Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-07-03210/USCOURTS-ca3-07-03210-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael Curtis Reynolds
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 07-3210

_____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

MICHAEL CURTIS REYNOLDS,

 Appellant

__________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Criminal No.05-cr-00493)

District Judge: Honorable Edwin M. Kosik

__________

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

on January 25, 2010

Before: RENDELL and JORDAN, Circuit Judges,

and PADOVA,* District Judge.

(Filed: March 18, 2010)

__________________

 * Honorable John R. Padova, Senior Judge of the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.

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__________

OPINION OF THE COURT

__________

RENDELL, Circuit Judge.

In 2007, a jury found Michael Curtis Reynolds guilty of multiple terrorism-related

crimes, and the District Court sentenced him to 360 months of imprisonment, three years

of supervised release, and a fine of $500. On appeal, Reynolds raises the following

issues: (1) whether the evidence submitted at trial was sufficient to find him guilty of the

five counts he was convicted of; (2) whether the “master” affidavit of probable cause for

the search warrants contained a reckless or intentional material misstatement of fact;

(3) whether perjured trial testimony was used to support the conviction; (4) whether the

United States vindictively prosecuted Reynolds; and (5) whether Reynolds’s right to a

speedy trial was violated. We will affirm the order of the District Court.

I.

Since we write only for the benefit of the parties, we state only the facts that are

necessary as background. An FBI source, Shannon Rossmiller, discovered a message

from October 25, 2005 that Reynolds posted on an on-line message board soliciting help

for what appeared to be a terrorist plan. In early November 2005, after finding similar

messages also posted by Reynolds, Rossmiller began direct communication with

Reynolds through email correspondence. In his response to her initial email, Reynolds

Case: 07-3210 Document: 003110063882 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/18/2010
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stated that his plan would cause the United States to bring its troops home. (Appellate Br.

at 13, citing Tr. 124.) Over the course of the next month, Rossmiller communicated

interest in Reynolds’s plans, Reynolds described the plans generally, and both parties

discussed payment arrangements. Reynolds was arrested by an FBI tactical team on

December 5, 2005 near Pocatello, Idaho, while he was attempting to retrieve reward

money promised to him by an undercover FBI agent. 

After his arrest, Special Agent Noone, of the FBI’s Scranton Resident Agency,

informed Reynolds of his constitutional rights, and Reynolds waived those rights. 

Reynolds confessed that he believed he was communicating with an organization tied to

al-Qaeda, but he denied being a terrorist. He claimed that he was attempting to gain

information about al-Qaeda in order to turn it over to a private paramilitary organization

with which he had been associated in the 1980s. He had not contacted anyone at the

organization about his plan, nor had he communicated this idea to anyone else. 

Illustrative operational plans for the attack were found on Reynolds’s computer. 

Reynolds’s plans for an explosive device were detailed and thorough. At the time of

Reynolds’s arrest, a search warrant was executed at his rented storage unit, and an officer

found a live hand grenade in the unit.

On December 20, 2005, a grand jury indicted Reynolds on two counts of

possessing an unregistered destructive device in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). 

Reynolds pleaded not guilty. His court-appointed attorney was then permitted to

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 Count 1: attempting to provide material support and resources to a foreign terrorist 1

organization in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B; Count 2: attempting to provide material

support and resources to damage or destroy property used in commerce by means of fire

or explosive, and to damage or attempt to damage an interstate gas pipeline, in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 2339A; Count 3: solicitation or inducement of another to damage or

destroy property used in commerce by means of fire or explosive, and to damage or

attempt to damage an interstate gas pipeline in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 373; Count 4:

distribution through the internet of information demonstrating the making or use of an

explosive or destructive device with the intent that the information be used to commit a

federal crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 842(p)(2); and Counts 5 and 6:

two counts of possessing an unregistered destructive device in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 5861(d).

 Reynolds included in his statement of questions for appeal that the District Court 2

refused to decide his pro se motions. However, he made no actual argument supporting

his contention in the body of his brief. It is a well-established rule that the failure to

argue an issue in an opening brief constitutes waiver of that issue on appeal. See United

States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005); see also Laborers’ Intern. Union of N.

Am., AFL-CIO v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994) (citation

omitted) (“An issue is waived unless a party raises it in its opening brief, and for those

purposes ‘a passing reference to an issue . . . will not suffice to bring that issue before this

court.’”)

4

withdraw and substitute counsel was appointed by the court. On June 7, 2006,

Reynolds’s second court-appointed counsel moved to withdraw. Over the next month,

Reynolds filed 11 pro se motions, while the District Court appointed Reynolds’s third

attorney on June 11, 2006. 

On October 3, 2006, before a scheduled hearing date on Reynolds’s outstanding

motions, the grand jury returned a six-count superseding indictment. Though Reynolds 1

was represented by court-appointed counsel, he filed 23 pro se motions in the form of

letter motions, writs, and complaints. On May 18, 2007, Reynolds’s counsel filed a 2

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motion to suppress evidence and a motion to dismiss the indictment for violation of the

Speedy Trial Act. The court denied the suppression motion, and on July 2, 2007 issued a

memorandum opinion rejecting the motion for violations of the Speedy Trial Act. 

