Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01549/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01549-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Bob Watson
Plaintiff
Yolo County Flood Control and Water Conservation District
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

BOB WATSON,

NO. CIV. S-06-1549 FCD DAD

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

YOLO COUNTY FLOOD CONTROL AND

WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT,

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Bob Watson (“Watson” or “plaintiff”) brings this

action against defendant Yolo County Flood Control and Water

Conservation District (the “District”), claiming violations of

the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) (29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq.). 

Specifically, plaintiff seeks damages, in the form of allegedly

unpaid minimum wages and overtime wages, for his work as a

damtender at the Indian Valley Dam at Indian Valley Reservoir in

Yolo County, California. Plaintiff also seeks equitable remedies

and unpaid benefits based upon the allegedly uncompensated work

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1 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders these matters submitted on the

briefs. E.D. Cal. Local Rule 78-230(h). 

2 Unless otherwise noted, the facts recited herein are

undisputed. (See Pl.’s Response to Def.’s Stmt. of

Uncontroverted Material Facts (“PUF”), filed Sept. 6, 2007;

Def.’s Response to Pl.’s Stmt. of Undisputed Facts (“DUF”), filed

Sept. 14, 2007). Where the facts are disputed, the court

recounts plaintiff’s version of the facts. 

Defendant objects to various evidence presented by plaintiff

in support of his opposition. Much of the evidence objected to

is immaterial to the court’s analysis of the summary judgment

motion. To the extent that the evidence is relevant, the court

finds that defendant’s objections are without merit. 

Specifically, defendant makes multiple objections based upon the

assertion that plaintiff’s declaration is inconsistent with his

deposition testimony. Unless otherwise noted, the court’s review

of plaintiff’s deposition does not reveal statements directly

contrary to relevant statements made in his declaration.

2

hours, which would have increased plaintiff’s benefits under the

District’s Money Purchase Pension Plan. 

This matter comes before the court on defendant’s motion for

summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication. 

Plaintiff opposes the motion and also moves for additional

discovery pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f). For

the reasons discussed below,1 defendants’ motion is GRANTED in

part and DENIED in part, and plaintiff’s motion for additional

discovery is DENIED.

BACKGROUND2

Plaintiff Watson has been employed as a damtender by

defendant District at the Indian Valley Reservoir, located in

Lake County, since 1994. (DUF ¶ 1). The District controls the

reservoir, Cache Creek, Clear Lake, and has water rights for

storage and diversion of water from the North Fork of Cache Creek

and Cache Creek. (DUF ¶ 2). In addition to supplying water for

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irrigation or drinking water, the Indian Valley Reservoir is used

for recreation, fishing, boating, flood control, and storm

drainage. (DUF ¶ 31). The District also operates a

hydroelectric plant and sells the power to PG&E. (DUF ¶ 33). 

Plaintiff’s duties are to maintain and operate the Indian Valley

Reservoir dam, the hydroelectric plant, the recreational

facilities, and the campground. (DUF ¶ 2).

Plaintiff’s work day starts at about 5:00 a.m., when he

visually inspects the gauges at the reservoir and the stream,

measures water level, and records the readings. (DUF ¶ 3). This

takes approximately fifteen to thirty minutes every morning,

including the time it takes to travel to the dam from the camp

office and from the dam to the stream. (DUF ¶ 3). Plaintiff

then goes to the hydroelectric plant, where he inspects the three

hydroelectric turbines and takes readings for amperage,

temperature, and voltage. This takes approximately forty-five

minutes. (DUF ¶ 4). After this is completed, plaintiff goes to

the water treatment plant, which provides potable water for the

public, and visually inspects gauges, takes readings, and adjusts

chemicals. This takes approximately thirty minutes. (DUF ¶ 5). 

Plaintiff then goes back to the camp office, where he typically

finds campers or fisherman waiting for him to either check in or

to find out about fishing conditions. (DUF ¶ 6). Defendant

contends that this is not typical because there are a significant

number of days during the year where there are no campers at the

facility. (DUF ¶ 6). Plaintiff then calls defendant District at

about 8:00 a.m. to give them the water level readings. (DUF ¶ 7;

PUF ¶ 10). The District calls plaintiff at approximately 11:00

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a.m. if adjustment to the dam gates are necessary to facilitate

the delivery of water. (PUF ¶ 10).

Plaintiff then starts his duties maintaining the campground. 

(DUF ¶ 8). Plaintiff usually makes a patrol through the

campsites to determine what needs to be done that day, which is

usually garbage clean up. (DUF ¶ 8). Twice a week, plaintiff

hauls the garbage collected from the campsite to the landfill,

which takes approximately four hours. (DUF ¶ 9). Watson also

cuts back brush and trees to maintain the integrity of the camp

site, cleans out the fire pits, keeps the roads to the campground

clear, and repairs and digs ditches for the water lines. (DUF ¶

10). Plaintiff also maintains and grades the dirt roads from the

camp office to the water treatment plant, the dam, the hydro

facility, and the stream. (DUF ¶¶ 10, 13). Plaintiff’s job also

includes maintaining the boat ramp. (DUF ¶ 16). 

Plaintiff asserts that while performing his duties, he is

often interrupted by campers, fishermen, or day trippers who have

questions or needs, such as changing flat tires, welding boat

trailers, or charging car batteries. (DUF ¶ 11). Watson also

has to leave his tasks to check in the campers. (DUF ¶ 12). 

