Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-02258/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-02258-7/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Jennifer Teran
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JENNIFER TERAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY,

Defendant.

Case No. 1:09-cv-02258-SAB

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 

ATTORNEY FEES

ECF NO. 39

On March 20, 2013, Plaintiff Jennifer Teran (“Plaintiff”) filed an application seeking 

attorneys’ fees and expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act. (ECF No. 39.) Plaintiff 

seeks attorneys’ fees and expenses in the amount of $25,015.98. For the reasons set forth below,

Plaintiff’s motion will be denied.

I.

BACKGROUND1

Plaintiff applied for benefits under the Social Security Act on December 28, 2006. (AR 

122-24.) Administrative Law Judge Michael J. Kopicki (“the ALJ”) denied Plaintiff’s application 

on May 13, 2009. (AR 70-82.) The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on 

 

1

Citations to the Social Security Administrative Transcript will be designated as “AR” (administrative record). Page 

numbers will refer to the page numbers as stamped and indexed in the lodged transcript. (See ECF No. 11.)

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August 8, 2009. (AR 7-9.)

The ALJ made the following determinations which are relevant to the present motion.2 

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting 

effects of [her] symptoms are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with the ... residual 

functional capacity assessment [as determined by the ALJ].” (AR 19-20.) The ALJ cited several 

findings supporting the adverse credibility determination, including the “normal” examination of 

her back and neck in December 16, 2005 by Dr. Holvic. However, the primary basis for the 

ALJ’s adverse credibility determination was the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s activities of daily 

living were inconsistent with her testimony regarding the severity of her symptoms. The ALJ 

wrote:

The claimant testified that she can only walk for 5 minutes before 

her back starts hurting however she also testified that she goes 

grocery shopping with her husband and she gets her 3 children, ages 

3, 9 and 1[1], ready for school, takes them to school and picks them 

up.

(AR 22.) Further:

The claimant testified that she can only sit for 5 minutes; however 

she also testified that she watches television for 4 hours per day 

and, at the hearing, she was able to sit for 30 minutes and did not 

shift position until it was pointed out to her that she had been sitting 

that long.

(AR 22.)

The testimony cited by the ALJ referred to Plaintiff’s testimony at a hearing before the 

ALJ on January 21, 2009. (AR 26-69.) Plaintiff testified that she lives in a house with her 

husband and three children, ages three, nine and eleven. (AR 30.) With respect to her typical 

daily activities, Plaintiff testified:

I get up, supervise my older children getting ready for school. They 

help me get my three-year-old ready, drop them off at school, come 

back home, take my medication, make him something simple to eat 

like oatmeal or cereal, my three-year-old and just sometimes sit and 

read with him, watch TV. I have to get up and move around or sit 

down or – and pretty much that until I pick up my children at three. 

And then come back home and take my medication and wait for my 

 

2

Citations to the Social Security Administrative Transcript will be designated as “AR” (administrative record). Page 

numbers will refer to the page numbers as stamped and indexed in the lodged transcript. (See ECF No. 11.)

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husband to get home to help me.

(AR 44.) Plaintiff testified that she watches TV four hours a day, but takes breaks in between 

watching shows. (AR 46, 53.)

The following exchange took place during the hearing, which the ALJ relied upon in 

discounting Plaintiff’s credibility:

Q. How far can you walk before you have to stop and rest?

A. I don’t know how far –

Q. Or how long?

A. -- but for maybe up to five minutes I would say at the most.

Q. Okay, Then what would happen or hurt?

A. Just my back starts hurting.

Q. Okay. How about standing, how long can you stand?

A. Probably about the same.

Q. Sitting?

A. Sitting probably about the same without pain, probably up to 

three or four maybe five minutes.

Q. Okay.

ALJ: So you have pain right now?

CLMT: Yeah, I do. I’m very uncomfortable right now.

BY ATTORNEY:

Q. But you can sit longer, though, even with pain?

A. If I have to, yeah.

Q. Because we’ve been here for longer than five minutes and 

you’re still sitting.

A. Yeah, but I have to move around. And I’m[sic] been 

moving around in the chair to try to –

Q. Okay. So even with squirming and moving around, could 

you sit – obviously you could sit longer, so how much longer can 

you sit?

