Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-05902/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-05902-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Patricia Bell
Plaintiff
Darryl Milburn
Defendant

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PATRICIA BELL,

Plaintiff,

v.

DARRYL MILBURN,

Defendant.

Case No. 16-cv-05902-MMC 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 

MOTION TO DISMISS; DISMISSING 

COMPLAINT WITHOUT PREJUDICE; 

VACATING HEARING

Re: Dkt. No. 12

Before the Court is defendant Darryl Milburn's ("Milburn") Motion to Dismiss, filed 

October 19, 2016. Plaintiff Patricia Bell has not filed opposition.1 Having read and 

considered the papers filed in support of the motion, the Court deems the matter 

appropriate for determination on the moving papers, VACATES the hearing scheduled for 

December 16, 2016, and rules as follows.

On September 23, 2016, plaintiff initiated the above-titled action by filing in state 

court a "Request for Civil Harassment Restraining Orders" pursuant to California Code of 

Civil Procedure section 527.6 (see Notice of Removal Ex. 1 at 1), which filing the Court 

construes as plaintiff's complaint. See Nakamura v. Parker, 156 Cal. App. 4th 327, 335 

(2007) (noting "harassment petition under . . . section 527.6 [is] itself essentially a cause 

of action") (internal quotation and citation omitted). In her complaint, plaintiff alleges that, 

inter alia, Milburn, her "manager" at the "VA Martinez Clinic," has engaged in "hostile 

behavior," specifically, "yell[ing] at [her] in front of veterans while [she] was doing [her] 

 

1Any opposition was due November 23, 2016. (See Order, filed October 27, 2016, 

at 2:9-11; Order, filed November 10, 2016.)

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job" and "constant negative behavior." (See Notice of Removal Ex. 1 at 2-3.)

On October 12, 2016, Milburn removed the above-titled action to federal district 

court. In the instant motion to dismiss, Milburn argues the Court lacks subject matter 

jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims, irrespective of whether they are construed as tort claims 

or employment discrimination claims.

A. Tort Claims

To the extent plaintiff is alleging tort claims,

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the Court finds the complaint is 

subject to dismissal.

The Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") provides the "exclusive" remedy where a 

plaintiff alleges a tort claim against an employee of the United States who is acting within 

the scope of his employment, see 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1), and the proper defendant in 

such action is "the United States," see id. Here, the Attorney General has certified that 

Milburn, an employee of the United States Department of Veteran Affairs, "was acting 

within the scope of his employment at all times material to [the] alleged incident." (See

Certification, filed October 12, 2016.) As plaintiff has not offered evidence to the 

contrary, the "Attorney General’s decision regarding scope of employment certification is 

conclusive." See Green v. Hall, 8 F.3d 695, 698 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding party seeking to 

challenge certification "bears the burden of presenting evidence and disproving the 

Attorney General's decision to grant . . . scope of employment certification").

A court has jurisdiction over a claim under the FTCA only where a plaintiff has 

"first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency" and the claim has been 

"finally denied by the agency in writing." See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a); Brady v. United 

States, 211 F.3d 499, 502-03 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding claim presentation requirement is 

 

2Under § 527.6 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, which statute is cited in 

plaintiff's complaint, a court may issue a restraining order where a plaintiff demonstrates 

she has suffered harassment, defined in relevant part as "a knowing and willful course of 

conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys or harasses the 

person, and that serves no legitimate purpose." See Cal. Code Civ. P. § 527.6(b)(3). 

The statute does not require the harassment to be on account of the plaintiff's 

membership in a protected class.

Case 3:16-cv-05902-MMC Document 22 Filed 12/05/16 Page 2 of 5
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"jurisdictional"; finding district court properly dismissed FTCA claims where plaintiff had 

not presented claim to federal agency prior to filing suit).

