Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-14-05035/USCOURTS-caDC-14-05035-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jeh Charles Johnson
Appellee
Danita M. Walker
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 23, 2015 Decided August 18, 2015 

No. 14-5035 

DANITA M. WALKER, 

APPELLANT

v. 

JEH CHARLES JOHNSON, SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:11-cv-00816) 

Ellen K. Renaud argued the cause for appellant. With her 

on the briefs were David H. Shapiro and Richard L. Swick. 

Javier M. Guzman, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. On the brief were Ronald C. Machen Jr., 

U.S. Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and R. Craig 

Lawrence and Jane M. Lyons, Assistant U.S. Attorneys. 

Before: MILLETT and PILLARD, Circuit Judges, and 

SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge PILLARD. 

USCA Case #14-5035 Document #1568348 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 1 of 15
2 

PILLARD, Circuit Judge: Danita Walker, an African 

American woman, sued her employer, the U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security, claiming under Title VII that her white 

supervisor, Walter LeRoy, took adverse actions against her on 

account of her race or because she had previously filed a 

discrimination complaint against the Department. The alleged 

adverse actions included charging Walker absent without 

leave, assigning her an average rating in an annual evaluation, 

issuing a letter censuring her for missing work and acting in 

what LeRoy described as an unprofessional manner, and 

rejecting her application for a promotion. The district court 

granted summary judgment to the Department. We affirm 

because the record in this case could not reasonably support a 

finding that the Department’s stated reasons were a pretext for 

discrimination or retaliation. 

I. 

The summary judgment record shows that Walker 

worked from 2005 to 2010 as a GS-12-level employee in a 

unit of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) within 

the Department of Homeland Security in Washington, D.C. 

Her role there was to develop policies for administering ICE’s 

immigration bond program for detained aliens. During most 

of Walker’s tenure, the bond management unit consisted of 

one supervisor, Walker, and three coworkers: two African 

American men and one white woman. 

LeRoy joined the bond management unit and became 

Walker’s supervisor in March 2008. A month before LeRoy 

arrived, Walker had filed an administrative complaint of raceand sex-based discrimination against the Department, the 

allegations of which were wholly unrelated to LeRoy. The 

parties mediated and settled those claims in May 2008. 

LeRoy learned of the ongoing mediation on April 7, 2008. 

USCA Case #14-5035 Document #1568348 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 2 of 15
3 

Walker describes her relationship with LeRoy as difficult 

from the outset. She found LeRoy very abrupt towards her, 

although not to the point of being rude or disrespectful. 

Meanwhile, she observed LeRoy as professional and 

courteous towards her coworkers, including two African 

American males and one white female. Walker informed 

LeRoy in May 2008 that she would need to miss work 

occasionally to care for her ailing mother, who was suffering 

from Alzheimer’s disease. From March to June, Walker was 

tardy or absent from work at least seventeen days without 

giving advance notice. LeRoy excused her tardiness and 

unscheduled absences during that period.

Starting in late June, LeRoy began what Walker 

characterizes as a pattern of unjustified antagonism toward 

her. First, on June 25, 2008, LeRoy issued her a Leave 

Restriction Letter explaining that her use of unscheduled 

leave posed a problem to the unit and that it was difficult to 

assign work to her in light of her irregular attendance. The 

Letter outlined specific procedures that Walker should follow 

when requesting leave, including whom to call and in what 

order, and how to identify in her requests the type of leave she 

sought. The Letter warned that failure to follow its 

procedures could result in a charge of absent without leave 

(AWOL). 

In October 2008, LeRoy gave Walker her annual 

performance evaluation for the 2007-2008 fiscal year. LeRoy 

classified Walker’s job performance as within the thirdhighest of four possible rating categories—one that made it 

unlikely she would receive a discretionary bonus. Walker’s 

white female coworker received the highest rating, and her 

two African American male coworkers each received the 

second-highest.

USCA Case #14-5035 Document #1568348 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 3 of 15
4 

The day she received her performance rating, Walker 

contacted an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) 

counselor and initiated the complaint that led to this litigation. 

