Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-10-01412/USCOURTS-caDC-10-01412-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, AFL-CIO
Intervenor for Respondent
National Labor Relations Board
Respondent
Trump Plaza Associates
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 9, 2012 Decided May 11, 2012 

No. 10-1412 

TRUMP PLAZA ASSOCIATES,

DOING BUSINESS AS TRUMP PLAZA HOTEL AND CASINO, 

PETITIONER

v. 

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, 

RESPONDENT

INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE,

AEROSPACE & AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS 

OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, 

INTERVENOR

Consolidated with 11-1028 

On Petition for Review and Cross-Application 

for Enforcement of an Order of the National Labor 

Relations Board 

 Theodore M. Eisenberg argued the cause for the 

petitioner. Brian A. Caufield was on brief. 

 Jeffrey Burritt, Attorney, National Labor Relations 

Board, argued the cause for the respondent. John H. 

USCA Case #10-1412 Document #1373254 Filed: 05/11/2012 Page 1 of 16
2 

Ferguson, Associate General Counsel, Linda Dreeben, 

Deputy Associate General Counsel, Julie B. Broido, 

Supervisory Attorney, and Renée D. McKinney, Attorney, 

were on brief. Kira D. Vol, Attorney, entered an appearance. 

Cassie Ehrenberg and Blair Katherine Simmons were on 

brief for intervenor International Union, United Automobile, 

Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, 

AFL-CIO in support of the respondent. 

 Before: HENDERSON, GRIFFITH and KAVANAUGH, Circuit 

Judges. 

 Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON. 

 KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Petitioner 

Trump Plaza Hotel and Casino (Trump Plaza) seeks review of 

an order of the National Labor Relations Board (Board, 

NLRB), in which order the Board concluded that Trump Plaza 

violated section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor 

Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (5), by 

refusing to bargain with the International Union, United 

Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers 

of America, AFL-CIO (Union). See Trump Plaza Assocs., 356 

N.L.R.B. No. 53, 2010 WL 5089764 (Dec. 13, 2010). Trump 

Plaza concedes that it refused to bargain with the Union but 

claims that the Board erred in certifying the Union. The Board 

cross-applied for enforcement. For the reasons set forth 

below, we grant Trump Plaza’s petition and vacate the 

Board’s order. 

I. 

In February and March 2007,1

 the Union was engaged in 

a city-wide campaign to represent the card dealers at several 

 

1

 All dates are in 2007 unless otherwise noted. 

USCA Case #10-1412 Document #1373254 Filed: 05/11/2012 Page 2 of 16
3 

Atlantic City casinos, including Trump Plaza. The centerpiece 

of the Union’s strategy was to garner and publicize the 

support of local, state and federal government officials. On 

March 22, for example, the Union sent a campaign leaflet 

entitled “Legislators Sign-On in Support of Atlantic City 

Dealers” to all of Trump Plaza’s full-time and part-time 

dealers. Employer’s Ex. 2. The leaflet, which was signed by 

sixty New Jersey state assemblymen and senators, declared 

that Union representation would give the dealers a “powerful 

voice to negotiate for better salaries, fair benefits, and a 

secure retirement.” Id. The back of the leaflet included copies 

of five letters from local, state and federal officials supporting 

the Union and unionization. The letters were also made 

available on the Union website through the link “Your 

Government and Community Support[] You, Click Here!” 

Employer’s Ex. 4G. 

On March 25, six days before the election, the Union 

held a rally and “mock card-check ceremony,” Resp’t’s Br. 7, 

at which three public officials (United States Congressman 

Robert Andrews, State Senator James “Sonny” McCullough 

and State Assemblyman Jim Whelan) signed a document 

entitled “Certification of Majority Status.” Employer’s Ex. 3. 

According to the document, the officials had “conducted a 

confidential examination of Union authorization cards . . . . in 

accordance with NLRB rules” and had determined that a 

majority of Trump Plaza’s dealers “authorized the [Union] to 

represent them for the purposes of collective bargaining.” Id.2

 

2

 Although the record provides little detail about how the mock 

card-check was conducted, the Union website advised dealers that 

they had a right to submit authorization cards to Union 

representatives. Employer’s Ex. 4H. According to the website, the 

cards would be counted in confidence and given to the Board, 

where they would remain until “we are certified.” Id. (“The 

Company has No Right to know who is or is not signing cards! 

