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Sealed Case

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 26, 1998 Decided July 24, 1998

No. 97-3112

In re: Sealed Case (Sentencing Guidelines' "Substantial

Assistance") No. 97-3112

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 95cr00031-02)

A.J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender, argued the cause

and filed the briefs for appellant.

Ann Rosenfield, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellee. With her on the brief were Mary Lou Leary,

U.S. Attorney at the time the brief was filed, John R. Fisher

and Thomas J. Tourish, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Tatel, Circuit Judge, and

Buckley, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Tatel.

Tatel, Circuit Judge: The district court denied appellant's

motion for downward departure under section 5K1.1 of the

United States Sentencing Guidelines because the Government

had not filed a motion attesting to appellant's substantial

assistance. Applying Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81

(1996), and finding nothing in the Sentencing Guidelines flatly

prohibiting departures in the absence of government motions,

we remand for the district court to determine whether the

circumstances of this case take it out of the relevant heartland so as to warrant departure.

I

The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines authorize district courts to

depart from prescribed sentencing ranges if they find "an

aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a

degree, not adequately taken into account by the Sentencing

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Commission." 18 U.S.C. s 3553(b) (1994). The Guidelines

also encourage departure under certain specific circumstances. For example, section 5K1.1 provides:

Upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed

an offense, the court may depart from the guidelines.

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ("U.S.S.G.") s 5K1.1

(1997). Prior to Koon, we interpreted section 5K1.1 to deprive district courts of authority to depart based on a defendant's assistance in the absence of a government motion. See

United States v. Ortez, 902 F.2d 61, 64 (D.C. Cir. 1990).

Having pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute cocaine, appellant

sought downward departure based on his alleged substantial

assistance to the government. The district court rejected the

request, citing U.S.S.G. s 5K1.1 and the absence of a government motion.

On appeal, appellant challenges the district court's decision

not to depart on two grounds. First, resurrecting an argument that was presented to us once before but never fully

addressed because appellant in that case failed to raise it in

district court, see United States v. Dawson, 990 F.2d 1314,

1316-17 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (per curiam), appellant challenges

section 5K1.1's validity on the grounds that the Commission

issued it as a policy statement rather than a guideline.

Because this appellant presented the issue to the trial court,

we can fully consider its merits. Second, appellant argues

that, assuming section 5K1.1's validity, Koon permits departures for substantial assistance even in the absence of a

government motion because the factor was not adequately

considered by the Commission. Although district court decisions not to depart are usually unreviewable, see United

States v. Pinnick, 47 F.3d 434, 439 (D.C. Cir. 1995), our

review here is de novo because appellant argues that the

district court misconstrued its legal authority under the

Guidelines, United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 138 F.3d

961, 975 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("[W]hether a given factor could ever

be a permissible basis for departure is a question of law

which we address de novo.") (citing Koon, 518 U.S. at 100).

II

Guidelines and policy statements differ in several ways.

The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98

Stat. 1987 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. ss 3551-3586, 28

U.S.C. ss 991-998 (1994)), directs the Commission to promulgate guidelines "for use of a sentencing court in determining

the sentence to be imposed." 28 U.S.C. s 994(a)(1). The Act

authorizes the Commission to promulgate general policy

statements "regarding application of the guidelines or any

other aspect of sentencing or sentence implementation that in

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the view of the Commission would further the purposes of

[sentencing]." Id. s 994(a)(2). Guidelines require congressional approval, id. s 994(p); policy statements do not,

U.S.S.G. ch. 7, pt. A, intro. cmt. 3(a). Guidelines establish

specific numeric sentence ranges; policy statements usually

provide general guidance about the factors that should inform

sentencing decisions. Courts must follow guidelines. See

Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 367, 391 (1989). The

binding effect of policy statements is less clear. The Supreme Court has called policy statements "authoritative

guide[s] to the meaning of the applicable Guideline."

Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 201 (1992). But

some policy statements are not binding at all. For example,

the Guidelines characterize Chapter 7's policy statements as

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"evolutionary" and designed merely to "provide guidance."

U.S.S.G. ch. 7, pt. A, intro. cmt. 1. And we have held that

where, as in Chapter 7, a policy statement is "independent of

(and a conscious substitute for) any Guideline," it is not

binding. United States v. Hooker, 993 F.2d 898, 901 (D.C.

Cir. 1993).

In support of his contention that the Commission should

have issued section 5K1.1 as a guideline rather than a policy

statement, appellant relies on 28 U.S.C. s 994(n), which

states:

The Commission shall assure that the guidelines reflect

the general appropriateness of imposing a lower sentence

than would otherwise be imposed, including a sentence

that is lower than that established by statute as a

minimum sentence, to take into account a defendant's

substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution

of another person who has committed an offense.

28 U.S.C. s 994(n) (emphasis added). According to appellant,

because Congress deliberately used the term "guidelines" and

"clearly differentiated between guidelines and policy statements," the Commission lacked authority to promulgate a

policy statement instead. Citing a contrary Fifth Circuit

decision, the Government responds that the statute sometimes uses the term "the guidelines" to refer broadly to the

system of guidelines as a whole--policy statements included--and that the Commission therefore had authority to

promulgate section 5K1.1 as a policy statement. See United

States v. Underwood, 61 F.3d 306, 310 (5th Cir. 1995) (construing the term "the guidelines" as used in 28 U.S.C.

s 994(n) to refer to the guidelines as a whole and concluding

that section 994(n) authorized the promulgation of a policy

statement).

Because appellant's argument amounts to a challenge to

the Commission's interpretation of its authority under the

statute to promulgate a policy statement, we proceed as

directed by Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See Stinson v. United

States, 508 U.S. 36, 44-45 (1993) ("The Sentencing Commission promulgates the guidelines by virtue of an express

congressional delegation of authority for rulemaking....");

United States v. Doe, 934 F.2d 353, 359 (D.C. Cir. 1991)

(applying Chevron analysis to Sentencing Guidelines). If the

statute is clear, that ends the matter. If the statute is

ambiguous, we must defer to the Commission's interpretation

as long as it is reasonable. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44.

We begin with the statute's language and structure. Defining the duties of the Commission, section 994 lists purposes

for the guidelines and tells the Commission what guidelines

and/or policy statements should accomplish. See generally 28

U.S.C. s 994. But section 994 uses the terms "guidelines"

and "policy statements" inconsistently. Some subsections

refer to "guidelines." Others refer to "guidelines promulgated pursuant to subsection (a)(1)," "guidelines and policy stateUSCA Case #97-3112 Document #369447 Filed: 07/24/1998 Page 4 of 11
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ments," "policy statements," or "policy statements promulgated pursuant to subsection (a)(2)," and it is not at all clear

whether Congress intended these terms to be mutually exclusive. For example, three different subsections dealing with

the length and conditions of imprisonment use three different

terms: Subsection 994(g) begins, "[t]he Commission, in promulgating guidelines pursuant to subsection (a)(1)," id.

s 994(g); subsection 994(h) begins, "[t]he Commission shall

assure that the guidelines specify," id. s 994(h); and subsection 994(e) begins, "[t]he Commission shall assure that the

guidelines and policy statements ... reflect," id. s 994(e).

Appellant argues that if, as the Government contends, "the

guidelines" means the system of guidelines as a whole, Congress's use of the words "guidelines and policy statements"

would have been redundant because the term "guidelines"

would already encompass policy statements. See id. s 994(c),

(d), (e). The Government responds that if the term "guidelines" means only those binding sentencing instructions as

defined in section 994(a)(1) and always excludes policy statements, Congress's use of the phrase "guidelines promulgated

pursuant to subsection (a)(1)" would have been redundant.

See id. s 994(b), (f), (g), (l), (y). Each side has a point.

Appellant also relies on the statute's definitional section

which states: " '[G]uidelines' means the guidelines promulgated by the Commission pursuant to section 994(a) of this title."

