Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02995/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02995-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dexter Ross
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

 ___________

 No. 06-2975

 ___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. *

*

Dexter Ross, *

*

Appellee. *

 ___________ Appeals from the United States

District Court for the

 No. 06-2995 Eastern District of Arkansas.

 ___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

Dexter Ross, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: February 13, 2007

Filed: June 7, 2007

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Appellate Case: 06-2995 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/07/2007 Entry ID: 3317114
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The Honorable Sandra Day O’Connor, Associate Justice (Ret.), Supreme Court

of the United States, sitting by designation.

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Before O’CONNOR, Associate Justice (Ret.),1

 WOLLMAN, and SMITH, Circuit

Judges.

___________

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

A jury found Dexter Ross guilty of conspiring to possess with the intent to

distribute marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846, possession with

the intent to distribute crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and being

a felon in possession in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). After

determining that Ross’s guidelines range was 110 to 137 months, the district court

sentenced Ross to 137 months’ imprisonment and then suspended 77 months of that

sentence. The government appeals the sentence. Ross cross-appeals, arguing that the

evidence against him should have been suppressed. We affirm the conviction, but

vacate the sentence and remand for further proceedings.

I. Factual Background

Martin Ruiz enlisted the assistance of a confidential source (CS) in delivering

100 pounds of marijuana to an individual known as “Dexter” in Arkansas. The CS

took his truck to Ruiz, who loaded it with the marijuana. The CS then drove the truck

to Arkansas. Ruiz and his girlfriend, Erica Gurrostieta, kept up with the CS in a

separate vehicle. Once they arrived in Arkansas, Gurrostieta went to meet with Dexter

Ross while Ruiz, the CS, and another individual began transferring the marijuana into

another truck. The men were arrested soon thereafter. Gurrostieta met with Ross and

they each took their respective vehicles to a residence occupied by Gurrostieta’s sister

in Morrilton, Arkansas. Gurrostieta arrived first. As Ross was pulling into the

driveway in his blue-and-white pickup, Gurrostieta began frantically sounding her

horn. After some initial hesitation, Ross quickly pulled out of the driveway and sped

Appellate Case: 06-2995 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/07/2007 Entry ID: 3317114
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Because we are deciding the matter on Leon grounds, we need not decide

whether the content of the affidavit established a constitutionally sufficient nexus

between Ross’s criminal activity and his residence. Cf. United States v. Carpenter,

341 F.3d 666, 671 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting that we do not conduct a de novo review of

the probable cause determination as part of the Leon analysis).

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away. Ross was apprehended shortly thereafter. At the time of his arrest, Ross had

approximately $900 in his possession. Agents obtained a state search warrant to

search his home for evidence related to a drug conspiracy. The affidavit submitted in

support of the warrant application recounted the details of the arrangement, stated that

the CS had delivered drugs to Ross some six months earlier, noted that an officer had

seen Ross’s same blue-and-white truck at Ross’s home earlier in the day, and stated

that Ross had verified his home address. The affidavit did not otherwise mention any

drug-related activity at Ross’s home. The police searched Ross’s home and found

seven grams of crack cocaine, a small amount of marijuana, two sets of digital scales,

drug ledgers, fax documents ordering “packages,” and other paraphernalia. 

II. The Suppression Claim

Ross moved to suppress the recovered evidence, arguing that the affidavit in

support of the warrant application failed to establish probable cause because it did not

establish a nexus between Ross’s alleged involvement in the marijuana distribution

conspiracy and his home. The magistrate judge concluded that the information within

the four corners of the affidavit sufficed to establish probable cause and recommended

denying the motion. The district court likewise found that the affidavit established

probable cause for the search. 

Assuming, without deciding, that the affidavit failed to provide a sufficient

nexus between Ross’s residence and the drug conspiracy at issue, the Leon good-faith

exception saves the evidence from suppression under the facts of this case.2

 See

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 921 (1984). Under the good-faith exception,

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None of the other exceptions to the Leon exception are applicable. See Leon,

468 U.S. at 913-17 (describing the exceptions to Leon).

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“evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant issued by a magistrate that is later

determined to be invalid, will not be suppressed if the executing officer’s reliance

upon the warrant was objectively reasonable.” United States v. Proell, 2007 WL

1174859, *3 (8th Cir. Apr. 23, 2007) (describing what constitutes good faith). The

Leon exception is inapplicable, however, when an officer relies on a warrant for which

the supporting affidavit is “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official

belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.” See Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 (citing

Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-11 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part)).3

“‘Entirely unreasonable’ is not a phrase often used by the Supreme Court, and we find

nothing in Leon or in the Court’s subsequent opinions that would justify our dilution

of the Court’s particularly strong choice of words.” United States v. Carpenter, 341

F.3d 666, 670 (8th Cir. 2003). We conclude that the officers’ reliance on the affidavit

was objectively reasonable.

First, from the perspective of law enforcement officers, the law is not so clearly

established that the officers could reasonably predict that the affidavit lacked

sufficient indicia of probable cause. Although we have not adopted a per se rule to

the effect that probable cause to arrest a drug trafficker establishes an inference that

records, paraphernalia, and other evidence of drug trafficking exists at the trafficker’s

residence, we have found probable cause to exist in cases in which officers have stated

that in their experience such an inference is appropriate and in which a supporting

affidavit also described a defendant’s continuous course of drug trafficking activity.

See, e.g., United States v. Luloff, 15 F.3d 763, 768 (8th Cir. 1994). Further, many of

our sister circuits have used language that comes even closer to a per se inference.

