Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-03086/USCOURTS-ca8-05-03086-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Brett Clyde
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-3086

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff-Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of South Dakota.

Brett Clyde, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Defendant-Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: February 16, 2006

Filed: February 22, 2006

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, LAY and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Brett Clyde appeals his conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to

distribute a controlled substance, arguing the evidence was insufficient to support the

jury’s verdict. He also argues his 120-month sentence violates the Sixth Amendment.

We affirm.

I. Background

Brett Clyde was indicted for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and

to distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture containing methamphetamine in violation

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The Honorable Lawrence L. Piersol, United States District Judge for the

District of South Dakota, presiding.

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of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. In December 2004, Clyde was tried before a jury.1

In addition to being instructed on the charge in the indictment, the jury also received

two lesser-included offense instructions. The first lesser-included offense instruction

required the jury to determine whether Clyde was guilty of “conspiracy to possess

with intent to distribute or to distribute 50 grams or more” of a mixture containing

methamphetamine. The second lesser-included offense instruction required the jury

to determine whether Clyde was guilty of “conspiracy to possess with intent to

distribute or to distribute some amount” of a mixture containing methamphetamine.

The jury found Clyde guilty of the first lesser-included offense.

Jeff Duncan, the government’s primary witness, testified pursuant to a plea

agreement. Duncan testified that from late November 2003 until February 2004 he

obtained approximately two pounds of methamphetamine from Clyde. The

government introduced Duncan’s telephone records to corroborate his testimony that

he was regularly in contact with Clyde during this time. In February 2004, a

confidential informant working for a drug task force placed an order for

methamphetamine with Duncan. Duncan testified he drove from his home in Mitchell

to a house in Sioux Falls, where he bought methamphetamine from Clyde. Duncan

then drove back to Mitchell, where he was confronted by law enforcement agents.

While being apprehended, Duncan dropped a bag containing two smaller bags, which

held a total of 81.9 grams of methamphetamine. The smaller bags contained two

identifiable fingerprints, both of them Duncan’s.

The government also presented the testimony of several witnesses who knew

Duncan and believed he purchased methamphetamine from Clyde in order to resell

it. Curtis Stange, Duncan’s roommate for over two years, stated he and Duncan used

methamphetamine. Stange testified concerning several occasions in which Clyde sold

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methamphetamine to Duncan for Stange and Duncan to use. James Steinmetz testified

he bought methamphetamine from Clyde several times and introduced Duncan to

Clyde after Duncan told him his drug source had dried up. Steinmetz further testified

that, after introducing Duncan to Clyde, he (Steinmetz) stopped buying from Clyde

and instead bought from Duncan. Denise Moore and Lindath Kendall Stone testified

Duncan supplied them with methamphetamine and recounted trips they took with

Duncan during which they believed he obtained drugs from Clyde. Moore was with

Duncan in February 2004 during Duncan’s final methamphetamine purchase from

Clyde and corroborated Duncan’s version of events. The government also presented

the testimony of Jennie Smith, who testified she met Clyde through a friend.

According to Smith, Clyde came to her home and used her scale to divide a quarter

ounce of methamphetamine into two “eight balls.” Smith also stated she once

observed Clyde wrapping what she believed to be a quarter pound of

methamphetamine in black tape.

Clyde raises two issues on appeal. First, he argues the government’s evidence

was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict. In the alternative, Clyde argues his

sentence was imposed in violation of the Sixth Amendment.

II. Sufficiency of Evidence

We review sufficiency of evidence claims de novo, viewing the evidence “in

the light most favorable to the government, resolving conflicts in the government’s

favor, and accepting all reasonable inferences that support the verdict.” United States

v. Washington, 318 F.3d 845, 852 (8th Cir. 2003). In reviewing the record, “we will

uphold the verdict if there is any interpretation of the evidence that could lead a

reasonable-minded jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

United States v. Hamilton, 332 F.3d 1144, 1149 (8th Cir. 2003). Absent extraordinary

circumstances, the reviewing court does not weigh evidence or evaluate witnesses

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Such extraordinary circumstances arise when the reviewing court determines

no reasonable person could believe the testimony offered. United States v. Crenshaw,

359 F.3d 977, 988 (8th Cir. 2004) (“Although ordinarily witness credibility is left

completely to the jury and is beyond appellate review, we must reverse a conviction

if no reasonable person could believe the incriminating testimony.”). We have

indicated credibility determinations will be removed from the jury when the testimony

describes an actual physical impossibility under the laws of nature or when it was

physically impossible for the witness to have observed what he or she claims to have

witnessed. United States v. Baker, 367 F.3d 790, 798 (8th Cir. 2004).

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credibility when making sufficiency of evidence determinations.2

 United States v.

Crenshaw, 359 F.3d 977, 988 (8th Cir. 2004). “We will reverse only when the jury’s

verdict lacks substantial evidence to support it.” United States v. Titlbach, 339 F.3d

692, 696 (8th Cir. 2003).

