Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_04-cv-00969/USCOURTS-almd-1_04-cv-00969-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Army Fleet Support, LLC
Defendant
Dyncorp Technical Services, LLC
Defendant
Angela Spann
Plaintiff

Document Text:

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, SOUTHERN DIVISION

ANGELA SPANN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

v. ) 1:04cv969-T

) (WO)

DYNCORP TECHNICAL SERVICES, )

LLC, and ARMY FLEET )

SUPPORT, LLC, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

Plaintiff Angela Spann filed this lawsuit against

defendant DynCorp Technical Services, LLC, claiming that,

while working for DynCorp as an aircraft mechanic and,

subsequently, as a technical aircraft inspector, she was

subjected to sex-based discrimination and unlawful

retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1981a, 2000e

through 2000e-17. Spann also asserts state-law claims

that DynCorp negligently and wantonly hired, supervised,

Case 1:04-cv-00969-MHT-VPM Document 77 Filed 11/02/05 Page 1 of 24
1. With an opinion and judgment entered on November

1, 2005, the court granted summary judgment in favor of

co-defendant Army Fleet Support, LLC.

2

trained and retained employees engaged in illegal

discriminatory conduct, and that DynCorp invaded her

privacy.

Jurisdiction over the federal claims is proper

pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331 (federal question), 1343

(civil rights), and 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (Title

VII). Supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law

claims is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367. 

This case is before the court on DynCorp’s motion for

partial summary judgment. For the reasons that follow,

the motion will be denied.1

 I. SUMMARY-JUDGMENT STANDARD 

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

Case 1:04-cv-00969-MHT-VPM Document 77 Filed 11/02/05 Page 2 of 24
3

that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Under Rule 56,

the party seeking summary judgment must first inform the

court of the basis for the motion, and the burden then

shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate why summary

judgment would not be proper. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); see also Fitzpatrick v. City of

Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115-17 (11th Cir. 1993)

(discussing burden-shifting under Rule 56). The nonmoving party must affirmatively set forth specific facts

showing a genuine issue for trial and may not rest upon

the mere allegations or denials in the pleadings. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(e).

The court's role at the summary-judgment stage is not

to weigh the evidence or to determine the truth of the

matter, but rather to determine only whether a genuine

issue exists for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). In doing so, the court must

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonCase 1:04-cv-00969-MHT-VPM Document 77 Filed 11/02/05 Page 3 of 24
4

moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor

of that party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

II. BACKGROUND 

In its motion for partial summary judgment, DynCorp

does not dispute the factual allegations of

discriminatory and retaliatory treatment enumerated in

Spann’s complaint; rather, DynCorp asserts that Spann’s

claims for monetary relief must be dismissed under the

doctrine of ‘judicial estoppel’ because Spann failed to

disclose her claims against DynCorp to the bankruptcy

court that had confirmed her Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan.

The chronology of events leading up to this lawsuit,

presented in the light most favorable to Spann, is as

follows. 

February 2001: Spann began working for DynCorp as an

aircraft mechanic. She was immediately subjected to a

hostile work environment, including sexual advances and

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2. Defendant DynCorp’s evidentiary submission in

support of partial motion for summary judgment (Doc. No.

39), Spann deposition (“Spann deposition”) (exhibit 2

part 1, pp. 155, 156).

3. Id., pp. 171 - 173.

4. Plaintiff’s evidentiary submission in support of

brief in opposition to motions for summary judgment (Doc.

No. 48), docket for U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Middle

District of Alabama (Dothan) bankruptcy petition #:03-

11430 (“bankruptcy docket”) (Doc. No. 48-10).

5. Spann deposition, p. 188.

5

sexual and demeaning comments from co-workers.

Specifically, DynCorp employee Larry Howell propositioned

her.2

 Later in 2001, another DynCorp employee, Ben Key,

verbally and physically harassed her in a sexual way.

All these actions went unpunished when brought to the

attention of supervisors.3

 

June 23, 2003: Spann filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy

petition.4

 

July 2003: Spann was transferred to Knox field at

Fort Rucker, Alabama, where DynCorp employee Steve Dublar

was the fleet manager.5

 Dublar made sexually offensive

remarks and overtures to her on an almost daily basis

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6. Id., pp. 186, 187.

7. Id., pp. 234-240).

8. Bankruptcy docket.

6

after her transfer through the date of her termination.

