Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-15-10165/USCOURTS-ca11-15-10165-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Adiel Sanchez Brey
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 15-10165

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cr-20488-JLK-2

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ADIEL SANCHEZ BREY, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

________________________

(September 21, 2015)

Before MARCUS, WILLIAM PRYOR, and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Adiel Sanchez Brey appeals his 43-month sentence of imprisonment, 

imposed after he pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to 

distribute ethylone. Because ethylone is not listed in the applicable sentencing 

guidelines, the district court, to determine Brey’s base offense level, was required 

to convert the quantity of ethylone to its equivalent in marijuana by using the 

marijuana equivalency of the most closely related controlled substance listed in the 

guidelines. Brey’s challenges on appeal all broadly relate to the district court’s 

determination of the most closely related substance and the resulting conversion 

ratio the court applied. After careful review, we affirm. 

I.

Brey pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to 

distribute ethylone. According to the presentence investigation report (“PSR”), 

Brey admitted brokering a deal for one kilogram of “molly” between a confidential 

source and Brey’s co-defendant, Li Valdes. The PSR states that “molly” is a term 

referring to several schedule I controlled substances and their analogues, including 

MDMA/ecstasy (3,4-methylenedioxy-methamphetamine), MDMC/methylone (3,4-

methylenedioxy-methcathinone), and ethylone (1-(1,3-benzodioxol-5-yl)-2-

(ethylamino)propan-1-one). Laboratory analysis revealed that the substance 

Valdes provided to Brey was ethylone, with a net weight of 999.3 grams. 

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Ethylone is not referenced in § 2D1.1 of the United States Sentencing 

Guidelines Manual (“U.S.S.G.), which provides the base offense level for drug 

offenses. When a controlled substance is not referenced in the guidelines, the court 

must “determine the base offense level using the marihuana equivalency of the 

most closely related controlled substance referenced in this guideline.” U.S.S.G. 

§ 2D1.1 cmt. n.6 (“Application Note 6”). In making that determination, the court 

must consider, “to the extent practicable,” the following three factors: 

(1) chemical structure, (2) effect on the user (whether stimulant, depressant, or 

hallucinogenic), and (3) relative potency of the drug. See id. 

The PSR concluded that the substance most closely related to ethylone was 

MDMC (methylone) and that ethylone had “half the potency of MDMA.” PSR 

¶ 18. One gram of MDMA is equivalent to 500 grams of marijuana, see U.S.S.G. 

§ 2D1.1 n.8(D), so the PSR halved the MDMA ratio and found that one gram of 

ethylone was equivalent to 250 grams of marijuana. Applying the 1:250 ratio

derived the equivalent of 249.825 kilograms of marijuana, for a base offense level 

of 24, which was reduced to a total offense level of 21 after application of a threelevel reduction for acceptance of responsibility. With a criminal history category 

of III, Brey’s advisory guideline range was 46 to 57 months’ imprisonment. 

The government objected to the PSR’s conversion ratio. According to the 

government, ethylone was most closely related in structure and effect to MDEA, 

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an analog of MDMA, and should carry the same ratio of 1 gram of substance to 

500 grams of marijuana. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.8(D). The government 

acknowledged that no scientific data or literature existed on ethylone’s potency, so 

there was no way to know if it was more or less potent than MDEA or methylone. 

Brey responded that a lower ratio should apply—either the 1:250 ratio applied by 

the PSR or a 1:125 ratio—because the available scientific evidence suggested that 

ethylone was at least half as potent as MDEA and MDMA. Brey agreed with the 

government that ethylone’s chemical structure was most similar to MDEA, and he 

acknowledged that ethylone had a similar effect on the user as MDMA, MDEA, 

and methylone. But, according to Brey, potency was “the crucial factor in 

determining the conversion ratio to be applied.” Doc. 56 at 13.

In anticipation of sentencing, the government noticed its intent to call two 

expert witnesses to testify about ethylone’s chemical structure and its effect on the 

user. Brey moved to exclude the expert testimony under Daubert1 and Rule 702 of 

the Federal Rules of Evidence. He contended that the only fact at issue was 

ethylone’s potency, about which the experts could not testify given the lack of 

available scientific data or literature on the question. Thus, according to Brey, the 

expert testimony would not help the district court determine a fact in issue.

 1 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).

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At the sentencing hearing, the district court denied Brey’s motion to exclude 

the expert testimony, stating that it did not know the controlled substances well and 

could benefit from the testimony. The government then called as expert witnesses 

Dr. Daniel Willenbring and Dr. Cassandra Prioleau, both drug-science specialists

with the Drug Enforcement Agency. 

