Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01353/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01353-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
GTNX, Inc.
Appellant
INTTRA, Inc.
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

GTNX, INC.,

Appellant

v.

INTTRA, INC.,

Appellee

______________________ 

2015-1349, 2015-1350, 2015-1352, 2015-1353

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in Nos. 

CBM2014-00072, CBM2014-00073, CBM2014-00074,

CBM2014-00075. 

______________________ 

Decided: June 16, 2015

______________________ 

BORIS FELDMAN, Wilson, Sonsini, Goodrich & Rosati, 

PC, Palo Alto, CA, for appellant. Also represented by

STEFANI E. SHANBERG, ROBIN L. BREWER, San Francisco, 

CA; MICHAEL T. ROSATO, Seattle, WA; RICHARD TORCZON, 

Washington, DC; GIDEON A. SCHOR, New York, NY. 

MICHAEL JOHN LYONS, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, 

Palo Alto, CA, for appellee. Also represented by WALTER 

SCOTT TESTER, AHREN CHRISTIAN HSU-HOFFMAN, DAVID 

VINCENT SANKER; THOMAS M. PETERSON, San Francisco, 

CA. 

Case: 15-1353 Document: 4 Page: 1 Filed: 06/16/2015
2 GTNX, INC. v. INTTRA, INC. 

______________________ 

ON MOTION

______________________ 

Before DYK, TARANTO, and CHEN, Circuit Judges. 

TARANTO, Circuit Judge. 

At the request of GTNX, Inc., the Patent Trial and 

Appeal Board instituted “covered business method patent” review proceedings for four patents owned by

INTTRA, Inc. A few months later, the Board reconsidered 

its institution decisions, determined that institution of 

proceedings in these matters violated a statutory proscription, vacated the institution decisions, and terminated the proceedings. GTNX, Inc. v. INTTRA, Inc., 

CBM2014-00073 et al., 2014 WL 7723800 (PTAB Dec. 10, 

2014). GTNX appeals, and INTTRA moves to dismiss the 

appeal. We grant the motion. In addition, treating the 

appeal in the alternative as a mandamus petition, we

deny mandamus relief.

BACKGROUND

A 

In the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 

112–29, § 18, 125 Stat. 284, 329-31 (2011), Congress 

required the Patent and Trademark Office to establish a 

“transitional post-grant review proceeding for review of 

the validity of covered business method patents.” 

§ 18(a)(1). Section 18(a)(1) states a general rule, subject 

to exceptions not material here, that the PTO must “employ,” for such review, the “standards and procedures of[ ] 

a post-grant review under chapter 32 of title 35,” i.e., 35 

U.S.C. §§ 321–329. 

Section 324 authorizes the Director of the PTO to institute post-grant review, but by regulation, the Director 

has delegated to the Board the responsibility to make the 

Case: 15-1353 Document: 4 Page: 2 Filed: 06/16/2015
GTNX, INC. v. INTTRA, INC. 3

institution determination. 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.4, 42.208. Of 

relevance to this case, 35 U.S.C. § 325(a)(1) declares that 

“review may not be instituted . . . if, before the date on 

which the petition for such a review is filed, the petitioner 

or real party in interest filed a civil action challenging the 

validity of a claim of the patent.” And § 324(e) declares 

that “[t]he determination by the Director whether to 

institute a post-grant review under this section shall be 

final and nonappealable.” 

Once review has been instituted, the Board conducts 

the post-grant review. § 326(c). “If a post-grant review is 

instituted and not dismissed under this chapter,” the 

Board “shall issue a final written decision with respect to 

the patentability of any patent claim challenged by the 

petitioner and any new claim added under section 326(d).” 

§ 328(a). Section 329 authorizes a party dissatisfied with 

the Board’s final written decision with respect to patentability to appeal to this court under 35 U.S.C. § 141(c), and

28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A) grants this court jurisdiction 

over such an appeal. 

B 

INTTRA owns four patents relating to online methods 

for coordinating containerized shipping. In 2011, GT 

Nexus, Inc., GTNX’s parent company, filed suit in the 

United States District Court for the Northern District of 

California, seeking a declaratory judgment that INTTRA’s 

shipping methods patents were invalid. Several years 

later, in early 2014, while the court case was pending, 

GTNX petitioned the PTO to review the patents as covered-business-method patents. See GTNX, 2014 WL 

7723800, at *1–2.

