Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02403/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02403-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael Barry
Defendant
County of Sacramento
Defendant
Mary C. Engel
Plaintiff
Hammer
Defendant
Sowles
Defendant
Scott Sparks
Defendant

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

MARY C. ENGEL,

NO. CIV. S 03-2403 MCE KJM

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MICHAEL BARRY, et al.,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Through the present action, Plaintiff Mary Engel

(“Plaintiff”) claims that Defendants Michael Barry, Deputy Brian

Hammer, Deputy William Sowles, and Officer Scott Sparks

(collectively, “Defendants”) violated her civil rights during the

course of searching her home and ultimately arresting her on

felony child endangerment charges. Specifically, Plaintiff

alleged federal claims under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42

U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983"), including false arrest, false

imprisonment, assault under color of law, assault and battery,

cruel and unusual punishment, violation of right to counsel,

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While Plaintiff failed to list this cause of action in the 1

caption of her complaint, the Court notes that it is set forth in

the body of her complaint and, therefore, warrants this Court’s

consideration.

Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 2

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal.

Local Rule 78-230(h). 

2

illegal search and seizure, taking of personal property without 1

due process or just compensation, racial discrimination,

conspiracy, and negligence/deliberate indifference. In addition,

Plaintiff raised state claims of trespass to land, trespass to

chattel, and invasion of privacy.

On March 25, 2004, Defendants concurrently moved to dismiss

Plaintiff’s claims and to strike Plaintiff’s request for punitive

damages. In its Memorandum and Order dated August 17, 2004, the

Court granted Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Section

1983 claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, cruel and

unusual punishment, violation of right to counsel, and deliberate

indifference for improper training as to probable cause for child

endangerment. See Mem. & Order, August 17, 2004. Also, the

Court granted Defendants’ Motion to Strike punitive damages. Id. 

In the current motion, Plaintiff is seeking summary judgment

or, in the alternative, summary adjudication as to her claims of

illegal search and seizure, due process violation, invasion of

privacy, deliberate indifference, conspiracy, trespass to land

and trespass to chattel. For the reasons set forth fully below,

Plaintiff’s motion is denied.2

//

//

//

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3

BACKGROUND

The Court has previously set forth a detailed factual

background for this action in its Order of August 17, 2004, which

is incorporated by reference and need not be reproduced herein.

Mem. & Order 2-5, August 17, 2004. 

STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary

judgment when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). One of the

principal purposes of Rule 56 is to dispose of factually

unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 325 (1986).

Rule 56 also allows a court to grant summary adjudication on

part of a claim or defense. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“A party

seeking to recover upon a claim ... may ... move ... for a

summary judgment in the party’s favor upon all or any part

thereof.”); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Madan, 889 F. Supp.

374, 378-79 (C.D. Cal. 1995); France Stone Co., Inc. v. Charter

Township of Monroe, 790 F. Supp. 707, 710 (E.D. Mich. 1992).

The standard that applies to a motion for summary

adjudication is the same as that which applies to a motion for

summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), 56(c); Mora v.

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4

ChemTronics, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 1998).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

always bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 323(quoting Rule 56(c)).

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

585-87 (1986); First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S.

253, 288-89 (1968).

In attempting to establish the existence of this factual

dispute, the opposing party must tender evidence of specific

facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery

material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The opposing party must demonstrate that

the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and that

the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 251-52

(1986); Owens v. Local No. 169, Assoc. of Western Pulp and Paper

Workers, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir. 1987). Stated another way,

“before the evidence is left to the jury, there is a preliminary

question for the judge, not whether there is literally no

evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury could

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properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it,

upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at

251 (quoting Improvement Co. v. Munson, 14 Wall. 442, 448, 20

L.Ed. 867 (1872)). As the Supreme Court explained, “[w]hen the

moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its

opponent must do more that simply show that there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts .... Where the record

taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find

for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87.

In resolving a summary judgment motion, the evidence of the

opposing party is to be believed, and all reasonable inferences

that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be

drawn in favor of the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 

Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is

the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate

from which the inference may be drawn. Richards v. Nielsen

Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985),

aff’d, 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).

ANALYSIS

1. Illegal Search and Seizure

The Court notes that this Motion for Summary Adjudication

marks the first opportunity for the Court to examine Plaintiff’s

claim of illegal search and seizure. Specifically, neither

Plaintiff nor Defendants had previously addressed this particular

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claim in the papers filed with the Court. Accordingly, the Court

must first consider whether this claim is viable.

