Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-14-11267/USCOURTS-ca5-14-11267-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Marrico Edward Spears
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-11267

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

MARRICO EDWARD SPEARS, 

 Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:14-CR-82-1

Before BENAVIDES, DENNIS, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

FORTUNATO P. BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge:* 

Defendant-Appellant Marrico Edward Spears (“Spears”) appeals his jury 

trial conviction and sentence for drug and firearm offenses. Law enforcement 

officers stopped Spears as he was driving from a house under surveillance for 

drug activity and, after detaining him for almost forty minutes while 

attempting to obtain a drug-sniffing dog, searched his vehicle. Spears appeals, 

inter alia, the district court’s denial of his motion to exclude evidence obtained 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 21, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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as a result of the search and seizure, contending the search and seizure 

violated the Fourth Amendment. For the reasons below, we REVERSE the 

district court’s denial of Spears’s motion to exclude evidence, and we VACATE 

his conviction and sentence.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Drug Investigation

On the day of the search and seizure, Spears visited a house located on 

New York Avenue in Fort Worth, Texas (the “New York House”) that law 

enforcement officers were monitoring for drug activity. Horacio Loera 

(“Loera”), a suspected drug dealer, lived at the New York House. An officer 

testified that a drug investigation into Loera began in February 2013, when

officers “seized approximately 250 pounds of marijuana from a business”

owned by Loera. Through investigation, officers identified multiple people 

suspected to be Loera’s customers. Once in May 2013 and once in October 

2013, confidential informants purchased drugs from people associated with 

Loera. Also in May 2013, an undercover officer purchased drugs from a person 

who had very recently visited the New York House. 

On January 15, 2014, law enforcement officers asked a confidential 

informant to order cocaine from a different suspected drug dealer. When the 

confidential informant placed the order, the suspected drug dealer said he 

would contact his source. The officers then began conducting surveillance on 

the suspected drug dealer. The officers observed the suspected drug dealer 

travel to the New York House and knock on the door, but nobody answered the 

door. He then told the confidential informant, “I’m not able to get the kilo [of 

cocaine]. I’m trying—I’ve tried to get a hold of my guy. I can’t get a hold of 

him. I went by his house. I can’t get anybody to answer.” An officer testified 

that based on this, the officers concluded that the suspected drug dealer had 

tried to get cocaine from the New York House.

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The following morning around 9:00 a.m., on January 16, 2014, officers 

set up surveillance at the New York House. An officer testified that the officers

“decided instead of trying to set up the buy again that [they] would move up 

and go directly to the source of the cocaine.” The officer also answered 

affirmatively when asked whether the officers “anticipate[d] that [the prior 

day’s] transaction might actually be consummated” that day. The record does 

not contain any further explanation as to why the officers believed a drug 

transaction might occur that day specifically.

After approximately thirty minutes of surveillance, Loera arrived at the 

New York House driving a silver sport utility vehicle. Shortly thereafter, 

Spears arrived at the New York House driving a white truck with an Oklahoma 

license plate. A third, blue car either arrived near this same time or was 

already parked in the driveway when surveillance began. The driveway 

extended all the way down the side of the house, behind the house, and into 

the backyard. Spears backed his truck into the driveway towards the back of 

the house—in between the house and the fence—in a manner that completely 

obstructed the driver’s side and the passenger’s side of the truck from the view 

of the officers on the street. Had the officers been located directly in front of 

the driveway, they would have been able to see Spears’s truck better, but from 

their vantage point they could not see whether Spears exited his truck, entered

or exited the house, or talked to Loera. At this time, Spears was unknown to 

the officers, and he had not previously been identified as a suspect connected 

with drug activity, the New York House, or Loera. 

Spears drove away from the New York House ten to twenty minutes after 

he arrived, and an officer followed him. Five to ten minutes after Spears left, 

a red car with Louisiana license plates arrived at the New York House. 

Officers observed two men get out of the red car, meet with Loera in the front 

yard, go to the back of the house without carrying anything, return to the car 

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carrying a duffle bag, and put the duffle bag in the trunk of the car. The two 

men left after approximately five minutes, and officers followed them. Shortly 

thereafter, Loera left in the sport utility vehicle, and officers followed him as 

well. 

