Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca6-17-04063/USCOURTS-ca6-17-04063-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ugbe Ojile
Appellant
Shelbie Smith
Appellee

Document Text:

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

File Name: 19a0306n.06

No. 17-4063

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UGBE OJILE,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

SHELBIE SMITH, Warden,

Respondent-Appellee.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF 

OHIO

Before: MERRITT and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.

1

LARSEN, Circuit Judge. Ugbe Ojile appeals the district court’s denial of his habeas 

petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Ojile, along with his co-defendant Kenyatta Erkins, was 

convicted of a litany of state robbery offenses arising from a scheme to rob people returning home 

from two casinos. The district court issued a certificate of appealability on three 

issues: (1) whether eyewitness identification testimony violated Ojile’s right to due process 

because the prosecution showed the eyewitness a photo of Ojile before trial; (2) whether the 

testimony of a jailhouse informant violated Ojile’s right to counsel; and (3) whether the evidence 

supporting Ojile’s convictions for complicity to robbery was insufficient because complicity to

robbery under Ohio Revised Code (ORC) § 2911.02(A)(1) requires proof of a deadly weapon. 

 

1 The third member of this panel, Judge Damon J. Keith, died on April 28, 2019. This decision is 

entered by the quorum of the panel. 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).

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Concluding that Ojile’s claims lack merit, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of his habeas 

petition.

I.

A. Factual Background

Ojile and his co-defendant Erkins were indicted for a series of robberies or attempted 

robberies occurring from February 2009 through October 2010. See State v. Ojile, Nos. C–110677, 

C–110678, 2012 WL 6674405, at *1–2 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2012) (direct appeal). Erkins and 

Ojile used substantially the same method to commit each robbery or attempted robbery. Id. at *1–

5. Erkins would enter a casino and find victims carrying large amounts of cash. Id. Ojile would 

wait in a car outside the casino, and Erkins would speak to him by phone, discussing possible 

targets. Id. They would generally select victims who were older or who were otherwise “easy 

targets.” Id. at *1. Once the soon-to-be victims left the casino, Ojile and Erkins would follow 

them home and rob them at gunpoint. Id. at *1–5. Erkins’ girlfriend, Amy Hoover, also 

participated in at least one of the robberies. Id. at *1.

During their lengthy investigation of this scheme, the police thwarted several attempted 

robberies by pulling over vehicles being tailed by Ojile and Erkins. Id. at *4–5. The police finally 

apprehended Ojile and Erkins by having Kyle Ingram, an undercover police officer, pose as an 

elderly gambler at one of the casinos. Id. at *1. When Ingram saw Erkins walking by him in the 

casino, the undercover officer pulled out a wad of cash. Id. Erkins called Ojile to report that he 

had a “target.” Id. When Ingram left the casino and drove away, Ojile and Erkins followed. Id. 

The police pulled their car over and found a backpack containing a Glock handgun (stolen from a 

previous robbery victim), a live round of ammunition, a BB gun, a previous victim’s papers, and 

duct tape that had been used to tie up another previous victim. Id. Police searched Ojile’s 

apartment and found a Glock Magnum handgun and a previous victim’s ID cards. Id. at *2.

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Ojile, Erkins, and Hoover were charged with numerous crimes arising from the robberies. 

Ojile and Erkins were tried jointly in a bench trial, and Ojile was convicted of six counts of 

aggravated robbery, one count of robbery, six counts of complicity to robbery, and one count of 

conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery. Id. at *1. Hoover testified against Ojile and Erkins. 

Id. at *13. Ojile was convicted and sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 10 years and 25 years.

B. Challenged Evidence at Trial

At trial, the prosecution presented the eyewitness identification testimony of Michael 

Weisbrod, a professional poker player who frequented one of the casinos targeted by Ojile and 

Erkins. In February 2009, Weisbrod had been robbed in his home by unknown assailants. In April 

2010, he was robbed again, this time after winning $8,000 at one of the targeted casinos. As he 

was trying to enter his apartment, two African-American men approached him and robbed him at 

gunpoint.

