Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-04149/USCOURTS-ca8-04-04149-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Anna Cacioppo
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-3587

No. 04-4149

___________ 

United States of America,

Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

v.

Anna Cacioppo,

Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

___________

No. 04-3588

No. 04-3713

___________ 

United States of America,

Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

v.

Richard Dean Plaskett, Jr., also

known as Don Plaskett,

Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

 

 

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

Appeal from the United States

District Court for the 

Western District of Missouri.

Appellate Case: 04-4149 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/22/2006 Entry ID: 2080877
-2-

________________

 Submitted: April 20, 2006 

 Filed: August 22, 2006 

________________

Before MURPHY, MELLOY and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges. 

________________

GRUENDER, Circuit Judge. 

A jury convicted Anna Cacioppo and Richard Dean Plaskett of five counts of

making false statements and/or failing to disclose certain facts in documents required

to be kept by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) in

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1027 and 2. According to the jury verdicts, Cacioppo made

the false statements and/or failed to disclose facts required to be disclosed in

documents she submitted to Local 264 of the Laborers International Union of North

America (“Local 264”) and the Laborers Welfare Fund and Laborers Pension Fund

(collectively, the “264 Fund”). While Plaskett did not directly submit paperwork to

the 264 Fund, the indictment alleged that he was punishable as a principal pursuant

to § 2. The jury also convicted Cacioppo of six additional counts of violating § 1027

with respect to documents she submitted to Local 1290 of the Laborers International

Union of North America (“Local 1290”) and the Kansas Welfare Fund and the Kansas

Pension Fund (collectively, the “1290 Fund”).

Following trial, the district court entered a judgment of acquittal in favor of

Cacioppo and Plaskett as to the counts of conviction based upon their submissions to

the 264 Fund. The district court did not rule on Plaskett’s alternative motion for a

new trial. The district court refused to set aside the jury verdicts against Cacioppo for

the counts of conviction related to the 1290 Fund submissions. The United States

appeals the judgment of acquittal for Cacioppo and Plaskett. Plaskett cross-appeals

Appellate Case: 04-4149 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/22/2006 Entry ID: 2080877
-3-

the district court’s failure to decide his motion for a new trial, and Cacioppo crossappeals the denial of her motion for a new trial with respect to her submissions to the

1290 Fund. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

I. BACKGROUND

A Special Grand Jury returned a 39-count indictment charging five individuals

with conspiracy, bribery and mail fraud, as well as the ERISA reporting violations that

are the subject of this appeal. The conspiracy, bribery and mail fraud counts related

to demolition and asbestos-removal work to be done for Rockhurst University in

Kansas City, Missouri. Plaskett was the co-owner of Industrial Environmental

Management (“IEM”), an asbestos removal company in Kansas City, Missouri, that

employed both union and non-union employees at its work sites. Plaskett’s partner

in IEM was Charles A. Cacioppo, Jr. Charles Cacioppo’s daughter, Anna Cacioppo,

worked as an office employee at IEM during the relevant period. The ERISA

reporting counts centered upon two collective bargaining agreements that IEM

entered, one with Local 264 and another with Local 1290, and the employee benefit

payments for which IEM was responsible. 

In February 1999, IEM entered into a collective bargaining agreement with

Local 264 for “covered work” in certain counties in Missouri and Kansas (the “IEM264 Association Agreement”). Plaskett signed on IEM’s behalf. The agreement

provided, among other things, that the parties would provide a fringe benefit program

and that IEM would pay into the fringe benefit fund a specific amount for each hour

of “covered work” conducted by “each employee covered by” the agreement. To

implement the fringe benefit program, Article VIII of the IEM-264 Association

Agreement required IEM to “file a written report . . . setting forth the names, social

security numbers and the hours paid for each employee for whom [benefit] payments

shall have been made during said period and such other information as the fringe

Appellate Case: 04-4149 Page: 3 Date Filed: 08/22/2006 Entry ID: 2080877
-4-

benefit program trustees desire.” The report, referred to as a “monthly remittance

report,” was to be submitted monthly along with IEM’s payments to the 264 Fund.

The monthly remittance report was required to be signed by an authorized employee

at IEM, and Anna Cacioppo signed on IEM’s behalf. Cacioppo certified, among other

things, that “the employees listed [on the reports] constitute all employees for whom

contributions are required under the terms of said agreements.” 

In April 2002, IEM entered a second collective bargaining agreement, this time

with Local 1290 (the “Local 1290 Agreement”). Under the Local 1290 Agreement,

IEM was required to pay benefits and to submit a similar monthly remittance report

each month. In contrast to the IEM-264 Association Agreement which required the

individual submitting reports to list “all employees for whom contributions are

required,” the reports to the 1290 Fund explicitly required IEM to “report on all

employees, union or non-union.” (Emphases added.) Again, Cacioppo prepared and

submitted the reports on IEM’s behalf.

Following seven days of trial, the jury acquitted Plaskett of conspiracy and

bribery charges. It also acquitted Cacioppo of a mail fraud charge. However, the jury

returned guilty verdicts against Plaskett and Cacioppo on Counts 28 through 32 of the

indictment, which alleged that they violated § 1027 in connection with their

submission of monthly remittance reports to the 264 Fund. The jury also convicted

Cacioppo on Counts 33 through 38 of the indictment, which alleged that she violated

§ 1027 in connection with her submission of monthly remittance reports to the 1290

Fund. 

