Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01405/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01405-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ulises Sanchez Cardenas
Petitioner
William Muniz
Respondent

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ULISES SANCHEZ CARDENAS,

Petitioner,

v.

WILLIAM MUNIZ,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:15-cv-01405-DAD-EPG-HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

RECOMMENDING DENIAL OF PETITION 

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner Ulises Sanchez Cardenas is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition 

for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In his petition for writ of habeas corpus, 

Petitioner raises the following claims for relief: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel; and (2) 

denial of due process and a fair trial. For the reasons discussed herein, the Court recommends

denying the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

I.

BACKGROUND

On July 20, 2012, Petitioner was convicted by a jury in the Stanislaus County Superior 

Court of first-degree murder (count 1) and two counts of assault with a firearm (counts 4 and 5).

The jury found true the allegation that Petitioner committed the offenses for the benefit of a 

criminal street gang. On August 17, 2012, Petitioner was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 

twenty-five years to life plus ten years for count 1 with the sentences for the remaining counts to 

be served concurrently. People v. Cardenas, No. F065841, 2014 WL 2735968, at *6 (Cal. Ct. 

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App. June 17, 2014). On June 17, 2014, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, 

modified the sentence to delete the ten-year gang enhancement and reflect a minimum parole 

eligibility of fifteen years. The judgment was affirmed as modified. Id. at *19. The California 

Court of Appeal denied a petition for rehearing. (LDs15, 6). The California Supreme Court 

denied Petitioner’s petition for review on September 17, 2014. (LDs 7, 8)

On September 17, 2015, Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas 

corpus. (ECF No. 1). Respondent has filed an answer to the petition. (ECF No. 18).

II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS2

Shortly after 5:00 p.m. on July 29, 2009, Albert Schopp was seen leaving his 

house in Modesto driving his blue Chevrolet. Around 6:00 p.m., Stanislaus 

County Deputy Sheriff Luke Schwartz was dispatched to Boulder Avenue and 

Broadway Avenue on the report of a shooting. He saw an older Chevrolet parked 

in the middle of the roadway. It appeared that the rear window had been shot out. 

The victim was lying on the ground outside the driver’s-side door with one foot 

still in the car. Schopp died of a gunshot wound to the head.

Witnesses reported that a sport utility vehicle (SUV) had been following or 

chasing Schopp’s car right before the shooting. Witnesses saw someone in the 

SUV with a firearm, although accounts of the size of the weapon and the armed 

person’s location within the SUV varied. Schopp’s stepbrother, Erick Fernandez, 

and Fernandez’s friend, Dario Rios, had been riding in the Chevrolet with 

Schopp. Fernandez told a detective that a blue SUV had chased them; Schopp told 

his passengers to get down and, after Fernandez ducked down, he heard one 

gunshot.

Jose Cabrera, who lived in the area and observed the SUV chasing Schopp’s car, 

told the police about an earlier incident involving the same SUV. Cabrera noticed 

a group of six young people—boys and girls around 15 to 21 years old—walking 

near a market across the street from Cabrera’s house. The SUV was headed 

toward the market when Cabrera saw a boy from the group shoot at the SUV. 

After the single gunshot, the young people on the street ran, and the SUV drove 

away. A few minutes later, Cabrera saw the same SUV drive by chasing Schopp’s 

car. Cabrera thought about 10 minutes had passed between the shooting at the 

market and when he saw the SUV chasing Schopp’s car.

The suspect vehicle was described as a green or blue Ford Expedition, and further 

investigation led the sheriff’s department to contact Carranza. Sergeant Brandon 

Kiely arrived at Carranza’s house at 12:05 a.m. on July 30, 2009, and observed a 

Ford Expedition parked in the driveway. A family member woke Carranza up, 

and Kiely asked him about the Expedition. Carranza agreed to go to the sheriff’s 

 

1

“LD” refers to documents lodged by Respondent on December 24, 2015. (ECF No. 19).

2 The Court relies on the California Court of Appeal’s June 17, 2014 opinion for this summary of the facts of the 

crime. See Vasquez v. Kirkland, 572 F.3d 1029, 1031 n.1 (9th Cir. 2009).

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office. Carla Gonzalez, Carranza’s live-in girlfriend at the time, also went to the 

sheriff’s office that night.

Detective Ken Hedrick interviewed Carranza, and the interview was videotaped. 

The interview lasted over four hours. Initially, Carranza denied any knowledge of 

either of the shootings.

Going into the interview, Hedrick did not know the names of any other suspects. 

At some point during the interview, Hedrick was given the name Ulises by a 

detective who interviewed Gonzalez,[n.2]and Hedrick asked Carranza about him. 

Eventually, Carranza admitted that Ulises was responsible for the shooting. 

Carranza provided Ulises’s last name and showed Hedrick where he lived. 

Carranza said a person called Timber—later identified as Lopez—was riding in 

the back seat of the Expedition. Carranza explained that Sanchez3lived with 

Timber at Timber’s family’s house. After the interview, Carranza, who was 17 

years old at the time, was sent to juvenile hall. Later, he was held in county jail.

Sanchez and Lopez were arrested on the morning of July 30, 2009. Detective 

Darwin Hatfield interviewed Lopez, and the interview was videotaped. Lopez told 

the detective that he was in the Expedition, Carranza was driving, and Sanchez 

fired the shot.

[n.2] According to Gonzalez’s trial testimony, on the day Schopp was 

killed, she saw Carranza at around noon, when he gave her a ride to her 

mother’s house. Carranza was driving the Expedition, and Sanchez was in 

the vehicle with him. The next time she saw Carranza was when he picked 

her up from her mother’s house at around 9:00 or 10:00 p.m. At that time, 

he was alone.

Detective Francisco Soria interviewed Sanchez. Sanchez admitted he was a 

member of the Sureños and his moniker was Popeye. He reported that he had 

been at work early the previous day, then he went to the store and stayed at home 

the rest of the day. Sanchez said that his enemies were Norteños and anybody 

who disrespects him.

The next day, a criminal complaint was filed against Sanchez, Carranza, and 

Lopez. All three defendants were charged with murder, two counts of attempted 

murder, two counts of assault with a deadly weapon, and active participation in a 

criminal street gang. Sanchez was alleged to have personally and intentionally 

discharged a firearm.

Carranza and Lopez were housed in the same cell in jail. Lopez reached a plea 

agreement with the district attorney in 2011. He agreed to testify in exchange for 

pleading guilty to a single count of participation in a criminal street gang with an 

aggravated term of three years. Carranza also reached a plea agreement under 

which he was allowed to plead guilty to one count of manslaughter and one count 

of attempted murder with a nine-year prison term in exchange for his testimony.

On October 20, 2011, the Stanislaus County District Attorney filed a six-count 

information against Sanchez only. He was charged with the murder of Schopp (§ 

187; count 1), the attempted murders of Fernandez and Rios (§§ 187, 664; counts 

2 and 3), assault with a firearm upon Fernandez and Rios (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); 

counts 4 and 5), and active participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. 

(a); count 6). For counts 1 through 5, it was alleged that Sanchez personally used 

 

3 At trial, the parties, judge, and witnesses referred to Petitioner as Mr. Sanchez. Cardenas, 2014 WL 2735968, at *1.

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a firearm (§ 12022.5 subd. (a)) and committed the offense for the benefit of a 

criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). For counts 1 through 3, it was also 

alleged that (1) Sanchez acted deliberately and with premeditation (§ 189); (2) he 

personally discharged a firearm, causing great bodily injury or death (§ 12022.53, 

subd. (d)); and (3) he was a principal of the offense, and at least one of the 

principals personally discharged a firearm, causing great bodily injury (12022.53, 

subd. (e)(1)).

A jury trial began on June 27, 2012. Lopez and Carranza were called as witnesses 

by the prosecution.

Lopez’s testimony

Lopez testified that on July 29, 2009, he lived with his parents, his wife, and 

Sanchez. Lopez was home that day. Around 12:30 p.m., Carranza and Sanchez 

arrived at his house. They hung out for a while and drank beer. In the afternoon, 

they drove to a friend’s house and then another friend’s house. Carranza drove his 

Ford Expedition. They headed to a store near Boulder and Broadway. At the store, 

“[s]ome kids shot at” Carranza’s Expedition. Carranza drove away, and Lopez 

noticed a bullet hole on the Expedition.

Lopez testified that Sanchez “said that he wanted to go get a gun, because he 

wanted to go and look for those kids, the one[s] that shot the vehicle.” Sanchez 

gave Carranza directions to a house. Sanchez got a gun from a shed next to the 

house. It was in a piece of luggage like a backpack. Sanchez sat in the front 

passenger seat, and Lopez sat in the back behind Sanchez. Sanchez opened the

backpack, and Lopez saw a rifle about 18 inches long.

They drove back to the market. They saw a car, “[l]ike an Oldsmobile.” Sanchez 

said, “they’re already looking for us to shoot us or something.” Carranza followed 

the car. The car stopped at the side of the road, and Carranza also stopped. Lopez 

saw the driver trying to get out of the car and two passengers ducking down inside 

the car. Sanchez put a bullet in the weapon. Sanchez “got out of the window, 

sitting in the window with his legs still inside the [Expedition] and pointed the 

gun at the vehicle.” Lopez heard one loud shot and saw the driver fall to the 

ground.

Sanchez handed a shotgun shell to Lopez and said it was the one he had just used. 

Lopez gave it back to Sanchez, who cleaned the shell with a rag and threw it out 

the window. They returned the gun to the shed. Then they went to Lopez’s house. 

They did not talk about the fact that someone had just been shot. They talked 

about how Carranza’s car had been shot and how to fix it. The three of them went 

to AutoZone. Sanchez drove his car, a green Cadillac, and they arrived at the store 

about 30 minutes to an hour after Schopp had been shot. They bought a package 

of Ford stickers, which Sanchez paid for. They went back to Lopez’s house, and 

Lopez put a sticker on the Expedition to cover the bullet hole. They hung out for a 

while at Lopez’s house, and at some point, Carranza left in his Expedition.

