Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02544/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02544-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
J. Brown
Respondent
James Thomas
Petitioner

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES THOMAS,

Petitioner,

 vs.

J. BROWN, Warden, 

Respondent. 

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No. C 05-2544 JSW (PR)

ORDER GRANTING

RESPONDENT’S MOTION

TO DISMISS PETITION 

(Docket No. 4)

Petitioner, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at San Quentin State Prison in

San Quentin, California, filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the failure of the Board of Prison Terms (“BPT”) to grant him

parole. The Court ordered Respondent to show cause why the instant petition should not

be granted. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition on multiple grounds,

Petitioner filed an opposition, Respondent filed a reply and Petitioner filed a reply to

Respondent’s reply. After reviewing the papers and supporting documents, the Court

concludes that Petitioner has not exhausted his claims in the state supreme court. The

Court will GRANT Respondent’s motion to dismiss (docket no. 4) and DISMISS the

instant petition without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies. 

BACKGROUND

According to the petition, Petitioner pled guilty in Los Angeles County Superior

Court to second-degree murder. On August 2, 1983, he was committed to a term of

sixteen years-to-life in state prison. In this habeas action, Petitioner does not challenge

his conviction, but instead challenges the execution of his sentence. Petitioner alleges

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that he was told by his attorney that if he accepted the plea agreement he would be

eligible for parole in ten years and, if he behaved, he could expect to be paroled after

having served between ten and twenty-one years of his sentence. However, on July 20,

2004, after having served more than twenty-two years in prison, the BPT found Petitioner

unsuitable for parole at his eighth parole suitability hearing. Petitioner contends that the

denial of parole by the BPT violates his constitutional right to due process, violates the

terms of his plea agreement, and denies him of his right to a trial by jury under the Sixth

Amendment. Petitioner filed the instant petition on June 22, 2005. In the petition, he

stated that he had exhausted state judicial remedies as to the claims raised in his federal

petition.

DISCUSSION

I. Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the instant petition on several grounds. 

Respondent argues alternatively that Petitioner has not exhausted his state judicial

remedies and has procedurally defaulted his claims; that Petitioner’s claims do not allege

a federal question; and that Petitioner’s claim regarding his plea agreement is without

merit. Petitioner filed an opposition and a “reply” to Respondent’s reply, alleging

primarily that he has a protected liberty interest in parole, addressing that aspect of

Respondent’s motion. Petitioner further argues that Respondent’s motion to dismiss on

failure to exhaust grounds is “incorrect” because if the decisions Petitioner received from

the state courts were denied without prejudice, they would have “plainly said so” and that

Respondent appeared to be “groping for arguments to prevent this court from considering

[Petitioner’s] exhausted claims.” Opposition at 13. However, because Petitioner’s claims

were indeed denied without prejudice in state court, they have not been exhausted and the

petition must be dismissed without prejudice. As such, this Court will not resolve the

other grounds raised in Respondent’s motion to dismiss.

II. Exhaustion of State Remedies

Respondent alleges that Petitioner did not exhaust his state judicial remedies by

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fairly presenting his federal claims to the state’s highest court. The Court finds that

Petitioner did not exhaust his claims because they were dismissed without prejudice in the

Court of Appeal and denied without a reasoned opinion in the California Supreme Court. 

Prisoners in state custody who wish to challenge collaterally in federal habeas

proceedings either the fact or length of their confinement are first required to exhaust

state judicial remedies, either on direct appeal or through collateral proceedings, by

presenting the highest state court available with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of

each and every claim they seek to raise in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c);

Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515-16 (1982); Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981);

McNeeley v. Arave, 842 F.2d 230, 231 (9th Cir. 1988). The state's highest court must be

given an opportunity to rule on the claims even if review is discretionary. See O'Sullivan

v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999) (a habeas petitioner must invoke “one complete

round of the State’s established appellate review process.”).

The exhaustion-of-state-remedies doctrine reflects a policy of federal-state comity

to give the state “the initial ‘opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its

prisoners’ federal rights.’” Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971) (citations

omitted). The exhaustion requirement is satisfied only if the federal claim (1) has been

“fairly presented” to the state courts, see id.; Crotts v. Smith, 73 F.3d 861, 865 

(9th Cir. 1996); or (2) no state remedy remains available, see Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d

828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996); Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1155-56 (9th Cir. 2003)

(en banc). 

