Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-05-00018/USCOURTS-ca10-05-00018-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Earl Joseph Loper
Appellant
Regina Teirejra Loper
Appellee

Document Text:

1 Honorable Janice Miller Karlin, United States Bankruptcy Judge, United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation.

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL

OF THE TENTH CIRCUIT

IN RE REGINA TEIREJRA LOPER,

Debtor.

BAP No. WO-05-018

EARL JOSEPH LOPER,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

Bankr. No. 03-23982-WV

Adv. No. 04-1108-WV

 Chapter 7

v.

REGINA TEIREJRA LOPER,

Defendant – Appellee.

JUDGMENT

Filed September 8, 2005

Before CLARK, BROWN, and KARLIN1

, Bankruptcy Judges.

This case originated in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western

District of Oklahoma.

The judgment of that court is REVERSED.

For the Panel:

Barbara A. Schermerhorn, Clerk of Court

By:

Deputy Clerk

BAP Appeal No. 05-18 Docket No. 38 Filed: 09/08/2005 Page: 1 of 10
1 Honorable Janice Miller Karlin, United States Bankruptcy Judge, United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation.

FILED

U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel

of the Tenth Circuit

September 8, 2005

Barbara A. Schermerhorn

Clerk PUBLISH

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL

OF THE TENTH CIRCUIT

IN RE REGINA TEIREJRA LOPER,

Debtor.

BAP No. WO-05-018

EARL JOSEPH LOPER,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

Bankr. No. 03-23982-WV

Adv. No. 04-1108-WV

 Chapter 7

v. OPINION

REGINA TEIREJRA LOPER,

Defendant – Appellee.

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Oklahoma

Bret D. Davis of Lamun Mock Cunnyngham & Davis, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma,

for Plaintiff – Appellant.

Kenneth L. Spears, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant – Appellee.

Before CLARK, BROWN, and KARLIN,1

 Bankruptcy Judges.

KARLIN, Bankruptcy Judge.

Earl Loper (Earl) timely appeals a final Order of the United States

Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, which granted summary

judgment in favor of Regina Loper (Regina) on Earl’s complaint seeking a

determination that the debt Regina owed to him arising out of their divorce was

BAP Appeal No. 05-18 Docket No. 38 Filed: 09/08/2005 Page: 2 of 10
2 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a).

3 28 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(1), (b)(1), and (c)(1); Fed R. Bankr. P. 8002.

4 All future statutory references in the text are to Title 11 of the United States Code.

5 Alternatively, Earl sought a determination the debt was nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15). The bankruptcy court granted summary

judgment in favor of Regina on this alternative claim, finding it untimely. Earl

did not appeal the bankruptcy court’s ruling regarding his claim under 11 U.S.C.

§ 523(a)(15), and therefore the decision on that claim is final.

-2-

nondischargeable.2 This Court has jurisdiction to hear timely-filed appeals from

“final judgments, orders, and decrees” of bankruptcy courts within the Tenth

Circuit, unless one of the parties elects to have the district court hear the appeal.3

 

Neither party elected to have this appeal heard by the United States District Court

for the Western District of Oklahoma, thus consenting to review by this Court.

For the reasons set forth below, we REVERSE and REMAND.

I. Background

The parties were divorced in Oklahoma on November 21, 2003. Adopting a

settlement on all issues reached by the parties, the divorce court found that Earl

made more money from his disability payments than Regina made from her house

cleaning business. In addition, the divorce court awarded custody of the parties’

children to Regina, and ordered Earl to pay approximately $500 in monthly child

support. The divorce decree awarded Earl various items of personal property, as

well as “$16,825.09 as alimony in lieu of property division which shall be

payable to [Earl] by [Regina] within six (6) months.”

Regina filed her Chapter 7 bankruptcy in December 2003 and listed the

debt owed to Earl as a general, unsecured debt. Earl then filed an adversary

proceeding under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5),4

 seeking a determination that the debt

was intended to be support for him following the divorce and was thus

nondischargeable.5

BAP Appeal No. 05-18 Docket No. 38 Filed: 09/08/2005 Page: 3 of 10
6 See Tillman ex rel. Estate of Tillman v. Camelot Music, Inc., 408 F.3d

1300, 1303 (10th Cir. 2005).

7 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) is made applicable to adversary proceedings pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7056. 

-3-

Regina moved for summary judgment on the dischargeability claim,

asserting that Earl could produce no evidence to support his claim that the

$16,825.09 was intended to be support, and that she was entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. She argued the debt represented a dischargeable division of

property. Earl responded to the motion for summary judgment, relying

exclusively on his own affidavit as evidence that the parties intended the payment

to operate as support, and that the money was actually to be used as support.

The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment to Regina, finding the

debt to be dischargeable. Specifically, the court found Earl’s affidavit to be selfserving and conclusory and, thus, insufficient to survive a summary judgment

motion. In addition, the court found that even if it did consider Earl’s affidavit, it

did not amount to even a scintilla of evidence in support of his claim, and that

summary judgment would still be proper.

This appeal followed the bankruptcy court’s entry of summary judgment in

favor of Regina.