Lopez denied that he was an active gang member but agreed that he associated 

with Sureños and knew a lot about gang culture. He testified that Sanchez was a 

Sureño gang member in a subset called Southside Trece or SST. Sanchez believed 

the person who had shot Carranza’s Expedition was associated with the Norteños. 

The victim was not the person who had shot Carranza’s Expedition near the 

market, but the people in the car they had followed were also Norteño gang 

members.

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Carranza’s testimony

Carranza testified that in July 2009 he was a member of SST, a subset of the 

Sureños. Sanchez was his good friend, and he was also a member of SST. 

Carranza thought Sanchez had higher stature in the gang than he did because 

Sanchez had been a member of the gang longer. Carranza testified that Lopez was 

“[j]ust an associate” of the Sureños, not a member of the gang, which meant he 

hung out with Sureños but did not do anything to benefit the gang.

Around 1:00 p.m. on July 29, 2009, Carranza drove his mother’s Ford Expedition 

to Lopez’s house. After about 20 minutes, Carranza and Sanchez went to 

Carranza’s house. Carranza and his girlfriend, Gonzalez, had a baby boy. 

Carranza and Sanchez took Gonzalez and the baby to Gonzalez’s father’s house. 

After they dropped off Gonzalez and the baby, Carranza and Sanchez drove back 

to Lopez’s house. They drank beer and hung out, and after about two hours, 

Carranza, Sanchez, and Lopez went to a neighborhood called the O.G., which 

includes the area of Boulder Avenue and Broadway Avenue. They were driving 

near a liquor store on Boulder when Carranza saw a group of about five 

pedestrians. Sanchez called them “busters,” which is a derogatory word for 

Norteños. About a minute later, Sanchez told Carranza they were being shot at, 

and Carranza “[t]ook off.” They went to a house to get a gun, and then they drove 

back to the O.G. to “get some pay back.”

When they returned to the O.G., Carranza saw three people in a car. Carranza 

recognized Schopp from the neighborhood and considered him an enemy because 

he was a Norteño. Carranza followed Schopp’s car. Schopp’s car stopped, and 

Carranza stopped directly behind him. Then Carranza saw Sanchez “come out of 

the window” and fire a shotgun. Carranza thought the shotgun was about two feet 

long. Carranza took off, and they dropped the gun off at the house where they had 

picked it up. They went to Lopez’s house. Carranza had the idea to cover the 

bullet hole on the Expedition with a sticker. They went to AutoZone in Sanchez’s 

Cadillac. Carranza testified that he paid for the Ford stickers. They returned to 

Lopez’s house and Carranza stayed for a while. Then he left to pick up Gonzalez 

and their baby and they went home.

Other evidence at trial

Witnesses’ observations of the SUV chasing Schopp’s car varied in many of the 

details. Jose Cabrera testified that he saw a person in an SUV “leaning out the 

window with a shotgun....” The shotgun was about three feet long. Cabrera said 

the person with the shotgun was in the back seat behind the front passenger. 

Cabrera’s girlfriend saw an Expedition chasing Schopp (whom she knew) and did 

not see any passengers in Schopp’s car. She saw “a guy in the backseat [of the 

Expedition] with a gun pointed out the window.” She described the gun as a small 

handgun about eight inches long.

Antonio Cortez lived on Boulder Avenue near Broadway at the time of the 

shooting. He observed a light blue Caprice going up and down the street “at least 

four, five times....” He saw a greenish Explorer following the Caprice. He only 

saw a driver and a front passenger in the Explorer. The two vehicles turned left 

onto Broadway, he lost sight of them, and then he heard one gunshot. After the 

gunshot, Cortez saw the Explorer drive in reverse on Broadway, make a U-turn, 

and head west on Broadway. As the Explorer backed up, he noticed the front 

passenger door was being closed. It appeared the passenger was not seated “but 

getting in about to be seated....” Cortez’s brother was at Cortez’s house that day. 

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He testified that someone in a Ford SUV “stuck ... one hand out the rear passenger 

side window and then fired the shot.” He described the firearm as a small, 

semiautomatic handgun, not a shotgun or long rifle.

Another witness told a deputy he saw three people in an Expedition, the driver 

fired a handgun, and the rear passenger yelled something out the window. 

Fernandez, who was in the car with Schopp, told Detective Hedrick that the shot 

came from the front passenger’s side of the SUV.

Deputy Sheriff Jon McQueary testified about shotgun ammunition. A shotgun 

shell usually holds many pellets of a certain size and wadding to hold the 

projectiles in place. When a shotgun shell has only one projectile instead of 

numerous pellets, the projectile is referred to as a slug. At the crime scene, a 

fragment of lead was found inside Schopp’s car along the dashboard on the 

driver’s side. McQueary found an expended shell casing on Boulder just north of 

the market at Broadway. A pathologist also recovered plastic wadding and lead 

fragments from Schopp’s brain. Based on his training and experience, McQueary 

believed a single lead slug from a shotgun went through the rear window of 

Schopp’s car, passed through Schopp’s head, struck the front windshield, and then 

fell in the dashboard area. A shotgun shell can only be fired from a shotgun, not 

from a standard handgun. A search of Lopez and Sanchez’s house was conducted 

on July 30, 2009. In Sanchez’s bedroom, a deputy found in a dresser drawer a 

shotgun shell with a slug.

Sergeant Kiely processed the Ford Expedition found in front of Carranza’s house. 

Carranza’s fingerprints were found on the exterior of the rear passenger-side 

cargo window, and Lopez’s fingerprints were found on the exterior of the rear 

passenger window. Kiely observed a Ford sticker on the rear passenger-side 

quarter panel of the Expedition. He removed the sticker and found a piece of 

tissue paper wadded up in a hole that appeared to be a bullet hole. The front 

passenger seat of the Expedition was pushed all the way forward. Sanchez was 

five feet two inches tall and the shortest of the three codefendants.

Kiely also searched Sanchez’s Cadillac. In the center console area, he found a 

receipt from AutoZone for two Ford stickers with a purchase date of July 29, 

2009. McQueary went to an AutoZone store on Paradise Road, a couple miles 

from the crime scene, and was able to recover a security camera video recording 

from the evening of July 29, 2009. The video and time stamp showed Sanchez, 

Carranza, and Lopez in the store buying stickers at 6:36 p.m. McQueary also 

found Ford stickers for sale at the store that matched the sticker that covered the 

bullet hole on the Expedition.

Detective Chad Bankston testified about the Sureño street gang. Southside Trece 

is a subset of the Sureños in Stanislaus County. The Sureños’ primary activities 

include homicide, drive-by shootings, drug dealing, possession of firearms, 

carjacking, extortion, and intimidation of witnesses. Their enemies are the 

Norteños, which is also a criminal street gang. The neighborhood known as the 

O.G., where Schopp was killed, is a high crime area. It was once run by Norteños, 

but now there are Sureños and Norteños in the neighborhood. Broadway and 

Boulder is the Norteño part of the neighborhood. Based on his review of law 

enforcement information, Bankston determined that Sanchez, Carranza, and 

Lopez were all active Sureño gang members, and Schopp was a Norteño gang 

member. Among the three codefendants, Bankston believed Sanchez had the most 

status as a Sureño.[n.4] He opined that the shooting of Schopp benefited the 

Sureños because it helped the “domination of the neighborhood with ... fear and 

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intimidation” and was direct retaliation for the earlier shooting of Carranza’s 

vehicle in front of the market, which Sanchez, Carranza, and Lopez understood to 

have been committed by Norteños. Bankston testified that, based on their status in 

the gang, Sanchez and Carranza had an obligation to retaliate after Carranza’s 

vehicle was shot by suspected Norteños. If they failed to retaliate, it would have 

been a sign of weakness and they would have been punished by their own gang.

[n.4] Bankston explained, “Based on the contacts . . . with law 

enforcement, how far back he’s been claiming to be in a Sureño criminal 

street gang, crimes he’s been guilty of, the fact that he’s been sentenced 

and served time in juvenile hall, those are things that are going to elevate 

your status.” Sanchez also had “SST” tattooed on his chest, which he 

“probably earned.” In contrast, there was “[n]ot much” gang information 

related to Lopez, and he had no gang tattoos.

At the close of the prosecution’s case, the trial court granted Sanchez’s section 

1118 motion and dismissed counts 2 and 3, the charges of attempted murder.

In her closing statement, Sanchez’s counsel argued that Carranza and Lopez were 

not credible witnesses and, without their testimony, there was no evidence 

Sanchez was in the Expedition when Schopp was shot. She suggested that, during 

the initial interviews, Carranza and Lopez told the detectives what they wanted to 

hear, rather than the truth, and Carranza’s and Lopez’s stories were not 

completely consistent with each other because they were “just making it up....”

Cardenas, 2014 WL 2735968, at *1–5 (footnote omitted).

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody 

pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws 

or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 

529 U.S. 362, 375 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed 

by the United States Constitution. The challenged convictions arise out of the Stanislaus County

Superior Court, which is located within the Eastern District of California. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 

28 U.S.C. § 2241(d).

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its 

enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th 

Cir. 1997) (en banc). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA and is 

therefore governed by its provisions.

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Under the AEDPA, relitigation of any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court is 

barred unless a petitioner can show that the state court’s adjudication of his claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2198 (2015); Harrington v. Richter, 562 

U.S. 86, 97–98 (2011); Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. Thus, if a petitioner’s claim has been 

“adjudicated on the merits” in state court, the “AEDPA’s highly deferential standards” apply.

Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2198. However, if the state court did not reach the merits of the claim, the 

claim is reviewed de novo. Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 472 (2009).

In ascertaining what is “clearly established Federal law,” this Court must look to the 

“holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court’s] decisions as of the time of the 

relevant state-court decision.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. In addition, the Supreme Court 

decision must “‘squarely address[] the issue in th[e] case’ or establish a legal principle that 

‘clearly extend[s]’ to a new context to the extent required by the Supreme Court in . . . recent 

decisions”; otherwise, there is no clearly established Federal law for purposes of review under 

AEDPA and the Court must defer to the state court’s decision. Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 

754 (9th Cir. 2008) (alterations in original) (quoting Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125, 

123 (2008)).

