Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01383/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01383-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
David Florence
Plaintiff
S. Frauenheim
Defendant
R. Reser
Defendant

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID FLORENCE,

Plaintiff,

v.

S. FRAUENHEIM, et al.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:15-cv-01383-AWI-MJS (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT 

(ECF NO. 1)

AMENDED COMPLAINT DUE WITHIN 

THIRTY (30) DAYS

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil 

rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s complaint is before the 

Court for screening.

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The in forma pauperis statute provides, “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any 

portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if 

the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

II. PLEADING STANDARD

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.”

Case 1:15-cv-01383-AWI-JDP Document 8 Filed 11/24/15 Page 1 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for 

vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 

(1989).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and 

(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state 

law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 

1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere 

possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are 

accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78.

III. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

The acts giving rise to this action occurred at Pleasant Valley State Prison 

(“PVSP”) in Coalinga, California. Plaintiff names as Defendants PVSP Correctional 

Officer (“CO”) R. Reser and PVSP Warden Scott Frauenheim.

Plaintiff’s allegations may be summarized essentially as follows.

Plaintiff transferred to PVSP on December 5, 2012, with nine boxes of personal 

property. Upon Plaintiff’s arrival, CO Reser told Plaintiff that he was only allowed four 

boxes and then, due to prison policy, confiscated six CDs containing explicit lyrics. Reser 

Case 1:15-cv-01383-AWI-JDP Document 8 Filed 11/24/15 Page 2 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

also confiscated a hot pot, tennis shoes, and an extension cord. Plaintiff filed an appeal 

regarding Defendant’s confiscation of the CDs, but this appeal was denied. 

In January or February 2013, Plaintiff suffered a nervous breakdown. He was 

placed in a crisis room and then transferred to California Medical Facility for treatment. 

Plaintiff was eventually transferred to Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”), 

where he is presently housed. Since his personal property remained at PVSP following 

his nervous breakdown, he sent a letter on June 26, 2013, to Defendant Warden 

Frauenheim requesting that the property be forwarded to him at RJD because of 

upcoming court deadlines. 

In August 2013, Plaintiff received some of his personal property, but his legal 

documents were missing and some personal items were damaged. Plaintiff wrote to 

Defendant Warden Frauenheim directly regarding his missing legal documents and 

damaged personal property. The letter was forwarded to Lieutenant K.D. Geringer, who 

advised Plaintiff on October 7 2013, to submit inmate appeals regarding his property 

issues. Plaintiff thereafter filed many appeals regarding his personal property. He now 

alleges, in essence, that his appeals were improperly processed, rejected, cancelled 

and/or otherwise inappropriately evaluated.

Plaintiff brings retaliation and denial of court access claims against the 

Defendants, as well as state law claims for violation of California Penal Code § 5058 and 

California Government Code § 19572(f). He seeks damages and declaratory relief.

IV. ANALYSIS

A. First Amendment Retaliation

“Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails 

five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against 

an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct, and that such action (4) 

chilled the inmate's exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not 

Case 1:15-cv-01383-AWI-JDP Document 8 Filed 11/24/15 Page 3 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal .” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 

567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (footnote and citations omitted).

Under the first element, plaintiff need not prove that the alleged retaliatory action, 

in itself, violated a constitutional right. Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (1995) (to 

prevail on a retaliation claim, plaintiff need not “establish an independent constitutional 

interest” was violated); see also Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 269 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(“[P]risoners may still base retaliation claims on harms that would not raise due process 

concerns.”); Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 531 (9th Cir. 1985) (transfer of prisoner to a 

different prison constituted adverse action for purposes of retaliation claim). The interest 

cognizable in a retaliation claim is the right to be free of conditions that would not have 

been imposed but for the alleged retaliatory motive. However, not every allegedly 

adverse action is sufficient to support a claim for retaliation under § 1983. Watison v. 

Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012) (harm must be “more than minimal” (quoting 

Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568, n.11)); see also Bell v. Johnson, 308 F.3d 594, 603 (6th Cir. 

2002) (“[S]ome adverse actions are so de minimis that they do not give rise to 

constitutionally cognizable injuries.” (citing Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 396 (6th 

Cir. 1999))).

To prove the second element, retaliatory motive, plaintiff must show that his 

protected activities were a “substantial” or “motivating” factor behind the defendant's 

challenged conduct. Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1271 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting 

Soranno's Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989)). Plaintiff must 

provide direct or circumstantial evidence of defendant's alleged retaliatory motive; mere 

speculation is not sufficient. See McCollum v. CDCR, 647 F.3d 870, 882-83 (9th Cir.

