Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-02226/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-02226-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ronald Ray Anderson
Petitioner
Matthew Cate
Respondent

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONALD RAY ANDERSON,

Petitioner,

v.

MATTHEW CATE,

Respondent.

 /

1:09-cv-02226-LJO-DLB (HC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. 1]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

 BACKGROUND1

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation following his conviction in Alameda County, for two counts of first degree

murder. Petitioner is serving a term of twenty five years to life.

In the instant petition, Petitioner challenges the California Board of Parole Hearings’

(Board) July 3, 2007 decision finding him unsuitable for release. 

On June 23, 2008, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Alameda

County Superior Court challenging the Board’s 2007 decision. On April 13, 2009, the superior

court denied the petition in a reasoned opinion. 

This information is derived from the exhibits attached to Respondent’s answer and is not subject to

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dispute. (Court Docs. 14-16.)

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On May 4, 2009, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California

Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District. The petition was summarily denied on June 4,

2009. 

On June 24, 2009, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California

Supreme Court. On December 2, 2009, the petition was summarily denied. 

Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus on December 23,

2009. Respondent filed an answer to the petition on April 12, 2010, and Petitioner filed a

traverse on April 27, 2010. 

STATEMENT OF FACTS2

First Case-Newman

On June 24, 1979, between the hours of 11:30 p.m. and 12:30 a.m., Mr. Leonard Luna

was house sitting at the home of his employer, Mr. Bernard Marks. At approximately 11:30

p.m., Mr. Luna answered the front door after hearing the doorbell. 

Two individuals, later identified as Marty Spears and Daniel Geisler, asked for assistance

in obtaining some gas for their vehicle. Mr. Luna assisted in getting the individuals gas from the

storage shed. Mr. Luna returned to the home and the doorbell rang a second time.

Marty Spears and Daniel Geisler had returned again and asked to use the telephone. Mr.

Luna let them into the home. After completing the phone call and exciting the house, Spears

pulled a gun on Mr. Luna. Then, one of them whistled and motioned for a car to pull to the front

of the house. 

Darren Lee and Petitioner then entered the residence. They instructed Luna to lay on the

floor as the four individuals began to remove items from the house. Luna was then instructed to

move to another room where he was tied with a rope and struck over the head with the butt of a

gun. Luna heard one of the individuals saying, “lets kill him, he’s seen our faces.” A different

voice instructed the others not to kill him.

This information is taken from the 2007 Board hearing which quoted the 2006 Board Report prepared by

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correctional counselor Bennett.

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Second Case-Ranzo Homicides

On June 25, 1979, at approximately 2:30 p.m., fellow employees of Phillip and Kathryn

Ranzo went to their residence to determine why they had not reported to work. Phillip Ranzo

was discovered lying face down, hog-tied on the garage floor and he appeared to be dead. 

Responding officers found Kathryn in a third-story bathroom, partially nude. A knife with blood

smears was found near the home office. 

The bedroom had been ransacked with jewelry and clothing thrown around the room. 

Investigators found blood on the sheets and various locations throughout the bedroom. The

coroner pronounced both Philip and Kathryn Ranzo dead at the scene. The autopsy report later

identified the cause of death for both victims as “slashing wounds to the neck.” 

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its

enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008 (1997); Jeffries

v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997), quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5 th th

Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy,

521 U.S. 320 (1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). 

The instant petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA; thus, it is governed by its

provisions. 

Petitioner is in custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

pursuant to a state court judgment. Even though Petitioner is not challenging the underlying state

court conviction, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 remains the exclusive vehicle for his habeas petition because

he meets the threshold requirement of being in custody pursuant to a state court judgment. Sass

v. California Board of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1126-1127 (9 Cir.2006), citing White v. th

Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1006 (9 Cir.2004) (“Section 2254 ‘is the exclusive vehicle for a th

habeas petition by a state prisoner in custody pursuant to a state court judgment, even when the

petition is not challenging [her] underlying state court conviction.’”). 

