Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-06-03162/USCOURTS-caDC-06-03162-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sean Ginyard
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 24, 2007 Decided January 4, 2008

No. 06-3162

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

SEAN GINYARD,

APPELLANT

Consolidated with

06-3163

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 03cr00473-01)

(No. 03cr00473-02)

James W. Beane, Jr., appointed by the court, argued the

cause and filed the briefs for appellant Sean Ginyard.

Yolanda T. Hibbler argued the cause for appellant Kevin

Jefferson. With her on the briefs was Peter M. Brody.

Mary C. Dobbie, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellee. With her on the brief were Jeffrey A. Taylor, U.S.

Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese, III, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

USCA Case #06-3162 Document #1090233 Filed: 01/04/2008 Page 1 of 17
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Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and GARLAND, Circuit

Judge, and EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

GARLAND, Circuit Judge: An eleven-member jury

convicted Sean Ginyard and Kevin L. Jefferson on a two-count

indictment that charged the defendants with distributing and

with possessing with intent to distribute cocaine base. On

appeal, a previous panel of this court vacated the convictions

and remanded the case for a new trial because the district court

had erred in dismissing the twelfth juror. See United States v.

Ginyard, 444 F.3d 648 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The defendants then

filed pretrial motions to dismiss all or part of one count of the

indictment. The district court granted the motions in part and

denied them in part, and the defendants have appealed.

Defendant Jefferson contends that the district court’s refusal

to dismiss the count in its entirety violates the Double Jeopardy

Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Although we have jurisdiction

over Jefferson’s interlocutory appeal, we conclude that he may

be retried on lesser-included charges of that count without

transgressing the bar against double jeopardy. Defendant

Ginyard, by contrast, does not contend that the Double Jeopardy

Clause requires dismissal of the count in its entirety, but only

that it bars the government from proceeding against him under

an aiding and abetting theory. Because we do not have

jurisdiction over that kind of interlocutory challenge, we dismiss

Ginyard’s appeal without reaching its merits.

I

On August 17, 2004, a grand jury returned a two-count

indictment against Ginyard and Jefferson. Count One charged

each defendant with distributing cocaine base (in the form of

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crack), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C), and

with aiding and abetting such distribution, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 2. Count Two charged each defendant with possessing

with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base (in the

form of crack), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and

(b)(1)(A)(iii), and with aiding and abetting that crime, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2. 

At trial, the government introduced evidence concerning

three quantities of cocaine base that the police discovered at the

time of the defendants’ arrest on October 2, 2003. The

government’s witnesses testified that, on that day, an undercover

police officer approached Ginyard to purchase drugs. Ginyard

directed the officer to Jefferson, who was standing in a nearby

walkway. Jefferson then lifted up a hubcap that was lying on

the ground, withdrew .7 grams of cocaine base from underneath

the hubcap, and sold it to the officer. When the police later

searched under the hubcap, they found an additional 21.1 grams

of the drug. A short time after the .7-gram sale, undercover

officers watched as another man drove into the area, stopped his

car, and handed Ginyard money. Ginyard then walked to a

parked Cadillac and opened it with a keyless remote control. A

subsequent police search of the Cadillac revealed 134.5 grams

of cocaine base in a nylon bag in the trunk. 

The government also introduced other evidence concerning

the defendants’ connection to narcotics. This included

testimony about several prior undercover drug purchases from

the defendants in July and August 2003, and about the discovery

of crack cocaine in a search of Ginyard’s mother’s residence

where both defendants had been seen. But the three quantities

of cocaine base discussed above -- the .7 grams sold to the

undercover officer, the 21.1 grams found under the hubcap, and

the 134.5 grams found in the Cadillac -- are the only facts

relevant to this appeal.

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1

After Jefferson went to trial, the Supreme Court handed down its

opinion in United States v. Booker, which rendered the U.S.

Jury deliberations began on September 10, 2004. On

September 16, the court dismissed one of the jurors. The juror

had sent the court a note stating that he would not be able to

continue serving on the jury because he needed to pursue a job

opportunity. Other notes from the jury made clear that this juror

was a holdout against the verdict agreed to by the others.

