Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-07-56365/USCOURTS-ca9-07-56365-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jason Skip Holland
Appellant
Al Scribner
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRANDON WADE HEIN, 

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

No. 07-56277 WILLIAM JOSEPH SULLIVAN, Warden

of California Correctional  D.C. No.

Institution, at Tehachapi, CV-04-03502-SJO

California, Substituted for Michael

G. Yarborough,

Respondent-Appellee. 

TONY MILIOTTI, 

Petitioner-Appellant, No. 07-56288

v.  D.C. No.

JIM HALL, CV-04-03491-SJO

Respondent-Appellee. 

JASON SKIP HOLLAND, 

Petitioner-Appellant,

No. 07-56365

v.  D.C. No.

AL SCRIBNER, Substituted for CV-04-03416-SJO

George A. Ortiz,

Respondent-Appellee. 

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MICAH HOLLAND,  No. 07-56367

Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No.

v.  CV-04-03407-

SJO(MLG) DERRAL G. ADAMS,

Respondent-Appellee. OPINION 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

S. James Otero, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

October 7, 2009—Pasadena, California

Filed April 12, 2010

Before: Andrew J. Kleinfeld and Richard C. Tallman,

Circuit Judges, and David G. Trager,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Trager

*The Honorable David G. Trager, United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation. 

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COUNSEL

William J. Genego, Santa Monica, California, for petitionerappellant Brandon Hein.

Tracy Dressner, La Crescenta, California, for petitionerappellant Tony Miliotti.

Manny A. Abascal, Daniel R. Seltzer and Scott P. Lawrence

for petitioner-appellant Micah Holland.

Erwin Chemerinsky, Durham, North Carolina, for petitionerappellant Jason Holland.

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Victoria B. Wilson, Supervising Deputy Attorney General,

Office of the California Attorney General, Los Angeles, California, for the respondents-appellees.

OPINION

TRAGER, District Judge:

In 1996, Brandon Hein, Micah Holland, Jason Holland1 and

Tony Miliotti, were convicted, after being tried together in

California state court, of crimes relating to the 1995 attempted

robbery of Michael McLoren, a small-time marijuana dealer,

and the stabbing death of McLoren’s friend, James Farris. All

the participants were teenagers at the time of the stabbing, and

Miliotti and Micah, who were juveniles at the time of trial,

were tried as adults. The jury had been instructed on felony

murder and found all four petitioners guilty of that crime.

Jason, who admitted at trial that he stabbed Farris, was also

convicted of assault with a deadly weapon. After bringing

unsuccessful appeals and habeas corpus petitions in state

court, petitioners filed habeas petitions in federal court, which

were denied.

Before trial, the prosecution had given the lawyer for

McLoren, its only eyewitness to the stabbing and a surviving

victim, a letter in which it promised not to use against him

anything he told the State about his marijuana dealing. Petitioners’ principal challenges — suppression in violation of

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), presentation of false

testimony and prosecutorial misconduct — stem from the

prosecution’s alleged non-disclosure of that letter to certain

defense counsel. Because, in light of the record from the twomonth-long jury trial, the letter was not the decisively

impeaching evidence petitioners make it out to be and

1To avoid confusion, we generally refer to brothers Micah and Jason

Holland by their first names only. 

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attempted robbery was the only plausible theory for the instigation of the fight that culminated in Farris’s death as well as

McLoren’s stabbing, petitioners fail to establish the prejudice

required to overturn their convictions. Accordingly, to the

extent the letter was not disclosed, we are satisfied its disclosure would have had little impact on the outcome of the trial.

Likewise, any improper argument made by the prosecution in

summation did not prejudice petitioners. Finally, petitioners’

claim that McLoren testified falsely finds no basis in the

record. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s judgment

denying habeas relief.

BACKGROUND

After a joint trial, a jury found petitioners guilty of

attempted robbery, burglary and felony-murder. The prosecution’s theory was that a fight between petitioners on one side

and McLoren and Farris on the other had ensued after petitioners entered McLoren’s grandparents’ property and

attempted to rob him of marijuana he kept for sale. Petitioners

contended that they were on the property to buy marijuana

from McLoren and that a fight had spontaneously erupted.

Thus, petitioners’ felony-murder convictions hinged on

whether the jury believed the prosecution’s theory that petitioners entered the property in order to rob McLoren of his

marijuana stash rather than petitioners’ theory that the

encounter was an attempted drug buy that went sour.

The Attempted Robbery

(1)

Petitioners’ convictions were attributable, in large part, to

the trial testimony of McLoren. McLoren, who was sixteen at

the time of the stabbing, testified that he maintained a makeshift shed, which he referred to as “the fort,” in the backyard

of his grandparents’ house in Los Angeles County. The fort

was furnished with a couch, a bed and a desk. McLoren kept

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marijuana for sale in a drawer of his desk, which he kept

locked. He also kept a television, VCR and two video game

consoles in the fort, all powered by an extension cord that ran

to the house. The fort was used as a place to smoke marijuana

and watch movies. McLoren also sold marijuana from the

fort.

McLoren testified that he spent much of the afternoon of

May 22, 1995, at the fort watching movies and smoking marijuana with his girlfriend and Farris, who was fifteen at the

time. McLoren’s girlfriend left sometime between five and

seven o’clock.

At around 7:15 p.m., McLoren and Farris were hitting a

punching bag outside the fort when McLoren saw petitioners,

Hein, seventeen years-old, Micah, fifteen, Jason, eighteen,

and Miliotti, seventeen, jump over his grandparents’ fence

and into the backyard. McLoren knew petitioners from prior

encounters and said to Farris: “Looks like trouble.” He then

called out to Micah: “What’s up, Micah?”

According to McLoren, petitioners, with Micah in the lead,

approached the fort without saying a word. Micah walked past

McLoren, entered the fort, started pulling on the locked desk

drawer and demanded the key. He was quickly followed into

the fort by McLoren, who, in turn, was followed by Jason and

Hein. (The time between McLoren’s entrance and Jason and

Hein’s entrance was estimated variously on direct to be three,

five and ten seconds.) Micah then shouted at McLoren: “Give

me the keys, ese. You want shit with the Gumbys, ese?”

McLoren understood “Gumbys” to be the name of a gang and

“ese” to be a Mexican slang term “used before a fight

ensues.”

Micah, Jason and Hein then began punching McLoren.

McLoren put his head down, and Micah, Jason and Hein

punched him about ten times. Farris then entered. McLoren

managed to place Micah into a headlock. McLoren proceeded

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to elbow Micah in the neck and back of the head. Seeing his

brother being elbowed, Jason ran at McLoren, who kicked

Jason in the nose. Someone then placed McLoren into a headlock and he felt himself being stabbed. He was stabbed three

more times and thrown against the wall of the fort. McLoren,

lying prone on the ground, looked up and saw Hein punching

Farris, who was sitting on the couch.

McLoren then got up and ran to his grandparents’ house.

He was followed by Farris who reached the house immediately after. McLoren’s mother was inside and asked what happened. McLoren told her: “They were trying to steal my stuff,

and they stabbed us.”

Farris collapsed on a table. He was still breathing when the

paramedics arrived. After the paramedics attempted to revive

Farris, McLoren heard one of them say: “He stopped breathing.” Farris was pronounced dead at McLoren’s house. He

died of a stab wound to the main chamber of the heart. Los

Angeles County Sheriff’s deputies also responded and commenced the homicide investigation. All four members of the

Holland group were ultimately charged.

