Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01927/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01927-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
A. Gill
Respondent
James Edward Gowdy
Petitioner

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES EDWARD GOWDY,

Petitioner,

v.

A. GILL,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:14-cv-01927-AWI-GSA-HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner is a federal prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 

I.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner is presently incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in Mendota, 

California. In the instant petition filed on December 3, 2004, Petitioner challenges his 2009

conviction and sentence in United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi

for being a felon in possession of ammunition. See United States v. Gowdy, Case No. 3:08-cr00167-WHB-JCS-1 (S.D. Miss. June 19, 2009).1

 He was sentenced under the Armed Career 

 

1

This Court “may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal 

judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.” U.S. ex rel. 

Case 1:14-cv-01927-AWI-GSA Document 7 Filed 01/09/15 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Criminal Act (“ACCA”). Petitioner appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the 

judgment was affirmed on January 29, 2010. See United States v. Gowdy, 364 Fed.App‟x 61, 

2010 WL 445458 (Jan. 29, 2010). Petitioner‟s petition for writ of certiorari was denied by the 

United States Supreme Court on June 1, 2010. See Gowdy v. United States, 560 U.S. 946, 130 

S.Ct. 3372, 176 L.Ed.2d 1258 (2010). 

Petitioner then filed a motion to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence with respect to 

this conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the Northern District of Mississippi, which was 

denied on January 5, 2011. Petitioner‟s appeal was dismissed by the Fifth Circuit Court of 

Appeals on July 15, 2011. See Gowdy v. United States, No. 11-60303 (5th Cir. July 15, 2011).

A review of the Court‟s dockets reveals that Petitioner has filed petitions for § 2241 relief 

in the Eastern District of Texas and this Court. On November 8, 2011, Petitioner‟s first federal 

petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2241 was denied by the Eastern District 

of Texas in Gowdy v. Gill, 2011 WL 5439068 (E.D.Tex. November 8, 2011). On October 24, 

2012, Petitioner‟s federal petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 was 

denied by this Court in Gowdy v. Gill, 2013 WL 5289310 (E.D.Ca. October 24, 2012). On 

September 18, 2013, the Ninth Circuit denied Petitioner‟s request for a certificate of 

appealability. See Gowdy v. Gill, no-12-17465, ECF No. 11. Petitioner‟s petition for writ of 

certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court on October 6, 2014.

II.

DISCUSSION

A federal court may not entertain an action over which it has no jurisdiction. Hernandez 

v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 2000). A federal prisoner who wishes to challenge the 

validity or constitutionality of his federal conviction or sentence must do so by way of a motion 

to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Tripati v. Henman, 843 F.2d 

 

Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244 (9thCir.1992); see also

MGIC Indem. Co. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 505 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Wilson, 631 

F.2d 118, 119 (9th cir. 1980). Accordingly, the Court takes judicial notice of United States v. 

Gowdy, Case No. 3:08-cr-00167-WHB-JCS-1 (5th Cir. 2009).

Case 1:14-cv-01927-AWI-GSA Document 7 Filed 01/09/15 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

1160, 1162 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Stephens v. Herrera, 464 F.3d 895, 897 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. 

denied, 549 U.S. 1313 (2007); Thompson v. Smith, 719 F.2d 938, 940 (8th Cir. 1983)=; In re 

Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 249 (3rd Cir. 1997); Broussard v. Lippman, 643 F.2d 1131, 1134 (5th 

Cir. 1981). In such cases, only the sentencing court has jurisdiction. Tripati, 843 F.2d at 1163. 

In general, a prisoner may not collaterally attack a federal conviction or sentence by way of a 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Grady v. United States, 929 

F.2d 468, 470 (9th Cir.1991); Tripati, 843 F.2d at 1162; see also United States v. Flores, 616 

F.2d 840, 842 (5th Cir.1980). 

