Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-13-03071/USCOURTS-caDC-13-03071-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Charles Ike Emor
Appellee
Sunrise Academy
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 9, 2014 May 5, 2015

No. 13-3071

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

CHARLES IKE EMOR, ALSO KNOWN AS CHARLES IKE 

EMENOGHA, ALSO KNOWN AS CHARLES IKESON,

APPELLEE

SUNRISE ACADEMY,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:10-cr-00298-1)

John D. Quinn argued the cause for appellant. With him 

on the briefs were Stephen Sale and David B. Smith.

Zia M. Faruqui, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Ronald C. 

Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney, and Elizabeth Trosman, John P. 

Mannarino, and Diane G. Lucas, Assistant U.S. Attorneys. 

Elizabeth H. Danello, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an 

appearance.

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Before: BROWN, MILLETT and WILKINS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge BROWN.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge WILKINS.

BROWN, Circuit Judge. In an episode of the iconic 1990s 

television show Friends, Joey Tribbiani tries to dissuade 

Rachel Green from moving to Paris. Joey asks Rachel to flip a

coin. If he wins the coin flip, she must agree to stay. Rachel 

flips the coin; Joey loses. When later recounting the story to 

Ross Gellar, a befuddled Joey says, “[w]ho loses fifty-seven 

coin tosses in a row?” Friends: The One with Rachel’s Going 

Away Party (NBC television broadcast Apr. 29, 2004). Before 

Ross can answer, Joey explains Rachel’s rules: “Heads, she 

wins; tails, I lose.” Id. 

The proceedings in this case have largely followed the 

same rules. SunRise Academy (“SunRise”) claimed the 

federal government seized property from criminal defendant 

Charles Emor belonging to SunRise. But the government 

succeeded in excluding SunRise from Emor’s criminal 

proceedings, suggesting SunRise could press its claims to the 

property in a third-party forfeiture proceeding. When SunRise 

later did so, the government filed a motion to dismiss the 

petition, contending that SunRise should be denied a hearing 

based on findings the court made in the prior proceeding from

which SunRise was excluded. Because this heads the 

government wins and tails SunRise loses form of criminal 

forfeiture does not comport with the statutory scheme, we 

reverse.

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I

A

SunRise was founded in 1999 by Charles Emor as a 

private nonprofit school serving special needs children in the 

District of Columbia. SunRise was governed by a Board of 

Directors, which, at various times, consisted of SunRise’s 

principal, teachers, employees, and Emor’s family members. 

Emor was the one constant on SunRise’s Board. 

SunRise was no small operation. It built a solid financial 

endowment, possessed two campuses, educated over 150 

students each semester, and employed a number of teachers, 

therapists, and counselors. In July 2007, SunRise filed a 

successful application for a Certificate of Approval with the 

District of Columbia to provide educational services to special 

needs students. Students paid no tuition to attend SunRise; 

instead, the District reimbursed SunRise for educating the 

students. That reimbursement often totaled over $400,000 a 

month. 

In April 2009, the District of Columbia Public Schools 

(“DCPS”) decided to investigate whether SunRise had fully 

implemented DCPS’s policies. More than a year later, the 

Office of State Superintendent of Education (“OSSE”) issued 

a report and revoked SunRise’s Certificate, after finding 

SunRise had failed to keep accurate daily attendance records, 

fully report absenteeism, and had fabricated student records to 

receive payment from the District for services not actually 

rendered. But OSSE did not revoke SunRise’s Certificate due 

to the quality of education provided by SunRise. 

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B

Meanwhile, from January 2006 through November 2010, 

Emor used his authority as a SunRise Director and Board 

Member to withdraw funds from SunRise’s bank accounts. 

He then used those funds to, inter alia, purchase luxury items 

for himself, provide money to his family members, and pay 

the rent on his townhouse. 

Emor’s most brazen fraud involved convincing 

SunRise’s Board to invest in a for-profit company called Core 

Ventures. According to the proposal, Core would build a 

coffee shop or vocational school on SunRise property. The 

business would provide training for SunRise students and 

profits would be returned to SunRise. 

Beginning in March 2009, Jamila Negatu, a SunRise 

Board Member and employee, made a series of wire transfers 

totaling over two million dollars to Core. Emor directed 

Negatu to transfer the money, even though SunRise possessed 

no loan documentation binding Core to repay the money, 

reinvest the profits, or explaining the consequence of default. 

The only documentation regarding the money transfers were

minutes from two SunRise Board meetings and financial 

documents prepared for SunRise by its accountant 

characterizing the transfers as loans. 

The money wired to Core was never returned to SunRise. 

Nor did Core pursue its plans for building a coffee shop or a 

vocational school. Core, however, did purchase and pay the 

insurance on a Lexus SUV that Emor drove. 

