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Parties Involved:
Susan Swift
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 5, 2002 Decided February 11, 2003

No. 01-5312

SUSAN J. SWIFT,

APPELLANT

V.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(99cv00145)

Michael D. Kohn argued the cause for appellant. On the

briefs was Susan J. Swift, appearing pro se.

Douglas Letter, Litigation Counsel, U.S. Department of

Justice, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief

were Roscoe C. Howard Jr., U.S. Attorney, and David W.

Long, Attorney.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

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Before: EDWARDS, HENDERSON, and RANDOLPH, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.

RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge: On January 19, 1999, Susan

Swift, a former Department of Justice attorney employee,

brought a qui tam action against one employee and two

former employees of the Justice Department’s Office of Legal

Counsel, claiming that in 1992 and thereafter they had conspired to defraud the government, in violation of the False

Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(3). For reasons unnecessary

to recount, one of the defendants was dropped from the case.

Swift alleged that the remaining two defendants had also

violated 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) and (2) by presenting a false

claim to the government. The alleged fraud, which dealt with

time sheets and leave slips, amounted to $6169.20.

On April 2, 1999, without purporting to intervene, the

government moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the

amount of money involved did not justify the expense of

litigation even if the allegations could be proven. Swift

opposed dismissal and requested a hearing. She also sought

leave to engage in discovery in order to learn the Justice

Department’s policy about dismissal of qui tam actions, and

she moved to unseal the record, arguing that this would

facilitate her efforts to gather information about the policy.

The district court ordered a hearing, but denied Swift’s

motions for discovery and unsealing. After several delays

and the hearing, the court dismissed the complaint, holding

that the government had demonstrated that dismissal was

rationally related to a valid governmental purpose. As a

result, the complaint was never served on the defendants.

Swift’s appeal is on the grounds that the government

cannot move to dismiss without first intervening, that the

government did not justify its decision to dismiss, that dismissal was improper since the government did not investigate

her claims, and that the district court erred in denying her

discovery and in refusing to unseal the record.

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The section of the False Claims Act dealing with the

government’s dismissal of qui tam actions provides: ‘‘The

Government may dismiss [a qui tam] action notwithstanding

the objections of the [relator] if the [relator] has been notified

by the Government of the filing of the motion and the court

has provided the person with an opportunity for a hearing on

the motion.’’ 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A). As is evident from

the quotation, the provision does not say that the government

must intervene in order to seek dismissal. Swift concedes as

much, but maintains that intervention is required in light of

§ 3730(b) and § 3730(c)(1).

Section 3730(b)(2) gives the government sixty days, plus

any court-ordered extensions, ‘‘to elect to intervene and proceed with the action’’ after receiving the complaint and being

informed of the material evidence. At the end of the sixtyday period (unless extended), the government ‘‘shall proceed

with the action TTT or notify the court that it declines to take

over the action.’’ 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4). Swift views

§ 3730(b)(4) as giving the government but two options: intervene or do not intervene. This is correct, but she misses the

point that § 3730(b)(2) makes intervention necessary only if

the government wishes to ‘‘proceed with the action.’’ Ending

the case by dismissing it is not proceeding with the action; to

‘‘proceed with the action’’ means, in the False Claims Act,

that the case will go forward with the government running

the litigation. Cf. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co.

v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 118 (1968).

The other provision Swift cites, § 3730(c)(1), reads: ‘‘If the

Government proceeds with the action, it shall have the primary responsibility for prosecuting the action, and shall not

be bound by an act of the [relator]. [The relator] shall have

the right to continue as a party to the action, subject to the

limitations set forth in paragraph (2).’’ Swift’s position is that

the phrase ‘‘subject to the limitations set forth in paragraph

(2)’’ means that the government’s dismissal power under

§ 3730(c)(2) exists only within the context of § 3730(c)(1). So

viewed, the government could not move to dismiss unless it

had complied with § 3730(c)(1) by intervening and proceeding

with the action.

