Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01956/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01956-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael Allan Hancock
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15‐1956

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL ALLAN HANCOCK,

Defendant‐Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 3:13‐cr‐00128‐bbc‐1 — Barbara B. Crabb, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED NOVEMBER 13, 2015 — DECIDED DECEMBER 28, 2016

____________________

Before POSNER, RIPPLE, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Michael Allan Hancock was indicted

on one count of possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and on one count of possession of an

unregistered firearm, in violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841,

5845(a)(2), and 5861(d). Before trial, Mr. Hancock challenged

the search warrant that had led to his arrest by requesting a

hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). In sup‐

Case: 15-1956 Document: 31 Filed: 12/28/2016 Pages: 19
2 No. 15‐1956

port of that motion, he maintained that critical evidence bear‐

ing on a confidential informant’s credibility had been omitted

from the probable cause affidavit. Following the magistrate

judge’s recommendation, the district court denied the motion.  

Mr. Hancock also moved in limine to preclude the use of

prior convictions as the basis for the § 922(g)(1) count. He

maintained that the release document issued to him by the

Colorado Department of Corrections lulled him into believing

that all of his rights, including the right to possess a weapon,

had been restored. The district court, assessing the release

document within its four corners, held that the document did

not communicate any restoration of rights to Mr. Hancock. A

jury later convicted Mr. Hancock on both counts of the indict‐

ment. The court imposed concurrent sentences of 120 months

on each count.1

  

Mr. Hancock now challenges both of these rulings. We

conclude that, viewed in its totality, the probable cause affi‐

davit amply supports the issued search warrant. We also

agree with the district court that, on its face, the release docu‐

ment does not speak to the restoration of rights. We therefore

affirm Mr. Hancock’s convictions.

                                                 

1 The jurisdiction of the district court was premised on 18 U.S.C. § 3231.

Case: 15-1956 Document: 31 Filed: 12/28/2016 Pages: 19
No. 15‐1956 3

I

BACKGROUND

A.

On August 14, 2013, law enforcement officers executed a

no‐knock search warrant on the property of Arthur Erickson.

This property included a residence, out buildings, and sur‐

rounding land. Mr. Hancock served as a caretaker of this

property during the winter months. When Erickson was

away, he lived in the residence; when Erickson was at home,

Mr. Hancock stayed in a recreational vehicle parked on the

property.

The search warrant, issued earlier the same day, was sup‐

ported by the probable cause affidavit of Chris Drost, an in‐

vestigator with the St. Croix Sheriff’s Office with fifteen years’

experience. In that affidavit, Investigator Drostrecounted that

he had interviewed Mr. Hancock (also known as “Munchy”)

in June 2013, while Mr. Hancock was detained at the St. Croix

County Jail. During that interview, Mr. Hancock referred to

himself as a “one percenter,” which Investigator Drost under‐

stood to mean that Mr. Hancock was affiliated with the “Out‐

law Motorcycle Gang.”2

Mr. Hancock further informed Inves‐

tigator Drost that he previously had been charged with a va‐

riety of crimes. Mr. Hancock also acknowledged that, on the

day he had been brought to jail, he was with his girlfriend,

who was identified (using police records) as Sarah Jo Davis.

The affidavit also contained information provided to In‐

vestigator Drost by a confidential informant, Jeremy Ray Pea‐

body. In June 2013, Peabody began giving information about

                                                 

2 R.17‐1 (Application for Search Warrant) at 4.

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4 No. 15‐1956

drug activity and stolen goods on the Erickson property to In‐

vestigator Drost. Peabody previously had provided infor‐

mation to the St. Croix County Sheriff’s Office for fifteen

years, and this information had led to several felony arrests

and convictions. He reported to Investigator Drost that, ap‐

proximately ten months earlier, Robert Graves had intro‐

duced Mr. Hancock to him and that Graves had identified

Mr. Hancock as his supplier. Peabody continued that, at their

first meeting, he had used methamphetamine with Mr. Han‐

cock and had befriended him in the hope that he would be

able to purchase drugs directly from Mr. Hancock and cut out

the middleman. After two buys with Graves, Peabody was

able to purchase drugs directly from Mr. Hancock.  

