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Parties Involved:
J. D. Jacobs
Appellant
Louis W. Sullivan
Appellee

Document Text:

# 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

J. D. JACOBS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

F !LED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth C~r'.:'.1it 

APR 15 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. ) No. 90-7076 

LOUIS w. SULLIVAN, M.D., Secretary 

of Health and Human Services, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

) (D.C. No. 89-375-C) 

) (E.D. Okla.) 

) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before McKAY, SEYMOUR, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

Plaintiff-appellant J. D. Jacobs appeals the Secretary of 

Health and Human Services's denial of his claim for disability 

benefits pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act (Act), 

42 u.s.c. SS 416(i), 423 (1988). We affirm. 1 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppal. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 90-7076 Document: 010110034181 Date Filed: 04/15/1991 Page: 1 
• 

• 

Background 

Jacobs filed his application for Title II benefits on 

August 12, 1987. In his initial application, Jacobs alleged that 

he had been disabled since October 1986 due to arthritis and 

cirrhosis of the liver. Tr. at 47. Sometime thereafter, Jacobs 

amended his application to claim disability dating from 

December 31, 1981 as a result of these conditions as well as 

"residuals of a cerebrovascular accident" and hypertension. Id. 

at 9. Although not specifically listed in his application, Jacobs 

also claims to be disabled as a result of various mental 

impairments. See, e.g., id. at 45. 

The State Agency and Social Security Administration denied 

Jacobs' application initially and upon reconsideration. 

Tr. 53-58, 92-106. At Jacobs' request, his claim was then 

considered de novo in a November 3, 1988 hearing before an 

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The issue presented at the 

hearing was whether Jacobs was under a disability as defined by 

the Act on or before the last date that he met the special 

earnings requirements necessary to establish his insured status 

under Title II and hence his eligibility for disability benefits. 

Tr. at 9; ~ 42 u.s.c. §§ 416(i)(3), 423(c)(claimant must be 

actually disabled before expiration of insured status in order to 

obtain Title II benefits); Potter v. Secretary of Health & Human 

Servs., 905 F.2d 134~, 1348-49 (10th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) 

(same). The ALJ issued his decision on November 30, 1988, finding 

that Jacobs last met the special earnings requirements of the Act 

on September 30, 1982 and that he was not disabled within the 

2 

Appellate Case: 90-7076 Document: 010110034181 Date Filed: 04/15/1991 Page: 2 
meaning of the Act on or before this date because he then retained 

the capacity to perform his past relevant work. Tr. at 10-12. 

The Appeals Council denied Jacobs' request for review of the ALJ's 

decision, rendering that decision the final determination of the 

Secretary regarding Jacobs' claim. 

Jacobs filed this action challenging the Secretary's denial 

decision on July 26, 1989. After the district court affirmed that 

decision, Jacobs timely appealed to this court. 

Discussion 

In this appeal, Jacobs claims that the Secretary erred in 

finding that he was not disabled within the meaning of the Act on 

September 30, 1982, the last date on which he was eligible for 

Title II benefits. 2 We may only reverse the Secretary's finding 

if we determine that it is not supported by substantial evidence. 

See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971); Hill v. 

Sullivan, 924 F.2d 972, 973 (10th Cir. 1991) (per curiam). 

Substantial evidence is defined as such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 

Potter, 905 F.2d at 1348. 

The Secretary made his disability determination in this case 

through the five-step "sequential evaluation" process required by 

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (1989). This process required the 

ALJ, acting on behalf of the Secretary, to determine: (1) whether 

2 Jacobs concedes that September 30, 1982 marks the last date 

on which he met the special earnings requirements of the Act and 

was hence eligible for Title II benefits. See Appellant's Brief 

at 8. 

3 

Appellate Case: 90-7076 Document: 010110034181 Date Filed: 04/15/1991 Page: 3 
• 

Jacobs was engaged in "substantial gainful activity;" (2) whether 

he had a severe impairment; (3) whether Jacobs was automatically 

deemed disabled because his impairment or impairments met or 

equaled an impairment or impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, 

Subpt. P, App. 1; (4) if Jacobs' impairment or impairments were 

not automatically presumed to be disabling, whether they prevented 

him from performing past relevant work; and (5) if Jacob could not 

perform his past work, whether his impairment or impairments 

prevented him from performing any other work. Bowen v. Yuckert, 

482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987); see generally Williams v. Bowen, 

844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988). The ALJ based his finding 

of no disability on his conclusion at the fourth step of this 

process that Jacobs could perform past relevant work, i.e., truck 

driving, as of September 30, 1982, despite his impairments. 3 

Tr. at 12. 