As explained in this Court’s August 17, 2004, Memorandum and

Order, a Section 1983 action that would call into question the

lawfulness of a plaintiff’s conviction or confinement is not

cognizable, and does not, therefore, accrue until and unless the

plaintiff can prove that her conviction or sentence has been

reversed on direct appeal. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,

486-87 (1994). Thus, when a plaintiff files a Section 1983

action, the court must determine whether "...a judgment in favor

of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his

conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be

dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the

conviction or sentence has already been invalidated." Id.

Plaintiff was convicted of misdemeanor child endangerment

and has failed to present any evidence that her conviction was

reversed or invalidated. Plaintiff made a motion to amend this

Court’s August 17, 2004, Order barring a number of her claims on

the ground that her conviction had been “set aside” under

California Penal Code § 1203.4. While a 1203.4 petition for

expungement does act to relieve a defendant from most penalties

and disabilities resulting from the offense, it does not nullify

the conviction. See People v. Vasquez, 25 Cal. 4th 1225, 1230

(Cal. Sup. Ct. 2001). Rather, the final judgment of a conviction

is a fact; and its effect cannot be nullified even by a 1203.4

set aside. Id. The Court acknowledged that Plaintiff’s

conviction had, indeed, been set aside under 1204.3, but clearly

held that her conviction was not expunged and still exists as a

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legal reality. Mem. & Order 3, August 17, 2004. As a result,

Heck will act to bar Plaintiff’s claim of illegal search and

seizure if it would imply the invalidity of her underlying

criminal conviction. See Mem. & Order 4, February 9, 2005.

The Ninth Circuit has spoken directly to whether a Section

1983 action alleging illegal search and seizure is cognizable

when it has resulted in a criminal conviction. See Harvey v.

Waldron, 210 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2000). The Harvey court

expressly held that a Section 1983 claim for illegal search and

seizure does not accrue until the criminal charges upon which

that search is based have been dismissed or the conviction has

been overturned. Id. at 1015. The court went on to explain that

such a holding will avoid the potential for inconsistent

determinations on the legality of a search and seizure in civil

and criminal cases and will therefore fulfill the Heck Court’s

objectives of preserving consistency and finality, and preventing

"...a collateral attack on [a] conviction through the vehicle of

a civil suit." Id.

Here, Plaintiff plead nolo contendere to the charge of child

endangerment. In order to receive and accept such a plea from an

accused, a factual basis for the plea must have been stated by

the prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant while under oath. 

In order for Plaintiff to succeed on this Section 1983 claim

alleging an illegal search and seizure, the underlying factual

basis for her conviction would need to be largely, if not

entirely, invalidated. Destroying the factual basis upon which

her conviction rests would certainly imply the invalidity of her

conviction. Such a result is strictly prohibited by Heck. 

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Plaintiff characterizes this claim as one for extortion. 3

See Pl’s. Compl. p. 1, 11, 12. Plaintiff claims that the threats

allegedly made to induce her to release the animals amounts to

extortion and, ultimately, to a violation of her constitutional

rights. Mere threats to do an unconstitutional act, however,

does not rise to the level of a constitutional wrong. Gaut v.

Sunn, 810 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1987). Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s claim is properly characterized as a deprivation of

her right to due process. 

8

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim alleging illegal

search and seizure is dismissed with prejudice. 

2. Violation of Right to Due Process3

In her complaint, Plaintiff avers, inter alia, that

Defendants deprived her of protections under the Fourth, Fifth,

Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Pl’s. Compl. 10-11. 

Plaintiff is relying on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to support her claim

that Officer Sparks and Officer Sowles deprived her of personal

property under color of law and without due process. In

pertinent part, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that:

Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State.

. . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of

the United States or other person within the

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution

and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an

action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress.

In order to state a cause of action under Section 1983, a

plaintiff must show (1) that a person acting under color of state

law engaged in the conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct

deprived the claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity

protected by the constitution or laws of the United States. See

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Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 632 (9th Cir. 1988). A person

deprives another of a constitutional right, within the meaning of

Section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in

another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he

is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which

the plaintiff complains. See id. at 633.

It is undisputed that Defendant Sparks and Defendant Sowles

acted under color of state law when they requested a release from

Plaintiff to surrender her animals to the custody of Animal

Control Services. Plaintiff’s central allegation is that

Defendants Sowles and Sparks forced her to sign the release that

surrendered her animals to Officer Sparks. Plaintiff avers that

Defendants Sowles and Sparks applied threats of a felony animal

cruelty charge against Plaintiff as leverage which, she claims,

amounted to extortion and ultimately a deprivation of due

process.

