Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-12-03798/USCOURTS-ca3-12-03798-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Anthony Douglas Elonis
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 12-3798

___________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

ANTHONY DOUGLAS ELONIS,

 Appellant

_______________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

D.C. Criminal No. 5-11-cr-00013-001

(Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel)

______________

Argued: June 14, 2013

Before: SCIRICA, HARDIMAN, and ALDISERT, Circuit 

Judges.

(Filed: September 19, 2013 )

Ronald H. Levine, Esq. [ARGUED]

Abraham J. Rein, Esq.

Post & Schell

Case: 12-3798 Document: 003111393034 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/19/2013
2

1600 John F. Kennedy Boulevard

Four Penn Center, 14th Floor

Philadelphia, PA 19103

 Counsel for Appellant

Sherri A. Stephan, Esq.

Office of United States Attorney

504 West Hamilton Street

Suite 3701

Allentown, PA 18101

Robert A. Zauzmer, Esq. [ARGUED]

Office of United States Attorney

615 Chestnut Street

Suite 1250

Philadelphia, PA 19106

 

 Counsel for Appellee

_________________

OPINION OF THE COURT

_________________

SCIRICA, Circuit Judge

This case presents the question whether the true threats 

exception to speech protection under the First Amendment 

requires a jury to find the defendant subjectively intended his 

statements to be understood as threats. Anthony Elonis 

challenges his jury conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), 

Case: 12-3798 Document: 003111393034 Page: 2 Date Filed: 09/19/2013
3

arguing he did not subjectively intend his Facebook posts to 

be threatening. In United States v. Kosma, 951 F.2d 549, 557

(3d Cir. 1991) we held a statement is a true threat when a 

reasonable speaker would foresee the statement would be 

interpreted as a threat. We consider whether the Supreme 

Court decision in Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003),

overturns this standard by requiring a subjective intent to 

threaten.

I.

In May 2010, Elonis’s wife of seven years moved out 

of their home with their two young children. Following this 

separation, Elonis began experiencing trouble at work. Elonis 

worked at Dorney Park & Wildwater Kingdom amusement 

park as an operations supervisor and a communications 

technician. After his wife left, supervisors observed Elonis 

with his head down on his desk crying, and he was sent home 

on several occasions because he was too upset to work. 

One of the employees Elonis supervised, Amber 

Morrissey, made five sexual harassment reports against him. 

According to Morrissey, Elonis came into the office where 

she was working alone late at night, and began to undress in 

front of her. She left the building after he removed his shirt. 

Morrissey also reported another incident where Elonis made a 

minor female employee uncomfortable when he placed

himself close to her and told her to stick out her tongue. On 

October 17, 2010 Elonis posted on his Facebook page a 

photograph taken for the Dorney Park Halloween Haunt. The 

photograph showed Elonis in costume holding a knife to 

Morrissey’s neck. Elonis added the caption “I wish” under 

the photograph. Elonis’s supervisor saw the Facebook 

Case: 12-3798 Document: 003111393034 Page: 3 Date Filed: 09/19/2013
4

posting and fired Elonis that same day.

Two days after he was fired, Elonis began posting 

violent statements on his Facebook page. One post regarding 

Dorney Park stated:

Moles. Didn’t I tell ya’ll I had several? Ya’ll 

saying I had access to keys for the fucking 

gates, that I have sinister plans for all my 

friends and must have taken home a couple. 

Ya’ll think it’s too dark and foggy to secure 

your facility from a man as mad as me. You 

see, even without a paycheck I’m still the main 

attraction. Whoever thought the Halloween 

haunt could 

be so fucking scary?

Elonis also began posting statements about his 

estranged wife, Tara Elonis, including the following: “If I 

only knew then what I know now, I would have smothered 

your ass with a pillow, dumped your body in the back seat, 

dropped you off in Toad Creek, and made it look like a rape 

and murder.” Several of the posts about Tara Elonis were in 

response to her sister’s status updates on Facebook. For 

example, Tara Elonis’s sister posted her status update as: 

“Halloween costume shopping with my niece and nephew 

should be interesting.” Elonis commented on this status

update, writing, “Tell [their son] he should dress up as 

matricide for Halloween. I don’t know what his costume 

would entail though. Maybe [Tara Elonis’s] head on a stick?” 

Elonis also posted in October 2010:

There’s one way to love you but a thousand 

Case: 12-3798 Document: 003111393034 Page: 4 Date Filed: 09/19/2013
5

ways to kill you. I’m not going to rest until 

your body is a mess, soaked in blood and dying 

from all the little cuts. Hurry up and die, bitch, 

so I can bust this nut all over your corpse from 

atop your shallow grave. I used to be a nice guy 

but then you became a slut. Guess it’s not your 

fault you liked your daddy raped you. 

So hurry up and die, bitch, so I can forgive you.

Based on these statements a state court issued Tara 

Elonis a Protection From Abuse order against Elonis on 

November 4, 2010. Following the issuance of the state court

Protection From Abuse order, Elonis posted several 

statements on Facebook expressing intent to harm his wife. 

