Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-10-05043/USCOURTS-caDC-10-05043-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Hillary Rodham Clinton
Appellee
Matthew Joseph McGrath
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 23, 2011 Decided January 27, 2012

No. 10-5043

MATTHEW JOSEPH MCGRATH,

APPELLANT

v.

HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, SECRETARY OF STATE, IN HER

OFFICIAL CAPACITY,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:05-cv-02011)

Leslie D. Alderman, III argued the cause for appellant. 

With him on the briefs was William Aramony.

Brian P. Hudak, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellee. With him on the brief were Ronald C. Machen, Jr.,

U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

Before: ROGERS, GARLAND, and BROWN, Circuit Judges.

USCA Case #10-5043 Document #1355058 Filed: 01/27/2012 Page 1 of 14
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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

GARLAND, Circuit Judge: Plaintiff Matthew McGrath

contends that his supervisor at the Department of State gave him

negative performance reviews in retaliation for his opposition to

discriminatory conduct, in violation of Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964. The district court granted the Department’s

motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case. Because

no reasonable juror could conclude that McGrath’s supervisor

unlawfully retaliated against him, we affirm.

I

McGrath served as a Foreign Service Officer in the State

Department from 1984 until 2004. The events at issue in this

case began in September 2001, when McGrath became unit

chief of the Cultural Programs Division, an office within the

Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. 

McGrath was responsible for supervising six program officers

and two administrative assistants. His difficulties with his own

supervisor, Van S. Wunder III, began soon after McGrath started

his job and accelerated in the spring of 2002, when Wunder sent

him a memorandum on March 8 that sharply criticized his

performance. This memorandum was followed by a negative

Employee Evaluation Report (EER), which both parties agree

was based largely on the March 8 memorandum. A second

negative EER followed the first, identical except that it was

approved by Wunder’s supervisor, who added his own critical

comments. 

Soon thereafter, McGrath was involuntarily removed from

his position as unit chief. For several months, he remained

employed by the Department but without an assignment. 

Although he was eventually transferred to another unit, he was

terminated altogether in 2004. McGrath alleges, and the

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Department does not dispute, that the decision to terminate him

was “based in substantial part” on the 2002 EERs. McGrath v.

Clinton, 674 F. Supp. 2d 131, 139 (D.D.C. 2009). 

In 2005, McGrath filed a complaint in district court

charging the State Department with, inter alia, retaliating against

him in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-3(a),

2000e-16(a).1 McGrath is a white male. The core of his charge

is that Wunder, also a white male, tried to force him to

document performance deficiencies of the only AfricanAmerican program officer in the unit, Ms. E.J. Montgomery, for

discriminatory reasons and with an eye to her eventual

termination. According to McGrath, when he refused to do so,

Wunder retaliated by giving him unfavorable employment

reviews that eventually led to his own termination. 

The district court found that the Department “provide[d] a

legitimate, non-retaliatory justification for the plaintiff’s

negative evaluation reports and his involuntary curtailment,”

McGrath, 674 F. Supp. 2d at 145, and that McGrath failed to

produce evidence from which a reasonable jury could find the

State Department retaliated against him for taking protected

action, id. at 147. Accordingly, the court granted the

Department’s motion for summary judgment. McGrath now

appeals.2

 

1

Before filing his complaint in district court, McGrath filed a

complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

(EEOC) that alleged similar grievances. The EEOC found in favor of

the State Department on all counts. McGrath v. U.S. Dep’t of State,

EEOC Case No. 100-2003-08249X (May 19, 2005) (J.A. 127-38). 

Both parties rely in part on testimony taken during the EEOC

proceedings, which this opinion cites as “EEOC Tr. at __.”

2

In addition to alleging retaliation, McGrath’s complaint raised

several other claims that the district court also dismissed on summary

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II

We review the district court’s decision to grant summary

judgment de novo. Waterhouse v. District of Columbia, 298

F.3d 989, 991 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The court may grant summary

judgment only if there is “no genuine dispute as to any material

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed R. Civ. P. 56(a). For a dispute about a material fact to be

“genuine,” the evidence must be such that “a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

Title VII prohibits federal agencies from discriminating

against their employees based on race or sex. 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-16(a). It also makes it unlawful to “discriminate

against” -- i.e., retaliate against -- an employee “because he has

opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by

this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); see Calhoun v.

