Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-01335/USCOURTS-caDC-97-01335-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
National Labor Relations Board
Respondent
Perdue Farms, Inc.
Petitioner

Document Text:

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 3, 1998 Decided May 29, 1998

No. 97-1335

Perdue Farms, Inc., Cookin' Good Division,

Petitioner/Cross-Respondent

v.

National Labor Relations Board,

Respondent/Cross-Petitioner

On Petition for Review and Cross-Application

for Enforcement of an Order of the

National Labor Relations Board

D. Christopher Lauderdale argued the cause for

petitioner/cross-respondent. With him on the briefs was

Erin E. Swann.

David A. Fleischer, Senior Attorney, National Labor Relations Board, argued the cause for respondent/cross-petitioner.

With him on the brief was Linda Sher, Associate General

USCA Case #97-1335 Document #355609 Filed: 05/29/1998 Page 1 of 19
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Counsel, and Aileen A. Armstrong, Deputy Associate General

Counsel. Margaret A. Gaines, Supervisory Attorney, and

Steven B. Goldstein, Attorney, entered appearances.

Before: Silberman, Randolph and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Tatel.

Opinion dissenting in part filed by Circuit Judge Randolph.

Tatel, Circuit Judge: After a union lost a representation

election at a chicken processing plant, the National Labor

Relations Board found that the company had committed

unfair labor practices by interrogating employees about their

union sympathies, as well as by increasing wages and implementing a new attendance policy in order to influence the

election. The Board also approved the administrative law

judge's issuance of a preclusion order as a sanction for the

employer's violation of a subpoena. Because substantial evidence in the record supports the Board's findings, and because the ALJ's preclusion order was not an abuse of discretion, we deny the company's petition for review and, with one

exception, grant the Board's cross-application for enforcement.

I

Two months after petitioner Perdue Farms, Inc. acquired a

chicken processing plant in Dothan, Alabama, in January

1995, the Laborers' International Union of North America,

AFL-CIO, Local 784 began an organizational campaign. In

April, the Union filed a petition for a representation election.

The election occurred on June 15. The Union lost by a

substantial majority.

Objecting to the conduct of the election, the Union charged

Perdue with violating sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National

Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. s 158(a)(1), (3) (1994). Section 8(a)(1) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer

"to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title." Id.

s 158(a)(1). Section 8(a)(3) prohibits "discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condiUSCA Case #97-1335 Document #355609 Filed: 05/29/1998 Page 2 of 19
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

tion of employment to encourage or discourage membership

in any labor organization." Id. s 158(a)(3).

Following a seven-day hearing, the administrative law

judge found that the employer had violated sections 8(a)(1)

and (3) of the Act. Adopting the ALJ's findings, the Board

agreed that Perdue violated section 8(a)(1) by interrogating

employees about their union activities and sympathies, by

confiscating union materials from employees entering the

plant, by threatening to close the plant if the Union won the

election, by promising increased benefits, by changing the

plant attendance policy two days before the election, and by

timing a wage increase and elimination of an attendance

bonus program for the day before the election, all in order to

influence the election's outcome. Cooking Good Div. of Perdue Farms, Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. No. 50, at 3-5, 8-10 (Mar. 31,

1997). The Board also found that the timing of the wage

increase and the changing of the attendance policy violated

section 8(a)(3), id. at 9-10, a somewhat surprising conclusion

in view of the fact that section 8(a)(3) has no applicability

where, as here, the record contains no evidence of discrimination. Conceding this point, agency counsel advised us at oral

argument that the Board no longer sought enforcement of the

section 8(a)(3) portion of its order. The Board found that the

interrogation of employees, the confiscation of union materials, the timing of the wage increase, and the changing of the

attendance policy also constituted objectionable conduct affecting the election. It thus issued a cease-and-desist order,

set aside the results of the election, and ordered a new one.

Id. at 12.

Perdue now petitions for review of the Board's findings

regarding the wage increase, the changed attendance policy,

and the interrogation of employees. Perdue also challenges

the ALJ's exclusion of certain evidence as a sanction for the

company's violation of a subpoena. The Board cross-applies

for enforcement.

