Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01347/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01347-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Andrei Karanja Lagergren
Appellant
United States
Appellee

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

ANDREI KARANJA LAGERGREN,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2016-1347

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:15-cv-00174-JPW, Senior Judge John 

Paul Wiese.

______________________ 

Decided: July 11, 2016

______________________ 

 ANDREI KARANJA LAGERGREN, Horizon City, TX, pro 

se.

 ERIC LAUFGRABEN, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented 

by MARTIN F. HOCKEY, JR., ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR.,

BENJAMIN C. MIZER. 

______________________ 

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2 LAGERGREN v. US

Before MOORE, LINN, and O’MALLEY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Andrei Karanja Lagergren (“Lagergren”) appeals from 

a decision of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, dismissing 

his claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Lagergren acknowledges that the government paid him certain 

compensation owed, but he claims that the government 

failed to pay him double pay pursuant to a penalty statute. Because Congress has not waived the United States’ 

sovereign immunity for claims of this kind, we affirm the 

dismissal of Lagergren’s claim. 

BACKGROUND1

Lagergren’s claim is based on 46 U.S.C. § 10504(b) 

and (c)(1). Those sections provide as follows: 

(b) The master shall pay a seaman the balance of 

wages due the seaman within 2 days after . . . the 

seaman is discharged . . . 

(c)(1) . . . [W]hen payment is not made as provided 

under subsection (b) of this section without sufficient cause, the master or owner shall pay to the 

seaman 2 days’ wages for each day payment is delayed.

Lagergren acknowledges that following his termination as a seaman on the National Oceanic and Atmospheric vessel Rainier, he received all wages owed. He asserts 

only that he is entitled to collect the delayed payment 

penalty under § 10504(c)(1). Lagergren’s complaint does 

not allege any contractual claim to this entitlement.

The Court of Federal Claims dismissed his suit, explaining that the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 was the 

 

1 Because we write for the parties, familiarity with 

the facts of the case is presumed. 

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LAGERGREN v. US 3

governing statutory provision, and that the Federal 

Government had not waived sovereign immunity for the 

double pay penalty provisions. The Court of Federal 

Claims also rejected Lagergren’s claim of entitlement to 

compensation under the Takings Clause, explaining that 

Lagergren did not have a property right in the double pay 

penalty. We have jurisdiction over an appeal from the 

Court of Federal Claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).

DISCUSSION

We review the Court of Federal Claims’ decision to 

dismiss a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de 

novo. Brandt v. United States, 710 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. 

Cir. 2013). 

 By default, the government is immune from suit, and 

this default rule is only modified where Congress has 

“unequivocally expressed in statutory text” its desire to 

waive immunity. Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1992). 

Even where such a desire is expressed, the waiver is 

generally narrowly construed. Id. The Tucker Act waives 

sovereign immunity for claims based in money-mandating 

statutory provisions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491. See also

United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 217 (1983) (“[To 

be cognizable under the Tucker Act] the claimant must 

demonstrate that the source of substantive law he relies 

upon ‘can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damages sustained.” (emphasis added)). But this waiver does not 

extend to the payment of penalties. See Missouri Pacific 

R.R. v. Ault, 256 U.S. 554, 563 (1921) (“[T]here is nothing 

either in the purpose or the letter of these clauses to 

indicate that congress intended to authorize suit against 

the government for a penalty, if it should fail to perform 

the legal obligations imposed.”); McCrea v. United States 

(The American Shipper), 70 F.2d 632, 635 (2d Cir. 

1934)(holding that the government had not waived immunity under the Seamen’s Act of March 4, 1915 for a 

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4 LAGERGREN v. US

double wages for delay provision because that provision 

was a “penalty”). 

While this Court has not previously decided the issue, 

we agree with the Second Circuit that Ault requires 

explicit Congressional waiver of immunity for government 

liability under a statutory penalty provision such as the 

one at issue here. Section 10504(c)(1)’s double wages 

provision is substantially similar to Section 2 of the 

Seamen’s Act at issue in The American Shipper, and we 

agree with the Second Circuit that provisions of this type 

are primarily punitive in nature. Moreover, in Griffin v. 

Oceanic Contractors, Inc., the Supreme Court clarified 

that the predecessor to the penalty provision here was 

partly punitive in nature. 458 U.S. 564, 572 (1982) (noting that the purpose of the predecessor statute, 46 U.S.C. 

§ 596, was “not exclusively compensatory,” and Congress 

has secured the general remedial purpose of the Act 

through “potentially punitive sanctions designed to deter 

negligent or arbitrary delays in payment.”). We therefore 

conclude that Lagergren cannot enforce § 10504(c)(1) 

against the government.

Lagergren also asserts that the Court of Federal 

Claims improperly failed to apply the Admiralty Clause in 

Article 3 of the United States Constitution. We can 

discern no basis on which the trial court misapplied the 

Admiralty Clause. That clause merely provides that the 

“judicial Power shall extend to . . . all Cases of admiralty 

and maritime Jurisdiction,” U.S. Const. Art. III, Sec. 2, 

Cl. 1. The clause says nothing about the disputed sovereign immunity issue here and does not relate to Lagergren’s claim for penalties under Section 10504. Similarly, 

Lagergren references the due process clause and the equal 

protection clause, but neither of those clauses is moneymandating, and therefore neither can support jurisdiction 

in the Court of Federal Claims. See LeBlanc v. United 

States, 50 F.3d 1025, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Finally, to 

the extent Lagergren argues entitlement based on a 

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LAGERGREN v. US 5

taking, we agree with the Court of Federal Claims that 

Lagergren must first show that he has a property interest 

in the delayed amounts owed, which he has not and 

cannot do here. See Adams v. United States, 391 F.3d 

1212, 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“We decline to treat a statutory right to be paid money as a legally-recognized property interest . . . . Instead, we view it as nothing more than 

an allegation that money is owed.”).

We conclude that the Court of Federal Claims did not 

err in dismissing Lagergren’s claim for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

Each party shall bear its own costs.

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