B. The Stop, Search, and Seizure

An officer pulled Spears over after another officer witnessed him commit 

a traffic violation. As the officer approached Spears’s truck, he observed 

Spears rummaging around the center console of the truck. The officer asked 

Spears for his identification and insurance, which he provided, and a few other 

questions. After speaking with Spears for approximately one minute, the 

officer returned to his patrol car. After approximately four and half minutes

in the patrol car, the officer exited the patrol car and began speaking with 

Spears again. The officer testified that while he was questioning Spears, 

Spears appeared nervous, was not giving straight answers, was evasive in 

responding to questions, and was very non-compliant. When the officer asked 

Spears where he was coming from, Spears said he was coming from visiting a 

relative, which the officer believed was an untrue statement. When asked, 

Spears said he did not have any weapons in the truck, but he did not consent 

to a search of the truck. The officer then instructed Spears to step outside the 

truck in order to, in part, pat him down to ensure he did not have any weapons 

on him, but he refused. When a second officer arrived, they again asked Spears 

to step outside the truck. Again Spears initially refused, but he complied 

approximately one minute after being asked. After the pat down, the officers

instructed Spears to sit in the back of the patrol car to wait for a drug-sniffing 

dog to arrive. He complied after protesting for approximately two minutes. 

When Spears first entered the back of the patrol car, approximately sixteen 

and a half minutes had elapsed since he was first pulled over. 

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At some point, officers with both the Fort Worth Police Department and 

the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (the “DEA”), which were 

both involved in the drug investigation, had begun trying get a drug-sniffing 

dog to the traffic stop. DEA officers in particular made multiple phone calls to 

different agencies, but no drug-sniffing dogs were available. An officer testified 

that one of the reasons they wanted to use a dog was to get probable cause to

search Spears’s vehicle. While still unable to locate a dog, the officers 

detaining Spears were informed by other officers that they had found a large, 

vacuum-sealed bag of money in Loera’s sport utility vehicle after stopping 

Loera. Upon receiving this information, the officers collectively decided there 

was probable cause to search Spears’s truck, and they proceeded to do so. 

Almost forty minutes had elapsed from the time Spears was initially stopped 

until the time the search began. 

In their search, the officers found a semiautomatic handgun in the center 

console, a backpack that contained approximately $59,800 in cash, a 

counterfeit money detector, and a laundry bag that smelled of marijuana. 

Spears was arrested and transported to the DEA office. His cell phone was 

obtained from his person when he was processed at the DEA office. The 

government subsequently searched his cell phone and found a picture of 

marijuana and a picture of stacks of money with a vacuum sealer. An officer 

testified that while Spears was at the DEA office, he admitted purchasing 

marijuana from Loera in the past and giving Loera a cash down payment that 

morning for marijuana. Loera ultimately admitted the same information after 

his arrest when questioned at the DEA office. 

C. Procedural History

The United States filed a complaint against Spears on March 20, 2014, 

and he was first indicted on April 16, 2014. The third superseding indictment 

charged Spears with three counts: conspiracy to possess with intent to 

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distribute at least 100 kilograms of marijuana, felon in possession of a firearm, 

and possession of a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime. 

On May 16, 2014, Spears filed a motion to suppress all the evidence 

obtained as a result of the search and seizure, including the physical evidence 

obtained from his truck, the cell phone pictures, and his alleged admission. On 

May 30, 2014, the district court held a hearing on the motion to suppress

evidence. During the hearing, the United States called three officers involved 

in the stop and search. Spears did not call any witnesses, but he introduced 

evidence that included the patrol car’s video and audio recording of the stop.

The district court denied the motion to suppress evidence, holding that law 

enforcement officers had probable cause to search Spears’s vehicle and that 

Spears’s detention pursuant to a traffic stop until there was probable cause for 

the search was reasonable.

Spears’s trial commenced on June 16, 2014. After two days, the jury

convicted Spears on all three counts. The district court sentenced Spears to a 

total term of imprisonment of 420 months and a 4-year term of supervised 

release. Spears now appeals, inter alia, the district court’s denial of his motion 

to suppress evidence.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“When reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress 

evidence as obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, we review the 

factual determinations for clear error and the legal conclusions de novo.” 

United States v. Powell, 732 F.3d 361, 369 (5th Cir. 2013). “[W]e may consider 

all of the evidence presented at trial, not just that presented” at the motion to 

suppress hearing. United States v. Raney, 633 F.3d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 2011)

(alternation in original). “[W]e may affirm the district court’s decision on any 

basis established by the record.” Powell, 732 F.3d at 369. 

