Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-06-02268/USCOURTS-ca10-06-02268-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert Michael Hanrahan
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

November 13, 2007

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

November 13, 2007

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ROBERT MICHAEL HANRAHAN,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 06-2268

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

(D. Ct. No. CR-04-1978-JB)

Jane Greek, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Office of the Federal Public

Defender for the District of New Mexico, Las Cruces, New Mexico, appearing for

Appellant.

Judith A. Patton, Assistant United States Attorney (Johnny Sutton, United States

Attorney, with her on the brief), Office of the United States Attorney for the

Western District of Texas, San Antonio, Texas, appearing for Appellee.

Before TACHA, Chief Circuit Judge, BALDOCK, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

TACHA, Chief Circuit Judge.

A jury convicted Defendant-Appellant Robert Hanrahan of being a felon in

possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e). The

Appellate Case: 06-2268 Document: 010167519 Date Filed: 11/13/2007 Page: 1 
-2-

District Court sentenced him to 235 months’ imprisonment. He appeals both his

conviction and sentence. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and

AFFIRM. 

I. BACKGROUND

On July 15, 2004, Deputy Lawrence Tonna of the Bernalillo County

Sheriff’s Department was dispatched to the area of 1014 Ortega Road in

Albuquerque, New Mexico to investigate an attempted burglary. The dispatcher

reported that two male suspects had left the scene and were headed east on Ortega

Road in a “primer gray” 1970s or 1980s full-sized Ford pickup truck. When

Deputy Tonna arrived at the location of the alleged attempted burglary, witnesses

confirmed the description of the vehicle and said that the truck had turned north

onto South Guadalupe Trail. Several minutes later, Deputy Tonna spotted a truck

on South Guadalupe Trail resembling the description provided to him by the

dispatcher and witnesses. Although the body of the truck was “primer gray,” the

cab was painted white, and there was only one occupant. 

Deputy Tonna pulled behind the truck and noticed that the truck’s license

plate was placed inside the lower right-hand corner of the rear windshield, rather

than affixed to the bumper of the truck, which Deputy Tonna believed to be a

violation of New Mexico law. He also noticed that the truck’s registration sticker

was the wrong color for the registration year, and that it read “96,” indicating that

the truck’s registration had expired in 1996. Based on these observations, Deputy

Appellate Case: 06-2268 Document: 010167519 Date Filed: 11/13/2007 Page: 2 
-3-

Tonna activated the lights on his patrol car to initiate a traffic stop. The truck

immediately pulled over. 

Before approaching the truck, Deputy Tonna ran a license-plate check,

which confirmed that the truck’s registration had expired in 1996. Deputy Tonna

then approached the driver’s side of the truck and asked the driver, Mr. Hanrahan,

for his license, registration, and proof of insurance. Mr. Hanrahan did not have

any of these documents. Deputy Tonna noticed that the steering column of the

truck was broken and that wires were dangling from the ignition mechanism,

indicating to Deputy Tonna that the vehicle might have been stolen. After two

back-up deputies arrived, Deputy Tonna ordered Mr. Hanrahan out of the vehicle. 

While Deputy Tonna escorted Mr. Hanrahan to the back of the truck,

Deputy Levi Swint, one of the back-up officers, looked inside the truck’s cab and

saw a small gun in plain view next to the driver’s seatbelt latch. He asked Mr.

Hanrahan whether it was a gun or a lighter made to look like a gun. Mr.

Hanrahan, who was facing away from the cab, acknowledged that it was, in fact, a

gun. He further said that it belonged to a friend and that it was inoperable. 

Deputy Tonna, after noticing tattoos on Mr. Hanrahan’s body that the deputy

knew to be associated with a prison gang, asked Mr. Hanrahan whether he had

served time in prison. Mr. Hanrahan admitted serving six years for armed

robbery. Deputy Tonna then confirmed Mr. Hanrahan’s criminal history and

arrested him for being a felon in possession of a firearm. 