Moreover, all terrain vehicles are not permitted in the

campground area, and plaintiff was continually stopping his other

tasks to enforce this policy. (DUF ¶ 14). Throughout the day,

plaintiff has to warn campers not to swim near the dam spillway;

on one occasion, he participated in a rescue. (DUF ¶ 15). Over

the last four years, plaintiff assisted with sinking boats. (DUF

¶ 17). Typically, plaintiff ends his physical work at about 4:00

or 5:00 p.m. (DUF ¶ 18). However, he continues to check in

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campers and escort campers to their campsites. (DUF ¶¶ 18-19). 

The campground entrance is open 24 hours per day, seven days per

week, and there is no limit to the time of day that campers check

in or out of the campground. (DUF ¶ 20). Again, defendant

asserts that these interruptions and duties do not occur often

because there are a significant number of days during the year

where there are no campers at the facility. (DUF ¶¶ 11, 14-15,

18). When no campers are present, plaintiff does not have to

collect fees or deal with other camper related issues. (PUF ¶

52).

During the time period relevant to this lawsuit, plaintiff

operated the store inside the office and retained the profits

from the store. (DUF ¶ 21; PUF ¶ 50). He kept the camp office

and store open until 10:00 or 11:00 p.m. at night, even if no

campers were present. (DUF ¶ 22; PUF ¶ 51). At about 11:00 p.m.

every evening, plaintiff would telephone PG&E, the company to

whom defendant sold electric power, and give them the reading

from the hydro plant. (DUF ¶ 23). This often would take ten to

fifteen minutes because he had to get a telephone signal. (DUF ¶

23).

Since plaintiff began his employment with defendant, there

has been no written employment contract for plaintiff. (DUF ¶

49). At the start of his employment, plaintiff reviewed the

contract between James Mitchell, the prior dam tender, and the

District and made few changes. (PUF ¶ 36). Plaintiff was paid a

salary for his position. (DUF ¶ 57). Plaintiff was required to

be on the Indian Valley Reservoir premises every day, 365 days

per year, unless he took vacation or sick leave. (DUF ¶ 58). He

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did not have set days off. (DUF ¶ 59). Plaintiff was expected

to provide constant supervision at the recreational facility,

including providing emergency response for injuries to the

public. (DUF ¶¶ 63-64). Plaintiff told other employees of

defendant District that he works seven days per week and in

excess of eight hours per day. (DUF ¶ 59). Plaintiff asserts

that he was consistently working from early morning through late

evening. (DUF ¶ 99). From February 1, 2002 through January 1,

2007, plaintiff left the Indian Valley Reservoir less than once

per week, only in the late afternoon or evening. (DUF ¶ 81). 

Prior to his wife’s death, she would take care of the campers

while he was off premises. (DUF ¶ 81). 

From January 1, 2003 through January 1, 2007, Christy Barton

(“Barton”), the Assistant General Manager of the District, came

to the Indian Valley Reservoir approximately four times. (DUF ¶

102). Barton and plaintiff never discussed the number of hours

per week that he works. (DUF ¶ 102). In early 2007, Tim

O’Halloran (“O’Halloran”), General Manager of defendant District

since 2003, told plaintiff not to exceed working forty hours per

week. (DUF ¶ 56).

Defendant asserts that plaintiff did not have a written

contract at least in part because Watson stated he was happy with

the way things were. (PUF ¶ 40). Defendant contends that based

upon the workload for the damtender at the Indian Valley

Reservoir, it was the District’s understanding that the position

required less than forty hours per week to perform. (PUF ¶ 47). 

Specifically, defendant contends that plaintiff’s duties could be

completed in four to six hours and that hourly employees who

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filled in for Watson did not require overtime to complete the

damtender duties. (PUF ¶ 69).

In November 2003, the District hired a consultant, CPS Human

Resource Services, to evaluate their employment practices and

personnel operations and to prepare a report. (DUF ¶ 105). 

Barton and O’Halloran received copies of the report. (DUF ¶

107). The report states, “I have a concern about the two

contract staff and whether they are truly FLSA exempt.” (DUF ¶

109). The report further provides under “Section VIII – Contract

Employees”:

The District currently has two employees who typically

work under contract. One employee is currently without

a contract. Further, both employees are stationed at

remote sites, without regular supervision, work long

hours during the season, receive District provided

housing and vehicle, have considerable flexibility

regarding scheduling of work, and employ their spouses

to assist with work. Both positions need to be

evaluated closely for FLSA exemptions and

appropriateness of total compensation and overtime

liability. The employment contract was not provided

for review, and legal review is advisable prior to

entering into a new contract.

Ex. A to Decl. of Karen Tynan (“Tynan Decl.”), filed Sept. 6,

2007, at 16; DUF ¶ 110). The District never adopted any of the

recommendations. (DUF ¶ 113). 

STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that

there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,

157 (1970).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

[A]lways bears the initial responsibility of informing

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the district court of the basis of its motion, and

identifying those portions of “the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file together with the affidavits, if any,” which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “[W]here the

nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a

dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made

in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Id. at 324. Indeed,

summary judgment should be entered against a party who fails to

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party

will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322. In such a

circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, “so long as

whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the

standard for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule

56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

585-87 (1986); First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S.

253, 288-289 (1968). In attempting to establish the existence of

this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the

denials of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of

specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible

discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute

exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The opposing party must

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demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact

that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986),

and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that 

a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,

Id. at 251-52.

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual

dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue

of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to

resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” 

First Nat’l Bank, 391 U.S. at 289. Thus, the “purpose of summary

judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in

order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Rule 56(e) advisory

committee’s note on 1963 amendments).

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party

“must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a

whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87, 106 S. Ct. at 1356. 