On November 7 he wrote:1

 

Did you know that it’s illegal for me to say I 

want to kill my wife?

It’s illegal.

It’s indirect criminal contempt.

It’s one of the only sentences that I’m not 

allowed to say.

Now it was okay for me to say it right then 

because I was just telling you that it’s illegal for 

me to say I want to kill my wife.

I’m not actually saying it.

I’m just letting you know that it’s illegal for me 

to say that.

It’s kind of like a public service. 

I’m letting you know so that you don’t 

accidently go out and say something like that 

 1 This statement was the basis of Count 2 of the indictment.

Case: 12-3798 Document: 003111393034 Page: 5 Date Filed: 09/19/2013
6

Um, what’s interesting is that it’s very illegal to 

say I really, really think someone out there 

should kill my wife. 

That’s illegal. 

Very, very illegal. 

But not illegal to say with a mortar launcher. 

Because that’s its own sentence. 

It’s an incomplete sentence but it may have 

nothing to do with the sentence before that. 

So that’s perfectly fine. 

Perfectly legal. 

I also found out that it’s incredibly illegal, 

extremely illegal, to go on Facebook and say 

something like the best place to fire a mortar 

launcher at her house would be from the 

cornfield behind it because of easy access to a 

getaway road and you’d have a clear line of 

sight through the sun room.

Insanely illegal.

Ridiculously, wrecklessly, insanely illegal.

Yet even more illegal to show an illustrated 

diagram.

===[ __ ] =====house

: : : : : : : ^ : : : : : : : : : : : :cornfield

: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 

: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 

: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 

######################getaway road

Insanely illegal.

Ridiculously, horribly felonious.

Cause they will come to my house in the middle 

of the night and they will lock me up.

Extremely against the law.

Case: 12-3798 Document: 003111393034 Page: 6 Date Filed: 09/19/2013
7

Uh, one thing that is technically legal to say is 

that we have a group that meets Fridays at my 

parent’s house and the password is sic simper 

tyrannis.

Tara Elonis testified at trial that she took these statements 

seriously, saying, “I felt like I was being stalked. I felt 

extremely afraid for mine and my children’s and my families’ 

lives.” Trial Tr. 97, Oct. 19, 2011. Ms. Elonis further 

testified that Elonis rarely listened to rap music, and that she 

had never seen Elonis write rap lyrics during their seven years 

of marriage. She explained that the lyric form of the 

statements did not make her take the threats any less 

seriously.

On November 15 Elonis posted on his Facebook page:

Fold up your PFA and put it in your pocket

Is it thick enough to stop a bullet?

Try to enforce an Order

That was improperly granted in the first place

Me thinks the judge needs an education on true 

threat jurisprudence

And prison time will add zeroes to my 

settlement

Which you won’t see a lick

Because you suck dog dick in front of children

****

And if worse comes to worse

I’ve got enough explosives

to take care of the state police and the sheriff's 

department

[link: Freedom of Speech, www.wikipedia.org]

Case: 12-3798 Document: 003111393034 Page: 7 Date Filed: 09/19/2013
8

This statement was the basis both of Count 2, threats to 

Elonis’s wife, and Count 3, threats to local law enforcement. 

A post the following day on November 16 involving an 

elementary school was the basis of Count 4:

That’s it, I’ve had about enough

I’m checking out and making a name for myself

Enough elementary schools in a ten mile radius 

to initiate the most heinous school shooting ever 

imagined

And hell hath no fury like a crazy man in a 

kindergarten class

The only question is . . . which one?

By this point FBI Agent Denise Stevens was 

monitoring Elonis’s public Facebook postings, because 

Dorney Park contacted the FBI claiming Elonis had posted 

threats against Dorney Park and its employees on his 

Facebook page. After reading these and other Facebook posts 

by Elonis, Agent Stevens and another FBI agent went to 

Elonis’s house to interview him. When the agents knocked 

on his door, Elonis’s father answered and told the agents 

Elonis was sleeping. The agents waited several minutes until 

Elonis came to the door wearing a t-shirt, jeans, and no shoes. 

Elonis asked the agents if they were law enforcement and 

asked if he was free to go. After the agents identified 

themselves and told him he was free to go, Elonis went inside 

and closed the door. Later that day, Elonis posted the 

following on Facebook:

You know your shit’s ridiculous

when you have the FBI knockin’ at yo’ door

Little Agent Lady stood so close

Case: 12-3798 Document: 003111393034 Page: 8 Date Filed: 09/19/2013
9

Took all the strength I had not to turn the bitch 

ghost

Pull my knife, flick my wrist, and slit her throat

Leave her bleedin’ from her jugular in the arms 

of her partner

[laughter]

So the next time you knock, you best be serving 

a warrant

And bring yo’ SWAT and an explosives expert 

while you’re at it

Cause little did y’all know, I was strapped wit’

a bomb

Why do you think it took me so long to get 

dressed with no shoes on?

I was jus’ waitin’ for y’all to handcuff me and 

pat me down

Touch the detonator in my pocket and we’re all 

goin’

[BOOM!]

