Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-07197/USCOURTS-caDC-96-07197-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Federal National Mortgage Association
Appellee
Paul Paquin
Appellant

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 6, 1997 Decided July 25, 1997 

No. 96-7197

PAUL PAQUIN,

APPELLANT

v.

FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 94cv01261)

Christopher G. Mackaronis argued the cause for the appellant.

Kenneth I. Juster argued the cause for the appellee. 

Bruce L. Montgomery was on brief.

Before: HENDERSON, ROGERS and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

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KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Paul Paquin 

alleges that the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 

(ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq., and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (DCHRA), D.C. Code Ann. §§ 1-2501 

et seq., by terminating him based on his age and by taking 

two retaliatory actions against him for engaging in conduct 

protected by the ADEA and the DCHRA. The district court 

awarded summary judgment to Fannie Mae on all of Paquin's 

claims. Paquin challenges the district court's award of summary judgment, its failure to order full discovery relating to 

performance evaluations of similarly situated employees at 

Fannie Mae and the magistrate judge's denial of expert fee 

reimbursement. We reverse the district court's refusal to 

order further discovery and, on that basis, reverse the district 

court's grant of summary judgment on Paquin's termination 

claim. With respect to Paquin's two retaliation claims we 

affirm the district court on one and reverse on the other. 

Finally, we affirm the magistrate judge's refusal to award 

expert fee reimbursement.

I. 

Paquin, currently 53 years old, began working for Fannie 

Mae in 1972 and four years later moved into Fannie Mae's 

newly formed Investor Relations Department (Department). 

Within that department he was promoted from manager to 

vice president to senior vice president, the highest position in 

the Department. The Department work has both an "external" aspect, involving relations with investors and analysts 

outside Fannie Mae, and an "internal" aspect, involving communications and strategy development within the company. 

The record is clear that Paquin performed the external 

aspects of his job well but, according to Fannie Mae, Paquin 

was deficient as to internal matters. Fannie Mae also claims 

that its senior management was disappointed with Paquin's 

performance on specific projects, such as Fannie Mae's 1993 

Investor/Analyst Biennial Conference.

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Toward the end of 1993 Fannie Mae decided to terminate 

Paquin. Paquin was informed of the decision on February 

14, 1994. He was offered a severance agreement, valued at 

approximately $600,000, was informed he should review it 

with his lawyer and was given until March 8, 1994, to accept 

the offer. The proposed severance agreement included a 

waiver of any legal claims. On March 1, 1994 Paquin's 

lawyer wrote a letter to Fannie Mae stating that Paquin 

believed his age played a role in Fannie Mae's decision to 

terminate him and requesting a severance package worth in 

excess of $4 million. In return Paquin offered to sign a 

release. Although the parties engaged in negotiations Fannie 

Mae ultimately refused to alter the terms of the original offer. 

According to Fannie Mae the deadline for accepting the 

original offer was extended to March 16, 1994 but Paquin 

maintains there was no such extension.

On March 17, 1994 Paquin filed a charge of unlawful 

termination and retaliation with the United States Equal 

Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). That same 

day Fannie Mae sent a letter to Paquin stating that, because 

he had not accepted the now-expired offer, Paquin had been 

terminated effective close of business on March 16th without 

severance benefits. On June 8, 1994 Paquin filed suit in 

district court alleging unlawful termination and retaliation 

under the ADEA and the DCHRA. At the close of discovery 

Fannie Mae moved for summary judgment on all of Paquin's 

claims, which motion was granted. Paquin then filed this 

appeal.

II.

A. Termination Claim

In ADEA cases we apply the familiar three-step burdenshifting framework announced in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 

Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), for Title VII cases. See Koger v. 

Reno, 98 F.3d 631, 633 (D.C. Cir. 1996).1 Under the first step 

__________

1 The McDonnell Douglas framework also applies to Paquin's 

claim under the DCHRA. See Perkins v. District of Columbia, 769 

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of McDonnell Douglas the complainant must establish a 

prima facie case of discrimination. 411 U.S. at 802. In the 

ADEA context a complainant makes his required prima facie

showing if he (i) belongs to the protected age group, (ii) was 

qualified for the position, (iii) was terminated and (iv) was 

replaced by a younger person. See Coburn v. Pan Am. 

