Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_15-cv-00398/USCOURTS-alsd-1_15-cv-00398-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Branch Banking and Trust Company
Plaintiff
Charles A. Maclay
Defendant
Maclay Construction, Inc.
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

BRANCH BANKING AND TRUST )

COMPANY, successor in interest to )

COLONIAL BANK, by asset acquisition )

from the FDIC, as Receiver for Colonial )

Bank, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-00398-KD-N

)

MACLAY CONSTRUCTION, INC. and )

CHARLES A. MACLAY, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

This action is before the Court on plaintiff Branch Banking and Trust Company’s (BBT) 

motion for summary judgment, brief, and evidentiary material in support. (Docs. 20, 21)

1 Upon 

consideration, and for the reasons set forth herein, BBT’s motion is GRANTED.

I. Factual Background

Defendants Maclay and Maclay Construction did not respond to the motion for summary 

judgment. Therefore, they did not dispute BBT’s statement of undisputed facts. Accordingly, the 

“Court will deem uncontroverted material facts to be admitted solely for the purpose of deciding 

the motion for summary judgment.” S. D. Ala. CivLR 56(d). 

 1 BBT frequently cites Attachment 1 to Exhibit A (doc. 21-1) as the source of true and 

correct copies of the notes, guarantees, mortgages, assignments, allonges, and other documents. 

However, BBT did not provide the Court with page numbers. Attachment 1 consists of fortyeight pages. 

2 Note 1 was the last of a series of notes that were executed in favor of Colonial Bank and 

renewed at various times between July 24, 2006 and August 13, 2008. (Doc. 21-1, p. 3, ¶ 4) 

3

 In the motion for summary judgment, BBT alleges that Maclay executed and delivered 

to Colonial on August 13, 2008, a personal Guarantee whereby he guaranteed all debts owed to 

Colonial under Note 1. (Doc. 21, p. 6) The Court was unable to locate a Guarantee signed on 

August 13, 2008 in Attachment 1 to Exhibit A, Ufen’s Affidavit. Also, Ufen made a sworn 

Case 1:15-cv-00398-KD-N Document 31 Filed 03/22/16 Page 1 of 17
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A. Note 1, Mortgage, and Guarantee

On August 13, 2008, Defendant Maclay Construction, Inc. executed and delivered to 

Colonial Bank a Commercial Promissory Note and Security Agreement (Note 1)2 in the principal 

amount of $250,000.00. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 6; Doc. 9, Defendants' Answer, at ¶ 6; Doc. 21-1, p. 16, 

Attachment 1 to Exhibit A, Affidavit of BBT Vice President Marya Ufen). Under the terms of 

Note 1, Maclay Construction agreed to make payments when due and “[i]f legal proceedings are 

instituted to enforce the terms of this Note,” Maclay Construction agreed “to pay all costs of 

[Colonial Bank] in connection therewith, including reasonable attorney fees.” (Id.) 

Note 1 was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage executed by Maclay Construction, dated 

July 24, 2006, and re-recorded on March 6, 2009, in Mortgage Book 6502, Page 1226, in the 

Office of the Judge of Probate of Mobile County, Alabama. (Doc. 21-1, p. 4, Ufen Affidavit, ¶ 6; 

Doc. 21-1, p. 30-37) 

Maclay Construction defaulted under the terms of Note 1 by failing to pay the full 

amount owed on the maturity date of August 11, 2009. (Doc. 21-1, p. 6, Ufen Affidavit, ¶ 13) 

By reason of the default, BBT became entitled to foreclose on the real property described in the 

Mortgage. The property securing Note 1 was sold at foreclosure sale on April 21, 2010, to BBT, 

the highest bidder, in the amount of $50,050.00. (Doc. 21-1, p. 6, Ufen Affidavit, ¶ 14)

At time of foreclosure, BBT was due $267,678.46 under Note 1. BBT credited the sale 

bid amount of $50,050.00 to the outstanding debt. After credit, BBT is owed $ 217,628.46 under 

Note 1 as of February 9, 2016 (excluding attorney fees, costs, and expenses). BBT is not seeking

additional interest accrued since that time on the Note. (Doc. 21-1, p. 6, Ufen Affidavit, ¶ 17)

