Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-94-05149/USCOURTS-caDC-94-05149-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of the Army
Appellee
Billy Ray Kidwell
Appellant

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 3, 1995 Decided June 13, 1995

No. 94-5149

BILLY RAY KIDWELL,

APPELLANT

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,

BOARD FOR CORRECTION OF MILITARY RECORDS,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 93cv02238)

Christopher G. Smith, appointed by the court, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs

was Charles F. Lettow.

Marina U. Braswell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief

were Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney. John D.

Bates, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: WALD, WILLIAMS and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion of the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

TATEL, Circuit Judge: Billy Ray Kidwell asked the Army Board for Correction of Military

Recordsto change his military filesto indicate a "medical" discharge rather than the general discharge

they now reflect. When the Board refused, Kidwell filed suit in the district court under the

Administrative Procedure Act. The district court dismissed his suit, concluding that Kidwell's claim

was, in essence, one for money damages that he must bring in the Court of Federal Claims. In the

alternative, the district court granted the government's motion for summary judgment, ruling that the

Board had acted on substantial evidence and in a reasonable manner when it denied Kidwell'srequest.

Although we conclude that the district court should not have dismissed the suit for lack of

jurisdiction, we agree with its alternative ruling on the merits, and affirm the decision of the Board.

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I.

BillyRayKidwell entered active dutywith the Army in January, 1968. In August of that year,

he was disciplined for being AWOL from his unit for four days. In January of 1969, he was detailed

to Vietnam as an automotive repairman. While in Vietnam, he was disciplined for being AWOL for

a day. He was also reduced in rank from private first class to private for carrying a pistol without

authorization. Kidwell left Vietnam and returned to the United States in December of 1969, where

his disciplinary problems continued. He was disciplined for speeding, and then for failing to report

to duty. In September 1970, he was charged with being AWOL for several weeks during the

summer, at which point he requested a discharge in lieu of a court-martial. The Army agreed,

discharging him in October on "undesirable" grounds.

In 1977, Kidwell asked the Army Board for Correction of Military Records to upgrade his

discharge to a "general discharge"a step, but still a significant one, below "honorable." The Board,

a civilian body authorized to "correct anymilitary record ... when [it] considersit necessaryto correct

an error or remove an injustice," 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a)(1) (Supp. V 1993), granted Kidwell's request.

Kidwell now claims that the disciplinary problems leading to his discharge were related to a

psychological disorder, "post traumatic stress disorder" ("PTSD"), which he developed while in

Vietnam. Many Vietnam veterans have been diagnosed with varying forms of PTSD, which is defined

bypsychiatrists as "the development ofspecific symptomsfollowing a psychologicallytraumatic event

that is beyond the range of usual human experience." Michael J. Davidson, Note, Post-Traumatic

Stress Disorder: A Controversial Defense for Veterans of a Controversial War, 29 Wm. & Mary

L. Rev. 415, 421 (1988) (citing American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and StatisticalManual

of Mental Disorders (3rd ed. 1980)). PTSD is triggered by a particularly traumatic "stressor" event.

See id. According to Kidwell, his "stressor" occurred just two months before his return to the United

States, when he observed a friend in his unit commit suicide by firing a grenade launcher into his head.

In the opinion of at least two federal agencies, Kidwell's conduct since his discharge has been

indicative of a person afflicted with PTSD. In 1987, the Social Security Administration held a

disability determination hearing at which an administrative law judge considered evidence regarding

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Kidwell'ssporadic employment history, his varioustreatmentsfor physical and psychiatric disorders,

and his occasional imprisonment for various thefts and assaults. See KidwellClaim Decision, Office

of Hearing and Appeals, Social Sec. Admin., Dep't of Health & Human Servs. (Sept. 11, 1987)

[hereinafter SSA Decision], in Joint Appendix [J.A.] at 7-14. The record suggests that the ALJ did

not consider any evidence from the period prior to Kidwell's discharge, and little evidence from prior

to 1974. The ALJ nonetheless concluded that Kidwell was disabled and entitled to disability

insurance benefits dating back to October, 1970. In particular, he noted that "[t]he evidence strongly

indicates the [applicant's] problems have been so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity

since 1970 when he was discharged from the Army, even though his signs, symptoms, and clinical

findings were not diagnosed as [PTSD] until recently." Id. at 6, in J.A. at 12. The Department of

Veterans' Affairsreached a similar conclusion in 1991, although it found only a 30% disability rating.