World Airways, Inc., 711 F.2d 339, 342 (D.C. Cir.), cert. 

denied, 464 U.S. 994 (1983). If the complainant succeeds in 

establishing a prima facie case, the second step of the 

McDonnell Douglas framework shifts the burden to the 

defendant employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse employment action. 411 U.S. at 

802. If the defendant does so, then under the third step of 

McDonnell Douglas the complainant must produce evidence 

showing that the defendant's proffered reason is but a pretext 

for discrimination. Id. at 804.

We agree with the district court that Paquin established a 

prima facie case. Paquin was fifty years old at the time of 

his termination and therefore a member of the age class (at 

least 40 years old) protected by the ADEA. 29 U.S.C. 

§ 631(a). Like the district court, we believe that Paquin's 

twenty-year tenure at Fannie Mae and his series of promotions within the Department suffice to show that he was 

qualified for his position. Finally, there is no dispute that 

Paquin was terminated and replaced by a younger person.

Turning to the second step of the McDonnell Douglas

framework, we conclude that Fannie Mae met its burden in 

articulating a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its 

termination of Paquin. Fannie Mae claims that Paquin's 

termination resulted from substandard performance, as evidenced primarily by annual performance evaluations for the 

years 1991-1993. The evaluations indicated areas in which 

Paquin needed improvement. For example, the 1991 evaluation, while praising Paquin's performance in external matters, 

stated "Paul must devote considerably more effort to raising 

__________

F. Supp. 11, 14 n.3 (D.D.C. 1991). Because we apply the same 

analysis to Paquin's ADEA and DCHRA claims, we refer from this 

point on to his claim under the ADEA only.

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the level of his and his staff's 'internal' performance." JA 

348. The 1991 evaluation concluded "Paul's challenge next 

year will be to bring his internal management performance 

up to a level approaching the exceptional performance he 

continues to post in the external arena with investors and 

analysts." JA 349. The 1992 evaluation stated that the year 

had been "a mixture of positives and negatives." JA 350. 

The positive aspects "were concentrated in the area of external investor relations, where Paul and his staff continue to get 

extremely high marks." Id. The negative aspect was that 

"Paul has not made as much progress as [the reviewer] had 

hoped for in what last year [the reviewer] had termed his 

'internal' performancedepartmental administration, attention to detail, planning and executing tasks in a timely 

fashion, and presentation design and speech writing." Id.

The evaluation set out three specific areas targeted for improvementelimination of "repeated or blatant errors" in the 

Department's work, increased creativity and greater insight 

into investor preferences and valuation processes. JA 350-

51. In each of the three areas the evaluation included a 

specific instance during the past year that, according to the 

reviewer, manifested Paquin's inadequate performance. The 

1993 evaluation indicated that Paquin had failed to make 

much progress in two of the three areas and that in the third 

the reviewer postponed making a decision for another month. 

The evaluation was peppered with some strong criticisms. 

For example, a speech from Paquin's Department was described as "unsophisticated, unfocussed, and ... contain[ing] 

not only overstatements and simplications [sic] but also outright inaccuracies." JA 352. The reviewer concluded with 

the statements "I believe you must take a much more disciplined approach to your job" and "I look forward to your 

doing substantially better in 1994." JA 353. Each annual 

evaluation also gave Paquin a numerical evaluation on a five 

point scale. In 1991 he received a 4, putting 14 of 21 senior 

vice presidents ahead of him. In 1992 he again received a 4, 

putting 14 of 23 senior vice presidents ahead of him. In 1993 

he received a 3+, putting 22 of 25 senior vice presidents 

ahead of him.

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In short the evaluations distinguished sharply between 

Paquin's performance in external and internal matters: Paquin appeared to excel in the former but was consistently 

deficient with respect to the latter. His numerical scores 

over the three years show him slipping from the middle to the 

bottom of executives at the senior vice president level. Paquin's performance deficiencies with respect to internal matters, as memorialized in the three year-end performance 

evaluations, suffice to meet Fannie Mae's burden of articulating a non-discriminatory reason for Paquin's termination.