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C

The federal government eventually caught Emor, 

arresting him, and seizing the Lexus SUV and the over two 

million dollars in Core’s bank account. The government 

charged Emor with thirty-seven counts, including mail and 

wire fraud, and various other federal and D.C. Code 

violations. The government also provided notice it was 

seeking forfeiture of Core’s property. 

The government had trouble identifying the alleged 

victim of Emor’s fraud. In some counts, the government 

alleged Emor, through SunRise, devised a scheme to defraud 

and to obtain public money from the District, for his own use 

and benefit. Consistent with a scheme to defraud the District, 

the government charged Emor with ten counts of mail fraud

and five counts of wire fraud, with each count involving the 

District reimbursing SunRise for educational services. The 

district court ultimately dismissed these counts of the 

indictment with prejudice over the government’s objections. 

But the government also described Emor’s scheme as one 

to defraud SunRise, alleging Emor created a set of bogus 

SunRise Board of Director resolutions purportedly 

authorizing SunRise to lend over two million dollars to Core 

for the purposes of operating a coffee shop, when the “terms 

of the loan w[ere] never reduced to writing.” J.A. 50. And the 

government charged Emor with several wire fraud counts

involving each wire transfer from SunRise to Core. 

SunRise was never charged with wrongdoing by the 

government. In fact, SunRise filed a motion under Federal 

Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 for the return of its property, 

claiming that it owned the two million dollars and the Lexus. 

The district court denied that request, holding that 21 U.S.C. 

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§ 853(k) prohibits third parties from intervening in criminal 

proceedings, other than a third party proceeding under 21 

U.S.C. § 853(n). Sunrise Acad. v. United States, 791 F. Supp. 

2d 200, 204 (D.D.C. 2011).

Emor ultimately negotiated a sweetheart deal with the 

government, which agreed to drop every count save one in 

exchange for Emor’s guilty plea. The Statement of the 

Offense, included as part of Emor’s plea agreement to one 

count of wire fraud, alleged that Emor devised a scheme to 

obtain money “from SunRise’s bank accounts.” J.A. 71. As a 

part of the scheme, Emor committed “various 

misrepresentations and omissions of material facts,” and 

“used the money obtained from SunRise’s bank accounts in a 

manner unrelated to the education of students with disabilities 

at SunRise.” Id. But the prosecutors consciously and 

deliberately declined to identify the victim of Emor’s fraud, 

and the district court deferred a determination of the fraud 

victim’s identity until the preliminary forfeiture hearing. 

D

SunRise could not participate at the preliminary forfeiture 

hearing, although two board members and several employees 

were called to testify as part of the government’s case. The 

court made a number of findings at the hearing, of which 

three are relevant to this appeal. First, the court found 

SunRise did not own Core. Second, the court held SunRise 

was Emor’s alter ego. Third, the court found, for restitution 

purposes, that SunRise was not a victim of Emor’s fraud. The 

court entered a preliminary order forfeiting the funds in 

Core’s bank accounts and the Lexus SUV to the federal 

government. 

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SunRise then filed a third-party petition claiming 

ownership in the forfeited property and requesting a hearing 

to determine its interest. SunRise claimed it was a secured 

lender to Core; the owner of the forfeited property; the 

assignee of all interest in the forfeited property from Core; the 

beneficiary of a constructive trust; and the victim of Emor’s 

fraud. 

The government moved to dismiss SunRise’s petition for 

lack of standing, and the district court granted the motion. 

United States v. Emor ̧ 2013 WL 3005366 (D.D.C. June 18, 

2013). The court found SunRise had failed to assert facts 

showing it possessed a secured interest in the seized funds. 

Moreover, SunRise’s bare assertion it owned Core was 

insufficient in light of the court’s previous finding at the 

preliminary forfeiture hearing that Emor, alone, owned Core. 

The court also rejected SunRise’s claim of assignment 

from Core. The court found Core was Emor’s nominee (hence 

Core and Emor were the same), and only someone “other 

than” the defendant could petition for a third-party 

proceeding. J.A. 313. Based on a finding it made during the 

preliminary forfeiture hearing, the court held SunRise lacked 

standing because it was an alter ego of Emor—a finding it

found “no reason to revisit.” J.A. 323. The court further 

declined SunRise’s constructive trust argument, noting that 

this Court does not allow the constructive trust theory of 

standing in forfeiture cases. See United States v. BCCI 

Holdings (Luxemborg), S.A., 46 F.3d 1185 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 

Lastly, the court concluded SunRise was not entitled to the 

forfeited funds as a victim of fraud because merely being a 

fraud victim does not confer an interest in property necessary 

to meet the standing requirements. 

