Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-05-03100/USCOURTS-caDC-05-03100-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Anthony D. Anderson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 20, 2010 Decided January 28, 2011

No. 05-3100

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

ANTHONY D. ANDERSON,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 04cr00343-01)

Lisa B. Wright, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued 

the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was A. J. 

Kramer, Federal Public Defender. Neil H. Jaffee, Assistant 

Federal Public Defender, entered an appearance.

Lauren H. Dickie, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Ronald C. 

Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese III, Assistant 

U.S. Attorney.

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Before: BROWN, Circuit Judge, and EDWARDS and 

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge BROWN.

BROWN, Circuit Judge: Anthony D. Anderson appeals his 

conviction and 235-month sentence for possession of a firearm 

and ammunition by a felon. See 18 U.S.C § 922(g)(1). He 

alleges he received ineffective assistance of counsel and the 

district court committed error at sentencing. We remand for an 

evidentiary hearing on Anderson’s Sixth Amendment claim,

because the record is insufficient for us to decide whether he 

was prejudiced by any mistakes his lawyer may have made. 

We vacate Anderson’s sentence and remand for resentencing 

because, given the expansive language of 18 U.S.C. § 3661, it 

was plain error for the district court to conclude it was 

precluded from considering Anderson’s allocution at 

sentencing.

I

Officers of the Metropolitan Police Department stopped a 

vehicle Anderson was driving when he ran a stop sign. His 

daughter’s fiancé, Terrence Saunders, was in the passenger 

seat. Officers James Boteler and David Chumbley testified 

they thought Saunders might be ingesting drugs, and they 

removed him from the car before Boteler asked Anderson for 

his license. At that point, Boteler says, Anderson reached to the 

floor between his legs, and Boteler opened the car door in time 

to see Anderson holding a semiautomatic handgun just off the 

floor. As Boteler pulled Anderson out of his car, the manual 

transmission vehicle somehow lurched forward and struck the 

car parked just ahead of it.1

 1 Officer Boteler testified Anderson’s right hand “somehow touched 

the gear shift or manipulated the gear shift in some manner in which 

The gun was the only evidence 

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found in the car, no fingerprints were lifted from the gun, and 

no evidence was recovered from Anderson or Saunders.

At the first status conference in the district court, 

Anderson’s trial counsel admitted he had not calculated the 

sentence Anderson faced under the Sentencing Guidelines, but 

said he and his client had “decided to go to trial” anyway. Tr. 

9/7/2004, at 2. The district court ordered Anderson’s lawyer to 

calculate “what [Anderson] would be facing” under the 

Guidelines so that there would be “no misunderstanding 

[about] what [his] choices [were].” Id. at 6. At a subsequent 

motions hearing, trial counsel still had not calculated the 

Guidelines range, but said he “believe[d]” Anderson was 

facing a fifteen-year mandatory minimum as a “career 

offender.” Tr. 10/28/2004, at 60. Again, the district court asked 

the lawyer to calculate the Guidelines range. Id. at 62–65.

On the day appointed for trial, Anderson’s lawyer said

Anderson intended to plead guilty, contrary to his earlier 

representation. The court asked trial counsel if he had done the 

Guidelines calculation, and he said he had. Tr. 11/8/2004, at 2.

The Government’s attorney then proffered the police officers’ 

testimony, and the court began a plea colloquy with Anderson. 

Id. at 10–11, 12. At first, Anderson agreed with the 

Government’s version of the story. Id. at 12. When the court 

questioned him more specifically, though, Anderson said he 

had not reached down for a gun when Boteler asked for his 

license. Id. at 13. Instead, Anderson said, the police only found 

the gun “up under the seat” after removing both Anderson and 

his passenger from the car and searching it. Id. at 13–14. Still, 

 

the vehicle lurched forward.” Tr. 11/9/2004, at 278. At sentencing 

and on appeal, Anderson claims that the car lurched forward when he 

took his foot off the clutch to “attempt[] to push the gun under the 

seat with his foot.” Dist. Ct. Docket No. 26, quoted in Appellant’s 

Br. 22 n.7.

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Anderson admitted to having “place[d] the gun there 

originally,” id. at 14, and confirmed that he was willing to go 

forward with the plea, id. at 15.

In the ensuing penalty discussion between counsel, the 

district court judge, and the probation officer, it became clear 

that Anderson’s lawyer had miscalculated the sentencing 

range. Id. at 21–28. He had erroneously disregarded as “stale” 

certain prior offenses

2 that made Anderson an “armed career 

criminal” subject to a fifteen-year mandatory minimum with a 

Guidelines range of 235 to 293 months—188 to 235 months if 

he accepted responsibility. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).

3 This 

was far longer than the statutory maximum of ten years and the 

Guidelines range of 77 to 96 months Anderson’s lawyer had 

calculated—the calculation on which Anderson had relied. 

