Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-71237/USCOURTS-ca9-12-71237-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Edson Acevedo
Petitioner
Loretta E. Lynch
Respondent

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

EDSON ACEVEDO,

Petitioner,

v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney

General,

Respondent.

No. 12-71237

Agency No.

A077-360-202

OPINION

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted July 10, 2015*

Pasadena, California

Filed August 24, 2015

Before: William A. Fletcher, Richard A. Paez,

and Marsha S. Berzon, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Paez

* The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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2 ACEVEDO V. LYNCH

SUMMARY**

Immigration

The panel denied Edson Acevedo’s petition for review of

the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision denying his

claim that he derived citizenship from his United States

citizen stepfather.

The panel held that Acevedo did not derive citizenship

under 8 U.S.C. § 1431(a) from his stepfather, who married his

non-citizen mother after he was born and never adopted him. 

The panel found that the BIA correctly concluded in Matter

of Guzman-Gomez, 24 I. & N. Dec. 824 (BIA 2009), that the

definition of “child” in § 1101(c)(1), the portion of the

Immigration and Nationality Act that applies to citizenship

and naturalization, does not include stepchildren. The panel

also found that Congress did not intend § 1101(b)’s definition

of child, which does include stepchildren, to apply to

§ 1431(a).

COUNSEL

Eduardo A. Paredes, Law Office of Eduardo A. Paredes, Los

Angeles, California, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Stuart F. Delery, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney

General, United States Department of Justice, Civil Division;

Terri J. Scadron, Assistant Director, Meadow W. Platt, Trial

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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ACEVEDO V. LYNCH 3

Attorney, United States Department of Justice, Office of

Immigration Litigation, Washington, D.C. for RespondentAppellee.

OPINION

PAEZ, Circuit Judge:

Edson Acevedo petitions for review of the Board of

Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) dismissal of his appeal of the

Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his claim to

derivative citizenship and ordering him removed. Acevedo

argues that he derived citizenship under 8 U.S.C. § 1431(a)

from his United States citizen stepfather. We deny the

petition.

I.

Edson Acevedo was born in Mexico in 1987. Both of his

biological parents are Mexican nationals. In 2000, when he

was 12 years old, his mother married a United States citizen. 

The following year, Acevedo’s stepfather filed a Petition for

Alien Relative on Acevedo’s behalf, and in 2002 Acevedo

was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent

resident. Acevedo’s stepfather did not legally adopt him.

In 2008, Acevedo pled guilty to a charge of domestic

violence in violation of California Penal Code section

273.5(a). Acevedo was initially granted probation, but

violated its terms, and was ultimately sentenced to two years

of imprisonment. In January 2010, the Department of

Homeland Security filed a Notice to Appear, charging

Acevedo with being subject to removal as an alien convicted

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4 ACEVEDO V. LYNCH

of a crime of domestic violence under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).

Acevedo argued before the IJ that he derived citizenship

from his stepfather under 8 U.S.C. § 1431(a). The IJ

concluded that the BIA’s decision in Matter of GuzmanGomez, 24 I. & N. Dec. 824 (B.I.A. 2009), foreclosed this

argument, sustained the removability charge, and ordered

Acevedo removed. Acevedo appealed; the BIA affirmed the

IJ’s decision and dismissed the appeal. Acevedo filed a

timely petition for review in this court.

II.

We have jurisdiction to review Acevedo’s claim that he

is a U.S. citizen under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5). The parties do

not dispute the facts of the case, and therefore we need not

transfer this case to the district court. Id. § 1252(b)(5)(A).

Where, as here, the BIA conducts an independent review

of the IJ’s findings and legal conclusions, we review the

BIA’s decision and not that of the IJ. Romero-Ruiz v.

Mukasey, 538 F.3d 1057, 1061 (9th Cir. 2008). “We review

de novo the legal questions involved in a claim that a person

is a national of the United States.” Id. And, “[b]ecause the

INA explicitly places the determination of nationality claims

solely in the hands” of the federal courts, “we are not required

to give [deference under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural

Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)] to the

agency’s interpretation of the citizenship laws.” Minasyan v.

Gonzales, 401 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

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ACEVEDO V. LYNCH 5

“There are two sources of citizenship, and two only: birth

and naturalization.” Scales v. INS, 232 F.3d 1159, 1164 (9th

Cir. 2000) (quoting Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 423

(1998) (opinion of Stevens, J.)) (internal quotation marks

omitted). “Citizenship at birth can be acquired by being born

in the United States,” but “[i]f a person is not born in the

United States, he or she can acquire citizenship at birth only

as provided by Congress.” Id. Because Acevedo was born in

Mexico, we must determine whether Congress provides

stepchildren like Acevedo with derivative citizenship under

8 U.S.C. § 1431.

III.

