Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-19-03073/USCOURTS-ca10-19-03073-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Albert Dewayne Banks
Appellant
Timothy Brown
Appellee
Geary County, Kansas
Not Party
Junction City Police Department
Not Party
Kansas Bureau of Investigation
Appellee
Ron Miller
Appellee
Steven L. Opat
Appellee
Riley County Police Department
Not Party
Brad Schoen
Appellee
Sprint/Nextel Wireless Telephone Company
Appellee
Topeka Police Department
Not Party
Glen F. Virden
Appellee
Virgin Mobile USA/Sprint PCS
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

ALBERT DEWAYNE BANKS, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

STEVEN L. OPAT; GLEN F. VIRDEN; 

SPRINT/NEXTEL WIRELESS 

TELEPHONE COMPANY; VIRGIN 

MOBILE USA/SPRINT PCS; TIMOTHY 

BROWN; BRAD SCHOEN; RON 

MILLER; KANSAS BUREAU OF 

INVESTIGATION, 

 Defendants - Appellees, 

and 

GEARY COUNTY, KANSAS; 

JUNCTION CITY POLICE 

DEPARTMENT; RILEY COUNTY 

POLICE DEPARTMENT; TOPEKA 

POLICE DEPARTMENT, 

 Defendants. 

No. 19-3073 

(D.C. No. 5:15-CV-03093-HLT-KGS) 

(D. Kan.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

May 12, 2020

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

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2 

Before MATHESON, KELLY, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

 Pro se prisoner Albert Dewayne Banks appeals from a district court order 

dismissing his civil rights complaint, which alleged violations of federal and state wiretap 

statutes, violations of the Fourth Amendment, and civil conspiracy. Exercising 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm in part and reverse in part.1

I. BACKGROUND2

 This case arises from a law enforcement investigation of drug trafficking in Geary 

County, Kansas. In March and April 2013, upon application of Geary County District 

Attorney Steven Opat, Judge David R. Platt of the Eighth Judicial District of Kansas 

issued wiretap orders for cell phones used by Anthony Thompson and Mr. Banks. 

Ensuing wiretaps produced information that law enforcement officers used to obtain 

search warrants for various locations, including Mr. Thompson’s residence, where 

“officers seized cell phones, cash, miscellaneous documents, drug paraphernalia, and 

credit cards.” United States v. Thompson, 866 F.3d 1149, 1152-53 (10th Cir. 2017), 

vacated and remanded by Thompson v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2706 (2018). 

1

 Although we liberally construe pro se pleadings, we do not assume the role 

of Mr. Banks’s advocate. See Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 

2008). 

2

 In reviewing a district court’s dismissal order, “we may exercise our 

discretion to take judicial notice of publicly filed records in our court and certain 

other courts concerning matters that bear directly upon the disposition of the case at 

hand.” United States v. Ahidley, 486 F.3d 1184, 1192 n.5 (10th Cir. 2007). We thus 

consider the district court’s decisions in Mr. Banks’s criminal case. 

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A. Mr. Banks’s Criminal Case 

A federal grand jury indicted Mr. Banks on multiple counts of distributing and 

conspiring to distribute crack cocaine. He joined co-defendants’ motions to suppress the 

intercepted communications. The motions argued (1) the wiretap orders did not permit 

the interception of electronic (text message) communications, and (2) investigators 

impermissibly intercepted his wire communications outside the Eighth Judicial District’s 

jurisdiction. The district court rejected both arguments. 

 First, the court ruled that investigators reasonably believed the wiretap orders, 

despite specifying only wire communications, permitted the interception of both text 

messages and oral communications.3

 In particular, the court found an understanding 

3

 The term “‘wire communication’ means any aural transfer made in whole or 

in part through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid 

of wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of 

reception . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1); see also Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-2514(1). An 

“‘aural transfer’ means a transfer containing the human voice at any point between 

and including the point of origin and the point of reception[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(18). 

In contrast, an “‘oral communication’ means any oral communication uttered by a 

person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to 

interception under circumstances justifying such expectation, but such term does not 

include any electronic communication[.]” Id. § 2510(2). A telephone conversation 

qualifies as a “wire communication.” See United States v. Axselle, 604 F.2d 1330, 

1334 (10th Cir. 1979). 

An “‘electronic communication’ means any transfer of signs, signals, writing, 

images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by 

a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects 

interstate or foreign commerce, but does not include—(A) any wire or oral 

communication . . . .” Id. § 2510(12); see also Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-2514(11). 