A. I don’t think I can sit very much more longer right now. I 

don’t know. I haven’t timed it so I couldn’t tell you for sure.

Q. Okay. So when do you need to get up?

A. Now.

Q. Okay.

ALJ: Feel free to change positions if you need to.

(AR 49-50.) Plaintiff later asked if she could stand during the hearing. (AR 55.) According to 

the transcript, the hearing began at 2:05 p.m. and concluded at 2:56 p.m. (AR 28, 69.)

The ALJ also afforded “little weight” to the opinions of Dr. Watrous, Plaintiff’s treating 

physician. (AR 22.) The ALJ noted that “[t]he functional limitations suggested by Dr. Watrous 

are inconsistent with the record.” (AR 22.) The ALJ noted that Dr. Watrous’ opinions “appears 

to be based primarily on the claimant’s subjective complaints,” which lacked credibility. (AR 

22.) The ALJ instead gave substantial weight to the medical opinions of the State agency medical 

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evaluators. (AR 22.)

On December 29, 2009, Plaintiff filed her complaint seeking judicial review of the denial 

of her Social Security benefits application. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff argued that the ALJ erred 1) in 

assessing Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity, 2) by rejecting the opinions of Plaintiff’s 

treating physician, 3) by discrediting Plaintiff’s testimony, 4) by failing to address the lay witness 

testimony, 5) by failing to address Plaintiff’s obesity and 6) by presenting a flawed hypothetical 

to the vocational expert. (Pl.’s Opening Brief 7:3-22:16.)

On February 3, 2011, this Court issued its order denying Plaintiff’s appeal. (ECF No. 24.) 

The district court rejected each of Plaintiff’s arguments. With respect to the issues pertinent to 

the present motion, the district court found that the ALJ properly rejected Dr. Watrous’ opinion 

because the limitations opined by Dr. Watrous were inconsistent with Plaintiff’s admitted 

activities of daily living and because Dr. Watrous’ opinions appeared to be based primarily on 

Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, which the ALJ found to lack credibility. The district court 

found that the ALJ properly assessed Plaintiff’s credibility by noting Plaintiff’s failure to seek 

immediate medical treatment for her disability and by noting that Plaintiff’s admitted activities of 

daily living appeared to be inconsistent with her alleged limitations.

On March 21, 2011, Plaintiff appealed this Court’s order denying her appeal. (ECF No. 

26.) On November 20, 2012, the Ninth Circuit granted Plaintiff’s appeal, reversed the district 

court’s order and instructed this Court to remand this action to the Commissioner with 

instructions to award Plaintiff benefits. (ECF No. 31.3) The Ninth Circuit found that the ALJ 

failed to give clear and convincing reasons for his adverse credibility finding and failed to give 

clear and convincing reasons to reject the opinion of Dr. Watrous.

Specifically, the Ninth Circuit stated:

Teran’s testimony that she can walk for only five minutes before 

her back begins to hurt does not conflict with her statements that 

she goes grocery shopping with her husband and takes her children 

to school.

Even if grocery shopping and taking children to school required 

more than five consecutive minutes of walking, of which there is no 

 

3

The Ninth Circuit’s “Memorandum” opinion is hereinafter cited as “Mem.”

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evidence, Teran did not testify that she was unable to walk for five 

minutes, but rather that walking for any longer was painful. 

Likewise, that Teran can sit comfortably for only five minutes is not 

undermined by her testimony that she watches four hours of TV per 

day. Teran never indicated that she watches TV sitting down (as 

opposed to lying down, standing up, or moving around), and she 

explicitly stated that she has to take breaks while watching and does 

not watch for four hours at a time.

(Mem. 2-3.)

The Ninth Circuit also disagreed with the ALJ’s assessment of his own observations of 

Plaintiff’s behavior during the hearing:

The ALJ found Teran’s testimony that she can sit for only five 

minutes to be inconsistent with her behavior at the hearing, during 

which, as the ALJ describes, “she was able to sit for 30 minutes and 

did not shift position until it was pointed out to her that she had 

been sitting that long.” This is unsupported by the record. When 

her attorney noted that she had been sitting for longer than five 

minutes, Teran responded that she was “very uncomfortable” and 

had been moving around in her chair, an explanation the ALJ never 

disputed on the record. She also acknowledged that she could sit 

for more than five minutes but explained that doing so was painful.