Dr. Willenbring, a chemist, testified that ethylone and MDEA were very 

similar in chemical structure and that there was no drug in the guidelines that was a 

better match for ethylone than MDEA. The only difference between ethylone and 

MDEA, according to Dr. Willenbring, was the “beta Keto,” an oxygen atom added 

to MDEA to make it ethylone. On cross-examination, Dr. Willenbring explained 

that potency could not be determined from chemical structure.

Dr. Prioleau, a pharmacologist, testified that ethylone “is expected to have a 

stimulant effect in the central nervous system that is substantially similar to that of 

MDEA.” Doc. 97 at 21. Dr. Prioleau was not aware of any human or animal 

studies on the potency of ethylone, and she admitted that ethylone could be more

potent than, less potent than, or equally as potent as MDEA or methylone. 

After the experts testified, the government argued that the 1:500 ratio should 

apply because the first two factors under Application Note 6, chemical structure 

and effect on the user, favored the government, while the third factor, potency, was 

an “unknown” that should be considered “neutral,” so “the scales tip in favor of the 

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Government.” Id. at 30. The government asserted that ethylone’s unknown 

potency should not benefit Brey, because the risk and danger of these substances is 

that young people take these pills, which are shipped over from China, without 

knowing what they actually contain. Brey responded that the government had the 

burden of proving its proposed finding by a preponderance of the evidence, and 

that “the issue of potency is a guess” that “does not rise to the level of . . . a 

preponderance standard.” Id. at 31. He argued that the district court should take a 

conservative approach and apply the 1:250 ratio. 

The district court sustained the government’s objection, finding that the 

government had “established by reasonable and reliable expert opinion that the 

ratio should be 1 to 500.” Id. at 36. The court explained its conclusion as follows: 

The Court finds that the three factors that the Court 

must consider have been considered. The first two factors 

under this evaluation were not in contest; it was the third 

factor that was in contest. 

The Court finds that the substance ethylone is 

appropriately and more properly considered in relation to 

the listed substance of MDEA [than] otherwise. 

Id. at 37. At the court’s request, the probation officer recalculated Brey’s total 

offense level to be 23, resulting in a guideline range of 57 to 71 months’ 

imprisonment. The district court granted a downward departure based on the 

government’s substantial-assistance motion, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, and 

sentenced Brey to 43 months’ imprisonment. Brey now brings this appeal. 

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II.

A.

Brey first contends that the district court failed to make factual findings

required by Rule 32(i)(3)(B), Fed. R. Crim. P., in support of its chosen conversion 

ratio of 1 gram of ethylone to 500 grams of marijuana.2

 We review a district 

court’s compliance with Rule 32(i) de novo.

3 See United States v. Vincent, 121 

F.3d 1451, 1453 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing a previous version of the rule). 

Under Rule 32(i)(3)(B), the district court at sentencing must, “for any 

disputed portion of the presentence report or other controverted matter,” explicitly 

rule on the dispute or determine that a ruling is unnecessary because the matter will 

not be considered in sentencing the defendant. If the district court fails to make an

express finding as to the disputed portion, remand for compliance with the rule 

 2 Brey cites to former Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)(D), which was in effect from 1983 to 

2002. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32, advisory comm. notes, 1983 & 2002 Amends. As part of the 

restyling of the Criminal Rules in 2002, the general rule of Rule 32(c)(3)(D), with some 

amendment, was incorporated into current Rule 32(i)(3)(B). Id., 2002 Amend. We therefore 

construe Brey’s challenge as under Rule 32(i)(3)(B).

3 The government contends that plain-error review applies because Brey did not object to 

the court’s failure to make supporting factual findings at sentencing. Where a defendant raises 

an objection for the first time on appeal, we ordinarily review for plain error only. United States 

v. Peters, 403 F.3d 1263, 1270 (11th Cir. 2005). To be eligible for plain-error relief, the 

defendant must show that (1) an error occurred, (2) the error was plain, and (3) the error affects 

substantial rights. Id. at 1270-71. We do not decide whether plain-error review applies because 

Brey has not shown that the district court erred, plainly or otherwise. 

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may be appropriate. See Shukwit v. United States, 973 F.2d 903, 905 (11th Cir. 

1992).

Here, the district court complied with Rule 32(i)(3)(B). The only disputed 

portion of the PSR concerned what marijuana conversion ratio should apply to 

ethylone. After hearing testimony from the experts and argument from the parties 

relevant to that issue, the district court clearly resolved this dispute by adopting the 

government’s favored 1:500 ratio and recalculating the PSR based on that ratio. 

Thus, the court “rule[d] on the dispute” in accordance with Rule 32(i)(3)(B). 

