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Parties Involved:
Francis Robinson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 27, 1995 Decided July 18, 1995

No. 91-3080

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

FRANCIS ROBINSON,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(90cr00272-01)

Allen E. Burns, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued the cause for the appellant. On brief was

A.J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender.

Barbara A. Grewe, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for the appellee. On brief

were Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, and Elizabeth Trosman, John R. Fisher and Carol

A. Fortine, Assistant United States Attorneys.

Before: HENDERSON, RANDOLPH and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Francis Robinson appeals his conviction on

one count of distribution of cocaine base and one count of possession of cocaine base with intent to

distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) officers

observed Robinson selling drugs outside a house at 1717 Montana Avenue, Northeast, in the District

of Columbia and subsequently discovered 23 grams of cocaine base inside the house. Robinson

argues that the district court improperly failed to give a limiting instruction and erred in other

evidentiary rulings as well. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In the early evening hours of May 30, 1990 MPD officers Donald Bell and Bradley Belden

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1A photograph of Robinson taken shortly after his arrest depicted him wearing clothes that

matched those described by Bell when he radioed the arresting officers: a black/blue T-shirt with

a black horizontal stripe and light-colored blue jeans. Tr. 82. 

of the MPD vice unit set up an observation post on Montana Avenue, Northeast, after receiving

information that numerous narcotics sales had taken place in an area housing complex. Trial

Transcript (Tr.) 70. At 5:20 PM, the officers watched as a passerby approached and talked to a man

standing in the courtyard of the housing complex. Officer Bell subsequently identified the man as

Robinson. Tr. 72. The man went inside the house located at 1717 Montana Avenue, came out

almost immediately and handed an unidentified object to the passerby in exchange for cash. Tr. 73.

A similar exchange took place between the same man and another passerby at 5:24 PM. Bell

observed that the objectsold during the second exchange was "small[and] white colored." Tr. 74-75.

Another transaction took place at 5:27 PM with a third passerby, later identified as Robert Kennedy,

who drove away in an automobile. Bell issued a radio alert for Kennedy, who was apprehended by

MPD Officer Charles Sanders. Sanders recovered two white rocks from Kennedy's pants pockets,

later determined to be 313 milligrams of cocaine base. Tr. 119. The drugs were 58 per cent pure.

Tr. 176-77.

The activity on Montana Avenue ceased after the driver of a car passing the housing complex

yelled to the seller to "watch out for the jumpout," a street nickname for narcotics police officers.

Tr. 80. The seller "appeared to act very nervous," and shook his head when two more men on the

street approached him and engaged himin conversation. Tr. 81. He finally returned to the house and

stayed inside. Bell then radioed a description of the seller and his location to MPD Officer Walter

Delpo, who on arrival knocked on the door of the house the seller had entered and spoke to the

woman who answered it. The woman, Rosalyn Redmond, told Delpo that she was alone with some

children. Delpo, however, heard movement, rushed up the stairs with his partner and found Robinson

running toward a third floor bedroom. Tr. 147. The officers detained Robinson and took him

downstairs.

Outside the house Bell identified Robinson as the seller and Robinson was arrested and

searched.1 Delpo found 460 dollars and a single-edged razor blade in a wrapper in Robinson's front

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2Washington testified that she used cocaine but that the drugs found in the room were not

hers, explaining "[i]f they were my drugs, I would have smoked them." Tr. 270. She further

testified that she allowed Robinson to use her bedroom to cut cocaine in exchange for drug

"crumbs." Tr. 273. 

pocket. Tr. 149. The officers then obtained a search warrant for the house at 1717 Montana Avenue

and discovered 23 grams of cocaine base (later determined to be 53 per cent pure) in the rear

bedroom on the third floor. Tr. 185, 201. The lessee of the house, Ogretta Washington, testified at

trial that the rear bedroom was hers but that she had not been aware that cocaine base was in the

room. She further testified that she had seen Robinson cut cocaine base with a razor blade in the

bedroom "about two or three times" previously.2 Tr. 271-72.

JosephBono, a Drug Enforcement Administrationchemist, andMPDDetectiveDavid Stroud

testified for the government as expert witnesses. Bono testified that a batch of cocaine base could

contain cocaine of both 53 per cent purity (like that of the cocaine found in the bedroom) and 58 per

cent purity (like that of the cocaine sold to Kennedy) because "on the street when cocaine base is

made, they don't mix it real well." Tr. 186-87. Stroud similarly opined that it was "possible" both

rocks of cocaine base came from the same batch, testifying "there have been cases where a rock of

crack cocaine was produced and found to have high purity on one side and the lower purity on the

other side and vice-versa." Tr. 252.

