Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_23-cv-01421/USCOURTS-caed-1_23-cv-01421-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Blankenship
Defendant
Andrew Celedon
Defendant
City of Bakersfield
Defendant
Doyle
Defendant
Kniffen
Defendant
Jeffery Aaron McFadden
Plaintiff
T. Schleicher
Defendant
Sims
Defendant
Skidmore
Defendant

Document Text:

1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Plaintiff Jeffery Aaron McFadden (“Plaintiff”) initiated this action with the filing of a 

complaint on September 29, 2023, against Defendants City of Bakersfield, T. Schleicher, Sims, 

Blankenship, Andrew Celedon, Doyle, Kniffen, and Skidmore (“Defendants”). (Doc. 1). Plaintiff 

raises the following claims against Defendants: unreasonable seizure, excessive force, failure to 

intercede and Monell violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id.

Pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion to exclude from evidence certain of the 

opinions of Plaintiff’s expert witness due to Plaintiff’s alleged discovery violations, filed November 5, 

JEFFERY AARON MCFADDEN,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF BAKERSFIELD, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:23-cv-01421-JLT-CDB

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 

PRECLUDE PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 26 

AND 37

(Doc. 33)

Case 1:23-cv-01421-JLT-CDB Document 39 Filed 01/06/25 Page 1 of 10
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2024. (Doc. 33). Plaintiff filed an opposition1and Defendants replied. (Docs. 34-37). The motion 

was submitted on the record without hearing and oral argument. (Doc. 38) (citing Local Rule 230(g)).

Background

On July 19, 2024, the Court granted in part Plaintiff’s opposed application to extend discovery 

deadlines. The deadline to complete nonexpert discovery was continued to September 16, 2024; the 

deadline to complete expert discovery was continued to December 16, 2024. (Doc. 27). The existing 

deadline to file dispositive motions remained unchanged (January 20, 2025). (Doc. 19).

On November 1, 2024, the parties convened with the undersigned for an informal discovery 

dispute conference during which Plaintiff declined to consent to informal resolution of the dispute 

involving the same expert discovery issue that is the subject of Defendants’ instant motion. (Doc. 32). 

The undersigned admonished the parties to diligently pursue and complete expert discovery.

On November 5, 2024, Defendants filed the pending motion seeking an order pursuant to Rule 

26 precluding Plaintiff’s expert from relying on documents that were not disclosed in Plaintiff’s Rule 

26 disclosures or in any other response by Plaintiff to Defendants’ discovery demands. Defendants 

contend Plaintiff’s lack of disclosure is “in violation of Federal Rule of Procedure 26 and this Court’s 

Scheduling Order, thereby prejudicing the Defendants.” (Doc. 33 at 2).

Specifically, Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s initial expert disclosures revealed that one of its 

expert witnesses – Benjamin Warren – relied upon not-previously disclosed materials in forming 

opinions that are the subject of his expert report. (Doc. 33-1 at 4). Those materials are: (1) 

Declaration of Audio Video Expert Arron S. Conaway with exhibits; (2) Stipulation for entry of final 

judgment and permanent injunction; (3) Bakersfield Police Department Internal Affairs Annual Status 

Report; (4) Bakersfield Monitor Annual Report Year One; and (5) Bakersfield Annual Report - Year 2

(the “Documents”). Id. The day after receiving Plaintiff’s expert witness disclosure, counsel for 

Defendants discovered the alleged deficiency and notified counsel for Plaintiff. Id. The next day 

(October 16, 2024), Plaintiff served a supplemental Rule 26 disclosure that identified and included the 

1 Plaintiff’s opposition brief is not double-spaced, in violation of Local Rule 130. Counsel for 

Plaintiff is admonished to refamiliarize themselves with the Local Rules of this Court and to conform 

all future filings to the requirements of those rules.

Case 1:23-cv-01421-JLT-CDB Document 39 Filed 01/06/25 Page 2 of 10
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

five subject documents (and newly identified other witnesses that are not the subject of Defendants’ 

instant motion). Defendants argue they suffered “obvious” prejudice by the late disclosure and 

production because their expert did not have the benefit of the undisclosed materials in authoring his 

expert report. Id. at 6. Defendants assert the first notice they had that Plaintiff intended to rely upon 

undisclosed Documents in support of their Monell theory was when the documents were first 

identified in Mr. Warren’s report. (Doc. 37 at 5). They further argue that disclosure of the theory and 

underlying documents after the close of nonexpert discovery deprived them of an opportunity to 

undertake nonexpert discovery directed toward the materials. Id. at 7-8.