In reviewing that decision, the Board of Veterans' Appeals found that Kidwell's "PTSD has been

severe in degree since 1984, and that it probably has precluded him from securing or following a

substantially gainful occupation since then." Kidwell Appeal, Bd. of Veterans' Appeals, Dep't of

Veterans' Affairs, No. 89-40 917 at 3 (Oct. 5, 1994), in J.A. at 58. As a result, it ruled, Kidwell

deserved a 100% disability rating. Id. at 10, in J.A. at 65.

Soon after the SocialSecurityAdministrationdetermined that Kidwellhad beendisabled since

1970, Kidwellfiled a second request with the ArmyBoard for Correction ofMilitaryRecords asking

it to change his "general discharge" to a "medical discharge." Although the Board can consider

requests filed at any time "in the interests of justice," 10 U.S.C. § 1552(b) (Supp. V 1993), it ruled

that no such interests existed in Kidwell's case and concluded that Kidwell had filed his request too

late. Kidwell sued. The district court affirmed the Board, but a panel of this court directed the

district court to remand the case for the Board to hear Kidwell's request. See Kidwell v. Surgeon

General of the United States, No. 91-5192 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 1, 1993).

Reviewing Kidwell's request on the merits, the Board found "no evidence of record which

would indicate that the applicant displayed any signs or symptoms of a mental illness [prior to his

discharge], or that he was treated for a mental illness during his period of active duty." Kidwell

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Decision, Board for Correction ofMilitaryRecords, Dep't ofthe Army, No. AC89-06719Aat 8 (Apr.

7, 1993) [hereinafter Board Decision], in J.A. at 37. In support of its conclusion, the Board noted

that neither Kidwell nor his Army doctors noted any physical or psychiatric difficulties at the time of

his discharge. Although Kidwell complained of "nervous trouble" on a medical checklist he filled out

during a routine separation medical exam, he denied having had nightmares, depression, difficulty

sleeping, or excessive worry. He also wrote "I'm in good health" on the form. The examining

physician concluded that he was "medically fit for any military assignment." Id. at 4, in J.A. at 33.

Kidwell's company commander and other supervising officers concluded that they had no reason to

believe that he was "mentally defective, deranged, or abnormal" at the time of his misconduct. Id.

The Board also reviewed the report of a psychiatric consultant to the Surgeon General who, after

reviewing Kidwell'srecords, concluded that "it would not be possible to support a diagnosis of PTSD

at the time of discharge." Id. The Board agreed and rejected Kidwell's request.

Acting pro se, Kidwell returned to the district court seeking an order requiring the Board to

correct hisrecords. Although Kidwell did not explicitly request monetary relief in his complaint, the

government claimed that a district court order requiring the Board to change Kidwell's records to a

"medical" dischargewould entitleKidwellto retroactive disabilitybenefitsthat could exceed $50,000.

Because the practical effect of Kidwell's request would be an award of money damages, the

government argued, the district court had no jurisdiction over the complaint. Instead, Kidwell had

to sue in the Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1988 & Supp. V

1993). The district court agreed with the government, concluding that it had no jurisdiction to hear

the case. Even if it did have jurisdiction, however, the district court concluded that the Board had

acted reasonablyand on substantial evidence in rejecting Kidwell'srequest. Kidwell appeals, claiming

that the district court did have jurisdiction and that the underlying Board decision was arbitrary and

capricious.

II.

The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, gives the United States Court of Federal Claims

jurisdiction

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to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the

Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department,

or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or

unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.