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III. ANALYSIS

Spears contends the district court erred in denying his motion to 

suppress evidence because his detention pursuant to a vehicular stop and the 

subsequent warrantless search of his vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment. 

The United States contends the search and seizure did not violate the Fourth 

Amendment because law enforcement officers had reasonable suspicion of 

criminal activity sufficient to stop and detain Spears, which developed into 

probable cause to search his vehicle.

“The exclusionary rule allows a defendant to suppress the evidentiary 

fruits of a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.” United States v. Pack, 

612 F.3d 341, 347 (5th Cir.), modified on other grounds, 622 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 

2010). “We analyze the legality of traffic stops for Fourth Amendment 

purposes under the standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Terry v. 

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).” Id. at 349−50. The 

Terry standard involves a two-part inquiry. Id. at 350. “First, we determine 

whether stopping the vehicle was initially justified by reasonable suspicion.” 

Powell, 732 F.3d at 369. Second, we determine “whether the officer’s 

subsequent actions were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that 

justified the stop of the vehicle in the first place.” United States v. Macias, 658 

F.3d 509, 517 (5th Cir. 2011). 

“Reasonable suspicion exists when the detaining officer can point to 

specific and articulable facts that, when taken together with rational 

inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the . . . seizure.” Id. at 519−20

(omission in original). “Although an officer’s reliance on a mere hunch is 

insufficient to justify a stop, the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to 

the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of 

satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Pack, 612 F.3d at 352. 

The reasonable suspicion analysis “is necessarily fact-specific, and factors 

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which by themselves may appear innocent, may in the aggregate rise to the 

level of reasonable suspicion.” United States v. Ibarra-Sanchez, 199 F.3d 753, 

759 (5th Cir. 1999). “‘We must pay heed to the Supreme Court’s admonition 

not to treat each factor in isolation,’ and instead must consider ‘the totality of 

the circumstances and the collective knowledge and experience of the officer.’” 

Macias, 658 F.3d at 520 (citations omitted). Under the collective knowledge 

doctrine, reasonable suspicion “can vest through the collective knowledge of 

the officers involved in the search and seizure operation.” Powell, 732 F.3d at 

369. 

A. Whether Stopping the Vehicle Was Initially Justified by 

Reasonable Suspicion

“For a traffic stop to be justified at its inception, an officer must have an 

objectively reasonable suspicion that some sort of illegal activity, such as a 

traffic violation, occurred, or is about to occur, before stopping the vehicle.” 

United States v. Lopez–Moreno, 420 F.3d 420, 430 (5th Cir. 2005). Even if a 

traffic violation has not been committed, an officer may stop a vehicle for 

investigatory purposes if he or she has a reasonable suspicion of criminal 

activity. United States v. Zavala, 541 F.3d 562, 574 (5th Cir. 2008). The 

United States contends, and the district court found, that the law enforcement 

officers were initially justified in stopping Spears’s vehicle for two reasons: 

reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation and reasonable suspicion of a drug 

crime. Each reason is addressed in turn.

First, law enforcement officers testified Spears committed a traffic 

violation. Specifically, the officer that pulled Spears over, who was with the 

Fort Worth Police Department, testified that an officer with the DEA 

communicated to him that he had observed Spears change lanes without 

signaling, which is a traffic violation. Additionally, an officer with the DEA 

testified that his colleague observed Spears commit a traffic violation. Based 

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on this evidence, we find stopping Spears’s vehicle was initially justified by a 

reasonable suspicion that he had committed a traffic violation.

Second, the United States contends the traffic stop was initially justified 

because the officers had a reasonable suspicion that Spears had committed or 

was about to commit a drug crime. The United States claims the following 

facts created this reasonable suspicion: Spears visited the New York House,

which had been the site of an attempted drug transaction with a confidential 

informant the day before, was where a suspected drug dealer lived, and had 

previously been visited by a person very soon before that person sold drugs to 

an undercover officer; Spears backed his truck into the driveway in a manner 

that obstructed the driver’s side and the passenger’s side of the truck from the 

view of the officers; Spears had an out-of-state license plate; multiple vehicles 

arrived at the New York House near the time Spears arrived at the New York 

House; and Spears stayed at the New York House for only ten to twenty 

minutes. 

