Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01169/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01169-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Nelson H. Anthoine
Plaintiff
Lori Brown
Defendant
Cindy Newton
Defendant
North Central Counties Consortium
Defendant

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

NELSON H. ANTHOINE, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

NORTH CENTRAL COUNTIES 

CONSORTIUM; LORI BROWN; and 

CINDY NEWTON, 

 

 Defendants. 

______________________________/

No. 2:06-CV-01169 JAM KJM 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Nelson H. Anthoine (“Anthoine”) brought this action against 

his former employer North Central Counties Consortium (“NCCC”), 

Lori Brown (“Brown”) and Cindy Newton (“Newton”) (collectively 

“Defendants”) alleging civil rights violations and state law 

claims arising out of his termination. Defendants now move for 

summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication 

pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

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Anthoine opposes the motion. For the reasons set forth below, 

Defendants’ motion is GRANTED.1

I. UNDISPUTED FACTS 

Defendant NCCC is a public entity created by an agreement 

between Colusa County, Glen County, Lake County, Sutter County 

and Yuba County for the purpose of providing state and federal 

funds through the Workforce Investment Act (“WIA”) to agencies 

providing job training services to businesses and jobseekers. 

Defs.’ Undisputed Material Facts (“UMF”) ¶¶ 1-3. NCCC is 

governed by a Board consisting of one county supervisor from 

each member county. Id. ¶ 5. NCCC works with agencies to 

ensure compliance with the WIA and seeks to provide monitoring 

that supports program success by providing assistance and 

technical guidance. Id. ¶ 4. 

Defendant Brown was an independent consultant hired by NCCC 

to accomplish various tasks from 2001 to 2004, including 

conducting a re-classification study, meeting facilitation for 

NCCC leadership, strategic planning, developing policies and 

procedures, staff training and human resources support. Defs.’ 

UMF ¶ 7. In 2005, NCCC hired Brown to serve as interim 

executive director of NCCC, a capacity in which she served from 

1

 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal. 

L.R. 78-230(h). 

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January 27, 2005 to December 31, 2005. Id. ¶ 9. Defendant 

Newton was a senior program analyst at NCCC responsible for 

supervising NCCC’s program monitoring efforts, including program 

analysts. Id. ¶ 10. Plaintiff Anthoine was a program analyst 

at NCCC from 1988 until his termination in May 2005. Id. ¶¶ 11, 

78. One of Anthoine’s principal duties as a program analyst was 

to monitor local workforce development programs for compliance 

with the WIA. Compl. ¶ 7. Specifically, from February 2004, 

until his discharge on May 26, 2005, Anthoine monitored Upward 

Bound, a workforce development program operated by the 

California State University at Chico. Defs.’ UMF ¶ 56. 

In 1990, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, and 2000, Anthoine was 

graded by supervisors as, among other things, weak in complying 

with instructions. Defs.’ UMF ¶¶ 14-17, 19, 21. Several times 

over this same period, Anthoine was also graded as unwilling to 

accept or follow the philosophy of NCCC. Id. ¶¶ 15, 19, 21. In 

particular, in 1998, in response to a project Anthoine was 

unable to complete, Anthoine received a memo from NCCC’s deputy 

executive director, Bill Rottman (“Rottman”), stating: “It is 

considered insubordinate by this office for you to hinder work 

in progress as a result of your personal views of an issue or 

procedure. It is certainly inappropriate and unacceptable 

conduct.” Id. ¶ 18. On March 25, 2002, Newton warned Anthoine 

that his failure to complete a particular assignment in a timely 

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manner was unacceptable and that future issues related to 

unacceptable work performance could result in disciplinary 

action. Id. ¶ 22; Newton Decl., Exh. J. Sometime later, 

Anthoine was reassigned from monitoring duties and worked 

primarily from home thereafter. Defs.’ UMF ¶ 23. 

In February 2004, Anthoine returned to monitoring duties at 

NCCC. Defs.’ UMF ¶ 23. In October 2004, Newton informed 

Anthoine that several events between June and October of 2004 

caused her to conclude that he had developed a pattern of not 

following directions and warned him that any further behavior in 

this regard could result in disciplinary action. Id. ¶ 24. In 

early January 2005, Anthoine was assigned the task of processing 

a backlog of case management reporting data (client data) for 

submission to the state. Id. ¶ 38. In late January 2005, 

Anthoine arranged a meeting with the chairman of NCCC’s 

governing Board, Gary Freeman (“Freeman”), to discuss the 

following issues: the problem with NCCC’s case management 

reporting system, Newton’s statement to the Board claiming that 

NCCC was current in its obligation to provide client data to the 

state, the potential litigation related to the case management 

reporting system, Rottman filling the executive director 

position, and Rottman ignoring his concerns that his work was 

not being considered properly. Id. ¶ 26. According to 

Anthoine, he arranged this meeting to “discuss several highly 

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important matters involving the overall direction and future of 

NCCC” and to raise his policy disagreements with Newton and 

higher managers. Anthoine Decl. ¶ 7. In particular, Anthoine 

asserts that he met with Freeman to inform him that, contrary to 

Newton’s statements to the Board, NCCC was not current in its 

obligation to report client data to the state. Id. Anthoine 

maintains that he told Freeman this information not only because 

of its bearing on NCCC’s obligation to the state, but also 

because it could impact the viability of any litigation launched 

by NCCC against Softscape, the company which provided NCCC with 

software that automated the gathering and uploading of client 

data to the state. Id. According to Anthoine, the delay in 

submitting client data to the state was due to the functional 

failure of Softscape’s software. Id. 

Following this meeting, Freeman spoke to Brown about 

Newton’s statements to the Board regarding the submission of 

client data to the state. Defs.’ UMF ¶¶ 29, 31. Thereafter, 

Brown met with Anthoine to discuss this issue. Id. ¶ 31. After 

this meeting, Brown investigated Anthoine’s concerns and 

concluded that a problem did in fact exist with the case 

management reporting system and relayed this information to 

Newton. Id. ¶ 32. Brown and Newton subsequently spoke about 

how to resolve this issue. Id. 