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Id. s 998(c). Section 994(a), in turn, has three subsections:

Subsection (a)(1) defines guidelines, subsection (a)(2) defines

policy statements, and subsection (a)(3) refers to both. Appellant interprets section 998(c)'s definition to restrict "guidelines" to guidelines as defined in subsection 994(a)(1). The

Government, pointing out that Congress knew how to refer to

subsection 994(a)(1) when it wanted to, argues that section

998(c)'s reference to section 994(a) encompasses both of its

subsections, defining guidelines (subsection 994(a)(1)) as well

as policy statements (subsection 994(a)(2)). Again, each side

has a point.

Because the parties each offer completely plausible interpretations of the statute and its structure, and because the

Supreme Court, though acknowledging the distinction between guidelines and policy statements, has never made clear

whether the use of the term "guidelines" in section 998(c)

excludes policy statements, see Williams, 503 U.S. at 200-201,

we face a classic case of statutory ambiguity, and thus turn to

Chevron 's second step, see Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44.

Given the statute's ambiguity and the Commission's broad

authority to promulgate policy statements--not only those

that interpret specific guidelines, but "regarding ... any

other aspect of sentencing or sentence implementation that in

the view of the Commission would further the purposes of

[sentencing]," 28 U.S.C. s 994(a)(2)--we have no doubt that

the Commission's decision to issue a policy statement rather

than a guideline in response to section 994(n) amounted to a

permissible, if not the only reasonable, construction of the

statute.

Appellant argues that since Hooker distinguished between

policy statements and guidelines, we cannot now read the

term "guideline" so broadly that it includes policy statements.

However, Hooker turned not on the distinction between

guidelines and policy statements, but on the unique nature of

Chapter 7 policy statements themselves. See Hooker, 993

F.2d at 901 (contrasting the freestanding, nonbinding, flexible

Chapter 7 policy statements promulgated pursuant to 28

U.S.C. s 994(a)(3), with the binding policy statements in

Williams, 503 U.S. at 200). Appellant suggests that under

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Hooker, freestanding policy statements like section 5K1.1 are

never binding. But this conflicts with Koon's description of

several freestanding Chapter 5 policy statements (sections

5H1.4, 5H1.10, 5H1.12, and 5K2.12) as binding, i.e., they

contain "factors that never can be bases for departure," Koon,

518 U.S. at 93; see also United States v. Webb, 134 F.3d 403,

406 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (treating a freestanding policy statement--section 5H1.4--as binding, noting that even though

the "directive is in the form of a 'policy statement' rather

than a 'guideline,' it is still 'an authoritative guide' for a court

contemplating a departure from the Guidelines") (quoting

Williams, 503 U.S. at 200).

III

This brings us to appellant's alternative argument that

even without a government motion, district courts can depart

based on substantial assistance in unusual cases. Although

the Supreme Court has twice addressed the substantial assistance motion requirement, see Melendez v. United States, 518

U.S. 120, 130-31 (1996) (government motion under section

5K1.1 for departure below Guidelines' range does not also

permit departure below the statutory minimum under 18

U.S.C. s 3553(e)); Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185-

86 (1992) (district court may review for unconstitutional motivation government decision not to file motion), it has never

decided whether departure might be appropriate when the

government has not filed a motion under section 5K1.1.

District courts may depart based on circumstances "not

adequately taken into consideration" by the Commission, 18

U.S.C. s 3553(b), and as Koon explains, the Guidelines list

very few factors that courts absolutely cannot use to depart,

see Koon, 518 U.S. at 93 (listing forbidden factors as "race,

sex, national origin, creed, religion, socio-economic status,

1995 U.S.S.G. s 5H1.10; lack of guidance as a youth,

s 5H1.12; drug or alcohol dependence, s 5H1.4; and economic hardship, s 5K2.12"); United States v. Rhodes, 1998

