Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00801/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00801-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cynthia Hill
Plaintiff
Skywest Airlines, Inc.
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CYNTHIA HILL, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. )

)

SKYWEST AIRLINES, INC., )

)

Defendant. )

)

 )

1:06-cv-00801-SMS

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOC. 19)

ORDER OVERRULING DEFENDANT’S

OBJECTIONS AND DENYING REQUEST TO

STRIKE EXPERT EVIDENCE (DOCS. 36-

38) 

Plaintiff is proceeding with a civil action in this Court.

The matter has been referred to the Magistrate Judge for all

proceedings, including the entry of final judgment, pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Fed. R. Civ. P. 73(b), and Local Rule 73-301.

Pending before the Court is the motion of Defendant Skywest

Airlines, Inc., for summary judgment, filed on July 6, 2007, with

a memorandum of points and authorities, statement of undisputed

facts, and supporting declarations of Kelly Storm-Bowles, Cynthia

Ann Hoene, Kimberly I. McIntyre, and Latricia Foulger. On July

16, 2007, Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition, a response

to the statement of undisputed facts, a separate statement of

disputed facts, and declarations of Daniel R. Baradat, Diana

Fairchild, and James E. Flynn. On August 3, 2007, Defendant filed

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a reply, including a memorandum, a further declaration of

Kimberly I. McIntyre, statements responsive to the statements of

disputed and undisputed facts, and objections to the three

declarations filed by Plaintiff in opposition to the motion.

The motion came on regularly for hearing on August 10, 2007,

at 9:30 a.m. in Courtroom 7 before the Honorable Sandra M.

Snyder, United States Magistrate Judge. Kimberly I. McIntyre of

Kenney and Markowitz appeared on behalf of Defendant; Daniel

Robert Baradat appeared on behalf of Plaintiff. After argument

the matter was submitted to the Court.

Defendant’s argument is that Plaintiff is legally and

factually precluded from establishing all of the elements of her

claim for negligence against Skywest because the undisputed facts

establish that Defendant carrier did not breach the heightened

duty of care owed to Plaintiff, or that Plaintiff has no evidence

which would support a reasonable inference that Plaintiff’s fall

was foreseeable or that Defendant breached its duty of care.

Plaintiff contends that there are conflicts in the evidence

that give rise to material issues of fact; further, even absence

any conflict in the evidence as to a material issue, there are

conflicting inferences that rationally may be drawn from the

evidence with respect to a breach of duty.

I. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that

there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Under summary judgment practice, the

moving party 

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[A]lways bears the initial responsibility of

informing the district court of the basis for

its motion, and identifying those portions of

"the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any," which

it believes demonstrate the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). It is the

moving party’s burden to establish that there exists no genuine

issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. British Airways Board v. Boeing Co.,

585 F.2d 946, 951 (9 Cir. 1978). th

Where a party with the ultimate burden of persuasion at

trial as to a matter moves for summary judgment, it must

demonstrate affirmatively by evidence each essential element of

its claim or affirmative defense and must establish that there is

no triable issue of fact as to each essential element such that a

rational trier of fact could render a judgment in its favor.

Southern California Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885,

888 (9 Cir. 2003). If a party moves for summary judgment with th

respect to a matter as to which the opposing party has the

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial, then the moving party

must show that the opposing party cannot meet its burden of proof

at trial by establishing that there is no genuine issue of

material fact as to an essential element of the opposing party’s

claim or defense; the moving party must meet the initial burden

of producing evidence or showing an absence of evidence as well

as the ultimate burden of persuasion. Nissan Fire Ltd. v. Fritz

Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9 Cir. 2000). In order to carry th

its burden of production, the moving party must either produce

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evidence negating an essential element of the opposing party's

claim or defense or show that the nonmoving party does not have

enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate

burden of persuasion at trial. Id. (citing High Tech Gays v.

Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 574 (9th Cir.

1990)). In order to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion on

the motion, the moving party must persuade the court that there

is no genuine issue of material fact. Id. 

However, “where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of

proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion

may properly be made in reliance solely on the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.”

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323. Indeed, summary

judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and

upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to

that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden

of proof at trial. Id. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning

an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily

renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance,

summary judgment should be granted, “so long as whatever is

before the district court demonstrates that the standard for

entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is

satisfied.” Id. at 323. 

