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Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Edith Evelyn Young
Appellant

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 18 1992 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk . 

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No. 90-6231 

v. (D.C. No. CR-89-256-W) 

(W.D. Oklahoma) 

EDITH EVELYN YOUNG, a/k/a 

Sister, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MOORE, MCWILLIAMS, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges. 

Edith Evelyn Young appeals convictions on four counts of 

converting property of the United States and one count of 

possession with intent to distribute cocaine. 

points of error. We affirm. 

She raises five 

Susan Barbara Werner, an employee of the Department of Human 

Services of the State of Oklahoma, was discovered by the FBI to be 

involved in a food stamp fraud. Confronted with the evidence, Ms. 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppal. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-6231 Document: 010110276757 Date Filed: 08/18/1992 Page: 1
Werner agreed to cooperate with the continuing investigation. For 

her part, Ms. Werner agreed to continue her scheme of diverting 

from legitimate purposes Authorizations to Participate (ATP), 

documents used by legitimate welfare recipients to receive their 

allocation of food stamps. 

Dessie Hudson had been working at the home of defendant Young 

since 1988. On three occasions between October 4 and October 12, 

1989, Ms. Werner diverted ATPs to Ms. Hudson which she converted 

into food stamps. Ms. Hudson then sold the stamps for cash and 

small amounts of cocaine at a duplex in Oklahoma City occupied by 

Ms. Young. 

On October 17, a search warrant was executed at Ms. Young's 

home. Defendant and Ms. Hudson were arrested at the time of the 

search. Located in defendant's bedroom were marked and unmarked 

food stamp coupons, three pistols, triple beam scales, electronic 

scales, a plastic bag containing a white powdery residue, four 

different Food Stamp Program ID cards, a bag containing twentyfive small glassine baggies, and a DHS envelope. As defendant was 

being booked in the marshal's office, 15.61 grams of 92% pure 

cocaine were found on her person. 

I. 

Defendant contends the search warrant was invalid because the 

affiant failed to disclose material facts to the magistrate. She 

argues the affiant "intentionally and recklessly" did not inform 

the magistrate that: 1) Ms. Werner had told FBI agents she 

refused cocaine from defendant, but they later discovered she had 

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accepted and used it; 2) Ms. Werner had "a criminal record"; 3) 

Ms. Werner was subject to a suspended sentence in state court; 4) 

Ms. Werner had a "drug history"; 5) "a syringe containing cocaine 

was found in a trash can next. to the desk where Werner worked" approximately one month before obtaining the warrant; and 6) Ms. 

Werner had lied on her employment application. Defendant also 

claims acts referred to in the affidavit did not occur. Defendant 

baldly states that the affiant knew all this information before 

making the affidavit, but "intentionally hid these facts from the 

magistrate." 

Defendant argues because the affiant relied on information 

from Ms. Werner, these omissions make the affidavit unreliable and 

negate the good faith of the affiant. She contends, therefore, 

the results of the search should have been suppressed. 

The necessary predicate to a valid affidavit is the 

credibility of the affiant, not the informant. Indeed, a warrant 

must be voided if the magistrate or judge issuing the warrant "was 

misled by the information in an affidavit that the affiant knew 

was false or would have known was false except for his reckless 

disregard of the truth." United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 

923; 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3421 (1984). If, however, the affidavit 

contains sufficient accurate or untainted evidence, the warrant is 

valid despite inclusion of unreliable facts. United States v. 

Snow, 919 F.2d 1458, 1460 (10th Cir. 1990). 

Defendant does not seriously contend the representations made 

by the affiant were false, but rather that they were recklessly 

made in disregard of the truth. The burden, therefore, falls upon 

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her to establish "the affiant 'in fact entertained serious doubts 

as to the truth of his' allegations." Bruning v. Pixler, 949 F.2d 

352, 357 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1943 (1992) 

(quoting United States v. Williams, 737 F.2d 594, 602 (7th Cir. 

1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985)). With this principle 

in mind, we turn to the record. 

