Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-11-10029/USCOURTS-ca9-11-10029-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Victor Manuel Reza-Ramos
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

VICTOR MANUEL REZA-RAMOS,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 11-10029

D.C. No.

4:06-cr-01142-

FRZ-GEE-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Frank R. Zapata, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 11, 2013

Submission Vacated November 25, 2013

Resubmitted March 2, 2016

San Francisco, California

Filed March 9, 2016

Before: J. Clifford Wallace, M. Margaret McKeown,

and Sandra S. Ikuta, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Ikuta

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2 UNITED STATES V. REZA-RAMOS

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed in part and vacated in part a criminal

judgment, and remanded, in a case in which a non-Indian was

convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1111, the federal murder statute,

for a murder on the Tohono O’odham Indian reservation.

The panel held that § 1111 was applicable to the

defendant under the Indian General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C.

§ 1152, which (among other things) makes federal criminal

law applicable in federal enclaves when the defendant is a

non-Indian and the victim is an Indian. The panel held that

the government had the burden of proving beyond a

reasonable doubt that the victim was an Indian, a

jurisdictional element in this case, and that the government

adduced sufficient evidence to establish both prongs of the

Indian status test. 

The panel also held that the evidence introduced at trial,

taken in the light most favorable to the government, was

sufficient to establish that Reza-Ramos acted with

premeditation. The panel therefore affirmed the defendant’s

conviction for first degree premeditated murder.

The panel vacated the defendant’s conviction for felony

murder because the district court erred in defining the term

“burglary” in § 1111 by reference under the Assimilated

Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13, to Arizona’s third-degree

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. REZA-RAMOS 3

burglary statute. The panel concluded that this error was not

harmless because burglary, in the context of § 1111, is

defined as the breaking and entering into a building or other

structure with intent to commit a crime, and the government

did not produce overwhelming evidence of a breaking.

COUNSEL

Jon M. Sands, Federal Public Defender, and M. Edith

Cunningham (argued), Assistant Federal Public Defender,

Tucson, Arizona, for Defendant-Appellant.

John S. Leonardo, United States Attorney, and Bruce M. Ferg

(argued), Assistant United States Attorney, Tucson, Arizona,

for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

IKUTA, Circuit Judge:

Victor Reza-Ramos, a non-Indian, appeals from his

judgment of conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1111, the federal

murder statute, following his jury trial for the murder of Jose

Flores on the Tohono O’odham Indian reservation in Arizona. 

We conclude that § 1111 was applicable to Reza-Ramos

under the Indian General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152,

which (among other things) makes federal criminal law

applicable in federal enclaves when the defendant is a nonIndian and the victim is an Indian, because the government

adduced sufficient evidence to establish that Flores was an

Indian. We also hold that the evidence introduced at trial,

taken in the light most favorable to the government, was

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4 UNITED STATES V. REZA-RAMOS

sufficient to establish that Reza-Ramos acted with

premeditation. We therefore affirmReza-Ramos’s conviction

for first degree premeditated murder.1 Nevertheless, we

vacate Reza-Ramos’s conviction for felony murder, because

the district court erred in defining the term “burglary” in

§ 1111 by reference to Arizona’s third-degree burglary

statute, and this error was not harmless.

I

The Kisto Ranch is located on the Tohono O’odham

Indian reservation near Sells, Arizona. Fred Narcho, nephew

of the ranch’s deceased owner, hired Jose Flores to take care

of the ranch after the owner died. The ranch contained

several structures, including the ranch house and a separate

carport with walls and doors made of sticks extending from

the ground to the roof, held together by horizontal supports. 

A black truck was parked in the carport.

Narcho and Flores planned to spend March 25, 2003,

branding cattle. On March 24, Flores mentioned over the

phone to Narcho that he had a Mexican visitor at the ranch. 

When Narcho arrived at the ranch on the morning of March

25, Flores was not waiting for him at the corral or the shop. 

Narcho tried the ranch house, but it was locked. Narcho

noticed blood on the ground, a bloody rock, and drag marks

leading over the end of a hill to a shallow ravine. There

Narcho found Flores’s battered, bloody corpse with three big

rocks on his chest and one on his face, and a bloody sweater

next to him. His face and head were “all smashed up.”

1 We reject Reza-Ramos’s remaining arguments in a memorandum

disposition filed concurrently with this opinion. See United States v.

Reza-Ramos, ___ Fed App’x ___ (2016).

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UNITED STATES V. REZA-RAMOS 5

Narcho notified the police, who arrived and started their

investigation. The investigators discovered two beds in the

ranch house and both appeared to have been used. They later

learned that Flores slept in the bedroom on the west end of

the ranch house, which adjoined a living room containing a

fireplace.

Outside, at the northwest corner of the house, the

investigators discovered a scuffle area. Within that area,

police found a baseball cap with blood spatter, blood stains

on the house and in the dirt, drag marks, and a metal scoop

end of a broken fireplace shovel.

Investigators followed the drag marks down a hill into a

shallow ravine, where Flores’s body lay. Investigators found

a bloody iron bar, later determined to be the handle of the

fireplace shovel, on Flores’s chest. A forensic analysis

revealed hairs on the broken end of the shovel. An autopsy

would later show that Flores died of “blunt force injuries to

the head” consistent with a beating from the rock or the

shovel handle. The injuries were caused by 60 separate

strikes to the head and torso. Blood evidence around the

body was consistent with the killer kneeling next to Flores

while striking him.

Inside the carport, the police found the black truck. One

of the truck’s windows was broken and there were blood

stains on the exterior and interior of the truck on the driver’s

side and on the steering wheel. The police also found

fingerprints on the truck that did not belong to Flores. On

some shelves next to the truck, investigators found bloodstained clothing covered up by a blanket. Police also found

blood stains on nearby tools, including a broken knife handle,

knife blade, hammer, and vice grips.

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6 UNITED STATES V. REZA-RAMOS

In January 2004, a Mexican citizen, Victor Manuel RezaRamos, was arrested in Mesa for simple drug possession. His

prints were taken and entered into the database. In the spring

of 2004, these prints were matched to prints taken at the scene

of Flores’s murder.

In 2006, federal prosecutors charged Reza-Ramos with

first-degree premeditated murder and felony murder. 

Because the murder occurred on an Indian reservation, the

indictment cited 18 U.S.C. §§ 13(a), 1111(a), 1151, and 1152. 

