Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00189/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00189-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Arthur S. Criscione
Petitioner
Kathy Mendoza-Powers
Respondent

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ARTHUR S. CRISCIONE,

Petitioner,

v.

KATHY MENDOZA-POWERS,

Respondent.

 /

CV F 05-0189 WMW HC

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER RE

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF

APPEALABILITY

Petitioner is a prisoner proceeding with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. Section 2254. Pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the parties have consented to the

jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge. Respondent opposes the petition.

BACKGROUND

On July 25, 1979, Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder in Santa Clara County

Superior Court. Petitioner does not challenge the propriety of his conviction. 

On July 12, 2002, the Governor reversed the decision of the Board of Prison Terms (“the

Board”) to grant parole to Petitioner. Petitioner challenges the Governor’s decision in this present

action.

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the Santa Clara County Superior

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Court in which he claimed as follows: (1) the Governor’s decision was not supported by some

evidence; (2) the Governor had a no parole policy; and (3) California Penal Code section 3041.2 is

unconstitutional. On June 27, 2003, the court entered an order reversing the Governor’s decision

and reinstating the decision of the Board.

Respondent appealed to the California Court of Appeal. On April 22, 2004, the Court of

Appeal issued an opinion reversing the Superior Court’s decision. The Court of Appeal found that

the Governor did not have a no-parole policy and that his decision was supported by some evidence.

Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California Supreme Court, which the court

summarily denied.

Petitioner filed the present petition in this court on February 10, 2005.

LEGAL STANDARDS

JURISDICTION

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant

to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct.

1495, 1504 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by

the United States Constitution. In addition, the conviction challenged arises out of Taft Correctional

Center, which is located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d). 

Accordingly, the court has jurisdiction over the action. 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. 

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct.

586 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 th

F.3d 751, 769 (5 Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107, 117 S.Ct. 1114 (1997), overruled on other

th

grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059 (1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable

to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of the

AEDPA, thus it is governed by its provisions. 

//

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The AEDPA altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply with

respect to a state prisoner's claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court. Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518-23 (2000). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus will

not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 1173 (2003) (disapproving of the Ninth

Circuit’s approach in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9 Cir. 2000)); Williams v. Taylor, 120 th

S.Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). “A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Lockyer, at 1174 (citations omitted). “Rather,

that application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citations omitted). 

When, as here, the California Supreme Court’s opinion is summary in nature, however, this

Court "looks through" that decision and presumes it adopted the reasoning of the California Court of

Appeal, the last state court to have issued a reasoned opinion. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S.

797, 804-05 & n. 3, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991) (establishing, on habeas review, "look

through" presumption that higher court agrees with lower court's reasoning where former affirms

latter without discussion); see also LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n. 7 (9 Cir.2000) th

(holding federal courts look to last reasoned state court opinion in determining whether state court's

rejection of petitioner's claims was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law under §

2254(d)(1)). 

While habeas corpus relief is an important instrument to assure that individuals are

constitutionally protected, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3391-3392 (1983);

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The statute provides: 1

(a) During the 30 days following the granting, denial, revocation, or suspension by a parole authority of the parole of a person

sentenced to an indeterminate prison term based upon a conviction of murder, the Governor, when reviewing the authority's

decision pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 8 of Article V of the Constitution, shall review materials provided by the

parole authority.

(b) If the Governor decides to reverse or modify a parole decision of a parole authority pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section

8 of Article V of the Constitution, he or she shall send a written statement to the inmate specifying the reasons for his or her

decision.

Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086 (1969), direct review of a criminal

conviction is the primary method for a petitioner to challenge that conviction. Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993). In addition, the state court’s factual

determinations must be presumed correct, and the federal court must accept all factual findings made

by the state court unless the petitioner can rebut “the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S.Ct. 1769

(1995); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116 S.Ct. 457 (1995); Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380,

1388 (9 Cir. 1997). th

DISCUSSION

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

Respondent contends that the court should deny this petition for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction, because Petitioner does not have a federal liberty interest in parole. The United States

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has since decided this issue, finding that California's parole

statute does create a due process liberty interest in release on parole. Sass v. California Board of

Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123 (9 Cir. 2006). Accordingly, the court finds no merit to this

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contention.

E POST FACTO VIOLATION

Petitioner claims that the application of Proposition 89, and Penal Code Section 3041.2 to 1

him is a violation of the prohibition against ex post facto application of the law. Respondent

contends that Petitioner’s ex post facto claim is without merit. Respondent relies on Johnson v.

Gomez, 92 F.3d 964 (9 Cir. 1996), in which the court found that the amendment to the California th

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Constitution giving the Governor the authority to reverse the Board’s decision to allow or deny

parole to persons sentenced to indeterminate terms of imprisonment upon conviction of murder did

not violate the ex post facto law. In that case, at the time of Johnson’s conviction California law

provided that the Board, acting as both a panel and a review committee, had sole responsibility for

deciding whether incarcerated defendants were suitable for parole. Id. at 965. Then, in 1988,

California voters approved Proposition 89, which added Section 8(b) to Article V of the California

Constitution to provide for review by the Governor. This is the same provision challenged by

Petitioner. 

Johnson was found suitable for parole by a Board panel on August 19, 1991. The Board

Decision Review Committee affirmed the decision, but under the new law, Johnson was not eligible

for immediate release. Under Section 8(b), his release was conditioned upon the expiration of the

thirty-day gubernatorial review period. The Governor of California exercised his review power on

October 18, 1991, and reversed the Board’s decision. 

