Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-96-06118/USCOURTS-ca10-96-06118-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Raymond D. Madden
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS . FILED 

Un1ted States Court or Appeals 

Teatb Circuit TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

SEP 3 - 1996 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

v. No. 96-6118 

RAYMOND D. MADDEN, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. CR-92-10-T) 

Submitted on the briefs.· 

Patrick M. Ryan, United States Attorney; M. Jay Farber, Assistant United States 

Attorney, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Raymond D. Madden, pro se. 

Before BRORBY, EBEL and HENRY, Circuit Judges. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

• After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this 

appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 96-6118 Document: 01019277473 Date Filed: 09/03/1996 Page: 1 
Raymond D. Madden, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis, appeals the district court's denial of his motion for the return of property 

pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 4l(e). We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291 and affirm. 

I 

A jury convicted Mr. Madden of one count of distributing phenylacetic acid, 

a precursor chemical in the manufacture of methamphetamine (21 U.S. C. 

§ 841(d)(2)), one count of conspiracy to distribute phenylacetic acid (21 U.S.C. 

§ § 841 ( d)(2) & 846), and one count of using a telephone to facilitate a conspiracy 

to distribute phenylacetic acid (21 U.S.C. § 843(b)). United States v. Madden, No. 

CR-92-010-T (W.D. Okla.). We later affirmed Mr. Madden's conviction and 

sentence on direct appeal. United States v. Madden, No. 92-6202 (lOth Cir. Aug. 20, 

1993 ), 1993 WL 332262, cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1116 (1994). Mr. Madden then 

moved for post-conviction relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The district court 

denied the motion and we again affirmed. Madden v. United States, No. 94-6465 

(lOth Cir. Aug. 21, 1995), 1995 WL 495247. 

After the jury convicted Mr. Madden, the government initiated an in rem civil 

forfeiture proceeding against certain real property pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 88l(a)(7), 

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Appellate Case: 96-6118 Document: 01019277473 Date Filed: 09/03/1996 Page: 2 
alleging the property was used to facilitate the commission of a drug offense. United 

States v. Real Property Located at Rt. 1, Box 118, Washita County, Okla., Civil Case 

No. 92-2012-A (W.D. Okla.). Mr. Madden answered the complaint, and the 

government subsequently moved for summary judgment. The magistrate judge 

presiding over the case did not rule on the motion for summary judgment. Instead, 

both the government and Mr. Madden's attorney, acting on behalf of Mr. Madden, 

signed an "Agreed Order of Forfeiture." Mr. Madden did not appeal the forfeiture 

order. 

Mr. Madden later filed a Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e) motion in his criminal case, 

seeking the return of his real property. In his motion, Mr. Madden contended the 

forfeiture amounted to double jeopardy in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The 

district court denied Mr. Madden's motion. In doing so, however, the district court 

did not reach the merits of Mr. Madden's double jeopardy argument, but instead 

concluded it lacked jurisdiction to grant relief under Fed. R. Crim. P. 41 (e) because 

his criminal case was complete and that even if were to construe Mr. Madden's 

motion as an independent civil action based upon equitable principles, equitable 

relief was not appropriate because Mr. Madden has an adequate remedy at law, 

namely, a motion for relief from judgment pursuant Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) filed in his 

civil forfeiture case. Mr. Madden did not heed the district court's recommendation 

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that he file a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion in his civil forfeiture case, but has instead 

appealed the denial of the Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e) motion he filed in his criminal 

case. 2 

II 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e), which is a part of the federal rule governing the 

issuance and execution of search warrants and suppression of evidence obtained as 

2 The district court denied Mr. Madden's motion on February 27, 1996. Mr. 

Madden did not file his notice of appeal until March 26, 1996. If we view Mr. 

Madden's Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e) motion as a "criminal case," we must dismiss his 

appeal for lack of jurisdiction, because his notice of appeal was not filed within ten 

days after the district court entered its order denying his motion. Fed. R. App. P. 

4(b). If, however, we view the motion as a "civil case," the notice of appeal was 

timely, because Mr. Madden filed it within sixty days after the district court entered 

its order. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(l). We have never considered whether a motion for 

return of property is a civil or criminal action for the purposes of determining the 

time for filing the notice of appeal. Our sister circuits have unanimously held, 

however, that a Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e) motion is a "civil case" within the meaning 

of Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(l) and that the sixty-day period prescribed therein applies. 

See United States v. Garcia, 65 F .3d 17, 18 n. 2 (4th Cir. 1995); Hunt v. Department 

of Justice, 2 F.3d 96,97 (5th Cir. 1993) ("Rule 41(e) motions represent a means by 

which a criminal defendant can determine her rights in property, and not a part of the 

trial and punishment process that is criminal law"); United States v. Taylor, 975 F.2d 

402, 403 (7th Cir. 1992) ("All appeals from orders granting or denying motions 

under Rule 41 (e) will be treated as civil appeals."); United States v. Martinson, 809 

F.2d 1364, 1367 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding sixty-day limit in Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(l) 

applies even though motion was filed in defendant's criminal case and bore a 

criminal docket number). We agree with our sister circuits on this point. Also, 

because there is no criminal proceeding currently pending against Mr. Madden, the 

district court's order denying his Fed. R. Crim. P. 41 (e) motion is a "final decision[] 

ofthe district court[]" within the meaning of28 U.S.C. § 1291. Martinson, 809 F.2d 

at 1367. 