If the Court determines there is clearly established Federal law governing the issue, the 

Court then must consider whether the state court’s decision was “contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, [the] clearly established Federal law.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). A 

state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court precedent if it “arrives at 

a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state 

court decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court] has on a set of materially 

indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A state court decision involves “an 

unreasonable application of[] clearly established Federal law” if “there is no possibility 

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fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court’s decision conflicts with [the Supreme 

Court’s] precedents.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. That is, a petitioner “must show that the state 

court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that 

there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for 

fairminded disagreement.” Id. at 103.

If the Court determines that the state court decision was “contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,” and the error is not structural, 

habeas relief is nonetheless unavailable unless it is established that the error “had substantial and 

injurious effect or influence” on the verdict. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) 

(internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 

(1946)).

The AEDPA requires considerable deference to the state courts. The Court looks to the 

last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state court judgment. See Brumfield v. Cain, 

135 S. Ct. 2269, 2276 (2015); Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1094 n.1 (2013); Ylst v. 

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 806 (1991). “When a federal claim has been presented to a state 

court and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the 

claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the 

contrary.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 99. Where the state court reaches a decision on the merits but 

provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a federal habeas court independently reviews the 

record to determine whether habeas corpus relief is available under § 2254(d). Walker v. Martel, 

709 F.3d 925, 939 (9th Cir. 2013). “Independent review of the record is not de novo review of 

the constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine whether a silent 

state court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th 

Cir. 2003). The federal court must review the state court record and “must determine what 

arguments or theories . . . could have supported, the state court’s decision; and then it must ask 

whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are 

inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme] Court.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 

102.

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IV.

REVIEW OF CLAIMS

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In his first claim for relief, Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing 

to request that the trial court exclude the coerced testimony of Isidro Carranza and Rafael Lopez. 

(ECF No. 1 at 6, 26).4 Respondent argues that the state court’s determination that Petitioner was 

not denied effective assistance of counsel was reasonable. (ECF No. 18 at 17).

Petitioner raised ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal in the California Court 

of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, which denied the claim in a reasoned decision. (LDs 1, 4). 

The claim was also raised in the petition for review, which the California Supreme Court 

summarily denied. (LDs 7, 8). As federal courts review the last reasoned state court opinion, the 

Court will “look through” the summary denial and examine the decision of the California Court 

of Appeal. See Brumfield, 135 S. Ct. at 2276; Ylst, 501 U.S. at 806. 

In denying Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim with respect to counsel’s 

failure object to the testimony of Carranza and Lopez, the California Court of Appeal stated:

I. Ineffective assistance of counsel based on failure to move to exclude 

testimony

Sanchez contends the trial court should have excluded the in-court testimony of 

Carranza and Lopez because coercive police interrogation techniques rendered it 

unreliable and its admission in evidence therefore denied him his right to due 

process of law. Acknowledging that his trial counsel did not request exclusion of 

this testimony, Sanchez further asserts that his trial counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance of counsel by failing to move to exclude Carranza’s and Lopez’s 

testimony.

To prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, Sanchez must show that 

his trial counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency caused him 

prejudice. (People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 493, fn. 31.) An attorney’s 

failure to move to exclude admissible evidence does not amount to ineffective 

assistance. (People v. Berry (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 162, 170 [where evidence was 

admissible, “any motion to have it suppressed would have been futile”; 

“[t]herefore, counsel was not ineffective when he failed to make the motion”].) 

Accordingly, to assess Sanchez’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we 

consider whether Carranza’s and Lopez’s testimony was inadmissible because of 

coercion.

 

4

Page numbers refer to the ECF page numbers stamped at the top of the page.

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A. Factual background 

1. Interviews with detectives in 2009

As we have mentioned, Hedrick’s interview of Carranza and Hatfield’s interview 

of Lopez were videotaped. Edited videos of the interviews were played for the 

jury, and DVD’ and transcripts of the interviews are part of the record on appeal.

a. Carranza

At the beginning of the interview, Hedrick established that Carranza had a 

girlfriend, Gonzalez, they intended to get married, and they had a four-month-old 

baby boy. Hedrick read Carranza his Miranda rights and the interview continued.

Carranza initially claimed that he spent the afternoon with Gonzalez. Hedrick 

reminded Carranza there had been a shooting and stated, “We have reasons to 

come to your house tonight to talk to you.”

Carranza denied going to the O.G. Hedrick urged Carranza to tell the truth and 

told him to think of his girlfriend and his baby. Asked how the Expedition got a 

bullet hole, Carranza first claimed that it was already there and probably his 

“sisters or the aunt or mom” put the sticker over the hole. Informed that his 

relatives denied the sticker was already there, Carranza responded, “I don’t know. 

Had a car crash. That’s it.” Hedrick asked if Carranza would take a lie detector 

test and told him he knew Carranza was lying. Carranza asked how he knew, and 

Hedrick replied, “Because I already know the answers. I know what happened. 

I’m now coming to you and I’m giving you the chance to tell the truth.” Hedrick 

continued: “[W]hen you lie and ... you lie, then pretty soon you lied so much that 

you get yourself in trouble and it’s harder to fix it. When you tell the truth, then 

we can try to fix what the problem is. People make mistakes.” Carranza then 

admitted that his car had been shot in the O.G. but claimed he was alone at the 

time.

Hedrick told Carranza that the market at Boulder and Broadway had cameras 

outside and that was how law enforcement knew his Expedition was involved. 

Hedrick said that, when the interview was over, he would show Carranza the 

video from the market,[n.5]but first he “want[ed] to give [Carranza] the chance to 

tell the truth.” Hedrick indicated that he knew Carranza went back to the O.G. and 

chased a car. Hedrick also said, “I can tell that you’re not a bad guy. I could tell 

right away. I talk to a lot of people.” Hedrick observed that Carranza’s eyes were 

starting to water and told him it was okay to be scared.

[n.5] In fact, there was no video. The market did have a security camera, 

but a deputy sheriff was unable to recover any video of the shootings 

because the camera was not recording during the relevant time.

Hedrick asked if the “guys in the car” (Schopp and his passengers) shot at 

Carranza’s car. Carranza responded, “I know I got shot at and there was just some 

guys walking.” At this point, Hedrick asked what Ulises was going to tell law 

enforcement, and Carranza responded, “Who?” Hedrick continued to remind 

Carranza of his family and to suggest it was all a mistake: “Why do you want to 

do this to your family? You got to think about your family. There was people out 

there. They saw it. We can start trying to fix it. Somebody got killed. I know 

that’s not what you wanted to happen. But if you lie, then it looks like you’re a 

bad guy and that it wasn’t a mistake. But when you tell the truth, then we can 

explain ... why it happened and what happened. And if you’re really sorry for 

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what happened, then you can tell the truth. And we can try to fix the mistake.... It 

was a mistake, huh?”

Carranza insisted that he “didn’t do nothing.” Hedrick asked who else was with 

him when he and his girlfriend left their house, and Carranza mentioned that he 

“gave some guy a ride home” but asserted that he did not know the person’s 

name. Hedrick stated that Gonzalez knew the person’s name and, further, she 

“tells us a different story.” The questioning continued as follows:

“[Hedrick]: So the question now is when we go and arrest [Sanchez], is he 

going to say that he was the shooter or is he going to say that you were the 

shooter?

“[Carranza]: I don’t know.

“[Hedrick]: I don’t know either. This is ... your chance. Before we talk to 

him, they’re out looking for him right now. And they’re going to find him. 

So this is your chance, your chance to tell me the truth before he does. 

Don’t be stupid. You’re not stupid. Don’t make a mistake again.

“[Carranza]: Everything stay the same.”

Hedrick urged Carranza to admit he was driving the Expedition when Schopp was 

shot: “You were just driving the car, huh? You weren’t the shooter, huh? Hey, 

come on. Take the chance here. I’m giving you this chance. Don’t blow it. You 

were just driving the car; right?” Hedrick told Carranza that Gonzalez was 

worried about him and he should “do the right thing for her....” He said, “If you 

were just driving the car, then you got to tell me. Make it better for yourself. 

Make it better for yourself before [Sanchez] comes in and he makes it better for 

himself.... Tell the truth so you can feel better.” Carranza denied driving the 

Expedition.

Hedrick asked if Ulises was the shooter and speculated that Carranza did not 

know that Ulises had a gun. Hedrick suggested possible scenarios to Carranza: 

“Did you know he was going to shoot? Was he supposed to just shoot and just 

scare them? Nobody was supposed to get hurt? If that’s the case and it was an 

accident, you got to tell me. Because otherwise I got to think you guys were 

trying to kill somebody.”

Hedrick then indicated that Ulises had been arrested and warned Carranza: “Once 

they start talking to [Sanchez] and he wants to make a deal, and he says that 

you’re the shooter, game’s over. Do you understand? If he says that you were the 

shooter, you’re going to go to jail and my report is going to show how you lied 

and lied and lied and lied, and I gave you all kinds of chances. That’s not going to 

look good for you.”

The interview continued in this manner with Hedrick suggesting what happened, 

urging Carranza to tell the truth, and reminding him to think of his family. 

Hedrick asked, “[W]as it [Sanchez] that shot or was it someone else in your car?” 

He asked Carranza who he cared more about, his family or Ulises, and Carranza 

answered his family. Hedrick told Carranza to prove he cared about his family by 

doing “the right thing” and telling the truth.

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Carranza asked, “What’s a deal?” Hedrick replied, “Well, maybe [Sanchez] wants 

to say that he was driving the truck and that you had the gun and he didn’t know.” 

Carranza said that was a lie.

Detective Hatfield entered the interview room to perform a gunshot residue 

(GSR) test.[n.7] Hatfield explained to Carranza that powder comes out of a gun 

when it is fired that can “get on you” if you shoot a gun or are near a person who 

shoots a gun.

