Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cr-02147/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cr-02147-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joshua Lee Andrew Merritt
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff,

vs.

Joshua Lee Andrew Merritt, 

Defendant. __________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

CR 14-02147-TUC-RCC(EJM)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO

DETERMINE COMPETENCY

Pending before the Court is defense counsel’s motion to determine the defendant’s

competency to stand trial pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241. This motion involves a rather unique

interplay between strong and unwavering religious beliefs and a mental disease or defect.

The precise issue is whether the defendant’s belief that God will intervene and the pending

charges will be dismissed stems from a mental disease or defect that renders him unable to

assist his attorney properly in the defense of this case. Defense counsel maintains that the

defendant’s total refusal to discuss the plea offer, assist in trial preparation, or discuss trial

strategy, are the product of a mental disease or defect which manifests itself in the

defendant’s irrational belief that the charges against him will be dismissed. The government

contends that the medical evidence establishes that the defendant does not suffer from a

mental disease or defect, he is intelligent and understands the legal process, and is able, but

not willing, to communicate with his attorney about the plea offer and assist his attorney in

preparing for trial. 

For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that the defendant does not suffer from

Case 4:14-cr-02147-RCC-EJM Document 94 Filed 03/24/16 Page 1 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 On 12/23/14, a federal grand jury in Tucson, Arizona returned a three-count

indictment against the defendant charging him with the following offenses: Distribution and

Possession of Child Pornography [Doc. #9.]

- 2 -

a mental disease or defect that makes him unable to properly assist his attorney at trial;

rather, this Court finds that the defendant is fully able to assist his attorney in properly

defending this case, but is unwilling to do so. While this unwillingness makes it difficult for

the defense attorney to represent the defendant on these very serious charges, it does not

amount to incompetence under 18 U.S.C. § 4241. Accordingly, this Court recommends that

the District Court find that the defendant is competent to stand trial. 

The Instant Charges:

On December 4, 2014, the defendant was arrested for distributing child pornography

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252. [Doc. 1.] A criminal complaint alleging this federal offense

was sworn to on December 5, 2014, and the defendant had his Initial Appearance on the

same date. The defendant was temporarily detained pending his preliminary hearing and

detention hearing set for December 9, 2014 before this Court. [Doc. 2.] On that date, the

defendant waived his right to a preliminary hearing and was ordered detained pending trial

as a danger to the community.1

 [Doc. 5.] The defendant appealed the detention order to the

District Court and on January 20, 2015, the District Court ordered the defendant released to

the supervision of Pretrial Services on certain conditions. [Doc. 15.] The defendant was

released from custody on January 22, 2015, and has been in compliance with his pretrial

release conditions since his release from custody over a year ago.

Motion for a Competency Examination and Dr. Kaempf’s Report:

On August 31, 2015, defense counsel filed a motion for a competency examination

of the defendant, which was granted by the District Court on September 4, 2015. [Doc. 57.]

Dr. Aimee C. Kaempf performed the competency examination and issued a report dated

October 23, 2015, which addressed her findings and the defendant’s competency to stand

trial. Dr. Kaempf did not provide an opinion as to whether she believes the defendant is

Case 4:14-cr-02147-RCC-EJM Document 94 Filed 03/24/16 Page 2 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 “Ex.” (followed by a letter) refers to the exhibits admitted at the evidentiary

hearings on the competency motion. “12/16/15 Tr.” refers to the transcript of the evidentiary

hearing held on December 16, 2015.

- 3 -

competent to stand trial. (Ex. A. at 11; 12/16/15 Tr. at 5.) 2

 Rather, she sets forth her findings

that the defendant is intelligent and understands the charges and court process, as well as her

concerns regarding the defendant’s ability to assist his counsel in the defense of this case. 

