Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-00051/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-00051-15/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
County of Contra Costa
Defendant
Lori Koch
Defendant
Gus S. Kramer
Defendant
Bernice Peoples
Plaintiff

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BERNICE PEOPLES,

Plaintiff,

 v.

COUNTY OF CONTRA COSTA, GUS S.

KRAMER in his individual capacity, LORI

KOCH in her individual capacity, and DOES 1

through 15 inclusive,

Defendants. /

No. C 07-00051 MHP

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Re: Plaintiff’s Motion to File Second

Amended Complaint

This employment discrimination action involves several incidents in which plaintiff Bernice

Peoples (“Peoples”)—an African-American woman who is employed as a tax assessor for defendant

Contra Costa County—applied for, but was denied a promotion. Plaintiff asserts claims of

discrimination under federal and state law against defendants Contra Costa County (“County”) and

two employees involved in the promotion decisions—Gus S. Kramer (“Kramer”) and Lori Koch

(“Koch”). Now before the court is plaintiff’s motion to file a second amended complaint. Having

considered the parties’ arguments and submissions, and for the reasons stated below, the court enters

the following memorandum and order. 

BACKGROUND

Peoples filed this action on January 4, 2007. The complaint as amended on March 16, 2007

alleges four causes of action. First, against all defendants, Peoples alleges race discrimination in

violation of 42 U.S.C. section 1981. First Amended Complaint ¶¶ 23–24. Second, against

defendants Kramer and Koch, she alleges race discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. section 1983 

and the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. ¶ 25–27. Third, against defendant County of Contra Costa, she

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 alleges a custom, policy, and practice of race discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. section 1983

and the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. ¶¶ 28–31. Fourth and finally, against all defendants, she alleges

race and gender discrimination in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act

(“FEHA”), Cal. Govt. Code §§ 12900 et seq. Id. ¶¶ 32–35.

Peoples now requests leave to file a second amended complaint to (1) amend the second

cause of action against Kramer and Koch for violation of 42 U.S.C. section 1983 to allege not race

discrimination alone, but race and gender discrimination; (2) add a cause of action for retaliation

against defendant County under FEHA; (3) add a cause of action for retaliation against defendant

Kramer under 42 U.S.C. section 1983; and (4) delete the existing third cause of action against the

County for race discrimination based on custom, policy, and practice in violation of 42 U.S.C.

section 1983. See Docket No. 109, Price Second Supp. Dec., Exh. A, Revised Second Amended

Complaint.1

On April 10, 2008, Peoples moved for leave to amend, and under the briefing schedule set

forth in Civil L.R. 7–2, noticed it for hearing on May 19. The court’s scheduling order does not

state a deadline to amend the First Amended Complaint. However, under the scheduling order, the

deadline for fact discovery was February 15. Summary judgment motions were to be noticed by

March 24 and the court on May 5 heard oral argument on the summary judgment motions. The

deadline to submit jury instructions and other pre-trial filings was May 16 (four days after the

hearing on this motion was held). Pretrial conference was set for May 26 and trial is to begin on

June 9. See August 29, 2007 Scheduling Order, Docket Entry 22; January 31, 2008 Stipulation and

Order to Enlarge Discovery Cut-off, Docket Entry 25. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Although the court’s scheduling order did not set a deadline by which to amend the First

Amended Complaint, plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend necessarily requires modification of the

pre-trial deadlines and the corresponding trial dates. Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

(“FRCP”) Rule 16(b)(4), “[a] schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s

consent.” A party seeking to amend the pleadings after the date specified in the scheduling order

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must first show “good cause” for modifying the scheduling order under Rule 16(b)(4). Johnson v.

Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.3d 604, 608 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Forstmann v. Culp, 114

F.R.D. 83, 85 (M.D.N.C. 1987)). If “good cause” is shown, the party must then demonstrate that

amendment is appropriate under FRCP Rule 15(a) which provides that leave to file amended

pleadings should be freely granted “when justice so requires.” Id. 

