Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-03390/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-03390-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert Capretto Jr.
Plaintiff
Michael Irigaray
Defendant
Stryker Corporation
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT CAPRETTO, JR.,

Plaintiff,

 v.

STRYKER CORPORATION,

MICHAEL IRIGARAY, and 

Does 1-50, inclusive,

Defendants. /

No. C 07-03390 WHA

ORDER GRANTING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO

REMAND TO STATE COURT

AND DENYING MOTION FOR

ATTORNEY’S FEES AND

VACATING HEARING

INTRODUCTION

In this employment-discrimination action, plaintiff Robert Capretto Jr. moves to remand

this case to state court. Defendant Stryker Corporation removed this matter to federal court

based on diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1332(a) and 1441(b). This order finds that

Stryker (1) did not file a notice of removal in a timely manner and (2) waived its right to

remove. Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion to remand is GRANTED. Plaintiff's request for

attorney's fees is, however, DENIED because Stryker has presented more than a colorable basis

for removal. 

STATEMENT

On March 28, 2006, plaintiff filed a complaint against his former employer, Stryker

Corporation, and former supervisor, Michael Irigaray, in Solano County Superior Court. The

complaint alleged claims against Stryker for disability discrimination under the California Fair

Case 3:07-cv-03390-WHA Document 15 Filed 08/29/07 Page 1 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 Stryker mistakenly removed the case to the Northern District instead of the Eastern District of

California. This error does not require a remand to state court. According to 28 U.S.C. 1406(a), “[t]he district

court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be

in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.”

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Employment and Housing Act and tortious discharge in violation of public policy. The only

claim plaintiff alleged against Irigaray was for disability harassment in violation of FEHA

(Compl. ¶¶ 17–27). 

When the complaint was first filed, there was no complete diversity of citizenship. 

Although Stryker was a Michigan corporation with its principal place of business in Michigan, 

Irigaray and plaintiff Capretto were both citizens California. Plaintiff served defendants with

the complaint on or about March 28, 2006 (Notice of Removal ¶¶ 2, 9–10).

Defendants deposed plaintiff in August (Notice of Removal Exh. C at 1). Irigaray was

deposed in November (Notice of Removal Exh. D at 1). On December 20, 2006, all defendants

filed a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff filed his opposition papers to the motion for

summary judgment on April 16, 2007. Defendants filed their reply papers on April 25, 2006. 

On April 30, 2006, the state court heard argument on the motion for summary judgment. On

June 8, 2006, the state court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants with respect to

plaintiff’s disability-harassment claim. The state court denied summary judgment as to the

claims of disability discrimination and tortious discharge. On June 28, 2006, defendant Stryker

filed a notice of removal of the case to federal court on grounds of diversity jurisdiction and the

fraudulent joinder of Michael Irigaray as a defendant (Notice of Removal ¶¶ 4–5).1

ANALYSIS

1. STANDARD FOR REMOVAL.

Defendants may remove a civil action from state court to federal court pursuant to 28

U.S.C. 1441(a). The strong presumption against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant

bears the burden of establishing proper removal. Gaus v. Miles Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th

Cir. 1992). Specifically, defendant here has the burden of showing that this Court can exercise

diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1332, namely, that plaintiff has different state citizenship

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 For purposes of its diversity analysis, this Court properly disregards the 50 Does named as

defendants. See 28 U.S.C. 1441(a) (“For purposes of removal . . . the citizenship of defendants sued under

fictitious names shall be disregarded”).

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than all properly named defendants. “Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt

as to the right of removal in the first instance,” such that courts must resolve all doubts as to

removability in favor of remand. Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566.2

Defendant here alleges that removal was proper once it was revealed that Irigaray was

likely a sham defendant who was joined solely to defeat diversity. This order assumes for the

sake of argument that Irigaray was a sham defendant. Under 28 U.S.C. 1446, defendant had 30

days to remove this action to federal court once defendant discovered that Irigaray was a sham

defendant.

2. TIMELINESS OF REMOVAL.

When removability is uncertain, the period of timeliness is measured from the point at

which the defendant had notice that the case was removable. 28 U.S.C. 1446(b). Section

1446(b) provides that the notice of removal should be filed within 30 days of “a copy of an

amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the

case is one which is or has become removable.” Interrogatory responses and other discovery

documents can constitute an “other paper” for Section 1446(b) purposes. Brewster v. A.W.

Chesterton Co., No. 07-1688 WHA, 2007 WL 1056774, *1 (Apr. 6, 2007 N.D. Cal.) (Alsup, J.). 

The comments to 28 U.S.C. 1446(b) further explain that “[t]he paper that reveals the phoniness

of the non-diverse defendant’s joinder may be, e.g., the deposition of some non-party witness.”

Defendant alleges that this action first became removable once the state court held that

plaintiff could not establish his claim for harassment against Irigaray. This order disagrees. 

