Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-11-07078/USCOURTS-caDC-11-07078-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
District of Columbia
Appellee
Vernon Norman Earle
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 16, 2012 Decided December 28, 2012

No. 11-7078

VERNON NORMAN EARLE,

APPELLANT

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:06-cv-00072)

Dominic F. Perella argued the cause for the appellant. 

Peter S. Spivack, Sean Marotta and Jonathan B. Skowron were 

on brief.

James C. McKay Jr., Senior Assistant Attorney General, 

Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, 

argued the cause for the appellee. Irvin B. Nathan, Attorney 

General, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General, and Donna M. 

Murasky, Deputy Solicitor, were on brief.

Before: HENDERSON and GARLAND, Circuit Judges, and 

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

USCA Case #11-7078 Document #1412415 Filed: 12/28/2012 Page 1 of 20
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KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Appellant 

Vernon Earle (Earle) alleges that the District of Columbia 

(District) violated rights conferred upon him by Article 

36(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 

24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 101, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 (VCCR). 

Assuming without deciding that Article 36(1)(b) confers 

individually enforceable rights actionable under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983, we conclude that Earle’s suit is untimely. We 

therefore affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment 

to the District.

I

A.

“The Vienna Convention was drafted in 1963 with the 

purpose, evident in its preamble, of ‘contribut[ing] to the 

development of friendly relations among nations, irrespective 

of their differing constitutional and social systems.’ ” 

Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 337 (2006) (quoting 

21 U.S.T. at 79). To achieve the purpose established in its 

preamble, the VCCR’s seventy-nine articles regulate the 

relationships among consular officers, the appointing state and 

the receiving state. See LUKE T. LEE, CONSULAR LAW AND

PRACTICE 23–27 (2d ed. 1991). The United States ratified the 

VCCR in 1969 and, as of 2006, 170 countries were parties 

thereto. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 337–38 (citing 21 U.S.T. 

at 77). The United States also ratified the Optional Protocol 

Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 24, 

1963, 21 U.S.T. 325, 596 U.N.T.S. 487 (Optional Protocol), in 

1969. The Optional Protocol conferred compulsory

jurisdiction on the International Court of Justice to resolve 

disputes regarding the interpretation and application of the 

VCCR. 21 U.S.T. at 326. The United States withdrew from 

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the Optional Protocol in 2005. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 

368. 

In his appeal, Earle contends that the District failed to 

comply with obligations imposed on it by Article 36 of the 

VCCR. Article 36(1) provides in pertinent part: 

(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the 

receiving State shall, without delay, inform the 

consular post of the sending State if, within its consular 

district, a national of that State is arrested or committed 

to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in 

any other manner. Any communication addressed to 

the consular post by the person arrested, in prison, 

custody or detention shall also be forwarded by the said 

authorities without delay. The said authorities shall 

inform the person concerned without delay of his rights 

under this sub-paragraph.

VCCR, 21 U.S.T. at 101.1

 Subparagraph (b) imposes three 

obligations on the “competent authorities of the receiving 

 1 Article 36 states in its entirety:

1. With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions 

relating to nationals of the sending State:

(a) consular officers shall be free to communicate with 

nationals of the sending State and to have access to them. 

Nationals of the sending State shall have the same freedom 

with respect to communication with and access to consular 

officers of the sending State;

(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the 

receiving State shall, without delay, inform the consular post 

of the sending State if, within its consular district, a national 

of that State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody 

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State” after they detain a foreign national: (1) if requested by 

the foreign national, they must notify the consular post of the 

foreign national’s country of the fact of his detention; (2) they 

must forward communications from the foreign national to the 

consular post “without delay”; and (3) they must notify 

“without delay” the foreign national of his right to contact the 

consular post. 

 

pending trial or is detained in any other manner. Any 

communication addressed to the consular post by the person 

arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall also be 

forwarded by the said authorities without delay. The said 

authorities shall inform the person concerned without delay 

of his rights under this sub-paragraph;

(c) consular officers shall have the right to visit a national of 

the sending State who is in prison, custody or detention, to 

converse and correspond with him and to arrange for his legal 

representation. They shall also have the right to visit any 

national of the sending State who is in prison, custody or 

detention in their district in pursuance of a judgment. 