In contrast, a prisoner challenging the manner, location, or conditions of that sentence's 

execution must bring a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the district 

where the petitioner is in custody. See Stephens, 464 F.3d at 897; Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 

F.3d 861, 864-65 (9th Cir.2000) (per curiam); Brown v. United States, 610 F.2d 672, 677 (9th 

Cir. 1990); Capaldi v. Pontesso, 135 F.3d 1122, 1123 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Tubwell, 

37 F.3d 175, 177 (5th Cir. 1994); Kingsley v. Bureau of Prisons, 937 F.2d 26, 30 n.5 (2nd Cir. 

1991); United States v. Jalili, 925 F.2d 889, 893-94 (6th Cir. 1991); Barden v. Keohane, 921 

F.2d 476, 478-79 (3rd Cir. 1991); United States v. Hutchings, 835 F.2d 185, 186-87 (8th Cir. 

1987). 

“The general rule is that a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is the exclusive means by 

which a federal prisoner may test the legality of his detention, and that restrictions on the 

availability of a § 2255 motion cannot be avoided through a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.” 

Stephens, 464 F.3d at 897 (citations omitted). Therefore, the proper vehicle for challenging a 

conviction is a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 

Nevertheless, a “savings clause” exists in § 2255(e) by which a federal prisoner may seek 

relief under § 2241 if he can demonstrate the remedy available under § 2255 to be “inadequate or 

ineffective to test the validity of his detention.” United States v. Pirro, 104 F.3d 297, 299 (9th 

Cir. 1997) (quoting § 2255); see Hernandez, 204 F.3d at 864-65. The Ninth Circuit has 

recognized that it is a very narrow exception. See Ivy v. Pontesso, 328 F.3d 1057, 59 (9th Cir.) 

(as amended), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1051 (2003). The remedy under § 2255 usually will not be 

Case 1:14-cv-01927-AWI-GSA Document 7 Filed 01/09/15 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

deemed inadequate or ineffective merely because a prior § 2255 motion was denied, or because a 

remedy under that section is procedurally barred. See Aronson v. May, 85 S.Ct. 3, 5 (1964) 

(finding that a prior § 2255 motion is insufficient to render § 2255 inadequate); Tripati, 843 F.2d 

at 1162-63 (holding that a petitioner's fears of bias or unequal treatment do not render a § 2255 

petition inadequate); Williams v. Heritage, 250 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1957); Hildebrandt v. Swope, 

229 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1956). 

The Ninth Circuit has acknowledged that petitioners may proceed under Section 2241

pursuant to the “savings clause,” when the petitioner claims to be: “(1) factually innocent of the 

crime for which he has been convicted; and, (2) has never had an „unobstructed procedural shot‟ 

at presenting this claim.” Ivy, 328 F.3d at 1059-60 (citing Lorentsen v. Hood, 223 F.3d 950, 954 

(9th Cir.2000)); see also Stephens, 464 F.3d at 898. In explaining that standard, the Ninth 

Circuit stated:

In other words, it is not enough that the petitioner is presently 

barred from raising his claim of innocence by motion under § 

2255. He must never have had the opportunity to raise it by 

motion.

Ivy, 328 F.3d at 1060. The burden is on the petitioner to show that the remedy is inadequate or 

ineffective. Redfield v. United States, 315 F.2d 76, 83 (9th Cir. 1963).

Petitioner maintains that, subsequent to his conviction, the United States Supreme Court 

case of Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 130 S.Ct. 2577 (2010), altered the 

requirements for calculating the requisite qualifying prior convictions for the ACCA, and thus he 

should not be sentenced pursuant to the ACCA. Petitioner argues that his sentence should be 

lowered to ten (10) years imprisonment, because he should not have been sentenced pursuant to 

the ACCA. Petitioner claims that because the maximum sentence for his 2004 conviction was 

only five (5) years imprisonment, and the ACCA prong requires that a defendant face at least ten 

(10) years imprisonment to qualify as a prior conviction under the ACCA, that 2004 conviction 

cannot be used as a qualifying prior conviction for the ACCA. The reasoning of CarachuriRosendo is clearly a direct challenge to Petitioner‟s conviction, not to the execution of his 

sentence. Indeed, Petitioner concedes as much in his Petition. Therefore, Petitioner is 

Case 1:14-cv-01927-AWI-GSA Document 7 Filed 01/09/15 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

challenging the validity and constitutionality of his federal sentence imposed by the United 

States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi, rather than an error in the 

administration and execution of his sentence. Thus, the appropriate procedure would be to file a 

motion pursuant to § 2255 in the Northern District of Mississippi, and not a § 2241 petition in 

this Court.

