Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-94-03139/USCOURTS-caDC-94-03139-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Darryl Wayne Askew
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 26, 1996 Decided July 12, 1996

No. 94-3139

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

DARRYL WAYNE ASKEW,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 93cr00465-01)

Thomas G. Corcoran, Jr., appointed by the court, argued the cause and filed the briefsfor appellant.

Mary B. McCord, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States

Attorney, John R. Fisher, Elizabeth Trosman, and Steven J. McCool, Assistant United States

Attorneys, were on the brief, argued the cause for appellee.

Before: WALD, WILLIAMS, and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

TATEL, Circuit Judge: Appellant challenges his conviction for possession of more than fifty

grams of cocaine base with intent to distribute, arguing that it was plain error for the trial court to

admit certainexpert testimonyabout intent, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and that

the trial court improperly admitted as rebuttal evidence testimony regarding a prior arrest.

Concluding that appellant has not shown prejudice from the admission of the expert testimony or

from his counsel's performance and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the

rebuttal testimony, we affirm his conviction.

I.

Shortly after midnight, on December 6, 1993, a United States Park Police officer observed

appellant Darryl Wayne Askew in the passenger seat of a car parked in front of Washington, D.C.'s

Union Station. Another person entered the car and started to drive away with Askew still inside.

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Noticing that it had no front license plate, the police officer stopped the car. After obtaining the

occupants' names and running an information check on them, the officer returned to the car to arrest

Askew. Askew stepped out of the car and ran away. Several police officers eventually apprehended

him, arrested him, and found in his possession 148.3 grams of cocaine base, five glass pipes, four

lighters, and a pager. Askew was charged with one count of unlawful possession with intent to

distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(iii).

Askew was appointed counsel, Assistant Federal Public Defender Amy Seidman. Less than

a week before trial, claiming dissatisfaction with Seidman, Askew requested a different attorney.

Another attorneyfromtheFederalPublic Defender Office, Assistant FederalPublicDefenderMichael

Wallace, who had spoken with Seidman about the case, was appointed to represent Askew. Wallace

reviewed the case files on a Friday evening, met with Askew and Seidman for about an hour the next

day, and then left town, returning the following Wednesday, the day before trial.

Testifying at Askew's jury trial in the United States District Court for the District of

Columbia, the arresting officer described the circumstances ofAskew's arrest, noting that afterwards,

Askew repeatedly stated that he "need[ed] a hit." The prosecution also presented an expert witness

who testified that in his opinion, the amount of cocaine base found in Askew's possession was

consistent with intent to distribute.

Askew's theory of defense was that he possessed the cocaine base for his personal use, not

for distribution. At trial, he testified that he had been addicted to crack cocaine for four or five years.

He also asserted that he had obtained the cocaine earlier on the day he was arrested from two boys

who were selling drugs in an alley. According to Askew, when a police car pulled up, he snatched

the drugsfrom the boys and ran away. Askew's fiancée testified on his behalf, stating that beginning

in the summer of 1993 he began losing weight quickly, his appearance deteriorated, they stopped

having sexual relations, and she noticed that money and jewelry were missing from her home.

Over the objection of Askew's counsel, the prosecution called as a rebuttal witness a New

Jersey state trooper who testified that he arrested Askew in New Jersey in 1989 on drug charges.

Askew's attorney, Wallace, was unaware that these charges had been dismissed as a result of a class

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action alleging trooper bias. The jury was never informed that the New Jersey charges were no

longer pending against Askew.

The jury convicted Askew, and the district court sentenced him to a prison term of 121

months followed by five years of supervised release. Askew later sought to have his conviction

vacated pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, alleging that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel.

After a hearing, the district court rejected his claims, and Askew now appeals.

II.