2011); accord, Wood v. Yordy, 753 F.3d 899, 905 (9th Cir. 2014). In addition to 

demonstrating defendant's knowledge of plaintiff's protected conduct, circumstantial 

evidence of motive may include: (1) proximity in time between the protected conduct and 

the alleged retaliation; (2) defendant's expressed opposition to the protected conduct; 

Case 1:15-cv-01383-AWI-JDP Document 8 Filed 11/24/15 Page 4 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

and (3) other evidence showing that defendant's reasons for the challenged action were 

false or pretextual. McCollum, 647 F.3d at 882 (quoting Allen v. Iranon, 283 F.3d 1070, 

1077 (9th Cir. 2002)).

The third element includes prisoners' First Amendment right to access to the 

courts. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996). While prisoners have no freestanding 

right to a prison grievance process, see Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir.

2003), “a prisoner's fundamental right of access to the courts hinges on his ability to 

access the prison grievance system,” Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir.

1995), overruled on other grounds by Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 230 n.2 (2001). 

Because filing administrative grievances and initiating civil litigation are protected 

activities, it is impermissible for prison officials to retaliate against prisoners for engaging 

in these activities. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567.

Under the fourth element, plaintiff need not demonstrate a “total chilling of his 

First Amendment rights,” only that defendant's challenged conduct “would chill or silence 

a person of ordinary firmness from future First Amendment activities.” Rhodes, 408 F.3d 

at 568-69 (emphasis in original, citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, 

direct and tangible harm will support a retaliation claim even without demonstration of a 

chilling effect on the further exercise of a prisoner's First Amendment rights. Id. at 568 n. 

1. “[A] plaintiff who fails to allege a chilling effect may still state a claim if he alleges he 

suffered some other harm” as a retaliatory adverse action. Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 1269 

(citing Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568 n.11).

Regarding the fifth element, the Ninth Circuit has held that preserving institutional 

order, discipline, and security are legitimate penological goals that, if they provide the 

motivation for an official act taken, will defeat a claim of retaliation. Barnett v. Centoni, 31 

F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994); Rizzo, 778 F.2d at 532. When considering this final factor, 

courts should “‘afford appropriate deference and flexibility’ to prison officials in the 

evaluation of proffered legitimate penological reasons for conduct alleged to be 

Case 1:15-cv-01383-AWI-JDP Document 8 Filed 11/24/15 Page 5 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

retaliatory.” Pratt, 65 F.3d at 807 (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995)). 

Plaintiff bears the burden of pleading and proving the absence of legitimate correctional 

goals for defendant's challenged conduct. Pratt, 65 F.3d at 806.

Plaintiff accuses Defendant Reser of withholding Plaintiff’s legal materials and 

damaging his personal property in response to Plaintiff’s filing of a grievance. Plaintiff’s 

claim, however, is purely speculative. It contains no alleged facts that might be said to 

connect Reser to the missing and damaged property or to suggest that the property was 

taken for other than legitimate penological reasons. Rather, Plaintiff apparently assumes 

Reser is responsible because Reser objected to the volume of Plaintiff’s personal 

property. Indeed, no facts suggest Reser was even aware of Plaintiff’s grievance.

The same is true regarding the purported retaliation claim against Warden 

Frauenheim. Plaintiff asserts that the warden conspired with Reser and other COs to 

steal his legal materials and damage his personal property in response to Plaintiff’s filing 

of multiple appeals. As plead, this allegation also appears to be based solely upon 

Plaintiff’s speculation, assumptions and surmise. It fails to state a claim. 

B. Access to Courts

Prisoners have a constitutional right to meaningful access to the courts. Silva v. 

DiVittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1101-02 (9th Cir. 2011). The right of access to the courts 

protects prisoners' right to file civil actions that have “a reasonable basis in law or fact” 

without “active interference” by the government. Id. at 1102-03 (internal quotation marks 

and emphasis omitted). The right of access to the courts “does not require prison 

officials to provide affirmative assistance in the preparation of legal papers,” but does 

prohibit states from “erecting barriers that impede the right of access of incarcerated 

persons,” such as by depriving prisoners of the “tools necessary to challenge their 

sentences or conditions of confinement.” Id. at 1102-03 (internal brackets and quotation 

marks omitted).