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On February 5, 2005, Newton gave Anthoine a memo notifying 

him of disciplinary action based on a “pattern of 

insubordination.” Defs.’ UMF ¶ 33. The memo set forth five 

incidents of insubordination and warned Anthoine that he needed 

to follow his supervisor’s directions and to refrain from taking 

action not approved by his supervisor. Id. ¶¶ 33-34; Newton 

Decl., Exh. L. Specifically, Newton’s memo stated: “I have held 

discussions with you on two separate occasions regarding five 

incidents of insubordination, specifically through your failure 

to follow directions. Additionally, your failure to follow 

directions has negatively impacted your work performance as well 

as that of your co-workers. Unfortunately, this behavior has 

continued, and as such disciplinary action has now been deemed 

necessary.” Newton Decl., Exh. L. The memo also warned 

Anthoine that “further incident of insubordination shall result 

in disciplinary action up to and possibly including 

termination.” Defs.’ UMF ¶ 33. 

On February 14, 2005, Anthoine submitted a written response 

to the disciplinary action. Defs.’ UMF ¶ 35. On February 24, 

2005, Brown met with Anthoine to discuss several issues 

including, Anthoine’s response to the disciplinary action, his 

complaint regarding work assignments, and his request to revoke 

the disciplinary action. Id. ¶ 36. On February 25, 2005, 

Anthoine submitted a formal grievance regarding his work 

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assignments, the disciplinary action, and Newton’s alleged 

practice of meeting with other program analysts without him. 

Id. ¶ 37. On March 25, 2005, Brown sent Anthoine a memo denying 

his formal grievance. Id. ¶ 39; Brown Decl., Exh. A. In this 

memo, Brown explained to Anthoine that even if his personal 

philosophy differs from the philosophy of NCCC, he needs to be 

mindful of NCCC’s goal, which is to provide monitoring that 

supports program success while ensuring quality through a high 

level of customer service and technical assistance. Brown 

Decl., Exh. A. On April 7, 2005, Anthoine appealed Brown’s 

decision to the Board. Defs.’ UMF ¶ 42. Following Anthoine’s 

presentation of his case to the Board, which incidentally did 

not include a complaint of gender discrimination, the Board 

unanimously denied his grievance and specifically directed him 

to follow the communication and decision making protocols 

established by Newton and Brown. Id. ¶¶ 44-49. According to 

Board chairman Freeman, he voted to deny Anthoine’s grievance 

because Brown had presented sufficient evidence of Anthoine’s 

insubordination. Id. ¶ 50. 

On March 17, 2005, Anthoine received his 2004 performance 

evaluation, which graded him as “unsatisfactory” overall. 

Defs.’ UMF ¶ 51. The evaluation stated that Anthoine has 

“extreme difficulty following directions and taking supervision 

from his supervisor,” and that his work “frequently must be 

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revised or redone by his supervisor or coworkers.” Id. The 

evaluation further stated that Anthoine’s work does not always 

reflect the philosophy of NCCC or a clear understanding of the 

needs of his internal and external customers. Id. 

On April 20, 2005, Anthoine conducted a monitoring 

appointment with Upward Bound. Defs.’ UMF ¶ 62. Prior to this 

appointment, Newton maintains that she directed Anthoine not to 

discuss his concerns about Upward Bound’s use of WIA funds 

(“funds”) for college preparatory classes until she received an 

answer from NCCC’s state WIA liaison about whether Upward 

Bound’s use of funds for this purpose was proper. Id. ¶¶ 57-58, 

63.2 Notwithstanding Newton’s alleged directive, Anthoine, 

during the April 20, 2005 monitoring appointment, told Upward 

Bound staff members that Upward Bound’s use of funds for college 

preparatory classes may not be allowable under the WIA and that 

Upward Bound may have to pay those funds back. Id. ¶ 64. 

Anthoine also told Upward Bound staff that, in his opinion, 

Upward Bound’s use of funds for college preparatory classes was 

unfair to other programs. Id. Anthoine maintains that he 

2

 Anthoine denies that Newton directed him not to express 

his concerns about Upward Bound’s use of funds for college 

preparatory classes prior to the April 20, 2005 monitoring 

appointment. Anthoine, however, acknowledges that both Newton 

and Brown specifically told him that they did not believe that 

Upward Bound’s use of funds for college preparatory classes 

violated the WIA. Defs.’ UMF ¶ 59. 

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expressed his opinion in this regard because he wanted to 

influence NCCC management to make these funds available to other 

programs that emphasized bona-fide work-site experience for 

disadvantaged youth who do not plan on attending college. Id. ¶ 

65. In Anthoine’s opinion, Upward Bound’s use of funds for 

college preparatory classes was inappropriate because it did not 

comport with the intent of the WIA, which is to support programs 

that assist disadvantaged youth in gaining work experience. Id. 

Following the monitoring appointment, two Upward Bound 

staff members contacted Newton and complained about Anthoine’s 

statements regarding Upward Bound’s use of funds for college 

preparatory classes. Defs.’ UMF ¶¶ 66, 68, 71. On May 13, 

2005, Newton informed Brown that she had directed Anthoine prior 

to the monitoring appointment not to discuss his concerns with 

Upward Bound staff about Upward Bound’s use of funds for college 

preparatory classes. Id. ¶ 70. On May 19, 2005, Brown received 

the complaint statements made by the Upward Bound staff members. 

Id. ¶ 71. Thereafter, Brown decided to terminate Anthoine based 

on her belief that he was unwilling or unable to correct his 

performance issues, follow directions, promote NCCC’s philosophy 

over his own, id. ¶ 72, and represent programs and services 

accurately. Decl. of Brown ¶ 12. According to Brown, she 

viewed the written complaint statements as a confirmation and 

continuation of Anthoine’s pattern of knowingly and overtly 

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refusing to follow directions and promoting his own opinions 

over the mission and philosophy of NCCC. Id. ¶ 11. 

