Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01789/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01789-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jack Wolfskin Ausrustung Fur Draussen GmbH & Company KGaA
Appellant
New Millennium Sports, S.L.U.
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

JACK WOLFSKIN AUSRUSTUNG FUR DRAUSSEN 

GMBH & COMPANY KGAA,

Appellant

v.

NEW MILLENNIUM SPORTS, S.L.U.,

Appellee

______________________ 

2014-1789

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Trademark Trial and Appeal Board in No. 

91195604.

______________________ 

Decided: August 19, 2015

______________________ 

RICHARD LEHV, Fross, Zelnick, Lehrman & Zissu, 

P.C., New York, NY, argued for appellant. Also represented by ROBERT A. BECKER. 

PHILIP BAUTISTA, Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, LLP, 

Cleveland, OH, argued for appellee. 

______________________ 

Before LOURIE, BRYSON, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.

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CHEN, Circuit Judge.

Appellant Jack Wolfskin Ausrustung Fur Draussen 

GmbH & Co. KGAA (Jack Wolfskin) applied to the Patent 

and Trademark Office to register a design mark consisting of an angled paw print for use with its clothing, footwear, and accessory products. Appellee New Millennium 

Sports, S.L.U. (New Millennium) opposed the registration

on the ground that Jack Wolfskin’s mark would likely 

create confusion with its own registered mark. In response, Jack Wolfskin filed a counterclaim for cancellation alleging that New Millennium had abandoned its 

registered mark. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board 

(Board) rejected Jack Wolfskin’s cancellation counterclaim 

and sustained the opposition, thus refusing to register 

Jack Wolfskin’s mark. We agree with the Board that New 

Millennium did not abandon its registered mark. We 

conclude, however, that the Board incorrectly found a 

likelihood of confusion between the two marks because 

the Board failed to properly compare New Millennium’s 

mark as a whole to Jack Wolfskin’s mark and also failed 

to recognize, in light of the significant evidence of paw 

prints appearing in third-party registrations and usage

for clothing, the relatively narrow scope of protection 

afforded to marks involving paw prints. We therefore 

affirm-in-part, reverse-in-part, and remand for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

New Millennium owns Trademark Registration No. 

1,856,808 (KELME mark). 

New Millennium registered the KELME mark for use in 

association with goods in International Class 25, which 

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encompasses a variety of clothing products. The KELME 

mark was registered on October 4, 1994.

On September 10, 2009, Jack Wolfskin filed U.S. 

Trademark Application Serial No. 77/823,794 with the 

Patent and Trademark Office, in which it sought to register a mark consisting of “a nonhuman paw print.” Joint 

Appendix (J.A.) 28.

In its application, Jack Wolfskin sought this trademark 

for a variety of products classified in International Classes 9, 18, 22, and 25.

New Millennium filed an opposition asserting that 

Jack Wolfskin’s mark would likely cause confusion with 

New Millennium’s KELME mark. See 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1052(d). New Millennium limited its opposition to goods 

in International Class 25. In response, Jack Wolfskin 

denied that its mark would cause confusion and counterclaimed to cancel New Millennium’s KELME mark on the 

basis of abandonment.

The Board rejected Jack Wolfskin’s abandonment 

counterclaim finding that New Millennium had continuously used the registered mark or a version that was not a 

“material alteration” of the registered mark. The Board 

then evaluated New Millennium’s likelihood-of-confusion 

claim according to the factors announced by our predecessor court in In re E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 

1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973) (DuPont factors), and concluded 

that Jack Wolfskin’s mark would likely cause confusion. 

The Board therefore sustained New Millennium’s opposition and refused to register Jack Wolfskin’s mark. 

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Jack Wolfskin appeals both parts of the decision. We 

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(B). Although we agree with the Board that New Millennium did 

not abandon its registered mark, we disagree that Jack 

Wolfskin’s mark is confusingly similar to New Millennium’s mark. 

