Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-07-50070/USCOURTS-ca9-07-50070-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mariano Meza
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MANUEL YEPIZ, AKA Martin 

Sanchez, Seal G and Pony;

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 07-50051

D.C. No.

CR-05-00578-

JFW-7

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JOSE LUIS MEJIA, AKA Jose Luiz 

Mejia, Jose Nernedes, Juan 

Martinez, Jose Mejia, Check Mejia, 

Jose Al Mejia, Joe Morin, Jose L. 

Mejia, “Checho”, “Joe” and 

“Cheech”,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 07-50062

D.C. No.

CR-05-00578-

JFW-37

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2 UNITED STATES V. YEPIZ

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

FRANCISCO ZAMBRANO, AKA

Franky Boy and “Franky”,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 07-50063

D.C. No.

CR-05-00578-

JFW-35

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JESUS CONTRERAS, AKA Jessie 

Contreras, Yuck,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 07-50067

D.C. No.

CR-05-00578-

JFW-21

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MARIANO MEZA,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 07-50070

D.C. No.

CR-05-00578-

JFW-44

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UNITED STATES V. YEPIZ 3

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

SERGIO MEJIA, AKA Robert Mesa,

Seal JJ, Jaws,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 07-50098

D.C. No.

CR-05-00578-

JFW-36

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

GILBERTO CARRASCO, AKA Gilberto 

Carrasco, Jr., Gil Carrasco, Robert 

Carrasco, Gilberto Carrosco,

Gilberto Corrosco, Julio Gonazalez,

Vicente Hernandez, Vincente 

Hernandez, Vincente NMN 

Hernandez, Sergio Renteria, Juan 

Rosas, Beto, Betillo, Red and Cejas,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 07-50133

D.C. No.

CR-05-00578-

JFW-22

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4 UNITED STATES V. YEPIZ

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ERNESTO OROZCO MENDEZ, AKA

“Gordo”, “El Gordo”, Ernesto 

Mijares, Ernesto Mendoza Mijares, 

Ernesto Mendoza Orozco (Birth 

Name),

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 07-50142

D.C. No.

CR-05-00578-

JFW-31

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

RAFAEL YEPIZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 07-50264

D.C. No.

CR-05-00578-

JFW-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

John F. Walter, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted December 7, 2015

Pasadena, California

Filed December 20, 2016

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UNITED STATES V. YEPIZ 5

Before: Stephen Reinhardt, John T. Noonan,

and Jacqueline H. Nguyen, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Noonan;

Dissent by Judge Nguyen

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

In appeals by nine defendants convicted of crimes arising 

out of their alleged membership or association with a 

Southern California gang, the panel remanded for factfinding in connection with the defendants’ joint 

Brady claims, vacated Manuel Yepiz’s conviction due to 

defects in the district court’s handling of his requests for 

substitution of counsel, and remanded for a new trial in 

Yepiz’s case.

On the joint claim that the government violated Brady v. 

Maryland by failing to disclose the full extent of the benefits 

a cooperating witness received at trial, the panel rejected the 

government’s arguments that the defendants waived this 

claim, that the allegedly withheld information would have 

been cumulative, and that the record conclusively shows that 

the benefits were all earned after the trial. In light of 

disputed facts surrounding the Brady claim, the panel 

remanded to the district court so that it may engage in the 

necessary fact-finding to ascertain whether the witness 

received benefits that were undisclosed to the defendants at 

 * This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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6 UNITED STATES V. YEPIZ

the time at trial, and if so, whether Brady was violated as to 

each convicted count.

The panel held that the district court abused its discretion 

when it arbitrarily and without explanation rejected Manuel 

Yepiz’s pro se April 9, 2006 letter seeking to replace his 

retained counsel with court-appointed counsel. The panel 

wrote that Yepiz’s failure to submit his letter through the 

very counsel he was hoping to discharge does not negate the 

court’s duty to inquire into the problems between Yepiz and 

counsel when they were first raised. The panel held that 

Yepiz did not waive his motion to substitute counsel by 

failing to reassert it at a May suppression hearing. The panel 

held that the record is sufficiently clear to determine, without 

remanding, that replacing counsel would not have caused 

significant delay or impeded the fair, efficient, and orderly 

administration of justice. The panel concluded that Yepiz 

was therefore entitled to discharge retained counsel “for any 

or no reason,” and that if he still qualified as an indigent 

defendant at the time he sent his pro se letter requesting 

substitution, he was also statutorily entitled to appointed 

counsel under the Criminal Justice Act. 

The panel addressed other issues in a concurrently filed 

memorandum disposition.

Judge Nguyen dissented in part. She wrote that the 

majority’s holding that the district court’s failure to consider

Yepiz’s letter is structural error requiring automatic reversal 

(1) invalidates well-established local rules prohibiting 

represented parties from communicating with the court pro 

se, and (2) by refusing to engage in harmless error analysis, 

brings this court seriously out of step with the Supreme 

Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.

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UNITED STATES V. YEPIZ 7

COUNSEL

Verna Wefald (argued), Pasadena, California, for 

Defendant-Appellant Manuel Yepiz.

Phillip A. Treviño, Los Angeles, California, for DefendantAppellant Jose Luis Mejia.

Shawn Perez, Las Vegas, Nevada, for Defendant-Appellant 

Francisco Zambrano.

Phillip Deitch, Santa Monica, California, for DefendantAppellant Jesus Contreras.

Donald C. Randolph (argued) and Ann-Marissa Cook, 

Randolph & Associates, Santa Monica, California, for 

Defendant-Appellant Mariano Meza.

Diane Berley, West Hills, California, for DefendantAppellant Sergio Mejia.

Adam Axelrad, Los Angeles, California, for DefendantAppellant Gilberto Carrasco.

Gary P. Burcham, Burcham & Zugman, San Diego, 

California, for Defendant-Appellant Ernesto Orozco 

Mendez.

Katherine Kimball Windsor (argued), Law Office of 

Katherine Kimball Windsor, Pasadena, California, for 

Defendant-Appellant Rafael Yepiz.

L. Ashley Aull (argued) and David Kowal, Assistant United 

States Attorneys; Robert E. Dugdale, Chief, Criminal 

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8 UNITED STATES V. YEPIZ

Division; United States Attorney’s Office, Los Angeles, 

California; for Plaintiff-Appellee United States.

OPINION

NOONAN, Circuit Judge:

Appellants are all alleged to be members or associates of 

the Vineland Boys (“VBS”), a gang located in Southern 

California. On November 30, 2005, a grand jury returned a

78-count first superseding indictment charging appellants 

and approximately forty other individuals with crimes 

arising out of their membership or association with VBS. 

