Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-99-03101/USCOURTS-caDC-99-03101-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Nigel Judson Maccado
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 6, 2000 Decided October 4, 2000

No. 99-3101

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Nigel Judson Maccado,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 98cr00162-01)

Sandra G. Roland, Assistant Federal Public Defender,

argued the cause for appellant. With her on the brief was A.

J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender.

Luis Andrew Lopez, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Wilma A.

Lewis, U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher, Thomas J. Tourish,

Jr., and Alan Boyd, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

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Before: Williams, Sentelle and Rogers, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Rogers.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge Williams.

Rogers, Circuit Judge: Nigel Judson Maccado appeals his

conviction on the ground that the district court misapplied

United States Sentencing Guidelines ("U.S.S.G.") s 3C1.1

(1995) by enhancing his sentence by two levels for obstruction

of justice in the absence of a substantial effect on the

investigation or prosecution of his case. He contends that the

enhancement is unwarranted for his failure timely to comply

with the court's order to give a handwriting exemplar for

essentially two reasons. First, the nineteen-day delay in the

taking of his handwriting exemplar that resulted from his

noncompliance did not delay or otherwise hinder the scheduled judicial proceedings, and second, his guilty plea cured

any obstruction. We hold that s 3C1.1 applies in the absence

of a substantial effect on an investigation or prosecution, and

accord due deference to the district court's determination that

Maccado's deliberate disobedience of the court order warranted an enhancement under s 3C1.1. Accordingly, we affirm.

I.

Maccado was indicted in 1998 for possession of false identification documents with intent to defraud the United States

and for making false statements in a passport application.

See 18 U.S.C. ss 1028(a)(4), 1542. He ultimately pleaded

guilty on August 17, 1998, to the false statements charge.

According to the government's proffer at the time Maccado

pleaded guilty, the charges stemmed from his submission on

September 11, 1997, of a completed United States Passport

Application (Form DSP-11) in the name of David Arnar

Proctor, born December 17, 1957, in Washi Maccado listed his social security number as and

presented as proof of citizenship a District of Columbia

certificate with a recorded date of birth, as well as an

employee identification card from his own construction company. He signed the form in the presence of the clerk at the

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Friendship Heights Post Office, who accepted the application

on behalf of the Department of State. Several months later,

Special Agent Leonard Codispot of the United States Department of State Bureau of Diplomatic Security obtained an

arrest photograph of Maccado from the Montgomery County,

Maryland, police records that matched the photo attached to

the passport application. Agent Codispot also determined

from the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service that Maccado was born in India in 1949, and was not a

United States citizen and not entitled to a United States

passport.

At a status hearing on Thursday, June 18, 1998, in contemplation of trial, the district court granted the government's

motion to compel Maccado to submit a handwriting exemplar

that day to Agent Codispot, who was present in the courtroom. When asked by the court if he understood the court's

order, Maccado replied, "Yes, your Honor." Nevertheless,

Maccado did not give the exemplar to the agent that day and

had no further personal contact with the agent until July 7,

1998, when Agent Codispot obtained the exemplar from Maccado in Maryland. At that time Maccado was in the Charles

County Detention Center in LaPlata, Maryland.1

At Maccado's sentencing hearing, Agent Codispot testified

that after the June 18th status hearing, he accompanied

Maccado and his wife to the first floor of the courthouse.

Agent Codispot told Maccado to wait while he obtained a copy

of the court order, and that the exemplar would be taken in a

vacant room in the courthouse. When Agent Codispot returned minutes later, Maccado was gone; his wife explained

that Maccado had left to move the car. After waiting for over

an hour for Maccado to return, Agent Codispot returned to

his office and found a message from Maccado that his car had

overheated and he had left it at his wife's office, that he had

__________

1 Two days after the status hearing at which he was ordered to

provide the exemplar to Agent Codispot, Maccado attempted suicide. He was hospitalized and thereafter transferred to the Charles

County Detention Center based on a Maryland warrant for a parole

violation.

