Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01622/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01622-12/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Darrel Adams
Respondent
Patrick Andrew Pierce
Petitioner

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PATRICK ANDREW PIERCE,

Petitioner, No. 2:06-cv-01622-NRS

vs.

DARREL ADAMS, Warden, ORDER

Respondent.

INTRODUCTION

In his amended petition for writ of habeas corpus, Pierce raises four claims. 

For the reasons discussed below, petitioner’s claims are DENIED IN PART,

GRANTED IN PART, and the case is REMANDED to the state trial court for

resentencing.

STATEMENT

The following recitation of the factual background of this case is based on

the decision of the Court of Appeals of California rejecting petitioner’s direct

appeal, People v. Pierce, No. C044205, 2005 WL 1230783 (Cal. Ct. App. May 23,

2005). The state court’s factual determinations are presumed to be correct

pursuant to 28 U.S.C 2254(e)(1).

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A. Overview

The victim in this case was born in November 1983. Her mother,

Amy, met defendant, they cohabited for about a year and a half and

they married in 1987. Defendant and Amy had a daughter in 1988

(Amanda) and another in 1989 (Molly). Defendant was in the Air

Force and the family lived in Florida until he was transferred to

Aviano Air Force Base in Italy in 1990, where the family lived in a

hotel and then in a house. In January 1993, he was transferred to

McClellan Air Force Base and the family lived on base. Later that

year, defendant resigned and the family moved to Illinois. They first

lived with defendant’s relatives, but conditions were crowded and

early in 1994 they moved to a house of their own. In the summer of

1994 the family moved to Orangevale, and defendant worked at

McClellan as a civilian. When the base was scheduled to close in

1999, defendant found a job at a base in North Carolina and the family

moved. It was there that the abuse came to light.

B. Uncharged Acts Against the Victim

In Italy (1990-1993), the victim sometimes would wake up and see

defendant standing near her bed, sometimes without pants on,

sometimes touching his penis. When the family moved to McClellan

Air Force Base in 1993, when the victim was nine, defendant would

go into her room and touch her breasts and genitals, and have her

stroke his penis and suck on it. She “would cry but ... never told him

no” because she “was always scared of what would happen.” He

would force her head to his penis with his hand. Defendant “always

told me that I can’t ever tell anybody.” When the family lived in

Illinois (1993-1994), when the victim was 10, similar abuse took

place. Although the house was crowded, defendant would wake her

up at night and tell her to go into the bathroom with him. Once, in

Illinois, defendant tried to have intercourse with her, but when he tried

to push his penis in she cried and told him it hurt and he stopped;

however, the victim later found blood in her underwear and told her

mother that she had started menstruating. Amy testified that the next

day the victim told her she was not menstruating. Amy testified that

once, defendant closed their bedroom door and went into the victim’s

room; she followed and found him crouched in his underwear next to

the victim’s bed. He claimed he was just “checking” the kids and

although Amy was suspicious, she did not want to make an accusation

against him.

C. Count 1; Continuous Sexual Abuse (§ 288.5)

When the family moved back to the Sacramento area in 1994 when

the victim was 10, she had her own bedroom and her half-sisters

shared a bedroom. Until she turned 12 in 1995, defendant again

fondled her and licked her vagina, and had her suck his penis; he

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again tried to have intercourse with her. Sometimes he had sexual

contact with her a couple times in a week, other times less than

monthly. “He would tell me exactly what he wanted me to do, but as I

got older, he would get mad at me if I didn’t just do it on my own.” 

He would force her head down so she would suck his penis;

sometimes she would cry. More than once he told her he would hurt

her or her mother if she told anybody, and he was both vocally

forceful when he said it and sometimes physically forceful in that

“[h]e would squeeze the back of my neck” with his hand when he

threatened her. “[I]f I ever didn’t do something right away, or I was

hesitant about it, he would get mad” and “use a strong voice and tell

me I better do it” which made her scared. She believed the threats

because he slapped the children when they did things wrong. On

redirect examination she testified that when she was younger and got

in trouble for ordinary things, he would take her in her room and

spank her “[b]ut then it would turn into a sexual act right after that.” 

“When I was older, I didn’t get the spankings, because I was older. 

But I did get hit on my head or on my butt if I was crying too loud, or

if I didn’t do what he told me to do right away.” The neck-grabbing

happened during and after sexual contact.

