Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04186/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04186-6/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cascadia Wildlands Project
Plaintiff
Center For Biological Diversity
Plaintiff
Environmental Protection Information Center
Plaintiff
Dirk Kempthorne
Defendant
Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Center
Plaintiff
Oregon Natural Resources Council
Plaintiff
United States Fish And Wildlife Service
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY,

a New Mexico non-profit corporation,

KLAMATH SISKIYOU WILDLANDS

CENTER, CASCADIA WILDLANDS

PROJECT, OREGON NATURAL

RESOURCES COUNCIL, Oregon non-profit

corporations, and ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION INFORMATION CENTER,

a California non-profit corporation,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

DIRK KEMPTHORNE, Secretary of the

U.S. Department of Interior, and UNITED

STATES FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE,

an agency of the U.S. Department of Interior,

Defendants. /

No. C 06-04186 WHA

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT AND DENYING

DEFENDANTS’ CROSS-MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

In this Endangered Species Act case, this order reviews a finding by the United States

Fish and Wildlife Service that listing the Siskiyou Mountains salamander and Scott Bar

salamander as “threatened” or “endangered” is not warranted. Plaintiffs, a group of

conservation organizations that filed the original petition to the Service, have moved for

summary judgment. Defendants Dirk Kempthorne and the Service have filed a cross-motion for

Case 3:06-cv-04186-WHA Document 37 Filed 01/19/07 Page 1 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 2

summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, this order GRANTS plaintiffs’ motion and

DENIES defendants motion. The Service must issue a new 90-day finding by MARCH 23, 2007.

STATEMENT

1. ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND REQUIRED 90-DAY FINDING.

The Endangered Species Act defines an “endangered species” as one that is “in danger

of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range.” 16 U.S.C. 1532(6). A

“threatened species” is “likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable future

throughout all or a significant portion of its range.” 16 U.S.C. 1532(20). Once a species is

listed as endangered or threatened, the species is entitled to a number of statutory protections

designed to ensure its survival and recovery. 

Section 1533 creates the procedures for determining endangered or threatened species. 

Private individuals may petition the Service to list species as either threatened or endangered. 

When the Service receives a petition to list a species, it has 90 days to determine whether the

“petition presents substantial scientific or commercial information indicating that the petitioned

action may be warranted.” 16 U.S.C. 1533(b)(3)(A). “Substantial information” is “the amount

of information that would lead a reasonable person to believe that the measure proposed in the

petition may be warranted.” 50 C.F.R. 424.14(b). 

The Service must make endangered or threatened species determinations based on any

of five factors: (1) the present or threatened destruction, modification, or curtailment of its

habitat or range; (2) overutilization for commercial, recreational, scientific, or educational

purposes; (3) disease or predation; (4) the inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms; or (5)

other natural or manmade factors affecting its continued existence. 15 U.S.C. 1533(a)(1). Any

one of the five factors may support a listing determination. See Kern County Farm Bureau v.

Allen, 450 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2006).

If the Service concludes in its 90-day finding that the petition presents “substantial

information,” the agency must conduct “a review of the status of the species concerned” to

determine whether listing the species is “warranted.” This status review must be concluded

Case 3:06-cv-04186-WHA Document 37 Filed 01/19/07 Page 2 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 3

within 12 months of the agency’s receipt of the petition. If, at the 12-month finding stage, the

agency concludes that such a listing is “warranted,” it must publish a proposed rule in the

Federal Register listing the species. Within 12 months of publishing the proposed rule, and

after considering public comment and all relevant evidence, the agency must make a final

decision whether to adopt a final rule listing the species. 16 U.S.C. 1533(b)(3)(B), (b)(5).

If, however, the Service concludes in the 90-day finding that a petition does not present

substantial information indicating that a listing may be warranted, the finding must be published

in the Federal Register. A negative 90-day finding may be challenged in federal court. 16

U.S.C. 1533(b)(3)(A), (b)(3)(C)(ii).

2. THE SISKIYOU MOUNTAINS SALAMANDER AND SCOTT BAR SALAMANDER.

The Siskiyou Mountains salamander (Plethodon stormi) is a small woodland salamander

first described as a species in 1965. In 2005, genetic analyses conducted on the Siskiyou

Mountains salamander recognized the Scott Bar salamander (Plethodon asupak) as a distinct

species. Both species are medium-sized, slender-bodied salamanders with short limbs. They

are brown in color with a lighter brown dorsal stripe and an array of white flecks on their sides

and limbs (AR 64). Because the Scott Bar salamander was only recently identified as a separate

species, the scientific research is applied by both parties to both species. 

