Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01487/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01487-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kenneth M. Douglas
Petitioner
James E. Tilton
Respondent

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In Houston v. Lack, the United States Supreme Court held that a pro se habeas petitioner's notice of appeal is

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deemed filed on the date of its submission to prison authorities for mailing, as opposed to the date of its receipt by the court

clerk. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 166, 276, 108 S.Ct. 2379 (1988). The rule is premised on the pro se prisoner’s mailing

of legal documents through the conduit of “prison authorities whom he cannot control and whose interests might be adverse

to his.” Miller v. Sumner, 921 F.2d 202, 203 (9th Cir. 1990); see Houston, 487 U.S. at 271. The rule is used to assess the

timeliness of federal habeas filings under the AEDPA’s limitation period, however, the Ninth Circuit has yet to address

whether the rule applies to the tolling provision of § 2244(d)(2). The date stamped on the original petition by the Northern

District of California is illegible. Accordingly, giving Petitioner the benefit of all possible doubt, the Court will use the date

Petitioner signed his petition, i.e., September 19, 2006, as the filing date for purposes of calculating the running of the statute

of limitations in this instance.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KENNETH M. DOUGLAS, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

JAMES E. TILTON, )

)

Respondent. )

____________________________________)

1:06-cv-01487-AWI-TAG HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

TO GRANT RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS (Doc. 8) 

ORDER DIRECTING OBJECTIONS TO BE

FILED WITHIN TWENTY DAYS

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed on

September 19, 2006 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California (Doc.

1-2), and transferred to this Court on October 20, 2006 (Doc. 1). Petitioner does not challenge his 1

conviction; rather, he challenges the manner in which his custody credits are being calculated by the

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. (Doc. 1, pp. 5 et seq.). On January 24,

2008, Respondent filed the instant motion to dismiss, contending that the petition is untimely under

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the one-year statute of limitation provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). (Doc. 8). Petitioner has

not filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss.

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

As mentioned, Respondent’s motion to dismiss contends the petition was filed outside the

one year limitation period prescribed by Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Rule 4 of the Rules

Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a petition if it “plainly appears from

the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court . .

. .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer if

the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being in violation of the

state’s procedural rules. See e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990) (using Rule

4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to exhaust state remedies); White v. Lewis, 874

F.2d 599, 602-603 (9th Cir. 1989) (using Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review motion to dismiss

for state procedural default); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982)

(same). Thus, a respondent can file a motion to dismiss after the Court orders a response, and the

Court should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. 

In this case, Respondent’s motion to dismiss is based on a violation of 28 U.S.C.

2244(d)(1)’s one year limitation period. Because Respondent’s motion is similar in procedural

standing to a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust state remedies or for state procedural default

and Respondent has not yet filed a formal answer, the Court will review the motion pursuant to its

authority under Rule 4. 

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas

corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326, 117 S.Ct. 2059 

(1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), overruled on other grounds

by Lindh v. Murphy, 520 U.S. 320. The instant petition was filed on September 19, 2006, and thus

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is subject to the AEDPA. 

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a federal

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, § 2244, subdivision (d)

reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In most cases, the limitation period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. The AEDPA’s one year statute of limitations, as embodied in § 2244(d)(1),

applies to habeas petitions challenging an administrative decisions within the prison. Shelby v.

Bartlett, 391 F.3d 1061, 1063 (9th Cir. 2004); see Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077, 1080 n. 4 (9

th

Cir. 2003). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D), the limitation period begins to run on “the date on

which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence.” 

In the context of a parole board decision or other administrative board action, the factual

basis is the administrative body’s denial of a petitioner’s administrative appeal. Shelby, 391 F.3d at

1066; Redd, 343 F.3d at 1082-1083. Thus, the statute of limitations begins to run the day following

a petitioner’s notification of the administrative body’s decision. Id. Where the date Petitioner

received notice of the decision of the administrative board’s decision is not part of the record, 

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In California, the Supreme Court, intermediate Courts of Appeal, and Superior Courts all have original habeas 2

corpus jurisdiction. See Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006, n. 2 (9th Cir. 1999). Although a Superior Court order denying habeas corpus

relief is non-appealable, a state prisoner may file a new habeas corpus petition in the Court of Appeal. Id. If the Court of

Appeal denies relief, the petitioner may seek review in the California Supreme Court by way of a petition for review, or may

instead file an original habeas petition in the Supreme Court. See id. 

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Shelby rejected the notion that remand for an evidentiary hearing was required to determine the date

on which a petitioner found out about results of the hearing, thus apparently establishing instead a

presumption that an inmate will in fact receive notice on the day the denial is issued, and that date

will be used to calculate the statute of limitations unless the petitioner rebuts that presumption:

“Here, as in Redd, Shelby does not dispute that he received timely notice of the denial of his

administrative appeal on July 12, 2001, and he offers no evidence to the contrary. Therefore,

the limitation period began running the next day.”

Shelby, 391 F.3d at 1066.

Here, Respondent has filed exhibits with the motion to dismiss that establish that Petitioner

himself has alleged in documents attached to his habeas corpus petition filed on December 6, 2005 in

the Sonoma County Superior Court, under penalty of perjury, that his inmate appeal was screened

out as ineligible on November 5, 2004. (Ex. 1, at Ex. B, pp. 5-6). Thus, Petitioner would have

discovered the “factual predicate” to his federal claim the following day, i.e., on November 6, 2004. 