Here, Milburn has offered evidence, undisputed by plaintiff, that establishes 

plaintiff has not submitted an administrative claim. (See Stroughter Decl. ¶¶ 1-4 (stating

declarant, after conducting search of system that "encompasses all cases filed in 

[Northern California]" against Department of Veterans Affairs, did not find an

administrative claim filed by plaintiff).)

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Accordingly, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s tort claims, 

and the complaint is subject to dismissal, without prejudice to plaintiff’s refiling her claims 

after she has submitted an administrative claim and the claim has been denied.

B. Title VII

To the extent plaintiff is alleging employment discrimination claims, the Court 

likewise finds the complaint is subject to dismissal.

Title VII "provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in 

federal employment," see Brown v. General Services Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 823, 835 

(1976), and the proper defendant in such an action is the "head of the department," see

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c). "Title VII specifically requires a federal employee to exhaust 

his administrative remedies as a precondition to filing suit." Vinieratos v. United States, 

939 F.2d 762, 767-68 (9th Cir. 1991). Specifically, the employee must file a "complaint

. . . with the agency that allegedly discriminated against the complainant," see 29 C.F.R. 

§ 1614.106(a), after which the agency "is required to conduct an impartial and 

appropriate investigation of the complaint within 180 days of the filing of the complaint," 

see 29 C.F.R. § 1614.106(e)(2). The employee may file suit in district court within "90 

 

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The Court may consider material outside the pleadings where, as here, the 

defendant's motion to dismiss challenges the district court's jurisdiction to consider the 

plaintiff's claims. See McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1986)

(holding, when considering motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, "the 

district court is not restricted to the face of the pleadings, but may review any evidence, 

such as affidavits and testimony").

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days of receipt of final action taken by the department" or "after one hundred and eighty 

days from the filing of the initial charge with the department." See 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-16(c). Where the employee files a civil action before the completion of the 

administrative process, however, the civil action is subject to dismissal without prejudice 

as premature. See Wrighten v. Metropolitan Hospitals, Inc., 726 F.2d 1346, 1351 (9th 

Cir. 1984) (holding "[p]remature suits [under Title VII] are always subject to a motion to 

dismiss"); Pinkard v. Pullman-Standard, 678 F.2d 1211, 1218 (5th Cir. 1982) (observing 

that where plaintiff files suit under Title VII prior to completion of administrative process, 

"[u]nquestionably, the action [is] subject to dismissal without prejudice at that time").

Here, according to the records of the Department of Veterans Affairs, plaintiff, on 

July 7, 2016, filed with the agency a "Discrimination Complaint" against Milburn, and said 

complaint remains pending before the agency. (See Kasnick Decl. ¶¶ 3-6, Ex. 1.)4

Accordingly, plaintiff's employment discrimination claims are subject to dismissal, 

without prejudice to plaintiff's refiling her claims after she has completed the 

administrative process.

C. Request for Issuance of Restraining Order

In addition to his challenge to any tort or Title VII claims, Milburn argues plaintiff's 

request for a restraining order should be denied.

As set forth above, plaintiff's complaint is subject to dismissal, and, consequently, 

plaintiff cannot at this time establish she is likely to succeed on the merits of her claims. 

See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (holding party 

seeking injunction "must establish," inter alia, she is "likely to succeed on the merits" of 

its claim).

Accordingly, the request will be denied.

 

4Milburn's unopposed request for judicial notice of the administrative record of 

plaintiff's claim is hereby GRANTED. See Lacayo v. Donahoe, 2015 WL 993448, at *9 

(N.D. Cal. March 4, 2015) (holding "it is well established that courts may consider the 

administrative record of a plaintiff's claims before the EEOC as judicially noticeable 

matters of public record") (citing cases).

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above:

1. Defendant's motion to dismiss is hereby GRANTED, and the complaint is 

hereby DISMISSED without prejudice.

2. Plaintiff's request for a restraining order is hereby DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 5, 2016

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

Case 3:16-cv-05902-MMC Document 22 Filed 12/05/16 Page 5 of 5