In addition, the men of the crew to which she was

assigned conspired to prevent her from successfully doing

her job. 

Later, Spann applied for and was promoted to the

position of technical inspector.6

 As the first AfricanAmerican woman to hold the position of technical

inspector in the company, she was continually thwarted by

employees whose work it was her duty to inspect, and she

was threatened with physical violence by one such

employee.7

September 8, 2003: Spann’s Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan

was confirmed, and she filed an amended schedule F adding

unsecured creditors.8

 Around the same time, DynCorp

learned that, effective December 1, 2003, Army Fleet

Support, LLC (“AFS”) would take over the government

Case 1:04-cv-00969-MHT-VPM Document 77 Filed 11/02/05 Page 6 of 24
9. Defendant AFS’s brief in support of motion for

summary judgment (Doc. No. 36, p. 2).

10. Plaintiff’s evidentiary submission in support of

brief in opposition to motions for summary judgment (Doc.

No. 48), Jacobs deposition (Doc. No. 48-2, p. 18).

11. Id., pp. 20, 21.

7

contract to perform military support services at Fort

Rucker. AFS committed to staff its workforce from

DynCorp’s incumbent employees in order to fulfill its

contract.9

 Spann was subsequently offered a position with

AFS.10

November 9 and 10, 2003: On November 9, 2003, Spann

returned her AFS employment paperwork to Susan Jacobs, a

member of the human resources team employed by a third

entity tasked with facilitating the transition from

DynCorp’s contract at Fort Rucker to AFS’s contract.

While meeting with Jacobs, Spann related the episodes of

harassment she had suffered at DynCorp. Jacobs contacted

Tom Green, the AFS General Manager, and, the next day,

Green met with Jacobs and Spann.11 Green encouraged Spann

to file a written statement with her employer, and he

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12. Plaintiff’s evidentiary submission in support of

brief in opposition to motions for summary judgment (Doc.

No. 48), Green deposition (Doc. No. 48-3, p. 18).

13. Spann deposition, pp. 254-256.

8

then called Tom Walker, general manager at DynCorp, to

alert Walker to Spann’s allegations.12 Spann expressed

fear that she would be fired for speaking out. 

November 14, 2003: Spann gave a written statement to

DynCorp asserting that she had suffered sexual

harassment. DynCorp subsequently investigated Spann’s

allegations. 

November 16, 2003: Spann took a medical leave of

absence.13 

November 24, 2003: DynCorp advised Spann that she was

being terminated, noting in the letter of termination

that “[t]he statements of a majority of the witnesses

[interviewed in the sexual harassment investigation]

contradicted what you had stated, and in fact indicated

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14. Plaintiff’s evidentiary submission in support of

brief in opposition to motions for summary judgment (Doc.

No. 48), termination letter (Doc. No. 48-7).

15. Id., AFS letter (Doc. No. 48-8). There is a

factual dispute--not relevant to the issues decided

here--as to whether Spann had to be an employee in good

standing with DynCorp on November 30, 2003, to remain

eligible for employment with AFS. 

9

that you have subjected other employees to repeated

sexual harassment, both verbal and physical.”14 

November 26, 2003: AFS notified Spann that its offer

to employ her was being rescinded because she was no

longer an employee in ‘good standing’ with DynCorp.15

December 1, 2003: AFS formally took over the Fort

Rucker contract.

December 18, 2003: In order to avoid the costs of

arbitration and the union grievance process, DynCorp

rescinded its termination of Spann, with the result that

her work-history file reflected a termination date of

November 30 due to “loss of contract.” AFS did not reextend its original offer of employment to Spann.

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16. Defendant DynCorp’s evidentiary submission in

support of partial motion for summary judgment (Doc. No.

39), EEOC DynCorp Charge (“EEOC DynCorp charge”) (Doc.

No. 39-4, exhibit 20 to Spann deposition).

17. Id., EEOC right-to-sue notice for DynCorp (Doc.

No. 39-5, exhibit 22 to Spann deposition).

10

March 1, 2004: Spann filed a charge of discrimination

against DynCorp with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (“EEOC”).16 

May 17, 2004: Spann’s bankruptcy case was ‘dismissed’

pursuant to 11 U.S.C.A. § 1307; Spann, therefore, did not

receive a ‘discharge’ of her Chapter 13 case pursuant to

11 U.S.C.A. § 1328. 

August 16, 2004: The EEOC issued a right-to-sue

notice to Spann.17

October 13, 2004: Spann filed this lawsuit charging

DynCorp with sexual harassment as well as retaliatory and

sexually discriminatory termination of her employment.