Before summary adjudication can be granted in her favor,

Plaintiff has the burden of establishing that there are no issues

of material fact regarding whether Defendants were acting under

color of state law and deprived her of the animals without

satisfying the rigors of due process. While there is no issue

regarding whether Defendants were acting under color of state

law, there remain issues of material fact regarding whether

Plaintiff was deprived of her property without due process.

As support for the contention that Plaintiff’s due process

rights were violated, Plaintiff makes the bare assertion that

Defendants “threatened her” with filing an animal cruelty charge. 

Defendants rebut this assertion by referring to inconsistencies

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in Plaintiff’s testimony. At this early stage in the

controversy, the Court is not required to engage in a fact

finding mission to determine the validity of all claims. 

Instead, Plaintiff’s failure to resolve the issues of material

fact concludes the inquiry. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Adjudication of this claim is denied.

3. Invasion of Privacy 

The constitution generally protects two kinds of privacy

interests. One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure

of personal matters, and another is the interest in independence

in making certain kinds of important decisions. Whalen v. Roe,

429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977). Such basic matters as contraception,

abortion, marriage, and family life are protected by the

constitution from unwarranted government intrusion. See

generally Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 244 (1970); Roe v.

Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438

(1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

Here, Plaintiff is seeking redress for the invasion of her

privacy occasioned by Defendants’ warrantless search of her home. 

In the absence of probable cause and a valid search warrant,

search of a home is a per se violation of the Fourth Amendment of

the Constitution of the United States of America. See Coolidge

v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-75 (1971). That said, the

warrant requirement may be waived based on a specific showing of

exigent circumstances. Id.

In support of her motion, Plaintiff categorically asserts

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that her constitutional right to privacy was infringed by

Defendants’ search of her home. In opposition, Defendants

contend that there were sufficient exigent circumstances to enter

and search her home. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the

home was simply in disrepair whereas Defendants contend that the

home exhibited serious signs of neglect along with a pungent odor

which caused Defendants to fear for the safety of the children. 

Clearly, issues of material fact exist as to whether there were

sufficient exigent circumstances to permit Defendants to conduct

a warrantless search of Plaintiff’s residence. Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Adjudication is denied.

4. Deliberate Indifference to the Training of Defendants

A municipality will only be found liable under section 1983

for a policy of inadequate training or supervision in limited

circumstances. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387

(1989). Inadequacy of training "may serve as the basis for

section 1983 liability only where the [municipal entity’s]

failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights

of persons with whom the police come into contact.” Id. 

Moreover, a plaintiff alleging municipal liability under Section

1983 must show there is a direct causal link between a municipal

policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation. Id.

at 385. 

Plaintiff offers no evidence whatsoever to establish the

material facts underpinning her claim. Rather, she simply avers

that the County of Sacramento indifferently trained Defendants

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resulting in a violation of her constitutional rights. The Court

cannot summarily adjudicate this claim in favor of Plaintiff when

there is a complete absence of evidence regarding whether the

County was deliberately indifferent to the rights of individuals. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Adjudication is

denied.

5. Conspiracy

A 42 U.S.C. § 1983 conspiracy claim generally requires a

predicate showing that a right guaranteed by law was violated. 

See Giannini v. Real, 911 F.2d 354, 359 (9th Cir. 1990). No

conspiracy claim may survive where no liberty deprivation,

retaliation or invasion of privacy occurred.

Plaintiff has not yet established any deprivation of liberty

or other invasion of privacy to which the conspiracy claim can

attach. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Adjudication of the

conspiracy claim is premature and must, therefore, be denied.

6. Trespass to Land and Trespass to Chattel

Plaintiff is seeking summary adjudication of her claims for

trespass to land and trespass to chattel. She argues that there

are no disputed facts regarding whether Defendants entered her

property without permission. Defendants rebut that they are

entitled to a qualified immunity which will absolutely shield

them of any liability for their actions in connection with the

search of Plaintiff’s home.

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In fact, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity

unless a reasonable officer would have known that the conduct at

issue was unlawful under clearly established law. See Anderson

v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987). The determination of

whether a reasonable officer could have believed his conduct was

lawful is a determination of law that can be decided on summary

judgment only if the material facts are undisputed. See LaLonde

v. County of Riverside, 204 F.3d 947, 953 (9th Cir. 2000).

As discussed in detail above, there remain a number of

material facts in dispute. Accordingly, whether Defendants can

be held liable for the tort of trespass to land and trespass to

chattel is inappropriate for disposition on this summary

adjudication motion. Plaintiff’s motion is, therefore, denied.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment or, in the alternative, Summary Adjudication is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 15, 2005

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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