Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-00508/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-00508-9/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Connie Gipson
Respondent
Roberto Herrera
Petitioner

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ROBERTO HERRERA, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

CONNIE GIPSON, 

Respondent. 

No. 2:12-cv-0508 KJM DAD P 

ORDER 

Respondent’s motion for reconsideration of the magistrate judge’s order granting 

an evidentiary hearing on petitioner’s claim that his guilty plea was involuntary is pending before 

the court. The motion was submitted without argument. Having considered the papers filed by 

the parties, the record in this action, and for the reasons set forth below, the court DENIES the 

motion for reconsideration. 

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

On September 9, 2010, in Lassen County Superior Court, petitioner pled guilty to 

and was convicted of battery by a prisoner on a non-confined person and possessing and carrying 

a sharp instrument while confined in a penal institution. Lodg. Doc. 2 at 43–52. 

On or around October 21, 2010, petitioner filed a request for a certificate of 

probable cause with the state trial court on several grounds, including that petitioner’s guilty plea 

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was involuntary. Lodg. Doc. 1 at 45. On November 5, 2010, the trial court denied petitioner’s 

request for a certificate of probable cause without comment. Id. at 48. 

On May 9, 2011, petitioner presented his constitutional claim that his plea was 

involuntary to the California Court of Appeal. Lodg. Doc. 4. The Court of Appeal denied 

petitioner’s claim on August 2, 2011. People v. Herrera, No. C066207, 2011 WL 3300160 (Cal. 

Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2011). 

 On October 26, 2011, petitioner presented his claim to the California Supreme 

Court in a petition for writ of habeas corpus and requested an evidentiary hearing. Lodg. Doc. 5. 

On February 29, 2012, the California Supreme Court denied the petition without comment. Lodg. 

Doc. 6. 

On February 27, 2012, petitioner filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus, challenging his 2010 conviction. ECF No. 1. 

 On February 8, 2013, the magistrate judge held a status conference during which 

he directed the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing whether an evidentiary hearing is 

required. ECF Nos. 46, 47. 

On January 23, 2014, following the parties’ briefing, the magistrate judge issued 

an order setting an evidentiary hearing on petitioner’s claim that his guilty plea was involuntary. 

ECF No. 60. The magistrate judge reasoned petitioner’s claim had not been adjudicated on the 

merits in state court, and, even assuming it was, the decision was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the circumstances leading up to petitioner’s plea colloquy. 

Id. Based on this conclusion, the magistrate judge found an evidentiary hearing appropriate under 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). Id. 

On February 24, 2014, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the 

magistrate judge’s order setting the evidentiary hearing. ECF No. 67. For the reasons discussed 

below, the motion is DENIED. 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS ON A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a) directs district judges to consider timely 

objections to nondispositive pretrial orders issued by magistrate judges and to “modify or set 

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aside any part of the order that is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law.” See also Local Rule 

303(f); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). “‘A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although there is 

evidence to support it, the reviewing [body] on the entire evidence is left with the definite and 

firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” Concrete Pipe and Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. 

Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 622 (1993) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum 

Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). “[R]eview under the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard is significantly 

deferential . . . .” Concrete Pipe and Prods. of Cal., 508 U.S. at 623. “To succeed [on a motion 

for reconsideration], a party must set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to induce 

the court to reverse its prior decision.” Enriquez v. City of Fresno, No. CV F 10–0581 AWI 

DLB, 2011 WL 1087149, at *1, 3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2011). Furthermore, when filing a motion 

for reconsideration, a party must show “what new or different facts or circumstances are claimed 

to exist which did not exist or were not shown upon such prior motion, or what other grounds 

exist for the motion.” E.D. Cal. Local Rule 230(j)(3). “A motion for reconsideration ‘may not be 

used to raise arguments or present evidence for the first time when they could reasonably have 

been raised earlier in the litigation.’” Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co.

(Marlyn), 571 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 

F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000)). 

III. ANALYSIS 

 A. The Magistrate Judge’s Order 

In his order filed January 23, 2014, the magistrate judge first considered whether 

the state court’s acceptance of petitioner’s guilty plea was a reasoned decision on the merits of 

petitioner’s constitutional claim that his guilty plea was involuntary. ECF No. 60 at 13. He 

found petitioner’s claim that his plea was involuntary is a new claim that was not raised in the 

state trial court, concluding, “[u]nder these circumstances, the trial court’s acceptance of 

petitioner’s guilty plea was not a decision on the merits of any claim presented by petitioner that 

his guilty plea was involuntary.” Id. 

The magistrate judge also found that, even assuming the trial court’s acceptance of 

petitioner’s guilty plea was a ruling on the merits, the state trial court’s decision was “based on an 

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unreasonable determination of the facts” under § 2254(d)(2) in light of the circumstances leading 

up to petitioner’s plea colloquy. Id. at 13–14. He reasoned the state trial court “essentially 

ignored evidence/circumstances which indicated that the coercive circumstances petitioner had 

repeatedly explained to the court were still motivating his guilty plea.” Id. Thus, the magistrate 

judge concluded § 2254(d) does not govern petitioner’s federal claim and the claim is reviewed 

de novo. Id.

