Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-03759/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-03759-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Daniel A. Aitkens
Petitioner
Kevin R. Chappell
Respondent
Ron Davis
Respondent

Document Text:

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANIEL A. AITKENS,

Petitioner,

v.

RON DAVIS, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No. 14-cv-03759-HSG (PR) 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; 

DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY

Before the Court is the above-titled petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2254 by petitioner Daniel A. Aitkens, challenging the validity of his state court 

sentence. Respondent has filed an answer to the petition.1Petitioner has filed a traverse. For the 

reasons set forth below, the petition is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

By information filed April 30, 2002, the Napa County District Attorney charged petitioner 

with aggravated assault, Cal. Penal Code § 245(a)(1). The information further alleged, as 

sentencing enhancements, one prior strike, id. at § 667(b)-(i), and one prior serious felony 

conviction, id. at § 667(a)(1). The information also alleged that, during the course of the assault, 

petitioner personally inflicted great bodily injury, another sentencing enhancement. See

Respondentʼs Exhibit C at 31-33 (Clerkʼs Transcript, hereinafter referred to as “CT”). The offense 

occurred while petitioner was in custody in the Napa County Department of Corrections, awaiting 

 

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Petitioner initially named Kevin R. Chappell, former warden of San Quentin State Prison—

where petitioner is incarcerated—as the respondent in this action. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Ron Davis, the current warden of San Quentin State Prison, is 

hereby SUBSTITUTED as respondent in place of petitioner’s prior custodian.

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sentencing on a separate Napa County conviction for attempted murder.

On January 17, 2003, pursuant to a negotiated disposition, petitioner pleaded no contest as 

charged and admitted all enhancements and prior conviction allegations. CT at 87-89. 

On February 25, 2003, the trial court sentenced petitioner to eight years in state prison. CT 

at 100-01, 116-17. In the instant petition, petitioner claims the sentence was to run consecutive to 

a separate sentence for an arson conviction in Placer County. Respondent contends the sentence 

was to run consecutive to both the Placer County arson conviction and the Napa County 

conviction for attempted murder.

On August 8, 2003, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment following 

review pursuant to People v. Wende, 25 Cal. 3d 436 (1979). CT at 139-42.

On April 8, 2011, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation reported 

that the Placer County Superior Court had dismissed the Placer County arson conviction and asked 

the trial court to consider issuing a modified abstract of judgment. CT at 156. 

Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in the trial court to withdraw his plea. On September 

23, 2011, the trial court denied petitionerʼs motion and ordered the clerk to issue a modified 

abstract of judgment. CT at 167-69. 

Petitioner appealed. On August 21, 2012, the California Court of Appeal dismissed the 

appeal for petitionerʼs failure to obtain a certificate of probable cause as required under California 

Penal Code section 1237.5. See Respondentʼs Exhibit A.

On December 12, 2012, the California Supreme Court denied the petition for review. See

Respondentʼs Exhibit B.

On January 21, 2014, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Napa 

County Superior Court. Pet. at 4. On March 21, 2014, the Napa County Superior Court denied 

the petition. Id.

On April 15, 2014, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California 

Court of Appeal. See Respondentʼs Exhibit D. On April 17, 2014, the California Court of Appeal 

denied the petition. Id.

On May 1, 2014, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California 

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Supreme Court. See Respondentʼs Exhibit E. On July 9, 2014, the California Supreme Court 

denied the petition. Id. 

On August 19, 2014, petitioner filed the instant federal petition. On November 10, 2014, 

the Court issued an order to show cause. 

The California Court of Appeal in its August 21, 2012 decision dismissing the second 

appeal summarized the background relevant to the instant proceedings as follows:

On December 19, 2000, appellant was charged in Napa County Superior Court case 

number CR102906 with attempted premeditated murder, arising out of his attack 

on another man in October 2000. We will refer to this case as the Napa attempted 

murder. On February 22, 2001, appellant was convicted of the Napa attempted 

murder charge, together with three enhancements.

