Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-16-72246/USCOURTS-ca9-16-72246-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
William P. Barr
Respondent
Silvano Lopez-Angel
Petitioner

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SILVANO LOPEZ-ANGEL,

Petitioner,

v.

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,

Respondent.

No. 16-72246

Agency No.

A044-076-538

OPINION

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted October 16, 2019

San Diego, California

Filed December 27, 2019

Before: Andrew D. Hurwitz, John B. Owens,

and Kenneth K. Lee, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Hurwitz;

Concurrence by Judge Lee

Case: 16-72246, 12/27/2019, ID: 11544783, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 1 of 14
2 LOPEZ-ANGEL V. BARR

SUMMARY*

Immigration

The panel granted Silvano Lopez-Angel’s petition for 

review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals, 

and remanded, holding that Lopez’s removal from the 

United States while his appeal was pending before the BIA 

did not withdraw his appeal under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.4.

The panel observed that the withdrawal sanction in 

§ 1003.4 is triggered by an alien’s “departure,” from this 

country, but the regulation does not distinguish between 

volitional and non-volitional departures. The panel also 

noted that the BIA has recognized that an unlawful removal 

does not a constitute a § 1003.4 departure, but has not 

addressed whether a lawful removal would withdraw an 

appeal. However, in Madrigal v. Holder, 572 F.3d 239 (6th 

Cir. 2009), the Sixth Circuit held that § 1003.4 applies only 

when the right to appeal is relinquished by the alien’s own 

volitional conduct, not solely that of the government. 

The panel agreed, concluding that the analysis in 

Madrigal is consistent with this court’s interpretation of a 

similar regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d), which states that 

any departure after the filing a motion to reopen or 

reconsider constitutes a withdrawal of such motion. In Coyt 

v. Holder, 593 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 2010), this court held that 

involuntary removal of a petitioner while a motion to reopen 

was pending did not withdraw the motion under § 1003.2(d). 

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

Case: 16-72246, 12/27/2019, ID: 11544783, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 2 of 14
LOPEZ-ANGEL V. BARR 3

Rather, the court reasoned that it would completely 

eviscerate the statutory right to reopen if the agency deems 

a motion to reopen constructively withdrawn whenever the 

government removes a petitioner while his motion is 

pending. Likewise, the panel here concluded that the 

statutory right to file an appeal would be undermined if the 

government could simply terminate an appeal by removing 

the petitioner. Accordingly, the panel held that § 1003.4 

provides for withdrawal only when the petitioner engaged in 

conduct that establishes a waiver of the right to appeal. 

Addressing whether Lopez otherwise waived his right to 

appeal, the panel concluded that there was no evidence that 

he voluntarily left the country; rather, the record established 

that the government removed him. The panel therefore held 

that Lopez did not withdraw his appeal and granted the 

petition for review so that the BIA could reinstate his appeal. 

Concurring, Judge Lee agreed that petitioner did not 

withdraw his appeal, but reached that conclusion differently. 

Judge Lee observed it was unclear whether the Sixth 

Circuit’s decision in Madrigal was based on the regulation 

itself or on constitutional concerns. In any event, Judge Lee 

wrote that he did not believe that the due process concerns 

in Madrigal applied here because the petitioner in Madrigal

filed a motion to stay, but the government removed her while 

the stay was pending. Here, however, there was no evidence 

that Lopez had moved for a stay. Because Lopez had not 

done all that he could to avail himself of the process, Judge 

Lee concluded that principles of fundamental fairness would 

not necessarily be violated if § 1003.4 applied here. 

Nonetheless, Judge Lee agreed with the majority’s 

conclusion based on a reasonable reading of § 1003.4 to 

interpret “departure” not to include a forcible removal.

Case: 16-72246, 12/27/2019, ID: 11544783, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 3 of 14
4 LOPEZ-ANGEL V. BARR

COUNSEL

Lauren Cusitello (argued), Crossroads Justice Center of San 

Diego, San Diego, California, for Petitioner.

Victoria Braga (argued), Trial Attorney; Andrew N. 

O’Malley, Senior Litigation Counsel; Cindy S. Ferrier, 

Assistant Director; Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil 

Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, 

D.C.; for Respondent.

OPINION

HURWITZ, Circuit Judge:

The government removed Silvano Lopez-Angel to 

Mexico while his appeal to the Board of Immigration 

Appeals (“BIA”) was pending. It now argues that Lopez 

withdrew the appeal because he left the country. We cannot 

improve on Judge Kethledge’s description of the 

government’s position: “To state that argument should be to 

refute it[.]” Madrigal v. Holder, 572 F.3d 239, 246 (6th Cir. 