Askew argues for the first time on appeal that the district court committed plain error by

admitting into evidence certain statements of opinion regarding intent by the Government's expert

witness. The expert, Metropolitan Police Detective Tyrone Thomas, testified that the amount of

cocaine base found in Askew's possession was enough to make 1,032 individual doses and that its

street value exceeded $20,000. Detective Thomas also gave his opinion that possession of this

amount of cocaine was consistent with an intent to distribute rather than with personal use. He

stated, "My opinion would be that anyone who possessed the equivalent of 1,032 bags of crack

cocaine would be in the business ofselling drugs on the streets of Washington, D.C. or wherever for

a profit." He also testified, referring to a Government exhibit containing the cocaine, pipes, and

lighters that had been found in Askew's possession, "I believe that the 148 grams that are inside of

here was intended to be sold on the streets of Washington for a profit for a drug dealer." On

cross-examination, Detective Thomas said, "[M]y opinion is that no one is going to possess the

equivalent of 1,032 bags of crack cocaine for their personal use." Askew argues that this testimony

violated Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b), which provides:

No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of

a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the

defendant did or did not have the mentalstate or condition constituting an element of

the crime charged or of a defense thereto.

Because Askew did not object to the admission of these particular statements at trial, we

review for plain error under Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Supreme

Court has explained that Rule 52(b) allows for correction of a trial error not drawn to the attention

of the court if an error is shown, the error is "plain" under current law, and the error affected

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substantial rights. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-35 (1993). If these requirements are

met, we may correct the error, but only if the error " "seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or

public reputation of judicial proceedings.' " Id. at 736 (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S.

157, 160 (1936)) (alteration in Olano).

For the district court's admission of the challenged statements to be plain error, "it must ...

have been error under settled law of the Supreme Court or this circuit" at the time of trial. United

States v. Mitchell, 996 F.2d 419, 422 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Thus, Askew cannot benefit from our

holding, more than a year after histrial, that Rule 704(b) is violated when an expert gives an opinion

regarding an element of the crime in response to a hypothetical question "exactly mirror[ing]" the

facts of the defendant's case. United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 667, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Instead,

Askew must rely on two cases decided prior to his trial, Mitchell and United States v. Williams, 980

F.2d 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

In Williams, the prosecutor asked an expert witness whether a certain quantity and packaging

of zip-lock bags "indicate anything in [the expert's] opinion as to the intentions of the person who

possessed those bags." Williams, 980 F.2d at 1465. The witness replied, "Yes, sir. These bags were

meant to be distributed at street level." Id. In response to defense counsel's objection, the judge

clarified the testimonybyobtaining the officer's admissions before the jurythat the officer was "giving

his opinion" and that he was not referring to and had no knowledge ofthe particular defendant's case.

Id. In response to further questioning, the expert witness again testified that "these bags were

intended for" "street leveldistribution." Id. On appeal, although we acknowledged that "[a]n expert's

opinion that a specific defendant had the "intentions' to distribute cocaine might be thought a

determination prohibited by Rule 704(b)," we found no violation because the prosecutor's question

was ambiguousfocusing on the bags, not the defendantand because the judge intervened to

clarify that the testimony referred only to a "hypothetical typical individual," not to the defendant in

particular. Id. at 1466.

In Mitchell, the prosecutor asked an expert witness, "Now, what, if anything, does the

packaging of that crack cocaine into nine individual ziplocks tell you about the intent of the person

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that was carrying those ziplocks?" Mitchell, 996 F.2d at 422. The witness replied, "It was intent to

distribute." Id. We held that, absent any corrective instruction by the trial judge, this testimony,

pointing more directly than the testimony in Williams to the mental state of "the person that was

carrying those ziplocks," violated Rule 704(b). Id.