D. Counts 2-6; Forcible Lewd Acts (§ 288, subd. (b))

Between November 1995 and November 1997, when she was 12 to

13, the victim sucked defendant’s penis monthly. He made her shave

her pubic hair a few times, and when he licked her vagina and she had

orgasms he would say she liked it, which made her cry. He

sometimes rubbed his penis between her breasts and ejaculated onto

her. He made her watch pornographic videos and act out what was

depicted, such as sucking his penis. He tried to have intercourse with

her a few times and told her she was acting like a baby and might be a

lesbian when she did not want intercourse or cried from the pain when

he tried to enter her; in her view, “I felt like his penis was too big to

go into my vagina.” During this time he continued to threaten to hurt

the victim or hurt her mother if the victim told anyone about the

abuse.

E. Counts 7-12; Forced Oral Copulation (§ 288a, subd. (b))

After the victim turned 14, the same abuse took place. Defendant

again would grab her neck and threaten her. When she cried during

sexual acts he would slap her on the bottom or face and tell her to shut

up. He rewarded her with driving lessons if she sucked his penis

while he drove. She sucked his penis at least 10 times and he licked

her vagina at least 10 times during this period.

F. Counts 13-18; Forcible Lewd Act (§ 288, subd. (c)(1))

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Also, after she turned 14, defendant fondled the victim’s breasts over

10 times, touched her vagina and tried to have intercourse with her

more than once, but he was never able to fully vaginally penetrate her. 

Sometimes if she did not suck his penis the way he wanted her to he

would threaten to “put his penis inside of me [i.e ., her vagina]

whether I wanted it or not.”

G. Gaining Access to the Victim

Defendant was sometimes able to do these things by making the other

girls stay in their room for long periods for minor infractions, or

making them take long baths together. Sometimes when Amanda

would ask if she could leave her room to go to the bathroom,

defendant would sternly tell her to stay where she was, and his voice

came from the victim’s room. Amanda sometimes heard the victim

crying during punishment; once the victim told Amanda that he was

helping her with homework. Defendant said the same thing, but he

never helped the other girls with their homework. Once, Amanda

came in to the victim’s room and found her on the floor, crying, with

defendant standing over her, wearing only shorts. Molly, too,

sometimes saw defendant near or coming out of the victim’s room

during punishment periods. The other girls had learned to obey

defendant. Amanda sometimes saw defendant hit her mother, Amy,

across the face. Amy testified she disagreed with defendant’s

discipline methods: “I didn’t like them to be slapped in the face” and

“I didn’t like him to get in their face and scream loudly at them.” 

Amanda and Molly complained to their mother about the long

punishments defendant imposed.

H. Discovery of the Abuse

On the trip to North Carolina the family stayed at some hotels; once

on the way, and once in a North Carolina hotel, defendant had the

victim suck his penis while Amy showered and the other girls slept. 

About a month after the family moved into a house in North Carolina,

on September 26, 1999, Amy found the victim was upset because she

had wanted to talk to a friend of hers named Richard, but defendant

was making fun of his name, calling him “Dick” and saying “the

victim likes Dick”; although Amy told defendant that was

inappropriate, he just laughed. Amy then took a shower. Defendant

began to feel the victim’s breasts. Amy left the shower when she

heard the victim crying and saying “stop”; she came out of the shower

and saw defendant’s “hands come out of the front of [the victim’s]

t-shirt as soon as I opened the door.” The victim then told her mother

that defendant had been “molesting” or “abusing” her either “since I

was six” or “for as long as I can remember.” Defendant had gone

downstairs; after he called up to Amy from downstairs and said that

he was not armed and would not hurt her, Amy went partway

downstairs and told him to leave. Meanwhile, the victim had dialed

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911. At about that moment, defendant told Amy the only reason he

married her was because of the victim. The police then arrived and

subsequently drove defendant to a motel. Defendant called Amy that

night and said the victim was lying; rather than denying he had abused

or harmed the girl, he denied intercourse in a vulgar and callous way,

telling the victim’s mother “I never f---ed that kid.” A few days later,

the rest of the family packed up and moved to San Antonio, Texas. 

