Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-14-04570/USCOURTS-ca3-14-04570-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Attorney General United States of America
Respondent
Carlos Chang-Cruz
Petitioner

Document Text:

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_______________

No. 14-4570

_______________

CARLOS CHANG-CRUZ,

Petitioner

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent

_______________

On Petition for Review of a Decision and Order 

of the Board of Immigration Appeals

(BIA-1: A040-147-192)

Immigration Judge: Honorable Margaret R. Reichenberg

_______________

Argued: July 12, 2016

Before: AMBRO, KRAUSE, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

(Opinion Filed: August 24, 2016)

David Debold

Martin A. Hewett (ARGUED)

Gibson Dunn & Crutcher

1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

9th Floor

Washington, DC 20036

Counsel for Petitioner

Briena L. Strippoli (ARGUED)

United States Department of Justice

Office of Immigration Litigation

P.O. Box 878

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2

Ben Franklin Station

Washington, DC 20044

Counsel for Respondent

_______________

OPINION*

_______________

KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS or “Government”) seeks to remove 

Appellant Carlos Chang-Cruz from the United States as a result of his two 2005 state 

drug convictions, while Chang-Cruz seeks to cancel his removal. After several rounds of 

review by the Immigration Judge (IJ) and Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), the BIA 

concluded that he is ineligible for cancellation of removal. We hold that the BIA erred. 

Therefore, we will grant Chang-Cruz’s petition for review and will remand the case to the 

BIA for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.

Chang-Cruz, a native and citizen of Ecuador, was admitted to the United States in 

1987 at the age of 14. In 2005, he pled guilty in New Jersey state court to two counts of 

violating New Jersey Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-7(a), which prohibits any “violat[ion] of [N.J. 

Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-5] by distributing, dispensing or possessing with intent to distribute a 

controlled dangerous substance” on or within 1000 feet of “school property used for 

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 

does not constitute binding precedent.

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school purposes . . . or a school bus.” The Government issued a Notice to Appear in 

2010, alleging that because these crimes involved a controlled substance, see 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), and are aggravated felonies—namely, offenses involving drug 

trafficking, see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(B), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)—Chang-Cruz was

removable.

Before the IJ, Chang-Cruz conceded that he was removable but denied that he was 

convicted of an aggravated felony and, therefore, sought cancellation of removal. See 

8 U.S.C. § 1229b. The Government disagreed, arguing that Chang-Cruz’s convictions 

are aggravated felonies because they are analogous to violations of 21 U.S.C. § 860, 

which prohibits, among other things, “distributing, possessing with intent to distribute, or 

manufacturing a controlled substance in or on, or within one thousand feet of, the real 

property comprising a public or private elementary, vocational, or secondary school.” 

The IJ concluded that Chang-Cruz’s convictions were not analogous to § 860 and 

exercised her discretion to cancel his removal.

The Government appealed to the BIA challenging only the IJ’s finding that 

Chang-Cruz was eligible for cancellation. See J.A. 30 & n.2, 452. Before that appeal 

was decided, the Government sought to remand the case to the IJ for consideration of the

newly received transcript of the colloquy at which Chang-Cruz pled guilty to his § 2C:35-

7 charges. The BIA granted the motion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), (4).

On remand, the IJ reversed course, concluding, in light of the plea transcript, that 

Chang-Cruz was convicted of aggravated felonies and was therefore ineligible for 

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cancellation of removal. However, the IJ noted that, assuming Chang-Cruz was not 

convicted of an aggravated felony, she would again cancel his removal in the exercise of 

her discretion.

The BIA affirmed the IJ’s second ruling that Chang-Cruz is ineligible for 

cancellation of removal. He filed a petition for review with our Court, but we remanded 

for reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Descamps v. 

United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013). The BIA again affirmed, and Chang-Cruz filed

the petition for review that we now consider.

II.

The IJ had jurisdiction over Chang-Cruz’s removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1229a, while the BIA had jurisdiction to review the IJ’s decision under 8 C.F.R. 

§§ 1003.1(b)(3) and 1240.15. When an alien is removable by virtue of having 

committed, among other things, an aggravated felony or controlled substance offense, we 

have jurisdiction to review the order of removal only to the extent the alien raises 

“constitutional claims or questions of law”—including whether the alien was in fact 

convicted of an aggravated felony. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); Gourzong v. Att’y 

Gen., --F.3d--, 2016 WL 3254900, at *3 (3d Cir. June 14, 2016). Thus, we have 

jurisdiction to determine whether Chang-Cruz’s crime of conviction is an aggravated 

felony and also whether the BIA adhered to its regulations governing remand.

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III.