II. Standard of Review

The applicable standard of review of an order granting summary judgment

is de novo, and this court is to apply the same legal standard as was used by the

bankruptcy court to determine whether either party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.6

 Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party

demonstrates that there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact” and that it is

“entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”7

 In applying this standard, the Court

views the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most

BAP Appeal No. 05-18 Docket No. 38 Filed: 09/08/2005 Page: 4 of 10
8 Lifewise Master Funding v. Telebank, 374 F.3d 917, 927 (10th Cir. 2004).

9 Thom v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 353 F.3d 848, 851 (10th Cir. 2003) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).

10 Id. (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).

11 Id. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)).

12 Id. (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325).

13 Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).

14 Diaz v. Paul J. Kennedy Law Firm, 289 F.3d 671, 675 (10th Cir. 2002).

-4-

favorable to the nonmoving party.8 An issue is “genuine” if “there is sufficient

evidence on each side so that a rational trier of fact could resolve the issue either

way.”9 A fact is “material” if, under the applicable substantive law, it is

“essential to the proper disposition of the claim.”10

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating an absence of a

genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.11 In

attempting to meet that standard, a movant who does not bear the ultimate burden

of persuasion at trial need not negate the other party’s claim; rather, the movant

need simply point out to the court a lack of evidence for the other party on an

essential element of that party’s claim.12

If the movant carries this initial burden, the nonmovant who would bear the

burden of persuasion at trial may not simply rest upon the pleadings; the burden

shifts to the nonmovant to go beyond the pleadings and “set forth specific facts”

that would be admissible in evidence in the event of trial from which a rational

trier of fact could find for the nonmovant.13 To accomplish this, sufficient

evidence pertinent to the material issue “must be identified by reference to an

affidavit, a deposition transcript, or a specific exhibit incorporated therein.”14 A

party opposing summary judgment must produce more than a scintilla of evidence

BAP Appeal No. 05-18 Docket No. 38 Filed: 09/08/2005 Page: 5 of 10
15 See, e.g., United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1113 (10th Cir. 2003).

16 Harris v. Beneficial Oklahoma, Inc. (In re Harris), 209 B.R. 990, 997 (10th Cir. BAP 1997).

17 Murray v. City of Sapulpa, 45 F.3d 1417, 1422 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1111 (10th Cir. 1991)).

18 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5).

19 Sampson v. Sampson (In re Sampson), 997 F.2d 717, 721 (10th Cir. 1993).

20 Jones v. Jones (In re Jones), 9 F.3d 878, 881-82 (10th Cir. 1993). 

-5-

to survive summary judgment.15

Although a party may submit an affidavit in an attempt to create a genuine

issue of material fact, the courts have placed some limitations on nonmoving

parties. An affidavit containing conclusory statements without specific

supporting facts lacks probative value, and thus, cannot defeat summary

judgment.16 Moreover, “[t]o survive summary judgment, ‘nonmovant’s affidavits

must be based upon personal knowledge and set forth facts that would be

admissible in evidence; conclusory and self-serving affidavits are not

sufficient.’”17

III. Legal Analysis

In order for a debt to be found non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C.

§ 523(a)(5), the court must find that (1) the debt is in the nature of alimony,

maintenance or support; (2) the debt is owed to a former spouse or child; and (3)

the debt was incurred in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree

or other order of a court of record.18 The issue whether an obligation is in the

nature of alimony or support is resolved according to federal bankruptcy law, not

state law.19 The policy underlying the discharge exception for enforcement of

spousal or child support obligations outweighs the policy that permits a debtor the

privilege of a fresh start.20 Consequently, the term “support,” as used in

BAP Appeal No. 05-18 Docket No. 38 Filed: 09/08/2005 Page: 6 of 10
21 Id. at 881.

22 Sampson, 997 F.2d at 723.

23 Id.

24 Id.

25 See, e.g. Lonian v. Lonian (In re Lonian), 226 B.R. 248 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1998) (noting distinction between “support alimony” and “alimony in lieu of

property division” and applying 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) to a claim of “alimony in

lieu of property division”), and Simons v. Simons (In re Simons), 193 B.R. 48

(Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1996) (applying 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) to a claim of

“alimony in lieu of property settlement”).

-6-

§ 523(a)(5), is construed broadly.21

When a divorce decree is entered into by agreement, as this one was, the

question of whether an obligation is in the nature of alimony, maintenance or

support is resolved by determining (1) the shared intent of the parties as to the

nature of the obligation at the time it arose, and (2) whether the obligation had the

actual effect of providing support.22 A written agreement between the parties is

persuasive evidence of intent.23 An unambiguous agreement creates “a substantial

obstacle for the party challenging its express terms to overcome.”24

The divorce decree in this case required Regina to pay Earl $16,825.09 and

categorized that debt as “alimony in lieu of property division.” Although the

Court used the term “alimony,” the phrases “alimony in lieu of property division”

and “support alimony” have different meanings under Oklahoma law. Oklahoma

courts have interpreted “alimony in lieu of property division” to mean something

other than “support alimony,” and have found that § 523(a)(5) does not apply to

“alimony in lieu of property division, because it is essentially money to be

exchanged as part of the divorce court’s attempt to equalize the property received

in the divorce.”25 Therefore, Earl faces a “substantial obstacle” in overcoming the

express terms of the divorce decree, and must thus show that the debt was

intended by the parties to be support, and therefore non-dischargeable under

BAP Appeal No. 05-18 Docket No. 38 Filed: 09/08/2005 Page: 7 of 10
26 See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 353 F.3d at 851.

