Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_06-cv-08016/USCOURTS-alnd-2_06-cv-08016-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Marquis Cantrell Drakes
Petitioner
United States of America
Respondent

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

MARQUIS CANTRELL DRAKES, ) 

Petitioner, ) 

VS. ) CR-04-H-444-S 

Ej 2255 # 2:06-CV-8016-JHH 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

Respondent. 1 

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION 

Petitioner, Marquis Cantrell Drakes, has filed a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside 

or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. tj 2255. He challenges the validity of 

his 2005 conviction pursuant to a plea of guilty offered and accepted in 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

Petitioner was indicted on October 27, 2004, by the federal grand jury in the 

Northern District of Alabama in a three-count indictment alleging in Count One a 

violation of 2 1 U.S.C. tj 84 1 (a)(l), in Count Two a violation of 18 U.S. 

5 924(c)(l)(A) and in Count Three a violation of 18 U.S.C. 5 922(g)(1) [Doc. # 11. 

FILED

 2006 May-03 PM 12:54

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:06-cv-08016-JHH -RRA Document 2 Filed 05/03/06 Page 1 of 33
Petitioner was originally represented by retained counsel Scott Boudreaux, 

who was allowed to withdraw after retained counsel Glennon Threatt entered an 

appearance for Drakes on November 29,2005 (Doc. #9). Drakes, through counsel, 

entered into a plea agreement (Doc. # 14) with the government wherein the 

government agreed to dismiss Count Three and to move for a three-level reduction 

for acceptance of responsibility and to recommend that he be sentenced at the low 

end of the sentencing guidelines in return for the petitioner's plea of guilty to 

Counts One and Two of the indictment. Additionally, the government agreed to 

afford Drakes the opportunity to cooperate in an effort to justifi the filing of a 

motion by the government under 18 U.S.C. 6 3553(e) and guideline § 5K1.1. The 

plea agreement contained a recitation of the factual basis for the plea as set forth in 

Exhibit A to this Memorandum of Decision and an acknowledgment of guilt and a 

limited waiver of right to appeal and to collaterally attack the convictions and 

sentences as set forth in Exhibit B to this Memorandum of Decision not to appeal 

the sentence imposed. [Doc. #5, Plea Agreement and Conditions, at 1,4]. 

On January 3,2005, petitioner, represented by retained counsel, withdrew 

his pleas of not guilty to the charges in Counts One and Two and pled guilty to 

both counts pursuant to the plea agreement. A copy of the entire court proceeding 

wherein the pleas of guilty were entered is set forth in Exhibit C to this 

Case 2:06-cv-08016-JHH -RRA Document 2 Filed 05/03/06 Page 2 of 33
Memorandum of Decision. Before taking petitioner's pleas, the court placed 

petitioner under oath and questioned him extensively about his understanding of 

the terms of the plea agreement and his willingness to plea guilty. The court urged 

petitioner to interrupt the court proceeding if anything was being said or taking 

place that petitioner did not fully understand so that the court or his attorney could 

clear the matter up. Drakes acknowledged, under oath, that the plea agreement 

contained everything that he was relying on with regard to his pleas. He also 

stated that, before signing the agreement, he had ample opportunity to discuss the 

pleas with his attorney and that his attorney answered to his satisfaction any 

questions regarding the meaning of the plea agreement or how it might operate. In 

particular, petitioner acknowledged that he and his attorney specifically discussed 

the provision of the agreement wherein petitioner agreed to waive the right to 

appeal and collaterally attack the conviction and the sentence to be imposed. The 

court explained to petitioner that Count One carried a minimum custodial five-year 

sentence and that Count Two also carried a minimum custodial five-year sentence 

that had to be consecutive to the sentence under Count One. 

On April 13,2005, petitioner received a sentencing hearing. At that 

hearing, counsel for petitioner was asked if he or petitioner had found any factual 

inaccuracies in the presentence report. Counsel reported that none were found by 

Case 2:06-cv-08016-JHH -RRA Document 2 Filed 05/03/06 Page 3 of 33
either.' Prior to sentencing, the court invited comments from petitioner and from 

his attorney. Petitioner did not address the court, and his attorney simply urged 

the court to impose the five-year statutory minimum under Count One to be 

followed by the mandatory consecutive statutory minimum of five years under 

Count Two. Thereafter, the court sentenced petitioner to a term of 60 months 

under Count One to be followed by a 60-month sentence for Count Two, running 

consecutively, for a total sentence of 120 months. Thereafter, the court queried 

whether any party had any objections, other than any that had already been stated 

in the record, to the court's finding of fact, the calculation of the sentencing 

guidelines, the sentencing itself or the manner in which it was imposed. Neither 

petitioner nor his attorney responded. The sentence which was imposed was 

consistent with the plea agreement. Petitioner did not appeal the conviction or 

sentence. 

About one year after the sentence was imposed, petitioner timely filed a 

motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 4 2255. 

He asserts that his plea of guilty was unknowing and involuntary largely as a result 

of ineffective assistance of counsel, a ground that petitioner expressly reserved in 

The court notes the recitation of facts in the presentence report, in all material respects, 

is the same as set forth on Exhibit A hereto. 

