Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-02640/USCOURTS-ca7-15-02640-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission
Respondent
Northern Illinois Service Company
Petitioner
Secretary of Labor
Respondent

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15-2640

NORTHERN ILLINOIS SERVICE COMPANY,

Petitioner,

v.

THOMAS PEREZ, Secretary of Labor, et al.,

Respondents.

____________________

Petition for Review of an Order of the

Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission

Nos. LAKE 2013-616-M, et al.

____________________

ARGUED APRIL 1, 2016 — DECIDED APRIL 27, 2016

____________________

Before POSNER, EASTERBROOK, and WILLIAMS, Circuit 

Judges.

EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Among its other activities, 

Northern Illinois Service Company operates portable rockcrushing units that it dispatches to quarries as needed. When 

inspecting some of these units, the Mine Safety and Health 

Administration concluded that Northern Illinois had failed 

to comply with some safety regulations. Inspectors issued 

Case: 15-2640 Document: 33 Filed: 04/27/2016 Pages: 5
2 No. 15-2640

nine citations. The company contested all nine and prevailed 

in part before an administrative law judge. The ALJ found 

six violations and labeled all six non-serious. 37 FMSHRC 

1225 (June 5, 2015). He ordered Northern Illinois to pay $100

per violation. After the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission denied its application for discretionary 

review, Northern Illinois petitioned for judicial review of 

two of those six. One wonders why the company is paying a 

lawyer many thousands of dollars to contest a $200 penalty, 

but that’s its prerogative.

The first violation arises from the company’s failure to 

fasten a bungee cord in front of two gas cylinders in the shop 

at one mine. The cord had been removed the last time one of 

the cylinders had been used, and whoever did this failed to 

put it back; the inspector found the cord near the storage 

rack. The ALJ concluded that this omission (which he called 

both “inadvertent” and “not serious”) violated 30 C.F.R. 

§56.16005, which requires mine operators to store pressurized gasses “in a safe manner”. The lack of a cord made the 

storage unsafe, the ALJ thought, because an unrestrained 

cylinder might tip over, and the fall could break or open the 

valve; escaping gasses might cause the heavy cylinder to 

scoot around the smooth floor, potentially injuring someone—though the ALJ allowed that this was unlikely, which 

explains calling the violation non-serious and setting the 

penalty at $100.

According to the company, the Administration did not 

have “jurisdiction” to impose a penalty, because, although 

the cylinder was stored at a mine, it was used offsite. We don’t 

understand what this has to do with jurisdiction, which in 

federal law means adjudicatory competence. See, e.g., Union 

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No. 15-2640 3

Pacific R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 558 U.S. 67, 

81–85 (2009) (applying this understanding to an administrative agency). Cf. United States v. Martin, 147 F.3d 529, 531–33 

(7th Cir. 1998) (the interstate-commerce element in many 

federal statutes concerns the merits rather than subjectmatter jurisdiction). The distinction between jurisdiction and 

the merits is one of long standing. See, e.g., Bell v. Hood, 327 

U.S. 678 (1946). If the agency had failed to show that the 

company was engaged in mining, or that the cylinder was 

connected to mining, it would have lost on the merits.

As for the difference between where the cylinder was 

stored and where it was used: the regulation asks where it 

posed a risk to safety. For a cylinder stored at a mine, the risk 

posed by falling on the floor occurs at the mine. Likewise if a 

banana peel were found on the floor at a mine, posing a 

slipping hazard, it would not be necessary to prove that the 

banana had been used to dig limestone.

The second penalty also stems from something that fell to 

the floor. According to 30 C.F.R. §56.12018 “[p]rincipal power switches shall be labeled to show which units they control, unless identification can be made readily by location.” A 

trailer housing one mining unit’s generator had eight power 

switches. Seven of these were labeled, but the eighth label 

had fallen off. The inspector could not determine “by location” what the unlabeled switch controlled, and he issued a 

citation. A test revealed that the switch controlled a conveyor 

belt that had not been used in three or four years. The ALJ 

thought that the unlabeled switch was risky, because someone standing on the belt when it was unexpectedly moved

might have been seriously injured. But as with the unsecured cylinder, the ALJ deemed this risk low because the belt 

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was disused and the miners had a “pretty good understanding” what all eight switches did. Again the penalty was correspondingly modest.

The company contends that the ALJ explained his decision inadequately, but it is thorough and covers the important issues. The company really means that in its view 

the ALJ applied the regulation incorrectly. It stresses that the 

regulation speaks of “units” in the plural, while the company’s trailer had only one unlabeled switch. Yet it is a principle of legal interpretation that the plural includes the singular. 1 U.S.C. §1 ¶2. Under this statute, known as the Dictionary Act, drafters can use either the singular or the plural 

knowing that judges will treat each as including the other 

“unless the context indicates otherwise”. Statutes and regulations are long enough as they are without forcing drafters 

to include both the singular and the plural every time. Observing that on occasion a plural construction really is designed to limit coverage to multiple instances, drafting 

guides recommend use of the singular for clarity. See, e.g., 

Bryan A. Garner, Guidelines for Drafting and Editing Legislation

§2.4 (2016); Senate Legislative Drafting Manual §104(a) (1997). 

But as the company does not contend that either the linguistic or economic context of §56.12018 implies a limit to more 

than one unit at a location—why would the Administration 

devise such a limit in such a backhanded way?—we apply 

the norm from the Dictionary Act.

The company also sees a problem in the fact that this is 

the first time the Administration has called a switch controlling a conveyor belt a “principal” power switch. It would be 

folly for a regulator to try to list all of the kinds of equipment 

that could be found in or near a mine, sorting each into

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No. 15-2640 5

“principal” and “other” piles. The problem is not simply 

that the set of all mining equipment is big, and always 

changing, but that what might be a “principal” component 

of one mine could be trivial at another. That’s why regulations usually contain general words, such as “principal” or 

“material,” while leaving detail to adjudication. That’s the 

common-law process, which agencies no less than courts are 

entitled to use. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 

267 (1974). The ALJ did not exceed his authority in treating 

as “principal” a switch controlling a conveyor belt that had 

the potential to injure persons standing on it when it starts to 

move.

The petition for review is denied.

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