Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-02215/USCOURTS-ca10-90-02215-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
James Armin Fowner
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FILED 

Unit.eel Sta~ Court of Appeals Ten~'t Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

OCT 3 0 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

JAMES ARMIN FOWNER, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

JEANNIE L. FOWNER, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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No. 90-2215 

(D.C. No. CR 89-489-01 SC) .(D.N.M.) 

No. 90-2223 

(D.C. No. CR 89-489-03 SC) 

(D.N.M.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before McKAY and SETH, Circuit Judges, and BROWN, District 

Judge**· 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppal. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

**Honorable Wesley E. Brown, United States District Judge for the 

District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 90-2215 Document: 010110093029 Date Filed: 10/30/1991 Page: 1 
These are appeals by co-defendants tried under the same 

indictment. The facts relating to each appeal are the same as are 

the basic contentions of each defendant. 

No. 90-2215 

Appellant James Fawner appeals his 30-month sentence under 

the United States sentencing guidelines following his plea of 

guilty to one count of manufacturing more than 100 grams of a 

mixture containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine and 

aiding and abetting. He claims that the district court applied an 

incorrect base offense level and violated his rights to due 

process and equal protection when it included waste materials 

containing detectable amounts of P2P in calculating his sentence 

under u.s.s.G. § 201.1. we affirm. 

Appellant and two co-defendants were charged with a series of 

drug and gun related offenses under a twelve-count superseding 

indictment. Appellant pled guilty to Counts III and VIII of the 

superseding indictment. Count III, which is the focus of this 

appeal, charged appellant with manufacturing more than 100 grams 

of a mixture containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine, in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(l) and 84l(b)(l)(A), and aiding 

and abetting, in violation of 18 u.s.c. § 2. Count VIII charged 

appellant with carrying and using a firearm to facilitate the drug 

trafficking crime in violation of 18 u.s.c. § 924(c)(l). 

Appellant does not appeal the mandatory term of five years' 

imprisonment that he received for Count VIII. 

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Appellate Case: 90-2215 Document: 010110093029 Date Filed: 10/30/1991 Page: 2 
In exchange for appellant's pleas of guilty to Counts III and 

VIII of the superseding indictment, the government agreed to 

dismiss the remaining counts. Because of appellant's substantial 

assistance to the government in the prosecution of other cases, 

the government further agreed to file a motion for downward 

departure under u.s.s.G. S SKl.1. 

At the time of his arrest, appellant was operating a 

methamphetamine laboratory on his property. 293 grams of 

marijuana, 79.7 grams of methamphetamine and two semi-automatic 

pistols were seized. In addition to the controlled substances, 

approximately 24 gallons of a liquid mixture containing detectable 

amounts of P2P were recovered. 

In its calculation of appellant's base offense level, the 

Probation Office included the firearms, the controlled substances 

and the weight of the entire 24-gallon mixture, which resulted in 

a base offense level of 36. This figure was reduced by two points 

for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to u.s.s.G. S 3El.1. 

With a base offense level of 34 at criminal history category II, 

the sentencing guideline range was 168-210 months' imprisonment. 

Appellant objected to the Probation Office's inclusion of the 

weight of the entire 24-gallon mixture because he claimed it was 

"waste" material which was not meant to be ingested or sold. If 

the 24 gallons were omitted, he argued that his base offense 

level, with the adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, 

should be 16. With a criminal history category of II, his 

sentencing guideline level would be 24 to 30 months. 

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Appellate Case: 90-2215 Document: 010110093029 Date Filed: 10/30/1991 Page: 3 
At sentencing, the district court noted his objection and 

heard testimony on the issue of "waste" from Dr. Cary Morrow, a 

chemist. Dr. Morrow testified that in his opinion, the 24 gallons 

of liquid was waste but conceded that additional P2P could be 

recovered if the solution was left to settle or reprocessed with 

additional chemicals. At the conclusion of Dr. Morrow's 

testimony, the district court stated that: 

"The definition of quote, waste, end 

quote, is something that troubles me because 

in the concept of, any concept of waste, I 

assume economic considerations enter into it, 

or maybe even other considerations. Some 

people might throw away as waste an item where 

other people would not consider it waste and 

so on, •••. 

"I don't know what waste is in the 

context of this case. We have a solution 

wherein certain chemicals were found. Whether 

or not it's waste or not waste is something 

that I don't think I have to address." 

Vol. III at 52-53. In rejecting appellant's argument and 

concluding that the weight of the entire liquid mixture must be 

included for purposes of sentencing, the district court relied on 

the commentary to U.S.S.G. S 2Dl.1 and two Fifth Circuit cases. 