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II

SunRise claims it possessed the standing necessary to 

obtain a third-party ancillary hearing under several legal 

theories. Before addressing those theories, a discussion of 

criminal forfeiture procedures is necessary.

A

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c), “criminal forfeiture is 

available for general . . . wire fraud violations.” United States 

v. Day, 524 F.3d 1361, 1376 (D.C. Cir. 2008). The procedures 

set forth in 21 U.S.C. § 853—minus subsection (d)—apply 

“to all stages of a criminal forfeiture proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. 

2461(c). 

At the preliminary order of forfeiture stage, “[i]f the 

government seeks forfeiture of specific property, the court 

must determine whether the government has established the 

requisite nexus between the property and the offense.” FED. R.

CRIM. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A). The court is required to make its 

determination “without regard to any third party’s interest in 

the property.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.2(b)(2)(A). Indeed, no third 

party may “intervene” in the criminal forfeiture proceeding. 

21 U.S.C. § 853(k)(1). 

The sole forum for a third party to address its interest in 

forfeited property is through a third party ancillary 

proceeding. See id. § 853(n). Any third party, “other than the 

defendant,” may petition for an ancillary proceeding if it can 

assert a “legal interest” in the forfeited property. Id. § 

853(n)(2). The third party must file a petition setting forth the 

“nature and extent” of its interest in the property, the “time 

and circumstances” when petitioner acquired that interest, any 

supporting facts, and the requested relief. Id. § 853(n)(3). 

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After receiving a petition, a court may, upon motion, 

“dismiss the petition for lack of standing” or for “failure to 

state a claim.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.2(c)(1)(A). For purposes 

of deciding any motion to dismiss, “the facts set forth in the 

petition are assumed to be true.” Id. 

In an appeal from a criminal forfeiture proceeding, we 

review the district court’s fact finding for clear error, see 

United States v. Oregon, 671 F.3d 484, 490 (4th Cir. 2012), 

and the district court’s legal interpretations de novo, see Day, 

524 F.3d at 1367.

B

As a threshold matter, we must determine whether 

SunRise has standing under Article III of the Constitution. See 

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–60 (1992). 

“[T]he requirements for a [petitioner] to demonstrate 

constitutional standing [to challenge a forfeiture] are very 

forgiving.” United States v. One-Sixth Share of James J. 

Bulger in All Present And Future Proceeds of Mass Millions 

Lottery Ticket No. M246233, 326 F.3d 36, 41 (1st Cir. 2003). 

While some courts have focused on whether a party had an 

ownership or possessory interest under state law at the time of 

forfeiture, see, e.g., United States v. Timley, 507, F.3d 1125, 

1129 (8th Cir. 2007), other courts have noted “it is the injury 

to the party seeking standing that remains the ultimate focus,”

United States v. Cambio Exacto, S.A., 166 F.3d 522, 527 (2d 

Cir. 1999). In general, any colorable claim on the property 

suffices, if the claim of injury is “redressable, at least in part, 

by a return of the property.” United States v. 7725 Unity Ave. 

N., 294 F.3d 954, 957 (8th Cir. 2002).

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SunRise claims ownership over the money it transferred 

to Core’s accounts in response to Emor’s fraudulent 

statements. SunRise further claims that had the government 

not seized the property and obtained a preliminary order of 

forfeiture, SunRise would have obtained its property back, 

either as the prior owner and crime victim with a superior 

interest or under Core’s assignment of rights. If SunRise 

could have obtained the property back from Core, SunRise 

continues to suffer injury because of the forfeiture order. See 

Oregon, 671 F.3d at 491 (declining to adopt government’s 

argument that “a petitioner with less than legal title 

challenging the forfeiture . . . could never have standing, even 

if its interest is greater than that forfeited by the defendant to 

the United States”); United States v. Campos, 859 F.2d 1233, 

1237–38 (6th Cir. 1988) (noting the criminal forfeiture statute 

“goes beyond giving only a party with a secured interest an 

opportunity to be heard”). Thus, because the seizure of 

property without due process is the quintessential injury, it is 

sufficient, for constitutional purposes, that SunRise alleged its 

property was taken by the government through forfeiture; it 

would have reacquired its property had the property not been 

forfeited to the government; it was excluded from the 

forfeiture proceedings; and its injury is redressable through an 

amendment of the forfeiture order. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 

560–61 (requiring injury, causation, and redressability in 

order to establish constitutional standing).

C

We next turn to statutory standing. Under 21 U.S.C. § 

853(n)(2), any third party, “other than the defendant,” may 

petition for an ancillary proceeding. The district court held

that SunRise was Emor’s alter ego; and hence, SunRise 

lacked standing because it was not someone “other than the 

defendant.” SunRise claims the court was wrong to dismiss its 

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petition based on an alter ego finding the court made at a 

hearing in which it was not allowed to participate. We agree.

