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Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Johnny B. Williams
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth circuit 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

DEC 1 9 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. No. 90-6085 

JOHNNY B. WILLIAMS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. CR-89-275-T) 

Frank Michael Ringer, Assistant United States Attorney (Timothy D. 

Leonard, United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Oklahoma 

City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

William P. Earley, Assistant Public Defender, Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before SEYMOUR, BALDOCK, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

Following a guilty plea on two separate counts of bank 

robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), Appellant Johnny B. 

Appellate Case: 90-6085 Document: 01019622883 Date Filed: 12/19/1990 Page: 1 
Williams (hereinafter 11Defendant") was sentenced to 180 months 

imprisonment on each count, to be served concurrently. The single 

issue in this appeal is whether the district court could depart 

upward from the sentence recommended by the United States 

Sentencing Commission Guidelines (the "Guidelines") because the 

recommended sentence did not adequately reflect the seriousness of 

Defendant's past criminal conduct. We affirm. 

Defendant's guilty plea on the two bank robbery counts was 

entered pursuant to a plea agreement. The Presentence Report 

reveals the recommended prison sentence, as determined by the 

Guidelines. 1 The base offense level resulting from two counts of 

robbery is 18. 2 One point is added when the robbery is of a 

financial institution. See United States Sentencing Commission, 

Guidelines Manual, §§ 2B3.1(a), 2B3.1(b)(l)(B) (Oct. 1988) 

1 The recommended sentence is found by referring to a 

sentencing table in ·the Guidelines. The two components of this 

table are the offense levels and the criminal history categories. 

The offense level is located first by assigning points based on 

the instant offense, as adjusted by a variety of factors such as 

whether a gun was used in the commission of the offense. After 

the offense level is set, the criminal history score is calculated 

by assigning points as dictated by various events in the criminal 

record. When all points are assigned, the sentencing judge refers 

to the sentencing table in the Guidelines. The table is a grid 

where the offense level and criminal history points come together 

to reveal a suggested imprisonment range and the judge may 

sentence from anywhere within the suggested range. Under certain 

circumstances, the judge may depart and sentence outside the 

range. See United States v. Roberson, 872 F.2d 597, 600-01 (5th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 110 s. Ct. 175 (1989). 

2 The base offense level for bank robbery has since been raised 

to 20. All references in this opinion are to the Guidelines as 

they applied at the time the Defendant committed the bank 

robberies in September, 1989. 

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Appellate Case: 90-6085 Document: 01019622883 Date Filed: 12/19/1990 Page: 2 
(hereinafter U.S.S.G.). No other points were added here, 

resulting in a total offense level for the Defendant of 19. 

According to the Presentence Report, Defendant's criminal 

history included four separate and distinct bank robberies, all 

dating back to 1981. In one of the four bank robberies he drove 

the getaway car. The charges stemming from these crimes included 

four counts of bank robbery and one count of aiding and abetting. 

Defendant was convicted and sentenced to fifteen years 

imprisonment on each of these five counts to run concurrently. He 

was paroled in 1989. The two convictions of bank robbery now 

before us are for robberies committed during the first year of 

Defendant's parole. 

Defendant received a total of six criminal history points for 

these five prior convictions. Only three points were given for 

his prior convictions because the Guidelines specify that "[p]rior 

sentences imposed in related cases are to be treated as one 

sentence for purposes of the criminal history." u.s.s.G. 

§ 4Al. 2 (a) ( 2 ) • The other three points were derived from 

Defendant's having committed the instant bank robberies less than 

two years following his release from prison and while on parole. 3 

u.s.s.G. §§ 4A1.1(d)-(e). The six criminal history points placed 

Defendant in criminal history category III of the Guidelines. 

3 In the present case, Defendant was charged with only two 

counts of bank robbery pursuant to a plea agreement with the 

United States Attorney. Defendant, however, actually committed 

eight robberies between August 29, 1989 and October 6, 1989. 