After trial, the district court set aside the 264 Fund-related jury verdicts and

entered judgments of acquittal in favor of Plaskett and Cacioppo with respect to those

charges. The district court found insufficient evidence that the IEM-264 Association

Agreement actually required IEM to list all employees, including non-union

Appellate Case: 04-4149 Page: 4 Date Filed: 08/22/2006 Entry ID: 2080877
-5-

employees. The district court did not rule on Plaskett’s alternative motion for a new

trial. The district court denied Cacioppo’s request for a judgment of acquittal or, in

the alternative, a new trial on the charges that she violated § 1027 in connection with

her reporting to the 1290 Fund. The district court sentenced Cacioppo to 5 years’

probation for those convictions.

II. DISCUSSION

The Government argues that the district court erroneously granted Cacioppo

and Plaskett’s motions for judgment of acquittal on Counts 28 through 32 of the

indictment because the evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdicts. Plaskett

cross-appeals the district court’s failure to rule on his motion for a new trial as to those

counts. Cacioppo appeals her convictions on Counts 33 through 38 of the indictment.

She argues that the district court improperly instructed the jury that it could convict

Cacioppo based upon her reckless disregard for, rather than knowledge of, the falsity

of her statements or the completeness of her submissions. Cacioppo also asserts that

the jury should have been given a “good faith” instruction. 

We begin by determining the proper mens rea requirement for a conviction

under § 1027—an issue raised by Cacioppo’s cross-appeal, but which also affects our

analysis of the disposition of the Government’s appeal. We then address the various

motions for judgment of acquittal and new trial to determine whether the evidence was

sufficient for a reasonable jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt under the

correct mens rea standard and, if so, whether a new trial is warranted due to

misinstruction of the jury. We view this as the appropriate method of deciding the

appeal and two cross-appeals that the parties present. See United States v. Boyd, 566

F.2d 929, 937-38 (5th Cir. 1978) (reasoning that the district court misconceived the

elements of the offense and, therefore, reviewing the evidence under the correct

standard to resolve an appeal concerning the sufficiency of the evidence).

Appellate Case: 04-4149 Page: 5 Date Filed: 08/22/2006 Entry ID: 2080877
1

Section 1027 states:

Whoever, in any document required by title I of the Employee

Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 . . . to be . . . kept as part of the

records of any employee welfare benefit plan or employee pension

benefit plan, or certified to the administrator of any such plan, makes any

false statement or representation of fact, knowing it to be false, or

knowingly conceals, covers up, or fails to disclose any fact the disclosure

of which is required by such title or is necessary to verify, explain,

clarify or check for accuracy and completeness any report required by

such title to be published or any information required by such title to be

certified, shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned not more than five

years, or both.

-6-

A. Section 1027’s Mens Rea Requirement

Section 1027 criminalizes two separate activities.1

 First, § 1027 provides for

criminal penalties when any person makes in any document required to be kept for

ERISA purposes “any false statement or representation of fact, knowing it to be false”

(the “false statement prong”). Second, § 1027 provides for criminal penalties when

any person “knowingly conceals, covers up, or fails to disclose any fact the disclosure

of which is required by [title I of ERISA] or is necessary to verify, explain, clarify or

check for accuracy and completeness of any report required by such title to be

published or any information required by such title to be certified” (the “concealment

prong”).

With respect to § 1027’s false statement prong, the district court instructed the

jury that Cacioppo and Plaskett could be found guilty if either “acted knowingly and

in the case of a false statement, with knowledge that the statement was false or with

reckless disregard for its truth or falsity.” Jury Instruction No. 34 (emphasis added).

The district court further instructed the jury that “the government must [prove] that

the defendant had knowledge that the statement was false or acted with reckless

Appellate Case: 04-4149 Page: 6 Date Filed: 08/22/2006 Entry ID: 2080877
-7-

disregard for whether or not it was false.” Jury Instruction No. 38 (emphasis added).

With respect to § 1027’s concealment prong, the district court instructed the jury that

Cacioppo and Plaskett could be found guilty if either “acted knowingly . . . and in the

case of a concealment, cover up, or failure to disclose, without a ground for believing

his action was lawful or with reckless disregard for its lawfulness.” Jury Instruction

No. 34 (emphasis added). Concerning both prongs, the district court added that,

“[r]egardless of whether the charge involves a false statement or a concealment, cover

up, or failure to disclose a fact, however, the government need not prove that the

defendant intended to violate the law or that he had actual knowledge of his

obligations under the law.” Jury Instruction No. 38 (emphasis added). In so doing,

the district court rejected Cacioppo and Plaskett’s proffered instructions, which

omitted any reference to reckless disregard.

Cacioppo contends that the district court should not have allowed the jury to

find guilt based solely upon a reckless disregard of the falsity of her statements or a

reckless disregard for the completeness of her reporting. The Government counters

that § 1027 has long been interpreted in a way that allows convictions based upon

reckless disregard. In this regard, the Government relies primarily upon United States

v. Tolkow, 532 F.2d 853, 858 (2d Cir. 1976) and United States v. S & Vee Cartage,

Co., 704 F.2d 914, 918-19 & n.1 (6th Cir. 1983), both of which approved § 1027

instructions that included a reckless disregard mens rea standard. We conclude that

the district court erred when it instructed the jury that reckless disregard of the falsity

of statements or completeness of reporting was a sufficient basis upon which to

convict. 