Under the third step of McDonnell Douglas, Paquin must 

prove that Fannie Mae's proffered reason was a pretext for 

discrimination. 411 U.S. at 804. At this stage, if Paquin is 

unable to adduce evidence that could allow a reasonable trier 

of fact to conclude that Fannie Mae's proffered reason was a 

pretext for discrimination, summary judgment must be entered against Paquin. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 

317, 322 (1986) ("[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates 

the entry of summary judgment ... against a party who fails 

to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an 

element essential to that party's case, and on which that party 

will bear the burden of proof at trial."). The district court 

concluded that Paquin failed to meet his burden but we think 

that its grant of summary judgment was premature. In 

response to Fannie Mae's summary judgment motion Paquin 

moved, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) 2, to 

deny Fannie Mae's motion on the ground that further discovery was necessary. We review the district court's discovery 

rulings for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Brune v. IRS, 861 

F.2d 1284, 1288-89 (D.C. Cir. 1988). In his motion Paquin 

__________

2 Rule 56(f), provides:

Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the 

motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by 

affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the 

court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a 

continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to 

be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order 

as is just.

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argued, inter alia, that Fannie Mae had failed to meet its 

discovery obligations by refusing to produce performance 

evaluations for Fannie Mae executives at Paquin's level. 

Fannie Mae had produced a summary, covering the years 

1990-1993, of the numerical ratings received by Fannie 

Mae's thirty-two senior vice presidents (including Paquin).3

Paquin claims, however, that in order to respond to Fannie 

Mae's motion for summary judgment he needs the underlying 

narrative evaluations of the executives. We agree.

As discussed above, Fannie Mae defends the termination of 

Paquin based on his written performance evaluations, including his declining numerical ratings vis à vis other senior vice 

presidents. If Fannie Mae's proffered reason is a pretext for 

discrimination, then comparable evaluations of other executives at his level are precisely the type of evidence that might 

enable Paquin to make his case. Cf. McDonnell Douglas,

411 U.S. at 804 (evidence that white employees engaged in 

comparable activity to that used to justify failure to rehire 

black employee "especially relevant" to show proffered reason 

is pretext for discrimination). For example, were the evaluations to reveal that other executives received written evaluations less favorable than those of Paquin but nonetheless 

received higher numerical scores, this would tend to discredit 

Fannie Mae's explanation that Paquin was terminated for a 

legitimate non-discriminatory reason. Even under the deferential abuse of discretion standard, the performance evaluations are sufficiently important to Paquin's case to warrant 

reversal. Cf. Hollander v. American Cyanamid Co., 895 

F.2d 80, 84-85 (2d Cir. 1990) (vacating award of summary 

judgment where district court refused to compel defendant to 

provide information about termination of employees similarly 

situated to plaintiff). Because we believe the district court 

erred in not granting Paquin's Rule 56(f) motion, we reverse 

__________

3 Not all thirty-two senior vice presidents were with Fannie Mae 

for the entire four-year period. The number of senior vice presidents ranged from twenty in 1990 to twenty-five in 1993.

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the district court's grant of summary judgment and remand 

for further discovery.4

We emphasize two points on remand. First, discovery is to 

be limited to the production of performance evaluations of 

individuals at the senior vice president level at Fannie Mae 

for the years 1991-1993.5 We are aware of the extensive 

history of discovery disputes in which the parties have been 

embroiled from the outset of the litigation. Aside from the 

performance evaluations already discussed, we affirm the 

district court's discovery rulings. We stress that it will not 

be open to Paquin on remand to seek additional discovery, the 

production of which the district court has previously refused 

to compel.6

__________

4 We affirm the district court's denial of Paquin's Rule 37(c) 

motion to recover discovery costs, including attorney's fees.

5 Although Fannie Mae's previously produced summary of numerical ratings also covered the year 1990, Fannie Mae is not required 

to produce performance evaluations for that year because it has 

relied only on Paquin's evaluations for the years 1991-1993. Indeed, the record manifests that Paquin did not even receive a 

written evaluation in 1990, so evaluations for other executives in 

that year would not assist Paquin in proving that Fannie Mae's 

proffered reason for terminating him was a pretext for discrimination. Fannie Mae has already produced the performance evaluations of senior vice presidents who left the company after 1990 and 

of one senior vice president who was demoted. These disclosures 

do not satisfy Fannie Mae's obligations. Given Fannie Mae's 

reliance on Paquin's unsatisfactory performance relative to all other 

senior vice presidents in the years 1991-1993, he is entitled to 

review the performance evaluations of the senior vice presidents 

who remained with the company as well as those who left. In 

recognition of the sensitive and confidential nature of similar information, the district court has already sealed, pursuant to the 

parties' stipulation, many of Fannie Mae's records; the 1991-1993 

performance evaluations fall into the same category.