Dr. Kaempf first concluded that the defendant is able to understand the nature and

consequences of the proceedings against him, and demonstrates a solid understanding of the

current charges, possible verdicts, potential consequences, and the basics of the legal system

and courtroom proceedings. (Ex. A at 11.) However, Dr. Kaempf also notes that the

defendant appears limited in his ability to rationally assist properly in his defense due to

magical thinking, ideas of reference, and grandiosity which have been diagnosed as

Schizotypal and Narcissistic personality traits that could also represent early symptoms of

a psychotic illness. (Id.) She further notes that the defendant’s tendency to view his case as

exceptional or unique combined with his strong religious convictions, ideas of reference,

magical thinking, and rigidity have led him to refuse to consider a plea bargain or assist in

trial preparation. (Id.) She concludes that this refusal to engage in these discussions do not

appear to be based in reality and are contradictory to statements he has made regarding his

desire to defend himself and his belief that he should be acquitted. (Id.) Although it may be

possible that the defendant may be choosing not to cooperate with his attorney based on his

strong religious convictions and maladaptive personality traits, she notes that the striking

resoluteness and contradictory nature of his decisions coupled with evidence of underlying

mental illness and possible prodromal psychosis raise significant concerns about his ability

to assist properly in his defense. (Id.) 

Testimony Presented at the Evidentiary Hearing on December 16, 2015:

Because Dr. Kaempf’s report did not provide an opinion as to competency to stand

trial, an evidentiary hearing was set for December 16, 2015. Dr. Kaempf testified at that

hearing, as did Dr. Paul Simpson, the psychologist who conducted a psychosexual and

Case 4:14-cr-02147-RCC-EJM Document 94 Filed 03/24/16 Page 3 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

 Exhibit C is the report of Dr. Simpson’s psychosexual and psychosocial evaluation

which notes his concerns about competence; Exhibit B is Dr. Simpson’s supplemental report

prepared at defense counsel’s request which further addresses competency concerns.

- 4 -

psychosocial evaluation of the defendant. In the report of his evaluation, Dr. Simpson first

raised concerns about the defendant’s competency. (See Ex. B and Ex. C.)3

Dr. Simpson testified that he did not conduct a competency examination of the

defendant, and if asked to do so he would utilize additional tests to help determine

competency. (12/16/15 Tr. at 14, 19, 22-23, 46.) As part of his psychosexual evaluation,

Dr. Simpson met with and interviewed the defendant on two occasions and also met with the

defendant’s mother. (Id. at 11.) With respect to his findings that gave rise to his concern

about the defendant’s competence, Dr. Simpson found that while the defendant denies

depression, his mother reported depressive symptoms, and testing did show some depressive

symptoms. (Id. 13.) Dr. Simpson also found schizoid and narcissistic personality traits --

i.e,. a tendency to be removed from relationships and a feeling that he is special and God will

intervene -- but neither rise to the level of a diagnosis for schizoid or narcissistic personality

disorder. (Id. at 15.) Dr. Simpson also noted some avoidant personality traits, like avoiding

conflict or negative situations by not dealing with them. (Id. at 16-18.) For instance, the

defendant’s refusal to take medication for his diabetes or take recommended anti-depressants.

(Id. at 17.) Dr. Simpson was concerned that the defendant was using the same avoidant traits

with respect to the pending criminal charges by refusing to embrace the reality of what he

is facing and not following his attorney’s advice. (Id. at 17-18.)

Notwithstanding his concerns about the defendant’s failure to follow his attorney’s

advice, Dr. Simpson did not opine that the defendant is unable to do so because his sincere

religious beliefs stem from a mental illness. (Id. at 36, 55, 70.) Ironically, Dr. Simpson

testified that he was a member of the same Pentecostal church attended by the defendant and

his family, and agrees that it is difficult to distinguish between sincerely held religious beliefs

and a mental illness. (Id. at 39, 42, 55, 58.) Dr. Simpson noted that part of the Pentecostal

belief system is “divine healing,” rather than traditional medicine, which could explain the

Case 4:14-cr-02147-RCC-EJM Document 94 Filed 03/24/16 Page 4 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

defendant’s refusal to medicate for diabetes and depression. (Id. at 41-42.) Dr. Simpson

acknowledged that the defendant’s church community and family’s attitudes make it even

more difficult for this defendant to admit to the alleged child pornography offenses. (Id. at

43.) Finally, Dr. Simpson noted that the defendant’s mother shares the same belief that faith

in God will resolve the pending case, and these beliefs can also be a learned familial pattern.

(Id. at 47-48.) 

