Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01515/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01515-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rodolpho Hernandez Flores
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15‐1515

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

RODOLPHO HERNANDEZ FLORES,

Defendant‐Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Illinois.

No. 14‐CR‐30068‐MJR — Michael J. Reagan, Chief Judge.

____________________

ARGUED AUGUST 5, 2015 — DECIDED AUGUST 19, 2015

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and MANION, Circuit

Judges.

PER CURIAM. Rodolpho Hernandez Flores was pulled

over on an Illinois highway for driving with an obstructed

license plate—his rear plate was affixed to his car by a

standard frame that covered the plate’s periphery. After

Hernandez Flores consented to a search of his vehicle, police

officers discovered over five kilograms of heroin, and Her‐

nandez Flores confessed to transporting it. He later moved

Case: 15-1515 Document: 19 Filed: 08/19/2015 Pages: 9
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Case: 15-1515 Document: 19 Filed: 08/19/2015 Pages: 9
No. 15‐1515 3

As McVicker neared Hernandez Flores, he could read the

uncovered portion of the plate but stopped him anyway. In‐

itially McVicker thought the plate was a “Colorado specialty

plate,” but he acknowledged that as he “got closer it ap‐

peared to read Baja California which is from Mexico.” The

officer asserted that the framing bracket may have been

“covering another state or region above Baja California.” He

explained that he then pulled over the vehicle for what he

believed was “the improper display of license plate due to it

covering a portion of Baja California and whatever may be

above it that was unknown.” See 625 ILCS 5/3‐413(b).  

The plate‐display law, 625 ILCS 5/3‐413(b), states in rele‐

vant part:

Every registration plate shall at all times be

securely fastened in a horizontal position to the

vehicle for which it is issued so as to prevent

the plate from swinging and at a height of not

less than 5 inches from the ground, measuring

from the bottom of such plate, in a place and

position to be clearly visible and shall be main‐

tained in a condition to be clearly legible, free

from any materials that would obstruct the vis‐

ibility of the plate.

A violation of this statute is considered a “petty offense.”

Id. 5/16‐104; 730 ILCS 5/5‐1‐17.  

The stop led to a drug arrest. Under questioning through

a translator, Hernandez Flores said that he was driving from

Tijuana, Mexico, to Columbus, Ohio. While McVicker was

writing a warning for the obstructed license plate, another

trooper and his canine partner arrived and conducted a

Case: 15-1515 Document: 19 Filed: 08/19/2015 Pages: 9
4 No. 15‐1515

free‐air sniff around the car. The dog alerted, and when the

officers searched the car they found a compartment in the

engine containing more than five kilograms of heroin in

vacuum‐sealed bags. After Hernandez Flores was arrested

and read Miranda warnings, he confessed that he had been

paid $2,000 to drive the heroin from Mexico to Ohio. He was

charged with possession with intent to distribute one kilo‐

gram or more of heroin. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).  

During the prosecution, Hernandez Flores moved to

suppress his statements and the evidence seized from the

truck. He argued that McVicker did not have reasonable

suspicion to pull him over for violating the plate‐display law

because the plate’s frame did not obstruct any of the plate’s

identifying information. He emphasized that the govern‐

ment’s reading of the statute has the absurd result of crimi‐

nalizing not only all license‐plate frames, but mud spots

covering part of a letter. Because the statute was not violat‐

ed, he asserted, McVicker lacked reasonable suspicion to

stop him.  

The judge denied the motion to suppress, reasoning that

the plate’s frame violated the plate‐display statute. He ob‐

served that the bracket covered the top half of the letters “B”

and “j” in “Baja,” the top half of the letters “C,” “l,” and “f”

in “California,” and some writing in the lower left of the

plate. Acknowledging that the statute does not outlaw “eve‐

ry speck” on a plate, he explained that it does ban any ob‐

struction that “interferes with” the visibility of the plate’s

information. And because the statute requires that a plate be

both “clearly legible” and “free from any materials that

would obstruct the visibility of the plate,” the judge con‐

cluded that the statute was violated even though the officer

Case: 15-1515 Document: 19 Filed: 08/19/2015 Pages: 9
No. 15‐1515 5

could “decipher” the plate. Hernandez Flores then entered a

conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the de‐

nial of the motion to suppress, and was sentenced to 50

months in prison.  

