Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00444/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00444-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Wesley Collins
Defendant
Matthew Fogel
Plaintiff
Grass Valley Police Department
Defendant
Michael Hooker
Defendant
Jarod Johnson
Defendant
Gary McClaughry
Defendant
Greg McKenzie
Defendant
Jason Perry
Defendant

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MATTHEW FOGEL 

Plaintiff,

v.

GRASS VALLEY POLICE DEPARTMENT,

et al., 

Defendants. 

 No. Civ. 05-0444 DFL KJM

ORDER

Plaintiff Matthew Fogel (“Fogel”) painted a provocative

message on the back of his car. The police were called and

arrested him. No charges were filed. Fogel now brings suit

against defendants Grass Valley Police Department, Captain Jarod

Johnson (“Johnson”), Sergeant Michael Hooker (“Hooker”), and

Officers Jason Perry (“Perry”), Wesley Collins (“Collins”), Gary

McClaughry (“McClaughry”), and Greg McKenzie (“McKenzie”). 

Plaintiff seeks damages under § 1983, primarily on the theory

that his arrest violated the First Amendment. He also brings

claims based on the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments as well as 

state law claims for false arrest and assault and battery. 

Case 2:05-cv-00444-DFL -KJM Document 36 Filed 02/14/06 Page 1 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2

Defendants move for summary judgment on all claims. The

individual defendants also assert that they are entitled to

qualified immunity. Plaintiff cross moves for summary judgment

on the § 1983 claims. For the reasons stated below, the court

GRANTS defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all claims and

DENIES plaintiff’s motion. 

I.

On May 25, 2004, Fogel painted the following message on his

1970 Volkswagen van: “I am a fucking suicide bomber communist

terrorist! Pull me over! Please, I dare ya! Allah praise the

Patriot Act . . . Fucking JIHAD on the First Amendment! P.S.

W.O.M.D. on Board!” (Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Facts

(“SUF”) ¶ 2.) The lettering was large and evidently intended to

catch public attention. Fogel then visited friends at an

apartment in Grass Valley, California and parked his van in the

parking lot. (Id. ¶¶ 7, 8.) That evening, the Grass Valley

Police Department received a call from a woman, who wished to

remain anonymous, reporting a van with suspicious lettering. 

(Id. ¶¶ 14, 15.) Defendant Hooker was assigned to the report and

went to the location of the van. He initially considered that

the wording was “political satire,” and that no further response

was necessary, but thought it wise to check his judgment by

consulting with his superior, defendant Johnson. (Hooker Dep.

56:1-4; Defs.’ SUF ¶ 16.) 

Johnson took a different view. He told Hooker to “handle

this as a bomb threat” and to take the threat seriously because

Case 2:05-cv-00444-DFL -KJM Document 36 Filed 02/14/06 Page 2 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

the country was at an elevated threat level. (Id. ¶ 18, 19.) 

Hooker returned to the van to initiate a criminal investigation. 

(Id. ¶ 21.) About five minutes later, defendants Perry, Collins,

McKenzie, and McClaughry also arrived. (Id.; Pl.’s SUF ¶ 9.) 

Hooker put Perry in charge of the investigation. (Id. ¶ 26.) 

Perry advised Hooker that “Homeland Security was aware of Mr.

Fogel as being an anti-government person” living in Nevada City. 

(Perry Dep. 44:3-45:18.) 

Hooker, Perry, and Collins found Fogel in apartment #22. 

Perry asked Fogel if he could talk to him about the van. (Pl.’ s

SUF ¶ 11.) Fogel said “yeah, sure” and “encouraged the officers

to search the van.” (Defs.’ Reply to Pl.’s SUF ¶ 12; Compl. ¶

26.) Perry’s police report and Hooker’s police report both state

that when Perry asked Fogel what he meant by the statements on

the van, Fogel said that “he did not agree with the United States

actions in the Middle East” or with the PATRIOT Act. (Defs.’

Mot. Ex. C at 2, Ex. D at 6.) The reports also state that Fogel

said that he meant to “scare people.” (Id.) 

Fogel denies telling the officers that he intended to

“scare” people. (Id.; Fogel Dep. 45:10-14.) Instead, he says

that he wanted to express his “disagreement . . . with the

PATRIOT Act” and his “frustration with local authorities” who, in

his experience, have infringed on his and others’ rights of

expression. (Fogel Dep. 25:4-19.) 

After Perry finished questioning Fogel, he searched the van

with Fogel’s consent. (Compl. ¶ 27.) Perry did not follow the

Case 2:05-cv-00444-DFL -KJM Document 36 Filed 02/14/06 Page 3 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Section 422 makes it a crime to “willfully threaten[] to 1

commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury

to another person.” Section 148.1 makes it a crime to

“maliciously inform[] any other person that a bomb or other

explosive has been or will be placed or secreted in any public or

private place, knowing that the information is false.” Section

415 makes it crime to use “offensive words in a public place

which are inherently likely to provoke an immediate violent

reaction.” 

