Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-05-56306/USCOURTS-ca9-05-56306-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael Billdt
Appellee
Mark Emoto
Appellee
Wesley Farmer
Appellee
Mark Garcia
Appellee
Walt Goggin
Appellee
Kimberlyn Hearns
Appellant
Craig Keith
Appellee
Mitchal Kimball
Appellee
Ernie Lemos
Appellee
San Bernardino Police Department
Appellee
Garret Zimmon
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KIMBERLYN HEARNS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

SAN BERNARDINO POLICE

DEPARTMENT; GARRET ZIMMON;

MICHAEL BILLDT, in his capacity as

Assistant Chief and Patrol

Division Commander of the

SBPD; WESLEY FARMER,

individually and in his capacity as

Captain in the SBPD; MARK

GARCIA, individually and in his No. 05-56214 capacity as a Lieutenant in the

SBPD; MARK  D.C. No. EMOTO, individually

and in his capacity as a Lieutenant CV-03-01434-SJO

in the SBPD; MITCHAL KIMBALL,

individually and in his capacity as

a Lieutenant in the SBPD; WALT

GOGGIN, individually and in his

capacity as a Lieutenant in the

SBPD; CRAIG KEITH, individually

and in his capacity as a Narcotics

Sergeant in the SBPD; ERNIE

LEMOS, individually and in his

capacity as an Internal Affairs

Supervisor in the SBPD,

Defendants-Appellees. 

7871

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KIMBERLYN HEARNS, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

SAN BERNARDINO POLICE

DEPARTMENT; GARRET ZIMMON;

MICHAEL BILLDT, in his capacity as

Assistant Chief and Patrol

Division Commander of the

SBPD; WESLEY FARMER,

individually and in his capacity as

Captain in the SBPD; MARK

GARCIA, individually and in his No. 05-56272 capacity as a Lieutenant in the

SBPD; MARK  D.C. No. EMOTO, individually

and in his capacity as a Lieutenant CV-03-01434-SJO

in the SBPD; MITCHAL KIMBALL,

individually and in his capacity as

a Lieutenant in the SBPD; WALT

GOGGIN, individually and in his

capacity as a Lieutenant in the

SBPD; CRAIG KEITH, individually

and in his capacity as a Narcotics

Sergeant in the SBPD; ERNIE

LEMOS, individually and in his

capacity as an Internal Affairs

Supervisor in the SBPD,

Defendants-Appellants. 

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KIMBERLYN HEARNS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

SAN BERNARDINO POLICE

DEPARTMENT; GARRET ZIMMON;

MICHAEL BILLDT, in his capacity as

Assistant Chief and Patrol

Division Commander of the

SBPD; WESLEY FARMER,

individually and in his capacity as

Captain in the SBPD; MARK

GARCIA, individually and in his No. 05-56306 capacity as a Lieutenant in the

SBPD; MARK  D.C. No. EMOTO, individually

and in his capacity as a Lieutenant CV-03-01434-SJO

in the SBPD; MITCHAL KIMBALL,

individually and in his capacity as

a Lieutenant in the SBPD; WALT

GOGGIN, individually and in his

capacity as a Lieutenant in the

SBPD; CRAIG KEITH, individually

and in his capacity as a Narcotics

Sergeant in the SBPD; ERNIE

LEMOS, individually and in his

capacity as an Internal Affairs

Supervisor in the SBPD,

Defendants-Appellees. 

HEARNS v. SAN BERNARDINO POLICE 7873

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KIMBERLYN HEARNS, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

SAN BERNARDINO POLICE

DEPARTMENT; GARRET ZIMMON;

MICHAEL BILLDT, in his capacity as

Assistant Chief and Patrol

Division Commander of the

SBPD; WESLEY FARMER,

individually and in his capacity as

Captain in the SBPD; MARK

GARCIA, individually and in his No. 05-56324

capacity as a Lieutenant in the D.C. No.

SBPD; MARK EMOTO, individually  CV-03-01434-SJO

and in his capacity as a Lieutenant OPINION in the SBPD; MITCHAL KIMBALL,

individually and in his capacity as

a Lieutenant in the SBPD; WALT

GOGGIN, individually and in his

capacity as a Lieutenant in the

SBPD; CRAIG KEITH, individually

and in his capacity as a Narcotics

Sergeant in the SBPD; ERNIE

LEMOS, individually and in his

capacity as an Internal Affairs

Supervisor in the SBPD,

Defendants-Appellants. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

S. James Otero, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

May 10, 2007—Pasadena, California

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Filed July 1, 2008

Before: Andrew J. Kleinfeld and Richard A. Paez,

Circuit Judges, and William T. Hart,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Hart;

Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Kleinfeld

*The Honorable William T. Hart, United States Senior District Judge

for the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation. 

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COUNSEL

Letitia E. Pepper, Riverside, California, for the plaintiff in

Appeals Nos. 05-56214, 05-56272, and 05-56324. 

Leo James Terrell, Beverly Hills, California, for the plaintiff

in Appeal No. 05-56306. 

James A. Odlum, Mundell, Odlum & Haws, LLP, San Bernardino, California, for defendants in Appeals Nos. 05-56214,

05-56272, 05-56306, and 05-56324. 

