Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-02345/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-02345-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
CDCR
Defendant
Colletti
Defendant
Mayson
Defendant
K. Miller
Defendant
Erlindo Rodriguez
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERLINDO RODRIGUEZ,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S 07-2345 MCE DAD P

vs.

CDCR, et al.,

Defendants. ORDER

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983. In accordance with this court’s November 8, 2007 order, plaintiff has filed a

properly completed application to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This

proceeding was referred to the undersigned magistrate judge in accordance with Local Rule 72-

302 and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

Plaintiff has submitted an in forma pauperis application that makes the showing

required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Accordingly, plaintiff will be granted leave to proceed in forma

pauperis.

Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. See

28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a) & 1915(b)(1). Plaintiff has been without funds for six months and is

currently without funds. Accordingly, the court will not assess an initial partial filing fee. See 28

Case 2:07-cv-02345-MCE -DAD Document 12 Filed 03/07/08 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Plaintiff will be obligated to make monthly payments of twenty percent of

the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. These payments shall

be collected and forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the

amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(2).

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised

claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2).

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28

(9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th

Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson,

355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim a

complaint must contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it

must contain factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” 

Bell Atlantic, 127 S. Ct. at 1965. In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must

Case 2:07-cv-02345-MCE -DAD Document 12 Filed 03/07/08 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital

Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421

(1969).

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the

meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which

complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the

actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named

defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed

constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862

(9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory

allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not

sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

/////

/////

/////

/////

Case 2:07-cv-02345-MCE -DAD Document 12 Filed 03/07/08 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 It is not clear what plaintiff means by his use of the prefix “DC.” If he elects to pursue 1

this action by filing an amended complaint, plaintiff should clarify whether DC refers to a

professional title or is shorthand for the defendants’ first and middle name initials.

4

In the present case, plaintiff has named as defendants the California Department

of Corrections and Rehabilitation, K. Miller, T. Lukas, DC Mayson, and DC Colletti. 

1

Plaintiff alleges:

I was trying to get back on medication July, 2006 but Mental

Health keep refusing to give me medication and I got in to troble

[sic] trying to get back on medication. And Dental refuse to clean

my tooths [sic], has been 8 months.

(Compl. at 5.) Plaintiff requests $100,000 in damages from “Mental Health” and contends that

CDCR needs a dentist who will clean prisoners’ teeth. (Id.)

The allegations in plaintiff’s complaint are so vague and conclusory that the court

is unable to determine whether the current action is frivolous or fails to state a claim for relief. 

The complaint does not contain a short and plain statement as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint must give fair notice to

the defendants and must allege facts that support the elements of the claim plainly and succinctly. 

Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff must allege

with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in that support his

claims. Id. Because plaintiff has failed to comply with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(2), the complaint must be dismissed. The court will, however, grant leave to file an

amended complaint. 

 If plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint, he is advised that in Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976), the Supreme Court held that inadequate medical care did not

constitute cruel and unusual punishment cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless the

mistreatment rose to the level of “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” In applying

this standard, the Ninth Circuit has held that before it can be said that a prisoner’s civil rights

Case 2:07-cv-02345-MCE -DAD Document 12 Filed 03/07/08 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

have been abridged, “the indifference to his medical needs must be substantial. Mere

‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support this cause of action.” 

Broughton v. Cutter Lab., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06).

The “deliberate indifference” standard also applies in cases involving the

adequacy of mental health care in prisons. Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir.

1994); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982). To establish unconstitutional

treatment of a mental health condition, “a prisoner must show deliberate indifference to a

‘serious’ medical need.” Doty, 37 F.3d at 546 (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050,

1059 (9th Cir. 1991)). A medical need is “serious if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition

could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” 

Doty, 37 F.3d at 546 (quoting McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059). 

If plaintiff files an amended complaint, he must allege facts demonstrating how

defendants’ actions rose to the level of “deliberate indifference.” For example, plaintiff has

named T. Lukas as a defendant. Plaintiff must allege in specific terms how defendant Lukas

treated him and explain why this treatment was constitutionally inadequate. Plaintiff must

similarly allege how each of the other named defendants were involved in denying him adequate

medical or dental care. Plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege any specific causal link between the

actions of the named defendants and the claimed constitutional violations. There can be no

liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a

defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v.

Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir.

1978). Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not

sufficient. Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

Finally, plaintiff is advised that the Eleventh Amendment serves as a jurisdictional

bar to suits brought by private parties against a state or state agency unless the state or the agency

consents to such suit. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 340 (1979); Alabama v. Pugh, 438

Case 2:07-cv-02345-MCE -DAD Document 12 Filed 03/07/08 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

6

U.S. 781, 782 (1978); Jackson v. Hayakawa, 682 F.2d 1344, 1349-50 (9th Cir. 1982). In the

instant case, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) has not

consented to suit. Accordingly, if plaintiff presents claims against the CDCR in his amended

complaint, the court will recommend that they be dismissed as frivolous.

Plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to

make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a

general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375

F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no

longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original

complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s February 29, 2008 application to proceed in forma pauperis is

granted.

2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 

The fee shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the Director of the

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently herewith.

3. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed.

4. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file an

amended complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice; the amended complaint must bear the

docket number assigned to this case and must be labeled “Amended Complaint”; failure to file an

/////

/////

/////

/////

Case 2:07-cv-02345-MCE -DAD Document 12 Filed 03/07/08 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

7

amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a recommendation that this action

be dismissed without prejudice.

DATED: March 7, 2008.

DAD:9

rodr2345.14a

Case 2:07-cv-02345-MCE -DAD Document 12 Filed 03/07/08 Page 7 of 7