Case 2:06-cv-08016-JHH -RRA Document 2 Filed 05/03/06 Page 4 of 33
the plea agreement as a basis upon which to pursue a § 2255 motion. But having 

the right to pursue a § 2255 motion is of no benefit if he has no basis to prevail on 

the motion. And having reviewed the § 2255 motion against the record in this 

case, the court concludes the motion is totally without merit. 

DISCUSSION 

Petitioner's basic claim in support of his motion is that ineffective 

assistance of counsel resulted in his pleas of guilty not having been offered 

knowingly and voluntarily. His argument, in essence, is that his pleas of guilty 

were "unknowing" because he was unaware he was pleading guilty under Count 

One to possessing with intent to distribute in excess of 5 (five) grams of a 

substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine base (crack) and 

consequently that he was denied due process. The indictment expressly charged in 

Count One in excess of five grams and the indictment was read to petitioner by the 

court during the court proceedings; petitioner, while under oath, acknowledged to 

the court he understood the charge and had had sufficient time to discuss the case 

and the plea agreement with his attorney; and petitioner, while under oath, stated 

he was satisfied with the services his attorney was providing. Petitioner's attorney 

advised the court that he had had a sufficient opportunity to investigate the 

charges, to consider any defenses petitioner may have had to the charges, and 

Case 2:06-cv-08016-JHH -RRA Document 2 Filed 05/03/06 Page 5 of 33
generally to give petitioner counsel and advice. The plea agreement also expressly 

set forth the weight of the drug charged as "5.49 grams of cocaine base (crack)", 

and recited that such fact was agreed to and stipulated by petitioner. During the 

presentation by the government of the facts which could be produced at a trial, the 

Assistant United States Attorney expressly noted the evidence would establish that 

the amount of cocaine base possessed by petitioner was in excess of five (5) 

grams. Petitioner, while still under oath, agreed that the recited evidence was 

substantially correct. Before the presentation by the government of the expected 

evidence, the court expressly called to petitioner's attention that he could not be 

found guilty under Count One at trial unless the jury found beyond a reasonable 

doubt that in excess of five (5) grams of cocaine base was involved, and the court 

urged petitioner to listen carefully to the government's attorney and to interrupt 

him if he said anything that petitioner did not think was true or if he felt that the 

government did not have some evidence to prove what was being said. Petitioner 

did not interrupt the presentation. Still under oath, he then acknowledged to the 

court that the factual presentation was substantially correct. Finally, petitioner 

confirmed that he knew he was under no obligation to plead guilty. 

Petitioner also argues that his pleas of guilty were involuntary because he 

had "signed the (plea) agreement at the behest and coercion of counsel." This 

Case 2:06-cv-08016-JHH -RRA Document 2 Filed 05/03/06 Page 6 of 33
argument is directly contradicted by the assurance petitioner gave the court while 

under oath that no person had promised him anything or threatened him in any 

manner to encourage him to enter his plea of guilty. 

In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, (1984), the Supreme Court 

established a two-prong test to evaluate ineffective assistance claims. To obtain 

reversal of a conviction, the defendant must prove (1) that counsel's performance 

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that counsel's deficient 

performance prejudiced the defendant resulting in an unreliable or fundamentally 

unfair outcome of the proceeding. Id. at 687-88. With regard to an ineffective 

assistance claim related to the entry of a guilty plea, "in order to satisfy the 

'prejudice' requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and 

would have insisted on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 

(1985). Here petitioner has not provided even an arguable basis upon which the 

court could conclude that his retained counsel's performance fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness. Further, to the extent petitioner is 

endeavoring to raise a ground in support of his motion other than ineffective 

assistance of counsel, petitioner expressly waived in the plea agreement the right 

to post-conviction relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 5 2255 (petitioner expressly 

Case 2:06-cv-08016-JHH -RRA Document 2 Filed 05/03/06 Page 7 of 33
reserved the right to pursue a claim under 5 2255 for ineffective assistance of 

counsel). The waiver is valid because the court specifically questioned petitioner 

and his attorney about the provisions during the plea colloquy and was advised by 

both that they specifically discussed the waiver provision. Moreover, the waiver 

is also valid because it is manifestly clear from the record that petitioner fully 

understood the significance of the ~aiver.~ United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 

1343, 1350-5 1 (1 1 th Cir. 1993). 

A separate final judgment will be entered denying the April 14, 2006 5 2255 

motion. 

DONE this the 3 d 

day of May, 2006. 

S IOR UNITED STATES DISTRTCT JUDGE v 

Petitioner advised the court, while still under an oath, that he had not taken any drugs, 

medication or narcotics of any kind during the past 72 hours. He also stated there was nothing 

that prevented him from understanding anything his attorney was saying while discussing the 

case with him or understanding the nature of the charges against him or understanding the 

matters stated to him by the court. 

