Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cr-00306/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cr-00306-11/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sundeep Dharni
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff, CIV NO. S-10-2934 EJG

vs. CR. NO. S-05-0306 EJG

SUNDEEP DHARNI, 

Defendant. ORDER

 /

Defendant, a prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a motion

to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2255. After reviewing the record, the documents filed

in connection with the motion and the applicable law, the court

has determined the motion may be decided without an evidentiary

hearing because the files and records of the case affirmatively

show the factual and legal invalidity of defendant’s arguments.

Shah v. United States, 878 F.2d 1156, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1989). 

For the reasons that follow, the motion is DENIED.

Background

Defendant was convicted on July 10, 2007, following a jury

trial for several arson and related counts. On November 2, 2007,

he was sentenced to 180 months imprisonment and a three year term

of supervised release. His sentence and conviction were affirmed

on appeal. United States v. Dharni, 324 Fed. Appx. 554 (9th Cir.

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 In light of United States v. Withers, --- F. 3d ---- , 1

2011 WL 6184 (9th Cir. Jan. 3, 2011), it appears defendant could

overcome the procedural default.

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2009).

Discussion

Defendant raises two claims in his § 2255 motion: 1)

violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial; and 2)

ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel.

1. Sixth Amendment Right to a Public Trial

Defendant alleges that his rights were violated when his

family and all other spectators had to leave the courtroom during

voir dire. Plaintiff argues that defendant procedurally

defaulted this claim by not raising this issue on appeal and that

the claim also fails on the merits. Rather than look to the

procedural default issue and whether defendant has shown cause

and prejudice the court will look to the merits of the claim.1

In the instant case, jury selection occurred on July 2,

2007. Due to trial starting before and continuing beyond the

July 4th holiday, the court convened a larger than usual panel of

prospective jurors. The court stated:

As soon as the jury comes up, I’m going to ask all

family members to go out in the hall. We need every

seat in the audience section of the courtroom as we

called in extra jurors because of the vacation problem. 

So that during jury selection, all of the family and

friends of the defendant and any other spectators that

are out there will wait out in the hall during jury

selection until seats open up.

Reporters Transcript (RT) Vol. 1 at 18.

The court’s comments did not draw an objection. The issues

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 Prior precedent involved the public trial right in voir 2

dire under the First Amendment, Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior

Court of Cal., Riverside Cty., 464 U.S. 501, (1984), and Sixth

Amendment right to a public trial concerning a pretrial

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raised in defendant’s motion have been the subject of recent

Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court decisions. In 2010, the Supreme

Court in Presley v. Georgia, --- U.S. ----, 130 S.Ct. 721 (2010),

reversed a criminal judgment where the trial court excluded

members of the public, including family of members of the

defendant, during voir dire, based on space limitations and

concern that jurors may accidentally hear prejudicial remarks. 

The Supreme Court held that “trial courts are required to

consider alternatives to closure even when they are not offered

by the parties” and “[t]rial courts are obligated to take every

reasonable measure to accommodate public attendance at criminal

trials.” Presley, 130 S.Ct. at 724-25; United States v. Withers,

--- F. 3d ---- , 2011 WL 6184 *5 (9th Cir. Jan. 3, 2011) (right

to a public trial is violated when the court is totally closed to

the public, for a non-trivial duration, without complying with

the four requirements established in Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S.

39 (1984)). Defendant cites Presley and argues that a structural

error was committed that requires dismissal of the charges or

retrial. For the reasons set forth below, defendant is mistaken.

Presley was decided in 2010, three years after the case at

bar. Prior to Presley, it was an open question if the Sixth

Amendment right to a public trial extended to jury selection and

voir dire. Presley, at 723-24. Since Presley, several district 2

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26 suppression hearing, Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984).

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courts have noted and held that “nowhere in Presley does the

Supreme Court announce that any part of it’s holding should apply

retroactively on collateral review. Nor has it so held in any

subsequent opinion.” Julian v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,

2010 WL 1854121 *4 (W.D. Pa. 2010); See also Bennefield v.

Kirkpatrick,--- F.Supp.2d ----, 2010 WL 3860992 *10, Fn. 1

(W.D.N.Y. 2010); Chalk v. Rhode Island, 2010 WL 597463 *5 Fn. 2

(D.R.I. 2010); Edelkind v. United States, 2010 WL2944369 *8 (W.D.