II

We begin with the company's challenge to the ALJ's exclusion of evidence. Prior to the hearing, the Board's General

USCA Case #97-1335 Document #355609 Filed: 05/29/1998 Page 3 of 19
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Counsel served Perdue's human resources manager, Jimmy

Chappell, with a subpoena duces tecum requesting notes and

other records "which reflect the content of meetings between

Jimmy Chapel [sic] and employees conducted between May 1,

1995 and June 15, 1995." Although Perdue produced undated

notes of meetings that it asserted occurred on or about May

11, it refused to produce any other documents relating to

meetings occurring between May 1 and June 15. Perdue

argued that the subpoena was "overly broad" because, although the subpoena sought documents for a six-week period,

the original complaint alleged violations by Chappell only on

or about May 11. Rejecting Perdue's argument and quoting

the Federal Rules of Evidence's definition of "relevant evidence," the ALJ concluded that the company's view of relevance was overly narrow, noting that six unfair labor practice

allegations named Chappell, that witnesses testified to meetings Chappell held from March to late May, and that the

notes could contain "admissions relating to other aspects of

the case." Cooking Good Div., 323 N.L.R.B. No. 50, at 5.

Pointing out that Perdue claimed no privilege and neither

asked for in camera review of the disputed notes nor offered

any other reason for refusing to produce them, the ALJ

barred the company from introducing virtually any evidence

regarding Chappell's meetings, including the May 11 meetings for which Perdue had provided notes. Id.

Perdue challenges the ALJ's ruling on two accounts: It

claims that documents relating to the June meetings were

irrelevant; it also claims that having produced all requested

documents regarding Chappell's May 11 meetings, it should

have been allowed to present testimony and documentary

evidence about those meetings. Reviewing the ALJ's ruling

for abuse of discretion, Dayton Hudson Dep't Store Co. v.

NLRB, 79 F.3d 546, 552 (6th Cir. 1996), we reject both

arguments.

Section 11(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29

U.S.C. s 161(1), authorizes subpoenas for evidence "that relates to any matter under investigation or in question." Id.

Information sought in an administrative subpoena need only

be "reasonably relevant." United States v. Morton Salt Co.,

USCA Case #97-1335 Document #355609 Filed: 05/29/1998 Page 4 of 19
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950); see also NLRB v. Line, 50 F.3d 311,

314 (5th Cir. 1995) (applying Morton Salt's "reasonably relevant" standard to NLRB subpoenas). Citing In re Sealed

Case (Admin. Subpoena), 42 F.3d 1412 (D.C. Cir. 1994),

where we quashed a subpoena seeking information about

"other wrongdoing, as yet unknown," id. at 1419, Perdue

argues that the request for documents regarding meetings in

June lies beyond even the broadest notions of relevance. We

disagree. Unlike the subpoena in In re Sealed Case, the

subpoena here sought not information regarding "other

wrongdoing, as yet unknown," but information relating to

specific allegations of wrongdoing contained in the General

Counsel's complaint. As the ALJ found, the subpoenaed

material could have provided evidence regarding specific allegations not involving Chappell and/or events occurring from

May 1 to the June 15 election. Under these circumstances,

the ALJ's conclusion that the subpoenaed material was relevant did not amount to an abuse of discretion.

We reach the same conclusion with respect to the ALJ's

preclusion order. "The preclusion rule," we have said, "prevents the party frustrating discovery from introducing evidence in support of his position on the factual issue respecting

which discovery was sought." Atlantic Richfield Co. v. U.S.

Dep't of Energy, 769 F.2d 771, 794 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Pointing

out that it had not "frustrat[ed] discovery" with respect to

Chappell's May 11 meetings, Perdue argues that it should

have been allowed to offer testimony about those meetings

and to establish, contrary to the testimony of certain employees, that Chappell conducted no other meetings during the

month. Once a party's challenge to a subpoena has been

rejected, however, the party cannot "pick and choose which

parts ... it will obey and which parts it can ignore." UAW v.

