Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02227/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02227-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Reginald Stern Gardner
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable James E. Gritzner, United States District Judge for the

Southern District of Iowa, sitting by designation.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-2227

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff-Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Northern District of Iowa.

Reginald Stern Gardner, also known *

as Daniel Carl Sharpe, also known as * [UNPUBLISHED]

Black, *

*

Defendant-Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: December 13, 2004

Filed: July 11, 2005

___________

Before WOLLMAN, LAY, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Reginald Stern Gardner was found guilty by a jury of possession with intent

to distribute cocaine base, cocaine, and marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1). Because Gardner had sustained two prior felony convictions for

controlled substance offenses, the district court1

 sentenced Gardner as a career

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offender pursuant to USSG § 4B1.1, and imposed a term of 360 months’

imprisonment. We affirm.

In the spring of 2003, police obtained information that drugs were being sold

from an apartment at 404 Second Street N.W. in Mason City, Iowa. Police conducted

surveillance and determined that there was heavy foot traffic going in and out of the

apartment, a circumstance consistent with drug dealing. In June of 2003, police

arrested Jennifer Boggess on unrelated theft charges. With hopes of receiving

favorable treatment, Boggess told the police that she had obtained cocaine and

cocaine base from an individual at the Second Street apartment on several occasions,

including earlier that day. The police then obtained a warrant to search the apartment.

While executing the search warrant, the police found Gardner in the residence,

and they seized a small amount of marijuana and approximately $500 in cash from

Gardner’s person. A search of the apartment turned up 23 grams of marijuana

prepackaged in twenty-three small bags, 122.65 grams of cocaine, and 9.98 grams of

cocaine base. The prepackaged marijuana was discovered in the back bedroom where

Gardner and three others were apprehended. The cocaine and cocaine base were

discovered in a food container hidden in the kitchen. Additionally, police seized

scales, drug packaging materials, and other drug paraphernalia. At the time of his

arrest, Gardner gave the police a false name and produced false identification. 

At trial, Gardner’s theory of defense was that he was at the apartment that

evening to buy drugs, not to sell drugs. Gardner further argued that there was

insufficient evidence directly linking him to the larger distribution quantities of drugs.

Boggess reluctantly testified that she had purchased drugs at the apartment from

Gardner and from others. Another witness, Katy Warren, testified that she had

observed Gardner selling cocaine and cocaine base from the apartment in June 2003.

To prove Gardner’s knowledge and intent to distribute, the government also

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introduced evidence of Gardner’s two prior convictions for drug distribution pursuant

to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).

On appeal, Gardner argues that the district court abused its discretion by: (1)

allowing 404(b) evidence of his two prior convictions; (2) rejecting his requested jury

instruction related to drug addicts; and (3) denying his motion for a judgment of

acquittal and a new trial. Gardner further argues that his sentence is unconstitutional.

We address each argument individually.

1. 404(b) Evidence.

Gardner argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting

evidence under Rule 404(b) that he was convicted in 1996 for sale of crack cocaine

and in 1995 for possession with intent to distribute cocaine. We have held

consistently that Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion. United States v. O’Connell, 841

F.2d 1408, 1422 (8th Cir. 1988). The government may introduce evidence of prior

crimes if the evidence is: “1) relevant to a material issue; 2) similar in kind and not

overly remote in time to the charged crime; 3) supported by sufficient evidence; and

4) such that its potential prejudice does not substantially outweigh its probative

value.” United States v. Crenshaw, 359 F.3d 977, 998 (8th Cir. 2004). We review

the district court’s decision to admit 404(b) evidence for abuse of discretion.

O’Connell, 841 F.2d at 1422.

Gardner claims the two prior drug convictions had no relevance to whether he

was at the apartment to sell drugs or merely to buy drugs. We disagree. Gardner’s

theory of defense was that he no longer lived at the apartment at the time of the

search, and that he was there only to buy drugs, not to sell them. This defense put his

intent at issue (i.e., did he intend only to buy, and not to sell?), and Gardner’s defense

also challenged the government’s position regarding his knowledge that drugs were

at the apartment and prepackaged for resale.

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Gardner’s 1995 conviction was for possession with intent to distribute cocaine.