La. 2010).

Regardless that Presley was decided three years after the

instant case and that the law was unsettled, the trial closure at

issue here was a “trivial” closure that did not violate the Sixth

Amendment. In United States v. Ivester, 316 F.3d 955 (9th Cir.

2003), the Ninth Circuit held that determining whether a closure

was too trivial to violate the Sixth Amendment one must look to

the values stated in Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984) and

Peterson v. Williams, 85 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1996). Ivester, at

960. The Ninth Circuit looked at the following values with

respect to a closure:

(1) to ensure a fair trial, (2) to remind the

prosecutor and judge of their responsibility to the

accused and the importance of their functions, (3) to

encourage witnesses to come forward; and (4) to

discourage perjury.

Ivester, at 960 (citations omitted).

A review of the record shows that these values were not

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 The court did also take a 15 minute recess during the jury 3

selection. Transcript of Jury Selection, Docket Entry #138 at

35.

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violated and as in Ivester, there was no structural error. The

record shows that on July 2, 2007, at 2:10 pm, jury selection

commenced and less than two hours later at 3:50 pm, the jury was 3

sworn and then a recess was taken. Docket Entry #53. The values

were not subverted by limiting voir dire proceedings to only the

attorneys, judge, defendant and prospective jurors for less than

two hours. The court read the indictment, provided

administrative details and asked the jurors several questions. 

The attorneys used several peremptory challenges but neither

party objected during any of the jury selection, and there were

no significant developments. Transcript of Jury Selection,

Docket Entry #138; See Gibbons v. Savage, 555 F.3d 112, 121 (2nd

Cir. 2009) (voir dire closure was trivial pursuant to Waller and

Peterson values when closure lasted for one afternoon and nothing

of significance occurred). 

Jury selection in the instant case consisted of routine jury

administrative matters that had no bearing on defendant’s

ultimate guilt or innocence. See Ivester, at 960. In addition,

it should be noted that the Ninth Circuit which looks to the

values from Waller, recently held that courtroom closures are not

always structural errors that should result in automatic

reversal. United States v. Waters, 627 F.3d 345, 361 (9th Cir.

2010)(automatic reversal was not required when Circuit looked at

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 Plaintiff has not fully briefed all elements of this 4

claim, but the court has looked through the record to address the

claim.

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courtroom closure in the context of a suppression hearing under

Waller). Upon viewing the details of the closure, and in light

of the applicable case law, the closure was too trivial to

warrant relief and this claim is denied.

2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Defendant next alleges that trial and appellate counsel were

ineffective for the following four reasons: a) trial counsel 4

failed to object to the courtroom closure and appellate counsel

failed to raise the issue on appeal; b) trial counsel failed to

subject the prosecution’s case to “meaningful adversarial

testing”; c) trial counsel failed to ask for a continuance or a

mistrial; and d) appellate counsel failed to raise a Brady issue

on appeal.

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,

defendant must demonstrate that counsel’s performance was

deficient and fell below an “objective standard of

reasonableness”, and that but for the deficiencies, “there is a

reasonable probability” the outcome would have been different. 

See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984). 

The court need not address the two separate prongs in any

particular order, nor does it need to address both of them. “In

particular, a court need not determine whether counsel’s

performance was deficient before examining the prejudice

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suffered. . . . The object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to

grade counsel’s performance. If it is easier to dispose of an

ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient

prejudice, . . . that course should be followed.” Id. at 697.

a) Courtroom Closure

Having denied defendant’s claim regarding the courtroom

closure, the ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on

this issue also fails, since even if counsel could be found

ineffective, there was no prejudice. Moreover, counsel has no

duty to foresee changes in the law or future developments. This

claim is therefore denied.

b) Failure to Attack Prosecution Case

Defendant generally alleges that trial counsel was

ineffective for not properly investigating the case, not

interviewing prosecution witnesses and not obtaining an expert

witness. Other than providing a list of complaints, defendant

presents no evidence of what trial counsel would have discovered

that would have aided defendant if counsel properly investigated

the case. Simply saying that counsel was ineffective without any

evidence in support is insufficient. See Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d

199, 205 (9th Cir. 1995) (“‘[c]onclusory allegations which are

not supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant

habeas relief’”) (quoting James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir.

