Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01006/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01006-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Christopher J. Morris
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 06-1006

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United States of America,

Appellee,

v.

Christopher J. Morris,

 Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States

District Court for the Western

District of Missouri.

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Submitted: June 13, 2006

 Filed: August 15, 2006

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Before SMITH, HEANEY and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges. 

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GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

Christopher J. Morris pled guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of

a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e)(1). The district court

sentenced Morris to 188 months’ imprisonment. Morris appeals his sentence,

challenging the district court’s conclusion that Morris was not entitled under U.S.

Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5G1.3(b) (2004) to credit for the time he already

served on a Missouri sentence for conduct relevant to the instant offense. For the

following reasons, we vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing. 

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I. BACKGROUND

On May 14, 2003, Morris burglarized a home in Lafayette County, Missouri,

and stole five firearms. Morris later pled guilty to burglary and receipt of stolen

property in Missouri state court (the “Lafayette County conviction”) and was

sentenced to seven years in state custody. Also on May 14, Morris pawned in

Independence, Missouri, a stolen Mossberg shotgun, two of the firearms stolen from

Lafayette County, and one other firearm. Morris’s possession of the Mossberg

shotgun is the subject of the indictment and conviction in this case.

Morris was serving prison sentences for the Lafayette County conviction and

other Missouri convictions at the time of his indictment in this matter. After his

indictment, Morris was transferred to federal custody pursuant to a writ of habeas

corpus ad prosequendum. He entered a guilty plea without a plea agreement, and the

district court ordered the preparation of a presentence investigation report (“PSR”).

The PSR presented two sentencing guidelines calculations for Morris’s offense, both

of which resulted in an offense level of 31. 

First, the PSR calculated Morris’s offense level under Chapters Two and Three

of the sentencing guidelines. In doing so, the PSR recommended Chapter Two

adjustments based on relevant conduct, including the conduct underlying the Lafayette

County convictions. The PSR assigned Morris a base offense level of 24 pursuant to

U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2). Two levels were added pursuant to § 2K2.1(b)(4) “because

the firearm had been stolen.” PSR ¶ 20. Four more levels were added pursuant to §

2K2.1(b)(1)(A) because Morris “was in possession of a total of 8 firearms on May 14

and 15, 2003,” which included firearms stolen in Lafayette County. PSR ¶ 21. Four

additional levels were added pursuant to § 2K2.1(b)(5) because Morris possessed two

firearms in connection with the felony offense of stealing the firearms in Lafayette

County. PSR ¶ 22. After a three-level reduction pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 for

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acceptance of responsibility, this calculation resulted in a total offense level of 31.

There were no objections to any of these calculations or underlying factual

determinations.

Alternatively, the PSR recommended classifying Morris as an Armed Career

Criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) and U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4. The PSR calculated a

Chapter Four offense level of 34 pursuant to § 4B1.4(b)(1) (“the offense level

applicable from Chapters Two and Three”) and a total offense level of 31 after a threelevel reduction for acceptance of responsibility. 

The PSR also noted a potential issue involving § 5G1.3, to which Morris

objected. Section 5G1.3(b) provides that if the conduct underlying Morris’s Lafayette

County conviction “is relevant conduct to the instant offense of conviction under the

provisions of subsections (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3) of § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct) and

. . . was the basis for an increase in the offense level for the instant offense under

Chapter Two (Offense Conduct) or Chapter Three (Adjustments),” then Morris’s

sentence for the federal offense “shall be imposed to run concurrently to the remainder

of the undischarged term of imprisonment” for his Lafayette County conviction, and

the “court shall adjust the sentence for any period of imprisonment already served on

the undischarged term of imprisonment if the court determines that such period of

imprisonment will not be credited to the federal sentence by the Bureau of Prisons.”

§ 5G1.3(b). However, if § 5G1.3(b) does not apply, then § 5G1.3(c) gives the

sentencing court discretion to impose a concurrent, partially concurrent, or

consecutive sentence “to achieve a reasonable punishment for the instant offense.”

§ 5G1.3(c).

