Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca6-23-03905/USCOURTS-ca6-23-03905-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Randall Hines
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 24a0479n.06

Case No. 23-3905

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

RANDALL HINES, 

Defendant-Appellant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED 

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF 

OHIO 

OPINION

Before: KETHLEDGE, THAPAR, and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.

THAPAR, Circuit Judge. At Randall Hines’ trial, the government used a peremptory strike 

on a black juror. Hines objected because he said the government’s strike was motivated by race,

in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). But the district judge denied the Batson 

challenge because race-neutral reasons explained the government’s decision. We agree and affirm.

I.

Randall Hines faced trial for armed bank robbery. At jury selection, the court asked the 

jurors if “you or any member of your immediate family or close personal friend have ever been 

arrested and charged with a crime?” R. 83, Pg. ID 665–66. Several jurors raised their hands, so 

the court asked them to describe the crime. Most of the jurors described state offenses like DUIs 

or disorderly conduct. The court then asked if each juror’s relationship to the crime would affect 

his ability to be impartial.

Case: 23-3905 Document: 49-2 Filed: 12/03/2024 Page: 1
No. 23-3905, United States v. Hines

- 2 -

Juror 28 raised her hand. The court instructed the juror and counsel to approach the bench 

for a sidebar. When the court asked if Juror 28 or a family member had been charged with a crime, 

she responded that her brother was “charged for, I guess, giving money to—that whole big case.” 

Id. at 669–70. She explained that her brother had worked for Cuyahoga County, Ohio, and the 

charges were “all over the news and everything.” Id. at 670. She also was under the impression 

that the charges “led to a criminal case because he was arrested.” Id. at 671. Still, she believed 

that she could “render a fair and impartial determination” of Hines’ guilt. Id.

The court let the government question Juror 28. The government asked for her brother’s 

name. They also asked if she believed that her brother was “treated fairly . . . by law enforcement.” 

Id. at 672. “Not really,” she responded. “[H]e was just doing his job that he was instructed to do, 

but because—but he got blamed for it . . . So I don’t think he—I don’t feel like he was treated 

fairly.” Id. at 672–73. She then mentioned another Cuyahoga County official involved in the same 

incident, which was a public corruption probe. As a final question, the government asked if Juror 

28 was aware of any federal involvement in her brother’s case, but she didn’t think so.

Later that afternoon, peremptory challenges began. When Juror 28 entered the jury box, 

the government requested another sidebar with the court and counsel. The government stated it 

wanted to strike Juror 28. 

Immediately, defense counsel raised a Batson challenge since Juror 28 is black. The court 

asked the government for a race-neutral explanation for the strike, and the government mentioned 

that Juror No. 28 “did not think her brother was treated fairly” in the Cuyahoga County case. Id.

at 795–96. The government responded that federal authorities investigated some people in the 

brother’s case. Because Juror 28 said that she didn’t think her brother was treated fairly, and the 

federal government may have been part of that case, the government said there was a chance she 

Case: 23-3905 Document: 49-2 Filed: 12/03/2024 Page: 2
No. 23-3905, United States v. Hines

- 3 -

might be biased against the federal government in this matter, too. The court found this

explanation to be race neutral.

The court gave Hines’ counsel an opportunity to respond. He argued that the government 

“expresse[d] a completely different viewpoint” about the fitness of the black juror to serve than 

similarly situated non-minority jurors. Id. at 798. And he emphasized that the government didn’t 

use a peremptory challenge until the sole black member of the venire sat down in the jury box.

After weighing the arguments, the court denied the Batson challenge. The case proceeded 

to trial, and the jury found Hines guilty on all counts. Hines now appeals the denial of his Batson

challenge.

II.

Parties can’t strike potential jurors because of their race. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89. If a party 

challenges a peremptory strike on Batson grounds, courts use a three-step inquiry to determine 

whether the strike was valid. First, the opponent of a peremptory challenge must make out “a 

prima facie case of racial discrimination.” Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767 (1995) (per curiam). 

Second, the strike’s proponent must “come forward with a race-neutral explanation.” Id. And 

third, the trial judge must decide “whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial 

discrimination.” Id. At bottom, a peremptory strike cannot be “motivated in substantial part by 

discriminatory intent.” Flowers v. Mississippi, 588 U.S. 284, 303 (2019) (citation omitted).

Here, the only issue is whether Hines has proven purposeful discrimination. To determine 

whether purposeful discrimination motivated a strike, courts assess “the persuasiveness of the 

prosecutor’s justification for his peremptory strike.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 338–39 

(2003). Because assessing the prosecutor’s credibility is “peculiarly within a trial judge’s 

Case: 23-3905 Document: 49-2 Filed: 12/03/2024 Page: 3
No. 23-3905, United States v. Hines

- 4 -

province,” we defer to the district court’s determination unless it is clearly erroneous. Snyder v. 

Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 477 (2008) (citation omitted).

The district court had ample reason to accept the prosecutor’s race-neutral justification for 

striking Juror 28. This juror had a brother who had recently been charged in a public-corruption 

probe. She didn’t “feel like [her brother] was treated fairly” by law enforcement. R. 83, Pg. ID

672–73. Although Juror 28 didn’t know of any federal involvement in her brother’s case, she 

mentioned another Cuyahoga County official who was tied to her brother and part of a federal 

probe. Thus, the government worried that the same federal agencies prosecuting Hines—the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation and United States Attorney’s Office—may have also charged her 

brother.