Mr. Warren relies on the Documents to support some of his opinions. For instance, in Opinion 

Number 2, Mr. Warren opines that the Bakersfield Police Department (“BPD”) “failed to properly 

train Crisis Intervention Techniques,” and observes that “[t]he California DOJ concurs as stipulated in 

the Judgment.” (Doc. 36, Declaration of Heather Cohen [“Cohen Decl.”], Ex. A at 42 of 73). Mr. 

Warren also refers narratively to the stipulated judgment in connection with some of his opinions. For 

example, in Opinion Number 7, Mr. Warren opines that Defendants did not use “objectively 

reasonable force” in obtaining custody of Plaintiff, and observes that under the stipulated judgment, 

“BPD was mandated ... to address widespread community concerns regarding excessive force,” and 

that the directive “was in part a response to multiple canine use of force incidents and instances of 

excessive force deemed unreasonable” under prevailing standards. (Cohen Decl., Ex. A at 63 of 73).

Governing Legal Standard

Court orders and rules governing discovery “make a trial less a game of blindman’s bluff and 

more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent. Only 

strong public policies weigh against disclosure.” United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 

677, 682 (1958) (internal citation omitted). As a foundational component of civil discovery, Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 26 provides in relevant part that “a party must, without awaiting a discovery 

request, provide to the other parties: ... (ii) a copy – or a description by category and location – of all 

documents, electronically stored information, and tangible things that the disclosing party has in its 

possession, custody, or control and may use to support its claims or defenses, unless the use would be 

solely for impeachment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(ii).

Case 1:23-cv-01421-JLT-CDB Document 39 Filed 01/06/25 Page 3 of 10
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Separately, pursuant to Rule 26(e)(1)(A), “a party who has made a disclosure under Rule

26(a) – or who has responded to an interrogatory, request for production, or request for

admission – must supplement or correct its disclosure or response in a timely manner if the party 

learns that in some material respect the disclosure or response is incomplete or incorrect....” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 26(e)(1)(A).

Under Rule 37(c), a party that “fails to provide information or identify a witness as required by 

Rule 26(a) or (e)” may not “use that information or witness to supply evidence ... at a trial, unless the 

failure was substantially justified or is harmless.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). See Yeti by Molly, Ltd. v. 

Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Rule 37(c)(1) gives teeth to these 

requirements by forbidding the use at trial of any information required to be disclosed by Rule 26(a) 

that is not properly disclosed.”). “The Advisory Committee Notes describe it as a ‘self-executing,’ 

‘automatic’ sanction to ‘provide[ ] a strong inducement for disclosure of material....’” Id. (quoting 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 advisory committee’s note (1993)). “Among the factors that may properly guide a 

district court in determining whether a violation of a discovery deadline is justified or harmless are: (1) 

prejudice or surprise to the party against whom the evidence is offered; (2) the ability of that party to 

cure the prejudice; (3) the likelihood of disruption of the trial; and (4) bad faith or willfulness involved 

in not timely disclosing the evidence.” Lanard Toys Ltd. v. Novelty, Inc., 375 Fed. Appx. 705, 713 

(9th Cir. 2010) (citing David v. Caterpillar, Inc., 324 F.3d 851, 857 (7th Cir. 2003)). “The party facing 

sanctions bears the burden of proving that its failure to disclose the required information was 

substantially justified or harmless.” R & R Sails, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of Pa., 673 F.3d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 

2012).

The sanction of evidence exclusion is not mandatory under Rule 37(c)(1). See Bonzani v. 

Shinseki, No. 2:11-CV-0007-EFB, 2014 WL 66529, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2014) (finding Rule 

37(c)(1) exclusion sanctions are not mandatory, even when the insufficient disclosures are not 

substantially justified or harmless). A court’s decision to exclude evidence is discretionary and the 

court is given “particularly wide latitude ... to issue sanctions under Rule 37(c)(1).” Id.