After reviewing the affidavit and the testimony of the 

affiant, Agent Raftery, we can find no evidence that suggests the 

affiant was in the least concerned or doubtful about the 

truthfulness of the statements he made. For that reason alone, we 

could not conclude the affiant's statements were recklessly made, 

and the defendant's argument must fail. 

We have also discovered the so-called omitted facts defendant 

claims would have affected the magistrate's evaluation of the 

evidence are more argumentative than probative. 1 Even had all 

those facts been included in the affidavit, we do not believe the 

magistrate would have been persuaded to deny the warrant. There 

are substantial additional facts, including personal observations 

1 For example, defense counsel takes issue with the fact that 

the affidavit states Agent DeNunzio saw Ms. Hudson at the 

defendant's residence on October 4, 1989, but, in his testimony, 

he stated the date was October 10. Whether the inconsistency is 

the result of an outright misstatement, as defendant contends, or 

"incorrect testimony," as the government contends, is really of no 

moment. Although defendant argues Agent DeNunzio was the only 

person to have seen Ms. Hudson at Ms. Young's residence, the 

affidavit describes an occasion on October 12 on which Ms. Hudson 

"was observed by an FBI agent leaving the front porch of 2215 

Northwest 49th Street [defendant's residence] and shortly 

thereafter returned to Werner's vehicle." Thus, if the October 4 

observation in the affidavit attributed to Agent DeNunzio is 

invalidated, the October 12 observation provides a nexus between 

Ms. Hudson, the illegal transactions, and defendant's residence. 

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of FBI agents, set forth in the affidavit which demonstrate 

probable cause. We conclude, therefore, the omissions provide no 

reason to invalidate the warrant. 

II. 

On three occasions during the examination of Ms. Werner, she 

volunteered testimony defendant contends was improper and the 

basis for a new trial. On one occasion, she euphemistically 

suggested Ms. Young was a drug dealer. An objection to the 

statement was sustained and the jury instructed to disregard it. 

The circumstances of the second instance are not nearly as 

clear, however. The record indicates the following transpired: 

Q. [By the prosecutor] Again, Ms. Werner, that was a 

conversation between you and who? 

A. Dessie. 

Q. Is that Dessie Hudson? 

A. Yes. 

Q. When you asked if Sister will take them all ---

MR. LEE: Object to that. 

THE COURT: Restate your question, I'm 

sorry, I didn't hear it. 

MS. KAESTNER: Your Honor, I just said, when 

you said, "Will Sister take them all" 

MR. LEE: I object, Your Honor. That was 

unintelligible on that. [referring to the contents of a 

tape recorded conversation] I'll object to her --

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THE COURT: 

what she heard. 

Sustained. You can ask her 

When the prosecutor attempted to ask Ms. Werner whether she 

heard Ms. Hudson use the word "Sister," defense counsel again 

objected arguing "that was not 'Sister' [on the tape recording] to 

me." Counsel did not object on hearsay grounds. Although the 

court apparently disagreed with defendant's counsel about the 

nature of the impropriety of Ms. Werner's testimony, the court 

nonetheless admonished the prosecutor that the statement was 

inadmissible hearsay. The court reasoned that the government had 

not yet established defendant was a part of a conspiracy; 

therefore, her hearsay statements were inadmissible. After some 

further discussion of that issue with the prosecutor, the 

examination of Ms. Werner was resumed without further objection. 

The third occasion to which counsel points is one on which 

Ms. Werner volunteered testimony about acts of the defendant which 

she did not observe. Again, an objection was sustained and the 

jury instructed to disregard the testimony. The witness was also 

admonished. 

On none of these occasions did defendant request a mistrial 

or otherwise contend the trial court did not properly deal with 

the testimony. On appeal, however, counsel argues the statements 

so infected the fairness of the trial, we should reverse as a 

matter of plain error. We disagree. 2 

2 Although the government contends the testimony was admissible 

under Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 107 s. Ct. 2775 

(1987), we do not agree. There is simply nothing in the record 

indicating the purpose of the objectionable statement was to 

(Continued to next page.) 