On May 16, 2005, the Board unanimously approved Brown’s 

decision to terminate Anthoine based on his longstanding and 

recent failures with communication, following directions, and 

promoting his own personal views over the philosophy of NCCC. 

Defs.’ UMF ¶¶ 74-75, 77. On May 20, 2005, NCCC notified 

Anthoine that his termination was effective May 26, 2005, due to 

unsatisfactory performance, insubordination, and discourteous 

treatment of the public or other employees. Id. ¶ 78. In a 

letter dated May 25, 2005, Anthoine’s attorney requested 

reconsideration of the disciplinary action taken against 

Anthoine as well the decision to terminate his employment. Id. 

¶ 85. In a letter dated May 26, 2005, Anthoine’s attorney 

advised Freeman that Anthoine was appealing the Board’s decision 

to deny his formal grievance and to terminate his employment. 

Id. ¶ 86. NCCC and Anthoine subsequently agreed to submit the 

following issues to arbitration: (1) whether the Board properly 

denied Anthoine’s grievance; and (2) whether Anthoine’s 

termination was appropriate under NCCC’s personnel rules. Id. ¶ 

87. On March 17, 2006, NCCC and Anthoine mutually agreed to end 

the arbitration proceedings so that Anthoine could pursue his 

claims in court. Id. ¶ 88. On May 30, 2006, Anthoine filed the 

instant action against Defendants alleging civil rights 

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violations and state law claims. Docket at 1. On February 22, 

2008, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. Docket at 

30. On March 13, 2008, Anthoine filed an opposition. Docket at 

49.3 

II. OPINION 

A. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate if “the pleadings, the 

discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits 

show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 

that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party bears the initial burden of 

demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. 

See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where 

the nonmoving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at 

trial, the movant’s burden may be discharged by pointing out to 

the district court that there is an absence of evidence to 

support the nonmoving party’s case. See id. at 325; Miller v. 

Glenn Miller Productions, Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 

2006). “Summary judgment for a defendant is appropriate when 

the plaintiff fails to make a showing sufficient to establish 

 

3

 As an initial matter, the Court notes that Anthoine, in 

his opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, 

expressed his desire to withdraw his intentional and negligent 

infliction of emotional distress claims; therefore, Anthoine’s 

Seventh and Eighth claims for relief are DISMISSED.

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the existence of an element essential to [his] case, and on 

which [he] will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Miller, 454 

F.3d at 987 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

If the moving party sustains its burden, the burden then 

shifts to the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by 

his or her own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific 

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)); Miller, 

454 F.3d at 987. “If the nonmoving party fails to produce 

enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact, the 

moving party wins the motion for summary judgment.” Nissan Fire 

& Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Companies, Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1103 

(9th Cir. 2000). Summary judgment is proper if, viewing the 

evidence and the inferences therefrom in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party, there are no genuine issues of 

material fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 

F.2d 1135, 1137 (9th Cir. 1989). 

B. First Claim: Free Speech Retaliation

 Defendants argue that summary adjudication is appropriate 

with respect to Anthoine’s First Amendment retaliation claim 

because Anthoine did not engage in constitutionally protected 

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speech, nor was the relevant speech a “substantial” or 

“motivating” factor in his termination.

Public employees suffer a constitutional violation when 

they are wrongfully terminated or disciplined for making 

protected speech. Marable v. Nitchman, 511 F.3d 924, 929 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (citing Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 

(1968)). “To state a First Amendment claim against a public 

employer, an employee must show: 1) the employee engaged in 

constitutionally protected speech; 2) the employer took adverse 

employment action against the employee; and 3) the employee’s 

speech was a substantial or motivating factor for the adverse 

action.” Marable, 511 F.3d at 929 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). To qualify as “constitutionally protected speech,” 

the employee must have uttered the speech as a citizen, not an 

employee; because when public employees make statements pursuant 

to their official duties, those statements do not receive First 

Amendment protection. Marable, 511 F.3d at 929 (citing Garcetti 

v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2005)). The question of whether 

speech is constitutionally protected is one of law, not fact. 

Marable, 511 F.3d at 930. 

In the present case, Anthoine maintains that he was 

wrongfully disciplined and ultimately terminated in retaliation 

for engaging in constitutionally protected speech. 

Specifically, Anthoine asserts unconstitutional retaliation in 

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the form of the following discipline: (1) he was barred from 

exercising responsibilities commensurate with his knowledge and 

experience; (2) he was excluded from NCCC staff meetings and 

assigned menial tasks; (3) he was subject to unfounded criticism 

and disciplinary action; (4) he was graded as unsatisfactory in 

a job performance evaluation and required to prepare and comply 

with a job performance improvement plan; and (5) he was 

terminated. Anthoine contends that Defendants wrongfully 

retaliated against him for informing Freeman that NCCC was in 

violation of its legal obligation to provide regularly updated 

client information to the state; and for informing Upward Bound 

staff that Upward Bound may be in violation of the WIA for using 

funds on college preparatory classes, and that use of funds for 

this purpose was unfair to other programs. Anthoine maintains 

that this speech is protected by the First Amendment because it 

was made as a citizen involving a matter of public concern, 

namely the proper and efficient expenditure of public funds. 

The Court disagrees. 

 Anthoine’s statements made to Freeman regarding NCCC’s 

purported failure to provide updated client information to the 

state are not protected by the First Amendment. This is so 

because Anthoine uttered the speech as an employee pursuant to 

his official duties, not as a private citizen speaking on a 

matter of public concern. See Ceballos, 547 U.S. at 421-24 

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(holding that when public employees make statements pursuant to 

their official duties, the employees are not speaking as 

citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does 

not insulate their communications from employer discipline). 

