Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-03138/USCOURTS-caDC-96-03138-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Daniel Joseph Perkins
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 11, 1998 Decided November 24, 1998

No. 96-3138

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Daniel Joseph Perkins,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 90cr00504-01)

Evelina J. Norwinski, Assistant Federal Public Defender,

argued the cause for appellant. A. J. Kramer, Federal Public

Defender, was on the briefs.

T. Anthony Quinn, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. Wilma A. Lewis, U.S. Attorney, John R.

Fisher and Thomas J. Tourish, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorneys,

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were on the brief. Elizabeth Trosman, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: Henderson, Rogers and Garland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Garland.

Garland, Circuit Judge: Daniel Joseph Perkins asks us to

vacate his 1991 conviction for the use or carrying of a firearm

during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense. He

contends that the district court improperly instructed the

jury with respect to the meaning of "use," as the Supreme

Court subsequently defined the term in Bailey v. United

States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995). Although Perkins did not object

to the district court's instruction at the time, he contends that

the standard of review normally applied when an objection

has been made, "harmless error" review, is the appropriate

standard for this case. We question whether harmless error

is in fact the appropriate standard of review here. We need

not resolve that question, however, because defendant's appeal fails even under the standard he asks us to apply.

I

While investigating gunshots in the vicinity of a building in

the District of Columbia, police officers saw Perkins leave the

building with a handgun protruding from his waistband.

When an officer ordered Perkins to stop, he disregarded the

order and ran, throwing a nine-millimeter handgun into the

bushes. The gun was found where Perkins threw it. Two

other officers apprehended and searched him. They found a

fully loaded nine-millimeter ammunition clip, two large rocks

of cocaine base, 154 ziplock bags of cocaine base, a razor

blade, and $518 in cash--$120 of which was concealed in

Perkins' underwear. The total street value of the cocaine

base was more than $4,500.

The grand jury returned a two-count indictment. Count 1

charged Perkins with possession with intent to distribute five

grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

ss 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B)(iii). Count 2 charged him with

violating 18 U.S.C. s 924(c)(1), which imposes punishment on

anyone who, during and in relation to a drug trafficking

crime, "uses or carries" a firearm. At trial, Perkins admitted

possessing the drugs; his defense to the s 841 charge was

that he did not intend to distribute them. Perkins said "a

boy named John" had asked him to hold the drugs about an

hour or two before his arrest, and that he had planned to give

the drugs back to John as soon as he returned to collect

them. 2/4/91 Tr. at 142-43, 153.

Perkins also admitted carrying the gun. 2/4/91 Tr. at 158.

His defense to the s 924(c)(1) charge was that although he

carried the weapon, he did not do so "during and in relation

to" a drug-trafficking offense. He said he carried the gun for

protection from an unknown assailant who had shot at him

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two weeks earlier, and not in connection with the drugs he

was holding. Id. at 114, 122. His counsel told the jury that

"in effect, it was a coincidence" that he had the gun and drugs

on his person at the same time. 2/1/91 Tr. at 70-71 (opening

statement). The jury convicted Perkins on both counts.

Perkins then appealed, contending that the district court

improperly denied a motion to suppress the evidence seized

from his person, and that there was insufficient evidence to

sustain a conviction for using or carrying a firearm "during

and in relation to" a drug trafficking offense. This court

rejected Perkins' claims and affirmed his convictions on July

26, 1993. United States v. Perkins, 1 F.3d 45 (D.C. Cir. 1993)

(unpublished opinion available at 1993 WL 299119).

On December 6, 1995, the Supreme Court decided Bailey v.

United States, in which it held that in order to establish "use"

of a firearm under s 924(c)(1), the government must show

"active employment of the firearm" by the defendant. 516

U.S. at 144.1 Perkins then filed a motion to vacate, set aside,

or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. s 2255. Per-

__________

1 Justice O'Connor explained that "active employment" includes

"brandishing, displaying, bartering, striking with, and most obviously, firing or attempting to fire a firearm." Id. at 148. It does not

include merely "storing a weapon near drugs or drug proceeds" or

"conceal[ing] a gun nearby to be at the ready for an imminent

confrontation." Id. at 149.