Seven of the nine appellants were charged with violating the 

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 

(“RICO”), and with RICO conspiracy (Counts 1 and 2, 

respectively), and all appellants were charged with 

distribution of narcotics (Count 3). Other charged counts 

included violent crimes in aid of racketeering (“VICAR”), 

attempted murder, and possession with intent to distribute 

cocaine, methamphetamine, and marijuana.

Trial commenced on August 9, 2006. On October 26, 

2008, the jury returned a verdict of not guilty as to five 

counts, a mistrial as to one count, and a verdict of guilty as 

to the remaining counts. Appellants’ subsequent motions for 

judgments of acquittal and new trials were denied by the 

district court. Appellants—Manuel Yepiz, Jose Luis Mejia, 

Francisco Zambrano, Jesus Contreras, Mariano Meza, 

Sergio Mejia, Gilberto Carrasco, Rafael Yepiz, and Ernesto 

Mendez—timely appealed their convictions and sentences.

We note at the outset that this case was vigorously 

litigated over the course of two-and-a-half months. It 

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UNITED STATES V. YEPIZ 9

presented the district court with a gauntlet of complex legal 

questions, and required it to grapple with unique concerns to 

courtroom safety and logistics. We are now presented with 

nearly three dozen distinct legal questions on appeal. These 

questions have been met by the district court promptly and 

persuasively.

In this opinion we resolve (1) appellants’ joint Brady

claims, and (2) Manuel Yepiz’s Sixth Amendment Right to 

Counsel claim. We address the remaining issues in a

concurrently filed memorandum disposition.

I. DEFENDANTS’ JOINT BRADY CLAIMS

BACKGROUND

At trial, one of the government’s cooperating witnesses 

was Victor Bulgarian. In September of 2006, on direct 

examination, Bulgarian testified that he was previously 

arrested for possession and sale of methamphetamine in an 

unrelated case, and agreed to cooperate with law 

enforcement in exchange for a lesser sentence, and a grant 

of immunity for his testimony as a government witness. 

Bulgarian testified to having received no benefits from the 

government in exchange for his testimony. However, on 

cross-examination, Bulgarian testified to having received 

$5,000 in cash from the government after he testified to the 

grand jury in this case. Defendants noted that this testimony 

directly contravened a letter the government sent to them 

asserting that no witnesses received any benefits from the 

government in exchange for their testimony. The 

government acknowledged that it was “a glaring mistake,” 

but argued that the error was cured because defendants had 

ample opportunity to cross examine Bulgarian on the subject 

of the $5,000 payment. Defendants did not raise the issue 

again either at trial or in a post-trial motion.

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10 UNITED STATES V. YEPIZ

Approximately three years later, on August 20, 2009, 

Bulgarian testified in the trial of Horacio Yepiz.1 On direct 

examination, Bulgarian once again testified to having 

received no benefit from the government in return for his 

testimony. On cross examination, Bulgarian testified that 

since his arrest for drug-related crimes in 2004, he had 

received roughly $100,000 to $200,000 in cash from five 

different law enforcement agencies, although he was unable 

to give an exact figure. He explained that he was able to 

solicit paid work from these agencies whenever he wanted 

(“I decide when I want to work, and when I work, I get 

paid.”). Indeed, he testified to having received $800 for three 

hours of work the week prior. Appellants now argue that the 

government violated Brady by failing to disclose the full 

extent of the benefits Bulgarian received at trial.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence 

favorable to an accused upon request violates due process 

where the evidence is material either to guilt or to 

punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the 

prosecution.” Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 

To prevail on a Brady claim, the defendant must show that 

the evidence was material. Materiality is satisfied when 

“there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been 

disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would 

have been different. A ‘reasonable probability’ is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 

(1985). This Court reviews alleged Brady violations de 

novo. United States v. Baker, 658 F.3d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 

 1 Horacio Yepiz was originally joined as a co-defendant of 

appellants, but was later deemed incompetent and tried separately.

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UNITED STATES V. YEPIZ 11

2011), overruled on other grounds by United States v. King,

687 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2012).

DISCUSSION

The government makes three arguments in support of its 

contention that it did not violate Brady: (1) defendants 

waived any Brady claim by failing to raise it at trial; (2) the 

allegedly withheld information would have been cumulative 

in light of other impeachment material provided to 

defendants; and (3) the record demonstrates that Bulgarian 

received these payments only after the trial in this case.

The government argues that defendants have waived 

their Brady claim by failing to raise it in the trial court. 

However, this Court has previously rejected this precise 

argument. In United States v. Bracy, undisclosed 

impeachment evidence of a government witness was 

uncovered for the first time in a later trial of a severed group 

of defendants. 67 F.3d 1421, 1428 (9th Cir. 1995). The 

information came to light only after the defendant had filed 

his notice of appeal, thereby divesting the trial court of 

jurisdiction over his case. See generally Griggs v. Provident 

Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982). This Court 

concluded that “[i]t defies logic to suggest that [the 

defendant] waived a claim by not raising it before a court 

that lacked jurisdiction to consider it.” Bracy, 67 F.3d at 

1428. This reasoning applies with equal force here given that 

defendants appealed their case in early 2007, roughly twoand-a-half years before the new evidence was revealed.

Next, the government presents a litany of impeachment 

evidence that it produced to defendants, and argues that 

“additional payments information could hardly have caused 

the jury to view Bulgarian or his relationship with the 

government differently or with greater caution.” To the 

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12 UNITED STATES V. YEPIZ

extent that the government argues that its duties under Brady 

only encompass disclosure of non-cumulative evidence, this 

Court has previously found this line of reasoning unavailing. 

Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 481 (9th Cir. 1997) (“We 

have held that the government cannot satisfy its Brady

obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence by making some 

evidence available and claiming the rest would be 

cumulative.”) (internal citations omitted). Moreover, failure 

to produce evidence (1) that Bulgarian made hundreds of 

thousands of dollars assisting law enforcement, and 

(2) enjoyed a relationship that allowed him to earn benefits 

whenever he chose, was material despite the effect of other 

impeachment evidence provided by the government. Indeed 

this evidence could very well have resulted in the jury 

disbelieving all of Bulgarian’s testimony, which played an 

important role in the government’s case. Cf. Benn v. 

Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The 

undisclosed benefits that Patrick received added 

significantly to the benefits that were disclosed and certainly 

would have ‘cast a shadow’ on Patrick’s credibility. Thus, 

their suppression was material.”).

