Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-03042/USCOURTS-ca13-15-03042-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of Justice
Respondent
Peter A. McMillan
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

PETER A. MCMILLAN,

Petitioner

v.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Respondent

______________________ 

2015-3042

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. DC-4324-11-0726-B-1.

______________________ 

Decided: February 16, 2016

______________________ 

ADAM AUGUSTINE CARTER, The Employment Law 

Group, P.C., Washington, DC, argued for petitioner. Also 

represented by R. SCOTT OSWALD.

ANNA BONDURANT ELEY, Commercial Litigation 

Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of 

Justice, Washington, DC, argued for respondent. Also 

represented by BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E.

KIRSCHMAN, JR., FRANKLIN E. WHITE, JR., NATHANAEL 

YALE; WILLIAM G. HUGHES, Office of Chief Counsel, Drug 

Enforcement Administration, Springfield, VA.

______________________ 

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2 MCMILLAN v. DOJ

Before NEWMAN, O’MALLEY, and TARANTO, Circuit Judges.

O’MALLEY, Circuit Judge. 

Peter A. McMillan (“McMillan”) seeks review of the 

Merit Systems Protection Board (“the Board” or “MSPB”) 

decision denying his request for corrective action under 

the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment 

Rights Act of 1994 (codified at 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4333) 

(“USERRA”). McMillan v. Dep’t of Justice, No. DC-4324-

11-0726-B-1, 2014 WL 5423476 (M.S.P.B. Oct. 16, 2014). 

Specifically, the Board found that McMillan failed to 

comply with the ordinarily accepted standards of conduct 

in the course of performing his military duties and was, 

therefore, not entitled to corrective action under 

USERRA. For the reasons below, we reverse the decision 

of the Board and remand for determination of an appropriate remedy.

BACKGROUND

McMillan was a GS-13 Criminal Investigator with the 

Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”). McMillan also serves 

as an officer in the United States Army Reserves. On 

June 24, 2007, he was assigned to the Lima, Peru County 

Office (“LCO”) of the DEA. His tour at LCO was due to 

expire in 2010, but he requested and was granted a oneyear extension. On September 14, 2010, he again requested a tour extension, this time for an additional two 

years. That request was denied and is the subject of this 

appeal. McMillan contends that the DEA’s decision not to 

renew his tour was based improperly on his military 

service in violation of USERRA.

The LCO office in which McMillan worked for the 

DEA was a relatively small office—“var[ying] in size from 

[six] to [fourteen] special agents, intelligence analysts, 

technical personnel, and tactical analysts.” Testimony of 

retired supervisory special agent from DEA James Watson, Trial Tr. 5 ll. 3–16, Jan. 25, 2012. The office was 

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MCMILLAN v. DOJ 3

occupied, in relevant part, by McMillan, Erika Jimenez 

(“Jimenez”), Juan Arrivillaga (“Arrivillaga”), Michael 

Walsh (“Walsh”), William Steffick (“Steffick”), and Patrick 

Stenkamp (“Stenkamp”). McMillan, as a GS-13 Criminal 

Investigator, had the following chain of command: Arrivillaga was his first-level supervisor; Steffick was his 

second-level supervisor; and Stenkamp was his third-level 

supervisor and also the Regional Director. In addition to 

McMillan’s direct line of command, McMillan also interacted with Walsh, who was the Field Intelligence Manager (“FIM”) and was outside of McMillan’s chain of 

command. Walsh’s first-level supervisor was Steffick and 

his second level-supervisor was Stenkamp.

McMillan also served in the Army Reserves and was 

scheduled to complete one week of military service at 

Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), in Miami, FL, from 

July 17, 2010 through July 26, 2010. As part of his military service, McMillan was assigned to write a “two to 

three page intelligence assessment on the historical 

impact of the DEA’s expulsion from Bolivia on drug 

trafficking, public corruption and social effects.” Pet’r Br. 

5. In particular, McMillan was instructed by his military 

supervisors to create an “Intel Assessment on how DEA’s 

expulsion from [Bolivia] has affected drug trafficking in 

[Bolivia], with additional discussion on any political 

(corruption), or societal effects,” and to use his “DEA 

expertise” to “look[] at a couple other products” during his 

week at SOUTHCOM. Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 630. 

In light of this, McMillan approached the LCO FIM, 

Walsh, to take advantage of his unique expertise on the 

DEA’s interaction with Bolivia. Walsh had been FIM 

with the DEA for over six years, had worked with the 

DEA for over twenty-three years, and, most importantly, 

was previously stationed in Bolivia. See id. at 650 ll. 6–

21. 

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In response to McMillan’s request for assistance, 

Walsh suggested he use a Foreign Situation Report 

(“FSR”) on Bolivia. See id. at 652 l. 19–653 l. 1. The FSR 

is a summary of the intelligence DEA has on a particular 

country. See id. at 664 ll. 11–18. Directly following this 

discussion, Walsh and McMillan walked down the hall to 

Stenkamp’s office to seek permission to release information from the FSR outside of DEA to McMillan’s military supervisors. See id. at 653 l. 18–654 l. 7. Stenkamp 

gave his approval for McMillan to use and cite the FSR. 

Id. at 15. McMillan testified that he “left that office with 

the understanding that . . . [he] had permission to use the 

FSR as a citation or a source document for the two to 

three-page situational awareness brief for interagency 

benefit.” Id. at 701 ll. 9–21.1

Thereafter, McMillan prepared his report and went to 

Miami to fulfill his military service obligations. While 

there, two email exchanges took place between McMillan, 

Walsh, Arrivillaga, Steffick, and Stenkamp. The first 

concerned the use of the FSR in the military intelligence 

report, and the second related to McMillan’s ability to 

participate in a secure video teleconference (“SVTC”) 

regarding the potential ejection of the Military Assistance 

Group from Bolivia. See id. at 703 ll. 16–21.

On the morning of Monday, July 19, 2010, McMillan 

first reached out to Walsh, simply attaching a draft of the 

 

1 Stenkamp testified that he did not recall providing his approval for use of the FSR, see J.A. 227 ll. 4–12, 

but was aware that McMillan wanted to use DEA resources, including the FSR, to fulfill his military service 

obligations, see id. at ll. 13–16. Walsh, however, agreed 

with the statement that “Mr. Stenkamp hesitantly agreed 

to allow [McMillan] to use [the FSR] with the caveat that 

the DEA would be reviewing his report.” Id. at 70 ll. 9–

12.