We begin with the fairly obvious observation that “reckless disregard” appears

nowhere in § 1027, as authored by Congress. We also note that the Supreme Court

has repeatedly declined opportunities to imply a mens rea requirement somewhere

between knowingly and strict liability in cases similar to the one we consider here.

Appellate Case: 04-4149 Page: 7 Date Filed: 08/22/2006 Entry ID: 2080877
-8-

See, e.g., United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994); Liparota v.

United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985). Nevertheless, we examine both of § 1027’s

prongs to determine what mens rea standard is appropriate.

The least complicated issue to resolve is the proper mens rea under the false

statement prong, as the district court’s insertion of a reckless disregard mens rea

standard into § 1027’s false statement prong conflicts with the statute’s plain

language. It is well established that we commence any statutory interpretation with

the statute’s plain language. See, e.g., Watson v. Ray, 192 F.3d 1153, 1155 (8th Cir.

1999) (“When determining the meaning of a statute, our starting point must be the

plain language of the statute.”). Where the language is plain, we need inquire no

further. See, e.g., United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989)

(“Where . . . the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts is to enforce

it according to its terms.”) (internal quotation omitted).

Here, it is impossible to square the district court’s instruction that the jury could

find Cacioppo guilty of making a false statement if Cacioppo “acted with reckless

disregard for whether or not it was false” with the statute’s provision that a defendant

can be found guilty only for making a false statement “knowing it to be false.” § 1027.

A person is said to have knowledge of a fact when she “has no substantial doubt about

[its] existence.” Black’s Law Dictionary888 (8th ed. 2004); see also Arthur Andersen

LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 705 (2005) (“‘Knowledge’ and ‘knowingly’ are

normally associated with awareness, understanding, or consciousness.”).

“Recklessness,” on the other hand, reflects something less than knowledge of a

statement’s falsity. See, e.g., 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraud & Deceit § 120 (2006) (“A

representation is ‘reckless’ if it is made without any knowledge of the truth, or if the

person making the representation knows that he or she does not have sufficient

information or a basis to support it, or if the maker realizes that he or she does not

know whether or not the statement is true.”). We have noted this distinction

Appellate Case: 04-4149 Page: 8 Date Filed: 08/22/2006 Entry ID: 2080877
-9-

repeatedly in the context of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C.

§ 3729(a). See, e.g., Minn. Ass’n of Nurse Anaesthetists v. Allina Health Sys. Corp.,

276 F.3d 1032, 1053 (8th Cir. 2002) (addressing the False Claims Act’s mens rea

requirement and distinguishing between whether defendants “knew” or “would have

known absent . . . reckless disregard” that bills submitted to Government would

falsely imply that certain services had been rendered). Indeed, it is clear from our

False Claims Act jurisprudence that Congress’s insertion of a reckless disregard

standard captures defendants who lacked actual knowledge. See id. Where, in the

context of representations to ERISA plans, Congress instead has elected to make

persons criminally liable only for those false statements made “knowing [them] to be

false,” we are bound to enforce the law as written.

The concealment prong presents a more difficult issue, as the prong’s language

is susceptible to two readings. The question we must decide is whether “knowingly”

modifies only the clause addressing a defendant’s acts (that is,“knowingly conceals,

covers up, or fails to disclose”) or whether “knowingly” also modifies the

concealment prong’s second clause (“the disclosure of which is required by such title

or is necessary to verify, explain, clarify or check for accuracy and completeness any

report required by such title to be published or any information required by such title

to be certified”). In other words, we must decide whether § 1027 allows criminal

conviction only where someone “conceals, covers up, or fails to disclose” facts that

she knew she was required to disclose or whether § 1027 criminalizes the knowing

concealment, cover up or failure to disclose certain facts, regardless of whether the

defendant knew she was required to reveal, uncover or disclose them. 

We hold that the former reading is correct. In our view, Tolkow and S & Vee

Cartage—both of which allowed instructions that included a reckless disregard mens

rea standard—are in conflict with the reasoning of subsequent decisions of the

Supreme Court. For instance, in Liparota, the Supreme Court addressed the mens rea

Appellate Case: 04-4149 Page: 9 Date Filed: 08/22/2006 Entry ID: 2080877
-10-

requirement of 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1), which provided that “whoever knowingly uses,

transfers, acquires, alters, or possesses coupons or authorization cards in any manner

not authorized by [the statute] or the regulations” is subject to criminal penalties. 471

U.S. at 420. The question to be resolved was whether “knowingly” modified only the

use, transfer, acquisition, alteration or possession portion of the statute or if it also

modified the phrase “in any manner not authorized.” Id. at 420-21. That is, just as

in this case, “[t]he question presented [was] whether . . . the Government must prove

that the defendant knew that he was acting in a manner not authorized by statute or

regulations.” Id. 

In Liparota, the Supreme Court applied a two-step method of statutory

interpretation, first looking to the statute’s plain language and structure and, in the

absence of clear language, then attempting to infer the statute’s meaning from its

legislative history. Id. at 423. Beginning with § 2024(b)(1)’s plain language, the

Supreme Court found that, while it was clear that Congress intended to require a mens

rea of “knowingly” with respect to some act, it was unclear whether “knowingly”

applied merely to possession of the coupons and cards or whether the statute required

both knowing possession and knowledge that the possession was proscribed by law.