To begin with, the Supreme Court has said that the term

“statutory standing” is a bit “misleading.” Lexmark Int’l, Inc. 

v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387 n.4 

(2014). Statutory standing is not really about standing at all, 

in the sense that it limits a “court’s statutory or constitutional 

power to adjudicate the case.” Id. (emphasis in original).

Instead, statutory standing is nothing more than an inquiry 

into whether the statute at issue conferred a “cause of action”

encompassing “a particular plaintiff’s claim.” Id. at 1387; see 

also Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 755 F.3d 1010, 1018 

(D.C. Cir. 2014). In other words, statutory standing “is itself a 

merits issue.” Oregon, 671 F.3d at 490 n.6. 

The focus on whether SunRise pled a valid cause of 

action substantially changes the inquiry. A district court 

deciding a motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds, such 

as standing, may consider evidence outside the complaint. See 

Coal. for Underground Expansion v. Mineta, 333 F.3d 193, 

198 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1)). But 

when a court decides whether a petitioner stated a valid claim 

for relief, a court must treat the complaint’s factual allegations 

as true and may not use factual findings and legal conclusions 

drawn from outside the pleadings. See Holy Land Found. for 

Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 165 (D.C. Cir. 2003)

(citing FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)). The Federal Rules of 

Criminal Procedure have largely adopted this pleadings-only 

rule for third-party ancillary proceedings. See FED. R. CRIM.

P. 32.2(c)(1)(A) (in deciding a motion to dismiss a third-party 

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criminal forfeiture petition, “the facts set forth in the petition 

are assumed to be true”).1

By requiring courts to stick to the pleadings when 

determining whether a petitioner has failed to state a valid 

claim for relief, the pleadings-only rule fortifies the due 

process concerns associated with stripping third parties of 

property rights based on proceedings in which they had no 

prior opportunity to participate. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. 

Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.7 (1979) (“It is a violation of due 

process for a judgment to be binding on a litigant who was not 

a party or a privy and therefore has never had an opportunity 

to be heard.”); United States v. Reckmeyer, 836 F.2d 200, 208 

(4th Cir. 1987) (“Congress intended, through . . . [the criminal 

forfeiture statutes], to provide a means by which third persons 

who raise challenges to the validity of the forfeiture order 

could have their claims adjudicated.”). Thus, to the extent the 

district court relied on an alter ego finding drawn from outside 

the petition and made during a proceeding in which SunRise

could not represent its own interests, the court erred. 

As to the government’s claim that SunRise failed to plead 

sufficient facts rebutting the district court’s alter ego finding, 

we disagree. The statutory text requires a third party to plead 

only a “legal interest” in the forfeited property, and then set 

forth the “nature and extent” of its interest in the property, the 

“time and circumstances” when petitioner acquired that 

interest, any supporting facts, and the requested relief. 21 

U.S.C. § 853(n)(2), (n)(3). There is no textual anchor forcing 

third parties to allege facts rebutting a court’s findings made 

 1 The criminal forfeiture statute prescribes when a court can 

consider “relevant portions of the record of the [underlying] 

criminal case” in deciding whether to amend a preliminary 

forfeiture order, and that is “[a]t the hearing.” 21 U.S.C. § 

853(n)(5). 

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at a proceeding in which the third party did not participate. 

And even assuming that SunRise was required to plead it was 

someone “other than the defendant,” 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(2), it 

did so. In its petition, SunRise stated that Emor never had an 

“ownership interest” in SunRise. J.A. 287.

III

SunRise must state a valid claim of relief in order to 

obtain a hearing. SunRise stated such a claim when it alleged,

“the Forfeited Property at all times remained the property of 

SunRise Academy.” J.A. 285. 

A

A third-party petitioner seeking relief from a preliminary 

order of criminal forfeiture must satisfy one of two 

conditions. A petitioner must either show a legal interest in 

the forfeitable property vested in petitioner rather than the 

defendant or show its interest was superior to the criminal 

defendant’s at “the time of the commission of the acts which 

gave rise to the forfeiture.” 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A). If the 

petitioner’s interest arose after the crime, the petitioner must 

show it was a “bona fide purchaser for value” of the property, 

who was “reasonably without cause to believe that the 

property was subject to forfeiture” at the time of purchase. Id. 

§ 853(n)(6)(B). The vesting and superior interest clause is 

most relevant here.

In its petition, SunRise alleged an embezzlement theory, 

claiming the “Forfeited Property at all times remained the 

property of SunRise Academy,” J.A. 285, and that “Mr. 