An aggravated felony includes the “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance (as 

defined in [21 U.S.C. § 802]), including a drug trafficking crime (as defined in [18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c)]).” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). Section 924(c)(2) defines a “drug trafficking 

crime” as, among other things, “any felony punishable under the Controlled Substances 

Act” (CSA). An offense—whether denominated as a misdemeanor or a felony by the 

relevant jurisdiction—constitutes a drug trafficking crime if it “proscribes conduct 

punishable as a felony” under the CSA. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1683 

(2013) (quoting Lopez v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 47, 60 (2006)). That is, an offense falls 

within this “hypothetical federal felony” route, Avila v. Att’y Gen., --F.3d--, 2016 WL 

3443112, at *4 (3d Cir. June 23, 2016); Evanson v. Att’y Gen., 550 F.3d 284, 289 (3d Cir. 

2008), when it necessarily prohibits conduct that the CSA also prohibits and punishes “by 

more than one year’s imprisonment,” Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1683 (citing 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3559(a)(5)).

1

To determine whether a state offense is a hypothetical federal felony, we start with 

the “categorical approach.” Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1684. Under this approach, we 

look “to whether ‘the state statute defining the crime of conviction’ categorically fits 

 

1 Under an alternative route, a state conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony if 

it (1) is a felony under state law, and (2) includes an illicit trafficking element. See 

Evanson, 550 F.3d at 288. The Government does not contend that this route applies. In 

any case, a trafficking element does not include “simple possession or transfer without 

consideration.” Id. at 289 (internal quotation marks omitted). Under New Jersey law, 

“distribution” and “dispensing” contain no remuneration requirement. See N.J. Stat. Ann. 

§ 2C:35-2; In re G.R., 929 A.2d 602, 605 (N.J. App. Div. 2003).

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within the ‘generic’ federal” crime. Id. This requires us to consider the state and federal 

offenses “in the abstract,” id.—that is, to consult only their respective elements—to see 

whether a conviction under the state statute “‘necessarily’ involved facts equating to the 

generic federal offense,” id. (quoting Gonzalez v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 185-87 

(2007)). 

In some cases, we may depart from the categorical approach and employ the 

“modified categorical approach.” Id. This approach applies when a state statute contains 

and describes “several different crimes,” id., and “at least one, but not all[,] of those 

crimes matches the generic version,” Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2285. The modified 

categorical approach allows us to look to “the charging document and jury instructions, 

or . . . the plea agreement, plea colloquy, or some comparable judicial record of the 

factual basis for the plea.” Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1684 (internal quotation marks 

omitted) (quoting Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 35 (2009)). But under both 

approaches, “[w]hether the noncitizen’s actual conduct involved . . . facts” criminalized

by the generic federal crime “‘is quite irrelevant.’” Id. (quoting United States ex rel. 

Guarino v. Uhl, 107 F.2d 399, 400 (2d Cir. 1939)). Instead, as the Supreme Court 

recently re-emphasized in Mathis v. United States, we “focus on the elements . . . of [the 

state and federal] crime[s].” 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2254 & n.4 (2016) (quoting Descamps, 133 

S. Ct. at 2285). If the elements of the state offense match up with, or are narrower than, 

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those of the generic federal offense, then the state offense is an aggravated felony. If not, 

then not.

2

 

Consequently, Mathis requires that, when “faced with an alternatively phrased 

statute,” we must “determine whether its listed items are [alternative] elements,” which 

must be unanimously found by a jury (or found by a judge at a bench trial) beyond a 

reasonable doubt to sustain a conviction, or instead are alternative “means” that a jury 

need not unanimously find. Id. at 2256. To make this determination, we consider 

whether the relevant jurisdiction’s courts have spoken on the issue; whether the statutory 

alternatives carry different minimum or maximum punishments (in which case the 

alternatives are elements under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and its 

progeny); or whether there is some other clear indication in the statute. Mathis, 136 S. 

Ct. 2256. Absent any such indication, we may take a “peek” at parts of the record, such 

as the indictment or jury instructions. Id. (quoting Rendon v. Holder, 782 F.3d 466, 473-

74 (9th Cir. 2015) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of reh’g en banc)). These sources 

might “indicate, by referencing one alternative term to the exclusion of all others, that the 

statute contains a list of elements,” or else charge several of the statutory alternatives, 

which “is as clear an indication as any that each alternative is only a possible means of 

commission.” Id. (emphasis added). If the statute, case law, and record do not “speak 

 

2

If conduct is punishable by the CSA as a felony only when certain sentencing 

factors are present, “it may be necessary to take account of [those] factors too,” such that 

an alien’s state conviction is for an aggravated felony only if that conviction necessarily 

“establish[ed] those factors as well.” Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1687; see CarachuriRosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 577 (2010).

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plainly,” then the record “will not be able to satisfy [the] ‘demand for certainty’ [needed]

when determining whether a defendant was convicted of a generic offense.” Id. (quoting 

Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 21 (2005)).

