that any leave to amend to include an ACRA claim would be futile 

because only a claim under A.R.S. § 23-1501 can support a constructive discharge claim and claims under the ACRA are distinct from claims under A.R.S. § 23-1501. (Doc. 18 

at 6–7). As already explained, the Court has determined that, even if constructive 

discharge is not an independent cause of action, A.R.S. § 23-1501 is not the sole basis for 

supporting a constructive discharge claim. 

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cause of action, UPH can file a new motion on this issue. Accordingly, at this time, the 

Court will not decide whether A.R.S. § 23-1502 constructive discharge is an independent 

cause of action. 

III. Conclusion 

 Based on the foregoing, 

 IT IS ORDERED that the parties’ Stipulated Motion to Dismiss Counts I and VI 

of Plaintiff’s Complaint with Prejudice (Doc. 44) is granted. Counts I and VI are 

dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that UPH’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 

Re: Counts I, IV, and VI of Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 13) is granted in part and denied 

in part. With respect to Counts I and VI, the motion is denied as moot. With respect to 

Count IV, Plaintiff’s request to amend her Complaint to include a claim under the ACRA 

is granted (Doc. 17). Plaintiff must file an amended complaint within 14 days of the date 

of this order. If Plaintiff fails to file the amended complaint to clarify her constructive 

discharge theory of Count IV, the Court will deem Count IV to be abandoned and 

dismissed as a result of this Order (the case will still then proceed on the currently filed 

complaint consistent with this Order). Because the amended complaint supersedes the 

original complaint, Plaintiff must replead all causes of action in the amended complaint 

except for the Counts already dismissed by this Court.6

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the dispositive motion deadline is extended to 

January 10, 2014. 

 Dated this 21st day of November, 2013. 

 

6 See Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 

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