These statements were the basis of Count 5 of the indictment. 

After she observed this post on Elonis’s Facebook page, 

Agent Stevens contacted the U.S. Attorney’s Office.

II.

Elonis was arrested on December 8, 2010 and charged 

with transmitting in interstate commerce communications 

containing a threat to injure the person of another in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). The grand jury indicted Elonis on five 

Case: 12-3798 Document: 003111393034 Page: 9 Date Filed: 09/19/2013
10

counts of making threatening communications: Count 1 

threats to patrons and employees of Dorney Park & 

Wildwater Kingdom, Count 2 threats to his wife, Count 3 

threats to employees of the Pennsylvania State Police and 

Berks County Sheriff’s Department, Count 4 threats to a 

kindergarten class, and Count 5 threats to an FBI agent. 

Elonis moved to dismiss the indictments against him, 

contending the Supreme Court held in Virginia v. Black, 538

U.S. 343, 347-48 (2003) that a subjective intent to threaten

was required under the true threat exception to the First 

Amendment and that his statements were not threats but were 

protected speech. The District Court denied the motion to 

dismiss because even if the subjective intent standard applied, 

Elonis’s intent and the attendant circumstances showing 

whether or not the statements were true threats were questions 

of fact for the jury. United States v. Elonis, No. 11-13, 2011 

WL 5024284, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 20, 2011).

Elonis testified in his own defense at trial. A jury

convicted Elonis on Counts 2 through 5, and the court

sentenced him to 44 months’ imprisonment followed by three 

years supervised release. Elonis filed a post-trial Motion to 

Dismiss Indictment with Prejudice under Rule 12(b)(3); and

for New Trial under Rule 33(a), to Arrest Judgment under 

Rule 34(b) and/or Dismissal under Rule 29(c). The District 

Court denied the motion to dismiss the indictment, finding the 

indictment correctly tracked the language of the statute and 

stated the nature of the threat, the date of the threat and the 

victim of the threat. The court also stated the objective intent 

standard conformed with Third Circuit precedent. The court

found the evidence supported the jury’s finding that the 

statements in Count 3 and Count 5 were true threats. Finally, 

Case: 12-3798 Document: 003111393034 Page: 10 Date Filed: 09/19/2013
11

the court held that the jury instruction presuming 

communications over the internet were transmitted through 

interstate commerce was supported by our precedent in 

United States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 244 (3d Cir. 2006). 

III.2

A.

Elonis was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) for 

“transmit[ting] in interstate or foreign commerce any 

communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or 

any threat to injure the person of another . . . .” Elonis 

contends the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury on the 

standard of a true threat. The court gave the following jury 

instruction:

A statement is a true threat when a defendant 

intentionally makes a statement in a context or 

 2 The District Court had jurisdiction over this case under 18 

U.S.C. § 3231. We exercise appellate jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1291. We review statutory interpretations and 

conclusions of law de novo. Kosma, 951 F.2d at 553. We 

exercise plenary review over the sufficiency of indictments. 

United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 280 (3d Cir. 2007). 

“We apply a particularly deferential standard of review when 

deciding whether a jury verdict rests on legally sufficient 

evidence.” United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 

1998). Because Elonis failed to object to the jury instructions 

at trial, we review whether the jury instructions stated the 

correct legal standard for plain error. United States v. Lee, 

612 F.3d 170, 191 (3d Cir. 2010).

Case: 12-3798 Document: 003111393034 Page: 11 Date Filed: 09/19/2013
12

under such circumstances wherein a reasonable 

person would foresee that the statement would 

be interpreted by those to whom the maker 

communicates the statement as a serious 

expression of an 

intention to inflict bodily injury or take the life 

of an individual.

Trial Tr. 127, Oct. 20, 2011. Elonis posits that the Supreme 

Court decision in Virginia v. Black requires that a defendant 

subjectively intend to threaten, and overturns the reasonable 

speaker standard we articulated in United States v. Kosma, 

951 F.3d 549, 557 (3d Cir. 1991).

In United States v. Kosma, we held a true threat 

requires that

the defendant intentionally make a statement, 

written or oral, in a context or under such 

circumstances wherein a reasonable person 

would foresee that the statement would be 

interpreted by those to whom the maker 

communicates the statement as a serious 

expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm 

upon or to take the life of the President, and that 

the statement not be the result of mistake, 

duress, or coercion. 

Id. at 557 (quoting Roy v. United States, 416 F.2d 874, 877-

78 (9th Cir. 1969) (emphasis omitted)). We rejected a 

subjective intent requirement that the defendant “intended at 

least to convey the impression that the threat was a serious 

one.” Id. at 558 (quoting Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 

Case: 12-3798 Document: 003111393034 Page: 12 Date Filed: 09/19/2013
13

35, 46 (1975) (Marshall, J., concurring)). We found “any 

subjective test potentially frustrates the purposes of section 

871—to prevent not only actual threats on the President’s life, 

but also the harmful consequences which flow from such 

threats.” Id. (explaining “it would make prosecution of these 

threats significantly more difficult”). We have held the same 

“knowingly and willfully” mens rea Kosma analyzed under 

18 U.S.C. § 871, threats against the president, applies to 

§ 875(c). United States v. Himelwright, 42 F.3d 777, 782 (3d 

Cir. 1994) (holding “the government bore only the burden of 

proving that Himelwright acted knowingly and willfully when 

he placed the threatening telephone calls and that those calls 

were reasonably perceived as threatening bodily injury”). 

