Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01316/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01316-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
American Medical Response, Inc.
Counter Defendant
City of Stockton
Counter Claimant

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 The City of Stockton also filed a related preliminary 1

injunction motion. It was denied on September 26, 2005. 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AMERICAN MEDICAL RESPONSE, INC. 

Plaintiff, CIV-S-05-1316 DFL PAN 

v. MEMORANDUM OF OPINION 

AND ORDER

CITY OF STOCKTON,

Defendant.

_________________________________/

CITY OF STOCKTON,

Counterclaimant,

v.

AMERICAN MEDICAL RESPONSE, INC.

Counterdefendant.

_________________________________/

Plaintiff American Medical Response, Inc. moves for summary

judgment as to defendant City of Stockton’s breach of contract

and breach of fiduciary duty counter claims. The City crossmoves for summary judgment as to its breach of fiduciary duty

claim. For the reasons stated below, both motions are DENIED.1

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I.

The following facts are not in dispute for purposes of the

pending motions. American Medical Response, Inc. (“AMR”) is a

large corporation that provides emergency and non-emergency

ambulance service throughout the nation. (City Opp’n at 3.) It

has provided these services in San Joaquin County for

approximately twelve years. (AMR Mot. at 2.) Starting in 2002,

the City of Stockton (“the City”), through its fire department,

also began providing emergency ambulance service in and around

Stockton. (Id.) Until recently, the ambulance market in the

County was competitive and non-exclusive, with multiple service

providers operating in Stockton, Lodi, and Tracy. (Id. at 3.) 

However, in January 2003, the County Emergency Medical

Services Agency (“EMS Agency”) decided to establish exclusive

operating areas (“EOAs”) in which one or more providers would bid

for the exclusive right to provide emergency services within the

EOA. (Id. at 3-4.) In July 2004, the San Joaquin County Board

of Supervisors adopted the EMS Agency’s plan to award exclusive

contracts for the following three zones: (1) the City of Stockton

and surrounding area (the “Stockton Zone”); (2) the City of Lodi

(the “Lodi Zone”); and (3) the City of Tracy. (Id. at 4; Welch

Decl. Ex. 14.) 

In early 2003, AMR and the City began to discuss

collaborating on a joint bid proposal to respond to the County’s

anticipated Request for Proposals (“RFP”) for the Stockton Zone. 

(City Opp’n at 5.) In June 2003, the City and AMR signed a

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26 A third smaller company, A-One, also was party to the MOU. 2

However, A-One went out of business in 2004 and is not a party to

this action. (AMR Mot. at 5.)

3

Memorandum of Understanding stating their intent to submit a

joint bid for the Stockton Zone (“2003 MOU”). (Welch Decl. Ex. 2

9.) Following the execution of the 2003 MOU, representatives of

AMR and the City met periodically to discuss plans for their

joint bid. (City Opp’n at 5-7.) In July 2004, the City of Lodi

also agreed to participate in a joint bid for the Stockton and

Lodi Zones, and all three parties executed a Joint Venture

Agreement (the “JVA”). (AMR Mot. at 7; Welch Decl. Ex. 10.) The

JVA largely incorporated language from the 2003 MOU and included

a statement that the parties would “jointly submit a response to

the [County RFP] for the award of exclusive rights to emergency

and non-emergency ambulance transportation within [the Stockton

and Lodi Zones] . . . .” (Welch Decl. Ex. 10.) Most notably for

this motion, section 4 of the JVA provided as follows:

The parties shall equally participate in the RFP

process. If any party withdraws from the joint venture

prior to an award of contract from the [County] or

accepts an offer from another bidder to compete for the

same service area, that party will be precluded from

bidding in the [County] RFP for ambulance service. 

(Id.) 

Throughout 2004, the parties continued to meet and discuss

the terms of a bid and of their business relationship. (AMR Mot.

at 10.) They began negotiating both a Limited Liability Company

agreement (the “LLC agreement”) and an operating agreement (the

“operating agreement”). (Id.) In 2005, the parties began

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26 According to the joint status report that was filed while 3

these motions were under submission, AMR was the successful

bidder.

4

meeting in earnest to finalize these agreements and their plans

for a joint bid. (AMR Mot. at 11.) However, at this point, the

relationship between AMR and the City began to break down. The

City and AMR disagree as to why the joint venture unraveled. On

June 23, 2005, AMR’s regional Chief Executive Officer, Louis

Meyer, informed the City Manager, Mark Lewis, that AMR was

discontinuing negotiations and whatever relationship the parties

had formed. (Id.) Meyer further explained that AMR intended to

submit its own bid. (Id.) The City disapproved of AMR’s

withdrawal and informed AMR that section 4 of the JVA precluded

AMR from submitting its own bid. (Id. at 13.) 