 2 Note 1 was the last of a series of notes that were executed in favor of Colonial Bank and 

renewed at various times between July 24, 2006 and August 13, 2008. (Doc. 21-1, p. 3, ¶ 4) 

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Previously on December 13, 2006, Maclay executed a Guarantee3 whereby he guaranteed 

all debts then owing to Colonial Bank by Maclay Construction, or any debts thereafter owed to 

Colonial Bank. (Doc. 21-1, p. 4, Ufen Affidavit, ¶ 8) Under the terms of the “continuing 

Guarantee”, Maclay guaranteed payment of all debts “of every kind and description, whether 

now owing or hereinafter arising out of credit previously, contemporaneously, or hereinafter 

granted” by Colonial Bank to Maclay Construction. (Doc. 21-1, p. 27) Maclay waived “all 

notices hereunder, demand, presentation and any and all notices of protest, default, or 

nonpayment.” (Id.) Maclay also agreed to pay all of Colonial’s “costs incurred to enforce this 

Guarantee, including reasonable attorney fees.” (Id.) 

B. Note 2, Mortgage, and Guarantee 

On October 23, 2008, Maclay Construction executed and delivered to Colonial a 

Commercial Promissory Note and Security Agreement (“Note 2”) in the principal amount of 

$146,000.00. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 21; Doc. 9, Defendants' Answer, at ¶ 21; Doc. 21-1, p. 18-19, 

Attachment 1 to Exhibit A, Ufen Affidavit). Under the terms of Note 2, Maclay Construction 

agreed to make payments when due and “[i]f legal proceedings are instituted to enforce the terms 

of this Note,” Maclay Construction agreed “to pay all costs of [Colonial Bank] in connection 

therewith, including reasonable attorney fees.” (Id.) 

Note 2 was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage executed by Maclay Construction, dated 

December 13, 2006, and recorded on December 14, 2006, in Mortgage Book 6096, Page 1714 in 

the Office of the Judge of Probate of Mobile County, Alabama. (Doc. 21-1, p. 4, Ufen Affidavit, 

 3

 In the motion for summary judgment, BBT alleges that Maclay executed and delivered 

to Colonial on August 13, 2008, a personal Guarantee whereby he guaranteed all debts owed to 

Colonial under Note 1. (Doc. 21, p. 6) The Court was unable to locate a Guarantee signed on 

August 13, 2008 in Attachment 1 to Exhibit A, Ufen’s Affidavit. Also, Ufen made a sworn 

statement that the Guarantee was executed December 13, 2006. (Doc. 21-1, p. 4, ¶ 8) 

Case 1:15-cv-00398-KD-N Document 31 Filed 03/22/16 Page 3 of 17
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¶ 7; Doc. 21-1, p. 38- 42) 

Maclay Construction defaulted under the terms of Note 2 by failing to pay the full 

amounts owed on the maturity date of October 22, 2009. (Doc. 21-1, p. 6, Ufen Affidavit, ¶ 13) 

By reason of the default, BBT became entitled to foreclose on the real property described in the 

Mortgage. The property securing the loans was sold at the foreclosure sale on April 22, 2010, to 

the highest bidder, in the amount of $135,590.00. (Doc. 21-1, p. 6, Ufen Affidavit, ¶ 14)

At time of foreclosure, BBT was owed $153,772.70 for Note 2 and applied the sale bid 

amount of $135,590.00 to the outstanding balance. After giving credit for the foreclosure sale bid 

amount, BBT is owed $18,182.70 under Note 2 as of February 9, 2016 (excluding attorney fees, 

costs, and expenses). BBT is not seeking additional interest that has accrued since that time.

(Doc. 21-1, p. 6, Ufen Affidavit, ¶ 17)

Also, on October 23, 2008, Maclay executed a Guarantee whereby he guaranteed all 

debts then owing to Colonial Bank by Maclay Construction, or any debts thereafter owed to 

Colonial Bank. (Doc. 21-1, p. 4-5, Ufen Affidavit, ¶ 9) Under the terms of the “continuing 

Guarantee,” Maclay guaranteed payment of all debts “of every kind and description, whether 

now owing or hereinafter arising out of credit previously, contemporaneously, or hereinafter 

granted” by Colonial Bank to Maclay Construction. (Doc. 21-1, p. 29) Maclay waived “all 

notices hereunder, demand, presentation and any and all notices of protest, default, or 

nonpayment.” (Id.) Maclay also agreed to pay all of Colonial’s “costs incurred to enforce this 

Guarantee, including reasonable attorney fees.” (Id..) 

C. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s assignment to BBT 

Initially, Colonial Bank owned and held the promissory notes and guarantee agreements. 

On August 14, 2009, Colonial Bank was closed by the Alabama State Banking Department and 

Case 1:15-cv-00398-KD-N Document 31 Filed 03/22/16 Page 4 of 17
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the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation was appointed Receiver. (Doc. 21-1, p. 52-58) 

BB&T purchased substantially all of the assets of Colonial Bank from the FDIC, including the 

Notes and Guarantees at issue. 

BBT now owns and holds Note 1 and Note 2, all modifications and renewals, and the 

associated loan documents, including Maclay’s Guarantees, by way of the Purchase and 

Assumption Agreement with the FDIC (see http:www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/colonialal_P_and_A.pdf), the Assignment of Security Instruments and Other Loan Documents, recorded 

in Book 6642, Page 1636, in the Office of the Judge of Probate of Mobile County, Alabama, 

(doc. 21-1, p. 50-51), and by virtue of the Allonges to Note 1 and Note 2. (Doc. 21-1, p. 11, 17).

II. Standard of Review

“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 56(a). Rule 56(c) governs procedures and provides as follows:

(1) Supporting Factual Positions. A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is 

genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:

(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including 

depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits 

or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of 

the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other 

materials; or

(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or 

presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot 

produce admissible evidence to support the fact.

(2) Objection That a Fact Is Not Supported by Admissible Evidence. A party may 

object that the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented 

in a form that would be admissible in evidence.

(3) Materials Not Cited. The court need consider only the cited materials, but it 

may consider other materials in the record.

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(4) Affidavits or Declarations. An affidavit or declaration used to support or 

oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that 

would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is 

competent to testify on the matters stated. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

BBT, as the party seeking summary judgment, bears the initial responsibility of 

informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the 

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 

affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. 

Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). If the BBT as the moving party “fails to discharge the initial 

burden, then the motion must be denied and the court need not consider what, if any, showing the 

non-movant [Maclay and Maclay Construction] has made.” Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 

1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993); Clark, 929 F.2d at 608.

If BBT carries its initial summary judgment burden, the responsibility shifts to Maclay 

and Maclay Construction “to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Fitzpatrick 

v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d at 1115. If they fail to make a sufficient showing on an essential 

element of their case with respect to which they have the burden of proof, then BBT, the moving 

party, is entitled to summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. In deciding whether the nonmoving parties Maclay and Maclay Construction have met their burden, the evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed and all justifiable inferences drawn in their favor. Tipton v. Bergrohr 

GMBH-Siegen, 965 F.2d 994, 998-99 (11th Cir. 1992) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted); McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003) (On 

motion for summary judgment, “[t]he evidence, and all reasonable inferences, must be viewed in 

the light most favorable to the nonmovant....”)

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III. Analysis

A. Governing Law

 “[A] federal court in a diversity case is required to apply the laws, including principles of 

conflict of laws, of the state in which the federal court sits.” Manuel v. Convergys Corp., 430 

F.3d 1132, 1139 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 

(1941)). Therefore, the Court must decide which state’s law governs this breach of contract 

action between defendants Maclay and Maclay Construction, citizens of Alabama, and BBT, a

citizen of North Carolina. In Alabama, the courts follow the traditional conflict-of-law principles 

of lex loci contractus. Lifestar Response of Ala., Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 17 So. 3d 200, 213 

(Ala. 2009). Accordingly, contract claims are governed by the laws of the state where the 

contract was made, unless the contracting parties chose a particular state’s law to govern their 

agreement, Cherry, Bekaert & Holland v. Brown, 582 So. 2d 502, 506 (Ala. 1991).