In the administrative process, Walker alleged sex- and racebased discrimination and retaliation, but she has since 

abandoned her sex discrimination claim.

At the end of October 2008, and again in February 2009, 

LeRoy charged Walker as AWOL for what he saw as her 

failure to adhere to the leave-request procedures outlined in 

her Leave Restriction Letter. When Walker took sick leave, 

LeRoy charged, she did not call the people listed in the Letter; 

rather, she emailed someone who was filling in for LeRoy 

that day. When she needed to tend to an emergency situation 

with her mother, LeRoy also faulted Walker for only leaving 

him a voicemail and not additionally calling the backup 

contacts as required by the Letter. Walker does not deny that 

she did not adhere to the Letter’s procedures on those 

occasions. 

In February 2009, Walker received a Letter of Reprimand 

from LeRoy reflecting a determination of ICE’s Discipline 

and Adverse Actions Panel. The Reprimand stemmed in part 

from Walker’s failure to follow her leave-request procedures. 

It also cited an occasion when Walker, while suffering an 

asthma attack, interrupted a meeting and gave LeRoy a leave 

form in what the Reprimand described as an abrupt, impolite, 

and unprofessional manner. 

Finally, in July 2009, Walker was denied a promotion to 

a position as a Management and Program Analyst. The 

vacancy announcement solicited applications from employees 

who would qualify as GS-13 or GS-14. When Walker applied 

in November 2008, she received a confirmation letter from 

the Philadelphia branch of the United States Office of 

USCA Case #14-5035 Document #1568348 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 4 of 15
5 

Personnel Management advising that her name had been 

referred to the selecting official for consideration, and 

identifying the position as GS-0343-13/14. The following 

summer, Walker received what appeared to be a standard 

form letter from that office reflecting that only GS-14 

candidates were being considered for the position, and 

advising that her application had been rejected because she 

did not have “the required specialized skills needed for this 

specialty and grade.” J.A. 196. 

In September 2009, LeRoy received a list of eligible 

employees from which he was to recommend a selection. All 

the candidates on that list were at the GS-14 level, whereas 

Walker qualified as only GS-13. Referring to her receipt of 

the November referral letter, Walker contends that LeRoy 

falsely claimed to have received a candidate list of only GS14 employees. LeRoy recommended a white woman, a GS14, who was eventually hired, although LeRoy asserts, and 

Walker does not dispute, that he did not know the candidates’ 

races when he selected her. 

Walker also points to other incidents that she contends 

show LeRoy’s discriminatory and retaliatory motive toward 

her. In April 2009, LeRoy sent her an email faulting her for 

failing to follow instructions on a work assignment that 

Walker believed she had completed in a professional and 

responsive manner. In November 2009, in relation to 

Walker’s submission of a workers’ compensation claim for 

work-related stress, LeRoy responded to an information 

request from the Office of Workers’ Compensation denying 

that he had ever personally observed her suffering a workrelated injury. Walker viewed that as suggestive of 

discrimination, given that she had told him of her workrelated stress and he had seen medical visit documentation of 

a stress-related asthma attack. 

USCA Case #14-5035 Document #1568348 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 5 of 15
6 

Walker filed suit against the Department in 2011. She 

alleged that LeRoy took adverse action against her in the 

spring of 2008 on account of her race or because she had 

engaged in protected EEO activity. The Department moved 

for summary judgment, identifying the legitimate, nondiscriminatory and non-retaliatory reasons it had proffered for 

the alleged adverse employment actions and arguing that no 

reasonable jury could infer discrimination or retaliation from 

the evidentiary record. The district court granted summary 

judgment to the Department. Our review is de novo. Aka v. 

Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en 

banc). 

II. 