USCA Case #10-1412 Document #1373254 Filed: 05/11/2012 Page 3 of 16
4 

Congressman Andrews led the event, which was attended by 

numerous Union representatives as well as a handful of public 

officials and at least two Trump Plaza dealers. Atlantic City’s 

television station NBC40 reported on the rally on the eleven 

o’clock news. The NBC40 reporter explained that: 

Representative Robert Andrews led a 

bipartisan card-check authorization for Trump 

Plaza Casino Dealers. The results of the cardcheck showed certification of majority status 

for forming a union at Trump Plaza. This 

comes on the heels of last week’s similar 

election at Caesar’s Casino, when more than 

80 per cent voted in favor of forming their own 

union as part of the UAW union . . . . State 

Senator Sonny McCullough, Assemblyman 

Jim Whelan and Reverend Reginald Floyd, 

joined Representative Andrews to sign the card 

count to confirm verification that the dealers 

want to join the UAW union. 

Employer’s Ex. 6. A poster-sized version of the “Certification 

of Majority Status” document was visible during the segment. 

Id. The broadcast then showed Congressman Andrews who 

said: “It’s a very American right to bind together with your 

neighbors and speak up for yourself. And there are some very 

courageous dealers that are doing that and I support them.” Id.

The reporter ended the segment by noting, “[t]he actual vote 

will be held this Saturday.” Id. Eighty-seven per cent of the 

voting class lived—and one hundred per cent of the voting 

 

Those cards will go . . . [from] the union reps[] to the National 

Labor Relations Board, where they stay until we are certified.”). 

Instead, the cards were apparently counted by the three public 

officials—Andrews, McCullough and Whelan—and, in any event, 

were not given to the Board. 

USCA Case #10-1412 Document #1373254 Filed: 05/11/2012 Page 4 of 16
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class worked—in NBC40’s broadcast area. See Employer’s 

Ex. 8. Two newspapers also covered the rally. Pet’r’s Br. 44; 

see Wayne Parry, Dealers at Another Casino Seek Union, 

Mar. 30, 2007, available at http://abclocal.go.com/wpvi/ 

story?section=news/local&id=5166717; Maya Rao, Dealers 

at Plaza Vote Today on Union, ATLANTIC CITY PRESS, Mar. 

31, 2007. 

After the rally, the Union displayed a copy of the 

“Certification of Majority Status” poster in its office and 

printed leaflet-sized photocopies, which were “made available 

to dealers who came into the union hall so they could read 

[them] and take [them].” Transcript of ALJ Hearing at 31-32, 

Trump Plaza Assocs., No. 4-RC-21263 (NLRB May 23, 

2007) (“There is a document entitled certification of majority 

status . . . [that] is identical to the poster that appears in the 

video broadcast . . . the actual poster board . . . was kept in the 

union hall . . . from the period approximately March 26th 

through the date of the election, and . . . the paper copy[] was 

reproduced and made available to dealers who came into the 

union hall so they could read it and take it.”). On March 31, 

the Union won the election by a vote of 324 to 149, with one 

challenged ballot. 

While the Union had won the hand, Trump Plaza did not 

fold. Instead, it filed objections with the Board challenging 

the Union’s election. Specifically, it alleged that the Union 

“explicitly and implicitly” misled voters to believe that the 

government—including the NLRB—“endorsed and supported 

the Union in the election, . . . undermining governmental (and 

NLRB) neutrality.” Employer’s Objections to Election at 1, 

Trump Plaza Assocs., No. 4-RC-21263 (NLRB Apr. 9, 2007). 

It further accused the Union of “[a]cting in concert with 

representatives of the federal government in ‘certifying’ the 

Union’s majority status ‘in accordance with NLRB rules,’ 

through a sham card[-]check” to give the false impression that 

USCA Case #10-1412 Document #1373254 Filed: 05/11/2012 Page 5 of 16
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“the Union was the certified representative of the dealers 

before an election was conducted.” Id. 

After a one-day hearing, an administrative law judge 

(ALJ) recommended that the Board reject Trump Plaza’s 

objections and certify the Union as the dealers’ exclusive 

bargaining agent. See Trump Plaza Assocs., 352 N.L.R.B. 