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MCMILLAN v. DOJ 5

“Bolivia Intelligence Assessment” he had prepared. Id. at 

922–23. That same morning, Walsh responded with 

various edits, commenting: “Nice report.” Id. at 922. 

McMillan replied, thanking Walsh for his review. Id. at 

921–22. He also articulated his belief that his work with 

the military is a “force multiplier for Lima CO.” Id. at 

922. He stated, moreover, that, while he was aware that 

there are “official channels,” which he “[wa]s not trying to 

circumvent,” he did “want to supplement them.” Id. 

The next day, on Tuesday, July 20, McMillan began a 

discussion regarding his participation in the SVTC, at the 

request of his military supervisors. McMillan wrote to 

Walsh to inform him that he would be “represent[ing] 

SOUTHCOM J2 in a SVTC with members of the Pentagon’s Joint Staff” and that he “would appreciate it if 

[Walsh] would advise RD Stenkamp” that he would 

“appreciate [Stenkamp’s and Walsh’s] perspective, guidance and expertise.” Id. at 962. McMillan further noted 

that he believed his “dual capacity as a MI Reservist and 

‘working’ agent,” allowed him “to be a proponent for 

DEA’s viewpoint in the Southern Cone.” Id. This email 

was forwarded to Stenkamp and Steffick. Stenkamp did 

not approve of this. He wrote to McMillan:

No. No. No. First, did you run this through your 

chain? The answer is no, you did not. Second, 

you are NOT to represent yourself in this meeting 

as associated with DEA. If DEA is to be respresented, [sic] it will be done at another level. In all 

due respect, you are not qualified to weigh in on 

Bolivia. The evidence of that is you are asking for 

my opinion, expertise and guidance. My opinion, 

expertise and guidance tell me that you may do 

more harm than good. I can not prohibit your 

participation in the SVTC, but you are to do so only in your capacity with the military. End of story 

– period.

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Id. at 961–62. In response, McMillan sent a sevenparagraph email in which he, among other things, “respectfully, [took] issue with [Stenkamp’s] characterization 

of [his] qualification to weigh in on a given topic” and 

noted that he found “offensive” Stenkamp’s remark that 

he “may do more harm than good.” Id. at 960. This email 

appears to be central to the government’s argument that 

McMillan acted outside the bounds of ordinarily accepted 

standards of conduct.

The Administrative Judge (“AJ”), in its opinion after 

the remand, characterized this email, saying that McMillan “set forth his qualifications as though he were applying for a position and stating he would compare it to 

anyone in the DEA.” Id. at 22 (citations omitted). The AJ 

continued, finding that McMillan “further stated that he 

sought Stenkamp’s input as a sign of respect and ‘to make 

[him] aware of events that may interest [him].’” Id.

(citations omitted). The AJ “found the appellant’s tone 

and the content of the email to be condescending and 

improper coming from a line agent to his third line supervisor and the Regional Director.” Id. In its Final Opinion, the Board stated that it “agree[d] with the 

administrative judge that the appellant’s July 20, 2012 

email to [Stenkamp] was disrespectful in tone and content.” Id. at 6. 

Stenkamp replied the next morning, on Wednesday, 

July 21, to McMillan’s email with: “You are not authorized to represent DEA policy or positions in this meeting. 

Period!!!!! Take all the issue you want.” Id. at 960. This 

ended the conversation regarding McMillan’s participation in the SVTC as a representative of DEA. McMillan 

still had yet to receive final sign-off on his intelligence 

report to the military, however.

Later that same day, Wednesday, July 21, Stenkamp 

conveyed edits he made to the intelligence report to 

McMillan through Walsh, asking McMillan to remove 

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MCMILLAN v. DOJ 7

certain sensitive information. Id. at 921. McMillan 

complied with the request and asked whether there was 

“anything else that needs to be modified or removed.” Id. 

McMillan and Walsh engaged in two additional rounds of 

edits to the report. McMillan then, apparently for the 

first time, looped in his first-level supervisor Arrivillaga. 

Id. Walsh continued the conversation with McMillan and 

Arrivillaga, noting that the report “[l]ooks okay to” him 

and that the “RD [Stenkamp] is reviewing it now” but 

“wants to verify” that certain information was publicly 

available. Id. at 919. After McMillan responded to that 

concern, Walsh further indicated that Stenkamp was “off 

to a meeting, [but] will re-visit [the report] when he 

returns.” Id.

Upon his return, Stenkamp conveyed to Walsh that 

he wanted all reference to the FSR removed. Walsh wrote 

to McMillan and Arrivillaga: “Sorry, but RD Stenkamp 

wants all references to the FSR to be removed from the 

report.” Id. at 918. McMillan replied:

If I remove all references to the FSR then the majority of the document cannot be substantiated 

and therefore cannot be produced. That will require me to begin researching alternative classified and unclassified materials to produce the 

same product which is illogical. DEA is a member 

of the intelligence community. There is no logical 

reason not to cite the FSR.

Id. Walsh’s response conveyed a message from McMillan’s second-level supervisor Steffick: “[I]t was a direct 

order from the Regional Director, and it is to be followed; 

no further discussion required. Is this clear?” Id. McMillan complied. Indeed, there is no contention that McMillan failed to follow any directive given by his DEA 

supervisors during his military service.

McMillan returned to LCO from his military duties on 

July 25, 2010. The next day, Arrivillaga sent McMillan a 

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Memorandum on “Issues Regarding Chain of Command, 

DEA Representation with US Military Entities, and 

Email to Southern Cone Regional Director.” Id. at 924–

25. The memo “establish[ed] clear and precise guidelines 

from Lima Country Office management in light of recent 

issues.” Id. It addressed “some misunderstanding as to 

[McMillan’s] role as a DEA GS-13 and [his] role as a 

Major in the US Army.” Id. Of particular importance, the 

memorandum stated:

In order to prevent any further misunderstanding, 

from the date of the receipt of this memorandum, 

in addition to explicit orders from the Regional 

Director, you are not to represent in any way or 

fashion anything associated with your duties or 

work product as a result of your employment with 

the DEA to your military colleagues. Your specific 

role as a GS-13 in the DEA and how you represent 

this role outside of this agency will be determined 

by the LCO chain of command. Should your colleagues in the military have a specific question or 

request because of your employment with the 

DEA, you are hereby instructed to refer them to 

our DEA liaison GS-15 representative at 

SOUTHCOM . . . . Any work product that you 

produce for the military must be authored by you 

under your military status and rank and not associated in any way or be attributed to your employment status with the DEA. If in the future 

there are any questions that arise, please refer 

back to this memorandum for guidance.

