Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-09-03020/USCOURTS-ca8-09-03020-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Christopher Earl Smith
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Richard W. Goldberg, Judge of the United States Court of

International Trade, sitting by designation.

2

The Honorable James E. Gritzner, United States District Judge for the Southern

District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 09-3020

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Southern District of Iowa.

Christopher Earl Smith, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: January 15, 2010

Filed: January 21, 2010

___________

Before MURPHY and BYE, Circuit Judges, and GOLDBERG,1

 Judge.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Christopher Smith was found guilty following a jury trial of being a prohibited

person in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), (3),

924(a)(2), and notice of forfeiture, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(d)(1). The district

court2

 sentenced Smith to seventy months’ imprisonment followed by two years of

supervised release. Smith appeals, contending the district court erred in denying his

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request for judgment of acquittal or, in the alternative, a new trial. Smith also argues

the district court erred by denying his request for a downward departure at sentencing.

We affirm.

The record reveals on June 27, 2006, a police officer working for the Southwest

Iowa Narcotics Enforcement Unit suspected Smith was trafficking methamphetamine

and firearms. The officer drove to Smith’s residence and waited for him there. When

Smith arrived at his home driving his Dodge pickup truck, the officer observed what

appeared to be a crumpled potato chip bag in the bed of the truck. Smith consented

to a search, and the police officer discovered inside the bag a zippered pouch which

itself contained an object tightly-wrapped in plastic and blue tape. At this stage,

Smith told the officer to “[c]heck it for prints, mine won’t be on it.” The officer

removed the tape and plastic and discovered a .380 FN Herstal semi-automatic pistol.

The first issue Smith raises is whether the evidence presented at trial was

sufficient to prove he was a prohibited person in possession of a firearm. Smith

stipulated to his status as a felon, but argued he did not “knowingly” possess the

handgun. We have previously held in order to sustain a conviction under 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1), the government must prove the defendant possessed the firearm

knowingly. See United States v. Maxwell, 363 F.3d 815, 818 (8th Cir. 2004). We

review de novo Smith's claim of insufficient evidence, “viewing evidence in the light

most favorable to the government, resolving conflicts in the government's favor, and

accepting all reasonable inferences that support the verdict.” United States v.

Whirlwind Soldier, 499 F.3d 862, 869 (8th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks

omitted). The conviction will be sustained unless no reasonable jury could have found

the accused guilty of the crime charged. Id. We conclude the evidence was sufficient

for the jury to find Smith possessed the handgun knowingly. Smith overlooks the fact

the jury is entitled to make reasonable inferences drawn from the direct evidence.

Here, given the facts the gun was discovered in Smith’s truck, and Smith’s insistence

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that his fingerprints would not be on the yet-unidentified object, the jury’s inference

Smith knowingly possessed the firearm was reasonable.

Smith next argues the district court erred by declining to grant him a new trial

because the jury’s verdict amounted to a serious miscarriage of justice. We disagree.

In determining whether to grant a motion for a new trial on the ground the verdict is

contrary to the weight of the evidence, “[t]he district court need not view the evidence

in the light most favorable to the verdict; it may weigh the evidence and in so doing

evaluate for itself the credibility of the witnesses.” United States v. Walker, 393 F.3d

842, 847 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Lincoln, 630 F.2d 1313, 1319 (8th

Cir. 1980)). If, after doing so, the court determines “the evidence preponderates

sufficiently heavily against the verdict that a serious miscarriage of justice may have

occurred, it may set aside the verdict, grant a new trial, and submit the issues for

determination by another jury.” Id. at 847-48. “The district court's denial of [Smith’s]

motion for a new trial based on the weight of the evidence will be affirmed absent a

clear and manifest abuse of discretion.” United States v. Anwar, 428 F.3d 1102, 1109

(8th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). For the reasons we have already

articulated, there was evidence in the record supporting the jury’s conclusion Smith

knowingly possessed the firearm. The district court did not abuse its discretion by

concluding that no miscarriage of justice occurred.

Finally, Smith contends his sentence of 70 months’ imprisonment was

substantively unreasonable. When we review the imposition of sentences, whether

inside or outside the Guidelines range, we apply ‘a deferential abuse-of-discretion

standard.’” United States v. Hayes, 518 F.3d 989, 995 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Gall

v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007)). A district court abuses its discretion when

it (1) “fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight”;

(2) “gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor”; or (3) “considers

only the appropriate factors but in weighing those factors commits a clear error of

judgment.” United States v. Kane, 552 F.3d 748, 752 (8th Cir. 2009) (internal

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quotations and citation omitted). In conducting this review, this court “take[s] into

account the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the

Guidelines range.” Id. If, as it is here, the defendant’s sentence is within the

Guidelines range, then we “may, but [are] not required to, apply a presumption of

reasonableness.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. Just because this court “might reasonably have

concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal

of the district court.” Id. Smith argues the district court failed to adequately consider

his history of substance abuse and his interest in caring for his family. The record

convinces us the district court adequately considered these factors among others in

reaching its sentencing decision. We therefore find no error in Smith’s sentence.

We affirm.

______________________________

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