See, e.g., United States v. Nolan, 199 F.3d 1180, 1183 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing other

circuit decisions recognizing an inference); United States v. Wiley, 475 F.3d 908,

912-13 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. McClellan, 165 F.3d 535, 546 (7th Cir. 1999)

(noting that a magistrate may reasonably infer that evidence is likely to be found

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Ross notes that the defendant in Hodge dealt drugs in the city of his residence

while Ross traveled more than thirty miles from his home to meet with Gurrostieta.

This argument may have some bearing on the probable cause determination, but is

largely inconsequential when considered from the perspective of law enforcement

officers who are not expected to have a complete understanding of every nuance and

vagary of the law. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 921; United States v. Rowland, 145 F.3d

1194, 1207-08 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting that officers are not expected to appreciate the

constitutional intricacies of the law).

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where drug dealers live); United States v. Feliz, 182 F.3d 82, 88 (1st Cir. 1999)

(stating that it could reasonably be supposed that a drug dealer stored evidence of

dealing at his home, though no drug trafficking was observed to occur there); United

States v. Thomas, 989 F.2d 1252, 1254-55 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (observations

of drug trafficking occurring away from dealer’s residence can support a finding of

probable cause for a search of the dealer’s home); United States v. Angulo-Lopez, 791

F.2d 1394, 1399 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that a magistrate may reasonably infer that

evidence is likely found where drug dealers live); United States v. Hodge, 246 F.3d

301, 306 (3rd Cir. 2001) (finding it reasonable to search an experienced and repeat

dealer’s home).4

Second, not only did the issuing judge find sufficient indicia of probable cause

within the affidavit to justify issuing a search warrant of Ross’s residence, but so too

did a United States magistrate judge and a United States district judge. This fact

supports the conclusion that the officers reasonably relied on the affidavit and warrant.

See Proell, 2007 WL 1174859, at *5 (the fact that multiple judges had independently

reviewed the warrant application and had each concluded that probable cause existed

cut against the argument that officers were clearly unreasonable for relying on the

application); United States v. Puckett, 466 F.3d 626, 630 (8th Cir. 2006) (same); see

also Carpenter, 341 F.3d at 670 (same, and also noting the deferential standard of

review for probable cause determinations). 

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The court was informed that Ross had begun attending church regularly.

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Finally, even if it was lacking sufficient detail to establish a nexus for probable

cause purposes, the affidavit did connect the drug transaction to Ross’s home by way

of his blue-and-white truck. An officer could reasonably believe that the connection

was sufficient to justify a search for drug trafficking evidence in the residence. The

affidavit recounted the use of trucks for hauling the marijuana, Ross’s use of his truck

in meeting Gurrostieta, the presence of Ross’s truck at his home that very morning,

the CS’s statement that the hundred pounds of hauled marijuana was intended for

Ross, and Ross’s history of drug distribution activities. See United States v. Peterson,

2000 WL 305137, at *2 (4th Cir. Mar. 24, 2000) (unpublished per curiam table

decision) (noting that the presence at the defendant’s residence of a vehicle which was

believed to have been involved in a crime “created a substantive connection between

the [defendant’s] residence and the crimes being investigated”). 

Accordingly, the information in the affidavit, coupled with the uncertain state

of the law and the consistent finding of probable cause by every judge who

independently reviewed the affidavit, satisfies us that the affidavit bore sufficient

indicia of probable cause to render the investigating officers’ reliance on it objectively

reasonable. 

III. The Suspended Sentence

During the sentencing hearing, the court stated that its initial intent was to

“adopt the government’s request . . . [and] sentence him” within the specified

guidelines range. After hearing how Ross had “seemingly travel[ed] the straight and

narrow path and sa[id] that [he had] seen the light,” the court reconsidered its original

position and decided to suspend 77 months of the 137-month sentence.5

 By all

appearances, then, the court based what amounts to a 45% variance entirely on Ross’s

post-offense rehabilitation and religious activity. 

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A conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) requires a mandatory minimum

of five years’ imprisonment. 

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The district court erred in imposing a suspended sentence in the absence of the

statutory authority to do so. See, e.g., United States v. Mastropierro, 931 F.2d 905,

906 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (noting that the Sentencing Guidelines do not authorize

suspended sentences); UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (U.S.S.G.)

ch. 7, pt. A, 2(a) (2006) (declaring the statutory authority to suspend sentences

“abolished”). Although he acknowledges that the district court erred, Ross asks that

we modify the sentence rather than remand for resentencing because the district

court’s intent is sufficiently clear. See United States v. Noble, 179 Fed. Appx. 400

(8th Cir. 2006) (unpublished per curiam decision) (modifying a sentence where

remand was unnecessary based on clear district court intent expressed in oral

pronouncement at sentencing). 

As the government points out, however, the fact that Ross experienced a

religious awakening is not a relevant sentencing consideration. U.S.S.G. § 5H1.10

(declaring religion an irrelevant consideration). To the extent that “seeing the light”

may have referred in any way to his church attendance and religious faith, then, it

should not have been considered at all. Cf. United States v. Ture, 450 F.3d 352, 357

(8th Cir. 2006) (noting that a sentence is unreasonable if it gives significant weight to

an improper or irrelevant factor). Further, we are not convinced that the district court

would have imposed only a 60-month sentence had it been aware that it could not

utilize the deterrence effect inherent in a suspended sentence.6

 Because the district

court might very well have concluded that a sentence of 60 months’ imprisonment,

standing alone, would have neither been reflective of the seriousness of the offense

nor adequate to deter criminal conduct, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2), it would be

inappropriate for us to modify the sentence to one of 60 months’ imprisonment. 

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We note with regret the fact that the sentencing judge is now deceased.

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Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of conviction, but vacate the sentence and

remand for resentencing consistent with this opinion.7

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