At sentencing, the district court overruled Morris’s objection to its refusal to

take into account the Lafayette County conviction as relevant conduct. The district

court explained that it was “not going to consider those [state] cases as relevant

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The district court also ordered Morris’s sentence to run consecutively to three

other Missouri sentences and to run concurrently to one other Missouri sentence

imposed after Morris committed the instant offense.

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conduct” but “rather [was] going to treat Mr. Morris as an armed career criminal.” In

order to factor out the Lafayette County relevant conduct, the district court utilized §

4B1.4(b)(3)(B) to determine that Morris’s base offense level was 33 and that his total

offense level was 30 after a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility.

With a criminal history category of VI and a mandatory minimum sentence of 180

months, the resulting sentencing range was 180 to 210 months. The district court

considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553 factors and sentenced Morris to 188 months’

imprisonment. Since it did not utilize the Lafayette County conviction as relevant

conduct in determining Morris’s guidelines range, the district court exercised its

discretion pursuant to § 5G1.3(c) to run the sentence concurrently to Morris’s term of

imprisonment for the Lafayette County conviction and refused to give Morris credit

for the time he already served on his Lafayette County conviction.1

On appeal, Morris argues that the district court should have sentenced him at

the greatest offense level available under § 4B1.4, which in this case is the offense

level taking into account the relevant conduct underlying the Lafayette County

conviction, and that a proper application of the sentencing guidelines requires the

district court to grant him credit for time already served for his Lafayette County

conviction pursuant to § 5G1.3(b). We agree that the district court should have

considered the relevant conduct and sentenced Morris at offense level 31 and that §

5G1.3(b) applies.

II. DISCUSSION

We review the district court’s interpretation and application of the sentencing

guidelines de novo. United States v. Vasquez-Garcia, 449 F.3d 870, 872 (8th Cir.

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2006). “Sentencing under Booker requires, as a ‘critical starting point,’ that the

district court calculate the advisory guidelines sentencing range in the same manner

it would have calculated the range under the mandatory Guidelines regime.” United

States v. Thomas, 422 F.3d 665, 669 (8th Cir. 2005). Therefore, an incorrect

application of the guidelines “can require remand regardless of whether the resulting

sentence was otherwise reasonable.” United States v. Donelson, 450 F.3d 768, 774

(8th Cir. 2006).

The district court calculated Morris’s offense level to be 33 as an armed career

criminal and his total offense level to be 30 after a three-point downward adjustment

for acceptance of responsibility. Morris contends that the district court violated

U.S.S.G. §§ 1B1.3 and 5G1.3(b) by excluding the relevant conduct underlying the

Lafayette County conviction from the guidelines calculation. He takes this position

because if the Lafayette County conviction is considered “relevant conduct . . . that

was the basis for an increase in the offense level for the instant offense under Chapter

Two (Offense Conduct) or Chapter Three (Adjustments),” § 5G1.3(b), then he is

entitled to credit for time already served on the Lafayette County conviction pursuant

to § 5G1.3(b). The Government asserts that the district court properly chose not to

consider the Lafayette County conviction in calculating Morris’s offense level based

on his status as an armed career criminal under § 4B1.4(b)(3)(B) and that § 5G1.3(b)

does not apply.

We conclude that the district court erred in its application of the armed career

criminal guideline because § 4B1.4(b) requires the district court to choose the greatest

offense level among the listed options, which in this case is 31 under § 4B1.4(b)(1).

As a consequence, the district court applied the wrong guidelines sentencing range and

failed to adjust Morris’s sentence for the period of imprisonment already served for

his Lafayette County conviction, provided that “the court determines that such period

of imprisonment will not be credited to the federal sentence by the Bureau of Prisons.”

§ 5G1.3(b).

