Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00405/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00405-6/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Carlos M. Lorigo
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CARLOS M. LORIGO,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,

Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

Case No. 1:13-cv-00405-SKO

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S 

COUNSEL'S MOTION FOR 

ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT TO 42 

U.S.C. § 406(b)

(Doc. 27)

I. INTRODUCTION

On September 4, 2015, counsel for Plaintiff, Steven Rosales, Esq., filed a motion for an 

award of attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). (Doc. 27.) Plaintiff was served with a 

copy of the motion for attorney's fees by mail on September 4, 2015. (Doc. 27, p. 10.) On 

September 8, 2015, the Court issued a minute order allowing Plaintiff Carlos M. Lorigo

("Plaintiff") and the Commissioner to file any objection to Plaintiff’s counsel’s motion by no later 

than September 21, 2015. (Doc. 28.) (Doc. 23.) The Commissioner filed a response on 

September 16, 2015, noting she had no specific opposition to Plaintiff's counsel's motion. On 

October 10, 2015, Plaintiff's counsel filed a supplemental declaration. (Doc. 31.) For the reasons 

set forth below, Plaintiff's counsel's motion for Section 406(b) attorney's fees is GRANTED.

Case 1:13-cv-00405-SKO Document 33 Filed 10/28/15 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brought the underlying action seeking judicial review of a final administrative 

decision denying his claim for disability benefits under the Social Security Act. (Doc. 1.) On 

April 18, 2014, the Court ordered the case remanded for further administrative proceedings before 

an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), and judgment was entered the same day. (Docs. 23, 24.) 

On August 6, 2014, the parties stipulated to an award of attorney's fees and expenses under the 

Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA") in the amount of $3,500, which the Court approved. (Docs. 

25, 26.)

On November 21, 2014, the Commissioner issued a decision finding Plaintiff disabled. 

(Doc. 27-2.) On December 21, 2014, the Commissioner issued a Notice of Award ("Notice) letter 

stating that retroactive disability benefits had been awarded to Plaintiff in the amount of

$39,145.65, which represented "all the money Plaintiff was due through December 2014." (Doc. 

27-3, p. 1.) The Notice letter also stated the following:

We usually withhold 25 percent of past due benefits in order to pay the approved 

representative's fee. We withheld $12,562.25 from your past due benefits in case 

we need to pay your representative.

(Doc. 27-3, p. 3.)

On September 4, 2015, Mr. Rosales filed a motion for attorney’s fees in the amount of 

$12,562 with an offset of $3,500 for EAJA fees already awarded. (Doc. 27.) Due to a 

discrepancy in the amount of Plaintiff's past-due benefit award calculated in the December 21, 

2014 Notice, the Court ordered Mr. Rosales to file a supplemental declaration setting forth the 

amount of Plaintiff's past-due benefits. On October 10, 2015, Mr. Rosales filed a supplemental 

declaration indicating that the past-due benefit award was $53,211.20. (Doc. 31.) Thus, Mr. 

Rosales' maintains his requested attorney's fees – $12,562 – is less than 25% of the past-due 

benefits awarded and comports with Section 406(b).

III. DISCUSSION

Pursuant to the Social Security Act, attorneys may seek a reasonable fee for cases in which 

they have successfully represented social security claimants. Section 406(b) provides the 

Case 1:13-cv-00405-SKO Document 33 Filed 10/28/15 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

following in relevant part:

Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this subchapter 

who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may determine and 

allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess 

of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled 

by reason of such judgment, and the Commissioner of Social Security may . . . 

certify the amount of such fee for payment to such attorney out of, and not in 

addition to, the amount of such past-due benefits . . . . 

42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added). "In contrast to fees awarded under fee-shifting 

provisions such as 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the fee is paid by the claimant out of the past-due benefits 

awarded; the losing party is not responsible for payment." Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 

1147 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (citing Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 802 (2002)). The 

Commissioner has standing to challenge the award, despite that the Section 406(b) attorney's fee 

award is not paid by the government. Craig v. Sec’y Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 864 F.2d 

324, 328 (4th Cir. 1989), abrogated on other grounds in Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807. The goal of 

fee awards under Section 406(b) is to provide adequate incentive to represent claimants while 

ensuring that the usually meager disability benefits received are not greatly depleted. Cotter v. 

Bowen, 879 F.2d 359, 365 (8th Cir. 1989), abrogated on other grounds in Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 

807.