Appellate Case: 06-2268 Document: 010167519 Date Filed: 11/13/2007 Page: 3 
1

A defendant convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is considered an

“armed career criminal” if he has three previous convictions for “violent

felon[ies] or . . . serious drug offense[s], or both, committed on occasions

different from one another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(a), (e)(1). Mr. Hanrahan had

convictions for armed robbery, burglary, and aggravated battery with a deadly

weapon.

-4-

On October 7, 2004, a grand jury indicted Mr. Hanrahan for being a felon

in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e). 

Prior to trial, Mr. Hanrahan moved to suppress physical evidence and the

statements he made during the traffic stop, arguing that he was stopped without

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 

The District Court denied the motion. The case went to trial, where Mr. Hanrahan

testified in his own behalf. The jury was unable to reach a verdict, and the

District Court declared a mistrial. The Government retried Mr. Hanrahan. At the

second trial, over Mr. Hanrahan’s objection, the District Court allowed the

Government to read Mr. Hanrahan’s prior testimony into evidence. This time, the

jury convicted Mr. Hanrahan. 

A presentence report (“PSR”) was prepared for sentencing. Because Mr.

Hanrahan was considered an “armed career criminal,” see 18 U.S.C. § 924(e),1

 the

PSR stated that he was subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years’

(180 months) imprisonment, see id. In addition, due to his status as an armed

career criminal, the PSR calculated Mr. Hanrahan’s base offense level at 33 and

placed him in Criminal History Category VI, which produced an advisory range

Appellate Case: 06-2268 Document: 010167519 Date Filed: 11/13/2007 Page: 4 
-5-

of 235-293 months’ imprisonment under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines

(“Guidelines” or “U.S.S.G.”). See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4(b)(3)(B); U.S.S.G. Ch. 5 pt.

A. The District Court ultimately concluded that a sentence within the applicable

Guidelines range was appropriate and sentenced Mr. Hanrahan to 235 months’

imprisonment, as well as three years’ supervised release. The court imposed a

special condition on Mr. Hanrahan’s supervised release—namely, that he submit

to suspicionless searches when requested to do so. 

Mr. Hanrahan now appeals, arguing that (1) the District Court erred in

denying his motion to suppress evidence; (2) the District Court admitted Mr.

Hanrahan’s testimony from the first trial in violation of his Fifth Amendment

privilege against self-incrimination; (3) there was insufficient evidence to support

his conviction; (4) his sentence is unreasonably long; and (5) the court abused its

discretion in imposing the special condition on his supervised release. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Denial of the Motion to Suppress

In reviewing the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and accept the

court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous. United States v. Patterson, 472

F.3d 767, 775 (10th Cir. 2006). It is within the province of the district court to

assess the credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable

inferences therefrom. United States v. Tibbetts, 396 F.3d 1132, 1136 (10th Cir.

Appellate Case: 06-2268 Document: 010167519 Date Filed: 11/13/2007 Page: 5 
-6-

2005). We review de novo the ultimate determination of reasonableness under the

Fourth Amendment. Patterson, 472 F.3d at 775. 

Whether a traffic stop is constitutional is a two-step inquiry. First, we

consider whether the officer’s action is justified at its inception. Id. (quotations

omitted). Second, we consider whether the traffic stop “was reasonably related in

scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place.” Id.

Because Mr. Hanrahan does not argue that the deputies unjustifiably exceeded the

permissible scope of the traffic stop, our focus in this case is on the first inquiry. 

