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Parties Involved:
Robert L. Russo
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 21, 1996 Decided January 14, 1997

No. 96-3031

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

ROBERT L. RUSSO,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(95cr00097-01)

Robert L. Tucker, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. With him on

the briefs was A.J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender.

William D. Weinreb, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief

were Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher, Roy W. McLeese, III, and Thomas J.

Motley, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: WILLIAMS, HENDERSON, and RANDOLPH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.

RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge: Illinois congressman Daniel D. Rostenkowski allegedly placed

people on the congressional payroll who did no official work, or very little. In 1993, a grand jury

investigating the congressman subpoenaed Robert L. Russo, a congressional employee who worked

part-time for Rostenkowskifrom1976 to 1987. During those 11 years Russo received federal wages

totaling $90,000. Asked about the nature of his work, Russotestifying under a grant of

immunitysaid he spent several hours cleaning the congressman's Chicago district office five days

a week, every other week. Russo denied that anyone else cleaned the Chicago office in those years.

Both statements, an indictment later charged, were false. A jury convicted Russo of perjury (18

U.S.C. § 1623(a)), and obstruction ofjustice (18 U.S.C. § 1503), and the district courtsentenced him

to ten months' imprisonment and a fine.

Of the three issues Russo raises in this appeal from his conviction, two relate to the district

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court's rulings excluding defense evidence. We will begin with them.

I

The evidence at trial directly contradicted Russo's grand jury testimony. The government

called Rostenkowski's "regular" office cleaners to the stand. From them, the jury learned that Russo

cleaned the Chicago district officeor "ward office," as it was knownonly on alternate Tuesday

evenings, or perhaps another evening or two, but not every day every other week. These workers

knew Russo and he knew them. They worked together occasionally and they discussed matters

relating to the cleaning of the ward office. The Chicago office manager was unsure how often Russo

cleaned the congressman's office, but she knew that others made up the regular daily cleaning crew.

The government sought to establish that the $90,000 paid to Russo in the 11 years was more

for the work of his wife Irene as the Rostenkowski housekeeper, than for Russo's work at the

congressman's office. The prosecutor, in his opening statement, promised that the jury would "hear

evidence that Mrs. Russo was the cleaning person for the family." Some of the evidence consisted

of the testimony of Rostenkowski's former son-in-law, who said he saw Irene cleaning the

congressman's house on a regular basis from 1979 to 1988. The government also sought to counter

Russo's explanation to the grand jury that his wife worked for free at the Rostenkowki home because

she liked to help people. In his opening statement, the prosecutor referred to Irene's bronchial asthma

condition, which caused her to quit her employment several years earlier, and questioned whether

someone in that condition would have cleaned the congressman's house because "she enjoys doing

it." The prosecutor then connected her alleged housekeeping to Russo's congressional salary, and

asked the jury the "$90,000 question": "Why are you really getting the $90,000 here, Mr. Russo?"

In his closing argument the prosecutor returned to the same theme:

Another thing he said is that Irene Russo cleaned for free. Step back for a moment

10 to 15 years. Someone cleaning for free, does that comport with your common

experiences, that someone would clean someone else's house for that long a period

of time, never get any money, never getting paid? He said that's the way his wife was.

The first ruling to which Russo objects relates to Rita Kusek, Irene Russo's friend for 25

years. The defense called Kusek to testify about Irene's "penchant for cleaning over the years," and

about her observations of Irene doing this without charge. When the district court barred the

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testimony on the ground that it was "totally irrelevant, " defense counsel made a proffer. Kusek

would describe Irene's spending several days helping put up the wallpaper in Kusek's house; and

would say, based on her experience, that "Irene is sort of a cleaning freak. She kind of likes to do

that." Defense counsel added that although Irene's propensity to clean may not initially have been

relevant to Russo's indictment for perjury (he was charged only with lying about his own work), the

matter became significant in light of the prosecutor's mocking Russo's grand jury testimony that his

wife "liked to clean, she just likes it, she enjoys it, she likes helping people." The court reiterated its

decision that the testimony was irrelevant.