Although Dr. Kaempf did not reach a conclusion as to competency in her report, she

testified that she believes the defendant is incompetent because he is unable to assist his

attorney as a result of his depression and the schizotypal and narcissistic personality traits she

identified in her report. (Id. at 78-85). She based this conclusion on the defendant’s “ideas

of reference” (experiencing innocuous events or coincidences as having strong personal

significance) and “magical thinking” (believing that God will intervene and his case will be

dismissed). (Id. at 80- 82.) While Dr. Kaempf did not see any evidence of psychosis, she

did testify that the defendant might be exhibiting signs of a prodromal (as yet emerging)

psychosis, given his age and decline in function. (Id. at 89-90.) Dr. Kaempf did not perform

any tests on the defendant, but rather relied on the information in Dr. Simpson’s evaluation.

(Id. at 95, 110.) She did agree with Dr. Simpson that it is very difficult to distinguish

between strong religious beliefs and a mental disease which renders someone incompetent.

(Id. at 96, 100-101.) 

At the conclusion of the hearing on December 16, 2015, the Court advised the parties

that a neuropsychologist was going to be appointed to conduct another evaluation of the

defendant. The Court ordered this examination for several reasons: (1) Dr. Simpson did not

perform a competency examination; (2) Dr. Kaempf’s examination involved no testing –

other than her reliance on Dr. Simpson’s testing conducted during his psychosexual

evaluation – and consisted only of a one hour interview of the defendant and a short

interview of his mother; and (3) neither doctor was able to adequately explain why the

defendant’s strong religious conviction, in and of itself, was the result of a mental disease or

defect, given that he was an otherwise intelligent, fully functioning young man who

Case 4:14-cr-02147-RCC-EJM Document 94 Filed 03/24/16 Page 5 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

understood the legal process and the consequences of not cooperating with his attorney. The

parties agreed on Dr. Marisa Menchola to conduct the neuropsychological examination. 

Dr. Menchola’s Report:

Dr. Menchola submitted a report dated February 9, 2016, which detailed her clinical

interview of the defendant, the neuropsychological tests she conducted and the results of

those tests, and her conclusion that the defendant was competent to stand trial. Like Dr.

Kaempf, Dr. Menchola found that the defendant’s intellectual abilities, memory functions,

and attention and executive functions were normal. (Ex. G at 5-6.) Dr. Menchola concluded

that the defendant showed “no evidence of a neurocognitive disorder or other cognitive

impairment” and found his “high average abstract reasoning and superior cognitive flexibility

. . . noteworthy.” (Id. at 10). 

Dr. Menchola disagreed with Dr. Kaempf that the defendant’s strong religious

conviction suggested prodromal psychosis or a schizotypal personality disorder. (Id.) She

concluded that both possibilities are “unlikely” because there was no evidence of functional

decline and his only “odd beliefs” or “magical thinking” related to his faith-based beliefs

which are shared by his family and faith community. (Id.) She also concluded that the

defendant has an adequate factual and rational understanding of the legal proceedings and

nature of the charges against him, and that he possesses the ability to cooperate with counsel.

(Id. at 11.) Ultimately, she concluded that the defendant is fully able to cooperate with his

attorney, but is “willingly choosing” not to cooperate and understands the potential

consequences of that choice. (Id.)

After receiving Dr. Menchola’s report, the Court set a status conference on February

16, 2016, to address her findings and conclusion. At the status hearing, neither party was

willing – quite understandably – to stipulate to either a finding of competency or

incompetency based on the prior testimony and/or the reports of the examinations of the

defendant. The Court concluded that given the apparent conflict between the conclusions

reached by Dr. Kaempf and Dr. Menchola regarding the defendant’s competency to stand

trial, an evidentiary hearing where Dr. Menchola would testify about her examination,

Case 4:14-cr-02147-RCC-EJM Document 94 Filed 03/24/16 Page 6 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

 “3/1/16 Tr.” refers to the transcript of the evidentiary hearing held on March 1, 2016.

- 7 -

findings, and conclusions was warranted. That hearing was set for March 1, 2016. 

Dr. Menchola’s Testimony at the Evidentiary Hearing on March 1, 2016:

Dr. Menchola’s testimony was consistent with her report; specifically, that her

examination of the defendant revealed that he suffers from no neuropsychological deficits,

and that she did not find any evidence of a mental illness that accounts for the defendant’s

religious beliefs and his refusal to cooperate with his attorney. (3/1/16 Tr. at 7-8, 16.)4

 Dr.