The Supreme Court distinguishes between “forward-looking” access to the courts 

Case 1:15-cv-01383-AWI-JDP Document 8 Filed 11/24/15 Page 6 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

claims, in which the plaintiff alleges that official action is frustrating plaintiff's ability to 

prepare and file a suit at the present time, and “backward-looking” claims, in which 

plaintiff alleges that due to official action, a specific case cannot now be tried, or be tried 

with all material evidence. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 413-14 (2002). To state 

a claim for denial of access to the courts, prisoners must allege an actual injury, i.e., that 

some official action has frustrated or is impeding plaintiff's attempt to bring a nonfrivolous 

legal claim. Nevada Dept. of Corrections v. Greene, 648 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Plaintiff here claims that the Defendants denied him access to the courts. As 

noted above, Plaintiff fails to adequately link either of the Defendants to the withholding 

of his legal materials. Plaintiff also fails to allege any injury. He fails to establish that he 

suffered any prejudice in connection with any contemplated or pending litigation.

Accordingly, this claim must be dismissed.

C. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process

A prisoner may not be deprived of a protected property interest without due 

process. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). However, “the Due Process 

Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss 

of or injury to ... property.” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986). Similarly, “an 

unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state employee does not constitute 

a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.” Hudson v. 

Palmer, 468 U.S. at 533. In California, a meaningful postdeprivation remedy is available 

in the form of a tort claim against public officials pursuant to California Government Code 

§ 900, et seq. See City of West Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234, 240 (1999). Because 

the State of California provides a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for any property 

deprivation that was either negligent or intentional but unauthorized, the allegation of 

such a deprivation fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted in the federal 

courts. Only an authorized, intentional deprivation of property by a public official may 

Case 1:15-cv-01383-AWI-JDP Document 8 Filed 11/24/15 Page 7 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

constitute an actionable violation of the Due Process Clause. Logan v. Zimmerman 

Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 435-36 (1982).

To the extent Plaintiff’s complaint can be construed as asserting a Due Process 

violation, it fails since it is based on an unauthorized, intentional deprivation, which is not 

actionable under the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff’s allegation that his personal 

property was wrongfully lost, misplaced, damaged, or stolen reflects a random and 

unauthorized deprivation of property not cognizable under Section 1983. His property 

claim may be cognizable under state law, but such a claim must be brought in state court 

rather than in federal court.

D. California Penal Code Section § 5058

Plaintiff asserts a violation of California Penal Code 5058 against both 

Defendants. A private right of action under a criminal statute has rarely been implied. 

Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 316 (1979). Where a private right of action has 

been implied, “‘there was at least a statutory basis for inferring that a civil cause of action 

of some sort lay in favor of someone.” Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at 316 (quoting Cort v. 

Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 79 (1975)). Section 5058 merely authorizes the director of CDCR to 

prescribe and amend rules and regulations for the administration of the prisons. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state any claim upon which relief may be 

granted under state law based on the alleged violations of California Penal Code § 5058.

E. California Government Code § 19572(f)

Lastly, Plaintiff claims that Defendants were dishonest in violation of California 

Government Code § 19572(f). The Government Code section cited by Plaintiff relates to 

discipline of state civil service personnel. There is no indication that Plaintiff is authorized 

to bring a private cause of action based on this Government Code provision.

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff’s complaint does not state a claim for relief. The Court will grant Plaintiff 

an opportunity to file an amended complaint. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 

Case 1:15-cv-01383-AWI-JDP Document 8 Filed 11/24/15 Page 8 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

(9th Cir. 1987). If Plaintiff opts to amend, he must demonstrate that the alleged acts 

resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78. Plaintiff 

must set forth “sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” 

Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must also demonstrate 

that each named Defendant personally participated in a deprivation of his rights. Jones 

v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).

Plaintiff should note that although he has been given the opportunity to amend, it 

is not for the purposes of adding new claims. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th 

Cir. 2007). Plaintiff should carefully read this Screening Order and focus his efforts on 

curing the deficiencies set forth above.

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, 

an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 

55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once an amended complaint is filed, the original complaint no 

longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an 

original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be 

sufficiently alleged. The amended complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “First 

Amended Complaint,” refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original signed 

under penalty of perjury. Plaintiff's amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a). Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a 

right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations 

omitted).

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff (1) a blank civil rights complaint form and 

(2) a copy of his complaint, filed September 10, 2015; 

2. Plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 1) is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted;

Case 1:15-cv-01383-AWI-JDP Document 8 Filed 11/24/15 Page 9 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

3. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days; and

4. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, the 

Court will dismiss this action, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim and 

failure to comply with a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 23, 2015 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:15-cv-01383-AWI-JDP Document 8 Filed 11/24/15 Page 10 of 10