4

police department’s bomb threat procedure while searching. 

(Perry Dep. 69:3-71:24.) Ultimately, Perry did not find a bomb

or any “weapon of mass destruction.” (Id. at 72:6-11.) Perry

arrested Fogel for violating California Penal Code §§ 422, 148.1,

and 415. (Defs.’ SUF ¶¶ 56, 57.) 1

Following Fogel’s arrest, Hooker impounded the van and

instructed the towing company not to release it until Fogel

removed the writing. (Id. ¶¶ 22, 23.) Fogel was released from

jail early the next morning. (Defs.’ SUF ¶ 61.) He recovered

his van the same day after he painted over the words with white

paint. (Fogel Dep. 48:24-49:17.) 

No charges were filed. (Id. ¶ 73.) 

II.

Fogel’s main contention is that the speech on the van was

protected by the First Amendment, and, therefore, that the

defendants violated the Constitution by placing him under arrest

and impounding the van. Of course, plaintiff is entitled to

express disagreement with the PATRIOT Act and to mock the

nation’s war on terrorism. Thus, the statement, for example,

“Allah praise the Patriot Act . . . JIHAD on the First

Case 2:05-cv-00444-DFL -KJM Document 36 Filed 02/14/06 Page 4 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

Amendment!” is protected speech. On the other hand, it is

equally the case that “true threats” are not protected speech. 

Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708, 89 S.Ct. 1399 (1969). 

A true threat is “an expression of an intention to inflict evil,

injury, or damage on another.” Planned Parenthood of

Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 290

F.3d 1058, 1075 (9th Cir. 2002). Laws prohibiting such threats 

“protect individuals from the fear of violence” and “from the

disruption that fear engenders.” Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S.

343, 360 (2003). The question here is whether Fogel’s statement

that he was “a fucking suicide bomber communist terrorist!” with

“W.O.M.D. on Board” was a “true threat.”

Whether a particular statement is a “true threat” depends on

“whether a reasonable person would foresee that the statement

would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the

statement as a serious expression of intent to harm or assault.”

United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir.

1990). In answering this question, the fact-finder should

evaluate the “entire factual context, including the surrounding

events and reaction of the listeners.” Id. A threat may be a

“true threat” even though the speaker did not intend, and lacked

the ability, to carry out the threat. Planned Parenthood, 290

F.3d at 1075. “The only intent requirement for a true threat is

that the [speaker] intentionally or knowingly communicate the

threat.” Id. 

Under the reasonable person test, mere “political hyperbole”

Case 2:05-cv-00444-DFL -KJM Document 36 Filed 02/14/06 Page 5 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

6

does not amount to a “true threat.” Watts, 394 U.S. at 708. In

Watts, a young war protester speaking at a public rally at the

Washington Monument stated: 

They always holler at us to get an education. And now

I have already received my draft classification as 1-A

and I have got to report for my physical this Monday

coming. I am not going. If they ever make me carry a

rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is

L.B.J. 

Id. at 706. The audience and speaker then laughed. After

examining the statement in context and recognizing the listeners’

reactions, the Court concluded that the speech was not a true

threat. Id. at 708. It could only be interpreted as “a kind of

very crude offensive method of stating a political opposition to

the President.” Id. 

Except in a circumstance in which the statement is only

fairly susceptible of one characterization – true threat v.

political hyperbole – whether a statement constitutes a “true

threat” is a question of fact for the jury, not a question of law

for the court. Melugin v. Hames, 38 F.3d 1478, 1485 (9th Cir.

1994). Thus, granting summary judgment on this issue is

inappropriate if a jury could reasonably return a verdict for

either party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

250, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (1986). 

In this case, a reasonable jury might conclude that a

reasonable person would foresee that the words on the van would

be taken “as a serious expression of intent to harm.” First, as

demonstrated in Watts, the reaction of listeners and the intent

Case 2:05-cv-00444-DFL -KJM Document 36 Filed 02/14/06 Page 6 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

7

of the speaker are relevant to what a reasonable person might

think. Here, one woman found Fogel’s words threatening enough

that she called the police and chose to remain anonymous, and the

jury could find that Fogel admitted that he intended to scare

people. Second, the recency and enormity of terrorism on

American soil is also relevant to what a “reasonable person”

might foresee. Post-9/11 statements have a different effect than

they might have had before that tragedy. Third, the words

themselves, taken literally, state a threat: the person

responsible for the van is a “suicide bomber communist

terrorist,” who dares the police to pull him over, and who has

“W.O.M.D. on Board.” Finally, the scrawled lettering,

exclamation marks, and angry invective, in addition to the

threatening language, placed on an aging van could persuade a

reasonable viewer that whoever wrote the language was not a

stable, rational individual. Thus, while a “rational” terrorist 

in possession of a threatening device or substance would not

advertise his possession, a violent, unstable person seeking

attention might do just that. 