On July 9-12, 2007, Reynolds was tried by U.S. District Judge Kosik before a jury. 

The jury found Reynolds guilty of five of the six counts. Reynolds was acquitted of one

count of possessing an unregistered destructive device. Reynolds prematurely filed his

notice of appeal on July 23, 2007. On November 6, 2007, the District Court sentenced

Reynolds to 360 months of imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and a fine of

$500. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a),

and will address the issues raised by Reynolds as listed above. 

II. 

a. Sufficiency of Evidence

We engage in plenary review over a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence. 

United States v. Omoruyi, 260 F.3d 291 (3d Cir. 2001). In conducting this review, the

court “must sustain a jury’s verdict if a reasonable jury believing the government’s

evidence could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the government proved all the

elements of the offenses.” United States v. Rosario, 118 F.3d 160, 163 (3d Cir. 1997)

(internal citation and quotation marks omitted). This “places a very heavy burden on the

appellant.” Id. Review of sufficiency claims are “guided by strict principles of deference

to a jury’s verdict.” Id. 

Case: 07-3210 Document: 003110063882 Page: 5 Date Filed: 03/18/2010
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Reynolds argues that the government’s claims are supported by insufficient

evidence, because he did not own a computer monitor to enable him to send email prior to

November 23, 2005. In addition, Reynolds asserts (erroneously) that because the

government did not dispute this fact in its rebuttal argument, it must be accepted as true. 

Even if we were to find this to be persuasive, this would not establish that the evidence

supporting the jury’s verdict was insufficient. The government proved that emails were

sent from an email address Reynolds controlled, under an alias that Reynolds used, and

were sent from Pennsylvania at a time that Reynolds admits he was located in the Middle

District. Whether they were sent from Reynolds’s personal computer or from some other

computer to which he had access, Reynolds’s assertion that his own computer had no

monitor does not render the government’s evidence insufficient. The jury had an

opportunity to consider this issue for itself at trial. Therefore, we find that Reynolds has

failed to overcome the significant hurdle to overturning a conviction on the basis of a

claim of insufficient evidence.

b. “Master” Affidavit and Probable Cause

Whether the “master” affidavit for probable cause for the relevant search warrant

contained a misstatement of fact, and whether any such misstatement was intentionally or

recklessly made, are factual questions to be resolved by the District Court in the first

instance in response to a suppression motion raising such issues. Franks v. Delaware,

438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978). Such misstatements will lead to suppression of evidence

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only if they were material to the finding of probable cause. United States v. Brown, 3

F.3d 673, 678 n.6 (3d Cir. 1993). Materiality is a legal question subject to plenary

review. United States v. Yusuf, 461 F.3d 374, 387-89 (3d Cir. 2006). 

Reynolds did not assert the existence of a specific misstatement of fact in the

District Court. Thus, there is no factual determination by the District Court to review. 

Reynolds filed a motion to suppress the fruits of the search of his storage unit. However,

he only asserted that the master affidavit did not establish probable cause, not that there

was a misstatement of fact. (Mot. to Suppress Evidence, Doc. No. 179.) The issue is

therefore reviewed only for plain error. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). We find Reynolds’s

argument unpersuasive. Reynolds fails to assert a misstatement, let alone a misstatement

that was intentional or reckless and was material to finding probable cause.

c. Perjured Trial Testimony

In his brief, Reynolds alleges that certain individuals committed perjury during the

trial. To establish a due process violation premised upon the government’s knowing use

of perjured testimony, a Defendant must show that (1) a government witness committed

perjury, (2) the Government knew or should have known of the perjury, (3) the perjured

testimony went uncorrected, and (4) there is a reasonable likelihood that the false

testimony could have affected the verdict. United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 183

(3d Cir. 2008). 

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Whether a witness’s testimony was false, and the government’s actual or imputed

knowledge thereof, are factual questions to be determined by the District Court in the first

instance. This Court will not overturn the findings unless such findings are unsupported

by evidence. Government of the Virgin Islands v. Lima, 774 F.2d 1245, 1251 (3d Cir.

1985). Outside of stating his innocence and testifying in his own defense in a manner

inconsistent with the testimony of several government witnesses, Reynolds failed to

preserve this issue in the District Court. As such, this inquiry is subject to review only for

plain error. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). 

Reynolds’s perjury allegations are based on his claim that Kevin Reardon, his

brother-in-law, lied. Specifically, Reynolds contends that Reardon planted the grenades

in the storage unit and committed perjury by stating otherwise. No evidence was

presented to establish Reynolds’s claim. Thus, he fails the first prong of the Hoffecker

test, and has not even suggested that he could meet the second. Accordingly, we find that

he has not met his burden on this issue. 

d. Vindictive Prosecution

Reynolds did not allege that the government’s prosecution of him was vindictive in

the District Court. Therefore, the issue is subject to review only for plain error. Fed. R.