///

///

Case 1:23-cv-01421-JLT-CDB Document 39 Filed 01/06/25 Page 4 of 10
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Discussion

1. Plaintiff Violated Rules 26(a) & (e)

Plaintiff’s disclosure of the Documents for the first time in his expert witness disclosure is not 

consistent with the requirement that a party supplement incomplete or incorrect disclosures made 

under Rule 26(a) “in a timely manner.” Plaintiff unquestionably possessed the Documents and was 

aware he intended for his expert witness to render opinions that rely in part on the Documents during 

nonexpert discovery. Thus, on August 22, 2024, Plaintiff deposed Defendant Schleicher, presented

one of the Documents to him (the stipulated judgment), and asked him questions about the stipulated 

judgment over counsel for Defendants’ objections. (Doc. 34-1, Declaration of Eric Morris “[Morris 

Decl.”], Ex. F.). Although he now characterizes the Documents as being critical to the success of his 

Monell claim (see Doc. 34 at 10), he did not identify the documents in his initial disclosures pursuant 

to Rule 26(a) (see Cohen Decl., Ex. 1) nor in any supplement to initial disclosures pursuant to Rule 

26(e) and did not produce the Documents until after making his expert witness disclosure. Further, 

Plaintiff did not identify the facts of the stipulated judgment or the internal affairs and annual monitor 

reports covered by the Documents in response to Defendants’ interrogatory requiring disclosure of all 

facts Plaintiff intends to rely upon in support of his Monell claim (see Cohen Decl., Ex. 2) nor in any 

supplemental interrogatory responses pursuant to Ruel 26(e).2

In response to Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff’s conduct summarized above violates Rule 

26, Plaintiff offers a variety of excuses. First, he argues that counsel for Defendants already possessed 

four of the five Documents in connection with their representation of Defendant BPD in an unrelated 

action (Doc. 34 at 3, citing Morris Decl., Ex. I). Second, he argues Defendants have “unclean hands” 

because they failed to produce the Documents in response to Plaintiff’s discovery demands that he 

claims required Defendants to produce the Documents. (Doc. 34 at, citing Morris Decl., Ex. A, 

Request for Production (“RFP”) Nos. 9 and 19). Third, he argues he satisfied any Rule 26(e) 

2 Although Defendants argue that their interrogatory directed toward Plaintiff’s Monell claim 

“specifically sought all documents that supported such claim” (Doc. 33 at 3), the interrogatory only 

directs Plaintiff to disclose the facts supporting the claim. See (Cohen Decl., Ex. 2, Interrogatory No. 

1).

Case 1:23-cv-01421-JLT-CDB Document 39 Filed 01/06/25 Page 5 of 10
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

supplemental disclosure duty because four of the Documents were identified in Mr. Warren’s expert 

witness disclosure well before the deadline to serve rebuttal reports and the Documents were the 

subject of examination during the deposition of Defendant Schleicher (see Morris Decl., Ex. F).3

None of Plaintiff’s counterarguments or cases cited in his opposition brief establish under the 

circumstances relevant here an exception to a party’s obligation under Rules 26(a) & (e) to timely 

supplement incomplete initial disclosures and discovery responses. First, Plaintiff is wrong in arguing 

that the mere availability of documents to a requesting party – either because counsel for the party 

received the documents in unrelated litigation or because the documents are publicly available –

relieves the producing party of its disclosure obligations. See (Doc. 34 at 5) (citing Macias v. Perez, 

No. 10cv976-MMA (BGS), 2011 WL 2669475, at *4 (S.D. Cal. July 7, 2011) (defendant’s challenge 

was to sufficiency of statement of disclosed expert’s opinions/reasons under Rule 26(a)(2)(B), not to 

plaintiff’s failure to make initial or supplemental disclosure/production of documents). Cf., Martino v. 

Kiewit New Mexico Corp., 600 Fed. Appx. 908, 911 (5th Cir. 2015) (“even if a document is publicly 

available or in the opposing party’s possession, a party must still disclose it under Rule 26(a)(1)(A) to 

provide notice of evidence central to its claims or defenses.”); Little v. City of Anniston, No. 1:15-CV954-VEH, 2016 WL 7407093, at *3-4 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 22, 2016) (“The Plaintiff cites no authority, and 

this Court has found none, for the proposition that a party is justified in failing to produce or identify a 

document in Rule 26(a) [disclosures] merely because that document was already in the possession of 

an opposing party.”). Likewise, the questioning of a single deponent about a single unproduced 

document (here, the stipulated judgment) does not excuse the questioning party from producing that

document or related documents (here, the related internal affairs and monitor reports) to the extent 

production is required under Rules 26(a) & (e).

In sum, the Court concludes that Plaintiff violated Rules 26(a) & (e) by withholding materials 

(the Documents) in his possession that he intends to use in support of his claims (Fed. R. Civ. P. 

3 Although Plaintiff separately argues that an expert witness may rely in forming his opinions 

on documents that properly are the subject of judicial notice (Doc. 34 at 11), even if that proposition is 

correct, Plaintiff cites no authority holding that this either excuses disclosure under Rule 26(a) or 

substantially justifies his nondisclosure of the Documents or otherwise ameliorates any harm 

Defendants suffered by the nondisclosure.