NLRB, 459 F.2d 1329, 1342 (D.C. Cir. 1972). A party refusing to comply with a subpoena risks application of the preclusion rule: "Without an adequate evidentiary sanction, a party

served with a discovery order in the course of an administrative adjudicatory proceeding has no incentive to comply, and

ofttimes has every incentive to refuse to comply." Atlantic

Richfield, 769 F.2d at 795.

USCA Case #97-1335 Document #355609 Filed: 05/29/1998 Page 5 of 19
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

III

Turning to Perdue's substantive challenges, we will not set

aside a Board decision unless, "reviewing the record as a

whole, it appears that the Board's factual findings are not

supported by substantial evidence or that the Board acted

arbitrarily or otherwise erred in applying established law to

the facts at issue." Synergy Gas Corp. v. NLRB, 19 F.3d

649, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Our review of the Board's factual

conclusions is "highly deferential." LCF, Inc. v. NLRB, 129

F.3d 1276, 1281 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see also Synergy Gas Corp.,

19 F.3d at 654 (Silberman, J., concurring) ("Our review, both

in theory and in practice, is quite deferential."). "If there is

substantial evidence to support the Board's conclusions, we

will uphold the Board's decision even if we would have

reached a different result had we considered the question de

novo." Id. at 651.

Interrogation of Employees

Claiming the Board erroneously applied the relevant legal

standard, Perdue challenges the Board's determination that

Chappell violated section 8(a)(1) by interrogating employees

when he asked them if Union representatives had visited

them at their homes. Interrogation of employees violates

section 8(a)(1) if, under all the circumstances, it reasonably

"tends to restrain, coerce, or interfere with rights guaranteed

by the Act." Rossmore House, 269 N.L.R.B. 1176, 1177

(1984). Both the Board and the courts agree that the starting point for determining whether unlawful interrogation has

occurred is the five-factor test set forth in Bourne v. NLRB,

332 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1964):

(1) The background, i.e., is there a history of employer

hostility and discrimination?

(2) The nature of the information sought, e.g. did the

interrogator appear to be seeking information on which

to base taking action against individual employees?

(3) The identity of the questioner, i.e., how high was

he in the company hierarchy?

USCA Case #97-1335 Document #355609 Filed: 05/29/1998 Page 6 of 19
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

(4) Place and method of interrogation, e.g., was employee called from work to the boss's office? Was there

an atmosphere of "unnatural formality"?

(5) Truthfulness of the reply.

Id. at 48; see also Chauffeurs, Local 633 v. NLRB, 509 F.2d

490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Determining whether employee

questioning violates the Act does not require strict evaluation

of each factor; instead, "[t]he flexibility and deliberately

broad focus of this test make clear that the Bourne criteria

are not prerequisites to a finding of coercive questioning, but

rather useful indicia that serve as a starting point for assessing the 'totality of the circumstance.' " Timsco Inc. v. NLRB,

819 F.2d 1173, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

Reviewing the entire record and the Board's decision and

" 'recogniz[ing] the Board's competence in the first instance

to judge the impact of utterances made in the context of the

employer-employee relationship,' " Southwire Co. v. NLRB,

820 F.2d 453, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting NLRB v. Gissel

Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 620 (1969)), we think the Board

properly applied the Bourne factors and that its section

8(a)(1) finding is supported by substantial evidence. Employee Willie Jackson testified that during a meeting with about

fifty employees on or about May 19, Chappell asked whether

"our homes and everything had been visited, you know, by

the union associate." According to Jackson, he and one other

man raised their hands in response. Chappell denied that the

meeting ever occurred, but the ALJ discredited his testimony, credited Jackson's testimony instead, and found that

Chappell had questioned employees in violation of section

8(a)(1). The ALJ said:

The setting of the interrogation was a general meeting of

employees and the record does not reflect that the union

sympathies of those present were known to [Perdue].

The questioner was a high official of [Perdue] who gave

no assurances that by asking the question the employees

would have nothing to fear. Additionally, Chappell was

from the Maryland headquarters and did not have any

established friendly relationship with the Alabama workUSCA Case #97-1335 Document #355609 Filed: 05/29/1998 Page 7 of 19
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

ers. There was no apparent legitimate reason for the

question, but by seeking this information [Perdue] could

learn who had been talking to the Union's organizers.