The government’s attempts to minimize the significance 

of Bulgarian’s testimony are not persuasive in light of the 

record. While some of Bulgarian’s testimony was 

independently corroborated, it nonetheless played a 

substantial role in the government’s case-in-chief. In 

particular, Bulgarian’s testimony was relied upon heavily by 

the government to show that VBS was a “criminal 

enterprise” under RICO. Therefore, had the alleged Brady 

materials been made available to appellants at trial, there is 

a “reasonable probability” that the result of the proceeding 

would have been altered.

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UNITED STATES V. YEPIZ 13

Finally, the government argues that the record 

conclusively shows that the benefits Bulgarian testified to 

receiving were all earned after appellants’ trial, and 

therefore could not serve as the basis of a Brady violation. 

The government points to a discovery letter sent to Horacio 

Yepiz in August of 2009, informing him that since 

Bulgarian’s testimony in this case in 2006, he had received 

an additional $80,000 to $90,000 from the government. 

However, Bulgarian testified that he may have received as 

much as $200,000 between 2004 and 2009; therefore a letter 

stating that he received roughly half that sum after 

appellants’ trial in 2006 does not foreclose appellants’ Brady 

claim.

The government concedes that the facts surrounding 

benefits paid to Bulgarian are “in dispute.” Likewise, 

defendants admit that “there are fact-finding gaps in the 

record with regard to how much Bulgarian was paid, when 

he received payments, and the purpose of the payments.” 

Defendants attempt to bridge these “gaps” by requesting that 

the court simply take judicial notice of Bulgarian’s 2009 

testimony at the trial of Horacio Yepiz. However courts may 

only take judicial notice of facts “not subject to reasonable 

dispute;” therefore the court DENIES defendants’ motion. 

Fed. R. Evid. 201; see also Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 

690 (9th Cir. 2001).2

 2 Defendants also request that this court take judicial notice of a 

complaint, verdict, and judgment in a state civil negligence case. 

Defendants have failed to adequately explain how these documents relate 

to any of their arguments on appeal, and how they meet the standard for 

judicial notice. MJN at 5 (citing JOB at 76–77). The Court therefore 

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14 UNITED STATES V. YEPIZ

In light of the disputed facts surrounding defendants’ 

Brady claim, we REMAND to the district court so that it 

may engage in the necessary fact-finding to ascertain 

whether Bulgarian received benefits that were undisclosed 

to appellants at the time of trial, and if so, whether Brady 

was violated as to each convicted count.3

II. MANUEL YEPIZ’S SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL CLAIM

BACKGROUND

Following Manuel Yepiz’s (“Yepiz”) arrest in June 

2005, an attorney named Bernard Rosen was appointed to 

represent him. In November 2005, Yepiz retained Nicolas 

Estrada to replace Rosen. On April 9, 2006, Yepiz wrote a 

letter addressed “to the Honorable Judge Walters,” which the 

court received on April 11, 2006. In the letter, Yepiz 

expressed “great concern” about “financial differences” he 

was having with Estrada. He stated that Estrada had asked 

him for $200,000 to proceed to trial, despite having told 

Yepiz and his family he would only charge an additional 

$25,000 to $35,000 for trial. He stated that if Estrada “would 

 DENIES defendants’ motion for judicial notice as to these documents as 

well.

3 At oral argument, the government conceded that defendants should 

have an opportunity to litigate their Brady claims by collaterally 

attacking their conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. However, the 

government points to no opinion of this Court holding that a postconviction motion under § 2255 is preferable to a remand. Indeed, the 

government stated at oral argument that “it doesn’t make much 

difference” what mechanism is used. Moreover, defendants would not 

enjoy the benefit of counsel in a § 2255 proceeding. Given that counsel 

for defendants are already familiar with the facts surrounding the Brady 

issue, the interests of justice and judicial efficiency militate in favor of 

remanding to the district court.

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UNITED STATES V. YEPIZ 15

have been more truthful from the start, [he] would have 

never hired [Estrada],” because his family could not afford 

him. Finally, Yepiz noted that he did not want to “waste 

everybodys [sic] time by waiting [until] the last minute to

ask for a new attorney,” that he had only recently been 

informed of Estrada’s prices, and that he was thus requesting 

a “panel attorney” now, so that he or she could “prepare for 

trial and [have] everything [go] as schedule[d].”

The court did not accept Yepiz’s letter, and instead 

ordered the letter “returned to counsel” along with a Notice 

of Document Discrepancies (NDD). A checked box at the 

bottom of the NDD stated that Yepiz’s letter was “NOT to 

be filed, but instead REJECTED.” The NDD did not 

indicate the basis for the court’s rejection, and the docket 

description of the document only indicated that the denial 

was based on the fact that “[p]arties should not write letter[s] 

to Judge.” Yepiz and Estrada subsequently appeared before 

the court on May 9, 2006 for a hearing on a motion to 

suppress evidence, though neither Yepiz nor Estrada 

reasserted Yepiz’s motion for substitution of counsel.

On July 25 and 31, Yepiz wrote two additional letters 

addressed to Judge Walter asking for an “in camera hearing” 

to “request the Court to appoint new counsel” on his behalf. 

He raised several concerns in his letters regarding Estrada’s 

representation, and the court scheduled a hearing for August 

4, 2006 to address them. At the hearing, the court stated that

it had received “two letters from the defendant,” referring to 

those letters dated July 25 and July 31. It did not reference 

Yepiz’s April 9 letter. After discussing several of Yepiz’s 

concerns, the following exchange took place between Yepiz 

and Judge Walter:

Yepiz: Okay, Your Honor. And then another 

thing. I addressed the Court—I wrote this 

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16 UNITED STATES V. YEPIZ

letter on April 9th—yes, I believe April 9th. 

I have it right here. It was returned, it was 

signed by, I believe, you and returned.4 Right 

here I’m asking for a lawyer because I’m 

already having problems with [Estrada] as of 

April 9th. This is not something that 

happened last week or a few weeks ago, 

[Y]our Honor, this has been going on. . . . 

This is a whole letter right here signed by 

you, yourself, [Y]our Honor, I have it right 

here in front of me.

The Court: Well, I didn’t sign any letter.

Yepiz: Well, it’s right here.

The Court: I didn’t sign your letter.

Yepiz: You didn’t sign—oh, you signed the 

copy of it.

The Court: Your letter that you’re saying 

that I signed.

Yepiz: My letter, I apologize, you know, I’m 

not the brightest car in the lot.

The Court: All right. Anything else?

