Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-11-05300/USCOURTS-caDC-11-05300-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ronnie Payne
Appellant
Patricia Stansberry
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 16, 2014 Decided July 29, 2014

No. 11-5300

RONNIE PAYNE,

APPELLANT

v.

PATRICIA STANSBERRY, WARDEN,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:10-cv-00617)

Rosanna M. Taormina, Assistant Federal Public Defender,

argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was A.J.

Kramer, Federal Public Defender.

John P. Gidez, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for

appellee. With him on the brief were Ronald C. Machen Jr.,

U.S. Attorney, and Elizabeth Trosman, Assistant U.S. Attorney. 

Suzanne G. Curt and John P. Mannarino, Assistant U.S.

Attorneys, entered appearances.

Before: ROGERS, SRINIVASAN andMILLETT, Circuit Judges.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: Ronnie Payne appeals the

dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in which he

USCA Case #11-5300 Document #1504943 Filed: 07/29/2014 Page 1 of 13
2

claimed he was denied his right to the effective assistance of

counsel under the Sixth Amendment when his appellate counsel

failed to seek plain error review of the trial judge’s instruction

that the jury “must find [Payne] guilty” even if the government

failed to prove any element of a charged offense beyond a

reasonable doubt. We conclude Payne has met his burden under

the ineffective assistance standard of Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668 (1984). Accordingly, he is entitled to a new direct

appeal at which he may raise this instructional error claim before

the D.C. Court of Appeals for plain error review.

I.

At the close of the evidence, the trial judge instructed the

jury on the government’s burden of proof:

If you find that the Government has proved, beyond a

reasonable doubt, every element of the offense with

which these defendants, or this defendant is charged,

it’s your duty to find that defendant guilty. 

On the other hand, if you find that the Government has

failed to prove any element of the offense, beyond a

reasonable doubt, you must find that defendant guilty. 

Trial Tr. 94 (Feb. 19, 1993) (emphasis added). The jury was

further instructed that it “may not . . . disregard any instruction”

and “may not question the wisdom of the law.” Id. at 90. At the

start of the trial, the judge had instructed the jury that it was to

follow the final instructions rather than his preliminary remarks. 

See Trial Tr. 108 (Feb. 9, 1993). Defense counsel did not object

to the final instruction on the government’s burden of proof. 

Payne was convicted and sentenced to consecutive sentences

ranging from two years to life imprisonment.

USCA Case #11-5300 Document #1504943 Filed: 07/29/2014 Page 2 of 13
3

On appeal, his trial counsel was appointed his appellate

counsel and argued, among other things, that the trial judge

erred in giving an aiding and abetting instruction to the jury,

visiting the crime scene, and denying Payne’s motion for a new

trial based on newly discovered potentially exculpatory

evidence. Although counsel had a trial transcript for review, he

did not seek plain error review of the burden of proof

instruction. The D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed Payne’s

convictions. Payne v. United States, 697 A.2d 1229 (D.C.

1997). Payne filed several pro se motions to vacate his

convictions and to recall the mandate, identifying in at least one

a missed “constitutional issue that he failed to present on direct

appeal.” Mot. for Recons. at 1 (Sept. 17, 2008). 

Following the denial of his post-conviction motions by the

District of Columbia courts, Payne filed a pro se petition for a

writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court. See Williams

v. Martinez, 586 F.3d 995, 998 (D.C. Cir. 2009). He argued that

he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective

assistance of appellate counsel, see Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S.

387, 393–94 (1985), because his appointed appellate counsel,

who was also his trial counsel, labored under a conflict of

interest and failed, among other things, to present the trial

judge’s erroneous burden of proof instruction for plain error

review. Payne attached to the petition two letters from counsel

acknowledging that he “overlooked the faulty jury instruction,”

and that he “simply d[id] not know how [he] could have missed

that in the appeal,” and suggesting that Payne’s “best option is

pursuing the ineffective [assistance of counsel] option.” 

Appellant’s App. 34–35 (attaching letters of Dec. 6 & 31, 2007). 

The district court dismissed the habeas petition, finding Payne

had failed to show he was prejudiced as a result of appellate

counsel’s deficient performance in failing to present the

“obvious” instructional error. Payne v. Stansberry, 800 F. Supp.