[n.7] At trial, Hatfield testified that the main purpose of administering the 

GSR test was “investigative,” not for its own evidentiary value. He 

explained, “[W]e ... put them in a mindset leading them to believe it did 

come back positive so the wheels turn in their head that we know 

something.” On cross-examination, Hatfield stated that he conducted GSR 

tests on Carranza and Lopez but did not remember giving the test to 

Sanchez. Hatfield also admitted that he did not read the instructions for the 

GSR test. An expert for the defense testified that, in use of a GSR test kit, 

it is recommended to take samples first using the stubs (which were 

described as similar to heavy duty double stick tape) and then using the 

swab. Using the swab before the stubs risked destroying evidence. 

Hatfield, however, had used the swab before the stubs with both Carranza 

and Lopez. The defense expert further testified that the samples from 

Carranza and Lopez had particles that could have come from the discharge 

of a firearm but could also have come from other sources.

Hatfield left. At this point, Carranza asked Hedrick what it would mean if, 

unknown to him, someone in his car had a gun and suddenly pulled it out and 

Carranza “just tr[ied] to leave. Like so nothing will happen.” Hedrick explained 

that might be an accessory “as opposed to being someone who’s a killer.” 

Carranza asked what the legal consequences would be under that scenario, and 

Hedrick responded that “who goes to jail and for how long” was not up to him. 

Hedrick told Carranza he had gunpowder on his hands[n.8]and they were going to 

test the Expedition for gunpowder. While Carranza still denied that he chased a 

car in the O.G., he expressed interest in a “deal” with the district attorney. 

Hedrick told him, “I can’t guarantee that the DA will make you a deal. [¶] ... [¶] 

But I can guarantee that if you’re not truthful, there won’t be any deals.”

[n.8] To the extent Hedrick suggested the GSR test results conclusively 

showed Carranza had been near a gunshot, this was not true. The defense 

expert found no conclusive evidence of gunshot residue in either Lopez’s 

or Carranza’s samples. Trial testimony suggests the sheriff’s department 

did not submit Carranza’s and Lopez’s GSR kits for analysis as Hatfield 

testified that the Department of Justice would not test the kits because the 

subjects were apprehended many hours after the shooting.

After further questioning, Carranza admitted that someone in his car had a gun. 

Carranza observed, “The thing is what if I cooperate and then things still [go] 

bad.” Hedrick responded, “It can’t go any worse.” Gonzalez was brought in to see 

Carranza, and she told him to tell the detectives everything.

Carranza told Hedrick that Ulises was in the front passenger seat. Carranza 

continued to deny that he chased a car and denied stopping behind a car. Hedrick 

stated: “You had to have stopped, otherwise you would have [run] into the car. If 

you’re going to cooperate and want the DA’s office to help you out, you got to 

cooperate all the way. All the way.” Carranza said that Ulises shot out the window 

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of the Expedition. Hedrick asked how many times he fired. Carranza responded, 

“It was just two—I think I didn’t even hear nothing.” Asked again, Carranza said, 

“I just remember—I think I just heard one.” Hedrick then explained, “I know he 

got shot one time. But I wanted to see if you were going to tell me the truth.”

Hedrick drew a map of the area, and Carranza showed where Schopp was shot. 

Carranza confirmed that Ulises was a Sureño and admitted that he associated with 

Sureños. He thought the people in the car they chased were Norteños. Carranza 

reported that Ulises’s street name was Popeye but denied that he himself had a 

gang moniker. He also denied that he had any gang tattoos although he had a 

tattoo of three dots, which is associated with Sureños. He thought the people who 

shot his Expedition in the O.G. were Norteños.

Hedrick next asked Carranza who was sitting in the back seat of the Expedition. 

Carranza admitted there was a passenger in the back seat but claimed he just met 

him that day. Hedrick asked for Ulises’s last name, and Carranza told him it was 

Sanchez.

Hedrick left the interview room, and Hatfield entered. Hatfield told Carranza he 

was not being truthful about not knowing who the back-seat passenger was. 

Hatfield told Carranza he had to be totally honest: “You’re doing good. You came 

a long way tonight. Okay? It takes a big man to do that. You got to understand our 

job. Our job is going to find out who that third person is. Okay? Now whether or 

not you want to be totally truthful, remember what I said, you have to be totally 

truthful if you want the DA to try to work a deal with you. Totally truthful. 

Okay?”

Hatfield accused Carranza of going back to the O.G. “looking for retribution, 

basically to get back at somebody for shooting your mom’s car.” Carranza denied 

looking for anyone and said he was “just driving.” The detective told Carranza 

they were done and Carranza was “going to get booked with one count of 

homicide and two counts of attempted homicide.” He suggested that a deal with 

the district attorney was unlikely. Carranza responded, “I’m cooperating.” 

Hatfield then told Carranza that Sanchez had admitted he was the shooter and, 

further, Sanchez said he shot because Carranza wanted him to shoot because 

Carranza was angry about his car.[n.9] Carranza denied telling Sanchez to shoot.

[n.9] Hatfield also reported that Sanchez said he did it because he was 

Carranza’s friend. In fact, Sanchez had not admitted to anything as he was 

not even in custody at the time. The detectives only learned of Sanchez’s 

whereabouts from Carranza.

Hatfield observed, “I know you wanted to shoot their car. I think it might have

been just an accident that the guy got shot.” Carranza responded, “Yeah.” 

Carranza said the gun was “[p]robably a shotgun.” The detective suggested: “The 

only reason that you turned toward them was so your buddy could shoot the gun 

at their car. Am I right or wrong? The only reason you turned toward them [i.e., 

turned left onto Broadway] is so [Sanchez] could shoot the gun and hit their car 

with it. And the driver just happened ... to get killed. Am I right or wrong?” The 

transcription of Carranza’s response reads “[u]nintelligible,” but Carranza 

appeared to nod his head affirmatively. The detective understood Carranza’s 

response as agreement because he next said, “Okay. Thank you.”

Carranza told Hatfield the person in the back seat was called Timber. Hatfield 

said that Sanchez was “coming up with a totally different statement than what” 

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Carranza was saying and Sanchez was “actually being truthful” because “he’s 

feeling sorry that the guy got shot.” Hatfield told Carranza they already knew who 

the person in the back seat was and Sanchez said the person was Carranza’s 

friend. Carranza maintained that he did not know the person’s name, other than 

Timber, but admitted that he picked up and dropped off Sanchez and Timber at 

their house. The detective said: “I want to tell you something. Okay? You’re 

going to be charged with one count of homicide, two counts of attempted 

homicide. We’re also going to talk to the DA about you because you finally 

became honest.... [¶] ... [¶] So that’s going to work in your benefit. Like I said 

earlier, I can’t guarantee you anything....”

Carranza was then driven to the area where Lopez and Sanchez lived, and he 

pointed out their house.

b. Lopez

Detective Hatfield interviewed Lopez on July 30, 2009. The interview lasted over 

two hours. Hatfield began by saying he already knew the answers to the questions 

he was going to ask. He said, “The thing is, I want to treat you as a witness, not as 

a suspect. [¶] ... [¶] But if you’re not truthful,—[¶] ... [¶]—you’re going to be 

treated as a suspect. You’re going to go to jail today.” Hatfield continued: “Okay? 

Simple as that. If you’re truthful, we might be able to work a deal out with the 

DA’s office. Okay?” Lopez said, “Okay.”

Lopez told Hatfield that Sanchez was his friend. He admitted he used to be called 

Timber. Hatfield asked, “You still [gang] bang a little bit?” and Lopez answered, 

“Yeah, but I’m just on the side.” Lopez was 22 years old and he lived with his 

parents. His girlfriend, who was over eight months pregnant, also lived with him. 

(At trial Lopez referred to her as his wife.)

Hatfield observed that Lopez was not at the sheriff’s office “on [his] own free 

will” and then read him his Miranda rights. Hatfield said he knew Lopez was 

“going to try to BS” him and repeated that he already knew the answers to the 

questions he was about to ask. Hatfield further told Lopez: “I know you were with 

those two guys last night, yesterday afternoon when somebody gets shot. [¶] ... [¶] 

... I know you’re not the shooter. Okay? Do you understand that? I know you’re 

not. We know [who] is. Okay? And we know [Carranza] is the driver, so it puts 

you as being a passenger. But I want you to understand something because of 

your gang affiliation, okay, we could tie you into it too. We don’t want to do that. 

Okay? We want to try to work as—you as a witness, but it depends on how 

truthful you are here.”

Hatfield’s interview of Lopez proceeded in a similar manner to Hedrick’s 

interview of Carranza, with Lopez initially denying any involvement and later 

admitting he was with Carranza and Sanchez when the shooting occurred. 

Hatfield also followed the interview techniques Hedrick had used with Carranza. 

Hedrick asked whether Lopez was having a boy or girl and told him to think of 

his baby and family. He (falsely) said there was video from the market that 

showed “you guys drive by when the shooting happens both times.” He said that 

Lopez’s girlfriend was being questioned and there was a “total different picture” 

from what Lopez was saying. He mentioned a lie detector test and administered a 

GSR test.

Hatfield told Lopez that they had already talked to Carranza and Sanchez and 

witnesses at the scene and suggested that the killing may have been a mistake: 

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“The other thing too is I don’t think ... [Sanchez] meant to shoot the victim. I 

think he was just shooting at cars in retaliation for [Carranza’s] car getting shot. 

Okay? But unfortunately, somebody got shot and they died. Okay?” At that point, 

Hatfield asked Lopez to tell him in his own words what happened the previous 

day.

Initially, Lopez said that Carranza and Sanchez had been at his house in the 

afternoon and then they left to visit Sanchez’s family in Fresno. Hatfield said he 

was about done, and Lopez would be going to jail for homicide and two counts of 

attempted homicide.