 If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

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586 (1986). In attempting to establish the existence of this

factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials

of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific

facts in the form of affidavits or admissible discovery material

in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Rule 56(e);

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party must

demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact

that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986);

T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809

F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine,

i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the nonmoving party, Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc.,

818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual

dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue

of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that "the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to

resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." 

T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 630. Thus, the "purpose of summary

judgment is to 'pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in

order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.'" 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)

advisory committee's note on 1963 amendments). The evidence of

the opposing party is to be believed, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255,

and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts

placed before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing

party, Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citing United States v.

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Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)(per curiam)). 

Nevertheless, it is the opposing party's obligation to produce a

factual predicate from which an inference may be drawn. Richards

v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal.

1985), aff'd, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). Although the

Court must not weigh the evidence, the Court must draw reasonable

inferences; evidence that is too insubstantial or speculative may

be insufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of

material fact. Coca-Cola Co. v. Overland, Inc., 692 F.2d 1250,

1255 (9 Cir. 1982); Dept. of Commerce v. U.S. House of Rep., 525 th

U.S. 316, 334 (1999). To demonstrate a genuine issue, the

opposing party "must do more than simply show that there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475

U.S. at 586. A mere scintilla of evidence supporting the opposing

party's position will not suffice; there must be enough of a

showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52. Where the record taken as a whole

could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving

party, there is no genuine issue for trial. Id. at 587. 

The showings must consist of admissible evidence,

Hollingsworth Solderless Terminal Co. v. Turley, 622 F.2d 1324,

1335 n.9 (9 Cir. 1980), or pleadings, depositions, answers to th

interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits or declarations, Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(c). Affidavits shall be based on personal

knowledge, set forth such facts as would be admissible in

evidence, and show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to

testify to the matters stated therein. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred

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to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith.

Id. Declarations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 may be used with

the same force and effect as affidavits. Pollock v. Pollock, 154

F.3d 601, 611, n.20 (6 Cir. 1998). A plaintiff’s verified th

complaint may be considered as an affidavit in opposition to

summary judgment if it is based on personal knowledge and sets

forth specific facts admissible in evidence. Lopez v. Smith, 203

F.3d 1122, 1132 (9 Cir. 2000). Personal knowledge may be th

inferred from declarations themselves, such as from facts

concerning a declarant’s position and participation, Barthelemy

v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, 897 F.2d 999, 1018 (9 Cir. 1990); th

however, a court cannot draw an inference about facts not

specifically put in the record by a party, and a court will not

assume that general averments embrace specific facts needed to

sustain a complaint, Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497

U.S. 871, 887 (1990). Unauthenticated documents cannot be

considered on a motion for summary judgment. Hal Roach Studios,

Inc. v. Richard Feiner and Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9 Cir. th

1990). Legal memoranda and oral argument are not evidence and do

not create issues of fact capable of defeating an otherwise valid

motion for summary judgment. British Airways Bd. v. Boeing Co.,

585 F.2d 946, 952 (9 Cir. 1978). th

The Court is not obligated to consider matters that are in

the record but are not specifically brought to its attention; the

parties must designate and refer to specific triable facts. Even

in the absence of a local rule, for evidence to be considered,

the party seeking to rely on it must specify the fact by

indicating what the evidence is or says and must indicate where

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it is located in the file. Although the Court has discretion in

appropriate circumstances to consider other material, it has no

duty to search the record for evidence establishing a material

fact. Carmen v. San Francisco United School Dist., 237 F.3d 1026,

1029 (9 Cir. 2001). th

A party moving for summary judgment is entitled to the

benefit of any relevant presumptions that support the motion

provided that the facts giving rise to the presumption are

undisputed. Coca-Cola Co. v. Overland, Inc., 692 F.2d 1250, 1254

(9 Cir. 1982). th

II. Governing Tort Principles

In a diversity case, the substantive law applied by the

federal court is generally state law, and the federal courts

generally must follow the conflict of laws rules prevailing in

the states in which they sit. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg.

Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496-97 (1941). If state law governs a

particular issue in a diversity case, the court must then

determine the content of the applicable state law; the decision

of the state’s highest court is generally the definitive

statement of the state’s law. Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch,

387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967). 

