Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03924/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03924-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Willie Johnson
Appellant
Ready Mixed Concrete Co.
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Laurie Smith Camp, United States District Judge for the

District of Nebraska.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-3924

___________

Willie Johnson, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* District of Nebraska. 

Ready Mixed Concrete Co., a *

Nebraska Corporation and division *

of Lyman-Richey Corporation, a *

Delaware Corporation, * 

*

Appellee. * 

___________

Submitted: June 24, 2005

Filed: September 26, 2005

___________

Before ARNOLD, McMILLIAN, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.

Willie Johnson appeals from the district court’s1

 grant of summary judgment

in favor of Ready Mixed Concrete (“Ready Mixed”) in his suit under Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17. We affirm.

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I.

Johnson, an African-American, was employed as a truck driver by Ready

Mixed from 1994 until 2002. He drove a cement mixing truck for the company and

was based out of its plant in Omaha, Nebraska. On June 13, 2002, Ready Mixed fired

Johnson, citing dishonesty as the reason for his termination.

Johnson’s alleged dishonesty occurred in connection with an incident in which

his truck was damaged by acid while he was washing it. All truck drivers at Ready

Mixed were required periodically to clean their trucks. The drivers cleaned their

truck cabs using soap and water, but cleaned the drums of the trucks with a solution

of diluted acid. The parties do not dispute that on Friday, June 7, Johnson was told

to clean his truck before leaving for the day, and that he reported acid damage to his

truck on the following Wednesday, June 12. They dispute, however, when and how

the acid damage occurred.

Johnson asserts that the acid damage occurred on Friday, June 7. According

to his deposition testimony, Johnson washed his truck out quickly that day after being

asked to do so, because he “was excited to get off early to enjoy the weekend.” (J.A.

at 94). Johnson pulled up next to the water hose and filled his bucket up with water

and soap. Leaving his broom in the bucket, he went to use the restroom, came back,

and started washing. Johnson began by washing one passenger door and the hood.

While walking back to the water hose to rinse off the door and hood, he noticed that

his truck “was changing colors.” He knew from the discoloration that “it must have

been acid in that bucket.” Johnson testified later that he thought the acid had been

added to his bucket either by a fellow employee seeking to conserve acid or as a

result of “sabotage.” (J.A. at 88, 108)

Johnson’s supervisors testified that they did not believe that the acid damage

occurred to his truck on Friday, June 7, but rather that it must have occurred on

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Tuesday, June 11, the day before Johnson reported the damage. They also testified

that they did not believe Johnson’s assertion that the acid was added to his bucket by

a fellow employee. When Johnson brought the damage to the attention of John

Stueve, the plant superintendent, on June 12, Stueve examined the truck and then

contacted William Herschlag, who was the acting general superintendent of Ready

Mixed’s concrete plants. Either Stueve or Herschlag asked Johnson to fill out a

company damage report, known as a “Form 5.” On the Form 5, Johnson drew a scene

of the “accident” and reported that the acid damage had occurred on June 7. He

recounted the incident as described above and concluded that “I bel[ie]ve someone

had to pour a[ci]d in my Bucket when I went to Restroom. Sab[o]tage.” (J.A. at

209). 

After receiving Johnson’s report, Stueve and Herschlag investigated the acid

incident. Stueve was skeptical that the damage had occurred on June 7, maintaining

that he “[a]bsolutely” would have noticed any acid damage to Johnson’s truck

occurring prior to June 11. He testified in his deposition that he “would have

observed” Johnson’s truck “numerous times” between June 7 and June 12, either from

his office or while performing duties near where it was parked. Stueve and Herschlag

reviewed Johnson’s time record from Friday, June 7, which indicated that Johnson

had clocked out twenty minutes after being told to wash his truck. According to

Stueve, he did not believe that Johnson could have washed his truck, gone to the

restroom, and, as required by company procedure, refueled his truck in twenty

minutes. Herschlag testified that he did not think Johnson had sufficient time to

“clean the truck, as he had stated.” (J.A. at 515).

Stueve, moreover, did not believe Johnson’s suggestion that another employee

put acid in Johnson’s bucket, reasoning that he did not “have employees at [the plant]

that would purposely do that.” (J.A. at 422). Herschlag likewise testified that he and

Stueve “did not believe” that Johnson had been sabotaged, (J.A. at 522), and that

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Johnson’s accusation that “somebody else pour[ed] acid into his bucket,” in his view,

was “false.” (J.A. at 541).

Stueve also testified that three employees approached him on June 12 with

information about the acid damage. These employees each wrote out statements

saying that they saw Johnson washing his truck on June 11. One of them testified

expressly that Johnson “put[] acid into a five gallon bucket,” and “proceeded to clean

his truck with the acid.”