This grant of jurisdiction to the Court of Federal Claims is "exclusive," but "only to the extent that

Congress has not granted any other court authority to hear the claims that may be decided by the

[Court of Federal Claims]." Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 910 n.48 (1988); see also Van

Drasek v. Lehman, 762 F.2d 1065, 1071 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (noting that so-called "exclusive

jurisdiction" of Court of Federal Claims over Tucker Act claims depends not on language of Tucker

Act, but on fact that Congress rarely grants district courts jurisdiction over such claims). Some

courts have held, for example, that 15 U.S.C. § 634(b)(1) gives district courtsjurisdiction over claims

for money damages against the Small Business Administration. See Van Drasek, 762 F.2d at 1071

n.10 (citing Munoz v. Small Business Admin., 644 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1981)). And the "Little

Tucker Act" gives district courts concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Federal Claims in most

Tucker Act cases seeking less than $10,000, see 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1988), although appeals

in almost all such cases go to the Federal Circuit, not the district court's geographical Court of

Appeals, see 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(2) (1988).

Finding that the complaint in this case "seeks disability retirement pay ofmore than $10,000,"

the district court concluded that Kidwell's suit fell into the category of cases within the sole

jurisdiction ofthe Court of FederalClaims. Kidwell v. Dept. of the Army, No. 93cv2238 at 3 (D.D.C.

May 16, 1994). Accordingly, the district court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Id.

at 4. We review the district court's resolution of this purely legal issue de novo. See Pershing Div.

of Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp. v. United States, 22 F.3d 741, 743 (7th Cir. 1994);

FDIC v. Hulsey, 22 F.3d 1472, 1479-80 (10th Cir. 1994).

Kidwell's complaint did not seek any monetary relief. Instead, it asked that "the defendant

be required to correct plaintiff's army records to reflect a military retirement in pay grade E-4

[Kidwell's pay grade when discharged] on October 8, 1970 with a 100% disability rating," as well as

for "any other relief that he may be entitled to." Complaint, Kidwell v. Dept. of the Army, No.

93cv2238 (D.D.C. Oct. 29, 1993), in J.A. at 48-49. Jurisdiction, he alleges, was founded on the

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Administrative Procedure Act, which providesfor judicialreview, 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1988), and waives

sovereign immunity for actions "seeking relief other than money damages and stating a claim that an

agency or an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under color

of legal authority." 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988). Since Kidwell's complaint fulfills the requirements for

district court jurisdiction under the APA and does not explicitly request monetary relief from the

United States, jurisdiction under the APA would appear to lie.

The plain language of a complaint, however, does not necessarilysettle the question ofTucker

Act jurisdiction. See, e.g., Megapulse, Inc. v. Lewis, 672 F.2d 959, 967-68 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see

also Bowen, 487 U.S. at 916 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[D]istrict court jurisdiction is not established

merely because a suit fails to pray for a money judgment." (citing cases)). This is because plaintiffs

can bypass Tucker Act jurisdiction by converting complaints which "at their essence" seek money

damages from the government into complaints requesting injunctive relief or declaratory actions.

E.g., Megapulse, 672 F.2d at 968. Because this forum shopping circumvents a primary purpose of

the Actto ensure that a central judicial body adjudicates most claims against the United States

Treasury, see United States v. Hohri, 482 U.S. 64, 71-73 (1987) (describing goal of uniformity

behind creation of FederalCircuit); Vietnam Veterans of America v. Secretary of the Navy, 843 F.2d

528, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (recognizing the Tucker Act'sinterest in uniformity)we have stated that

"[j]urisdiction under the Tucker Act cannot be avoided by ... disguising a money claim" as a claim

requesting a formof equitable relief. Van Drasek, 762 F.2d at 1071 n.11. To enforce this prohibition

on the creative drafting of complaints, we look to the complaint'ssubstance, not merely itsform. See,

e.g., Amoco Prod. Co. v. Hodel, 815 F.2d 352, 361 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1234

(1988). Absent other grounds for district court jurisdiction, a claim is subject to the Tucker Act and

its jurisdictional consequences if, in whole or in part, it explicitly or "in essence" seeks more than

$10,000 in monetary relief from the federal government. See Megapulse, 672 F.2d at 967-68;

Heller, Ehrman, White & MacAuliffe v. Babbit, 992 F.2d 360, 363 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (Plaintiffs "may

not, by creatively framing their complaint, circumvent a congressional grant of exclusive

jurisdiction."); see also Hahn v. United States, 757 F.2d 581, 589 (3d Cir. 1985) (concluding that

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district court did not have jurisdiction over request for money damages in complaint, but allowing it

to retain jurisdiction over nonmonetaryclaims also requested); cf. Vietnam Veterans, 843 F.2d at 535

(noting that courts are divided, in cases where plaintiffs request both monetary and equitable relief,

over whether Court of FederalClaimsjurisdiction precludes district court from hearing simultaneous

request for equitable relief or vice-versa, and that this court has not decided issue).