Id. (emphasis added).

On September 14, 2010, less than two months after 

McMillan’s military service, McMillan submitted a request for a two-year tour extension. Id. at 710 ll. 12–14. 

This request was rejected the next day. Id. at 330 ll. 7–

10; 710 l. 20–711 l. 5.

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McMillan filed a complaint in November 2010 with 

the Department of Labor’s Veterans’ Employment and 

Training Service (“VETS”), complaining that the Agency’s 

actions violated USERRA. After that claim was investigated and found unsupported, McMillan appealed that 

decision to the Board on June 21, 2011. On February 15, 

2012, an AJ issued the first Initial Decision of the MSPB. 

See J.A. 614–625. The AJ found:

[T]he record contains no evidence that the appellant’s status or obligations as a military reservist 

played any part whatsoever in the agency’s decision to disapprove his request for a 2-year renewal 

of his tour of duty in Lima, Peru. The appellant’s 

request for corrective action under USERRA 

therefore must be denied.

Id. at 624–25. On March 21, 2012, McMillan petitioned 

the MSPB for review. The MSPB granted McMillan’s 

petition on July 16, 2013, and vacated the AJ’s Initial 

Decision, remanding the case for further proceedings. Id.

at 628–643. In particular, the Board found that, “to the 

extent an employee’s military duties are themselves at 

odds with the interests of the civilian employer, the 

employer may not take action against the employee on 

that basis” and “remand[ed] the appeal to provide the 

parties an opportunity to present additional evidence and 

argument in light of [its] holding.” Id. at 638–39.

On December 17, 2013, on remand, an AJ held an additional hearing to resolve the issues identified by the 

Board in its remand order, leading to a second Initial 

Decision, dated January 31, 2014. In that decision, the 

AJ resolved each issue against McMillan and denied his 

request for corrective action. Id. at 8–28. In particular, 

the AJ found that McMillan’s military duties were not a 

motivation for the denial of his request for a tour extension. Instead, the AJ identified three motivations for the 

denial of McMillan’s request: McMillan’s “performance 

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10 MCMILLAN v. DOJ

issues,” which are considered in terms of the number of 

arrests, seizures, informant recruitment, and disruptions 

of criminal organizations McMillan facilitated, id. at 19–

20; McMillan’s alleged failure to follow his chain of command in soliciting assistance with his military assignment, id. at 14–19; and McMillan’s “disdain[ful],” 

“arroga[nt], “disrespectful and improper” emails to his 

supervisor, Stenkamp, id. at 19, 22.

After McMillan petitioned the Board for review of the 

second Initial Decision on March 7, 2014, the Board 

issued its final decision denying McMillan’s request for 

corrective action on October 16, 2014. Id. at 1–7. This 

appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

On appeal, a final order or decision from the MSPB 

must be upheld unless we find that it is “(1) arbitrary, 

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 

accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures 

required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; 

or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7703(c).

Underlying factual determinations are reviewed for 

substantial evidence. Bolton v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 154 

F.3d 1313, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also Parker v. U.S. 

Postal Serv., 819 F.2d 1113, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (The 

correct “standard is not what the court would decide in a 

de novo appraisal, but whether the administrative determination is supported by substantial evidence on the 

record as a whole.”). This Court “will not overturn an 

agency decision if it is supported by such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion.” Hogan v. Dep’t of Navy, 218 F.3d 

1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks 

omitted) (quoting Brewer v. U.S. Postal Serv., 647 F.2d 

1093, 1096 (Ct. Cl. 1981)). “It is not for this court to 

reweigh the evidence before the Board.” Henry v. Dep’t of 

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MCMILLAN v. DOJ 11

Navy, 902 F.2d 949, 951 (Fed. Cir. 1990). We have jurisdiction to review the final order of the MSPB pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).

DISCUSSION

Resolution of McMillan’s appeal turns on this court’s 

interpretation of USERRA, the purpose of which is, 

among other things, “to prohibit discrimination against 

persons because of their service in the uniformed services.” See 38 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(3). The operative provision in this case is 38 U.S.C. § 4311, which provides, inter 

alia, that, “[a] person who . . . has an obligation to perform service in a uniformed service shall not be denied . . . any benefit of employment by an employer on the 

basis of . . . performance of service.” § 4311(a). And, 

further, that:

(c) An employer shall be considered to have engaged in actions prohibited— 

(1) under subsection (a), if the person’s 

membership, application for membership, 

service, application for service, or obligation for service in the uniformed services 

is a motivating factor in the employer’s action, unless the employer can prove that 

the action would have been taken in the 

absence of such membership, application 

for membership, service, application for 

service, or obligation for service.

§ 4311(c)(1). 

In Sheehan v. Dep’t of Navy, 240 F.3d 1009 (Fed. Cir. 

2001), this court articulated the analysis the Board must 

employ in a USERRA case. In Sheehan we held that, “an 

employee making a USERRA claim of discrimination . . . bear[s] the initial burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the employee’s military 

service was ‘a substantial or motivating factor’ in the 

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12 MCMILLAN v. DOJ

adverse employment action.” Id. at 1013. Once the 

employee has made the requisite showing, “the employer 

then has the opportunity to come forward with evidence to 

show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the employer would have taken the adverse action anyway, for a 

valid reason.” Id. Notably, however, “an employer can 

not treat employees on military duty like those on nonmilitary leave of absence.” Erickson v. U.S. Postal Serv., 

571 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (internal quotation 

marks omitted) (quoting Allen v. U.S. Postal Serv., 142 

F.3d 1444, 1447 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).