Nevertheless, consular officers shall refrain from taking 

action on behalf of a national who is in prison, custody or 

detention if he expressly opposes such action.

2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be 

exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the 

receiving State, subject to the proviso, however, that the said 

laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the 

purposes for which the rights accorded under this Article are 

intended.

VCCR, 21 U.S.T. at 100–01. 

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B.

Earle is a national of Jamaica and currently incarcerated in 

a federal penitentiary. On June 13, 1985, officers of the 

Metropolitan Police Department arrested Earle pursuant to a 

warrant charging him with “Assault with Intent to Kill while 

Armed.” Joint Appendix (JA) 34. Earle was convicted in 

District Superior Court of, inter alia, first-degree murder and, 

on October 22, 1987, sentenced to two consecutive terms of 

twenty years to life imprisonment. He was originally 

incarcerated in the Lorton Correctional Complex in Fairfax 

County, Virginia, in the custody of the District Department of 

Corrections. On September 19, 1988, he escaped from 

custody and remained at large until he was recaptured by 

deputies of the United States Marshals Service (USMS) on 

March 7, 1989. At no point from his initial arrest in 1985 until 

2004 was Earle informed of his consular access rights2 under 

the VCCR. 

Earle apparently first become aware of his consular access 

rights in 2004, although the record does not disclose how he 

came to be aware of those rights. In 2006, he sued the District 

and federal defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating 

their VCCR disclosure obligations. 3 The district court 

 2 In addition to the disclosure obligations at issue, we assume 

arguendo that Article 36(1)(b) grants two substantive rights to a 

detained foreign national: the right to have his consulate informed of 

his detention by “competent authorities” (right of consular 

notification) and the right to have his communications forwarded to 

his consulate (right of consular communication). We refer to 

these rights collectively consular access rights. 

3 Section 1983 applies to a violation of “rights . . . secured by the 

Constitution and laws” of the United States by any person acting 

under color of law “of any State or Territory or the District of 

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dismissed the complaint as untimely filed. We reversed and 

instructed the district court to consider, inter alia, whether 

D.C. Code § 12-302(a)(3)4 tolled the statute of limitations. 

Earle v. Washington D.C. Police Dep’t, 298 Fed. App’x 10, 11 

(D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam).5

Earle filed an amended complaint against the District on 

November 9, 2009. 6 The district court granted summary 

judgment to the District on three grounds. First, it held that 

even if D.C. Code § 12-302(a)(3) tolled the statute of 

limitations during Earle’s imprisonment, the tolling ceased 

when Earle escaped and did not recommence upon his 

 

Columbia.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Earle’s action against the federal 

defendants—the United States Attorney, the Immigration and 

Naturalization Service and the Department of Justice—arises under 

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of 

Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The federal defendants are not 

before us and so we treat only Earle’s section 1983 claim. 

4 D.C. Code § 12-302(a)(3) provides, in pertinent part: “[W]hen 

a person entitled to maintain an action is, at the time the right of 

action accrues . . . (3) imprisoned . . . he or his proper representative 

may bring action within the time limit after the disability is 

removed.” 

5 We informed the district court that it might also consider how, 

if at all, Earle’s escape from prison affected tolling; when the cause 

of action accrued; whether Earle needed to amend his complaint to 

clarify a claim of municipal liability against the District; and, 

whether Article 36 of the VCCR creates individually enforceable 

rights. Earle, 298 Fed. App’x at 11. 

6 He also named several other defendants in his amended 

complaint but the complaint was dismissed as to those defendants for 

failure to effect service. The District is the only appellee. 

