Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01433/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01433-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Jeffrey Grant Peabody
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Plaintiff Jeffrey Grant Peabody, by his attorney, seeks judicial review of a final decision of 

the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying his application for disability 

insurance and supplemental insurance benefits pursuant to Titles II and XVI of the Social Security 

Act (42 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.) (the “Act”). The matter is currently before the Court on the parties’ 

cross-briefs, which were submitted, without oral argument, to the Honorable Sandra M. Snyder, 

United States Magistrate Judge. Following a review of the complete record and applicable law, 

this Court finds the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) to be supported by 

substantial evidence in the record as a whole and based on proper legal standards.

I. Background

A. Procedural History

In August 2008, Plaintiff filed applications for disability insurance benefits and 

supplemental security income, alleging an onset of disability date of May 1, 2008. An 

administrative law judge denied Plaintiff’s claim in May 2010. 

In April 2011, Plaintiff filed new applications for disability insurance benefits and 

JEFFREY GRANT PEABODY,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

CASE NO. 1:14-CV-1433-SMS 

ORDER AFFIRMING AGENCY’S 

DENIAL OF BENEFITS AND ORDERING 

JUDGMENT FOR COMMISSIONER

(Doc. 16)

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supplemental security income, alleging an onset of disability date of September 30, 2010. The 

Commissioner initially denied the claims on August 25, 2011, and upon reconsideration again 

denied the claims on May 11, 2012. On June 6, 2012, Plaintiff filed a timely request for a hearing.

On January 9, 2013, and represented by counsel, Plaintiff appeared and testified at a 

hearing presided over by Christopher Larsen, Administrative Law Judge (“the ALJ”). See 20 

C.F.R. 404.929 et seq. An impartial vocational expert, Judith Najarian (“the VE”), also appeared 

and testified. 

On February 7, 2013, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s application. The Appeals Council denied 

review on July 9, 2014. The ALJ’s decision thus became the Commissioner’s final decision. See 

42 U.S.C. § 405(h). On September 12, 2014, Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking this Court’s 

review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3).

B. Plaintiff’s Testimony

At the administrative hearing, Plaintiff was fifty years old. He was married and lived with 

his wife. He had finished high school and completed one year in junior college. He last worked in

2008 installing rain gutters. At that time, he had one or two employees, including his son, and was 

responsible for bidding, installing the gutters, payroll, hiring and firing, and scheduling. He had 

this business for about four years. In 2010, he had some income from this business from jobs 

which were awarded to him but were performed by his son and a friend. Prior to this, Plaintiff was 

briefly employed as a travelling salesman. Prior to that, Plaintiff was an office manager and buyer. 

Regarding his physical ailments, Plaintiff testified that he believed he could work five 

days, but not a full month due to onset of boils due to hidradenitis suppurativa. Plaintiff testified 

that the boils would sometimes become the size of an orange or bigger. He had boil outbreaks one 

to three times a month. From the time they appear, they remain for an average of ten days. During 

these ten days, the pain was excruciating. When he had an outbreak, he mostly lied down because 

movement caused more pain. For the first few days he would be in bed for sixteen hours. After 

that, during its “peak,” he could only get up to use the restroom. During that time, it was too 

painful to sit in a chair, stand, or walk. His condition has worsened. Each area becomes bigger 

each time it has an outbreak. 

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Plaintiff testified that the larger boils need to be drained. He had boil outbreaks in the groin 

area, on the inside and outside of his legs, in the armpits, on his arms, and on his back and side. 

Plaintiff was prescribed methadone for pain. He also took antibiotics. 

Plaintiff also testified that he had sleep apnea and diabetes for the last few years. He used a 

CPAP which helped him rest, and medication to control diabetes. 

Plaintiff had not driven a car since 2008. He relied on his wife and daughter to take him 

places. He expressed displeasure with his being unable to work, provide for his family, or play 

with his grandchildren. 

