Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-10-03074/USCOURTS-caDC-10-03074-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jerome Hampton
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 14, 2012 Decided June 25, 2013

No. 10-3074

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

JEROME HAMPTON, ALSO KNOWN AS JAY,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:07-cr-00153-14)

Christopher S. Rhee, appointed by the court, argued the

cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Isaac B.

Rosenberg and Arthur Luk. 

Suzanne Grealy Curt, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Ronald C.

Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese III, Mary B.

McCord, John K. Han, and Anthony Scarpelli, Assistant U.S.

Attorneys. Elizabeth Trosman, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered

an appearance.

Before: BROWN, Circuit Judge, and EDWARDS and

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judges.

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Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

RANDOLPH.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge BROWN.

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge: A jury, after a retrial,

convicted Jerome Hampton of conspiracy to distribute and to

possess with intent to distribute phencyclidine (PCP). See 21

U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(iv). The first trial, prosecuted

against several alleged members of the conspiracy, ended in a

mistrial for Hampton after the jury failed to reach a verdict with

respect to him. Hampton argues that in his retrial the district

court violated Rule 701 of the Federal Rules of Evidence when

it permitted the FBI’s administrative case agent to testify about

his understanding of recorded conversations played for the jury.

The FBI recorded the conversations during its investigation

of a D.C.-based drug ring led by Lonnell Glover. Glover’s

network distributed PCP Glover purchased from out-of-state

suppliers through an intermediary, Velma Williams. Williams

pleaded guilty before the first trial and testified for the

government in that trial and in Hampton’s retrial. The jury

convicted Glover in the first trial. The government alleged that

Glover paid Hampton to receive shipments of PCP at his place

of business and that several shipments of the drug were

delivered there. Williams testified that Hampton knowingly and

willingly participated in Glover’s drug operation by receiving

packages shipped through FedEx and UPS. 

FBI Agent Bevington was a key witness against Hampton

at trial. The government did not attempt to qualify him as an

expert witness under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 

Instead, he was called as a lay witness. Agent Bevington

testified that he had 20 years of FBI experience at the time of

this trial, including more than 100 drug investigations and more

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than 50 investigations with court-ordered wiretaps. With respect

to Glover’s drug operation, Bevington testified that he was the

case agent—the supervisor of the FBI agents conducting the

investigation. In that capacity, he monitored wiretaps,

performed physical surveillance, provided daily reports to the

United States Attorney’s Office, and supervised other personnel

monitoring the wiretaps. He also testified that he had reviewed

every conversation—some 20,000—captured by the wiretaps,

not just the 100 or so recordings admitted into evidence. The

government put Bevington on the stand five times during the

trial, usually to give the context and an explanation of recorded

statements admitted into evidence. As the government told the

jury during its opening statement, the recorded telephone calls

were “very, very cryptic,” and the government used Bevington

to interpret them for the jury. 

Federal Evidence Rule 701 permits lay testimony in the

form of an opinion when it meets the following criteria: it must

be rationally based on the witness’s perception and helpful to the

jury in understanding the witness’s testimony or the

determination of a “fact in issue,” and may not be based on the

kind of specialized knowledge possessed by experts within the

scope of Rule 702.1

 We review the district court’s admission of

evidence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Williams, 212

F.3d 1305, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 

When there has been a proper objection, the district court of

course must determine whether the lay witness’s opinion

1

 The full text of Rule 701 is as follows: “If a witness is not

testifying as an expert, testimony in the form of an opinion is limited

to one that is: (a) rationally based on the witness’s perception;

(b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to

determining a fact in issue; and (c) not based on scientific, technical,

or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.”

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testimony satisfies Rule 701’s requirements. See Williams, 212

F.3d at 1309–10 & n.6; see also 29 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT,

KENNETH W.GRAHAM,JR.,VICTOR JAMES GOLD &MICHAEL H.

GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE

§§ 6254, 6255 (1997 & Supp. 2013); Anne Bowen Poulin,

Experience-Based Opinion Testimony: Strengthening the Lay

Opinion Rule, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 551, 595–96, 610–11 & n.227,

(2012). 

Jurors too must independently assess the basis of the

opinion and scrutinize the witness’s reasoning. But “[w]hen a

witness has not identified the objective bases for his opinion, the

proffered opinion obviously fails completely to meet the

requirements of Rule 701, first because there is no way for the

court to assess whether it is rationally based on the witness’s

perceptions, and second because the opinion does not help the

jury but only tells it in conclusory fashion what it should find.” 

United States v. Rea, 958 F.2d 1206, 1216 (2d Cir. 1992). 