27 Affidavit in Support of Responses to Motion for Summary Judgment. (Appellant’s App. at 66-67).

28 Loper v. Loper (In re Loper), Adv. No. 04-1108-WV at 7 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. Feb. 18, 2005).

-7-

§ 523(a)(5), notwithstanding this language.

As the party who bears the burden of proof on his claim, Earl was required

to set forth specific facts that would be admissible at trial, from which a rational

trier of fact could find in his favor, in order to survive summary judgment.26 Earl

sought to satisfy this burden by submitting an affidavit in support of his response

to the summary judgment motion. It contained, in part, the following statements:

5. Both my wife and I intended the $16,825.09, to be paid as

support.

6. The obligation of $16,825.09, functioned as support for me. After my divorce, I had no home as my ex-wife received the

marital homestead. As a result, I was forced to move in with

my mother in Kingfisher, Oklahoma.

7. I was intending to use the $16,825.09 to support myself in establishing a new life after my divorce. This amount would

have functioned as support for me.

8. At the time of the divorce and to the present, my ex-wife, Regina Loper, ran a successful housekeeping business. She

would earn an average of $2,500.00-$3,000.00, per month. A

large portion of her income was cash.

9. At the time of the divorce, I only earned $2,000.00, per month in disability payments. I am totally disabled and have no other

sources of income. I also pay over $500.00, per month in child

support to my ex-wife.

10. My ex-wife’s income, during our marriage, at the time of divorce and to the present has exceeded my income.27

The bankruptcy court found this affidavit to be self-serving and conclusory, and

that it thus need not even be considered in determining the motion for summary

judgment.28 

BAP Appeal No. 05-18 Docket No. 38 Filed: 09/08/2005 Page: 8 of 10
29 The affidavit contradicted an attachment to the parties’ stipulated divorce Journal Entry, which listed their respective monthly incomes. In the attachment,

the parties indicated Earl’s income was higher than Regina’s by $250 per month

($2,000 for Earl versus $1,750 for Regina). Earl now implies this information

was faulty, and infers that Regina had income she was not reporting.

30 By way of example, the parties may have intended the $16,825.09 to be used as support by Earl to allow him to make a down payment on the purchase of

a new house, since Debtor received the marital home in the divorce, or to

purchase appliances and furniture to replace those items that Debtor retained from

the divorce. If Earl always intended to live at his mother’s house, however,

which can be addressed at trial, that might show the $16,255.09 was not meant to

support him while he set up a home, but was instead merely a division of the

parties’ property.

-8-

Although the affidavit is clearly self-serving,29 as most any affidavit

submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment would be, we believe

that the affidavit was more than conclusory. Although the affidavit does contain

conclusory statements, such as paragraph five which states “Both my wife and I

intended the $16,825.09, to be paid as support,” the affidavit goes beyond being

merely conclusory by providing additional facts that at least partly substantiate

his claim that the parties intended the payment to be support, and that the money

was to be used for his support. Because the affidavit provided at least some

substantive facts to support Earl’s claim,30 the bankruptcy court should have

considered this affidavit when ruling on the summary judgment motion.

Having determined that the affidavit should have been considered by the

bankruptcy court, we must now shift our focus to the court’s finding that the

affidavit, even if it were considered, did not rise to even a scintilla of evidence

and that summary judgment was still proper. In a case involving the intent of the

parties, it is often difficult for either party to present evidence as to intent, other

than their own testimony as to what they intended. In such situations, finders of

fact are required to look to other supporting evidence, as well as to the credibility

of the witnesses, which is not something that can be typically accomplished on

summary judgment. 

BAP Appeal No. 05-18 Docket No. 38 Filed: 09/08/2005 Page: 9 of 10
-9-

Earl presented evidence not only consisting of his own testimony about the

parties’ intent, but also included other supporting facts, such as the fact that

because Regina was given the family home, he needed money to set up a new

home. Because there is no unequivocal evidence to the contrary, the reasonable

inference, which on summary judgment must be resolved in the light most

favorable to Earl, is that the parties could have intended this $16,825.09 to act as

support. This Court concludes that Earl’s affidavit amounts to more than a

scintilla of evidence. It is sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as

to whether the parties intended the payment to operate as support. 

The Court also concludes that at the summary judgment stage, all evidence

and reasonable inferences therefrom must be weighed in favor of the non-movant. 

It appears to this Court that the affidavit was instead construed in the light most

favorable to Regina, the non-movant, by finding Earl’s affidavit non-persuasive. 

Therefore, summary judgment was not proper in this case.

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court reverses the bankruptcy court’s decision to grant

Regina’s motion for summary judgment, and remands this case for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

BAP Appeal No. 05-18 Docket No. 38 Filed: 09/08/2005 Page: 10 of 10