WL 321541, at *3-4 (D.C. Cir. June 19, 1998). If the proposed departure factor is not prohibited, courts may depart,

although the precise departure inquiry depends on whether

the factor is encouraged, discouraged, or unmentioned. See

Koon, 518 U.S. at 96; Rhodes, 1998 WL 321541, at *7. If the

factor is encouraged, courts can depart only "if the applicable

Guideline does not already take it into account." Koon, 518

U.S. at 96. If the factor is discouraged, or encouraged but

has already been taken into account in an applicable guideline, courts can depart "only if the factor is present to an

exceptional degree or in some other way makes the case

different from the ordinary case where the factor is present."

Id. If the factor is unmentioned, courts must, "after considering the 'structure and theory of both relevant individual

guidelines and the Guidelines taken as a whole,' decide whether [the factor] is sufficient to take the case out of the

Guideline's heartland." Id. (quoting United States v. Rivera,

994 F.2d 942, 949 (1st Cir. 1993)).

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Applying Koon to this case, we begin with the obvious: The

circumstance under which appellant seeks departure is not

prohibited. Nowhere do the Guidelines state that courts

cannot depart based on substantial assistance in the absence

of a government motion. Compare U.S.S.G. s 5K1.1 ("Upon

motion of the government ... the court may depart ....")

(emphasis added), with id. s 5H1.10 (stating that race, sex,

national origin, creed, religion, and socio-economic status "are

not relevant in the determination of a sentence").

But clarity ends here because the circumstances of this

case do not fit neatly into Koon's remaining encouraged/discouraged/unmentioned categories. The Guidelines encourage

substantial assistance departures with a government motion

but not without such a motion. Indeed, the Guidelines nowhere expressly address substantial assistance without a

government motion. The Government argues that the very

existence of a government motion requirement implicitly discourages departures without such a motion. But unlike other

policy statements that explicitly discourage consideration of

factors such as age, education, or family circumstances, see id.

ss 5H1.1, 5H1.2, 5H1.6, the Guidelines nowhere expressly

discourage departures based on "substantial assistance without a government motion," even though the Commission could

easily have done so. Just because the filing of a government

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motion makes substantial assistance an encouraged ground

does not mean the government's failure to file such a motion

transforms substantial assistance--a factor Congress expressly injected into the sentencing decision-making process, see 28

U.S.C. s 994(n)--into a discouraged ground.

Appellant argues that since the Guidelines neither encourage nor discourage consideration of substantial assistance

without a government motion, we should view it as unmentioned. Koon, adopting the First Circuit's analysis in Rivera,

coined the term "unmentioned" to refer to the class of

unusual factors not " 'adequately' " considered by the Commission. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 96 (quoting Rivera, 994 F.2d

at 949); see also id. (noting that unmentioned factors will be

" 'highly infrequent' ") (quoting U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A, intro.

cmt. 4(b) (describing general departure authority)). Rivera

explained that although the Guidelines identify some encouraged and discouraged factors, the Guidelines themselves recognize that departure factors " 'cannot, by their very nature,

be comprehensively listed and analyzed in advance.' " Rivera, 994 F.2d at 949 (quoting U.S.S.G. s 5K2.0). District

courts will therefore often have to decide for themselves

whether a case involves unusual factors not adequately considered by the Commission.

It is not always easy to determine whether a particular

factor (here, substantial assistance without a government

motion) that seems related to a factor mentioned in the

Guidelines (substantial assistance with a motion) has or has

not been adequately taken into account. Koon makes clear,

however, that factors mentioned in the Guidelines should be

interpreted precisely. Rejecting the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the Guidelines' prohibition on consideration of socioeconomic status precluded consideration of job loss, Koon

said that "[a]lthough an impermissible factor need not be

invoked by name to be rejected, socioeconomic status and job

loss are not the semantic or practical equivalent of each

other." Koon, 518 at 110. Two First Circuit cases take a

similarly precise approach. In one, the court found that the

Guidelines' designation of vocational skills as a discouraged

factor did not bar consideration of two related factors, i.e.,

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business failure and job loss. See United States v. Olbres, 99