When the jury reconvened, the remaining eleven members

found Ginyard and Jefferson guilty on both counts of the

indictment. With respect to Count One, which pertained to the

sale of the .7 grams to the undercover officer, the jury found the

defendants guilty. That count is not at issue on this appeal.

With respect to Count Two, which charged each defendant

with possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of

cocaine base, the court used a complicated verdict form. The

form was apparently constructed in response to the Supreme

Court’s opinions in Blakely v. Washington and Apprendi v. New

Jersey, which had held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior

conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime

beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to

a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Blakely, 542

U.S. 296, 301 (2004) (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466, 490

(2000)). As to each defendant, the form first asked whether he

was guilty of the charge. If the jury found the defendant guilty,

the form then asked the jury to indicate the amount of cocaine

base for which he was responsible and listed three progressively

decreasing amounts: at least 150 grams, at least 50 grams, and

at least 20 grams. The instructions indicated that the jury should

consider each progressively lower quantity if it was unable to

find unanimously that the defendant was responsible for the

greater quantity.1

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Sentencing Guidelines “effectively advisory.” 543 U.S. 220, 245

(2005); see Kimbrough v. United States, No. 06-6330, slip op. at 11-12

(U.S. Dec. 10, 2007). So modified, the Sixth Amendment’s bar

against judicial fact-finding does not apply to Guidelines sentencing.

Booker, 543 U.S. at 259; see United States v. Lawson, 494 F.3d 1046,

1055-56 (D.C. Cir. 2007); United States v. Bras, 483 F.3d 103, 108

(D.C. Cir. 2007). After Booker, only drug quantities that constitute

elements of statutory offenses must be submitted to the jury. See

Bras, 483 F.3d at 106-08. For possession with intent to distribute

cocaine base, those quantities are 5 grams and 50 grams. See 21

U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), (b)(1)(B)(iii); United States v. Webb, 255

F.3d 890, 894-97 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The question of whether the

defendant possessed at least 20 or 150 grams is relevant only to

sentencing and may be determined by the district court under the (now

advisory) Sentencing Guidelines. See Lawson, 494 F.3d at 1055-56;

Bras, 483 F.3d at 106-08.

2

In response to a note that the jury sent the court during its

deliberations, the court instructed the jury that it should first determine

whether each defendant possessed with intent to distribute a detectable

amount of cocaine base. Although the jury then modified Jefferson’s

verdict form, it did not alter Ginyard’s.

On Ginyard’s verdict form, the jury checked “guilty” on the

question of whether he had possessed with intent to distribute at

least 50 grams of cocaine base. It left blank the question of

whether the amount proven was at least 150 grams. But it

checked “proven” with respect to whether the amount was at

least 50 grams.

On Jefferson’s verdict form, the jury also checked the

“guilty” line for Count Two, but it crossed out “50 grams” and

wrote in “detectable amount.”2 The jury left blank the questions

of whether the amount proven was at least 150 grams or at least

50 grams. It did, however, check “proven” for the question of

whether the amount was at least 20 grams.

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3

On appeal, the government conceded that the district court had

abused its discretion in dismissing the deliberating juror. See United

States v. Ginyard, 444 F.3d 648, 651 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

 Ginyard and Jefferson appealed their convictions. Holding

that the district court had erred in dismissing the twelfth juror

without conducting an adequate inquiry regarding his continuing

availability,3

 this court vacated the convictions and remanded

the case for a new trial. See United States v. Ginyard, 444 F.3d

648 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The district court scheduled a new trial,

on both counts of the indictment, to commence on November 1,

2006.

In pretrial motions following the remand, Jefferson moved

to dismiss Count Two altogether, to bar the government from

presenting evidence suggesting that he was responsible for the

134.5 grams of cocaine base found in the Cadillac’s trunk, and

to prohibit the government from proceeding against him on an

aiding and abetting theory. The district court permitted Ginyard

to join Jefferson’s motion. See Status Conf. Tr. 5-6 (Oct. 31,

2006).

In a memorandum order issued on October 31, 2006, the

district court held that “the Government may not relitigate the

question of whether, in Count Two, the amount of crack cocaine

which Defendant Jefferson unlawfully possessed with the intent

to distribute was either at least 50 grams or at least 150 grams.”

