Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-04-03015/USCOURTS-caDC-04-03015-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sealed Case

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 8, 2005 Decided May 23, 2006

No. 04-3015

IN RE: SEALED CASE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 00cr00252-01)

Mary E. Davis, appointed by the court, argued the cause for

appellant. With her on the brief was Christopher M. Davis.

Patricia A. Heffernan, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Kenneth L.

Wainstein, U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher, Assistant U.S.

Attorney at the time the brief was filed, Elizabeth Trosman, and

Martin D. Carpenter, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: HENDERSON and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges, and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge: Appellant pled guilty to leading

a criminal enterprise that distributed significant quantities of

heroin. In return, the Government promised that in exchange for

Appellant’s help, it would file a motion recommending that he

be sentenced to a term below the life sentence called for by 21

U.S.C. § 848(b) and Section 5G1.1(b) of the United States

Sentencing Guidelines. Appellant rendered the promised help

USCA Case #04-3015 Document #969714 Filed: 05/23/2006 Page 1 of 16
2

and the Government filed the promised motion, but Appellant,

dissatisfied with the Government’s recommended sentence,

which the District Court accepted, challenges his conviction and

sentence on appeal. We affirm his conviction because the

Government met its obligations under the plea agreement. We

also affirm the District Court’s sentence because it was not

“imposed in violation of law.” 

I.

Appellant directed a massive heroin distribution ring in the

Washington, D.C. metropolitan area from 1996 to 2000. By the

time the Government arrested Appellant, his criminal enterprise

had distributed 222 kilograms—almost 500 pounds—of heroin.

In August 2000, a federal grand jury sitting in Washington, D.C.

returned a three-count indictment charging him with: (1)

engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise, which carried a

mandatory sentence of life imprisonment, 21 U.S.C. § 848(b);

(2) conspiracy to distribute heroin, which carried a minimum

sentence of ten years, 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1); and (3)

money laundering, which carried no minimum sentence but

allowed a maximum sentence of twenty years, 18 U.S.C.

§ 1956(a)(1). Faced with a possible life sentence if his case

went to trial, Appellant entered into a plea agreement in which

he promised to plead guilty to all three counts and to “cooperate

truthfully, completely and forthrightly with . . . law enforcement

authorities . . . in any matter as to which the Government deems

the cooperation relevant.” The Government agreed to file a

substantial assistance motion, which would give the District

Court authority to impose a sentence less than life.

Appellant fully complied with his part of the agreement. He

pled guilty to all three counts, testified against four codefendants, advised others to cooperate with the Government,

and helped conduct sting operations in New York City and the

USCA Case #04-3015 Document #969714 Filed: 05/23/2006 Page 2 of 16
3

District of Columbia that led to the arrests and convictions of

twelve other heroin distributors. Based on this substantial

assistance, the Government filed a downward departure motion

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) and Section 5K1.1 of the

Sentencing Guidelines that recommended that Appellant be

sentenced to 360 months imprisonment. The District Court

agreed and sentenced Appellant to 360 months for engaging in

a continuing criminal enterprise, 360 months for conspiring to

distribute heroin, and 240 months for money laundering, the

three sentences to run concurrently. Although this fell below

the life sentence that would have been required had the

Government not made its substantial assistance motion, a 360-

month sentence was more severe than Appellant hoped. If he

serves the full thirty-year term, he will be in prison until he is

about eighty years old. Seeking to avoid his conviction

altogether or at least reduce the length of his sentence, Appellant

appeals both. In a brief submitted by court-appointed counsel,

he challenges his sentence. In a supplemental pro se brief, he

challenges his conviction and brings additional challenges to the

sentence.

II.

As a threshold matter, we must determine whether we have

jurisdiction to hear this appeal. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better

Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (“‘[T]he first and fundamental

question is that of jurisdiction . . . . This question the court is

bound to ask and answer for itself, even when not otherwise

suggested, and without respect to the relation of the parties to

it.’”) (quoting Great S. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S.

