Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-05201/USCOURTS-ca10-92-05201-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Arrow Valve Co., Inc.
Appellee
Wheatley Gaso, Inc
Appellant

Document Text:

--

FILbD 

United States~~ Appeals 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tentb Ci 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT APR 13 1993 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

WHEATLEY GASO, INC., ) 

a Delaware corporation, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

ARROW VALVE CO., INC., ) 

a Kansas corporation, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee. ) 

No. 92-5201 

(O.C. No. 90-C-561-C) 

( N. D • Okla • ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before LOGAN, MOORE, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(e); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 92-5201 Document: 010110200907 Date Filed: 04/13/1993 Page: 1 
Wheatley Gaso, Inc. appeals from two orders of the district 

court awarding and denying costs under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54 (d ) . We 

affirm. 

Wheatley filed an action under the Lanum Act seeking damages 

and injunctive relief against a Wheatley competitor, Arrow Valve 

Co. At issue was whether claims made by Arrow in one of its 

publications were false. Soon after the filing of the complaint, 

Arrow voluntarily removed the publication from the market. 

Thereafter, the district court held a hearing to determine whether 

a preliminary injunction should enter. 

According to the limited record before us, the only issue to 

be resolved at that hearing was whether Arrow's voluntary action 

was sufficient to purge the market of its false claim. It does 

not appear that Arrow contested whether the claim was false but 

only whether further burdens should be placed upon it to overcome 

the effect of that claim. The court allowed the parties to file 

affidavits on the issue and ultimately ruled the voluntary effort 

was "inadequate and insufficient to remedy the violation." The 

court concluded a preliminary injunction should enter prohibiting 

re-assertion of the false claim and requiring Arrow to notify all 

recipients of the claim that the assertion made by Arrow was false 

and retracted . 

The case thereafter went to trial on the issue of damages and 

the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant, Arrow. 

Following trial, Arrow submitted its claim for costs pursuant to 

Rule 54 (d ) . The clerk granted the claim, Wheatley objected, but 

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Appellate Case: 92-5201 Document: 010110200907 Date Filed: 04/13/1993 Page: 2 
the trial court sustained the clerk on the ground that Arrow had 

prevailed at trial and was entitled to its costs. 

The district court then entered an order making permanent the 

preliminary injunction issued prior to trial. Wheatley then 

sought costs of its own, claiming to be a prevailing party under 

Rule 54 (d) . The clerk denied the application, but no explanation 

for that decision appears in the record before us.

1 Wheatley 

again objected and the district court affirmed the clerk by a 

summary minute order. Wheatley appeals the orders granting 

Arrow's claim and denying its claim. 

Although Wheatley blesses us with an exegesis on the 

definition of the term "prevailing party," it fails to acknowledge 

that Rule 54(d) provides costs shall be allowed to the prevailing 

party "unless the court otherwise directs." Omitting any 

recognition that the rule portends a claim for costs may be 

denied, Wheatley asserts it was the prevailing party and 

unequivocally entitled to its costs. In like manner Wheatley also 

argues Arrow was not a prevailing party by simply ignoring the 

outcome of the trial on damages. These oversights of fact permit 

Wheatley to argue disingenuously the district court erred in its 

rulings. 

We have previously ruled in a similar matter, but 

unfortunately, neither party cites the case. In Howell Petroleum 

1 In its brief, Arrow asserts that the costs Wheatley sought 

were incurred for and during the trial which ended in a verdict 

favoring Arrow. Our examination of the material in Appellant's 

Appendix lends credence to that assertion. 

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Appellate Case: 92-5201 Document: 010110200907 Date Filed: 04/13/1993 Page: 3 
Corp. v. Samson Resources Co. , 903 F.2d 778, 783 (1 0th Cir. 1990 ) , 

we held: 

The t rial court's decision whether or not to tax 

will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion. 

court was within its discretion to refuse to award 

to a party which was only partially successful. 

costs 

The 

costs 

(citations omitted). As in Howell, Wheatley's success in this 

case, if any, was partial . Wheatley lost its claim for damages 

after a six day trial and only won an injunctive order apparently 

conceded by its adversary. 

Despite this singular outcome, Wheatley summarily states the 

district court erred by "denying Wheatley the status of prevailing 

party and failing to award costs." That bald statement misse s at 

least three points. 

First, there is nothing in the court's orders which suggests 

it denied Wheatley "the status of prevailing party . " Second, Rule 

54 (d ) on its face provides the district court with authority to 

deny costs to a prevailing party. Third, Wheatley cannot escape 

the undeniable fact that Arrow was a prevailing party. 

Yet, Wheatley attempts to justify its entitlement to costs 

upon a contention it carried the day on two counts. First, it 

argues, it was succe ssful in having the district court dec lare 

Arrow's advertising c laim was false. Sec ond, Wheatley contends it 

obtained a permanent injunction against any further assertion of 

that claim. We regard those successes with little enthusiasm. 

We assume withou t proof of fraud the injuncti ve order could 

not have entered, thus, Wheatley exaggerates the breath of its 

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Appellate Case: 92-5201 Document: 010110200907 Date Filed: 04/13/1993 Page: 4 
victory. Indeed it simply bisects the outcome of its injunctive 

claim. Because Wheatley's first asserted "success" was a 

necessary part of its second, the argument is redundant. Further 

minimizing the value of Wheatley's asserted victory is the fact 

Arrow virtually conceded its fraud by withdrawing its advertising 

claim after the institution of this action. 

Moreover, without a contest over the issue of fraud, the only 

matter left for the district court to decide was how to fashion a 

remedy. Indeed, under the circumstances, an injunctive order of 

some kind was foregone with Arrow's virtual concession. Thus, the 

record fails to support Wheatley's zealous claims of success. 

This reduces the argument on appeal to the fact that the 

district court simply awarded costs to Arrow and denied them to 

Wheatley. From the record presented to us, we cannot say either 

of the court's orders is reversible. 

As we noted in Howell, the award or denial of costs when a 

party has been only partially successful becomes a matter for the 

exercise of judicial discretion. Thus, the only way Wheatley can 

prevail here is by demonstrating the district court abused that 

discretion. That has not been attempted, let alone accomplished . 

We think Wheatley's utter failure to deal with the only 

possible justiciable issue in the case makes this appeal 

frivolous. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED and 

appellee's request for double costs under 28 USC§ 1912 GRANTED. 

------

Entered for the Court 

John P. Moore 

Circuit Judge 

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