Menchola testified that the defendant’s religious beliefs are not uncommon or unusual, even

though they may appear to be at first blush. (Id. at 19-20.) She explained that she has

conducted over 100 competency examinations and that in her experience she has seen

defendants who are uncooperative and make choices that seem ill-advised because of their

religious beliefs. (Id. at 29-30.) Moreover, she has seen defendants who have difficulty

admitting guilt when the admission would be contrary to the values of the church or church

community. (Id. at 30–31.) That is certainly the case with respect to the defendant given his

family and church community. (Id.) Finally, she has seen defendants refuse to admit guilt

or cooperate in cases involving sex offenses, because those defendants have a long history

of denial. (Id. at 30.) 

Dr. Menchola also testified that the defendant’s refusal to consider a plea agreement

is explained by a completely rational reason aside from his religious beliefs. That is, the

defendant’s admission to her that even absent his faith, he would still likely reject a plea and

go to trial because a conviction would destroy his life and future. (Id. at 35-36.) Dr.

Menchola believes that this admission further shows that the defendant is fully able to

cooperate with his attorney and discuss a plea offer or trial strategy, but is making a choice

not to do so. (Id.) Thus, Dr. Menchola’s conclusion is that the defendant is competent to

stand trial. (Id. at 40.)

Discussion:

A defendant is competent to stand trial if he is able “to understand the nature and

Case 4:14-cr-02147-RCC-EJM Document 94 Filed 03/24/16 Page 7 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

 More recently, the Supreme Court has recognized that requiring a criminal

defendant to “be competent has a modest aim: It seeks to ensure that he has the capacity to

understand the proceedings and to assist counsel.” Godniez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 402

(1993).

6

 Although the defendant did not testify at either evidentiary hearing, the Court has

observed the defendant’s demeanor at several court hearings and has had discussions with

the defendant about his performance on pretrial release and this competency issue. He has

been well-mannered, courteous, and respectful at all court hearings, and is well-spoken and

articulate. The defendant told the doctors, and the Court, that he does not believe that he is

mentally ill, incompetent or abnormal. (3/1/16 Tr. at 16-17; 12/16/15 Tr. at 126.) However,

he is aware that people perceive his beliefs to be unusual, crazy or insane. (3/1/16 Tr. at 17.)

7

 As discussed in text infra, this Court adopts the findings and conclusions of Dr.

Menchola and discounts the contrary findings and conclusions of Dr. Kaempf. 

- 8 -

consequences of the proceedings against him” and to “assist properly in his defense.” 18

U.S.C. § 4241. The government has the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the

evidence that the defendant is competent to stand trial. United States v. Hoskie, 950 F.2d

1388, 1392 (9th Cir. 1991). The Supreme Court has held that in determining if a defendant

is competent to stand trial, a district court must determine “whether [the defendant] has

sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational

understanding - and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the

proceedings against him.” Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960); see also Bills v.

Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 2010).5

A court’s determination of competency is a factual, rather than a legal determination.

United States v. Mackovich, 209 F.3d 1227, 1232 (10th Cir. 2000). In determining

competency, a court “may rely on a number of factors, including medical opinion and the

court’s observation of the defendant.” United States v. Boigegrain, 155 F.3d 1181, 1189

(10th Cir. 1998).6

 In cases, such as this one, with multiple experts, a district court may find

a defendant competent by adopting the findings of one expert and discounting the contrary

findings of another. Miles v. Dorsey, 61 F.3d 1459, 1472-74 (10th Cir. 1995).7

A defendant who suffers from a mental illness may still be competent to stand trial,

Case 4:14-cr-02147-RCC-EJM Document 94 Filed 03/24/16 Page 8 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

even if the defendant exhibits “bizarre, volatile and irrational behavior.” Medina v.

