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Parties Involved:
Royland Otto Byfield
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FILED ,_,,,,. 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

United Stat~ Co"!}rt <?f Appc ... w 

Tenth C!rCUlt 

OCT 2 5 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

ROYLAND OTTO BYFIELD, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

No. 90-4089 

(D.C. No. 88-CR-214S 

(D. Utah) 

Before .ANDERSON, BRORBY, and TACHA, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Defendant-appellant Rayland o. Byfield appeals a conviction 

of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 

21 U.S.C. S 841(a)(l), and using or carrying a firearm in a drug 

trafficking offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 924(c)(l). On 

appeal, Byfield contends that the evidence was insufficient to 

convict him. Byfield also argpes that the trial judge committed 

reversible error in admitting evidence that, on a previous 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-4089 Document: 010110092177 Date Filed: 10/25/1991 Page: 1 
occasion, the Kansas City Police Department had taken a .45 

caliber firearm from the defendant. We exercise jurisdiction 

under 28 u.s.c. § 1291 and affirm. 

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

In evaluating Byfield's claim of insufficient evidence, we 

must "view all the evidence, direct and circumstantial, as well as 

all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most 

favorable to the government." United States v. Levario, 877 F.2d 

1483 (10th Cir. 1989) (citing United States v. Hooks, 780 F.2d 

1526, 1529 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1128, 106 S. Ct. 

1657, 90 L.Ed.2d 199 (1986)). If a reasonable jury could find the 

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the evidence is 

sufficient. United States v. Parrish, 925 F.2d 1293 (10th Cir. 

1991). 

The government was required to prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that Byfield knowingly possessed the cocaine with intent to 

distribute. 21 u.s.c. § 841(a)(l). "Possession may be actual or 

constructive and may be proved by circumstantial evidence." 

United States v. Hooks, 780 F.2d at 1531 (citation omitted). This 

court has recognized that constructive possession may be 

established by proving that the defendant exercised control and 

dominion over the vehicle from which the controlled substance was 

taken. Id. Proof of dominion and control over a vehicle, 

"without the requisite showing of knowledge, is insufficient to 

sustain a conviction under 21 u.s.c. § 841(a)(l)." Id. (citation 

omitted). 

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Byfield argues that the evidence is insufficient to establish 

he was in constructive possession of the cocaine that was found 

inside his suitcase in the trunk of his car. In support of his 

argument, Byfield points to evidence that could establish someone 

else put the cocaine in his suitcase without his knowledge: 

Byfield testified that after he put his suitcase into his car, his 

cousin's boyfriend borrowed his car, and the next morning his wife 

used the car; also, the arresting officer noted Byfield's suitcase 

was partially opened and looked as if it had been rummaged 

through. 

We find that the jury had before it ample evidence from which 

to find that Byfield knowingly possessed the cocaine. Byfield 

admitted that he was the sole owner, driver and occupant of the 

car. Byfield made conflicting statements as to whether he loaned 

his car to anyone, and, if so, to whom he loaned the car. The 

jury also had before it evidence that a .22 caliber pistol was 

found on Byfield when he was arrested, and that an unsheathed 

bayonet, a .38 caliber handgun, a 9 millimeter assault rifle, and 

some .45 caliber ammunition were all found within the passenger 

compartment of Byfield's car. Byfield's possession of these 

weapons is circumstantial evidence that Byfield knowingly 

possessed the cocaine. The direct and circumstantial evidence 

taken as a whole, together with all reasonable inferences to be 

drawn from the evidence, convince us that a reasonable jury could 

have found that Byfield was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 

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Appellate Case: 90-4089 Document: 010110092177 Date Filed: 10/25/1991 Page: 3 
II. 404(b) Evidence 

The trial judge allowed evidence to be presented that the 

Kansas City Police Department had once taken a .45 caliber handgun 

from Byfield. On direct examination, Deputy Sheriff Mitchell 

Vetere of the Emery County Sheriff's Department testified that he 

recovered a black tennis bag from the back seat of Byfield's car. 

The bag contained a .38 caliber revolver, a 9 millimeter assault 

rifle, and several types of ammunition, including some .45 caliber 

ammunition. Over Byfield's objection, Mitchell then testified 

that he asked Byfield whether there was a .45 caliber handgun in 

the vehicle, and Byfield responded that the .45 caliber handgun 

"had been previously taken by the Kansas City Police Department." 