Id. at 424. The Court concluded that “[e]ither interpretation would accord with

ordinary usage.” Id. Because the statute’s plain language was ambiguous, the Court

then examined the statute’s legislative history. Id. It found, however, that “the

legislative history of the statute contains nothing that would clarify the congressional

purpose on this point.” Id. 

The Liparota Court then held that, absent a clear indication to the

contrary—from either the statute’s plain language or legislative history—the Court

would presume that Congress intended to apply “knowingly” to both elements of the

statute because “to interpret the statute otherwise would . . . criminalize a broad range

of apparently innocent conduct.” Id. at 425-26. Specifically, it stated that, “[a]bsent

Appellate Case: 04-4149 Page: 10 Date Filed: 08/22/2006 Entry ID: 2080877
-11-

indication of contrary purpose in the language or legislative history of the statute, we

believe that § 2024(b)(1) requires a showing that the defendant knew his conduct to

be unauthorized by statute or regulations.” Id. at 425. 

Since Liparota, the Court has consistently applied this presumption to statutes

where construing the statute more broadly would criminalize otherwise innocent

conduct. See Arthur Andersen LLP, 544 U.S. at 703-74 (noting that reading a statute

to require corrupt intent “is particularly appropriate . . . where the act underlying the

conviction . . . is by itself innocuous”); Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 610

(1994) (addressing “the particular care we have taken to avoid construing a statute to

dispense with mens rea where doing so would criminalize a broad range of apparently

innocent conduct”) (internal quotation omitted); Posters ‘N’ Things, Ltd. v. United

States, 511 U.S. 513, 524 (1994) (requiring in a drug paraphernalia case “the

Government [to] establish that the defendant knew that the items at issue are likely to

be used with illegal drugs”); Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 149 (1994)

(holding in a currency transaction structuring case that “[t]o convict Ratzlaf of the

crime with which he was charged . . . , the jury had to find he knew the structuring in

which he engaged was unlawful”), superseded by statute, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5322(a), (b),

5324(c). Indeed, the Court has extended the application of “knowingly” to elements

in separate subsections of a criminal statute—that is, to phrases more remote than we

do here. See X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 68, 72 (reasoning that “Morisette,

reinforced by Staples, instructs that the presumption in favor of a scienter requirement

should apply to each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent

conduct” and applying “knowingly” to the elements in each subsection of the statute,

even where the word did not appear in each subsection).

We have followed suit in cases where a broad range of apparently innocent

conduct would be criminalized by a particular reading of an ambiguous statute’s mens

rea requirement. See United States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436, 440 (8th Cir. 1996) (“Only

Appellate Case: 04-4149 Page: 11 Date Filed: 08/22/2006 Entry ID: 2080877
2

Compare § 1027, providing that “whoever . . . knowingly conceals, covers up,

or fails to disclose any fact the disclosure of which is required by [title I of ERISA]

or is necessary to verify, explain, clarify or check for accuracy and completeness of

any report required by such title to be published or any information required by such

title to be certified” is subject to prosecution with § 2024(b)(1), providing that

“whoever knowingly uses, transfers, acquires, alters, or possesses coupons or

authorization cards in any manner not authorized by [the statute] or regulations” is

subject to prosecution.

-12-

conduct that is inevitably nefarious, that is, obviously ‘evil’ or inherently ‘bad,’

warrants the traditional presumption that anyone consciously engaging in it has fair

warning of a criminal violation. Thus, we agree with the district court’s decision to

instruct the jury that the government must meet a heightened mens rea burden.”)

(internal citation and quotation omitted); cf. United States v. Collins, 949 F.2d 1029,

1031 (8th Cir. 1991) (refusing to expand the reach of “knowingly” within a statute

where the defendant had reason to know that the use of explosives “is a type of

conduct that a reasonable person should know is subject to stringent public regulation

and may seriously threaten the community’s health or safety”) (quoting Liparota, 471

U.S. at 433). 

Applying Liparota’s reasoning to this case, we conclude that the Government

is required to prove both that the defendant knowingly “conceal[ed], cover[ed] up, or

fail[ed] to disclose a[] fact” that she was required to disclose and that she knew that

she was obliged to disclose it. We begin with the statute’s plain language and

structure. A comparison of the statute at issue in Liparota and the statute here shows

them to have identical structures in all relevant respects.2

 The plain language of both

statutes is equally ambiguous as to whether “knowingly” applies to a defendant’s

knowledge of the requirements of the relevant regulations or statute. 

Here, however, unlike in Liparota, the statute’s structure offers one additional

clue as to congressional intent. Congress specifically provided in § 1027 that one may

Appellate Case: 04-4149 Page: 12 Date Filed: 08/22/2006 Entry ID: 2080877
3

Section 1027 was amended in 1974 to refer to ERISA rather than the WPPDA.

Pub. L. 93-406.

-13-

be convicted under the false statement prong of the statute only if the statement is

made “knowing it to be false.” On the other hand, under the Government’s reading

of § 1027’s concealment prong, a defendant could be convicted for concealing facts,

even though she was unaware that she was required by law to disclose them. Nothing

in the statute’s language, structure or history indicates to us that Congress meant to

apply different mens rea standards to two different means of violating § 1027. That

is, we see nothing indicating that Congress meant to allow conviction for affirmative

statements only when the defendant knows they are false but, at the same time, to

allow conviction for the failure to disclose facts where the defendant was unaware of

the duty to disclose them. To the contrary, in our view, the provision that false

statements are punishable only if made “knowing [them] to be false” indicates that

Congress meant to restrict the type of activity that § 1027 criminalized rather than to

write the statute as expansively as possible. 