Finally, the magistrate judge found petitioner satisfied the due diligence 

requirement for an evidentiary hearing under § 2254(e)(2) and established a colorable claim for 

relief. Id. at 14–18. In that regard, the magistrate judge explained that, under the circumstances 

presented in this action, “there is certainly reason to doubt the sincerity of the colloquy at 

petitioner’s third change of plea hearing.” Id. at 16. 

 B. The Motion for Reconsideration 

On February 24, 2014, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing the 

magistrate judge erred in finding no state court reached the merits of petitioner’s involuntary plea 

claim. ECF No. 67 at 7. Respondent contends “[t]he trial judge found Petitioner’s plea was 

voluntary by accepting it” and the same court “found no merit to a claim of involuntariness by 

denying [p]etitioner leave to appeal on that ground.” Id. 

 i. Evidentiary Hearings in Federal Habeas Cases 

The decision whether to grant an evidentiary hearing is grounded in the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which provides in relevant part: 

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person 

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be 

granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits 

in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim- 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal 

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 

States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented 

in the State court proceeding. 

(e)(1) In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of 

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habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a 

State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court 

shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden 

of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing 

evidence. 

(2) If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim 

in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary 

hearing on the claim unless the applicant shows that-- 

(A) the claim relies on-- 

(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive 

to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, 

that was previously unavailable; or 

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been 

previously discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence; and 

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to 

establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for 

constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have 

found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

In Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011), the Supreme Court held that 

“review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated 

the claim on the merits,” id. at 1398, because the review “focuses on what a state court knew and 

did,” id. at 1392. The Court reiterated that “[i]f a claim has been adjudicated on the merits by a 

state court, a federal habeas petitioner must overcome the limitation of § 2254(d)(1) on the record 

that was before the state court.” Id. at 1400. It recognized that “not all federal habeas claims . . . 

fall within the scope of § 2254(d), which applies only to claims ‘adjudicated on the merits in the 

State court proceedings.’” Id. at 1401; Stokley v. Ryan, 659 F.3d 802, 808 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(“Pinholster also held that this bar on new evidence is coterminous with the scope of § 2254(d). 

If a petitioner presents a claim that was not adjudicated on the merits . . . federal review is not 

necessarily limited to the state record.”). 

When the state court’s ruling is a summary denial, a petitioner “can satisfy the 

‘unreasonable application prong of § 2254(d)(1) only by showing that ‘there was no reasonable 

basis’” for the decision. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1402 (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 

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770, 784 (2011)). A state court’s decision is not entitled to deference under § 2254(d)(1) if its 

ruling is “contrary to” clearly established federal law, that is, if it applied a rule different from the 

governing law defined by Supreme Court authority or if its decision is different from Supreme 

Court authority on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the second prong of 

§ 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is an “unreasonable application” of federal law if it correctly 

identified the governing legal principle but unreasonably applied it to the facts of the particular 

case. The focus of the latter inquiry is on whether the state court’s application of clearly 

established federal law is objectively unreasonable, whether or not it is correct. Waddington v. 

Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179, 190 (2009); Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). 

Pinholster restricts the consideration of evidence that was not before the state 

court under § 2254(d)(2) as well as under (d)(1); to determine whether there has been an 

unreasonable determination of fact, a district court must consider the record before the state court. 

Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1400 n.7 (noting the “additional clarity” in (d)(2), which specifically 

provides that review is limited to the state record); Blue v. Thaler, 665 F.3d 647, 655–56 & n.26 

(5th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 105 (2012); Lor v. Felker, No. CIV S–08–2985 GEB 

DAD P, 2012 WL 1604519, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 7, 2012), aff’d, 2012 WL 3201961 (E.D. Cal. 

Jul. 31, 2012). 

In Hibbler v. Benedetti, 693 F.3d 1140, 1146 (9th Cir. 2012), the Ninth Circuit 

examined the concept of an unreasonable determination of fact within the meaning of 

§ 2254(d)(2), recognizing that if the state court’s determination of fact was objectively 

unreasonable it is not entitled to deference under (d)(2). The court in Hibbler said there are two 

main categories of challenges: “First, a petitioner may challenge the substance of the state court 

findings and attempt to show that those findings were not supported by substantial evidence in the 

state court record. Second, a petitioner may challenge the fact-finding process itself on the ground 

that it was deficient in some material way.” Id. (citation omitted). Unreasonableness is a higher 

standard than incorrectness: 

[I]f a petitioner challenges the substance of the state court findings, 

it is not enough that we would reverse in similar circumstances if 

this were an appeal from a district court decision. Rather, we must 

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be convinced that an appellate panel, applying the normal standards 

of appellate review, could not reasonably conclude that the finding 

is supported by the record. Similarly, when the challenge is to the 

state court’s procedure, mere doubt as to the adequacy of the state 

court’s finding of fact is insufficient; we must be satisfied that any

appellate court to whom the defect [in the state court’s fact-finding 

process] is pointed out would be unreasonable in holding that the 

state court’s fact-finding process was adequate. 

Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

If the restrictions in subdivision (d) are surmounted, either because the state court 

did not address a particular claim on the merits or because its decision is contrary to or an 

unreasonable application of federal law or an unreasonable determination of fact, a court must 

then consider the application of subdivision (e). See Williams v. Woodford, 859 F. Supp. 2d 

1154, 1161 (E.D. Cal. 2012). Although the Pinholster court found “no need . . . to address the 

proper application of § 2254(e)(2),” it nevertheless recognized that “[s]ection 2254(e)(2) 

continues to have force where § 2254(d)(1) does not bar federal habeas relief” by restricting the 

district court’s discretion to consider new evidence when the state court did not adjudicate claims 

on the merits. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1401 & n.8. 

Before a court may consider holding a hearing under subdivision (e), it must 

determine whether a petitioner failed to develop his claims in the state court. A petitioner will 

only be charged with a “failure to develop” the facts if “there is lack of diligence, or some greater 

fault, attributable to the prisoner or the prisoner’s counsel.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 

432 (2000). The petitioner must have “made a reasonable attempt, in light of the information 

available at the time, to investigate and pursue claims in state court.” Id. at 435. “Diligence will 

require in the usual case that the prisoner, at a minimum, seek an evidentiary hearing in the state 

court in the manner prescribed by state law.” Id. at 437. “‘A petitioner who has previously 

sought and been denied an evidentiary hearing has not failed to develop the factual basis of his 

claim and therefore satisfies § 2254(e)(2).’” Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 783 (9th Cir. 

2012) (quoting Stanley v. Schriro, 598 F.3d 612, 624 (9th Cir. 2010)). 

Even if a petitioner has been diligent in state court, a court is not required to hold a 

hearing, but may do so in its discretion. In deciding whether to hold a hearing, the court “must 

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consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition’s factual 

allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief . . . . Because the 

deferential standards prescribed by § 2254 control whether to grant habeas relief, a federal court 

must take into account those standards in deciding whether an evidentiary hearing is appropriate.” 

Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007); Stokley, 659 F.3d at 811. The Court in 

Landrigan clarified that “if the record refutes the applicant’s factual allegations or otherwise 

precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.” 550 U.S. 

at 474. 

 ii. State Court Record 

To provide context to petitioner’s claim and the motion before the court, the state 

court record reflects the following relevant facts. In or about November 2009, petitioner was 

charged with one count of battery by a prisoner and one count of possession of a sharp 

instrument. Lodg. Doc. 1 at 1–6. Petitioner initially pled not guilty. Id. During the trial court’s 

November 20, 2009 trial readiness conference, petitioner’s counsel conveyed to the court 

petitioner’s desire to be “transferred someplace else during the duration of the trial due to the 

nature of the charges.” Lodg. Doc. 2 at 6. Following a continuance of petitioner’s trial, the court 

held another trial readiness conference on May 6, 2010. Id. at 24. During the conference, 

petitioner’s counsel indicated petitioner requested him to “cease work” and “conduct no further 

investigation” because he wanted to plead straight up. Id. at 26. He explained petitioner had a 

problem with the plea form, specifically paragraph nine of the plea form, which states the plea is 

offered freely and voluntarily and without any threats. Id. Petitioner’s counsel stated petitioner 

“contends that in fact he has been threatened and intimidated and he wants to give a statement to 

the Court before he enters his plea of guilty.” Id. The following dialogue between petitioner and 

the trial court took place: 

THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Herrera, the bind that I see in this matter 

is that you want to plead guilty, and many people do and accept 

whatever sentence is given by the Court. The problem here is if 

you in fact are pleading guilty because you are under some threat or 

duress that’s causing you to plead guilty, that’s just not a good plea, 

the appellate courts would throw it out in a heartbeat. 

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. . . . 

[PETITIONER]: The reason I want to plead guilty is because, see, 

my thing involves, my case involves battery on staff, correctional 

officers, and ever since then, I’ve been, I came back from Corcoran 

SHU[1] for court proceedings for this case, battery on a staff. 

Several staff, IGI’s, ISU’s, were involved in this case. I’ve been 

harassed, threatened by several correctional officers ever since I’ve 

been here for this case. 

THE COURT: What was the threat? What did they threaten to do? 

[PETITIONER]: Something about if I take the stand and I reveal 

what took place on my side of the story, what really took place, 

how I was -- excessive force was used on me, I was beat up by 

correctional officers and stuff. They don’t want me to reveal all 

this, telling me if I go and take the stand -- I go back in my cell, my 

cell always get tossed up, my paperwork, my legal stuff gets all 

thrown out and just keep getting harassed. 

