Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-02989/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-02989-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Marco Heyward
Plaintiff
United States Government
Defendant

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARCO HEYWARD,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT,

Defendant.

Case No.19-cv-02989-JSC 

ORDER OF REASSIGNMENT 

AND REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION TO 

DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 1

Mr. Marco Heyward, proceeding without an attorney, sues the United States Government 

for allegedly committing gross negligence and medical malpractice when performing his knee 

surgery at the San Francisco Veteran Affairs Medical Center in December 2010. (Dkt. No. 1.) 

Having granted Mr. Heyward’s application to proceed in forma pauperis, (Dkt. No. 9), the Court 

now screens the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and concludes that the complaint is 

deficient and cannot be cured by amendment for the reasons stated below. Because all parties 

have not appeared and consented to magistrate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, this 

matter must be reassigned to a district court judge. See Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 504 (9th 

Cir. 2017) (holding that magistrate jurisdiction “cannot vest until the court has received consent 

from all parties to an action.”). Thus, the Clerk of Court is directed to REASSIGN this case. 

Further, the Court RECOMMENDS that the newly-assigned district court judge DISMISS the 

complaint without leave to amend because it fails to state a plausible claim for relief as a matter of 

law. 

COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS

Mr. Heyward asserts federal subject matter jurisdiction based on federal question 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. (Dkt. No. 1 at 3.) First, Mr. Heyward requests 

reconsideration of a Board of Veterans’ Appeals (“BVA”) decision that denied Mr. Heyward 

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service connection for a right calf disability and residuals of his left knee surgery. (See generally 

Dkt. No. 1.) Second, Mr. Heyward alleges “gross negligence and medical malpractice” resulting 

from his surgery at the San Francisco VA Medical Center (“VAMC”) in December 2010 pursuant 

to section 1346(b) of the Federal Torts Claims Act. (Dkt. No. 1 at 2-3.) Mr. Heyward alleges that 

the San Francisco VAMC provided him with inadequate medical care because the December 2010 

surgery placed his left knee “anatomically lower than his right knee.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 5.) 

Furthermore, Mr. Heyward asserts that the San Francisco VAMC knew or had knowledge of this 

mistake and “tried to shift blame to [him],” constituting “an extreme departure from ordinary 

standard of care.” (Id.) 

LEGAL STANDARD

The Court has a continuing duty to dismiss any case in which a party is proceeding in 

forma pauperis upon a determination that the case is: (1) frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a 

claim on which relief may be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The standard of review under 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2) mirrors that of Rule 12(b)(6). Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012)

(citing Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000)). Thus, the complaint must allege 

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 

A facial plausibility standard is not a “probability requirement” but mandates “more than a 

sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). To avoid dismissal, a complaint must 

contain more than “naked assertion[s],” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-57. “A claim has facial plausibility 

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

When a plaintiff files a complaint without an attorney, the court must “construe the 

pleadings liberally . . . to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 

338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Upon dismissal, selfCase 3:19-cv-02989-MMC Document 13 Filed 07/19/19 Page 2 of 9
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represented plaintiffs proceeding in forma pauperis must be given leave to “to amend their 

complaint unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by 

amendment.” Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228 n.9 (9th Cir. 1984) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

The gravamen of Mr. Heyward’s complaint is that the San Francisco VAMC committed 

gross negligence and medical malpractice when performing his knee surgery in December 2010. 

(See generally Dkt. No. 1.) Mr. Heyward also asserts that the BVA erred in denying his service 

connection claim for right leg disability to include right calf disability allegedly sustained during 

the same “botched” knee surgery in December 2010. (Id.) At the outset, the Court must address 

whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over Mr. Heyward’s claims. 

I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Mr. Heyward asserts subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. section 1331. Federal 

subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 requires a civil action to arise “under the 

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 

A. Reconsideration or Revision of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals Decision

Although not entirely clear, it appears Mr. Heyward seeks reconsideration of the BVA’s 

decision regarding Mr. Heyward’s claims for service connection for right leg disability and 

injuries resulting from his knee surgery. (Dkt. No. 1 at 1.) In the alternative, Mr. Heyward seeks 

a revision of the BVA’s decision based on clear and unmistakable error “for medical complaint for 

damages under duty owed of responsibility and obligation.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 2.) The Court does not 

have jurisdiction to review or revise the BVA’s decision. 

First, the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act (“VRJA”) vests the Court of Appeals for Veterans 

Claims with exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from BVA decisions. See 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a). 

An appeal of a BVA decision must be filed as a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims within 120 days of the BVA decision. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7266. Thus, district courts 

do not have jurisdiction to hear appeals of BVA decisions.