Although Anthoine initiated his communications with Freeman 

outside of work, his speech was nonetheless uttered pursuant to 

the execution of his responsibilities and official duties at 

NCCC because, as a program analyst, he was charged with 

monitoring local workforce development programs for compliance 

with the WIA and for ensuring that NCCC satisfied its obligation 

to timely gather and report the services being provided by 

workforce development programs to state and federal agencies 

administering the WIA. Moreover, it is undisputed that Anthoine 

was assigned the task of processing a backlog of case management 

reporting data to the state in early January 2005, and that it 

was during the execution of these duties that he discovered NCCC 

was in violation of its legal obligation to provide regularly 

updated client information to the state. Thus, to the extent 

that Anthoine’s conversation with Freeman involved a complaint 

about a supervisor’s alleged misconduct in connection with 

NCCC’s duty to report client data to the state, this speech is 

not constitutionally protected because it owed its existence to 

Anthoine’s professional responsibilities, that is, the speech is 

not protected by the First Amendment because it was related to 

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activities that Anthoine undertook in a professional capacity to 

further NCCC’s objectives, and was uttered as an employee 

pursuant to his official responsibilities, not while acting as a 

private citizen. See Ceballos, 547 U.S. at 421-22 (“Restricting 

speech that owes its existence to a public employee’s 

professional responsibilities does not infringe any liberties 

the employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen. It simply 

reflects the exercise of employer control over what the employer 

itself has commissioned or created.”); see also Freitag v. 

Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 546 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal complaints 

about supervisory failures or workplace mismanagement are 

consistent with the type of activities the employee is 

professionally obligated to perform); Hong v. Grant, 516 

F.Supp.2d 1158, 1166 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (an employee’s official 

duties are construed broadly to include those activities that an 

employee undertakes in a professional capacity to further the 

employer’s objectives). Accordingly, because Anthoine’s 

statements in this regard indicate that he was fulfilling a 

professional obligation, and not acting as a private citizen, 

the statements are not constitutionally protected.4 

 

4

 Because Anthoine does not argue that any of the other 

statements he made to Freeman during the January 2005 meeting 

qualify as protected speech under the First Amendment, the Court 

treats any First Amendment retaliation claim based thereon as 

abandoned.

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Anthoine’s statements to Upward Bound staff members 

concerning Upward Bound’s use of funds for college preparatory 

classes are also not constitutionally protected because they 

were made pursuant to Anthoine’s official duties. It is 

undisputed that Anthoine was assigned to monitor the Upward 

Bound program on behalf of NCCC (which included, among other 

things, ensuring compliance with the WIA and providing 

assistance and technical guidance to support Upward Bound’s 

success), and that Anthoine told Upward Bound staff that the 

funds allocated to college preparatory classes may be in 

violation of the WIA. Indeed, Anthoine concedes that he was 

exercising his duty to provide monitoring guidance to Upward 

Bound when he told Upward Bound staff members that he 

interpreted the WIA regulations to prohibit the payment of funds 

to students for attending college preparatory classes. It is 

also undisputed that Anthoine told Upward Bound staff members 

that, in his opinion, Upward Bound’s use of funds for college 

preparatory classes was unfair to other programs because the 

intent of the WIA is to provide funds for work experience to 

disadvantaged youth who do not plan on attending college. Thus, 

while Anthoine’s official duties did not include assessing 

whether a particular program’s use of funds was fair to other 

programs, his duties did include monitoring the use of funds by 

programs for compliance with the WIA and to provide assistance 

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and technical guidance to support program success. As such, 

Anthoine’s opinion as to the propriety of Upward Bound’s 

allocation of funds owes its existence to his professional 

responsibilities as a program analyst for NCCC insofar as it was 

related to activities that Anthoine undertook in a professional 

capacity to further NCCC’s objectives, and was uttered pursuant 

to his official duties while acting within the scope of his 

employment, not while acting as a private citizen. See

Ceballos, 547 U.S. at 421-23; see also Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin 

Peaks Charter Academy, 492 F.3d 1192, 1203 (10th Cir. 2007) (if 

an employee engages in speech during the course of performing an 

official duty and the speech reasonably contributes to or 

facilitates the employee’s performance of the official duty, the 

speech is made pursuant to the employee’s official duties). 

Because these statements were made during the course of 

Anthoine’s daily professional activities and were related to 

official duties that he was charged with performing, his 

supervisors had the authority to take the proper corrective 

action if they believed the statements to be inflammatory or 

misguided because supervisors have an interest in ensuring that 

official communications are accurate, demonstrate sound 

judgment, and promote the employer’s mission. See Ceballos, 547 

U.S. at 422-24 (the First Amendment does not prohibit managerial 

discipline based on an employee’s expressions made pursuant to 

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official responsibilities). Accordingly, Anthoine’s statements 

to Upward Bound staff members are not constitutionally 

protected, and therefore he has no First Amendment claim based 

on Defendants’ reaction to it. 

 Because the Court concludes that Anthoine did not speak as 

a citizen with regard to the speech at issue, the Court need not 

reach the remaining factors to establish a First Amendment 

retaliation claim. Absent protected speech, there is no 

cognizable retaliation claim. Accordingly, summary adjudication 

is granted in favor of Defendants on Anthoine’s First Amendment 

retaliation claim. 

C. Second Claim: Gender Discrimination

 Defendants argue that summary adjudication is appropriate 

with respect to Anthoine’s gender discrimination claim because: 

(1) there is no evidence of discriminatory intent; (2) 

Defendants had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for their 

actions; and (3) Anthoine cannot show any evidence of pretext. 

In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), 

the United States Supreme Court articulated a three-part test 

for assessing the burdens and order of proof in a Title VII case 

alleging discriminatory treatment. First, the plaintiff has the 

burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence a prima 

facie case of discrimination. Id. at 802. Second, if the 

plaintiff succeeds in demonstrating a prima facie case, the 

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burden shifts to the defendant to “articulate some legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.” Id. 

