Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00249/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00249-9/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Conservation Congress
Plaintiff
United States Fish and Wildlife Service
Defendant
United States Forest Service
Defendant

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

CONSERVATION CONGRESS,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE, 

and UNITED STATES FISH AND 

WILDLIFE SERVICE,

Defendants.

CIV. NO. 2:15-00249 WBS AC

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION

FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Conservation Congress brought this action 

against the United States Forest Service (“Forest Service”) and 

the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”), alleging 

that defendants violated the National Environmental Policy Act 

(“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347, the Endangered Species Act 

(“ESA”), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544, the National Forest Management 

Act of 1976 (“NFMA”), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614, and the 

Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706, in 

Case 2:15-cv-00249-WBS-AC Document 60 Filed 06/02/16 Page 1 of 12
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approving the Harris Vegetation Management Project (“Harris 

Project”) in the Shasta-Trinity National Forest. In October 

2015, after plaintiff had initiated its lawsuit, the Forest 

Service voluntarily reinitiated ESA section 7 consultation on the 

potential impacts of the Harris Project on the gray wolf and 

prepared a BA Addendum finding the Harris Project “may affect, 

but is not likely to adversely affect” the gray wolf, and the FWS 

concurred. (Myers Decl. ¶ 18 (Docket No. 54).) Both parties 

agreed that plaintiff’s gray wolf ESA claims were mooted by this 

voluntary action and, as a result, the court dismissed the two 

ESA claims as moot. (Pl.’s Reply to Mot. for Summ. J. at 2 

(Docket No. 27); Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 13 (Docket No. 41-

1); Feb. 23, 2016 Order at 15-16 (Docket No. 49).) The court 

granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on the remaining 

claims. (Feb. 23, 2016 Order.) 

Plaintiff now argues it was successful on its ESA 

claims regarding the gray wolf under the catalyst theory and 

requests attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to section 11(g)(4) 

of the ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4). (Pl.’s Notice of Mot. & Mot. 

for Att’y’s Fees (“Pl.’s Mot.”) (Docket No. 51).) 

The ESA citizen suit provision provides that a court 

“may award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and 

expert witness fees) to any party, whenever the court determines 

such award is appropriate.” 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4). This 

“whenever appropriate” language “‘was meant to expand the class 

of parties eligible for fee awards from prevailing parties to

partially prevailing parties--parties achieving some success, 

even if not major success.’” Ass’n of Cal. Water Agencies v. 

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Evans, 386 F.3d 879, 885 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Ruckelhaus v. 

Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 688 (1983) (interpreting the Clean Air 

Act’s identical fee-shifting provision)). In statutes that 

provide for fee shifting “whenever appropriate,” Congress 

intended for a plaintiff to be able to recover attorney’s fees if 

its suit furthered the goals of the statute or forced a defendant

to abandon illegal conduct, even if there was no formal court 

order. See Ass’n of Cal. Water Agencies, 386 F.3d at 885.

When a plaintiff does not win a final judgment on the 

merits, the two-part “catalyst theory” test determines whether 

that plaintiff nonetheless prevailed for the purpose of receiving 

attorney’s fees. The district court must determine that (1) the 

lawsuit accomplished, at least in part, what it sought to 

accomplish and there was a “‘clear, causal relationship between 

the litigation brought and the practical outcome realized,’” and 

(2) “‘the benefit achieved was required by law and was not a 

gratuitous act of the defendant.’” Id. at 885-86 & n.3 (citation 

omitted). 

In this case, plaintiff achieved some success even 

though its ESA claims regarding the gray wolf were dismissed as 

moot. In its Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), plaintiff alleged 

that the Forest Service failed to adequately analyze the 

potential for adverse effects of the Harris Project on the gray 

wolf and that its finding of “no effect” was arbitrary and 

capricious. (SAC ¶¶ 92-97 (Docket No. 10).) Plaintiff also

claimed the FWS improperly concurred in the Forest Service’s 

analysis. (Id. ¶¶ 104-09.) Plaintiff requested that the court 

declare that defendants violated the ESA, vacate and remand the 

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BA and FWS Concurrence Letter, and enjoin timber harvest in the 

Harris Project until defendants complied with the ESA. (Id.

¶¶ 115-16.)

In its voluntarily prepared BA Addendum, the Forest 

Service conducted a more detailed analysis of the potential 

effects on the gray wolf and changed its finding of “no effect” 

to “may affect, but is not likely to adversely affect.” (Myers 

Decl. ¶ 18.) It, in essence, vacated its prior BA with respect 

to the gray wolf by preparing this supplemental analysis. 