Visiting a house linked to drug activity is similar to being in a high-crime 

area. While a person’s presence in an area known to be high in crime is a 

“‘relevant contextual consideration’” in the reasonable suspicion analysis, such 

presence, “‘standing alone, is not enough’ to support a reasonable suspicion 

that anybody found there is involved with drugs.” United States v. Hill, 752 

F.3d 1029, 1035 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 

(2000)). Likewise, the fact that Spears visited the New York House, which was

linked to drug activity in several ways, is relevant; however, this fact alone is 

not enough to support a reasonable suspicion that he is involved with drugs. 

Significantly, neither Spears nor his truck were known to the officers before he

visited the New York House, and he had not previously been identified as a 

suspect connected with drug activity, the New York House, or Loera. Also, the 

officers did not observe Spears take any action besides parking in the driveway; 

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specifically, they did not see Spears exit his truck, enter or exit the New York 

House, or talk to Loera. Thus, the officers had no way of differentiating Spears 

from a law-abiding visitor—for example, a maintenance technician visiting to 

work on the house, or a relative visiting for social purposes only. For these 

reasons, additional suspicious activity is needed to give rise to a reasonable 

suspicion that Spears had committed or was about to commit a crime.

The United States claims that backing into the driveway in a manner 

that concealed loading and unloading of the truck was suspicious. However,

backing into the driveway of a house is not unusual, and there is no indication 

that Spears backed his truck into the driveway in an atypical way. Although 

the way Spears parked obstructed the driver’s side and the passenger’s side of 

the truck from the view of the officers on the street, the officer’s view was 

obstructed because of the placement of the back of the driveway in relation to 

the fence, the house, and the officer’s location on the street—not because of 

anything Spears did other than park in the back of the driveway. Had the 

officers been located directly in front of the driveway, they would have been 

able to see Spears’s truck better. Also, no evidence was adduced that Spears 

loaded or unloaded anything while at the New York House, nor was any 

evidence provided that the contents of Spears’s truck changed while at the New 

York House. Just as we have found “the fact that a car is backed into a parking 

space [of an apartment complex] is of little persuasive value in evaluating 

reasonable suspicion,” Hill, 752 F.3d at 1036, the fact that Spears backed into 

the driveway of the New York House is of little persuasive value here. 

The United States also claims the fact that Spears was driving a truck

with Oklahoma license plates in northern Texas was suspicious. An officer 

testified that out-of-state license plates are very common in narcotic 

investigations, especially when dealing with large quantities of drugs, because 

people do not usually come from out of state to buy a small quantity of drugs. 

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However, we have noted that “an out-of-state driver’s license and license 

plates . . . may not suffice to create reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” 

United States v. Davis, _ F. App’x _ , 2015 WL 4931408, at *3 (5th Cir. Aug. 19, 

2015). On one hand, we have found a reasonable suspicion of drug crime 

where, inter alia, a tractor-trailer with out-of-state license plates exited a main 

road to an area without a gas station or truck stop. United States v. Chasten, 

223 F. App’x 418, 420 (5th Cir. 2007). On the other hand, other circuits have 

found a vehicle with out-of-state license plates, even on a highway known to be 

used for drug trafficking or even when exiting a highway at an unlikely place 

for cross-country travelers, does not give rise to a reasonable suspicion of drug 

crime because if it did, “officers could pull over scores of drivers every day” and 

because “[t]oo many people fit this description for it to justify a reasonable 

suspicion of criminal activity.” Huff v. Reichert, 744 F.3d 999, 1004–05 (7th 

Cir. 2014); United States v. $45,000.00 in U.S. Currency, 749 F.3d 709, 723 (8th 

Cir. 2014); United States v. Yousif, 308 F.3d 820, 828 (8th Cir. 2002)

(alternation in original). Here, unlike in our Davis case, there is no evidence 

or suggestion that Spears was travelling in an area of northern Texas 

unfrequented by Oklahoma visitors in pickup trucks. While we view the facts 

in light of the officer’s experience, the same officer who testified about the 

commonality of out-of-state license plates in narcotics investigations also 

testified that is it is “not uncommon to see out-of-state plates go to a house.”

Even assuming travelling with an out-of-state license plate can be a factor 

supporting reasonable suspicion, we find Spears’s travel with an out-of-state 

license plate in this case does not give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal 

activity.