C. Relevant Medical Record

During the relevant time period, Plaintiff regularly saw Mario Ochoa, M.D., at Kingsburg 

Medical Center. Plaintiff had appointments with Dr. Ochoa about once a month, but sometimes 

more often and sometimes less. The treatment notes indicate boils or scars on different places 

including thighs, legs, sides of abdomen, and right thumb. E.g. AR 273, 333. Dr. Ochoa also noted 

swelling and numbness of legs and feet, anxiety, diabetes, hypertension, extensive scarring, and 

body-ache secondary to extensive scarring and inflammatory skin condition. Dr. Ochoa noted that 

Plaintiff reported that a friend stole his prescription for Xanax and Norco, so alternative 

medication, methadone, was prescribed instead. AR 275. The last appointment in the record was 

in July 2011. AR 273. 

On March 20, 2012, Roger Wagner, M.D., performed a comprehensive internal medicine 

evaluation. Dr. Wagner noted that Plaintiff cooks and cleans, shops, and performs activities of 

daily living without assistance. He walks for exercise. Dr. Wagner observed that Plaintiff was 

easily able to get out of a chair and walk without assistance and without the cane he carried with 

him. He was able to get on and off the exam table and take his shoes on and off without difficulty. 

Plaintiff declined to walk on his toes and heels due to his left ankle pain. Dr. Wagner found that 

hidradenitis suppurativa was present primarily on the anterior thighs. At the time, it seemed to be 

managed “reasonably well.” He had multiple small scars on the upper arms and thighs. Dr. 

Wagner observed multiple scars and three or four active lesions on each thigh, multiple scars on 

the upper arms, but no lesions or scars in the axillae (armpits) or on the head. A few lesions were 

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progressing near the groin area. He also noted diabetes with numbness in the soles of his feet, and 

left ankle pain with significant swelling. Plaintiff had a full range of motion in the left ankle and it 

was only minimally tender. Dr. Wagner opined that Plaintiff could stand and walk for up to six 

hours, and sit without limitation. He assessed that Plaintiff could lift and carry 100 pounds 

occasionally and fifty pounds frequently. Dr. Wagner assessed no postural or manipulative 

limitations. He recommended that Plaintiff avoid working around extremely hot temperatures. The 

ALJ did not specifically state how much weight he gave Dr. Wagner’s opinion, but expressed that, 

without having treated Plaintiff himself, Dr. Wagner would be less able to accurately evaluate 

Plaintiff’s long-term functional capacity than a treating physician. The ALJ’s RFC determination 

is more restrictive than Dr. Wagner’s. 

On March 28, 2012, E. Aquino-Caro, M.D., reviewed the record and opined that the 

evidence supported an RFC to perform light work. Dr. Aquino-Caro noted that Plaintiff needed 

assistance with personal activities of daily living if boils were interfering with his hands and arms. 

She found his allegations to be partially credible because he was walking with a cane but was not 

using it and did not appear to need it. Plaintiff claimed that he was unable to perform any type of 

work, but there was normal range of motion and motor strength in both upper and lower 

extremities. Dr. Aquino-Caro noted that Plaintiff’s skin infection may be due to a source other 

than hidradenitis supperativa, which is usually confined to the intertriginous areas of the body, 

whereas Plaintiff’s lesions mostly occurred on the thighs and arms. 

On April 10, 2012, W. Jackson, M.D., reviewed the record and completed a physical 

residual functional capacity assessment. AR 317. Dr. Jackson opined that Plaintiff could lift 

twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently, stand and walk for about six hours and sit 

for about six hours in an eight-hour workday. Dr. Jackson found that Plaintiff was not limited in 

pushing and pulling, and assessed no postural, manipulative, or visual limitations. Regarding 

environmental limitations, Dr. Jackson found that Plaintiff should avoid concentrated exposure to 

extreme heat, wetness, and humidity. He did not explain his conclusions. The ALJ gave little 

evidentiary weight to Dr. Jackson’s opinion because the medical evidence established that 

Plaintiff’s impairments were more severe than they may have appeared at that time, and Dr.

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Jackson had not adequately considered Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. 

On July 5, 2012, Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Ochoa, completed a physical capacities 

evaluation. AR 322. Dr. Ochoa opined that Plaintiff could stand sit, stand, and walk for a total of 

one hour each, alternating sitting and standing every thirty minutes. He opined that Plaintiff could 

not use his feet for repetitive movements, could not use his hands for pushing and pulling when 

boils were present, but could use his hands for fine manipulation. 

