Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_15-cv-00859/USCOURTS-almd-2_15-cv-00859-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
N. J. Cereva
Defendant
Troy City Municipal Court
Defendant
Greg Wright
Defendant
Justin Youngblood
Plaintiff

Document Text:

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

JUSTIN YOUNGBLOOD, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:15CV859-WHA

)

TROY CITY MUNICIPAL COURT, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER and RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

By order entered on November 18, 2015, the District Judge has referred this case to

the undersigned for action or recommendation on all pretrial matters. (Doc. # 6). Plaintiff

Justin Youngblood, proceeding pro se, has filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma

pauperis in this action. Upon consideration of the motion, it is 

ORDERED that the motion (Doc. # 2) is GRANTED. 

However, upon review of the complaint, the court concludes that some of plaintiff’s

claims are due to be dismissed prior to service of process, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B). Thus, it is further 1

ORDERED that the Clerk is DIRECTED to serve the summons and complaint on the

defendants, and that defendants’ obligation to file an answer or otherwise to respond to the

The statute provides, in pertinent part: “[T]he court shall dismiss the case at any time if the 1

court determines that ... the action or appeal– (i) is frivolous or malicious, (ii) fails to state a claim

on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune

from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Case 2:15-cv-00859-WHA-SRW Document 9 Filed 11/24/15 Page 1 of 11
complaint is STAYED pending further order of the court.

Plaintiff styles his complaint “CIVIL RIGHTS LIABILITY UNDER 42 USC 1983”

and seeks redress for a violation of his due process rights and for assault and battery. 

(Complaint, p. 1). In the verified complaint, plaintiff alleges the following:

On the day of November 4th of 2015, I Justin Youngblood was scheduled for

an arraignment at 8:30 a.m. for attempt to elude, resisting arrest, & criminal

mischief 3rd degree. After my name was called, I begin to exercise my

Constitutional Right by the Authority of the 6th Amendment to be informed

of the nature and cause of the accusation. N. J. Cereva, administrator, begin

to ask how do I plea. I then stated I could not enter a plea until I had questions

answered concerning the nature and cause of the accusation by the Authority

of the 6th Amendment. After refusing to hear and acknowledge my questions

I then reserved my rights under the US Constitution and Constitution of the

State of Alabama. Immediately, I was threatened by Administrator N. J.

Cereva to be held in contempt if I did not enter a plea. 

After not consenting to enter a plea or contracting with the court without being

informed of full disclosure to the nature and cause of the accusations, I was

ignored and ordered to be held in contempt. As the bailiff approached, I

informed him that any violation of my rights, life, limb, or property would be

brought before a federal court. Again, ignored by the bailiff and 3 of his

colleague, I was forcedly grabbed and carried out of court without any due

process of law. With no jurisdiction to make the order of contempt or

jurisdiction to make any order the judge/ administrator, N. J. Cereva, was

completely in an excess of jurisdiction and ULTRA VIRES. Due to these torts

and ULTRA VIRES I was assaulted by Officer Greg Wright once carried by

other officers into the City Jail. While being held by other officers I was

forcedly choked by Officer Greg Wright, for two to three minutes. In the

process of being choked I screamed for help gradually over and over. After

calling for help, I was put in a cell with no uniform or clothing. While trying

to be released by a bondsman, I was placed on a hold for 24 hrs before able to

bond. After contacting the Mayor office on this matter I was released the same

day of November 4th of 2015 approximately 3:00 p.m.

Complaint, ¶¶ 1-2. Plaintiff further alleges that, upon his release, he “immediately rushed

2

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to the local hospital[,]” where he was treated and released. Id., ¶ 3. X-rays performed at the

hospital “showed bruised scratches and scar tissue.” Id. Plaintiffseeks a judgment awarding

him damages in the amount of $250,000.00 against the City of Troy Municipal Court,

Cereva, and Wright. (Id., p. 2). 2

DISCUSSION

Judicial Immunity

Plaintiff refers to defendant Cervera as “Administrator” (Complaint, ¶ 1), “judge/

administrator” (id., ¶ 2), and “magistrate” (Notice of Claim attached to complaint). The

municipal court’s records reflect that N. J. Cervera is the judge who presided over the 3

The municipal court’s docket reflects that this defendant’s surname is Cervera, not 2

“Cereva.” In this recommendation, the court adopts the spelling used by the municipal court for this

defendant’s name. (See n. 3, infra, and Doc. # 8). 

Plaintiff alleges that Judge Cervera “ordered [plaintiff] to be held in contempt” and that 3

he did so “[w]ith no jurisdiction to make the order of contempt or jurisdiction to make any order[.]” 