Emor’s embezzlement from SunRise occurred at the time of 

each transfer from SunRise to Core,” J.A. 289. In its 

opposition to the government’s motion to dismiss, SunRise 

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again referred to Emor’s “embezzle[ment]” of the $2 million 

dollars and claimed SunRise owned the funds transferred to 

Core at the time of “the alleged illegal taking by Mr. Emor . . 

. .” Petitioner SunRise Academy’s Memorandum of Points 

and Authorities in Opposition to Government’s Motion to 

Dismiss at 3, 15-16, United States v. Emor, No. 10-CR-298-

PLF (D.D.C. Oct. 10, 2012), ECF No. 122 (emphasis added).

Although the embezzlement theory was not well developed, 

SunRise did enough to preserve the claim for our review.

SunRise claimed Emor stole the funds. Under District of 

Columbia law, theft covers not merely larceny, but “larceny 

by trick, larceny by trust, embezzlement, and false pretenses.” 

D.C. CODE § 22-3211(a) (emphasis added). So if SunRise 

proves Emor stole or embezzled the funds SunRise sent to 

Core for the purposes of building a coffee shop, SunRise 

could establish possession of legal title or a superior legal 

interest at “the time of the commission of the acts which gave 

rise to the forfeiture.” 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A). That is so 

because, under District of Columbia law, embezzlement is a 

form of theft in which the defendant deprives the victim of the 

possession of, but not title to, property. See Great Am. Indem. 

Co. v. Yoder, 131 A.2d 401, 403 (D.C. 1957) (where one

transfers possession of property to another who converts it to 

his own use, the taking is a larceny); see also GEORGE G.

BOGERT, ET AL., BOGERT’S TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 476

(Thomsen-Reuters rev. 3d ed. 2015) (“A thief or an embezzler 

has no title to the stolen property and thus, if the stolen 

property is found still in his or her hands, the property may be 

recovered by the rightful possessor.”).

Congress designed criminal forfeiture to punish criminal 

defendants, not crime victims, and clearly did not contemplate 

section 853(c) being used to defeat a victim’s property 

interest. To put it another way, the vesting statute targets the 

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perpetrator’s interests downstream from the crime, not the 

upstream interests of the victim. Thus, whether a third party 

petitioner can claim continuous title or superior interest 

should make little practical difference in circumstances such 

as these. An example helps to illustrate how seemingly 

disparate characterizations ought to lead to congruent results. 

Say an employee convinced the Metropolitan Museum of Art 

to take part in an art transfer with another museum. But 

instead of shipping the painting to the other museum, the 

employee ships it to his home for his personal use, 

committing mail fraud in the process. If the act is labeled a 

fraud, the Museum’s vested interest prior to the fraud should 

mean it retains a superior interest sufficient to defeat 

forfeiture. Arguably, though, a fraud victim could be 

relegated to the ranks of general creditors and, lacking the 

ability to claim a constructive trust, have a more difficult time 

regaining its property. See BCCI Holdings, 46 F.3d at 1191–

92. In contrast, if the act is characterized as larceny by trick or 

embezzlement, the Museum can argue its title was never 

relinquished.

If SunRise can prove embezzlement upon remand, then 

SunRise at all times possessed vested legal title or a superior 

legal interest over the money and Emor did not, which means 

the government never had a valid legal interest. See 21 U.S.C. 

§ 853(n)(6)(A) (stating a petitioner may seek an amendment 

of forfeiture, if a petitioner possessed title that “vested in the 

petitioner rather than the defendant”). Suffice it to say, 

SunRise may be able to establish a vested legal interest in the 

$2 million dollars, thus stating a valid claim.

2

 2 Because SunRise could not claim title to or possession of the 

Lexus at the time of the wire transfer from SunRise to Core, 

SunRise could only have had a superior interest in the Lexus at the 

time of the acts giving rise to forfeiture through the imposition of a 

constructive trust. But, as we explain below, this Court does not 

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B

In an effort to give the district court some guidance upon 

remand, we highlight some potential issues that could arise. 

Normally, a purported victim of crime would never need to 

claim a vested or superior interest to obtain its money back 

from the perpetrator. In many cases, a criminal defendant 

pleads guilty to defrauding an identifiable victim. At 

sentencing, the victim seeks restitution, see 18 U.S.C. § 

3663A(c)(1)(A)(ii), and if restitution is ordered and the 

government has seized assets belonging to the crime victim, it 

often returns them. Similarly, the U.S. Attorney’s Office 

would usually recommend restoration of forfeited assets to a 

victim who is named in the restitution order. Status Hearing at 

13, United States v. Emor, No. 10-CR-298-PLF (D.D.C. Aug. 

2, 2011), ECF No. 50 (“Status Hearing”). 