6 Because Fannie Mae attempts to justify Paquin's termination by 

comparing his performance to other senior vice presidents, we 

affirm the district court's decision declining to compel discovery 

regarding performance of individuals below the senior vice president level.

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Second, our remand does not automatically turn Paquin's 

wrongful termination claim into a jury issue. Although we 

believe summary judgment was premature given Fannie 

Mae's nondisclosure of performance evaluations of other senior vice presidents, summary judgment will be available to 

Fannie Mae upon renewed motion unless the evaluations 

indicate that Fannie Mae's reliance on Paquin's alleged poor 

performance was a pretext for discrimination. We have 

reviewed Paquin's opposition to Fannie Mae's summary judgment motion and are not persuaded by itaccordingly, were 

Paquin not entitled to limited additional discovery, we would 

affirm the district court. Because Fannie Mae has come 

forward with a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for Paquin's termination, the presumption that arises from Paquin's 

prima facie case "simply drops out of the picture." St. 

Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993). At this 

point all that is left to decide is "the ultimate question: 

whether plaintiff has proven 'that the defendant intentionally 

discriminated against [him].' " Id. (quoting Texas Dep't of 

Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)). 

Paquin fired a salvo of arguments attempting to raise a 

triable issue of fact on the ultimate question of discrimination 

but produced insufficient evidence to permit a reasonable 

factfinder to come down on his side. We review Paquin's 

arguments briefly, construing, at the summary judgment 

stage, all evidence in the light most favorable to him as the 

non-moving party. See United States v. General Motors 

Corp., 565 F.2d 754, 757 (D.C. Cir. 1977).

Paquin first argues that the year-end performance evaluations insufficiently documented his alleged poor performance 

and that Fannie Mae was required to offer evidence of 

contemporaneous documents identifying specific deficiencies. 

The performance evaluations themselves, however, described 

general deficiencies bolstered by specific examples (for example, the 1992 evaluation identified a particular memorandum 

which, in the reviewer's opinion, was incomplete). We have 

already concluded that the three performance evaluations 

satisfied Fannie Mae's burden of proffering a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason. The burden then shifted to Paquin to 

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produce evidence that could allow a reasonable factfinder to 

conclude that the evaluations were a pretext for discrimination. Paquin cannot meet his burden simply by claiming that 

Fannie Mae was required to produce more evidence of his 

poor performance. To accept Paquin's position would contradict the Supreme Court's clarification of the McDonnell 

Douglas framework in Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, according to 

which the burden of persuasion remains at all times on the 

plaintiff. Thus once the defendant employer has articulated a 

legitimate non-discriminatory reason, "whatever its persuasive effect," Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511, the employer need not 

come forward with affirmative evidence showing its action 

was not discriminatory. Rather, it is the plaintiff who must 

offer evidence that the action was discriminatory. See id.

Paquin next relies on the fact that his numerical evaluations were correlated in Fannie Mae's computer system to 

letter descriptions. Thus a "4" meant "FE" or "frequently 

exceeds requirements." A "3" meant "SM" or "successfully 

meets requirements." Paquin argues that the labels raised a 

genuine issue of material fact as to his level of performance 

because they show that the three performance evaluations on 

which Fannie Mae relied judged him to "frequently exceed 

requirements" twice and to "successfully meet requirements" 

once. Whatever names one gives to the ratings, however, 

Paquin's performance placed him by the end of 1993 near the 

bottom of the heap of senior vice presidents.

Paquin also claims to have "rebutted each of the alleged 

deficiencies that Fannie Mae claimed justified his termination." Appellant's Opening Br. at 29. Rather than rebutting each of the numerous deficiencies, however, Paquin 

strains to create a triable issue of fact with respect to the two 

he raises on appeal.7 First, he notes that one of the performance evaluations criticized the caliber of his memoranda. 

