Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-02985/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-02985-17/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Tom Felker
Respondent
Yong Lor
Petitioner

Document Text:

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

YOUNG LOR,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-08-2985 TLN DAD P

vs.

TOM FELKER,

Respondent. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS 

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding through counsel with a petition for a writ

of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges a judgment of conviction

entered against him on November 18, 2004 in the Sacramento County Superior Court on two

counts of attempted murder with personal use of a firearm. He seeks federal habeas relief on the

following grounds: (1) the prosecutor violated his right to a fair trial in failing to disclose

exculpatory evidence to the defense; (2) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance; (3) the

trial court’s failure to bifurcate trial on gang enhancement allegations violated his right to a fair

trial; and (4) the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 is unconstitutional. 

Upon careful consideration of the record and the applicable law, the undersigned will

recommend that petitioner’s application for habeas corpus relief be denied.

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PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In its unpublished memorandum and opinion affirming petitioner’s judgment of

conviction on appeal , the California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District provided 1

the following factual summary:

Defendant Yong Lor appeals after a jury convicted him of two

counts of attempted murder and found true gang and personal

firearm use enhancements. He argues: (1) the gang enhancement

is not supported by the evidence; (2) the court should have granted

his motion to bifurcate trial of the gang enhancement; and (3)

insufficient evidence was adduced to establish that he acted with

the intent to kill or express malice required to sustain the attempted

murder convictions. The first contention has merit; the remaining

two do not. Accordingly, we will strike the gang enhancement and

affirm the judgment as modified.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Defendant is a member of a gang known as the Asian Family

Gangsters (AFG), which is part of the Hmong Nation Society

(HNS), a gang based in the northern area of Sacramento. A rival

gang, the Masters of Destruction (MOD), and an associated gang

calling itself the Young Mafia Society (YMS), consider the

southern area of Sacramento to be their territory. During the

summer of 2001, the rival gangs were at war, with at least a dozen

shootings between them.

On July 18, 2001, defendant, armed with a loaded weapon, drove

into the Meadowview area of southern Sacramento. He accosted

T.V., a 15-year-old boy who was a member of the YMS. T.V. had

a loaded .32 caliber semiautomatic handgun in his pocket, and was

carrying a pit bull puppy to show his friend who was waiting at the

market of a nearby gas station. Using gang parlance, defendant

asked T.V. about his gang membership. Not recognizing

defendant, T.V. denied being a gang member, but asked defendant

“where are you from.” Defendant responded with the letter “H,”

which signified both his membership in the HNS and an aggressive

intent, since he was confronting T.V. in MOD territory.

T.V. ignored defendant’s response and proceeded to the market,

where he met Zang Her, also a MOD member, and Her’s wife,

Helen. Upon arriving, he put the puppy down, turned in

defendant’s direction, raised his arms in the air and said, “What’s

 People v. Lor, No. C049133, 2007 WL 1874424 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. June 29, 2007) 1

(unpublished disposition) (hereinafter “Opinion”). See also document entitled “Exhibit,”

attached to the instant petition.

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up?” The gesture and words were intended to force defendant

either to return and fight T.V., or to leave.

Upon seeing the gesture of engagement, defendant turned his car

around and drove directly toward T.V. and his two companions. 

Defendant stuck his gun outside the driver’s side window, stopped

the car about 20 to 36 feet from T.V., and fired at least a dozen

shots at T.V. and Her. Several shots were aimed at T.V.’s head. 

T.V. returned fire. After several rounds hit the side of defendant’s

car, defendant sped away.

T.V. was shot in the hand and elbow. Her was shot in the buttocks. 

The puppy was also injured.

Defendant’s car was found later that night at an apartment complex

in North Sacramento. It had three bullet holes in the driver’s side

door, which had been recently taped and painted. Defendant was

arrested in Wisconsin several months later. The arresting officer

told defendant that he was being arrested on a California warrant

involving a homicide case. Defendant asked, “Did the guy die?”

Defendant testified that he was the victim of an unprovoked

assault. He explained that he was in the Meadowview area because

he had just finished taking his five-year-old stepdaughter to visit

his sister. While stopped at an intersection, he heard his car’s glass

shatter, and believed he was being attacked. Shielding the child

from the assault, defendant returned fire with a gun he kept under

the front seat. Then he stepped on the gas. Defendant admitted he

used to be a member of HNS, but denied being an active member

on the day of the shootings.

Lor, 2007 WL 1874424, at **1-2.

After petitioner’s judgment of conviction was affirmed by the California Court of

Appeal, he filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court, claiming that the trial

court’s denial of his motion to bifurcate the trial of the gang enhancements from the trial of the

underlying charges violated his federal right to due process, and that his attempted murder

conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence. (Resp’t’s Lod. Doc. 6.) That petition for

review was summarily denied. (Resp’t’s Lod. Doc. 7.) 

Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

Sacramento County Superior Court, claiming that he received ineffective assistance of trial

counsel, that the trial court erred in failing to bifurcate the trial of the gang enhancements from

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the trial on the underlying charges, and that the prosecutor committed misconduct in withholding

exculpatory evidence from the defense. (Resp’t’s Lod. Doc. 8.) That habeas petition was denied

in a reasoned decision dated February 28, 2008. (Id.) Petitioner then filed petitions for writ of

habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal and California Supreme Court, raising the same

claims as presented to the Sacramento County Superior Court. (Resp’t’s Lod. Docs. 9, 10.) 

Those state habeas petitions were summarily denied. (Id.)

The habeas petition pending before this court was filed on December 8, 2008. 

Respondent filed an answer on February 9, 2009, and petitioner filed a traverse on May 6, 2009. 

On May 11, 2009, petitioner filed a request for an evidentiary hearing on his claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. (Doc. No. 29.)

On July 27, 2010, this court appointed counsel for petitioner. (Doc. No. 36.) On

October 12, 2010, after two status conferences, the court issued an order allowing petitioner to

file a second motion for evidentiary hearing and/or discovery. (Doc. No. 46.) Pursuant to that

order, petitioner filed a motion for discovery and an evidentiary hearing on October 29, 2010. 

(Doc. No. 47.) On January 10, 2011, after a hearing, this court granted petitioner’s October 29,

2010 motion, in part, and ordered that a limited evidentiary hearing would be held on his claims

of prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel. (Doc. No. 52.) On March 31,

2011, respondent’s motion for reconsideration of the January 10, 2011 order was denied by the

then-assigned district judge. (Doc. No. 61.) 

On April 4, 2011, the Supreme Court decided the case of Cullen v. Pinholster, ___

U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011). On April 7, 2011, this court issued an order advising the

parties that, in light of the decision in Pinholster, the court intended to sua sponte reconsider its

January 10, 2011 order granting a limited evidentiary hearing in this case. The court directed the

parties to file briefing addressing the impact of the decision in Pinholster on petitioner’s request

for an evidentiary hearing. (Doc. No. 62.) On May 7, 2012, after receiving the parties’

responsive briefs, this court issued another order granting petitioner an evidentiary hearing on his 

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claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. (Doc. No. 71.) An

evidentiary hearing was then held pursuant to that order on January 28, 2013. 

ANALYSIS

I. Standards of Review Applicable to Habeas Corpus Claims

An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a

judgment of a state court can be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the

United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the

interpretation or application of state law. See Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S.___, ___, 131 S. Ct.

13, 16 (2010); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146,

1149 (9th Cir. 2000).

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) sets forth the following standards for granting federal

habeas corpus relief:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall

not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on

the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the

claim -

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

For purposes of applying § 2254(d)(1), “clearly established federal law” consists

of holdings of the United States Supreme Court at the time of the state court decision. Stanley v.

Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 859 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06

(2000)). Nonetheless, “circuit court precedent may be persuasive in determining what law is

clearly established and whether a state court applied that law unreasonably.” Stanley, 633 F.3d at

859 (quoting Maxwell v. Roe, 606 F.3d 561, 567 (9th Cir. 2010)). 

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A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if it applies a

rule contradicting a holding of the Supreme Court or reaches a result different from Supreme

Court precedent on “materially indistinguishable” facts. Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640

(2003). Under the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court may

grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the Supreme

Court’s decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.

2

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003); Williams, 529 U.S. at 413; Chia v. Cambra, 360

F.3d 997, 1002 (9th Cir. 2004). In this regard, a federal habeas court “may not issue the writ

simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court

decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. See also Schriro v.

Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75 (it is “not enough that a federal

habeas court, in its independent review of the legal question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that

the state court was ‘erroneous.’”). “A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit

precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of

the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S.___,___,131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011)

(quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). Accordingly, “[a]s a condition for

obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court’s

ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was

an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded

disagreement.” Richter,131 S. Ct. at 786-87. 

If the state court’s decision does not meet the criteria set forth in § 2254(d), a

reviewing court must conduct a de novo review of a habeas petitioner’s claims. Delgadillo v.

 Under § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision based on a factual determination is not to be 2

overturned on factual grounds unless it is “objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence

presented in the state court proceeding.” Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859 (quoting Davis v. Woodford,

384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004)). 

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Woodford, 527 F.3d 919, 925 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 735 (9th

Cir. 2008) (en banc) (“[I]t is now clear both that we may not grant habeas relief simply because

of § 2254(d)(1) error and that, if there is such error, we must decide the habeas petition by

considering de novo the constitutional issues raised.”). 

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state

court judgment. Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859; Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir.

2004). If the last reasoned state court decision adopts or substantially incorporates the reasoning

from a previous state court decision, this court may consider both decisions to ascertain the

reasoning of the last decision. Edwards v. Lamarque, 475 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007) (en

banc). “When a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied

relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence

of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784-

85. This presumption may be overcome by a showing “there is reason to think some other

explanation for the state court’s decision is more likely.” Id. at 785 (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker,

501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991)). Similarly, when a state court decision on a petitioner’s claims rejects

some claims but does not expressly address a federal claim, a federal habeas court must presume,

subject to rebuttal, that the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits. Johnson v. Williams,

___ U.S. ___, ___, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1091 (2013). 

Where the state court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning

to support its conclusion, a federal habeas court independently reviews the record to determine

whether habeas corpus relief is available under § 2254(d). Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860; Himes v.

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). “Independent review of the record is not de novo

review of the constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine

whether a silent state court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. 