(2)

Jason Holland testified in the defense’s case-in-chief and

admitted stabbing both Farris and McLoren. On May 22,

Jason, after drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana for several hours, drove with petitioners and his friend Chris Velardo

in Velardo’s truck to McLoren’s house. When they arrived,

petitioners exited the truck while Velardo remained in the

driver’s seat. Jason asked Velardo why they were there, to

which Velardo replied: “We’re going to get some weed.”

Jason took that to mean that they were going to buy some

marijuana. Resolution of the true purpose of seeing McLoren

was the key issue the jury had to resolve.

When Jason jumped the fence, Micah was already in the

yard about twenty feet ahead of him. As Micah approached

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the fort, Jason heard McLoren say: “What’s up Micah?”

Micah said nothing and waved. Micah and McLoren then

entered the fort and Farris stood in the doorway facing out.

Jason could see inside the fort and observed Micah and

McLoren facing each other about a foot apart. Micah and

McLoren then dropped their heads and started fighting. Jason

and Hein entered the fort and joined the fight.

Jason testified that he stabbed Farris twice after Farris spun

him around. He also testified that the other petitioners did not

believe that he had stabbed McLoren and Farris until he

showed them the bloody knife as they fled the crime scene.

(3)

Petitioners point to a number of occasions where McLoren

provided inconsistent information to the police about the

object of the alleged attempted robbery. For instance, before

McLoren was taken to the hospital on the night of the stabbing, he was questioned briefly by the police and told them

that petitioners had come for his electronic equipment.

Then, four days after the stabbing, in a recorded interview,

McLoren was questioned at the hospital by Sheriff’s Homicide Detectives Robert Tauson and William Neumann.

McLoren denied ever having sold marijuana even though he

received assurances from Detective Tauson that the authorities had no interest in prosecuting him. However, McLoren

did admit keeping some marijuana for personal use. Consistent with this version of events, he initially told the detectives

on May 26, 1995, that he thought petitioners had come for his

video games, adding that it was his opinion that petitioners

were “just bored” and were “going to come up on a bunch of

stuff,” such as “a free T.V., VCR . . . and maybe even like a

little bit of marijuana to go with.”

McLoren did not admit selling marijuana until he met with

Deputy District Attorney Jeffrey Semow (“DDA Semow” or

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“Semow”) on July 10, 1995. In an in camera, ex parte pretrial

hearing, Semow recalled meeting with McLoren’s lawyer,

Ellery Sorkin, on that day. Semow wanted to “see if Mr.

McLoren would testify without transactional immunity.”

Sorkin believed that Semow was building a marijuana prosecution against McLoren. To allay Sorkin’s fears, Semow

drafted a letter (“July 10 letter” or “immunity letter”) to

Sorkin promising that “nothing [McLoren] tells me or the

investigating officers about marijuana will be used in any way

against him.”

The Wallet Theft

About an hour before the stabbing, Velardo drove petitioners to Gates Park in nearby Calabasas where they intended to

get drunk. As they were pulling into the parking lot, a wallet

sitting in a van caught Jason’s eye. The van belonged to Alyce

Moulder, who was playing with her children in the park.

Jason opened the door of the unlocked van, took the wallet

and closed the door, which Moulder witnessed. Jason jumped

into the bed of the truck and told Velardo to drive.

Velardo then sped out of the parking lot as Moulder yelled:

“Hey don’t take my wallet. I don’t have any money in it. I

need my driver’s license.” Jason rifled through the wallet,

which indeed held no money, and threw it onto the road.

After about five minutes, Moulder collected her children,

got into her van and followed Velardo’s truck. She found the

truck parked at a shopping mall soon after. She pulled up

behind the truck, parked and walked over to it. Only Velardo

was in the truck at that time. Moulder confronted him, grabbing his collar and demanding her wallet. He said he did not

have her wallet.

While Moulder was still arguing with Velardo, petitioners

approached them from across the parking lot. Moulder saw

that Hein was holding something in his hand that she recog5462 HEIN v. SULLIVAN

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nized as a wheel locking device known as “The Club.” Petitioners threatened Moulder, screaming at her to leave. She

slowly backed up toward the driver’s side door of her van and

entered it. As she did so, Hein spat on her windshield.

Moulder then pulled away, and Micah threw something which

hit her van.

Procedural History

Petitioners were convicted of burglary, attempted robbery

and felony murder with a special circumstance2 and appealed.

The California Court of Appeals denied all of petitioners’

claims except Miliotti’s claim that insufficient evidence supported the special circumstance finding against him. Hein,

2Section 190.2(a) of the California Penal Code provides a penalty of

death or life imprisonment for defendants who are found guilty of firstdegree murder if certain special circumstances are found to be true beyond

a reasonable doubt by the finder of fact. One of the special circumstances

is that the murder was committed during the commission of one of the felonies enumerated in section 190.2(a)(17), which include robbery and burglary. Section 190.2(d) authorizes the death penalty or life imprisonment

for any defendant other than the actual killer who “with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant, aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, solicits, requests, or assists in the commission of” one of

those felonies. In petitioners’ trial, the jury was instructed that: 

[I]t could only find the special circumstance to be true if they

found beyond a reasonable doubt (1) that the defendant with the

intent to kill aided and abetted any actor in the commission of the

first degree murder; or, (2) that the defendant with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant aided “or” abetted in the commission of the attempted robbery and burglary

which resulted in the death of Farris. 

People v. Hein, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 85, 91-92 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). The jury

found the special circumstance to be true beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

at 87. The record is silent as to which condition of the special circumstance the jury found to be true. However, it appears that the jury found

true — and the California Court of Appeals dwelled on — the second condition (i.e., that petitioners “with reckless indifference to human life” and

as “major participant[s]” aided or abetted in the commission of the

attempted robbery and burglary) at least as to Micah, Hein and Miliotti.

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104 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 92. The court accordingly reduced his

murder conviction to second degree. Id. at 95. He was resentenced to fifteen years to life plus four years. Regarding petitioners’ claims of prosecutorial misconduct, the court found

that the prosecution “contravened the trial court order excluding gang evidence” and made statements which were “unnecessary, professionally questionable and highly risky.” But the

court held that reversal was not necessary because a better

result would not have been reasonably probable had the comments not been made. 

Since petitioners claim that they did not find the July 10

letter until after their direct appeal had concluded, their

habeas petitions to the California Supreme Court raised the

issues relating to the letter for the first time. The court summarily denied the petitions. Petitioners filed timely petitions

for habeas corpus in federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254. The magistrate judge’s 78-page report and recommendation, which the district court adopted, found that none

of the claims raised warranted habeas relief. Micah and Hein

are currently serving prison sentences of twenty-nine years to

life,3 Miliotti is serving a sentence of nineteen years to life

and Jason is serving a sentence of life without parole.

DISCUSSION

Petitioners raise five claims on appeal: (1) suppression of

evidence in violation of Brady, (2) presentation of false testimony, (3) prosecutorial misconduct, (4) cumulative error and

(5) ineffective assistance of counsel. Their federal due process

claims arising out of their California state prosecution are

subject to the stringent standard of review provided by the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”),

28 U.S.C. § 2254.

3After briefing was completed, Hein’s murder sentence was commuted

from life without parole to a term of twenty-five years to life. His total

custodial sentence is now twenty-nine years to life. 

