Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-15-15320/USCOURTS-ca9-15-15320-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Renee Baker
Appellee
Glenn Hammock
Appellee
Charles Manley
Appellant
Scott Manning
Appellee
E. K. McDaniel
Appellee
Michael Rowley
Appellee
State of Nevada
Appellee
Alan Zimmer
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CHARLES MANLEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MICHAEL ROWLEY, Officer; ALAN 

ZIMMER; GLENN HAMMOCK; SCOTT 

MANNING; STATE OF NEVADA, 

Nevada Department of Corrections; 

E. K. MCDANIEL; RENEE BAKER, 

Warden,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-15320

D.C. No.

3:11-cv-00636-

RCJ-WGC

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the District of Nevada

Robert C. Jones, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted December 14, 2016

San Francisco, California

Filed January 30, 2017

Before: DIARMUID F. O’SCANNLAIN, RONALD M. 

GOULD, and MILAN D. SMITH, JR., Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.;

Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by 

Judge O’Scannlain

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2 MANLEY V. ROWLEY

SUMMARY*

Prisoner Civil Rights

The panel reversed in part and affirmed in part the 

district court’s summary judgment and remanded with 

instructions to assign this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 prisoner civil 

rights action, alleging Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment 

claims for excessive force and deliberate indifference, to a 

different judge.

Reversing the district court’s summary judgment on the 

excessive force claim, the panel held that the record 

indicated that a genuine dispute of material fact existed 

regarding whether appellees’ use of force resulted in the 

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or suffering.

Affirming the district court’s summary judgment on 

plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim against Officer 

Zimmer for failure to intervene, the panel held that plaintiff 

failed to timely exhaust his administrative remedies as to that 

claim.

The panel instructed that on remand the case be 

reassigned to different judge. The panel concluded that the 

district judge would have substantial difficulty in putting out 

of his mind previously expressed views regarding past trial 

outcomes when presiding over this matter on remand. The 

panel further held that the district judge’s stated position 

 * This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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MANLEY V. ROWLEY 3

confirmed that reassignment was necessary to preserve the 

appearance of justice.

Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge 

O’Scannlain concurred in the decision on the merits. Judge 

O’Scannlain dissented from the panel’s decision to reassign 

on remand, stating that although the district court’s judge’s 

inappropriate comments regarding past trials were highly 

unusual and logically incoherent, they did not warrant the 

extraordinary measure of reassignment.

COUNSEL

Matthew Cormack (argued), Katherine Cheng, and Greg 

Andres, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, New York, New 

York, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Lawrence VanDyke (argued), Solicitor General; Clark G. 

Leslie, Assistant Solicitor General; Adam Paul Laxalt, 

Attorney General; Office of the Attorney General, Carson 

City, Nevada; for Defendants-Appellees.

OPINION

M. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-Appellant Charles Manley challenges the 

district court’s entry of summary judgment for DefendantsAppellees, who are various prison officers and officials, on 

Manley’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims for 

excessive force and deliberate indifference. For the reasons 

given in this opinion, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and 

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4 MANLEY V. ROWLEY

remand with instructions to assign this case to a different 

district judge.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This matter began on July 2, 2009 as the result of an 

altercation between Manley and his cellmate at Ely State 

Prison (ESP). Manley claims that he fought in self-defense, 

and that he used the prison’s intercom system multiple times 

to contact Correctional Officer Zimmer and request removal 

from the cell. Zimmer denies receiving any such requests.

Some time later, Appellees Officer Rowley and 

Lieutenant Jones “responded to reports of a fight” in 

Manley’s cell. Manley and his cellmate were extracted from 

their cell, and officers video-recorded the extraction, as 

required by Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC) 

Administrative Regulation (A.R.) 405.07. Because only one 

camera was used, after Manley’s extraction, the camera 

panned away from Manley (in alleged violation of prison 

policy) to focus on his cellmate’s removal. Manley alleges 

that during this unrecorded interval, Officers Rowley and 

Hammock punched, kicked, and stomped him while he was 

restrained in handcuffs and leg irons. The video pans back 

to Manley and shows him walking briefly, before officers 

begin carrying him by his shackles. Lifting an inmate by his 

restraints contravenes ESP training, but does not violate 

NDOC policy.