Relevant evidence is "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is

of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be

without the evidence." Federal Rule of Evidence 401. The Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 401

tells us that relevancy "exists only as a relation between an item of evidence and a matter properly

provable in the case." The first step in determining relevancy, therefore, is "to identify the "matter

properly provable.' " United States v. Foster, 986 F.2d 541, 545 (D.C. Cir. 1993). In performing

this task, the judge must take account of the relationship of the evidence offered to the evidence

already admitted. Some matters are properly provable only because the opposing party has made

them such.

If, for instance, the prosecution had presented nothing about Irene Russo's serving for free

as Rostenkowski's housekeeper, Kusek's testimony would have been of no consequence. But it

became of consequence when the prosecution sought to bolster its case by offering the jury a reason

why the congressman would have paid Russo more than he actually earned. The government's

desired inferencethat the $90,000 represented, in large measure, compensation for Irene's

servicesalso impugned Russo's credibility in the grand jury. There he had testified, as the trial jury

knew, that his wife helped Mrs. Rostenkowski clean, and that she did so without compensation

because she is "a very helpful individual" who "just likes to help people."

It wastherefore proper for Russo to put on evidence contrary to the government's suggested

inference. As in Foster, 986 F.2d at 545, the Kusek evidence fell within Wigmore's principle of

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"explanation": "every evidentiary fact or class of facts may call for two processes and raise two sets

of questions: (1) the admissibility of the original fact from the proponent, and (2) the admissibility

of explanatory facts from the opponent." 1A JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 36, at 1004 (Tillers

rev. 1983). In the words of Rule 401, the "fact that [became] of consequence to the determination

of the action" was Irene's expectation of compensation for cleaning the Rostenkowski home. The

prosecutor tried to convince the jury that Irene would not have worked for nothing. Rita Kusek

would have given evidence that Irene sometimes did just that. In the words of Rule 401, Kusek's

testimony would have made it "more probable" than without evidence that Irene cleaned for free.

And if the jury found that she worked all those years without expecting compensation, this would

have tended to undercut the government's theory about why the congressman paid Russo so much.

Trial judges, of course, are not expected to provide detailed explanations for each of their

evidentiary rulings. The judge must decide, often in a flash, if the answer to a question, or a

document, or some other kind of exhibit, would make something in the case more probable or less

probable than it would otherwise be. Precedent, logic, experience and just plain "feel" may play a role

in the decision. This is not to suggest that there are degrees of relevancy. An item sought to be

introduced may have little probative value or it may have a great deal. But as Rule 401 defines it, the

item is either relevant or it is not; there is no in-between. Foster, 986 F.2d at 545. Nonetheless,

FederalRule of Evidence 103(a) instructs usthat "[e]rror may not be predicated upon a ruling which

admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected ....", and Federal Rule

of Criminal Procedure 52(a) provides that "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance which does

not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." See also 28 U.S.C. § 2111.

Here the district court stated one ground, and one ground only, for refusing to admit Kusek's

testimonyit was irrelevant. Rather than trying to defend the court's ruling on that basis, the

government invokes another ground for exclusion. The argument is that admitting Kusek's testimony

would have violated Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a). With exceptions not pertinent here,

"[e]vidence of a person's character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity

therewith on a particular occasion...." FED R. EVID. 404(a). This opens up another set of questions.

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Rather than offer answers, we shall give Russo the benefit of all legal doubts. We will, in other

words, assume that the testimony about Irene's penchant for cleaning was offered for "a

consequential, material proposition, rather than to prove an act," and therefore did not come "within

the prohibition of [Rule 404(a)]." JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S

EVIDENCE § 404[01], at 404-18 (1996). We will also assume that what Kusek would say about

Irene's helping her with wallpaper had something to do with cleaning, and that despite Federal Rule

of Evidence 405, which deals with the permissible methods of proving character, all of Kusek's

testimony should have been admitted. Even in the face of these assumptions, we could not set aside

Russo's conviction.

