Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05907/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05907-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
R. L. Runnels
Respondent
Delbert Dwayne Tinsley
Petitioner

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This information is derived from the petition for writ of habeas corpus and Respondent’s answer to the petition.

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

 DELBERT DWAYNE TINSLEY, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

R. L. RUNNELS, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

CV F 03 5907 REC SMS HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant to

a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Stanislaus, entered on April 14, 2000,

following his conviction by jury trial of murder in the second degree in violation of Cal. Penal Code

§ 187. See Exhibit 1, Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (hereinafter “Answer”). The jury

found true the allegations that Petitioner had personally used a knife and a fireplace poker in the

commission of the murder within the meaning of Cal. Penal Code § 12022(b). Id. Petitioner was

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“RT” refers to the Reporter’s Transcript lodged with the Court.

U.S . District Court

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sentenced to an indeterminate term of 17 years to life with the possibility of parole. Id.

Thereafter, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the California Court of Appeal, Fifth

Appellate District (hereinafter “5th DCA”). On April 30, 2002, the 5th DCA issued an unpublished

opinion affirming the judgment. See Exhibit 3, Answer.

On June 4, 2002, Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California Supreme Court. See

Exhibit 4, Answer. On July 10, 2002, the California Supreme Court denied the petition. See Exhibit

5, Answer.

On July 2, 2003, Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas petition in this Court. Petitioner

raises one ground for relief: He claims there was insufficient evidence to show that his actions were

the proximate cause of the victim’s death.

On September 3, 2003, Respondent filed an answer to the petition. 

Petitioner did not file a traverse. 

 FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On June 1, 1998, at approximately 8:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m., Jose Barrera was riding his bicycle

along the banks of an irrigation canal near the city of Escalon in the county of Stanislaus when he

discovered the body of a woman lying on her back on the canal bank approximately two to two and a

half meters from the water’s edge. (RT2 480-481, 494-498.) Mr. Barrera saw plastic near the woman.

(RT 485.) As Mr. Barrera made his way down the canal bank toward the woman, she attempted to sit

up twice but lay back down. (RT 481.) She then pushed using her hands by her side and slid on her

back little by little into the water. (RT 481-484, 487.) Mr. Barrera heard the victim moaning. (RT

485.) Once in the water, she made a few dog paddle swimming-type motions with her hands but the

current carried her away downstream. (RT 482, 489.) Mr. Barrera then left to call 911. (RT 488.) 

When the firemen arrived, they retrieved the body of Cindy Hubbard from the irrigation canal. (RT

489, 494, 500.) An autopsy of Hubbard’s body revealed she had been severely beaten and stabbed

numerous times. (RT 135-140.) 

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Tina Dominguez and James Dominguez were engaged at the time. (RT 66.)

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 3

On the previous night, Petitioner, James Dominguez, and Tina Dominguez3 returned to James

Dominguez’s home in Modesto following a trip to the Bay Area. (RT 65-66.) They arrived in

Modesto at approximately 10:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. (RT 67, 314.) After running a couple of errands,

Petitioner, James Dominguez, Tina Dominguez, and Tina’s daughter Aliza arrived at the Dominguez

home. (RT 67, 315.) Petitioner and James left soon thereafter. (RT 315.) 

At around 12:00 a.m., Petitioner and James arrived at Aaron Murillo’s house. (RT 219, 315-

316, 318, 690.) Petitioner had driven them over in his car. (RT 219-220, 691.) After “hanging

around” for a time, Petitioner, James, John Lopez and Victor Quiroz left the Murillo residence in

Petitioner’s Cadillac and headed to a store. (RT 221-222, 319, 694.) However, the store was closed.

(RT 222, 320.) Petitioner then broke into the store and Victor helped him steal a case and a half of

beer. (RT 222-223, 320-321, 695-696.) The four of them then left the store in Petitioner’s car and

went to James’ house. (RT 224, 321, 697.) Petitioner parked the car in the driveway facing the

garage. (RT 230, 328.)