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recapture. Earle v. District of Columbia, No. 1:06-cv-0072, 

slip op. at 9–13 (D.D.C. June 29, 2011). Earle does not appeal 

this holding. See Br. for Appellant 4–5. Second, it concluded 

that the District’s failure to inform Earle of his VCCR rights 

was not a continuing violation and therefore his claim “accrued 

on the day of his arrest—June 13, 1985.” Id. at 7. Finally, the 

district court held that Earle was not entitled to equitable 

tolling of the statute of limitations because the District had not 

fraudulently concealed any facts material to Earle’s claim. Id.

at 13–15. Earle timely appealed. 

II

A.

The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over 

Earle’s section 1983 claim under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 

1343(a)(3). See Doe v. Metro. Police Dep’t of Dist. of 

Columbia, 445 F.3d 460, 466 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Best v. Kelly, 

39 F.3d 328, 330 (D.C. Cir. 1994). We have jurisdiction to 

review the district’s final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We 

review a grant of summary judgment de novo.” Hampton v. 

Vilsack, 685 F.3d 1096, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 2012). Summary 

judgment is appropriate only if “there is no genuine dispute as 

to any material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A “dispute about a 

material fact is ‘genuine’ . . . if the evidence is such that a 

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 

party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 

(1986). “In making that determination, the court must ‘view 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party, draw all reasonable inferences in her favor, and eschew 

making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence.’ ” 

Calhoun v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 1259, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 

(brackets omitted) (quoting Lathram v. Snow, 336 F.3d 1085, 

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1088 (D.C. Cir. 2003)); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

“In our circuit it is a venerable practice, and one frequently 

observed, to assume arguendo the answer to one question . . . 

in order to resolve a given case by answering another and 

equally dispositive one . . . .” In re Grand Jury Subpoena 

(Judith Miller), 438 F.3d 1141, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 

(Henderson, J., concurring). We therefore hasten to make 

clear which questions we assume, but refrain from deciding, in 

order to resolve this case. First, we express no opinion on 

whether the VCCR is a “law[]” within the meaning of section 

1983, viz., whether it is either self-executing or the subject of 

implementing legislation by the Congress. See Medellin v. 

Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504–05 (2008). Assuming arguendo

that the VCCR is a “law[]” under section 1983, we express no 

view on the disagreement amongst our sister circuits over 

whether Article 36 of the VCCR creates “specific, individually 

enforceable rights,” Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 281 

(2002), actionable under section 1983. Compare Gandara v. 

Bennett, 528 F.3d 823, 827–29 (11th Cir. 2008) (Article 36 

creates no rights enforceable under section 1983), Mora v. New 

York, 524 F.3d 183, 196–97 (2d Cir. 2008) (same), Cornejo v. 

Cnty. of San Diego, 504 F.3d 853, 855 (9th Cir. 2007) (same), 

United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 392 (6th Cir. 

2001), and United States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192, 198 

(5th Cir. 2001), with Jogi v. Voges, 480 F.3d 822, 834–36 (7th 

Cir. 2007) (Article 36 creates rights enforceable under section 

1983). Finding Earle’s claim barred by the statute of 

limitations, we reserve these questions for another day.

B.

The law governing the statute of limitations and claim 

accrual in a section 1983 case is a complex patchwork of 

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federal law and state law. To avoid the statute of limitations 

bar, Earle argues both that, under District law, the statute of 

limitations was tolled until he discovered his rights and that, 

under federal law, his claim accrued only upon the District’s 

satisfaction of its disclosure obligations. Before addressing 

his arguments, we briefly lay out the general framework 

governing claim accrual and the limitations period applicable 

in a section 1983 action.

Section 1983 sets no limitations period. Consistent with 

“settled practice,” Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266 (1985), 

abrogated on other grounds as recognized by Jones v. R.R. 

Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 269 (2004), 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1988(a) adopts the applicable state statute of limitations for a 

section 1983 action so long as such adoption “is not 

‘inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United 

States.’ ” Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 48 (1984) (quoting 

42 U.S.C. § 1988(a)). The United States Supreme Court has 

determined that the appropriate statute of limitations for a 

claim brought under section 1983 “is that which the State 

provides for personal-injury torts.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 

384, 387 (2007). “[W]here state law provides multiple 

statutes of limitations for personal injury actions, courts 

considering § 1983 claims should borrow the general or 

residual statute for personal injury actions.” Owens v. Okure, 

488 U.S. 235, 249–50 (1989). The District has two statutes of 

limitations applicable to tort claims: a one-year statute 

governing enumerated intentional torts, D.C. Code 

§ 12-301(4), and a three-year residual statute covering all other 

tort actions. Id. § 12-301(8). We apply the three-year residual 

statute of limitations to a section 1983 claim. Singletary v. 