ANALYSIS

On July, 12, 2007, plaintiff filed a complaint for damages

in this action, alleging (1) failure to pay overtime in violation

of the FLSA; (2) failure to pay minimum wage in violation of the

FLSA; (3) restitution of unpaid overtime wages in violation of

California’s Unfair Trade Practices Act; (4) restitution of

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unpaid minimum wage in violation of California’s Unfair Trade

Practices Act; (5) failure to provide meal and rest periods in

violation of Labor Code § 226.7; (6) equitable remedies and

unpaid benefits; (7) breach of oral contract; and (8) equitable

action for an accounting. Defendant asserts that plaintiff has

waived and agreed not to pursue his claims for violations of

California’s Unfair Trade Practices Act, breach of contract, and

equitable action for an accounting; these claims constitute

plaintiff’s Third, Fourth, Seventh, Eight, and Ninth claims for

relief. Plaintiff did not dispute this assertion in his

opposition. Therefore, defendant’s motion for summary judgment

regarding plaintiff’s Third, Fourth, Seventh, Eight, and Ninth

claims for relief is GRANTED. Moreover, in plaintiff’s

opposition, he concedes that he does not have a claim for meal or

rest periods pursuant to Labor Code § 226.7, the basis for his

Fifth claim for relief. As such, defendant’s motion for summary

judgment regarding plaintiff’s Fifth claim for relief is GRANTED. 

Thus, the remaining claims at issue in this motion are

plaintiff’s claims based upon failure to pay overtime and minimum

wage in violation of the FLSA and for equitable remedies and

unpaid benefits.

A. Irrigation Exemption to the FLSA

Defendant contends that plaintiff is not entitled to the

payment of overtime wages as set forth in the FLSA because

plaintiff’s employment falls within the “irrigation” exemption to

the FLSA. “The FLSA is construed liberally in favor of

employees; exemptions ‘are to be narrowly construed against the

employers seeking to assert them.” Cleveland v. City of Los

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Angeles, 420 F.3d 981, 988 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Arnold v. Ben

Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 (1960)); Dole v. West Extension

Irrigation Dist., 909 F.2d 349, 352 (9th Cir. 1990). An FLSA

exemption will only be found to apply in contexts that are

“plainly and unmistakably within the given exemptions terms and

spirit.” Id. Therefore, the District has the burden to

demonstrate that plaintiff meets each element of the irrigation

exemption and that plaintiff fits “plainly and unmistakably”

within the terms and spirit of the exemption. See id. 

The irrigation exemption to the FLSA provides that the

maximum hour requirements of the FLSA shall not apply to

any employee employed in agriculture or in connection

with the operation of maintenance of ditches, canals,

reservoirs, or waterways, not owned or operated for

profit, . . . and which are used exclusively for

supply and storing of water, at least 90 percent of

which was ultimately delivered for agricultural

purposes during the preceding calendar year.

29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(12) (West 2007). In order to carry their

burden on summary judgment, the District must show that there are

no disputed issues of material fact that: (1) plaintiff is

employed in connection with the operation or maintenance of

ditches, canals, reservoirs, or waterways; (2) the ditches,

canals, reservoirs, or waterways are not owned or operated for

profit; (3) the ditches, canals, reservoirs, or waterways are

used exclusively for supply and storing of water; and (4) at

least 90 percent of that water was ultimately delivered for

agricultural purposes during the preceding year.

/////

/////

///// 

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3 Plaintiff asserts that there are triable issues of fact

as to all four of the elements that defendant must show. 

12

Plaintiff contends the Indian Valley Reservoir is not used

exclusively for the storage and supply of water.3 Defendants do

not dispute that the District uses the Reservoir for recreational

facilities, to generate electricity, and for flood control. 

(Def.’s Reply, filed Sept. 14, 2007, at 5). Rather, defendants

contend that these alternate uses of the reservoir do not make

the irrigation exemption inapplicable to plaintiff because the

term “exclusive” in § 213(b)(12) does not pertain to the use and

storage of water, but to the ultimate purpose for which the water

was delivered in the previous year.

Section 213(b)(12) was amended in 1997. Prior to that

amendment, it read

Any employee employed in agriculture or in connection

with the operation or maintenance of ditches, canals,

reservoirs, or waterways, not owned or operated for

profit, or operated on a sharecrop basis and which are

used exclusively for supply and storing of water

ultimately delivered for agricultural purposes. 

Dole, 909 F.2d at 350. The only Ninth Circuit decision that

addressed the term “exclusively” in the pre-1997 version of §

213(b)(12) is Dole v. West Extension Irrigation District. Id.

In Dole, the court held that where three percent of the defendant

District’s water was used for non-agricultural purposes, the

irrigation exemption did not apply. Id. at 351. The court noted

that while Congress could have based the exemption on other

factors suggested by the defendant, it did not do so. Id.

Congress used the term “exclusively” in defining the exemption,

and the Ninth Circuit gave that term “force.” Id.; see also

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Sanders v. Elephant Butte Irrigation Dist. of New Mexico, 112

F.3d 468 (10th Cir. 1997) (adopting the Ninth Circuit’s rationale

and holding that the irrigation exemption did not apply to a

ditchrider employed by the defendant District whose water was

used for lawns, shrubbery, gardens, and orchards despite the

District’s operating practices that purportedly prohibited such

non-agricultural use). 

