Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-04932/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-04932-6/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Maraina Arik
Plaintiff
Michael J. Astrue
Defendant
Dalena M. Taverniti
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OAKLAND DIVISION

DALENA M. TAVERNITI, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant. 

No. C 04-04932 SBA

ORDER

[Docket No. 52]

REQUEST BEFORE THE COURT

Before the Court is defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (the “Motion”)

[Docket No. 52]. Plaintiffs Dalena Taverniti and Maraina Arik have raised claims in connection

with their Social Security Administration (“SSA”) administrative proceedings. Defendant Michael

J. Astrue, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“defendant”), has requested

dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,

claiming plaintiffs have failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, and under Rule 12(b)(6) for

failure to state a claim.

As discussed below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the Motion. 

Specifically, with regards to Taverniti, she has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, and she

is not entitled to have them waived. Thus, under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Court has no jurisdiction

over her complaint. Further, she has not stated a colorable constitutional claim of due process

violation, so the Court has no jurisdiction on this independent basis. Thus, under Rule 12(b)(1), the

Court DISMISSES her, without prejudice. 

Turning to Arik, she has made three claims. In regards to her first claim, she has stated a

colorable constitutional claim of due process violation, in regards to an April 6, 2006 Appeals

Council ruling, denying her request, under Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 91-5p, for district court

review. As for her second claim, demanding a hearing under SSR 91-5p, the SSA and Arik agree it

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1 An ALJ’s order issued on June 16, 2005, however, indicates Taverniti may have requested

the Waiver in 2001, and that it may have been denied in 2002. Ford Decl., Ex. “2” at 4 para. 4.

2 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), there is no distinction between successive SSA

commissioners sued in their official capacity.

3 This subsection states, in part:

Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made

after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy,

may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days

after the mailing to him of notice of such decision or within such further time as the

Commissioner of Social Security may allow. 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (emphasis added).

2

is moot, as the SSA already gave her one. Lastly, in regards to her third claim, she has not stated a

colorable constitutional claim of due process violation, in regards to the SSA unduly delaying the

processing of her request, under SSR 91-5p, for district court review. Thus, the Court DENIES the

Motion with respect to Arik’s first claim, GRANTS the Motion with respect to Arik’s second claim,

which it DISMISSES without prejudice as moot, and GRANTS the Motion with respect to Arik’s

third claim, which it DISMISSES without prejudice, but with 14 days leave to amend.

BACKGROUND

I. Dalena M. Taverniti 

Taverniti has a lengthy history with the SSA, which goes back to 1980. Docket No. 44

¶ (3)(a) (Decl. of Dennis V. Ford re. Dalena Taverniti (“Ford Decl.”)). For this matter, however, her

pertinent facts are as follows. At some point between 1982 and 1991, the SSA advised her she owed

it for overpaid disability and/or SSI benefits. Id. ¶ (3)(c). She requested a waiver of the recovery of

her overpayment (the “Waiver”). Id. ¶ (3)(d). In May 1991, this request was denied, following

which she requested a personal conference. Id. In August 1991, the SSA affirmed its denial.1

 Id. 

Over ten years later, on January 27, 2003, Taverniti’s attorney requested the Appeals Council

to review the 1991 affirmance. Id., Ex. “1” at 2 para. 1. On September 10, 2003, Taverniti sued

defendant’s predecessor2

 in this Court, in Taverniti v. Barnhart, case 03-04126. See Docket

No. 1-4126. She claimed the Appeals Council had unduly delayed responding to her January 27,

2003 request, and having exhausted her administrative remedies, this Court had jurisdiction under 42

U.S.C. § 405(g).3 Docket No. 15-4126 at 6:4-7 (Order). 

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4 This ruling is designed:

to clarify [the SSA’s] policy on establishing good cause for missing the deadline to

request review. It is being issued to avoid the improper application of res judicata or

administrative finality when the evidence establishes that a claimant lacked the

mental capacity to understand the procedures for requesting review.

Soc. Sec. Ruling 91-5P; 1983-1991 Soc. Sec. Rep. Serv. 809 (CCH); 1991 WL 208067 (SSA), *1;

1991 SSR LEXIS 5, *1.

As the ruling notes, a “request for reconsideration, hearing before an administrative law

judge (ALJ), review by the Appeals Council, or review by a Federal district court must be filed

within 60 days” of an adverse determination or decision. WL 208067 at *1; SSR LEXIS 5 at *1-*2. 

SSA regulations, however, allow more time for good cause shown. WL 208067 at *1; SSR LEXIS 5

at *2. As the ruling makes clear, if a claimant establishes they lacked the mental capacity to

understand the procedures for requesting review, and had no one legally responsible for prosecuting

the claim, such as a parent, legal guardian, attorney, et seq., then he or she is entitled to an extension

of time beyond the standard 60 days. WL 208067 at *2; SSR LEXIS 5 at *4-*5. 

3

On August 25, 2004, this Court dismissed case 03-04126 for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction, because Taverniti had failed to allege the Appeals Council had actually reviewed her

request. Id. at 6:13-20. As such, the Court had no”final” decision to review. Id. The Court also

found she was not entitled to waive the exhaustion requirement, because: (1) her dispute centered

on, and was not collateral to, a substantive claim of entitlement; (2) she failed to allege she would

suffer irreparable harm if forced to exhaust administrative remedies; and (3) her Waiver, and any

allegations that mental incapacity prevented her from pursuing review of any denials, were best

adjudicated by the SSA under Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 91-5p.4

 Id. at 6:21-7:8. 

In addition, Taverniti argued SSR 91-5p and Udd v. Massanari, 245 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir.

2001) mandated the SSA must provide her a new hearing on the merits, as she lacked the mental

capacity to effectively appeal her denial. Docket No. 15-4126 at 8:11-13. The Court noted,

however, that SSR 91-5p merely provided a framework within which she could request the SSA to

consider her mental capacity allegations, which framework she had not utilized. Id. at 8:14-21. The

Court also held Udd was inapposite, as Udd, unlike Taverniti, presented such allegations to the SSA. 

Id. at 8:21-9:5. Thus, lacking jurisdiction, the Court dismissed her matter on August 25, 2004. See

id. at 9.

///

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5 Plaintiff alleges she submitted a second request on September 31, 2004, because she believed

the SSA had taken no action on the first one. Compl. ¶ 2. The parties make no further mention of

this second request.

6 Title 20 C.F.R. § 404.967 states, in part, “[i]f you or any other party is dissatisfied with the

hearing decision or with the dismissal of a hearing request, you may request that the Appeals

Council review that action.”

4

Five days later, on August 31, 2004, Taverniti requested a hearing with an ALJ, under SSR

91-5p, claiming this Court had mandated the SSA provide her with one. Ford Decl. ¶ (3)(h), Ex. “2”

at 5 para. 3; Docket No. 45 ¶ 2 (Amend. Compl. (“Compl.”)).5 

On November 19, 2004, Taverniti sued defendant in the matter before the Court. See Docket

No. 1. In her complaint, she alleged the SSA was dragging its feet in complying with this Court’s

order, allegedly mandating the SSA provide her a hearing under SSR 91-5p. Id. at ¶ 2. On March 1,

2005, the SSA filed a motion to dismiss matter for lack of jurisdiction. See Docket No. 9. On

March 17, 2005, Taverniti filed a cross-motion for summary judgment and a reply to the SSA’s

motion to dismiss. See Docket No. 10. 

