Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-09-02839/USCOURTS-ca8-09-02839-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
David A. Jandreau
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 09-2839

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of South Dakota.

David A. Jandreau, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: May 14, 2010

Filed: July 20, 2010

___________

Before BYE, MELLOY, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

___________

SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.

In 2009, David Jandreau was indicted for engaging in a sexual act with a minor. 

Prior to trial, the government notified Jandreau that it would seek to admit DNA

paternity evidence to prove that Jandreau was the father of the minor victim’s child. 

Jandreau’s motion to exclude this evidence was denied by the district court1

. Jandreau

was subsequently convicted and sentenced to 33 months imprisonment. Jandreau

appeals the district court’s evidentiary ruling and we affirm.

1

The Honorable John B. Jones, United States District Judge for the District of

South Dakota.

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I.

In early 2008, Jandreau, a Native American, was living with his ex-girlfriend

in Wagner, South Dakota, a small town on the Yankton Sioux Indian Reservation. 

Jandreau’s aunt, Jane Zephier, also lived in Wagner with her minor daughter, V.Z.,

and her daughter’s 14-year-old friend, R.F. In February 2008, Jane made

arrangements for Jandreau to babysit V.Z. and R.F. at her home while she stayed

overnight at a hospital with her son. At the time, Jandreau was 25 years old.

Although Jandreau and R.F. presented conflicting accounts of the events that

transpired that evening, the record is clear that a sexual encounter occurred between

them. According to R.F., she and V.Z. spent the night drinking, eventually returning

to Jane’s house after midnight, after which R.F. went to sleep in Jane’s bed. She

awoke to Jandreau having sexual intercourse with her, although she testified that

Jandreau did not force her to have sex. Jandreau admitted to having sex with R.F. but

stated that she instigated the encounter. R.F. subsequently gave birth to a child on

November 9, 2008, and identified Jandreau as the father. 

Following a report from the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) that a 15-year-old

girl had recently given birth to a child, the BIA and FBI investigated Jandreau. In an

interview with BIA and FBI agents, Jandreau admitted to having sex with R.F. 

Jandreau initially claimed that he believed R.F. to be 18 years old but later stated that

he knew she was under 16. In January 2009, Jandreau was indicted for engaging in

a sexual act with a minor between the ages of 12 and 16 in Indian country, in violation

of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 2243(a), and 2246(2). Prior to trial, Jandreau filed a motion in

limine to exclude any DNA evidence that Jandreau was the father of the child born to

R.F., arguing that he had admitted to the sexual encounter with R.F. and that paternity

evidence would prejudice the jury against him. The government argued that it was

entitled to prove the elements of its case as it saw fit and that the paternity evidence

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was strong evidence the sexual encounter occurred. The district court denied

Jandreau’s motion and the case proceeded to trial. 

At trial, Jandreau admitted to having sex with R.F. and testified that he did not

know how old she was at the time, but believed she was at least 16 years old, contrary

to his earlier statement that he knew she was under 16 years of age. R.F. testified that

she and Jandreau had sex in February 2008. In addition, the government presented

DNA paternity evidence that there was a 99.99999832% probability that Jandreau is

the father of R.F.’s child. The jury convicted Jandreau and the district court sentenced

him to 33 months imprisonment. This appeal followed.

II.

Jandreau appeals the district court’s evidentiary ruling allowing the government

to present DNA evidence proving that Jandreau was the father of the child born to

R.F. He argues that, because he admitted to having sex with R.F., the DNA evidence

was unrelated to any issue in the case and prejudiced the jury against him. See Fed.

R. Evid. 403 (allowing a court to exclude otherwise relevant evidence “if its probative

value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice”). We review a

district court’s decision to admit DNA evidence for an abuse of discretion. See United

States v. Johnson, 56 F.3d 947, 952 (8th Cir. 1995). We review a district court’s

interpretation and application of the Federal Rules of Evidence de novo. See United

States v. Street, 531 F.3d 703, 708 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 129 S. Ct. 432 (2008).

Jandreau relies heavily on Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997). In

Old Chief, the Supreme Court affirmed “the accepted rule that the prosecution is

entitled to prove its case free from any defendant’s option to stipulate the evidence

away.” Id. at 189. However, the Court created a narrow exception to this rule in cases

where a defendant’s “prior conviction is for an offense likely to support conviction on

some improper ground.” Id. at 191. In such cases, the district court should allow a

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defendant to stipulate to the fact of the prior conviction and “abuses its discretion if

it spurns such an offer.” Id. at 174. The Court emphasized the narrowness of its

holding, noting that “a defendant’s Rule 403 objection offering to concede a point

generally cannot prevail over the Government’s choice to offer evidence showing guilt

and all the circumstances surrounding the offense.” Id. at 183.

We have previously noted that Old Chief is limited to cases involving prior

felony convictions and upheld the traditional rule that a defendant cannot stipulate

away the evidence against him. See, e.g., United States v. Becht, 267 F.3d 767, 774

(8th Cir. 2001) (“We believe the Old Chief Court made clear that, absent the unusual

circumstance of prior criminal status, the Government is free to offer its evidence as

it sees fit.”); United States v. Hill, 249 F.3d 707, 711-13 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that

Old Chief does not require a court to accept a defendant’s offer to stipulate to past

crimes under Rule 404(b)); United States v. Gonzalez-Rodriguez, 239 F.3d 948, 952

(8th Cir. 2001) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing

to let defendant stipulate that his residence was within 1000 feet of a school for

purposes of his prosecution for methamphetamine possession under 21 U.S.C.

§ 860(a)); United States v. Barry, 133 F.3d 580, 582 (8th Cir. 1998) (“The law is clear

in this Circuit that as a general rule, the government is not bound by a defendant’s

offer to stipulate.” (quotation omitted)). 

Given our precedent, Jandreau’s argument is unpersuasive. The Old Chief

exception to the general rule is a narrow one. Jandreau is unable to direct us to any

case that has expanded it beyond cases dealing with prior convictions, and we decline

to do so here.2

 The government was entitled to prove up its case with relevant

2

Additionally, we note that Jandreau did not offer to stipulate to the fact of the

sexual encounter, but rather testified that the encounter happened. Trial testimony is

not subject to the same evidentiary weight as a stipulation, further removing this case

from the Old Chief exception. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 186

(1997) (“Old Chief’s proffered admission would, in fact, have been not merely

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evidence, which included the paternity evidence at issue, and the district court did not

abuse its discretion in admitting it.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. 

______________________________

relevant but seemingly conclusive evidence of the element.”); see also Christian Legal

Soc. Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings College of Law v. Martinez, No. 08-1371, slip

op. at 11 (U.S. June 28, 2010) (“[F]actual stipulations are ‘formal concessions . . . that

have the effect of withdrawing a fact from issue and dispensing wholly with the need

for proof of the fact.’” (quoting 2 Kenneth S. Broun et al., McCormick on Evidence

§ 254, at 181 (6th ed. 2006)); 1 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick,

Federal Evidence § 4:17 (3d ed. 2007) (“While an instruction cannot properly require

a jury to find an element of a charged offense against a defendant in a criminal case,

a stipulation can pave the way for an instruction that excuses the prosecutor from

offering proof.”). 

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