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Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Dwayne A. Washington
Appellant

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 14, 1996 Decided February 21, 1997

No. 95-3097

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

DWAYNE A. WASHINGTON,

APPELLANT

Consolidated with

Nos. 95-3098, 95-3099

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 93cr00451-06)

(No. 93cr00451-08)

(No. 93cr00451-12)

Stanley J. Reed, appointed by the court, argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant John C.

Harmon.

Allen E. Burns, appointed by the court, argued the cause for appellant Troy E. Taylor, with whom

A.J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender, was on the briefs.

Steven R. Kiersh, appointed by the court, filed the briefs for appellant Dwayne A. Washington.

Mary-Patrice Brown, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for appellee, with whom Eric H.

Holder, Jr., U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher, Leslie A. Blackmon, Carol A. Fortine and Steven W.

Pelak, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, were on the brief.

Before: WALD, GINSBURG and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM.

PERCURIAM: In these consolidated appeals, appellants are three officers of the Metropolitan

Police Department ("MPD"), who, with others, were caught in a reverse-sting operation. They

challenge their convictions and sentences for a variety of drug-related charges, raising numerous

claims both jointly and individually. In Part I, we summarize the relevant evidence. In Part II, we

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1Part II, except II.E, is authored by Judge Wald; Part IV is authored by Judge Ginsburg; 

Parts I, II.E, and III are authored by Judge Rogers. 

address the challenges to the jury instructions on entrapment, specifically, the district court's refusal

to instruct the jury on derivative entrapment as well as the sufficiency of the general entrapment

instructions. We also address appellant Washington's challenge to the refusal to admit evidence of

his prior commendations and appellant Harmon's challenge to the exclusion of his prior consistent

statement. Further, we address appellants Taylor and Washington's challenge to the instructions on

attempted possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, both as to the sufficiency of the evidence

and the jury instructions themselves, as well as appellant Harmon's challenge to the bribery

instruction. In Part III, we address the exclusion of expert testimony and appellants' various

challenges to their firearms convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Finally, in Part IV, we address

appellants' sentencing challenges.1 For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgments of

convictions in all respects save for one of the firearms convictions of each appellant; we remand the

cases for resentencing in light of the vacation of these convictions.

I.

In December 1992, undercover FBI AgentJose Olivier, posing as a member of a Miami-based

narcotics organization, told MPD Officer NygelBrown that he wasinterested in obtaining protection

from Brown and other willing police officers for hisillegal narcotics activities while in the District of

Columbia. Olivier explained that he was working for a cocaine dealer named Juan, and they wanted

to set up a "drug base" in the District of Columbia. Brown, who was already on a list of suspected

corrupt officers, expressed his interest and stated that he knew other potential recruits. On two

separate occasions during February and March 1993, Brown accompanied and "protected" Olivier

while Olivier delivered $250,000 in cash, ostensibly for a drug purchase on one occasion and for

money laundering on the other. Brown was paid $1000 on each occasion.

On March 4, 1993, Brown introduced Olivier to Officer Sean Wiggins. Brown told Olivier

that Wiggins had dealt drugs both before and after becoming a police officer, which Wiggins later

confirmed. Upon learning from Olivier the same account of his plans to use the District of Columbia

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as a transit point for his drug operation, Wiggins was enthusiastic to join. On March 23, Brown and

Wiggins escorted Olivier on another staged money laundering run. Olivier paid Wiggins $1000, but

this time gave Brown $1500, telling Brown the bonus was for recruiting Wiggins.

On April 25, 1993, Brown and Wiggins were flown by Olivier to Miami, Florida, to be

introduced to Olivier's boss "Juan," undercover FBI agent Robert Williams. After wining and dining

the officers, Williamsinformed themthat he intended to flylarge quantities of cocaine into the District

of Columbia area, and that he wanted police officersto "protect" those shipments until courierstook

possession of the cocaine and left the District of Columbia. Williams stated that the officers would

receive $2000 for each run, but that Wiggins and Brown would receive $7500 a run for their

leadership roles. Williams told them that he wanted "dirty police officers, people who were used to

protecting drugs." Wiggins and Brown agreed to this proposal without reservation.

On June 8 and 9, 1993, Brown and Wiggins introduced Olivier to Officers Ronald Bailey,

William Hackney, and Kyle Davis. After meeting with Olivier individually and learning of the drug

operation, they each agreed to join. On July 13, 1993, the officers participated in the first of three

staged drug runs. Olivier, Brown, and Wiggins drove to the airport, picked up a shipment of cocaine,

and drove it back to Olivier's house in Northwest Washington. "Couriers" subsequently arrived to

pick up the drugs, and Wiggins, Bailey, and Hackney escorted them from Olivier's house to the

CapitalBeltway, which encirclesthe District ofColumbia. Bailey and Hackney each received $2000,

and Brown and Wiggins, $7500.

On August 9, 1993, Brown and Hackney brought Roland Harris and John Harmon to meet

Olivier. After making sure that Harris and Harmon were interested, Olivier asked each of them

whether he had any prior experience with the drug world. Both officers responded affirmatively.

Harmon stated that he had sold drugs with Hackney and that he had done "rips" on the street, picking

up drugs or money dropped by fleeing dealers. After explaining that the officers would be expected

to drive behind the couriers and to be prepared to "use their badges" if necessary, Olivier stated that

his organization had successfully employed police officers in numerous other cities. Neither Harris

nor Harmon expressed any reluctance to join the endeavor, and on August 10, 1993, both joined in

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the second of the three runs. Harmon and the other escorts received $2000, while Wiggins and

Brown each received $7500 for their day-long services.

On August 25, 1993, Olivier told Hackney and Brown that Juan wanted to set up a second

team, and asked Hackney to lead it and recruit as many new officers as he could. Hackney readily

agreed, and on September 16, 1993, Brown and Hackney brought Officers Dwayne Washington,

Darryl Lawson, Mark Reid, and VikkiChildressto meet Olivier. Officer Troy Taylor, who was also

invited, did not attend because he was working. After Olivier engaged in his standard introduction

and questions, Washington told Olivier not only that he had worked in vice and was used to being

around drugs, but that he had stolen drugsfrom street dealers because "they ain't gonna say nothing."

Washington also told Olivier that he wastold by Hackney that he would not have to touch the drugs

and that he was comfortable with the arrangement. After similar discussions with Olivier, the other

three officers also agreed to join the operation.

On October 4, 1993, Taylor was introduced to Olivier. After being given the standard pitch

fromOlivier, Taylor agreed to participate. Taylor described his former experience "running the coke"

and "shipping it out to the little people" for a local drug dealer. Although he claimed to have shot

people in the course of his illegal activities, and stated that he would "take somebody's life,

point-blank" if things went wrong, he said he had never killed anyone. He also said that he knew a

"hit man" if Olivier encountered "any problems with anybody." The next day, on October 5, after

attending a morning meeting with all the officers, Washington and Taylor joined in the third and final

drug run.

On November 16, 1993, Olivier held separate meetings with two groups of the officers to

update them on the operation. Olivier informed the officers that the next run, which would be

conducted around Thanksgiving, would include a larger shipment and would be conducted from a

hotel room, rather than his townhouse. During the meeting, Olivier mentioned the high crime rates

and murders connected with drug trafficking, and referencing a newspaper article, discussed at length

an actual case in Puerto Rico where two bodies had been found in a car trunk, cut up into "seven

pieces." At trial, Olivier testified that the story was idle conversation; Harmon testified that he

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understood it to send a message about the consequences of betrayal. On duty during the time of the

meeting, Taylor learned of the plans from Olivier over the telephone the next day.

On December 14, 1993, Taylor, Washington, and Harmon, along with eight other officers,

assembled in two hotel rooms with Olivier and another courier to prepare for the cocaine shipment

scheduled for that day. While they were discussing their runs, FBI agents and MPD senior officers

rushed in to the hotel rooms with guns drawn, and arrested the officers.

Officers Wiggins, Hackney, Harmon, Washington, and Taylor were charged on April 26,

1994, in a superseding indictment with the following crimes: conspiracy to commit bribery, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine,

in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; bribery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201; attempted possession with

intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 and 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(2),

846; and two counts per defendant of using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug

trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). The indictment alleged that the conspiracies

existed between March and December 1993. Following the example of seven other defendants,

Wiggins and Hackney ultimately pleaded guilty and agreed to cooperate with the government.

In a jury trial, appellants Washington, Taylor, and Harmon presented an entrapment defense.

Each of them stated that before meeting with Olivier, he knew only of the opportunity to do some

private security work, not of the work's connection with drug operations. Each further testified that

upon learning of the nature of the operations, he wastoo scared to back out. Each also testified that

he carried a gun during the drug runs.

The jury found Washington and Taylor guilty of all six charges; it acquitted Harmon of

attempted possession with intent to distribute cocaine but convicted him of the five remaining

charges. Appellants were each sentenced to prison terms totaling 592 months (49 years, 4 months),

aggregating concurrent terms of up to 292 months (24 years, 4 months) for the bribery and drug

offenses with consecutive terms of 300 months (25 years) for the firearms offenses.

II.

A. Sufficiency of the Jury Instructions on Entrapment Issues. With two exceptions, the

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2Hackney was not aware that Olivier was a government agent at the time when Hackney

recruited the appellants at Olivier's direction. 

3There is some dispute as to whether appellant Taylor was actually recruited by Hackney, or

whether he was recruited by Harmon (another step removed from Olivier). Compare Joint Brief

for Appellants, at 59 n.38 ("Harmon had mentioned to Taylor the prospect of some lucrative

private security work, but referred Taylor to Hackney, who in turn provided Taylor with

information and acted as a conduit to Olivier."), with Final Brief for Appellee, at 103 ("Taylor was

"recruited' not by Agent Olivier or Hackney, but by his co-defendant, John Harmon."). The

district court did not make factual findings on this issue. For purposes of this analysis, we

consider the facts in the light most favorable to the defenseand so we assume that Hackney did

recruit Taylor. See infra, page 13. 

jury instruction on entrapment given by the district court adhered to the standard Redbook

instruction. See CriminalJury Instructionsfor the District ofColumbia, No. 5.05 (4th ed. 1993). The

two exceptions were that the jury was instructed that (1) "it is not a defense to the crimes charged

that the defendants were induced to commit the crimes by their co-conspirators," and (2) "if you find

that a defendant was entrapped as to one offense, you may but are not required to find the defendant

was also entrapped as to the other offenses." Appellants challenge these two deviations from the

standard instructions, and they also object to the district court's refusal to include various additions

to the standard instructions they proposed.

1. Refusal to Instruct the Jury on Derivative Entrapment. Appellants first contest the

district court's decision to preclude consideration of a "derivative entrapment" defense. Whereas a

regular entrapment instruction is generally given when the evidence shows that the defendant was

directly induced to commit a crime by a government agent, the evidence in the present case showed

that the three appellants were not directlyrecruited byOlivier(the undercover agent), but byHackney

(an "unwitting"2intermediary who had previously been recruited by Olivier).3 All three appellants

testified at trial that Hackney approached them claiming that a Miami businessman who carried lots

of cash and needed protection while in the area waslooking for officersto work private security. On

the basis ofthistestimony, the defense requested an entrapment instruction that would have permitted

the jury to consider the conduct of and inducement offered by Hackney in determining whether the

defendants had been entrapped.

The district court rejected the request for an instruction on derivative entrapment. The jurors

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4The court did not elaborate as to why a defendant could not, as a matter of law, be

"entrapped" by "co-conspirators." 

5

See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 979 F.2d 1424, 1432 (10th Cir. 1992) (claiming to be

"among the majority of Circuits that have not recognized the defense of vicarious or derivative

entrapment" and collecting cases). 

were instructed that "they could consider only the representations or actions of the FBI agent"

himself, and that "as a matter of law it is not a defense to the crimes charged that the defendants were

induced to commit the crimes by their co-conspirators, such as William Hackney or Nygel Brown."4

Appellants challenge this instruction, contending that this circuit has recognized the derivative

entrapment defense (at least in dicta), United States v. Johnson, 317 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir. 1963), that

other circuits have also recognized it, and that the defense should have been available here because

otherwise the government would be allowed to shield itself from regular entrapment claims by

designing sting operations to shift the task of recruiting additional sting targets onto the original

targets of the operation. Joint Brief for Appellants, at 59-60. The government, on the other hand,

asserts that, even if derivative entrapment is a legitimate defense under the law of this circuit, there

was "no legal or factual basis" for allowing it in this case. Final Brief for Appellee, at 96. We review

the district court's decision not to give the derivative entrapment instruction de novo. United States

v. Layeni, 90 F.3d 514, 517 (D.C. Cir. 1996); United States v. Ortiz, 804 F.2d 1161, 1164 (10thCir.