“The factual question of discriminatory motivation or 

intent may be proven by either direct or circumstantial 

evidence.” Sheehan, 240 F.3d at 1014. As we have explained, “military service is a motivating factor for an 

adverse employment action if the employer ‘relied on, took 

into account, considered, or conditioned its decision’ on 

the employee’s military-related absence or obligation.” 

Erickson, 571 F.3d at 1368 (quoting Petty v. Metro. Gov’t 

of Nashville–Davidson Cty., 538 F.3d 431, 446 (6th Cir.

2008)). Because employers rarely concede an improper 

motivation for their employment actions, we recognized in 

Sheehan that employees may satisfy their burden to 

establish that their military service or obligation was a 

motive in the challenged action by submitting evidence 

from which such a motive may be fairly inferred. 

Sheehan describes four, non-exclusive factors that should 

help the Board determine whether a discriminatory 

motivation may be reasonably inferred in any given 

USERRA challenge: 

Discriminatory motivation under the USERRA 

may be reasonably inferred from a variety of factors, including [1] proximity in time between the 

employee’s military activity and the adverse employment action, [2] inconsistencies between the 

proffered reason and other actions of the employer, [3] an employer’s expressed hostility towards 

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MCMILLAN v. DOJ 13

members protected by the statute together with 

knowledge of the employee’s military activity, and 

[4] disparate treatment of certain employees compared to other employees with similar work records or offenses.

240 F.3d at 1014 (numbering added).

Much, therefore, hinges on whether the testimony before the Board was sufficient to allow a reasonable inference that the adverse employment action at issue was 

discriminatory under USERRA. If McMillan demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that his military 

service was “a substantial or motivating factor” in the 

denial of his request for a tour extension, id. at 1013, the 

Board must shift the burden to the government to demonstrate, also by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 

adverse employment action would have taken place for a 

valid reason. 

A. The Sheehan Factors

The Board never formally shifted the burden to the 

government because it concluded that McMillan failed to 

meet his initial burden of showing by a preponderance of 

the evidence that his military service and obligations 

were relied on, taken into account, or considered in the 

adverse employment action. Whether a petitioner’s 

military service was a motivating factor in the employment decision is a flexible inquiry. We conclude that the 

evidence permits only one reasonable finding: the evidence establishes the presence of all four of the Sheehan

factors, which together demonstrate that McMillan satisfied his burden.

1. Timing of the Adverse Action

The first factor discussed in Sheehan is the “proximity 

in time between the employee’s military activity and the 

adverse employment action.” Id. at 1014. McMillan 

approached Walsh on July 7, 2010 for assistance with

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14 MCMILLAN v. DOJ

completing his military obligation, J.A. 62 ll. 17–21, to 

produce an “Intel Assessment,” id. at 630. McMillan’s 

military leave was from July 17 through July 26, 2010. 

Id. at 631. The email communications that gave rise to 

the adverse employment action, id. at 918–23, 960–62, are 

dated between July 19 and July 22, 2010, during McMillan’s military leave. Upon his return to the DEA, McMillan was presented with a disciplinary memorandum on 

July 26, 2010, which “establish[ed] clear and precise 

guidelines from Lima Country Office management in light 

of recent issues regarding” McMillan. Id. at 924–25. And, 

while McMillan had received an overall “Outstanding” 

performance rating in 2008, id. at 874, and 2009, id. at 

888, he received a “Significantly Exceeds Expectations” 

rating in October 2010, id. at 903—a downgrade—after he 

took his military leave.2

McMillan requested a tour extension on September 

14, 2010, less than two months after his military leave. Id.

at 19. It was denied the next day on September 15, 2010. 

Id. at 19–20. The timing of the adverse action, therefore,

favors McMillan’s claim that there was discriminatory 

motivation in violation of USERRA.

2. Inconsistencies Between the Employer’s 

Reasons and Actions

The second Sheehan factor looks to the “inconsistencies between the proffered reason and other actions of the 

employer.” 240 F.3d at 1014. The AJ identified three 

reasons for the denial of McMillan’s request for a tour 

extension, each of which is at least somewhat inconsistent 

 

2 The four-tiered rating system, in descending order, is: “Outstanding,” “Significantly Exceeds Expectations,” “Acceptable,” and “Unacceptable.” See, e.g., J.A. 

915.

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MCMILLAN v. DOJ 15

with DEA’s other actions and explanations for its treatment of McMillan. 

First, the AJ pointed to “performance issues,” which 

are considered in terms of the number of arrests, seizures, 

informant recruitment, and disruptions of criminal organizations facilitated by McMillan. J.A. 19–20. Second, it 

found that McMillan failed to follow his chain of command 

in soliciting assistance with his military assignment. Id.

at 14–19. Third, it found that McMillan’s email to 

Stenkamp was “disrespectful and improper” and “arroga[nt].” Id. at 19, 22. We find inconsistencies with respect to each of these reasons, making reliance on them 

questionable. 

i. Performance Issues

First, McMillan’s alleged “performance issues” do not 

appear to be a factor upon which the DEA actually based 

its decision not to renew his tour extension request. The 

AJ found that “Arrivillaga told [McMillan] of management’s decision on September 15, 2010, and informed the 

appellant that his performance with respect to seizures, 

arrests and informant recruitment were not at expected 

levels.” Id. at 19–20. 

But on October 6, 2010, McMillan was given an overall rating of “Significantly Exceeds Expectations.” Id. at 

903. In 2009, the year prior, he received the rating of 

“Outstanding.” Accompanying that rating, management 

penned a narrative under “Performance Accomplishments,” explaining why it believed McMillan was functioning at a high level. Id. at 900. The narrative noted 

that McMillan, among other things, “has been at the 

forefront of complex money laundering investigations,”

has “develop[ed] in-roads to the . . . Money Laundering 

Investigations Division” that “proved critical to successfully dismantling” a priority target organization and an 

infamous individual, resulting “in the seizure of over $200 

million in tangible assets and severely damaged the drug 

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industry export flow” using “new and innovative undercover money laundering techniques.” Id. No reference to 

seizures, arrests or an identified number of informants 

appeared in that narrative. There was no narrative at all 

in McMillan’s 2010 performance review. Thus, there is 

nothing explaining the new rating decisions, pointing to 

any specific performance failures, or indicating that 

McMillan’s prior positive activities had ceased. 