Where no reasoned decision is available, the habeas petitioner still has the burden of “showing

there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784. 

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When it is clear, however, that a state court has not reached the merits of a

petitioner’s claim, the deferential standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) does not apply and a

federal habeas court must review the claim de novo. Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860; Reynoso v.

Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006); Nulph v. Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir.

2003).

II. Petitioner’s Claims3

A. Prosecutorial Misconduct: Brady Claim

1. Background

Petitioner’s first claim is that his due process rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373

U.S. 83 (1963) were violated when the prosecutor failed to produce exculpatory evidence to the

defense. (Doc. No. 1 at 7.) As noted above, petitioner was charged with and convicted of 4

attempted murder with use of a firearm. Petitioner alleges that the victim, Andy Vang, was also

arrested and charged with assault with a firearm in connection with this very incident, and may

have been convicted of that crime. (Id. at 7-8.) Petitioner argues that the prosecutor should have

provided this evidence to the defense and/or elicited the information from Andy Vang and

Detective Kang, the prosecution’s gang expert, when they testified at petitioner’s trial. (Id.) 

Petitioner contends that this evidence was relevant to his self-defense theory presented at his trial

and would have been valuable impeachment evidence against both the victim, Vang, and

Detective Kang. (Id. at 8-9.) Petitioner notes that Det. Kang was called as a witness by the

prosecution but was not asked about the assault charge filed against Vang. (Id. at 8.)

/////

 Petitioner’s claims are contained in his petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the 3

California Supreme Court, which is attached to his federal habeas petition. (Doc. No. 1 at 13-

55.) He elaborates on several, but not all of these claims in his form application for federal

habeas relief. (Id. at 4-12.)

 This court will refer to page numbers of the parties’ pleadings by using the automated 4

numbers assigned by the court’s electronic filing system.

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Petitioner argues that information that Andy Vang was arrested and charged with

assault in connection with this incident “transcends being merely ‘impeachment evidence’ as it

goes directly to the very heart of this case; who initiated the violence.” (Id. at 7-8.) He argues

that the fact the prosecuting authorities had enough evidence to charge Vang with assault raises a

significant question with regard to the identity of the aggressor in this case and, if it had been

divulged, could have given rise to a reasonable doubt as to petitioner’s guilt. Put another way,

petitioner argues that the prosecutor’s failure to fully disclose the facts surrounding the assault

charges brought against Andy Vang in connection with this same incident “adversely impacted”

the presentation of his defense based upon a theory of self-defense because “had he been able to

show that the alleged victim had been charged, arrested, possibly convicted of being the initiator

of the violence there is substantially more than a mere probability of a different outcome.” (Id. at

9.) 

Petitioner also claims that evidence regarding the charges brought against Vang,

including the evidence relied on to support those charges, was relevant to impeach the credibility

of Det. Kang, who “spent more time on the witness stand than anybody in Petitioner’s case,

never mentioned that he had arrested Vang on the P.C. 245(a)(1) and never mentioned to the

court or jury that Vang had been charged with that offense.” (Id. at 8.) According to petitioner,

because this undisclosed evidence was relevant to impeach Det. Kang’s credibility, it is irrelevant

in determining whether petitioner’s due process rights were violated by the non-disclosure

whether Vang was actually convicted of the assault. (Id.) 

In support of these arguments, petitioner has filed with this court a copy of a

California Law Enforcement Tracking System (CLETS) database printout, also known as a “rap

sheet,” pertaining to Andy Vang. (Id. at 85, 88.) Although difficult to decipher, the first and

second pages of this document when read together appear to reflect that on September 21, 2001,

in case No. #01F06166, Vang was charged with (and eventually convicted of) illegal possession

of a concealed weapon and “assault with firearm on person.” (Id.) The first entry on the second

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page reflects that on November 2, 2001, also in case No. #01F06166, Vang was convicted of

those same two charges. (Id. at 88.) The third entry reflects that also on November 2, 2001,

again in case No. #01F06166, Vang was convicted of illegal possession of a concealed weapon,

but that the charge of “assault with firearm on person” was “dismissed.” (Id.) Finally, the rap

sheet indicates that on his felony conviction Vang was sentenced to 7 years probation with the

condition that he serve 180 days in the county jail. (Id.)

It is not clear from the face of this CLETS printout whether the charge brought

against Vang of assault with a firearm on a person was eventually dismissed before petitioner’s

trial commenced, or whether Vang was ultimately convicted of that offense. (Id.) However,

petitioner argues that regardless of whether Vang was actually convicted of the assault charge,

the fact the prosecution withheld the information that Vang was charged with assault in

connection with the incident over which petitioner was convicted constitutes a Brady violation. 

Petitioner asks:

Should Petitioner have been permitted a fair opportunity to

impeach the witnesses, Andy Vang and Detective Kang? Was he

afforded that right given that the State suppressed the evidence of

Vang’s prosecution for ASSAULT WITH FIREARM ON

PERSON directly related to this case? If the prosecution itself had

“reasonable doubt” about who initiated the gunfire – as is

irrefutably proven by its charging of Vang for ASSAULT WITH

FIREARM ON PERSON – weren’t the trial court, jury, and

defendant entitled to know that?

(Id.) 

In sum, petitioner claims that the prosecutor violated the dictates of Brady in

failing to disclose evidence of the actual charges brought against Andy Vang in connection with

the incident for which petitioner stood trial. He argues that this evidence would have been

material to his defense that he was not the aggressor but rather the victim, would have

undermined the prosecution theory that Vang was not the aggressor, and also would have

impacted the credibility of both witnesses Vang and Det. Kang. Petitioner states that he was

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unaware of the charges brought against Vang until after his trial was over. (Doc. Nos. 1 at 8; 63

at 3.)

As set forth above, petitioner raised his Brady claim in a petition for writ of

habeas corpus filed in the Sacramento County Superior Court. There, he claimed that the

prosecutor violated his constitutional rights by failing to turn over to the defense exculpatory

material regarding the charges brought against Vang in connection with this case, including the

disposition of those charges. (Resp’t’s Lod. Doc. 8, Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 34-40.) 

The Superior Court rejected petitioner’s arguments, reasoning as follows:

THE BRADY CLAIM IS WITHOUT MERIT

A petitioner seeking relief by way of habeas corpus has the burden

of stating a prima facie case entitled him to relief. (In re Bower

(1985) 38 Cal.3d 865, 872.) A petition for writ of habeas corpus

should attach as exhibits all reasonably available documentary

evidence or affidavits supporting the claim. (People v. Duvall

(1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474.) The prosecution has the duty to

disclose any material exculpatory evidence to the defense. (Pen.

Code, § 1054.1(e); Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83.) 

Petitioner claims that the prosecutor failed to disclose evidence that

the victim in Petitioner’s case, Andy Vang, was convicted of

assault with a deadly weapon in violation of Penal Code section

245(a)(1). He attaches as “proof” a copy of Vang’s CLETS rap

sheet showing that Vang was “convicted.” A person’s rap sheet is

not evidence. It is inadmissible hearsay. (See Evid. Code § 1200.)

Although Vang was arrested for a violation of Penal Code section

245(a)(1) and was charged with that offense, the charge was

dismissed. Therefore, Petitioner has not shown that there was any

material exculpatory evidence that the prosecutor failed to disclose.

(Id., Superior Court decision at “Page 2 of 6.”)

5

Petitioner’s allegations before this court raise two separate but related claims. 

First, petitioner claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct under Brady in failing to

 Petitioner also raised his claim of prosecutorial misconduct in his habeas petitions filed 5

in the California Court of Appeal and California Supreme Court. Those petitions were

summarily denied. (Resp’t’s Lod. Docs. 9, 10.) Accordingly, this court will analyze the Superior

Court’s decision as the relevant state-court determination under AEDPA. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 806;

Robinson, 360 F.3d at 1055.

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disclose evidence that Andy Vang was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon in connection

with the shooting for which petitioner was convicted. Second, petitioner claims that, whether or

not Vang was convicted, the prosecutor committed misconduct under Brady in failing to disclose

to the defense that Andy Vang had been charged with assault with a deadly weapon in connection

with this case. 

In the May 7, 2012 order setting an evidentiary hearing, this court found that the

Sacramento County Superior Court’s decision on petitioner’s claim that the prosecutor

committed a Brady violation in failing to disclose that Andy Vang was convicted of assault in

connection with this case was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the state court proceedings, and was therefore not entitled to deference

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). (Doc. No. 71 at 17-19.) In light of that previously made

ruling, this court must decide this aspect of petitioner’s Brady claim de novo. Stanley, 633 F.3d

at 860; Frantz, 533 F.3d at 735. 

This court also determined in the May 7, 2012 order that petitioner’s claim that

the prosecutor committed misconduct in failing to disclose to the defense that Andy Vang had

been charged with assault in connection with this case was not considered or addressed on the

merits by the Sacramento County Superior Court in its decision on petitioner’s habeas claims. 

(Doc. No. 71 at 20-21.) After the May 7, 2012 order was issued, the United States Supreme

Court held that where a state court issues an opinion that addresses some issues but does not

expressly address the federal claim in question, the federal habeas court must presume, subject to

rebuttal, that the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits. Johnson, 133 S. Ct. at 1091. 

Petitioner has not attempted to rebut the presumption that the Sacramento County Superior Court

considered, but rejected, his claim that the prosecutor committed misconduct in failing to

disclose to the defense that Vang had been charged with assault with a deadly weapon in

connection with this case. Accordingly, this court will, as it now must, assume that the Superior

Court rejected that claim on the merits, and will analyze it pursuant to the standards set forth in

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28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Johnson, 133 S. Ct. at 1094 (“we see no reason why the Richter

presumption should not also apply when a state-court opinion addresses some but not all of a

defendant’s claims.”).

2. Applicable Law

The United States Supreme Court has held “that the suppression by the

prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the

evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of

the prosecution.” Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. See also Youngblood v. West Virginia, 547 U.S. 867,

869 (2006) (“A Brady violation occurs when the government fails to disclose evidence materially

 favorable to the accused”). The “central premise” of the Brady decision is that “even though an

individual prosecutor may win a conviction, society as a whole loses when that conviction is

wrong.” Gonzalez v. Wong, 667 F.3d 965, 981 (9th Cir. 2011). The duty to disclose evidence

favorable to the defense is applicable even though there has been no request by the accused,

United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976), and encompasses impeachment evidence as

well as exculpatory evidence. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985); Gonzalez, 667

F.3d at 981. There are three components of a Brady violation: “[t]he evidence at issue must be

favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; the

evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice

must have ensued.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999). See also Skinner v.

