Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-05-03119/USCOURTS-caDC-05-03119-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Antoine Michael Perry
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 13, 2006 Decided March 16, 2007

No. 05-3119

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

ANTOINE MICHAEL PERRY,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 03cr00329-01)

Richard K. Gilbert, appointed by the court, argued the cause

for the appellant. 

John P. Gidez, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the

cause for the appellee. Kenneth L. Wainstein, United States

Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and Roy W. McLeese,

III, Anthony M. Alexis, and David B. Goodhand, Assistant

United States Attorneys were on brief.

Before: HENDERSON, RANDOLPH and GRIFFITH, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

USCA Case #05-3119 Document #1028734 Filed: 03/16/2007 Page 1 of 16
2

1

The crime is committed by anyone who: “knowingly causes the

transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a

result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without

authorization, to a protected computer.” 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A)(i).

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: The appellant,

Antoine Perry, was convicted of unlawful accessing a computer

resulting in damage in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 1030(a)(5)(A)(i).1 He appeals, asserting that the district court

committed three errors: (1) it ordered Perry’s wife and eightyear-old son removed from the courtroom during Perry’s trial;

(2) it sua sponte instructed the jury to disregard Perry’s wife’s

failure to testify; and (3) it failed to read the complete jury

instructions to the jury. For the reasons set forth below, we

reject Perry’s claims and affirm his conviction.

I.

Lockheed-Martin (Lockheed) provides computer support

services to the Office of Site Remediation Enforcement (OSRE),

a division of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

OSRE links its computers through a local area network (LAN)

that connects its employees to its file server. The LAN allows

OSRE employees to create and edit their documents, access

databases and send e-mails to co-workers.

 In September 1999, Perry was a computer network systems

administrator for Norell, a subcontractor of Lockheed. In that

capacity, Perry helped to maintain the connection between the

file server and the LAN and was given remote access to the

network, allowing him to remotely control server operations.

On September 10, 1999, Lockheed offered Perry a job as a

network administrator. Because Perry failed Lockheed’s

mandatory employee drug test, however, Lockheed rescinded its

offer on Friday, September 24, 1999, and also informed Perry

that he could no longer work on the EPA contract. Lockheed’s

USCA Case #05-3119 Document #1028734 Filed: 03/16/2007 Page 2 of 16
3

2

OSRE employed no one named “M. Burton” and gave no one

permission to create an “Mburton” account. 

action was effective immediately and Lockheed security

escorted him out of Lockheed’s main office building. One

witness described him as “angry.” Tr. I, 2/3/04 at 103. 

On the following Monday, September 27, 1999, OSRE

employees arrived at work and discovered that they could not

log on to the file server. After investigating, a LAN systems

manager determined that someone using the fictitious username

“Mburton” had disabled the server via remote access, changed

passwords and deleted printers from the network system.2 The

systems manager concluded a security breach had occurred and

he then shut down the server, replaced its hardrives and reloaded

its software. As a result of the server problems and

maintenance, OSRE employees could not access work-related

documents and e-mails for more than one day. 

A Lockheed network design engineer eventually traced the

remote connection used to disable the server to Perry’s

Maryland home telephone number. On October 13, 1999,

agents from the EPA Inspector General’s Office and the FBI

searched Perry’s house and confiscated, inter alia, a desktop

computer, a laptop computer, several hard drives and a modem.

The FBI also seized a list of the printers and print services

within the EPA’s computer system. On July 30, 2003, Perry

was charged in a one-count indictment with unauthorized access

to a computer causing damage.

Perry’s trial began on February 2, 2003, with jury selection.