Further, the Forest Service reinitiated consultation with the FWS

and the FWS issued a new letter of concurrence. While plaintiff 

did not receive a judgment finding defendants had violated the 

ESA, plaintiff received most of the benefits it was seeking in 

its ESA claims as to the gray wolf. See Greater L.A. Council on 

Deafness v. Cmty. Television of S. Cal., 813 F.3d 217, 220 (9th 

Cir. 1987) (finding that “[p]laintiffs need only have received 

some of the benefits they sought in the suit” to be a prevailing 

party for the purpose of receiving attorney’s fees under the 

Rehabilitation Act). Accordingly, the lawsuit accomplished, at 

least in part, what it sought to accomplish.

The question remaining is whether there is a “‘clear, 

causal relationship between the litigation brought and the 

practical outcome realized.’” See Ass’n of Cal. Water Agencies, 

386 F.3d at 886 (citation omitted) (emphasis omitted). The Ninth 

Circuit has found that the test “inquires whether the suit was at 

least a material factor or played a catalytic role in bringing 

about the desired result.” Or. Envtl. Council v. Kunzman, 817 

F.2d 484, 497 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation and internal quotation 

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marks omitted). 

“[C]hronological events are important, although not a 

definitive factor, in determining whether or not a defendant can 

be reasonably inferred to have guided his actions in response to 

a plaintiff’s lawsuit.” Braafladt v. Bd. of Governors of Or. 

State Bar Ass’n, 778 F.2d 1442, 1444 (9th Cir. 1985) (affirming 

the district court’s finding of no causal connection where an 

earlier suit had already raised similar constitutional questions 

and prompted the Oregon Supreme Court to act). “Clues to the 

provocative effects of the plaintiffs’ legal efforts are often 

best gleaned from the chronology of events” given that 

“defendants, on the whole, are usually rather reluctant to 

concede that the litigation prompted them to mend their ways.” 

Sablan v. Dep’t of Fin. of the Commonwealth of the N. Mariana 

Islands, 856 F.2d 1317, 1326 (9th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). 

“‘Whether a litigant has shown a sufficient causal 

relationship between the lawsuit and the practical outcome 

realized is a pragmatic factual inquiry for the district court.’” 

Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Cal. Native Plant Soc., 182 F. 

Supp. 2d at 950 (citation omitted). “[C]redibility choices in 

the resolution of conflicting testimony are the district court’s 

province as fact finder.” Sablan, 865 F.2d at 1326 (citation 

omitted). 

For example, in Association of California Water 

Agencies, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s award 

of attorney’s fees to the plaintiffs even though the case was 

rendered moot when the government settled a separate but related 

case and voluntarily remanded the critical habitat designations 

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plaintiffs were challenging under the ESA. Id. at 881-82. The 

Ninth Circuit concluded that it was reasonable for the district 

court to find that the plaintiffs’ complaint and imminent summary 

judgment proceedings were a catalyst, especially considering that 

the plaintiffs’ action was the first to challenge this approach 

to critical habitat designations. Id. at 886. The chronology 

established a causal relationship because the government began 

considering a voluntary remand after the district court set the 

filing date for cross-motions for summary judgment. The 

government decided to go forward with the voluntary remand only 

two weeks before the summary judgment deadline and after the 

district court found the plaintiffs’ had standing and suggested 

that the evidence supported the plaintiffs’ claim. 

Likewise, in Southwest Center for Biological Diversity, 

California Native Plant Society v. Carroll, 182 F. Supp. 2d 944 

(C.D. Cal. 2001), the court found that the evidence indicated 

that the plaintiffs’ ESA claims regarding two endangered plant 

species “played an active role in the process that culminated in” 

the BA. Id. at 951. The government relied exclusively on a 

declaration that glossed over critical facts from the chronology 

and made no reference to the administrative record to argue that

plaintiffs’ suit had no impact on its decision to create a BA. 

Id. The court found that, despite the government’s 

representations, it was clear from the full record that the 

government agreed to a date for the issuance of the BA, included 

an analysis of the two endangered plant species in its BA, and 

even adopted the environmental baselines that the plaintiffs had 

argued were appropriate only after several rounds of settlement 

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discussions with the plaintiffs. Id. The court thus found that

the plaintiffs’ suit and subsequent settlement discussions were 

the catalyst and the plaintiffs were the prevailing party for the 

purposes of attorney’s fees. 