Since our precedent is clear, the question is whether the 

Supreme Court decision in Virginia v. Black overturned this 

standard.

The Supreme Court first articulated the true threats

exception to speech protected under the First Amendment in 

Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969). During a rally 

opposing the Vietnam war, Watts told the crowd, “I am not 

going. If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want 

to get in my sights is L.B.J.” Id. at 706 (internal quotation

marks omitted). The Court reversed his conviction for 

making a threat against the president because the statement 

was “political hyperbole,” rather than a true threat. Id. at 708. 

The Court articulated three factors supporting its finding: 1. 

the context was a political speech; 2. the statement was 

“expressly conditional”; and 3. “the reaction of the listeners” 

who “laughed after the statement was made.” Id. at 707-08. 

The Court did not address the true threats exception again 

Case: 12-3798 Document: 003111393034 Page: 13 Date Filed: 09/19/2013
14

until Virginia v. Black in 2003.3

In Virginia v. Black the Court considered a Virginia 

statute that banned burning a cross with the “intent of 

intimidating” and provided “[a]ny such burning of a cross 

shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a 

person or group of persons.” 538 U.S. at 348 (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). The Court reviewed three 

separate convictions of defendants under the statute and 

concluded that intimidating cross burning could be proscribed

as a true threat under the First Amendment. Id. at 363. But 

the prima facie evidence provision violated due process, 

because it permitted a jury to convict whenever a defendant 

exercised his or her right to not put on a defense. Id. at 364-

65.

The Court reviewed the historic and contextual 

meanings behind cross burning, and found it conveyed a 

political message, a cultural message, and a threatening 

message, depending on the circumstances. Id. at 354-57. The 

Court then described the true threat exception generally 

before analyzing the Virginia statute: 

“True threats” encompass those statements 

where the speaker means to communicate a 

serious expression of an intent to commit an act 

of unlawful violence to a particular individual 

or group of individuals. See Watts v. United 

States, supra, at 708 . . . (“political hyperbole” 

 3 The Court did discuss the constitutional limits on banning 

“fighting words” in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,

388 (1992).

Case: 12-3798 Document: 003111393034 Page: 14 Date Filed: 09/19/2013
15

is not a true threat); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 

505 U.S., at 388. . . . The speaker need not 

actually intend to carry out the threat. Rather, a 

prohibition on true threats “protect[s] 

individuals from the fear of violence” and 

“from the disruption that fear engenders,” in 

addition to protecting people “from the 

possibility that the threatened violence will 

occur.” Ibid. Intimidation in the 

constitutionally proscribable sense of the word 

is a type of true threat, where a speaker directs a 

threat to a person or group of persons with the 

intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily 

harm or death. Respondents do not contest that 

some cross burnings fit within this meaning of 

intimidating speech, and rightly so. As noted in 

Part II, supra, the history of cross burning in 

this country shows that cross burning is often 

intimidating, intended to create a pervasive fear 

in victims that they are a 

target of violence.

Id. at 359-60 (citation omitted). Elonis contends that this 

definition of true threats means that the speaker must both 

intend to communicate and intend for the language to threaten 

the victim.

4

 But the Court did not have occasion to make 

 4 Elonis also points to the passage “[i]ntimidation in the 

constitutionally proscribable sense of the word is a type of 

true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person or 

group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear 

of bodily harm or death.” Black, 538 U.S. at 360. But this 

Case: 12-3798 Document: 003111393034 Page: 15 Date Filed: 09/19/2013
16

such a sweeping holding, because the challenged Virginia 

statute already required a subjective intent to intimidate. We 

do not infer from the use of the term “intent” that the Court 

invalidated the objective intent standard the majority of 

circuits applied to true threats.

5 Instead, we read “statements 

where the speaker means to communicate a serious 

expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful 

violence” to mean that the speaker must intend to make the 

communication. It would require adding language the Court 

did not write to read the passage as “statements where the 

speaker means to communicate [and intends the statement to 

be understood as] a serious expression of an intent to commit 

an act of unlawful violence.” Id. at 359. This is not what the 

Court wrote, and it is inconsistent with the logic animating 

the true threats exception.

The “prohibition on true threats ‘protect[s] individuals 

from the fear of violence’ and ‘from the disruption that fear 

engenders,’ in addition to protecting people ‘from the 

possibility that the threatened violence will occur.’” Id. at 

 

sentence explains when intimidation can be a true threat, and 

does not define when threatening language is a true threat.

