Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02110/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02110-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Brandon Doe
Defendant
Kenneth R. Reynolds
Plaintiff
Benjamin Shure
Defendant
Jennifer Shure
Defendant
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

KENNETH R. REYNOLDS,

Plaintiff,

v.

JENNIFER SHURE; BENJAMIN 

SHURE; STATE FARM MUTUAL 

AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, 

an Illinois corporation; 

BRANDON DOE, an individual 

and employee of State Farm 

Mutual Automobile Insurance 

Company, an Illinois 

corporation; and DOES 1 to 

100, inclusive,

Defendants.

CIV. NO. 2:15-02110 WBS EFB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION 

TO DISMISS

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Kenneth R. Reynolds filed this action in 

state court against defendants Jennifer Shure, Benjamin Shure, 

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”), 

and Brandon Doe arising from a dispute over coverage under 

defendants Jennifer and Benjamin Shure’s insurance policy. 

Defendants removed the action to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

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§ 1441(b). Defendant State Farm now moves to dismiss plaintiff’s 

claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, trespass 

and conversion, punitive damages, and negligence for failure to 

state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Docket No. 7.) 

I. Factual and Procedural History

On July 28, 2015, plaintiff’s daughter, Madelaine 

Reynolds, was driving plaintiff’s vehicle and was in an 

automobile accident with defendants Jennifer and Benjamin Shure. 

(Compl. ¶¶ 10, 25 (Docket No. 1-1).) The Shures attempted to 

move into the left lane on Interstate 5 around Los Angeles, 

California, crashing into and causing significant damage to 

plaintiff’s vehicle, a 2005 Infiniti FX35. (Id. ¶¶ 23-24.) The 

Shures and their vehicle are insured by State Farm. (Id. ¶ 6.) 

In response to the accident, State Farm opened claim 

number 04-6V62-083 and began an investigation. (Id.) Plaintiff 

contacted State Farm twice in early August about finalizing their 

investigation and repairing his car. (Id. ¶ 23.) On August 7, 

2015, plaintiff called State Farm and was connected with State 

Farm employee Brandon Doe. (Id. ¶ 25.) He informed Brandon Doe 

that he was an attorney and would be representing his daughter, 

Madelaine Reynolds, and that he “would not permit” State Farm “to 

take a statement from Madeleine Reynolds.” (Id.) Despite his 

instructions, State Farm called Madeleine that same day to take 

her statement and did not ask if she was represented by an 

attorney or inform her that her attorney had asked that she not 

be contacted. (Id. ¶ 26.) Plaintiff witnessed this phone call. 

(Pl.’s Opp’n at 8.)

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On August 10, 2015, defendant Brandon Doe advised 

plaintiff that State Farm had a police report placing liability 

for the accident on plaintiff’s daughter. (Id. ¶ 32.) The 

police were not called to the accident scene and, as a result,

plaintiff alleges there either was no police report or the Shures 

fabricated a report after the accident. (Id.) 

State Farm advised plaintiff on August 21, 2015 that 

the Shures had accepted liability for the accident and 

plaintiff’s losses. (Id. ¶ 27.) State Farm informed plaintiff 

that it would mail a check for $5,615.33 that day for car repairs 

and additional payments would be made if further damages were 

discovered. (Id.) In reliance on this statement, plaintiff paid 

$2,716.33 to repair the electronic damage to his car. (Id. ¶ 

28.) 

On August 28, 2015, State Farm called plaintiff and 

informed him that it had changed its mind and issued a stop 

payment on the check sent to plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 29.) Plaintiff 

alleges he would not have undertaken the car repairs if he had 

known State Farm would decide not to pay. (Id. ¶ 30.) 

In his Complaint, plaintiff asserts the following 

causes of action: (1) motor vehicle, personal injury, property 

damage, negligence by the Shures; (2) fraud and deceit; (3) 

infliction of emotional distress; (4) misrepresentation, 

concealment, false promises; (5) trespass and conversion; (6) 

punitive damages; and (7) negligence by State Farm. State Farm 

now moves to dismiss plaintiff’s third, fifth, sixth, and seventh 

causes of action. 

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II. Discussion

On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court 

must accept the allegations in the complaint as true and draw all 

reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Scheuer v. 

Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds by

Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 

319, 322 (1972). To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff 

must plead “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 570 (2007). This “plausibility standard,” however, “asks 

for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

unlawfully,” and where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely 

consistent with a defendant’s liability,” it “stops short of the 

line between possibility and plausibility.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 

“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion 

to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a 

plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his 

entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and 

conclusions . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (alteration in 

original) (citations omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (“While legal conclusions can provide the 

framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual 

allegations.”).

A. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

The elements of intentional infliction of emotional 

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distress are: “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the 

defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of 

the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the 

plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; (3) 

and actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by 

the defendant’s outrageous conduct.” Cervantez v. J. C. Penney 

Co., 24 Cal. 3d 579, 593 (1979). Conduct is outrageous if it is 

“so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in 

a civilized community.” Id. The distress inflicted must be “of 

such substantial quantity or enduring quality that no reasonable 

man in a civilized society should be expected to endure it.” 

Fletcher v. W. Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 397 (4th

Dist. 1970) (citation omitted). The courts have jurisdiction in 

California “to impose civil damages or other remedies against 

insurers in appropriate common law actions, based on such 

traditional theories as . . . infliction of emotional distress.” 

Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Cos., 46 Cal. 3d 287, 304-05 

(1988). 

Plaintiff alleges he suffered severe emotional distress 

of “anguish, fright, horror, nervousness, grief, anxiety, worry, 

shock, humiliation, and shame” due to State Farm’s “outrageous” 

conduct. (Compl. ¶¶ 37-38.) He alleges that State Farm intended 

to cause him emotional distress and acted with reckless disregard 

to the probability that he would suffer emotional distress. (Id.

¶ 37.) He claims that State Farm knew he was “particularly 

vulnerable to emotional distress,” although he does not allege 

how he was particularly vulnerable or how State Farm knwe. (Id.

¶ 42.) Plaintiff incorporates the prior paragraphs of his 

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Complaint but provides no further explanation of why State Farm’s

conduct was outrageous or his distress severe. (Id. ¶ 35.) 

In his opposition to State Farm’s motion to dismiss, 

plaintiff explains that his emotional distress was caused by 

State Farm’s 1) invading his attorney-client relationship with 

his daughter and 2) inducing him to incur debt by promising to 

pay him for repairs and then cancelling payment. (Pl.’s Opp’n to 

Mot. to Dismiss (“Pl.’s Opp’n”) at 3-4 (Docket No. 12).) He 

argues in his opposition that State Farm’s behavior was 

particularly outrageous given the ethical obligation to avoid 

dealing with represented claimants directly without the consent 

of the attorney. (Id. at 5.) None of these facts are alleged in 

the Complaint. 

Even if plaintiff had alleged that his basis for 

claiming emotional distress was interference with the attorneyclient relationship and inducement by false promise, plaintiff 

still would have failed to allege how such behavior qualifies as 

outrageous conduct “so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that 

usually tolerated in a civilized community.” Cervantez, 24 Cal. 

3d at 593. Plaintiff does not allege that defendant had the 

intent to later stop payment at the time it told him it would pay 

for the repairs to his vehicle--an act that could plausibly 

constitute outrageous behavior. Instead, plaintiff simply 

alleges that defendant advised defendant that payment would be 

mailed and then seven days later “changed [its] mind about 

paying.” (Pl.’s Compl. ¶¶ 28-29.) Thus, at root, plaintiff 

grounds his intentional infliction of emotional distress claim on 

State Farm’s cancellation of payment and refusal to accept 

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responsibility for the damages incurred. 

Disputes over the handling of insurance claims are not 

generally considered outrageous conduct sufficient to support a 

cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 

Cf. Schlauch v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 146 Cal. App. 

3d 926, 937 (3d Dist. 1983) (“The failure to accept an offer of 

settlement or the violation of statutory duties under Insurance 

Code section 790.03 does not in itself constitute the type of 

outrageous conduct which will support a cause of action for 

intentional infliction of emotional distress.”).

Plaintiff’s claim that State Farm acted outrageously by 

invading his attorney-client relationship is also insufficiently 

pled. California Rule of Professional Conduct 2-100 provides 

that a lawyer may not communicate directly with a party the 

lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer unless the 

member has the consent of the other lawyer. However, it is not 

alleged that the person who contacted plaintiff’s daughter was a 

lawyer. The court has found no comparable provision in the 

California Insurance Code prohibiting insurance carriers from 

communicating directly with persons represented by an attorney.

What plaintiff relies upon is something in the Model 

Rules of Professional Conduct and the Statement of Principles 

established in 1938 at the annual convention of the American Bar 

Association (“ABA”). (Pl.’s Opp’n at 5.) The Statement of 

Principles is an agreement between the ABA Committee on the 

Unauthorized Practice of Law, the Committee of Lay Adjusters of 

the Insurance Section, and a special committee representing 

insurance interests. See 7-49 Appleman on Insurance Law & 

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Practice Archive § 49.23 (2nd ed. 2011) (Statement of Principles 

§ a-1: “The companies or their representatives will not deal 

directly with any claimant represented by an attorney without the 

consent of the attorney”). This agreement does not carry the 

force of law.