The County issued the RFP in July 2005, and the bids were

due by September 22, 2005. (Welch Decl. Ex. 14.) The RFP

contemplated the award of a five-year exclusive contract for

emergency ambulance service in the Stockton Zone. (Id.) The

City joined with Rural Metro Corporation (“Rural”). (AMR Mot. at

12.) At oral argument on these motions, the City expressed its

intent to submit a joint bid with Rural. AMR also stated its

intent to submit a solo bid.3

II. AMR Motion for Summary Judgment

In response to AMR’s complaint seeking a declaratory

judgment, the City filed counterclaims against AMR for breach of

contract and breach of fiduciary duty. In defense, AMR asserts

that the JVA is null and void, and, therefore, unenforceable,

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 AMR also styles its motion as a motion for declaratory 4

judgment as to section 4 of the JVA. 

5

because it contains terms violating the Sherman Antitrust Act

(the “Sherman Act”). AMR now moves for summary judgment arguing

that the following provisions of the JVA violate § 1 of the

Sherman Act: (1) sections 1 and 2, which purport to allocate

emergency and non-emergency services between the parties; and (2)

section 4, which precludes a party from bidding on the RFP after

it withdraws from the JVA or otherwise joins with another party

to bid. (Mot. at 16-25.) Because the City raises genuine issues

of fact regarding the alleged antitrust violations, AMR’s motion

for summary judgment will be DENIED.

4 

A. Legal Standard

Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very contract,

combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in

restraint of trade or commerce among the several States . . . .” 

15 U.S.C. § 1. When reviewing allegedly anti-competitive

behavior under § 1, courts generally apply either the per-se rule

or rule of reason:

In the first category are agreements whose nature and

necessary effect are so plainly anticompetitive that no

elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish

their illegality - they are “illegal per se.” In the

second category are agreements whose competitive effect

can only be evaluated by analyzing the facts peculiar

to the business, the history of the restraint, and the

reasons why it was imposed. In either event, the

purpose of the analysis is to form a judgment about the

competitive significance of the restraint; it is not to

decide whether a policy favoring competition is in the

public interest, or in the interest of members of an

industry.

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Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692,

98 S.Ct. 1355 (1978). 

B. Was the Joint Venture Legitimate?

Whether the parties here formed a legitimate joint venture

is important to determining which standard of review applies. 

Where the joint venture between competitors is a sham entity, the

restraint on trade is generally deemed per se illegal. Engine

Specialties, Inc. v. Bombardier Ltd., 605 F.2d 1, 11 (1st Cir.

1979) (“The talisman of ‘joint venture’ cannot save an agreement

otherwise inherently illegal.”). Conversely, where there is a

bona fide joint venture, courts often apply rule of reason

analysis. Dagher v. Saudi Ref., Inc., 369 F.3d 1108, 1118 (9th

Cir. 2004) (where a legitimate joint venture engages in

anticompetitive conduct, a per se rule will not apply if the

“specific restraint is sufficiently important to attaining the

lawful objectives of the joint venture”). 

The elements necessary to create a joint venture are: “(1)

joint interest in a common business; (2) with an understanding to

share profits and losses; and (3) a right to joint control.” 

April Enters., Inc. v. KTTV, 147 Cal.App.3d 805, 819 (1983). The

joint venture can be formed by express contract or it can be

assumed from the conduct of the parties. Id. The existence of a

joint venture depends on the parties’ intent. Id. Therefore, in

most cases, “[w]hether a . . . joint venture exists is primarily

a factual question to be determined by the trier of fact from the

evidence and inferences to be drawn therefrom.” Bank of Cal. v.

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Connolly, 36 Cal.App.3d 350, 364 (1973). 

In this case, AMR and the City dispute whether the parties

had a joint interest in a common business. The City argues that

the venture’s common business purpose was to submit a joint bid

in response to the RFP. (Opp’n at 20.) The City also asserts

that the parties’ conduct shows they intended to work together on

that purpose. (Id. at 6-8.) The parties negotiated over a twoyear period, made their respective offices available to the other

party for bid work, used project-planning software to assign

tasks, and did not sign confidentiality agreements to protect any

proprietary information. (Id.; Elzig Dep. at 26-29.) In

addition, AMR executives repeatedly referred to the relationship

as a joint venture. (Higgins Decl. Ex. 4.) 