Section 1111(a) is the federal murder statute which

criminalizes, among other things, “the unlawful killing of a

human being with malice aforethought,” including any

“willful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated killing.” It

also criminalizes felony murder, which is any murder

“committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate,

any arson, escape, murder, kidnapping, treason, espionage,

sabotage, aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse, child

abuse, burglary, or robbery.” Id.2 Sections 1151 and 1152

 

2

 18 USC § 1111(a) states in full:

(a) Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being

with malice aforethought. Every murder perpetrated by

poison, lying in wait, or any other kind of willful,

deliberate, malicious, and premeditated killing; or

committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to

perpetrate, any arson, escape, murder, kidnapping,

treason, espionage, sabotage, aggravated sexual abuse

or sexual abuse, child abuse, burglary, or robbery; or

perpetrated as part of a pattern or practice of assault or

torture against a child or children; or perpetrated from

a premeditated design unlawfully and maliciously to

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UNITED STATES V. REZA-RAMOS 7

make § 1111 applicable on an Indian reservation. Section

1152 provides that “the general laws of the United States as

to the punishment of offenses committed in any place within

the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States . . .

shall extend to the Indian country,” and § 1151 defines

“Indian country” as including “all land within the limits of

any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United

States Government.”3 Finally, 18 U.S.C. § 13, the

effect the death of any human being other than him who

is killed, is murder in the first degree.

Any other murder is murder in the second degree.

 

3

 18 U.S.C. § 1152 provides:

Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the

general laws of the United States as to the punishment

of offenses committed in any place within the sole and

exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, except the

District ofColumbia, shall extend to the Indian country.

This section shall not extend to offenses committed by

one Indian against the person or property of another

Indian, nor to any Indian committing any offense in the

Indian country who has been punished by the local law

of the tribe, or to any case where, by treaty stipulations,

the exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses is or may

be secured to the Indian tribes respectively.

18 U.S.C. § 1151 provides, in pertinent part:

Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and

1156 of this title, the term “Indian country”, as used in

this chapter, means (a) all land within the limits of any

Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United

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8 UNITED STATES V. REZA-RAMOS

Assimilated Crimes Act (“ACA”), allows the government to

apply state law in a federal enclave under certain

circumstances. Specifically, a person who “is guilty of any

act or omission which, although not made punishable by any

enactment of Congress, would be punishable if committed or

omitted within the jurisdiction of the State . . . in which such

place is situated, by the laws thereof in force at the time of

such act or omission, shall be guilty of a like offense and

subject to a like punishment.” 18 U.S.C. § 13(a).4

The indictment alleged that Reza-Ramos “intentionally

kill[ed] and murder[ed]Jose Flores, an Indian, by beating him

to death.” The government proposed four alternative theories

of first degree murder. First, the indictment alleged that

Reza-Ramos committed murder with premeditation and

malice aforethought. Second, the indictment alleged three

alternative felony murder theories, that Reza-Ramos

States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any

patent, and, including rights-of-way running through

the reservation . . . .

 

4

 18 U.S.C. § 13(a) provides in full:

(a) Whoever within or upon any of the places now

existing or hereafter reserved or acquired as provided in

section 7 of this title, or on, above, or below any

portion of the territorial sea of the United States not

within the jurisdiction of any State, Commonwealth,

territory, possession, or district is guilty of any act or

omission which, although not made punishable by any

enactment of Congress, would be punishable if

committed or omitted within the jurisdiction of the

State, Territory, Possession, or District in which such

place is situated, by the laws thereof in force at the time

of such act or omission, shall be guilty of a like offense

and subject to a like punishment.

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UNITED STATES V. REZA-RAMOS 9

committed murder: (1) “during the attempt to perpetrate the

robbery of Jose Flores of a Chevrolet Silverado truck, a

felony, in violation of [Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.] §§ 13-1001,

1902;” (2) during “the perpetration of the burglary of a

nonresidential structure with the intent to commit the felony

of robbery of a Chevrolet Silverado truck, a felony, in

violation of [Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.] § 13-15[06](A); and

(3) during “the perpetration of the burglary of a

nonresidential structure with intent to commit the felony of

theft of property” in violation of [Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.] § 13-

1506(A).5 The state statutes define attempted robbery, § 13-

1001 (defining attempt); 13-1902 (defining robbery); and

burglary, § 13-1506(A) (defining third degree burglary as the

“[e]ntering or remaining unlawfully in or on a nonresidential

structure or in a fenced commercial or residential yard with

the intent to commit any theft or any felony therein.”).

At trial, the government presented an exhibit showing

Flores’s death certificate, listing Flores’s race as “4/4 Tohono

O’odham.” The government also introduced the medical

examiner’s report from the scene of the murder, which

described Flores as “Native American.” One of the

government’s witnesses, RoseMarie Savala, testified that she

had a “relationship” with Flores from 1998 until his death,

and that Flores was a member of the Tohono O’odham

tribe. Narcho, who hired Flores to take care of the Kisto

Ranch, testified that Flores lived and worked on the

Tohono O’odham reservation in Arizona, and spoke in

Tohono O’odham.

5 The indictment lists both Arizona Revised Statute § 13-1560(A) and

§ 13-1506(A) in regard to the burglary predicate offenses. There is no

Arizona Revised Statute § 13-1560(A), so we assume it was a scrivener’s

error.

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10 UNITED STATES V. REZA-RAMOS

At the close of the government’s case, Reza-Ramos

moved for a judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 29, arguing insufficiency of the evidence of both

first degree premeditated murder and felony murder. RezaRamos also argued that the indictment improperly charged

him with felony murder premised on the Arizona offense of

burglary of a non-residential structure. The district court

denied the motion. Reza-Ramos unsuccessfully renewed the

motion after the defense rested and after the verdict.

The jury instructions stated that to convict Reza-Ramos,

the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

“Jose L. Flores was an Indian.” The jury instructions on

“burglary” stated:

In order for you to find that the defendant

committed a burglary with intent to commit

theft, the government must prove each of the

following elements beyond a reasonable

doubt:

The defendant entered, or remained

unlawfully, in or on a nonresidential structure

or in a fenced commercial or residential yard,

and

The defendant entered or remained

unlawfully with the intent to commit any

theft; and

This unlawful or unprivileged entry

occurred on the Tohono O’odham Indian

reservation within the district of Arizona.

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UNITED STATES V. REZA-RAMOS 11

“Nonresidential structure” means any

structure other than a residential structure and

includes a retail establishment.6

The jury convicted Reza-Ramos of premeditated murder,

felony murder premised upon commission of burglary with

intent to commit theft, and felony murder premised upon

commission of burglary with intent to commit robbery, all as

charged in the indictment. The jury acquitted Reza-Ramos of

felony murder premised upon commission of a robbery. This

timely appeal followed. We have jurisdiction to review the

district court’s final judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II

We first consider Reza-Ramos’s challenge to his

conviction for first degree premeditated and felony murder

under 18 U.S.C. § 1111 on the ground that the evidence was

insufficient to establish that this statute is applicable to his

conduct. According to Reza-Ramos, § 1111 does not apply

to him under § 1152 unless Flores is an Indian. Further,

Reza-Ramos claims that the government has the obligation of

proving Flores’s Indian status and there was insufficient

evidence to prove this element here. In considering a

sufficiency of the evidence claim, we must uphold the jury’s

verdict unless, viewing the evidence “in the light most

favorable to the prosecution,” no “rational trier of fact could

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.” United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158,

6 The instructions for felony murder premised upon the alleged

commission of the crime of burglary with intent to commit robbery are

substantially the same.