Notes 1 and 2 were executed and delivered to Colonial Bank, BBT’s predecessor, in

Mobile, Alabama. Each Note states that “[t]his Agreement has been delivered in the state where 

the Lender is located and shall be construed in accordance with the laws of that State” Thus, the 

Notes are governed by the laws of Alabama. 

The Guarantees do not contain any statement regarding the applicable law. However, 

both show Colonial Bank as the Lender with its location as Mobile, Alabama and that the 

borrower Maclay Construction is located in Mobile, Alabama. Since the Guarantees were made 

in Alabama, and the contracting parties did not chose otherwise, Alabama law controls the 

Guarantees. 

B. Breach of Contract for Note 1 and 2

“A promissory note is a form of contract; therefore, it must be construed under general 

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contract principles.” Merchants Bank v. Head, 161 So.3d 1151, 1154 (Ala. 2014) (citing

Bockman v. WCH, L.L.C., 943 So.2d 789, 795 (Ala. 2006) (quoting Dawkins v. Walker, 794 

So.2d 333, 339 (Ala. 2001), quoting in turn Ex parte Dan Tucker Auto Sales, Inc., 718 So.2d 33, 

35–36 (Ala.1998)). “The elements of a breach-of-contract claim under Alabama law are (1) a 

valid contract binding the parties; (2) the plaintiff's performance under the contract; (3) the 

defendant's nonperformance; and (4) resulting damages.” Shaffer v. Regions Financial Corp., 29 

So.3d 872, 880 (Ala.2009) (internal quotes omitted). 

On motion for summary judgment, BBT argues that it has established a prima facie case 

for enforcement of the Notes. BBT argues that it has produced the Notes and shown that they 

were executed and that it has provided affidavit testimony as to the amounts due and Maclay 

Construction’s failure to make the required payments. BBT also argues that Maclay Construction 

has not established any valid defense to the debt and has not presented any evidence to dispute 

the amount of the debt. Defendant Maclay Construction did not respond to the motion for 

summary judgment. 

The uncontroverted evidence shows that a contract existed between BBT and Maclay 

Construction, i.e., the Notes; that BBT performed under the terms of the Notes by loaning funds 

to Maclay Construction; that Maclay Construction failed to pay the Notes according to their 

terms which resulted in a default on the respective mortgages and two foreclosures; and that 

BBT was damaged by Maclay Construction’s failure to pay.4 The Affidavit of BBT’s Vice 

 4

 In the answer to the complaint, Defendants assert that BBT was not the holder of the 

loan documents and was not otherwise entitled to enforce the Notes. Defendants did not respond 

to the motion for summary judgment and therefore, did not present any evidence to support this 

statement or to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether BBT has standing to enforce 

the Notes. BBT has now presented sufficient evidence that the FDIC was the successor to 

Colonial Bank’s statutory right as a holder of the Notes, and transferred the Notes to BBT for the 

(Continued)

Case 1:15-cv-00398-KD-N Document 31 Filed 03/22/16 Page 8 of 17
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President Ufen is sufficient evidence of Maclay Construction’s failure to make the required 

payments. Ufen stated that “[t]he Company defaulted under the terms of the Notes by failing to 

pay the full amounts owed under Note 1, on the maturity date of August 11, 2009, and under 

Note 2, on the maturity date of October 22, 2009.” (Doc. 21-1, p. 6 ¶13) 

As to the amount due, Ufen stated that after applying the purchase price from the 

foreclosures, BBT was owed $217,628.46 as the balance due on Note 1 and $18,182.70 as the 

balance due on Note 2. (Id., ¶ 17). In support, Ufen provided a copy of the account statement, 

which showed the debt owed at the time of foreclosure and affirmed that the debt amount was 

correct. (Id., ¶ 18; 59-61 (Attachment 2 – Account Statement). See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. 

Vergos, 2012 WL 206169, *2 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 24, 2012) (“Alabama law provides that the proffer 

of a copy of the note and affidavit testimony as to the amounts due under the note, as well as the 

defendant's failure to make the required payments, is sufficient to establish a plaintiff's case to 

recover a note.”) (citing Griffin v. American Bank, 628 So.2d 540, 543 (Ala. 1993) (affidavit 

submitted by bank president)). Accordingly, summary judgment is due to be granted in BBT’s 

favor and judgment entered against Maclay Construction in the amount of $217,628.46 as to 

Note 1 and $ 18,182.70 as to Note 2, for a total amount of $241,952.75 as of February 9, 2016. 

