Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-03605/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-03605-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of San Leandro
Defendant
Faith Fellowship Foursquare Church
Miscellaneous
Surlene G. Grant
Defendant
International Church of the Foursquare Gospel
Plaintiff
John Jermanis
Defendant
Debbie Pollart
Defendant
Jim Prola
Defendant
Tony Santos
Defendant
Diana M. Souza
Defendant
Joyce R. Starosciack
Defendant
Bill Stephens
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

INTERNATIONAL CHURCH OF THE 

FOURSQUARE GOSPEL,

Plaintiff, No. C 07-3605 PJH

v. ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

CITY OF SAN LEANDRO, et al.,

Defendants.

_______________________________/

Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction came on for hearing before this court on

September 5, 2007. Plaintiff appeared by its counsel Matthew B. McReynolds, Peter

MacDonald, and Kevin J. Snider, and defendants appeared by their counsel Peter S.

Hayes, Jayne W. Williams, and Deborah J. Fox. Having read the parties papers and

carefully considered their arguments and the relevant legal authority, and good cause

appearing, the court hereby DENIES the motion as follows and for the reasons stated at

the hearing.

INTRODUCTION

This is a case alleging violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized

Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (“RLUIPA”), and also asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 for First and Fourteenth Amendment violations and violations of RLUIPA. 

Plaintiff is the International Church of the Foursquare Gospel (“ICFG”), a Christian

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church. ICFG holds title to the property that is at issue in this action. ICFG asserts that the

real party in interest is Faith Fellowship Foursquare Church (“the Church”), a congregation

affiliated with ICFG, and located in San Leandro. According to ICFG, the Church pays the

mortgage on the property, submits applications to local governments for development and

use of the property, plans and pays for the development of the property, and wants to

occupy and use the property for its religious activities. 

Defendants are the City of San Leandro (“the City”); Tony Santos – Mayor of San

Leandro and a member of the San Leandro City Council; Surlene G. Grant, Diana M.

Souza, Joyce R. Starosciack, Bill Stephens, and Jim Prola – all members of the San

Leandro City Council; John Jermanis (“Jermanis”) – San Leandro City Manager; and

Debbie Pollart (“Pollart”) – Planning Manager of the City of San Leandro. 

ICFG filed this action on July 12, 2007, alleging that defendants violated the

Church’s constitutional rights and rights under RLUIPA by refusing to re-zone an industrial

property in San Leandro (“the Catalina property” or “the property”) to allow the Church to

expand its operations. 

ICFG seeks an order preliminarily enjoining the City of San Leandro from preventing

the Church from using the property for religious purposes; from delaying the processing of

the conditional use permit application of ICFG and the Church while this case is pending;

and from using any criteria, in processing the conditional use permit application, that would

not be applied to any nonreligious assembly for the Catalina property.

BACKGROUND

The Church was originally founded in 1947. Gary Mortara, the present senior

pastor, took over running the Church in September 1993. At that time, according to Rev.

Mortara, there were only 65 people attending, and they were meeting in the Church’s

present location in San Leandro. The Church grew rapidly after 1993, soon expanding the

number of Sunday services. In April 2003, the Church completed construction of a new

sanctuary on an adjacent property, with 650-700 seats.

By the end of 2005, the Church had again outgrown its space. The Church

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presently conducts three religious services each Sunday for a total of more than 1700

attendees, and also runs numerous programs throughout the week, for children, the

disadvantaged, women, youth, and persons struggling with addictions. The parking lot has

space for only 154 vehicles, and members of the congregation are forced to park on nearby

residential streets, as much as a 20-minute walk away from the Church. The Church’s

small kitchen is being used to feed between 300 and 400 people each Wednesday night. 

In January 2006, the Church decided to look for a larger property. In February 2006,

the Church found a site located on two parcels at 14600 and 14850 Catalina Street in San

Leandro, comprising 3.56 acres and 188 parking spaces. The Catalina property is zoned

“Industrial Park” (“IP”), and is situated in the “West San Leandro Focus Area,” which was

set aside in the City’s General Plan to preserve an environment for industrial and

technological activity. The property is adjacent to a plastic-parts manufacturer, and is

surrounded by numerous other industrial and light-industrial uses.

The Catalina property is developed with a single-story office building of

approximately 46,000 square feet, which was formerly occupied by a software company. 

The Church claims that the property can accommodate 1100 people in the sanctuary and

an additional 500 in other activities (e.g., Sunday school and adult Bible studies) per

service. The Church also contends that there is room for nearly 500 parking spaces, that

the commercial zone where the property is located is largely vacant on week-ends, and that

the kitchen and food preparation area is five times as large as the present kitchen. The

Church contends that moving the Church to the Catalina property will enable the

congregation to more fully follow their sincerely held beliefs.

