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Parties Involved:
Jesse Gutierrez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

JESSE GUTIERREZ, 

v. 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS F I L L .i,) 

United States Court of Appeala FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Tenth Circuit 

Appellant, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

DEC 2 2 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

) No. 92-4044 

) ( D • C • No . 91-CR-19 9 G) 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Appellee. 

) (D. Utah) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT1 

Before LOGAN, Circuit Judge, TACHA, Circuit Judge, and CAUTHRON, 

District Judge2 • 

Appellant, Jesse Gutierrez, was convicted after jury trial of 

possession with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1) 

& (b) (1) (C), and using and carrying a firearm in relation to a drug 

trafficking crime, 18 u.s.c. § 924(c). Jurisdiction exists in this 

1

This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3 

2

Honorable Robin J. Cauthron, United States District Judge for 

the Western District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 92-4044 Document: 010110154885 Date Filed: 12/22/1992 Page: 1 
Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 & 1294(1). The issues raised 

in this appeal are: 1) whether the stop of the automobile in which 

defendant Gutierrez was a passenger was based on a reasonable, 

articulable suspicion and thus was not an unconstitutional 

pretextual stop; 2) whether the evidence was sufficient beyond 

reasonable doubt to convict Gutierrez of possession of cocaine with 

intent to distribute; and 3) whether the evidence was sufficient 

beyond reasonable doubt to convict Gutierrez of using and carrying 

a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime. After careful 

review of the briefs and having heard oral argument, we answer the 

questions in the affirmative and affirm. 

At the evidentiary hearing on the motions to suppress, 

Sergeant Kenneth Pearce of the Salt Lake City Police Department 

testified that he was on patrol in his sector on August 7, 1991, in 

the area of the Alta Motel, which was a high crime area during the 

relevant time period. Pearce had thirteen years of experience and 

has been an undercover narcotics officer, a narcotics detective, a 

member of the vice squad, and a certified drug recognition expert 

and trainer. Pearce observed a silver Oldsmobile on three 

occasions before finally stopping the vehicle. On the first 

occasion at about 1:30 a.m., there were two people in the vehicle, 

which was entering the u-shaped entry of the Alta Motel. About an 

hour later, he saw the car leaving the motel with two occupants 

whom he could not identify. The driver of the vehicle, up to this 

2 

Appellate Case: 92-4044 Document: 010110154885 Date Filed: 12/22/1992 Page: 2 
point, had not committed any traffic or other violations of the 

law. 3 

The third instance when Pearce saw the vehicle was around 6: 00 

a.m. The car had four occupants and was parked on a side street 

near the Al ta Motel at the entrance to an alley. As Pearce 

approached the vehicle in his marked police cruiser, the driver 

immediately turned on his lights, pulled away from the curb, and 

made a right-hand turn without a signal. Pearce immediately 

activated his police emergency lights and pulled the vehicle over. 

After the stop, as Pearce approached the vehicle from behind, he 

observed the passenger seated in the left rear seat of the car, 

defendant Gutierrez, make furtive movements during which he 

disappeared from view. Pearce then ordered the driver out and, 

subsequently, the front passenger. It was at this point that 

backup officer Cary Smith arrived at the scene. Pearce directed 

Smith to order Gutierrez and the right-rear passenger out of the 

vehicle. Pearce ultimately searched the vehicle and discovered a 

gun, money, and cocaine and heroin. All occupants of the vehicle 

appeared to have fresh puncture wounds on their arms, indicative of 

a recent intravenous injection of narcotics. Thereafter, all of 

3 Pearce admitted that but for another stop in which he was 

involved at this time he would have pulled the car over for an 

investigation based on his suspicions. While the government 

conceded at oral argument that such a stop would have been much 

more difficult to justify, the point is moot because a stop never 

took place at that time. Therefore, any subjective misjudgment on 

the part of the officer regarding a hypothetical stop is simply 

irrelevant to the present inquiry, which must narrowly focus on 

purely objective factors. 

3 

Appellate Case: 92-4044 Document: 010110154885 Date Filed: 12/22/1992 Page: 3 
them, except Gutierrez, were released, and no traffic citation was 

issued to the driver. In fact, Pearce candidly testified that he 

did not stop the vehicle because of a traffic violation; he 

remarked that he would have stopped the car regardless of any 

violation of the traffic laws. 

