Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-2_05-cv-02072/USCOURTS-arwd-2_05-cv-02072-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ernest Kramme
Plaintiff
Safelite Autoglass, Inc.
Defendant
Safelite Fulfillment, Inc.
Defendant
Safelite Glass Corporation
Defendant
Safelite Group, Inc
Defendant

Document Text:

AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

 Plaintiff filed an age discrimination claim with the Equal 1

Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)on May 7, 2004. On January 26,

2005, the EEOC issued a finding that it was unable to conclude the

Defendants violated a statute. Plaintiff was given ninety (90) days from

the EEOC finding to institute a civil action. Plaintiff filed the present

suit on April 25, 2005, within the required time. Doc. 1, p. 2; Exhibit A.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FORT SMITH DIVISION

ERNEST KRAMME PLAINTIFF

V. CIVIL NO. 05-2072

SAFELITE GROUP, INC.,

SAFELITE FULFILLMENT, INC.,

SAFELITE GLASS CORPORATION, 

and SAFELITE AUTOGLASS, INC. DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Currently before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment, Statement of Facts, and Brief in Support (Docs. 11, 12 &

13), and Plaintiff’s Response and Brief in Support (Docs. 27 & 28).

Plaintiff filed suit against his employer (Defendant Safelite), which

alleged his employment was terminated on the basis of his age.1

Plaintiff asserted claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment

Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (Doc. 1) For reasons

that follow, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and

this action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

A. BACKGROUND

The following facts are undisputed except where otherwise noted.

Plaintiff was sixty-three years of age at the time of his

termination, and had been employed by Defendants from approximately

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July 1986, to February 13, 2004, when he was terminated. Plaintiff

was told by the Regional Sales Manager, Gary Hunter, that he was

being terminated due to a corporate decision involving restructuring.

At the time of his termination, Plaintiff earned between $75,000 -

$100,000 per year. 

Defendants contend that Plaintiff was terminated because of

restructuring that resulted in the elimination of Plaintiff’s

position. Plaintiff’s sales territory was split between sales

representatives that lived in major metropolitan areas (Kansas City

and Dallas) and that were in close proximity to Defendant’s

warehouses. Plaintiff lived more than two hours from any of

Defendants’ warehouses. (Doc. 13, pp. 1-2) 

Plaintiff alleges that he was terminated because of his age, and

of his high rate of pay. He also alleges that several other older

workers had been terminated due to age.

B. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

Summary judgment is appropriate only where there is no genuine

issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The burden of proof is

on the moving party to set forth the basis of its motion. Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). The Court must view all facts

and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574 (1986).

“The non-moving party, however, must still ‘present evidence

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sufficiently supporting the disputed material facts that a reasonable

jury could return a verdict in [their] favor.’” Pope v. ESA

Services, Inc., 406 F.3d 1001, 1003-4 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting

Gregory v. City of Rogers, Ark., 976 F.2d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir.

1992)). Summary judgment is appropriate where a plaintiff fails to

present evidence sufficient to create a jury question as to an

essential element of his claim. Turner v. Honeywell Fed. Manuf. &

Tech., 336 F.3d 716, (8th Cir. 2003). The Court must keep in mind,

however, that summary judgment is to be used sparingly in employment

discrimination cases. Id. However, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

56 does not contain an exception for discrimination cases, and it is

useful in determining whether a case merits a trial. Pope, 406 F.3d

at 1006 (citing Berg v. Norand Corp. 169 F.3d 1140, 1144 (8th Cir.

1999)). 

Plaintiff contends that he was terminated because of his age and

its correlation to higher wages. Plaintiff contends that he received

a higher salary than younger workers and that other older workers had

also been terminated. Defendants deny that the decision to terminate

Plaintiff was motivated by Plaintiff’s age and contend the decision

was based solely on corporate restructuring that eliminated

Plaintiff’s position. 

C. AGE DISCRIMINATION

The ADEA provides that it is unlawful for an employer to

discharge any person in the protected class (age forty and older)

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“because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1988).

In order to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under

the ADEA, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) he was within the

protected age group; (2) he met applicable job qualifications; (3)

he was discharged; and (4) after his termination, the position

remained open or the employer hired a person not in the protected

class to fill this opening. Id. “During a reduction in an

employer’s work force,” however, the fact that the plaintiff’s duties

were assumed by a younger person is “not in itself enough to

establish a prima facie case.” Id. Therefore, in a reduction-inforce case, the plaintiff is required to come forward with additional

evidence that age was a factor in his termination. Id. 

If a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case, the analysis

then moves to one of two burden-shifting standards. When a plaintiff

produces direct evidence, such as statements by decision-makers

clearly showing that age was a motivating factor in the employment

decision; or at least significant circumstantial evidence showing a

specific link between the discriminatory animus and the challenged

employment decision, the burden-shifting standards established by

Price-Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), come into play.

Simmons v. New Pub. Sch. Dist. No. Eight, 251 F.3d 1210, 1215 (8th

Cir. 2001). “The Supreme Court has defined direct evidence in the

negative by stating that it excludes ‘stray remarks in the

workplace,’‘statements by nondecision-makers,’ and ‘statements by

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decision-makers unrelated to the decisional process itself.’” EEOC

v. Liberal R-II, 314 F.3d 920, 923 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting Price

Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 227). Once direct evidence exists, “the

burden shifts to the employer to show that it would have reached the

same employment decision absent any discrimination.” Id. (citations

omitted). In the absence of such evidence, the three-part burden

shifting framework set forth in the McDonnell Douglas paradigm is

applicable to determine if circumstantial evidence exists. McDonnell

Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Mayer v. Nextel W. Corp., 318

F.3d 803, 806 (8th Cir. 2003). 

Even if Plaintiff established a prima facie case, the Court

nonetheless finds that Plaintiff has failed to produce any direct

evidence of age discrimination. The only evidence of discrimination

produced by Plaintiff was his opinion that, because of his age, he

made a higher salary than younger employees, and this motivated

Defendants to terminate him. The Plaintiff also contends other older

employees were terminated, although Plaintiff admitted he was not

aware of the circumstances surrounding terminations of these

employees. (Doc. 12, at pp. 51-53) Because Plaintiff has failed to

produce direct evidence or specific circumstantial evidence of age

discrimination, Plaintiff’s discrimination claims would properly be

analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas standard. However, Plaintiff’s

allegations of circumstantial evidence are not enough to survive

summary judgment. 

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The Court finds that Plaintiff cannot establish the fourth

element of his prima facie case, viz, that his position remains open

or was filled by someone younger. Defendants contend that a new plan

for sales made it imperative for the sales force to be located near

Defendants’ warehouses. (Doc. 13 at p. 7) Since Plaintiff resided

more than two hours away from the closest warehouse, his position was

eliminated and the territory was divided among other sales force

members. Id. Plaintiff has not demonstrated a “genuine factual

controversy regarding whether the legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason is a pretext for an intent to discriminate based on age.”

Chambers v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 351 F.3d 848, 855 (8th Cir.

2003). Plaintiff has not shown that age played any role in his

termination. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment

is GRANTED.

D. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment

(Doc. 11) is GRANTED. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE. A separate judgment will be entered accordingly. 

IT IS SO ORDERED this 22nd day of November 2006.

/S/ Robert T. Dawson 

Robert T. Dawson

United States District Judge

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