The 1997 amendment to § 213(b)(12) added the phrase “at

least 90 percent of which was ultimately delivered for

agricultural purposes during the preceding calendar year.” 29

U.S.C. § 213(b)(12). Subsequent to this amendment, the only

federal case to address the interpretation of the irrigation

exemption to FLSA is an unpublished decision from the Eastern

District of California, Avila v. Turlock Irrigation District,

2006 WL 3437549 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2006). In Avila, the court

found that the 1997 amendment expanded the term “exclusively” to

mean that 90 percent, rather than 100 percent, of the water must

be delivered for agricultural purposes. Id. at *14. As such,

the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the exemption could

only be applied in circumstances where the ditches, canals,

reservoirs, or waterways were used exclusively for the supply and

storage and water and not for operation or maintenance of water

delivered or managed for other purposes. Id. at *13. 

Defendant contends that the court should adopt the same

statutory interpretation of § 213(b)(12) as the court in Avila. 

Particularly, defendant asserts that the term “exclusively”

actually means 90 percent and refers only to the delivery

component of the exception. Under this reading, defendant argues

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4 Defendant also contends that the Supreme Court of

Arizona’s decision in Wright v. Salt River Vally Water Users’

Ass’n. 94 Ariz. 318 (1963), is applicable to this case. The

court disagrees. In Wright, the court rejected plaintiff’s

argument that the irrigation exemption did not apply because

parts of the dam produced electrical energy that was subsequently

(continued...)

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that it is immaterial that the District uses water for

recreation, electricity, and flood purposes. 

The court disagrees. In amending section 213(b)(12),

Congress did not remove the term “exclusively” from the language

of the statute. As such, the court must give this term force. 

See Dole, 909 F.2d at 351. By its definition, the term

“exclusively” cannot and does not mean 90 percent. Therefore,

these two statutory terms cannot be conflated. Section

213(b)(12) applies to ditches, canals, reservoirs, or waterways

“which are used exclusively for supply and storing of water.” 

Moreover, at least 90 percent of that water must ultimately have

been delivered for agricultural purposes in the preceding

calendar year. A plain reading of the statute, giving force to

each of the terms set forth by Congress, demonstrates that the

term “exclusively” applies to the supply and storage component

while the “90 percent” applies to the delivery component. 

Furthermore, the court’s interpretation of the function of the

term “exclusively” in § 213(b)(12) narrowly construes the section

against defendant District. See Arnold, 361 U.S. 388 at 392

(1960)); Cleveland, 420 F.3d at 988; Dole, 909 F.2d at 352 (9th

Cir. 1990). 

Because it is undisputed that the Indian Valley Reservoir is

not used exclusively for supply and storing of water,4 the

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(...continued)

sold. The court noted that the plaintiff was solely engaged in

the activity of an irrigation worker, and his activity “was not

in the remotest sense related to the generation or distribution

of electricity.” In this case, it is undisputed that, at the

very least, plaintiff’s job duties included activities relating

to the recreational facility. Moreover, the Wright court was

interpreting the irrigation exemption to the FLSA prior to the

1997 amendment.

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application of the irrigation exemption to plaintiff is not

plainly and clearly within the terms of § 213(b)(12). Therefore,

the irrigation exemption to the FLSA does not apply to this case.

In his opposition, plaintiff moved pursuant to Rule 56(f)

for additional discovery relating to the 90 percent delivery

component of the irrigation exemption. In light of the court’s

finding that the irrigation exemption does not apply because the

Indian Valley Reservoir was not used exclusively for the supply

and storage of water, such discovery is unnecessary. Therefore,

plaintiff’s motion for additional discovery is DENIED. 

B. “Home Worker Exception” to the FLSA

Defendant also contends that plaintiff’s FLSA claims for

overtime and minimum wage are precluded by the “home worker

exception” set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 785.23. This section

provides, in relevant part

An employee who resides on his employer’s premises on a

permanent basis or for extended periods of time is not

considered as working all the time he is on the

premises. . . . It is, of course, difficult to

determine the exact hours worked under these

circumstances and any reasonable agreement of the

parties which takes into account all of the pertinent

facts will be accepted.

29 C.F.R. § 785.23. This section does not provide employers with

an exception to the overtime pay requirements of the FLSA, but

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5 Both plaintiff and defendant cite to the Ninth

Circuit’s decision in Berry v. County of Sonoma, 30 F.3d 1174

(9th Cir. 1994), for the relevant standard regarding the “home

worker exception” to the FLSA. However, the Berry court did not

mention, let alone discuss, the “home worker exception.” Rather,

the Berry court addressed whether on-call time could be

considered compensable overtime under the FLSA. Id. at 1180.

16

“simply offers a sound methodology of calculating how many hours

the employees actually worked within the meaning of the FLSA.” 

Brigham v. Eugene Water & Elec. Bd., 357 F.3d 931, 942 (9th Cir.

2004) (finding that the agreement between the parties was

reasonable, but remanding to the district court to determine how

much overtime each of the employees was owed for hours exceeding

40 in a given workweek); see Leever v. Carson, 360 F.3d 1014,

1017 & n.2 (9th Cir. 2004) (using the parties’ nomenclature in

stating that the regulation provides an exemption from the

overtime pay requirement, but recognizing that it simply offers a

methodology for calculating hours). In order for this section to

be applicable, the District has the burden of proving, “‘plainly

and unmistakably,’ that (1) there was an agreement to compensate

plaintiff for his overtime work; and (2) the agreement was

‘reasonable,’ having taken into account ‘all of the pertinent

facts.’” Leever, 360 F.3d at 1018 (citing Brigham v. Eugene

Water & Elec. Bd., 357 F.3d 931, 940 (9th Cir. 2004)).5

1. Existence of an Agreement

Neither party disputes that there was no written employment

contract between plaintiff and defendant. However, defendant

contends that there was a constructive agreement between the

parties. “A constructive agreement may arise if employees have

been informed of the overtime compensation policy and continue to

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6 Plaintiff does not dispute that he received notice of

these policies; rather, he submits these memos as evidence in

opposition to defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff

has offered no evidence to contradict defendant’s contention that

he knew of the overtime policy and continued to work for the

District as a damtender. 