Lastly, the United States claims the fact that multiple vehicles arrived 

at the New York House near the same time and the fact that Spears stayed at 

the New York House for only ten to twenty minutes were suspicious. However, 

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the officer that testified about this issue did not necessarily say that such facts 

were suspicious; rather, he said the multiple arrivals “piqued [the officers’] 

interest,” especially given that there was not any activity at the New York 

House during the first thirty minutes of surveillance, “showed [them] that 

there was some definite activity going on,” and made it “appear[ ] to [them] 

that everyone seemed to arrive at approximately the same time.” There are 

many innocent reasons for multiple cars to arrive at a house around the same 

time in the morning, even if only staying a short amount of time. We do not 

find these facts probative enough to support a reasonable suspicion finding in 

this particular case. 

Having analyzed the facts individually, we are mindful that each fact 

should not be treated in isolation and that facts which by themselves appear 

innocent may in the aggregate rise to the level of reasonable suspicion. 

Nonetheless, we do not find the totality of the circumstances at the time of the 

stop created a reasonable suspicion of a drug crime or any other criminal 

activity. 

In summary, stopping Spears’s vehicle was initially justified by 

reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation only. Accordingly, the officers’

subsequent actions must have been reasonably related in scope to a traffic 

violation.

B. Whether the Law Enforcement Officer’s Subsequent Actions 

Were Reasonably Related in Scope to the Circumstances that 

Justified the Stop of the Vehicle 

“An officer’s subsequent actions are not reasonably related in scope to 

the circumstances that caused him to stop the vehicle if he detains its 

occupants beyond the time needed to investigate the circumstances that caused 

the stop, unless he develops reasonable suspicion of additional criminal 

activity in the meantime.” Pack, 612 F.3d at 350. Specifically, a stop justified 

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by only a traffic violation “‘become[s] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the 

time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission’ of issuing a ticket for the 

violation” and “attend[ing] to related safety concerns,” absent reasonable 

suspicion of additional criminal activity. Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 

1609, 1612, 1614−16 (2015) (first two alterations in original) (quoting Illinois 

v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)). “If the officer develops reasonable 

suspicion of additional criminal activity, . . . he may further detain [the] 

occupants [of the vehicle] for a reasonable time while appropriately attempting 

to dispel this reasonable suspicion.” Andres, 703 F.3d at 833 (alterations in 

original).

The time reasonably required to complete the mission of issuing a traffic 

ticket can include the time it takes to inspect the driver’s license, automobile 

registration, and proof of automobile insurance; run computer checks; 

determine whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver; and ask

the purpose and itinerary of the trip. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1615; Pack, 612 

F.3d at 350. A dog sniff is not part of the mission of issuing a traffic ticket. 

Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1615. Therefore, absent reasonable suspicion of 

additional criminal activity, waiting for or conducting a dog sniff cannot

prolong a stop justified by only a traffic violation beyond the amount of time 

reasonably required to complete the mission of issuing a traffic ticket and 

attending to related safety concerns. Id. at 1614, 1616.

Almost forty minutes elapsed from the time the officers initially stopped 

Spears until the time they began the search of his vehicle, which was

commenced due to the receipt of information that other officers had found a 

large amount of money in Loera’s vehicle after stopping Loera. Approximately 

sixteen and a half minutes after the officers initially stopped Spears, they sat 

him in the back of the patrol car, and all questioning of him, the pat down for 

weapons, and the computer checks had been fully completed. Thus, activities 

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involving the mission of issuing a traffic ticket and attending to related safety 

concerns were completed, at the very latest, sixteen and a half minutes into 

the traffic stop.1 Spears was detained for almost an additional twenty-three 

and a half minutes—just sitting in the back of the patrol car—while the officers 

tried to obtain a drug-sniffing dog, which is not part of the mission of issuing a 

traffic ticket. Therefore, detaining Spears beyond the initial sixteen and a half 

minutes of the stop was not permitted unless a reasonable suspicion of criminal 

activity arose during those sixteen and a half minutes. The United States 

claims the following facts that arose during the stop, combined with the facts 

previously discussed that occurred before the stop, created a reasonable 

suspicion of criminal activity: Spears lied about where he was coming from; he 

appeared nervous; he was evasive, non-compliant, and argumentative; and 

there was a backpack inside his vehicle in plain view.2 

As to the purported lie, “the question is whether it was reasonable for 

someone in [the officer’s] shoes to view the answers as suspicious, not whether 

they are convincing proof that [the defendant] was lying.” United States v. 