Brey contends that he cannot meaningfully challenge, and we cannot 

meaningfully review, the district court’s conclusion as to the applicable conversion 

ratio because the court did not make any factual findings as to potency or discuss 

how potency factored into its decision. See, e.g., United States v. Reid, 139 F.3d 

1367, 1368 (11th Cir. 1998) (“We cannot engage in meaningful appellate review of 

a sentence unless the district court sets out the facts underpinning the guidelines it 

applied in fashioning the defendant’s sentence or the record plainly establishes 

such facts.”). We disagree. The record shows that the court agreed with the 

government that ethylone is most closely related to MDEA in chemical structure 

and effect on the user. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.6. On this basis, the court 

concluded that MDEA’s 1:500 ratio should apply, despite the uncertainty regarding 

ethylone’s potency. Brey simply disagrees with the court’s conclusion that the 

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government met its burden of proof without presenting any evidence of ethylone’s 

potency. We turn to that issue now. 

B.

Brey argues that the district court clearly erred in determining that MDEA 

was the most closely related substance to ethylone under Application Note 6 to 

§ 2D1.1 because the government did not put forth any evidence establishing 

ethylone’s potency.

In considering issues under the Sentencing Guidelines, we review the district 

court’s factual findings for clear error and its application of the sentencing 

guidelines de novo.

4

 United States v. Gupta, 572 F.3d 878, 887 (11th Cir. 2009). 

For a factual finding to be clearly erroneous, we must be “left with the definite and 

firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Id. (internal quotation marks 

omitted). A district court’s choice between two permissible views of the evidence 

cannot be clear error. United States v. Ndiaye, 434 F.3d 1270, 1305 (11th Cir. 

2006). 

The government must prove a contested fact in the PSR that would increase 

a defendant’s sentence by a preponderance of the evidence. Gupta, 572 F.3d at 

 4 Although we have not expressly held in a published opinion that a district court’s 

determination of the “most closely related controlled substance” under Application Note 6 to 

§ 2D1.1 is a factual finding reviewed only for clear error, the parties both urge that clear-error 

review applies, and we agree.

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887. The government must satisfy this burden with “reliable and specific 

evidence.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

As explained above, when a drug is not specifically referenced in the drugquantity table under § 2D1.1(c), the district court is tasked with converting the 

quantity of the controlled substance to its equivalent in marijuana by using the 

marijuana equivalency of the “most closely related controlled substance referenced 

in this guideline.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.6 & n.8(A). To determine the most 

closely related substance,

the court shall, to the extent practicable, consider the 

following:

(A) Whether the controlled substance not referenced in 

this guideline has a chemical structure that is 

substantially similar to a controlled substance 

referenced in this guideline.

(B) Whether the controlled substance not referenced in 

this guideline has a stimulant, depressant, or 

hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system 

that is substantially similar to the stimulant, 

depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central 

nervous system of a controlled substance 

referenced in this guideline.

(C) Whether a lesser or greater quantity of the 

controlled substance not referenced in this 

guideline is needed to produce a substantially 

similar effect on the central nervous system as a 

controlled substance referenced in this guideline.

Id. cmt. n.6.

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Here, the district court did not clearly err in determining that ethylone is 

most closely related to MDEA and so should carry the same conversion ratio of 1 

gram of substance to 500 grams of marijuana. The government produced reliable 

and specific evidence of the first two factors, chemical structure and effect on the 

user, which Brey does not challenge. Instead, Brey’s challenge rests on the 

government’s failure to put forth any evidence of potency, without which, he 

contends, the government did not meet its burden of proving the application of the 

1:500 ratio with reliable and specific evidence.

But Brey’s argument that the lack of evidence of potency is fatal to 

government’s position—and the district court’s ultimate conclusion—is not 

supported by the commentary to § 2D1.1. Application Note 6 does not impose an 

absolute duty on the government to produce evidence about all three factors; 

rather, it requires only that the district court consider the three factors “to the extent 

practicable.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.6 (emphasis added). The guidelines thus 

recognize “that, in some circumstances, sentencing courts will be unable to match 

substances under each of the factors.” United States v. Chowdhury, 639 F.3d 583, 

586 (2d Cir. 2011). In short, the absence of specific and reliable evidence as to one 

of the factors, such as potency, does not preclude a court from making a 

determination as to the most closely related controlled substance under Application 

Note 6. See id. (holding that the district court did not clearly err in substituting 

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MDMA for the substance in question despite the “absence of a substance with a 

substantially similar chemical structure, or reliable information regarding the 

relative potency of the two substances” (internal citations omitted)). 

Given MDEA’s and ethylone’s similar chemical structure and effect on the 

user, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that the district court made 

a mistake in finding that MDEA was the “mostly closely related controlled 

substance” to ethylone under Application Note 6 to § 2D1.1, despite the lack of 

evidence as to relative potency.5

 See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.6. 