In Askew's case, Detective Thomas made one statement regarding intent that seems to fall

somewhere between the facts of Williams and Mitchell: "[T]he 148 grams that are inside of here was

intended to be sold on the streets of Washington for a profit for a drug dealer." As in Williams, the

statement appearsto refer more to the object possessed than to the possessor, but, asin Mitchell, the

statement lacked a corrective interjection by the judge. Detective Thomas's statement seems, like the

expert'sstatement in Williams, not to point precisely to the defendant'sintent, but rather, in the words

of the Williams court, "to answer a different question, i.e., for what purpose [was the cocaine]

designed?" Williams, 980 F.2d at 1466. We suggested in Williams that such a "somewhat

ambiguous" response would be "troubling" absent intervention by the district court. Id. In Askew's

case, although Detective Thomas's statement did not identify who intended to sell the drugs, the

district court made no corrective interjection to ensure that the jury did not think that the

prosecution's expert was testifying that Askew in particular intended to distribute the cocaine base.

Although the question is close, we agree with the Government that at the time ofAskew'strial

we had not clearly held that questions such as the one answered by Detective Thomas, framed so as

not to refer to the intent of the actual defendant, are forbidden under Rule 704(b). Neither Williams

nor Mitchell explicitly found impermissible testimony that, while linking an intent with certain

contraband, did not go so far asto link intent with a specific person. Although we stated in Williams

that such testimony would be "troubling" without a corrective interjection by the district court, see

Williams, 980 F.2d at 1466, this expression of concern does not rise to the level of "settled law."

Indeed, in Mitchell, where we ruled that the testimony in question violated Rule 704(b), we

nevertheless concluded that "[t]he testimony ... though forbidden, was different enough from the

strictures of prior cases not to have been plainly forbidden." Mitchell, 996 F.2d at 423. As in

Mitchell, then, "[t]he difference may seemsubtle, but Rule 704(b) invitesthe drawing ofrathersubtle

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lines." Id.

At any rate, we do not think that Askew has shown that admission of this statement "

"seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.' " Olano, 507

U.S. at 736 (quoting Atkinson, 297 U.S. at 160). Because Detective Thomas's statement of his belief

that "the 148 grams that are inside of here was intended to be sold on the streets of Washington for

a profit for a drug dealer" without referring to Askew in particular was in fact consistent with

Askew's own testimony that he stole the cocaine fromtwo young boys who themselves possessed the

cocaine for distribution, Askew has not shown a likelihood of unfair prejudice.

Askew also challenges two other statements by the expert: "anyone who possessed the

equivalent of 1,032 bags of crack cocaine would be in the business of selling drugs on the streets of

Washington, D.C. or wherever for a profit" and "no one is going to possess the equivalent of 1,032

bags of crack cocaine for their personal use." Askew argues that, by "categorically exclud[ing]

everyone fromintending personaluse ofthese particular drugs, [Detective Thomas] "pointed directly'

to Askew's mentalstate." Reply Brief for Appellant at 12. Askew, however, cites no cases holding

that Rule 704(b) rendersimpermissible expert testimony using categorical termssuch as "anyone" or

"no one."

Although we are troubled by such testimony absent corrective instruction, we need not reach

the issue here, for Askew has failed to show unfair prejudice from the admission of this testimony.

As the Supreme Court explained in Olano, Rule 52(b) assigns to "the defendant rather than the

Government ... the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice." Olano, 507 U.S. at 734.

Although we have noted the powerful effect of expert testimony on an ultimate issue of fact, see

Boyd, 55 F.3d at 672, the jury could have viewed Detective Thomas's testimony as addressing the

ultimate issue of Askew's intent only by reading the words "anyone" and "no one" very literally, that

is as definitely including Askew within their scope. Furthermore, other evidence clearly supports the

jury's finding that Askew intended to distribute the drugs in his possession. Cf. United States v.

