Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-09-03117/USCOURTS-caDC-09-03117-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Daniel Wright
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 13, 2013 Decided March 25, 2014 

No. 09-3117 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

APPELLEE

v. 

DANIEL WRIGHT, 

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:92-cr-00131-1) 

Sandra G. Roland, Assistant Federal Public Defender,

argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was 

A.J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender. Neil H. Jaffee, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, entered an appearance. 

Lauren R. Bates, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. On the brief were Ronald C. Machen Jr., 

U.S. Attorney, and Elizabeth Trosman and Angela G. 

Schmidt, Assistant U.S. Attorneys. Elizabeth H. Danello, 

Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance. 

Before: GRIFFITH and KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges, and 

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge. 

USCA Case #09-3117 Document #1485164 Filed: 03/25/2014 Page 1 of 5
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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge 

KAVANAUGH. 

KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge: In this case, Daniel Wright 

appeals from his conviction by guilty plea. We affirm. 

In 1992, Daniel Wright, Antoine Washington, and Glen 

Early, Jr., were arrested following a high-speed car chase 

through the streets of Washington, D.C. The police found 

drugs in the car in which the three men were traveling. All 

three were indicted and charged with possession with intent to 

distribute cocaine. Washington and Early went to trial later 

that year and were convicted and sentenced to 12 years and 7 

months in prison and 14 years and 6 months in prison, 

respectively. See United States v. Washington, 12 F.3d 1128, 

1132 (D.C. Cir. 1994). But Wright disappeared before trial 

after having been released on bail. 

Wright was eventually caught and brought back to the 

District of Columbia in 2008 to face the 1992 drug charges. 

Attorney Douglas Wood was appointed to represent Wright. 

A few weeks after his appointment, Wood recalled that he had 

previously represented Washington in Washington’s appeal 

(albeit not at Washington’s trial). Wood recognized that his 

prior representation of Washington might result in a conflict 

of interest in his representation of Wright. Wright soon also 

became aware of the potential conflict, but he did not object 

to Wood’s continued representation. Although Wood 

continued to represent Wright during several months of plea 

negotiations, Wood brought in conflict-free counsel Jenifer 

Wicks to consult with Wright before and during the entry of 

his guilty plea. Wright eventually pled guilty to one count of 

possession with intent to distribute cocaine. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 

841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). He was sentenced to eight years in 

prison. 

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Wright now appeals. He claims that Wood’s prior 

representation of Washington created an impermissible 

conflict of interest. 

A defendant asserting an ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim must show (1) that defense counsel’s performance was 

deficient and (2) that counsel’s deficient performance affected 

the outcome of the defendant’s case. See Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694 (1984). Conflict of 

interest claims such as that asserted by Wright in this case are 

a “specific genre” of ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 

United States v. Bruce, 89 F.3d 886, 893 (D.C. Cir. 1996). In 

Cuyler v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court held that a defendant 

who asserts a conflict of interest claim on appeal or in habeas 

proceedings generally must demonstrate only that an actual 

conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s 

performance. 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980). The defendant 

typically need not demonstrate the second prong of the 

Strickland test – that the lawyer’s deficient performance 

affected the outcome of the case. See id. at 349-50. 

In Cuyler v. Sullivan, the conflict of interest had been 

caused by the defense attorneys’ concurrent representation of 

multiple clients in the same case. In this case, Wood’s 

representation of Washington apparently ended before 

Wood’s representation of Wright began. Wright’s claim 

therefore may involve a conflict caused by successive

representation of multiple clients in the same matter. In 

Mickens v. Taylor, the Supreme Court explained that the 

language of Cuyler v. Sullivan “itself does not clearly 

establish, or indeed even support,” applying the Cuyler v. 

Sullivan standard “unblinkingly” to cases involving 

successive representation of multiple clients. 535 U.S. 162, 

174-75 (2002). But the Court ultimately did not decide the 

question of whether Cuyler v. Sullivan applied to cases of 

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successive representation, saying that the question remained 

“open.” Id. at 176. 

Since Mickens, this Court has likewise not decided 

whether the Cuyler v. Sullivan standard applies to cases 

involving successive representation. See United States v. 

Berkeley, 567 F.3d 703 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 

Here, we again need not decide that question. Even 

under the Cuyler v. Sullivan standard, Wright still has to 

demonstrate that Wood’s alleged conflict of interest adversely 

affected his performance. Wright has not done so. Wright 

claims that Wood’s performance was defective because Wood 

allegedly coerced Wright into pleading guilty. But the record 

conclusively shows that Wright’s guilty plea was voluntary, 

not coerced. Three pieces of record evidence make that clear: 

First, six months before Wright’s guilty plea, Wood 

recognized that a conflict might arise if Washington was a 

witness in Wright’s trial. See Tr. Status Hearing at 9, Jan. 7, 

2009. To address the possible conflict, Wood enlisted 

conflict-free counsel, Jenifer Wicks, to “consult with Mr. 

Wright and to be present” before and during the entry of his 

guilty plea. Tr. Plea Hearing at 3, July 2, 2009. During the 

plea hearing, Wicks stated that she had talked with Wright 

about the range of sentences that Wright could face by 

pleading guilty. Wicks and Wright each signed the 

Government’s plea agreement, statement of offense, and 

waiver of trial by jury forms. Conflict-free counsel’s 

prominent role in the plea discussions and in Wright’s 

decision to enter a plea belies Wright’s claim that he was 

coerced by Wood into entering the plea. 

Second, during the plea colloquy, Wright made clear that 

he understood the ramifications of his guilty plea and was 

voluntarily choosing to plead guilty. Wright stated that he 

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had read his plea agreement and had reviewed it with his 

attorneys. Id. at 7. Wright admitted that he had possessed 

powder and crack cocaine. Id. at 14. Wright confirmed that 

nobody had “forced,” “pressured,” or “coerced” him “in any 

way” into pleading guilty. Id. at 14-15. Wright stated that he 

was “pleading guilty voluntarily” and of his “own free will.” 

Id. at 15. Those statements, made in Wood’s absence, 

contradict Wright’s current contention that he pled guilty 

because of Wood’s coercion. 

Third, after his plea and in advance of sentencing, Wright 

submitted a letter to the District Court. Wright’s letter 

confirmed that his choice to plead guilty had been voluntary. 

Wright wrote that he “wanted to explain” his decision and 

“why” he had chosen to plead guilty. Letter from Daniel 

Wright to Judge James Robertson at 1, United States v. 

Wright, No. 92-cr-00131 (D.D.C. Oct. 14, 2009). Wright 

acknowledged his role in the conduct underlying his offense 

and admitted that he had been on a self-destructive path and 

that it was time to face the consequences of his actions. See 

id. The next day, in open court, Wright again apologized to 

the District Court for his conduct. See Tr. Sentencing Hearing 

at 17, Oct. 15, 2009. Those candid and unsolicited 

admissions further contravene Wright’s claim that Wood 

coerced him to plead guilty. 

Because the record conclusively rebuts Wright’s claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel, we affirm the judgment of 

conviction. See United States v. Thompson, 721 F.3d 711, 

713 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 

So ordered. 

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