A traffic stop is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if the officer had

reasonable suspicion that the driver “violated any one of the multitude of

applicable traffic and equipment regulations of the jurisdiction.” Id. (quotations

omitted). Deputy Tonna initiated a traffic stop because he believed that the

truck’s registration had expired, see N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-3-18(C) (prohibiting

operating a vehicle with a registration sticker for other than the current

registration period), and because he believed that Mr. Hanrahan’s license plate

was unlawfully displayed in the truck’s rear window, see N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-3-

18(A) (requiring the registration plate to be attached to the rear of the vehicle and

clearly visible). Mr. Hanrahan does not contest that a violation of either statutory

provision would support a traffic stop; rather, he argues that (1) Deputy Tonna

could not have seen the date on the registration sticker and therefore had no basis

under N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-3-18(C) to stop him; and (2) it is not unlawful to

Appellate Case: 06-2268 Document: 010167519 Date Filed: 11/13/2007 Page: 6 
-7-

display a license plate in the window of a vehicle, so N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-3-

18(A) similarly provides no basis for the stop. He also maintains that Deputy

Tonna lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him for the alleged attempted burglary. 

As to the first contention, Mr. Hanrahan maintains that Deputy Tonna could

not have seen the registration sticker because the traffic stop occurred late at

night in a neighborhood without street lights, and because the license plate was

placed on the rear window above the beam of the patrol car’s headlights. During

the suppression hearing, however, Deputy Tonna testified that when he began

following the truck, his patrol car’s headlights illuminated the truck and he

“immediately noticed” that the registration sticker was “different than it should

have been.” Specifically, he observed that the sticker was red with white

lettering, while the current registration year’s sticker was gray with black

lettering. He also noticed that “96,” instead of “04” was printed on the sticker. 

At that point, Deputy Tonna effected the traffic stop. The District Court found

Deputy Tonna’s testimony credible and therefore determined that the stop was

warranted because he had reasonable suspicion that Mr. Hanrahan had violated

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-3-18(C). Because the court’s factual finding is supported by

the evidence, it is not clearly erroneous. The traffic stop was therefore justified

on this basis, and we need not reach Mr. Hanrahan’s other arguments on this

point.

B. Admission of Mr. Hanrahan’s Prior Testimony

Appellate Case: 06-2268 Document: 010167519 Date Filed: 11/13/2007 Page: 7 
2

The testimony was not hearsay because, as Mr. Hanrahan conceded at trial,

it was an admission by a party-opponent. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A)

(statements made by a party and offered against a party are not hearsay).

-8-

Mr. Hanrahan next argues that the District Court violated his Fifth

Amendment privilege against self-incrimination when the court permitted a

witness for the Government to read Mr. Hanrahan’s testimony from the first trial

into evidence in the second trial.2

 

Under the Fifth Amendment, “[a] defendant who chooses to testify waives

his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination with respect to the testimony

he gives.” Harrison, 392 U.S. at 222. But if a defendant chooses not to testify,

the Fifth Amendment prohibits a prosecutor from commenting on that decision. 

See United States v. Nelson, 450 F.3d 1201, 1212 (10th Cir. 2006) (“The general

rule of law is that once a defendant invokes his right to remain silent, it is

impermissible for the prosecution to refer to any Fifth Amendment rights which

defendant exercised.” (quotation omitted)). In reviewing whether the prosecutor

improperly commented on the defendant’s silence, the court looks at “whether the

language used by the prosecutor was manifestly intended or was of such character

that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the

failure of the accused to testify.” Id. (quotation and alteration omitted).

In this case, Mr. Hanrahan does not point to any statement made by the

prosecutor that amounts to a comment on his decision not to testify. Instead, he

argues that his former testimony in large part corroborated the Government’s

Appellate Case: 06-2268 Document: 010167519 Date Filed: 11/13/2007 Page: 8 
-9-

other evidence, and thus its primary effect was to highlight to the jury that he was

not testifying in the present case. This argument is without merit. When the

Government introduced Mr. Hanrahan’s prior statement into evidence, it did not

reveal that it was testimony from a prior trial; it was read into evidence by ATF

Special Agent Frank Ortiz, who testified simply that he was present “when the

defendant gave a statement under oath.” Similarly, the prosecutor revealed

nothing that would indicate to the jury that the testimony came from a prior

trial—let alone that would cause the jury to consider it a comment on Mr.