District of Columbia, 351 F.3d 519, 529 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 

A federal court considering a section 1983 claim also 

applies the tolling rules of the jurisdiction from which it draws 

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the limitations period so long as those rules are not 

“inconsistent with the policies underlying § 1983.” Bd. of 

Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y. v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 487 

(1980) (quotation marks omitted). This rule applies to both 

statutory and common law tolling rules. See id. at 486–87 

(borrowing statutory tolling rules); Wallace, 549 U.S. at 394–

95 (borrowing common law rules). 

Unlike the statute of limitations, “the accrual date of a 

§ 1983 action is a question of federal law that is not resolved by 

reference to state law.” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388 (emphasis in 

original). A section 1983 claim accrues “when the plaintiff 

has ‘a complete and present cause of action,’ that is, ‘when the 

plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.’ ” Id. (quoting Bay Area 

Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. 

of Cal., 522 U.S. 192, 201 (1997)); see, e.g., Muñoz v. Bd. of 

Trs. of Univ. of Dist. of Columbia, 427 Fed. App’x 1, 4 (D.C. 

Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (section 1983 claim accrues when 

wrongful conduct occurs). 

C.

We turn first to Earle’s accrual argument. Applying the 

ordinary rule of claim accrual, the district court concluded that, 

because all of the elements of a cause of action under section 

1983 existed on the day Earle was arrested in 1985, his claim 

accrued upon his arrest. Earle, slip op. at 7. Earle argues, 

however, that the VCCR imposes a continuous obligation to 

inform him of his consular access rights. A claim for a 

violation of Article 36(1)(b) did not accrue, Earle reasons, until 

the obligation was satisfied.7

 Because the District had failed 

 7 In his brief, Earle did not make clear whether his claim accrues 

only when the District in fact informs him of his consular access 

rights or whether it accrues when he learns of them. At oral 

argument, when pressed on the issue, Earle’s able counsel indicated 

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to discharge its obligation to Earle as of the date he brought 

suit, his claim had yet to accrue and his suit was therefore 

timely.8

As a general rule, “ ‘[a] claim normally accrues when the 

factual and legal prerequisites for filing suit are in place.’ ” 

Norwest Bank Minn. Nat’l Ass’n v. FDIC, 312 F.3d 447, 451 

(D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting 3M Co. v. Browner, 17 F.3d 1453, 

1460 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). We have recognized various 

exceptions to, and glosses on, the rule, see, e.g., Connors v. 

Hallmark & Son Coal Co., 935 F.2d 336, 342 (D.C. Cir. 1991) 

(adopting discovery rule for damages claim involving latent 

injuries), including the continuing violation doctrine.9 This 

doctrine is “muddled,” Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 

F.3d 38, 53 (1st Cir. 1999) (quotation marks omitted), 

“intricate and somewhat confusing,” Keohane v. United States, 

669 F.3d 325, 329 (D.C. Cir. 2012), and we have never had 

occasion to apply it to a section 1983 claim. Other courts, 

however, have done so. See, e.g., Ayala-Sepúlveda v. 

 

that the duty probably expired when Earle discovered his rights 

although he declined to concede the point. Earle v. District of 

Columbia, No. 11-7078, Oral Argument Tr. at 13 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 16, 

2012). 

8 The district court briefly addressed Earle’s continuing 

violation argument, concluding that even under that theory, Earle’s 

claim accrued, at the latest, on the date of his conviction. Earle, slip 

op. at 8–9. 

