Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-14-04162/USCOURTS-ca3-14-04162-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Willie L. Davis
Appellant
Charles E. Samuels
Not Party

Document Text:

BLD-145 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 14-4162

___________

WILLIE L. DAVIS,

Appellant

v.

CHARLES E. SAMUELS, JR.

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil No. M.D. Pa. No. 3-14-cv-00821)

District Judge: Honorable Robert D. Mariani

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

March 26, 2015

Before: AMBRO, JORDAN and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: March 30, 2015)

_________

OPINION*

_________

PER CURIAM

Willie Davis appeals pro se from an order of the District Court dismissing his 

complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Because we agree with the District Court 

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.

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that Davis failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, we will summarily 

affirm.

I.

Davis is currently incarcerated in the special management unit at the United States 

Penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania. He filed the civil rights complaint at bar

against Charles E. Samuels, Jr., Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, alleging 

constitutional violations that arose from prison practices and grievance procedures. See

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388

(1971). Specifically, he alleged that prison officials removed mattresses from the cells in 

his unit for 16 hours per day, that he was denied medical treatment for conditions 

(hemorrhoids and body aches) that arose from the removal of the mattresses, and that 

Samuels failed to act favorably on his grievance regarding these issues. Davis sought 

compensatory and punitive damages.

The Magistrate Judge initially recommended that Davis’ claim be dismissed for 

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) (“fails to state a claim on which 

relief may be granted”). The Magistrate Judge, noting that Davis was proceeding pro se,

also recommended that Davis be given 20 days to amend his pleading, and the District 

Court adopted the recommendation. Davis did not amend, and the Magistrate Judge’s

second report recommended that the District Court dismiss Davis’ case with prejudice “as 

frivolous for failure to state a claim.” The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s 

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report, but its dismissal language referenced only § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) (“frivolous or 

malicious”). Davis filed a timely notice of appeal.

II.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review over the 

District Court’s dismissal of Warner’s complaint under § 1915(e). See Allah v. 

Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). We may summarily affirm the District 

Court’s judgment if an appeal presents no substantial question. See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4 

and I.O.P. 10.6. 

III.

It is unclear whether the District Court intended to dismiss Davis’ claim under 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), as it suggested following the Magistrate Judge’s first report, or under 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), as it indicated following the second report. Davis merely chose not to

amend his original complaint; he did not alter it in any way. Moreover, if the District 

Court initially found Davis’ complaint to be frivolous under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), it would 

not have needed to grant Davis the opportunity to amend. See Grayson v. Mayview State 

Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 112-13 (3d Cir. 2002) 

The answer to this question potentially affects our standard of review. See Ball v. 

Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 462 & n.18 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting the potential of more 

deferential review of §1915(e)(2)(B)(i) dismissals). Under the circumstances, we will 

treat the District Court’s dismissal as one under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), which we review de 

novo. See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Geiger v. 

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Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 373 (5th Cir. 2005) (using, in a similar case, the more generous 

standard of review).1

The District Court properly dismissed Davis’ complaint. The legal standard for 

dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as 

that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to a motion filed under Rule 12(b)(6) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Allah, 229 F.3d at 223. “To survive a motion to 

dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Blanket assertions and 

conclusory statements by themselves do not suffice to show plausibility. See Renfro v. 

Unisys Corp., 671 F.3d 314, 320 (3d Cir. 2011). 

A. Dismissal of the claim against Samuels for acts done by prison personnel

We begin with Davis’ claims against Samuels for harm allegedly done on-site by 

prison officials and medical personnel. Davis did not allege that Samuels himself had 

any involvement in the removal of mattresses from Davis’ unit or in the denial of Davis’

medical care, and a civil rights claim cannot be premised on a theory of respondeat 

superior. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675-77; Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d 

Cir. 1988). Davis, who – as we have noted – did not utilize his opportunity to amend his 

 

1 We note, of course, that we would reach the same result if we employed a more 

deferential standard. Regardless of which ground Davis’ claim is dismissed on, it 

appears to constitute a “enumerated strike ground” under § 1915(g), which may affect

Davis’ ability to bring in forma pauperis claims in the future. Ball, 726 F.3d at 462. 

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complaint, has also not attempted to sue those directly responsible for the acts described 

in his claim. His claim must therefore meet the test for supervisory liability that we 

developed in Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1118 (3d Cir. 1989).2 See Barkes v. First 

Corr. Med. Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 330 (3d Cir. 2014).3 Here, Davis has not alleged any facts 

suggesting that the practice of removing mattresses during the day created an 

unreasonable risk of a constitutional violation or that Samuels would have been aware of 

any such risk. The District Court thus correctly held that Davis failed to make a plausible 

claim for relief against Samuels for harms he claims to have suffered at the hands of 

prison officials.

B. Dismissal of the claim against Samuels for grievance response

Davis’ claim that Samuels should be liable because he did not favorably resolve 

Davis’ grievance also fails. First, we note that the Constitution does not even require a 

prison to utilize a grievance procedure. See Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th 

Cir. 2001) (“[T]he existence of a prison grievance procedure confers no liberty interest on 

a prisoner.”); Flick v. Alba, 932 F.2d 728, 729 (8th Cir. 1991). Because prisoners have 

 

2 Under Sample, “to hold a supervisor liable because his policies or practices led to an 

Eighth Amendment violation, the plaintiff must identify a specific policy or practice that 

the supervisor failed to employ and show that: (1) the existing policy or practice created 

an unreasonable risk of the Eighth Amendment injury; (2) the supervisor was aware that 

the unreasonable risk was created; (3) the supervisor was indifferent to that risk; and (4) 

the injury resulted from the policy or practice.” Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 

134 (3d Cir. 2001).

3 Barkes affirmed the continuing viability of the Sample test following the Supreme 

Court’s discussion of supervisory liability in Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676. See Barkes, 766 

F.3d at 320. 

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no constitutional right to a grievance process, the tenor or existence of Samuels’ response 

did not violate Davis’ constitutional rights. See Massey, 259 F.3d at 647.

Further, as we suggested above, personal involvement is required to find a 

constitutional violation. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675-77; Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207-08 

(holding that a plaintiff must establish that the defendants “have personal involvement in

the alleged wrongs [which] . . . can be shown through allegations of personal direction or 

of actual knowledge and acquiescence”). Davis does not claim that Samuels personally 

directed any unlawful conduct by on-site officials, but he does appear to claim that, 

because he sent the grievance to Samuels’ office, Samuels knew of and acquiesced in 

their conduct. This argument fails. In Rode we held that the filing of a grievance with 

the governor’s office of administration was “simply insufficient” to prove that governor 

had actual knowledge of an alleged action. Id. at 1208. In a similar way, merely sending 

an individual grievance about an occurrence in one unit of a single prison to the office of 

Samuels, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, in no way establishes that 

Samuels actually knew about the grievance or acquiesced in the conduct described in it.

“Allegations of participation or actual knowledge and acquiescence . . . must be made 

with appropriate particularity.” Id. at 1207. Here, Davis has made no attempt to allege 

particular facts leading to the conclusion that Samuels personally knew of or acquiesced 

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in any of the challenged conduct of subordinates. The District Court was therefore 

correct to dismiss the claim regarding Davis’ grievance.4

IV.

For the reasons given in this opinion, we will affirm the judgment of the District 

Court.

 

4 Moreover, because Davis failed to amend his complaint during the District Court 

proceedings, despite being given the opportunity to do so, we agree that the District Court 

was correct to dismiss his claim with prejudice. See In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 

F.3d 696, 703 (3d Cir. 1996).

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