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12 UNITED STATES V. REZA-RAMOS

1161 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307, 319 (1979)).

A

We first address a question of first impression: when the

government charges a defendant with a federal crime made

applicable to Indian country under the Indian General Crimes

Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152, does the government or the defendant

have the burden of proving that the victim of the crime is an

Indian or non-Indian? We review questions of law de novo,

United States v. Bynum, 327 F.3d 986, 992 (9th Cir. 2003),

and conclude that because the victim’s Indian status here is a

jurisdictional element, the burden is on the government.

Section 1152 provides that, in general, federal criminal

laws “extend to the Indian country.” But this rule has both a

statutory and judicial exception.

First, the statute itself provides an exception: “This

section shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian

against the person or property of another Indian.” In other

words, by its terms, § 1152 does not apply where both the

perpetrator and victim of the crime are Indians. The purpose

of this exception is to ensure “that federal criminal laws

reached non-Indians committing crimes in Indian country,

while at the same time preserving the right of the tribes to

punish their own.” United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215,

1219 (9th Cir. 2005).

There is also a judge-made exception to the rule that

federal criminal law applies in Indian country. In United

States v. McBratney, the Supreme Court considered the

applicability of § 1152 to a case where both the perpetrator

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UNITED STATES V. REZA-RAMOS 13

and the victim were non-Indians, but the act at issue occurred

on an Indian Ute reservation in Colorado. 104 U.S. 621

(1881). The Court reasoned that because Colorado had been

admitted into the Union “upon an equal footing with the

original States,” Colorado “acquired criminal jurisdiction

over its own citizens and other white persons throughout the

whole of the territory within its limits, including the Ute

Reservation, and that reservation is no longer within the sole

and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.” Id. at 624.

Given Colorado’s exclusive criminal jurisdiction over nonIndians, the Court concluded that federal courts had “no

jurisdiction to punish crimes within that reservation” of

“offences committed by white men against white men,”

although federal courts did have jurisdiction “to carry out

such provisions of the treaty with the Ute Indians as remain

in force.” Id.

In sum, when McBratney is read together with the

exception in § 1152, the general laws of the United States

extend to Indian country under § 1152 only when an Indian

perpetrator commits a crime against a non-Indian victim, or

a non-Indian perpetrator commits a crime against an Indian

victim. See Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1221.

The burden of proving the applicability of the statutory

exception in § 1152 is on the defendant, United States v.

Hester, 719 F.2d 1041, 1042–43 (9th Cir. 1983), because it is

in the nature of an affirmative defense, Bruce, 394 F.3d at

1223. As a general rule, the government does not have to

“allege the non-applicability of an exception” written into a

statute when charging a defendant under that statute. Hester,

719 F.2d at 1042–43; see also McKelvey v. United States,

260 U.S. 353, 357 (1922) (“[A]n indictment . . . need not

negative the matter of an exception made by a proviso or

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14 UNITED STATES V. REZA-RAMOS

other distinct clause . . . . ”). Rather, the defendant must

come forward with sufficient evidence regarding the

applicability of the statutory exception to permit the finder of

fact to decide the issue in the defendant’s favor. See Bruce,

394 F.3d at 1222–23. Nevertheless, “the government retains

the ultimate burden of persuasion—or ‘the obligation to

persuade the trier of fact of the truth of [the] proposition’ . . .

—that the exception [the defendant] claims is inapplicable.” 

Id. at 1223. Applying this rule, we have held that where the

government alleges that the victims are Indians, the

government has no obligation to plead and prove the

defendant’s non-Indian status under § 1152. Hester, 719 F.2d

at 1043. Instead, the defendant has the burden of production

on this issue. Id. The result makes practical sense because

where the government alleges that the victim is an Indian,

“[i]t is far more manageable for the defendant to shoulder the

burden of producing evidence that [the defendant] is a

member of a federally recognized tribe than it is for the

Government to produce evidence that [the defendant] is not

a member of any one of the hundreds of such tribes.” Id.

By contrast, the judicial exception is jurisdictional. Thus,

“the government must prove the jurisdictional element in a

federal criminal statute beyond a reasonable doubt, like any

other element of the offense,” United States v. Gomez,

87 F.3d 1093, 1096–97 (9th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, the

government has the burden of proving that the McBratney

exception to federal court jurisdiction under § 1152 is not

applicable.

In this case, it is undisputed that Reza-Ramos is a nonIndian. Because Arizona was admitted into the Union upon

an equal footing with the original states, California ex rel.

State Lands Comm’n v. United States, 457 U.S. 273, 281 n.9

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UNITED STATES V. REZA-RAMOS 15

(1982), Arizona courts have jurisdiction over criminal cases

involving two non-Indians, even if the criminal conduct

occurs on an Indian reservation. McBratney, 104 U.S. at 624. 

Therefore, unless Flores is an Indian, the general laws of the

United States would not be applicable to Reza-Ramos’s

offense and a federal court would have no jurisdiction to hear

this case. Id. Because the district court’s jurisdiction hinges

on Flores’s status, the government has the burden of proving

this element. Gomez, 87 F.3d at 1096–97.

We therefore conclude that the government had the

burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Flores was

an Indian.

B

Given this conclusion, we now turn to Reza-Ramos’s

argument that the government failed to carry its burden of

proving Flores was an Indian. Proof of Indian status requires:

“(1) proof of some quantum of Indian blood, whether or not

that blood derives from a member of a federally recognized

tribe, and (2) proof of membership in, or affiliation with, a

federally recognized tribe.” United States v. Zepeda,

792 F.3d 1103, 1113 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc). Although

Zepeda involved the applicability of § 1153, “the same test

applies to the determination of Indian status” under both

§ 1153 and § 1152. United States v. Cruz, 554 F.3d 840, 845

(9th Cir. 2009).

The first prong of the Indian status test, proof of some

quantum of Indian blood, “requires ancestry living in

America before the Europeans arrived, but this fact is

obviously rarely provable as such.” Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1223. 

As a result, “evidence of a parent, grandparent, or great-

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16 UNITED STATES V. REZA-RAMOS

grandparent who is clearly identified as an Indian is generally

sufficient to satisfy this prong.” Id. Reliable or undisputed

documentation that a defendant has Indian blood, or

testimony regarding the defendant’s ancestry may meet this

requirement. For instance, in Zepeda, a tribal certificate of

enrollment stating that the defendant “had one-half Indian

blood, with blood from the Pima and Tohono O‘Odham

tribes,” along with testimony from the defendant’s brother

that their father was an Indian, satisfied the first prong. 