The salamanders’ habitats overlap. The Siskiyou Mountains salamander’s habitat

covers a range of approximately 337,037 acres in southwestern Oregon and northern California. 

The Scott Bar salamander is found in 68,438 acres of Siskiyou County, California. Within

these ranges the salamanders dwell in rocky soils and talus outcrops, spending most of their

lives underground. Being “lungless,” they must breathe through their skin and require constant

moisture (id. at 24, 63–65, 68, 1199). 

Plaintiffs submitted a petition to list the Siskiyou Mountains salamander as “threatened”

or “endangered” under the Endangered Species Act on June 16, 2004 (id. at 2). After receiving

no timely response from the Service, plaintiffs sued the Service for failing to make a finding

regarding the petition within the requirements of the Section 4 of the ESA. See Center for

Case 3:06-cv-04186-WHA Document 37 Filed 01/19/07 Page 3 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 4

Biological Diversity v. Norton, Civ. No. 05-11311-BR (D. Or.). The parties reached a

settlement agreement requiring the Service to submit a 90-day finding on the petition to the

Federal Register by April 15, 2006, and, pending a positive finding, submit a 12-month finding

by January 15, 2007 (Parties’ Stipulated Settlement Agreement (Dec. 28, 2005) (Plaintiff Ex. H

at ¶ 1)). 

On April 17, 2006, the Service made its 90-day finding, concluding that the petition did

not “present substantial scientific or commercial information” to warrant the listing of the

salamanders (AR 63). Plaintiffs filed the instant suit to vacate the determination and order the

Service to complete a status review and render a 12-month finding. Plaintiffs and the Service

subsequently filed the instant cross-motions for summary judgment.

ANALYSIS

Although the ESA provides for judicial review of a negative 90-finding, it lacks a

standard of review. Thus, the Administrative Procedure Act governs the standard and scope of

judicial review for administrative decisions. Pac. Coast Fed. of Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Nat’l

Marine Fisheries Serv., 265 F.3d 1028, 1034 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that “[a]gency decisions

under ESA are governed by the Administrative Procedure Act”). Under the Administrative

Procedure Act, the applicable standard of review is whether the agency’s decision was

“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with the law.” 

5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A); Pac. Coast, 265 F.3d at 1034. In applying the “arbitrary or capricious”

standard, the reviewing court examines whether the agency considered the relevant factors,

articulated a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made, and whether

there was a clear error of judgment. See Ocean Advocates v. United States Army Corps of

Eng’rs, 402 F.3d 846, 585–59 (9th Cir. 2005). A court’s review is normally limited to the

administrative record consisting of the information before the agency at the time it made its

decision. Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Endangered Species Comm’n, 984 F.2d 1534, 1548 (9th

Cir. 2001). 

Case 3:06-cv-04186-WHA Document 37 Filed 01/19/07 Page 4 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 5

Plaintiffs contend that the Service arbitrarily and capriciously issued the negative 90-day

review. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that the Service: (1) applied the wrong standard; (2) erred

in its evaluation of scientific information; (3) relied on uncertain regulatory mechanisms; and

(4) erred by failing to evaluate whether the salamanders may be threatened or endangered

throughout a significant portion of their range, or whether a distinct population segment may be

threatened or endangered.

1. APPLICATION OF APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW.

Plaintiffs first contend that the Service improperly relied on an elevated standard to

determine that the petition did not present substantial information. The Service contends that it

faithfully applied the relevant standard. The parties agree on two important threshold issues. 

First, they agree that the appropriate standard the Service should apply asks “whether the

petition presents substantial scientific or commercial information indicating that the petitioned

action may be warranted.” 16 U.S.C. 1533(b)(3)(A). “Substantial information” is “that amount

of information that would lead a reasonable person to believe that the measure proposed in the

petition may be warranted.” 50 C.F.R. 424.14(b)(1). Second, the parties agree that it would be

wrong for the Service to require a petition to demonstrate “conclusive evidence” that the

petitioned action was warranted. The parties do not dispute decisions holding that a

“conclusive evidence” standard is inappropriate on a 90-day review. Indeed, the Service has

been reversed by other district courts for using such a higher standard. See, e.g., Center for

Biological Diversity v. Morgenwick, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1141 (D. Colo. 2004); Moden v.