“A court’s evaluation of good cause [under Rule 16(b)(4)] is not coextensive with an inquiry

into the propriety of the amendment under [Rule 15(a)].” Id. at 609. Unlike Rule 15(a)’s liberal

amendment policy which focuses on the undue delay or bad faith of the party seeking amendment,

the prejudice to the opposing party, and the futility of the amendment, see Griggs v. Pace American

Group, Inc., 170 F.3d 877, 880–81 (9th Cir. 1999), Rule 16(b)(4)’s “good cause” standard primarily

considers the diligence of the party seeking the amendment. Johnson, 975 F.3d at 609. The district

court may modify the pretrial schedule “if it cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the

party seeking the extension.” Id. Although the existence or degree of prejudice to the party

opposing the modification might supply additional reasons to deny a motion, the focus of the inquiry

is upon the moving party’s reasons for seeking modification. Id. 

DISCUSSION

Peoples does not claim that the factual allegations giving rise to her claims for retaliation

against the County and Kramer were unknown at the time she commenced this action in January

2007. The facts which form the basis of her retaliation claims are in the Complaint and the First

Amended Complaint. See Complaint ¶¶ 12–13 (Peoples “lodged a complaint of gender

discrimination based upon sexual harassment against defendant Kramer” in August 2000, and “since

she filed her sexual harassment complaint . . . , [she] has been consistently passed over for

promotion” in both 2005 and 2006); First Amended Complaint ¶¶ 12–13 (same). Peoples does not

seek leave to amend to add newly discovered claims. Rather, Peoples seeks leave to amend to add a

claim for which she now believes she has evidence to make the claim viable. 

 Peoples’ counsel Pamela Y. Price (“Price”) attests that she did not include a claim for

retaliation in the prior complaints “based upon [her] interpretation of legal precedents which suggest

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that the possibility of establishing a causal link is extremely difficult when there is a significant

lapse of time between retaliatory acts and protected activity.” Price Dec. ¶ 5. However, on April 1,

2008, James E. Hicks (“Hicks”), Peoples’ union representative, gave deposition testimony that

shortly after Peoples filed a sexual harassment complaint against Kramer in 2000, Kramer told Hicks

that he would never promote Peoples because of the sexual harassment complaint. Id. Until Hicks

testified under oath to Kramer’s statement, counsel Price “did not believe that [there was] sufficient

evidence to pursue a retaliation claim.” Id. 

Price initially contacted Hicks in July 2007 to schedule an interview. Id. Throughout the

Fall of 2007, Price made repeated attempts to meet with Hicks, but because of Hicks’ severe medical

complications, she was not able to meet with him until January 31, 2008. Id. ¶ 9. On that day,

Hicks was interviewed by one of Price’s associates and agreed to make himself available for a

deposition in February. Id. ¶ 11. His deposition was arranged for February, but Hicks was unable to

attend because he had traveled to Arkansas and his return flight was grounded by poor weather

conditions. Hicks Dec. ¶ 9. The deposition was rescheduled for March 4 but the deposition did not

occur because according to Price, defense counsel did not appear. Price Dec. ¶ 12. The deposition

was rescheduled for the next day on March 5, but it did not occur because Hicks suffered a heart

attack. Hicks Dec. ¶ 10. Finally, on April 1 Hicks was able to give his deposition testimony. Id. ¶

11. Price, on behalf of her client plaintiff Peoples, filed this motion for leave to amend shortly

thereafter on April 10. 

The court questions counsel’s decision to not assert a claim for retaliation in the prior

complaints. FRCP Rule 11 requires that an “attorney . . . certif[y] to the best of the person’s

knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances”

that “the claims . . . are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending,

modifying, or reversing existing law” and that “the factual contentions have evidentiary support, or

if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for

further investigation or discovery.” Rule 11 dictates the standards for investigation and research

necessary for an attorney to sign, file and submit a complaint, but the standard is not the same as the

standard of proof at trial. Sworn testimony is not required for factual allegations in a complaint and

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an attorney may assert a claim even if it may require a nonfrivolous extension or modification of the

existing law. 

Notwithstanding counsel’s questionable decision to not assert a retaliation claim in the prior

complaints, the court finds that there is “good cause” under Rule 16(b)(4) for plaintiff to amend the

complaint at this late stage, even though it will necessarily require modification of the court’s

scheduling order. Plaintiff’s counsel Price was diligent in seeking the deposition testimony of

Hicks, but was thwarted in her efforts due to conditions beyond her control. Once Price obtained

Hicks’ testimony, she promptly sought a stipulation from defense counsel, and failing that, filed the

instant motion shortly thereafter. 