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We review a district court’s decision to deny habeas corpus

de novo and its findings of fact for clear error. Richter v.

Hickman, 578 F.3d 944, 951 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc), cert.

granted sub nom. Harrington v. Richter, 559 U.S. ___ (Feb.

22, 2010). Where, as here, “no state court has explained its

reasoning on a particular claim, we conduct an independent

review of the record to determine whether the state court’s

decision was objectively unreasonable.” Richter, 578 F.3d at

951 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

(1)

Due Process Violations: Brady, False Evidence and

Prosecutorial Misconduct

Three of petitioners’ claims — Brady, false evidence and

prosecutorial misconduct — are closely related in that they all

stem principally from the July 10 letter. To wit, petitioners

contend that if the prosecution had not committed a Brady

violation as to the July 10 letter, it would not have been able

to present false evidence concerning McLoren’s immunity, or,

in the alternative, petitioners would have been able to

impeach McLoren with the letter once he gave false testimony. Similarly, if petitioners possessed the letter, they claim,

the prosecution would not have been able to make certain

improper arguments in summation regarding McLoren’s criminal liability without defense counsel pointing out their impropriety. In sum, petitioners argue that, when viewed together

with McLoren’s challenged testimony and the prosecution’s

improper summation, the suppression of the letter affected

their convictions by rendering the trial unfair.

We discuss Brady, false evidence and prosecutorial misconduct challenges individually to determine, respectively,

whether the prosecution failed to disclose the July 10 letter,

presented false evidence or made improper argument in summation. Although we find that the prosecution did not present

false evidence, we agree with petitioners that the prosecution

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failed to disclose the letter to Jason and Hein and made

improper comments in summation. Because petitioners’

Brady and prosecutorial misconduct claims require similar

analyses for evaluating prejudice4 and encompass overlapping

considerations, we analyze their effect on petitioners’ convictions collectively and conclude that, to the extent the prosecution committed error, it did not prejudice petitioners.

a. Brady Violation

i. Applicable Law

[1] Hein, Jason and Micah argue that the prosecution’s

failure to disclose favorable evidence, including McLoren’s

immunity letter, constituted a Brady violation.5“The govern4Although the tests for evaluating the prejudicial impact of these violations each use a distinct formulation, they both examine the fundamental

fairness of the proceeding. A finding of prejudice, thus, requires that the

conduct have some impact on the outcome of the proceeding — i.e., a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different or that it so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the

resulting conviction a denial of due process. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514

U.S. 419, 436 (1995); Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643

(1974). This means that we cannot review each instance of non-disclosure

or prosecutorial misconduct in isolation, but rather must view them collectively in light of the entire record. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436; Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 182 (1986). 

5Petitioners also allege that the prosecution failed to turn over another

piece of favorable evidence. Detective Tauson took a statement from a

friend of Velardo’s, Katren Anderson, who signed the statement. A copy

of the statement was turned over to petitioners in which Anderson said that

Velardo had told her that, on the day of the stabbing, he and petitioners

were going to “get some bud.” However, petitioners speculate that another

version of the statement existed which indicated that Velardo had said

they intended to “buy some bud”; this alleged, other statement was never

found. Petitioners’ argument appears to be based on a misunderstanding,

for it is probable that no separate version of the statement existed. Petitioners rely on the transcript of an in camera, ex parte hearing at which

Detective Tauson discussed the statement he took from Anderson. At the

hearing, Tauson told the court that Anderson said: “[T]hey were going to

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ment violates its constitutional duty to disclose material

exculpatory evidence where (1) the evidence in question is

favorable to the accused in that it is exculpatory or impeachment evidence, (2) the government willfully or inadvertently

suppresses this evidence, and (3) prejudice ensues from the

suppression (i.e., the evidence is ‘material’).” Silva v. Brown,

416 F.3d 980, 985 (9th Cir. 2005). Suppressed evidence must

be considered “collectively, not item by item,” Kyles, 514

U.S. at 436, and is material “only if there is a reasonable

probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the

defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different,” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). “A

‘reasonable probability’ of a different result is accordingly

shown when the government’s evidentiary suppression

‘undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.’ ” Kyles,

514 U.S. at 434 (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678).

The district court found that petitioners had satisfied the

first two Brady factors (i.e., that the evidence was favorable

to petitioners and that the State had suppressed it). However,

it found that petitioners had not satisfied the third (i.e., that

the suppressed evidence was material).

ii. Whether the Prosecution Suppressed the Letter

At a juvenile fitness hearing held on July 24, 1995, and

attended by Micah, Miliotti and Velardo, DDA Semow,

responding to a request for discovery, orally disclosed the

substance of the July 10 letter:

buy some bud.” However, it is apparent that Tauson was paraphrasing the

very statement the prosecution disclosed to petitioners but said “buy”

instead of “get.” The fact that the statement disclosed to petitioners and

the one described by Detective Tauson in the in camera hearing both bore

Anderson’s signature leads us to believe that the statements were one and

the same. In any event, although the defense had Anderson’s statement

through discovery, they neither called her as a witness nor cross-examined

Tauson regarding her statement. 

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There is no immunity agreement for Mr. McLoren,

other than I promised him in writing that nothing he

said in this case about Marijuana, [sic] would be

used as evidence against him. That is it.

Counsel for Miliotti and Micah, as well as Velardo, were

present. (Velardo pled guilty before trial.) Curt Leftwich,

Miliotti’s counsel, was the only attorney present at this hearing to also represent his client at trial. Leftwich did not crossexamine McLoren regarding his use immunity in the subsequent superior court jury trial.

Semow also apparently mentioned the letter later at a pretrial discovery hearing held on September 15, 1995, at which

all trial counsel were present:

Those will be available at 1:30: A July 10 letter from

the district attorney [to McLoren’s counsel]; an

August 11 letter consisting of two pages; what

appears to be a misdemeanor complaint, 95M00754,

attached documents, a police report. A supplementary report bearing the number 495-00136-2222-072;

and another complaint report bearing a D.R. number

of 195-06108-2223-189. So that can be disclosed to

counsel.

Although all counsel attended this hearing, petitioners, with

the exception of Miliotti, claim their counsel did not receive

the July 10 letter.

In early 2002, Miliotti’s habeas counsel found a copy of the

July 10 letter and the transcript of the juvenile fitness hearing

in the file Leftwich gave to Miliotti’s family after the trial and

sent the transcript and a copy of the letter to Leftwich. In a

declaration dated July 10, 2002, Leftwich stated that he did

not recall ever having seen the letter. But he stated that the

transcript of the juvenile fitness hearing refreshed his recol5468 HEIN v. SULLIVAN

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lection that he had learned of the letter’s existence when Miliotti’s case was in juvenile court.

Trial counsel for Hein and Micah also submitted declarations, in which they claimed not to recall receiving the letter.

Jill Lansing, Hein’s trial counsel, submitted a declaration in

which she stated that she had no recollection of receiving the

letter or having been told of any immunity agreement. She

attached three discovery receipts from 1995, two of which

predate the September 15, 1995, pretrial discovery hearing.