792 F.3d at 1115. Similarly, in Bruce, a certificate of Indian

blood confirming that the defendant was one-eighth

Chippewa Indian, along with testimony that the defendant’s

mother and two children were enrolled members of an Indian

tribe, was sufficient evidence of Indian blood. 394 F.3d at

1224.

Here, the evidence presented by the government included

Flores’s death certificate, which stated that his race was “4/4

Tohono O’odham,” testimony that Flores was a Tohono

O’odham tribal member, and a medical examiner’s report

describing Flores as “Native American.” This evidence

meets the first prong of the Indian status test. See id. at

1223–24. The government had no obligation to introduce

additional evidence, such as verification of Flores’s

demographic information, given that the submitted evidence

was undisputed. See Zepeda, 792 F.3d at 1115.

The second prong of the Indian status test “probes

whether the Native American has a sufficient non-racial link

to a formerly sovereign people,” Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1224, by

asking whether “the defendant was a member of, or affiliated

with, a federally recognized tribe at the time of the offense,”

Zepeda, 792 F.3d at 1114. The criteria for such recognition

are, in declining order of importance: (1) enrollment “in a

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UNITED STATES V. REZA-RAMOS 17

federally recognized tribe; (2) government recognition

formally and informally through receipt of assistance

available only to individuals who are members, or are eligible

to become members, of federally recognized tribes;

(3) enjoyment of the benefits of affiliation with a federally

recognized tribe; [and] (4) social recognition as someone

affiliated with a federally recognized tribe through residence

on a reservation and participation in the social life of a

federally recognized tribe.” Id. Because the list of federally

recognized tribes prepared by the Bureau of Indian Affairs

(BIA) is the best evidence of a tribe’s federal recognition, the

question whether a tribe is federally recognized is a question

of law. Id. at 1114–15. The government should “present to

the judge evidence that the tribe was recognized at the time

of the offense,” but the judge may also “consult other

evidence that is judicially noticeable or otherwise appropriate

for consideration.” Id. at 1114.

There is no dispute that the Tohono O’odham Nation of

Arizona is a federally recognized tribe. Rather, Reza-Ramos

disputes that the evidence introduced by the government

established Flores’s membership in the Tohono O’odham

Nation of Arizona and not some unrecognized Tohono

O’odham tribe. Although no tribal membership certificate

was provided, the government presented undisputed

testimony that Flores was a Tohono O’odham tribal member

and that he lived and worked on the Tohono O’odham

reservation in Arizona. This evidence was sufficient for a

reasonable juror to conclude that Flores was a member of the

Tohono O’odham Nation of Arizona. Flores thus met the

most important criteria of “enrollment in a federally

recognized tribe.” Zepeda, 792 F.3d at 1114.

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18 UNITED STATES V. REZA-RAMOS

The testimony adduced at trial also showed that Flores

enjoyed benefits of affiliation with the tribe by living and

working on the reservation, and that he was recognized as a

member of the tribe, the third and fourth criteria. Witnesses

testified that Flores had lived in Sells, Arizona (the capital of

the Tohono O’odham Nation) with his wife before she died

in 1996, and that Flores had lived and worked on the

reservation for five months before his murder. Flores’s death

certificate stated that he was buried at the Fresnal Canyon

Village Cemeteryin Fresnal, Arizona, which is located within

the Tohono O’odham reservation. There was also undisputed

testimony that Flores spoke the tribal language. While there

was evidence that Flores had lived in Tucson before moving

to the Tohono O’odham reservation, and still visited Tucson

regularly, a reasonable juror could conclude that Flores had

social recognition as someone affiliated with a federally

recognized tribe given that he had lived and worked on the

reservation for some time. See United States v. LaBuff,

658 F.3d 873, 878–79 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that the lack

of evidence of participation in tribal activities does not

preclude an inference of social recognition). Although there

was no evidence regarding Flores’s receipt of benefits from

the tribe, receipt of tribal assistance is only one indicia of

tribal affiliation, not a mandatory factor. Accordingly,

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

government, a reasonable juror could conclude that Flores

met the second prong of the Indian status test.

There was sufficient evidence to show Flores met both

prongs of the Indian status test, so we conclude that the

government met its burden of establishing Flores’s Indian

status. Because the victim was an Indian, Arizona did not

have exclusive jurisdiction over the crime, see McBratney,

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UNITED STATES V. REZA-RAMOS 19

104 U.S. at 624, and the government could prosecute RezaRamos under § 1111.

C

Reza-Ramos also argues that the district court erred in

failing to define “Indian” in the jury instructions. Because

Reza-Ramos did not object to the instruction at trial, we

review for plain error. Zepeda, 792 F.3d at 1115. “Plain

error is (1) error, (2) that is plain, (3) that affect[s] substantial

rights, and (4) the error seriously affect[s] the fairness,

integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” 

United States v. Gadson, 763 F.3d 1189, 1203 (9th Cir. 2014)

(internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).

Under Zepeda, the court must instruct the jury both:

(1) “that it has to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the

defendant has some quantum of Indian blood”; and (2) “that

it has to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant

was a member of, or affiliated with, a federally recognized

tribe at the time of the offense.” Zepeda, 792 F.3d at 1114. 

Further, “[i]f the court has found that the tribe of which the

government claims the defendant is a member, or with which

the defendant is affiliated, is federally recognized, it should

inform the jury that the tribe is federally recognized as a

matter of law.” Id. at 1114–15. Although failure to provide

such an instruction is an error, it does not affect the

defendant’s substantial rights where there is “clear and

undisputed evidence that [the defendant] both had Indian

blood and was an enrolled member of a federally recognized

tribe.” Id. at 1115.

Here, the juryinstructions stated only that the government

must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that “Jose L. Flores

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20 UNITED STATES V. REZA-RAMOS

was an Indian,” and did not provide any instruction regarding

the two prongs of the Indian status test. Accordingly, the

court committed an error that is plain. Nevertheless, this

error did not affect Reza-Ramos’s substantial rights because,

as discussed above, “there was clear and undisputed evidence

that [Flores] both had Indian blood and was an enrolled

member of a federally recognized tribe.” Id. Thus, the

court’s jury instruction was not plain error.

III

Because we conclude that the government could charge

Reza-Ramos with murder under § 1111, we address his

additional argument that he could not be convicted of first

degree premeditated murder because no rational trier of fact

could have found that the killing was “deliberate” or

“premeditated” beyond a reasonable doubt. See Nevils,

598 F.3d at 1163–64.

Premeditation is a required element of first-degree

premeditated murder under § 1111(a). See United States v.

