Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-02071/USCOURTS-ca10-92-02071-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Elizabeth Guerro
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF 

FILLU 

United Stata Court of Appeal, Tenth Circuit 

APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT JAN 151993 

------------KOBERTL.HOECKER 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Clerk 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

vs. 

ELIZABETH GUERRO, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

No. 92-2071 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. Cr-91-494JP) 

Kathleen A. Felton, Attorney, Department of Justice, Washington, 

D.C. (Nina Goodman, Attorney, Department of Justice, Washington, 

D.C., Don J. Svet, United States Attorney, Albuquerque, New 

Mexico, and Joe M. Romero, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, 

Albuquerque, New Mexico, on the brief), for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Peter Schoenburg, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Albuquerque, 

New Mexico, for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before LOGAN and KELLY, Circuit Judges and BROWN, District Judge.t 

KELLY, Circuit Judge. 

Defendant- appellee Elizabeth Guerro was indicted for 

voluntary manslaughter on October 3, 1991. After an evidentiary 

hearing on her motion to suppress, the district court found that 

statements she had made shortly after the incident were 

involuntary and that her signed waiver of Miranda rights was 

t The Honorable Wesley E. Brown, Senior United States District 

Judge for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 92-2071 Document: 010110157249 Date Filed: 01/15/1993 Page: 1 
invalid. On appeal, the government, while conceding the 

invalidity of her signed Miranda waiver, challenges the finding as 

to voluntariness. Our jurisdiction arises under 18 U.S.C. § 3731 

and we reverse. 

Background 

On August 5, 1991, police received a report that Charlotte 

Guerro had been stabbed at her home on the Alamo Indian 

Reservation and that the victim's sister (Defendant) was 

suspe _:ed. As Navajo Police Officer Jasper Hanson proceeded to 

the 3cene, he learned that the victim had died. 

At the home, numerous relatives, including Defendant's mother 

and brothers, and friends were present. One brother, who was very 

upset told the officer that Ms. Guerro did not have to talk to 

officers until she had an attorney. Another brother asked if the 

statement Hanson wanted tot ke from Defendant would "incriminate" 

his sister. 

Officer Hanson took Defendant into her parent's bedroom and 

her brothers and a friend followed. Defendant was crying and very 

upset. Officer Hanson advised Defendant of her Miranda rights and 

either asked or told her to sign a waiver form, which she did. 

Defendant then made a statement in which she admitted stabbing her 

sister. 

At -he suppression hearing, Defendant testified that she was 

twE : y- j ur years old and a high school graduate. She had never 

lived away from home and had no prior experience with police. She 

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testified that she was afraid of Officer Hanson and had not 

understood the Miranda rights or the waiver form. 

The district court granted Defendant's motion to suppress the 

statement she had given Officer Hanson and issued findings from 

the bench. The court noted that, while her intelligence was 

average, her reading skills were at the fifth or sixth grade level 

and her ability to understand English was minimal. The court also 

described Defendant as "more susceptible to suggestion, 

intimidation - even though it may not have been overt - than any 

witness I have ever seen in my experience on the bench." II R. 

180. As another factor, the court pointed out the circumstances 

existing at the time: Defendant had just learned her sister had 

died from the stab wound, Defendant's mother had fainted and was 

apparently clutching her heart and a large group of distraught 

family and friends had gathered. 

As to Officer Hanson's conduct, the district court found that 

there was not "much evidence of direct intimidation by Officer 

Hanson." II R. 179 . Rather, "the circumstances under which the 

interview was conducted were extremely intimidating." II R. 179. 

In a written order, the court clarified: 

[C]areful consideration of the existing case law leads 

me to believe that in order to find police coercion, I 

do not need to find that Officer Hanson did anything 

objectively "wrong." My understanding of [the caselaw] 

is that otherwise seemingly innocuous "acts" of a law 

enforcement officer may be deemed "coercive" in a case 

with exceptional surrounding circumstances and an 

unusually susceptible defendant. 

IR. doc. 31 at 2-3. 