449, 453 (1900)). Appellant’s jurisdictional argument relies

solely and entirely upon 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which provides that

“[t]he courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals

from all final decisions of the district courts of the United

States.” Although we agree that § 1291 provides jurisdiction for

USCA Case #04-3015 Document #969714 Filed: 05/23/2006 Page 3 of 16
4

us to hear Appellant’s challenge to his conviction, United States

v. Kelley, 36 F.3d 1118, 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1994), and we consider

that challenge in Section IV, § 1291 is not a sufficient basis to

allow us to consider challenges to a sentence. For that, we look

to 18 U.S.C. § 3742, which we have held is “the statute

conferring jurisdiction on the appellate courts to review

sentences.” United States v. Sammoury, 74 F.3d 1341, 1343

(D.C. Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Doe, 934 F.2d 353,

356 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal

under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b).”); United States v. Hazel, 928 F.2d

420, 426 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“This court’s power to review

sentencing decisions is spelled out in 18 U.S.C. § 3742.”)

(Mikva, J., concurring). Appellant’s briefs are of no help on this

point; they do not address whether we have jurisdiction under

§ 3742. This failure, while bothersome to a court, is not

necessarily fatal to Appellant’s appeal of his sentence. In

United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 551 F.2d

384, 389 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (“AT&T”), we held that we may

exercise jurisdiction over a case even where the basis invoked

by a party proves incorrect provided the defendant’s “factual

allegations fairly support an alternative basis [for jurisdiction]

in a more proper or simple manner.” Id. If they do, jurisdiction

exists even though a party may have failed to point us to its

source. Id.

Section 3742(a) states:

A defendant may file a notice of appeal in the

district court for review of an otherwise final

sentence if the sentence – 

(1) was imposed in violation of law;

(2) was imposed as a result of an incorrect

application of the sentencing guidelines; or

USCA Case #04-3015 Document #969714 Filed: 05/23/2006 Page 4 of 16
5

1

 Having explained why this case is not an instance of an

“incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines,” it may be

helpful to note what, by contrast, is. Our cases demonstrate that

subsection (2) creates jurisdiction only where the district court

(3) is greater than the sentence specified in the

applicable guideline range . . . ; or

(4) was imposed for an offense for which there

is no sentencing guideline and is plainly

unreasonable.

18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).

We can quickly dispose of subsections (2), (3), and (4) as

possible bases for jurisdiction. Subsection (1), which we find

does provide jurisdiction, requires a more extended discussion,

and we will turn to it shortly. Subsection (2) does not allow

jurisdiction here because Appellant’s sentence was not the

“result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines.”

Rather, his sentence was the result of the District Court’s

decision to grant a departure from the Sentencing Guidelines,

something the Court may do only when the Government files a

substantial assistance motion that recommends such a departure.

The Guidelines provide, “[u]pon motion of the government

stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in

the investigation or prosecution of another person who has

committed an offense, the court may depart from the

guidelines.” U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 (emphasis added). The District

Court’s decision to accept the Government’s recommended

downward departure of the sentence did not involve an

application of the Guidelines. It involved a decision not to apply

the Guidelines at all. In Hazel, we explained that a challenge to

a district court’s discretion to sentence outside the Guidelines is

not reviewable under subsection (2).1

 928 F.2d at 423.

USCA Case #04-3015 Document #969714 Filed: 05/23/2006 Page 5 of 16
6

mistakenly applies or mistakenly fails to apply a provision of the

Sentencing Guidelines. For example, in United States v.

Thomas, 361 F.3d 653, 656 (D.C. Cir. 2004), we suggested that

if a district court enhances a defendant’s sentence because it

mistakenly concludes that a crime for which the defendant had

been previously convicted was a “crime of violence” under the

Guidelines, then there is jurisdiction under subsection (2)

because the sentence has been imposed as a result of an

incorrect application of the Guidelines. Similarly, in Sammoury,

74 F.3d at 1344, we noted that if a district judge refuses to

depart from the Guidelines “because he mistakenly believes he

lacks authority [under the Guidelines] to do otherwise, his

sentencing decision is reviewable on appeal” under subsection

(2). 

Neither subsection (3) nor (4) provide jurisdiction either.

Subsection (3) allows us to hear challenges to sentences that are

“greater than the sentence specified in the applicable guideline

range.” Appellant’s sentence, 360 months, is less than, not

greater than, the life sentence “specified in the applicable

guideline range.” Subsection (4) applies only if a sentence “was

imposed for an offense for which there is no sentencing

guideline and is plainly unreasonable.” There are Sentencing

Guidelines for each of Appellant’s offenses. See U.S.S.G.