Begay, 673 F.3d 1038, 1042 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). The

district court here instructed the jury as follows on the

element of premeditation:

“Premeditation” means with planning or

deliberation, so that the defendant planned or

deliberated about killing Jose L. Flores before

doing so. The amount of time needed for

premeditation of a killing depends on the

person and the circumstances. It must be long

enough, after forming the intent to kill, for the

killer to have been fully conscious of the

intent and to have considered the killing.

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UNITED STATES V. REZA-RAMOS 21

Reza-Ramos does not dispute that this is a correct statement

of the law.

“Premeditation can be proved by circumstantial

evidence.” Id. at 1043. We have noted a range of relevant

circumstantial evidence establishing that a defendant “acted

with planning or deliberation in killing his victims” and that

“there was sufficient time for him to plan or deliberate.” Id.

“Carrying the murder weapon to the scene is strong evidence

of premeditation.” Id. at 1043–44. The defendant need not

carry the weapon over a long distance. See id. (noting that

the jury could reasonably infer evidence of premeditation

from the defendant’s carrying of a gun across a street). 

Evidence that the defendant was not “agitated or rushed”

gives rise to the inference that the defendant “had enough

time to become fully conscious of his intent to kill and to

consider the killing.” Id. at 1044. Multiple strikes with

multiple weapons over a long period of time suggest that the

killing was not rushed. Cooper v. Calderon, 255 F.3d 1104,

1110 & n.5 (9th Cir. 2001). A jury can also reasonably infer

evidence of premeditation from “calculated behavior”

exhibited both before and after the killing, Begay, 673 F.3d

at 1044 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 325), as well as from

“the manner of the killing,” United States v. Free, 841 F.2d

321, 325 (9th Cir. 1988). Finally, lack of evidence presented

at trial to establish a motive on the part of the defendant to

kill the victim does not preclude a reasonable juror from

finding sufficient evidence of premeditation. Begay, 673

F.3d at 1045.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

government, there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable

juror to find that the killing was premeditated. The

government adduced evidence that Reza-Ramos had slept in

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22 UNITED STATES V. REZA-RAMOS

the ranch house, taken a fireplace shovel located inside the

house to an area outside the house, and used it to beat Flores. 

A reasonable juror could infer from the evidence that RezaRamos had selected a weapon and carried it to the site of the

murder. There was also evidence that after Flores had fallen

to the ground, Reza-Ramos kneeled over his body and

repeatedly struck him on the head and torso with both a rock

and the shovel handle, from which a reasonable jury could

infer that the killing was not rushed. Finally, the evidence

was sufficient to show that Reza-Ramos had dragged the

victim’s body into the ravine, partially covered it with rocks,

and concealed blood-stained clothing under a blanket in the

carport. This evidence reasonably supports the inference that

Reza-Ramos engaged in calculated behavior after the killing,

which demonstrates “he was fully capable of committing

premeditated murder.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 325. Because

this evidence shows planning and deliberation, a reasonable

juror could conclude that the killing was premeditated.

Accordingly, and because we reject Reza-Ramos’s

remaining challenges to his conviction of first degree

premeditated murder in the memorandum disposition filed

concurrently herewith, we affirm Reza-Ramos’s conviction

of this charge.

IV

Reza-Ramos also challenges his conviction for first

degree murder on the felony murder theories. The

government argues that because felony murder is merely an

alternative means for proving mens rea, we need not address

Reza-Ramos’s arguments concerning felony murder after we

affirm his conviction for premeditated murder. We disagree.

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UNITED STATES V. REZA-RAMOS 23

Should Reza-Ramos ultimately prevail in vacating his

conviction of first degree premeditated murder (before the

Supreme Court or on collateral review) on the ground that

there was insufficient evidence of premeditation (or some

other ground that is not equally applicable to his conviction

of felonymurder), the government might nevertheless be able

to enforce Reza-Ramos’s conviction for felonymurder, given

that the jury unanimously agreed on this alternative theory.

Cf. Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 56 (1991) (even a

general verdict for a multiple-object conspiracy need not be

set aside merely because the verdict is unsupportable on one

of the alternate grounds and it is not possible to tell which

ground the jury selected); id. at 61 (Blackmun, J., concurring)

(“[T]he Government had two other means of avoiding the

possibility, however remote, that petitioner was convicted on

a theory for which there was insufficient evidence: The

Government either could have charged the two objectives in

separate counts, or agreed to petitioner’s request for special

interrogatories.”); see also Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624,

630–45 (1991) (plurality opinion) (stating that when a state

charges first degree murder as a single crime, the constitution

does not require juries to be unanimous on whether the

government proved the mens rea element under a felonymurder or premeditation theory).

Accordingly, we turn to Reza-Ramos’s arguments that the

district court erred in allowing the jury to convict him for

felonymurder under § 1111 by incorporating Arizona’s thirddegree burglary statute, Arizona Revised Statute § 13-

1506(A), as a predicate felony under the ACA. We review de

novo whether the ACA permits federal prosecution under the

state statute at issue. United States v. Waites, 198 F.3d 1123,

1126 (9th Cir. 2000).

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A

The ACA provides that in federal enclaves, a person who

“is guilty of any act or omission which, although not made

punishable by any enactment of Congress, would be

punishable if committed or omitted within the jurisdiction of

the State . . . in which such place is situated, by the laws

thereof in force at the time of such act or omission, shall be

guilty of a like offense and subject to a like punishment.” 

18 U.S.C. § 13(a). The statute therefore “assimilates into

federal law, and therebymakes applicable on federal enclaves

. . . certain criminal laws of the State in which the enclave is

located.” Lewis v. United States, 523 U.S. 155, 158 (1998). 

“[T]he ACA is . . . made applicable to Indian reservations by

18 U.S.C. § 1152,” United States v. Marcyes, 557 F.2d 1361,

1364 (9th Cir. 1977), and thus is applicable here, where the

alleged crime occurred on the Tohono O’odham reservation.

As we recently explained, see United States v. Rocha,

598 F.3d 1144, 1147–48 (9th Cir. 2010), our analysis of

whether a defendant in a federal enclave can be charged with

violating a state criminal statute under the ACA is guided by

the Supreme Court’s decision in Lewis. In Lewis, a defendant

was charged with violating Louisiana’s first-degree murder

statute for beating and killing a four-year-old girl on a federal

Army base in Louisiana. 523 U.S. at 158. Relying on the

ACA, the government charged the defendant with a violation

of a state first-degree murder statute, which defined first

degree murder to include the killing of a human being with

the “specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm upon

a victim under the age of twelve.” Id. at 158, 167 (internal

quotations and citations omitted).