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is “no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

A movant is entitled to summary judgment when the evidence 

is such that a reasonable jury, drawing all reasonable 

inferences in the non-movant’s favor, could not return a 

verdict for the non-movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 

477 U.S. 242, 248, 255 (1986). 

Title VII prohibits the federal government from 

discriminating against employees on the basis of race, 42 

U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a), or retaliating against them because they 

opposed an unlawful employment practice or made a charge 

under the statute, id. § 2000e-3(a); see Barnes v. Costle, 561 

F.2d 983, 988 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (explaining that Title VII 

places the same restrictions on federal agencies as it does on 

private employers). 

Discrimination and retaliation claims are subject to the 

familiar, burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas 

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Brady v. Office of 

USCA Case #14-5035 Document #1568348 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 6 of 15
7 

the Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 493-94 (D.C. Cir. 2008); 

Jones v. Bernanke, 557 F.3d 670, 677 (D.C. Cir. 2009). A 

plaintiff must first establish her prima facie case. To state a 

prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff must allege she 

is part of a protected class under Title VII, she suffered a 

cognizable adverse employment action, and the action gives 

rise to an inference of discrimination. Stella v. Mineta, 284 

F.3d 135, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2002). For a retaliation claim, the 

plaintiff must allege that she engaged in activity protected by 

Title VII, the employer took adverse action against her, and 

the employer took that action because of the employee’s 

protected conduct. Hamilton v. Geithner, 666 F.3d 1344, 

1357 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 

If the plaintiff clears that hurdle, the burden shifts to the 

employer to identify the legitimate, non-discriminatory or 

non-retaliatory reason on which it relied in taking the 

complained-of action. Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 896 

(D.C. Cir. 2006). Assuming the employer proffers such a 

reason, the “central question” at summary judgment becomes 

whether “the employee produced sufficient evidence for a 

reasonable jury to find that the employer’s asserted nondiscriminatory or non-retaliatory reason was not the actual 

reason and that the employer intentionally discriminated or 

retaliated against the employee.” Allen v. Johnson, – F.3d –, 

No. 13-5170, 2015 WL 4489510, at *3 (D.C. Cir. July 24, 

2015) (brackets omitted) (quoting Brady, 520 F.3d at 494); 

see also Hamilton, 666 F.3d at 1351. 

A plaintiff may support an inference that the employer’s 

stated reasons were pretextual, and the real reasons were 

prohibited discrimination or retaliation, by citing the 

employer’s better treatment of similarly situated employees 

outside the plaintiff’s protected group, its inconsistent or 

dishonest explanations, its deviation from established 

USCA Case #14-5035 Document #1568348 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 7 of 15
8 

procedures or criteria, or the employer’s pattern of poor 

treatment of other employees in the same protected group as 

the plaintiff, or other relevant evidence that a jury could 

reasonably conclude evinces an illicit motive. Brady, 520 

F.3d at 495 & n.3. The temporal proximity between an 

employee’s protected activity and her employer’s adverse 

action is a common and often probative form of evidence of 

retaliation. See Hamilton, 666 F.3d at 1357-59; Taylor v. 

Solis, 571 F.3d 1313, 1322 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Whether 

evidence offered to show that an employer’s explanation is 

false itself suffices to raise an inference of unlawful 

discrimination or retaliation is a fact-sensitive inquiry. See 

Aka, 156 F.3d at 1294 (“[I]t is difficult, if not impossible, to 

say in any concise or generic way under what precise 

circumstances such an inference will be inappropriate.”). We 

undertake that inquiry below. 

III. 

Walker has failed to identify evidence in the record from 

which a reasonable jury could conclude that LeRoy’s 

proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory and non-retaliatory 

reasons for his actions were pretextual and that his real 

reasons were discriminatory or retaliatory. 

Like most Title VII plaintiffs—including those whose 

claims succeed—Walker lacks direct evidence that her 

employer acted with a retaliatory or discriminatory motive. 