Singletary, 59 F.3d 1095, 1107 (11th Cir. 1005); see also Boag v. Raines, 769 F.2d 1341,

1343 (9th Cir. 1985) (defendant’s diagnosis as a sociopath did not render him incompetent

because it had no bearing on his ability to understand the proceedings or consult with his

attorney). Relatedly, a defendant’s choice to make seemingly irrational decisions, or not to

communicate or cooperate with his attorney, does not support a finding of incompetence if

the defendant has the capacity to assist in his defense despite not doing so. See United States

v. Ghane, 593 F.3d 775, 781 (8th Cir. 2010) (disagreement with one’s attorney does not make

a defendant mentally unable to consult with his attorney); United States v. Ferrer-Hernandez,

2013 WL 594261, at *6 (N.D. Iowa Feb. 15, 2013) (“[D]enying the facts in the face of

contradictory evidence does not make one delusional. Instead, it may simply represent a

defendant’s unsophisticated effort to avoid the consequences of his actions.”). 

United States v. Battle, 613 F.3d 258 (D.C. Cir. 2010) is similar to the case at hand

in that it involved the issue of whether a defendant was unable or unwilling to assist his

counsel given his grandiose delusions with strong religious beliefs. Moreover, Battle also

involved conflicting conclusions from two doctors concerning the defendant’s competence

to stand trial. In that case, the district court found the defendant competent notwithstanding

a clinical psychologist’s opinion that the defendant was not competent because his delusions

were “almost certainly psychotic in nature and precluded his working with his attorney

effectively.” Battle, 613 F.3d at 260. A forensic psychologist who examined the defendant

at the Federal Medical Center found that the defendant did not appear to suffer from

delusional thinking, and while his personality characteristics were likely to result in

significant difficulty in working with his attorney, his refusal to cooperate was volitional and

the result of a conscious choice, and not the product of a mental defect that the defendant

could not control. Id. at 261. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s finding of

competency, holding that uncooperativeness with one’s counsel does not alone prove

inability to assist; rather, the relevant legal question was not whether the defendant will

“assist properly in his defense” but whether “he [is] able to do” so. Id. at 263. 

Case 4:14-cr-02147-RCC-EJM Document 94 Filed 03/24/16 Page 9 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 -

Here, based on the testimony of all three doctors, there is no question that the

defendant has an adequate factual and rational understanding of the charges against him and

the consequences he faces. All three doctors testified that he is an intelligent young man and

has a good understanding of how the criminal justice process works, including the role of the

prosecutor, his attorney, the judge, and the jury, as well as his options of pleading guilty or

proceeding to trial. The only issue is whether he is unable to assist his attorney because his

firmly held religious beliefs stem from a mental disease or defect. As in Battle, this Court

concludes that the evidence establishes the defendant’s religious beliefs are not the result of

a mental disease or defect and that he is able, but is unwilling, to assist his attorney. 

 Dr. Menchola concluded that the defendant does not suffer from any

neuropsychological deficits, and she is the only doctor who performed testing to rule out that

possibility. She also did not find any evidence of a mental illness that would account for his

religious beliefs. All three doctors testified that defendant does suffer from depression, but

this mental health condition is prevalent in society and understandable here given the charges

facing the defendant. Moreover, no doctor testified that the defendant’s depression is so

severe that it renders him unable to assist his attorney. Like in Battle, Dr. Kaempf and Dr.

Menchola do disagree about whether the defendant’s strong religious conviction suggested

prodromal psychosis or a schizotypal personality disorder which rendered him unable to

assist his attorney. Dr. Menchola concluded that both possibilities are “unlikely” because

there was no evidence of functional decline and his only “odd beliefs” or “magical thinking”

related to his faith-based beliefs which are shared by his family and faith community.

The defense argues that Dr. Menchola’s “conclusion that these beliefs were culturally

normative” is based on “very thin and inadequate information.” (Def. Supp. Mem. at 7.)

Specifically, the defense claims that her conclusion is not based on the “exact sub-cultural

group” to which the defendant belonged – i.e., his Pentecostal faith – but rather her work

with various cultural groups in her practice where similar irrational beliefs, such as faith

healing, were accepted and normal. (Id.) Moreover, the defense complains that Dr.