United States v. Jefferson, No. 03-473, Mem. Order at 3-4

(D.D.C. Oct. 31, 2006). But the court denied the motion to

dismiss all of Count Two. Id. At a status conference that same

day, the court explained that “[t]here wasn’t a clear decision by

the jury as to the aiding and abetting question,” and it therefore

declined to “strik[e] the aiding and abetting alternative” from the

indictment. Status Conf. Tr. 34-35 (Oct. 31, 2006). 

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Both Jefferson and Ginyard now appeal, each presenting a

different challenge to the district court’s rulings. 

II

The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment

provides that no person shall “be subject for the same offence to

be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S CONST. amend. V.

As is relevant here, the Clause “protects against a second

prosecution for the same offense after acquittal[, and] protects

against a second prosecution for the same offense after

conviction.” Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977) (quoting

North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)). The

Clause also embodies principles of collateral estoppel: “[e]ven

if two offenses are sufficiently different to permit the imposition

of consecutive sentences,” the collateral estoppel component of

double jeopardy bars “successive prosecutions . . . where the

second prosecution requires the relitigation of factual issues

already resolved by the first.” Id. at 166 n.6 (citing Ashe v.

Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970)). “It has long been settled,

however, that the Double Jeopardy Clause’s general prohibition

against successive prosecutions does not prevent the government

from retrying a defendant who succeeds in getting his first

conviction set aside . . . because of some error in the

proceedings leading to conviction.” Lockhart v. Nelson, 488

U.S. 33, 38 (1988).

In the district court, Jefferson contended that the jury in his

first trial implicitly acquitted him of the charge of possessing

with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base. He

drew that conclusion from the fact that the jury crossed out “50

grams” on the verdict form and wrote in “detectable amount,”

that it did not respond to the questions of whether the amount for

which Jefferson was responsible was at least 150 grams or at

least 50 grams, and that it checked “proven” for the question of

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4

Supreme Court opinions discussing the concept of implied

acquittal include Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 236 (1994); Price v.

Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 329 (1970); and Green v. United States, 355

U.S. 184, 190-91 (1957).

whether the amount was at least 20 grams. Agreeing with

Jefferson’s contention, the district court held that he could not

be retried on the charge of possessing with intent to distribute 50

grams or more of cocaine base. Mem. Order at 3-4. The

government does not dispute that holding, Gov’t Br. 14 n.5, and

we therefore have no occasion to evaluate it.4

On appeal, Jefferson contends that, in light of this acquittal,

the district court erred in refusing to dismiss Count Two in its

entirety. That count charges him with possessing with intent to

distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base. Jefferson argues

that the 50-gram quantity is an essential element of the charge

and that, because the government may not relitigate whether he

possessed that amount, the count must be dismissed. We first

address our jurisdiction to consider this contention and then turn

to its merits.

A

Although the government does not challenge this court’s

jurisdiction to decide Jefferson’s appeal, we have an

independent obligation to consider the issue. See Steel Co. v.

Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998). The

question of our jurisdiction arises because there has not yet been

a final judgment in the district court. Indeed, Jefferson’s retrial

has not yet begun. In the absence of a final judgment, this court

generally lacks jurisdiction to hear a challenge to a decision of

a district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (providing appellate

jurisdiction over “appeals from all final decisions of the district

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courts of the United States”); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S.

651, 657 (1977) (citing § 1291).

In Abney, the Supreme Court held that an appeal from the

denial of a pretrial motion to dismiss an indictment on double

jeopardy grounds is an exception to this general rule. 431 U.S.

at 659. The Court concluded that such a claim falls within the

collateral-order exception to the final-judgment rule because,

inter alia, the protection against double jeopardy “would be

significantly undermined if appellate review . . . were postponed

until after conviction and sentence.” Id. at 660. The right that

the Double Jeopardy Clause protects is the right not to be “twice

put to trial for the same offense,” and the Supreme Court

explained that the protections of the Clause

would be lost if the accused were forced to “run the

gauntlet” a second time before an appeal could be

taken; even if the accused is acquitted, or, if convicted,

has his conviction ultimately reversed on double

jeopardy grounds, he has still been forced to endure a

trial that the Double Jeopardy Clause was designed to

prohibit. 

Id. at 661-62.