In this case, plaintiff relies on the chronology of 

events to argue that defendants reinitiated informal consultation 

and issued a BA Addendum because of its pending lawsuit. (Pl.’s 

Mot. at 5-8; Pl.’s Reply at 6-8 (Docket No. 58).) Plaintiff 

filed its SAC, adding the ESA gray wolf claims, on May 5, 2015. 

This was, according to plaintiff, the first suit to challenge a 

Forest Service project in California for failing to fully analyze 

a project’s effects on the gray wolf. On May 18, 2015, this 

court issued a Status (Pretrial Scheduling) Order setting August 

17, 2015 as the deadline for plaintiff’s summary judgment motion

(although the parties later stipulated to extend the deadline to 

November 6, 2015). Plaintiff filed its motion to admit extrarecord evidence regarding the ESA wolf claims on August 31, 2015. 

In October 2015, the Forest Service finalized its BA Addendum and 

the FWS concurred, effectively mooting plaintiff’s ESA claims. 

Plaintiff argues that, as in Association of California Water 

Agencies, defendants voluntarily reinitiated consultation because 

the deadline for plaintiff’s summary judgment motion was 

approaching and plaintiff’s motion to admit extra-record evidence 

related to the gray wolf was pending. 

Defendants, however, offer a different explanation for

this same sequence of events. David R. Myers, the Forest 

Supervisor for the Shasta-Trinity National Forest who is 

responsible for assuring compliance with section 7 of the ESA and 

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for the decision authorizing the Harris Project, represents that 

plaintiff’s lawsuit “did not influence the Forest Service’s 

decision to prepare a BA Addendum and reinitiate informal 

consultation with the FWS on the Harris Project’s anticipated 

effects on the gray wolf.” (Myers Decl. ¶ 5.) Instead, he 

explains that the Forest Service reinitiated consultation because 

of two press releases issued by the California Department of Fish 

and Wildlife (“CDFW”) in August 2015. (Id. ¶¶ 13-18.) 

The first press release on August 3, 2015 stated that 

the CDFW had collected evidence of at least one wolf in Siskiyou 

County. A biologist had spotted large canid tracks and a remote 

trail camera photographed a large canid that CDFW believed to be 

a lone gray wolf. (Id. ¶ 13; see also Myers Decl. Attach. A 

(Docket No. 54-1).) On August 20, 2015, the CDFW issued a second 

press release announcing the confirmed presence of seven gray 

wolves in northern California, including the adult previously 

photographed on August 3, 2015. (Myers Decl. ¶ 14; see also

Myers Decl. Attach. B (Docket No. 54-2).) The press release 

designated this group of two adults and five pups as the “Shasta 

Pack” and noted that the presence of the pack was exciting news 

for California, which has had no wolves, aside from OR7 who had 

already returned to Oregon, since 1924. (Id.) Based on these 

two press releases, the Forest Service prepared a Consideration 

of New Information and ultimately decided to reinitiate informal 

consultation. (Myers Decl. ¶ 15.) 

Plaintiff argues that the CDFW news releases were not 

“new information” that triggered a requirement to reinitiate 

consultation because the Forest Service already knew that OR7 had 

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traveled near the project area. (Pl.’s Mot. at 9.) Based on 

this information alone, plaintiff contends, the Forest Service 

was required under the ESA to fully analyze the effects of the 

Harris Project on the gray wolf. (Id.) It seems clear to the 

court, however, that the press releases about seven newly 

discovered wolves present in northern California provided new 

information distinct from information about one wolf that had 

briefly passed through California but already returned to Oregon.

Plaintiff also attacks the reliability of Myers’

declaration, contending that he “lacks the necessary personal 

knowledge to state that Plaintiff’s lawsuit ‘did not influence’ 

the Forest Service’s decision-making process” because he does not 

have “personal knowledge of all discussions among Forest Service 

staff regarding the lawsuit.” (Pl.’s Reply at 10.) Plaintiff 

offers two Forest Service emails that allegedly demonstrate that

it is “simply not possible for Mr. Myer [sic] or anybody else to 

categorically state as a fact that, ‘the Forest Service’s 

decision to reinitiate consultation was entirely unrelated to 

Plaintiff’s lawsuit.’” (Id. at 13.) In the first e-mail, a 

Shasta-Trinity National Forest environmental coordinator wrote an 

FWS employee acknowledging that they had received plaintiff’s 

complaint and the FWS employee responded that the “wolf issue was 

NOT included in complaint.” (Id. at 11, Ex. 1.) The second was 

sent by a Shasta-Trinity National Forest biologist on August 27, 

2015--shortly after the CDFW press releases--to a Shasta-Trinity 

National Forest environmental coordinator and copied an attorney

from the Office of General Counsel. The email reported that she 

had “begun discussing the new information on the Shasta Pack with 

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the [Office of General Counsel], as well as the FWS and Klamath 

