Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-16-01294/USCOURTS-ca3-16-01294-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Amin A. Rashid
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

ALD-275 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

____________

No. 16-1294

____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

AMIN A. RASHID,

Appellant

__________________________________ 

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civ. No. 2-08-cr-00493-1)

District Judge: Cynthia M. Rufe

__________________________________

Submitted for Possible Summary Action 

Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

June 3, 2016

Before: AMBRO, SHWARTZ, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: June 7, 2016)

____________

OPINION*

____________

PER CURIAM

Amin A. Rashid appeals from an order of the District Court denying and 

dismissing his motion to dismiss the Superseding Indictment in his criminal case. For the 

reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm.

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Rashid was charged by Indictment on August 21, 2008 with two counts of mail 

fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and one count of aggravated identity theft, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1), (c)(5). On May 28, 2009, a Superseding 

Indictment charged him with ten counts of mail fraud, eight counts of aggravated identity 

theft, and one count of forging or counterfeiting postal money orders, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 500. The mail fraud counts in the Superseding Indictment alleged that Rashid 

“knowingly caused to be delivered by mail and commercial interstate carrier according to 

the directions thereon, and placed in a post office or authorized depository for mail 

matter” ten specific letters. In the aggravated identity theft counts, the Superseding 

Indictment charged that Rashid “knowingly and without lawful authority transferred, 

possessed, and used, a means of identification of another person ... during and in relation 

to mail fraud.” After a jury trial at which Rashid represented himself, he was found 

guilty of nine counts of mail fraud and all eight counts of aggravated identity theft. The 

jury found him not guilty of one count of mail fraud and of forging or counterfeiting 

postal money orders. After denying Rashid’s post-verdict motions, the District Court 

sentenced him to a total term of imprisonment of 240 months.

On appeal, Rashid contended in his pro se brief that the District Court erred in 

denying his motions to suppress evidence, motion for recusal, and motion to dismiss the 

indictment under the Speedy Trial Act. Rashid further contended that the evidence was 

insufficient to support his convictions for mail fraud, that the prosecutor’s statements 

during closing were not a fair characterization of the evidence, and that the District Court 

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denied him due process at sentencing. We rejected these contentions as meritless and 

affirmed the criminal judgment. See United States v. Rashid, 593 F. App’x 132 (3d Cir. 

2014). Our mandate issued on January 21, 2015.

On March 3, 2015, Rashid filed a motion in the District Court to dismiss the 

“jurisdictionally defective” indictment pursuant to current Federal Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 12(b)(2) (“A motion that the court lacks jurisdiction may be made at any time 

while the case is pending.”), and former Rule 12(b)(3),1arguing that the District Court 

lacked jurisdiction to convict him. Specifically, Rashid argued that the mail fraud charge 

in the Superseding Indictment failed to state that he used the “United States mail” or 

“Postal Service.” He argued that the aggravated identity theft charge failed to state that 

the identity theft occurred in or affected interstate or foreign commerce, as required by 18 

U.S.C. § 1028(c)(3)(A), and/or failed to state that the means of identification was 

“transported in the mail,” as required by § 1028(c)(3)(B). Rashid further argued that his 

motion to dismiss the indictment on jurisdictional grounds was not untimely because the 

time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari had not yet expired when he filed the 

motion. For support, he cited our order in United States v. Blood, C.A. No. 08-4101 (3d 

Cir. April 28, 2009) (Order), where, after the defendant filed a petition for rehearing 

explaining that his motion to dismiss the indictment was filed before the time for filing a 

 

1 We note that the 2014 amendment relocated Rule 12(b)(3) to Rule 12(b)(2). See Fed. 

R. Crim. P. 12 advisory committee’s note to 2014 amendment. Current Rule 12(b)(3) 

requires that a motion alleging that the indictment “fail[s] to state an offense” be filed 

pretrial. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(B)(v). Rashid clearly stated his intention to proceed 

under current Rule 12(b)(2), which concerns whether the District Court “lacks 

jurisdiction,” and which has no time limit other than that the case be “pending.” Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 12(b)(2).

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certiorari petition expired, we concluded that his (former) Rule 12(b)(3) motion was 

timely filed, withdrew our opinion, and remanded to the District Court for a ruling on the 

merits of the motion. 

The Government responded to Rashid’s motion to dismiss the indictment by 

arguing that it was meritless, and also procedurally frivolous because our mandate had 

issued and thus his case was no longer “pending,” see Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2), when he 

filed his motion.

In an order entered on January 25, 2016, the District Court denied and dismissed 

Rashid’s motion. Noting our Order in Bland, but also noting that we had not yet decided 

in a precedential opinion when a case is no longer “pending” under current Rule 12(b)(2) 

(or former Rule 12(b)(3)), the District Court reasoned that nothing was pending, that is, 

“awaiting decision,” when Rashid filed his motion to dismiss the indictment on 

jurisdictional grounds; our mandate had issued and he had not yet file his certiorari 

petition.2 Therefore, his motion was untimely filed. The Court in the alternative 

concluded that the motion was meritless, because “defects in an indictment do not 

deprive a court of its power to adjudicate,” United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 

(2002). Last, the Court concluded that, in any event, Rashid’s specific arguments were 

meritless. The Superseding Indictment was not defective for its failure to use the 

language “United States mail” or “Postal Service,” because the indictment distinguished 

between “mail” and private “commercial interstate carrier[s]” and thus the reference to 

 

2 On March 30, 2015, and thus after he filed his motion to dismiss the indictment, Rashid 

filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court denied on May 18, 2015.