Furthermore, any violation of this ethical rule harms 

the represented client, not the attorney.1 Thus, even if breach 

of this ethical duty constituted outrageous behavior, it would

provide the client, not the attorney, with grounds for an 

emotional distress claim. See, e.g., Harmatz v. Allstate Ins. 

Co., 170 F. Supp. 511, 512 (SDNY 1959) (finding that the penalty 

for violations of New York’s version of California’s rule against 

unauthorized contact by an attorney with the represented adverse 

party “is not a personal action for damages by the aggrieved 

attorney”).

2 Madeleine, plaintiff’s client and daughter, is not 

 

1 In a suit brought by an improperly contacted client 

under Rule 2-100, the remedy is generally disqualification of the

offending attorney from further participation in the case or 

exclusion of improperly obtained evidence. See Snider v. 

Superior Court, 113 Cal. App. 4th 1187, 1212 (4th Dist. 2003). 

“The court’s goal is not to impose a penalty, as the propriety of 

punishment for violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct is 

a matter within the purview of the State Bar, not of a court 

presiding over the affected case. Instead, what the court must 

do is focus on identifying an appropriate remedy for whatever 

improper effect the attorney’s misconduct may have had in the 

case before it.” HTC Corp. v. Tech. Props. Ltd., 715 F. Supp. 2d 

968, 973 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 

2 In Harmatz, the plaintiff was an attorney who was 

retained by the parents of an infant, Maria Natal, who was 

injured in an automobile accident involving a man insured by 

Allstate Insurance Company. 170 F. Supp. at 512. Though 

Allstate knew plaintiff was representing Maria, it had a 

physician examine Maria without the knowledge or consent of 

plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff alleged that this interference with 

the attorney client relationship caused him “great mental pain, 

suffering, anguish, and anxiety.” Id. The court held that

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a party to this lawsuit. Any emotional distress Madeleine may 

have suffered cannot form the basis for plaintiff’s emotional 

distress claim. Plaintiff does not have a derivative right of 

action based on his attorney-client or father-daughter 

relationship with Madeleine. 

Lastly, plaintiff’s statement that he suffered 

“anguish, fright, horror, nervousness, grief, anxiety, worry, 

shock, humiliation, and shame” is conclusory and insufficient. 

Plaintiff does not provide any facts regarding his susceptibility 

to emotional distress, the duration of the distress, or the 

causal link between State Farm’s behavior and his emotional 

state. See Fletcher, 10 Cal. App. 3d at 397 (“[T]he intensity 

and duration of the distress are factors to be considered in 

determining its severity.”). It is simply not plausible from the 

facts alleged that plaintiff suffered distress “that no 

reasonable man in a civilized society should be expected to 

endure” from having incurred $2,000 worth of debt and 

experiencing a minor invasion of his attorney-client relationship 

with his daughter. Id. at 397. Accordingly, the court will 

grant State Farm’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s emotional 

distress claim.

 

 

“annoyance at the violation by defendant of the rules governing 

the handling of lawsuits” is not a basis for the award of damages 

and plaintiff failed to allege “loss of his client, loss of the 

case, diminution of his fees or anything else that could be 

compensated for in damages.” Id. “The complaint seeks to set up 

a contrived cause of action designed to let the lawyer cash in on 

the unethical conduct of an opponent with no allegation of 

compensable damages suffered by the lawyer.” Id. at 512-13. 

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B. Trespass and Conversion

Conversion is a “tort that protects against 

interference with possessory and ownership interests in personal 

property.” Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120, 

134 (1990). To establish conversion, a “plaintiff must establish 

an actual interference with his ownership or right of possession. 

Where plaintiff neither has title to the property alleged to have 

been converted, nor possession thereof, he cannot maintain an 

action for conversion.” Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural 

Materials Co., 123 Cal. App. 3d 593, 610-611 (2d Dist. 1981). 

To establish trespass, a plaintiff must be entitled to 

immediate possession of the property and be “deprived of the use 

of the chattel for a substantial time.” Restatement (Second) of 

Torts § 219; see also Zaslow v. Kroenert, 29 Cal. 2d 541, 550 

(1946) (“To establish a conversion, it is incumbent upon the 

plaintiff to show an intention or purpose to convert the goods 

and to exercise ownership over them, or to prevent the owner from 

taking possession of his property.”).

Plaintiff alleges that State Farm promised to mail

$5,615.33 for repairs in August. (Compl. ¶ 57.) As a result, 

plaintiff argues, he then possessed, or had the right to possess, 

the funds promised. (Id. ¶ 57.) In issuing the stop payment on 

that check, plaintiff alleges State Farm intentionally interfered 

with plaintiff’s use or possession of the money that he had a 

right to possess. (Id. ¶ 61.)3 

 

3 Plaintiff also alleges in his trespass/conversion cause 

of action that State Farm interfered with his attorney-client 

relationship with his daughter. The court does not see how this 

is relevant to a claim for trespass/conversion. 