OPINION

HART, District Judge: 

It is the right and duty of a plaintiff initiating a case to file

a “short and plain statement of the claim.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

Rule 8(a)(2). The district court dismissed Plaintiff Kimberlyn

Hearns’ 81-page complaint under Rule 8 without prejudice

with leave to file an amended complaint. When Hearns filed

an amended complaint that was substantially unaltered, the

district court dismissed the case with prejudice. Neither complaint warranted dismissal under Rule 8: although each set

forth excessively detailed factual allegations, they were coherent, well-organized, and stated legally viable claims. We

therefore reverse in appeal No. 05-56214 and remand for further proceedings. Pursuant to Defendant’s non-opposition, we

also reverse in appeal No. 05-56306. Finally, we dismiss

appeals Nos. 05-56272 and 05-56324 as moot. 

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Kimberlyn Hearns, an African-American male, is

a police officer employed by Defendant City of San Bernardino Police Department (“SBPD”). In December 2003, PlainHEARNS v. SAN BERNARDINO POLICE 7877

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tiff filed a complaint against the SBPD and 10 unnamed

defendants in which he alleged that he experienced race-based

discrimination and retaliation, in violation of 42 U.S.C.

§§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986; Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e

et seq.; and state law (the “First Case”). The complaint was

81 pages and raised 17 claims. 

Defendants moved to dismiss the original complaint in its

entirety based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) and

alternatively moved to dismiss some claims under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In an order dated June 25,

2004, the district court granted the motion in part, dismissing

Plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice for failing to comply

with Rule 8 and allowing Plaintiff 18 days to file a first

amended complaint (“FAC”). The district court did not reach

Defendants’ Rule 12 arguments. 

No FAC was filed within 18 days. In an order dated

July 28, 2004, the district court ordered that Plaintiff show

cause in writing as to why the case should not be dismissed

for lack of diligent prosecution. Plaintiff filed a written

response. The attorney who represented him at the time stated

in a declaration that she had not received the order of dismissal or the order to show cause. On September 21, 2004,

the court granted Plaintiff 18 more days to file the FAC,

which was filed on October 4. The FAC is 68 pages in length.

It contains the same 17 claims as the original complaint.

Although Plaintiff dropped one individual Defendant and

removed or shortened some allegations, the 13-page reduction

resulted primarily from narrowing the margins. 

Defendants moved to dismiss the FAC, again raising Rule

8 and Rule 12(b)(6) arguments. The district court granted the

motion to dismiss with prejudice “for failure to obey the June

25 order requiring [plaintiff] to comply with Rule 8(a).” The

court also stated “that alternative measures less drastic than

dismissal with prejudice would [not] be effective here. See

McHenry [v. Renne], 84 F.3d [1172,] 1178 [(9th Cir. 1996)].”

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The dismissal order was entered on the docket on February

17, 2005. Although neither party notes this fact, no separate

Rule 58 judgment was ever entered on the docket, with the

consequence that the order of dismissal did not become a final

judgment until 150 days later, on July 18, 2005.1 Fed. R. Civ.

P. 58(b)(2)(B). 

Plaintiff’s then-attorney informed him that his case had

been dismissed with prejudice because “the judge felt the

complaint was still too long.” She did not recommend any

other action. The attorney who represents Plaintiff on this

appeal also drafted the original complaint, pursuant to a contract with Plaintiff’s original attorney of record. When she

learned of the dismissal, she offered to assist Plaintiff and

entered her appearance after Plaintiff discharged his original

attorney. Believing that more than 30 days had passed since

the entry of judgment, Plaintiff’s new attorney filed a Rule

60(b)(6) motion seeking relief from dismissal based on prior

counsel’s misconduct and inaction. In the alternative, Plaintiff

requested an extension of time to file a notice of appeal. On

April 18, 2005, the district court reopened the case to hear the

Rule 60(b)(6) motion. 

While Plaintiff’s motion for relief from the dismissal of the

First Case was pending, he filed a second lawsuit against the

SBPD and 10 unnamed defendants, alleging that he experienced retaliation for filing the first lawsuit, in violation of

Title VII (the “Second Case”). The Second Case was transferred to the same judge who was presiding over the First

Case. Thereafter, the court sua sponte consolidated the two

cases. 

In an Order entered on the docket on August 1, 2005, the

district court denied the Rule 60(b) motion because Plaintiff

had not shown that his former attorney was grossly negligent.

Accordingly, the district court denied Defendants’ motion for

1The 150th day was Sunday, July 17. 

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discovery as moot. The court found, however, that because

prior counsel had advised Plaintiff not to appeal, failed to

inform him how to preserve his right to appeal, and delayed

in turning over the case file, good cause existed for extending

the time to appeal. Accordingly, the court entered an order

granting a 10-day extension. Four days after the entry of this

Order, Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal, No. 05-56214, challenging the original dismissal and the denial of his Rule

60(b)(6) motion.

On August 11, 2005, Defendants filed a motion for postjudgment relief seeking reconsideration of the extension of

time to appeal, contending they did not have an adequate

opportunity to file an opposition to that part of Plaintiff’s

Rule 60(b) motion. On August 19, the court denied the

motion. In that Order, the court also stated:

Finally, the Court originally calendared a scheduling conference for August 22, 2005 in the [Second

Case]. However, the [Second case] and [First case]

were already consolidated for all purposes including

trial. See Order of July 29, 2005. Accordingly, the

entire matter is now up on appeal. The scheduling

conference is hereby taken OFF CALENDAR. There

are no matters pending before this Court in this case.

The clerk is hereby ordered to close the file. 

On August 19, Defendants filed a notice of cross-appeal,

No. 05-56272, from the August 1 Order, in which they challenged the grant of an extension of time for Plaintiff to appeal.

On August 30, 2005, Defendants filed a second notice of

appeal, No. 05-56324, from the denial of their motion to

reconsider. 

