Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01298/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01298-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
David Polys
Appellant
Marcia Polys
Appellant
Trans-Colorado Airlines, Inc.
Appellee

Document Text:

( 

PUBLISH 

FI LED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 121991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

DAVID POLYS and MARCIA POLYS, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

TRANS-COLORADO AIRLINES, INC., 

Defendant-Appellee. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 88-1298 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. NO. 86-M-827) 

Edward A. Gleason of Sherman & Howard, Colorado Springs, Colorado, 

Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants. 

William White (Joseph T. Batuello with him on the brief) of Byrne, 

Kiely & White, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before SEYMOUR, BARRETT, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge. 

Plaintiffs, David L. Polys and Marcia Polys, appeal a judgment in favor of the defendant, Trans-Colorado Airlines, Inc., in 

the Polyses' personal injury suit against Trans-Colorado. We 

affirm. 

On January 14, 1984, Trans-Colorado Flight 216, which 

originated in Albuquerque, New Mexico, landed at the Durango, 

Appellate Case: 88-1298 Document: 01019667098 Date Filed: 08/12/1991 Page: 1 
Colorado airport, skidded to the left, and stopped abruptly upon 

impact with a snowbank. R. Vol. I, tab 5 at 1. David Palys was 

one of four passengers aboard that plane. Approximately two years 

later, the Polyses filed a personal injury action against TransColorado Airlines, Inc. David Palys claimed that the "aircraft 

landing incident caused a closed head injury [to him] which 

produced disabling psychological and psychiatric effects." Mrs. 

Palys joined the action claiming a loss of consortium. TransColorado admitted negligence in the operation of the aircraft, but 

denied causation and damages. After a bench trial, the United 

States District Court for the District of Colorado held for the 

defendants, finding that the Polyses had "failed to prove that the 

conduct of the defendant's agents on January 14, 1984, caused any 

injury to David Palys." 

On appeal, the Polyses raise two issues. First, they contend 

that the district court erred in excluding the deposition 

testimony of two of the Polyses' expert witnesses. Second, they 

contend that the district court erred in finding that they failed 

to prove that Trans-Colorado's admitted negligence caused any 

injury to Mr. Palys and, thus, erroneously denied recovery for the 

alleged injuries and damages. 

I. 

The Polyses argue that the district court erred in excluding 

the deposition testimonies of two expert witnesses, Dr. Schultz 

and Dr. Daven. We disagree because the Polyses failed to preserve 

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the issue for appeal by making an offer of proof and the court's 

ruling did not amount to plain error. 

Federal Rule of Evidence 103(a) states in pertinent part: 

Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits 

or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the 

party is affected, and 

(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one 

excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence was 

made known to the court by of fer or was apparent from 

the context within which questions were asked. 

The first purpose of the offer of proof requirement is to allow 

the trial judge to make an informed evidentiary ruling. The plain 

language of Federal Rule of Evidence 103(a)(2) requires that the 

judge be informed contemporaneously with the proponent's attempt 

to admit the evidence. This will be accomplished if the substance 

and purpose of the evidence are apparent to the judge from the 

context in which it is offered, or an offer of proof either 

precedes or immediately follows the ruling so that the trial judge 

can reconsider. 1 

To satisfy the rule, we have previously stated that "merely 

telling the court the content of • • . proposed testimony" is not 

an offer of proof. Gates v. United States, 707 F.2d 1141, 1145 

1 Of course, no offer of proof is required if it would have 

been futile. As, for example, it would be if the proponent is not 

allowed to proffer an explanation for the record. See Beech 

Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 175 n.22 (1988) (applying 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 46). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 46 states in 

part: "if a party has no opportunity to object to a ruling ••. 

at the time it is made, the absence of an objection does not 

thereafter prejudice the party." Naturally, if the nature of 

excluded evidence is not clear from the substance of the questions 

then the same reasoning applies to the offer of proof requirement. 

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(10th Cir. 1983) (citing United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 1048, 

1053 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1100 (1977)). 