§§ 2D1.1; 2D1.5; 2S1.1.

That leaves subsection (1), which allows us to consider

appeals of sentences “imposed in violation of law.” We find

jurisdiction here. A sentence is “imposed in violation of law”

when it contravenes a statutory or constitutional provision or is

in some other way unlawful. For example, we have noted that

we would have jurisdiction where an appellant alleges that his

sentence was “based on some illegal reason, such as the

defendant’s race or religion,” Sammoury, 74 F.3d at 1343, or

USCA Case #04-3015 Document #969714 Filed: 05/23/2006 Page 6 of 16
7

where he alleges that his sentence violates the Double Jeopardy

Clause of the Constitution, United States v. Townsend, 178 F.3d

558, 566 (D.C. Cir. 1999). See also id. (noting that a sentence

that was “plainly unlawful” or “influenced by unlawful

considerations” would be “imposed in violation of law.”).

As have other appellate courts, this Court has looked to the

allegations and not the merits to determine whether there is

jurisdiction under § 3742(a)(1). In Townsend, we held that we

can exercise appellate jurisdiction under § 3742(a)(1) over a

case in which a defendant “claims that his sentence ‘was

imposed in violation of law,’” even if the defendant loses on the

merits. 178 F.3d at 566 (emphasis added); see also United

States v. Graham, 72 F.3d 352, 358 n.8 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[W]e

believe our jurisdiction to review [defendant’s] sentence lies

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1)

because [defendant] has alleged that his sentence was imposed

in violation of law . . . .”); United States v. Pridgen, 64 F.3d 147,

150 (4th Cir. 1995) (“We conclude this claim is one that alleges

that the sentence was imposed in violation of law, and

accordingly may be reviewed by this court pursuant to

§ 3742(a)(1).”).

Appellan t here never argues expressly that his sentence was

imposed in violation of law under § 3742(a)(1). He does argue,

however, that his sentence runs afoul of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), the

Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.

220 (2005), and his due process rights. Because these

allegations “fairly support” § 3742(a)(1) as an “alternative

basis” for jurisdiction, see AT&T, 551 F.2d at 389 n.7, they

support our finding of jurisdiction.

That would be the end of our jurisdictional analysis were it

not for language in the Supreme Court’s decision in United

States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628 (2002), which suggests that

USCA Case #04-3015 Document #969714 Filed: 05/23/2006 Page 7 of 16
8

appellate courts lack jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1)

unless the appellant can prove, on the merits, that his sentence

“was imposed in violation of law.” In Ruiz, the appellant sought

appellate jurisdiction in the Ninth Circuit based on allegations

that the sentencing judge mistakenly believed he lacked

authority to grant a departure from the sentence called for by the

Sentencing Guidelines and that the Government had infringed

upon her right to a fair trial by failing to provide her with

exculpatory evidence. Id. at 627-28. Based on these allegations

alone, the Ninth Circuit found appellate jurisdiction, as would

we, and ruled in the appellant’s favor. The Supreme Court,

however, used language that seemed to suggest that the Ninth

Circuit had no jurisdiction under § 3742(a)(1) unless the

defendant could show that she would prevail on the merits. The

Court stated that “it was necessary for the Ninth Circuit to

address the merits” in order to “determine its own jurisdiction.”

Id. at 628. If that were the holding of Ruiz, we would need to

look to the merits of Appellant’s case to determine whether we

have jurisdiction to hear his appeal. That reading of Ruiz seems

wrong, and it is. The Ruiz language is dicta that the Court did

not follow in its disposition of the case. Instead of vacating the

Ninth Circuit’s decision, as one would have expected the Court

to do if it believed that the Ninth Circuit did not have appellate

jurisdiction, the Court reached the merits of the appeal to reverse

the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 633.

Finally, it is significant to us that Booker, decided after

Ruiz, made no reference to this language in Ruiz, and appears to

assume there is jurisdiction to hear an appeal to consider the

reasonableness of a sentence without regard to the merits of the

claim. 543 U.S. at 267 (“if the sentence comes before the Court

of Appeals for review, the Court of Appeals should apply the

review standards set forth in this opinion”—that is, review for

reasonableness).