There, the victim went to a children’s advocacy center and prepared a

written statement outlining the abuse she had suffered, though she did

not “go into extensive detail” in that statement. She prepared a

statement for Texas authorities which also did not go into detail.

I. Inculpatory Statements by Defendant

In December 1999, defendant spoke with Cumberland County, North

Carolina Detective Frank Pierce (no relation) and admitted reading the

victim’s diary. During the conversation he related an incident when

he had left a “Dear John” letter and left the house; he told Amy “the

only reason I got back with you and the only reason I married you was

because of that child.” He was arrested about a month later, in

January 2000, in North Carolina. While defendant was awaiting trial,

Pierce re-arrested him on a California warrant in December 2000.

While being transported, defendant told Pierce: “I know what I

should have done. The [B]ible says if you penetrate her and she

doesn’t bleed, then you kill her.” Defendant testified this garbled

what he said, which was a reference to a specific biblical passage

(Deuteronomy 22:13-21) prescribing stoning of a bride who is found

not to have been a virgin, by the failure to produce a bloodstained

cloth, and he was referring to the medical evidence from San Antonio,

to the effect that the victim’s hymen was intact.

J. Internet Pornography

Amy later discovered that during their marriage defendant had

accessed several pornographic websites on their home computer

which, by their titles, offered pictures of young women or women

without pubic hair. Amanda testified that she once saw her father

looking at pornographic images of teenage girls on the family

computer.

K. Medical Evidence

Cathy Boyle, a nurse with expertise in child sexual abuse, reviewed

records from a nurse and doctor in Texas; the doctor had found the

victim’s hymen “normal,” but the nurse whose work was reviewed

had found it “obliterated.” Nurse Boyle disagreed with both the

doctor and the other nurse, and opined the hymen was neither

“obliterated” nor normal.

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L. North Carolina Trial

The victim testified in this California case that she had testified

against defendant in North Carolina. He was convicted there of two

counts based on the T-shirt incident, viz., felonious child abuse and

taking indecent liberties with a child. The parties stipulated that the

North Carolina jury convicted him of counts taking place on

September 26, 1999, but acquitted him of three counts arising on or

about August 27, 1999, i.e., the alleged fellatio in the hotel on the trip

to North Carolina. The stipulation seems to conflict with the opinion

affirming the North Carolina convictions, State v. Pierce (2002) 153

N.C.App. 525 [570 S.E.2d 152], but this is not important for purposes

of this appeal. The victim was allowed to testify about the reaction of

some of the North Carolina jurors after their verdicts were read, but

the court in this case instructed the jury to consider that evidence for

and only for its effect on the victim: The North Carolina jurors

hugged and kissed her and told her they believed her but had to acquit

due to “confusion during the testimony” regarding the fellatio charge.

M. Defense

Defendant denied any sexual abuse of the victim. He admitted having

pornographic videos (which both he and Amy testified she bought to

“spice up” marital congress) but testified that any “teen” pornography

websites were accessed inadvertently when he was searching for a

contest entry form for the victim offered by a “teen” magazine, or

when he followed an offer of a picture-of-the-day to whatever site

sponsored that picture. Defense counsel emphasized that during the

period of the alleged abuse the victim visited her father for long

periods, saw a youth pastor for religious counseling, and had other

logical opportunities to speak up, but did not say anything. Defense

counsel also emphasized the riskiness of some the behavior attributed

to defendant, implying he would not have had sexual contact with the

victim where discovery was so likely. Defense counsel also pressed

inconsistencies in different versions of the victim’s story or

newly-revealed details. He also attempted to show defendant had

such an unusual penis shape that the victim should have mentioned it,

but the photograph of defendant’s penis which was introduced into

evidence was not taken when it was fully erect, therefore it did not

establish the shape of his erect member. The victim testified, “I

thought that it was big, and I remember that it was always either

shaven or neatly cut, the pubic hair was.” She testified she tried not to

look at it when she could avoid it, but that when erect “[i]t was mostly

at a diagonal position, kind of pointing up.” Contrary to appellate

counsel’s implication, there was no evidence the victim was familiar

with normal penis shapes or sizes. Defendant’s brother John (with

whom the family had lived in Illinois) testified the victim was a

dishonest person, John’s wife Kari testified the victim was

manipulative, and their daughter Ashley testified the victim was

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manipulative and dishonest. Defense counsel tried to paint Amy as a

liar, based on alleged false statements about residency made in her

divorce papers, although she testified she filled out the papers

according to her attorney’s instructions. He implied Amy used the

victim’s allegation as a convenient way for her to get out of a bad

marriage, caused by defendant’s heavy drinking, alleged infidelity,

constant fighting, possession of guns, and the fact he once pushed her

head into a wall and threatened to throw her through a glass door.

