Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-06263/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-06263-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Tony Hedgpeth
Respondent
Elnorris Stone
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ELNORRIS STONE,

Petitioner,

v.

TONY HEDGPETH, Warden,

Respondent.

NO. C 07-6263 TEH (PR) 

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

AND DENYING CERTIFICATE

OF APPEALABILITY;

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE CLERK

I. INTRODUCTION

This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pro se by a state prisoner pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254. An Alameda County jury convicted Petitioner of first degree murder and

found true the allegation that he was armed with a firearm in the commission of the offense.

He was sentenced to twenty-six years to life in state prison.

The conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal by the Court of Appeal of

California, with a minor clarification of the restitution obligation. The Supreme Court of

California denied review. Petitioner’s state habeas petitions were denied.

On April 28, 2008, this Court dismissed the petition based on Petitioner’s

representation that he had not exhausted his claims in state court. Petitioner then filed a

motion seeking to stay the case pending the exhaustion of certain claims in state court, but

did not move to reopen the closed case. Shortly thereafter he filed a motion requesting

“directed nunc pro tunc” and filed an amended petition informing the Court that all of the

claims had now been exhausted. The Court construed Petitioner’s motion as a motion to

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1 Citations to “Ex.” are to exhibits in the record that respondent has lodged with the Court,

unless otherwise indicated.

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reopen the case, granted it, and ordered respondent to show cause why the petition should not

be granted.

Respondent has filed an answer and memorandum of points and authorities in support

of it, and has lodged the record with the Court. Petitioner has filed a traverse and a motion

for an evidentiary hearing. For the reasons set out below, the motion for an evidentiary

hearing and the petition will be denied.

II. FACTS

Petitioner and Romeo Yarborough were jointly charged with first degree murder. Ex.

5 (opinion of California Court of Appeal) at 19.1

 Yarborough moved to change his plea prior

to trial, so Petitioner was tried alone. Id. His first trial, in September of 2003, ended in a

mistrial when defense counsel’s wife died. Id. His second trial, which began in March of

2004, ended with his conviction. Id. 

The California Court of Appeal’s opinion contains an unusually extensive and very

detailed description of the testimony at trial. Id. at 1-19. Summarizing, at the time of the

offense Petitioner was living in Sacramento, but he formerly was a drug dealer in Oakland,

and his friend Romeo Yarborough still was. Id. at 2. Petitioner’s family owned a duplex on

a block of 52nd Avenue between International Boulevard and Bancroft Avenue. Id. He

periodically returned to the neighborhood to visit his family and see Yarborough. Id. On

one of these visits, Petitioner and Yarborough became aware of Noble Gardiner, the victim,

standing on 52nd Avenue, and approached him. Id. at 3. Gardiner had a pistol in his hand. 

Id. Yarborough, who knew Gardiner, introduced Petitioner; although Yarborough and

Gardiner were ostensibly friendly, both kept their guns out. Id. at 4-5. Yarborough had

earlier told Petitioner that Gardiner had shot a man named Leo Logwood, and bragged about

committed other shootings and murders. Id. at 4. The three adjourned to Gardiner’s

apartment to smoke marijuana. Id. at 5. The group broke up when Kenya Smith, Gardiner’s

girlfriend, came home. Id. at 6. 

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After Yarborough and Petitioner left, Gardiner was unable to find his cigarette lighter

and said to Smith that he believed one of the other two men had taken it. Id. at 7. He went

out and encountered Yarborough and Petitioner, who were standing inside a gate at

Petitioner’s family’s residence. Id. The conversation was tense, and Petitioner believed

Gardiner was attempting to position himself to keep both other men covered, although

Gardiner was not showing a gun. Id. at 7-8. At some point Petitioner decided to “walk

away;” he walked around the side of the building, but became anxious about his friend

Yarborough being alone with Gardiner, took his gun out, and returned to where Yarborough

and the victim were. Id. at 8-9. There, Yarborough and Gardiner appeared to be in some sort

of close confrontation; Petitioner spun Gardiner around, and saw that Gardiner had a gun

concealed in his “beanie” cap in his left hand. Id. at 9. Yarborough grabbed Gardiner’s gun

hand and kept him from shooting Petitioner. Id. Petitioner hit Gardiner in the face with his

gun, then opened fire. Id.

Appellant's version of the ensuing struggle was that Gardiner broke free from

Yarborough, still holding his pistol in his left hand, and started to bring it to

bear on appellant. Appellant grabbed Gardiner's wrist, and fired off at least one

more shot while they were struggling, but soon after that, his gun jammed and

would not fire any more. Meanwhile, Gardiner, who had apparently been hit in

the left shoulder, grabbed appellant with his right hand while continuing to try

to break his left wrist free from appellant's grasp. The two men then struggled

together toward the front steps of the house, where appellant tripped slightly on

the steps, allowing Gardiner to break his pistol hand free. Gardiner then

stepped one foot back and tried to shoot appellant, who was still holding

Gardiner's other shoulder.

At that point, appellant testified, Yarborough started shooting Gardiner, firing

at least three times, and appellant was able to regain his grasp on Gardiner's

gun hand, though he could not get the gun away from him. Gardiner responded

by grasping appellant's shoulder with his other hand, and pulled him back down

the walkway to the street. [FN13. Photographs of the crime scene taken by the

police, and introduced by the prosecution at trial, showed a trail of blood

leading from the front steps, through the front gate, and across the sidewalk to

the car where the body was found.] After Gardiner pulled appellant out

through the gate, Gardiner fell down near a car that was parked in front of the

house, and nearly pulled appellant down with him. By that time, Yarborough

had followed the other two men out of the front yard and was standing very

close to appellant, but was not still shooting at Gardiner. Appellant was able to

break away from Gardiner by bracing himself on the car when Gardiner fell,

and he then took a step back, grabbed Yarborough's gun, and shot Gardiner

twice in the head with it.

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Appellant testified that during the entire duration of the struggle, and even after

it was over, he believed that Gardiner was about to kill him, and that he had to

kill Gardiner in self-defense in order to prevent that from happening. He

explained that the reason he fired the last two shots was that when he had

hesitated to shoot earlier during the struggle, it had almost cost him and

Yarborough their lives. He stressed that the bullet wounds Gardiner received

did not seem to affect him, and that even after Gardiner had been shot

repeatedly and had fallen down near the car, Gardiner was still moving and

trying unsuccessfully to get up, and appellant “figured that if he had movement

in him[,] he would shoot me.” [FN14. This testimony was consistent with that

of the prosecution's pathologist, who testified . . . that Gardiner was still alive

at the time each of the gunshot wounds was inflicted on him, and that only the

final shots to the back of Gardiner's head would have incapacitated him

completely. Appellant also introduced testimony from an expert on the use of

deadly force in self-defense, who confirmed that it would not be unusual for a

person to continue to struggle violently after receiving several bullet wounds,

and even after being paralyzed from the waist down by a spinal cord wound.