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III. DISCUSSION

In its motion for partial summary judgment, DynCorp

advances a single argument: the doctrine of ‘judicial

estoppel’ should bar monetary relief in this case because

Spann never disclosed to the bankruptcy court her claims

against DynCorp. 

Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine, invoked

at the court’s discretion, under which a party is

precluded from asserting a claim in a legal proceeding

inconsistent with a claim made in a previous proceeding.

Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282, 1285 (11th

Cir. 2002). The doctrine exists “to protect the

integrity of the judicial process by prohibiting parties

from deliberately changing positions according to the

exigencies of the moment.” Id. (quoting New Hampshire v.

Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750 (2001)). Nevertheless, the

doctrine “ought to be applied with caution ‘because of

the harsh results attendant with precluding a party from

asserting a position that would normally be available to

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the party.’” Sumner v. Michelin N. Am., 966 F.Supp. 1567,

1578 (M.D. Ala.) (Thompson, J.) (quoting Lowery v.

Stovall, 92 F.3d 219, 224 (4th Cir. 1996). 

While “the circumstances under which judicial

estoppel may appropriately be invoked are probably not

reducible to any general formulation of principle,” New

Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 750, the Eleventh Circuit Court of

Appeals considers two primary factors in applying the

doctrine to a particular case. “First, it must be shown

that the allegedly inconsistent positions were made under

oath in a prior proceeding. Second, such inconsistencies

must be shown to have been calculated to make a mockery

of the judicial system.” Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1285

(quoting Salomon Smith Barney, Inc. V. Harvey, 260 F.3d

1302, 1308 (11th Cir. 2001)). Therefore, judicial

estoppel may be applied only in situations involving

intentional manipulation of the courts, not when the

litigant’s contradictory positions are the “product of

inadvertence or mistake.” Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1287

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(quoting Matter of Cassidy, 892 F.2d 637, 642 (7th Cir.

1990)). Judicial estoppel “looks toward cold

manipulation.” Johnson Service Co. v. Transamerica Ins.

Co., 485 F.2d 164, 175 (5th Cir 1973)). The “deliberate

and intentional manipulation” of the courts required

before judicial estoppel may properly be invoked can be

inferred from the record. Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1287.

In bankruptcy, a debtor has a duty to disclose all

potential assets and must amend her financial statements

if circumstances change. 11.U.S.C.A. § 521(1).

Potential assets may include “contingent, dependant or

conditional” claims, and a debtor must disclose them if

she has “enough information prior to confirmation to

suggest that [she] may have a possible cause of action.”

Youngblood Group v. Lufkin Fed. Sav. And Loan Ass’n, 932

F.Supp 859, 867 (E.D. Texas 1996) (Heartfield, J.)

(internal citations omitted). Such claims include

“litigation which has the potential of arising in a nonbankruptcy context.” Id. at 868. 

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18. EEOC DynCorp charge.

14

Spann made no representation about potential federal

and state employment claims when she filed her bankruptcy

petition in June 2003. DynCorp correctly points out that

Spann’s EEOC charge alleges that she suffered sexual

harassment from supervisor Steve Dublar beginning around

March 2003, and that her lawsuit alleges earlier

instances of sexual harassment and discrimination.18

DynCorp asserts that, because these events occurred

before the filing of her bankruptcy petition, the

entirety of Spann’s monetary claims must be barred. 

This argument fails for a number of reasons. First,

Spann’s termination from DynCorp occurred in November

2003, after her initial bankruptcy filing and after her

Chapter 13 plan was confirmed. It would have been

impossible for Spann to have included in her bankruptcy

filings claims based on an event that had not yet

occurred. Moreover, the bulk of the sexual harassment

she alleges occurred after her transfer to Knox field in

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July 2003, and thus after the filing of her bankruptcy

petition.

But more importantly, as stated, there must be

deliberate and intentional manipulation of the judicial

process before judicial estoppel can be applied to bar

relief; divergent or different positions that are the

product of inadvertence or mistake are not enough.