Plaintiff then filed an application to sever the two cases and

to reinstate the Second Case. Although Defendants did not

oppose Plaintiff’s request, the district court denied the application because “the allegations in each Complaint stem from

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a common nexus of facts and involve the same parties.” The

court did not expressly address Plaintiff’s reinstatement

request. On August 25, Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal, No.

05-56306, from the portion of the August 19 Order directing

that the Second Case be closed. At oral argument, the SBPD

informed the court that it does not oppose this appeal. We

therefore vacate the district court’s dismissal of the Second

Case and remand for further proceedings. 

II. DEFENDANTS’ APPEALS

In No. 05-56272, Defendants contend that the district court

abused its discretion in extending the time for Plaintiff to

appeal and seek reversal of the August 1, 2005 Order. 

Defendants’ argument lacks merit because no extension of

time was ever needed. Because no separate Rule 58 judgment

was entered for the February 17, 2005 Order dismissing the

FAC, the window for appealing that decision did not begin to

run on that date. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

58(b)(2)(B), the appeal period began to run 150 days later, on

July 18, 2005. See Stephanie-Cardona LLC v. Smith’s Food

& Drug Ctrs., Inc., 476 F.3d 701, 704 (9th Cir. 2007). See

also Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(7)(A)(ii). Plaintiff therefore had at

least 30 days thereafter (August 17, 2005) in which to appeal

this order, see Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1), and in fact actually

filed his notice of appeal prior to that date.2

2Alternatively, we would find Plaintiff’s August 5th notice of appeal

timely under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4)(A)(iv) and (vi)

because he filed his motion for post-judgment relief within ten days of the

judgment becoming final on July 18, 2005—indeed, he filed the motion

before that date. Construing Plaintiff’s motion as seeking relief under

either Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 or 60(b), that motion tolled the

time period for filing the notice of appeal. See Shapiro v. Paradise Valley

Unified Sch. Dist. No. 69, 374 F.3d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 2004); Miller v.

Marriott Int’l, Inc., 300 F.3d 1061, 1063-64 (9th Cir. 2002). 

HEARNS v. SAN BERNARDINO POLICE 7881

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We finally note that, although neither party has raised this

issue, the district court never docketed in the First Case the

August 1, 2005 Order denying Plaintiff’s motion for postjudgment relief and extending the time to appeal in the First

Case. This failure is of no consequence, however, because the

parties have effectively waived the entry requirement by treating the order as an appealable judgment. See Calhoun v.

United States, 647 F.2d 6, 10-11 (9th Cir. 1981), overruled on

other grounds, Acosta v. Louisiana Dep’t of Health & Human

Res., 478 U.S. 251 (1986); see also Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381, 382, 387-88 (1978). 

Because no extension of time to appeal the order dismissing the First Case was required, we therefore dismiss Defendants’ two appeals, Nos. 05-56272 and 05-56324, as moot. 

III. DISMISSAL OF THE FIRST CASE

[1] We turn now to the merits of the February 17, 2005

Order dismissing the First Case. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) authorizes a district court to dismiss a complaint

with prejudice for failure to comply with Rule 8(a). Nevijel v.

North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981).

We review a Rule 41(b) dismissal for abuse of discretion. Id.

at 674 (citing Schmidt v. Hermann, 614 F.2d 1221, 1224 (9th

Cir. 1980)). To do so, we must necessarily consider the legal

question of whether the district court correctly dismissed

without prejudice the original complaint on Rule 8 grounds.

See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996) (“A district court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an

error of law.” (citation omitted)); In re Dominguez, 51 F.3d

1502, 1508 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). 

As regards the application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), the original complaint and the FAC are essentially

identical. The FAC is 68 pages long. The first four pages

name and identify Plaintiff and 10 Defendants. The next 42

pages, captioned “Factual Background,” relate Plaintiff’s 17-

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year history as a police officer and sergeant. The remaining

22 pages allege 17 different federal and state claims, clearly

identifying each claim and each Defendant named in a particular claim. Other than the hostile workplace claim, no claim

is more than nine paragraphs. 

On appeal, Defendants do not attempt to identify particular

allegations as immaterial or unnecessary. They do not assert

that the complaint fails to set forth cognizable causes of

action, that the legal theories are incoherent, or that they cannot tell which causes of action are alleged against which

Defendants. They simply object that the complaint provides

too much factual detail. The part that has been attacked as

prolix is the Factual Background section, reciting Plaintiff’s

education, military service, training, promotion and demotion

history, and discrimination incidents. We reject Defendants’

argument and conclude that neither complaint violated Rule

8(a). 

We affirmed a district court’s dismissal on Rule 8 grounds

in McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 1996). Not only

was the first complaint at issue in that case lengthy; it set out

its claims in two sentences, which comprised 30 lines, without

specifying which of the 20 named defendants were liable for

which claims. Id. at 1174. To make matters worse, in response

to the district court’s order to file an amended complaint

“ ‘which clearly and concisely explains which allegations are

relevant to which defendants,’ ” the plaintiffs filed an

amended complaint that was longer than the first complaint.

Id. (quoting district court’s order). The district court then gave

the plaintiffs a final opportunity to file a proper complaint

“ ‘which states clearly how each and every defendant is

alleged to have violated plaintiffs’ legal rights. . . . [P]laintiffs

would be well advised to edit or eliminate their twenty-six

page introduction and focus on linking their factual allegations to actual legal claims.’ ” Id. at 1176 (quoting district

court’s order). We affirmed the district court’s dismissal of

the final amended complaint, which we described as “arguHEARNS v. SAN BERNARDINO POLICE 7883

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mentative, prolix, replete with redundancy, and largely irrelevant,” id. at 1177, noting that “[o]nly by months or years of

discovery and motions [could] each defendant find out what

he is being sued for,” id. at 1178. Considering Rule 41(b), we

concluded that the district court had not abused its discretion

because it had already given the plaintiffs multiple opportunities to comply, along with specific instructions on how to correct the complaint. Id. at 1178-79. 