Applying the second step of Liparota’s analysis, the legislative history here

does not indicate clearly that Congress intended to circumscribe the reach of

“knowingly” in a way that criminalized the failure to disclose certain information

where the defendant was unaware of a duty to disclose it. We acknowledge that

Tolkow addressed § 1027’s legislative history and found that the history indicated that

Congress intended § 1027 to be applied broadly, 532 F.2d at 858, but we are

unpersuaded that the legislative history requires us to read into the statute a reckless

disregard standard that appears nowhere in its text. Tolkow takes an extraordinarily

broad view of § 1027’s legislative history, noting only that § 1027 was passed with

the intent to give the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act3

 “enforcement teeth.”

Id. at 858. But observing that a particular statute is meant to have teeth is not the

same as defining the extent of its bite. Congress undoubtedly intended the anti-child

pornography statute addressed in X-Citement Video to have “teeth,” as it had recently

Appellate Case: 04-4149 Page: 13 Date Filed: 08/22/2006 Entry ID: 2080877
-14-

broadened the statute’s application to regulate even more pornographic material than

did previous iterations of the statute. 513 U.S. at 74 (discussing the expansion of the

statute in 1984 to regulate materials that were not legally “obscene,” whereas an

earlier version of the bill had limited itself to actual obscenity). The Supreme Court,

however, still read the statute in a way that required a defendant to know that he was

transporting a video that depicted an actual minor. Id. at 78. 

More to the point, in lieu of Tolkow’s exceedingly broad view of the legislative

history, Liparota and its progeny require us to examine the legislative history with an

eye toward determining whether Congress made some statement particularly

addressing the intended mens rea requirement. See, e.g., X-Citement Video at 74-75

(examining legislative history regarding the intended mens rea requirement). After

our review of § 1027’s legislative history, we see nothing addressing the mens rea

requirement at all, much less indicating that Congress intended to criminalize the

failure to report certain information even where the actor was unaware of the duty to

do so. See H. R. Rep. No. 87-998, pt.4 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1532-

1537-39, 1547. When interpreted in this fashion, the statute still has “enforcement

teeth,” but captures only those actors who deliberately conceal, cover up or fail to

disclose information that they knew they were required to reveal, uncover or disclose.

For all these reasons, we conclude that neither the statute’s plain language nor

the statute’s legislative history clearly indicate that Congress intended to criminalize

conduct where the defendant was unaware of a duty to disclose the information

allegedly concealed. We further find that the Government’s reading of the statute

would criminalize an extraordinary amount of otherwise innocent conduct. For

instance, if a clerical employee failed to retain any document that the benefit fund later

decided it needed “to verify, explain, clarify or check for accuracy and completeness

any report required” by ERISA, she could later be held criminally liable, even though

she had no reason to suspect that she was required to create or keep the document—or,

Appellate Case: 04-4149 Page: 14 Date Filed: 08/22/2006 Entry ID: 2080877
4

Following Liparota, we have not labeled the crime in question in this case as

either a “specific” or “general” intent crime. These two categories fail to describe

adequately the possible mens rea requirements. See Liparota, 471 U.S. at 423 n.5

(“We have also recognized that the mental element in criminal law encompasses more

than the two possibilities of ‘specific’ and ‘general’ intent.”).

5

 Differentiating between Liparota’s interpretation of § 2024(b)(1)’s mens rea

requirement and a mistake-of-law defense, the Liparota Court wrote: 

Our holding today no more creates a “mistake of law” defense than does

a statute making knowing receipt of stolen goods unlawful . . . . In both

cases, there is a legal element in the definition of the offense. In the case

of a receipt-of-stolen-goods statute, the legal element is that the goods

were stolen; in this case, the legal element is that the “use, transfer,

acquisition,” etc. were in a manner not authorized by statute or

regulations. It is not a defense to a charge of receipt of stolen goods that

one did not know that such receipt was illegal, and it is not a defense to

a charge of a § 2024(b)(1) violation that one did not know that

possessing food stamps in a manner unauthorized by statute or

regulations was illegal. It is, however, a defense to a charge of knowing

receipt of stolen goods that one did not know that the goods were stolen,

just as it is a defense to a charge of a § 2024(b)(1) violation that one did

-15-

indeed, even if she had no idea of the document’s purpose. Because the

Government’s reading of the statute would criminalize apparently innocent conduct,

we apply Liparota’s presumption and conclude that Congress intended to apply

“knowingly” to both clauses of § 1027’s concealment prong.4

We pause to address two final, but important issues. First, our holding does not

imply that a defendant must in fact know that § 1027 exists and that she is violating

it before she can be held to account in a criminal prosecution. We hold only that the

defendant must have known that she was required to disclose the information she

allegedly concealed. The Supreme Court discussed this distinction in Liparota. 471

U.S. at 426 n.9.5

 Second, our decision concerning the proper mens rea requirement

Appellate Case: 04-4149 Page: 15 Date Filed: 08/22/2006 Entry ID: 2080877
not know that one’s possession was unauthorized. 

471 U.S. at 425 n.9.

-16-

in no way affects how the Government can go about proving that the required mens

rea exists. Despite the requirement that the Government prove that a particular

defendant knowingly concealed information she knew she was required to disclose,

“knowledge can [still] be inferred from circumstantial evidence, including any

external indications” that she knew that she was required to keep or disclose the

particular information. Staples, 511 U.S. at 615 n.11; see also Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at

149 n.19 (“A jury may, of course, find the requisite knowledge on defendant’s part by

drawing reasonable inferences from the evidence of defendant’s conduct . . . .”).

