Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-04180/USCOURTS-ca10-94-04180-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Julio Ortiz
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH F I L E D 

Ualted States Court of Appe&:S UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit 

TENTH CIRCUIT AUG 0 8 1995 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

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PATRICK FISHER 

CJer:t 

vs. No. 94-4180 

JULIO ORTIZ, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 

(D.C. No. 93-CR-248) 

Gordon w. Campbell, Assistant United States Attorney, Salt Lake 

City, Utah (Scott M. Matheson, Jr., United States Attorney, with 

him on the brief) for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Robert Breeze, Salt Lake city, Utah for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before KELLY and McKAY, Circuit Judges, and COOK, District Judget. 

KELLY, Circuit Judge. 

Defendant-Appellant Julio Ortiz entered a conditional plea to 

unlawful possession of a firearm with an obliterated 

manufacturer's serial number, 18 u.s.c. § 922(k). He now appeals 

the district court's denial of his motion to suppress, and its 

application of the Sentencing Guidelines. We exercise 

t The Honorable H. Dale Cook, United States District Judge for 

the Northern District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 94-4180 Document: 01019279373 Date Filed: 08/08/1995 Page: 1 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), 

and we affirm the conviction, but remand for resentencing. 

Background 

In the early morning hours of June 6, 1992 two officers from 

the Salt Lake City Metro Gang Unit were patrolling in an area 

known for frequent juvenile criminal activity. The officers 

observed what they considered to be a teenage girl, holding a can 

of Budweiser, standing next to the passenger side of a black pickup truck in a parking lot. She was leaning toward the inside of 

the truck and appeared to be conversing with the passengers. 

The officers, thinking that a violation of the law (a minor 

in possession of alcohol) was occurring, decided to investigate. 

As they pulled into the parking lot, and approached the scene on 

foot, the teenage girl began walking rapidly in the opposite 

direction. Suspecting that the girl had been given beer by the 

vehicle's occupants, one of the officers approached the truck, 

which started to pull away. The officer slapped the right rear 

side of the vehicle, and the truck halted just as it reached the 

edge of the parking lot and before it entered the street. 

The officer walked around toward the front of the vehicle, 

shined his flashlight inside the passenger compartment, and 

observed an open bottle of Budweiser between the driver's legs and 

a can of Budweiser sitting next to the passenger. The officer 

then requested identification from the two occupants of the truck. 

The passenger's identification indicated that he was under twentyone years of age. At that point, the officer placed the driver, 

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Mr. Ortiz, under arrest for having an open container of alcohol in 

the truck and for providing alcohol to a minor. He arrested the 

passenger for being a minor in possession of alcohol. 

The officer then proceeded to search the truck. He found 

additional bottles of beer, and underneath the driver's seat, a 

nine millimeter handgun with its serial number obliterated. Mr. 

Ortiz fled the scene, but was later apprehended. Shortly after 

being apprehended, Mr. Ortiz admitted knowing that the gun had 

been in the truck, that its serial number had been filed off, and 

that the weapon was stolen. He claimed that he had been holding 

the gun for someone else. 

Discussion 

A. Motion to Suppress 

Mr. Ortiz first contends that the district court erred by not 

suppressing evidence of the gun discovered during the search of 

the truck immediately following the arrest of Mr. Ortiz and his 

passenger. In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we 

accept the district court's findings of fact unless they are 

clearly erroneous. United States v. Nielsen, 9 F.3d 1487, 1489 

(lOth Cir. 1993). We are mindful that "the credibility of the 

witnesses and the weight given to the evidence, as well as the 

inferences and conclusions drawn therefrom, are matters for the 

trial judge." United States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874, 876 (lOth 

Cir. 1994). Of course, the ultimate question of the 

reasonableness of a search or seizure is a question of law that we 

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review de novo. United States v. Horn, 970 F.2d 728, 730 (lOth 

Cir. 1992). 

Although the arrest of Mr. Ortiz for violating Utah's open 

container law, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.20 (1993), and for 

providing a minor with alcohol, Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-203 

(1994), was found invalid, the district court did ultimately 

uphold the search of the truck as incident to the valid arrest 

of Mr. Ortiz's passenger. Without deciding the validity of 

Mr. Ortiz's original arrest, we agree with the district court's 

holding as to the arrest of his passenger for being a minor 

in possession of alcohol, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 

§ 32A-12-209(1) (1994), and uphold the subsequent search flowing 

therefrom. 

Examining, as we must, the totality of the circumstances, 

Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990), we think it clear that 

at the moment the police stopped the truck, they possessed the 

requisite reasonable articulable suspicion that the occupants had 

been, were, or were about to be engaged in criminal activity. See 

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968); United States v. Sokolow, 

490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989); United States v. Nicholson, 983 F.2d 983, 

987 (lOth Cir. 1993). The officers were alerted to the possible 

commission of at least two potential crimes, providing alcohol to 

a minor and driving with an open container, by the absence of the 

beer can in the girl's hand as she fled the scene, and by the 

truck, in which she might have placed the can, starting to drive 

away. 

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From that point, the encounter continued to develop along 

proper Fourth Amendment lines. The officer's shining of his 

flashlight into the truck's passenger compartment comported with a 

valid plain view search. See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 

305 (1987). This search revealed the presence of alcohol in close 

proximity to Mr. Ortiz and the passenger, and the identification 

produced indicated that the latter was under twenty-one years of 

age. This combination of facts gave the officer the requisite 

probable cause to arrest the passenger for being a minor in 

possession of alcohol. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 

160, 175-76 (1949); United States v. Hugaboom, 984 F.2d 1083, 

1083-84 (lOth Cir. 1993). Once the passenger had been arrested, 

the police then were entitled to search the passenger compartment 

of the truck as a contemporaneous incident of the arrest. See 

California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 575-76 (1991); New York v. 

Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981); United States v. Franco, 981 

F.2d 470, 472 (lOth Cir. 1992). Thus, the gun discovered 

underneath the front seat was within the scope of a valid Fourth 

Amendment search, and the district court was correct in denying 

Mr. Ortiz's motion to suppress. 

B. Criminal History Computation 

At sentencing, in accordance with U.S.S.G. § 4Al.l, the 

district court determined that Mr. Ortiz's past criminal 

convictions warranted placement in criminal history category IV. 

The probation department's presentence report calculated Mr. 

Ortiz's total criminal history score to be eight points. Mr. 

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Ortiz raised separate objections to the inclusion of two of these 

points, which the district court subsequently rejected. 

On appeal, Mr. Ortiz only pursues one of his earlier 

objections. He contends that an uncounseled misdemeanor 

conviction should not have been included because, while he was 

originally placed on probation, he subsequently was incarcerated 

following the revocation of that probation. We need not reach 

this issue. 

In order to qualify for criminal history category IV, a 

defendant's criminal history score must total at least seven 

points. Even if the one point attributed to the uncounseled 

misdemeanor conviction were not included, Mr. Ortiz's criminal 

history score would be seven points, still within category IV. 

Because Mr. Ortiz's criminal history category remains the same, we 

do not need to resolve this criminal history dispute. See United 

States v. Williams, 919 F.2d 1451, 1458 (lOth Cir. 1990), cert. 

denied, 499 U.S. 968 (1991}. 

Our conclusion would not change even if Mr. Ortiz had revived 

his objection to the other contested criminal history point in 

conjunction with this current appeal. At sentencing, Mr. Ortiz 

had objected to the use of another conviction in determining his 

criminal history point tally, because the record relating to this 

conviction had been destroyed. Relying upon research completed by 

the probation department, the district court, however, 

specifically found that sufficient reliable evidence of this 

conviction existed to support its use in calculating Mr. Ortiz's 

criminal history point total. See United States v. Johnson, 973 

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F. 2d 857, 861 (lOth Cir. 1992) (district court to find that prior 

felony convictions established by preponderance of the evidence) ; 

United States v. Easterling, 921 F.2d 1073, 1077 (lOth Cir. 1990) 

(factual determinations at sentencing under preponderance of 

evidence standard), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 937 (1991). Once the 

government had established the fact of this prior conviction, the 

burden then shifted to Mr. Ortiz to challenge its validity. See 

United States v. Wicks, 995 F.2d 964, 978 (lOth Cir.} (defendant 

pointing to missing record must submit affidavit or equivalent 

asserting plea not voluntary or that he lacked necessary 

understanding}, cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 482 (1993}. Mr. Ortiz's 

failure to do so gave the district court no cause to doubt the 

existence of this prior conviction, and so it was properly 

included in calculating his criminal history score. 

C. U.S.S.G. § 3El.l{b) 

Mr. Ortiz lastly argues that he was entitled to a threelevel, and not just a two-level, downward adjustment at sentencing 

for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to § 3El.l(b} (1} of the 

Sentencing Guidelines. He contends that the lower court erred by 

finding that the commencement of trial precluded application of 

this provision. 

Because resolution of this issue mandates that we examine the 

district court's interpretation and application of the Sentencing 

Guidelines, our review is de novo. See United States v. 

Hershberger, 962 F.2d 1548, 1550 (lOth Cir. 1992}. 

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Section 3El.l(b) of the Guidelines permits an additional onelevel reduction when the defendant has assisted authorities in the 

investigation or prosecution of his own misconduct by one of two 

different means: 

(1) timely providing complete information to the 

government concerning his own involvement in the offense; or 

(2) timely notifying authorities of his intention to 

enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting the government 

to avoid preparing for trial and permitting the court to 

allocate its resources efficiently .... 

Although Mr. Ortiz raised the applicability of § 3El.l(b) (1) 

at sentencing, arguing that he had timely provided complete 

information to the government, a review of the hearing transcript 

reveals that the district court examined only the timing of Mr. 

Ortiz's plea, i.e., the applicability of§ 3El.l(b) (2), in 

declining to award the additional one-level reduction. Because 

the district court looked solely to § 3El.l(b) (2), it made no 

findings regarding whether Mr. Ortiz had provided complete 

information concerning his involvement in the offense in a timely 

manner. 

It is not possible to ignore this omission by reasoning that 

the commencement of trial, which may render a plea of guilty 

untimely for purposes of § 3El.l(b) (2), also operates to render 

the provision of complete information untimely for purposes of 

§ 3El.l(b) (1). These two sections are disjunctive, and so the 

language referencing the commencement of trial applies only to 

§ 3El.l(b) (2). See United States v. Talladino, 38 F.3d 1255, 1266 

(1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Stoops, 25 F.3d 820, 823 (9th 

Cir. 1994); United States v. Tello, 9 F.3d 1119, 1124-25 (5th Cir. 

1993); see also Sutherland Statutory Construction§ 21.14 (5th ed. 

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. . 

1993). We therefore remand this case to allow the district court 

to consider whether Mr. Ortiz is eligible for the additional onelevel reduction under § 3E1.1(b) (1). 

In all other respects, the judgment of conviction and 

sentence of the district court is affirmed. 

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