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UNITED STATES V. REZA-RAMOS 25

The Court concluded that the defendant could not be

charged with a violation of the state law, and it set out a

framework for analyzing the ACA. By its terms, the ACA

applies to acts or omissions “not made punishable by any

enactment of Congress.” 18 U.S.C. § 13(a). However, the

Court concluded that it would be an error to interpret the

phrase “any enactment of Congress” too broadly, because

“[t]he Act would be unable to assimilate even a highly

specific state law aimed directly at a serious, narrowly

defined evil, if the language of any federal statute, however

broad and however clearly aimed at a different kind of harm,

were to cover the defendant’s act.” Id. at 161. Such an

overbroad interpretation would defeat the purpose of the Act,

which is to “fill gaps in the federal criminal law that applies

on federal enclaves,” id. at 160.

Therefore, Lewis articulated a two part test for applying

the ACA to determine whether state criminal law applies in

a federal enclave. Id. at 164; see also Rocha, 598 F.3d at

1148. First, a court must determine whether the defendant’s

act is made punishable by any act of Congress. Lewis,

523 U.S. at 164. If the answer is no, then state law may be

assimilated. Rocha, 598 F.3d at 1148 (quoting Lewis,

523 U.S. at 164).

If a federal law does punish the defendant’s act, the court

must proceed to the second question and determine

Congress’s intent, i.e., “[d]oes applicable federal law indicate

an intent to punish conduct such as the defendant’s to the

exclusion of the particular state statute at issue?” Lewis,

523 U.S. at 166. As we explained in Rocha, “The Court gave

three examples of when a federal enactment precludes

application of a state law: (1) application of the state law

‘would interfere with the achievement of a federal policy’;

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26 UNITED STATES V. REZA-RAMOS

(2) application of the state law ‘would effectively rewrite an

offense definition that Congress carefully considered’; or

(3) the ‘federal statutes reveal an intent to occupy so much of

a field as would exclude use of the particular state statute at

issue.’” 598 F.3d at 1149 (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 164).

Applying this two-part test, Lewis first concluded that the

defendant’s act (the murder of the four-year-old) was

punishable by the federal murder statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1111,

and thus “punishable by any enactment of Congress.” 

523 U.S. at 168. The Court then turned to the second

question: “Does applicable federal law indicate an intent to

punish conduct such as the defendant’s to the exclusion of the

particular state statute at issue?” Id. The Court conceded that

the state statute focused on a narrower and different range of

conduct than § 1111. Id. at 169. Nevertheless, the Court

concluded that given “[t]he complete coverage of the federal

statute over all types of federal enclave murder,” Congress

intended the federal murder statute to preclude application of

Louisiana’s murder statute. Id. In fact, “Congress intended

its statute to cover a particular field—namely, ‘unlawful

killing of a human being with malice aforethought’—as an

integrated whole.” Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Court

rejected the government’s arguments that the state murder

law was a child protection statute that filled a gap in § 1111. 

Id. at 171–72.

Lewis is directly applicable here. The first question is

whether Reza-Ramos’s conduct was made punishable by any

enactment of Congress. It clearly was, because the

government charged Reza-Ramos with murdering Flores

during the commission of a burglary, and this conduct was

punishable as a murder “committed in the perpetration of . . .

burglary” under the federal murder statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1111. 

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UNITED STATES V. REZA-RAMOS 27

Lewis also controls the answer to the second question,

whether applicable federal law indicates an intent to punish

murder to the exclusion of the particular state statute at issue. 

Lewis has already ruled that in enacting § 1111, Congress

intended to preclude application of state statutes, and to

provide complete coverage “over all types of federal enclave

murder.” Id. at 169. Moreover, Lewis held that Congress did

not intend to allow state law to fill any purported “gap” in

§ 1111. Therefore, we conclude that Congress did not intend

to allow Arizona criminal law to fill a “gap” in § 1111, and

the government can convict Reza-Ramos only under § 1111

to the exclusion of state law.

We acknowledge that the issue here is distinguishable

from the situation in Lewis: the defendant in Lewis was

directly charged with a state crime, while here, Reza-Ramos

was charged with federal murder, and the government seeks

to use state law to define one of the terms (“burglary”) in the

federal murder statute. But if anything, this distinction

weighs against assimilating state law here. Where Lewis

raised a question about the interpretation of the ACA, namely

whether the ACA allows the government to charge a

defendant who committed a crime in a federal enclave under

state law, this case raises a completely different question of

statutory interpretation, namely, how should we interpret a

specific term in § 1111. The ACA has no bearing on this

question. And with respect to this statutory interpretation

question, the Supreme Court has been clear: “in the absence

of a plain indication of an intent to incorporate diverse state

laws into a federal criminal statute, the meaning of the federal

statute should not be dependent on state law.” United States

v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 411 (1957); see also Dickerson v.

New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 119–20 (1983) (holding

that absent plain Congressional intent to the contrary, courts

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28 UNITED STATES V. REZA-RAMOS

should not construe federal laws so that their application is

dependent on state law). Rather, when a federal criminal

statute uses an undefined term, a court must determine the

definition of that term through ordinary tools of statutory

construction. See, e.g., Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575

(1990) (construing the term “burglary” for purposes of 18

U.S.C. § 924(e) by reference to legislative intent); Perrin v.

United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42–49 (1979) (construing the

undefined term “bribery” in the federal Travel Act by

applying canons of statutory construction).

We take this approach even when considering the

applicability of state law under the ACA. For instance, in

Rocha, a defendant in a federal correctional facility was

charged with assault in violation of a state statute, assimilated

into federal law by the ACA. 598 F.3d at 1146. Applying the

first part of the Lewis test, we determined that Rocha’s

conduct was made punishable by the federal assault statute. 

Id. at 1148. Because the federal assault statute did not define

assault, we adopted the common law definition and

concluded that it punished the defendant’s wrongful conduct,

and thus the ACA did not properly assimilate the state law. 

Id.; see also United States v. Lewellyn, 481 F.3d 695, 697 (9th

Cir. 2007) (adopting common law definition for assault under

8 U.S.C. § 113). Similarly, in United States v. Lilly, we

defined the “robbery” predicate offense to felony murder

under § 1111 by reference to the federal robbery statute,

which we interpreted in light of common law to include a

specific intent element. 512 F.2d 1259 (9th Cir. 1975).7In

7 We therefore reject the Fourth Circuit’s conclusory and unreasoned

statement that because there is no federal burglary statute, the ACA

incorporates the state law of burglary into § 1111. See United States v.

Scheetz, 293 F.3d 175, 187 (4th Cir. 2002).

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UNITED STATES V. REZA-RAMOS 29

neither case did we look to state law to define a term in the

federal offense.

When Congress intends to define terms in federal criminal

statutes by reference to state law, it does so explicitly. The

Indian Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153, provides a list of

criminal offenses and states that any offense “that is not

defined and punished by Federal law . . . shall be defined and

punished in accordance with the laws of the State in which

such offense was committed.” 18 U.S.C. § 1153(b). 