“[T]ext messages constitute ‘electronic communications’ within the meaning of the 

Wiretap Act.” United States v. Jones, 451 F. Supp. 2d 71, 75 (D.D.C. 2006), aff’d in 

part, rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 

544 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 

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between Judge Platt and investigators “that the orders were supposed to authorize 

interception of electronic [i.e., text] communications.” United States v. Banks and 

Thompson, 5:13-CR-40060-DDC, 2014 WL 4261344, at *4 (D. Kan. Aug. 29, 2014). 

The court thus applied the good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary 

rule and refused to suppress the text messages. Id. at *5 (citing United States v. Leon, 

468 U.S. 897, 920-22 (1984)). 

 Second, the court “rule[d] that a Kansas state court judge acting under Kansas law 

has no authority to authorize interception outside the judge’s own judicial district.” 

ROA, Vol. I at 43. It granted the motion to suppress the extra-territorial communications, 

but it stated that officers “almost certainly” acted in good faith, “because one would not 

expect the officers executing the search warrants to have apprehended the subtle, 

technical jurisdictional defect.” United States v. Banks and Thompson, No. 13-CR40060-DDC, 2015 WL 2401048, at *3 (D. Kan. May 15, 2015). 

 A jury convicted Mr. Thompson and Mr. Banks on all counts.4

4

 We affirmed the convictions. See Thompson, 866 F.3d at 1152; United States 

v. Banks, 706 F. App’x 455, 460 (10th Cir. 2017). The Supreme Court vacated those 

decisions and remanded for further consideration in light of Carpenter v. United 

States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217, 2222 (2018). In Carpenter, the Court held that “an 

individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the record of his physical 

movements as captured through [cell service location information].” Because law 

enforcement relied on such information to prove some of Mr. Thompson’s and Mr. 

Banks’s communications, we remanded to the district court to determine whether the 

government presented sufficient evidence absent the information. United States v. 

Thompson, 740 F. App’x 166, 168 (10th Cir. 2018). 

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B. Mr. Banks’s Civil Case 

 While his criminal proceeding was pending, Mr. Banks filed a pro se suit in the 

District of Kansas against Judge Platt; Geary County District Attorney Steven L. Opat; 

Kansas Bureau of Investigation Special Agent Glen Virden; Junction City Police Chief 

Timothy Brown; Riley County Police Department Director Brad Schoen; Topeka Police 

Chief Ron Miller; and Sprint/Nextel Wireless Telephone Company and Virgin Mobil 

USA/Sprint PCS (collectively, “Sprint”). The district court dismissed Judge Platt, 

District Attorney Opat (in his official capacity), and Special Agent Virden (in his official 

capacity) on immunity grounds.5

 In an amended pro se complaint, Mr. Banks named as defendants Judge Platt, 

District Attorney Opat, Special Agent Virden, Police Chief Brown, and Sprint. Mr. 

Banks alleged: 

 • Judge Platt (1) knew or should have known he lacked jurisdiction to issue 

 wiretap orders beyond his territorial jurisdiction; and (2) set an excessive 

 bond and twice failed to appoint counsel in May 2013. 

 • District Attorney Opat, Special Agent Virden, and Police Chief Brown 

 (“law enforcement defendants”) knew or should have known that the 

 wiretap orders sought communications that were outside of Judge Platt’s 

 territorial jurisdiction and did not encompass text messages. 

 • The law enforcement defendants impermissibly disclosed his text messages 

 to third parties, such as the U.S. Attorney’s Office, despite the absence of 

 reference to texts in the wiretap orders. 

5

 To the extent Mr. Banks had listed various police departments in the caption 

as defendants, the district court noted they are not suable entities and dismissed them 

as well. Similarly, the district court dismissed Geary County, as there were no 

allegations of misconduct against it. 

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 • The law enforcement defendants “all had final decision making authority 

 within their respect[ive] departments.” ROA, Vol. II at 9. 

 • Sprint improperly intercepted and disclosed his text messages, resulting in 

 the improper execution of a search warrant. 

 • “the defendants act[ed] under the color of state law.” Id.

He sued under 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (providing a civil action for the unlawful 

interception, disclosure, or use of wire, oral, or electronic communications), Kan. Stat. 

Ann. § 22-2518 (same), 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and civil conspiracy law. The following chart 

summarizes the specific claims alleged in the amended complaint against each of the 

defendants: 

DEFENDANTS CLAIMS FOR RELIEF 

Judge Platt, sued in his 

individual and official 

capacities 

NONE SPECIFIED 

District Attorney Opat, 

Chief Brown, and Agent 

Virden, each sued in his 

individual and official 

capacity

1. Violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-2518 

2. Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2520 

3. Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Fourth Amendment) 

4. “Conspiracy to Commit the Substantive Counts” 

 (pled only against Opat & Virden) 

Sprint 1. Violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-2518 

2. Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2520 

3. Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Fourth Amendment) 

 The district court screened the amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) 

and 1915A, and dismissed (1) Judge Platt, (2) the law enforcement defendants—District 

Attorney Opat, Police Chief Brown, and Special Agent Virden—to the extent they were 

sued in their official capacities, and (3) any defendants named in the original complaint 

but not named in the amended complaint—Director Schoen, Police Chief Miller, Geary 

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County, the Kansas Bureau of Investigation, and the various police departments. The 

remaining defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). The district court granted 

the motions. Mr. Banks unsuccessfully sought reconsideration under Rule 59(e). His 

appeal challenges the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals and the denial of reconsideration.6

II. DISCUSSION 

A. Standard of Review 

 We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of an action under Rule 12(b)(6). 

Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1190 (10th Cir. 2012). “To survive a motion 

to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(quotations omitted). Plausibility requires “more than the mere possibility of 

misconduct.” Id. at 679. The plaintiff must “plead[ ] factual content that allows the court 

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 

Id. at 678. “[W]here ‘there is no disputed issue of fact raised by an affirmative defense, 

or the facts are completely disclosed on the face of the pleadings, . . . it is appropriate and 

expedient to dispose of a claim by a motion to dismiss [based on an affirmative defense] 

under Rule 12(b).” Frost v. ADT, LLC, 947 F.3d 1261, 1267 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting 

6

 On appeal, Mr. Banks does not contest and thus has waived any challenge to 

the district court’s dismissal of his claims against Judge Platt, or to the official 

capacity claims against Chief Brown and Agent Virden, or to any claims against 

defendants named in the original complaint but not named in the amended complaint. 

See Burke v. Regalado, 935 F.3d 960, 995 (10th Cir. 2019) (“The failure to raise an 

issue in an opening brief waives that issue.” (quotations omitted)). 

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5 Arthur R. Miller et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1277 (3d ed. 2002) (August 

2019 update)). 

B. Wiretap Claims 

The district court concluded that Mr. Banks failed to plead a plausible federal or 

state wiretap claim because the defendants relied in good faith on Judge Platt’s orders 

regarding both electronic (text messages) and extra-territorial communications. We 

resolve these claims as follows: 

As to the law enforcement defendants: 

(1) We affirm dismissal of the text messages claim because 

the district court’s determination in the criminal case that 

investigators acted in good faith precludes Mr. Banks 

from contesting a good faith affirmative defense in this 

case;7

 and 

(2) We reverse dismissal of the extra-territorial 

communications claim because the district court erred in 

holding that the disposition in the criminal case precluded 

Mr. Banks from contesting a good faith defense 

here. Collateral estoppel does not apply because the 

district court in the criminal case excluded the extraterritorial evidence rather than rely on investigators’ good 

faith to admit it. 

As to Sprint: 

 We reverse dismissal of the text messages claim 

 because the collateral estoppel applicable to the law 

 enforcement defendants does not extend to Sprint. 

7

 To the extent the district court in this case suggested that Mr. Banks’s 

statutory wiretap claims failed without his alleging lack of good faith, we note that a 

plaintiff is not required to anticipatorily plead against an affirmative defense. See

Fernandez v. Clean House, LLC, 883 F.3d 1296, 1299 (10th Cir. 2018). 

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Legal Background 

Title I of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (“ECPA”), 18 

U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522, provides that “any person whose wire, oral, or electronic 

communication is intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used in violation of this chapter 

may in a civil action recover from the person or entity, other than the United States, 

which engaged in that violation such relief as may be appropriate.” 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a). 

Kansas law provides a nearly identical remedy. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-2518(1). 

Both the federal and state statutes provide “a complete defense” for “good faith 

reliance” on “a court warrant or order.” 18 U.S.C. § 2520(d); Kan. Stat. Ann. 

§ 22-2518(2). The statutory good faith defense is akin to the good faith exception to the 

exclusionary rule for Fourth Amendment violations. See United States v. Moore, 41 F.3d 

370, 376 (8th Cir. 1994) (observing that the federal wiretap statute’s “legislative history 

expresses a clear intent to adopt suppression principles developed in Fourth Amendment 

cases”); see, e.g., Reed v. Labbe, No. CV 10–8315–SVW (OP), 2012 WL 5267726, at *9 

(C.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2012) (relying on findings in the plaintiff’s underlying criminal case 

to conclude that § 2520(d) provided a complete defense to plaintiff’s claims under the 

ECPA and required dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)); Marino v. Hegarty, No. 86 C 6759, 

1987 WL 9582, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 10, 1987) (“Good faith reliance on a court order is a 

defense both to fourth amendment claims and to the claims under [the ECPA].”). 