Third, should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff 

then has an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the 

evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant 

were not its true reasons but were a pretext for discrimination. 

Id. at 804. To establish pretext, a plaintiff may do so by 

directly persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more 

likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the 

employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. 

Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 

1998). A plaintiff may sustain their burden to show pretext by 

using either direct or circumstantial evidence. Coghlan v. 

American Seafoods Co. LLC., 413 F.3d 1090, 1094-95 (9th Cir. 

2005). When the plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence, 

that evidence must be “specific and substantial” to avoid 

summary judgment. Id. at 1095. 

 In the present case, Anthoine relies exclusively on 

circumstantial evidence to establish a prima facie case of 

gender discrimination. In this regard, Anthoine offers the 

following evidence: (1) his testimony that Brown’s tone of voice 

and non-verbal behavior was noticeably more positive when she 

engaged with female employees as opposed to male employees; (2) 

documentary evidence that two female employees received higher 

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performance evaluation grades than all three NCCC male employees 

for the 2004 performance evaluation grading period; and (3) 

documentary evidence that all three male NCCC employees were 

terminated on the same day. Even assuming for the sake of 

argument that Anthoine produced sufficient evidence to establish 

a prima facie case of gender discrimination, Defendants have 

articulated legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for the various 

complained of conduct. Anthoine maintains that the evidence he 

produced in response to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment 

is sufficient to raise a triable issue of material fact as to 

whether his verbal reprimand (for his comments made to Upward 

Bound staff) and his subsequent termination were “falsely 

overblown and hence pretextual.”5 Specifically, Anthoine argues 

that Brown and Newton, acting out of gender bias, exaggerated 

his behavior during his monitoring appointment with Upward Bound 

to create the justification for his termination. The Court 

finds, however, that Anthoine failed to sustain his burden to 

produce specific, substantial evidence raising a triable issue 

of material fact on the question of whether Defendants’ stated 

reasons for his verbal reprimand and subsequent termination were 

5

 To the extent that Anthoine failed to respond to the 

nondiscriminatory reasons proffered by Defendants for the other 

complained of conduct in which Anthoine alleges was motivated by 

gender discrimination, the Court will treat Anthoine’s failure 

in this regard as an abandonment of his contention that such 

conduct constituted illegal gender discrimination. 

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really a pretext for illegal gender discrimination. The 

undisputed facts demonstrate that Anthoine had a long history of 

performance issues, including an inability or unwillingness to 

follow directions and the philosophy of NCCC. It is also 

undisputed that, despite being warned in writing by Newton in 

February 2005 to refrain from taking action that is not approved 

by his supervisor, and despite knowing that both Newton and 

Brown did not agree with his assessment that Upward Bound’s use 

of funds for college preparatory classes violated the WIA, 

Anthoine nonetheless told Upward Bound staff members that Upward 

Bound’s use of funds for this purpose may be in violation of the 

WIA. In short, the Court finds Defendants’ articulated 

nondiscriminatory reasons for Anthoine’s termination to be 

credible. 

Additionally, the Court finds that Anthoine did not sustain 

his burden to produce specific, substantial evidence 

demonstrating that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated 

his termination rather than the reasons proffered by Defendants. 

In this regard, Anthoine did not produce meaningful evidence 

raising a triable issue of material fact on the question of 

whether Defendants were biased or harbored discriminatory animus 

insofar as the evidence produced by Anthoine has little direct 

bearing on the specific intentions of Defendants in terminating 

him. See Aragon v. Republic Silver State Disposal Inc., 292 

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F.3d 654, 663 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that in disparate 

treatment cases, statistical evidence (such as evidence that 

four out of five people laid off (out of 28 total employees) 

were African American), in and of itself, rarely suffices to 

rebut an employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory rationale for 

its decision to dismiss an individual employee because a 

company’s overall employment statistics generally have little 

direct bearing on the specific intentions of the employer when 

dismissing a particular individual). Anthoine’s statistical 

evidence does not show a stark pattern of discrimination 

unexplainable on grounds other than gender. It also does not 

account for possible nondiscriminatory variables,6 such as job 

performance. Because such evidence is not supported by other 

probative evidence of illegal discrimination, the Court 

concludes that this evidence falls short of constituting 

substantial and specific evidence of illegal gender 

discrimination. See id. at 663-64. Anthoine, for instance, did 

not point to evidence indicating that the 2004 employee 

performance evaluations were based on anything other than job 

 

6

 Interestingly, although Defendants did not proffer NCCC’s 

reorganization and downsizing as a legitimate nondiscriminatory 

reason for Anthoine’s termination, Anthoine concedes that NCCC’s 

reorganization and downsizing were significant contributing 

factors in his termination. Defs.’ UMF ¶¶ 115-116. In fact, 

Anthoine acknowledges that Brown sought to eliminate the 

positions occupied by the other two male NCCC employees as part 

of a plan to reorganize NCCC. 

 

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performance. Nor does the Court find Anthoine’s belief that 

Brown’s tone of voice and nonverbal behavior was noticeably more 

positive when she engaged with female employees to be 

substantial and specific evidence of illegal gender 

discrimination demonstrating that there is a genuine issue for 

trial. See Rodriguez v. International Business Machines, 960 

F.Supp. 227, 231 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (a plaintiff’s subjective 

belief that his employers actions were discriminatorily 

motivated is not sufficient to withstand summary judgment). In 

sum, the evidence offered by Anthoine does not undermine the 

reasons proffered by Defendants for his termination, nor is it 

sufficient evidence to indicate that either Brown or Newton 

harbored discriminatory animus toward men in general or Anthoine 

in particular. Accordingly, because Anthoine did not 

demonstrate that the Defendants legitimate, nondiscriminatory 

reasons for his termination were a pretext for illegal gender 

discrimination, summary adjudication is granted in favor of 

Defendants on Anthoine’s gender discrimination claim. 

