Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-99-03024/USCOURTS-caDC-99-03024-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sealed Case

Document Text:

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 2, 1999 Decided January 4, 2000

No. 99-3024

In re: Sealed Case

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 98ms00058)

Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr. argued the cause and filed the

brief for appellants.

Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Rogers and Tatel, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge Edwards.

Edwards, Chief Judge: Appellants in this case, a group of

news organizations, seek to require the District Court to

establish a public docket of grand jury ancillary proceedings

to facilitate greater access to information emanating from the

grand jury. The District Court denied appellants' request for

USCA Case #99-3024 Document #487770 Filed: 01/04/2000 Page 1 of 10
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

a generic rule requiring public docketing of all grand jury

matters. Appellants now appeal the judgment of the District

Court.

This is the second time that this case has come before this

court. In In re Motions of Dow Jones & Co., 142 F.3d 496

(D.C. Cir. 1998) ("Dow Jones"), this court held that there is

no First Amendment right of access to grand jury ancillary

proceedings. See id. at 502-04. The decision in Dow Jones

also made it clear that appellants have neither a statutory

right, apart from Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e),

nor a common law right of access to matters before the grand

jury. See id. at 504. The only issue left unresolved in Dow

Jones was the meaning of the District Court's Local Criminal

Rule 6.1 (formerly Local Rule 302, hereafter referred to as

"Rule 6.1"). Because Rule 6.1 "provides a limited means for

disclosing non-secret" grand jury matters, id. at 504, the

court in Dow Jones remanded the case to the District Court

to consider the feasibility of a redacted public docket for

grand jury ancillary proceedings. On remand, the District

Court declined to establish an open docket for all grand juryrelated motions. The District Court held that it was under

no legal obligation to establish a generic rule, and, further,

that such a rule would be unduly burdensome to administer to

no good end. See Mem. Order at 3-5, Jan. 20, 1999, reprinted in Joint Appendix ("J.A.") 116, 118-20. Appellants appeal

this order, asking that we overturn the District Court's

decision, or, in the alternative, that we ensure that, pursuant

to Rule 6.1, press and other media organizations are allowed

to file motions for public docketing in individual cases.

The District Court's judgment denying appellants' request

for a generic rule requiring public docketing of all grand juryrelated matters is affirmed. There is no constitutional, statutory, or common law right requiring such a rule; indeed, by

their own admission, appellants acknowledge that there is not

even a widespread practice of public docketing of grand jury

matters in the federal courts in the United States. In these

circumstances, it would be presumptuous, at best, for this

USCA Case #99-3024 Document #487770 Filed: 01/04/2000 Page 2 of 10
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

court to re-write the District Court's local rules covering

access to materials before the grand jury.

The appellants' alternative request for relief is less troublesome, for it finds support in Rule 6.1. Reasonably construed,

Rule 6.1 says that, with respect to grand jury ancillary

proceedings, when a party makes a request for a redacted

docket in a specific case, the District Court will duly consider

the request and will, if it denies the request, offer some

explanation. Any denial must, of course, be based on something more than the justification that explains the denial of

across-the-board docketing. Rule 6.1 would be heartless

without the possibility of such an ad hoc procedure, so we

have no doubt that the District Court will entertain such

requests as they arise.

I. BACKGROUND

The events giving rise to this appeal are fully recounted in

Dow Jones, so we will only briefly discuss the facts. Early in

1998, Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr convened a grand

jury to consider evidence relating to matters that eventually

led to presidential impeachment proceedings. See Dow

Jones, 142 F.3d at 497-98. The grand jury spawned a flood

of ancillary proceedings as witnesses challenged subpoenas

and objected to various aspects of the investigation. Under

Local Civil Rule 40.7(3), these ancillary proceedings were held

before the Chief Judge. Although grand jury proceedings

themselves are entirely secret, proceedings ancillary to the

grand jury are subject to slightly different rules. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require "matters affecting a

grand jury proceeding to be closed to the extent necessary to

prevent disclosure of matters occurring before a grand jury."

Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(5). Local Criminal Rule 6.1, in turn,

provides that

[p]apers, orders and transcripts of hearings subject to

this rule, or portions thereof, may be made public by the

court on its own motion or on motion of any person upon

a finding that continued secrecy is not necessary to

USCA Case #99-3024 Document #487770 Filed: 01/04/2000 Page 3 of 10
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

prevent disclosure of matters occurring before the grand

jury.

L.Cr.R. 6.1.

The press and other media services, quite predictably,

sought access to ancillary proceedings and related documents

emanating from the grand jury convened by the Independent

Counsel. Motions were filed with the District Court requesting access to certain proceedings and also asking the District

Court to establish procedures, including a public docket of all

ancillary proceedings, to facilitate media access. The District

Court, however, denied media requests to establish special

"procedures relating to public access to judicial proceedings

and records." Order, March 18, 1998, reprinted in J.A. 68

(internal quotation marks omitted). The media appealed, arguing "that the blanket closure of judicial proceedings and

the failure to provide procedural safeguards prior to closure

violate the First Amendment." Dow Jones, 142 F.3d at 499

(internal quotation marks omitted).

The court in Dow Jones recognized that, under federal and

local rules, ancillary proceedings that do not reveal " 'matters

occurring before the grand jury' " need not be closed. Id. at

501 (citation omitted). Most importantly, however, the decision in Dow Jones held that the First Amendment does not

require the District Court to open grand jury ancillary proceedings. Rather, the court noted, Rule 6.1 "gives [the press]

the most it could expect from its constitutional claim." Id. at

500.

Rule 6.1 addresses motions and orders relating to proceedings ancillary to the grand jury, providing that such matters

"shall be filed under seal" and that "[a]ll hearings on matters

affecting a grand jury proceeding shall be closed." L.Cr.R.

6.1. However, the rule also provides that matters "may be

made public by the court on its own motion or on motion of

any person upon a finding that continued secrecy is not

necessary to prevent disclosure of matters occurring before

the grand jury." Id. Thus, Rule 6.1 "provides a limited

means for disclosing non-secret matters." Dow Jones, 142

F.3d at 504; see also id. at 501 (noting that Local Criminal

USCA Case #99-3024 Document #487770 Filed: 01/04/2000 Page 4 of 10
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Rule 6.1 "appears to mean only that, as an initial matter, all

proceedings relating to the grand jury shall be closed, subject

to an order opening the proceedings"). Given the possibility

of access afforded by Rule 6.1, the court in Dow Jones

questioned whether the District Court should establish an

administrative rule or procedure ensuring a redacted public

docket of grand jury ancillary proceedings. Noting that the

District Court had not explained the lack of a public docket,

the court remanded the case for further consideration.

On remand, the District Court declined to establish a public

docket of "materials filed in connection with any grand jury

proceedings." Mem. Order, Jan. 20, 1999 at 1, reprinted in

J.A. 116 (internal quotation marks omitted). The District

Court noted the importance of "secrecy to the proper functioning of the grand jury system." Id. at 2, reprinted in J.A.

117. Because of the need for secrecy, the court pointed out,

any public docket would of necessity have to be "nondescriptive" to "protect[ ] the identities of subpoenaed witnesses and targets." Id. at 4, reprinted in J.A. 119. Such a

non-descriptive docket, the District Court held, would be of

only limited utility to the media while imposing undue administrative burdens on the trial court. The District Court

concluded that the administrative burdens, combined with

possible threats to grand jury secrecy, militated against a

public docket for all grand jury ancillary proceedings. Therefore, the District Court ruled that it would "not waste either

its or the news organizations' time and resources by establishing such a docket." Id. at 5, reprinted in J.A. 120. The

appellants appealed.