To invoke the good faith defense, an “officer’s reliance on [a] defective warrant 

still must be objectively reasonable.” United States v. Russian, 848 F.3d 1239, 1246 

(10th Cir. 2017); see also Davis v. Gracey, 111 F.3d 1472, 1484 (10th Cir. 1997) (stating 

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that the good-faith defense to an 18 U.S.C. § 2707 civil claim under Title II of the ECPA 

for unauthorized access to stored electronic communications requires, like the Fourth 

Amendment, objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant). “The test is an objective one 

that asks ‘whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search 

was illegal despite the magistrate’s authorization.’” United States v. Otero, 563 F.3d 

1127, 1134 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23). “In addition, 

application of the ‘good faith’ exception assumes ‘that the officers properly executed the 

warrant and searched only those places and for those objects that it was reasonable to 

believe were covered by the warrant.’” United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592, 607 n.27 

(10th Cir. 1988) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 918 n.19)). 

2. District Attorney Opat, Chief Brown, and Agent Virden 

a. Text messages 

The district court in Mr. Banks’s criminal case said that, although Judge Platt’s 

orders authorized interception of “wire communications” without specifying “electronic 

[text] communications,” Judge Platt “and [the] executing officers both understood . . . 

that the authorization included interception of text messages.” Banks, 2014 WL 

4261344, at *5. It found that the law enforcement defendants reasonably believed the 

orders permitted them to intercept text messages. See id. The court therefore held that 

their “interception of the text messages falls within the good-faith exception to the Fourth 

Amendment’s exclusionary rule.” Id. at *4-5. 

 The district court’s determination in Mr. Banks’s criminal case that investigators 

acted in good faith regarding the interception and disclosure of text messages precludes 

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him from contesting the law enforcement defendants’ affirmative defense of good faith.8

 

“[T]he doctrine of issue preclusion prevents a party that has lost the battle over an issue 

in one lawsuit from relitigating the same issue in another lawsuit.” In re Corey, 583 F.3d 

1249, 1251 (10th Cir. 2009). “Under federal law, issue preclusion attaches . . . when an 

issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and 

the determination is essential to the judgment.” Id. (quotations omitted and alterations 

incorporated)).9

 The doctrine is applicable in a civil case to preclude relitigation of an 

issue decided in favor of the prosecuting authority in a prior criminal case. Restatement 

(Second) of Judgments § 85(2)(a) (1982).10

Issue preclusion has four elements: 

(1) the issue previously decided is identical with the one 

presented in the action in question, (2) the prior action has 

been finally adjudicated on the merits, (3) the party against 

whom the doctrine is invoked was a party, or in privity with a 

party, to the prior adjudication, and (4) the party against 

whom the doctrine is raised had a full and fair opportunity to 

litigate the issue in the prior action. 

8

 Although none of the defendants argues for the application of issue 

preclusion, a court may sua sponte raise a preclusion bar where, as here, the court is 

on notice that the issue has been previously decided. See Arizona v. California, 530 

U.S. 392, 412 (2000). 

9

 “Because we are here concerned with the preclusive effect of a federal-court 

judgment, federal law applies.” Id.

10 See also id. cmt. e, illus. 7 (“D is convicted of arson of a building. D then 

brings an action against I, an insurer which wrote a fire insurance policy on the 

building, seeking to recover on the policy. The policy has an exclusion of liability 

for losses caused by intentional act of the insured. The determination in the criminal 

prosecution that D deliberately set the fire is conclusive in favor of I in the 

subsequent civil action.”). 

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Park Lake Res. Ltd. Liab. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 378 F.3d 1132, 1136 (10th Cir. 

2004) (quotations omitted). Here, those elements are met. 

First, good faith under the wiretap statutes derives from the good faith exception to 

the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule, see Moore, 41 F.3d at 376; Davis, 111 F.3d 

at 1484, and turns on the objective reasonableness of investigators’ reliance on Judge 

Platt’s wiretap orders to intercept text messages. See Davis, 111 F.3d at 1484. 

Second, the district court in Mr. Banks’s criminal case finally adjudicated the good 

faith issue when it “refuse[d] to suppress [text messages] on the basis that the orders 

authorized interception of wire communications only.” Banks, 2014 WL 4261344, at *5. 

See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13 (1982) (stating that “for purposes of issue 

preclusion (as distinguished from merger and bar), ‘final judgment’ includes any prior 

adjudication of an issue in another action that is determined to be sufficiently firm to be 

accorded conclusive effect”). 

 Third, Mr. Banks was a party-defendant to the motion-to-suppress litigation that 

led to the determination of good faith. 