Johnson, 632 F.3d 1259, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 2011). To prove

unlawful retaliation, a plaintiff must show: (1) that he opposed

a practice made unlawful by Title VII; (2) that the employer

took a materially adverse action against him; and (3) that the

employer took the action “because” the employee opposed the

practice.3

 The State Department does not dispute that the

judgment. A special panel of this court granted the State

Department’s motion for summary affirmance as to all claims other

than the retaliation claim that we address here. See Order, McGrath

v. Clinton, No. 10-5043 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 10, 2010).

3

Although these are often described as the elements that a

plaintiff must show to establish a “prima facie” case of retaliation, see,

e.g., Jones v. Bernanke, 557 F.3d 670, 677 (D.C. Cir. 2009), they are

also the elements that a plaintiff must ultimately prove in order to win

his case. The first and third elements derive from Title VII’s express

statutory language. The second is the Supreme Court’s gloss on the

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actions it took against McGrath -- giving him poor performance

reviews that eventually resulted in his termination -- were

materially adverse. The following sections address the

remaining two elements of McGrath’s cause of action for

retaliation.

A

Title VII bars federal agencies from retaliating against an

employee because he has opposed “a practice made an unlawful

employment practice” by the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a);

see Calhoun, 632 F.3d at 1261. We have interpreted this phrase

as extending to a practice that the employee reasonably and in

good faith believed was unlawful under the statute. George v.

Leavitt, 407 F.3d 405, 417 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Parker v. Balt. &

Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see Clark

Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270-71 (2001) (noting

this interpretation, but declining to rule on its propriety “because

even assuming it is correct, no one could reasonably believe that

the incident recounted . . . violated Title VII”). But if the

practice the employee opposed is not one that could reasonably

and in good faith be regarded as unlawful under Title VII, this

element is not satisfied. See Clark Cnty., 532 U.S. at 271.

McGrath alleges that his specific act of “opposition” was

his resistance to Wunder’s alleged instruction that he document

phrase “discriminate against.” See Burlington Northern & Santa Fe

Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 56 (2006). Where, as here, the

employer has proffered a non-retaliatory explanation for a materially

adverse employment action, the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s prima

facie case is no longer in issue, and “the only question is whether the

employee’s evidence creates a material dispute on the ultimate issue

of retaliation.” Jones, 557 F.3d at 678; see Kersey v. Wash. Metro.

Area Transit Auth., 586 F.3d 13, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2009).

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deficiencies in Montgomery’s work -- particularly, her inability

to meet deadlines -- in a manner that McGrath claims was

intended to prepare the way for her termination.4 McGrath

asserts that the instruction was an unlawful employment practice

under Title VII because it was motivated by Montgomery’s race

and gender.

 According to McGrath, soon after he started his job in the

Cultural Programs Division in 2001, Wunder spoke to him about

Montgomery’s work. Montgomery suffers from a disability, and

McGrath charges that Wunder told him to start documenting her

job performance with the goal of eventually firing her. When he

refused to do as he was told, McGrath claims that Wunder

shortened the home leave that McGrath had planned to take that

winter. He further alleges that when he returned from leave on

January 7, 2002, Wunder again told him to document

Montgomery’s performance. This admonition was allegedly

repeated at a meeting on March 8, at which Wunder gave him a

memorandum criticizing his performance and said that it would

“reflect badly” on him if he did not begin to document

Montgomery’s deficiencies. McGrath Br. at 6. McGrath

charges that this constituted a threat to give him negative

employment reviews and then to fire him, which is what

ultimately transpired.

4

In the district court, McGrath also cited as “acts of opposition”

complaints he filed with his departmental equal employment officer,

and later with the EEOC. On appeal, however, he stated that these

were not really relevant to the retaliation analysis because they were

filed after Wunder had already sent him the negative March 8, 2002

performance memorandum. As McGrath’s counsel explained at oral

argument: “[B]y March 8, Wunder’s already decided that McGrath is

gone, voluntarily or involuntarily. So anything that happens after

March 8 is irrelevant -- it’s a foregone conclusion that McGrath is

gone.” Oral Arg. Recording at 22:52-23:07.