Peabody subsequently made more than twenty visits to

the Erickson property to purchase methamphetamine from

Mr. Hancock. He was, consequently, able to provide detailed

information about Mr. Hancock, his business, and the prop‐

erty. Peabody explained that Mr. Hancock and Davis lived in

an RV on the property and that Mr. Hancock had access to all

of the buildings on the property, including a “large pole

shed”3 from which he sold drugs. Peabody further reported

that he had witnessed approximately forty to sixty drug sales

to other individuals on the property, that Mr. Hancock had

accepted stolen property as well as cash from his customers,

and that Mr. Hancock had informed him that the property

was stolen. Peabody had seen the stolen items (including a

car, ATVs, and chainsaws) on the Erickson property. He also

warned Investigator Drost that he considered Mr. Hancock to

be dangerous, in part because of Mr. Hancock’s affiliation

                                                 

3 Id. at 5.

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No. 15‐1956 5

with the Outlaw Motorcycle Gang. Peabody “advised ... that

within the last several months he ha[d] seen a handgun in

Munchy’s living quarters located in the RV” and that

Mr. Hancock had access to the handguns inside the Erickson

residence.4 Peabody had seen Mr. Hancock use the weapons

to “shoot[] at lights and shadows on the property.”5

Peabody also provided Investigator Drost with cell phone

numbers for Mr. Hancock and Davis. He said that Mr. Han‐

cock used Davis’s cell phone to conduct his drug activities.

Based on this information, Investigator Drost had secured a

search warrant for Davis’s cell phone number on July 15, 2015.

The search revealed numerous text messages with references

to drug transactions during the week prior to the application

for the warrant to search the Erickson property.

The probable cause affidavit also included information

provided by Rachelle Lowrie. Lowrie had met Mr. Hancock

in June 2013 through Davis. Lowrie asked Davis how she

could purchase methamphetamine from Mr. Hancock and

was told that she “could go through Davis to pur‐

chase ... from Munch[y].”6 Lowrie further explained that, on

August 6, 2013, “she had been driven to [a] court appearance

by Detective Funk of the Prescott Police Department” and that

                                                 

4 Id. at 7.

5 Id.

6 Id. at 9.

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6 No. 15‐1956

Mr. Hancock may have seen her.7 Mr. Hancock later accused

her “of being a snitch and informant for the police.”8  

On August 11, 2013, Mr. Hancock and another man, iden‐

tified as “Shawn,” came to Lowrie’s residence. Mr. Hancock

tied Lowrie to the sofa, sexually assaulted her, and “extin‐

guished lit cigarettes” on her.9 Mr. Hancock warned her

against “snitch[ing]” and threatened her and her daughter

with further harm if she reported him to the police.10 Lowrie

believed that Mr. Hancock took from Lowrie prescription

medications, jewelry, her wallet, and other items, including

pictures of her daughter.  

Finally, the probable cause affidavit recounted that, after

transporting Lowrie to the hospital, Investigator Drost spoke

with the nurse who conducted Lowrie’s physical examina‐

tion. The nurse confirmed that Lowrie’s injuries were con‐

sistent with what Lowrie had reported to Investigator Drost.

On the basis of this affidavit, a search warrant for the Er‐

ickson property was issued. Upon execution of the search

warrant, the officers found a short barreled shotgun, shotgun

shells, some allegedly stolen property, a small amount of

methamphetamine, and some drug paraphernalia.  

                                                 

7 Id.   

8 Id.

9 Id.

10 Id.

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No. 15‐1956 7

B.

1.

On October 10, 2013, a grand jury returned a two‐count

indictment charging Mr. Hancock with possession of a fire‐

arm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and with

possession of an unregistered firearm, in violation of 26 U.S.C.

§§ 5841, 5845(a)(2), and 5861(d). Mr. Hancock moved to sup‐

press the evidence obtained during the execution of the search

warrant and requested an evidentiary hearing under Franks v.

Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), alleging that the affidavit lacked

probable cause, contained material false statements concern‐

ing the alleged sexual assault, and omitted material infor‐

mation, namely evidence of Peabody’s criminal record and

the fact that he was in custody for assaulting a police officer

at the time he provided the relevant information. The Govern‐

ment opposed the motion to suppress and the request for a

Franks hearing.  