Hatfield told Lopez he was “worth saving” but was about to make a bad decision 

by not telling the truth. He warned Lopez that the punishment for murder was life 

in prison and “if we can prove premeditation, it’d get you the death penalty.”

Hatfield said: “[Y]ou’re about not to see your family for the rest of your life. I can 

tell that’s hurting you. I can see it in your eyes, dude. Is there something else you 

want to tell me about yesterday?” Lopez responded: “No. Well, you guys saw 

everything. That’s what it is.” Lopez asked why they were still asking questions 

when “[y]ou guys know what happened.” Hatfield stated that, by not telling the 

truth, Lopez was “taking the gang side of life.” Then he asked: “Just think about if 

your old lady gets with a [Norteño] and your kid is raised as a [Norteño]? 

Wouldn’t that just get at you?” Hatfield continued: “I’m about ready to walk out 

this door because I’m tired. I want to go home. I’m going to go out and fill out 

some paperwork to book your ass in jail. You decide you want to tell me the truth, 

you knock on that door. I’ll give you an opportunity. But I guarantee you, once 

you leave here in cuffs and go to jail, no further opportunities.”

Lopez denied being in Carranza’s Expedition, and Hatfield said they were going 

to test it for DNA. Hatfield told Lopez he already knew a shotgun was used in the 

shooting. He talked about DNA testing and said: “So each little thing we’re doing 

here is one more nail in your coffin. You need to understand that. I’m about ready 

to put you away for life. Okay?” Lopez responded, “I didn’t shoot nobody 

though.” Lopez indicated that he thought he had only been brought in as an 

eyewitness. Hatfield explained that Lopez was not just a witness, he was a gang 

member hanging out with two gang members committing a crime.

Lopez asked, “And what’s the only way I can do so I can get out?” Hatfield 

answered: “Tell the truth. Tell the truth. It’s the only way. Now, is that going to 

stop you from going to jail today? Probably not. But I’m going to tell you what 

the DA most likely will do when it starts going to court. Guess who he’s [going 

to] offer a deal to? The one that’s telling the truth, the one that’s less culpable at 

committing a crime. You’re the less culpable because you didn’t pull the trigger. 

You’re less culpable because you didn’t drive the car. You’re just a passenger.”

Lopez claimed he did not know what was going to happen and he could not say 

anything or he would get in trouble with the gang. He did not want to be called a 

rat. Hatfield said: “I can’t help you out unless you tell the truth. And the only way 

I can help you out if you tell the truth, I’ll go talk to the DA. Then it’s the DA’s 

decision whether or not to offer you a deal.” Lopez responded that he was “still 

going to [be] locked up no matter what.” Hatfield told him: “You’re going to get 

locked up for a little while. Okay? Whether or not you go to prison, or you can go 

to county for a little while, that’s up to the DA. The DA’s the one that makes the 

ultimate decisions of how you get charged—whether you get charged at all. We 

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can put you in jail today. They say, ‘No, we’re going to treat him as a witness,’ 

and release you in 48 hours.”

Hatfield asked, what if Sanchez said he was not the shooter and Lopez was? 

Lopez replied, “You guys got the video.” Hatfield said they only had video of the 

people in the Expedition, not of the actual shooting.[n.10] Hatfield further told 

Lopez that a witness said the person in the back seat was the shooter.

[n.10] Again, we note that this was not true; there was no video from the 

market.

Lopez said, “I’ll give them to you” and stated that he wanted to get out of jail that 

day. Hatfield said that was not going to happen and Lopez was going to jail. 

Lopez offered he would “say whatever” to get out that day. Again, Hatfield told 

him that would not happen and, “The only thing I can tell you is that if you’re 

honest, the DA will look at it and maybe offer you a deal.” Hatfield continued: 

“Now, you have ... two choices, and ... you need to make it, not me.... You can 

either spend the rest of your life in prison, or you take a shot at telling the truth, 

and hopefully spending some time with your kid and your future—I’m sure 

you’re probably ... going to get married—your future wife.... [¶] ... [¶] ... Think 

about seeing your mom and dad at visiting times, not being able to touch them, 

only being able to see them through glass and talk to them on a little phone.”

At this point, Lopez said he did not want anyone hearing if he said something. 

Hatfield assured him the walls were soundproof. Then Lopez told the detective 

that Carranza was driving and Sanchez had the gun. He said Sanchez shot once. 

Asked why he shot the gun, Lopez responded, “Because he had got shot first, 

that’s why.” Hatfield asked why he shot that specific car. Lopez answered, “He 

was not going to shoot nobody, but they—he thought that they were after us, 

because they were looking for us already.” Lopez stated that he did know where 

the gun came from. Hatfield told Lopez that he was “doing the right thing.” 

Hatfield said he would go to bat for Lopez with the district attorney but he could 

not guarantee anything.

2. Interviews with investigator in 2011

Froilan Mariscal is a criminal investigator with the Stanislaus District Attorney’s 

Office assigned to its gang task force. Carranza and Lopez agreed to provide 

statements about the shooting and, in December 2011, Mariscal interviewed them 

individually at the county jail. The interviews were recorded and played for the 

jury.

a. Lopez

Mariscal interviewed Lopez first. He explained that Lopez’s attorney had given 

him permission to talk to Lopez because “they’re trying to get a deal worked out.” 

He warned Lopez this was his only chance to be completely honest.

Mariscal asked Lopez to tell him everything that happened on July 29, 2009. 

Lopez said that Sanchez and Carranza arrived at his house around noon and they 

drank beer in the backyard. They decided to go to a friend’s house, but Lopez 

claimed he did not know the person’s name. The friend was not at his house, and 

someone at the house told them to try another person’s place. Lopez said he did 

not know this person’s name either. The second place was a trailer near Seventh 

Street. The friend was not there either. Then Carranza, Sanchez, and Lopez went 

to a store. They stopped and parked on the side of the street. A teenager pulled a 

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gun and he shot once. Carranza, Sanchez, and Lopez went back to the friend’s 

house. Then they drove by the store again on their way back to Lopez’s house. 

Lopez said he felt the car going out of control and then Sanchez told him to duck. 

Lopez heard a gunshot. He looked up and saw Sanchez with a gun.

At this point, Mariscal told Lopez there were “a lot of blanks” in his story, which 

indicated that Lopez was not being completely honest with him. He said, “That 

tells me that you’re leaving out a lot of the details that we need to go forward with 

your statement.” Mariscal asked who brought the gun in the car, and Lopez said it 

was Sanchez. Lopez said Sanchez was talking on the phone and the person he was 

speaking to told Sanchez where he could find a gun. Lopez described the location 

of a house with a shed where they went and Sanchez picked up the gun. He said it 

was in a bag like a backpack or duffel bag.

During the interview, Lopez began crying and saying how fearful he was for his 

family. He told Mariscal he was afraid of retaliation if he told him the truth. 

Mariscal said that he understood and everybody gets scared.

Lopez reported that Sanchez said they would look for the teenager who shot at 

them. Sanchez said he would take the gun from the teenager so it could be used 

by SST. Sanchez knew the teenager was a Norteño, and he “had a problem with 

him before.” Sanchez also knew that the victim was a Norteño. Lopez described 

seeing Sanchez shoot out the window.

Lopez also identified the friend who was not at home as Clumsy and the person 

who lived in the trailer as Chicken Legs. He thought the person from whose house 

they retrieved the shotgun was called Yogi.

Lopez denied that he had a gun that day. He also denied that he touched 

Sanchez’s firearm. He said that Sanchez caught the shotgun shell with his hand 

and handed it to Lopez. Later, Sanchez threw the shell out the window. Asked 

what happened to the shotgun after the shooting, Lopez answered that Sanchez 

“probably took it back to his friend’s house,” but Lopez was not there.

b. Carranza

After Lopez’s interview, Mariscal interviewed Carranza. At the start, Mariscal 

told him: “I can tell you that the DA on the case, he’s thinking about working out 

a deal with you; right? ... [¶] ... [¶] ... Okay. There ... may have been some holes 

with your statement, and that’s why I’m here. This is your opportunity to be 

completely 100 percent honest with everything. Okay?”

Carranza said he went to Lopez’s house to visit Sanchez. Then Carranza, Lopez, 

and Sanchez went to visit a friend, Vicente. From there, they headed to “some

other people’s house.” Carranza said they passed a liquor store on their way to 

“the second guy’s house.” Sanchez rolled down his window and “said some 

things” to a group of pedestrians, and then they were shot at. Carranza drove 

away. Carranza reported that he saw Sanchez pull a gun out of his pants and he 

backed up and tried to leave. Carranza said he did not know what happened to the 

gun.

After hearing Carranza’s version of events, Mariscal told him: “It’s very easy for 

me to tell when somebody is not being completely honest with me just like you 

are right now. Okay? It’s very easy for me to tell based on all the evidence what 

happened in this case based on the investigation that we’ve been doing for a 

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couple of years already. And for you to come in here right now and to not be 

completely honest about what really happened, that’s wasting my time and it’s 

wasting your time. Okay?” He continued: “This story is the story that you want 

me to believe to minimize your culpability, to minimize [Sanchez’s] culpability. 

This story is because you’re hiding things, it’s full of holes, and it’s not 

believable.” Mariscal said: “This is your opportunity. I mean, if you want to take 

it, you can take it.” At this point, Carranza responded, “I’ll tell you how it 

happened.”

Carranza said that Sanchez called Vicente and said he was going to come over. 

The three of them went to Vicente’s house. From there, they were going to go to 

“another dude’s house.” On their way to the second house, they “went to the 

liquor store just to drive around....” They saw a group of people, and Sanchez said 

to pull over because he saw Norteños. Sanchez screamed out, “‘Fucking busters.’” 

Carranza saw a person pull out a gun from his shirt, and Carranza drove away. 

They drove to Yogi’s house and Sanchez got the gun. Carranza said he had it in 

his shirt. They went back to the area where the Expedition was shot. Sanchez 

wanted to find the kid who shot at them. Then they saw the victim, whom 

Sanchez knew. Carranza chased the victim for around 30 seconds. They passed 

the liquor store and turned. Carranza saw the victim get shot. They dropped the 

gun off at Yogi’s house and then went to Lopez’s house. Mariscal asked what 

kind of gun Lopez had, and Carranza answered that Lopez did not have a gun. 

