Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01160/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01160-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Teresa A. Schwarte
Respondent
Mebrhato Tsehai
Petitioner

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MEBRHATO TSEHAI, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

)

v. )

)

)

TERESA A. SCHWARTE, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:05-cv-01160-OWW-TAG HC 

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION

FOR BAIL

(Doc. 12)

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner is currently serving a sentence of four years in state prison

for convictions under California Penal Code §§ 4501.5 (battery on a peace officer) and 4501.1

(aggravated battery by gassing). (Doc. 1, p. 1). 

The instant Petition was filed on September 14, 2005. (Id.). On October 27, 2005, Petitioner

filed the instant Motion for Bail on Appeal. (Doc. 12). 

DISCUSSION

In his Motion, Petitioner indicates only that he is “asking for bail on appeal” in this case and

that he “should be given bail.” (Doc. 12, p. 1). Petitioner provides no reasons or argument

supporting such a request. 

The Ninth Circuit has not yet determined whether the district court has the authority to

release a state prisoner on bail pending resolution of a habeas proceeding. In re Roe, 257 F.3d 1077,

1079-1080 (9th Cir. 2001.) However, even assuming a district court has this power, the exercise of

such authority is reserved for extraordinary cases. Id., 257 F.3d at 1080; see also United States v.

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Mett, 41 F.3d 1281, 1282 (9th Cir. 1994) (bail pending the resolution of a habeas corpus petition

filed in a district court is reserved to "extraordinary cases involving special circumstances" and

where there is a high probability of the petitioner's success). A petitioner must demonstrate some

circumstance that makes him exceptional and especially deserving of such special treatment in the

interests of justice. See Aronson v. May, 85 S.Ct. 3, 5 (1964) (Douglas, Justice, in chambers);

Benson v. California, 328 F.2d 159, 162 (9th Cir. 1964). In addition to these factors, the Court must

take into consideration the petitioner’s risk of flight and the danger to the community should he be

released. See Marino v. Vasquez, 812 F.2d 499, 508-509 (9th Cir. 1987).

The Court has carefully reviewed Petitioner’s scant motion for bail and concludes that

Petitioner has not met the above requirements. First, Petitioner fails to show that there is a “high

probability” that his claim will succeed. The Court as yet has not had an opportunity to conduct a

thorough review of the merits of Petitioner’s claims, which are grounded on allegations of

ineffective assistance of counsel. Any determination as to the eventual success of Petitioner’s claims

must await such a review. Nothing, however, in Petitioner’s motion for bail addresses the likelihood

of his prevailing on the merits in this case and thus the Court cannot conclude at this juncture that

Petitioner has shown a “high probability” of success.

The Court notes that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has indicated that “even if we found

that the allegations in his petition for habeas corpus made out a clear case for his release...[,]

[s]omething more than that is required before we would be justified in granting bail.” Benson v.

California, 328 F.2d 159, 162 (9th Cir. 1964). Here, even assuming, arguendo, that Petitioner would

prevail on the merits of his claims, he has not shown any other special circumstances are present that

would justify the setting of bail. Indeed, Petitioner’s motion provides no reasons or arguments

whatsoever supporting such a conclusion. The Court has only Petitioner’s conclusory statement that

he “should be given bail.” (Doc. 10, p. 1). Standing alone, such a self-serving statement does not

constitute an “extraordinary circumstance” justifying release on bail.

Third, Petitioner indicates in his Petition that he was convicted of “gassing” law enforcement

personnel while incarcerated in state prison. (Doc. 1, pp. 4-5). While Petitioner does not explain

the basis for his initial incarceration, the Court must assume it was for a prior felony conviction. In

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the absence of any other evidence before the Court to support his Motion for bail, evidence that

Petitioner was already incarcerated for another felony conviction at the time he was convicted of

felony assault on a peace officer suggests to this Court that Petitioner’s release during the pendency

of this case would pose some public safety concerns. 

Considering all of the foregoing factors, the Court concludes that Petitioner has failed to

make a showing that he satisfies the requisite “exceptional” circumstances for granting bail in the

instant case. 

ORDER

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion for Bail (Doc. 12), is hereby

DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 6, 2006 /s/ Theresa A. Goldner 

j6eb3d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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