Switzer, ___U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1300 (2011); Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691 (2004);

Maxwell v. Roe, 628 F.3d 486, 509 (9th Cir. 2010). In order to establish prejudice, a petitioner

must demonstrate that “‘there is a reasonable probability’ that the result of the trial would have

been different if the suppressed documents had been disclosed to the defense.” Strickler, 527

U.S. at 289. “The question is not whether petitioner would more likely than not have received a

different verdict with the evidence, but whether “in its absence he received a fair trial, understood

as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.” Id. (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S.

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419, 434 (1995)). See also Hein v. Sullivan, 601 F.3d 897, 906 (9th Cir. 2010); Silva v. Brown,

416 F.3d 980, 986 (9th Cir. 2005) (“a Brady violation is established where there ‘the favorable

evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to

undermine confidence in the verdict’”) 

Information that is required to be disclosed under Brady “includes “material . . .

that bears on the credibility of a significant witness in the case.” United States v. BrumelAlvarez, 991 F.2d 1452, 1461 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. Strifler, 851 F.2d 1197,

1201 (9th Cir. 1988)). See also Killian v. Poole, 282 F.3d 1204, 1210 (9th Cir. 2002) (habeas

relief granted where undisclosed letters would have been valuable to the defense in impeaching

“make-or-break” witness’ credibility before the jury); Singh v. Prunty, 142 F.3d 1157, 1161-63

(9th Cir. 1998) (petitioner was entitled to habeas relief where the prosecution suppressed

evidence of agreement to provide benefits to a key witness in exchange for his testimony, and a

reasonable probability existed that had evidence been disclosed, one or more members of jury

would have viewed the witness’s testimony differently). In determining whether the suppression

of impeachment evidence is sufficiently prejudicial to rise to the level of a Brady violation, a

reviewing court must analyze the totality of the undisclosed evidence “in the context of the entire

record,” Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112, because “[t]he cumulative effect of all the undisclosed evidence

may violate due process and warrant habeas relief under AEDPA.” Maxwell, 628 F.3d at 512

(citing Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1094 (9th Cir. 2005)). “Whether the suppressed

evidence was material must be considered collectively, not item by item.” Maxwell, 628 F.3d at

509. Once the materiality of the suppressed evidence is established, no further harmless error

analysis is required. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435-36; Silva, 416 F.3d at 986. 

However, “[w]here the defendant is aware of the essential facts enabling him to

take advantage of any exculpatory evidence, the Government does not commit a Brady violation

by not bringing the evidence to the attention of the defense.” United States v. Brown, 582 F.2d

197, 200 (2d Cir. 1978). See also United States v. Alvarez, 86 F.3d 901, 905 (9th Cir. 1996)

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(when Brady material concerns impeachment evidence against a government witness, Brady error

is avoided so long as the defendant can present the evidence to the jury and can fully

cross-examine the witness); United States v. Dupuy, 760 F.2d 1492, 1501 n.5 (9th Cir. 1985)

(citing Brown with approval); United States v. Griggs, 713 F.2d 672, 674 (11th Cir. 1983)

(“Where defendants . . . had within their knowledge the information by which they could have

ascertained the supposed Brady material, there is no suppression by the government”). 

2. Analysis

At the January 28, 2013 evidentiary hearing, petitioner’s trial counsel was asked

whether he was aware that Andy Vang had been charged with assault in connection with the

same incident for which petitioner was eventually convicted. (Doc. No. 98 (hereinafter

Transcript), at 6.) Counsel responded, 

To the best of my recollection, I can’t tell you yes or no to that. It

certainly would not have surprised me, or shocked me. I do know

this, he was not convicted.

(Id. at 7.) However, counsel stated that he “would have been given the rap sheet that’s required

under Brady v. Maryland and 1054 of the Penal Code from the prosecution is likely what I would

have relied upon.” (Id. at 8.) Petitioner’s trial counsel testified that he understood that the “final

outcome” of Vang’s case was “possession of a weapon and that there was no prosecution, or the

charges were dismissed as far as [assault].” (Id.) Later during the evidentiary hearing,

petitioner’s trial counsel testified that he was aware at the time of petitioner’s trial that “there

wasn’t a conviction on behalf of Mr. Vang for this incident,” but that “there was a [conviction

for] possession.” (Id. at 12.) 6

/////

/////

 At the evidentiary hearing conducted in this federal habeas proceeding, it was clearly 6

established that Andy Vang was charged with assault in connection with the incident for which

petitioner was convicted, but that the assault charge was in fact dismissed six weeks after it was

filed. (Id. at 25-26.)

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Petitioner’s trial counsel also testified that, even if he knew that Andy Vang had

been charged with assault in connection with the incident for which petitioner was on trial, he

would not have cross-examined Vang or Detective Kang regarding that subject. (Id. at 21.) 

Petitioner’s trial counsel explained that he did not want to “bolster the credibility of the

prosecution’s case by having the jury know that they were both arrested and that the district

attorney reviewed the files of both and determined that Mr. Vang was credible, and Mr. Lor was

not.” (Id. at 21-22.) In other words, petitioner’s trial counsel indicated that he did not want to

“bolster[] credibility . . . on behalf of the prosecution against my client.” (Id. at 22.) 

Petitioner’s trial counsel also explained that he believed Mr. Vang’s trial

testimony had not been credible with respect to the number of bullets he fired at the scene, and he

did not wish to highlight for the jury that the police and/or the District Attorney had ultimately

believed Mr. Vang’s version of the events over petitioner’s. (Id. at 23-24.) He stated that he

“wanted it to be as unbiased and balanced as possible on a level playing field to show that Mr.

Lor was, indeed the victim of this case.” (Id. at 24.) Petitioner’s trial counsel also opined that

“without a conviction there are evidentiary hurdles to getting the evidence in.” (Id. at 28-29.) In

this regard, petitioner’s trial counsel explained at the evidentiary hearing as follows:

If you’re asking me strategically why, well, there’s evidentiary

hurdles to begin with, without a conviction, and the second is, and

I’m not saying this was why, I don’t know what information – I

did not have any information that the district attorney’s office had

offered a deal to Mr. Vang. I had no information that he was given

any type of immunity. I had no information whatsoever of that

nature. The only information I had was that he had been arrested,

and charges were . . . dismissed – 

(Id. at 29-30.) 

Trial counsel also testified that he believed he could demonstrate to the jury that

Vang had fired the first shot, based on ballistics evidence, and that he intended to argue this to

the jury during his closing argument. (Id. at 40.) He explained that he did not want to reveal this

theory of the defense prior to the presentation of his closing argument, and did not want the jury

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to be influenced to believe Vang’s version of the events simply because the charges against Vang

were dismissed and the charges against petitioner were allowed to proceed to trial. (Id.) Finally,

petitioner’s trial counsel explained he feared that if he asked Detective Kang about the assault

charges brought against Vang, it might have “open[ed] the door” to questions about Kang’s

knowledge of “negative aspects” of petitioner’s background, or to the admission of damaging

evidence that had previously been ruled inadmissible by the trial judge. (Id. at 44.) Petitioner’s

attorney explained that he “did some further investigation and looked prior [sic] backgrounds,

and it could have opened the door to excluded evidence that was done by Judge Mullen.” (Id.)

Trial counsel’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing clearly reflects that he was

“aware of the essential facts enabling him to take advantage of any exculpatory evidence.” 

Brown, 582 F.2d at 200. Specifically, petitioner’s trial counsel testified that he would have been

given Vang’s “rap sheet” by the prosecutor and that he “relied on that.” He also testified that he

knew Vang had been arrested but had not been convicted of assault and was instead convicted

only of a gun possession charge in connection with this incident. At the very least, it is clear that

petitioner’s counsel had all of the information necessary to determine whether Vang had been

charged with and/or convicted of assault in connection with the incident for which petitioner was

on trial. In light of this, petitioner has failed to show that the prosecutor committed any Brady

violation at all. Brown, 582 F.2d at 200; Alvarez, 86 F.3d at 905; Griggs, 713 F.2d at 674. 

Petitioner has also failed to demonstrate prejudice with respect to his claim of

prosecutorial misconduct related to the alleged Brady violation. As noted above, petitioner’s trial

counsel explained at the evidentiary hearing in this matter that he would not have cross-examined

Andy Vang or Detective Kang about any assault charges brought against Vang in connection

with this incident, even if he had known about those charges, because he did not wish to

highlight the fact that the authorities had credited Vang’s version of the events over petitioner’s. 

In light of his trial counsel’s testimony in this regard, petitioner cannot show a reasonable

/////

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probability that “the result of the trial would have been different if the suppressed documents had

been disclosed to the defense.” Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289.

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, petitioner is not entitled to federal

habeas relief on his claim of prosecutorial misconduct based on a Brady violation.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner also raises numerous claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 

After setting forth the applicable legal principles, the court will evaluate these claims in turn

below.

1. Applicable Legal Principles

The Sixth Amendment guarantees the effective assistance of counsel. The United

States Supreme Court set forth the test for demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To support a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel, a petitioner must first show that, considering all the circumstances, counsel’s

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 466 U.S. at 687-88. After a

petitioner identifies the acts or omissions that are alleged not to have been the result of

reasonable professional judgment, the court must determine whether, in light of all the

circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally

competent assistance. Id. at 690; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003). Second, a

petitioner must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance. Strickland,

466 U.S. at 693-94. Prejudice is found where “there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at

694. A reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome.” Id. See also Williams, 529 U.S. at 391-92; Laboa v. Calderon, 224 F.3d 972, 981

(9th Cir. 2000). A reviewing court “need not determine whether counsel’s performance was

deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged

deficiencies . . . . If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of 

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sufficient prejudice . . . that course should be followed.” Pizzuto v. Arave, 280 F.3d 949, 955

(9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697). In assessing an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim “[t]here is a strong presumption that counsel’s performance falls within the ‘wide

range of professional assistance.’” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). There is in addition a strong presumption that counsel “exercised

acceptable professional judgment in all significant decisions made.” Hughes v. Borg, 898 F.2d

695, 702 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).

