Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01648/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01648-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John Green
Petitioner
Daniel Paramo
Respondent

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with a petition for 

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Doc. 1. On October 27, 2014, this Court 

screened the petition and, without addressing the merits, concluded that it was not plain from the 

allegations that Petitioner is not entitled to relief and directed Respondent to file a response. Doc. 

5. Respondent filed an answer addressing the merits of the petition. Doc. 19. Petitioner did not file 

a traverse. For the following reasons, the Court recommends that the petition be denied. 

I. BACKGROUND 

On April 18, 1999, Danica Pestich, a 92-year-old woman living in Fresno, California, 

called her daughter around 1:15 a.m.1

 Her daughter told her to call the police, which she did 

around 2:57 a.m. Ms. Pestich told the 911 dispatcher that someone she did not know came into her 

house. She recounted how he had knocked her down, sexually battered her, ejaculated on her foot, 

and intimidated her against calling the police before he left. Fresno Police Officers Valentino and 

Valles arrived at her home. 

 

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 This brief factual background is summarized from the California Court of Appeals opinion. 

 JOHN GREEN, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

DANIEL PARAMO, Warden, 

Respondent. 

CASE NO. 1:14-CV-1648-LJO-SMS-HC 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

RECOMMENDING DENIAL OF THE 

PETITION 

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On April 20, 1999, Fresno Police Detective Weiss went to Ms. Pestich’s home to interview 

her. She collected a rug off of a washing machine on the back porch, because Ms. Pestich told her 

that she had used the rug to wipe the ejaculate off of her leg and then moved it to the back porch. 

A lab analysis revealed a semen stain on the rug. The stain was sent to the Berkeley Department of 

Justice laboratory for DNA typing and entry of the DNA profile into the database. 

In January 2003, DNA typing was submitted to the database. In March 2003, a “hit” was 

reported, and Detective Weiss was notified of Petitioner for the first time. Detective Weiss 

interviewed Petitioner, who said that he had never been to Ms. Pestich’s home. Petitioner’s blood 

sample was collected and his DNA profile matched that of the stain. In 1985, in Alameda County, 

California, Petitioner had been convicted by guilty plea of forcible rape of an elder with personal 

use of a deadly weapon and personal and intentional infliction of great bodily injury; assault of an 

elder with intent to commit rape; and false imprisonment of an elder by means of force or 

violence. 

Ms. Pestich passed away before Petitioner’s trial. Part of her 911 phone call was admitted 

into evidence. 

On October 21, 2010, after a jury trial in the Superior Court of Fresno County, Petitioner 

was convicted of all three counts against him: 1) assault with intent to commit rape; 2) sexual 

battery on a restrained person; and 3) elder abuse, during each of which, he personally inflicted 

great bodily injury on a person 70 years of age or older. On December 3, 2010, Petitioner was 

sentenced to a total unstayed prison term of 25 years to life, plus 10 years. 

Petitioner pursued a direct appeal of the sentence on the grounds that the trial court 

violated his constitutional right to confront witnesses by allowing Ms. Pestich’s statement to the 

911 dispatcher into evidence, and that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when his trial 

attorney “opened the door” to previously excluded evidence.” On June 6, 2013, the California 

Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, and, on September 11, 2013 the California Supreme 

Court denied review. 

Petitioner filed the pending federal petition for habeas corpus on October 22, 2014. 

Petitioner re-alleges the arguments made in his direct appeal. 

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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Habeas corpus is neither a substitute for a direct appeal nor a device for federal review of 

the merits of a guilty verdict rendered in state court. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n. 5 

(1979) (Stevens, J., concurring). Habeas corpus relief is intended to address only “extreme 

malfunctions” in state criminal justice proceedings. Id. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective 

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus 

filed after its enactment, a petitioner can prevail only if he can show that the state court’s 

adjudication of his claim: 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; 

or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-71 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 

362, 413 (2000). “By its terms, § 2254(d) bars relitigation of any claim ‘adjudicated on the merits’ 

in state court, subject only to the exceptions set forth in §§ 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2).” Harrington v. 

Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011). 

The AEDPA standard is difficult to satisfy since even a strong case for relief does not 

demonstrate that the state court’s determination was unreasonable. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102. 

“A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its 

independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law 

erroneously or incorrectly.” Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75-76. “A state court’s determination that a 

claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on 

the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101 (quoting Yarborough v. 

Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). Put another way, a federal court may grant habeas relief 

only when the state court’s application of Supreme Court precedent was objectively unreasonable 

and no fair-minded jurist could disagree that the state court’s decision conflicted with Supreme 

Court’s precedent. Williams, 529 U.S. at 411. 

III. CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 

Petitioner argues that his constitutional right to confront witnesses was violated when the 

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trial court allowed Ms. Pestich’s statement made to a 911 dispatcher into evidence, even though 

Ms. Pestich had passed away, and Petitioner did not have the opportunity to cross-examine her. 

The California Court of Appeal found that Ms. Pestich’s statement was not testimonial in nature, 

because its primary purpose was to meet an ongoing emergency, and, even if the statement should 

have been excluded, admission was harmless error because it did not have a substantial injurious 

effect on the verdict. 

A. Applicable Law 

The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation clause bars the government from introducing 

testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial unless the declarant is unavailable and the 

defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine. U.S. Const., Amend. VI; Crawford v. 

Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004). 

Nontestimonial statements do not implicate the Confrontation Clause. Moses v. Payne, 555 

F.3d 742, 754 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406 (2007)). “Statements are 

nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively 

indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an 

ongoing emergency.” Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). “They are testimonial when 

the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the 

primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later 

criminal prosecution.” Id.; and see United States v. Brooks, 772 F.3d 1161, 1169 (9th Cir. 2014). 

“[T]he existence of an ‘ongoing emergency’ at the time of an encounter between an 

individual and the police is among the most important circumstances informing the ‘primary 

purpose’ of an interrogation.” Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1156 (2011) 

(citing Davis, 547 U.S. at 826). “If the information the parties knew at the time of the encounter 

would lead a reasonable person to believe that there was an [ongoing] emergency, even if that 

belief was later proved incorrect, that is sufficient for purposes of the Confrontation Clause.” Id. at 

1157, note 8. 

In Davis v. Washington, the Supreme Court concluded that primary purpose of a specific 

911 call was to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency because the speaker 

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described events that were actually happening, she was facing an ongoing emergency, the nature 

of the questions and answers elicited statements necessary to resolve the present emergency, and 

the speaker was frantic and in a not tranquil environment. Davis, 547 U.S. at 827-28. Hence, she 

was not acting as a “witness,” and she was not “testifying.” Id. at 828. 

B. Discussion 

The California Court of Appeal concluded, according to California Supreme Court 

interpretation of the Confrontation Clause post Michigan v. Bryant, that an objective assessment of 

Ms. Pestich’s communication with the 911 dispatcher demonstrates that the primary purpose was 

to meet an ongoing emergency. The appeals court acknowledged Petitioner’s argument that the 

communication occurred after Petitioner had left Ms. Pestich’s home, the attack was over, and Ms. 

Pestich had already telephoned her daughter. However, Ms. Pestich told the dispatcher that she 

had been attacked, her assailant warned her against calling the police, he indicated that he was 

going across the street, and she worried he would return. She said she had been knocked down and 

was bleeding, and she was not sure if she needed an ambulance. The appeals court concluded that 

a reasonable person would have believed that the emergency had not ended, whether or not it 

actually had. 

In addition, the appeals court found that the questions from the dispatcher and Ms. 

Pestich’s answers elicited statements necessary to resolve the present emergency. The dispatcher 

tried to get a description of the assailant, determine his whereabouts, and the nature of the threat 

he posed. The circumstances of the communication were chaotic. Ms. Pestich was distraught and 

very fearful. 

A review of the 911 phone call reveals that the California Court of Appeal’s determination 

that the Ms. Pestich’s statement to the 911 dispatcher was nontestimonial was not based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding because the circumstances objectively indicated that the primary purpose of 

dispatcher’s line of questioning was to enable police to respond to an ongoing emergency. The 

transcript reveals that Ms. Pestich was distraught, wailed and exclaimed, and was fearful that her 

assailant would return. She told the dispatcher she was afraid that her assailant would return if she 

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called the police, and she was, in fact, on the phone with a law enforcement official. She believed 

that the emergency was ongoing, and the dispatcher could also reasonably believe that the 

emergency was ongoing. The dispatcher gathered information from Ms. Pestich in order to resolve 

the emergency. The trial court concluded that the communication with the 911 dispatcher ceased 

to be nontestimonial when the police arrived at Ms. Pestich’s home, and the recorded 

communication began to be more investigative in order to establish or prove what had occurred, 

which would be potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution. 

Ms. Pestich’s communication with the dispatcher is therefore very similar to the 911 phone 

call made in Davis and is not testimonial such that it would implicate the Confrontation Clause. 

The Court of Appeal’s determination was not contrary to, nor did it involve an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established federal law. Therefore, the petition should be denied on this 

ground. 

