Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-08001/USCOURTS-ca10-92-08001-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael Stuart St. Martin
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

' 

UNITED STATES 

FI LLO 

United Staa C'Aurtof Appeal, 

COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Cireuit 

TENTH CIRCUIT DECO 4 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

MICHAEL STUART ST. MARTIN, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

No . 92-8001 

(D.C. No. 91-CR-066-0lB) 

(Dist. of Wyoming) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before LOGAN, BARRETT and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this 

panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not 

materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. 

App. P. 34(a); Tenth Cir. R. 34 . 1.9. The cause is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. 

Michael Stuart St. Martin (St. Martin) appeals his sentence 

entered upon his jury convictions of making a false statement in 

connection with the acquisition of a firearm and being a felon in 

possession of a firearm. 

* This Order and Judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 92-8001 Document: 010110149265 Date Filed: 12/04/1992 Page: 1 
On July 12, 1991, St. Martin was charged with making a false 

statement in connection with acquiring a firearm in violation of 

18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a) (6) and 924(a) (1), Count I; possession of a 

firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) 

and 924(e), Count II; and interstate transportation of a firearm 

by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 

924(a) (2), Count III. Count III was dismissed prior to trial. 

On July 24, 1991, the government filed notice of intent to 

seek an enhanced penalty under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) should St. 

Martin be convicted of Count II. Under§ 924(e), a sentence 

imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) for possession of a firearm by a 

convicted felon is subject to enhancement if the defendant has had 

three prior convictions "for a violent felony or a serious drug 

offense, or both." § 924 (e) (2) (B) defines "violent felony" as 

"any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one 

year .. that ... (ii) is burglary, arson ... or otherwise 

involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of 

physical injury to another." 

Within its notice, the government listed five of St. Martin's 

prior convictions, all of which occurred in Oregon: June 29, 

1977, burglary in the second degree; March 27, 1979, burglary in 

the first degree; April 17, 1979, burglary in the first degree; 

August 31, 1982, arson in the second degree; and December 2, 1982, 

possession of a weapon by an inmate in a penal institution. All 

of the convictions were for "crime[s] punishable by imprisonment 

for a term exceeding one year." 

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Appellate Case: 92-8001 Document: 010110149265 Date Filed: 12/04/1992 Page: 2 
Prior to trial, St. Martin filed a motion in limine to 

require the government to designate his 1977 conviction for 

burglary in the second degree as the prior felony conviction to be 

used throughout the trial. The government responded that it 

would designate St. Martin's conviction for possession of a 

weapon by an inmate of a penal institution; it would redact from 

its proof any reference to St. Martin's other convictions; and it 

would refrain from presenting the underlying facts of his 

conviction for possession of a weapon by an inmate of a penal 

institution which had involved an attempted murder charge for the 

stabbing of another inmate. 

St. Martin's motion was denied, and at trial the government 

proved that St. Martin had a prior conviction for possession of a 

weapon by an inmate. The jury convicted St. Martin on Counts I 

and II. The court sentenced St. Martin to 293 months, reflecting 

an enhancement under§ 924(e). 

On appeal, St. Martin contends that: (1) the district court 

abused its discretion by allowing the government to prove that his 

prior conviction was committed while he was in prison for a 

different offense; (2) his sentence was improperly enhanced under 

§ 924(e) with his Oregon burglary convictions; (3) his sentence 

was improperly enhanced under § 924(e) with his Oregon arson 

conviction; and (4) the enhancement of his sentence was erroneous 

because the government did not prove that two of the offenses 

occurred on occasions different from one another. 

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Appellate Case: 92-8001 Document: 010110149265 Date Filed: 12/04/1992 Page: 3 
I. 

St. Martin contends that the district court abused its 

discretion when it allowed the government to prove in conjunction 

with Count II, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, that 

his prior conviction was committed while he was in prison for a 

different offense. 

St. Martin, while acknowledging that the district court's 

ruling "that the government could use any prior conviction it 

wished in proving that [he] was a convicted felon .... is true, 

as a general rule," (Defendant/Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 6), 

nevertheless argues that the court abused its discretion by 

allowing the government to prove that he had been convicted of 

possession of a weapon while an inmate in a penal institution. 

St. Martin contends that the admission of this evidence was unduly 

prejudicial because it allowed the government to prove two 

convictions rather than one and because it was so similar to the 

substantive conviction before the jury. We disagree. 

We may not reverse the evidentiary rulings of a trial court 

absent an abuse of discretion. 

F.2d 1293, 1301 (10th Cir. 1988). 

United States v. Alexander, 849 

Nothing in§ 922(g) indicates 

that a defendant with multiple prior convictions may dictate 

which felony the government must use to establish his or her prior 

conviction. Moreover, St. Martin's plea of guilty to possession 

of a weapon while an inmate in a penal institution was an 

admission of all the facts relevant thereto, and that judgment is 

not subject to collateral attack. United States v. Burns, 934 

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Appellate Case: 92-8001 Document: 010110149265 Date Filed: 12/04/1992 Page: 4 
F.2d 1157, 1159 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 

(1992). 

U.S. 

Under these circumstances, we hold that the district court 

did not abuse its discretion in ruling that St. Martin could not 

dictate which felony the government should use in establishing a 

prior conviction for purposes of§ 922(g). 

II. 

St. Martin contends that his sentence was improperly enhanced 

under§ 924(e) by his Oregon burglary convictions. We review a 

sentence enhancement under § 924(e) de novo. United States v. 