By contrast, AMR asserts that the parties entered into the

JVA in anticipation of forming a joint venture that could then

bid on the RFP. (Mot. at 1.) Because the parties never reached

an agreement as to how the joint bidding entity would function,

AMR asserts that they never formed a joint venture. (Reply at 2.)

The JVA did not provide for the purchase of capital or other

equipment, the hiring of joint venture employees, the designation

of a single billing entity, or the combination of resources. 

(Id. at 5.) Further, AMR argues, there was no “clinical

integration” since, under the JVA, each party continued to

operate its own ambulance service exactly as it had done before. 

(Id.) 

Both parties agree that the JVA did not set out critical

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aspects of a typical joint venture, such as how AMR and the City

would combine resources, share profits and losses, or contribute

capital. However, the JVA contemplated that if the parties won

the County contract, they would refine the terms of the joint

venture into an operating agreement. (Welch Decl. Ex. 10.) In

fact, in April 2003, AMR’s attorney sent the City a memorandum

suggesting that the parties enter into a joint venture “for the

limited purpose of jointly participating in the RFP process and

thereafter creat[e] the LLC to govern and administer any contract

award.” (Rishwain Decl. Ex. 1.) Therefore, the City and AMR may

have intended to pool capital, integrate, and otherwise combine

resources when and if the parties received the contract. This is

the City’s contention. 

Both parties admit that they were negotiating an operating

agreement and LLC agreement when AMR terminated the relationship. 

(Mot. at 10; Opp’n at 11-12.) While the court does not have a

full draft of either agreement in the record, the City submitted

e-mail correspondence in which sections of a draft LLC agreement

are reproduced. (Higgins Decl. Ex. 9.) Specifically, the draft

provides that “the purpose of the LLC shall be to prepare the

[p]roposal and, if successful, provide [a]mbulance [s]ervices

within the defined [s]ervice [a]rea.” (Id.) The agreement

states that the LLC will use one “agreed upon independent billing

entity.” (Id.) In short, the agreement contemplated a common

business purpose and at least one combined resource, the billing

entity. Whether the parties intended additional integration is

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 AMR argues that without integration and economic 5

efficiencies, a joint venture cannot exist. It cites the Federal

Trade Commission and Department of Justice Antitrust Guidelines

for support, specifically the section describing agreements that

are analyzed as illegal per se. Fed. Trade Comm’n & Dep’t of

Justice, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among

Competitors, § 3.2, 2000 WL 33534553 at *7 (2000). The

Guidelines describe a legitimate joint venture as an “efficiencyenhancing integration,” which involves collaboration among the

participants that benefits or will potentially benefit consumers. 

Id. Indicators of such integration “typically” include the

combination of “significant capital, technology, or other

complementary assets to achieve procompetitive benefits” not

achievable by the parties on their own. Id. AMR’s reliance on

the Guidelines is misplaced. First, whether or not a joint

venture exists is a question of state law. Nelson v. Serwold,

687 F.2d 278, 282 (9th Cir. 1982). Second, the Guidelines are

“intended to explain how the Agencies analyze certain antitrust

issues” and are not controlling authority. Finally, as noted

above, even if the Guidelines apply, a question of fact remains

as to whether the parties intended eventual integration. See

Earl W. Kinter, Federal Antitrust Laws § 11.32 (2002) (“Joint

ventures may take many forms, with varying objectives and varying

degrees of integration.”). 

9

not clear from the current record. 

On this record, the proper characterization of AMR and the

City’s working relationship is uncertain. From the conduct of

the parties and draft agreements such as the one partially

produced, a trier of fact could infer the creation of a joint

venture to bid and then, if successful, to form an operating

company. On the other hand, a trier of fact could also conclude

that the lack of specificity in the JVA prevented the formation

of a legitimate joint venture. Therefore, because there are

genuine issues of material fact, the court cannot resolve on

summary judgment whether the parties formed a bona fide joint

venture by entering into the JVA.5 

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 Section 2(b)(i) of the JVA (alleged emergency service 6

market allocation) provides:

The implementation schedule of 9-1-1 dedicated

emergency ambulances specifically within areas known as

the [Stockton Zone] by [the City], AMR, and A-One will

be as follows: (i) Initially and continuing, [the City]

and AMR shall each place into service an equal and even

number of ALS ambulance units. A-One shall place one

ALS ambulance into service. (ii) Any additional

increase in emergency ambulance resource needs shall be

alternated between the three parties for implementation

with [the City] having the first right of refusal, AMR

having the second and A-One having the third. 

