Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-01920/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-01920-7/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Audencio Maldonado
Petitioner
Daniel Paramo
Respondent

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

AUDENCIO MALDONADO, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

DANIEL PARAMO, 

Respondent. 

Case No. 14-cv-01920-JSW 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 

DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND 

DIRECTING PARTIES TO MEET AND 

CONFER RE DEVELOPMENT OF 

FACTUAL RECORD 

Re: Docket No. 18 

Now before the Court for consideration is the motion to dismiss, filed by Respondent, 

Warden Daniel Paramo (“Paramo”). The Court has considered the parties’ papers, relevant legal 

authority, and the record in this case, and it finds the motion is suitable for disposition without oral 

argument. The Court HEREBY DENIES, WITHOUT PREJUDICE, Paramo’s motion. 

BACKGROUND 

The Court shall provide a brief summary of the facts pertinent to the motion. On March 

26, 2007, Maldonado was convicted in the Superior Court of the State of California for the County 

of Santa Clara (“Superior Court”) of five counts of lewd or lascivious acts on a child by force, 

violence, duress, menace or fear, in violation of California Penal Code section 288(b)(1). 

(Respondent’s Exhibit (“RX”) 1.) On May 7, 2007, Maldonado was sentenced to a term of 40 

years imprisonment. (RX Ex. 2; RX 11.) It is undisputed that Maldonado did not timely appeal 

his sentence. However, with the assistance of his former cellmate, Carlos Brocatto, between 

March 16, 2012 and January 16, 2014, Maldonado filed several motions with the state court as 

well as three state habeas petitions. (RX 5, 7-8, 11.) Maldonado, again with Brocatto’s 

assistance, filed the Petition in this case on April 25, 2014. 

The Court previously dismissed the Petition for failure to pay the filing fee or to submit an 

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United States District Court 

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application to proceed in forma pauperis. However, on March 6, 2015, the Court granted a 

motion for reconsideration, directed that counsel be appointed, and re-opened the case. The 

Court’s ruling was based, in part, on Brocatto’s representations about Maldonado’s mental status 

and Brocatto’s representations that he had been transferred to a different prison and had been 

unable to assist Maldonado. (Docket No. 10, Order Granting Motion for Reconsideration at 2:21-

3:12.) 

The Court shall address additional facts as necessary in its analysis. 

ANALYSIS 

Paramo moves to dismiss Maldonado’s Petition on the basis that it is untimely. The 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) imposes a one-year statute of 

limitations on petitions for writs of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). That time begins to 

run from “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the 

expiration of the time for seeking such review.” Id. § 2244(d)(1)(A). However, “[t]he time during 

which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect 

to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation 

under this subsection.” Id. § 2244(d)(2). 

The Supreme Court has determined that the doctrine of equitable tolling applies to 

AEDPA’s statute of limitations. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010). “[A] ‘petitioner’ 

is ‘entitled to equitable tolling’ only if he shows ‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights 

diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and prevented timely 

filing.” Holland, 560 U.S. at 649 (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)); 

accord Forbess v. Franke, 749 F.3d 837, 839 (9th Cir. 2014). 

Maldonado does not dispute that he failed to file his federal petition within AEDPA’s oneyear limitation period. Rather he argues that the doctrine of equitable tolling applies, based on 

alleged mental impairments. The Ninth Circuit has adopted a two-part test to evaluate whether a 

petitioner is entitled to equitably tolling on the basis of a mental impairment. Forbess, 749 F.3d at 

840 (citing Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d at 1092, 1093 (9th Cir. 2010)). The Court shall refer to this 

test as the “Bills test.”

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First, a petitioner must show that his mental impairment was an 

‘extraordinary circumstance’ beyond his control ... by 

demonstrating the impairment was so severe that either 

(a) petitioner was unable to rationally or factually to 

personally understand the need to timely file, or 

(b) petitioner’s mental state rendered him personally unable 

to prepare a habeas petition and effectuate its filing. 