Pena-Gonzalez, _ F. App’x _ , 2015 WL 4317820, at *4 (5th Cir. July 16, 2015). 

Nonetheless, minor, insignificant, illusory, or reconcilable inconsistencies in a 

defendant’s story are not probative of criminal activity. See Davis, 2015 WL 

 

1 Likely, the reasonable amount of time required to complete the mission of issuing a 

traffic ticket and attending to related safety concerns was less than sixteen and a half 

minutes. However, because reasonable suspicion did not arise during the initial sixteen and 

a half minutes for reasons explained infra, we need not parse exactly when the mission of 

issuing a traffic ticket and attending to related safety concerns was reasonably completed. 

Indeed, the United States does not contend that the officers even intended to issue a traffic 

ticket at any time. 2 The United States also claims the presence of what appeared to be a money counter 

in plain view contributed to reasonable suspicion. However, the DEA officer who saw what 

appeared to be a money counter did not arrive to the traffic stop until well after the initial 

sixteen and a half minutes of the stop. Therefore, the presence of what appeared to be a 

money counter could not have contributed to reasonable suspicion during the time reasonably 

required to complete the mission of issuing a traffic ticket and attending to related safety 

concerns.

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4931408, at *4; Pack, 612 F.3d at 359–60. When the officer that stopped Spears

asked him “where he was coming from,” Spears said he was coming from 

“visiting a relative,” which the officer believed was an untrue statement based 

on the information he had received from the other officers. The other officers 

knew Spears had come from the New York House, where Loera lived. 

Specifically, the officers knew Spears had parked in the driveway of the New 

York House for ten to twenty minutes, during which time the officers could not 

see whether Spears exited the vehicle and went inside the house. However, 

there is no evidence or contention that any of the officers knew that Loera was

not a relative of Spears or that none of Spears’s relatives lived at the New York 

House. Also, there is no evidence or contention that any of the officers knew 

who, if anyone, lived with Loera at the New York House. Spears was unknown 

to the officers prior to that day, and the officer did not ask Spears anything 

about Loera or the New York House. Therefore, we find it was not reasonable 

for the officer to view Spears’s answer about where he was coming from as 

suspicious, much less that it was lie. 

Next, the United States claims the fact that Spears appeared nervous 

created a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The only evidence 

regarding Spears’s nervousness is the officer’s testimony that Spears “was 

nervous”; the officer did not explain why he thought Spears was nervous or 

name any physical displays of nervousness. In most other cases in which we 

have found nervousness to be a factor supporting reasonable suspicion, the 

defendant was described as being more nervous than how Spears was 

described. See, e.g., United States v. Wallstrum, 515 F. App’x 343, 345, 347, 

350 (5th Cir. 2013) (arms and hands shaking, eyes twitching, and neck visibly 

pulsing); United States v. Wilkerson, 405 F. App’x 893, 896 (5th Cir. 2010) 

(ankle slapping, shifty eyes, shaky hands, and trembling body). Here, the non-

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descriptive, general statement that Spears was nervous is not sufficiently 

persuasive to create reasonable suspicion.

The United States also claims Spears’s evasiveness, non-compliance, and 

argumentativeness were suspicious. “[E]vasive behavior is a pertinent factor 

in determining reasonable suspicion,” but because “such behavior ‘is not 

necessarily indicative of wrongdoing,’” the “context is key.” Hill, 752 F.3d at 

1036 (quoting Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124–25). The officer testified that while 

he was questioning Spears, Spears was not giving straight answers, was 

evasive in responding to questions, and was very non-compliant. The officer 

further testified that “from [his] experience, the way [Spears] was acting led 

[him] to believe that [Spears] was going to either try to run or fight.” 

Specifically, the officer testified that he asked Spears whether there was a 

weapon in the vehicle because he observed Spears rummaging around the 

center console. At first Spears avoided answering this question with questions 

of his own, including wondering why he was being asked such a question, but 

he eventually said he did not have any weapons. Also, Spears refused to step 

outside his truck when first instructed to do so by the officer that stopped him. 

