Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-15-16404/USCOURTS-ca9-15-16404-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jeffrey A. Beard
Appellant
Gregory Mahrt
Appellee
Stu Sherman
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GREGORY MAHRT,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v.

JEFFREY A. BEARD, Secretary of

the California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation;

STU SHERMAN, Warden,

Respondents-Appellants.

No. 15-16404

D.C. No.

1:14-cv-01696-NJV

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Nandor J. Vadas, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted September 14, 2016

San Francisco, California

Filed March 1, 2017

Before: William A. Fletcher, Morgan B. Christen,

and Michelle T. Friedland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge W. Fletcher

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2 MAHRT V. BEARD

SUMMARY*

Habeas Corpus

The panel reversed the district court’s grant of a habeas

corpus petition in which a California state prisoner alleged

that his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of

counsel was violated by trial counsel’s failure to bring a preplea suppression motion.

The panel held that the petitioner’s ineffective assistance

of counsel claim is not barred by Tollett v. Henderson, 411

U.S. 258 (1973), which, properly understood, does not bar

federal habeas claims of pre-plea ineffective assistance of

counsel when the action, or inaction, of counsel prevents

petitioner from making an informed choice whether to plead. 

The panel explained that if the deputies unconstitutionally

searched the petitioner’s home, counsel’s failure to move to

suppress the fruits of that search prevented him from making

an informed choice whether to plead.

The panel wrote that counsel should have moved to

suppress the firearm and ammunition found in the petitioner’s

home, but concluded that the state habeas courts were not

unreasonable in denying the writ because it would have been

reasonable for the state courts to conclude that a motion to

suppress, if brought, would likely have been denied.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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MAHRT V. BEARD 3

COUNSEL

Pamela K. Critchfield (argued), Deputy Attorney General;

Peggy S. Ruffra and Jeffrey M. Laurence, Supervising

Deputy Attorneys General; Office of the Attorney General,

San Francisco, California, for Respondents-Appellants.

Paul Kleven (argued), Law Offices of Paul Kleven, Berkeley,

California, for Petitioner-Appellee.

OPINION

W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:

The State of California appeals from a grant of habeas

corpus to Petitioner Gregory Mahrt. The district court found

that Mahrt’s state-court guilty plea rested on a violation of his

Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. 

For the reasons that follow, we reverse.

I. Factual Background

On September 3, 2012, at approximately 10:00 p.m.,

Sonoma County Sheriff’s deputies were dispatched to a

residence in Petaluma, California. A neighbor had reported

that a “male and female subject [were] arguing over a gun.” 

The property was owned by Robyn Ryan, the mother of

Petitioner-Appellee Gregory Mahrt’s ex-girlfriend, Tracy

Ryan. Mahrt was living in a garage on the property that had

been converted into a room.

As the deputies approached the property, Mahrt walked

out and met them at the front gate. The deputies detained

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4 MAHRT V. BEARD

Mahrt and asked about the argument and the gun. In a

written “Incident/Investigation Report,” Deputy Yoder

described Mahrt as initially “uncooperative.” According to

DeputyYoder’s report, Mahrt told the deputies that Tracyhad

left before they arrived. Robyn Ryan stated in a sworn

declaration that she likewise had informed the deputies that

Tracy had “left the area” before they arrived, and that she had

provided this information to the deputies before any search.

The deputies conducted what Deputy Yoder’s report

characterizes as a “protective sweep” of Mahrt’s room in the

garage. According to the report, the deputies felt justified in

conducting this warrantless search “[d]ue to the report of the

possible domestic incident and the mention of a deadly

weapon” and because Mahrt “may [have been] attempting to

conceal a victim inside.” As the deputies approached the

garage, Mahrt “began yelling that he did not want [the

officers] to enter his room.” The deputies found no one

inside Mahrt’s room.

According to the report, the deputies observed

ammunition cans, ammunition, and what appeared to be an

AR-15 Rifle (later determined to be a replica). Upon

determining that no one was in the room, and after observing

the firearm-related materials, the deputies discontinued their

search of the garage.