 4 While the NDD stipulated that the letter should be returned to 

counsel, based on Yepiz’s statements, he was aware that the letter had 

been returned, either because it had been returned directly to him, or 

because Estrada informed him that it had been returned.

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UNITED STATES V. YEPIZ 17

The court then briefly questioned Yepiz about his July 25 

letter, but never again acknowledged Yepiz’s April 9 letter. 

The court held that “the issues raised ha[d] been adequately 

addressed by counsel” and that Yepiz’s requests for 

substitution were “untimely, as [they had been] filed on the 

eve of trial.” The court further stated that because it had 

received four or five letters from several of Yepiz’s codefendants who were “all housed together at [a correctional 

facility],” they amounted to “nothing more than a strategic 

attempt to delay the trial.” Because it found that a 

substitution “would necessitate a continuance” of the trial, 

the court denied Yepiz’s request.

On September 20, 2006—the 23rd day of trial—Yepiz 

sent a fourth letter to the court that was addressed to Judge 

Walter. The letter raised several “concerns as to [Yepiz’s] 

attorney and his representation.” Among other things, it 

stated that Estrada would not spend $60 to copy a videotape 

of Yepiz’s arrest and that he feared Estrada had “lost interest 

to defend [him]” because he had “run out of money.” He 

stated that Estrada was “constantly harass[ing]” him for 

money and his family was “selling their house to pay him,” 

but that Estrada’s response was “no money [no] defense.” 

Interpreting Yepiz’s letter as a request for substitution of 

counsel, the court scheduled a hearing for three days later, 

where Yepiz clarified that the letter was actually “just a 

request to get the video” from Estrada, and Estrada agreed to 

produce it.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“We review a district court’s denial of a motion for 

substitution of counsel for abuse of discretion.” United 

States v. Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d 976, 978 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Unlike “most substitution cases” that “arise when an 

indigent defendant requests new court-appointed counsel in 

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18 UNITED STATES V. YEPIZ

place of an existing appointed attorney,” the present appeal 

concerns a defendant’s request to replace retained counsel 

with appointed counsel. Id.

The Sixth Amendment provides that, [i]n all criminal 

prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have 

the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” U.S. Const. 

amend. VI. This right “encompasses two distinct rights: a 

right to adequate representation” for all defendants and, for 

defendants who have retained their own attorney, the right 

“to be represented by the attorney of [their] choice.” RiveraCorona, 618 F.3d at 979 (emphasis omitted). The right to 

counsel of choice includes the constitutional “right to 

discharge retained counsel,” and a defendant may generally 

do so “for any reason or no reason” so long as “the 

substitution would [not] cause significant delay or 

inefficiency or run afoul of . . . other considerations,” such 

as the “fair, efficient and orderly administration of justice.” 

United States v. Brown, 785 F.3d 1337, 1340, 1344, 1345, 

1346 (2015); Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d at 980–81. “[D]enial 

of a defendant’s right to counsel of choice is a structural 

error, requiring that convictions be vacated even without a 

showing of prejudice.” Brown, 785 F.3d at 1350. Where a 

“court allows a defendant to discharge his retained counsel 

and the defendant is financially qualified, the court must 

appoint new counsel for him under the Criminal Justice Act” 

(CJA), at any stage of the proceedings. Id. at 1340; 

18 U.S.C. § 3006A.

DISCUSSION

Yepiz claims the district court abused its discretion when 

it failed to inquire into his April letter seeking to replace 

Estrada with court-appointed counsel. We agree. Under this 

court’s precedent, “the trial judge had a duty to inquire into 

the problems between” Yepiz and Estrada “when they were 

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UNITED STATES V. YEPIZ 19

first raised.” Blacketter, 525 F.3d at 896. The court here 

failed to conduct any inquiry with regard to Yepiz’s April 

letter, though it clearly understood it was bound by such a 

duty given the speed with which it scheduled hearings 

regarding Yepiz’s July and September letters, each of which 

were similarly addressed directly to Judge Walter. Yepiz’s 

failure to submit his letter through the very counsel he was 

hoping to discharge, does not negate the court’s duty.

As an initial matter, the government argues that the court 

need not have addressed Yepiz’s request because it was not 

properly filed. According to the government, Yepiz’s letter 

was rejected and not filed because it did not comply with 

Local Rules 83-2.9.1 and 83-2.11. Those rules prohibit 

parties who are represented by counsel from acting pro se

and from communicating with the judge via letters or phone 

calls. See C.D. Cal. Civ. L-R 83-2.9.1 & 83-2.11. The NDD 

rejecting Yepiz’s letter, however, made no mention of these 

local rules. Indeed, no reason for the rejection was provided 

on that form. It was only on the electronic version of the 

docket that any explanation was provided: “[p]arties should 

not write letter [sic] to Judge.” Thus, no clear explanation 

as to why Yepiz’s letter was rejected was ever presented to 

Yepiz’s counsel, and because the letter and NDD were sent 

to Yepiz’s counsel and not to Yepiz, Yepiz was given no 

explanation at all.

Had such an explanation been given to Yepiz, he would 

have been in a position to properly comply with the local 

rules: he could have requested that his counsel file a motion 

asking to withdraw, a motion which his counsel would have 

been ethically obligated to file. Alternatively, Yepiz could 

have filed another letter explaining why he was unable to 

comply with the rules—perhaps his counsel was unwilling 

or unable to comply with his ethical obligations to file a 

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20 UNITED STATES V. YEPIZ

motion to withdraw, or perhaps Yepiz was unable to contact 

his counsel at all. Because no explanation was provided, 

Yepiz was not given notice as to how he could properly 

present his request for new counsel, and as such, the local 

rules served to arbitrarily deny Yepiz’s constitutional rights. 

Under the circumstances of this case, therefore, we reject the 

government’s argument that the court was excused from its 

duty to inquire into Yepiz’s request because of Yepiz’s 

failure to comply with any local rule of procedure.

The government also argues that Yepiz waived his Sixth 

Amendment right to counsel when he failed to reassert his 

substitution motion at the May suppression hearing. See 

United States v. Taglia, 922 F.2d 413, 416 (7th Cir. 1991) 

(stating that “[i]f a motion is not acted upon, a litigant had 

better renew it. He may not lull the judge into thinking that 

it has been abandoned and then, after he has lost, pull a rabbit 

out of his pocket in the form of the forgotten motion.”). 

However, the record does not support the government’s 

claim of waiver.