Although no appellate court appears to have ruled directly

on the question of whether Abney extends to an appeal from the

denial of a motion to dismiss a single count of a multi-count

indictment, the Second Circuit has noted that, “[w]here a

defendant challenges an entire count on grounds of former

jeopardy, lack of an interlocutory appeal would prevent all

opportunity to vindicate the asserted right to avoid trial on that

count.” United States v. Tom, 787 F.2d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 1986);

see also United States v. Head, 697 F.2d 1200, 1206 n.9 (4th

Cir. 1982). We agree. Because the Double Jeopardy Clause

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guarantees the right not to be twice put to trial “for the same

offense,” Abney, 431 U.S. at 661, a defendant may no more be

forced to “run the gauntlet” a second time on a single count --

which charges a single offense -- than he may be required to do

so on an entire indictment. Accordingly, we have jurisdiction

over Jefferson’s interlocutory appeal of the denial of his motion

to dismiss Count Two, and we proceed to the merits of the issue.

B

Jefferson contends that we must dismiss Count Two

because it charges him with possessing with intent to distribute

50 grams or more of cocaine base -- the same offense for which

the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial. But there is no danger

that Jefferson will be retried on the 50-gram charge. The district

court ruled that the government may not relitigate whether

Jefferson possessed with intent to distribute at least 50 (or at

least 150) grams of cocaine base. Mem. Order at 3-4. And the

government agrees that it may not retry him on that charge. See

Gov’t Br. 14 & n.5; Oral Arg. Recording at 24:09. 

 What the government does intend is to seek Jefferson’s

conviction on either of two lesser charges: possession with

intent to distribute at least 5 grams of cocaine base, or

possession with intent to distribute a detectable amount of

cocaine base. See Gov’t Br. 15-16; Oral Arg. Recording at

24:18. A trial on those charges would not violate the Double

Jeopardy Clause. As noted above, Jefferson’s first jury found

him guilty, under Count Two, of possessing a detectable amount

or more of cocaine base. Verdict Form at 4 (J.A. 33). And it

indicated that the amount that the government had proven was

“[a]t least 20 grams” of the drug. Id. at 5 (J.A. 34). Although

Jefferson’s conviction on Count Two was vacated on appeal, the

Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar retrial after a conviction

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has been overturned because of an error in the trial court

proceedings. See Lockhart, 488 U.S. at 38.

Jefferson nonetheless insists that possession of 50 grams or

more is an essential element of Count Two and that, because the

government may not relitigate this quantity, the entire count

must be dismissed. This argument is unavailing, as it is clear

that a “defendant may be found guilty of . . . an offense

necessarily included in the offense charged.” FED. R. CRIM. P.

31(c)(1); see Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 715-21

(1989). In this case, possession with intent to distribute 5 grams

or more and possession with intent to distribute a detectable

amount are both lesser-included offenses of the greater charge

of possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of

cocaine base. See United States v. Webb, 255 F.3d 890, 896-97

(D.C. Cir. 2001) (concluding that 21 U.S.C. § 841 is a tripartite

statute that establishes three crimes with three different statutory

sentence maxima depending on the drug quantity categories of

§ 841(b)); see also United States v. Lafayette, 337 F.3d 1043,

1048 (D.C. Cir. 2003). See generally Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 716

(holding that one offense is “necessarily included” in another if

“the elements of the lesser offense are a subset of the elements

of the charged offense”). Thus, without reindicting Jefferson on

a lesser charge, see Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 718, the government

may retry him for the two lesser-included offenses.

Finally, citing a New York Court of Appeals case, People

v. Mayo, Jefferson argues that, because the government has not

obtained a new indictment limited to the lesser-included

offenses, his retrial will be conducted “under the shadow” of the

50-gram charge -- and that he will therefore suffer a harm that

the Double Jeopardy Clause forbids. Appellant Jefferson’s

Reply Br. 7 (citing Mayo, 397 N.E.2d 1166 (N.Y. 1979)). The

defendant in Mayo was retried on a first-degree robbery charge

after having been acquitted of that offense in a previous trial.