Although it looms large in this appeal, Irene's cleaning of the congressman's home was

scarcely central at trial. What mattered was the sufficiency of the government's proof that Russo

intentionally lied to the grand jury, next to which the Kusek testimonywas comparatively trivial. The

government's evidence of Russo's lying was strong indeed. Several witnesses testified that Russo

knew they were the ones who regularly cleaned the ward office, and that Russo worked far lessthan

he claimed. Whatever Rostenkowski's motivation for paying Russo as much as he did, the evidence

ofRusso'slying remained. Furthermore, Kusek's evidence added little to what the jury eventually had

before it on this side issue. Other testimony indicating Irene's cleaning proclivity found its way into

the case. Rostenkowski's daughter testified on direct examination that Irene was never the

housekeeper for her family, and that Irene and Mrs. Rostenkowski would reciprocate helping each

other out with cleaning and redecorating. The congressman's daughter further explained that the

same wastrue at the family'ssummer home in Wisconsin, where "mom and Irene would get together

on redecorating or even planting something in the yard and theywould help each other out." Another

defense witnesstold the jury that the Russos and the Rostenkowskis were neighbors both in Chicago

and Wisconsin. After Russo's daughter and son-in-law purchased a summer home in Wisconsin,

Russo and his wife would spend weekends there. Before then, Russo and his wife rented a cottage

next door to the congressman's Wisconsin property. The jury thus heard that the Russo and

Rostenkowski families were friendly, that Irene and the congressman's wife were good friends, and

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that Irene voluntarily helped out with cleaning and redecorating. Kusek would not have added much

to this evidence, and we cannot believe her testimony would have changed the outcome of the trial.

We conclude therefore that refusing to allow Kusek to testify about Irene was a harmless error, if it

was an error at all, because the verdict against Russo was "not substantially swayed" by keeping her

testimony out. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946).

Russo's other evidentiary challenge relatesto FBI Agent Richard Eggleston, who interviewed

Russo five weeks before his grand jury testimony. Russo told Eggleston he had worked at both

Rostenkowski's Damen Avenue ward office and the congressman's home office on Noble Street. As

part of its case, the defense wanted to call Eggleston to testify about this part of the interview, in

order to show that Russo reasonably could have thought he was being asked about both offices when

he was questioned in the grand jury. The district court excluded the evidence, on the grounds that

it was hearsay and irrelevant.

There is no doubt that the nature of Russo's work for Rostenkowski was a fact of

consequence in the trial. But the defense did not offer the FBI agent's interview for the truth of

Russo'sstatement that he worked at the congressman's home onNoble Street. As the defense seemed

to agree, the agent's testimony, if introduced for this purpose, would have been hearsay and thus

inadmissible. Like the district court, we thus fail to see the relevance of this evidence. One cannot

say that because Russo worked at two offices, the agent's testimony would have made it more

probable that Russo misunderstood questions in the grand jury regarding his work at "the office."

Entailed in that statement is an assumption that Russo did in fact work at the congressman's home,

yet the interview could not be admitted to show this. If other evidence, properly admitted, indicated

that Russo cleaned the congressman's home office, that might enable defense counsel to argue in

closing that Russo was confused in the grand jury. But it would not make Eggleston's testimony

relevant and admissible.

II

Russo challenges his conviction on Count Two, which charged him with obstruction of

justice, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503, by "falsely and evasively testifying to the grand jury

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concerning (1) the nature and extent of any work he did for the Rostenkowski congressional office;

and (2) the cleaning services performed by others at 2148-2150 North Damen Avenue." For our

purposes, the pertinent portion of § 1503 is as follows:

(a) Whoever corruptly, or by threats of force, or by any threatening letter or

communication, endeavorsto influence, intimidate, orimpede anygrand or petit juror,

or ... influences, obstructs, orimpedes, or endeavorsto influence, obstruct, or impede,

the due administration of justice, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).

Relying on United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1991), Russo argues that

§ 1503 "is not violated by the mere giving of false testimony to a grand jury." This is true, but beside

the point. In a § 1503 prosecution, the government must proveas it did in this casenot just that

the defendant lied to a grand jury, but that he did so with the intent "to impede the due administration

of justice." United States v. Bridges, 717 F.2d 1444, 1449 & n.30 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Because the

elements of perjury and obstruction of justice are not the same, Bridges held that a defendant who

allegedly made a false statement to a grand jury could be prosecuted for both offenses.