Menchola based her conclusion on the fact the defendant himself told her that some of his

Case 4:14-cr-02147-RCC-EJM Document 94 Filed 03/24/16 Page 10 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 -

family members and his pastor share or support his beliefs, but she never spoke with these

people or conducted research about the defendant’s faith community. (Id. 7-8.) The defense

claims that the defendant was “an untrustworthy source for this information” because all

three doctors concluded that the defendant was reverse malingering – trying to make himself

look healthier and “normal.” (Id. at 8.) For these reasons, the defense argues that Dr.

Menchola’s conclusion as to competency should be disregarded. 

Instead, the defense argues that the Court should rely on Dr. Simpson’s testimony

because he was raised in the Pentecostal faith and culture. (Id.) Moreover, he is familiar

with the defendant’s sub-cultural group because he attended this same church, knows the

pastor well, and spoke with him and the defendant’s mother about this case. (Id.) The

defense maintains that this unique perspective allowed Dr. Simpson to testify with

uncommon authority that the defendant’s beliefs were not normative in his sub-culture. (Id.)

The defendant’s argument that this Court should completely disregard Dr. Menchola’s

testimony and instead rely on Dr. Simpson’s unique perspective is faulty for several reasons.

First, Dr. Menchola is the only doctor who performed tests to rule out whether the defendant

suffered from a neurocognitive disorder or other cognitive impairment. Dr. Simpson did not

even conduct a competency examination of the defendant; if he had, he would have

conducted additional tests to determine competency. Dr. Kaempf’s examination consisted

only of meeting with the defendant for an hour and a short conversation with his mother; she

performed no testing and instead relied on Dr. Simpson’s report of his psychosexual

evaluation. Moreover, in her report, Dr. Kaempf was on the fence as to whether the

defendant was incompetent. While she did ultimately testify that she believed the defendant

was incompetent, as discussed below, she could not adequately support that conclusion when

confronted with the defendant’s statements to Dr. Simpson that the defendant had previously

discussed legal strategy with his lawyer and felt like he was being ignored. 

Second, Dr. Simpson testified that the defendant’s mother shares the same belief as

the defendant that faith in God will somehow take care of the criminal charges. Indeed, he

testified that those beliefs are common in the Pentacostal faith and perhaps a learned familial

Case 4:14-cr-02147-RCC-EJM Document 94 Filed 03/24/16 Page 11 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

 The doctors testified that during their interviews the defendant could and did discuss

plea agreements in the abstract or in a hypothetical case - in terms of the advantages and

disadvantages to accepting a plea agreement versus taking a case to trial – but refused to

discuss the plea agreement offered in his case because to do so would violate his religious

beliefs. (12/16/15 Tr. at 47, 115-116; 3/1/16 Tr. at 28.) 

- 12 -

pattern, but those beliefs alone would not make a person incompetent because they were

unable to assist his/her attorney. Those facts further evidence that the defendant’s beliefs are

the product of his religion, faith, and/or family, and not a mental illness. 

Third, Dr. Menchola testified that she has performed many competency examinations

on individuals – ultimately found to be competent – whose cultural or religious beliefs result

in decisions that others would consider irrational. (3/1/16 Tr. at 20.) In fact, she has worked

with patients in the medical setting that were Pentecostal or identify as Pentecostal. (Id. at

12.) As such, there is nothing unique about the defendant’s sub-cultural religious beliefs that

would undermine Dr. Menchola’s ability to conduct a competency assessment or her

conclusion. 

Fourth, Dr. Menchola testified that, in her experience, individuals charged with sex

offenses against children also have a difficult time in admitting to interest in children, and

a Pentecostal belief system could contribute greatly to that inability to admit this type of

interest. (Id. at 31.) Those facts also lead to the conclusion that external sources, and not

mental illness, are impacting the defendant’s ability to cooperate with his attorney. 

Finally, but importantly, Dr. Menchola addressed an issue that had not been raised in

the prior evaluations or testimony of other doctors, that being, the defendant’s “defiance” in

his refusal to consider a plea agreement even if he did not have his strong religious beliefs.

(Id. at 35.) When Dr. Menchola talked with the defendant about a plea agreement, he said

something to the effect of: “I’m not going to just sign. Why would I sign my freedom

away? This is going to ruin my life. I would put up a fight.” (Id.) Dr. Menchola took these

statements to mean that: “If you want to put me through hell, I’m going to take you to hell.