kins contended that the jury instructions at his trial were

improper because they did not limit "use" to mean only active

employment, and because the court implied that the jury

could find "use" merely by finding that Perkins possessed the

gun to advance or facilitate a drug trafficking offense. The

district court denied Perkins' s 2255 motion, holding that the

instructions were proper. See United States v. Perkins, 939

F. Supp. 42, 44 (D.D.C. 1996). Defendant appeals the denial

of his motion.2

II

We first consider whether there was error in the district

court's instructions as to the elements of s 924(c)(1). This is

a question of law which we review de novo. See Joy v. Bell

Helicopter Textron, 999 F.2d 549, 556 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

The court instructed the jury that:

[T]o establish the offense charged in Count 2

[s 924(c)(1)], the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the following elements:

1.That the defendant committed a drug trafficking

crime ...[;]

2.That the defendant used or carried a firearm

knowingly and intentionally; and

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3.That the firearm was used or carried during and in

relation to a drug trafficking offense.

2/5/91 Tr. at 25. With respect to the first element, the court

explained that the drug trafficking crime at issue was the

possession with intent to distribute charge that was the

subject of Count 1. Id. With respect to the "knowingly and

__________

2 After the appeal was filed, the government moved to dismiss

based on the defendant's failure to obtain a certificate of appealability, as required by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act, 28 U.S.C. s 2253(c) ("AEDPA"). In light of the Supreme

Court's opinion in Lindh v. Murphy, 117 S. Ct. 2059, 2067 (1997),

this court denied the motion to dismiss because Perkins filed his

s 2255 motion before Congress enacted AEDPA. United States v.

Perkins, No. 96-3138 (Sept. 26, 1997).

intentionally" aspect of the second element, the district court,

at defendant's request, gave the standard charge that "an act

is done knowingly and intentionally if done consciously, voluntarily and purposely, and not by mistake, inadvertence or

accident." Id. at 26.

The court did not define either "use" or "carry." It did,

however, define "in relation to" as follows:

Now we get to the third element.... The use or

carrying of a firearm relates to a drug trafficking offense

if it advances or facilitates the commission of a drug

trafficking offense. The carrying of a firearm does not

relate to a drug trafficking offense if the defendant

inadvertently used or carried the firearm.

2/5/91 Tr. at 26-27. The defendant did not object to the

instructions.

Perkins now contends that the failure to define "use" or

"carry," combined with the above definition of "in relation to,"

led the jury to believe that "use" could include any advancing

or facilitating of a drug offense, even if there were no active

employment of the firearm as required by Bailey. Although

we will assume for purposes of analysis that the jury instructions were erroneous as defendant contends, for the following

reasons we are not at all certain that they were.

First, there was no error in the definition of "in relation

to." It was drawn largely from an instruction avidly sought

by defendant as the basis for his only defense to the s 924(c)

charge. See Defendant's Proposed Jury Instructions Regarding 18 U.S.C. s 924(c)(1) (filed Jan. 31, 1991). Moreover, it

was very close to the wording employed by the Supreme

Court in Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 237-38 (1993),

and by this court in United States v. Washington, 106 F.3d

983, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Nor was there any implication

that the trial court was, by those words, defining "use" rather

than "in relation to." The court clearly prefaced its remarks

by saying that it was about to define the third element of the

offense, which it had just moments before explained was the

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requirement that the using or carrying be "in relation to" a

drug trafficking offense.

There also was no error in the court's failure to define

"carry." See United States v. Freisinger, 937 F.2d 383, 387

(8th Cir. 1991). Although a trial court must define words and

phrases that have technical or unconventional meanings, it is

not required "to define words which are in common use, and

are such as are readily comprehended by persons of ordinary

intelligence, where the words are applied in the judge's

instructions in their conventional sense." United States v.

Maude, 481 F.2d 1062, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see also United

States v. DeSantiago-Flores, 107 F.3d 1472, 1480 (10th Cir.

1997). In Muscarello v. United States, the Supreme Court

determined that Congress intended "carry" to have its "ordinary" and "generally accepted contemporary meaning," 118

S. Ct. 1911, 1916, 1919 (1998), which, the Court said, includes

both carrying a firearm on one's person and knowingly possessing and conveying a firearm in a vehicle--even in the

vehicle's locked glove compartment or trunk, id. at 1913-14.

Given that broad definition of the word, it is implausible that

the jury could have adopted a still broader interpretation that

was impermissible under the statute.