(Complaint, ¶ 2). The subject matter jurisdiction of the state court is a matter of law and, thus, the

court need not accept plaintiff’s allegation as true. The court finds that, by challenging Judge

Cervera’s jurisdiction to enter the contempt order, plaintiff has incorporated by reference the Troy

Municipal Court’s record of proceedings for the charges against him that appeared on the docket of

November 4, 2015, and that the municipal court record is central to plaintiff’s claim that Judge

Cervera violated plaintiff’s due process rights by ordering – in the absence of jurisdiction to do so

– that plaintiff be held in contempt of the court. The court may take judicial notice of the municipal

court’s record in evaluating the present complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). See

LaGrasta v. First Union Securities, Inc., 358 F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004)(“In analyzing the

sufficiency of the complaint, we limit our consideration to the well-pleaded factual allegations,

documents central to or referenced in the complaint, and matters judicially noticed.”); Davis v. Self,

547 F. App’x. 927, 929-30 (11th Cir. Nov. 19, 2013)(unpublished opinion)(finding no error in

district court’s taking judicial notice, in resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “of opinions and

judgments in the underlying custody and child support proceedings, many of which were attached

as exhibits to [the plaintiff’s] complaint”)(citing Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2); Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor

Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007); and United States v. Jones, 29 F.3d 1549, 1553

(11th Cir. 1994)). While “a complaint conflicting with facts of which the district court may take

3

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November 4, 2015, docket. Judge Cervera’s absolute judicial immunity bars plaintiff’s

§1983 claims against him for damages. “Judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity 4

from damages for those acts taken while they are acting in their judicial capacity unless they

acted in the ‘“clear absence of all jurisdiction.”’” Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th

Cir. 2000)(quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978)). “Whether a judge’s

actions were made while acting in his judicial capacity depends on whether: (1) the act

complained of constituted a normal judicial function; (2) the events occurred in the judge’s

chambers or in open court; (3) the controversy involved a case pending before the judge; and

(4) the confrontation arose immediately out of a visit to the judge in his judicial capacity.” 

Sibley v. Lando, 437 F.3d 1067, 1070 (11th Cir. 2005); see Stump, 435 U.S. at 362 (“The

relevant cases demonstrate that the factors determining whether an act by a judge is a

‘judicial’ one relate to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally

performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the

judge in his judicial capacity.”).5

judicial notice might also properly be dismissed under Section 1915[]” (Taylor v. Gibson, 529 F.2d

709 (5th Cir. 1976), there are no such conflicts in the present case between plaintiff’s allegations and

the judicially-noticed municipal court records. 

 Plaintiff seeks monetary damages only. (See Complaint, p. 2). 4

Judicial immunity is an affirmative defense. Boyd v. Carroll, 624 F.2d 730,732-33 (5th 5

Cir. 1980). It may, nevertheless, support dismissal for failure to state a claim on which relief may

be granted, if the complaint itself establishes the defense. See Sibley, 437 F.3d at 1070 n. 2 (“We

reject Sibley’s argument that the failure to plead the affirmative defense of judicial immunity

precludes dismissal, because dismissal is available, as in this case, when the defense is an obvious

bar given the allegations”); see also LeFrere v. Quezada, 582 F.3d 1260, 1263 (11th Cir. 2009)(“If

the complaint contains a claim that is facially subject to an affirmative defense, that claim may be

4

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Plaintiff complains of the defendant judge’s in-court conduct during the docket held

at 8:30 a.m. on November 4, 2015, and seeks monetary damages arising from Judge

Cervera’s decision to proceed without acknowledging or answering plaintiff’s questions

regarding the “nature and cause of the accusation” (Complaint, ¶ 1) and, thereafter, holding

plaintiff in contempt of the court (id., ¶ 2). Plaintiff alleges no extrajudicial acts by Judge

Cervera and no encounters with him other than in court. It is clear that plaintiff’s claims rest

entirely on acts performed by Judge Cervera in the performance of normal judicial functions. 

Thus, Judge Cervera is absolutely immune from plaintiff’s claims for damages unless he

acted in the “‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’” Bolin, 225 F.3d at 1239 (citation omitted). 

The Alabama legislature has provided that the municipal court “shall have jurisdiction

of all prosecutions for the breach of the ordinances of the municipality within its police

jurisdiction” and “concurrent jurisdiction with the district court of all acts constituting

violations of state law committed within the policy jurisdiction of the municipality which

may be prosecuted as breaches of municipal ordinances.” Ala. Code § 12-14-1(b), (c).

Plaintiff alleges that “[o]n the day of November 4th of 2015, I, Justin Youngblood was

scheduled for an arraignment at 8:30 a.m. for attempt to elude, resisting arrest, & criminal

mischief 3rd degree.” (Complaint, ¶ 1). The municipal court docket for 8:30 a.m. on

dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6)); Quiller v. Barclays American/Credit, Inc., 727 F.2d 1067, 1069

(11th Cir. 1984), opinion reinstated on rehearing en banc, 764 F.2d 1400 (11th Cir. 1985)(“The

claim may be adequately stated ... but in addition to the claim the complaint may include matters of

avoidance that preclude the pleader’s ability to recover. When this occurs, the complaint has a builtin defense and is essentially self-defeating.”). 