Enforcement of Rule 701’s criteria thus ensures that the jury has

the information it needs to conduct an independent assessment

of lay opinion testimony. Judicial scrutiny of a law-enforcement

witness’s purported basis for lay opinion is especially important

because of the risk that the jury will defer to the officer’s

superior knowledge of the case and past experiences with

similar crimes. United States v. Grinage, 390 F.3d 746, 750–51

(2d Cir. 2004). 

Here, the district court’s failure to enforce Rule 701’s

boundaries on lay-opinion testimony denied the jury the

information it needed to assess the FBI agent’s interpretations of

recorded statements. 

On several occasions the district court allowed Agent

Bevington to provide opinions about the meaning of ambiguous

references in recordings admitted into evidence. The prosecutor,

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for example, played a tape in which Velma Williams asked

Lonnell Glover: “[H]ave you talked [to] your brother? . . . [H]e

say he feeling fine then?” The prosecutor then asked Agent

Bevington to interpret the questions. When Agent Bevington

opined that Williams was referring to Hampton, defense counsel

objected, calling this mere speculation, and adding at the bench

conference that Glover himself had a brother. In response to the

court’s question about the basis of Bevington’s opinion, the

prosecutor replied: “I think he has listened to all of the calls, and

he’s done the surveillance, and he has seen all of the evidence in

this case, and he has based his opinion . . . on this investigation.” 

Apparently convinced, the court overruled the objection. 

That was only one of several such exchanges. After

considering Hampton’s objection that Agent Bevington’s

opinions about the meaning of certain terms used by the

participants in the recordings were admissible only as expert

testimony, the district court ruled that it would allow the

testimony “because of the work here in this case where [Agent

Bevington] has testified that he listened to thousands of

conversations” recorded during the investigation. 

The prosecutor asked Agent Bevington what he thought

Glover meant when he said to Hampton during a phone call,

“[s]o a boy come pick me up, then I had to ride around with him,

when I see you I’m gonna tell you everything been going on, I

just man you talking about a hectic [expletive deleted] day.”2

The court overruled Hampton’s objection and explained, “I

think that there is sufficient basis on the record with the

2

 Immediately before this statement, Glover mentioned his

activities: he took his mother for treatment of an infection the previous

day and stayed with her until 8 p.m., “then [he] had to run around”

until midnight, he started getting calls at 6 a.m., and he took his

truck—used in his hauling business—to the repair shop.

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sequence and the contents of each of these phone calls, and

Agent Bevington has experience in this case from reviewing all

of the thousands of phone calls and understanding, so he can talk

about his opinion as to what he believed they were discussing

when he says that.” The agent testified that he believed the

statement indicated that Glover was planning to tell Hampton,

when they met in person, that on the previous day police had

executed a search warrant on the home of one of Glover’s

lieutenants and had seized PCP there. 

On cross-examination, defense counsel challenged the basis

for that opinion. The agent defended his testimony, stating,

“There is more to it based on other activations on the phone and

in the truck,” and “it is based on other conversations.” When

asked if someone else could understand the statement

differently, Agent Bevington replied, “If they just had this

portion of the conversation and didn’t know other things about

the investigation and other conversations, maybe. But I

think—anybody who has listened to all of the calls and is aware

of all of the conversations would agree with me.” 

When an agent, particularly a case agent, see United States

v. Dukagjini, 326 F.3d 45, 53–55 (2d Cir. 2003), provides

interpretations of recorded conversations based on his

“knowledge of the entire investigation,” “the risk that he was

testifying based upon information not before the jury, including

hearsay, or at the least, that the jury would think he had

knowledge beyond what was before them, is clear.” Grinage,

390 F.3d at 750; see also United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201,

213–15 (2d Cir. 2005). The Grinage court held that the agent’s

interpretation of conversations in that case was not a permissible

lay opinion under Rule 701 “because, rather than being helpful

to the jury, it usurped the jury’s function.” 390 F.3d at 751. 

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Grinage and this case are basically the same, with one

important difference, a difference that highlights the error in

admitting Agent Bevington’s opinion testimony. In Grinage the

government recorded 2000 telephone calls from the defendant’s

cellular phone. 390 F.3d at 747. Although the prosecution

played only 13 of these calls for the jury, all 2000 were admitted

into evidence. Id. at 747–48. Here there were approximately

20,000 recorded calls, but only 100 or so were admitted into

evidence, and fewer still were played in court. And so when

Bevington interpreted those conversations on the basis of his

listening to “all of the calls,” the jury had no way of verifying

his inferences or of independently reaching its own

interpretations. 

We draw further support for our conclusion from cases

discussing the government’s use of summary or overview

witnesses at trial, the analysis of which, we have noted,

approaches the question presented here but from a different

perspective. See United States v. Moore, 651 F.3d 30, 57 (D.C.

Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citing Garcia, 413 F.3d at 211–17); see

also Garcia, 413 F.3d at 214–15; United States v. Casas, 356

F.3d 104, 117–20 (1st Cir. 2004). There is an overarching

concern in that context with a witness using, as the basis for his

opinion, evidence outside the record. “Such testimony raises the

very real specter that the jury verdict could be influenced by

statements of fact or credibility assessments in the overview but

not in evidence.” Moore, 651 F.3d at 57 (quoting Casas, 356

F.3d at 119–20) (brackets omitted). 

These concerns also arise in cases addressing claims of

prosecutorial misconduct for statements of opinion made during

closing arguments. When a prosecutor gives his personal

opinion on the credibility of witnesses or the defendant’s guilt,

the Supreme Court explained that “such comments can convey

the impression that evidence not presented to the jury, but

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known to the prosecutor, supports the charges against the

defendant and can thus jeopardize the defendant’s right to be

tried solely on the basis of the evidence presented to the jury.” 

United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18 (1985). “The

prosecutor’s opinion,” the Supreme Court reasoned, “carries

with it the imprimatur of the Government and may induce the

jury to trust the Government’s judgment rather than its own

view of the evidence.” Id. at 18–19. In nonetheless finding in

that case that the remarks were not so harmful as to compromise

the jury’s deliberations, the Court noted that the prosecutor’s

statement “contained no suggestion that he was relying on

information outside the evidence presented at trial.” Id. at 19.

For all of these reasons, we agree with Hampton that the

district court abused its discretion in allowing Agent

Bevington’s opinion testimony in violation of Rule 701.3 

Contrary to the government’s contentions, we cannot

conclude that the errors were harmless. The government’s

evidence consisted largely of wiretap interceptions and

recordings from a listening device. As a result, Agent

Bevington’s interpretations of conversations played a key role

3

 Agent Bevington was permitted to testify about the meaning of

non-coded terms participants used in conversations. For instance, in

the recorded conversation mentioned earlier, Glover told Hampton that

“when I see you I’m gonna tell you everything been going on.” Over

a defense objection, Bevington stated that Glover meant he would tell

Hampton about the seizure of PCP pursuant to a search warrant. 

Several courts of appeals have held that Rule 701 does not permit lay

opinion testimony interpreting “clear statements,” United States v.

Dicker, 853 F.2d 1103, 1109 (3d Cir. 1988), or “plain English words

and phrases,” United States v. Peoples, 250 F.3d 630, 640 (8th Cir.

2001). But cf. United States v. Rollins, 544 F.3d 820, 831–32 (7th Cir.

2008). Given our analysis we need not rely on this additional line of

authority.

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in the government’s presentation to the jury. See Grinage, 390

F.3d at 751–52. Apart from the recorded conversations, the

government’s other major source of evidence was the testimony

of Velma Williams. The jury had reasons to doubt her

credibility and discount her testimony. Williams pleaded guilty

to conspiracy under a deal with the government and hoped to

benefit at sentencing by cooperating in Hampton’s prosecution. 

When confronted with inconsistencies between her testimony

and a note she had written about Hampton and Glover before

pleading guilty, she cried on the stand. 

The prosecution was unable to point to any money, drugs,

weapons, or other evidence seized by law-enforcement

personnel that could be tied to Hampton’s alleged role in the

conspiracy. There was never a wiretap on Hampton’s phone. 

There were no witnesses who saw the contents of the packages

shipped to Hampton’s office park. Nor did the government ever

seize those packages. 

In light of the importance of Agent Bevington’s opinion

testimony to the government’s case, the weakness of the

government’s other evidence, and the likelihood that the jurors

afforded Bevington substantial authority because of his expertise

and access to information unavailable to them, we cannot say

“with fair assurance” that the error did not substantially affect

the jury’s verdict. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765

(1946); see Grinage, 390 F.3d at 752. 

Hampton also claims that some of Bevington’s opinions,

admitted as lay testimony, constituted expert testimony and thus

should have been subject to the requirements of Federal Rule of

Evidence 702. The agent gave his opinion on why drug

traffickers use code when talking on the phone, based on his

“experience of listening to wiretap interceptions.” He also

testified that “water” and “boat” mean PCP, and that in his

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experience the term “dope” means heroin. We have recently

addressed this precise issue, see United States v. Glover, 681

F.3d 411, 422 (D.C. Cir. 2012); United States v. Smith, 640 F.3d

358, 365 (D.C. Cir. 2011), and find that these statements

constituted expert testimony within the scope of Rule 702. 

Whether those particular errors—errors because Bevington was

never qualified as an expert—were harmless is unnecessary to

decide in light of our conclusion that Hampton’s conviction

must be vacated for the reasons stated above. 