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In our view, the trial court correctly dealt with each 

situation as it arose. The jury was instructed to disregard the 

improper testimony, and in the absence of any indication to the 

contrary, we must presume . it followed the instruction. United 

States v. Morris, 623 F.2d 145, 148 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 

U.S. 1065 (1980). Moreover, in light of the evidence produced at 

trial, we do not see how the verdict could have been influenced by 

the objectionable responses. 

III. 

Defendant contends the trial court's denial of a mistrial 

when a government witness allegedly stated a conclusion of law 

which defendant asserts was beyond his capacity was error. We 

believe the district court properly ruled upon the objection. 

Josh Bohannon, the program supervisor of the food stamp 

program at the Oklahoma Department of Human Services, testified 

that only an authorized person should have possession of food 

stamp coupons. Following an objection that the witness was 

testifying about a legal conclusion, the answer was stricken and 

the jury admonished. Citing Specht v. Jensen, 853 F.2d 805 (10th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1008 (1989), defendant contends, 

nonetheless, she was prejudiced by the testimony. Defendant 

misreads the import of Specht. 

(Continued from prior page.) 

establish the existence of the conspiracy, and the prosecutor did 

not advance this reason to the trial court in opposition to the 

objections. 

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The testimony to which defendant objects was introduced while 

the witness was examining a blowup of a food stamp coupon which 

stated on its face it was "nontransferable." When asked by the 

prosecutor to define "nontransferable," Mr. Bohannon stated, "it 

is to be used for its designated purpose: that is, to purchase 

edible items for nutrition. Only the bearer, or the person that 

is authorized to use them, should have possession or use of the 

coupons, unless they have been authorized by the client to do 

their shopping for them .... " Following this answer, defense 

counsel asked for a bench conference at which he raised the Specht 

issue, claiming the witness was "giving a legal opinion." At 

defendant's request, the court admonished the jury to disregard 

any witness statement "with regard to what the law is," and 

advised the jury the court would instruct on the law. 

The situation is quite distinct from Specht in which an 

expert, in response to hypothetical questions "tailored to reflect 

plaintiffs' view of the evidence," testified at length on issues 

of substantive law that would govern the jury's deliberation 

without intervention of the trial judge. Specht, 853 F.2d at 807. 

In this instance, the prompt action of the trial judge averted 

that infraction, and a mistrial was unwarranted. 

IV. 

Defendant maintains the evidence of her unauthorized use of 

the ATPs in Counts 1 and 7, and of the conversion of coupons in 

Count 9 was insufficient. We review claims of insufficiency of 

the evidence in a light most favorable to the government and only 

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to determine whether a reasonable jury could have found defendant 

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on the facts presented. United 

States v. Johnson, F.2d __ , 1992 WL 177174, *2 (10th Cir. 

Jul. 28, 1992). 

Defendant contends there was no evidence linking her to the 

transactions because: no ATPs were found on her premises; nothing 

occurred on October 4, 1989 [the date in Count l] that involved 

her; and the ATPs are not money or property of the United States 

so she could not have been guilty of conversion. Finally, she 

advances Count 9 charges her with a conversion that occurred on 

October 9, but no one testified "they saw or heard her until the 

search of her apartment on October 17." We find these arguments 

unpersuasive. 

That no ATPs were found in defendant's home on the date of 

the search does not preclude her conviction. Ms. Werner testified 

about the scheme and how the ATP of Travis Mason (Count 1) was 

cashed for food stamps. In addition, the jury heard the tapes of 

the conversations between Ms. Werner and Ms. Hudson. The same is 

true for the transaction involved with the Susan Casey ATP charged 

in Count 7. Additionally Agent Raftery testified about his 

surveillance of the transaction and his monitoring of the 

participants. The transaction charged in Count 9 is similarly 

supported by the testimony of Ms. Werner, the taped conversations, 

and the FBI surveillance. 

Nearly $700 worth of marked and unmarked food stamps were 

found in defendant's purse or by her bed. The evidence disclosed 

that: defendant admitted after arrest Ms. Hudson told her she 

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could get stamps from a girl at the capitol; defendant did not pay 

Ms. Hudson for the stamps; defendant had asked Ms. Hudson no 

questions about the stamps; and defendant was not eligible to 

receive them. The evidence f _ound during the search, including the 

ID cards of other people, is corroborative. We believe there is 

an ample factual basis for the convictions. 