Paquin claims to have rebutted the alleged deficiency by 

pointing to the reviewer's failure during deposition to give an 

__________

7 Although Paquin took issue with other items in the performance 

evaluations below, we limit our discussion to the matters he argues 

on appeal.

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example of a deficient memorandum. A deponent's inability 

to recall specifics three years later does not rebut the performance deficiencies on which Fannie Mae relied, especially 

where, as here, the evaluation itself included an example of a 

deficient memorandum. JA 350-51 ("[The reviewer] would 

cite a memo that went to the Office of the Chairman on 

Freddie Mac's February press conference that neglected to 

mention the fact that Freddie Mac was proposing to increase 

the size of its mortgage portfolio."). Second, one of the 

evaluations included Paquin's alleged statement about Fannie 

Mae's CEO as an example of Paquin's failure to pay attention 

to detail. Paquin denied having made the statement. The 

alleged statement, however, was only one of three examples 8

of Paquin's failure to pay attention to detail. Accepting that 

Paquin did not make the statement, as we must on summary 

judgment, see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986), a reasonable factfinder could 

not conclude, in light of the other performance shortcomings 

detailed in the evaluations, that Fannie Mae's real reason for 

terminating Paquin was age-based.

Next Paquin claims that Fannie Mae's reliance on the three 

performance evaluations manifested procedural irregularitiesand was therefore suspectby unduly emphasizing the 

internal aspects of his job when his "performance objectives" 

were 90 per cent related to external matters. See Krodel v. 

Young, 748 F.2d 701, 709 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (employer's failure 

to follow own procedures probative of discrimination), cert. 

denied, 474 U.S. 817 (1985); Johnson v. Lehman, 679 F.2d 

918, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (same). As Fannie Mae points out, 

however, the "performance objectives" to which Paquin refers 

were developed in connection with a bonus plan and did not 

encompass the entire range of Paquin's responsibilities. It is 

true that Paquin's bonus plan objectives were used to evaluate him once in the past (in 1989). Assuming other employ-

__________

8 Paquin was also criticized for "taking a $300 cab ride in spite of 

[the evaluator's] repeated admonitions ... about unnecessary or 

excessive expenses" and "forwarding without review a memo ... 

erroneously labeling [the evaluator] as guilty of 'selective disclosure.' " JA 353.

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ees continued to be evaluated entirely on their bonus plan 

objectives while Paquin was not, such a departure from 

procedure would still not be suspect. One of the asserted 

reasons for his termination is that Paquin failed to understand that external and internal matters must be considered 

in tandem. That is, if Paquin failed to communicate effectively developments in external matters to individuals inside the 

company, he was not doing his job properly. Paquin's bonus 

plan objectives, therefore, were themselves consistent with 

Fannie Mae's consideration of internal performance.

Paquin also attacked Fannie Mae's criticism of Paquin's 

lack of "creativity" and his "stubbornness." Paquin claims 

that the terms are age stereotypes that support an inference 

that Fannie Mae's termination decision was age-related. We 

have held that a decision not "derived from stereotypical 

preconceptions about older people[ ]," Hayman v. National 

Academy of Sciences, 23 F.3d 535, 539 (D.C. Cir. 1994), does 

not support an inference of age discrimination. Thus Paquin 

must show that Fannie Mae thought he lacked creativity 

because he was older. But Paquin's evidence was limited to 

expert opinion testimony that factors such as "creativity" are 

sometimes based on age stereotypes. This is not enough. To 

prevail, Paquin must present evidence that the statements in 

fact spring from stereotypes. The context in which the 

statements were madedetailed evaluations of Paquin's performance of management tasks one would expect to require 

creativity and flexibilityindicates they were based not on 

stereotypes but on objective assessments of job performance.

Finally, Paquin argues that because he was more qualified 

than the person by whom he was replaced, a reasonable 

factfinder could conclude that Fannie Mae terminated him for 

discriminatory reasons. Although hiring a less qualified person can support an inference of discriminatory motive, see 

Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150, 153-54 (D.C. Cir. 1993), Paquin's argument misses the mark. Paquin grounds his claim 

of superiority on his performance in external matters. But 

Fannie Mae never contested his qualifications in external 

matters; instead it insisted that his replacement surpassed 

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him on the internal sidethe area in which Paquin failed to 

improve after repeated warnings.