The same expert opined that if the facts were as described by appellant,

appellant acted reasonably.] He acknowledged that he could not be sure

Gardiner had his gun pointed at him when he fired the last two shots, but

explained that at the time, he was no longer thinking, just reacting, and averred

that his decision to “wasn't a case of making a choice or anything like that. It

was reaction. Split-second, instantaneously survival [ sic ].”

Id. at 10-11. 

Petitioner claimed that the shooting was in self-defense. The evidence to the contrary

– the evidence that supports the verdict – includes that Gardiner got off no shots; that his gun

was found in his beanie cap near the gate, far from his body; and the testimony of a reluctant

witness, Juan Rodriguez, who heard the shots and saw a man who appeared to be Petitioner

walk a bit away from the scene, then return and fire a final shot into what the witness thought

was a car tire, but which in fact may have been the victim. 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Motion for Evidentiary Hearing

Petitioner has moved for an evidentiary hearing to introduce into the record the

exhibits he has filed in support of his petition and an exhibit attached to his traverse.

An evidentiary hearing is held in federal habeas cases only under the most limited

circumstances. Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1077-79 (9th Cir. 1999). An evidentiary

hearing on a claim for which the Petitioner failed to develop a factual basis in state court can

be held only if Petitioner shows that: (1) the claim relies either on (a) a new rule of

constitutional law that the Supreme Court has made retroactive to cases on collateral review,

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or (b) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise

of due diligence, and (2) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by

clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable fact finder

would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A)-

(B). In short, if Petitioner did not attempt to present in state court the facts he wishes to

present now, for instance by attempting to develop them in his state habeas proceedings, he

cannot do so now unless he can show that he meets the provisions of section 2254(e)(2)

outlined above. 

A prisoner "fails" to develop the factual basis of a claim, triggering § 2254(e)(2), if

"there is lack of diligence, or some greater fault, attributable to the prisoner or the prisoner's

counsel." Williams (Michael) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 432 (2000). "Diligence will require in

the usual case that the prisoner, at a minimum, seek an evidentiary hearing in state court in

the manner prescribed by state law." Id. at 437. Accordingly, where the prisoner has met the

burden of showing he was diligent in efforts to develop the facts supporting his claims in

state court, an evidentiary hearing may be held without regard to whether the "stringent"

requirements of § 2254(e)(2) apply. Id. at 437; Jaramillo v. Stewart, 340 F.3d 877, 882 (9th

Cir. 2003); Jones v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1002, 1013 (9th Cir. 1997).

It is Petitioner's burden to show that he attempted to develop the facts in state court

but was prevented from doing so. Hutchison v. Bell, 303 F.3d 720, 747 (6th Cir. 2002)

(requiring Petitioner to demonstrate "sufficient diligence"); Baja, 187 F.3d at 1078-79. 

Petitioner does not demonstrate in his motion that he acted with due diligence in

attempting to develop the facts in state court, whether by requesting an evidentiary hearing in

state court or submitting declarations there. He thus has failed to develop facts in state court,

and because he has not attempted to show that the exceptions of Section 2254(e)(2)(A)-(B)

apply to him, is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. 

Furthermore, in ruling on issues where the attachments are relevant, such as those

involving the declarations of Rodriguez and Segura, the Court has taken the attachments into

account and nevertheless concluded that the claims are without merit. Thus, even if

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Petitioner had shown that he attempted to develop the facts in state court and was prevented

from doing so, he would not be entitled to an evidentiary hearing under the pre-AEDPA

standard. See Williams v. Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995) (to establish right to

evidentiary hearing, Petitioner must provide allegations of fact that, if proven, would

establish right to relief). 

The motion for an evidentiary hearing will be denied. 

B. Merits

As grounds for habeas relief, Petitioner asserts that: (1) his counsel was ineffective in

failing to call Yarborough as a witness; (2) the prosecution violated his due process rights by

failing to turn over exculpatory evidence about a shooting in which the victim may have been

involved (the “Bancroft shooting”) until after the trial; (3) the prosecution violated his due

process rights by failing to turn over Bancroft shooting evidence at the preliminary hearing;

(4) the prosecution violated his due process rights by failing to turn over all the exculpatory

evidence from the Bancroft shooting; (5) counsel was ineffective in failing to discover

information about the Bancroft shooting; (6) the trial court’s denial of Petitioner’s motion for

more information about a altercation in which the victim was involved while incarcerated

violated his rights; (7) the prosecution violated his due process rights by failing to turn over a

diagram of the shooting scene; (8) counsel was ineffective in cross-examination of

Rodriguez; (9) the prosecution knowingly used perjured testimony; (10) there was

insufficient evidence to support the conviction; (11) his rights were violated in connection

with the trial court’s failure to give an instruction on inability to withdraw from mutual

combat; (12) his rights were violated by the failure to give the instruction involved in claim

eleven insofar as it had an impact on his “imperfect self-defense” argument; (13) his rights

were violated by the failure to give the instruction involved in claim eleven in that it affected

the mutual combat instructions; (14) his rights were violated by the trial court’s failure to

give a proposed instruction on the victim’s violent character; (15) his counsel had a conflict

///

///

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2 “So named after People v. Marsden, 2 Cal. 3d 118 (1970), it is a motion permitting a

defendant to articulate why he is dissatisfied with his court-appointed counsel and why counsel

should be relieved.” McNeely v. Blanas, 336 F.3d 822, 825 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2003).

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at a Marsden2

 hearing and in preparing a motion for new trial; (16) his appellate counsel was

ineffective in not raising the claims presented here on appeal; (17) his trial counsel was

ineffective in not asking for a continuance until after a co-defendant was sentenced; (18)

some jurors were biased, the prosecutor discriminated in his use of peremptory strikes, and

defense counsel was ineffective in not objecting to the discriminatory use of peremptory

strikes; (19) the superior court violated his rights by denying his motion for a transcript of

jury voir dire and for copies of the juror questionnaires; and (20) his trial counsel was

ineffective in not locating a witness named Felix Segura and in not calling him to testify. 