II. ABANDONMENT COUNTERCLAIM

Jack Wolfskin’s cancellation counterclaim relies on 

the fact that New Millennium ceased using the registered 

version of its mark and instead began using a modified or 

modernized version of that mark. Because of this change, 

Jack Wolfskin contends that New Millennium abandoned 

its registered mark and that it should therefore be cancelled. New Millennium does not dispute that it no longer 

uses the exact mark that appears in its registration and 

admits that it has not used that version since 2004. New

Millennium argues, however, that it has not abandoned 

its mark because the differences between the modernized 

mark and the registered mark are minor. 

A. Legal Standard

A trademark owner abandons its mark if use of the 

mark has been “discontinued with intent not to resume.” 

15 U.S.C. § 1127. If a registered mark has been abandoned, a party may file a petition to cancel the registration at any time. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3). Abandonment may 

also be alleged in a counterclaim to an opposition filed by 

the owner of the purportedly abandoned mark. 

Trademark owners sometimes cease using their literal 

registered marks in favor of modified or modernized 

versions. As McCarthy explains, 

[s]uch changes in the form of marks have been legally attacked on two grounds: (1) that the change 

resulted in abandonment of rights in the old form; 

(2) that the change prevents the user from tracing 

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priority of use back to a date of first use of the old 

form of the mark.

J. Thomas McCarthy, 3 McCarthy on Trademarks and 

Unfair Competition § 17:25 (4th ed. 2015) [hereinafter 

McCarthy]. This ability to rely on an earlier form of a

mark, when now using a modified version of that mark, is 

often called “tacking.” Courts have referenced tacking in 

both abandonment and priority contexts. See Hana Fin., 

Inc. v. Hana Bank, 135 S. Ct. 907, 909 (2015) (recognizing 

that “tacking” encompasses situations where an entity 

makes modifications to its marks over time, but is still 

able to “clothe [that] new mark with the priority position 

of an older mark”); Sunstar, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co., 

586 F.3d 487, 496 (7th Cir. 2009) (explaining that the rule 

of “tacking on” “makes the use by a trademark’s owner of 

a variant of his original trademark a defense to a claim 

that replacing the original with the variant constituted 

the abandonment . . . of the trademark”). McCarthy also 

recognizes that “[i]mproper tacking [by using a modified 

mark that materially alters the earlier mark] can result 

in ‘abandonment’ of the old form of the mark” if the elements of abandonment—nonuse with intent not to resume 

use—are satisfied. McCarthy § 17:26. 

In the context of a priority dispute, we previously held

that if the old form and the new form of the mark are 

“legal equivalents,” such legal attacks will fail. Van DyneCrotty, Inc. v. Wear-Guard Corp., 926 F.2d 1156, 1159 

(Fed. Cir. 1991), abrogated on other grounds by Hana 

Fin., 135 S. Ct. at 910. Two marks are legally equivalent 

if they “create the same, continuing commercial impression” and where the modified version of the mark does not 

“materially differ from or alter the character” of the 

original mark.1 Id. (citation and internal quotation marks 

1 Jack Wolfskin contends that this “material alteration” standard originates from the statute governing 

 

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omitted); see also Ilco Corp. v. Ideal Sec. Hardware Corp., 

527 F.2d 1221, 1224 (CCPA 1976) (“The law permits a 

user who changes the form of its mark to retain the 

benefit of its use of the earlier form, without abandonment, if the new and old forms create the same, continuing commercial impression.”). 

trademark amendments. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(e) (permitting 

amendment to a registered mark so long as that amendment “does not alter materially the character of the 

mark”). The Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure 

(TMEP) explains that an amendment to a mark is material if “the change would require republication in order to 

present the mark fairly for purposes of opposition.” 

