Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-09-03099/USCOURTS-caDC-09-03099-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mark Stubblefield
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 15, 2010 Decided June 28, 2011

No. 09-3099

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

MARK STUBBLEFIELD,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:08-cr-00171)

Dennis M. Hart, appointed by the court, argued the cause

and filed the brief for appellant.

Michael J. Friedman, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Ronald C.

Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese III, Chrisellen

R. Kolb, and Stephanie Brooker, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: TATEL, GARLAND, and KAVANAUGH, Circuit

Judges.

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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Garland.

Garland, Circuit Judge: Mark Stubblefield appeals from his

convictions for multiple bank robberies. He contends that his

trial violated the Speedy Trial Act, that the district court erred in

limiting the scope of his counsel’s closing argument, and that

the court further erred in admitting evidence of an additional,

uncharged bank robbery. We reject the first two contentions and

conclude that any error with respect to the third was harmless. 

I

On January 29, 2008, a man entered Washington First bank

in Northwest Washington, D.C. and passed the teller a crumpled

note informing her that it was a robbery. When the teller

dropped the note, the robber snatched it back. The teller then

turned over more than one thousand dollars in cash, and the

robber escaped. Washington First was robbed twice more, on

March 26 and April 7, 2008. On all three occasions, witnesses

described the perpetrator as a very short African-American

male, with unusual marks or indentations on the skin of his face. 

In two of the robberies, witnesses also described the perpetrator

as having a unique, raspy voice. Two of the crimes were

initiated when the robber handed the teller a note, which he

snatched back before she could finish reading it. A bank

employee who witnessed all three robberies reported that the

robber was the same in each one. 

On March 26, approximately fifteen minutes after the

second Washington First bank robbery, there was an

unsuccessful attempt to rob the Urban Trust Bank located less

than four blocks away. The perpetrator approached the teller

and handed her a note that said, “give me your large bills.” He

left when the teller ran away without handing over any money. 

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Witnesses described the robber as a short black man with a mark

on his face. 

A United Bank in Northwest Washington was also robbed

twice during the first half of 2008. On March 21 and April 11,

2008, a person entered the bank, handed the teller a note

demanding money, and then left the bank with the cash. 

Witnesses reported that the two robberies were committed by

the same person, again described as a very short AfricanAmerican man with odd facial skin.

Finally, on April 21, 2008, a robber obtained over six

hundred dollars from a teller at Commerce Bank by walking up

to her window, handing her a crumpled note, and -- before she

had a chance to read it -- telling her it was “a stick up.” 

Witnesses reported that the robber was a short black man with

unusual facial markings or indentations and a raspy voice.

The Metropolitan Police Department distributed wanted

posters in connection with the robberies. In early May 2008, an

informant told the police that Mark Stubblefield matched the

description of the man on the posters. On May 13, Stubblefield

was charged by complaint with robbery, having been taken into

custody on another charge. Stubblefield did not have any of the

stolen currency on his person when he was arrested, nor was

there evidence of a dye pack that had been hidden in some of the

stolen money.1

 His unusual appearance, however, did match the

witnesses’ descriptions of the robber: Stubblefield is a 5'2", 51-

year-old African-American male who, at the time of his arrest,

“had loose facial skin that created certain types of indentations

on his face when he made certain facial expressions.” Trial Tr.

1

The police were unable to search Stubblefield’s residence for

the currency or other physical evidence because he had no fixed

address, and investigators could not determine where he was living.

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at 44 (Jan. 27, 2009).2

 On June 13, 2008, a grand jury handed

down an indictment charging Stubblefield with six counts of

bank robbery and one count of attempted bank robbery, all in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a).

At trial, the government relied primarily on witness

identification evidence. It presented at least one witness to each

robbery who picked Stubblefield out of a photo array,

identifying him as the perpetrator. In addition, the court

permitted the government to present -- over defense objections

-- information concerning a further, uncharged bank robbery that

occurred in Virginia. In that robbery, witnesses described the

perpetrator as a short African-American man with a “smoker’s

voice,” who used a note to obtain money from a teller during

business hours. A witness to the Virginia robbery identified

Stubblefield from a photo array. 