Accordingto the report, the deputies subsequentlylearned

that Mahrt had a prior felony conviction and arrested him for

being a felon in possession of ammunition. The deputies then

asked Mahrt for permission to search his room, and Mahrt

consented. The deputies conducted a second search of the

room. They found additional ammunition, rifle magazines,

and two firearms.

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MAHRT V. BEARD 5

In a sworn declaration, Mahrt described only one search

of his room. He insisted that he did not consent to the search. 

He stated in his declaration:

Isaw several deputies approach the room, and

stated that they did not have permission to

search it, but they ignored me. The deputies

searched the room for close to an hour. Inside

the room were closed green boxes that

contained ammunition, and a locked guitar

case that contained a shotgun and an AK-47

rifle. . . . After the deputies completed their

search of the room, the deputy in charge,

Deputy Yoder, approached and asked me to

sign a written form waiving my right to object

to the search. When I refused, the deputy I

had been talking to about my [frightened

three-year-old] son threatened that if I did not

sign the waiver form, the SWAT team would

tear the entire place up for the next twelve

hours right in front of my son. I believe that

his threat was recorded on the dash camera. 

Based on the threat, I signed the form and

recorded a statement to the effect that the

waiver was given voluntarily.

According to Deputy Yoder’s report, further investigation

“verified that [Tracy Ryan] was not a victim of Domestic

Violence.”

II. Prior Judicial Proceedings

On September 5, 2012, the State of California charged

Mahrt with having been a felon in possession of a firearm and

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6 MAHRT V. BEARD

ammunition in violation of California Penal Code

§ 29800(a)(1) and § 30305(a)(1). Mahrt believed that the

warrantless search (or searches) of the garage was (or were)

illegal. However, neither of the two public defenders who

represented him at the trial court level moved to suppress the

firearms and ammunition recovered from his room.

Mahrt’s first public defender, Anderson Thomas,

represented Mahrt for just over a month while his case was

being considered for early resolution. Mahrt’s state-court

habeas corpus attorney, Paul Kleven, states in a sworn

declaration that Thomas originally told him that he did not

recall discussing a motion to suppress with Mahrt. However,

after checking his files, Thomas corrected himself, telling

Kleven that he “did recall Mr. Mahrt telling him that the

police should not have been allowed to search.” Kleven

states that Thomas recounted to him that he told Mahrt “the

search was justified under the circumstances.” Mahrt states

in his declaration that no such conversation occurred.

Mahrt’s second public defender, Christina Davis, took

over from Thomas and represented Mahrt thereafter in the

trial court. Kleven states in a sworn declaration that he twice

spoke to Davis, who told him both times “that she did not

recall ever discussing a motion to suppress with Mr. Mahrt.” 

Kleven drafted a proposed declaration to that effect, but

Davis never signed it. On November 2, 2012, Mahrt filed a

Marsden motion seeking to replace Davis as his courtappointed counsel. See People v. Marsden, 465 P.2d 44 (Cal.

1970). A “Marsden motion” is the California procedural

mechanism through which a criminal defendant “seeks to

discharge his appointed counsel and substitute another

attorney” on the ground that he has received inadequate

representation. People v. Barnett, 954 P.2d 384, 409 (Cal.

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MAHRT V. BEARD 7

1998) (quoting People v. Memro, 905 P.2d 1305, 1343 (Cal.

1995)); see also John-Charles v. California, 646 F.3d 1243,

1245 n.1 (9th Cir. 2011). During his Marsden hearing, Mahrt

said he was dissatisfied with Davis because she had not

returned his phone calls, had made him feel “less important,”

and had left Mahrt “not feeling like [he was] being

represented.” Mahrt did not raise the issue of Davis’s failure

to file a suppression motion. The judge denied the request for

new counsel.