Moreover, in this case there was no reason for jurors to

scratch their heads over the definition of "carry." The only

evidence of carrying in the case was the most "ordinary" of

the ordinary possibilities noted in Muscarello: Perkins had

the gun on his person. More important, defense counsel told

the jurors in his opening statement that "Mr. Perkins will tell

you that he carried the gun, and that's not going to be an

issue." 2/1/91 Tr. at 70. Perkins did indeed testify that he

carried the gun. 2/4/91 Tr. at 121-22, 158. The failure to

define a term that is both conceded by the defendant and

commonly used can hardly be error. See Maude, 481 F.2d at

1075 & n.98.

The trial court's failure to define "use," however, is more

problematic. On the one hand, there are reasonable arguments for concluding that such a failure may constitute error

in the usual case. Although the Bailey Court said it was

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giving "use" its "ordinary and natural" meaning when it

defined the term as "active employment," 516 U.S. at 145,

148, it acknowledged that the meaning of "use" had been "the

source of much perplexity in the courts" and that many,

including this court, had given the word a much broader

meaning. Id. at 142 (collecting cases); see United States v.

Bailey, 36 F.3d 106, 115 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc) ("[O]ne

uses a gun ... whenever one puts or keeps the gun in a

particular place from which one ... can gain access to it if

and when needed to facilitate a drug crime."), rev'd, 516 U.S.

137 (1995). If so many judges could define the word erroneously in the absence of Supreme Court guidance, it is not

unreasonable to suggest that jurors might do the same in the

absence of trial court instruction. Moreover, the Court itself

later noted that Bailey had construed the term "use" narrowly, in contrast with the broad reading given to "carry" in

Muscarello. Muscarello, 118 S. Ct. at 1918. While a jury's

failure to give a term its appropriately broad meaning will not

affect a defendant whose conduct falls within a narrower one,

a jury's failure to restrict a term to its appropriately narrow

meaning may well have an important impact on a jury's

deliberations.

On the other hand, this was not the usual case. Here,

"use" was not at issue. Although the court did instruct the

jury that it could convict Perkins for use or carrying, neither

the prosecutor nor the defense counsel suggested that the

case involved "use" of the firearm; both told the jury that the

issue in the case was whether defendant carried the firearm

in relation to a drug trafficking offense. 2/1/91 Tr. at 67, 70-

71. Under these circumstances, whether the court erred by

failing to define "use" is a more difficult question. However,

it is a question we need not resolve today because, as we

conclude below, even if the jury instructions were erroneous

they did not prejudice the defendant.

III

Assuming for purposes of analysis that the district court's

instructions were erroneous with respect to the "use" element

of s 924(c)(1), the next issue is the appropriate standard for

reviewing such an error3--or, more precisely, the appropriate

standard for determining whether we have authority to correct the error. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 727

(1993). Here, defendant asserts instructional error for the

first time in a motion under s 2255, having failed to object

either at trial or on direct appeal. Ordinarily, "[w]here a

defendant has procedurally defaulted a claim by failing to

raise it on direct review, the claim may be raised in habeas

only if the defendant can first demonstrate either 'cause' and

actual 'prejudice,' or that he is 'actually innocent.' " Bousley

v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1604, 1611 (1998) (citations

omitted). In this case, however, the government itself might

be said to have "procedurally defaulted," as it failed to raise

the issue of Perkins' procedural default below and hence

deprived the district court of an opportunity to determine

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whether the s 2255 criteria were met. Recognizing this

failure, the government does not press us to review this case

other than as if it were on direct appeal. See Gov't Br. at 11

n.5. Whether or not we nonetheless may apply the s 2255

criteria as a matter of our own discretion,4 we decline to do so

__________

3 There is no question in this case that the evidence was sufficient

to sustain Perkins' conviction. Although the government does not

contend there was sufficient evidence to convict Perkins on a "use"

theory, "evidence that fails to show 'use' may nonetheless support a

conviction for 'carrying.' " In re Sealed Case 96-3167, 153 F.3d 759,

771 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing Bailey, 516 U.S. at 146). Perkins does

not dispute there was sufficient evidence to convict him on a

"carrying" theory: He admitted he carried the gun; he does not

contest the validity of his conviction on the drug trafficking offense

in Count 1; and this court previously held on direct appeal that the

evidence was sufficient to sustain the "during and in relation to"

element of the offense. Perkins, 1993 WL 299119 at *3.