2d 251, 260–62 (D.D.C. 2011). Payne’s motion for

USCA Case #11-5300 Document #1504943 Filed: 07/29/2014 Page 3 of 13
4

reconsideration was denied. 

This court granted Payne’s motion for a certificate of

appealability with regard to his claims of ineffective assistance

of counsel due to appellate counsel’s conflict of interest in

serving as both trial and appellate counsel, see Cuyler v.

Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980), and in failing to challenge the

reasonable doubt instruction, see Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668 (1984). See Order, Oct. 18, 2012. In view of our

disposition, we do not reach the conflict of interest claim.

II.

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

under Strickland, the defendant must show that (1) his counsel’s

performance “fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness,” and (2) “there is a reasonable probability that,

but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” 466 U.S. at 687–88,

694; see United States v. Hughes, 514 F.3d 15, 17 (D.C. Cir.

2008). The same standard applies with respect to claims of the

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. See Smith v.

Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000). The Strickland test “does

not require defendants to show that the errors ‘more likely than

not altered the outcome in the case,’ but only that they were

‘sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’” United

States v. Saro, 24 F.3d 283, 287 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693–94). The parties agree that the D.C.

Court of Appeals would have applied a plain error standard of

review had appellate counsel presented the issue of the burden

of proof instruction in Payne’s direct appeal and under

Strickland’s second prong, the question therefore is whether it

is reasonably probable that the D.C. Court of Appeals would

have concluded that the instruction was plain error. This court

reviews the district court’s factual findings for clear error and

USCA Case #11-5300 Document #1504943 Filed: 07/29/2014 Page 4 of 13
5

questions of law de novo. See Obaydullah v. Obama, 688 F.3d

784, 791–92 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Dorsey v. Stephens, 720 F.3d

309, 314 (5th Cir. 2013); Wilson v. Parker, 515 F.3d 682, 691

(6th Cir. 2008). 

A.

“The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness

must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper

functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be

relied upon as having produced a just result.” Strickland, 466

U.S. at 686. Strickland cautions that “a court must indulge a

strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide

range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 689. As our

sister circuit has observed, “[b]ecause of this presumption and

the reality that effective appellate advocacy often entails

screening out weaker issues, the Sixth Amendment does not

require that appellate counsel raise every colorable or nonfrivolous issue on appeal.” Roe v. Delo, 160 F.3d 416, 418 (8th

Cir. 1998) (citing Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751–54

(1983)). A “defendant must overcome the presumption that,

under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be

considered sound trial strategy.’” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689

(citation omitted). Indeed, the decision to forego a plain error

claim would not uncommonly be thought to be “the result of a

reasonable winnowing of weaker appellate claims.” Roe, 160

F.3d at 418.

In Payne’s case, however, counsel’s own letters indicate

that there could be no basis for concluding that there was any

strategic or tactical decision not to challenge the instruction on

appeal. Counsel acknowledged that he had no explanation for

his failure to raise the issue. Counsel stated that he “d[id] not

know how [he] could have missed” the issue on appeal. The

instructional error was significant because it lowered the

government’s burden of proof and would have been apparent to

USCA Case #11-5300 Document #1504943 Filed: 07/29/2014 Page 5 of 13
6

a reasonably competent attorney who reviewed the trial

transcript andwas familiar with long-established Supreme Court

precedent on the burden of proof. See In re Winship, 397 U.S.

358, 364 (1970). Counsel raised a different non-constitutional

instructional error on direct appeal, further indicating that the

failure to raise this issue was oversight, not deliberate strategy.

Consequently, absent a strategic decision by counsel, the

ineffectiveness prong of Strickland turns on whether an

objectively reasonable attorney would have sought plain error

review because the issue had a reasonable likelihood of success. 

“In other words, this is the rare case where both Strickland

prongs turn on the same question, whether there is a reasonable

probability that the outcome of [Payne’s] appeal would have

been different had this issue been raised.” Roe, 160 F.3d at 419. 

The answer requires an examination of the D.C. Court of

Appeals’ application of the plain error standard of review to

instructional error.

B.

Under the plain error standard of review, there must be

(1) error (2) that is “obvious,” (3) “affec[ts] substantial rights,”

and (4) “seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public

reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Olano, 507

U.S. 725, 732–36 (1993); see Foreman v. United States, 633

A.2d 792, 795 (D.C. 1993). 