TMEP § 1609.02(a); see also 37 C.F.R. § 2.72(a)(2)

(amending a mark is permissible if “[t]he proposed 

amendment does not materially alter the mark.”). As far 

as we can tell, this “republication” standard has been 

used only in the context of determining the propriety of a 

proposed amendment. See, e.g., In re Thrifty, 274 F.3d 

1349, 1352–53 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (applying the material 

alteration standard in affirming the Board’s rejection of 

an amendment to a rejected trademark application). 

Furthermore, the TMEP also explains that “[i]n determining whether an amendment is a material alteration, the 

controlling question is always whether the new and old 

forms of the mark create essentially the same commercial 

impression.” TMEP § 1215.08 (emphasis added); see also 

TMEP § 807.14. Thus, even if we were to embrace the 

TMEP provisions relating to amendment, our analysis for 

abandonment would not change. See In re Thrifty, 274 

F.3d at 1352–53 (“To avoid material alteration, the new 

form must create the impression of being essentially the 

same mark.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

 

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We have not spoken directly on what standard to use 

in the abandonment context. The Board, however, employs the “same, continuing commercial impression” 

standard when evaluating whether changes to a mark 

result in abandonment of an earlier registered mark. See, 

e.g., Paris Glove of Can., Ltd. v. SBC/Sporto Corp., 84 

U.S.P.Q.2d 1856, 1861 (T.T.A.B. 2007) (citing McCarthy 

§ 17:26) (“[A] change in the form of a mark does not 

constitute abandonment or a break in continuous use if 

the change neither creates a new mark nor changes the 

commercial impression of the old mark.”). In addition, 

other circuits have also adopted this standard in the 

abandonment context. See, e.g., George & Co. LLC v. 

Imagination Entm’t Ltd., 575 F.3d 383, 402 (4th Cir. 

2009) (concluding that the trademark owner had abandoned its registered mark where it could not “tack” its 

prior use of the mark to its current, modernized version of 

that mark because its new mark did not create the same 

continuing commercial impression); Sands, Taylor & 

Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 955 (7th Cir. 

1992) (examining whether the differences between the 

registered and the modified marks alter the “basic, overall 

commercial impression created on buyers” and stating 

that “[s]o long as the owner continues use of the ‘key 

element’ of the registered mark, courts generally will not 

find abandonment”). 

In both contexts—priority and abandonment—the 

fundamental inquiry is the same: has the original mark 

been so substantially altered such that third parties 

would not expect that presently used mark to be used 

under and protected by the registration.. Our case law 

recognizes that it would be wrong to allow a trademark 

owner to claim priority to a mark that creates a different 

commercial impression from the mark currently in use. 

This same inequity exists when a trademark owner seeks 

to avoid abandonment of the originally registered mark 

even though the current mark is a materially different 

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version. We hold that the same legal standard applies in

both contexts. Accordingly, when a trademark owner uses 

a modified version of its registered trademark, it may 

avoid abandonment of the original mark only if the modified version “create[s] the same, continuous commercial 

impression.” 

B. Standard of Review

The Supreme Court recently held, in the context of a 

priority dispute, that the “same continuing commercial 

impression” inquiry is a question of fact, thus abrogating 

our practice of viewing this inquiry as a question of law 

subject to de novo review. Hana Fin., 135 S. Ct. at 910–

11 (citing Van Dyne-Crotty, 926 F.2d at 1159). In Hana

Financial, the Supreme Court explained that 

“[a]pplication of a test that relies upon an ordinary consumer’s understanding of the impression that a mark 

conveys falls comfortably within the ken of a jury.” Id. at 

911. Given our understanding that the same legal analysis applies in both priority and abandonment cases, there 

is no reason that the standard of review should differ. We 

therefore must review the Board’s factual determination 

for substantial evidence. In doing so, we must ask whether a reasonable fact-finder might find that the evidentiary 

record supports the Board’s conclusion. See Consol. 

Edison Co. of N.Y. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).

C. Discussion

New Millennium’s registered mark is a composite 

mark consisting of the word KELME on the left and an 

image of a paw print on the right.