1986) ("[W]hether there is evidence sufficient to constitute a triable issue of entrapment is a question

of law.").

This case involves a difficult question in the field of entrapment law, and one on which courts

around the country have reached vastly different conclusions: to what extent is a derivative

entrapment instruction merited in cases where the government acts through an unwitting agent.

Although all circuits appear to be in agreement that "[p]ersuasion, seduction, or cajoling by a private

party does not qualify as entrapment," United States v. Burkley, 591 F.2d 903, 911 n.15 (D.C. Cir.

1978), and some circuits appear to have rejected the derivative entrapment defense in all its forms,5

nevertheless a number of circuits have recognized the defense under some circumstances when

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6United States v. Buie, 407 F.2d 905, 908 (2d Cir.), aff'd on other grounds sub nom., Minor v.

United States, 396 U.S. 87 (1969); see also United States v. Hodges, 936 F.2d 371, 372 (8th Cir.

1991); United States v. Valencia, 645 F.2d 1158, 1168-69 (2d Cir. 1980) (as amended), reh'g

denied, 669 F.2d 37 (1981). 

7

See, e.g., United States v. Emmert, 829 F.2d 805, 809 (9th Cir. 1987) (rejecting the

"unwitting agent" theory and stating that "an approach to a defendant by a private citizen before

he was [knowingly] cooperating with the government, [does] not constitute governmental

solicitation or inducement for purposes of the entrapment defense"); United States v. Beverly,

723 F.2d 11, 12 (3d Cir. 1983) ("[A]n entrapment defense cannot be predicated on the actions of

a party who has not agreed explicitly or implicitly to help the government make its case against

the person who complains of entrapment."). 

8

See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 839 F.2d 1041, 1054 (5th Cir. 1988) (as corrected) (stating

that "the government may entrap a defendant through the actions of an "ignorant pawn' "). 

9Although the term "derivative entrapment" was not explicitly mentioned in Johnson, the court

held that a defendant was entitled to a jury instruction on entrapment in a situation where an

undercover police officer supplied an (apparently unwitting) intermediary with government

money, instructed the intermediary to purchase narcotics with the money, and then drove the

intermediary to a spot where said intermediary returned with the defendant. The defendant then

instructed the undercover officer to drive to another spot, where the defendant purchased drugs

as requested by the intermediary, who in turn gave the drugs to the officer. 

"government agents act through private citizens."

6 Of those jurisdictions permitting the defense,

some have allowed it only in cases in which the government acts through a knowing agent (e.g., an

informant),7 whereas others have also allowed its application in cases of unwitting (that is, de facto)

agents.8

After carefully examining case law in this and other jurisdictions, we conclude that a limited

formofthe "derivative entrapment" theory isrecognized in this circuit, and extendsto casesin which

unwitting intermediariesat the government's directiondeliver the government's inducement to a

specified third party. In United States v. Johnson, this court first stated that, although "[t]he

entrapment defense does not extend to inducement by a private citizen," nevertheless "it has found

general application to cases where the officer acts through a private citizen." 317 F.2d 127, 128

(D.C. Cir. 1963).9 More recently, in United States v. Layeni, we further explained that:

[T]he entrapment defense can be raised by a defendant who was induced by an

unknowing intermediary at the instruction or direction of a government official or

third party acting on behalf of the government (e.g., an informant). The defense

should not apply if, in response to pressure put on him by the government, the

unknowing intermediary on his own induces the defendant to engage in criminal

activity.

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10See also United States v. Hodges, 936 F.2d 371, 372 (8th Cir. 1991) ("[C]ourts have ...

recognized that, under certain circumstances, an unknowing middleman ... can satisfy the element

of governmental inducement in another's entrapment defense."); United States v. Valencia, 645

F.2d 1158, 1168 (2d Cir. 1980) (as amended) ("If a person is brought into a criminal scheme after

being informed indirectly of conduct or statements by a government agent which could amount to

inducement, then that person should be able to avail himself of the defense of entrapment just as

may the person who receives the inducement directly."), reh'g denied, 669 F.2d 37 (1981). 

90 F.3d 514, 520 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (emphasis in original). The Layeni court made explicit what was

implicit in Johnsonthat a derivative entrapment defense could be based on the actions of an

"unknowing intermediary." Then, most recently, in United States v. Spriggs, this court again

confirmed the existence of the defense (as well as its application in cases of unknowing, de facto

government agents), when it cited Layeni for the proposition that "it may be possible to establish

indirect entrapment through an unwitting intermediary." 102 F.3d 1245, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The

combined weight of the decisions in Johnson, Layeni, and Spriggs persuades us that situations may

arise in which this court would be obligated to give an instruction on derivative entrapment, even if

the intermediary involved did not know that he was acting as a de facto government agent.10

Of course, the fact that derivative entrapment is a legally cognizable defense in this circuit

does not mean that an instruction on the defense was merited on the facts of this case. We do,

however, reject the notion that the intermediary'signorance ofthe fact that he is acting as go-between

for the government by itself negates a derivative entrapment defense, and so disagree with the district

court's ruling to the extent it suggests a blanket rule against a derivative entrapment instruction in

cases where "the defendants were induced to commit the crimes by their co-conspirators." Indeed,

the purpose behind allowing such a defense is to prevent the government from circumventing rules

against entrapment merely by deploying intermediaries, only one degree removed from the officials

themselves, who carry out the government's explicit instructions to persuade a particular individual

to commit a particular crime using a particular type of inducement. This purpose could too easily be

defeated by allowing the government to target specific individuals through unwitting go-betweens.

In the present case, nonetheless, for the reasons outlined below we agree with the district court

thatregardless of what view of the factsis adoptedthere is no basisfor the derivative entrapment

defense.

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The facts of the so-called "entrapment" scenario were hotly disputed in the proceedings

below. The defense asserted that the appellants were not aware that the "private security work" was

illegal until they actually met with Olivier. The prosecution, in contrast, claimed that the appellants

knew from the outset that they were hired to participate in illegal drug-running activities. Generally

speaking, "[i]n deciding whether the trial judge should have given the jury an entrapment instruction,

this court must consider appellant's version of the facts as true." United States v. McKinley, 70 F.3d

1307, 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Borum, 584 F.2d 424, 427 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).

However, if we assume the facts alleged by the defense on appeal, then appellants clearly are not

entitled to a derivative entrapment defense. According to appellants,

The three defendants herein had all been recruited byHackney. Each officer testified,

with some variation, that Hackney had approached them under the same pretexta

Miamibusinessmanwho carried lots ofmoneyand needed protection while in the area

was looking for officers to work private security, a scenario consistent with what

Hackney, in his[Pre-Sentencing Report], claimed he had been told byBrown. Based

on that testimony, the jury could have concluded that Hackney duped the defendants

into meeting with Olivier, by causing them to believe that the work for Olivier

involved legal, albeit unauthorized, private security work.

Joint Brief for Appellants, at 58-59 (footnotes and citations omitted). Appellants argue that a

derivative entrapment instruction was warranted despite the fact that the "inducement" communicated

by Hackney to hisrecruits was allegedly different than the inducement that Olivier directed Hackney

to relay. This assertion conflicts with established law in this circuit. Under our precedents, the

derivative entrapment defense may only be raised if the alleged inducement communicated by the

unwitting intermediary is the same inducement, directed at the same target, as the inducement that

the government agent directsthe intermediary to communicate. If the intermediary deviatesfromthe

government's plan, and therefore acts "on his own," then the inducement cannot be attributed to the

government agent. United States v. Layeni, 90 F.3d at 520. Accordingly, even if it were true (as

appellants themselves allege) that Hackney modified the alleged inducement, telling the appellants that

they would be engaging in legitimate private security work in exchange for $2000 per run, then he

would have deviated from the government's original inducement (offering money in exchange for

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11Indeed, appellant Harmon's counsel conceded at trial that

if the jury were to conclude that the defendants were all misled before they walked

in [to meet Olivier] ... it would be difficult to sustain a derivative entrapment

instruction, because it's clear that Mr. Hackney did not say he was told to mislead

anybody. 

12United States v. Borum, 584 F.2d 424, 427 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (as amended) (quoting United

States v. Boone, 543 F.2d 412, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted). This

principle, in turn, is based on the idea that an appellate court may not infringe upon the domain of

the jury, and so may not "decide the factual question whether appellant was indeed entrapped, but

only the legal question whether the trial judge should have given the jury an entrapment

instruction." Id.

13In addition, the appellants were required to meet with Olivier himself before becoming

official members of the scheme. Cf. United States v. Valencia, 645 F.2d 1158, 1169 n.10 (2d Cir.

1980) (as amended) (suggesting that a case for a derivative entrapment defense is more easily

made in cases where the defendant is "made aware" of the government official's inducement, or

where the defendant has actually been introduced to the official), reh'g denied, 669 F.2d 37

drug-running), and a derivative entrapment instruction would not be supported by the evidence.11

Assuming that appellants did not know they were to commit a crime until after they met with Olivier

himself, then the only issue for the jury would be whether Olivier himself entrapped them. But the

jury was instructed on the issue of direct entrapment, and it was up to the jury to decide whether the

elements of the derivative entrapment defense were shown.

On the other hand, because the McKinley rule is based on the principle that, "[i]n deciding

whether a jury question israised, the trial judge must consider the evidence in the light most favorable

to the defendant,"12 and because, ironically, all three appellants might have made a stronger case for

a derivative entrapment instruction had they conceded that they were aware fromthe outset that they

would be working for a "drug dealer," we give appellants every benefit of the doubt on this question

and go on to consider whether they would have been entitled to a derivative entrapment instruction

under that view of the facts. This second scenario is much closer to a paradigmatic example of

derivative entrapment: the undercover agent explicitly directed his initial recruit (who acted as an

unwitting government agent) to recruit more "corrupt" officersand to offer these new recruits a

monetary incentive ($2000 per drug run) that Olivier had set. One could argue that, by recruiting the

three appellants, Hackney unwittingly acted as a conduit, directly communicating an incentive

dictated by a government agent to other sting targets, at the direction of that government agent.13

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(1981). 

14The Layeni court also observed that, "even if [the girlfriend] had induced [the boyfriend], the

intended target of the government's sting," nevertheless the boyfriend "would not be entitled to an

entrapment instruction because there is no evidence that [the informant] suggested that [the

girlfriend] should "use inducements' to bring him to the table." 90 F.3d at 518-19 (citations

omitted). Presumably, however, if the government had told the girlfriend to offer a particular

inducement to her boyfriend, and she had not deviated from this plan, he would have been entitled

to an entrapment instruction. Similarly here, had the government designated particular officers

that Hackney should target with particular inducements, and Hackney had followed this plan, the

appellants might have been entitled to a derivative entrapment instruction. 

Given thisscenario, a derivative entrapment instruction almost certainly would have been necessary,

except for the crucial fact that Olivier did not designate particular police officers to whom the

intermediariesshould offer the $2000 incentive per drug run. Rather, Olivier instructed Hackney and

Brown more generally to offer the incentive to undesignated cops whom they knew to be corrupt or

"dirty."

Such a general instruction by a government agent to an intermediary is not sufficient to

support a derivative entrapment defense. As Layeni made clear, "[t]he defense should not apply if,

in response to pressure put on him by the government, the unknowing intermediary on his own

induces the defendant to engage in criminal activity." 90 F.3d at 520. In Layeni, this court held that

a derivative entrapment instruction was not required in a case where a government informant

(directed by the government) attempted to apprehend a known heroin dealer by persuading the

dealer's girlfriend to arrange for the dealer to sell drugsto the informant. On the day of the proposed

sale, however, the dealer happened to be out oftown, and the girlfriend instead sent defendant Layeni

to make the sale. In affirming the denial of the defendant's request for an entrapment instruction, we

reasoned that, because the girlfriend had acted "on her own" (rather than at the explicit direction of

the government) in sending Layeni (rather than her boyfriend) to make the sale, the government had

not entrapped the defendant.14

The meaning of acting "on one's own" was further expounded upon in Spriggs, where this

court noted that, although government agents conducting a money-laundering sting operation had

indirectly communicated monetary incentives to the defendant through a go-between, the actual

inducement ofthat particular defendant "was notspecificallycontemplated bytheGovernment, which

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15Other courts have established somewhat different frameworks for the defense. Of these

various theories, some are narrower than the one we set forth here, see, e.g., United States v.

Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196, 1204 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc) ("[T]here is a defense of derivative

entrapment: when a private individual, himself entrapped, acts as agent or conduit for

governmental efforts at entrapment, the government as principal is bound. This principle follows

... from the unquestioned principle that the entrapment defense will lie whether the government

uses its own employee as the stinger or an informant."); United States v. Hodges, 936 F.2d 371,

372 (8th Cir. 1991) (permitting the derivative entrapment defense in cases where the unwitting

intermediary is himself entrapped and then, at the behest of the government, induces others to join

a criminal scheme), while others are potentially broader, see, e.g., United States v. Valencia, 645

F.2d 1158, 1168-69 (2d Cir. 1980) (as amended) ("In general, we hold that a vicarious

entrapment defense can be presented to a jury only where the defendant first introduces admissible

evidence that the agent's inducement was directly communicated to him by another."), reh'g

denied, 669 F.2d 37 (1981). See generally Note, Entrapment Through Unsuspecting Middlemen,

95 HARV. L. REV. 1122 (1982) (surveying various theories of derivative entrapment). 

16Even if the district court had erred in its general entrapment instruction, such error would not

constitute a basis for reversal unless the appellants could show that they were prejudiced by the

error. The first three arguments were raised at trial and therefore would be reviewed for harmless

error. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a). The fourth argumentpertaining to the timing of the finding of

predisposition on the part of the defendantswas not raised below and therefore would be

had not targeted any particular salesperson." 102 F.3d 1245, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1996). In this way,

Spriggs elaborated on the reasoning of Layeni, making clear that a derivative entrapment theory

should onlyapplyto sting operations conducted through unwitting intermediariesifthe intermediaries

are directed to target specific individuals and follow these instructions. Here, in contrast, Hackney

acted independentlythat is, on his ownin deciding who would be targets of Olivier's offer.

Because appellants were not specifically targeted by the government's scheme, they are not entitled

to a derivative entrapment defense.15 We therefore conclude that appellants were not entitled to a

derivative entrapment defense under any possible version of the facts that the jury could have found.

2. Sufficiency of the General Entrapment Instructions. In addition to the claim that the

district court should have given an instruction on a derivative entrapment defense, appellants also

challenge the general entrapment instructions actually given on four grounds, arguing that the district

court erred when it refused to add the appellants' suggested language. In reviewing jury instructions

for legal error, "we consider not just the challenged phrases, but the instruction as a whole." United

States v. Merlos, 984 F.2d 1239, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). We conclude that, viewed

as a whole, the instructions given by the district court correctly informed the jury about the

entrapment defense and about the legal standards to be applied in this case.16

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reviewed only for plain error. FED R. CRIM. P. 52(b). 

Appellants first contend that the entrapment instruction in its entirety was "severely

imbalanced" because it "exhaustivelycatalogued a veritable litanyofproper government actions while

failing" to mention that the government cannot "create the crime" under Jacobson v. United States,

503 U.S. 540, 548-49 (1992). See Joint Brief for Appellants, at 65. Although it is true that the

instruction did not specifically use the Jacobson language that the government may not "create the

crime," this fact alone is not sufficient to demonstrate that the instruction was flawed. On the

contrary, the instruction did includein standard Redbook formthe functional equivalent of the

Jacobson language by stating that, "[a] person is entrapped if law enforcement officials induced or

persuaded a person to commit a crime which he would not otherwise have committed." Nor in our

view were the instructions "severely imbalanced" in any other way. Although the instruction did cite

many examples of proper police conduct, it also suggested numerous examples ofimproper conduct,

explaining that inducement "may take many forms, including persuasion, fraudulent representations,

threats, coercive tactics, harassment, promises of reward, or pleas based upon need, sympathy, or

friendship." We therefore find that the court fairly and adequately described the legal meanings of

improper inducement; ultimately, it was the jury's province to decide whether Olivier's specific

conduct fit this model.

Second, appellants challenge the district court's denial of defendants' request that the jury "be

instructed that it could consider Olivier's actions as relating to the scope and nature of the

inducement, and its effect on the defendants'states of mind." Joint Brief for Appellants, at 65 (citing

United States v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603, 617 (2d Cir. 1983), as an example of a case where such an

instruction was given)). According to the defense, it was necessary so to instruct the jury because

Olivier accompanied the monetary inducement with constant reassurances that it was "easy money,"

and because Olivier exerted subtle coercion over the defendants, presenting himself as "a "Columbian'

drug dealerbehind locked doors, and in the presence of other armed policemen, some of whom

were not known to the officers, and all of whom appeared already to be in cahoots with Olivier." Id.

at 66. This argument is without merit. As the government rightly points out, the entrapment

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17The Sherman court stated that, "[i]t makes no difference [for purposes of an entrapment

defense] that the sales for which petitioner was convicted occurred after a series of [prior

narcotics] sales. They were not independent acts subsequent to the inducement but part of a

course of conduct which was the product of the inducement." Id. at 374. 

instruction included standard Redbook language which adequately conveyed to the jury that it could

consider both the impact that Olivier's words and actions may have had on the appellants' states of

mind, as well as the various forms that "inducement" by a law enforcement officer might take.

Moreover, adding the precise language requested by the appellants could have misled the jury into

judging the defendants' predisposition on a subjective basis, when the established standard for

predisposition is objective. United States v. Kelly, 748 F.2d 691, 698 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (for

entrapment defense, relevant issue is whether the government agent's conduct waslikely to overcome

"a law-abiding citizen's will to obey the law").

Third, appellants argue that, despite the repeated objections of defendants at trial, the judge's

entrapment instruction misconstrued the legal principles set forth in Sherman v. United States, 356

U.S. 369, 374 (1958).17 They contend that the jury should have been allowed to consider that the

sting operation and the resulting actions of the participants constituted a single continuing course of

conduct such that once a defendant was entrapped, he may have stayed entrapped throughout the

duration ofthe conspiracy. However, appellants' reliance on this theory (and on the nearly forty-year

old Sherman case) ignoresthe fact that we recently rejected the "once-entrapped-always-entrapped"

theory. See United States v. Vaughn, 80 F.3d 549, 552 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (interpreting Jacobson to

permit "a jury to consider the possibility that a defendant's disposition to commit a crime changed

over time"); United States v. Layeni, 90 F.3d 514, 517 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (explaining that "the

continuing entrapment theory" was rejected by Vaughn); Spriggs, 102 F.3d 1245, 1260 (D.C. Cir.

1996) (finding that an instruction on continuing entrapment wasforeclosed byVaughn, and reasoning

that the fact "[t]hat a particular defendant might have lacked predisposition to launder money once

does not mean he lacked it at a later time."). As the Vaughn court explained, "Sinners may become

saints and saints may become sinners. Nothing is necessarily permanent about either state. A person

might be disposed to commit a crime one day and not disposed to do so some time later." 80 F.3d

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18The jury was informed that, "[j]ust as it's your responsibility to consider each offense and the

evidence ... concerning each defendant separately, it is also your responsibility to consider the

evidence concerning entrapment as to each offense and each defendant separately." 

19Because no defendant took issue with this aspect of the instruction at the trial, this argument,

unlike the previous three made by appellants, may only be reviewed for plain error. 

at 552. Here, the challenged instruction, which properly required the jury to find predisposition for

each separate offense,18 but which also stated that, "if you find that a defendant was entrapped as to

one offense, you may but are not required to find the defendant was also entrapped as to the other

offenses," was entirely consistent with Vaughn, Layeni, and Spriggs.

Fourth and finally, appellants claim the entrapment instruction did not inform the jury

adequately about the essential timing of a finding of predisposition. According to appellants, "[i]t is

fundamental that a defendant's predisposition to engage in the crime must precede or arise

simultaneously with the proffered inducement." Joint Brief for Appellants, at 66 (emphasis in

original) (citing cases).19 Contrary to appellants' assertion, we conclude that the court did not err (let

alone plainly err) by omitting an instruction that the jury must find that the defendant was ready and

willing to commit the crime before being approached by government agents. Although at least one

of our sister circuits has stated that, "[a] defendant's predisposition is not to be assessed "as of that

time when he committed the crime,' " and that "predisposition refers to the state of mind of a

defendant before government agents make any suggestion that he should commit a crime," United

States v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603, 618 (2d Cir. 1983) (emphasis added), the government is correct

in arguing that this circuit has interpreted the "prior to" language ofsome of our cases "to mean only

that the government must prove that the defendant's disposition was "independent and not the

product of the attention that the Government' directed at the defendant." Vaughn, 80 F.3d at 552.

The district court explained to the jurythat inducement and predisposition were two distinct elements

of the entrapment defense, and that the jury was required to make a finding that "the defendant was

otherwise ready and willing to commit the crimes charged." These instructions made clear to the jury

that the defendants' predisposition to commit the crime, or lack thereof, was a separate and

independent element from the government'sinducement. An additional instruction emphasizing that

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20During cross-examination, the government established that Washington had been paid by two

employers for the same time period (double billing). Other cross-examination topics covered by

the government were Washington's removal from the motor tract unit for misconduct, his

interaction with Officers Reid and Lawson (to impeach his claim that he didn't know or deal with

any of the charged officers), and his alleged extortion and bribery on previous occasions when he

seized nitrous oxide containers to resell them, or accepted money not to seize them. 

21Washington objected to admission of this evidence, but the government countered that the

evidence showed a previous criminal relationship between Washington and Lawson, and that

Washington had placed his intent at issue by declaring that he participated in Olivier's operation

because he had no realistic alternatives. The district court ruled that the government had met its

burden of laying a foundation for Washington's prior bad acts; it also ruled that the evidence was

probative as to predisposition, and that this probative value was not outweighed by the prejudicial

effect. 

the predisposition must be "prior to" the alleged inducement was not required by current law and

would have been superfluous.

B. Refusalto Admit Evidence of Appellant Washington's PriorCommendations. In the

proceedings below, the government was permitted to present "other crimes" evidence20 under Rule

404(b) of the FederalRules of Evidence in order to rebut the defendants' entrapment defense, and to

"prove that [the officers'] betrayal of trust was done intentionally and knowingly and not done

mistakenly or accidentally" and that theywere predisposed to abuse their authority as police officers.

Government's Notice of Rule 404(b) Evidence, at 1-2.21 Washington, in turn, sought to have

evidence admitted under FederalRule of Evidence 405(b) ofseveral commendations he had received

for his work on the police force. He proffered this evidence in an attempt to rebut the instances of

alleged criminal activity raised by the government, and to disprove predisposition. Washington

argued at trial that the jury could then contrast prior good with prior bad acts and be better able to

determine the presence or absence of criminal intent.

The district court refused to admit the commendationsinto evidence, explaining that they did

not fit the criteria for any exception from the hearsay rule for character evidence, that they did not

constitute rebuttal evidence, and that neither Rules 404 nor 405 provided a basisfor their admission.

We review the district court'srefusal to admit evidence ofthe commendationsfor abuse of discretion.

United States v. Watson, 894 F.2d 1345, 1349 (D.C. Cir. 1990).

On appeal, Washington complainsthat the district court was expansive in its admission of the

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government's evidence of prior bad acts, while at the same time it was unfairly strict in its admission

of evidence of prior good acts. In arguing that the commendations were admissible, he relies on

Michelson v. United States, in which the Supreme Court stated that a defendant "may introduce

affirmative testimony that the general estimate of his character isso favorable that the jury may infer

that he would not be likely to commit the offense charged." 335 U.S. 469, 476 (1948). In some

cases, the Court explained, "such testimony alone ... may be enough to raise a reasonable doubt of

guilt." Id. The defense contends that the letters "would have rebutted the government's repeated

declaration that Washington was prepared to "sell his badge' and clearly cast doubt on whether the

evidence of prior bad acts established a predisposition" on Washington's part. Individual Brief for

Appellant Washington, at 16.

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the

commendations. It is true that the accused may introduce evidence of a "pertinent trait of character"

under FederalRule of Evidence 404(a)(1). Such evidence generally must be in the form of testimony

as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an "opinion," FED. R. EVID. 405(a), but "[i]n cases in

which character or a trait of character of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or

defense, proof may also be made of specific instances of that person's conduct." FED. R. EVID.

405(b). Under these Rules, the district court acted well within its discretion when it excluded the

evidence at issue here. As the government persuasively argues, the commendations were not

admissible under either Rule because appellant's "dedication, aggressiveness and assertiveness" in

investigating drug dealing and carjacking is neither "pertinent" to nor an "essential element" of his

supposed lack of predisposition to engage in the corrupt criminal activity with which he was charged.

Cf. United States v. Nazzaro, 889 F.2d 1158, 1168 (1st Cir. 1989) (excluding evidence of police

officer's prior commendations because "the traits which they purport to showbravery, attention to

duty, perhaps community spiritwere hardly "pertinent' to the crimes [of perjury and conspiracy to

commit mail fraud] of which [the defendant] stood accused").