On appeal, Byfield argues that the evidence of the prior 

seizure of the gun is inadmissible under Rule 404(b) of the 

Federal Rules of Evidence, which states in part that "evidence of 

other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the 

character of a person in order to show action in conformity 

therewith." Byfield also argues that the evidence was 

inadmissible under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence 

because the probative value of this evidence was substantially 

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The trial court's 

decision to admit the testimony is reviewed under an abuse of 

discretion standard. United States v. Suntar Roofing, Inc., 897 

F.2d 469, 479 (10th Cir. 1990). 

In United States v. Record, 873 F.2d 1363 (10th Cir. 1989), 

we noted that Rule 404(b) applies only to "evidence of acts 

extrinsic to the charged crime." Id. at 1372 n.5 (citing United 

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Appellate Case: 90-4089 Document: 010110092177 Date Filed: 10/25/1991 Page: 4 
States v. Orr, 864 F.2d 1505, 1510 (10th Cir. 1988)). An act is 

not extrinsic if it is "'inextricably intertwined' with the 

charged crime such that a witness' testimony 'would have been 

confusing and incomplete without mention of the prior act.'" Id. 

(quoting United States v. Richardson, 764 F.2d 1514, 1521-22 (11th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 952, 106 S. Ct. 320, 88 L.Ed.2d 303 

(1985)). See also United States v. Foster, 889 F.2d 1049, 1053 

(11th Cir. 1989) (inextricably intertwined evidence that is "'an 

integral and natural part of the witnesses' accounts of the 

circumstances surrounding the offenses for which the defendant was 

indicted'" is not extrinsic evidence and Rule 404(b) does not 

apply) (citations omitted). 

The record makes clear that Deputy Sheriff Vetere's testimony 

about the .45 caliber handgun was an integral and natural part of 

his account of the circumstances surrounding the offenses for 

which Byfield is charged. Deputy Sheriff Vetere was testifying as 

to the weapons found on Byfield and within Byfield's car. Vetere 

also was testifying as to the sequence of events that led up to 

the discovery of the cocaine in the trunk. Vetere testified that 

he saw a long "clip" on the floorboard of the driver's seat that 

appeared to be ammunition for some kind of rifle. Vetere pulled 

the clip out of the car and asked Byfield where the firearm was. 

Byfield responded that it was in the black bag in the back seat. 

Vetere found an unloaded 9 millimeter assault rifle in the black 

bag. Vetere testified that the clip he pulled from the front 

floorboard was the ammunition that fit with the assault rifle. 

Vetere's search of the black bag also revealed a fully loaded .38 

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Appellate Case: 90-4089 Document: 010110092177 Date Filed: 10/25/1991 Page: 5 
caliber revolver and ammunition for a .45 caliber handgun. Vetere 

inquired about the location of the .45 caliber handgun while he 

was in the process of locating and securing all concealed weapons 

which Byfield may have had. After Byfield responded that the .45 

caliber pistol had been taken by the police in Kansas City, Vetere 

placed Byfield in the back of the patrol car and Vetere proceeded 

to search the trunk. 

We find that the evidence of the prior seizure of the .45 

caliber handgun was "inextricably intertwined" with Deputy Sheriff 

Vetere's account of the circumstances surrounding the offenses 

with which Byfield is charged. The jury was aware that Vetere's 

discovery of the clip of ammunition on the front floorboard led 

Vetere to inquire about, and discover, the weapon that fit that 

ammunition. Vetere had also informed the jury that he discovered 

some .45 caliber ammunition, but no .45 caliber gun. We find that 

Vetere testified about the .45 caliber gun as an integral and 

natural part of his account of the circumstances surrounding the 

offenses for which Byfield was indicted. Indeed, if the testimony 

had been excluded, Vetere's testimony would have been incomplete, 

and the jury might have been confused as to why Vetere did not ask 

about the location of the .45 caliber gun, just as he had asked 

about the location of the rifle that fit the clip of ammunition. 