Hanrahan’s choice not to testify in the current trial. In addition, the Government

presented Mr. Hanrahan’s former testimony as part of its case-in-chief, before it

was clear whether Mr. Hanrahan would or would not testify. Thus, the jury could

not naturally and necessarily construe the Government’s introduction of Mr.

Hanrahan’s prior testimony as an impermissible comment by the prosecution on

Mr. Hanrahan’s decision not to testify in his second trial. 

We similarly reject Mr. Hanrahan’s suggestion that the prosecutor

improperly commented on the testimonial evidence during closing argument. 

During closing arguments, the prosecutor referred to Mr. Hanrahan’s statement as

evidence that Mr. Hanrahan knew of the gun’s presence and had access to it in the

truck. This was a fair comment on the evidence and did not amount to an

impermissible comment on Mr. Hanrahan’s silence. See Nelson, 450 F.3d at 1213

(prosecutor’s reference to defendant’s post-arrest statements was not

Appellate Case: 06-2268 Document: 010167519 Date Filed: 11/13/2007 Page: 9 
3

To obtain a conviction for being a felon in possession under 18 U.S.C. §

922(g), the government must prove: “(1) the defendant was previously convicted

of a felony; (2) the defendant thereafter knowingly possessed a firearm; and (3)

the possession was in or affecting interstate commerce.” United States v.

Ledford, 443 F.3d 702, 705 (10th Cir. 2006). 

-10-

impermissible comment on defendant’s failure to testify when it was clear that

prosecutor used defendant’s words as an admission of guilt). 

C. Sufficiency of the Evidence

We review claims of insufficient evidence de novo, viewing the evidence in

the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Willis, 476 F.3d

1121, 1124 (10th Cir. 2007). “Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction

if . . . a reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Id. (quotation omitted). “We must not weigh conflicting

evidence or consider the credibility of the witnesses, but simply determine

whether the evidence, if believed, would establish each element of the crime.”

United States v. Vallo, 238 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2001) (quotation and

alteration omitted). 

Mr. Hanrahan argues his conviction must be reversed because there is

insufficient evidence that he “knowingly possessed” the gun.3

 To establish this

element, the Government must show the defendant actually or constructively

possessed the firearm. United States v. Jameson, 478 F.3d 1204, 1209 (10th Cir.

2007). A person has actual possession when he has “direct physical control over

the firearm at a given time.” Id. On the other hand, a person has constructive

Appellate Case: 06-2268 Document: 010167519 Date Filed: 11/13/2007 Page: 10 
-11-

possession of a firearm when he “knowingly holds the power and ability to

exercise dominion and control over [it].” Id. In this way, constructive possession

may occur when a person has exclusive possession of the premises where a

firearm is found. Id. In such a case, “knowledge, dominion, and control can be

properly inferred because of the exclusive possession alone.” Id. When two or

more people occupy the space where the firearm is found, however, proximity to

the firearm alone is insufficient to establish knowledge of and access to that

firearm. Id. In such a “joint occupancy” case, proximity is probative, but it must

be combined with other evidence to support an inference of knowledge of and

access to the firearm. Id.

The District Court instructed the jury on the law pertaining to both actual

and constructive possession. Further, it instructed the jury on both soleoccupancy and joint-occupancy situations because a witness for the defense,

Eddie Hartman, testified that he had borrowed Mr. Hanrahan’s truck earlier in the

day and left the gun there. Even under the most stringent instruction—the

instruction pertaining to constructive possession in a joint-occupancy

situation—there is sufficient evidence that Mr. Hanrahan knowingly possessed the

firearm. The gun was in plain view on the truck’s bench near the driver’s seatbelt latch, where the driver’s right hip would be; Mr. Hanrahan is right-handed. 