Stenkamp’s testimony below indicated that—from his 

perspective—the reason for the drop in McMillan’s ratings 

from 2009 to 2010 was based less on the number of seizures and arrests and more on “a failure to engage with 

management.” Id. at 237 ll. 5–11.

Furthermore, it is undisputed that “there were never 

any metrics or statistics established at the LCO for 

McMillan in particular, or for an agent seeking a tour 

extension more generally.” Pet’r Br. 16. Jimenez, an 

agent previously assigned to LCO, also testified at McMillan’s hearings in front of the Board. When asked: “None 

of your DEA managers in Lima, Peru informed you that 

in order to have an agent’s tour extended that the agent 

needed to demonstrate any particular level of performance, correct?,” she responded: “Not that I recall, no. I 

don’t believe I was ever told that.” J.A. 88 ll. 6–11. 

McMillan testified that he believed that he needed to be 

rated “acceptable” in order to have his tour extension 

request approved. Id. at 714 ll. 8–14. To the extent, 

therefore, that McMillan actually fell short of management’s expectations, that shortcoming was never reflected 

in any documentation related to his performance rating. 

And, to the extent the DEA relies on McMillan’s performance metrics to demonstrate that his tour extension 

request was properly denied, there is no evidence that 

that policy was ever made known to McMillan or similarly 

situated agents.

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MCMILLAN v. DOJ 17

ii. Chain of Command

The Board found that McMillan “was required to follow the agency chain of command in soliciting assistance 

with his military assignment” and that “he 

was . . . obliged to proceed through his own chain of 

command prior to approaching [Stenkamp] for approval to 

use the FSR.” Id. at 3, 4.

Yet the government does not dispute that, when 

McMillan approached Walsh to ask for help on his military assignment, there was an “open-door” policy in place

for the office. Jimenez testified as follows:

Q: The type of environment and [sic] you and Mr. 

McMillan worked in in Peru was one where an 

agent could freely move around and ask people for 

help, including other – his supervisors and other 

employees at the DEA, correct?

A: Yes, sir. It’s a very small office.

Q: And the supervisors there had open door policies about helping one another.

A: I – I think so, yes. That’s correct.

Q: And it was a cooperative environment.

A: Yes.

Id. at 91 ll. 4–14. Similarly, Walsh testified that there 

was nothing at all unusual about McMillan approaching 

him for help on this project. See id. at 652 ll. 15–18 (“Q: 

And so there was nothing inappropriate about Mr. McMillan approaching you at all; is that right? A: That’s 

right.”). This testimony directly contradicts Stenkamp’s 

testimony that McMillan broke the chain of command

when he approached Walsh. Stenkamp testified that 

“[McMillan] went straight to Mike Walsh, and he knows 

that’s not the chain or I submit he should have known 

that that was not the chain, the proper chain of command. 

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18 MCMILLAN v. DOJ

It doesn’t matter if it’s an intelligence function. He did 

not report to Mike Walsh.” Id. at 231 ll. 14–19.

On this issue, the Board found that, “even if the appellant had acted within the bounds of the agency’s open 

door policy when he first approached [Walsh], he was 

nonetheless obliged to proceed through his own chain of 

command prior to approaching [Stenkamp] for approval to 

use the FSR.” Id. at 4. This conclusion suffers from three

inconsistencies: first, it was Walsh who walked McMillan 

down the hall to see Stenkamp and seek approval for the 

use of the FSR—see Pet’r Br. 19 (Walsh “took McMillan 

down the hall to obtain permission to use the DEA source 

material”); second, “clear and precise guidelines” regarding the “[c]hain of [c]ommand, DEA [r]epresentation with 

US [m]ilitary [e]ntities, and [e]mail to Southern Cone 

Regional Director” had yet to be formally established, J.A. 

924; and third, as discussed in more detail below, Walsh 

violated his own chain of command when he took McMillan directly to Stenkamp but was never criticized for that. 

As previously discussed, when McMillan returned 

from his military leave, he was presented with a memorandum from his first-level supervisor Arrivillaga, which 

“establish[ed] clear and precise guidelines from Lima 

Country Office management in light of recent issues.” 

J.A. 924–25. But, that memorandum established concrete 

policies “from the date of [its] receipt.” Id. One policy 

established by that memorandum is that “[a]ny work 

product that [McMillan] produce[s] for the military must 

be authored by [McMillan] under [his] military status and 

rank and not associated in any way or be attributed to 

[his] employment status with the DEA.” Id. The memorandum implies that no clear policy was in place before 

the date of its receipt. It is entirely inconsistent for DEA 

to take an adverse employment action based on McMillan’s alleged failure to comply with a policy created after 

the occurrence of the complained-of actions. Indeed, 

Stenkamp did not even know what the precise chain of 

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MCMILLAN v. DOJ 19

command in the office was, indicating further its lack of 

strict enforcement prior to this incident. See id. at 820 ll. 

3–16 (Q: And nor did you raise [issues regarding the chain 

of command] with Mr. Walsh, Mr. Walsh approaching you 

directly about this matter either? A: I did not because 

Mike Walsh reported directly to me. Q: No, he didn’t. He 

reported to Mr. Steffick. A: No. Mike Walsh reported 

directly to the regional director. Q: So if Mr. Walsh 

testified that his supervisor was Mr. Steffick, is he being 

untruthful or just wrong? A: I think he’s wrong. My 

recollection is that Mike Walsh reported directly to me.”).

 We do not question the fact that the chain of command is “need[ed] and importan[t].” Id. at 19. This is 

especially true where the civilian setting is a law enforcement agency. The Board failed, however, to address 

the fact that the policy was explicitly defined to cover 

McMillan’s situation only after the complained-of actions. 

Although the Respondent notes that “Mr. Walsh was not 

in Mr. McMillan’s chain of command, and Mr. McMillan 

failed to contact Mr. Arrivillaga his first-level supervisor” 

before contacting Walsh, Resp’t Br. 3, Walsh obviously did 

not believe McMillan did anything wrong and clearly did 

not believe he needed to bring his own immediate supervisor into the dialogue regarding McMillan’s military

project.