At the time that ICFG identified the Catalina property as a potential site for the

Church, the City’s zoning ordinance did not allow “assembly uses” – churches, clubs,

lodges – to locate in the IP district or other industrial or commercial districts of the City, but

did allow them to locate in residential districts if they obtained a conditional use permit. 

According to ICFG, Church representatives first met with City Planning Staff in

March 2006 to discuss using the property for religious activities. The Church claims that

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 ICFG seems to be suggesting that the City misled the Church, but doesn’t clearly

articulate what the alleged misrepresentation was.

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 According to defendants, the Planning Staff advised the Church to apply for a rezone

from IP to IL because, from a staff perspective, the IL zoning district (meant to provide areas

of low- to moderate-density industrial uses which are capable of being located adjacent to

residential areas) was more amenable to “assembly” use than the IP zoning district (meant to

serve commerce, high technology, factory production and assembly, retail, and related uses).

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these officials (Development Director Hansom Hom, Planning Manager Pollart, and

Business Development Director Luke Simms) advised the Church to apply for re-zoning of

the property from IP to “Industrial Limited” (“IL”). The officials also allegedly assured the

Church that while zoning for industrial districts precluded an assembly use for church

activities, several assembly uses for commercial recreation and entertainment in IL zones

were allowed via a conditional use permit. However, the Church claims that this advice

was incorrect, unbeknownst to the Church representatives, as churches can be located

only on land that is zoned “residential.”1

 

The City’s version is that when Church representatives met with the Planning Staff to

express the Church’s desire to relocate to the Catalina property, the Planning Staff advised

the Church that the City Council preferred to maintain existing industrial districts, and was

typically reluctant to convert industrial land to non-industrial use. When the Church

nonetheless indicated an interest in pursuing the relocation, the Planning Staff advised that

ICFG would need to request the City Council to amend the zoning ordinance to allow the

proposed use at the Catalina site. Specifically, the Planning Staff advised the Church that

two changes to the zoning ordinance would be required – an amendment of the zoning

map to designate the Catalina property as IL, and an amendment of the zoning code to

make assembly uses allowable in the IL district.2 

On March 24, 2006, the Church signed a purchase and sales agreement for the

property, and paid $50,000, half of a nonrefundable fee applicable to the purchase price of

$5.375 million, giving the Church eight days to decide whether to complete the purchase of

the property. On March 31, 2006, the Church paid the other $50,000 of the nonrefundable

fee. 

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On May 19, 2006, the ICFG filed a planning permit application for a zoning map

amendment on the Catalina property from IP to IL, to allow a subsequent application for a

conditional use permit for an assembly use. On the same day that it filed the permit

application, ICFG signed an amendment to the purchase and sales agreement and paid a

further $50,000 nonrefundable fee, applicable to the purchase price, to extend the

agreement to July 6, 2006. 

On June 8, 2006, the City Council’s Business Development Committee met and

discussed the Church’s application to use the Catalina property. They expressed concerns

over the policy implications of allowing an assembly use in an industrial zone.

According to defendants, the Church’s rezoning application raised a broader policy

issue for the City – determining which non-residential areas were appropriate for an

expansion of assembly use. Because the Church’s proposed rezoning would allow

assembly use in all IL properties throughout the City, the Planning Staff advised the Church

that the request would require careful analysis by Staff and consideration at public hearings

by numerous civic advisory bodies, the Planning Commission, and ultimately the City

Council, to ensure that any such change was consistent with the City’s General Plan. On

June 29, 2006, the City advised the Church that a rezoning of the nature proposed in its

application would require thorough analysis by the Planning Staff, the Planning

Commission, the Board of Zoning Adjustments, and, ultimately, the City Council. In the

June 29, 2006, letter, the City stated that “[g]iven current staff commitments, vacation

schedules, and the fact that the [Business Development] Subcommittee does not meet

during the month of August, staff is anticipating returning to the Subcommittee with this

matter in September,” and “[a] public hearing before the Planning Commission is

anticipated in October/November, followed by the City Council hearing in

November/December.” 

On July 11, 2006, the Church signed an amendment to the purchase and sales

agreement and paid an additional $50,000 nonrefundable fee, applied to the purchase

price, to extend the agreement to October 31, 2006.

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On October 10, 2006, Church representatives addressed the City Council during the

“public comment” portion of the Council meeting, informing the Council about the proposed

purchase of the Catalina property and the delays that defendants had allegedly caused in

the review process.