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gone to visit a cousin in the hospital, and that he would do the

"court-ordered things" at another time. Agent Codispot

twice attempted unsuccessfully to reach Maccado at the pager

number that Maccado had left as part of his recorded message.

Maccado's wife recounted somewhat different events. She

testified that after the status hearing Agent Codispot informed them the exemplar would be taken at an office in

Virginia, and that Maccado left the courthouse to retrieve the

car so they could follow the agent to Virginia. Upon returning to her office later that day, Mrs. Maccado found a

message from her husband explaining that he had encountered car problems and another message from her cousin's

wife stating that Maccado had been to the hospital to get

water for the car. Upon returning home around 4:30 p.m.,

Mrs. Maccado found her husband at home. She telephoned a

mechanic and dropped the car off that night, leaving a

message for the mechanic about the problem. She also

telephoned Agent Codispot, leaving a message about rescheduling the taking of the exemplars.

At sentencing, the district court found:

that there has been obstruction of justice; that the

obstruction of justice occurred when, notwithstanding a

court order to go with the FBI agent [sic] to give a

handwriting exemplar, and it's clear from the transcript

that I told the defendant that he had to go with that

agent that day to provide a handwriting exemplar, notwithstanding that, he didn't, and he hasn't offered any

plausible explanation or reason why he didn't.

I mean, I think that if I were to credit his testimony

that he had to take his car to get it fixed, it's not a

mitigating circumstance to offset the failure to comply

with the court directive to have that handwriting exemplar provided that day, and his failure to do so rises to the

level of an obstruction of justice.

After applying the two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G.

s 3C1.1 and crediting Maccado for acceptance of responsibiliUSCA Case #99-3101 Document #548022 Filed: 10/04/2000 Page 4 of 18
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ty, id. s 3E1.1, which resulted in a sentencing range of 12 to

18 months, the court sentenced Maccado to 18 months' incarceration and three years' supervised release.

II.

On appeal, Maccado contends that mere disobedience of a

court order is insufficient to constitute obstruction of justice

under U.S.S.G. s 3C1.1 where the ordered evidence is produced within a relatively brief time prior to any scheduled

court hearing and, thus, does not substantially influence the

investigation or prosecution. Combined with his guilty plea

to one count, that he maintains effectively cured any prior

obstructive conduct, Maccado contends that the district

court's application of U.S.S.G. s 3C1.1 involved an erroneous

interpretation of law that is subject to de novo review.

As to our standard of review, we agree with Maccado.

Maccado does not challenge the district court's findings that

his conduct was unjustified, or that he materially breached

the district court's order. Nor does he claim that he had a

necessity defense or that his actions were not willful. Consequently, the only issue presented on appeal is whether

s 3C1.1 requires that a defendant's conduct have a substantial effect on the investigation or prosecution of his case, and

if so, whether a guilty plea negates the obstruction of justice.

These are questions of law that the court reviews de novo.

See United States v. (Michael) Taylor, 997 F.2d 1551, 1560

(D.C. Cir. 1993). Upon determining whether there is a

substantial effect requirement in s 3C1.1, the court must

accord due deference to the district court's factual determination that the defendant's conduct is within the range of

punishable actions. See In re Sealed Case, 199 F.3d 488, 491

(D.C. Cir. 1999); 18 U.S.C. s 3742(e); see also United States

v. Drew, 200 F.3d 871, 880 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

The relevant version of s 3C1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines instructs that:

[i]f the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or

attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of

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tion, or sentencing of the instance offense, increase the

offense level by 2 levels.

U.S.S.G. s 3C1.1 (1995).2 In the Application Notes to the

Guidelines, which the court must treat as authoritative, see

Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993), the Sentencing Commission has included two non-exhaustive lists of

examples to illustrate some of the kinds of conduct that do

and do not fall within s 3C1.1. See Application Notes 3 & 4.