Cooking Good Div., 323 N.L.R.B. No. 50, at 5.

Although we agree with Perdue that the "place and method" of Chappell's questioning of employees (the fourth

Bourne factor) were not particularly coercive, the other

Bourne factors support the Board's finding of unlawful interrogation. Chappell came from Perdue's headquarters and

served as its top human resources supervisor (factor 3). See

Bourne, 332 F.2d at 48; Midwest Reg. Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing Workers of Am., 564 F.2d 434, 443 (D.C. Cir.

1977). In his questions to employees, Chappell appeared to

seek information about individual employee union sympathies

(factor 2). Cf. Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. NLRB, 104 F.3d

1354, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (" '[A]ny attempt by an employer

to ascertain employee views and sympathies regarding unionism generally tends to cause fear of reprisal in the mind of

the employee if he replies in favor of unionism and, therefore,

tends to impinge on his [statutory] rights.' ") (quoting Struksnes Constr. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 1062, 1062 (1967)). Perdue

claims that the ALJ considered circumstances outside the

Bourne factors, i.e., that Chappell "gave no assurances that

by asking the question the employees would have nothing to

fear," Cooking Good Div. 323 N.L.R.B. No. 50, at 5, but both

this court and the Board have found that failure to give such

assurances is relevant to the unlawful interrogation determination. See Midwest Reg. Joint Bd., 564 F.2d at 443; Fiber

Glass Sys., Inc., 298 N.L.R.B. 504, 504-05 (1990).

Challenging the ALJ's finding that Chappell had no legitimate reason to interrogate employees, Perdue claims that

because it had received complaints that Union organizers

were representing themselves as Perdue agents when visiting

employees in their homes, it needed to know the answers to

Chappell's questions to gauge the reach of the Union's misrepresentations. But Perdue received the complaints over a

month before the Union filed its election petition, the company immediately met with employees to warn them that Union

USCA Case #97-1335 Document #355609 Filed: 05/29/1998 Page 8 of 19
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

organizers representing themselves as Perdue agents were

reportedly visiting employee homes, and the meeting at which

Chappell questioned employees occurred over two months

later, a week after the election had been scheduled. Because

Perdue never claimed that it was still receiving complaints at

that time, we think the record supports the Board's conclusion that Chappell had no legitimate reason for asking the

question.

June 14 Wage Adjustment

The day before the election, on June 14, Perdue informed

employees that they would receive an eighty-cents-per-hour

pay increase, in part to replace the predecessor company's

attendance bonus program under which employees received

bonuses for perfect attendance. Acknowledging that the

amount of the wage adjustment was not "out of the ordinary,"

the Board concluded that its timing was nevertheless "troubling" because "it would be reasonable for the employees to

view the timing of the raise as designed to influence their

voting in the election." Cooking Good Div., 323 N.L.R.B. No.

50, at 9.

The Supreme Court has interpreted section 8(a)(1) to prohibit "conduct immediately favorable to employees which is

undertaken with the express purpose of impinging upon their

freedom of choice for or against unionization and is reasonably calculated to have that effect." NLRB v. Exchange

Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 409 (1964). Granting benefits does

not violate the Act if it occurs "in the normal course of the

business of an employer, without any motive of inducing

employees to vote against the union." Pedro's Inc. v. NLRB,

652 F.2d 1005, 1008 (D.C.Cir.1981). Put another way, "[a]s a

general rule, an employer's legal duty in deciding whether to

grant benefits while a representation proceeding is pending is

to decide that question precisely as it would if the union were

not on the scene." United Airlines Servs. Corp., 290

N.L.R.B. 954, 954 (1988). Both the decision to confer benefits and the timing of the announcement of such benefits are

subject to "in the normal course of business" analysis: "[T]he

timing of the announcement of a wage increase may violate

USCA Case #97-1335 Document #355609 Filed: 05/29/1998 Page 9 of 19
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

section 8(a)(1), 'even though the employer's initial decision to

raise wages was perfectly legitimate.' " St. Francis Fed. of

Nurses and Health Prof'ls v. NLRB, 729 F.2d 844, 850 (D.C.