None of the three referenced the July 10 letter. The receipts

also do not reflect that counsel received any of the other material mentioned by Semow at that hearing.6

 Notably, petitioners

do not claim that the prosecution failed to disclose those other

documents.

James Sussman represented Micah at trial but not at the

juvenile fitness hearing. In a signed declaration, Sussman

stated that he was unaware of the July 10 letter. Sussman prepared a writ challenging the findings of the juvenile court, but

this was before the transcript of the July 24 juvenile fitness

hearing had been made available. Although Semow had disclosed the entire contents of the letter on the record at that

hearing, and Sussman admitted that he later reviewed the transcript for impeachment purposes after the writ was denied, he

“did not ‘pay attention to the discussions or arguments of

counsel.’ ”

In the court below, the State did not object to the magistrate

judge’s factual finding that none of the petitioners, with the

exception of Miliotti, received the July 10 letter or were

6Because the record reflects only oral disclosure of the letter at the juvenile fitness hearing, Miliotti’s counsel, Leftwich, probably did not receive

a copy of the letter then but rather after the September 15, 1995, discovery

hearing. It, thus, seems odd that, despite Semow’s explicit statement that

counsel should pick the letter up at 1:30 the day after the discovery hearing, only Leftwich appears to have actually received it. 

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apprised of its existence. However, the State now correctly

argues that the prosecution fulfilled its Brady obligation to

Micah by disclosing the existence of the July 10 letter to

Micah’s counsel at the juvenile fitness hearing.

[2] The State concedes that Hein and Jason meet the second Brady element. The magistrate judge did not dwell on

this element of the Brady test, finding that the agreement was

suppressed as to Micah as well as to Jason and Hein. After

citing Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 695-96 (2004), for the

proposition that the Supreme Court’s “decisions lend no support to the notion that defendants must scavenge for hints of

undisclosed Brady material when the prosecution represents

that all such material has been disclosed,” the magistrate

judge determined that the immunity deal was not disclosed

because “[t]he existence of the letter was not made clear to

trial counsel.” Holland v. Adams, No. CV-04-3407-

SJO(MLG), slip op. at 20 (C.D. Cal. filed Apr. 3, 2007).

[3] Banks does not support the magistrate judge’s finding

as to Micah. Semow disclosed the July 10 letter on the record

at the juvenile fitness hearing attended by Micah, Miliotti and

Velardo. Even though Sussman, Micah’s trial counsel, was

not present at that hearing, he read the transcript, explaining

that he did not “pay attention to the discussions or arguments

of counsel.” Thus, the record supports a finding that Micah’s

failure to discover the July 10 letter was the result of his

defense counsel’s carelessness, rather than the prosecution’s

alleged misconduct. In reality, Micah is seeking to advance an

ineffective assistance of counsel claim masquerading as a

Brady claim. Micah is no doubt trying to cast a patina of prosecutorial misconduct on his counsel’s failure to follow up on

Semow’s disclosure at the juvenile fitness hearing.7

7We also note that it is unusual that Micah’s counsel at the juvenile fitness hearing did not notify Sussman of the immunity letter. 

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[4] As to Jason and Hein, the record, as it stands, supports

the conclusion that disclosure was not made to them although

that non-disclosure, if it occurred, was likely inadvertent. At

a pretrial discovery hearing, attended by all trial counsel,

Semow mentioned that “[a] July 10 letter from the district

attorney [to McLoren’s counsel]” — presumably, the immunity letter — would be available “at 1:30” the next day. However, it was apparently not included in the materials disclosed

by the prosecution. In addition, Jason and Hein did not participate in the juvenile fitness hearing, and the record is silent as

to whether transcripts of that hearing were made available to

them. Jason and Hein, therefore, satisfy the second Brady element. Before turning to the materiality of the non-disclosure,

we consider whether the prosecution presented false evidence

or made improper arguments in summation.

b. False Evidence

[5] Petitioners contend that the prosecution presented false

evidence and failed to correct false testimony in violation of

the Supreme Court’s decision in Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S.

264 (1959). To prevail on a Napue claim, “the petitioner must

show that (1) the testimony (or evidence) was actually false,

(2) the prosecution knew or should have known that the testimony [or evidence] was actually false, and (3) that the false

testimony [or evidence] was material.” United States v. ZunoArce, 339 F.3d 886, 889 (9th Cir. 2003). False evidence is

material “if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false

[evidence] could have affected the judgment of the jury.”

Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678 (internal citation and quotation marks

omitted). We find that McLoren did not testify falsely, and,

as such, his statements do not factor into the materiality analysis which follows our discussion of prosecutorial misconduct.

There are two parts to petitioners’ claim. First, that the testimony of the State’s principal witness, McLoren, was false.

Second, the manner in which Deputy District Attorney

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Michael Latin (“Latin” or “DDA Latin”), who shared trial

duties with Semow, questioned McLoren was misleading and

could be characterized as presenting false evidence. Regarding Latin’s line of questioning, petitioners especially take

issue with his failure to specifically ask McLoren about the

July 10 letter.

As to McLoren’s testimony, although a few of McLoren’s

statements at trial were incomplete, the critical point of

McLoren’s testimony, to wit, that he could still be prosecuted

for marijuana possession or sale, was true. To the extent that

McLoren failed to mention the July 10 letter, his testimony,

viewed in its entirety, conveyed to the jury an accurate picture

of his legal situation (i.e., that, although he would probably

not be prosecuted, he was not given transactional immunity).

Similarly, Napue imposed no duty on Latin to clarify

McLoren’s answers to open-ended questions about his willingness to be a witness or to specifically question him about

the July 10 letter.

On appeal, as they did below, petitioners highlight seven

statements of McLoren that they claim were false.8 Because

8The district court, in its unpublished opinion adopting the magistrate

judge’s report and recommendation, held that certain statements made by

McLoren were false (but immaterial), but it is unclear what, exactly, the

magistrate judge found false. First, the magistrate judge set forth the seven

statements that petitioners challenged, then found that McLoren’s intimations that he did not receive immunity were “clearly false.” This suggests

that the magistrate judge found false a number of instances where

McLoren cited motivations to testify other than use immunity. Holland,

No. CV-04-3407-SJO(MLG), slip op. at 36. Yet, to support his falsity

determination, the magistrate judge cited only two pages of the transcript

which contained two statements petitioners argued were false: that

McLoren believed that what he told Detectives Tauson and Neumann

could be used against him and that he received no assurances about prosecution from his attorney. For many of the reasons discussed infra, the

magistrate judge’s finding of falsity on these two statements is unsustainable; McLoren’s interview with Detectives Tauson and Neumann in which

the detectives assured him that he was not the priority for prosecution in

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McLoren was given only use immunity and was never specifically asked whether his trial testimony or the statements he

gave to the authorities after July 10, 1995, could have been

used against him, none of these statements were false.

According to petitioners, McLoren testified falsely by

asserting that: (1) he still faced potential prosecution and (2)

he was willing to testify even though some of his testimony

would incriminate him.

First, on cross by Lansing, Hein’s trial counsel, McLoren

testified about what Detectives Tauson and Neumann told him

about their intentions to prosecute him:

[Lansing]: And at that time they basically

told you that they weren’t going to

prosecute you if you admitted selling, if you admitted —

[McLoren]: They said they didn’t have an

interest in prosecuting me.