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Appellate Case: 90-6085 Document: 01019622883 Date Filed: 12/19/1990 Page: 3 
Based on Defendant's offense level of 19 and criminal history 

category of III, the Guidelines suggested a sentence from 37-46 

months. But the probation officer, in his presentence report, 

suggested an upward departure from the Guidelines would be 

appropriate because "the criminal history category of this 

defendant does not appear to adequately reflect the seriousness of 

his past criminal conduct nor the likelihood that he will commit 

other crimes • " The district court agreed, deciding that 

incarceration for only 37-46 months was disproportionately low in 

light of the Defendant's extensive criminal background. 

Announcing his decision to depart upward, the district judge found 

the criminal history Guidelines range was insufficient "to 

adequately reflect the seriousness of Mr. Williams' prior criminal 

record and the likelihood that he will repeat similar behavior." 

The judge further observed: 

The defendant has three [sic][ 4 ] prior instances of 

robbery of financial institutions. These were separate 

and distinct acts, but the cases arising from those acts 

were consolidated for sentencing purposes. Had Mr. 

Williams been convicted for each offense on three 

separate occasions, he would be a career criminal as 

defined at part 4Bl.l of the guidelines. 

I thus find that this defendant's criminal history 

category of III, that's Roman Numeral III, is 

inadequate, and upward departure is warranted pursuant 

to the guideline part 4A1.3 policy statement. 

Furthermore, the 

financial institutions 

opinion of the Court, 

repeated acts of 

by the defendant 

circumstances of 

robbery of 

is, in the 

a kind not 

4 We note there existed four separate instances of bank 

robbery, which resulted in five prior felonies including four bank 

robbery convictions and one aiding and abetting conviction. 

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Appellate Case: 90-6085 Document: 01019622883 Date Filed: 12/19/1990 Page: 4 
adequately considered by the Sentencing Commission in 

formulating the guidelines for this offense. 

Following these comments, the court imposed a sentence under the 

career offender provisions of the Guidelines. see u.s.s.G. 

§ 4Bl.l. 

A defendant is a career offender if he meets three 

requirements as set forth in the Guidelines. These requirements 

are: 

(1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the 

time of the instant offense, (2) the instant offense of 

conviction is a felony that is either a crime of 

violence or a controlled substance offense, and (3) the 

defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of 

either a crime of violence or a controlled substance 

offense. 

u.s.s.G. § 4B1.1.5 The base offense level for a career offender 

is increased to the maximum offense level allowed by the statute 

setting forth the elements of the crime. In addition, the 

criminal history category is raised to the highest level of the 

Guidelines, which is category VI. For example, the 

maximum sentence allowed by the federal bank robbery statute is 

240 months. Under the career offender provisions of the 

Guidelines the base offense level for a career offender bank 

robber is 32, and the criminal history category is VI. Pursuant 

to the Guidelines, the sentence range is 210-262 months, and this 

is within the maximum 240-month sentence allowed by the bank 

robbery statute. See 18 u.s.c. 2113(a); u.s.s.G. § 4Bl.l. 

5 The Guidelines definition of violent crime includes 

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(1}, comment. (n.l). 

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robbery. 

Appellate Case: 90-6085 Document: 01019622883 Date Filed: 12/19/1990 Page: 5 
The sentence, however, in this 

which is below the 210-262 month range 

case was only 180 months, 

in the Guidelines. In 

imposing its sentence, the district court recognized it was 

dipping below the career offender range. In so doing, the court 

acknowledged it was crediting the Defendant "for his cooperation 

--his pledge to cooperate and my belief that he will do so." The 

Guidelines allow a two-point reduction in the offense level when a 

defendant accepts responsibility for his crimes and cooperates 

with the authorities. u.s.s.G. § 3E1.1. Thus, the 180-month 

sentence this defendant received is consistent with a two point 

reduction from offense level 32, criminal history category VI. 

See U.S.S.G. Chapter 5, Part A - Sentencing Table, Offense Level 

30, Criminal History Category VI, which yields a sentencing range 

of 168-210 months. 

Defendant argues on appeal that the district court erred by 

departing upward. He asserts that "[t]he failure of the 

sentencing court to follow guideline procedures before departing 

upward from the applicable sentencing guideline range makes the 

sentence illegal." Defendant believes the jump from a criminal 

history category of III to VI, coupled with an increase in the 

base offense level from 19 to 32, is insupportable under the 

Guidelines and the record in this case. He complains that the 

district court did not reveal what method of reasoning would be 

used in departing upward until it made findings and imposed 

sentence. 