17

work under the disclosed terms of the policy.” Berry v. County

of Sonoma, 30 F.3d 1174, 1180 (9th Cir. 1994) (discussing the

existence of an agreement in the inquiry into whether on-call

hours were compensable under the FLSA); Owens v. Local No. 169,

Ass’n of W. Pulp and Paper Workers, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir.

1992); see also Brigham, 357 F.3d at 938. 

In support of its contention that plaintiff had entered into

a constructive agreement, defendant points to a memo dated

September 21, 1995. (Ex. B. to Decl. of Bob Watson (“Watson

Decl.”), filed Sept. 6, 2007). This memo addresses the hours and

compensation for damtenders, including plaintiff. Under the

summary of consideration, the memo states that “IVR averages 8

hours per day annually.” (Id.) The memo also states that

“profit-sharing should off-set the estimated average time over 8

hours per day required providing camping [sic].” (Id.) While

inarticulately phrased, the policy set forth in the memo provides

that the District anticipated that plaintiff would work 8 hours

per day and that any work performed by plaintiff exceeding 8

hours per day would be compensated by the profit-sharing. 

Defendant also points to a memo dated February 8, 2002,

addressing “Holiday Pay and Reporting Requirements.” (Ex. A to

Watson Decl.).6

 This memo pertains to the District’s policies

relating to overtime pay on holidays and provides (1) that only

minimal work was to be done on holidays; and (2) that the

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7 See Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Pl.’s

Opp’n”), filed Sept. 6, 2007, at 22) (stating that the relevant

period was April 2003 through April 2006).

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District anticipated that such tasks would require less than four

hours of work a day. The memo also directs plaintiff to call for

authorization in advance of the extra working time, unless it is

an emergency. 

Therefore, prior to the relevant period at issue, which

plaintiff identifies as April 2003-April 2006,7 the District had

informed plaintiff of its policies regarding anticipated hours

and overtime both generally and with respect to holidays. 

Subsequently, plaintiff continued to work for defendant. As

such, there was a constructive agreement between plaintiff and

defendant regarding his hours and compensation. See Berry, 30

F.3d at 1180; see also Braziel v. Tobosa Dev. Servs., 166 F.3d

1061, 1063 (10th Cir. 1999) (“Although it is clear from the

record and appellants’ pleading that they became unhappy with the

policy[,] it is equally clear that appellants understood and

acquiesced to the policy when they were hired.”); Bodie v. City

of Columbia, 934 F.2d 561, 564-65 (4th Cir. 1991) (“[C]ontinuance

in the job and acceptance under the new plan of payment was

sufficient to create a valid agreement, even though the agreement

was implied and not in writing.”).

2. Reasonableness of the Agreement

While defendant has demonstrated that there was a

constructive agreement with plaintiff regarding overtime

compensation, defendant must also demonstrate that the agreement

was reasonable under § 785.23. Leever, 360 F.3d at 1018. The

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Ninth Circuit has recognized that apart from stating that “all

pertinent facts” should be taken into consideration, § 785.23

does not specify what facts are pertinent to the reasonableness

inquiry. Id. at 1019. However, the Ninth Circuit has held that,

“at a minimum, an agreement must take into account some

approximation of the number of hours actually worked by the

employee or that the employee could reasonably be required to

work.” Id.

Where an agreement explicitly instructs the employee not to

exceed a set amount of hours without prior approval, such an

agreement may be deemed reasonable as a matter of law. Rudolph

v. Metropolitan Airports Commission, 103 F.3d 677, 684 (8th Cir.

1996); Leever, 360 F.3d at 1019 (discussing the Eighth Circuit’s

decision in Rudolph with approval). In Rudolph v. Metropolitan

Airports Commission, the Eighth Circuit held that the agreement

between the plaintiff employees and the defendant was reasonable,

despite the fact that the employees claimed to have regularly

worked in excess of the time for which they were paid. 103 F.3d

at 684. The parties’ agreement explicitly dictated the amount of

time the plaintiffs were to spend on their job duties and

specified that the plaintiff needed to obtain prior approval for

any additional time they thought necessary. Id. at 683. The

court reasoned that the defendant was entitled to rely on the

plaintiff to follow the clear terms of the agreement by not

performing additional work without prior approval. Id. at 684. 

Therefore, the court found the agreement reasonable as a matter

of law pursuant to § 785.23. Id. 

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With respect to the constructive agreement relating to

defendant’s policy for hours and compensation on holidays, the

agreement was reasonable as a matter of law because defendant was

entitled to rely on the clear terms of the 2002 memo. The 2002

memo provides that plaintiff needed to obtain prior approval for

any additional work time in excess of four hours that he thought

was necessary. (Ex. A to Watson Decl.). Like the defendant in

Rudolph, defendant District was entitled to rely on its explicit

direction that plaintiff was not to work more than fours hours on

holidays without prior authorization. As such, the constructive

agreement with respect to holiday hours was reasonable. 

Therefore, plaintiff is not entitled to back-pay for work

exceeding four hours that was not pre-approved by the District on

holidays. 

However, with respect to the constructive agreement relating

to defendant’s general policy for hours and compensation, there

is a triable issue of fact regarding whether the District took

into account the actual numbers of hours worked by plaintiff. 