9 Courts do not lightly create exceptions to the general rule of 

claim accrual. On the contrary, the general rule governs “[u]nless 

Congress has told us otherwise in the legislation at issue.” Bay Area 

Laundry, 522 U.S. at 201. Indeed, absent a “clear[] directive” from 

the Congress, the general rule applies. AKM LLC dba Volks 

Constructors v. Sec’y of Labor, 675 F.3d 752, 757 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 

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Municipality of San Germán, 671 F.3d 24, 30 n.6 (1st Cir. 

2012); Hildebrandt v. Ill. Dep’t of Natural Res., 347 F.3d 

1014, 1036 n.18 (7th Cir. 2003). We need not decide whether 

the continuing violation doctrine applies to section 1983 claims 

because Earle does not prevail under this theory, assuming 

arguendo it applies.

Our continuing violation precedent recognizes at least two 

applications of the doctrine. The first applies to conduct 

that could not reasonably have been expected to be 

made the subject of a lawsuit when it first occurred 

because its character as a violation did not become 

clear until it was repeated during the limitations period, 

typically because it is only its cumulative impact (as in 

the case of a hostile work environment) that reveals its 

illegality.

Taylor v. FDIC, 132 F.3d 753, 765 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citations 

and quotation marks omitted); see also Nat’l R.R. Passenger 

Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115–16 (2002) (“cumulative 

effect of individual acts . . . collectively constitute[s] one 

unlawful employment practice” (quotation marks omitted)). 

If such a violation is alleged, the plaintiff may rely on conduct 

that took place outside the limitations period so long as some 

conduct on which the claim is based took place within the 

limitations period. Singletary, 351 F.3d at 526–27. The 

doctrine does not, however, make actionable either a discrete 

unlawful act or the “lingering effect of an unlawful act.” Felter 

v. Kempthorne, 473 F.3d 1255, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 

(quotation marks omitted). Moreover, the “mere failure to 

right a wrong . . . cannot be a continuing wrong . . . for that is 

the purpose of any lawsuit and the exception would obliterate 

the rule.” Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 553 F.2d 220, 230 (D.C. Cir. 

1977). This application of the continuing violation doctrine 

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thus applies if the fact of the violation becomes apparent only 

by dint of the cumulative effect of repeated conduct. 

Keohane, 669 F.3d at 329. 

Here, the District’s first alleged violation of Earle’s 

Article 36 rights (its failure to apprise him of his consular 

access rights on his arrest) was immediately actionable. The 

subsequent alleged violations did not accumulate to comprise a 

single, actionable violation. Earle essentially concedes the 

point, arguing that “the District therefore had a continuing duty 

to tell Mr. Earle about his right to contact his consulate, and 

each day it failed to do so was another lost opportunity for Mr. 

Earle to secure assistance.” Br. for Appellant 15. Because the 

violation does not rest on the cumulative impact of the 

District’s ongoing failure to inform Earle of his consular access 

rights, this articulation of the doctrine does not apply. 

We have occasionally recognized a second application of 

the continuing violation doctrine if the text of the pertinent law 

imposes a continuing obligation to act or refrain from acting. 

“[W]here a . . . statute[ ] imposes a continuing obligation to act, 

a party can continue to violate it until that obligation is satisfied 

and the statute of limitations will not begin to run until it does.” 

See AKM LLC dba Volks Constructors v. Sec’y of Labor, 675 

F.3d 752, 763 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Garland, J., concurring). 

Whether the obligation is continuing is a question of statutory 

construction. In Postow v. OBA Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, for 

example, this court considered the Consumer Credit Protection 

Act’s statute of limitations, which required an action alleging a 

violation of the Act to be brought within one year of the 

violation. 627 F.2d 1370, 1379 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The Act 

required a lender to make certain disclosures to a borrower 

“ ‘before the credit is extended.’ ” Id. at 1374 (quoting 15 

U.S.C. § 1639(b) (1976)). Although we concluded that a 

violation of the Act occurred when two borrowers paid a 

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“stand-by fee” without having obtained the required 

disclosures, we held the Act imposed a disclosure obligation 

continuing after the payment of the stand-by fee. Id. at 1379–

80. A suit brought more than one year after the two plaintiffs 

paid the stand-by fee was timely so long as it was brought 

within a year of the date on which the disclosures were made. 

