Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-16-01233/USCOURTS-ca10-16-01233-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Marc Bolt
Appellee
Felicia Brooks
Appellee
Curtis Deines
Appellee
Fitzgerald
Appellee
Allen Harms
Appellee
Higgins
Appellee
D. Hillyer
Appellee
Frankie Nickels
Appellee
Virginia Page
Appellee
Jean Peterson
Appellee
Ramona Phipps
Appellee
David Scherbarth
Appellee
Brian Uhrich
Appellee
Kevin Vorwald
Appellee
Tyrone Walker
Appellant
Wesley Wilson
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

TYRONE WALKER, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

DAVID SCHERBARTH, in individual and 

official capacities; WESLEY WILSON, in 

individual and official capacities; 

FRANKIE NICKELS, in individual and 

official capacities; VIRGINIA PAGE, in 

individual and official capacities; FELICIA 

BROOKS, in individual and official 

capacities; JEAN PETERSON, in 

individual and official capacities; 

RAMONA PHIPPS, in individual and 

official capacities; BRIAN UHRICH, in 

individual and official capacities; ALLEN 

HARMS, in individual and official 

capacities; CURTIS DEINES, in individual 

and official capacities; D. HILLYER, in 

individual and official capacities; 

FITZGERALD, in individual and official 

capacities; HIGGINS, in individual and 

official capacities; KEVIN VORWALD, in 

individual and official capacities; MARC 

BOLT, in individual and official capacities, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 16-1233 

(D.C. No. 1:15-CV-00823-MJW) 

(D. Colo.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

 *

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

(continued) 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

January 27, 2017

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

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2 

_________________________________ 

Before HOLMES, BALDOCK, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Tyrone Walker, a Colorado prisoner proceeding without the assistance of 

counsel, appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants on his 

claims of First-Amendment retaliation. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291, we affirm. 

I 

The Colorado Department of Corrections (DOC) requires that incarcerated 

persons be given work assignments. Before 2012, Mr. Walker was incarcerated at 

the Sterling Correctional Facility, where he was assigned to work as an offender care 

aide (OCA). In June 2012, he was transferred to the Limon Correctional Facility, 

where he was also assigned to work as an OCA. Mr. Walker was transferred back to 

Sterling in August 2013 and was assigned to Food Services, which, according to one 

of Mr. Walker’s case managers, “is a typical assignment for inmates arriving at 

Sterling.” R. Vol. 1 at 549. 

Mr. Walker, however, refused to work in Food Services on August 16, 2013, 

because doing so entailed an 8-hour shift, which would not leave adequate time to 

conduct research and draft filings for his myriad lawsuits, one or more of which are 

related to the water quality at Sterling, which was found to have traces of uranium on 

 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

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multiple occasions. He insists that he was given approval to continue his assignment 

as an OCA after his arrival at Sterling. On August 22, prison officials circulated a 

memorandum to inmates stating that Sterling’s drinking water had again tested for 

high levels of uranium. Mr. Walker requested a grievance form to complain about 

the water quality on August 26. On September 5, his case manager informed 

Mr. Walker that, if he continued to refuse work in Food Services, he would be 

referred to the “Classification Committee for possible placement in Restricted 

Privileges” (RP), R. Vol. 1 at 550, which is a program where inmates have certain 

privileges taken away. Despite additional warnings thereafter, Mr. Walker continued 

to refuse and was placed in RP on September 23, 2013, though he has since been 

released from RP. 

Mr. Walker filed this lawsuit on April 17, 2015. In his most recent amended 

complaint, he alleged that he was retaliated against for grieving the water quality at 

Sterling by being placed in RP. He also alleged violations of due process, but those 

claims were dismissed by the district court on the defendants’ motion. Mr. Walker 

does not appeal that dismissal here. The defendants then moved for summary 

judgment. In response, Mr. Walker essentially argued that although prison 

regulations proscribe inmates from refusing work assignments, they permit inmates 

to refuse reassignments from an existing assignment. 