The 1995 memo estimates that plaintiff would work an average of

eight hours per day. However, the memo also implicitly

contemplates that plaintiff might work more than eight hours per

day, for which he would be compensated by profit sharing. The

memo does not mention how many more hours the District

anticipated plaintiff would work or how many more hours plaintiff

actually worked. Nor has defendant presented evidence that it

made any inquiry into the numbers actually spent by plaintiff in

the performance of his duties. See id. (“[T]he number of hours

actually worked is clearly ‘pertinent’ to the question of how

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much compensation ought to be paid for that work.”). While

defendant presents evidence that other workers who covered for

plaintiff did not work the hours that plaintiff asserts he did,

plaintiff also contends that these other employees did not

perform all of his duties. Moreover, with respect to non-holiday

hours, defendant did not require pre-approval for hours exceeding

a certain threshold. Cf. Rudolph, 103 F.3d 677. Therefore,

there is a triable issue of fact regarding whether the parties’

constructive agreement as to non-holiday hours was reasonable. 

See Chao v. Jasmine Hall Care Homes, Inc., No. 05-1306, 2007 WL

2069932, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2007) (denying defendants’

motion for summary judgment based in part on § 785.23 because

there were genuine issues of material fact concerning, inter

alia, how many hours the employees actually worked, what was

expected of them under the agreement, and how much knowledge

defendants had of any alleged overtime).

Furthermore, pursuant to the 1995 memo cited by defendants,

plaintiff was expected to work an average of 8 hours per day

annually. Section 785.23 merely offers a methodology for

calculating how many hours plaintiff actually worked. If that

number exceeds 40 (and in this case, the average anticipated

hours was 56 per week), “the additional hours must be paid at the

time-and-a-half rate demanded by 29 U.S.C. § 207(a).” Brigham,

357 F.3d at 942. Under Ninth Circuit precedent, even if the

agreement is reasonable, a determination of the overtime payment

owed is still required. 

Therefore, defendant’s motion for summary judgment regarding

plaintiff’s claim for back-pay for overtime hours worked on

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8 For the reasons set forth infra, plaintiff’s claim for

back-pay for hours that he was on-call, but not actively working

are not compensable.

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holidays is GRANTED. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment

based on the applicability of § 785.23 regarding plaintiff’s

claim for back-pay for overtime hours actually worked8 on nonholidays is DENIED.

C. Compensability of “On-Call” Time

Defendant further contends that plaintiff’s claims for

overtime and minimum wage fail because his time spent “on-call,”

when he was not actively engaged in duties for the District, is

not compensable under the FLSA. Whether an employee was “engaged

to wait,” which is compensable, or “waiting to be engaged,” which

is not compensable, must be determined by the circumstances in a

given case. Brigham, 357 F.3d at 935 (quoting Owens, 971 F.2d at

350). The two predominant factors in deciding whether on-call

waiting time is compensable overtime are (1) the agreements

between the parties; and (2) the degree to which the employee is

free to engage in personal activities. Berry, 30 F.3d at 1180

(citing Owens, 971 F.2d at 350). Whether there is an agreement

between the parties that employees would receive compensation for

on-call waiting time is a question of fact. Id. “[W]hether the

limitations on the employees’ personal activities while on-call

are such that on-call waiting time would be considered

compensable overtime under the FLSA is a question of law.” Id.

(citing Birdwell v. City of Gadsen, Ala., 970 F.2d 802, 807 (11th

Cir. 1992)).

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9 Because the 1995 memo provides that the IVR damtender

works an average of 8 hours per day, it is likely that this time

did not include on-call time. However, the court cannot make

such an inference as to a question of fact on a motion for

summary judgment. 

23

The inquiry regarding the first predominant factor, the

agreement between the parties, is significant to the extent that

the terms of the agreement may assist the trier of fact in

determining whether the parties characterized the time spent

waiting on-call as actual work. Berry, 30 F.3d at 1181. 

However, such agreements are not controlling as to the character

of the uncompensated time at issue. Id. 

In this case, as set forth above, the undisputed evidence

demonstrates that there was a constructive agreement between

plaintiff and defendant regarding hours and compensation. 

However, nothing in the agreement plainly addresses on-call

waiting time or whether such time was compensable.9 Therefore,

the constructive agreement between the parties does not weigh in

favor or against the conclusion that on-call waiting time is

compensable.

The proper inquiry regarding the second predominant factor,

the degree to which an employee is free to engage in personal

activities, is “whether an employee is so restricted during oncall hours as to be effectively engaged to wait.” Berry, 30 F.3d

at 1182. In Owens, the Ninth Circuit “enumerated an illustrative

list of factors to consider in gauging the extent to which

employees could pursue personal activities during the course of

their on-call shifts.” Brigham, 357 F.3d at 936 (quoting Owens,

971 F.2d at 351). Such factors include:

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(1) whether there was an on-premises living

requirement; (2) whether there were excessive

geographical restrictions on employee’s movements; (3)

whether the frequency of calls was unduly restrictive;

(4) whether a fixed time limit for response was unduly

restrictive; (5) whether the on-call employee could

easily trade on-call responsibilities; (6) whether the

use of a pager could ease restrictions; and (7) whether

the employee had actually engaged in personal

activities during call-in time. 

Id. at 936. No one factor is dispositive, and the court “should

balance the factors permitting personal pursuits against the

factors restricting personal pursuits to determine whether the

employee is so restricted” that waiting time should be

compensated. Id. Although the limitations on personal

activities inquiry is a question of law, on a motion for summary

judgment, where there is a genuine dispute relating to the facts

relevant to these factors, the court will accept plaintiff’s

version of the facts.