Around 1:00 a.m. or 2:00 a.m., Tina was awakened when Petitioner, James Dominguez,

Victor Quiroz, and John Lopez entered the house. (RT 68, 225.) Tina spoke to James and then went

back to bed with her daughter. (RT 69, 225, 322, 697.) Petitioner, James, Victor and John initially

sat in the living room, talked, and drank beer, but at around 6:00 a.m., they went out onto the porch

in front of the house and continued to talk and drink beer. (RT 226, 322-323, 698.) At one point,

Petitioner jokingly made a comment to James that he wanted to “take his frustrations out.” (RT 339.)

While they were sitting in the front of the house, a man on rollerblades skated past. (RT 698.)

Petitioner ran toward him, confronted him, and called him a “queer”. (RT 699.) The man

immediately left “like he was scared.” (RT 699.) Petitioner returned to the porch and said, “It’s just a

queer, a queer on skates.” (RT 699-700.) 

Later, a woman walked by. (RT 324, 702.) Petitioner talked to the woman, but she continued

to walk away from the house. (RT 324.) She later returned and came into the garage. (RT 705.)

James and John then went back inside the house. (RT 227, 707.) John was hungry and started

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cooking some sausage. (RT 227, 326.) James recalled that Petitioner came into the house and asked

if the woman could “hang out” with them in the garage. (RT 325.) James told Petitioner that he

didn’t mind. (RT 325.) Victor stated that he watched Petitioner and the woman get into an argument

involving drugs. (RT 705.) Victor testified that Petitioner told the woman, “You’re just looking for

drugs, you’re just a dopehead,” or something along those lines. (RT 706.) Petitioner also called the

woman “white trash.” (RT 707.) Petitioner then attacked the woman, choking her and slapping her.

(RT 708.) The woman attempted to block him. (RT 708.) Petitioner continued to attack her, and

Victor attempted to separate them; however, Petitioner did not desist and stated, “I have to do it.”

(RT 709.) Victor told Petitioner, “Just let her go, just let her go, there’s no reason to be doing this.”

(RT 710.) Petitioner just continued, stating, “I can’t let her go. She knows, she knows something.”

(RT 710.) Victor asked Petitioner, “What are you going to do?” (RT 712.) Petitioner stated that he

“was just going to scare her.” (RT 712.) Victor then backed away and went into the house to use the

bathroom and get more beer. (RT 712.) 

Later, Petitioner entered the house and asked James if he could close the large garage door.

(RT 327.) James responded by saying he could. (RT 328.) James and John then heard the large

garage door close. (RT 231, 330.) James opened the door into the garage and John saw Petitioner

holding a woman in his arms attempting to kiss her. (RT 233.) James closed the door, went into the

living room and turned on the radio. (RT 234-235.) He appeared scared. (RT 235.) John continued

cooking the sausage. (RT 235.) James told John not to go into the garage, and John responded by

asking, “What the hell is going on?” (RT 235.) James did not respond. (RT 236.) John lost his

appetite, stopped cooking and went into the front room. (RT 236.) He “knew something was going

on.” (RT 238.) He heard a woman’s voice coming from the garage saying, “Leave me alone.” (RT

239.) He then heard a voice from who he thought was Petitioner say, “Shut up.” (RT 239.) He heard

a voice again say, “Be quiet, shut up.” (RT 243.) Victor had gone back into the garage. (RT 713.) He

recalled that Petitioner told him, “I think I killed her.” (RT 714.) James recalled hearing voices

coming from the garage, but he did not remember who was speaking. (RT 330.) Victor saw the

woman lying on the ground with blood around her head. (RT 714.) Victor walked up to the woman

and attempted to nudge her thinking that she was dead. (RT 715.) The woman moved and grabbed

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for him, but Victor kicked the woman away. (RT 715.) Petitioner came in behind him and said,

“Man, she’s still alive.” (RT 716.) Petitioner then started stomping on her and kicking her. (RT 717.)

Victor recalled Petitioner stating, “She won’t go down, she won’t go down. She won’t die, she keeps

on getting up.” (RT 718.) Victor came into the house looking scared and like he wanted to cry. (RT

239-240.) As Victor walked into the front room where James and John were, he looked down and

shook his head from side to side. (RT 242.) Petitioner came in about two or three minutes after

Victor. (RT 240, 330.) Petitioner went to the bathroom and started throwing up. (RT 243.) When he

had finished, he walked back into the kitchen, picked up a pocket knife from the kitchen, and went

into the garage. (RT 244, 343.) Victor also went back into the garage. (RT 245.) Victor recalled that

Petitioner handed him a knife. (RT 719.) Victor opened the knife, then closed it back up and handed

it to Petitioner. (RT 719.) Petitioner then opened the knife, walked over to the woman, and started

stabbing her. (RT 719.) 