B. Paquin's Retaliation Claims

An employer may not retaliate against an employee for 

conduct protected under the ADEA. The three elements of a 

retaliation claim are (1) the employee's protected activity, (2) 

the employer's action that has an adverse impact on the 

employee and (3) a causal relationship between the protected 

activity and the adverse action. See Passer v. American 

Chem. Soc'y, 935 F.2d 322, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1991).9 Paquin 

claims Fannie Mae took two impermissible retaliatory actions 

against him. The first is Fannie Mae's withdrawal of Paquin's proposed severance package on March 17. The second 

is Fannie Mae's removal of Paquin from its payroll on the 

same date.

1. Fannie Mae's Withdrawal of the Severance Package

Paquin claims that Fannie Mae unlawfully retaliated by 

withdrawing its proposed severance package in response to 

Paquin's March 1, 1994 letter in which he claimed that his 

termination was based on age and that he was prepared to 

take legal action if acceptable severance terms were not 

offered. Fannie Mae argues first that the March 1 letter was 

not protected activity under the ADEA. We disagree. The 

statute provides:

It shall be unlawful for an employer to discriminate 

against any of his employees ... because such individual 

... has opposed any practice made unlawful by this 

section or because such individual ... has made a 

charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner 

in an investigation, proceeding, or litigation under this 

chapter.

__________

9 As with Paquin's wrongful termination claim, the law governing 

retaliation under the ADEA applies as well to Paquin's retaliation 

claims under the DCHRA. See Goos v. National Ass'n of Realtors,

715 F. Supp. 2, 3 (D.D.C. 1989).

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29 U.S.C. § 623(d). Paquin's March 1 letter asserting that 

his termination was unlawfully based on age fits within the 

statutory coverage of action that "oppose[s] any practice 

made unlawful by this section." Cf. Connell v. Bank of 

Boston, 924 F.2d 1169, 1178-79 (1st Cir.) (retaining counsel is 

protected activity under ADEA), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1218 

(1991). Fannie Mae contends that if a demand letter is 

protected activity, then a disgruntled employee need only 

send such a letter and the employer must either capitulate or 

face a retaliation claim. Fannie Mae's argument is a red 

herring. A disgruntled employee's letter would be protected 

under the ADEA but the employee would be unable to 

establish the necessary causal connection to make out a 

retaliation claim unless the employer took an adverse action 

because of the employee's protected activity and not for some 

legitimate reasonsuch as rejecting the employee's demand 

because it is unreasonable. 

Next, Fannie Mae argues that its withdrawal of the severance package did not amount to adverse action because 

employees at Paquin's level were not entitled to severance 

benefits. An employer's withdrawal of a voluntary benefit, 

however, may constitute adverse action. For example, we 

have held that an employer's cancellation of a symposium 

honoring its employee, which it had no obligation to hold, 

constitutes adverse action. See Passer, 935 F.2d at 331. 

Similarly, Fannie Mae's withdrawal of its severance package 

offer, even assuming Fannie Mae had no obligation to provide 

it, was adverse action.

Although we conclude that Paquin's March 1 letter was 

protected activity and Fannie Mae's withdrawal of the severance package offer was adverse action, Paquin has failed to 

establish the causal connection necessary to establish his 

retaliation claim. The parties agree that Fannie Mae withdrew the severance package on March 17 but they disagree 

that a deadline to accept or reject it existed. Fannie Mae 

claims that its offer expired on March 16 and, when Paquin 

failed to accept by that date, it withdrew the offer because it 

had expired. Paquin, however, disputes the March 16 deadline and maintains that Fannie Mae took back the offer 

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because of his protected activity. Irrespective of the deadline, Paquin has not established a causal relation between the 

March 1 letter and the March 17 withdrawal of the severance 

package. Between March 1 and March 17 the parties engaged in negotiations involving, among other things, whether 

Paquin could receive the severance package tax free. According to the February 14, 1994 termination letter in which 

Paquin was first informed about the severance package, 

Paquin was given until March 8 to accept the agreement. 