2. Conflict of Interest

a. Background

Petitioner claims that his trial counsel was operating under a conflict of interest

because counsel had previously represented Andy Vang “and his firm acted as counsel on

charges directly related to this case.” (Doc. No. 1 at 4.) Petitioner argues that this conflict

resulted in “the obvious lackluster cross-examination of the alleged victim/former client of trial

counsel.” (Id.) He also argues that, absent this conflict of interest, his trial counsel would have

investigated Vang’s criminal background and discovered that Vang had been arrested for and

charged with assault with a firearm upon petitioner in connection with this very case. (Id. at 9.) 

Moreover, petitioner asserts that his trial counsel’s former law firm was aware that Vang had

been charged with assault because Vang was then a client of that firm. (Id. at 10.) Petitioner

claims that, because of the conflict arising from his trial counsel’s previous and possibly ongoing

representation of and involvement with Vang, counsel failed to question Vang about the charges

brought against him for assaulting petitioner with a deadly weapon. (Id.) In essence, petitioner

claims that his trial counsel’s prior representation of and involvement with Vang, both personally

and as a former member of the law firm representing Vang, constituted a conflict of interest

which adversely affected counsel’s representation of petitioner by limiting counsel’s

impeachment of Vang and counsel’s investigation into Vang’s arrest and possible conviction on

charges related to petitioner’s prosecution. 

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As described above, petitioner raised his claim of ineffective assistance of trial

counsel in his petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the Sacramento County Superior Court. 

That court rejected petitioner’s arguments in this regard, reasoning as follows:

Claims that could have been raised on appeal are not normally

cognizable on habeas corpus. (In re Dixon (1953) 41 Cal.2d 756,

759; Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th at 828.) 

Petitioner claims that he had a conflict of interest with trial counsel

that denied him effective representation. The issue of a potential

conflict was raised on the record. In particular, trial counsel

disclosed that he worked for the Miller Law Group as of counsel

and the Miller Law Group represented a witness, Andy Vang. 

Counsel stated that he never substantively represented Vang. He

further disclosed that Vang’s mother attempted to pay counsel, but

that he directed his staff to refuse the payment and refer her to the

Miller Law Group. The trial court found that there was no conflict

and if there was one, that Petitioner had waived the conflict on the

record. (See attached transcripts.) Therefore, any claim regarding

this conflict, which was discussed on the record, is barred by

Dixon.

Petitioner now claims that trial counsel lied to the trial court when

discussing the potential conflict of interest. According to the

transcripts, trial counsel represented to the court that he had

previously conveyed to Petitioner the information about working

for the Miller Law Group, which had represented Vang. He also

stated that Petitioner signed “something” that stated that counsel

explained the issue to Petitioner. In fact, Petitioner now claims

those two representations were false. Even if counsel’s statements

were false, Petitioner has not shown that a conflict actually existed. 

At a minimum, the facts were disclosed on the record and the trial

court found that no conflict existed, based in part on the fact that

counsel never made any substantive appearances on Vang’s behalf. 

Petitioner also waived any conflict on the record. Similarly

Petitioner claims that he was unaware that Vang’s mother tried to

pay trial counsel, but that information was also disclosed on the

record. Finally, Petitioner claims that counsel maintained a

relationship with Vang’s family through closing arguments. He

refers to a page in the transcript that states: “Andy has three

brothers and sisters back in my office.” Petitioner has not shown

that the family’s presence resulted in or reflected any improper

conduct by counsel. The reason behind Vang’s family’s presence

at counsel’s office is unknown. Petitioner assumes or speculates

that it is nefarious, but it is equally likely to be innocent. Since it is

Petitioner’s obligation to show that he is entitled to relief, the claim

is without merit.

(Resp’t’s Lod. Doc. 8 at “Page 3 of 6.”)

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The state trial court record reflects that the following exchange between the court

and petitioner’s counsel occurred during petitioner’s trial regarding the possible conflict of

interest resulting from counsel’s involvement with or prior representation of victim/witness

Vang: 

THE COURT: . . . Briefly, Counsel, you discussed with me, and I

just wanted to put it on the record, the conflict of interest, which is

not truly a legal conflict of interest, but if you’d explain those

circumstances just so that we can get it out and on the record.

MR. ROSENFELD: Thank you, your Honor. 

Your Honor, I have explained to Mr. Lor in the past that one of the

complaining witnesses in this case, Mr. Andy Vang, was a longtime returning client of the Miller Law Group. I explained to Mr.

Lor that I used to work with the Miller Law Group as of counsel,

not for the Miller Law Group. I was never an employee of the

Miller Law Group.

I was an employee of the Miller Law Group for a period of time,

left the office, went to work for Rothschild, Wishek and Sands,

went back to the Miller Law Group as of counsel, but during my

time of as of [sic] counsel was when I first met Mr. Andy Vang.

I never controlled his file. I was never privy to any conversations. 

I made appearances on behalf of Mr. Russ Miller, just standing in

for him on various court appearances for Mr. Andy Vang.

I told that to Mr. Lor because if there is an appearance of the

possible impropriety of conflict, but none exists. But I felt it was

necessary that Mr. Lor have the information.

THE COURT: He’s previously, as I understand it – 

And the appearances you made were continuances. They weren’t

substantive matters like prelims or other things; is that correct?

MR. ROSENFELD: No, your Honor. I never made a substantive

appearance that I can recall on behalf of Mr. Vang.

THE COURT: You’ve informed me that you’ve explained this to

Mr. Lor, and he’s signed a written waiver of conflict?

MR. ROSENFELD: It was about a year ago, your Honor, that I did

explain it to him and had him sign something stating that I

explained it to him.

/////

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I also want to further state that I have talked to Mr. Russ Miller,

just in case my recollection was faulty, just to make sure with him,

because he is the counsel for Mr. Vang, that I never did anything

substantive, and Mr. Miller, after reviewing his notes and his file,

told me I never did anything substantive, just made appearances for

him.

THE COURT: Mr. Lor, I just want to make it clear you’re aware

of this; is that correct?

THE DEFENDANT (through the interpreter): Yeah. Yes.

THE COURT: Do you waive --

Do you still wish to have Mr. Rosenfeld as your attorney?

THE DEFENDANT (through the interpreter): Yes.

THE COURT: And do you waive any possible legal conflict there

may have been as a result of his working for the same law firm that

represented the alleged victim?

THE DEFENDANT (through the interpreter): Yes.

THE COURT: All right. The other thing is, counsel also told me

that the mother of the victim just recently attempted to pay your

firm --

To make it clear for the record, you no longer work with Russ

Miller Group, you’re on your own, separate private firm; is that

correct?

MR. ROSENFELD: Yes, your Honor. For the last year and a half

I have had my own practice.

THE COURT: All right. And then out of the blue, the mother of

the alleged victim came to pay you money, presumably based on

that prior representation by the Russ Miller Group; is that correct?

MR. ROSENFELD: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: And as you have explained it to both the

prosecution and I, because of your concerns about the appearances,

as well as any legal conflicts, appearances of impropriety and legal

conflicts, you instructed your staff not to accept the money and

directed the mother to go to the Russ Miller Group; is that correct?

MR. ROSENFELD: Yes, your Honor.

/////

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THE COURT: All right. As I understand it, you were not

personally present; your secretary called you with the question as to

what should I do, this woman wants to pay us money, we don’t

represent her or the son.

MR. ROSENFELD: That’s correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: And so you explained to them, your staff, what to

do, to just direct the woman down the street.

MR. ROSENFELD: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Having that in mind, Mr. Lor, do you

still wish to have Mr. Rosenfeld represent you in this case?

THE DEFENDANT (through the interpreter): Yes.

THE COURT: All right. I’m satisfied there’s no conflicts, legal

conflict, and if there is one, that the defendant, Mr. Lor, has waived

any conflict and it’s appropriate for counsel to continue

representing him in this case.

(Reporter’s Transcript (RT) at 3-7.) 

Petitioner now claims that “trial counsel and his firm” represented Andy Vang on

the assault and weapons charges stemming directly from the instant case, but that petitioner’s

counsel did not advise the trial court of this at the time of the above-described colloquy regarding

the potential conflict. (Doc. No. 1 at 9-10, 18.) Petitioner also contends that his trial counsel

failed to impeach Vang with his arrest and possible conviction on a charge of assault upon

petitioner with a deadly weapon in connection with this case, even though the Miller Law Group

almost certainly was in possession of all relevant information in this regard. (Id. at 10.) 

Petitioner has attached and incorporated his habeas petition filed in the California

Supreme Court to his federal habeas petition. In that state habeas petition, petitioner claimed that

he did not understand the ramifications of his waiver of conflict-free counsel which was obtained

by the trial court. (Id. at 16.) He noted that he required a Hmong interpreter at all court hearings,

and states that he “never had the relevant facts, nor their true implications, sufficiently explained

to him.” (Id.) Petitioner stated that his trial counsel “lied’ when he told the trial court he had

previously informed petitioner of a potential conflict and obtained a written waiver of that

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conflict from petitioner. (Id. at 16-17.) Petitioner noted, in this regard, that there is no evidence

in the record of any such written waiver. Petitioner also questions why the victim’s mother

would have attempted to retain or pay petitioner’s trial counsel instead of the Miller Law Group

if counsel’s connection with the victim was as minimal as he represented it to be to the trial

court. (Id. at 17.) Petitioner speculates that his trial counsel may have had a more substantial

involvement in the prior representation of Vang. (Id.) In this regard, petitioner asks:

Why would the mother of the alleged victim track down Mr.

Rosenfeld, at his own new practice, to pay him money, supposedly

owed, for mere appearances made more than a year and a half

before? Why did she specifically come to Mr. Rosenfeld, with that

money, instead of taking it to the “Miller Law Group?” 

(Id.) Petitioner also directs the court attention to his trial counsel’s closing argument, wherein he

stated, “I had to spend some time because the binder I brought had five hundred pages in it, and

Andy has three brothers and sisters back in my office.” (Id. at 18-19; RT at 1006.) Petitioner

questions why the siblings of his alleged victim were “in [trial counsel’s] office during closing

argument.” (Id. at 18-19.) 