On October 12, 2006, the Business Development Committee met and discussed the

Church’s application. Church representatives attended the meeting. The members of the

Committee expressed concern over the lack of tax revenue that would result from

permitting a religious assembly use on land zoned “industrial.” They decided that more

research was needed.

According to Planning Manager Pollart, by October 2006, the Planning Staff had

developed two legislative options by which the City could expand the accommodation of

assembly uses in non-residential districts. Option 1 would allow assembly use on all

parcels within the IL district, which would increase the area in which assemblies were

allowable by about 90 acres. Option 2 would create a new “Assembly Use Overlay

District,” which, when applied to any non-residential property, would make assemblies an

allowable use in addition to those allowed under the pre-existing zoning. Option 2 would

also apply the Assembly Use Overlay designation to certain non-residential properties

identified by the Planning Staff as suitable for assembly use, according to criteria Staff had

developed from the City’s General Plan. Option 2 would increase the area in which

assemblies are allowable by over 200 acres. 

On October 19, 2006, the Board of Zoning Adjustments and the Planning

Commission held a “Joint Work Session,” at which time the Church’s application was

discussed. At the meeting, Pollart explained the two options, and stated that they were

designed to lay the groundwork for accommodating religious and secular assembly uses in

non-residential areas throughout the City, though neither option would immediately affect

the Catalina property. If Option 1 were approved, ICFG would need to obtain rezoning of

the property to IL. If Option 2 were approved, ICFG would need to obtain rezoning of the

property to “Assembly Use Overlay.” 

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Rev. Mortara urged the City to act quickly, pleading that the Catalina property had

been “in escrow” since February, and that ICFG was obliged to complete its purchase by

October 31, 2006. In response, Pollart explained that under either option, ICFG’s use of

the Catalina property could not feasibly be made allowable by October 31. At the close of

the meeting, the City decision-makers expressed a preference for Option 2. 

On October 23, 2006, the Church signed an amendment to the purchase and sales

agreement and paid an additional $50,000 nonrefundable fee, applicable to the purchase

price, to extend the agreement to December 31, 2006.

On November 1, 2006, one of ICFG’s attorneys wrote a letter to the members of the

Planning Commission, advising them that any denial of the Church’s application for a

Zoning Map Amendment would violate RLUIPA, and that there could be no possible

governmental interest that would justify denial of the application. 

On December 7, 2006, the Board of Zoning Adjustments met and reviewed the

proposal for the “Assembly Use Overlay.” The Planning Staff had recommended that the

Board review the proposed amendments and make comments that would be forwarded to

the Planning Commission, so that the Planning Commission could hold a hearing after the

required environmental analysis by Staff. It appears that the proposal was then forwarded

to the Planning Commission. 

On December 29, 2006, the Church closed escrow on the Catalina property, making

a final down payment of $53,903.39. ICFG claims that Church representatives believed

there was a “good chance” that the application would be approved by the City, based on

statements of City officials that other amendments for assembly uses by commercial

recreation and entertainment businesses had been previously approved, and also based on

supportive statements by City officials at public meetings.

On January 2, 2007, the deed of trust was recorded in Alameda County Recorder’s

Office, in the names of ICFG and the Church.

On February 22, 2007, the Planning Staff presented the Planning Commission with

proposed amendments to the zoning ordinance that would replace all references to

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“religious assembly” and “clubs and lodges” with a religiously neutral category of “assembly

use,” and would also create the new Assembly Use Overlay District. The Planning Staff

further indicated that it had identified nearly 200 properties as suitable for Assembly Use

Overlay designation, using eight criteria developed by the Staff after consulting applicable

General Plan policies:

1) Site is not located along a major commercial corridor;

2) Site is not located within certain General Plan Focus Areas

(Downtown, Bayfair, Marina Blvd/SOMAR, or West San Leandro);

3) Site is not located in regional-serving retail area (Greenhouse

Marketplace, Westgate, Marina Sq., or “old” Target site);

4) Site is not located inside the one-half mile study area defined for the

Downtown Transit-Oriented Development Strategy;

5) Site abuts or is within one-quarter mile of an arterial street;

6) Site is not located in a Residential zone;

7) Site is not considered public land, and is not zoned Public Service,

Open Space, or Commercial Recreation; is not owned by and Exempt Public Agency or

leased/owned by a public utility;

8) Overlay area must allow a contiguous area greater than or equal to two

acres.