On March 3, 2001, while in custody awaiting sentencing in the Napa attempted 

murder case, appellant assaulted another inmate, breaking several bones in the 

victim’s face and causing permanent injuries. As a result, on May 25, 2001, the 

Napa County District Attorney filed a criminal complaint, followed by an 

information, in Napa County Superior Court case number CR105153. This is the 

case from which this appeal ultimately arises. We will refer to this case as the 

Napa assault. The information filed in the Napa assault case charged appellant with 

assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen.Code, § 245, 

subd. (a)(1)), with a special allegation of personal infliction of great bodily injury 

resulting in a serious felony (§§ 12022.7, subd. (a); 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)). The 

information also included special allegations that appellant had suffered a prior 

conviction of a serious or violent felony (§ 667, subds.(b)-(i)), and a serious felony 

(§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), both of which were predicated on the Napa attempted murder 

conviction.

While the charges were pending in the Napa assault, appellant was convicted of the 

Napa attempted murder, and on March 28, 2001, he was sentenced to an 

indeterminate term of life in prison with the possibility of parole, consecutive after 

a determinate term of 6 years for the enhancements. On June 20, 2002, we 

affirmed appellant’s conviction and sentence in the Napa attempted murder. 

(People v. Aitkens (June 20, 2002, A094838) [nonpub. opn.].)

While appellant was awaiting trial in the Napa assault, he was also awaiting trial in 

Placer County for arson causing great bodily injury (§ 451, subd. (a)), with an 

enhancement for use of an accelerant or delayed ignition device (§ 451.1, subd. 

(a)(5)). We will refer to this case as the Placer arson. In the Placer arson, appellant 

pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to 13 years in prison.

Appellant was represented in the trial court in the Napa assault by Michael H. 

Keeley, an employee of the Law Offices of Mervin C. Lernhart, Jr. On January 17, 

2003, appellant appeared in court with Keeley and entered a plea of no contest in 

the Napa assault. On a written plea form, appellant indicated that he was pleading 

no contest to the special allegations as well as to the assault. The plea was 

described on the form as an “open plea w[ith the] understanding that this matter 

will run consecutive to Placer Co[unty case number] 62–018203,” i.e., the Placer 

arson. Under the terms of the plea, appellant retained his right to argue motions to 

strike his prior conviction and one of the enhancements under People v. Superior 

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Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497. The plea agreement did not mention 

whether the sentence would be consecutive or concurrent with the sentence for the 

Napa attempted murder. The plea form indicated that the maximum potential 

prison term resulting from the plea would be four years in state prison, doubled on 

account of the prior strike conviction, plus three years in state prison based on the 

great bodily injury enhancement, plus five years in state prison based on the prior 

serious felony allegation.

As contemplated in the plea agreement, appellant later filed a motion to strike the 

prior serious felony conviction. In the same motion, he also requested the court to 

“impose one-third the term on the enhancements,” including the enhancement 

alleged under section 667, subdivision (a)(1). On February 25, 2003, the court 

denied the motion to strike.

The court then heard argument on sentencing. The prosecutor stated that it was the 

People’s position that the court should impose “an additional eight-year total to 

[appellant’s] ongoing determinate sentencing time,” including both the determinate 

sentence in the Placer arson “and the six years on the enhancements in our original 

case here,” i.e., the Napa attempted murder. The prosecutor later repeated that 

appellant should receive “eight years consecutive to the ... determinate time he has 

to do in Placer County and the determinate time he has to do out of Napa County’s 

sentence.” Appellant's counsel, Keeley, concurred that “the agreement was that 

this case would be run consecutive to the other matters,” using the plural. The only 

disagreement Keeley expressed with the prosecutor’s proposal was to argue, 

consistent with his written motion, that the consecutive term on the enhancement

for the prior serious felony under section 667, subdivision (a)(1), should be onethird the five-year term (that is, one year eight months), rather than the entire five 

years, thus yielding a total of four years eight months rather than eight years.

“After hearing the arguments of counsel, the trial judge agreed with the prosecutor 

that the five-year enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a)(1) had to be 

served in full, and accordingly ordered that appellant receive “an aggregate term of 

eight years.” The prosecutor asked the judge to “clarify, this eight years is 

consecutive to our prison term?” and the judge responded, “Placer and here, it is.[”]

Consistent with the transcript, the trial court’s minute order and the abstract of 

judgment indicate that the court sentenced appellant to a term of eight years in state 

prison, consisting of the total of: (1) a base term of one-third the middle term (i.e., 

one year) for the assault, doubled to two years on account of the prior strike 

conviction; (2) one-third the middle term (i.e., one year) for the great bodily injury 

enhancement, to be served consecutively to the base term; and (3) five years for the 

prior serious felony allegation. The minute order provided that the enhancement 

terms were to be served consecutive to the base term, adding “and consecutive to 

CR102926” (i.e., the Napa attempted murder), and to the Placer County arson. In 

the abstract of judgment, however, in the space for listing incompleted sentences to 

which the sentence on the Napa assault was to be served consecutively, only the 

Placer County arson was listed.