1. Standard of Review

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) limits the authority of

federal courts to issue a writ of habeas corpus. Under AEDPA, a district court may only

grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the basis of a claim that was

"adjudicated on the merits" in state court if the state court's adjudication of the claim (1)

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2)

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first prong

of the Act applies both to questions of law and to mixed questions of law and fact. Williams

v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407-07 (2001). The second prong applies to decisions based on

factual determinations. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 332, 339 (2003).

A state court has "adjudicated" a Petitioners claim on the merits for purposes of

2254(d) when it has decided the Petitioner's right to post-conviction relief on the basis of the

substance of the constitutional claim advanced, rather than denying the claim on the basis of

a procedural or other rule precluding state court review on the merits. Lambert v. Blodgett,

393 F.3d 943, 969 (9th Cir. 2004). It is error for a federal court to review de novo a claim

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that was adjudicated on the merits in state court. See Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 638-43

(2003). 

“Clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States . . . refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court’s decisions

as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. The "some

evidence" standard identified in Hill is clearly established federal law in the parole context

for AEDPA purposes. Sass v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1128-29 (9th

Cir. 2006). “Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the

state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a

question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has

on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. Additionally, a

state court decision is contrary to federal law if it “applies a rule that contradicts the

governing law.” Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (per curiam). Importantly, state court

decisions are not required to cite Supreme Court cases, “so long as neither the reasoning nor

the result of the state-court decision contradicts them.” Id. 

“Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the

writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme]

Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.”

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court

decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously and incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. Whether the state court’s decision was

unreasonable must be assessed in light of the record that court had before it. Holland v.

Jackson, 542 U.S. 649, 651 (2004) (per curiam). Moreover, the “unreasonable application”

clause is objective, and the federal court should ask only if it the state court decision was

reasonable, not whether other federal courts have applied federal law in the same manner as

the state court. Williams, 529 U.S. at 409.

/// 

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A federal court reviewing a state prisoner’s habeas corpus petition may also grant the

writ if it concludes that the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). An unreasonable determination of the facts

occurs where the state court fails to consider and weigh highly probative relevant evidence,

central to Petitioner’s claim, that was properly presented and made part of the state-court

record. Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1005 (9th Cir. 2004). A district court must

presume correct any determination of a factual issue made by a state court unless the

Petitioner rebuts the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(e)(1).

2. Failure to Call Yarborough

Petitioner contends that his counsel was ineffective in failing in failing to call

Yarborough as a witness. This is ground one in the Amended Petition. 

a. Standard

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is cognizable as a claim of denial of the

Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which guarantees not only assistance, but effective

assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). In order to

prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness of counsel claim, Petitioner must establish that

counsel's performance was deficient, i.e., that it fell below an "objective standard of

reasonableness" under prevailing professional norms. Id. at 687-88. Second, he must

establish that he was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance, i.e., that "there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id.

It is unnecessary for a federal court considering a habeas ineffective assistance claim

to address the prejudice prong of the Strickland test if the Petitioner cannot even establish

incompetence under the first prong. Siripongs v. Calderon, 133 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir.

1998). Similarly, a court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient

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before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as the result of the alleged

deficiencies. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.

b. Analysis

Romeo Yarborough was Petitioner’s co-defendant, but he pled guilty to voluntary

manslaughter on September 11, 2003, before the first trial was to begin. Petitioner’s motion

to postpone commencement of the first trial until after Yarborough’s sentencing was denied. 

Yarborough still had not been sentenced when the second trial began on March 17, 2004. 

The record contains orders signed by the trial judge on the 17th and 18th of 2004, ordering

Yarborough transported to court, but he did not testify.

One ground for Petitioner’s post-trial Marsden motion was that counsel failed to call

Yarborough. At the hearing on the motion, Petitioner contended that Yarborough would

have supported his self-defense claim if called. Ex. 4C at 740. Petitioner contended that

defense counsel told him that Yarborough did not want to testify and did not support

Petitioner’s story, whereas a defense investigator “said that [Yarborough] did want to

testify.” Id. The investigator was present at the Marsden hearing, and when asked by the

court whether that was correct, said: “We had a number of conversations back and forth. 

Mr. Yarborough probably would have testified perhaps but there was a question whether he

was going to testify or not. There was a question whether he was going to take the Fifth, a

number of issues were going on with Mr. Yarborough. I believe Mr. Pyle spoke with him

and in that conversation it was determined that he would not be helpful to Mr. Stone’s

defense.” Id. 

The trial court held that the decision was a trial tactic “that I’m not going to second

guess Mr. Pyle on.” Id. This was the only reasoned state court ruling on this claim, hence is

the one that Petitioner must show was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States,” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” See 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d).

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 The declaration is dated May 16, 2006, long after Yarborough’s sentencing on

December 13, 2004, and long after Petitioner’s trial in March of 2004. It thus was made

when Yarborough no longer faced the pressures he did at the time of Petitioner’s trial. 

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 Petitioner has provided a declaration from Yarborough. Pet., Ex. Q. Assuming for

the sake of decision that it can be considered here, it provides no new information. The

declaration for the most part conforms very closely to the summary of Petitioner’s testimony

that the court of appeal used as the basis for its statement of the facts, which in turn was the

basis for this court’s facts as set out above. 

As was brought out at the Marsden hearing, Yarborough says in his statement that he

had told a defense investigator that he was willing to testify. Yarborough then says:

Mr. Stone’s lawyer Walter [P]yle, summoned me from San Quentin prison

in order to testify on Mr. Stone’s behalf. However, when I arrived in court on

the day of the trial only moments before it started, Mr. Pyle asked me some

questions. I felt uncomfortable because I didn’t know what my rights were in

this situation, my lawyer was not present to advise me and I was concerned that

the D.A. might take my deal away if I testified. I told Mr. Pyle all the things

that I have stated in above statement & was prepared to testify before the court

as to the truth of this matter, however I was not called to testify and was given

no expl[a]nation as to the reason for the inconv[enie]nce.

Id.