 B. Motions for Judgment of Acquittal and New Trial

Having decided the proper mens rea requirement under § 1027, we must decide

whether the district court appropriately decided the various post-trial motions. We

review de novo the grant of a post-trial motion for judgment of acquittal, United

States v. Hively, 437 F.3d 752, 760 (8th Cir. 2006), using the same standards used by

the district court, United States v. Monnier, 412 F.3d 859, 861 (8th Cir. 2005). Fed.

R. Crim. P. 29(a) provides that the district court “must enter judgment of acquittal of

any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.” “When

considering whether there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction, we view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, giving it the benefit of all

reasonable inferences.” Monnier, 412 F.3d at 861 (quotation omitted). A motion for

judgment of acquittal should be granted only “if there is no interpretation of the

evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt.” United States v. Gomez, 165 F.3d 650, 654 (8th Cir. 1999). 

Appellate Case: 04-4149 Page: 16 Date Filed: 08/22/2006 Entry ID: 2080877
-17-

1. Counts 28 Through 32: Monthly Remittance Reports

Submitted to the 264 Fund

The district court granted Cacioppo and Plaskett’s motions for judgment of

acquittal on Counts 28 through 32 of the indictment, reasoning that there was

insufficient proof that the IEM-Local 264 Association Agreement actually required

Cacioppo and Plaskett to report the names of all workers at any work site, irrespective

of whether they were union members. We affirm the judgment of acquittal in favor

of Cacioppo, albeit for a different reason. See United States v. McCaster, 193 F.3d

930, 933 (8th Cir. 1999) (“We may affirm the judgment on any grounds supported by

the record, even if not relied on by the district court.”). However, we reverse the

judgment of acquittal in favor of Plaskett and remand for the district court to

determine if he is entitled to a new trial.

a. Motions for Judgment of Acquittal

Given our resolution of the mens rea issue above, the question we must resolve

with respect to the reporting to the 264 Fund is whether the Government presented

evidence sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find Cacioppo and Plaskett guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt of knowingly making false statements and/or knowingly

concealing or failing to disclose facts they knew they were required to disclose. 

We briefly restate the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict,

resolving evidentiary disputes in favor of the Government. We begin with the IEM264 Association Agreement. Article III of the agreement provided that the parties

“recognize[d] the Union as the exclusive bargaining agent for all employees of the

Employer performing any type of construction work which has historically and

traditionally been performed heretofore by Laborers in the geographical area of this

Appellate Case: 04-4149 Page: 17 Date Filed: 08/22/2006 Entry ID: 2080877
-18-

Agreement.” (Emphasis added.) Article IV of the agreement recognized the Union

“as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for all employees coming within the terms

of this Agreement.” (Emphasis added.) Article VIII provided that “[t]he parties

agreed to provide a fringe benefit program . . . which program is to be maintained by

contributions from employers under the terms of this Agreement and is established for

the benefit of employees of members of the Association” and that “[o]n all work

covered . . . each employer shall pay to the Fringe Benefit Program the amounts per

hour set forth in [the agreement] for each hour paid . . . to each employee covered by

this Agreement.” (Emphasis added.) Finally, Article VIII required IEM to “file a

written report . . . setting forth the names, social security numbers and the hours paid

for each employee for whom payments shall have been made during said period and

such other information as the fringe benefit program trustees desire.” 

Suzanne Clark Bradley, who managed IEM’s offices until March of 2002, was

responsible during an undefined period in 1999 for preparing and submitting the

monthly remittance reports. Bradley testified that she understood that she was

required to list all employees on the monthly remittance reports, irrespective of union

membership. Her understanding was based solely upon her reading of the IEM-264

Association Agreement. Bradley further testified that she prepared the monthly

remittance reports by running a pre-defined “Time-by-Name Report” on IEM’s

financial software. Bradley testified that Plaskett told her to remove names from the

reports she had prepared. Bradley also testified that she had a conversation with

Plaskett and his partner, Chuck Cacioppo, Jr., about the reporting:

Q. When you were doing these reports then for . . . Plaskett, did you

discuss how to fill out the forms, who was supposed to be on the forms,

that kind of information?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Tell us about that, please.

Appellate Case: 04-4149 Page: 18 Date Filed: 08/22/2006 Entry ID: 2080877
-19-

A. I was basically told after I did a couple of them to mind my own

business.

Q. Tell us about that conversation, who was there, what was the

conversation?

A. I had had a conversation with Don in regard to union and non union

employees and who we were paying on and who we weren’t paying on

and I was basically told just to keep my nose out of it.

Q. By who?

A. By . . . Plaskett and Chuck [Cacioppo, Jr.].

Trial Tr. Vol. II at 411:18-412:7. 

Anna Cacioppo took over the reporting duties when she began working at IEM.

Bradley did not testify that she informed Cacioppo that Cacioppo should list all

employees, irrespective of union membership. When asked whether she explained the

reporting requirements to Cacioppo, Bradley said only that she “basically showed

[Cacioppo] how [Bradley] did [the reports] in the beginning and gave [Cacioppo] the

time by name report and she was to discuss it with [Plaskett] and how he wanted to

pay.” Id. at 413:25-414:2. Bradley later testified that she “showed Anna how the

reports were to be pulled out of the computer and how [Plaskett] showed [Bradley] to

do them. And basically Anna dealt with [Plaskett] from that point forward.” Id. at

436:4-6. 