Manley alleges that he suffered numerous injuries as a 

consequence of this rough treatment. His prison medical 

records reflect various injuries and physical complaints, 

though they do not indicate the cause of his ailments. The 

record also shows that on July 2, 2009, Manley was under 

the influence of methamphetamine.

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MANLEY V. ROWLEY 5

Manley was charged in a disciplinary proceeding for his 

July 2, 2009 conduct. Manley challenged the results of the 

disciplinary proceeding through the prison grievance 

process, wherein he claimed that the proceeding had not 

complied with prison procedural requirements. Thereafter, 

Manley received a new hearing, wherein the presiding 

officer found him guilty of disobeying a correctional 

employee, abusive language or actions, delaying, hindering, 

or interfering with a correctional employee in the 

performance of his duties, and assault and battery. Manley 

then filed a second grievance, wherein he argued that the 

second hearing was held outside of the 30-day timeframe 

required by A.R. 707(d)(1). Manley also claimed in his 

second grievance that he had “proved at [the] hearing” that 

he had called Officer Zimmer “requesting to be removed 

from [his] cell,” but that “by the time someone responded to 

the cell [his] cell[mate] had already started the fight.” 

Manley noted that Officer Zimmer “requested that 

[Manley’s] cell be checked,” and that neither “he [Zimmer] 

nor [the prison] [is] responsible for what happened in the

cell.” However, Manley also disclaimed any personal 

responsibility for what happened since he was left in the cell 

and had to defend himself. Finally, Manley requested that 

the “charges [] be dismissed due to information given that 

Manley requested to leave the cell before the fight.” 

Manley’s second grievance was denied, and he pursued it 

through two more levels of appeal, each of which denied his 

grievance.

Manley filed a complaint in the District Court of Nevada 

on July 22, 2011, and Appellees removed the matter to 

federal district court in the District of Nevada on September 

1, 2011. Manley then filed an amended complaint, asserting 

claims for (1) deliberate indifference against Officer Alan 

Zimmer for failure to intervene, and (2) cruel and unusual 

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6 MANLEY V. ROWLEY

punishment against Officers Michael Rowley, Cameron 

Horsley, Glenn Hammock, and Scott Manning for their 

alleged use of excessive force in removing and restraining 

Manley on July 2, 2009, all in violation of the Eighth and 

Fourteenth Amendment.1 The parties filed cross-motions 

for summary judgment, and a magistrate judge issued a 

report recommending that the district court grant Appellees’ 

motion in part and deny it in part, and that the court deny 

Manley’s motion. The magistrate judge recommended that 

the district court dismiss Manley’s deliberate indifference 

claim against Officer Zimmer “without prejudice for failing 

to exhaust his administrative remedies.” The magistrate 

judge provided a detailed recitation of the evidence 

concerning Manley’s excessive force allegation, and found 

that “a multitude of disputed facts preclude the court from 

entering summary judgment.”

The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report 

and recommendation in part. It found that Manley had failed 

to exhaust his administrative remedies against Officer 

Zimmer, but it declined to dismiss the claim without 

prejudice and instead granted summary judgment for Officer 

Zimmer, thereby finalizing the adjudication of that claim. It 

also adopted the magistrate judge’s findings of fact 

regarding Manley’s excessive force claim, but rejected the 

recommended disposition, and granted summary judgment 

for Appellees. In so doing, the district court rejected 

Manley’s testimony about the events at issue. The district 

court further commented that,

 1 Manley also asserted a supervisory liability claim against ESP 

Warden E.K. McDaniel and Officer Renee Baker. Manley did not, 

however, appeal the district court’s adjudication of this claim.

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MANLEY V. ROWLEY 7

[a]dmittedly, the Court does not have an 

excellent track record with the Court of 

Appeals in granting summary judgment 

under similar circumstances, [citing four 

reversals of the district court in similar 

circumstances], but the Court of Appeals has 

an equally poor record with juries after 

remand, [citing jury verdicts in favor of the 

defendants in each of the four remanded 

cases], so this Court’s record in finding that a 

reasonable jury could not find for a plaintiff 

is ultimately very good.