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mail necessarily meant “United States mail.” The Court concluded that the Superseding 

Indictment was not defective for failing to allege that the aggravated identity theft 

occurred in or affected interstate or foreign commerce, and/or failed to state that the 

means of identification was “transported in the mail.” The Court reasoned that the 

elements of aggravated identity theft, as set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 1028A, are: (1) the 

defendant knowingly transferred, possessed, or used a means of identification of another 

person; (2) the defendant did so without lawful authority; and (3) the defendant did so 

during and in relation to certain enumerated crimes, including mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 

1028A(a)(1), (c)(5); and the Superseding Indictment adequately stated those elements. 

Rashid’s argument was flawed, the Court reasoned, because he had relied upon the 

“interstate commerce” and “transported in the mail” requirements of a different statute, 

18 U.S.C. § 1028, and the statute he was alleged to have violated, the aggravated identity 

fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1028A, contains no such requirements. 

Rashid appeals. We have jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our Clerk advised the 

parties that the appeal was subject to summary action under Third Cir. LAR 27.4 and 

I.O.P. 10.6. Rashid has submitted a motion for summary reversal, and a supplement. 

We will summarily affirm the order of the District Court because no substantial 

question is presented by this appeal, Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. Rashid 

argues in his motion for summary reversal that his case was still pending within the 

meaning of criminal Rule 12(b)(2) because the 90-day period for filing a certiorari 

petition, see Sup. Ct. R. 13, had not yet expired when he filed his motion. He argues that 

we should follow Blood and hold that his motion should be considered timely filed. We 

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conclude that we need not resolve the meaning of “pending” here, because, even 

assuming that a case is “pending” for purposes of Rule 12(b)(2) so long as the time for 

filing a certiorari petition has not expired, no substantial question is presented by the 

District Court’s alternative determination that Rashid’s motion to dismiss the indictment 

was lacking in merit.3 Although we agree with Rashid that the “gist” of mail fraud is the 

misuse of the United States mail, his argument that the Superseding Indictment is fatally 

defective because it does not use the words “United States Mail” or U.S. Postal Service” 

is not persuasive. The Superseding Indictment distinguished between “mail” and private 

“commercial interstate carrier[s],” and thus the reference to mail necessarily meant the 

United States mail. 

As to Rashid’s second concern, the elements the Government is required to prove 

in order to convict a defendant of aggravated identity theft are: (1) the defendant 

knowingly transferred, possessed, or used a means of identification of another person; (2) 

the defendant did so without lawful authority; and (3) the defendant did so during and in 

relation to certain enumerated crimes, including mail fraud. See United States v. 

Stepanian, 570 F.3d 51, 59 (1st Cir. 2009). Rashid has cited no authority, and we know 

of none, for his argument that the aggravated identity theft statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1028A, 

includes a requirement that the identity theft affect interstate or foreign commerce, and/or 

 

3 For the same reason we also need not decide whether Cotton bars Rashid’s Rule 

12(b)(2) motion. Cotton did not concern criminal Rule 12(b)(2), see United States v. 

Hedaithy, 392 F.3d 580, 589 (3d Cir. 2004), and, although it reversed the holding of Ex 

parte Bain, 121 U.S.1 (1887), that indictment defects are jurisdictional, Cotton, 535 U.S. 

at 630, it holds only that forfeited claims of a defect in the indictment -- specifically drug 

quantities that increased the statutory maximum sentence -- are reviewed for plain error, 

id. at 631.

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that the means of identification be “transported in the mail.” The not precedential 

decision he cites in his motion for summary reversal, United States v. Agarwal, 314 F. 

App’x 473 (3d Cir. 2008), along with a case from another circuit, United States v. Sutton, 

13 F.3d 595, 599 (2d Cir. 1994), involve a different statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1028, which 

criminalizes the production, transfer and possession of false identification documents. 

Rashid was charged with violating the aggravated identity theft statute, 18 U.S.C. § 

1028A. United States v. Savarese, 686 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2012), on which Rashid also 

relies, notes the language used in the defendant’s indictment but does not hold that 18 

U.S.C. § 1028A includes a requirement that the identity theft affect interstate or foreign 

commerce, and/or that the means of identification be “transported in the mail.”

For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the order of the District Court 

to the extent that the Court dismissed and denied Rashid’s motion to dismiss the 

Superseding Indictment pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2) for lack of jurisdiction.4

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.

 

4

In addition to denying Rashid’s Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss the indictment with 

prejudice, the District Court stated that its denial of the motion was without prejudice to 

Rashid’s right to file a motion to vacate sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. We 

express no view about this aspect of the District Court’s order because the issue is not 

before us. “Ordinarily, only a party aggrieved by a judgment or order of a district court 

may exercise the statutory right to appeal therefrom.” Deposit Guaranty National Bank 

v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333 (1980) (emphasis added). 

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