2009) (Kethledge, J., concurring). We conclude that the 

removal did not withdraw Lopez’s appeal and grant his 

petition for review.

I. Background.

Lopez, a native and citizen of Mexico, became a lawful 

permanent resident of the United States in 1993. In 2004, 

Lopez was convicted of corporal injury to a spouse or 

cohabitant in violation of California Penal Code (“CPC”) 

§ 273.5 and sentenced to 180 days in jail. In 2007, Lopez 

was served with a Notice to Appear alleging that he was 

removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) as an alien 

Case: 16-72246, 12/27/2019, ID: 11544783, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 4 of 14
LOPEZ-ANGEL V. BARR 5

convicted of a crime of domestic violence. An Immigration 

Judge (“IJ”) administratively closed the removal 

proceedings in April 2009 because Lopez was in state 

custody awaiting trial on other charges. Later that year, 

Lopez was convicted of kidnapping in violation of CPC 

§ 207(a), inflicting corporal injury in violation of CPC 

§ 273.5, and making criminal threats in violation of CPC 

§ 422. Lopez received a five-year sentence on the 

kidnapping conviction; the sentences for the two other 

convictions were stayed.

Removal proceedings were reopened in 2012. The 

government lodged an additional charge, alleging that 

because of the 2009 kidnapping conviction, Lopez was also 

removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) as an alien 

convicted of an aggravated felony for which the term of 

imprisonment was at least one year. Lopez conceded 

removability but sought cancellation of removal. The IJ 

concluded that Lopez was ineligible for cancellation of 

removal because of the kidnapping conviction. Lopez did 

not seek review of the IJ’s removal order and was deported 

to Mexico in 2013.

Lopez was apprehended in September 2015 while 

attempting to reenter the United States and charged with 

illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. The prior 

order of removal was reinstated and a warrant of removal 

issued. In December 2015, Lopez moved in immigration 

court for reconsideration of the removal order and to reopen 

proceedings. He argued that his 2009 kidnapping conviction 

no longer barred him from seeking cancellation of removal 

because we had found unconstitutionally vague the 

definition of a crime of violence in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), which 

is incorporated into the definition of an aggravated felony in 

the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. 

Case: 16-72246, 12/27/2019, ID: 11544783, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 5 of 14
6 LOPEZ-ANGEL V. BARR

§ 1101(a)(43)(F). See Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110, 

1120 (9th Cir. 2015), aff’d sub nom. Sessions v. Dimaya, 

138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018). Lopez subsequently successfully 

moved for dismissal of his illegal reentry case on this 

ground. United States v. Lopez-Angel, No. 3:15-cr-2730 

(S.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2016). The IJ, however, denied Lopez’s 

motions as untimely and also declined to reopen proceedings 

sua sponte.

Lopez filed a notice of appeal to the BIA on April 1, 

2016. On April 21, 2016, shortly after Lopez was released 

from custody on the § 1326 charge, the government removed 

him to Mexico. The BIA then returned the record in Lopez’s 

appeal to the IJ, holding that Lopez had withdrawn his 

appeal under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.4 by departing the country. 

That regulation provides in relevant part:

Departure from the United States of a person 

who is the subject of deportation or removal 

proceedings, except for arriving aliens as 

defined in § 1001.1(q) of this chapter, 

subsequent to the taking of an appeal, but 

prior to a decision thereon, shall constitute a 

withdrawal of the appeal, and the initial 

decision in the case shall be final to the same 

extent as though no appeal had been taken.

8 C.F.R. § 1003.4. Lopez timely petitioned for review.

II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review.

We have jurisdiction to review final orders of removal 

under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. This jurisdiction “encompasses 

review of decisions refusing to reopen or reconsider such 

orders.” Mata v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 2150, 2154 (2015). The 

BIA’s decision that Lopez withdrew his appeal is “the 

Case: 16-72246, 12/27/2019, ID: 11544783, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 6 of 14
LOPEZ-ANGEL V. BARR 7

logical and functional equivalent” of an order denying his 

motions. Madrigal, 572 F.3d at 242.

