Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-03308/USCOURTS-ca10-89-03308-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Anthony R. Russo
Appellant

Document Text:

.. 

In the Matter of: 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

FIL ti 

Uaitoo Stat,§ Cw,t of A .Pnls 

Tenth Circuit 

APR 19 199 

R.OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

ANTHONY R. RUSSO, 

Plaintiff-Appellant. 

No. 89-3308 

(No. 81-1127AD) 

(D. Kansas) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MOORE, BRORBY, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(1); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The cause is therefore ordered 

This is a disciplinary proceeding in which Mr. Russo appeals 

the order of the United States District Court denying Mr. Russo's 

petition for reinstatement to the Bar of the United States 

District Court for the District of Kansas. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-3308 Document: 01019971510 Date Filed: 04/19/1990 Page: 1 
Mr. Russo's problems began in 1974, when he was convicted in 

federal court of conspiracy to use interstate facilities in 

violation of state laws concerning prostitution and bribery of law 

enforcement officials. Mr. Russo, following his conviction, 

surrendered his license to practice law both in the state of 

Kansas and in the United States District Court and served his 

sentence. Mr. Russo subsequently filed a petition for 

reinstatement with the Supreme Court of Kansas which denied this 

petition in 1980. 

(1981) (Russo I). 

See State v. Russo, 230 Kan. 5, 630 P.2d 711 

Mr. Russo then filed his first petition for reinstatement in 

the federal court for the district of Kansas in 1981. This 

petition was heard before a two-judge panel, which heard and 

received evidence and denied Mr. Russo's petition. This panel 

specifically held: (1) no constitutional questions had been 

raised; and (2) there are no exceptional circumstances which would 

warrant the United States District Court taking action different 

from the state. The two-judge panel also specifically stated: 

We agree with our state brethren that the serious 

nature of petitioner's original misconduct and its 

consequent adverse effect upon the legal profession and 

the administration of justice outweighs the favorable 

recommendations of friends and members of the bar, their 

sympathy for him, and their beliefs that he has been 

sufficiently punished. Perhaps petitioner has paid the 

price for his criminal activity, but the court cannot 

overlook the fact that his criminal transgression was of 

such nature that it undermines the very foundation of 

our justice system. 

(Citation omitted). Mr. Russo did not appeal this decision. 

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In 1987 Mr. Russo again applied for reinstatement to the 

Kansas Supreme Court which, after considering the record, denied 

his petition holding that "the seriousness of the original 

misconduct of Mr. Russo is such that his disbarment should be 

permanent.'' In re Russo, 244 Kan. 3, 765 P.2d 166, 167 (1988) 

(Russo II). 

Mr. Russo then filed another petition with the United States 

District Court pursuant to D. Kan. Rule 409, praying for an order 

reinstating him to practice before the federal court. By its 

order of July 1, 1989, the district court denied the petition for 

reinstatement and, pursuant to D. Kan. Rule 410, issued an order 

to show cause why the imposition of discipline identical to that 

imposed by the Kansas Supreme Court would be unwarranted. Mr. 

Russo filed a response to this order stating his desire to present 

''live evidence and additional documentation." In order to 

determine whether an evidentiary hearing was necessary, the 

district court directed Mr. Russo to file a statement listing 

proposed witnesses and their proposed testimony, together with any 

additional documentation he wished to offer. Mr. Russo thereupon 

specified: (1) the names of witnesses who would testify that, in 

their opinions, his reinstatement would not adversely affect the 

public confidence and respect for the Bar or the administration of 

justice; (2) the petition of approximately 125 lawyers opposing 

Mr. Russo's suspension to show the support of the Bar for Mr. 

Russo; (3) "[c]opies of polygraph tests admitted before Kansas 

Supreme Court in 1974 going to the question of the seriousness of 

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Appellate Case: 89-3308 Document: 01019971510 Date Filed: 04/19/1990 Page: 3 
the offense"; (4) a newspaper clipping reporting the reinstatement 

of a federal judge to the Utah Bar after his conviction of a 

felony; and (5) his own testimony. 