After a complete review of the record, we are persuaded that 

both this finding and the resulting finding of no disability are 

supported by substantial evidence. Because Jacobs did not have an 

impairment so severe as to preclude gainful activity, he had the 

burden of proving that his impairments as of September 1982 

prevented him from returning to his past work. See Potter, 

905 F.2d at 1349; see also Williams, 844 F.2d at 751. The 

3 The ALJ also identified janitorial service as past relevant 

work that Jacobs was able to perform as of September 30, 1982. 

While the medical record supports the ALJ's conclusion that Jacobs 

was capable of such work, there is no indication in the record 

that Jacobs ever worked as a janitor before September 30, 1982. 

The ALJ's error in so identifying this work is of no consequence, 

however, given his supportable finding that Jacobs' impairments 

did not preclude him from performing his past relevant work as a 

truck driver. Tr. at 12. 

4 

Appellate Case: 90-7076 Document: 010110034181 Date Filed: 04/15/1991 Page: 4 
strongest evidence Jacobs presented in support of this claim was 

his testimony at the November 1988 hearing that his nerves had 

caused him to be discharged from his last job as a truck driver in 

September 1982, Tr. at 31, that two doctors had diagnosed him in 

spring 1981 as having depressive neurosis or chronic posttraumatic stress neurosis, id. at 189, 203, 204, and that the 

Veteran's Administration had awarded him disability benefits in 

May 1982. See id. at 221-24. 

The award of VA disability benefits is not determinative of 

Jacobs' qualification for disability benefits under the different 

standards of the Social Security Act. See Mandrell v. Weinberger, 

511 F.2d 1102, 1103 (10th Cir. 1975) (finding of Veterans' 

Administration is entitled to consideration by the Secretary, but 

is not controlling). Both the two spring 1981 diagnoses and 

Jacobs' description of his impairments and their preclusive effect 

on his ability to drive a delivery truck are also inconsistent 

with the majority of the medical evidence of record regarding 

. 4 Jacobs' physical and mental condition as of September 30, 1982. 

This evidence includes: medical reports indicating that Jacobs' 

drinking problem and associated physical effects had ceased 

sometime before 1981, Tr. at 119, 139, 189, 222, and that his 

hypertension was adequately controlled through medication, id. 

at 210, 222; neurological examinations in 1980, 1981 and April 

1982 that found Jacobs to have normal to good gait, coordination 

4 In fact, much of Jacobs' testimony before the ALJ focused on 

his ability to perform past relevant work as of the November 1988 

date of the hearing, rather than his ability to perform such work 

prior to expiration of his insured status on September 30, 1982. 

See, e.g., Tr. at 30-38. 

5 

Appellate Case: 90-7076 Document: 010110034181 Date Filed: 04/15/1991 Page: 5 
1 

and cranial function and, at most, some numbness or weakness in 

his left hand, id. at 128-29, 181, 190, 193, 209-10; and 

psychiatric examinations in 1980, 1981 and 1982 that found Jacobs 

to be "well-oriented," coherent and possessed of a good memory, 

found no evidence of psychosis, impaired judgment or thought 

disorder and concluded that Jacobs' mental state was "within 

normal limits" and that he suffered, at worst, from only a mild 

anxiety state. 5 Id. at 128-29, 135-36, 139, 181, 216. There is 

little or no evidence in the record that a person in this physical 

and mental condition could not perform the activities required of 

a truck driver. Thus, the medical evidence cited above is 

substantial evidence in support of the ALJ's decision that Jacobs 

was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act 

because his impairments as of September 30, 1982 did not prevent 

him from performing his past relevant work of truck driver. The 

judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Oklahoma affirming the ALJ's decision is therefore 

AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

Stephanie K. Seymour 

Circuit Judge 

5 Given the ALJ's express consideration of Jacobs' claimed 

mental - impairments and their possible effect on his ability to 

perform work, see Tr. at 11, 12, 13-19 (evaluating Jacobs' mental 

impairments as required by 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920, 416.920a), we 

reject Jacobs' assertion on appeal that the ALJ failed to "develop 

the issue" of Jacobs' mental impairments adequately in making his 

disability determination. 

6 

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