The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding that 

Mr. Walker failed to establish “but for” causation with regard to any retaliation by 

the defendants because his undisputed “refusal to participate in a Food Services 

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assignment triggered disciplinary action” regardless of whether the defendants had a 

retaliatory motive. R. Vol. 1 at 614. Specifically, the court found that, under 

administrative regulations, Mr. Walker did not retain any right to his assignment as 

an OCA upon transfer from Limon to Sterling, and even if he did, “nothing in these 

regulations places a limit on the prison’s ability to reassign him, and nothing suggests 

that [he] was not subject to discipline for refusing a reassignment.” R. Vol. 1 at 613. 

The court noted that “the regulations do not support any inference that inmates have a 

right to pick their work assignments at will.” R. Vol. 1 at 613. Addressing 

Mr. Walker’s proposed distinction between refusing assignments and reassignments, 

the court reasoned that when the prison “imposes a reassignment, it is necessarily 

true that the previous assignment is no longer DOC sanctioned.” R. Vol. 1 at 612. 

On appeal, Mr. Walker presents the following errors for our review: (1) the 

district court dismissed six claims that the defendants did not move for summary 

judgment on; (2) the district court based its decision on an argument that neither the 

defendants nor Mr. Walker addressed, thus violating Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

56(f); (3) Mr. Walker demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact regarding the 

causation element of his retaliation claims; and (4) the district court ignored the 

defendants’ retaliatory motive in rendering its decision. We address the alleged 

procedural errors first. 

II 

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal 

standard as the district court. Lundstrom v. Romero, 616 F.3d 1108, 1118 (10th Cir. 

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2010). Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “When applying this standard, we view the evidence and draw 

reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” 

Doe v. City of Albuquerque, 667 F.3d 1111, 1122 (10th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). We may affirm summary judgment for any reason that finds 

adequate support in the record. Baca v. Sklar, 398 F.3d 1210, 1216 (10th Cir. 2005). 

A 

Mr. Walker argues that the district court ignored claims four, six, eight, ten, 

twelve, and fourteen of his complaint, all of which relate to his continued placement 

in RP, not merely the initial placement. He insists that the defendants only moved 

for summary judgment on his first three claims regarding his initial placement in RP. 

After a thorough review of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, we can 

find no limitation to Mr. Walker’s first three claims of retaliation. In fact, the motion 

expressly argues that defendants’ “placing and maintaining” of Mr. Walker in RP 

“was required and justified by policy and not intended to infringe on any protected 

activity.” R. Vol. 1 at 341 (emphasis added). We thus discern no error by the district 

court in adjudicating Mr. Walker’s claims relating to post-placement retaliation. 

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B1

With regard to Mr. Walker’s Rule 56 claim, he contends that the district court 

“was not fully informed, and that it erroneously added the argument of 

‘re-assignment.’” Opening Br. at 7. He is referring to the district court’s 

characterization of his argument for a distinction between inmates refusing an 

assignment and refusing a reassignment. Rule 56 requires a court to give “notice and 

a reasonable time to respond” before granting a summary-judgment “motion on 

grounds not raised by a party,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f), but we clearly see in 

Mr. Walker’s response to the motion for summary judgment where he made this 

argument: 

Plaintiff admits that he did not accept the Job in Food Services. . . . 

Plaintiff argues that because he was assigned as an O.C.A. at the time of 

the alleged incident, he was not required to accept the Food Service 

assignment. Plaintiff also contends that because he had a Job as an 

O.C.A., he could not be subjected to the sanctions of [Administrative 

Regulation] 600-05. This is because R.P. is not a sanction that can be 

imposed against a prisoner who has a facility Job. . . . [F]or a prisoner to 

be approved for placement on R.P., he must have had “refused to 

participate in” his “assigned” Job or program. Because Plaintiff was 

assigned as an O.C.A. and not to Food Services, the act of not 

participating in Food Services — a Job Plaintiff was not assigned to — 

could not be used as a predicate to subject him to R.P. 

R. Vol. 1 at 570–71 (brackets omitted). Though he did not phrase this argument as 

succinctly as the district court did, we think the district court’s characterization of the 

 1

 To the extent that Mr. Walker’s arguments regarding this issue touch on the 

district court’s issuance of its order before the deadline to file a reply brief, there is 

no requirement that a district court wait for or consider a reply brief. See D. Colo. L. 

Civ. R. 7.1(d) (indicating that reply briefs are optional and that the district court may 

rule on a motion any time after filing). 