5

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November 4, 2015, indicates that plaintiff appeared before Judge Cervera on three cases:

14N0317, 15N0823, and 15N0824. (See Doc. # 8). The complaints in each of these cases

charge the plaintiff with violating “Ordinance Number 1-14-1[,]” which is alleged to

embrace particular cited provisions of Title 13A of the Alabama Code. In case number

14N0317, the complaint charges that plaintiff committed the offense of “CRIMINAL

MISCHIEF 3RD within the City of TROY or in the police jurisdiction thereof[.]” (Doc. # 8-

1). The complaints in case numbers 15N0823 and 15N0824 charge plaintiff with,

respectively, “Resisting Arrest” and “Attempting to Elude[,]” also “within the Cityof TROY,

ALABAMA or in the police jurisdiction thereof[.]” (Docs. ## 8-2, 8-3). He does not state

the factual basis underlying his conclusory allegation that Judge Cervera had no jurisdiction

to issue any order at all, including the contempt order, or that he acted ultra vires and

“completely in an excess of jurisdiction.” (See Complaint, ¶ 2). Because plaintiff was

charged with violating – within the City of Troy or its police jurisdiction – a municipal

ordinance that embraces the state criminal code, the TroyMunicipal Court had subject matter

jurisdiction over each of the three cases in which plaintiff appeared before Judge Cervera on

November 4, 2015. See Ala. Code, § 12-14-1; Art VI, § 145, Ala. Const. of 1901 (“All

municipal courts shall have uniform original jurisdiction limited to cases arising under

municipal ordinances as prescribed by law.”); see generally, Ex parte Safeway Ins. Co. of

Alabama, Inc., 148 So.3d 39, 42-43 (Ala. 2013)(“Subject matter jurisdiction is a simple

concept: Jurisdiction of the subject matter is the power to hear and determine cases of the

6

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general class to which the proceedings in question belong. ... In determining a trial court’s

subject-matter jurisdiction, this Court asks only whether the trial court had the constitutional

and statutory authority to hear the case. Problems with subject-matter jurisdiction arise if,

for example, a party files a probate action in a juvenile court, a divorce action is a probate

court, or a bankruptcy petition in a circuit court, because the nature or class of those actions

is limited to a particular forum with the authority to handle them.”)(citations and internal

quotation marks omitted); Ex parte Collins, 84 So.3d 48, 51-52 (Ala. 2010) (“Subject-matter

jurisdiction concerns a court’s power to decide certain types of cases. Further, a court’s

power is derived from the Alabama Constitution and the Alabama code. Therefore whether

a circuit court has subject-matter jurisdiction over a case is determined by inquiring as to

whether the circuit court has the requisite constitutional or statutory authority over the case.”)

(internal quotation marks, alteration brackets, and citations omitted; emphasis in original). 

Thus, Judge Cervera is entitled to absolute judicial immunity as to plaintiff’s § 1983 claims

for damages even if, as plaintiff contends, the defendant’s acts were in excess of his

authority. Dykes v. Hosemann, 776 F.2d 942, 946 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (judges having

subject matter jurisdiction of a case enjoy absolute immunity from § 1983 claims for

damages); Bolin, 225 F.3d at 1239 (absolute judicial immunity “applies even when the

judge’s acts are in error, malicious, or were in excess of his or her jurisdiction”)(citing

Stump, 435 U.S. at 356); Harris v. Deveaux, 780 F.2d 911, 916 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that

a Georgia municipal court judge had absolute judicial immunity because he acted in his

7

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judicial capacity and did not act “in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction’”). 

To the extent that plaintiff asserts claims arising under state law against Judge

Cervera, any such claims are also due to be dismissed. See Ex parte City of Greensboro, 948 6

So.2d 540, 542 (Ala. 2006) (observing, in deciding a case involving claims against a

municipal magistrate, that “[j]udges acting in an official judicial capacity are entitled to

absolute judicial immunity under Alabama law[.]”); id. at 543-44 (“Davis’s actions, as a

magistrate and court clerk for the City of Greensboro, were discretionary judicial acts. She

is entitled to absolute judicial immunity ... . Consequently, we pretermit any discussion of

the issue of discretionary-function immunity.”). According to the complaint, Judge Cervera

was in the process of taking plaintiff’s plea when he ordered that plaintiff be held in

contempt of court. (Complaint, ¶¶ 1-2). Taking a criminal defendant’s plea and holding a

party in contempt are uniquely judicial functions, and plaintiff alleges no extra-judicial acts

by Judge Cervera. Accordingly, plaintiff’s state law claims against Judge Cervera are also

barred by the defendant’s absolute judicial immunity.