Registration No. 1,856,808. As noted above, New Millennium admits that it no longer uses the exact mark that 

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appears in its registration. Since 2004, New Millennium 

has instead used a modified version of its mark. The 

presence of the KELME and paw print elements, as well 

as the orientation of these elements, did not change. New 

Millennium altered only the font of the KELME element 

and the style of the paw print element. 

The Board found the changes to the mark to be minor 

stylistic alterations. In evaluating the KELME element 

of the mark, the Board noted that “the style shown in the 

registration is relatively non-distinctive, and the style in 

which the letters are now presented is highly conventional.” New Millennium Sports, S.L.U. v. Jack Wolfskin 

Ausrustung Fur Draussen GmbH & Co. KGAA, No. 

91195604, 2014 WL 2997637, at *5 (T.T.A.B. June 10, 

2014). The Board further recognized that KELME, the 

word element of the mark, was “far more distinctive than 

the lettering in which it is presented” and therefore the 

change in the style of the lettering did not materially 

affect the impression created by the word. Id. With 

respect to the paw print design component of the mark, 

the Board rejected Jack Wolfskin’s arguments that the 

registered mark could be interpreted as something other 

than a paw. Id. (“If the design resembles in any way a 

mountain, a volcano, or a setting sun, it does so only in a 

very vague way.”). The Board was also not persuaded 

that the addition of claws to the paw prints materially 

altered the mark because the claws are “a very small 

component” and because “it is common knowledge that an 

animal’s paws are accompanied by claws.” Id.

We agree. Despite the stylistic modifications, the 

mark that New Millennium currently uses still consists of 

the literal KELME element and the paw print design 

element. The KELME portion still appears in all capital, 

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block style lettering. The minor adjustment to the font is 

not sufficient to warrant a finding that consumers would 

view these as different marks. Likewise, Jack Wolfskin 

presents no persuasive reason why the alterations to the 

design element change the commercial impression that 

the mark creates. As the Board stated, “[i]t appeared to 

be a paw before, and now it still appears to be a paw.” Id. 

For these reasons, we conclude that the Board’s finding

that New Millennium did not abandon its registered mark 

by migrating to a modernized version of its mark is supported by substantial evidence. A reasonable fact-finder 

could conclude that the new version creates the same 

continuing commercial impression as the registered mark. 

We therefore affirm the Board’s dismissal of Jack 

Wolfskin’s cancellation counterclaim. 

III. LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

Whether there is likelihood of confusion between a 

registered mark and a mark for which an application has 

been filed presents an issue of law based on underlying 

facts, namely findings under the DuPont factors. M2 

Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1381 

(Fed. Cir. 2006). We review the Board’s legal conclusions 

de novo and its factual findings for substantial evidence. 

In re Pacer Tech., 338 F.3d 1348, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 

The Board found evidence in the record relevant to 

seven DuPont factors. Specifically, the Board found that 

the similarity of the goods, the similarity of the trade 

channels, and the similarity of the marks pointed to a 

likelihood of confusion, whereas the similarity of the 

buyers and purchasing conditions were either neutral or 

slightly favored finding a likelihood of confusion. In 

addition, the Board decided that the number and nature 

of similar marks in use, the fame of New Millennium’s 

mark, and the absence of actual confusion were neutral 

factors. The Board then balanced these factors and 

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tion with the identified goods, so closely resembles opposer’s registered mark as to be likely to cause confusion, 

mistake or deception as to the source of applicant’s 

goods.” New Millennium, 2014 WL 2997637, at *14.

Neither party asserts that the Board erred by failing 

to consider any of the remaining factors. See M2 Software, 450 F.3d at 1382 (“Neither we nor the board, however, are required to consider every DuPont factor. 