See United States v. Mueller, 902 F.2d 336 (5th Cir.) (entire 

weight of mixture containing detectable amounts of the 

methamphetamine was properly included for purposes of sentencing); 

United States v. Butler, 895 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir.) (same). 

In sentencing appellant, the district court acknowledged that 

with a base offense level of 34 at a criminal history category of 

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Appellate Case: 90-2215 Document: 010110093029 Date Filed: 10/30/1991 Page: 4 
II, appellant's sentencing guideline was 168-210 months. Because 

the government had filed a motion for downward departure under 

u.s.s.G. S SKl.1, however, the district court sentenced appellant 

to a term of 30 months' imprisonment. 

In his brief, appellant concedes that the 30-month 

imprisonment term falls within the guideline range that he 

contends is applicable for his offense; however, he submits that 

the district court should have considered the motion for a 

downward departure from the 24- to 30-month guideline range rather 

than the 168-210 months' guideline range. 

On appeal, appellant challenges the district court's 

inclusion of the 24-gallon liquid mixture in the calculation of 

his base offense level. He claims that the term "mixture or 

substance" referred to in the commentary accompanying u.s.s.G. 

S 2D1.1 does not contemplate the inclusion of waste materials 

containing detectable amounts of a controlled substance and such 

an application is contrary to the Congressional intent of a 

"market-oriented" approach in setting punishments. We review a 

challenge to the district court's interpretation of the sentencing 

guidelines de novo. United States v. Agbai, 930 F.2d 1447, 1448 

(10th Cir.). 

Pursuant to the sentencing guidelines, the base offense level 

is calculated from the Drug Quantity Table found in S 2D1.l(c). 

In interpreting and applying the sentencing guidelines, we 

consider the commentary to be essential. United States v. Rutter, 

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Appellate Case: 90-2215 Document: 010110093029 Date Filed: 10/30/1991 Page: 5 
897 F.2d 1558, 1561 (10th Cir.). The commentary to u.s.s.G. 

S 2Dl.1 provides: 

"The scale amounts for all controlled 

substances refer to the total weight of the 

controlled substance. Consistent with the 

provisions of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, if any 

mixture of a compound contains any detectable 

amount of a controlled substance, the entire amount 

of the mixture or compound shall be considered in 

measuring the quantity." 

u.s.s.G. § 2Dl.1. we have held that for purposes of sentencing 

under the Drug Quantity Table, the weight of the mixture 

containing a controlled substance is the entire amount of the 

mixture. See United States v. Callihan, 915 F.2d 1462, 1463 (10th 

Cir.) . 

In United States v. Dorrough, 927 F.2d 498 (10th Cir.), we 

were presented with a similar issue. In Dorrough, the police 

seized 94 kilograms of an amphetamine mixture before the 

manufacturing process had been completed. At sentencing, the 

defendant presented evidence that the most P2P which could have 

been produced from the liquid seized was 8.85 kilograms. Dorrough 

argued that only the 8.85 kilograms should have been considered in 

calculating his sentence and that the remaining liquid from the 

manufacturing process was "waste." Finding support in the 

commentary to u.s.s.G. S 2Dl.1, we held that the district court 

properly considered the weight of the entire 94 kilograms because 

the mixture contained a detectable amount of P2P. Id. at 502. 

We agree with the district court and conclude that a 

determination of whether the liquid mixture was waste and intended 

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Appellate Case: 90-2215 Document: 010110093029 Date Filed: 10/30/1991 Page: 6 
• 

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to be discarded need not be made. Such an interpretation would 

require needless speculation which is not contemplated by the 

sentencing guidelines. In this case, the evidence showed that 

there was a detectable amount of P2P in the 24-gallon liquid 

mixture. Under u.s.s.G. S 2Dl.1 and the above-cited case law, so 

long as the mixture contains a detectable amount, the entire 

weight of the mixture is included for purposes of calculating the 

base offense level. Therefore, we find that the district court 

properly included the weight of the entire 24-gallon liquid 

mixture for purposes of sentencing appellant. 

Appellant's attempt to distinguish Dorrough from the present 

case is unpersuasive • . Appellant argues that in Dorrough the 

weight of the entire mi~ture was properly included because the 

manufacturing process had not been completed when the liquid was 

seized. In his case, however, appellant claims that the 

manufacturing process was complete and the remaining mixture was 

"waste"; therefore, the weight of the entire liquid mixture should 

not be included. We reject his argument for the following 

reasons. 