When a second officer arrived, they again asked Spears to step outside the 

truck. Again Spears initially refused, saying he was in a hurry and did not 

understand why this was necessary for a traffic violation. He complied once 

threatened with going to jail for non-compliance, which was approximately a 

minute after being asked the second time. After the pat down, the officers 

instructed Spears to sit in the back of the patrol car. He complied after 

protesting for approximately two minutes, asking, in part, why he was being 

detained. On one hand, such behavior is not a proper response to law 

enforcement and is pertinent in determining reasonable suspicion, especially 

in light of the officer’s perception based on his experience. On the other hand,

such behavior is not necessarily indicative of criminal wrongdoing, and Spears

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eventually complied with all instructions and answered all questions within 

approximately two minutes of being asked. After carefully considering all of 

the evidence in context, including the officer’s testimony and the video and 

audio recording of the traffic stop, we find that Spears’s level of evasiveness, 

non-compliance, and argumentativeness did not rise to such a level that it 

alone created a reasonable suspicion of a criminal activity under the specific 

facts of this case.

Lastly, the United States claims that the presence of a backpack inside 

Spears’s vehicle in plain view was suspicious. The officer testified that a 

backpack is “one of the most common items” used to store money or drugs 

during drug transactions. We have found reasonable suspicion to stop a van 

where a DEA agent observed three men load the van with large duffle bags at 

a suspected “stash house” in the dark due to the deactivation of a motionsensitive light. Ibarra-Sanchez, 199 F.3d at 756–59. Also, we have found 

probable cause to stop and search a car where an officer observed a suspected 

drug dealer transfer a canvas bag from his car to another car in a supermarket 

parking lot, and then observed the car with the bag travel to the city that a 

confidential informant said the suspected drug dealer was sending drugs to. 

United States v. Piaget, 915 F.2d 138, 140 (5th Cir. 1990). Unlike those cases, 

in this case the officers did not observe any movement of Spears’s backpack. 

Notably, they did not see Spears enter or exit the New York House with the 

backpack, nor did they see Spears and Loera exchange the backpack. The first 

time officers saw the backpack was after stopping Spears’s vehicle. While we 

are considerate of law enforcement’s experience with backpacks in drug 

transactions, the very common occurrence of having a backpack in a vehicle 

and the multitude of innocent uses for a backpack in a vehicle renders the 

presence of a backpack in Spears’s vehicle of little persuasive value.

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For all of these reasons, we find the totality of circumstances that existed

both before the stop and during the initial sixteen and a half minutes of the 

stop did not create a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. In so finding, 

we have considered the officers’ experience and the facts in the aggregate. 

Because law enforcement officers detained Spears longer than the time

reasonably required to issue a ticket for a traffic violation and attend to related 

safety concerns, without reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity,

his prolonged detention violated the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the 

district court erred in denying Spears’s motion to suppress the evidence 

obtained as a result of this unlawfully prolonged detention. Because Spears’s 

conviction was obtained with evidence that should have been suppressed, we 

vacate Spears’s conviction and sentence.3

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s decision denying Spears’s 

motion to suppress evidence is reversed, and Spears’s conviction and sentence 

are vacated. VACATED AND REMANDED for further proceedings not 

inconsistent with this opinion.

 

3 Because we vacate Spears’s conviction and sentence on this Fourth Amendment 

ground, we need not reach the other issues raised on appeal.

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GREGG COSTA, Circuit Judge, specially concurring:

It is a close call whether the officers had reasonable suspicion to believe 

that Spears was involved in drug trafficking, if not at the inception of the stop 

then at least after his interaction with law enforcement. A brief stop in the 

driveway of a known drug dealer on a day when there was reason to believe a 

deal was going down; evasive answers to officers; an apparent 

misrepresentation about where Spears had been (“visiting a relative” is not 

consistent with staying inside a vehicle in a driveway)—for the reasons well 

explained in the majority opinion, standing alone these might not amount to 

much. But add them together, and things start to get suspicious. 

I would not decide the reasonable suspicion question, however, 1 because 

there is a more straightforward basis for suppressing the evidence obtained 

during the search of Spears’s vehicle: even if reasonable suspicion of criminal 

wrongdoing existed, the traffic stop was unreasonably long. Like the streetcorner Terry stop on which it is based, a traffic stop supported by reasonable 

suspicion of wrongdoing must be “temporary and last no longer than is 

necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” United States v. Brigham, 382 

F.3d 500, 507 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc). Indeed, given how common routine 

traffic stops are, it is lengthy roadside detentions that represent the more 

unusual and greater intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests. Cf. Rodriguez 

v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1615-16 (2015) (rejecting de minimis rule 

 

1 The district court found that there was probable cause of drug trafficking at the 

inception of the stop. That would mean officers could have arrested Spears and conducted a 

search of his vehicle solely on the basis for observing him in the driveway of 1251 New York. 