The quoted portion of the declaration is somewhat inconsistent, in that Yarborough

seems to have been at least reluctant to testify, but also says that he was prepared to do so.3

In determining whether it was deficient performance for counsel not to call Yarborough, the

ambiguous declaration must be set against the fact that counsel interviewed Yarborough and

made a conscious decision not to call him, and that Yarborough’s testimony would have done

no more than confirm that of Petitioner himself. Such testimony would have been of little

value, since it would come from a person who clearly was deeply involved in the crime. On

these facts, the decision not to call Yarborough was not deficient performance, and because if

he had been called he would have done no more than provide weak support for Petitioner’s

version of events, the failure to call him was not prejudicial. And certainly the state courts’

rejections of this claim were not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearlyestablished United States Supreme Court authority. 

 3. Late Disclosure of Information About Bancroft Avenue Shooting

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In his second ground for relief, Petitioner contends that the prosecutor failed to turn

over evidence of a shooting at 96th and Bancroft in Oakland, in which the victim, Gardiner,

may have been implicated, until after the trial. 

In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the Supreme Court held that "the

suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due

process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the

good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Id. at 87. The Supreme Court has since made

clear that the duty to disclose such evidence applies even when there has been no request by

the accused, United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976), and that the duty encompasses

impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence, United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S.

667, 676 (1985). Evidence is “material” under Brady "if there is a reasonable probability

that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have

been different. A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence

in the outcome." Id. at 682. “There are three components of a true Brady violation: [t]he

evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or

because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either

willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S.

263, 281-82 (1999). 

Gardiner’s resume was found in a car involved in the 96th and Bancroft shooting and

two witnesses said that someone named “C” opened fire on two victims. Gardiner went by

the nickname “C-note.” This information could have been relevant to Petitioner’s state of

mind, to the question whether he acted in self-defense, but only if there was evidence that

Petitioner was aware of the 96th and Bancroft shooting at the time of the murder. There is no

evidence in the record that Petitioner was aware of that shooting, so the evidence that was not

disclosed was not material for that reason. In addition, the parties entered into a stipulation

that the victim had bragged to his girlfriend about having shot Leo Logwood, a friend of

Petitioner and of Yarborough, and of having committed the Bancroft shootings. Ex. 4C at

540. This stipulation, and the information that the victim was a drug dealer and had

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threatened Petitioner and Yarborough, was before the jury. In light of this, even if the State’s

information about the Bancroft shooting had been turned over, the result of the proceeding

would not have been different – that is, the information was not material. See Bagley, 473

U.S. at 682 (definition of “material” for Brady purposes).

For these reasons, the rejections of this claim by the state courts were not contrary to,

or unreasonable applications of, clearly-established United States Supreme Court authority. 

4. Preliminary Hearing Brady claim 

In ground three, Petitioner contends that it was a Brady violation for the prosecution

not to turn over the evidence about the Bancroft shooting in time for the preliminary hearing. 

The Court has determined above that information about the Bancroft shooting was not

material, so failure to turn it over, whether in time for trial or in time for the preliminary

hearing, was not a constitutional violation. This claim is without merit.

5. Undisclosed Brady Material

In ground four, Petitioner speculates that there must have been additional information

about the Bancroft shooting that was never turned over. Petitioner has failed to establish that

there was evidence that was not turned over. Furthermore, the analysis in section two, above,

shows that information about the Bancroft shooting was not material, and that analysis also

applies to this claim. This claim is without merit.

6. Counsel’s Failure to Discover Facts of Bancroft Shooting

In ground five, Petitioner contends that counsel was ineffective in not discovering the

facts of the Bancroft shooting. The standard set out above in section 2(a) for ineffective

assistance claims applies to this claim. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 694

(1984) (to prevail on an ineffectiveness of counsel claim, Petitioner must establish that

counsel's performance was deficient and that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."). 

Because there is no evidence that Petitioner knew of the Bancroft shooting at the time of his

confrontation with Gardiner, and because the Bancroft information was not material, he

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could not have been prejudiced by any hypothetical failure of counsel to discover it. This

claim is without merit. 

7. Request for Prison Information

Before Petitioner’s first trial, the trial court reviewed the victim’s prison record. It

contained a record of a fight between the victim and another prisoner in 2002. The prison

record evidently quoted Gardiner as saying that he and the other prisoner had just been

“messing around,” and that they were friends. The court declined to reveal the name of the

other prisoner to counsel so counsel could contact him to determine whether Gardiner had

been the aggressor. Petitioner’s sixth ground for relief in the Amended Petition is that the

refusal of the court at the first trial to release the information violated his rights under Brady,

his right to compulsory process, and his right to effective assistance of counsel. Pet. P&A

48-49.

 The second and third grounds are frivolous; in the absence of a similar request at the

second trial, his right to compulsory process was not triggered, and the court at the second

trial did nothing with respect to this issue that hampered his counsel’s representation. And

although it apparently is true that the prosecution did not turn over the prison records as

Brady material at the time of the second trial, even if the other prisoner involved in the

incident could have been contacted and had blamed Gardiner as the aggressor, that relatively

minor piece of information would not have created a reasonable probability that, had the

evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been

different. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682. This claim is without merit.

8. Suppression of Diagram

In his seventh ground for relief, Petitioner contends that his Brady rights were violated

by the prosecution’s failure to turn over a diagram of the shooting scene which he believes

must have existed. Petitioner has not established the existence of such a diagram, so this

claim is without merit. 

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9. Cross-Examination of Rodriguez

In his eighth ground for relief, Petitioner contends that his attorney was ineffective in

his cross-examination of witness Rodriguez. The standard set out above in section 2(a) for

ineffective assistance claims applies here. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686,

694 (1984) (to prevail on an ineffectiveness of counsel claim, Petitioner must establish that

counsel's performance was deficient and that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."). 

Rodriguez was the only witness to the shooting who was not a member of Petitioner’s

family. The California Court of Appeal set out the facts regarding his testimony:

The eyewitness whose testimony was most damaging to appellant's case was

Juan Rodriguez, who testified at the trial through an interpreter.

Rodriguez was a carpenter who was remodeling a house on 52nd Avenue

during December 2002. On December 5, 2002, he was working on the house

late in the evening, when it was dark out, with his wife and children present in

the house. He testified that he heard two shots from inside the house, and then

looked out the window, but saw nothing. He then went into another room in the

house where his wife was, heard two more shots, and looked out the window

again. He then saw two men next to a car, near the tire, and “a light like a little

flame coming out right next to the tire of the car” when the taller of the two

men [FN16. Appellant is a few inches taller than Yarborough.] fired the fifth

and last shot. Rodriguez did not see anyone other than the two men, and

thought that they had just fired at the car tire.