The first two prongs of the plain error standard are met: The

burden of proof instruction was legal error and the error was

obvious, as the district court found, Payne, 800 F. Supp. 2d at

261. Both this court and the D.C. Court of Appeals have held

that a judge who incorrectly instructs the jury that it “must find

the Defendant guilty” absent adequate proof, even through “an

honest oversight,” effectively directs a verdict of guilt. United

States v. Hayward, 420 F.2d 142, 144 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Baker

USCA Case #11-5300 Document #1504943 Filed: 07/29/2014 Page 6 of 13
7

v. United States, 324 A.2d 194, 196–97 (D.C. 1974); cf. United

States v. Birbal, 62 F.3d 456, 461 (2d Cir. 1995); Bloomer v.

United States, 162 F.3d 187, 194 (2d Cir. 1998). In Baker, the

jury had been instructed that it must convict the defendant if the

government disproved the defendant’s self-defense claim,

regardless of whether it found all of the elements of the charged

offense had been proven. 324 A.2d at 196. The court relied on

this court’s opinion in Hayward, 420 F.2d 142, which was

binding under M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310 (D.C. 1971),

holding that a similar instruction amounted to a directed verdict

in violation of the Sixth Amendment, and reversing the

conviction, Hayward, 420 F.2d at 146. Noting the similarity

between the two “must” convict instructions — one involving

self-defense, the other an alibi defense — the D.C. Court of

Appeals in Baker rejected the government’s argument that the

error was harmless when the other instructions were considered. 

The court observed that applying the well-established

“presumption that juries faithfully obey” the judge’s instructions

leads to the dilemma of which instruction do we

presume the jury obeyed. Did they obey the specific

instruction that they ‘must’ convict if the government

disproved [the defendant’s] claim of self-defense; or

did they, in spite of that specific instruction, somehow

obey the general instructions that the government bears

the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on all

elements of the offense?

324 A.2d at 197. Further, the court rejected the idea that the

weakness of the defendant’s self-defense claim rendered the

error harmless, noting that the problem with the instruction was

that it allowed the jury to convict solely on the basis of rejecting

the defense and thus “in effect direct[ed] a guilty verdict with

respect to all elements of the crime.” Id. 

USCA Case #11-5300 Document #1504943 Filed: 07/29/2014 Page 7 of 13
8

The government suggests that omission of the word “not”

in the instruction was either an error in transcription or a slip of

the tongue by the trial judge. But it makes no proffer to support

its transcription error theory, advising only that the jury was

apparently not given a written copy of the instructions and that

both the audio recording and the notes of the now-deceased

court reporter have been destroyed. And whether or not the

judge’s error was inadvertent does not change whether it was

obvious error. See, e.g., Hayward, 420 F.2d at 144; Turrentine

v. Mullin, 390 F.3d 1181, 1194 (10th Cir. 2004). 

As regards the third and fourth prongs of the plain error

standard on prejudice and the fairness of the trial, the analysis

begins with Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993). There,

the Supreme Court held that a jury instruction defining

“reasonable doubt” as “such doubt as would give rise to a grave

uncertainty,” “an actual substantial doubt,” and a “moral

certainty” was structural error. See id. at 277 (citing Cage v.

Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 40 (1990)). The Court observed that

“although a judge may direct a verdict for the defendant if the

evidence is legally insufficient to establish guilt, he may not

direct a verdict for the State, no matter how overwhelming the

evidence.” Id. (citing Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51,

105–06 (1895)). It concluded that “the jury verdict required by

the Sixth Amendment is a jury verdict of guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt,” id. at 278, and held that denial of the right to

a jury verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is a “structural

error,” which “def[ies] analysis by ‘harmless-error’ standards,”

id. at 281–82. Both this court and the D.C. Court of Appeals

have recognized that the logic of Sullivan applies to plain error

analysis. See United States v. Merlos, 8 F.3d 48, 51 (D.C. Cir.

1993); Arthur v. United States, 986 A.2d 398, 413 (D.C. 2009). 