Case 2:06-cv-08016-JHH -RRA Document 2 Filed 05/03/06 Page 8 of 33
I (d) FACTUAL BASIS FOR PLEA 

[The defendant hereby agrees and stipulates to the accuracy of 

the following information. The defendant agrees that the 

information here may be used for sentencinc purposes and waives any 

On April 7, 2004, BPD Officer Shelly Pennington conducted a 

traffic stop or. Lacoyia Holcombe for failure to employ a turn 

signal while driving a 2001 Chevrolet. Drakes was a passenger in 

the car. A check of the NCIC revealed the driver had outstanding 

misdemeanor warrants. Drakes' drivers license had been suspended, 

also. An inventory search of the car revealed: 

-a stolen, loaded Beretta .40 caliber pistol under the front 

dash of the vehicle, 

-a bag of marijuana with pink pills (Loratabs), 

-a plastic bag with 45 bags of crack cocaine 

-two small Sags of marijuana, 

-a small bag of marijuana was found on the passenger seat 

where Drakes had been seated, 

-$1,156 cash was recovered from Drakes front pants pocket, and 

-a box cf sandwich bags which had been purchased by Drakes at 

a Chevror, Service just prior to the traffic stop. 

On April 7, 2004, Holcombe was advised of the Miranda Rights, 

which she waived. She denied any knowledge of the firearm or the 

drugs. She stated that the car belonged to her sister. 

On Aprll 7, 2004, Drakes was advised of the Miranda warnings, 

which he waived. He stated that he smoked marl3uana and traded 

cocaine to pecple for fzvcrs. He stated :ha: Holcombe had no 

Case 2:06-cv-08016-JHH -RRA Document 2 Filed 05/03/06 Page 9 of 33
knowledge ~f the drugs cr the flrearrn; he admltted possession. He 

stated tha~ he purchased the gun from a person ln Ga~e Clty Houslng 

Prclects for $103.00, for protecElcn. 

The f 1rear-n had prevlousl;~ traveled In lnterstats commerce. It 

was found to be operable by forensic scientist, Mitch Rectgr, on 

May 10, 2004. 

Or. April 17 and 28, 2004, Sonya Eollin~sjlead, forensic 

scientist, Alabama State Depzrtnent cf Forensic Sciences, opined 

that the drugs were : 5.49 grams of cocaine base (crack) , 2.14 grams 

of cocaine hydrochloride, and 22.58 grams of narijuana. 

Drakes had incurred a previous csnvlction f3r "ssession of 

Marijuana, on March 15, 1999, in case number c'C98-3305, In the 

Circuit Court 3f Jefferson Ccunty, Alabama. 

Case 2:06-cv-08016-JHH -RRA Document 2 Filed 05/03/06 Page 10 of 33
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF GUILT 

The defendant is pleading guilty to the charges described 

above because the defendant is in fact guilty. Should the 

defendant move the court to accept the plea of guilty under the 

provisions of North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), or 

tender a plea of nolo contendere, the plea agreement described 

above will be null and void and the United States will not be bound 

by any aqreement, understanding, provision, or stipulation, express 

or implied in this document. 

WAIVERS 

By pleading guilty the defendant waives and agrees to waive 

any and all motions, defenses, objections, or requests which have 

been made or which could have been made in this case. The 

defendant also waives the right to trial by a jury (or by a judge 

if the defendant elected to be tried by a judge alone). 

At any such trial the defendant would have the right to 

assistance of counsel, to confront and cross-examine the witnesses 

against the defendant, to present evidence on the defendant's 

behalf, to compel the attendance of witnesses for the defense, and 

to testify or refuse to testify. 

The United States wou'ld have the burden or proving the case 

against the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant 

would be presumed innocent and could only be convicted if a jury of 

twelve people (or a ludge if the defendant elects to be tried by a 

Case 2:06-cv-08016-JHH -RRA Document 2 Filed 05/03/06 Page 11 of 33
judge) unanimously found the defendant to be guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt. The defendant would have the right to appeal a 

guilty verdict. 

do hereby agree to have my sentence determined pursuant to the 

Federal Sentencing Guidelines. In so doing, I expressly waive all 

constitutional challenges to the valldity of the Federal Sentencing 

Guidelines (including facts that support any specific offense 

characteristic, other enhancement or adj ustment , or upward 

departures) alleged in the indictment and found by a jury beyond a 

reasonable doubt. My attorney has explained to me that I may be 

entitled to a jury determination of such facts pursuant to Blakely 

v. Washinqton, however, I have determined it is in my best interest 

to have my sentence determined by the judge 

All these rights and protections are hereby waived. 

DEFENDANT'S DECLARATION 

In consideration of the government's recommended 

disposition I, 

defendant, herein knowingly and voluntarily waives my right to 

appeal the plea regarding non- jurisdictional issues, (United 

States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343 (11th Cir. l993)), as well as 

post-conviction relief pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. Section 2255. 