Carranza said he thought Yogi’s name was Marcos.

Mariscal asked Carranza some questions based on what Lopez had told him. He 

asked if Sanchez caught the shell after he fired the shot. Carranza responded that 

he threw it away. Mariscal asked if he gave it to Lopez, and Carranza said no. He 

asked if they went to Chicken Legs’s house, and Carranza said no.

3. Trial testimony

Through cross-examination, Sanchez’s counsel challenged the credibility of 

Carranza and Lopez and questioned the detectives’ interview techniques.

a. Carranza

On cross-examination, Carranza admitted that, during the interview with Hedrick, 

he was trying to find out if there was something he could confess to that would be 

less serious than murder. Carranza wanted to know what the punishment would be 

for accessory because he was trying to decide if he would confess to something. 

He agreed Hedrick mentioned that Sanchez had a gun before Carranza told him 

that Sanchez had a gun. Carranza tried to minimize his culpability by giving 

Hedrick the impression that he would never have anything to do with guns.

b. Lopez

On cross-examination, Lopez agreed that, during their interview, Hatfield 

mentioned a possibility of a deal with the district attorney. Hatfield told Lopez 

“he would see what he could do,” and that was what Lopez wanted. Sanchez’s 

counsel asked, “Which story do you have to tell in order to get out of custody?” 

Lopez answered, “Say the truth.” The questioning continued:

“[Counsel]: Q. Do you have to convince this jury of your last story to 

Detective Mariscal to get out of the custody?

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“A. I just need to give the truth, and [that] depends on them if they give 

me a chance to live once again and be with my family.

“Q. You think it’s up to the kindness of the District Attorney’s heart 

because they want you to go home to your family?

“A. No. It’s not that. I know I did screw up some. I was talking about 

other things. Everybody makes errors, but at this time it’s not the time to 

be lying.

“Q. Right now is not the time to be lying?

“A. No.”

Lopez agreed that his “number one goal in this case ... is to get out as soon as 

possible....” He admitted that, during the interview with Hatfield, Lopez said he 

would be truthful and then continued to lie. Sanchez’s counsel pointed out that 

during the interview Hatfield told Lopez that Carranza was the driver and Sanchez 

was the shooter before Lopez had given Hatfield any information. Then Hatfield 

told Lopez that a witness said the back-seat passenger was the shooter. Lopez 

admitted that this made him nervous and it was at that point that he identified 

Sanchez as the shooter.

Sanchez’s counsel asked if Lopez lied to protect someone else or to help himself. 

Lopez responded: “I said it because everything that the detective was saying, it 

was making sense to my head, everything how it happened was going, so I had no 

choice but to say it because basically somebody was saying something already.”

On redirect examination, the prosecutor followed up on what Lopez meant when 

he testified that detective Hatfield was making sense. Lopez explained that 

Hatfield “was making sense of how everything kind of, like, happened” and 

agreed the detective seemed to know what had happened “[j]ust like [Lopez] had 

lived it....” The prosecutor asked, “Detective Hatfield was giving you bits of 

information that were right on with what actually happened; is that correct?” 

Lopez answered, “Correct.”

Lopez remembered that Hatfield told him multiple times to tell the truth during 

the interview. Lopez explained that he initially withheld details such as getting the 

gun from Mariscal “[b]ecause a lot of them, they were going to hurt more to 

Sanchez, so I was kind of holding back.” Lopez testified that he was telling the 

truth when he told the jury it was Sanchez who killed Schopp.

c. Detectives

On cross-examination, Sanchez’s counsel asked Hedrick why he told Carranza 

“‘Let’s fix this’” a number of times throughout the interview. Hedrick testified, 

“[M]y intent was ... that by telling the truth, he could fix this and kind of lessen” 

his culpability. Defense counsel asked if that was also why Hedrick said things 

like “‘[m]aybe it was a mistake’” and “‘[m]aybe you didn’t know it was going to 

happen.’” Hedrick explained this was an interview technique “to make the 

situation look less than what it really is to get him to initially just admit to being 

there.” Hedrick agreed that he lied about apprehending Sanchez during Carranza’s 

interview and about the existence of a videotape of Carranza’s car at the shooting.

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On redirect examination, Hedrick testified that it was common for people to lie 

before finally acknowledging they were involved in criminal activity. Hedrick 

believed that Carranza lied at the beginning of the interview and was never 100 

percent truthful but some of the things he said about the crime were true. Hedrick 

testified that he did not try to get specific answers from Carranza other than the 

truth.

Hatfield testified that he used the GSR test in an effort to encourage Carranza and 

Lopez to tell the truth.

B. Analysis

“[D]efendants must allege a violation of their own rights in order to have standing 

to argue that testimony of a third party should be excluded because it is coerced.” 

(People v. Badgett (1995) 10 Cal.4th 330, 343 (Badgett ).) As Sanchez 

acknowledges, it is well settled that a defendant has no standing to object to a 

violation of the Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth Amendment rights of a third party. 

(Badgett, supra, at pp. 343–344.)

Rather, “if the defendant seeks to exclude a third party’s testimony on the ground 

the testimony is somehow coerced or involuntary, ‘[a]ny basis for excluding [the 

third party’s] testimony must be found in a federal constitutional right personal to 

defendant.’ [Citation.] Further, the basis of the claim must be that coercion has 

affected the third party’s trial testimony.” (Badgett, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 344.) 

“[O]nly when the evidence produced at trial is subject to coercion are [a] 

defendant’s due process rights implicated....” (Ibid.)

When a defendant seeks to exclude coerced testimony of a witness or 

codefendant, it is the defendant’s burden to establish the statement was 

involuntary. (People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 453.) Therefore, it was 

Sanchez’s burden to show that Carranza’s and Lopez’s trial testimony was 

coerced. The question of coercion, in turn, requires a factual inquiry into the 

totality of the circumstances. (People v. Quiroz (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 65, 78–79 

(Quiroz ) [considering and rejecting claim that police interrogation of witness 

rendered testimony coerced where defendant failed to object to witness at trial].) 

Sanchez has failed to meet his burden.

Carranza and Lopez testified pursuant to plea agreements, but this is not sufficient 

to show coercion. In Badgett, the Supreme Court recognized: “We have never 

held, nor has any authority been offered in support of the proposition, that an offer 

of leniency in return for cooperation with the police renders a third party 

statement involuntary or eventual trial testimony coerced. On the contrary, ... we 

[have] held that testimony given under an immunity agreement does not violate 

the defendant’s right to a fair trial, if the grant of immunity is made on condition 

the witness testifies fully and fairly.” (Badgett, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 354–355.)

This is so even though our Supreme Court has also acknowledged that testifying 

pursuant to an agreement involves a “certain degree of compulsion.” (People v. 

Homick (2012) 55 Cal.4th 816, 862.) The court has explained:

“ ‘ “[A] defendant is denied a fair trial if the prosecution’s case depends 

substantially upon accomplice testimony and the accomplice witness is 

placed, either by the prosecution or the court, under a strong compulsion 

to testify in a particular fashion.” [Citation.] Thus, when the accomplice is 

granted immunity subject to the condition that his testimony substantially 

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conform to an earlier statement given to police [citation], or that his 

testimony result in the defendant’s conviction [citation], the accomplice’s 

testimony is “tainted beyond redemption” [citation] and its admission 

denies the defendant a fair trial. On the other hand, although there is a 

certain degree of compulsion inherent in any plea agreement or grant of 

immunity, it is clear that an agreement requiring only that the witness 

testify fully and truthfully is valid.’ [Citation.] ... These principles are 

violated only when the agreement requires the witness to testify to prior 

statements ‘regardless of their truth,’ but not when the truthfulness of 

those statements is the mutually shared understanding of the witness and 

the prosecution as the basis for the plea bargain. [Citation.]” (People v. 

Homick, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 862–863, italics added.)

In the present case, Sanchez does not claim the plea agreements required Carranza 

and Lopez to testify in a particular fashion. In addition, Lopez testified as to 

understanding that his plea agreement required him to “[s]ay the truth.” 

Accordingly, the fact that Carranza and Lopez testified pursuant to plea 

agreements does not render their testimony coerced.

We also observe that “mere advice or exhortation by the police that it would be 

better for the accused to tell the truth when unaccompanied by either a threat or a 

promise does not render a subsequent confession involuntary. [Citation.]” (People 

v. Jimenez (1978) 21 Cal.3d 595, 611, overruled on other grounds in People v. 

Cahill (1993) 5 Cal.4th 478, 509–510, fn. 17.) Further, “[t]here is nothing 

improper in confronting a suspect with the predicament he or she is in, or with an 

offer to refrain from prosecuting the suspect if the witness will cooperate with the 

police investigation.” (People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 863.) The police 

“are not precluded from discussing any ‘advantage’ or other consequence that will 

‘naturally accrue’ in the event the accused speaks truthfully about the crime.” 

(People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 340.) Here, the detectives consistently 

urged Carranza and Lopez to tell the truth. They also threatened them with 

prosecution for murder and discussed the possibility of a deal with the district 

attorney without making any promises. These circumstances do not render 

Carranza’s and Lopez’s interview statements coerced.

Sanchez argues his case is very similar to People v. Lee (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 

772 (Lee ). We disagree. In Lee, the victim was shot in the back of the head at 

point-blank range as he played dice with Saxon. (Id. at pp. 776, 781.) At trial, 

Saxon testified that, upon hearing gunshots, he went into a fetal position and did 

not see who shot the victim. (Id. at p. 781.) The prosecution then played a 

recording of an interrogation of Saxon by police polygraph examiner Youngblood 

in which Saxon said that defendant Lee killed the victim. A few minutes later, 

Saxon also told two police officers that Lee shot the victim. The next day, 

however, Saxon recanted his statement. (Ibid.) At trial, Saxon testified that his 

statement that Lee was the killer was false and he only made it because 

Youngblood pressured him to name Lee as the killer or face trial for the murder 

himself. (Id. at p. 782.)