A constitutional right may generally only be waived “if 

it can be established by clear and convincing evidence that 

the waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent,” and we 

must “indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver 

of fundamental constitutional rights.” Schell v. Witek, F.3d 

1017, 1024 (9th Cir. 2000). In Schell, we held that the 

defendant did not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently 

waive his right to counsel when he failed to reassert a request 

for substitution that the court had overlooked. Id. Instead, 

we found that because Schell’s attorney had advised him that 

his motion “must have been denied” and there was “nothing 

in the record to suggest that Schell knew of the court’s 

inadvertent error,” he could not have waived the request. Id. 

While this case presents a slightly different scenario in that 

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UNITED STATES V. YEPIZ 21

we do not know why Yepiz failed to reassert his motion at 

the May hearing, our conclusion is the same.

In this case, Yepiz sent his first letter to the court in April 

2006, which the court rejected. He then sent two additional 

letters addressed to Judge Walter requesting substitution of 

counsel in July 2006. At a hearing to address the July letters, 

Yepiz stated that the issues he was having with Estrada were 

“not something that had just happened last week,” but had 

instead “been going on” since April. In his September letter, 

Yepiz stated that “[d]uring a conversation in April 2006, I 

explained I had no more money . . . [and] [w]e agreed that 

[Estrada] would withdraw from the case. However, he still 

remains and I am being repeatedly harassed for money.” 

Yepiz’s consistent statements that his issues with Estrada 

had not been resolved suggest that Yepiz did not voluntarily, 

knowingly, or intentionally waive his motion.

This conclusion is supported by the fact that the NDD 

failed to put Yepiz on notice that the letter was rejected or 

how he might rectify the deficiency. For all he knew, as in 

Schell, the motion “must have been denied.” Schell, 

218 F.3d at 1024. We therefore hold that Yepiz did not

waive his motion.

While it may sometimes be necessary to remand a case 

such as this to the district court in order to determine whether 

substitution of counsel would have “caused significant 

delay” or impeded the “fair, efficient and orderly 

administration of justice,” the record here is sufficiently 

clear to determine, without remanding, that replacing 

Estrada would not have implicated these concerns. 

Blacketter, 525 F.3d at 896. The court received Yepiz’s 

April 2006 letter four months prior to the start of trial. In the 

letter, Yepiz stated specifically that he “did not want to delay 

the trial,” and merely wanted to “have the time to get a new 

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22 UNITED STATES V. YEPIZ

lawyer to defend [him] properly,” as provided by the 

Constitution. Id. The district court later suggested that “five 

weeks would have been sufficient time” for a substitute 

attorney to prepare a defense for a different defendant joined 

in Yepiz’s case, and any counsel appointed to represent 

Yepiz would have had months to prepare for trial. Because 

the substitution would not have affected the court’s calendar, 

Yepiz was entitled to discharge Estrada “for any reason or 

no reason.” Blacketter, 525 F.3d at 896. If Yepiz still 

qualified as an indigent defendant at the time he sent his 

April letter, he was also statutorily entitled to appointed 

counsel under the CJA. Brown, 785 F.3d at 1346.

We therefore find that the district court abused its 

discretion when it arbitrarily and without explanation 

rejected Yepiz’s April 2006 letter. Given the defects in the 

district court’s handling of Yepiz’s requests, we VACATE

Yepiz’s conviction and REMAND for a new trial. Brown, 

785 F.3d at 1350.

NGUYEN, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part:

While represented by competent retained counsel, 

Manuel Yepiz sent a pro se letter to the district court. 

Because the court’s local rules prohibit, among other things, 

represented parties from communicating with the court pro 

se, his letter was not filed. Instead, the court returned the 

letter to Yepiz’s counsel along with notice of the reason for 

the rejection. Importantly, Yepiz’s letter doesn’t suggest any 

dissatisfaction with his attorney’s representation, only with 

its cost. Yet the majority holds that the court’s failure to 

consider the letter is structural error requiring automatic 

reversal of Yepiz’s conviction. I respectfully dissent.

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UNITED STATES V. YEPIZ 23

The majority’s ruling invalidates not only wellestablished local rules in the Central District of California, 

but similar rules in every district in the Ninth Circuit. More 

troubling, however, is the majority’s refusal to engage in 

harmless error analysis. A request for appointed counsel 

implicates the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of effective 

assistance, not choice, of counsel, regardless of whether the 

attorney whom the criminal defendant seeks to replace was 

retained or appointed. Consistent with other effectiveassistance cases, Yepiz’s conviction should be affirmed 

unless he can show prejudice. There was no such showing 

here. Indeed, counsel continued to represent Yepiz 

competently throughout the extensive proceedings in this 

case, including pretrial hearings, trial, and sentencing. By 

finding structural error and vacating the conviction, the 

majority brings us seriously out of step with the Supreme 

Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.

I.

I agree with the majority that the Sixth Amendment 

claim turns on Yepiz’s April 2006 handwritten letter to the 

district court regarding his retained attorney, Nicolas 

Estrada.1 In the letter, Yepiz did not express concern about

Estrada’s competence or any other aspect of his 

performance. To the contrary, the letter was premised 

 1 Yepiz sent four letters to the court regarding Estrada. The first, at 

issue here, was sent in April 2006. Yepiz followed up with two more in 

July, and a fourth letter in September after trial had begun. I agree with 

the majority that the denial of the July and September requests for 

substitution of counsel were justified. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 

924 F.2d 925, 926 (9th Cir. 1991) (“We have consistently held that a 

district court has broad discretion to deny a motion for substitution made 

on the eve of trial if the substitution would require a continuance.” (citing 

United States v. McClendon, 782 F.2d 785, 789 (9th Cir. 1986))).

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entirely on “financial differences” that developed between 

Yepiz and Estrada. Yepiz wrote that he “need[ed] a Panel 

attorney” because Estrada had only recently informed him of 

the representation’s “financial cost.”

The court “rejected” the letter for filing and returned it 

to counsel for failure to comply with the district court’s local 

rules. Those rules prohibit a party from “writing letters 

to . . . or otherwise communicating with a judge in a pending 

matter unless opposing counsel is present” and require “[a]ll 

matters [to] be called to a judge’s attention by appropriate 

application or motion.” C.D. Cal. L.R. 83-2.11 (2006). The 

rules also prohibit a represented party from acting pro se. 

C.D. Cal. L.R. 83-2.9.1 (2006). It appears that the letter may 

have been bounced by court staff without the judge’s 

involvement.2 At a later hearing in which Yepiz recounted 

the letter, the district judge gave no indication that he had 

seen it.

