Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-01982/USCOURTS-ca7-14-01982-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Stance D. Strong
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted January 6, 2015

Decided January 7, 2015

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

RICHARD D. CUDAHY, Circuit Judge

JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge

No. 14‐1982

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

STANCE D. STRONG,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 12‐20060‐01

Michael P. McCuskey,

Judge.

O R D E R

Stance Strong was caught selling crack cocaine to a police informant in Kankakee,

Illinois, and later pleaded guilty to distributing crack cocaine. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).

The court sentenced him below the guidelines range to 60 months’ imprisonment, the

statutory minimum. See id. § 841(b)(1)(B). Strong filed a notice of appeal, but his attorney

asserts that any argument would be frivolous and seeks to withdraw under Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Counsel has submitted a brief that explains the nature of

the case and addresses the issues that an appeal of this kind might be expected to

involve. Strong has not responded to our invitation to comment on counsel’s motion.

See CIR. R. 51(b). Because the analysis in the brief appears to be thorough, we limit our

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

Case: 14-1982 Document: 24 Filed: 01/07/2015 Pages: 2
No. 14‐1982    Page 2

review to the subjects that counsel has discussed. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774,

776 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996).

First counsel explains that Strong has no interest in challenging his guilty plea

and thus appropriately omits discussion about the adequacy of the plea colloquy and the

voluntariness of the plea. See United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012);

United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2002).

Counsel considers challenging the length of Strong’s sentence but properly

concludes that to do so would be frivolous. Strong admitted that the count of conviction

involved at least 28 grams of crack, making his 60‐month prison term the statutory

minimum, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B), well less than the correctly calculated guidelines

range (63 to 78 months based on a total of 167.5 grams and corresponding to an offense

level of 25, see U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1(c)(6) (2013), 3E1.1(a), (b), and Strong’s three

criminal‐history points, see id. § 4A1.1(c), 4A1.2(c)(1)). A below‐guidelines sentence is

presumptively reasonable. United States v. Shamah, 624 F.3d 449, 460 (7th Cir. 2010).

Counsel next considers arguing that Strong should have received relief under the

“safety valve,” which allows a sentence below the statutory minimum for certain

nonviolent drug offenses. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f); U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2. But counsel rightly

notes that Strong’s three criminal‐history points made him ineligible for a sentence

below the statutory minimum, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1); U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a)(1); Dorsey v.

United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2337 (2012), so any argument about the safety valve would

be frivolous.

The motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and the appeal is DISMISSED.

Case: 14-1982 Document: 24 Filed: 01/07/2015 Pages: 2