628, 633-34 (2008). And, on May 30, 2008, a two-member 

panel of the Board did just that, albeit for somewhat different 

reasons from those relied on by the ALJ. See id. at 629-30. 

Thereafter, the Board General Counsel issued a complaint 

alleging that Trump Plaza had violated section 8(a)(5) and (1) 

of the NLRA in refusing to bargain with the Union. See 29 

U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (5). In its answer, Trump Plaza admitted 

its refusal to bargain but challenged the Union’s certification. 

On August 29, 2008, the two-member Board again rejected 

Trump Plaza’s attempt to set aside the election. Trump Plaza 

Assocs., 352 N.L.R.B. No. 146, 2008 WL 4056280 (Aug. 29, 

2008). Trump Plaza then petitioned this Court for review, 

challenging, inter alia, the two-member Board’s capacity to 

act. We held the case in abeyance pending the United States 

Supreme Court’s decision in New Process Steel, L.P. v. 

NLRB, 130 S. Ct. 488 (2009). The High Court ultimately held 

that the two-member Board lacked the authority to act, New 

Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 130 S. Ct. 2635, 2645 (2010); 

we then vacated the Board’s decision and “remanded for 

further proceedings before the Board.” Trump Plaza Assocs. 

v. NLRB, Nos. 08–1304, 08–1340, 2010 WL 4227407 (D.C. 

Cir. Sept. 20, 2010). 

On September 29, 2010, the Board upheld the 

certification of the Union for the reasons stated in the May 30, 

2008 order. See Trump Plaza Assocs., 355 N.L.R.B. No. 202, 

2010 WL 3813239 (Sept. 29, 2010). Specifically, the Board 

found that “reasonable voters would not have concluded that 

the letters and resolutions [from government officials], either 

USCA Case #10-1412 Document #1373254 Filed: 05/11/2012 Page 6 of 16
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individually or in the aggregate, reflected the Board’s 

endorsement of the Union or otherwise raised doubts about 

the Board’s neutrality.” Trump Plaza Assocs. 352 N.L.R.B. at 

629. It further found that the mock “card-check ‘Certification’ 

. . . [did] not justify setting aside the election, given the 

absence of evidence that more than a few voters were aware 

of the ‘Certification’ and the wide margin of the Union’s 

victory.” Id. The Board then reaffirmed that, by “refusing to 

recognize and bargain with the Union as the exclusive 

collective-bargaining representative of the unit employees, 

[Trump Plaza] ha[d] engaged in unfair labor practices.” 

Trump Plaza Assocs., 356 N.L.R.B. No. 53, 2010 WL 

5089764 (Dec. 13, 2010). 

Trump Plaza timely petitioned for review. 

II. 

Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA makes it an unfair labor 

practice for an employer “to refuse to bargain collectively 

with the representatives of his employees.” See 29 U.S.C. 

§ 158(a)(5).3

 Trump Plaza does not dispute that it refused to 

bargain with the Union but instead challenges the Board’s 

certification of the Union. See U-Haul Co. of Nev. v. NLRB, 

490 F.3d 957, 960-61 (D.C. Cir. 2007). “[Our] review of 

NLRB decisions is deferential.” Pirlott v. NLRB, 522 F.3d 

423, 432 (D.C. Cir. 2008). We vacate a Board order “if the 

Board’s factual findings are not supported by substantial 

evidence[] or the Board acted arbitrarily or otherwise erred in 

applying established law to the facts of the case.” Id.

(quotation marks and citation omitted). “On questions 

regarding representation, we accord the Board an especially 

wide degree of discretion,” Canadian Am. Oil Co. v. NLRB, 

 

3

 “A violation of [s]ection 8(a)(5) is also a violation of [s]ection 

8(a)(1) . . . .” S. Nuclear Operating Co. v. NLRB, 524 F.3d 1350, 

1356 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 

USCA Case #10-1412 Document #1373254 Filed: 05/11/2012 Page 7 of 16
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82 F.3d 469, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quotation marks and 

citation omitted), “as Congress has charged the Board, a 

special and expert body, with the duty of judging the tendency 

of electoral flaws to distort the employees’ ability to make a 

free choice,” C.J. Krehbiel Co. v. NLRB, 844 F.2d 880, 885 

(D.C. Cir. 1988) (quotation marks and citation omitted). That 

said, the Board cannot “ignore its own relevant precedent but 

must explain why it is not controlling.” B B & L, Inc. v. 