This is, however, not a typical third party case. The 

government initially charged Emor with a scheme to defraud 

the District of Columbia and SunRise. The district court 

dismissed—with prejudice—the counts alleging a scheme 

whereby Emor, through SunRise, defrauded the District. But 

when the government offered Emor a guilty plea to a single 

count of taking money from “SunRise’s bank accounts,” it 

failed to identify a victim.3 At Emor’s change of plea hearing, 

 

recognize the constructive trust doctrine in federal criminal 

forfeiture proceedings. See infra, at 21. 3 The Statement of Offense accompanying Emor’s guilty plea 

claims Emor fraudulently obtained money from SunRise’s bank 

accounts, not from the District. See J.A. 71. ¶ 7 (“A goal of the 

scheme and artifice was for defendant Emor to fraudulently obtain 

money, from SunRise’s bank accounts, for his own use and benefit . 

. . .”) (emphasis added); J.A. 71 ¶ 8 (“It was part of the scheme and 

artifice that defendant Emor, through various misrepresentations 

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the district court asked how it could “take a plea” without 

knowing the identity of the victim, and the government 

responded that the court could determine the identity of the 

victim at sentencing.4 Status Hearing, at 5. After Emor pled 

guilty, the government took the position that, for restitution 

and forfeiture purposes, the victim was the District of 

Columbia. This meant SunRise could be denied restitution (it 

was not the victim) and the government was free to argue 

SunRise was Emor’s alter ego (SunRise was the defendant). 

The government was candid about the reasons for its 

unorthodox approach: it would permit the forfeiture 

determination to be made in “a compressed evidentiary 

hearing . . . with a preponderance standard and the hearsay 

rules, obviously not applying,” see Status Hearing, at 5–6, 

United States v. Emor, No. 10-CR-298-PLF (D.D.C. Aug. 3, 

2011), ECF No. 59 (“Status Hearing II”), and without 

agreement as to the nature of the offense. 

 

and omissions of material facts, used the money obtained from 

SunRise’s bank accounts in a manner unrelated to the education of 

students with disabilities at SunRise.”) (emphasis added). 

4 While establishing the precise identity of the victim(s) of the fraud 

is not a required element of wire fraud, as a practical matter it is 

difficult to conceive how the government could prove a violation of 

a statute intended to punish those who deprive others of their 

property, without identifying in some manner who those “others” 

were. See Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 355 (2005) 

(holding that an element of wire fraud includes that the object of the 

fraudulent scheme be money or property “in the victim’s hands”); 

United States v. Madeoy, 912 F.2d 1486, 1492 (D.C. Cir. 1990) 

(“We reject the appellants’ contention that the indictment did not 

charge a scheme or artifice to defraud a victim of property.”) 

(emphasis added). 

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Fraudulent schemes are not fungible. They come in many 

forms and courts must consider the nature of the scheme to 

determine how to connect the dots—who was defrauded and 

how—and the amount of harm caused or intended. See United 

States v. Munoz, 430 F.3d 1357, 1370 (11th Cir. 2005) 

(“Fraudulent schemes, however, comes in various forms, and 

we must consider the nature of the scheme in determining 

what method is to be used to calculate the harm caused or 

intended”). Even when guilt is established by plea rather than 

a jury trial, the factual basis underlying the plea plays an

important role in assuring a knowing, intelligent, and 

voluntary plea and resolving questions about restitution and 

forfeiture. See United States v. Gonzalez, 647 F.3d 41, 65–66 

(2d Cir. 2011). Here, when the district court suggested the 

superseding information was “open to interpretation,” defense 

counsel disputed this interpretation, insisting everyone was 

“operating under the assumption that this is stealing from 

SunRise,” and SunRise “was the victim.” Status Hearing, at 

20, 22, 23. Both the court and defense counsel acknowledged 

the parties would need to be on the same page “as to what the 

thrust of the charge is” before Mr. Emor could enter a 

“knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea.” Id. at 23.

District courts must determine the crime before a 

defendant pleads guilty and is sentenced. The government’s 

strategic determination not to identify the victim in the plea—

arguing that the court could determine the victim at or after 

the defendant’s sentence—has logical consequences. 

Contradictory factual determinations could possibly sever the 

nexus between the criminal conviction and the forfeiture. See

21 U.S.C. § 853(a); FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A) (stating 

there must be a nexus “between the property and the offense”

in order for property to be forfeitable). On remand, the district 

court must ensure that its findings of fact and conclusions of 

law do not contradict the factual and liability admissions 

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within the Statement of Offense. By the same token, the 

government may not use the forfeiture proceeding to try and 

establish additional facts—including the identity of the fraud 

victim—that would contradict the factual basis for Emor’s 

plea or alter the scope of legal liability to which he pled in the 

Statement of Offense. See Status Hearing II, at 5–6.

