Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_06-cv-01959/USCOURTS-alnd-2_06-cv-01959-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Todd Burkes
Plaintiff
Hubbell Steel Corporation
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

TODD BURKES,

Plaintiff,

v.

HUBBELL STEEL

CORPORATION,

Defendant.

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Case No.: 2:06-CV-1959-VEH

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS

I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

This is an action where the plaintiff, Todd Burkes (“Burkes”), has brought

federal claims under 42 U.S. C. § 1981, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act

(the “ADEA”), and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (“Title

VII”) against defendant, Hubbell Steel Corporation (“Hubbell Steel”). Before the

court is the Motion to Dismiss First Amendment to Complaint or, in the Alternative,

Motion for More Definite Statement (“Motion”) filed by the Hubbell Steel. (Doc.

13). The time to respond to the Motion has expired without any opposition or other

response by Burkes.

FILED

 2007 Jan-18 AM 11:35

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:06-cv-01959-VEH Document 17 Filed 01/18/07 Page 1 of 15
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For the reasons stated hereinafter, the Motion is due to be GRANTED in part

and DENIED in part. Burkes’s Title VII and ADEA failure to promote and unequal

pay claims and his Title VII claims that he was required to work “on the line” with

other laborers under his supervision, even though Caucasian supervisors were not

required to work on the line, his claims that Hubbell Steel engaged in a pattern and

practice of race discrimination and harassment that created a hostile work

environment for African-American employees, and his claims that he was retaliated

against for complaining about this racially hostile environment are due to be

DISMISSED as barred for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. In all other

respects, the Motion to Dismiss will be DENIED. Hubbell Steel’s Motion for a More

Definite Statement will be GRANTED.

II. APPLICABLE STANDARDS

Defendants have challenged the sufficiency of the complaint under F. R. Civ.

P. 12(b)(6) and 12(e).

A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

(b) How Presented. ...[T]he following defenses may at the option of the

pleader be made by motion: ...(6) failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted .... If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered

(6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and

not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for

summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all

Case 2:06-cv-01959-VEH Document 17 Filed 01/18/07 Page 2 of 15
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parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material

made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.

FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).

A court may dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) only if it appears beyond

a doubt that the Plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims that would

entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). In deciding a Rule

12(b)(6) motion, the court “must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations in the

complaint as true and construe the facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving

party.” Dacosta v. Nwachukwa, 304 F.3d 1045, 1047 (11th Cir. 2002)(citing GJR

Invs., Inc. v. County of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1367 (11th Cir. 1998)).

“[U]nsupported conclusions of law or of mixed fact and law have long been

recognized not to prevent a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.” Dalrymple v. Reno, 334 F.3d

991, 996 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Marsh v. Butler County, 268 F.3d 1014, 1036 n.

16 (11th Cir. 2001)). Furthermore, “[a] complaint may not be dismissed because the

Plaintiff’s claims do not support the legal theory he relies upon since the court must

determine if the allegations provide for relief on any possible theory.” Brooks v. Blue

Cross & Blue Shield of Florida, Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1997) (emphasis

in original)(citing Robertson v. Johnston, 376 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1967)). “The

threshold of sufficiency that a complaint must meet to survive a Motion to Dismiss

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for failure to state a claim is...‘exceedingly low.’” Ancata v. Prison Health Serv.,

Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 703 (11th Cir. 1985) (quoting Quality Foods de Centro America,

S.A. v. Latin American Agribusiness Dev., 711 F.2d 989, 995 (11th Cir. 1983)).

As a general rule, the court may only consider the pleading which

is attacked by an FR Civ P, Rule 12(b)(6) motion in determining its

sufficiency. ... The court is not permitted to look at matters outside the

record; if such matters are considered, the FR Civ P, Rule 12(b)(6)

motion to dismiss is, by the express terms of FR Civ P, Rule 12(b),

converted into a motion for summary judgment. However, the court

may consider documents which are attached to or submitted with the

complaint, as well as legal arguments presented in memorandums or

briefs and arguments of counsel. 

AMJUR PLEADING § 584 (footnotes and citations omitted).

B. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e)

(e) Motion for More Definite Statement. If a pleading to which a

responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party

cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, the party

may move for a more definite statement before interposing a responsive

pleading. The motion shall point out the defects complained of and the

details desired. If the motion is granted and the order of the court is not

obeyed within 10 days after notice of the order or within such other time

as the court may fix, the court may strike the pleading to which the

motion was directed or make such order as it deems just.

FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e).

Interpreting this Rule, the Eleventh Circuit has noted that: 

While the requirements of pleading under the Federal Rules are liberal,

and a litigant need not allege a specific fact to cover every element or

allege with precision each element of a claim, a pleader must at least

Case 2:06-cv-01959-VEH Document 17 Filed 01/18/07 Page 4 of 15
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provide his opponent with fair notice of what his claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests. 