On June 10, 2005, the Appeals Council dismissed Taverniti’s January 27, 2003 request to

review the August 1991 affirmance of the denial of her May 1991 request for the Waiver. Ford

Decl. ¶ (3)(d), Ex. “1” at 1. It dismissed, because under 20 C.F.R. § 404.967, the Council may

review a hearing decision or a dismissal of a hearing request.6

 Id., Ex. “1” at 2 para. 2. As she had

not had a hearing with an ALJ nor requested one, the Council had no jurisdiction. Id. Further, she

had never taken the predicate step to obtain a hearing, of requesting the SSA reconsider its 1991

decisions. Id., Ex. “1” at 2 paras 2-4. The Council also held neither SSR 91-5p nor Udd allowed her

to bypass the appropriate level of administrative review. Id., Ex. “1” at 2 para. 3. The Council thus

recommended she file a request for reconsideration and present evidence regarding how her mental

capacity in 1991 affected her ability to timely pursue review. Id., Ex. “1” at 2 para. 4.

///

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7 Title 20 C.F.R. § 404.930(a) states, in part, “[y]ou or another party may request a hearing

before an administrative law judge if we have made–(1) A reconsidered determination; (2) A revised

determination of an initial determination ...; (4) A revised reconsidered determination ....” 

8 While 20 C.F.R. § 404.930(a) addresses disability benefits, see supra preceding note, 20

C.F.R. § 416.1430(a) is an analogous provision addressing SSI benefits.

9 The ALJ was uncertain as to what Taverniti had requested, because she had failed to comply

with his requests to identify what relief she sought, as required by 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.911, 404.933(c),

416.1411, and 416.1433(c). Ford Decl. ¶ (3)(d), Ex. “2” at 4 para. 2; Ex. “2” at 6 paras. 4, 6. The

ALJ also noted that contrary to Taverniti’s allegations, the Court’s August 25, 2004 order did not

mandate the SSA must provide her with a hearing under SSR 91-5p.

10 Subsequent developments involving Taverniti are discussed in part III, infra.

5

Six days later, on June 16, 2005, an ALJ dismissed Taverniti’s August 31, 2004 request for

hearing. Id. ¶ (3)(j), Ex. “2” at 1. He noted 20 C.F.R. § 404.930(a)(1)7 and § 416.1430(a)(1)8

provide a person has a right to a hearing before an ALJ, if the SSA has made a reconsidered

determination or a revised initial or reconsidered determination on a matter in issue. Id., Ex. “2” at 6

para. 7. He further noted if Taverniti were challenging the denial of her request for the Waiver, he

had no jurisdiction, as she had never requested the SSA to reconsider its 1991 determinations.9 Id.,

Ex. “2” at 6 para. 8. 

Taverniti then filed a request with the Appeals Council to review this dismissal. Id. ¶ (3)(j). 

On July 27, 2006, the Appeals Council denied her request, as it could find no basis to provide any

review. Id. ¶ (3)(k); Ex. “3” at 1.

On August 28, 2006, back in this Court, Taverniti filed an Amended Complaint. See Docket

No. 45. In it, she claimed the ALJ violated her due process by dismissing her hearing request, id.

at 2:10-13, 25-27, and the Appeals Council violated her due process by denying her request to

review the ALJ’s dismissal, id. at 2:17-21, 27-30.10

II. Maraina Arik

On February 16, 1995, Arik filed an application with the SSA for SSI benefits. Docket

No. 43 ¶ (3)(a) (Decl. of Dennis V. Ford Re: Maraina Arik (“Ford Decl. 2”)). On January 26 or

February 6, 1999, an ALJ dismissed Arik’s request for a hearing, based on a request for withdrawal. 

Id. ¶ (3)(d) (indicating Feb. 9); see id., Ex. “2” at 1, 2 para. 1 (indicating Jan. 26). Shortly after

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11 This is the same person as her current counsel.

12 The SSA puts this date at November 5, 2004. Ford Decl. 2 ¶ (3)(f). 

13 Arik was not a party, however, to Taverniti’s first law suit.

6

receiving this decision, Arik terminated her counsel.11 Id. at 2 para. 5. At that time, her counsel

explained how the 60-day appeals period worked and offered to file a request for review. Id. Arik

declined the offer. Id. On March 19, 1999, Arik, pro se, filed a request for review. Id. at 2 para 6.

She did not, however, inform the SSA she had terminated her counsel. Id. On March 14, 2000, the

Appeals Council denied Arik’s request for review, advising her how she could request court review,

and sent a copy to her prior counsel, not knowing of the termination. Id. 

More than four years later, on or about September 27, 2004,12 Arik requested a hearing under

SSR 91-5p. Amend. Compl. at 3:3:-6. In her form, she stated, “I be awarded a 91-5p hearing for

reopening my prior claims because I was without counsel at the time my appeal lapsed and my

mental disability precluded me from affecting an appeal.” Id. at 3:6-8. More specifically, her

representative claimed she was legally incompetent in 2000 to appeal the Appeals Council denial. 

Ford Decl. 2, Ex. “2” at 1. In her form, she referenced this Court’s August 25, 2004 order.13

Amend. Compl. at 3:8-9. 

On November 19, 2004, Arik sued in the matter before the Court. See Docket No. 1. In her

complaint, she alleged the SSA was dragging its feet in complying with this Court’s August 25,

2004 order, which allegedly mandated she receive a hearing under SSR 91-5p. Id. at ¶ 3. On March

1, 2005, the SSA filed a motion to dismiss Arik’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction. See Docket No.

9. On March 17, 2005, Arik filed a cross-motion for summary judgment and a reply to the SSA’s

motion to dismiss. See Docket No. 10. 

On August 18, 2005, the Court referred to a magistrate, a dispute over whether the SSA

should produce Arik’s administrative record. See Docket No. 16. On October 25, 2005, the

magistrate judge denied Arik’s motion to compel production of the record, holding it would be

premature under the Court’s Social Security Procedural Order [Docket No. 2], which does not

require the SSA to produce it, until after it files an answer. See Docket No. 22. Further, the

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magistrate judge felt Arik did not need the record to oppose a motion to dismiss for lack of

jurisdiction. See id.

On March 3, 2006, an ALJ dismissed Arik’s September 27, 2004 hearing request, for lack of

jurisdiction, as she had filed a request for an extension of time to seek district court review, which

request she had to file with the Appeals Council. Ford Decl., Ex. “1” at 4. Arik then filed a request

for review of this dismissal with the Appeals Council, which denied it, on April 6, 2006. Id.

¶ (3)(g)-(h). In so holding, the Council found the ALJ properly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 

Id., Ex. “2” at 1-2. 