Rather, as the Fifth Circuit stated in McQuaig v. McCoy, 806 F.2d 

1298, 1301 (5th Cir. 1987), the proponent must explain what it 

expects to show and "the grounds for which the party believes the 

evidence to be admissible ...• [so that the trial] court [is] on 

notice of the purpose for which the evidence is offered while 

there is still time to remedy the situation. 112 

The second purpose for the of fer of proof is to create a 

clear record that an appellate court can review to "determine 

whether there was reversible error in excluding the [testimony]." 

New Mexico Sav. & Loan Assoc. v. United States Fidelity and Guar. 

Co., 454 F.2d 328, 334 (10th Cir. 1972) (citing Downie v. Powers, 

193 F.2d 760, 768 (10th Cir. 1951) and 5 Moore's Fed. Prac. (2d. 

ed.), ,r 43.11, pp. 1381-82); see also McQuaig v. McCoy, 806 F.2d 

at 1302; Thomas v. Wyrick, 687 F.2d 235, 239 (8th Cir. 1982), 

cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1175 (1983). 

2 See,~' Estes v. Dick Smith Ford, Inc., 856 F.2d 1097, 

1104-05 (8th Cir. 1988) (counsel told trial court what excluded 

evidence would tend to prove); McQuaig v. McCoy, 806 F.2d at 1302 

(record contained six pages about substance of evidence and 

proponents' reasons for offering it); Coursen v. A.H. Robins Co., 

764 F.2d 1329, 1333 (9th Cir. 1985) (proponent "apprise[d] the 

judge of the purpose of the evidence"); Collins v. Wayne Corp., 

621 F.2d 777, 781 (5th Cir. 1980) (deposition was not filed, but 

proponent made "the substance of the deposition known to the 

district court"); Fenstermacher v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 493 

F.2d 333, 338 (3d Cir. 1974) ("to prove my case" was inadequate 

offer of proof). 

The trial judge may also be sufficiently apprised, if the 

excluded evidence was previously discussed with the trial judge, 

for example at the pre-trial conference, so that during trial the 

judge is well aware of the content and purpose of the evidence. 

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Once we find that a party, either in fact or substance, made 

an offer of proof of excluded evidence, then a trial judge's 

"decisio[n] to admit or exclude evidence 'will not be reversed by 

this court absent a clear abuse of discretion.'" Big Horn Coal 

Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 852 F.2d 1259, 1266 (10th Cir. 

1988) (quoting Weir v. Federal Insur. Co., 811 F.2d 1387, 1396 

(10th Cir. 1987)); see also Rainbow Travel Serv., Inc. v. Hilton 

Hotels Corp., 896 F.2d 1233, 1242 (10th Cir. 1990); United States 

v. Alexander, 849 F.2d 1293, 1301 (10th Cir. 1988). This is 

especially true with respect to deposition testimony. Alfonso v. 

Lund, 783 F.2d 958, 961 (10th Cir. 1986); Reeg v. Shaughnessy, 570 

F.2d 309, 317 (10th Cir. 1978); Sims Consol., Ltd. v. Irrigation 

and Power Equip., Inc., 518 F.2d 413, 418 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. 

denied, 423 U.S. 913 (1975); Campbell v. Barnett, 351 F.2d 342 

(10th Cir. 1965). 

Under this standard of review, we strongly defer to the trial 

court. The review is generally setting specific, looking at 

whether the district court correctly weighed appropriate factors. 

See,~' Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981). 

Even if the trial judge abused his or her discretion in making a 

decision to exclude evidence, we will overlook the error as 

harmless unless a party's substantial right was affected. 3 K-B 

3 After finding abuse of discretion, appellate courts have 

nonetheless refused to reverse trial courts' decisions to exclude 

deposition testimony as harmless error if it would not have added 

anything to the evidence presented. See,~' Sims Consol., Ltd. 

v. Irrigation and Power Equip., Inc., 518 F.2d at 418 (In a case 

in which all the testimony was by deposition, the court found that 

"[i]t [was] not error to refuse to admit into evidence, •.. or . . . to refuse to consider depositions that do not add anything 

[footnote continued] 

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Trucking Co. v. Riss Intern. Corp., 763 F.2d 1148, 1156 (10th Cir. 