Analysis

Hernandez Flores maintains on appeal that the district

court should have granted his motion to suppress. He revis‐

es slightly the argument he presented in the district court,

which was that, because he did not violate the statute,

McVicker lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him. See Unit‐

ed States v. McDonald, 453 F.3d 958, 961 (7th Cir. 2006). Rec‐

ognizing that under Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530,

534 (2014), only an unreasonable mistake of state law invali‐

dates a stop, he now argues that McVicker’s belief that the

statute was violated was unreasonable. He suggests that the

statute’s requirement that plates be “free from any materials

that would obstruct the visibility of the plate,” should be

read in context with “maintained in a condition to be clearly

legible.” In that context, the law bans only obstructions that

interfere with law enforcement’s ability to read the plate. Be‐

cause McVicker was able to read the plate, he thus unrea‐

sonably believed that it violated Illinois law. McVicker’s

reading of the law, by contrast, leads to the absurd result

that law enforcement may stop anyone using a customary

frame to affix a license plate to a car.

To begin, the parties dispute the proper standard of re‐

view. Hernandez Flores advocates for de novo review be‐

cause this court is reviewing a legal conclusion about rea‐

sonable suspicion. The government urges plain‐error review

because, it asserts, Hernandez Flores did not argue to the

district court that McVicker made an “unreasonable mistake

Case: 15-1515 Document: 19 Filed: 08/19/2015 Pages: 9
6 No. 15‐1515

of law” under Heien. See United States v. Kelly, 519 F.3d 355,

365 (7th Cir. 2008) (arguments not made before district court

are subject to plain‐error review). But Heien, which was re‐

leased after the district court denied the motion to suppress,

arguably replaced the pre‐existing standard in our circuit

under McDonald on which Hernandez Flores had relied.

McDonald had invalidated arrests based on a reasonable but

erroneous interpretation of state law. Hernandez Flores’s

appellate argument is thus a permissible, updated version of

his preserved argument that reasonable suspicion is lacking.

See United States v. Billups, 536 F.3d 574, 578 (7th Cir. 2008)

(new twist on old argument preserved for appellate review);

see also Molnar v. Booth, 229 F.3d 593, 599 (7th Cir. 2000) (ap‐

plying intervening Supreme Court decisions on de novo re‐

view of a preserved issue). Accordingly the argument is sub‐

ject to de novo review.

On the merits, the parties agree that before making a

brief traffic stop, police officers need at least reasonable sus‐

picion to believe that the driver is breaking the law.

See Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014). In par‐

ticular, this court has recently held that a stop for a technical

moving violation was lawful when the arresting officer rea‐

sonably believed that the violation was easily avoidable.

See United States v. Bentley, No. 13‐2995, 2015 WL 4529024, at

*3 (7th Cir. July 28, 2015) (ruling that officer reasonably

stopped driver for not signaling lane change, when law re‐

quires signaling if “practicable”). Reasonable suspicion can

also rest on a reasonable mistake of law. See Heien, 135 S. Ct.

at 536. But if the officer’s mistake of law is unreasonable, the

evidence collected from the traffic stop should be sup‐

pressed. See id. at 539; United States v. Shields, 789 F.3d 733,

742–46 (7th Cir. 2015). Thus to prevail here, Hernandez Flo‐

Case: 15-1515 Document: 19 Filed: 08/19/2015 Pages: 9
No. 15‐1515 7

res must show both that his plate’s frame did not violate the

law and that Officer McVicker unreasonably believed that it

did.  