Shelby, 391 F.3d at 1066. The AEDPA’s one-year limitation period would have commenced the

following day, November 7, 2004, and would have expired one year later on November 7, 2005. 

As mentioned, the instant petition was not filed until September 19, 2006, ten months after

the one-year period would have expired. Thus, unless Petitioner is entitled to some form of statutory

or equitable tolling, the petition is untimely and should be dismissed.

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In

Nino v. Galaza, the Ninth Circuit held that the “statute of limitations is tolled from the time the first

state habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme Court rejects the petitioner’s final collateral

challenge.” Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999); see also, Taylor v. Lee, 186 F.3d 2

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557 (4th Cir. 1999); Barnett v. Lemaster, 167 F.3d 1321, 1323 (10th Cir. 1999). The Ninth Circuit

reasoned that tolling the limitation period during the time a petitioner is preparing his petition to file

at the next appellate level reinforces the need to present all claims to the state courts first and will

prevent the premature filing of federal petitions out of concern that the limitation period will end

before all claims can be presented to the state supreme court. Id. at 1005. However, the limitation

period is not tolled for the time such an application is pending in federal court. Duncan v. Walker,

533 U.S. 167, 181-182, 121 S.Ct. 2120 (2001).

This statutory tolling will apply if a state petition has been “properly filed.” Artuz v. Bennett,

531 U.S. 4, 8, 121 S. Ct. 361 (2000)(holding that a properly filed state application complies with the

applicable laws and rules governing filings, including the form of the application and time

limitations). A state habeas petition is “pending” during a full round of review in the state courts, a

period that includes the time between a lower court decision and filing a new petition in a higher

court as long as those intervals are “reasonable.” Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 222-224, 122 S.

Ct. 2134 (2002). 

In Delhomme v. Ramirez, 340 F.3d 817, 820 (9th Cir. 2003), the Ninth Circuit held that a

petitioner begins a separate round of review “each time [he] files a new habeas petition at the same

or a lower level” of the state court system. See also Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006-1007 (intervals tolled

between state court’s disposition of a state habeas petition and the filing of “a petition at the next

state appellate level.”). There is no tolling for the period between sets or “rounds” of state habeas

petitions. Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2003)(no tolling once California Supreme Court

denied review). Nor is a petitioner entitled to continuous tolling when the later petition raises

unrelated claims. Gaston v. Palmer, 447 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2006). However, if the California

Supreme Court denies a petition for failure to allege with sufficient particularity facts warranting

habeas relief and allows amendment to comply, the petitioner will be entitled to tolling for the period

between denial and commencement of next series of petitions if the subsequent petitions are limited

to an elaboration of the facts relating to the claims in the first petition and the second petition is not

denied as untimely. King v. Roe, 340 F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 2003).

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The limitation period is not tolled for the period between finality of an appeal and the filing

of an application for post-conviction or other collateral review in state court since no state court

application is “pending.” Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006-1007. Nor is there tolling between finality and the

filing of a federal petition. Id. at 1007. And, as mentioned previously, the one-year period is not

tolled during the pendency of a federal petition. Duncan, 533 U.S. at 181-182. 

Here, the record before the Court indicates that Petitioner filed his first state habeas petition

regarding the claims in the instant petition on December 6, 2005. (Doc. 8, Exh. 1). In that situation,

Petitioner cannot avail himself of the AEDPA’s statutory tolling provisions. A petitioner is not

entitled to tolling where the limitations period has already run prior to filing a state habeas petition. 

Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9th Cir. 2000); see Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256, 1259

(11th Cir. 2000)(same); Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820 (9th Cir. 2003)(“section 2244(d) does

not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the state petition was

filed.”); Jackson v. Dormire, 180 F.3d 919, 920 (8th Cir. 1999) (petitioner fails to exhaust claims

raised in state habeas corpus filed after expiration of the one-year limitation period). Here, as

mentioned, the limitation period expired on November 7, 2005, approximately one month before

Petitioner filed his first state habeas petition. Accordingly, he cannot avail himself of the statutory

tolling provisions of the AEDPA. 

D. Equitable Tolling

The limitation period is subject to equitable tolling if “extraordinary circumstances beyond a

prisoner’s control” have made it impossible for the petition to be filed on time. Roy v. Lampert, 455

F. 3d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 2006); Calderon v. United States District Court (Beeler), 128 F. 3d 1283,

1288 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other grounds by Calderon v. United States District Court

(Kelly), 163 F. 3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998). “When external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of

diligence, account for the failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations

may be appropriate.” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Petitioner has not alleged entitlement to equitable tolling. Petitioner has not responded to the

motion to dismiss. Moreover, the record before the Court reflects no facts that would support a

finding of equitable tolling. Because the petition is untimely, and because, further, Petitioner is not

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entitled to any type of tolling that would make the petition timely, the motion to dismiss should be

granted and the petition should be dismissed.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the motion to dismiss (Doc. 8), be

GRANTED and the habeas corpus petition be DISMISSED for Petitioner’s failure to comply with 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)’s one year limitation period.

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304

of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within twenty (20) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with

the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served and

filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the objections. 

The District Judge will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636

(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive

the right to appeal the District Judge’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 6, 2008 /s/ Theresa A. Goldner 

j6eb3d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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