Petitioner also questions why his defense counsel did not follow up more closely

on Vang’s admitted conviction for shooting into an occupied dwelling a year after the events at

issue at petitioner’s trial. (Id. at 22.) He questions whether there was “a negotiated plea and

leniency provided [in that case] contingent upon Vang’s cooperation and testimony in

petitioner’s case?” (Id.) Further, he notes that during cross-examination of Vang, his trial

counsel elicited testimony that Vang had a conviction for “firing a gun.” (RT at 160.) However,

petitioner explains, his trial counsel did not ask any further questions about that prior conviction,

nor did he ask Vang whether he was charged with any crimes in connection with the incident

from which the charges against petitioner stemmed. Petitioner argues that these obvious

omissions during the cross-examination of Vang were the result of his trial counsel’s conflict of

interest. In summary, petitioner claims that if the defense was aware of the facts surrounding the

charges brought against Vang, his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to cross24

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examine Vang and Det. Kang about those facts. Petitioner also contends that his trial counsel’s

previous relationship with Vang constituted a conflict of interest which prevented him from

effectively cross-examining Vang and Det. Kang. He also argues that his waiver of the conflict

in the trial court was not knowing and voluntary and that his trial counsel’s representations in

open court that petitioner had been informed of the conflict and waived it in writing were false. 

In the May 7, 2012 order setting an evidentiary hearing, this court found that the

Sacramento County Superior Court’s decision addressing this claim was contrary to clearly

established federal law and was also based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. (Doc.

No. 71 at 31-35.) Accordingly, this federal habeas court will now evaluate the claim de novo. 

Frantz, 533 F.3d at 735.

b. Applicable Legal Principles

It is well established that the right to effective assistance of counsel carries with it

“a correlative right to representation that is free from conflicts of interest.” Wood v. Georgia,

450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981). See also Campbell v. Rice, 302 F.3d 892, 897 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Conflicts of interest broadly embrace all situations in which an attorney’s loyalty to, or efforts on

behalf of, a client are threatened by his responsibilities to another client or a third person or by

his own interests. See generally ABA, Model Rules Prof. Conduct, Rule 1.7 and commentary

(1983). Conflicts may occur in various factual settings. For example, conflicts may arise in

circumstances in which one attorney represents more than one defendant in the same proceeding. 

See, e.g., Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 481-91 (1978). Conflicts may also arise in

situations in which an attorney represents a defendant in a criminal matter and currently has or

formerly had an attorney-client relationship with a person who is a witness in that matter. See,

e.g., Houston v. Schomig, 533 F.3d 1076, 1-81 (9th Cir. 2008); Thomas v. Municipal Court, 878

F. 2d 285 (9th Cir. 1989). The rule prohibiting counsel from representing conflicting interests

serves to protect confidential information obtained during the course of an earlier representation,

ensure undivided attorney loyalty, and guard against infringement of the right to cross25

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examination. See Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1452-53 (9th Cir. 1994); Fitzpatrick v.

McCormick, 869 F.2d 1247, 1251 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Allen, 831 F.2d 1487, 1497

(9th Cir. 1987); Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 999 (9th Cir. 1980). Courts “generally presume

that the lawyer is fully conscious of the overarching duty of complete loyalty to his or her client.” 

Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 784 (1987). 

In order to establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on a conflict

of interest, a petitioner must show that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his

lawyer’s performance. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 174 (2002); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446

U.S. 335, 348-350 (1980); Lewis v. Mayle, 391 F.3d 989, 997 (9th Cir. 2004); Mannhalt v Reed,

847 F.2d 576, 582 (9th Cir. 1988) (adverse effects found where a conflict “may have impacted

the manner of the cross-examination” by the attorney). The existence of an actual conflict

“cannot be governed solely by the perceptions of the attorney; rather, the court itself must

examine the record to discern whether the attorney’s behavior seems to have been influenced by

the suggested conflict.” Sanders, 21 F.3d at 1452. The mere possibility that an attorney had a

conflict of interest is insufficient to entitle a petitioner to habeas relief. Rather, the petitioner

must show that: (1) his attorney actively represented conflicting interests, and (2) the conflict

“actually affected” the adequacy of the attorney’s representation. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349-50. 

See also Campbell, 302 F.3d at 897; Lockhart, 250 F.3d at 1229. However, a defendant “need

not demonstrate prejudice in order to obtain relief.” Cuyler, at 349-50. See also Delgado v.

Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 981 (9th Cir. 2000). Nonetheless, a defendant must show that “the

attorney’s behavior seems to have been influenced” by the conflict.” Lockhart, 250 F.3d at 1231

(quoting Sanders, 21 F.3d at 1452). 

 A defendant may “waive his right to the assistance of an attorney unhindered by a

conflict of interests.” Holloway, 435 U.S. at 483 n.5. “A valid waiver of conflict of interest

must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, such that the defendant is sufficiently informed of

the consequences of his choice.” Lewis, 391 F.3d at 996. See also Garcia v. Bunnell, 33 F.3d

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1193, 1195 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Even if counsel is subject to an actual conflict of interest, however,

the trial court may generally allow the attorney to proceed if the defendant makes a voluntary,

knowing, and intelligent waiver.”); Allen, 831 F.2d at 1494 (“[o]f course, a defendant may waive

his right to the assistance of an attorney who is unhindered by conflicts . . . provided the waiver is

given knowingly and intelligently.”) Whether there is a proper waiver is to be determined by the

trial court and any such waiver should appear on the record. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,

464-65 (1938). Resolution of the issue of waiver depends “upon the particular facts and

circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the

accused.” Id. See also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981). Moreover, a court must

“indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental rights.” Lewis, 391

F.3d at 997 (citations omitted.) 

c. Analysis

At the January 29, 2013 evidentiary hearing, petitioner’s trial counsel testified that

he was not associated with the Miller Law Group at the time of petitioner’s trial but that he had

previously made “stand-in appearances” on behalf of the Miller Law Group’s client Andy Vang

while acting as “of-counsel” to that firm. (Transcript at 5.) In this regard, he explained that at

least one year prior to petitioner’s trial, he made one or two such “stand-in” appearances on

Vang’s behalf. (Id.) He testified that he did not engage in discussions with Vang about his case

at that time. (Id.) 

Petitioner’s trial counsel also testified that he was not “personally” in contact with

Vang’s family at the time of petitioner’s trial, but that on one occasion Vang’s mother mistakenly

came to his office to make a payment to the Miller Law Group. (Id.) Counsel explained that he

and the Miller Law Group were located in the same building at the time the Miller Law Group

was representing Andy Vang. (Id. at 32.) Counsel theorized that Vang’s mother came to his

office in the mistaken belief that the Miller Law Group had moved into his office. (Id. at 5-6.) 

By that time, however, the Miller Law Group had moved into an office building less than a block

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away. (Id. at 31-32.) Trial counsel testified that his staff directed Vang’s mother to the correct

office. (Id. at 6, 31-32.) Counsel also explained that Vang’s mother did not speak English and

that there were “language issues.” (Id. at 5.) Counsel further testified that, while he did not have

any personal contact with Vang’s family, his investigator had contacted them to follow up on

information that “Mr. Vang had told his family members that he had shot first.” (Id.) 

Petitioner’s trial counsel also testified at the evidentiary hearing that he told

petitioner he had associated with the Miller Law Group as “of counsel” in the past, that the

Miller Law Group had represented Andy Vang in another case, and that he had made courtesy

appearances on behalf of Vang. (Id. at 8, 9.) Counsel testified that he did not believe he had a

conflict of interest as a result of these circumstances, but that in an abundance of caution he

informed petitioner and the trial court of the facts surrounding his prior contacts with Andy

Vang. (Id. at 9, 10-11.) He explained during his testimony that he “knew that this was

something that Mr. Lor should explore with the Court and that I should tell the Court, and I did,

and prior to proceeding to trial, the Court extensively went through the issue with Mr. Lor and

myself to make sure that there was no conflict, and I felt that that was sufficient, and so did the

Court.” (Id. at 10-11.) Counsel also testified that petitioner signed a written waiver of any

conflict. (Id. at 10, 17.) 

7

Upon further questioning at the evidentiary hearing, petitioner’s trial counsel

stated that he had no desire to protect Vang at the time of petitioner’s trial, and that his “duty and

. . . representation went straight to Yong Lor.” (Id. at 13, 17.) He explained that he had no

relationship with Vang other than “simple counsel standing in for other counsel and continuing

the matter.” (Id.) He also stated that he did not receive any confidential information from Vang

that he had a duty to keep secret. (Id. at 37.) In this regard, he explained:

/////

 It should be noted that petitioner’s trial counsel could not explain why that waiver was 7

not contained in the state court file. (Id. at 17.) 

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I’ve been licensed a long time, and I would have never had

confidential information that I would have jeopardized my client,

my career, I – there’s no confidential information I ever had. I

simply made stand-in appearances, and as an abundance of caution

brought it to the attention of Mr. Lor and the Court.

(Id. at 37-38.)

Trial counsel was unable to explain the statements he made during his closing

argument as reflected in the trial transcript to the effect that Andy Vang’s brothers and sisters

were waiting in his office. (Id. at 14, 15.) However, he speculated that his investigator might

have arranged to meet with them in his office at that time in order to continue her investigation of

Vang’s statements to them that he fired the first shot. (Id. at 14-15, 18.) Petitioner’s trial counsel

explained that his investigator was continuing her investigation into this area even at the time of

his closing argument. (Id. at 19.) Counsel denied that he was representing the Vang family in

any way at that time. (Id. at 15.) 

After a review of the record, this court concludes that petitioner has failed to

demonstrate his trial counsel was operating under a conflict of interest when he represented

petitioner in this case. Trial counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that he only made “standin” appearances for Andy Vang as a favor to the Miller Law Group, that he did not discuss

Vang’s case with him at that time, that he was never Vang’s retained counsel, and that he did not

obtain any confidential information from Vang that he would be obligated to protect during his

later representation of petitioner. Further, there is no evidence in the record that any conflict of

interest adversely affected counsel’s performance on petitioner’s behalf. Counsel testified at the

evidentiary hearing that he refrained from questioning the trial witnesses at petitioner’s trial

about any charges brought against Vang in connection with this case because he did not want to

highlight the fact that the authorities had ultimately credited Andy Vang’s version of the events

over petitioner’s version. There is no evidence before this court that trial counsel’s decision in

this regard was based on his need to protect Vang. Put another way, there is no evidence in the

record before this federal habeas court that a conflict caused petitioner’s trial counsel to “pull his

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punches” when questioning Andy Vang or Officer Kang. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate

that his attorney actively represented conflicting interests or that any conflict actually affected the

adequacy of counsel’s representation. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas 8

relief on this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.9

3. Failure to File a Motion to Suppress

Petitioner also claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in

failing to “challenge the legality of the police impounding, searching, and seizing evidence from

petitioner’s vehicle in this case.” (Doc. No. 1 at 24.) Petitioner directs the court’s attention to

the trial testimony of police officer Henry Luckie, who located and impounded petitioner’s car. 