NLRB, 52 F.3d 366, 369 (D.C. Cir. 1995). “Where an agency 

departs from established precedent without a reasoned 

explanation, its decision will be vacated as arbitrary and 

capricious.” Pirlott, 522 F.3d at 432 (quotation marks and 

citation omitted). 

A. Government Endorsement 

Trump Plaza first argues that the Union—acting in 

concert with numerous government officials—sought to make 

voters believe that the NLRB (and the government generally) 

supported the Union and viewed unionization as a 

governmental objective. Trump Plaza points to the Union’s 

distribution of the five letters from local, state and federal 

officials supporting the Union and unionization in general, 

which letters were included in the Union campaign leaflet 

mailed to the employees on March 22 and made available on 

the Union website. It also highlights repeated statements 

made in Union mailings and on its website that the 

“Government” and “Legislators” supported the Union’s 

campaign. See, e.g., Employer’s Ex. 4A (“These are letters 

from our Government in Support of Exercising our Rights 

Under State and Federal Laws!”); Employer’s Ex. 2 

(“Legislators Sign-On in Support of Atlantic City Dealers”). 

The Board maintains that, while the Union used governmental 

support as a central component of its campaign strategy, no 

reasonable voter would misinterpret the various letters and 

USCA Case #10-1412 Document #1373254 Filed: 05/11/2012 Page 8 of 16
9 

statements to suggest that the Board itself endorsed the Union. 

Resp’t’s Br. 17. 

A public official’s involvement in an election campaign 

is not by itself objectionable. Affiliated Computer Servs., Inc., 

355 N.L.R.B. No. 163, 2010 WL 3446126, at *2 (Aug. 27, 

2010). “[P]ublic officials . . . , like other third parties, are not 

required to remain neutral and may properly seek to persuade 

employees.” Id. The Board will set aside a representation 

election because of a public official’s endorsement only if the 

endorsement (1) “create[s] a general atmosphere of fear and 

reprisal rendering a free election impossible,” Overnite 

Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 140 F.3d 259, 265 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 

(quotation marks and citation omitted), or (2) reasonably 

suggests that the Board itself endorses a particular outcome, 

see Ursery Cos., 311 N.L.R.B. 399, 399 (1993) (“[N]o 

participant in a Board election may . . . suggest either directly 

or indirectly that this Government Agency endorses a 

particular choice in an election.” (emphasis in original)). 

The letters distributed by the Union here are plainly the 

opinions of the various officials who wrote them. 

Congressman Andrews’s letter, for example, recounts his 

personal experience working with the Union: “I have had the 

privilege of working closely with the [Union] and . . . think 

very highly of them and what they represent. I am confident 

that the [Union] will continue to zealously represent its 

members to protect their rights.” Employer’s Ex. 4D. 

Although some of the letters suggest that the “Government” 

supported the Union’s campaign, e.g., Employer’s Ex. 4C 

(“Government’s advocacy for casino workers has been very 

successful, securing a stable workforce for casinos while 

protecting employees’ rights . . . .”), nothing suggests that the 

officials’ statements intended to speak for or otherwise 

indicate that the Board itself supported unionization. 

USCA Case #10-1412 Document #1373254 Filed: 05/11/2012 Page 9 of 16
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For this reason, Trump Plaza’s reliance on Columbia 

Tanning Corp., 238 N.L.R.B. 899 (1978), is misplaced. In 

Columbia Tanning, a letter endorsing unionization was 

written in Greek on stationary with the Massachusetts 

Department of Labor letterhead and mailed to a group of 

twenty-six Greek employees, about half of whom did not 

speak English. Id. at 899. The next day, the union narrowly 

won the election. When Columbia Tanning challenged the 

election, the Board determined that, because the laborers were 

“recent immigrants who in all likelihood were not familiar 

with the complexities of state and Federal jurisdiction over 

labor relations,” the letter created a “potential for confusion” 

that threatened the “Board’s appearance of impartiality” and 

“thereby interfere[d] with the exercise of a free choice in the 

election.” Id. at 900 (emphasis added). Given the union’s 

narrow margin of victory and the special circumstances, the 

Board set aside the election. Id. 