Second, the petitioner must show diligence in pursuing the claims to 

the extent he could understand them, but that the mental impairment 

made it impossible to meet the filing deadline under the totality of 

the circumstances, including reasonably available access to 

assistance. 

Bills, 628 F.3d at 1099-1100 (citations and footnote omitted, emphasis in original). 

The Bills court then explained that, in practice, a court must 

(1) find the petitioner has made a non-frivolous showing that he had 

a severe mental impairment during the filing period that would 

entitle him to an evidentiary hearing; (2) determine, after 

considering the record, whether the petitioner satisfied his burden 

that he was in fact mentally impaired; (3) determine whether the 

petitioner’s mental impairment made it impossible to timely file on 

his own; and (4) consider whether the circumstances demonstrate 

the petitioner was otherwise diligent in attempting to comply with 

the filing requirements. 

Id. at 1100-1101. The Bills court also held that “[t]he ‘totality of the circumstances’ inquiry in the 

second prong considers whether the petitioner’s impairment was a but-for cause of any delay,” and 

that a petitioner can demonstrate the necessary diligence by showing that he “diligently [sought] 

assistance and exploit[ed] whatever assistance [was] reasonably available.” Id. at 1100-1101. 

The Ninth Circuit also has made clear that a petitioner is not always entitled to an 

evidentiary hearing to determine whether equitable tolling applies. Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 

768, 773 (9th Cir. 2010). “Where the record is amply developed, and where it indicates that the 

petitioner’s mental incompetence was not so severe as to cause the untimely filing of his habeas 

petition, a district court is not obligated to hold evidentiary hearings to further develop the factual 

record[.]” Id. (citing Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 2003). 

At this stage in the proceedings, the record on the existence and nature of Maldonado’s 

alleged mental impairment is sparse. Brocatto has stated in both the federal and state petitions that 

Maldonado’s mental capacity is akin to that of a ten year old child, he has a low understanding of 

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what he did and the length of his prison term, and did not understand the nature of the plea 

proceedings. (See, e.g., Docket No. 1, Petition at 12; RX 8 at p. 6.) Each of Maldonado’s state 

petitions was signed under penalty of perjury, as is his federal Petition. Paramo has not submitted 

any evidence to contradict Brocatto’s statements. Rather, he points the Superior Court opinion 

denying Maldonado’s initial state petition, which states, inter alia, that “the file contains no 

evidence which indicates [Maldonado] was incompetent to stand trial at any point during the 

pendency of his criminal proceedings. [Maldonado] was interviewed by police and the probation 

department and none of those individuals expressed a concern for [Maldonado’s] intellectual 

ability or capacity to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings.” (RX 1, Order at 3:6-13.) 

Those findings, however, refer to Maldonado’s alleged mental impairments at the time he entered 

his guilty plea and do not address Maldonado’s mental state during the AEDPA limitations period. 

On this record, the Court cannot find that, as a matter of law, Maldonado is not entitled to 

equitable tolling. See, e.g., Chick v. Chavez, 518 Fed. Appx. 567, 569 (9th Cir. 2013) (remanding 

for development of record where existing record included statements from petitioner’s jailhouse 

lawyer and there was no medical evidence in the record); Laws, 351 F.3d at 924 (“Of course, a 

petitioner’s statement, even if sworn, need not convince a court that equitable tolling is justified 

should countervailing evidence be introduced.”) (emphasis added). 

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Paramo’s motion to dismiss. This ruling, however, is 

without prejudice to Paramo renewing his motion after the record has been developed. See, e.g., 

Rules 6 and 7 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Petitions in Federal Courts.1

 

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 The parties should not construe this Order as finding that an evidentiary hearing will be 

required to resolve a renewed motion. 

Case 4:14-cv-01920-JSW Document 24 Filed 12/18/15 Page 4 of 5
United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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