IV

Several of SunRise’s claims fail as a matter of law, and 

the district court need not consider them on remand.

A

SunRise claims it possessed “documents evidencing” its 

ownership of Core, “through the members it appointed, who 

hold their membership interest for the benefit and on behalf of 

Sunrise” J.A. 289. As the district court noted, “[w]hat 

SunRise means by this is not clear.” J.A. 306–07. What is 

apparent is that SunRise failed to provide any legal or factual 

support of its ownership claim. Cf. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009). The district court correctly found SunRise 

failed to state a valid claim of ownership over Core.

B

SunRise further contends it possesses a legal interest 

because Core assigned its rights to SunRise and SunRise was 

a bona fide purchaser. Neither of these claims withstands

scrutiny. 

Under the criminal forfeiture statute’s relation back 

provision, these theories fail because title to forfeited property 

vested in the government upon commission of the criminal act 

giving rise to forfeiture. 21 U.S.C. § 853(c). Emor’s fraud 

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occurred at the very latest when SunRise wired the money to 

Core in 2010, and thus well before Core’s alleged assignment 

to SunRise in May 2012. Core could not have taken a 

cognizable interest in the property because its interest vested 

at the same time as the government’s interest. See 21 U.S.C. § 

853(c). So Core had no right to seek return of its property. 

Consequently, as to its assignment from Core, SunRise is 

restricted to arguing that it is a bona fide purchaser for value

without reason to believe the property was subject to 

forfeiture. 

SunRise’s allegations were insufficient to meet that 

burden. See Smith v. Wells Fargo Bank, 991 A.2d 20, 26 

(D.C. 2010) (holding that a bona fide purchaser for value is 

one who “acquired . . . interest in a property for valuable 

consideration and without notice of any outstanding claims 

which are held against the property by third parties”). Given 

SunRise’s attempt to intervene in Emor’s criminal 

proceedings in 2011 and the government’s seizure of the 

property a year before, SunRise had sufficient cause to 

believe the property was subject to forfeiture when Core 

assigned its right to SunRise in 2012. Cf. United States v. 

Huntington Nat’l. Bank, 682 F.3d 429, 436 (6th Cir. 2012) 

(“[T]he whole purpose of 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(B) is to

protect innocent purchasers who acquire property without 

notice of the government’s superior interest . . . in the 

forfeited property.”) (emphasis added). 

C

Finally, SunRise contends it possessed a constructive 

trust in the forfeited property superior to the government’s 

interest. SunRise acknowledges its constructive trust theory is 

in considerable tension with BCCI Holdings, but it asks us to 

limit BCCI Holdings to the RICO context. 

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While it is true BCCI Holdings was decided in the RICO 

context and under a different statute, see 18 U.S.C. § 1963, it 

is also true the two forfeiture statutes contain identical 

language, and “it appears that no court has interpreted these 

two provisions differently,” United States v. BCCI Holdings 

(Luxembourg) S.A., 956 F. Supp. 5, 9 n.4 (D.D.C. 1997).

BCCI Holdings is not limited solely to the RICO context. See

Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 378 (2005) (“To give these 

same words a different meaning . . . would be to invent a 

statute rather than interpret one.”).

SunRise did not specifically request that we overturn 

BCCI Holdings. Such a strategy would have support. Every 

circuit to consider the constructive trust question in the 

context of criminal forfeiture has rejected the analysis in 

BCCI Holdings. E.g., Willis Mgmt. (Vermont), Ltd. v. United 

States, 652 F.3d 236, 244–45 (2d Cir. 2011); United States v.

Salti, 579 F.3d 656, 670 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. 

Shefton, 548 F.3d 1360, 1366 (11th Cir. 2008); see also Osin 

v. Johnson, 243 F.2d 653 (D.C. Cir. 1957). However, since 

we cannot overrule a prior panel’s decision, except via an 

Irons footnote or en banc review, we leave this issue for 

another day. See Oakey v. U.S. Airways Pilots Disability 

Income Plan, 723 F.3d 227, 232 (D.C. Cir. 2013) cert. denied, 

134 S. Ct. 1513 (2014).

IV

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s judgment is

Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part, and Remanded.

So ordered.

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WILKINS, Circuit Judge, concurring: I join in the Court’s 

result and much of its rationale. I agree that SunRise has 

standing to petition as the alleged victim of Emor’s 

embezzlement and that SunRise is not estopped from 

demonstrating its “interest” in the forfeited property based on 

findings of fact the District Court made before it was entitled 

to intervene in the proceedings. I write separately due to my 

concern that Section III.B. of the majority opinion may 

engender confusion about the scope of wire fraud or criminal 

forfeiture. 