You are not just going to take my life away.”8

 (Id.) The defendant’s statements regarding

considering a plea agreement further show that he is able to discuss a plea agreement with

Case 4:14-cr-02147-RCC-EJM Document 94 Filed 03/24/16 Page 12 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 13 -

his attorney, but he is unwilling to do so because a conviction will ruin his life. 

Relatedly, the defendant made statements to Dr. Simpson about his attorney’s refusal

to listen to him in terms of legal strategy, which also show that he has been able, but is not

now willing, to assist his attorney in his defense. In Dr. Simpson’s report, he notes that: 

Mr. Merritt stated that no one is listening to my ideas, like they didn’t have a

warrant. They, the police, asked for my keys. I gave them my keys.

Something went wrong with the whole process. I keep trying to tell my lawyer

and they keep trying to bring this issue up with my brother. Defendant

discussed that if the police didn’t have a warrant, they didn’t have what they

needed to get what they did. My mom is the owner of the house. 

(12/16/15 Tr. at 113; Ex. B.)

At the evidentiary hearing, after the Court read this statement to Dr. Kaempf, the

Court asked the following question: “isn’t that statement showing the ability to discuss this

case with his attorney?” (12/16/15 Tr. at 113). Dr. Kaempf responded: 

It could be. And it’s somewhat striking because that suggests he would be

interested in participating in his defense; yet, he’s – he’s not, which that

contradictory kind of nature of he thinks he should be acquitted, the charges

should be dismissed; yet, he’s not willing to discuss a plea agreement or any

trial strategies is concerning.

(Id.) The Court then asked Dr. Kaempf: “But doesn’t it suggest that he’s able, but not

willing?” (Id.) Dr. Kaempf responded: “I don’t know. I wasn’t present for that conversation.

It suggests some willing - some ability to discuss his case, but he’s not discussing his case.”

(Id. at 113- 114.) That response is troubling because it begs the question of why Dr. Kaempf

did not even address the defendant’s purported prior cooperation with his attorney during her

interview of the defendant, given that this fact was noted in Dr. Simpson’s report, which she

relied upon, and because that is the ultimate issue in the matter at hand. The failure to

explore this important point, in this Court’s view, undermines Dr. Kaempf’s findings and

conclusion that the defendant is unable to assist his attorney.

The Court put this same line of questioning to Dr. Simpson, since he was a participant

in this conversation with the defendant. Like Dr. Kaempf, Dr. Simpson was also befuddled

by the defendant’s statements about his prior discussions of legal strategy with his attorney,

given his unwillingness to do so now. Dr. Simpson testified that: “Again, it’s kind of a

Case 4:14-cr-02147-RCC-EJM Document 94 Filed 03/24/16 Page 13 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 14 -

confusing picture that I put before the Court, but he’s – in some aspects, he’s engaged with

his attorney, and is talking through and doesn’t feel listened-to, you know. And yet, on some

key elements, I felt like he – he wasn’t engaging. And that’s – that’s why I raised the red

flag to say, I think this needs to be explored more.” (Id. at 66.)

The Court finds that it was understandable and prudent for Dr. Simpson to raise the

red flag about the defendant’s competency given his utter refusal to cooperate with his

attorney because he believes that God will ensure the charges are dismissed. Both that belief

and decision obviously seem irrational to most, and there are dangerous consequences to

maintaining both as this case progresses to trial. However, based on the evidence presented

in the doctor’s reports and their testimony, including the defendant’s statements to Dr.

Simpson (about his attorney’s refusal to listen to him about strategy) and Dr. Menchola (that

he would never plead guilty even absent his beliefs because a conviction will ruin his life),

this Court finds that the government has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the

defendant’s religious beliefs are not the result of a mental disease or defect, and that he is

fully able to assist his attorney. 

Accordingly, this Court recommends that the District Court find that the defendant

is competent to stand trial. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B), the parties have fourteen (14) days from the date

of this Report and Recommendation to file written objections to these findings and

recommendations with the District Court. Any objections and Responses to objections filed

should be filed as CR 14-02147-TUC-RCC. No Replies shall be filed unless leave is granted

from the District Court. 

Dated this 23rd day of March, 2016. 

Case 4:14-cr-02147-RCC-EJM Document 94 Filed 03/24/16 Page 14 of 14