Furthermore, in consideration of the government's recommended 

disposition, I M heD~lS Cfik~el( bmu~ , do hereby waive and 

give up my right to appeal my conviction in this case, any sentence 

the court might impose upon me, and the right LO challenge any 

Case 2:06-cv-08016-JHH -RRA Document 2 Filed 05/03/06 Page 12 of 33
sentence so imposed or the manner in which the sentence was 

determined in any collateral attack, including, but not limited to, 

a motion brought under 28 U.S.C.§ 2255, subject to the following 

limitations : 

The defendant reserves the right to contest in an appeal or 

post-conviction proceeding any/all of the following: 

(a) Any punishment imposed in excess of the statutory maximum; 

(b) Any punishment that constitutes an upward department from the 

guidelines sentencing range as determined by the court at the time 

sentence is imposed; and 

(c) Any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

In addition, the defendant reserves the right to petition the 

court for re-sentencing, in accordance with 18 U. S .C. § 3582 (c) , in 

the event of a future retroactive amendment to the U.S.S.G that 

would affect the defendant's sentence. 

I further acknowledge that before giving up these rights, I 

discussed the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) and their 

application to my case with my attorney, who explained them to my 

satisfaction. I understand that pursuant to Blakelv v. Washinqton, 

I may have the right to have a jury find, beyond a reasonable 

doubt, any facts used in determining my sentence. I hereby waive 

the right and agree to have my sentence determined by the judge 

using the U . S . S . G. , based upon the preponderance of evidence 

standard. 

I hereby place my signature on the line directly below to 

sianlfy that I fully understand the foregoing paragraph and that I 

Case 2:06-cv-08016-JHH -RRA Document 2 Filed 05/03/06 Page 13 of 33
am knowingly and voluntarily giving up appeal and 

sentencing rights as stated. 

DATE DEFENDANT ' 

ALICE H. MARTIN 

United States Attorney 

DATE FRANK M. SALTER 

Assistant United States Attorney 

Case 2:06-cv-08016-JHH -RRA Document 2 Filed 05/03/06 Page 14 of 33
FILED 

2006 Ma-02 PM 03: 19 

US. DISTRICT COURT 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1 

) Case No. CR04-H-444-S 

MARQUIS CANTRELL DRAKES, 

DEFENDANT. 

j Birmingham, Alabama 

) 

) January 3, 2005 

\ 

TRANSCRIPT OF PLEA 

HELD BEFORE THE HONORABLE JAMES H. HANCCEK 

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

APPEARANCES : 

FOR THE GOVERNMENT : 

FOR THE DEFENDANT: 

COURT REPORTER : 

BRAD FELTON 

Assistant U.S. Attorney 

1801 4th Avenue North 

Birmingham, AL 35203 

GLENNON F . THREATT , JR . Miller Hamilton Snider & Odom 

1200 Financial Center 

Birmingham, AL 35203 

Karla Johnson, RPR, RMR 

Hugo Black Courthouse 

1729 5th Avenue N., Ste 325 

Birmingham, AL 35203 

- 

Karla S. Johnson, RPR, RMR 

Federal Official Reporter E~I.)[AIT C 

LABAMA 

Case 2:06-cv-08016-JHH -RRA Document 2 Filed 05/03/06 Page 15 of 33
January 3, 2005 9:00 a.m. 

PROCEEDINGS 

(OPEN COURT) 

THE COURT: The matter to be taken up at this time 

is the case of the United States of America versus Marquis 

Cantrell Drakes, CR04-H-444-S. 

On November 17 of last year, the defendant, Mr. Drakes, 

entered a plea of not guilty to a three count indictment 

charging him with three specific offenses against the laws of 

the United States and the matter is currently set for trial 

next week. 

The defendant and his attorney, Mr. Threatt, are in court 

at this time, however, because the Court understands that the 

defendant desires to withdraw his earlier plea of not guilty 

to one or more of the charges in the indictment and to enter a 

plea of guilty to one or more charges. Is that correct, Mr. 

Threat t? 

MR. THREATT: That is, Your Honor. 

THE COURT: To which count or counts does the 

defendant desire to withdraw his earlier plea of not guilty? 

MR. THREATT: Your Honor, there's a guilty plea 

agreement in this case. And the conditions of the plea 

agreement is my client will be entering a plea of guilty to 

Counts 1 and 2; and Count 3 will be dismissed. 

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Drakes, the withdrawal 

Case 2:06-cv-08016-JHH -RRA Document 2 Filed 05/03/06 Page 16 of 33
of your earlier plea of not guilty to the charges preferred 

against you in Counts 1 and 2 is accepted. But before I can 

accept the plea of guilty from you to those two counts, there 

are certain matters into which I must inquire and this will 

necessitate your being placed under an oath. 

While you're under that oath, I want to emphasize to you, 

that any statements that you make must be truthful statements. 

Any answers that you give to questions, must be truthful 

answers. Because a false answer or a false statement could be 

used against you later as the basis upon which to prosecute 

you for perjury or false statement. Do you understand that? 

DEFENDANT DRAKES : Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: All right. I'm going to request that an 

oath be administered. 