Defendant admitted he had been convicted of two felonies committed

against the victim, “felonious child abuse by sexual assault” and

“indecent liberties with a child.”

At this point we observe that the jury convicted defendant of all 18

counts as charged. Appellate counsel repeatedly paints this as a

“close” case, but the victim’s testimony was corroborated in several

important ways. Amy testified she once found defendant crouching

over the victim’s bed in a suspicious way, and once found blood in the

victim’s underwear although she was not yet menstruating. Amy saw

defendant with his hands coming out of the victim’s T-shirt in North

Carolina. The combined testimony of Amanda and Molly showed that

defendant did keep them in their room or in the bath for long periods

of time, during which defendant was in or near the victim’s room,

sometimes with the victim crying. Defendant accessed pornography

geared toward those who wish to see younger women, or women with

shaved pubic regions, which tends to show defendant lusted after

young females generally and corroborates the victim’s story that

defendant shaved her pubic region. Defendant’s denials of lewd

conduct or intention were undermined by his felony convictions for

sexually abusing the same victim. Further, he made bizarre

statements to Amy (that the victim “likes Dick” and later, “I never

f---ed that kid”) and to Detective Pierce (the paraphrase about killing

unchaste brides). This case involved positive direct testimony by the

victim corroborated by circumstantial evidence provided by several

witnesses. Further, there was no persuasive explanation why the

victim and other incriminating witnesses would lie. Therefore, this

was not a close case.

Pierce, 2005 WL 1230783, at *1–5.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 6, 2003, the jury found Pierce guilty on all 18 counts, including:

continuous sexual misconduct with a child under the age of 14; lewd and lascivious

acts with a child under the age of 14; forcible oral copulation; lewd and lascivious

acts with a 14 to 15-year-old child who was at least 10 years younger than Pierce. 

The trial court sentenced Pierce to imprisonment for the term of 110 years and 4

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months, on June 3, 2003. The appellate court affirmed the judgment on May 23,

2005. The California Supreme Court denied Pierce’s petition for review, without

opinion, on July 20, 2005.

Pierce filed his petition, in this court, for writ of habeas corpus on July 11,

2006. Pierce filed an amended federal petition—adding a claim for ineffective

assistance of counsel at both the state trial and appellate level—on January 11,

2007. On March 9, 2007, Pierce filed a state habeas corpus petition with the

California Supreme Court in order to exhaust his claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel. That petition was denied by the California Supreme Court on August 15,

2007.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that

he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The AEDPA altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must

apply with respect to a state prisoner’s claim that was adjudicated on the merits in

state court. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 402–13 (2000). Under the AEDPA,

an application for habeas corpus will not be granted unless the adjudication of the

claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71

(2003) (disapproving of the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212

F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2000)); Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. “[A] federal habeas court

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may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent

judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal

law erroneously or incorrectly.” Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75–76 (quoting Williams,

529 U.S. at 411). “Rather, that application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. 

While habeas corpus relief is an important instrument to assure that

individuals are constitutionally protected, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887

(1983); Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290 (1969), direct review of a criminal

conviction is the primary method for a petitioner to challenge that conviction. 

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633 (1993). In addition, the state court’s

factual determinations must be presumed correct, and the federal court must accept

all factual findings made by the state court unless the petitioner can rebut “the

presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995); Thompson v. Keohane, 516

U.S. 99 (1995); Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1388 (9th Cir. 1997). Finally,

even if this court finds a constitutional violation, such a violation does not warrant

habeas relief unless the violation in question “had substantial and injurious effect

or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637 (quoting

Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)). 

Moreover, Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases requires the Court to

make a preliminary review of each petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Court

must dismiss a petition “[i]f it plainly appears from the face of the petition . . . that

the petitioner is not entitled to relief.” Habeas Corpus Rule 4; see also Hendricks

v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir.1990). 