Aplaintiff does not "in essence" seek monetaryrelief, however, merely because he orshe hints

at some interest in a monetary reward from the federal government or because success on the merits

may obligate the United States to pay the complainant. See Vietnam Veterans, 843 F.2d at 534 ("It

is ... clear that a claim is not for money merely because its success may lead to pecuniary costs for

the government or benefits for the plaintiff."). Even where a monetary claim may be waiting on the

sidelines, aslong asthe plaintiff's complaint only requests non-monetary relief that has "considerable

value" independent of any future potential for monetary relief, see Francis E. Heydt Co. v. United

States, 948 F.2d 672, 677 (10th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)that is,

as long as the sole remedy requested is declaratory or injunctive relief that is not "negligible in

comparison" with the potential monetary recovery, see Hahn, 757 F.2d at 589we respect the

plaintiff's choice ofremedies and treat the complaint assomething more than an artfully drafted effort

to circumvent the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims. But see Vietnam Veterans, 843 F.2d

at 535 (noting, but not deciding, that pursuit of equitable reliefin district court may preclude plaintiff

fromlaterseeking monetary reliefinCourt of FederalClaims). In such cases, even if the plaintiff filed

the complaint with an eye to future monetary awards, a district court with otherwise appropriate

jurisdiction may hear the claim and grant the proper equitable relief.

We applied these principles in Vietnam Veterans of America v. Secretary of the Navy, 843

F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1988), where the plaintiffs had been dismissed from the Navy under

less-than-honorable conditionssolely because oftheir possession or use of drugs while in the service.

The petitioners alleged that after their discharge the Navy issued a series of memoranda that

advocated a more lenient position with respect to servicemembers who had been discharged for drug

violations and that, if applied to them, would have led to an upgrade in their discharge status.

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Seeking such an upgrade, they sued the Navy. According to the Navy, since a "direct, automatic, and

unavoidable consequence" of such an upgrade would be a payment to the petitioners for leave time

that they had accrued at the time of their dismissal, id. at 534, the case was a suit for money damages

against the United States under the Little Tucker Act, meaning that the Federal Circuit, not this

circuit, had jurisdiction over the appeal.

Rejecting the Navy's argument, we held that inquiries into the consequences of plaintiff

victorieseven "automatic" consequenceswould "take us outside the record sought to be reviewed

and thereby complicate the jurisdictional issue." Id. We concluded that "[i]t would be foolish to

impute to Congress an intent to require an appellate court to go outside the record to ascertain its

own jurisdiction." Id. at 535. Although we recognized that a victory for the plaintiffs may well have

required the government to pay them money, the Tucker Act was not implicated as long as that

requirement flowed not from the district court's exercise of jurisdiction but from the structure of the

benefits program. Id. We therefore reaffirmed what we labelled a "bright line rule," under which we

consider casesto be based on the Tucker Act's waiver ofsovereign immunity only ifthe plaintiffseeks

money or the district court grants it. Id.

We "sharpened" this bright line rule in Wolfe v. Marsh, where, as here, the plaintiff had

requested a discharge in lieu of a court-martial on disciplinary violations, and later asked the Board

to change his records. Wolfe v. Marsh, 846 F.2d 782, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1988), aff'g on reh'g 835 F.2d

354 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 942 (1988). As here, the Board refused. We affirmed

the Board's decision, but Wolfe requested rehearing, arguing that the Federal Circuit had appellate

jurisdiction because hissuit was one for money damages under the Little Tucker Act. He argued that

his opposition to the government's district court motion to dismissfor lack of jurisdiction anticipated

money damages both because it calculated how much back pay he was dueless than $10,000,

thereby saving the district court'sjurisdiction under the Little Tucker Actand because it offered to

amend his complaint to waive any damages over $10,000. On rehearing, we noted that despite these

explicitstatementsregarding monetaryrelief,Wolfe's complaint "contained neither a claimfor money

damages nor a suggestion that the requested relief would entail such damages." 846 F.2d at 783.