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The instant petition is reviewed under the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act which became effective on April 24, 1996. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,

70 (2003). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus will not be granted unless the

adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court

of the United States” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d); see Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 70-71;Williams, 529 U.S. at 413.

“[A] federal court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state court decision applied clearly established federal

law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. 

A federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the

state court’s application of clearly established federal law was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at

409. Petitioner has the burden of establishing that the decision of the state court is contrary to

or involved an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court precedent. Baylor v.

Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996). Although only Supreme Court law is binding on the

states, Ninth Circuit precedent remains relevant persuasive authority in determining whether a

state court decision is objectively unreasonable. See Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9

th

Cir.2003); Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th Cir.1999). 

II. Review of Petition

There is no independent right to parole under the United States Constitution; rather, the

 right exists and is created by the substantive state law which defines the parole scheme. 

Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F.3d 546, 559, 561 (9 Cir. 2010) (en banc) (citing Bd. of Pardons v. th

Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 371 (1987); Pearson v. Muntz, No. 08-55728, 2010 WL 2108964, * 2 (9th

Cir. May 24, 2010) (citing Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 162 L.Ed.2d

174 (2005)); Cooke v. Solis, No. 06-15444, 2010 WL 2330283, *6 (9th Cir. June 4, 2010). 

“[D]espite the necessarily subjective and predictive nature of the parole-release decision, state

statutes may create liberty interests in parole release that are entitled to protection under the Due

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Process Clause.” Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. at 371. 

In California, the Board of Parole Hearings’ determination of whether an inmate is

suitable for parole is controlled by the following regulations:

(a) General. The panel shall first determine whether the life prisoner is suitable for

release on parole. Regardless of the length of time served, a life prisoner shall be found

unsuitable for a denied parole if in the judgment of the panel the prisoner will pose an

unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison.

(b) Information Considered. All relevant, reliable information available to the

panel shall be considered in determining suitability for parole. Such information shall

include the circumstances of the prisoner's social history; past and present mental state;

past criminal history, including involvement in other criminal misconduct which is

reliably documented; the base and other commitment offenses, including behavior before,

during and after the crime; past and present attitude toward the crime; any conditions of

treatment or control, including the use of special conditions under which the prisoner may

safely be released to the community; and any other information which bears on the

prisoner's suitability for release. Circumstances which taken alone may not firmly

establish unsuitability for parole may contribute to a pattern which results in a finding of

unsuitability.

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§ 2402(a) and (b). Section 2402(c) sets forth circumstances tending to

demonstrate unsuitability for release. “Circumstances tending to indicate unsuitability include:

(1) Commitment Offense. The prisoner committed the offense in an especially heinous,

atrocious or cruel manner. The factors to be considered include:

(A) Multiple victims were attacked, injured or killed in the same or separate

incidents.

(B) The offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated manner,

such as an execution-style murder.

(C) The victim was abused, defiled or mutilated during or after the

offense.

(D) The offense was carried out in a manner which demonstrates an

exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering.

(E) The motive for the crime is inexplicable or very trivial in relation to

the offense.

(2) Previous Record of Violence. The prisoner on previous occasions inflicted or

attempted to inflict serious injury on a victim, particularly if the prisoner

demonstrated serious assaultive behavior at an early age.

(3) Unstable Social History. The prisoner has a history of unstable or tumultuous

relationships with others.’

(4) Sadistic Sexual Offenses. The prisoner has previously sexually assaulted

another in a manner calculated to inflict unusual pain or fear upon the victim.

(5) Psychological Factors. The prisoner has a lengthy history of severe mental

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problems related to the offense.

(6) Institutional Behavior. The prisoner has engaged in serious misconduct in

prison or jail.

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(c)(1)(A)-(E),(2)-(9). 

Section 2402(d) sets forth the circumstances tending to show suitability which include:

(1) No Juvenile Record. The prisoner does not have a record of assaulting others as a

juvenile or committing crimes with a potential of personal harm to victims.