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Appellate Case: 96-6118 Document: 01019277473 Date Filed: 09/03/1996 Page: 4 
a result of unlawful searches and seizures, provides in pertinent part: 

A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure or by the 

deprivation of property may move the district court for the district in 

which the property was seized for the return of the property on the 

ground that such person is entitled to lawful possession of the property. 

Although Fed. R. Crim. P. 41 (e) is contained in the Federal Rules of Criminal 

Procedure, we have held "[p ]roceedings surrounding the motion for return of 

property seized in a criminal case are civil in nature," and that the higher standard 

of proof applicable in criminal proceedings does not apply. United States v. Maez, 

915 F.2d 1466, 1468 (lOth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1104 (1991). We have 

also held the remedy provided under Fed. R. Crim. P. 41 (e) may be available even 

if there is no criminal action currently pending against the party seeking the return 

of property. United States v. Clark, 84 F.3d 378, 381 (lOth Cir. 1996); Floyd v. 

United States, 860 F .2d 999, 1006 (1Oth Cir. 1988). For example, we and a number 

of our sister circuits have held that if there are no criminal proceedings pending 

against the defendant, and the defendant files a Fed. R. Crim. P. 41 (e) motion for 

return of property seized in a prior nonjudicial forfeiture proceeding or as part of 

some other nonjudicial proceeding or occurrence, the district court should construe 

the motion as an independent civil action based on equitable principles. See Clark, 

84 F.3d at 380-81; United States v. Giraldo, 45 F.3d 509, 511 (1st Cir. 1995); 

Onwubiko v. United States, 969 F.2d 1392, 1397 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. 

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Woodall, 12 F.3d 791,793-94 & n.1 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Martinson, 809 

F .2d 1364, 1366-67 (9th Cir. 1987). 

The cases holding the district court should construe a Fed. R. Crim. P. 41 (e) 

motion for return of property seized in a prior nonjudicial forfeiture proceeding or 

as part of some other nonjudicial proceeding or occurrence filed after the criminal 

case is complete as an independent civil action based on equitable principles are 

distinguishable from this case, however, because the property Mr. Madden seeks was 

forfeited in ajudicial forfeiture proceeding brought in district court pursuant to 21 

U.S.C. § 881(a)(7). Fed. R. Crim. P. 54(b)(5) provides that the Federal Rules of 

Criminal Procedure, including Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e), "are not applicable to ... civil 

forfeiture of property for violation of a statute of the United States." We have 

explained that Fed. R. Crim. P. 54(b)(5) "stands for the proposition" Fed. R. Crim. 

P. 41 (e) "will not govern a judicial civil forfeiture proceeding in district court" 

pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881. Floyd, 860 F.2d at 1007. Therefore, in light of Fed. 

R. Crim. P. 54(b)(5), neither Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e) nor an independent equitable 

action brought under the guise of Fed. R. Crim. P. 41 (e) was the appropriate vehicle 

for seeking the return of the forfeited property in this case. 

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There was, however, an adequate remedy available to Mr. Madden. In United 

States v. Mosquera, 845 F.2d 1122, 1126 (1st Cir. 1988), the First Circuit recognized 

that although a party cannot challenge a judicial forfeiture by filing an independent 

civil action under the guise of Fed. R. Crim. P. 41 (e), as he could have had the 

property been seized in a nonjudicial forfeiture proceeding, he may nevertheless 

challenge the forfeiture by filing a motion for relief from judgment entered in the 

civil forfeiture proceeding pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Mosquera, 845 F.2d 

at 1126. We agree with the First Circuit on this point, and hold the appropriate 

vehicle for challenging a civil forfeiture judgment is a motion for relief from 

judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). See United States v. Timbers Preserve, Routt 

County, Colo., 999 F.2d 452, 454 (lOth Cir. 1993) (motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 

55( c) and 60(b) appropriate vehicle for challenging a default entered in an in rem 

judicial forfeiture proceeding in district court); see generally United States v. 51 

Pieces of Real Property, 17 F .3d 1306, 1308-09 n. 2 (1Oth Cir. 1994) (Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure and Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime 

Claims govern civil forfeiture actions in district court); United States v. $39,000 in 

Canadian Currency, 801 F.2d 1210, 1216 (lOth Cir. 1986) (same). Because Mr. 

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Madden did not challenge the forfeiture by filing a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion in 

the civil forfeiture proceeding, the district court was correct to deny relief. 

AFFIRMED. 

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