None of the examples is precisely on point. By way of

caveat, Application Note 2 states that "[o]bstructive conduct

can vary widely in nature, degree of planning, and seriousness . . . [and] is not subject to precise definition." Application Note 3 gives as examples of when the enhancement is

properly imposed "committing, suborning, or attempting to

suborn perjury; . . . escaping or attempting to escape from

custody before trial or sentencing; or willfully failing to

appear, as ordered, for a judicial proceeding; . . . [or] providing materially false information to a judge or magistrate."

U.S.S.G. s 3C1.1, Application Note 3(b), (e), (f).3 On the

__________

2 The district court sentenced Maccado under the 1995 edition

of the Sentencing Guidelines, and we refer to that edition. Maccado's offense occurred in September 1997, and the relevant guideline

was modified in November 1997.

3 Application Note 3 lists the following examples:

(a) threatening, intimidating, or otherwise unlawfully influencing a co-defendant, witness, or juror, directly or indirectly,

or attempting to do so;

(b) committing, suborning, or attempting to suborn perjury;

(c) producing or attempting to produce a false, altered, or

counterfeit document or record during an official investigation

or judicial proceeding;

(d) destroying or concealing or directing or procuring another person to destroy or conceal evidence that is material to an

official investigation or judicial proceeding (e.g., shredding a

document or destroying ledgers upon learning that an official

investigation has commenced or is about to commence), or

attempting to do so; however, if such conduct occurred contemporaneously with arrest (e.g., attempting to swallow or throw

away a controlled substance), it shall not, standing alone, be

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other hand, examples of acts that do not qualify for punishment under s 3C1.1 include "providing incomplete or misleading information, not amounting to a material falsehood, in

respect to a presentence investigation; ... [and] avoiding or

fleeing from arrest." Id., Application Note 4(c), (d).4

By providing non-exhaustive illustrations, the Sentencing

Commission has left considerable discretion in applying

s 3C1.1 to the sentencing court. In view of the variety of

situations that might constitute obstruction of justice, the

Commission necessarily relied on the district court's reasoned

exercise of discretion in applying s 3C1.1 to particular fact

patterns. The question, therefore, is how the threshold for

applying s 3C1.1 is to be defined. Efforts by the circuit

courts of appeal to identify that threshold have not been

__________

sufficient to warrant an adjustment for obstruction unless it

resulted in a material hindrance to the official investigation or

prosecution of the instant offense or the sentencing of the

offender;

(e) escaping or attempting to escape from custody before

trial or sentencing; or willfully failing to appear, as ordered,

for a judicial proceeding;

(f) providing materially false information to a judge or magistrate;

(g) providing a materially false statement to a law enforcement officer that significantly obstructed or impeded the official investigation or prosecution of the instant offense;

(h) providing materially false information to a probation

officer in respect to a presentence or other investigation for the

court;

(i) conduct prohibited by 18 U.S.C. ss 1501-1516.

4 Application Note 4 lists the following examples:

(a) providing a false name or identification document at

arrest, except where such conduct actually resulted in a significant hindrance to the investigation or prosecution of the instant

offense;

(b) making false statements, not under oath, to law enforcement officers, unless Application Note 3(g) above applies;

(c) providing incomplete or misleading information, not

amounting to a material falsehood, in respect to a presentence

investigation;

(d) avoiding or fleeing from arrest (see, however, s 3C1.2

(Reckless Endangerment During Flight)).

particularly successful in view of the breadth of the text of

s 3C1.1.