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argument is faithful and accurate. But even if it were not, “district courts . . . possess 

the power to enter summary judgment sua sponte, so long as the losing party was on 

notice that she had to come forward with all of her evidence.” Celotex Corp. v. 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 326 (1986). And there can be no doubt here that Mr. Walker 

was on notice to present all of his evidence. 

 Mr. Walker’s proposed smoking gun does nothing to dislodge this conclusion. 

He points to an Implementation Adjustment that requires a change of assignment to 

be “‘reviewed by the [offender’s] case manager, current supervisor, and prospective 

supervisor.’” Opening Br. at 8 (quoting I.A. 850-03). He says he would have raised 

this provision if he had known the district court would find a distinction between 

assignment and reassignment. But Mr. Walker points to no evidence in the record 

showing his assignment to Food Services was not reviewed as required; all he 

musters are conclusory allegations. The district court therefore did not grant the 

motion on grounds not raised by a party, much less do so without notice and time to 

respond. 

C 

 Having disposed of the procedural claims of error, we arrive at the merits of 

Mr. Walker’s cause of action for retaliation. Mr. Walker argues that he demonstrated 

a genuine issue of material fact by showing that he was not subject to RP pursuant to 

DOC policy and producing an affidavit from Lewis Moore, an offender he cared for 

as an OCA. He also contends that documents in the record, which do not reflect any 

assignment as an OCA at Sterling, were “doctored, altered, and otherwise falsified” 

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by the defendants to remove any such reference. Opening Br. at 16. He maintains 

that he provided information showing that defendants were wrong about the timeline 

of events — that Mr. Walker was not told about RP as a potential sanction until 

September 5, 2013, thus demonstrating that RP was not a consideration until after he 

grieved the water quality at Sterling. 

 “[P]rison officials may not retaliate against or harass an inmate because of the 

inmate’s exercise of his constitutional rights.” Peterson v. Shanks, 149 F.3d 1140, 

1144 (10th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). A First-Amendment 

retaliation claim requires proof of the following elements: 

(1) that the plaintiff was engaged in constitutionally protected activity; 

(2) that the defendant’s actions caused the plaintiff to suffer an injury 

that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to 

engage in that activity; and (3) that the defendant’s adverse action was 

substantially motivated as a response to the plaintiff’s exercise of 

constitutionally protected conduct. 

Shero v. City of Grove, 510 F.3d 1196, 1203 (10th Cir. 2007). “Obviously, an inmate 

is not inoculated from the normal conditions of confinement . . . merely because he 

has engaged in protected activity,” so to satisfy the third prong of this analysis, 

Mr. Walker was required to establish that “but for the retaliatory motive, the 

incidents to which he refers . . . would not have taken place.” Peterson, 149 F.3d at 

1144 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

In the DOC, “[a]n offender who transfers to another facility/unit, for any 

reason, does not retain the right to any previous assignment.” Admin. Reg. 

§ 850-03(IV)(F)(3), available at R. Vol. 1 at 599. Additionally, “[a]ny DOC 

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offender who refuses to participate in, or is terminated from, a DOC sanctioned work 

or treatment program is subject to Restricted Privileges Status and the offender’s case 

manager shall initiate a restricted privileges (RP) status review.” Admin. Reg. 

§ 600-05(IV)(A)(1), available at R. Vol. 1 at 498. In this provision, “refusal” is 

defined as “[a]ny condition caused by offenders’ actions/conduct that precludes their 

[active] participation in work assignments.” Admin. Reg. § 600-05(III)(C) & (F), 

available at R. Vol. 1 at 497–98. 

 We are not persuaded by Mr. Walker’s arguments for a number of reasons. 

First, with regard to Mr. Moore’s affidavit, it is scant, stating only that Mr. Walker 

was temporarily assigned as his OCA “around August[] 2013.” R. Vol. 1 at 583. 

Information presented in a nonmovant’s affidavit, however, “must be based on 

personal knowledge and must set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence.” 