The Council, however, also considered Arik’s request for more time to file a civil action. Id.

at 2. The Council noted her representative had stated in an August 24, 2005 letter and a March 6,

2006 statement that Arik failed to timely appeal in 2000, due to mental incompetency within the

meaning of SSR 91-5p. Id. at 2 para 4. The Council found, however, its records showed Arik had a

severe mental impairment, but not a lack of mental capacity to understand the procedures for

requesting review, as contemplated in SSR 91-5p. Id. at 2 para. 7. Further, its records showed she

had a limited education and semi-skilled past relevant work. Id. at 2 para. 8. Also, she timely filed

her 1999 appeal allegedly on her own. Id. She received disability benefits directly, without a

representative payee. Id. And, she was able to articulate events which took place well into the past,

indicating facility in the English language. Id. 

The Council also noted the only documents indicating Arik had been without counsel in

2000, when she received instructions on how to request court review, were not from 2000, but

declarations from her counsel, dated January 31, 2005, and from her, dated February 1, 2005. Id.

Based on these findings, the Appeals Council found no reason to extend the time for her file a civil

action, and denied her request to do so. Id. at 3.

On August 28, 2006, back in this Court, Arik filed an Amended Complaint. See Docket No.

45. In it she alleged three claims. First, she claimed due process entitled her to judicial review of

the Appeals Council’s April 6, 2006 decision, denying her an extension to seek district court review,

under SSR 91-5p. Opp’n at 3:12-13, 4:3-10, 4:12-14. Second, she claimed she had stated a

constitutional claim mandating the SSA give her a hearing under SSR 91-5p. Id. at 3:8-10, 4:10-12. 

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14 Subsequent developments involving Arik are discussed in part III, infra.

15 The Court notes at points in the Motion, rather than provide certain arguments, the SSA

attempts to incorporate by reference prior motions filed in this matter. See, e.g., Mot. at 2:9-11

(incorporating prior motions by reference), 3:20-23 (same), 3:25-26. This is completely

inappropriate and a violation of Civil Local Rule 7-4(a)(5), governing the content of a motion’s

points and authorities, and rule 7(b), governing page limits. This is even more true where the Court

has denied these motions as moot. All motions must be fully self-contained. While the Court did

consider the Ford declarations, as the SSA could have attached them to the Motion without violating

Rule 7(b), the Court did not consider any pleadings or arguments contained therein, referenced

beyond the Motion before the Court.

16 Despite the title, this pleading is only an opposition to the SSA’s Motion.

8

Third, she claimed the SSA had violated her due process by unduly delaying the administrative

process, possibly because she had sued it. Id. at 3:10-12, 4:13-14.14

III. Developments in and after September 2006 involving Taverniti and Arik.

In this matter, on September 8, 2006 the magistrate judge ordered the parties to treat

Taverniti’s and Arik’s initial complaint as operative, because they failed to obtain a stipulation or

leave of court to file an amended complaint. See Docket No. 48. The SSA then filed a second

motion to dismiss, see Docket No. 49, and Taverniti and Arik filed an opposition, see Docket

No. 50. On November 8, 2006, this Court issued an order holding Taverniti and Arik were allowed

to file their Amended Complaint without a stipulation or leave of court, and thus held it was the

operative complaint. See Docket No. 51. In so holding, the Court denied as moot the SSA’s first

and second motions to dismiss [Docket Nos. 9 and 49], and Taverniti’s and Arik’s cross-motion and

reply [Docket No. 10]. See Docket No. 51.

On December 8, 2006, the SSA filed the Motion before the Court.15 See Docket No. 52. On

December 15, 2006, Taverniti and Arik filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and Reply in

Opposition to the Motion (the “Opposition”).16 See Docket No. 53.

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

A party may assert a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction by motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). 

As the Supreme Court has stated:

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9

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power

authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial

decree. It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the

burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); A-Z Intern. v. Phillips, 323

F.3d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir. 2003).

“A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction may either attack the allegations

of the complaint or may be made as a ‘speaking motion’ attacking the existence of subject matter

jurisdiction in fact.” Thornhill Pub. Co., Inc. v. Gen. Tel. & Elec. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir.

1979). In resolving a “facial” attack, a court limits its inquiry to the complainant’s allegations,

which are taken as true, Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004),

though the Circuits are split as to whether reasonable inferences are drawn in the complainant’s

favor, see Valentin v. Hosp. Bella Vista, 254 F.3d 358, 361 (drawn) (1st Cir. 2001); Shipping Fin’l

Servs. Corp. v. Drakos, 140 F.3d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1998) (not drawn). And, leave to amend will be

granted to correct formal defects. Telluride Mgmt. Solutions, Inc. v. Telluride Inv. Group, 55 F.3d

463, 466 (9th Cir. 1995). 

In contrast, “[i]n resolving a factual attack on jurisdiction, the district court may review

evidence beyond the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary

judgment.” Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1039. 

Once the moving party has converted the motion to dismiss into a factual motion by

presenting affidavits or other evidence properly brought before the court, the party

opposing the motion must furnish affidavits or other evidence necessary to satisfy its

burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction.

Id. (quoting Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch., 343 F.3d 1036, 1039 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2003)). 

The court then proceeds to weigh the evidence, and resolve any factual disputes on its own. 

Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987). If, in its discretion, a court finds it

necessary, it may hold evidentiary hearings. Rosales v. United States, 824 F.2d 799, 803 (9th Cir.

1987). If it does, then the “court need not presume the truthfulness of the plaintiff’s allegations.” 

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10

Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1039. If it does not hold hearings, however, but instead rules solely on the

complaint, declarations, et seq., then it must take the complaint’s allegations as true. Rhoades v.

Avon Prods., Inc., 504 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2007); McLachlan v. Bell, 261 F.3d 908 (9th Cir

2001).

The procedure is different, however, “when ‘the jurisdictional issue and substantive issues

are so intertwined that the question of jurisdiction is dependent on the resolution of factual issues

going to the merits’ of an action.” Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1039 (quoting Sun Valley Gas., Inc. v. Ernst

Enters., 711 F.2d 138, 139 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077

(9th Cir. 1983))). “The question of jurisdiction and the merits of an action are intertwined where “a

statute provides the basis for both the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal court and the

plaintiff’s substantive claim for relief.” Id. In such cases, a court may not hold hearings to resolve

genuinely disputed facts, but instead must employ the standard applicable to a motion for summary

judgment. Rosales, 824 F.2d at 803. Thus, a court may only grant such a motion to dismiss “if the

material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter

of law.” Id. Otherwise, the court must defer the issue for resolution at trial. Id. An exception to

this rule exists, however, where the intertwined allegations are immaterial, insubstantial, or

frivolous. Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1039-40. In such cases, a court may determine jurisdiction, despite

a genuine dispute over jurisdictional facts intertwined with the merits of a given matter. Id.

II. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a claim may be dismissed if it does not

“state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When considering a

motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the plaintiff’s complaint is liberally construed and all wellpleaded facts are taken as true. Syverson v. IBM Corp., 472 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Conclusory allegations of law, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences, however,

are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss. See Fields v. Legacy Health Sys., 413 F.3d 943, 950

n.5 (9th Cir. 2005); Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). If

dismissal is warranted, it is generally without prejudice, unless it is clear the complaint cannot be

saved by any amendment. See Sparling v. Daou, 411 F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied,

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546 U.S. 1172 (2006); Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 2002). In resolving a

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court may review documents referenced in pleadings,

whose authenticity is undisputed, without transforming it into a motion for summary judgment. 

Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir.1994), overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v.

County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1123-24 (9th Cir. 2002)).

III. Finality and Exhaustion under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)

As made clear by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and § 405(h), of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 301 et seq., the district courts have subject-matter jurisdiction only over disputes involving final

decisions of the Commissioner of the SSA. As section 405(h) states:

The findings and decision of the Commissioner of Social Security after a

hearing shall be binding upon all individuals who were parties to such hearing. No

findings of fact or decision of the Commissioner of Social Security shall be reviewed

by any person, tribunal, or governmental agency except as herein provided. No

action against the United States, the Commissioner of Social Security, or any officer

or employee thereof shall be brought under section 1331 or 1346 of Title 28 to

recover on any claim arising under this subchapter.

42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (emphasis added).

Section 405(g) states:

Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social

Security made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in

controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action commenced

within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such decision or within such

further time as the Commissioner of Social Security may allow. 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (emphasis added).

A final judgment consists of two elements: (1) the claimant presenting a claim to the

Commissioner; and (2) the claimant exhausting his or her administrative remedies. Kaiser v. Blue

Cross of Cal., 347 F.3d 1107, 1115 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 605-06

(1984)); Kildare v. Saenz, 325 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Johnson v. Shalala, 2 F.3d

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918, 921 (9th Cir. 1993)). The presentment requirement is jurisdictional, and therefore cannot be

waived by the Commissioner or the courts. Kaiser, 347 F.3d at 1115 (citing Matthews v. Eldridge,

424 U.S. 319, 328 (1975)); Johnson, 2 F.3d at 921. The exhaustion requirement, however, is not

jurisdictional, and is thus waivable by either the Commissioner or the courts. Kaiser, 347 F.3d at

1115 (citing Matthews, 424 U.S. at 328); Johnson, 2 F.3d at 921 (same).

Following City of New York, 476 U.S. 467 (1986), the Ninth Circuit “adopted a three-part

test for determining whether a particular case merits judicial waiver of § 405(g)’s exhaustion

requirement.” Kildare, 325 F.3d at 1082 (citing Johnson, 2 F.3d at 921). “The claim must be

(1) collateral to a substantive claim of entitlement (collaterality), (2) colorable in its showing that

denial of relief will cause irreparable harm (irreparability), and (3) one whose resolution would not

serve the purposes of exhaustion (futility).” Kildare, 325 F.3d at 1082 (quoting Johnson, 2 F.3d

at 921 (citing Briggs v. Sullivan, 886 F.2d 1132, 1139 (9th Cir. 1989))). 

With regards to the first element, the Ninth Circuit has held a “plaintiff’s claim is collateral if

it is not essentially a claim for benefits.” Johnson, 2 F.3d at 921. With regards to the second

element, a plaintiff must raise “at least a colorable claim that exhaustion will cause him [or her]

irreparable injury.” Id. at 922. A colorable showing is one that is not “wholly insubstantial,

immaterial, or frivolous.” Id.; see also Briggs, 886 F.2d at 1140 (economic hardship awaiting

administrative review constitutes irreparable injury -- “Back payments can have some ameliorative

effect . . . [y]et they cannot erase either the experience or the entire effect of several months without

food, shelter or other necessities.”). 

Lastly, the third element’s function is to determine whether a plaintiff’s claim is the kind

“whose resolution would not serve the purposes of exhaustion.” As the Supreme Court explained:

Exhaustion is generally required as a matter of preventing premature

interference with agency processes, so that the agency may function efficiently and so

that it may have an opportunity to correct its own errors, to afford the parties and the

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17 Title 20 C.F.R. § 416.1402 lists 15 non-exclusive categories of “initial determinations.” 

Analogous provisions governing disability benefits are found at 20 C.F.R. § 404.902.

18 Analogous provisions governing disability benefits are found at 20 C.F.R. § 404.903.

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courts the benefit of its experience and expertise, and to compile a record which is

adequate for judicial review.

Bowen v. New York, 476 U.S. 467, 484 (1986) (citation omitted). 

Exhaustion also serves the purpose of conserving judicial resources. Johnson, 2 F.3d at 922.

IV. Judicial Review of Decisions not Generally Subject to Administrative or Judicial

Review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)

Subchapter II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq., governs old age, survivors,

and disability insurance (OASDI) benefits, while subchapter XVI, 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq., governs

SSI for the aged, blind, and disabled. Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(b), the SSA must hold evidentiary

hearings when a claimant timely requests one to dispute a determination regarding their benefits or

disability status. Likewise, under 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c), the SSA must to do likewise, when a

claimant timely requests one to dispute a determination regarding their SSI benefits. Under 42

U.S.C. § 405(g), on timely request, a claimant who disputes a decision arising from a mandatory

evidentiary hearing is entitled to judicial review. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) (OASDI), 1383(c)(3)

(SSI).

Turning solely to SSI, the SSA has codified these principles in the Code of Federal

Regulations. Thus, under 20 C.F.R. § 416.1402, “initial determinations,” such as those regarding

eligibility for benefits, or the amount, suspension, reduction, or termination of benefits, are subject

to administrative and judicial review. Id. § 416.1402, § 416.1402(a)-(b).17 By definition, “initial

determinations” are subject to the mandatory hearing provisions of § 1383(c) and the administrative

and judicial review provisions of § 405(g).

In contrast, under 20 C.F.R. § 416.1403(a), administrative actions that are not “initial

determinations” may be reviewed by the SSA, but are not subject to administrative or judicial review.

Id. § 1416.1403(a). These actions include, but are not limited to, denying a request to extend the

time period for requesting review of a determination or a decision, id. § 1416.1403(a)(8).18 By

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19 Sanders involved disability benefits. Under 42 C.F.R. § 404.903(l), such a decision is not an

“initial determination.” The analogous SSI provision is 42 C.F.R. § 416.1403(a)(5).

20 Under 42 C.F.R. § 404.903(j), such a decision is not an “initial determination.” The

analogous SSI provision is 42 C.F.R. § 404.1403(a)(8).

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definition, administrative actions which are not “initial determinations” are not subject to the

mandatory hearing provisions of § 1383(c) or the administrative and judicial review provisions of

§ 405(g).

The Supreme Court discussed this framework in Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977),

where the court addressed whether a decision to reopen a prior final decision was itself a “final

decision” subject to judicial review under § 405(g).19 Id. at 107-08. The court held it was not, for

four reasons. First, it held decisions made by the SSA which do not require a mandatory hearing,

under § 405(b), are not subject to judicial review under § 405(g). Id. at 107-08. Second, it held

allowing judicial review of decisions like this, at any time, even years after the prior final decision

had been made, would frustrate Congress’ intent, in § 405(g), limiting review to 60 days after a

decision. Id. at 108. Third, non-initial determinations are regulatory and governed by the SSA, not

statutory and governed by Congress. Id. And fourth, denying Sanders judicial review of the

decision to reopen did not deny him his right of judicial review, as he lost it himself by failing to

timely seek review of the prior “final” decision.