During the Planning Commission’s public hearing, Pollart stated that the proposed

amendments would not immediately make religious assembly use allowable at the Catalina

property, as the Planning Staff had not identified it as suitable for Assembly Use Overlay

designation. She further explained, however, that if the City Council enacted the proposed

amendments, the Church’s application to rezone the Catalina property would be modified

by the Planning Staff to a request that it be added to the Assembly Use Overlay District. At

the close of the public hearing, the Planning Commission unanimously recommended that

the City Council approve the proposed amendments.

On March 19, 2007, the City Council approved the Assembly Use Overlay District

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and Map amendments, effective on May 1, 2007, passing an ordinance (San Leandro

Ordinance No. 2007-005) that consolidated and equalized treatment of secular and

religious assembly uses. The City Council applied the new Assembly Use Overlay District

designation to the 196 properties (over 200 acres total) that the Planning Staff had

identified as suitable.

 ICFG claims, however, that the few parcels rezoned to “Assembly Use Overlay

District” that were of adequate size for a congregation of 1500 persons were generally

located between two railroad tracks near heavier industry, lacking in infrastructure, and

adjacent to old strip commercial “blight” or residential development.

The Church’s rezoning application was modified to request that the Assembly Use

Overlay designation be applied to the Catalina property. In addition, on March 28, 2007,

the Church submitted an application for a conditional use permit for a proposed assembly

use at the Catalina property, under the existing zoning. The application stated, “We are

applying for an existing permitted use, entertainment activities – some [or same] church

use conditional use permit.” In a cover letter, the Church described the application as “a

parallel application to the existing zone code amendment we have in process currently.” 

The Church submitted a site plan with the conditional use permit application. 

Pollart reviewed the application for the conditional use permit, and determined that it

was incomplete and could not be processed. On April 25, 2007, she wrote the Church,

advising them that the application was missing information regarding the square footage of

the proposed sanctuary area; information regarding the number of parking spaces required

vs. the number provided; the dimensions for standard, compact, and handicap spaces;

clarification as to whether the 188 on-site parking spaces shown on the map included

diagonal spaces located within an access easement, and parking spaces on adjacent

property; information as to the height of the existing concrete screen wall, the square

footage for all proposed uses within the building, and whether the chairs in the main

sanctuary were fixed or not; information regarding potential uses for the triangular-shaped

areas at the rear of the sanctuary, any existing or proposed lighting standards in the

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 ICFG submits that it did not provide the requested information because it determined,

after the City Council denied the rezoning application, that pursuing the conditional use permit

would be “futile.” ICFG contends that if the court orders the City to “process” the conditional

use permit and to treat this religious use equally to an “entertainment use,” the Church

“stand[s] ready to provide the additional information requested by the City” in Pollart’s April 25,

2007, letter. 

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parking lot, and whether roof-mounted equipment (HVAC, etc.) would be installed. 

Pollart also noted that the City had received conflicting information from the Church

regarding the intended hours/days of operation for the assembly use – as the application

stated “four hours on Sunday,” while previous communications from the Church had

indicated that the facility would be used every day except Saturday. Moreover, the

application stated that the facility would be made available to other organizations, such as

the Boy Scouts, the Girl Scouts, and 4-H Clubs “at the sole discretion of Faith Fellowship

Church.” Pollart advised the Church that the Planning Department needed the intended

days/hours of the activities for which the conditional use permit was being sought. 

Pollart states that the Church did not respond to any of the issues raised in her

letter, and did not submit the required information. Thus, she took no further action

regarding the application.3

 In addition, because the Planning Department never processed

the conditional use permit application, it never had occasion to consider or approve the

Church’s proposed assembly use, other uses, tenant improvements, or development of the

property. Thus, according to Pollart, it is unclear what exists on the property now, what

would be required to accommodate the Church’s desired activities, and what uses might be

appropriate or safely handled on the property today. 

Meanwhile, Pollart submitted a Staff Report to the Planning Commission prior to its

meeting of April 12, 2007. Pollart stated that the Planning Staff had recommended that the

Planning Commission deny the Church’s application for an amendment for the Assembly

Overlay on the Catalina property. In making its recommendation, the Staff considered the

eight criteria based on the City’s General Plan and Policies, which criteria the City had used

to produce the already approved Assembly Overlay District covering 196 properties. 

The Staff Report stated that the Catalina property did not meet two of the criteria –

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No. 2, because the property is located within one of the General Plan Focus Areas, and No.

5, because the property does not abut or is not located within one-quarter mile of an

arterial. The report went on to say that the site failed to meet additional criteria of public

health and safety, because the presence and the potential future presence of hazardous

materials and activities in the vicinity of the Church’s proposed assembly use rendered it

inappropriate for re-zoning within the Assembly Use Overlay. This last conclusion was

based on the fact that there are eight businesses operating under a Hazardous Materials

Business Plan within 500 feet of the Church’s site, and an additional 13 businesses

between 500 feet and one-quarter mile of the site.