Id. at 1379. We so held because we determined that “the 

announced goals of the Act” required construing the obligation 

imposed by section 1639(b) to be a continuing one. Id. at 1380; 

cf. In re Bluewater Network, 234 F.3d 1305, 1312–15 (D.C. 

Cir. 2000) (permitting mandamus action after expiration of 

limitations period for challenging agency action because 

statute imposed continuing obligation to act); In re United 

Mine Workers of Am. Int’l Union, 190 F.3d 545, 548–49 (D.C. 

Cir. 1999) (same).

Earle contends that the goal of Article 36, which he 

believes to be the provision of “legal and other assistance [by 

the] consulate,” makes the disclosure obligation of consular 

access continuing. Br. for Appellant 16. The District, 

however, contends that the plain language of Article 36(1)(b) 

requires notification at discrete points in time—arrest, 

commitment to prison, commitment to custody or any other 

form of detention—and therefore a claim alleging violation of 

the obligation accrues at those discrete points. We express no 

opinion as to the proper construction of the VCCR because 

assuming arguendo that Article 36’s notification obligation is 

continuing, Earle cannot prevail.

A claim alleging a continuing violation accrues “after the 

date of the last injury,” viz., after the defendant’s last violative 

act. Keohane, 669 F.3d at 329; see also Page v. United States, 

729 F.2d 818, 821 (D.C. Cir. 1984). We must first, then, 

determine who owed Earle the duty to notify him of his 

consular access rights. Article 36 does not impose a 

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disclosure obligation on the whole world. Rather, it imposes 

the obligation on the “competent authorities of the receiving 

State.” VCCR, 21 U.S.T. at 101. While it appears that no 

court has interpreted the phrase, the United States Department 

of State has defined “competent authorities” as 

those officials, whether federal, state, or local, who are 

responsible for legal action affecting the foreign 

national and who are competent, within their legal 

authorities, to give the notification required. This 

interpretation makes sense as a practical matter: 

compliance with the notification requirements works 

best when it is assumed by those government officials 

closest to the foreign national’s situation and with 

direct responsibility for it.

U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, CONSULAR NOTIFICATION AND ACCESS

14 (3d ed. 2010), available at

http://travel.state.gov/pdf/cna/CNA_Manual_3d_Edition.pdf 

(NOTIFICATION AND ACCESS). Given the “great weight” we 

accord the State Department’s interpretation of treaties, 

Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184–85 

(1982), we find this common-sense interpretation persuasive 

and, accordingly, apply it here. 

Because it was responsible for his arrest and detention in 

1985, we assume that the District was the “competent 

authorit[y]” obligated to notify Earle of his consular access 

rights. On September 19, 1988, however, Earle escaped the 

District’s custody. When he escaped, the District was no 

longer “the government . . . closest to the foreign national’s 

situation.” NOTIFICATION AND ACCESS 14. In fact, as he was 

no longer in any government’s custody, there were no 

“competent authorities” obligated to disclose anything to him. 

Accordingly, the District’s notification duty as a “competent 

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authorit[y]” ceased at that time. Even assuming Article 

36(1)(b)’s notice obligation was ongoing, the day of the last act 

constituting a violation of the obligation was September 19, 

1988, and his claim based on that violation accrued on that day. 

His 2006 suit against the District was therefore untimely as to 

that violation.

Earle was subsequently captured by the USMS in 1989. 

He now argues that he was thereafter transferred back to the 

District’s custody, which transfer triggered a new continuing 

violation. But he did not allege in his amended complaint that 

he escaped or was subsequently recaptured (or by whom). He 

therefore failed to allege a “second” violation of Article 

36(1)(b) that began when he was recaptured in 1989. 