Medical staff, they’re not trying to give me medical attention 

because of this, because of my case, and I’m tired of it. I just want 

to get it over with, take a guilty plea and get on. That way, I can 

just sentence and go back to Corcoran, get away from this, from all 

the harassment. 

Id. at 27–28. After advising petitioner if the matter went to trial he would not have to take the 

stand, and offering him the option of pleading no contest as opposed to pleading guilty, the trial 

court did not accept petitioner’s plea and continued the matter until May 27, 2010. Id. at 28–30. 

During the next May 27, 2010 trial setting conference petitioner’s counsel informed the court it is 

“quite clear” to him that “any kind of plea under duress or intimidation would certainly most 

likely be overturned,” but petitioner wants to enter his plea of guilty and “put on the record again 

the reason for it and the fact that he had been intimidated into entering the plea.” Id. at 33. The 

trial court addressed petitioner, asking if he still had the same concerns about his safety he 

expressed during the prior conference to which petitioner responded he did. Id. at 33–34. The 

trial court responded it could “not take a plea based upon that.” Id. at 34. Petitioner’s counsel 

also renewed petitioner’s desire to be transferred out of High Desert State Prison because of the 

physical retaliation by the officers there and the interference with his mail. Id. He explained 

petitioner requested that he file a motion for his transfer, and the trial court set a hearing for the 

motion for June 17, 2010. Id.; see also id. at 36 (petitioner’s counsel stating petitioner “wants the 

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 Security Housing Unit. 

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motion heard at the earliest time”). It is unclear from the record why, but the hearing on the 

motion was vacated. 

On September 9, 2010, the court held a hearing during which petitioner pled guilty 

to the two charges. At the hearing, petitioner made the following statements on the record: 

[PETITIONER]: Okay, I was last here on May, I believe May 28th. 

That’s when you denied to accept my guilty plea based on that I 

was being threatened and harassed, to take a guilty plea due to the 

nature of my case, battery on ISU, High Desert State Prison 

officials. 

. . . . I want to put on the record, to reflect on the record, I want to 

give a declaration, one of my several declarations I’m saying I 

mailed out to my attorney. I want to give it to him today right now 

on the record. I’m keeping a copy of this declaration for my 

personal records. It’s dated today’s date, 9/9/2010. 

. . . . 

[PETITIONER]: I also like to tell the Court that I’m not being 

pressured. The retaliation, harassment, it was made up by me, it 

was just made up. I’m not being pressured. I’ll sign the guilty plea 

documents. I want to get sentenced today, though. I’m not being 

pressured, I made it up. 

THE COURT: Hang on. I misunderstood what you said. You 

what? 

[PETITIONER]: I made up about the retaliation by cops, being 

pressured by High Desert State Prison officials harassing me, I 

made it up. I just made it up. I’m not being pressured, I want to 

take a guilty plea straight up, no offers, no deals, no nothing. I 

don’t want to go to trial, I want to plead straight up. 

THE COURT: Okay. 

[PETITIONER]: I’ll sign the document right now. On the record, 

I’ll sign right now, I want to get sentenced today. Whatever, two 

life sentences, three life sentences, whatever time it carries, I’m 

okay. 

THE COURT: So you’re saying that you do not want a probation 

report? 

[PETITIONER]: I don’t want any of that, just send me, that’s it. 

Id. at 43–44. As the court was directing petitioner and his counsel to a conference room to review 

the plea form, petitioner interrupted saying, “No, I’m all right, I’ll sign right now, I’ll sign 

whatever the DA wants me to sign.” Id. He also stated “I want to get this done, that’s it, I’m 

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tired, okay.” Id. After insisting several times that he sign the plea form on the record before the 

court, petitioner and his counsel reviewed the form off the record. Id. at 45–46; see also Lodg. 

Doc. 1 at 28–34 (plea form and waiver of rights). The trial court specifically addressed the 

section of the form with which petitioner previously had taken issue, noting petitioner initialed 

the section and the trial court “highlighted it.” Lodg. Doc. 2 at 46–47; Lodg. Doc. 1 at 32. The 

trial court reviewed with petitioner the rights he forfeited by entering his guilty plea and petitioner 

stated he was entering the plea freely and voluntarily. Lodg. Doc. 2 at 47–48. Petitioner waived 

the option of referral to probation, stating, “I just want to get sentenced right now, today.” Id. at 

48; see also id. at 49. Ultimately, petitioner pled guilty to the two charges and admitted three 

prior convictions; the trial court accepted the guilty plea and acknowledgements. Id. at 49–51. 

The trial court sentenced petitioner to two concurrent sentences of 25 years to life to be served 

consecutively to his existing sentence. Id. at 52. Thereafter, petitioner indicated he would like 

his counsel to assist him with filing an appeal, id. at 53, as well as have the court preserve 

evidence for the purpose of his appeal, id. at 54. 