On April 9, 2007, Peter MacDonald, an attorney representing the Church, wrote to

the Planning Commission, addressing the proposed negative findings of the Planning Staff

report prepared by Pollart and her recommendation that the Planning Commission deny the

Church’s application. 

Mr. MacDonald made five arguments – that the Catalina property has “ready

access” to all major arterials in the area; that church uses are compatible with light

industrial uses, and any users of hazardous materials bear the burden of providing a

system that prevents migration of those materials off their property; that churches, unlike

residential and retail uses, do not displace industrial uses if they are permitted in areas

zoned “industrial;” that traffic will not be a concern, as the heaviest traffic will be on Sunday

mornings and in the evenings when the industrial uses are minimized; that the presence of

a church on the premises will provide other advantages, such as providing a sort of security

when industrial businesses are closed; and that churches are a community amenity.

ICFG also submitted a declaration by Paul Gantt, a fire and safety expert, to the

Planning Commission, in an attempt to respond to Pollart’s comments about the “health

and safety” concerns. Mr. Gantt, who has 15 years’ experience in the “Fire Service” and

now owns his own consulting firm, states that he “toured” the “area in question,” and

reviewed records of the site, and concluded that the fact that adjacent businesses filed

Hazardous Materials Business Plans should not disqualify the Catalina property from being

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used as a church, because, variously, there probably aren’t that many hazardous materials

actually present; any that are present do not appear to be particularly dangerous; the City

seems to have good hazardous materials controls in place; the members of the Church

would be just as safe as the 2000 or so employees that probably work in the area during

the week; that he and his family attend “Crosswinds Church” in Dublin, which is located in

an industrial park that includes some tenants who use hazardous materials; and that he is

aware of other congregations that meet in industrial areas in Livermore and Dublin. 

On April 12, 2007, the Planning Commission held a hearing on the Church’s

assembly use amendment application. The Commission heard statements, pro and con. 

Although one Commissioner spoke in favor of the rezoning, the other Commissioners

expressed reservations, including concerns that the rezoning would constitute “spot

zoning,” or “putting a non-conforming use in the middle of a specifically designated area,”

and would result in “piecemeal or shot-in-the-dark approach to planning,” inconsistent with

the considerable time and effort the City had put into the creation of the Assembly Use

Overlay District. The Commission then voted 4-1 to deny the application. The decision did

not require concurrence by the City Council, but appeal to the City Council was permitted.

On May 2, 2007, an attorney for ICFG wrote the City Council stating that denial of

the Church’s application would be a violation of RLUIPA. 

On May 7, 2007, the City Council met to consider the appeal. The same speakers

appeared as at the Planning Commission meeting – Mr. Brantt, Mr. MacDonald, Rev.

Mortara, and other supporters of the Church, as well as San Leandro residents who spoke

in opposition on their own behalf and on behalf of local homeowners’ associations. The

City Council, in a unanimous vote of the six members present, denied the Church’s appeal. 

The minutes of the meeting reflect the comments of only one councilmember, who is

reported as commenting that ICFG had bought the property knowing that it was zoned for

industrial use, and as expressing concern about taking the property out of the tax base. In

addition, he noted that the presidents of all three homeowners’ associations in the area had

sent letters opposing granting the application. He expressed the concern that two major

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arterials were already heavily impacted on Wednesday evenings, and that the Church’s

plan to hold a weekly Wednesday evening service for 400 people would have a direct

negative effect on the neighborhood. He expressed the hope that the Church would

choose one of the other 196 sites in San Leandro that had already been designated for

assembly use. 

Following the denial of the appeal, the City immediately offered assistance to ICFG

to locate an alternative site within the City’s Assembly Use Overlay District, and ICFG

offered to work with the City toward that end in the context of settlement negotiations. 

ICFG apparently accepted the offer, but nevertheless filed the present lawsuit on July 12,

2007, and now seeks a preliminary injunction requiring the City to allow the Church to

install itself at the Catalina property, and conduct religious services there. 

ICFG asserts that the denial of the Church’s application for use of the Catalina

property has caused, and continues to cause, economic damage to the Church. In addition

to the $100,000 payment the Church made with the purchase and sales agreement on

March 24, 2006, it had to make three additional payments of $50,000, while it waited for a

response to its application. Since January 2, 2007, when it completed the purchase, the

Church has made monthly mortgage payments of $33,809.88 – more than $1100 a day –

without being able to use the property. The Church was also forced to hire an attorney to

facilitate the application with the City. ICFG contends that the Church has spent over

$460,000 in down payments and mortgage payments (as of the time of the filing of the

complaint in July 2007).