At trial, Weisbrod testified via video that Ojile was one of the men who had robbed him in 

April 2010. Weisbrod had initially described his attackers as being African-American men of 

medium build, wearing hoodies and jeans or dark pants. Weisbrod testified that the area where he 

saw the men was well lit, and that he had gotten a good look at them. Roughly six months after 

the attack, Weisbrod saw television news stories about the arrest of Erkins, Ojile, and Hoover, and 

he recognized Ojile and Erkins as the two men who committed the second robbery. Crossexamined at trial, Weisbrod disclosed that, two weeks before trial, the prosecutors had shown him 

single photos of Ojile, Erkins, and Hoover, and said that “these [were] the people up for trial.” 

Ojile’s trial counsel did not move to suppress Weisbrod’s testimony.

The trial also featured the testimony of Tyrone Tanks, a jailhouse informant. In February 

2011, Tanks was transferred from federal prison in Michigan to the Hamilton County jail (where 

Ojile was being held) in order to testify for the state in an unrelated criminal prosecution. Prior to 

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the transfer, Tanks had not had any communications with the prosecution in Ojile’s case, and he 

was not familiar with the proceedings against Ojile. He and Ojile recognized each other from a 

previous visit to one of the casinos. Ojile disclosed the details of some of the robberies to Tanks 

and also discussed his plan to argue at trial that the police had planted evidence in his apartment. 

A few weeks later, Tanks wrote a letter to Ojile’s prosecutors saying that he had information that 

might be useful to them. The prosecutors deposed Tanks on April 6, 2011. During the deposition, 

Tanks told the prosecutors everything Ojile had said.

At some point following the deposition, Ojile was moved into Tanks’ cell for four or five 

days. Ojile has submitted an unsigned letter—purportedly from Tanks and dated May 1, 2011—

that suggests Tanks shared additional information with the prosecutors after the April 6 deposition. 

But Tanks’ trial testimony was not materially different and was only slightly more detailed than

his testimony at the April 6 deposition—i.e., when deposed, Tanks said that Ojile intended to claim 

that the police had planted evidence in his apartment, but at trial, Tanks testified that Ojile planned 

to say that a specific officer had planted the evidence. Ojile’s trial counsel did not move to 

suppress Tanks’ testimony.

C. Ojile’s Direct Appeal and State Postconviction Relief

Following trial, Ojile timely appealed, claiming, inter alia, (1) that Weisbrod’s 

identification testimony was unreliable because of the state’s unduly suggestive pretrial 

identification procedures; (2) that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object that Tanks’ 

testimony was inadmissible because it had been procured in violation of the Sixth Amendment; 

and (3) that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions for complicity to the 

robberies that went uncompleted. See Ojile, 2012 WL 6674405, at *7–9, 11–12. 

The Ohio Court of Appeals denied Ojile’s eyewitness identification claim. Id. at *12. 

Because Ojile’s counsel had not objected at trial, the court reviewed the claim for plain error and 

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held that “[t]he record shows that both Weisbrod’s pretrial identification and his subsequent incourt identification of Ojile were reliable and that there was no likelihood of misidentification.” 

Id. “The in-court identification,” the court explained, “was the result of Weisbrod’s previous 

identification of Ojile. Consequently, Ojile has failed to show that the court erred in allowing 

Weisbrod’s in-court identification of Ojile, [much] less that it committed plain error.” Id.

The court also denied Ojile’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, concluding that “Ojile 

ha[d] failed to meet his burden to show that he was prejudiced by” the failure to exclude Tanks’ 

testimony. Id. at *11. Specifically, the court found that “[t]he record does not support Ojile’s 

claim that Tanks provided damaging testimony about any specific statements Ojile had made after 

Tanks had met with prosecutors.” Id.

Finally, the court held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Ojile’s convictions for 

complicity to robbery under ORC § 2911.02(A)(1). Id. at *8. The court explained that the 

elements of the underlying robbery offense were that “[n]o person, in attempting or committing a 

theft offense . . . or in fleeing immediately after the attempt or offense, shall . . . [h]ave a deadly 

weapon on or about the offender’s person, or under the offender’s control.” Id. at *7 (alterations 

in original) (quoting ORC § 2911.02(A)(1)). Responding to Ojile’s reliance on the fact that some 

of the robberies were never completed, the court explained that ORC § 2911.02 also prohibits 

attempted robbery, so it was only necessary for the jury to find that Ojile was complicit in the 

attempted commission of robberies. Id. at *7–8. And “the evidence showed they took substantial 

steps showing their criminal purpose to rob the victims.” Id. at *8. Ojile petitioned the Ohio 

Supreme Court for review, but that court declined jurisdiction.2

 