A finding that the instructional error at Payne’s trial was

“structural” would, under the logic of Sullivan v. Louisiana, go

USCA Case #11-5300 Document #1504943 Filed: 07/29/2014 Page 8 of 13
9

a significant way towards establishing the last two prongs of the

plain error inquiry, which in turn would go a long way towards

establishing (at least) a reasonable probability of plain error. In

Arthur, 986 A.2d at 413, the D.C. Court of Appeals

acknowledged that “if [an error] is structural in nature, the

defendant’s substantial rights will be deemed to have been

affected, without need for further analysis in the context of the

particular trial.” In Barrows v. United States, 15 A.3d 673 (D.C.

2011), the court acknowledged that a structural error is “likely

to have an effect on the fairness, integrity or public reputation of

judicial proceedings.” Id. at 679. And in Foreman, 633 A.2d at

796, the D.C. Court of Appeals acknowledged that “Sullivan

strongly implies that some defective reasonable doubt

instructions would constitute plain error, since a ‘structural

error’ of that kind undermines the ‘reliability’ and hence

integrity of the criminal trial.” 

In Foreman, moreover, the D.C. Court of Appeals

acknowledged a critical distinction between a jury instruction

that directs a verdict (as here) and a jury instruction containing

a confusing legal standard (as in that case). There, the trial

judge had departed from the standard jury instruction on

reasonable doubt by substituting the phrase “a deep rooted belief

in” for the phrase “an abiding conviction of.” Id. at 794. With

regard to the prejudice prong of the plain error standard under

Olano, id. at 795–96, the court distinguished between the type

of instructional error it was addressing, which “did not eliminate

any essential elements of the charged offenses,” and an

instructional error that “serve[s] to direct a verdict of guilty.” 

Id. at 796. The court concluded there was no structural error

under Sullivan because the ambiguous instruction in Foreman’s

trial involved “no dilution of the government’s burden even

comparable to that in Sullivan . . . ; the judge’s single

modification of the [standard jury] instruction did not work a

‘structural defect in the constitution of the trial mechanism’ and

USCA Case #11-5300 Document #1504943 Filed: 07/29/2014 Page 9 of 13
10

so deprive [Foreman] of ‘the right to trial by jury. . . .’” Id. at

796–97 (quoting Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 280–82). 

Payne contends that the erroneous instruction at his trial is

an example of a structural error that is “so intrinsically harmful

as to require automatic reversal” of his convictions. Neder v.

United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7 (1999); see Merlos, 8 F.3d at 51;

Arthur, 986 A.2d at 413; Littlejohn v. United States, 73 A.3d

1034, 1043 (D.C. 2013). Alternatively, Payne contends the D.C.

Court of Appeals would have found prejudice because “there is

a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instructions

to allow conviction based on proof insufficient to meet the

Winship standard,” Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 6 (1994),

which requires the government to prove every element of a

charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt, Winship, 397 U.S.

at 364. Regardless of the accuracy of the trial judge’s other

instructions on the presumption of innocence and the

government’s burden of proof, Payne focuses on the

requirement, acknowledged by the D.C. Court of Appeals in

Baker, that the court must “presum[e] that juries faithfully obey

the instructions given to them by the judge,” 324 A.2d at 197,

noting the particular instructions given to his jury — that it may

not disregard any final instruction or question the wisdom of the

law, and that it must follow the trial judge’s final instructions

rather than his preliminary remarks or the statements of counsel. 

Payne further points out that the erroneous instruction was the

only time the trial judge instructed the jury on what to do if the

government failed to meet its burden of proof on an element of

an offense. 

In the government’s view, Payne would prevail under

neither approach because the D.C. Court of Appeals would not

have found either structural error or error so prejudicial to

Payne’s substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and

integrity of his trial. Citing Victor, 511 U.S. 1, the government

USCA Case #11-5300 Document #1504943 Filed: 07/29/2014 Page 10 of 13
11

concludes that the D.C. Court of Appeals would have examined

the jury instructions in their entirety and concluded that the jury

would not have been misled about the government’s burden of

proof. Id. at 5–6; see also Foreman, 633 A.2d at 794–96. But

Victor and Foreman involved erroneous or ambiguous

definitions of reasonable doubt, not an instruction that the jury

must find the defendant guilty even if the government failed to

meet its burden of proof on any element of a charged offense. 

It is true that in a case not cited by the parties, Minor v. United

States, 647 A.2d 770, 773 (D.C. 1994), the court applied

Victor’s analysis in rejecting a Fifth Amendment due process

challenge where the jury was instructed that “[t]he government

is not required to establish guilt beyond all reasonable doubt.” 