United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1203 (D. Or. 2003). This order

holds that the Service has, once again, arbitrarily and capriciously applied a more stringent

standard than whether a “reasonable person” would find that the proposed action “may be

warranted.” 

As an initial matter, internal agency documents support plaintiffs’ contention that a more

stringent standard was, indeed, applied. Two internal Service memoranda include the

Case 3:06-cv-04186-WHA Document 37 Filed 01/19/07 Page 5 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 6

statement: “Paul: Need a strong likelihood that it may be warranted to meet standard” (AR 58,

62). One of the memoranda explains this statement (AR 62):

This “strong likelihood” standard definitely changes how far the

inferences made in the initial draft can stack up before falling

apart. As I’ve mentioned elsewhere in this message, much of the

information on these species is equivocal, and could be used to

(weakly) support different conclusions re population status/trends. 

I contend that there is NO interpretation that is strongly supported

by the information currently available for these species. . . . [T]he

guidance in Paul’s point here suggests that the Service

interpretation would therefore be that the threat has not been

substantially supported.

At oral argument, the parties clarified that those memoranda were written after a draft 90-day

finding had been circulated. That draft had found that listing the salamanders “may be

warranted.”

The Service contends that this reference to “strong likelihood” simply clarifies the

meaning of the “may be warranted” standard. This order cannot agree. The author of the

quoted memorandum applied the “strong likelihood” standard to conclude that equivocal

evidence, meaning a submission admitting of more than one interpretation, was insufficient as a

matter of law inasmuch as it would not rise to the level of a strong likelihood. This was wrong. 

A reasonable person could find that an action “may be warranted” even in the face of evidence

cutting multiple ways. 

The finding and the record also independently demonstrate that the Service did not

faithfully apply the “may be warranted” standard. The Service correctly noted at oral argument

that the 90-day finding cited and quoted the relevant standard. But merely quoting the relevant

standard does not mean it was properly applied. As plaintiffs point out, the finding uses

ambiguous language by stating, for example, that “the impact of clear-cutting on salamanders

may be temporary,” that the effects of habitat disturbance “may impact local abundance and

viability,” and that “tractor yarding may disturb” the salamanders’ habitats (AR 66–68). The

“may be warranted” standard, however, seems to require that in cases of such contradictory

evidence, the Service must defer to information that supports petition’s position. It would be

Case 3:06-cv-04186-WHA Document 37 Filed 01/19/07 Page 6 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 7

wrong to discount the information submitted in a petition solely because other data might

contradict it. At this stage, unless the Service has demonstrated the unreliability of information

that supports the petition, that information cannot be dismissed out of hand. Here, the Service

reached its ultimate conclusion because much of the evidence was not conclusive. This was

arbitrary and capricious. A failure to apply the “non-stringent” standard “renders [the

Service’s] findings and ultimate conclusion flawed.” Morgenwick, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1141. 

This order remands to the Service to apply the standard properly in a new 90-day finding. Next,

this order addresses other issues raised by plaintiffs that will guide the Service when it conducts

a new 90-day review.

2. ASSESSMENT OF THREATS IN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE.

Plaintiffs also contend that the Service arbitrarily and capriciously concluded that the

petition failed to provide substantial information regarding the threats to salamander habitat. 

Specifically, they argue that there was sufficient scientific information presented that a

reasonable person would find that listing “may be warranted.” This order agrees that on this

record, plaintiffs have demonstrated substantial information presented by various scientists that

logging and other activity threatened the salamanders. 

The petition alleged that logging was considered the “princip[al] threat” to the continued

existence of the salamander. According to the petition, the salamander required a combination

of “late-successional forest conditions, talus substrate, and an appropriate climactic setting.” 

Logging would alter “stand microclimate through canopy removal” and “compact[] or

otherwise impact[] talus substrates,” thereby rendering the habitat unsuitable for the

salamander. The petition noted several other threats to the salamander’s habitat, including road

building, mining, recreation, construction of a dam, fires, and global warming (AR 4).