2 Ojile’s direct appeal was successful on several claims irrelevant to this habeas petition. See Ojile, 

2012 WL 6674405, at *6–7. The Ohio Court of Appeals remanded for the trial court to vacate 

Ojile’s conviction for conspiracy to commit robbery because Ojile had erroneously been convicted 

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On June 1, 2012, while his direct appeal was pending, Ojile moved for post-conviction 

relief pursuant to ORC § 2953.21. Ojile alleged that he had been denied his right to counsel by 

the admission of Tanks’ testimony. He attached a copy of the transcript from Tanks’ April 6 

deposition, and the May 1 letter (purportedly from Tanks) suggesting that another meeting had 

taken place. The trial court held that res judicata prohibited it from conducting a hearing on Ojile’s 

claims because the claims either were raised or could have been raised at trial or on direct appeal. 

Ojile appealed, and the Ohio Court of Appeals held that Ojile’s claim was, in fact, barred by the 

law of the case because the issue regarding Tanks’ testimony had been adjudicated on direct 

appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court declined jurisdiction.3

D. Federal Habeas Proceedings

Ojile filed a pro se habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, raising ten grounds for relief. 

The state argued that these claims were procedurally defaulted or meritless. The magistrate judge 

issued an initial report and recommendation (R&R), and then a supplemental R&R, concluding 

that Ojile’s petition should be denied. Ojile v. Oppy, No. 1:13–cv–844, 2014 WL 6808785 (S.D. 

Ohio Dec. 2, 2014) (initial R&R); Ojile v. Oppy, No. 1:13-cv-844, 2015 WL 4603458 (S.D. Ohio 

July 30, 2015) (supplemental R&R). The district court largely agreed with the magistrate judge’s 

analysis and denied the petition, but the court granted a certificate of appealability (COA) on three 

 

of both conspiracy to commit robbery and robbery for the same underlying conduct. Ojile, 2012 

WL 6674405, at *6. The Ohio Court of Appeals also held that the trial court’s final judgment 

erroneously found Ojile guilty of a count on which he was acquitted and remanded for the trial to 

vacate that conviction. Id. at *7. And the court noted a number of clerical errors in the judgment 

that needed to be fixed on remand. Id. Because of these changes, Ojile’s sentence was reduced to 

22 years.

3

In February 2013, Ojile also applied to reopen his appeal pursuant to Ohio R. App. P. 26(B), 

alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to appeal numerous issues including 

that Tanks’ testimony violated Ojile’s right to counsel. The Court of Appeals summarily denied 

the 26(B) motion, and the Ohio Supreme Court declined jurisdiction.

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issues: (1) whether the eyewitness identification testimony violated Ojile’s due process rights 

because, before trial, the prosecution had shown the eyewitness photos of the defendants; 

(2) whether the testimony of a jailhouse informant violated Ojile’s right to counsel; and 

(3) whether Ohio robbery under ORC § 2911.02(A)(1) requires proof of a deadly weapon. Ojile 

v. Warden, Corr. Reception Ctr., No. 1:13CV844, 2017 WL 4334196, at *12 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 

2017).

Ojile timely appealed and petitioned this court for an expanded COA concerning three 

additional issues: (1) whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to secure expert testimony 

to prove an alibi; (2) whether the trial court violated due process by convicting and sentencing him 

for a crime for which he was not charged or tried; and (3) whether Weisbrod’s testimony via video 

violated Ojile’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. This court denied Ojile’s motion to 

expand his COA. Ojile v. Smith, No. 17-4063 (6th Cir. Mar. 2, 2018) (order).

II.

A. Standard of Review

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) sharply limits federal court 

review of a state habeas petitioner’s claims of error. Where a state court has adjudicated a claim 

on the merits, we may reverse the state court’s decision only if it (1) “was contrary to, or involved 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

Court of the United States,” or (2) “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). “Where a 

state court has not adjudicated a claim on the merits,” the claim “is reviewed de novo by a federal 

court on collateral review.” Trimble v. Bobby, 804 F.3d 767, 777 (6th Cir. 2015).