Case 1:23-cv-01421-JLT-CDB Document 39 Filed 01/06/25 Page 6 of 10
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

26(a)(1)(A)(ii)) and did not supplement his incomplete initial disclosures and responses to Defendants’ 

interrogatories in a timely manner (Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1)(A)).

2. The Rule 26 Violation Does Not Warrant Evidence Preclusion

Plaintiff does not argue that his belated disclosure of materials relied upon by Mr. Warren was 

substantially justified. To the extent Plaintiff intended to rely upon the same arguments he raises as to 

why the nondisclosure does not violate Rule 26(a) as grounds for finding the nondisclosure 

substantially justified, for the reasons set forth above, the Court finds Plaintiff fails to carry his burden 

of demonstrating substantial justification.

Instead, Plaintiff argues that any noncompliance by him under Rules 26(a) & (e) does not 

warrant preclusion of Mr. Warren’s opinions relating to the Documents because the noncompliance 

was harmless. First, he points out that Defendants received Mr. Warren’s expert report identifying the 

Documents on October 14, 2024, and, thus, had approximately one month within which to prepare a 

rebuttal expert report addressing the Documents (e.g., by November 12, 2024) and sufficient time to 

prepare for and examine Mr. Warren about the Documents during his deposition thereafter. (Doc. 34 at 

6-7). Second, he argues that Defendants fail to demonstrate any harm caused by the belated notice and 

production of the Documents. Third, he argues that Defendants (after learning about and challenging 

the relevance and nondisclosure of the Documents during the deposition Defendant Schleicher) should 

have but declined to file a motion to compel production of the Documents. (Doc. 34 at 7-8) (citing

inter alia Harvey v. District of Columbia, 949 F. Supp. 874, 877 (D.D.C. 1996); Casida v. Sears 

Holdings Corp., No. 1:11-cv-01052 AWI JLT, 2012 WL 3260423, at *3-4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2012); 

Holt v. Wesley Med. Ctr., LLC, No. 00-1318-JTM, 2006 WL 5556006, at *4-5 (D. Kan. Jan. 25, 

2006)).

Though none of Plaintiff’s proffered arguments individually renders his Rule 26 violation 

harmless, the undersigned is persuaded that a number of factors considered collectively sufficiently

ameliorate any resulting prejudice to Defendants. First, notwithstanding Defendants generally had 

notice of Plaintiff’s intent to use and rely upon the improperly withheld Documents on August 22, 

2024, when one of the Documents was the subject of examination during a defense deposition, and 

notwithstanding that counsel for Defendants objected to the examination on the grounds of Plaintiff’s 

Case 1:23-cv-01421-JLT-CDB Document 39 Filed 01/06/25 Page 7 of 10
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

nondisclosure of the Documents pursuant to Rule 26 (see Morris Decl., Ex. F, at 21-25, 60-61), 

Defendants did not move to compel Plaintiff to produce the Documents. Defendants decision to 

forego timely seeking the Court’s assistance through a motion to compel after suggesting Plaintiff’s 

nondisclosure of the stipulated judgment violated Rule 26 undermines their arguments concerning 

harm and prejudice. See, e.g., Casida, 2012 WL 3260423, at *4 (“Defendants should have taken 

adequate steps to protect their rights by seeking the Court’s assistance and intervention and their 

failure to do so now precludes them from excluding Ms. Gonzalez’[s] declaration.”).4

Second, prejudice was minimized because immediately after counsel for Defendants 

confronted Plaintiff’s counsel about the nondisclosure, Defendants received the Documents with 

sufficient time to prepare a rebuttal expert report and to depose Mr. Warren concerning his opinions 

related to the Documents. Thus, this case is unlike cases cited by Defendants finding evidence 

preclusion warranted, such as Greenwalt (Doc. 33-1 at 5), where the plaintiff disclosed a supplemental 

expert report some four months after expert discovery had closed and “just weeks before trial.” 2006 

WL 1688088, at *4-5 (D. Az. June 10, 2006). Cf. Krause v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., No. 2:18-cv00928 JAM AC, 2019 WL 13225251, at *5-6 (E.D. Cal. June 7, 2019) (opting “not to impose 

exclusionary sanctions in an effort to deter what could be perceived as an attempt to scuttle plaintiff’s 

case on procedural grounds when ample time remained to cure the nondisclosure.”); Forouzan v. 