On June 30, 2003, the Third District Court of Appeal reversed appellant’s 

conviction for the Placer County arson, holding that one of the provisions of 

appellant’s plea agreement was invalid. The case was remanded to the Placer 

County Superior Court to permit appellant to withdraw his plea if he chose to do 

so. (People v. Aitkens (June 30, 2003, C040589) [nonpub. opn.].)

On August 8, 2003, this court filed its opinion on appellant’s direct appeal from the 

Napa assault. (People v. Aitkens (Aug. 8, 2003, A101969) [nonpub. opn.] (Aitkens 

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I ).) In Aitkens I, the attorney appointed to represent appellant on appeal filed a 

brief raising no issues and asking this court to review the record pursuant to People 

v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. In our opinion, we held that the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s motion for new counsel at the plea 

hearing, despite appellant’s contention that Keeley had misinformed him in failing 

to advise him that the prosecutor intended to add a five-year enhancement for a 

prior serious felony conviction to the information, even if appellant waived his 

right to a preliminary hearing. (Aitkens I, supra, at pp. 2–3.)

On the issue of sentencing, we noted in Aitkens I that “[a]ppellant entered his plea 

with the understanding that the sentence in this matter would be a consecutive 

subordinate term to the term appellant already was serving” (Aitkens I,supra, at p. 

2, fn. omitted] ), adding in a footnote: “Appellant already was serving both a 

determinate and an indeterminate sentence.” (Id. at p. 2, fn. 2.) We characterized 

the sentence imposed by the trial court in that case as an “aggregate term ... 

total[ing] eight years in state prison to be served consecutively to the determinate 

portion of the sentence appellant was already serving.” (Id. at p. 2.) We also noted 

that “[t]he [trial] court did not directly state how the eight-year term that it would 

impose was to be constructed,” but opined that it was “clear from the transcript” 

that the sentence was as described in our opinion. (Id. at p. 3.)

On February 14, 2005, following the reversal and remand in the Placer arson, the 

trial court dismissed that case. On April 27, 2005, the attorney who represented 

appellant on appeal in the Napa assault sent a memorandum to the Napa County 

Superior Court informing it that the Placer County arson conviction had been 

“overturned on appeal and dismissed.” The memorandum indicated that appellant 

needed to be resentenced as a result, because appellant’s plea in the Napa assault 

was “pursuant to an understanding that sentence would run consecutive” to the 

sentences imposed on the Placer County arson and the Napa County attempted 

murder.

Apparently in response to this memorandum, the Napa County Superior Court held 

a hearing on May 18, 2005. Appellant was not present, but counsel appeared on his 

behalf, including both attorney Greg Galeste, who had represented appellant in the 

Napa attempted murder, and attorney Mervin C. Lernhart, Jr., the employer and 

supervisor of appellant’s trial attorney in the Napa assault. The prosecutor and 

Galeste agreed that no change was necessary in appellant’s sentence in the Napa 

attempted murder, and the matter was dropped from the calendar. With respect to 

the Napa assault, Lernhart reported that appellate counsel was concerned that 

appellant could lose the benefit of his plea bargain, under which he received a 

subordinate term consecutive to the Placer arson, due to the reversal of the latter. 

Both the prosecutor and Lernhart agreed, however, that despite the reversal, 

appellant’s sentence in the Napa assault would still run consecutively to his 

sentence in the Napa attempted murder, and the result would be the same. The 

court expressed the view that appellant might wish to do something with this case 

now that [the] Placer [arson] no longer exists as a term of imprisonment,” but 

indicated that it would be “up to [appellant] to initiate those proceedings.” 

