Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-07032/USCOURTS-caDC-97-07032-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Barwood, Inc.
Appellee
Dial A Car, Inc.
Appellant
Transportation, Inc.
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 8, 1997 Decided January 16, 1998 

No. 97-7032

DIAL A CAR, INC.,

APPELLANT

v.

TRANSPORTATION, INC. D/B/A RED TOP CAB COMPANY OF ARLINGTON,

AND 

BARWOOD, INC., D/B/A BARWOOD CAB COMPANY OF MARYLAND,

APPELLEES

__________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 96cv02457)

__________

James M. Loots argued the cause for appellant, with whom 

Mark E. Herlihy was on the briefs.

David L. Meyer argued the cause for appellees, with whom 

Stephen W. Grafman and A. Thomas Morris were on the 

brief.

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Before: GINSBURG, HENDERSON, and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GINSBURG.

GINSBURG, Circuit Judge: Dial A Car, Inc. sued Transportation, Inc. and Barwood, Inc. for damages and an injunction, 

alleging that the defendants are operating taxicab services in 

the District of Columbia without a license from the D.C. 

Taxicab Commission. Because we hold that there is no 

implied private right of action under the statute prohibiting 

unlicensed taxicab operations in the District, we affirm the 

judgment of the district court dismissing this action.

I. Background

In 1986 the Council of the District of Columbia passed the 

Taxicab Commission Establishment Act, which established 

the Taxicab Commission and gave it "exclusive authority for 

intrastate regulation of the taxicab industry." D.C. Code 

§ 40-1704. Among other things, the Act prohibits anyone 

from operating a taxicab service "within the District without 

first procuring all applicable licenses required by the Commission," and authorizes the Commission to fine an unlicensed 

operator up to $500. Id. § 40-1719(a). In 1987 the Taxicab 

Commission granted limited authority to Arlington County 

and Montgomery County taxicab companies to operate in the 

District. See D.C. Taxicab Commission Office Administrative 

Order No. 4 (Aug. 13, 1987).

Dial A Car is licensed by the Taxicab Commission as a 

sedan service providing point-to-point transportation primarily to corporate clients at a contractual rate. Transportation, 

Inc. is a Virginia taxicab service licensed in Arlington County, 

and Barwood, Inc. is a Maryland taxicab service licensed in 

Montgomery County. Neither of the defendants is licensed 

in the District.

Dial A Car claims that the defendants are violating D.C. 

Code § 40-1719 and Administrative Order No. 4 by providing 

on-call taxicab services to corporate clients in the District. In 

October 1993 Dial A Car sued the same defendants in the 

district court alleging violations of the Sherman Act, the 

Lanham Act, and the D.C. statute prohibiting unfair trade 

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practices, as well as the common law torts of interference 

with contract and with prospective business relations. The 

court dismissed Dial A Car's federal claims and declined to 

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over its state-law claims. 

See Dial A Car, Inc. v. Transporation, Inc., 884 F. Supp. 584 

(D.D.C. 1995), aff'd, 82 F.3d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

In 1996 Dial A Car sued Transportation and Barwood 

again, this time in D.C. Superior Court, seeking damages and 

an injunction. Dial A Car asserted, among other causes of 

action, a private right of action for violation of D.C. Code 

§ 40-1719. The defendants removed the case to the federal 

district court, which dismissed Dial A Car's claims, holding in 

relevant part that there is no private right of action under 

§ 40-1719. Dial A Car appealed only that portion of the 

judgment. A motions panel of this court denied Dial A Car's 

motion to certify to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals 

(DCCA) the question whether there is a private right of 

action under § 40-1719.

II. Analysis

The DCCA applies the test of Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 

(1975), to determine whether a D.C. statute creates an implied private right of action. See, e.g., Kelly v. Parents 

United for the D.C. Pub. Sch., 641 A.2d 159, 164 (D.C. 1994). 

In Cort the Supreme Court stated:

In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a 

statute not expressly providing one, several factors are 

relevant. First, is the plaintiff one of the class for whose 

especial benefit the statute was enactedthat is, does 

the statute create a ... right in favor of the plaintiff? 

Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to 

deny one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying 

purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?