The district court sent a notice of discrepancy to Estrada 

informing him that filing was rejected, along with a copy of 

the letter. The electronic docket entry noted the reason for 

the rejection as “[p]arties should not write letter [sic] to 

 2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(d)(4) prohibits the clerk from 

refusing to file a paper solely for noncompliance with a local rule, but 

such orders can be entered at the direction of a judicial officer. E.g., 

Christian v. Mattel, Inc., 286 F.3d 1118, 1129 (9th Cir. 2002); see Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 5(e) advisory committee’s note to 1991 amendment (“The 

enforcement of these rules and of the local rules is a role for a judicial 

officer.”). It’s unclear whether Judge Walter saw the letter and rejected 

the filing, he delegated that duty, or, if his usual practice was to set a 

hearing, a clerk inadvertently failed to comply. That Judge Walter’s 

signature is on the notice of discrepancy doesn’t definitively tell us the 

answer as most judges have signature stamps for their courtroom 

deputy’s use.

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UNITED STATES V. YEPIZ 25

judge.” In short, the district court promptly alerted Estrada 

that the letter was not filed and gave him a copy of it so that 

he would know the exact nature of his client’s complaint. It 

appears that Estrada discussed the matter with his client

because, at a subsequent hearing, Yepiz stated that he had a 

copy of the “returned” letter “signed by” the court

(presumably referring to the notice of discrepancy).

Yet for three months after filing was rejected, neither 

Yepiz nor defense counsel raised any concerns. Estrada 

continued to represent Yepiz, filing a reply in support of his 

motion to suppress wiretap evidence and appearing 

alongside him at the hearing. Throughout that time Estrada 

never filed a motion to withdraw or a request for 

substitution.

II.

The majority acknowledges that the letter was neither 

filed nor considered on the merits. It concludes, however, 

that because the district court presented “no clear 

explanation as to why Yepiz’s letter was rejected” to Yepiz 

or to this attorney, the local rules “served to arbitrarily deny 

Yepiz’s constitutional rights.” Slip Op. at 19–20. I disagree.

For one thing, the docket entry plainly states that the 

letter was rejected “based on: [p]arties should not write 

letter [sic] to judge.” Estrada received this notice. See C.D. 

Cal. L.R. 5-4.1.4(4). Moreover, because “familiarity with 

[the] Local Rules [is] a prerequisite to admission to practice 

in the Central District,” Moore v. La Habra Relocations, 

Inc., 501 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1279 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (citing 

C.D. Cal. L.R. 83-2.2.2 (2006)), Estrada was expected to 

know that those rules prohibited represented parties from 

writing letters directly to the judge. He certainly would have 

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26 UNITED STATES V. YEPIZ

known that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require 

motions to be served on opposing counsel. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

5(a)(1)(D).

Once Estrada learned that his client might want to 

discharge him, he had a duty to promptly discuss the issue 

with Yepiz and, if Yepiz indeed had that intent, to honor it. 

An attorney has an ethical obligation to seek substitution or 

withdrawal if his client wants the representation to end. See, 

e.g., Fracasse v. Brent, 6 Cal. 3d 784, 790 (1972) (“[T]he 

client’s power to discharge an attorney, with or without 

cause, is absolute.” (citation omitted)); see also Cal. Bus. & 

Prof. Code § 6068(m) (requiring attorneys “to keep clients 

reasonably informed of significant developments”); Cal. R. 

of Prof’l Conduct, R. 3-500 (same).

“[T]he attorney is in the best position to determine when 

a conflict exists and so ‘defense attorneys have the 

obligation, upon discovering a conflict of interests, to advise 

the court at once of the problem.’” United States v. Elliot, 

463 F.3d 858, 866 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Holloway v. 

Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 485–86 (1978)). Attorneys 

routinely bring their clients’ requests to discharge counsel or 

potential conflicts to the court’s attention, including in the 

cases relied upon by Yepiz and the majority. E.g., United 

States v. Brown, 785 F.3d 1337, 1341–42 (9th Cir. 2015) 

(“[Defense counsel] advised the court [in a written motion] 

that Brown ‘desire[d] counsel to withdraw from representing 

him . . . .’”); United States v. Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d 976, 

977–78 (2010) (“[Retained counsel] moved to withdraw 

[after his client expressed a loss of faith in him] and 

requested that new counsel be appointed.”); Miller v. 

Blacketter, 525 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2008) (filing 

withdrawal motion on the day after the defendant “left a 

message on [counsel’s] home answering machine stating 

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UNITED STATES V. YEPIZ 27

that he was no longer comfortable with her representation 

and . . . wanted a new lawyer”). There is no reason to think 

Estrada would not have done the same thing here if Yepiz 

remained intent on firing him.

For all we know, Yepiz and Estrada may have 

temporarily resolved their financial differences after Yepiz’s 

letter was rejected. If so, then we must “presume that 

counsel [continued] to execute his professional and ethical 

duty to zealously represent his client, notwithstanding the 

fee dispute.” United States v. O’Neil, 118 F.3d 65, 71 (2d 

Cir. 1997). We should assume that Estrada fulfilled his 

duties given the “‘strong presumption’ that an attorney’s 

conduct was professionally competent.” Frazer v. United 

States, 18 F.3d 778, 786 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Strickland 

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984)). Nothing in 

Yepiz’s April 2006 letter suggested that Estrada was 

unwilling to end the representation or that there was any 

other conflict that might have warranted the district court’s 

intrusion into the attorney-client relationship. In Yepiz’s 

next two letters to the district court, written three months 

later, he did not even mention the fee issue. By vacating 

Yepiz’s conviction without knowing why he never renewed 

his request as a formal substitution motion, the majority flips 

the presumption that Estrada was competent on its head.3

 3 As stated, Yepiz knew that his letter was rejected. But the majority 

appears to assume that Estrada failed to notify Yepiz in a timely manner 

or refused to honor a request to withdraw. Even if true, Yepiz had a 

remedy: he could allege ineffective assistance of counsel. Of course,

we usually do not consider such claims on direct appeal because the 

record is inadequate to evaluate them. See, e.g., United States v. 

Rahman, 642 F.3d 1257, 1259 (9th Cir. 2011). But that’s all the more 

reason why we shouldn’t disturb the conviction in these proceedings.

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Today’s decision will place tremendous strain on our 

already overburdened district courts. The majority’s holding 

means that district courts can’t enforce local rules 

prohibiting represented parties from writing pro se letters to 

the judge. Such rules exist in every district court throughout 

the Ninth Circuit. See D. Alaska Civ. R. 11.1(a)(1)(3)[A]; 

D. Ariz. Civ. R. 83.3(c)(2); N.D. Cal. Civ. R. 11-4(c); S.D. 

Cal. Civ. R. 83.9; D. Guam Gen. R. 19.1(a); D. Haw. R. 