Immediately after cocaine was found in the area of the 

vehicle where Gutierrez was seated, Pearce confronted him and 

handcuffed him. Gutierrez was not given any Miranda warnings, but 

was questioned as to why he was carrying a large amount of money 

and if he had been using drugs. Gutierrez then made incriminating 

statements. 

On January 14, 1992, the trial court granted Gutierrez I s 

motion to suppress the statements; however, the motion to suppress 

the physical evidence was denied. Gutierrez subsequently underwent 

a two- day jury trial. 

At trial, on January 14, 1992, Pearce repeated his testimony 

concerning the stop of the vehicle. Pearce testified that the 

search of the vehicle revealed a fanny pack located in the left 

rear portion of the vehicle where Gutierrez was seated. The pack 

contained Gutierrez's identification, a key to a room at the Alta 

Motel, some jewelry, a small package of heroin, and approximately 

$1,050. Pearce further testified that he also observed a gun 

wedged in between the back rest and the seat portion of the vehicle 

next to the place where Gutierrez had been sitting. Pearce also 

stated there was a large package of cocaine and some heroin in the 

vicinity of the gun. The gun was not registered to Gutierrez and 

4 

Appellate Case: 92-4044 Document: 010110154885 Date Filed: 12/22/1992 Page: 4 
no fingerprints were taken to determine the owner of either the gun 

or the cocaine and heroin. 

On the second day of trial, based on this evidence, Gutierrez 

moved for a judgment of acquittal on both counts. He asserted that 

the government's evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction 

either for possession with intent to distribute or carrying and 

using a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime. The trial 

court denied the motion and the case was submitted to the jury, 

which subsequently found Gutierrez guilty on both counts. 

On January 17, 1992, Gutierrez renewed his motion to suppress 

evidence. The trial court again denied the motion, finding that 

the officer had reasonable suspicion for the stop. Then, on March 

16, 1992, the trial court sentenced Gutierrez to thirty months on 

Count I and sixty months on count II, with the terms to be served 

consecutively, and, upon release, a three-year term of supervised 

release. 

Gutierrez first argues that the stop of the vehicle was 

pretextual and was accomplished in violation of Gutierrez's right 

against unreasonable searches and seizures. See United States v. 

Guzman, 864 F. 2d 1512, 1515 ( 10th Cir. 1988) . Gutierrez also 

contends that there were no articulable facts and individualized 

suspicion to support a Terry stop. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 

21-22 & nn.18-19 (1968). The officer's stop of the vehicle was not 

pretextual. Gutierrez makes much of the fact that the police 

officer candidly admitted that he did not stop the vehicle because 

of any traffic offense, but rather because he suspected some other 

5 

Appellate Case: 92-4044 Document: 010110154885 Date Filed: 12/22/1992 Page: 5 
crime. However, the officer did not rely on the driver's failure 

to signal in order to stop the vehicle, and therefore a pretextual 

stop like in United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1515, is actually 

not present in this case. 

With regard to a Terry stop, that is, whether the officer had 

reasonable suspicion of illegal activity, our inquiry is not what 

the particular officer relied upon, but rather we must look at the 

evidence de novo from the perspective of a reasonable, trained, and 

experienced police officer. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 21-22; 

Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 & n.2 (1979) (requiring a 

reasonable suspicion to make an investigative stop from the 

perspective of a trained, experienced police officer who is able to 

perceive and articulate meaning in conduct that might appear 

totally innocent to the untrained observer); United States v. 

Morales-Zamora, 914 F.2d 200, 202 (10th Cir. 1990) ("The ultimate 

determination of reasonableness under the fourth amendment is 

. a conclusion of law that we review de novo. 11 ). 

Warrantless police traffic stops are particularly fact 

sensitive and the underlying facts should be reviewed in detail. 

The facts here are: 1) thirteen years specific training and 

experience of the officer, observing 2) an out-of-state car 4 , 

4 The fact that the vehicle had an out-of-state license plate 

when viewed in conjunction with a motel setting might be more 

indicative of totally innocent activity as opposed to anything 

illegal. However, when this factor is viewed in conjunction with 

the others, and particularly an out-of-state vehicle being 

repeatedly observed with different passengers in the early morning 

hours in an area well known for its prostitution and drug 

distribution activity, then it takes on a quite different 

perspective. 

