Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02321/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02321-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Eric Arnold
Respondent
Michael Murphy
Petitioner

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MICHAEL MURPHY, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

ERIC ARNOLD, 

Respondent. 

No. 2:15-cv-2321 AC P 

ORDER 

 Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, together with an application to proceed in forma pauperis. 

Petitioner has consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge for all purposes 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Local Rule 305(a). ECF No. 4. 

I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 

Examination of the in forma pauperis application reveals that petitioner is unable to afford 

the costs of suit. ECF No. 2. Accordingly, the application to proceed in forma pauperis will be 

granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 

II. Petitioner’s Allegations 

Petitioner was convicted of kidnapping for robbery in 1986, and sentenced to life with the 

possibility of parole. ECF No. 1 at 1. He challenges a July 2014 decision by the Board of Parole 

Hearings (Board), denying him parole. Id. at 5. Petitioner initially alleges that the Board failed to 

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fix his base term and adjusted base term as required by the settlement in In re Butler, California 

Court of Appeal Case No. A139411 (First Appellate District, Division 2), but later alleges that his 

base term was set at thirteen years and attaches documentation showing his adjusted base term 

was set at 180 months, or fifteen years. Id. at 5, 8, 41, 51. He alleges that “[t]he purpose in 

setting base terms and adjusted base terms is to establish a total period of confinement” (id. at 5) 

and that he has now been in prison for almost twice the thirteen-year maximum sentence imposed 

by the board (id. at 8). Petitioner argues that the failure to comply with In re Butler violates his 

rights under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 6. 

III. Discussion 

Rule 4 of the Habeas Rules requires the court to summarily dismiss a habeas petition “[i]f 

it plainly appears from the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled 

to relief in the district court.” As set forth below, the petition fails to state a cognizable claim for 

relief and will be dismissed. 

The United States Supreme Court in 2011 overruled a line of Ninth Circuit precedent that 

had supported habeas review of parole denials in California cases. Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 

216, 219 (2011). The Supreme Court held that federal habeas jurisdiction does not extend to 

review of the evidentiary basis for state parole decisions. Id. Because habeas relief is not 

available for errors of state law, and because the Due Process Clause does not require correct 

application of California’s “some evidence” standard for denial of parole, federal courts may not 

intervene in parole decisions as long as minimum procedural protections are provided. Id. at 

219-20. The protection afforded by the federal Due Process Clause to California parole decisions 

consists solely of the “minimum” procedural requirements set forth in Greenholtz v. Inmates of 

Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979). Cooke, 562 U.S. at 220. Specifically, it is 

required only that petitioner be provided with “an opportunity to be heard and . . . a statement of 

the reasons why parole was denied.” Id. (citing Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 16). 

The petition and exhibits make clear that petitioner was present at the hearing and 

provided a statement of the reasons parole was denied. ECF No. 1 at 45-52. “[T]he beginning 

and the end of the federal habeas courts’ inquiry” is whether petitioner received “the minimum 

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procedures adequate for due-process protection.” Cooke, 562 U.S. at 220. The Ninth Circuit has 

acknowledged that after Cooke, substantive challenges to parole decisions are not cognizable in 

habeas. Roberts v. Hartley, 640 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2011). Therefore, to the extent 

petitioner is simply attempting to challenge the denial of parole, his claim is not cognizable. 

With respect to petitioner’s claim that the Board’s failure to adhere to the terms of the 

settlement in In re Butler violates his constitutional rights, the agreement required the Board to 

announce and implement the procedures petitioner contends should be applied to him. 

In re Butler, 187 Cal. Rptr. 3d 375 (2015). The stipulated judgment required “the Board to 

publicly announce and implement new policies and procedures that would result in the setting of 

base terms and adjusted base terms at life inmates’ . . . next hearing resulting in a grant or denial 

of parole.” Id. at 376. The calculation of base and adjusted base terms at the outset of the 

sentence was viewed as assisting the courts in determining whether an indeterminate sentence 

was becoming excessive, or was in fact excessive. Id. at 389. The calculations were also seen as 

potentially discouraging the Board from unduly denying parole suitability, but the settlement did 

not mandate parole suitability findings in a prisoner’s favor at any particular time. Id. 388-89. 

[T]he Board regulations specified in the settlement and stipulated 

order as governing establishment of the base and adjusted base 

terms . . . do not indicate that the base and adjusted base terms the 

Board promptly fixes for a particular prisoner constitute the Board’s 

estimate of the maximum prison term constitutionally proportionate 

to that prisoner’s culpability for his or her base crime. Nor do any 

of the specified regulations prohibit the Board from refixing a base 

or adjusted base term. Nevertheless, the base and adjusted base 

terms represent an approximation of the punishment the Board 

deems proportionate to the particular prisoner’s offense. 