The Service’s finding recognized that logging, wildfire, and other habitat disturbances

“may impact local abundance” of the salamander by “altering the microclimate within stands

that support” the species. The finding, however, concluded that the petition and other

information did not provide substantial information that the salamander’s continued existence

Case 3:06-cv-04186-WHA Document 37 Filed 01/19/07 Page 7 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 8

was threatened by the present or threatened destruction, modification, or curtailment of the

species’ habitat. Specifically, although extensive logging had occurred in the region, “the

extent of habitat loss ha[d] not been quantified.” Additionally, the Siskiyou Mountains

salamanders and Scott Bar salamanders existed to “some extent” in clear-cuts, second-growth

stands, burned areas, and naturally open habitats. This suggested that although timber harvest

and wildfire could reduce habitat quality, they did not result in the “extirpation of populations.” 

The rate and extent of timber harvests had declined dramatically in the past 30 years and it was

anticipated that the rate would remain at the present levels in the foreseeable future. Finally,

though it was “reasonable to assume” that high-intensity wildfire “may have a negative impact

on salamander habitat and populations,” the Service had “no information and the petition

provided no information to support a determination that fire [was] a substantial risk” (AR 68). 

This order agrees with plaintiffs that there were several problems with the 90-day

finding. For example, the Service improperly dismissed a key study on which the petition

relied. That study, conducted by Lisa Ollivier of the United States Department of Agriculture

Forest Service, had found that the Siskiyou Mountains salamanders and Scott Bar salamanders

were closely associated with characteristics of mature forests, “such as closed canopies, large

tree diameters, and a mossy ground cover layer.” The petition, based on the Ollivier study,

“infer[red] that removal of forest cover would result in habitat conditions unsuitable for the

salamanders.” The Service discounted the Ollivier study in light of subsequent studies

conducted by private and California Department of Fish and Game biologists. Those

researchers had “conducted numerous surveys and detected Siskiyou Mountains salamanders in

previously logged sites.” The finding relied on those studies to “demonstrate that salamander

populations persist at sites that have been logged” (AR 67). 

For purposes of the 90-day review, the post-Ollivier studies should not have been used

to conclusively contradict the Ollivier study because, as the finding itself noted, the later studies

“followed no sampling design and [could not] be used to infer a lack of impacts caused by

logging.” Moreover, a letter submitted to the Service by Dr. Hartwell H. Welsh, Jr. compared

Case 3:06-cv-04186-WHA Document 37 Filed 01/19/07 Page 8 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 9

the methods used by the surveys. According to Dr. Welsh, a research wildlife biologist, the

Ollivier study intensively studied small areas and was “more likely to detect the presence of

self-sustaining populations present at a given stand.” In contrast, the state survey was

“extensive” and “conducted across a much wider area” which “greatly increas[ed] the chances

of detections,” and was “more likely to detect migrating individuals that may be crossing areas

of generally unsuitable habitat in search of better conditions” (AR 1848–49). 

It is true that generally, a court reviewing an agency decision must be “deferential to the

agency’s expertise in situations . . . where resolution of this dispute involves primarily issues of

fact.” Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Assoc. v. United States Fish and Wildlife, 273 F.3d 1229, 1236

(9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotations omitted). Here, however, there was at least contradictory

information regarding the salamanders’ close association with mature forests. The Service

should have determined whether reliable evidence supported the petition’s position. The

Ollivier study satisfied the “substantial information” standard in that respect. The finding did

not explain why the Ollivier study was wrong, only that it was contradicted. Dismissal of the

Ollivier study further evidences the Service’s failure to properly apply the “may be warranted”

standard.

The Service’s principal contention in opposition is that there was a “paucity” of

scientific evidence supporting plaintiffs’ “chain of inferences” (Opp. 31). Plaintiffs, however,

did present evidence in their petition that supported each of the important links in the theory. 

First, there was evidence that salamanders were closely associated with old-growth and mature

forests. This was demonstrated, for example, by Dr. Welsh’s comments and the Ollivier study

(AR 67). Second, there was evidence that the salamanders habitats were threatened by logging. 