Section 1 of the JVA (alleged non-emergency service

market allocation) provides:

Except as set forth below, the response to the RFP will

allow each signatory to provide non-emergency ambulance

transportation within their own zones. AMR and A-One

will be exclusively responsible for non-emergency

interfacility transfers, critical care transfers, long

distance transfers, scheduled wait and returns and

HMO/PPO contractual agreements.

Welch Decl. Ex. 10. 

10

C. Horizontal Market Allocation

AMR asserts that even if the parties formed a joint venture,

the JVA illegally allocated emergency and non-emergency ambulance

services in the Stockton Zone. 

6 According to AMR, if the court

determines that AMR and the City, as competitors, allocated the

market among themselves, then the agreement to do so is per se

illegal. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405

U.S. 596, 608, 92 S.Ct. 1126 (1972) (“One of the classic examples

of a per se violation of § 1 is an agreement between competitors

at the same level of the market structure to allocate territories

in order to minimize competition.”). In the JVA, horizontal

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competitors AMR and the City do allocate the emergency and nonemergency services market between them. AMR argues that this is

sufficient to deem the JVA per se illegal. 

However, such “literalness is overly simplistic and often

overbroad.” Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc.,

441 U.S. 1, 9, 99 S.Ct. 1551 (1979). Courts avoid applying a per

se standard without some knowledge of the competitive landscape

and effect of the allegedly pernicious provision. See Augusta

News Co. v. Hudson News Co., 269 F.3d 41, 47 (1st Cir. 2001)

(“The categorical descriptions of per se offenses are quite

misleading for anyone not well versed in antitrust.”); Tower Air,

Inc. v. Fed. Express Corp., 956 F.Supp. 270, 284 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)

(“[T]here is a presumption in favor of the rule of reason

standard and departure from that standard must be justified by

demonstrable economic effect, rather than formalistic

distinctions.”); William C. Holmes, Antitrust Law Handbook § 2.16

(2005) (“[A]pplication of the label ‘per se horizontal restraint’

to conduct should be the outcome of reasoned analysis, and not a

substitute for that analysis”). 

Here, the determination of whether the market allocation

provision is anti-competitive is intertwined with the question of

how the joint venture would have affected competition. The

allocation provisions alone would have little effect unless the

joint venture between AMR and the City eliminated any meaningful

competition in the bidding process. AMR argues that because

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 For similar reasons, AMR’s reliance on In Re B&J School 7

Bus Serv., Inc., 116 F.T.C. 308 (April 22, 1993) (FTC File No.

9010172), is misplaced. In B&J, the four major competitors in

the market combined to bid, won the bid, and performed the

awarded contract for many years. Their performance under that

contract did not result in any change to their business

practices; they did not combine resources, change service areas,

12

either of the two entities could serve the entire Stockton Zone

on its own, the parties would have eliminated competition by

entering into the JVA and allocating the market among themselves. 

However, on this record, there is no evidence that the joint

venture between AMR and the City excluded all other competitors

from the bidding process. Indeed, two other private companies

submitted a letter of intent to bid for the contract. 

(Supplemental Higgins Decl. Ex. 2.) 

While AMR alleges that AMR and the City were the most worthy

competitors, the evidence before the court does not show that

their combination eliminated all other competition. Without such

evidence, the court is not persuaded that the mere labeling of

the JVA provisions as a horizontal market allocation is

sufficient to merit application of a per se standard. See SCFC

ILC, Inc. v. VISA USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 965 (10th Cir. 1994)

(“To be judged anticompetitive, the agreement must actually or

potentially harm consumers.”); Chicago Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship

v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 1992) (“Whenever producers

invoke the antitrust laws and consumers are silent, the

[potential or actual harm] inquiry becomes especially

pressing.”).7 Therefore, AMR’s motion for summary judgment as to

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or integrate operations. Here, the parties never submitted a

joint bid and, therefore, never performed under a contract. 

Therefore, the court has no similar evidence of anticompetitive

effect before it. 

13

sections 1 and 2 of the JVA is denied. 

D. Bid Preclusion Claim

Section 4 of the JVA prohibits a member of the joint venture

from leaving the joint venture to bid on its own or from joining

another partner to submit a joint bid. AMR claims that the

provision is per se illegal under § 1 of the Sherman Act. The

City counters that the provision is not per se illegal and is

subject to review under rule of reason analysis. Disputed

factual issues and facts missing from the record prevent the

court from determining at this juncture whether the per se or

rule of reason standard should apply. 

