Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-03205/USCOURTS-ca10-92-03205-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Richard L. Reser
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALF I ~ ~ Jlppeah United States cμ it 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Tenth ,'!"Cu 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

RICHARD L. RESER, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

DEC 10 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 92-3205 

(D.C. No. 89-40032-01) 

(D. Kan.) 

Before BALDOCK and SETH, Circuit Judges, and BABCOCK,** District 

Judge. 

**Honorable Lewis T. Babcock, District Judge, 

District Court for the District of Colorado, 

designation. 

United States 

sitting by 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

* 

The case is therefore ordered 

This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 92-3205 Document: 010110151559 Date Filed: 12/10/1992 Page: 1 
/ 

Defendant-appellant Richard L. Reser was convicted on six 

federal offenses including and in connection with drug 

trafficking. Following a direct appeal of his conviction, which 

was affirmed by this court, United States v. Reser, No. 90-3001 

(10th Cir. filed Oct. 4, 1990) (Order and Judgment), Reser filed a 

prose motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 

He now appeals the district court's denial of that federal habeas 

corpus motion. 

This court construes Reser's prose motion for habeas relief 

liberally, as required by Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), 

see Ewing v. Rodgers, 826 F.2d 967, 971 (10th Cir. 1987). "Review 

in a section 2255 habeas action entails a two-step inquiry: 

(1) whether the defendant is entitled to relief if his allegations 

are proved; and (2) whether the district court abused its 

discretion by refusing to grant an evidentiary hearing." United 

States v. Whalen, 976 F.2d 1346, 1348 (10th Cir. 1992) (citing 

United States v. Estrada, 849 F.2d 1304, 1305 (10th Cir. 1988), 

and United States v. Barboa, 777 F.2d 1420, 1422 (10th Cir. 

1985)). 

On appeal, Reser argues two points. First, he contends that 

the district court erred in rejecting his argument that his 

conviction is invalid because the Attorney General failed to 

follow required procedures in reclassifying methamphetamine from a 

Schedule III to a Schedule II controlled substance. He correctly 

notes that United States v. Zamora, 784 F.2d 1025 (10th Cir. 

1986), a case cited by the district court, did not address this 

issue because it was not raised in that case. Id. at 1030. 

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✓ 

Nonetheless, the remaining ten cases relied on by the district 

court did address and reject the claim that methamphetamine was 

improperly transferred to Schedule II. Reser contends that none 

of these cases addresses "this specific issue." His brief on 

appeal says only that "the Attorney General did not follow the 

congressionally mandated procedure when on 

transferred methamphetamine from Schedule III 

July 7, 1971, he 

to Schedule II." 

However, his eighty-page brief before the district court generally 

discusses a number of theories by which the Attorney General may 

be found to have improperly reclassified methamphetamine. We 

agree with the district court that all of these arguments were 

addressed and rejected in several previous cases, those cases on 

which the district court relied in its ruling against Reser. See. 

~' United States v. Durham, 941 F.2d 886, 889 (9th Cir. 

1991) ("It is no longer an open question whether 

has properly been designated a Schedule 

substance."). Accordingly, we conclude the 

correctly ruled on this issue. 

methamphetamine 

II controlled 

district court 

Second, Reser argues that the district court's summary ruling 

on the issues presented in his pro se habeas motion was error 

because the court did not order the United States Attorney to 

respond nor did it hold an evidentiary hearing. Rule 4(b) of the 

Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings specifically allows the 

district court to summarily dispose of a defendant's§ 2255 motion 

11 [i]f it plainly appears from the face of the motion and any 

annexed exhibits and the prior proceedings in the case that the 

movant is not entitled to relief." The district court's order 

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✓ 

indicated a careful and thorough review of Reser's motion, and 

clearly set forth its reasoning, together with accompanying 

authority, for rejecting each of Reser's claims. Following our 

review of the record on appeal, we cannot say the district court 

abused its discretion in this case. 

In his reply brief, Reser raises an argument not raised in 

his initial brief on appeal. He contends that 21 C.F.R. § 1308.22 

is ambiguous, resulting in a denial of due process. We will not 

ordinarily consider issues argued for the first time in a reply 

brief, see Boone v. Carlsbad Bancorporation. Inc., 972 F.2d 1545, 

1554 n.6 (10th Cir. 1992) (due process argument not fleshed out 

until reply brief not considered), and decline to do so here. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Kansas is AFFIRMED. 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

Entered for the Court 

Oliver Seth 

Circuit Judge 

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