The magistrate judge recommended that the district court

deny the motion to suppress and deny the request for a Franks

hearing. In the report and recommendation, the magistrate

judge identified four categories of evidence in the affidavit

that supported the search warrant: (1) Investigator Drost’s in‐

terview of Mr. Hancock; (2) Peabody’s information to the po‐

lice; (3) Davis’s text messages related to drug dealing; and (4)

the interview and medical examination of Lowrie. The mag‐

istrate judge concluded that Investigator Drost had been reck‐

less in omitting Peabody’s criminal convictions from the affi‐

davit. He concluded nevertheless that, even if the evidence of

Peabody’s criminal history had been included in the probable

cause affidavit, the warrant would have issued. Specifically,

the magistrate judge noted that Peabody’s account had been

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8 No. 15‐1956

detailed and corroborated by other evidence. Moreover, prob‐

able cause to search the premises would have existed based

on the information provided by Lowrie:  

Lowrie’s account, as corroborated in part by the

[Sexual Assault Response Team] nurse’s report

to Investigator Drost ... provides a separate and

severable basis to search the premises for the ar‐

ticles that Lowrie claims Hancock took from

her. Lowrie provided a vivid and detailed ac‐

count of what happened along with a lengthy

and detailed list of what Hancock stole from her

and took with him. This court has no reason to

doubt this account and it could stand alone as a

basis to uphold this search warrant.[11]

The magistrate judge therefore recommended denying the re‐

quest for a Franks hearing and the motion to suppress.

Mr. Hancock objected to the report and recommendation.

In his view, the finding of a reckless omission of Peabody’s

criminal convictions mandated a Franks hearing. Notably,

Mr. Hancock did not address the magistrate judge’s finding

that the interview and medical examination of Lowrie pro‐

vided an independent basis for the search. The district court

accordingly held that Mr. Hancock had waived any objection

to the finding of the discrete sufficiency of the rape allegations

and otherwise adopted the magistrate judge’s report and rec‐

ommendation.  

                                                 

11 R.49 at 30–31.

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No. 15‐1956 9

2.

Prior to trial, Mr. Hancock filed a motion in limine to pre‐

clude the Government from introducing evidence of his Col‐

orado felony convictions as the factual predicates for the

§ 922(g)(1) charge. Mr. Hancock argued that, by operation of

state law, all of his rights to citizenship had been restored

upon his release from prison. Moreover, the Colorado Depart‐

ment of Corrections had provided him with an “uncondi‐

tional” discharge upon his release.12 According to Mr. Han‐

cock, because he had been unconditionally discharged, his

convictions could not be used as predicate offenses under

§ 922(g)(1).  

The district court denied the motion. It further held that

nothing in the document issued by the Colorado Department

of Corrections told defendant that any or all of his civil rights

had been restored. “Therefore, he was not misled into think‐

ing he could possess a firearm.”13

A jury convicted Mr. Hancock on both counts of the indict‐

ment, and the court imposed concurrent sentences of 120

months. Mr. Hancock timely appealed.

                                                 

12 R.62‐1.

13 R.88 at 5.

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10 No. 15‐1956

II

DISCUSSION

A.

Mr. Hancock maintains that the district court erred in

denying his motion to suppress and his motion for a Franks

hearing. In reviewing a motion to suppress, “we review legal

conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error. Simi‐

larly, we review the denial of a Franks hearing for clear error,

but any legal determinations that factored into the ruling are

reviewed de novo.” United States v. Glover, 755 F.3d 811, 815

(7th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).

We recently have reiterated the standard for granting a

Franks hearing in United States v. Mullins, 803 F.3d 858 (7th Cir.

2015). We explained that  

[a] defendant is entitled to a Franks hearing—an

evidentiary hearing regarding the veracity of in‐

formation included in a search warrant applica‐

tion—if he can make a substantial preliminary

showing that: (1) the warrant affidavit con‐

tained false statements, (2) these false state‐

ments were made intentionally or with reckless

disregard for the truth, and (3) the false state‐

ments were material to the finding of probable

cause.