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B. Eyewitness Identification

“The Constitution . . . protects a defendant against a conviction based on evidence of 

questionable reliability, not by prohibiting introduction of the evidence, but by affording the 

defendant means to persuade the jury that the evidence should be discounted as unworthy of 

credit.” Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 237 (2012). Notwithstanding this general 

principle, the Supreme Court has held that due process may “require a preliminary judicial inquiry 

into the reliability of an eyewitness identification when the identification was . . . procured under 

unnecessarily suggestive circumstances arranged by law enforcement.” Id. at 248. And the Court 

has authorized a two-step inquiry “to determine whether the Due Process Clause requires 

suppression of an eyewitness identification tainted by police arrangement.” Id. at 238. At the first 

step, courts should consider whether “law enforcement officers use[d] an identification procedure 

that is both suggestive and unnecessary.” Id. at 238–39. Yet, the Supreme Court has held that 

“[e]ven when the police use such a procedure, . . . suppression of the resulting identification is not 

the inevitable consequence.” Id. at 239. Rather, at the second step, courts should only suppress 

the tainted identification when “the indicators of a witness’ ability to make an accurate 

identification are outweighed by the corrupting effect of law enforcement suggestion.” Id.

(citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).

Ojile posits that the “corrupting effect” of the prosecution’s “suggestive and unnecessary” 

photograph display outweighed the reliability of Weisbrod’s in-court identification. The Warden 

counters that Weisbrod’s testimony was sufficiently reliable to defeat Ojile’s due process 

challenge. We agree. And given the weakness of the claim, we need not address the more difficult 

question whether the claim was, as the Warden also argues, procedurally defaulted. See Storey v. 

Vasbinder, 657 F.3d 372, 380 (6th Cir. 2011). Instead, “we cut to the merits here.” Id. And since 

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Ojile’s claim would fail even de novo review, we decline to address the question whether AEDPA 

deference would apply to the state court’s rejection of the claim on “plain error” review.4

There is little doubt that the prosecution’s pretrial photograph display was “unduly 

suggestive.” See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 116 (1977) (explaining that “identifications 

arising from single-photograph displays may be viewed in general with suspicion”). Nor does the 

Warden justify that conduct. The question thus becomes whether the “indicators of [Weisbrod’s]

ability to make an accurate identification” were “outweighed by the corrupting effect” of the 

prosecution’s photograph display. Id.

The Supreme Court has articulated five factors for assessing the reliability of eyewitness 

identification: (1) the witness’s opportunity to view the suspect at the time of the crime, (2) the 

degree of the witness’s attention, (3) the accuracy of the description, (4) the witness’s level of 

certainty about the identification, and (5) the time between the crime and the confrontation. 

 

4 The district court applied AEDPA deference to the state court’s determination, on plain error 

review, that Weisbrod’s testimony was reliable. Whether AEDPA deference applies to the state 

court’s conclusion, on plain error review, that no error occurred is actually a bone of contention 

in this circuit. In Fleming v. Metrish, 556 F.3d 520, 532 (6th Cir. 2009), this court held that the 

decision of a state court on plain error review may be entitled to AEDPA deference if the state 

court actually reaches the merits of the claim. Here, the state court concluded that there was “no 

error” in admitting Weisbrod’s testimony, so it reached the merits, and, under Fleming, we would

review Ojile’s claim under the more deferential standard. Indeed, another panel of this court 

applied AEDPA deference to Erkins’ parallel challenge to the identification. See Erkins v. 

Chuvalas, 684 F. App’x 493, 498 (6th Cir. 2017).

But Fleming’s holding has been disputed by subsequent published cases. See Frazier v. 

Jenkins, 770 F.3d 485, 496, n.5 (6th Cir. 2014) (“We have repeatedly held that plain-error review 

is not equivalent to adjudication on the merits, which would trigger AEDPA deference.”); but see 

id. at 506 (Sutton, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (explaining that Fleming 

“makes clear as day that a state court’s plain-error review of an issue may receive AEDPA 

deference when the state court addresses the merits of the federal claim”). Fleming appears to be 

the first case squarely resolving this issue, but the weakness of Ojile’s due process claim makes it 

unnecessary for us to address whether AEDPA deference should apply.

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Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114–16. Applying these factors here indicates that Weisbrod’s 

identification—like many eyewitness identifications—was only moderately reliable. 

The first factor, Weisbrod’s opportunity to view the perpetrators, cuts in favor of reliability. 

Weisbrod testified that the area where he was robbed was well lit, the robbers were not wearing 

masks, and he got a good look at their faces. At the time, he told the police he “would probably

be able to identify the suspects if he saw them again,” though he did not say he would “certainly” 

be able to do so. The second factor, Weisbrod’s degree of attention, weighs against reliability. 