The Court of Appeal concluded that police coercion by Youngblood made 

Saxon’s prior statement to the police inherently unreliable. (Lee, supra, 95 

Cal.App.4th at p. 782.) Saxon had voluntarily gone to the police station to be 

interviewed about the shooting. Youngblood administered a polygraph 

examination during which he asked if Saxon shot the victim. (Ibid.) Youngblood 

then told Saxon there was a 97 percent probability he was the person who shot the 

victim. (Id. at p. 783.) “Youngblood proceeded to threaten Saxon with a first 

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degree murder prosecution unless he identified defendant as the killer.” (Ibid.) 

“Youngblood told Saxon: ‘So right now there’s no question in my mind either 

you are the one that pulled that trigger or [Lee] and you pulled that trigger. Okay. 

What I am going to tell you now, before this thing gets too far out of hand, work 

with me or work against me. That’s where you are, where you are. Now, that’s the 

reality of it.’ Saxon replied, ‘I’m with you.’ ” (Id. at p. 784.) Youngblood also 

suggested a motive for Lee killing the victim, telling Saxon that the victim was 

seeing Lee’s girlfriend. (Ibid.)

Youngblood continued: “ ‘The thing is, you got caught up in the middle of this 

thing. Okay if you didn’t shoot the man yourself. I am going to tell you now I 

want everything. Because if I run you back on this thing again and it still shows 

that you are the person who shot him, I am going to walk out of here without 

giving you the results. I will personally write my report today. And turn it in. 

Okay? Now, if you did shoot the man, I want to know why and what really 

happened. So I am asking you now, I don’t [care] how scared you are. Did you 

shoot him?’ ” (Lee, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at pp. 784–785, italics omitted.) Saxon 

responded that he did not do it. Youngblood then said: “ ‘But you know who did. 

And you know what happened out there and you are afraid because somebody is 

going to put a snitch jacket on you.’ ” (Id. at p. 785.) Saxon said, “ ‘[Lee] shot 

him.’ ” (Ibid., italics omitted.)

The Lee court acknowledged, “California courts have long recognized it is 

sometimes necessary to use deception to get at the truth.” (Lee, supra, 95 

Cal.App.4th at p. 785.) For example, where a police officer falsely told a suspect 

that his fingerprints were found on the getaway car, the suspect’s subsequent 

confession was admissible. (People v. Watkins (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 119, 125.) 

Similarly, the false statement that the defendant had been positively identified did 

not render the defendant’s confession inadmissible. (People v. Pendarvis (1961) 

189 Cal.App.2d 180, 186.)

In Lee, however, the court concluded: “Youngblood went beyond mere deceit as 

to the evidence pointing to Saxon as the killer. He also went beyond merely 

exhorting Saxon to tell the truth. He even went beyond threatening Saxon with 

prosecution for first degree murder unless he named the real killer. [¶] 

Youngblood in essence told Saxon: We will prosecute you for first degree murder 

unless you name [Lee] as the killer.” (Lee, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 785.)

The court further noted that Saxon was not Mirandized until after he was told 

there was a 97 percent probability that he was the killer. (Lee, supra, 95 

Cal.App.4th at p. 786.) Under the circumstances of the case, the court concluded: 

“[T]he interrogation of Saxon was not designed to produce the truth as Saxon 

knew it but to produce evidence to support a version of events the police had 

already decided upon. In this respect, the police crossed the line between 

legitimate interrogation and the use of threats to establish a predetermined set of 

facts.” (Ibid.)

The present case is easily distinguishable from Lee. First and foremost, in Lee, the 

witness Saxon recanted his statement and expressly testified that he only named 

Lee as the killer because of pressure from Youngblood. Here, in contrast, 

Carranza and Lopez did not recant their initial statements to the police and 

testified at trial that Sanchez shot Schopp. Thus, unlike Lee, there is no evidence 

that Carranza and Lopez subjectively felt pressure to identify Sanchez falsely as a 

participant in the shooting.

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Further, in Lee, Youngblood threatened that he would prosecute Saxon unless he 

named Lee as the killer. Here, the detectives did not present a similar either/or 

threat to Carranza and Lopez. In other words, they were not told that either 

Sanchez was going to be charged with murder or they were. Instead, the 

detectives suggested that all three were involved in the shooting and urged them 

to tell the truth about what happened. They were not led to believe they could 

avoid criminal prosecution altogether by naming Sanchez as the shooter. Indeed, 

after Carranza and Lopez identified Sanchez as the one who fired the gun, they 

were charged with the same crimes that Sanchez was charged with.

Nor did the questioning demonstrate a similar intent on the part of the detectives 

to produce statements conforming to a version of events they had already decided 

on. In Carranza’s interview, in particular, Hedrick did not even know who the 

passengers in the Expedition were when he began the interview. He learned who 

they were and where to find them from Carranza. At one point, Hedrick asked 

whether Sanchez shot “or was it someone else in [the] car,” indicating that he had 

not already decided that Sanchez was the shooter but was trying to elicit the facts 

from Carranza. While it is true that Hatfield told Lopez his understanding of the 

crime (Carranza was the driver, Sanchez was the shooter, and Lopez was the 

passenger), this was based on evidence, that is, Carranza’s statement to Hedrick. 

“It is well settled that law enforcement may confront a witness with what they 

know.” (Quiroz, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 79.) We have reviewed the 

interview transcripts and video, and they do not demonstrate the detectives 

questioned Carranza and Lopez only “to establish a predetermined set of facts” as 

was the case in Lee. (Lee, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 786.)[n.11]

[n.11] To the extent Sanchez argues that Mariscal coerced Lopez and 

Carranza into giving statements that matched a “predetermined set of 

facts” (Lee, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 786), we reject the argument. 

Mariscal did tell them they were leaving out details—such as where the 

gun came from—but he did not tell them how to answer his questions. The 

transcripts show that Lopez told Mariscal where Sanchez picked up the 

gun, and Carranza gave a similar description of the place where they got

the gun. Lopez’s and Carranza’s stories did differ in certain details. For 

example, Lopez said they went to Chicken Legs’s place and Carranza said 

they did not. But this does not show Mariscal tried to coerce them into 

making statements as to a predetermined set of facts. He simply asked 

Carranza questions about details he had learned from Lopez. He did not 

attempt to force Carranza to give a statement that conformed with 

Lopez’s.

In addition, Saxon was not Mirandized before he was told there was a 97 percent 

probability that he was shooter. (Lee, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 786.) Here, 

Carranza and Lopez were read their Miranda rights before they were told about 

the (nonexistent) surveillance video from the market or were given the GSR test. 

We also reiterate that the Lee court recognized police deception is sometimes 

necessary “to get at the truth.” (Lee, supra, at p. 785.) In general, “[p]olice 

trickery that occurs in the process of a criminal interrogation does not, by itself, 

render a confession involuntary and violate the state or federal due process 

clause.” (People v. Chutan (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1280.) Thus, the fact that 

Hedrick and Hatfield used deception and techniques that could be described as 

“trickery” does not by itself render Carranza’s and Lopez’s interview statements 

involuntary or coerced. In sum, the present case is not similar to the situation in 

Lee, and Sanchez’s reliance on Lee to show that Carranza’s and Lopez’s 

testimony was coerced is misplaced.

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Sanchez has failed to establish Carranza’s and Lopez’s trial testimony was 

coerced. We have reviewed the trial transcripts and previous interviews in detail, 

and the totality of the circumstances supports the conclusion that Carranza’s and 

Lopez’s testimony was admissible. As a consequence, it was not ineffective 

assistance for the trial counsel not to move to exclude their testimony. (People v. 

Berry, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at p. 170.)

Cardenas, 2014 WL 2735968, at *6–19 (footnote omitted).

1. Strickland Legal Standard

The clearly established federal law governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), which requires a petitioner to show that (1) 

“counsel’s performance was deficient,” and (2) “the deficient performance prejudiced the 

defense.” Id. at 687. To establish deficient performance, a petitioner must demonstrate that 

“counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and “that counsel 

made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the 

defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 688, 687. Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance 

is highly deferential. A court indulges a “strong presumption” that counsel’s conduct falls within 

the “wide range” of reasonable professional assistance. Id. at 687. To establish prejudice, a 

petitioner must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. A court “asks whether 

it is ‘reasonable likely’ the result would have been different. . . . The likelihood of a different 

result must be substantial, not just conceivable.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 111–12 (citing Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 696, 693).

When § 2254(d) applies, “[t]he pivotal question is whether the state court’s application of 

the Strickland standard was unreasonable. This is different from asking whether defense 

counsel’s performance fell below Strickland’s standard.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 101. Moreover, 

because Strickland articulates “a general standard, a state court has even more latitude to 

reasonably determine that a defendant has not satisfied that standard.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 

556 U.S. 111, 123 (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). “The standards 

created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both ‘highly deferential,’ and when the two apply in 

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tandem, review is ‘doubly’ so.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 105 (citations omitted). Thus, “for claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel . . . AEDPA review must be ‘doubly deferential’ in order to 

afford ‘both the state court and the defense attorney the benefit of the doubt.” Woods v. Donald, 

135 S. Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015) (quoting Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 13 (2013)). When this 

“doubly deferential” judicial review applies, the appropriate inquiry is “whether there is any 

reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Richter, 562 U.S. 

at 105.

2. Analysis

Petitioner asserts that he was deprived of effective assistance when trial counsel failed to 

request that the trial court exclude the testimony of Isidro Carranza and Rafael Lopez. (ECF No. 

1 at 26). Petitioner argues that Carranza’s and Lopez’s in-court testimony should have been 

excluded based on unreliability because: (1) their prior statements and in-court testimony were 

generated by police and prosecution coercion, and (2) the substance of their statements and 

testimony was suggested to them by interrogators before they stated it themselves. (Id. at 28). 