The officers apparently did not believe they had this authority, thus the lengthy stop during 

which they were trying to establish probable cause. Although the inquiry does not depend 

on the officer’s subjective views, I agree with them that visiting a known drug trafficking 

location alone is insufficient to establish the higher standard of probable cause.

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that would have allowed officers to prolong a stop for just a few minutes while 

waiting for a canine to arrive because any unjustified prolonging of stop is 

unlawful). 

The seizure of Spears rose to the level at which those concerns are strong, 

lasting close to forty minutes before the discovery of the bag of money in Loera’s 

vehicle prompted the search of Spears’s vehicle. The district court found that 

this significant length of time did not pose a constitutional problem for two 

reasons: 1) “the defendant’s resistance to lawful commands”; and 2) the 

“officer’s diligent efforts to dispatch a canine unit to the scene.” The first is 

readily dispelled. Spears delayed the weapons pat down by about a minute 

and his subsequent transfer to the police car by about two minutes. Both of 

these events occurred within the first sixteen minutes of the stop, so they 

cannot be the reason the stop continued for an additional period more than 

twice that long. 

What about the attempts to find a canine, which is often the issue in 

challenges to the length of a traffic stop? See, e.g., Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 

1609; United States v. Pack, 612 F.3d 341, modified on denial of reh’g, 622 F.3d 

383 (5th Cir. 2010). For starters, some testimony indicates that law 

enforcement had given up on finding a dog. The local police officer who 

initiated the stop testified that they “were unable to locate a canine that was 

available” and had stopped looking. There is evidence suggesting the contrary, 

however, as a recorded radio communication indicates that at least someone 

was still “working on getting [] one.” This general statement, with no specifics 

about who was being contacted or when, is still likely enough to support the 

district court’s factual determination that the officers were still pursuing a 

canine. 

It is the conclusion at the next step of that analysis—that it was 

reasonable to continue the stop for forty minutes while those unsuccessful 

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attempts to find a canine continued—that runs into a problem. The district 

court cited Pack to support the length of the stop here, noting that it upheld 

the reasonableness of a stop lasting just under 35 minutes. But in Pack, the 

canine arrived at the scene 33 minutes after the stop. Pack, 612 F.3d at 345–

46 (stop at 8:45 a.m.; canine arrival at 9:18 a.m.). At that point in this stop, 

and for a number of minutes that followed, officers were still merely hoping to 

find a canine. 

There is a vast difference between a situation in which a canine has 

already arrived and one in which a canine has not even been located. In the 

former, the end of the “reasonable suspicion” stop is in sight. If the dog alerts, 

there is probable cause. If it does not, the driver should be on his way. In 

contrast, the latter situation looks like the “indefinite detention” that the low 

threshold of reasonable suspicion cannot support. Pack, 612 F.3d at 361–62. 

It is purely speculative that a dog will ever be found, and the odds of finding 

one are low given that lengthy efforts to locate the dog had thus far proven 

unsuccessful. Any dog that is found at this late juncture is likely to be far away 

as it would have been logical for officers to first contact nearby canine units. 

So even if a canine is finally located at minute 40, or 45, or 50, it would likely 

be well into the second hour of the stop before the canine arrives.

The 35 minutes it took for the Pack canine to arrive approaches the outer 

limits of the length of stops that courts generally allow. See United States v. 

Foreste, 780 F.3d 518, 527 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing cases that show 30 to 38 

minutes as being “the range that this and other courts have found reasonable 

for similar canine investigations”); United States v. Hardy, 855 F.2d 753, 760 

(11th Cir. 1988) (50 minutes for dog to arrive reasonable when dog was 

“immediately” located). Those cases allowing lengthier stops are ones in which 

the canine was “on the way” much earlier in the stop. See, e.g., United States 

v. Schlieve, 159 F. App’x. 538, 540–41 (5th Cir. 2005) (attempt to locate canine 

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officer lasted ten minutes, canine arrived 46 minutes after reasonable 

suspicion developed and a little more than an hour after initial stop for traffic 

violation). The government cites no case, nor have I found one, in which forty 

minutes was held to be a reasonable time in which to still be looking for a dog 

without any specific lead that one might be available. Keeping a car and its 

driver on the side of the road for that length of time based on nothing more 

than a remote hope that a canine might finally turn up is unreasonable. 

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