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Because the "plain terms of [Wolfe's] complaint demanded only equitable relief," id. at 784, the

"bright line rule" established in Vietnam Veterans meant that Little Tucker Act jurisdiction was not

implicated. In reiterating that rule, we recognized that we were endorsing a "strict pleading

requirement," but concluded that its application would "allow [ ] this court to determine easily and

definitively whether it has jurisdiction." Id. at 785 n.4.

With respect to Tucker Act jurisdiction, the facts of this case do not differ significantly from

those in either Vietnam Veterans or Wolfe. As in those cases, the plaintiff here has not explicitly

requested monetary relief. As in those cases, granting the relief requested would offer a direct

non-monetary benefit to the plaintiff because resting Kidwell's discharge on medical grounds would

lift some of the shame associated with failing to receive an honorable discharge. See generally

Christopher H. Lunding, Judicial Reviewof Military Administrative Discharges, 83 Yale L.J. 33, 35

(1973) (noting the stigma that flows from a general discharge). As in those cases, any monetary

benefits that may flow from Kidwell's victory would not come from the district court's exercise of

jurisdiction, but fromthe structure ofstatutory and regulatory requirements governing compensation

when a servicemember's files change. And as in those cases, we could refuse jurisdiction only by

going outside the record to review the process by which Kidwell might receive past disability

payments, a processthat is apparently far from automatic, since Kidwell would have to file a separate

claim with the Secretary for the benefits, 32 C.F.R. § 581.3(g) (1994), and since the amount due him

would be reduced by the yet-to-be-determined amount of any VA benefits that he receives. See 10

U.S.C. § 1212(c) (Supp V 1993); Reply Brief at 4 n.2.

The government argues that this case is different because Kidwell has explicitly requested

money damages in his complaint. In support of this argument, the government points to the

complaint'srequest for reinstatement into a particular paygrade and to its claimthat the Board denied

Kidwell's request "[t]o cheat plaintiff out of the relief and benefits he is legally entitled to."

Complaint, in J.A. at 48. Because Kidwell's complaint thus contains "a suggestion" of monetary

relief, the government argues, see Wolfe, 846 F.2d at 783, he should have brought his suit in the

Court of Federal Claims. The alternative conclusion would, according to the government, allow

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plaintiffs to escape Tucker Act jurisdiction by artfully crafting their complaints to avoid explicit

requests for monetary relief.

We do not share the government's concern. Just as Wolfe hinted at an interest in monetary

relief without implicating Tucker Act jurisdiction, Kidwell can hint at a similar interest and stay in the

district court as long as the "plain terms" of his complaint do not mention monetary relief. They do

not, and in view of Wolfe 's observation that "it is an extremely rare plaintiff who has trouble asking

for money, if that is what he wants," 846 F.2d at 784 n.2, this omission is particularly notable.

Furthermore, since Kidwell's pro se complaint reveals an independent interest in valuable

non-monetary reliefthe correction of his discharge recordsit is not "in essence" a claim for

monetary relief and does not raise the specter of "artful crafting" of a complaint to avoid Court of

Federal Claims jurisdiction. The equitable relief that Kidwell seeks is, in form and substance, not

"negligible in comparison" to monetary claims he may raise in the future, Hahn, 757 F.2d at 589, so

the bright line rule of Vietnam Veterans and Wolfe appropriately applies. Under that rule, Kidwell's

complaint does not implicate the Tucker Act because it does not explicitly request monetary relief.

The district court therefore had subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint.

III.

We thusturn to the district court's alternative holding that, if it did have jurisdiction, it would

issue summary judgment in favor of the government. We review that decision de novo, see Tao v.

Freeh, 27 F.3d 635, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1994), and the underlying decision of the Board according to the

deferential standards of the Administrative Procedure Act, under which we affirm the Board's

decision unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. See Wolfe, 835 F.2d at 360; 5 U.S.C.