In Nevijel, 651 F.2d 671, we upheld a Rule 8(a) dismissal

of a 48-page complaint that contained an additional 23 pages

of addenda and exhibits. The complaint was characterized as

“ ‘verbose, confusing and almost entirely conclusory.’ ” Id. at

674. After the district court dismissed the original complaint

without prejudice, the plaintiff filed a late amended complaint

that “named additional defendants without leave of court, and

was equally as verbose, confusing and conclusory as the initial complaint.” Id. We found no abuse of discretion because

the district court provided “reasonable opportunities and alternatives” before dismissing with prejudice; in light of the fact

that the plaintiff offered no excuse for the late filing and

utterly failed to comply with the district court’s order, there

was no reason to think that an additional opportunity would

yield different results. See id.

In Schmidt, the complaint was 30 pages long. It was “impossible to designate the cause or causes of action attempted

to be alleged in the complaint.” 614 F.2d at 1223. The complaint was described as a “confusing statement of a nonexisting cause of action” and as “confusing, distracting,

ambiguous, and unintelligible.” Id. at 1224. Additionally, the

complaint’s conclusory allegations did not satisfy the heightened pleading requirement for averments of fraud. Id. The

Ninth Circuit upheld the dismissal of the action following two

amendments of the original complaint. Id. at 1223-24. 

In Gillibeau v. City of Richmond, 417 F.2d 426, 431-32

(9th Cir. 1969), one of the claims named seven defendants. As

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to only one of these defendants, that claim was dismissed for

failing to comply with Rule 8(a)(2). This court reversed the

dismissal based on Rule 8(a)(2). In doing so, this court stated

that “a dismissal for a violation under Rule 8(a)(2), is usually

confined to instances in which the complaint is so ‘verbose,

confused and redundant that its true substance, if any, is well

disguised.’ ” Id. at 431 (quoting Corcoran v. Yorty, 347 F.2d

222, 223 (9th Cir. 1965)). The claim at issue did not satisfy

those criteria. 

Defendants cite a 1964 decision of this court which upheld

the dismissal of a 55-page complaint for violating Rule 8(a)

and the subsequent dismissal of the case when the plaintiff

failed to file any new pleading by two and one-half months

after the date set for filing an amended complaint. See Agnew

v. Moody, 330 F.2d 868, 870-71 (9th Cir. 1964). That case

provides only a brief statement of the holding that the complaint did not comply with Rule 8(a).

The complaint was dismissed as to the arresting

officers for failure to satisfy the requirement of Rule

8(a) that it contain ‘a short and plain statement of the

claim.’ Although the elements and factual context of

appellant’s claim for relief were simple, the complaint extended over fifty-five pages, excluding the

prayer and exhibits. Making full allowance for whatever additional verbiage appellant might be permitted in view of the many decisions emphasizing the

need for specificity in pleadings under the Civil

Rights Act (Stiltner v. Rhay, 322 F.2d 314, 316 n.4

(9th Cir. 1963)), the district court was entirely justified in holding that the complaint did not comply

with Rule 8(a), and in ordering appellant to replead.

Id. at 870. 

[2] Unlike the facts here, the plaintiff in Agnew never filed

an amended complaint as had been ordered. Agnew cannot

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fairly be read as holding that excessive length, by itself, is a

sufficient basis for finding a violation of Rule 8(a). Two

Ninth Circuit cases decided shortly after Agnew characterize

the holding of Agnew as being limited to a complaint that is

“so verbose, confused and redundant that its true substance,

if any, is well disguised.” Gillibeau, 417 F.2d at 431; Corcoran, 347 F.2d at 223. Agnew has never been cited by this

court as standing for the proposition that a complaint may be

found to be in violation of Rule 8(a) solely based on excessive

length, nor does any other Ninth Circuit case contain such a

holding. 

[3] Decisions from other circuits are also consistent with

the view that verbosity or length is not by itself a basis for

dismissing a complaint based on Rule 8(a). See Wynder v.

McMahon, 360 F.3d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that district court erred in dismissing on Rule 8 grounds when the

complaint, though long, was not “so confused, ambiguous,

vague or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if

any, is well disguised” (internal quotation omitted)); Garst v.

Lockheed-Martin Corp., 328 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 2003)

(“Some complaints are windy but understandable. Surplusage

can and should be ignored.”); Mann v. Boatwright, 477 F.3d

1140, 1148 (10th Cir. 2007) (affirming Rule 8 dismissal when

it was impossible to “separate the wheat from the chaff” in the

complaint and because “[i]t was not the district court’s job to

stitch together cognizable claims for relief from the wholly

deficient pleading”). 

[4] By contrast, the complaint at issue here was not “replete

with redundancy and largely irrelevant.” Cf. McHenry, 84

F.3d at 1177. It set out more factual detail than necessary, but

the overview was relevant to Plaintiff’s causes of action for

employment discrimination. Nor was it “confusing and conclusory.” Cf. Nevijel, 651 F.2d at 674. The complaint is logically organized, divided into a description of the parties, a

chronological factual background, and a presentation of enumerated legal claims, each of which lists the liable Defendants

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and legal basis therefor. The FAC and the original complaint

contain excessive detail, but are intelligible and clearly delineate the claims and the Defendants against whom the claims

are made. These facts distinguish this complaint from the ones

that concern the dissent. Here, the Defendants should have no

difficulty in responding to the claims with an answer and/or

with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. 