The next day, inclement weather resulted in school closings

throughout the District and Perry’s wife brought their eightyear-old son to court. Before opening arguments began and out

of the jury’s presence, the trial judge suggested that Perry’s wife

remove the child to prevent him from witnessing his father’s

USCA Case #05-3119 Document #1028734 Filed: 03/16/2007 Page 3 of 16
4

3

During the search of Perry’s house, the FBI seized a certificate

awarded to “Tonya Burton” in recognition of her completion of jury

duty. Tr. II, 2/3/04 at 118. 

trial. The judge stated, “Of course [Perry’s son] and his mother

have every right to be here . . . [but] I’m always concerned about

the effect of these types of proceedings on children, especially

children of tender years . . . I’m not ordering you to leave.” Tr.

I, 2/3/04 at 17-19. The judge then declared a recess to “give

everyone a chance to relocate.” Id. at 20. After the recess,

however, the judge declared, “It was reported to me over the

recess that Mr. Perry instructed his wife to keep the child in

court. There’s no doubt in this Court’s mind that such an effort

on his part is made solely to evoke sympathy on the part of the

jurors.” Id. The judge then ordered Perry’s wife to remove the

boy from the courtroom. Perry replied, “Your Honor, that’s my

wife. That’s my support system,” to which the judge responded,

“Your support system can return without your son, sir.” Id. at

21. After the judge repeated his belief that Perry sought to keep

his son in court only to evoke juror sympathy, Perry stated,

“That was not the reason, Your Honor.” Id. Perry’s wife then

left the courtroom with the child.

The trial proceeded with the Government presenting

evidence to establish that Perry disabled OSRE’s file server

under the username “Mburton” by informing the jury, inter alia,

that Perry’s wife’s name is “Tonya Marie Burton Perry.”3

 After

closing arguments, the judge asked counsel from both sides if

they wanted him to instruct the jury to refrain from speculating

regarding Perry’s wife’s failure to testify. The judge declared,

“[Perry’s wife’s] name has been mentioned prominently in this

case. The last thing in the world I want . . . is for there to be a

verdict followed by a questioning session that reveals that . . .

[the jury was] troubled because her name was used and she was

here and she didn’t testify.” Tr. II, 2/4/04 at 81. Perry’s counsel

USCA Case #05-3119 Document #1028734 Filed: 03/16/2007 Page 4 of 16
5

objected, arguing that “the mere mention of that instruction may

actually put th[e] thought [that Perry’s wife was involved in the

crime] in [the jurors’] minds.” Id. at 82. He further argued that

he “[did not] see a need to raise a possible issue with respect to

[Perry’s wife],” id. at 85, because Perry’s defense was “technical

and forensic, as opposed to personal,” id. at 90. Nevertheless,

the judge instructed the jury, “You are instructed as a matter of

law not to speculate as to any reason why Mr. Perry’s wife did

not testify in this case. That’s not an issue in this case.” Id. at

101. 

Before charging the jury on the elements of the offense, the

judge declared, “I’m just going to focus on the elements of the

offense, Counsel. I’m going to send the entire instruction back.

. . . There are definitions. Loss is defined, computer’s defined.

There’s a statute defining the offense. I’m not going to read that

to you. You can read it . . . I want to focus on the elements.” Id.

at 105. Neither party objected to his decision not to read aloud

to the jury the definitions included in the written charge. The

jury convicted Perry and the judge sentenced him to four

months’ incarceration and three years’ supervised release. He

also ordered Perry to pay restitution in the amount $5,000 and

a special assessment of $100. Perry filed a timely notice of

appeal on July 15, 2005.

II.

We address separately Perry’s Sixth Amendment claim and

his two challenges to the jury instructions.

A. Sixth Amendment Claim

Perry argues that the district court violated the Sixth

Amendment to the United States Constitution when it removed

his wife and child from the courtroom. Specifically, he contends

that the reasons given by the court for its action—to protect the

child’s welfare and to prevent Perry from using the child to

evoke juror sympathy—did not justify denying him his right to

USCA Case #05-3119 Document #1028734 Filed: 03/16/2007 Page 5 of 16
6

a public trial. In addition, Perry maintains that he objected at

trial to the removal and thus is entitled to harmless error review.