Since Columbia Tanning, however, the Board has 

repeatedly upheld union elections where a public official 

supported a particular election outcome but nothing in the 

record suggested that the voters could have reasonably 

believed the Board itself endorsed that outcome. See, e.g.,

Chipman Union, Inc., 316 N.L.R.B. 107, 107-08 (1995) 

(“[T]he Employer [here] has not referred to any potential 

evidence which would show that its employees could not 

discern the difference between statements about labor 

relations by an individual member of Congress and statements 

by the Board and its representative.”). Unlike the Greek 

immigrants in Columbia Tanning who “could not be expected 

to discern readily the difference between [a letter from] the 

state ‘Department of Labor’ and the Federal ‘National Labor 

Relations Board,’ particularly in light of the fact that both 

contain the word ‘Labor’ in their titles,” 238 N.L.R.B. at 900, 

nothing in the record suggests that Trump Plaza dealers were 

similarly susceptible to confusion. See also Huntsville Mfg. 

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11 

Co., 240 N.L.R.B. 1220, 1223 (1979) (“Our concern [after 

Columbia Tanning] is . . . with how closely a document 

mimics a Board publication—an[d] under what circumstances 

it can be said that employees might be susceptible to such 

mimicry.” (emphasis added)); Ursery Cos., 311 N.L.R.B. at 

399 n.2 (“[E]mployees are not so politically naïve that they 

would be unable to distinguish between a Connecticut State 

Representative and the NLRB . . . .”). Accordingly, we 

believe that the Trump Plaza dealers could not reasonably 

have read the leaflet or website to suggest that the Board 

endorsed unionization. 

B. Mock Card-Check

Trump Plaza also challenges the mock card-check rally 

and its corresponding certification document. The ALJ 

recommended overruling the objection on the ground that “it 

was clear to any reasonable viewer that the card[-]check 

certification was not the equivalent of a Board election and 

that neither the Board nor the federal government favored the 

Union’s victory in the actual Board election.” Trump Plaza 

Assocs., 352 N.L.R.B. at 634. The Board, however, dismissed 

Trump Plaza’s challenge on a different ground. It held that 

“[i]n the absence of evidence establishing that the 

Certification was widely disseminated among the unit 

employees, and given the Union’s substantial margin of 

victory . . . , the record does not permit a reasonable inference 

that the document could have influenced enough employees to 

affect the results of the election.” Id. at 630. Trump Plaza 

argues that, in so holding, the Board departed from its 

precedent and, without explanation, set a new standard for 

establishing dissemination. The Board meets this argument at 

the threshold, claiming that section 10(e) of the NLRA, 29 

U.S.C. § 160(e), bars our review. Specifically, it argues that 

Trump Plaza was obligated to move for reconsideration 

USCA Case #10-1412 Document #1373254 Filed: 05/11/2012 Page 11 of 16
12 

challenging the Board’s different basis for its decision in 

order to preserve the issue for our review. 

1. Waiver Vel Non

Under section 10(e) of the NLRA, “[n]o objection that 

has not been urged before the Board, its member, agent, or 

agency, shall be considered by the court, unless the failure or 

neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of 

extraordinary circumstances.” 29 U.S.C. § 160(e). The 

provision promotes the “salutary policy . . . of affording the 

Board opportunity to consider on the merits questions to be 

urged upon review of its order.” Marshall Field & Co. v. 

NLRB, 318 U.S. 253, 256 (1943). “Cases interpreting section 

10(e) look to whether a party’s exceptions are sufficiently 

specific to apprise the Board that an issue might be pursued 

on appeal.” Consol. Freightways v. NLRB, 669 F.2d 790, 793 

(D.C. Cir. 1981). “While we have not required that the ground 

for the exception be stated explicitly in the written exceptions 

filed with the Board, we have required, at a minimum, that the 

ground for the exception be evident by the context in which 

the exception is raised.” Parsippany Hotel Mgmt. Co. v. 