In support of his claim to derivative citizenship, Acevedo

proposes two statutory interpretations, both relating to the

definitions of “child” in the Immigration and Nationality Act

(“INA”). The INA contains two definitions of “child.” One

applies to immigration-related provisions, and explicitly

includes stepchildren, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1).1 The other

applies to citizenship and naturalization provisions,

§ 1101(c)(1), and does not explicitly include stepchildren.2

1

8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1) provides, in part, “The term ‘child’ means an

unmarried person under twenty-one years of age who is . . . (B) a

stepchild, whether or not born out of wedlock, provided the child had not

reached the age of eighteen years at the time the marriage creating the

status of stepchild occurred.”

 

2

 8 U.S.C. § 1101(c)(1) provides that

[t]he term ‘child’ means an unmarried person under

twenty-one years of age and includes a child

legitimated under the law of the child’s residence or

domicile, or under the law of the father’s residence or

domicile, whether in the United States or elsewhere,

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6 ACEVEDO V. LYNCH

Relatedly, 8 U.S.C. § 1431(a), on which Acevedo relies,

provides derivative citizenship for foreign-born children of

U.S. citizens, while § 1431(b) provides for such citizenship

only for adopted children.3 Section 1431(b) refers to the

definition of “child” in § 1101(b), but only in reference to

“the requirements applicable to adopted children.” 8 U.S.C.

and, except as otherwise provided in sections 1431 and

1432 of this title, a child adopted in the United States,

if such legitimation or adoption takes place before the

child reaches the age of 16 years [with certain

exceptions], and the child is in the legal custody of the

legitimating or adopting parent or parents at the time of

such legitimation or adoption.

 

3

 8 U.S.C. § 1431 provides:

(a) In general

A child born outside of the United States

automatically becomes a citizen of the United States

when all of the following conditions have been

fulfilled:

(1) At least one parent of the child is a citizen of

the United States, whether by birth or naturalization.

(2) The child is under the age of eighteen years.

(3) The child is residing in the United States in the

legal and physical custody of the citizen parent

pursuant to a lawful admission for permanent residence.

(b) Adoption

Subsection (a) of this section shall apply to a child

adopted by a United States citizen parent if the child

satisfies the requirements applicable to adopted children

under section 1101(b)(1) of this title.

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ACEVEDO V. LYNCH 7

§ 1431(b). Acevedo contends that if the term child in

§ 1431(a) is controlled by the definition of child in

§ 1101(c)(1), then we should read § 1101(c)(1) to include

stepchildren, just as § 1101(b)(1) does. Alternatively, he

contends that the term child in § 1431(a) implicitly

incorporates the definition of child in § 1101(b)(1),

something that § 1431(b) expressly does, though, again, only

in reference to that section’s “requirements applicable to

adopted children.”

A.

Agreeing with the IJ, the BIA rejected Acevedo’s first

argument by relying on its decision in Matter of GuzmanGomez. Although we do not owe Chevron deference to the

BIA when it interprets citizenship laws, see Minasyan, 401

F.3d at 1074, we agree with the BIA’s conclusion and reject

Acevedo’s proffered interpretation of § 1101(c)(1) as

including stepchildren. Accord United States v. Sarwari,

669 F.3d 401, 408 & n.5 (4th Cir. 2012).

The material facts of Guzman-Gomez are

indistinguishable from Acevedo’s: Guzman-Gomez argued

that he derived citizenship under § 1431(a) from his

stepfather, who did not legally adopt him and who married

his noncitizen mother after he was born. 24 I. & N. Dec. at

824–25. The BIA concluded that “comparison of sections

[1101(b)(1) and (c)(1)] shows that when Congress wants the

term ‘child’ to encompass stepchildren for some purpose

under the Act, it knows how to make its intention clear in that

regard.” Id. at 827. The BIA relied on the “well established”

principle that “a negative inference may reasonably be drawn

from the exclusion of language from one statutory provision

that is included in other provisions of the same statute” to

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8 ACEVEDO V. LYNCH

conclude that Congress’s omission of stepchildren from

§ 1101(c)(1) was intentional. Id.; see also INS v.

Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 (1987) (stating the same

principle).

If the only evidence of congressional intent were the

observation that stepchildren are included in subsection (b),

but excluded from subsection (c), that negative inference

might not be conclusive here. After all, subsection (b) also

includes “a child born in wedlock,” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(A),

while subsection (c) does not explicitly list such a person,

instead noting only that the term “child” “includes” certain

legitimated and adopted children, id. § 1101(c)(1). Congress

surely intended biological children born in wedlock to U.S.