Glenn, 64 F.3d 706, 711-12 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (finding no plain error when expert testimony "almost

identical" to that in Boyd was presented "long before" Boyd was decided and noting as well that the

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defendant "was not unfairly prejudiced in view of the possession evidence which ... was itself

sufficient to support the jury'sinference that he intended to distribute the drugs"). Detective Thomas

testified that Askew was found in possession of the equivalent of 1,032 doses of cocaine base worth

over $20,000. We have held that a sufficiently large amount of drugs can be regarded as adequate

evidence of an intent to distribute. See id. at 711 (noting that "[t]he 24.7 grams [of cocaine base] at

issue "significantly exceed[ed] that necessary for personal use' and could itself properly support an

inference ofintent to distribute" (quoting United States v. Stephens, 23 F.3d 553, 557-58 (D.C. Cir.),

cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 522 (1994)) (third alteration in Glenn)). In addition to knowing about the

large quantity of drugs found in Askew's possession, the jury knew that Askew had five pipes, four

lighters, and a pager. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that any error in admitting the

expert'sstatements was prejudicial or "seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation

of judicial proceedings."

III.

Askew also challenges the performance of his trial counsel as constitutionally ineffective on

numerous grounds. To prevail on these claims, Askew must show that counsel's performance was

deficient, falling below "an objective standard of reasonableness" defined by "prevailing professional

norms." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). Askew must also show that he was

prejudiced by counsel's performance, that is, "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694.

As the Supreme Court noted in Strickland, "[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be

highly deferential." Id. at 689. Thus, courts must make "every effort ... to eliminate the distorting

effects of hindsight" and "must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the

wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id. Employing these standards, the district court

rejected Askew's ineffective assistance claims after the section 2255 hearing. On review, we accept

the district court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. See United States v. Del

Rosario, 902 F.2d 55, 58 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 942 (1990). Although the Supreme

Court has labeled as mixed questions of law and fact whether counsel's performance was deficient

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and prejudicial,see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698, that does not settle whatstandard of appellate review

is appropriate, compare Ornelas v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1662 (1996) (adopting de novo

review for determinations of reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop and probable

cause to make a warrantless search) with Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 401-05

(1990) (adopting abuse of discretion standard for review of Rule 11 rulings). We need not decide

here which standard of review is appropriate, for even assuming that we should review the district

court's determination de novo, cf. Nealy v. Cabana, 764 F.2d 1173, 1176-77 (5th Cir. 1985)

(adopting de novo review), we affirm its rejection of Askew's claims.

Askew first argues that counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to request a

continuance in order to obtain the services of an expert to testify that the amount of cocaine base

found in Askew's possession could be consistent with personal use. According to Askew, because

Wallace knew that the prosecution planned to call an expert witness to testify that the amount of

cocaine base found in Askew's possession was consistent with an intent to distribute, Wallace should

have either hired an expert to counter that testimony or asked the district court for a continuance until

an expert was available to testify. At the section 2255 hearing, Askew's first attorney, Seidman,

testified that she had spoken with two experts; one was not willing to say that 148.3 grams of

cocaine base was consistent with personal use, and the other told Seidman that it was possible that

such an amount could be consistent with personal use but that his schedule would not permit him to

participate in the trial. Testifying at the section 2255 hearing, Wallace said that he contacted several

experts who told him that they could not testify in good faith that someone could consume such a

large amount of cocaine base. Wallace also testified that, as a tactical matter, he generally avoided

using such experts because he did not think that "they give a clear indication of what ... the mental

state of the defendant is."

A special filing by Askew in this appeal demonstrates why he has not shown that counsel's

failure to call an expert was unconstitutionally deficient performance. In the course of moving this

court for leave to hire expert witnesses and to file their affidavits on appeal, Askew sought to justify

his unusual request as follows:

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[I]t appears that defense narcotic experts are not often called in this jurisdiction so it

is difficult to put before the Court what they typically say. Counsel has also

attempted to find such testimony in other reported opinions, which the Court could

judicially notice, but has been unsuccessful.