We begin with the question whether Hernandez Flores’s

frame violated the plate‐display statute and conclude that it

did not. The Illinois Supreme Court has recently held that

“trailer hitches, ... wheelchair and scooter carriers, bicycle

racks and rental trailers” will obstruct a license plate, but

nonetheless plates obscured by these common car attach‐

ments do not violate the statute. People v. Gaytan, 32 N.E.3d

641, 650 (Ill. 2015). Otherwise “a substantial amount” of law‐

ful conduct would be illegal in Illinois. Id. Plate frames like

those in this case fall in the same category. Like rear‐

mounted trailers, they are common—car dealerships regu‐

larly provide them with the cars they sell, and Illinois’s pub‐

lic universities, sports teams, and schools sell them to stu‐

dents, fans, and families. Rear‐mounted trailers can obstruct

the entirety of “at least one of the numbers on the license

plate.” Id. at 645. Plate frames, by contrast, generally sur‐

round the periphery of the plate, leaving the numbers and

place of origin readable. If, as Illinois has determined, com‐

mon rear‐mounted trailers do not violate the statute, then

neither can ordinary peripheral plate frames. See United

States v. Edgerton, 438 F.3d 1043, 1050 (10th Cir. 2006) (reject‐

ing strict reading of similar statute because it would lead to

unreasonable conclusion that snow, rain, or fog would ren‐

der license plate illegal); Whitfield v. United States, 99 A.3d

650, 652 (D.C. 2014) (rejecting literal interpretation of similar

statute that would “effectuate a near‐complete ban on the

use of ubiquitous license plate frames”).  

Case: 15-1515 Document: 19 Filed: 08/19/2015 Pages: 9
8 No. 15‐1515

But was it reasonable for Officer McVicker to conclude

that the plate’s frame violated this statute? We think not.

Long before Gaytan, Illinois courts had held that the plate‐

display statute requires only that the plate’s information be

clearly visible and legible. People v. Miller, 611 N.E.2d 11, 20

(Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (plate must be clearly visible); People v.

Bradi, 437 N.E.2d 1285, 1288 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (plate must

be legible). And in holding that a plate obscured by a trailer

hitch does not the violate the statute, Gaytan ruled that the

arresting officer reasonably believed otherwise when he tes‐

tified that he could not in fact see “at least one” of the plate’s

numbers. 32 N.E.3d at 652–53. But in this case, even though

the frame covered a fraction of some letters, McVicker

acknowledged that once he neared the car he could read

“Baja California” on the plate. And based on the record pho‐

tos in this case, that admission is one we would expect a rea‐

sonable officer to make. Even though some letters are not

100% unobstructed, “Baja California” is clearly visible and

legible. If the frame does not impede a reasonable officer

from reading a plate, then it is unreasonable to believe that

the plate’s information is not clearly visible and legible.  

The government replies that even though the uncovered

information was readable, McVicker reasonably suspected

that the frame masked information above the top lettering,

so the entire plate was not clearly visible. But that possibility

proves too much: it is true of all similar frames. If McVick‐

er’s suspicion—that the frame covered “another state or re‐

gion” in the plate’s periphery—were reasonable, then it

would justify stopping any of the vast number of cars driven

lawfully but affixing plates with the ubiquitous frames like

the one in this case. A suspicion so broad that would permit

the police to stop a substantial portion of the lawfully driv‐

Case: 15-1515 Document: 19 Filed: 08/19/2015 Pages: 9
No. 15‐1515 9

ing public, unless the drivers all removed their plate frames,

is not reasonable. See United States v. Alvarado‐Zarza, 782 F.3d

246, 250 (5th Cir. 2015) (interpreting statute too broadly is

unreasonable); United States v. $45,000.00 in U.S. Currency,

749 F.3d 709, 716 (8th Cir. 2014) (it is objectively unreasona‐

ble to interpret similar statute as meaning anything other

than “readable” when case law establishes “readability”

standard); Whitfield, 99 A.3d at 652 (literal interpretation of

statute would unreasonably “effectuate a near‐complete ban

on the use of ubiquitous license plate frames”). It seems to us

unrealistic—and unreasonable—to expect a wide segment of

the driving population to remove these conventional plate

frames in order to avoid a traffic stop. See Delaware v. Prouse,

440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979) (observing that courts must circum‐

scribe “standardless and unconstrained discretion” that

would otherwise allow officers to stop all drivers); United

States v. Lopez‐Valdez, 178 F.3d 282, 289 (5th Cir. 1999) (if of‐

ficers are allowed to stop vehicles when drivers have not

broken law, “the potential for abuse of traffic infractions as

pretext for effecting stops seems boundless and the costs to

privacy rights excessive”). Accordingly, the stop was based

on an unreasonable mistake of law and therefore lacked rea‐

sonable suspicion.

Because the traffic stop was not based on reasonable sus‐

picion, the drugs seized and confession resulting from the

stop should have been suppressed. We therefore VACATE

the district court’s judgment and REMAND for further pro‐

ceedings consistent with this opinion.

Case: 15-1515 Document: 19 Filed: 08/19/2015 Pages: 9