C. Breach of Guarantees

“Every suit on a guaranty agreement requires proof of the existence of the guaranty 

 

purpose of enforcement of the Notes. See Branch Banking and Trust Company v. Imagine CBQ, 

LLC, 2012 WL 1252582, *4 (S.D. Ala. April 13, 2012) (finding that the Purchase and 

Assumption Agreement between the FDIC and BBT and the Assignment from the FDIC to BBT 

were sufficient evidence to establish that BBT had standing to sue to enforce the Notes and 

Guarantees at issue).

Case 1:15-cv-00398-KD-N Document 31 Filed 03/22/16 Page 9 of 17
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contract, default on the underlying contract by the debtor, and nonpayment of the amount due 

from the guarantor under the terms of the guaranty.” Delro Industries, Inc. v. Evans, 514 So.2d 

976, 979 (Ala.1987); see also Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Bynum, 2013 WL 4874322, at *3 

(N.D. Ala. Sept. 12, 2013) (“Because a guaranty agreement is a contract, the elements for a 

breach of guaranty claim are the same as those for a breach of contract claim.”). 

By their terms, the Guarantees are continuing. Generally “to recover under a ... 

continuing guaranty, an additional element, notice to the guarantor of the debtor's default, must 

be proved”, Delro Industries, 514 So.2d at 979, unless the guarantor has waived this notice 

requirement through the terms of the guaranty. RBC Bank v. CMI Electronics, Inc., Slip Copy, 

2010 WL 2719096, *2 (M.D. Ala. Jul. 8, 2010) (providing that “[i]n the case of a continuing 

guaranty, it is also necessary to prove that the guarantor received notice of the debtor's default, 

unless that right has been waived by the terms of the guaranty contract.”).

In that regard, “[t]he language of the guaranty is controlling in determining whether the 

holder of the guaranty is under a duty to notify the guarantor of a default by the principal, and 

notice need not be given when the terms of the guaranty expressly dispense with the need for it.” 

Sharer v. Bend Millwork Systems, Inc., 600 So.2d 223, 226 (Ala.1992) (applying the rule to a 

continuing guaranty); Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Broaderip, 2011 WL 3511774, at *4 (S.D. 

Ala. Aug. 11, 2011) (same). The Guarantees contain an express waiver of the right to receive 

“all notices hereunder[.]” (Doc. 21-1, p. 27, 29) Therefore, based on the terms of the 

Guarantees, Maclay has waived his right to receive notice and BBT need not provide proof of 

notice. 

As to the first element, BBT argues that Maclay executed the continuing Guarantees and

agreed to the terms. The uncontroverted evidence, the sworn statement of BBT’s Vice President 

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Ufen, shows that the Guarantees exist. (Doc. 21-1, p. 4, Ufen Affidavit, ¶ 8; ¶ 9) Maclay does not 

dispute the existence of the Guarantees. Therefore, the first element is met. 

As to the second element, BBT argues that Maclay Construction has defaulted under the 

terms of the underlying contracts, specifically Notes 1 and 2. In support, BBT cites Ufen’s 

Affidavit, which states as follows:

13. The Company defaulted under the terms of the Notes by failing to pay the full 

amounts owed under Note 1, on the maturity date of August 11, 2009, and under 

Note 2, on the maturity date of October 22, 2009. 

Doc. 21-1, p. 6 ¶13). The uncontroverted evidence, Ufen’s sworn statement, shows that Maclay 

Construction defaulted on the terms of the underlying contracts by failing to make payments 

when due. Maclay does not dispute that Maclay Construction has not paid the balance due on the 

Notes. Therefore, the second element is met. 

As to the third element, BBT argues that Maclay failed to pay the debts of Maclay 

Construction. In support, BBT again cites to Ufen’s Affidavit at Paragraph 13, which states that

“[b]y failing to fully and promptly pay the debts of Construction as required under the 

Guarantees, Defendant Construction breached the terms of the Guarantees. (Exhibit A at ¶ 13).” 