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Her interpretation is unwarranted. The phrase ‘‘subject to

the limitations set forth in paragraph (2)’’ can signify only

that the relator’s right to remain a party after the government has intervened is constrained by the government’s right

to dismiss the action pursuant to § 3730(c)(2). Swift’s interpretation requires one to read ‘‘subject to’’ as also having the

converse meaning—that § 3730(c)(1) acts as a limit on the

operation of § 3730(c)(2). Nothing in § 3730(c)(1) justifies

that reading. To support Swift’s interpretation, either

§ 3730(c)(2) would have to be a subsection of § 3730(c)(1)—

which it is not—or § 3730(c)(2) would have to contain language stating that it is applicable only in the context of

§ 3730(c)(1)—which it does not (as highlighted by the fact

that § 3730(c)(2) contains two express constraints on the

government’s ability to dismiss, neither of which is related to

§ 3730(c)(1)). In other words, the second sentence of

§ 3730(c)(1) is limited by § 3730(c)(2), but § 3730(c)(2) is

independent of § 3730(c)(1).

In any event, the question whether the False Claims Act

requires the government to intervene before dismissing an

action is largely academic. As Swift conceded at oral argument, if there were such a requirement, we could construe the

government’s motion to dismiss as including a motion to

intervene, a motion the district court granted by ordering

dismissal. See United States ex rel. Neher v. NEC Corp., No.

92–2854, slip op. at 30 (11th Cir. Apr. 28, 1995).

Swift has a separate reason why the district court improperly dismissed the case. The district court applied the standard stated in United States ex rel. Sequoia Orange Co. v.

Sunland Packing House Co., 912 F. Supp. 1325, 1339 (E.D.

Cal. 1995), aff’d sub nom. United States ex rel. Sequoia

Orange Co. v. Baird–Neece Packing Corp., 151 F.3d 1139 (9th

Cir. 1998). Under that standard, the government may dismiss a qui tam case over the relator’s objection if (1) the

government shows that the dismissal is rationally related to a

valid purpose, and (2) once the government satisfies this

burden, the relator fails to show that the decision to dismiss

was fraudulent, illegal, or arbitrary and capricious. Sequoia,

151 F.3d at 1145.

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We hesitate to adopt the Sequoia test. It may be that

despite separation of powers, there could be judicial review of

the government’s decision that an action brought in its name

should be dismissed. Cf. United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d

504, 513 (5th Cir. 1975). But we cannot see how

§ 3730(c)(2)(A) gives the judiciary general oversight of the

Executive’s judgment in this regard. The section states that

‘‘The Government’’—meaning the Executive Branch, not the

Judicial—‘‘may dismiss the action,’’ which at least suggests

the absence of judicial constraint. To this must be added the

presumption that decisions not to prosecute, which is what

the government’s judgment in this case amounts to, are

unreviewable. Cf. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831–33

(1985); Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C.

Cir. 1967). Reading § 3730(c)(2)(A) to give the government

an unfettered right to dismiss an action is also consistent with

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 41(a)(1)(i) permits a plaintiff to dismiss a civil action ‘‘without order of the

court’’ if the adverse party has not yet filed an answer or a

motion for summary judgment. A dismissal pursuant to Rule

41(a)(1)(i) is not subject to judicial review. See Randall v.

Merrill Lynch, 820 F.2d 1317, 1320 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In qui

tam actions, the complaint remains under seal for ‘‘at least’’

sixty days; government dismissal within that period necessarily occurs before the defendant has answered. (If the government tried to have an action dismissed after the complaint

had been served and the defendant answered, it might be

subject to Rule 41(a)(2), which requires an order of the court

‘‘upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper.’’)

The relator’s right to a hearing, as set forth in

§ 3730(c)(2)(A), is all that points to a role for the courts in

deciding whether the case must go forward despite the government’s decision to end it. The Sequoia court viewed this

provision as authorizing judicial review of the government’s

reasons for dismissal, 912 F. Supp. at 1338, explaining that

this would not ‘‘place an additional burden on the executive’s

exercise of prosecutorial discretion, because the constitution

itself prohibits arbitrary or irrational prosecutorial decisions.’’

