Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03306/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03306-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joseph Anthony Roberson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable David S. Doty, United States District Judge for the District of

Minnesota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

Nos. 06-2767/3306

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, * Appeals from the United States

* District Court for the

v. * District of Minnesota.

*

Joseph Anthony Roberson, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: October 5, 2007

Filed: October 18, 2007

___________

Before MURPHY, SMITH, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

A jury found Joseph Anthony Roberson guilty of being a felon in possession

of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and the district court1

 sentenced

him to 27 months in prison and 3 years of supervised release. We address and reject

seriatim all of the arguments Roberson raises in this pro se appeal.

First, the district court’s revocation of Roberson’s pretrial release became moot

once he was convicted. See Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481 (1982) (per curiam).

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Second, when he claimed that the indictment lacked the signatures of the prosecutor

and grand jury foreperson, the court obtained the signed copy and showed it to him.

Third, the court did not err in setting Roberson’s base offense level because he failed

to meet his burden to show that he possessed the firearm solely for lawful sporting

purposes or collection. See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(2); United States v. Lussier, 423

F.3d 838, 843 (8th Cir. 2005). Fourth, the repeal of 18 U.S.C. § 922(v) does not

invalidate his conviction under section 922(g)(1). Fifth, there is no indication in the

record that the government lied to the court when it represented, in response to

Roberson’s pretrial motion for disclosure of a confidential informant, that the

informant did not participate in the offense and would not be called to testify at trial.

Sixth, the Speedy Trial Act was not violated because no more than 45 nonexcludable days passed before Roberson was tried. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (70-

day speedy trial clock), (h)(1)(F) (excluding time when defendant’s motions are

pending), and (h)(1)(J) (excluding time when defendant’s motions are under

submission). Seventh, the Double Jeopardy Clause was not violated when he was

twice arrested--as opposed to twice tried or twice punished--for the same offense.

Eighth, Roberson’s claim for monetary damages for wrongful imprisonment is

unavailing because he has not shown that he is wrongfully imprisoned. Ninth, his

claim that the jail interfered with his ability to represent himself below does not find

adequate support in the record. Last, Roberson’s motion for a new trial was untimely

because it was not based on newly discovered evidence. See Fed. R. Crim. P.

33(b)(2); United States v. Martinson, 419 F.3d 749, 752 (8th Cir. 2005).

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

______________________________

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