(Mem. 3.)

The Ninth Circuit went on to conclude that the ALJ erred in rejecting the opinions of Dr. 

Watrous. Since the ALJ discredited Dr. Watrous’ opinions because they were based upon 

Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Watrous’ opinion “was based on the 

same flawed characterization of Teran’s behavior that led to his adverse credibility finding and is 

unsupported by the evidence.” (Mem. 5.)

II.

LEGAL STANDARDS FOR EAJA MOTIONS

A party that prevails against the United States in a civil action is entitled, in certain 

circumstances, to an award of attorney’s fees, court costs, and other expenses under the EAJA. 

Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 566, (9th Cir. 1995). The Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), states, in pertinent part:

(d)(1)(A) Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a 

court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States 

fees and other expenses, in addition to any costs awarded pursuant 

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to subsection (a), incurred by that party in any civil action (other 

than cases sounding in tort), including proceedings for judicial 

review of agency action, brought by or against the United States in 

any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds 

that the position of the United States was substantially justified or 

that special circumstances make an award unjust.

The Court is required to provide a concise but clear explanation for the reasons for the fee award. 

Sorenson v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140, 1145 (9th Cir. 2001). Hours that are inadequately documented 

and hours that were not reasonably expended may reduce the fee award. Id. at 1146.

Fee shifting under EAJA is not mandatory. Flores, 49 F.3d at 567. Attorneys’ fees and 

expenses are not awarded under EAJA where the government’s position was substantially 

justified. Id. “A position is ‘substantially justified’ if it has a ‘reasonable basis in law and fact.’” 

Hardisty v. Astrue, 592 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 

552, 565 (1988)). “It is the government’s burden to show that its position was substantially 

justified or that special circumstances exist to make an award unjust.” Gutierrez v. Barnhart, 274 

F.3d 1255, 1258 (9th Cir. 2001). The government must establish first, whether the underlying 

conduct of the ALJ was “substantially justified” and second, that its litigation position defending 

the ALJ’s error was “substantially justified.” Id. at 1259. As the Ninth Circuit described:

Substantial justification does not mean “justified to a high degree,” 

but simply entails that the government must show that its position 

meets the traditional reasonableness standard-that is “justified in 

substance or in the main,” or “to a degree that could satisfy a 

reasonable person.”

Corbin v. Apfel, 149 F.3d 1051, 1052 (9th Cir. 1998).

Under EAJA, attorney fees are capped at $125.00 per hour “unless the court determines 

that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified 

attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher fee.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A); 

Sorenson v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140, 1145 (9th Cir. 2001).

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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III.

DISCUSSION

A. Defendants’ Position With Respect To Plaintiff’s Credibility Was 

Substantially Justified

The Court finds that Defendant’s position with respect to Plaintiff’s credibility was 

substantially justified. Defendant’s position was substantially justified with respect to both the 

underlying conduct of the ALJ and Defendant’s litigation position defending the ALJ’s error. As 

set forth below, Defendant’s position with respect to Plaintiff’s credibility had a reasonable basis 

in both law and in fact.

1. Defendant’s Position with Respect to Plaintiff’s Credibility Had a Reasonable 

Basis in Law

The Court finds that Defendant met its burden in demonstrating that its position had a 

reasonable basis in law. As a matter of law, the ALJ’s credibility determination had a reasonable 

basis. The ALJ’s proffered reasons for discrediting Plaintiff’s subjective testimony are supported 

by caselaw.

“[W]here the record includes objective medical evidence establishing that the claimant 

suffers from an impairment that could reasonably produce the symptoms of which he complains, 

an adverse credibility finding must be based on clear and convincing reasons.” Carmickle v. 

Commissioner, Social Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations and 

citations omitted). The ALJ’s adverse credibility finding will be affirmed on appeal if the clear 

and convincing reasons cited by the ALJ are supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 1159. 

Here, the ALJ relied upon Plaintiff’s seemingly inconsistent statements to discredit 

Plaintiff. “The ALJ may consider many factors in weight a claimant’s credibility, including ... 

ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such as ... prior inconsistent statements, and other 

testimony by the claimant that appears less than candid.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 

1039 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Plaintiff’s seemingly 

inconsistent statements regarding her limitations in sitting, standing and walking, when contrasted 

with Plaintiff’s statements regarding her daily activities of watching television, taking care of 

young children and going grocery shopping, are, as a matter of law, a valid basis to discredit 

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Plaintiff.

Furthermore, the ALJ relied upon his own personal observations of the claimant’s 

behavior at the hearing and concluded that Plaintiff’s behavior and demeanor at the hearing 

before the ALJ was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s testimony regarding her limitations. The ALJ’s 

personal observations may be used in the overall evaluation of the credibility of the claimant’s 

statements, though they may not form the sole basis for discrediting the claimant. Orn v. Astrue, 

495 F.3d 625, 639 (9th Cir. 2007). Accordingly, when considered in combination with Plaintiff’s 

seemingly inconsistent statements, the ALJ’s reliance on his own observations of Plaintiff during 

the course of the hearing was a valid basis to discredit Plaintiff.

Although the Ninth Circuit ultimately determined that the evidence did not support the 

ALJ’s proffered reasons for discrediting Plaintiff, those reasons had a reasonable basis in law. 

Accordingly, both the ALJ’s actions and Defendant’s decision to defend the ALJ’s actions had a 

reasonable basis in law.

2. Defendant’s Position with Respect to Plaintiff’s Credibility Had a Reasonable 

Basis in Fact

The Court further finds that Defendant met its burden in demonstrating that its position 

had a reasonable basis in fact. Although the Ninth Circuit reversed the ALJ and determined that 

the facts and evidence do not support an adverse credibility finding, the ALJ’s findings are 

sufficiently reasonable to conclude that the ALJ’s actions were substantially justified.

The Court notes that the ALJ’s adverse credibility determination was not based upon 

direct evidence of inconsistent testimony, but was instead based upon circumstantial evidence that 

created an inference that Plaintiff’s professed daily activities were inconsistent with Plaintiff’s 

testimony that she could only sit, stand or walk for five minutes at a time. The ALJ was 

reasonable in relying upon such circumstantial and equivocal evidence. In fact, caselaw in this 

circuit states that the ALJ’s conclusions from such evidence are normally entitled to deference. 

“Where evidence is susceptible of more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ’s conclusion 

which must be upheld.” Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing 

Rhinehart v. Finch, 438 F.2d 920, 921 (9th Cir. 1971)). “In reaching his findings, the law judge 

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is entitled to draw inferences logically flowing from the evidence.4” Id.

a. Plaintiff’s grocery shopping

An example of the ALJ’s interpretation of the equivocal evidence is the ALJ’s assessment 

of Plaintiff’s testimony that she went grocery shopping with her husband and took care of her 

small children. From this testimony, the ALJ drew the inference that Plaintiff had admitted to 

daily activities that involved walking for more than five minutes at a time or standing for more 

than five minutes at a time. The Ninth Circuit correctly noted that neither activity necessarily 

involves more than five consecutive minutes of walking or standing. Although, the record was 

silent as to the precise walking and standing times exerted by Plaintiff while grocery shopping, 

the Court finds the ALJ’s inference reasonable for purposes of the substantial justification 

standard and the present EAJA motion, despite being ultimately rejected by the Ninth Circuit. 

It is not unreasonable to infer that someone going grocery shopping is standing or walking 

for more than five minutes at a time. It is possible that Plaintiff shops for groceries at small 

convenience stores for a small number of items at a time, which involves less than five minutes of 

walking/standing time. It is also possible that Plaintiff stops to rest while going grocery shopping 

every five minutes. However, the fact that Plaintiff testified that she went grocery shopping with 

her husband lends some credence to the ALJ’s inference. The ALJ could have made the logical 

inference that people who suffer disabling pain after five minutes of walking generally will not 

volunteer to accompany their spouse for a trip to the grocery store. The ALJ could have 

concluded that, if Plaintiff’s allegations of pain were true, she would have sent her husband to 

shop on his own, rather than endure the discomfort of accompanying him.

b. Plaintiff’s child care activities

Similarly, it is not unreasonable to infer that someone taking care of small children aged 3, 

9 and 11, alone at home while her husband works, is not suffering from symptoms as disabling as 

 

4

The Court notes that the ALJ has a duty to assist in further developing the record where the record is equivocal and 

the ALJ may not decide an issue against the claimant based on the absence of evidence in the record. Ludwig v. 