Whether the divergent positions are intentional or

inadvertent depends, obviously, on the litigant’s intent

or motive, if any, behind the divergence; and, of course,

absent direct evidence of intent, the first place a court

should look to see whether the litigant had the intent or

motive to assert divergent positions is to the records of

the cases at issue. 

If the records reflect that the litigant received, or

could have received, a benefit from the divergent

positions, then there could be circumstantial evidence of

intentional manipulation. But if the records are devoid

of any benefit, real or hopeful, to the litigant from the

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19. The court is reluctant to generalize about human

nature and say that the absence of a benefit would be

dispositive evidence of no intent to manipulate, for a

litigant might want to make a mockery of the judicial

process for spite alone.

16

divergent positions, then that absence would be strong

circumstantial evidence that the divergent positions are

the product of accident or mistake, not intentional

manipulation. One would be hard pressed to say that a

litigant would do something for which she would receive

no benefit.19

Applying these common-sense principles, the court

concludes that, even if the incidents of discrimination

and retaliation, including those that occurred before

June 2003, were sufficient in scope and nature to

constitute a contingent or conditional claim that Spann

should have disclosed at the moment of filing her

bankruptcy petition or later, Spann’s failure to do so

was not intentional or deliberate, for Spann derived no

benefit from the failure. She derived no benefit while

her bankruptcy petition was pending, and she derived no

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benefit from its dismissal, for her debts were not

discharged. Without a benefit to be gained, Spann had no

motive to conceal her federal and state claims. 

This approach of looking to whether the litigant

received a benefit from her divergent positions is

consistent with that used in other cases where courts

were called upon to determine whether to apply judicial

estoppel. For example, in Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex,

Inc., where the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a district

court’s application of judicial estoppel to bar an

employee’s claims for monetary relief in an employment

discrimination suit when those claims were not disclosed

in bankruptcy proceedings, the chronology was as follows:

in July 1997, plaintiff filed for Chapter 13 relief; six

months later, in January 1998, he filed an EEOC charge of

discrimination against his employer; in December 1999,

plaintiff filed his employment discrimination suit; in

October 2000, he requested that his Chapter 13 petition

be converted to a Chapter 7 case, the Bankruptcy Court

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20. The court found that judicial estoppel did not

bar a claim for injunctive relief, because “[plaintiff’s]

undisclosed claim for injunctive relief offered nothing

of value to the estate,” and therefore would not have

18

ordered him to file amended schedules, and plaintiff

filed schedules and certified them as true and accurate,

but failed to report the lawsuit that had then been

pending for over eleven months; and on January 23, 2001,

plaintiff received a “no asset” complete discharge of his

debts. Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1284.

The Burnes plaintiff received the benefit of a

conversion to Chapter 7 followed by a complete discharge

of his debts long after he filed a lawsuit claiming

millions of dollars in damages, without ever revealing

these claims to his creditors or to the bankruptcy court.

Id. at 1288. These facts supported the court’s finding

that plaintiff, because of the great benefit he derived,

possessed the requisite intent to mislead the bankruptcy

court (to the detriment of his creditors) such that

judicial estoppel should be applied to the monetary

claims potion of his discrimination suit.20 Id. at 1288.

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been important to the bankruptcy court in determining the

outcome of his bankruptcy. Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1288,

1289. Similarly, DynCorp does not assert that Spann’s

non-monetary claims should be judicially estopped. 

19

Similarly, in In re Coastal Plains, Inc., 179 F.3d

197 (5th Cir. 1999), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals

reversed determinations by a bankruptcy court and a

district court that plaintiff’s failure to disclose known

tort claims over the course of a bankruptcy proceeding

was “inadvertent.” Applying judicial estoppel, the court

found that plaintiff took inconsistent positions by

omitting a potential tort claim from its bankruptcy

schedules; that the bankruptcy court relied on that

representation; and that the representation was not

inadvertent because plaintiff "knew of the facts giving

rise to its inconsistent positions, and had a motive to

conceal the claims." Coastal Plains, 179 F.3d at 212.

Plaintiff filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in April

1986, and shortly thereafter initiated a tort claim

against Browning Manufacturing, plaintiff’s largest

unsecured creditor. Id. at 202. In June 1986,

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plaintiffs’s CEO signed sworn bankruptcy schedules

without mentioning the that, at the time, he believed

plaintiff had tort claims of up to $10 million against

Browning. In September 1986, the automatic stay was

lifted, plaintiff’s assets went into foreclosure, and an

auction was subsequently held. Id. at 203. 