See United States v. Perkins, 161 F.3d 66, 72 (D.C. Cir. 1998)

(citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a) (“Any error, defect, irregularity,

or variance that does not affect substantial rights must be

disregarded.”)). The Government responds that the district court

did not err and that we should review his claim under the plain

error standard because he failed to object at trial. See United

States v. Spriggs, 102 F.3d 1245, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (Per

Curiam) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) (“A plain error that

affects substantial rights may be considered even though it was

not brought to the court’s attention.”)). We need not decide the

correct standard of review, however, because the district court

committed no error at all. 

 The Sixth Amendment provides in part: “In all criminal

prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and

public trial . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. VI. As the Supreme

Court explained in Waller v. Georgia, the right to a public trial:

(1) “ensure[s] that judge and prosecutor carry out their duties

responsibly,” (2) “encourages witnesses to come forward” and

(3) “discourages perjury.” 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984). Indeed, “the

guarantee has always been recognized as a safeguard against any

attempt to employ our courts as instruments of persecution.” In

re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948).

Both Perry and the Government analyze the removal of

Perry’s child from the courtroom under the four-prong test

developed in Waller. See Appellant’s Br. at 32-36; Appellee’s

Br. at 17-23. In Waller, the trial court had “ordered [a]

suppression hearing closed to all persons other than witnesses,

court personnel, the parties, and the lawyers.” 467 U.S. at 42.

In reversing that decision, the Supreme Court held that

notwithstanding the fact that a defendant has a Sixth

Amendment right to a public suppression hearing, the right

“may give way in certain cases to other rights or interests.” Id.

USCA Case #05-3119 Document #1028734 Filed: 03/16/2007 Page 6 of 16
7

4

While we have not addressed the issue, the Government points

out that several circuits require that the prosecution advance only a

“substantial” interest—not an “overriding” interest—to support a

“partial” closing because “partial closures do not implicate the same

fairness and secrecy concerns as total closures.” United States v.

Osborne, 68 F.3d 94, 99 (5thCir. 1995) (exclusion of co-defendant’s

sister and “new spectators” during testimony of one witness upheld);

see also United States v. Farmer, 32 F.3d 369, 371-72 (8th Cir. 1994)

(exclusion of all spectators except victim’s family while victim

testified upheld); Woods v. Kuhlmann, 977 F.2d 74, 76 (2d Cir. 1992)

(exclusion of defendant’s common law wife, his common law wife’s

sister and his cousin during one witness’s testimony upheld); Nieto v.

Sullivan, 879 F.2d 743, 753 (10th Cir. 1989) (exclusion of defendant’s

sisters and other unspecified relatives during one witness’s testimony

upheld); United States v. Sherlock, 962 F.2d 1349, 1356-57 (9th Cir.

1989) (exclusion of defendants’ unspecified family members during

victim’s testimony upheld); Douglas v. Wainwright, 739 F.2d 531,

533 (11th Cir. 1984) (exclusion of members of general public during

one witness’s testimony upheld).

at 45. Ultimately, the complete closing of a criminal proceeding

is constitutional only if: 

[1] the party seeking to close the hearing . . . advance[s]

an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, [2]

the closure [is] no broader than necessary to protect that

interest, [3] the trial court . . . consider[s] reasonable

alternatives to closing the proceedings, and [4] it . . .

make[s] findings adequate to support the closure.

Id. at 48. Because the trial court’s complete closing of the

suppression hearing was “plainly . . . unjustified,” the Court

remanded for a new hearing.4 Id. at 48, 50. 

The Waller test applies, however, only if closing the

courtroom implicates the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right.

United States v. Ivester, 316 F.3d 955, 958 (9th Cir. 2003)

(“Before applying the Waller test to determine whether the

USCA Case #05-3119 Document #1028734 Filed: 03/16/2007 Page 7 of 16
8

district court violated [the defendant’s] Sixth Amendment right

to a public trial, we must first determine whether the right

attaches . . . .”) (citation omitted). While “[d]etermining with

any precision the contours of th[e] right [to a public trial] is a

difficult task,” Braun v. Powell, 227 F.3d 908, 917 (7th Cir.