[Lansing]: And what did you take that to

mean?

[McLoren]: That I wasn’t the priority.

a robbery-murder case predated the July 10 letter which granted McLoren

immunity, and, since McLoren was given only use immunity, he was still

subject to prosecution. 

The magistrate judge then concluded that McLoren’s “general denial of

any immunity agreement, when coupled with the prosecutor’s emphasis

upon his altruistic motivation for testifying, can be characterized for purposes of this analysis as false evidence.” Id. at 37. Assuming the magistrate judge found falsity throughout the other five statements petitioners

challenged, his finding is incorrect. McLoren was asked why he decided

to be candid with Semow, not whether his post-immunity statements could

have been used against him. His answers thus do not amount to “general

denial[s]” of immunity. 

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[Lansing]: That you wouldn’t be prosecuted;

is that right?

[McLoren]: Not that I wouldn’t be, that I probably wouldn’t be. They reserved

the option.

[Lansing]: But they suggested to you that that

probably wasn’t going to happen;

is that correct?

[McLoren]: Yes.

Lansing revisited the issue on re-cross:

[Lansing]: Was it your state of mind that the

things you told Detective Neumann and Detective Tauson would

not be used against you?

[McLoren]: No.

[Lansing]: You hired a lawyer; is that correct?

[McLoren]: Yes.

. . . .

[Lansing]: And did that lawyer give you any

assurances in terms of whether

you would be prosecuted or not?

[McLoren]: No, not really.

[Lansing]: And have you been prosecuted?

[McLoren]: No.

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[6] As an initial matter, McLoren’s testimony regarding his

understanding that his statements to Detectives Tauson and

Neumann could have been used against him was clearly not

false. Because McLoren had not been given any immunity at

the time of the interview with the detectives on May 26, 1995,

this question is irrelevant to the issue of whether he gave false

testimony about the July 10 letter.

[7] Next, McLoren’s testimony about whether he faced

potential prosecution was not false because he was given only

use immunity. The plain language of the July 10 letter supports this conclusion. The agreement explicitly promised

McLoren that “nothing he tells [Semow] or the investigating

officers about marijuana will be used in any way against him.”

9

Although McLoren understood and admitted at trial that

charges for marijuana dealing were unlikely, the prosecution

did not promise that it would never prosecute McLoren for it.

Therefore, McLoren accurately testified that the State “reserved the option” to prosecute him and there is no basis for

saying that he was lying when he testified that his lawyer

never assured that he would not be prosecuted.

9Despite the plain language of the July 10 letter, petitioners argue that

McLoren actually received transactional immunity because the California

statute regarding immunity did not recognize use immunity until it was

amended in 1996. The magistrate judge declined to address this argument.

Petitioners appear to be mistaken that use immunity was not recognized

before 1996 in California. See People v. Badgett, 10 Cal. 4th 330, 363

(1995) (finding that trial testimony given pursuant to an agreement granting use immunity was not coerced). Furthermore, the statute they rely on,

section 1324 of the California Penal Code, addresses only immunity for

judicially compelled testimony. See Griego v. Superior Court, 95 Cal.

Rptr. 2d 351, 354 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (finding that section 1324 applies

only when a witness is judicially compelled to testify in “felony proceedings or investigations before the court or the grand jury”). We do not read

People v. Brunner, 108 Cal. Rptr. 501 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973), as broadly as

petitioners do for the contrary position. Therefore, it appears that McLoren

was, in fact, granted use immunity and still could have been prosecuted.

In any event, we are discussing McLoren’s understanding and not the state

of the law. 

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Petitioners next allege that McLoren’s testimony citing

altruistic reasons for being candid with DDA Semow was

false. Several times, on direct and redirect, McLoren was

asked, with varying specificity, what had spurred him to be

more forthcoming with DDA Semow than when initially

questioned by Detectives Tauson and Neumann.

On direct examination, McLoren testified that he understood, from representations made by Detective Tauson at the

hospital, that the State did not want to prosecute him for marijuana. McLoren was then asked:

[Latin]: Since that initial interview with

Detectives Neumann and Tauson,

when questioned by either law

enforcement officers or district

attorneys, have you ever made any

effort to hide the fact that you possessed or sold marijuana?

[McLoren]: No.

. . . .

[Latin]: Are there any other reasons other

than what Detective Tauson told

you at the hospital that caused you

to no longer want to hide the fact

that you had marijuana?

. . . .

[McLoren]: Yes. My grandma told me just to

take the drug charge and just bust

them.

Later, while McLoren was still on direct, the following

exchange occurred:

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[Latin]: As you sit here and testify in this

court, do you feel inhibited or

deterred in any way from talking

about your prior dealings with

marijuana?

. . . .

[McLoren]: No. I feel fine talking about it.

[Latin]: Why? Can you explain why?

[McLoren]: Because it is something that I have

to do.

[Latin]: Why?

[McLoren]: Because I want to get these guys

that stabbed me and killed my best

friend.

Then, on redirect, after he was asked why he felt ready to

talk to the authorities about marijuana, the following

exchange occurred:

[Latin]: What brought that about?

[McLoren]: My lawyer told me I wasn’t going

to be able to get these guys until I

tell the whole truth.

[Latin]: Who did you talk to first . . . ?

[McLoren]: Jeff Semow

. . . .

[Latin]: You didn’t know for sure whether

you could trust Semow?

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[McLoren]: Yes.

Finally, while still on redirect, McLoren testified:

[Latin]: Do you still feel uncomfortable

talking about [your involvement

with marijuana]?

[McLoren]: Somewhat.

[Latin]: Why are you talking about it anyhow?

[McLoren]: Because it’s more important to get

these guys than drugs.

[8] Contrary to petitioners’ contentions, none of these

statements are false — and certainly not perjurious. McLoren

was asked a series of open-ended questions about why he

decided to be forthcoming on and after July 10, 1995 (e.g.,

“[What reasons] other than what Detective Tauson told you at

the hospital [caused you to come forward]?”; “Can you

explain why [you decided to come forward]?”; “What brought

that about?”; “Why are you talking about it anyhow?”). None

of these questions specifically addressed immunity, and

McLoren’s failure to mention use immunity cannot be

described as false. Assuming that the grant of use immunity

was one reason McLoren decided to speak to Semow, he

never denied receiving it. Instead, he listed alternative reasons

for his willingness to be a witness, none of which are facially

false. Therefore, even if McLoren’s failure to mention that

use immunity played a role in his decision is viewed with

some skepticism, petitioners fail to demonstrate its falsity.