(Doc. 21, p. 11) (emphasis added) Reading the sentence in context, use of the phrase 

“Defendant Construction” is apparently an error and BBT meant “Defendant Maclay” had 

breached the terms of the Guarantees. Defendant Maclay did not respond to the motion for 

summary judgment and therefore, did not dispute that he did not pay BBT according to the terms 

of the Guarantees. Also, the Court notes that Maclay admitted in his answer that he “breached 

the terms of ... the guarantees by failing to pay the full amount due on the maturity date.” (Doc. 

9, p. 9, ¶ 37; p. 10, ¶ 42) Accordingly, summary judgment is due to be granted in BBT’s favor 

and judgment entered against Maclay in the amount of $217,628.46 as to Note 1 and $ 18,182.70 

Case 1:15-cv-00398-KD-N Document 31 Filed 03/22/16 Page 11 of 17
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as to Note 2, for a total amount of $241,952.75 as of February 9, 2016. 

D. BBT’s Claim for Attorney Fees and expenses. 

BBT argues that according to the terms of the Notes and Guarantees, Maclay 

Construction and Maclay agreed to pay all costs of collection including a reasonable attorneys 

fee. BBT argues that costs in the amount of $948.54 and a reasonable attorney fees in the amount 

of $5,136.05 have been incurred, for a total amount of $6,084.59. BBT relies upon the Affidavit 

of it counsel, Patrick L.W. Sefton, as to the work performed, time expended, and hourly rates for 

the attorneys, and an itemization of the costs incurred. (Doc. 21-2) 

Under Alabama law, the courts follow “the American rule, whereby attorney fees may be 

recovered if they are provided for by statute or by contract” or “special equity”. Jones v. 

Regions Bank, 25 So.3d 427, 441 (Ala. 2009) (citations omitted); Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. 

Cochran Plastering Co., Inc., 935 So.2d 462, 472 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006) (citations omitted)

(same); see also In re Martinez, 416 F.3d 1286, 1288 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Generally, in federal 

litigation, ... a prevailing litigant may not collect an attorney's fee from his opponent unless 

authorized by either a federal statute or an enforceable contract between the parties.”). Also, a 

contract provision for attorneys’ fees is “susceptible to breach.” Army Aviation Center Federal 

Credit Union v. Poston, 460 So.2d 139, 141 (Ala.1984); see Ierna v. Arthur Murray Int'l, Inc., 

833 F.2d 1472, 1476 (11th Cir.1987) (“When the parties contractually provide for attorneys' fees, 

the award is an integral part of the merits of the case.”). In making the Notes, Maclay 

Construction agreed that “[i]f legal proceedings are instituted to enforce the terms of this Note,” 

it would “pay all costs of the Lender in connection therewith, including reasonable attorney 

fees.” (Doc. 21-1, p. 16, 18) In making the Guarantees, Maclay agreed to “pay all Beneficiary’s 

costs incurred to enforce this Guarantee, including reasonable attorney fees.” (Id., p. 27, 29) 

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Based on the express terms of the Notes and Guarantees, the Court finds that BBT is entitled to 

its costs and reasonable attorney fees. 

In that regard, “[t]he determination of whether an attorney fee is reasonable is within the 

sound discretion of the trial court.” Kiker v. Probate Court of Mobile County, 67 So.3d 865, 867 

(Ala. 2010) (citations omitted). Generally, the courts begin with the lodestar analysis: A

determination of the reasonable hourly rate multiplied by the hours reasonably expended.” Bivins 

v. Wrap It Up, Inc., 548 F.3d 1348, 1350 (11th Cir. 2008); Norman v. Housing Authority of City 

of Montgomery, 836 F. 2d 1292, 1303 (11th Cir. 1988). When making this determination, the 

district court may consider the twelve factors5 identified in Pharmacia Corp. v. McGowan, 915 

So.2d 549, 552–53 (Ala. 2004) (quoting Van Schaack v. AmSouth Bank, N.A., 530 So. 2d 740, 

749 (Ala. 1988)); cf. Bivins, 548 F. 3d at 1350 (addressing the twelve factors6 from Johnson v. 

Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-719 (5th Cir.1974)). “The product of these 

two figures is the lodestar and there is a strong presumption that the lodestar is the reasonable 

sum the attorneys deserve.” Bivins, 548 F.3d at 1350 (internal citations and quotation omitted). 