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The armed career criminal guideline provides:

(b) The offense level for an armed career criminal is the greatest of:

(1) the offense level applicable from Chapters Two and Three;

or

(2) the offense level from § 4B1.1 (Career Offender) if

applicable; or

(3) (A) 34, if the defendant used or possessed the firearm or

ammunition in connection with either a crime of

violence, as defined in § 4B1.2(a), or a controlled

substance offense, as defined in § 4B1.2(b), or if the

firearm possessed by the defendant was of a type

described in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a)*; or

(B) 33, otherwise.* 

*If an adjustment from § 3E1.1 (Acceptance of

Responsibility) applies, decrease the offense level by the

number of levels corresponding to that adjustment.

§ 4B1.4(b) (emphasis added).

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The armed career criminal guideline, § 4B1.4, requires the district court to

choose the greatest of four possible offense level calculations.2

 Two of the options,

§ 4B1.4(b)(2) and § 4B1.4(b)(3)(A), do not apply to Morris. Section 4B1.4(b)(2) is

inapplicable because Morris does not qualify as a career offender for the instant

offense. Section 4B1.4(b)(3)(A) applies only to the particular firearm upon which the

instant conviction is based. United States v. Mann, 315 F.3d 1054, 1056 (8th Cir.

2003) (contrasting § 4B1.4(b)(3)(A) with the § 2K2.1(b)(5) enhancement, which

applies to “any” firearm). In this case, “the firearm” is the Mossberg shotgun, the

subject of Morris’s federal conviction. The district court did not make a finding that

Morris used or possessed the Mossberg shotgun “in connection with” the burglary in

Lafayette County or any other crime of violence. 

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When the PSR calculated Morris’s offense level under the armed career

criminal guideline, it determined that the offense level was 34 under § 4B1.4(b)(1) and

then subsequently reduced the offense level by three for acceptance of responsibility.

Because the guideline for acceptance of responsibility, § 3E1.1, is located in Chapter

Three, and § 4B1.4(b)(1) requires the determination of the offense level applicable

from Chapters Two and Three, we find that the offense level under § 4B1.4(b)(1) is

31, not 34.

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Morris’s offense level based upon the third option is 30 because §

4B1.4(b)(3)(B) specifies that the given offense level of 33 is to be reduced for

acceptance of responsibility, if applicable. The fourth option for the offense level for

an armed career criminal is “the offense level applicable from Chapters Two and

Three.” § 4B1.4(b)(1). When determining the offense level under Chapters Two and

Three, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 directs that it “shall be determined on the basis of” relevant

conduct. Therefore, the district court does not have the option of ignoring the

Lafayette County relevant conduct when calculating the offense level under §

4B1.4(b)(1). The PSR identified a total offense level of 31 using the Lafayette County

relevant conduct under Chapter Two and reducing three levels for acceptance of

responsibility under Chapter Three.3

 Morris’s offense level pursuant to § 4B1.4(b)(1)

is 31.

The district court was then required to choose the greatest offense level under

§ 4B1.4(b). Because the offense level of 31 calculated under § 4B1.4(b)(1) was the

greatest of the four options, the court should have determined the guidelines

sentencing range based on a total offense level of 31 instead of 30. The guideline

calculation under § 4B1.4(b)(1) is based on the adjustments under Chapters Two and

Three, which necessarily includes adjustments under § 2K2.1 based on the Lafayette

County conviction. Because the Lafayette County conviction was required to be taken

into account as relevant conduct to the instant offense and was the basis for an

increase in his offense level under § 2K2.1(b), § 5G1.3(b) applies to Morris. See §

5G1.3(b).

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We remand for resentencing because we cannot say based on this record that

the combined errors of miscalculating the guidelines sentencing range and failing to

apply § 5G1.3(b) did not impact the ultimate sentence imposed by the district court.

See United States v. Lindquist, 421 F.3d 751, 757 (8th Cir. 2005) (explaining that

remand is not required where an error in the application of the guidelines was

harmless). On remand, the district court should apply the guidelines sentencing range

corresponding to offense level 31 and should grant Morris an adjustment of his

sentence for time served on his Missouri state conviction for burglary and receipt of

stolen property pursuant to § 5G1.3(b) “if the court determines that such period of

imprisonment will not be credited to the federal sentence by the Bureau of Prisons.”

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we vacate the sentence and remand the case to

the district court for resentencing consistent with this opinion.

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