As with the market allocation argument, AMR asserts that 

even if the parties created a joint venture, the bidding

preclusion provision should be reviewed under a per se standard. 

AMR relies upon the decision in COMPACT v. Metro. Gov’t of

Nashville & Davidson County, 594 F.Supp. 1567, 1576 (M.D. Tenn.

1984). In COMPACT, the district court found that a bidding

agreement among all three of the minority-owned architectural

firms in the Nashville area was per se illegal. Id. at 1571. It

determined that the agreement among members to only bid as a

group, and not as individual firms, was an attempt to “peg the

price of minority participation.” Id. Moreover, by agreeing to

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refrain from individually competing against the joint venture,

the joint venture eliminated competition among minority-owned

firms. Id. at 1576. AMR asserts that section 4 of the JVA is

similar because it requires AMR and the City to bid only as a

group and does not allow one party to bid individually. 

The City counters that Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas

Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986), should apply

because, like Rothery, section 4 of the JVA was an ancillary

agreement. (Opp’n at 25.) In Rothery, the court determined that

the challenged restraint was “subordinate and collateral to a

separate, legitimate transaction” -- the elimination of the freeriding problem, and applied the rule of reason. 759 F.2d at 224. 

The City contends that the bidding preclusion provision was a

necessary part of a “pro-competitive joint venture,” both because

it put teeth into the parties’ fiduciary obligations to one

another and because it served as consideration for entering into

the joint venture itself. (Opp’n at 22, 27.) 

On the record as it now stands, the court is not prepared to

decide whether either the per se or rule of reason standard

applies to section 4 of the JVA. In both COMPACT and Rothery,

there was extensive evidence regarding the effect each respective

provision had on competition. Here, there is no similar

evidence. The court has been given very little about the

ambulance service bidding market, and what, if any, combinations

of potential bidders would best serve that market. As a

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 AMR also cites to a group of cases holding that bid- 8

rigging is per se illegal. See, e.g., Movie 1 & 2 v. United

Artists Communications, 909 F.2d 1245, 1253 (9th Cir. 1990)

(agreement between movie exhibitors to split the market for movie

license amongst themselves, to the exclusion of other exhibitors,

per se illegal under § 1 of the Sherman Act). However, while the

cases relied upon by AMR involve a party’s ultimate exclusion

from bidding, they are distinguishable from the facts currently

at issue here. The cases involve parties colluding to eliminate

bidding competition where both of the parties involved in the

collusion benefit from that scheme. AMR has not alleged that it

and the City engaged in such collusion. Also, both parties could

not simultaneously benefit from the implementation of section 4. 

By definition, if one of the parties walked away, it could not

bid at all and, therefore, could not provide ambulance services

in the Stockton Zone.

15

consequence, it is not readily apparent whether a joint venture

of the City and AMR would have provided optimal service to the

County or whether the enforcement of this provision would

eliminate all meaningful competition. Therefore, AMR’s motion

for summary judgment as to section 4 of the JVA is denied.8

III. The City’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment

The City filed a cross-motion for summary judgment as to its

breach of fiduciary duty claim against AMR. As stated above, the

court cannot determine as a matter of law whether the parties

formed a joint venture in the first place. In the alternative,

even if a joint venture existed, there are a number of disputed

facts regarding whether AMR took confidential information from

the joint venture to use against the City in its bid. These

facts go directly to whether AMR breached its fiduciary duty. 

A. Breach of Fiduciary Duty - Legal Standard 

Assuming the parties entered into a joint venture, the City

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asserts that AMR breached a fiduciary duty by bidding in response

to the RFP. The City argues that even after leaving the joint

venture, and without respect to section 4 of the JVA, AMR had an

ongoing fiduciary duty to refrain from competing against the

City. (Mot. at 17.) It cites a California Supreme Court case,

Leff v. Gunter, 33 Cal.3d 508 (1983), to support this

proposition. However, in Leff, the court had both a fully

developed record and a jury finding that the defendant breached a

fiduciary duty to a joint venture. Id. at 516-17. Here, the

unraveling of the joint venture is the subject of much dispute,

and a jury has not found a breach of fiduciary duty. 

To succeed on its breach of fiduciary duty claim, the City

must demonstrate that AMR misused information acquired from the

joint venture. See id. at 514-17 (relying on cases involving a

former partner’s misrepresentation, concealment of information,

or misuse of information belonging to the partnership). This

inquiry requires a showing that AMR obtained confidential

information from the City in the first place. The City fails to

make this showing. 

