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Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Stacie Weisman
Appellant

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 15-14536

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 0:12-cr-60204-WJZ-2

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

STACIE WEISMAN, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

________________________

(June 1, 2016)

Before MARCUS, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Stacie Weisman appeals the district court’s denial of her Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 59(e) motion to alter or amend the district court’s amended order 

of forfeiture. Weisman entered into a plea agreement, in which she agreed to 

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forfeit all assets listed in an attached exhibit (“Exhibit A”), which included 

jewelry. In a separate paragraph, the plea agreement stated that Weisman “further 

agrees to entry of a money judgment against her in the amount involved in the 

violation to which she is pleading guilty.” After entering a preliminary judgment 

and order of forfeiture, the district court amended its order to require that the 

forfeited Exhibit A assets be turned over to a related bankruptcy estate and that the 

money judgment remain in place. On appeal, Weisman argues that the district 

court abused its discretion in denying her motion to amend its amended order of 

forfeiture because: (1) it was the intention of the parties and the unambiguous 

meaning of the plea agreement that the forfeited property would satisfy any money 

judgment against her; and (2) if the jewelry sold above its estimated value, 

allowing the government to retain the proceeds would result in an impermissible 

double recovery. After thorough review, we affirm.

We review the denial of a Rule 59(e) motion for abuse of discretion. 

Mincey v. Head, 206 F.3d 1106, 1135 (11th Cir. 2000). “[A]n abuse of discretion 

occurs if the judge fails to apply the proper legal standard or to follow proper 

procedures in making the determination, or makes findings of fact that are clearly 

erroneous.” Id. at 1137 n.69 (quotations and alterations omitted). The district 

court’s factual findings regarding the scope of a plea agreement will be set aside 

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only if they are clearly erroneous. United States v. Copeland, 381 F.3d 1101, 1105 

(11th Cir. 2004). 

In the context of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion, we’ve held 

that a defendant could not challenge a criminal forfeiture order under the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure because the judgment was not entered in a civil case. 

United States v. Mosavi, 138 F.3d 1365, 1366 (11th Cir. 1998). However, 

ancillary proceedings to criminal forfeiture actions are civil in nature. United 

States v. Gilbert, 244 F.3d 888, 906-07 (11th Cir. 2001), superseded by rule on 

other grounds as stated in United States v. Marion, 562 F.3d 1330, 1340-41 (11th 

Cir. 2009). “Although a motion for reconsideration of a district court order in a 

criminal action is not expressly authorized by the Federal Rules of Criminal 

Procedure, the Supreme Court has held that the timely filing of such a motion in a 

criminal action tolls the time for filing a notice of appeal and the time begins to run 

anew following disposition of the motion.” United States v. Vicaria, 963 F.2d 

1412, 1413-14 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing United States v. Dieter, 429 U.S. 6, 8-9

(1976)).

Under Rule 59(e), a party can file a motion to alter or amend a judgment 

within 28 days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). The only grounds 

for granting a motion to alter or amend a judgment under Rule 59(e) are newly 

discovered evidence or manifest errors of law or fact. Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 

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1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007). A motion to alter or amend a judgment may not be 

used “to relitigate old matters, raise argument or present evidence that could have 

been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” Id. (quotation omitted). It is not an 

abuse of discretion for the district court to deny a Rule 59(e) motion based on a 

new legal theory or arguments that should have been submitted prior to the initial 

judgment. Mincey, 206 F.3d at 1137 n.69. Moreover, new evidence can only be 

the basis for a successful Rule 59(e) motion if the evidence was unavailable at the 

time of the judgment. Id. 

“[W]hen a guilty plea has been induced by a promise or agreement of the 

government, such promise or agreement must be fulfilled.” United States v. 

Hauring, 790 F.2d 1570, 1571 (11th Cir. 1986); see also United States v. Harvey, 

869 F.2d 1439, 1443 (11th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (“Due process requires the 

government to adhere to the terms of any plea bargain.”). To determine the 

meaning of any disputed terms in a plea agreement, a court applies an objective 

standard and determines whether the government’s actions were inconsistent with 

the defendant’s reasonable understanding when he pled guilty. Copeland, 381 F.3d 

at 1105. “The written agreement should be viewed against the background of the 

negotiations and should not be interpreted to directly contradict an oral 

understanding.” Id. (quotation omitted). In this two-step process, the district court 

first considers whether the language in the plea agreement was ambiguous, and if 

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so, it considers extrinsic evidence. Id. at 1105-06. An ambiguous plea agreement 

must be read against the government. Id. If it is not ambiguous, the court will 

limit its interpretation to the clear meaning of the wording. Id. at 1105. Second, 

the court decides if it should enforce the agreement, in light of the fact that the 

validity of a guilty plea transaction ultimately depends on how voluntarily and 

intelligently the defendant entered his plea. Id. at 1106.

Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Weisman’s 

motion to alter or amend its amended order of forfeiture.1

 For starters, the plea 

agreement’s forfeiture provisions were not ambiguous and did not entitle Weisman 

to apply the value of the Exhibit A property to the money judgment, even if they 

sold for more than the estimated value. Paragraph 14 of the agreement stated that 

the Exhibit A property was to be forfeited, while paragraph 15 stated that Weisman 

further agreed to a money judgment in the amount involved in her laundering. The 

language shows that these provisions were not dependent on each other and the 

money judgment was in addition to the forfeiture. Plus, the agreement did not 

mention Weisman’s ability to credit the Exhibit A property toward the money 

judgment, nor did it reference the value of the property in any way. 

 1 Although it is unclear whether the district court would have had authority to grant relief in 

Weisman’s criminal forfeiture action through the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is 

unnecessary to address the issue. As we discuss above, even assuming the district court could 

grant Weisman such relief, a review of the record reveals that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying Weisman’s motion. 

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Moreover, viewing the agreement in context of the ongoing negotiations, it 

is clear that the Exhibit A assets were those assets connected to the criminal 

activity that had already been recovered by the government during the 

investigation. The money judgment, on the other hand, was intended to address 

those assets that were at the heart of Weisman’s conviction -- namely, the missing 

assets that were sold by Weisman and others to prevent the government’s seizure. 

Neither the missing property nor the proceeds from the sale of the missing property 

were recovered by the government, which meant that a money judgment was 

needed to recover the value. Indeed, at the plea colloquy, the district court recited 

the plea agreement’s forfeiture provisions and there was no discussion of credit for 

forfeited assets or any set off. In short, any understanding Weisman had regarding 

credit for forfeited Exhibit A assets was not supported by the plea agreement, plea 

colloquy, or background information, and was thus not a reasonable interpretation. 

As for her claim that the government’s recovery would result in a double 

recovery, we are unpersuaded. The Exhibit A assets were separate from the assets 

represented by the money judgment. The plea agreement sought to recover the 

Exhibit A assets regardless of their value because they were seized during the 

investigation into the criminal activity of Scott Rothstein, Weisman, and the other 

co-defendants. The money judgment, however, was an estimate of the sales 

resulting from Weisman’s laundering activity. Thus, the sale of the Exhibit A 

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assets, even above the estimated value, did not affect the estimated impact of 

Weisman’s laundering. 

AFFIRMED.

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