D. Third Claim: Violation of Procedural Due Process

 Defendants argue that summary adjudication is appropriate 

with respect to Anthoine’s due process property interest claim 

because Anthoine did not have a protected property interest in 

continued employment with NCCC and because Anthoine was provided 

a proper opportunity to be heard prior to his termination. 

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Additionally, Defendants argue that summary adjudication is 

appropriate with respect to Anthoine’s due process liberty 

interest claim because Defendants did not publish false, 

stigmatizing statements in connection with Anthoine’s 

termination. 

 The procedural due process component of the Fourteenth 

Amendment protects individuals against the deprivation of 

liberty or property by the government without due process. “A 

section 1983 claim based upon procedural due process . . . has 

three elements: (1) a liberty or property interest protected by 

the Constitution; (2) a deprivation of the interest by the 

government; (3) lack of process.” Portman v. County of Santa 

Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 1993). The essential 

requirements of due process are notice and an opportunity to 

respond, i.e., opportunity to present reasons, either in person 

or in writing, why proposed action should not be taken. 

Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 

(1985). However, an individual is only entitled to procedural 

due process if he was deprived of a protected property or 

liberty interest. See Clements v. Airport Authority of Washoe 

County, 69 F.3d 321, 331 (9th Cir. 1995). 

 A government employee has a constitutionally protected 

property interest in continued employment when the employee has 

a legitimate claim of entitlement to the job. Portman, 995 F.2d 

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at 904 (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 

(1972)). Laws, rules or understandings derived from independent 

sources such as state law create such claims of entitlement. 

Portman, 995 F.2d at 904. The existence of an entitlement 

amounting to a property right may be established through 

agreement, express or implied, limiting the public employer’s 

right to dismiss absent sufficient cause. Figueroa v. Housing 

Authority, 131 Cal.App.3d 528, 532 (1982). If an employee is 

subject to discharge only for cause, then the claimant has a 

property interest which is entitled to constitutional 

protection. Id. However, a mere expectation that employment 

will continue does not create a property interest. Portman, 995 

F.2d at 904. Thus, if under state law, employment is at-will, 

then the claimant has no property interest in the job. Id. 

“The liberty interest protected by the due process clause 

encompasses an individual’s freedom to work and earn a living.” 

Portman, 995 F.2d at 907 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

“[W]hen the government dismisses an individual for reasons that 

might seriously damage his standing in the community, he is 

entitled to notice and a hearing to clear his name.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). However, in order to 

implicate constitutional liberty interests, the reasons for 

dismissal must be sufficiently serious to “stigmatize” or 

otherwise burden the individual so that he is not able to take 

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advantage of other employment opportunities. Id. Injury to 

reputation standing alone does not violate the Due Process 

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Wenger v. Monroe, 282 F.3d 

1068, 1074 (9th Cir. 2002). Rather, due process protections 

apply only if a plaintiff is subjected to “stigma plus,” i.e., 

if the government makes a charge against a plaintiff that might 

seriously damage his standing and associations in the community, 

and (1) the accuracy of the charge is contested, (2) there is 

some public disclosure of the charge, and (3) it is made in 

connection with the termination of employment or the alteration 

of some right or status recognized by state law. Id. A 

government employee is entitled to a name-clearing hearing “if 

the employer creates and disseminates a false and defamatory 

impression about the employee in connection with his 

termination.” Brady v. Gebbie, 859 F.2d 1543, 1553 (9th Cir. 

1988) (internal quotation marks omitted).

1. Due Process Violation Premised on Protected Property 

Interest

 Anthoine maintains that Defendants deprived him of a 

constitutionally protected property interest in continued 

employment by terminating him without providing an opportunity 

to contest the charges in a pre-termination hearing. To support 

this claim, Anthoine did not point to a statute, rule or policy 

giving him a property interest in continued employment; rather, 

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he points to a provision of NCCC’s personnel rules ostensibly 

for the purpose of demonstrating that NCCC had a policy of 

corrective discipline, and that such a policy is inconsistent 

with a policy of at-will employment. In other words, Anthoine 

points to the provision for the purpose of demonstrating that he 

was only terminable for cause. Anthoine’s argument is misplaced 

and unpersuasive. 

This provision, titled, “Employee Discipline Procedures,” 

sets forth the purpose and reasons for taking disciplinary 

action against employees as well as the steps and procedures to 

be followed in disciplining an employee. This provision states, 

in relevant part, that “the purpose of disciplinary action is to 

improve employee performance” and that “[d]isciplinary actions 

are corrective and progressive in nature.” The Court finds this 

evidence, standing alone, insufficient to avoid summary judgment 

because it does not establish a triable issue of material fact 

as to whether Anthoine was only terminable for cause, that is, 

it does not demonstrate that Anthoine had a property interest 

which is entitled to constitutional protection. See Davis v. 

Consolidated Freightways, 29 Cal.App.4th 354, 367 (1994) (the 

use of a “progressive discipline” policy does not rebut the 

presumption of at-will employment). Moreover, the Court finds 

that this claim does not survive summary judgment because the 

undisputed facts demonstrate that NCCC complied with procedural 

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due process requirements insofar as it provided Anthoine proper 

notice of the charges, an explanation of the evidence, and an 

opportunity to be heard prior to termination. See Clements, 69 

F.3d at 331 (Under a due process analysis, plaintiff must 

receive notice and an opportunity to be heard “before he is 

deprived of any significant property interest.”). An 

“elaborate” pre-termination hearing is not required; rather, 

only “some kind of hearing” must be afforded the employee prior 

to termination. Id. at 332. “The essential requirements of 

this pre-termination process are notice and an opportunity to 

respond.” Id. (emphasis in original). Here, it is undisputed 

that Anthoine received notice of his termination, in writing, 

from Brown on May, 20 2005, outlining the reasons for his 

termination. It is also undisputed that this notice expressly 

advised Anthoine that he had the right to respond to the charges 

against him prior to the effective date of his termination by 

contacting the Interim Director of NCCC and/or by appealing the 

decision to the Board. Anthoine does not dispute receiving this 

letter, nor its contents. Thus, the notice requirement was met. 