B. Confidential Information

The City argues that the following three categories of

confidential information were provided to AMR during the duration

of the joint venture: (1) the City’s financial “bottom line;” (2)

the City’s system design, deployment plans, response times,

dispatch and communication requirements, employee safety programs

and disaster plans, and vehicle maintenance programs; and (3) the

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City’s billing practices and efficiencies, including information

about collections and “payor mix.” (Confidential Supplemental

Mot. at 2-3.) 

1. City’s financial “bottom line”

The RFP requires the following expense information for a

bidder’s proposed operating budget: (1) personnel wages and

benefits; (2) vehicle fuel, repair and maintenance, and equipment

lease/depreciation; (3) medical supplies, equipment

lease/depreciation, and repair and maintenance; and (4) rent,

insurance, utilities and telephone, office supplies and postage,

professional services, and taxes. (Rishwain Decl. Ex. 4.) As

for a bidder’s projected revenues, it requires the following: (1)

patient charges; and (2) other sources of income. (Id.) 

The City fails to show that AMR knows anything other than

already public information or information that is determinable

from the public record. The public can obtain information

regarding most budget items, such as payroll and benefit

information and equipment costs. (Lewis Dep. at 55, 67-69;

Gillis Dep. at 50, 54-56, 65.) And, as discussed below, the

patient charges (or payor mix) could probably be predicted by AMR

even without access to the City’s numbers. Finally, it is at

least possible that the miscellaneous expenses and other

potential sources of income could be reverse engineered from the

otherwise public information and total budget number. Therefore,

it is not clear that AMR has any confidential insight into the

City’s budget. 

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 2. Operations Information

The RFP also requests details in each of the following

categories: (1) initial and ongoing deployment plan; (2) response

time standards; (3) dispatch and communication requirements and

equipment; (4) ambulances, ambulance equipment, and supplies; (5)

employee safety programs; (6) vehicle maintenance programs; (7)

disaster preparedness plans; and (8) personnel information. 

(Rishwain Decl. Ex. 4.) AMR asserts that, like the City’s

budget, all of the City’s information regarding these categories

is a matter of public record. (Opp’n at 27.)

In reviewing the record now before the court, it appears

that the City’s response time standards, dispatch and

communications equipment information, and employee safety

programs are public or were at least disclosed to parties other

than AMR. (Rodriguez Dep. at 23-25, 74; Hafey Dep. at 110.) In

addition, there is evidence that a request for information

regarding the department’s equipment was granted because the

information was a matter of “public record.” (Gillis Dep. at 50.) 

Therefore, it would seem that information regarding the

ambulances and related equipment and supplies would also be

public. That leaves deployment plans, vehicle maintenance

programs, disaster preparedness plans, and personnel information

as possible areas where AMR knows something that the greater

public does not know. Based on the existing record, the court

cannot determine whether any of these categories provide AMR with

information that it could use against the City in the bidding

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process. 

3. Billing Information

Finally, the City asserts that AMR also obtained

confidential information regarding its billing practices,

specifically its payor mix analysis (the types of insurance

carriers or other payors that the City encountered in each

applicable neighborhood) and collection rates (the amounts the

City was able to collect from insurance companies for ambulance

charges). (Id. ¶ 25.) AMR asserts, and the record shows, that

the City regularly files a report with the County that details

insurance information for each patient that it transports. 

(Rodriguez Dep. at 25.) It is not apparent whether this includes

all of the information necessary for a payor mix analysis or

whether the County makes this report available publicly. 

However, this may not matter. AMR has similar payor mix

information of its own from operating its ambulance service in

the Stockton Zone. (Opp’n at 28; White Dep. at 65-66, 72-73.) 

In addition, as with the payor mix, AMR likely has collection

rate information from its own operations and did not need to rely

on similar information from the City. Therefore, whether AMR has

the City’s confidential billing information cannot be resolved. 

In sum, there are genuine issues of material fact as to

whether AMR has the City’s confidential information and whether

this information is of any use to AMR. Therefore, the question

of whether it has misused the information in violation of a 

fiduciary duty to the joint venture cannot be resolved on this

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record. The City’s cross-motion is DENIED. 

IV.

For the reasons stated above, AMR’s motion for summary

judgment or declaratory judgment is DENIED. The City’s crossmotion for summary judgment as to its breach of fiduciary duty

claim is also DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 3/27/2006

DAVID F. LEVI

United States District Judge

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