On June 13, in response to Stueve’s skepticism of Johnson’s claim that the acid

damage had occurred on June 7, Johnson submitted another statement explaining his

actions on June 11. He claimed that the acid he had been seen with was “to help

clean the hopper and drum,” and that on June 11, he “washed only the D[ru]m &

hopper.”

Still disbelieving Johnson’s account, Stueve faxed the Form 5, along with the

three employee statements and a statement of his own, to Kevin Schmidt, Executive

Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of Ready Mixed. Schmidt then approved

Johnson’s dismissal “due to dishonesty and falsification of company documents.”

(J.A. at 553). Herschlag informed Johnson of his termination on June 13, 2002.

Schmidt asserts that he spoke to Johnson shortly after he was fired, and that Johnson

claimed that two fellow truck drivers could support his version of events. The two

truck drivers gave statements saying that they had not seen Johnson washing out his

truck on June 7. One of them stated that he had seen Johnson washing his truck’s

hopper with acid on June 11, and the other stated that he had been away from work

on June 11. On June 19, Schmidt told Johnson that neither driver corroborated his

story, and Johnson identified three other employees as potential witnesses.

Statements were obtained from all of these employees, none of whom reported seeing

Johnson washing his truck on June 7.

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Johnson sought unemployment benefits, but Ready Mixed denied his petition.

Johnson filed a charge of discrimination with the Nebraska Equal Opportunity

Commission (“NEOC”), which ultimately notified him of his right to sue under Title

VII. Johnson then filed suit on October 10, 2003, alleging that the termination of his

employment violated the statute’s prohibition on race discrimination.

The district court granted Ready Mixed’s motion for summary judgment,

reasoning that although Johnson had stated a prima facie case of discrimination, he

had not demonstrated a genuine dispute for trial over whether Ready Mixed’s

proffered reason for dismissing him – his dishonesty regarding the acid damage to

his truck – was merely pretext for race discrimination. The district court also refused

to draw a negative inference from Ready Mixed’s failure to produce photographs of

the damage to Johnson’s truck.

II. 

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material

fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c). We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, drawing all

reasonable inferences, without resort to speculation, in favor of the non-moving party.

See Hitt v. Harsco Corp., 356 F.3d 920, 923-24 (8th Cir. 2004). 

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it an unlawful employment

practice for an employer to “discharge any individual . . . because of such individual’s

race, color, religion, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). The parties agree

that the burden-shifting framework promulgated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), should be applied to determine whether Ready Mixed

was entitled to summary judgment. Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a

plaintiff must establish a prima facie case by showing that he (1) is a member of a

protected class, (2) was qualified for his position, and (3) suffered an adverse

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employment action under circumstances permitting an inference that the action was

the result of unlawful discrimination. See Habib v. Nationsbank, 279 F.3d 563, 566

(8th Cir. 2001). The burden of production then shifts to the employer to articulate a

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for firing the plaintiff. Id. If the employer can

satisfy this burden, the plaintiff must show that the employer’s reason is a pretext for

intentional discrimination. Id. Because the record was fully developed in connection

with the motion for summary judgment, we need not analyze each step of the burdenshifting framework on appeal, but instead may turn directly to whether there is a

genuine issue for trial on the question of race discrimination vel non. See United

States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983); George v.

Leavitt, 407 F.3d 405, 411-12 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 

Johnson’s principal argument is that two white truck drivers, Kenneth

Schroeder and Carl Spencer, were involved in conduct similar to his alleged

misconduct, but were not fired. Schroeder and Spencer both had acid-damaged trucks

but did not voluntarily report the damage. Johnson asserts that the two drivers

“concealed” the damage from the company. He argues that the conduct of Schroeder

and Spencer was thus dishonest, just as his conduct was believed to be dishonest, and

that the differential treatment by Ready Mixed supports an inference that Johnson was

discharged because of his race. We disagree that Schroeder and Spencer were

similarly situated to Johnson in all relevant respects, as required to demonstrate race

discrimination based on disparate treatment of fellow employees. E.g., Harvey v.

Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 38 F.3d 968, 972-73 (8th Cir. 1994). We thus conclude that

an inference of race discrimination is not supported.

The evidence does not bear out Johnson’s suggestion that Ready Mixed must

have viewed the conduct of Schroeder and Spencer as “dishonest,” but treated them

differently than Johnson. Johnson identifies no evidence that Ready Mixed believed

that Schroeder or Spencer violated any duty to the company requiring disclosure of

acid damage, or that management considered their conduct to be dishonest.

