Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-15-01347/USCOURTS-ca10-15-01347-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Austin Ray
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

_________________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

AUSTIN RAY, 

 Defendant - Appellant.

No. 15-1347

(D.C. No. 1:14-CR-00147-MSK-2)

(D. Colo.)

_________________________________

ORDER

_________________________________

Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, HARTZ, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________

We raise sua sponte the question of whether this court has jurisdiction to consider 

this appeal. Austin Ray, who is proceeding pro se in his criminal case with counsel 

appointed to act in an advisory capacity only, seeks to appeal the district court’s “Second 

Opinion and Order Addressing Various Motions.” Mr. Ray’s trial is scheduled to 

commence later this month. 

As the court recently explained in dismissing another of Mr. Ray’s appeals: 

“Generally, the final judgment rule prohibits appellate review in a criminal case until 

after conviction and imposition of sentence.” United States v. Ray, No. 15-1291 (10th 

Cir. Sept. 24, 2015) (citing Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 263 (1984)). 

Although the collateral order doctrine permits appellate review of certain interlocutory 

decisions, “because of the compelling interest in prompt criminal trials, [the doctrine is 

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

October 5, 2015

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

Appellate Case: 15-1347 Document: 01019502004 Date Filed: 10/05/2015 Page: 1 
2

applied] with the utmost strictness in criminal cases.” Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 265. To fall 

within this doctrine, the district court’s order must: (1) conclusively determine, (2) an 

important issue separate from the merits of the case, that (3) will be effectively 

unreviewable once final judgment is entered. United States v. Tucker, 745 F.3d 1054, 

1063 (10th Cir. 2014). The doctrine is so limited in the criminal context that the Supreme 

Court has applied it to only three categories of interlocutory criminal appeals: those 

involving motions to reduce bail, motions to dismiss based on double jeopardy grounds, 

and motions to assert immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause. See id. (discussing 

limited application of collateral order doctrine in the criminal context). Outside these 

precise categories, this court has found the requirements of the collateral order doctrine 

satisfied only when the asserted right cannot be vindicated after trial. Id. at 1064.

In its “Second Opinion and Order” the district court addressed several motions to 

dismiss the indictment based on denial of due process, lack of personal jurisdiction, 

violation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, outrageous government conduct, and 

multiplicity. None of the rights asserted could not be vindicated on appeal following 

final judgment. See, e.g., United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., Inc., 458 U.S. 263, 

264 (1982) (holding the collateral order doctrine does not apply to motions to dismiss for 

prosecutorial vindictiveness); Tucker, 745 F.3d at 1064 (dismissing for lack of 

jurisdiction appeal from denial of motion to dismiss indictment and noting that very few 

motions to dismiss, even if founded on a valid constitutional right, will give rise to 

interlocutory appellate jurisdiction); United States v. Johnson, 130 F.3d 1420, 1424 (10th 

Cir. 1997) (reversing conviction under multiplicitous count on appeal following final 

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judgment). The district court also addressed discovery motions, a motion to exclude 

evidence, a motion requesting new standby counsel, and the government’s motions to 

correct clerical errors in the indictment and to set a trial preparation conference. None of 

the district court’s rulings as to any of these motions fall within the collateral order 

doctrine. See, e.g., United States v. Beltran, 663 F.3d 1056, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(collecting and discussing cases that hold the denial of replacement counsel is not 

immediately appealable); United States v. Schneider, 594 F.3d 1219, 1229 (10th Cir. 

2010) (noting that evidentiary rulings are not appealable collateral orders). Accordingly, 

we lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

In addition to this appeal, Mr. Ray has filed at least three other appeals in his 

criminal case since August 2015 with confirmed or potential jurisdictional defects. See 

United States v. Ray, No. 15-1289 (10th Cir. Sept. 17, 2015) (dismissed for failure to 

respond to order identifying potential jurisdictional defect); United States v. Ray, 15-

1291(10th Cir. Sept. 24, 2015) (dismissed for lack of jurisdiction); United States v. Ray, 

15-1357 (10th Cir. Sept. 30, 2015) (potential jurisdictional defect identified). We caution 

Mr. Ray that future interlocutory appeals in his criminal case may be summarily 

dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

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APPEAL DISMISSED.

Entered for the Court

ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER, Clerk

by: Jane K. Castro

 Counsel to the Clerk

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