 5

 “(1) [T]he nature and value of the subject matter of the employment; (2) the learning, skill, and 

labor requisite to its proper discharge; (3) the time consumed; (4) the professional experience and 

reputation of the attorney; (5) the weight of his responsibilities; (6) the measure of success 

achieved; (7) the reasonable expenses incurred; (8) whether a fee is fixed or contingent; (9) the 

nature and length of a professional relationship; (10) the fee customarily charged in the locality 

for similar legal services; (11) the likelihood that a particular employment may preclude other 

employment; and (12) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances.” 

Pharmacia Corp., 915 So.2d at 552–53.

6 “Those factors are: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the 

questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of 

employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the 

fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the 

amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the 

attorneys; (10) the “undesirability” of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional 

relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.” Bivins, 548 F. 3d at 1350 (quoting 

Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-719 (5th Cir.1974)). 

Case 1:15-cv-00398-KD-N Document 31 Filed 03/22/16 Page 13 of 17
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Once the lodestar is calculated, the use of some of these factors may continue when the 

district court considers whether to adjust the lodestar. Association of Disabled Americans v. 

Neptune Designs, Inc., 469 F.3d 1357, 1359 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 

U.S. 424, 434 n.9, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1940 n. 9 (1983)) (noting that the district courts may consider 

the twelve factors outlined in Johnson, but that “many of these factors usually are subsumed 

within the initial calculation of hours reasonably expended at a reasonable hourly rate.”); Bivins, 

548 F.3d at 1352 (finding that the “Johnson factors are to be considered in determining the 

lodestar figure” but “should not be reconsidered in making either an upward or downward 

adjustment to the lodestar—doing so amounts to double-counting.”)

Additionally, the Court may utilize its own “knowledge and expertise” to determine the 

reasonableness of requested attorney's fees. Loranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776, 781 (11th Cir. 

1994). Overall, the movant bears the burden of establishing the “reasonableness” of the 

attorney’s fees by providing specific evidence to support the hours and rates claimed. American 

Civil Liberties Union of Ga. v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 427 (11th Cir. 1999); Taylor Newman 

Cabinetry, Inc. v. Classic Soft Trim, Inc., 436 Fed. Appx. 888, 895 (11th Cir. 2011).

In regard to the work performed, Seldon states that his firm reviewed the loan documents, 

investigated the factual background, sent demand letters to Maclay Construction and Maclay, 

filed the complaint, obtained service, continued to correspond with BBT, discussed the potential 

for settlement, prepared the Rule 26(f) report, prepared and sent interrogatories and requests for 

production, and prepared the summary judgment motion and brief. (Doc. 21-2) 

As to the time expended and the hourly rates, Seldon states that he billed for 25.40 hours 

at an hourly rate of $200.00. He also states that he has practiced since 1996 and that $200.00 per 

hour is within the range of rates charged by lawyers of similar experience. Seldon also states 

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that Brett Hargett, an attorney with seven years of experience, billed for 0.70 hours at an hourly 

rate of $170.00 per hour, and that his hourly rate is within the range charged by lawyers of 

similar experience. Seldon asserts that based upon his experience the fees and expenses sought 

are reasonable in light of the work necessary to prosecute the case, that the fees represent less 

than 3% of the balance owed on the loans, and that this matter has been handled as efficiently as 

possible. (Doc. 21-2) 

Upon consideration of BBT’s submission, the relevant factors, and review of the Court’s 

docket, the Court finds that the work performed and the hours expended are reasonable under the 

circumstances. As BBT stated and as the docket confirms, this has been a straightforward 

enforcement of a debt due with limited motion practice and without extensive or contested 

discovery.

The Court further finds that the hourly rates are reasonable in that they are comparable to 

“the prevailing market rate in the legal community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably 

comparable skills, experience, and reputation.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895–896 n. 11, 

104 S.Ct. 1541 (1984); Norman v. Housing Authority of the City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 

1299 (11th Cir. 1988); American Civil Liberties Union of Ga. v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 437 (11th 

Cir.1999) (The “relevant market” is the “place where the case is filed.”); Branch Banking and 

Trust Co. v. Imagine CBQ, LLC, 2012 WL 1987830, *2 (S.D. Ala. June 4, 2012) (finding that 

$200.00 per hour was a reasonable hourly rate for an attorney with fourteen years of experience 

and that $170.00 was a reasonable hourly rate for an attorney with five years of experience). 