When Anderson realized the severity of the sentence he was 

facing, he decided not to plead guilty. Tr. 11/8/2004, at 30.

At trial, the court ruled the Government could not use 

Anderson’s testimony in the aborted plea colloquy to impeach 

him, but noted the Government could use it as the basis for a 

perjury charge. Tr. 11/9/2004, at 233. The Defense put on no 

 2 According to Anderson’s lawyer, the three relevant priors were for 

carrying a dangerous weapon, assault with a dangerous weapon, and 

attempted distribution of cocaine. Tr. 11/8/2004, at 28.

3 Normally certain prior convictions that are more than 10 years old 

are not counted for purposes of calculating criminal history. See 

U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(e). But the armed career criminal enhancement 

applies to persons convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) with at least 

three prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses, 

regardless of the age of the offenses. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4 app. n.1 

(“[T]he time periods for the counting of prior sentences under 

§ 4A1.2 . . . [are not] applicable to the determination of whether a 

defendant is subject to an enhanced sentence under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(e).”).

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witnesses, and Anderson declined to testify “irrespective of 

whether [he] would be impeached.” Tr. 11/10/2004, at 399.

Anderson now says he would have testified but for his lawyer’s 

mistaken advice that testifying truthfully to his innocence 

would have exposed him to a fifteen-year penalty for perjury.

The jury found Anderson guilty of unlawful possession of 

a firearm and ammunition by a felon.

At sentencing, Anderson said the gun belonged to

Saunders and Anderson had only taken responsibility for it to 

protect his daughter’s fiancé from prison. Tr. 5/6/2005, at 8–9.

He argued for the mandatory minimum fifteen-year sentence 

on that basis. Id. at 7–8. According to Anderson’s sentencing 

memorandum, Saunders “threw the gun in the direction of Mr. 

Anderson,” and “[t]he gun landed on the floor in front of Mr. 

Anderson where he left it for fear that the police would see him 

reach down between his legs and think he intended to shoot 

them.” Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing at 1, United States 

v. Anderson, No. 04-cr-343, (D.D.C. Feb. 11, 2005). When he 

was ordered out of the car, Anderson “attempted to push the 

gun under the seat with his foot” “[a]t the same time [he] was 

getting out.” Id.

The district court sentenced Anderson to 235 months in 

prison, the low end of the Guidelines range. Tr. 5/6/2005, at 14. 

Anderson argues that certain comments the sentencing judge 

made betray the court’s misunderstanding of the scope of its 

discretion at sentencing. First, Anderson says the court 

impermissibly treated a sentence within the Guidelines range 

as presumptively correct and therefore refused to consider 

departing from that range without a special evidentiary 

justification. Second, Anderson argues the court mistakenly 

believed it could not consider his allocution at sentencing.

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II

A

Anderson argues his trial counsel failed to provide 

constitutionally adequate assistance because he miscalculated 

Anderson’s Sentencing Guidelines range, induced him to 

begin a plea colloquy that he terminated when he learned the 

true sentencing range, and then advised him not to testify in his 

own defense on the mistaken belief that any exculpatory 

testimony would conflict with the aborted plea colloquy and 

make him liable for perjury.

“In order to succeed on a Sixth Amendment claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show two 

things: (1) ‘that counsel’s performance was deficient,’ and (2) 

‘that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.’” 

United States v. Shabban, 612 F.3d 693, 697 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 

(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). 

“To establish deficiency, [he] must show his ‘counsel’s 

representation fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness.’ To establish prejudice, he ‘must show that 

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 

been different.’” Porter v. McCollum, 130 S. Ct. 447, 452 

(2009) (citations omitted) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 

694)). “This court’s general practice is to remand the claim for 

an evidentiary hearing unless the trial record alone 

conclusively shows that the defendant either is or is not entitled 

to relief.” United States v. Shabban, 612 F.3d 693, 698 (D.C. 

Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Rashad, 331 F.3d 908, 

909–10 (D.C. Cir. 2003)).

Anderson does not deny that the trial record is inadequate 

for us to determine whether he was denied his Sixth 

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Amendment right to counsel. For example, Anderson offers no 

evidence that his lawyer advised him a perjury conviction 

would carry a fifteen-year penalty or that he would have 

testified at trial but for his fear of indictment for perjury.

The Government insists we may deny Anderson’s 

ineffective assistance claim forthwith because the record needs 

no supplementation. Even under Anderson’s version of the 

facts, the Government contends, his claim cannot satisfy the 

prejudice requirement of Strickland. According to the 

Government, Anderson’s insistence that he was just “trying to 

kick the gun up under the seat” after Saunders threw it to him 

amounts to an admission of constructive possession. Tr. 

5/6/2005, at 8–9. We disagree. 