Halter, 5 Fed. Appx. 689, 690-91 (9th Cir. 2001). However, the Ninth Circuit did not determine that the ALJ erred in 

this regard and EAJA fees are only awarded with respect to issues actually addressed by the Ninth Circuit. Hardisty 

v. Astrue, 592 F.3d 1072, 1077-79 (9th Cir. 2010).

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alleged by Plaintiff. The record indicates that the three year old child does not attend school and 

stays home with Plaintiff while the other children are at school and Plaintiff’s husband is at work. 

It is not unreasonable for the ALJ to conclude that Plaintiff’s impairments were not disabling as 

alleged given her ability to care for a three year old child by herself on a day to day basis.

c. Plaintiff’s behavior at the hearing

The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff hearing behavior. The 

ALJ noted that Plaintiff sat for 30 minutes and did not shift position until her attorney pointed out 

the fact that she had just testified that she can only sit comfortably for 3-5 minutes at a time, yet 

had been sitting for longer than five minutes.5 The Ninth Circuit determined that the ALJ’s 

finding was unsupported by the record. However, this Court finds that reasonable fact finders 

could disagree. The ALJ’s findings are supported by the fact that the ALJ was present at the 

hearing and observed Plaintiff’s conduct first-hand. In Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 960 

(9th Cir. 2002), the Ninth Circuit held that it was appropriate for an ALJ to reject a claimant’s 

testimony using “ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation” such as the claimant’s “demeanor 

at the hearing.” While the ALJ’s personal observations cannot form the sole basis for discrediting 

a person’s testimony, they “may be used ... in ‘the overall evaluation of the credibility of the 

individual’s statements.’” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 639-40 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting SSR 96-

7p). When considered in combination with Plaintiff’s professed activities of daily living, the 

ALJ’s credibility finding was sufficiently reasonable for purposes of the “substantially justified” 

standard.

The Ninth Circuit observed that the ALJ never disputed Plaintiff’s testimony that she was 

“very uncomfortable” and had been moving around in her chair. This conclusion is also subject 

to reasonable dispute. The ALJ wrote that Plaintiff had not shifted position until she made this 

statement. This statement from the ALJ, in and of itself could be interpreted as the ALJ disputing 

Plaintiff’s testimony, though it is not as straightforward as expressly contesting Plaintiff’s 

 

5

The Court notes that the record indicates that the hearing lasted approximately 51 minutes. During that span, the 

record only indicates that Plaintiff stood up once (some time after the exchange where Plaintiff’s attorney noted the 

fact that Plaintiff had been sitting for longer than five minutes), though it is possible that the transcript did not record 

other instances of Plaintiff standing up.

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description of what occurred at the hearing.

The sequence of events at the hearing supports a reasonable inference that Plaintiff was 

being less than candid. Plaintiff testified that she could sit for approximately three to five minutes

at a time before suffering pain. This testimony was elicited during Plaintiff’s attorney’s 

examination. At this point in time, the ALJ interjected and asked, “[s]o you have pain right 

now?” Plaintiff testified that she is “very uncomfortable right now” and Plaintiff’s attorney 

proceeded to elicit testimony about how Plaintiff can sit for longer than five minutes at a time 

with pain and by squirming and moving around in her chair. Plaintiff eventually testified: “I 

don’t think I can sit very much more longer right now.”

One logical inference from this sequence of events is that the ALJ caught Plaintiff in a 

cross-examination, Plaintiff having testified that she could not sit for more than five minutes at a 

time without realizing that she had been sitting for approximately thirty minutes. Plaintiff’s 

attorney then attempted to clean up the record as best she could by explaining that sitting for more 

than five minutes is possible by enduring the pain and moving about in a manner not inconsistent 

with how Plaintiff had been moving about up until that point in the hearing. The ALJ’s decision 

suggests that this is the inference followed by the ALJ, though not explained in as great detail as 

set forth above. The Ninth Circuit appears to have rejected the ALJ’s inference, albeit without 

any express discussion of this portion of the transcript. The Court finds that reasonable minds can 

disagree, but the ALJ’s analysis of the record is substantially justified for purposes of the present 

EAJA motion.

