Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-09-01621/USCOURTS-ca8-09-01621-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Orville Dean Myers
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

 The Honorable Richard G. Kopf, United States District Judge for the District

of Nebraska.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 09-1621

___________

United States of America, * 

*

 Plaintiff - Appellee, *

*

v. * Appeal from the United States 

* District Court for the 

Orville Dean Myers, * District of Nebraska.

*

 Defendant - Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: February 12, 2010

Filed: March 16, 2010

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, GRUENDER and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

 ___________

BENTON, Circuit Judge.

Orville Dean Myers pled guilty to one count of failing to register as a sex

offender in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). The district court1

 sentenced him to 24

months imprisonment. Myers appeals his sentence, arguing that the court engaged in

impermissible double-counting by using a prior felony conviction to calculate his base

offense level and the criminal history category under the Sentencing Guidelines.

Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742, this court affirms.

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I.

In May 2000, Myers pled guilty to sexually assaulting a nine-year-old girl in

Colorado in 1996. In July, he was sentenced to probation, but in December his

probation was revoked, and he was sentenced to eight years incarceration. Released

in December 2007, he was notified of his duty to register as a sex offender. Myers did

not register in Colorado. In January 2008, he moved to Nebraska and also did not

register. In December 2008, Myers pled guilty to failing to register as a sex offender

under 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). 

As for the base offense level under § 2A3.5, the district court calculated it at

level 16, because Myers was required to register as a Tier III offender. (Myers does

not contest that he is a Tier III offender.) A Tier III offender is one previously

convicted of a sex offense punishable by more than a year in prison, and involving a

victim under the age of 13. U.S.S.G. § 2A3.5 App. Note 1; 42 U.S.C. § 16911(4). 

As for the criminal history category under § 4A1.1, three points were assessed

for Myers’s conviction for sexually assaulting the nine-year-old in Colorado because

it was a “prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month.”

U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(a). An additional two points were assessed because his instant

offense of failing to register as a sex offender was committed less than two years after

release from prison. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(e). With an additional two points added for

a prior conviction for violation of a restraining order, Myers’s seven criminal history

points put him in category IV. His Guideline range was 24 to 30 months, and he was

sentenced to 24 months. Myers argues that the district court impermissibly doublecounted his conviction for sexually assaulting a nine-year-old by including it in both

his base offense level and the criminal history category.

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II.

This court reviews “de novo whether the district court’s application of the

sentencing guidelines amounts to impermissible double counting.” United States v.

Peck, 496 F.3d 885, 890 (8th Cir. 2007). “Double counting occurs when one part of

the Guidelines is applied to increase a defendant’s punishment on account of a kind

of harm that has already been fully accounted for by application of another part of the

Guidelines.” United States v. Hipenbecker, 115 F.3d 581, 583 (8th Cir. 1997)

(quotations omitted); United States v. Donelson, 450 F.3d 768, 774 (8th Cir. 2006).

Even if the court finds double-counting, it is permissible where “(1) the [Sentencing]

Commission intended the result and (2) each statutory section concerns conceptually

separate notions related to sentencing.” Hipenbecker, 115 F.3d at 583.

A.

In determining Myers’s sentence for failing to register as a sex offender, one

part of the Guidelines, § 2A3.5(a)(1), was applied to increase his base offense level

on account of the nature of the predicate felony of sexually assaulting a nine-year-old.

This felony was also accounted for by application of another part of the Guidelines,

§ 4A1.1, in Myers’s criminal history points. The question is whether the harm of his

prior conviction was fully accounted for in one of the two Guidelines. This court

concludes it was not, and therefore, no double-counting occurred.

The offense level for failing to register as a sex offender is based on the nature

of the sexual conduct in the prior conviction. The apparent rationale is that the

seriousness of not registering is increased by the severity of the underlying sex

offense. Myers’s offense level for failing to register was higher because the victim

in his prior conviction was under 13 years old. 

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On the other hand, the criminal history is not based on the nature of the prior

conviction (age of the victim), but based solely on the length of incarceration and the

conviction’s recency. The harm of his prior conviction was not fully accounted for

by either Guideline alone, so no double-counting occurred. See United States v.

Phillips, 506 F.3d 685, 688 (8th Cir. 2007) (The “base offense level and criminal

history provisions address conceptually separate sentencing notions. One addresses

the gravity of the particular offense. The other addresses the need to deter future

criminal activity by this defendant.”). 

B.