In addition, even if the exclusion amounted to error, it would have been harmless. When a

court reviews a nonconstitutional trial error, it must determine "whether the error "had a substantial

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22Evidence admitted against Harmon's story included Hackney's testimony that Harmon did

know prior to that first meeting of Olivier's drug dealer status and cross-examination in which the

prosecutor questioned the likelihood that Harmon's "good friend" Hackney (Harmon was a

groomsman in Hackney's wedding) would have led him into this situation without telling him the

work was drug-related. The prosecutor also emphasized the fact that Harmon displayed no

surprise when Olivier started their first discussion about the drugs, that Harmon unhesitatingly

told Olivier that he had sold drugs in the past, and that Harmon conceded that he never

confronted Hackney about introducing him to a drug dealer. 

or injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.' " Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.

619, 637 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)). Any error that

might have occurred here would not have had a substantial effect on the jury's verdict because (1) the

government produced overwhelming evidence of Washington's predisposition, and because (2) the

commendation evidence was cumulative of other "good character" evidence that was admitted. First,

the government produced reliable evidence that Washington told Olivier that he had previously sold

marijuana, and that, while Washington was a police officer, he had stolen money and drugs. Second,

appellant was permitted to call four witnesses who attested to his "good character." The

commendationsthat were excluded from evidence were unlikely to be more effective in rebutting the

government's predisposition evidence than the testimony of these live witnesses. For these reasons,

any conceivable error committed in declining to admit the commendations was harmless.

C. Refusal to Admit Evidence of Appellant Harmon's Prior Consistent Statement. At

trial, appellant Harmon (like Washington and Taylor) claimed that at the time he entered his first

meeting with Olivier, he still believed that Olivier was offering the opportunity to do legitimate

private security work. Harmon attempted to establish that, by the time he learned at the first meeting

that the work involved illegal drug-running, he was already too scared to get out of the conspiracy.

In support of his story, he sought admission of testimony from his friend and mentor, Russell

Hairston, that Harmon had told Hairston separately that he was going to be doing some part-time

private securitywork, that he would be paid in cash for the work, and that other police officers would

be working with him.22

Althoughthe courtfound that Harmon'sstatement to Hairstonwasmaterial, and that Hairston

was a credible witness, it nevertheless ruled that the statement did not meet the specific criteria for

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23This subsection of the Rule provides:

(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if

(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is

subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is ... (B)

consistent with the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or

implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or

motive....

FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B). 

admissibility under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B).23 The court acknowledged that the

government had challenged Harmon's credibility, but found that Harmon had not been directly

impeached with prior inconsistent statements, or expressly or impliedly charged with recent

fabrication, or improper influence or motive, as required by the Rule. We review the court's refusal

to admit the statement for abuse of discretion (although the court's ruling on the residual hearsay

exception may not be overturned unless this court has a "definite and firm conviction that the court

made a clear error of judgment," United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 909 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (as

amended) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Harmon argues that the district court erred by refusing to admit evidence of the prior

statement. Individual Brief of Appellant Harmon, at 7-8. He claims that the issue of what he knew

before entering the townhouse for the initial interview with Olivier was crucial in the jury's

determination of his predisposition at the time that he wasinduced to join the conspiracy. He asserts

three alternative theories ofadmissibility: (1) the statement was admissible non-hearsay under Federal

Rule ofEvidence 801(d)(1)(B) because it was offered to rebut an implied charge ofimproper motive;

(2) it was admissible to rehabilitate Harmon's trial testimony even if it did not meet the requirements

of Rule 801(d)(1)(B); and (3) it was admissible under the residual hearsay exceptions set forth in

Federal Rules of Evidence 803(24) and 804(b)(5). The government, on the other hand, argues that

the statement should have been excluded both for lack of rebutting force under Rule 801(d)(1)(B)

and for insufficient probative value under Rule 403.

We conclude that the district court did not err in excluding Hairston's statement from

evidence. First, it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to exclude the statement under Rule

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24Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) provides that a statement is not hearsay if (1) the

declarant testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination about the statement, (2) the

statement is consistent with the declarant's testimony, and (3) the statement is offered to rebut an

express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or

motive. 

25Appellant conceded at trial that there had been no charge of recent fabrication, and does not

raise that argument here. The district court additionally found that the government had made no

charge of improper motive. We need not reach the question of whether this finding constituted an

abuse of discretion because, in any event, the statement was inadmissible for lack of rebutting

force. 

26Rule 803(24) provides:

The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though declarant is

available as a witness: ... (24) Other exceptions. A statement is not specifically

covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial

guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is

offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the

point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can

procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules

and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into

evidence....

FED. R. EVID. 803(24). Rule 804(b)(5) is identical, except that it applies to cases where the

declarant is not available. 

801(d)(1)(B)24 because, even if there had been a charge of recent fabrication or improper incentive

or motive by the prosecution,25 Hairston's statement had no rebutting force against such a charge.

The statement would only have established that appellant told Hairston he was going to be doing

private security work, not that he did not know that his employer was a drug dealer. Second, the

district court did not abuse itssubstantial discretion in finding that the statement wasinadmissible for

rehabilitation purposes because the credibility of Harmon's testimony was subjected only to a

"generalized attack," and more than thisisrequired for admission under thisrationale. United States

v. Pierre, 781 F.2d 329, 333 (2d Cir. 1986) (prior consistent statements must have some rebutting

force "beyond showing that the witness had at an earlier time been consistent with his trial

testimony"). Finally, we do not have the requisite "definite and firm conviction that the [district]

court made a clear error of judgment" in refusing to admit the statement under the residual hearsay

exceptions of Rules 803(24) or 804(b)(5).26 North, 910 F.2d at 909. These two exceptions to the

hearsay rule are extremely narrow and require testimony to be "very important and very reliable."

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27See, e.g., United States v. Tome, 61 F.3d 1446, 1452 (10th Cir. 1995) (" ... Rule 803(24)

should be used only "in extraordinary circumstances where the court is satisfied that the evidence

offers guarantees of trustworthiness and is material, probative and necessary in the interest of

justice.' ") (quoting United States v. Farley, 992 F.2d 1122, 1126 (10th Cir. 1993)). 

28The government points out that it was especially likely that Harmon would be untruthful or

omit important facts given the fact that "Mr. Hairston was an apparently law-abiding individual

awaiting admission to the District of Columbia Bar." Brief for Appellee, at 82. 

United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 766 (D.C. Cir. 1979); see also Securities &Exchange Comm'n

v. First City Financial Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1225 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (stating that "the legislative

history of the [Rule 803(24)] exception indicates that it should be applied sparingly" and

"acknowledg[ing]the broad discretiona trial court enjoysin assessing the probityand trustworthiness

of documents"). Thus, the proponent of the statement bears a heavy burden to come forward with

indicia of both trustworthiness and probative force,27 neither of which appellant has succeeded in

doing here. Despite the fact that the district court found Hairston to be a "credible" witness, the prior

statement was not trustworthy because of the unlikelihood that Harmon would have disclosed the

true, illegal nature of the security work he was performing to a friend who was not involved in the

conspiracy. See, e.g., Tome, 61 F.3d at 1453 (explaining that, in order to find the statement

trustworthy, a court must find that the declarant of the prior statement "was particularly likely to be

telling the truthwhen the statement was made.") (internal quotation marks omitted).28 Moreover, the

statement was not "more probative on the point for which it [was] offered than any other evidence

which the proponent [could have] procure[d] through reasonable efforts." FED. R. EVID. 803(24).

Asthe government pointed out, the prior consistent statement was too vague to be inconsistent with

the prosecution's theory. Even if the jury believed the statement to be true, it only established that

appellant said he was going to be involved in some security work and that other officers would be

involved. It did not show that appellant had no knowledge that his prospective employer was a drug

dealer. Thus, the statement did not meet the requirements of these residual hearsay exceptions.

For similar reasons, even if there were any error here, it too would be harmless under the

Brecht-Kotteakos standard. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 617, 637 (1993) (error is harmless

unless it " "had a substantial or injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.' "). As

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29Appellant Harmon was acquitted of this offense. 

noted above, the prior consistent statement was too vague to be inconsistent with the prosecution's

theory. Moreover, a rational juror would not expect any of the appellants involved in the conspiracy

to tell their friends or mentors who were not involved in the conspiracy about itsillegal nature. Thus,

admission of the statement would not have significantly helped Harmon's ability to prove his theory

of the case, and in light of the overwhelming evidence against him, any error was harmless.

D. Sufficiency of Charge on Attempted Possession of CocaineWith Intentto Distribute.

Appellants Taylor and Washington challenge their convictions for attempted possession of cocaine

with intent to distribute29 on two grounds: (1) that there was insufficient evidence to convict them

on this count; and (2) that the jury instructions were erroneous because they permitted the jury to

convict based on insufficient evidence. Individual Brief for Appellant Taylor, at 8-11 (argument

adopted by appellant Washington in his individual brief). We review the sufficiency of the evidence

de novo to determine

whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government,

according theGovernment the benefit of alllegitimate inferences, and recognizing that

it is the jury's province to determine credibility and to weigh the evidence, a

reasonable jury must necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt on the evidence

presented.

United States v. Singleton, 702 F.2d 1159, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (emphasis in original). In

reviewing the jury instructions, we must determine whether, taken as a whole, they accurately state

the governing law and provide the jury with sufficient understanding of the issues and applicable

standards. United States v. Merlos, 984 F.2d 1239, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("[I]n reviewing a jury

instruction we consider not just the challenged phrases, but the instruction as a whole."). However,

as appellants concede, see Individual Brief for Appellant Taylor, at 8, the jury instructions here will

be reversed only for plain error because they were not challenged below. Whoie, 925 F.2d at 1485.

1. Sufficiency of the Evidence. The record contains no evidence that appellants

themselves attempted to possess the cocaine that was being transported by the undercover officers.

Rather, the evidence (viewed in the light most favorable to the government for purposes of this

appeal) showed that appellants willingly and knowingly helped Olivier, whom they believed to be a

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30See, e.g., United States v. Loder, 23 F.3d 586, 591 (1st Cir. 1994) (in order to show "shared

intent," government must present evidence that accomplice had knowledge he was furthering the

crime); United States v. Parekh, 926 F.2d 402, 407 n.9 (5th Cir. 1991) (legal terms "community

of unlawful intent" and "shared intent" are "simply different articulations of the usual requirement

that the [accomplice] associated with a criminal venture ... and sought by his action to make the

venture succeed") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Gomez, 733

F.2d 69, 73 (8th Cir. 1984) (aider and abettor must voluntarily act "with bad purpose either to

disobey or to disregard the law") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

31See also United States v. Zerbst, 111 F. Supp. 807, 810 (E.D.S.C. 1953) ("There can be no

accessory without a principal. One cannot be guilty of aiding and abetting in the perpetration of a

drug dealer, in what they believed to be his possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Consistent

with these facts, the prosecution put forth its charge of attempted possession on an aiding and

abetting theory. In support of the proposed charge, the prosecution explained:

The fact that [appellant] Harmon never touched the suitcase, never touched

any drugs is irrelevant under the government's theory of aiding and abetting the

possession with intent to distribute cocaine. What he did was take a substantial step

in furtherance of hisintended purpose to aid Jose Olivier in the transportation of [the

drugs]. 

After some initial controversy raised by Harmon's counsel, the judge ultimately allowed the attempt

charge against all three appellants on the basis of this aiding and abetting theory. 

Appellants now claimthat there wasinsufficient evidence to convict themunder an aiding and

abetting theory because they did not possess "the same criminal intent as the principals." United

States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 881 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1990). They argue that their convictions must be

reversed because the undercover FBI agents participating in Operation Broken Faith, who were the

so-called "principals" to the attempted possession crime, had no criminal intent whatsoever. The

government, on the other hand, argues that the "shared intent" requirement of accomplice liability

refers not to the fact that the accomplice and the principal must have the same intent, but rather to

the fact that "the accomplice must have some criminal purpose in mind." Final Brief for Appellee,

at 111.30 We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to instruct the jury on the attempted

possession with intent to distribute charge.

It is true that in order to convict an accomplice of a completed substantive crime (rather than

a mere attempt), "there must be a guilty principal before there can be an aider and abettor," United

States v. Staten, 581 F.2d 878, 887 (D.C. Cir. 1978),31and the accomplice and the principal must

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crime without its first being shown that a crime was actually committed by another.... So one

cannot render himself criminally liable as an aider and abettor for aiding in the commission of an

act which is not in fact criminal.").