Finally, McMillan did not approach Walsh as a civilian. The Board makes much of the fact that McMillan 

was acting in a “dual capacity” and that he was “in his 

civilian position” when he approached Walsh for help. Id. 

This is because McMillan did not “contest the administrative judge’s finding that he would be required to go 

through the chain of command if he were (1) acting in his 

capacity as a [DEA] agent, and (2) seeking to disseminate 

DEA information outside the agency.” J.A. 3. McMillan 

was not acting in his capacity as a DEA agent, however. 

Both Walsh and Stenkamp were keenly aware that 

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20 MCMILLAN v. DOJ

McMillan was approaching them for assistance with a 

military project, assigned to him in his military capacity.3

 

3 Walsh testified as follows:

Q: In the early part of July 2010, my client, Mr. 

McMillan approached you to tell you about an assignment that he had received in his capacity as a 

military intelligence officer; is that correct?

A: Yes.

Q: And he told you at that time that it was to be 

an intelligence assessment concerning Bolivia; is 

that correct?

A: That’s correct.

Q: And did you understand that Mr. McMillan 

was asking you that – for that question or for that 

help in his capacity as a – or on behalf of the military?

A: Yes.

Q: Indeed it was in preparation for his ongoing 

military assignment?

A: That’s right.

Id. at 651 l. 19–652 l. 14. Stenkamp was similarly aware 

of the military nature of the request. And, although he 

was unable to recall that McMillan personally asked him 

for permission to use the FSR outside of DEA, he did 

recall that the resources he discussed with Walsh in July, 

2010 were to be used externally by McMillan in his role 

with the military:

Q: Okay. On or about July 7th, 2010 Mr. McMillan came to you along with Mr. Walsh to ask 

about using background material on Bolivia for a 

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MCMILLAN v. DOJ 21

Further compounding the inconsistencies between the 

proffered reason—breaking the chain of command—and 

the adverse employment action, Stenkamp testified that 

McMillan’s alleged breaking the chain of command was 

not even the reason he did not concur with McMillan’s 

request to renew his tour:

Q: Is the fact that appellant did not follow the 

chain of command the only reason why you did 

not concur with his request to renew his tour?

A: It was a – it was symptomatic of the reasons 

why I did not concur with the renewal of his tour. 

It was not per se a reason that was specific. Had 

he followed the chain of command 100 percent in 

this particular instance that we’re talking about, I 

still would not have renewed his tour.

Q: And why would you still not have concurred 

with his request?

A: For several reasons. . . . They did not appear to 

be investigations that merited a GS-13. I didn’t 

 

military intelligence assignment that he had, correct?

A: I don’t recall that Pete McMillan actually came 

to me. I recall that Mike Walsh came to me. 

Q: You don’t recall the two of them standing in 

your office talking about this assignment?

A: I do not.

Q: Okay. You were aware though that Mr. McMillan desired to use DEA resources and this background report in his role as a military Reservist.

A: I was.

Id. at 227 ll. 4–16.

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22 MCMILLAN v. DOJ

think that he meshed with the team notion that I 

was trying to cultivate there in Lima. He was a 

lone wolf, liked to do his own thing, wasn’t intuitive of the many reasons.

Id. at 814 l. 19–815 l. 20. The Board’s reliance on McMillan’s breaking the chain of command in using the FSR in 

his military report is unsupported by and, in fact, contradicted by the record: the evidence of an open door policy in

the office, the after-the-fact establishment of an explicit

chain of command policy, the apparent disregard of the 

chain of command by others, and Stenkamp’s testimony 

that McMillan’s alleged breaking the chain of command 

did not influence his decision.

iii. McMillan’s Tone

McMillan’s personality and tone through his communications are a third reason given for his dismissal. The 

Board found that McMillan “fail[ed] to comply with the 

ordinarily accepted standards of conduct in the course of 

performing his military duties.” Id. at 6; see Figueroa 

Reyes v. Hosp. San Pablo del Este, 389 F. Supp. 2d 205, 

212 (D.P.R. 2005) (“The protection of a veteran’s employment is, therefore, ‘based upon the veteran’s compliance 

with the reasonable and ordinarily accepted standards of 

personal conduct and performance of all employees.’”) 

(quoting Preda v. Nissho Iwai Am. Corp., 128 F.3d 789, 

792 (2d Cir. 1997))). 

In finding that he failed to comply with “reasonable 

and ordinarily accepted standards of personal conduct 

and performance applicable to all employees,” the AJ 

noted that, in his emails, “the appellant’s reaction and 

responses to his manager’s instructions were not within 

the ordinarily accepted standards of personal conduct.” 

J.A. 21. Reliance on the content and tone of McMillan’s 

email responses as a basis for the denial of his tour renewal request, however, is inconsistent with the employer’s other actions, including emails sent from McMillan’s 

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MCMILLAN v. DOJ 23

third-line supervisor and Regional Director Stenkamp

that appear equally, if not more, out of keeping with 

“ordinarily accepted standards of personal conduct.” The 

email exchanges must be construed in context. 

The first email mentioned by the Board was what the 

Board characterized as McMillan’s “seven paragraph 

email in which he set forth his qualifications as though he 

were applying for a position,” which the Board said

“make[s] clear his arrogance and opinion that he was not 

required to follow his chain of command or even consult 

with them.” Id. at 22. The Board “found the appellant’s 

tone and the content of the email to be condescending and 

improper coming from a line agent to his third line supervisor and the Regional Director.” Id. We find the Board’s 

characterization of this email unsupportable.

First, the email must be construed in context. McMillan’s first email in this chain was respectful and informative. He simply noted to Walsh that he would be 

“represent[ing] SOUTHCOM J2 in a SVTC with members 

of the Pentagon’s Joint Staff” and that he “would appreciate it if [Walsh] would advise RD Stenkamp” that he 

would “appreciate [Stenkamp’s and Walsh’s] perspective, 

guidance and expertise.” Id. at 962. He appears proud of 

his military assignment and its relation to his civilian

position and seeks input from his civilian supervisors. Id. 