Petitioner argues, however, that § 2255 is inadequate and ineffective for gaining relief, 

because he did not have an opportunity to raise his Carachuri-Rosendo claim in his § 2255 

petition. The decision in Carachuri-Rosendo was issued on June 14, 2010, prior to the decision 

in Petitioner‟s § 2255 motion by approximately six months, and therefore, Petitioner had the 

opportunity to raise his challenge under Carachuri-Rosendo in his § 2255 motion.

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that his claims qualify under the “savings clause” of 

Section 2255 because Petitioner's claims are not proper claims of “actual innocence.” In the 

Ninth Circuit, a claim of actual innocence for purposes of the Section 2255 “savings clause” is 

tested by the standard articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Bousley v. United 

States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998). In Bousley, the Supreme Court explained that, “[t]o establish actual 

innocence, petitioner must demonstrate that, in light of all the evidence, it is more likely than not 

that no reasonable juror would have convicted him.” Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, “actual innocence means factual innocence, not mere 

legal insufficiency.” Id. 

The standards announced by the various circuit courts for an “actual innocence” claim 

contain two basic features: actual innocence and retroactivity. E.g., Reyes–Requena v. United 

States, 243 F.3d 893, 903 (5th Cir. 2001); In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328 (4th Cir. 2000); In re 

Davenport, 147 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 1998); In re Hanserd, 123 F.3d 922 (6th Cir. 1997); In re 

Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245 (3d Cir. 1997).

Petitioner‟s only argument in support of his innocence claim is the holding in CarachuriRosendo. In Carachuri-Rosendo, the Supreme Court addressed the applicability of a state‟s 

recidivist law to the aggravated felony determination in an immigration context. 

However, Carachuri-Rosendo is not relevant to the issue of whether Petitioner is actually

Case 1:14-cv-01927-AWI-GSA Document 7 Filed 01/09/15 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

innocent of the crime for which he has been convicted, which is the standard for a claim to 

qualify under the savings clause. See Ivy v. Pontesso, 328 F.3d 1057, 1060 (9th Cir. 2003). 

While Petitioner argues that this Court should allow him to utilize the savings clause because the 

Ninth Circuit has reserved on the issue of whether a claim that a sentence was above the 

statutory maximum qualifies for the “actual innocence” requirement of the savings clause, the 

Ninth Circuit has not held that a petitioner‟s claim that he is innocent of the sentence qualifies 

for the savings clause, and therefore, Petitioner cannot avail himself of the savings clause. See

Marrero, 682 F.3d at 1194-95. Moreover, because Carachuri-Rosendo is presently inapplicable 

to cases that are on collateral review, such as the present case, Petitioner is unable to avail 

himself of the “savings clause.” 

Motions pursuant to § 2255 must be heard in the sentencing court. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a); 

Hernandez, 204 F.3d at 864-65. Because this Court is only the custodial court and construes the 

Petition as a §2255 motion, this Court lacks jurisdiction over the Petition. Hernandez, 204 F.3d 

at 864-65. In sum, should Petitioner wish to pursue his claims in federal court, he must do so by 

way of a motion to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the 

sentencing court.

III.

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that:

1. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DISMISSED as the petition does not allege 

cognizable grounds for relief in a petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241; and

2. The Clerk of Court be DIRECTED to enter judgment for Respondent and terminate the 

case.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District 

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local 

Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within 

thirty (30) days after service of the Findings and Recommendation, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

Case 1:14-cv-01927-AWI-GSA Document 7 Filed 01/09/15 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

“Objections to Magistrate Judge‟s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections 

shall be served and filed within fourteen (14) days after service of the objections. The Court will 

then review the Magistrate Judge‟s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are 

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the 

District Court‟s order. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. 

Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 9, 2015 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:14-cv-01927-AWI-GSA Document 7 Filed 01/09/15 Page 7 of 7