On the other hand, some courts have carved out significant exceptions to the rule that

there must be a guilty principal and a substantive crime committed. For example, "it is now

generally accepted that an accomplice may be convicted notwithstanding the fact that the principal

in the first degree has not yet been tried or has been acquitted in a separate trial." WAYNE R.

LAFAVE, MODERN CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 754 (2d ed. 1988)

(collecting cases). Similarly, some courts have stated that an accomplice may be convicted

despite the fact that the principal was found not guilty based on some defense not available to the

accomplice, such as entrapment or insanity. See id. Finally, some courts have held that an aiding

and abetting conviction for a completed substantive offense may stand even if the principal is a

government agent with no guilty intent, and even if therefore no substantive crime was actually

committed. See United States v. Meinster, 619 F.2d 1041, 1046 (4th Cir. 1980) (upholding

conviction for aiding and abetting drug smuggling and rejecting appellants' claim that "the absence

of a guilty principal precludes their conviction on aiding and abetting charges"); United States v.

Gould, 419 F.2d 825, 826 (9th Cir. 1969) (per curiam) (upholding conviction for aiding and

abetting the smuggling of marijuana even though there was no "guilty principal" because the drugs

were actually "smuggled" over the border by a government informant). 

32However, in Walker and our earlier decision in Edmond, we emphasized that the aider and

abettor need not have the exact same intent as the principal. Rather, a finding of overlapping

intent between accomplice and principal is sufficient to establish liability. See Walker, 99 F.3d at

442 ("[T]he intent of the aider and abettor must be shown, in crucial respects, to overlap with

(but not necessarily match) the criminal intent of the principal"); United States v. Edmond, 924

F.2d 261, 266, 267 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that, although "the government must prove the

criminal act the defendant is accused of abetting," a jury "could consistently convict the

[defendant-]abettor of first-degree murder while finding the actual perpetrator guilty only of the

lesser offense" because "[t]he degree of murder in each case depends on the mens rea of the

defendant who is on trial.") (emphasis added). 

have a "shared intent." United States v. Walker, 99 F.3d 439, 442 (D.C. Cir. 1996).32In United

States v. Raper, we set forth the specific requirements for convicting an accomplice:

The elements of aiding or abetting an offense are (1) the specific intent to facilitate the

commission of a crime by another; (2) guilty knowledge on the part of the accused;

(3) that an offense was being committed by someone; and (4) that the accused

assisted or participated in the commission of the offense.

676 F.2d 841, 849 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). In purported reliance on

these principles, appellants here claim that they could not legitimately be convicted of aiding and

abetting attempted possession of drugs with intent to distribute because there was no guilty principal,

and because there was no "shared intent" between the "principals" and the accessories (because the

government agents, unlike the appellants, were only pretending to be drug dealers and therefore did

not have the necessary mens rea for the offense). Whatever merit such arguments might have in

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33Under 18 U.S.C. § 2 (in which the common law notion of accomplice liability was codified),

"the acts of the perpetrator become the acts of the aider and abettor and the latter can be charged

with having done the acts himself." United States v. Kegler, 724 F.2d 190, 201 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 

another context, appellants'reliance on these principles here is entirelymisplacedbecause theywere

not charged or convicted of the completed substantive crime, but only of an attempt.

The Model Penal Code has expressly addressed the question we face here. In a section on

the law of criminal attempt, it states:

Section 5.01. Criminal Attempt.

... 

(3) Conduct Designed to Aid Another in Commission of a Crime. A person who

engages in conduct designed to aid another to commit a crime that would establish

his complicity under Section 2.06 if the crime were committed by such other person,

is guilty of an attempt to commit the crime, although the crime is not committed or

attempted by such other person.

Model Penal Code and Commentaries (Official Draft and Revised Comments), Part I, § 5.01(3)

(A.L.I. 1985). In an explanatory note, the Code identifies the purpose behind subsection (3):

Subsection (3) fills what would otherwise be a gap in complicity liability. Section

2.06 [of the Model Penal Code] covers accomplice liability in situations where the

principal actor actually commits the offense. In cases where the principal actor does

not commit an offense, however, it is provided here that the accomplice will be liable

if he engaged in conduct that would have established his complicity had the crime

been committed.

Id. at 297-98 (explanatory note to § 5.01(3)). It is important to highlight the fact that this passage

does not describe an offense of aiding and abetting an attempted crime (in that case, there would be

a guilty principal and an offense, thus posing no problem under the traditional aiding-and-abetting

framework), but rather refers to attempting to aid and abet a crime (an offense for which there may

not be a guilty principal). See id. at 354-56 (comment to § 5.01(3)). But in either case,

paradoxically, the crime ultimately charged is the same. If the principal had actually attempted to

commit a crime but had failed, the aider and abettor would be charged with the same offense as the

principal (attempt to commit the crime).33 If (as here), the principal had only pretended to commit

the crime, and the accomplice attempted to aid the principal by "engag[ing] in conduct that would

have established his complicity had the crime been committed," the accomplice may also be charged

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with an attempt to commit the crime. 

In the latter scenario, however, the prosecution need not show that an offense was actually

committed, nor that the principal and accomplice had a "shared intent." As with other attempt crimes,

the focus of the court's analysis shifts away from external circumstances to an examination of the

defendant'sintent and actionsin furtherance of that intent. Thus, the prosecution must show that the

defendant "acted with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission of the crime

which he is charged with attempting," and that he "engaged in conduct which constitutes a substantial

step toward the commission of the crime." United States v. Mandujano, 499 F.2d 370, 376 (5th Cir.

1974); accord 2 WAYNE R. LA FAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 18

(1986) ("The crime of attempt ... consists of (1) an intent to do an act or to bring about certain

consequences which would in law amount to a crime; and (2) an act in furtherance of that intent

which ... goes beyond mere preparation."). Factual impossibility is no defense. United States v.

Duran, 884 F. Supp. 577, 580 n.5 (D.D.C. 1995) (citing cases), aff'd, 96 F.3d 1495 (D.C. Cir. 1996);

see also 2 LAFAVE & SCOTT, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 41 ("[F]actual impossibility, where the

intended substantive crime is impossible of accomplishment merely because of some physical

impossibility unknown to the defendant, is not a defense."). The court looks instead to the question

of whether, if the facts had been as the accomplice believed them, the principal would have been

guilty. As with other attempt crimes, permitting convictions on the basis of the "attempt to aid and

abet" theory is justified because, even if an offense was not actually committed, the defendant

"manifests the same dangerousness of character as the actor who himself attempts to commit the

offense." Model Penal Code, supra, at 356.

In a case very similar to the one we decide today, the Fifth Circuit reached a similar

conclusion. United States v. Cartlidge, 808 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1987). In that case, a government

informant and other undercover government agents posed as drug dealersin order to catch a corrupt

police officer who "had solicited money from [the informant] in return for providing protection for

drug deals." Id. at 1065. The undercover agents recorded a conversation in which the defendant

"demand[ed] $500 a month to provide protection for [the informant's] involvement in what [the

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defendant] assumed to be a drug operation." Id. at 1066. After several more recorded conversations

in which the defendant accepted money from the undercover agents, assuring them that in exchange

he would "provide security" to drug dealers, the defendant was arrested. Although the drug

operation that the defendant intended to help did not really exist (since the undercover agents were

only pretending to be drug dealers), the defendant was charged with and convicted of attempting to

aid and abet in the federal crime of possession and distribution of marijuana.

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit upheld the conviction for attempted aiding and abetting of the

drug offense. As the Cartlidge court pointed out, the federal Controlled Substances Act punishes

"[a]ny person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense" enumerated in the Act. 21 U.S.C.

§ 846 (1994). Neither the statute itself nor its legislative history provides any other explanation of

what constitutes an attempt, so "federal courts have, like state courts faced with a similar problem,

followed the principles of attempt liability developed at common law." Cartlidge, 808 F.2d at 1066.

Under the common law model, the defendant could be convicted of attempted aiding and abetting

possession with intent to distribute, despite the fact that no drug offense was actually committed by

a principal, if he (1) had exhibited a criminal intent consistent with the crime of aiding and abetting

a drug operation; and (2) had "moved beyond preparation" and completed the "requisite substantial

step" toward committing that crime by accepting the money and by promising to protect the

purported "drug dealers." Id. at 1068-69.

Similarly here, the evidence construed in the light most favorable to the government showed

that appellants had a criminal intent consistent with the crime of aiding and abetting possession of

cocaine (based on the tapes of their discussions with Olivier, evidence of their discussions with each

other, as well as their actions). Moreover, they took very substantial steps toward committing that

crime (e.g., meeting with Olivier, agreeing to protect drug dealers and accepting cash payments for

doing so, and protecting the "drug dealers"), and would have committed the crime, but for the fact

that the crime was made factually impossible because the "principals" were really undercover

government agents. As noted above, factual impossibility is no defense to an attempt crime. Under

these circumstances, there clearly was sufficient evidence to convict appellants of attempted

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34That portion of the charge stated:

It is not necessary that a defendant have had the same intent as a principal offender

when the crime was committed or that he have intended to commit the particular

crime committed by the principal offender. An aider and abettor is legally

responsible for the acts of other persons that are the natural and probable

consequences of the crime in which he intentionally participates.

In the case of felony murder, unlike here, an actual crime (of murder) is committed, there is some

overlapping intent between accomplice and principal, and the murder can be seen as a "natural and

probable consequence" of the crime in which the accomplice intended to participate. 

possession with intent to distribute.

2. Jury Instructions. Although we have established that there was sufficient evidence to

convict appellants of the attempted possession with intent to distribute charge, we must still address

the question of whether the jury instructions on that charge were plainly erroneous. United States

v. Gatling, 96 F.3d 1511, 1524 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

Most of appellants' objectionsto the jury instructions are based on their erroneous view that,

for a charge of attempted aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute, the accomplice and

the "principal" must have a "shared intent." Individual Brief for Appellant Taylor, at 10-11. Those

arguments were addressed and rejected in the previous section on the sufficiency of the evidence.

However, appellants do correctly point out that the district court included some language in the jury

instructions that was not supported by the evidence. For example, although the language of the

second to last paragraph of the charge is drawn from the Redbook, that particular version of the

instruction is explicitly designed for situationslike felonymurder, in which there is originally a shared

intent between the principal and the accessory, but where the accessory may not actually have

intended the crime which the principal ultimately committed. Id. at 10 (citing D.C. Bar Association,

Criminal Jury Instructions(1993 ed.) (Instr. 4.02Comment)).34 Similarly, some of the district court's

instructions (for example, those that explain the requirements for convicting a person of attempted

possession, without referring to an aiding and abetting theory) seem to lay the groundwork either for

a charge of direct attempted possession, or for aiding and abetting attempted possession, neither of

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35On the contrary, there was no evidence that the defendants themselves attempted to possess

the cocaine, only that they attempted to help others to do so. Moreover, the government agents

did not meet the requirements for attempted possession because there was absolutely no factual

basis for finding that they possessed the requisite criminal intent. 

36The court stated:

The essential elements of the crime of possession with intent to distribute

cocaine are:

Again, that a person possessed a controlled substance;

That a person did so knowingly and intentionally. This means consciously,

voluntarily, and one purpose, not mistakenly, accidentally, or inadvertently;

That when a person possessed a controlled substance, he had the specific

intent to distribute it. Distribute means to transfer or attempt to transfer to

another person.... 

37The court explained in part that:

which was supported by the evidence here.35

Yet, in spite of the fact that the district court included some superfluous language describing

legal theories that were not supported by the evidence, we cannot conclude that these inclusions

constituted plain or reversible error. We will find plain error "only if the defendant has shown a clear

or obvious error occurred that affected substantial rights." Gatling, 96 F.3d at 1525. The defense

must show that this error "was prejudicial and actually affected the outcome below," and that it was

an error that "seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings."

Id. (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 735-36) (internal quotation marks omitted). This standard is not met

here.

First, no error was committed that seriously affected the fairness of the trial. Although the

instructions included descriptions of theories of liability that were not necessarily supported by the

evidence, this does not constitute reversible error because the instructions viewed as a whole

provided an entirely adequate explanation of all of the elements that go into a proper attempt to aid

and abet charge. The court began by laying out the requirements for the offense of possession of

cocaine with intent to distribute.36 The court also correctly advised the jury of the requirements for

convicting a defendant of an attempt crime,37and of the requirements for finding accomplice

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In order to find the defendant guilty of the crimeI'm sorry, in order to find a

defendant guilty of committing the crime of attempted possession with the intent to

distribute cocaine as charged in the indictment, the government must first prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that the particular defendant's mental processes passed

from the stage of thinking about the crime to actually intending to commit the

crime, and secondly, that the physical conduct of the defendant went beyond the

stage of mere preparation to some firm, clear, and undeniable action to accomplish

that intent. 