Amendment to include a retaliation claim is also appropriate under Rule 15(a). For the same

reasons that the court finds “good cause” under Rule 16(b)(4) to modify the scheduling order, the

court finds that under Rule 15(a), plaintiff does not bring this motion after undue delay or in bad

faith. Moreover, amendment is not futile because under FEHA, plaintiff’s claim for retaliation

against the County was administratively exhausted. Although a retaliation claim does not appear on

the face of the formal charge, it is clear from Peoples’ pre-complaint questionnaire and the intake

notes that she complained to the Department of Fair Employment and Housing about her prior

sexual harassment complaint and the subsequent failure to promote. See Docket No. 73. Retaliation

is also cognizable against defendant Kramer under section 1983, and under that statute,

administrative exhaustion is not required. Lastly, because the court will modify the pretrial and trial

dates to accommodate plaintiff’s amended complaint, any prejudice defendant may suffer will be

mitigated. Although the complaint did not formally assert a retaliation claim, the factual basis of the

claims was alleged in both the Complaint and the First Amended Complaint. Defendant, therefore,

has had ample notice of the potential retaliation claims.

With respect to plaintiff’s request for leave to amend the existing section 1983 claim for

discrimination against Kramer and Koch, the court notes that the existing FEHA claim for

discrimination already alleges both race and gender discrimination. From the outset, plaintiff could

have also pled the section 1983 claim as both a race and gender claim. At this late stage, plaintiff

offers no explanation for this omission, and the court finds that plaintiff’s request is untimely. 

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However, allowing plaintiff to amend the section 1983 claim against Kramer and Koch to allege

both race and gender would be neither futile nor prejudicial to defendants. Although the parties

dispute whether plaintiff has properly exhausted a gender discrimination claim under FEHA, that

dispute does not bear on the section 1983 claim because exhaustion is not required under section

1983. Accordingly, amendment of the section 1983 claim would not be futile. Moreover, prejudice

to the defendants is minimal because one claim in this litigation has already proceeded under a

theory of race and gender discrimination and discovery has been conducted accordingly. As the

court has already noted, whatever prejudice exists may be mitigated by postponing the pretrial and

trial dates. On balance, although amendment of the section 1983 claim to include gender

discrimination is untimely, the court finds that leave to amend should be granted because it is not

futile or unduly prejudicial to defendants. 

Finally, plaintiff requests leave to amend to delete the existing third cause of action against

the County for race discrimination based on custom, policy, and practice in violation of 42 U.S.C.

section 1983. The reason for the deletion is that defendant County has moved for summary

judgment on this cause of action and plaintiff does not oppose the motion. Plainly, this deletion is

not made in bad faith and is not untimely, futile or prejudicial, and plaintiff’s request to amend is

therefore granted. 

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s motion to file a second amended complaint is GRANTED in its entirety. The

proposed revised second amended complaint (Docket No. 109, Exh. A) is deemed filed, and

defendants shall file their answer or otherwise respond within fourteen (14) days of the date of this

order. The Clerk shall contact the parties to re-schedule the pretrial and trial dates. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 27, 2008 

MARILYN HALL PATEL

United States District Court Judge

Northern District of California

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1. Plaintiff filed a proposed second amended complaint on April 10, 2008, attaching the complaint

to her opening brief. See Docket No. 62. She later filed a revised proposed second amended complaint

on May 6, 2008, attaching the revised complaint to her reply brief. See Docket No. 109. Defendant has

objected to the revised complaint because it proposes a further amendment that was not included in the

initial proposed complaint, namely the addition of a retaliation claim against the County under FEHA.

See Docket No. 113. However, the retaliation claim against the County under FEHA is nearly identical

to the retaliation claim against Kramer under section 1983. While the former was not included in the

initial proposed amendment, the latter was. Accordingly, defendants have had the opportunity to

respond to the new retaliation claims and have in fact done so. The apparent reason for plaintiff’s

revised complaint is that in the interim between the filing of the opening and reply briefs, she received

records from the Department of Fair Employment and Housing showing that plaintiff complained of

retaliation based upon her filing a previous sexual harassment complaint. 

ENDNOTES

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