1985); Julander v. Ford Motor Co., 488 F.2d 839, 842 (10th Cir. 

1973); Fed. R. Civ. P. 61. 

On the other hand, if the complaining party failed to meet 

the of fer of proof standard, we can reverse only if there was 

plain error affecting a party's substantial rights. Fed. R. Evid. 

103(d). 4 Although the plain error doctrine applies to both 

[footnote continued] 

of probative value which has already been developed."); Fenstermacher v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d at 338 ("The district 

judge's refusal to permit the introduction of the depositions into 

evidence was not prejudicial . . . [because] the depositions do 

not appear to add any information to that given in oral testimony 

by the deponents and otherwise developed at the hearing."). 

Another example of harmless error in a jury trial is even if the 

jury had considered the evidence the outcome would be the same. 

See Bower v. O'Hara, 759 F.·2d 1117, 1123 (3d Cir. 1985) (finding 

error because the jury might have decided differently with the 

excluded testimony). 

4 In Reese v. Mercury Marine Div. of Brunswick Corp., 793 F.2d 

1416, 1421 (5th Cir. 1986), the Fifth Circuit stated: 

[I]n asserting objections to a trial court's exclusion 

of evidence, a party is required under Fed. R. Evid. 

103(a)(2) to carefully articulate every ground for which 

the evidence is admissible. Failure to do so renders 

the district court's ruling reversible only upon a finding of plain error. • . . Busy trial courts should not 

be required to repeat trials, especially civil trials, 

because the trial judge has excluded evidence for lack 

of a clear understanding of the proponent's purpose in 

offering the evidence. The trial judge must be put on 

notice of the purpose for which the evidence is offered 

while there is still time to remedy the situation. It 

is the proponent's duty, not that of the trial court, to 

clearly articulate the purpose for which the evidence is 

offered. 

(citations omitted) (emphasis added). But see Petty v. !deco, 761 

F.2d 1146, 1151 (5th Cir. 1985), an earlier case in which the 

Fifth Circuit stated: "Where no offer of proof appears of record, 

there is no way that a party can demonstrate that his substantial 

rights have been affected." We prefer the Fifth Circuit's later 

reasoning in Reese, however, because "[p]lain error is error not 

[footnote continued] 

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criminal and civil cases, with respect to the latter, "[t]he 

'plain error' exception • . . has been limited to errors which 

seriously affect 'the fairness, integrity or public reputation of 

judicial proceedings.'" McEwen v. City of Norman, Okla., 926 F.2d 

1539, 1545 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting Karns v. Emerson Elec. Co., 

817 F.2d 1452, 1460 (10th Cir. 1987). 5 The "miscarriage of 

justice" must be "patently plainly erroneous and prejudicial." 

[footnote continued] 

raised at trial, but nevertheless considered by a reviewing 

court," who will determine if a party's substantial rights have 

been affected. 1 Weinstein and Berger, Weinstein's Evidence 

11 103[01] (1986) (emphasis added). "[T]he distinction between 

harmless and plain error is whether the particular error in the 

case at hand excuses the party's failure to bring it properly to 

the trial court's attention." Id. For a discussion about offer 

of proof in a criminal matter, see United States v. Willie, 

F.2d _ (10th Cir. 1991). 

Similarly, with respect to admitted evidence, a timely motion 

to object is required at the time the evidence is admitted or the 

appellate court "will reverse only if there was plain error and a 

substantial right of the objecting party is affected." Big Horn 

Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 852 F.2d at 1266; see also 

Karns v. Emerson Elec. Col., 817 F.2d 1452, 1460 (10th Cir. 1987) 

(citing Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)(1) and (d); Whitely v. OKC Corp., 719 

F.2d 1051, 1057 (10th Cir. 1983)); Bannister v. Town of Noble, 

Okla., 812 F.2d 1265, 1271 (10th Cir. 1987). 