National Forest” and had formulated a “general approach for 

addressing the new information for the Porcupine and Harris 

projects that are in active litigation.” (Id. Ex. 2.) Plaintiff 

contends the emails demonstrate that individuals within the 

Forest Service were taking into consideration plaintiff’s suit in 

deciding how best to handle the information about the Shasta Pack 

and Myers’ categorical assertion to the contrary is not credible. 

Defendants have therefore submitted Myers’ declaration 

as direct evidence that plaintiff’s suit did not play a role in 

its decision to reinitiate consultation while plaintiff has

presented both the chronology of events and the internal Forest 

Service emails as circumstantial evidence that its suit was in 

fact a catalyst. When required to consider the catalyst theory, 

as the court is under the ESA, and faced with two conflicting 

versions of events, the court cannot undertake the factbound 

inquiry necessary to determine which party is more credible based 

solely on the contradicting pleadings and declarations. As the 

Supreme Court noted in Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West 

Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 

609 (2001), in finding the catalyst theory was not a permissible 

basis for the award of attorney’s fees under the Fair Housing 

Amendments Act of 1988 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 

1990, “a ‘catalyst theory’ hearing would require analysis of the 

defendant’s subjective motivations in changing its conduct, an 

analysis that ‘will likely depend on a highly factbound inquiry 

and may turn on reasonable inferences from the nature and timing 

of the defendant’s change in conduct.’” Id. (citation omitted).

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An evidentiary hearing will enable the court to listen 

to the witnesses’ testimony, observe their demeanor, assess their

credibility, and resolve the disputed issues of fact regarding 

defendant’s motivations based on the totality of the evidence. 

See, e.g., Sablan v. Dep’t of Fin. of the Commonwealth of the N. 

Mariana Islands, 856 F.2d 1317, 1322 (9th Cir. 1988) (explaining 

that “the purpose of an evidentiary hearing is to resolve 

disputed issues of fact” and finding that “[f]ee awards therefore 

need not be preceded by an evidentiary hearing if the record and 

supporting affidavits are sufficiently detailed to provide an 

adequate basis for calculating an award”); Kilgour v. City of 

Pasadena, 53 F.3d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 1995), abrogated on other 

grounds by Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 601-02 (noting that the trial 

court concluded after an evidentiary hearing that the plaintiff 

was not a significant catalyst); Iranian Students Ass’n v. 

Sawyer, 639 F.2d 1160, 1163-64 (5th Cir. 1981) (remanding for an

evidentiary hearing to determine whether the plaintiff’s lawsuit 

was a significant catalyst because the chronology of events was a 

factor to consider but not definitive and the contradicting 

pleadings and affidavits were insufficient evidence for the court 

to determine which party’s argument was more plausible); cf.

Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 34 Cal. 4th 553, 576-77 (2004) 

(“When a lawsuit has been mooted by a defendant’s change in 

conduct, some development of the factual record is required in 

order to prevail on a catalyst theory. . . . When the suit is 

mooted early in its prosecution (as occurred in the present 

case), it may generally be established during the attorney fee 

proceeding by declarations, or, at the discretion of the trial 

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court, by an abbreviated evidentiary hearing.”); Coal. for a 

Sustainable Future in Yucaipa v. City of Yucaipa, 238 Cal. App. 

4th 513, 521 (4th Dist. 2015) (same). To the extent that other 

courts have decided similarly disputed issues of fact on the 

record alone, this court disagrees. Accordingly, the court will 

decide plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees only after holding 

an evidentiary hearing. 

This matter is therefore set for evidentiary hearing in 

accordance with this Order on June 28, 2016 at 9:00 a.m. in 

Courtroom No. 5 of this court. Counsel shall be prepared to call 

the witnesses and present the documentary evidence in support of 

their respective positions on the issue of whether plaintiff is 

entitled to attorney’s fees on a catalyst theory.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 2, 2016

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