Tina recalled waking up and hearing someone throwing up in the bathroom. (RT 71.) She

went into the kitchen and saw James sitting on a chair in the living room and John lying on the

couch. (RT 72.) She then returned to bed.

John testified that Petitioner again entered the house from the garage carrying the pocket

knife. (RT 245, 359.) Petitioner stated, “I killed her.” (RT 245, 333.) He stated that he had hit the

victim on the head with a rod. (RT 246, 261.) John noticed that Petitioner’s pants appeared dark and

wet. (RT 260.) Petitioner left the knife on the kitchen table, and James later hid the knife in the

kitchen oven. (RT 359-360.) Petitioner then asked James for some plastic and a blanket, and James

went into a room and ripped plastic from a mattress. (RT 246.) James gave the plastic, a blanket, and

a mop to Petitioner and Petitioner returned to the garage. (RT 247, 344, 356.) John then lay down on

the couch and tried to go to sleep. (RT 247.) James then went into the garage and saw Victor and

Petitioner standing with the victim lying on the ground. (RT 338, 341.) James saw blood on the trunk

of the vehicle that was in the garage. (RT 358.) James gave Petitioner and Victor some plastic bags

in which to put the towels that they had used to clean up the blood. (RT 343.) Victor helped

Petitioner place the victim into the trunk of Petitioner’s Cadillac. (RT 724.) John later heard a car

start up and the main garage door lift open. (RT 248.) Petitioner reentered the house and told James,

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U.S . District Court

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“I’m going to drop her ass off.” (RT 249.) After the car left, John heard water running near the front

of the house. (RT 250.) John got up and saw that Petitioner’s Cadillac was gone. (RT 250.)

Victor left with Petitioner in his Cadillac expecting that Petitioner would drop him off at his

home. (RT 724-725.) However, Petitioner drove “out towards the country, Escalon area.” (RT 726.)

Petitioner drove to a canal and parked his car. (RT 726.) Victor and Petitioner then unloaded the

victim from the car and placed her on the canal bank. (RT 726.) They then got back into the car and

returned to James Dominguez’ house. (RT 363, 728.) 

At approximately 9:00 a.m., Michelle Pritchard was driving home after having dropped her

children off at school. (RT 513.) As she was driving down Harrold Road, she spotted a vehicle that a

had backed up to the edge of the canal bank. (RT 510-511.) She saw two men near the car. (RT 514.)

Later that day, Ms. Pritchard was driving the same route when she saw emergency personnel at the

same area she had seen the vehicle and the two men. (RT 515.) 

When Petitioner entered the house, he told James “not to worry about it, he took care of it.”

(RT 363.) Victor and Petitioner then attempted to clean up the garage with water and towels. (RT

728, 729.) A short time thereafter, James entered the bedroom and had a conversation with Tina in

which James told Tina what had occurred. (RT 75, 358.) Approximately five minutes later,

Petitioner entered the bedroom asking James for clothes to wear. (RT 75, 365.) After Petitioner

obtained clothes from Petitioner, there was knocking on the door and the doorbell rang. (RT 77,

366.) When no one answered the door, Tina got up and went into the living room. (RT 77.) John was

sleeping on one couch and Petitioner was lying on another. (RT 77.) Petitioner told Tina to return to

her bedroom. (RT 77-78.) When she turned around to do so, a police officer told her to put her hands

up. (RT 78.) Victor had seen the police approaching the house, so he ran out the back door, jumped

over a fence and ran away. (RT 730.) He was arrested the following day. (RT 732.) John recalled

hearing the police at the door demanding that he come out of the house. (RT 251.) John then exited

the house with his hands above his head and was placed into custody. (RT 253.) James also exited

the house at gunpoint and was placed into custody. (RT 367.) Petitioner was also placed in custody.

(RT 558.) Officer Kelly Harris personally placed him into her police vehicle; she testified that he did

not appear to be under the influence of alcohol. (RT 558.) As John was being led away, he noticed

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that the Cadillac was back on the driveway. (RT 261.) 