On or around October 21, 2010, petitioner filed a request for a certificate of 

probable cause stating, among other grounds, the following constitutional ground for appeal: 

“Defendant’s constitutional rights to a fair trial were violated in that he entered a plea of guilty 

after he was beaten and harassed by correctional staff at High Desert State Prison.” Lodg. Doc. 1 

at 45. On November 5, 2010, the trial court denied petitioner’s request for a certificate of 

probable cause without comment. Id. at 48. 

On May 9, 2011, petitioner presented his constitutional claim that his plea was 

involuntary to the California Court of Appeal in a supplemental brief to his counsel’s “no issues” 

Wende2

 brief. Lodg. Doc. 4. The California Court of Appeal ruled as follows with regard to his 

involuntary plea claim: 

Defendant filed a supplemental brief, again claiming he was 

pressured into entering the plea by the threats and harassment of the 

correctional officers. Defendant’s claims are challenges to the 

validity of the plea. Such challenges cannot be raised without a 

certificate of probable cause. (People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal. 4th 

 2 People v. Wende, 25 Cal. 3d 436 (1979). 

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1084, 1098–1099; People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal. 4th 68, 74–

75.) 

Herrera, 2011 WL 3300160, at *2. On October 26, 2011, petitioner presented his claim to the 

California Supreme Court in a petition for writ of habeas corpus and requested an evidentiary 

hearing. Lodg. Doc. 5. On February 29, 2012, the California Supreme Court denied the petition 

without comment. Lodg. Doc. 6. 

iii. Adjudication on the Merits Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) 

The magistrate judge found the last reasoned decision addressing petitioner’s 

involuntary plea claim is the California Court of Appeal decision, which “specifically rejected 

that claim on the procedural ground that petitioner had failed to obtain a certificate of probable 

cause.” ECF No. 60 at 12. The magistrate judge concluded, “because the state courts rejected 

petitioner’s claim on procedural grounds, their decisions do not constitute an adjudication on the 

merits sufficient to invoke the deference that § 2254(d) commands.” Id. at 13. 

In her motion for reconsideration, respondent argues the state trial court 

adjudicated petitioner’s involuntary plea claim on the merits when it accepted petitioner’s guilty 

plea during the plea colloquy, or alternatively, when it denied petitioner’s request for a certificate 

of probable cause. Respondent raises her alternative argument for the first time here. See ECF 

No. 54 at 3 (respondent arguing the trial court adjudicated petitioner’s claim when it accepted his 

guilty plea); see also ECF No. 24 at 12–16 (respondent argues the Court of Appeal’s decision was 

the last reasoned decision on petitioner’s federal claim). It is generally improper to present an 

argument for the first time on a motion for reconsideration. Marlyn, 571 F.3d at 880. 

Nevertheless, the court finds neither of respondent’s arguments are persuasive and will address 

them both. 

As noted above, § 2254(d) applies to claims that were adjudicated on the merits in 

state court proceedings. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1401. “A judgment is normally said to have 

been rendered ‘on the merits’ only if it was ‘delivered after the court . . . heard and evaluated the 

evidence and the parties’ substantive arguments.’” Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1097 

(2013) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1199 (9th ed. 2009)); see also Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 

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F.3d 943, 966 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he term ‘adjudicated’ refers to whether the petition for postconviction relief was either granted or denied, whereas the phrase ‘on the merits’ requires that the 

grant or denial rest on substantive, rather than procedural, grounds.”). 

Here, petitioner raised his claim regarding the voluntariness of his plea before the 

California Supreme Court in his petition for review. Lodg. Doc. 5. Because the California 

Supreme Court summarily denied the petition for review, Lodg. Doc. 6, the court “looks through” 

the summary disposition to the California Court of Appeal opinion. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 

797, 803–06 (1991). The Court of Appeal denied petitioner’s claim on direct review on 

procedural grounds, for a failure to obtain a certificate of probable cause.3 Herrera, 2011 WL 

3300160. Thus, this court looks to the state trial court for the last reasoned decision. 

Following acceptance of petitioner’s guilty plea, Lodg. Doc. 2 at 49–51, the state 

trial court denied petitioner’s request for a certificate of probable cause without comment, Lodg. 

Doc. 1 at 48. Thus, there is no reasoned state court decision on the record. The trial court did not 

adjudicate petitioner’s constitutional claim that his plea was involuntary during the plea colloquy 

because the claim was not squarely presented to the trial court. Despite the trial court’s focus on 

accepting petitioner’s guilty plea, respondent insists the trial court addressed petitioner’s 

involuntary plea claim on the merits during the plea colloquy. However, petitioner presented the 

trial court with the opposite of an involuntary plea claim when he stated he was not being coerced 

to plead guilty. Lodg. Doc. 2 at 48 (petitioner replying “Yes, I am” when asked if he was 

entering his plea freely and voluntarily). The trial court had no occasion during the September 9, 

2010 plea colloquy to address petitioner’s federal claim that his plea was coerced. Id. at 43–51. 