That there was some extension of the offereither to March 

16 (according to Fannie Mae) or indefinitely (according to 

Paquin)can be inferred from Fannie Mae's affirmative withdrawal of the offer on March 17. In light of the 17-day lapse 

between Paquin's demand letter and Fannie Mae's withdrawal, their continued negotiations and the undisputed extension 

of the offer for at least 8 days, we reject Paquin's claim that 

Fannie Mae's adverse action was caused by his protected 

activity. We therefore affirm the district court's grant of 

summary judgment to Fannie Mae on this claim.

2. Paquin's Removal from the Payroll

Paquin filed a claim with the EEOC on March 17, 1994. 

That day, Fannie Mae informed Paquin by letter that he had 

been removed from the payroll effective March 16, 1994 

because he had failed to accept Fannie Mae's severance offer 

before it expired. Paquin's filing of a claim constitutes 

protected activity under the ADEA. Removing Paquin from 

the payroll is an adverse action. The only issue is whether 

Paquin produced sufficient evidence of a causal connection 

between the two to survive summary judgment. Fannie Mae 

contends that Paquin had already been terminated on February 14 and thus the adverse action could not have been 

caused by subsequent protected activity. While Paquin was 

notified of his termination on February 14, 1994, the record is 

clear that Paquin remained on the payroll until March 17, 

1994. Whatever immediate consequences accompanied the 

termination notice, they did not include removal from the 

payroll. Instead Paquin did not incur that additional penalty 

until March 17. The adverse action occurred on the same 

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day the protected activity occurred and suffices to raise at 

least the inference that the two events were causally connected. It may be, as Fannie Mae contends, that it removed 

Paquin from the payroll on March 17 because he failed to 

accept the severance offer. Paquin, however, contends that 

there was no deadline and at the summary judgment stage we 

must accept Paquin's version of the facts. See Matsushita,

475 U.S. at 587. We therefore reverse the district court's 

grant of summary judgment and remand for trial on Paquin's 

retaliation claim regarding his removal from Fannie Mae's 

payroll.10

C. Expert Witness Fees

Paquin challenges the magistrate judge's order declining to 

treat two of Paquin's witnesses, Alan Bortel and Cecil Godman, as experts eligible for fee and expense reimbursement 

as provided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(C).11

The magistrate judge concluded that Bortel's and Godman's 

deposition testimony was lay opinion based on their personal 

knowledge of Paquin's circumstances. Paquin claims the 

magistrate judge erred because an expert witness may also 

have personal knowledge of the facts of a case. See, e.g., 

__________

10 In the parties' briefs and at oral argument Paquin's second 

retaliation claim purportedly included the withdrawal of severance 

benefits as well as Paquin's removal from the payroll. In Paquin's 

opposition to summary judgment, however, he limited the second 

claim to his removal from Fannie Mae's payroll. Moreover, the 

district court's disposition is consistent with Paquin's opposition to 

summary judgment. Paquin v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, No. 

94-1261, Mem. Op. at 18-20 (D.D.C. July 31, 1996).

11 Rule 26(b)(4)(C) provides:

Unless manifest injustice would result, (i) the court shall require that the party seeking discovery pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to discovery under this 

subdivision; and (ii) with respect to discovery obtained under 

subdivision (b)(4)(B) of this rule the court shall require the 

party seeking discovery to pay the other party a fair portion of 

the fees and expenses reasonably incurred by the latter party 

in obtaining facts and opinions from the expert.

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Holbrook v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 80 F.3d 777 (3d Cir. 1996) 

(allowing expert testimony of physician with personal knowledge of party). The magistrate judge, however, concluded 

that Bortel and Godman had only personal knowledge lacking 

"scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge [which] 

will assist the trier of fact" and thus did not qualify as experts 

under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.12

* * *

The district court's grant of summary judgment on Paquin's termination claim and second retaliation claim (removal 

from payroll) are reversed. The district court's grant of 

summary judgment on the first retaliation claim (withdrawal 

of severance package) and the magistrate judge's denial of 

expert fee reimbursement are affirmed.

So ordered.

__________

12 Rule 702 provides:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist 

the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a 

fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, 

skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in 

the form of an opinion or otherwise.

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