5 See, e.g., United States v. Whiffen, 121 F.3d 18, 20-21 (1st 

Cir. 1997); United States v. Francis, 164 F.3d 120, 122 (2d 

Cir. 1999); United States v. Darby, 37 F.3d 1059, 1066 (4th 

Cir. 1994); United States v. Myers, 104 F.3d 76, 80-81 (5th 

Cir. 1997); United States v. DeAndino, 958 F.2d 146, 148 (6th 

Cir. 1992); United States v. Schneider, 910 F.2d 1569, 1570 

(7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Manning, 923 F.2d 83, 86 

(8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Hart, 457 F.2d 1087, 1091 

(10th Cir. 1972); United States v. Callahan, 702 F.2d 964, 

965 (11th Cir. 1983); Metz v. Dep’t of Treasury, 780 F.2d 

1001, 1002 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 

Case: 12-3798 Document: 003111393034 Page: 16 Date Filed: 09/19/2013
17

360 (quoting R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388). Limiting the definition 

of true threats to only those statements where the speaker 

subjectively intended to threaten would fail to protect 

individuals from “the fear of violence” and the “disruption 

that fear engenders,” because it would protect speech that a 

reasonable speaker would understand to be threatening. Id.

Elonis further contends the unconstitutionality of the 

prima facie evidence provision in Black indicates a subjective 

intent to threaten is required. The Court found the fact that 

the defendant burned a cross could not be prima facie 

evidence of intent to intimidate. Id. at 364-65. The Court 

explained that while cross burning was often employed as 

intimidation or a threat of physical violence against others, it 

could also function as a symbol of solidarity for those within 

the white supremacist movement. Id. at 365-66. Less 

frequently, crosses had been burned outside of the white 

supremacist context, such as stage performances. Id. at 366. 

Since the burning of a cross could have a constitutionallyprotected political message as well as a threatening message, 

the prima facie evidence provision failed to distinguish 

protected speech from unprotected threats. Furthermore, the 

prima facie evidence provision denied defendants the right to 

not put on a defense, since the prosecution did not have to 

produce any evidence of intent to intimidate, which was an 

element of the crime. Id. at 364-65.

We do not find that the unconstitutionality of 

Virginia’s prima facie evidence provision means the true 

threats exception requires a subjective intent to threaten. 

First, the prima facie evidence provision did not allow the 

factfinder to consider the context to construe the meaning of 

the conduct, id. at 365-66, whereas the reasonable person 

Case: 12-3798 Document: 003111393034 Page: 17 Date Filed: 09/19/2013
18

standard does encompass context to determine whether the 

statement was a serious expression of intent to inflict bodily 

harm. Second, cross-burning is conduct that may or may not 

convey a meaning, as opposed to the language in this case 

which has inherent meaning in addition to the meaning 

derived from context. Finally, the prima facie evidence 

provision violated the defendant’s due process rights to not 

put on a defense, because the defendant could be convicted 

even when the prosecution had not proven all the elements of 

the crime. Id. That is not an issue here because the 

government had to prove that a reasonable person would 

foresee Elonis’s statements would be understood as threats.

The majority of circuits that have considered this 

question have not found the Supreme Court decision in Black

to require a subjective intent to threaten. See United States v. 

White, 670 F.3d 498, 508 (4th Cir. 2012) (“A careful reading 

of the requirements of § 875(c), together with the definition 

from Black, does not, in our opinion, lead to the conclusion 

that Black introduced a specific-intent-to-threaten 

requirement into § 875(c) . . . .”); United States v. Jeffries, 

692 F.3d 473, 479 (6th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he position reads too 

much into Black.”); United States v. Mabie, 663 F.3d 322, 

332-33 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 107 (2012) 

(noting the objective test had been applied many times after 

Black) 6

; United States v. Nicklas, 713 F.3d 435, 440 (8th Cir.

 6 The Eighth Circuit cited the following cases applying an 

objective standard after the Supreme Court’s decision in 

Black: 

United States v. Beale, 620 F.3d 856, 865 (8th 

Cir. 2010) . . . ; United States v. Armel, 585 

Case: 12-3798 Document: 003111393034 Page: 18 Date Filed: 09/19/2013
19

2013) (quoting extensively from Jeffries, the court 

“concluded § 875(c) does not require the government to prove 

a defendant specifically intended his or her statements to be 

threatening”). 

The Fourth Circuit in United States v. White

considered the same criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), and 

found the Court in Black “gave no indication it was 

redefining a general intent crime such as § 875(c) to be a 

specific intent crime.” 670 F.3d at 509. The Fourth Circuit 

reasoned that Black had analyzed a statute that included a 

specific intent element, whereas § 875(c) had consistently 

been applied as a general intent statute. Id. at 508. The court 

further distinguished Black by noting the multiple meanings 

of cross-burning necessitated a finding of intent to distinguish 

protected speech from true threats. Id. at 511. The court in 

White found this same problem did not exist for threatening 

language because it has no First Amendment value. Id.

Finally, the court found the general intent standard for § 

875(c) offenses did not chill “statements of jest or political 

 

F.3d 182, 185 (4th Cir. 2009) (applying an 

objective test in a true threat analysis); Porter v. 

Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 616–

17 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[T]o lose the protection of 

the First Amendment and be lawfully punished, 

the threat must be intentionally or knowingly

communicated to either the object of the threat 

or a third person.”); United States v. Zavrel, 384 

F.3d 130, 136 (3d Cir. 2004) (applying an 

objective test in a true threat analysis).

Mabie, 663 F.3d at 332.

Case: 12-3798 Document: 003111393034 Page: 19 Date Filed: 09/19/2013
20

hyperbole” because “any such statements will, under the 

objective test, always be protected by the consideration of the 

context and of how a reasonable recipient would understand 

the statement.” Id. at 509.7

In United States v. Jeffries the Sixth Circuit agreed that

Black does not require a subjective intent to threaten to 

convict under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). 692 F.3d at 479. Because

Black interpreted a statute that already had a subjective intent 

requirement, the Sixth Circuit found the Court was not 

presented with the question whether an objective intent

standard is constitutional. Id. Jeffries also found that the 

Court’s ruling on the prima facie evidence provision did not 

address the specific intent question because “the statute 

lacked any standard at all.” Id. at 479-80. Like the Fourth 

Circuit in White, the Sixth Circuit explained that the prima 

facie evidence provision failed to distinguish between 

protected speech and threats by not allowing for consideration 

of any contextual factors. Id. at 480. In contrast, “[t]he 

reasonable-person standard winnows out protected speech 

because, instead of ignoring context, it forces jurors to 

examine the circumstances in which a statement is made.” Id. 

The Ninth Circuit took a different view, and found the 

true threats definition in Black requires the speaker both 

intend to communicate and “intend for his language to 

threaten the victim.” United States v. Cassel, 408 F.3d 622, 

631 (9th Cir. 2005). The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the 

unconstitutionality of the prima facie provision meant that the 

Court required a finding of intent to threaten for all speech 

 7 The Fourth Circuit test focuses on the reasonable recipient, 

but our test asks whether a reasonable speaker would foresee 

the statement would be understood as a threat. 

Case: 12-3798 Document: 003111393034 Page: 20 Date Filed: 09/19/2013
21

labeled as “true threats,” and not just cross burning. Id. at 

631-32 (“[T]he prima facie evidence provision rendered the 

statute facially unconstitutional because it effectively 

eliminated the intent requirement.”). “We are therefore 

bound to conclude that speech may be deemed unprotected by 

the First Amendment as a ‘true threat’ only upon proof that 

the speaker subjectively intended the speech as a threat.” Id. 

at 633.8

Regardless of the state of the law in the Ninth Circuit, 

we find that Black does not alter our precedent. We agree 

with the Fourth Circuit that Black does not clearly overturn 

the objective test the majority of circuits applied to § 875(c). 

Black does not say that the true threats exception requires a 

subjective intent to threaten. Furthermore, our standard does 

require a finding of intent to communicate. The jury had to 

find Elonis “knowingly and willfully” transmitted a 

“communication containing . . . [a] threat to injure the person 

of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). A threat is made

“knowingly” as when it is “made intentionally and not [as]

the result of mistake, coercion or duress.” Kosma, 951 F.2d 

at 557 (quotation omitted). A threat is made willfully when 

“a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would 

be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the 

statement as a serious expression of an intention to inflict 

bodily harm.” Id. (citation and emphasis omitted). This 

objective intent standard protects non-threatening speech 

 8 Similarly, in United States v. Bagdasarian the Ninth Circuit 

wrote in dicta that, in light of Black, “[a] statement that the 

speaker does not intend as a threat is afforded constitutional 

protection and cannot be held criminal.” 652 F.3d 1113, 1122

(9th Cir. 2011). 

Case: 12-3798 Document: 003111393034 Page: 21 Date Filed: 09/19/2013
22

while addressing the harm caused by true threats. 

Accordingly, the Kosma objective intent standard applies to 

this case and the District Court did not err in instructing the 

jury.

B.

Elonis contends the indictment was insufficient 

because it did not quote the language of the allegedly 

threatening statements. An indictment “must be a plain, 

concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts 

constituting the offense charged.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1). 

An indictment is sufficient when it “(1) contains the elements 

of the offense intended to be charged, (2) sufficiently apprises 

the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet, and (3) 

allows the defendant to show with accuracy to what extent he 

may plead a former acquittal or conviction in the event of a 

subsequent prosecution.” United States v. Vitillo, 490 F.3d 

314, 321 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal quotations omitted). We 

have found an indictment is sufficient “where it informs the 

defendant of the statute he is charged with violating, lists the 

elements of a violation under the statute, and specifies the 

time period during which the violations occurred.” United 

States v. Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 595 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 

133 S. Ct. 422 (2012). 

In Huet we found an indictment for aiding and abetting 

a felon in possession of a firearm was sufficient because it 

alleged the previous felony conviction of the principal, the 

time period of the violation and the specific weapon involved, 

and alleged the defendant “knowingly aided and abetted

Hall’s possession of that firearm.” Id. at 596. “No more was 

required to allow Huet to prepare her defense and invoke 

double jeopardy.” Id. 