Accordingly, the court reappointed Lernhart and suggested that he consult with 

appellant and determine whether to put the matter on the court’s calendar for 

further proceedings, with appellant present. Lernhart agreed to do so. The 

prosecutor reiterated that the sentence for the Napa assault should be served 

consecutive to the Napa attempted murder, but the court indicated that it would 

“leave it up to [appellant]” and that it was “up to him whether he thinks something 

needs to be done now.”

Our record does not reveal whether Lernhart or appellant took any action in the 

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wake of the May 18, 2005 hearing. Almost six years later, however, on April 8, 

2011, an employee of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 

sent a letter to the trial judge in the Napa assault case indicating that the abstract of 

judgment and/or minute order in the case might be incomplete or in error. The 

letter acknowledged that appellant had been given a base term of one-third the 

middle term (doubled) for the Napa assault, and one-third the term for one of the 

enhancements, because appellant’s sentence was consecutive to the sentences in the 

Placer arson and the Napa attempted murder. In the wake of the dismissal of the 

Placer arson, the letter opined that under California Rules of Court, rule 4.451, the 

court should impose the full terms for the Napa assault and for its enhancement, to 

be served consecutive to the indeterminate term imposed in the Napa attempted 

murder.

The trial court held a hearing on the resentencing issue in the Napa assault on 

September 23, 2011 (the resentencing hearing). At the resentencing hearing, 

appellant was again represented by Lernhart. Lernhart reported to the court that he 

had examined the files in the Napa assault and the Napa attempted murder, and 

expressed the opinion that “when the Placer [arson] case went away, that did not 

undo the order that the [Napa assault] case run consecutive with the other Napa 

case” (that is, the Napa attempted murder). Lernhart concluded that he did not see 

any basis for a modification of appellant’s sentence, but informed the court that 

appellant wished to withdraw his plea, which appellant confirmed.

Appellant raised three reasons for seeking to withdraw his plea: (1) the plea waiver 

form appellant signed did not state that his sentence in the Napa assault would be 

consecutive to the Napa attempted murder, but only to the Placer arson; (2) the 

form did not have a check in the box notifying appellant that he would not be 

eligible for probation based on the plea (although the form did indicate appellant’s 

admission of strike enhancements which had that effect); and (3) appellant 

contended Keeley told him his violent felony prior under section 667, subdivision 

(a)(1) would result in an additional term of one-third of five years, when in fact it 

resulted in an additional term of the full five years. Appellant contended that as a 

result of these errors, he did not enter a knowing and intelligent plea, and was 

deprived of the benefit of his plea bargain. Appellant also contended that at the 

time of sentencing, “he didn't really understand what was going on,” and that was 

why he failed to object at the time.

After placing these issues before the court, Lernhart explained to the court that he 

himself was actually the attorney appointed to represent appellant in the Napa 

assault case. Lernhart had assigned the case to Keeley, his associate, and worked 

with him on it. Thus, Lernhart believed he “would have a conflict of interest that 

would amount to an impairment of [appellant’s] right to have an objective review 

of ... whether or not he should be able to withdraw his plea.” Accordingly, he 

asked that if the court were “inclined to proceed along those lines,” he be relieved 

of the representation. Appellant agreed with him, adding that he believed he 

“should probably be appointed different counsel, somebody that could be more 

objective,” because he felt he had been improperly represented due to the 

difference between the eight-year sentence he received for the Napa assault, and the 

sentence of four years eight months that he had expected.

The trial judge denied the motion to withdraw the plea, opining that he no longer 

had jurisdiction to entertain such a motion, given the passage of time. He added 

that even if he did have jurisdiction, he did not see any basis to grant the motion on 

any of the grounds that had been stated, nor did he see any basis to appoint counsel 

to investigate further.

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On the issue of modifying the sentence, the trial judge concluded that “to effectuate 

the plea agreement,” which involved a base term of one-third the middle term, the 

sentence in the Napa assault would “still have to be consecutive to something.” 

Lernhart agreed, and pointed out that the minute order in the Napa assault expressly 

provided that the sentence on the enhancements would be consecutive to the Napa 

attempted murder. Accordingly, the trial court ordered the abstract of judgment 

modified to delete the reference to the Placer arson, and in its place, to indicate that 

the sentence in the Napa attempted murder would be the one to which the sentence 

in the Napa assault was to be served consecutively. The court did not change the 

base or enhancement terms originally imposed for the Napa assault. Lernhart 

stated he did not object to this ruling.