Municipal Liability

In the style of his complaint, plaintiff names the Troy City Municipal Court as a

defendant. (Doc. # 1, p. 1). However, he attaches to his complaint a copy of a Notice of

While it is not clear from the allegations in the body of the complaint that plaintiff brings

6

a state law cause of action against Judge Cervera, the “Notice of Claim” that he has attached to his

complaint indicates that plaintiff claims injury resulting from Officer Wright’s assault and battery

and Judge Cervera’s “violation of the US Constitution and state of Alabama Constitution.” (Doc.

# 1-1).

8

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Claim bearing a statement that it was hand-delivered to the city clerk and in which he claims

to have suffered injury and damages due to the conduct of “CITY EMPLOYEE[S] ... N.J.

Cereva and Greg Wright[.]” (Doc. # 1-1). Pursuant to its duty to construe the pro se

plaintiff’s complaint liberally, the court treats the complaint as asserting claims against the

City of Troy, instead of the city court. However, plaintiff’s allegations fail to state an 7

actionable § 1983 claim or state law claim against the city based on Judge Cervera’s conduct. 

This is true for two reasons. First, “[a] municipality may not be held liable under

section 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior. It is only when the execution of the

government’s policy or custom ... inflicts the injury that the municipality may be held liable

under section 1983.” Snow v. City of Citronelle, 420 F.3d 1262, 1270-71 (11th Cir. 2005)

(citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989)) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Plaintiff alleges no facts to suggest that his injury was the direct result of a

municipal policy or custom and, thus, he has failed to state a § 1983 claim against the city

based on the alleged conduct of either Judge Cervera or Officer Wright.

It is questionable whether the Troy Municipal Court is an entity subject to suit under 7

Alabama law. See Ala. Code, Tit. 12, Ch. 14, Art. 1 (creating municipal courts without any

indication of legislative intent to authorize lawsuits against the courts); Tallaseehatchie Creek

Watershed ConservancyDist. v. Allred, 620 So.2d 628, 631 (Ala. 1993) (“[T]CWCD will be subject

to suit unless the language in [the statute specifying the powers of the district’s board] is insufficient

to authorize an action against TCWCD.”); Cook v. St. Clair County, 384 So.2d 1, 4 (Ala. 1980)

(“Section 11-1-2, Code 1975, provides, ‘Every county is a body corporate, with power to sue or be

sued in any court of record.’ This provision contains the words ‘be sued’ which this Court has stated

in Lorence, Sims and Caver to be essential to a determination of statutory authorization of suits

against a governmental entity.”). Because it appears from the “Notice of Claim” attached to

plaintiff’s complaint that he intends to sue the City of Troy, the court need not resolve this issue.

9

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Additionally, because the alleged conduct of Judge Cervera entitles the municipal

court judge to absolute judicial immunity, the city may not be held liable for that conduct. 

See Ex parte City of Greensboro, 938 So.2d at 543-544 (“Davis’s actions, as a magistrate and

court clerk for the City of Greensboro, were discretionary judicial acts. She is entitled to

absolute judicial immunity, and the Cityof Greensboro cannot be held liable for those acts.”). 

Thus, plaintiff fails to state a claim under state law against the city for any injury caused by

Judge Cervera’s conduct. 

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that, pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B):

(1) plaintiff’s claims against Judge N. J. Cervera be DISMISSED, as they are barred

by Judge Cervera’s absolute judicial immunity;

(2) plaintiff’s state law claims against the Troy City Municipal Court (City of Troy)

– to the extent that they arise from Judge Cervera’s conduct – be DISMISSED, as they are

also precluded by the defendant judge’s absolute judicial immunity;

(3) all of plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against the Troy City Municipal Court (City of

Troy) be DISMISSED, as the complaint does not state a claim for municipal liability under

§ 1983;

(4) that this matter be referred back to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for further

proceedings.

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The Clerk of the Court is ORDERED to file the Recommendation of the Magistrate

Judge and to serve a copy on the plaintiff. Plaintiff is DIRECTED to file any objections to

this Recommendation on or before December 8, 2015. Any objections must identify the

specific factual findings and legal conclusions in the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation

to which the plaintiff objects. Frivolous, conclusory, or general objections will not be

considered by the District Court.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the

Magistrate Judge’s report shall bar a party froma de novo determination by the District Court

of factual findings and legal issues covered in the report and shall “waive the right to

challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal

conclusions” except upon grounds of plain error if necessary in the interests of justice. 11th

Cir. R. 3-1; see Resolution Trust Co. v. Hallmark Builders, Inc., 996 F.2d 1144, 1149 (11th

Cir. 1993); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989).

DONE, this 24 day of November, 2015. th

/s/ Susan Russ Walker 

SUSAN RUSS WALKER

CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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