The district court thereafter ruled that it could "conceive 

of no circumstances making any of the above relevant to the 

issues" before the court (those issues set forth in the district 

of Kansas Rule 410(d)) 1 and declined to conduct an evidentiary 

hearing. The district court then found and determined 

1 

upon the face of the record that the proceedings in none 

of the disciplinary matters which resulted in the 

D. Kan. Rule 410(d) reads: 

Identical Discipline Imposed; Exceptions. Upon the 

expiration of 30 days from service of the notice issued 

pursuant to the provisions of (b) above, the 

Disciplinary Panel shall impose the identical discipline 

unless the respondent-attorney demonstrates, or the 

Disciplinary Panel finds, that upon the face of the 

record upon which the discipline in another jurisdiction 

is predicated it clearly appears: 

(1) That the procedure was so lacking in notice or 

opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation 

of due process; or 

(2) that there was such an infirmity of proof 

establishing the misconduct as to give rise to the clear 

conviction that the Disciplinary Panel could not, 

consistent with its duty, accept as final the conclusion 

on that subject; or 

(3) that the imposition of the same discipline by 

the Disciplinary Panel would result in grave injustice; 

or 

(4) that the misconduct established is deemed by 

the Disciplinary Panel to warrant substantially 

different discipline. 

Where the Disciplinary Panel determines that any of 

said elements exist, it shall enter such other order as 

it deems appropriate. 

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Appellate Case: 89-3308 Document: 01019971510 Date Filed: 04/19/1990 Page: 4 
respondent's disbarment or in denial of his readmission 

to the Bar were in any way so lacking in notice or 

opportunity to be heard as to deprive him of due 

process; that there was no infirmity of proof 

establishing the respondent's misconduct; that the 

imposition of the same discipline would not result in 

grave injustice; and that the misconduct established is 

deemed by this court to warrant identical disbarment but 

that the disbarment need not be permanent. 

The court also stated that it could not overlook the fact, as 

decided by the earlier two-judge panel, that Mr. Russo's criminal 

transgressions were of such a nature that they '"undermine the 

very foundation of our justice system.'" 

Mr. Russo, while articulating his arguments in a different 

fashion, is asserting on appeal: 

(1) Mr. Russo was denied his right, under the Due Process 

Clause, to an evidentiary hearing before the district court 

concerning his petition for reinstatement; 

(2) the district court failed to consider any of Mr. Russo's 

arguments concerning his constitutional assertions; and 

(3) The district court erred in determining that the action 

of the Kansas Supreme Court in disbarring Mr. Russo was 

constitutionally valid as the procedure was so lacking in notice 

or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due 

process, and the district court erred in finding that the 

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Appellate Case: 89-3308 Document: 01019971510 Date Filed: 04/19/1990 Page: 5 
imposition of temporary disbarment was warranted based on the 

state court proceedings. 

We disagree with Mr. Russo's cont entions and affirm the 

decision of the district court. 

Where a disbarred attorney challenges a district court's 

disciplinary procedures, the only question before the court is 

whether the district court followed its rules and whether those 

rules meet constitutional standards. Mattox v. Disciplinary Panel 

of U.S. Dist. Court, 758 F.2d 1362, 1364 (10th Cir. 1985). 

Whether those rules provide adequate constitutional protection is 

a matter for de novo review at the appellate level. In addition, 

the appellate court must review de novo the district court's 

application of constitutional due process standards to the state 

court proceedings. 

Mr. Russo first argues that he has been denied his right, 

under principles of due process, to a full evidentiary hearing 

before the federal district court concerning his petition for 

reinstatement. However, we begin our analysis by noting that the 

due process requirements in a disciplinary proceeding are less 

exacting than for, by example, a criminal proceeding. Razatos v. 

Colorado Supreme Court, 746 F.2d 1429, 1435 (10th Cir. 1984), 

cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1016 (1985); In re Phelps, 637 F.2d 171, 

176 (10th Cir. 1981). The standard is one of permitting the 

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Appellate Case: 89-3308 Document: 01019971510 Date Filed: 04/19/1990 Page: 6 
attorney a fair opportunity to present his case. 

637 F.2d at 176. 

In re Phelps, 

Here, the federal district court afforded Mr. Russo a fair 

opportunity to present his case. The court allowed Mr. Russo to 

identify the new or additional evidence that he wished to present. 