Cal. Civ. Code § 2100 provides:

 A carrier of persons for reward must use the utmost

care and diligence for their safe carriage, must

provide everything necessary for that purpose,

and must exercise to that end a reasonable degree

of skill.

The common carrier is not an insurer of the passengers’ safety;

rather, the degree of care and diligence that they must exercise

is such as can reasonably be exercised consistent with the

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character and mode of conveyance adopted and the practical

operation of the business of the carrier. Gomez v. Superior

Court, 35 Cal.4th 1125, 1130 (2005). The carrier is responsible

for even the slightest negligence and is required to do all that

human care, vigilance and foresight reasonably can do under given

circumstances. Acosta v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit District, 2

Cal.3d 19, 27 (1970) (upholding as supported by sufficient

evidence a verdict of liability against a bus carrier where the

bus began to move before the plaintiff had reached a seat, and

the bus drove at a speed that required a sudden stop for a

visible pedestrian in a crosswalk; the court noted that a jury

reasonably could conclude that the bus driver had not acted with

the utmost care in driving the bus). The duty extends to the

passenger during the journey and until the passenger has safely

departed from the carrier’s vehicle and has reached a place

outside the sphere of any activity of the carrier which might

reasonably constitute a mobile or animated hazard to the

passenger. Marshall v. United Airlines, 35 Cal.App.3d 84, 86-87 

(1973). The carrier must exercise as high a degree of care in

affording passengers a reasonable opportunity to alight in safety

as in carrying them safely; the carrier must provide a safe and

convenient means of access and departure, and must do all that

human care, vigilance, and foresight reasonably can do under all

the circumstances to prevent accidents to passengers. McBride v.

Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co., 44 Cal.2d 113, 116-118

(1955); Lopez v. Southern California Rapid Transit Dist., 40

Cal.3d 780, 785 (1985). Whether a carrier, by not inspecting and

cleaning the steps of a pullman car, breached its duty to

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exercise utmost care and diligence was improperly determined on

nonsuit, and instead was held to be a question for the jury where

a passenger alighting from a pullman car was thrown to the ground

where his crutch came into contact with a wet cigar butt on the

steps of the car. McBride v. Atchison, Topeka Y& Santa Fe Railway

Co., 44 Cal.2d at 118. The court reaffirmed in McBride that

negligence is a question of fact for the jury, even when there is

no conflict in the evidence, if different conclusions upon the

subject can rationally be drawn from the evidence. Id. at 118.

The mere fact that the passenger exercises some control over

operative factors does not change the relationship or necessarily

absolve the carrier from liability where the control is within

the reasonable contemplation of the contract of carriage.

McIntyre v. Smoke Tree Ranch Stables, 205 Cal.App.2d 489 (1962)

(plaintiff’s holding the reins of the mule not determinative);

Kline v. Santa Barbara Consolidated Railway Co., 150 Cal. 741

(1907) (plaintiff’s failing to hold on to a hand-rail while

riding on a street-railway car); Jamison v. San Jose & Santa

Clara Railway Co., 55 Cal. 593, 598-99 (upholding a judgment for

the passenger, finding no contributory negligence as a matter of

law, reaffirming the province of the jury in determining breach

of duty, and noting that it was not the duty of the passenger to

call for lights to illuminate a narrow, unprotected walkway

between cars); Teale v. Southern Pac. Co.August 6, 2007, 20

Cal.App. 570, 581-82 (1912) (carrying small bags down steps

provided effected by a healthy woman advanced in years found not

to have been contributory negligence as a matter of law despite

presence of arguably more reasonable alternatives). Such

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circumstances may be pertinent to a consideration of issues of

comparative fault, but they do not reduce the duty of care

imposed by law upon the carrier. See, McIntrye v. Smoke Tree

Ranch Stables, 205 Cal.App.2d at 493 (referring to contributory

negligence). A carrier’s heightened standard of care may require

the carrier to warn passengers of existing and forthcoming

dangers. See, Jamison v. San Jose & Santa Clara Railway Co., 55

Cal. 593, 597-98 (1880).