§ 706(2)(A) (1988).

Kidwell's sole point on appeal concerns the Board's treatment of the Social Security

Administration's determination that he had been disabled since his discharge in 1970. Specifically,

he claims that the Board was bound by principles of collateral estoppel to adopt as "conclusively

established" the SSA'sfactsregarding his disability, and that it therefore had to conclude that Kidwell

was, as of the date of his discharge, severely impaired, unable to "engage in any substantial gainful

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activity," and "unable to do his previous work." See Appellant's Brief at 20, 29-31 (citing 42 U.S.C.

§ 423(d)(1)(A) &(2)(A) (1988 &Supp. V 1993) (defining "disability" for SocialSecuritypurposes)).

Because the Board did not treat these "facts" as "conclusively established," and because they are

"pertinent" and "relevant" to whether Kidwell had a physical disability at the time of his discharge,

id. at 30, 31, he asks us to remand the case to the Board with instructions to reconsider Kidwell's

request in light of the facts found by the SSA.

We do not think it necessary to determine whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel could

in some cases require the Board to consider factual findings by the SSA to be "conclusively

established" because the doctrine would, in any event, not apply to this case. Collateral estoppel only

applies to issues "in substance the same as those resolved" in an earlier proceeding. Montana v.

United States, 440 U.S. 147, 155 (1979); Mayeske v. International Ass'n of Firefighters, 905 F.2d

1548, 1553 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("Issue preclusion does not apply ... when the issue decided by an earlier

proceeding differssubstantially from the issue at hand."). In this case, the precise question put to the

Boardwhether Kidwellwas medically fit forservice at the time of his dischargewas not "actually

and necessarily determined" in the SSA proceeding. See Montana, 440 U.S. at 153. The SSA found

that Kidwell was under a disability "since October 10, 1970, but not before," SSA Decision at 7, in

J.A. at 13 (emphasis added), while Kidwell was discharged from the Army two days before October

10on October 8, 1970. Moreover, the SSA determined that Kidwell was disabled for purposes of

awarding him disability insurance. The Board, on the other hand, was concerned with whether

Kidwellwas medically fit forservice, and under Armyregulationsthe presence of a mentalor physical

impairment does not necessarily mean that a servicemember is unfit. See id. at 6-7, in J.A. at 35-36.

As we read theBoard's decision, then, it gave the SSA findings all the consideration theywere

due. The Board was clearly aware of the findings, going so far as to quote a portion of the SSA's

decision. See Board Decision at 4, in J.A. at 33. The Board observed, however, that "there can be

an honest difference of opinion between medical personnel concerning the date of onset and the

severity of a condition at a given time." Id. at 10, in J.A. at 39. Because the Board was concerned

with Kidwell's fitness for service at the time of his discharge while the SSA was concerned with

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Kidwell'sfitnessfor civilian employment after his discharge, the Board reasonably considered but did

not give determinative weight to the SSA's opinion. More important to the Board was its review of

the medical evidence available to the Army when the discharge decision was madeevidence that

did not reveal any kind of impairment. As the Board put it,

the evidence of record, combined with the total absence of any documentation which

would indicate that an unfitting psychiatric disorder existed at the time, clearly

established that the applicant was physically fit, by Army standards, at the time of his

8 October 1970 discharge; and that this combination of factors outweighs any

contrary implication in the 1987 SSA and the 1991 VA decisions.

Id. Kidwell argues that the Board improperly treated the SSA's factual findings as "implications"

rather than conclusive facts. But given the question put to the Boardwhether Kidwell was

medically fit at the time of his dischargewe do not see how any facts found by the SSA regarding

Kidwell's disabilities after the date of his discharge could provide anything other than "implications"

regarding his fitness for military duty before that date. Given the other evidence available to the

Board, it reasonably rejected those implications. Because the Board found no evidence, express or

implied, demonstrating that Kidwell was unfit for service at the time of his discharge, the Board

reasonably rejected Kidwell's request.

We reverse the district court's decision dismissing this case for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction, but affirm its alternative grant of summary judgment in favor of the government.

So ordered.

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