Even if double-counting occurred in this case, it was permissible because the

Commission intended the result, and the offense level and criminal history sections

address different concerns. The General Application Principles in the Sentencing

Guidelines instruct a sentencing court to determine the base offense level

independently of the criminal history category. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1. The Application

Notes further clarify: “Absent an instruction to the contrary,” enhancements to the

base offense level and determinations of the criminal history guidelines “are to be

applied cumulatively.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 App. Note 4(B). Myers points to

application notes in other Guidelines, which specifically say that a predicate

conviction can be used to calculate both the base offense level and the criminal history

category. See U.S.S.G. § 2A6.2 App. Note 3 (stalking or domestic violence); § 2K1.3

App. Note 9 (receipt, possession, or transportation of explosives); § 2K2.1 App. Note

10 (felon in possession of a firearm); § 2L1.1 App. Note 4 (smuggling, transporting,

or harboring unlawful alien); § 2L1.2 App. Note 6 (illegal re-entry following felony

conviction); § 2L2.1 App. Note 4 (trafficking in false immigration documents); §

2L2.2 App. Note 2 (fraudulently acquiring or using false immigration documents).

Myers argues that because the Application Notes to § 2A3.5 do not also

specifically say that his predicate sexual assault can be used in both calculations, the

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Commission did not intend that result. This interpretation turns the application

instructions upside down. The application principles state that “absent an instruction

to the contrary,” the sentencing court must calculate the base offense level and

criminal history cumulatively. Therefore, because the Commission did not instruct

to the contrary in either § 2A3.5 or § 4A1.1, its intent was for the base offense level

and criminal history to be applied cumulatively to Myers. The fact that other

Guidelines expressly state that a predicate felony can be used for both calculations

does not require a different application here. See United States v. Thomas, 930 F.2d

12, 14 (8th Cir. 1991) (stating that where the Guidelines do not contain a specific

exception to the application of an enhancement, the Commission intends for that

enhancement to apply). See also United States v. Kenney, 283 F.3d 934, 938 (8th Cir.

2002) (“[T]he Commission intended to include enhancements for every applicable

aspect of the criminal conduct, to be added together cumulatively, unless the

Guidelines themselves direct otherwise.”) (emphasis added); United States v.

Wyckoff, 918 F.2d 925, 927 (11th Cir. 1990) (before the application note to § 2K2.1

was amended to specifically permit it, holding no impermissible double-counting by

using predicate felony in calculation of base offense level and criminal history);

United States v. Hawkins, 69 F.3d 11, 14 (5th Cir. 1995) (“Double counting is

prohibited only if the particular guidelines at issue specifically forbid it.”). Therefore,

the Commission intended for Myers’s predicate sexual assault to be used to calculate

both his base offense level and the criminal history category.

Finally, as discussed, the base offense level and criminal history calculations

address different sentencing goals. See, e.g., United States v. Saffeels, 39 F.3d 833,

836 (8th Cir. 1994) (“[W]hile the base offense inquiry reflects the seriousness of the

offense, the criminal history score assesses the offender and the need to deter him

from further criminal activity.”); United States v. Alessandroni, 982 F.2d 419, 423

(10th Cir. 1992); Wyckoff, 918 F.2d at 927.

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Myers contends that § 4A1.1 excludes his prior sentence from the criminal

history calculation because it was for conduct that is part of his offense of failing to

register. He cites Application Note 1 to § 4A1.2, which defines a “prior sentence” as

“a sentence imposed prior to sentencing on the instant offense, other than a sentence

for conduct that is part of the instant offense.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 App. Note 1.

“Conduct that is part of the instant offense” means “relevant conduct to the instant

offense under the provisions of § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct).” Id. U.S.S.G. §

1B1.3(a)(2) defines “relevant conduct” to include acts “that were part of the same

course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction.” Relevant

conduct also includes “offense conduct associated with a previously imposed sentence

[that is] expressly charged in the offense of conviction.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 App. Note

8. 

 

Myers’s act of sexually assaulting a child in 1996 in Colorado is not “part of

the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan” as his act of failing to register

as a sex offender in 2008 in Nebraska. Myers’s indictment charges his status as a

person required to register as a sex offender; it does not charge his conduct of sexual

assault. Therefore, his prior sexual assault is not relevant conduct to his failure to

register, and his prior sentence is not for conduct that is part of the instant offense.

See Alessandroni, 982 F.2d at 421 (holding it is not the conduct of committing a prior

felony that is an element of being a felon in possession of a firearm, rather it is the

status of being a convicted felon).

III.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

______________________________

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