38The court instructed the jury in part that:

To find the defendant aided and abetted in committing a crime, you must

find the defendant knowingly associated himself with the persons who committed

the crime, that he participated in the crime as something he wished to bring about,

and that he intended by his actions to make it succeed.

Some affirmative conduct by the defendant in helping or carrying out the

crime is necessary....

It is not necessary that a defendant have had the same intent as a principal

offender when the crime was committed or that he have intended to commit the

particular crime committed by the principal offender.... 

39In Collins, we explained that, whereas "[j]urors are not generally equipped to determine

whether a particular theory of conviction submitted to them is contrary to law," id. (citing Yates v.

United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1956)), nonetheless "a general verdict cannot be set aside merely

because one of the possible bases of conviction is unsupported by substantial evidence" because

jurors are presumed to be "well equipped, through their intelligence and expertise, to analyze the

evidence and convict on the ground with sufficient evidence." Id.

liability.38 Thus, the district court succeeded in explaining to the jury each of the elements of the

crime of attempting to aid and abet possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Moreover,

although the instructions also suggested some theories of liability that were not supported by the

evidence, it is a well-established principle that when a jury is instructed on multiple acts that may

legally form the basis for a conviction, a general verdict must be sustained so long as "the evidence

issufficient with respect to any one ofthe acts charged." Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 56-57

(1991) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Collins, 56 F.3d 1416, 1421

(D.C. Cir. 1995) (upholding conviction in a case where one basis of charge wasfactually unsupported

but other basis was supported), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 737 (1996).39

Second, the error, if any, did not rise to the level of plain error because the defendants were

not prejudiced thereby. For one thing, a rational jury presumably would ignore those charges that

were unsubstantiated by the facts of the case. Moreover, the prosecution presented overwhelming

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40See D.C. Code § 4-142 (1988) (prescribing penalty for any officer who neglects to make an

arrest for an offense committed in the officer's presence); 6A DCMR § 200.4 (1988) ("[m]embers

of the [MPD] force shall be held to be always on duty"); cf. Bauldock v. Davco Food, Inc., 622

A.2d 28, 320 (D.C. 1993). 

evidence that the defendants were guilty of attempting to aid and abet possession with intent to

distribute. In light of this overwhelming evidence, the appellants' only chance of acquittal was if the

jury believed their entrapment defense. But the elements of that defense (i.e., inducement and

predisposition) were completely separate from and independent of the elements of the attempted

possession charge. Thus, the defendants did not show any error in the instructions which possibly

could have "actually affected the outcome below." We therefore conclude that there was no

reversible error in the jury instructions on the attempt charge.

E. Permissibility of Bribery Instructions. In defining an essential element of the bribery

count, the district court instructed the jury: "the defendant demanded, sought, received, accepted,

or agreed to receive or accept a thing of value corruptly in return for being influenced in the

performance of any official act, or being persuaded to omit an act in violation of his official duty."

Harmon contends that there was no evidence that he received payments in exchange for omitting an

act in violation of his duty, and therefore, the district court erred in instructing the jury on a charge

unsupported by the evidence. This contention is without merit.

When a jury is instructed on multiple acts that may form the basis of a conviction, " "the

verdict stands if the evidence is sufficient with respect to any one of the acts charged.' " Griffin v.

United States, 502 U.S. 46, 56-57 (1991) (quoting Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 420

(1970)). The fact that the district court may have instructed the jury on an additional ground not

warranted by the evidence thus would not in itself establish grounds for reversing the bribery

conviction. In the instant case, in any event, the instruction was supported by the evidence. The

evidence showed that the defendants did "omit an act" in violation of their duties as police officers:

they failed to arrest or even investigate a drug trafficker.40 Each appellant acknowledged that he

thought "Jose" was a drug dealer, yet none arrested him, began an investigation into his activities, or

reported him to the police department. Moreover, Harmon admitted that he accepted a bribe rather

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than taking appropriate "police procedures and arrest[ing] [Jose] or mak[ing] some type of report,"

and Taylor testified that he had accepted $2000 in return "for not arresting Jose." Based on this

testimony, the jury reasonably could have concluded that the bribes were an inducement for the

officers to keep quiet, as well as a payment for their affirmative misconduct. The district court's jury

instruction on bribery thus comported with the evidence.

III.

We turn to appellants' contention that the district court abused its discretion in excluding the

testimony of their expert witnesses, and then address their challenges to their convictions under 18

U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).

A. Expert testimony. Appellants contend that the district court abused its discretion in

granting the government's motion to exclude the proposed expert testimony of Dennis Fitzgerald and

GeorgeSmith. Fitzgerald, an advisor to law enforcement agencies on corruption training, would have

testified that MPD police training was insufficient to prepare young police officers to identify and

resist corrupt overtures. Smith, a member of the Tucson, Arizona, police force who had set up many

sting operations, would have testified that the design and implementation of OperationBroken Faith,

as manifest by the language used by Agent Olivier, created a coercive environment and effectively

limited the young officers' realistic options to resist. Because the proposed expert testimony would

allegedly have permitted the jurors to understand the "unique culture of law enforcement" and the

particular pressures and difficulties faced by young police officers in confronting police corruption,

appellants maintain that the district court's exclusion of such testimony prejudiced their ability to

present an entrapment defense.

Under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the district court may admit expert

testimony that "assist[s] the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue."

FED. R. EVID. 702. But "[expert] testimony should ordinarily not extend to matters within the

knowledge of lay[persons]." United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624, 628 (D.C. Cir. 1992). In other

words, "[w]here the jury is just as capable of drawing correct conclusions as the witness possessed

with special training, expert testimony is unnecessary." United States v. Fadayini, 28 F.3d 1236,

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1241 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Even when testimony may assist the trier of fact for purposes of Rule 702,

the district court may nonetheless exclude such testimony on the groundsthat it is unduly prejudicial

under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. United States v. Hall, 969 F.2d 1102, 1109 (D.C.

Cir. 1992). "A trial court has "broad discretion' in deciding both issues, and its decision to admit or

exclude expert testimony will be sustained unless the court has in fact abused that discretion. Id. at

1109-10 (internal citations omitted); see also Fadayini, 28 F.3d at 1241.

In considering Fitzgerald's proffered testimony, the district court found that the testimony,

which "focuse[d] on something the government failed to do in its training program," was not

"relevant to the issue of whether the defendants were either predisposed to commit the crime or not

predisposed to commit the crime charged." In evaluating Smith's proffered testimony, the district

court concluded that hisinterpretation of the conversations and interaction among Agent Olivier and

appellants would not assist the jury because it pertained to matters wellwithin the jurors' knowledge.

Not only was the proposed testimony unnecessary, the district court explained, but its admission

would have presented the risk that the jurors would substitute the expert's interpretation of the

conversations and interaction for their own. Finally, the district court stated that the proffered

testimony of both experts was too generalabout training or sting operations in generalto be of

assistance to the jury.

We find no abuse of discretion by the district court in excluding the proffered experts'

testimony. The district court could reasonably conclude not only that the jurors were capable of

understanding the evidence in the instant case and determining facts in controversy simply by

evaluating the agents' and appellants' own words and demeanor on tape and in the courtroom, see

United States v. Mitchell, 49 F.3d 769, 780 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 327 (1995); see also

United States v. Devine, 787 F.2d 1086, 1087-88 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848 (1986), but

that the general expert testimony on corruption training and sting operations risked distracting the

jury fromthe true issues ofthe trial. See United States v. Rouco, 765 F.2d 983, 995 (11thCir. 1985),

cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1124 (1986). As the Eleventh Circuit stated in United States v. Evans, 910

F.2d 790 (11th Cir. 1990), which affirmed the exclusion of a linguist's expert testimony interpreting

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41In interpreting the language of § 924(c), the in banc court stated that "Congress was focusing

on the defendant's employment of a gun for the purpose of bringing about a crime." Anderson,

59 F.3d at 1326. Appellants' contention, that Anderson thus establishes that a conviction under §

924(c)(1) requires proof of carrying with a specific purpose or intent related to the drug

recorded conversations as evidence of entrapment:

[Q]uestions regarding the defendant[s'] understanding of the illegality of the

operation and the extent of government inducement were at the center of the

trial. The jury's task was to determine, on the basis of its collective experience

and judgment, what [the defendants'] state of mind was when [they] accepted

the money and whether [they were] entrapped into committing the crime for

which [they were] charged.

Id. at 803. The defendants, after all, were members of the MPD, and the jury was in a position to

understand that as police officers they would be alert to unlawful conduct even more readily than

most persons. Expert testimony essentially to excuse their status as members of the MPD would have

been misleading. Moreover, it would have had little bearing on the central issue relevant to

appellants' entrapment defense: whether they had a predisposition to commit the crimes with which

theywere charged. Hence, we reject appellants' contention that the district court abused its discretion

in excluding the proffered expert testimony.

B. Firearms Convictions. Appellants challenge their convictions under 18 U.S.C. §

924(c)(1) on five independent grounds, including the sufficiencyofthe evidence; the jury instructions

on co-conspirator liability, unanimity, and "use"; and the permissibility of their second firearms

convictions in light of United States v. Anderson, 59 F.3d 1323 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,

116 S. Ct 542 (1995). Only the last challenge has merit.

1. Sufficiency of the evidence. Appellants contend that, even assuming that they could

be held vicariouslyliable for the acts oftheir co-conspirators, the evidence wasinsufficient to support

any of their firearms convictions. In order to convict under § 924(c)(1), the government must show

that the defendant "use[d] or carrie[d] a firearm," and that the use or carrying was "during and in

relation to" a "crime of violence or drug trafficking crime." Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223,

227-28 (1993). "The phrase "in relation to' thus, at a minimum, clarifies that the firearm must have

some purpose or effect with respect to the drug trafficking crime; its presence or involvement cannot

be the result of accident or coincidence." Id. at 237-38.41 "[T]he gun at least must facilitate, or have

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trafficking crime, misconstrues this statement by removing it from its context. Holding that

multiple § 924(c)(1) convictions could not be linked to only one underlying predicate offense, the

Anderson court was merely clarifying that Congress did not intend to criminalize every discrete

occasion that a defendant used or carried a gun during an ongoing drug crime, but instead

intended only to criminalize the circumstance of "the defendant's advancement of his criminal ends

by means of a gun." Id. at 1326-27. 

42"Members of the [MPD] force, when off duty any place in the District of Columbia, except in

their residences, shall carry their badges, identification cards and service revolvers at all times." 

District of Columbia v. Davis, 386 A.2d 1195, 1202 (D.C. 1978) (quoting MPD Manual 2:3:1). 

the potential of facilitating, the drug trafficking offense." Id. at 238 (internal quotation marks and

brackets omitted). According to appellants, no rational juror could have found that they or any of

the other officers, all of whom were required by police regulations to carry their guns at all times,42

had an intent or purpose to make illegal use of the weapons for the purpose of facilitating a drug

trafficking offense.

In reviewing a sufficiency challenge, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the

government. United States v. Fennell, 53 F.3d 1296, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Given Olivier's

instructions to the defendants that their guns and badges would be necessary to the drug runs, and

the defendants' compliance in carrying their guns while escorting the couriers, there was sufficient

evidence to support appellants' § 924(c) convictions, notwithstanding appellants' self-serving

testimony that they did not intend to use their guns. Not only was appellants' testimony significantly

discredited throughout the trial, but their co-conspirators, Officers Hackney, Wiggins, and Harris,

admitted that they carried, and were prepared to use, their guns to ensure the couriers' safe passage

through the District of Columbia. In light of this evidence, a reasonable juror could find that

appellants carried their guns in relation to the drug operations.

2. Instruction on co-conspirator liability. In Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640,

647-48 (1946), the Supreme Court held that a co-conspirator may be held vicariously liable for

reasonably foreseeable substantive offenses committed by other co-conspiratorsin furtherance ofthe

conspiracy. In the instant case, when the district court advised that it intended to instruct the jury on

the Pinkerton theory of liability with respect to the § 924(c)(1) counts, appellants objected, stating

"It may be the law, but it was not what the government argued, and it was not consistent with the

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evidence presented in the case." Over defense objection, the district court instructed the jury:

If you find that any or all of the defendants were members of a conspiracy, you may

find each defendant guilty of carrying or using a firearm during and in relation to a

drug trafficking offense if any of their fellow co-conspirators committed this offense

during the existence of the conspiracy and in furtherance of the conspiracy. This is

because each member of a conspiracy is considered to be responsible for any offense

committed by a co-conspirator that could have been reasonably expected or

anticipated as a necessary or a natural consequence of the conspiracy.