Plaintiff was required to be on the Indian Valley Reservoir

premises every day, unless he took vacation or sick leave (factor

1). Plaintiff was subject to some geographic constraints (factor

2); he had to respond to the hydro-electric unit alarms within

thirty minutes. (DUF ¶ 68; Pl.’s Opp’n at 21). Further, when

campers were at the facility, he had to respond immediately to

their needs (factor 4). (DUF ¶ 78). As such, plaintiff left the

premises less than once per week. (DUF ¶ 81). Plaintiff

contends that a pager would do little to lessen the burdens of

his duties because of the remote location of the Indian Valley

Reservoir and because he was often the only employee present

(factor 6).

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However, it is undisputed that there are many days

throughout the year where there are no campers present at the

facility. (PUF ¶ 53). As such, during those times, there was no

need for plaintiff to respond immediately to the needs of campers

(factors 3 and 4). (PUF ¶ 52). Moreover, when plaintiff was

injured and his wife was sick, other employees were able to

perform the damtender duties (factor 5). Estella Watson

performed the damtender duties when plaintiff was injured. (PUF

¶ 70). John Pettus filled in for plaintiff for approximately

four months. (PUF ¶ 71). In 2006, O’Halloran worked for two

weekends as the damtender at the facility. (DUF ¶ 84).

Furthermore, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that

plaintiff was able to engage in personal activities when he was

on call (factor 7). Between 2003 and 2007, plaintiff made many

improvements to the damtender residence, including installing

cabinets and countertops, relocating the laundry room,

constructing closets, building a fence to create a front yard,

constructing a storage building, and planting trees. (PUF ¶ 49). 

Plaintiff was free to have visitors and would have time to talk

to them during the day for up to an hour; plaintiff’s

grandchildren would visit once a week or once a month. (PUF ¶¶

61-62). Plaintiff built a bar for a friend over a period of five

days, spending four to five hours per day on the project. (PUF ¶

63). Plaintiff also built decking with friends. (PUF ¶ 63). 

For approximately a year and a half, plaintiff kept horses at the

facility in a pen adjacent to the house; he fed the horses twice

a day, picked up after them, and exercised them. (PUF ¶¶ 65-66).

Plaintiff also captured wild pigs and was hoping they would

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breed. (PUF ¶ 67). Plaintiff and a friend would go ATV hunting

for an hour or two. (PUF ¶ 68). On occasion, plaintiff did

leave the facility in the late afternoon or evening. (DUF ¶ 81).

On balance, the Owens factors weigh against finding that

plaintiff’s on-call time was compensable. The response-time

restrictions placed on plaintiff were not particularly severe;

there were many times during the year when plaintiff did not need

to immediately respond to the needs of campers. Plaintiff also

had a half hour to respond to the hydro-electric unit alarms. 

See Berry, 30 F.3d at 1184 (finding on-call time not compensable

where employees required to remain in the county and to respond

to calls within fifteen minutes); Owens, 971 F.2d at 349 (finding

on-call time not compensable where employees required to reply

within ten minutes of receiving a call or page). Further, there

is no evidence that plaintiff’s duties put him in the position of

being responsible for the safety of thousands of people and thus,

required him to be both immediate and absolutely prepared in his

responses. Cf. Brigham, 357 F.3d at 938 (finding that the Owens

factors weighted narrowly in favor of the employees were they

were subject to the constant pressures of being absolutely

prepared to respond to emergencies where the safety of thousands

was at stake). Moreover, while plaintiff was required to live at

the facility and was subject to geographic constraints, the

undisputed evidence demonstrates that he engaged in a variety of

personal pursuits including home improvement, construction

projects, having visitors, raising horses, capturing wild pigs,

and ATV hunting. As such the record does not demonstrate that

plaintiff’s on-call time “was so restricted that it could not be

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10 Defendant contends that plaintiff’s own assertions

regarding the amount of hours he worked is insufficient evidence

for his FLSA overtime claim. The court disagrees. Defendant

cites Hearnsberger v. Gillespie, 435 F.2d 926 (8th Cir. 1970) in

support of its contention. Hearnsberger is inapposite. In

Hearnsberger, the case was dismissed after the court made certain

findings after trial. Id. On a motion for summary judgment, the

court cannot weigh the evidence or make credibility

determinations; it is sufficient that “the claimed factual

dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the

parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” First Nat’l

Bank, 391 U.S. at 289. Thus, plaintiff’s assertions are

sufficient to demonstrate a triable issue of fact.

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used for personal activities.” Serv. Employees Int’l Union Local

102 v. County of San Diego, 60 F.3d 1346, 1355 (9th Cir. 1994)

(concluding that requiring a park ranger to be on-call at night

to respond to inquiries and enforce park rules was not so

restrictive that on-call time could not be used for personal

activities).

Based upon the foregoing analysis of the Owens factors,

plaintiff was not “so restricted during on-call hours as to be

effectively engaged to wait.” Berry, 30 F.3d at 1182. 

Therefore, and because the constructive agreement between the

parties holds no weight in this analysis, plaintiff’s time spent

“on-call” is not compensable under the FLSA. As such,

defendant’s motion for summary adjudication on this issue is

GRANTED. 

However, although plaintiff’s time not spent actively

working is not compensable under the FLSA, there is a genuine

issue of fact regarding how many hours plaintiff was on-call and

how many hours plaintiff actually worked.10 Therefore,

defendant’s motion for summary judgment regarding plaintiff’s 

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11 Plaintiff’s silence could be construed as a nonopposition to defendant’s motion regarding his minimum wage

claims. However, in an abundance of caution, the court analyzes

the merits of defendant’s argument.