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Appellate Case: 90-6085 Document: 01019622883 Date Filed: 12/19/1990 Page: 6 
Our review of district court decisions to depart upward is 

governed by statute, 18 u.s.c. § 3742(e), as articulated by the 

standard adopted in United States v. White, 893 F.2d 276 (lOth 

Cir. 1990), and in which the parties in this case agree controls 

our disposition. According to our standard: 

First, we determine de novo whether the district court 

has articulated circumstances which warrant departure 

and which were not adequately considered by the 

Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines, or 

if considered by the Commission, that a departure was 

invited by the guidelines. Second, we determine whether 

the factual findings underlying the sentencing court's 

decision were clearly erroneous. Finally, 18 u.s.c. 

§ 3742(e)(3) requires us to determine whether the degree 

of departure was "reasonable." 

United States v. Gardner, 905 F.2d 1432, 1434 (lOth Cir.) (citing 

White, 893 F.2d at 278), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 202 (1990). 

See 1 ~' United States v. Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d 43, 49 (1st 

Cir.), cert. denied, 110 s. Ct. 177 (1989) (setting forth the 

standard adopted in White). 

Beginning with the first step of White, the district court 

may depart if it determines "there exists an aggravating or 

mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately 

taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in 

formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence 

different from that described." 18 u.s.c. § 3553(b). While the 

Guidelines specify sentences for the typical "heartland" crime, 

there are cases that are sufficiently unusual so as to warrant 

departure. White, 893 F.2d at 278. "When a court finds an 

atypical case, one to which a particular guideline linguistically 

applies but where conduct significantly differs from the norm, the 

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Appellate Case: 90-6085 Document: 01019622883 Date Filed: 12/19/1990 Page: 7 
court may consider whether a departure is warranted." !d. 

(citation omitted). In our review, we decide whether the district 

court properly relied on information placing this case in the 

"unusual" or "atypical" category not adequately considered by the 

Guidelines. The district court must make adequate findings 

explicitly setting forth the reasons behind its decision to depart 

so we have a sufficient record to review. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2); 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c). See United States v. Freitekh, 912 F.2d 

421, 423 (lOth Cir. 1990}; United States v. Emrick, 895 F.2d 1297 

(lOth Cir. 1990). 

The district court sufficiently explained the circumstances 

warranting departure here by discussing on the record the 

Defendant's "repeated acts of robbery." Because the court made 

such findings we are able to review its decision, and in so doing 

conclude that these repeated acts of bank robbery constitute 

similar criminal conduct not adequately considered by the 

Guidelines. Gardner, 905 F.2d at 1435. Where previous crimes 

were consolidated for trial or sentencing, the Guidelines caution 

against blindly relying on the artificially low criminal history 

score that consolidation brings. The district court, instead, 

must look beyond the underrepresentative criminal history score 

and consider "the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history 

and the danger that he presents to the public." u.s.s.G. § 4A1.2, 

comment. (n.3). As the Guidelines provide: 

[I]f the defendant commits a number of offenses on 

independent occasions separated by arrests, and the 

resulting criminal cases are consolidated and result in 

a combined sentence of eight years, counting merely 

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Appellate Case: 90-6085 Document: 01019622883 Date Filed: 12/19/1990 Page: 8 
three points for this factor will not adequately reflect 

either the seriousness of the defendant's criminal 

history or the frequency with which he commits crimes. 

In such circumstances, the court should consider whether 

departure is warranted. 

Id. Based on the foregoing, the first step of White is satisfied. 

The district court in this case considered the Defendant's five 

prior felony convictions stemming from four separate and distinct 

bank robberies as only three prior instances of bank robbery. If 

the district court erred, it was in the Defendant's favor and of 

no consequence to him. See supra note 4. 

Next, utilizing the clearly erroneous standard, we find there 

is a sufficient factual basis to justify departure under White's 

second step. There is no dispute as to the material facts 

revealing Defendant 1 S propensity for robbing banks, i.e., the four 

separate and distinct instances of bank robbery. See 18 u.s.c. 

§ 3742(e). 