Case: 12-3798 Document: 003111393034 Page: 22 Date Filed: 09/19/2013
23

The Eighth Circuit considered an indictment that did 

not include the verbatim contents of a letter, the date it was 

written, or the name of the author. Keys v. United States, 126 

F.2d 181, 184-85 (8th Cir. 1942). The indictment for 

communicating a threat to injure with the intent to extort 

merely stated the letter threatened to harm the reputation of 

the victim with intent to extort. Id. at 182-83. Since the 

indictment summarized the contents of the letter, provided the 

date it was mailed and the name of the addressee, the Eighth 

Circuit found there could be no confusion as to the elements 

and subject of the crime. Id. at 185 (“The fact that the 

defendant upon reading the indictment recognized the letter 

referred to and made no objection to the description at the 

time indicates the want of merit in his present criticism.”).

To find a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) a defendant 

must transmit in interstate or foreign commerce a 

communication containing a threat to injure or kidnap a 

person. 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). Here the indictment on Count 2

stated:

On or about November 6, 2010, through on or 

about November 15, 2010, in Bethlehem, in the 

Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and elsewhere, 

defendant ANTHONY DOUGLAS ELONIS 

knowingly and willfully transmitted in interstate 

and foreign commerce, via a computer and the 

Internet, a communication to others, that is, a 

communication containing a threat to injure the 

person of another, specifically, a threat to injure 

and kill T.E., a person known to the grand jury. 

Case: 12-3798 Document: 003111393034 Page: 23 Date Filed: 09/19/2013
24

In violation of Title 18, United States Code, 

Section 875(c).

The indictment on the other counts was identical, but stated 

each date of the threat, the nature of the threat, and the 

subjects of the threat. Count 3 alleged “a threat to injure 

employees of the Pennsylvania State Police and the Berks 

County Sheriff’s Department”; Count 4 alleged “a threat to 

injure a kindergarten class of elementary school children”; 

and Count 5 alleged “a threat to injure an agent of the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation.” Elonis contends the indictment was 

deficient because they did not include the allegedly 

threatening statements.

The indictment was sufficient because the counts 

describe the elements of the violation, the nature of the threat, 

the subject of the threat, and the time period of the alleged 

violation. For example, Count Four alleged defendant 

communicated over the internet on November 16, 2010 “a 

threat to injure a kindergarten class.” If Elonis had already 

been charged with this statement, the indictment provided

enough information to challenge a subsequent prosecution. 

Based on the indictment, defendant was notified he needed to 

dispute that the statement was a threat, that he communicated 

the statement, and that he transmitted the statement through 

interstate commerce. Moreover, like the defendant in Keys, 

Elonis was able to identify which internet communications 

the indictment described, since he did not raise the issue until 

after trial.9

 9 Elonis did challenge the sufficiency of the indictment prior 

to trial, but only on constitutional grounds. The indictment 

did not include a subjective intent to threaten. 

Case: 12-3798 Document: 003111393034 Page: 24 Date Filed: 09/19/2013
25

C.

Elonis contends there was insufficient evidence to 

convict on Counts 3 and 5 of the indictment because the 

statements on which they were based were not threats. “A 

claim of insufficiency of evidence places a very heavy burden 

on the appellant.” United States v. Coyle, 63 F.3d 1239, 1243 

(3d Cir. 1995). “[T]he relevant question is whether, after 

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the 

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis 

omitted).

1.

Elonis contends Count 3 was based on a conditional 

statement, which he asserts cannot be a true threat. In Watts

the Supreme Court found the conditional nature of 

defendant’s statement to be one of the three factors 

demonstrating it was not a true threat. Watts, 394 U.S. at 708 

(“Taken in context, and regarding the expressly conditional 

nature of the statement and the reaction of the listeners, we do 

not see how it could be interpreted otherwise.”). Elonis

posted the following on his Facebook page:

Fold up your PFA and put it in your pocket

Is it thick enough to stop a bullet?

Try to enforce an Order

That was improperly granted in the first place

Me thinks the judge needs an education on true 

threat jurisprudence

Case: 12-3798 Document: 003111393034 Page: 25 Date Filed: 09/19/2013
26

And prison time will add zeroes to my 

settlement

Which you won’t see a lick

Because you suck dog dick in front of children

****

And if worse comes to worse

I’ve got enough explosives

to take care of the state police and the sheriff’s 

department

[link: Freedom of Speech, www.wikipedia.org]

We considered the impact of conditional statements on 

the true threat analysis in Kosma, 951 F.2d at 554. We found 

that Watts did not hold conditional statements can never be 

true threats. Id. at 554 n.8 (“Even if Kosma’s threats were 

truly conditional, they could still be considered true threats.”). 

We explained the conditional statements in Watts “were 

dependent on the defendant’s induction into the armed 

forces—a condition which the defendant stated would never 

happen.” Id. at 554. Because the defendant’s threats in 

Kosma stated a precise time and place for carrying out the 

alleged threats, they were true threats. Id.