III. Objections

As stated during argument, the Court overrules Defendant’s

objections to evidence or considers the objections moot, and the

Court declines to strike experts’ reports or declarations because

of tardy submission of expert evidence.

A. Deposition Excerpts

Defendant objects to the deposition excerpts that are

attached to the declaration of Baradat, submitted in opposition

to the motion, on the basis of inadequate foundation and lack of

authentication. 

As the Court noted at hearing, a deposition or an extract

therefrom is authenticated in a motion for summary judgment when

it identifies the names of the deponent and the action and

includes the reporter's certification that the deposition is a

true record of the testimony of the deponent. Orr v. Bank of

America, NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 774 (9th Cir. 2002). Upon

objection, authentication or identification is a condition

precedent to admissibility determined pursuant to Fed. R. Evid.

104(b), Ricketts v. City of Hartford, 74 F.3d 1397, 1409 (2 Cir. nd

1996); the Court makes a preliminary determination as to whether

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there is sufficient evidence to sustain a jury finding of

authenticity; ultimate resolution of whether evidence is

authentic calls for a factual determination by the trier of fact.

United States v. Branch, 970 F.2d at 1370. Authentication

requirements are satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a

finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims,

Fed. R. Evid. 901(a). It is sufficient if there is enough support

in the record to warrant a reasonable person in determining that

the evidence is what it purports to be; thereafter, the question

of weight to be given to the evidence is left to the finder of

fact. United States v. Holmquist, 36 F.3d 154, 167 (1 Cir. st

1994). 

Although Plaintiff’s initial showing was inadequate,

Defendant’s objections are moot because copies of deposition

transcripts themselves have been submitted to the Court.

Considering all of the evidence and the facts before the Court,

the Court finds that an adequate foundation has been laid, and

the deposition excerpts are adequately authenticated.

B. Expert Evidence

Defendant objects to the declaration of James B. Flynn

submitted by Plaintiff in opposition to the motion. 

Flynn opined that Storm-Bowles was negligent in the

application of basic safety principles because she failed to

provide for Plaintiff’s obvious need for help in exiting the

plane in a safe manner. Flynn authored a report, Ex. B to his

declaration, in which he reviewed specified items of evidence and

information, concluded that Storm-Bowles should have decided that

an unacceptable risk of Plaintiff’s not being able to negotiate

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the stairs safely was presented by the obvious dangers presented

by Plaintiff’s heavy and numerous belongings, assertedly apparent

partial or complete inability to use handrails, and blocking of

her view by things being carried; the attendant should have

insisted in the strongest of terms that she be allowed to provide

assistance, instead of following a policy to offer assistance

only upon passenger requests; and the attendant failed to provide

for an obvious need for help. Defendant, faced with foreseeable

falls, was required to create and implement policies to reduce or

eliminate potential injury associated with deplaning; StormBowles’ choice not to help Plaintiff contributed to the

accident’s occurrence. 

Defendant objects that this opinion lack foundation, is not

supported by the evidence in the case, hearsay, is unnecessary,

is beyond the witness’s qualifications, and constitutes an

impermissible opinion on an ultimate issue of law. Defendant

specifically objects to the conclusion regarding the unacceptable

risk and awareness of Plaintiff’s lack of a free hand to use

handrails on essentially the same grounds as well as speculation.

Defendant argues that Flynn is an automobile accident

reconstructionist without any demonstrated familiarity or

knowledge with the aviation industry in any pertinent respect.

Defendant objects to the declaration of Diana Fairechild,

who purports to be an experienced flight attendant, who opined

that Storm-Bowles was negligent in not assisting Plaintiff in

deplaning after she saw Plaintiff stumble because her conduct

fell below the professional standards of flight attendants.

Defendant objects because the opinion was not timely disclosed as

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required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1); Defendant further objects

on the grounds that in various respects, the declaration lacks

foundation, misstates the evidence, is not authenticated, lacks

expert qualification, is unnecessary, and is based on

speculation.

 With respect to what is in effect a renewed motion to

strike expert evidence offered by Plaintiff because Plaintiff’s

designation of expert evidence was tardily submitted, the Court

notes that the experts’ reports are simple and straightforward.