At the time of that arrest, he provided a false name to police and was in possession

of 57.9 grams of powder cocaine and 50.7 grams of crack cocaine. Gardner’s 1996

conviction was for selling cocaine. At the time of that arrest, he provided a false

name to police and was in possession of 10 grams of cocaine and $784. We agree

with the government that this evidence is relevant in the instant case to establish that

Gardner knew the drugs were in the residence, knew they were packaged for resale,

and intended to sell drugs. Gardner’s prior convictions were relevant to a material

issue, similar in kind, not too remote in time, and supported by sufficient evidence.

Unlike the 404(b) evidence in Crenshaw, the potential for unfair prejudice from the

evidence in this case was not substantially outweighed by its probative value. 

2. Drug Addict Jury Instruction. 

Gardner argues that the district court should have instructed the jury on specific

reasons why a drug addict’s testimony may lack credibility. We review the district

court’s choice of jury instructions for an abuse of discretion. Campos v. City of Blue

Springs, 289 F.3d 546, 551 (8th Cir. 2002).

The district court is not obligated to provide a special addict-informant

instruction. United States v. Hoppe, 645 F.2d 630, 633 (8th Cir. 1981). The presence

of the following factors may obviate the need for an addict witness instruction: 1) a

dispute as to whether the witness is actually an addict; 2) cross-examination

concerning the witness’ addiction; 3) an instruction alerting the jury to view the

witness’ testimony with care; and 4) corroboration of the witness’ testimony. Id.

“When reviewing a challenge to the jury instructions, we recognize that the district

court has wide discretion in formulating the instructions and will affirm if the entire

charge to the jury, when read as a whole, fairly and adequately contains the law

applicable to the case.” United States v. Casas, 999 F.2d 1225, 1230 (8th Cir. 1993).

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Although it was under no obligation to do so, the district court gave the jury

a special instruction regarding the credibility of the two informants. In Instruction

8, entitled “CREDIBILITY-DRUG ABUSER,” the district court instructed the jury

that it must examine the testimony of the two witnesses with greater care. Further,

the district court allowed Gardner to cross-examine the witnesses regarding their

addiction and their motive to cooperate with the government. The two witnesses

corroborated each other’s testimony. 

After reviewing the jury instructions, we conclude that as a whole, they

accurately reflected the law applicable to the case. Based on this record, we hold that

the district court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting Gardner’s preferred addictinformant instruction.

3. Judgment of Acquittal and New Trial.

Gardner appeals denial of his motions for a judgment of acquittal and a new

trial. We address each claim individually. 

In considering a motion for judgment of acquittal, the district court must deny

the motion if, “after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

government, substantial evidence justifies an inference of guilt, even if contrary

evidence exists.” United States v. Harris, 352 F.3d 362, 365 (8th Cir. 2003). A

denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal will be reversed “only if there is no

interpretation of the evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find the defendant

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Gomez, 165 F.3d 650, 654 (8th

Cir. 1999). We review the district court’s ruling on a motion for judgment of

acquittal de novo. Harris, 352 F.3d at 365. 

We conclude that substantial evidence supports the guilty verdict. The jury

was presented with the physical evidence of the drugs seized at the apartment, the

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testimony of two witnesses who saw Gardner sell drugs from the apartment, evidence

of using a false identity and paying for the apartment in cash, and the 404(b) evidence

of the two prior convictions for distribution of the same types of drugs. In his

defense, Gardner produced evidence, through the testimony of his girlfriend, that he

had moved out of the apartment prior to the search. Reviewing this evidence in the

light most favorable to the government, we conclude that substantial evidence

justifies the inference that Gardner was selling drugs from the apartment.

Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not err when it denied Gardner’s

motion for judgment of acquittal.

Gardner fares no better on his motion for a new trial. The district court may

grant a new trial “if the interest of justice so requires.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a). The

district court has broad discretion to grant a new trial on the grounds that the verdict

was contrary to the evidence. United States v. Huerta-Orozco, 272 F.3d 561, 565-66

(8th Cir. 2001). We will reverse the district court only for an abuse of discretion. Id.

at 566. As we have already concluded, there was substantial evidence supporting the

jury’s guilty verdict. In the face of substantial evidence of Gardner’s guilt, we hold

that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for a new

trial.