2000), the Supreme Court has suggested, albeit in dicta, that the

right to a public trial entitles a criminal defendant “at the very

least . . . to have his friends, relatives and counsel present, no

matter with what offense he may be charged.” In re Oliver, 333

U.S. at 272; see also Braun, 227 F.3d at 917 (describing

“Supreme Court’s requirement” that “friend[s] or relative[s] of

the defendant” be allowed to attend trial); Vidal v. Williams, 31

F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir. 1994) (“[T]he Supreme Court has

specifically noted a special concern for assuring the attendance

of family members of the accused.”). Nevertheless, some

circuits “have recognized that there are certain instances in

which [an] exclusion cannot be characterized properly as

implicating the constitutional guarantee.” Braun, 227 F.3d at

918; see also id. at 919 (exclusion of member of jury venire not

chosen to sit as juror did not implicate Sixth Amendment); see

also Carson v. Fischer, 421 F.3d 83, 93 (2d Cir. 2005)

(exclusion of defendant’s ex-mother-in-law did not implicate

Sixth Amendment); Ivester, 316 F.3d at 960 (exclusion of

“spectators during the brief mid-trial questioning of the jurors to

determine if they were concerned for their safety” did not

implicate Sixth Amendment); Peterson v. Williams, 85 F.3d 39

(2d Cir. 1996) (inadvertent courtroom closing during

defendant’s brief testimony did not implicate Sixth

Amendment). That is, even a problematic courtroom closing

can be “too trivial to amount to a violation of the [Sixth]

Amendment.” Peterson, 85 F.3d at 42. The Second Circuit

explained:

A triviality standard, properly understood, does not

dismiss a defendant’s claim on the grounds that the

defendant was guilty anyway or that he did not suffer

USCA Case #05-3119 Document #1028734 Filed: 03/16/2007 Page 8 of 16
9

5

Although the judge ordered Perry’s wife to remove the child, he

did not exclude her from the proceedings. Indeed, the judge twice

informed Perry that she could return without their son. Tr. I, 2/3/04

at 21-22. While Perry appears to argue that the judge effectively

excluded his wife because the school cancellation compelled her to

stay with their child, see Appellant’s Br. at 31, the record does not

indicate that Perry so advised the court or that his wife was unable to

make alternative arrangements. Moreover, the record indicates that

the trial lasted from February 3rd (the day Perry’s son was removed)

until February 5th when the verdict was returned. See Tr. 2/3/04-Tr.

2/5/04. Perry suggests in his brief that his wife missed only the first

day of trial. See Appellant’s Br. at 30 (“[T]he fact remain [sic] in this

case that Appellant’s wife and child were excluded for a full day of

testimony including essential government witnesses.” (emphasis

added)). 

“prejudice” or “specific injury.” It is, in other words,

very different from a harmless error inquiry. It looks,

rather, to whether the actions of the court and the effect

that they had on the conduct of the trial deprived the

defendant—whether otherwise innocent or guilty—of

the protections conferred by the Sixth Amendment.

Id. A courtroom closing is “trivial” if it does not implicate the

“values served by the Sixth Amendment” as set forth in Waller.

Id. (citing Waller, 467 U.S. at 46-47); see also Braun, 227 F.3d

at 918-19. “[E]ven the exclusion of a family member or friend

may, in rare circumstances . . . , not implicate the Sixth

Amendment public trial guarantee.” Carson, 421 F.3d at 94. 

Using the triviality standard, we believe the district court’s

action did not violate the Sixth Amendment. Perry’s son was

the only person excluded from the proceedings5

 and an eightyear-old’s presence in the courtroom would neither “ensure that

judge and prosecutor carry out their duties responsibly” nor

“discourage[] perjury.” Waller, 467 U.S. at 46. Nor would the

child’s attendance “encourage [a] witness[] to come forward.”