Rather we need to consider only the factors that are 

relevant and of record.” (citation omitted)). On appeal, 

Jack Wolfskin asserts that the Board’s likelihood of 

confusion conclusion is erroneous because of a lack of 

substantial evidence supporting two critical factors:

(1) the similarity of the marks; and (2) the number and 

nature of similar marks in use. We agree.

A. Similarity of the Marks

Our predecessor court instructed that the similarity 

or dissimilarity of marks should be compared “in their 

entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and 

commercial impression.” DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361. 

“[M]arks must be viewed ‘in their entireties,’ and it is 

improper to dissect a mark when engaging in this analysis, including when a mark contains both words and a 

design.” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 

2012). We have also explained that when a mark consists 

of both words and a design, “the verbal portion of the 

mark is the one most likely to indicate the origin of the 

goods to which it is affixed.” CBS Inc. v. Morrow, 708 

F.2d 1579, 1581–82 (Fed. Cir. 1983). These principles do

not, however, trump our duty to consider marks on a caseby-case basis. Viterra, 671 F.3d at 1362–63. Finally, the 

Board may “state that, for rational reasons, more or less 

weight has been given to a particular feature of the 

mark.” Packard Press, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 227 

F.3d 1352, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Even so, the touchstone 

of this factor is consideration of the marks in total. Id.; 

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see also Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enters. LLC, No. 14-

1853, 2015 WL 4400033, at *5 (Fed. Cir. July 20, 2015) 

(explaining that this factor “merely requires heeding the 

common-sense fact that the message of a whole phrase

may well not be adequately captured by a dissection and 

recombination”). 

New Millennium’s registered mark consists of two elements: the KELME component and the paw print design. On appeal, Jack Wolfskin argues that the Board 

improperly dissected New Millennium’s mark by overemphasizing the paw print element and minimizing the 

importance of the KELME component. In response, New 

Millennium urges us to accept the Board’s discussion of 

the KELME component as sufficient. 

The Board’s opinion did acknowledge the obligation to 

consider the marks in their entireties and even recognized 

that “the KELME component of [New Millennium]’s mark 

creates a visual and phonetic impression that is absent 

from applicant’s mark.” New Millennium, 2014 WL 

2997637, at *9. But in evaluating the “appearance, 

sound, connotation” of the two marks, the Board discussed 

only the appearance, sound, and connotation of the paw 

print element in each mark, and did not discuss the 

impact of the KELME portion of New Millennium’s mark. 

This is clear from the Board’s statement that “[w]ith 

respect to sound, it is obvious that neither design has any 

phonetic element.” Id. at *10. The Board then explained 

that, given the substantial similarities between the paw 

print elements of the two marks, the KELME component 

of the New Millennium mark did not distinguish the 

commercial impression of that mark from the commercial 

impression of Jack Wolfskin’s mark. To support this 

statement, the Board broadly declared that “[c]ompanies 

that use marks consisting of a word plus a logo often 

display their logos alone, unaccompanied by the literal 

portions of their trademarks.” Id. For this reason, the 

Board concluded that consumers could interpret Jack 

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Wolfskin’s mark “as a display of [New Millennium]’s

design apart from [New Millennium]’s word element” and 

accordingly this factor pointed towards a likelihood of 

confusion. Id.

We agree with Jack Wolfskin that the Board failed to 

adequately account for the presence of the literal, KELME 

component of the New Millennium mark. Contrary to the 

guideposts in our case law, the Board essentially disregarded the verbal portion of New Millennium’s mark and 

found that the two paw print designs were substantially 

similar. This analysis did not consider the marks as a 

whole. 

The Board justified its decision to focus on the paw 

print elements by stating that companies often use the 

design portion of a composite mark as shorthand for their 

brand. We do not opine as to whether such a commercial 

practice of truncating the registered mark could, under 

the right circumstances, support finding a likelihood of 

confusion based on that truncated version. Even so, this 

concept certainly cannot be invoked without supporting 

evidence. The Board’s broad statement alone, which does 

not amount to substantial evidence, cannot warrant 

disregarding the verbal portion of a composite mark. See 

Viterra, 671 F.3d at 1366 (recognizing that emphasis on 

the literal portion of a mark “makes sense given that the 

literal component of brand names likely will appear alone 

when used in text and will be spoken when requested by 

consumers.”). 