DISCUSSION

Petitioner seeks habeas relief on four grounds: (1) the trial court erroneously

admitted improper evidence that jurors, in a prior trial involving the same victim,

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believed the victim’s testimony; (2) petitioner was deprived of effective assistance

of trial counsel and appellate counsel; (3) the trial court erroneously admitted

evidence that petitioner’s stepfather sexually abused petitioner’s sister; and (4) the

trial court erred at sentencing when it increased petitioner’s sentence based upon

facts which were neither found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted

by the petitioner.

1. Juror Statements from the Previous Trial

Claim 1 arises out of the trial court’s admission of testimony from the victim

that, at the conclusion of the North Carolina trial, some of the jurors hugged and

kissed her and “told her they believed her but had to acquit due to ‘confusion

during the testimony’ regarding the fellatio charge.” Pierce, 2005 WL 1230783,

at *4. Petitioner argues that the admission of this testimony entitles him to habeas

relief on the grounds that: (a) by admitting the statements of the North Carolina

jurors, whom he was unable to cross-examine, the court deprived him of his right

under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment; and (b) the statements, as

admitted, constituted impermissible vouching evidence violating his right to Due

Process under the Fourteenth Amendment.

a. Pierce Was Not Deprived of His Rights Under the Confrontation Clause

Pierce is not entitled to federal habeas relief because he is unable to

demonstrate that the California courts violated clearly established federal law as

determined by the Supreme Court. In fact, Supreme Court precedent supports a

finding that Pierce’s Confrontation Clause rights were not violated. 

The admission of the out-of-court statements of the North Carolina jurors

did not violate Pierce’s rights under the Confrontation Clause, because those

statements were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. The Confrontation

Clause applies to those who “bear testimony” against the accused. Crawford v.

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Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004). Typically, “testimony” is a statement “made

for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.” Id. (internal quotation

omitted). In Crawford, the Supreme Court explicitly stated that the Confrontation

Clause does not bar statements offered “for purposes other than establishing the

truth of the matter asserted.” Id. at 59 n.9. Here, the jury was instructed by the

judge that the victim’s testimony, regarding the comments made to her by the

North Carolina jurors, was to be considered only for the effect on the victim, but

not for the truth of what was actually being said. Therefore, Pierce is not entitled

to habeas relief on this ground.

b. The Admitted Statements Did Not Constitute Impermissible Vouching

Pierce argues that the admission of the North Carolina juror’s statements

constituted vouching. The California Court of Appeals rejected Pierce’s

contention. This court agrees. This court finds no Supreme Court precedent

suggesting this circumstance is vouching (and Pierce is unable to direct this court

to any clearly established precedent). Pierce presents cases finding impermissible

vouching (1) where other witnesses testified as to a person’s veracity, or (2) where

a prosecutor expressed his or her belief in the credibility of a witness. However,

there is no precedent establishing that impermissible vouching also includes

situations in which a witness testifies that other people believed her. Further, this

evidence was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted—that the North

Carolina jurors actually believed the victim—but was offered to show its effect

upon the victim.

Because this court finds that no constitutional violation occurred here, it

need not address Pierce’s arguments that the testimony “had substantial and

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at

637 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

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Therefore, Pierce is not entitled to habeas relief on this ground.

2. Assistance of Trial and Appellate Counsel

Pierce next contends that he was deprived of his right to effective assistance

of counsel, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment, (1) when his trial counsel

failed to object to the admission of the above statements made by the North

Carolina jurors, based on California Evidence Code section 1150, and (2) when his

appellate counsel failed to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel at his appeal. 

The State argues that (a) Pierce is time-barred from raising the ineffective

assistance of counsel claim as this ground for relief was raised after the one-year

statute of limitation had expired, and the new claim does not relate back to his

original petition; and (b) even if Pierce were not time barred, he cannot

demonstrate that there was ineffective assistance entitling him to habeas relief.

a. Time Bar and Relation Back

Pierce’s one-year statute of limitations under the AEDPA expired on

October 18, 2006. Pierce did not add his claim for ineffective assistance to his

petition until January 11, 2007. Thus, unless those claims “relate back” to his

original, and timely, filing made on July 11, 2006, they are barred from

consideration by this court. Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 649–650, 654 (2005); 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); Habeas Corpus Rule 11; Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1).