Weisbrod testified that the robbery was a “very, very traumatic experience.” And this court has 

stated that “[t]here is a great potential for misidentification when a witness identifies a stranger 

based solely upon a single brief observation, and this risk is increased when the observation was 

made at a time of stress or excitement.” Wilson v. Mitchell, 250 F.3d 388, 398 (6th Cir. 2001)

(quoting United States v. Russell, 532 F.2d 1063, 1066 (6th Cir. 1976)). The third factor, the 

accuracy of Weisbrod’s initial description of the suspects, also cuts somewhat against reliability. 

His description was generic—two black males, in their 20s, with black hoodies—and cross-racial 

identifications are often suspect. Cf. Webb v. Havener, 549 F.2d 1081, 1086 (6th Cir. 1977). The 

fourth factor, the certainty of Weisbrod’s in-court identification, favors reliability. At trial, 

Weisbrod expressed absolute certainty that Ojile was one of the men who robbed him. Lastly, the 

fifth factor, the gap between the crime and the identification, cuts against reliability; there was 

roughly a year between the crime and the in-court identification. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 

188, 201 (1972) (suggesting that a delay of seven months might undermine reliability). The result

of this analysis is thus that Weisbrod’s eyewitness identification was only somewhat reliable.

Nevertheless, the reliability of Weisbrod’s identification was not “outweighed by the 

corrupting effect of the challenged identification itself.” Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 116. The 

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prosecution did not seek to introduce Weisbrod’s suggestively-procured pretrial identification as 

evidence at trial. Ojile, therefore, must show that the prosecution’s pretrial photograph display so 

corrupted Weisbrod’s in-court identification as to create a substantial risk that he identified Ojile 

in error. It is not plausible, however, that the pretrial display had any influence (or, at least, any 

material influence) on Weisbrod’s in-court identification. This is because Ojile has not disputed 

Weisbrod’s testimony at trial that he recognized Ojile and his co-defendants in news reports

broadcast shortly after they were arrested. Thus, well before the police showed Weisbrod the 

photo of Ojile, Weisbrod had already seen a picture of Ojile, and had decided that he was one of 

the men who robbed him. Given this prior valid identification, Ojile has not shown that the 

prosecution’s pretrial photograph display had any further deleterious effect whatsoever. 

Of course, the news reports were as suggestive as the prosecution’s photograph display, if 

not more so. But in Perry the Supreme Court affirmed that due process is only implicated “when 

the police have arranged suggestive circumstances leading the witness to identify a particular 

person as the perpetrator of a crime.” 565 U.S. at 232 (emphasis added). The news reports do not 

implicate due process because they were not state action. In sum, the de minimis “corrupting 

effect” of the government’s pretrial display did not outweigh Weisbrod’s ability to make an 

accurate identification of Ojile in court, and we affirm the district court’s denial of this claim.

C. Right to Counsel

Ojile next argues that he was deprived of his right to counsel when the government used 

Tanks as its agent to elicit incriminating information. In Massiah v. United States, the Supreme 

Court held that it violates a criminal defendant’s right to counsel when, at trial, the state uses 

“evidence of [the defendant’s] own incriminating words, which [state] agents had deliberately 

elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel.” 377 U.S. 201, 206 

(1964). “[T]he primary concern of the Massiah line of decisions is secret interrogation by 

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investigatory techniques that are the equivalent of direct police interrogation.” Kuhlmann v. 

Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459 (1986). Thus, the Supreme Court has found inadmissible “incriminating 

statements made by [a criminal defendant] to his cellmate, an undisclosed Government informant, 

after indictment and while in custody.” United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 265 (1980). Put 

broadly, the state cannot “intentionally creat[e] a situation likely to induce [a criminal defendant] 

to make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel.” Id. at 274. 

Here, the district court held that Ojile’s Massiah claim was procedurally defaulted. The 

Warden defends that conclusion on appeal, but argues, alternatively, that the claim is meritless. 

Because it is indeed meritless, we again sidestep the murky procedural default issue and reject 

Ojile’s Massiah challenge on the merits. See Storey, 657 F.3d at 380.