A few weeks later, while still represented byDavis, Mahrt

pleaded guilty to both charges pursuant to an open plea

agreement. Mahrt’s signed waiver form has a circle around

“no contest” rather than “guilty,” but Mahrt unambiguously

pleaded “guilty” during his change of plea hearing, and the

state trial court record says that he pleaded guilty. Under an

“open plea” in California, the defendant pleads guilty without

any promises from the government. People v. Cuevas,

187 P.3d 30, 34–35 (Cal. 2008). Mahrt faced a maximum

prison sentence of seven years and four months. He received

a six-year sentence.

On appeal, Mahrt’s appointed counsel did not raise any

issues. Instead, his counsel filed a “Wende” brief, the

California analogue to an Anders brief. A Wende brief is

filed when a California appellate attorney concludes that an

appeal would be frivolous. See Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S.

259, 265 (2000); People v. Wende, 600 P.2d 1071, 1074–75

(Cal. 1979). On November 27, 2013, the California Court of

Appeal affirmed Mahrt’s conviction.

With the assistance of counsel, Mahrt filed a state habeas

petition in the Court of Appeal. The petition alleged that the

warrantless search of Mahrt’s room violated the Fourth

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8 MAHRT V. BEARD

Amendment and that defense counsel provided ineffective

assistance of counsel by failing to move to suppress the

firearms and ammunition recovered during the search. The

Court of Appeal summarily denied Mahrt’s habeas petition. 

The California Supreme Court also summarily denied his

petition.

On April 11, 2014, Mahrt filed a federal habeas petition

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The petition alleged that

Mahrt’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of

counsel was violated by his trial counsels’ failure to move to

suppress the firearms and ammunition found in his room. A

magistrate judge, sitting by consent, granted Mahrt’s petition. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). The State timely appealed.

III. Standard of Review

We review de novo the district court’s grant of habeas

corpus. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 964 (9th Cir.

2004). We review factual findings for clear error. Id.

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), we

may not grant Mahrt’s application for a writ of habeas corpus

with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits in state

court unless the state adjudication “resulted in a decision that

was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),

or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented

in the State court proceeding,” id. § 2254(d)(2).

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MAHRT V. BEARD 9

“A state court decision is ‘contrary to’ clearly established

Supreme Court precedent if the state court applies a rule that

contradicts the governing law set forth in Supreme Court

cases or if the state court confronts a set of facts materially

indistinguishable from those at issue in a decision of the

Supreme Court and, nevertheless, arrives at a result different

from its precedent.” Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 751 (9th

Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).

A state-court adjudication “involves an unreasonable

application of th[e] [Supreme] Court’s precedent if the state

court identifies the correct governing legal rule from th[e]

Court’s cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the

particular state prisoner’s case.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.

362, 407 (2000). In order to satisfy the “unreasonable

application” prong of § 2254(d)(1), the state court decision

“must be objectively unreasonable, not merely wrong.” 

Woods v. Donald, 135 S. Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015) (per curiam)

(quoting White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014)).

Where, as here, there is no reasoned state court decision

analyzing the state prisoner’s constitutional claim, we

“determine what arguments or theories . . . could have

supported[] the state court’s decision” and then determine

whether application of those hypothetical theories would have

been reasonable. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102

(2011); Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 996 (9th Cir. 2014). 

Habeas relief is warranted only if “there was no reasonable

basis for the state court to deny relief.” Richter, 562 U.S. at

98.

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IV. Discussion

The State makes two arguments. First, it argues that

under Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973), Mahrt’s

ineffective assistance of counsel claim is not cognizable on

federal habeas review because it rests upon an alleged

constitutional violation that preceded his guilty plea. Second,

the State argues that even if Mahrt’s claim is cognizable, the

state court’s rejection of the claim was not contrary to or an

unreasonable application of established law as determined by

the Supreme Court. We hold that Tollett does not bar Mahrt’s

ineffective assistance of counsel claim. We hold further that

the state court could reasonably have concluded that Mahrt’s

counsel did not provide ineffective assistance in failing to

move to suppress the firearms and ammunition.

