Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-15-20119/USCOURTS-ca5-15-20119-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rodolfo Hernandez Acosta
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-20119

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

RODOLFO HERNANDEZ ACOSTA, also known as Rodolfo Acosta, also known 

as Rodolfo Hernandez,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:14-CR-487-1

Before DAVIS, SOUTHWICK, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

STEPHEN A. HIGGINSON, Circuit Judge:*

Rodolfo Hernandez Acosta appeals his conviction and sentence for illegal 

reentry pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(1). He argues that the district 

court erred by imposing an eight-level aggravated felony enhancement under 

U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) based on his 1993 Virginia misdemeanor conviction 

for sexual battery. Hernandez Acosta contends that because his sexual battery 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 2, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 15-20119 Document: 00513743487 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/02/2016
No. 15-20119

2

conviction was a misdemeanor under Virginia state law it cannot constitute an 

aggravated felony under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C). He further asserts that his sexual 

battery conviction does not constitute an aggravated felony under 

§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) because it fails to satisfy the definition of a crime of violence 

under 18 U.S.C. § 16.

Although Hernandez Acosta argues that § 1326(b) is unconstitutional on 

its face and as applied because it does not require the fact of a prior felony or 

aggravated felony conviction to be charged in an indictment and proved beyond 

a reasonable doubt, he concedes that this argument is foreclosed but raises it 

to preserve it for further review. See United States v. Pineda-Arrellano, 492 

F.3d 624, 625 (5th Cir. 2007).

Because the foregoing issues were not raised in the district court, our 

review is limited to plain error. See United States v. Peltier, 505 F.3d 389, 391 

(5th Cir. 2007). To establish plain error, Hernandez Acosta must show a 

forfeited error that is clear or obvious and that affects his substantial rights. 

See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). If he makes such a 

showing, this court has the discretion to correct the error but only if it seriously 

affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See 

id.

Hernandez Acosta’s assertion that his misdemeanor conviction cannot 

qualify as an aggravated felony under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) is without merit. See

United States v. Ramirez, 731 F.3d 351, 354-57 (5th Cir. 2013) (“Ramirez 

maintains that for a prior conviction to constitute an aggravated felony, the 

prior conviction must actually be a felony. Under this logic, his misdemeanor 

conviction cannot be considered an aggravated felony. While his argument is 

seemingly persuasive in its simplicity, every circuit court to have considered 

whether a misdemeanor conviction can constitute an aggravated felony for 

 Case: 15-20119 Document: 00513743487 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/02/2016
No. 15-20119

3

purposes of § 1101(a)(43), including our court, has held the contrary.”); United 

States v. Urias-Escobar, 281 F.3d 165, 167 (5th Cir. 2002). In addition, this 

court has rejected Hernandez Acosta’s argument that § 16(b) is 

unconstitutionally vague on its face in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in 

Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). See United States v. 

Gonzalez-Longoria, 831 F.3d 670, 675-79 (en banc), petition for cert. filed (Sept. 

29, 2016) (No. 16-6259). Relatedly, Hernandez Acosta has failed to cite 

pertinent authority demonstrating plain error with respect to the district 

court’s imposition of the aggravated felony enhancement under 

§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(C). See United States v. Peralta-Reyes, 533 F. App’x 372, 376 (5th 

Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (finding no plain error where the district court 

determined that Colorado’s sexual assault statute was a crime of violence

under § 16(b) because “non-consent of the victim” was an element of the 

Colorado crime); Zaidi v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 357, 361 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding 

that an Oklahoma sexual battery conviction was a crime of violence under 

§ 16(b), because “the non-consent of the victim is the touchstone for 

determining whether a given offense involves a substantial risk that physical 

force may be used in the commission of the offense.” (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted)); see also United States v. Ramos Ceron, 775 F.3d 222, 

226 (5th Cir. 2014) (concluding that a defendant could not demonstrate clear 

or obvious error in the “absence of case law unequivocally supporting” his 

position on appeal).

AFFIRMED.

 Case: 15-20119 Document: 00513743487 Page: 3 Date Filed: 11/02/2016