1994)). As defendant has failed to demonstrate any prejudice

from trial counsel’s actions, this claim is denied.

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c) Continuance and Mistrial

Defendant next argues that trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to ask for a continuance or move for a mistrial when the

prosecution handed over an exhibit on the first day of trial. 

The exhibit at issue is a one page handwritten piece of

scratch paper belonging to defendant where he listed his assets

(five entries equaling seven-hundred and five thousand dollars)

and liabilities (fifteen entries equaling five-hundred and three

thousand dollars). See Docket Entry #140, Exhibit C. The

scratch piece of paper had been seized from defendant’s

briefcase, photocopied and then returned to defendant. RT Vol. 1

at 25-26. The prosecution further stated that discovery

disclosed that the contents of defendant’s briefcase had been

copied so defendant had constructive notice that the prosecution

had the document. Id. Instead of asking for a continuance, as

defendant alleges was the proper course, trial counsel asked that

the prosecution not be allowed to reference the piece of paper in

opening arguments, so that trial counsel could review the

document in further detail. The court granted this request. 

Id., at 27.

Regardless of whether the exhibit was handed over late or

not, defendant has failed to show that counsel was ineffective

for failing to ask for a continuance. Defendant theorizes that

counsel could have consulted with defendant or an expert

regarding the exhibit, what was listed on the exhibit and how it

related to the prosecution’s theory of the case. Yet,

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defendant’s finances were already central to the prosecution’s

case, which the defense was well aware of. Moreover, defendant

testified in his own defense and admitted writing the exhibit and

explained what it signified and attempted to explain it away. RT

Vol. 4 at 582-85. 

The jury’s failure to credit defendant’s testimony on this

issue does not show that counsel was ineffective, nor has

defendant presented any persuasive arguments that he was

prejudiced by counsel failing to ask for a continuance. Nor

would there have been any merit if there was a request for a

mistrial. Therefore, this claim is denied. To the extent that

defendant’s motion alleges that appellate counsel was ineffective

for failing to raise this issue, any such claim is also denied.

d) Brady Evidence

Defendant alleges that the prosecution did not timely turn

over criminal rap sheets for three prosecution witnesses, Richard

Duran, Tiffany Martinez and Rose Duran. Defendant also alleges

that the prosecution failed to disclose agreements to dismiss

charges and withheld information pertaining to witnesses, Tiffany

Martinez and Alicia Jardin. However, it is not entirely clear

that agreements existed with these witnesses. Defendant’s only

argument in support of the existence of agreements is the release

of partial transcripts of their testimony after the trial. This

argument is insufficient, and ultimately, defendant has failed to

allege a viable claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for

failing to raise this claim under Strickland. Assuming

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 It appears that defendant is referring to police reports 5

regarding the contents of the rap sheets that the defense was

attempting to acquire. The prosecution was aiding the defense in

obtaining these reports, but ultimately defendant has not shown

that this was Brady material.

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defendant’s allegations are accurate, he has not demonstrated any

prejudice from counsel’s alleged errors.

With respect to the rap sheets, two were received by the

defense the week prior to trial, so the basis for the Brady claim

is not clear. RT Vol. 1 at 14-16. Defendant has presented no 5

evidence that Rose Duran even had a rap sheet. In addition,

defendant has not set forth any arguments that he suffered any

prejudice whatsoever, or that appellate counsel was ineffective

for failing to raise this issue. Accordingly, defendant’s vague

claim that appellate counsel was ineffective is denied.

3. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, defendant’s motion to vacate, set

aside or correct sentence is DENIED. The Clerk of the Court is

directed to close the companion civil case CV. S-10-2934 EJG.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 30, 2011

 /s/ Edward J. Garcia 

EDWARD J. GARCIA, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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