Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00431/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00431-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John W. Coleman
Plaintiff
Thomas J. Ridge
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1 Previously, Mr. Coleman filed a “request for reconsideration/restatement,” which the Court

construed as a Rule 60(b) motion. See Docket No. 10. The Court denied that motion on May 31, 2005.

See Docket No. 12. Thereafter, Mr. Coleman sent a letter to the Court on or about May 17, 2006, which

the Court construed as a second motion for relief from judgment. The Court denied that motion on July

19, 2006. See Docket No. 18.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN W. COLEMAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

THOMAS J. RIDGE, Secretary, Department

of Homeland Security,

Defendant.

___________________________________/

No. C-05-0431 EMC

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

THIRD MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM

JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 60(B)

On December 17, 2007, Plaintiff John W. Coleman sent a letter to the Court. Based on the

letter, it appears that Mr. Coleman wishes to re-open his case. The Court shall construe, for Mr.

Coleman’s benefit, his letter as another motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b).1

 See

Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 429 U.S. 17, 18-19 (1976) (allowing a district court to entertain a

Rule 60(b) motion to reopen a decision that has been affirmed on appeal without obtaining leave

from the appellate court). For the reasons stated herein, the Court hereby DENIES the motion. 

In his motion, Mr. Coleman argues that his case should be re-opened in light of a recent

Ninth Circuit decision, namely, American Federation of Government Employees Local 1 v. Stone,

Case 3:05-cv-00431-EMC Document 21 Filed 01/08/08 Page 1 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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2

502 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2007). The Court agrees with Mr. Coleman that American Federation is not

only binding authority on this Court but also instructive with respect to some aspects of his case. 

In American Federation, the plaintiff was -- like Mr. Coleman -- a TSA security screener. 

The plaintiff posted union materials in the employee break room and made union forms available to

fellow employees. See id. at 1030. In response, TSA management allegedly retaliated against the

plaintiff, for example, by issuing him a written verbal warning for conducting union activities on the

job, by putting him on administrative leave after he refused to answer questions about his union

activities, by issuing him a “Memorandum of Counseling” for, inter alia, posting union materials

before receiving approval from TSA management, and finally by terminating him. See id. 

Subsequently, the plaintiff brought suit against the TSA Administrator in his official capacity,

claiming that his First Amendment rights to free speech and association had been violated inasmuch

as the plaintiff was punished for engaging in union activities. See id. at 1029.

According to the Ninth Circuit, under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act

(“ATSA”), the TSA Administrator has the authority to “‘employ, appoint, discipline, terminate, and

fix the compensation, terms, and conditions of employment of Federal service for such a number of

individuals as the [Administrator] determines to be necessary to carry out . . . screening functions.’” 

Id. at 1030 (quoting ATSA § 111(d)). Pursuant to that authority, “the TSA Administrator issued a

Human Resources Management Letter dated July 29, 2002, which declared that all screeners are

subject to a one year probationary period and ‘may be terminated at any time’ during that period.” 

Id. at 1031. The TSA letters further stated that screeners (unlike non-screeners) had no right to reply

to a termination letter or to bring an administrative appeal. Id. In contrast, other employees can

appeal personnel decisions to the MSPB and seek judicial review thereof.

The plaintiff in American Federation was a probationary screener, having been employed by

the TSA for less than one year. See id. The question for the Ninth Circuit was whether the above

provisions precluded the plaintiff not only from pursuing remedies before the MSPB, but also from

obtaining any judicial review of his constitutional claim. The Ninth Circuit concluded that although

the plaintiff had no statutory right to appeal his termination under the Civil Service Reform Act

Case 3:05-cv-00431-EMC Document 21 Filed 01/08/08 Page 2 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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2

 The parties apparently agreed that, because of § 111(d), the “CSRA” did not apply to the

plaintiff’s case. See American Federation of Government Employees, Local 1 v. Stone, C-04-1274 CW

(Docket No. 20, at 5). The Ninth Circuit did not appear to take issue with this.

3

 An exception may exist as this Court noted in its earlier Order Dismissing Plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint of May 2, 2005 for reprisals for whistleblowing in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).

3

(“CSRA”) and could not seek relief from the MSPB2

, he did have a right to judicial review of his

constitutional claim for equitable relief under the First Amendment. See id. at 1036. The Ninth

Circuit explained that, under Supreme Court precedent, there must be a clear intention on the part of

Congress to prohibit judicial review of a constitutional claim -- because otherwise there would be a

serious constitutional question if a federal statute were construed to deny a judicial forum for a

colorable constitutional claim. The Ninth Circuit found the ATSA did not reflect such a clear

intention and thus did not preclude such judicial review. See id. Notably, however, the Ninth

Circuit indicated that the above rule favoring judicial review did not apply where the claim involved

was not a constitutional one. See id. (“When Congress decides to exclude an employee from the

protections of the CSRA . . . , Fausto precludes the employee from obtaining judicial review of

statutory or regulatory claims.”).