Moreover, because the July 10 letter was addressed to

Sorkin, McLoren’s lawyer, and not to McLoren, and

McLoren’s awareness of it was not established by the state or

district courts, we do not assume McLoren knew of the let5478 HEIN v. SULLIVAN

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ter’s existence.10 Although it is possible that Sorkin informed

McLoren about the gist of the letter, the record is silent on

exactly what, if anything, was communicated to McLoren.11

Arguably, the most colorable claim of falsity concerns

McLoren’s statement that his grandmother told him “just to

take the drug charge and just bust” petitioners, but this claim

fails as well. Petitioners do not contend that McLoren’s

grandmother never offered this advice. Rather, they appear to

take issue with McLoren’s testimony because, according to

petitioners, it suggested that McLoren could have exposed

himself to liability by speaking to Semow, which would not

have been true. A broader look at the exchange in which the

statement appeared is instructive. McLoren was asked what,

other than Detective Tauson’s assurance, “caused [him] to no

longer want to hide the fact that [he] had marijuana.” The

question is vague as to time. Thus, if McLoren’s grandmother

offered the advice before July 10, 1995, McLoren could still

have been risking criminal liability. But even assuming the

statement was made after July 10, McLoren’s answer was still

not false because, as noted earlier, his understanding as to the

existence of the July 10 letter has not been established. Moreover, McLoren’s statement did not foreclose or diminish the

possibility that he was granted use immunity. Thus,

McLoren’s testimony was not false.

10Although immunity agreements are often signed by the person being

granted immunity, McLoren did not sign the July 10 letter. 

11Although Napue prohibits the presentation of false evidence regardless of whether the witness is aware of its falsity, the testimony must still

be actually false. See Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 980-82 (9th Cir.

2005) (en banc). In Hayes, the witness testified that he was still subject

to criminal charges even though the prosecutor had made a secret deal

with the witness’s attorney to dismiss the charges and had instructed the

attorney not to notify the witness. Id. at 980. Sitting en banc, we held that,

under those circumstances, the prosecution had presented false evidence.

Id. at 981. Here, by contrast, McLoren was asked why he was willing to

testify — a matter that depended exclusively on his personal knowledge

— not whether he had received use immunity. 

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Finally, petitioners interpret McLoren’s statement that it

was “more important to get these guys than drugs” to mean

that he was willing to risk prosecution for marijuana crimes

if it meant bringing petitioners to justice. However, in the

context of McLoren’s testimony about Detective Tauson’s

representation, a more plausible interpretation of McLoren’s

answer is that McLoren was stating that he was testifying at

trial because the prosecution was concerned only about the

murder and did not care about his relatively minor drug

crimes. This interpretation comports with McLoren’s testimony that he was told that he was not a priority.

[9] Turning to Latin’s examination, neither his questions

nor his failure to expand upon McLoren’s answers were

improper and may not have even been deliberate (at least in

the case of his direct examination). As none of McLoren’s

answers to Latin’s open-ended questions were false, Latin had

no duty to clarify McLoren’s answers or to question McLoren

specifically about the use immunity he received. Moreover,

since Latin had reason to believe that the letter was in the

hands of the defense (and clearly was in the case of Miliotti),

he might well have expected defense counsel to raise use

immunity on cross if they thought it appropriate. Accordingly,

we reject petitioners’ claim that the prosecution knowingly

presented false evidence.

c. Prosecutorial Misconduct

Petitioners’ final related claim is that the prosecution made

statements in summation that violated due process. In evaluating allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, we consider

whether the prosecution’s actions “so infected the trial with

unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due

process.” Darden, 477 U.S. at 181 (internal quotation marks

omitted) (quoting Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643). In determining

whether a comment rendered a trial constitutionally unfair,

factors we may consider are whether the comment misstated

the evidence, whether the judge admonished the jury to disre5480 HEIN v. SULLIVAN

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gard the comment, whether the comment was invited by

defense counsel in its summation, whether defense counsel

had an adequate opportunity to rebut the comment, the prominence of the comment in the context of the entire trial and the

weight of the evidence. See Darden, 477 U.S. at 182.

There were a number of instances of improper argument

during the prosecution’s summation, some of which were

addressed by the trial court and by the California Court of

Appeals.

First, the prosecution vouched for McLoren’s credibility.

After describing McLoren as a “very powerful and credible

witness,” DDA Semow told the jury on opening summation:

[H]e was painfully honest. He answered every question truthfully, no matter how much it cost him in

terms of pain, discomfort, embarrassment and humiliation. He is not a model teenager but the model of

a perfect witness.

DDA Latin continued on surrebuttal:

Think about the way you felt while you [sic] he testified. Didn’t you know in your heart he was telling

the truth? Didn’t you? . . . Think about how honest

he was about some very, very painful things in his

life, some things that were embarrassing, some

things that hold himself out to the public as not a

very good person. He was so honest about it. That’s

the kind of integrity that our system would like to

see.

Next, Latin impugned the character of petitioners’ defense

counsel. After claiming that he did not “appreciate cheap lawyer tricks,” Latin argued:

[O]ne side presented a very clear and pure picture of

what happened, and the other side did some very

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dirty things, dishonest. The defense in this case was

dishonest.

Latin also argued that defense counsel pressured a defense

witness, Jason Stout, to change his testimony so that it was

more favorable to petitioners.

Finally, the prosecution made improper comments about

petitioners themselves. For instance, the prosecution compared them to “a pack of wolves” when they stole Moulder’s

wallet, called Micah “a little punk” and addressed Hein

directly, saying: “What a tough guy[ ] you are.”

The trial judge sustained objections to, among other things,

the prosecution’s accusations of dishonesty and allegations of

pressuring Stout. The judge also characterized Latin’s accusation of dishonesty as “very close . . . to misconduct” and

instructed the jury that there was no evidence that any of the

lawyers in the case committed any wrongdoing. (Defense

counsel did not object to a few of the statements petitioners

now challenge, including Semow’s vouching for McLoren

and Latin’s calling Micah “a little punk.”) Several times during summation the judge made generalized instructions that

argument was not evidence.

[10] The statement we find most problematic was not

addressed by the state courts. On surrebuttal summation, Latin

told the jury:

[McLoren] wasn’t like Jason Holland that told the

truth that he wanted to tell, that he chose to tell. He

understood that if you are going to be believed you

better be prepared to come in here and open up your

life no matter whether the questions seem relevant to

what happened or not. And many of these questions

probably didn’t seem relevant. They looked like they

had nothing to do with anything, but he answered

them. And he opened himself up to embarrassment,

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scorn, ridicule, contempt and criminal liability, but

he did it because he understood that that is what it

takes to tell the truth and be believed.

This comment could have been taken to mean that McLoren

exposed himself to prosecution for marijuana dealing by testifying, which, due to use immunity, would not have been true.

However, the comment could also have been taken to mean

that McLoren’s testimony exposed him to charges of perjury

if he lied on the stand. On appeal, the State concedes that the

statement was incorrect. But it is hard to accept that the trial

judge, who had made a number of conscientious evidentiary

rulings and timely admonitions throughout summation,

remained idle while the prosecution presumably deceived the

jury, even though the other rulings had been prompted by

defense counsel. It is probable that the judge found the statement ambiguous as well.

d. Prejudice Resulting from the Brady Violation and

Prosecutorial Misconduct

Accepting that the prosecutors’ comments in summation

were improper and that they failed to disclose the July 10 letter to Jason and Hein, we next consider whether the prosecution’s conduct prejudiced petitioners. Because we are satisfied

that the trial was fundamentally fair and there was no reasonable probability that the letter would have affected the verdict,

we reject both petitioners’ Brady and prosecutorial misconduct claims.

[11] It is unclear whether we should employ Brady’s prejudice standard to evaluate the cumulative effect of the prosecutorial misconduct and the non-disclosure. Although this

circuit has never explicitly used the “reasonable probability”

formulation found in the Brady line of cases to analyze

alleged prosecutorial misconduct, a number of circuits have

concluded that prosecutorial misconduct lends itself to that

standard. E.g., Styron v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 438, 454 (5th Cir.