422 U.S. at 78 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

Of these the most important consideration is whether the 

legislature intended to create a private right of action. See 

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Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 364 (1992); see also Twyman 

v. Johnson, 655 A.2d 850, 857 (D.C. 1995); Parents United,

641 A.2d at 164. Everything about the D.C. taxicab statute 

suggests that the Council did not intend to create such a 

right. The Council created the Commission specifically to be 

the "exclusive authority" over taxicab regulation. D.C. Code 

§ 40-1704; see also Edward v. D.C. Taxicab Comm'n, 645 

A.2d 600, 602 (D.C. 1994); Onabiyi v. D.C. Taxicab Comm'n,

557 A.2d 1317, 1318 (D.C. 1989). The regulatory regime 

provides in detail for the agency to enforce the Act. To that 

end the Council gave the Commission's Panel on Rates and 

Rules the power to establish fines for violations of Commission rules, D.C. Code § 40-1707(b)(1)(I), and gave the Commission's Panel on Adjudication the powers to investigate the 

taxicab industry and to adjudicate disputes between members 

of the industry, id. § 40-1707(b)(2).

The DCCA has been reluctant to find a private right of 

action implicit in a statute that provides for public enforcement. See Albertie v. Louis & Alexander Corp., 646 A.2d 

1001, 1004 (D.C. 1994) (snow removal statute, D.C. Code 

§ 7-901 et seq.); see also Assassination Archives & Research 

Ctr. v. Department of Justice, 43 F.3d 1542, 1544 (D.C. Cir. 

1995) (finding no private right of action under the President 

John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 

1992 where the Congress created a review board to evaluate 

agency decisions regarding access to records); cf. Twyman,

655 A.2d at 856-57 (statute prohibiting retaliation in rental 

housing provided claimant with remedies from Rent Administrator and Rental Housing Commission); Brantley v. District 

of Columbia, 640 A.2d 181, 184 (D.C. 1994) (declining to 

recognize tort of educational malpractice and noting that 

regulations governing assignment of children to school provided plaintiff with remedy). In Parents United, upon which 

Dial A Car relies, the court did find a private right of action 

but it did so in part upon the ground that the regulatory 

scheme in that case did not provide for public enforcement. 

See 641 A.2d at 164 ("In fact, the [statute] does not contain 

any provision for enforcement of the Act. In Cort, the 

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Supreme Court indicated that such silence would leave room 

for an implied private remedy"). Although Dial A Car may 

be correct that the legislature's having provided for public 

enforcement of a law is not necessarily fatal to the inference 

that it also intended to create a private right of actiona 

question we need not resolve insomuch as there is no other 

evidence in this case to support such an inferencea provision for public enforcement is a good indication that the 

Council did not by its silence intend to create a parallel 

private right of action.

Dial A Car suggests that under Parents United it does not 

need to show that the legislature intended to create a private 

right of action; for this the plaintiff points to the court's 

statement that where a statute grants "a class of persons 

certain rights, it is not necessary to show an intention to 

create a private cause of action". 641 A.2d at 164 (quoting 

Cort, 422 U.S. at 82) (emphasis deleted). Read in context, 

however, this passage is meant to say only that the plaintiff 

need not show an explicit legislative purpose to create a 

private right of action. As subsequent case law makes clear, 

the legislature must at least implicitly have intended to create 

a private right of action before the court can countenance 

such a suit: "unless this ... intent can be inferred from the 

language of the statute, the statutory structure, or some 

other source, the essential predicate for implication of a 

private remedy simply does not exist." Twyman, 655 A.2d at 

857 (quoting Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers 

Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77, 94 (1981)); see also Fountain v. 

Kelly, 630 A.2d 684, 690 (D.C. 1993).

In sum, the structure of the statute clearly indicates that 

the Council did not intend to create a private right of action 

and Dial A Car points to no contrary evidence whatsoever. 

Although that is probably enough to dispose of the plaintiff's 

claim, see Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis,

444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979) (ultimate question is "whether 

[legislature] intended to create the private remedy asserted"), 

we note that the other factors in the Cort analysis also cut 

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against judicial interpolation of a private right of action in 

§ 40-1719.