USCA Case #04-3015 Document #969714 Filed: 05/23/2006 Page 8 of 16
9

2

 Section 3553(e) provides in its entirely (without any

suggestion of the restriction urged by Appellant): “Upon motion

of the Government, the court shall have the authority to impose

a sentence below a level established by statute as a minimum

sentence so as to reflect a defendant’s substantial assistance in

the investigation or prosecution of another person who has

committed an offense. Such sentence shall be imposed in

accordance with the guidelines and policy statements issued by

the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994 of title 28,

United States Code.”

We note that the United States Attorney’s Manual

recognizes no such restriction either, and, in fact, encourages the

prosecutor to do just the opposite. United States Department of

Because we construe Appellant’s arguments as asserting

that his sentence “was imposed in violation of law,” we are

satisfied of our jurisdiction and turn now to the merits.

III.

Appellant first argues that the prosecutor violated 18

U.S.C. § 3553(e) during the sentencing hearing by stating that

Appellant is dangerous and might continue to engage in criminal

conduct after leaving prison. Appellant advances the curious

view, not found in any authority of which we are aware, that

once the prosecutor has filed a substantial assistance motion, he

cannot address, nor can the district court consider, any topic

other than the defendant’s substantial assistance to the

Government. That argument has no support in the language of

the statute, which contains no suggestion that the filing of a

substantial assistance motion in any way restricts the

Government from giving the district court the full benefit of its

knowledge about factors relevant to the court’s sentencing

decision.2

 Appellant presses his point in asserted reliance upon

USCA Case #04-3015 Document #969714 Filed: 05/23/2006 Page 9 of 16
10

Justice, U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 9-27.710(A)(1) (August

2002) (“[d]uring the sentencing phase of a Federal criminal case,

the attorney for the government should assist the sentencing

court by . . . [a]ttempting to ensure that the relevant facts are

brought to the court’s attention fully and accurately.”). 

two cases, neither of them from this Circuit, United States v.

Stockdall, 45 F.3d 1257 (8th Cir. 1995), and United States v.

Thomas, 930 F.2d 526 (7th Cir. 1991), neither of which say

anything about arguments a prosecutor may or may not make at

sentencing. 

In Stockdall, the defendants pled guilty to “multiple drug,

firearm, and money laundering offenses.” 45 F.3d at 1258. The

Government filed substantial assistance motions for some of the

counts, but not others. The defendants argued that this selective

filing breached their plea agreements because it would prevent

the court from granting a downward departure on the counts for

which no motions had been filed. At an evidentiary hearing on

the defendants’ motion for performance of their plea

agreements, the court asked the Government whether its

decision to file motions for some but not all of the counts was “a

method or manner by which [the U.S. Attorney’s Office]

attempts to retain control over the sentences imposed or degree

of reduction that will be imposed?” Id. at 1261. The

Government acknowledged that it was. Id. The Eighth Circuit

held that to be an impermissible use of substantial assistance

motions. “The prosecutor’s role in this aspect of sentencing is

limited to determining whether the defendant has provided

substantial assistance with respect to ‘a sentence,’ advising the

sentencing court as to the extent of that assistance, and

recommending a substantial assistance departure. The desire to

dictate the length of a defendant’s sentence for reasons other

than his or her substantial assistance is not a permissible basis

for exercising the government’s power under § 3553(e).” Id.

USCA Case #04-3015 Document #969714 Filed: 05/23/2006 Page 10 of 16
11

(internal citation omitted) (emphasis added).

Appellant seizes upon this last quoted sentence to argue that

Stockdall supports his broader point that “[t]he government’s

desire to dictate the length of the sentence for reasons not

relevant to the assistance rendered violated § 3553(e).” Context

matters, and Appellant wants this language in Stockdall to

govern all aspects of sentencing, including what a prosecutor

may properly say at a sentencing hearing. The Eighth Circuit

was clear, however, that it was only considering “this aspect of

sentencing”—the factors that may properly influence a

prosecutor’s decision whether to file a substantial assistance

motion for a particular count. That issue is not before us

because the prosecutor here filed a substantial assistance motion

for each of the counts with which Appellant was charged. The

only issue Appellant has placed before us is whether a

prosecutor’s arguments and comments at a sentencing hearing

are limited to the quality of the assistance the defendant has

rendered. Stockdall provides no support for Appellant’s

argument that they are.