( DEEEADANT MARQUIS CANTRELL DRAKES, SWORN ) 

THE COURT: Mr. Drakes, if anything is said here 

this morning that you do not fully understand, or if anything 

takes place in this courtroom this morning that you do not 

fully understand, I want you to interrupt the proceedings. 

Just ask me to stop the proceedings and ask me to clear the 

matter up for you, or ask me to give you the opportunity, 

privately, to talk to Mr. Threatt, your attorney, so that he 

can answer your questions and clear the matter up. Do you 

understand that? 

DEFENDANT DRAKES: Yes, sir. 

Case 2:06-cv-08016-JHH -RRA Document 2 Filed 05/03/06 Page 17 of 33
THE COURT: It's not uncommon for a plea of guilty, 

such as the one that you're offering here this morning, to be 

offered in reliance upon some plea bargain or plea agreement, 

between the defendant, or his attorney, and the U.S. 

Attorney's office. 

Plea bargains and plea agreements are certainly 

permissible but they're not binding on the Judge or the Court. 

But where they exist and where a defendant is entering his 

plea of guilty in reliance upon the plea agreement, the 

defendant, his attorney, and the U.S. Attorney's office, all 

have the obligation to disclose that fact to the Court and to 

tell the Court the essential terms and conditions of any plea 

bargain or any plea agreement upon which a defendant might be 

relying when he enters his plea of guilty. 

At this time, I'm going to ask Mr. Brad Felton, the 

Assistant U.S. Attorney, to advise the Court the extent of 

that office's knowledge, of any plea bargain or plea agreement 

upon which Mr. Drakes might be relying here this morning. Mr. 

Felt on. 

MR. FELTON: Your Honor, upon your acceptance of 

this plea, the government would recommend the following: That 

the defendant plead guilty, of course, to Counts 1 and 2; and 

the government will move to dismiss Count 3 of the indictment. 

The United States will also recommend a three point 

credit for acceptance of responsibility and ask that the 

Case 2:06-cv-08016-JHH -RRA Document 2 Filed 05/03/06 Page 18 of 33
defendant be sentenced at the low end of the guideline range, 

whatever that may be, at the sentencing hearing. 

The government may also file a 5K1.1 motion upon the 

defendant's substantial cooperation in the matter. That would 

be the substantial part of the agreement. 

THE COURT: You're holding a document in your hand. 

I assume that that is a copy of the written plea agreement 

that was earlier filed this morning which Mr. Threatt 

referred. 

MR. FELTON: It is, Your Honor. 

THE COURT: Does that document set forth everything 

that you and your office are aware of that Mr. Drakes might be 

relying upon at this time? 

MR. FELTON: It does, Your Honor. 

THE COURT: Mr. Threatt, you have there, also, a 

copy of the written plea agreement that was earlier filed this 

morning. Does that set forth everything that you are aware of 

that Mr. Drakes is relying upon at this time by way of a plea 

bargain or a plea agreement? 

MR. THREATT: It does, Your Honor. It was provided 

to us prior to today's hearing. It's been shared and 

explained to Mr. Drakes. A copy has been provided to him. 

His signature, as well as mine, are on the document. 

THE COURT: Before you signed it and before he 

signed it, did you have qle opportunity fully to discuss it 

- 

Case 2:06-cv-08016-JHH -RRA Document 2 Filed 05/03/06 Page 19 of 33
with him? 

MR. THREATT: I did, Your Honor. Not only had I 

discussed this one with him but this was the second one that 

we had done because there were revisions to it. So I had an 

opportunity to discuss it with him and he understands. 

THE COURT: Did he have any questions of you with 

regard to the meaning of the agreement or how it might operate 

that you do not feel you were able to answer to his 

satisfaction? 

MR. THREATT : No, Your Honor. He had numerous 

questions. 

THE COURT: I can imagine so. 

MR. THREATT: He had numerous questions and I did my 

best to explain them to him. 

THE COURT: Did you specifically discuss with him 

his waiver of his right to appeal the plea of guilty and the 

conviction, and his waiving of the Blakely issues and his 

waiving of his right to appeal a sentence, except under the 

specific instances set forth in the plea agreement, there was 

some things that were preserved; but, otherwise, did you 

discuss all of that with him? 

MR. THREATT: I did, Your Honor. We went over both 

the Blakely, as well as the Bouchard case (phonetic), which is 

an Eleventh Circuit case, which affects the defendant's 

ability to waive certain rights under appeal. I explained all 

Case 2:06-cv-08016-JHH -RRA Document 2 Filed 05/03/06 Page 20 of 33
of that to him. And, as I indicated earlier, he had an 

opportunity to read it and ask me any questions that he had. 

THE COURT: Someday I'll get you to explain it all 

to me, too. 

MR. THREATT: Hopefully, those on high will explain 

it to all of us shortly. 

THE COURT: At least with regard to part of it. Mr. 

Drakes, you can remain seated. You have there in front of you 

a 12-page written plea agreement that bears your signature on 

Page 12 that was filed with the Court today. It also has Mr. 

Threatt's signature and also has an Assistant U.S. Attorney's 

signature on it. 