According to John, during the morning hours of the date of the incident he was not drunk,

and James did not appear to be drunk. (RT 228.) Victor, however, appeared to be drunk, and

Petitioner appeared to be slightly drunk. (RT 229, 231.) Victor testified that he was somewhat drunk

from beer, but he was feeling the effects of methamphetamines which he had taken earlier. (RT 704,

705.)

At the police station, James gave the police permission to search his house and the Pontiac

located in the garage. (RT 368-370.) Tina also gave permission to search the house. (RT 567.)

Petitioner gave permission to search his Cadillac. (RT 570.) In the garage, police investigators found

blood on the inside of the garage door, on the garage floor, on the Pontiac located in the garage, on

the trunk of the Cadillac located in the driveway, inside the trunk of the Cadillac, on the rear bumper

of the Cadillac, and on the undercarriage of the Cadillac; they also found a mop and bucket that had

recently been used, and wet clothing. (RT 535, 553, 565-566.) 

When Tina was first questioned by police, she told them she was asleep during the entire

incident and that no one was at the home except for she and James. (RT 83.) After further

questioning, however, she told her whole story. (RT 84.) John also did not tell the entire story to the

police when he was first questioned, because he stated he was scared that Petitioner and Victor

would harm him. (RT 264.) After he was repeatedly questioned, though, John provided all of the

details to the police as he remembered them. (RT 267.) James initially did not tell the police the

entire truth, because he did not want Petitioner or Victor to get into trouble. (RT 371.) After being

questioned by the police, however, James divulged the details of the incident. (RT 371.) James was

concerned for the safety of his family. (RT 371.) James also told the investigators of the location of

the pocket knife. (RT 374.) After the incident, Tina found car keys which belonged to Petitioner’s

Cadillac in her cat’s litter box. (RT 88-89.) She and James immediately turned the keys over to the

police. (RT 89, 375.) Victor was also questioned by the police, and he told investigators the full story

of what had occurred. (RT 740-741.) 

On June 3, 1998, an autopsy was performed on the body of Cindy Hubbard by Dr. Sally

Fitterer. (RT 132.) The autopsy revealed that the victim had sustained many external injuries

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including contusions, bruises, scrapes, lacerations, cuts due to blunt force, and stab wounds. (RT

133.) The victim sustained several lacerations, contusions, and patterned injuries to the head, a

fractured nose, a fracture to the jaw, an evulsion of a tooth, a stab wound to the left shoulder, a stab

wound to the left side of the neck and a stab wound to the left cheek. (RT 135-137, 147.) The stab

wounds had been caused by a single-edged sharp implement such as a knife. (RT 137-138.) Dr.

Fitterer found it significant that there was not a great amount of blood present in the stab wounds,

especially since the wound to the neck showed the knife actually pierced the left internal jugular

vein. (RT 138.) According to Dr. Fitterer, one possible explanation for the small amount of blood

would be that the victim had sustained the facial injuries prior to the stabbing. (RT 138-139.) The

facial beating would cause the blood pressure to drop, and the profuse amount of blood which would

ordinarily be produced from such facial wounds would lessen the amount of blood volume. (RT 138-

139.) The victim also sustained several lacerations, contusions, and patterned injuries to her back and

shoulders, as well as some minor scrapes, contusions and abrasions to her arms and legs. (RT 142-

146.) 

The patterned injuries showed the victim had been beaten with a fireplace poker. (RT 162.)

However, there was no evidence that the victim had been kicked with a shoe or boot. (RT 158.) In

addition, the patterned injuries and severe lacerations were not consistent with trauma inflicted by

the body possibly bumping across the bottom of the irrigation canal. (RT 171.)