Cir. 1984) (quoting J.J. Newberry Co. v. NLRB, 645 F.2d 148,

151 (2d Cir. 1981)).

Perdue claims that it always intended to follow the previous

owner's practice of granting wage increases between June 1

and July 1 and that the timing of the wage adjustment

occurred "in the normal course of business." "Doubt[ing],"

these assertions, the Board found that the company offered

no documentary evidence that it intended to follow the practices of the predecessor company, that Perdue "never told

employees to expect raises in June," and that the employees'

"first knowledge of when the raises would be received was the

day before the election." Cooking Good Div., 323 N.L.R.B.

No. 50, at 9. Evidence in the record supports these findings.

One employee testified that in January, shortly after Perdue

acquired the Dothan processing plant, it told employees it

would increase wages and eliminate the attendance bonus, but

that it gave no timetable. Responding to the Union's organizing efforts, the vice president and general manager of Perdue's Dothan division, Larry Winslow, sent a March 30 letter

to all employees explaining the company's plans with regard

to changes in wages and benefits, but acknowledging that

Perdue had no "exact timetable for those decisions." The

Winslow letter merely promised improved benefits and wages

"[i]n the next few months." Employees who later asked

when the company would adjust wages and benefits testified

they received vague responses. One employee testified that

when she asked Jimmy Chappell about wages and benefits, he

responded "July 1"; but when she asked him the same

question on another occasion, "he said that he didn't want to

give [the] exact date of July 1, because he didn't want to say

July 1 and it wasn't." Another employee testified that when

Chappell was asked about pay raises at a May meeting, he

replied that he "couldn't give us any information on a pay

increase, but that there was supposed to be a person coming

later to discuss the pay increase." In sum, the record

supports the Board's finding that Perdue neither promised a

USCA Case #97-1335 Document #355609 Filed: 05/29/1998 Page 10 of 19
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

mid-June wage adjustment nor informed Dothan employees

that it intended to follow the predecessor's practice of awarding annual wage adjustments in June or early July. Thus,

even if the predecessor company's practice was to announce

wage adjustments only days before they were to take effect,

as Perdue contends, because Dothan employees had no reason to know Perdue was following the predecessor's practice,

they could reasonably have viewed the election eve announcement as an attempt to discourage their support for the Union.

Both Perdue and our dissenting colleague argue that June

14 was the only day Perdue could safely grant a wage

increase because any deviation from that date would have

risked a Board finding that it accelerated or postponed the

increase in order to influence the election. This argument

ignores not only that the Board's finding of a section 8(a)(1)

violation rested on the company's failure to inform its employees that it intended to follow its predecessor's practice, but

also the fact that the predecessor's practice was to raise

wages, not on June 14, but anytime between June 1 and July

1. By failing to announce that it intended to follow its

predecessor's practice and by announcing the pay increase on

the eve of the election, Perdue put itself in the worst possible

position to claim that it had not attempted to influence the

election.

Our dissenting colleague also criticizes the Board's case law

regarding wage increases implemented prior to elections.

See Diss. Op. at 1-2. Perdue, however, makes no such

argument, and normally we do not address issues the parties

fail to raise. See Ryan v. Bentsen, 12 F.3d 245, 249 n.5 (D.C.

Cir. 1993).

June 13 Change in Attendance Policy

Challenging the Board's conclusion that it violated section

8(a)(1) by announcing a change in its attendance policy two

days before the election in order to "discourage the employees' support for the Union," Cooking Good Div., 323 N.L.R.B.

No. 50, at 10, Perdue argues not that it implemented the

change for some reason other than to influence the election,

USCA Case #97-1335 Document #355609 Filed: 05/29/1998 Page 11 of 19
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

but rather that in June 1995, it made no change in the policy.