See Allen, 2015 WL 4489510, at *3 (“Direct evidence of 

reprisal . . . is the exception rather than the rule.”). Walker’s 

case is somewhat distinctive because she worked in a small 

unit with only three coworkers, two of whom were also 

African American. By Walker’s own account, her African 

American coworkers were not subjected to the kinds of action 

that she challenges as racially discriminatory. LeRoy gave 

USCA Case #14-5035 Document #1568348 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 8 of 15
9 

those colleagues higher performance ratings and, according to 

Walker, was courteous and respectful towards them. The 

dearth of comparator evidence within her unit does not 

necessarily doom Walker’s claim, but it may well make it 

more difficult to raise an inference “strong enough to let a 

reasonable factfinder conclude that discrimination has 

occurred at all.” Aka, 156 F.3d at 1291; see, e.g., Hall v. 

Giant Food, Inc., 175 F.3d 1074, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (the 

fact that three-quarters of a plaintiff’s fellow employees were 

older than him “tend[ed] to refute any implication” of age 

discrimination). 

As factual support for her retaliation claim, Walker relies 

on the same allegations of antagonism that she points to in 

support of her discrimination claim, plus the temporal 

proximity between LeRoy learning of Walker’s EEO activity 

on April 7 and his issuing the Leave Restriction Letter on 

June 25. No inference of retaliation arises on that basis here. 

We previously rejected as “untenable” “an inference of 

retaliatory motive based upon the ‘mere proximity’ in time” 

between an employee filing a lawsuit, and discipline for 

unexcused absence two and one-half months later. Taylor, 

571 F.3d at 1322. The conduct of which Walker complains 

was not a sudden or marked change. To the contrary, even 

after LeRoy became aware that Walker had a pending EEO 

claim, he excused each of Walker’s seventeen unscheduled 

absences or late arrivals. More than three months then passed 

before he took any other action that Walker characterizes as 

adverse or retaliatory. 

Walker thus recognizes that “the heart of [her] case is the 

evidence raising an inference of pretext.” Appellant Br. 13. 

She argues that she has shown that LeRoy’s stated 

explanations were false, and that a reasonable jury could thus 

conclude that the actual reason for his actions was racial bias 

USCA Case #14-5035 Document #1568348 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 9 of 15
10 

or retaliation. She emphasizes our recognition in past cases 

that evidence that the employer’s stated reason is pretextual 

can be sufficient in itself to give rise to an inference of 

discrimination or retaliation. See, e.g., George v. Leavitt, 407 

F.3d 405, 413 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Aka, 156 F.3d at 1292. 

Walker is correct that a plaintiff is not “presumptively 

required to submit evidence over and above [evidence of 

pretext] in order to avoid summary judgment.” Aka, 156 F.3d 

at 1292. For instance, “[if] the only reason an employer 

offers for firing an employee is a lie, the inference that the 

real reason was a forbidden one . . . may rationally be drawn.” 

Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 401 (7th Cir. 1990). 

Even then, however, “the inference is not compelled.” Id. 

Because such judgments are contextual, “the plaintiff 

cannot always avoid summary judgment by showing the 

employer’s explanation to be false.” Aka, 156 F.3d at 1292; 

see also, e.g., Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 

F.3d 1061, 1066-67 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc) (“[D]isbelief of 

the defendant’s proffered reasons [is a] threshold finding[], 

beyond which the jury is permitted, but not required, to draw 

an inference leading it to conclude that there was intentional 

discrimination.”). The evidence of record must be such that a 

reasonable jury could not only disbelieve the employer’s 

reasons, but conclude that the real reason the employer took a 

challenged action was a prohibited one. We thus held that an 

employer’s “admi[ssion] to having lied” about why it failed to 

hire a black applicant, together with evidence that the 

employer lacked knowledge about the applicant’s experience 

and that its hiring practices “were generally inhospitable to 

minorities,” could support an inference that the employer was 

hiding a true, discriminatory motive. Colbert v. Tapella, 649 

F.3d 756, 760 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 

USCA Case #14-5035 Document #1568348 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 10 of 15
11 

The evidence on which Walker relies in this case could 

not support a finding that the employer’s proffered reasons 

were untrue, and thus, a fortiori, could not support an 

inference that her employer was hiding a prohibited motive. 