For example, the Fifth Circuit has derived two general

principles from the commentary's lists based on two factors

that it has presumably distilled from the commentary. The

two factors are: "(1) whether the conduct 'presents an inherently high risk that justice will be obstructed;' and (2)

whether the conduct 'requires a significant amount of planning,' as opposed to being 'the result of a spur of the moment

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decision' or 'stem[ming] from merely panic, confusion, or

mistake.' " United States v. Phillips, 210 F.3d 345, 348 (5th

Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Greer, 158 F.3d 228, 235

(5th Cir. 1998)). A classification relying on this distinction,

articulated in United States v. Draves, 103 F.3d 1328, 1337

(7th Cir. 1997), as the difference between "panicked, instinctive flight" and "calculated evasion," appears to place the

threshold higher than the Commission's language and listings

suggest, because the list of sanctionable conduct in Application Note 3 includes actions that do not seem to require much

planning.5

The circuits, however, have had little problem imposing

s 3C1.1 enhancements when a defendant refused to cooperate

with an order to provide a handwriting exemplar. See United

States v. Brazel, 102 F.3d 1120 (11th Cir. 1997); United States

v. (David) Taylor, 88 F.3d 938 (11th Cir. 1996); United States

v. Ruth, 65 F.3d 599 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Reyes,

908 F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1990). As the Second Circuit observed

in United States v. Valdez, 16 F.3d 1324 (2d Cir. 1994), "there

are few better examples of a classic obstruction of justice

than a defendant who refuses to give handwriting samples

when compelled by subpoena [to do so]." Id. at 1335. It is

true that these cases involved defendants who either refused

to provide exemplars and never supplied them, or repeatedly

refused and then belatedly provided the handwriting samples.

Still, there is no suggestion that more than a single act

without additional obstreperous, deliberate, or disruptive con-

__________

5 Our concurring colleague refines the Fifth Circuit's analysis

slightly. See concurring opinion at 4.

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duct is required under s 3C1.1, much less that a meaningful

distinction exists between never submitting an exemplar and

submitting one late. As the Seventh Circuit has observed,

the guideline is concerned with the effect of potentially obstructive conduct rather than formal definitions. Cf. United

States v. Harrison, 42 F.3d 427, 431 (7th Cir. 1994).

Other circuit cases emphasize the obstructive nature of

avoiding full compliance with an order to provide an exemplar. Both the Second and Seventh Circuits have affirmed

s 3C1.1 enhancements when a defendant disguised a handwriting exemplar that was to be compared with writings to be

introduced at trial. See United States v. Yusufu, 63 F.3d 505,

514-15 (7th Cir. 1995); Valdez, 16 F.3d at 1335-36. As in the

instant case, the exemplars sought in Yusufu and Valdez

were for comparison with writing that was to be introduced at

trial. See Yusufu, 63 F.3d at 514; Valdez, 16 F.3d at 1335.

Furthermore, in United States v. Ruth, 65 F.3d 599 (7th Cir.

1995), the Seventh Circuit affirmed a s 3C1.1 enhancement

based on a pretrial finding of contempt for two refusals to

provide a handwriting exemplar, even though the government

"eventually found another way to prove its case and did not

try a third time to take the handwriting exemplars." Id. at

606.

In addition, a series of cases have applied s 3C1.1 to out-ofcourt conduct that is analogous to the type of conduct at

issue. The Second Circuit in United States v. Defeo, 36 F.2d

272, 276 (2d Cir. 1994), affirmed enhancement under s 3C1.1

for a "four-month failure to report to pretrial services." The

Ninth Circuit in United States v. Draper, 996 F.2d 982 (9th

Cir. 1993), affirmed enhancement under s 3C1.1 for failure to

report to a community corrections center during pre-trial

release, rejecting both the view that a "significant disruption"

was required and the view that "a two week absence is not

sufficient to warrant the obstruction adjustment." Id. at 984-

87.

The line of authority applying s 3C1.1 to handwriting

exemplars and out-of-court conduct is persuasive for three

reasons: the Commission has (1) used broad language in

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s 3C1.1; (2) included egregious as well as non-egregious

conduct in its list of acts that warrant a sentencing enhancement; and (3) determined that for most of the listed conduct

sanctionable under s 3C1.1, actual hindrance is an irrelevant

consideration. By contrast, our concurring colleague's interpretation does not adequately explain either the language of

s 3C1.1 or the two lists in the commentary. The Commission

not only included attempts in s 3C1.1 but stated that "willfully failing to appear, as ordered, for a judicial proceeding" is

punishable under s 3C1.1 without actual hindrance, even

though such failures do not seem necessarily to have a high

risk of materially impeding the criminal justice process and

might encompass spontaneous conduct. In (Michael) Taylor,

997 F.2d at 1559-60, the court, in rejecting a specific mens

rea requirement, upheld a s 3C1.1 enhancement for obstruction where the defendant failed to return to the courtroom

before the jury returned its verdict, even though defense

counsel waived his presence and the proceedings continued.

