Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-01372/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-01372-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael Masters
Plaintiff
Royal Electric Company
Defendant
Vellutini Corporation
Defendant

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MICHAEL MASTERS, individually 

and on behalf of himself and 

all others similarly situated, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

VELLUTINI CORPORATION DBA ROYAL 

ELECTRIC COMPANY and DOES 1-750

 Defendant. 

______________________________/

No. 2:08-CV-01372-JAM-DAD 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO REMAND 

 Michael Masters (“Plaintiff”) brought this action against 

Vellutini Corporation (“Defendant”) for violations of the 

California Business and Professions Code and the California 

Labor Code. On June 17, 2008, Defendant filed a Notice of 

Removal in this Court. Plaintiff now seeks to remand the action 

back to state court and an award of attorneys’ fees. Defendant 

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opposes the Motion. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s 

Motion to Remand is GRANTED.1

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

 Plaintiff was employed by Defendant from 1987 to 2007 as a 

non-exempt employee. Compl. ¶ 1. Defendant is a C-10 

electrical contractor, providing services on various commercial 

construction projects, including public works projects, in 

California. Id. ¶ 6. Plaintiff alleges that as part of his 

employment, he pulled wire and conduit, ran wire, terminated 

boxes, installed conduit, and dug and poured concrete for 

electrical installations. Id. ¶ 9. Plaintiff’s employment 

relationship with Defendant was governed by a collective 

bargaining agreement between the Northern California District 

Council of Laborers of the Laborers’ International Union of 

North America, AFL-CIO and Defendant (“CBA”). Notice of Removal 

¶ 3(a) 

 The Department of Industrial Relations, Department of Labor 

Standards Research (“DLSR”), pursuant to California Labor Code 

§§ 1770, 1773, and 1773.1, determines the rate of pay that shall 

be paid to certain crafts of employees, including laborers and 

electricians, for public works construction. Compl. ¶ 7. DLSR 

sets forth job classifications through its “Scope of Work” 

 

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 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision 

without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-230(h). 

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descriptions. Id. Plaintiff alleges that while he was 

employed, Defendant misclassified him as a laborer instead of an 

electrician in order to pay him a lower wage. Id. ¶ 10. 

 On May 15, 2008, Plaintiff filed his Complaint in 

Sacramento Superior Court. Notice of Removal Ex. A. On June 

17, 2008, Defendant filed its Notice of Removal under 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1331 and 1441(b) in this Court. Docket at 1. Defendant 

argues that because the dispute arises out of Plaintiff’s 

employment with Defendant, and because the employment 

relationship is governed by a collective bargaining agreement, 

Plaintiff’s state law claims are pre-empted by Section 301(a) of 

the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). 

On July 16, 2008, Plaintiff filed this Motion to Remand this 

Action back to state court. Docket at 8. 

OPINION 

 Section 301(a) of the LMRA states: 

Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a 

labor organization representing employees in an industry 

affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or between any 

such labor organizations, may be brought in any district 

court of the United States having jurisdiction of the 

parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or 

without regard to the citizenship of the parties. 

29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Section 301(a) preempts state law claims 

“founded directly on rights created by collective-bargaining 

agreements, and also claims substantially dependent on analysis 

of a collective-bargaining agreement.” Caterpillar, Inc. v. 

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Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 394 (1987). However, “states may 

provide substantive rights to workers that apply without regard 

to a CBA; a state court suit seeking to vindicate these rights 

is preempted only if it ‘requires the interpretation of a 

collective-bargaining agreement.’” Cramer v. Consol. 

Freightways, Inc., 255 F.3d 683, 690 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 

Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 413 

(1988)). The Supreme Court has noted that “§ 301 cannot be read 

broadly to pre-empt nonnegotiable rights conferred on individual 

employees as a matter of state law.” Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 

U.S. 107, 123-124 (1994). “It is the legal character of a 

claim, as independent of rights under the collective-bargaining 

agreement (and not whether a grievance arising from precisely 

the same set of facts could be pursued), that decides whether a 

state cause of action may go forward. Id. The purpose of 

Section 301(a) preemption is to “ensure uniform interpretation 

of collective-bargaining agreements, and thus to promote the 

peaceable, consistent resolution of labor-management disputes.” 

Lingle, 486 U.S. at 404. 

 In this case, Plaintiff claims that Defendant misclassified 

him as a laborer for the purposes of the DLSR’s prevailing wage 

rates. Defendant argues that determining whether Plaintiff was 

a laborer or an electrician will require interpretation of the 

CBA. Notice of Removal ¶ 3(b). Specifically, Defendant notes 

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that the CBA specifically describes laborers’ work covered by 

the agreement. See Notice of Removal Ex. D Sec. 1(B). 