Ojile argues that Tanks acted as a state agent after he was deposed by the prosecution on 

April 6, 2011; the Warden disputes that point. But it does not matter. Even if Ojile were correct, 

he has not identified any materially incriminating statements made after the April 6 deposition and 

introduced against him at trial. The only difference between Tanks’ April 6 deposition, which 

comprised Ojile’s admissions before Tanks was putatively acting as a state agent, and Tanks’

testimony at trial is that the trial testimony was slightly more specific. Tanks told prosecutors

during his deposition that Ojile planned to say that the police planted a victim’s ID cards in his 

apartment. At trial, Tanks testified that Ojile said he planned to say that a specific officer—Officer 

Morgan—had planted the victim’s ID cards. 

Even assuming that this detail was extracted from Ojile after the April 6 deposition—

assuming, therefore, that Ojile’s right to counsel was infringed—the error was certainly harmless. 

Ayers v. Hudson, 623 F.3d 301, 317 n.12 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Massiah violations are normally subject 

to harmless-error analysis.” (citing Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972))). Based solely on 

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Ojile’s pre-April 6 admissions, Tanks could permissibly testify about Ojile’s numerous admissions 

of guilt and his strategy to accuse the police of planting evidence. In light of this, and given the 

evidence of Ojile’s guilt, Tanks’ ability to name a specific officer—Officer Morgan—as the one 

Ojile had planned to name as the planter of the evidence did not have a “substantial and injurious 

effect or influence in determining the . . . verdict.” Moore v. Berghuis, 700 F.3d 882, 890 (6th Cir. 

2012) (quoting Tolliver v. Sheets, 594 F.3d 900, 924 (6th Cir. 2010)); id. at 889 (finding error not 

harmless where “there was no evidence, other than the custodial confession, indicating 

premeditation or deliberation by” the defendant convicted of premeditated murder). Because any 

constitutional violation was harmless, the district court did not err in denying habeas relief on this 

ground. 

D. Proof of a Deadly Weapon

The last issue certified by the district court for our review is whether attempted robbery 

under ORC § 2911.02(A)(1) requires proof of a deadly weapon. This question arose because Ojile 

argued—on direct appeal and in the federal district court below—that the evidence was insufficient 

to establish his convictions for complicity to robbery under ORC § 2911.02(A)(1). The Ohio Court 

of Appeals rejected Ojile’s sufficiency challenge, see Ojile, 2012 WL 6674405, at *7–8, and the 

federal district court did, too, see Ojile, 2017 WL 4334196, at *2–3. 

But the district court, unlike the state court, appeared to reject Ojile’s claim on the 

assumption that attempted robbery under § 2911.02(A)(1) does not require proof of a deadly 

weapon. See id. at *3 (“The Court finds this issue to be a particularly close call, as it is not 

particularly convinced that the subsection of the statu[t]e under which Petitioner was convicted 

does not require proof of a weapon.”). That assumption is wrong. Section 2911.02(A)(1) explicitly 

provides that “[n]o person, in attempting or committing a theft offense or in fleeing immediately 

after the attempt or offense, shall . . . [h]ave a deadly weapon on or about the offender’s person, or 

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under the offender’s control.” And the Ohio Supreme Court has explained that it is the “possession 

of a deadly weapon . . . that is required to elevate a theft offense to robbery.” State v. Wharf, 715 

N.E.2d 172, 174 (Ohio 1999). 

As the government points out, § 2911.02(A)(1) itself proscribes attempted robbery, so the 

state needed to show only a “substantial step” toward the commission of the crime. See State v. 

Group, 781 N.E.2d 980, 995 (Ohio 2002) (“A ‘criminal attempt’ is when one purposely does or 

omits to do anything which is an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a course of 

conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime.” (quotations omitted)). So an 

attempted theft offense—not just a completed theft offense—can form the basis for a conviction 

under § 2911.02(A)(1). Nevertheless, for the attempted theft to become an attempted robbery under 

§ 2911.02(A)(1), there must also be evidence of “a deadly weapon on or about the offender or under 

the offender’s control.” State v. Holmes, 909 N.E.2d 163, 168 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009). 

On appeal, the Warden only halfheartedly defends the district court’s construction of the 

statute, claiming that we are bound by the Ohio Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the statute in 

this case. But the Ohio Court of Appeals never suggested that evidence of a deadly weapon was 

unnecessary; it merely affirmed that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Ojile’s convictions. See 

Ojile, 2012 WL 6674405, at *7–8. And the trial court record makes clear that the prosecution 

thought it was required to prove the presence of a deadly weapon, explaining the elements of the 

crime to the judge as follows: “We believe there is sufficient evidence to meet the charge of 

robbery . . . . In attempting to commit a theft offense, the defendants were armed with a deadly 

weapon.” In sum, we must answer the district court’s certified question—whether the statute 

requires proof of a deadly weapon—in the affirmative.