The viability of our concurring colleague's distinction cannot

rest on the fact (Michael) Taylor involved a "judicial proceeding" rather than an "ancillary process," see infra concurring

opinion at 4, for the obstruction that occurred in both cases

was adverse to the court's process.

Accordingly, we hold that a s 3C1.1 enhancement can be

based on a defendant's failure to comply with a court order to

provide a handwriting exemplar in connection with the underlying pending charges regardless of whether the failure has a

substantial effect on the investigation or prosecution. A

defendant's failure to provide the ordered exemplar clearly

has the potential to weaken the government's case, prolong

the pendency of the charges, and encumber the court's docket

with an unnecessary trial. The two circumstances on which

Maccado relies are unavailing. Whether or not the scheduled

judicial proceedings are postponed is not dispositive, see

Defeo, 36 F.3d at 276-77; those proceedings might occur as

scheduled, but without a defendant's exemplar or adequate

time to evaluate or reach a plea agreement, the course of the

proceeding could be very different. The fact that a defendant

ultimately enters a guilty plea to some of the charges cannot

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be dispositive; until the district court has accepted the plea,

see Fed. R. Crim. P. Rule 12, anything could happen. See,

e.g., supra n.1. Moreover, the conclusion that a plea could

erase an actual obstruction of justice would be inconsistent

with s 3C1.1's inclusion of attempts. Each of these circumstances, in other words, fails to eliminate the concern about

the potential effect of the defendant's conduct that the guideline is addressing.6 While we do not adopt a per se rule for

handwriting exemplars, for the Commission's reference in

Application Note 2 to the "degree of planning" and "seriousness" of the obstructive conduct are relevant factors for the

district court to consider in deciding whether a s 3C1.1

enhancement is warranted, we reject a heightened threshold

requiring conduct that has a substantial effect on the investigation or prosecution. It remains for the district court to

determine whether a defendant has offered a sufficient reason

for failing to comply with the court order as would make

application of the guideline inappropriate. As stated in United States v. Baker, 641 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1981), "criminal

contempt requires a contemnor to know of an order and

willfully disobey it. . . . A good faith effort to comply with

the order is a defense, although delaying tactics or indifference to the order are not." Id. at 1317 (citations omitted).

Having concluded that the threshold for application of

s 3C1.1 does not bar enhancement for failing to comply with

a court order in the absence of a substantial effect, the

remaining question is whether the district court's findings

were in some manner lacking. We find no clear error. See

generally United States v. Saro, 24 F.3d 283, 286 (D.C. Cir.

__________

6 The cases on which Maccado relies are distinguishable for the

reason that the Application Notes require that the giving of false

identification information to authorities actually hinder the investigation or prosecution of the case. See United States v. Manning,

955 F.2d 770 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Robinson, 978 F.2d

1554 (10th Cir 1992). Likewise, Maccado's reliance on United States

v. Tabares, 951 F.2d 405 (1st Cir. 1991), is misplaced; the materiality of Maccado's handwriting exemplar, which was relevant to the

prosecution of his case, is undisputed. See United States v. Smaw,

993 F.2d 902, 904 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

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1984). Under s 3C1.1 the district court could reasonably

determine that Maccado's failure to comply with a clearly

understood order was inadequate. Not only did Maccado's

explanation seem implausible, it failed to explain why he did

not provide his exemplar, or at least make arrangements to

provide it, before he went to the hospital and was thereafter

taken into custody, where his exemplar, albeit probably in a

disguised form, was finally obtained.7 Maccado could hardly

contend that the district court's interpretation of his conduct

as being consistent with obstruction is clearly erroneous, for

Maccado's version of events is undermined by Agent Codispot's testimony that Maccado's telephone message stated he

would take care of the "court-ordered things" at another time,

thus indicating a deliberate, planned decision not to comply

with the court order, a serious matter in and of itself.

