Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-07-04222/USCOURTS-ca4-07-04222-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gary Alan Rinehults
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-4222

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

GARY ALAN RINEHULTS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, District

Judge. (3:06-cr-00078-HEH)

Argued: January 30, 2008 Decided: March 5, 2008

Before MICHAEL, TRAXLER, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ARGUED: Robert James Wagner, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,

Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Elizabeth Catherine Wu,

Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES

ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Michael S.

Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Alexandria, Virginia, Charles

D. Lewis, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL

PUBLIC DEFENDER, Richmond, Virginia, Sapna Mirchandani, Research

and Writing Attorney, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,

Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Chuck Rosenberg, United

States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:

The main question presented by this appeal is whether

waiver of the right to appeal any sentence within the statutory

maximum on the grounds set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3742 also waives

the right to appeal the determination under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 with

respect to when a new sentence begins to run for a defendant

serving an undischarged term of imprisonment. Gary Alan Rinehults,

who is serving a state sentence, contends that the district court

erred in imposing his federal sentence to run partially

concurrently under § 5G1.3(c) rather than wholly concurrently under

§ 5G1.3(b). We conclude that because 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(2)

provides the right to appeal a sentence “imposed as a result of an

incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines,” a waiver of

appeal rights under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 waives the right to appeal a

determination under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 as to when a sentence begins

to run in relation to an undischarged term.

I.

The parties stipulated to the following facts. In

October of 2004 Rinehults’s adopted minor daughter told

investigators from the Hanover County, Virginia, Sheriff’s Office

that Rinehults had regularly sexually abused her, beginning in

September of 2000 and continuing through October of 2004. The

daughter also reported that she had seen images of naked young

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people on a computer in their home. Based on this information, law

enforcement officers obtained a search warrant and executed it at

the Rinehults’s residence on October 29, 2004. They seized two

laptop computers, one desktop computer, thirty-nine computer

diskettes, one audiotape, and ten computer discs. Investigators

found on one of the computers a large number of still and moving

images depicting apparent child pornography. Many of the children

depicted were prepubescent.

On April 15, 2005, Rinehults pled guilty in the Circuit

Court of Hanover County to sodomy, rape, aggravated sexual battery,

animate object sexual penetration, and misdemeanor sexual battery

involving his adopted daughter. He was sentenced to approximately

sixteen years of prison time. At his state sentencing hearing,

Rinehults admitted that the images of child pornography that he had

viewed “came into [his] mind” at the time when he began to sexually

abuse his daughter.

On March 7, 2006, a federal grand jury charged Rinehults

with knowingly receiving an image of child pornography involving an

actual child in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(B) (count 1)

and with knowingly possessing an image of child pornography

depicting an actual child in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 2252A(a)(5)(B) (count 2). Pursuant to a written plea agreement,

Rinehults pled guilty to count 1, and the government agreed not to

prosecute count 2. The parties also agreed that pursuant to

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U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3, the court should impose a sentence of which 51 to

64 months should run concurrently with Rinehults’s prior

undischarged term of imprisonment for the sexual abuse of his

daughter. In exchange for the concessions made by the government,

Rinehults waived “the right to appeal the conviction and any

sentence within the statutory maximum described above (or the

manner in which that sentence was determined) on the grounds set

forth in Title 18, United States Code, Section 3742 or on any

ground whatsoever.” J.A. 36 (emphasis added). 

Rinehults’s presentence investigation report (PSR)

recommended a base offense level of seventeen pursuant to U.S.S.G.

§ 2G2.2(a) for his receipt of materials involving the sexual

exploitation of a minor. Rinehults’s base offense level was

increased fourteen levels for various specific offense

characteristics listed in § 2G2.2(b) that also relate to the sexual

exploitation of a minor. Rinehults received a three-level

reduction under § 3E1.1(a) and (b) for acceptance of

responsibility. His total offense level was 28. The PSR counted

Rinehults’s state conviction for sexual abuse in placing him in

criminal history category III. The offense level total of 28 and

the criminal history category III yielded a guideline range of 97

to 121 months’ imprisonment.

The PSR did not count the offenses underlying the prior

conviction as relevant conduct to the instant offense and therefore

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recommended that Rinehults’s sentence be imposed under U.S.S.G.

§ 5G1.3(c). Rinehults objected to this final recommendation,

arguing that his sentence should be imposed under § 5G1.3(b)(2).

U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 provides, in relevant part:

Imposition of a Sentence on a Defendant Subject to an

Undischarged Term of Imprisonment

. . .

(b) If . . . a term of imprisonment resulted from

another offense that is relevant conduct to the

instant offense of conviction under the provisions

of subsections (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3) of § 1B1.3

(Relevant Conduct) and that was the basis for an

increase in the offense level for the instant

offense under Chapter Two (Offense Conduct) or

Chapter Three (Adjustments), the sentence for the

instant offense shall be imposed as follows:

 

(1) the court shall adjust the sentence for any

period of imprisonment already served on the

undischarged term of imprisonment if the court

determines that such period of imprisonment

will not be credited to the federal sentence

by the Bureau of Prisons; and

(2) the sentence for the instant offense shall be

imposed to run concurrently to the remainder

of the undischarged term of imprisonment.