C. Related Hearsay Argument 

Petitioner also argues that his constitutional right to confront witnesses was violated when 

the trial court admitted the 911 call because it was impermissible hearsay under the California 

rules of evidence and did not fall under the spontaneous statement exception. This inquiry does 

not raise a federal question and is not appropriate for habeas review. 

An application for a writ of habeas corpus in a federal district court by a person in custody 

under a judgment of a state court is only available to address violations of the Constitution or laws 

of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the 

interpretation or application of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (“it is not 

the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law 

questions.”). 

Also, Petitioner has not demonstrated that the state court application of the California 

Evidence Code was erroneous, arbitrary, or capricious, or that it rendered his trial fundamentally 

unfair in violation of the Due Process Clause. Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990). Thus, 

whether Ms. Pestich’s 911 call was inadmissible hearsay pursuant to California Evidence Code is 

not a question properly before this court. 

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IV. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 

Petitioner argues that his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel was violated 

because his trial attorney succeeded in blocking Ms. Pestich’s statement to Detective Weiss but 

then questioned her if the victim advised her as to whether or not the rug had been used to wipe 

semen from her leg. Petitioner argues that this was ineffective assistance of counsel because there 

was no strategic reason to elicit the harmful evidence, which was the only evidence that connected 

Petitioner to Ms. Pestich’s assailant. The Court of Appeal reasoned that Petitioner’s trial counsel 

made a reasonable tactical choice in the midst of trial, and that Petitioner had not demonstrated 

prejudice. 

A. Applicable Law 

A habeas claim alleging appellate counsel was ineffective is evaluated under Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, (1984). See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390-91 (2000). To 

establish ineffective assistance of counsel, petitioner must prove: (1) counsel’s representation fell 

below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and (2) there 

is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have 

been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-94, 697. The relevant inquiry is not what counsel could 

have done; rather, it is whether the choices made by counsel were reasonable. Babbitt v. Calderon, 

151 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir.1998). 

Habeas relief for ineffective assistance of counsel may only be granted if the state-court 

decision unreasonably applied the Strickland standard. Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 129 

S.Ct. 1411, 1419 (2009). 

B. Analysis 

Here, the Court of Appeal reasoned that Petitioner’s trial counsel may have altered his 

strategy as the testimony proceeded. The record on appeal did not shed light on why trial counsel 

acted as he did, nor did it preclude the possibility of satisfactory explanation on direct appeal. The 

Court of Appeal also considered Petitioner’s prejudice argument –that the DNA evidence on the 

rug was insufficient to show that he was Ms. Pestich’s assailant. Petitioner argued to the Court of 

Appeal that a jury, without Ms. Pestich’s statement to Detective Weiss, could have inferred that 

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Petitioner’s DNA got on the rug some other way, and that Ms. Pestich found the rug and brought it 

inside, or that Petitioner came into Ms. Pestich’s home while she was away and masturbated on 

the rug. The Court of Appeal found those scenarios “speculative in the extreme” and that jurors 

would have much more likely inferred that Detective Weiss seized the rug because of something 

Ms. Pestich told her during her interview, or on the off chance it might contain evidence. 

 Petitioner’s trial counsel does not appear to have fallen below an objective standard of 

reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, but the appeals court reasonably found that 

there was not enough evidence in the record on appeal to make that determination. Nonetheless, 

the Court of Appeal’s determination that Petitioner did not establish prejudice was not based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding, and the decision was not contrary to, nor did it involve an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established Federal law. There is not a reasonable probability that exclusion of Ms. 

Pestich’s statement to Detective Weiss regarding using the rug to wipe the semen from her leg, 

would have resulted in a different outcome. It is not reasonably probable that a jury, without 

knowing the reason why Detective Weiss collected the rug, would infer either of Petitioner’s 

alternate theories as to how his DNA appeared on a rug found in Ms. Pestich’s home. Without 

demonstrating a reasonable likelihood of prejudice, Petitioner cannot succeed on the ground of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court of Appeal did not unreasonably apply the Strickland

test. Hence, the petition should be denied on this ground. 

V. APPEALABILITY 

For the reasons set forth above, Petitioner has not shown “that jurists of reason would find 

it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right [or] that 

jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural 

ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Hence, the Court should decline to issue a 

certificate of appealability. 

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VI. RECOMMENDATION 

Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that: 

1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus be DENIED; 

2. Judgment be ENTERED for Respondent; and 

3. The Court DECLINE to issue a certificate of appealability. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the Honorable Lawrence J. O’Neill, 

United States District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and 

Rule 72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of 

California. Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, Petitioner may file written 

objections with the Court, serving a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The Court will then review 

the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that 

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District 

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: 4/23/2015 /s/ SANDRA M. SNYDER 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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