We think the record contains sufficient evidence to support

the Board's contrary finding. Dothan employee Bryan Smith

testified that he attended a June 13 meeting where Supervisor Tony Williams told employees that the company was

changing the attendance policy. Although admitting that he

first learned the specific details of the old policy at the

meeting, Smith testified that under that policy employees

were "written up" the first time they were late or missed a

day, and that Williams described the new policy as "when you

missed a day, that would count as half an occurrence. And

that if you missed two days, that was like, then you missed

the whole day, so then you got ... wrote up." As corroboration for Smith's testimony, the Board pointed to a June 30

memorandum (two weeks after the election) from senior

human resources representative Ed Scarborough, stating:

We are having more associates to come in late to work

[sic], since we do not have the attendance bonus and each

late is a-half of an occurance [sic] against your attendance record. An associate that is late (2) two times has

the equal of (1) one whole occurance [sic], which is the

same as missing one full day and it may cause you to get

a written letter of warning and may even cause termination if your record is already bad. We ask that each of

you be on time so that you will not have your attendance

record be a bad reflection on you.

According to Perdue, the Scarborough memorandum simply

reminded employees that the predecessor company's attendance policy remained in effect. The Board interpreted the

memorandum differently: "The message in this memo is that

[Perdue] has made ... changes relative to the elimination of

the attendance bonus and the calculation of occurrences."

Cooking Good Div., 323 N.L.R.B. No. 50, at 10. We think the

Board's interpretation is not unreasonable. The memorandum cites two reasons for increased tardiness: the elimination of the attendance bonus and the treatment of each

instance of tardiness as one-half of an occurrence. The

Board read the memorandum to mean that the latter, like the

USCA Case #97-1335 Document #355609 Filed: 05/29/1998 Page 12 of 19
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

former, resulted from a recent change in policy at Dothan.

Although Perdue offers an equally plausible interpretation of

the memorandum, the standard under which we review Board

findings does not permit us to "displace the Board's choice

between two fairly conflicting views, even though the court

would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter

been before it de novo." Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,

340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951). We will thus not disturb the

Board's finding that the June 30 memorandum signaled that

the attendance policy changed in June 1995.

Perdue points to Scarborough's testimony that the company did not change the attendance policy until January 1996,

six months after the election. Even if true, Scarborough's

testimony does not undermine the Board's finding that Perdue also changed the policy in June 1995. Although Scarborough's testimony (that the change occurred in January 1996)

differs from Smith's (that the policy changed in June 1995), so

long as the record contains substantial evidence supporting

the Board's findings, as it does here, we defer to the Board's

analysis, even if other evidence in the record could support an

alternative determination. See Harter Tomato Prods. Co. v.

NLRB, 133 F.3d 934, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see also Synergy

Gas Corp., 19 F.3d at 651.

Finally, to the extent that Perdue challenges Smith's credibility, it has failed to meet the heavy burden required to

overturn a credibility determination. " '[C]redibility determinations may not be overturned absent the most extraordinary

circumstances such as utter disregard for sworn testimony or

the acceptance of testimony which is on its fac[e] incredible.' "

E.N. Bisso & Son, Inc. v. NLRB, 84 F.3d 1443, 1445 (D.C.

Cir. 1996) (quoting Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers

Union v. NLRB, 736 F.2d 1559, 1563 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). The

ALJ "credit[ed] Smith's testimony that Williams did announce a change in the attendance system to a less severe

method at the June 13 meeting." Cooking Good Div., 323

N.L.R.B. No. 50, at 10. While not expressly based upon

observation of the witness's demeanor, the ALJ's decision to

credit Smith's testimony reflected his consideration of conflicting testimony from Williams and Scarborough, as well as

USCA Case #97-1335 Document #355609 Filed: 05/29/1998 Page 13 of 19
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

of Scarborough's June 30 memorandum. Although Smith

admitted that his memory of the June 13 meeting was "not

good," and needed to refresh his recollection before testifying,

his testimony was neither incredible nor did it become so

simply because he was not completely certain of every detail

of the meeting. Because Perdue has failed to demonstrate

"extraordinary circumstances," we decline to overturn the

ALJ's decision to credit Smith's testimony. See NLRB v.

Creative Food Design Ltd., 852 F.2d 1295, 1297 (D.C. Cir.

1988) (refusing to overturn an ALJ's credibility determination

because, after evaluating conflicting testimony, the ALJ credited one version of the evidence presented).