F.3d 28, 35 (1st Cir. 1996). In the other case, the court

treated "assistance to the judicial system" (in the form of an

early plea agreement saving time and judicial resources) as

unmentioned by section 5K1.1 because assisting the judiciary

differs both conceptually and practically from assisting the

prosecution. See United States v. Dethlefs, 123 F.3d 39, 45

(1st Cir. 1997). By comparison, we held in Rhodes that postconviction rehabilitation, though neither expressly encouraged

nor discouraged as a departure basis, is nevertheless "taken

into account" because the Guidelines refer to the broader

concept of post-offense rehabilitation, Rhodes, 1998 WL

321541, at *9, "a concept linguistically broad enough to cover

post-conviction rehabilitation," id. at *8.

From these cases, the following standard emerges: Where

a proposed departure factor amounts either to the semantic

or practical equivalent of an explicitly mentioned factor or a

completely covered subset of an explicitly mentioned factor,

that factor has been accounted for in the Guidelines. Where,

however, the factor has no equivalent or substitute in the

Guidelines and no mentioned factor encompasses it, that

factor has not been adequately considered. This standard, in

addition to comporting with the case law, ensures that courts

remain faithful to the Guidelines. The Commission carefully

delineated encouraged and discouraged factors. See Koon,

518 U.S. at 106-09 (judicial preclusion of consideration of nonforbidden factors would usurp the Commission's policy making role). The Commission itself has described its guideline

promulgation process as evolutionary and its role "over time

[to] ... refine the guidelines to specify more precisely when

departures should and should not be permitted." U.S.S.G.

ch. I, pt. A, intro. cmt. 4(b). Courts should therefore not

extend Guideline categories to answer questions the Commission may have left for another day. See Olbres, 99 F.3d at 35

("[C]ourts should be careful not to construe the categories

covered by the Guidelines' factors too broadly....").

Applying this standard to the facts of this case, and considering "the sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary of the Sentencing Commission," 18 U.S.C.

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s 3553(b), we agree with appellant that a substantial assistance departure without a government motion is neither

encompassed by nor equivalent to any mentioned, encouraged, or discouraged factor, and was thus not adequately

considered by the Commission. Substantial assistance without a government motion is certainly not a "semantic or

practical equivalent" of substantial assistance with a motion,

Koon, 518 U.S. at 110. Nor is section 5K1.1 "linguistically

broad enough" to account for a substantial assistance departure without a government motion, Rhodes, 1998 WL 321541,

at *8. Indeed, the departure factors at issue in this case

differ more sharply than those at issue in Koon, Olbres, and

Dethlefs: socioeconomic status versus job loss (Koon), vocational skills versus business failure (Olbres), and assistance to

the government-as-prosecutor versus assistance to the government-as-judiciary (Dethlefs). Although these latter factors have at least some conceptual overlap, the factors at

issue here--substantial assistance with a government motion

versus substantial assistance without one--stand as polar

opposites. In fact, where the government files no motion,

section 5K1.1 does not even apply. Section 5K1.1 thus cannot

be viewed as adequate consideration of substantial assistance

without a government motion, particularly since 28 U.S.C.

s 994(n) explicitly directed the Commission to assure that the

guidelines reflect the general appropriateness of lesser sentences for defendants who substantially assist the prosecution.

We therefore conclude that even where the government

files no motion, Koon authorizes district courts to depart from

the Guidelines based on a defendant's substantial assistance

where circumstances take the case out of the relevant guideline heartland. Insofar as this contradicts our holding in

Ortez that district courts lack authority to consider substantial assistance absent a government motion, Koon effectively

overrules that aspect of Ortez. As Koon directs, we leave it

to the district court to define the "heartland" for a particular

case. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 98-99; Rhodes, 1998 WL 321541,

at *9.

This case is remanded for possible re-sentencing in light of

this opinion.

So ordered.

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