BMW of N. Am., LLC, No. CV 17-3875-DMG (GJSx), 2018 WL 6016277, at *9 & n.6 (C.D. Cal. June 

27, 2018) (declining to preclude expert from testifying based on Rule 26 nondisclosure allegations 

where previously undisclosed materials were provided to counsel prior to expert’s deposition); In re 

Term Commodities Cotton Futures Litig., No. 12 CV 5126 (ALC) (KNF), 2018 WL 2021641, at *5 

(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2018) (same)

Third, while the undersigned acknowledges Defendants were disadvantaged by Plaintiff’s Rule 

26 violation, Defendants’ characterization of the resulting surprise and prejudice seems exaggerated. 

Though Defendants’ argument that their receipt of Plaintiff’s expert report was the first time they were 

4 For the same reason, Plaintiff’s suggestion that Defendants engaged in “chicanery” by not 

producing the Documents in response to his discovery demands (Doc. 34 at 2-3, 10) – an objection he 

raised during Defendant Schleicher’s deposition (Morris Decl., Ex. F at 60-61) – is meritless as he, 

too, declined to move the Court to compel Defendants to produce the documents.

Case 1:23-cv-01421-JLT-CDB Document 39 Filed 01/06/25 Page 8 of 10
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“put on notice” that Plaintiff intended to rely on the Documents in support of his Monell theory may 

be accurate (Doc. 37 at 5), Defendants had at least some familiarity with the theory. Plaintiff refers to 

the independent monitor in the allegations of his Monell claim (Complaint ¶ 181) and the stipulated

judgment was presented at and the subject of examination during the deposition of Defendant 

Schleicher more than two months prior to the close of nonexpert discovery. (Morris Decl., Ex. F). 

See Exeltis USA Inc. v. First Databank, Inc., No. 17-cv-04810-HSG, 2020 WL 7025089, at *3 (N.D. 

Cal. Nov. 20, 2020) (finding nondisclosure harmless; “Defendant was made aware of the existence of 

[the undisclosed] documents during [the expert’s] deposition on June 5, 2019. It had the opportunity 

to question Dr. Gorospe about them at that time and to request or seek identification of any such 

documents before the close of expert discovery”); Van Maanen v. Youth With a Mission-Bishop, 852 

F. Supp.2d 1232, 1237 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (“although Dr. Bloomer was not identified in University’s 

Rule 26(a) disclosures, his identity, position, location, and the subject of the information he possessed 

were made known to Plaintiff through the Fairley and Cunningham Depositions”); U.S. Axminster, 

Inc. v. Chamberlain, 176 F.R.D. 532, 534 (N.D. Miss. 1997) (finding plaintiff’s failure to disclose 

document harmless where existence of document was made known during deposition; “[s]ince the 

Defendant already knew about the agreement, the Plaintiff’s tardy disclosure of the agreement itself 

did not prejudice the Defendant during discovery”). Defense counsel’s assertion that they had not 

seen the annual reports of the monitor and internal affairs investigative report (Doc. 37 at 6) does not 

refute Plaintiff’s showing that counsel represented BPD in the underlying action resulting in the 

stipulated judgment and that service of four of the documents was made upon BPD (through counsel).

Coupled with counsel for Defendants’ long-time representation of the City of Bakersfield and 

BPD in civil rights actions involving claims of excessive force, the prejudice from any surprise that 

Plaintiff would base his Monell claim in part on recent and well publicized litigation involving related 

allegations of BPD’s practices largely is ameliorated. The Court acknowledges Defendants’ argument 

that Plaintiff’s late disclosure deprived them of the ability to undertake nonexpert discovery relating to 

the Documents, including by identifying witnesses knowledgeable about the Documents (Doc. 37 at 7-

8). However, that summary claim to prejudice without any details concerning what specifically 

Defendants would have done had Plaintiff timely disclosed the Documents is not a sufficient basis to 

Case 1:23-cv-01421-JLT-CDB Document 39 Filed 01/06/25 Page 9 of 10
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

exclude Mr. Warren’s opinions. See Razaghi v. Razaghi, No. 2:18-cv-01622-EJY, 2024 WL 4502888, 

at *5 (D. Nev. Oct. 15, 2024) (“Defendants say had the disclosures been timely made, they would have 

‘had the opportunity to change their discovery (pre-trial and trial) strategies ....’ ... Defendants offer 

no specific argument regarding what would have changed. The Court finds the general assertions of 

harm relating to discovery are so broad and without support that a finding of prejudice is not 

warranted.”)

Conclusion and Order

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ motion (Doc. 33) is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 6, 2025 ___________________ _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:23-cv-01421-JLT-CDB Document 39 Filed 01/06/25 Page 10 of 10