Looking at the record as a whole, the ALJ’s adverse credibility determination had a 

reasonable basis in fact. Accordingly, the Court finds that both the ALJ’s actions and 

Defendant’s defense of those actions were substantially justified.

B. Defendants’ Position With Respect To Dr. Watrous’ Opinions Was 

Substantially Justified

The ALJ discredited Dr. Watrous’ (a treating physician) medical opinions because they 

were based upon Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. The ALJ determined that Dr. Watrous’ 

medical opinions had little weight because Plaintiff’s subjective complaints were unreliable, 

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given the ALJ’s adverse credibility determination. 

“By rule, the Social Security Administration favors the opinion of a treating physician 

over non-treating physicians.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2007). “If a treating 

physician’s opinion is ‘well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic 

techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record, [it will 

be given] controlling weight.’” Id. (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)). “Even if the treating 

doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor, the ALJ may not reject this opinion without 

providing specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Id. at 

633 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

“An ALJ may reject a treating physician’s opinion if it is based ‘to a large extent’ on a 

claimant’s self-reports that have been properly discounted as incredible.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 

533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008). Moreover, the ALJ may reject a treating physician’s 

opinion if it is inconsistent with the claimant’s reported daily activities. Rollins v. Massanari, 261 

F.3d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 2001) (rejecting treating physician’s opinion where it “appears to be 

inconsistent with the level of activity that [the claimant] engaged in by maintaining a household 

and raising two young children....”). Accordingly, the ALJ had a reasonable basis in law to 

discount Dr. Watrous’ opinion based upon an inconsistency between the limitations opined by Dr. 

Watrous and Plaintiff’s daily activities.

The Ninth Circuit treated Dr. Watrous’ opinion as uncontradicted: “[t]he ALJ does not 

appear to have based his rejection of Dr. Watrous’s opinion on the existence of a contradicting 

opinion, and we are not convinced there is one.” (Mem. 4 n.1.) The ALJ stated that Dr. Watrous’ 

opinions “are inconsistent with the record” and went on to state that the State agency medical 

evaluator’s opinion “is more consistent with the claimant’s reported and observed limitations” 

and “is given substantial weight.” (AR 22.) Dr. Watrous opined that Plaintiff could sit for less 

than one hour in an eight hour day, stand/walk for 20-30 minutes in an eight hour day, and lift 

five pounds at the most on a frequent basis. (AR 449.) Dr. G. W. Bugg opined that Plaintiff was 

not as limited (sit about six hours, stand/walk at least two hours, frequently lift up to ten pounds). 

(AR 297.) Dr. E. E. Wong affirmed those findings. (AR 366.) The Court finds that the ALJ’s 

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reliance on contradictory medical opinions had a reasonable basis in fact and it is unclear why the 

Ninth Circuit was “not convinced” that there were contradicting opinions in the record.

The Ninth Circuit determined that “[t]he ALJ’s finding that Dr. Watrous’s opinion was 

inconsistent with Teran’s testimony and behavior at the hearing was based on the same flawed 

characterization of Teran’s behavior that led to his adverse credibility finding and is unsupported 

by the evidence.” (Mem. 4-5.) Since the ALJ’s adverse credibility determination was 

substantially justified, the Court finds that there was a reasonable basis in fact to discredit Dr. 

Watrous’ opinion. For example, Dr. Watrous opined that Plaintiff could sit for less than one hour 

in an eight hour work day and could stand or walk for 20-30 minutes during an eight hour work 

day. (AR 449.) The ALJ determined that these opinions were inconsistent with Plaintiff’s 

professed daily activities and the ALJ’s own observation of Plaintiff during the hearing, where 

she sat for 30 minutes straight and the record suggests that Plaintiff was sitting during most of the 

51 minute hearing.

Although the Ninth Circuit ultimately rejected the ALJ’s proffered reasons for affording 

little weight to Dr. Watrous’ opinions, the Court finds that the ALJ’s findings had a reasonable 

basis in fact, for purposes of the present EAJA motion. The ALJ was substantially justified in his 

actions and Defendant was substantially justified in defending the ALJ’s actions.

IV.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ and Defendant were substantially 

justified in their actions. Accordingly, Plaintiff is not entitled to attorney’s fees under EAJA.

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees is 

DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 3, 2013 _ _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE DEAC_Signature-END:

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