The Court finds that the evidence does not support a conclusion

that in their process of providing expert opinions, Plaintiff’s

experts took advantage of any of Defendant’s expert evidence. The

Court thus denies the request to strike this evidence. This

denial is without prejudice to raising the issue as a motion in

limine.

Insofar as Defendant asserts that either or both experts do

not have the qualifications to render their opinions, or that

what they submitted lacks foundation, credentialing, or

reliability, the Court DENIES the objection without prejudice to

bringing a motion in limine based on Daubert principles in

connection with which there will be an opportunity for a response

and full briefing.

To the extent that Defendant argues that the opinions lack

foundation as not supported by, or as contradicted by, the

evidence submitted in this case, or that the opinions are

unnecessary, the Court concludes that the objections are not

well-taken as framed. Most of the pertinent facts are not subject

to dispute; rather, the parties disagree in their

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characterizations of the evidence, or as to the appropriate

inferences to be drawn therefrom. It is for the trier to

determine the facts and the inferences to be drawn therefrom. To

the extent that Defendant argues that the opinions are

speculative, the Court finds that there is showing at this point

that the experts engaged in anything other than appropriate

contemplation, consideration, surmise, and abstract reasoning.

Finally, the Court notes that it for the narrow purposes of

this motion, it is unnecessary for the Court to resolve these

objections because even if the declarations of the experts are

not considered, the facts present a basis upon which a rational

trier of fact could draw reasonable inferences supporting a

conclusion that Defendant breached its high duty of care and was

negligent. 

IV. Facts

Most of the pertinent facts are agreed upon; the evidence is

not materially disputed, but the parties’s characterizations of

the evidence are at odds, and the parties disagree as to the

drawing of inferences in support of Plaintiff’s claim.

It is undisputed that on March 24, 2006, Plaintiff, a

ticketed passenger who had flown to Fresno from Los Angeles on an

aircraft owned and operated by Defendant, a carrier for hire, was

injured when she fell down while carrying a computer bag

containing a laptop computer estimated by Plaintiff to weigh

thirty or forty pounds, a backpack purse, and a coat down the

stairs that were provided by Defendant and which Plaintiff used

for deplaning. 

The aircraft was an Embraer EMB 120 Brasilia, a thirty-seat

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turboprop regional airliner. 

The evidence reveals that Plaintiff had flown between Los

Angeles and Fresno an average of ten times per year since 2002 on

various carriers that used small planes that in turn provided for

exiting stairs that came down from the plane itself; she had

sufficient familiarity with such stairs. Although Plaintiff had

not previously gotten stuck, tripped, fallen, or had an accident

on such stairs, she testified that it was difficult to get up and

down the stairs because they were narrow and steep; in boarding

the plane she had the bag in front of her, and it was a difficult

quick climb, although she could not remember if she held on to a

hand rail (Dep. pp. 90-91, 112-13, 152.).

There is no dispute as to whether or not Plaintiff was in

compliance with regulations in boarding the plane with her three

items in the sense that she was within the limit of carry-on

bags. (Undisp. Facts, no. 5.) Skywest Standard Practice 1118 sets

forth the inflight operations manual carry-on baggage program; at

par. 3, subpar. (B), it states that passengers are allowed to

carry on one carry-on bag and one personal item; pursuant to par.

2(b), coats and other items and devices are allowed to be carried

on the aircraft without being counted against the personal item

allowance.

After Plaintiff tried unsuccessfully to fit her computer bag

in the overhead compartment or under the seat, a conversation

ensued between the flight attendant, Kelly Storm-Bowles, and

Plaintiff. Plaintiff testified that Storm-Bowles told Plaintiff

that the bag would have to be ground-checked because it did not

fit. Plaintiff responded that she did not want it ground-checked

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because she had two computers in it; Plaintiff smiled and told 1

the attendant that if the attendant wanted it down there, the

attendant could carry it down there. Plaintiff expressed that she

did not want the bag checked. Plaintiff did not recall using the

word “precious” in describing her computers. (Dep. Pltf. pp. 114-

17, 125-26.) The attendant returned, suggested that the bag could

be put on a seat, and put the bag on a seat and strapped it in

towards the back of the plane. (Id. pp. 117-18.) Otherwise, no

attempt was made to check any of Plaintiff’s baggage by

Defendant’s personnel in Los Angeles. (Id. p. 126.)