Fourth, Mr. Banks had a full and fair opportunity to litigate good faith. He 

participated in the suppression proceedings, which included testimony from Agent 

Virden, and the good faith issue was squarely presented to the district court. See Burrell 

v. Armijo, 456 F.3d 1159, 1172 (10th Cir. 2006) (explaining that “the inquiry into 

whether a party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue” involves “whether 

there were significant procedural limitations in the prior proceeding, whether the party 

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had the incentive to litigate fully the issue, or whether effective litigation was limited by 

the nature or relationship of the parties” (quotations omitted)). 

Mr. Banks thus cannot relitigate in this civil action whether investigators relied on 

Judge Platt’s wiretap orders in good faith when seeking his text messages. See, e.g.,

Guenther v. Holmgreen, 738 F.2d 879, 884 (7th Cir. 1984) (“There can be little doubt 

that the issue of Holmgreen’s veracity and good faith—the linchpin of Guenther’s § 1983 

Fourth Amendment claim—was both raised and actually litigated in the preliminary 

hearing.”); Blinder, Robinson & Co. v. SEC, 565 F. Supp. 74, 77 (D. Colo. 1983) 

(collecting cases for the proposition that “[t]he collateral estoppel doctrine has been held 

to bar a subsequent civil action challenging the constitutional sufficiency of a Fourth 

Amendment search where, in a prior criminal action, the issue of suppression had been 

raised by the defendant and decided adversely to him”), aff’d, 748 F.2d 1415 (10th Cir. 

1984).

The district court correctly granted the law enforcement defendants’ motions to 

dismiss the statutory claims pertaining to text messages.11

b. Extra-territorial communications 

In his amended complaint, Mr. Banks alleged that Judge Platt acted beyond his 

jurisdiction and that “all defendants knew or had reason to know that the [wiretap] order 

they were endorsing was invalid on its face.” ROA, Vol. II at 9. He further alleged that 

11 Mr. Banks mistakenly relies on United States v. Medlin, 798 F.2d 407 (10th 

Cir. 1986) and United States v. McNulty, 729 F.2d 1243 (10th Cir. 1983), for the 

proposition that “good faith reliance” is not a defense. ROA, Vol. II at 9-11. Neither 

concerns defenses asserted here. 

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the law enforcement defendants unlawfully intercepted calls while he was in the privacy 

of his home and “then used this private information in order to further there [sic] own 

personal agenda.” Id. at 10. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss “accept[s] all well-pled 

factual allegations [in the complaint] as true and view[s] these allegations in the light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Peterson v. Grisham, 594 F.3d 723, 727 (10th 

Cir. 2010) (quotation and citation omitted). We conclude that Mr. Banks has “plead[ ] 

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the [law 

enforcement] defendant[s] [are] liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678. 

Unlike the good faith affirmative defense to the text message claim, collateral 

estoppel is not available to the law enforcement defendants on this claim. Judge Platt’s 

orders permitted the law enforcement defendants to intercept Mr. Banks’s 

communications without a territorial limit. The district court in Mr. Banks’s criminal 

case stated that officers “almost certainly” acted in good faith given “the subtle[ ] [and] 

technical” nature of the jurisdictional defect, but it excluded the extra-territorial 

intercepted evidence, concluding there was no good-faith exception to the statutory 

requirement for “suppress[ing] unlawfully intercepted wire and oral communications.” 

Banks, 2015 WL 2401048, at *2, *3. Because the court made only an observation about 

good faith but not a finding, Mr. Banks is not collaterally estopped from litigating the 

issue of good faith regarding his wiretap claims alleging the interception of extraterritorial communications. 

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We therefore reverse the dismissal of the extra-territorial wiretapping claims 

against the law enforcement defendants.12

3. Sprint

 In his amended complaint, Mr. Banks alleged that Sprint disclosed his electronic 

communications (text messages) to the other defendants without authorization in the 

wiretap order. He further alleged the disclosures included “private text and picture[ ] 

messages to family members” sent from “the privacy of [his] home.” ROA, Vol. II at 9. 

Viewing these allegations in the light most favorable to Mr. Banks, see Peterson, 594 

12 District Attorney Opat argues alternatively that claim preclusion bars all of 

Mr. Banks’s claims because he could have asserted them in a prior lawsuit. Opat 

Aplee. Br. at 18-19. Specifically, in October 2014, Mr. Banks sued Judge Platt and 

District Attorney Opat in federal court for violating his right to counsel in state court 

when he was arrested on drug charges. In April 2015, Mr. Banks filed the instant 

litigation. In August 2015, he sought to consolidate the two cases. The district court 

dismissed Mr. Banks’s right-to-counsel case based on judicial and prosecutorial 

immunity, and it denied as moot the request to consolidate. Banks v. Geary Cnty. 

Dist. Ct., No. 14-3199-SAC, 2015 WL 12864252, at *2 (D. Kan. Nov. 24, 2015), 

aff’d, 645 F. App’x 713 (10th Cir. 2016). 