This is consistent with the orders he received from his 

military supervisor, in which McMillan was informed that 

he was expected to use his “DEA expertise” to help with 

“other projects” while at SOUTHCOM. Id. at 630.

Walsh forwarded this email to Stenkamp and Steffick, 

merely stating, “FYI.” Id. Stenkamp’s response then 

changed the tone from one of respect to one of derision. 

Stenkamp wrote, “No. No. No.” Id. at 961–62. He told 

McMillan that he was “not qualified to weigh in on Bolivia” and, as evidence for that proposition, he pointed to the 

fact that McMillan was “asking [Stenkamp] for [his] 

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24 MCMILLAN v. DOJ

opinion, expertise and guidance.” Id. McMillan’s request 

for guidance from his superior caused a seemingly unprovoked backlash.

McMillan saw an opportunity to capitalize on his particular position and connections at DEA to better fulfill 

his military obligations. He sought to use the FSR in his 

intelligence report, as Walsh suggested he do. It was only 

after Stenkamp realized the military was viewing McMillan as a possible spokesperson for the DEA that 

Stenkamp pulled the plug on the use of the FSR.

The second email exchange with which the Board took 

issue was one in which McMillan characterized the belated decision to forbid use of the FSR and require McMillan 

to prepare a new report as “illogical.” Id. at 22. That 

email was sent the day after the exchange relating to 

McMillan’s participation in the SVTC. At that point, 

McMillan had approval for use of the FSR for over two

weeks, Walsh had been in contact with McMillan on edits 

to the intelligence report that referenced the FSR, and 

Stenkamp himself had read the report and provided 

feedback that did not require removing reference to the 

FSR. McMillan complied with all edits up to that point

without complaint. Then Walsh gave McMillan the bad 

news: “Sorry, but RD Stenkamp wants all references to 

the FSR to be removed from the report.” Id. at 918. 

Clearly, Walsh knew this was information likely to upset 

McMillan or, at minimum, upend his reasonable expectation that the FSR was an appropriate source upon which 

to rely. On July 21, 2010, halfway through his military 

leave, he had to redo his report. His email demonstrates 

his understandable frustration. It is also hard to understand how the AJ could characterize the email as one in 

which McMillan called his third-line supervisor “illogical.” 

Id. at 22. On its face, the email simply refers to McMillan’s need to rewrite the report from scratch as “illogical.” 

See id. at 918.

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MCMILLAN v. DOJ 25

The content and tone of McMillan’s responses to his 

supervisors were, to be sure, not ideal. But they were not 

unprompted and not as inappropriate as the Board’s 

strained characterization of them indicates. They cannot, 

without more, explain the motivation for the decision not 

to renew his tour.

3. Expressed Hostility

The third Sheehan factor that may lead to an inference of discriminatory motivation is the “expressed hostility towards members protected by the statute together 

with knowledge of the employee’s military activity.” 240 

F.3d at 1014. While the Board made no finding one way 

or the other, Stenkamp’s emails to McMillan ordering him 

not to represent DEA during the SVTC cannot be reasonably construed as anything but hostile to McMillan’s 

military assignment. See J.A. 960, 961–62. While 

Stenkamp may not have been hostile to McMillan’s need 

to do his military service, he certainly was hostile to 

McMillan’s military obligations once he focused on what 

those obligations entailed.

4. Disparate Treatment of Other Employees

The fourth factor discussed in Sheehan as indicative 

of discriminatory motivation is the “disparate treatment 

of certain employees compared to other employees with 

similar work records or offenses.” 240 F.3d at 1014. 

McMillan points to the DEA’s treatment of Walsh as 

evidence that non-military employees were treated differently. In particular, McMillan alleges:

Walsh admittedly, went around his own chain-ofcommand (bypassing Steffick) by going directly to 

Stenkamp on July 7. Walsh’s supervisor, Steffick 

testified that by approaching Stenkamp directly, 

without first clearing his question through Steffick, Walsh broke his chain-of-command. Despite 

Walsh breaking chain-of-command, Walsh was 

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26 MCMILLAN v. DOJ

never disciplined. Walsh, who is not covered by 

USERRA, also had all of his tours renewed in the 

LCO.

Pet’r Br. 9 (citations omitted). As Steffick explained:

Q: All right. Let’s go back to July 7th and I’ll represent to you the testimony has been that Mr. 

McMillan approached Mr. Walsh for some help on 

his research assignment. Mr. Walsh mentioned 

the FSR and Mr. Walsh said, “But before it can be 

released outside of DEA, we’ve got to go down and 

get Mr. Stenkamp’s authority,” and that they 

walked down to Mr. Stenkamp’s office to get his 

approval. That’s the wind up. Here’s the pitch. 

Did you – do you believe that if those are the facts, 

that Mr. Walsh, as your supervisee, had an obligation to take this matter through you?

A: Yes, I do.

Q: Okay. Did he get disciplined for breaking the 

chain of command?

A: No, he did not.

J.A. 799 l. 18–800 l. 12. 

DEA points out that it was McMillan, and not Walsh, 

who was “the individual taking DEA resources and using 

them outside the agency.” Resp’t Br. 28. This is certainly 

an important distinction as the dissemination of confidential information outside the organization requires more 

scrutiny than use of that same information for internal 

purposes. But Walsh understood that McMillan’s intention was to use the information being sought for military 

purposes. So did Stenkamp. See J.A. 651 l. 19–652 l. 14, 

227 ll. 4–16. That McMillan was the individual who 

ultimately sought to rely on the confidential information 

in his military report does not absolve Walsh of his responsibility to go through his chain of command before 

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MCMILLAN v. DOJ 27

supplying McMillan with the confidential document, 

knowing of McMillan’s purpose in acquiring the document. Yet Walsh was never the subject of any adverse 

employment action, while McMillan was.

* * * 

All of this evidence gives rise to a fair inference that 

McMillan’s obligation to prepare a report on DEA’s ouster 

from Bolivia while on military duty was a motivation for 

the denial of his tour extension. As the Board noted in its 

remand following McMillan’s initial appeal, McMillan 

requested a written explanation for the denial of his 

request, but LCO command curtly refused to provide any. 

Id. at 633. The Board’s after-the-fact effort to now provide an explanation of the DEA’s motivations is fraught 

with too many overstatements and inconsistencies to 

offset the inference that the actual motivation was an 

improper one under USERRA.