Our standard for constructive possession requires that 

there be “some action, some word, or some conduct that links 

the individual to the contraband and indicates that he had some 

stake in them, some power over them.” United States v. Bryant, 

523 F.3d 349, 355 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quotation marks and 

alteration omitted); see United States v. Foster, 557 F.3d 650, 

657 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“Constructive possession requires that 

the defendant knew of, and was in a position to exercise 

dominion and control over, the contraband.”). It is not clear

from the record whether Anderson had the necessary stake in 

the handgun to have constructively possessed it. Though 

“evasive conduct . . . coupled with proximity” to a gun “may 

suffice” to establish constructive possession, see United States 

v. Booker, 436 F.3d 238, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (emphasis 

added), that is a question for the trier of fact.

Because the record before us is insufficient to decide 

whether Anderson received constitutionally adequate counsel, 

we remand for an evidentiary hearing on his Sixth Amendment 

claim.

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B

Anderson challenges his sentence on the ground that the 

district court placed two inappropriate restraints on its

discretion at sentencing: The sentencing judge was unwilling

to depart from the Guidelines range without some factual 

showing to justify the departure, and she refused to consider 

Anderson’s exculpatory statements at the sentencing hearing.

Because he did not object to the district court’s statements 

at the sentencing hearing, we review Anderson’s

sentencing-related claims for plain error. See In re Sealed 

Case, 204 F.3d 1170, 1171 (D.C. Cir. 2000). To justify 

reversal, “[i]n addition to being obvious, the error generally 

must also have been ‘prejudicial.’” United States v. Saro, 24 

F.3d 283, 286 (D.C. Cir. 1994). That is, “the defendant must 

show a reasonable likelihood that the sentencing court’s 

obvious errors affected his sentence.” Id. at 288. “While our

plain error review in the sentencing context requires a ‘slightly 

less exacting’ showing of prejudice than for trial errors, an 

appellant must still show that ‘from the perspective of the trial 

court, the error was so plain that the trial judge and prosecutor 

were derelict in countenancing it, even absent the defendant’s 

timely assistance in detecting it.’” In re Sealed Case, 204 F.3d 

at 1172 (quoting Saro, 24 F.3d at 286, 287 (alterations and 

quotation marks omitted)).

1

Anderson first argues the district court erred by applying a 

presumption of reasonableness to its within-Guidelines 

sentence. Anderson says the judge’s comments at the 

sentencing hearing suggest that any departure from the 

Guidelines range would have to be justified with a special 

factual finding. Recognizing that Anderson’s sentence at the 

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low end of the Guidelines range “certainly is a hefty sentence,” 

the judge said, “there is nothing in your life that the court can 

point to, or that you can, . . . that the court can look to, to 

consider not giving you what the sentencing guidelines 

require.” Tr. 5/6/2005, at 13–14 (emphases added); see also id.

at 13 (“[T]here really isn’t something that would ordinarily 

come forward for [downward departure from the Guidelines], 

which would be the reason to consider it.”). According to 

Anderson, these statements amount to a presumption that a 

sentence within the Guidelines range is reasonable. 

The Supreme Court clarified two years after Anderson 

was sentenced that “the sentencing court does not enjoy the 

benefit of a legal presumption that the Guidelines sentence 

should apply.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007). 

That presumption attaches only in the court of appeals. See id. 

Assuming arguendo the district court applied an 

erroneous presumption of reasonableness to the Guidelines 

sentence, we would not find the error plain. “[W]here, as here, 

the law was unsettled at the time of trial but becomes settled by 

the time of appeal, we assess error as of the time of trial.” 

United States v. Mouling, 557 F.3d 658, 664 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 

When Anderson was sentenced, no clear precedent established 

that district courts may not avail themselves of the 

presumption of reasonableness applied by appellate courts to 

within-Guidelines sentences. Thus, “any error in employing 

such [a presumption] cannot have been plain,” id., and we need 

not decide the question.

Of course, the district court will be bound by Rita at 

resentencing and may not apply a presumption of correctness 

to a within-Guidelines sentence.

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2

Anderson next alleges the district court misapprehended 

the breadth of its discretion in refusing to consider his

allocution at sentencing. We agree. The court said its

sentencing

decisions were made based on the testimony 

that was provided. And obviously the 

information I believe that you’ve provided [at 

the sentencing hearing] as to what occurred is 

not something that’s on the record, if I’m not 

mistaken. And so, you know, both the court and 

the jury makes a decision based on what the 

record is.

Tr. 5/6/2005, at 16. It was clear at the time of Anderson’s

sentencing hearing, however, that a court could consider the 

defendant’s post-trial statement in crafting his sentence. Any 

assumption to the contrary violates the rule that “[n]o 

limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the 

background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an 

offense which a court of the United States may receive and 

consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.” 