On the other hand, a jury might find that Fogel’s words

could not be reasonably interpreted as a serious threat. The

references to the First Amendment and the PATRIOT Act arguably

indicated the political nature of the message. Moreover, the

jury might conclude that no reasonable person would believe that

a suicide bomber would actually announce his presence or his

possession of W.O.M.D. 

Case 2:05-cv-00444-DFL -KJM Document 36 Filed 02/14/06 Page 7 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

8

In short, whether the language used by Fogel was protected

by the First Amendment presents a disputed issue of fact. 

Neither party is entitled to summary judgment on this basis.

III.

Alternatively, the individual defendants assert that they

are entitled to qualified immunity. “Qualified immunity protects

‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate

the law.’” Lee v. Gregory, 363 F.3d 931, 934 (9th Cir. 2004)

(citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092

(1986)). Usually when deciding a claim of qualified immunity,

the court must first decide if a constitutional right has been

violated on the plaintiff’s alleged facts. If so, the court must

then decide whether this right was clearly established at the

time of the unconstitutional conduct. Here, as discussed above,

there is a material issue of disputed fact as to whether a

reasonable person would consider the language on the van as a

true threat. Therefore, the court assumes that the conduct of

the officers violated the First Amendment and passes to the

second part of the Saucier inquiry: whether "a reasonable

official would understand that what he is doing” violated the

First Amendment. Id. at 202 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483

U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)). “[T]he

salient question . . . is whether the state of the law [in 2004]

gave [the officers] fair warning that their alleged treatment of

[Fogel] was unconstitutional.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730,

741, 122 S.Ct. 2508 (2002). 

Case 2:05-cv-00444-DFL -KJM Document 36 Filed 02/14/06 Page 8 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Plaintiff makes the argument that the individual 2

defendants may not claim qualified immunity because of their

subjective belief that they were violating the First Amendment. 

There are three ways in which the argument fails. First, the

test for qualified immunity is objective; it asks what a

reasonable officer would understand in the circumstances. 

Second, under the case law, the defendant officers could not have

“known” that the actions here violated the First Amendment

because no case had so held. Finally, plaintiff does not succeed

in showing that the officer defendants believed that they were

acting in violation of the First Amendment. Plaintiff claims

that Hooker believed that the message was protected by the First

Amendment because his first reaction was to consider the speech

as “political satire.” But the fact that Hooker formed a

tentative judgment and was overruled by a superior officer, does

not equate to a belief by Hooker that the arrest was wrongful or

violated clearly established law. Further, that the officers did

not believe that there was actually a bomb in the van, does not

affect probable cause to arrest for making a threat because the

crime does not require the present ability to carry out the

threat. 

9

It follows from the discussion above of the underlying

constitutional question that the state of case law did not

provide a clear answer as to whether the language on the van was

a true threat or political commentary. Fogel contends that under

Watts only one answer could be given to this question. But as

discussed already, Watts is distinguishable both in what was said

and where, when, and how it was said. The court is not aware of

any case that holds that language comparable to that used by

Fogel is necessarily protected by the First Amendment. Because a

reasonable officer could conclude that the language used was not

protected by the First Amendment, the court finds that the

officer defendants are entitled to the protection of qualified

immunity as to plaintiff’s First Amendment claim.2

IV.

Case 2:05-cv-00444-DFL -KJM Document 36 Filed 02/14/06 Page 9 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

10

Fogel advances a number of subsidiary claims that fail in

light of the discussion in the preceding sections. His claims

under the Fourth Amendment for unlawful arrest and seizure of the

van fail because the defendant officers had probable cause to

arrest Fogel and seize the van. As discussed above, a reasonable

officer could believe that the language on the van stated a

threat that a reasonable person would take seriously. It follows

that the officers had probable cause to arrest Fogel, at least as

to California Penal Code §§ 422 and 148.1, and to seize the van. 

For the same reasons, his state law “false imprisonment” and

“assault and battery” claims fail since the arrest was lawful.

V.

In light of the rulings above, the only remaining claim is

the First Amendment claim as against the Grass Valley Police

Department. The Police Department may not claim the defense of

qualified immunity. However, the Department is only liable under

§ 1983 upon a showing that there was unconstitutional action that

“implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance,

regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by

that body’s officers.” Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs. of New

York, 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). 

Plaintiff makes no such showing of an unconstitutional official

policy. At best, he demonstrates that one officer was overruled

by a superior officer. However, there is no showing that either

officer was a policy making official for the Police Department as

a whole.

Case 2:05-cv-00444-DFL -KJM Document 36 Filed 02/14/06 Page 10 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

11

VI.

For the reasons stated above, the court GRANTS defendants’

motion for summary judgment on all claims and DENIES plaintiff’s

cross motion for summary judgment. The clerk shall enter

judgment. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 2/13/2006

DAVID F. LEVI

United States District Judge

Case 2:05-cv-00444-DFL -KJM Document 36 Filed 02/14/06 Page 11 of 11