USCA Case #05-3119 Document #1028734 Filed: 03/16/2007 Page 9 of 16
10

Id. Perry’s trial remained open to the public—and specifically

to his wife—throughout. 

B. Jury Instruction Regarding Wife’s Failure to Testify

Perry next argues that the district court erred by instructing

the jury “not to speculate as to any reason why Mr. Perry’s wife

did not testify in this case.” Tr. II, 2/4/04 at 101. Because Perry

objected to the instruction at trial, we review his claim under the

harmless error standard. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a); see also United

States v. Logan, 998 F.2d 1025, 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“To

preserve an objection to jury instructions, a defendant must raise

the specific objection before the trial court.” (citing United

States v. Pryce, 938 F.2d 1343, 1350 (D.C. Cir. 1991))). Under

that standard, the Government bears the burden of proving an

error is “harmless”—that is, not “prejudicial.” See United States

v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993).

Although there appears to be little or no precedent

specifically addressing a trial judge’s decision to issue sua

sponte a cautionary jury instruction to disregard the failure of an

individual—other than the defendant—to testify, the Supreme

Court has held that a similar sua sponte instruction to disregard

a defendant’s failure to testify over the defendant’s objection

does not violate the privilege against compulsory selfincrimination. Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 340-41

(1978). In so holding, the Court rejected the argument that such

instruction would “encourage the jury to draw adverse

inferences from a defendant’s silence,” stating that the argument

rests on the “speculative assumptions” that “the jurors have not

noticed that the defendant did not testify and will not, therefore,

draw adverse inferences on their own” and that they “will totally

disregard the instruction.” Id. at 339-40. The Court concluded

that, although “[i]t may be wise for a trial judge not to give such

a cautionary instruction over a defendant’s objection,” the

instruction does not violate the Fifth Amendment to the

USCA Case #05-3119 Document #1028734 Filed: 03/16/2007 Page 10 of 16
11

6

The Court also rejected the argument that the instruction violated

the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel by “interfering with

counsel’s trial strategy” because the judge gave a lawful instruction

and “[i]t is the judge, not counsel, who has the ultimate responsibility

for the conduct of a fair and lawful trial.” Lakeside, 435 U.S. at 341-

42. 

Constitution.6 Id. at 340-41; see also United States v. Moss, 756

F.2d 329, 334-35 (4th Cir. 1985) (affirming district court’s

decision to sua sponte instruct jury that “[t]he weight of the

evidence is not necessarily to be determined by the number of

witnesses testifying” over defendant’s objection after defendant

offered “no witnesses at trial”).

While a cautionary jury instruction regarding a potential

witness’s failure to testify does not implicate the Fifth

Amendment issue addressed in Lakeside v. Oregon, we agree

with the Supreme Court’s suggestion that a trial judge should

refrain from sua sponte instructing the jury, as was done here,

over the defendant’s objection. See Lakeside, 435 U.S. at 340-

41; see also Moss, 756 F.2d at 335. Defense counsel should

have considerable latitude in weighing the effect of such an

instruction, cf. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688

(1984) (“Counsel’s function is to assist the defendant . . . [and]

[c]ounsel also has a duty to bring to bear such skill and

knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial testing

process.”), and, once he objects, the trial judge should carefully

consider the objection. 

Nonetheless, we are confident that Perry suffered no

prejudice. Indeed, we would be speculating to conclude either

that the instruction caused the jury to draw inferences adverse to

Perry that it would not otherwise have drawn or that the jury did

not follow the instruction. Cf. Lakeside, 435 U.S. at 340

(discussing instruction regarding defendant’s failure to testify).