Finally, having determined a departure is warranted, we go on 

to step three of White and decide if the degree of departure is 

reasonable. We will vacate a sentence if we independently decide 

it is unreasonable. Gardner, 905 F.2d at 1435; White, 893 F.2d at 

278. In our assessment, we consider all of the factors the 

district court looks to under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See 18 u.s.c. 

§ 3742(e). Recently, we stressed that these factors encompass 

concepts of "uniformity and proportionality." Gardner, 905 F.2d 

at 1436. In White, we also pointed out that the factors include: 

"the seriousness of the offense, the need for just punishment, 

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Appellate Case: 90-6085 Document: 01019622883 Date Filed: 12/19/1990 Page: 9 
deterrence, protection of the public, correctional treatment, the 

sentencing pattern of the Guidelines, [and] the policy statements 

contained in the Guidelines ..•• " Id. at 278. See,~~ United 

States v. Keys, 899 F.2d 983, 990 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 111 

s. Ct. 160 (1990). "[T]here is no single formula or rationale 

that should be used in all instances by the district courts to 

determine the degree of departure from the guidelines." Gardner, 

905 F.2d at 1438. In fact, in passing the Guidelines as part of 

its sentencing reform plan, Congress envisioned that sentencing 

judges would still have discretion. White, 893 F.2d at 278-79 

(citing s. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1984 

U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3182, 3235). "With these factors in 

mind, we should not lightly overturn determinations of the 

appropriate degree of departure." United States v. Arminta 

Mohundro Russell, 905 F.2d 1450, 1455 (lOth Cir.) (citing White), 

cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 267 (1990). 

Before going to 

engaged in bank robbery. 

jail in 1981, the Defendant repeatedly 

Within a year of his release in 1989 he 

was again robbing banks. After considering the sentencing factors 

set forth in 18 u.s.c. § 3553(a)(l), the district court determined 

the applicable Guidelines sentencing range was inadequate based 

upon Defendant's prior criminal history and departed upward to the 

career offender range "to protect the public from further crimes 

of the defendant, to deter others from similar criminal conduct, 

to reflect the seriousness of the offense, and to promote respect 

for the law." Based on these articulated reasons, we cannot say 

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Appellate Case: 90-6085 Document: 01019622883 Date Filed: 12/19/1990 Page: 10 
that the district court's departure upward from the Guidelines was 

unreasonable. 

We recognize that the prior felony convictions used to 

qualify a person as a career offender must be felony convictions 

that are ordinarily counted separately by the Guidelines. 

u.s.s.G. § 4Bl.2(3)(B). In this case the prior felony convictions 

were not counted separately because the convictions were combined 

for sentencing. The Guidelines say "[p]rior sentences imposed in 

related cases are to be treated as one sentence for purposes of 

the criminal history." u.s.s.G. 

Guidelines commentary specifically 

§ 4Al.2{a)(2) in an overly broad 

§ 4Al. 2 (a) ( 2 ) • However, the 

cautions against applying 

fashion so that the criminal 

history score underrepresents the seriousness of the defendant's 

criminal history and the danger the defendant presents to the 

public. u.s.s.G. S 4Al.2, comment. (n.3). With this caution in 

mind, a sentencing judge may separate prior related convictions 

that resulted in a single sentence. The judge may then count the 

convictions as prior felony convictions for purposes of the 

Guidelines career offender calculation. See United States v. 

Dorsey, 888 F.2d 79 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 s. Ct. 756 

(1990) (efficient judicial administration procedure provided by 

consolidating cases for sentencing should not be sacrificed by a 

literal interpretation of the career offender provision) . 

After reviewing the transcript of the sentencing hearing, it 

is apparent that the district court examined the Guidelines and 

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Appellate Case: 90-6085 Document: 01019622883 Date Filed: 12/19/1990 Page: 11 
found that without departing, the sentence range would be only 37-

46 months. The court then continued its consultation of the 

Guidelines and found departure is recommended when the criminal 

history score "underrepresents the seriousness of the defendant's 

criminal history and the danger that he presents to the public." 

U.S.S.G. § 4Al.2, comment. (n.3). Still following the Guidelines, 

the court considered whether departure was warranted, and found 

that it was. Id. 

