Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01768/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01768-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Attorney General of the State of Arizona
Respondent
Sheryl Foster
Respondent
Theresa Hume
Petitioner

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Theresa Hume, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Sheryl Foster, Warden, Southern Nevada

Women's Correctional Center; Attorney

General of the State of Arizona, 

Respondents. 

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No. CIV 06-1768-PHX-NVW (DKD)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE NEIL V. WAKE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Theresa Hume, through counsel, filed a timely petition for writ of habeas corpus on

July 17, 2006, challenging her conviction for manslaughter following a guilty plea, and the

trial court's imposition of an aggravated 14-year prison term. In her first ground for habeas

relief, she contends that the trial court's imposition of an aggravated sentence violated her

right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment, citing Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296

(2004). She also argues that her guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary, in

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Respondents contend that Hume's first ground is

procedurally defaulted, and that both grounds are without merit. For the reasons stated

below, the Court recommends that Hume's petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Hume was originally indicted for manslaughter and aggravated assault, arising from

the death of the victim which occurred while Hume was driving while intoxicated. The state

alleged a prior conviction for attempted aggravated assault, and that Hume had committed

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the offenses while on probation (Doc. #12, Exh A-C). As part of the plea agreement, the

state agreed to dismiss the aggravated assault charge, and the allegations of a prior conviction

and that the offense occurred while she was on probation. Under the original indictment,

Hume faced prison time ranging from 9.25 to 23.25 years. The plea agreement specified that

Hume would serve between 9 and 14 years in prison (Id., Exh D). The trial court sentenced

Hume to an aggravated term of 14 years (Id., Exh G, H). 

Through counsel, Hume filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that the

imposition of an aggravated term was an abuse of the trial court's discretion and that the plea

was not voluntarily, knowingly or intelligently made (Id., Exh K, L). Hume petitioned the

court of appeals for review, and supplemented her petition for review with a Blakely

argument (Id., Exh T-X). On its own motion, the court of appeals stayed the petition for

review and revested jurisdiction in the superior court to allow Hume to present her Blakely

claim. The trial court granted Hume relief, finding that "[u]nder the most recent cases, each

aggravating factor considered by the sentencing judge must be Blakely-exempt or Blakely

compliant," and that "other than the aggravating factor of Defendant being on probation for

an alcohol-related offense, the remaining factors considered involve subjective nuances that

needed to be submitted to a jury" (Id., Exh GG).

The trial court set a status conference and a date for the jury determination of the

aggravating factors. In the order extending the trial court's jurisdiction, the court of appeals

stated that jurisdiction would revest in the appellate court sooner than the date of the status

conference in superior court (Id., FF-II). For that reason, the status conference and date for

a jury determination were both vacated upon separate motions by the parties. The court of

appeals summarily denied Hume's original petition for review that raised no claim under

Blakely; the supreme court also denied review (Id. Exh JJ-MM).

Although Respondents argue that Hume has not exhausted her first claim by failing

to file any supplemental petition for review with the court of appeals to alert the appellate

court to an alleged Blakely error, the Court need not address the issue of exhaustion because

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The sentencing judge also listed other aggravating factors:

[T]he defendant continuing to be in extreme risk to reoffend and harm

members of the society, of society and my not feeling that when the defendant

gets out, that the risk of harm would be lessened, and the fact that the

defendant has destroyed many lives as a result of her conduct in this matter

and the conscious decisions that she did make.

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it finds that Hume's Blakely claim is without merit. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The Sixth

Amendment requires that "any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory

maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Blakely v.

Washington, 542 U.S. at 301(quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)).

In Arizona, the statutory maximum is the presumptive term, the maximum sentence the judge

may impose solely "on the basis of facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the

defendant." Id. at 303 (emphasis in original). However, "once a jury finds or a defendant

admits a single aggravating factor, the Sixth Amendment permits the sentencing judge to find

and consider additional factors relevant to the imposition of a sentence up to the maximum

prescribed in that statute." State v. Martinez, 210 Ariz. 578, 585 (2005). See also United

States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738, 748 (2005) (jury must determine facts that raise a sentencing

ceiling).

First, Hume was not sentenced pursuant to the statutory sentencing range for a

manslaughter conviction - 7.5 to 21 years, with a presumptive term of 10.5 years. Hume

negotiated and agreed to a sentencing range between 9 and 14 years. Second, even assuming

that the 10.5 presumptive term is the "statutory maximum" for purposes of Blakely, the

sentencing judge's finding of aggravating factors was Blakely-compliant. Included among

the aggravating factors listed by the trial court were "[t]he defendant having an alcohol,

blood alcohol level of in excess of two times the legal limit, [and] the defendant being on

probation for an alcohol-related offense for which she was ordered to refrain from any

alcohol consumption" (Doc. #12, Exh K at 59).1

 Hume stipulated to that blood alcohol level

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Some of those conscious decisions being the decision, knowing her

problems and knowing the problems she has with alcohol, to take that first

drink, and the conscious decision knowing of consequences as a result of not

taking medication (Doc. #12, Exh K, R.T. 8/30/2002 at 59).

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as part of the plea agreement. In addition, a review of the sentencing transcript indicates that

both counsel and the trial court discussed, and Hume admitted (1) a 1991 arrest for DUI,

following a serious traffic accident which occurred while she was intoxicated, resulting in

her being in a coma for six months; (2) a 2000 arrest for DUI and aggravated assault for

striking a police officer; and (3) her on-probation status at the time of the 2002 offense, with

a court order that she not consume any alcohol during the period of her probation.

Blakely was therefore satisfied once Hume admitted a single aggravating factor. In

addition, exempt from the Blakely requirement is Apprendi's exception for prior convictions.

See United States v. Fagans, 406 F.3d 138, 141-42 (2nd Cir. 2005) (a trial judge's onprobation finding "seems logically to fall within [the prior conviction] exception"). Once a

true finding as to Hume's probation status was established, based upon her own admission,

the sentencing judge was authorized to find the remaining aggravating factors, State v.

Martinez, and acted within his discretion in imposing a sentence anywhere within the

statutory range agreed to by Hume.

In a second, somewhat related claim, Hume contends that her plea was not knowing,

intelligent and voluntary because the state argued her probationary status as an aggravating

factor justifying the imposition of an aggravated term, when the parties had agreed not to

allege this status as a sentence enhancement pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-604.02(B). We agree

with Respondents and the state court that Hume's misapprehension or mistaken assumptions

about the possible sentence cannot form the basis for overturning a guilty plea. See United

States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 630 (2002). In addition, Hume benefitted from the state

dismissing the allegation of probation pursuant to § 13-604.02(B); with that enhancement,

the trial court would have been required to sentence Hume to a term not less than the

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presumptive - 10.5 years, without the possibility of early release. Hume also does not

contend that absent the misunderstanding, she would not have entered the plea and would

have gone to trial on the original indicted charges, presumably with enhancements, facing

almost 25 years in prison. She therefore suffered no prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Theresa Hume's petition for writ of

habeas corpus be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE (Doc. #1).

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rules

72, 6(a), 6(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within

which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the Magistrate

Judge's Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and

Recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any factual

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 7th day of June, 2007.

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