In his defense, Stubblefield pointed out that, although the

police were able to collect some latent fingerprints at the scene

of several of the robberies, none of the prints matched each other

or those of Stubblefield. Stubblefield’s fingerprint expert

testified that this was highly unusual, as was the fact that the

police had been unable to detect any latent prints at all at some

of the banks. Stubblefield also sought to undermine the various

witness identifications. He presented evidence that one witness

to the March 26 Washington First robbery and one witness to

the United Bank robberies each indicated the perpetrator was not

in a photo array that contained Stubblefield’s picture, and he

elicited testimony that some witnesses initially described the

robber as having different physical characteristics than those of

Stubblefield. Stubblefield also called three witnesses to the

uncharged Virginia robbery to testify to their impressions that

2

These indentations were apparently caused by missing teeth,

which were repaired before trial by a dentist at the D.C. Jail.

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the perpetrator was a 20- to 25-year-old, light-skinned man who

was approximately 5'6" tall. Trial Tr. 29-59 (Feb. 9, 2009 a.m.).

The jury convicted Stubblefield on all charges, and he now

raises three challenges to his conviction.

II

Stubblefield’s first contention is that his indictment should

have been dismissed pursuant to the 30-day complaint-toindictment clock of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(b),

3162(a)(1). Defense counsel filed a motion to dismiss on that

ground in the district court, which the court denied without

comment. We review a district court’s Speedy Trial Act

determination “de novo [as to] matters of law,” and “for clear

error as to findings of fact.” United States v. Sanders, 485 F.3d

654, 656 (D.C. Cir. 2007).

The Speedy Trial Act provides: “If, in the case of any

individual against whom a complaint is filed charging such

individual with an offense, no indictment . . . is filed within the

[30-day] time limit required by section 3161(b) as extended by

section 3161(h) . . . , such charge against that individual

contained in such complaint shall be dismissed or otherwise

dropped.” 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(1). Stubblefield contends that,

because 31 calendar days passed between the May 13 complaint

and the June 13 indictment in his case, the Act required the

district court to dismiss the case. 

The government does not dispute Stubblefield’s arithmetic. 

The Speedy Trial Act, however, contains exceptions to the 30-

day rule. As just quoted, § 3162(a)(1) requires that the

indictment be filed within the 30-day limit “as extended by

section 3161(h).” That section provides, as particularly relevant

here, that the “following periods of delay shall be excluded in

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computing the time within which . . . an indictment must be

filed”:

(1) Any period of delay resulting from other

proceedings concerning the defendant, including but

not limited to . . . (D) delay resulting from any pretrial

motion, from the filing of the motion through the

conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt

disposition of, such motion.

18 U.S.C. § 3161(h). On appeal, the government suggests an

array of days that might be excluded under this provision. 

However, because there were only 31 days between the

complaint and Stubblefield’s indictment, there need only be one

excluded day to bring the indictment within the Act’s time

limitation. And because at least one day clearly is excluded, we

need not address the government’s other arguments.

The excluded date is May 23, 2008. The district court’s

docket states that, on that day, the United States made an oral

motion to commit the defendant to the custody of the Attorney

General, the magistrate judge held a detention hearing, and the

magistrate granted the government’s motion and ordered pretrial

detention. See Crim. Docket for Case #: 1:08-cr-00171. 

Accordingly, May 23 is excluded from the 30-day calculation as

a period of “delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the

filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing

on . . . such motion,” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D). See United

States v. Harris, 491 F.3d 440, 443 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding

that both the day on which a pretrial motion is filed and the day

on which the hearing is held are excluded); United States v.

Taylor, 497 F.3d 673, 676 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that

“exclusion under § 3161(h) . . . is triggered by written and oral

motions alike”).