(2) Stable Social History. The prisoner has experienced reasonably stable relationships

with others.

(3) Signs of Remorse. The prisoner performed acts which tend to indicate the presence of

remorse, such as attempting to repair the damage, seeking help for or relieving suffering

of the victim, or indicating that he understands the nature and magnitude of the offense.

(4) Motivation for Crime. The prisoner committed his crime as a result of significant

stress in his life, especially if the stress has built over a long period of time.

(5) Battered Woman Syndrome. At the time of the commission of the crime, the prisoner

suffered from Battered Woman Syndrome, as defined in section 2000(b), and it appears

the criminal behavior was the result of that victimization.

(6) Lack of Criminal History. The prisoner lacks any significant history of violent crime.

(7) Age. The prisoner’s present age reduces the probability of recidivism.

(8) Understanding and Plans for Future. The prisoner has made realistic plans for release

or has developed marketable skills that can be put to use upon release.

(9) Institutional Behavior. Institutional activities indicate an enhanced ability to function 

within the law upon release. 

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(d)(1)-(9)

The California parole scheme entitles the prisoner to a parole hearing and various

procedural guarantees and rights before, at, and after the hearing. Cal. Penal Code § 3041.5. If

denied parole, the prisoner is entitled to subsequent hearings at intervals set by statute. Id. In

addition, if the Board or Governor find the prisoner unsuitable for release, the prisoner is entitled

to a written explanation. Cal. Penal Code §§ 3041.2, 3041.5. The denial of parole must also be

supported by “some evidence,” but review of the Board’s or Governor’s decision is extremely

deferential. In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal.4th 616, 128 Cal.Rptr.3d 104, 59 P.3d 174, 210 (2002). 

Because California’s statutory parole scheme guarantees that prisoners will not be denied

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parole absent some evidence of present dangerousness, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

recently held California law creates a liberty interest in parole that may be enforced under the

Due Process Clause. Hayward v. Marshall, 602 F.3d at 561-563; Pearson v. Muntz, 606 F.3d

606, 608-609 (9th Cir. 2010). Therefore, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, this Court’s ultimate

determination is whether the state court’s application of the some evidence rule was unreasonable

or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence. Hayward v.

Marshall. 603 F.3d at 563; Pearson v. Muntz, 606 F.3d at 608. 

The applicable California standard “is whether some evidence supports the decision of

the Board or the Governor that the inmate constitutes a current threat to public safety, and not

merely whether some evidence confirms the existence of certain factual findings.” In re

Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th 1181, 1212 (2008) (emphasis in original and citations omitted). As to the

circumstances of the commitment offense, the Lawrence Court concluded that

although the Board and the Governor may rely upon the aggravated circumstances

of the commitment offense as a basis for a decision denying parole, the aggravated

nature of the crime does not in and of itself provide some evidence of current

dangerousness to the public unless the record also establishes that something in

the prisoner’s pre- or post-incarceration history, or his or her current demeanor

and mental state, indicates that the implications regarding the prisoner’s

dangerousness that derive from his or her commission of the commitment offense

remain probative to the statutory determination of a continuing threat to public

safety. 

Id. at 1214. 

In addition, “the circumstances of the commitment offense (or any of the other factors

related to unsuitability) establish unsuitability if, and only if, those circumstances are probative to

the determination that a prison remains a danger to the public. It is not the existence or

nonexistence of suitability or unsuitability factors that forms the crux of the parole decision; the

significant circumstance is how those factors interrelate to support a conclusion of current

dangerousness to the public.” In re Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th at 1212. 

“In sum, a reviewing court must consider ‘whether the identified facts are probative to the

central issue of current dangerousness when considered in light of the full record before the

Board or the Governor.’” Cooke v. Solis, 606 F.3d 1206, 1214 (9th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in

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original) (citing Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F.3d at 560). 

A. Timeliness of Petition

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas

corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059,

2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118

S.Ct. 586 (1997). The instant petition was filed on December 23, 2009, and thus, it is subject to

the provisions of the AEDPA. 