[5] The district court also has ample remedial authority to

relieve a defendant of the burden of responding to a complaint

with excessive factual detail. One option would have been to

simply strike the surplusage from the FAC. See Simmons v.

Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1995); Fallon v. U. S. Gov’t,

No. CIV S-06-1438, 2007 WL 707531, *2 (E.D. Cal. March

6, 2007); Grayson v. Schriro, No. CIV 05-1749, 2007 WL

91611, *3 (D. Ariz. Jan. 11, 2007) (quoting Marshall v.

United Nations, No. CIV S-05-2575, 2006 WL 1883179, *3

(E.D. Cal. July 6, 2006)). Many or all of the paragraphs from

33 through 207 of the FAC, covering 38 pages, could have

been stricken. Alternatively, the judge could have excused

Defendants from answering those paragraphs. 

[6] Because dismissal with prejudice is a harsh remedy, our

precedent is clear that the district court “should first consider

less drastic alternatives.” McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1178. In

weighing possible alternatives against the consequences of

dismissal with prejudice, the district court should consider, for

example, whether “public policy strongly favor[s] resolution

of this dispute on the merits.” Dahl v. City of Huntington

Beach, 84 F.3d 363, 366 (9th Cir. 1996). The court should

also consider whether “dismissal [would] severely penalize[ ]

plaintiffs . . . for their counsels’ bad behavior.” Id. at 366; cf.

Al-Torki v. Kaepmen, 78 F.3d 1381, 1383-85 (9th Cir. 1996)

(affirming dismissal with prejudice when plaintiff’s own conduct violated court orders). Even when the litigant is the one

actually responsible for failure to comply with a court’s order,

which evidence before the court did not show is the situation

here, “[t]he sanction of dismissal should be imposed only if

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the deceptive conduct is willful, in bad faith, or relates to the

matters in controversy in such a way as to interfere with the

rightful decision of the case.” United States v. Nat’l Med.

Enters., Inc., 792 F.2d 906, 912 (9th Cir. 1986) (citations

omitted); see also Hamilton Copper & Steel Corp. v. Primary

Steel, Inc., 898 F.2d 1428, 1430 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that

even in light of party’s misconduct, district court should generally consider alternatives to dismissal with prejudice). 

[7] The district court abused its discretion by imposing the

sanction of dismissal with prejudice instead of imposing a less

drastic alternative. Plaintiff’s complaints were long but intelligible and allege viable, coherent claims. Because we conclude

that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing with

prejudice, we need not reach the merits of the Rule 60(b)

motion based on former counsel’s alleged misconduct. 

In the district court, Defendants also raised Rule 12(b)(6)

grounds for dismissal of some claims. Those grounds were

not addressed by the court nor are they raised here. On

remand, the district court may address the Rule 12(b)(6)

issues before requiring an answer to the FAC. As indicated

above, the district court may also consider striking surplusage

from the FAC or not requiring Defendants to answer all paragraphs of the FAC. 

[8] In No. 05-56214, we vacate the dismissal order and

remand for further proceedings. 

IV. THE SECOND CASE DISMISSAL

The parties again fail to note that the district court never

entered a separate Rule 58 judgment dismissing the Second

Case. Regardless, the parties have treated the August 19, 2005

Order as a final appealable judgment and Plaintiff filed his

notice of appeal well within the time permitted. See Fed. R.

App. P. 4(a)(1), 4(a)(7)(A)(ii). Appeal No. 05-56306 is therefore properly before us. As that appeal is not opposed by

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SBPD, the only named Defendant, we remand the Second

Case for reinstatement and further proceedings. 

V. CONCLUSION

In No. 05-56214, the order of dismissal is VACATED and

REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion. In No. 05-56306 the matter is REMANDED with

instructions to reinstate the case. Appeals Nos. 05-56272 and

05-56324 are DISMISSED as moot. 

KLEINFELD, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part: 

There are two cases before us, one filed by Hearns in 2003,

and one filed in 2005. I concur in the reversal and remand in

the 2005 case, and dissent in the 2003 case. We are all agreed

that Hearns’s 2005 complaint should not have been dismissed.

My dissent, therefore, has no bearing on whether Hearns may

proceed with his case. The important issue is whether district

courts may apply Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and our

precedent. 

The district court, granting the motion to dismiss in the

2003 case, carefully explained that the court was acting pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) as construed in our

decisions Nevijel v. North Coast Life Insurance1 and McHenry

v. Renne.

2

 The panel does not follow these authorities, even

though they are binding circuit law. The district court exercised its discretion to dismiss only after giving plaintiff

numerous opportunities to cure not only the pleading defect

but also other defects, and providing the plaintiff with guidance about what was wrong with the complaint. The district

1

651 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1981). 

2

84 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 1996). 

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court’s liberality was repaid with contumaciousness and evasion. The plaintiff filed an amended complaint distinguished

from the dismissed version only by smaller margins.3

The majority opinion recites but does not actually apply the

standard of review for dismissal under Rule 8, abuse of discretion.4

 The majority offers no authority and no reason for its

extraordinary holding, that the district court should have

stricken “[m]any or all of the paragraphs from 33 through

207” or excused defendants from answering them. The closest

it comes is a Second Circuit case addressing a 4 1⁄2 page pro

se complaint, not an 81 page counseled compliant.5 The

majority errs by holding that district courts have the duty (not

merely the discretion) to “relieve a defendant of the burden of

responding to a complaint with excessive factual detail” and

should “simply strike the surplusage from” faulty complaints.6

One might suppose that this jurisprudential surprise would

occur in a pro se case, but this is a counseled case, in which

plaintiff has had at least three attorneys of record. 