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At oral argument, Stubblefield conceded that, had the

district court stated it was denying his Speedy Trial Act motion

because May 23 was excluded, he would have no ground for

appeal. Oral Arg. Tr. 12. But because the court did not give

that -- or any other rationale -- Stubblefield maintains that the

denial of his motion cannot be sustained. This circuit, however,

has held that the fact “[t]hat neither the district court nor the

government relied upon [an] exclusion provided by section

3161(h)(1) does not . . . preclude us from doing [so].” United

States v. Garrett, 720 F.2d 705, 710 (D.C. Cir. 1983). And

because the exclusion provided by § 3161(h)(1)(D) is

“automatic[,]” United States v. Tinklenberg, — S. Ct. —, 2011

WL 2039366, at *6 (May 26, 2011), and applies “without

district court findings,” Bloate v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1345,

1353 (2010), there is no reason why we should not apply it and

hold Stubblefield’s indictment timely. See Garrett, 720 F.2d at

710-11.3

III

Stubblefield’s second contention is that the district court

erred in granting the government’s motion to bar his counsel

from pursuing two lines of argument in her closing. We review

the court’s decision to limit the scope of closing argument for

abuse of discretion. United State v. Brodie, 524 F.3d 259, 267

(D.C. Cir. 2008); United States v. Hoffman, 964 F.2d 21, 24

(D.C. Cir. 1992). 

3

Tinklenberg held that “the filing of a pretrial motion falls

within [§ 3161(h)(1)(D)] irrespective of whether it actually causes, or

is expected to cause, delay.” 2011 WL 2039366, at *3. Bloate noted

that § 3161(h)(1)(D) “automatically” applies without a finding by the

district court that a continuance would serve the “ends of justice.” See

130 S. Ct. at 1350-53, 1355-56. 

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The district court barred counsel from arguing that law

enforcement officers had failed to engage in “best practices”

when presenting witnesses with photo arrays, and that DNA

evidence (which the government did not have) “was more

trustworthy than fingerprint or photo identification evidence.” 

Appellant Br. 39. The district court barred these arguments

because counsel had presented “no evidence of what any [b]est

[p]ractices are” with respect to photo arrays, and no evidence

“that DNA evidence is more reliable” than fingerprints or

identifications. Trial. Tr. 54-55 (Feb. 9, 2009 p.m.).4

 Because

it is “elementary . . . that counsel may not premise arguments on

evidence which has not been admitted,” Johnson v. United

States, 347 F.2d 803, 805 (D.C. Cir. 1965), we find no abuse of

discretion here. See also Hoffman, 964 F.2d at 24 (noting that

“it is improper for either the prosecutor or defense counsel to

make statements as to facts not proven” (internal quotation

marks and alteration omitted)).

At oral argument, Stubblefield conceded that he did not

introduce evidence concerning best practices, but suggested that

knowledge of the best practices for investigating crimes should

be considered part of the “common human experience” of jurors. 

Oral Arg. Tr. 7. It is true that nothing precludes an attorney

“from referring to matters of common public knowledge or

human experience” in closing argument. United States v.

Maddox, 156 F.3d 1280, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1998). But we have

previously held that a prosecutor may not premise a closing

argument on the assumption that police procedures are

“common knowledge.” Id. (holding it improper for the

government to argue without evidence that “police customarily

4

Counsel did question the law enforcement witnesses who

conducted the photo arrays about “best practices,” but they provided

no information and appeared unfamiliar with the term. See, e.g., Trial

Tr. 56-57 (Jan. 27, 2009); Trial Tr. 34-35 (Feb. 2, 2009 p.m.). 

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return car keys having evidentiary value”). The same rule

applies to defense counsel. See Hoffman, 964 F.2d at 25

(holding that the trial court properly barred defense counsel

from arguing “that standard police procedure required

fingerprint analysis,” without offering supporting evidence). 

Although defense counsel may not introduce arguments for

which there is no evidentiary support, she “must be permitted to

argue all reasonable inferences from the facts in the record.” 