Moreover, the judge emphasized to the jury that the reason for

USCA Case #05-3119 Document #1028734 Filed: 03/16/2007 Page 11 of 16
12

Perry’s wife’s silence was not at issue in the case. Tr. II, 2/4/04

at 101 (“That’s not an issue in this case.”); cf. Moss, 756 F.2d at

335 (“[T]he possible prejudice resulting from the number of

witnesses instruction was lessened because the district court

informed the jury in the same instruction that the government’s

large number of witnesses need not be considered ‘persuasive at

all.’”). Accordingly, the district court’s instruction constitutes,

at most, harmless error. 

C. Failure to Read Complete Jury Instructions

Finally, Perry argues that the district court erred by failing

to read aloud the complete jury instructions. Because Perry did

not object at trial, we review his claim under the plain error

standard. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). Under that standard, we

will remedy a trial court error only if there is “(1) ‘error,’ (2)

that is ‘plain,’ and (3) that ‘affect[s] substantial rights[]’ . . .

[and] (4) the error ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or

public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Johnson v. United

States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1997) (quoting Olano, 507 U.S.

at 732). An error “affec[ts] substantial rights” if it is

“prejudicial” or “affected the outcome of the district court

proceedings.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 734. 

While we have not addressed the issue, both the Third

Circuit and the Ninth Circuit have held that “[i]t is . . . essential

that all instructions to the jury be given by the trial judge orally

in the presence of counsel and the defendant.” United States v.

Noble, 155 F.2d 315, 318 (3d Cir. 1946); accord Guam v. Marquez,

963 F.2d 1311, 1314-15 (9th Cir. 1992). In Noble, the court

explained its reasoning:

[T]he trial judge would not have fulfilled his duty . . .

merely by sending the information out with the jury to

read if they chose to do so . . . . For not only are counsel

and the defendant entitled to hear the instructions in

order that they may . . . object to them and secure their

USCA Case #05-3119 Document #1028734 Filed: 03/16/2007 Page 12 of 16
13

7

Contrary to the Government’s argument, Appellee’s Br. at 30-31,

the words do not constitute “words of general use,” United States v.

Garza-Juarez, 992 F.2d 896, 910 (9th Cir. 1993) (“A jury charge that

does not include definitions of words of general use does not

constitute plain error.”); see also Perkins, 161 F.3d at 70 (“Although

a trial court must define words and phrases that have technical or

unconventional meanings, it is not required to define words which are

in common use, and are such as are readily comprehended by persons

of ordinary intelligence, where the words are applied in the judge’s

instructions in their conventional sense.” (internal quotation omitted)).

Both “computer” and “loss” have specific meanings set forth in the

statute itself, see 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1), (e)(11), the parties agreed

that “loss” also “includes any natural and foreseeable result of any

damage that . . . occurred,” see Joint Proposed Statement of the Case,

Voir Dire, Jury Instructions, and Verdict Form 12 (Jan. 29, 2004)

(Jury Instructions), reprinted in Appellant’s App. at 32 (citing United

States v. Middleton, 231 F.3d 1207, 1213 (9th Cir. 2000)), and the

parties agreed on a definition of “individual” derived from Middleton,

231 F.3d at 1212, see Jury Instructions, supra, at 32. 

prompt correction by the trial judge, but it is equally

important to make as certain as may be that each

member of the jury has actually received the

instructions.

Noble, 155 F.2d at 318; see also Marquez, 963 F.2d at 1314-15

(trial judge must read jury instructions aloud to jury for “reasons

articulated . . . in Noble”). 

We agree with our sister circuits that a trial judge must read

aloud jury instructions in their entirety. As the Ninth Circuit

noted, the lack of case law on the subject most likely results

from the fact that “judges and litigators have always assumed

that jury instructions must be oral.” Marquez, 963 F.2d at 1314.

Accordingly, the district court erred in failing to read to the jury

the definitions of “computer,” “loss” and “individual.”7

USCA Case #05-3119 Document #1028734 Filed: 03/16/2007 Page 13 of 16
14

8

It is also not clear that the district court’s error was “plain.” An

error is “plain” if it is “clear” or “obvious.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 734.