Even if we were to analyze this evidence under Rule 404(b), 

we find that the admission of this evidence does not violate Rule 

404(b). Protection against undue prejudice is presumed if the 

evidence meets these four requirements: "(l) the evidence is 

offered for a proper purpose; (2) the evidence must be relevant; 

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(3) the trial court must make a Rule 403 determination of whether 

the probative value of the similar acts is substantially 

outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice; and (4) pursuant 

to Fed. R. Evid. 105, the trial court shall, upon request, 

instruct the jury that the evidence of similar acts is to be 

considered only for the proper purpose for which it was admitted." 

United States v. Jefferson, 925 F.2d 1242, 1258 (10th Cir. 1991) 

(citing to United States v. Record, 873 F.2d 1363, 1374 (10th Cir. 

1989) (applying the Supreme Court's analysis from Huddleston v. 

United States, 485 U.S. 681, 108 S. Ct. 1496, 99 L.Ed.2d 771 

(1988))). In Record, we endorsed the inclusive approach to the 

admission of Rule 404(b) evidence taken by United States Y..!.. Nolan, 

551 F.2d 266 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 904, 98 S. Ct. 

302, 54 L.Ed.2d 191 (1977). Under this inclusive approach, we 

"allow the admission of uncharged illegal acts unless the only 

purpose for their admission is to prove the criminal disposition 

of the defendant." Nolan, 551 F.2d at 271. 

On the basis of the record established at trial, we find that 

the trial court's decision to admit testimony regarding the .45 

caliber pistol satisfies the four requirements set out in 

Huddleston. First, there is no indication that the evidence was 

offered to prove any criminal disposition on the part of Byfield. 

At trial, the government argued that the evidence related to 

establishing the contraband found at the scene and that the 

statement was made by Byfield while the officer was in the process 

of looking for additional weapons. As discussed above, the 

evidence of the .45 caliber pistol was an integral and natural 

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Appellate Case: 90-4089 Document: 010110092177 Date Filed: 10/25/1991 Page: 7 
part of Deputy Sheriff Vetere's account of the circumstances 

surrounding the offenses for which Byfield was indicted. We find 

that this purpose of admitting evidence satisfies Rule 404(b). 

See United States v. Aleman, 592 F.2d 881, 885-86 (5th Cir. 1979) 

(404(b) test satisfied by evidence that was not introduced on the 

issue of character, but was introduced because it was integral and 

natural part of witness' account of circumstances surrounding the 

offenses charged). Although the trial court failed to identify 

the specific purpose for which the evidence was being admitted, as 

required by United States v. Kendall, 766 F.2d 1426, 1436 (10th 

Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1081, 106 S. Ct. 848, 88 

L.Ed.2d 889 (1986), we find this error to be harmless because the 

record reflects the decision to admit was proper. See Record, 873 

F.2d at 1375 n.7. 

Second, Vetere's testimony was relevant to establish the 

evidence found at the scene of the arrest. United States v. 

Masters, 801 F.2d 1437, 1444 (4th Cir. 1986) (evidence that 

"serve[s] to 'complete the story of the crime on trial by proving 

its immediate context of happenings near in time and place'" is 

relevant and therefore admissible), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 938 

(1987) (citations omitted). See also Weinstein's Evidence 

§ 401[05] (1991) ("Evidence that serves as background information 

about persons, subjects or things in a trial is generally 

admissible although it may not relate to a consequential fact."). 

Third, we cannot say that the trial judge abused his 

discretion when he determined that the evidence was "more 

probative than prejudicial." The trial judge has broad discretion 

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Appellate Case: 90-4089 Document: 010110092177 Date Filed: 10/25/1991 Page: 8 
to determine whether the probative value of otherwise relevant 

evidence is outweighed by possible undue prejudice. Record, 873 

F.2d at 1375. 

Fourth, we find no evidence in the record that the defendant 

requested a limiting instruction. "It is not error for the trial 

court to fail to instruct the jury at the close of the case in the 

absence of a proper request by counsel." Record, 873 F.2d at 1376 

(citations omitted). 

In sum, we hold that the evidence regarding the seizure of 

the .45 caliber handgun was "inextricably intertwined" with Deputy 

Sheriff Vetere's testimony regarding Byfield's arrest for the 

crimes for which he is charged. Even if the evidence of the 

seizure of the handgun was not "inextricably intertwined" with 

Vetere's testimony, we find that the trial judge did not abuse his 

discretion in admitting the 404(b) testimony into evidence. 

AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

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ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Deanell Reece Tacha 

Circuit Judge 

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