Here the District Court found that a reasonable jury 

could find the statement to be a true threat. United States v. 

Elonis, 897 F. Supp. 2d 335, 346 (E.D. Pa. 2012). Unlike in 

Watts, Elonis did not vow the condition precedent would 

never occur. However, this case is also unlike Kosma, where 

the statement included a particular time and place. Elonis’s 

statement only conveys a vague timeline or condition. But, 

taken as a whole, a jury could have found defendant was 

threatening to use explosives on officers who “[t]ry to enforce 

an Order” of protection that was granted to his wife. Since 

Case: 12-3798 Document: 003111393034 Page: 26 Date Filed: 09/19/2013
27

there is no rule that a conditional statement cannot be a true 

threat—the words and context can demonstrate whether the 

statement was a serious expression of intent to harm—and we 

give substantial deference to a jury’s verdict, there was not 

insufficient evidence for the jury to find the statement was a 

threat. 

2.

Defendant contends that the statement on which Count 

5 is based is a description of past conduct, not a future intent 

to harm: 

You know your shit’s ridiculous

when you have the FBI knockin’ at yo’ door

Little Agent Lady stood so close

Took all the strength I had not to turn the bitch 

ghost

Pull my knife, flick my wrist, and slit her throat

Leave her bleedin’ from her jugular in the arms 

of her partner

[laughter]

So the next time you knock, you best be serving 

a warrant

And bring yo’ SWAT and an explosives expert 

while you’re at it

Cause little did y’all know, I was strapped wit’

a bomb

Why do you think it took me so long to get 

dressed with no shoes on?

Case: 12-3798 Document: 003111393034 Page: 27 Date Filed: 09/19/2013
28

I was jus’ waitin’ for y’all to handcuff me and 

pat me down

Touch the detonator in my pocket and we’re all 

goin’

[BOOM!]

A threat under § 875(c) is a communication 

“expressing an intent to inflict injury in the present or future.” 

United States v. Stock, No. 12-2914, slip op. at 13 (3d Cir. 

Aug. 26, 2013). It was possible for a reasonable jury to 

conclude that the statement “the next time you knock, best be 

serving a warrant [a]nd bring yo’ SWAT and an explosives 

expert” coupled with the past reference to a bomb was a 

threat to use explosives against the agents “the next time.” 

Indeed, the phrase “the next time” refers to the future, not a 

past event. Accordingly, a reasonable jury could have found 

the statement was a true threat. 

D.

Elonis contends the jury instruction stating 

communications that travel over the internet necessarily travel 

in interstate commerce violated his due process rights because 

the government was required to prove interstate transmission 

as an element of the crime. The District Court instructed the 

jury: “Because of the interstate nature of the Internet, if you 

find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant used the 

Internet in communicating a threat, then that communication 

traveled in interstate commerce.” Trial Tr. 126, Oct. 11, 2011. 

In United States v. MacEwan we explained the 

difference between interstate transmission and interstate 

Case: 12-3798 Document: 003111393034 Page: 28 Date Filed: 09/19/2013
29

commerce. 445 F.3d 237, 243-44 (3d Cir. 2006). The 

defendant in MacEwan contended the government failed to 

prove he received child pornography through interstate 

commerce because a Comcast witness testified it was 

impossible to know whether a particular transmission traveled 

through computer servers located entirely within 

Pennsylvania, or to any other server in the United States. Id. 

at 241-42. “[W]e conclude[d] that because of the very 

interstate nature of the Internet, once a user submits a 

connection request to a website server or an image is 

transmitted from the website server back to [the] user, the 

data has traveled in interstate commerce.” Id. at 244. 

“Having concluded that the Internet is an instrumentality and

channel of interstate commerce . . . . [i]t is sufficient that 

MacEwan downloaded those images from the Internet, a 

system that is inexorably intertwined with interstate 

commerce.” Id. at 245.

Elonis distinguishes MacEwan by stating that in that 

case the government presented evidence on how the internet 

worked. But the government’s evidence in MacEwan did not 

show that any one of the defendant’s internet transmissions 

traveled outside of Pennsylvania.10 We found that fact to be 

irrelevant to the question of interstate commerce because 

submitting data on the internet necessarily means the data 

travels in interstate commerce. Id. at 241. Instead, we held 

 10 Notably, the government did present testimony on how 

Facebook works. A computer forensic expert, Michael 

Moore, testified about privacy settings and that when a 

Facebook account is made public the postings can be seen by 

“whoever has access to it through the internet throughout the 

world.” Trial Tr. 15-17, Oct. 17, 2011. 

Case: 12-3798 Document: 003111393034 Page: 29 Date Filed: 09/19/2013
30

“[i]t is sufficient that [the defendant] downloaded those 

images from the Internet.” Id. at 245. Based on our 

conclusion that proving internet transmission alone is 

sufficient to prove transmission through interstate commerce, 

the District Court did not err in instructing the jury.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons we will uphold Elonis’s 

convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).

Case: 12-3798 Document: 003111393034 Page: 30 Date Filed: 09/19/2013