Robinson maintained that he was nowhere near the Montana Avenue house until 6:10 PM on

May 30th. His alibi witnesses testified that he had spent most of that afternoon waiting at a repair

shop for work to be completed on his car, leaving only to briefly visit his parole officer. Parole office

records indicated that Robinson signed in with both the office's security desk and his parole officer

at 4:30 PM and left at either 4:45 PM (according to the security desk log) or 5:00 PM (according to

the officer'slog). Tr. 403, 408-09. Eric Aull testified that he drove Robinson back to the repair shop

at about that time and that they did not return to Montana Avenue until 6:10 PM or 6:15 PM. Tr.

373. The proprietor of the repair shop, William Melby, testified that he did not complete work on

Robinson's car until 5:45 PM or 6:00 PM. Melby further testified that Robinson arrived at his shop

at approximately 3:00 PM, left the shop "around 4, 4:30, something like that," Tr. 451, returned

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3Robinson's girlfriend, Carol Waddell, generally corroborated Aull's testimony. Tr. 433-39. 

Other friends or acquaintances of Robinson testified that they had not seen Robinson at the

Montana Avenue house in the early afternoon. Tr. 321-22 (Michael Goggins); Tr. 331-34

(Keana Hinton); Tr. 346-47 (Arnetta Jackson). 

4The plain error standard applies here because at trial Robinson made only a hearsay objection

to the admission of the testimony. Tr. 508. 

"around 4:30, 5 o'clock, around that time," Tr. 452, and left again at 5:45 PM. Tr. 459.3

In rebuttal the prosecution recalled Bell, who testified that Melby had told him in a pre-trial

interview that Robinson had left his shop at about 5:00 PM and had been Melby's last customer of

the day before he closed the shop. Tr. 509. The jury found Robinson guilty of one count of

distribution of cocaine base and one count of possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute. The

district court sentenced Robinson to 136 months' imprisonment on the distribution count and 60

months' imprisonment on the possession with intent to distribute count, to run concurrently.

II. DISCUSSION

Robinson makes three challenges to his conviction. He contends that the district court

committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury that Officer Bell's rebuttal testimony could

be considered only as impeachment evidence and by admitting Washington's testimony that she had

seen Robinson cut cocaine base at other times. In addition Robinson challenges certain expert

testimony as well as alleged prosecutorial vouching. We find no reversible error in any of the district

court's rulings.

A. Limiting Instruction

Although Robinson did not ask the district court to give the jury a limiting instruction

regarding Bell's rebuttal testimony, we have recognized that a district court may commit error by

failing to give a cautionary instruction when admitting certain impeachment testimony even if the

defendant does not request the instruction. United States v. Copelin, 996 F.2d 379, 385 (D.C. Cir.

1993). Our review is to determine whether the claimed error affected substantial rights and had an

unfair prejudicial impact on the jury's deliberations.4Id. (citing United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1,

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5We have also explained that "[t]o be noticed ... the error must be clear or, equivalently,

obvious and must have affected the outcome of the District Court proceedings." United States v.

Clarke, 24 F.3d 257, 266 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The

government concedes that "appellant has met his burden of showing that the failure to give the

instruction was error and that the error was obvious." Govt. Br. at 29. 

16 n.14 (1985)).5

Relying ontheCopelin holding,RobinsonarguesthatBell'stestimonysubstantially prejudiced

him in that the jury could have drawn an inference from it that he had in fact left Melby's auto repair

shop at 5:00 PM. We disagree for two reasons. First, the district court's omission here is different

from the one discussed in Copelin. In Copelin, where the defendant was also charged with

possession and distribution of crack, the district court failed to issue an instruction limiting the jury's

consideration of impeachment evidence, otherwise inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence

404(b), that the defendant had previously tested positive for cocaine use. Id. at 382. We concluded

that a limiting instruction was necessary in that case because

[t]he information regarding Mr. Copelin's positive drug tests was "bad acts" evidence

ofthe most prejudicialsort. Not only did the revelation that he used cocaine on other

occasions subject him to the opprobrium that members of the jury may have felt

toward drug users, but it also tended to bolster the government's contention that he

was the man who sold the same drug ... on the day in question.

Id. at 385.

The impeachment evidence inCopelin wasthusimpermissible because it not only affected the

jury's view of the defendant himself but also allowed the jury to infer from Copelin's past drug use

that he was guilty of the charged offense. Here, the prejudicial effect of Bell's rebuttal testimony was

more remote as it did not indicate any prior bad acts by Robinson. Although the jury could have

inferred that Melby had not testified truthfully when he stated that Robinson did not leave his shop

until 6:00 PM and accordingly could have discounted Robinson's alibi defense, that inference would

have no more than the impeachment effect Robinson concedes is permissible. Robinson Br. at 24

(statement "was only admissible to impeach Melby").

Second, the fate of Robinson's alibi defense did not rest entirely on Bell's impeachment of

Melby's version of events. Melby weakened his own testimony by first stating that the car repairs had

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6When asked what time he finished with Robinson's car, Melby responded "I finished the job

quarter to five, or six o'clock, or something like that. I mean, quarter to six, or quarter

toquarter to six, around that time in between six o'clock." 