Id. at 389. Thus, contrary to petitioner’s claim that the base term is the maximum time he can 

legally be required to serve for his crime (ECF No. 1 at 8), the base and adjusted base terms in 

petitioner’s case have only a speculative effect on whether he will be granted parole before the 

expiration of his life. However, whether the effect is speculative or not, In re Butler governs only 

state administrative procedures and does not establish new maximum sentences. 

/// 

/// 

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To the extent petitioner contends that the failure to release him violated his due process 

rights and the Eight Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment because he has 

served more than the thirteen-year base term established by the Board, he fails to state a claim. 

With respect to the due process portion of petitioner’s argument, it is established that 

“[t]here is no right under the Federal Constitution to be conditionally released before the 

expiration of a valid sentence, and the States are under no duty to offer parole to their prisoners.” 

Cooke, 562 U.S. at 220 (citing Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7). If state law does create a liberty 

interest in parole, “[w]hatever liberty interest exists is . . . a state interest.” Id. (emphasis in 

original). Due process is satisfied as long as the state provides an inmate seeking parole with “an 

opportunity to be heard and . . . a statement of the reasons why parole was denied.” Id. (citing 

Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 16). As already explained, the petition and exhibits establish that 

petitioner was afforded the minimal procedures required to satisfy due process. ECF No. 1 at 

45-52. 

As for petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim, a criminal sentence that is “grossly 

disproportionate” to the crime for which a defendant is convicted may violate the Eighth 

Amendment. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 271 

(1980). However, outside of the capital punishment context, the Eighth Amendment prohibits 

only sentences that are extreme and grossly disproportionate to the crime. United States v. Bland, 

961 F.2d 123, 129 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) 

(Kennedy, J., concurring)). Such instances are “exceedingly rare” and occur in only “extreme” 

cases. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 73; Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272. “A punishment within legislatively 

mandated guidelines is presumptively valid.” United States v. Mejia–Mesa, 153 F.3d 925, 930 

(9th Cir. 1998) (citing Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272). “‘Generally, so long as the sentence imposed 

does not exceed the statutory maximum, it will not be overturned on eighth amendment 

grounds.’” Id. (quoting United States v. McDougherty, 920 F.2d 569, 576 (9th Cir. 1990)). 

The United States Supreme Court has held that a life sentence is constitutional, even for a 

non-violent property crime. See Rummel, 445 U.S. at 265-66 (upholding a life sentence with the 

possibility of parole, imposed under a Texas recidivist statute, for a defendant convicted of 

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obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses, an offense normally punishable by imprisonment for two to 

ten years); see also Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 961, 994-96 (upholding a sentence of life without the 

possibility of parole for a defendant convicted of possessing more than 650 grams of cocaine, 

although it was his first felony offense). Accordingly, a life sentence kidnapping for robbery such 

as was committed by petitioner would not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the 

Eighth Amendment. See Wilkerson v. Nelson, 133 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 1998) (unpublished 

decision finding a life sentence for kidnapping for robbery is not cruel and unusual punishment 

under the Eighth Amendment). Accordingly, petitioner’s claim of cruel and unusual punishment 

must be dismissed. 

Finally, petitioner claims that his First Amendment right to access the courts has been 

violated by the Board’s failure to set a base term and adjusted base term. Specifically, he alleges 

that because the Board has not set a base term or adjusted base term, he cannot obtain judicial 

review of the constitutionality of his sentence from the state courts. ECF No. 1 at 6-7. Even if it 

is true that petitioner cannot obtain state court review related to whether his sentence is 

unconstitutionally excessive until the Board has set a base term and adjusted base term, it is clear, 

both from the petition and its attachments, that base and adjusted base terms have been set. Id. at 

7-8, 41, 51. Therefore any claim based on the Board’s alleged failure to set base and adjusted 

base terms must fail. 

IV. Conclusion 

For the reasons set forth above, the petition will be dismissed for failure to state a claim. 

V. Summary 

 The petition is dismissed because a claim that parole was improperly denied does not state 

a federal constitutional claim unless petitioner was denied a hearing or was not told the reasons 

why parole was denied. Petitioner received a hearing and a statement of reasons. The petition is 

also denied because the Board did set a base term and adjusted base term for petitioner. 

In re Butler does not require petitioner to be released once he has completed either of those terms, 

and life with the possibility of parole for kidnapping for robbery does not violate the Eighth 

Amendment. 

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VI. Certificate of Appealability 

Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, this court must 

issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant. A 

certificate of appealability may issue only “if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the 

denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). For the reasons set forth herein, a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right has not been made in this case. 

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. Petitioner’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is granted. 

2. Petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus is dismissed. 

3. No certificate of appealability shall issue. 

DATED: November 18, 2016. 

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