On November 9, 2012, Dr. Ochoa completed another physical capacities evaluation, which 

stated that Plaintiff could sit for a total of two hours a day, and stand and walk for a total of one 

hour each. AR 356. He did not mention alternating sitting and standing, but added that Plaintiff 

would need to rest for a total of three hours in addition to normal break and meal periods. He 

stated that Plaintiff could use both feet for repetitive moments, could use his hands for pushing 

and pulling without limitation, and could not use his hands for fine manipulation. He additionally 

restricted Plaintiff’s environmental capacity regarding humidity, vibration, fumes and hazards. Dr. 

Ochoa did not explain why these two evaluations varied. The ALJ stated that “[c]ertain aspects of 

the doctor’s opinion are in fact consistent with my assessment of [Plaintiff’s] residual functional 

capacity.” 

Plaintiff’s mental impairments are not at issue on appeal. Hence, his mental health record 

is not summarized here. 

D. Vocational Expert Testimony

At the administrative hearing, the VE classified Plaintiff’s past work as buyer (DOT # 

162.157-018, light (performed at medium), SVP 6), office manager (DOT # 169.167-034, 

sedentary (performed at light), SVP 7), metal fabricator (DOT # 619.361-014, heavy (performed at 

medium), SVP 7), and sales (DOT # 274.357-034, light, SVP 5). The ALJ asked the VE to assume 

a hypothetical person of Plaintiff’s same age, education, and work experience, who could lift and 

carry ten pounds occasionally and less than ten pounds frequently; stand and walk a total of two 

hours and sit for a total of six hours in an eight-hour day; never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds;

occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, and climb ramps or stairs. The ALJ further 

limited the hypothetical person to avoiding concentrated exposure to extreme heat and to 

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performing simple, repetitive tasks with occasional public contact. The VE opined that such a 

person could not perform any of Plaintiff’s past relevant work, but could perform some unskilled 

sedentary jobs. The VE opined that the hypothetical person could perform work as an ampoule 

sealer (DOT # 559.687-014, sedentary, SVP 2), sedentary assembler (DOT # 706.684-030, 

sedentary, SVP 2), and table worker (DOT # 739.687-182, sedentary, SVP 2). The VE testified 

that these jobs existed in substantial numbers in the state and national economy. 

The ALJ then directed the VE to assume a second hypothetical person with Plaintiff’s 

same age, education, and work experience, but would be likely to miss five or more days of work 

per month. The VE opined that there would not be any jobs in the economy for that worker. 

E. Disability Determination

After considering the evidence, the ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured status 

requirements through December 31, 2015. The ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity from the alleged onset date of disability. The ALJ found that Plaintiff 

had the following severe, medically determinable impairments: diabetes, obesity, hidradenitis 

suppurativa, sleep apnea, depressive disorder, and anxiety disorder. The ALJ found that Plaintiff 

did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the 

severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. He found 

that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to lift and carry ten pounds 

occasionally, and less than ten pounds frequently; stand and walk for two hours and sit for six 

hours in an eight-hour work day; never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; and occasionally 

balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, and climb ramps or stairs. He further found that Plaintiff 

must avoid concentrated exposure to extreme heat and was limited to simple, repetitive tasks with 

occasional public contact. The ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform any of his past 

relevant work. However, the ALJ found that before October 22, 2012, Plaintiff could perform jobs 

that existed in significant numbers in the national economy. On October 22, 2012, Plaintiff’s age 

category changed, and the ALJ found that Plaintiff could not perform any jobs existing in 

significant numbers in the national economy. Hence, he determined that Plaintiff was “not 

disabled” prior to October 22, 2012, and became disabled on that date. 

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II. Legal Standard

A. The Five-Step Sequential Analysis

An individual is considered disabled for purposes of disability benefits if she is unable to 

engage in any substantial, gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or 

mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted, or can be expected to 

last, for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a) 

(3)(A); see also Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 23 (2003). The impairment(s) must result from 

anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities that are demonstrable by medically 

accepted clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and must be of such severity that the 

claimant is not only unable to do her previous work but cannot, considering her age, education, 

and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial, gainful work that exists in the 

national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)-(3), 1382c(a)(3)(B), (D). 

To encourage uniformity in decision making, the Commissioner has promulgated 

regulations prescribing a five-step sequential process for evaluating an alleged disability. 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 (a)-(f); 416.920 (a)-(f). In the five-step sequential review process, the burden 

of proof is on the claimant at steps one through four, but shifts to the Commissioner at step five. 

See Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1099 (9th Cir. 1999). If a claimant is found to be disabled or 

not disabled at any step in the sequence, there is no need to consider subsequent steps. Id. at 

1098–99; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.

In the first step of the analysis, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is currently 

engaged in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If not, in the 

second step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has a severe impairment or a 

combination of impairments significantly limiting her from performing basic work activities. Id. 

§§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If so, in the third step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant 

has a severe impairment or combination of impairments that meets or equals the requirements of 

the Listing of Impairments, 20 C.F.R. 404, Subpart P, App. 1. Id. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If 

not, in the fourth step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has sufficient RFC, despite 

the impairment or various limitations to perform his past work. Id. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). If 

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not, in step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can perform 

other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. Id. §§ 404.1520(g), 

416.920(g).

B. Standard of Review

Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision 

to deny benefits under the Act. The record as a whole must be considered, weighing both the 

evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s decision. 

Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). In weighing the evidence and making findings, the Commissioner must apply the proper 

legal standards. See, e.g., Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988). If an ALJ 

applied the proper legal standards and the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, 

this Court must uphold the ALJ’s determination that the claimant is not disabled. See, e.g., Ukolov 

v. Barnhart, 420 F.3d 1002, 104 (9th Cir. 2005); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial 

evidence means “more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance.” Ryan v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1998 (9th Cir. 2008). It is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 

2005). Where the evidence as a whole can support either outcome, the Court may not substitute its 

judgment for the ALJ’s, rather, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld. Id. 

III. Discussion

The ALJ found Plaintiff to be disabled as of October 22, 2012. Plaintiff appeals the finding 

of nondisability between September 30, 2010, the alleged date of disability, and October 22, 2012. 

Plaintiff brings four issues on appeal: 1) that the ALJ erred in failing to find that his hidradenitis 

suppurativa impairment met a listing; 2) that the ALJ erred in discounting treating physician 

Mario Ochoa, M.D.’s opinion; 3) that the ALJ erred in discounting Plaintiff’s credibility; and 4) 

that the ALJ erred in failing to consider laywitness testimony. 

A. Step Three – Listed Impairments

Plaintiff argues that his skin disorder meets the listing criteria, and the ALJ erred at his 

step-three finding that Plaintiff’s hidradenitis suppurativa did not meet a listed impairment. The 

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ALJ stated that he specifically considered Listing 8.06 for hidradenitis suppurativa. Listing-level 

hidradenitis suppurativa is described as “extensive skin lesions involving both axillae, both 

inguinal areas or the perineum that persist for at least 3 months despite continuing treatment as 

prescribed.” 20 C.F.R § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 at § 8.06. The appendix gives some insight 

into an intended distinction between three months of ongoing treatment generally and three 

months of persisting lesions: “if you do not have continuing treatment as prescribed, if your 

treatment has not lasted for at least 3 months, or if you do not have extensive skin lesions that 

have persisted for at least 3 months, your impairment cannot meet the requirements of these skin 

disorder listings.” Id. at § 8:00(H)(1).

Plaintiff argues that he endured recurring outbreaks in all three areas identified by the 

listing for two years. However, the medical evidence and Plaintiff’s testimony suggest otherwise. 

First, Plaintiff testified that his lesions lasted ten days on average. This does not meet the listing 

requirement that the lesions have persisted at least three months. Moreover, Dr. Wagner’s

examination revealed scars and lesions on the upper arms and thighs, but specifically did not 

reveal scars or lesions in the axillae. Dr. Wagner’s examination revealed lesions on the thighs 

approaching the groin, but not in the inguinal areas or perineum. Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. 

Ochoa, noted that the lesions were present on his thighs, sides of abdomen, and right thumb. This 

evidence demonstrates that he did not have lesions in both axillae, both inguinal areas or the 

perineum as required to meet the listed impairment. Therefore, the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s 

impairments did not meet a listed impairment is without legal error and supported by substantial 

evidence in the record. 

B. Plaintiff’s RFC

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly rejected treating physician Dr. Ochoa’s opinion

that Plaintiff could only sit for two hours and stand and walk for one hour in a workday, required 

rest breaks totaling three hours, and that he could not use his hands for fine manipulation.