People v. Aitkens, No. A133513, 2012 WL 3578652, at *1-5 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2012) 

(footnotes omitted).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

A petition for a writ of habeas corpus is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPAˮ). This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

“in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that 

he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.ˮ 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(a).

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the 

basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state courts adjudication 

of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 

States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.ˮ 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). Additionally, habeas relief is warranted only if the 

constitutional error at issue “had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the 

jury’s verdict.” Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 795 (2001) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 

U.S. 619, 637 (1993)). 

A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court precedent if it 

“applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court’s] cases,” or if it 

“confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] 

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Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its] precedent.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 

405-06. “Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if 

the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s 

decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. 

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its 

independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law 

erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. 

Section 2254(d)(1) restricts the source of clearly established law to the Supreme Court’s 

jurisprudence. “[C]learly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 

United States” refers to “the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court’s decisions 

as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. “A federal court 

may not overrule a state court for simply holding a view different from its own, when the 

precedent from [the Supreme Court] is, at best, ambiguous.” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17 

(2003).

B. Petitioner’s Claims

Petitioner asserts the following grounds for relief: (1) at the resentencing hearing in the 

Napa assault case, the trial court imposed a sentence that violated the terms of his plea agreement; 

and (2) appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise the above claim on 

appeal.

1. Plea Agreement

Petitioner claims that “the state re-sentenced petitioner in a manner contrary to the literal 

and explicit terms of his plea contract/agreement.” Pet. at 6(i). Petitioner specifically contends:

On or about 23 September, 2011, the Napa County Superior Court re-sentenced 

Aitkens on the Napa assault. The re-sentencing Court, however, then substituted 

into the place of the overturned and dismissed Placer arson case—over the 

objections and efforts of Aitkens to withdraw his plea—Aitkensʼ Napa County 

attempted murder case (Case No. CR-102906). The re-sentencing Court ordered 

the original Abstract of Judgment modified to delete the reference to the Placer 

arson case, and in its place, substitute the Napa attempted murder case to which the 

sentence on the Napa assault would run consecutively. 

But-for the promises, inducements or considerations by the prosecuting attorney 

and endorsed by the court—that the Napa assault sentence would run consecutively 

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to only the Placer arson—Aitkens would never have entered into nor agreed to any 

plea agreement on the Napa assault case; never have waived his constitutional 

rights associated with trial. 

Of course, the promises, inducements or considerations offered by the prosecutor, 

as endorsed by the sentencing court, could not, on re-sentencing, be fulfilled 

because the Placer arson case had been overturned and dismissed; the plea contract 

agreement was no longer valid, it was void. The re-sentencing court could not 

comply with the literal terms of the plea contract/agreement but, instead, resentenced Aitkens contrary to the explicit terms, thus rendering Aitkensʼ plea 

involuntary.

Pet. at 6(ii)-6(iii). 

a. State Court Opinion

The Napa County Superior Court, in its March 21, 2014 opinion on state habeas, was the 

highest court to have reviewed this claim. It is the Napa County Superior Courtʼs opinion that this 

Court reviews herein. See Ylst v. Nunnemakker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991); Barker v. Fleming, 

423 F.3d 1085, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2005). The court resolved the claim as follows:

Contrary to petitionerʼs core argument, the plea agreement does not “literal[ly] and 

explicit[ly]...require[] that the sentence on the Napa assault run consecutively only 

to the Placer arson case” and no other. (Petition, p. 3(i) of 6.) In fact, the plea was 

described on the plea form as an open plea with the understanding that the sentence 

will run consecutive to Placer County case number 62-018203 (the Placer arson 

case). The plea agreement does not include the word “only,” and it does not 

mention whether the sentence would be consecutive or concurrent with the 

sentence for the Napa attempted murder. In sum, there is nothing in the plea 

agreement itself, or in the supporting documents that petitioner has filed, or in any 

authority that petitioner has cited, that would preclude a court from modifying 

petitionerʼs original sentence after the Placer arson case was dismissed. Nor has 

petitioner cited any authority that his original sentence became “void” upon the 

dismissal of the Placer case. Further, to the extent the petition would require the 

court to re-determine sentencing-related facts, relief is not available. (In re Harris

(1993) 5 Cal. 4th 813, 839-841.)