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2001); Jones v. Gibson, 206 F.3d 946, 959 (10th Cir. 2000);

Kennedy v. Dugger, 933 F.2d 905, 914 (11th Cir. 1991); cf.

United States ex rel. Shaw v. De Robertis, 755 F.2d 1279,

1281 n.1 (7th Cir. 1985) (“To carry this burden, [a petitioner]

must show that it is at least likely that the misconduct complained of affected the outcome of his trial — i.e., caused the

jury to reach a verdict of guilty when otherwise it might have

reached a verdict of not guilty.”); see generally Strickler v.

Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 298-301 & n.3 (1999) (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (tracing the evolution of

the “reasonable probability” formulation and noting the applicability of that and synonymous phrases in a number of contexts).

The standard announced in Darden and Donnelly appears

to be similar to the Brady standard. Like the Brady standard,

the touchstone for the Darden/Donnelly standard is the fairness of the trial. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434 (“The question is

not whether the defendant would more likely than not have

received a different verdict with the [undisclosed] evidence,

but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood

as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.”); Darden, 477 U.S. at 181-82 & n.13 (noting that prosecutorial

comments, although deserving of condemnation, did not violate due process because they did not affect the fairness of the

trial). The Darden factors — i.e., the weight of the evidence,

the prominence of the comment in the context of the entire

trial, whether the prosecution misstated the evidence, whether

the judge instructed the jury to disregard the comment,

whether the comment was invited by defense counsel in its

summation and whether defense counsel had an adequate

opportunity to rebut the comment — require courts to place

improper argument in the context of the entire trial to evaluate

whether its damaging effect was mitigated or aggravated. In

essence, what Darden requires reviewing courts to consider

appears to be equivalent to evaluating whether there was a

“reasonable probability” of a different result. Cf. Brooks v.

Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383, 1401 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc),

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vacated on other grounds, 478 U.S. 1016 (1986), reinstated,

809 F.2d 700 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (noting that “fundamental fairness, the same standard adopted in Donnelly, is

the governing principle in reviewing errors of counsel [under

the reasonable probability standard employed by Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)]”).

[12] Although it seems doubtful that Darden would

impose a lower burden on petitioners than Brady does, we do

not need to resolve the question here.12 Instead we use the

framework announced in Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057

12The magistrate judge below and the State on appeal addressed the possibility of Latin’s “criminal liability” statement forming the basis of a false

evidence claim. The materiality standard for false evidence is less burdensome on petitioners than that for Brady. See United States v. Agurs, 427

U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976); Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1058 n.12 (9th Cir.

2002) (recognizing that the Supreme Court employs a stricter standard of

materiality for Brady claims than for false testimony claims). According

to the Supreme Court, this is because false evidence claims “involve prosecutorial misconduct, but more importantly because they involve a corruption of the truth-seeking function of the trial process.” Agurs, 427 U.S.

at 103-04. Since part of the reason false evidence claims are less burdensome is the involvement of prosecutorial misconduct, one could argue that

Darden misconduct claims should themselves also be subject to that standard. Cf. Brooks, 762 F.2d at 1402 n.26 (“[T]here may be cases where the

prosecutor’s intentional conduct rises to a level equivalent to a knowing

use of false evidence.”). But that is unlikely in this case for a number of

reasons. Argument in summation is hardly equivalent to evidence in its

impact on a jury. See Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 646-47 (“The consistent and

repeated misrepresentation of a dramatic exhibit in evidence may profoundly impress a jury and may have a significant impact on the jury’s

deliberations. Isolated passages of a prosecutor’s argument, billed in

advance to the jury as a matter of opinion not of evidence, do not reach

the same proportions.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Summation

consists of opinion, advocacy and appeals to justice. Juries are routinely

instructed to view summation in that light, and we have no reason to presume that the jury in this case, having been so instructed, viewed it otherwise. In sum, the improper argument in this case did not present the same

threat to the truth-seeking function of the trial process as false evidence

would have. It is, thus, inappropriate to treat it as submission of false evidence. 

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(9th Cir. 2008), which was created for analyzing combined

Brady and Napue challenges. In Jackson, we reasoned that,

although instances of non-disclosure and false evidence must

be evaluated collectively, the difference between the materiality standards used for weighing their potential prejudice compelled us to consider the materiality of the false evidence

alone before combining it with non-disclosure. Jackson, 513

F.3d at 1076. Thus, under Jackson’s framework, instances of

false evidence are analyzed first under Napue’s materiality

standard, and, if those errors are not material standing alone,

false evidence is then considered together with nondisclosure, and both are analyzed under Brady’s more

demanding standard. Id. Assuming, arguendo, that Darden’s

standard is less demanding than Brady’s, we first analyze the

prosecutorial misconduct challenges to assess whether they

alone so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the

resulting conviction a denial of due process. If the prosecution’s comments alone do not meet this standard, we analyze

them together with the non-disclosure of the July 10 letter to

determine whether there is a reasonable probability that without those violations the result of the proceeding would have

been different. In doing so, we concentrate on the touchstone

of Brady’s materiality standard: that, even with the trial

errors, petitioners received “a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434.

[13] Here, two key factors illustrate that the prosecution’s

summation, when viewed in the context of the entire record,

did not render the trial fundamentally unfair. See Darden, 477

U.S. at 182-83. First, in context, much of the potential prejudice of the prosecution’s comments was mitigated. The trial

court sustained a number of objections and gave timely cautionary instructions to the jury, including general instructions

about the hortative nature of summation. Moreover, the comments were made in the course of several days of summation

after a two-month trial. Regarding Latin’s statement about

McLoren’s “criminal liability,” which appeared in one paragraph of a summation that took up eighty-four pages of the

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transcript, the comment was ambiguous and, to the extent it

was given its more damaging interpretation, it is likely that

the comment did not have much impact. McLoren had told

the jury that he was not the State’s priority, from which it

could conclude that he faced little risk of criminal charges.

Moreover, Latin’s statement was ambiguous, and we do not

presume that the jury ascribed to it its most damaging meaning. See Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 647 (“[A] court should not

lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark to

have its most damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting through

lengthy exhortation, will draw that meaning from the plethora

of less damaging interpretations.”). Even if the jury gave the

statement its more damaging interpretation, the statement

would have bolstered McLoren’s testimony only a negligible

amount, which would not have helped the prosecution’s case

much anyway since McLoren had little incentive to lie.13

Finally, the comment did not pervade the proceedings and

was not emphasized.

[14] Second, in light of the other evidence received over

the course of two months of trial, the prosecution offered the

only believable theory for why the fight began in the first

place, i.e., that it had been instigated by Micah’s attempted

robbery of McLoren’s drugs. Petitioners never offered a plausible alternative to this theory. Additionally, the prosecution’s

version of events was corroborated by petitioners’ theft of

Moulder’s wallet to show why the group also intended to rob

McLoren. In contrast, petitioners’ argument here is what

defense counsel argued in summation at trial, to wit, that petitioners had entered McLoren’s grandparents’ property to buy

marijuana and that a fight had spontaneously erupted with no

words exchanged between petitioners and McLoren. Although

13Even if one could somehow argue that the statement was an instance

of false evidence — and, thus, that the less-demanding Napue standard

applied — the statement would still not be prejudicial. For the same reasons cited above, there is no reasonable likelihood that the statement could

have affected the judgment of the jury. 