ICFG alleges that defendants Jermanis and Pollart “intentionally delayed” the review

of the Church’s application for fourteen months, knowing that such delay was substantially

burdening the Church’s religious exercise and violating the Church’s rights to freedom of

speech, freedom of assembly, and free exercise of religion under the First Amendment, its

right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, and its rights under RLUIPA.

The complaint asserts eleven causes of action:

(1) a cause of action for a preliminary and permanent injunction, requiring

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defendants to “immediately process the conditional use permit application” of the Church

for the Catalina property, against all defendants;

(2) a claim of violation of RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a), alleging that the City’s

land restrictions place a “substantial burden on religious exercise,” against all defendants;

(3) a claim of violation of RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1), alleging that the

City’s denial of the Church’s application constitutes “treatment of religious assembly on less

than equal terms with nonreligious assembly,” against all defendants.

(4) a claim of violation of RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(3), alleging that the

City’s denial of the Church’s use of the Catalina property constitutes “total exclusion from

jurisdiction or unreasonable limits on religious assemblies within jurisdiction,” against all

defendants;

(5) a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violation of the right to free exercise of

religion under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, against defendants Jermanis and

Pollart;

(6) a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violation of the right to freedom of speech

under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, against defendants Jermanis and Pollart;

(7) a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violation of the right to freedom of

assembly under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, against defendants Jermanis and

Pollart;

(8) a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violation of the right to freedom of

association under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, against defendants Jermanis and

Pollart;

(9) a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violation of the right to equal protection

under the Fourteenth Amendment, against defendants Jermanis and Pollart;

(10) a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violation of the right to due process under

the Fourteenth Amendment, against defendants Jermanis and Pollart;

(11) a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violation of rights under RLUIPA, against

defendants Jermanis and Pollart.

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DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

1. Motions for Preliminary Injunction

To prevail on a motion for preliminary injunction, plaintiff must show (1) a strong

likelihood of success on the merits, (2) the possibility of irreparable injury to plaintiff if

preliminary relief is not granted, (3) a balance of hardships favoring the plaintiff, and 

(4) advancement of the public interest (in certain cases). See Rodde v. Bonta, 357 F.3d

988, 994 (9th Cir. 2004). Alternatively, injunctive relief can be granted if the plaintiff merely

"demonstrate[s] . . . a combination of probable success on the merits and the possibility of

irreparable injury." Id. Because a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, courts

require the movant to carry its burden of persuasion by a “clear showing.” Mazurek v.

Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997). 

In addition, because the basic function of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the

status quo pending a determination of the action on the merits, Chalk v. U.S. Dist. Court,

840 F.2d 701, 704 (9th Cir. 1988), courts generally require a movant to meet a higher

degree of scrutiny where the movant seeks to alter rather than maintain the status quo, or

where issuance of the injunction will provide the movant with substantially all of the relief

that would be available after a trial on the merits. See Schwarzer, Tashima & Wagstaffe,

Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial (2007) § 13:78 (citing Tom Doherty Assocs., Inc. v.

Saban Entm't, Inc., 60 F.3d 27, 33-34 (2nd Cir. 1995)). 

In short, requests for mandatory (as opposed to prohibitory) preliminary injunctions

that would alter the status quo are “subject to a heightened scrutiny and should not be

issued unless the facts and law clearly favor the moving party.” Dahl v. HEM Pharms.

Corp., 7 F.3d 1399, 1403 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313,

1319 (9th Cir. 1994); Anderson v. United States, 612 F.2d 1112, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 1979).

2. RLUIPA

RLUIPA is Congress’ most recent effort “to protect the free exercise of religion

guaranteed by the First Amendment from government regulation.” Guru Nanak Sikh Soc.

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of Yuba City v. County of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2006). RLUIPA was enacted

in response to the Supreme Court’s invalidation of the Religious Freedom and Restoration

Act (“RFRA”), which the Court found to be an unconstitutional exercise of congressional

power under the Fourteenth Amendment because of a “lack of proportionality or

congruence between the means adopted that the legitimate end to be achieved.” City of

Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 533, quoted in Guru Nanak, 456 F.3d at 985.

RLUIPA replaced the void provisions of RFRA, and prohibits the government from

imposing “substantial burdens” on “religious exercise” unless there exists a compelling

government interest and the burden is the “least restrictive means of satisfying the

governmental interest.” San Jose Christian College v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024,

1033-34 (9th Cir. 2004). To avoid RFRA’s fate, Congress wrote RLUIPA to apply only to

regulations regarding land use and prison conditions. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709,

714-15 (2005).

