Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-06113/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-06113-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Howard Clark
Plaintiff
Todd Hall
Plaintiff
Raymond Lee
Intervenor
Suzanne Mirzoyan
Intervenor
Angela Pirrone
Plaintiff
The Hershey Company
Defendant

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HOWARD CLARK, TODD HALL, 

ANGELA PIRRONE, individually, on 

behalf of all others similarly situated, and 

the general public,

Plaintiffs,

v.

THE HERSHEY COMPANY, a Delaware 

corporation,

Defendant.

No. C 18-06113 WHA 

ORDER RE MOTION TO 

INTERVENE

INTRODUCTION

In this food-mislabeling case, proposed intervenors move to intervene. For the following 

reasons, the motion is DENIED. 

STATEMENT

Previous orders have stated the facts of this case. Briefly, defendant The Hershey 

Company sells chocolates with a fruit-flavored center called “Brookside Dark Chocolate.” 

Each of the Brookside products at issue in this action are sold in packages with labels that 

represent the product is made with “No Artificial Flavors.” These products contain malic acid, 

a synthetic chemical (SAC ¶¶ 6, 18). Plaintiffs, Howard Clark, Todd Hall, and Angela Pirrone,

allege the “No Artificial Flavors” labeling is false and misleading due to the presence of malic 

acid in the product. 

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United States District Court

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The operative complaint, filed in March 2019 alleges twelve claims, including (1) fraud 

by omission, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1709–1710, (2) negligent misrepresentation, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 

1709–1710, (3) violation of California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), Cal. Civ. 

Code §§ 1750, et seq., (4) violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. 

Code §§ 17200, et seq., (5) violation of California’s False Advertising Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. 

Code §§ 17500, et seq., (6) breach of express and implied warranties, Cal. Com. Code §§ 2313 

and 2314, (7) violations of §§ 349 and 350 of New York General Business Laws, and (8) 

claims for breach of express and implied warranties under New York U.C.C. §§ 2-313 and 2-

314. 

A November 2019 order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment and allowed 

proposed intervenors to move to intervene as plaintiffs. The proposed intervenors, Suzanne 

Mirzoyan and Raymond Lee, accordingly filed the instant motion in December. Defendant 

opposes. This order follows full briefing and oral argument. 

ANALYSIS

Generally, it is improper to allow intervention after denial of class certification due to an 

inadequate class representative because “it is a back-door attempt to begin the action anew.” 

Lidie v. State of Cal., 478 F.2d 552, 555 (9th Cir.1973). Once a class is certified, however, 

substitution may be allowed because a class acquires “a legal status separate from that of the 

named plaintiffs,” such that the named plaintiffs’ loss of standing does not necessarily call for 

the “simultaneous dismissal of the class action, if members of that class might still have live 

claims.” Birmingham Steel Corp. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 353 F.3d 1331, 1336 (11th Cir. 

2003). In other words, a suit brought as a class action must be dismissed when there is no 

longer a case or controversy and no class has been certified. Employers-Teamsters Local Nos. 

175 & 505 Pension Tr. Fund v. Anchor Capital Advisors, 498 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2007).

Our situation here is slightly different than the above-mentioned ones, and there is no 

binding case law directly on point. In the above, either a class certification motion had not 

been filed or a court had ruled on the merits on a class certification motion already. Here, 

however, plaintiffs filed a class certification motion and the motion was denied as moot due to 

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

a summary judgment order finding that the named plaintiffs either did not rely on the label or 

did not suffer an injury due to the alleged mislabeling. 

Nonetheless, the reasoning from our court of appeals still applies — without standing, not 

only must plaintiffs’ motion for class certification be denied, the case must be dismissed. 

Lierboe v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 350 F.3d 1018, 1023 (9th Cir. 2003). Defendant 

attempts to distinguish the instant case by pointing to the summary judgment order’s dismissal 

of plaintiffs’ claims based on a lack of prudential standing and not constitutional standing. 

Constitutional standing requires: (1) a concrete injury that is actual or imminent and not 

hypothetical; (2) fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly wrongful conduct; (3) that is 

likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 

560–61 (1992). Here, plaintiff Clark’s injury was not caused by his reliance on the alleged 

mislabeling and plaintiffs Hall and Pirrone did not rely on the alleged mislabeling. Both of 

these failures in causation mean there is no longer a live case or controversy, and the case must 

be dismissed. 

Even if a motion to intervene were proper, the proposed intervenors have not shown good 

cause. As a preliminary matter, Rule 16 applies in determining whether the motion should be 

granted. Rule 16 states that deadlines in a scheduling order may only be modified for good 

cause. Here, a January 2019 scheduling order specifically provided a deadline of March 28, 

2019, to add new parties or to amend pleadings (Dkt. No. 29). The proposed intervenors argue 

that because they are not moving for leave to amend the complaint, only Rule 24 applies, 

which specifically addresses intervention. In this case, even though the proposed intervenors 

are not moving to amend the complaint, through the intervention motion, they are seeking to 

add new parties to serve as class representatives, for which the scheduling order provided a 

deadline.

Following the summary judgment order, the proposed intervenors promptly submitted the 

instant motion (approximately two weeks after the order) as directed by the order. This case 

has been ongoing for over a year, however, and fact discovery has closed. Plaintiffs’ counsel 

have long known that the crux of the case is whether plaintiffs relied on the labeling and were 

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injured by it, and yet chose to move for class certification with deficient plaintiffs. Good cause 

having not been shown, the motion to intervene is DENIED. Judgment will be entered in a 

separate order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 6, 2020.

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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