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 The evidence, however, does not support McGrath’s

allegation that he opposed an employment practice that he could

reasonably have regarded as unlawful under Title VII. 

According to McGrath’s testimony at an EEOC hearing, see

supra note 1, he told Wunder that he believed Wunder’s

treatment of Montgomery was racially discriminatory. EEOC

Tr. at 196 (J.A. 824). But McGrath’s unsupported assertion --

whether made to Wunder or anyone else -- neither makes the

accusation true nor makes it reasonable for him to have believed

it was true. McGrath also claimed that Wunder told him: “If

you’re not going to do this [document Montgomery’s

performance deficiencies], then it’s going to reflect badly on

you.” Id. at 193 (J.A. 821). As McGrath describes it, however,

this was at worst a threat to downgrade McGrath’s own

employment review if he refused to follow a management

directive -- an act that Title VII does not bar unless it is

accompanied by unlawful animus. And there is nothing in

McGrath’s description of his conversation with Wunder to

suggest that it was. 

When asked at oral argument for his best evidence that

Wunder’s directive was motivated by discrimination, McGrath

pointed to Wunder’s own description of their January 7

exchange regarding Montgomery. See Oral Arg. Recording at

6:50-7:50. That description was as follows:

Q: Did you tell Mr. McGrath to document Ms.

Montgomery’s performance and either say or suggest

that he do so in order to use this information to

terminate her employment? . . . .

A: I did not instruct Mr. McGrath to document Ms.

Montgomery’s performance for the purposes of

possible termination. [In] late December 2001 or early

January 2002, I had a conversation with Mr. McGrath

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concerning his staff. Mr. McGrath raised the issue of

limitations he perceived in the performance of various

members of his staff, and noted that one of these

limitations concerned Ms. Montgomery, who suffers

from [a] . . . medical condition [that] makes it difficult

for Ms. Montgomery to type, which means that it is

difficult for her to prepare the many written

communications that Program Officers must complete.

. . . I advised Mr. McGrath that EEO regulations

require that appropriate compensation be made for

employees with disabilities, but that if performance

after compensation has been made is still not adequate,

then it was the duty of the supervisor to deal with the

situation. I noted that EEO regulations do not require

that an employee be kept in the same position if that

employee cannot perform at an acceptable level after

compensatory steps have been taken. 

Wunder Decl. at 3-4 (J.A. 398-99) (emphases added). 

As indicated by the first passage italicized above, it was

McGrath -- not Wunder -- who brought up Montgomery’s

alleged performance limitations. Indeed, two pages later,

Wunder states that he “was not in a position to directly observe

Ms. Montgomery’s performance,” and that, to his “direct

knowledge, there were no major duties that Ms. Montgomery

was not proficient at performing.” Id. at 6 (J.A. 401). This

hardly suggests Wunder was implying that McGrath should

terminate Montgomery, let alone for an unlawful reason. 

As indicated by the second italicized passage, it is also clear

that Wunder was not telling McGrath that he should terminate

Montgomery, but rather that he should accommodate her,

advising “that EEO regulations require that appropriate

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compensation be made for employees with disabilities.” Indeed,

later in the same paragraph Wunder states that he told McGrath:

If Ms. Montgomery was indeed limited in her

performance, then Mr. McGrath had the first line of

responsibility for working with her to identify

compensatory steps that could respond to her physical

condition. I mentioned such examples as providing

voice-recognition software to assist her in drafting

correspondence or shifting duties within the Cultural

Programs Division to lessen the correspondence

requirements on Ms. Montgomery.

Id. at 4 (J.A. 399). 

McGrath emphasizes Wunder’s concession that he also told

him that “EEO regulations do not require an employee to be

kept in the same position if that employee cannot perform at an

acceptable level after compensatory steps have been taken.” But

this does no more than correctly state the law under the

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et

seq. See McFadden v. Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll,

LLP, 611 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Moreover, as there was no

suggestion in this exchange that compensatory steps would in

fact be insufficient, these words cannot reasonably be read as

suggesting a plan to terminate Montgomery. Indeed, McGrath

does not dispute that Wunder rated Montgomery as “excellent”

on her own 2002 EER; that Wunder himself took steps to

accommodate her disability by obtaining voice recognition

software; and that Montgomery was still employed in the unit as

of the time the lawsuit was filed. See Def.’s Statement of

Undisputed Facts ¶¶ 135-39 (J.A. 669-70); Pl.’s Statement of

Disputed Facts at 22 (J.A. 740) (no response). 