Id. at 1340. This is not an accurate statement of constitutionUSCA Case #01-5312 Document #731361 Filed: 02/11/2003 Page 5 of 8
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al law with respect to the government’s judgment not to

prosecute. The Constitution entrusts the Executive with

duty to ‘‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’’

U.S. CONST., art. II, § 3. The decision whether to bring an

action on behalf of the United States is therefore ‘‘a decision

generally committed to [the government’s] absolute discretion’’ for the reasons spelled out in Heckler v. Chaney, 470

U.S. at 831. The government’s discretion to dismiss an action

it has already brought may not be absolute, but even then

courts presume the Executive is acting rationally and in good

faith. See, e.g., Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 30

(1977); see also United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456,

464–65 (1996). Nothing in § 3730(c)(2)(A) purports to deprive the Executive Branch of its historical prerogative to

decide which cases should go forward in the name of the

United States. The provision neither sets ‘‘substantive priorities’’ nor circumscribes the government’s ‘‘power to discriminate among issues or cases it will pursue.’’ Heckler v.

Chaney, 470 U.S. at 833. We therefore conclude that the

function of a hearing when the relator requests one is simply

to give the relator a formal opportunity to convince the

government not to end the case. While the government

conceded at oral argument that there may be an exception for

‘‘fraud on the court,’’ no evidence of that sort was presented,

and we therefore do not pass on whether this type of exception, or any other, might be consistent with our reading of

§ 3730(c)(2)(A).

The Sequoia court also justified its test on the basis of

legislative history of the 1986 amendment to the False Claims

Act. The Ninth Circuit quoted statements from a Senate

committee report that a relator may object to a government

motion to dismiss in order to prevent the government from

‘‘dropp[ing] TTT false claims cases without legitimate reasons’’

and may petition for an evidentiary hearing, which the court

should grant ‘‘if the relator presents a colorable claim that the

TTT dismissal is unreasonable in light of existing evidence,

that the Government has not fully investigated the allegations, or that the Government’s decision was based on arbitrary or improper considerations.’’ S. REP. NO. 99–345, at 26

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(1986). But this portion of the Senate report relates to an

unenacted Senate version of the 1986 amendment. That

version read: ‘‘If the Government proceeds with the action

TTT the [relator] shall be permitted to file objections with the

court and to petition for an evidentiary hearing to object to

TTT any motion to dismiss filed by the Government.’’ Id. at

42. The whole point here is that the government has not

elected to proceed; it has elected to dismiss the case. Had

the Senate version been enacted, the Senate report still would

not support the Ninth Circuit’s judgment.

Even if Sequoia set the proper standard, the government

easily satisfied it. The asserted governmental interests were

that the dollar recovery was not large enough to warrant

expending resources monitoring the case, complying with

discovery requests, and so forth, and that spending time and

effort on this case would divert scarce resources from more

significant cases. Although Swift believes that the costs

would be relatively small, the government’s goal of minimizing its expenses is still a legitimate objective, and dismissal of

the suit furthered that objective. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470

U.S. at 831; Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest

Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 859 n.17 (1984). In addition,

Swift failed to establish that the government’s prosecutorial

judgment was arbitrary and capricious, illegal, or fraudulent.

While she asserted that the government’s reasons for dismissal were pretextual, she offered nothing to support the

charge.*

Few words are needed to dispose of Swift’s remaining

arguments. Since the government conceded the truth of

Swift’s allegations when it sought to dismiss, the fact that the

government did not investigate the validity of her charges is

of no consequence. As to her claim that she was entitled to

* The theory is that a relator’s standing derives from the injury

to the United States and a partial assignment of the government’s

claim for damages. See Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v.

United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 773–74 (2000). Dismissal ends the assignment.

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discovery, the Supreme Court has stated that a party is not

entitled to discovery of information relating to prosecutorial

decisions absent a substantial threshold showing. See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 463. As we have said, Swift offered no

evidence to support her allegations that the government acted

improperly. Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in

denying Swift’s motion to unseal the case. Swift did not

oppose the government’s motion to keep the case sealed

during the proceedings on dismissal, and although she had

many months to file a motion to unseal, her motion came at

the eleventh-hour; granting it would have delayed the hearing, which had already been postponed twice at Swift’s request. Cf. Ned Chartering & Trading, Inc. v. Republic of

Pakistan, 294 F.3d 148, 151 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

Affirmed.

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