To prove Clyde was guilty of conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt, “the

government must offer either direct or circumstantial evidence to show that at least

two people entered an agreement, the object of which was a violation of the law.”

United States v. Reeves, 83 F.3d 203, 206 (8th Cir. 1996). Here, the violation at issue

required the government to demonstrate Clyde conspired to possess with intent to

distribute 50 grams or more of a mixture containing methamphetamine. 

Clyde emphasizes that the government’s primary witness, Jeff Duncan, was a

co-conspirator who expected to receive a reduced sentence in exchange for his

testimony. He also points out that most of the other witnesses were also coconspirators who were friends of Duncan. Clyde appears to argue this evidence is not

sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict unless it is supported by what he describes as

“sufficient other non-co-conspirator evidence.” We disagree.

“Accomplice testimony is sufficient to support a conviction when it is not

incredible or insubstantial on its face.” United States v. Drews, 877 F.2d 10, 13 (8th

Cir. 1989); see also Unites States v. Lopez, 42 F.3d 463, 466 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating

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it is the jury’s role to weigh testimony in light of a witness’s possible motive for

testifying); United States v. Martinez, 958 F.2d 217, 218 (8th Cir. 1992) (“The jury

was aware of [the witness’s] cooperation with the government, of the potential for a

reduction of his sentence in exchange for his assistance, and of his extensive criminal

record. They were free to give whatever weight they chose to his testimony. It is the

sole province of the jury to weigh the credibility of a witness.”).

Here, the government’s witnesses did not present evidence that was incredible

or insubstantial on its face. Rather, the events recounted by the government’s

witnesses substantially support the jury’s conclusion that Clyde was guilty of

conspiring to possess with the intent to distribute 50 grams or more of a substance

containing methamphetamine. Specifically, Duncan detailed numerous drug

transactions with Clyde in which he obtained drugs to resell to others. His testimony

was corroborated by his phone records, which reflect frequent contact with Clyde.

Moore and Stone testified they obtained methamphetamine from Duncan and

recounted trips they took with Duncan in which they believe he purchased drugs from

Clyde for resale. Smith stated Clyde used her scale to weigh methamphetamine. She

also testified she once observed him wrapping drugs in electrical tape. The jury was

free to weigh the credibility of these witnesses and reject any testimony they regarded

as unbelievable. The jury’s verdict indicates it found the government’s witnesses

credible, a conclusion we will not disturb.

Clyde also notes the government presented limited physical evidence of the

crime charged, stating that, although Duncan testified he bought over two pounds of

methamphetamine from Clyde, the government introduced “only” the 81.9 grams of

methamphetamine Clyde sold to Duncan shortly before Duncan’s arrest. Clyde points

out this evidence contained Duncan’s fingerprints, not Clyde’s. Clyde’s argument

seems to be that the jury could not reasonably attribute to Clyde the sale of the 81.9

grams presented as evidence because the bags in which the drugs were packaged did

not contain his fingerprints. We find this argument unavailing. By presenting roughly

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82 grams of methamphetamine, the government’s physical evidence supported the

jury’s conclusion that Clyde conspired to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams

or more. It was the jury’s role to evaluate the credibility of Duncan’s testimony

regarding whether he obtained the drugs from Clyde. The jury apparently found

Duncan credible. Again, this is a conclusion we will not disturb. Accordingly,

viewing the jury’s verdict in the light most favorable to the government, we hold the

evidence presented by the government substantially supports the jury’s verdict.

III. Sentencing

Clyde’s conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams

or more of methamphetamine required a five-year minimum sentence under 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(b)(1)(B). However, § 841(b)(1)(B) requires courts to impose a minimum tenyear sentence if the defendant’s conviction occurs “after a prior conviction for a

felony drug offense has become final.” Clyde’s presentence investigation report

showed he had a qualifying prior conviction. Accordingly, the district court imposed

a ten-year minimum sentence as required by § 841(b)(1)(B).

Clyde asserts his prior conviction was based on facts not found by a jury. As

such, he argues the district court violated the Sixth Amendment by using the

conviction as a basis for imposing the mandatory ten-year minimum sentence.

However, in his brief to this court Clyde concedes the infirmity of his own argument,

noting “this Court has held numerous times that a district court which uses prior

convictions to impose a mandatory minimum sentence is on firm legal ground.”

Indeed, in United States v. Vieth we stated “the Supreme Court has consistently said

that the fact of a prior conviction is for the court to determine, not the jury.” 397 F.3d

615, 620 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) and

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, — , 125 S. Ct. 738, 756 (2005)). Here, based

on information in Clyde’s presentence investigation report, the district court found

Clyde had a previous qualifying conviction and imposed a ten-year minimum sentence

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as required by the governing statute. Given his previous conviction, this was the most

favorable sentence to which Clyde was entitled by law. See United States v. Torres,

409 F.3d 1000, 1004 (8th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, we reject Clyde’s Sixth

Amendment claim.

AFFIRMED.

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