“Amendments made after the statute of limitations has run relate back to the

date of the original pleading if the original and amended pleadings ‘ar [i]se out of

the conduct, transaction, or occurrence.’” Mayle, 545 U.S. at 655 (quoting Fed. R.

Civ. P. 15(c)(2)). A habeas petition must “specify all the grounds for relief

available to the petitioner” and “state the facts supporting each ground.” Habeas

Corpus Rule 2(c). A habeas petitioner is aware of this requirement, because the

model form available to aid prisoners as guidance in filing their habeas petition

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states:

CAUTION: You must include in this petition all the grounds for

relief from the conviction or sentence that you challenge. And you

must state the facts that support each ground. If you fail to set

forth all the grounds in this petition, you may be barred from

presenting additional grounds at a later date.

Petition for Relief From a Conviction or Sentence By a Person in State Custody,

Habeas Corpus Rules, Forms App., 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (emphasis in original).

Pierce’s claim of ineffective assistance does not relate back to his original

petition. In the timely petition, Pierce only argued that he was entitled to habeas

relief because the admitted testimony (1) deprived him of his right under the

Confrontation Clause and (2) constituted impermissible vouching evidence. 

In Mayle, the court looked both to the grounds for relief and to the facts giving rise

to those grounds. Here, Pierce raises an entirely new ground for relief. Further,

although this ground rests upon some similar facts, the dispositive facts are

different. Under an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, this court looks to the

actions of counsel (from an objective perspective) to determine what counsel

should have done. Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)

b. Deficiency of Representation and Prejudice

Even if Pierce’s claim were to relate back, this court still finds no grounds to

grant him habeas relief on the effective assistance of counsel claim. Ineffective

assistance of counsel claims are governed by the two-prong test articulated in

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Under Strickland, the Court must determine: “(1)

whether the performance of counsel was so deficient that he was not functioning as

‘counsel’ as guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment; and (2) whether this deficient

performance prejudiced the defendant by depriving him of a fair trial.” United

States v. Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 1433 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at

691–92). “In determining whether counsel’s performance was deficient, [the

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This section is similar to Federal Rule of Evidence 403: “The court in its discretion may 1

exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its

admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of

undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” Cal. Evid. Code § 352.

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Court] appl[ies] an objective standard of reasonableness, indulging a strong

presumption that a counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable

professional assistance.” Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). Under

Strickland, the Court determines not what defense counsel could have pursued, but

rather whether counsel’s strategy was reasonable. Siripongs v. Calderon, 133 F.3d

732, 736 (9th Cir. 1998).

On this record, this court is unable to find that the California courts’ rulings

violated clearly established federal law. Ineffective assistance of counsel

prejudices a petitioner when “there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The petitioner “‘need

not show that [counsel’s] deficient conduct more likely than not altered the

outcome in the case. This ‘preponderance’ standard was explicitly rejected in

Strickland.’” Richter v. Hickman, 578 F.3d 944, 952 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting

Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1461 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 693) (emphasis omitted)).

Pierce claims that, by not challenging the admission of the North Carolina

jurors’ statements as inadmissible under California Evidence Code section 1150,

his trial counsel acted objectively unreasonable. When the prosecution sought to

elicit those statements from the victim, Pierce’s counsel objected on relevance,

hearsay, and California Evidence Code section 352 grounds, all of which were

1

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overruled. 

California Evidence Code section 1150 governs the admission of evidence

regarding the validity of a verdict.

(a) Upon an inquiry as to the validity of a verdict, any otherwise

admissible evidence may be received as to statements made, or

conduct, conditions, or events occurring, either within or without the

jury room, of such a character as is likely to have influenced the

verdict improperly. No evidence is admissible to show the effect of

such statement, conduct, condition, or event upon a juror either in

influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or concerning

the mental processes by which it was determined.

(b) Nothing in this code affects the law relating to the competence of a

juror to give evidence to impeach or support a verdict.

Cal. Evid. Code § 1150. Pierce argues that, by admitting the statements and

actions of past jurors, the trial court ran afoul of this section, because it revealed

the effect the victim’s testimony had upon the jurors.