(Id. at 25; RT at 327-36.) Petitioner argues that Officer Luckie did not have the proper authority

to impound the vehicle. (Doc. No. 1 at 25.) He contends that his trial counsel’s crossexamination of Officer Luckie was inadequate in that it “contains not one single question

pertaining to the legality of the impound, search, and seizure of evidence.” (Id.) Petitioner 

argues that counsel “failed to subject this crucial aspect of the prosecution’s case to the crucible

of legally sufficient adversarial testing.” (Id.) 

Petitioner also complains that his trial counsel failed to challenge Officer Luckie’s

testimony that he did not touch or remove the tape on the door of petitioner’s vehicle, but simply

assumed there were bullet holes under the tape. (Id.) Petitioner claims that Officer Luckie’s

 In light of this conclusion, this court will not address petitioner’s argument that his 8

waiver of a conflict was insufficient.

 To the extent petitioner is claiming his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in 9

failing to cross-examine Andy Vang and Detective Kang about the assault charge brought against

Vang, apart from any conflict of interest, his claim lacks merit and should be rejected. 

Petitioner’s trial counsel testified that he would have refrained from such cross-examination

because he decided, for tactical reasons, not to highlight the fact that the charges against Vang

were dismissed while the charges against petitioner were allowed to proceed. Counsel’s decision

in this regard is not unreasonable. Reasonable tactical decisions, including decisions with regard

to the presentation of the case, are “virtually unchallengeable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. 

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on any such claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel.

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testimony in this regard conflicted with the preliminary hearing testimony of Officer Winston

Gin that bullet holes on the car door were visible. Petitioner argues this indicates that the tape

was removed by Officer Luckie. (Id.) He asks, “how did Officer Gin ‘actually see bullet holes’ .

. . in the vehicle being ‘detained by Officer Luckie’ if the tape wasn’t removed from the door?” 

(Id.) Petitioner argues that his trial counsel “had a fundamental duty to challenge the legality of

police doing anything at all to petitioner’s vehicle which was legally parked in the carport space

assigned to his parent’s apartment.” (Id.) Petitioner questions whether the “preliminary

information” was falsified, and why “is there not one single mention of a warrant by the police,

prosecutor, or [trial counsel]?” (Id.)

Petitioner argues that his trial counsel’s failure to challenge the seizure and search

of his vehicle was not harmless because the evidence found in the vehicle formed the basis for

damaging trial testimony against petitioner. (Id. at 26.) He contends that evidence obtained from

his vehicle “was, and led to, what constituted the very heart of the prosecution’s case.” (Id.) 

The Sacramento County Superior Court rejected petitioner’s arguments in this

regard, reasoning as follows:

Petitioner argues that trial counsel should have moved to suppress

evidence regarding the seizure of Petitioner’s vehicle. However,

he has not shown what grounds existed for suppressing the

evidence. He generally claims that the law enforcement officers

could not have seen the bullet holes without first removing the tape

from the vehicle, but he does not explain why they did not have the

authority to impound the vehicle. Petitioner has not shown that

had trial counsel moved to suppress the evidence that it is likely

that the motion would have been successful and that the evidence

would have been suppressed. Therefore, he has not shown that

counsel’s failure was prejudicial to Petitioner’s case.

(Resp’t’s Lod. Doc. 8 at “Page 4 of 6.”). 

“To show prejudice under Strickland resulting from the failure to file a motion, a

defendant must show that (1) had his counsel filed the motion, it is reasonable that the trial court

would have granted it as meritorious, and (2) had the motion been granted, it is reasonable that

there would have been an outcome more favorable to him.” Wilson v. Henry, 185 F.3d 986, 990

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(9th Cir. 1999) (citing Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 373-74) (so stating with respect to failure to file

a motion to suppress on Fourth Amendment grounds)). See also Ceja v. Stewart, 97 F.3d 1246,

1253 (9th Cir. 1996) (Trial counsel is not ineffective in failing to file a suppression motion

“which would have been ‘meritless on the facts and the law[.]’”); Lowry v. Lewis, 21 F.3d 344,

346 (9th Cir. 1994) (failure to file suppression motion is not ineffective assistance where counsel

investigated filing the motion and there was no reasonable possibility that the evidence would

have been suppressed); United States v. Molina, 934 F.2d 1440, 1447 (9th Cir. 1991) (Counsel

did not render ineffective assistance by failing to file a motion to suppress that was “clearly

lacking in merit[.]”). 

The Sacramento County Superior Court’s conclusion that petitioner had failed to

show prejudice stemming from his trial counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress, or to more

vigorously cross-examine trial witnesses about the seizure of petitioner’s vehicle, is not

unreasonable and should not be set aside. Petitioner’s conclusory allegations and rhetorical

questions fail to demonstrate that a more vigorous cross-examination would have uncovered any

grounds upon which to challenge the search and seizure of his vehicle, or that a motion to

suppress evidence would have been granted. See Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204 (9th Cir.

1995) (“‘Conclusory allegations which are not supported by a statement of specific facts do not

warrant habeas relief.’”) (quoting James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994)). Petitioner has

failed to support this ineffective assistance of counsel claim with sufficient facts or argument. 

Accordingly, he is not entitled to federal habeas relief.

4. Delay in Prosecution

Petitioner’s next claim is that the first of his two trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance in failing to object to the 34-month delay in bringing his case to trial. (Doc. No. 1 at

27.) Petitioner argues that his counsel’s multiple waivers of petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right

to a speedy trial were improper. (Id.) Petitioner states that, due to his ignorance of the law and

/////

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limited English skills, he was “forced” to trust his trial attorney to make appropriate decisions in

this regard. (Id.) 

The Sacramento County Superior Court rejected this claim, reasoning as follows:

Petitioner alleges that trial in his criminal case was improperly

delayed by 34 months. The crime occurred on July 18, 2001. 

According to the petition, Petitioner was arrested in Wisconsin. 

He was arraigned on February 13, 2002, was held to answer on

July 9, 2002 and his trial commenced on October 25, 2004. The

record reflects numerous time waivers. Although Petitioner claims

that he relied exclusively on trial counsel’s advice and decisions to

waive time, he has not shown that such advice was improper. Nor

has he shown that had he asserted his right to a speedy trial that the

outcome of his case would have been any different.

(Resp’t’s Lod. Doc. 8 at “Page 4 of 6.”).

Before this court petitioner has failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel’s

waivers of his right to a speedy trial were improper or in any way “outside the wide range of

professional assistance.” Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 381. Put another way, petitioner has failed to

rebut the “strong presumption” that counsel’s decision to delay the trial was not the product of

“acceptable professional judgment.” Hughes, 898 F.2d at 702. Petitioner has also failed to

demonstrate any reason to believe that the outcome of his case would have been different had his

counsel insisted on going to trial earlier. This court also notes that a client is bound by the

decisions of his counsel on scheduling matters, such as a delay in the trial. New York v. Hill,

528 U.S. 110, 115, 117 (2000) (“scheduling matters are plainly among those for which agreement

by counsel generally controls”). This is so because “the lawyer has – and must have – full

authority to manage the conduct of the trial.” Id. (quoting Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 417-

18 (1988). 

The decision of the Sacramento County Superior Court that petitioner failed to

show either deficient performance or prejudice with respect to this aspect of his ineffective

assistance of counsel claim is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. 

Accordingly, petitioner is also not entitled to federal habeas relief with respect to this claim.

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5. Prosecution Witnesses/Possession of Work Product

Petitioner claims that his first trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance because

a law clerk and an investigator employed by defense counsel eventually testified for the

prosecution at his trial. (Doc. No. 1 at 27.) Without any elaboration with respect to this claim,

petitioner argues that the simple fact these two persons testified at trial in the prosecution’s case

was “unfair.” (Id. at 28.) 

Petitioner also notes that, at some point during his trial, the trial judge remarked

that petitioner’s second trial counsel was “a little bit at odds” because he did not receive a

complete file from petitioner’s original trial counsel. (Id. at 27.) Petitioner observes that the trial

judge further stated that “the prosecution is in possession of some expert reports . . . that defense

counsel did not have and did not possess, and it was a report done at the behest of . . . the former

defense attorney.” (Id.) Petitioner argues that the prosecution had “no legal right” to

“confidential, defense ‘work product.’” (Id.) He contends that it was “unfair” for the prosecutor

to “somehow, acquir[e] defense materials generated by the first attorney which were NOT turned

over to the second defense attorney.” (Id. at 28.) Petitioner states that the prosecution would

only be entitled to this material if the discovery rules permitted it. He argues that the

prosecutor’s actions in obtaining the defense expert reports that were generated by his original

attorney may have “circumvented” his right to counsel. (Id.) Petitioner also notes that his

second trial counsel complained to the trial court about “the grave disadvantage that I am at with

another attorney handing over information and files and statements that would never have been

done by myself after my analysis and review of the case.” (Id. at 28; RT at 685.) Petitioner

argues that this “set of circumstances” resulted in his receiving ineffective assistance of counsel. 

(Doc. No. 1 at 28.) 

The Sacramento County Superior Court rejected these arguments, reasoning as

follows:

/////

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Petitioner complains that members of the defense team, including a

law clerk and an investigator, were eventually called as witnesses

for the prosecution. Petitioner asserts that this alone constitutes

unfairness. However, he does not identify any particular fact or act

by counsel that was ineffective. Nor has he shown that there was

any violation of attorney-client or work product privileges. 

Therefore, he has not stated grounds for relief.

(Resp’t’s Loc. Doc. 8 at “Page 4 of 6.”)