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But although we conclude that the district court incorrectly interpreted the statute, we still 

affirm the district court’s denial of the sufficiency claim. See U.S. Postal Serv. v. Nat’l Ass’n of 

Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, 330 F.3d 747, 750 (6th Cir. 2003) (“We may affirm a decision of the 

district court if correct for any reason, including one not considered below.”). Though its reasoning 

was mistaken, the district court was right to deny Ojile relief. 

Under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979), evidence is constitutionally 

insufficient only if, “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, [no]

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” This standard, alone, presents “a nearly insurmountable hurdle,” and AEDPA requires an 

additional level of deference to a state court’s adjudication of a sufficiency challenge. Davis v. 

Lafler, 658 F.3d 525, 534 (6th Cir. 2011). The Ohio Court of Appeals adjudicated Ojile’s 

sufficiency of the evidence claim on the merits. So we cannot grant relief unless the Ohio court’s 

denial of Ojile’s sufficiency claim was not merely wrong but objectively unreasonable—i.e., “so 

lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law 

beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 

(2011).

The Ohio Court of Appeals’ denial of Ojile’s sufficiency arguments was not objectively 

unreasonable.5 Ojile asserts that there was no evidence that he or Erkins had a deadly weapon when 

 

5 Ojile challenges the state court’s sufficiency of the evidence determination as to five convictions 

for complicity to robbery (counts 22, 23, 25, 28, and 29). The parties dispute whether Ojile 

forfeited his argument that the evidence was insufficient to show a substantial step toward the 

commission of the crimes underlying these five counts. For all five of these counts, the state 

presented evidence that the robbers followed the potential victims by car after they left the casino. 

With respect to three of the counts, the police intervened to prevent the robberies by pulling over 

the potential victims’ vehicles, but it is less clear why Ojile and Erkins did not go through with the 

other robberies. Regardless, we need not decide the substantial step issue because the district court 

granted a COA only on the deadly weapon question. Insofar as Ojile invites us to expand the 

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they followed five potential targets leaving casinos. Ojile is right that there was no direct evidence. 

But there was circumstantial evidence supporting this element of the offense. There was evidence 

that the robberies followed a pattern: Ojile and Erkins selected victims who had just won cash at a 

casino; the victims were invariably older gamblers or otherwise “easy targets”; when the victims 

drove home from the casino, Ojile and Erkins followed; and when the victims arrived at their 

homes, Ojile or Erkins (or both) would approach and demand money at gunpoint. Given this high 

degree of similarity across multiple robberies, a reasonable jury could infer the presence of a gun 

in the facially identical attempted robberies from the fact that the pair used a gun in all their 

completed robberies—and in the attempted robbery of Ingram. Viewing the circumstantial 

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could certainly have 

found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a deadly weapon was present. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. 

And the state court’s decision to this effect was certainly not objectively unreasonable under 

AEDPA review. We affirm the district court’s denial of Ojile’s sufficiency claim.

E. Expanded COA

Finally, Ojile asks this court to exercise its discretion to consider two issues on which a 

COA has not been granted: (1) whether he was convicted of a crime for which he was not charged 

in violation of due process; and (2) whether the admission of video-taped depositions and live 

video testimony at trial violated his confrontation rights under the Sixth Amendment. 

This court generally declines to address issues not certified for appeal by the district court 

or this court. See Valentine v. Francis, 270 F.3d 1032, 1035 (6th Cir. 2001) (“We cannot consider 

this argument since a certificate of appealability did not issue . . . .”). Ojile previously sought to 

 

issued COA and address whether the state court’s substantial-step determination was objectively 

unreasonable, we decline to exercise our discretion to do so. See Willis v. Jones, 329 F. App’x 7, 

13 (6th Cir. 2009).

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expand his original COA in this court, and this court declined his request. Cf. Willis, 329 F. App’x 

at 13 (“[A]s this court has already decided not to grant a COA on the original denial of habeas 

relief, we decline to expand . . . the certificate of appealability to encompass the original denial of 

habeas.”). We again decline to expand the COA. 

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Ojile’s habeas petition.

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