New Millennium argues that it provided numerous 

examples in which it displayed the paw print element of 

its mark without the KELME brand name. None of the 

examples in the record, however, conclusively establishes 

that the paw print alone was used for source identification. For example, New Millennium points to its shoe 

boxes where the paw print appears on the top of the shoe 

box without the KELME brand name, but ignores the fact 

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that the KELME brand name appears on each side of the 

same shoe box. Similarly, New Millennium notes that the 

paw print appears on the sides of several of its soccer 

shoes, but again ignores the KELME brand name on the

tongue and/or bottom of the same shoes. At bottom, 

neither the Board nor New Millennium has pointed to 

anything in the record that indicates that consumers 

recognize solely the paw print portion of New Millennium’s registered mark as being associated with New 

Millennium’s products. The Board’s finding lacked substantial evidence for minimizing the relevance of the word 

element of New Millennium’s registered trademark. 

Indeed, the Board’s conclusion is even more untenable in 

light of the numerous examples of paw prints as source 

identifiers, discussed below. 

This is not to say that the Board cannot, in appropriate circumstances, give greater weight to a design component of a composite mark. But, when the Board places 

such heavy emphasis on an oft-used design element, as it 

did in this case, it must provide a rational reason for 

doing so. See In re Comput. Commc’ns, Inc., 484 F.2d 

1392, 1393–94 (CCPA 1973) (holding that the Board did 

not err in focusing on the design portion because the 

Board found the large design portion to be the mark’s 

“most visually prominent feature”). In this respect the 

Board failed and, as a result, its conclusion that this

factor supports finding a likelihood of confusion is not 

supported by substantial evidence. 

B. Other Marks in Use

“[E]vidence of third-party use bears on the strength or 

weakness of an opposer’s mark.” Juice Generation, 2015 

WL 4400033, at *3. “The weaker an opposer’s mark, the 

closer an applicant’s mark can come without causing a 

likelihood of confusion and thereby invading what 

amounts to its comparatively narrower range of protection.” Id.; see also Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot 

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Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1373 

(Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Evidence of third-party use of similar 

marks on similar goods is relevant to show that a mark is 

relatively weak and entitled to only a narrow scope of 

protection.”).

Before the Board, Jack Wolfskin presented voluminous evidence of paw print design elements that have 

been registered and used in connection with clothing, but

the Board largely discounted these examples. The Board 

gave “little weight” to the third-party registrations “because they are not evidence that the marks are in use.” 

New Millennium, 2014 WL 2997637, at *11. To the 

extent the Board found any of the third-party registrations supported by evidence of use, the Board largely 

minimized this evidence because it consisted of secondary 

source indicators. In many of the examples that Jack 

Wolfskin provided, the paw-print design was being used 

to identify colleges or high schools and their sports teams, 

rather than identifying an apparel or a sporting goods 

company. As such, the Board concluded that these marks 

“perform the function of secondary source indicators 

rather than conventional marks of apparel companies,” 

and therefore “their impact on the distinctiveness of 

opposer’s apparel trademark is somewhat reduced.” Id. at 

*12. In addition, the Board rejected the relevance of 

another subset of the third-party usage evidence because 

the marks related to “secondary source indicators for 

businesses offering pet-related goods and services.” Id. 

As to the remaining paw-print trademarks, the Board

focused on the differences between those designs and the 

designs at issue. See New Millennium, 2014 WL 2997637, 

at *11 (finding that these marks are “quite different, in 

that four of them have five digits and all of them have 

very prominent claws”). In light of these conclusions, the 

Board found that this factor was neutral.