The district court here did not address this claim-preclusion argument. In his 

brief, District Attorney Opat provides only a cursory analysis limited to general 

statements about the collateral estoppel doctrine. He does not show why it should 

apply to the procedural circumstance here, where Mr. Banks moved to consolidate to 

include all of his claims in one action before his first case was dismissed. None of 

his cited cases addresses this question. We decline to address it as an alternative 

ground to affirm because this issue has not been “sufficiently illuminated by counsel 

on appeal.” See Walton v. Powell, 821 F.3d 1204, 1212 (10th Cir. 2016). “[W]e 

decline to affirm on an alternative ground neither passed on below nor cultivated on 

appeal.” Wilson v. Falk, 877 F.3d 1204, 1211-12 (10th Cir. 2017); see Perry v. 

Woodward, 199 F.3d 1126, 1141 n.13 (10th Cir. 1999) (declining to address an 

alternative basis for affirming the district court’s dismissal where appellees did not 

adequately develop an argument). 

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F.3d at 727, we conclude he has pled sufficient facts to plausibly show that Sprint “is 

liable for the misconduct alleged,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

 The district court dismissed these claims against Sprint primarily for the same 

reason it did so for the law enforcement defendants: “the record establishes [Mr. 

Banks’s] wiretap claims are barred by the good faith defense.” ROA, Vol. II at 161. 

Although businesses like Sprint may rely on the good faith defense, see 18 U.S.C. 

§2520(a); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-2518(2), Sprint stands in different shoes than the law 

enforcement defendants. 

 Sprint asserts that Mr. Banks cannot complain of the unauthorized interception of 

text messages “in light of the judicially noticed fact that Judge Platt confirmed that his 

orders did, in fact, authorize interception and disclosure of text messages and other forms 

of communications.” Sprint Aplee. Br. at 19. It argues that the district court in Mr. 

Banks’s criminal case “found that Judge Platt and executing officers both understood the 

intended scope of the wiretap authorization, and that the authorization included 

interception of text messages, and that officers’ reliance on this understanding was 

objectively reasonable.” Id. (quotations omitted). Sprint further posits that “if it was 

objectively reasonable for the officers to rely on this understanding, it would . . . also be 

objectively reasonable for Sprint . . . to rely on the same interpretation.” Id.13

13 Sprint also argues the wiretap claims against it should be dismissed based on 

18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(ii). Under this statute, telecommunication companies that 

“provid[e] information, facilities, or assistance in accordance with the terms of a 

court order” have an immunity defense. But Mr. Banks’s amended complaint alleges 

that the wiretap order Sprint received did not authorize the interception of text 

messages. ROA, Vol. II at 9-10. Based on that allegation, § 2511(2)(a)(ii) does not 

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 Sprint’s reliance on judicial notice to preclude Mr. Banks from contesting its good 

faith is a misplaced attempt to invoke collateral estoppel. But collateral estoppel requires 

that “the issue previously decided [be] identical with the one presented in the action in 

question.” Park Lake Res., 378 F.3d at 1136 (emphasis added). Sprint provides no 

applicable authority that it can preclude Mr. Banks’s wiretap claims based on the district 

court’s determination that investigators acted in good faith. We therefore reverse the 

dismissal of Mr. Banks’s statutory wiretap claims against Sprint. 

C. Fourth Amendment § 1983 Claims 

Mr. Banks argues the Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights by 

intercepting and disclosing his text messages. He contends the district court 

therefore erred in dismissing his § 1983 claim. We disagree. 

apply. See Hepting v. AT & T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2006) 

(denying AT&T’s motion to dismiss where the plaintiffs adequately alleged that 

AT&T “did not receive a certification authorizing it[ ]” to conduct electronic 

surveillance), remanded on other grounds, 539 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Sprint does not explain how Judge Platt’s and the law enforcement officials’ 

understanding that the wiretap order was supposed to include text messages, even 

though its terms did not mention texts, would make any difference. Moreover, 

consistent with Mr. Banks’s allegations, it appears that Sprint intercepted and 

disclosed his text messages pursuant to the March 5, 2013, wiretap order on his 

phone before Judge Platt clarified that wiretap orders issued for two of Mr. Banks’s 

co-defendants included text messages. See Doc. 379, Exs. 9 & 10, United States v. 

Banks, No. 5:13-CR-40060-DDC (D. Kan. July 1, 2014) (Judge Platt’s clarification 

orders, entered on April 5, 2013, and April 25, 2013, stating that wiretap orders 

entered on April 2 were “clarified to express that the interception of wire 

communications previously authorized includes all forms of communication”); see 

also Banks, 2014 WL 4261344, at *4 (observing that an affidavit in support of the 

April 2 wiretap order for the phone of co-defendant Otis Ponds “contained references 

to [earlier intercepted] text messages”). 