5 See also Petty v. !deco, 761 F.2d at 1150 ("The 'plain error 

rule' is an extraordinary remedy which is invoked only in exceptional circumstances to avoid a miscarriage of justice." (citation omitted)); Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 

738 F.2d 1509, 1516 (10th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 472 U.S. 585 (1985) 

("Courts repeatedly have cautioned that the plain error exception 

is limited to exceptional cases."); Brenner v. World Boxing 

Council, 675 F.2d 445, 456 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 

835 (1982) ("[T]he plain error doctrine, especially in civil 

cases, should be applied only where the 'error [is] so serious and 

flagrant that it goes to the very integrity of the trial.'" 

(quoting Modave v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center, 501 F.2d 

1065, 1072 n.1 (2d Cir. 1974)); Gay v. P.K. Lindsay Co., 666 F.2d 

710, 712 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 975 (1982) 

("Plain error ... is a rare species in civil litigation; it will 

be found only 'to prevent a clear miscarriage of justice.'" 

(quoting Nimrod v. Sylvester, 369 F.2d 870, 873 (1st Cir. 1966)). 

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Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509, 

1516 (10th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 472 U.S. 585 (1985). 

The Polyses' counsel made no formal offer of proof when the 

district court sustained Trans-Colorado's objection to the admission of both Dr. Daven's and Dr. Schultz's deposition testimonies. 

Following the exclusion of Dr. Daven's testimony, counsel 

responded "Thank you, Judge. The next witness we would call 

.••• " R. Vol. II at 25. The next witness was to be Dr. 

Schultz. Polyses' counsel submitted his deposition testimony for 

admission. Although their counsel briefly explained that the 

first will-call witness was out of the country and the second was 

out of the district, both over 100 miles away, he did not explain 

the substance or purpose of the experts' testimonies. In response 

to the sustained objection, Polyses counsel merely called the next 

witness. R. Vol. II at 26. 

Furthermore, the context in which the deposition evidence was 

offered; following the Polyses' first witness, revealed nothing 

about the substance or purpose of the testimonies. The Polyses 

argue, nonetheless, that they met the Rule 103(a)(2) requirement 

because "in the course of proceedings, the district court was made 

aware of the nature and substance of the excluded testimony." 

Appellants' Reply Brief at 8. To support this argument, the 

Polyses cite four times during the trial when Dr. Daven or Dr. 

Schultz were discussed. When the doctors' names came up one and 

two days later, however, the plaintiffs' counsel made no effort to 

argue for admittance of the deposition testimony and they never 

explained what its contribution would have been. 

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The plaintiffs appear to believe that if the significance of 

excluded evidence becomes apparent later, a trial judge sua sponte 

must reconsider its earlier evidentiary ruling. The plaintiffs 

misunderstand the offer of proof requirement. First, eliciting 

through later testimony the substance of previously excluded 

evidence, without more in the way of explanation or proffer to the 

court, satisfies neither the plain language of, nor the purpose 

for, Rule 103(a)(2). As we stated, the Rule contemplates some 

contemporaneity between the trial judge's knowledge about the 

proposed evidence and the evidentiary ruling to allow a proper 

decision at the time the evidence is offered. Even considering, 

hypothetically, that counsel had requested admission of the 

excluded deposition testimonies later in the proceedings when 

other witnesses testified about these doctors, the testimony in 

question was not sufficient to apprise the district court of the 

substance and purpose of the excluded testimony and would not have 

satisfied the second purpose of the rule -- to create a clear 

record for us to review the trial court's decision. 6 Therefore, 

6 With respect to Dr. Daven, on the second day of trial during 

plaintiff's direct examination of Dr. Witty, the witness testified 

that he had received and read Dr. Daven's reports. Then the 

following exchange occurred: 

Q What else did you obtain in the way of history 

related to the signs and symptoms [of the alleged neck 

injury]? 

A [Palys] mentioned that is was believed that he was 

experiencing seizure disorder between that time and the 

present . . . . I have no evidence of the seizure 

disorder other than his telling me that and that he had 

been prescribed anticonvulsive medicine for that. 

Q .... Did Dr. Daven document the seizure 

[footnote continued] 

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because the Polyses have not preserved the issue for appeal, we 

can not review the district court's decision to exclude the 

deposition testimonies for abuse of discretion. Consequently, we 

[footnote continued] 

disorder? 

