Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00326/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00326-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Woodlake
Defendant
Susanna Lucia Ordonez
Plaintiff
Tulare County District Attorneys Office
Defendant
Sandra Valdez
Plaintiff
Richard Williams
Defendant
Woodlake Police Department
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SANDRA VALDEZ, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

CITY OF WOODLAKE, et al., )

)

 Defendants. )

______________________________)

)

SUSANNA LUCIA ORDONEZ, )

 )

 Plaintiff, )

 )

v. )

 )

CITY OF WOODLAKE, et al., )

 )

 Defendants. )

 )

1:05-cv-00326-AWI-SMS

1:05-cv-01025-AWI-SMS

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

TO CONSOLIDATE CASES 1:05-cv00326-AWI-SMS AND 1:05-cv-01025-

AWI-SMS FOR ALL PURPOSES

ORDER DIRECTING THE CLERK

TO CLOSE ACTION NUMBER 1:05-cv01025-AWI-SMS

ORDER DIRECTING THE PARTIES TO

FILE IN THE FUTURE ALL DOCUMENTS

IN ACTION NUMBER 1:05-cv-00326-

AWI-SMS

Plaintiff Sandra Valdez moves to consolidate her case,

action number 1:05-cv-00326-AWI-SMS, with action number 1:05-cv01025-AWI-SMS by motion filed on December 28, 2005, in action

number 1:05-cv-00326-AWI-SMS, which was accompanied by a

memorandum, declaration, and exhibit consisting of a preliminary

hearing transcript. Defendant City of Woodlake filed opposition

on January 24, 2006, in action number 1:05-cv-00326-AWI-SMS,

including a memorandum, declaration, and exhibit. Plaintiff filed

Case 1:05-cv-00326-AWI -SMS Document 56 Filed 02/10/06 Page 1 of 10
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1 Defendant states that it was erroneously sued as the Woodlake Police

Department. The docket lists the Tulare County District Attorneys Office as a

party defendant, but it does not appear that this party has been served or has

appeared in the action.

2

a reply on February 1, 2006. No opposition or notice of nonopposition was received from Defendant Williams, although the

electronic proof of service indicates that the motion was served

on Williams’ counsel. By separate order the Court has vacated the

hearing on the motion and deemed the matter submitted for

decision. 

I. Background

In action number 1:05-cv-00326-AWI-SMS, Plaintiff Sandra

Valdez alleges in the second amended complaint filed on August

17, 2005, claims against Defendant Richard Williams, formerly a

Woodlake police officer, and his former employer, the police

department and city of Woodlake1, including violation of 42

U.S.C. § 1983 (unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth

and Fourteenth Amendments); Cal. Const., art. I, § 13

(unreasonable search and seizure); intentional infliction of

emotional distress; negligent infliction of emotional distress;

false imprisonment; sexual battery; Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1;

negligence; and Cal. Civ. Code § 52.4 (gender violence). It is

alleged that the defendants acted pursuant to city policy and

custom, and that Defendant City negligently hired, trained, and

supervised Defendant Williams regarding detention and searching

of suspects. Plaintiff seeks general, punitive, and statutory

damages.

In action number 1:05-cv-01025-AWI-SMS, Plaintiff Susanna

Lucia Ordonez sues Defendants Williams, Woodlake Police

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2 The only distinction between the sets of defenses asserted in the two

cases is the different specific statutes upon which the claim of justification

is based.

3

Department, and the City of Woodlake, asserting the same type of

claims as in the Valdez action except that there is no sexual

battery claim in the Ordonez action. The allegations in Ordonez

contain additional factual allegations, consisting of references

to the previous unreasonable search of Plaintiff Valdez,

notification to the Defendant City of the Valdez claim, and

Defendant City’s failure to correct the problem. Plaintiff

Ordonez seeks the same type of relief as Plaintiff Valdez.

In the two answer filed by Defendant Williams, Defendant

denied many of the factual allegations but admitted that

Defendant Williams was acting in the course and scope of his

employment; Defendants asserted defenses of justification and

probable cause; justification based on various bases, including

Cal. Pen. Code § 836, Cal. Health & Saf. Code § 11550 (Valdez),

Cal. Veh. Code § 22351 (Ordonez),2 privilege and public or

private necessity, and the need to effectuate a lawful detention

and arrest; absolute federal immunity; qualified immunity;

immunity under Cal. Govt. Code sections 820.2, 820.4, 820.6,

802.8, 821 and Penal Code sections 836 and 847; reasonable belief

in lawful conduct; failure to state a claim; unclean hands;

laches; estoppel; failure to mitigate damages; statute of

limitations; Plaintiff’s sole fault; wilful misconduct, and fault

and misconduct of others. Defendant Woodlake’s answers both deny

that Defendant Williams acted in the course and scope of his

employment; Woodlake asserts, among other defenses, absolute and

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qualified immunities, some of the same statutory immunities,

assumption of the risk, failure of Plaintiff to mitigate, and

statute of limitations. 