The twenty-five percent (25%) maximum fee is not an automatic entitlement, and courts 

are required to ensure that the requested fee is reasonable. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808-09 (Section 

406(b) does not displace contingent-fee agreements within the statutory ceiling; instead, Section 

406(b) instructs courts to review for reasonableness fees yielded by those agreements). "Within 

the 25 percent boundary . . . the attorney for the successful claimant must show that the fee sought 

is reasonable for the services rendered." Id. at 807; see also Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1148 (holding

that Section 406(b) "does not specify how courts should determine whether a requested fee is 

reasonable" but "provides only that the fee must not exceed 25% of the past-due benefits 

awarded"). 

Generally, "a district court charged with determining a reasonable fee award under 

§ 406(b)(1)(A) must respect 'the primacy of lawful attorney-client fee arrangements,' . . . 'looking 

Case 1:13-cv-00405-SKO Document 33 Filed 10/28/15 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

first to the contingent-fee agreement, then testing it for reasonableness.'" Crawford, 586 F.3d at 

1148 (quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 793, 808). The United States Supreme Court has identified 

several factors that may be considered in determining whether a fee award under a contingent-fee 

agreement is unreasonable and therefore subject to reduction by the court: (1) the character of the 

representation; (2) the results achieved by the representative; (3) whether the attorney engaged in 

dilatory conduct in order to increase the accrued amount of past-due benefits; (4) whether the 

benefits are large in comparison to the amount of time counsel spent on the case; and (5) the 

attorney's record of hours worked and counsel's regular hourly billing charge for non-contingent 

cases. Id. (citing Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807-08). 

Here, the fee agreement between Plaintiff and Mr. Rosales provides as follows:

4. If this matter requires judicial review of any adverse decision of the Social 

Security Administration, the fee for successful prosecution of this matter is a 

separate 25% of the backpay awarded upon reversal of any unfavorable ALJ 

decision for work before the court. Attorney shall seek compensation under the 

Equal Access to Justice Act and such amount shall credit to the client for fees 

otherwise payable for court work . . . 

(Doc. 27-1.) 

The Court has considered the character of counsel’s representation of Plaintiff and the 

results achieved by counsel, which included an award of benefits. As Plaintiff's counsel, Mr. 

Rosales spent 18.4 hours reviewing the transcript and drafting briefs, and Mr. Rosales' support 

staff spent an additional 2.9 hours to prepare various letters and basic filings. (Doc. 27-4.) There 

is no indication that a reduction of the award is warranted due to any substandard performance by 

Mr. Rosales as he secured a successful result for Plaintiff. There is also no evidence that Mr. 

Rosales engaged in any dilatory conduct resulting in delay. 

Mr. Rosales' requested attorney's fees of $12,562 represents less than 25% of the past-due 

benefits paid to Plaintiff and are not excessive in relation to the past-due award. (Doc. 19.)1 See 

generally Taylor v. Astrue, No. 1:06-cv-00957-SMS, 2011 WL 836740, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 

2011) (granting petition for an award of attorney's fees pursuant to Section 406(b) in the amount 

 

1 The Court accepts Mr. Rosales' calculation of the past-due benefit award of $53,211.20, in conjunction with the 

December 2014 Notice of Award issued by the Commissioner. (See Docs. 31, 32.)

Case 1:13-cv-00405-SKO Document 33 Filed 10/28/15 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

of $20,960.00); Jamieson v. Astrue, No. 1:09-cv-00490-LJO-DLB, 2011 WL 587096, at *2 (E.D. 

Cal. Feb. 9, 2011) (recommending an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to Section 406(b) in the 

amount of $34,500.00); Logan-Laracuente v. Astrue, No. 1:07-cv-00983-SMS, 2010 WL 

4689519, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2010) (granting petition for attorney's fees pursuant to Section 

406(b) in the amount of $23,558.62).

In making this determination, the Court recognizes the contingent-fee nature of this case 

and counsel's assumption of risk in agreeing to represent Plaintiff under such terms. See Hearn v. 

Barnhart, 262 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2003) ("Because attorneys like Mr. Sackett 

contend with a substantial risk of loss in Title II cases, an effective hourly rate of only $450 in 

successful cases does not provide a basis for this court to lower the fee to avoid a 'windfall.'"

(quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807)). 

An award of Section 406(b) fees, however, must be offset by any prior award of attorney's 

fees granted under the EAJA. 28 U.S.C. § 2412; Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796. Plaintiff was 

awarded $3,500 in fees pursuant to the EAJA; as such, the fee award will be offset by $3,500.

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons stated above, the Court concludes that the fees sought by Plaintiff’s 

counsel pursuant to Section 406(b) are reasonable. 

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's counsel's motion for an award of attorney's 

fees pursuant to Section 406(b) in the amount of $12,562 is GRANTED subject to an offset of 

$3,500 for EAJA fees previously awarded.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 27, 2015 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:13-cv-00405-SKO Document 33 Filed 10/28/15 Page 5 of 5