Consistent with the Sentencing Commission's acknowledgment of the need for case-by-case determinations, see Application Note 2, these are circumstances where the court owes

due deference to the district court's application of a guideline.

See In re Sealed Case, 199 F.3d at 491.

Accordingly, we affirm the appealed judgment.

__________

7 At sentencing, the government presented evidence that Maccado's exemplar was "not naturally executed," and that when giving

his exemplar, Maccado "was straining" and "bearing down with a lot

of pressure."

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Williams, Circuit Judge, concurring: At the initial status

hearing on Maccado's indictment, the district court ordered

him to provide a federal agent a handwriting sample. Maccado disappeared. The district court's discussion of Maccado's

explanation, recounted in the majority opinion ("Maj. Op.") at

4, strikes me as somewhat ambiguous, but I accept the

majority's reading: namely that the court, rather than finding

the explanation insufficient, simply disbelieved it. On that

view, Maccado's disappearance looks like a deliberate and

considered decision to pursue a course tending to delay the

enforcement of the criminal law, and perhaps to thwart it.

On that assumption we must consider whether there was

error in the district court's decision under the Sentencing

Guidelines to add a two-point enhancement for obstruction of

justice under s 3C1.1.

In the course of affirming, the majority appears to establish a lower threshold for enhancement than s 3C1.1 permits.

The Guidelines provide for the enhancement "[i]f the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct

or impede, the administration of justice during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense."

U.S.S.G. s 3C1.1. To elucidate this language the Sentencing

Commission has included in its commentary two nonexhaustive lists, one of acts qualifying for the enhancement

and the other of non-qualifying acts. We owe the commentary deference. Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38

(1993); see also U.S.S.G. s 1B1.7 (1995). Defendant's conduct is not among the specific examples, so we must try to

discern the pattern and see where Maccado's conduct fits

best.

To help the reader navigate through the two lists, I offer in

advance the general principles that the Fifth Circuit has

drawn from them. It found that the enhancement should

depend on the inherent tendency of the conduct actually to

obstruct justice and on the deliberateness of defendant's

behavior: "(1) whether the conduct 'presents an inherently

high risk that justice will be obstructed;' and (2) whether the

conduct 'requires a significant amount of planning,' as opposed to being 'the result of a spur of the moment decision' or

'stem[ming] from merely panic, confusion, or mistake.' "

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United States v. Phillips, 210 F.3d 345, 348 (5th Cir. 2000)

(internal citation omitted). The acts listed by the commentary as qualifying for enhancement are, in the Fifth Circuit's

view, ones that are "egregiously wrongful," involving both

considerable advance planning and a high risk of derailing an

investigation or prosecution. United States v. Greer, 158

F.3d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1998). In support it points to language in the commentary noting the range of "degree of

planning[ ] and seriousness" that obstruction of justice issues

may present. Id. at 234. In fact, I question whether every

item in the Commission's lists handily fits the Fifth Circuit's

explanation, but it is a useful starting point.