Whether or not admitted evidence violates California Evidence Code section

1150 depends upon the purpose for which it is offered. Had those statements been

admitted for the purpose of demonstrating that the victim’s testimony effected the

jurors’ decision, this section would be implicated. However, as discussed above,

the trial court made clear that such evidence was to be considered only for its effect

on the victim, and not the truth of the matter asserted (that the jurors were

convinced by the victim’s testimony). Therefore, the evidence was not offered “to

show the effect of such statement . . . upon a juror” and did not violate California

Evidence Code section 1150. Furthermore, even if the admission did violate that

code, this court cannot find that such a violation was so clear that counsel acted

objectively unreasonable in objecting only on three grounds and not on this fourth

one.

Having determined that trial counsel was not deficient in the representation

of Pierce, this Court also finds that appellate counsel was not deficient by not

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raising this point on appeal.

Therefore, Pierce is not entitled to habeas relief on this ground.

3. Evidence that Pierce’s Stepfather Sexually Abused Pierce’s Sister

Claim 3 arises out of the trial court’s admission of testimony from the

investigating detective that Pierce’s stepfather had molested Pierce’s sister. Pierce

contends that the unfair prejudice caused by such an admission deprived him of his

right to Due Process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. 

A federal court has “no authority to review alleged violations of a state’s

evidentiary rules in a federal habeas proceeding.” Windham v. Merkle, 163 F.3d

1092, 1103 (9th Cir. 1998). Such rulings do not violate due process “unless the

evidence is ‘of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial.’” Id. (quoting

Kealohapauole v. Shimoda, 800 F.2d 1463, 1465 (9th Cir. 1986)).

The detective’s testimony that Pierce’s stepfather molested Pierce’s sister

was given during the government’s redirect examination, in response to a line of

questioning developed on cross-examination. On cross-examination, Pierce asked

the investigating detective the following question:

“[Q.]: [Reading from transcript] ‘She knows how much I love my kids, and

what she has done is trying to make – make my kids hate me. And then she says –

he says she has taken them away from me, and making me look [like] my [] own

stepfather. Well I will tell you, between you and I, I have gone overboard for those

kids since day one, and you can ask my wife.’ He [Mr. Pierce] said that as well,

didn’t he?”

“[A.]: Yes.”

On re-direct examination, counsel for the government then asked:

“[Q.]: There is a reference to ‘she is trying to make me look like my own

stepfather.’ You recall that reference?”

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“[A.]: Yes.”

“[Q.]: Is it true in the sentences just preceding that, Mr. Pierce makes a

statement indicating that his stepfather had molested his own sister?”

[California Evidence Code section 352 objection overruled.]

“[A.]: Yes, he did.”

The California Court of Appeals found that this testimony did not violate Pierce’s

due process right because (1) the prosecutor was entitled to clarify the meaning of

Pierce’s statement to the detective, and (2) the evidence did not prejudice Pierce in

any event. Pierce, 2005 WL 1230783, at *7–8. Pierce has not satisfied his burden

of showing that the admission of this evidence was improper, let alone so improper

that it necessarily prevented a fair trial. Not being able to show this, Pierce

certainly cannot demonstrate that the California courts’ decisions that Pierce was

not entitled to habeas relief was in violation of clearly established federal law.

Therefore, Pierce is not entitled to habeas relief on this ground.

4. Cunningham v. California Claim

Finally, Pierce claims that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right

to a jury trial when it imposed upper-term sentences based on facts that were

neither found by the jury nor admitted by him. Both parties agree that the trial

court’s sentencing violated the Supreme Court’s holding in Cunningham v.

California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007). However, because sentencing occurred after

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S.

296 (2004), but before Cunningham, the question before this court is whether

Cunningham should be applied retroactively, under the test set out in Teague v.

Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).

“Cunningham . . . did not announce a new rule of constitutional law and may

be applied retroactively on collateral review.” Butler v. Curry, 528 F.3d 624, 639

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(9th Cir. 2008). 

Therefore, this court must “remand to the state trial court for resentencing

under the procedures delineated in [People v.] Sandoval, [161 P.3d 1146 (Cal.

2007)].” Chioino v. Kernan, 581 F.3d 1182, 1186 (9th Cir. 2009).

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner’s habeas petition is

DENIED IN PART, GRANTED IN PART, and the case is REMANDED to the

state trial court for resentencing.

DATED: January 5, 2010

 

Honorable N. Randy Smith

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge

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