83.6(a); D. Idaho Civ. R. 83.6(a)(2); D. Nev. R. IA 11-6 (a); 

D. N. Mar. I. Civ. R. 83.5(g)(1); D. Or. Civ. R. 83-9(b); E.D. 

Wash. R. 83.2(d)(2); W.D. Wash. Civ. R. 83.2(b)(4).4 In 

fact, we enforce similar rules in our own court, see, e.g., 

United States v. Noriega-Perez, 467 F. App’x 698, 703 (9th 

Cir. 2012); United States v. Ortiz-Martinez, 593 F. App’x 

649, 650 (9th Cir.) (rejecting pro se filing seeking new 

counsel), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2912 (2015), as do other 

circuits, see, e.g., United States v. Hunter, 770 F.3d 740, 746 

(8th Cir. 2014) (“It has long been Eighth Circuit policy ‘that 

when a party is represented by counsel, we will not accept 

pro se briefs for filing.’” (quoting United States v. Payton, 

918 F.2d 54, 56 n.2 (8th Cir. 1990))).

Until today, we have always afforded district courts great 

discretion in enforcing these rules because “[a] criminal 

defendant does not have an absolute right to both selfrepresentation and the assistance of counsel.” United States 

 4 The Eastern District of California does not have a specific rule 

except for capital habeas petitioners, E.D. Cal. R. 191(c), but its rules 

cite “letters to the Court not suitable for filing” as an example of 

“received” documents that are “not . . . part of the official record in the 

action,” E.D. Cal. R. 101. The District of Montana implies such a rule 

for represented criminal defendants: “When the right to counsel no 

longer applies in this court, pro se filings may not be dismissed or 

stricken on the grounds that the filer was represented by counsel.” D. 

Mont. Crim. R. 44.1.

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UNITED STATES V. YEPIZ 29

v. Halbert, 640 F.2d 1000, 1009 (9th Cir. 1981). Of course, 

district courts can’t turn a blind eye to conflicts between a 

criminal defendant and defense counsel under the guise of 

procedure. When the court is aware of a conflict that 

potentially could affect a defense counsel’s representation, it 

has a duty to inquire further. E.g., Garcia v. Bunnell, 33 F.3d 

1193, 1199 (9th Cir. 1994). But “not every conflict or 

disagreement between the defendant and counsel implicates 

Sixth Amendment rights.” Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 

1027 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (citing Morris v. Slappy, 

461 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1983) (rejecting “the claim that the Sixth 

Amendment guarantees a ‘meaningful relationship’ between 

an accused and his counsel”)).

Yepiz expressed no concern about Estrada’s 

performance. He did not suggest that counsel’s 

representation would suffer as a consequence of their 

financial dispute. I agree that because he asked for 

appointed counsel, the more prudent course would have been 

for the district court to exercise its discretion and take up his 

complaint. But the failure to do so under these 

circumstances is not per se reversible error. By concluding 

that structural error occurs when a district court fails to 

inquire into a single pro se letter that is returned to counsel, 

the majority effectively requires district judges to review and 

entertain all pro se filings submitted by every single 

represented criminal defendant. This is no small task. For 

many of our district courts that handle massive criminal 

dockets, receiving pro se letters is a routine matter. Some 

defendants in custody are prolific letter writers and, without 

counsel’s help, their messages may be prolix and inscrutable. 

District courts, no longer safe to rely on the defense bar’s 

professionalism in raising client concerns, will now be 

pressed to hold hearings whenever criminal defendants write 

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to them on differences with their counsel, regardless of how 

seemingly minor.

III.

The majority’s assignment of error to the district court’s 

routine handling of a pro se communication wouldn’t be 

nearly so pernicious if not for its failure to assess 

harmlessness. Guided by our precedents—which I believe 

were wrongly decided—the majority holds that when a 

district court erroneously denies a motion to substitute 

retained counsel with appointed counsel, it commits 

structural error. The mistake in this approach stems from 

confusion about the right at issue.

“The Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel encompasses 

two distinct rights: a right to adequate representation and a 

right to choose one’s own counsel.” Rivera-Corona, 

618 F.3d at 979 (quoting Daniels v. Lafler, 501 F.3d 735, 

738 (6th Cir. 2007)). These rights are distinct because they 

arise from different sources. The right to effective counsel 

is derived from the Due Process Clause’s fair trial guarantee 

and incorporated into the Sixth Amendment based on “our 

perception that representation by counsel ‘is critical to the 

ability of the adversarial system to produce just results.’” 

United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147 (2006) 

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685). Because the limits of 

this right are also derived from the goal of a fair—“not 

mistake-free”—trial, “a violation of the Sixth Amendment 

right to effective representation is not ‘complete’ until the 

defendant is prejudiced.” Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

685).

“The right to select counsel of one’s choice, by contrast, 

has never been derived from the Sixth Amendment’s 

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UNITED STATES V. YEPIZ 31

purpose of ensuring a fair trial. It has been regarded as the 

root meaning of the constitutional guarantee.” Id. at 147–48 

(footnote and citations omitted). “Deprivation of the right is 

‘complete’ when the defendant is erroneously prevented 

from being represented by the lawyer he wants, regardless of 

the quality of the representation he received.” Id. at 148. 

Although the right to choice of counsel is subject to 

qualifications, see Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 

(1988), the improper denial of that right, including the right 

not to have counsel, see Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 

821 (1975), is structural error subject to automatic reversal. 

Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 152; Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 

724, 734 (9th Cir. 2008).

Here, Yepiz did not seek to retain a particular lawyer or 

proceed pro se. He asked the district court to appoint

counsel. His request was grounded not in the Sixth 

Amendment’s right to counsel of choice but rather in its 

“right to the effective assistance of counsel, the violation of 

which generally requires a defendant to establish prejudice.” 

Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 146; see Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159 

(“[W]hile the right to select and be represented by one’s 

preferred attorney is comprehended by the Sixth 

Amendment, the essential aim of the Amendment is to 

guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant 

rather than to ensure that a defendant will inexorably be 

represented by the lawyer whom he prefers.”). The Supreme 

Court has cautioned us not “to confuse the right to counsel 

of choice—which is the right to a particular lawyer 

regardless of comparative effectiveness—with the right to 

effective counsel—which imposes a baseline requirement of 

competence on whatever lawyer is chosen or appointed.” 

Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 148.

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In Rivera-Corona, the panel cited Bland v. California 

Department of Corrections, 20 F.3d 1469, 1479 (9th Cir. 