Turning to the statutes before us, the Government concedes that if Mathis applies

(which it does3), we cannot conclude that Chang-Cruz was convicted of an aggravated 

felony because it is not “certain[],” see id., whether “distribution” and “dispensing” in 

§ 2C:35-7 constitute alternative elements or alternative means. See Oral Arg. at 23:05 

(argued July 12, 2016). If they are both elements, we may apply the modified categorical 

approach to determine the elements of Chang-Cruz’s conviction. If they are both means, 

there is one element satisfied by either distribution or dispensing, in which case § 2C:35-

7 sweeps more broadly than § 860, which criminalizes distribution but not dispensing.4

We agree with the Government. First, neither we nor the parties have uncovered 

any case clearly holding that distribution and dispensing are alternative elements, but we 

have found suggestions to the contrary—namely, cases that appear to treat distribution 

 

3 Although decided in the context of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 

Mathis’s focus on the elements of a crime applies in the immigration context. See 

Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2251 & n.2 (explaining that the principle that we look to elements, 

and not facts, is a “mantra” of cases “applying the categorical approach outside the 

ACCA context—most prominently, in immigration cases”); see also Rojas v. Att’y Gen., 

728 F.3d 203, 216 n.12 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc) (stating that “we have rejected any 

notion that the [categorical or modified categorical] analysis is different depending on 

whether the federal baseline statute resides in the [Immigration and Nationality Act] or 

the ACCA”).

4 The definitions of “distributing” and “dispensing” under New Jersey law are 

almost identical to their respective definitions under federal law. Compare N.J. Stat. 

Ann. § 2C:35-2, with 21 U.S.C. § 802(10), (11).

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and dispensing as alternative means of fulfilling a single element. See, e.g., State v. 

Maldonado, 645 A.2d 1165, 1185 (N.J. 1994) (upholding, on other grounds, a jury charge 

stating that, “to find against [the defendant] on this element, the State must prove ‘he 

knew that it was cocaine and intended to distribute or dispense it to [another]” (emphasis 

added)); State v. Wilkinson, 316 A.2d 6, 8 (N.J. App. Div. 1973) (concluding that there 

was sufficient evidence to prove that the defendant was guilty of “possession of 

marijuana with intent to distribute or dispense it”). 

Second, Chang-Cruz’s judgments of conviction indicate that he was convicted of 

“DISPENS[ING]/DISTRIBUT[ING]” drugs within 1000 feet of a school, J.A. 91, 94, 

while his indictments charge him with “dispens[ing] or distribut[ing] marijuana” and 

“possess[ing] with intent to dispense or distribute marijuana,” J.A. 93, 96. This is “as 

clear an indication as any that each alternative,” distribution and dispensing, “is only a 

possible means of commission, not an element that the prosecutor must prove to a jury 

beyond a reasonable doubt,” Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2257.

Third, the jury instructions for § 2C:35-7 instruct that, to convict the defendant 

under the statute when the defendant distributes or dispenses drugs, the jury must 

conclude “that the defendant knowingly or purposely distributed or dispensed a 

controlled dangerous substance.” See Model Jury Charge (Criminal) Distributing or 

Dispensing Controlled Dangerous Substances Near or on School Property Used for 

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School Purposes (1992).

5

 That the judge instructs the jury to find distribution or 

dispensing suggests that these terms are alternative means, not alternative elements. But 

see id. (instructing the judge to charge that “[t]he defendant is charged with (distributing) 

(dispensing) a controlled dangerous substance near or on school property”).

In view of the Government’s concession and the ambiguity in New Jersey law, we 

conclude that the record does not satisfy the “demand for certainty” necessary to 

conclude that Chang-Cruz was convicted of distribution or possessing with intent to 

distribute instead of dispensing or possessing with intent to dispense, Mathis, 136 S. Ct. 

at 2257, and therefore we cannot conclude that he was convicted of a generic federal 

offense.

6 Consequently, we hold that Chang-Cruz was not convicted of an aggravated 

felony.7

IV.

 

5 These instructions are available at 

http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/criminal/juryindx.pdf. We note that, with respect to 

§ 2C:35-5, which is a separate controlled substances provision, there is a model 

instruction for distribution of a drug but no model instruction for dispensing a drug. This 

may suggest that distribution and dispensing are alternative elements but does not speak 

with the requisite certainty for us to reach such a conclusion.

6

In view of our disposition, we leave for another day the issues of whether 

“school property” and “school bus” in § 2C:35-7 are alternative locational elements or 

means and whether “school property . . . used for school purposes” in § 2C:35-7 is 

broader than “real property comprising a . . . school” in § 860. 