We review questions of law de novo but sometimes defer 

to the BIA’s interpretation of its governing statutes and 

regulations. Lezama-Garcia v. Holder, 666 F.3d 518, 524–

25 (9th Cir. 2011). This is not such a case, however. The 

BIA’s one-member, non-precedential order is not entitled to 

Auer deference “because it does not reflect the BIA’s 

considered judgment on the question.” United States v. 

Hernandez-Arias, 757 F.3d 874, 883 (9th Cir. 2014). And, 

because the BIA’s decision “contains no reasoning of any 

substance on the issue we consider here,” Skidmore

deference does not apply. See Miller v. Sessions, 889 F.3d 

998, 1001–02 (9th Cir. 2018). 

III. Discussion.

A. When does 8 C.F.R. § 1003.4 apply?

The withdrawal sanction in § 1003.4 is triggered by an 

alien’s “departure” from this country. On its face, § 1003.4 

“does not distinguish between volitional and non-volitional 

departures.” Madrigal, 572 F.3d at 244. But, the BIA has 

already recognized that the regulation does not apply every 

time a petitioner leaves this country. See Matter of DiazGarcia, 25 I. & N. Dec. 794, 796 (BIA 2012) (citing 

Wiedersperg v. INS, 896 F.2d 1179, 1181–82 (9th Cir. 

1990)). An unlawful removal, for example, does not 

constitute a § 1003.4 departure. Id. at 797.

The BIA, however, has expressly pretermitted whether a 

lawful removal during the pendency of an appeal qualifies 

as a departure under § 1003.4. Id. at 797 n.4. Three of our 

sister Circuits have also left the issue open. See MontanoVega v. Holder, 721 F.3d 1175, 1179–80 (10th Cir. 2013); 

Case: 16-72246, 12/27/2019, ID: 11544783, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 7 of 14
8 LOPEZ-ANGEL V. BARR

Ahmad v. Gonzales, 204 F. App’x 98, 99 (2d Cir. 2006); 

Long v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 516, 520 n.6 (5th Cir. 2005) (per 

curiam).

But the Sixth Circuit has squarely addressed the issue. 

Madrigal, 572 F.3d at 244–45. Like Lopez, Madrigal was 

removed under an outstanding removal order after appealing 

an IJ’s denial of her motion to reopen. Id. at 241–42. The 

BIA found her appeal automatically withdrawn under 

§ 1003.4. Id. at 242. The Sixth Circuit panel, however, 

unanimously held that § 1003.4 did not apply. Id. at 244–

45. Analyzing under the doctrine of waiver, the court held 

that § 1003.4 applies only when the right to appeal is 

relinquished by the alien’s own volitional conduct, not solely 

that of the government. Id. Otherwise, the government 

could vitiate the appeal of any petitioner subject to a removal 

order simply by removing the petitioner before a ruling by 

the BIA. Id. at 245. Because Madrigal was forced to leave 

the country by the government, the Sixth Circuit held that 

she did not waive her right to appeal. Id.

We agree. The analysis in Madrigal is consistent with 

our interpretation of a similar regulation, 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1003.2(d), which states in relevant part:

Any departure from the United States, 

including the deportation or removal of a 

person who is the subject of exclusion, 

deportation, or removal proceedings, 

occurring after the filing of a motion to 

reopen or a motion to reconsider, shall 

constitute a withdrawal of such motion.

In Coyt v. Holder, we held that the involuntarily removal of 

a petitioner whose motion to reopen was pending did not 

withdraw the motion. 593 F.3d 902, 906–07 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Case: 16-72246, 12/27/2019, ID: 11544783, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 8 of 14
LOPEZ-ANGEL V. BARR 9

Construing § 1003.2(d) in light of the rights provided aliens 

by the INA, we noted that “[i]t would completely eviscerate 

the statutory right to reopen provided by Congress if the 

agency deems a motion to reopen constructively withdrawn 

whenever the government physically removes the petitioner 

while his motion is pending before the BIA.” Id. at 907. 

Seeking to harmonize the regulation with the underlying 

statutory scheme, we held that “the physical removal of a 

petitioner by the United States does not preclude the 

petitioner from pursuing a motion to reopen.” Id.

Application of the withdrawal sanction of § 1003.4 here 

would produce a similar conflict with the INA. See Decker 

v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 609 (2013) (“It is a 

basic tenet that ‘regulations, in order to be valid, must be 

consistent with the statute under which they are 

promulgated.’”) (quoting United States v. Larionoff, 

431 U.S. 864, 873 (1977)). The INA gives a petitioner the 

right to appeal a final removal order. See Mata, 135 S. Ct. 

at 2153 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1), (c)(5)). That right 

encompasses “decisions refusing to reopen or reconsider 

such orders,” including decisions based on the untimeliness 

of the motions. See id. at 2154. The statutory right would 

be undermined if the government could simply terminate an 

appeal by removing a petitioner. See Marin-Rodriguez v. 