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Not until the last moment, just before it sent the jurors to

deliberate, did the court withdraw the charge and instruct the

jury to consider only lesser-included offenses. The Court of

Appeals reversed Mayo’s subsequent conviction for seconddegree robbery, holding that, because the jury was advised at the

outset that the defendant was on trial for robbery in the first

degree, the judge’s last-minute instruction could not ensure that

the verdict was not influenced “by the looming presence of [the

prohibited] charge throughout the trial.” Mayo, 397 N.E.2d at

1170.

Mayo has no application here because the district court has

already ruled that Jefferson will not be retried on the greater (50-

gram) charge. As the District of Columbia Court of Appeals

held in rejecting -- under similar circumstances -- an argument

almost identical to Jefferson’s, the “judge at a new trial can

readily dispose of the problem presented by Mayo by avoiding

any reference to the original charge . . . and simply advising the

jury that the defendant is on trial for the [lesser-included]

offenses.” Coreas v. United States, 585 A.2d 1376, 1381-82

(D.C. 1991). If the district court decides to give the jury a copy

of the indictment, it can redact or revise the document

accordingly. See generally United States v. Roy, 473 F.3d 1232,

1238 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Indeed, at oral argument the

government stated that it intended either to submit an edited

indictment or to supersede. Oral Arg. Recording at 26:07.

In sum, because Jefferson may be retried on lesser-included

offenses of Count Two without transgressing the bar against

double jeopardy, we affirm the district court’s denial of his

motion to dismiss that count.

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III

Defendant Ginyard contends that the district court erred in

denying his motion to prohibit the government from retrying

him on the theory that he aided and abetted Jefferson’s

possession with intent to distribute cocaine base. Because the

jury found Ginyard guilty of possessing with intent to distribute

at least 50 grams but did not mark “proven” (or “unproven”) as

to whether he possessed at least 150 grams, Ginyard argues that

it must have found him responsible only for the 134.5 grams in

the Cadillac. The jury could not also have found him

responsible for the 21.1 grams under the hubcap, he claims,

because adding that amount would have raised the total to more

than 150 grams. By the same token, because the jury found

Jefferson responsible for more than 20 grams but not more than

50 or 150 grams, Ginyard infers that the jury must have found

Jefferson responsible for the drugs under the hubcap but not for

those in the Cadillac. 

From all of this, Ginyard concludes that, while the jury

found that each defendant possessed a specific stash of cocaine

base, it also found that neither defendant aided or abetted the

other’s possession. He therefore contends that the government

should be estopped from proceeding against him under Count

Two on an aiding and abetting theory. To retry him on that

theory, he insists, would violate the guarantee against double

jeopardy.

The government disputes Ginyard’s premise that the jury

necessarily found that Ginyard did not aid and abet Jefferson’s

possession with intent to distribute the 21.1 grams of cocaine

base found under the hubcap. All that the verdict form reveals,

the government argues, is “that the jury decided that the

government had ‘proven’ that appellant Ginyard possessed . . .

at least 50 grams” and that it “was ‘unable to unanimously’ find

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him guilty of 150 grams.” Gov’t Br. 31 (quoting Verdict Form

at 2 (J.A. 31)). In any event, the government maintains that

Ginyard’s claim -- unlike Jefferson’s -- is not properly raised on

an interlocutory appeal. 

We do not reach the merits of Ginyard’s claim because we

agree with the government that this court lacks jurisdiction.

Ginyard’s claim is different from Jefferson’s in an important

respect. While Jefferson challenges the government’s ability to

retry him on Count Two at all, Ginyard does not dispute that he

may be retried for the crime that is expressly charged in that

count: possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of

cocaine base. Oral Arg. Recording at 22:29. Indeed, while the

jury found that Jefferson possessed only 20 grams or more of

cocaine base, it found Ginyard guilty of possessing 50 grams or

more, see Verdict Form at 2 (J.A. 31), and Ginyard therefore

concedes that he may be retried on that charge. Ginyard’s only

contention is that the government may not retry him on a

particular theory of liability for that offense. 

The Abney exception to the final-judgment rule does not

extend this far. That exception was designed to protect

defendants from a particular injury -- “being twice put to trial

for the same offense.” Abney, 431 U.S. at 661 (emphasis

omitted). But as the Supreme Court has noted, “exceptions to

the final judgment rule in criminal cases are rare.” Flanagan v.