RLUIPA applies only if one of three conditions exists – (1) the state program

receives Federal financial assistance, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(A); or (2) the substantial

burden imposed by local law affects or would affect commerce with foreign nations,

commerce among the states, or commerce with Indian tribes, id. § 2000cc(a)(2)(B); or (3)

the substantial burden is imposed in the implementation of a land use regulation or system

of land use regulations, under which the government makes or is permitted under the law to

make, individualized assessments of the proposed uses for the property involved, id. §

2000cc(a)(2)(C).

Thus, under the third of these conditions, which pertains to the present case, the

court must determine whether the challenged action involves an individualized land use

assessment, and if it does, must then determine whether the City’s action imposes a

substantial burden under RLUIPA. RLUIPA provides, in relevant part, that 

No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner

that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person,

including a religious assembly or institution, unless the government

demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person, assembly, or

institution – 

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(A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and

(B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 

governmental interest.

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1).

The plaintiff in a land use case challenging the denial of a conditional use permit

bears the burden of proving that the governmental authority’s denial of the application

imposes a substantial burden on its religious exercise. Guru Nanak, 456 F.3d at 988. A

“‘substantial burden’ must place more than an inconvenience on religious exercise.” Id.

(citation omitted). To impose a substantial burden, a land use regulation “‘must be

oppressive to a significantly great extent. That is, a substantial burden on religious

exercise must impose a significantly great restriction or onus upon such exercise.’” Id. at

988-89 (quoting San Jose Christian, 360 F.3d at 1034). If the plaintiff establishes that the

land use regulation or denial of conditional use permit imposes a substantial burden, the

governmental authority must then show that the restrictions are narrowly tailored to

accomplish a compelling government interest. Id. at 992. 

RLUIPA also prohibits “discrimination” and “exclusion.” Subsection (b)(1) provides

that “[n]o government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that

treats a religious assembly or institution on less than equal terms with a nonreligious

assembly or institution.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1). Subsection (b)(3) provides that “[n]o

government shall impose or implement a land use regulation” that either “totally excludes

religious assemblies from a jurisdiction” or “unreasonably limits religious assemblies,

institutions, or structures within a jurisdiction.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc(b)(3).

B. ICFG’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction

ICFG seeks a preliminary injunction, based on the second cause of action

(“substantial burden” claim) and the third cause of action (“equal terms” claim). ICFG

argues that the Church is likely to succeed on the merits, and already has suffered

irreparable harm. With regard to the merits, ICFG first argues that the City’s actions violate

RLUIPA’s “equal terms” provision because the City allows entertainment and recreational

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assembly uses but denies religious assembly use, and because the City has imposed a

hazardous materials burden on the Church but not on any of the 196 properties approved

under the Assembly Use Overlay. 

Second, ICFG contends that the City’s actions have imposed a “substantial burden”

on the Church’s religious exercise because without the additional space the new facility will

provide, the Church’s ministry and outreach efforts will be severely limited. In addition,

ICFG argues that the Church has already suffered irreparable harm, as it has been

compelled to pay out a significant sum of money for a property it cannot use, and because

the City’s actions have had the effect of restricting the Church’s First Amendment religious

and associative rights. 

Defendants oppose the motion, arguing that ICFG is seeking a mandatory injunction

that would alter the status quo and afford ICFG nearly all the relief it seeks before there has

been full determination on the merits. Defendants also assert that ICFG has failed to show

a likelihood of success on the merits because it has failed to establish that the City’s refusal

to rezone the Catalina property placed a substantial burden on ICFG’s religious exercise,

and because it has failed to show that the City’s zoning ordinances treats any similarly

situated secular assembly use more favorably than it does ICFG’s assembly use. 

Defendants argue further that ICFG has failed to show irreparable injury, since the

hardships of which it complains consist either of the monetary carrying costs of the

purchase of the property, or of operational difficulties, such as inadequate parking at the

present facility, neither of which were caused by the City’s actions. Finally, defendants

assert that the preliminary injunction would prevent the City from protecting the public

interest, as the City has no basis upon which to determine whether the property is

adequate as a place of assembly, with regard to seismic integrity, fire safety, exits, lighting,

seating, ventilation, disability accommodations, bathrooms, or hallways. 

The court finds that the motion must be DENIED. As an initial matter, the court

notes that granting the motion would essentially provide ICFG with complete relief on the

merits, with the exception of the damages and attorneys’ fees sought in the complaint, as

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the purpose of ICFG’s lawsuit is to obtain an order compelling the City to allow the Church

to use the Catalina property for religious assembly purposes. In other words, ICFG would

achieve what it wants without any trial on the merits. 