Plaintiff mischaracterizes the ALJ’s treatment of Dr. Ochoa’s opinion. The ALJ did not 

reject Dr. Ochoa’s opinion in coming to his RFC determination. ALJ reviewed all medical 

evidence, including Dr. Ochoa, Wagner’s two different opinions, and, as required by his role, 

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established Plaintiff’s RFC, which is supported by the record.

Applicable Law

An RFC “must be based on all of the relevant evidence in the case record,” including 

medical history, medical source statements daily activities, lay evidence. SSR 96-8p; 20 CFR 

404.1545 (“[The ALJ] will assess your residual functional capacity based on all of the relevant 

medical and other evidence.”). The ALJ’s RFC determination will not be overturned if the ALJ 

applied the proper legal standard and the RFC assessment is supported by substantial evidence. 

Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005). The Court must review the record as a 

whole, “weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the 

Commissioner's conclusion.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007)(internal 

quotation and citation omitted).

In addition, an ALJ is “not bound by an expert medical opinion on the ultimate question of 

disability.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008); S.S.R. 96-5p, 1996 SSR 

LEXIS 2. A treating physician’s opinion is not conclusive as to either a physical condition or the 

ultimate issue of disability. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989). “A 

physician’s opinion of disability ‘premised to a large extent upon the claimant's own accounts of 

his symptoms and limitations’ may be disregarded where those complaints have been ‘properly 

discounted.’” Morgan v. Commissioner of the SSA, 169 F.3d 595, 602 (9th Cir. Or. 1999)(citing 

Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 605 (9th Cir. 1989)).

Analysis

Here, the ALJ was not required to unequivocally accept Plaintiff’s treating physician’s 

opinion in determining Plaintiff’s RFC. Dr. Ochoa’s opinions were contradicted, even among each 

other. Dr. Ochoa’s medical notes do not specify Plaintiff’s limitations. However, his notes state 

that Plaintiff has “disabling” hydroxiadenitis and that his flare-ups are “frequent.” His functional 

capacity opinions were highly restrictive, indicating that Plaintiff was only able to stand and sit for 

one hour each per day and required frequent breaks. In contrast, Dr. Wagner opined that Plaintiff 

had no sitting limitations and could stand for six hours in a day. Dr. Jackson opined that Plaintiff 

could sit and stand for six hours each per day. Dr. Aquino-Caro opined that Plaintiff only needed 

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assistance with personal activities when lesions were interfering with his hands and arms.

Also, Plaintiff was prescribed pain medication for his skin condition, but still testified that 

he experienced excruciating pain during an outbreak. Dr. Ochoa did not alter his pain medication 

except when his medication was reported stolen, and Plaintiff was not entirely compliant with his 

medication. Plaintiff specifically requested that his pain medication not be increased because of 

his concern of dependency. AR 277. After changing Plaintiff’s pain medication from Norco to 

methadone because of the alleged theft, Dr. Ochoa did not alter Plaintiff’s pain medication. 

The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s condition was less severe at the time of the consultative 

examination and that Dr. Ochoa had a better perspective regarding Plaintiff’s long-term disability. 

The ALJ also found that Plaintiff was able to function at a capacity greater than Dr. Ochoa opined. 

Plaintiff was able to get to and from his doctor’s appointments, the administrative hearing, the 

store, and his mother’s home. He was able to prepare some meals and do some housework. He 

was able to sit through and participate in the hearing and the consultative examination. Plaintiff’s 

testimony was that his pain is particularly bad for ten days during an outbreak, a few days of 

which he could not get out of bed unless necessary. He testified that outbreaks occurred at least 

once a month. However, as is discussed below, the ALJ properly discredited Plaintiff’s symptom 

testimony. The evidence as a whole, therefore, supports an RFC that is less restrictive than Dr. 

Ochoa’s, but more restrictive than Dr. Wagner’s. 

As noted above, the ALJ’s finding must be supported by substantial evidence, which 

consists of “more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance.” Here, the ALJ assessed an 

RFC that is less restrictive than Dr. Ochoa’s opinion, but more restrictive than Dr. Wagner’s. The 

ALJ found that Plaintiff could stand for two hours and sit for six hours in a workday. He did not 

find that Plaintiff would miss a notable number of workdays in a month. Although the evidence 

may support a more restrictive RFC finding, the ALJ’s RFC finding is supported by substantial 

evidence in the record and will not be overturned. 