Rodriguez testified that the taller man walked away, turned around and walked

back to the car to fire the final shot, and then walked away again with the other

man, laughing. He also said that before firing the final shot, the tall man made a

backward motion with his hands, as if pulling a gun out of his waistband, but

acknowledged that he did not actually see the gun. At an earlier hearing,

however, Rodriguez had testified that only seconds elapsed between the fourth

shot and the fifth shot.

Rodriguez testified that at the time of the shooting, he recognized the two men

as the same ones he had seen in the area two days earlier, when they asked him

for a cigarette and a light, but that by the time of trial, he no longer

remembered what they looked like, except that one was taller and

darker-skinned, and the other was shorter and lighter-skinned. [FN17. A police

officer who interviewed Rodriguez on December 19, 2002, testified that at that

time, Rodriguez said he had seen a tall person with a dark face standing over

the victim, with another person next to him, and that he had seen these two men

in the neighborhood prior to the shooting.] He did not identify appellant when

shown a photo lineup containing appellant's photograph, and did not recognize

appellant as the shooter at the trial.

Rodriguez testified at trial that when he was shown a photo lineup, he

identified one of the photographs as resembling, but not necessarily being, the

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shooter. [FN18. This testimony was corroborated by one of the officers who

were present at the time Rodriguez viewed the photo lineup.] The photograph

Rodriguez identified in this manner did not depict either appellant or

Yarborough. Rodriguez admitted that at appellant's earlier trial, he had testified

that he was “a hundred percent sure” that the photograph depicted the shooter,

but contended that he had meant to say he was a hundred percent sure that the

photograph resembled the shooter. Rodriguez had testified at appellant's

preliminary hearing, at which he did not have the assistance of an interpreter,

that the man who did the shooting was the lighter-skinned of the two men, but

at trial, he denied having made that statement. At trial, he recalled that the

shooter was the taller and darker of the two men.

Rodriguez acknowledged at trial that it was dark out at the time of the shooting,

and that it was not possible to really see clearly outside through the closed

window of the living room, in which the lights were on. He said that there was

moonlight at the time, but the court later took judicial notice of the fact that on

the day of the shooting, the moon set at 6:14 p.m. Appellant's investigator

testified that the distance from the front steps of the house Rodriguez was

working on to the location where Gardiner's body was found was 160 feet, but

acknowledged on cross-examination that the area in front of appellant's family

home was visible from the window through which Rodriguez said he observed

the shooting.

In his defense case, appellant presented the testimony of the police officer who

interviewed Rodriguez on the night of the crime. The officer's notes indicated

that Rodriguez told him he had heard five loud pops, and that his wife had then

looked out the window and said she saw two men walking away from the area.

Rodriguez then looked out the window himself, and saw two men he

recognized from seeing them hanging around in the area during the previous

couple of days. The men walked until they reached the house across the street

from the one in which Rodriguez was working, and then ran through its yard in 

a westbound direction. Rodriguez was able to describe the two men. The

officer described Rodriguez as being nervous and somewhat rattled during the

interview, and in a hurry to leave the area, and although he spoke enough

English to communicate with the officer, he sometimes had to search for words

to use to describe things. [FN19. Rodriguez also described himself as having

been extremely nervous when he spoke to the officer, and did not remember

very well what he had said. He testified on direct examination that he did not

read his statement before signing it, but admitted on cross-examination that he

had looked it over. He admitted at first that the officer had read at least some

parts of the statement to him before he signed it, as he had testified at the

earlier trial, but then said he did not remember whether this had occurred or

not.] During the interview, which lasted about 15 minutes, Rodriguez never

mentioned having actually seen anyone doing any shooting.

Ex. 5 at 12-13.

This ground for relief contains two separate claims. Counsel did impeach Rodriguez

on a number of points, namely that at the preliminary hearing Rodriguez had identified

Yarborough as the shooter, had told police that he did not see the shooting, had claimed to be

100% certain that a person he picked out of a photo array – who was neither Petitioner nor

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Yarborough – was the shooter, and had not mentioned at the preliminary hearing his trial

claim that the shooter walked away from the victim’s body, then returned to fire another shot. 

Petitioner contends, however, that counsel was ineffective in not “demonstrating through

questioning that the inconsistencies were not innocent,” Pet. P&A at 52, but rather were lies

meant to aid the prosecution. Petitioner suggests that this could have been done by asking

Rodriguez to “explain” the inconsistencies, something experienced litigators know is not 

good cross-examination. Doing so would not have been any more effective than what

counsel did, namely bring out inconsistencies from which the jury could have concluded that

Rodriguez was a liar. This subclaim is without merit. 

The other subclaim in this ground for relief is a contention that counsel was

ineffective in not using cross-examination to point out prior inconsistent statements by 

Rodriguez. The first of these is that Rodriguez identified Yarborough as the shooter at the

preliminary hearing, but at trial identified Petitioner. Id. at 6e. Defense counsel did,

however, bring that out in his cross-examination. Ex. 4A at 203-04. Petitioner also contends

that counsel should have elicited that Rodriguez had “little or no difficulty understanding

questions at the preliminary hearing,” which would have undermined the prosecution’s

theory that Rodriguez’s flip-flop as to the identity of the shooter was becuase of a language

barrier. Pet. at 6e. Petitioner provides no basis for the contention that Rodriguez had no

language difficulty at the preliminary hearing; the bare transcript references he provides do

not prove or disprove the point, because a witness’s difficulty understanding would not

necessarily appear in the record, and a reading of the entire examination and crossexamination of Rodriguez in fact reveals many misunderstandings and communication

difficulties. 

Petitioner also contends that counsel was ineffective in not asking Rodriguez why he

had initially failed to mention that Petitioner walked away from the victim, then came back

and fired again, and in not “impeaching” Rodriguez with the fact that the prosecutor had to

lead him to obtain that testimony. The prosecutor’s questions at the preliminary hearing

would not have been a proper basis for impeachment, not being a prior inconsistent statement

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by the witness, and it is generally not effective representation to ask “why” in crossexamination. 

Petitioner also contends that counsel should have impeached Rodriguez with his

inconsistent statements about whether he saw a muzzle flash from the gun; his inability to

identify Petitioner at trial, after identifying him at the preliminary hearing; and his statement

at the preliminary hearing that he’d seen a body or “shadow” falling, which was inconsistent

with his trial testimony that he did not see anyone other than Petitioner and Yarborough. 