IV

We deny Perdue's petition for review. Except for the

Board's section 8(a)(3) findings, we grant its cross-application

for enforcement.

So ordered.

USCA Case #97-1335 Document #355609 Filed: 05/29/1998 Page 14 of 19
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Randolph, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part: When a

traffic light simultaneously blinks "Stop" and "Go" everyone

knows repairs are needed. If a motorist encountering the

light proceeds ahead while another motorist pauses, it is

unimaginable that both would be guilty of failing to heed the

signal. The Board's "law" governing pre-election wage increases is like the faulty traffic light and the Board's enforcement of that "law" approaches the unimaginable. As the

Board sees it, when yearly wage increases are the norm, and

the one-year anniversary falls just before a representational

election, employers who proceed to grant a raise on that date

are illegally trying to influence the vote. The Board also

believes that employers who hold back and let the date pass

are just as guilty of an unfair labor practice. Board theory

one is that a company giving the raise demonstrates its power

over its employees, implicitly threatening them with the

removal of benefits should they vote for the union; Board

theory two is that a company postponing the wage increase

until after the election unfairly attempts to scare its employees into voting against the union. Theory one has received

the Supreme Court's blessing, see NLRB v. Exchange Parts

Co., 375 U.S. 405, 409 (1964), and it has also received severe

criticism. See Derek C. Bok, The Regulation of Campaign

Tactics in Representation Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 38, 113 (1964); Robert A.

Gorman, Basic Text on Labor Law: Unionization and Collective Bargaining 164 (1976). Regardless of how Board theory

one is judged working alone, when it is considered in tandem

with Board theory two it rises--or more accurately falls--to

the level of arbitrariness. Many courts and administrative

law judges have expressed exasperation with the Board's

Janus-faced doctrine. See, e.g., Pedro's, Inc. v. NLRB, 652

F.2d 1005, 1008 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1981); J.J. Newberry Co. v.

NLRB, 645 F.2d 148, 151 (2d Cir. 1981); Free-Flow Packaging Corp. v. NLRB, 566 F.2d 1124, 1130 (9th Cir. 1978);

NLRB v. Otis Hosp., 545 F.2d 252, 255 (1st Cir. 1976); Osco

Drug, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 231, 232-33 (1978). Why the Board

does not call a halt to this nonsense is unfathomable. The

Board plainly has the power do so. Through its Regional

USCA Case #97-1335 Document #355609 Filed: 05/29/1998 Page 15 of 19
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Directors, the Board can simply schedule elections at a time

removed from the historical anniversary date for unit wage

increases.

Substantial evidence does not, in any event, support the

Board's finding that Perdue gave the wage increases on June

14, 1995, in order to influence the election scheduled for the

next day, and thereby violated s 8(a)(1). Perdue acted on

June 14 because the Board's bewildering doctrine gave the

company no other realistic option. Perdue took over the

Dothan, Alabama plant early in 1995. In previous years,

employees at the plant received their annual pay raises

between June 1 and July 1. In 1994, wage increases at

Dothan were granted on June 15, the first day of the new pay

period. We have held that employers may give wage increases prior to an election "in the normal course of [ ] business,"

Pedro's, 652 F.2d at 1008, and "in a manner and at a time in

accord with past practice," Allen v. NLRB, 561 F.2d 976, 981

(D.C. Cir. 1977). There can be no dispute that it was

Perdue's "normal" practice to maintain an acquired company's customary date for granting a pay raise. At Dothan,

only one day naturally suggested itself as the customary date:

June 14, 1995, which as in the 1994 Dothan raise, represented

the first day of the new pay period. Only that date could

clearly be considered "in the normal course of business" at

Dothan, and in compliance--if not with the precedents of the

Board--at least with the decisions of this court.

The obvious question is "What should the company have

done differently?" One idea is that before the election Perdue should have announced (1) that it was withholding granting a wage increase on the customary date in order to avoid

the appearance of attempting to "bribe" employees to vote

against the union, but (2) that it would grant the raise after

the election no matter what the outcome. But in terms of the

effect on employees, there is only one difference between the

company's granting the wage increase on June 14 and giving

a promise that the increase will occur on June 16, or some

other time shortly after the election. The difference is not

that the employees will feel less threatened by the company.