The Government also called Leslie Williams, who had been president and

business manager for Local 264 for 22 years and a trustee for the Laborers Fringe

Benefit Office Health and Welfare Fund. Williams testified that the IEM-264

Association Agreement required IEM to report and pay fringe benefits for every

employee, irrespective of union membership, from the very first day of employment.

Williams further testified that the union had field representatives who were

Appellate Case: 04-4149 Page: 19 Date Filed: 08/22/2006 Entry ID: 2080877
-20-

responsible for telling employers about their responsibilities with respect to paying

fringe benefits. Williams also testified that Plaskett signed the collective bargaining

agreement on behalf of IEM. As to Cacioppo, Williams testified that he had never

met her and had no idea whether she had ever seen the collective bargaining

agreement. 

Plaskett testified that he did not list non-union employees “because the union

agreement doesn’t tell us to do that.” Trial Tr. Vol. IV at 793:14-15. He further

testified that, to meet what he perceived to be the reporting requirements, he set up on

IEM’s computer a recurring report that listed all employees working on a project.

Plaskett called it the “Time-by-Name” report. Plaskett then applied to the Time-byName report a filter that eliminated the names of non-union employees. Plaskett

testified that, as soon as an employee reported that he joined the union, Plaskett then

changed the designation of that employee and IEM would begin reporting their work

on monthly remittance reports. 

Cacioppo testified that she never read any union agreement. She stated that she

prepared the report that was “memorized” on the computer. Id. at 876:23. According

to Cacioppo, the report was “called ‘264,’ something like that.” Id. at 876:24.

Referring to Cacioppo’s role in the reporting, Plaskett confirmed that Cacioppo simply

ran the Time-by-Name Report with the filters that Plaskett defined to yield only union

members’ names. 

To decide whether either defendant’s conviction can be upheld, we must first

determine whether a reasonable jury could find that IEM was required to disclose the

names of each employee on the monthly remittance reports, irrespective of union

membership. We disagree with the district court’s conclusion that no reasonable jury

could so find. IEM agreed that “[o]n all covered work herein each employer shall pay

to the Fringe Benefit Program the amounts set forth . . . for each hour paid . . . to each

Appellate Case: 04-4149 Page: 20 Date Filed: 08/22/2006 Entry ID: 2080877
-21-

employee covered by this Agreement.” In the same agreement, IEM “recognize[d] the

Union as the exclusive bargaining agent for all employees of the Employer performing

any type of construction work which has historically and traditionally been performed

heretofore by Laborers in the geographical area of this Agreement.” Based upon these

two provisions alone, a reasonable jury could conclude that the employer was required

to pay benefits for every employee, irrespective of union membership. Under Article

VIII of the agreement, IEM was required to report every worker for whom benefit

payments should be made. Accordingly, a reasonable jury could conclude that every

employee, union and non-union, should have been listed on the monthly remittance

reports.

Cacioppo’s convictions under § 1027, then, turn upon whether she knowingly

represented that all names required to be disclosed on the monthly remittance reports

had been disclosed, knowing that representation to be false, or whether she knowingly

failed to disclose employees she knew she was required to report. 

 With respect to Local 264, Cacioppo was required to certify that “the employees

listed [on the reports] constitute all employees for whom contributions are required

under the terms of said agreements.” Rather than explicitly request that she list every

employee, the monthly remittance reports called for Cacioppo to make some judgment

concerning which employees IEM was required to disclose. Although we have

concluded that a reasonable jury could have determined that the IEM-264 Association

Agreement required Cacioppo to list all employees, irrespective of union membership,

no proof was presented to the jury that would even support the inference that

Cacioppo knew she was required to list every employee and then falsely certified that

she had done so. To the contrary, she testified that she had never read the agreement

and no one testified that they told her about its requirements. As such, we conclude

that there was insufficient evidence that Cacioppo knowingly made a false statement

when she certified the completeness of her reporting. For the same reasons, we also

Appellate Case: 04-4149 Page: 21 Date Filed: 08/22/2006 Entry ID: 2080877
6

Plaskett was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 1027 and 2. Title 18 Section

2 of the United States Code, provides in subsection (b) that “[w]hoever willfully

causes an act to be done which, if directly performed by him or another would be an

offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal.” Because this statute

“makes it unnecessary that the intermediary who commits the forbidden act have a

criminal intent,” United States v. Rucker, 586 F.2d 899, 905 (2d Cir. 1978) (internal

quotation omitted), Plaskett could be found guilty even though Cacioppo lacked the

requisite mens rea. 

-22-

conclude that there was insufficient evidence that she knowingly concealed the names

of individuals she knew she was required to disclose. Accordingly, we affirm the

judgment of acquittal in favor of Cacioppo on Counts 28 through 32 of the indictment.