A I believe he did. I believe he indicated that he 

believed there was a seizure disorder. 

R. Vol. III at 60-61. 

Later during plaintiffs' direct examination of Dr. Witty, the 

testimony was: 

A I also reviewed the records ... of Dr. Daven in 

Pueblo . 

. He's a neurologist. 

Q And what was his determination? 

A Well, he says, this unfortunate man present with a 

post-traumatic design manifested by seizure persistent - - documents the persistence of latter difficulties with 

no improvement over the last two and a half years is 

worrisome and raises likelihood that Mr. Polys will 

probably be left with permanent neuropsychological 

sequelae. 

R. Vol. III at 98-99. 

Finally, during the plaintiffs cross-examination of 

defendant's expert witness Dr. Spitz, the testimony was: 

Q Have you reviewed Dr. Daven's deposition testimony 

in this matter? 

A Yes, I have. 

Q Are you aware that Dr. Daven is board certified in, 

not only neurology, but in child neurology as well? 

A Yes, I am. 

Q And is also an electroencephalographer? 

A Yes. 

Q And had has reviewed and evaluated Mr. Polys, and 

[footnote continued] 

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do not reach the harmless error question. Instead, we examine the 

record for plain error. 

We note that it is difficult to find plain error in cases 

like this because "failure to comply with normal requirements of 

offers of proof is likely to produce a record which simply does 

not disclose the [plain] error." Fed. R. Evid. 103(d) advisory 

[footnote continued] 

did you disagree with his conclusion that Mr. Polys in 

fact does have a seizure disorder? 

A Yes. 

R. Vol. IV at 244. Because these colloquies occurred much later 

during the trial than when the deposition testimonies were offered 

they hardly amount to a contemporaneous offer of proof. Even if 

this testimony had occurreQ prior to the attempt to admit the 

depositions, it would not have been sufficient to apprise the 

trial court about the substance and purpose of Dr. Daven's deposition. Furthermore, we can not say that the trial judge was 

obliged sua sponte to reconsider his earlier ruling. 

On cross-examination Dr. Spitz testified about Dr. Schultz as 

follows: 

Q Are you aware that Dr. Schultz who is a board 

certified neurologist in Phoenix, Arizona was the one 

who reviewed both the first and the second BEAM studies 

and has testified by deposition in this matter, and I'm 

assuming that you have read his testimony? 

A Yes, I have. 

Q Do you have any qualms with their qualifications as 

certified BEAM evaluators? 

A I do not. 

R. Vol. IV at 233-34. This exchange does not yield enough information to apprise the district court or us about the substance and 

purpose of Dr. Schultz's deposition testimony. 

Even though, in the motion before the district court after 

trial, the plaintiffs claimed that Dr. Schultz "would have further 

testified on the FRYE standards" for BEAM technology, R. Vol. I, 

tab 7 at 2, this was not evident during the trial. 

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committee's note. On the facts before us, however, we can not say 

exclusion of the deposition testimonies was plain error comprising 

an exceptional case of prejudice or unfairness. 

First, we find no plain error. We agree with Trans-Colorado 

that the district court was not automatically required to admit 

the deposition testimonies under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

32(a)(3)(B) just because the witnesses were more that 100 miles 

away as plaintiffs appear to argue. The trial judge appropriately 

considered surprise to opposing counsel. See Alfonso v. Lund, 783 

F.2d at 961; see also In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton International Airport, 720 F. Supp. 1493, 1502 (D.Colo. 1989) (The 

trial court refused to admit deposition testimony even though the 

witness lived outside the 100 mile radius because it decided the 

jury needed to "consider and evaluate the witness's 

credibility."). Conversely, the Polyses are correct that when 

applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 32, courts no longer 

distinguish between depositions taken for discovery use or for 

trial use. See, ~' United States v. International Business 

Mach. Corp., 90 F.R.D. 377, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Thus, TransColorado's objection to the admission of the depositions because 

they were taken for discovery and not for use in trial was 

erroneous. The record indicates, however, only that this was one 

argument for objection to admission, not that the judge accepted 

this rationale in making his evidentiary ruling. R. Vol. II at 25-

26. 

