Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cr-01089/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cr-01089-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Efren Cobian-Jimenez
Defendant
United States of America
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America, 

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v. 

Efren Cobian-Jimenez, 

Defendant-Movant. ______________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CR 03-1089-PHX-EHC

No. CV 04-2630-PHX-EHC (JM)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is Movant's pro se Amended Motion Under 28 U.S.C. §

2255 To Vacate, Set Aside, Or Correct Sentence By A Person In Federal Custody [Docket

No. 47]. In accordance with the Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the

District of Arizona and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), this matter was referred to the Magistrate

Judge for report and recommendation. As explained below, the Magistrate Judge

recommends that the District Court, after an independent review of the record, deny the

Motion.

I. CLAIMS

Movant Efren Cobian-Jimenez is currently confined at CCA/FCC in Florence,

Arizona. On December 30, 2004, he filed a pro se motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255

alleging that he was not thoroughly informed of the consequences of signing the plea

agreement, and that the court unfairly considered his prior criminal history to enhance his

sentence.

Case 2:03-cr-01089-EHC Document 55 Filed 01/06/06 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

II. BACKGROUND

On October 22, 2003, Movant was indicted for Reentry After Deportation in violation

of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), which was enhanced by section 1326(b)(2). Docket No. 7. On

February 3, 2004, pursuant to a written plea agreement, Movant pled guilty to illegal re-entry

after deportation, a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), enhanced by section 1326(b)(2), as

charged in the indictment. Docket No. 42 (Plea Agreement); Docket No. 41 (Judgment in a

Criminal Case). On September 22, 2004, he was sentenced to be committed to the Bureau

of Prisons for a term of forty-one months, to be followed by three years of supervised release.

Docket No. 43 (Judgment [Sentence]). Movant did not appeal.

III. LEGAL DISCUSSION

A. Ground One

In Ground One of the Motion, Movant alleges that his counsel was ineffective in

explaining his plea agreement:

I believe I was not thoroughly informed of the consequences of

signing such an agreement. If I had known, I would never had

signed it. I knew what I was signing but I did not know what

that could or would bring me. Also, I signed an agreement from

27 to 71 months. I was hoping they would give me the

minimum and not the maximum of the sentence. I expect to be

sentenced to the minimum that I was signing for and not the

minimum that I could be charged with.

Motion, p. 4.

Pursuant to the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, a criminal

defendant has a right to “effective assistance of counsel.” Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The Strickland standard for

ineffective assistance of counsel has two components. A defendant must first demonstrate

that counsel's performance was deficient, i.e., that counsel made errors so serious that counsel

was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed a defendant by the Sixth Amendment. 466

U.S. at 687. It requires the defendant to show that counsel's conduct “fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness.” 466 U.S. at 687-688. Second, a defendant must show that the

mistakes made were "prejudicial to the defense," that is, the mistakes created a "reasonable

Case 2:03-cr-01089-EHC Document 55 Filed 01/06/06 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

probability that, but for [the] unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different." 466 U.S. at 694. Counsel's performance is strongly presumed to fall within

the ambit of reasonable conduct unless Movant can show otherwise. Id. at 689-90. 

The Strickland test applies to claims that a defendant did not receive effective

assistance in determining whether to accept a guilty plea. See United States v. Day, 285 F.3d

1167, 1172 (9th Cir. 2002). Under the test, a mere inaccurate prediction of the sentence,

standing alone, does not constitute ineffective assistance. Doganiere v. United States, 914

F.2d 165, 168 (9th Cir. 1990); Iaea v. Sunn, 800 F.2d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 1986). Rather,

Movant must establish that his attorney grossly mischaracterized the likely outcome and

provided erroneous advice on the effects of going to trial. Iaea, 800 F.2d at 865.

Initially, Movant's knowledge of the likely outcome of his case is evidenced by his

recognition in his Motion that he "signed an agreement from 27 to 71 months." Motion, p.

4. He was sentenced to 41 months. Despite his hopes for less time, the record establishes

that he was fully apprised by his lawyer and by the court of the potential sentence to be

imposed under the agreement. At the change of plea hearing, Movant informed the court that

he had met with his lawyer "[a]bout five times." Reporter's Transcript of Change of Plea

Proceedings ("RT"), Docket No. 51, p. 6. Movant and his lawyer stated that the agreement

had been explained to him. RT, pp. 7-8. The court, however, expressed concern because a

Movant, who is a native Spanish-speaker, had not been provided a translated copy of the

agreement and had not had the agreement read to him in Spanish. RT, pp. 8-9. Despite

Movant's statement that he had had enough time to talk to his lawyer about the agreement,

the judge adjourned the hearing to allow Movant time to review the agreement in its entirety

with the court's interpreter. RT, p. 10.

After a four hour recess, the change of plea proceedings were continued. RT, pp. 11-

12. Upon questioning, Movant informed the court that he had the plea agreement read to him

in Spanish and that he had no comments, objections or questions about the agreement. RT,

p. 14. The judge then proceeded to explain to Movant the possible sentence he faced under

Case 2:03-cr-01089-EHC Document 55 Filed 01/06/06 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

the agreement. The judge explained that, "because we have a sentencing procedure now

which considers a number of factors, including a person's criminal history, offense level for

certain conduct . . . . there's a range for time, a minimum amount of time and a maximum

under a range." Reporter's Transcript of Change of Plea Proceedings ("RT"), Docket No.

51, p. 18. Movant was also informed that the range in his case was "somewhere between 27

and 71 months." RT, p. 21. The judge also explained various potential ranges depending on

Movant's criminal history category. RT, pp. 21-22. Movant stated that he understood what

he was being told by the court at the hearing and informed the court that he had discussed the

agreement and its implications with his lawyer. RT, 22-24.

The record does not support a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. Movant

has not identified any inaccurate prediction of the sentence ultimately imposed. To the

contrary, the record discloses that he several times met with his lawyer, understood the plea

agreement and was fully aware of the likely outcome of his acceptance of the agreement.

Moreover, there is no evidence suggesting that he was provided erroneous advice on the

effects of going to trial. Iaea, 800 F.2d at 865. As such, the Court recommends that this

claim be denied.

B. Ground Two

Movant next asserts that his conviction was obtained in violation of the protection

against double jeopardy because the sentencing court used his criminal record to enhance his

sentence. Motion, p. 4. It is not a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause for the sentencing

court to consider a defendant's past criminal history in determining the sentence for the

instant offense of conviction. See United States v. Wright, 891 F.2d 209, 212 (9th Cir.1989);

see also Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983) ("Double Jeopardy Clause does no

more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the

legislature intended.”). As such, this claim also fails and the Court recommends that it also

be denied.

IV. RECOMMENDATION

Case 2:03-cr-01089-EHC Document 55 Filed 01/06/06 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

For all of the above reasons, THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE RECOMMENDS that

the District Court, after its independent review, issue an Order denying Movant's Motion

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 To Vacate, Set Aside, Or Correct Sentence By A Person In Federal

Custody [Docket No. 43].

This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court's judgment. 

However, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of service of a copy of this

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the District Court. See

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72(b), 6(a) and 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Thereafter, the parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to the objections.

If any objections are filed, this action should be designated case number: CV 03-1089-PHXEHC. Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate

Judge may be considered a waiver of a party's right to de novo consideration of the issues.

See United States v. Reyna-Tapia 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

DATED this 5th day of January, 2006.

Case 2:03-cr-01089-EHC Document 55 Filed 01/06/06 Page 5 of 5