The internal autopsy revealed the victim had sustained some brain injuries consistent with 

blunt force trauma to the victim’s head. (RT 150-151.) In addition, Dr. Fitterer found foamy, frothy

fluid inside the victim’s lungs which was consistent with the discovery of the victim’s body in the

irrigation canal. (RT 154.) Dr. Fitterer certified the cause of death as asphyxia due to fresh water

drowning. (RT 154.) The significant blood loss due to the scalp and face lacerations and the stab

wounds contributed to death. (RT 154.) Dr. Fitterer could not determine whether the victim would

have survived had she not drowned in the irrigation canal. (RT 155, 165.) Nevertheless, the victim

was still alive but unconscious for an unknown period of time after the severe beating as evidenced

by the presence of pneumonia in her bronchial tissue. (RT 155-156.) Dr. Fitterer also noted that the

victim had a minor amount of methamphetamine present in her blood stream. (RT 164.) 

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DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant

to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

375 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S.

Constitution. In addition, the conviction challenged arises out of the Stanislaus County Superior

Court, which is located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d). 

Accordingly, the Court has jurisdiction over the action. 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. 

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114

F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997), quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir.1996), cert.

denied, 520 U.S. 1107 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997)

(holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant petition was

filed after the enactment of the AEDPA; thus, it is governed by its provisions.

II. Legal Standard of Review

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The instant petition is reviewed under the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act which became effective on April 24, 1996. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70

(2003). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus will not be granted unless the

adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Lockyer,

538 U.S. at 70-71; see Williams, 529 U.S. at 413.

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As a threshold matter, this Court must "first decide what constitutes 'clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.'" Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71,

quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In ascertaining what is "clearly established Federal law," this Court

must look to the "holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions as of the time

of the relevant state-court decision." Id., quoting Williams, 592 U.S. at 412. "In other words, 'clearly

established Federal law' under § 2254(d)(1) is the governing legal principle or principles set forth by

the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision." Id.

Finally, this Court must consider whether the state court's decision was "contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law." Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72,

quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). “Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the

writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a

question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of

materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413; see also Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72. 

“Under the ‘reasonable application clause,’ a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state

court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably

applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. 

“[A] federal court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state court decision applied clearly established federal law

erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A

federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state

court’s application of clearly established federal law was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. 

 Petitioner has the burden of establishing that the decision of the state court is contrary to or

involved an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court precedent. Baylor v. Estelle,

94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996). Although only Supreme Court law is binding on the states,

Ninth Circuit precedent remains relevant persuasive authority in determining whether a state court

decision is objectively unreasonable. See Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th

Cir.1999). 

AEDPA requires that we give considerable deference to state court decisions. The state

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court's factual findings are presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). We are bound by a state's

interpretation of its own laws. Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 621 (9th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 537

U.S. 859 (2002), rehearing denied, 537 U.S. 1149 (2003). 

III. Review of Petitioner’s Claim

In his sole ground for relief, Petitioner claims the evidence was insufficient to support a

finding that Petitioner’s actions were the proximate cause of the victim’s death. Noting the forensic

pathologist testified the cause of death to be asphyxia due to drowning, Petitioner contends the

wounds sustained as a result of the beating and stabbing did not cause the victim’s death. Petitioner

alleges the victim chose to go swimming, and this action was a superceding cause which severed the

chain of causation. Respondent contends the evidence was more than sufficient. 

In reviewing sufficiency of evidence claims, California courts expressly follow the Jackson

standard enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). See People v. Johnson, 26 Cal.3d

557, 575-578 (1980); see also People v. Thomas, 2 Cal.4th 489, 513 (1992). Pursuant to the

Supreme Court’s holding in Jackson, the test in determining whether a factual finding is fairly

supported by the record is as follows:

“[W]hether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements 

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; see also Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 781 (1990). 

Sufficiency claims are judged by the elements defined by state law. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324

n. 16. This Court must presume the correctness of the state court’s factual findings. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459 (1986). This presumption of

correctness applies to state appellate determinations of fact as well as those of the state trial courts. 

Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 525 (9th Cir.1990). Although the presumption of correctness does not

apply to state court determinations of legal questions or mixed questions of law and fact, the facts as

found by the state court underlying those determinations are entitled to the presumption. Sumner v.

Mata, 455 U.S. 539, 597 (1981). 

 This claim was first presented on direct appeal to the 5th DCA. On April 30, 2002, the 5th

DCA denied the claim in a reasoned opinion. See Exhibit 3, Answer. On June 4, 2002, Petitioner

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raised the claim in a petition for review before the California Supreme Court. See Exhibit 4, Answer. 