 As to whether Anthoine received the requisite meaningful 

opportunity to respond, it is undisputed that Anthoine requested 

a hearing before the Board on May 25, 2005, and that on May 26, 

2005, the parties mutually agreed to forego the hearing before 

the Board so they could arbitrate, among other things, whether 

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Anthoine’s termination was appropriate under NCCC’s personnel 

rules. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Anthoine 

was afforded a sufficient opportunity to be heard prior to his 

termination to satisfy constitutional due process requirements. 

The fact that Anthoine chose to arbitrate the propriety of his 

termination rather than present his case to the Board does not 

make the process afforded to him constitutionally deficient. 

Accordingly, summary adjudication is granted in favor of 

Defendants on Anthoine’s due process protected property interest 

claim. 

2. Due Process Violation Premised on Protected Liberty 

Interest 

Anthoine maintains that Defendants deprived him of a 

constitutionally protected liberty interest by publishing false 

reasons for his termination without providing a pre-termination 

name clearing hearing. The Court disagrees. The undisputed 

evidence demonstrates that the reasons for Anthoine’s dismissal 

(e.g., unsatisfactory performance, insubordination, and 

discourteous treatment of the public or other employees) were 

not sufficiently serious to “stigmatize” or otherwise burden 

Anthoine such that he is unable to take advantage of other 

employment opportunities. See Portman, 995 F.2d at 907 

(“Charges that carry the stigma of moral turpitude such as 

dishonesty or immorality may implicate a liberty interest, but 

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charges of incompetence or inability to get along with others do 

not.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gray v. 

Union County Intermediate Educ. Dist., 520 F.2d 803, 806 (9th 

Cir. 1975) (charges of “insubordination, incompetence, hostility 

toward authority, and aggressive behavior” are insufficiently 

stigmatizing to implicate a constitutional liberty interest). 

Here, none of the stated reasons for Anthoine’s termination 

implicate a liberty interest. The record in this case reflects 

that the charges against Anthoine focus on his inability to 

perform his job satisfactorily, follow directions and treat 

people courteously, not on dishonesty or moral turpitude. As 

such, the charges do not infringe on a liberty interest. 

Accordingly, because the charges against Anthoine do not 

implicate a liberty interest, and because Antoine was provided 

an opportunity to be heard prior to his termination, summary 

adjudication is granted in favor of Defendants on Anthoine’s due 

process protected liberty interest claim. 

E. Fourth and Fifth Claims: Wrongful Discharge in Violation of

Public Policy

 Defendants argue that summary adjudication is appropriate 

with respect to Anthoine’s wrongful discharge in violation of 

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public policy claims because Anthoine was not terminated based 

on free speech retaliation or sex discrimination.7

 Under California law an employer may be held liable for 

wrongful termination if it discharges an employee in 

contravention of fundamental public policy. Tameny v. Atlantic 

Richfield Co., 27 Cal.3d 167, 177 (1980); Green v. Ralee

Engineering Company, 19 Cal.4th 66 (1998). To establish a claim 

of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy under 

California law, plaintiff must show: (1) that she was terminated 

from her employment; (2) that the termination was a violation of 

public policy, i.e., that there was a nexus between the 

termination and the plaintiff’s status or protected activity; 

and (3) damages. Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 7 Cal.4th 

1238, 1258-59 (1994). Tort claims for wrongful discharge 

typically arise when an employer retaliates against an employee 

for “(1) refusing to violate a statute, (2) performing a 

statutory obligation, (3) exercising a statutory right or 

 

7

 As an initial matter, the Court notes that Anthoine’s 

Fourth and Fifth claims for relief can only be brought against 

NCCC. Under California law, it is well established that only an 

employer can be liable for the tort of wrongful discharge in 

violation of public policy. Khajavi v. Feather River Anesthesia 

Medical Group, 84 Cal.App.4th 32, 53 (2000). Accordingly, to 

the extent that Anthoine seeks to bring such claims against 

Newton and Brown, the Court grants summary adjudication in their 

favor. 

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privilege, or (4) reporting an alleged violation of a statute of 

public importance.” Id. at 1256 (citations omitted). 

1. Wrongful Discharge Premised on Violation of California 

Constitution and WIA

 Anthoine’s Fourth claim for relief seeks to state a claim 

for wrongful discharge in violation of fundamental public 

policies, namely the free speech clause of the California 

Constitution and the policies embedded in the WIA. 

Specifically, Anthoine claims he was retaliated against for 

complaining about violations of the WIA. However, as discussed 

above, because Anthoine did not demonstrate that the speech in 

question is constitutionally protected under the First 

Amendment, he cannot establish that he was wrongfully terminated 

in contravention of a fundamental policy of the California 

Constitution. With respect to Anthoine’s claim that he was 

wrongfully discharged in violation of the public policies 

embedded in the WIA, the Court finds that Anthoine failed to 

establish a genuine issue for trial with regard to this claim. 

Anthoine did not identify the specific provisions of the WIA 

that would be violated by his termination. Anthoine’s vague 

charge that the speech at issue is protected by the policies 

embedded in the WIA puts the Court in the position of having to 

guess the nature of the public policies involved in this claim. 

This kind of showing is insufficient to create a triable issue 

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of fact justifying a trial. See Turner, 7 Cal.4th at 1256-57. 

Accordingly, summary adjudication is granted in favor of 

Defendants on Anthoine’s wrongful discharge in violation of 

public policy claim premised upon the free speech clause of the 

California Constitution and the policies embedded in the WIA. 