The attendant characterized her own conduct as an offer or

advice that the bag could be ground checked and stowed in cargo,

and she characterized Plaintiff’s conduct as an absolute refusal

of an offer to stow; Plaintiff said the two computers in the bag

were precious and that she did not want anything to happen to

them. (Decl. ¶ 5, 6, Dep. p. 6.)

The attendant testified that she knew that Plaintiff’s

computer bag was quite heavy. (Dep. pp. 6-7.)

Plaintiff did not know and did not recall hearing the

attendant announcing to passengers to watch their step and hold

on to the railing as they descended; she could have done so and

Plaintiff did not recall. However, Plaintiff did specifically

recall her making announcements, and Plaintiff remembered safety

mentioned at take-off, and a welcome to Fresno when landing. Her

knowledge of what was said was also based on her experience as a

traveler pursuant to which she knew what was said. She thought

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she was paying attention to the announcements made after landing,

but one could not hear the speaker well. (Pltf. Dep. pp. 128-29.)

The attendant declared that because she had observed

Plaintiff coming up the aisle with her personal effects and saw

her trip over her coat, which had been draped over her arm, and

further because the attendant knew that Plaintiff’s bag was

heavy, the attendant asked Plaintiff, “Can I help you with

anything?” Plaintiff responded, “No, I’ve got it,” then adjusted

her coat by hiking it up further over her arm, and she proceeded

to exit the plane. (Decl. ¶ 11.) 

Plaintiff testified that she was not sure if the attendant

asked her if she needed assistance after Plaintiff had gathered

her belongings; she did not specifically remember that, although

she remembered their short conversation at the back of the plane.

(Dep. p. 137.) She did not recall the attendant telling her to

watch out for her coat; it was possible that Plaintiff readjusted

the coat further up over her arm. (Dep. p. 138.)

The attendant declared that upon landing she gave an

announcement that included an admonition to exercise care and use

handrails when exiting the airplane; she stated that she

announced that safety was their first priority, and they asked

that the passengers hold on to the handrails and watch their step

as they deplaned; should they require any assistance, they should

please not hesitate to ask. (Decl. ¶ 8.) 

Before deplaning, the attendant was at the front of the

plane, adjacent to the door, exit stairs and cockpit, and

Plaintiff heard something to the effect of an announcement from

the attendant stating that if one required assistance in

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deplaning to let her know. (Pltf.’s Dep. p. 129-30.) However,

Plaintiff testified that she was not sure if after Plaintiff

gathered her belongings, the attendant asked Plaintiff if she

needed assistance; Plaintiff did not specifically remember the

attendant speaking to her and asking if she needed assistance.

(Dep. p. 137.) Plaintiff had no recollection. (Dep. p. 137.)

Plaintiff recalled being the last or next-to-last person off

the plane; she personally retrieved her computer bag from the

back of the plane and thanked the attendant at that time.

Plaintiff carried her backpack purse with one strap over her left

shoulder; her coat was over her left arm. (Pltf.’s Dep. pp. 130-

31, 139-40.) She picked up the computer bag by its short handle

with her right hand, and she carried it with one hand in front of

her. She had trouble negotiating her way down the aisle because

the aisle was so narrow, and the bag was nearly as wide as the

aisle; she had to turn the bag to feed it through, and she saw

the flight attendant as she did so. Plaintiff stumbled when the

corner of the computer bag in front of her hit the seat, but she

did not trip. She did not recall her coat dragging on the ground.

(Dep. pp. 131-35.) When she was ready to deplane, her left hand

was free except for holding her coat with her forearm. (Dep. p.

143.)

The attendant declared that Plaintiff came up the aisle

after retrieving her computer bag; Plaintiff had her personal

effects, and her coat was draped over her arm. The attendant

observed Plaintiff trip over her coat. (Decl. ¶ 10-11.) The

attendant had also lifted the computer bag and knew that it was

heavy. (Decl. ¶ 11.)

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Plaintiff did not remember the attendant repositioning

herself at the front door of the plane. (Dep. p. 135-36.)

The attendant declared that she stood at the cockpit door

next to the main cabin, assisting passengers in any way necessary

as they deplaned; Plaintiff was the last to deplane. (Decl. ¶¶ 9-

10.)

