Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-18-03501/USCOURTS-ca7-18-03501-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Linda Fultz
Appellee
Melissa Johnson
Appellee
Christel Van Dyke
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Argued December 17, 2019 

Decided January 2, 2020 

Before 

KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge 

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge 

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge

No. 18-3501 

CHRISTEL VAN DYKE, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 

v. 

LINDA FULTZ and MELISSA JOHNSON, 

individually and officially as employees of 

the Lutheran Social Services of Illinois, 

 Defendants-Appellees.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 

Eastern Division. 

No. 1:13-cv-05971 

John Z. Lee, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

In 2013, employees of a social-services organization removed Christel 

Van Dyke’s three-year-old grandson from foster-care placement in her home. 

Ms. Van Dyke sued the employees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting they violated her 

First and Fourth Amendment rights. The district court entered summary judgment for 

the employees. The court also denied Ms. Van Dyke’s motion to reconsider. 

Ms. Van Dyke’s appeal is timely only with regard to the denial of her post-judgment 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1 

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No. 18-3501 Page 2 

motion. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying this motion, 

we affirm. 

The Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (“DCFS”) removed K.C. 

from his mother’s care in 2011 and placed him in foster care with his maternal 

grandmother, Ms. Van Dyke. At the time of placement, DCFS informed Ms. Van Dyke 

that it reserved the right to remove K.C. from her home if it determined that doing so 

was in his best interest. DCFS contracted with Lutheran Social Services of Illinois 

(“LSSI”), a nonprofit organization, to provide child welfare services to K.C. and his 

family. LSSI supervised court-ordered visits between K.C. and his father. Ms. Van Dyke 

began interfering with these visits out of concern that K.C.’s father was sexually and 

physically abusing K.C. during the visits. Ms. Van Dyke reported her suspicions to LSSI 

staff, who explained that they had not witnessed any concerning behavior or signs of 

distress during these supervised visits, and had no reason to believe that K.C.’s father 

was abusing him. 

Concerns then arose over K.C.’s safety and well-being with Ms. Van Dyke, and 

LSSI determined that he should be removed from her care. LSSI supervisor Linda Fultz 

made this decision after learning that Ms. Van Dyke allowed K.C.’s mother to live with 

them, that K.C. had reported an incident of domestic violence between his mother and 

grandmother, and that Ms. Van Dyke continued to interfere with court-ordered visits 

between K.C. and his father. Ms. Fultz directed LSSI employee Melissa Johnson to 

remove K.C. from Ms. Van Dyke’s home and place him with other relatives. 

Ms. Van Dyke sued Ms. Fultz and Ms. Johnson individually and officially as 

employees of LSSI. She asserted that they violated the Fourth Amendment by entering 

her home under false pretenses and using force to remove K.C. from her care without a 

warrant or probable cause. Ms. Van Dyke also contended that Ms. Fultz and 

Ms. Johnson violated the First Amendment when they decided to remove K.C. from her 

care in retaliation for her reporting the suspected abuse. 

The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants on March 29, 

2018. The court determined that Ms. Fultz and Ms. Johnson, as social workers 

contracted by DCFS, were entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment 

claim because there was no clearly established law prohibiting them from entering a 

foster home without a warrant to remove a foster child, especially when Ms. Van Dyke 

knew that DCFS reserved its right to remove K.C. from her home. Regarding the First 

Amendment claim, the court found that the defendants presented undisputed evidence 

of legitimate and nonretaliatory reasons for removing K.C. from Ms. Van Dyke’s care. 

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No. 18-3501 Page 3 

 After entering summary judgment, the district court granted a motion by 

Ms. Van Dyke requesting all documents about the case and, at the same time, extended 

her deadline to file a motion to reconsider to May 25, 2018. Ms. Van Dyke filed a motion 

on May 25 “under Rule 59, or alternatively, Rule 60” generally challenging the district 

court’s entry of summary judgment. (Doc. 219, Mot. to Reconsider.) Ms. Van Dyke 

argued that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity because an Illinois 

statute gives foster parents the right to reasonable notice before terminating a foster 

placement. Ms. Van Dyke also argued that the district court erred in entering summary 

judgment on her retaliation claim because she had demonstrated that her reports of the 

alleged abuse had motivated LSSI to remove K.C. from her care. 

On October 26, 2018, the district court denied the motion, noting that Ms. Van 

Dyke did not raise any acceptable bases for reconsideration. Her arguments 

“amount[ed] to little more than a rehash of arguments that she ha[d] made previously, 

and that the Court rejected.” (Doc. 224, Order Denying Mot. to Reconsider, at 2.) 

On November 26, 2018, Ms. Van Dyke filed a notice of appeal. This court, noting 

that her notice appeared to be untimely as to the underlying judgment, see FED. R. APP.

P. 4(a), ordered her to explain why appellate review should not be limited to the district 

court’s October 26th order denying her motion to reconsider. After both parties 

submitted statements, we limited this appeal to a review of that order. 

The sole issue on appeal, then, is whether the district court abused its discretion 

by denying Ms. Van Dyke’s motion to reconsider. Because she filed her motion beyond 

the twenty-eight days provided by Rule 59(e), we construe it under Rule 60(b). Blue v. 

Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local Union 159, 676 F.3d 579, 583–84 (7th Cir. 2012). Even 

though she filed her motion within the district court’s extension of time, district courts 

are prohibited from extending the time to act under Rule 59(e). FED. R. CIV. P. 6(b)(2); 

see Blue, 676 F.3d at 584–85. The grounds for relief under Rule 60(b) are narrow: A 

district court may grant relief from judgment when the moving party shows grounds 

such as fraud or misconduct by the opposing party, newly discovered evidence, 

mistake or neglect, or another exceptional circumstance that justifies this extraordinary 

remedy. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b); Provident Sav. Bank v. Popovich, 71 F.3d 696, 698–99 (7th Cir. 

1995). We will reverse a district court’s denial of relief under Rule 60(b) only if no 

reasonable person could agree with the district court’s determination. Id. at 698. 

Ms. Van Dyke argues that the district court erred “by not correcting its mistake” 

in two instances. First, she maintains that the court wrongly decided the Fourth 

Amendment claim without considering the Illinois law that requires fourteen days’ 

notice before a child can be removed from a foster-care placement. She also argues that 

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the district court erred in determining that the defendants did not violate the First 

Amendment, given her evidence that her reports of alleged abuse motivated LSSI’s 

decision to remove K.C. from her care. 

 There are no legitimate bases to disturb the judgment. The district court did not 

err by failing to address the fourteen-day notice requirement in the Illinois statute 

because, as the court pointed out, the Fourth Amendment does not create a remedy for 

violations of state or local law. Nor has Ms. Van Dyke brought newly discovered 

evidence to support her retaliation claim, or presented any other extraordinary 

circumstances that would warrant relief. Her challenge amounts to little more than 

rehashed arguments that the district court already rejected at summary judgment. 

Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ms. Van Dyke’s motion 

to reconsider, we affirm. 

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