Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01901/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01901-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John M. Smith
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 15-1901 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

JOHN M. SMITH, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 13 CR 863-1 — Edmond E. Chang, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED MARCH 2, 2016 — MARCH 21, 2016 

____________________ 

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and KANNE, Circuit 

Judges. 

BAUER, Circuit Judge. John Smith was found guilty by a 

jury of distributing heroin, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and sentenced to 216 months’ imprisonment. During deliberations 

the jury sent four notes to the judge who conferred with the 

parties before responding. In the fourth note, a juror asked 

to be removed from the case, but the judge responded that 

all the jurors should continue deliberating. Smith argues that 

Case: 15-1901 Document: 32 Filed: 03/21/2016 Pages: 6
2 No. 15-1901 

this response was unduly coercive and asks that his conviction be vacated. The government argues that Smith waived 

any challenge to the court’s response. We agree that Smith 

waived his challenge and affirm the judgment. 

I. 

Smith, a retired member of the Black Disciples gang, routinely distributed heroin near Garfield Park on Chicago’s 

West Side. On four occasions over about a month, he sold 

heroin to a confidential source of the FBI. Each time, the sale 

took place as follows: first the FBI would record telephone 

conversations between Smith and the source to arrange the 

buy. Then, in preparation for the sale, the FBI would search 

the source and his car for contraband, provide the source 

with money for the buy, and equip the source with an audio 

recorder. During each sale, FBI agents would conduct audio 

and visual surveillance from nearby positions. Afterward, 

agents would search the source and send the recovered baggies of drugs to a lab, which tested the contents positive for 

heroin. 

Smith’s trial lasted three days. The confidential source 

did not testify, but two FBI agents testified about the telephonic recordings, the searches they carried out, and the 

heroin they recovered. An expert witness in narcotics trafficking testified as to the meaning of coded language in the 

recorded telephone calls and the market prices at that time 

for heroin in that part of Chicago. Another expert witness 

testified to the lack of usable fingerprint evidence on the 

baggies. Surveillance agents testified that Smith drove an Infiniti car during the transactions, and records from a ChicaCase: 15-1901 Document: 32 Filed: 03/21/2016 Pages: 6
No. 15-1901 3

go-based Infiniti dealership definitively linked the car to 

Smith. Smith presented no evidence. 

After closing arguments the court instructed the jury on 

the applicable law. It read aloud the so-called Silvern instruction, set forth in Section 7.03 of the Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions of this court, which urges jurors to use their “considered judgment,” listen to their fellow jurors, but “not surrender [their] honest beliefs” for the sake of a unanimous 

verdict. 

On the morning of deliberations, the jury submitted several notes to the court. The first note simply requested copies 

of the verdict form. The second note requested clarification 

about whether the definition of “distribution” covered a situation where the defendant handed the drugs to someone 

else to give to the source. The court conferred with counsel 

and Smith, and then wrote the jury that it already had all the 

applicable instructions on the definition of “distribution.” 

Before it could respond to the jurors’ second note, the 

court received a third note. In that note a juror expressed 

concern about being bullied by another juror and asked to be 

removed from the case. The parties and the court conferred, 

and defense counsel requested that the court tell the jurors to 

continue deliberating. The court proposed that it repeat the 

Silvern instruction. Defense counsel did not object. The court 

then prepared a note to the jury that read, “In response to a 

note concerning your deliberations, I am directing all of you 

to re-read the attached instruction which was previously 

provided to you,” along with another copy of the Silvern instruction. Defense counsel replied, “That is perfect.” 

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An hour later another juror submitted a fourth note, 

which is the subject of this appeal. In the note, this juror 

asked to be removed from the jury: 

Dear Judge, 

Can I get off of this Jury due to I cannot make a 

sound disstion [sic] of this case. 

[Juror’s Signature] 

The court read the note aloud and then asked defense 

counsel his position. Counsel responded, “Continue to deliberate.” But the government wanted to bring the jury back 

into the courtroom and have them listen again to the Silvern

instruction. Defense counsel wondered aloud whether the 

note was a sign of an impending deadlock, but the government and court were disinclined to conclude that the jury 

was deadlocked based on one juror’s note. Defense counsel 

responded: “Your honor, under oath she was asked if she 

would listen to the Court’s instructions and she would render a fair verdict. I would ask that she be told, not her herself, but the jurors be told to continue to deliberate.” He also 

noted that now there were three or four jurors who had a 

“problem” with the case, and he hoped this might benefit 

Smith. 

The court adopted the language that defense counsel requested as follows: “In response to jury note 4, each of you is 

part of the jury that has been picked to decide this case. Each 

of you must continue to deliberate.” The court turned to defense counsel and asked, “How is that, [defense counsel]?” 

Counsel answered, “Perfect.” 

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No. 15-1901 5

Twenty minutes later, the jury informed the court that it 

had reached a verdict. The jury found Smith guilty on all 

counts. The court polled each juror, and each assented to the 

guilty verdict. 

Seven months later, after obtaining new counsel, Smith 

moved for a new trial on the basis that the court’s response 

to the fourth note was unfairly coercive because it did not 

remind the jurors to hold onto their convictions. He argued 

that the court’s exhortation to keep deliberating, despite the 

jurors’ complaints of being bullied and being unable to make 

a sound decision, forced the jurors to resign their beliefs and 

vote guilty. The district court denied the motion as untimely, 

and in any event, the court continued, the challenge to the 

court’s response to the fourth juror note was “waived as 

waived can be.” The court explained that it formulated its 

response to express Smith’s request that the jury “continue to 

deliberate,” and Smith agreed that the court’s formulation 

was “perfect.” And the challenge was meritless, the court 

added, because it had instructed the jurors aloud and twice 

in writing to deliberate with an open mind but not to surrender their beliefs. 

Smith was sentenced to 216 months’ imprisonment on 

each count to run concurrently and eight years’ supervised 

release. 

II. 

Smith’s only argument on appeal is that the district 

court’s response to the fourth note was coercive. He argues 

that the court should have admonished the jury not to relinquish their convictions to reach a verdict. The government 

argues that Smith affirmatively waived any challenge to the 

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6 No. 15-1901 

court’s response by agreeing with it. It contends that defense 

counsel’s reply of “perfect” to the court’s proposed response 

constituted “unmistakable approval.” 

We agree with the government and the district court that 

Smith waived his challenge to the court’s response by affirmatively proposing the formulation of the response. When 

a defendant affirmatively approves an instruction to the jury, 

he waives his challenge. United States v. Kirklin, 727 F.3d 711, 

716 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v. DiSantis, 565 F.3d 354, 361 

(7th Cir. 2009). Smith’s unequivocal answer of “perfect”—a 

more affirmative answer than, say, “no objection”—

constitutes a waiver. See United States v. Ajayi, 808 F.3d 1113, 

1121 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Ordinarily, we treat an affirmatively 

stated “no objection” to a jury instruction as a waiver.”). 

And the district court was under no obligation to provide 

the Silvern instruction for a fourth time; it is within the 

court’s discretion simply to tell the jury to continue deliberating. United States v. Degraffenried, 339 F.3d 576, 580 (7th Cir. 

2003). “[A] bare instruction to keep deliberating does not 

warrant reversal.” United States v. Coffman, 94 F.3d 330, 336 

(7th Cir. 1996). 

III. 

We AFFIRM the judgment. 

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