Ellis v. J.R.’s Country Stores, Inc., 779 F.3d 1184, 1201 (10th Cir. 2015) (alterations 

and internal quotation marks omitted). In this affidavit, there is no factual foundation 

for Mr. Moore’s personal knowledge of Mr. Walker’s work assignment or any 

specificity as to when Mr. Walker was purportedly assigned as an OCA. The 

affidavit is therefore “conclusory and self-serving,” Murray v. City of Sapulpa, 

45 F.3d 1417, 1422 (10th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted), and does not 

demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact. 

Without the affidavit, we are left with a multitude of prison records that do not 

reveal any assignment as an OCA at Sterling, temporary or otherwise, and 

Mr. Walker’s assertion that such records were forged. While we will not sanction the 

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falsification of records, Mr. Walker has not proffered any evidence to create a triable 

fact issue as to whether a particular defendant altered his prisoner records. See, e.g., 

Cardoso v. Calbone, 490 F.3d 1194, 1199 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding broad allegation 

of conspiracy to fabricate prison misconduct charge failed to state a claim for relief); 

see also Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 654 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that “mere 

allegations of falsified evidence,” without more, do not state a claim). This 

contention is thus insufficient to overturn the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment. 

Regardless of these defects in his claims, the timeline of events reflected in the 

record does not support Mr. Walker’s allegations of retaliation. Specifically, 

Mr. Walker first informed the supervisor of Food Services on August 16 that he 

“would not work in the kitchen because he needed to go to [the] law library.”2

 

R. Vol. 1 at 494. Given that prison officials did not apprise the Sterling population 

of the water quality until August 22, there is no way his placement in RP could be in 

retaliation for his water-quality grievance. Rather, as the simplest explanation would 

dictate, Mr. Walker’s placement in RP was a consequence of his refusal to work in 

Food Services, as this consequence is mandatory under administrative policy. See

Admin. Reg. § 600-05(IV)(A)(1) (requiring that “the offender’s case manager shall

initiate a [RP] status review” (emphasis added)). Mr. Walker’s allegations that RP 

 2

 According to the food-service supervisor, Mr. Walker would still have 

“plenty of time to take care of his legal matters” while working in Food Services. 

R. Vol. 1 at 494. 

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only became a consequence for him after he grieved the water quality on August 26 

are baseless and belied by the regulations. Furthermore, in light of prison policy that 

gives Mr. Walker no right in his previous assignment as an OCA in Limon, see

Admin. Reg. § 850-03(IV)(F)(3), it is clear that his placement in RP would have 

taken place regardless of any retaliatory motive on the part of the defendants. See

McBeth v. Himes, 598 F.3d 708, 719 (10th Cir. 2010) (“If there is a finding that 

retaliation was not the but-for cause of the adverse action, the claim fails for lack of 

causal connection . . . despite proof of some retaliatory animus in the official’s 

mind.” (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted)). 

In his arguments to the contrary, Mr. Walker confuses not being told about RP 

until September 5 as evidence that the DOC was not considering RP until that date. 

In reality, pursuant to policy, RP was a consequence of his refusal to accept his 

food-service assignment from the moment he refused on August 16; it is of no 

moment that the DOC gave Mr. Walker multiple warnings before referring him for 

RP. See Admin. Reg. § 600-05(IV)(A)(1). Additionally, though Mr. Walker 

complains of his continued placement in RP despite appeals and it being normal for 

inmates to rotate out of RP, the defendants presented evidence that it is routine for 

inmates moving out of RP to be assigned to Food Services. See R. Vol. 1 at 557. 

Mr. Walker continued to refuse an assignment there, complaining that “he needed 

more time to work on his court cases.” Id. Accordingly, Mr. Walker has not raised 

any genuine issue of material fact on appeal. 

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D 

 Having concluded that his retaliation claim fails regardless of any retaliatory 

motive the defendants may have had, it is not necessary for us to rule on 

Mr. Walker’s fourth claim of error — that the district court ignored evidence of the 

defendants’ retaliatory motive. 

III 

 In this case, Mr. Walker experienced “the normal conditions of confinement,” 

natural consequences of his stated refusal to work in Food Services. See Peterson, 

149 F.3d at 1144. We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment to the defendants. We also grant Mr. Walker’s motion to proceed without 

prepayment of fees. 

Entered for the Court 

Bobby R. Baldock 

Circuit Judge 

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