Application Note 3 gives a non-exhaustive list of acts calling

for enhancement:

(a) threatening, intimidating, or otherwise unlawfully

influencing a co-defendant, witness, or juror, directly or

indirectly, or attempting to do so;

(b) committing, suborning, or attempting to suborn

perjury;

(c) producing or attempting to produce a false, altered,

or counterfeit document or record during an official

investigation or judicial proceeding;

(d) destroying or concealing or directing or procuring

another person to destroy or conceal evidence that is

material to an official investigation or judicial proceeding

(e.g., shredding a document or destroying ledgers upon

learning that an official investigation has commenced or

is about to commence), or attempting to do so; however,

if such conduct occurred contemporaneously with arrest

(e.g., attempting to swallow or throw away a controlled

substance), it shall not, standing alone, be sufficient to

warrant an adjustment for obstruction unless it resulted

in a material hindrance to the official investigation or

prosecution of the instant offense or the sentencing of

the offender;

(e) escaping or attempting to escape from custody

before trial or sentencing; or willfully failing to appear,

as ordered, for a judicial proceeding;

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(f) providing materially false information to a judge or

magistrate;

(g) providing a materially false statement to a law

enforcement officer that significantly obstructed or impeded the official investigation or prosecution of the

instant offense;

(h) providing materially false information to a probation officer in respect to a presentence or other investigation for the court;

(i) conduct prohibited by 18 U.S.C. ss 1501-1516.

This adjustment also applies to any other obstructive

conduct in respect to the official investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense where there is a

separate count of conviction for such conduct.

U.S.S.G. s 3C1.1, Application Note 3. Many of these acts

easily score on both the factors identified by the Fifth Circuit.

Example (g), however, seems to embrace a defendant's spontaneous deception of a law enforcement officer--but only if

the deception in fact generates a "significant" obstruction or

impediment.

Application Note 4 gives examples of conduct not qualifying

for an enhancement:

The following is a non-exhaustive list of examples of the

types of conduct that, absent a separate count of conviction for such conduct, do not warrant application of this

enhancement, but ordinarily can appropriately be sanctioned by the determination of the particular sentence

within the otherwise applicable guideline range:

(a) providing a false name or identification document

at arrest, except where such conduct actually resulted in

a significant hindrance to the investigation or prosecution

of the instant offense;

(b) making false statements, not under oath, to law

enforcement officers, unless Application Note 3(g) above

applies;

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(c) providing incomplete or misleading information,

not amounting to a material falsehood, in respect to a

presentence investigation;

(d) avoiding or fleeing from arrest (see, however,

s 3C1.2 (Reckless Endangerment During Flight)).

U.S.S.G. s 3C1.1, Application Note 4. Given Note 3(g) and

the second part of Note 3(d), and the re-appearance of

concern for actual obstructive effect in 4(a) and 4(b), I might

amend the Fifth Circuit's classification to say that generally

the enhancement is due (1) when the conduct is the result of

planning and is highly likely to cause a serious derailment of

the process, or (2) when conduct, even if spontaneous, actually

does cause such a derailment. Such a view puts the risk of

derailment largely on the perpetrator. Other courts appear

to rely on the distinction between planned and high risk

conduct, on one hand, and instinctive and low risk conduct, on

the other. See United States v. Draves, 103 F.3d 1328, 1337

(7th Cir. 1997) (holding obstruction enhancement improper

when defendant fled from the back of a patrol car during his

arrest; "panicked, instinctive flight" must be distinguished

from "calculated evasion").

"[W]illfully failing to appear, as ordered, for a judicial

proceeding," see Application Note 3(e), appears not to fit

readily the Fifth Circuit's taxonomy. Such failures do not

seem necessarily to have a high risk of materially impeding

the criminal justice process--except in the sense of to some

degree wasting judicial resources; and, depending on the

breadth of "willfully," these acts might or might not encompass spontaneous conduct. The language is, however, confined to a "judicial proceeding," rather than reaching any

neglect of any judicial order, and would not seem necessarily

to encompass a judicial order to turn up for some ancillary

process such as giving a handwriting sample out of court.

Although courts have held that the failure to appear for a

non-judicial proceeding qualifies for a s 3C1.1 sentencing

enhancement, these courts also found the defendant acted in

a deliberate and calculated fashion. See United States v.

Defeo, 36 F.3d 272, 276 (2d Cir. 1994) (upholding s 3C1.1

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enhancement for four month failure to report to pretrial

services because it was comparable to escape from custody);

United States v. Mondello, 927 F.2d 1463, 1466-67 (9th Cir.