As to the last two of these three, clearly it would have been counterproductive to

emphasize testimony unfavorable to Petitioner, even if inconsistent, by repeating it as a

cross-examination question. As to the muzzle flash, Petitioner is correct that the witness said

in the preliminary hearing that he did not see a gun flash, Ex. 1A at 113, and at trial that he

did, Ex. 4A at 180, 199. Counsel did, however, effectively used the many other

inconsistencies between Rodriguez’s preliminary hearing testimony and his trial testimony. 

See Ex. 4A at 197-204. The failure to use the gun flash inconsistency was quintessentially

the sort of tactical decision by counsel which the Court should not second-guess. See Bashor

v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1241 (9th Cir. 1984) (tactical decisions are not ineffective

assistance simply because in retrospect better tactics are known to have been available). 

For these reasons, counsel was not ineffective in his cross-examination of Rodriguez

10. Perjured Testimony

In his ninth claim, Petitioner contends that admission of Rodriguez’s allegedly

perjured testimony violated his due process rights. 

"[A] conviction obtained by the knowing use of perjured testimony is fundamentally

unfair, and must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony

could have affected the judgment of the jury." United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103

(1976); see also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678-80 (1985) ("Deliberate deception

of the court by the presentation of false evidence is incompatible with rudimentary demands

of justice" and a resulting conviction must be set aside "if there is any reasonable likelihood

that the false testimony could have affected the jury verdict.").

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Prosecutors will not be held accountable for discrepancies in testimony where there is

no evidence from which to infer prosecutorial misconduct. United States v. Zuno-Arce, 44

F.3d 1420, 1423 (9th Cir.1995). Here, it is undisputed that there were inconsistencies

between Rodriguez’s statement to police at the time of the offense, his testimony at the

preliminary hearing, and his testimony at trial. Petitioner has not, however, established that

any of the testimony was a deliberate lie, nor that it was the testimony at trial, as opposed to

the other testimony, that was untrue. But most importantly, even if it is assumed for purposes

of decision that the testimony at trial was untrue, Petitioner has not established that the

prosecution knew it. This claim is without merit. See Morales v. Woodford, 388 F.3d 1159,

1179 (9th Cir.2004) (factual basis for attributing knowledge to the government that the

testimony was perjured must be established).

11. Sufficiency of the Evidence

In his tenth ground for relief, Petitioner contends that there was insufficient evidence

to disprove self-defense and prove premeditation and deliberation. 

The Due Process Clause "protects the accused against conviction except upon proof

beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is

charged." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). A state prisoner who alleges that the

evidence in support of his state conviction cannot be fairly characterized as sufficient to have

led a rational trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt therefore states a

constitutional claim, Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 321 (1979), which, if proven, entitles

him to federal habeas relief, id. at 324. The federal court determines only whether, "after

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 319. 

Only if no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,

may the writ be granted. Id. at 324. 

Here, Petitioner’s own evidence was that he walked away from the confrontation, but

once he got around the side of the house changed his mind, drew his gun, and returned to the

scene. Petitioner does not dispute that he fired the last two shots into the victim’s head at

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close range, and Rodriguez’s evidence would support the conclusion that Petitioner paused,

then decided to finish off the victim execution-style. And the victim’s gun was found,

unfired, some distance from where he fell when his spinal cord was severed. 

Rodriguez’s statements to the police, at the preliminary hearing, and at trial were

undoubtedly inconsistent, but when considering a sufficiency of the evidence claim the Court

must “view[] the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,” id. at 319, so must

assume that the jury believed the prosecution witnesses. The evidence summarized above

was sufficient to support the verdict. 

12. Failure to Instruct on Inability to Withdraw

In his eleventh ground for relief, Petitioner contends that his due process rights were

violated when the trial court did not give the jury an instruction. He also contends that his

counsel was ineffective in failing to request it. Because counsel did in fact request the

instruction, the ineffective assistance part of this claim clearly is without merit. See Ex. 1D

at 823-25; 4C at 634-35. 

This issue was raised on direct appeal. The California Court of Appeal explained the

context:

Finally, appellant argues that even if warranted, the mutual combat instruction

was incomplete and therefore misleading. His argument rests largely on

[People v.] Quach [(2004)] 116 Cal.App.4th 294. In Quach, a group of people

composed of members of two rival gangs emerged from a bar. An argument

broke out between the defendant and a member of the rival gang. Shots were

exchanged between both men. The eyewitness accounts failed to agree as to

who drew a weapon first, but there was substantial evidence that the rival drew

first, and perhaps even fired, before the defendant drew his gun. Based on this

specific set of facts, Division Three of the Fourth District determined that

CALJIC No. 5.56 had probably misled the jury by omitting an exception to the

general rule requiring mutual combatants or initial aggressors to withdraw in

order to regain the right to self-defense. [FN31. CALJIC No. 5.56 was

subsequently revised in light of Quach, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th 294. (CALJIC

No. 5.56 (2004 Re-revision).) The mutual combat instruction included in the

Judicial Council Criminal Jury Instructions also includes an optional paragraph

reflecting the holding in Quach, to be used, when the facts warrant, in both

initial aggressor and mutual combat situations. (CALCRIM No. 3471.)] This

exception is that “ ‘when a defendant engages in a simple assault and his

opponent responds with deadly force so suddenly that the person cannot

withdraw, a defendant may immediately use deadly force in self-defense.’ “

(Id. at p. 301.)

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Here, one possible view of the evidence is that appellant committed a simple

assault by grabbing Gardiner's shoulder, and that Gardiner suddenly responded

with deadly force by raising his previously concealed gun and pointing at

appellant, giving appellant no opportunity to withdraw. Under this view of the

evidence, the Quach exception then came into play, and appellant became

entitled to respond with deadly force in self-defense. Thus, the facts of this case

may well have justified including in the instruction the Quach exception, as

appellant's trial counsel requested.

Nonetheless, we find the error harmless. Even if appellant initially started

shooting Gardiner out of self-defense, the jury's rejection of appellant's

self-defense claim, and its finding of premeditated murder, reflect a finding that

by the time appellant fired the final, fatal shots, Gardiner had been disabled,

and appellant had thus lost his right to continue to use deadly force. (See

CALJIC Nos. 5.52, 5.53.) It is therefore not reasonably probable that including

the Quach proviso in the mutual combat instruction would have resulted in an

outcome more favorable to appellant.

Ex. 5 at 30-31.