As the magistrate judge correctly points out, if during the plea colloquy the trial court learned of 

 3

 Petitioner raises the issue of procedural default in his opposition to respondent’s motion 

for reconsideration. Petitioner notes “respondent failed to raise as an affirmative defense that 

petitioner had failed to obtain a certificate of probable cause from the trial court.” ECF No. 73 at 

5 n.1. In reply, respondent explains he did not assert the affirmative defense because his 

argument is there has been a merits determination on the claim. ECF No. 74 at 3–4. Respondent 

further explains if the court does not agree with his position, “it may on its own consider whether 

a procedural default has occurred.” Id. at 3. The issue before the court is whether the magistrate 

judge erred in his conclusion that an evidentiary hearing is appropriate on petitioner’s claim that 

his plea was involuntary. The court declines to undertake an analysis of petitioner’s claim under 

the procedural default doctrine. The magistrate judge is free to address this matter at his 

discretion. 

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petitioner’s contemporaneous declaration to his counsel that his plea was involuntary, “the trial 

judge would almost certainly have rejected petitioner’s attempt to enter a guilty plea for the third 

time.” ECF No. 60 at 13. Accordingly, the magistrate judge’s decision was not clearly erroneous 

or contrary to law. 

To the extent respondent argues the trial court’s denial of petitioner’s request for a 

certificate of probable cause serves as a reasoned decision on the merits of petitioner’s 

constitutional claim, this argument also fails. Under California law, a defendant may not appeal 

from a judgment of conviction upon a guilty plea unless he obtains a certificate of probable cause 

from the trial court. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1237.5. “Section 1237.5 is procedural in nature” and 

“establishes a mechanism for the operation of the ‘general’ appeal-limiting ‘principle’ of the 

decisional law.” People v. Mendez, 19 Cal. 4th 1084, 1095 (1999). The purpose of the state 

statute is “to promote judicial economy . . . by screening out wholly frivolous guilty and nolo 

contendere plea appeals before time and money are spent” on matters such as preparing the record 

on appeal. Id. (citations, internal quotations and alteration omitted). “The impact of section 

1237.5 relates to the procedure in perfecting an appeal from a judgment based on a plea of guilty, 

and not to the grounds upon which such an appeal may be taken.” People v. Hoffard, 10 Cal. 4th 

1170, 1178 (1995) (quoting People v. Ribero, 4 Cal. 3d 55, 63 (1971)). 

Here, the state trial court was presented with petitioner’s request to proceed to the 

Court of Appeal on his federal claim that his plea was involuntary, on the ground it was coerced 

as a result of threats and harassment by High Desert correctional officers. The state did not 

oppose the request; the trial court summarily denied petitioner’s request without comment. Lodg. 

Doc. 1 at 48. Based on California’s procedural statute, the state court screened out petitioner’s 

guilty plea appeal because it was wholly frivolous. In re Chavez, 30 Cal. 4th 643, 651 (2003). 

However, the trial court did not indicate on what ground the denial was based, nor is there any 

indication its decision was based on an application of federal law. While a habeas court generally 

presumes the state court adjudicated a claim on the merits, Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784–85 (citing 

Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 265 (1989)), here there is simply no indication that the trial court 

“heard and evaluated the evidence and the parties’ substantive arguments,” Johnson, 133 S. Ct. at 

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1097, with regard to petitioner’s federal claim when it denied petitioner’s request for a certificate 

of probable cause. This is especially true considering petitioner presented no substantive 

argument in support of his request, and the state made no substantive argument in opposition. It 

is therefore difficult to conclude the screening of petitioner’s federal claim under a state court 

procedural rule involved an adjudication of the merits of the claim. Cf. Sadler v. Howes, 541 F. 

App’x 682, 689 (6th Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (finding state trial court adjudicated petitioner’s 

claim on the merits because it “reviewed both affidavits and listened to each party’s arguments,” 

“inquired as to what additional evidence would be presented in an evidentiary hearing,” 

“compared the information relating” to the claim against the “information relating to the prejudgment motion,” and, only “after undertaking all of these steps did the state trial court deny” 

petitioner’s motion). 

Similarly, and perhaps more fundamentally, if the trial court granted petitioner’s 

request for a certificate of probable cause, the decision would not have resolved his federal claim 

such that he would have been entitled to further proceedings at the trial court level. In other 

words, assuming petitioner’s request for a certificate of probable cause was a petition for postconviction relief, the state trial court neither granted nor denied the request on substantive 

grounds and therefore did not adjudicate petitioner’s claim on the merits. Lambert, 393 F.3d at 

966. Rather, the trial court’s issuance of a certificate of probable cause would merely have 

removed a procedural barrier and permitted petitioner to go forward with his federal claim to the 

California Court of Appeal and receive a merits disposition at that level. CAL. PENAL CODE

§ 1237.5. In this light, the trial court’s denial of petitioner’s request for a certificate of probable 

cause was akin to a discretionary decision to apply a state procedural bar, not a decision to deny a 

federal claim for relief on the merits. See, e.g., Vang v. Nevada, 329 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir. 