As for the likelihood of success on the merits, it appears that ICFG is challenging

two decisions by the City – the City’s failure to proceed with the conditional use application,

and the City’s denial of the application to rezone the property as part of the Assembly Use

Overlay District. It is clear, both from the parties’ papers and from the arguments at the

hearing, that ICFG did not complete the requirements for the conditional use application

(which ICFG unilaterally determined would be “futile”). As stated at the hearing, the court is

not in a position to determine the likelihood of success of an incomplete conditional use

application, and will not rule on that question. 

With regard to the challenge to the City’s denial of the rezoning application, the court

finds that ICFG has made an insufficient showing of likelihood of success – both as to

“substantial burden” and to “equal terms.” With regard to the “substantial burden,” ICFG

argues in its moving papers that the burden consists of the Church having to continue to

operate at its present location. However, ICFG provides no evidence in its moving papers

that there are no other options available to the Church. In the reply, ICFG provides

declarations purporting to establish that none of the 196 properties in the Assembly Use

Overlay District is suitable for the Church’s needs. But, for the reasons argued by the

defendants, that evidence is not competent, and in any event cannot be considered

because it was first presented with the reply, as part of an argument not raised in the

moving papers. 

While it is true that under Guru Nanak, a religious group need not show that there is

no other possible location where it could build its church, it is not true that there is no need

for any showing at all. In that case, the plaintiff, a Sikh organization, sought a conditional

use permit to build a temple on a 1.9 acre parcel of land zoned “low-density residential.” 

The temple would be used by no more than 75 people at a time. The “low density

residential” zoning classification allowed churches, with a conditional use permit. The Sikh

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group applied for a conditional use permit, but was refused, based on the neighbors’ fears

about noise and traffic. The group then acquired a 28.8 acre parcel zoned “general

agricultural.” As with the “low-density residential,” a church could be built on “general

agricultural” land only with a conditional use permit. The group applied for a conditional

use permit, which was granted by the Planning Commission, after the group had agreed to

implement a number of mitigating measures. However, that decision was reversed by the

County Board of Supervisors, based on their concerns that the land should remain

agricultural. 

The Ninth Circuit specifically did not decide that “failing to provide a religious

institution with a land use entitlement for a new facility for worship necessarily constitutes a

substantial burden pursuant to RLUIPA,” Guru Nanak, 456 F.3d at 989, which is essentially

what ICFG is arguing here. What the Ninth Circuit did decide was that under the facts of

the case, the defendant County had imposed a substantial burden on the plaintiff, based on

the County’s broad reasons for its denials, which the court found could easily be applied to

all future applications by the group, and also based on the fact that the group had readily

agreed to every mitigating measure suggested by the County’s planning division, but had

still been denied without any substantive explanation.

Here, by contrast, ICFG has not previously applied for a conditional use permit or

rezoning and been denied. Moreover, the reasons given by the City for its denial of the

proposed amendment of the zoning designation are more specific than the reasons given in

Guru Nanak. In addition, the court notes that the City’s reasons for the denial are not the

same as the “stated interests” – which ICFG identifies as maximizing tax revenues,

preventing traffic congestion, and protecting health and safety. These considerations may

have been raised at public hearings, by both City officials and citizens attending the

hearing, but they were not among the eight criteria that the City used to evaluate ICFG’s

application. 

With regard to the “equal terms” violation, ICFG does not focus its argument on the

two criteria that formed the basis of the City’s denial of the application. Rather, ICFG

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focuses almost entirely on the “health and safety” issue, which was added as a secondary

consideration following the City’s discussion of the two determinative factors. Moreover,

ICFG has not conclusively shown that there are no other suitable properties available, or

that the City allows other similar assembly uses in areas where churches are not allowed. 

While the court is not entirely persuaded by defendants’ “equal terms” argument, the court

finds that plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing that the Church was treated on

“less than equal terms” than other, non-religious assembly uses.

 Nor is the court persuaded that the alleged harm is irreparable. ICFG suggests that

the Church was promised some type of re-zoning by the City, and that the City

subsequently reneged. However, the record is clear that the Planning Staff advised the

Church that any zoning amendment process would take a long time, and made no

guarantees that the Church’s application would be granted. ICFG was aware when it

bought the property that it was zoned industrial. 

Finally, the court SUSTAINS defendants’ objections to the evidence submitted by

ICFG with its reply. 

CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing, the court DENIES plaintiff’s motion for preliminary

injunction.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 2, 2007 ______________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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