The Supreme Court held, however, that in “rare instances,” where a claimant raises a

constitutional challenge, then judicial review will be available, even for a decision which does not

require a mandatory hearing under § 405(b). Id. at 108-09. This is because “[c]onstitutional

questions obviously are unsuited to resolution in administrative hearing procedures and, therefore,

access to the courts is essential to the decision of such questions.” Id. at 109. 

The Ninth Circuit first explored these principles in Peterson v. Califano, 631 F.2d 628 (9th

Cir. 1980). In Peterson, a claimant failed to seek judicial review within 60 days of the Appeals

Council affirming the revocation of his disability benefits. Id. at 629. The Appeals Council then

denied his request to extend the time to seek judicial review.20 Id. He sued anyway, and the Ninth

Circuit affirmed the district court dismissing for lack of jurisdiction, based on the principles

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28 21 The absence of counsel, however, is not required to state such a claim. Udd, 245 F.3d

at 1099 n.3.

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enunciated in Sanders. Id. at 629-31. Since Peterson, the Ninth Circuit has affirmed the Sanders

principles a number of times. See Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1197, 1203 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting

constitutional exception); Matlock v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 492, 493-94 (9th Cir. 1990) (no review for

denying request to extend time to seek Appeal Council review of ALJ’s ruling, citing 20 C.F.R.

§ 416.1403(a)(8)); Davis v. Schweiker, 665 F.2d 934, 934-36 (9th Cir. 1982) (no review for denying

a request to reopen a prior final decision or for a determination a prior decision is res judicata).

In construing the Sanders’ constitutional exception, the Ninth Circuit has held a

constitutional claim may not be merely substantive, i.e., an attack on the merits of a prior decision. 

Evans v. Chater, 110 F.3d 1480, 1482 (9th Cir. 1997); Boettcher v. Sec’y of Health and Human

Servs., 759 F.2d 719, 722 (9th Cir. 1985). Instead, it must be procedural. “[T]he Sanders exception

applies to any colorable constitutional claim of due process violation that implicates a due process

right either to a meaningful opportunity to be heard or to seek reconsideration of an adverse benefits

determination.” Udd v. Massanari, 245 F.3d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Evans, 110 F.3d

at 1483 (citations omitted)); Panages v. Bowen, 871 F.2d 91, 93 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Further, “[a] challenge that is not ‘wholly insubstantial, immaterial, or frivolous’ raises a

colorable constitutional claim.” Udd, 245 F.3d 1096 (quoting Boettcher, 759 F.2d at 722). For

example, a claim is colorable, “[w]here a claimant alleges that a prior determination should be

reopened because he suffered from a mental impairment and was not represented by counsel at the

time of the denial of benefits, he has asserted a colorable constitutional claim.” Udd, 245 F.3d at

1099 (citing Evans, 110 F.3d at 1483).21 A claim is not colorable, however, if it is clearly

immaterial, insubstantial, or frivolous and made only for the purposes of establishing jurisdiction. 

Hoye v. Sullivan, 985 F.2d 990, 991-92 (9th Cir.1993). 

ANALYSIS

I. The Court has no subject-matter jurisdiction over Taverniti.

In its Motion, the SSA argues the Court should dismiss Taverniti, under Rule 12(b)(1), as the

Court has no subject-matter jurisdiction over her claims, under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Specifically, the

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22 There were two decisions in 1991. First, a decision denying Taverniti’s request for the

Waiver, then a decision affirming the denial. Neither party has indicated the affirmance was a form

of reconsideration.

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SSA argues she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies and is not entitled to have them

waived. Mot. at 4:27-5:10. The SSA also argues she failed to state a colorable constitutional claim

of due process violation. Id. at 9:6-7. As explained below, the SSA is correct. 

Before turning to analyze the SSA’s Motion, however, the Court must first determine the

correct form of analysis to apply, under Rule 12(b)(1). Because the SSA attached declarations and

exhibits to its Motion, it clearly made a “speaking motion,” attacking the factual basis for

Taverniti’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Further, as discussed below, the determination of whether or

not Taverniti actually did or did not request the SSA to reconsider its 1991 decisions will determine

whether she has jurisdiction and resolve her substantive claims. This is because, the answer will

determine whether or not she exhausted her administrative remedies, whether it would have been

futile for her to do so, and whether or not she has stated a colorable constitutional claim for the ALJ

and Appeals Council violating her due process. All three issues relate to jurisdiction, and the third

issue states her substantive claim. Thus, the jurisdictional and substantive issues are intertwined,

such that this Court must proceed under the standard applicable to a motion for summary judgment.

A. Taverniti has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies.

Title 20 C.F.R. § 404.900(a) explains the SSA’s administrative review process comprises

four steps, which run in this order: an initial determination, a reconsideration, an administrative

hearing before an ALJ, and then an Appeals Council Review. The SSA has presented evidence that

Taverniti failed to request the SSA reconsider its 1991 decisions.22 In her Opposition, Taverniti does

address this issue, effectively conceding it to the SSA. The Court thus finds the material

jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the SSA is entitled to prevail on this issue as a matter of

law. As such, the Court finds Taverniti failed to exhaust her administrative remedies and obtain a

“final” decision from the Appeals Council regarding its 1991 determinations. As a result, the Court

does not have jurisdiction over her claims, under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

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23 At a number of points in her pleadings, Taverniti cryptically references Acquiescence Ruling

92-7(9) a.k.a. AR 92-7(9). See, e.g., Amend. Compl. at 3:1-3. She does not, however, explain what

it is, what it says, or where the Court might find it. The Court, however, has reviewed Social

Security AR 92-7(9), which addresses the following issue: 

Whether an initial determination in the Social Security or Supplemental

Security Income (SSI) programs must be reopened when the notice of the initial

determination did not explicitly state that the failure to seek reconsideration results in

a final determination, and the claimant did not pursue a timely appeal.

57 Fed. Reg. 45061-02 (Sep. 30, 1992).

The SSA published AR 92-7(9) in response to the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1990) which held the SSA’s prior version of denial notices violated due

process, by failing to advise recipients an adverse determination would be a final determination,

absent a timely challenge. 57 Fed. Reg. at 45061-02. Subsequent to Gonzalez, the SSA provided a

process for Ninth Circuit residents to challenge denials predicated on the type of notice addressed in

Gonzalez. Id. Taverniti provides no explanation whatsoever how AR 92-7(9) has any application to

this matter.

24 It is unclear how Arik’s counsel interpreted this Court’s August 25, 2004 order as a mandate

enforceable against the SSA, when it clearly is not. The Court cautions counsel to exercise more

care when wielding this Court’s orders for his client’s purposes.

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B. Taverniti is not entitled to waiver of the exhaustion requirement.

In her Opposition, Taverniti argues even assuming she has not exhausted her administrative

remedies, this Court should waive the requirement she do so. Opp’n at 4:4-5:21. Applying the

standard applicable to a motion for summary judgment, the Court finds she does not meet any of the

three elements required for waiver. With regards to the first element of collaterality, Taverniti wants

the SSA to waive the repayment of her overpayment. Thus, she is disputing benefits paid, and her

claim is not collateral. 

