Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00902/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00902-45/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Pedro Abascal
Plaintiff
Charter Communications, Inc.
Defendant
Charter Communications, LLC
Defendant
Lionel Harper
Plaintiff
Daniel Sinclair
Plaintiff
Hassan Turner
Plaintiff
Luis Vazquez
Plaintiff

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

LIONEL HARPER, DANIEL SINCLAIR, 

HASSAN TURNER, LUIS VAZQUEZ, and 

PEDRO ABASCAL, individually and 

on behalf of all others 

similarly situated and all 

aggrieved employees,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, LLC,

Defendant.

No. 2:19-cv-00902 WBS DMC

ORDER RE: MOTIONS FOR 

RECONSIDERATION AND

INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL

----oo0oo----

I. Motion for Reconsideration

Plaintiffs ask the court to reconsider its order 

compelling plaintiffs Harper, Turner, Vazquez, and Abascal to 

arbitration (Docket No. 202) in light of the California Court of 

Appeal’s recent decision in Ramirez v. Charter Communications, 

Inc., 75 Cal. App. 4th 365 (2d Dist. 2022). In Ramirez, that

court held that Charter’s Solution Channel Agreement -- the same 

Case 2:19-cv-00902-WBS-DMC Document 288 Filed 04/22/22 Page 1 of 6
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arbitration agreement this court enforced in its prior order --

was unenforceable due to procedural and substantive 

unconscionability. See id. at 373-87.

A court may reconsider a prior order if it “is 

presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, 

or if there is an intervening change in the controlling law.” 

Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 

873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). Because Ramirez was 

decided after the court ordered Harper, Turner, Vazquez, and 

Abascal to arbitration, plaintiffs argue the decision represents 

an intervening change in controlling law. (See Mot. at 9.)

However, as the Ninth Circuit has stated, “[d]ecisions 

of [California’s] six district appellate courts are persuasive 

but do not bind each other or us.” Muniz v. United Parcel Serv., 

Inc., 738 F.3d 214, 219 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). 

Although the Ninth Circuit has noted that federal courts 

nonetheless “should” follow the California Court of Appeal’s 

decisions regarding California law in most circumstances, see

id., this does not render the Court of Appeal’s decisions 

binding. Because Ramirez is not binding, it does not constitute 

a “change in the controlling law,” and plaintiffs’ motion for 

reconsideration will therefore be denied.

II. Motion to Certify Order for Interlocutory Appeal

Plaintiffs alternatively request that the court certify 

its order compelling arbitration for interlocutory appeal. A 

district court may certify an order for interlocutory appeal if 

the order (1) “involves a controlling question of law” (2) “as to 

which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion” and 

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(3) “an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance 

the ultimate termination of the litigation.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1292(b).

The court’s order compelling arbitration “involves a 

controlling question of law.” Whether California law on 

contracts and unconscionability prohibits enforcement of an 

arbitration agreement with the provisions contained in the 

Solution Channel Agreement is a question of law.1 That question 

is also controlling, as it was dispositive to the court’s 

previous order. (See Docket No. 202.)

This issue also presents a “substantial ground for 

difference of opinion.” Although defendant notes that most 

federal and California trial courts to have evaluated the 

Solution Channel Agreement have concluded that it was not 

unconscionable, at least one district court has held otherwise. 

(Opp. at 27-28 (Docket No. 283)); see Durruthy v. Charter Comms., 

1 Defendants cite this court’s statement that “while the 

Ninth Circuit has apparently not had occasion to address the 

issue, many courts have found the question of law must be a ‘pure 

question of law,’ not a mixed question of law and fact or an 

application of law to a particular set of facts.” Aldapa v. 

Fowler Packing Co. Inc., 1:15-cv-420 DAD SAB, 2016 WL 8731316, at 

*1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2016). That observation referred to

decisions of other circuit courts, including a Sixth Circuit 

decision stating, “On interlocutory appeal, we do not review the 

district court’s findings of fact, and instead consider only pure 

questions of law.” Id. (quoting Park W. Galleries, Inc. v. 