Hoffman, 964 F.2d at 24. The district court permitted

Stubblefield’s counsel to do just that. While she was not

allowed to argue that the officers had failed to implement best

practices in conducting the photo arrays, she was permitted to

argue that the witnesses’ identifications were unreliable. See,

e.g., Trial Tr. 41-50 (Feb. 10, 2009). Similarly, while the court

did not allow counsel to argue that the government was required

to introduce fingerprint or DNA evidence, or that such evidence

was better than eye-witness identifications, it did permit her to

emphasize that the government had failed to introduce DNA or

fingerprint evidence against Stubblefield, and to argue that the

absence of such evidence created reasonable doubt. Id. at 53-59. 

We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s

treatment of counsel’s closing argument.

IV

Finally, Stubblefield contends that the district court erred in

permitting the government to introduce evidence regarding an

uncharged bank robbery in Virginia. The court permitted the

introduction of this evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence

404(b), which bars the admission of “[e]vidence of other crimes

. . . to prove the character of a [defendant] in order to show

action in conformity therewith,” but allows the introduction of

such evidence “for other purposes, such as proof of motive,

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or

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absence of mistake or accident.” FED. R. EVID. 404(b). Here,

the government maintains that evidence concerning the

uncharged Virginia robbery was admissible because it used that

evidence for such an “other purpose” -- proof of identity. 

Stubblefield argues that, to the contrary, the Virginia evidence

was valuable only for the impermissible purpose of proving his

alleged propensity to rob banks. 

We need not resolve this dispute because even if the district

court erred, any error was harmless. See United States v.

Johnson, 519 F.3d 478, 483 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Under Federal

Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a), we may not correct a district

court’s error unless it affected the defendant’s “substantial

rights.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a). “[I]n most cases [this] means

that the error must have been prejudicial: It must have affected

the outcome of the district court proceedings.” United States v.

Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993). When, as here, the error did

not involve a constitutional right, it is not prejudicial as long as

“it did not have a ‘substantial and injurious effect or influence

in determining the jury’s verdict.’” United States v. Powell, 334

F.3d 42, 45 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting Kotteakos v. United

States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)). 

The government bears the burden of proving the absence of

prejudicial effect, Johnson, 519 F.3d at 483, and it has met that

burden in this case. At trial, the government presented

testimony from numerous witnesses to the six charged bank

robberies, each of whom described a perpetrator who resembled

Stubblefield. The jury also heard that at least one witness to

each of the charged robberies had identified Stubblefield as the

perpetrator from a photo array. Under these circumstances, it is

very unlikely that additional testimony regarding one more

allegedly similar robbery would have a “substantial . . .

influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” That is particularly

so given that, as Stubblefield himself argues, the evidence

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connecting him to the Virginia robbery was substantially weaker

than that connecting him to the others. None of the prosecution

witnesses testified that the Virginia robber had unusual facial

skin; and the defense called several witnesses of its own who

described a robber who was taller, lighter-skinned, and younger

than Stubblefield. Indeed, we find it hard to understand why the

government went to the trouble of proffering the Virginia

evidence in the first place, given that it was considerably weaker

(and certainly no more gripping) than the evidence of the crimes

charged in the indictment.5

On this record, we conclude that, even if it were erroneous,

the admission of the Virginia evidence was harmless because it

did not have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence” on

the jury’s verdict. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776.

V

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court

is 

affirmed.

5

We further note that the district court gave the jury limiting

instructions designed to ensure that it did not use the evidence of the

uncharged offense to conclude that Stubblefield showed a propensity

to rob banks. See Trial Tr. 99 (Feb. 10, 2009); cf. United States v.

Pettiford, 517 F.3d 584, 590 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (finding no unfair

prejudice under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 because similar limiting

instructions “minimize[d] the danger that the jury would use the

404(b) evidence” to conclude that the defendant had a propensity to

commit the charged offense). 

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