4 In Trest v. Cain, a case involving a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus to vacate a state sentence for armed robbery, the Supreme

Court noted that "procedural default is normally a 'defense' that the

state is 'obligated to raise' and 'preserv[e]' if it is not to 'lose the

right to assert the defense thereafter.' " 118 S. Ct. 478, 480 (1997)

(quoting Gray v. Netherland, 116 S. Ct. 2074, 2082 (1996)). The

Court held that a federal court of appeals is not required to raise

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here because defendant is unable to show that his conviction

should be reversed even on the more lenient standards applicable to claims raised on direct review.5

In order to determine the appropriate standard of review

applicable to direct appeal of erroneous jury instructions, we

turn to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52. That Rule

identifies two possible standards. Under Rule 52(a), we

apply "harmless error" review when there has been a timely

objection below. Rule 52(b), however, requires us to apply

"plain error" review when an objection has been forfeited

because it was not asserted below. See Olano, 507 U.S. at

731-33.

Harmless error is the standard more favorable to a defendant. To justify reversal of a conviction under that standard,

there must be (1) error, (2) that "affect[s] substantial

rights"--i.e., that is prejudicial. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a); see

Olano, 507 U.S. at 731, 734. To meet the plain error standard, both of these requirements must be satisfied6 and the

__________

the issue of procedural default sua sponte where the state has failed

to do so (even at the appellate level), but expressly declined to

decide whether the law permitted a court of appeals to consider a

procedural default the state waived or failed to raise. Id. But see

Boyd v. Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Every

circuit to consider the issue holds that a habeas court has discretion

to raise procedural default sua sponte....").

5 See United States v. Saro, 24 F.3d 283, 287 (D.C. Cir. 1994)

("The Supreme Court has declared that the showing of 'prejudice'

necessary under the 'cause and prejudice' standard of habeas law 'is

significantly greater' than that necessary under the plain-error

doctrine.") (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494 (1986));

see also Olano, 507 U.S. at 734 (noting that both the "harmless

error" and "plain error" standards of review normally require the

same kind of inquiry with respect to "whether [an] error was

prejudicial").

6 In addition, in contrast to harmless error review, on plain error

"[i]t is the defendant rather than the Government who bears the

burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice." Olano, 507 U.S. at

534.

error must also be "plain." Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); see

Olano, 507 U.S. at 734. Even then, although a court of

appeals has discretion to correct an error, there is a fourth

consideration: "[T]he court should not exercise that discretion unless the error 'seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity

or public reputation of judicial proceedings.' " Olano, 507

U.S. at 732 (citations omitted). And, critical to our analysis

here, the Supreme Court has indicated that it is "not likely an

error can have that effect where the evidence against the

defendant is 'overwhelming.' " United States v. Gartmon,

146 F.3d 1015, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing Johnson v. United

States, 117 S. Ct. 1544, 1550 (1997)).

Because Perkins did not object to the district court's jury

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instructions at trial, his claim of error would ordinarily be

reviewed under the plain error standard. He correctly points

out, however, that this circuit has applied harmless error

review to post-Bailey claims of instructional error even when

defendants did not raise them at their pre-Bailey trials. See,

e.g., United States v. Toms, 136 F.3d 176, 180-81 (D.C. Cir.

1998); United States v. Smart, 98 F.3d 1379, 1393 (D.C. Cir.

1996); see also United States v. Hudgins, 120 F.3d 483, 486-

88 n.3 (4th Cir. 1997). In those cases, we have relied on the

circuit's "supervening-decision doctrine," which permits appellate review as if an objection had been made below when

prevailing circuit law at the time of the trial would have made

such an objection futile. See Toms, 136 F.3d at 180 & n.5;

Smart, 98 F.3d at 1393; United States v. Lin, 101 F.3d 760,

771 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Thus in Toms, where the trial court

instructed the jury without objection that the "government

need not show the defendant actively employed the firearm"

to establish "use," we applied harmless error analysis because

at the time of the trial the instruction was consistent with

"prevailing law in this circuit." Toms, 136 F.3d at 180 (citing

United States v. Bailey, 36 F.3d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).7

__________

7 It might be argued that the supervening-decision doctrine does

not apply to this case, since if there were an error here, it was not

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The Supreme Court's decision last year in Johnson v.