Appellants' initial contention that Pinkerton liability ought not apply to § 924(c)(1) charges

in drug conspiracy cases is meritless. Consistent with the decisions in numerous other circuits, see,

e.g., United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 1464 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Dean, 59 F.3d

1479, 1489-90 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 748 (1996); United States v. DeMasi, 40

F.3d 1306, 1319-20 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 947 (1995); United States v. Williams,

31 F.3d 522, 526-27 (7th Cir. 1994), this court has assumed the applicability of Pinkerton liability

to § 924(c)(1) counts. United States v. Long, 905 F.2d 1572, 1577 n.8 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 498

U.S. 948 (1990). As long as the use or carrying of a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking offense

was done in furtherance of the conspiracy and was reasonably foreseeable to the co-conspirators,

Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 647-48, we see no reason, and appellants offer none, that would render

Pinkerton liability inapplicable to § 924(c)(1) offenses.

Appellants' further contention that by instructing the jury on Pinkerton liability the district

court constructively amended the indictment is also meritless. Count Two of the indictment, the drug

conspiracy count, incorporated by reference the "Overt Acts" and "Manner and Means" sections of

Count One, the bribery count. The "Overt Acts" section, which included 59 specifications, did not

include any allegations of use of a firearm during and in relation to drug trafficking. Only the

"Manner and Means" sections mentioned that appellants and their co-conspirators used their badges

and their guns to protect shipments of cocaine. The fact that the use of firearms was not mentioned

in the "Overt Acts" section of the conspiracy count does not mean, as appellants maintain, that the

court should not have instructed the jury on the Pinkerton theory of liability.

Contrary to appellants' view that co-conspirators may be held liable only for the overt acts of

their co-conspirators specifically alleged in the indictment, a theory of defendant liability need not be

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43In support of the constructive amendment claim, appellants rely on United States v. Pedigo,

12 F.3d 618, 630-31 (7th Cir. 1993). In that case, although the defendant was also convicted of

conspiracy, the § 924(c) count charged him with using a firearm during and in relation to a

substantive drug possession count, rather than the conspiracy count. Id. at 629. By contrast, the

§ 924(c) counts in this case specifically alleged that the defendants used or carried firearms during

and in relation to a conspiracy. Moreover, the Seventh Circuit stated that "any broadening of an

indictment, so that a trial jury is presented with more or different theories of conviction than

charged by the grand jury is fatal." Id. at 631. This circuit, by contrast, has stated that the

indictment need only state concisely the essential facts constituting the offense; it need not recite

the government's theory of proof. Edmonds, 924 F.2d at 269. 

pleaded in the indictment. United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879, 894-95 (9th Cir. 1970), cert.

denied, 401 U.S. 924 (1971). Nor can appellants prevail because the indictment did not specifically

list the use or carrying of a firearm as an overt act in the conspiracy count. With respect to the §

924(c)(1) counts, the indictment clearly stated that appellants and their co-conspirators knowingly

used and carried a firearm during and in relation to a drug conspiracy. As the court stated in United

States v. Edmond, 924 F.2d 261, 269 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 838 (1991): "Indictments

do not recite the government's theory of proof, which is what the Pinkerton theory is.... [T]he

function of a federal indictment is to state concisely the essential facts constituting the offense, not

how the government plansto go about proving them." The indictment here stated the essential facts,

and submission of the Pinkerton theory to the jury did not change the charges. Moreover, because

appellants were charged with the firearms offenses in relation to the drug conspiracy, they had

sufficient notice that they could be held liable for the substantive offenses of their co-conspirators.43

Finally, while Pinkerton did mention, as appellants maintain, that an overt act is an "essential

ingredient" of a conspiracy, 328 U.S. at 647, its reasoning in support of finding co-conspirator

liability did not depend on it. As long as a substantive offense was done in furtherance of the

conspiracy, and was reasonably foreseeable as a "necessary or natural consequence of the unlawful

agreement," then a conspirator will be held vicariously liable for the offense committed by his or her

co-conspirators. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 647-48.

Likewise, we reject appellants' contention that the Pinkerton instructions impermissibly

allowed the jury to convict them for acts prior to their membership in the conspiracy. Appellants

maintain that the instruction that each conspirator is liable for co-conspirators' offenses, as long as

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the acts could have been "reasonably expected or anticipated," rather than "reasonably foreseen,"

coupled with the instruction that the relevant time-frame was "the existence of the conspiracy," may

have led the jury to attribute to each appellant liabilityfor the conduct of othersthat took place before

his membership in the conspiracy. Harmon was hired on August 9, 1993, Washington, on September

16, 1993, and Taylor, on October 4, 1993, and the indictment charged that the conspiracylasted from

about March to December 1993. Although it is not inconceivable that the jury instructions could lead

to the danger suggested by appellants, the record makes clear that no such danger existed in the

instant case. At appellant Harmon's request, the jury verdict form was revised to reflect the specific

dates upon which appellants were alleged to have committed the substantive firearms offense. As

marked by the jury, the special verdict form reflects findings of guilt on the firearms offenses for

Harmon on acts committed on August 10, and December 14, 1993, and for Washington and Taylor,

on October 5, and December 14, 1993. Under the circumstances, there is no basis for concern that

the jury instructions caused the jury to believe that it could convict appellants based on the actions

of their co-conspirators that took place before appellants joined the conspiracy. Hence, the

instructional error, if any, was harmless.

3. Unanimity instruction. Appellants' contention that the instructions violated the

requirement that criminal verdicts be unanimous is also flawed. In instructing the jury on the

unanimity requirement, the district court stated, "In order to return a verdict as to any count, it is

necessary that each juror agree to the verdict as to that count. In other words, your verdicts must

be unanimous as to each defendant and as to each count." Appellants maintain that this instruction

violated both the Sixth Amendment and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 31(a). Because the

district court did not require the jury to agree as to the principal factual elements for any of the §

924(c)(1) convictions, they contend that the jury may have rendered impermissibly non-unanimous

verdicts of guilt on the firearmcounts. Because they raise this contention for the first time on appeal,

we review for plain error. 

In United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270, 1281 (D.C. Cir. 1982), the court noted with

approval the rule announced by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Hack v. United States,

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44Concurring in McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 449 n.5 (1990), Justice Blackmun

noted the "general agreement" of the federal courts of appeals that unanimity "means more than a

conclusory agreement that the defendant has violated the statute in question," but that "there is a

requirement of substantial agreement as to the principal factual elements underlying a specified

offense." While the jury need not unanimously credit "each bit of evidence," it must unanimously

agree as to "the nature of the defendant's violation." Id. 

445 A.2d 634, 641 (D.C. 1982), that "when one charge encompasses two separate incidents, the

judge must instruct the jury that if a guilty verdict is returned the jurors must be unanimous as to

which incident or incidentsthey find the defendant guilty."

44 Despite its endorsement of this rule, the

Mangieri court held that, in light of the circumstances of that case, the failure of the district court to

give a special unanimity instruction was not plain error. Similarly, the general unanimity instruction

in the instant case was adequate because there wassufficient evidence of each act that could formthe

basis of the verdict, and in the context of the entire charge and whole trial, a conscientious juror

would have understood the prerequisite of agreement on the essential facts. Mangieri, 694 F.2d at

1281. The co-conspirators admitted that they carried their guns in order to facilitate the drug

conspiracy, and it is uncontested that appellants carried their guns during the drug runs after Oliver

told them that their guns and badges were necessary for protection, i.e., to facilitate the conspiracy.

4. "Use" instruction. In instructing the jury on the "use" prong of the § 924(c)(1) count,

the district court stated, 

[U]se is not limited to firing or brandishing or displaying a gun. Rather, a

defendant uses a firearmwhenever he puts or keeps a gun in a particular place

from which he or his agent can gain accessto it if and when the gun is needed

to facilitate a drug crime. 

Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Bailey v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 501 (1995), which

held that a conviction under the "use" prong of § 924(c) requires proof that the defendant "actively

employed" the firearm, appellants contend, and the government concedes, that the district court erred

in instructing the jury on the "uses" prong of § 924(c)(1). We agree. See United States v. Hung Shun

Lin, 101 F.3d 760, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Washington, 12 F.3d at 1138, 1139).

"A verdict [is required] to be set aside in cases where the verdict is supportable on one

ground, but not another, and it is impossible to tell which ground the jury selected." Yates v. United

States, 354 U.S. 298, 312 (1957); see also Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 58-59 (1991);

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United States v. Collins, 56 F.3d 1416, 1421 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 737 (1996).

Appellants contend that, particularly in light of the fact that co-conspirator Harris stated that he was

willing to "use" his gun to protect the drug shipments on August 10 and December 14, it is possible

that the jury, without even considering the "carry" prong, convicted appellants for "use" of the

firearm. Yet the only evidence in support of the firearms convictions showed that the officers wore

their service pistols on their persons during the drug trafficking offenses; there was no evidence

suggesting that the officers merely "possessed," without carrying, the guns for protection or active

use. Hence, regardless of whether the jury actually convicted appellants under the "use" or "carry"

prong, it is clear that the jury's reasoning included a finding that appellants, or their co-conspirators,

carried their guns. Moreover, the fact that the jury convicted appellants necessarily means that the

jury concluded that the guns were connected, or "related," to the drug offenses. Because it was

impossible, under these facts, for the jury to have found "use" without having concluded that the gun

was "carried" in relation to the drug conspiracy, the erroneous "use" instructions do not require

reversal of the convictions. See United States v. Feinberg, 89 F.3d 333, 339-40 (7th Cir. 1996).

5. Second convictions in light of Anderson. All three appellants were charged and

convicted oftwo violations of § 924(c)(1). Appellant Harmon was charged in Count Eight with using

or carrying a firearm on or about August 10, 1993, during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime,

that is, the drug conspiracy (Count 2) and attempted possession with intent to distribute cocaine on

that same date (Count 7). Appellants Washington and Taylor were charged in Count Eleven with

using or carrying a firearm on or about October 5, 1993, during and in relation to a drug trafficking

crime, that is, the drug conspiracy (Count 2) and attempted possession with intent to distribute

cocaine on that same date (Count 10). All three appellants were charged in Count Twelve with using

or carrying a firearm on or about December 14, 1993, during and in relation to a drug trafficking

crime, that is, the drug conspiracy.

In Anderson, 59 F.3d at 1334, the in banc court held that "only one § 924(c)(1) violation may

be charged in relation to one predicate crime." Consequently, appellants contend, because each of

their two § 924(c)(1) convictions may have been predicated on the narcotics conspiracy, one of each

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45The government contends that because both the conspiracy count and the attempt count may

legally form the predicate for a violation of § 924(c), the court should not reach the "impossible to

tell" analysis. Yet, the government errs by attempting to argue about what is legally permissible in

the abstract. In the instant case, in light of the separate firearms conviction based on the predicate

conspiracy offense, the second firearm conviction was supportable on one ground, the predicate

attempt offense, but not another, the predicate conspiracy offense. Hence, the Yates test controls. 

of their firearms convictions must be vacated. In light of Anderson, the Yates standard once again

governs. 354 U.S. at 312; see also Griffin, 502 U.S. at 58-59; Collins, 56 F.3d at 1421.45 Because

it is "impossible to tell" whether the jury relied on the drug conspiracy as the predicate offense for

each firearms conviction, we agree that one of the § 924(c)(1) convictions for each of the appellants

must be vacated.

The fact that the jury acquitted appellant Harmon of Count Seven, the attempted possession

with intent to distribute charge, but nonetheless convicted him of two violations of § 924(c)(1)

suggests that it is quite likely that his two firearms convictions were predicated on the same offense,

the drug conspiracy. Although it is possible that one of Harmon's firearms convictions was based on

the attempt count, see Anderson, 59 F.3d at 1331 ("[T]he government need not convict ofbut it

must provethe predicate crime ..."), this conclusion, as the government acknowledges, cannot be

made with sufficient confidence to warrant upholding the verdict. Thus, we agree with appellants and

the government that one of Harmon's firearms convictions must be vacated.

Unlike Harmon, Taylor and Washington were convicted of both of the underlying predicates

to the firearms charge inCount Eleven. Yet, contrary to the government's contention, it is impossible

to tell whether the jury actually based its conviction for Count Eleven on the attempt or the

conspiracy charge. In giving a unified charge concerning all three § 924(c) counts, the district court

instructed the jury that each defendant was charged with both "the crime of conspiracy to distribute

or possess with intent to distribute cocaine and the crime of attempted possession with intent to

distribute cocaine," and that both were "drug trafficking crimes" for purposes of § 924(c). The

district court further instructed that the jury should consider the § 924(c) charge only if it "found

beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant committed one of those drug trafficking crimes." In the

absence of contrary record evidence, we assume the jury understands and follows its instructions.