Upon review of Mr. Russo's response, the court concluded that none 

of the evidence proffered would be relevant to any of the issues 

to be determined under D. Kan. Rule 410(d), and therefore closed 

the record. The court then went on to review the existing record, 

including Mr. Russo's petition, summary of facts, and points and 

authorities in making its decision. We conclude that Mr. Russo 

was afforded sufficient opportunity to submit relevant information 

to the court in support of his position. Thus, we find no 

constitutional infirmity with the federal district court 

proceedings. We also find no evidence that the district court 

abused its discretion therein. We note that the federal courts 

have now considered Mr. Russo's reinstatement twice. The first 

panel considered evidence and testimony for Mr. Russo and 

concluded that disbarment was appropriate pursuant to Rule 410. 

With the instant proceedings, appellant has now had a second 

opportunity to present these same issues. 

Mr. 

failed to 

foundation 

specific 

Russo's next contention that the federal district court 

consider any of his arguments is simply without 

or merit. While the court may not have articulated a 

response to each of Mr. Russo's assertions, the 

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Memorandum Opinion is clear and it is beyond doubt that the court 

considered and ruled against Mr. Russo on all relevant matters. 

As to the adequacy of the state proceedings, Mr. Russo argues 

that the district court erred in relying upon the state court 

proceedings to impose its own discipline. He also alleges that 

the discipline was improperly imposed upon him without due process 

or equal protection of law, and that the state court proceedings 

suffered such infirmity of proof as to render it defective under 

Rule 410(d). 

Here, the district court specifically found and determined as 

required by Rule 410, upon the face of the record, that the 

discipline imposed by the Kansas Supreme Court was not flawed by 

any deprivation of notice or opportunity to be heard as to deprive 

Mr. Russo of due process, and that there was no infirmity of proof 

establishing his misconduct. Also as required by Rule 410, the 

court concluded that the imposition of the same discipline would 

not result in grave injustice, and that the misconduct warranted 

identical disbarment, but that the disbarment need not be 

permanent. Accordingly, the district court's findings are 

consistent with the guidelines established in Rule 410(d). The 

provisions of D. Kan. Rule 410(d) are based upon Selling v. 

Radford, 243 U.S. 46, 51 (1917), wherein the Supreme Court 

established the principles and conditions under which all federal 

courts give effect to state court disciplinary proceedings. 

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We have reviewed the record and conclude that Mr. Russo was 

given a full and fair opportunity to present his case before the 

Kansas Supreme Court. The disciplinary panel appointed by the 

Kansas Supreme Court heard numerous witnesses and recommended to 

the Kansas Supreme Court that Mr. Russo be reinstated. All of 

this evidence was on record for the Kansas Supreme Court's review. 

However, that court, not once but twice, determined that the 

seriousness of Mr. Russo's conduct was such that he should be 

permanently disbarred. See, Russo I, and Russo II. In so doing, 

the court in Russo II adopted and reaffirmed its statement in 

Russo I: 

"While the evidence before the panel indicates that 

many respected members of petitioner's community 

sincerely believe that he has been totally 

rehabilitated and should be again admitted to the 

practice of law, it is this court's duty to 

determine whether the readmission of Mr. Russo to 

the practice of law would be in the best interests 

of justice and the people of the State of Kansas." 

230 Kan. at 8, 630 P.2d 711. 

That statement is equally applicable to the proceeding 

now before the court. 

It is the opinion of a majority of 

the court that the seriousness of 

misconduct of Mr. Russo is such that 

should be permanent. 

the members of 

the original 

his disbarment 

765 P.2d at 167. The fact that the Kansas Supreme Court did not 

consider appellant's evidence as sufficient to overcome the 

seriousness of appellant's original misconduct does not constitute 

a lack of due process. Accordingly, we affirm the federal 

district court's findings as to the constitutional adequacy of the 

state court proceedings. 

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Finally, Mr. Russo argues that his right to practice law had 

merely been suspended temporarily, and that during the petition 

for reinstatement the Kansas Supreme Court, without notice to him 

or opportunity to be heard, changed the proceeding into one of 

permanent disbarment. The record simply does not support such an 

argument. Mr. Russo further asserts that disbarment by the Kansas 

Supreme Court is not a sanction available to that court; that 

permanent disbarment has never been imposed on any other Kansas 

lawyer; and he cites an Oklahoma case which illustrates that 

Oklahoma holds that time and experience may overcome a character 

flaw. These arguments do not rise to a constitutional dimension. 

The decision of the United States District Court for the 

District of Kansas is AFFIRMED. 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

Entered for the Court: 

WADE BRORBY 

Circuit Judge 

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