7The government argues that Robinson waived his objection to the 404(b) evidence by stating

"[a]s long as a cautionary instruction is given, I have no problem with that" during an earlier

bench conference. Tr. 260. When the testimony was given, however, his counsel twice objected,

Tr. 271, and the only apparent basis of the objection was rule 404(b). 

8The holding in United States v. Simpson, 992 F.2d 1224 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114

S. Ct. 286 (1993), relied on by Robinson, is distinguishable for this reason. In Simpson, "the

AUSA made no attempt to characterize the prior bad acts evidence as relevant to any permissible

purpose." Id. at 1229. 

been completed at 4:45 PM and then quickly changing his account. Tr. 452.6 Moreover, Aull

independently corroborated Robinson by testifying that he and Robinson had been at Melby's shop

until approximately 6:00 PM. Tr. 371. We thus conclude that the absence of a limiting instruction

was not plain error.

B. Rule 404(b) Evidence

Robinson next argues that Washington's testimony that she had seen him cut cocaine base in

the third floor bedroomofthe Montana Avenue residence was evidence of prior bad actsinadmissible

under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).7 We review the admissibility of rule 404(b) evidence with

a two step analysis. "The first step requires that the evidence be probative of some material issue

other than character. The second step requires that the evidence not be inadmissible under Rule 403."

United States v. Clarke, 24 F.3d 257, 264 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).

Washington'stestimonymeets both steps. The district court admitted the evidence as relevant

to the issues of intent, common scheme and possession. Tr. 260. We agree that the testimony was

probative of Robinson's intent, particularly in light of Stroud's earlier testimony that razor blades are

"very popular amongst the crack dealers" to "cut a big rock of crack cocaine down to smaller pieces

of crack cocaine." Tr. 248, 249. Thus, "the evidence is not barred by Rule 404(b) because it was

offered to show more than ... character. The evidence of this prior transaction is probative of intent,

knowledge and plan...." United States v. Washington, 969 F.2d 1073, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert.

denied, 113 S. Ct. 1287 (1993).8 The district court also instructed the jury that the evidence could

be considered to show "that [Robinson] had possession of drugs at one time." Tr. 272 (emphasis

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added). Robinson argues that the evidence was clearly inadmissible to establish possession; but as

the emphasized language indicates, the jury was instructed, albeit imprecisely, that it could consider

the evidence as relevant to the issue of absence of mistake. United States v. Rogers, 918 F.2d 207,

210 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Although the district court did not expressly mention the rule 403 step, he

necessarilyweighed the probative and prejudicial effectsin admitting the evidence. Especially in light

of the limiting instruction, we uphold the district court on this issue. Tr. 271-72.

C. Expert Testimony and Prosecutorial Vouching

Robinson further asserts that the district court erred by allowing Bono and Stroud to testify

that the cocaine base taken from Kennedy and the cocaine base found in the Montana Avenue house

could have come from the same batch of cocaine base. Our review is for abuse of discretion. United

States v. Carswell, 922 F.2d 876, 878 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Although Robinson objected that the "street"

manufacturing of cocaine base was outside Bono's expertise, Tr. 187, he did not dispute the district

court's qualification of Bono as an expert in "forensic chemistry, analytical chemistry." Tr. 173.

Bono's conceded expertise amply permitted the district court to allow the witness to testify on the

manufacturing of cocaine base. Tr. 173. The same is true of Stroud, who qualified as an expert in

the "street use of narcotics," Tr. 239, and expressly declined to provide an expert opinion on the

frequency of purity variations in a cocaine base batch. Tr. 255.

Finally Robinson alleges that the prosecution improperly vouched for Bell's testimony in its

closing argument by stating "Well now, ladies and gentlemen, ifthat's a fact, if officer Bellwas willing

to risk hisreputation and his career to come in here and perjure himself," Tr. 549, further arguing that

the police "were doing their jobs" and had "no stake" in the case. Tr. 550. But Robinson had raised

Officer Bell's credibility as an issue in his own closing argument and throughout the trial, arguing that

Bell had been harassing Robinson and othersin the Montana Avenue area. Tr. 535. The prosecutor's

remarks in response to Robinson's assertions thus did not constitute improper vouching. United

States v. Nnanyererugo, 39 F.3d 1205, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1969 (1995);

see also United States v. Monaghan, 741 F.2d 1434, 1439 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S.

1085 (1985) ("The prosecution cannot be shut off from fair comment on the strength of its own

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witness's testimony, particularly where it is relying principally on one witness and that witness has

been severely challenged by the defense."); cf. United States v. Boyd, 54 F.3d 868, 871-72 (D.C. Cir.

1995) (in closing argument prosecutor erroneously vouched for police witnesses, relying on evidence

outside record).

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is

Affirmed.

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