Finally, defendant contends the convictions cannot stand 

because, although she was charged with conversion of the property 

of the United States, food stamps are issued by the State of 

Oklahoma; hence they are not federal property. That argument is 

specious. 

Defendant relies upon the testimony of Mr. Bohannon who said 

an ATP is generated by the state, physically produced by a private 

printer under contract with the state, and that the state issues 

the ATP. She thus concludes ATPs are the property of the state. 

Defendant ignores the remaining testimony of Mr. Bohannon that 

"the program is a federal program" in which the state acts as an 

agent of the United States Department of Agriculture, and that 

"the benefits all are federal funds." We conclude the evidence 

was sufficient for the purpose of conviction. 

v. 

Finally, defendant contends the sentencing guidelines were 

not followed in sentencing. She cites several particulars. 

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A. Amount of Loss 

Defendant argues the district court incorrectly found the 

amount of the loss was $3,349, and she was only responsible for 

"under $1000 of the loss." She contends "Counts 1 and 3 involved 

a Travis Mason ATP that was fictitious; therefore, no loss was 

incurred." She also asserts Counts 9 and 11 involved an aggregate 

of $498 worth, and Count 7 "involved the Susan Casey ATP that was 

found in the Defendant's possession during the search on 

October 17th." Therefore, she argues, under u.s.s.G. § 2Bl.1 she 

should receive only a one level increase because the loss was not 

more than $1,000. 

Nonetheless, the court heard evidence at trial that the 

estimated loss in the food stamp fraud perpetrated by the 

defendant and her codefendants is in the amount of $40,000.00. 

Ms. Werner testified that she diverted three to four ATPs per day 

from June to September, 1989, and each was worth "generally 

greater than $250.00." The court made a factual finding, subject 

to the clearly erroneous test, that defendant, in collaboration 

with Ms. Hudson, was responsible for at least $3,349 in loss to 

the United States. In light of u.s.s.G. § 2Bl.1, comment. (n.3), 

which states the determination of loss need not be precise and may 

be inferred from reasonable information, we think the court's 

finding was not clearly erroneous. 

B. More than Minimal Planning 

Defendant argues she was "involved only in 

possession of the food coupons. There is no showing 

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the passive 

that she 

Appellate Case: 90-6231 Document: 010110276757 Date Filed: 08/18/1992 Page: 11
distributed them." 

minimal planning. 

Thus, she contends, she was involved only in 

We examine the application of the § 2Bl.l(b)(4) increase 

under a clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Williams, 

966 F.2d 555 (10th Cir. 1992). Repeated criminal acts committed 

by a defendant justify a finding that the defendant engaged in 

more than minimal planning. Id. The evidence in this case 

discloses repeated acts committed by Ms. Young negating any 

suggestion the court's finding was clearly erroneous. 

C. Adjustment for Firearms 

Defendant argues that although guns were found in her bedroom 

they were not taken by the FBI "which indicates that the FBI 

itself did not consider them to have been used in the commission 

of any offense." She urges the guns were not mentioned at trial; 

therefore, the court should not have found they were used in connection to the offense. 

The government replies, and we agree, the firearms were 

related to the cocaine charge, and "possession of a firearm during 

the commission of the offense establishes a presumption that the 

possession is connected to the offense." United States v. Moreno, 

899 F.2d 465, 470 (6th Cir. 1990). Moreover, defendant can only 

overcome the presumption if she can show it is clearly improbable 

that the weapon was connected to the offense. Id.; see also 

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, comment. (n.3). Here the weapons were found 

with paraphernalia which is related to drug dealing. The 

guideline was correctly applied. 

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D. The Multiple Count Adjustment 

Ms. Young contends the counts of which she was convicted 

involve substantially the same harm; therefore, she should not 

have received an adjustment for multiple counts. We disagree . 

See United States v. Eason, 897 F.2d 353, 354 (8th Cir. 1990) (The 

counts of illegal acquisition of food stamps and 

distribution involve two separate societal interests.) . 

AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

John P. Moore 

Circuit Judge 

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cocaine 

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