However, under the deferential standard for reviewing jury verdicts, Plaskett’s

conviction should have been upheld. Again, we disagree with the district court’s

finding that no reasonable jury could conclude that the IEM-264 Association

Agreement required IEM to disclose the work of all employees, irrespective of union

membership. Plaskett’s conviction therefore turns upon whether there was sufficient

evidence to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that he knew that IEM was required

to disclose the identity of the non-union employees and that he nevertheless caused

Cacioppo to fail to disclose the information.6

 

We hold that there was. First, Plaskett signed the IEM-264 Association

Agreement on behalf of IEM. Second, Les Williams testified that it was the union’s

practice to tell employers that they are required to pay benefits for all employees,

irrespective of union membership. Third, Bradley testified that she believed that the

names should be listed, that she discussed the reports with Plaskett, including the

distinction between union and non-union employees, and that Plaskett told her to

“keep her nose out of it.” Viewing this evidence and all reasonable inferences from

it in a light most favorable to the verdict, we find that a reasonable jury could

conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Plaskett knew that IEM was required to list

Appellate Case: 04-4149 Page: 22 Date Filed: 08/22/2006 Entry ID: 2080877
-23-

the IEM’s non-union employees on the monthly remittance reports. The evidence also

plainly shows that Plaskett caused Cacioppo to create and submit the incomplete

monthly remittance reports. Indeed, Plaskett’s own testimony indicated that he

caused Cacioppo to file the monthly remittance reports without listing the names of

IEM’s non-union employees by virtue of the filter he programmed on IEM’s

computers that eliminated those names from the Time-by-Name Report in IEM’s

financial software. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s judgment of acquittal

in favor of Plaskett on counts 28 through 32 of the indictment. 

b. Plaskett’s Motion for a New Trial

In addition to seeking a judgment of acquittal, Plaskett also moved in the

alternative for a new trial. Although the district court granted Plaskett’s motion for

a judgment of acquittal, it failed to rule upon his alternative motion. Plaskett crossappeals the district court’s failure to rule in the alternative. We agree with Plaskett

that the district court erred when it failed to rule in the alternative on Plaskett’s new

trial motion. Rule 29(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states that “[i]f

the [district] court enters a judgment of acquittal after a guilty verdict, the court must

also conditionally determine whether any motion for a new trial should be granted if

the judgment of acquittal is later vacated or reversed.” Accordingly, we remand for

the district court to rule in the first instance on Plaskett’s motion for a new trial on

Counts 28 through 32 of the indictment.

2. Counts 33 Through 38: Monthly Remittance Reports

Submitted to the 1290 Fund

Cacioppo also appeals the denial of her motion for a new trial on Counts 33

Appellate Case: 04-4149 Page: 23 Date Filed: 08/22/2006 Entry ID: 2080877
7

Although Cacioppo moved for a judgment of acquittal in the district court, she

did not argue in her appeal that she was entitled to a judgment of acquittal. 

-24-

through 38 of the indictment, arguing that the jury was misinstructed.7

 “Jury

instructions are adequate if, taken as a whole, they adequately advise the jury of the

essential elements of the offenses charged and the burden of proof required of the

government.” United States v. Rice, 449 F.3d 887, 895 (8th Cir. 2006) (internal

quotation and alteration omitted). As we discussed in part II.A., ante, the jury was

improperly instructed as to the appropriate mens rea requirement under § 1027.

Nevertheless, our inquiry does not end there, as “[p]roperly objected to jury

instructions are reviewed for harmless error pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a).”

United States v. Jacobs, 97 F.3d 275, 278 (8th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation omitted).

Any misinstruction may be harmless if the evidence of guilt is overwhelming. See,

e.g., Barnes v. United States, 777 F.2d 430, 431 (8th Cir. 1985); see also United States

v. Ferrarini, 219 F.3d 145, 154 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[A]n erroneously given conscious

avoidance instruction constitutes harmless error if the jury was charged on actual

knowledge and there was ‘overwhelming evidence’ to support a finding that the

defendant instead possessed actual knowledge of the fact at issue”).

In this case, the Government did not argue that the alleged instructional error

was harmless, and the failure to do so waives any right to such review. Lufkins v.

Leapley, 965 F.2d 1477, 1481 (8th Cir. 1992). We may overlook the waiver and

review the record to determine whether the error was harmless, although we will “err

on the side of the criminal defendant” where the Government failed to argue harmless

error. Id. Having reviewed the record, we cannot say that the evidence offered

against Cacioppo with respect to her submissions to the 1290 Fund so overwhelmingly

shows her guilt that any error was harmless. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment 

Appellate Case: 04-4149 Page: 24 Date Filed: 08/22/2006 Entry ID: 2080877
8

Cacioppo also claims that the district court improperly denied Cacioppo’s

request for a “good faith” instruction. Because the remedy for the district court’s

allegedly improper refusal to give a good faith instruction would have been a new

trial—something we have already granted—we leave the issue for the district court’s

consideration during any retrial, as the appropriateness of a good faith instruction is

entirely dependent upon the evidence adduced at trial. See, e.g., United States v.

Sherer, 653 F.3d 334, 337 (8th Cir. 1981).

-25-

against Cacioppo on Counts 33 through 38 of the indictment. We remand for a new

trial of these counts.8

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s judgment of acquittal

in favor of Cacioppo with respect to Counts 28 through 32. We reverse the district

court’s judgment of acquittal in favor of Plaskett with respect to the same counts, and

we remand for the district court to consider Plaskett’s motion for a new trial on those

counts. We vacate the judgment against Cacioppo with respect to her convictions on

Counts 33 through 38 of the indictment, and we remand the case for a new trial as to

those counts. 

______________________________

Appellate Case: 04-4149 Page: 25 Date Filed: 08/22/2006 Entry ID: 2080877