Second, we find that the Polyses did not suffer prejudice or 

unfairness. The Polyses argue that they were prejudiced because, 

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without the deposition testimonies, the district court decided 

their case on incomplete evidence. They contend that Doctor 

Schultz's testimony would "have demonstrated the validity of the 

use of BEAM analysis" and that "Dr. Daven would have documented 

Mr. Polys' seizure disorders ••. [and] would have testified to 

Mr. Polys' neuropsychological prognosis." Appellant's Brief at 

13. 

With respect to Dr. Schultz's proposed testimony, the 

district court found that "[e]ven if the BEAM test results are 

accepted as indicating some organic brain damage, the tests are 

not probative of causation." R. Vol. I, tab 5 at 6. Because the 

Polyses must prove causation in order to recover damages, we find 

that the exclusion of Dr. Schultz's testimony did not prejudice 

them. With respect to Dr. Daven's proposed testimony, both parties offered expert evidence about whether David Polys suffered 

seizures and about his neuropsychological condition. Dr. Daven's 

testimony on this point would have been cumulative. We find that 

exclusion of Dr. Daven's testimony was not exceptionally 

prejudicial or unfair to the Polyses. 

In sum, absent offers of proof, we can not review the 

district court's ruling that excluded Doctors Daven's and 

Schultz's deposition testimonies for abuse of discretion. In 

addition, we hold that that ruling was not plain error. It was 

not error and, even if it was, it did not affect a substantial 

right of the Polyses. Therefore, we will not reverse the district 

court. 

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II. 

The Polyses next contend that the district court erred in 

finding that they failed to prove causation despite TransColorado' s admitted negligence. 7 We disagree. 

The Polyses argue that the district court misapplied the law 

on aggravation of a pre-existing condition. We review statutory 

interpretations or legal analyses de novo. Supre v. Ricketts, 792 

F.2d 958, 961 (10th Cir. 1986). In Colorado, this cause of action 

requires a plaintiff to show that a pre-existing condition was 

aggravated by an accident due to the negligence of another. 

Stephens v. Koch, 561 P.2d 333, 334 (Colo. 1977). Although 

Colorado law regarding aggravation of a pre-existing condition 

allows a jury to place all· the liability for a disability on a 

defendant if it can not apportion causation between an aggravating 

accident and a pre-existing condition, a plaintiff must still 

prove that the accident aggravated the pre-existing condition. 

See Stephens v. Koch, 561 P.2d at 334. 

The plaintiffs argue that the district court essentially made 

two mistakes. 8 First, they claim that because "the district court 

7 Because we do not reverse the district court ruling that 

excluded Doctors Daven's and Schultz's deposition testimonies, we 

need not address the plaintiffs' first argument that the district 

court's finding was "based •.. on incomplete evidence after it 

erroneously excluded the deposition testimon[ies)." Appellant's 

Brief at 12. 

8 The Polyses unfortunately confuse two separate causes of 

action, negligent infliction of emotional distress and aggravation 

of a pre-existing condition. For example, while arguing that the 

district court incorrectly applied the law on aggravation of a 

pre-existing condition, the Polyses discuss the "impact rule." 

The "impact rule" concerns negligent infliction of emotional 

distress. It has nothing to do with aggravation of a pre-existing 

[footnote continued) 

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acknowledged that (David Polys] previously had psychological 

problems and that he suffered psychological injury as a result of 

the accident[,] •.. it erred in denying recovery for the aggravation of Mr. Polys' pre-existing psychological conditions 

caused by Trans-Colorado's admitted negligence." Appellant's 

Brief at 13-14. With respect to the Polyses claim of aggravation 

of a pre-existing condition, the district court stated: "For the 

plaintiff to recover here, it must be said that his personality 

disorders became worse as a result of a minor inconveniencing 

incident in which he suffered no physical injury." Id. at 9. As 

Trans-Colorado notes, the district court 

[did] not find that (David Polys'] personality disorders 

did become worse, but only that that specific finding 

would be required before any further inquiry would 

become appropriate. Unless the Trial Court found that 

some condition was "worsened" or "aggravated," which it 

did not, there is simply no basis for applying the 

doctrine of pre-existing condition. 