Crim. P. 52(b). 

Prosecutorial vindictiveness may be found when the government penalizes a

defendant for invoking legally protected rights. United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368,

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372 (1982). There is no prosecutorial vindictiveness, however, where the prosecutor’s

decision to prosecute is based on the usual determinative factors. United States v. Oliver,

787 F.2d 124, 126 (3d Cir. 1986). Reynolds bears the burden of proving prosecutorial

vindictiveness. United States v. Paramo, 998 F.2d 1212, 1220 (3d Cir. 1993). He may

meet his burden by either (1) using evidence of the prosecutor’s retaliatory motive to

prove actual vindictiveness, or (2) proving facts that in certain circumstances give rise to

a presumption of vindictiveness. Id. Courts will apply a presumption of vindictiveness

only where there exists a “realistic likelihood of vindictiveness.” Id.

Reynolds fails to allege any facts that could support a finding of actual

vindictiveness, or a presumption of vindictiveness other than that more serious charges

were brought after the initial indictment. Reynolds’s original two-count indictment

followed his arrest by just fifteen days. Nine-and-a-half months after the original

indictment, and after a more thorough investigation, a more comprehensive indictment

was issued. Moreover, Reynolds offers no evidence of the prosecution having an actual

retaliatory motive. Thus, Reynolds has not sustained his burden for this claim as he has

not established facts giving rise to a presumption of vindictiveness or evidence of an

actual retaliatory motive. 

e. Speedy Trial

Reynolds appeals the denial of a motion to dismiss the indictment, claiming a

violation of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq. Section 3161(h) of the Act

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 See Bloate v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 2010 WL 757660 at *5 & n.7 (Mar. 8, 3

2010) (acknowledging that delay resulting from defendant’s pretrial motion is

automatically excluded under § 3161(h)(1)(D)). 

10

permits the exclusion of periods of delay in the calculation of the seventy-day time limit

for the commencement of trial. Properly excluded periods of delay include pretrial

motions, from filing to their disposition, and any period of delay from a continuance

provided there is an ends of justice reason given by the court. 

3

As the District Court’s memorandum opinion states, the speedy trial period began

to run when Reynolds was arraigned on the original indictment on January 3, 2006. The

eventual trial was held on July 9, 2007. Reynolds’s counsel filed a motion on January 12,

2006 to review his previous detention by a magistrate judge. On January 19, 2006,

Reynolds’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw from the case due to irreconcilable

differences. New counsel was appointed shortly thereafter. In March 2006, the bail

motion was withdrawn, and the defense filed ex parte motions for discovery and authority

to hire expert services. In May 2006, the second court-appointed attorney sought to

withdraw due to irreconcilable differences. At this point, Reynolds also filed several pro

se motions. 

On July 17, 2006, Reynolds’s third court-appointed attorney was assigned, and

moved for discovery soon after. Throughout the remainder of the 2006 summer and into

the fall, Reynolds filed numerous pro se motions despite having legal representation. The

District Court found that there were outstanding motions for the entirety of this time

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frame except for the eight days between Reynolds’s arraignment and the motion to review

his detention, and a period of nine days from March 14-28, 2006. United States v.

Reynolds, No. 3:CR06-493, 2007 WL 1959302, at *4 (M.D. Pa. July 2, 2007). 

On October 3, 2006, a superseding indictment containing four additional charges

was returned. If a superseding indictment charges a new offense that did not have to be

joined with the original indictment, then the subsequent indictment begins a new,

independent speedy trial period. United States v. Lattany, 982 F.2d 866, 872 n.7 (3d Cir.

1992). On the same day as the issuance of the superseding indictment, the court ordered a

competency exam for Reynolds. Pursuant to section 3161(h)(1)(F), the District Court

properly excluded the time period Reynolds was committed for his competency exam,

which began on October 11, 2006 and ended on January 5, 2007. Reynolds continued to

file numerous pro se motions from October 2006 into April 2007. The District Court

properly excluded these pro se motions in addition to other counseled defense motions for

enlargements of time to file pretrial motions, defense motions for continuances of trial,

and defense motions for pretrial relief from the time between Reynolds ’s arraignment on

the superseding indictment and the commencement of trial pursuant to section

3161(h)(1)(F). Therefore, the District Court stated that, at best, non-excluded time was

minimal, and there was no violation of the Speedy Trial Act for the first or second

indictment. 

Case: 07-3210 Document: 003110063882 Page: 11 Date Filed: 03/18/2010
 In addition to the arguments discussed, Reynolds raised additional arguments that we 4

have considered, and which we also find to be meritless. 

12

Additionally, prejudice or lack of prejudice to the defendant is also a factor to be

contemplated. United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326. 339-41 (1988). We agree with the

District Court’s finding that the non-excludable delay was minimal, and it was not

prejudicial to Reynolds. 

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the Judgment and Commitment Order of

the District Court.4

 

 

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