6 

Appellate Case: 92-4044 Document: 010110154885 Date Filed: 12/22/1992 Page: 6 
3) that was coming and going from a high crime area notorious for 

both drug deals and prostitution, 4) with different and varying 

numbers of occupants, 5) during the wee morning hours, 6) where an 

unsolved robbery had occurred the previous week; and 7) the car was 

parked on the street in this area at around 6:00 a.m., and then 8) 

pulled away at the moment the police cruiser came into view, while 

9) failing to signal; 5 and 10) all of the rational inferences from 

these facts. 

We find these facts are sufficient to support the conclusion 

that the officer had a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity at 

the time he turned on his emergency lights and initiated the stop. 

Gutierrez can only muster a serious argument challenging any 

reasonable suspicion prior to the officer's activation of his 

police emergency lights, because after that the reasonable 

suspicion progressively crystallized into probable cause . Once the 

lights were on, the officer observed furtive movements by 

Gutierrez; the driver had no license and was uncertain of vehicle 

registration information; and there was the presence of visible 

track marks on the occupants and they had constricted pupils, 

implying the use of drugs by all occupants of the vehicle. A 

consent was given to search the vehicle; there were incriminating 

statements by Gutierrez of drug use and sales that were later 

5 Although the officer said that he did not rely on the 

failure to signal, this conduct is relevant to an objective 

evaluation of the totality of the circumstances. The commission of 

a minor traffic offense could support an inference that other 

criminal conduct may be present when viewed in the light of other 

relevant factors. 

7 

Appellate Case: 92-4044 Document: 010110154885 Date Filed: 12/22/1992 Page: 7 
suppressed; a knife was found in Gutierrez's pocket; a visible gun 

was spotted that was loaded; a fanny pack was found that contained 

Gutierrez's ID, heroin, and a substantial amount of suspiciously 

wadded and randomly placed cash; and still more drugs were found in 

the car. We conclude that the trial court's denial of the motion 

to suppress should be upheld. 

Gutierrez argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict 

him of the distribution charge. He argues that he did not own the 

car, was not driving it, and did not have exclusive possession of 

it. Gutierrez thus contends that the government did not prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of knowledge, possession, 

and intent to distribute; and there was also no evidence of 

dominion and control of the drugs. Gutierrez's defense is that he 

was an admitted drug addict and the drug quantity only justified at 

most a charge of possession, not distribution. The evidence has 

been summarized as it relates to defendant's arguments and need not 

be repeated. We find that the jury was properly instructed, 

including being provided an instruction for the lesser included 

offense of simple possession. The jury could reasonably conclude 

that the drugs were initially on Gutierrez and that he distributed 

drugs to the occupants, and tried to hide them during the stop. In 

short, the jury had evidence from which it could find defendant's 

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Gutierrez next argues that the evidence presented at trial was 

insufficient to sustain his conviction of using and carrying a 

firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime. In this regard 

8 

Appellate Case: 92-4044 Document: 010110154885 Date Filed: 12/22/1992 Page: 8 
Gutierrez argues that no fingerprints were taken to establish 

ownership. The jury could conclude that the firearm was used as 

prohibited by section 924(c) because the defendant had ready access 

to it, the firearm was an integral part of the criminal 

undertaking, and it was carried through movement of the car. Its 

availability increased the likelihood that the undertaking would 

succeed. See United States v. Johnson, Nos. 91-7012, -7015 to 

-7017, __ F.2d __ , __ , 1992 WL 239333 at *6 (10th Cir. Sept. 29, 

1992) . 

The trial court's decision on the motion for judgment of 

acquittal is reviewed determining whether, after viewing the 

evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational 

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt. See id., at *5 ("'"Evidence is 

considered sufficient to support a criminal conviction if, when 

viewed in the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable 

jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."'") 

(quoted citations omitted). Clearly, there was evidence on which 

a reasonable jury could convict the defendant of the crimes 

charged. 

Finally, Gutierrez argues that the indictment alleged that 

Gutierrez carried and used a firearm, and the prosecution did not 

prove both. However, the prosecution can file an indictment in the 

9 

Appellate Case: 92-4044 Document: 010110154885 Date Filed: 12/22/1992 Page: 9 
conjunctive, but need only prove its case in the disjunctive. 

Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 420 (1970). 

Accordingly, the judgment is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

ROBIN J. CAUTHRON 

10 

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