7 An alien has the burden of showing that he is eligible for cancellation of 

removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(A). Even so, if the statute under which he was 

convicted is broader than the federal analogue, then we cannot conclude that he was 

convicted of an aggravated felony. See Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1685 & n.4.

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Because Chang-Cruz was not convicted of an aggravated felony, he is not 

ineligible for cancellation of removal on this basis. In the Government’s initial August 

19, 2011 notice of appeal, and as the BIA carefully noted in its opinion, “aside from the 

argument that [Chang-Cruz] is statutorily precluded from establishing his eligibility for 

cancellation of removal . . . on account of having been convicted of an aggravated felony, 

the DHS has not otherwise challenged the Immigration Judge’s conclusion that [ChangCruz] warranted a grant of said relief, as a matter of discretion.” J.A. 30; 459. Nor, 

following the IJ’s decision on remand indicating that she would exercise her discretion to 

grant relief if Chang-Cruz had not been convicted of an aggravated felony, J.A. 26, did 

the Government (1) argue to the BIA that the IJ’s discretionary determination was 

erroneous, (2) cross-appeal to the BIA, or (3) argue to this Court that Chang-Cruz is 

ineligible for cancellation on some other ground. Rather, the Government has failed to 

raise any meaningful challenge to Chang-Cruz’s cancellation besides his purported 

conviction for an aggravated felony, and the BIA twice reviewed the IJ’s decision 

without disturbing her conclusion as to discretionary relief. 

It appears under these circumstances, and consistent with its own regulations, 

precedents, and practice, that the BIA may be expected on remand to deem any new 

challenge by the Government waived and thus to reinstate the IJ’s order cancelling 

Chang-Cruz's removal. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 1003.3(b); In re R-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec.

657, 663 (BIA 2012); see also In re William Ysla, 2010 WL 5559164 (BIA Dec. 23, 

2010) (unpublished). Consistent with our own precedent and practice, however, we leave 

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that to the BIA in the first instance and will grant the petition for review and remand for 

the BIA to conduct further proceedings as appropriate. See INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 

16 (2002); Singh v. Gonzalez, 406 F.3d 191, 199-200 (3d Cir. 2005); see also Lin v. 

Attorney General, 543 F.3d 114, 122-26 (3d Cir. 2008).

8

In closing, we note our expectation that on remand and in future cases the 

Government will refrain from engaging in the problematic conduct that has marked its 

performance here. The last time this case was before us, the Justice Department 

requested and we granted a remand to the BIA for the limited purpose of the BIA 

considering “what effect, if any, Descamps has on this immigration case.” J.A. 619. 

Once back before the BIA, however, the Government asserted that Descamps was 

inapplicable and instead proceeded to argue that the plea transcript was relevant to 

whether Chang-Cruz should receive discretionary relief, along with an inadequate 

explanation for why it failed to obtain that plea transcript before the IJ rendered her initial 

 

8

In view of our determination that Chang-Cruz’s convictions are not aggravated 

felonies, we would normally have no need to address Chang-Cruz’s alternative argument 

that the BIA improperly remanded his case to the IJ for consideration of the plea 

transcript under a modified categorical analysis. However, to the extent that the 

Government might rely on the transcript in making any argument concerning 

discretionary relief, we note that there was no evidence introduced to satisfy the prerequisite for the BIA’s consideration of the transcript under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) and 

(4)—the requirement that the transcript “could not have been discovered or presented at 

the former hearing.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). It would appear that the consideration 

of this transcript, at least without an evidentiary finding as to the justification for the 

Government’s delay, was in error. See Sakhawati v. Lynch, 823 F.3d 852, 858 (6th Cir. 

2016); Ivanov v. Gonzalez, 487 F.3d 635, 639 (8th Cir. 2007); Johnson v. Ashcroft, 378 

F.3d 164, 166 (2d Cir. 2004); Ramon-Sepulveda v. INS, 743 F.2d 1307, 1310 (9th Cir. 

1984); In re A-S-J-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 893, 897 (BIA 2012).

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decision cancelling Chang-Cruz’s removal. These were issues well outside the scope of 

our remand. See Pareja v. Att’y Gen., 615 F.3d 180, 197 (3d Cir. 2010). Most troubling, 

however, is the Government’s resort before the BIA to a frivolous argument that ChangCruz engaged in “obstructionism” by opposing the Government’s remand to the IJ to 

consider the plea transcript. See J.A. 879. It comports with neither the professionalism

nor the ethical mandates of Government counsel to chill vigorous advocacy by asserting 

that an alien who avails himself of the congressionally prescribed opportunity to seek 

cancellation of removal thereby loses the privilege of cancellation. We trust that this was 

an unfortunate mistake that will not be repeated.

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, we grant the petition for review and remand to the BIA 

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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