Appellant's Reply to Opp'n to Mot. for Leave to Hire Expert Witnesses at 1. We quote from this

request in light of Strickland's holding that "[t]he proper measure of attorney performance remains

simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. Because

Askew's request to us concedes that the sort of expert testimony on which his claim depends is

infrequent in this jurisdiction and because he has pointed to no other case involving such testimony,

we have no basis for concluding that Askew's trial counsel breached prevailing professional norms.

Further weakening Askew's claim is Wallace's testimony setting forth a reasonable tactical

basis for his decision: his doubts about the effectiveness of expert testimony regarding intent.

Indeed, in light of Askew's own testimony at trial that he stole the 148.3 grams of cocaine base from

street drug dealers, Wallace may have anticipated that testimony by a government expert that 148.3

grams of cocaine base is consistent with an intent to distribute would not be especially harmful to

Askew's defense. Askew has thus not "overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the

challenged action "might be considered sound trial strategy.' " Id. at 689 (quoting Michel v.

Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).

Askew also bases his ineffective assistance claim on counsel's failure to prepare to rebut the

testimony of the New Jersey state trooper, in particular, counsel's failure to discover that the New

Jersey charges about which the trooper testified had been dropped by the time of Askew's trial. At

trial, when the Government sought to introduce the trooper's testimony as part of its case in chief,

Wallace requested a thirty-day continuance,stating that he knew "absolutely nothing about" the New

Jersey charge. Denying the continuance, the district court noted that the Federal Public Defender's

Office had been on notice of the New Jersey arrest for four months. Because the prosecution had

given only two days' notice of its intention to use the trooper'stestimony, however, the district court

permitted the trooper to testify only in rebuttal.

In his testimony, the New Jersey trooper described the circumstances under which he had

arrested Askew nearly five years earlier. According to the trooper, as part of a narcotics investigation

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in New Jersey, he interviewed three suspects who had been detained in a road stop on drug charges.

With their assistance, Askew was lured to a service station where he retrieved from a car a bag

containing a "chunky" substance. At the section 2255 hearing, Wallace testified that he learned after

Askew's conviction that the New Jersey case had been dismissed as a result of a class action alleging

trooper bias. Although Askew's first attorney, Seidman, testified that she thought she knew before

or during the trial that the New Jersey charges had been dropped, the district court thought "[h]er

testimony was not very confident on that point."

Askew first attempts to satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland by arguing that had counsel

discovered that the New Jersey charges had been dismissed, the district court would have had to

exclude the officer's testimony. We disagree. Askew has offered no reason to think that his arrest

was based on an improper search of his property or that the officer in his case lacked probable cause

to arrest him. Regardless of whether probable cause supported the initial road stop that resulted in

the arrest of the three suspects who eventually lured Askew to the service station, Askew has given

us no reason to doubt that the three suspects' statements to the trooper that they were transporting

cocaine for Askew, combined with Askew'sretrievalofthe bag containing the chunkysubstance from

a car, were sufficient to establish probable cause to arrest him.

Notwithstanding the likely admissibility of the trooper's testimony, Askew may still satisfy

Strickland 's prejudice prong by demonstrating a reasonable probability either that, had the jury

known that the charges had been dropped for trooper bias, it would have discounted the trooper's

testimony and determined that the prosecution had not shown beyond a reasonable doubt that Askew

had the intent to distribute the cocaine base in his possession, or that, had the district court known,

it would not have admitted the trooper's testimony as rebuttal evidence and the jury might not have

convicted Askew. We think Askew's showing is not sufficient for either of these purposes.

Askew concedes that he "do[es] not know what Wallace would have found if he had

investigated the New Jersey case." Brief for Appellant at 26. The only relevant evidence in the

record indicates simply that the case against Askew had been dismissed as part of a class action

alleging trooper bias. Askew's suggestions in his brief that the bias at issue was racial and that bias

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was present in his case in particular are unsupported by any record evidence. The most that the

record shows is that his case was dismissed as part of a class action alleging bias on the part of

troopers whose identities we do not know against plaintiffs whose identities we likewise do not know.