Parker v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1294 (11th Cir. 2005) (citations

and quotations omitted).

III. BURKES’S FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

The facts alleged against Hubbell Steel, which the court accepts as true for

purposes of this Motion, are as follows. Burkes is an African-American male, over

the age of forty, who was employed by Hubbell Steel. (Am. Compl., ¶ 4.) He was the

senior-most employee at Hubbell Steel’s Fairfield, Alabama branch. (Am. Compl.,

¶ 10.) Burkes was more qualified than his Caucasian co-workers; however, he was

passed over for promotion for more than three years. (Am. Compl., ¶ 11.) In or about

2004, Burkes was “finally advised that he was being promoted to supervisor and was

promised a pay raise; however, ,,, [he] never received a pay raise. Caucasian

supervisors, who were also promoted, received pay raises... .” (Am. Compl., ¶ 12.)

Burkes was required to work on the line with other laborers under his supervision,

while Caucasian supervisors were not required to work on the line. (Am. Compl., ¶

13.) Caucasians with less years with Hubbell Steel, less experience, and/or less

qualifications “have been afforded promotions and other employment opportunities

and benefits that ... Burkes has been denied.” (Am. Compl., ¶ 14.) “ ... [Hubbell

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Steel], by way of its Caucasian management team, continues to engage in a pattern

and practice of race discrimination and harassment to which ... [Burkes], along with

other African-Americans, are and were subjected. ...[Hubbell Steel’s] practice of race

discrimination and harassment created a hostile work environment for AfricanAmerican employees and manifested itself in discrimination against AfricanAmerican employees with regards [sic]to promotions, job assignments, benefits, and

other terms and conditions of employment.” (Am. Compl., ¶ 15.) ... “Burkes

complained about ... [Hubbell Steel’s] racial harassment and discriminatory conduct

towards [sic] him and other African-American employees, but nothing was done to

rectify ... [Hubbell Steel’s] racially discriminatory work environment. ... Burkes was

subjected to [sic] an on-going basis of [sic] a racially hostile and discriminatory work

environment which included, but is not limited to, negative race-related comments

and attitudes. ... Burkes, and other employees, complained about the same, but ...

[Hubbell Steel] failed to take any action to rectify the situation and continued to

maintain a racially hostile and discriminatory work environment.” (Am. Compl., ¶

16.) 

Burkes was retaliated against for having complained about the race

discrimination that existed at Hubbell Steel. (Am. Compl., ¶ 17.) Burkes was

terminated from his position in July 2005. (Am. Compl., ¶ 18.) Burkes was replaced

Case 2:06-cv-01959-VEH Document 17 Filed 01/18/07 Page 6 of 15
 Filed September 28, 2006. 1

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by an employee who was significantly younger than Burkes. (Am. Compl., ¶ 20.)

IV. THE EEOC CHARGE

Along with Burkes’s original Complaint, and referenced as an attachment in

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his Amendment to Complaint, is his EEOC charge. It appears that, under the section

entitled “Cause of discrimination based on,” Burkes checked the boxes for “race”,

“age,” and “retaliation.” The “particulars’ are set out on an “attached sheet.” Those

particulars, in their entirety, are as follows:

Hubbell Steel discriminated against me on the basis of my race

(African-American) by terminating my employment in order to eliminate

the only black supervisor/manager in the plant. Hubbell Steel

Corporation discriminated against me on the basis of my age (forty-one)

by terminating my employment in order to replace me and fill the

position with a younger person.

Further, the termination was retaliation for my complaints

regarding OSHA violations and immigration/labor law violations. The

reason cited for my termination was a failure to perform my job

according to job description after warnings. However, as the most

senior employee in the Alabama plant, I was never written up for not

performing my job duties. In fact, during the seven years I devoted to

Hubbell, the only written notice Ireceived wasto provide alternate ways

to supervise/manage my employees.

Additionally, I was promoted to plant supervisor more than 16

months ago and advised that my promotion came with a raise. However,

I never received any pay commensurate with the promotion and

additional responsibilities that I received. Hubbell Steel’s allegation

that I failed to perform my job duties was a pretext for terminating my

employment on the basis of age, race and retaliation.