Appellee's Brief at 14. Thus the district court correctly applied 

the law on aggravation of a pre-existing condition to find that 

David Polys' "mental and emotional disorders," his pre-existing 

condition, did not become worse as a result of the incident. R. 

Vol. I, tab 5 at 8. 

The Polyses' second argument is that they are entitled to 

damages for emotional distress which, in Colorado negligence 

actions, is not dependent on either physical injury or impact. 

Appellant's Brief at 15. To succeed under this theory, David 

(footnote continued] 

condition. Towns v. Anderson, 579 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Colo. 1978) 

(no requirement of impact in cases of negligently inflicted 

distress where that distress has resulted in serious physical 

manifestations). 

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Palys "must have been subjected to an unreasonable risk of bodily 

harm because of the negligence of another" which caused emotional 

injury and must have so alleged or he is "preclude[d] . . . from 

recovering such damages." Slovek v. Board of County Comm'rs, 697 

P.2d 781, 783 (Colo. App. 1984) aff 'd, 723 P.2d 1309 (Colo. 1986) 

(citation omitted). The Polyses are correct that this cause of 

action does not require a showing of physical injury or impact. 

The Polyses apparently construe the following district court 

statement as a finding of emotional injury: "Where the 

defendant's conduct is nothing more that negligent, as admitted, 

recovery for purely emotional and psychological stresses would 

inordinately expand tort law." (Emphasis added). On the 

contrary, the district court found that David Palys suffered no 

physical or psychological injury as a result of the airplane 

incident. But more important to our review is the fact that the 

Polyses did not plead negligent infliction of emotional distress. 

In their first amended complaint, the Polyses alleged "severe 

injury to [David's] back and spine." R. Vol. I, tab 2 at 4. The 

plaintiffs complained that these injuries would "in time" affect 

David Palys' physical and mental condition thus setting the stage 

for the aggravation of a pre-existing condition claim made at 

trial. The plaintiffs stated: 

David L. Palys suffered severe inJury to his back and 

spine. The specific injuries and their ill effects have 

in turn caused Plaintiff's physical and mental condition 

to deteriorate generally so that the specific injuries 

and ill effects alleged have caused . . • Plaintiff to 

suffer the consequences and ill effects of such 

deterioration. 

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R. Vol. I, tab 2 at 3-4 (emphasis added). 

Furthermore, at trial the Polyses did not indicate an intention to add a claim for negligent infliction of emotional 

distress. In opening statements they said they would offer 

evidence to show that as a result of the airplane incident David 

Palys suffered chronic post-traumatic stress disorder and seizures 

in addition to "some problems that were physical coupled with 

psychological." R. Vol. II at 4. They concluded the opening 

statement by asking the court to find in the alternative that 

David Palys' alleged injuries were an aggravation of a preexisting injury. R. Vol. II at 5. The plaintiffs' closing arguments allude to nothing in addition to the earlier alleged 

injuries which were post-traumatic stress disorder, organic brain 

damage, seizures, and aggravation of a pre-existing condition. 

Finally, the Polyses' argument that their claim of emotional 

injury "was raised and specifically addressed at trial" because 

"the last inquiry the district court made to Trans-Colorado's 

counsel at trial concerned that law governing aggravation of a 

pre-existing condition" is nonsense. It is absurd to think that 

after closing arguments a litigant may introduce a new cause of 

action. Moreover, the question from the district court judge to 

the defendant's counsel, merely sought to determine if any recent 

Colorado cases varied the law on aggravation of a pre-existing 

condition. R. Vol. V at 89. The brief exchange had nothing 

whatsoever to do with a negligent infliction of emotional distress 

claim or the law on that cause of action. We find that the 

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Polyses did not raise a negligent infliction of emotional distress 

claim either in their complaint or at trial. 

In sum, the district court correctly applied the law on 

aggravation of pre-existing condition to deny recovery on that 

theory. In addition, the Polyses did not allege negligent infliction of emotional injury and now may not claim that cause of 

action. 

In accordance with the foregoing, we AFFIRM the district 

court order. 

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