Taverniti argues she is not claiming benefits, but is claiming a due process violation, because

the SSA has allegedly failed to follow its own rules under SSR 91-5p and Acquiescence

Ruling 92-7(9).23 Opp’n at 4:16-17. The Court finds these arguments unavailing for four reasons: 

First, the uncontroverted facts show Taverniti was denied a hearing, and denied Council review of

that denial, because she skipped over required steps in the administrative process, while seeking the

Waiver. Second, she cannot argue the SSA violated this Court’s August 25, 2004 order, mandating

she receive a hearing under SSR 91-5p, as the Court never issued any such mandate.

24 Third, she

never indicates what “rules,” if any, found in SSR 91-5p were violated by the SSA. And fourth, she

fails to explain what, if any, relationship AR 92-7(9) bears to her case. Thus, the undisputed facts

show Taverniti’s claim is at root one for benefits, and not collateral.

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Turning to the second element of irreparability, Taverniti fails to effectively address it. See

id. at 5:3-6. On this element, her entire argument is:

The element of irreparability is met by Defendant’s refusal to grant Taverniti

a 91-5p hearing and a decision and failure to apply AR 92-7(9) to the facts of her

case. See, Briggs v. Sullivan, 886 F.2d at 1140 (citation and internal quotations

omitted) (“a colorable showing of irreparable injury for purposes of waiver of the

exhaustion requirement is one that is not wholly insubstantial, immaterial, or

frivolous”).

Opp’n at 5:3-6.

Taverniti has not made any claim of irreparable harm, much less a colorable claim.

Turning to the third element of futility, the Supreme Court held in Bowen v. City of New

York, where it found futility:

This case is materially distinguishable from one in which a claimant sues in district

court, alleging mere deviation from the applicable regulations in his particular

administrative proceeding. In the normal course, such individual errors are fully

correctable upon subsequent administrative review since the claimant on appeal will

alert the agency to the alleged deviation. Because of the agency’s expertise in

administering its own regulations, the agency ordinarily should be given the

opportunity to review application of those regulations to a particular factual context. 

Bowen, 476 U.S. at 484 (emphasis added). 

Here, Taverniti has failed to show any deviations, much less mere deviations. Taverniti has

claimed the ALJ improperly dismissed her request for a hearing, and she claimed the Appeals

Council improperly declined to review the ALJ’s dismissal. But, because Taverniti has conceded

she did not request the SSA to reconsider its 1991 decisions, she has thus conceded the ALJ and

Appeals Council did not deviate from the SSA’s proper practices. Also, while Taverniti has claimed

the SSA deviated from its own rules under SSR 91-5p and AR 92-(7)(9), as noted above, she

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25 In this regard, the Court notes this is the second time Taverniti has come before it

complaining of irregularities regarding the SSA’s administrative procedures and its handling of her

attempts to utilize SSR 91-5p. Each time, however, it has been clear Taverniti has not bothered to

actually pursue her available administrative remedies, nor follow the correct procedures for utilizing

SSR 91-5p. This Court suggests Taverniti simply follow the SSA’s procedures, before filing any

more suits in district court.

26 Likewise, to the extent reconsideration is appropriate, or to the extent Taverniti is qualified

for relief under SSR 91-5p, the SSA stands in the better position, than this Court does, to provide the

appropriate relief.

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provides no support for these bare naked allegations.25 In turn, contrary to the arguments in her

Opposition, she has not implicated any fundamental SSA policies, broadly impacting similarly

situated persons, making exhaustion allegedly futile. Opp’n at 5:7-16. Thus, her dispute essentially

concerns her request for the Waiver, and as such, is best resolved by the SSA’s administrative

processes, and not by this Court’s involvement in them.26 As a result, on the third element,

Taverniti’s claim does not exhibit futility.

In summary then, on the waiver issue, the Court finds the material jurisdictional facts are not

in dispute, and the SSA is entitled to prevail on this issue as a matter of law. As such, the Court

finds Taverniti is not entitled to waiver of the requirement she exhaust her administrative remedies. 

And, as a result, the Court does not have jurisdiction over her claims, under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

C. Taverniti has failed to state a colorable constitutional claim of due process

violation.

Under Sanders and its Ninth Circuit progeny, a district court may judicially review a

decision by the SSA, regardless of whether or not it is a final decision judicially reviewable under 42

U.S.C. § 405(g), if a claimant states a colorable constitutional claim of due process violation. Here,

however, Taverniti’s claim “is clearly immaterial, insubstantial, or frivolous and made only for the

purposes of establishing jurisdiction.” Taverniti alleges the SSA violated her due process by

denying her an administrative hearing and review by the Appeals Council. The undisputed facts

show, however, the SSA could not provide these to her, because she had not yet requested the SSA

to reconsider its 1991 decisions. As a result, the ALJ correctly dismissed her request for a hearing,

and the Appeals Council correctly affirmed the ALJ. Thus, under the summary judgment standard,

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27 Because the Court dismisses on this ground, it does not consider whether Taverniti is subject

to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).

28 As discussed infra, in part II.A.2, Arik’s second claim has become moot.

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the SSA is entitled to prevail on this issue as a matter of law. As such, the Court finds Taverniti has

not stated a colorable constitutional claim of due process violation. And, as a result, the Court does

not have jurisdiction over her claims. 

D. The Court dismisses Taverniti’s claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Under the summary judgment standard, the Court finds the material jurisdictional facts are

not in dispute, including but not limited to, that Taverniti failed to request the SSA to reconsider its

1991 decisions. The Court thus concludes the SSA is entitled to prevail as a matter of law on the

jurisdictional issue. Taverniti did not exhaust her administrative remedies, and she is not entitled to

have the exhaustion requirement waived. Thus, the Court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction

over her claims, under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Likewise, because she failed to state a colorable

constitutional claim of due process violation, the Court does not independently have jurisdiction on

this ground. Thus, the Court must dismiss her under Rule 12(b)(1).27

II. The Court has jurisdiction over Arik’s first claim, which states a colorable

constitutional due process violation, but her second claim is moot, while her third claim

is meritless.

A. Rule 12(b)(1) Analysis

In its Motion, the SSA argues the Court should dismiss Arik’s claims in her Amended

Complaint, under Rule 12(b)(1), because the Court has no jurisdiction, under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g),

over her “non-initial determination.” Mot. at 3:17-19, 8:12-17, 8:24-9:2. The SSA also argues the

Court should dismiss her claims because she failed to state a colorable constitutional claim of due

process violation. Id. at 9:3-16. Before the Court may analyze the SSA’s allegations, however, the

Court must first determine the correct form of analysis to apply, under Rule 12(b)(1). As already

noted, in part I, supra, the SSA’s Motion is a “speaking” motion. Further, as discussed below,

Arik’s only basis for jurisdiction for her first and third claims,28 is by stating a colorable

constitutional claim of due process violation, which is also the alleged substance of her first and

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29 It also declined to review the ALJ’s denial of her request for an extension, on the grounds

she had to file her request with the Appeals Council. The denial appears to fall under 20 C.F.R.

§ 416.1403(a)(8) as a non-initial determination. Alternatively, this is the type of non-benefitdetermining, SSA self-regulating, procedural activity which qualifies as a non-initial determination. 

As such, the Court’s reasoning in connection with the Appeals Council’s denial of Arik’s request for

an extension, also applies to its denial of Arik’s request to review the ALJ’s decision.

