Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-09-03550/USCOURTS-ca7-09-03550-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Vernon D. Woods
Appellant

Document Text:

*

After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record. See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2)(C).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted March 31, 2010*

Decided May 6, 2010

Before

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 09‐3550

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

VERNON D. WOODS,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Western Division.

No. 06 CR 50073

Philip G. Reinhard,

Judge.

O R D E R

The last time this case was before us, we concluded that appellant Vernon D. Woods

was entitled to be resentenced, because the district court had erred when it concluded that

Woods was a career offender for purposes of § 4B1.1 of the United States Sentencing

Guidelines. See United States v. Woods, 576 F.3d 400 (7th Cir. 2009) (Woods I). In keeping with

our order, the district court held a second sentencing hearing on remand, after which it

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 09‐3550 Page 2

imposed a sentence of 144 months’ imprisonment and six years’ supervised release on his

two drug distribution charges, and a concurrent sentence of 120 months for possessing a

firearm and ammunition as a convicted felon. Woods’s original sentence had been 192

months’ imprisonment, and so his first appeal had the effect of shaving four years off of his

overall sentence. Nevertheless, the court’s sentence was considerably higher than the 63‐78

month range that the guidelines recommended, once the career‐criminal provisions were set

aside.

Woods has appealed again, asserting that the district court failed to give an adequate

explanation for choosing a sentence so much higher than the top of the guidelines range. He

infers, from that lack of explanation, that the district court failed to take into account the risk

that its sentence could lead to unwarranted sentencing disparities among similar

defendants. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). Our review of the sentencing record satisfies us,

however, that the district court acted within its discretion when it chose a proper sentence

for Woods, and that it committed no procedural error requiring reversal. We therefore

affirm.

There is little more that we need add. As we explained in United States v. Moreno‐

Padilla, 2010 WL 1380120 (7th Cir. April 8, 2010):

Our review of sentencing decisions proceeds in two steps. . . . First, we ensure

that the district court did not commit any “significant procedural error,”

examples of which include failing to calculate, or improperly calculating, the

applicable Guidelines range; treating the Guidelines as mandatory; or failing

to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. . . . Once we are convinced that the

sentencing judge followed correct procedure, we then consider the

substantive reasonableness of the sentence. . . . We presume that

within‐Guidelines sentences are reasonable, . . . and we review sentences only

for abuse of discretion . . . .

2010 WL 1380120 at *6 (citations omitted). In addition, the court “must adequately explain

the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review and to promote the perception

of fair sentencing.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007), citing Rita v. United States, 551

U.S. 338, 356‐57 (2007).

As we noted, Woods’s primary argument in this appeal is that the district court

failed to offer an adequate explanation for why it chose a sentence (144 months) that was

nearly twice the top of the recommended guidelines range (78 months). Such a sentence, he

continues, violates the principle expressed in § 3553(a)(6) that unwarranted disparities

among similar defendants must be avoided. We reject both of these propositions. The

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No. 09‐3550 Page 3

district court began the resentencing hearing by allowing both Woods and the government

to present arguments about what sentence would be appropriate. The government urged

the court to reinstate the 192‐month sentence it had originally imposed, in light of the

serious nature of the drug and gun charges Woods faced, the fact that his criminal history

included four felony drug convictions as well as the conviction for involuntary

manslaughter (which we discussed in Woods I), and the likelihood of recidivism. Woods

responded that 192 months was well in excess of any sentence that met the requirements of

§ 3553(a). He pointed out that his prior drug convictions all involved small quantities. He

also brought to the court’s attention the fact that, since his original sentencing, he had

earned his GED, completed drug treatment and education programs, and had not received

any disciplinary tickets while incarcerated. Finally, he argued that his dysfunctional

upbringing was a reason for a sentence within the revised guidelines range.

The court’s comments show that it took all of this information into account. It found

– contrary to Woods’s argument – that his criminal history was quite serious. It noted that

despite Woods’s numerous prior drug convictions, he had proved thus far to be

incorrigible. The fact that Woods also possessed a loaded .357 Magnum in connection with

his current offense also supported a higher sentence, in the court’s view. On a number of

occasions, Woods had violated the conditions of his state parole and his parole had been

revoked. Summarizing, the court said “I must deter this defendant, and the only way is

imprisonment for a substantial period of time, and a light sentence would have no deterrent

effect for one with his record.” The court acknowledged that Woods had used his time in

prison well and that his upbringing had been difficult, but that these considerations did not

override the need to protect society from him and to deter him from committing future

crimes. It specifically noted that the sentence it chose was lower than the one the

government had recommended, but significantly higher than the recommended guidelines

sentence.

From a procedural standpoint, this explanation was entirely sufficient to allow this

court to follow the district court’s reasoning. Any disparity between Woods’s sentence and

that of other defendants facing similar charges was justified by Woods’s own characteristics.

Woods is correct that it would be wise for sentencing courts to consider the guidelines when

they determine how much incremental punishment should be applied, United States v.

Kirkpatrick, 589 F.3d 414, 416 (7thCir. 2009), but the district court is not required to express

its conclusions in those terms. Finally, we see nothing substantively unreasonable about the

sentence the court chose.

We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

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