C. Plaintiff’s Credibility

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not provide specific, clear, and convincing reasons to 

reject Plaintiff’s testimony. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ only rejected Plaintiff’s credibility based 

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on his activities of daily living and his lack of compliance with medication. Plaintiff argues that 

these reasons are not convincing and not supported by the record. 

Applicable Law

The Ninth Circuit established two requirements for a claimant to present credible symptom 

testimony: the claimant must produce objective medical evidence of an impairment or 

impairments, and she must show the impairment or combination of impairments could reasonably 

be expected to produce some degree of symptom. Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1407 (9th Cir. 

1986). The claimant, however, need not produce objective medical evidence of the actual 

symptoms or their severity. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996). Where an ALJ 

concludes that a claimant is not malingering, and that she has provided objective medical evidence 

of an underlying impairment which might reasonably produce the pain or other symptoms alleged, 

the ALJ may “reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of her symptoms only by offering 

specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 

(9th Cir. 2007). 

The Commissioner may not discredit a claimant’s testimony on the severity of symptoms 

merely because it is unsupported by objective medical evidence. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 

722 (9th Cir. 1998); Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 345 (9th Cir. 1991). However, an ALJ is 

entitled to consider whether there is a lack of medical evidence to corroborate a claimant’s 

subjective symptom testimony so long as it is not the only reason for discounting her testimony. 

Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680-681 (9th Cir. 2005).

An ALJ is not “required to believe every allegation of disabling pain” or other nonexertional requirement. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 2007), quoting Fair v. Bowen, 

885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). “[T]he ALJ must identify what testimony is not credible and 

what evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 834, quoting Varney v. 

Secretary of Health and Human Services, 846 F.2d 581, 584 (9th Cir. 1988). He or she must set 

forth specific reasons for rejecting the claim, explaining why the testimony is unpersuasive. Orn,

495 F.3d at 635. See also Robbins v. Social Security Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Although the credibility analysis need not be extensive, the ALJ must provide some reasoning in 

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order to meaningfully determine whether the ALJ’s conclusions were supported by substantial 

evidence. Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 495 (9th Cir. 2015).

When weighing a claimant’s credibility, the ALJ may consider the claimant’s reputation 

for truthfulness, inconsistencies in claimant’s testimony or between his testimony and conduct, 

claimant’s daily activities, claimant’s work record, and testimony from physicians and third 

parties about the nature, severity and effect of claimant’s claimed symptoms. Light v. Social 

Security Administration, 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997). The ALJ may consider “(1) ordinary 

techniques of credibility evaluation, such as claimant’s reputation for lying, prior inconsistent 

statements concerning the symptoms, and other testimony by the claimant that appears less than 

candid; (2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a 

prescribed course of treatment; and (3) the claimant’s daily activities.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 

F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008), quoting Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273 (9th Cir. 1996). If the 

ALJ’s finding is supported by substantial evidence, the Court may not second-guess his or her 

decision. Thomas, 278 F.3d at 959.

Analysis

Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably 

be expected to cause some of the alleged symptoms, but Plaintiff’s statements concerning the 

intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the symptoms were not credible to the extent that 

they were inconsistent with the ALJ’s RFC analysis. The ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s credibility 

determination based on the discrepancy between his testimony and the objective medical evidence, 

the discrepancy between his testimony and his daily activities, his lack of compliance with 

medication, and Dr. Wagner’s observations during the consultative examination. 

The ALJ states that, overall, the objective medical evidence does not support Plaintiff’s 

allegations of utterly disabling symptoms. The ALJ noted that there were very few objective 

medical findings. Plaintiff testified to having lesions in his armpits and groin, but Dr. Ochoa’s 

treatment notes and Dr. Wagner’s consultative examination did not reveal lesions or scars in either 

area. Dr. Wagner’s examination revealed mostly normal findings, with scarring and lesions on his 

thighs and upper arms. Dr. Ochoa prescribed pain medication, but did not alter his prescription 

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despite Plaintiff’s allegations of excruciating pain which caused him to remain in bed for entire 

days at a time. Plaintiff’s allegations of lesions and his allegations of severe pain are not supported 

by the objective medical findings. 