On August 12, 2014, the Board instituted review proceedings (four separate proceedings which the Board then 

treated together). Id. at *1. In October 2014, however, 

the Board granted INTTRA leave to file a motion to 

dismiss the proceedings on the ground that § 325(a)(1) 

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4 GTNX, INC. v. INTTRA, INC. 

barred the reviews because of GTNX’s previously filed 

civil action. Id. After INTTRA filed the authorized motion, GTNX opposed, arguing that INTTRA had waived 

the § 325(a)(1) objection by not presenting it earlier, 

either before institution or within the 14 days allowed by 

the rule giving a right to seek reconsideration, 37 C.F.R. 

§ 42.71(d). Id. at *2.

On December 10, 2014, the Board granted INTTRA’s 

motion. It “vacated” the August 2014 institution decisions 

and “terminated” the proceedings, id. at *1, *3, without 

addressing any issues of patentability. The Board noted 

that there was no dispute that GTNX’s declaratoryjudgment action fell within the terms of § 325(a)(1). Id. at 

*2. And it concluded that § 325(a)(1) is a statutory limit 

on Board “jurisdiction” that it could not and would not 

decline to enforce just because INTTRA had not invoked it 

earlier. Id.

Characterizing the ruling as a final written decision 

under § 328, GTNX appeals under § 329, which provides 

for appeals under § 141. INTTRA moves to dismiss.

DISCUSSION 

We agree with INTTRA that GTNX’s appeal falls outside 35 U.S.C. §§ 141 and 329 and hence outside this 

court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A). 

By its terms, § 329 authorizes appeal, under § 141(c),

only from a “final written decision of the [Board] under 

section 328(a).” Similarly, § 141(c), as relevant here, 

authorizes appeal only from a “final written decision of 

the [Board] under section . . . 328(a).” In turn, § 328(a)

refers only to “a final written decision with respect to the 

patentability of any patent claim challenged by the petitioner and any new claim added under section 326(d).” § 

328(a) (emphasis added). Here, the Board made no decision “with respect to the patentability” of any claim. The 

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GTNX, INC. v. INTTRA, INC. 5

Board decision at issue, therefore, is outside § 328(a) and, 

hence, outside §§ 141(c) and 329.

In St. Jude Medical, Cardiology Division, Inc. v. Volcano Corp., we dismissed an appeal from a non-institution 

decision under chapter 31 of Title 35, which establishes a 

regime for “inter partes review” of issued patents that is 

materially the same as chapter 32 in the particular jurisdictional respects relevant here. 749 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir.

2014). We explained the structural contrast between a 

“determination . . . whether to institute” a proceeding, 

which is “final and nonappealable,” 35 U.S.C. § 314(d), 

and the “final written decision” determining patentability, 

§ 318(a), and we held that the appeal authorization

there—§ 319, incorporating § 141(c)—was limited to the 

final written decision on patentability. Id. at 1375–76. 

We thus relied on chapter 31’s textually clear and common-sense distinction between a final Board decision that 

reaches the patentability merits and an earlier decision 

whether to institute. We concluded that 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(4)(A)’s grant of jurisdiction to this court to

review decisions of the Board “under title 35” is limited 

“to the Board’s decision . . . on the merits of the . . . review, after it ‘conducts’ the proceeding that the Director 

has ‘instituted.’” Id. at 1376.

The same conclusion applies to this case under chapter 32. The Board decision GTNX is seeking to appeal 

was not reached after conduct of the review and did not 

make a determination with respect to patentability. The 

decision is therefore outside 35 U.S.C. §§ 141(c), 328(a), 

329 and, in turn, outside 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A). 

Confirming that the decision at issue is not a § 328(a) 

decision—the only appealable decision within the statutory regime—is that the fair characterization of the decision 

within the regime is as a decision whether to institute

proceedings. The Board expressly stated that it was 

vacating the earlier decision to institute proceedings. 

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6 GTNX, INC. v. INTTRA, INC. 

Having reconsidered whether to institute the proceeding 

here and determined not to do so based on § 325(a)(1), the 

Board simultaneously “vacated” the institution decisions 

and required termination of the proceedings. GTNX, 2014 

WL 7723800, at *1, *3. It is strained to describe this as 

anything but a “determination . . . whether to institute” 

proceedings—statutory language that is not limited to an 

initial determination to the exclusion of a determination 

on reconsideration. § 324(e); see also § 324(c). The statute declares such a decision to be “final and nonappealable,” § 324(e), thus reinforcing the absence of appeal 

jurisdiction in this court. 

