Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-09-05026/USCOURTS-caDC-09-05026-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Krishna Murthy
Appellant
Thomas J. Vilsack
Appellee

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notify the

Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the

bound volumes go to press. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 12, 2010 Decided June 25, 2010

No. 09-5026

KRISHNA MURTHY,

APPELLANT

v.

THOMAS J. VILSACK, SECRETARY, UNITED STATES

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:06-cv-02208-RJL)

David A. Branch argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant.

Alan Burch, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for

appellee. With him on the brief were Ronald C. Machen, Jr.,

U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

Before: ROGERS, TATEL and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges.

USCA Case #09-5026 Document #1251790 Filed: 06/25/2010 Page 1 of 10
2

Opinion for the Court by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: Dr. Krishna Murthy sued the

Secretary of Agriculture for breach of the terms of a settlement

agreement and for non-selection to a GS-15 position in violation

of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e

et seq. The district court transferred the contract claims to the

Court of Federal Claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631 and

granted summary judgment on the Title VII non-selection claim

for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Murthy appealed. 

By order of July 10, 2009 this court dismissed Murthy’s appeal

of the transfer of the contract claims for lack of jurisdiction. 

Murthy v. Vilsack, Order, No. 09-5026 (D.C. Cir. July 10, 2009)

(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1292(d)(4)(A)). The question now is

whether, despite the transfer of some claims, this court has

jurisdiction to review the grant of summary judgment on the

remaining Title VII non-selection claim. We conclude that we

do, and we affirm.

I.

According to his complaint, Dr. Krishna Murthy worked at

the U.S. Department of Agriculture for twenty-seven years, most

recently as a GS-14, step 10 veterinarian in Food Safety and

Inspection Services. Throughout his tenure, despite his

“exemplary” performance, he was “repeatedly” denied

promotions to GS-15 and has consequently filed equal

employment opportunity (“EEO”) complaints against the

Department. Cmplt. ¶ 5. He also was “instrumental” in

initiating a class charge filed with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) by Asian/Pacific Islander

employees alleging discrimination by the Department in denying

promotions. Cmplt. ¶ 6. A settlement agreement of the class

charge was approved by the EEOC in December 2004. Arun C.

Basu, et al. v. Veneman, Dep’t of Agriculture, EEOC No. 100-

USCA Case #09-5026 Document #1251790 Filed: 06/25/2010 Page 2 of 10
3

A1-7863X. However, Murthy did not learn the settlement had

been approved until after the thirty-day period to object had

passed. Three of the six class agents received “significant

individual relief, including retroactive promotions and payments

of $100,000 to $300,000,” while he, although also a class agent,

“was designated to receive only $40,000 and a two step increase

at his current grade 14 step 8 position.” Cmplt. ¶ 10. Murthy

filed a notice of breach of the settlement agreement with the

Department and later complained to the EEOC contesting the

fairness of the settlement agreement. The EEOC denied his

petition and request for reconsideration.

Murthy then filed two charges with the EEOC: on June 28,

2006 seeking promotion to GS-15, and on August 17, 2006

alleging a violation of the settlement agreement and

discrimination and reprisal when he was not selected for a GS15 Associate Deputy Administrator position. On December 26,

2006 — 131 days after filing his August 17, 2006 EEOC charge

— Murthy filed a complaint in the federal district court. In

count one, he alleged discrimination in violation of Title VII

when the Department denied him promotions to GS-15 in June

and August 2006. He also alleged discrimination and retaliation

in violation of Title VII when he was provided “significantly

less relief” under the settlement agreement than other class

agents and was not provided timely notice of his right to object. 

Cmplt. ¶ 17. He sought placement in a GS-15 or comparable

position and compensatory damages, including front and back

pay and benefits. In count two, he alleged breach of contract

because he was provided “significantly less” under the

settlement agreement than other class agents and was not

provided timely notice of his right to object. Cmplt. ¶ 18. He

sought rescission of the settlement agreement as it applied to

him, damages equal to his accumulated lost wages and benefits

as well as future lost wages, and damages for financial and

emotional harm.

USCA Case #09-5026 Document #1251790 Filed: 06/25/2010 Page 3 of 10
4

The district court transferred Murthy’s breach of the

settlement agreement claims in count 2 and also the nonpromotion claims in count 1 determined to arise under the

settlement agreement to the Court of Federal Claims, which has

exclusive jurisdiction over contract claims against the United

States for more than $10,000, see 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1);

Greenhill v. Spellings, 482 F.3d 569, 572 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The

district court reasoned that Murthy’s claims of discrimination

and retaliation relative to the other class agents were primarily

contract claims for breach of the settlement agreement. The

district court granted summary judgment on Murthy’s remaining

Title VII non-selection claim because he failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies when he filed his lawsuit prior to the

expiration of Title VII’s 180-day waiting period. Murthy v.

Schafer, 579 F. Supp. 2d 110 (D.D.C. 2008).