Applying this language, we determined that where the

defendant’s conduct — the burglary of a private residence —

was not “defined and punished by Federal law,” the offense

had to “be defined and punished” under state law, pursuant to

§ 1153. United States v. Bear, 932 F.2d 1279, 1281 (9th Cir.

1990).

But contrary to the government’s argument, Bear and

other cases interpreting § 1153 are inapposite here because

the ACA does not require the offenses listed in § 1111 to be

“defined” under state law. Rather, the ACA directs courts to

assimilate state statutes only when an act or omission is “not

made punishable by any enactment of Congress.” Because

the language of § 1153 makes clear that Congress knew how

to instruct courts to use state law to define an offense listed in

a state statute, we may infer that Congress did not intend

courts to define “burglary” in § 1111 by reference to state

law.

Because Lewis holds that § 1111 punishes murder in a

federal enclave, including felony murder, and the lack of a

definition for “burglary” in § 1111 does not create a gap that

must be filled by state law, we conclude that the district court

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30 UNITED STATES V. REZA-RAMOS

erred in incorporating the Arizona burglary statute under the

ACA.

B

Although the district court erred in convicting RezaRamos of felony murder predicated on a state crime of

burglary, this error may still be harmless if the jury

instructions included all the elements of burglary as defined

in § 1111, or if there was “overwhelming” and

uncontroverted evidence of any missing element in the

instruction so that no jury could reasonably find that the

government had not proven that element beyond a reasonable

doubt. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 9 (1999). In order

to determine if the error here is harmless under Neder, we

must first determine the elements of burglary under § 1111.

Over the course of some forty years, the Supreme Court

has developed a framework for determining the meaning of

an undefined criminal offense in a federal statute. The Court

first addressed this issue in a series of cases interpreting the

Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952, which (among other things)

makes it unlawful to engage in specified unlawful activities,

defined by the statute to include “extortion, bribery, or arson

in violation of the laws of the State in which committed.” See

Perrin, 444 U.S. 37; United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286

(1969). In these cases, the Court first considered the

legislative history of the act at length, and determined that

Congress’s intent in enacting the Travel Act was to

supplement state authorityand enforcement. Perrin, 444 U.S.

at 42; Nardello, 393 U.S. at 292. In light of this legislative

history, the Court concluded that Congress intended the term

“extortion” in § 1952(b) to refer to a generic offense, and

rejected the argument that Congress intended “extortion” to

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UNITED STATES V. REZA-RAMOS 31

mean only state crimes labeled as such. Nardello, 393 U.S.

at 293–94. The Court then considered the specific offense

terms in the federal act in light of their ordinary meaning at

the time Congress enacted the Travel Act in 1961. Perrin,

444 U.S. at 42–43. Having determined that “by the time the

Travel Act was enacted in 1961, federal and state statutes had

extended the term bribery well beyond its common-law

meaning,” id. at 43, the Court rejected petitioner’s argument

that Congress intended to adopt a narrow common law

meaning, id. at 49; see also Nardello, 393 U.S. at 296 (“In

light of the scope of the congressional purpose we decline to

give the term ‘extortion’ an unnaturally narrow reading.”). 

Instead, the Court held that Congress intended the

contemporary “generic definition” of the offense terms in the

Travel Act, which included bribery and extortion relating to

private individuals as well as public officials. Perrin,

444 U.S. at 49.

The Supreme Court took the same approach in Taylor

when interpreting the term “burglary” in the Armed Career

Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). 495 U.S. 575. 

This section of ACCA (among other things) imposes a

sentencing enhancement on a person convicted of three

violent felonies, and defines the term “violent felony” to

include convictions for burglary, arson, or extortion. 

18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B); see Taylor, 495 U.S. at 578. The

Court again began with a thorough review of the legislative

history of § 924(e). Taylor, 495 U.S. at 581. Based on this

review, the Court discerned that the intent and purpose of the

Act was to supplement the states’ efforts against career

criminals, which included ensuring that “the same type of

conduct is punishable on the Federal level in all cases,” id. at

582 (quoting S. Rep. No. 98–190, at 20 (1983)). Given this

review, the Court rejected the argument that the offense terms

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32 UNITED STATES V. REZA-RAMOS

should be given their narrow common law meaning,

explaining that “[t]he arcane distinctions embedded in the

common-law definition have little relevance to modern law

enforcement concerns.” Id. at 593. The Court declined to

incorporate common law definitions that were “ill suited” to

Congress’s purpose “[i]n the absence of any specific

indication that Congress meant to incorporate” such common

law meanings. Id. at 594. Accordingly, the Court concluded

that Congress “had in mind a modern ‘generic’ view of

burglary, roughly corresponding to the definitions of burglary

in a majority of the States’ criminal codes” at the time of its

enactment in 1984 and reenactment in 1986. Id. at 589. The

Court therefore reviewed the modern statutory definitions of

“burglary” and derived the rule that “a person has been

convicted of burglary for purposes of a § 924(e) enhancement

if he is convicted of any crime, regardless of its exact

definition or label, having the basic elements of unlawful or

unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or

structure, with intent to commit a crime.” Id. at 599.

Therefore, in interpreting a federal statute that references

a criminal offense that is otherwise undefined, a court must

consider legislative history of the act to determine the intent

and purpose of the law. If neither the text nor legislative

history indicates that Congress intended “to incorporate

diverse state laws into a federal criminal statute,” Turley,

352 U.S. at 411, the court should develop “uniform

categorical definitions,” see Taylor, 495 U.S. at 591. Nor

should a court use a narrow common law definition of the

criminal offenses when doing so would be contrary to

Congressional intent. “In the absence of any specific

indication that Congress meant to incorporate” common law

meanings, id. at 594, a court should survey the state law

understanding of the crimes current at the time of the

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UNITED STATES V. REZA-RAMOS 33

enactment (or reenactment) of the federal statute, and derive

from that review a generic definition of the offense.

C

We now apply these principles to our analysis of the word

“burglary” in § 1111, which defines “murder in the first

degree” to include murder “in the perpetration of . . .

burglary.” The term “burglary” is not defined in the statute,

so we turn to the legislative history. The original federal

murder statute was enacted in the Act of March 4, 1909, as

section 273. The purpose of the act was to codify, revise, and

amend all the laws of the United States. Act of March 4,

1909, Pub. L. No. 60-350, ch. 321, 35 Stat. 1088 (preamble). 

The codification of federal criminal law was a

“comprehensive effort” which included expanding the scope

of some crimes and adding new federal laws, some of which

were explained by reference to state law. John L. McClellan,

Codification, Reform, and Revision: The Challenge of a

Modern Federal Criminal Code, 1971 Duke L. J. 663, 677,

679. This “clear and systematic compilation” was intended

to become “the original and authoritative law of the land,”

covering “the whole field of common law and statutory

crime.” Id. at 678 (internal quotations omitted).