The many additional authorities cited in the majority opinion largely uphold dismissals and none of them uphold the

new rule announced by the panel, the citations in the majority

opinion being more in the nature of decorations than applications of law.7

3There were negligibly minor revisions and four fewer averments. 

4McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996). 

5

Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 85 (2d Cir. 1995). 

6Majority Opinion p.7887. 

7

See Wynder v. McMahon, 360 F.3d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 2004); Garst v.

Lockheed-Martin Corp., 328 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 2003); Mann v. Boatwright, 477 F.3d 1140, 1148 (10th Cir. 2007); McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d

1172, 1176-79 (9th Cir. 1996); Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651

F.2d 671, 674 (9th Cir. 1981); Schmidt v. Hermann, 614 F.2d 1221, 1223-

24 (9th Cir. 1980); Gillibeau v. City of Richmond, 417 F.2d 426, 431-32

(9th Cir. 1969); Corcoran v. Yorty, 347 F.2d 222, 223 (9th Cir. 1965);

Agnew v. Moody, 330 F.2d 868, 870 (9th Cir. 1964). 

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Facts.

A comprehensive factual recount shows why the district

court reasonably exercised its discretion to dismiss Hearns’s

complaint. 

The original complaint is 81 pages long, much longer than

we allow appellate briefs to be. It has 336 separate averments

of events spanning more than a decade (and setting out many

alleged wrongs for which the statute of limitations would bar

claims, as well as Title VII claims against fellow employees

rather than the employer, plainly barred by law).8 It is very

hard to understand. Even the chronology is hard to follow

because the events are not set out in any logical order, chronological or otherwise. The claims do not start until page 57,

after a lengthy, largely irrelevant and entirely unnecessary

history of Hearns’s life and work, and the many wrongs committed against him and others at work. 

In 2005, a different lawyer filed a different complaint,

alleging substantially the same history and claims plus a retaliation claim. By contrast with the 2003 complaint and

amended complaint, the 2005 complaint is clear and concise,

9 pages instead of 81, and 39 averments instead of 336. Were

there the slightest doubt whether the case lent itself to a clear

and concise pleading, the well pleaded 2005 case would eliminate the doubt.

The complaint and amended complaint in the 2003 case are

not just prolix and largely unnecessary to the “short and plain

statement of the claim[s]” required by Rule 8(a)(2), but are

also very difficult to read because of odd rhetorical devices.

For example, instead of calling defendants “defendants,” or

using their names where the averments and claims distinguish

them, it calls them the “GOBN,” defining this acronym

(which one must memorize to read the complaint) as the

8

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). 

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“Good Ole Boys Network” (plaintiff is male, and does not

allege sex discrimination). 

The district judge, in dismissing the 2003 complaint,

explained that “the complaint is unnecessarily long, even

given that it contains seventeen legal claims.” The factual section is “over 50 pages long, and includes many details that are

not necessary in order to give Defendants notice of the allegations of racial discrimination at issue here. For example,

plaintiff need not have inserted entire email exchanges into

the complaint . . . in order to give Defendants notice that

Plaintiff was alleging a hostile relationship between himself”

and a particular supervisor. Nor did the averment about some

coworker’s alleged rapes have much to do with Hearns’s

claims. The district court aptly noted that “such specificity at

the initial pleading stage is unduly cumbersome to Defendants’ ability to timely answer the complaint.” 

On June 25, 2004, the district court gave plaintiff 18 days

to file an amended complaint or else have the action dismissed for failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b). Two weeks

after this deadline passed, instead of dismissing the case, the

court issued an order to show cause why the action should not

be dismissed. Again, no response. 

Plaintiff did not file anything until two and a half months

after the dismissal without prejudice, long after the deadline

on the order to show cause. Counsel claimed (but did not

swear or declare under penalty of perjury) that she “did not

become aware until Sunday, 9/5/04” of either order. She

requested another 18 days to file an amended complaint.

Meanwhile, she had been quoted in a newspaper accusing

defendants of racial harassment perpetrated by the GOBN. 

The court expressed skepticism about counsel’s unsworn

claim that she had not received the orders, and noted that the

record showed that both documents were mailed to counsel at

her present law office address, but gave her the 18 days she

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asked for anyway. Though she filed the amended complaint

within 18 days, she did not make any substantive changes.

She instead used narrower margins to cut the number of

pages. The amended complaint rambled on in the same prolix

way about the GOBN, about how those blacks and other

minorities who were not mistreated were “tools” and “decoys,” and claimed that promotions went to WTW’s. This

acronym was defined as “who they want.” The amended complaint has about the same number of words as the initial complaint. 

This case was not just a counseled case rather than a pro se

case, but also it was a counseled case in which the plaintiff

as well as his attorney bore personal responsibility for the

defiance of Rule 8 and of the court order. Hearns’s lawyer,

Danuta Tuszynska, gave defense counsel an affidavit which

was filed, stating that a contract attorney, Letitia Pepper, had

actually drafted the original complaint. Tuszynska said in her

sworn statement that “[a]fter the court’s order granting the

first motion to dismiss, I advised plaintiff that we needed to

shorten the pleading, but he refused. Instead he urged me to

lengthen the first amended complaint by adding additional

parties, which I declined to do.” Tuszynska shortened the

complaint from 81 pages down to 68 pages, but not by cutting

what the judge had said to cut. She just deleted four of the 336

averments and made the margins narrower. 

