Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03393/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03393-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Herbert Thornton
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-3113

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

James Thornton, *

*

Appellant. *

Appeals from the United States

__________ District Court for the Southern

District of Iowa.

No. 03-3393

__________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

Herbert Thornton, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: May 11, 2004

Filed: May 17, 2004

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Appellate Case: 03-3393 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/17/2004 Entry ID: 1767851 
*

The Honorable Richard W. Goldberg, Judge of the United States Court of

International Trade, sitting by designation.

**The Honorable Ronald E. Longstaff, United States District Judge for the

Southern District of Iowa. 

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Before MURPHY and FAGG, Circuit Judges, and GOLDBERG,*

 Judge of the United

States Court of International Trade.

___________

FAGG, Circuit Judge.

After brothers James and Herbert Thornton sold cocaine base to an undercover

agent several times, the Government charged them with drug crimes. James pleaded

guilty to the conspiracy charge and agreed to cooperate against Herbert. At James’s

sentencing, the district court** denied his motion for a downward departure based on

his cooperation, found he was a career offender, and sentenced him to 262 months in

prison. Herbert stood trial and a jury convicted him of multiple counts. In this

consolidated appeal, James challenges his sentence and Herbert challenges his

conviction. 

James argues the district court should have held a hearing on whether the

Government acted in bad faith in refusing to make a motion for a downward departure

based on his cooperation. James’s plea agreement stated the Government, in its sole

discretion, might file a motion requesting a departure if the Government concluded

James provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of other

criminals. Because the Government expressly reserved its discretion to file the

motion, we perform only a limited review. United States v. Hardy, 325 F.3d 994, 995

(8th Cir. 2003). To challenge the Government’s refusal, James had to make a

substantial threshold showing of prosecutorial discrimination, irrational conduct, or

bad faith. Id. If James did not make this threshold showing, he was not entitled to

an evidentiary hearing. Id.

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We agree with the district court that James did not make a substantial threshold

showing of bad faith by the Government. James submitted no evidence of a punitive

intent. See United States v. Wolf, 270 F.3d 1188, 1190-91 (8th Cir. 2001). Unlike the

situation in United States v. Rounsavall, 128 F.3d 665, 668-69 (8th Cir. 1997), James

did not testify against his brother and James’s plea agreement did not specify what

was required to earn a Government motion. Further, the Government had good

reasons for not using James as a witness. The Government’s decision not to use

James’s testimony at trial was partially tactical, but primarily based on the fact his

testimony was unnecessary given the strength of the case against Herbert. Because

James failed to make the necessary threshold showing of bad faith on the part of the

Government, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his request for

an evidentiary hearing. 

James also asserts the district court erroneously found he was a career offender

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). A defendant is a career offender under § 4B1.1(a) if, among

other things, the defendant has at least two earlier felony convictions of either a crime

of violence or a controlled substance offense. “Crime of violence” means any federal

or state offense punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year that “(1)

has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force” against

another person, or “(2) is burglary of a dwelling . . . or otherwise involves conduct

that presents a serious potential risk of injury to another.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). An

earlier felony conviction means an earlier adult federal or state conviction for an

offense punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, regardless of

whether the offense is specifically designated as a felony and regardless of the actual

sentence imposed. Id. n.1. 

The district court found James had two earlier convictions for crimes of

violence: a 1991 conviction and a 1986 conviction. James admits he conceded at

sentencing the 1986 conviction was a crime of violence, so we decline to consider his

belated arguments regarding that conviction. As for the 1991 conviction, James

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contends he was convicted of first-degree theft rather than robbery, and because the

elements of theft do not include the use of force against another person, see Iowa

Code § 714.2(1), it was not a crime of violence within the meaning of the guideline.

At the sentencing hearing, the Government submitted certified copies of paperwork

related to the 1991 conviction. The Government noted: 

the complaint and affidavit for the robbery second charged notes in the

affidavit portion that Mr. Thornton did commit robbery in the seconddegree against another when he grabbed the victim by the throat and

took the victim’s wallet from the victim’s pants. The trial information

says that Mr. Thornton did, with intent to commit a theft, assault Calvin

Brown and take from his person a wallet containing five dollars cash,

driver’s license, and other personal items, in violation of section 711.3

The trial information does charge Mr. Thornton with robbery second

degree, and 711.3 is the code section for robbery under the Iowa Code.

The district court admitted the exhibits, with no objection from the defense. James

now points out that although the underlying complaint and affidavit indicate he was

charged with robbery, the presentence report shows the conviction as first-degree

theft, with a citation to the code section for robbery, Iowa Code § 711.3. 

A robbery conviction clearly constitutes a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. §

4B1.2 n.1. Even if the offense described in the presentence report was ultimately

pleaded down to first-degree theft, however, the district court correctly counted the

conviction as a crime of violence because of the underlying factual scenario– conduct

presenting a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. See U.S.S.G. §

4B1.2(a)(2); United States v. Johnson, 326 F.3d 934, 936-37 (8th Cir. 2003) (theft

from a person is a crime of violence within meaning of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a); United

States v. Newton, 259 F.3d 964, 968 (8th Cir. 2001) (examining uncontested facts to

decide that conviction was for crime of violence for purpose of § 4B1.2(a)(2)).

Because the 1991 offense was a crime of violence, the district court correctly decided

James was a career offender under § 4B1.1.

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Herbert contends only that the evidence was insufficient to convict him.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude a

reasonable jury could find Herbert guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States

v. Espino, 317 F.3d 788, 792 (8th Cir. 2003). First, the evidence showed Herbert

conspired with James to distribute cocaine base. Herbert argues his mere association

with James is insufficient to establish a conspiracy. The evidence shows, however,

that Herbert played a direct and often controlling role in the conspiracy. Regarding

his conviction for distribution of cocaine base, Herbert contends the Government

failed to show he knowingly sold the drug. The evidence showed Herbert was

familiar with cocaine base as a user, and he knew the bag he gave to the undercover

officer contained cocaine base because the bag was clear. As for his conviction for

attempting to distribute cocaine base, Thornton argues he abandoned the attempt. A

reasonable jury could conclude, however, that Herbert simply tried to relocate the

transaction for completion elsewhere and was arrested before the relocation. With

respect to his conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine base,

Thornton contends he was guilty of mere physical proximity to the drug. Evidence

of Thornton’s role, conduct, and comments at the time showed his constructive

possession of the crack cocaine, knowledge and ownership, dominion or control, and

intent to distribute. 

We thus affirm James Thornton’s sentence and Herbert Thornton’s conviction.

______________________________

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