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Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987); Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 242

(1957).

Because the verdict form indicated that appellants Taylor and Washington were charged in

Count Eleven with "carrying or using a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime on

or about October 5, 1993," the government contends that the jury must have based its firearms

convictions on the predicate offense of attempted possession with intent to distribute; it was the only

offense charged for that specific date, and the only evidence presented concerned the conduct alleged

in the attempted distribution count. Yet, the government's reasoning is undermined by the fact of

appellant Harmon's two firearms convictions. The jury verdict form specified the date, August 10,

1993, of Harmon's alleged activities with regard to the § 924(c)(1) count for which attempted

possession or conspiracy could have formed the predicate offense. While the jury convicted Harmon

of the August 10 firearms count, it nonetheless acquitted him of the specific conduct alleged on that

datethe attempted possessionwith intent to distribute chargethussuggesting the juryconsidered

conspiracy to be the predicate offense to the firearms count. Just as it was possible for the jury to

convict Harmon on the firearms count with the conspiracyasthe underlying offense, notwithstanding

the date specification in the jury verdict form and the evidence presented, it was possible that the jury

convicted Taylor and Washington of the second firearms conviction with the conspiracy as the

predicate offense. Under these circumstances we conclude that it is impossible to tell on which

grounds appellants Washington and Taylor were convicted, and, therefore, one of each of their §

924(c)(1) convictions must be vacated. See United States v. Cappas, 29 F.3d 1187, 1188 (7th Cir.

1994).

IV.

Each appellant argues that the district court should have departed from the strictures of the

Sentencing Guidelines because of some unusual features of his case. In addition Taylor and

Washington each challenge the district court's decision to increase his offense level by two pointsfor

obstruction of justice. Finally, Taylor and Harmon each argue that the district court should have

reduced his offense level by two points because he played only a minor role in the offense.

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We review the district court's decision not to grant a downward departure only to determine

whether the sentencing judge misunderstood the scope of his authority to depart. United States v.

Hazel, 928 F.2d 420, 423 (D.C. Cir. 1991). We review the district court's factual findings relating

to reductions or enhancements of a defendant's offense level under the "clearly erroneous" standard,

giving due deference to the district court's application of the Guidelines to the facts. United States

v. Graham, 83 F.3d 1466, 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

A. Downward departure. A district court is not to depart from the Sentencing Guidelines

unless it "finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree,

not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines

that should result in a sentence different fromthat described." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). As the Supreme

Court hasstated, "[b]efore a departure is permitted, certain aspects ofthe case must be found unusual

enough for it to fall outside the heartland of cases in the Guideline." Koon v. United States, 116 S.

Ct. 2035, 2046 (1996).

In sentencing the three defendants to 49 years and four months, the district court stated that

it did "not believe that the length of the sentence equates to the wrongness of the actions of the

defendants." The district court declined, however, to depart from the Guidelines because it concluded

that the circumstances involved in the case had all been adequately considered by the Sentencing

Commission; hence there was "no princip[led] basis for the court to depart under the Guidelines."

In Koon, the Supreme Court adopted as its own the approach that then-Chief Judge Breyer

had taken in United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 949 (1st Cir. 1993), to determine whether to

depart fromthe Guidelines. The court first asks what features of the case are unusual and potentially

take it out of the Guidelines' heartland. Then the court determines whether the Commission has

specifically forbidden departures based upon those features. If not, then the court asks whether the

Commission has encouraged or discouraged departures based upon those features. Koon, 116 S. Ct.

at 2045. Although Koon had not yet been decided when these appellants were sentenced, the district

court expressly (and presciently) followed the framework of Rivera. Nevertheless, the appellants

argue that the district court did not understand the full extent of its freedom to depart from the

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Guidelines. Specifically, they argue that under Rivera the district court, looking at the totality of the

circumstances, may depart based upon a combination of a number offactors no one of which by itself

would be a ground to depart. See U.S.S.G. 5k2.0, comment. ("The Commission does not foreclose

the possibility of an extraordinary case that because of a combination of such characteristics or

circumstances, differssignificantly from the "heartland' cases covered by the guidelines in a way that

is important to the statutory purposes of sentencing, even though none of the characteristics or

circumstancesindividuallydistinguishesthe case. However, the Commission believes that such cases

will be extremely rare.")

Clearly, however, the district court did not misunderstand its authority to depart from the

Guidelines. The court expressly stated that under Rivera "courts are free to consider in an unusual

case whether the factors that make it unusual are present in sufficient kind to warrant a departure,

and I amfree to do this whether or notsuch departures are encouraged, discouraged, or unconsidered

by the Guidelines." The district court also considered the totality of the circumstances: "none of the

factorsidentified by the defendants at least, either individually or collectively,seemto me to raise this

case to the unusual case ... that the Guidelines considers appropriate to take it out of the heartland

type of cases." We have repeatedly emphasized that "if the judge correctly understood the Sentencing

Guidelines and the evidence, knew he could depart, and yet decided to stick to the guideline range,

there has been no incorrect application of the Guidelines ... and so the resulting sentence cannot be

set aside." United States v. Sammoury, 74 F.3d 1341, 1343 (D.C. Cir. 1996). We may not review

the "court's discretionary decision that the particular circumstances of a given case do not warrant

a departure." United States v. Pinnick, 47 F.3d 434, 439 (D.C. Cir. 1995); cf. Graham, 83 F.3d at

1481 (remand proper where district court erroneously thought it could not depart based upon

defendant's vulnerability to abuse in prison).

Even if the court were to review the district court's decision not to depart, we would have to

affirm because the appellants have provided no reason why their sentences fall outside the

heartlandaside from their bald assertion that this case is "atypical." In fact, the appellants point to

only two factors that they claim warrant a downward departure. First, they contend that there was

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no connection between the police officers' pay or conduct and the amount of drugs involved; thus,

they argue, a sentence based upon the amount of drugs involved overstates each defendant's

culpability. Even assuming that there was no connection (which the Government disputes), the

district court properly held that the lack of such a connection "does not provide a basis for

departure." See United States v. Walls, 70 F.3d 1323, 1329-30 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (rejecting defense

of "sentencing entrapment" where undercover police officer who had purchased powder cocaine from

defendant asked him to cook it into crack cocaine in order to subject defendant to greater penalty for

distribution of crack cocaine). The appellants concede that Walls forecloses their claims of

"sentencing entrapment and improper sentence factor manipulation," but they argue that even if the

Government's alleged sentencing manipulation is not by itself sufficient to grant a downward

departure it may be considered as part of the totality of the circumstances.

Unfortunately for the appellants, there is no other mitigating factor to throw into the mix.

They argue that the district court should have considered that the second § 924(c)(1) convictions

entail mandatory additional 20-year sentences. Because we reverse the second § 924(c)(1)

convictionstoday, however, we need not addresswhether a sentencing judge mayconsiderthe impact

of multiple § 924(c)(1) convictions upon a defendant's totalsentence in order to determine whether

to depart from the Guidelines. Left only with the claim that the amount of drugs involved in the sting

operation overstated each defendant's culpability, neither appellant can show that the district court

erred in refusing to grant a downward departure.

B. Upward adjustment for obstruction of justice. Section 3C1.1 of the Guidelines directs

the district court to increase a defendant's offense level by two ifit issatisfied by clear and convincing

evidence, United States v. Montague, 40 F.3d 1251, 1254-56 (D.C. Cir. 1994), that "the defendant

willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice

during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense." In this case the district

court found that Taylor and Washington had each committed perjury and accordingly increased each

defendant's base offense level by two for obstruction of justice.

At trialHackneytestified that he told Washington, wellbeforeWashington'sfirst meetingwith

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Olivier, that Olivier was a drug dealer and that working for him would involve the protection of

cocaine. Washington, however, testified that he did not know Olivier was a drug dealer until he met

him and that he went along with Olivier's scheme only because he was afraid of him. In addition,

Washington denied that he feared or suspected that the operation might be a set-up. The district

court did not believe any of this. The videotape of Washington's first meeting with Olivier clearly

showed that Washington knew in advance that Olivier was a drug dealer and that Washington had

no fear of Olivier. Videotape evidence and testimony also refuted Washington's claim that he had not

been worried about a set-up: Washington was concerned that there might be a video camera in the

fireplace of the townhouse and surveillance equipment on the roof.

The district court further concluded that Washington also perjured himself when he denied

his involvement in a previous crime. In order to establish Washington's predisposition, the

Government introduced evidence, through two witnesses, that Washington had seized and resold

illegalnitrous oxide tanks while working as a security officer at a GratefulDead concert. One witness

was Darryl Lawson, who had pleaded guilty to his involvement in the scheme. The other was a

"Deadhead," a Grateful Dead fan who follows the group around the country, who had attended the

concert and corroborated Lawson's account. Thus does Washington attack the credibility of these

witnesses: Lawson had reason to lie and the Deadhead was high. Despite this, the district court

specifically found the testimony of these witnesses to be "credible" and "very convincing" and we

have no reason to disturb the court's credibility findings.

The district court found that Taylor also perjured himself by denying that he knew that Olivier

was a drug dealer before he met with him in person; Taylor claimed that he did not know drugs

would be involved in this part-time "security job" until he met Olivier. The court also found that

Taylor lied about the meaning of his statement that he would kill Bailey, a member of the conspiracy

who had been driven out because of his lack of discretion. The district court labeled "ludicrous"

Taylor's testimony that he had threatened to kill Bailey only because he was afraid that if Bailey did

not keep his mouth shut then Taylor might get in trouble for engaging in unauthorized (but not

unlawful) part-time security work.

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The district court concluded that there was "clear and convincing" evidence that both Taylor

and Washington testified falsely. Considering the weight of the evidence refuting each appellant's

testimony, we cannot say that this conclusion was clearly erroneous. The court also concluded that

their lies were material and were intended to mislead. As such, we cannot say that the sentencing

enhancement under § 3C1.1 of the guidelines was unwarranted.

C. Denial of downward adjustmentsfor thedefendants' "minor role." Under § 3B1.2(b)

of the Guidelines the district court may reduce a defendant's offense level by two if it finds that the

"defendant's culpability ... was relatively minor compared to that of the other participant(s)" in the

offense. See United States v. Caballero, 936 F.2d 1292, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The district court

refused to grant Taylor and Harmon minor role adjustments because it concluded that each defendant

actively participated in the offense:

Theywere active participants, whose participation ... levelwas consistent with

the others. Nine out of twelve ... took $2,000 bribes....

Here among all ofthese nine defendants, it's apparent to me they're somewhat

equally culpable. 

Mr. Harmon actively recruited Mr. Taylor. Mr. Taylor indicated he would

commit violence on anyone and actually was heavily involved. So it does not appear

that either is entitled to a reduction.

Harmon complains that his participation totaled no more than four hours, consisting of one

"run," a few meetings and telephone calls, and his suggestion that Taylor contact Hackney. But the

Guidelines do not indicate that a defendant's sentence should be determined by reference to the

amount of time in which he actively participated in a criminal enterprise. Great harm can be wrought

in a short time. Harmon also argues that his role was no greater, and possibly less, than that of a drug

courier. The Guidelines, however, direct the sentencing judge to consider a defendant's culpability

relative to that of his comrades, not to that of a hypothetical courier or other prototypical criminal.

For his part Taylor argues that the district court should have considered that he was the "last

recruit" in the operation and that, unlike several others, he never tried to recruit anyone else. For

what it is worth, the record is unclear on the question whether Taylor was the last officer to join the

scheme. He was the last officer to meet Olivier but there is evidence that he expressed an interest in

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the organization earlier in August 1993. Furthermore, although Taylor did not actually recruit any

additional police officers, he freely offered to do so. More important, there was evidence that Taylor

was willing to inject violence into the conspiracy: he offered to introduce to Olivier a hit man.

We have noted before that the district court need not make express findings of relative

culpability so long as it is clear that the court assessed the defendant's "role in the specific criminal

conduct" and did not "gauge his culpability generically." United States v. Edwards, 98 F.3d 1364,

1370 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Here the court did make express findings concerning Taylor's and Harmon's

relative culpability and those findings are based upon sufficient record evidence. 

---------

Accordingly, we affirmthe judgments of conviction in allrespectssave for one ofthe firearms'

convictions of each appellant; we remand the cases for resentencing in light of the vacation of these

convictions.

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