Iffurther investigation byAskew'strial counselwould have shown that the very trooper who arrested

Askew wasraciallymotivated, Askew would have a powerful argument for Strickland prejudice. But

further investigation might instead have shown simply that, in order to settle a large class action

involving other officers, New Jersey officials agreed to drop an entire class of minor drug charges

regardless of who the arresting officers were. If this latter reason were the basis for dropping the

charges against Askew, then the district court might have admitted the trooper's testimony and the

jury might have felt no need to discount it. Without more information about why the New Jersey

charges were dropped, we cannot say that Askew has demonstrated a reasonable probability that

further investigation by his attorney would have resulted in an acquittal.

In so ruling, we agree with the Seventh Circuit that to show prejudice, a defendant basing an

inadequate assistance claim on his or her counsel's failure to investigate must make

"a comprehensive showing as to what the investigation would have produced. The

focus ofthe inquirymust be onwhat informationwould have been obtained fromsuch

an investigation and whether such information, assuming its admissibility in court,

would have produced a different result."

Sullivan v. Fairman, 819 F.2d 1382, 1392 (7th Cir. 1987) (quoting United States ex rel. Cross v.

DeRobertis, 811 F.2d 1008, 1016 (7thCir. 1987)). This approach is fair to defendants and is sensible

from an institutional perspective. When a convicted defendant seeks to overturn a jury verdict based

on inadequate investigation by counsel, courts should insist that the defendant show to the extent

possible precisely what information would have been discovered through further investigation. Any

other rule would give defendants an incentive to present as little evidence as is necessary to create

some doubt, even when disclosure of more facts would make clear that further investigation by trial

counselwould not have created a reasonable probabilityof a different outcome. Although defendants

are entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt at trial, an appellate court should not overturn a

conviction simply because the defendant hasteasinglysuggested that there maybe facts out there that

his trial counsel could have discovered and that would have helped his case. If any such facts exist,

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the defendant must identify them. Askew has failed to do so. Even with highly skilled counsel in this

court, Askew has revealed only scant information regarding the dismissal of the New Jersey case

against him. The little he has told us is not enough to convince us that there is a reasonable

probability that had the jury known it, the jury would have reached a different result, particularly in

light of other evidence, including the amount of cocaine base and the drug paraphernalia found in

Askew's possession. We cannot speculate about the impact on the jury of what Askew has not told

us.

Because we find that Askew has not demonstrated prejudice by virtue of counsel's failure to

discover that the New Jersey charges were dropped, we need not determine whether the performance

of his counsel was deficient. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. Nevertheless, we note that the

troubling problem this case presentsis one that can be easily avoided in future cases either by defense

counsel or by prosecutors who choose to present testimony regarding prior arrests. As the

Government itself suggested at oral argument, a simple phone call to the appropriate New Jersey

court by counsel for either party would likely have revealed that the charges had been dropped.

At his section 2255 hearing, Askew offered several other arguments as to why he received

ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. We are unconvinced by each. Askew's assertion that

Wallace did not spend enough time on his case does not in and of itself establish prejudice without

some showing of how more time spent on his case might have influenced the outcome of the trial.

Askew's claimthat Wallace'sfailure to introduce into evidence a photograph showing Askew's weight

loss due to drug use does not rise to the level of deficient or prejudicial performance in light of other

evidence at trial of Askew's drug use, including his own testimony, his fiancée's testimony, and the

arresting officer's testimony.