One study, for example, stated that “[c]atastrophic loss of canopy can extirpate the animals

from a given site” (AR 416). Dr. Welsh also stated that “[t]he literature is clear on plethodontid

salamanders both east and west that they do not occupy clearcuts by choice and when it happens

the populations become depressed and many species disappear” (AR 43). Third, the finding

itself noted that extensive logging had occurred throughout the salamanders’ ranges and was

Case 3:06-cv-04186-WHA Document 37 Filed 01/19/07 Page 9 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 10

“likely to continue on private lands” (AR 67). Accordingly, there was evidence in the record

that plaintiffs’ petition was more than a unsupported “chain of inferences.” The finding did not

adequately explain how the petition’s evidence fell short.

The Service additionally contends that the other information regarding the threats to the

salamanders was “speculative and equivocal.” For example, the Service’s opposition states that

“[w]hile one older study characterized optimal habitat as old-growth forest stands on

north-facing slopes, more recent studies found the species in all forest-age classes and on all

slope aspects” (Opp. 14). But the Service did not, in either its opposition or the finding, explain

that the older study was unreliable or otherwise wrong. See Morgenweck, 351 F. Supp. 2d at

1142 (“While some of the information in the Petition may have been ‘outdated’ as defendants

suggest, the information was not necessarily inadequate or incorrect.”).

The Service relies on other inconsistencies in the evidence to justify its conclusion. The

Service points to studies that related salamander species were found to persist following

clear-cutting. The Service does not dispute, however, that those studies also demonstrated that

the salamanders were significantly less abundant in clear-cut areas and younger forests than

they were in older forests (AR 66). Moreover, in criticizing some of the studies relied upon by

the Service, Dr. Welsh stated (AR 1849): 

[I]t is not accurate to assume that the presence of younger animals

at a site constitutes a reproducing population, and it is an even

greater mistake to assume that these detections in fact mean that

the species as a whole does not require interior forest conditions

for its long-term well-being. If that were indeed the case, it

would be the first plethodontid salamander species ever to liberate

itself from forest-associated micro-habitats.

Dr. Welsh’s evaluation of some of the studies relied upon by the Service calls into question the

finding’s statement that the impact of clear-cutting on salamanders “may be temporary.” The

fact that other studies merely suggested that salamanders could exist in clear-cut and young

forests did not render Dr. Welsh’s comments — or any other evidence submitted by plaintiffs

— not “substantial.” 

Case 3:06-cv-04186-WHA Document 37 Filed 01/19/07 Page 10 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 The Service contends that reliance on drafts is improper under Center for Biological Diversity v.

United States Bureau of Reclamation, 143 F.3d 515, 523 (9th Cir. 1998). There, the Ninth Circuit held that the

Service was “entitled to . . . change its mind.” That decision is inapposite. This order only looks to the drafts as

evidence that reasonable people could find that the petitioned action was warranted, not that the Service should

never change its mind. Because the final finding did not adequately justify its conclusion, it is worth noting

here that there was apparently disagreement within the Service during the 90-day review. 

11

At the 90-day stage, the question is not whether the designation is warranted, only

whether it may be. The standard requiring consideration of whether a “reasonable person”

would conclude that action “may be warranted” contemplates that where there is disagreement

among reasonable scientists, then the Service should make the “may be warranted” finding and

then proceed to the more-searching next step in the ESA process. Indeed, an early outline of the

finding and a preliminary draft of the finding both concluded that concluded that listing the

salamanders may be warranted (AR 1846-46; AR 71).1

 On remand, if the Service again finds

that the threats to the salamanders would not justify further action, the Service must clearly

explain why the evidence that supports the petition is unreliable, incorrect, or otherwise

irrelevant. If certain facts such as the effect of logging roads on the salamanders remain

“unknown,” the Service must explain why that uncertainty does not leave open the possibility

that listing “may be warranted.”

3. CONSIDERATION OF REGULATORY MECHANISMS.

A. Existing Regulatory Protections.

Logging on federal lands in the salamanders’ range has been regulated since 1994

pursuant to the Northwest Forest Plan. Under the plan, the “Survey and Manage” program is

designed to protect certain rare and uncommon old-growth dependent species in the plan area. 

The Siskiyou Mountains salamander and Scott Bar salamander are both protected under the

Survey and Manage program. (The Scott Bar salamander was not originally named as a Survey

and Manage species but protections were extended once the Scott Bar salamander was

recognized as a separate species.) Accordingly, surveys for the salamanders must be conducted

before any ground-disturbing activity like timber-harvesting or road-building (AR 962, 1213).