Id. at 861–62. This rule applies to omissions as well as affirm‐

ative misrepresentations. Id. at 862. However, “[i]f sufficient

allegations existed warranting the search irrespective of the

affiant’s alleged errors, a hearing is unnecessary and the mo‐

tion should be denied.” Id. We assess the sufficiency of the

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No. 15‐1956 11

allegations supporting the warrant according to the “totality

of the circumstances.” Id. at 861. Specifically,  

[w]hen probable cause is supported by infor‐

mation supplied by an informant, we particu‐

larly look to several factors: (1) the degree to

which the informant has acquired knowledge of

the events through firsthand observation, (2)

the amount of detail provided, (3) the extent to

which the police have corroborated the inform‐

ant’s statements, and (4) the interval between

the date of the events and the police officer’s ap‐

plication for the search warrant.

Id. at 863 (quoting United States v. Sutton, 742 F.3d 770, 773 (7th

Cir. 2014)).

Here, the magistrate judge looked to these standards in

evaluating whether a Franks hearing was warranted. He con‐

cluded that Investigator Drost’s omission of Peabody’s crimi‐

nalrecord from the probable cause affidavit was reckless.14 He

therefore “consider[ed] the affidavit, ... incorporating omit‐

ted material facts, and determine[d] whether probable cause

existed.” United States v. Harris, 464 F.3d 733, 738 (7th Cir.

2006); see also United States v. Robinson, 546 F.3d 884, 888 (7th

Cir. 2008) (same). The magistrate judge reviewed the infor‐

mation provided by Peabody and concluded that it corrobo‐

rated Mr. Hancock’s statements to Investigator Drost, the text

messages, and Lowrie’s statement. The magistrate judge also

believed that, “[i]n light of Peabody’s long‐term, intertwined

history as both a criminal and a snitch, a court considering the

                                                 

14 See R.49 at 28.

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12 No. 15‐1956

reliability of his information would have to be skeptical but

receptive: notwithstanding his personal criminality, Peabody

was a long‐term, reliable informant.”15 “In this particular

case,” the magistrate judge continued, “Peabody’s lengthy,

richly detailed, first‐hand report of what Hancock and Davis

were doing at the premises—involving precisely‐described

stolen property, ongoing drug runs to Hastings, followed by

sales and consumption on the premises, [and] meth‐fueled

gunplay ... strikes this court as worthy of credence.”16 We per‐

ceive no legal error in the magistrate judge’s recitation of the

applicable standards and no factual error in his thorough con‐

sideration of the evidence on which the probable cause affi‐

davit was based.

Mr. Hancock does not point to any specific flaw in the

magistrate judge’s analysis, which was adopted by the district

court as its own.

17 Instead, he claims that our decision in

Glover mandates a Franks hearing every time “substantial ad‐

verse information about the informant’s credibility” is omit‐

ted from a probable cause affidavit. Glover, 755 F.3d at 820.

This is a misreading of our holding in Glover.

In Glover, a search warrant had been issued on the basis of

an officer’s affidavit, which contained the following facts:

On July 23, 2010, confidential informant “Doe”

spoke with Officer Brown regarding a felon,

known to Doe as “T.Y.,” in possession of two

handguns: a black semiautomatic and a black

                                                 

15 Id. at 30.

16 Id.  

17 See R.55 at 3–4.

Case: 15-1956 Document: 31 Filed: 12/28/2016 Pages: 19
No. 15‐1956 13

.38‐caliber revolver. T.Y. lived at 905 Kedvale in

Chicago. Doe said he had seen the guns while in

the house the day before and “many times over

the course of the last six weeks.” Doe said T.Y.

needed the guns because he had a “dope spot”

(a street‐level point of sale) for heroin. Doe also

said T.Y. was a member of the Traveler Vice

Lords gang and part of a “stick‐up crew” who

robbed people carrying large amounts of money

or drugs.

Id. at 814–15. The affidavit, however, “did not include any

available information on Doe’s credibility,” including that he

was affiliated with a gang, that he had a lengthy criminal his‐

tory (including four crimes committed while he was working

as an informant), that he “had used aliases when questioned

by police officers,” and that he had “received payment for

providing information to the police in the past.” Id. at 815.