Moreover, Earle raises this “second” violation argument for 

the first time on appeal. “It is well settled that issues and legal 

theories not asserted at the District Court level ordinarily will 

not be heard on appeal.” District of Columbia v. Air Fla., Inc., 

750 F.2d 1077, 1084 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also Breeden v. 

Novartis Pharm. Corp., 646 F.3d 43, 56 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 

(holding argument raised for first time on appeal forfeited); 

Benoit v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 608 F.3d 17, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 

(same). Although we have discretion to consider such 

arguments, we exercise that discretion only if “exceptional 

circumstances” exist. Flynn v. Comm’r, 269 F.3d 1064, 1068–

69 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Discerning none, we decline to consider 

Earle’s argument.10 

 10 We are further convinced that, even if the District 

subsequently became the “competent authorit[y]” at some point after 

Earle’s recapture in 1989, Earle’s cause of action remains untimely. 

As the District noted in its brief the Congress ordered the District to 

close Lorton no later than December 31, 2001. National Capitol 

Revitalization and Self-Government Improvement Act of 1997, Pub. 

L. No. 105-33, § 11201(b), (f), 111 Stat. 251, 734. That Act 

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17

D.

Earle also contends that the statute of limitations was 

tolled under the common law doctrine of fraudulent 

concealment. He argues that the District’s failure to notify 

him of his consular access rights—despite a duty to do 

so—amounts to a fraudulent concealment of facts relevant to 

his claim. He thus concludes that the statute of limitations 

 

directed that “the felony population sentenced pursuant to the 

District of Columbia Code residing at the Lorton Correctional 

Complex shall be transferred to a penal or correctional facility 

operated or contracted for by the Bureau of Prisons.” Id. § 11201(b), 

111 Stat. at 734. In so doing, the Congress transferred to the United 

States responsibility for “custody, care, subsistence, education, 

treatment and training of” all District prisoners. Id. We have 

previously indicated that this transfer resulted in the District no 

longer remaining a proper respondent in a habeas corpus petition 

involving a Lorton prisoner whose parole was previously denied by 

the District. See Crawford v. Jackson, 323 F.3d 123, 125–26 (D.C. 

Cir. 2003). Moreover, we have heretofore recognized that the 

District closed Lorton in 2001. See Fletcher v. Reilly, 433 F.3d 867, 

873 (D.C. Cir. 2006); see also Serge F. Kovaleski, Lorton’s Final 

Lockdown: Last Inmates Leave as 91-Year-Old Facility Completes a 

Difficult Four-Year Closure, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2001, at B01. 

Because we may take judicial notice of statutes, see Pine View 

Gardens, Inc. v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 1073, 1075 (D.C. 

Cir. 1973), as well as facts of record in other proceedings, see Covad 

Commc’ns Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 407 F.3d 1220, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 

2005), we may conclude that Earle, a felon, was transferred to the 

custody of the United States in 2001 pursuant to section 11201(b) of 

the Revitalization Act. Accordingly, the District ceased to be the 

“competent authorit[y]” under Article 36(1)(b) when it lost all 

responsibility for Earle’s imprisonment. Nevertheless we do not 

reach this issue because, as discussed earlier, Earle both failed to 

allege that his recapture triggered a new continuing violation and 

raises his second violation argument for the first time on appeal. 

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18

was tolled until he discovered his rights in 2004. Because, in 

a section 1983 action, we apply the tolling rules of “the state in 

which the cause of action arose,” see Wallace, 549 U.S. at 387, 

we look to the law of the District of Columbia for the relevant 

common law tolling rules. See Rogers v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 

144 F.3d 841, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“When interpreting the 

common law of the District of Columbia, we follow the 

decisions of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which 

is, for Erie purposes, treated as if it were the highest court of 

the state.”).

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals (D.C. Court of 

Appeals) has repeatedly recognized the doctrine of fraudulent 

concealment. Drake v. McNair, 993 A.2d 607, 619 (D.C. 2010) 

(“ ‘It is well established that affirmative acts employed by a 

party to fraudulently conceal either the existence of a claim or 

facts forming the basis of a cause of action toll the running of 

limitations periods.’ ” (quoting Estate of Chappelle v. Sanders, 

442 A.2d 157, 158 (D.C. 1982)). If a defendant undertakes 

“something of an affirmative nature designed to prevent 

discovery of a cause of action,” Cevenini v. Archbishop of 

Wash., 707 A.2d 768, 773–74 (D.C. 1998) (quotation marks 

and brackets omitted), and the plaintiff by reasonable diligence 

could not discover the concealed facts, see Diamond v. Davis, 

680 A.2d 364, 376 (D.C. 1996), the statute of limitations is 

tolled until the facts are revealed. Silence, however, is 

insufficient to toll the statute of limitations. See Adrian v. Am. 