Hines faults the government for not presenting proof of the federal investigation. But it’s 

unreasonable to expect the government to have instantaneous proof of previous investigations for 

public corruption—not to mention that the prosecutors here were part of an unrelated violentcrimes unit. So, the district court had reason to accept the government’s suspicion that Juror 28’s 

brother had been part of a federal investigation, even if the government didn’t have ready proof.

Indeed, we’ve previously affirmed the denial of a Batson challenge when the government 

raised similar concerns about a potential juror. In United States v. Beverly, for example, we 

declined to find a Batson violation for a peremptory strike on a juror with a brother who spent time 

in jail and had a nephew in jail. 369 F.3d 516, 527 (6th Cir. 2004). And in United States v. AlDin, we upheld the denial of a Batson challenge where the juror had expressed “belief in the 

unfairness” of the criminal justice system. 631 F. App’x 313, 326 (6th Cir. 2015). The ultimate 

question we must ask is whether the district court clearly erred when it determined that the 

“prosecutor’s proffered reason” was reasonable and did not “suggest a discriminatory purpose.” 

Case: 23-3905 Document: 49-2 Filed: 12/03/2024 Page: 4
No. 23-3905, United States v. Hines

- 5 -

United States v. Gore, 118 F.4th 808, 819 (6th Cir. 2024). Here, it was reasonable for the district 

court to conclude the government struck Juror 28 because she believed the same law enforcement 

authorities involved in the Hines case treated her brother unfairly.

Hines’ arguments to the contrary aren’t persuasive. He points to a host of circumstantial 

evidence to show racial motivation, including comparisons to the government’s treatment of other 

jurors and statements to the court. See Flowers, 588 U.S. at 301–02. But this evidence isn’t

enough to prove that the district court clearly erred.

First, Hines points to the many non-minority jurors in this panel who revealed that they or 

their close family members had run-ins with law enforcement. The government didn’t question 

these jurors or use peremptory strikes on them. Hines takes this disparate treatment to mean that 

the government struck Juror 28 because of her race. 

But these other jurors aren’t useful comparators. They mentioned charges that state 

authorities likely would’ve investigated and prosecuted, such as DUIs, disorderly conduct, 

stabbing, leaving the scene of an accident, and similar state-law infractions. Juror 28, by contrast, 

mentioned her brother’s involvement in a “big case” with potential federal involvement. R. 83, 

Pg. ID 669–70. So, it made sense the prosecution was more concerned about Juror No. 28 than 

the others. And while the government wasn’t sure whether federal investigators were involved, 

bare suspicion can justify a peremptory strike. After all, parties can use peremptories “for any 

reason,” so long as it’s race-neutral. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89 (citation omitted).

What’s more, the government did question the other juror who mentioned a crime that 

might have involved the federal government. Juror 30, who wasn’t a minority, mentioned that her 

husband and two friends had been arrested for possession of marijuana while camping. The 

government asked if this occurred in a national park—and thus implicated federal authorities. The 

Case: 23-3905 Document: 49-2 Filed: 12/03/2024 Page: 5
No. 23-3905, United States v. Hines

- 6 -

juror replied that it didn’t. So, throughout voir dire, the government tried to reveal any federal 

involvement in the cases that jurors mentioned. 

Hines also takes issue with the government’s failure to object to Juror 24. During voir dire, 

this juror revealed that he trained police officers in jiu-jitsu and his father was a police officer. But

the government’s treatment of this juror isn’t helpful here. Comparative analyses only reveal

purposeful discrimination where “a prosecutor’s proffered reason for striking a black panelist 

applies just as well to an otherwise-similar nonblack who is permitted to serve.” Miller-El v. 

Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 241 (2005). But Jurors 24 and 28 weren’t similarly situated: one had a 

favorable view of law enforcement, the other didn’t. 

Finally, Hines objects to the government’s statement during the Batson sidebar that Juror 

28 was “upset” at how law enforcement treated her brother. Hines calls this inaccurate since Juror 

28 never expressed “hostility or anger” towards law enforcement. Appellant Br. at 25. And he 

points out that “[w]hen a prosecutor misstates the record in explaining a strike, that misstatement 

can be another clue showing discriminatory intent.” Id. (quoting Flowers, 588 U.S. at 314).

But here, the government’s characterization of Juror 28 as “upset” didn’t “misstate[] the 

record.” Flowers, 588 U.S. at 314. It’s true that Juror 28 didn’t use the word “upset” to describe 

her emotions at how her brother was treated. But she did say that her brother wasn’t treated fairly. 

Indeed, during the Batson sidebar, the government repeated these exact statements using the same 

language as Juror 28. And given that Juror No. 28 was clearly unhappy about how her brother was 

treated, it was fair for the government also to call her “upset.” To the extent describing her as 

“upset” could mean anything different, defense counsel didn’t object at the time. So, for all we 

know, it accurately captured Juror 28’s tone and body language. We won’t nitpick the 

government’s statements based on a cold appellate record.

Case: 23-3905 Document: 49-2 Filed: 12/03/2024 Page: 6
No. 23-3905, United States v. Hines

- 7 -

* * *

The district court committed no error, let alone a clear one, in accepting the government’s

race-neutral explanation for striking Juror No. 28. We therefore affirm.

Case: 23-3905 Document: 49-2 Filed: 12/03/2024 Page: 7