Finally, the arguments petitioner makes in this petition were raised and rejected on 

petitionerʼs direct appeal in the court of appealʼs opinion filed in August 2012. 

(See petitionerʼs exhibit E [opinion of the First District Court of Appeal, A133513, 

filed August 21, 2012, at pp. 11-12].) The court of appealʼs opinion states, in part, 

as follows: 

Nothing on the plea form indicates appellant was promised anything 

in this regard one way or the other. It is clear from the transcript 

and minute order of the original sentence, however, that both 

appellantʼs trial counsel and the trial court understood that the Napa 

assault sentence would run consecutively to both of the other cases. 

Any claim appellant may have that this provision of his original

sentence did not comply with the plea agreement could and should 

have been raised in his direct appeal.

Further at page 11, the court of appeal stated, “We explain our reasoning here in 

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order to forestall any future effort to raise the same claims, which have already 

been fully briefed in this court. . . .”

Respondent’s Exhibit E, Dkt. No. 7-7, at 46-47.

b. Legal Standard

“[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, 

so that it can be said to be a part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be 

fulfilled.” Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971). Plea agreements are contractual in 

nature and subject to contract law standards of interpretation. In re Ellis, 356 F.3d 1198, 1209

(9th Cir. 2004). The construction of a state court plea agreement is governed by state contract law, 

and the federal court should not disturb a reasonable state court interpretation. Ricketts v. 

Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 6 n.3 (1987); Buckley v. Terhune, 441 F.3d 688, 695 (9th Cir. 2006) (en 

banc) (quoting Ricketts at 6 n.3) (“the construction and interpretation of state court plea 

agreements ‘and the concomitant obligations flowing therefrom are, within broad bounds of 

reasonableness, matters of state law’”). If, however, a state court fails to apply state contract law, 

its decision is “contrary to” Ricketts for purposes of § 2254(d)(1). Buckley, 441 F.3d at 696-97.

Under California law, in determining whether a plea agreement has been broken, courts 

must first “look to the plain meaning of the agreementʼs language.” Buckley, 441 F.3d at 695 

(citing Cal. Civil Code §§ 1638, 1644). Second, if that language is ambiguous, “it must be 

interpreted in the sense in which the promisor believed, at the time of making it, that the promisee 

understood it.” Id. (citing Cal. Civil Code § 1649). “Although the intent of the parties determines 

the meaning of the contract, the relevant intent is objective—that is, the objective intent as 

evidenced by the words of the instrument, not a partyʼs subjective intent.” Id. (quoting Badie v. 

Bank of America, 67 Cal. App. 4th 779, 802 n.9 (1998)). “This inquiry considers the disputed or 

ambiguous language in the context of the contract as a whole and of the relevant surrounding 

circumstances.” Id. at 698 (citing Nissel v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, 62 Cal.

App. 4th 1103, 1111-12 (1998)). If ambiguity still remains, the contract is construed against the 

party who caused the uncertainty to exist. Id. at 695-96 (citing Cal. Civil Code § 1654).

c. Analysis

The state superior court examined the trial record and rejected petitionerʼs claim. Further, 

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although the claim was not directly raised in the state appellate court, the appellate court 

nonetheless considered the issue sua sponte and made factual findings rejecting petitionerʼs 

assertions that the plea agreement was breached. Specifically, the state appellate court found: “It 

is clear from the transcript and minute order of the original sentence . . . that both appellant’s trial 

counsel and the trial court understood that the Napa assault sentence would run consecutively to 

both of the other cases.” People v. Aitkens, 2012 WL 3578652 at *6.2 

Based on a review of the record, it cannot be said that the state courts’ rejection of 

petitionerʼs claim was contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent or 

was objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented. As noted by the state superior 

court, the plea form never used the word “only” with respect to the Placer arson conviction. See

CT at 87-89. The form was silent as to how the determinate term on the Napa attempted murder 

conviction fit into the sentence. The state court could have reasonably found on that basis alone 

that there was no agreement on that point between the prosecutor and the defense.