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Finally, this exchange does not mention -- directly or by

implication -- race, gender, or any other motive prohibited by

Title VII. Even if it could be read as suggesting discrimination

based on disability (and we do not believe it can), such

discrimination is not an act “made unlawful by this subchapter”

-- i.e., by Title VII -- and hence is not subject to its antiretaliation provision. Although discrimination based on

disability is made unlawful by the ADA, McGrath’s complaint

relies solely on Title VII and never mentions the ADA or its

anti-retaliation provision, 42 U.S.C. § 12203. In short, there is

nothing in McGrath’s “best evidence” to suggest that the act of

opposition he asserts -- refusing to document Montgomery’s

shortcomings -- had anything to do with opposing a violation of

Title VII.

 Asked at oral argument for any other evidence he had

regarding Wunder’s alleged discriminatory animus, McGrath

cited an affidavit by a former program assistant, LaFaye Proctor,

who stated that “Ms. Montgomery later told me that she

complained about Mr. Wunder to the union and that, as a result,

Mr. Wunder . . . had to go to diversity training classes.” Proctor

Aff. at 2 (J.A. 1208). Regardless of whether such a statement by

Montgomery could support the contention that Wunder harbored

racial animus against her, Proctor would not be permitted to

testify about it at trial because -- coming from Proctor’s mouth

-- it would be pure hearsay. “It therefore counts for nothing” in

an opposition to summary judgment. Gleken v. Democratic

Cong. Campaign Comm., 199 F.3d 1365, 1369 (D.C. Cir. 2000);

see Greer v. Paulson, 505 F.3d 1306, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 

Montgomery’s own testimony, by contrast, was not that she

went to her union representative because of something Wunder

said or did to her, but rather because she heard “rumors” that he

was going to fire her. EEOC Tr. at 354-55 (J.A. 614). McGrath

concedes, however, that it was he -- not Wunder -- who spread

such rumors. EEOC Tr. at 199 (J.A. 826). (Montgomery also

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denied knowing anything about Wunder having been sent to

diversity training. EEOC Tr. at 355 (J.A. 614)).5

In sum, because McGrath fails to offer evidence from which

a jury could conclude that he opposed a practice that could

“reasonably be thought” to violate Title VII, he fails to satisfy

the first element of his cause of action. George, 407 F.3d at

417; see Clark Cnty., 532 U.S. at 270.

B

McGrath has no more luck with his effort to establish the

third element of a Title VII retaliation claim: that the employer

took a materially adverse action against the employee “because”

the employee opposed a protected practice. To establish this

element, the employee must proffer evidence from which a

reasonable jury could infer the employer’s retaliatory intent. 

Montgomery v. Chao, 546 F.3d 703, 706 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

Although such evidence may be direct, circumstantial, or both,

see McGill v. Munoz, 203 F.3d 843, 845 (D.C. Cir. 2000),

McGrath has proffered none at all.

We have already discussed the principal direct evidence

upon which McGrath relies: his exchange with Wunder

regarding Montgomery. As we have noted, there was nothing in

that conversation from which a jury could reasonably conclude

that Wunder’s subsequent negative reviews of McGrath were in

retaliation for his opposition to protected activity. 

5

The remainder of the evidence upon which McGrath relies is

even weaker than the evidence discussed in the text, and even less

closely related to the asserted act of discrimination (against

Montgomery) that McGrath claims to have opposed. Accordingly, it

does not merit further discussion.

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In the absence of direct evidence of retaliation, we analyze

a plaintiff’s claims under the framework of McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Calhoun, 632 F.3d at

1261; Lathram v. Snow, 336 F.3d 1085, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 

 Where, as here, “the employer has proffered a legitimate, [nonretaliatory] reason for a challenged employment action, the

‘central question’ is whether ‘the employee produced sufficient

evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer’s

asserted [non-retaliatory] reason was not the actual reason and

that the employer intentionally [retaliated] against the

employee” in violation of Title VII. Calhoun, 632 F.3d at 1261

(quoting Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 494

(D.C. Cir. 2008)). McGrath’s contention is that the

Department’s rationale for his negative reviews was so patently

pretextual that it justifies an inference that the true reason was

retaliation for his opposition to Wunder’s allegedly unlawful

direction to document Montgomery’s deficiencies.