Walker attributes her “achieving expectations” performance 

rating to her race because, in her view, she “was doing so 

much more than [she] needed to do in [her] position and [she] 

was going out of [her] way above and beyond,” and “there 

was absolutely no other reason for [LeRoy] not to 

acknowledge all the effort that [she] put forth.” J.A. 306-07 

(Walker Dep.). LeRoy’s rating of Walker was, however, 

equivalent to the “fully successful” rating she received from a 

different supervisor the preceding year under the 

Department’s old rating system. Walker also identifies 

nothing in the record suggesting that LeRoy did not genuinely 

and reasonably believe he made the right decision in the 

performance rating. Assessment of job performance often 

involves myriad contestable judgments, but Walker points to 

nothing other than her own opinion of her performance to 

dispute LeRoy’s evaluation. In light of the other evidence in 

this case, including Walker’s acknowledged absences and 

LeRoy’s determination that her unreliable attendance was 

interfering with his ability to manage work flow, Walker’s 

own personal opinion is inadequate by itself to create an issue 

for the jury. See Vatel v. Alliance of Auto. Mfrs., 627 F.3d 

1245, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“It is settled that ‘it is the 

perception of the decision maker which is relevant, not the 

self-assessment of the plaintiff.’” (quoting Hawkins v. 

PepsiCo, Inc., 203 F.3d 274, 280 (4th Cir. 2000))). 

Walker also invokes what she calls LeRoy’s inconsistent 

accounts of an incident, cited in the Letter of Reprimand, in 

which Walker came into a meeting to give LeRoy a leave slip. 

Walker argues that variation between the respective 

descriptions of the incident offered by LeRoy, other 

USCA Case #14-5035 Document #1568348 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 11 of 15
12 

participants in the meeting, and the Letter of Reprimand 

render LeRoy’s explanation implausible and would permit a 

reasonable juror to infer that he was covering up an unlawful 

motive. “[S]hifting and inconsistent justifications are 

‘probative of pretext.’” Geleta v. Gray, 645 F.3d 408, 413 

(D.C. Cir. 2011). Here, however, there are only minor 

variations in the descriptions—Walker “drop[ped]” or “tossed 

(with emphasis)” or “swiftly placed” or “slammed” the leave 

slip on the desk—and every account describes Walker as terse 

and abrupt. J.A. 150-52, 458. Such fine descriptive 

differences between materially consistent accounts, without 

more, do not tend to make the accounts unworthy of belief, let 

alone support an inference of discrimination or retaliation. 

Walker also asserts that there is a material issue of fact in 

dispute over whether her name was among those referred to 

LeRoy for his hiring recommendation. She contends that 

evidence showing that she, qualifying for a GS-13 position, 

was identified as a potential candidate gives the lie to 

LeRoy’s explanation that only GS-14 candidates were 

considered. Walker contends that he was not being truthful 

about the composition of the list and the real reason that he 

did not recommend Walker was her race or EEO activity. Her 

only evidence in that regard is a November 2008 message 

from a Philadelphia personnel office, which stated that her 

application was received and her name had been referred for 

further consideration. The Philadelphia office, however, 

passed over Walker’s application for lack of requisite 

qualifications in July 2009, two months before LeRoy 

received the list and made his decision. There is thus no basis 

for any reasonable inference that Walker’s name was on the 

list that LeRoy received for consideration when he made his 

decision in September 2009. Walker points to an unchecked 

box on the selection form that contemplates the possibility of 

the official making a choice based on something other than 

USCA Case #14-5035 Document #1568348 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 12 of 15
13 

the preceding list of candidates. The box that was checked, 

however, reflects that the selection was made from the list. 

Walker’s mere speculation that LeRoy could also have had in 

front of him a list of GS-13 candidates with her name on it 

does not present a genuine dispute of material fact. 