A state trial court's refusal to give an instruction does not alone raise a ground

cognizable in a federal habeas corpus proceedings. Dunckhurst v. Deeds, 859 F.2d 110, 114

(9th Cir. 1988). The error must so infect the trial that the defendant was deprived of the fair

trial guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The omission of an instruction is less

likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement of the law. Walker v. Endell, 850 F.2d 

850 F.2d 470, 475-76 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. at 155). Thus, a

habeas Petitioner whose claim involves a failure to give a particular instruction bears an

"'especially heavy burden.'" Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 624 (9th Cir. 1997)

(quoting Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 155 (1977)). 

Here, it is established by the court of appeal’s opinion that the trial court’s failure to to

give Petitioner’s proposed addition to the instructions was state law error. The reasons upon

which the court of appeal relied for concluding that the error was harmless, however, also

establish that failure to give the instruction did not so infect the trial as to deprive Petitioner

of a fair trial. That is, the fact that the jury found Petitioner guilty of premeditated murder

and rejected his self-defense argument on the instructions that were given means that, on

these facts, the proposed addition to the self-defense instruction was surplusage. The failure

to give it thus could not have deprived Petitioner of a fair trial. This claim is without merit.

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 13. Imperfect Self-Defense

In his twelfth ground for relief, Petitioner contends that the trial court’s failure to give

the additional instruction discussed in section twelve, above, also had the effect of denying

him the benefit of a concept under California law known as “imperfect self-defense.” 

Imperfect self-defense occurs when a defendant subjectively believes in the need to defend,

but that belief or the resulting conduct is unreasonable. Ex. 5 at 27. The trial court’s failure

to give the proposed addition did not affect the fairness of the trial for the reason discussed

above, so this claim is without merit.

14. Mutual Combat Instructions

In this thirteenth ground for relief, Petitioner contends that the trial court’s failure to

give the additional instruction discussed in section twelve, above, also had the effect of

undermining a jury instruction that includes a provision restricting application of self-defense

in mutual combat situations. See CALJIC 5.56. The trial court’s failure to give the proposed

addition did not affect the fairness of the trial for the reason discussed above, so this claim is

without merit. 

15. Instruction on Decedent's Violent Character

Petitioner’s fourteenth ground for relief is a claim that his rights were violated by the

trial court’s failure to give his requested instruction that a decedent’s character for violence

“in the form of specific instances of conduct and opinions of people who knew his reputation

may be considered by you as relevant to the issue of whether Noble Gardiner was acting in

conformity with his character trait for violence. . . .” Ex. 1D at 795. The California Court of

Appeal held that failure to give the instruction was state law error, but that the error was

harmless:

As is clear from our statement of the facts, appellant was permitted to introduce

ample evidence tending to prove Gardiner's violent character. The jury was

given guidance as to the import of this evidence by appellant's pinpoint

instruction which was given, and which told the jury that it could consider

Gardiner's past threats and harmful acts against appellant and others in

determining the reasonableness of appellant's beliefs and conduct. Although

this instruction did not expressly use the term “violent character,” it did

implicitly permit the jury to consider Gardiner's character, as demonstrated by

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the evidence of his past behavior, in determining whether appellant's fear of

Gardiner was reasonable.

Moreover, appellant's trial counsel repeatedly drew the jury's attention to

Gardiner's violent character in his closing argument. He stressed that Gardiner

“claimed to be a shooter and a killer”; noted that Gardiner told appellant and

Yarborough “how tough a guy he was, [and that] he shoots people”; drew

inferences from Gardiner's tattoos about “what kind of guy” he was; and

reminded the jury of Smith's testimony that Gardiner had several guns, and

always carried one with him.

In addition, the jury was instructed not only on self-defense, but also on

imperfect self-defense, using CALJIC 5.17. Under this instruction, if the jury

believed that appellant subjectively feared Gardiner, but deemed that fear

unreasonable, it would have convicted him of voluntary manslaughter rather

than first-degree murder. Conversely, the jury's verdict finding appellant guilty

of first-degree murder implies that it rejected appellant's testimony that he

believed he was acting in self-defense. If the jury had believed appellant's

description of his own state of mind, but found his fear of Gardiner or his

resulting conduct unreasonable, the refused instructions on Gardiner's violent

character would have had more bearing on the jury's decision, because the

instructions were directly relevant to the reasonableness of appellant's beliefs

and actions. The first-degree murder verdict, however, implies that the jury

simply did not believe that appellant was motivated solely by self-defense

when he killed Gardiner. (See People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, 874

(Crandell ), disapproved on another ground in People v. Crayton (2002) 28

Cal.4th 346, 364-365 [finding errors in jury instructions on self-defense

harmless, where jury's verdict finding murders to have been committed with

premeditation and deliberation “indicate[d] a complete rejection of the

evidence on which defendant relied to establish self-defense”].) As to the

fundamental question whether defendant's self-defense claim was credible, the

rejected instructions did not materially add to the self-defense instructions that

were actually given.

For all of the foregoing reasons, even if the trial court erred in refusing to give

the victim's violent character and awareness of victim's violent character

instructions, we are not convinced that it is reasonably probable that a result

more favorable to appellant would have been reached in the absence of the

error. ( People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)

Ex. E at 27-28.

The standard applicable here to Petitioner’s constitutional claim is that set out above

in section twelve: he must show that the failure to give that instruction denied him a fair trial. 

For the reasons set out by the court of appeal in concluding that the state law error was

harmless, the Court concludes that failure to give the instruction did not deny Petitioner a fair

trial. 

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16. “Conflict of Interest”

Petitioner’s fifteenth ground for relief is that his counsel allegedly had a “conflict of

interest” in the Marsden hearing and in preparing a motion for new trial. In essence,

Petitioner’s claim is that counsel was unable to admit his failings at the Marsden hearing out

of fear of malpractice liability or bar discipline – that counsel had a conflict between selfinterest and the interest of his client – which resulted in the Marsden motion being denied

and in counsel filing a motion for new trial that omitted any claims that he had been

ineffective. 

The denial of a motion to substitute counsel implicates a defendant's Sixth

Amendment right to counsel and is properly considered in federal habeas. Bland v.