Here, the merits of Petitioner’s claim that Carranza’s and Lopez’s testimony should have 

been excluded “control the resolution of the Strickland claim because trial counsel cannot have 

been ineffective for failing to raise a meritless objection.” Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1273 

(9th Cir. 2005). Generally, a defendant does not have standing to challenge a violation of a third 

party’s rights. See Douglas v. Woodford, 316 F.3d 1079, 1092 (9th Cir. 2003); People v. 

Badgett, 10 Cal. 4th 330, 343 (1995). However, admission of a third party’s coerced testimony 

can render a trial so fundamentally unfair as to violate due process. Williams v. Woodford, 384 

F.3d 567, 593 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Karis v. Calderon, 283 F.3d 1117, 1129 n.5 (9th Cir. 2002); 

Badgett, 10 Cal. 4th at 344–48.

a. Plea Agreements

“The general rule is that an accomplice who has pled guilty may testify against nonpleading defendants without raising due process concerns.” Morris v. Woodford, 273 F.3d 826, 

836 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Yarbrough, 852 

F.2d 1522, 1537 (9th Cir. 1988)). “An agreement that requires a witness to testify truthfully in 

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exchange for a plea is proper so long as ‘the jury is informed of the exact nature of the 

agreement, defense counsel is permitted to cross-examine the accomplice about the agreement, 

and the jury is instructed to weigh the accomplice’s testimony with care.’” Allen v. Woodford, 

395 F.3d 979, 995 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Yarbrough, 852 F.2d at 1537). In the instant case, 

both Carranza and Lopez testified pursuant to plea agreements. (1 RT5171; 2 RT 239). The jury 

was informed of the nature of the agreements and defense counsel had the opportunity to crossexamine both Carranza and Lopez regarding the agreements. The jury also was instructed to 

weigh Carranza’s and Lopez’s testimony with caution. (2 CT 293–94). Accordingly, the state 

court’s determination that Carranza’s and Lopez’s plea agreements did not render their testimony 

coerced was not objectively unreasonable.

b. Interview Statements to Detectives and Investigator

A coercive interrogation exists when the “totality of all the surrounding circumstances” 

shows that a suspect’s “will was overborne.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 

(1973). The detectives’ and the investigator’s repeated exhortations that Carranza and Lopez tell 

the truth were not coercive per se. See Cunningham v. City of Wenatchee, 345 F.3d 802, 810 

(9th Cir. 2003) (citing Amaya-Ruiz v. Stewart, 121 F.3d 486, 494 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating 

officer’s repeated insistence that the suspect tell the truth did not amount to coercion)). The 

detectives’ statements regarding the likely charges and potential penalties were not coercive per 

se. See United States v. Okafor, 285 F.3d 842, 847 (9th Cir. 2002) (“We have held that 

‘recitation of the potential sentence a defendant might receive does not render a statement 

involuntary.’ . . . Those who do a crime may have to pay in time; and we do not hesitate to say 

that law enforcement may bring this to the suspect’s attention.”) (quoting United States v. 

Bautista-Avila, 6 F.3d 1360, 1365 (9th Cir. 1993)). The detectives’ lies regarding a video 

recording from the market and Petitioner’s alleged admissions were not coercive per se. See

United States v. Preston, 751 F.3d 1008, 1026 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Assuredly, interrogating officers 

can make false representations concerning the crime or the investigation during questioning 

without always rendering an ensuing confession coerced.”) (citing Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 

 

5

“RT” refers to the Reporter’s Transcript on Appeal lodged by Respondent on December 24, 2015. (ECF No. 19).

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731, 739 (1969)). The detectives’ comments that Carranza and Lopez had to be totally truthful if 

they wanted the District Attorney (“DA”) to try to work a deal and the detectives’ statements that 

they would inform the DA of Carranza’s and Lopez’s cooperation were not coercive per se. See

United States v. Coleman, 208 F.3d 786, 791 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Leon 

Guerrero, 847 F.3d 1363, 1366 (9th Cir. 1988) (“An interrogating agent’s promise to inform the 

government prosecutor about a suspect’s cooperation does not render a subsequent statement 

involuntary, even when it is accompanied by a promise to recommend leniency or by speculation 

that cooperation will have a positive effect.”)). The detectives’ comments urging Carranza and 

Lopez to think of their families were not coercive per se. See Ortiz v. Uribe, 671 F.3d 863, 872 

(9th Cir. 2011) (holding not to be unreasonable the state court’s determination that a habeas 

petitioner had not been coerced by a detective’s statements that he had an obligation to his family 

to tell the truth and that his children were counting on him to do the right thing); Brown v. 

Horell, 644 F.3d 969, 981–82 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding not to be unreasonable the state court’s 

determination that a habeas petitioner had not been coerced by a polygraph examiner’s 

statements that he would need to tell the truth in order to see his unborn child).

The Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]he line between proper and permissible police 

conduct and techniques and methods offensive to due process is, at best, difficult to draw.” 

Hayes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515 (1963). Based on the foregoing, it was not objectively 

unreasonable for the state court to determine that, considering the totality of the circumstances, 

Lopez and Carranza’s interview statements were not coerced.

c. In-Court Testimony

In the petition, Petitioner “does not claim that the state employed coercive tactics at the 

time of trial or immediately before trial in order to secure [Carraza’s and Lopez’s] trial 

testimony. Thus . . . the question before us is whether the post-arrest coercion of a government 

witness so tainted that witness’s trial testimony as to render the testimony’s admission a violation 

of the defendant’s right to due process.” Williams, 384 F.3d at 594. The Court considers factors 

such as the passage of time between the coercion and the trial testimony and whether intervening 

circumstances sufficiently insulated the testimony from the effect of the prior coercion. Id. at 

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595. Additionally, the fact that a witness is represented by counsel “provide[s] some safeguard 

for the truth of [the witness’s] trial testimony.” Id. at 596 (citing Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 

1220, 1240 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (“The presence of a lawyer can . . . help to guarantee that 

. . . a fully accurate statement [is given] to the police and that the statement is rightly reported by 

the prosecution at trial.”)).

As discussed earlier, Carranza’s and Lopez’s interview statements were not coerced. 

Almost three years elapsed between the interviews with detectives on July 30, 2009, and when 

Carranza and Lopez testified at Petitioner’s trial in July 2012. (3 RT6549; 5 RT 813; 1 CT7225–

26, 228–29). Approximately seven months elapsed between the interviews with the investigator 

in December 2011 and when they testified at Petitioner’s trial. (2 RT 436–37). Carranza and 

Lopez were represented by attorneys in this case. (1 RT 171–72; 2 RT 293). At trial, Carranza 

and Lopez were subjected to cross-examination, through which defense counsel elicited details 

of their interviews, their incentives to cooperate and testify, and their inconsistent statements.

(1 RT 171–97; 2 RT 202–06, 228–33; 3 RT 366–77, 386–92, 396–401). Moreover, videos of

Carranza’s and Lopez’s interviews with the detectives were shown to the jury, and defense 

counsel questioned Carranza and Lopez regarding what was shown in the videos. (1 RT 187–97; 

2 RT 202–06; 3 RT 370–77, 386–92, 396–400). Thus, Petitioner was able to test thoroughly 

whether Carranza’s and Lopez’s testimony was voluntary and truthful, and the jury could assess 

the credibility of the witnesses in light of the pretrial interviews and their plea agreements. 

Accordingly, the state court’s determination that Carranza’s and Lopez’s in-court testimony was

not coerced was not objectively unreasonable. See Williams, 384 F.3d at 596 (holding no due 

process violation when witness, who allegedly had been beaten, threatened with a murder charge, 

and offered immunity during a prior interrogation, testified at trial because two years had passed 

since illegal interrogation and witness was represented by counsel); United States v. Mattison, 

437 F.2d 84, 85 (9th Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (holding no due process violation when witness, 

who previously was illegally interrogated, testified at trial because “psychologically coercive 

 

6

“RT” refers to the Reporter’s Transcript on Appeal lodged by Respondent on December 24, 2015. (ECF No. 19).

7

“CT” refers to the Clerk’s Transcript on Appeal lodged by Respondent on December 24, 2015. (ECF No. 19).

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atmosphere of that interrogation must surely have dissipated” by the time of trial, there was no 

indication that the witness was told what he should say on the witness stand, and the witness’s 

testimony “was made in open court, subject to cross-examination, where the jury could observe 

his demeanor and gauge his credibility.”).

Having “reviewed the trial transcripts and previous interviews in detail,” the state court

found that “the totality of the circumstances supports the conclusion that Carranza’s and Lopez’s 

testimony was admissible. As a consequence, it was not ineffective assistance for the trial 

counsel not to move to exclude their testimony.” Cardenas, 2014 WL 2735968, at *19. Based on 

the foregoing, the state court’s denial of Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim was 

not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, nor was it 

based on an unreasonable determination of fact. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas 

relief on his first claim.

B. Admission of Unreliable Coerced Testimony

In his second claim for relief, Petitioner raises a separate due process claim regarding the 

admission of Carranza’s and Lopez’s testimony. (ECF No. 1 at 28). In the California Court of 

Appeal, Petitioner had asked the court to “consider the merits of his due process claim under the 

rubric of his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” (LD 1 at 41). In his petition for review 

filed in the California Supreme Court, Petitioner raised separate claims for ineffective assistance 

of counsel and violation of due process. (LD 7).

 As discussed in section IV(A)(2), supra, the state court’s determination that Carranza’s 

and Lopez’s interview statements and trial testimony were not coerced was not contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, nor was it based on an unreasonable 

determination of fact. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on his second claim.

V.

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the petition for writ of habeas 

corpus be DENIED.

///

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This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District 

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local 

Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within 

THIRTY (30) days after service of the Findings and Recommendation, any party may file 

written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be 

captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the 

objections shall be served and filed within fourteen (14) days after service of the objections. The 

assigned United States District Court Judge will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within 

the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Wilkerson v. 

Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th 

Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 19, 2016 /s/

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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