As noted above, American Federation is instructive authority. It clarifies the statutory

framework for employment of TSA security screeners. Under the ATSA and the TSA letter,

screeners, unlike other TSA employees, have no administrative remedies to challenge their

termination.3

 They may, however, obtain judicial review of constitutional claims sounding in equity

where the plaintiff has no other remedy. 

This Court’s previous order dismissing the amended complaint appears to have been in error

inasmuch as it based its dismissal in part upon Mr. Coleman’s failure to exhaust remedies under the

CSRA. American Federation now makes clear that screeners such as Mr. Coleman have no

remedies under the CSRA, but instead may challenge constitutional violations by the TSA directly

in federal court by seeking equitable relief (but not damages) therein. Nonetheless, Mr. Coleman’s

claim for relief under Rule 60(b) must be denied for several reasons. 

First, the Ninth Circuit has said that “a change in the applicable law after a judgment has

become final in all respects is not a sufficient basis for vacating the judgment.” Tomlin v. McDaniel,

Case 3:05-cv-00431-EMC Document 21 Filed 01/08/08 Page 3 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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865 F.2d 209, 210 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Delay v. Gordon, 475 F.3d 1039, 1046 n.13 (9th Cir.

2007) (citing Tomlin for the proposition that there is no relief under either Rule 60(b)(5) or 60(b)(6)

based on a change in decisional law). See also Clifton v. Attorney General of the State of California,

997 F.2d 660, 664-65 (9th Cir. 1993) (accord). Under the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Tomlin, this

Court may not reopen the judgment even in light of the American Federation case.

Second, even if this Court had the power to reconsider and reopen the case, unlike the

plaintiff in American Federation, Mr. Coleman has not asserted any cognizable constitutional claim

against the government. In his earlier appeal, the Ninth Circuit already adjudicated Mr. Coleman’s

retaliation claim and denied it on the merits. To the extent Mr. Coleman suggests that he has

another constitutional claim based on Article VI, clause 3, of the Constitution, this provision simply

states in relevant part that “all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the

several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution . . . .” U.S.

Const., Art. VI, Cl. 3. Mr. Coleman has not cited any authority establishing that, under this

provision, termination of an executive or judicial officer who takes this oath ipso facto violates the

constitution. See Order of 3/22/05, at 3 (“[T]he thrust of Mr. Coleman’s complaint is that, on or

about October 13, 2002, he was hired by the TSA as a transportation security screener but that, only

hours after being sworn in and filling out paperwork, was wrongfully terminated.”). In contrast, the

plaintiff in American Federation was engaged in union organizing activity, conduct protected by the

First Amendment for which he was allegedly punished.

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Case 3:05-cv-00431-EMC Document 21 Filed 01/08/08 Page 4 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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4

 The Court does not address whether Mr. Coleman can file a new lawsuit based on a claim

different than the one alleged in his complaint herein.

5

Thus, although the Ninth Circuit’s decision in American Federation indicate this Court erred

in its procedural analysis of Mr. Coleman’s rights and remedies under the CSRA, the Ninth Circuit’s

decision in Tomlin prevents this Court from reconsidering its earlier judgment. Even if the Court

could reconsider, because no cognizable constitutional claim (such as a violation of the First

Amendment) is alleged, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in American Federation would not change the

outcome in the instant case.4

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 8, 2008

____________________________ EDWARD M. CHEN

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 3:05-cv-00431-EMC Document 21 Filed 01/08/08 Page 5 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN W. COLEMAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

THOMAS J. RIDGE, Secretary, Department

of Homeland Security,

Defendant.

___________________________________/

No. C-05-0431 EMC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the U.S. District Court, Northern

District of California. On the below date, I served a true and correct copy of the attached, by placing

said copy/copies in a postage-paid envelope addressed to the person(s) listed below, by depositing

said envelope in the U.S. Mail; or by placing said copy/copies into an inter-office delivery

receptacle located in the Office of the Clerk.

John W. Coleman

P.O. Box 996

Alameda, CA 94501

Dated: January 8, 2008 RICHARD W. WIEKING, CLERK

By: /s/ 

Leni Doyle

Deputy Clerk

Case 3:05-cv-00431-EMC Document 21 Filed 01/08/08 Page 6 of 6