II. ANALYSIS

Appellants argue that, under this court's decision in Dow

Jones, the District Court must establish a public docket for

all grand jury ancillary proceedings. Appellants thus seek an

order from this court requiring the District Court to maintain

such a public docket. Appellants are self-servingly generous

in their reading of Dow Jones, for the decision simply does

not mandate the result here sought. Indeed, as appellants'

USCA Case #99-3024 Document #487770 Filed: 01/04/2000 Page 5 of 10
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

counsel was forced to concede at oral argument, the request

for a generic rule requiring public docketing for all grand

jury ancillary matters is completely unprecedented; and, in

our view, the request is also unsupported and unavailing. We

therefore affirm the District Court's judgment on this score.

Appellants' alternative request--to allow parties to file motions pursuant to Rule 6.1 to request public docketing in

specific cases--is unnoteworthy, for it seeks nothing more

than what the rule already provides.

A. Public Docketing of All Ancillary Grand Jury Proceedings

We begin by noting the extraordinary nature of appellants'

request: mandatory public docketing of grand jury ancillary

proceedings is virtually unknown in the federal courts. Appellants concede that they can point to no "practice" in the

federal courts imposing such a requirement on district courts.

And the decision in Dow Jones plainly establishes that there

is no constitutional, statutory, or common law principle requiring such public docketing.

Appellants argue that, despite the absence of legal authority, we should take the uncharted step of imposing a requirement of public docketing on our District Court, because the

courts have upheld rights of public docketing and access in

other situations not involving grand jury matters. See Br. for

Appellants at 15-17. It is true that the courts have required

public docketing in some judicial proceedings. See, e.g.,

United States v. Valenti, 987 F.2d 708, 715 (11th Cir. 1993)

(finding a public docket was necessary to protect the public's

and the media's constitutional rights of access to criminal

proceedings); Washington Post v. Robinson, 935 F.2d 282,

289 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that motions to seal plea agreements, for which there is a First Amendment right of access,

must be publicly docketed); In re State-Record Co., 917 F.2d

124, 128-29 (4th Cir. 1990) (requiring public docketing of a

criminal proceeding because of the constitutional right of

access); Webster Groves Sch. Dist. v. Pulitzer Publ'g Co., 898

F.2d 1371, 1377 (8th Cir. 1990) (ordering court to produce a

redacted public docket of a sealed case to protect at least a

USCA Case #99-3024 Document #487770 Filed: 01/04/2000 Page 6 of 10
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

common law right of access); Stone v. University of Maryland Med. Sys. Corp., 855 F.2d 178, 181 (4th Cir. 1988)

(requiring district court to maintain a public docket where

parties have at least a common law right of access to proceedings); In re Knoxville News-Sentinel Co., 723 F.2d 470, 475-

76 (6th Cir. 1983) (admonishing district court to publicly

docket motions to seal proceedings where there is at least a

common law right of access). However, this legal authority

does not hold, or even suggest, that there must also be public

docketing of grand jury ancillary proceedings. As appellants

readily concede, the grand jury context is unique. It is

because of their unique status that grand jury processes are

not amenable to the practices and procedures employed in

connection with other judicial proceedings.

There is a plethora of authority recognizing that the grand

jury context presents an unusual setting where privacy and

secrecy are the norm. See, e.g., Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol

Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218 (1979); In re Sealed Case,

151 F.3d 1059, 1069-71 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Indeed, as the

Supreme Court has noted, the grand jury is not even a part

of the judicial system. See United States v. Williams, 504

U.S. 36, 47 (1992) ("[T]he grand jury is an institution separate

from the courts."). The theory "of its function is that it

belongs to no branch of the institutional Government, serving

as a kind of buffer or referee between the Government and

the people." Id. That function depends on "maintain[ing]

the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings in the federal

courts." United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S.

677, 681 (1958). As the Court noted, "[s]ince the 17th century, grand jury proceedings have been closed to the public,

and records of such proceedings have been kept from the

public eye." Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. at 218 n.9.