 However, the definition of laborer found in the CBA for the 

purposes of determining whether an activity is covered under 

that agreement has no bearing on whether an individual is a 

laborer under DLSR’s Scope of Work. Otherwise, parties could 

contract for job classifications to have specific meanings 

distinct from DLSR’s Scope of Work to subvert the prevailing 

wage law. Defendant argues that a court may need to consult the 

list of duties of a laborer contained in the CBA to crossreference it against DLSR’s Scope of Work. However, the Supreme 

Court has noted that “when the meaning of contract terms is not 

the subject of dispute, the bare fact that a collectivebargaining agreement will be consulted in the course of statelaw litigation plainly does not require the claim to be 

extinguished.” Livadas, 512 U.S. at 124; see also Ward v. 

Circus Circus Casinos, Inc., 473 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2007) 

Because the job duties listed in the CBA themselves are not in 

dispute, the fact that the state court might have to consult 

them does not rise to the level of interpretation that would 

trigger Section 301(a) preemption. 

 Whether the state court would even need to consult the CBA 

at all is questionable. Defendant had a statutory duty to 

compensate Plaintiff at the prevailing wage for the type of work 

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that he was performing. The key facts in dispute are the nature 

of the job duties Plaintiff performed and if those job duties 

correspond to the parameters of electrician as defined by the 

Scope of Work. Plaintiff need only show the particular job 

duties he individually performed. The entire list of all job 

duties covered by the CBA and performed by all laborers is not 

relevant to determining whether Plaintiff’s individual 

employment fell under the DLSR’s definition of electrician. In 

fact, a non-unionized employee could maintain the same claim, 

although the employee was not subject to any collective 

bargaining agreement. Although Defendant may introduce the CBA 

to show that it is unlikely that Plaintiff performed job duties 

outside those listed in the agreement, “[a] defense based on the 

CBA is alone insufficient to require preemption.” Ward, 473 

F.3d at 998. 

 Defendant further argues that because DLSR relies on 

collective bargaining agreements in determining the Scope of 

Work, the state court claims should be preempted. California 

Labor Code Section 1773 requires the Director of Industrial 

Relations (the “Director”) to set the prevailing wage rate by 

consulting collective bargaining agreements in the locality and 

relevant labor market. In setting the prevailing wage, the 

Director may choose to adopt the prevailing wage rate from a 

collective bargaining agreement by reference. In this case, the 

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Scope of Work for both laborers and electricians was adopted by 

reference from collective bargaining agreements between parties 

who are separate from this case. Defendant argues that because 

the Scope of Work is a collective bargaining agreement, any 

interpretation of it would prompt Section 301(a) preemption. 

Because a court would necessarily need to interpret the Scope of 

Work to determine whether Plaintiff’s job duties fell under the 

classification of electrician, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs 

state law claims should be preempted. 

 However, the Scope of Work is not a collective bargaining 

agreement for the purposes of Section 301(a) preemption. 

Although the Director adopted a collective bargaining agreement 

by reference as the Scope of Work, he is not bound by the 

agreement. In fact, the Director could unilaterally change the 

Scope of Work at any time without negotiating with the relevant 

union. Furthermore, any interpretation by a court of the DLSR’s 

Scope of Work would have no binding effect on the referenced 

collective bargaining agreement, as neither of the parties to 

that agreement are parties in this case. Thus, the purpose of 

Section 301(a) preemption, to ensure the peaceable resolution of 

labor disputes, would not be served in refraining to interpret 

the DLSR’s Scope of Work. Because the Scope of Work is not a 

collective bargaining agreement, but an agency decision, 

interpretation of the Scope of Work does not prompt Section 301 

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preemption. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s state law claims are not 

preempted. 

 Plaintiff seeks an award of attorneys’ fees. 28 U.S.C. § 

1447(c) allows the Court discretion in awarding “just costs and 

any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a 

result of the removal.” However, the Supreme Court has stated 

that “[a]bsent unusual circumstances, courts may award 

attorney's fees under § 1447(c) only where the removing party 

lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal.” 

Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005). 

Defendant in this case had an objectively reasonable basis for 

seeking removal. Accordingly, an award of attorneys’ fees is 

not warranted in this case. 

ORDER 

 For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand 

is GRANTED. This action shall be remanded to the Superior Court 

of the State of California in and for the County of Sacramento. 

Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Date: September 18, 2008 

 

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