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Parties Involved:
Lloyd Oren Holsey
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

.. 

PUBLISH FIL~D , United States Court of App, ·.us 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

MAY 2 8 1993 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

LLOYD OREN HOLSEY, also known 

as John Q. Ramsey, also known 

as Jacko. Webber, also known 

as Jack Hicckor, also known as 

Lloy o. Holsey, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Defendant - Appellant. ) 

No. 92-3249 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Kansas 

(0. C. No. 91-10001-T) 

Jackie N. Williams (Lee Thompson, United States Attorney and David 

M. Lind, Assistant u. s. Attorney, with him on the brief), Assistant u. s. Attorney, Wichita, Kansas, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Norman Trip Shawver, Wichita, Kansas, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before BALDOCK, BRORBY and MCWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges. 

MCWILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 92-3249 Document: 010110115800 Date Filed: 05/28/1993 Page: 1 
In a two-count indictment ~loyd Oren Holsey was charged 

as follows: in Count 1, Holsey was charged with taking by 

force and violence approximately $2,900.00 in currency belonging to the Kansas State Bank & Trust, Wichita, Kansas, a 

federally insured bank, from employees of the bank, in violation of 18 U.S . C. § 2113(a); and in Count 2, Holsey was 

charged with using and carrying a firearm to commit the offense charged in Count 1, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) . 

A jury convicted Holsey on both counts. Under the 

United States Sentencing Guidelines, Holsey was sentenced to 

imprisonment for 210 months on Count 1, the low end of the 

guideline range for such conviction. As to Count 2, Holsey 

was sentenced pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) to a mandatory 

l consecutive 60 months' imprisonment. Holsey appeals his con-

~M victions and the sentences imposed therein. We affirm. 

I. DR. ROACH 

Prior to trial Holsey filed a timely notice that he intended to rely upon the affirmative defense of insanity at 

the time of the alleged offense. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.2. As a 

result, Holsey was transported to the Medical Center for Federal Prisoners at Springfield, Missouri for examination and 

evaluation. The examining physician at the Springfield facility concluded that Holsey was not insane at the time of 

the bank robbery. Upon Halsey's return to Wichita, Kansas, 

Holsey was examined a second time by a Dr. Neil Roach of 

Wichita, at the behest of defense counsel. 

2 

Dr. Roach also 

Appellate Case: 92-3249 Document: 010110115800 Date Filed: 05/28/1993 Page: 2 
concluded that Holsey was not insane at the time of the offense. 

During the trial, after the jury was excused at the conclusion of the government's case, counsel for Holsey told the 

court that he was considering calling Dr. Roach as a defense 

witness and that he wanted Halsey's "understanding and concurrence" that Dr. Roach's testimony could conceivably damage 

Halsey's plea of insanity. When the district court expressed 

doubt about whether there was any evidence of insanity, 

Halsey's counsel made an offer of proof as to the testimony 

he would elicit from Dr. Roach if he were permitted to call 

him as a defense witness. That proffer was as follows: 

Dr. Roach, I believe, would testify that in 

his opinion Mr. Holsey does not have any major mental deficit, and that in his opinion his loss of 

memory was malingering and a selective loss of 

memory rather than being an actual fugue state or 

hysterical situation where he was not mentally competent at the time of the incident. 

He would, I've talked with him, and what evidence I was going to put on was the fact that Mr. 

Holsey was under a lot of stress prior to this incident and that stress, in fact, can bring on a 

dissociative state, and then have Dr. Roach talk 

about what a dissociative state is. Then have Mr. 

Holsey indicate that he had no memory as of that 

time and that this was basically similar to what a 

dissociative state is. 

At that point, we would ask based on that testimony with some expert opinion that Mr. Holsey 

was, in fact, in a dissociative state at the time. 

To present the question of insanity with an appropriate instruction to the jury that at the time 

of the alleged incident that Mr. Holsey as a result 

of severe mental disease or defect was unable to 

appreciate the quality or the wrongfulness of his 

acts as set forth in Section 17. I understand that 

there .are some difficulties with that. 

3 

Appellate Case: 92-3249 Document: 010110115800 Date Filed: 05/28/1993 Page: 3 
Defense counsel's position was that Dr. Roach's testimony, coupled with the testimony of Holsey and his sister 

regarding Holsey's memory lapses, would be sufficient evidence of insanity to require the issue to be submitted to the 

jury. 

The district court pressed defense counsel as to whether 

or not Dr. Roach would testify that Holsey had a "severe mental disease or defect" which left him "unable to appreciate 

the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts." 18 

U.S.C. § 17. Holsey's counsel responded: "As an officer of 

the Court, my understanding is that Dr. Roach will not go 

that far, Your Honor." 

In this general setting, the district court rejected 

counsel's offer of proof and ruled that since Dr. Roach had 

found Holsey to be sane at the time of the bank robbery, he 

would not be allowed to testify regarding Holsey's "stress" 

and the possibility that stress can cause a "dissociative 

state," since such testimony was not evidence of insanity 

under 18 U.S.C. § 17. 

On appeal, counsel first argues that the district court 

erred in not allowing Dr. Roach to testify. Under the described circumstances, we find no error. 

reads as follows: _, 

§ 17. Insanity defense 

. 

18 u.s.c. § 17 

(a) Affirmative defense. - It is an affirmative 

defense to a prosecution under any Federal statute 

that, at the time of the commission · of the acts 

constituting the offense, the defendant, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the 

4 

Appellate Case: 92-3249 Document: 010110115800 Date Filed: 05/28/1993 Page: 4 
wrongfulness of his acts. Mental disease or defect 

does not otherwise constitute a defense. 