Unlike typical judicial proceedings, grand jury proceedings

and related matters operate under a strong presumption of

secrecy. See In re Sealed Case, 151 F.3d at 1069-71 (holding

that the sanctity of the grand jury process justified an

exception to the general rule of discovery in civil proceedings); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Pokaski, 868 F.2d 497, 509-10

(1st Cir. 1989) (holding that blanket sealing of all grand jury

USCA Case #99-3024 Document #487770 Filed: 01/04/2000 Page 7 of 10
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

records was justified, because grand jury context, unlike

other judicial proceedings, is presumptively closed); In re

Subpoena to Testify Before Grand Jury Directed to Custodian of Records, 864 F.2d 1559, 1563 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding

that the rule of holding an open hearing before deciding to

close proceedings did not apply in the grand jury context).

The cases cited by appellants, involving situations other than

grand jury ancillary proceedings, are therefore inapposite.

In the instant case, involving grand jury ancillary proceedings, appellants have a limited right of access pursuant to

Rule 6.1. As noted above, Rule 6.1 provides that when

"continued secrecy is not necessary to prevent disclosure of

matters occurring before the grand jury," ancillary proceedings may be made public. L.Cr.R. 6.1. The District Court

has held that a mandatory public docket is not required by

the rule, and that to impose such a rule would be unduly

burdensome. We have no good reason to second-guess the

District Court's interpretation of its own rule, especially since

we review the District Court's decision for abuse of discretion. See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Bender, 127 F.3d 58,

67 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (reviewing District Court's decision under

local rule for abuse of discretion). It cannot be said here that

the District Court abused its discretion in failing to promulgate a generic rule, beyond the compass of Rule 6.1, requiring

a public docket for all grand jury ancillary proceedings.

Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed

on this point.

B. Alternative Procedure for Redacted Public Docketing

in Specific Cases

As an alternative to mandatory public docketing in all cases

involving grand jury ancillary proceedings, appellants request

a procedure whereby a party may file a motion pursuant to

Rule 6.1 seeking a redacted public docket in a specific case.

This alternative request for relief raises no momentous issue,

because the rule itself already allows for that which is being

sought.

Appellants' principal concern here is that they be given a

right to request public docketing in specific "high-profile"

cases. Counsel for appellants admitted that there is no

USCA Case #99-3024 Document #487770 Filed: 01/04/2000 Page 8 of 10
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

realistic possibility that the media ever will be unaware of

grand jury proceedings in a high-profile case. History defies

any such claim. Thus, appellants cannot reasonably assert

that they are unduly handicapped without a public docket for

all grand jury ancillary proceedings. Rather, they merely

contend that a rule requiring public docketing in all cases

might facilitate media attempts to uncover matters before a

grand jury. This is hardly a justification for an interpretation of Rule 6.1 beyond its terms. In point of fact, as counsel

acknowledged, the media invariably knows when to request a

public docket in a specific case; as a consequence, appellants

are able to take full advantage of the limited right of access

afforded by Rule 6.1 without the imposition of a public docket

covering all grand jury ancillary proceedings.

When a party makes a request under Rule 6.1 for a

redacted public docket in a specific proceeding, the District

Court must duly consider the request and, if it denies the

request, offer some explanation. The District Court's explanation must bear some logical connection to the individual

request. In other words, it must rest on something more

than the administrative burdens that justified the denial of

across-the-board docketing, and it must be more substantial

than, say, an arguable possibility of leaks. This approach is

fully consistent with Rule 6.1; indeed, the rule would make

little sense without the possibility of such an ad hoc procedure.

This alternative remedy was not directly addressed by the

District Court, because the matter was never pursued on

remand by appellants. Our decision here does not usurp the

legitimate administrative control that the District Court exercises over its own docket. Rather, we simply agree with

appellants that Rule 6.1 means what it says in providing a

limited right of access with respect to grand jury ancillary

proceedings in which continued secrecy is not necessary to

prevent disclosure of matters before the grand jury.

III. CONCLUSION

The judgment of the District Court is affirmed insofar as it

rejects appellants' request for a generic rule requiring public

USCA Case #99-3024 Document #487770 Filed: 01/04/2000 Page 9 of 10
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

docketing of all grand jury ancillary proceedings. The case is

hereby remanded for further proceedings, as may be necessary, consistent with the foregoing opinion.

USCA Case #99-3024 Document #487770 Filed: 01/04/2000 Page 10 of 10