II.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631, the district court may transfer

a civil action for lack of jurisdiction. Section 1631 provides:

Whenever a civil action is filed in a [qualifying

federal] court . . . and that court finds that there is a

want of jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is in the

interest of justice, transfer such action or appeal to any

other such court in which the action or appeal could

have been brought at the time it was filed . . ., and the

action or appeal shall proceed as if it had been filed in

. . . the court to which it is transferred on the date upon

which it was actually filed in . . . the court from which

it is transferred.

In Hill v. Henderson, 195 F.3d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1999), the district

court dismissed one of four counts in a complaint and ordered

the remaining counts transferred to the Northern District of

USCA Case #09-5026 Document #1251790 Filed: 06/25/2010 Page 4 of 10
5

Illinois based on venue. Id. at 672 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)). 

When Hill appealed the dismissal, this court held that it lacked

jurisdiction for want of a final judgment, in the absence of an

order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). Hill, 195

F.3d at 674. The court stated that the dismissed count should

“tag[] along” with the transferred counts to best effectuate “[t]he

efficiencies sought to be achieved by the final judgment rule.” 

Id. The court reasoned that unlike dismissal of parties, see

Reuber v. United States, 773 F.2d 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1985),

dismissal of claims seemed more likely to achieve these

efficiencies given the “greater probabilities that circumstances

will moot dismissal of the appeal (e.g., by overall settlement, or

by a recovery on one of the claims that effectively compensates

plaintiff for loss under the dismissed claim), and that issues

between the two (hypothetical) appeals will overlap.” Hill, 195

F.3d at 674. Viewing “the appealability of the claim dismissal

[to] . . . flow[] to the transferee circuit,” the court stated that the

dismissed count would be subject to appellate review by the

Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals “on the issuance of a final

judgment by the [district court in the] Northern District of

Illinois.” Id. at 675, 678. 

Ordinarily, the principles in Hill would counsel declining

jurisdiction over the grant of summary judgment on Murthy’s

Title VII non-selection claim and permitting the Federal Circuit

to undertake eventual review of all of the claims in Murthy’s

complaint, including the Title VII non-selection claim. 

However, the Court of Federal Claims and the Federal Circuit

are courts of specialized jurisdiction. Although the Federal

Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over an appeal from a final

decision of the Court of Federal Claims, see 28 U.S.C.

§ 1295(a)(3), the Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction over

claims “sounding in tort,” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). This court

observed in Greenhill, 482 F.3d at 574, that “the Court of

Federal Claims has no jurisdiction over Title VII claims.” The

USCA Case #09-5026 Document #1251790 Filed: 06/25/2010 Page 5 of 10
6

Federal Circuit has held that section 1631 permits partial

transfers to the Court of Federal Claims and considers

transferred claims to be bifurcated from untransferred claims. 

See United States v. County of Cook, Ill., 170 F.3d 1084, 1089

(Fed. Cir. 1999). As a result, neither the Court of Federal

Claims nor the Federal Circuit upon appeal will review the

dismissal of the untransferred claims.

Because of the specialized jurisdiction of the Court of

Federal Claims and the Federal Circuit’s treatment of partial

transfers, neither the federal district court nor the Court of

Federal Claims could exercise jurisdiction over all of the claims

in Murthy’s complaint. This court recognized in Hill, 195 F.3d

at 678, that an exception to the tag-along approach might be

required where the transferee court could not adjudicate the

dismissed claim. This is such a case. Were this court to decline

to exercise appellate jurisdiction, the grant of summary

judgment on the Title VII non-selection claim would

“completely elude review,” Hill, 195 F.3d at 676. There may be

a risk that some part of the case could be transferred back to the

district court, but that risk is minimized here because Murthy

has not appealed the transfer order to the Federal Circuit, see 28

U.S.C. § 1292(d)(4)(A), and the deadline for such an appeal has

passed, see FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(B).

In other circumstances it would be preferable to exercise

appellate jurisdiction based upon a Rule 54(b) order in which the

district court made the required finding of “no just reason for

delay,” given the separability of the affected claims. But here

requiring a Rule 54(b) certification “would . . . not ensure only

a single appeal — one of the objectives of the final judgment

rule” and would “risk needless complications.” United States ex

rel. Hampton v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 318 F.3d

214, 217 (D.C. Cir. 2003); see also United States v. County of

Cook, Ill., 167 F.3d 381, 384 (7th Cir. 1999).

USCA Case #09-5026 Document #1251790 Filed: 06/25/2010 Page 6 of 10
7

Accordingly, this court will exercise appellate jurisdiction

over the grant of summary judgment on Murthy’s Title VII nonselection claim.

III.

Title VII permits an aggrieved federal employee to file a

civil action in the district court 180 days after the filing of a

charge with the EEOC, when the EEOC has taken no final

action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c). In Martini v. Federal National

Mortgage Ass’n, 178 F.3d 1336, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 1999), this

court construed the 180-day period in Title VII’s enforcement

provisions, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. The court interpreted the 180-

day period in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), under which the EEOC

may authorize private suits, to be a mandatory waiting period. 