We agree with Jack Wolfskin that the Board erred in 

its consideration of this evidence. Jack Wolfskin presentCase: 14-1789 Document: 43-2 Page: 15 Filed: 08/19/2015
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ed extensive evidence of third-party registrations depicting paw prints and evidence of these marks being used in 

internet commerce for clothing.2 The Board too quickly 

dismissed the significance of this evidence. As we recently explained in Juice Generation, such extensive evidence 

of third-party use and registrations is “powerful on its 

face,” even where the specific extent and impact of the 

usage has not been established. 2015 WL 4400033, at *4

(detailing the extensive use of marks used in connection 

with the food service industry that incorporate the words 

“Peace” and “Love” ). For example, evidence of thirdparty registrations is relevant to “show the sense in which 

a mark is used in ordinary parlance,” id. at *4; that is, 

some segment that is common to both parties’ marks may 

have “a normally understood and well-recognized descriptive or suggestive meaning, leading to the conclusion that 

that segment is relatively weak,” id. In addition, evidence 

of third-party use of similar marks on similar goods “can 

show that customers have been educated to distinguish 

between different marks on the basis of minute distinctions.” Id. at *3 (internal quotation marks omitted). In 

this case, Jack Wolfskin’s evidence demonstrates the 

ubiquitous use of paw prints on clothing as source identifiers. Given the volume of evidence in the record, con2 Some of the notable examples of third-party registration and use in commerce include the Clemson University paw print; the Ohio University paw print; the 

University of New Mexico paw print; the Penn State paw 

print; the University of Montana paw print; the Loyola 

University of Chicago paw print; the University of New 

Hampshire paw print; the Wayne State College paw print; 

the Bearpaw brand paw print; the Wolverine brand paw 

print; the Alaskan Hardgear brand paw print; Boyds 

Collection brand paw print; the Chester Cheetah mark for 

Cheetos snack foods, which incorporates a paw print; the 

Garanimals brand mark, which incorporates a paw print.

 

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JACK WOLFSKIN AUSRUSTUNG v. NEW MILLENNIUM SPORTS,

S.L.U. 

17

sumers are conditioned to look for differences between 

paw designs and additional indicia of origin to determine 

the source of a given product. Jack Wolfskin’s extensive 

evidence of third-party uses and registrations of paw 

prints indicates that consumers are not as likely confused 

by different, albeit similar looking, paw prints. The 

Board’s conclusion that this factor was neutral is not 

supported by substantial evidence. 

***** 

New Millennium cannot escape the fact that the 

KELME element of its registered mark is the dominant 

portion of the mark. By narrowly focusing on the paw 

print element of the registered mark, the Board failed to

appreciate that the KELME element is unlike anything 

that appears in Jack Wolfskin’s applied-for mark. The 

dissimilarity of the marks is further confirmed by the 

considerable evidence of third-party registration and 

usage of marks in commerce that depict paw prints on 

clothing. This evidence indicates that the paw print 

portion of New Millennium’s mark is relatively weak. 

Balancing the factors, the Board’s determination that 

Jack Wolfskin’s mark would likely cause consumer confusion cannot be sustained. 

CONCLUSION

Although we affirm the Board’s rejection of Jack 

Wolfskin’s cancellation counterclaim, we conclude that 

the dissimilarity of the marks and the many third-party 

marks incorporating paw prints require us to find that 

there is no likelihood of confusion between the two marks. 

We therefore reverse the Board’s decision sustaining New 

Millennium’s opposition and remand to the Board for 

further consideration in light of this opinion.

COSTS

No costs.

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 JACK WOLFSKIN AUSRUSTUNG v. NEW MILLENNIUM SPORTS,

S.L.U. 

18

AFFIRMED-IN-PART, REVERSED-IN-PART, and 

REMANDED

Case: 14-1789 Document: 43-2 Page: 18 Filed: 08/19/2015