Case 3:06-cv-04186-WHA Document 37 Filed 01/19/07 Page 11 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 12

In 2004, the Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management eliminated the Survey and

Manage program. In August 2005, Judge Marsha Pechman in the Western District of

Washington held that the agencies’ decision to eliminate the program violated the National

Environmental Policy Act and the ESA. See Nw. Ecosystem Alliance v. Rey, 380 F. Supp. 2d

1175 (W.D. Wash. 2005). In January 2006, Judge Pechman reinstated the Survey and Manage

program. See Nw. Ecosystem Alliance v. Rey, No. 04-844P, 2006 WL 44361, *1 (W.D. Wash.

Jan. 9, 2006). In December 2005, however, the Forest Service and Bureau of Land

Management announced plans to eliminate the Survey and Manage program again by

addressing the concerns in Judge Pechman’s ruling. 70 Fed. Reg. 73,483 (Dec. 12, 2005).

The salamanders receive some state protection in California. The Siskiyou Mountains

salamander has been listed as threatened under the California Endangered Species Act since

1985. The California ESA protections have largely been applied to timber-harvest operations

on private timberlands that comprise approximately 10 percent of the Siskiyou Mountains

salamanders’ ranges and 18 percent of the Scott Bar salamanders’ ranges. In 2005, the

California Department of Fish and Game formally petitioned the California Fish and Game

Commission to delist the Siskiyou Mountains salamander under the California ESA. The Fish

and Game Commission is expected to rule on the petition on January 31, 2007 (AR 69).

The Scott Bar salamander currently receives no protection under the California ESA. 

According to plaintiffs, the Department of Fish and Game has determined that the Scott Bar

salamander is not a protected species under the California ESA. That decision is being

challenged in California state court (Br. Exh. G).

The Service’s 90-day finding held that federal regulations “currently provide substantial

protection for the Siskiyou Mountains salamander and Scott Bar salamander through the Survey

and Manage program.” Additionally, the finding stated that “California regulations provide

substantial protection for the Siskiyou Mountains salamander on private lands.” Thus, “the

Service consider[ed] the current Federal and State regulations adequate for both salamander

species.” In short, “the petition and other information in [the Service’s] files [did] not present

Case 3:06-cv-04186-WHA Document 37 Filed 01/19/07 Page 12 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 The decisions cited by the parties do not address directly whether an existing regulation can be

considered inadequate solely because it is likely to be eliminated. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Babbitt, 958 F.

Supp. 670, 684 (D.D.C. 1997) (holding that it was improper for Service to merely “assert[] that . . . protections

13

substantial information that these species are threatened at this time by the inadequacy of

existing regulatory mechanisms across all or a significant portion of their ranges” (AR 69).

B. Evaluation of Regulatory Mechanisms.

Plaintiffs allege that the Service did not properly account for the uncertainty in the

federal and state regulatory mechanisms. In their papers, plaintiffs do not contend that the

federal and state protections for the salamanders are themselves inadequate. Instead, they

contend that there is a high likelihood that the Survey and Manage program will be eliminated

and that the Siskiyou Mountains salamander will be delisted from the California ESA. 

Plaintiffs maintain that the protections “have been or are in the process of being eliminated,”

and accordingly, that the regulatory mechanisms are inadequate due to the uncertainty of their

continued existence. The Service attempts to rebut plaintiffs’ argument by contending that

predicting that a regulation will be eliminated cannot rise to the level of “substantial

information.” 

Both parties’ positions have some merit. When an existing regulatory mechanism is

adequate under the ESA, a petitioner cannot simply speculate that the regulation may become

inadequate because it is going to be eliminated. There, the Service would be justified in finding

that there is no “substantial information” that the existing regulatory mechanism is inadequate. 

Conversely, however, it is possible that facts could be presented to the Service demonstrating

that a particular regulation has an imminent likelihood of being eliminated. In that case, the

“existing” regulatory mechanism could not be considered adequate because of the near-certainty

that the regulation would have only short-lived efficacy. As plaintiffs note, it is the Service’s

policy that “[c]entral to this concept [of making a prediction about the future persistence of a

species] is a prediction of future conditions, including consideration of future negative effects of

anticipated human actions.” 68 Fed. Reg. 15,100, at 15,107 (Mar. 28, 2003).2

 

Case 3:06-cv-04186-WHA Document 37 Filed 01/19/07 Page 13 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

exist, and make[] no attempt to analyze past or present data to determine whether these mechanisms are

effectively protecting the Lynx population from continued destruction”); Biodiversity Legal Found. v. Babbitt,

943 F. Supp. 23, 25–26 (D.D.C. 1996) (finding it improper for the Service to rely on a promised action as an

existing regulatory mechanism); Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Babbitt, 939 F. Supp. 49, 52 (D.D.C. 1996)

(holding that Service “cannot use promises of proposed future actions as an excuse for not making a

determination based on the existing record).

