Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-15-40991/USCOURTS-ca5-15-40991-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Francisco Alvaro-Velasco
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-40991

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff–Appellee,

versus

FRANCISCO ALVARO-VELASCO,

Defendant–Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:15-CR-144-1

Before JOLLY, SMITH, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Following his guilty-plea conviction of illegal reentry, Francisco Alvaro-

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 21, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 15-40991 Document: 00513768005 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/21/2016
No. 15-40991

2

Velasco was sentenced to 48 months of imprisonment, including a 16-level 

enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) on account of his conviction of 

second-degree kidnapping under North Carolina General Statutes § 14-39. 

Alvaro-Velasco contends that the district court “committed reversible plain 

error by convicting, sentencing, and entering judgment against Alvaro-Velasco

under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) based on its determination that his prior kidnapping conviction qualified as a conviction for a ‘crime of violence’ under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 16(b) and thus one for an ‘aggravated felony’ under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F).” 

Relying primarily on Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), AlvaroVelasco maintains that the definition of a crime of violence in § 16(b), as 

incorporated by reference into the definition of an aggravated felony in 

§ 1101(a)(43)(F), is unconstitutionally vague on its face. He further contends 

that this court cannot apply § 16(b) in this case without violating due process. 

The government has filed an unopposed motion for summary affirmance, 

urging that Alvaro-Velasco’s reasoning is foreclosed by United States v. 

Gonzalez-Longoria, 831 F.3d 670 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc), petition for cert. 

filed (Sept. 29, 2016) (No. 16-6259). The government is correct that GonzalezLongoria forecloses Alvaro-Velasco’s facial vagueness challenge to § 16(b) and 

his challenge to our application of § 16(b) on due-process grounds.1 See id. Accordingly, the motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the judgment 

is AFFIRMED. The government’s alternate motion for an extension of time to 

file a brief is DENIED as unnecessary.

 

1 The grant of certiorari on the issue whether § 16(b) is unconstitutional in light of 

Johnson in Lynch v. Dimaya, 2016 WL 3232911 (Sept. 29, 2016) (No. 15-1498), does not affect

the analysis. This court is bound by its own precedent unless and until it is altered by a

decision of the Supreme Court. See Wicker v. McCotter, 798 F.2d 155, 157–58 (5th Cir. 1986).

 Case: 15-40991 Document: 00513768005 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/21/2016