The ALJ also found that Plaintiff’s alleged daily activities do not support his allegations of 

disabling symptoms. The ALJ pointed to Plaintiff’s wife’s statement. Plaintiff’s wife wrote in her 

statement that Plaintiff sat outside, watched television, folded clothes, visited with others, went to 

the store, went out alone, and sometimes cared for the dogs. He occasionally needed help with his 

personal grooming needs. The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff told a consultative examiner that he 

cooked, shopped, cleaned, and watched television. While these activities are not particularly 

vigorous and may not translate directly to a finding that Plaintiff could sustain full-time work, the 

ALJ’s finding that they impact his credibility as to his symptom’s allegations is reasonable and 

may be considered along with other facts in reaching a credibility determination. 

The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff’s lack of compliance with his medication indicated that 

his symptoms were not as limiting as alleged. This is a specific, clear, and convincing reason to 

discount Plaintiff’s credibility when taken together with others. 

The ALJ also summarized Dr. Wagner’s observations. Dr. Wagner noted that Plaintiff 

brought a cane, but did not appear to use or need the cane. Dr. Wagner also noted that Plaintiff had 

left-ankle pain and declined to walk on his heels and toes; however, Plaintiff was able to remove 

his shoes and get on and off of the examination table and Dr. Wagner noted a full range of motion 

and only minimal tenderness in the left ankle. These observations from the record may also 

reasonably cast doubt on Plaintiff’s credibility. 

In sum, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s medical record, including physicians’ observations,

did not sustain allegations of disabling impairments; Plaintiff’s described daily activities were 

inconsistent with his complaints of disabling symptoms; and, Plaintiff’s lack of compliance with 

his medication indicated that his symptoms were not as disabling as alleged. Taken together, these 

reasons are sufficiently specific, clear, and convincing grounds which are supported by substantial 

evidence in the record to discount Plaintiff’s credibility.

D. Laywitness Testimony

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Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in giving little weight to Plaintiff’s wife’s statement 

regarding Plaintiff’s limitations. He also argues that he erred in failing to account for three 

additional family members and a friend’s statements submitted in support of Plaintiff’s 

application. 

Lay witness testimony is competent evidence to which the ALJ, if he wishes to discount 

lay witness testimony, must give reasons germane to each witness. Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 454 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2006). The Ninth Circuit has held that inconsistency with medical 

evidence constitutes a legitimate reason for discrediting the testimony of lay witnesses. See 

Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1393, 1395 (9th Cir. 1984); see also Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 

1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005); Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 512 (9th Cir. 2001). To the extent that 

the lay witness statements were of the same general nature as the subjective complaints from the 

plaintiff’s testimony, the ALJ’s legally sufficient reasons for rejecting the plaintiff’s subjective 

symptom testimony also constituted legally sufficient reasons for rejecting the lay witness 

statements. See Valentine v. Commissioner, Social Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 694 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Further, an ALJ’s failure to comment on lay witness testimony is harmless where the same 

evidence that the ALJ cited in discrediting the claimant’s testimony also discredits the lay witness’

claims. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012).

Plaintiff’s wife’s statement set forth her opinion that his condition affected his ability to 

lift, squat, concentrate, and otherwise posture. The ALJ gave her comments regarding his 

limitations little weight because she did not quantify the limitations she described, other than his 

ability to walk half a block before resting, which was inconsistent with the medical evidence. This 

reason is sufficient for discrediting laywitness testimony. In addition, the ALJ’s failure to consider 

statements from his three other family members and friend was harmless because they either 

reiterated Plaintiff’s asserted limitations, which were properly discredited, or did not add anything 

valuable. For example, Plaintiff’s mother’s statement largely describes Plaintiff’s former hobbies 

and family relationships. AR 258-259. His brother’s statement expresses remorse that he is unable 

to visit Plaintiff very often. AR 260. Hence, the ALJ properly considered Plaintiff’s wife’s 

testimony, and his failure to consider other laywitness testimony is harmless. 

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IV. Conclusion and Order

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the ALJ applied appropriate legal standards 

and that substantial credible evidence supported the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff was not 

disabled. Accordingly, the Court hereby DENIES Plaintiff’s appeal from the administrative 

decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter 

judgment in favor of the Commissioner and against Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 10, 2016 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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