Sec. & Trust Co., 211 A.2d 771, 772 (D.C. 1965). Moreover, 

“mere failure to disclose pertinent information . . . is not 

sufficient to toll the statute of limitations unless there has been 

some affirmative act of concealment.” Drake, 993 A.2d at 619. 

But “failure to disclose pertinent information” is all that Earle 

has asserted.

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To avoid this rule, Earle contends that “if a defendant has a 

duty to disclose information, nondisclosure alone can trigger 

the tolling.” Br. for Appellant 22. Earle points out that in two 

cases—Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. FCC, 76 F.3d 1221 (D.C. Cir. 

1996), and Smith v. Nixon, 606 F.2d 1183 (D.C. Cir. 

1979)—we held that silence in the face of a statutory obligation 

to disclose tolled the statute of limitations. Although he 

correctly describes the holdings, see Sprint Commc’ns Co. 76 

F.3d at 1226–27; Smith, 606 F.2d at 1190, he overlooks a 

crucial distinction: in those cases, we construed federal statutes 

of limitations and therefore applied federal tolling rules. 

Here, we apply the District’s statute of limitations and 

therefore the District’s tolling rule. 

Because no D.C. Court of Appeals case is directly on 

point, we “reason by analogy from D.C. cases” to predict how 

that court would decide the question in a case like this. 

Workman v. United Methodist Comm. on Relief, 320 F.3d 259, 

262 (D.C. Cir. 2003); see also Novak v. Capital Mgmt. & Dev. 

Corp., 452 F.3d 902, 907 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“Our duty, then, is 

to achieve the same outcome we believe would result if the 

District of Columbia Court of Appeals considered this case.”). 

At oral argument, Earle’s counsel agreed with the Court’s 

suggestion that the appropriate analogy in this case would be a 

section 1983 action brought against the District for failure to 

give a required Miranda warning. See Earle v. District of 

Columbia, No. 11-7078, Oral Argument Tr. at 20–23 (D.C. 

Cir. Oct. 16, 2012). Although neither this court nor the 

Supreme Court has held that a Miranda violation is actionable 

under section 1983, see Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 

(2003) (addressing but failing to resolve question), and we do 

not decide that now, the District Court of Appeals has

addressed the question. In Cannon v. District of Columbia, 

the plaintiff sought to recover under section 1983 after “he was 

questioned by police concerning his involvement in a criminal 

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incident without being given a so-called Miranda warning.” 

569 A.2d 595, 596 (D.C. 1990) (per curiam). He brought suit 

well after the expiration of the limitations period but argued 

that the District’s failure to give the Miranda warning

“constituted fraudulent concealment, thereby tolling the statute 

of limitations.” Id. The court rejected his argument: “[E]ven 

assuming the police themselves deliberately concealed from 

appellant his rights at the time they questioned him, he did 

have an attorney soon thereafter to counsel him as to his rights 

and to pursue such rights against the government as the 

circumstances warranted.” Id. at 597.

Cannon points the way here.11 We know that Earle was 

assisted by counsel during his Superior Court trials and we 

predict that the D.C. Court of Appeals, should it consider this 

question, would therefore decline to toll the statute of 

limitations. Accordingly, because the statute of limitations 

began to run no later than Earle’s escape on September 19, 

1988, his 2006 lawsuit is untimely. 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the 

district court.

So ordered.

 11 The appellant in Cannon raised the argument for the first time 

on appeal so the District Court of Appeals considered whether there 

were “exceptional circumstances” permitting it to consider the 

claim. Cannon, 569 A.2d at 596–97. We do not believe that the 

waiver issue affects Cannon’s merits holding. 

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