Granting a motion to dismiss the amended complaint, this

time with prejudice, the judge explained that he “thoroughly

compared the [First Amended Complaint] to the complaint

and conclude[d] that they include nearly all of the same factual and legal allegations. Hearns . . . made no genuine effort

to comply with the June 25 order. Hearns’ factual allegations

remain grossly excessive, and in certain parts, repetitive and

immaterial. It is clear that Hearns’ [First Amended Complaint] has not cured the pleading deficiencies discussed in the

June 25 order.” The district court expressly considered sancHEARNS v. SAN BERNARDINO POLICE 7893

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tions other than dismissal with prejudice, but rejected them

because of the history:

The court does not believe that alternative measures

less drastic than dismissal with prejudice would be

effective here. See McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1178. The

court has already given Hearns leave to amend to

comply with Rule 8(a), which he failed to do. Moreover, when Hearns’ counsel claimed not to have

received the June 25 order or the July 28, 2004

Order to Show Cause why his case should not be dismissed for failure to amend within the time allotted

by the court, the court extended the time to file a

[First Amended Complaint], even though it was

‘extremely coincidental’ that Hearns’ counsel did not

receive two court documents mailed from the Clerk

of the Court to her present law office address. 

After the dismissal of the amended complaint, Hearns substituted Tuszynska’s contract attorney, Letitia Pepper, as his

new counsel. Pepper missed what she understood to be the

appeal deadline, and blamed it on Hearns’s first lawyer, Tuszynska. Pepper sought an extension of time to file an appeal

because of Tuszynska’s “gross negligence and/or egregious

misconduct.” According to Pepper, Tuszynska delayed in

releasing Hearns’s files, failed to convey messages to Hearns

about Pepper’s willingness to help Tuszynska with the First

Amended Complaint, and failed to timely appeal the dismissal

order. Pepper also blamed the delay on a falling out between

herself and Tuszynska that arose from when Tuszynska initially represented Pepper after she was arrested for dog theft

(no charges were filed) and Tuszynska abruptly ended the

representation. 

Analysis

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a “short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

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entitled to relief.” Subsection 8(d)(1) requires that “[e]ach

allegation must be simple, concise and direct.”

9

 Rule 84 provides that “[t]he forms in the Appendix suffice under these

rules and illustrate the simplicity and brevity that these rules

contemplate.” The forms in the Appendix for complaints

range from three to eight averments, none requiring more than

a few pages after the caption, even for such complex matters

as patent infringement, copyright infringement and unfair

competition, and interpleader and declaratory relief. 

“We review dismissal of a complaint with prejudice for

failure to comply with a court’s order to amend the complaint

to comply with Rule 8 for abuse of discretion.”

10 “The district

judge’s evaluation of whether the plaintiff complied with his

order is entitled to considerable weight.”

11 I cannot see that

the majority opinion gives any weight, much less “considerable weight,” to the district judge’s evaluation.

We have for decades upheld dismissals with prejudice of

needlessly prolix and confusing complaints, after plaintiff

failed to take advantage of an invitation to cure the defects in

an amended complaint.12 So have our sister circuits.13 Federal

courts not infrequently exercise discretion not to dismiss with

prejudice rambling complaints by pro se litigants who are not

9Emphasis added. 

10McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996). 

11Id.

12See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 674 (9th Cir.

1981); Schmidt v. Hermann, 614 F.2d 1221, 1223-24 (9th Cir. 1980);

Agnew v. Moody, 330 F.2d 868, 871 (9th Cir. 1964). 

13Keul v. FDIC, 8 F.3d 905 (1st Cir. 1993); In re Westinghouse Secs.

Litigation, 90 F.3d 696 (3rd Cir. 1996); Smith v. Intn’l Longshoremen’s

Ass’n, AFL-CIO, Local No. 333, 592 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1979); Collier v.

First Michigan Coop. Housing Ass’n, 274 F.2d 467 (6th Cir. 1960); Garst

v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 328 F.3d 374 (7th Cir. 2003); Koll v. Wayzata

State Bank, 397 F.2d 124 (8th Cir. 1968); Ausherman v. Stump, 643 F.2d

715 (10th Cir. 1981); McCann v. Clark, 191 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1951).

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likely to be able to plead any more clearly.14 “Conversely, the

federal courts are far less charitable when one or more

amended pleadings already have been filed with no measurable increase in clarity.”

15

I now turn to the earlier of the two cases upon which the

district judge based his decision, Nevijel v North Coast Life

Insurance Company.

16 As in the case before us, the district

court dismissed with prejudice, after first giving the plaintiff

an opportunity to amend. We affirmed, holding that in appropriate circumstances “[a] complaint which fails to comply

with rules 8(a) and 8(e) may be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to rule 41(b),”

17 and that such a dismissal will be overturned on appeal “only” if the district court abused its

discretion.18 The circumstances in that case resembled those in

the case at bar, except that the complaint in Nevijel was

nowhere near as verbose and confusing as the one in this case,

nor did the plaintiff in Nevijel sneak around the court’s

instructions in the earlier dismissal by word processor manipulation. 

Fifteen years later, in McHenry v. Renne,

19 we followed our

holding in Nevijel. We upheld a dismissal with prejudice of

a civil rights complaint a fraction of the length of the one in

the case before us, and comparably confusing. The majority’s

ground for not following McHenry is that among the many

faults with the complaint, one could not figure out which

defendants were being sued on which claims. That is not

much of a distinction, considering the hours it would take to

prepare an outline of the complaint in the case before us, nor

145 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1217 (3d ed. 2004). 