C.

Finally, Brey argues that the district court abused its discretion in admitting 

the testimony of the government’s experts. We review for an abuse of discretion 

the district court’s decisions as to the admissibility of expert testimony and the 

reliability of an expert opinion. United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1258 

(11th Cir. 2004) (en banc). 

Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence controls the admission of expert 

testimony. It provides that a qualified expert may testify in the form of an opinion 

or otherwise if

 5 Brey points to a decision by another district judge in the same district finding that a 

1:200 ratio should apply to ethylone, but the evidence before the courts in the two cases differed, 

and, in any event, the clear-error standard allows for courts to come to different conclusions as 

long as the conclusions are supported by substantial evidence in the record, as they are here. We 

emphasize that we do not hold generally that courts should apply a 1:500 ratio for ethylone. 

Instead, we hold only that, based on the specific record in this case, the district court did not 

clearly err in determining that MDEA was the appropriate substitute substance.

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(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other 

specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to 

understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles 

and methods; and 

(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and 

methods to the facts of the case. 

Fed. R. Evid. 702. Thus, in considering the admissibility of expert testimony 

under Rule 702, district courts must consider three basic requirements: 

qualification, reliability, and helpfulness to the factfinder. Frazier, 387 F.3d at 

1260. 

Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the expert 

testimony of government witnesses Dr. Willenbring and Dr. Prioleau. Brey does 

not dispute that the experts were qualified. We also readily conclude that their 

testimony was helpful to determine a fact in issue. Brey’s contention that only 

potency was at issue is unpersuasive. To determine the “most closely related 

controlled substance” to ethylone under Application Note 6, the district court was 

required to consider, in addition to potency, whether ethylone had a chemical 

structure and an effect on the user’s central nervous system that were similar to a 

referenced substance. The expert testimony went directly to these two relevant 

factors and was the basis for the government’s assertion that the 1:500 ratio should 

apply. In other words, the expert testimony clearly was relevant and helpful to 

determining a fact in issue. 

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The fact that Brey “stipulated” to the government’s position regarding

chemical structure and effect on the user does not, for several reasons, preclude the 

court from hearing expert testimony regarding these factors. First, no formal 

stipulation was entered into the record, so the government still needed to meet its 

burden with reliable and specific evidence. Second, Brey’s “stipulation” was 

weaker than the expert testimony, at least with respect to effect on the user. 

Specifically, Brey admitted that ethylone had a similar effect on the central 

nervous system to MDMA, MDEA, and methylone. But Dr. Prioleau’s testimony 

focused on the substantial similarity between ethylone and MDEA, which is more 

favorable to the government’s position. Third, “the accepted rule [is] that the 

prosecution is entitled to prove its case free from any defendant’s option to 

stipulate the evidence away.” Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 189, 117 

S. Ct. 644, 654 (1997). Finally, even if Brey’s stipulation was sufficiently

effective, the court still was required to determine the most closely related 

referenced controlled substance to ethylone, which, in turn, requires some 

familiarity with the substances that the court is supposed to compare. Here, the 

district court indicated that it was unfamiliar with the substances, so the expert 

testimony was helpful to the court in understanding the substances for purposes of 

making a determination under Application Note 6.

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Nor did the experts testify as to matters outside of their expertise on issues 

of potency, as Brey suggests. Dr. Willenbring limited his opinion on the articles 

Brey filed to the portion he could comment on as a chemist. He stated three times 

that potency was outside of his field and declined to speculate as to ethylone’s 

potency. Dr. Prioleau testified only that there was no existing data for anyone to 

reliably determine the potency of ethylone. Brey’s challenge to the reliability of 

Dr. Prileau’s opinion is based on a misunderstanding of her testimony. 

Dr. Prioleau testified that in vitro studies—conducted outside of a living 

organism—are helpful to determine the possible effects a drug may have, but they 

are not reliable for determining potency because potency depends on complex 

interactions between multiple systems in the body. Consistent with this testimony, 

Dr. Prioleau explained that her opinion about the expected effects of ethylone was 

based on in vitro studies and that Brey’s proffered in vitro studies did not reliably 

show potency. 

Overall, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s admission of 

expert testimony from Dr. Willenbring and Dr. Prioleau.6

III.

In sum, we AFFIRM Brey’s sentence. 

 6 Brey also makes a passing reference that the government did not comply with its 

disclosure obligations relating its experts because it failed to provide a copy of the in vitro 

studies on which Dr. Prioleau based her opinion. Such a passing reference is insufficient to raise 

the issue for appellate review. Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th 

Cir. 2014).

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