18 U.S.C. § 3661; see United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 

446 (1972) (“[A sentencing] judge may appropriately conduct 

an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the 

kind of information he may consider, or the source from which 

it may come.”).4

 4 The legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 3577, predecessor to current 

§ 3661, cites with approval the Supreme Court’s observation that 

“modern concepts individualizing punishment have made it all the 

more necessary that a sentencing judge not be denied an opportunity 

to obtain pertinent information by a requirement of rigid adherence 

to restrictive rules of evidence properly applicable to the trial.” 

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The Government does not defend the district court’s 

statement of the law, but concludes “[i]t is not entirely clear . . . 

what the district court meant.” Appellee’s Br. 50. The 

Government speculates that the judge “could have been 

explaining to appellant that in exercising her discretion to 

formulate a sentence, she was going to give greater weight to 

the sworn testimony and evidence presented at trial, and less 

weight to appellant’s unsworn statements at sentencing.” Id. at 

51. This charitable reading of the district court’s statement has 

no basis in the record. The court made no mention of 

“discretion” or the “weight” of evidence, apparently believing

its ken to be limited, like a jury’s, to the evidence presented at 

trial. Cf. United States v. Holton, 116 F.3d 1536, 1542 (D.C. 

Cir. 1997) (“[C]onsideration by the jury of documents not in 

evidence is error.”). But a sentencing judge is subject to no 

such limitation. Although it need not assign any weight to a 

defendant’s unsworn statements, the sentencing court may 

consider the allocution along with any other available 

“information concerning the [defendant’s] background, 

character, and conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3661; see also United 

States v. Ayers, 428 F.3d 312, 315 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 

(“Mitigating evidence [from the defendant at sentencing 

pursuant to § 3661] would have been relevant, of course, to the 

court’s analysis under § 3553(a).”); United States v. Doe, 934 

F.2d 353, 358 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (noting the defendant raised 

information relevant to sentencing at her sentencing hearing).

The “somewhat lighter” prejudice requirement that 

applies in the context of sentencing error is satisfied here. Saro, 

24 F.3d at 288. Because the court thought it was not allowed to 

 

Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949), cited in S. Rep. No. 

91-617, at 167 (1969) (“Appropriately evaluated hearsay is 

permissible. The exclusionary rules developed for trial on the issue 

of guilt are not to be applied.” (citation omitted)); see H.R. Rep. No. 

91-1549, at 63 (1970) (citing Williams, 337 U.S. 241).

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consider statements not in evidence at sentencing, it neglected 

to consider Anderson’s entire allocution. That allocution was 

relevant to Anderson’s background, his character, and the 

conduct for which he was sentenced:

What [the prosecutor] said about me, yeah, 

I did all the things, but I was young and very 

stupid at the time. And I feel as though I done 

paid for them crimes that I did. And for me to be 

up here looking at 25 years for a gun that I 

never really possessed is to be kind of—you 

know, it just don’t make sense now. . . .

I haven’t been in my daughter’s life 

because I been locked up most of my life and 

this is her boyfriend and they plan on getting 

married and he’s 10 years probation. So when 

he does it, I’m looking at I got 5 years for a gun, 

and probably if I take a cop 36 months or 42 

months or something like that, and I, like, I feel 

like I owe her that. You know what I mean? 

And she would look at it like, Oh, my father he 

ain’t did nothing for me, but he did this here for 

me.

But I never knew I was looking at this kind 

of penalties. If I did, then when the police 

approached the car, it would have been said, 

“Oh, this ain’t my gun. This is his gun.”

I never thought that I’m going to be 

looking at the rest of my life with something, 

like I said, I never really possessed.

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And like I was telling you when I was 

taking my cop, the police lied. Never seen the 

gun in my hand. I was trying to kick the gun up 

under the seat, and that’s what he seen, Your 

Honor. But other than that, that’s all I have to 

say.

Tr. 5/6/2005, at 8–9. Anderson’s sentence “might likely have 

been different” if the sentencing judge had considered

Anderson’s description of his minimal responsibility for the 

gun, the brief time that it was in his proximity, and his 

generous impulse toward his daughter and her fiancé. United 

States v. Smith, 267 F.3d 1154, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 

(concluding a sentencing error was prejudicial). No evidence 

in the record conveyed Anderson’s unique perspective on the 

relevant events. 

The district court, of course, is in the best position to 

evaluate Anderson’s credibility. See Gall v. United States, 552 

U.S. 38, 51–52 (2007). And if what Anderson said is true, it is 

for the district court to determine how that should affect his 

sentence. See id. Therefore, “we express no view as to the 

ultimate propriety” of the sentence and remand “only to ensure 

that the appropriate methodology is followed.” United States v. 

Taylor, 937 F.2d 676, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

We vacate Anderson’s sentence, and we remand his case 

for an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance claim. 

If the district court determines Anderson received 

constitutionally adequate counsel, it should resentence him.

So ordered.

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