Johnson filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus and the district court denied the writ,

finding no ex post facto violation. Johnson v. Gomez, 876 F.Supp. 226 (E.D. Cal. 1995). On

appeal, the Ninth Circuit reviewed Supreme Court precedent, ending with California Department of

Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 115 S.Ct. 1597 (1995). In Morales, the issue was a change in

the law to provide one class of petitioners with fewer parole hearings. The petitioner in Morales had

never been granted parole under the old law. The Court rejected the petitioner’s ex post facto claim

on the ground that he could not prove that the change in parole procedures created more than a

speculative risk of increasing his punishment. Id. at 115 S.Ct. at 1603.

After reviewing the Morales decision, the Ninth Circuit in Johnson found that, “[i]n this case,

Johnson is similarly unable to demonstrate that an increase in his punishment actually occurred,

because, like the petitioner in Morales, he had not been granted parole under the old law. Johnson,

92 F.3d at 967. “Here, because the BPT’s parole decision is not final until after the expiration of the

thirty-day gubernatorial review period, it cannot be said with certainty that the BPT would have

granted Johnson parole had it possessed the final review authority.” Id. The Ninth Circuit thus

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concluded that, “the application of Proposition 89 to authorize the governor’s review of Johnson’s

grant of parole did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.” Id.

 The court finds, therefore, that under the controlling Ninth Circuit authority in Johnson,

Petitioner’s ex post facto claim is without merit. The court must conclude that this claim presents no

basis for habeas corpus relief.

DUE PROCESS

Petitioner contends that he has “exceeded far beyond the matrix for second degree murder.” 

He claims that he has spent almost twice as long in prison as called for under the “statutory

proportionary criteria.” Petitioner also contends that he has met all factors showing suitability for

parole set forth in the California Code of Regulations. Further, Petitioner contends that he has had

excellent psychological evaluations for the past nine years Habeas corpus relief is not available to

correct alleged errors in the state court's application or interpretation of state law. Estelle v.

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480 (1991); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1084-

85 (9th Cir.1985). To the extent that these contentions state a federal claim, the court interprets

them as due process claims.

The standard to be applied in analyzing a due process claim related to the deprivation of

parole is the “some evidence” standard. Sass v. California Board of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d at 1129,

citing Jancsek v. Or. Bd. of Parole, 833 F.2d 1389, 1390 (9th Cir.1987). The Ninth Circuit has

explained, “[t]o determine whether the some evidence standard is met “does not require examination

of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the

evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could

support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445,

455-56, 105 S.Ct. 2768.

In the present case, the Court of Appeal denied Petitioner’s petition, finding that the

Governor’s decision was supported by some evidence. Noting first that the Governor had concluded

that Petitioner was unsuitable for parole because he still poses an unreasonable risk of danger if

released at this time, the Court of Appeal found that some evidence existed to support that

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conclusion. The Court of Appeal found:

In light of the coroner’s conclusion that Quintanar had died of both strangulation and

drowning, the fact that Criscione first strangled Quintanar until she was rendered

unconscious and then, without knowing whether she was already dead, he pushed her limp

body into a partially filled bathtub, provides some evidence that Criscione acted with cold,

calculated dispassion and that he gratuitously prolonged Quintanar’s pain and suffering, i.e.,

that the offense was committed in a manner that showed “exceptionally callous disregard for

human suffering.” (Regs., § 2402, subd.(d)(1)(D).) Accordingly, the Governor’s parole

decision that Criscione was unsuitable for parole was supported by some evidence related to

the specified factors governing parole.

The Court of Appeal also found some evidence supporting the Governor’s conclusions that 1)

Petitioner had a history of domestic violence and tumultuous relationships with women, that

culminated in his offense; 2) Petitioner had a history of mental illness that culminated in his offense;

3) Petitioner’s gains regarding his potential for violence against women were recent; and 4)

Petitioner’s remorse and acceptance of full responsibility for his crime were inadequate. The Court

of Appeal supported each of these findings with extensive citation to the record and analysis.

Petitioner has not and indeed can not, dispute the existence of this evidence as found by the

Court of Appeal. This court finds that this evidence constitutes some evidence to support the Court

of Appeal’s decision to reinstate the decision of the Governor. Consequently, the Court of Appeal’s

decision was neither contrary to, nor did it involve an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d). Petitioner’s due process claim therefore provides no basis for habeas corpus relief.

Petitioner may seek to appeal from the judgment of the court in this case. Petitioner cannot

proceed on such an appeal absent a certificate of appealability. The controlling statute, 28 U.S.C. §

2253, provides as follows:

(a) In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under section 2255 before a district judge,

the final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by the court of appeals for the circuit in

which the proceeding is held.

(b) There shall be no right of appeal from a final order in a proceeding to test the validity of a

warrant to remove to another district or place for commitment or trial a person charged with a

criminal offense against the United States, or to test the validity of such person's detention

pending removal proceedings.

(c)(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not

be taken to the court of appeals from--

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(A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises

out of process issued by a State court; or

(B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.

(2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the applicant has made

a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

(3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall indicate which specific issue or

issues satisfy the showing required by paragraph (2).

In the present case, the court finds no denial of a constitutional right. Accordingly, a 

certificate of appealability will be denied.

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

1) The petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED;

2) A certificate of appealability is DENIED;

3) The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment for Respondent and to close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 17, 2008 /s/ William M. Wunderlich 

mmkd34 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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