30 As noted earlier, this is not a necessary element of a colorable constitutional claim for a due

process violation related to mental incompetency impairing a person’s ability to seek review.

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third claims. Thus, the jurisdictional and substantive issues are intertwined, such that the Court must

proceed under the standard applicable to a motion for summary judgment. The Court now turns to

Arik’s three claims.

1. Arik is entitled to judicial review of the Appeals Council’s April 6, 2006

decision.

On April 6, 2006, the Appeals Council denied Arik’s request, under SSR 91-5p, for an

extension of time to seek district court review of its 2000 denial of her request to review the ALJ’s

1999 affirmance of her SSI benefits denial.29 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), 20 C.F.R. § 416.1403(a)(8),

and Sanders and its Ninth Circuit progeny, this decision is not an “initial determination,” and this

Court may not judicially review it, unless Arik pleads a colorable constitutional claim. In her

Amended Complaint, Arik expressly alleges that when the time came to seek district court review in

2000, she was without counsel and her mental disability precluded her from timely seeking district

court review. Under Udd, this is a colorable constitutional claim.

To its Motion, the SSA attached the Appeals Council’s April 6, 2006 Notice of Appeals

Council Action (the “Notice”), which concluded Arik had a “severe mental impairment” but not a

sufficient lack of mental capacity to support an extension to seek district court review. The Notice

also indicated the Council had difficulty finding Arik was without counsel in 2000, due to the

absence of any evidence from 2000 indicating as such.30 

Under the summary judgment standard, the Court finds the SSA has failed to meet its burden

of proof on Arik’s first claim. This is because under this standard, the SSA may only prevail if the

material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the SSA is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. 

Here, the material jurisdictional facts are directly disputed. While the SSA has presented the Notice,

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and Arik failed to present any evidence in her Opposition, in support of the allegations in her

Amended Complaint, the Court still finds the SSA cannot prevail here. 

The reason is the standard for prevailing as a matter of law, in this context, is not whether

any reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party, if all reasonable inferences were construed

in favor of the non-moving party. Rather, the applicable standard in this summary judgment context

is whether, as a matter of law, the ALJ’s findings were supported by substantial evidence. See 42

U.S.C. § 405(g) (In judicial review “[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any

fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive ....”); Udd, 245 F.3d at 1100; Evans,

110 F.3d at 1483; see also Civ. Local R. 16-5 (in an SSA appeal, the claimant must file a motion for

summary judgment).

“Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which, considering the record as a whole, a

reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Evans, 110 F.2d at 1483

(quoting Flaten v. Sec’y of Health and Human Serv., 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995)). 

“Substantial evidence is ‘more than a mere scintilla,’ but ‘less than a preponderance.’ ” Evans, 110

F.2d at 1483 (quoting Young v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 180, 183 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted)). 

Here, the SSA is the moving party, and thus had the burden to put forth evidence to meet the

standard for a motion for a summary judgment in an SSA appeal. All the SSA provided was the

Appeals Council’s conclusions. The SSA failed to provide any evidence, much less “substantial”

evidence, on which this Court could find the Council’s findings were properly based. 

This is why courts disposing of SSA appeals, even on jurisdictional grounds, have the

administrative record before them. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (In judicial review, “[a]s part of the

Commissioner’s answer the Commissioner of Social Security shall file a certified copy of the

transcript of the record including the evidence upon which the findings and decision complained of

are based.”); Evans, 110 F.3d at 1481 (jurisdictional dismissal). This is especially important where

claimants allege mental incompetency prevented them from understanding the review process. Udd,

245 F.3d at 1100 (overwhelming evidence from Udd’s medical records supported finding due

process violation under SSR 91-5p); Evans, 110 F.3d at 1481 (review of the administrative record

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31 Nor is the Court certain whether producing some of Arik’s administrative record would have

equitably sufficed, as the SSA would have been able to withhold records beneficial to Arik, and only

present those beneficial to itself. This is why in Rule 12(b)(1) motions like these, the Courts have

the option of deferring the jurisdictional question to a post-answer disposition on the merits, such as

under Rule 56.

32 The SSA, rather oddly however, attempts to argue that because this allegedly was Arik’s

only basis for suing initially, that upon receiving a hearing under SSR 91-5p, her entire suit was

mooted, even after she filed her Amended Complaint, and thus the Court should dismiss her. Mot.

at 7:28-9:2. Rather obviously, one of the purposes of amending a pleading is to cure a defect in a

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supported dismissal of alleged incompetent’s claims). In contrast to Evans and Udd, this Court has

neither an administrative record nor overwhelming evidence before it, from which it could find any

reasonable court would find substantial evidence supported the Appeals Council decision regarding

Arik’s mental incompetency claims. 

Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the SSA is not required to produce the administrative record, until

after it answers. The section is silent, however, regarding the period prior to answering. In this

case, however, the SSA filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), in a case where the

jurisdictional and substantive issues were intertwined, thus subjecting itself to the motion for

summary judgment standard. As such, it had the choice of either meeting its evidentiary burden by

producing Arik’s administrative record, or not. As the SSA chose to pick only two conclusory

documents from the record, it did not meet its burden.31 

In conclusion, in regards to Arik’s first claim, that in 2000, she was without counsel and her

mental disability precluded her from timely seeking district court review, the Court is unable to find

the material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute. Nor can it conclude the SSA is entitled to prevail

as a matter of law on this issue. Thus, Arik has stated a colorable constitutional claim of due process

violation. As a result, the Court denies the SSA’s motion to dismiss Arik’s first claim under

Rule 12(b)(1).

2. Arik’s claim for a hearing under SSR 91-5p is moot.

In its Motion, the SSA argues Arik’s claim regarding an entitlement to a hearing under SSR

91-5p is moot, as she obtained one. Mot. at 7:28-8:11. In her Opposition, Arik “admits that

Defendant’s [sic] has provided her with the 91-5p hearing that she prayed for in her initial

complaint.” Opp’n at 9:5-6. The claim is thus dismissed as moot.32

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prior pleading. Thus, assuming all or part of Arik’s initial complaint was mooted by receiving a

hearing under SSR 91-5p, to the extent her Amended Complaint does not turn on this issue, the

SSA’s mootness argument is moot.

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3. Arik is not entitled to judicial review of the SSA’s undue delay in

processing her requests.

In her Amended Complaint, Arik alleges the SSA violated her due process by “unduly”

delaying the administrative process. The facts show Arik requested a hearing with an ALJ on

September 27 or November 5, 2004. She then sued in this matter, on November 19, 2004, claiming

undue delay. The ALJ then did not render a decision until March 3, 2006, or one-and-a-half years

later. 

As a threshold matter, the Court notes Arik’s allegation of undue delay is clearly one of those

“constitutional questions [which] obviously are unsuited to resolution in administrative hearing

procedures and, therefore, access to the courts is essential to the decision of such questions.” 

Further, her complaint strikes directly at the SSA’s administrative processes, and turns not at all on

the merits of any specific determination. For the following reasons, however, because the Court

finds her third claim is “wholly insubstantial, immaterial, or frivolous,” the 

Court lacks jurisdiction to hear it.