Russo's actual point thus must be that, under § 1503, his lying to a grand jury with the intent

to obstruct its investigation did not amount to a "corrupt" obstruction of the due administration of

justice. On the face of it, this is a surprising proposition. It supposes that "corrupt" has nothing to

do with honesty, that a witness whose aim is to impede a grand jury investigation by distorting the

truth is not acting "corruptly." It also entails some odd consequences. For instance, how can it be

that concealing or destroying documentsrequested bya grand jurysubpoena ducestecummayviolate

§ 1503, while lying under oath about the location of the documents cannot? United States v. Lench,

806 F.2d 1443, 1445 (9thCir. 1986); United States v. McKnight, 799 F.2d 443, 447 (8thCir. 1986).

Russo'srelated claim is that he had no notice that perjury could trigger a § 1503 violation. Yet when

he was immunized, the district court warned him that if he lied to the grand jury he could be

prosecuted for obstruction of justice.

At any rate, Russo's attempt to analogize his case to Poindexterfailsfor many of the reasons

given by Judge Lamberth in United States v. Watt, 911 F. Supp. 538, 545-47 (D.D.C. 1995). In

Poindexter we had an as-applied challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 1505, which forbids "corruptly"

obstructing or impeding "the due and proper administration of the law" in any agency or

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congressional proceeding. We held that "corruptly," as used in § 1505, "is too vague to provide

constitutionally adequate notice that it prohibits lying to Congress." 951 F.2d at 379. While the

portion of § 1503 at issue here, and the portion of § 1505 at issue in Poindexter, are very nearly

identical, the settingsin which the provisions apply are vastly different. One can imagine any number

of non-corrupt ways in which an individual can intend to impede the work of an agency or

congressional committee. We gave the example in United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 882,

withdrawn and superseded in part on reh'g, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990), of an executive branch

official calling the chairman of a congressional committee and stating, "We both know this

investigation is really designed to embarrass the President (or a Senator), not to investigate

wrongdoing. Why don't you call it off?" The problem for the Poindexter court, then, was to discern

some special meaning in the word "corruptly," some meaning "sufficiently definite, as applied to the

conduct at issue on this appeal, viz. lying to Congress, to be the basis of a criminal conviction." 951

F.2d at 378. Otherwise "the statute would criminalize all attempts to "influence' congressional

inquiriesan absurd result that the Congress could not have intended in enacting the statute." Id.

at 377-78. We have no such problem in this case.

Anyone who intentionally liesto a grand jury is on notice that he may be corruptly obstructing

the grand jury's investigation. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). Whatever the

outer limits of "corruptly" in § 1503, Russo's acts of perjury were near its center. See Posters "N'

Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511 U.S. 513, 525 (1994). Numerous cases have, therefore, sustained

§ 1503 convictions of defendants who lied to grand juries. See United States v. Cohn, 452 F.2d 881,

882, 883-84 (2d Cir. 1971); United States v. Griffin, 589 F.2d 200, 201, 202-07 (5th Cir. 1979);

United States v. Perkins, 748 F.2d 1519, 1527-28 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Walasek, 527

F.2d 676, 679 (3d Cir. 1975). As we said in North, "very few non-corrupt ways to or reasons for

intentionally obstructing a judicial proceeding leap to mind." 910 F.2d at 882. This is why, in Judge

Lamberth's words, the "Poindexter court [ ] drew a sharp distinction between § 1505 and § 1503, and

repeatedly warned that the provisions were too "materially different' for the construction of one to

guide the other." 911 F. Supp. at 546. Poindexter, in other words, determined that the analogy

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Russo tries to draw between § 1503 and § 1505 is not a valid one despite the wording of the

provisions.

Russo cites four cases from other circuits, but these do not affect our judgment. United

States v. Essex, 407 F.2d 214 (6th Cir. 1969), stands for the proposition that § 1503 does not "make

the rendering of false testimony alone an obstruction of justice," a proposition Bridges endorses and

one not inconsistent with the verdict against Russo. United States v. Grubb, 11 F.3d 426, 437 (4th

Cir. 1993), and United States v. Wood, 958 F.2d 963, 973-75 (10th Cir. 1992), which Russo also

cites, are to the same effect. United States v. Aguilar, 21 F.3d 1475 (9th Cir.), aff'd in part, rev'd

in part on other grounds, 115 S. Ct. 571 (1994), decided nothing of importance to this case. In a

footnote the court said that although Poindexter was "helpful," it was "unnecessary" for the court to

conduct the same sort of vagueness inquiry with respect to § 1503. 21 F.3d at 1486 n.8.

Affirmed.

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