(b) Burden of proof. - The defendant has the 

burden of proving the defense of insanity by clear 

and convincing evidence. 

Since Dr. Roach was of the view that Holsey was, in fact, 

sane at the time of the robbery, Dr. Roach's testimony concerning Holsey's "stress" and possibility that stress can 

cause a "dissociative state" would not be relevant or material to the insanity defense. It should be remembered that 

in his offer of proof counsel indicated quite clearly that 

Dr. Roach's testimony was being offered in support of 

Holsey's affirmative defense of insanity, and not for any 

other purpose. 

The determination of whether expert testimony should be 

admitted rests within the sound discretion of the trial 

court. Unites States Y..t.. ~. 832 F.2d 531, 535 (10th Cir. 

1987), cert. denied. 485 U.S. 908 (1988), and~- denied, 

485 U.S. 991 (1988). The trial court's ruling will not be 

disturbed absent a clear abuse of that discretion. l,d. We 

cannot say that under the circumstances described above the 

district court abused its discretion in rejecting counsel's 

offer of proof concerning Dr. Roach. 

II. INSANITY INSTRUCTION 

As a corollary of the foregoing argument, counsel next 

argues that the district court erred in refusing to instruct 

the jury on . the insanity defense and in failing to submit to 

the jury a "not guilty by reason of insanity" verdict form in 

5 

Appellate Case: 92-3249 Document: 010110115800 Date Filed: 05/28/1993 Page: 5 
accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 4242(b). In the district court, 

defense counsel argued that under Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.2, once 

timely notice is given that a defendant intends to rely upon 

the defense of insanity at the time of the alleged offense, a 

district court is required to instruct the jury on insanity 

even though there is no evidence of insanity. However, in 

his brief in this court, counsel concedes that if a defendant 

files a timely notice pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.2, he 

is entitled to an instruction on insanity only if there is 

some evidence of insanity. We agree. See, United States y_,_ 

Prazak, 623 F.2d 152, 154 (10th Cir),~- denied, 449 U.S. 

880 (1980) (A trial court need not instruct on a defendant's 

theory of defense where there is no support therefor in the 

evidence.). So, whether Holsey was entitled to an instruction on insanity depends on whether there was evidence tending to show insanity sufficient to require an instruction to 

the jury on the matter. 

In his own defense, Holsey testified, inter alia, that 

he was not insane, but that he felt "goofy in the head" prior 

to the incident and had "blacked out" and did not remember 

robbing the bank. Halsey's sister testified that her brother 

had frequent "loss of memory." We reject counsel's suggestion that Halsey's testimony and that of his sister was evidence of insanity sufficient to require the district court to 

instruct the jury on insanity. And we further note, parenthetically, that even if Dr. Roach's testimony had been allowed, the result would still be the same. 

6 

Appellate Case: 92-3249 Document: 010110115800 Date Filed: 05/28/1993 Page: 6 
• 

• 18 U.S.C. § __ 17 clearly provides that mental disease or 

defect does not constitute a defense unless it rendered the 

accused "unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the 

wrongfulness of his acts." Holsey's testimony and that of 

his sister, even in conjunction with the preferred testimony 

of Dr. Roach, do not amount to evidence that Holsey suffered 

from the kind of mental disease or defect that would constitute a defense under 18 U.S.C. § 17. Cf. United States v. 

Analla, 490 F.2d 1204, 1209 (10th Cir.), vacated QI! other 

grounds, 419 U.S. 813 (1974) (Defendant's testimony that he 

was distraught and had vivid recollections of combat in Vietnam was insufficient to raise the issue of insanity.). Under 

the circumstances, the district court did not err in refusing 

to instruct the jury on insanity. 

III. DOWNWARD DEPARTURE 

The United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines 

Manual § SHl.1 provides that age "may" be a reason to impose 

a sentence below the applicable guidelines range. Section 

SHl.4 provides that extreme physical impairment "may" also be 

a reason to impose a sentence below the applicable guideline 

range. Counsel argued in the district court that the judge 

should make a downward departure in sentencing on Count 1 

because Holsey was 52 years of age and in poor health. The 

judge declined to do so, and counsel on appeal argues that 

such is reversible error. 

7 

Appellate Case: 92-3249 Document: 010110115800 Date Filed: 05/28/1993 Page: 7 
In United States ~ Bromberg. 933 F.2d 895, 896 (10th 

Cir. 1991), we SLoke as follows: 

It is settled law 

district court's 

downward from the 

late jurisdiction 

in this circuit 

discretionary 

guidelines does 

under 18 U.S.C. 

and others 

refusal to 

not confer 

§ 3742. 

that a 

depart 

appelUnder Bromberg, and other precedent in this circuit, we 

have no jurisdiction to review the district court's discretionary refusal to depart downward from the guidelines because of Holsey's age or poor health. See also, United 

States ~ Brownlee, 970 F.2d 764, 766 (10th Cir. 1992); 

United States~ Davis, 900 F.2d 1524, 1529-30 (10th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 498 U.S. 856 (1990); United States ~ 

Richardson, 901 F.2d 867, 870 (10th Cir. 1990); United 

States ~ Lowden, 905 F.2d 1448, 1449 (10th Cir.)~- denied, 498 U.S. 876 (1990). 

Judgment AFFIRMED. 

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Appellate Case: 92-3249 Document: 010110115800 Date Filed: 05/28/1993 Page: 8