The judgment of conviction is vacated, and the matter is

remanded for further proceedings. 

So ordered.

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BROWN, Circuit Judge, concurring: I agree that “when 

Bevington interpreted th[e] conversations on the basis of his 

listening to ‘all of the calls,’ the jury had no way of verifying 

his inferences or of independently reaching its own 

interpretations.” Panel Op. 7. But as I see it, the problems do 

not end there. By testifying on numerous occasions on the 

meaning of ordinary—albeit cryptic—recorded language, 

Agent Bevington trespassed into the jury’s domain. 

Let’s start with the sort of opinion testimony a witness 

may give in interpreting wiretapped conversations. An expert 

witness may interpret for a jury coded language generally 

used in drug conspiracies, much as a lay witness with 

personal knowledge of a particular drug conspiracy may 

testify on the meaning of coded language specific to that 

conspiracy. See United States v. Wilson, 605 F.3d 985, 1025–

26 (D.C. Cir. 2010); United States v. Rollins, 544 F.3d 820, 

830–32 (7th Cir. 2008). Yet neither category encompasses 

Agent Bevington’s testimony on the wiretapped conversations 

in this case. Under the guise of lay opinion testimony, he 

explained the inferences the jury should draw from recorded 

conversations involving ordinary language. At that point, his 

testimony transformed from evidence into argument. See 

United States v. Peoples, 250 F.3d 630, 640–42 (8th Cir. 

2001).

Take, for example, “Activation 100,” a conversation 

between Lonnell Glover and Coolridge Bell, who was also 

indicted as a coconspirator:

Glover: Now I pay my man 5,000 for 

every time a 10 of those UI 

[unintelligible] come in?

Bell: Huh?

Glover: Every time 10 come in, I give 

him 5.

Bell: UI.

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Glover: Naw to receive it.

Bell: Oh UI.

Glover: I pays everybody well man. 

That’s what I’m saying there 

ain’t no whole lot of room in 

this shit for me right.

. . . .

Glover: UI I give him 5, okay so he’ll 

wind up making $25,000.00, 

just receiving and picking the 

shit up for me.

Bell: UI.

Glover: Alright and I’ll take it and put it 

other places. I pay the peoples 

fucking bills you know what 

I’m saying?

From this barely coherent exchange, Agent Bevington 

somehow divined that “Mr. Glover is talking to Coolridge 

Bell about paying Mr. Hampton for receiving shipments of 

PCP. . . . $5,000 every time ten gallons were received.” 

Consider also “Activation 5982,” referenced in the 

opinion: “So a boy come pick me up, then I had to ride around 

with him, when I see you I’m gonna tell you everything been 

going on, I just man you talking about a hectic motherfucking

day.” Somehow, when passed through Agent Bevington’s 

interpretive prism, this jumble of vagaries becomes crystal 

clear: Glover was “talking about Mr. Suggs coming to pick 

him up after he dropped his truck off in the shop, and he is 

going to tell Mr. Hampton what happened with the search 

warrant and everything related to that.” That is not to say a 

juror could not have reached the same conclusions, but rather 

that such conclusions are fit only for a juror to reach.

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As the panel recognizes, the reasoning in United States v. 

Grinage, 390 F.3d 746 (2d Cir. 2004), readily applies to the 

facts of this case. Panel Op. 6–7. I fear, however, that based 

on our discussion, a casual reader may infer only one guiding 

principle from Grinage. In actuality, two may be distilled, and 

both apply here: First, the jury must not be deprived of the 

opportunity to independently evaluate the foundation for such 

testimony based on facts in evidence. See 390 F.3d at 750 

(“Whether labeled as an expert or not, the risk that [the 

witness] was testifying based upon information not before the 

jury, including hearsay, or at the least, that the jury would 

think he had knowledge beyond what was before them, is 

clear.”). Second, even if the testimony draws its inferences 

based only on facts in evidence, it may nonetheless 

impermissibly supplant the jury’s factfinding role. A lay 

opinion witness may tell jurors “what was in the evidence,” 

but not “tell them what inferences to draw from it,” for that 

responsibility is up to the jury and the jury alone. Id. As the 

panel explained, “‘rather than being helpful to the jury,’” such 

testimony “‘usurp[s] the jury’s function.’” Panel Op. 6

(quoting Grinage, 390 F.3d at 751).

Admitting Agent Bevington’s testimony under Rule 701 

was error. But just to be clear: had the government in this case 

placed into evidence the literally thousands of recorded 

conversations, the conclusion would be the same. Lambasting 

the jury with reams of additional evidence while still 

according magisterial status to Agent Bevington’s inferences

would do nothing to fix his intrusion on the factfinder’s 

function.

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