The State Department’s rationale for McGrath’s poor

reviews, as reflected in the March 8 memorandum and the two

negative EERs, can be boiled down to two principal concerns: 

(1) McGrath failed to adequately supervise his staff; and (2) he

botched an important assignment that embarrassed his division. 

The record in this case contains detailed descriptions of the

various incidents giving rise to these concerns as well as several

others, and is well documented in the district court’s opinion. 

See McGrath, 674 F. Supp. 2d at 134-38. 

As to the first concern, McGrath does not dispute that,

shortly after he began serving as unit chief of the Cultural

Programs Division, he ceased holding weekly staff meetings. 

See Pl.’s Statement of Disputed Facts ¶ 24 (J.A. 721). By way

of explanation, McGrath says that he did so because he found

the meetings unproductive and thought individual conversations

more useful. But he does not deny that Wunder instructed him

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to resume the meetings and that he failed to heed that

instruction. McGrath Decl. at 16 (J.A. 1066). Nor does

McGrath dispute that at least three members of his staff

complained to Wunder about his performance as a supervisor,

describing McGrath as generally unresponsive to requests for

guidance or feedback. See EEOC Tr. at 375-78 (J.A. 334-35)

(Kathryn Wainscott); id. at 559-60 (J.A. 457) (Leanne Mella). 

Indeed, one employee characterized McGrath’s supervision of

the office as “almost non-existent.” Id. at 297 (J.A. 325) (Susie

Baker). 

With respect to the second concern, the State Department

describes an incident in January of 2002, the central facts of

which McGrath again does not dispute. McGrath had been

tasked with arranging a cultural event set for January 20, two

days after he was scheduled to depart for another leave. At the

event, then-Secretary of State Colin Powell was to present jazz

musician Billy Taylor with a “certificate of appreciation” at the

Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts. When Wunder asked

McGrath before he departed whether there were any important

projects that he had not yet completed, McGrath said there were

none. In fact, however, the certificate had not been printed and

the Secretary’s remarks had not been prepared. Again, McGrath

has an explanation: because Taylor had been ill and Secretary

Powell was scheduled to be away that weekend, McGrath says

he concluded that the ceremony was not going to take place. 

Unfortunately for McGrath, the event did take place, with

Secretary Powell’s wife and Taylor’s daughter substituting for

the principals. Because McGrath had failed to perform his

assigned tasks, someone else had to hastily prepare remarks for

the Secretary’s wife, and she had to present Taylor’s daughter

with a blank certificate. As Wunder told McGrath in an e-mail

to which McGrath never responded, the matter had “blown up

all the way to the Secretary’s office” and “reflect[ed] very badly

on our office and the bureau.” J.A. 1137.

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 Taken together, and relying on facts that McGrath does not

dispute, these incidents constitute legitimate, non-retaliatory

reasons for the negative employment reviews McGrath received. 

McGrath does offer explanations for some of his actions, and he

notes that he made useful contributions on specific programs (a

point his 2002 EERs acknowledge, see J.A. 505, 526). At best,

however, these “responses constitute[] an argument that,

notwithstanding [his] failings, [the Department] should not have

terminated [him] because there were extenuating circumstances

and there were some positive attributes to [his] performance.” 

Waterhouse, 298 F.3d at 995. “But courts are without authority

to ‘second-guess an employer’s personnel decision absent a

demonstrably discriminatory motive,’” and McGrath’s

“responses offer[] no grounds for a rational juror to conclude

that the reason [he] was fired was [retaliation] rather than poor

performance.” Id. (quoting Fishbach v. District of Columbia

Dep’t of Corr., 86 F.3d 1180, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (additional

internal quotation marks omitted)).

III

Because no reasonable juror could find that McGrath

satisfied either of two required elements of Title VII’s cause of

action for unlawful retaliation, the district court’s grant of

summary judgment in favor of the Department of State is

affirmed.

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