As we have previously explained, the federal murder

statute (originally § 273, now § 1111) “was passed by

Congress to ‘enlarge the common law definition’ of murder.” 

United States v. Spencer, 839 F.2d 1341, 1343 (9th Cir. 1988)

(quoting Special Joint Comm. on the Revision of the Laws,

Revision and Codification of the Laws, Etc., H.R. Rep. No.

2, 60th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 24 (1908)). “The enlarged

§ [273] definition was ‘similar in terms to the statutes

defining murder in a large majority of States.’” Id. Section

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34 UNITED STATES V. REZA-RAMOS

273 was codified without change in 1946 as 18 U.S.C. § 452

(1946).

In 1948 there was a second major revision to the federal

criminal code. McClellan, 1971 Duke L. J. at 683. Despite

extensive changes to other sections of the code, § 452

(formally § 273) was reenacted without change as part of

§ 1111. The Reviser’s Notes to the 1948 revision do not

indicate any intention to change the meaning of “burglary” in

§ 1111. See H.R. Rep. No. 304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., at

A89–90 (1947).8

We conclude that Congress’s intent in enacting § 273

(now § 1111) was to modernize and make uniform the federal

criminal law with respect to murder. Given this goal, and

legislative history indicating that the proposed murder statute

enlarged the common law, there is no “specific indication that

Congress meant to incorporate” common law meanings into

§ 1111. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 594. We therefore conclude that

Congress did not use a narrow common law definition of the

predicate offenses in § 1111.

Based on this analysis, we must survey the state law

understanding of burglary in 1909, when the law was

8

Indeed, during a Congressional hearing by the Subcommittee of the

Committee on the Judiciary on June 5, 1946, one Congressman asked a

member ofWest PublishingCompany, who worked on the bill recodifying

the criminal code, “What is the difference between what [§ 1111 in this]

bill will be when it is enacted into law and what it is now?” Hearing on

H.R. 2200 Before the Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 79th

Cong. 12 (June 5, 1946). The West representative responded: “We did not

change the Homicide Statute at all.” Id.

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UNITED STATES V. REZA-RAMOS 35

enacted.9 As explained in Taylor, the common-law definition

of “burglary” is “a breaking and entering of a dwelling at

night with intent to commit a felony.” Taylor, 495 U.S. at

576. Based on our review, by 1909 a majority of states had

expanded this common law definition by statute. Although

most relevant state statutes did retain the element of breaking,

i.e., forced entry, see e.g., Ala. Code § 6415 (1907); Del. Rev.

Stat. § 4727 (1915); Kan. Gen. Stat. § 2549 (1910), a majority

of state statutes in 1909 either eliminated the element of

nighttime entry in defining the crime of burglary and

specified that the act could occur at any time, see e.g., Ind.

Stat. Ann. § 2264 (1908); Miss. Code Ann. § 1066 (1906);

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5819 (1910), established different levels of

culpability if the act took place during the day or night, see

e.g., W. Va. Code Ann. § 5202 (1914); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 6634

(1920), or were silent on the applicable time frame, see e.g.,

Cal. Penal Code § 459 (1909); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 3281 (1915). 

Many of the relevant state statutes did not limit burglary to

entry into a dwelling, but rather included a list of enumerated

buildings that would qualify. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann.

§ 1603 (1904); Cal. Penal Code § 459 (1909); Ill. Rev. Stat.,

ch. 38, § 36 (1908). And a majority of the state burglary

statutes did not require an intent to commit a felony, but

9 Although § 1111 was reenacted in 1948, Congress made no changes

to the statutory language, nor gave any indication that it intended to make

any change in the law. Nor can we infer that Congress intended to

incorporate a consistent judicial interpretation of “burglary,” because none

existed at that time. Therefore, we must consider Congress’s intent as of

1909 when the statute was originally enacted. See Pierce v. Underwood,

487 U.S. 552, 566–67 (1988) (holding that when Congress reenacts a

statute without changing its language, and when there is no indication that

"Congress thought it was doing anything . . . except reenacting and

making permanent” the earlier legislation, a court should not give weight

to legislative history pertaining to the reenactment).

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36 UNITED STATES V. REZA-RAMOS

merely an intent to commit a range of crimes. See, e.g.,

Minn. Gen. Stat. § 8826 (1913); N.D. Penal Code § 9868

(1914); Tex. Penal Code Art. 838 (1910). In sum, by 1909,

the generic definition of “burglary” had a scope broader than

the common law definition. With the exception of the

requirement of “breaking and entering,” which was retained

by the majority of state statutes at the time, the 1909

definition was analogous to the definition of the crime

described in Taylor. We thus conclude that burglary, in the

context of § 1111, is defined as the breaking and entering

(i.e., a forcible entry) into a building or other structure with

intent to commit a crime. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 598.

With the correct definition of burglary in mind, we now

turn to the question whether the government and district

court’s error in predicating the charge of felonymurder under

§ 1111 on a state crime of burglary was harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt. The jury was instructed that it had to find,

“beyond a reasonable doubt,” that the “defendant entered, or

remained unlawfully, in or on a nonresidential structure or in

a fenced commercial or residential yard.” Unlike the generic

federal offense of burglary, this instruction did not require the

jury to find that Reza-Ramos made a forcible entry into a

building or other structure. Although this error could be

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if there were

overwhelming evidence of these missing elements, Neder,

527 U.S. at 9, the error was not harmless here. Although

there was evidence at trial that Reza-Ramos had broken a

window in the truck and used various tools in an attempt to

steal it, the government presented no evidence that RezaRamos had forcibly entered into the carport, even assuming

that the carport constitutes a building or structure. Thus,

under Neder, there was not overwhelming evidence of a

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UNITED STATES V. REZA-RAMOS 37

breaking. Id. As a result, we vacate the conviction for felony

murder.10

V

Accordingly, we affirm Reza-Ramos’s conviction for first

degree premeditated murder under § 1111. This federal

criminal statute applied to Reza-Ramos under § 1152 because

it was undisputed that Reza-Ramos was a non-Indian, and,

viewed in the light most favorable to the government, the

evidence of the victim’s Indian status was sufficient to

establish federal jurisdiction over the offense. We vacate

Reza-Ramos’s conviction on a theory of felony murder,

because the district court erred in defining the term

“burglary” in § 1111 by reference to state law, and this error

was not harmless.

AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and

REMANDED.

10 Because we vacate Reza-Ramos’s felony murder conviction on this

ground, we do not reach the question whether there was sufficient

evidence to show that the murder was “committed in the perpetration of

. . . burglary” for purposes of § 1111.

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