Manley now appeals the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment on his deliberate indifference and excessive force 

claims.

ANALYSIS

I. Manley’s Excessive Force Claim

Courts may enter summary judgment if “the movant 

shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party may oppose a motion for 

summary judgment by asserting “any of the kinds of 

evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c),” including 

declarations and affidavits. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 

477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). “If, as to any given material fact, 

evidence produced by the moving party ... conflicts with 

evidence produced by the nonmoving party ... we must 

assume the truth of the evidence set forth by the nonmoving 

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8 MANLEY V. ROWLEY

party with respect to that material fact.” Furnace v. Sullivan, 

705 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2013). 2

We have refused to find a “‘genuine issue’ [as to a 

material fact] where the only evidence presented is 

‘uncorroborated and self-serving’ testimony.” Villiarimo v. 

Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(quoting Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477, 1481 (9th 

Cir. 1996)). However, because a party’s own testimony will 

nearly always be “self-serving,” the mere self-serving nature 

of testimony permits a court to discount that testimony 

where it “states only conclusions and not facts that would be 

admissible evidence.” Nigro v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 

784 F.3d 495, 497–98 (9th Cir. 2015). Moreover, a court 

ruling on a motion for summary judgment may not engage 

in “[c]redibility determinations” or “the weighing of 

evidence,” as those are functions reserved for the jury. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).

 2 After briefing concluded on this matter, Appellees submitted a 

letter, purportedly pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 28(j), accompanied by 

new evidence in support of summary judgment on Manley’s excessive 

force claim. Manley then submitted a letter opposing Appellees’ 

submission. We construe Manley’s letter as a motion to strike 

Appellees’ letter.

Rule 28(j) permits a party to file a letter alerting the court “[i]f 

pertinent and significant authorities come to a party’s attention after the 

party’s brief has been filed.” Fed. R. App. P. 28(j). As we have 

previously stated, “Rule 28(j) permits a party to bring new authorities to 

the attention of the court; it is not designed to bring new evidence 

through the back door.” Trans-Sterling, Inc. v. Bible, 804 F.2d 525, 528 

(9th Cir. 1986) (emphasis in original). Manley’s motion to strike is 

granted because Appellees’ letter offers no new authorities, but rather 

seeks to supplement the record with new evidence.

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MANLEY V. ROWLEY 9

The record in this case contains multiple issues of 

disputed material fact regarding Manley’s excessive force 

claim. Manley contends that he was beaten by corrections 

officers during the period when the camera panned away 

from him; Appellees claim that no such beating occurred. 

The parties do not dispute that Manley was picked up by his 

wrist and leg restraints and carried horizontally to a holding 

cell. Manley, however, asserts that this was a wanton use of 

force that caused him extreme pain and violated ESP 

training, while Appellees claim that their actions were 

necessary to restore and maintain order—though they 

concede that it contravened officer training protocols.

Thus, the record indicates that a genuine dispute of 

material fact exists regarding whether Appellees’ use of 

force resulted in the unnecessary and wanton infliction of 

pain or suffering. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 

(1992) (setting forth the standard for excessive force claims). 

The district court’s conclusion to the contrary rested 

primarily on its finding that, due to Manley’s ingestion of 

methamphetamine, his testamentary evidence was “so 

compromised as to be virtually worthless.” However, this 

discounting of Manley’s testimony constitutes the sort of 

credibility finding properly left for a jury. See Santos v.

Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 851–54 (9th Cir. 2002); Leslie v. Grupo 

ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 1999). Manley’s 

testimony must be credited at this stage of the proceedings 

unless it is legally defective. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 

Accordingly, we reverse and remand the district court’s 

grant of summary judgment for Appellees on Manley’s 

excessive force claim.