First, the statute was not enacted for the "especial benefit" 

of the firms to be regulated, such as Dial A Car. To be sure, 

the Council did intend to foster a "healthy" taxicab industry 

and to provide taxicab companies with "just compensation." 

See D.C. Code § 40-1702(a)(2) & (a)(3). But the Council was 

also concerned with the general public interest, see id.

§ 40-1702(a)(1), including "a healthy degree of competition 

within the taxi industry," id. § 40-1702(b)(1)(B), and more 

specifically with creating a centralized system for the regulation of taxicabs, see id. § 40-1701(3) & (4). In light of these 

mixed motives we cannot conclude that the Council intended 

taxicab regulation for the "especial benefit" of industry members, as opposed to the taxicab-using public at large.

Second, implying a private right of action would not be 

consistent with the primary purpose of the statute, viz., to 

consolidate responsibility for the regulation of the industry in 

a single administrative agency. See D.C. Code § 40-1701(3)-

(6); D.C. Council, Comm. on Public Servs. & Cable Television, Report on Bill 6-159, at 1 (Nov. 19, 1985); see also Lim 

v. D.C. Taxicab Comm'n, 564 A.2d 720, 723 (D.C. 1989) 

(centralization is "the only purpose of the bill"). Although 

Dial A Car suggests that a private right of action would only 

further the Commission's effort to enforce the statute, giving 

the courts a role in its enforcement would clearly frustrate 

the Council's stated intention of centralizing regulation of the 

taxicab industry in the Taxicab Commission.

Dial A Car relies heavily upon a recent case in which the 

Supreme Court of Virginia entertained a suit brought by 

licensed taxicab companies to enjoin an unlicensed taxicab 

company from violating a Norfolk ordinance that prohibited 

unlicensed operators from using the term "taxi" in their 

advertisements. See Black & White Cars, Inc. v. Groome 

Transp., Inc., 442 S.E.2d 391 (Va. 1994). The court acknowledged both the "general rule that a penal statute or ordinance 

does not automatically create a private right of action," and 

the exception to this rule that "an injunction is appropriate 

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relief where violation of a penal statute ... results in special 

damage to property rights," such as the plaintiffs' taxicab 

licenses, "which would be difficult to quantify." Id. at 394.

Black & White cannot rescue Dial A Car's claim for the 

simple reason that it is not controlling authority in the 

District of Columbia. In fact, it is not even persuasive 

concerning District law because, as noted above, when faced 

with a claim to an implied right of action the DCCA applies 

the Supreme Court's test in Cort v. Ash; in Black & White 

the Supreme Court of Virginia did not even cite Cort v. Ash

or its sequelae. Moreover, Dial A Car states that its damages are "more easily quantifiable" than the damages in 

Black & Whitea nearly suicidal point because even under 

Black & White an injunction is not appropriate if the plaintiff's damages are not "difficult to quantify." 442 S.E.2d at 

394.

Finally, Dial A Car renews its argument, already rejected 

by another panel, that this court should certify to the DCCA 

the question whether there is a private right of action under 

§ 40-1719. The certification procedure is appropriate only if 

"it appears to the certifying court there is no controlling 

precedent in the decisions of the [DCCA]." D.C. Code 

§ 11-723(a). In deciding whether to certify a case we look to 

whether local law is "genuinely uncertain" with respect to a 

dispositive question, Tidler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 851 F.2d 418, 

426 (D.C. Cir. 1988), and to whether the "case is one of 

extreme public importance," Joy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, 

Inc., 999 F.2d 549, 563-64 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). 

If, however, there is a "discernible path for the court to 

follow," then we do not stop short of deciding the question. 

Tidler, 851 F.2d at 426.

In this case we conclude again that certification is unnecessary. The DCCA precedent regarding implied private rights 

of action is reasonably clear and provides a "discernible path" 

to the resolution of this case which, although not insignificant, 

is not one of "extreme public importance" in the District of 

Columbia.

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III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons we hold that there is no private 

right of action under D.C. Code § 40-1719. Because there is 

no genuine uncertainty as to the proper outcome of this issue 

we decline to certify the question to the DCCA. Accordingly, 

the order of the district court is

Affirmed.

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