Applying the totality of the circumstances test set forth in

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), we held that a Franks hear‐

ing was warranted. Looking at the factors that inform a

Franks‐hearing determination, see Mullins, 803 F.3d at 863, we

noted that the “tip was minimally corroborated,” and the in‐

formant had “provided little detail.” Glover, 755 F.3d at 817.

Moreover, the “checkered past” of the informant called into

question the reliability of the information, namely Doe may

have “report[ed] Glover merely because of gang rivalries.” Id.

Under these circumstances, “[t]he complete omission of infor‐

mation regarding Doe’s credibility [was] insurmountable.” Id.

at 816.  

Unlike the information in Glover, however, here the prob‐

able cause affidavit contained specific information concerning

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14 No. 15‐1956

Peabody and his reliability as a witness.18 As well, the infor‐

mation provided by Peabody differed in quantity and quality

from that provided in Glover: Peabody gave highly detailed

descriptions of Mr. Hancock’s activities based on Peabody’s

frequent, personal interactions with Mr. Hancock. Further‐

more, Mr. Hancock’s criminal activities were corroborated by

the text messages from Davis’s phone, Lowrie’s report of as‐

sault to the police, and Mr. Hancock’s own prior statements

to Investigator Drost, in which he referenced his gang affilia‐

tion and admitted to a long line of arrests. We therefore con‐

clude, as we did in Mullins, that this other evidence of relia‐

bility distinguishes the present situation from Glover. See Mul‐

lins, 803 F.3d at 864 (holding that Glover was “readily distin‐

guishable” because “the search warrant in Glover was issued

based almost entirely on the informant’s report,” but “[h]ere,

by contrast, ... the critical information was corroborated by

the officers’ firsthand observations”).

We also note that, in the case before us, there are not the

same type of concerns with Peabody’s credibility as there

were with the informant in Glover. Specifically, there is no ev‐

idence that Peabody was involved in a different—and per‐

haps rival—gang, that he had attempted to deceive the police,

or that he was expecting remuneration for his cooperation.

                                                 

18 See R.17‐1 at 4–5 (identifying Peabody as “a known credible confidential

informant,” who, “over the course of the last fifteen years, has provided

the St. Croix County Sheriff’s Office with information on several burgla‐

ries leading to felony arrests and convictions,” and who had “made a min‐

imum of 3 controlled drug buys for the St. Croix County Sheriff’s Office

and the West Central Drug Task Force, leading to at least one felony arrest

and conviction”).

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No. 15‐1956 15

Here, the magistrate judge comprehensively reviewed the

totality of the circumstances and concluded that a Franks hear‐

ing was not warranted. We therefore affirm the district court’s

denial of Mr. Hancock’s request for a Franks hearing.

B.

Mr. Hancock renews his claim that his Colorado convic‐

tions cannot be considered predicate offenses for purposes of

§ 922(g)(1) because he received an “unconditional” discharge

for those convictions.19 Section 922(g) of Title 18 of the United

States Code provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any per‐

son—(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime pun‐

ishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year[,] ...

to ... possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammu‐

nition ... .” Excluded from the definition of “crime punishable

by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,” however, is

“[a]ny conviction which has been expunged, or set aside or

for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights

restored ... unless such pardon, expungement, or restoration

of civilrights expressly provides that the person may not ship,

transport, possess, or receive firearms.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20).  

We have described this second provision as “an anti‐

mousetrapping rule, designed to ensure that persons who

have been told that all civil rights have been restored are not

taken by surprise when the statute books contain reservations

(such as a ban on possessing firearms) omitted from the com‐

munication.” United States v. Burnett, 641 F.3d 894, 895 (7th

Cir. 2011).  

                                                 

19 Appellant’s Br. 10.

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16 No. 15‐1956

Consequently, if a state advises a convicted felon that his

“’big three’ civil rights” have been restored—“the rights to

vote, to hold office, and to serve on juries”—then it also must

provide “express” notice that he may not possess firearms.

Buchmeier v. United States, 581 F.3d 561, 564, 565 (7th Cir. 2009)

(en banc). It is not sufficient notice that “the state’s statutes at

large” contains such a prohibition. Id. at 565. Rather, “[t]he

statute asks only what a document contains. If the document

says that civil rights have been restored but omits a firearms

qualification, then the conviction no longer counts as a violent

felony ... . Section 921(a)(20) directs us to the four corners of

the document, and there we stop.” Burnett, 641 F.3d at 896.