United States, 117 S. Ct. 1544 (1997), however, casts doubt on

whether harmless error and the supervening-decision doctrine remain the appropriate rubrics for analyzing forfeited

Bailey claims.8 Johnson involved a prosecution for perjury.

The trial judge, following the then-settled law, instructed the

jury that the element of materiality was a question for the

judge to decide and that he had determined the statements at

issue were material. The defendant did not object. After

Johnson's conviction but before her appeal, the Supreme

Court decided United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995),

holding that the materiality of a false statement must be

decided by the jury rather than the judge. See Johnson, 117

S. Ct. at 1547.

The Johnson Court did not consider applying harmless

error review or the supervening-decision doctrine. Instead, it

held that because Johnson had not objected to the trial

judge's failure to submit materiality to the jury, plain error

was the appropriate standard. Id. at 1547-49. The Court

did not ignore the fact that objection at the time would have

been useless. That, the Court said, was good reason for

evaluating the plainness of the error from the vantage point

of the time of appellate consideration rather than trial. Id. at

1549. Applying that rule, the Court concluded that the trial

court's Gaudin error was plain.

__________

the giving of an incorrect definition of "use," but rather the failure

to give any definition at all--an issue the supervening decision in

Bailey did not address. But, if there were an error here, it was one

that was not made manifest until Bailey narrowed the definition of

"use," creating the possibility that without judicial guidance a jury

might convict a defendant on a broader than lawful definition of the

term.

8 With the exception of Toms, all of our cases applying the

harmless error standard to forfeited Bailey errors were decided

before Johnson. In Toms, we found it unnecessary to decide

whether Johnson changed the landscape because the defendant's

conviction survived even harmless error review. See Toms, 136

F.3d at 180 n.6. We also applied harmless error analysis in United

States v. Kennedy, 133 F.3d 53, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1998), but the opinion

does not indicate whether there was an objection at trial.

The next question normally would have been whether the

defendant was prejudiced by the failure to submit materiality

to the jury. But because it applied a plain rather than

harmless error standard, the Court held that it did not need

to decide the prejudice question. Even if the defendant had

been prejudiced, the Court said, the "overwhelming" evidence

of materiality meant that Johnson could not satisfy the fourth

element of the plain error standard. Id. at 1550.

Were we to apply plain error analysis here, it would

significantly affect the way in which we analyze Perkins'

appeal. Ordinarily, in cases in which the jury has been

offered two possible grounds for conviction, one of which is

legally inadequate, we examine the prejudicial effect of an

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error according to the test set forth in Yates v. United States:

"[A] verdict [must be] set aside in cases where the verdict is

supportable on one ground, but not another, and it is impossible to tell which ground the jury selected." 354 U.S. 298, 312

(1957); see Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 59 (1991)

(limiting Yates test to cases in which one of the grounds is

legally, not merely factually, inadequate). We have repeatedly used the Yates test to analyze the prejudicial effect of

forfeited Bailey error. See Toms, 136 F.3d at 181; United

States v. Washington, 106 F.3d 983, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

But if plain error review were the required standard for a

forfeited Bailey error, we would be required to sustain a

s 924(c)(1) conviction when there is overwhelming evidence of

carrying, even if it were impossible to tell whether the jury

found "carrying" or only "use." Given the overwhelming

evidence of carrying in this case, including Perkins' own incourt admissions, such an approach would end this appeal

without further analysis.9

There is good reason to conclude that plain error review is

as appropriate for forfeited Bailey error as it is for forfeited

__________

9 In Johnson, the Court found the evidence of materiality "overwhelming" because materiality was "essentially uncontroverted" at

trial. 117 S. Ct. at 1550. The same is true here with respect to

"carrying," except that we can dispense with the qualifier "essentially."

Gaudin error. Both involve objections that would have been

futile under then-prevailing law.10 And in both situations the

concern is whether the jury properly found an element of the

offense. In the Bailey context it may be "impossible to tell"

whether the jury found "carrying" rather than improperly

found "use." But in the Gaudin context the concern is not

even speculative; the reviewing court can be virtually certain

the jurors did not find materiality since they were never

instructed to look for it. Because Johnson makes clear that

plain error review is the appropriate standard even in that

context, it would appear a fortiori that it is appropriate in the

Bailey context as well. See United States v. Hastings, 134

F.3d 235, 239-40 (4th Cir. 1998) (applying plain error review

to forfeited Bailey error); United States v. McKinney, 120

F.3d 132, 133 (8th Cir. 1997) (same).