(c) (Policy Statement) In any other case involving an

undischarged term of imprisonment, the sentence for

the instant offense may be imposed to run

concurrently, partially concurrently, or

consecutively to the prior undischarged term of

imprisonment to achieve a reasonable punishment for

the instant offense.

At sentencing the district court overruled Rinehults’s objection to

the presentence report’s recommended application of § 5G1.3(c),

finding that the sexual abuse was not relevant conduct to the child

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pornography offense because the two offenses involved different

victims, different acts, and were not necessarily temporally

related.

The government advised the court that the plea

agreement’s sentencing recommendation of a partially concurrent,

partially consecutive sentence was designed to neutralize the fivelevel increase Rinehults received for the prior state conviction,

thereby avoiding punishing him for the same behavior twice. The

district court sentenced Rinehults according to the recommendations

in the plea agreement, ordering 61 months of a 121-month sentence

to be served concurrently with the prior state sentence and 60

months to be served consecutively. Rinehults appeals, arguing that

the sexual abuse was relevant conduct to the federal offense and

therefore his federal sentence should have been imposed to run

concurrently with his undischarged state sentence. See U.S.S.G.

§ 5G1.3(b). The government argues that this appeal is precluded by

the plea agreement and, in the alternative, that the sexual abuse

crimes were not relevant conduct to the child pornography offense.

Rinehults also contends that his sentence was illegal because, when

combined with the state sentence, it exceeds the statutory maximum

for the federal offense. The government argues that state

sentences do not count towards federal statutory maximums.

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II.

We must first determine whether in his plea agreement

Rinehults waived his right to appeal the manner in which his

sentence was imposed. Because we conclude that he did waive this

right, we do not reach the relevant conduct question.

A defendant may make an express and unqualified waiver of

the statutory right to appeal his sentence if the waiver is

knowingly and voluntarily given. United States v. Brown, 232 F.3d

399, 403 (4th Cir. 2000). Rinehults does not challenge the

validity of his appeal waiver; rather, he challenges its scope.

Appealing whether a sentence is imposed concurrently or

consecutively, Rinehults claims, is distinct from appealing the

determination of the sentence itself. 

As noted above, U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) provides for a

sentence to be imposed concurrently with an undischarged sentence

if the prior offense involves relevant conduct to the instant

conviction. Rinehults’s claim is that the sexual abuse was

relevant conduct to the federal offense, and as such, the district

court erred in sentencing him under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c) and

imposing a partially consecutive sentence rather than sentencing

him under § 5G1.3(b) and imposing a wholly concurrent sentence.

Yet Rinehults waived his right to appeal on the grounds listed in

18 U.S.C. § 3742. Section 3742(a)(2) provides for an appeal if the

sentence “was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of

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the sentencing guidelines.” Rinehults now wishes to appeal his

sentence on that very ground. We therefore conclude that the clear

terms of his plea agreement preclude his appeal. 

In urging us to make a distinction between waiving an

appeal of the length of a sentence and waiving an appeal of the

method or timing of its implementation, Rinehults cites a line of

cases from the Second Circuit that make such a distinction. See,

e.g., United States v. Stearns, 479 F.3d 175, 178 (2d Cir. 2007);

United States v. Williams, 260 F.3d 160, 164-65 (2d Cir. 2001);

United States v. Brown, 232 F.3d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 2000); United

States v. Velasquez, 136 F.3d 921, 923 n.1 (2d Cir. 1998) (per

curium). The discussions of the plea agreements in these cases,

however, do not reveal that those agreements included a waiver of

the specific appeal right listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(2). More

to the point, those cases do not discuss the effect of a waiver

under § 3742(a)(2) of the right to appeal a sentence “imposed as a

result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines.”

As a result, the Second Circuit cases are not sufficiently specific

to assist Rinehults in his argument that he can appeal here on the

ground that the district court incorrectly applied U.S.S.G.

§ 5G1.3. Again, that ground for appeal is plainly waived in the

plea agreement. 

Rinehults also argues that his plea agreement does not

bar this appeal because the district court imposed half of the 121-

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month sentence for the receipt of child pornography to run

consecutively to the undischarged 16-year sentence for the state

sexual abuse conviction; therefore, his “punishment for the related

conduct exceeds the 20-year statutory maximum authorized under law”

in 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(B). Appellant’s Br. at 9. We find no

support, and Rinehults cites none, for the proposition that a prior

undischarged state sentence (in this case, for sexual abuse) counts

against a federal statutory maximum for a separate crime (in this

case, receipt of child pornography). We conclude that this

proposition is meritless. Rinehults was sentenced within the

statutory maximum, and his plea agreement bars an appeal of any

sentence within that maximum.

Because Rinehults waived the right to appeal the

application of the sentencing guidelines and a sentence imposed

within the statutory maximum, his appeal is

DISMISSED.

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