NLRB, 99 F.3d 413, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (brackets, quotation 

marks and citation omitted). “In each case, the critical inquiry 

is whether the objections made before the Board were 

adequate to put the Board on notice that the issue might be 

pursued on appeal.” Consol. Freightways, 669 F.2d at 794 

(emphasis added). 

Although Trump Plaza did not move for 

reconsideration—raising a specific challenge to the Board’s 

alleged departure from precedent—it did emphasize the scope 

of the mock card-check’s dissemination in excepting to the 

ALJ’s decision. See, e.g., Employer’s Exceptions to the ALJ’s 

Decision at 2, 3-4, Trump Plaza Assocs., No. 4-RC-21263 

(July 12, 2007) (Trump Plaza “takes exception” to “[t]he 

ALJ’s finding that the airing of a television news program, six 

USCA Case #10-1412 Document #1373254 Filed: 05/11/2012 Page 12 of 16
13 

days before the election, throughout the viewing area where 

87% of the voters lived and 100% worked, . . . did not 

reasonably tend to mislead voters as to the impartiality of the 

Board and/or Government.”); Employer’s Br. in Support of Its 

Exceptions to ALJ’s Decision at 22, Trump Plaza Assocs., 

No. 4-RC-21263 (July 12, 2007) (“[T]he certification 

message was distributed throughout the voting community . . . 

.”); id. at 28 n.19 (“The misrepresentation of governmental 

certification was disseminated first via two Trump dealers 

who attended the certification rally; second by television 

broadcast . . . ; and, third . . . by handouts to dealers who came 

to the hall . . . .”). The Union also argued the dissemination 

issue. See Union’s Br. in Answer to Trump Plaza’s 

Exceptions to the ALJ’s Decision at 18 n.13, Trump Plaza 

Assocs., No. 4-RC-21263 (July 23, 2007) (“[N]o evidence 

was introduced as to the general viewership ratings for the 

particular broadcast nor was there any evidence that any voter 

actually saw the broadcast.”); id. at 17 n.12 (“[O]nly two 

Trump dealers attended this event.”). 

We believe Trump Plaza’s objections “were adequate to 

put the Board on notice” that the Board’s treatment of the 

dissemination issue inexplicably departed from precedent. Its 

failure to seek reconsideration, then, is not fatal to its petition 

for review. Trump Plaza’s argument that the mock card-check 

was adequately disseminated to affect the election necessarily 

includes the argument that it was adequately disseminated 

under Board precedent. See BPH & Co. v. NLRB, 333 F.3d 

213, 219 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“[D]espite the fact that the 

Company’s attack on the Board’s new application [of its 

precedent] is made for the first time before us, the Board was 

sufficiently apprised, for the purpose of section 10(e), of the 

critical issue—whether the Board’s [unfair labor practice] 

findings are supported by substantial evidence.”). Raising the 

issue by seeking Board reconsideration would have been an 

USCA Case #10-1412 Document #1373254 Filed: 05/11/2012 Page 13 of 16
14 

“empty formality.” Local 900, Int’l Union of Elec., Radio & 

Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 727 F.2d 1184, 1192 (D.C. Cir. 

1984). 

2. Merits 

Satisfied with our jurisdiction to review the mock cardcheck challenge, we turn to the merits thereof. First, the 

Board was plainly wrong to conclude that there was an 

“absence of evidence” of dissemination. Trump Plaza Assocs., 

352 N.L.R.B. at 630. It is undisputed that (1) at least two 

Trump Plaza dealers attended the mock-certification rally; (2) 

the rally was covered by NBC40 on its 11 o’clock news that 

evening; (3) eighty-seven per cent of Trump Plaza dealers 

resided, and one hundred per cent of them worked, in the 

station’s broadcast area; (4) the certification poster was 

displayed in the Union hall for six days before the election; 

(5) copies of the certification were available for distribution in 

the Union hall; and (6) two local newspapers published stories 

of the certification rally. Given the substantial media coverage 

of the event, it blinks reality to say that Trump Plaza failed to 

provide “evidence establishing that the Certification was 

widely disseminated among the unit employees.” Id. This 

statement suggests that the Board requires direct evidence of 

dissemination. But nothing in our case law or in Board 

precedent supports such a requirement. See, e.g., Crown Bolt, 

Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. 776, 779 (2004) (“Where proof of 

dissemination of coercive statements . . . is required, the 

objecting party will have the burden of proving it and its 

impact on the election by direct and circumstantial evidence.” 