Holder, 612 F.3d 591, 593 (7th Cir. 2010) (observing in dicta 

that § 1003.4 is “strange phraseology as applied to an alien 

whose departure was beyond his control” because “[i]t is 

unnatural to speak of one litigant withdrawing another’s 

motion”). It is therefore important, as we made clear in Coyt, 

that “a party’s withdrawal of a pending proceeding . . . be a 

voluntary relinquishment of a right.” 593 F.3d at 907 (citing 

Madrigal, 572 F.3d at 244).

Case: 16-72246, 12/27/2019, ID: 11544783, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 9 of 14
10 LOPEZ-ANGEL V. BARR

We therefore hold that an alien does not withdraw his 

appeal of a final removal order, including the appeal of the 

denial of a motion to reopen or reconsider, simply because 

he was involuntarily removed before the appeal was decided. 

Rather, we hold that § 1003.4 provides for withdrawal only 

when the petitioner engaged in conduct that establishes a 

waiver of the right to appeal. See Madrigal, 572 F.3d at 244–

45.1

B. Did Lopez otherwise waive his right to appeal?

Resolution of this issue is now straightforward. There is 

no evidence that Lopez voluntarily left the country, even 

briefly, while his appeal was pending. See Aguilera-Ruiz v. 

Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 835, 838 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that 

voluntary departures, even if “brief, casual, and innocent,” 

withdraw an appeal under § 1003.4). The record establishes 

only that the government removed Lopez on the same day 

he was released from criminal custody after the dismissal of 

the illegal reentry case.2

1 The government relies on two memorandum dispositions stating 

that lawful removal qualifies as a departure under § 1003.4. See

Kureghyan v. Holder, 338 F. App’x 622, 624 (9th Cir. 2009) (observing 

that the BIA had lost jurisdiction over a prior appeal because the 

petitioner’s removal withdrew his appeal under § 1003.4); Ertur v. 

Gonzales, 229 F. App’x 583, 584 (9th Cir. 2007) (reviewing the decision 

of an IJ directly after the BIA determined that the petitioner’s appeal had 

been withdrawn under § 1003.4 because he was removed). But, in 

addition to being non-precedential, these dispositions addressed the issue 

before us today only in passing. And, both predate Madrigal and Coyt. 

We therefore do not find them persuasive in this case.

2 We reject the government’s argument that Lopez’s failure to 

appeal the 2013 removal order or request a stay of removal pending 

appellate adjudication of his motions to reopen and reconsider 

Case: 16-72246, 12/27/2019, ID: 11544783, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 10 of 14
LOPEZ-ANGEL V. BARR 11

We therefore hold that Lopez did not withdraw his 

appeal of the denial of his motions to reopen and reconsider 

when he was involuntarily removed from the United States. 

We grant the petition for review so that BIA can reinstate his 

appeal. We of course express no opinion on the merits of 

that appeal; we hold only that Lopez did not withdraw it.

PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED; 

REMANDED.

LEE, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I agree that the petitioner did not withdraw his appeal of 

a motion to reopen under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.4 when he was 

forcibly removed from the country, but I reach that 

conclusion differently.

The majority opinion concludes that § 1003.4 does not 

apply here because of Madrigal v. Holder, 572 F.3d 239 (6th 

Cir. 2009). But it is “unclear whether the Sixth Circuit 

thought this exception could be found lurking somewhere in 

the terms of the rule itself, or whether it thought the 

Constitution’s due process guarantee required it.” MontanoVega v. Holder, 721 F.3d 1175, 1179 (10th Cir. 2013). In 

any event, I do not believe that the due process concerns in 

Madrigal apply here. The petitioner in Madrigal filed a 

constitutes waiver of his right to appeal the IJ’s order denying those 

motions. Neither was an intentional relinquishment of the right to appeal 

at issue here. See generally United States v. Depue, 912 F.3d 1227, 1232 

(9th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (“Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the 

timely assertion of a right, waiver is the ‘intentional relinquishment or 

abandonment of a known right.’”) (emphasis omitted) (quoting United 

States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993)).