California Dep't of Corrections, 20 F.3d 1469, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other

grounds by Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The Ninth Circuit has

held that when a defendant voices a seemingly substantial complaint about counsel, the trial

judge should inquire into the reasons for the defendant's dissatisfaction. Id. at 1475-76. The

inquiry need only be as comprehensive as the circumstances reasonably would permit,

however. King v. Rowland, 977 F.2d 1354, 1357 (9th Cir. 1992) (record may demonstrate

that extensive inquiry was not necessary). The ultimate inquiry in a federal habeas

proceeding in which a petitioner contends new counsel should have been appointed is

whether the Petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated. Schell, 218 F.3d at

024-25. 

The standard set out above in section 2(a) above for ineffective assistance claims

applies to this claim. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 694 (1984) (to

prevail on an ineffectiveness of counsel claim, Petitioner must establish that counsel's

performance was deficient and that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."). 

Petitioner contends that his ineffective assistance claims should have been raised in a

motion for new trial, and that it was ineffective assistance not to raise them. The claims he

says should have been raised are largely those discussed in sections one, five, eight,

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seventeen, and eighteen of this order. They are without merit. Because petitioner has not

shown any instances in which counsel was ineffective at or before trial, it was not ineffective

assistance for his attorney not to raise those claims in the motion for new trial. 

In addition, this claim is, in essence, a claim that the Sixth Amendment requires

appointment of different counsel to represent a criminal defendant on his or her motion to

replace counsel, something that has never been considered, much less required, by the United

States Supreme Court. As a consequence, the state courts’ denials of this claim cannot be

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court authority. 

17. Ineffective Appellate Counsel

In his issue sixteen, Petitioner contends that his appellate counsel was ineffective in

failing to raise “the claims in this petition” on direct appeal. As the claims are rejected on the

merits in this ruling, this ground for relief is without merit. 

18. Counsel’s Failure to Ask for Continuance

In ground seventeen of the amended petition, Petitioner contends that his counsel was

ineffective in not asking for a continuance until after Yarborough’s sentencing, when

Yarborough might have been more willing to testify, and that the prosecutor and

Yarborough’s attorney intimidated Yarborough into not testifying. 

As respondent points out, a motion to continue the trial until after Yarborough’s

sentencing had been denied before the first trial, suggesting that such a motion would have

had little chance of success. See Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1273 (9th Cir. 2005) (trial

counsel cannot have been ineffective for failing to raise a meritless motion). Furthermore,

although in his declaration Yarborough refers to his concern that his plea bargain would be

withdrawn if he testified, he provides no indication that his testimony, had been able to give

it freely, would have been anything other than what he describes in the declaration, i.e.,

duplicative of Petitioner’s own. For these reasons, counsel’s failure to move for a

continuance until after Yarborough’s sentencing was not deficient performance, nor could it

have prejudiced Petitioner. 

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4 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).

5 The standard set out above in section 2(a) for ineffective assistance claims applies to this

claim. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 694 (1984) (to prevail on an

ineffectiveness of counsel claim, Petitioner must establish that counsel's performance was deficient

and that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of

the proceeding would have been different."). 

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As to Petitioner’s claim that Yarborough was intimidated into not testifying, there

simply is no evidence of that in the record, and in fact there is evidence to the contrary -- that

it was defense counsel’s decision not to use Yarborough. See Ex. 4C at 740. 

The claims in ground seventeen are without merit.

19. Batson Claim

In his ground for relief eighteen, Petitioner contends that some jurors were “biased,”

that the prosecutor used peremptory strikes to remove “minority” jurors from the panel, and

that his counsel was ineffective in not challenging the strikes on Batson4

 grounds. There is

nothing in the record to support this claim. It is rejected.

20. State Court Denial of Petitioner’s Postconviction Request for Juror Voir

Dire Transcripts and Questionnaires 

In his nineteenth ground for relief, Petitioner contends that the superior court’s denial

of his motion for a transcript of jury voir dire and for copies of the juror questionnaires

violated his due process rights. The California rule requiring an indigent defendant to show a

specific need for a complete voir dire transcript does not violate clearly established federal

law, Boyd v. Newland, 467 F.3d 1139, 1150-51 (9th Cir. 2006), and in view of Petitioner’s

complete failure to provide any factual basis from his own recollection for his claims

regarding jury prejudice or discriminatory use of peremptory strikes, the denial of his motion

did not violate due process. This claim is rejected. 

21. Witness Segura

In his twentieth claim, Petitioner contends that his trial counsel was ineffective in

failing to investigate to discover a witness named Felix Segura, and in failing to call him to

testify.5

 Petitioner has provided a declaration by Segura. Am. Pet., Ex. W. As discussed

above in the ruling on Petitioner’s motion to dismiss, he has not established that he exercised

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due diligence in attempting to present the Segura declaration to the state courts, and thus it

cannot be considered here. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A)-(B).

Alternatively, assuming for purposes of decision that the declaration can be

considered, it does not suffice to show ineffective assistance. 

Segura says in his declaration that he was interviewed “by a man and a woman who I

believed were working with the defense.” Am. Pet., Ex. W. Thus, defense counsel did

discover Segura. Segura’s evidence was that he heard shots but did not see the shooting. Id. 

Although Segura does say that the shots came in rapid succession, this minor discrepancy is

not sufficient to generate a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have

been different. He thus was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to call Segura. 

This claim is without merit. 

C. Appealability

The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners have recently

been amended to require a district court that denies a habeas petition to grant or deny a

certificate of appealability in the ruling. See Rule 11(a), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28

U.S.C. foll. § 2254 (effective December 1, 2009). 

A petitioner may not appeal a final order in a federal habeas corpus proceeding

without first obtaining a certificate of appealability (formerly known as a certificate of

probable cause to appeal). See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). A judge shall

grant a certificate of appealability "only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of

the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The certificate must indicate

which issues satisfy this standard. See id. § 2253(c)(3). “Where a district court has rejected

the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is

straightforward: the petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district

court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 120

S.Ct. 1595, 1604 (2000).

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This was not a close case. For the reasons set out above, jurists of reason would not

find the result debatable or wrong. A certificate of appealability will be denied. Petitioner is

advised that he may not appeal the denial of a COA, but he may ask the court of appeals to

issue a COA under Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Rule 11(a),

Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Petitioner’s motion for an evidentiary hearing (document number 44 on the docket) is

DENIED. For the reasons set out above, his petition for a writ of habeas corpus also is

DENIED. A certificate of appealability is DENIED. See Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing

Section 2254 Cases (eff. Dec. 1, 2009). 

The Clerk shall enter judgment in accordance with this order and close the file. 

SO ORDERED.

Dated: 01/11/10 

THELTON E. HENDERSON, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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