Does that document there in front of you tell me 

everything that you are relying upon, at this time, by way of 

a plea bargain or a plea agreement? 

DEFENDANT DRAKES: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: Before you signed the agreement, did you 

have ample opportunity fully to discuss it with Mr. Threatt? 

DEFENDANT DRAKES : Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: Did you have any questions of him with 

regard to the meaning of the agreement or how it might operate 

that he did not answer to your satisfaction? 

DEFENDANT DRF1KES : No, sir. 

THE COURT: Specifically, did you all discuss the 

fact that you were waiving your right to appeal the plea of 

Case 2:06-cv-08016-JHH -RRA Document 2 Filed 05/03/06 Page 21 of 33
guilty, or the conviction, and that you were waiving your 

right to challenge, collaterally, in some other court or some 

other proceeding, the conviction that otherwise will come 

about as a result of this plea of guilty, and that you were 

waiving your right to have a jury decide certain issues that 

might be relevant in the sentencing process and other waivers 

in there? Did you all specifically discuss that? 

DEFENDANT DRAKES: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: The U.S. Attorney's office has taken on 

certain responsibilities under this written plea agreement and 

it must discharge those responsibilities and those obligations 

consistent with the terms of the written plea agreement. But 

do you understand that the written plea agreement is not 

binding on the Judge or the Court? 

DEFENDANT DRAKES: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: Do you understand, for example, that if 

I accept the plea of guilty here this morning, at such time 

later when we proceed with sentencing, I could structure a 

sentence precisely in accordance with the plea agreement or 

recommendations made by the government consistent with the 

plea agreement; or I could structure a sentence that could be 

viewed as more severe, or less severe, than the one 

contemplated and, yet, you could not withdraw your plea of 

guilty. Do you understand that? 

DEFENDANT DRAKES : Yes, sir. 

Case 2:06-cv-08016-JHH -RRA Document 2 Filed 05/03/06 Page 22 of 33
THE COURT: Has anyone promised you anything or 

threatened you in any way to encourage you to enter this plea 

of guilty? 

DEFENDANT DRAKES: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: Someone has promised you something? 

DEFENDANT DRAKES: No, no. 

THE COURT: Let me ask that again to be certain. 

Has anybody promised you anything or threatened you in any way 

to encourage you to enter this plea of guilty? 

DEFENDANT DRAKES: No, sir. 

THE COURT: I am required to explain to a defendant, 

as I take a plea of guilty, what the maximum penalties are for 

the offenses to which the defendant is entering a plea of 

guilty. This is not to suggest that the maximum penalties 

will be imposed. But I am obligated to explain both maximum 

penalties and minimum penalties to a defendant at the time he 

enters his plea of guilty. 

The offense charged in Count 1 could carry with it a fine 

of $250,000 and a sentence of not more than 40 years. And it 

carries with it a mandatory sentence of not less than 5 years. 

It also carries with it a term of supervised release of not 

less than 4 years to follow the period of incarceration. Do 

you understand that? 

DEFENDANT DRAKES: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: And with regard to Count 2, the second 

Case 2:06-cv-08016-JHH -RRA Document 2 Filed 05/03/06 Page 23 of 33
count, the maximum penalty which could be imposed would be a 

fine also of $25O,OOO, and a term of not less than 5 years, 

which must be imposed consecutive to the sentence imposed 

under Count 1. And the maximum penalty under Count 2 could 

indeed reach life imprisonment. Do you understand that? 

DEFENDANT DRAKES: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: The sentence under Count 2, also, would 

carry with it a term of supervised release, but that would 

just be one of not more than 5 years and the usual $100 

special assessment fee. Do you understand that? 

DEFENDANT DRAKES: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: Do you understand that any sentence that 

the Court imposes must be structured pursuant to certain 

sentencing guidelines that have been developed? And those 

guidelines are structured to inform the Court of what a normal 

range for a sentence, in this particular case, involving you, 

should fall. And the Court is told to impose a sentence 

within that range, unless for some reasons, consistent with 

the guidelines, the Court feels like it is appropriate to 

depart above that range or below that range. 

For example, in this particular case, I know the U.S. 

Attorney's office and you have reached an agreement that would 

provide you an opportunity to what they call cooperate, and 

that's described in the plea agreement, in which event the 

government might move, if it's what they view, in their 

Case 2:06-cv-08016-JHH -RRA Document 2 Filed 05/03/06 Page 24 of 33
opinion, as sufficient cooperation, might move for a departure 

downward from that guideline range. 

The point is that I am required to obey the sentencing 

guidelines and impose a sentence within that range, or for 

reasons consistent with the guidelines, one below or above 

that range. Do you understand that? 

DEFENDANT DRAKES: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT : Do you also understand that you have the 

right to insist upon the earlier plea of not guilty that you 

entered to these two charges at the time of your arraignment? 

And, if you do so, then the burden is on the government to 

prove to a jury, beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial, where 

you would be entitled to the assistance of a lawyer and where 

you could not be compelled to incriminate yourself or give 

evidence against yourself. But that with this plea of guilty 

this morning, that ends the matter. There will be no jury 

trial. There will be no further presumption of innocence. 