II. Manley’s Deliberate Indifference Claim

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (PLRA), 

amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, requires that inmates exhaust 

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10 MANLEY V. ROWLEY

their administrative remedies prior to bringing a court action 

to redress prison conditions or occurrences. Id. at 

§ 1997(e)(a). This exhaustion requirement is mandatory, 

and “[a]ll available remedies must [] be exhausted; those 

remedies need not meet federal standards, nor must they be 

plain, speedy, and effective.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 

516, 524 (2002) (quotation marks omitted).

The Supreme Court instructs that “exhaustion” under the 

PLRA requires compliance with both procedural and 

substantive requirements set forth by prison grievance 

processes in order to ensure that the prison receives the 

“opportunity to correct its own mistakes ... before it is haled 

into federal court.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 89 (2006) 

(quotation marks omitted). The applicable procedures that a 

prisoner must exhaust “are defined not by the PLRA, but by 

the prison grievance process itself.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 

199, 218 (2007).

The district court correctly entered summary judgment 

on Manley’s deliberate indifference claim because Manley 

failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The second 

grievance filed by Manley did not put the prison on notice of 

Manley’s deliberate indifference claim against Officer 

Zimmer; in fact, it specifically disavowed any assertion of 

liability on the part of Officer Zimmer or the prison. The 

prison therefore did not have the opportunity to respond to 

Manley’s allegation on the merits, and the claim was not 

exhausted.

Manley argues that even if he failed to exhaust his 

deliberate indifference claim, the district court erred by 

granting summary judgment to Appellees rather than 

considering a stay to permit exhaustion. We decline to 

consider whether the district court committed any such error 

because it would be harmless in any event.

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MANLEY V. ROWLEY 11

ESP regulations require that grievances be filed within 

six months of an alleged incident, and state that a prisoner’s 

failure to file within that period constitutes abandonment of 

such grievance at all levels. A.R. 740.05(4)(A), (8). The 

Supreme Court has clarified that the unavailability of 

administrative remedies due to missed deadlines does not 

render such remedies “exhausted” under the PLRA, nor does 

it excuse a failure to exhaust. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90–93. 

The incident giving rise to Manley’s deliberate indifference 

claim occurred on July 2, 2009. Accordingly, by the time 

the district court entered its order dismissing that claim on 

February 10, 2015, the time for filing a grievance had long 

since passed. Because Manley failed to timely exhaust his 

deliberate indifference claim against Officer Zimmer, entry 

of summary judgment on that claim was appropriate.

III. Reassignment upon Remand

Manley asks that we reassign this case to a different 

district judge on remand.3 We will reassign a case to a new 

judge on remand only under “unusual circumstances or when 

required to preserve the interests of justice.” United States 

v. Wolf Child, 699 F.3d 1082, 1102 (9th Cir. 2012). We need 

not find actual bias on the part of the district court prior to 

reassignment. Krechman v. Cty. of Riverside, 723 F.3d 

1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2013). Rather, we consider:

 3 Manley has also requested appointment of counsel, and an 

instruction that the district court consider appointing a guardian ad litem. 

We conclude that the magistrate judge did not abuse his discretion when 

he denied Manley’s previous motion for appointment of counsel. 

However, we leave it to the discretion of the district court whether to 

appoint counsel and/or a guardian ad litem if Manley so moves upon 

remand.

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12 MANLEY V. ROWLEY

(1) whether the original judge would 

reasonably be expected upon remand to have 

substantial difficulty in putting out of his or 

her mind previously expressed views or 

findings determined to be erroneous or based 

on evidence that must be rejected, 

(2) whether reassignment is advisable to 

preserve the appearance of justice, and 

(3) whether reassignment would entail waste 

and duplication out of proportion to any gain 

in preserving appearance of fairness.

Wolf Child, 699 F.3d at 1102 (quoting United States v. 

Quach, 302 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 2002)). The mere 

erroneous grant of a party’s motion does not warrant 

reassignment. McSherry v. City of Long Beach, 423 F.3d 

1015, 1023 (9th Cir. 2005). However, the first two factors 

of the reassignment consideration—the reasonable 

expectation that a judge will have difficulty setting aside a 

prior determination, and whether reassignment is advisable 

to preserve the appearance of justice—are “equally 

important and a finding of either is sufficient to support 

reassignment on remand.” Krechman, 723 F.3d at 1112 

(citing United States v. Jacobs, 855 F.2d 652, 656 (9th Cir. 