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a

federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, Section 2244,

subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. 

The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized

by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and

made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or

claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this

subsection. 

In most cases, the limitations period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. In a situation such as this where the petitioner is challenging a parole board

decision, the Ninth Circuit has held that direct review is concluded and the statute of limitations

commences when the final administrative appeal is denied. See Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d

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1077, 1079 (9th Cir.2003) (holding that § 2241(d)(1)(D) applies in the context of parole

decisions and that the Board of Prison Term’s denial of an inmate’s administrative appeal is the

“factual predicate” of the inmate’s claim that triggers the commencement of the limitations

period). 

Respondent initially argues that the one-year limitation period began to run immediately

following the administrative decision of July 3, 2007, citing Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d at 1081. 

However, contrary to Respondent’s argument, the July 3, 2007 decision was merely a proposed

decision, and it did not become final until October 31, 2007. Under the rationale of Redd,

Petitioner could not have known the factual predicate of his claim unless and until the decision

becomes final. See Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d at 1084 (statute of limitations begins to run when

administrative decision becomes final) ; see also Banks v. Kramer, 2009 WL 256449 *1 (E.D.

Cal. 2009); Tidwell v. Marshall, __ F.Supp.2d ___, 2009 WL 1537960 (C.D. Cal. 2009);

Feliciano v. Curry, 2009 WL 691220 (N.D. Cal. 2009); Ramirez-Salgado v. Scribner, 2009 WL

211117 (S.D. Cal. 2009). Based on these facts, the statute of limitations began to run the 3

following day on November 1, 2007, and was set to expire one year later on November 1, 2008. 

At the time Petitioner filed the first state petition on June 23, 2008, 235 days of the

limitations period had expired. The limitations period was tolled from June 23, 2008 to

December 2, 2009, the date the California Supreme Court denied his petition for writ of habeas

corpus. The limitations period began again on December 3, 2009, and the instant petition filed

on December 23, 2009, is timely. Therefore, Respondent’s argument that the petition is untimely

is without merit. 

B. Last State Court Decision

Here, the Alameda County Superior Court issued the last state court reasoned decision,

and under the look-through doctrine this Court must determine whether it was a reasonable

application of federal law and a reasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence. 

Notwithstanding his argument to the contrary, Respondent recognizes that this Court, not to mention

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several other District Courts, have concluded likewise, but argues that petition is still untimely even under this

analysis.

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Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991). 

The superior court held, in pertinent part, the following:

The record reveals that the Board gave individualized consideration to all

relevant factors. The Board’s decision goes into detail as to some of the favorable

circumstances in support of parole. Despite some positive factors, the Board felt

that these did not outweigh the factors tending to show unsuitability for release on

parole. The Board based its denial on the commitment offense, his institutional

behavior, lack of self-help, and the latest psychiatric report. It is evidence from a

review of the parole hearing transcript that a main factor for the Board’s finding

Petitioner is currently a threat to the public if released was Petitioner’s behavior

while incarcerated. Petitioner had 16 CDC 115, most recently in 2004, some

involving violent and use of a controlled substance. Petitioner admitted to having

a drug problem, has been disciplined for use of controlled substances, but has not

participated in sufficient self-help to assist him with this particular issue. The

record supports the finding that Petitioner has not participated in much self-help

programming in his entire period of incarceration, although the Board commended

him for his recent involvement in such programs. Also, there is some evidence to

support the finding by the Board that the psychological evaluation and report was

not supportive of parole release. . . . It is readily apparent that given the fact that

Petitioner has been in prison for twenty-seven years at the time of the parole

hearing, and his lack of criminal record, the Board spent a significant amount of

time conducting the hearing in order to evaluate Petitioner’s danger potential. A

review of the record reveals that some evidence supports all of the Board’s

findings. 

(Exhibit 6, to Answer.) 