While, in hindsight, it perhaps would have been better if the military had not ordered McMillan to prepare a 

report relating to the DEA and Bolivia, it did. While 

Walsh and Stenkamp may wish, also in hindsight, that 

they did not agree to help with that report, they did. 

Under USERRA, McMillan may not be punished for 

fulfilling his military obligations.

B. The Government’s Burden

We thus conclude that McMillan carried his burden to 

demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the 

employee’s veteran status was “a substantial or motivating factor for an adverse employment action.” Erickson, 

571 F.3d at 1368. Because the Board did not find that 

McMillan successfully carried his burden, it never shifted 

the burden to the DEA. Because McMillan has made the 

requisite showing, “the [DEA] then has the opportunity to 

come forward with evidence to show, by a preponderance 

of the evidence, that the employer would have taken the 

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28 MCMILLAN v. DOJ

adverse action anyway, for a valid reason.” Sheehan, 240 

F.3d at 1013. At oral argument, attorneys for both parties agreed that, if this court were to find that McMillan 

carried his burden, no remand is necessary to provide the 

government with an additional opportunity to meet its 

burden. Oral Arg. at 6:21–8:31; 25:38–26:16, available at

http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=20

15-3042.mp3. As such, we rely on the evidence of record, 

as the parties have invited us to do.

We must determine, therefore, whether DEA adduced 

evidence sufficient to prove by a preponderance of the 

evidence that it would have denied McMillan’s request for 

a tour renewal despite the protected activity. The first 

step is defining what activity was protected.

In Erickson, this court applied the “substantial or motivating factor” analysis from Sheehan. Erickson v. U.S. 

Postal Serv., 571 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2009). There, a 

Postal Service employee was absent from his position for 

almost five years during his service in the National 

Guard. The Postal Service removed Mr. Erickson from 

his position, noting as its reason “his excessive use of 

military leave.” Id. at 1368. The court noted that: 

[a]n employer cannot escape liability under 

USERRA by claiming that it was merely discriminating against an employee on the basis of his absence when that absence was for military service. 

As other courts have held, military service is a 

motivating factor for an adverse employment action if the employer “relied on, took into account, 

considered, or conditioned its decision” on the employee’s military-related absence or obligation.

571 F.3d at 1368 (quoting Petty, 538 F.3d at 446). Indeed, 

“the overarching goal of [USERRA] is to prevent those 

who serve in the uniformed services from being disadvantaged by virtue of performing their military obligations.” 

Id.

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MCMILLAN v. DOJ 29

The Postal Service is “entitled to remove an employee 

for prolonged nonmilitary leaves of absence.” Id. at 1369 

(emphasis added). But “an employer can not treat employees on military duty like those on non-military leave 

of absence.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Allen, 142 F.3d at 1447). “Congress enacted USERRA 

in part to make clear that discrimination in employment 

occurs when a person’s military service is ‘a motivating 

factor,’ and not to require . . . that military service be the 

sole motivating factor for the adverse employment action.” 

Id. Erickson stands for the proposition that, even when 

an employee’s acts—in that case prolonged absence—

would justify the agency’s adverse employment action if 

not related to his military service, USERRA is violated if 

the frowned-upon acts of the employee are required by the 

military service. 

Here, unlike in Erickson, McMillan was not obligated 

to seek assistance from his colleagues and superiors at 

DEA to fulfill his military obligations, and he does not 

allege that he was obligated by his military supervisors to 

use the FSR. In the end, of course, he fulfilled his military duties without referring to the FSR in his intelligence report. The question is whether the complained-of 

actions are so related to his military obligations—as in 

Erickson—that it would be improper to consider them in 

an adverse employment action.

The Board resolved this issue against McMillan, finding that: 

Protection under USERRA is contingent on the 

employee’s compliance with the reasonable and 

ordinarily accepted standards of personal conduct 

and performance of all employees. Hence, assuming arguendo that management denied the tour 

extension based solely on the appellant’s conduct 

in connection with his military assignments, and 

not on performance issues, there was no USERRA 

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30 MCMILLAN v. DOJ

violation if the appellant failed to comply with ordinary accepted standards of personal conduct 

and performance in the course of fulfilling his military assignments.

J.A. 5 (citing Figueroa Reyes, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 212). 

But as the discussion above makes clear, DEA failed 

to establish that two of its proffered reasons—McMillan’s 

alleged performance issues and his failure to follow the 

chain of command—were “ordinary accepted standards of 

personal conduct and performance.” Id. The tone in 

McMillan’s emails, moreover, is simply not egregious 

enough to independently support the DEA’s burden under 

the preponderance standard, especially considering that it 

was triggered by Stenkamp’s reaction to McMillan’s 

reasonable request for assistance in fulfilling his military 

obligations. If McMillan’s alleged “arrogance, disrespect 

and condescension,” Resp’t Br. 9, were characteristic, then 

surely the government could have adduced evidence of 

additional examples of his misconduct that were wholly 

unrelated to his military service. It did not. Instead, 

McMillan’s previous performance reviews indicated that 

there were no such issues. Indeed, all of the proffered 

reasons for the denial of McMillan’s tour extension were 

related to the project McMillan was assigned to perform 

as part of his military service and the interactions with 

LCO command in connection thereto. Again, while the 

DEA may have been unhappy with McMillan’s military 

assignment, it was not entitled to punish him for attempting to fulfill it.

We do not intend to give carte blanche to employees to 

engage in misconduct in service of their military duties 

under the protection of USERRA. But once the petitioner 

meets his burden, an employer must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the non-military-service 

justifications for the adverse employment action are 

legally sufficient. For all of the reasons explained, the 

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MCMILLAN v. DOJ 31

DEA failed to demonstrate that it would have made the 

same decision in the absence of McMillan’s military 

service.

CONCLUSION

Because substantial evidence does not support the 

Board’s finding that McMillan failed to meet his burden 

under USERRA, and because the testimony proffered 

below by the government is insufficient to satisfy its 

burden, we reverse the ruling of the Board that USERRA 

was not violated, and remand for determination of an 

appropriate remedy. 

REVERSED AND REMANDED

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