As to costs and expenses, Seldon states that BBT incurred expenses for postage, copies, 

Federal Express, service of process, computerized research, investigation, and court costs. He 

also asserts that the expenses incurred were reasonable in light of the work necessary to 

prosecute the case. (Doc. 21-2) In making the Notes, Maclay Construction agreed that “[i]f 

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legal proceedings are instituted to enforce the terms of this Note,” it would “pay all costs of the 

Lender in connection therewith[.]” (Doc. 21-1, p. 16, 18) In making the Guarantees, Maclay 

agreed to “pay all Beneficiary’s costs incurred to enforce this Guarantee[.]” (Id., p. 27, 29) 

Upon consideration of the terms of the Notes and Guarantees, the Court finds that BBT is 

entitled to recover the costs and expenses as requested. See Peppertree Apartments LTD v 

Peppertree Apartments, 631 So.2d 873, 878 (Ala. 1993) (providing that “[t]he intention of the 

parties controls when a court construes the terms of a promissory note, and that intention is to be 

derived from the provisions of the contract, if the language is plain and unambiguous[ ]”). 

Additionally, Sefton’s Affidavit sufficiently supports a finding that the collection costs and 

expenses incurred are reasonable. Accordingly, BBT is granted the amount of $948.54, for the 

reasonable costs and expenses of collection. 

As previously stated, in making the Guarantees, Maclay guaranteed payment of “all other 

debts, obligations, and liabilities of every kind and description, whether now owing or hereafter 

arising out of credit ... granted by the Beneficiary [(BBT)] to” Maclay Construction and also

agreed to “pay all Beneficiary’s [(BBT’s)] costs incurred to enforce this Guarantee, including 

reasonable attorney fees.” (Id., p. 27, 29) (bracketed text added) Thus, by the terms of the 

Guarantee, Maclay is liable for all reasonable attorney fees, expenses and costs incurred in 

enforcement of the Notes and the Guarantees. 

However, in making the Notes, Maclay Construction agreed that “[i]f legal proceedings 

are instituted to enforce the terms of this Note,” it would “pay all costs of the Lender in 

connection therewith, including reasonable attorney fees.” (Doc. 21-1, p. 16, 18) The terms of 

the Notes do not indicate that Maclay Construction agreed to pay any attorney fees, costs or 

expenses arising from BBT’s efforts to recover from Maclay on the Guarantees. See Synovus 

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Bank v. M/V ACCU V, 2012 WL 4760780, *2 (S.D. Ala. Oct. 4, 2012) (“By this language, 

Accumarine agreed to pay reasonable attorney’s fees arising from the plaintiff’s efforts to 

recover from Accumarine but not such fees associated with the plaintiff’s efforts to recover from 

the various guarantors. Accordingly the plaintiff will not be awarded attorney’s fess and 

expenses incurred in connection with its efforts to recover from the guarantors.”) 

Since Sefton did not delineate which hours of work were expended or the costs and 

expenses incurred for collection of the Notes as opposed to the Guarantees, the Court is unable to 

determine the attorney fees, costs and expenses for which Maclay Construction is liable. 

Accordingly, BBT shall, on or before April 4, 2016, supplement its submission with sufficient 

evidence to establish the work expended, costs, and expenses related to enforcement of the 

Notes. 

IV. Conclusion

Upon consideration, and for the reasons set forth herein, the Court finds that there is no 

genuine dispute of material fact and that BBT is entitled to judgment as a matter of law regarding 

Maclay Construction’s breach of the Notes and Maclay’s breach of the Guarantees. Accordingly, 

BBT’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. 

Final judgment shall issue by separate document as provided in Rule 58(a) of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure upon resolution of the attorney fees, costs and expenses incurred in 

regard to enforcement of the Notes. 

DONE and ORDERED this the 21st day of March 2016. 

/s/ Kristi K. DuBose

KRISTI K. DuBOSE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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