Once again, however, we need not resolve whether plain or

harmless error is the appropriate standard for reviewing

forfeited Bailey claims in order to decide this case. As we

indicate below, Perkins' appeal fails even if we employ harmless error review. Accordingly, we reserve for another day

the question of which standard is the more appropriate. See

Toms, 136 F.3d at 180 n.6 (finding it unnecessary to determine whether plain or harmless error was the appropriate

__________

10 The Supreme Court's recent decision in Bousley casts some

doubt on whether we should continue to regard Bailey-type objections as having been "futile" before Bailey was decided. In BousUSCA Case #96-3138 Document #398345 Filed: 11/24/1998 Page 12 of 17
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ley, the Court rejected--for purposes of establishing "cause" for a

procedural default under s 2255--the suggestion that an argument

for a narrow definition of use "was not reasonably available" to trial

counsel pre-Bailey, because even then "the Federal Reporters were

replete with cases" involving challenges to a broad definition. 118

S. Ct. at 1611. Nor would the Court accept the argument that

default should be excused because, before Bailey, such a challenge

would have been futile. "Futility," the Court said, "cannot constitute cause if it means simply that a claim was 'unacceptable to that

particular court at that particular time.' " Id. at 1611 (citations

omitted). If this analysis were applied to cases on direct review,

the supervening-decision doctrine (even if still generally applicable)

would not apply to Bailey errors at all.

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standard since conviction survived even harmless error analysis).

IV

Assuming without deciding, then, that harmless error remains the appropriate standard for reviewing Perkins' challenge, we now proceed to analyze it under our precedents

employing the Yates test to determine whether a Bailey error

is prejudicial. United States v. Washington, 106 F.3d 983

(D.C. Cir. 1997), is the most directly on point. In that case,

we affirmed defendants' convictions for violating s 924(c)(1),

notwithstanding the district court's error in instructing the

jury that "a defendant uses a firearm whenever he puts or

keeps a gun in a particular place from which he ... can gain

access to it...." 106 F.3d at 1013. Defendants were police

officers who were caught in a sting operation in which they

escorted and protected purported drug couriers. The officers

admitted they carried their service pistols during the drug

runs, but contended they did so because police regulations

required them to carry their weapons at all times, and not "in

relation to" the drug trafficking. Id.

Washington first rejected the claim that there was insufficient evidence to establish the "in relation to" element. Id. at

1010. We then noted that "the only evidence in support of

the firearms convictions showed that the officers wore their

service pistols on their persons during the drug trafficking

offenses; there was no evidence suggesting that the officers

merely 'possessed,' without carrying, the guns for protection

or active use." Id. at 1013. We therefore concluded that

"regardless of whether the jury actually convicted appellants

under the 'use' or 'carry' prong, it is clear that the jury's

reasoning included a finding that appellants ... carried their

guns." Id. Since the jury could not, "under these facts,"

have found "use" without also finding "carrying," we concluded that the convictions passed the Yates test and that the

defendants were not prejudiced by the erroneous instruction.

Id.

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The case at bar passes the Yates test at least as readily as

did Washington. Like the defendants in Washington, Perkins admitted carrying the weapon but defended on the

ground that he did not do so "in relation to" drug trafficking.

Like the Washington defendants, he also admitted he carried

the gun during the entire relevant time period: He testified

that he had the gun in his waistband from the moment "John"

gave him the drugs until the moment the police arrested him.

2/4/91 Tr. at 158. And as in Washington, there was no

evidence that Perkins "used" the gun in any way--active or

otherwise--besides carrying it in his waistband. "Under

these facts," Washington, 106 F.3d at 1013, the jury could not

have found use without finding carrying, and hence the trial

court's error, if there were one, was harmless. See Toms, 136

F.3d at 181; Smart, 98 F.3d at 1393-94; see also Hudgins,

120 F.3d at 487-88.

Defendant disputes the conclusion that the jury could not

have found "use" without "carrying." In his opening brief, he

argues that the jury might have believed that he took the gun

from his home earlier in the day for his general protection,

and that then, "forgetting about the gun," he acquired the

drugs. Def. Br. at 9-10. Under this scenario, Perkins

contends, the jury might have found that his "conduct did not

quite reach the 'intentionally carrying' level but that it did

satisfy a lower standard, namely, that he generally 'used' (i.e.,

possessed) the gun to 'advance or facilitate' his drug trafficking." Id.