Citizens to qualify as “children” for naturalization purposes,

yet such children, like stepchildren, are not explicitly

mentioned in subsection (c).

As the BIA pointed out, however, legislative history also

undermines Acevedo’s argument. The BIA in GuzmanGomez also examined the legislative history of the first

version of the INA, the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952, in

which the two definitions of child originated. Id. at 827–28. 

That history shows that a Senate subcommittee (the Special

Subcommittee to Investigate Immigration and Naturalization,

a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary)

prepared a report on proposed changes to the immigration

system and “affirmatively disclaimed any intention to change

the existing law” with respect to derivative citizenship, id. at

828, which then provided that “[s]tepchildren do not derive

citizenship through the naturalization of a stepparent.” S.

Rep. No. 81-1515, at 707 (1950).

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ACEVEDO V. LYNCH 9

While the question addressed by the Senate report was not

precisely the one at issue here — the question for us is not

whether a stepchild derives citizenship when his stepparent

naturalizes, but whether he derives citizenship when his

biological parent marries a person who is already a U.S.

citizen — the report convinces us that the inclusion of

“stepchild” in the definition applicable to the INA’s

immigration provisions, and the omission of it from the

definition applicable to the naturalization provisions, was

purposeful. We therefore give it the intended effect and hold

that the definition of “child” in § 1101(c)(1) does not include

stepchildren.

B.

The BIA’s decision in Matter of Guzman-Gomez did not

address Acevedo’s second argument, that the reference to

8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1) contained in 8 U.S.C. § 1431(b) should

be read also to apply to 8 U.S.C. § 1431(a). However, canons

of construction, as well as the legislative history of the

section, which we use as an interpretive tool to understand

Congress’s purpose in enacting it, lead us to reject Acevedo’s

claim.

“[W]here Congress includes particular language in one

section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same

Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally

and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” 

Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 432 (alteration in original). In

§ 1431(b), Congress expressly referenced § 1101(b)’s

definition of child, which includes stepchildren. Because

Congress did not similarly reference § 1101(b)’s definition in

§ 1431(a), we must infer that Congress did not intend that

definition to apply to § 1431(a). Rather, we infer that

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10 ACEVEDO V. LYNCH

Congress intended to apply the INA’s default definition. That

definition is supplied by § 1101(c), which applies generally

to the INA’s citizenship provisions and, as we have held, does

not include stepchildren.

Moreover, § 1431(b) does not incorporate wholesale the

definition of child found in § 1101(b)(1). Instead, it provides

that “[s]ubsection (a) of this section shall apply to a child

adopted by a United States citizen parent if the child satisfies

the requirements applicable to adopted children under section

1101(b)(1) of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1431(b). We do not read

the reference to § 1101(b)(1) in § 1431(b) to extend further

than incorporation of the requirements applicable to adopted

children listed in the former. Acevedo was never adopted, so

the requirements applicable to adopted children under that

subsection do not apply.

Finally, the purpose of § 1431, which was to streamline

adoptions abroad, does not support Acevedo’s interpretation. 

See 146 Cong. Rec. 18,493–94 (2000) (statement of Rep.

Smith explaining purpose of Act); H.R. Rep. No. 106–852, at

11–12 (2000) (Department of Justice letter to Congress). 

Congress was so focused on adopted children, in fact, that an

early version provided adoptees alone with a special form of

automatic derivative citizenship. See H.R. Rep. No. 106–852,

at 10. As the Department of Justice pointed out in a letter to

the House Committee on the Judiciary, which was

responsible for the bill, such a law would “favor adopted,

non-citizen children of United States citizens over biological,

non-citizen children of United States citizens.” Id. at 11

(emphasis added). Instead, the Department of Justice

proposed and provided “alternative draft legislation that . . .

creat[ed] a standard set of conditions for foreign-born

children . . . to acquire citizenship.” Id. at 11–12. The

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ACEVEDO V. LYNCH 11

Department assured the committee that the alternative draft

legislation “provides for fair treatment of all biological and

adopted children in terms of acquisition of United States

citizenship.” Id. at 12 (emphasis added).

The House amended the bill to conform to the alternative

version the Department of Justice proposed, and both the

House and the Senate passed that version without further

amendment. Child Citizenship Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.

106–395, 114 Stat. 1631. Nothing in the legislative history,

therefore, indicates any intention to broaden the derivative

citizenship provisions previously extant to encompass

stepchildren.

As Acevedo makes no other challenge, we deny the

petition.

PETITION DENIED.

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