Walker asserts that LeRoy sought to curtail her ability to 

care for her ailing mother by exercising his discretion to 

charge her AWOL when she took leave to care for her mother 

in an emergency. Putting aside that the record does not show 

that LeRoy was aware of the details of that situation, and that, 

as Walker acknowledges, LeRoy had excused past occasions 

on which Walker was absent without notice and later asserted 

that she was away to care for her mother, Walker’s contention 

at most supports a conclusion that LeRoy was willing to 

enforce procedures for obtaining leave authorization; it does 

not impugn the veracity of LeRoy’s reason or evince unlawful 

motive.1

 

For all of those reasons, we affirm the judgment of the 

district court that Walker failed to point to evidence capable 

of supporting an inference of discrimination or retaliation. 

Two portions of the district court’s opinion concerning 

whether the alleged employment actions were cognizably 

adverse warrant some clarification. First, to the extent that 

the district court suggested that Walker was obligated to make 

a “threshold showing” that her 2008 performance rating was 

 

1

 Walker makes passing reference to a white man whose requests 

for leave had been approved, but she could not provide any details 

surrounding his situation that might show that she was similarly 

situated to him, and she could not say whether LeRoy ever 

supervised him. 

USCA Case #14-5035 Document #1568348 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 13 of 15
14 

lowered from (and not equivalent to) the prior year’s for it to 

qualify as cognizably adverse, see J.A. 64, that suggestion 

should not be taken to insulate from challenge a 

discriminatory or retaliatory denial of a deserved rise in 

performance rating. Whether an assessment is adverse does 

not hinge on whether it was lowered; rather, the question is 

whether discrimination or retaliation caused a significant, 

tangible harm. See Douglas v. Donovan, 559 F.3d 549, 552-

53 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Proof that a rating unchanged from a 

prior period was nonetheless materially adverse could be 

difficult, but cannot categorically be ruled out. An employee 

whose volume and quality of work demonstrably improved, 

or who had significant difficulties at work in the prior period 

that she had overcome, might fairly deserve a significantly 

improved rating and would be materially harmed if 

discrimination prevented appropriate recognition. 

Second, insofar as the district court suggested that, even 

if LeRoy had acted with an illicit motive, that motive was 

rendered inoperative because it was the disciplinary 

committee, not LeRoy, that issued the Letter of Reprimand, 

and Walker did not establish that the committee knew of her 

race or prior EEO activity, see J.A. 65, 73, the court 

erroneously overlooked established law on “cat’s-paw” 

discrimination. Under a cat’s-paw theory, a formal decision 

maker may be an unwitting conduit of another actor’s illicit 

motives. See Griffin v. Wash. Convention Ctr., 142 F.3d 

1308, 1311-12 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see also Staub v. Proctor 

Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 421 (2011) (“[A] supervisor’s biased 

report may remain a causal factor if the [ultimate decision 

maker’s] independent investigation takes it into account 

without determining that the adverse action was, apart from 

the supervisor’s recommendation, entirely justified.”); 

Hampton v. Vilsack, 685 F.3d 1096, 1101-02 (D.C. Cir. 

2012). If the disciplinary committee was independent of and 

USCA Case #14-5035 Document #1568348 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 14 of 15
15 

insulated from LeRoy’s influence, that break in the chain 

would have rendered inoperative any illicit motive LeRoy 

might have had regarding the discipline. If, however, LeRoy 

played a role informing the committee about Walker and her 

conduct, the committee becomes “the conduit of [his] 

prejudice—his cat’s-paw.” Griffin, 142 F.3d at 1311-12 

(quoting Shager, 913 F.2d at 405); see also Staub, 562 U.S. at 

421-22. Because it appears that LeRoy played an integral role 

in informing the disciplinary committee, we do not rely on the 

theory that its action rendered LeRoy’s motive irrelevant. 

* * * 

Plaintiffs may survive summary judgment based solely 

on evidence of pretext when the evidence is such that a 

reasonable jury not only could disbelieve the employer’s 

reasons, but also could conclude that the employer acted, at 

least in part, for a prohibited reason. The evidence in this 

case, however, could not support a finding of pretext. We 

therefore affirm the judgment of the district court. 

So ordered. 

USCA Case #14-5035 Document #1568348 Filed: 08/18/2015 Page 15 of 15