Appellant misreads Thomas, too. There, the defendant was

convicted of heroin possession, entered into a plea agreement,

provided help to the Government, and the prosecutor filed a

substantial assistance motion. To calculate the amount of the

departure from the mandatory minimum sentence, the District

Court took into account not only the nature of the defendant’s

substantial assistance, but also her “extremely burdensome

family responsibilities.” 930 F.2d at 529. The Government

appealed and the Seventh Circuit remanded for resentencing,

holding that the District Court should not have considered the

defendant’s family responsibilities because “only factors

relating to a defendant’s cooperation should influence the extent

of a departure for providing substantial assistance under

§ 3553(e).” Id. Appellant latches onto this statement to argue

USCA Case #04-3015 Document #969714 Filed: 05/23/2006 Page 11 of 16
12

that the District Court erred by considering his criminal history

and the nature of his offense when it sentenced him. In

Appellant’s view, because these factors were unrelated to his

substantial assistance, they should not have influenced the extent

of the departure. The Sentencing Reform Act, however, requires

sentencing courts to consider “the nature and circumstances of

the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,”

the very factors Appellant wants barred from the District Court’s

consideration. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1); see also Booker, 543

U.S. at 261 (“Section 3553(a) remains in effect, and sets forth

numerous factors that guide sentencing.”). Thomas does not

suggest otherwise. It only prevents courts from looking to

factors unrelated to the defendant’s cooperation when deciding

to increase the amount of a substantial assistance departure. It

makes no sense to read Thomas to prevent courts from

considering other factors when deciding to limit the amount of

a departure. Such a rule would convert a substantial assistance

motion into a one-way ratchet, requiring courts to depart to the

minimum possible sentence any time the defendant provided the

maximum possible assistance, no matter how heinous the

defendant’s crime. 

Although it may be understandable why an appellant

challenging his sentence would invoke Booker in hopes that its

significant impact might reach his case, we can find nothing in

Booker that helps this Appellant under § 3742(a)(1). Appellant

argues that the District Court failed to comply with Booker

because it did not consider the five factors listed in Section

5K1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines when it imposed his

sentence. But Booker says nothing to suggest that the

sentencing court must consider each of the Section 5K1.1 factors

whenever the Government files a substantial assistance motion.

That is not surprising given the plain language of Section 5K1.1,

which creates the opposite rule:

USCA Case #04-3015 Document #969714 Filed: 05/23/2006 Page 12 of 16
13

[t]he appropriate reduction shall be determined

by the court for reasons stated that may include,

but are not limited to, consideration of the

following:

(1) the court’s evaluation of the

significance and usefulness of the

defendant’s assistance, taking into

consideration the government’s

evaluation of the assistance rendered;

(2) the truthfulness, completeness, and

reliability of any information or

testimony provided by the defendant;

(3) the nature and extent of the defendant’s

assistance;

(4) any injury suffered, or any danger or

risk of injury to the defendant or his

family resulting from his assistance;

(5) the timeliness of the defendant’s

assistance. 

U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 (emphasis added). The sentencing court

“may” consider the listed factors, as well as others, when

determining an appropriate reduction, but it is not required to do

so. Appellant’s argument ignores this obvious point. We also

note that Appellant’s assertion that “the court failed to consider

a single one of these factors” is belied by a review of the record,

which reveals statements by the District Court indicating that it,

in fact, considered the Section 5K1.1 factors in determining “the

appropriate reduction.” See, e.g., App. at 51-52 (“I recognize

what the Government is saying in [the substantial assistance]

USCA Case #04-3015 Document #969714 Filed: 05/23/2006 Page 13 of 16
14

memorandum specifically with respect to the conduct which the

Government feels the court should consider with regard to

departure”); App. at 81 (stating that the judge had considered

“the factual elements of what [Appellant had] been able to do to

provide substantial assistance”); App. at 83-84 (“you were able

to provide the information that has now been credited to you as

substantial assistance”).