A. Tollett and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973), a state

prisoner sought federal habeas relief on the ground that the

indictment to which he had pleaded guilty had been returned

by a constitutionally defective grand jury. Reasoning that “a

guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has

preceded it in the criminal process,” the Supreme Court

denied relief. Id. at 267. It held that “[w]hen a criminal

defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in

fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may

not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the

deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the

entry of the guilty plea.” Id. However, the Court in Tollett

made clear that there is an exception to the general rule

barring federal habeas relief arising out of pre-plea

constitutional violations. The Court wrote that a habeas

petitioner may “attack the voluntary and intelligent character

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MAHRT V. BEARD 11

of the guilty plea” based on pre-plea ineffective assistance of

counsel “by showing that the advice he received from counsel

was not within the” “range of competence demanded of

attorneys in criminal cases.” Id. at 267–68 (internal

quotations omitted).

The State argues that Tollett’s “voluntary and intelligent

. . . plea” exception applies only to ineffective assistance

rendered when providing incompetent advice concerning the

guilty plea itself, and not to ineffective assistance rendered in

other pre-plea contexts. On this interpretation of Tollett, a

claim that counsel provided incorrect advice about minimum

and maximum sentences or parole eligibility would not be

barred, but a claim, like the one brought by Mahrt, that

defendant received deficient representation in connection

with a pre-plea suppression motion, would be barred.

The Tollett exception is not as narrow as the State

contends. Tollett, properly understood, provides that

although freestanding constitutional claims are unavailable to

habeas petitioners who plead guilty, claims of pre-plea

ineffective assistance of counsel are cognizable on federal

habeas review when the action, or inaction, of counsel

prevents petitioner from making an informed choice whether

to plead. See Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267–69; see also United

States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 574 (1989) (suggesting that a

“failure by counsel to provide advice [on a double jeopardy

defense] may form the basis of a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel” and could “serve as the predicate for

setting aside a valid plea.”); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S.

759, 772 (1970) (stating that “a plea of guilty in a state court

is not subject to collateral attack in a federal court on the

ground that it was motivated by a coerced confession unless

the defendant was incompetently advised by his attorney”). 

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The scope of the Tollett exception may be seen in Tollett

itself. The Supreme Court held in Tollett that a defendant

who had pleaded guilty could not obtain habeas relief “by

proving only that” blacks were unconstitutionally excluded

from his grand jury. Tollett, 411 U.S. at 260. But rather than

dismiss the claim, the Supreme Court remanded to allow the

lower court to determine in the first instance whether

counsel’s failure to investigate or object to the grand jury

composition constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Id.

at 268–70.

Consistent with this interpretation of the Tollett

exception, many courts, including the Supreme Court, have

analyzed on the merits a habeas petitioner’s allegation that his

counsel rendered pre-plea ineffective assistance by failing to

file a motion to suppress. See Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115,

123–32 (2011); Arvelo v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 788 F.3d

1345, 1348–50 (11th Cir. 2015); Lynch v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of

Corr., 776 F.3d 1209, 1219–20 (11th Cir. 2015); Gilbert v.

Merchant, 488 F.3d 780, 790–95 (7th Cir. 2007); Weaver v.

Palmateer, 455 F.3d 958, 972 (9th Cir. 2006); Ward v.

Dretke, 420 F.3d 479, 487–90 (5th Cir. 2005); Langford v.

Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1387 (9th Cir. 1996); Hale v. Lockhart,

903 F.2d 545, 550 (8th Cir. 1990); Adcox v. O’Brien,

899 F.2d 735, 737 (8th Cir. 1990).

Mahrt’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, premised

upon a failure to file a motion to suppress, is squarely within

this line of cases. The State’s entire case against Mahrt

depended on its ability to introduce into evidence the firearms

and ammunition found in his room. If the deputies

unconstitutionally searched Mahrt’s home, counsel’s failure

to move to suppress the fruits of that search prevented Mahrt

from making the informed choice to which he was entitled. 

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MAHRT V. BEARD 13

We therefore conclude that Mahrt’s ineffective assistance of

counsel claim is allowed under Tollett.

B. “Unreasonable Application”

An ineffective assistance of counsel claim entails a twoprong inquiry. “First, the defendant must show that counsel’s

performance was deficient.” Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). “Second, the defendant must show

that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Id.