In its Motion, the SSA argues, “Arik’s claim was processed in the normal course of

business.” Mot. at 9:7-8. The SSA, however, did not provide a declaration to this effect. The SSA,

however, also points the Court to F.T.C. v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 336 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1964), for the

proposition that “it would be the extremely rare case where a Court would be justified in holding ...

that the passage of time and nothing more presents an occasion for the peremptory intervention of an

outside Court in the conduct of an agency’s adjudicative proceedings.” Id. at 692 (footnote

omitted); Mot. at 9:8-11. Lastly, the SSA alleges Arik failed to allege the SSA acted in a dilatory or

arbitrary manner in determining her request for an extension of time to file a civil action. Mot. at

9:11-13.

Turning first to Weingarten, the Court notes it appears to favor the SSA’s position. 

Weingarten involved a Federal Trade Commission investigation, resulting in two-and-a-half years of

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hearings before an examiner, followed by an eleven-month appeal before the Commission itself. 

Weingarten, 336 F.2d at 689-91. When the Commission remanded for more proceedings before an

examiner, Weingarten sued and obtained an order from a district court, forcing the Commission to

resolve the matter, itself, within 30 days. Id. at 690. 

The Fifth Circuit reversed, finding in part, “[a]bsent proof of the normal time necessary to

dispose of a similar proceeding or of facts tending to show a dilatory attitude on the part of the

Commission or its staff - matters totally undeveloped on this record - we are unable to say that a

Judge can so hold.” Id. at 691. The Court continued:

So far as this record shows, this case not only proceeded at a rate comparable to that

normally experienced in cases of its kind, it also proceeded at a rate satisfactory to

Weingarten [as t]his record is barren of any suggestion that Weingarten at any time ...

ever complained about the pace of the proceedings. 

Id.

In comparing this matter to Weingarten, the Court finds it does not have before it “proof of

the normal time necessary to dispose of” requests similar to Arik’s. Further, unlike the plaintiffs in

Weingarten, Arik was clearly unsatisfied with the SSA’s pace, as she sued to speed it up. Lastly, the

Court notes, in her Amended Complaint, Arik merely alleged the SSA “unduly” delayed her request. 

Applying the summary judgment standard to these facts, the Court finds neither side has

presented anything other than bare allegations. While at first, this might seem to favor Arik, as the

non-movant, it does not, as she clearly failed to meet the pleading burden imposed on her by

Weingarten. Whether a one-and-a-half year delay is “normal” or not, Arik merely alleged it was

“undue.” She did not, however, allege what this means or how or why the SSA unduly delayed

processing her request. As a result, her allegedly colorable constitutional claim of due process

violation rests solely on the passage of time itself. 

Looking to Weingarten, however, there is no evidence before the Court to suggest this is “the

extremely rare case where a Court would be justified in holding ... that the passage of time and

nothing more presents an occasion for the peremptory intervention of an outside Court in the

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33 The SSA also requests the Court to dismiss Arik’s claims under Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure 7(b), 8(a), 8(e), 10(b), and 41(b), on the general grounds her complaint is so poorly pled,

the Court has no choice but to dismiss it. Mot. at 3:19-4:24. The Court first notes the SSA is

partially correct. Arik’s and Taverniti’s pleadings are very poorly drafted. The Court also notes,

however, the SSA’s pleadings are only marginally better, and the Court had difficulty deciphering

both party’s arguments. That said, the Court was able to distill Arik’s three claims from her

Amended Complaint. Thus, the SSA, having possession of Arik’s file, should have been able to

distill them as well. 

26

conduct of an agency’s adjudicative proceedings.” Thus, it is clear that Arik’s third claim is “wholly

insubstantial, immaterial, or frivolous.” As a result, under the motion for summary judgment

standard, although the parties’ allegations are in dispute, the Court has little trouble concluding the

SSA would prevail on it as a matter of law. As such, Arik’s third claim does not state a colorable

constitutional claim of due process violation. And thus, the Court has no jurisdiction over it and

grants the SSA’s motion to dismiss it under Rule 12(b)(1).

B. Rule 12(b)(6) Analysis

Because Arik’s second claim is moot, see supra, part II.A.2, the Court only addresses her

first and third claims. Turning to the former, because it already survived the motion for summary

judgment standard, under Rule 12(b)(1), it easily survives the more lenient standard applicable,

under Rule 12(b)(6). With regards to this claim, Arik expressly alleges, in her Amended Complaint,

that when the time came to seek district court review, in 2000, she was without counsel and her

mental disability precluded her from timely seeking district court review. Taking these allegations

as true, under Udd, Arik has stated a colorable constitutional claim of due process violation. To the

extent the SSA argues her claim is frivolous, the SSA’s own evidence contradicts this allegation. 

The SSA allegedly found Arik had at least a “severe mental impairment.” Based on this allegation,

the Court cannot find that Arik’s and the SSA’s two statements are so contradictory that her claim is

frivolous or completely meritless. Thus, Arik has stated a colorable constitutional claim of due

process violation, and the SSA’s motion to dismiss her first claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is denied.

With regards to Arik’s third claim, for the same reasons it was found meritless in part II.A.3,

supra, it fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted. That is, the mere passage of time,

alone, does not state a colorable constitutional claim of due process violation. Thus, the Court

grants the SSA’s motion to dismiss Arik’s third claim under Rule 12(b)(6).33

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As for the SSA’s requested remedy, the Court directs the SSA to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(e). This rule allows a party to request another party to provide a more definite

statement, where the former cannot reasonably prepare their response, due to confusion regarding

the latter’s pleading. If the SSA desired a more definite statement, dismissal is not the proper

request; a more definite statement is. Nor is there any ground under the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, to outright dismiss Arik under Rules 7 through 10, where she has never been given a

chance to amend to cure any alleged pleading defects.

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CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

for Lack of Jurisdiction (the “Motion”) [Docket No. 52] as follows:

(1) The Court GRANTS the Motion in part and DISMISSES without prejudice plaintiff

Dalena Taverniti;

(2) The Court DENIES the Motion in part with regard to plaintiff Maraina Arik’s first

claim;

(3) The Court GRANTS the Motion in part and DISMISSES without prejudice Arik’s

second claim as moot;

(4) The Court GRANTS the Motion in part and DISMISSES without prejudice Arik’s

third claim, and gives Arik 14 days from the date of this Order to file a Second Amended

Complaint, addressing only her first and third claims. Defendant shall then have 34 days from the

date of this Order to either (i) answer the Second Amended Complaint; or (ii) respond by motion,

but only in regards to Arik’s third claim.

(A) If defendant answers, it shall comply with paragraph 1 of the Social Security

Procedural Order (the “Procedural Order”) [Docket No. 2] filed on November 19, 2004, except for

the 90-day provision. The parties shall then follow the procedures and schedule set by paragraphs 2

through 5 of the Procedural Order. The parties, however, shall only address Arik’s first and third

claims, going forward.

(B) If defendant chooses to respond by motion, Arik shall have 14 days from

service of the response, to file an opposition. If Arik files an opposition, defendant shall have 7 days 

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from service of the opposition, to file a reply. The Court will then deem the matter submitted on the

pleadings.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

March 31, 2008 _________________________________

Saundra Brown Armstrong 

United States District Judge

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