First, we are not convinced that the manufacturing process 

was complete or that the 24-gallon liquid mixture constituted 

"waste." As the district court correctly pointed out, the concept 

of waste is not easily defined. Although we can only speculate as 

to why appellant would have kept over 24 gallons of liquid which 

was allegedly "waste" material, we are mindful of the chemist's 

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Appellate Case: 90-2215 Document: 010110093029 Date Filed: 10/30/1991 Page: 7 
• 

testimony that if the mixture was allowed to settle, additional 

P2P could be recovered. 

The chemist also testified that it would be possible to 

extract more P2P from the liquid mixture if the chemist was 

skilled and possessed the proper chemicals. Although the 

chemicals required were not present in appellant's laboratory at 

the time of the seizure, we cannot eliminate the possibility that 

he was intending to either purchase the additional chemicals and 

attempt to perform the process himself or sell the remaining 

liquid mixture to a chemist with the proper chemicals. While this 

is sheer conjecture on our part, appellant's argument would have 

the district court perform this same analysis in determining 

whether the mixture or substance seized was intended for 

consumption or disposal. 

Based upon the chemist's testimony, the manufacturing process 

was not necessarily complete at the time of the seizure. 

Therefore, appellant was in essentially the same position of the 

manufacturing process as Dorrough and the facts of the two cases 

become indistinguishable. 

Lastly, appellant would have us differentiate the two cases 

on the timing of the seizure in relation to the manufacturing 

process. We do not believe that the timing of the seizure should 

dictate the severity of the sentence and conclude that the 

adoption of such a distinction would create greater disparities 

among sentences. 

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Appellate Case: 90-2215 Document: 010110093029 Date Filed: 10/30/1991 Page: 8 
Although we agree with appellant that Congress created the 

Anti-Drug Abuse Act intending to employ a "market-oriented" 

approach in setting punishments, United States v. Mendes, 912 F.2d 

434, 439 (10th Cir.), his argument of marketability is foreclosed 

by our findings above. Appellant could have skimmed additional 

P2P off the top of the liquid mixture, reprocessed the liquid 

mixture, or sold the entire liquid mixture to a chemist capable of 

reprocessing the liquid mixture. Given the potential saleability 

of the entire liquid mixture or at least part of it, we cannot say 

that the inclusion of the weight of the entire mixture was 

contrary to the "market-oriented" approach intended by Congress. 

Appellant also makes a constitutional challenge to the 

district court's inclusion of the weight of the entire liquid 

mixture. He claims that the waste material does not fit within 

the definition of any "mixture or substance containing a 

detectable amount"; therefore, it violates the Fifth Amendment 

guarantees of due process and equal protection. 

Based upon our findings above and for the reasons articulated 

in United States v. Baker, 883 F.2d 13, 15 (5th Cir.), we conclude 

that the inclusion of the total weight of the mixture is 

reasonably related to a legitimate governmental interest and not 

violative of the Fifth Amendment. 

Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court for the 

District of New Mexico is AFFIRMED. 

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Appellate Case: 90-2215 Document: 010110093029 Date Filed: 10/30/1991 Page: 9 
No. 90-2223 

Appellant Jeannie Fowner appeals from her sentence of five 

years' probation under the United States sentencing guidelines 

following her plea of guilty to one count of manufacturing more 

than 100 grams of a mixture containing a detectable amount of 

methamphetamine in violation of 21 u.s.c. §§ 841(a)(l) and 

84l(b)(l)(A). She claims that the district court applied an 

incorrect base offense level and violated her rights to due 

process and equal protection when it included waste materials 

containing detectable amounts of P2P in calculating her sentence 

under u.s.s.G. § 201.1. we affirm. 

Appellant was indicted along with two co-defendants in a 

twelve-count superseding indictment alleging various drug 

trafficking and firearm violations. In exchange for her plea of 

guilty to Count III, the remaining counts were dismissed. Because 

of appellant's substantial assistance to the government in the 

prosecution of other cases, the government agreed to file a motion 

for downward departure under u.s.s.G. § 5Kl.1. 

At the time of her arrest, appellant was involved in the 

operation of a methamphetamine laboratory located on her property 

and co-defendant's. 293 grams of marijuana, 79.7 grams of 

methamphetamine and two semi-automatic weapons were seized. In 

addition to the controlled substances, approximately 24 gallons of 

a liquid mixture containing detectable amounts of P2P were 

recovered. 

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Appellate Case: 90-2215 Document: 010110093029 Date Filed: 10/30/1991 Page: 10 
• 

In its calculation of appellant's base offense level, the 

Probation Office included the two firearms, the controlled 

substances and the weight of the entire 24-gallon liquid mixture 

in reaching a base offense level of 36. This figure was reduced 

by two points for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to 

U.S.S.G. § 3El.1. Although the firearms were found on her 

property, the Probation Office recommended a two-point reduction 

because she did not have possession of the firearms at the time of 

the arrest. With a base offense level of 32 at criminal history 

category I, the sentencing guideline range was 121-151 months. 

