Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-15-01497/USCOURTS-ca8-15-01497-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ismael Miranda-Zarco
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 15-1497

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Ismael Miranda-Zarco

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis

____________

 Submitted: January 11, 2016

 Filed: September 6, 2016

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Before MURPHY, SMITH, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

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BENTON, Circuit Judge. 

Ismael Miranda-Zarco pled guilty to two conspiracies: to distribute

methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A); and to

commit money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (a)(1)(B)(i) and (h). He

appeals the addition of one criminal-history point under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1. Having

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court vacates the sentence and remands. 

Appellate Case: 15-1497 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/06/2016 Entry ID: 4444928 
In 2001, for the same act, Miranda-Zarco pled guilty to first-degree robbery and

armed criminal action (ACA). See § 569.020 RSMo (robbery in the first degree); §

571.015 RSMo (ACA). “According to court records” he, “acting with another,

forcibly stole U.S. currency in the possession of Pizza-Hut-DeSoto, and in the course

thereof defendant, acting with another, displayed what appeared to be a deadly

weapon.” He received 10 yearsin prison for the robbery, and a concurrent three years

for the ACA. 

I.

The district court added three criminal-historypointsfor the robbery conviction

under § 4A1.1(a), as authorized for a prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one

year and one month. Guideline 4A.1.1(e) then says to “add 1 point for each prior

sentence resulting from a conviction of a crime of violence that did not receive any

points under (a), (b), or (c) above because such sentence was treated as a single

sentence . . . .” Accordingly, for the ACA conviction, the court added one point. 

Miranda-Zarco objects to the ACA point, claiming because the ACA arose out of the

same conduct as the burglary, it cannot be counted separately.

By state law, the ACA conviction is separate and distinct from the robbery

conviction. In Missouri, first-degree robbery occurs when a person

forcibly steals property and in the course thereof he, or another

participant in the crime,

(1) Causes serious physical injury to any person; or

(2) Is armed with a deadly weapon; or

(3) Uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous instrument

against any person; or

(4) Displays or threatens the use of what appears to be a deadly weapon

or dangerous instrument.

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§ 569.020 RSMo. An ACA violation occurs when a person commits any felony “by,

with, or through the use, assistance, or aid of a dangerous instrument or deadly

weapon . . . .” § 571.015 RSMo. An ACA punishment is “in addition to” the

punishment for the underlying felony. Id. The Supreme Court of Missouri has held

that robbery and armed criminal action “are not the same offense” for purposes of

multiple prosecution because “the expressed intent of the legislature” isto punish the

offenses cumulatively. State v. Flenoy, 968 S.W.2d 141, 144-45 (Mo. banc 1998),

citing Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 367 (1983). The district court correctly

rejected Miranda-Zarco’s claim. See United States v. Watson, 650 F.3d 1084,

1091–92 (8th Cir. 2011) (affirming, under similar Oklahoma law, district court’s

application of one point under § 4A1.1(e)). 

II.

Miranda-Zarco submitted a pro se supplemental brief arguing, among other

things, that the district court incorrectly added the additional point because his ACA

conviction is not a “crime of violence.” The Clerk initially denied his motion to file

the pro se supplemental brief. See U. S. Ct. of App. 8th Cir. Rule 27A(a). 

Miranda-Zarco asks this court to reconsider the Order. Normally, this court

does not address arguments in pro se filings when the defendant is represented by

counsel. Cf. U. S. Ct. of App. 8th Cir., Internal Operating Procedures, III.I.2

(banning all supplemental brief “without leave of the court”). Nevertheless, this court

has discretion to review pro se supplemental briefs. See, e.g., United States v. Scales,

735 F.3d 1048, 1052-53 (8th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e will consider the five issuesraised by

Scales in his pro se brief.”); United States v. Benson, 686 F.3d 498, 505 (8th Cir.

2012) (granting motion to file pro se supplemental brief although defendant was

represented by counsel, and finding arguments meritless); United States v. Blum, 65

F.3d 1436, 1443 n.2 (8th Cir. 1995) (despite general “Eighth Circuit policy” against

considering pro se filings when a party is represented by counsel, this court

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“gratuitously examined” defendant’s pro se filings, finding “they set forth no material

of arguable merit”); United States v. Halverson, 973 F.2d 1415, 1417 (8th Cir. 1992)

(reviewing arguments raised by pro se supplemental brief, and finding them without

merit); United States v. Payton, 918 F.2d 54, 56 n.2 (8th Cir. 1990) (“While our

Eighth Circuit policy providesthat when a party isrepresented by counsel we will not

accept pro se briefs for filing, . . . we granted leave to appellant to file a brief not to

exceed five pages.”). Having reviewed Miranda-Zarco’s pro se supplemental brief

(and the government’s response ), this court authorizesthe filing of the supplemental

1

brief on the issue whether his ACA conviction is a “crime of violence.”

Because this argument was not raised in the district court, this court reviews

for plain error. United States v. Ault, 598 F.3d 1039, 1042 (8th Cir. 2010). To

prevail, he must show that there is “‘(1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects

substantial rights. If all three of those conditions are met, an appellate court may then

exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously

affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Id.,

citing Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 462 (1997). 

At sentencing on February 25, 2015, the guidelines provided that a “crime of

violence” was any offense punishable by over one year’s imprisonment that—

(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of

physical force against the person of another, or

(2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of

explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious

potential risk of physical injury to another.

See In re Riverside-Linden Inv. Co., 945 F.2d 320, 324 (9th Cir. 1991) (“We

1

have discretion to review an issue not raised by appellant, however, when it is raised

in the appellee’s brief.”).

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U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). The case of Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557 2

(2015)—argued almost fourmonths beforeMiranda-Zarco’s sentencing—invalidated

the identically worded “residual clause” in the federal statute, 18 U.S.C. §

924(e)(2)(B)(ii). According to the government, this court need not consider whether

the “residual clause” in the then § 4B1.2 (a)(2) was unconstitutional. The

government believes that an ACA conviction has as an element “the use, attempted

use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” 

The record does not indicate whether the district court relied on the residual

clause or the force clause to determine that Miranda-Zarco’s ACA offense was a

crime of violence under § 4A1.1(e). If the district court used the residual clause, “our

precedent would foreclose [his] argument because we have held that a district court

does not commit plain error in holding that a defendant’s prior felonies constitute

crimes of violence under the Guidelines’s residual clause.” United States v.

Robinson, 2016 WL 3407698, at *1 (8th Cir., June 21, 2016). 

Miranda-Zarco might, however, be entitled to plain error relief if the district

court incorrectly found his ACA conviction was a crime of violence under §

4B1.2(a)(1). See id. at *2, citing Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 1338,

1345 (2016). The government claims that using a dangerous instrument or a deadly

weapon during the commission of a felony is “clearly” a crime of violence under §

4B1.2(a)(1). However, it is not readily apparent whether committing a felony “by,

with, or through the use, assistance, or aid of a dangerous instrument or deadly

weapon” necessarily has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of

physical force against the person of another. This court lacks full briefing and an

adequate record to address this issue. On remand, this court assumes the parties will

“assist in gathering whatever state court records are available so the district court can

Guideline 4B1.2 has since been amended, effective August 1, 2016. 

2

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Appellate Case: 15-1497 Page: 5 Date Filed: 09/06/2016 Entry ID: 4444928 
make a proper determination under the categorical or modified categorical approach,

whichever the court concludes is more appropriate.” See United States v. Fields,

2016 WL 4191179, at *4 (8th Cir. Aug. 9, 2016).

* * * * * * *

The sentence is vacated, and the case remanded for additional sentencing

proceedings.

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