United States, 465 U.S. 259, 270 (1984). “Adherence to this

rule of finality has been particularly stringent in criminal

prosecutions because ‘the delays and disruptions attendant upon

intermediate appeal’ . . . ‘are especially inimical to the effective

and fair administration of the criminal law.’” Abney, 431 U.S.

at 657 (quoting DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 126

(1962)). Thus, “an interlocutory appeal has been denied when

a collateral estoppel claim would merely suppress evidence but

not preclude trial on the charge.” United States v. Brizendine,

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5

After these cases were decided, the Supreme Court held that

“prosecution of a defendant for conspiracy, where certain of the overt

acts relied upon by the Government are based on substantive offenses

for which the defendant has been previously convicted, does not

violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.” United States v. Felix, 503 U.S.

378, 380-81 (1992).

6

The aiding and abetting provision of Title 18 states: “Whoever

commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels,

commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a

principal.” 18 U.S.C. § 2(a). An “indictment need not specifically

include an aiding and abetting charge because, ‘whether specified or

not,’ the federal statute creating liability for aiding and abetting . . . ‘is

659 F.2d 215, 224 n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (citing United States v.

Mock, 604 F.2d 336, 337-41 (5th Cir. 1979)). Courts have

likewise refused to extend Abney to interlocutory appeals from

denials of motions to strike overt acts or objects from conspiracy

indictments, see Head, 697 F.2d at 1206; United States v.

Powell, 632 F.2d 754, 758 (9th Cir. 1980),5 or predicate acts

from Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act

(RICO) indictments, see Tom, 787 F.2d at 68; United States v.

Witten, 965 F.2d 774, 776 (9th Cir. 1992).

Because Ginyard’s appeal cannot protect him “against being

twice put to trial for the same offense,” Abney, 431 U.S. at 661

(emphasis omitted), it too fails to fall within the Abney

exception. Regardless of whether Ginyard may be retried for

aiding and abetting, he may be tried again for the offense

contained in Count Two. That offense is possession with intent

to distribute 50 grams of cocaine base. Aiding and abetting is

not a separate offense; it is only a theory of liability -- one

ground upon which the jury may find him liable for the charged

offense. See United States v. Garcia, 400 F.3d 816, 818-20 (9th

Cir. 2005); United States v. Smith, 198 F.3d 377, 383 (2d Cir.

1999).6

 Hence, even a successful interlocutory appeal would not

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considered embodied in full in every federal indictment.’” United

States v. Lam Kwong-Wah, 924 F.2d 298, 302 (D.C. Cir. 1991)

(quoting United States v. Michaels, 796 F.2d 1112, 1118 (9th Cir.

1986)).

save Ginyard from having to endure a second trial on the offense

charged in Count Two. Nor is the prejudice associated with

having to defend oneself against a particular theory of liability

alone sufficient to justify an interlocutory appeal. As the

Second Circuit explained in Tom: 

 If a defendant has a valid double jeopardy claim, he is

entitled to present it on an interlocutory appeal to avoid

“the personal strain, public embarrassment, and

expense of a criminal trial” on the indictment or count

for which he has previously been in jeopardy . . . .

However, he is not entitled to an interlocutory appeal

to avoid whatever slight increment of strain,

embarrassment, or expense might arise from having to

defend against allegations made or evidence presented

in connection with a count on which trial will in any

event occur.

787 F.2d at 68 (quoting Abney, 431 U.S. at 661); cf. Witten, 965

F.2d at 776 (finding no appellate jurisdiction because “[t]he

appellants moved to dismiss an alleged predicate act [from a

RICO indictment], not an entire indictment, or even an entire

count,” and because “[e]ven if the . . . act were dismissed, the

appellants would still face trial for conspiracy to violate

RICO”); Powell, 632 F.2d at 758 (stating that a claim that

“would affect the course of the trial,” but would not “have

barred the ordeal of retrial,” is “not properly appealable before

trial”).

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17

This court therefore lacks jurisdiction over Ginyard’s

interlocutory appeal. If the government tries and convicts

Ginyard on an aiding and abetting theory, he may of course

challenge that conviction in a post-judgment appeal.

IV

For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss Ginyard’s

interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Although we have

jurisdiction over Jefferson’s interlocutory appeal, we affirm the

district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss Count Two in its

entirety. 

So ordered.

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