And there will be no opportunity for you to confront or 

cross-examine witnesses whose testimony otherwise would be 

necessary. Do you understand that? 

DEFENDANT DRAKES : Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: Do you understand that with this entry 

of a plea of guilty this morning, the plea of guilty cannot be 

withdrawn? Do you understand that? 

DEFENDANT DRAKES : Yes, sir. 

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THE COURT: Is there anything, in your opinion, Mr. 

Drakes, that prevents you from understanding anything that I'm 

saying to you at this time, or that prevents you from 

understanding anything that Mr. Glennon Threatt says to you 

when he discusses this matter with you, or that prevents you 

from understanding the nature of the charges preferred against 

you in this indictment, including the two counts to which 

you're entering your plea of guilty, as well as the one count 

that is to be dismissed pursuant to the written plea 

agreement? Is there anything that prevents you from 

understanding any of that? 

DEFENDANT DRAKES: No, sir. 

THE COURT: Have you, within the past 72 hours, 

taken any drugs, or medications, or narcotics, of any kind? 

DEFENDANT DRAKES: No, sir. 

THE COURT: Count 1 of the indictment charges, in 

essence, that in early April of last year, April 7, 2004, you 

did knowingly, intentionally, and unlawfully possess with the 

intent to distribute in excess of 5 grams of a mixture and 

substance containing a detectable mount of cocaine base, more 

commonly referred to as "crack cocaine, " in violation of law. 

Do you understand that charge? 

DEFENDANT DRAKES: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: It's my understanding from the written 

plea agreement, that the mount of crack cocaine that was 

Case 2:06-cv-08016-JHH -RRA Document 2 Filed 05/03/06 Page 26 of 33
involved in the transaction, and to which you have stipulated 

in the plea agreement, was 5.49 grams; is that correct? 

DEFENDANT DRAKES : Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: Count 2 of the indictment charges, in 

essence, that on or about the same date, you did knowingly 

carry a firearm, that is, a Beretta .40 caliber pistol, during 

and in relation to the drug trafficking offense charged in 

Count 1 of the indictment. Do you understand that charge? 

DEFENDANT DRAKES: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: Have you had a sufficient opportunity to 

discuss both of these charges with Mr. Threatt? 

DEFENDANT DRAKES: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: Have you had a sufficient opportunity 

also to discuss the third charge that is to be dismissed, with 

him? 

Drakes fi 

does not 

DEFENDANT DRAKES : Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: Are you satisfied with his services? 

DEFENDANT DRAKES: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: Mr. Threatt, are you satisfied that Mr. 

lly understands all three of these charges? 

MR. THREATT: I am, Your Honor. Although this Court 

require it, there's a Guilty Plea Advice of Rights 

form that some judges use, and I use it as a guideline to take 

my client through to make sure that he understands all of the 

rights that he's waived; and he has gone through that form and 

Case 2:06-cv-08016-JHH -RRA Document 2 Filed 05/03/06 Page 27 of 33
executed it. 

THE COURT: Mr. Drakes, if the charge in Count 1 

were to proceed to trial next week, as scheduled, before there 

could be a verdict of guilty under that count, the government 

would have to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, to a jury two 

things : 

First, that on or about the date charged, that is April 

7th of last year, you did knowingly and willfully possess 

cocaine base in the amount of over 5 grams, as charged. 

And second, that you possessed that cocaine base or crack 

with the intent to distribute it. Do you understand that? 

DEFENDANT DRAKES: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: If the offense charged in Count 2 were 

to go to trial, before there could be a verdict of guilty 

under Count 2, the government would have to prove, beyond a 

reasonable doubt to a jury, the following three things : 

First, that you did in fact commit the drug trafficking 

offense charged in Count 1. In other words, they would have 

to have already found you guilty under Count 1. That's the 

first element they would have to prove. 

Second, the government would have to prove that, during 

the commission of that offense, you knowingly carried the 

Beretta as charged in the indictment. 

And third, that you carried the Beretta firearm in 

relation to the drug trafficking offense charged in Count 1. 

Case 2:06-cv-08016-JHH -RRA Document 2 Filed 05/03/06 Page 28 of 33
Do you understand that? 

DEFENDANT DRAKES : Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: All right. I want you to listen very 

carefully to Mr. Felton, the Assistant U. S. Attorney, because 

he's going to outline for you and for me, some of the evidence 

that he would expect to offer to a jury, if this case were to 

proceed to trial. 

And if, while he is talking, he says anything that you do 

not think is true or that you do not think he has some 

evidence that he could introduce in court to prove, I want you 

to stop him, just interrupt him as he is talking and then 

let's you and me discuss what he will have just said that you 

question or take issue with, okay? 

DEFENDANT DRAKES: Yes. 

THE COURT: Okay. Listen very carefully. 

MR. FELTON: Your Honor, if this case proceeded to 

trial, the govecvnment would prove the following: 

That on April 7, 2004, a Birmingham police officer 

conducted a traffic stop on Ms. Holcombe for failure to avoid 

a turn signal, in a 2001 Chevrolet. The defendant, Mr. 