Defendant should have known of the removability of this action and Irigaray’s alleged sham

status long before the superior court ruled on the motion. In August 2006, defendants deposed

plaintiff. Irigaray was deposed in November. On December 20, 2006, defendants moved for

summary judgment. The decision on summary judgment rested on evidence obtained from the

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depositions of plaintiff and Irigaray. This order holds that the depositions, which were

discovery documents, constituted “other papers” from which it could have first been ascertained

that the case had become removable. By December 20, 2006, when defendants moved for

summary judgment, they had sufficient information to be on notice that no possible harassment

claim against Irigaray existed. It was at this point that defendants knew or should have known

that Irigaray was a sham defendant. Accordingly, at the latest, the removal clock started

running on December 20, 2006. Defendant Stryker failed to remove the case to federal court

until June 28, 2007, well beyond the 30-day limit. Because its removal fell outside the 30-day

window, defendant waived its right to remove the state court action to federal court. See, e.g.,

Sehl v. Safari Motor Coaches, Inc., No. 01-1750, 2001 WL 940846, *4 (N.D. Cal. 2001)

(Illston, J.) (“[S]ince [defendant] failed to remove the case within thirty days of the original

complaint, which was removable at the time, [defendant] thereby waived its right to file a

subsequent removal even though the complaint was amended to create a new basis for

removal.”).

3. WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO REMOVE.

There exists another separate and independent basis for removal. “A party, generally the

defendant, may waive the right to remove to federal court where, after it is apparent that the

case is removable, the defendant takes actions in state court that manifest his or her intent to

have the matter adjudicated there, and to abandon his or her right to a federal forum.” 

Resolution Trust Corp. v. Bayside Developers, 43 F.3d 1230, 1240 (9th Cir. 1994). Acts such

as seeking an injunction and moving for summary judgment have been held to manifest the

defendant's intent to have the matter resolved in a state forum. Zbranek v. Hofheinz, 727

F.Supp. 324, 325 (E.D. Tex. 1989) (Cobb, J.) (“[B]y actively invoking the state court's

jurisdiction in seeking an injunction, summary judgment and an order requiring re-pleading by

plaintiffs, defendants lost their right to remove.”). 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Defendants seek to distinguish Zbranek from the instant case. They argue that the

parties in Zbranek “participated in extensive proceedings” in state court, which included an

injunction hearing, a special exceptions hearing, a motion to quash a subpoena for depositions,

a motion for summary judgment and the filing of an amended answer. Here, defendants filed a

motion for summary judgment. The only other motions filed were plaintiff's requests to

continue the hearing on the motion for summary judgment. 

Defendants err in their reasoning, and this Court finds that Zbranek is analogous. The

main concern in Zbranek was that the defendant invoked the state's jurisdiction to resolve

issues, which defendants did in this case by filing a motion for summary judgment. In Bolivar

Sand Co., Inc. v. Allied Equipment, Inc., 631 F.Supp. 171, 173 (W.D. Tenn. 1986) (Todd, J.),

the court stated: “The critical factor in determining whether a particular defensive action in the

state court should operate as a waiver of the right to remove is the defendant's intent in making

the motion. If the motion is made only to preserve the status quo ante and not to dispose of the

matter on its merits, it is clear that no waiver has occurred. On the other hand, if a motion seeks

a disposition, in whole or in part, of the action on its merits, the defendant may not attempt to

invoke the right to remove after losing on the motion.” Still other courts have ruled that “a

defendant who seeks a summary judgment in state court affirmatively invokes the state court's

jurisdiction and demonstrates his clear intent to have the state court proceed on the merits of the

case.” Jacko v. Thorn Americas, Inc., 121 F.Supp.2d 574, 576 (E.D. Tex. 2000) (Cobb, J.). 

Defendants here moved for summary judgment on December 20, 2006. Plaintiff filed

opposition papers on April 16, 2007 and defendants filed their reply papers on April 25, 2007. 

The state court heard argument on the motion for summary judgment on April 30, 2007. 

Defendants' conduct clearly manifested an intent to have the state court proceed on the merits of

the case. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit resolves doubts as to removability in favor of remand. 

Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. Stryker waived its right to remove. This is an alternative and

independent basis for removal. 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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4. REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES.

Plaintiff requests an award of costs and attorney's fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1447(c),

which provides that an order of remand “may require payment of just costs and any actual

expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.” A court has “wide

discretion” in deciding whether to award attorney's fees. Moore v. Permanente Med. Group,

981 F.2d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 1992). Although this order grants plaintiff's motion to remand,

defendant’s arguments regarding the propriety of removal were not unfounded. Defendant

believed it only discovered the alleged fraudulent joinder after the superior court ruled on the

motion for summary judgment. This argument was barely plausible, sufficiently so to avoid the

sanction of attorney’s fees.

CONCLUSION

The plaintiff’s motion to remand is GRANTED. This case is hereby remanded to Solano

County Superior Court. Plaintiff's request for attorney's fees and costs is DENIED. The hearing

on this motion is hereby VACATED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 29, 2007 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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