Finally, Appellant argues that the Government violated his

due process rights when the prosecutor suggested, during the

sentencing hearing, that Appellant had not been completely

forthcoming, but had lied to the Government about the amount

of money he had obtained through the conspiracy. This

argument is unavailing. We find nothing in the record that

suggests that the prosecutor’s statements were false or that

suggests that the sentence was influenced in any way by these

statements.

Appellant has failed to show that his sentence violated 18

U.S.C. § 3553(e), Booker, or his due process rights. We find,

therefore, that Appellant’s sentence was not imposed in

violation of law. From this discussion, it is apparent that we

reject the Government’s argument that we are without

jurisdiction to review any downward departure from a minimum

sentence under § 3742(a)(1), even one imposed in violation of

law. That is how the Government reads our decision in Hazel,

928 F.2d 420. But in Townsend, we rejected that same

argument, holding “[t]he fact that the specific illegality []

claimed involves the amount of a downward departure [] does

not render § 3742(a)(1) inapplicable.” 178 F.3d at 566. We

noted that although Hazel precludes review of “the district

court’s judgment regarding the amount of downward departure

which is warranted,” it does not preclude review when the

sentence “was imposed in violation of law.” Id. at 565-66.

USCA Case #04-3015 Document #969714 Filed: 05/23/2006 Page 14 of 16
15

3

 When the Government files a § 3553(e) motion, the

district court has “authority to impose a sentence below a level

established by statute as a minium sentence so as to reflect a

defendant’s substantial assistance in the investigation or

prosecution of another person who has committed an offense.”

18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). In the absence of such a motion, the

district court cannot impose a sentence below the statutory

minimum. See Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S. 120, 126

(1996) (“[n]othing in § 3553(e) suggests that a district court has

power to impose a sentence below the statutory minimum to

reflect a defendant’s cooperation when the Government has not

authorized such a sentence, but has instead moved for a

departure only from the applicable Guidelines range.”).

IV.

We turn to Appellant’s challenge to his conviction.

Appellant argues that the plea agreement was “meaningless,”

“fraudulent,” and “illusory,” because it did not, by its terms,

require that the Government file a § 3553(e) substantial

assistance motion.3

 The plea agreement obligated the

Government to file a Section 5K1.1 motion with the District

Court if the Appellant provided substantial assistance to its

ongoing investigations and prosecutions. But the Government

did not make any promises to file a § 3553(e) motion, and a

Section 5K1.1 motion alone gives the District Court authority to

grant a substantial assistance departure only from the Sentencing

Guidelines and not from the statutory minimum sentence. The

plea agreement expressly provided: “Your client understands

and acknowledges . . . that even if your client provides

substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of

another person for purposes of Section 5K1.1 of the Sentencing

Guidelines, this Office [the Office of the United States Attorney

for the District of Columbia] reserves its right to decline to file

a departure motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e).” In

USCA Case #04-3015 Document #969714 Filed: 05/23/2006 Page 15 of 16
16

Appellant’s view, the Government’s failure to promise to file

this § 3553(e) motion made the plea agreement “illusory”

because it left him exposed to the possibility of the statutory

minimum sentence he was seeking to avoid. He argues that he

received no benefit from his promise. 

Because Appellant failed to raise this argument below, we

review for plain error, In re Sealed Case, 349 F.3d 685, 690

(D.C. Cir. 2003), and find none. Appellant’s argument

overlooks that the substantial assistance motion that the

Government filed in this case was filed pursuant to both Section

5K1.1 and § 3553(e). The motion states, “[Appellant] has

provided substantial assistance to the Government in the

investigation and prosecution of others involved in his criminal

conduct. Therefore, he is entitled to a downward sentencing

departure from his sentencing guidelines and his statutory

mandatory minimum sentences. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) and

Section 5K1.1 of the U.S.S.G. Manual.” App. at 42 (emphasis

added). Even if the promise to file such a motion had been

illusory when made—a determination we need not and do not

make—any possible deficiency was cured by the Government’s

performance. See 1-1 Corbin on Contracts, § 1-17 (2005)

(illusory contracts can be “cured by performance”).

V.

Appellant’s conviction and his sentence are therefore

Affirmed. 

USCA Case #04-3015 Document #969714 Filed: 05/23/2006 Page 16 of 16