Hochman, 692 F.3d 539, 543 (6th Cir. 2012)). Nevertheless, 

consideration of whether plaintiffs should be released from their 

obligation to arbitrate their claims requires no consideration of 

any findings of fact made by this court, and there are no 

disputed facts regarding the contents of the arbitration 

agreement. Accordingly, this court regards the question at issue 

as a pure question of law.

”

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LLC, 20-cv-1374 W (MSB), 2021 WL 254194 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 

2021). Now, on the first occasion upon which a California Court 

of Appeal has evaluated the substantive unconscionability of the 

agreement, it too has held that the agreement is unenforceable as 

unconscionable. See Ramirez, 75 Cal. App. 4th at 387.2

Given that the Ninth Circuit has cautioned that courts 

should “not disregard a well-reasoned decision from a state’s 

intermediate appellate court” when that decision is highly 

relevant, see In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness 

Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268, 1278 (9th Cir. 2013), the 

disagreement between the California Court of Appeal and many of 

the trial courts to have addressed this issue indicates that a 

substantial ground for disagreement exists. See Couch v. 

Telescope Inc., 611 F.3d 629, 634 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(“[I]dentification of a sufficient number of conflicting and 

contradictory opinions would provide substantial ground for 

disagreement . . . .”) (quoting Union Cnty. v. Piper Jaffray & 

Co., Inc., 525 F.3d 643, 647 (8th Cir. 2008) (per curiam)).

Finally, an immediate appeal from this court’s order 

“may materially advance the ultimate termination of the 

litigation.” Plaintiffs have stated that, if the Solution 

Channel Agreement is held to be unenforceable against Harper, 

Turner, Vazquez, and Abascal, those plaintiffs will seek to 

2 Defendants note that the California Court of Appeal had 

considered the enforceability of a provision of the Solution 

Channel Agreement before it decided Ramirez. (See Opp. at 12-13 

(citing Patterson v. Super. Ct., 70 Cal. App. 5th 473, 489-90 (2d 

Dist. 2021)).) But that decision did not consider whether the 

Agreement as a whole was substantively unconscionable. See

Patterson, 70 Cal. App. 5th 473. 

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rejoin the putative class action as proposed class 

representatives, which would necessitate a renewed motion for 

class certification and further briefing. (See Mot. at 21-22.)

Further, in opposing plaintiff Sinclair’s pending 

motion for class certification, Charter has argued that Sinclair 

lacks standing to represent certain putative class members, (see

Docket No. 271 at 31-35, 50-51, 63-64), an argument that would 

become moot if the other plaintiffs rejoin the action as proposed 

class representatives. Interlocutory appeal would avoid the 

expenditure of judicial resources that would result if the court 

had to adjudicate Sinclair’s pending motion for class 

certification only to have to revisit that decision following a 

subsequent appeal. An interlocutory appeal will also allow for 

greater certainty and finality in light of Ramirez and, 

regardless of the result, will allow the court and the parties to 

move forward with the determination of class certification 

without distraction.

Because the court therefore concludes that 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1292(b)’s requirements are satisfied, the court will certify 

its order compelling plaintiffs Harper, Turner, Vazquez, and 

Abascal to arbitration for interlocutory appeal.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion for 

reconsideration (Docket No. 275) be, and the same hereby is, 

DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs’ alternative 

motion (Docket No. 275) for certification for interlocutory 

appeal of the court’s order compelling arbitration (Docket No. 

202), be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED.

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All proceedings in this case are hereby STAYED pending 

resolution of the interlocutory appeal, and the hearings on the 

instant motion (Docket No. 275) and on defendant’s motion for 

leave to file a surreply (Docket No. 285), currently calendared 

for May 2, 2022, and on plaintiffs’ motion for class 

certification (Docket No. 257), currently calendared for May 31, 

2022, are hereby VACATED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 22, 2022

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