Meanwhile, plaintiff’s former CEO formed a new

company, and all of plaintiff’s employees and customers

became the employees and customers of the new company.

The new company then purchased plaintiff’s assets from

the auction buyer at a great discount in February 1987,

including the previously undisclosed potential cause of

action. Id. In April 1987, plaintiff’s Chapter 11

reorganization was converted into a Chapter 7

liquidation, and the bankruptcy case was closed in

February 1998. In October 1988, the new company decided

to pursue the tort claim against Browning that had

remained dormant for two and a half years, and was

substituted as plaintiff. In 1996 (ten years after the

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original claim), a jury in federal district court awarded

the new company over $13 million, reduced to a final

judgment of $3.6 million plus $1.6 million in attorney’s

fees. Id. at 204. 

The Coastal Plains plaintiff avoided paying debts by

filing bankruptcy without disclosing claims that were

then pending. The company’s CEO formed a new company,

purchased all assets at bargain prices, including the

undisclosed claims, and then sued on those undisclosed

claims and recovered a windfall. Plaintiff’s plan could

be characterized as “[c]onceal your claims; get rid of

your creditors on the cheap, and start over with a bundle

of rights.” Id. at 213 (quoting Payless Wholesale

Distributors, Inc. v. Alberto Culver (P.R.) Inc., 989

F.2d 570, 571 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 931

(1993)).

In no way can Spann’s actions be compared to those of

the plaintiffs in Burnes or Coastal Plains. As stated,

Spann dismissed her bankruptcy case after the alleged

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discriminatory and retaliatory actions that gave rise to

her EEOC charge took place and before she filed her

lawsuit. Moreover, in contrast to the Burnes and Coastal

Plains plaintiffs, who failed to reveal existing claims

even as their debts were discharged or otherwise

relieved, Spann obtained no relief or benefit through

bankruptcy before filing her lawsuit in this court.

Spann’s situation is comparable, rather, to that of

the plaintiff in In re Baldwin, 307 B.R. 251 (M.D. Ala.

2004) (Albritton, J.), where plaintiff’s claims were not

barred by judicial estoppel because he promptly amended

his bankruptcy asset schedule upon learning of preexisting undisclosed claims, prior to any discharge of

his debt and while the bankruptcy case remained open.

Spann, instead of amending her bankruptcy case to reflect

the employment claims she now brings, dismissed the

bankruptcy. If a defense of judicial estoppel would be

defeated had Spann amended her bankruptcy schedules, then

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it is certainly defeated by her dismissal of the

bankruptcy outright. 

DynCorp asserts that, although Spann’s bankruptcy was

dismissed, she nonetheless benefitted from it through the

automatic stay on collection activity, and that benefit

is an “inequity” that judicial estoppel should bar. It

is true that a benefit sufficient to trigger judicial

estoppel does not have to involve full discharge of a

party’s debts. “The bankruptcy court may ‘accept’ the

debtor's assertions by relying on the debtor's

nondisclosure of potential claims in many other ways.

See, e.g., In re Coastal Plains, 179 F.3d at 210 (finding

that judicial acceptance was satisfied when the

bankruptcy court lifted a stay based in part on the

debtor's nondisclosure in its bankruptcy schedules and in

a liftstay stipulation); Donaldson v. Bernstein, 104 F.3d

547, 555-56 (3rd Cir. 1997) (holding that judicial

acceptance was satisfied when the court approved the

debtor's plan of reorganization).” Hamilton v. State

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Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 270 F.3d 778, 784 (9th Cir. 2001).

 To be sure, Spann derived the benefit of an

automatic stay as a result of her bankruptcy petition;

however, that benefit existed irrespective of the claims

she listed (or failed to list) in her filings. In this

case, the automatic benefit of a stay on collection

action prior to dismissal of a bankruptcy case is not a

benefit that threatens judicial integrity in a way

sufficient to provide a basis for judicial estoppel. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Because Spann did not manipulate the courts,

intentionally or otherwise, to gain advantage through

inconsistent positions, her claims cannot properly be

barred through the application of judicial estoppel.

It is therefore ORDERED that defendant DynCorp

Technical Services, LLC’s motion for partial summary

judgment (Doc. No. 38) is denied.

Done, this the 2nd day of November, 2005.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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