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FLSA overtime claims based on non-holiday hours actually worked

by plaintiff is DENIED.

D. Minimum Wage

Defendant contends that summary judgment should be granted

as to plaintiff’s minimum wage claim because, even assuming

plaintiff worked every waking moment, his hourly wage is still in

excess of the applicable federally mandated minimum wage of

$5.15. See 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2004); (Compl. ¶ 63). Plaintiff

fails to offer any argument in opposition to defendant’s

assertion.11

One effect of the FLSA was “to raise substandard wages first

by a minimum wage.” Hodgson v. Baker, 544 F.2d 429, 432 (9th

Cir. 1976) (quoting Overnight Motor Transp. Co., Inc. v. Missel,

316 U.S. 572, 577 (1942)). An employee’s regular rate of pay is

calculated by dividing the employee’s salary by the number of

hours worked. Id. at 433; see 29 C.F.R. § 548.3 (West 2007). 

Overtime is then assessed by calculating time and one-half of

that regular rate. Id.; see 29 C.F.R. § 548.3. 

As set forth above, plaintiff’s on-call time (such as when

he was sleeping) is not compensable. Assuming plaintiff was

actively working from 5:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m. every day, seven

days a week, (see DUF ¶¶ 3, 22; Pl.’s Opp’n at 23), plaintiff

worked approximately 540 hours a month (18 hours/day x 30 days =

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12 If the court modeled its formula upon the one set forth

by plaintiff in the complaint (Compl. ¶ 61), by calculating on a

weekly basis and estimating four weeks in a month, he would have

worked approximately 504 hours/month (18hr/day x 7days/wk x 4

wk/month = 504 hrs/month). Therefore, his hourly pay would be

approximately $5.55. However, because it is more favorable to

plaintiff, the court calculates his monthly hours by using a 30

day month.

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540 hours/month).12 Plaintiff alleges that he was paid $2,800

per month. Assuming that defendant did not pay overtime, as

plaintiff contends, this equates to an hourly wage of

approximately $5.19 per hour. This is in excess of the federally

mandated minimum wage of $5.15. Therefore, defendant’s motion

for summary judgment regarding plaintiff’s Second claim relief

that defendant failed to pay minimum wage in violation of the

FLSA is GRANTED. 

E. Willful Conduct by Defendant

Defendant contends that summary judgment should be granted

on plaintiff’s claim that the District willfully violated the

FLSA. All causes of action brought under the FLSA must generally

be commenced within two years after the action’s accrual date. 

29 U.S.C. § 255(a). However, “[i]f a particular employer’s

conduct embodies [a] ‘willful violation’ of [the] FLSA, 29 U.S.C.

§ 255(a) permits extension of the FLSA’s standard two-year

statute of limitations to a three-year period.” Alvarez v. IBP,

Inc., 339 F.3d 894, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). For purposes of the

statute of limitations under § 255(a), “willfulness” means that

“the employer knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of

whether its conduct was prohibited by the statute.” McLaughlin

v. Richland Shoe, 486 U.S. 128, 133 (1988).

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Plaintiff has proffered evidence that in November 2003,

defendant hired consultant who expressed concerns about whether

plaintiff was exempt under the FLSA. The consultant’s report

recommended that the position be evaluated for FLSA exemptions,

appropriateness of total compensation, and overtime liability. 

The proffered evidence also demonstrates that despite the

consultant’s concerns, the District never adopted any of the

recommendations. As such, there is a triable issue of fact

regarding whether defendant knew or showed reckless disregard for

whether its conduct violated the FLSA. Therefore, defendant’s

motion for summary judgment regarding plaintiff’s claim of

willfulness is DENIED.

F. Additional Retirement Benefits

Finally, defendant moves for summary judgment on plaintiff’s

equitable claim that he is entitled to additional retirement

benefits. Apart from its contention that plaintiff’s claims for

overtime must fail on the merits, the District contends that

plaintiff must first contact the Plan administrator regarding the

procedures for pursuit of any claims he may have. Plaintiff does

not dispute that he must contact the Plan administrator regarding

the proper process if he prevails in his claim for back pay for

overtime. Rather, plaintiff contends that he is not required to

act in anticipation of receiving an accounting or equitable award

in this case. The court agrees. 

Through his claim for equitable relief, plaintiff is

requesting a determination of the hours worked for which he

claims he was not credited or paid. Plaintiff does not dispute

and, therefore the court need not adjudicate, that if plaintiff

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prevails, he must comply with the procedures set forth in the

Plan for obtaining proper credit under the District’s Money

Purchase Pension Plan. As such, defendant’s motion for summary

judgment regarding plaintiff’s Fifth claim for relief seeking

equitable remedies is DENIED. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part: 

(1) Defendant’s motion for summary judgment regarding

plaintiff’s Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh,

Eighth, and Ninth claims for relief is GRANTED.

(2) Defendant’s motion for summary judgment regarding

plaintiff’s claim for back-pay for overtime hours

worked on holidays is GRANTED.

(3) Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication on the

issue of whether plaintiff’s on-call time is

compensable is GRANTED.

(4) Defendant’s motion for summary judgment regarding

plaintiff’s FLSA overtime claims based on non-holiday

hours actually worked by plaintiff is DENIED.

(5) Defendant’s motion for summary judgment regarding

plaintiff’s claim of willfulness is DENIED.

(6) Defendant’s motion for summary judgment regarding

plaintiff’s claim for equitable remedies pertaining to

his retirement benefits is DENIED.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 17, 2007

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