Observing that Congress had imposed a “mandatory and

unqualified” duty on the EEOC to investigate charges and that

the legislative history indicated Congress “‘hoped that recourse

to . . . private lawsuit will be the exception and not the rule,’”

the court concluded that EEOC’s power to authorize private

suits within 180 days would undermine both its statutory

investigatory duty and Congress’ policy of encouraging informal

“resolution up to the 180th day.” Martini, 178 F.3d at 1346–47

(quoting 118 CONG. REC. 7168). Rejecting a suggestion of

futility based upon EEOC’s lack of resources, and finding no

equitable considerations warranting an exception to the 180-day

requirement, the court held that Martini’s lawsuit was untimely

because it was filed less than 180 days after the filing of the

EEOC charge, vacated the district court’s judgment, and

remanded the case with instructions for the district court to

dismiss the complaint without prejudice. See id. at 1348.

The reasoning in Martini applies no less to the 180-day

period in section 2000e-16(c). Section 2000e-16 provides that

a federal employee must wait 180 days, absent final action by

USCA Case #09-5026 Document #1251790 Filed: 06/25/2010 Page 7 of 10
8

the EEOC, before filing a lawsuit in the federal district court and

that any civil suit shall be filed “as provided in § 2000e-5,” and,

specifically, that section 2000e-5(f) through (k) shall govern. 

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c), (d). The reasoning in Martini that

permitting exceptions would undermine the purpose of the 180-

day waiting period in section 2000e-5(f)(1) supports reading the

180-day waiting period in section 2000e-16(c) as mandatory,

and Murthy provides no reason to read it otherwise. Although

worded somewhat differently, the 180-day period in section

2000e-16(c) serves the same purpose as the 180-day period in

section 2000e-5(f)(1), as interpreted in Martini. Congress

sought to allow a period for the EEOC to investigate and attempt

to resolve charges through conciliation; in the absence of an

agreeable resolution or when the EEOC took no action,

Congress determined lawsuits could be filed in federal district

court by an aggrieved party. This conclusion about the purpose

of the 180-day period is consistent with the Supreme Court’s

observation in Brown v. General Services Admininistration, 425

U.S. 820, 832–33 (1976), that the filing of lawsuits by federal

employees “after 180 days” is part of Title VII’s “careful blend

of administrative and judicial enforcement powers,” and that the

provision authorizing lawsuits after 180 days incorporates Title

VII’s enforcement provisions, see id. at 832.

Murthy’s attempts to avoid the consequences of the

mandatory 180-day waiting period fail. First, the filing of an

amended complaint after the 180-day period expired cannot cure

the failure to exhaust. Section 2000e-16(c) provides an

aggrieved federal employee may file a civil action “after one

hundred and eighty days from the filing of the initial charge”

when the EEOC has failed to take final action. As with

permitting the EEOC to authorize a private suit before the

expiration of the 180-day period in Martini, allowing Murthy to

cure his failure to exhaust administrative remedies by amending

his complaint would contravene EEOC’s investigative duty and

USCA Case #09-5026 Document #1251790 Filed: 06/25/2010 Page 8 of 10
9

undermine Congress’ policy of encouraging informal resolution

“up to the 180th day.” Martini, 178 F.3d at 1346–47.

Second, Murthy’s argument that he had to file his civil

action related to his contract claims within 90 days of the

EEOC’s September 2006 decision on those claims, see 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-16(c), is forfeited. Murthy raised this argument only in

his motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), and “issues not raised before

judgment in the district court are usually considered to have been

waived on appeal,” Whelan v. Abell, 48 F.3d 1247, 1251 (D.C

Cir. 1995). His argument touches upon several complex issues

regarding Title VII’s administrative exhaustion requirements and

the Supreme Court’s decision in National Railroad Passenger

Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002), none of which has been

adequately briefed. Moreover, there is a split in the circuits

regarding whether after Morgan “a claim arising after the filing

of a formal administrative complaint must be raised with . . . [an]

agency’s [Office of Equal Employment Opportunity] before

being brought before a district court.” Weber v. Battista, 494

F.3d 179, 183–84 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 

Finally, contrary to Murthy’s suggestion, res judicata will

not bar the filing of a new Title VII non-selection civil action

after he exhausts his EEOC remedies. In granting summary

judgment on the Title VII non-selection claim, the district court

did not dismiss Murthy’s complaint without prejudice, as in

Martini, 178 F.3d at 1348. However, where an action is

prematurely filed or the plaintiff has failed to satisfy a

precondition to suit, a final judgment for the defendant “does not

bar another action by the plaintiff instituted after the claim has

matured, or the precondition has been satisfied.” RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 20(2) (2009). The Secretary

acknowledges in his brief that such a new claim “would not face

res judicata problems from the District Court’s decision here

USCA Case #09-5026 Document #1251790 Filed: 06/25/2010 Page 9 of 10
10

because that decision necessarily did not reach the merits of his

new basis for arguing exhaustion.” Appellee’s Br. at 23 (citing,

e.g., I.A.M. Nat’l Pension Fund v. Indus. Gear Mfg. Co., 723

F.2d 944, 946–47 (D.C. Cir. 1983)); see also Ali v. Dist. of

Columbia, 278 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

Accordingly, we affirm the grant of summary judgment.

USCA Case #09-5026 Document #1251790 Filed: 06/25/2010 Page 10 of 10