3

 Alternatively, 

the state court could have reasonably found that the language of the plea form was ambiguous

given that the underlying sentence had to be either consecutive to or concurrent with the Napa 

attempted murder sentence. Assuming the state court found ambiguity4, it was proper for the state 

court to consider the original sentencing transcripts as the “relevant surrounding circumstances” to 

resolve such ambiguity. Buckley, 441 F.3d at 698. At the February 25, 2003 sentencing, the 

prosecutor stated his position that the court should impose “an additional eight-year total to 

[petitioner’s] ongoing determinate sentencing time,” clarifying that the sentence would include 

“13 years from Placer County and the six years on the enhancements in our original case here,

which he now has 19 years, adding another eight years would be a total of 27 years.” 

 

2

The sole issue before the state appellate court in petitioner’s second appeal was whether the 

resentencing court violated petitioner’s right to effective assistance of counsel by failing to appoint 

substitute counsel to represent petitioner in connection with his motion to withdraw his plea. See 

People v. Aitkens, 2012 WL 3578652 at *5. The court nonetheless addressed petitioner’s 

argument that the plea was involuntary “in order to forestall any future efforts to raise the same 

claims.” Id. at *6.

3

This appears to be the approach taken by the Napa County Superior Court on state habeas.

4

This appears to be the approach taken by the state appellate court on petitioner’s second appeal.

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Respondent’s Exhibit J at 1157 (Reporter’s Transcript, hereinafter referred to as “RT”) (emphasis 

added). The prosecutor later summed up that the court should impose “a total of eight years 

consecutive to the concurrent—sorry, the determinate time he has to do in Placer County and the 

determinate time he has to do out of Napa County’s sentence.” RT at 1161 (emphasis added).

Counsel for petitioner concurred, stating “[M]y client . . . understands that he’ll be responsible for 

restitution and the agreement was that this case would be run consecutive to the other matters,” 

using the plural. RT at 1162 (emphasis added). After the court imposed the eight-year term, the 

prosecutor asked the judge, “[M]aybe we just ought to clarify, this eight years is consecutive to 

our prison term?” RT at 1164. The judge responded, “Placer and here, it is.” Id. (emphasis 

added). These colloquies make clear that the “the promisor,” here the prosecutor, believed at the 

time of making the plea agreement that “the promisee,” here petitioner, understood his sentence 

would run consecutive to the sentences on both the Napa attempted murder and the Placer arson. 

See Buckley, 441 F.3d at 695. In sum, extrinsic evidence cured any ambiguity in the plea form, 

supporting the state courts’ rejection of this claim.

Further, even assuming the state courts erred, petitioner cannot show the error had 

“substantial and injurious effect” on his sentence as required by Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. See

Buckley, 441 F.3d at 697 (applying the Brecht harmless error rule to the law of contractual plea 

agreements). Specifically, even if the state courts had ruled in petitioner’s favor and he had been 

permitted to withdraw his plea, the end result would have been a trial on the original Napa assault 

charges or the negotiation of a new plea agreement. Due to the prior strike and prior serious 

felony conviction, both of which were predicated on the Napa attempted murder (see CT at 32), as 

well as the ample evidence for the charges against petitioner (see CT at 103), it is unlikely that a 

new trial or new plea deal would have resulted in a sentence shorter than the one he received. 

Indeed, petitioner acknowledged on his plea form that he faced a maximum possible term of 

sixteen years on the Napa assault. See Pet. Exhibit A. Finally, the new sentence would have to 

run consecutive to something. Thus, even if petitioner had succeeded in withdrawing his plea, 

whatever new sentence he ended up with would run consecutive to the Napa attempted murder, 

which is precisely the status of his current sentence.

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Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner claims appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise “the most obvious 

and substantial issue—the constitutionally violative re-sentencing of Aitkens.” Pet. at 6(iv). 

a. State Court Opinion

Here, the California Supreme Court, on state habeas, summarily denied the claim. Where, 

as here, the state court decision is unaccompanied by a rationale for its conclusions, a federal court 

must conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the state court decision is 

objectively reasonable. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). This 

“[i]ndependent review . . . is not de novo review of the constitutional issue, but rather, the only 

method by which [a federal court] can determine whether a silent state court decision is 

objectively unreasonable.” See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). “Where a 

state courtʼs decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitionerʼs burden still 

must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” See 

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011). 

b. Legal Standard

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is cognizable as a claim of denial of the Sixth 

Amendment right to counsel, which guarantees not only assistance, but “effective” assistance of 

counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). In order to prevail on a Sixth 

Amendment claim based on ineffectiveness of counsel, a petitioner first must establish such 

counselʼs performance was deficient, i.e., that it fell below an “objective standard of 

reasonableness” under prevailing professional norms. Id. at 687-88. Second, the petitioner must 

establish prejudice resulting from his counselʼs deficient performance, i.e., that “there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counselʼs unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different.” Id. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 

undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.