While Mr. Hanrahan was detained at the back of the truck, Deputy Swint asked

whether the object was a gun or a lighter. Deputy Swint did not remove the gun

Appellate Case: 06-2268 Document: 010167519 Date Filed: 11/13/2007 Page: 11 
4

According to Mr Hanrahan, his demeanor during the traffic stop (he was

cooperative), the lack of fingerprints on the gun, the absence of ammunition, Mr.

Hartman’s “uncontradicted” testimony that he accidentally left the gun on the

truck’s seat earlier that day, and the fact that the dome light inside the truck did

not work show that Mr. Hanrahan never saw the gun on the seat. 

-12-

from the seat when he asked the question, and from his position, Mr. Hanrahan

could not see into the truck’s cab. Nevertheless, Mr. Hanrahan responded,

without hesitation, that it was a gun. He also volunteered that it was inoperable. 

A reasonable jury could infer from Mr. Hanrahan’s admissions at the scene and

his knowledge of the gun’s working condition at the time of his arrest that he

knew the gun was present in the car. Mr. Hanrahan points to no evidence that

warrants reversal of the jury’s verdict.4

 

D. Reasonableness of the Sentence

We review a district court’s sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion,

asking whether the sentence is “reasonable” based on the factors set forth in 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. Garcia-Lara, — F.3d —, 2007 WL 2380991,

at *1 (10th Cir. Aug. 22, 2007). A sentence must be both procedurally and

substantively reasonable. See United States v. Mateo, 471 F.3d 1162, 1166 (10th

Cir. 2006). A procedurally reasonable sentence is one that is “‘reasoned,’ or

calculated utilizing a legitimate method,” and substantive reasonableness

concerns “the actual length of the sentence imposed” in light of the § 3553(a)

factors. Id. (quotation omitted). 

Mr. Hanrahan does not challenge any procedural aspect of the court’s

Appellate Case: 06-2268 Document: 010167519 Date Filed: 11/13/2007 Page: 12 
-13-

sentencing decision. Instead, he argues that it is unreasonably long. Because his

sentence is within the range recommended by the Guidelines, it is entitled to a

presumption of reasonableness on appeal. United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050,

1054 (10th Cir. 2006); see also Rita v. United States, — U.S. —, 127 S. Ct. 2456,

2462, 168 L. Ed. 2d 203 (2007) (holding that a court of appeals may apply a

presumption of reasonableness to sentences properly calculated under the

Guidelines). As we explain below, Mr. Hanrahan has failed to rebut this

presumption.

Mr. Hanrahan argues that his sentence is unreasonable because the nature

of the instant offense was “benign” because the gun was small and unloaded, it

did not belong to him, it was inoperative, and it was not used to commit another

crime. He also maintains that because he is subject to a mandatory minimum

sentence of fifteen years, he will be released from prison at an age (approximately

fifty-six) where recidivism is unlikely; thus, a longer sentence will not provide

any additional protection to the public. In a similar vein, he maintains that all

three predicate offenses which subjected him to sentencing under the Armed

Career Criminal Act occurred in the 1980s and are therefore sufficiently “stale”

so as to warrant a sentence of no more than fifteen years.

The District Court thoroughly considered and rejected these contentions. It

noted that the Guidelines do not distinguish among firearms of different sizes. In

addition, the court heard testimony that the gun could easily be concealed and

Appellate Case: 06-2268 Document: 010167519 Date Filed: 11/13/2007 Page: 13 
-14-

that, although it was inoperable at the time of Mr. Hanrahan’s arrest, it could

easily be made operable by using a rubber band. Furthermore, although no

evidence definitively connected Mr. Hanrahan to the attempted burglaries that

Agent Tonna was investigating at the time of Mr. Hanrahan’s arrest, the court

declined to consider the offense benign simply because Mr. Hanrahan was not

convicted of committing an offense while possessing the gun. 