Finally, Askew now points for the first time to several other alleged instances of ineffective

assistance. Because Askew failed to raise these claims in his section 2255 hearing, we deem them

waived for purposes of this proceeding unless "the trial record alone conclusively shows that the

defendant is entitled to no relief " or, to the contrary, that the defendant is entitled to relief. United

States v. Fennell, 53 F.3d 1296, 1303-04 (D.C. Cir. 1995), on reh'g, 77 F.3d 510 (1996). On the

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basis of the trial record alone, we can conclude that Wallace's failure to object to the statements of

Detective Thomas did not amount to deficient performance. As we indicated above, at least one of

the challenged statements was not clearly forbidden by then-existing case law, and the other two

present close questions. Furthermore, demonstrating his familiarity with this circuit's cases construing

Rule 704(b), Wallace made several objections to Detective Thomas's testimony on intent. We thus

have no doubt that Wallace's performance was objectively reasonable under prevailing professional

norms.

We cannot evaluate Askew's remaining claims on the basis of the trial transcripts alone, for

further inquiry into factual matters or potential tactical choices is necessary for each. For example,

Askew points to Wallace's failure to object to the New Jersey trooper's reference to "contraband."

But this may have involved a tactical choice; Wallace may have decided not to object to the New

Jersey trooper's use of the term "contraband" because, having already objected to the trooper's use

of the term "cocaine," he wished not to draw any more attention to the issue. Nor can we judge from

the trialrecord alone Askew's claim that Wallace should have asked the district court to exclude any

amount of cocaine base that Askew intended for personal use from the amount of cocaine used to

calculate his sentence. The record does not indicate what portion of the cocaine base, if any, Askew

intended to devote to personal use. Finally, although Askew argues that Wallace misunderstood the

personal use defense, we cannot assess counsel's comprehension of the defense on the basis of the

trialrecord alone. Following our practice in Fennell, "we deem [these ineffective assistance claims]

waived for purposes of this proceeding and will not remand." Id. at 1304.

IV.

We turn finally to Askew's argument that we should reverse his conviction because the trial

court improperlyadmitted asrebuttalevidence theNewJerseytrooper'stestimonyregarding Askew's

1989 arrest on drug charges. According to Askew, the trooper's testimony was not relevant because

it did not constitute rebuttal evidence. In his brief, Askew points out that, because the district court

made its decision to admit the evidence in chambers without transcription, we do not know the

precise evidence that the prosecution expected the New Jersey trooper's testimony to rebut. Askew

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speculates that the only evidence it could have rebutted was his testimony that the cocaine base was

for his own personal use. He then argues that because the trooper was not competent to testify that

the substance allegedly being transported for Askew in the New Jersey case was cocaineindeed,

the district courtstruck fromthe record the trooper'sreference to "cocaine"the trooper'stestimony

about Askew's connection five years earlier with a chunky substance similar in appearance to the

cocaine base he possessed in the present case could not rebut Askew's claim that he had no intent to

distribute that cocaine base. According to the Government, by claiming that he obtained the cocaine

base by snatching it from two young boys, Askew implicitly denied his involvement in drug

trafficking; because evidence showing that Askew had formerly been arrested for picking up a

container with a large quantity of a substance that looked like cocaine rebuts this implicit denial, it

is relevant to Askew's intent to distribute the cocaine base.

Federal Rule of Evidence 402 states that "[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible, except as

otherwise provided." Rule 401 explains that evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the

existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less

probable than it would be without the evidence." We normally review a district court's relevance

determinations for abuse of discretion. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 124-25 (1974);

United States v. Carter, 522 F.2d 666, 685 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The Government argues for stricter

review under the plain error standard on the ground that Askew's counsel objected to the rebuttal

evidence based only on lack of notice, not because it was improper rebuttal evidence.

Askew's claim fails under either standard. Because five years had passed and because the

trooper was not competent to testify as to whether the substance for which Askew was arrested in

New Jersey was in fact cocaine, the trooper's testimony was, as the district court noted, "thready or

thin" and "[n]ot the strongest available testimony." Nevertheless, a jury could make reasonable

inferences from the trooper's testimony that would make Askew's denial of involvement in drug

trafficking less likely. The district court thus did not abuse its discretion or commit plain error in

admitting the trooper's testimony as rebuttal evidence.

We affirm Askew's conviction.

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So ordered.

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