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Schroeder and Spencer both testified the acid damage to their trucks was observed by

supervisors, thus suggesting that it could not have been intentionally “concealed” as

Johnson asserts. Spencer testified specifically that he was not told that he should

have reported the damage, (J.A. at 664), and Schroeder was not even asked in his

deposition about a reporting requirement. Neither supervisor, Stueve or Herschlag,

testified that Schroeder or Spencer violated any policy relating to reporting of

damage. And most importantly, there is no showing that Schroeder or Spencer

misrepresented any facts to Ready Mixed or falsified reporting documents, as the

company believed that Johnson had done. Violations of different company policies

do not necessarily support an inference that employees are similarly situated,

particularly where one violation is considered more serious than the other. See Tolen

v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d 879, 882-83 (8th Cir. 2004); Malone v. Eaton Corp., 187 F.3d

960, 962 (8th Cir. 1999); Lowe v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., 963 F.2d 173, 175 (8th

Cir. 1992). In short, the record does not support an inference that these two drivers

were similarly situated to Johnson in all relevant respects, but treated differently.

Johnson next contends that contrary to Ready Mixed’s conclusion, the time

card information from June 7 shows that Johnson had sufficient time to wash his

truck on that date, and that the company’s conclusion that Johnson lied about the date

of the damage is therefore flawed. One difficulty with this argument is that Johnson

must show not only that the employer may have been incorrect in its conclusion about

the events of June 7, but that the employer did not really believe that Johnson was

dishonest. Scroggins v. Univ. of Minn., 221 F.3d 1042, 1045 (8th Cir. 2000). If the

employer was motivated by a good faith belief that Johnson was dishonest, then it

was not motivated by his race, even if the conclusion about timing was erroneous.

Absent other evidence to show that the employer was actually motivated by race,

moreover, proof that it reached an unfounded conclusion about Johnson’s dishonesty

is insufficient to prove the claim.

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Johnson also asserts that the district court erred by refusing to draw a negative

inference from Ready Mixed’s failure to produce pictures of the damage to his truck.

He argues that the pictures would have shown that the acid damage to his truck was

similar to the damage to the trucks of Schroeder and Spencer, who were not fired. 

We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s decision whether to draw an

adverse inference based on destruction of evidence. Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R.

Co., 354 F.3d 739, 745 (8th Cir. 2003). An adverse inference is appropriate only

when, among other things, the party seeking the inference can show that once-extant

records were destroyed “to suppress the truth,” and that the records would have

favored its case. Groves v. Cost Planning & Mgmt. Int’l, Inc., 372 F.3d 1008, 1010

(8th Cir. 2004); see also Koons v. Aventis Pharms., Inc., 367 F.3d 768, 780 (8th Cir.

2004).

Although there is some evidence in the record suggesting that pictures should

have been taken of Johnson’s truck, and that Ready Mixed typically took pictures of

truck damage, Johnson has not shown that any pictures actually were taken of his

truck. None of the witnesses who were deposed recalls seeing any such pictures, or

seeing them taken. More importantly, even if the pictures did exist, Johnson has

proffered no evidence that they were intentionally destroyed to suppress the truth or

that they would have helped his case. The relative severity of the damage to the three

trucks is not relevant to Johnson’s claim. The stated basis for termination was

Johnson’s perceived dishonesty, not the severity of damage to his truck. Even if the

acid damage to Johnson’s truck was as severe or less severe than the damage to the

trucks of Schroeder and Spencer, therefore, it would not demonstrate that Schroeder

and Spencer were similarly situated in a relevant respect. The district court did not

abuse its discretion in determining that an adverse inference from the absence of

pictures was unwarranted.

In one of our most oft-quoted passages, we said in 1994 that “[f]ederal courts

do not sit as a super-personnel department that reexamines an entity’s business

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decisions.” Harvey v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 38 F.3d 968, 973 (8th Cir. 1994)

(internal quotations omitted). One reason we emphasize this point is that a number

of plaintiffs present a sympathetic situation in which the employer’s judgment in

imposing discipline may appear poor or erroneous to outsiders. It is tempting to think

that the role of the federal courts is to offer a remedy in that sort of case. Whether we

might believe that Ready Mixed was unduly harsh in its treatment of Mr. Johnson,

however, is not a matter to be considered in deciding this appeal. Our authority is to

determine only whether there is a genuine issue for trial on the question whether

Ready Mixed discharged Johnson because of his race. For the reasons set forth

above, we agree with the district court that the record developed by Johnson is not

sufficient to support a finding of intentional race discrimination, and that summary

judgment was appropriate. 

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. Ready

Mixed’s motion to supplement the record on appeal is denied as moot.

______________________________

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