Finally, neither Mr. Hanrahan’s age nor the age of his predicate convictions

justify a sentence below the Guidelines range. The Armed Career Criminal Act is

designed to punish recidivists more harshly than first-time offenders and, as the

District Court noted, Mr. Hanrahan has engaged in extensive criminal conduct

that continued to the date of his arrest in this case. This belies Mr. Hanrahan’s

contention that he poses a low risk of recidivism. 

In short, the District Court expressly considered the factors that Mr.

Hanrahan cites in support of a shorter sentence, but it concluded that in light of

the § 3553(a) factors, a sentence at the low end of the applicable Guidelines range

was appropriate. We find no abuse in the court’s exercise of its discretion.

E. Special Condition of Supervised Release

Finally, we address Mr. Hanrahan’s argument regarding the District Court’s

imposition of a special condition of supervised release requiring him to submit to

suspicionless searches. 

District courts have broad discretion to set a condition on supervised

Appellate Case: 06-2268 Document: 010167519 Date Filed: 11/13/2007 Page: 14 
-15-

release, see United States v. Edgin, 92 F.3d 1044, 1048 (10th Cir. 1996), and we

will remand for resentencing only when the court abuses that discretion, see

United States v. Zanghi, 209 F.3d 1201, 1203 (10th Cir. 2000). A court may

impose any condition on supervised release it deems appropriate so long as it is

reasonably related to and involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is

reasonably necessary given “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the

history and characteristics of the defendant,” the need “to afford adequate

deterrence to criminal conduct,” the need “to protect the public from further

crimes of the defendant,” and the need “to provide the defendant with needed

educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in

the most effective manner.” Edgin, 92 F.3d at 1048 (quoting 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)–(D)); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d).

In this case, after giving Mr. Hanrahan notice of its intent to do so, the

District Court imposed the following special condition on his supervised release:

“The defendant must submit to a search of his person, property, or automobile

under his control to ensure compliance with all conditions of probation. He must

inform any residents that the area may be subject to search.” According to Mr.

Hanrahan, this condition is not reasonably related to the nature and circumstances

of the offense, and, accordingly, the District Court abused its discretion when it

set such a term of his release.

It is well-established that the purpose of supervised release is to provide

Appellate Case: 06-2268 Document: 010167519 Date Filed: 11/13/2007 Page: 15 
-16-

enough supervision to prevent recidivism on the part of the offender. See

U.S.S.G. Ch. 7 Pt. A(4) (stating that “the purpose of . . . supervised release

should focus on the integration of the violator into the community, while

providing the supervision designed to limit further criminal conduct”); see also 18

U.S.C. § 3583(d) (requiring courts to balance the defendant’s liberty interest with

the need to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct in imposing conditions

on supervised release). Mr. Hanrahan was convicted of unlawfully possessing a

firearm. Thus, one effective means of preventing Mr. Hanrahan from committing

a similar offense in the future is to require him to submit to suspicionless searches

after he has been released from prison but while he is still under the supervision

of the Probation Office. See United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199, 1208 (10th

Cir. 2001) (upholding suspicionless searches as a condition of supervised release

for defendant convicted of possession of child pornography); cf. Samson v.

California, – U.S. –, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2196, 165 L. Ed. 2d 250 (2006) (holding

that a suspicionless search of a parolee did not violate the Fourth Amendment

when a state statute authorized it). Searches based on some particularized level

of suspicion, by way of contrast, would likely not be as effective at deterring

future crimes of possession since the defendant could easily conceal such

wrongdoing. Cf. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 878 (1987) (stating that “a

probable-cause requirement [to search a parolee] would reduce the deterrent

effect of the supervisory arrangement”). We have reviewed the record in its

Appellate Case: 06-2268 Document: 010167519 Date Filed: 11/13/2007 Page: 16 
-17-

entirety, and we are satisfied that in this case the District Court acted within its

discretion when it imposed the suspicionless-search special condition on Mr.

Hanrahan’s supervised release.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Mr. Hanrahan’s conviction and his

sentence.

Appellate Case: 06-2268 Document: 010167519 Date Filed: 11/13/2007 Page: 17