The difference is that the announce-the-raise-but-give-it-later

approach means employees will not get their raise on the

USCA Case #97-1335 Document #355609 Filed: 05/29/1998 Page 16 of 19
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

customary date and thus will lose money. Who may the

employees blame? Maybe the union. Better yet, the Board,

and the courts who go along with the Board. As an alternative one might suppose that Perdue should have postponed

the wage increase but made it retroactive to June 14. But by

any measure there is no difference between announcing a

wage increase on June 14, and announcing that a wage

increase will be granted after the election, retroactive to June

14. In any event, both of these options, and others, erroneously place the burden on Perdue to alter its normal business

practice to accommodate the union election. See Newport

Div. of Wintex Knitting Mills, 216 N.L.R.B. 1058, 1058

(1975).

I wish also to explain why I would reject the Board's

conclusion that on June 13, two days before the election,

Perdue relaxed Dothan's attendance disciplinary policy in

order to influence votes, and thereby violated s 8(a)(1). See

Cooking Good Div., 323 N.L.R.B. No. 50, at 9-10 (Mar. 31,

1997). The evidence of any such change in policy is slim to

nil. The Board relied chiefly on the testimony of employee

Bryan Smith, who said he attended a meeting held by manager Tony Williams. At first, Smith could not recall Williams

discussing such a policy change, nor could he remember the

date of the meeting, or whether it was close to the election.

Smith also testified that he had no knowledge of the attendance policy in place before the meeting. Only after reviewing

his affidavit was Smith able to give June 13 as the meeting

date. Smith then said Williams announced that the attendance policy "changed" so that "when you missed a day, that

would count as half an occurrence. And that if you missed

two days, that was like, then you missed the whole day, so

then you got write [sic] up...." J.A. 112. How Smith could

take this as a "change" in policy when he admitted not

knowing the existing policy is a mystery. Williams, on the

other hand, flatly denied announcing any change to the

attendance disciplinary policy at any time and Ed Scarborough, the human resources representative at Dothan, testified

USCA Case #97-1335 Document #355609 Filed: 05/29/1998 Page 17 of 19
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

that Perdue first altered this policy on January 15, 1996--six

months after the election.

Scarborough also testified that he was very familiar with

the attendance disciplinary policy instituted by the previous

employer, which he described as follows:

The first two times you are just verbally warned about

being absent; the third time you was [sic] out was a

written warning; the next time was a one-day suspension; the next time a three-day; and then termination.1

J.A. 276. This matches the description of the "change" Smith

said he heard about at the June 13 meeting.

The Board also relied on a memo by Scarborough issued to

employees on June 30, 1995. See Cooking Good Div., 323

N.L.R.B. No. 50, at 10. But the document merely describes

the existing attendance policy established by the previous

employer: "An associate that is late (2) two times has the

equal of (1) one whole occurrence, which is the same as

missing one full day and it may cause you to get a written

letter of warning...." J.A. 339.

No one produced any written record of a policy change and

not a single witness had a clear memory of any easing of the

attendance policy before the election. If Perdue's goal had

been to influence the election, one would have expected it to

__________

1 Scarborough described the new Perdue attendance policy

implemented on January 15, 1996:

The first two times you are [absent], there is just nothing done

about it, you are free; the third time you are out, you receive a

written verbal [sic] warning; the next time you get a second

warning; the third is a final warning; and then the fourth we

give a three-day suspension pending investigation of our records to make sure that our records are correct. If they are

correct, when they get the three-day suspension, they are

term[inat]ed. They can work off an incident, though every 28

days with Perdue.

J.A. 277-78.

USCA Case #97-1335 Document #355609 Filed: 05/29/1998 Page 18 of 19
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

broadcast the new policy loudly and clearly. Yet on this

matter of importance to employees, there was no proof of any

widespread knowledge among them. Given this state of

affairs, there was no substantial evidence that Perdue made

any policy change, let alone that it intended to influence the

election.

USCA Case #97-1335 Document #355609 Filed: 05/29/1998 Page 19 of 19