Second, the VJRA states that “the VA ‘shall decide all questions of law and fact necessary 

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to a decision by the Secretary under a law that affects the provisions of benefits by the Secretary to 

veterans.’” Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 678 F.3d 1013, 1023 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting 

38 U.S.C. § 511(a)). Moreover, the VJRA “prohibits review of ‘all questions of law and fact 

necessary to a decision . . . that affects the provision of benefits.’” Id. (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 

511(a)). “In general, review of decisions made in the context of an individual veteran’s VA 

benefits proceedings are beyond the jurisdiction of federal courts outside the review scheme

established by the VJRA.” Id. This provision is intended to “limit outside court intervention in 

the VA decision making process.” Veterans for Common Sense, 678 F.3d at 1023 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Thus, the VJRA “precludes jurisdiction over a claim if it requires the 

district court to review VA decisions that relate to benefits decisions, including any decision made 

by the Secretary in the course of making benefits determinations.” Id. at 1025. 

Here, Mr. Heyward requests reconsideration or revision of the BVA decision. Under the 

VJRA, the Court may not review the decision of the BVA, intervene in the VA decision making 

process, or grant a reconsideration or revision of the decision. Id. at 1023. Additionally, motions 

for reconsideration of BVA decisions and motions for revision based on clear and unmistakable 

error must be filed with the BVA itself. 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.1002(b), 20.1404(c). The final page of 

the BVA decision that was issued to Mr. Heyward instructs Mr. Heyward on the proper method of 

appeal or revision of the BVA’s decision. (Dkt. No. 1 at 33.) 

Accordingly, the Court does not have jurisdiction to review, reconsider, or modify the 

BVA’s decision regarding Mr. Heyward’s service connection claims.

B. Negligence and Medical Malpractice Under Federal Torts Claims Act

Mr. Heyward also asserts federal question jurisdiction based on claims under the Federal 

Torts Claims Act (“FTCA”). (Dkt. No. 1 at 3.) Mr. Heyward identifies section 1346(b) as 

grounds for bringing claims of negligence and medical malpractice against the United States 

Government. (Id.) Section 1346(b) gives district courts “exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on 

claims against the United States, for money damages, . . . for injury or loss of property, or personal 

injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the 

Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).

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Congress added a provision to the VRJA, 38 U.S.C. § 7316, covering how the federal 

government will respond to medical malpractice and negligence suits against VA 

employees. Tunac v. United States, 897 F.3d 1197, 1205 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 

817, 202 L. Ed. 2d 578 (2019). When a plaintiff brings an action against a VA health care 

employee alleging injury from a negligent medical decision, the action may proceed under 

the FTCA and is not barred by the VJRA. Id.

District courts can consider a veteran’s FTCA claims alleging negligence and medical 

malpractice against VA doctors if doing so does not require the district court “to review VA 

decisions that relate to benefits decisions, including any decision made by the Secretary in the 

course of making benefits determinations.” Veterans for Common Sense, 678 F.3d at 1025 

(internal quotes omitted). In other words, the claims of negligence and medical malpractice must 

be separate from the veteran’s benefits determination. Tunac, 897 F.3d 1197 at 1205. Based on 

Mr. Heyward’s allegations, the Court cannot conclude that his claims of gross negligence and 

medical malpractice rest on the BVA’s benefits determination regarding service connection for 

injuries suffered during the surgery. Accordingly, for purposes of section 1915 review, the Court 

has federal question jurisdiction over Mr. Heyward’s negligence claims pursuant to the FTCA. 

II. Sufficiency of the Complaint

As previously discussed, to survive 1915 review, the complaint must allege “enough facts 

to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. The

substantive law governing a plaintiff's FTCA claim is the “law of the place where the act or

omission occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). Plaintiff alleges that the actions at issue took place

in California, so California law governs his gross negligence and medical malpractice claims. See

Littlejohn v. United States, 321 F.3d 915, 924 (9th Cir. 2003). To establish a claim for medical

malpractice under California law, Plaintiff must demonstrate: “(1) the duty of the professional to

use such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members of his profession commonly possess and

exercise; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a proximate causal connection between the negligent

conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the professional’s

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negligence.” Gami v. Mullikin Med. Ctr., 18 Cal. App. 4th 870, 877 (1993) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted).