C. 2007 Parole Hearing

Petitioner’s minimum procedural due process rights were met at the 2007 hearing in that

Petitioner had received advanced written notice of the hearing, an opportunity to submit

materials for the Board’s consideration, an opportunity to be heard, and a written decision

explaining the reasons for parole denial. Hayward, 603 F.3d at 561. 

At the 2007 hearing, the Board found Petitioner unsuitable for release based on the

circumstances of the commitment offense, lack of sufficient participation in self-help

programming, institutional misconduct, and unfavorable psychological report. These findings

provide some evidence to support the Board’s finding of unsuitability. 

With regard to the commitment offense, the Board found that it was carried out in an

especially cruel and callous manner. There were multiple victims attacked, injured, and killed in

separate incidents. The victims were confronted in their homes by four individuals and robbed of

their belongings. Mr. Luna was tied with a rope and struck over the head with the butt of a gun

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Victims Phillip and Kathryn Ranzo throats were slashed and they were bound with rope similar

to the rope used on Mr. Luna. The motive for the offenses was financial gain, which the Board

found trivial in relation to taking the lives of two individuals. 

Petitioner argues that the Board (and subsequent state court) improperly relied on the

aggravated nature of the commitment offense in finding him unsuitable for release. Petitioner

reasons that he did not actually kill the victims and was convicted under California’s Felony

Murder Rule, which makes an accomplice liable for the death in the commission of certain

felony, namely burglary of an inhabited residence. Even if Petitioner acted as the “lookout” or

“getaway source”, he nonetheless participated in the commission of the offense and is legally

liable for the killings of Phillip and Kathryn Ranzo, and he cannot escape the brutal

circumstances of the commitment offenses. Therefore, the Board (and state court) properly

found the circumstances of the commitment offense remain indicative of Petitioner’s present

dangerousness, particularly when considered in light of his institutional behavior. 

During his incarceration, Petitioner received sixteen 115 violations, the last on September

9, 2004 for mutual combat. Petitioner received four of the 115 violations after the last parole

hearing, two involving violence and one involving substance abuse. He also received sixteen

128(a) counseling chronos, the last on June 26, 2005, for failure to report. 

The Psychologist found that Petitioner was still at risk for both violence and relapse on

drugs given his recent rules violations for violence and drug use. Petitioner was assessed to be in

the moderate range of future violence if released. It was certainly reasonable for the Board to

conclude that Petitioner poses a current danger because he still has problems controlling his

anger and abusing drugs, and has not demonstrated an ability to function within the law upon

release. See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15 § 2402(c)(6) (institutional behavior is a factor tending to

demonstrate unsuitability for parole if “the prisoner has engaged in serious misconduct in prison

or jail.”); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15 § 2402(d)(9) (institutional behavior may demonstrate suitability

where it “indicate[s] an enhanced ability to function within the law upon release.”). 

The Board also noted that Petitioner’s participation in self-help had been sporadic and

weak, and the Psychologist concluded that Petitioner had not completed the necessary

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programming essential to transition into society and further time is needed to achieve such

programming. In addition, Petitioner’s vocational training was outdated. Petitioner contends

this factor was improperly considered by the Board because it is not an enumerated in section

2402(c)(1)-(6) to support unsuitability. Petitioner overlooks the fact that section 2402(b)

specifically states that the Board may consider “any information which bears on the prisoner’s

suitability for release.” Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15 § 2402(b). Therefore, although this factor alone

may not have justified the finding of unsuitability, it was properly considered as one factor,

among others, that did not support suitability. 

After considering the factors in support of suitability, the Board concluded that Petitioner

was unsuitable for release because he must demonstrate an ability to maintain the positive gains

over an extended period of time. In light of the evidence above, there is clearly some evidence to

support the finding that Petitioner remains a current danger if released, and the state court’s

decision was not an unreasonable determination of the “some evidence” standard nor an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence before the Board. 

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus be DENIED; and

2. The Clerk of Court be directed to enter judgment in favor of Respondent.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within

thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with the court

and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate

Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and filed 

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within fourteen (14) days after service of the objections. The Court will then review the

Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: July 13, 2010 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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