1994), overruled on other grounds by Schell v. Witek, 

218 F.3d 1017, 1024–25 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc), for the 

proposition that a defendant’s request to substitute appointed 

counsel in place of a retained attorney “implicate[s] the 

qualified right to choice of counsel.” 618 F.3d at 981. I 

don’t read Bland as holding that, let alone “unequivocally” 

so. Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d at 981. At issue was the “right 

to discharge counsel,” Bland, 20 F.3d at 1472 (emphasis 

added), not the right to have new counsel appointed. Bland’s 

retained attorney moved unsuccessfully “to be relieved as 

counsel.” Id. at 1475 (emphasis omitted). We affirmed 

habeas relief based on the trial court’s denial of that motion. 

Id. at 1472. Although Bland’s retained attorney also 

expressed his client’s wish to have new counsel appointed, 

id. at 1475, that request wasn’t at issue because the trial court 

ultimately appointed counsel when the retained attorney 

failed to appear at sentencing. Id.

Admittedly, we inconsistently framed the issue as both 

the right to choice of counsel (which wouldn’t require a 

showing of prejudice) and the right to effective assistance 

(which would). But it made no difference how Bland’s right 

was characterized because he “established the requisite 

prejudice” in any event. Id. at 1479. In pointing out that 

“the Sixth Amendment . . . protects [Bland’s] qualified right 

to obtain retained counsel of his choice,” we “assume[d] 

Bland was not indigent.” Id. at 1477 (emphasis added).

As we explained in Schell, the right to choice of counsel 

is not implicated by an indigent defendant’s request for 

appointed counsel: “The qualified right of choice of counsel 

applies only to persons who can afford to retain counsel.” 

218 F.3d at 1025 (emphasis added). In Gonzalez-Lopez, the 

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Supreme Court echoed this principle, stating that “the right 

to counsel of choice does not extend to defendants who 

require counsel to be appointed for them.” 548 U.S. at 151.

The error in Rivera-Corona was compounded in Brown, 

which held that the erroneous denial of a motion to substitute 

retained counsel with appointed counsel “is a structural 

error, requiring that convictions be vacated even without a 

showing of prejudice.” 785 F.3d at 1350 (citing GonzalezLopez, 548 U.S. at 150). The panel acknowledged “that it is 

not, strictly speaking, correct to say that the defendant in 

Rivera-Corona, or [Brown], was entitled to, or seeking, 

counsel of choice.” Id. at 1344. Nevertheless, the panel 

concluded that the district courts were “really deciding two 

issues. The first, whether the defendant may discharge the 

attorney whom he retained, implicates the Sixth Amendment 

right to counsel of choice . . . . [A]t the same time, [the 

courts were] also considering a request for appointment of 

counsel.” Id. at 1344–45. Since the first issue involves a 

right that if violated requires automatic reversal, Brown

concluded that the ultimate decision was also subject to 

automatic reversal if erroneous. Id. at 1350.

Whatever the logic of that proposition in general, it 

makes no sense to apply it when the substitution request is 

for purely financial reasons. The defendant doesn’t want to 

fire his retained counsel independently of having new 

counsel appointed. The former is incidental to the latter. See

United States v. Mota-Santana, 391 F.3d 42, 47 (1st Cir. 

2004) (“[T]he two [analyses] merge, since defendant and his 

family ran out of funds to retain other private counsel and 

defendant sought court appointed counsel.”). Here, had the 

district court found Yepiz indigent and appointed Estrada to 

continue representing him at public expense, the majority 

presumably would find no error. See C.D. Cal. Gen. Order 

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34 UNITED STATES V. YEPIZ

13-09 (allowing for appointment of counsel not on Criminal 

Justice Act Panel to ensure continuity of representation and 

preserve the interests of economy). Then why find per se 

reversible error when the consequence of the court’s 

purported error was the continued representation by Estrada? 

The majority doesn’t say.

Before Rivera-Corona and Brown led us astray, we 

treated motions to substitute retained counsel with appointed 

counsel under the standard for appointing new counsel 

because that was the crux of the request. Bland held that 

“[w]hen reviewing the denial of a motion to substitute 

[retained with appointed] counsel for abuse of discretion, we 

consider . . . three factors: ‘(1) timeliness of the motion; 

(2) adequacy of the court’s inquiry into the defendant’s 

complaint; and (3) whether the conflict between the

defendant and his attorney was so great that it resulted in a 

total lack of communication preventing an adequate 

defense.’” 20 F.3d at 1475 (quoting United States v. Walker, 

915 F.2d 480, 482 (9th Cir. 1990)). Schell, though 

overruling Bland’s application in habeas cases as 

insufficiently deferential, confirmed that the standard 

applied in Bland “is the correct methodology for reviewing 

federal cases on direct appeal.” 218 F.3d at 1025 (citing 

Walker). Yet Rivera-Corona wrongly held that “the extentof-conflict review is inappropriate” when a defendant seeks 

to replace retained with appointed counsel. 618 F.3d at 981. 

But see Martel v. Clair, 132 S. Ct. 1276, 1287 (2012) 

(explaining that review of substitution motions “generally 

include[s]” factors such as “the timeliness of the motion; the 

adequacy of the district court’s inquiry into the defendant’s 

complaint; and the asserted cause for that complaint, 

including the extent of the conflict or breakdown in 

communication between lawyer and client (and the client’s 

own responsibility, if any, for that conflict)”). See generally

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UNITED STATES V. YEPIZ 35

Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d at 983–87 (Fisher, J., disagreeing 

that Bland and Schell were not controlling but concurring in 

the result). By wholly conflating two distinct rights—the 

right to counsel of choice and the right to effective counsel—

Rivera-Corona and Brown forged structural error from 

harmless mistake.

IV.

This case illustrates why a conviction shouldn’t be set 

aside when the district court erroneously denies a request to 

substitute retained with appointed counsel absent a showing 

of prejudice. Midway through trial, the district court held a 

hearing to discuss Yepiz’s most recent complaints about 

Estrada. The court made specific findings that Estrada had 

continued throughout the proceedings to competently 

represent Yepiz, that he had “participated in the trial,” “made 

objections . . . at the appropriate time,” and “properly crossexamined witnesses that ha[d] anything to say that relate[d] 

to [Yepiz].” Critically, the court found that Yepiz and 

Estrada “[could] continue to work out” defense strategy. 

None of these findings is consistent with “the conflict 

between the defendant and his attorney [being] so great that 

it resulted in a total lack of communication preventing an 

adequate defense.” Bland, 20 F.3d at 1475. In other words, 

there is no evidence of prejudice.

I respectfully dissent.

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