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the prosecution’s case relied on McLoren’s testimony, petitioners’ inability to advance any plausible theory for why the

fight began cannot be disregarded. Accordingly, petitioners

do not demonstrate that the prosecutors’ improper comments

affected the fairness of petitioners’ trial. See Darden, 477

U.S. at 181 n.13.

We next consider whether the combined instances of nondisclosure and improper argument deprived petitioners of a

fair trial, meaning “a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434. As explained above, the fact

that the prosecution advanced the only plausible theory for the

instigation of the fight undercuts any claim of prejudice.

The non-disclosure of the July 10 letter does not affect this

conclusion. The use immunity letter was not the potent

impeachment evidence petitioners make it out to be. McLoren

received no benefit — such as dropped charges or transactional immunity — from the prosecution for testifying. The

grant of use immunity left McLoren in the same position he

was in before speaking with Semow. Petitioners attempt to

assign more importance to the letter by suggesting that there

was an unspoken (or unwritten) understanding that McLoren

would not be prosecuted, but there is no support in the record

for this assertion.14

14Petitioners, pointing to the in camera, ex parte hearing at which

Semow recollected his July 10, 1995, meeting with Sorkin, claim that

Sorkin was seeking transactional immunity for McLoren. At the hearing,

Semow said that “one of the reasons for this interview was to see if Mr.

McLoren would testify without transactional immunity.” The July 10 letter

indicates that Semow achieved this goal. Thus, this statement provides no

support for petitioners’ contention that McLoren received transactional

immunity. Even if there were such an understanding, McLoren admitted

at trial that Detectives Tauson and Neumann had already told him that he

was not the priority and was not likely to be charged. These representations reflected an undramatic revelation: that the State was much more

interested in building a murder prosecution against petitioners than against

McLoren for marijuana dealing. McLoren testified to that understanding

to the jury. 

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Another reason use immunity had only very limited

impeachment value relates specifically to the substance of

McLoren’s testimony. As we stressed in our discussion of

petitioners’ false evidence claim, McLoren never denied

receiving use immunity. Importantly, he was never asked

whether his statements to the prosecution and at trial could

have been used against him. Moreover, because McLoren was

given only use immunity, his statements that he could still

have been prosecuted were also not false. Even if defense

counsel had confronted McLoren with the prosecution’s grant

of use immunity, none of McLoren’s testimony would have

been exposed as untruthful. Accordingly, the combined effect

of the prosecution’s arguments and the non-disclosure of the

July 10 letter did not deprive petitioners of a fair trial.

(2)

Cumulative Error

Petitioners’ next claim is that “the cumulative effect of

multiple errors” prejudiced them. Jackson, 513 F.3d at 1085

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Whelchel v.

Washington, 232 F.3d 1197, 1212 (9th Cir. 2000)). As with

petitioners’ prosecutorial misconduct claims, we consider

whether the cumulative error “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643.

[15] For many of the reasons set forth in our preceding discussion of prejudice, the alleged errors, when considered

together, do not render the trial constitutionally flawed. The

trial was long and hard-fought. The closing arguments were

contentious, but the trial court sustained reasonable objections

and admonished the prosecution on more than one occasion.

The court advised the jury that the prosecution’s questions

regarding Jason’s alleged gang membership and its statements

impugning petitioners and their counsel were not evidence.

The court also gave general instructions that arguments made

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in summation were not evidence, thereby reducing the potential harm done by the prosecution’s vouching for McLoren.

Additionally, the prosecution’s “criminal liability” statement

was ambiguous and, in any event, occupied only a brief

moment in summation at the end of a long trial and had little

risk of rendering the entire trial unfair.

[16] Similarly, the undisclosed evidence was not material.

McLoren testified both that he understood that he was not the

priority and that he was told by the police that the State had

no interest in prosecuting him. Moreover, if one were to

accept petitioners’ argument that they were on the property

merely to buy drugs, then, as noted, the reason for the fight

makes little sense. Therefore, any trial errors, to the extent

they existed, did not prejudice petitioners.

(3)

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Finally, Miliotti contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel, Leftwich, who had a

copy of the use immunity letter at the time of trial, failed to

cross-examine McLoren with it.15 We reject Miliotti’s claim.

Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are governed by

Strickland, which requires a petitioner to demonstrate: (1)

“that counsel’s performance was deficient” and (2) “that the

deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” 466 U.S. at

687. As Miliotti must satisfy both prongs in order to prevail

under Strickland, we may dispose of his claim if he fails to

satisfy either prong of the two-part test. Id. at 697.

15Miliotti also faults Leftwich for failing to impeach McLoren on his

statement to the police that petitioners had tried to steal his electronics,

failing to impeach him on his arrest for marijuana use in August 1995,

failing to introduce evidence of previous burglaries of the fort and failing

to introduce a lack of any fingerprint evidence. 

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[17] Turning first to the “performance prong,” Miliotti

“must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688. Courts must be

“highly deferential” to counsel’s performance such that “the

defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound

trial strategy.” Id. at 689 (internal quotation marks omitted).

[18] Miliotti cannot rebut the presumption that Leftwich’s

failure to confront McLoren with the July 10 letter was sound

trial strategy. As explained earlier, there was little, if anything, to be gained by questioning McLoren about having

been granted use testimony. Rather than pursuing a fruitless

attempt to impeach McLoren with the use immunity letter,

Leftwich instead focused on the inconsistencies in McLoren’s

description of Millioti’s actions. McLoren admitted that he

did not recall whether Miliotti was involved in the fight and

testified inconsistently about whether Miliotti had even

entered the fort, where the entirety of the fight took place. It

also emerged during trial that McLoren had initially named

Velardo — who never entered the property — as the fourth

attacker when he was questioned by the police, a fact that

Leftwich focused on in summation. Leftwich’s strategy bore

fruit when the California Court of Appeals concluded that

Miliotti was not a major participant in the attempted robbery

and reduced his conviction to second degree murder, finding

that “the evidence is persuasive that Miliotti did not enter the

fort, but merely stood in the doorway during the activities

inside the fort.” Hein, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 92, 95. Leftwich’s

performance was, thus, not deficient for failing to raise the

use immunity letter.

Even if Miliotti satisfied the first prong, he must still establish prejudice by “show[ing] that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result

of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466

U.S. at 694. This is the same standard used to determine the

materiality of suppressed evidence under Brady. See Bagley,

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473 U.S. at 682; Benn, 283 F.3d at 1053 (“[W]e analyze all

of the suppressed evidence together, using the same type of

analysis that we employ to determine prejudice in ineffective

assistance of counsel cases.”). Because petitioners’ case was

weak and McLoren admitted that he was probably not going

to be prosecuted and never denied having received immunity,

Miliotti was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to impeach

McLoren with the use immunity letter. Miliotti’s other allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel are without merit.

CONCLUSION

Under our independent review of the record, we determine

that petitioners’ state convictions did not violate the Constitution or laws of the United States. It was therefore not objectively unreasonable for the California Supreme Court to deny

petitioners’ state habeas petitions. We affirm the district

court’s denial of habeas relief.

AFFIRMED.

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