Here the discharge document issued by the Colorado De‐

partment of Corrections is silent as to the restoration of any

rights. The “Statutory Discharge” states: “The above named

inmate is to be unconditionally discharged from the custody

of the Department of Corrections pursuant to 18‐1.3‐401.”20

Because the document does not mention the restoration of

rights, and because our analysis begins and ends with the four

corners of the document, Mr. Hancock’s Colorado felonies are

not excluded from consideration by § 921(a)(20).

Mr. Hancock maintains, however, that our analysis should

not end there. He notes that the discharge document refer‐

ences section 18‐1.3‐401 of the Colorado Revised Statutes,

which states in relevant part:

(3) Every person convicted of a felony, whether

defined as such within or outside this code,

shall be disqualified from holding any office of

                                                 

20 R.62‐1.

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No. 15‐1956 17

honor, trust, or profit under the laws of this

state or from practicing as an attorney in any of

the courts of this state during the actual time of

confinement or commitment to imprisonment

or release from actual confinement on condi‐

tions of probation. Upon his or her discharge af‐

ter completion of service of his or her sentence

or after service under probation, the right to

hold any office of honor, trust, or profit shall be

restored, except as provided in section 4 of arti‐

cle XII of the state constitution.

Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18‐1.3‐401 (West 2016). Mr. Hancock

further contends that, because his prior convictions are not

listed in Article XII, Section 4 of the Colorado Constitution,21

his right to hold office has been restored. Moreover, he con‐

tinues, a different article of the Colorado Constitution auto‐

matically restores his right to vote after completion of his sen‐

tence.22 Finally, the Colorado Constitution specifically guar‐

antees the right to bear arms to all persons: “The right of no

person to keep and bear arms in defense of his home, person

                                                 

21 See Colo. Const. art. XII, § 4 (“No person hereafter convicted of embez‐

zlement of public moneys, bribery, perjury, solicitation of bribery, or sub‐

ornation of perjury, shall be eligible to the general assembly, or capable of

holding any office of trust or profit in this state.”).

22 See Colo. Const. art. VII, § 10 (“No person while confined in any public

prison shall be entitled to vote; but every such person who was a qualified

elector prior to such imprisonment, and who is released therefrom by vir‐

tue of a pardon, or by virtue of having served out his full term of impris‐

onment, shall without further action, be invested with all the rights of cit‐

izenship, except as otherwise provided in this constitution.”).  

Case: 15-1956 Document: 31 Filed: 12/28/2016 Pages: 19
18 No. 15‐1956

and property, or in aid of the civil power when thereto legally

summoned, shall be called in question; but nothing herein

contained shall be construed to justify the practice of carrying

concealed weapons.” Colo. Const. art. II, § 13. Mr. Hancock

therefore submits that, because the discharge references the

statute, which in turn references the Colorado Constitution,

he was sent on an “Easter egg hunt” for his rights,23 which

eventually misled him to conclude that an unconditional right

to possess firearms had been restored to him.

We cannot accept this argument. The requirement that a

state provide “express” notice of a continuing firearm prohi‐

bition only applies “[w]hen the state gives the person a formal

notice of the restoration of civil rights.” United States v. Glaser,

14 F.3d 1213, 1218 (7th Cir. 1994). As we already have ob‐

served, the notice Mr. Hancock received does not speak to the

restoration of rights. The notice, therefore, stands in contrast

to the notice sent in Buchmeier that specifically informed the

recipient of “restoration of your right to vote and to hold of‐

fices created underthe constitution of the state of Illinois.” 581

F.3d at 564.  

The rule of Buchmeier is confined to situations in which the

state provides a notice of the restoration of civil rights to a

former inmate. Absent such a notice, the proviso to 18 U.S.C.

§ 921(a)(20) requiring that the “restoration ... expressly pro‐

vide[] that the person may not ... possess ... firearms” simply

does not apply. The district court, therefore, did not errin con‐

sidering his Colorado convictions as predicate offenses for

purposes of § 922(g)(1).

                                                 

23 Appellant’s Br. 13.

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No. 15‐1956 19

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth in this opinion, the judgment of

the district court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

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