15Id.

16651 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1981). 

17Id. at 673. 

18Id. at 674. 

1984 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996). 

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was that the issue on which McHenry turned. As in the case

before us, the complaint in McHenry “read[ ] like a magazine

story instead of a traditional complaint.”

20

We held in McHenry that the Federal Rules “require,” not

merely suggest, that complaints be “simple, concise and

direct,”21 and pointed out that Rule 84 and the Appendix of

Forms illustrated the “simplicity and brevity” contemplated

by Rule 8.22 As in the case before us, the complaint in

McHenry was “argumentative, prolix, replete with redundancy, and largely irrelevant.”

23 We took special note that

“[n]one of this material has any resemblance to the sample

pleadings in the Appendix of Forms,” and rather than set out

the claims, “the pleading seems designed to provide quotations for newspaper stories.”

24

True, dismissal with prejudice is a harsh remedy. But so is

the failure to dismiss with prejudice, where such a dismissal

is appropriate. The harshness and injustice of failure to dismiss falls not only on courts, but also on defendants and litigants in other cases. As we explained in McHenry, complaints

like this one require the judge in effect to draft a proper complaint in chambers, a task likely to take at least half a day. The

majority thinks the judge ought to have trudged through the

81 pages, 336 averments with a red pen, striking averments or

drafting an order telling defendants when averments did not

need to be answered. Indeed, in this case, that is just what the

majority says the district judge should have done, as though

the judge should have been Hearns’s fourth lawyer in this

case. By contrast with the hours of effort the majority imposes

on the district judge, all Hearns’s lawyer evidently had to do

20Id. at 1176. 

21McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1177. 

22Id. at 1177. 

23Id.

24Id. at 1178. 

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was a “select all” and narrow the margins on her word processor. 

Failure to dismiss reeks of unfairness to defendants. The

defendants are put to the expense of a far more extensive pretrial process, and in all likelihood a far lengthier trial requiring expensive preparation on all sorts of irrelevancies, leaving

as detritus the uncertainty about how to apply res judicata to

whatever was adjudicated, if the plaintiff sues again. 

Prolix, confusing complaints such as the ones

plaintiffs filed in this case impose unfair burdens on

litigants and judges. As a practical matter, the judge

and opposing counsel, in order to perform their

responsibilities, cannot use a complaint such as the

one plaintiffs filed, and must prepare outlines to

determine who is being sued for what. Defendants

are then put at risk that their outline differs from the

judge’s, that plaintiffs will surprise them with something new at trial which they reasonably did not

understand to be in the case at all, and that res judicata effects of settlement or judgment will be different from what they reasonably expected. “[T]he

rights of the defendants to be free from costly and

harassing litigation must be considered.” Von Poppenheim [v. Portland Boxing and Wrestling

Comm’n, 442 F.2d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 1971)]. 

The judge wastes half a day in chambers preparing

the “short and plain statement” which Rule 8 obligated plaintiffs to submit. He then must manage the

litigation without knowing what claims are made

against whom. This leads to discovery disputes and

lengthy trials, prejudicing litigants in other case who

follow the rules, as well as defendants in the case in

which the prolix pleading is filed. “[T]he rights of

litigants awaiting their turns to have other matters

resolved must be considered. . . .” Nevijel, 651 F.2d

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at 675; Von Poppenheim, 442 F.2d at 1054. While

commendable in its consideration for plaintiffs in

this case, the magistrate’s thorough analysis and

thirty-page report, and the judge’s study of the

report, took a great deal of time away from more

deserving litigants waiting in line.25

A complaint with hundreds of averments generates tens of

thousands of dollars in discovery and motions expenses. Even

answering the complaint is an expensive and unjustified burden, because Rule 8(b) requires the defendants to state their

defenses to “each” claim, and worse, in a complaint with hundreds of averments, to “admit or deny the allegations asserted

against it by an opposing party.”

26 One experienced in litigation knows how time consuming for the lawyer and expensive

for the client it is to search out documents and personnel and

get people on the phone, in order to file a good faith answer

to hundreds of averments. The majority’s claim that

“[d]efendants should have no difficulty in responding to the

claims with an answer and/or with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to

dismiss” assumes days of associates’ time available and an

unlimited litigation budget. 

Failure to dismiss with prejudice, as we explained in

McHenry, also imposes injustices on other litigants waiting in

line for the district court’s time. No doubt judges feel that

they are doing a fine and charitable thing when they devote

a great deal of time to an incompetently pleaded complaint,

trying to turn a sow’s ear into a silk purse. 

The feeling of compassion, though, may be unjustified. The

judge who does what the majority opinion says he ought to do

with a complaint that violates Rule 8 is like a clerk in a grocery store displaying warmth and friendliness by chatting with

the customer at the register, while a half dozen others stand

25McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1179-80. 

26Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(b)(1). 

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seething in the slow line. The district court owes it to the

other litigants in other cases as well as to the defendants to

husband its resources for cases that are properly pleaded. 

None of our disagreement goes to whether Hearns may litigate his civil rights claim. We are all agreed that dismissal of

the 2005 complaint was indeed an abuse of discretion. The

only reason I can see for why the district court dismissed that

complaint was that it could hardly be seen, under the huge

pile of garbage dumped on the court by the complaint and

amended complaint in the 2003 case. What our dispute is

about is whether the mandatory language of Rule 8 shall be

followed, and whether a panel shall follow the binding precedents of our own court. Today’s majority decision means that

a district judge who conscientiously applies the rule and follows our precedents in Nevijel and McHenry cannot count on

us to do the same.

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