4. Sentencing Issues.

Based on Gardner’s two prior drug convictions, the district court determined

that Gardner was a career offender for purposes of the sentencing guidelines, see

USSG § 4B1.1, and sentenced him to a term of 360 months’ imprisonment, which

was the low end of the applicable guideline sentencing range of 360 months to life

imprisonment. This sentence was to run consecutively to the 24-month term Gardner

received in a revocation of supervised release in case MJ-04-55-JEG, which was

transferred from the District of Minnesota. 

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For the first time on appeal, Gardner challenges the constitutionality of the

sentencing guidelines. His claim in his appellate briefs and at oral argument was

based upon Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). Since then, the Supreme

Court decided United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), which applied the

principles of Blakely to the federal sentencing guidelines, and held that the guidelines

are effectively advisory in all cases. Gardner argues the applicability of Booker in a

letter filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(j).

Since Gardner did not object to the constitutionality or mandatory nature of the

guidelines in the district court, we review his claim for plain error. United States v.

Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 550 (8th Cir. 2005). This case does not involve a violation of

the Sixth Amendment, because the district court’s application of the career offender

provision of the guidelines was based on Gardner’s prior convictions, and sentencing

enhancements based on prior convictions are outside the rule of Booker. See Booker,

125 S. Ct. at 756; United States v. Marcussen, 403 F.3d 982, 984 (8th Cir. 2005). The

district court did err by applying the guidelines as mandatory, however, and this error

is now plain.

Upon review of the record as a whole, we conclude that the district court’s

error in applying the guidelines as mandatory did not affect Gardner’s substantial

rights. The record does not indicate a reasonable probability that Gardner’s sentence

would have been different had the district court applied the guidelines as advisory.

See Pirani, 406 F.3d at 552. Although Gardner received a sentence at the low end of

the recommended guideline range, this fact “is insufficient, without more, to

demonstrate a reasonable probability that the court would have imposed a lesser

sentence absent the Booker error.” Id. at 553. 

Gardner argues that certain statements made by the district court at sentencing

suggest that it would have imposed a more favorable sentence under Booker. He

points to such comments as “[f]rom what I’ve read about you, there’s an individual

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there that we ought to have back as a member of society, and you ought to have a

chance to have a better future as time goes by,” (S. Tr. at 19), and “there are a lot of

contradictions in your case.” (S. Tr. at 16). The court also noted, however, that “[i]n

your past conduct you’ve gotten involved in some things that caused society a lot of

trouble,” and found that “a sentence at the bottom of the guideline range adequately

affords deterrence of criminal conduct and protection of the public . . . [and]

adequately addresses the issues in this case.” (Id.). The record gives no firm

indication what the district court might have done under an advisory system, and

“where the effect of the error on the result in the district court is uncertain or

indeterminate – where we would have to speculate – the appellant has not met his

burden of showing a reasonable probability that the result would have been different

but for the error.” Pirani, 406 F.3d at 553 (internal quotation omitted). 

The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 

LAY, Circuit Judge, concurring.

I concur in the judgment of the court. I write separately to highlight the limited

efficacy of an inflexible federal criminal justice policy that responds to the epidemic

of drug crimes without adequately addressing the root cause of this epidemic – drug

addiction. Many states have created specialized drug courts that approach this

epidemic with much greater success. In most drug courts, nonviolent, substanceabusing offenders charged with drug-related crimes are channeled into judicially

supervised substance abuse treatment, mandatory drugs testing, and other

rehabilitative services in an effort to reduce recidivism. Eligible offenders typically

have the charges against them stayed and dropped if treatment is successful, or plead

guilty with prosecution deferred and criminal punishment withheld if treatment is

successful. Evidence shows that the flexible and pro-active approach of drug courts

reduces recidivism rates to less than half of the recidivism rate of those offenders who

are simply imprisoned for their drug crimes. Unfortunately, the federal criminal

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justice system offers no such alternatives for nonviolent, substance-abusing offenders.

Given the tremendous economic and human costs of imprisoning nonviolent drug

offenders, Congress should seriously consider creating federal drug courts. Federal

drug courts would save a significant amount of money for taxpayers.

______________________________

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