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Legal Background 

a. Fourth Amendment 

“The gravamen of a Fourth Amendment claim is that the complainant’s legitimate 

expectation of privacy has been violated by an illegal search or seizure.” Kimmelman v. 

Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 374 (1986). The Fourth Amendment applies to wiretapping. 

See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967); United States v. Williams, 827 F.3d 

1134, 1145 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (noting that “two different legal theories”—the Fourth 

Amendment and wiretap statutes—are available to challenge “evidence gathered as a 

result of wiretap surveillance”). 

b. Qualified immunity defense 

Qualified immunity is available to “[i]ndividual defendants named in a § 1983 

action” as a shield “from damages actions unless their conduct was unreasonable in light 

of clearly established law.” Estate of Booker v. Gomez, 745 F.3d 405, 411 (10th Cir. 

2014) (quotations omitted). “In resolving a motion to dismiss based on qualified 

immunity, the court considers (1) whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged make out a 

violation of a constitutional right, and (2) whether the right at issue was clearly 

established at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Keith v. Koerner, 707 F.3d 

1185, 1188 (10th Cir. 2013) (quotations omitted). The clearly-established-law prong 

requires both “a sufficiently clear foundation in then-existing precedent” and a “clear[ ] 

prohibit[ion] [on] the officer’s conduct in the particular circumstances before him.” 

District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 590 (2018). “The doctrine of qualified 

immunity is designed to protect public officials who act in good faith, on the basis of 

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objectively reasonable understandings of the law at the time of their actions.” Weigel v. 

Broad, 544 F.3d 1143, 1151 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotations omitted and alterations 

incorporated). 

c. State action requirement 

Only persons acting under color of state law may be sued under § 1983. See West 

v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). “[I]n rare circumstances[,] . . . a private party [can] be 

viewed as a ‘state actor’ for section 1983 purposes.” Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 

1130 (11th Cir. 1992). “Private individuals and entities may be deemed state actors . . . if 

they have acted together with or have obtained significant aid from state officials, or if 

their conduct is otherwise chargeable to the state.” Johnson v. Rodrigues, 293 F.3d 1196, 

1202 (10th Cir. 2002) (quotations and alterations omitted). But a private party’s mere 

compliance with a court order does not constitute state action. See, e.g., Fairley v. PM 

Mgmt.-San Antonio AL, L.L.C., 724 F. App’x 343, 345 (5th Cir. 2018) (concluding that a 

nursing home’s compliance with probate court’s order was not state action), cert. denied, 

139 S. Ct. 815 (2019); Green v. Truman, 459 F. Supp. 342, 345 (D. Mass. 1978) (ruling 

that a court order requiring a doctor to supervise a child’s chemotherapy did “not clothe 

[the doctor] with the authority of state law necessary to satisfy the state actor 

requirement”). 

Analysis 

a. District Attorney Opat, Chief Brown, and Agent Virden 

 The law enforcement defendants argued in district court that they are entitled to 

qualified immunity on Mr. Banks’s Fourth Amendment § 1983 claim. The district court 

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relied on the clearly-established-law prong of the qualified immunity test and found that 

immunity applied because Mr. Banks had identified no authority “holding that the Fourth 

Amendment is violated by the specific facts presented here.” ROA, Vol. II at 164-65. 

 We agree that qualified immunity applies under the second prong. The district 

court in Mr. Banks’s criminal case determined that investigators relied in good faith on 

Judge Platt’s wiretap orders in intercepting his text messages. “[R]easonable person[s] in 

[their] position would not know that [their] actions violated the Fourth Amendment for 

the same reasons [that] establish the good faith defense to liability under [18 U.S.C. § 

2520].” Frierson v. Goetz, 99 F. App’x. 649, 654 (6th Cir. 2004). Where, as here, “the 

requisites of the statutory good faith defense are met, then the standard for qualified 

immunity as a defense to Fourth Amendment violations is also satisfied.” Kilgore v. 

Mitchell, 623 F.2d 631, 633 (9th Cir. 1980) (footnote omitted); see also 18 U.S.C. 

2520(d) (providing that good-faith reliance “is a complete defense against any civil or 

criminal action brought under this chapter or any other law” (emphasis added)). The 

district court correctly dismissed Mr. Banks’s Fourth Amendment claims against the law 

enforcement defendants. 

Sprint 

 Mr. Banks failed to allege Sprint engaged in state action. He claimed Sprint (1) 

received a wiretap order that did not cover text messages, (2) intercepted those messages, 

and (3) disclosed them to the other defendants. But the amended complaint did not allege 

Sprint participated in procuring the wiretap order, obtained aid from state officials, or 

performed acts attributable to the state. Thus, Mr. Banks failed to allege Sprint’s 

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compliance with Judge Platt’s order constitutes state action. The district court correctly 

dismissed Mr. Banks’s Fourth Amendment claim against Sprint. 