3

 The term “distinct population segment” comes from the ESA, which explains that “‘species’ includes

any subspecies of . . . wildlife . . . and any distinct population segment of any species of . . . wildlife which

interbreeds when mature.” 16 U.S.C. 1532(16). 

14

This order does not decide whether there was enough information before the Service to

constitute “substantial information” that the existing regulatory mechanisms were inadequate

due to the possibility that they might be eliminated. This order notes that there seems to be a

possibility that both federal and state protections might be eliminated. It is recognized,

however, that agency and judicial action is difficult, if not impossible, to predict. On remand,

the Service should take into account any new developments regarding the existing federal and

state protections. 

4. “SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF THE RANGE” AND DISTINCT POPULATION

SEGMENT ANALYSES.

As discussed above, a species may be listed as endangered if it is “in danger of

extinction throughout . . . a significant portion of its range.” 16 U.S.C. 1532(6). A species is

threatened if it “is likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable future

throughout . . . a significant portion of its range.” 16 U.S.C. 1532(20). Here, the petition

requested that the Service: (1) consider whether either the Siskiyou Mountains salamander or

Scott Bar salamanders should be listed as threatened or endangered throughout a significant

portion of its range and (2) determine whether a distinct population segment (“DPS”) of the

species should be listed (AR 2).3

 Plaintiffs contend that the Service erred by failing to conduct

“significant portion of the range” analyses and DPS analyses. Defendants do not deny that

those analyses were not done. Defendants instead contend that such analyses were not required

in light of the lack of substantial information regarding the salamanders’ habitat and in support

of the five listing factors.

Case 3:06-cv-04186-WHA Document 37 Filed 01/19/07 Page 14 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 15

In Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton, 258 F.3d 1136, 1145 (9th Cir. 2001), the Ninth

Circuit explained that a species “can be extinct ‘throughout . . . a significant portion of its

range’ if there are major geographical areas in which it is no longer viable but once was.” The

Service rests on portions of the record that indicate that “little is known about [the species’]

historic distribution” and that “the extent of habitat loss has not been quantified” (AR 12; AR

68). Plaintiffs point out, however, that there is other information in the record that “10% of

potential habitat on the Applegate Ranger District was clearcut between 1980–1990” and that

“[p]rivate lands (20%) within the range of the species are not expected to provide much, if any,

suitable habitat for the species” (AR 14–15). Moreover, the finding itself noted that “extensive

logging has occurred in the Siskiyou Mountains salamander and Scott Bar salamander habitat

for over one hundred years” (AR 68). Thus, there is at least some evidence that there are

“major geographical areas” where the salamander used to be, but no longer remains, viable. In

this case, whether the evidence meets the non-stringent “substantial information” standard is a

determination for the Service to make — the Service having failed to do so the first time.

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, this order VACATES the 90-day finding and REMANDS to the

Service to issue another 90-day finding in accordance with this order. Specifically, the Service

must: (1) correctly apply the “substantial scientific or commercial information” standard; (2)

reevaluate the scientific information presented under the appropriate standard; (3) reconsider its

prior finding with respect to the existing regulatory mechanisms and consider developments in

the efforts to eliminate those protections; and (4) evaluate whether the salamanders or any DPS

may be threatened or endangered throughout a significant portion of their range. This must be

completed by MARCH 23, 2007. Because the Service did not perform the “significant portion of

Case 3:06-cv-04186-WHA Document 37 Filed 01/19/07 Page 15 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 16

the range” analysis in the first finding and must do so now in the first instance, this order does

not reach the issue raised by plaintiffs that the appropriate remedy is to order the Service to

undertake the 12-month review immediately. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 19, 2007. WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:06-cv-04186-WHA Document 37 Filed 01/19/07 Page 16 of 16