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It must be remembered that plaintiff was not 

defendant’s insured. Thus, while plaintiff seems to have

superficially alleged the elements of trespass/conversion, the 

court must dismiss this claim because an injured third party must 

have a judicial determination of fault before he has standing to 

sue the insurer of the party at fault. Shaolian v. Safeco Ins., 

71 Cal. App. 4th 268, 271 (1999) . “As a general rule, a third 

party may directly sue an insurer only when there has been an 

assignment of rights by, or a final judgment against, the 

insured.” Id.; see also Cal. Ins. Code § 11580(b)(2) (providing 

that “[a] policy insuring against losses . . . shall not be 

issued or delivered to any person in this state unless” it 

contains a “provision that whenever judgment is secured against 

the insured or the executor or administrator of a deceased 

insured in an action based upon bodily injury, death, or property 

damage, then an action may be brought against the insurer on the 

policy and subject to its terms and limitations, by such judgment 

creditor to recover on the judgment”). 

Plaintiff has not secured a final judgment, nor a 

binding settlement agreement, against the insured and, as a 

result, has not demonstrated that he has an ownership interest in 

or right to immediate possession of the proceeds of the Shures’ 

insurance policy. His allegation that the Shures caused the 

automobile accident and accepted liability for the accident is 

insufficient in California. (Compl. ¶ 27.) Accordingly, the 

court will grant State Farm’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s 

conversion and trespass claims.

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C. Punitive Damages

According to California Civil Code section 3294, a 

plaintiff may recover punitive damages in addition to actual 

damages in “an action for the breach of an obligation not arising 

from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing 

evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, 

or malice.” “There is no cause of action for punitive damages. 

Punitive or exemplary damages are remedies available to a party 

who can plead and prove the facts and circumstances set forth in 

Civil Code section 3294.” Hilliard v. A. H. Robins Co., 148 Cal. 

App. 3d 374, 391 (2d Dist. 1983) (citation omitted).

In his Complaint, plaintiff alleges a separate cause of 

action for punitive damages based on State Farm’s malice, 

oppression, and fraud. (Compl. ¶ 63.) However, in his 

opposition plaintiff acknowledges that punitive damages are not a 

separate cause of action and requests that he be permitted to 

pursue punitive damages as a remedy. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 6.) 

Likewise, State Farm states in its reply that it “does not 

challenge the inclusion of punitive damages in the prayer, just 

as a stand-alone cause of action.” (Def.’s Reply at 5.) 

Accordingly, the court will dismiss the punitive action claim as 

a cause of action but permit plaintiff to seek punitive damages 

as a remedy. 

D. Negligence

“The threshold element of a cause of action for 

negligence is the existence of a duty to use due care toward an 

interest of another that enjoys legal protection against 

unintentional invasion.” Adelman v. Assoc. Interns. Ins. Co., 90 

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Cal. App. 4th 352, 361 (3d Dist. 2001). Plaintiff’s threadbare 

negligence claim alleges that State Farm “was negligent as 

described earlier in this complaint; Plaintiff was harmed; and 

State Farm, Brandon Doe, and Does 1 through 50’[s] negligence was 

a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s harm.” (Compl. ¶ 

68.) Further, plaintiff alleges State Farm “failed to use 

reasonable care to prevent harm to Plaintiff.” (Id. ¶ 69.) 

Plaintiff failed to allege that State Farm owes a duty 

of care to him, a third-party claimant who is not insured under 

the operative State Farm policy. In his opposition plaintiff recharacterizes this cause of action as one for negligent 

infliction of emotion distress. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 7.) He argues 

that he is both a direct and indirect victim of State Farm’s 

invasion of the attorney-client relationship--which caused injury 

both to his daughter and himself. (Id.) Even if State Farm did 

breach the agreement between the ABA and insurance committees by 

contacting a represented client directly without plaintiff’s 

permission, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that State Farm’s 

duty of care extends to plaintiff. More importantly, the 

negligent infliction of emotional distress claim is entirely 

absent from plaintiff’s Complaint. Accordingly, the court grants 

State Farm’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s negligence claim.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that State Farm’s motion to 

dismiss plaintiff’s third, fifth, sixth, and seventh causes of 

action (Docket No. 7) be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED.

Plaintiff has twenty days from the date this Order is 

signed to file a First Amended Complaint, if it can do so 

consistent with this Order.

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Dated: December 2, 2015

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