But that case is also distinguishable. Like the instruction at

Payne’s trial, this instruction misstated the burden of proof,

rather than defining “reasonable doubt” in an ambiguous or

confusing way. But unlike Payne’s case, the court was not

considering a “must” convict instruction that explicitly directed

a verdict against the defendant. In Minor, the judge did wrongly

state in his final instructions that the government is not required

to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but he immediately

corrected himself, informing the jury that the government’s

burden “is to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at

774. In Payne’s case, by contrast, the defective instruction was

the only instruction given to the jury regarding what it should do

if the government failed to prove an element of a charged

offense beyond a reasonable doubt. To the extent the

government addresses the “must” convict instruction cases, it

fails to explain on what basis an instruction that the jury “must

find the defendant guilty” without proof sufficient to meet the

Winship standard is an “explicitly directed [] guilty verdict” in

Hayward, Appellee’s Br. 49, but not in Payne’s case.

The Supreme Court acknowledged in Neder that there are

defective reasonable doubt instructions that fall in a “limited

USCA Case #11-5300 Document #1504943 Filed: 07/29/2014 Page 11 of 13
12

class of fundamental constitutional errors” that are “so

intrinsically harmful as to require automatic reversal . . . without

regard to their effect on the outcome,” 527 U.S. at 7–8. Here,

the erroneous instruction was contrary to the Fifth Amendment

guarantee that no one will be deprived of liberty without due

process of law and the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury,

which together require a jury to determine a defendant’s guilt on

every element of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. 

See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509–10 (1995);

Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. at 277–78; Winship, 397 U.S. at

364. The distinctions drawn by the D.C. Court of Appeals in

Foreman with respect to the ambiguous reasonable doubt

instruction suggest it is reasonably probable that court would

have reached a different conclusion regarding the prejudice

prong of the plain error standard had it viewed the instruction to

direct a guilty verdict or otherwise dilute the government’s

burden of proof, in a manner comparable to the instruction in

Sullivan. In Payne’s case, the court would have been confronted

with an instruction that directed the jury to render a guilty

verdict, the presumption that juries “faithfully” follow the trial

judge’s instructions, and the fact that the erroneous instruction

was the only instruction regarding the jury’s obligation if the

government failed to meet its burden to prove an element of a

charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 

As noted, to establish Strickland prejudice, Payne must

demonstrate that it is reasonably probable that, had his counsel

raised the issue on direct appeal, the D.C. Court of Appeals

would have concluded that the challenged instruction was plain

error. Although we cannot be certain the D.C. Court of Appeals

would have found plain error had this issue been presented in

Payne’s direct appeal, the question before this court is limited to

whether there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of his

appeal would have been different. Because the erroneous jury

instruction reduced the government’s burden of proof, the

USCA Case #11-5300 Document #1504943 Filed: 07/29/2014 Page 12 of 13
13

distinctions drawn in Foreman between ambiguous and directed

verdict instructions, and the analysis in Baker of the

presumption that juries “faithfully” follow instructions move

the analysis toward finding plain error. An objectively

reasonable attorney, then, would have presented this issue for

plain error review. That is sufficient to establish ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel under Strickland. The

appropriate relief is to afford Payne a belated appeal on the issue

that counsel ineffectively failed to present. See Roe, 160 F.3d

at 420; Mason v. Hanks, 97 F.3d 887, 902 (7th Cir. 1996). 

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is reversed,

and the case is remanded with directions to issue a writ of

habeas corpus unless, within whatever reasonable period of time

the district court deems appropriate, Payne is afforded a new

appeal in which he may raise the burden of proof instruction

issue omitted from his original direct appeal. See, e.g., Evitts,

469 U.S. at 390–91; Lewis v. Johnson, 359 F.3d 646, 662 (3d

Cir. 2004); Hughes v. Booker, 220 F.3d 346, 348, 353 (5th Cir.

2000); Mapes v. Tate, 388 F.3d 187, 195 (6th Cir. 2004); Shaw

v. Wilson, 721 F.3d 908, 910 (7th Cir. 2013); Johnson v.

Champion, 288 F.3d 1215, 1230 (10th Cir. 2002). 

USCA Case #11-5300 Document #1504943 Filed: 07/29/2014 Page 13 of 13