Here, Respondent contends that Petitioner did not fairly present his claims in the

instant petition to the state supreme court because Petitioner’s claims were denied on

procedural grounds for failure to state a claim for relief. Respondent argues that because

the claims were dismissed without prejudice, Petitioner’s could still meet the fair

presentation requirement “by filing a new petition in state court which satisfies the

procedural pleading requirements and thereby allows the state court to reach the merits of

his petition.” Motion at 5. Respondent submitted a copy of Petitioner’s denial from the

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Court of Appeal. See Resp. Ex. 1. The Court of Appeal summarily denied the petition on

the grounds that it did not state sufficient facts to support relief citing “In Re Clark (1993)

5 Cal.4th 750, 763-787; In re Swain (1949) 34 Cal. 2d 300, 303-304' see In Re

Dannenberg (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1061, 1070-71; In Re Rosencrantz (2002) 29 Cal.4th 616,

676-677)”. See Respondent’s Motion, Exhibit 1. The California Supreme Court denied

the petition for review of that decision without citation. See Respondent’s Motion,

Exhibit 2. 

Under California law, a denial of a habeas petition with a citation to In re Swain

indicates that a petitioner has failed to state his claim with sufficient particularity for the

state court to examine the merits of the claim and has failed to explain the reasons for any

delay in filing his petition. See, In re Swain, 34 Cal. 2d at 304. The Ninth Circuit treats a

citation to In re Swain as standing for a denial on procedural grounds which can be cured

in a renewed state petition. See Kim v. Villalobos, 799 F.2d 1317, 1319 (9th Cir. 1986). 

State judicial remedies therefore are not exhausted. See id.; accord McQuown v.

McCartney, 795 F.2d 807, 808 n.1, 809 (9th Cir. 1986); Harris v. Superior Court, 500

F.2d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1974). In Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991),

the Supreme Court has held in the context of addressing procedural default, that where

the last reasoned opinion on a claim expressly imposes a procedural bar, it should be

presumed that a later decision summarily rejecting the claim did not silently disregard the

bar and consider the merits. Because the California Supreme Court denied the petition

without citation, this Court presumes under Ylst that the supreme court denied the petition

for the same reason that the state appellate court did, for failure to state the claim with

sufficient particularity. As such, the claims have been denied without prejudice and have

not been exhausted in the state courts.

Petitioner briefly addresses this ground of Respondent’s motion in his opposition,

but incorrectly argues that the state courts did not deny his claims without prejudice

because they did not specify that the claims were denied without prejudice. However,

contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, the Court of Appeal opinion specifically states that the

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petition was denied because “petitioner has not stated facts sufficient to support relief.” 

Respondent’s Motion, Exhibit 1. That, coupled with a citation to Swain, clearly notifies

Petitioner that his claims are denied for failure to state a claim, which is a dismissal

without prejudice that can be cured by a renewed petition. Therefore, the petition must be

dismissed because state court remedies have not been exhausted. 

The United States Supreme Court has held that a district court may stay mixed

habeas petitions to allow the petitioner to exhaust in state court. Rhines v. Webber, 

544 U.S. 269, 277-78 (2005). However, a district court does not have discretion to stay a

petition containing only unexhausted claims, however, even where the record shows that

there were exhausted claims that could have been included. Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d

1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (declining to extend the rule in Rhines to completely

unexhausted petitions and finding that the district court must dismiss a completely

unexhausted petition based on Jimenez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 2001)). 

Because there are no exhausted claims before the Court, it must be dismissed in its

entirety. 

However, a dismissal solely for failure to exhaust is not a bar to Petitioner's

returning to federal court after exhausting available state remedies. See Trimble v. City of

Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 586 (9th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, this petition is DISMISSED

without prejudice to Petitioner's filing a new federal habeas petition once he has

exhausted state remedies by presenting his claims to the highest state court. The clerk

shall terminate all pending motions, enter judgment and close the file in accordance with

this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 13, 2007

 JEFFREY S. WHITE 

 United States District Judge

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