2003) (a state court’s decision whether to apply a procedural bar does not involve any 

consideration of federal law). 

The magistrate judge did not err in holding petitioner’s claim was not adjudicated 

on the merits and the deference due under § 2254(d) does not apply. As discussed below, even if 

the court determines under Richter either of the trial court’s decisions constituted a determination 

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of the merits of petitioner’s federal claim, petitioner’s claim meets the demanding standard 

applicable under § 2254(d)(2), which provides an application for a writ of habeas corpus “shall 

not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court 

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim . . . resulted in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding.” 

 iv. Unreasonable Determination of the Facts Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) 

The magistrate judge found that, even assuming the trial court’s acceptance of 

petitioner’s guilty plea was a denial of petitioner’s federal claim on the merits, the decision was 

an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented to the court. ECF 

No. 60 at 13–14. 

Respondent argues the state trial court’s factual determination that petitioner’s plea 

was voluntary was not an unreasonable determination of the facts under § 2254(d)(2), ECF No. 

67 at 11–14; and, with regard to the state trial court’s ruling on petitioner’s request for a 

certificate of probable cause, “there is nothing to refute that the state court found [p]etitioner’s 

claim was simply not colorable, in light of the record,” ECF No. 74 at 3. As noted, respondent’s 

latter argument was not properly presented to the magistrate judge and is therefore untimely. 

Marlyn, 571 F.3d at 880. Notwithstanding the deficiency, this court addresses both arguments. 

Under § 2254(d)(2), “a decision adjudicated on the merits in a state court and 

based on a factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively 

unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El v. 

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 324 (2003). While federal courts are particularly deferential to statecourt findings, a determination that a trial court’s findings were unreasonable is made when a 

habeas court is “satisfied that any appellate court to whom the defect is pointed out would be 

unreasonable in holding that the state court’s fact-finding process was adequate.” Taylor v. 

Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004). “To fatally undermine the state fact-finding 

process, and render the resulting finding unreasonable, the overlooked or ignored evidence must 

be highly probative and central to petitioner’s claim.” Id. at 1001. 

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Here, the trial court did not hold an evidentiary hearing on petitioner’s involuntary 

plea claim or afford him the opportunity to present evidence regarding the claim when it both 

accepted his guilty plea and denied his request for a certificate of probable cause. Thus, the trial 

court did not make an explicit finding of fact on petitioner’s involuntary plea claim at either stage. 

Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1001 (“If, for example, a state court makes evidentiary findings without 

holding a hearing and giving petitioner an opportunity to present evidence, such findings clearly 

result in an ‘unreasonable determination’ of the facts.” (citing Weaver v. Thompson, 197 F.3d 

359, 363 (9th Cir. 1999); Nunes v. Mueller, 350 F.3d 1045, 1055 (9th Cir. 2003); Bryan v. Mullin, 

335 F.3d 1207, 1215–16 (10th Cir. 2003); Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941, 948–50 (5th Cir. 

2001))). As a result, “the state-court factual determination is perforce unreasonable and there is 

nothing to which the presumption of correctness can attach.” Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000–01. 

Here, even assuming the trial court reviewed the record on either occasion and 

made an implicit factual finding that petitioner’s claim was wholly frivolous, the finding is 

unreasonable in light of the record before the trial court. Goldyn v. Hayes, 444 F.3d 1062, 1065 

n.5 (9th Cir. 2006) (Expressing doubt that the federal court is “bound by a state court’s implicit 

findings under AEDPA,” and noting “deference to state court implicit factfinding would likely 

vitiate the function of federal courts on habeas, because the state could always point to some 

‘implicit’ finding by the state court to fill in a whole variety of constitutional defects.”). The 

record shows petitioner was adamant on two separate prior occasions that High Desert 

correctional officers pressured him to plead guilty to the charges through harassment and threats. 

While the trial court’s statements at the third, successful plea hearing reflect a recollection of the 

prior aborted hearings, nothing the court said reconciled the prior statements by petitioner with 

his about face, explained only by his desire to move on.4

 

In his decision, the magistrate judge accurately summarizes additional probative 

evidence in the record in support of his conclusion that the state trial court’s decision was 

 4

 For example, the plea form petitioner ultimately signed includes an asterisk next to the 

section on the form indicating the plea was not coerced, the section with which petitioner 

previously took issue. Lodg. Doc. 1 at 32. Whether or not petitioner or the trial court placed the 

asterisk on the form is unclear although the judge stated he was “highlighting” that section. 

Lodg. Doc. 2 at 47. 