Perkins' "unintentional carrying" scenario has two fatal

flaws. First, it ignores his own testimony that he knew he

had the gun at the time he received the drugs. 2/4/91 Tr. at

156. Second, the court instructed the jury that defendant

must have "used or carried a firearm knowingly and intentionally." 2/5/91 Tr. at 25. The court did not instruct that

while the defendant had to carry the gun intentionally, he

could be convicted if he unintentionally used it. Hence, if the

jury had found that defendant forgot he had the gun, it could

not have convicted him under either prong.

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In his reply brief, Perkins offers another scenario in which

the jury could have convicted him for using but not carrying

the weapon. He contends the jury could have found that "he

generally possessed (i.e., 'used') this gun to protect or embolden him while trafficking ... even though he may not have

done so on the night of his arrest." Def. Reply Br. at 7-8.

Perkins' theory, apparently, is that the jury could have found

he trafficked in a different batch of drugs on an earlier date,

when the gun was in his general possession (e.g., at home) but

not in his waistband. See id. at 8 n.4.

Once again, defendant's scenario is unsupported by any

evidence at the trial. The only "drug trafficking offense" at

issue in the case was the possession of the cocaine found on

his person at the time he was arrested. There was no

evidence that he possessed drugs on any other day.11 And

defendant testified that he had the gun in his waistband the

entire time he possessed the drugs. Hence, there was no

evidence from which the jury could construct a drug trafficking scenario in which defendant used his gun other than by

carrying it in his waistband.

Our cases have been careful to emphasize that it is the

evidence before the jury that determines whether a conviction

passes the Yates test--not just any hypothetical the defendant can conjure up. In Washington, for example, we

stressed that "the only evidence in support of the firearms

convictions showed that the officers wore their service pistols

on their persons during the drug trafficking offenses; there

was no evidence suggesting that the officers merely 'possessed' without carrying...." 106 F.3d at 1013 (emphasis

added). Similarly, in Smart we stressed that the scenario

offered by defense counsel must be plausible, not merely

__________

11 Defendant contends that the jury could have interpreted the

testimony of the government's narcotics expert to suggest that

Perkins regularly dealt in drugs. But that testimony did not refer

to any course of conduct on the part of Perkins; the expert merely

testified that the amount and packaging of the narcotics found on

his person were consistent with distribution rather than personal

use of those drugs. 2/4/91 Tr. at 79-82.

hypothetically possible. 98 F.3d at 1393-94. We rejected the

scenario offered by defense counsel in that case--which speculated that the jury could have found "use" through constructive possession--as "too farfetched a possibility for any rational jury to base its verdict on in light of the evidence

offered at trial." Id. at 1394 n.22 (emphasis added).

In sum, based on the facts in evidence at trial, the jury

could not have found Perkins used the gun without also

finding he carried it. Thus, any error the district court may

have committed by failing to define "use" was harmless.12

V

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The appropriate standard for reviewing post-trial assertions of Bailey error is an issue as to which there remain a

number of loose strands of legal doctrine. Unfortunately for

Perkins, his appeal unravels regardless of which strand we

pull. Applying the standard of review most favorable to

defendant--harmless error--we find he suffered no prejudice

and thus affirm the judgment of the district court.

__________

12 Defendant contends that we have reversed s 924(c)(1) convictions in three cases with facts similar to his. See United States v.

Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 380 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v. Lin, 101

F.3d 760, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1996); United States v. Morrison, 98 F.3d

619, 628-29 (D.C. Cir. 1996). None of those cases is an apt

comparison, because in none did the evidence establish that the

defendant carried a gun on his person. Moreover, in two of the

cases the government conceded that Bailey required reversal,

making it unnecessary for the court to conduct a harmless error

analysis at all. See Moore, 104 F.3d at 380; Morrison, 98 F.3d at

629.

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