Case: 16-72246, 12/27/2019, ID: 11544783, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 11 of 14
12 LOPEZ-ANGEL V. BARR

motion to stay the removal pending the disposition of her 

appeal, but DHS removed her from the country while the 

motion to stay was pending. 572 F.3d at 241–42. As the 

Sixth Circuit noted, “principles of fundamental fairness 

would be violated” if the government could unilaterally 

terminate an appeal and moot a motion for a stay when a 

petitioner “appears to have done all that she could have done 

to avail herself of the process.” Id. at 245.

Here, though, there is nothing in the record showing that 

Lopez moved for a stay. Since Lopez has not done all that 

he could have done to avail himself of the process, 

“principles of fundamental fairness” would not necessarily 

be violated if § 1003.4 applied here.

Nonetheless, I agree with the majority’s conclusion 

based on a reasonable reading of the regulation. As quoted

in the majority opinion, § 1003.4 states as follows: 

“Departure from the United States of a person who is the 

subject of deportation or removal proceedings . . . 

subsequent to the taking of an appeal, but prior to a decision 

thereon, shall constitute a withdrawal of the appeal.” The 

question is whether a forcible removal is a “departure” under 

the above regulation.

We give words their ordinary meaning when interpreting 

a statute. See Animal Legal Defense Fund v. United States 

Dept. of Agriculture, 933 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 2019) 

(“When a statute does not define a term, we typically ‘give 

the phrase its ordinary meaning.’” (internal quotation marks 

omitted)) (quoting FCC v. AT & T Inc., 562 U.S. 397, 403 

(2011)). The ordinary meaning of the word “departure” 

refers to a volitional act. It would be quite strange to say, for 

example, “the suspect departed the crime scene when police 

took him into custody.” Though it might be possible to use 

“departure” in a non-volitional sense, there is a “distinction 

Case: 16-72246, 12/27/2019, ID: 11544783, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 12 of 14
LOPEZ-ANGEL V. BARR 13

between how a word can be used and how it ordinarily is

used.” Smith v. U.S., 508 U.S. 223, 242 (1993) (Scalia, J., 

dissenting) (emphasis in original).

The context of the word “departure” also suggests that it 

does not include forcible removals. See ASARCO, LLC v. 

Celanese Chemical Co., 792 F.3d 1203, 1210 (9th Cir. 2015) 

(“A primary canon of statutory interpretation is that the plain 

language of a statute should be enforced according to its 

terms, in light of its context.”). Section 1003.4 is a single 

paragraph describing the procedure for how a party can 

withdraw his or her own appeal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.4 

(beginning with how “[i]n any case in which an appeal has 

been taken, the party taking the appeal may file a written 

withdrawal thereof with the office at which the notice of 

appeal was filed”). As the Seventh Circuit has noted, “[i]t is 

unnatural to speak of one litigant withdrawing another’s 

motion.” Marin-Rodriguez v. Holder, 612 F.3d 591, 593 

(7th Cir. 2010). Moreover, if “departure” included 

deportations or removals, the regulation would read: 

“Departure [e.g., deportation or removal] from the United 

States of a person who is the subject of deportation or 

removal proceedings . . . shall constitute a withdrawal of the 

appeal.” That would be an odd way to read the regulation.

Notably, Section 1003.2(d) — the substance of which 

was promulgated on the same day as § 1003.4, see Executive 

Office for Immigration Review; Motions and Appeals in 

Immigration Proceedings, 61 Fed. Reg. 18,900, 18,905–07 

(April 29, 1996) — states that “[a]ny departure from the 

United States, including the deportation or removal of a 

person who is the subject of exclusion, deportation, or 

removal proceedings, occurring after the filing of a motion 

to reopen or a motion to reconsider, shall constitute a 

withdrawal of such motion.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) 

Case: 16-72246, 12/27/2019, ID: 11544783, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 13 of 14
14 LOPEZ-ANGEL V. BARR

(emphasis added). Here, if “departure” included forcible 

removals, it would have been unnecessary in § 1003.2(d) to 

state that a “departure” includes the “deportation or 

removal” of the person subject to the proceedings. Indeed, 

this shows that the agency knew how to specify that 

“departure” includes forcible removals when it intended to 

do so.

I therefore concur that Lopez’s appeal was not 

withdrawn under § 1003.4 when he was forcibly removed 

from this country.

Case: 16-72246, 12/27/2019, ID: 11544783, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 14 of 14