A federal habeas court considering an ineffective assistance claim need not address the 

prejudice prong of the Strickland test “if the petitioner cannot even establish incompetence under 

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the first prong.” Siripongs v. Calderon, 133 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1998). Conversely, the court 

“need not determine whether counselʼs performance was deficient before examining the prejudice 

suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant 

effective assistance of counsel on his first appeal. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 391-405 (1985). 

Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are reviewed according to the standard set in 

Strickland. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668; Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir. 

1989). A petitioner thus must show his counselʼs advice fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counselʼs unprofessional 

errors, he would have prevailed on appeal. Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434 & n.9.

Appellate counsel does not have a constitutional duty to raise every nonfrivolous issue 

requested by a criminal defendant. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-54 (1983). “[T]he 

weeding out of weaker issues is widely recognized as one of the hallmarks of effective appellate 

advocacy.” Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434. Consequently, where appellate counsel “decline[s] to raise a 

weak issue,” he or she will “frequently remain above an objective standard of competence” and, 

for the same reason, will have caused his client no prejudice. Id.

A “doubly” deferential judicial review applies in analyzing ineffective assistance of 

counsel claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1410-11 

(2011). The rule of Strickland, i.e., that a defense counselʼs effectiveness is reviewed with great 

deference, coupled with AEDPAʼs deferential standard, results in double deference. See Cheney 

v. Washington, 614 F.3d 987, 995 (9th Cir. 2010). Put another way, when § 2254(d) applies, “the 

question is not whether counselʼs actions were reasonable[;] [t]he question is whether there is any 

reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Stricklandʼs deferential standard.” See Richter, 562 

U.S. at 105. Moreover, because Stricklandʼs standard for assessing defense counselʼs 

effectiveness is a “general” one, state courts have “greater leeway in reasonably applying [that] 

rule,” which in turn “translates to a narrower range of decisions that are objectively unreasonable 

under AEDPA.” See Cheney, 614 F.3d at 995 (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 

(2004). 

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c. Analysis

Here, petitioner contends that his appellate counsel failed to raise a claim that his plea was 

violated through resentencing. For the reasons discussed above in connection with petitioner’s 

first claim, the argument would not have succeeded on appeal. Indeed, as also discussed above, 

the state appellate court considered the claim tangentially and specifically rejected it. See People 

v. Aitkens, 2012 WL 3578652 at *6. Appellate counsel therefore cannot be faulted for declining to 

raise the claim. See Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 840 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[A]ppellate 

counsel’s failure to raise issues on direct appeal does not constitute ineffective assistance when 

appeal would not have provided grounds for reversal.”) 

Further, even if petitioner has shown error, no prejudice has been shown. Even if appellate 

counsel had argued that petitioner’s resentencing violated his plea agreement, and assuming this 

argument prevailed, the end result would have been the same or worse for petitioner for the 

reasons discussed above in connection with petitioner’s first claim. Indeed, petitioner concedes 

that counsel communicated to petitioner that she would not raise the issue of a plea violation 

“because to prevail on the issue might well subject [petitioner] to greater punishment upon a retrial 

of the original assault charge.” Traverse, Ex. A at 5. This does not demonstrate incompetence, 

but is instead a sound tactical choice.

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

C. Certificate of Appealability

The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners require a district court 

that issues an order denying a habeas petition to either grant or deny therein a certificate of 

appealability. See Rules Governing § 2254 Case, Rule 11(a).

A judge shall grant a certificate of appealability “only if the applicant has made a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), and the 

certificate must indicate which issues satisfy this standard. Id. § 2253(c)(3). “Where a district 

court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) 

is straightforward: [t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district 

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court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 

473, 484 (2000).

Here, petitioner has not made such a showing, and, accordingly, a certificate of 

appealability will be denied.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED, and a 

certificate of appealability is DENIED.

The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of respondent and close the file.

Additionally, the Clerk is directed to substitute Warden Ron Davis on the docket as the 

respondent in this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

10/7/2015

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