If the defendant has pleaded guilty, “in order to satisfy the

‘prejudice’ requirement, the defendant must show that there

is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he

would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on

going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).

We conclude that trial counsel should have moved to

suppress the firearms and ammunition. There was at least a

chance that such a motion would have succeeded. First, there

was a clear conflict in the available evidence. Deputy

Yoder’s written report tells one story. Mahrt’s sworn

declaration, supplemented by the sworn declaration of Robyn

Ryan, tells another. Both of those declarations were

presented to the California courts by Mahrt’s habeas counsel. 

The same evidence — in the form of declarations or live

testimony — would undoubtedly have been available to

Mahrt’s trial counsel had he or she sought to obtain it. 

According to Mahrt and Robyn Ryan, the deputies were told

before they searched Mahrt’s room that Tracy Ryan had left

the area. The deputies then searched Mahrt’s room over his

objection. According to Mahrt, there was one extensive

search of his room, to which he unambiguously objected,

rather than, as recounted by Deputy Yoder, a preliminary

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14 MAHRT V. BEARD

sweep, followed by consent by Mahrt to a further search,

followed by an extensive search.

Second, Deputy Yoder’s report mischaracterized the first

search (if indeed it was a first search rather than a single

search) as a “protective sweep.” A warrantless protective

search is permitted under Maryland v. Buie, based on the

“interest of the officers in taking steps to assure themselves

that the house in which a suspect is being, or has just been,

arrested is not harboring other persons who are dangerous and

who could unexpectedly launch an attack.” 494 U.S. 325,

333 (1990). Mahrt was being detained by the deputies, and

they had no reason to suspect that there was some other

person who could pose a danger to themselves or to others.

We nonetheless conclude that the state habeas courts were

not unreasonable in denying the writ. We have nothing but

one-sentence denials from the Court of Appeal and from the

Supreme Court, so we are obliged to supply the reasons those

courts could have had for their denials. Richter, 562 U.S. at

102. It would have been reasonable for the state courts to

conclude that a motion to suppress, if brought, would likely

have been denied. This is so even if Mahrt’s evidence is

believed, and even in light of Deputy Yoder’s statement that

the search was a “protective sweep.” We do not regard

Yoder’s improper use of this legal term, which has a specific

and relatively narrow meaning, as preventing the state courts

from relying on some other basis to justify the search. 

Specifically, the state courts could reasonablyhave concluded

that the search was justified under the “emergency aid”

exception to the warrant requirement. See Michigan v.

Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 47 (2009) (per curiam).

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MAHRT V. BEARD 15

Deputy Yoder stated in his report that “[b]ased on

[Mahrt’s] behavior, I felt he may be attempting to conceal a

victim inside.” Although warrantless searches of the home

are “presumptively unreasonable,” Kyllo v. United States,

533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001), law enforcement officers “may enter

a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to

an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent

injury.” Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 47 (2009) (internal

quotation marks omitted). To invoke this “emergency aid”

exception, an officer must have an objectively reasonable

basis for believing both that a person is inside the house and

that the person is in need of immediate aid. See id.; United

States v. Martinez, 406 F.3d 1160, 1164 (9th Cir. 2005).

Yoder and the other deputies were not obliged to believe

Mahrt and Robyn Ryan when they said that Tracy Ryan had

left the area. The officers “were not conducting a trial, but

were required to make an on-the-spot decision as to whether

[the potential victim] could be in the apartment in need of

medical help.” United States v. Black, 482 F.3d 1035, 1040

(9th Cir. 2007). “[H]ad they not investigated and [the victim]

was in fact in the apartment[,]” the officers would likely have

been “harshly criticized” by their superiors. Id.; see also

Martinez, 406 F.3d at 1164 (emphasizing “[t]he volatility of

situations involving domestic violence”). It thus would not

have been unreasonable for the state courts to regard the

possibility of a victim inside Mahrt’s room as an exigent

circumstance justifying the warrantless search of the room. 

See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978).

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Conclusion

We therefore reverse the district court’s grant of habeas

corpus.

REVERSED.

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