Mr. Heyward alleges “gross negligence and medical malpractice” by the San Francisco 

VAMC for a “botched” knee surgery. (Dkt. No. 1 at 2.) Mr. Heyward asserts that the San 

Francisco VAMC performed an arthroscopic surgery of his right and left bilateral quadricep 

tendons on December 28, 2010. (Id. at 5.) Mr. Heyward alleges that the VA surgeons surgically 

placed his “left patella anatomically lower than [his] right patella.” (Id. at 2.) “As a result, [the 

lower placement of his left patella] caused marked muscular atrophy of left thigh/quadriceps with 

limitations of extension of left leg: knee ankyloses of extremely unfavorable inflexion of an angel 

of 45 degrees or in dorsiflexion at more than 10 degrees with abduction, adduction, inversion or 

eversion deformity, shortening of the lower extremity, and flat foot acquired with pronounced 

marked pronation, extreme tenderness of plantar surfaces of the feet, marked inward displacement 

and severe spasm of the tendon Achilles.” (Id.) Mr. Heyward further alleges that “the VA was the 

proximate cause of these additional secondary and tertiary disabilities: left thing quadriceps 

muscle atrophy, PTSD: Adjustment Disorder with depression, left knee/right knee, lower back and 

feet, and ankles, upper and lower extremities.” (Id. at 4.) 

These allegations reasonably support an inference that the United State Government “is 

liable for the misconduct alleged” and thus the complaint states a medical malpractice claim 

sufficient to survive 1915 review. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. As discussed below, however, Mr. 

Heyward’s FTCA claim fails because it is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 

III. Statute of Limitations 

 District courts may sua sponte dismiss claims without leave to amend under § 1915(e), 

where it is clear from the face of the complaint that the claims asserted are barred by complete and 

obvious defenses. See Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228 (9th Cir. 1984)1; see also

Herrera v. Ginter, No. CV 12-6652-PA DTB, 2012 WL 4466621, at *3 n.2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 

 

1 The court in Franklin applied the former version of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). As noted in Herrera, 

the former version only allowed for sua sponte dismissal of frivolous and malicious claims. See

2012 WL 4466621, at *3 n.2. 

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2012) (distinguishing former § 1915(d) that “permitted sua sponte dismissal for frivolous and 

malicious claims” from current version § 1915(e)(2) that “mandates sua sponte dismissal not only 

for frivolous and malicious claims, but also claims that fail to state a claim,” and dismissing 

complaint as time-barred), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 12-6652-JAK DTB, 

2012 WL 4470863 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2012).

Before initiating an action under the FTCA, a plaintiff must first exhaust administrative 

remedies by presenting a claim to the appropriate Federal agency and receiving either a final 

written denial or a “deemed” denial based on the agency's lack of response for six months. 28 

U.S.C. § 2675(a). The FTCA further states that “[a] tort claim against the United States shall be 

forever barred unless it is presented within two years after such claim accrues or unless action is 

begun within six months after . . . notice of final denial of claim by the agency to which it was 

presented.” 28 U.S.C. § 2401. Here, Mr. Heyward filed an Administrative Tort Claim on 

November 16, 2011. (Dkt. No. 1 at 3.) The Administrative Tort Claim was denied on June 11, 

2014. (Id.) Mr. Heyward filed this present action on May 30, 2019—almost five years after 

denial of the Administrative Tort Claim. (Dkt. No. 1.) Mr. Heyward’s FTCA claim is thus timebarred because he did not file this action within the six months period. See Crittle v. United 

States, No. C 14-3979 CRB (PR), 2015 WL 7075609, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2015)

(dismissing pro se plaintiff's FTCA claims as time-barred where plaintiff brought claim eight 

months after agency denied his administrative claim). 

CONCLUSION

Mr. Heyward’s complaint fails section 1915 review because the Court lacks jurisdiction 

over his claim for reconsideration or revision of the BVA’s decision and because his FTCA gross 

negligence/malpractice claim is barred by the statute of limitations. The Court thus 

RECOMMENDS that the district court dismiss the complaint with prejudice because leave to 

amend would be futile. In November 2014, Mr. Heyward filed a complaint in the Northern 

District of California against the United States alleging negligence and medical malpractice arising 

from the same December 2010 knee surgery at issue here. See Heyward v. United States 

Gov't, No. 4:14-CV-05114-KAW, 2016 WL 3648660, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 6, 2016). The court 

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dismissed the complaint with prejudice because the statute of limitations barred the claim. Id. at 

*4. Thus, it is clear that amendment cannot cure the deficiencies of Mr. Heyward’s complaint.

Any party may file objections to this report and recommendation with the district court 

judge within fourteen days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 72(b); N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 72. Failure to file an objection may waive the right to review of 

the issue in the district court.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 19, 2019

JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY

United States Magistrate Judge

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARCO HEYWARD,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT,

Defendant.

Case No. 19-cv-02989-JSC 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. 

District Court, Northern District of California.

That on July 19, 2019, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing 

said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by 

depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery 

receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Marco Heyward

P.O. Box 466

Hayward, CA 94543 

Dated: July 19, 2019

Susan Y. Soong

Clerk, United States District Court

By:________________________

Ada Means, Deputy Clerk to the 

Honorable JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY

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