2. Wrongful Discharge Premised on FEHA Violation

Anthoine’s Fifth claim for relief seeks to state a claim 

for wrongful discharge in violation of the public policies 

embedded in Government Code §§ 12940 et seq., the California 

Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), which forbids 

employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of 

gender. However, for the reasons discussed above, because 

Anthoine failed to establish that Defendants’ legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for his termination were not pre-textual, 

and therefore failed to establish a meritorious gender 

discrimination claim, Anthoine similarly cannot establish a 

violation of FEHA. See Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 

917, 923 (9th Cir. 2000) (California courts apply the McDonnell 

Douglas burden shifting approach to claims brought pursuant to 

FEHA and apply the same guiding legal principles). In other 

words, because Anthoine did not show that he was wrongfully 

terminated based on gender discrimination, he cannot show that 

he was wrongfully terminated based on a violation of the public 

policies embedded in FEHA. See Esberg v. Union Oil Co., 28 

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Cal.4th 262, 272 (2002) (failure to establish a violation of 

FEHA is fatal claim to a claim for wrongful termination in 

violation of public policy based on FEHA). Accordingly, summary 

adjudication is granted in favor of Defendants on Anthoine’s 

wrongful discharge in violation of public policy claim premised 

on FEHA. 

F. Sixth Claim: Defamation

 Defendants argue that summary adjudication is appropriate 

with respect to Anthoine’s defamation claim because Defendants 

did not publish any defamatory statements about Anthoine, and 

because Anthoine was not strongly compelled to publish 

statements regarding his termination. The Court agrees. 

 “Defamation is an invasion of the interest in reputation. 

The tort involves the intentional publication of a statement of 

fact which is false, unprivileged, and has a natural tendency to 

injure or which causes special damage.” Ringler Associates Inc. 

v. Maryland Cas. Co., 80 Cal.App.4th 1165, 1179 (2000). 

“Publication, which may be written or oral, is defined as a 

communication to some third person who understands both the 

defamatory meaning of the statement and its application to the 

person to whom reference is made.” Id. Publication to a single 

individual is sufficient to satisfy the publication element of a 

defamation claim. Id. In all cases of alleged defamation the 

truth of the offensive statements or communication is a complete 

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defense against civil liability, regardless of bad faith or 

malicious purpose. Id. at 1180. 

 Generally, when a defamed person voluntarily repeats a 

libelous communication to others, the originator of the 

defamatory statement is not liable for any ensuing damage. 

McKinney v. County of Santa Clara, 110 Cal.App.3d 787, 796 

(1980). However, there is an exception to this rule “where the 

originator of the defamatory statement has reason to believe 

that the person defamed will be under a strong compulsion to 

disclose the contents of the defamatory statement to a third 

person.” Id. A “strong compulsion” may exist when a job seeker 

must tell a prospective employer the reasons he was terminated 

in order to explain away a negative job reference from his 

former employer. Live Oak Publishing Co. v. Cohagan, 234 

Cal.App.3d 1277, 1287 (1991); see also Davis, 29 Cal.App.4th at 

373 (Self-publication of alleged defamatory statements may be 

imputed to the originator of the statement if the person defamed 

is operating under a strong compulsion to republish the 

defamatory statement, such as if a job seeker must tell a 

prospective employer what is in his personnel file in order to

explain away a negative job reference.). 

 In the present case, Anthoine does not argue that 

Defendants published the reasons for his termination to any 

third party; rather, he argues that he self-published the 

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alleged defamatory statements to prospective employers because 

he felt “strongly compelled” to explain the reasons for his 

termination. However, because Anthoine failed to show that NCCC 

ever gave him a negative job reference, or that he had reason to 

believe they would do so, the Court finds that Anthoine failed 

to raise a triable issue of material fact as to whether he was 

“strongly compelled” to publish the allegedly defamatory 

statements such that the publication may be imputed to NCCC. 

Accordingly, summary adjudication is granted in favor of 

Defendants on Anthoine’s defamation claim. 

G. Rule 56(f)

 Anthoine requests a continuance pursuant to Rule 56(f) 

because he was unable to secure the declaration of a witness he 

failed to depose. 

A party requesting a continuance pursuant to Rule 56(f) 

must identify by affidavit the specific facts that further 

discovery would reveal, and explain why those facts would 

preclude summary judgment. Tatum v. City and County of San 

Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090, 1100 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f)). Failure to comply with the requirements of 

Rule 56(f) is a proper ground for denying discovery and 

proceeding to summary judgment. See Weinberg v. Whatcom County, 

241 F.3d 746, 751 (9th Cir. 2001). The burden is on the party 

seeking additional discovery to proffer sufficient facts to show 

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that the evidence sought exists, and that it would prevent 

summary judgment. Chance v. Pac-Tel Teletrac Inc., 242 F.3d 

1151, 1161 n. 6 (9th Cir. 2001). The district court does not 

abuse its discretion by denying further discovery if the movant 

has failed to diligently pursue discovery in the past. Id. 

In the present case, Anthoine requested a continuance 

pursuant to Rule 56(f) in his opposition to summary judgment. 

The Court finds this request plainly inadequate to justify a 

continuance. See Weinberg, 241 F.3d at 751 (references in 

memoranda and declarations to a need for discovery do not 

qualify as motions under Rule 56(f)). Moreover, even assuming 

that Anthoine’s request for a continuance was not procedurally 

deficient, the Court nonetheless finds that Anthoine failed to 

sustain his burden to justify a continuance because he neither 

identified by affidavit the specific facts that further 

discovery would have revealed, nor did he explain why those 

facts would have precluded summary judgment. Nor did Anthoine 

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adequately demonstrate that he diligently pursued his previous 

discovery opportunities. Accordingly, Anthoine’s request for a 

continuance pursuant to Rule 56(f) is denied.8 

III. ORDER 

 For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment is GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court is directed 

to enter judgment in this matter in accordance with this Order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: July 8, 2008 

8

 In light of the foregoing, the Court finds it unnecessary 

to consider Defendants’ objections to evidence submitted by 

Anthoine in support of his opposition to Defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment. Docket at 53. 

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