Case 2:06-cv-01959-VEH Document 17 Filed 01/18/07 Page 7 of 15
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V. TITLE VII CLAIMS

The date of Burkes’s EEOC charge was 8/12/05. In it, he states that he was

promoted to plant supervisor “more than 16 months ago.” Sixteen months prior to

8/12/05 would be 4/12/04. Title VII permits an aggrieved employee to seek relief in

federal court only where the plaintiff has (1) filed timely charges with the EEOC and

(2) received and acted upon the EEOC's statutory notice of right-to-sue. See 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798, 93

S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Concerning the first requirement, the plaintiff is

required to file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days of the

alleged discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). If the plaintiff fails to file before

this time elapses, the plaintiff's claim is untimely and, therefore, the plaintiff is

procedurally barred for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. See Delaware

State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 256, 101 S. Ct. 498, 66 L. Ed. 2d 431 (1980);

Everett v. Cobb County Sch. Dist., 138 F.3d 1407, 1410 (11th Cir.1998).

It is apparent from Burkes’s EEOC charge, which was attached to his

Complaint, and referenced in his Amendment to Complaint, that he was promoted

“more than 16 months” prior to August 12, 2005, the date of his charge. Sixteen

months is 480 days, or April 12, 2004. Thus, any allegations of failure to promote are

Case 2:06-cv-01959-VEH Document 17 Filed 01/18/07 Page 8 of 15
 Burkes’s claims of failure to promote are not saved by the “continuing violation” 2

doctrine. Pursuant to that doctrine, “[w]here an employee charges an employer with

continuously maintaining an illegal employment practice, he may file a valid charge of

discrimination based upon that illegal practice until 180 days after the last occurrence of an

instance of that practice.” Beavers v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 975 F.2d 792, 796 (11th Cir.

1992). Again, the “practice” of not promoting Burkes last occurred sixteen months prior to

August 12, 2005, to wit, April 12, 2004 or earlier.

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procedurally barred under Title VII. 2

Finally, Burkes’s Title VII failure to promote claims, his unequal pay claims,

his claims that he was required to work “on the line” with other laborers under his

supervision, even though Caucasian supervisors were not required to work on the

line, his claims that Hubbell Steel engaged in a pattern and practice of race

discrimination and harassment that created a hostile work environment for AfricanAmerican employees, and his claims that he was retaliated against for complaining

about this racially hostile environment are barred for failure to exhaust administrative

remedies because Burkes’s EEOC charge does not raise any of these issues. A

plaintiff is precluded from raising allegations in a civil action unless they are

reasonably related to the underlying charges raised before the EEOC. See Gregory

v. Georgia Dept. of Human Resources, 355 F.3d 1277, 1280 (11th Cir. 2004)

(explaining that “a plaintiff's judicial complaint is limited by the scope of the EEOC

investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of

Case 2:06-cv-01959-VEH Document 17 Filed 01/18/07 Page 9 of 15
 The purpose of this requirement is that the EEOC “should have the first opportunity to 3

investigate the alleged discriminatory practices to permit it to perform its role in obtaining

voluntary compliance and promoting conciliation efforts.” See Gregory, 355 F.3d at 1279.

Additionally, the charge requirement serves to notify the employer of the allegations made

against it. See Wilkerson v. Grinnell Corp., 270 F.3d 1314, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001).

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discrimination”). Although judicial claims that “amplify, clarify, or more clearly

3 

focus” the allegations in the EEOC charge are permitted, a plaintiff may not allege

in his complaint new acts of discrimination. See id. at 1279-80.

VI. SECTION 1981 CLAIMS

Burkes’s failure to promote and retaliation claims are not barred by failure to

exhaust administrative remedies. Unlike Title VII claims, a plaintiff has no duty to

exhaust administrative remedies under § 1981. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,

491 U.S. 164, 181, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 105 L. Ed. 2d 132 (1989) (superceded by statute

on other grounds by 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b)).

However, as set forth in Section VIII of this Memorandum Opinion and Order,

the court finds that Burkes has failed to plead his Section 1981 race discrimination

and retaliation claims with the specificity required byFederal Rule of Civil Procedure

8. Therefore, as set forth in such section, the court will require repleading of those

claims.

VII. ADEA CLAIMS

As a general rule, an employee who wishes to sue his employer for age

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discrimination must first file an administrative charge of discrimination with the EEOC.

See Hipp v. Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 1208, 1217 (11th Cir. 2001). Thus,

Burkes’s claims under the ADEA must be reasonably related to his EEOC charges or

they are barred under the doctrine of failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Burkes claims that he was terminated in order to replace him with a younger worker.

This claim was presented in his EEOC charge as well. Therefore, Hubbell Steel’s

Motion to Dismiss Burkes’s claims for termination based on age will be DENIED.