D. Civil Conspiracy14

“Allegations of conspiracy may . . . form the basis of a § 1983 claim.” Tonkovich 

v. Kan. Bd. of Regents, 159 F.3d 504, 533 (10th Cir. 1998). “[T]o recover under a § 1983 

conspiracy theory, a plaintiff must plead and prove not only a conspiracy, but also an 

actual deprivation of rights; pleading and proof of one without the other will be 

insufficient.” Dixon v. City of Lawton, 898 F.2d 1443, 1449 (10th Cir. 1990). Likewise, 

“[a] civil conspiracy is not actionable under Kansas law without commission of some 

wrong giving rise to a tortious cause of action independent of conspiracy.” Pepsi-Cola 

Bottling Co. of Pittsburg, Inc. v. PepsiCo, Inc., 431 F.3d 1241, 1268 (10th Cir. 2005). 

14 The amended complaint does not say whether this claim is predicated on 

§ 1983 or Kansas law. The claim fails under both. To the extent Mr. Banks is 

attempting to assert a federal common-law conspiracy claim, courts generally 

construe such claims as § 1983 conspiracy claims, and we do the same. See Burdett 

v. Reynoso, No. C-06-00720 JCS, 2007 WL 2429426, at *29 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 

2007) (finding common law conspiracy claim properly construed as § 1983 claim and 

collecting authority recognizing a § 1983 conspiracy claim), aff'd, 399 F. App’x 276 

(9th Cir. 2010). Mr. Banks does not appear to be advancing a § 1985(3) conspiracy 

claim, which “generally describes a conspiracy of two or more persons for the 

purpose of depriving . . . another of equal protection of the laws or equal privileges 

and immunities under the laws.” Dixon v. City of Lawton, 898 F.2d 1443, 1447 (10th 

Cir. 1990). 

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Mr. Banks alleged that District Attorney Opat and Agent Virden “knowingly 

conspired with one another to commit the substantive count in th[e] complaint,” 

ROA, Vol. II at 12, and that they knew or should have known the wiretap orders were 

unlawful. The district court determined that Mr. Banks’s conspiracy claim failed 

because there was neither an underlying unlawful act nor sufficiently pled facts of a 

conspiracy. We agree with the latter determination. 

 An actionable conspiracy “requires at least a combination of two or more persons 

acting in concert and an allegation of a meeting of the minds, an agreement among the 

defendants, or a general conspiratorial objective.” Brooks v. Gaenzle, 614 F.3d 1213, 

1227-28 (10th Cir. 2010); see also Stoldt v. City of Toronto, 678 P.2d 153, 161 (Kan. 

1984) (stating elements of a civil conspiracy as: “(1) two or more persons; (2) an object 

to be accomplished; (3) a meeting of the minds in the object or course of action; (4) one 

or more unlawful overt acts; and (5) damages as the proximate result thereof” (quotations 

omitted)). 

 “[A] plaintiff must allege specific facts showing an agreement and concerted 

action amongst the defendants” because “conclusory allegations of conspiracy are 

insufficient to state a valid § 1983 claim.” Brooks, 614 F.3d at 1228 (quotations omitted 

and alterations incorporated). Mr. Banks’s allegation of a conspiracy is conclusory. It 

identifies no agreement between District Attorney Opat and Agent Virden to work 

together to achieve an unlawful objective. See, e.g., Vieux v. E. Bay Reg’l Park Dist., 

906 F.2d 1330, 1343 (9th Cir. 1990) (observing that “[a] civil conspiracy is a 

combination of two or more persons who, by some concerted action, intend to 

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accomplish some unlawful objective for the purpose of harming another which results in 

damage,” and concluding that there was no evidence of an illegal objective despite 

correspondence and discussions between the defendants). 

 The district court appropriately dismissed Mr. Banks’s civil conspiracy claim. 

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the district court’s judgment in part, but we reverse and remand for 

further proceedings on Mr. Banks’s statutory wiretap claims about the law 

enforcement defendants’ interception and disclosure of extra-territorial 

communications and Sprint’s interception and disclosure of text messages. Also, we 

deny Mr. Banks’s request for the assistance of appellate counsel, and we remind him 

to continue making partial payments until the entire filing fee has been paid.15

Entered for the Court 

Scott M. Matheson, Jr. 

Circuit Judge 

15 To the extent Mr. Banks appeals the district court’s order denying his Rule 

59(e) motion, we affirm because the court did not abuse its discretion. 

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