The court then departed upward and imposed sentence by using 

"the guideline range for a defendant with a higher criminal 

history category, as applicable." U.s. S. G. § 4Al. 3, p. s. In this 

case, the applicable criminal history category was so high that 

the Defendant qualified as a career offender. Defendant achieved 

this by (1) being over eighteen at the time of the instant 

offense; (2) by committing a crime of violence; and (3) by having 

at least two prior felony convictions for yiolent crimes. 

u.s.s.G. § 4Bl.l. When the district court counted some of the 

Defendant's prior bank robberies as separate offenses, which they 

were, the Defendant received the career offender status he was 

6 due. Finally, the district court dropped the Defendant's offense 

level two points because he cooperated with the authorities by 

admitting he robbed eight banks in 1989. u.s.s.G. § 3El.l. It 

6 As previously stated, the d i strict court referred to only 

three of the four prior bank robberies committed by the Defendant. 

These separate crimes led to the Defendant's conviction on four 

counts of bank robbery and one count of aiding and abetting. 

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was at this point the district court concluded that the Defendant 

should be sentenced to 180 months. 

Our review of a district court dec i sion to depart from the 

Guidelines would be easier if the sentencing judge would set forth 

the factual findings and explain the basis for the departure in 

more detail than was done here. Nevertheless, because we are able 

to determine the district court's decision process in this case, 

we do not agree with the Defendant's argument that the departure 

here traduced the Guidelines or the policies behind them. On the 

contrary, the district court adhered to the Guidelines when it 

found that the Defendant is a career offender and sentenced 

accordi ngly. In addition,· we believe Def endant's complaints that 

the record is inadequate and that the district court did not 

reveal its method of reasoning in departing upward are nothing 

more than corollaries to the Defendant's principal assertion that 

his sentence traduces the Guidelines and is illegal. We therefore 

reject these arguments for the same reasons we reject Defendant's 

primary assertion. We also believe the Defendant's reliance on 

our decision in United States v. Hawkins, 901 F.2d 863 (lOth Cir. 

1990), to support his position is misplaced. In Hawkins, we 

reversed and remanded for resentencing because the district court 

sentence d an individual as a career offender even though he "did 

not actually qualify as a career offender because one of his two 

prior f e lony convictions did not meet the definition contained in 

§ 4Bl.l ( 2) . " Id. at 866 (footnote omitted). Hawkins is 

inapposite to this case because, as already pointed out, the 

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Defendant here easily meets the Guidelines' definition for a 

career offender. 

Despite Defendant's claim, the district court did not traduce 

the Guidelines or their policies. We find no provision in the 

Guidelines preventing a court from departing upward to the career 

offender section of the Guidelines. Moreover, the Guidelines 

anticipate cases where departure to the statutory maximum for a 

career offender is proper: 

The Commission contemplates that there may, on occasion, 

be a case of an egregious, serious criminal record in 

which even the guideline range for a Category VI 

criminal history is not adequate to reflect the 

seriousness of the defendant's criminal history. In 

such a case, a decision above the guideline range for a 

defendant with a Category VI criminal history may be 

warranted. 

u.s.s.G. § 4A1.3, p.s. See also Russell, 905 F.2d at 1455 (where 

a defendant's consolidated sentence involves sixteen separate 

counts, it is proper for sent encing court to rely on this as a 

factor in its decision to depart); United States v. James Ray 

Russell, 905 F.2d 1439, 1444 (lOth Cir. 1990) (district court may 

depart upward when defendant's strong propensity to commit crime 

is not revealed by criminal history due to defendant's 

incarceration). But~ United States v. Fortenbury, 917 F.2d 

477, 480 (lOth Cir. 1990) (remand for resentencing necessary where 

upward departure in offense level is not based on defendant's 

career offender status as determined by the Guidelines). 

In conclusion, we have applied the test enunciated in White. 

The circumstances articulated by the trial court, i.e., the prior 

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bank robberies, constituted similar criminal conduct not 

adequately considered by the Guidelines. The factual findings 

underlying the decision to depart upward were not clearly 

erroneous. The degree of departure was reasonable under White. 

The sentence of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

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