As with the immediately preceding claims addressed above, petitioner has failed

to substantiate these claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel with any facts or argument. 

Specifically, petitioner has failed to show that the trial testimony of the original defense

attorney’s law clerk and investigator prejudiced his trial in any way, or that his trial counsel could

or should have prevented this testimony from being introduced at trial. Petitioner has also 10

failed to explain the exact nature of the “work product” that the prosecutor allegedly improperly

possessed, or why he suffered any prejudice from the prosecutor’s receipt of this material. 

Because petitioner’s arguments are unsupported by any specific factual allegations and he has

failed to establish prejudice, he is not entitled to federal habeas relief on this claim. 

6. Corroborating Evidence

Petitioner’s next claim is that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in

failing to call petitioner’s wife and sister to testify at his trial. (Doc. No. 1 at 29.) Petitioner

states that these witnesses would have verified his version of the events; specifically, that he was

with his daughter during the altercation and that they had visited his sister prior to being attacked

by Vang. (Id.) Petitioner also argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in

failing to obtain a photocopy of the “sign in log” at his daughter’s preschool, to show that he

picked her up that afternoon. (Id.) Petitioner argues that this evidence “points to the

/////

 This court has reviewed the trial testimony of the original defense counsel’s law clerk 10

and investigator in question. (RT at 863-80.) The substance of their testimony regarding their

brief interviews of petitioner’s step-daughter regarding the events in question does not appear to

have been prejudicial to petitioner’s defense. 

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implausibility of petitioner going to start trouble, in enemy gang territory, in broad daylight, and

alone except for his four year old daughter.” (Id.) 

The California Court of Appeal rejected these arguments, reasoning as follows:

A petition alleging ineffective of counsel based on the failure to

obtain favorable evidence must show what evidence should or

could have been obtained and what effect it would have had. 

(People v. Geddes (1991) 1 Cal. App.4th 448, 454.)

Trial counsel apparently did not call Petitioner’s family to support

his contention that he was in the area where the crime occurred for

the purpose of picking up his daughter from school. Petitioner

states that there was also supporting evidence in the form of a signin log at his daughter’s school. He does not attach the evidence to

the petition. Therefore, he has not shown that any such evidence

existed for trial counsel to present.

(Resp’t’s Lod. Doc. 8 at Pages 4-5 of 6.)

Petitioner has failed to adequately allege or establish either deficient performance

or prejudice with respect to this aspect of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Petitioner’s

conclusory allegations that calling his wife and sister as witnesses at his trial, or obtaining the

sign in log from his daughter’s school, would have resulted in a different verdict in his case are

clearly insufficient for this purpose. See Jones, 66 F.3d at 205 (“conclusory suggestions” and

“bald assertions” fall short of stating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim and do not entitle

the petitioner to an evidentiary hearing). Nor has petitioner established that his wife and sister

would have given testimony favorable to his defense if called. See Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d

1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 2001) (petitioner failed to establish prejudice where he did “nothing more

than speculate that, if interviewed,” the witness would have given helpful information); Wildman

v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 839 (9th Cir. 2001) (speculating as to what expert witness would say is

not enough to establish prejudice); Dows v. Wood, 211 F.3d 480, 486-87 (2000) (no ineffective

assistance of counsel for failure to call witnesses where petitioner did not identify an actual

witness, provide evidence that the witness would testify, or present an affidavit from the alleged

witness); Grisby v. Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365, 373 (9th Cir. 1997) (same); United States v. Harden,

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846 F.2d 1229, 1231-32 (9th Cir. 1988) (no ineffective assistance because of counsel’s failure to

call a witness where, among other things, there was no evidence in the record that the witness

would testify). Without any evidence that specific witnesses would have testified in a manner

that might have led to a different result at his trial, petitioner’s bare allegations are insufficient to

support his claims in this regard. 

In sum, this claim by petitioner of ineffective assistance of counsel is conclusory,

lacks support, and fails to demonstrate that petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of the

performance of his trial counsel. The decision of the state courts rejecting these claims is not

contrary to or an unreasonable application of Strickland. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to

federal habeas relief.

7. Failure to Subpoena Probation Records

Petitioner also argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in

failing to subpoena his probation records or call his probation officer as a witness at trial. (Doc.

No. 1 at 29-30.) Petitioner argues that his probation records would have verified his good

behavior on probation and his intent to withdraw from gang activity. (Id.)

The Sacramento County Superior Court rejected this claim, reasoning as follows:

Petitioner claims that his probation officer would have testified, if

called, to various facts relating to Petitioner’s desire to stop

participating in gang activity. First, Petitioner has not attached any

evidence showing how the probation officer would have testified. 

Second, Petitioner testified on his own behalf and could and may

have testified about his gang activity or lack thereof. Finally, as

the gang enhancements were stricken, he has failed to show any

prejudice.

(Resp’t’s Lod. Doc. 8 at “Page 5 of 6.”).

This court agrees with the Superior Court that petitioner has failed to demonstrate

prejudice with respect to this claim. Aside from the fact that the California Court of Appeal

struck the gang enhancement findings, petitioner’s unsupported speculation as to how his

probation officer would have testified at trial or what his probation records would have

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demonstrated if presented at trial is clearly insufficient to establish prejudice. In addition, there

is no evidence before this court that petitioner’s counsel did not contact petitioner’s probation

officer and simply concluded that his testimony, or the probation records, would not have been

beneficial to the defense. In short, petitioner has failed to substantiate this claim with facts or

evidence. Accordingly, he is not entitled to federal habeas relief.

8. Cross-Examination

Petitioner also claims that his trial counsel failed to “protect [him] from crossexamination that clearly went beyond the scope of the direct testimony.” (Doc. No. 1 at 30.) He

argues that his counsel allowed the prosecution to “make the defendant their own witness.” (Id.) 

Petitioner states that examples from the record to support this claim are “too numerous to list,”

but he notes that while his direct-examination covered only 11 1/3 pages of trial transcript, the

prosecutor’s cross-examination of him went on for 55 pages. (Id.) Petitioner also argues in

conclusory fashion that his trial counsel’s short cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses

was “pathetic.” (Id.) Petitioner speculates as to the possible reasons for his trial counsel’s

inadequate cross-examination, but fails to provide any concrete examples from the trial

transcript.

The Sacramento County Superior Court denied relief with respect to this claim,

stating as follows:

Petitioner contends that trial counsel failed to “protect” him from

cross-examination beyond the scope of direct examination. He

provides no evidence supporting his claim, stating merely that they

are too numerous to list and identifying the fact that crossexamination constituted 55 pages of testimony compared to 11 1⁄2

pages of direct examination. General claims cannot be evaluated

on habeas corpus.

(Resp’t’s Lod. Doc. 8 at “Page 5 of 6.”).

As with the ineffective assistance claims discussed above, petitioner has failed to

support his conclusory statements in support of this aspect of his claim with specific allegations

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or proof. Accordingly, he has failed to establish either deficient performance or prejudice and

fails to show entitlement to federal habeas relief on this claim.

C. Failure to Bifurcate Trial of Gang Enhancement Allegations

Petitioner claims that the trial court violated his right to due process when it

denied his motion to bifurcate the trial of the gang enhancement allegations from the trial on the

underlying charges. (Doc. No. 1 at 5, 35.) Petitioner also argues that, as an alternative to

bifurcation, the trial court should have stricken the gang enhancement allegations and all related

trial testimony. (Id. at 35.) 11

Petitioner contends that Detective Kang’s testimony was factually inconsistent

and confusing with regard to the particulars of the alleged prior gang activities of petitioner’s

gang. (Id. at 37-38.) Petitioner compares Det. Kang’s preliminary hearing testimony to his

testimony at trial in an attempt to demonstrate that Kang’s trial testimony was inaccurate with

regard to the predicate offenses, and that the prosecution did not properly substantiate those

offenses. (Id. at 37-39.) Petitioner argues that this court’s assessment of the prejudice resulting

from the trial court’s failure to bifurcate the gang allegations from the trial on the underlying

charges should take into account: “the Wisconsin evidence; the length of Detective Kang’s

testimony before the jury; the proven lack of foundation for the gang evidence; the trial court’s

failure to even take a look at the preliminary hearing evidence proffered by the prosecution;

Detective Kang’s proven incompetence and unreliability, factual inconsistencies; dishonesty, and

that, ultimately, it was the prosecution’s ‘offer of proof’, not actual proof that unfairly decided

this issue at trial level.” (Id. at 41.) Petitioner also argues that, in light of the problems with the

evidence supporting the gang enhancement allegations, there was a significant possibility of juror

confusion. (Id. at 41-42.) 

 Under California law, a defendant is required to file a motion to sever in order to 11

request separate trials of substantive counts, while enhancements are subject to a motion to

bifurcate. People v. Burnell, 132 Cal. App.4th 938, 946 & n. 5 (2005).

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Respondent failed to address these claims in the answer filed in this action.

The last reasoned decision addressing this claim is the decision of the California

Court of Appeal. That court rejected petitioner’s contentions in this regard, reasoning as follows:

Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to

bifurcate the gang enhancement allegations from the trial of the

underlying crimes. We disagree.

Before trial, defendant moved to bifurcate the gang enhancement

allegations, to which the People filed an opposition. The trial court

denied the motion because the gang allegations were probative on

the issues of defendant’s motive and intent. The court also

concluded that the prejudicial impact of the evidence was minimal

because the evidence also was being admitted in connection with

the underlying offenses.

In People v. Hernandez (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1040, 1046, 1051, our

Supreme Court determined that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in denying defendant’s motion to bifurcate the gang

enhancement charges from the underlying charges of robbery. The

court noted that a trial court has the discretion to bifurcate certain

issues such as prior convictions from the determination of the

defendant’s guilt of the charged offense. (Id. at p. 1048.) The

Hernandez court, however, distinguished the prior conviction –

which relates to the defendant’s status and is often not connected to

the instant crime – from the criminal street gang enhancement

allegations – which is, by definition, inextricably linked to the

defendant’s crime. (Ibid.) On this latter point, the Hernandez

court explained: “Evidence of the defendant’s gang affiliation –

including evidence of the gang’s territory, membership, signs,

symbols, beliefs and practices, criminal enterprises, rivalries, and

the like – can help prove identity, motive, modus operandi, specific

intent, means of applying force or fear, or other issues pertinent to

guilt of the charged crime.” (Id. at p. 1049.) Bifurcation is thus

warranted only when the other evidence of the predicate acts

required to establish the gang enhancement is unduly prejudicial,

or when gang evidence about the defendant is “so extraordinarily

prejudicial, and of so little relevance to guilt, that it threatens to

sway the jury to convict regardless of the defendant’s actual guilt.”