We have declared that “absent precedent from either the Supreme

Court or this court . . . , [an] asserted error . . . falls far short of plain

error.” United States v. Vizcaino, 202 F.3d 345, 348 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

Nonetheless, “[s]ome legal norms are absolutely clear (for example,

because of the clarity of a statutory provision or court rule); in such

cases, a trial court’s failure to follow a clear legal norm may constitute

plain error, without regard to whether the applicable statute or rule

previously had been the subject of judicial construction.” United

States v. Merlos, 8 F.3d 48, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 

9

“(a) Whoever . . . (5)(A)(i) knowingly causes the transmission of

a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such

conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a

protected computer . . . and (B) by conduct described in clause (i), . .

. caused . . . (i) loss to 1 or more persons during any 1-year period . .

. aggregating at least $5,000 in value . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)

(emphases added). The “Elements of the Offense” section of the

charge uses “individuals” rather than “persons” pursuant to the parties’

agreement. Jury Instructions, supra n.7, at 31. 

Perry has failed to demonstrate, however, that the judge’s

error “affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.”8

Olano, 507 U.S. at 734. In addition to the general charge

relating to burden of proof, credibility of witnesses and the like,

see Tr. II, 2/4/04 at 94, 97-98, the judge read to the jurors the

portion of the charge explaining the essential elements of the

charged offense,9 see id. at 105-06, and failed to read only the

definitions of three words referenced in the elements. There is

little chance that the jurors failed to “actually receive[],” Noble,

155 F.2d at 318, the definitions because the judge orally

instructed them to read the definitions in the written charge they

had with them in the jury room, Tr. II, 2/4/04 at 105 (“There are

definitions. Loss is defined, computer’s defined. There’s a

statute defining the offense. I’m not going to read that to you.

USCA Case #05-3119 Document #1028734 Filed: 03/16/2007 Page 14 of 16
15

10Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1) (“computer” is “an electronic,

magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing

device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, and

includes any data storage facility or communications facility directly

related to or operating in conjunction with such device, but such term

does not include an automated typewriter or typesetter, a portable hand

held calculator, or other similar device”) with Webster’s Third New

International Dictionary 468 (1993) (Webster’s) (“computer” is “a

programmable electronic device that can store, retrieve, and process

data”); compare Jury Instructions, supra n.7, at 32 (“loss” is “any

reasonable cost to any victim, including the cost of responding to an

offense, conducting a damage assessment, and restoring the data,

program, system, or information to its condition prior to the offense,

and any revenue lost, cost incurred, or other consequential damages

incurred because of interruption of service,” 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(11),

and “includes any natural and foreseeable result of any damage that .

. . occurred”) with Webster’s, supra, at 1338 (“loss” is “an amount that

is lost”). The parties agreed that “individuals” include “both natural

persons and governmental agencies.” Jury Instructions, supra n.6, at

32. Although that definition is broader than the dictionary definition

of “person,” see Webster’s, supra, at 1686 (“person” is “an individual

human being”), both “individual” and “person” are often defined more

broadly in statutes. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417,

428 & n.13 (1998) (in Line Item Veto Act, 2 U.S.C. § 692(a)(1)

(1994), “individual” “is synonymous with the word ‘person’” and

“‘person’ often has a broader meaning in the law” (citing 1 U.S.C. §

1 (“person” includes “corporations, companies, associations, firms,

partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as

individuals”))). 

You can read it.”). Even if the jurors did not read the

definitions, “computer,” “loss” and “individual” are simple

terms and the jury instruction definitions differ immaterially

from their dictionary meanings.10 We conclude the district

court did not plainly err in failing to read aloud the definitions

of “computer,” “loss” and “individual.”

USCA Case #05-3119 Document #1028734 Filed: 03/16/2007 Page 15 of 16
16

11To the extent Perry raised additional claims in his pro se brief,

we find them all without merit.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district

court is affirmed.11

So ordered.

USCA Case #05-3119 Document #1028734 Filed: 03/16/2007 Page 16 of 16