Maines, 920 F.2d 1525, 1527 n. 4 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 

U.S. (1991). 

St. Martin argues, citing United States v. Permenter, 969 

F.2d 911 (10th Cir. 1992), that a conviction predicated on a 

burglary which does 

under§ 924(e) (2) (B), 

not meet the definition of a violent felony 

cannot be used for enhancement. He further 

argues that since the Oregon statutes define first and second 

degree burglary more broadly than the generic definition set forth 

in Taylor v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 2143 (1990), and since 

there was no evidence beyond the fact of convictions to establish 

that the actual crimes met the generic definition of burglary, his 

sentence was improperly enhanced and a remand is necessary "in 

order for the government to provide and the district court to 

review the relevant document, and apply the Taylor analysis." 

(Defendant/Appellant's Opening Brief at 13.) We agree. 

In Taylor, the Court held: 

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Appellate Case: 92-8001 Document: 010110149265 Date Filed: 12/04/1992 Page: 5 
We conclude that a person has been convicted of a 

burglary for purposes of a§ 924(e) enhancement if he is 

convicted of any crime, regardless of its exact 

definition or label, having the basic elements of 

unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a 

building or structure, with intent to commit a crime. 

There remains the problem of applying this 

conclusion to cases in which the state statute under 

which a defendant is convicted varies from the generic 

definition of "burglary." If the statute is 

narrower than the generic view ... there is no problem 

A few States' burglary statutes, however ... define burglary more broadly. . We therefore must 

address the question whether, in the case of a defendant 

who has been convicted under a nongeneric burglary 

statute, the Government may seek enhancement on the 

grounds that he actually committed a generic burglary. 

* * * 

... For example, in a state whose burglary statutes 

include entry of an automobile [such as Oregon's which 

includes "vehicles"] as well as a building, if the 

indictment or information and jury instructions show 

that the defendant was charged only with burglary of a 

building • and that the jury necessarily had to find an 

entry of a building to convict. then the Government 

should be able to use the conviction for enhancement. 

(Emphasis added.) 

110 S. Ct. at 2158-60. 

Under Taylor, a defendant's burglary conviction pursuant to a 

nongeneric burglary statute may be used for purposes of 

enhancement only if it is clear that the defendant "actually 

committed a generic burglary." 110 S. Ct. at 2159. Moreover, 

"[i]n the absence of clarity, Taylor bars sentencing courts from 

engaging in detailed fact finding concerning the specific felony, 

and prevents convictions under a non-conforming statute from being 

employed for enhancement purposes." United States v. Barney, 955 

F.2d 635, 641 (10th Cir. 1992). 

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Appellate Case: 92-8001 Document: 010110149265 Date Filed: 12/04/1992 Page: 6 
Oregon's burglary statutes, which define a building to 

include "any booth, vehicle, boat, [or] aircraft 11 are much 

broader than the generic burglary defined in Taylor as one "having 

the basic elements of unlawful entry or unprivileged entry into, 

or remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a 

crime." 110 s. Ct. at 2158. As such, the enhancement of St. 

Martin's sentence based upon his Oregon burglary convictions was 

improper unless a review of "the indictment or information and 

the jury instructions show[s] that St. Martin was charged only 

with a burglary of a building and that the jury necessarily had to 

find an entry of a building to convict." Id. at 2160. 

United States v. Strahl, 958 F.2d 980, 983 (10th Cir. 1992). 

Applying these standards to the facts herein, we hold that 

the case must be remanded to the district court. For sentence 

enhancement purposes under§ 924(e), it shall be the obligation of 

the government to provide certified copies of "the indictment or 

information and jury instructions" along with the text of any 

guilty pleas1 underlying St. Martin's felony convictions for the 

district court's review and application of the Taylor analysis. 

III. 

St. Martin contends that his sentence was improperly enhanced 

under§ 924(e) by his Oregon arson conviction. Our record on 

1 In United State v. Barney, 955 F.2d at 639 we joined the other 

circuits which had considered the question and held that where 

enhancement is sought on the basis of a conviction obtained 

through a guilty plea, the sentencing court may look at the 

underlying indictment or information and the text of the guilty 

plea to determine if the defendant was charged with and admitted 

conduct which falls without question within the ambit of Taylor's 

generic definition. 

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Appellate Case: 92-8001 Document: 010110149265 Date Filed: 12/04/1992 Page: 7 
• 

appeal fails to reflect to what degree, if any, the district court 

did or did not consider St. Martin's second degree arson 

conviction to enhance his sentence. The district court may, in 

its discretion, determine whether it is necessary to address 

this issue upon remand. 

IV. 

St. Martin contends that his sentence was erroneously 

enhanced because the government did not prove that his two firstdegree burglary convictions, both of which were predicated on 

burglaries which occurred on January 16, 1979, were "committed on 

occasions different from one another" as required under § 

924(e) (1). St. Martin asks that we order a remand to the district 

court for further consideration of this issue based upon 

examination of the indictments. 

We agree with St. Martin that the government did not prove 

that the two convictions were committed on different occasions as 

as required under§ 924(e) (1). See United States v. Green, 967 

F.2d 459, 460-61 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 

(1992). 

U.S. 

Remanded for further proceedings in accordance herewith. 

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Entered for the Court: 

James E. Barrett, 

Senior United States 

Circuit Judge 

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