I agree with the majority that the government is not 

required to establish the identity of a specific victim in order 

to prove wire fraud, Maj. Op. at 17 n.4, as the nine circuits to 

consider the question have uniformly held. See United States 

v. Tum, 707 F.3d 68, 75-76 & n.6 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing cases 

from the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth and Eleventh circuits); 

see also United States v. McAuliffe, 490 F.3d 526, 533 (6th 

Cir. 2007); United States v. Trapilo, 103 F.3d 547, 552 (2d

Cir. 1997); United States v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193, 216 (3d 

Cir. 1992). As we have held, wire fraud requires proof only 

of 1) knowing and willful entry into a scheme to defraud and 

2) use of an interstate wire communication in furtherance of

the scheme. See United States v. Tann, 532 F.3d 868, 872 

(D.C. Cir. 2008). Consequently, I disagree with the 

suggestions throughout the majority opinion that the 

government needed to identify the victim of the wire fraud in 

the charging documents, or that the District Court needed to 

determine whether SunRise, the District of Columbia, or the 

federal government was the victim of Emor’s fraud at the time 

of the guilty plea. 

Wire fraud comes in many shapes and sizes. One 

paradigmatic iteration of the offense transpires when the

defendant diverts for personal use funds that a donor provided 

to a nonprofit corporation for a specific purpose. In such 

cases, the donor/grantor can be properly characterized as the 

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2

victim even though the defendant took the property directly 

from the nonprofit. See, e.g., United States v. Treadwell, 760 

F.2d 327, 335-37, 337 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Post v. United 

States, 407 F.2d 319, 329 (D.C. Cir. 1968); United States v. 

Kilpatrick, No. 10-20403, 2013 WL 4041866, at *18-19 (E.D. 

Mich. Aug. 8, 2013). As the majority notes, the diversion of 

funds could also be characterized as an embezzlement in 

which the nonprofit organization – here SunRise – is the 

victim. Maj. Op. at 14.

In this case, the Information and Statement of Offense 

expressly noted that the District and federal governments 

were SunRise’s sole sources of funds and that the funds were 

provided exclusively as reimbursement for special education 

services, and characterized Emor’s scheme as involving the 

use of SunRise’s funds “in a manner unrelated to the 

education of students with disabilities at 

SunRise.”1 Superseding Information at 1, 3, United States v. 

Emor, No. 10-cr-298 (D.D.C. July 22, 2011), ECF No. 44; 

J.A. 69, 71. Thus, slightly differing from the majority, Maj. 

Op. at 18-19, my reading of the record is that the prosecution 

and Emor agreed at the time of the guilty plea that the wire 

fraud scheme involved illegally diverting funds restricted for 

educational uses to Emor’s personal use; and the parties went 

forward with the plea with the full understanding that, in

subsequent proceedings, the government would argue that the 

victim of Emor’s fraudulent scheme was the District, while 

Emor would argue that the victim was SunRise. Transcript of 

Aug. 3, 2011 at 14-15, Emor (D.D.C. Aug. 3, 2011), ECF No. 

59.

 1 Echoing the Internal Revenue Code, SunRise’s articles of 

incorporation provide that “[n]o part of the net earnings of the 

corporation shall inure to the benefit of, or be distributable to,” its 

officers. J.A. 183; 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).

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Indeed, the government had ample basis to have

questions about the role of SunRise in Emor’s scheme. When 

the government subpoenaed SunRise’s documents related to 

Core Ventures, SunRise produced only brief, incomplete 

notes purportedly reflecting two Board of Directors meetings

to document its $2 million “loan.” J.A. 232, 237-38. After 

the guilty plea, the evidence presented at the hearings 

indicated that SunRise’s Board at relevant times consisted

solely of Emor, his college-age son, and a young SunRise

employee; that the Board neglected to meet at all during 2008;

that it completely failed to document major activities such as 

the purported loan to Core Ventures; that it approved

hundreds of thousands of dollars in purchases of luxury 

vehicles, housing, and gifts for Emor and his family members;

and that it approved a $500,000 bonus to Emor while he was 

incarcerated for selling stolen computers. J.A. 214-44. Of 

course, SunRise will have the opportunity to rebut or explain 

this evidence on remand, and to show that SunRise was not 

complicit in Emor’s diversion. Nonetheless, I think it unfair 

to suggest that the government should have been certain that 

SunRise was a victim at the time of the guilty plea based on a 

reasonable assessment of the facts as they would have 

appeared to the government at that time.

In sum, the District Court can sort out any remaining 

disputed issues of fact and law on remand, including

SunRise’s ability to demonstrate its “legal interest” in the 

forfeited property and whether it is someone “other than the 

defendant.” 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(2). 

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