Burkes’s EEOC charge did not, however, reasonably relate to any claims that

he was not promoted based on his age. Indeed, Burkes claims that he was terminated

in July 2005, that he was 41 when he was terminated, and that he had been promoted

“16 months” before the charge date (August 12, 2005). Thus, Burkes alleges that he

was promoted while he was a member of the age-protected class. The ADEA

prohibits discrimination on the basis of age against persons who are at least 40. 29

U.S.C. § 631(a)(b). Nonetheless, the court finds that, any claim of failure to promote

based on age is barred by Burkes’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies. To the

extent the Amended Complaint can be read to state a claim for unequal pay due to

age, such claim was not raised in his EEOC charge and is therefore also barred.

Therefore, Burkes’s claims under the ADEA for failure to promote and for unequal

pay will be DISMISSED.

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VIII. MOTION FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT

Defendant argues that, alternatively, the Plaintiff’s Complaint is due to be

repled with more specificity because the Plaintiff’s discrimination claims are “nothing

more than bald, conclusory allegations unsupported by facts.” (Doc. 14 at 10.) 

Guided by the principle that Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is disfavored, and that it

should be granted only in circumstances where it “appears beyond a doubt that the

plaintiff can prove no set of facts” that would entitle him to relief, the court declines

to dismiss on the grounds of indefinite pleading Burkes’s claims which are not

otherwise barred. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80

(1957). “[A] complaint is sufficient if it contains ‘allegations from which an

inference can be drawn that evidence on these material points will be introduced at

trial.’ 5 Wright & Miller, § 1216 at 154.” F.T.C. v. Citigroup, Inc., 239 F. Supp. 2d

1302, 1305 (N.D. Ga.2001).

However, a § 1981 claim for discrimination will fail if the plaintiff fails to

plead sufficient facts from which an inference of intent to discriminate can be drawn.

See Jackson v. BellSouth Telecommunications, 372 F.3d 1250, 1271 (11th Cir. 2004).

This is because the (amended) complaint must “provide the defendant with fair notice

of the factual grounds on which the complaint rests.” Id. These Rule 8 standards are

also applicable to ADEA cases. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 513,

Case 2:06-cv-01959-VEH Document 17 Filed 01/18/07 Page 12 of 15
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122 S. Ct. 992, 998 (2002) (“Rule 8(a)'s simplified pleading standard applies to all

civil actions, with limited exceptions.”) In this case, as in Jackson, Burkes claims

racial discrimination in violation of § 1981. As in Jackson, Burkes has alleged a

disparate treatment case (race) but has wholly failed to identify any specific examples

of other persons who are comparably situated but are not African-American, and who

(1) received promotions, (2) were paid more while working at the same position as

Plaintiff, or (3) were not required to work on the line. As to his retaliation claim,

Burkes has failed to plead facts from which the decision-maker’s knowledge of his

complaints of racial discrimination can be inferred. See Brungart v. Bellsouth

Telecomms., Inc., 231 F.3d 791, 799 (11th Cir. 2000). The court finds that it would

be more appropriate, where the basis of the motion is that the claims are too vague

and conclusory to allow the defendant to respond, to order Burkes to restate his §

1981 claims with more particularity. Therefore, the court will ORDER Burkes to file

a Second Amended Complaint, within 20 days of the date of this Order, setting forth

his surviving claims with the required specificity. 

IX. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby the ORDER of the court that Hubbell

Steel’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part:

(1) Burkes’s Title VII and ADEA failure to promote and unequal pay claims

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are hereby DISMISSED for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

(2) Burkes’s Title VII claims that he was required to work “on the line” with

other laborers under his supervision, even though Caucasian supervisors were not

required to work on the line, his claims that Hubbell Steel engaged in a pattern and

practice of race discrimination and harassment that created a hostile work

environment for African-American employees, and his claims that he was retaliated

against for complaining about this racially hostile environment are DISMISSED for

failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

(3) In all other respects, the Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.

(4) Hubbell Steel’s Motion for a More Definite Statement is GRANTED.

(5) Accordingly, it is further ORDERED as follows:

On or before January 30, 2007, Burkes is ORDERED to file a Second

Amended Complaint which sets forth, (A) as to his § 1981 racial discrimination

claims (1) the names or other identifying information about the comparators who

were treated more favorably than he was as to promotions, wages, or conditions of

employment (and identifying as to each comparator how that comparator received

more favorable treatment, e.g., promotion (to a specific position), higher wage at

same position, not being required to work on the line), and (2) the approximate dates

or time periods during which each identified comparator was treated more favorably

Case 2:06-cv-01959-VEH Document 17 Filed 01/18/07 Page 14 of 15
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than Burkes; and (B) as to his retaliation claims (1) what his protected activity

complaints consisted of (2) who he complained to and (3) when he complained.

Hubbell Steel shall have until February 19, 2007, to plead or otherwise respond

further.

DONE and ORDERED this 18th day of January, 2007.

 

 VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS

United States District Judge

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