(emphasis added)). Indeed, a direct-evidence requirement 

could unfairly burden the party challenging the election, 

obligating it to poll each member of the voting class—or at 

least a sufficient number to affect the election—to determine 

whether they were aware of the challenged conduct. 

USCA Case #10-1412 Document #1373254 Filed: 05/11/2012 Page 14 of 16
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In evaluating the adequacy of dissemination, moreover, 

the Board looks to the gravity and severity of the conduct. In 

basing its decision solely on lack of dissemination and margin 

of victory without considering the nature of the challenged 

conduct, the Board put the cart before the horse. See id. 

(“[T]he severity of a threat is one factor, among several, to be 

considered in deciding whether to set aside an election.”); see 

also Caron Int’l, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 1120, 1120 (1979) 

(factors Board considers in resolving whether misconduct 

affected results of election include number of violations, 

severity, extent of dissemination and size of unit). In Archer 

Services, Inc., 298 N.L.R.B. 312 (1990), for example, the 

Board relied largely on circumstantial evidence of 

dissemination and the severity of the challenged conduct to 

set aside an election with a substantial voting margin (382 to 

41). Archer Services involved a union challenge to an election 

on grounds similar to those at issue here. The union alleged 

the employer distributed a document—an altered NLRB 

ballot—that impugned the Board’s impartiality. The Board 

determined that “employees could reasonably believe that the 

document came from the Board or that the Board favored the 

[e]mployer,” and, given the employer’s stipulation that it 

distributed the altered ballot during the campaign, the Board 

adopted the ALJ’s recommendation to set aside the election—

“notwithstanding the large size of the unit and the decisive 

outcome of the vote” and the fact that only two voters 

admitted to having seen the altered ballot. Id. at 314. 

Similarly, in Mount Carmel Medical Center, 306 

N.L.R.B. 1060 (1992), the Board set aside a lopsided election 

(185 to 77) because the employer had posted a “forged” 

document in the workplace. Id. at 1060 n.2. The Board 

explained that “[c]ontrary to the Employer’s assertion that 

few employees saw the document in question,” it was 

“distributed to [non-voting] managers, . . . posted by the 

Employer’s basement timeclock, on the bulletin board of its 

USCA Case #10-1412 Document #1373254 Filed: 05/11/2012 Page 15 of 16
16 

fourth floor medical department, and on restroom doors.” Id.

Thus, the Board held the hearing officer was “justified in 

drawing an inference that the [] document was widely 

disseminated and therefore could have affected the election 

outcome.” Id. 

It escapes us how the evidence of dissemination here is 

weaker than in Archer Services or Mount Carmel Medical. In 

both of those cases, the Board, relying largely on the gravity 

of the challenged conduct and circumstantial evidence of 

dissemination, set aside the election. And it did so despite 

wide voting margins. Here, however, the Board ignored the 

substantial circumstantial evidence of dissemination and 

relied almost entirely on the “wide margin of the Union’s 

victory” (324 to 149), which was no larger than the margin of 

victory in Archer Services (382 to 41) or Mount Carmel 

Medical (185 to 77). See Trump Plaza Assocs., 352 N.L.R.B. 

at 629-30. The Board has given no “reasoned explanation” for 

its departure from this precedent. Pirlott, 522 F.3d at 432. 

For the foregoing reasons, we grant Trump Plaza’s 

petition, vacate the Board’s order and remand to the Board to, 

first, assess the severity of the challenged conduct—to wit, 

Trump Plaza’s contention that the mock card-check 

constituted “a fundamental breach of Board neutrality,”4

Pet’r’s Br. 17, which misled voters to believe the election was 

a “foregone conclusion,” id. at 33—and second, to reassess 

the extent of the mock card-check dissemination under its 

precedent. 

 So ordered.

 

4

 In this regard, we note the “Certification of Majority Status” 

recited that Andrews’s, McCullough’s and Whelan’s examination 

of Union authorization cards was conducted “in accordance with 

NLRB rules,” Employer’s Ex. 3, suggesting the Board could have 

had a role therein. 

USCA Case #10-1412 Document #1373254 Filed: 05/11/2012 Page 16 of 16