The statutory minimum for this offense is ten years' imprisonment. 

Appellant objected to the Probation Office's inclusion of the 

entire 24-gallon liquid mixture contending that it was "waste" 

product. At the sentencing hearing, the district court noted her 

objection and heard testimony on the issue of "waste" from 

Dr. Cary Morrow, a chemist. At the conclusion of Dr. Morrow's 

testimony, the district court rejected appellant's argument and 

concluded that the weight of the entire liquid mixture must be 

included for purposes of sentencing under u.s.s.G. § 201.1. 

In sentencing appellant, the district court recognized that 

the guideline range was 121-151 months; however, it granted the 

government's motion for a downward departure and sentenced 

appellant to a five-year term of probation with certain 

conditions. 

On appeal, appellant challenges the district court's 

inclusion of the weight of the 24-gallon liquid mixture in the 

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Appellate Case: 90-2215 Document: 010110093029 Date Filed: 10/30/1991 Page: 11 
• calculation of her base offense level. She claims that the term 

"mixture or substance" referred to in the commentary accompanying 

u.s.s.G. S 2D1.1 does not contemplate the inclusion of waste 

materials containing detectable amounts of a controlled substance. 

Such an application, she argues, is contrary to the Congressional 

intent of a "market-oriented" approach in setting punishment and 

is violative of the Fifth Amendment. 

Before reviewing the merits, we must address the government's 

contention that we are without jurisdiction to entertain this 

appeal. Appellant invokes 18 u.s.c. § 3742(a) as the 

jurisdictional basis for this appeal. The government claims that 

we lack jurisdiction because appellant's appeal does not fit 

wi thin any of the four subsections under 18 u.s.c. § 3742(a) and 

there is no way to logically challenge the district court's 

calculations which led to the probated sentence. We disagree. 

18 u.s.c. S 3742(a) provides that a defendant may appeal a 

sentence only if it: 

"(l) was imposed in violation of law; 

"(2) was imposed as a result of an 

incorrect application of the sentencing 

guidelines; or 

"(3) is greater than the sentence 

specified in the applicable guideline range to 

the extent that the sentence includes a 

greater fine or term of imprisonment, 

probation, or supervised release than the 

maximum established in the guideline range or 

includes a more limiting condition of 

probation .; or 

"(4) was imposed for an offense for which 

there is no sentencing guideline " 

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Appellate Case: 90-2215 Document: 010110093029 Date Filed: 10/30/1991 Page: 12 
18 u.s.c. S 3742(a). It is clear from appellant's claim of error 

that she is challenging the district court's interpretation and 

application of the guidelines; therefore, subsection (2) gives us 

jurisdiction. 

While it is true that appellant was only sentenced to a term 

of probation with no incarceration, the Sentencing Reform Act 

recognizes probation as a sentence in itself. U.S.S.G., Ch.7, 

Pt.A, 2(a) (citing 18 u.s.c. S 3561). Appellant would be placed 

in an unusual situation if the district court subsequently finds 

that she violated the conditions of her probation. If this 

occurs, the district court has the following options: it "may 

continue probation, with or without extending the term or 

modifying the conditions, or revoke probation and impose any other 

sentence that initially could have been imposed." Id. 

Unless appellant violates her probation, the guideline range 

of her offense may not now be significant. However, since the 

possibility exists that she may violate her probation and the 

district court decides to revoke her probation and impose 

sentence, we must on this appeal review her claim to ensure that 

the guideline range was appropriately calculated. 

The evidence showed that there was a detectable amount of P2P 

in the 24-gallon mixture. See discussion, above, in No. 90-2215. 

Under u.s.s.G. S 2D1.1, so long as the mixture contains a 

detectable amount, the entire weight is included for purposes of 

calculating the base offense level. With a base offense level of 

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Appellate Case: 90-2215 Document: 010110093029 Date Filed: 10/30/1991 Page: 13 
32 at criminal history category I, the sentencing guideline range 

is 121-151 months. 

For the reasons articulated in United States v. Fawner, 

No. 90-2215, we conclude that appellant's guideline range of 121-

151 months was appropriately calculated and not violative of the 

Fifth Amendment. 

Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court for the 

District of New Mexico is AFFIRMED in this appeal. 

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Entered for the Court 

Oliver Seth 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 90-2215 Document: 010110093029 Date Filed: 10/30/1991 Page: 14