Drakes, was a passenger in that car. 

A records check revealed that the driver, Ms. Holcombe, 

had an outstanding misdemeanor warrant, and Mr. Drakes had his 

driver's license suspended, so no one could drive the car 

away. 

Case 2:06-cv-08016-JHH -RRA Document 2 Filed 05/03/06 Page 29 of 33
An inventory search of the car revealed a stolen Beretta 

-40 caliber pistol, a bag of marijuana with some pink pills in 

it, a plastic bag with 45 bags of crack cocaine, two small 

bags of marijuana, and a small bag of marijuana was found in 

the passenger's seat where Mr. Drakes was seated. Also, there 

was $1,156 in cash recovered from Mr. Drakes, from his pants 

pocket; and a box of sandwich bags purchased by Mr. Drakes at 

the service station prior to the traffic stop. 

The co-defendant, Ms. Holcombe, was advised of her rights 

and she denied any knowledge of the firearm and stated the car 

belonged to her sister. Mr. Drakes was advised of his Miranda 

warnings and waived those warnings and gave a statement in 

which he admitted to smoking marijuana and trading cocaine to 

people for favors. He stated that Ms. Holcombe had no 

knowledge of the drugs and the firearms and he ach-rutted to 

their possession. He stated he purchased the firearm from a 

person at the Gate City housing project for $100 as 

protect ion. 

The firearm had previously traveled in interstate 

commerce and was found to be operable by Mitch Rector, a 

forensic scientist. The alleged drugs were tested and found 

to be, in fact, 5.4 9 grams of cocaine base, 2.14 grams of 

cocaine hydrochloride, and 22.69 grams of marijuana. All of 

these things occurred in the Northern District of Alabama. 

THE COURT: Mr. Drakes, are the facts as briefly 

Case 2:06-cv-08016-JHH -RRA Document 2 Filed 05/03/06 Page 30 of 33
outlined by the Assistant U.S. Attorney substantially correct? 

DEFENDANT DRAKES: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT : Do you understand that you are under no 

obligation to enter a plea of guilty to these charges? 

DEFENDANT DRAKES: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: Do you understand that you are free at 

this moment, but this is the last time that you would be free, 

to withdraw the plea of guilty that you're in the process of 

entering, and to reinstate the earlier plea of not guilty that 

you entered at the time of your arraignment on November 17? 

Do you understand that? 

DEFENDANT DRAKES: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: Do you still desire to enter a plea of 

guilty to Counts 1 and 2 of this indictment? 

DEFENDANT DRAKES: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: The Court finds that the defendant's 

plea of guilty is freely, knowingly, and voluntarily offered 

by him, and that the requisite factual basis exists to support 

the plea, and the plea is going to be accepted. 

In connection with the entry of the plea, the government 

and the defendant entered into a written plea agreement and 

the government has filed a motion to place that written plea 

agreement under seal, and that motion is granted. 

We're going to necessarily have to continue this matter 

for sentencing for a substantial period of time to allow a 

Case 2:06-cv-08016-JHH -RRA Document 2 Filed 05/03/06 Page 31 of 33
full presentence report to be developed, and then to give you, 

Mr. Drakes, and your attorney, and the government, and me, a 

full opportunity to review it. 

But I would like to set a date now that at least the 

attorneys currently do not see any reason why we could not 

start with that as a sentencing date, keeping in mind that we 

could move that if something developed in the meantime. I'm 

looking at Thursday, April the 21st, at 10: 30 in the morning. 

It 's a long way away but -- 

MR. THREATT: Your Honor, I expect to start the 

Ensley police officer shooting trial on April the 18th. If 

Your Honor could set it prior to that, it would facilitate my 

calendar. 

THE COURT: All right. Let's see if we can't do 

that. How long is that going to last, do you think? 

MR. THREATT: Your Honor, I've been told by the 

state that they expect to introduce about two weeks of 

testimony in that case. With the jury selection, it could go 

three to three-and-a-half weeks. 

THE COURT: Well, what about Monday, April the 4th, 

at 9:00? 

MR. THREATT : That ' s great. 

THE COURT: I'm not used to looking at the 2005 

calendar but we'll tentatively set it for that date and then 

we can work around it if something comes up either with the 

Case 2:06-cv-08016-JHH -RRA Document 2 Filed 05/03/06 Page 32 of 33
Court or with you all. 

MR. THREATT : Thank you . 

THE COURT: 

MR. FELTON: 

THE COURT : 

Anything else to take up, Mr. Felton? 

No, sir. Not at this time. 

All right. Court will be in recess. 

(COURT AD JOURZVED) 

STATE OF ALABAMA 

JEFFERSON COUNTY 

I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and 

correct transcript of the record of proceedings in the 

above-entitled matter. 

Karla S. Johnson, RPR, RMR 

Federal Official Reporter 

Date: 5-2-06 

Case 2:06-cv-08016-JHH -RRA Document 2 Filed 05/03/06 Page 33 of 33