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Discussion 

This appeal does not concern the dist~ict court's findi ng 

that Defendant's Miranda waiver was invalid. The government 

conc edes that point. The government argues, however, that the 

statement made by Defendant was v oluntary and may therefore be 

used f or impeachment purposes under the rule announced in Harris 

v. New York, 4 01 U.S. 222 (1971 ) . 

Ac ~reed or involuntary statement, which violates a 

suspect' s rights under the Fifth Amendment, is not admissible at 

trial for any purpose. United States v. Short, 947 F.2d 1445, 

1449 (10th Cir. 1991), cert . denied, 112 S. Ct. 1680 (1992 ) . The 

issue of voluntariness is reviewed de nova, but the factual 

findings of the district court are reviewed under the clearly 

e~roneous standard. Short, 947 F.2d at 1449 . 

The district cour~ specifically found Officer Hanson did n ot 

utilize improper interrogation tactics or coerce Ms. Guerro. 

Rather, it was the combination of the circumstances existing at 

the time of the statement and the characteristics of Ms. Guerro 

that led the ~-urt to the conclusion that t ha statement was 

involuntary. ~e government argues t hat f · o rado v. Connelly, 479 

U.S. 157, 16 7 (1986) requires "coercive 1- ::e activity" in order 

to find "that a confession is not 'voluntary' within the meaning 

of the Due Process Clause . " 

In ..... m nelly, a man approached a pol.:.. ce officer and, "without 

any prompting , stated that he had murdered someone and wanted to 

talk about it. " Id. at 160. The man was advised of his Miranda 

rights and made a full confession. The next d.::.,l , he stated that 

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he had been instructed by voices to either c onfess or kill 

himself. The trial court suppressed his statements, finding that, 

although the p olice had done nothing wrong, the confession was 

involuntary. Id. at 162. 

In reversing, the Court reasoned that "[a]bsent police 

conduct causally related to the confession, there is simply n o 

basis for concluding that any state actor has deprived a criminal 

defendant of due process of law." Connelly. 479 U. S. at 164 . 

While the defendant's mental condition is an important 

consideration, to find a statement involuntary, the police must 

somehow overreach by exploiting a weakness or condition known to 

exist. Id. at 165 . See United States v . Chrismon, 965 F.2d 1465, 

1469 (7th Cir. 1992) ("A diminished mental state is only relevant 

to the voluntariness inquiry if it made mental or physical 

coercion by the police more effective." ) . 

We decline, as did the Court in Connelly. to require courts 

to evaluate the motivation of a suspect. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 

165-67 . The Fifth Amendment guarantees that the government will 

not deprive a defendant of life, liberty, or property without due 

process of law. U. S . Const . amend . V. This guarantee does not 

protect against conduct by private parties, Connelly, 479 U.S. at 

166, nor does it protect a defendant from his own compulsions or 

internally-applied pressures which are not the product of police 

action. See United States v . Kelley. 953 F.2d 562, 565 (9th Cir. 

1992 ) (suspect who was experiencing withdrawal made a voluntary 

statement) . 

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We recently addressed the issue of voluntariness in Short , 

aLj held that only those statements "obcained by government acts, 

threats, or promises" are inadmissible . Short , 947 F.2d at 1149-

50. The Defendant testified that he was under the influence of 

pain pills and visibly in pain when he made certain incriminating 

statements . This court affirmed the district court's refusal to 

suppress the statements, being convinced "that Defendant's 

statements were not impermissibly coerced by the police as a 

matter of law. " Id. at 1450 . 

As the district court pointed out, Short lists several 

factors a court is to review, including characteristics of the 

person as well as the circumstances of the interview. Id. at 

1449. However, these factors must be considered in relation to 

the tactics employed by the police to determine if police took 

unfair advantage of a defendant's traits or the surrounding 

circumstances. Connelly . 479 U.S. at 165 -67 . Here, the district 

court did not show any police overreaching and merely concluded 

that Officer Hanson had taken firm, directive actions. The 

district court, however, failed to make the "essential link 

between coercive activity of the State, on the one hand, and a 

resulting confession by defendant, on the other." Connelly. 479 

U.S . at 165. 

REVERSED and REMANDED . 

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