In its notice of appeal, GTNX invoked the All Writs 

Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651. Although in opposing the motion to 

dismiss, GTNX does not invoke that provision, we may 

treat the appeal as, in the alternative, a request for 

mandamus relief under § 1651. See, e.g., In re Cuozzo 

Speed Techs., Inc., 778 F.3d 1271, 1278 & n.5 (Fed. Cir. 

2015). Doing so, we do not find mandamus relief to be 

available. 

In In re Dominion Dealer Solutions, Inc., 749 F.3d 

1379, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2014), which involved a requested 

inter partes review, we relied on the statutory scheme to 

conclude that the petitioner there could not invoke mandamus to challenge a non-institution decision in this 

court. We relied on the absence of a “‘clear and indisputable’” right to relief in this court, id. at 1381 (citation 

omitted), a conclusion reflecting the careful statutory 

limits on this court’s jurisdiction to review non-institution 

decisions. 

Moreover, in Cuozzo, where inter partes review had 

been instituted, and the institution was challenged after a 

final written decision, we found the particular asserted 

limit on institution to fall short of constituting a clear and 

indisputable bar on the Board’s action. 778 F.3d at 1278. 

Here, too, it cannot be said that GTNX has a clear and 

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GTNX, INC. v. INTTRA, INC. 7

indisputable right to have the proceeding continue, in the 

face of the otherwise-applicable proscription of § 325(a)(1), 

just because INTTRA did not raise this ground before the 

initial institution decision was made or in a rehearing 

request within 14 days under 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). 

GTNX identifies nothing in the statute or regulations 

that precludes the Board from reconsidering an initial 

institution decision or invoking the § 325(a)(1) bar on its 

own, let alone inviting the patentee to file a motion more 

than 14 days after institution. In particular, 37 C.F.R. 

§ 42.71(d)(1) restricts only rehearing requests made as of 

right. It does not prohibit the PTO from allowing a party

to file a later request for rehearing from an institution 

decision, as the Board did here. Moreover, as a general 

matter, “administrative agencies possess inherent authority to reconsider their decisions, subject to certain limitations, regardless of whether they possess explicit 

statutory authority to do so.” Tokyo Kikai Seisakusho, 

Ltd. v. United States, 529 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 

2008). We see nothing in the statute or regulations 

applicable here that clearly deprives the Board of that 

default authority. 

We likewise see no clear bar on the Board’s treatment 

of the § 325(a)(1) proscription as a “jurisdiction[al]” limit, 

to be applied without invoking waiver based on the timing 

of the patentee’s raising of the issue. GTNX, 2014 WL 

7723800, at *2 (relying on La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 

476 U.S. 355, 374–75 (1986) (agency “may not confer 

power upon itself” because “to expand its power in the 

face of a congressional limitation on its jurisdiction would 

be to grant to the agency power to override Congress”)). 

In any event, GTNX cannot find a clear, indisputable 

right to have the Board maintain the proceeding in the 

circumstances present here. We conclude that mandamus 

relief is unavailable. 

Case: 15-1353 Document: 4 Page: 7 Filed: 06/16/2015
8 GTNX, INC. v. INTTRA, INC. 

GTNX asserts jurisdiction here on one basis besides 

35 U.S.C. §§ 141(c), 329 and 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A). It 

invokes the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 

§§ 702, 704. “The APA, however, is not a jurisdictionconferring statute.” Trudeau v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 456 

F.3d 178, 183 (D.C. Cir. 2006); see Califano v. Sanders, 

430 U.S. 99, 105–07 (1977). We therefore reject GTNX’s 

invocation of the APA as a ground of jurisdiction. We 

need not consider other questions raised by GTNX’s 

invocation of the APA, such as whether the APA grants a 

cause of action for a case brought only against a private 

party, not against any federal-government actor, and, 

even if so, whether review limitations within chapter 32 of 

Title 35 would remove the case from APA coverage by 

virtue of, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 701(a), 702. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss the appeal and 

deny mandamus relief.

APPEAL DISMISSED, MANDAMUS DENIED

Case: 15-1353 Document: 4 Page: 8 Filed: 06/16/2015