Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06370/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06370-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alfred James Prince
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL .. -9 1991 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

ALFRED JAMES PRINCE, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

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&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-6370 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. NO. CR-90-96-W) 

Submitted on the Briefs:* 

Timothy D. Leonard, United States Attorney, and Ted A. Richardson, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for 

Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Bill Zuhdi, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before ANDERSON, BARRETT, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

* After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this 

three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument 

would not be of material assistance in the determination of this 

appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The 

cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 90-6370 Document: 01019293812 Date Filed: 07/09/1991 Page: 1 
While the public's perception of lawyers seems to reach new 

lows every day, parents -- we are told -- still encourage their 

children to enter this profession. 1 But the parent who happens to 

read this opinion may not be so quick to urge a loved child to 

become a lawyer after learning how the defendant in this case 

expressed his extreme personal dislike of his lawyer. Likewise, 

the would-be lawyer raised on the hit television series, L.A. Law, 

to believe a law degree is that golden ticket to a glamorous 

career of big money, fast cars and intimate relationships among 

the beautiful people may think twice before sending in his or her 

law school application when word of this case gets out. 2 

Defendant in this case is Alfred James Prince (hereinafter 

Defendant) . He was convicted in federal court of robbing an 

Oklahoma savings and loan, and of using a sawed-off shotgun during 

the robbery. 3 His guilt for these crimes is not an issue in this 

appeal. 

1 See The '80s; Lawyers, National Law Journal, Dec. 

at Sl6. 

25, 1989, 

2 Law school admissions directors point to ~L~·=A~·~~L=a=w~ as one 

possible factor in the growing number of law school applications. 

See Orey, Sexl Money! Glitz! In-House at L.A. Law, The American 

Lawyer, Dec. 1988, at 32. 

3 The specific federal laws Defendant was charged with 

violating are the ones against bank robbery, 18 u.s.c. § 2113(a) 

and (d), and for unlawfully using of a firearm during the 

commission of a violent crime, 18 u.s.c. § 924(c)(i). He was 

convicted on Sept. 25, 1990, and sentenced to just over twentyeight years in prison. 

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Appellate Case: 90-6370 Document: 01019293812 Date Filed: 07/09/1991 Page: 2 
Shortly after Defendant's arrest a federal public defender 

was assigned as his lawyer. Defendant, however, did not care for 

his lawyer. Realizing this, the lawyer asked the judge to take 

him off the case, but the judge refused. Finally, the matter was 

ready to be tried. Just before the jury was to be sworn in and 

seated the lawyer urged the court to reconsider his request to 

withdraw, telling the judge his client "simply does not want to 

talk to me." But the judge again refused, finding "absolutely no 

reason whatsoever" for allowing the attorney to withdraw. 

Defendant, who was present and heard the judge's decision, 

apparently decided to give the judge a reason. 

As the jury was being sworn in Defendant became loud and 

disruptive. He managed to get out of his pants and expose a key 

portion of the lower part of his anatomy to the judge and jury. 

He then began to urinate in the presence of the jurors, and some 

of the urine struck the table which was being used by his lawyer. 

Needless to say, the proceedings were then halted. Defendant was 

"helped" from the courtroom by United States Marshals and the jury 

was excused. 

When Defendant was brought before the judge a few minutes 

later we assume, although the record does not so state, he was 

fully dressed. The judge admonished and instructed Defendant to 

conduct himself "in a manner consistent with order and decorum in 

the courtroom." Defendant responded to this stern warning by 

moaning loudly. Next, Defendant's lawyer, who was still on the 

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Appellate Case: 90-6370 Document: 01019293812 Date Filed: 07/09/1991 Page: 3 
case despite Defendant's 

psychiatric evaluation of 

moaning while his lawyer 

wishes, moved for a mistrial and for a 

the Defendant. Defendant continued 

and the judge spoke briefly about the 

motions. Defendant then began to supplement his moans with 

screams. The judge ordered the United States Marshals to remove 

Defendant, and five deputy marshals escorted the now completely 

unruly and physically struggling Defendant from the courtroom. 

The judge then ordered a psychological examination of 

Defendant and the trial was postponed. Subsequently, Defendant's 

lawyer filed another motion to withdraw and the judge, presumably 

now fully convinced that Defendant really did not care for his 

lawyer, granted the motion. Another lawyer from a private law 

firm was assigned the case. He represented Defendant at trial and 

continues to represent him in this appeal. Eventually, a separate 

jury, with no knowledge of the facts just described, was seated 

and heard the case after Defendant got his new lawyer. 

Results from the court ordered psychological exam indicate 

Defendant was mentally competent to 

physician concluded Defendant knew 

be 

he 

tried. The 

was charged 

treating 

with bank 

robbery and could cooperate with an attorney if he chose to do so. 

The doctor reported Defendant discussed his courtroom behavior 

during the examination. According to the doctor, Defendant 

"wanted to fire his attorney but ... the judge had prevented him 

from doing so." Defendant "admitted to having acted out by 

standing and urinating on papers and attempting to urinate on his 

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Appellate Case: 90-6370 Document: 01019293812 Date Filed: 07/09/1991 Page: 4 
attorney." 

II. 

The only issue on appeal is Defendant's contention that the 

trial judge erred and abused his discretion by refusing to order a 

second mental competency examination after completion of the 

initial exam. 

When deciding whether a criminal defendant is competent to 

stand trial, a court determines if the defendant "has sufficient 

present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable 

degree of rational understanding -- and whether he has a rational 

as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." 

Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960). "[A] trial court 

must always be alert to circumstances suggesting a change that 

would render the accused unable to meet the standards of 

competence to stand trial." Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 181 

(1975). Evidence of a defendant's behavior and demeanor at trial 

are relevant as to the ultimate decision of competency to stand 

trial. Pate v. Robinson, 383 u.s. 375, 386 (1966). 

Defendant in this case was ordered examined pursuant to a 

federal statute providing, in relevant part, that "[a]t any time 

after the commencement of a prosecution for an offense ••. the 

defendant or the attorney for the Government may file a motion for 

a hearing to determine the mental competency of the defendant." 

18 u.s.c. § 4241(a). The medical report resulting from this 

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Appellate Case: 90-6370 Document: 01019293812 Date Filed: 07/09/1991 Page: 5 
examination indicated Defendant knew he was charged with bank 

robbery, and while he would be difficult to work with, he could 

cooperate with a lawyer if he chose to do so. 

In attacking the district court's refusal to order a second 

competency exam, Defendant points to his continuing disruptive 

behavior while at the hospital for the first exam. Defendant 

recounts how he set fire to his hospital cell, told his new lawyer 

he was hearing voices, tried to commit suicide 

wrist, and had no memory of the bank robbery. 

fails to grasp is that all of these behaviors 

discounted in the single psychological report. 

by cutting his 

What Defendant 

were noted and 

As the report reveals, Defendant set fire to his hospital 

cell and had to be removed while the fire was put out. He further 

told his doctor he was hearing voices, but "was extremely vague in 

describing the voice, claiming that he did not know whether it was 

a man's or a woman's voice, and [was] unable to state what the 

voice had allegedly told him." His suicide attempt was described 

in the report as an acting out behavior occurring after the 

hospital staff gave him a razor because Defendant said he wanted 

to shave. Defendant took the blade and made a number of "very 

superficial scratches to his left wrist and right lower abdomen." 

Very little bleeding occurred. 

Defendant's story about having no memory of the bank robbery 

also changed during his hospitalization. According to the 

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Appellate Case: 90-6370 Document: 01019293812 Date Filed: 07/09/1991 Page: 6 
psychological report, Defendant knew he was charged with bank 

robbery and that the crime happened in December 1988, but "claimed 

he did not participate in the robbery and that he was elsewhere at 

the time." He did not say he had no memory of the crime. 

In summary, the single medical report described Defendant as 

a very problematic and uncooperative patient who went to great 

lengths to convince the hospital's staff he suffered from mental 

problems. In the end, however, the most the evaluating physician 

could say was that Defendant's behavior was "fabricated," and 

Defendant was "not suffering from a severe mental disease or 

defect that renders him mentally incompetent to the extent that he 

is presently unable to understand the nature and consequences of 

proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense if he 

chooses to do so." With this conclusion in hand, and with no 

other suggestion of mental problems, the district court denied 

Defendant's request for another exam. 

The decision on whether to order a second competency exam is 

a matter wholly within the sound discretion of the trial court. 

United States v. Crosby, 713 F.2d 1066, 1078 (5th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 464 U.S. 1001 (1983). Cf. United States v. Hill, 526 F.2d 

1019, 1023 (lOth Cir. 1975) (trial judge acts within his range of 

discretion when he denies motions for psychiatric examination on 

the ground of lack of good faith in making the motions), cert. 

denied, 424 u.s. 940 (1976). We will not reverse a trial court's 

refusal to order a second competency exam unless we conclude the 

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Appellate Case: 90-6370 Document: 01019293812 Date Filed: 07/09/1991 Page: 7 
trial court's decision was an abuse of its discretion. See United 

States v. Bodey, 547 F.2d 1383, 1387 (9th Cir.) (examination of 

the trial record shows trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

refusing to order a psychiatric exam), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 932 

(1977); United States v. Stevens, 461 F.2d 317, 321 (7th Cir.) 

(record examination reveals trial court did not err in failing to 

order further competency exam), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972). 

There is no evidence in this record of any irrational 

behavior by Defendant that was not adequately explained in the 

single competency report. Nor has Defendant pointed to any 

subsequent behavior following the one exam that even slightly 

hints he later became incompetent. See, ~' Robinson, 383 U.S. 

at 386 (demeanor at trial relevant to the ultimate decision as to 

sanity). We note the motion for the first examination was not 

objected to by the prosecution, and that the judge was rightly 

concerned about whether Defendant's behavior was "a genuine 

reflection of psychiatric or psychological disorders or whether it 

is a contrived attempt to obstruct and delay these proceedings." 

We hold the district judge did not abuse his discretion when he 

declined to order a second competency examination. 

III. 

In conclusion, there is no rule of law equating intentional 

and public displays of incontinence with incompetence. The trial 

judge, court personnel, and lawyers who stuck with this case in 

spite of the unique hazards of working with this defendant are to 

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be commended. As for the one-time budding lawyer whose hopes for 

a dazzling life have now been dashed by the facts of this case, we 

suggest an alternative career in screenwriting. Stories about 

lawyers are in wide demand, and this case -- now that it is in the 

public domain-- could be part of your first plot. 4 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

4 Unusual stories like this one are apparently standard fare 

for the fictional television lawyers of L.A. Law, who face many 

obstacles before cashing their paycheck and speeding off to 

another intimate dinner-party. One news story described the 

typical L.A. Law plot as follows: 

The divorce lawyer is in bed with his client. 

Again. A name partner ducks gunshots in court. An 

overzealous new associate cross-examines a witness to 

death -- literally. The messenger accidentally shreds a 

key file. A secretary and two lawyers are using insider 

information to make stock trades. 

Orey, Sexl Money! Glitz! In House at L.A. Law, The American 

Lawyer, Dec. 1988, at 32. 

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