1988)).

In granting summary judgment for Appellees, the district 

judge conceded that he had previously been reversed by our 

court at least four times under “similar circumstances.” He 

further claimed that because juries ultimately decided the 

four referenced cases in favor of the same parties for whom 

he had initially granted summary judgment, his record was 

“ultimately very good,” and implied that we should, 

therefore, defer to his judgment.

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MANLEY V. ROWLEY 13

By matching his own reversals in other “similar” cases 

with what he appears to construe as jury “reversals” of our 

rulings on appeal, the district judge describes a personal 

matrix wherein the ultimate finding of no liability by a jury 

justifies his prior entry of summary judgment for Appellees 

even if his doing so violated governing law. Taking such a 

position is highly unusual, and goes well beyond a mere 

legal error or offhand comment. It strongly suggests that the 

district judge will “have substantial difficulty in putting out 

of his . . . mind previously expressed views” when presiding 

over this matter on remand. His stated position also 

confirms that on remand we must reassign the case “to 

preserve the appearance of justice.” Wolf Child, 699 F.3d at 

1102. Finally, because no trial has yet occurred in this 

matter, any duplication of judicial efforts will be minimal if 

the case is reassigned on remand.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm the 

district court’s grant of summary judgment on Manley’s 

deliberate indifference claims, reverse its grant of summary 

judgment on Manley’s claim for excessive force, and 

remand with the instruction that this case be assigned to a 

different district judge. Each party shall bear its own costs 

on appeal.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and 

REMANDED.

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14 MANLEY V. ROWLEY

O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and 

dissenting in part:

While I concur in the decision on the merits, I 

respectfully dissent from Part III, “Reassignment upon 

Remand.” The district court’s argument that past trial 

outcomes verify his ability to predict what a reasonable jury 

can find is certainly “highly unusual.” It is also logically 

incoherent. Whether a specific jury finds for one party does 

not indicate that every reasonable jury would so find. 

Nevertheless, I disagree that the trial court’s inappropriate 

comment “call[s] for the extraordinary measure of

reassignment.” McSherry v. City of Long Beach, 423 F.3d 

1015, 1023 (9th Cir. 2005).

“We have reassigned cases based upon the ‘appearance 

of justice’ in few situations. . . . The common thread in these 

cases is that the district court’s expressions of frustration 

with an attorney or party somehow appeared to affect his or 

her handling of the substantive issues in the case.” State of 

Cal. v. Montrose Chemical Corp. of California, 104 F.3d 

1507, 1521 (9th Cir. 1997). Judge Jones believes that he has 

predicted many trial outcomes, but that does not mean he 

would interfere with a trial to maintain his record. Reading 

such an impulse into his language assumes bad faith where 

none has been suggested.

Because there is no evidence that the district court’s 

previous verbal excesses would affect its rulings during trial, 

the request for reassignment should be denied. Compare 

Krechman v. City of Riverside, 723 F.3d 1104, 1111–12 (9th 

Cir. 2013) (deciding not to reassign because judge’s offcolor comments about an expert’s credibility did not indicate 

that the judge would be unable to apply the correct standard 

on remand) and California v. Montrose Chem. Corp.,

104 F.3d 1507, 1521–22 (9th Cir. 1997) (deciding not to 

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MANLEY V. ROWLEY 15

reassign because judge’s repeated references to 

environmental scientists as “pointy heads” and “so-called 

experts” did not impact his substantive decisions) with 

United States v. Jacobs, 855 F.2d 652, 656–57 (9th Cir. 

1988) (deciding to reassign where trial judge criticized the 

government’s handling of the case in the jury’s presence, 

offered strategic advice to one defendant, dismissed 

indictment in error, refused to reassemble the jury when the 

mistake was discovered two minutes later, and allowed 

defendants to file an untimely motion to dismiss).

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