The petition was summarily denied on July 10, 2002, without comment or citation of authority. See

Exhibit 5, Answer. The California Supreme Court, by its “silent order” denying review of the 5th

DCA’s decision, is presumed to have denied the claims presented for the same reasons stated in the

opinion of the 5th DCA. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). 

In reviewing Petitioner’s claim, the 5th DCA first noted that under California law, “in order

[for a defendant] to be liable for the death of another, the death must be a natural and probable

consequence of the defendant’s actions.” See p. 10, Exhibit 3, Answer. Furthermore, an independent

intervening cause would absolve a defendant of criminal liability if the cause was “unforeseeable . . .

an extraordinary and abnormal occurrence, which rises to the level of an exonerating, superceding

cause.” Id. If on the other hand, the intervening cause is “a normal and reasonably foreseeable result

of defendant’s original act, the intervening act is ‘dependent’ and not a superceding cause, and will

not relieve defendant of liability.” Id. 

The 5th DCA first noted that Petitioner’s actions “were a significant factor in the victim’s

death.” See p. 11, Exhibit 3, Answer. The appellate court noted that the forensic pathologist had

testified that the wounds inflicted by Petitioner contributed to the victim’s death because they

accounted for significant blood loss and an extremely low blood pressure. Id. The pathologist opined

that the injuries caused the victim to succumb to drowning, because under other circumstances, the

victim would not have drowned when she entered the water. Id. Accordingly, the appellate court

found that the jury reasonably found appellant’s actions were the proximate cause of death. Id.

The 5th DCA next found meritless Petitioner’s argument that the victim’s action of getting

into the water and “going for a swim” was an independent intervening cause. The appellate court

determined the jury could reasonably find that “it was foreseeable the victim would slide into the

water and drown after [Petitioner] severely beat the victim and left her near the edge of a fastmoving canal.” Id. The court noted that the eyewitness testimony demonstrated that the victim either

crawled or slid into the water. Id. The court noted that the victim had been severely beaten and had

sustained multiple serious injuries including contusions, lacerations, stab wounds, brain

hemorrhaging, fractures, and an evulsion. Id. The court found the jury could reasonably infer that the

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victim, as a result of her injuries, slipped into the water and drowned. Id. The court concluded the

evidence was sufficient to support a finding that Petitioner was the proximate cause of the victim’s

death. Id.

Likewise, this Court concludes that Petitioner’s actions were the proximate cause of the

victim’s death. As noted above, the evidence demonstrated that Petitioner inflicted a potentially fatal

beating and stabbing of the victim using a fireplace poker and a knife. The record shows Petitioner

threw the body of the victim onto a canal bank only two to two and a half meters from the water’s

edge, and left her there. It was certainly foreseeable that the victim’s body would slide into the water. 

This Court also finds meritless Petitioner’s argument that the victim’s action of “going for a

swim” was an independent superceding cause. According to eyewitness Barrera, the victim was lying

on her back on the canal bank. (RT 480-481, 494-498.) As he attempted to approach, Mr. Barrera

watched the victim attempt to sit up twice but lie back down. (RT 481.) He testified that she then

pushed using her hands by her side and slid on her back little by little into the water. (RT 481-484,

487.) He testified that he heard the victim moaning. (RT 485.) Finally, he stated that once in the

water, the victim made a few dog paddle swimming-type motions with her hands before the current

ultimately carried her away. (RT 482, 489.) In light of this evidence, it was certainly reasonable for

the jury to conclude that the victim slid into the water. Or, the jury could reasonably have concluded

that the victim, hearing the approaching person and fearful of further beating or stabbing, pushed

herself into the water. The jury could also have concluded that the victim, delirious because of her

wounds, pushed herself into the water. In either scenario, the victim’s actions were a normal and

reasonably foreseeable result of defendant’s original acts and were not independent acts which would

rise to the level of an exonerating, superceding cause. 

Accordingly, the state court rejection of this claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States, nor did the state court resolution result in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The claim

must be denied. 

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RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the petition for writ of habeas

corpus be DENIED and the Clerk of Court be DIRECTED to enter judgment. 

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the Honorable Robert E. Coyle,

United States District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and

Rule 72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of

California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections

with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served and

filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the objections. 

The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 12, 2005 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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