1991) (contrasting defendant's two-week "cat-and-mouse

game of avoiding the authorities" after arrest with very

different "situation where ... a criminal is surprised in the

act of committing a crime and makes an evasive dodge to

avoid apprehension").

The majority's characterization of the Fifth Circuit's analysis seems to me incorrect. The analysis does not set actual

hindrance as a threshold requirement for the enhancement,

compare Maj. Op. at 11, and it does not read out the attempt

language in s 3C1.1, compare Maj. Op. at 10. It requires

actual hindrance only when the defendant's act is better

viewed as spontaneous than deliberate (in the sense of deliberated). Also contrary to the majority, I do not see how the

Sentencing Commission's inclusion of attempts to obstruct

provides any basis for some sort of across-the-board lowering

of the bar. Compare id. For example, one who attempts to

escape from custody before trial deserves the enhancement,

even if he is foiled by an alert guard. See Application Note

3(e). But that is no basis for diluting the requirement of

actual impact expressed by the Commission in cases such as

3(g).

The majority goes some way to erase all the distinctions

that the Commission sought to draw. It characterizes the

Commission as having "included egregious as well as nonegregious conduct in its list of acts that warrant a sentencing

enhancement," Maj. Op. at 10, and says that the Seventh

Circuit in Draves placed "the threshold higher than the

Commission's language and listings suggest," Maj. Op. at 8.

Obviously the margin between "egregious" and "nonegregious" is vague, but the Commission was plainly trying to

set up a hierarchy. In Application Note 2 it stresses that

"Application Note 4 sets forth examples of less serious forms

of conduct to which this enhancement is not intended to

apply, but that ordinarily can appropriately be sanctioned by

the determination of the particular sentence within the otherwise applicable guideline range." U.S.S.G. s 3C1.1, ApplicaUSCA Case #99-3101 Document #548022 Filed: 10/04/2000 Page 17 of 18
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tion Note 2 (emphasis added). By refusing to apply s 3C1.1

to "panicked, instinctive flight", the court in Draves was

merely honoring the Commission's scheme and leaving punishment of "less serious" obstructions to adjustment within

the otherwise prevailing sentencing range.

Accepting the district court's view of Maccado's conduct as

deliberate, there remains the question of the risk (or reality)

that his actions would seriously impede his prosecution. In

several cases courts have found a deliberate, affirmative

refusal to provide a handwriting sample grounds for enhancement--in many of them the refusal was repeated. See United States v. Brazel, 102 F.3d 1120, 1163 (11th Cir. 1997)

(upholding enhancement where the defendant affirmatively

refused to provide, and never supplied, sample); United

States v. Taylor, 88 F.3d 938, 944 (11th Cir. 1996) (upholding

enhancement for defendant's "repeated refusals to supply

handwriting exemplars, and his effort to disguise his handwriting when he did supply them"); United States v. Ruth, 65

F.3d 599, 608 (7th Cir. 1995) (upholding enhancement where

the "court twice ordered handwriting exemplars, and [defendant] twice failed to comply"); United States v. Reyes, 908

F.2d 281, 290 (8th Cir. 1990) (upholding enhancement where

defendant refused to comply with handwriting sample order

and never supplied one). Maccado's behavior seems to have

posed less risk and caused less actual impact on law enforcement. Indeed, if we exclude days in the hospital or in

custody, only two days passed between the June 18, 1998

order and the actual taking of an example. Maccado seems

reminiscent of the luckless Conrad Hensley in Tom Wolfe's A

Man in Full, though to be sure a good deal more feckless.

But his hospitalization and custody may be viewed as windfalls, so that--given the deference we owe the district court's

application of law to facts, see United States v. Kim, 23 F.3d

513, 517 (D.C. Cir. 1994)--we cannot reverse the district

court for its implicit judgment that Maccado's actions presented a serious risk of derailing justice.

Accordingly, I join the court in affirming the judgment.

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