Ramp supervisor Andres Nazario testified that he made eyecontact with the attendant and was ready to provide any required

assistance. (Dep. pp. 7-8.)

The flight attendant saw Plaintiff fall as she attempted to

descend the main cabin door exist stairs; Mr. Nazario, the ramp

supervisor, was positioned near the bottom of the stairs, and he

rushed to Plaintiff’s aid and radioed for assistance. (Decl. ¶

12.) Plaintiff testified that as she started down the stairs, she

did not make, or missed, the first step because her computer bag,

which was being held with her right hand, caught, and Plaintiff

fell. Plaintiff did not know what portion of her bag caught, or

what exactly her bag struck on the airplane. (Dep. pp. 153-61.)

Plaintiff described the stairs as having maybe five or six steps

and railings. (Dep. 149-50.)

Plaintiff testified that she did not ask the flight

attendant for assistance at any time before beginning down the

stairs. (Dep. p. 141.) She did not feel that she needed

assistance going down the stairs, and she had made her judgment

that she would be able to make it down. (Tr. 141-42.)

The flight attendant testified that her job included

assisting passengers in any way that was necessary, that they

asked for. (Dep. p. 10.) If in her job she saw that a deplaning

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passenger was having difficulty with luggage, she would assist

them. (Dep. p. 10.) Storm-Bowles declared that as a flight

attendant, the safety of the passengers was her responsibility.

(Decl. ¶ 3.) Although federal aviation and Skywest regulations

prohibit flight attendants from leaving the plane to assist

passengers who are deplaning, it is permissible to follow the

last passenger deplaning, such as Plaintiff, down the stairs and

assist with carry-on items. (Decl. ¶¶ 9-10.) Pilot Thomas Wassmer

testified that during his employment with Defendant since July

28, 2005, he knew of a ramp that was used for deplaning purposes

that rolls up to the airplane and sits in the doorway and allows

passengers to walk down the ramp; he did not know why or when the

ramp was used, although on further examination he stated it was

to deplane handicapped people. (Dep. pp. 7-11.)

Plaintiff had two bloody Mary cocktails on the plane from

Chicago to Los Angeles but was not feeling the effects when in

Los Angeles she boarded the flight to Fresno. (Pltf. Dep. pp.

121-23.)

IV. Analysis

There is uncertainty as to whether or not the attendant

specifically asked Plaintiff if she needed help as she was about

to deplane; although the attendant specifically testified she did

so and received a negative response, the attendant also testified

in a manner that could be interpreted to mean that she helped by

responding to requests for help. Plaintiff had no recollection of

a specific offer or inquiry, although she recalled the remainder

of their interaction in some detail. A rational trier of fact

might determine that no specific request was actually made of

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Plaintiff. Further, even if a verbal query regarding assistance

were found to have been made, the Court is mindful of the high

standard of care set forth by the pertinent state substantive law

and the need to draw every possible, favorable, rational

inference in the Plaintiff’s favor. The record contains the

attendant’s own testimony to the effect that the safety of

passengers was her responsibility, her job included assisting

passengers in any way that was necessary, and that if in her job

she saw that a deplaning passenger was having difficulty with

their luggage, she would assist them. (Dep. p. 10.) The record

contains evidence of the attendant’s announcements, from which a

rational trier could infer that Defendant set a very high

standard of care with respect to passenger safety. The record

also permits a reasonable inference that there existed other,

more helpful options of conduct on the part of the attendant

besides permitting Plaintiff to walk down the stairs fully

burdened. This is the stuff of trials–-allowing the trier of fact

to weigh and evaluate the evidence, draw inferences, and make

ultimate findings. It is for the trier of fact in this case to

resolve the conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the

evidence regarding whether or not Defendant breached its duty of

care. 

V. Disposition

Accordingly, it IS ORDERED that

1) Defendant’s motion for summary judgment IS DENIED; and

2) Defendant’s objections to evidence ARE OVERRULED, without

prejudice to raising them by motions in limine in a manner

consistent with this order; and

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3) Defendant’s request to strike or not to consider

Plaintiff’s expert evidence because of tardy submission of expert

evidence by Plaintiff IS DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 13, 2007 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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