(Ibid.)

Drawing from cases discussing the standard for severance of

charged offenses, the Hernandez court stated, “when the evidence

sought to be severed relates to a charged offense, the ‘burden is on

the party seeking severance to clearly establish that there is a

substantial danger of prejudice requiring that the charges be

separately tried. [Citations.] When the offenses are joined for trial

the defendant’s guilt of all the offenses is at issue and the problem

of confusing the jury with collateral matters does not arise. The

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other-crimes evidence does not relate to [an] offense for which the

defendant may have escaped punishment. That the evidence would

otherwise be inadmissible may be considered as a factor suggesting

possible prejudice, but countervailing considerations that are not

present when evidence of uncharged offenses is offered must be

weighed in ruling on a severance motion. The burden is on the

defendant therefore to persuade the court that these countervailing

considerations are outweighed by a substantial danger of undue

prejudice.” (People v. Hernandez, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1050.)

We review the trial court’s decision under the deferential abuse of

discretion standard of review. (Id. at pp. 1050-1051.)

Here, we detect no abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying

the motion for bifurcation. Defendant’s connection to his gang

was relevant to his identity as the shooter and the motive for the

crime, since HNS and MOD were engaged in a “war” at the time of

the shooting. The gang evidence helped explain an otherwise

random exchange of gunfire. It also helped explain why defendant,

undertaking a dangerous venture into hostile territory, would pick a

fight with an unaccompanied young teenage opponent, who was

possibly unarmed and probably inexperienced. The evidence that

T.V., upon meeting a fellow gang member at the market, turned

around and taunted defendant with a gang gesture, lent support to

defendant’s claim that he did not fire the first shots, a defense

buttressed by defendant’s testimony that he was no longer a gang

member and that he was simply driving his stepdaughter to his

sister’s residence on the day T.V. shot at him. The gang evidence

put the event in perspective, and decreased the risk to all parties

that the jurors would speculate about extraneous matters having

little or no connection to the facts of the case. Under these

circumstances, the gang evidence admitted about defendant was

relevant to his guilt and not unduly prejudicial.

In addition, the evidence of the other predicate crimes was so brief

and short of details that its inflammatory potential was never

kindled. The chances of jury confusion were also minimal, since

the evidence was offered to prove the charged gang enhancements,

which were distinct from the substantive offenses. Finally,

defendant’s lack of involvement with the predicate crimes negated

any possibility that the jury could believe that defendant should be

punished for those acts. The court did not abuse its discretion by

denying the motion to bifurcate.

(2007 WL 1874424, at **5-6.) 

The United States Supreme Court has not determined that a criminal defendant

has a federal constitutional right to bifurcation. See Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 565-66

(1967) (“Two-part jury trials are rare in our jurisprudence; they have never been compelled by

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this Court as a matter of constitutional law, or even as a matter of federal procedure.”); Marshall

v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 438 n.6 (1983) (reaffirming Spencer). Therefore, a court may grant

habeas relief based on a state court’s decision to deny a motion for severance only if the joint

trial was so prejudicial that it denied a petitioner his right to a fair trial. Zafiro v. United States,

506 U.S. 534, 538-39 (1993) (court must decide if “there is a serious risk that a joint trial would

compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a

reliable judgment about guilt or innocence”); Featherstone v. Estelle, 948 F.2d 1497, 1503 (9th

Cir. 1991) (“The simultaneous trial of more than one offense must actually render petitioner’s

state trial fundamentally unfair and hence, violative of due process before relief pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254 would be appropriate.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Petitioner bears the burden of proving that he is entitled to federal habeas relief,

Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2003), and must establish that prejudice arising

from the failure to grant a severance was so “clear, manifest, and undue” that he was denied a fair

trial. Lambright v. Stewart, 191 F.3d 1181, 1185 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v.

Throckmorton, 87 F.3d 1069, 1071-72 (9th Cir. 1996)). “In evaluating prejudice, the [federal

habeas court] focuses particularly on cross-admissibility of evidence and the danger of ‘spillover’

from one charge to another, especially where one charge or set of charges is weaker than

another.” Davis, 384 F.3d at 638. Undue prejudice also exists “whenever joinder of counts

allows evidence of other crimes to be introduced in a trial where the evidence would otherwise

be inadmissible.” Sandoval v. Calderon, 241 F.3d 765, 772 (9th Cir. 2000). 

On habeas review, federal courts neither depend on the state law governing

severance, Grisby, 130 F.3d at 370 (citing Hollins v. Dep't of Corrections, State of Iowa, 969

F.2d 606, 608 (8th Cir. 1992)), nor consider procedural rights to a severance given to criminal

defendants in the federal criminal justice system. Id. Rather, the relevant question is whether the

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state proceedings satisfied due process. Id.; see also Cooper v. McGrath, 314 F. Supp. 2d 967,

983 (N.D. Cal. 2004).

12

As the California Court of Appeal correctly observed, in this case the gang

evidence was admissible to show petitioner’s intent and motive on the underlying crimes. This

fact reduced the possibility of prejudice. See Comer v. Schriro, 480 F.3d 960, 985 (9th Cir.

2007) (cross-admissibility of evidence significantly reduces potential prejudice). As described by

the trial court,

As to the enhancement itself I don’t see that it prejudices the

defense. The words spoken, gang challenges, and other things are

already going to be before the jury because they are part of the

operative facts, and the fact that there is an enhancement is not

going to – once that evidence comes in, is not going to cause any

further damage than already would have occurred in the sense that

the jury will have learned that the defendant is involved in gangs.”

As to the enhancement itself, it’s an entirely appropriate charge. 

It’s part and parcel of the evidence and the testimony of the expert

witnesses commonly heard in any number of gang cases

throughout the States, in California, and it’s appropriate that this

jury try it all in the unity of a trial rather than bifurcate a trial. . . .” 

* * *

The point being the evidence in and of itself to the underlying

crime is totally a gang initiated attempt [sic] murder. Two separate

counts of the gang enhancement just simply brings in further

evidence to support that it was done for the purpose and benefit of

promoting the HNS street gang.

(RT at 27-28.) 

As noted by the state appellate court, the gang evidence in this case also served to

explain an otherwise inexplicable series of events and it “put the event in perspective.” See

United States v. Takahashi, 205 F.3d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir. 2000) (gang evidence admissible when

 Of course, to the extent petitioner is arguing that the trial court abused its discretion 12

under state law in denying his request for bifurcation, his claim is not cognizable in these federal

habeas proceedings. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68. 

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relevant to a material issue). Further, the fact that petitioner did not have any involvement with

the predicate crimes lessened any potential prejudice resulting from the admission of the gang

evidence. In denying petitioner’s request for bifurcation, the trial court noted that the predicate

offenses were not offenses in which petitioner was “linked,” and that they were “the classic kind

of predicate offenses that are used in gang crimes to support the theory that this is a criminal

street gang.” (Id. at 29-30.) Under the circumstances of this case, petitioner has not established

that the state trial court’s refusal to bifurcate the trial of the gang allegations from the underlying

charges rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. Davis, 384 F.3d at 638. Thus, federal habeas

relief is not warranted on this claim. See Cisneros v. Harrington, Nos. CV 10-574-DMG (OP) 13

& CV 09-6716 DMG (OP), 2012 WL 3150610, at *14-15 (C.D. Cal. Jan 31, 2012) (rejecting

similar claim to federal habeas relief).

D. Constitutionality of AEDPA

Petitioner claims that “as it is being applied in this case, and throughout

California, the AEDPA, violates the UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.” (Doc. No. 1 at 5.) 

/////

 Petitioner also claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to 13

do more to persuade the trial court to bifurcate the gang enhancements from the trial on the

underlying charges. (Doc. No. 1 at 31-34.) Petitioner claims that the prejudice from the

admission of this gang evidence “was not adequately demonstrated by [trial counsel].” (Id. at

31.) Specifically, petitioner argues that trial counsel should have “attacked the prosecution’s

credibility sufficiently;” cross-examined Andy Vang on the assault charge brought against him in

connection with this case; filed a motion to strike the trial testimony of Detective Kang on the

grounds that his testimony failed to support the gang enhancement allegation and was unreliable;

filed a motion to strike testimony about petitioner’s alleged criminal conduct in Wisconsin

because it was relevant only to the gang enhancement allegation which was later stricken by the

California Court of Appeal; filed a motion to strike the gang enhancement allegation on the basis

that it was not supported by sufficient evidence; and “ma[de] motions for mistrial, dismissal of

the gang enhancement allegation, exclusion of the Wisconsin evidence and/or the striking of all

the gang enhancement evidence.” (Id. at 31-34.) However, petitioner has failed to demonstrate

that his trial counsel’s performance in connection with the gang evidence was not based on

reasonable tactical decisions or was otherwise outside the “wide range of professional

assistance.” Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 381. Moreover, he has failed to demonstrate that the result

of the proceedings would have been different had his trial counsel performed the actions now

suggested by petitioner. Accordingly, he is not entitled to federal habeas relief with respect to

such claims.

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Petitioner does not elaborate on this claim further in either his petition or traverse. Respondent

has failed to address the claim in the answer filed in this action. 

To the extent petitioner is attempting to raise a free-standing claim challenging the

constitutionality of the AEDPA, his claim appears to be unexhausted and lacks merit in any

event. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the AEDPA violates the federal constitution on

its face or as applied in this case. See Crater v. Galaza, 491 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2007).

Petitioner’s vague and conclusory allegation that AEDPA violates the federal constitution is

insufficient to demonstrate that he is entitled to federal habeas relief. Jones, 66 F.3d at 204;

James, 24 F.3d at 26. 

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that

petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twentyone days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. Failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir.

1991). In his objections petitioner may address whether a certificate of appealability should issue

in the event he files an appeal of the judgment in this case. See Rule 11, Federal Rules

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Governing Section 2254 Cases (the district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant). 

DATED: May 16, 2013.

DAD:8

lor2985.hc

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