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unreasonable. For example, petitioner informed the trial court he was handing a declaration to his 

attorney at the time he entered his guilty plea and the court did not inquire about the declaration. 

Also, petitioner was rushed during the plea hearing to both plead guilty and file an immediate 

appeal or be transferred out of High Desert, a detail not properly relegated to the insignificant, as 

respondent suggests in her opposition. Rather, petitioner’s actions corroborate his federal claim 

that his plea was involuntarily coerced by threats and harassment from High Desert correctional 

officers. See ECF No. 1 at 5–9. 

Moreover, to the extent the trial court relied solely on petitioner’s guilty plea in 

making its determination regarding petitioner’s request for a certificate of probable cause, the 

guilty plea was made without a renewed presentation of petitioner’s claim that his plea was 

involuntary. An isolated reliance on the plea colloquy in light of the substantial evidence 

surrounding the state court proceeding was objectively unreasonable. Nothing in the record 

allows this court as the reviewing court to know how the trial court accounted for petitioner’s 

prior accounts of threats, his handing a contemporaneous declaration to his lawyer, Lodg. Doc. 2 

at 27–28, 43, or whether it evaluated his demeanor during its fact-finding process. Taylor, 366 

F.3d at 999; Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 346. Thus, the trial court’s factual determination, if the court 

infers an implicit determination, that petitioner’s guilty plea was obtained in a constitutionally 

acceptable manner was an unreasonable determination of facts such that “an appellate panel, 

applying the normal standards of appellate review, could not reasonably conclude that the finding 

is supported by the record.” Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000, 1007–08 (“failure to take into account and 

reconcile key parts of the record casts doubt on the process by which the finding was reached, and 

hence on the correctness of the finding”). 

Accordingly, the magistrate judge did not error when it determined petitioner’s 

claim is not governed by § 2254(d)(2). 

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v. Evidentiary Hearing Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e) 

The magistrate judge held petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing under 

§ 2254(e) because petitioner was diligent in developing the factual basis of his claim in state court 

by requesting an evidentiary hearing and he made a colorable claim for relief. ECF No. 60 at 14–

18. 

Respondent argues the court cannot hold an evidentiary hearing because petitioner 

failed to pursue his claims in state court. ECF No. 67 at 15. Respondent contends because 

petitioner failed to present evidence regarding his guilty plea at the time of his plea, he cannot 

“bypass the hearing that was actually prescribed to determine the factual issues.” Id. 

In reply, petitioner argues his “claim is dependent upon matters only from outside 

the record and the state has not afforded petitioner an opportunity to develop them.” ECF No. 73 

at 18. Further, because the state court denied petitioner an evidentiary hearing, “he has not 

‘failed’ to develop the factual basis within the meaning” of § 2254(e)(2). Id. at 20 (citing 

Williams, 529 U.S. at 432). 

Here, upon reviewing the record, the court finds petitioner was diligent in 

developing his claim in his post-conviction proceedings. Petitioner requested a certificate of 

probable cause at the trial court level following his conviction and requested an evidentiary 

hearing on his claim filed in the California Supreme Court. Lodg. Doc. 1 at 45; Lodg. Doc. 5. 

While respondent argues petitioner’s “refusal to speak his current truth to the trial court was not a 

sufficient effort to try the facts,” ECF No. 67 at 15–16 (alterations omitted), petitioner’s efforts on 

review are not limited to his efforts at the trial court level. The court also considers whether 

petitioner was diligent in developing his claim in his post-conviction proceedings. Lopez v. Ryan, 

630 F.3d 1198, 1206 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding a lack of diligence because petitioner failed to 

properly allege his claim in his post-conviction proceedings); West v. Ryan, 608 F.3d 477, 484–85 

(9th Cir. 2010) (finding diligence in state post-conviction proceedings when petitioner 

demonstrated “persistent, though imperfect, efforts to obtain a hearing”); Stanley, 598 F.3d at 624 

& n.8 (petitioner did not fail to develop the factual basis of his claim because he sought an 

evidentiary hearing in his state petition for post-conviction relief). Considering the record before 

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the court, the magistrate judge correctly held “petitioner made a reasonable attempt to pursue his 

claims in state court.” ECF No. 60 at 16. 

Finally, there is reason to conclude an evidentiary hearing could enable petitioner 

to prove the factual allegations in his petition. Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 474. Petitioner 

communicated to the trial court on more than one occasion that correctional officers at High 

Desert were harassing and threatening to harm him if he went forward with his trial. Lodg. 

Doc. 2 at 27–28 & 33–34. If these factual allegations are proven true, petitioner would be 

entitled to federal habeas relief on his claim that his guilty plea was involuntary. The magistrate 

judge did not err in finding petitioner “demonstrated a colorable claim for federal habeas relief, 

despite the full plea colloquy.” ECF No. 60 at 16–17. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above, respondent’s February 24, 2014 motion for 

reconsideration (ECF No. 67) is DENIED. 

Dated: August 24, 2014. 

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