As to the facts, according to the complaints and the

transcript of the preliminary hearing (Tr.) in the state criminal

case against Defendant Williams, lodged by Plaintiff Valdez, both

cases involved threats by Defendant Williams before undertaking a

search, searches that were not situated to be recorded by police

video equipment, searches which commenced as searches concerning

one thing (stolen property in Valdez’s case and a traffic

violation in Ordonez’s case) but progressed into searches for

narcotics and associated evidence, searches of vaginal areas

and/or breasts of female persons in sites other than a police

facility by the male officer, threatening statements by the

officer apparently designed to induce the females not to seek to

have a female officer undertake the searches, and inappropriate

comments by the officer. 

Valdez’s search occurred on May 26, 2004, in her bedroom.

(Tr. 158-9.) Plaintiff Valdez testified at the preliminary

hearing that she had had previous contact with Defendant Williams

on several occasions; once he helped her put transmission fluid

in her car when her vehicle was not registered and then followed

her home; once he arrested her boyfriend at her house and then

returned to apologize to her about it; once he gave her two sons

Easter baskets and then called later to identify himself as the

donor; and once he jokingly approached her about her registration

being expired. On May 26, 2004, Defendant Williams arrived in

connection with an investigation of stolen property, which had

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been found in Plaintiff’s car during a time that Plaintiff was

not using it. Plaintiff Valdez told him that she had not used

drugs for two days and did not have any. While the two were alone

in her bedroom, the officer searched inside her overalls, had her

disrobe, spread her labia, and squat; he opened her vagina with

his fingers. She was arrested by another officer twenty minutes

later for being under the influence. The charges were dismissed.

(Tr. 158-292.)

Ordonez’s search occurred on August 20, 2004 between

Williams’ patrol car and a house after Defendant Williams

effected a traffic stop of a vehicle driven by Ordonez’s fiancé

and in which Ordonez was a passenger (Tr. 7, 10.) Williams said

he wanted to search for drugs because Ordonez had made hand

movements during the stop. He administered a field sobriety test,

ascertained she was wearing no underwear, looked down her front

with a flashlight when she pulled her waistband out at his

instruction, patted the waistband, put two fingers in the

waistband, appeared to see her private part, mentioned tattoos

located close to the line of her pubic hair, and told her he was

going to give her a break and would not give them a ticket. (Tr.

13-17.)

 Another set of potential witnesses consists of women who

were also stopped and searched by Defendant Williams on the night

of August 20, 2004, or at about 3:00 a.m. on August 21, 2004,

namely Cassandra Minchew, Trisha Simons, Kristin Buik, Jessica

Saleh, and Jaylyn Johnson. Minchew testified at the preliminary

hearing regarding a traffic stop, which developed into roadside

sobriety tests and a search for drugs involving making Minchew

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shake out her bra and unzip her pants, shining a flashlight down

Minchew’s waistband and touching her with his finger while moving

her panties to the side in front, exposing her pubic hair,

ultimately inspecting her bare breast with a flashlight and then

commenting that it was interesting, and asking her not to mention

it to anyone. No citation or ticket was given. (Tr. 36-80.)

Simons gave similar testimony with respect to having to shake out

her bra and pull out her waistband so that the officer could look

down inside her pants and inside her underpants. (Tr. 81-91.)

Saleh gave similar testimony regarding shaking her bra and having

the officer touch her when he was manipulating her waistband.

(Tr. 97-114.) Johnson testified to shaking her bra out and

manipulating her overalls and underwear for the officer, but not

being touched. (Tr. 115-35.) Buik testified to a similar search,

and the officer’s touching her a couple of inches below her

navel. (Tr. 135-57.)

II. Consolidation

Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a) provides:

When actions involving a common question of law

or fact are pending before the court, it may order

a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters

in issue in the actions; it may order all the

actions consolidated; and it may make such orders

concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid

unnecessary costs or delay.

A trial court has broad discretion to consolidate in whole or in

part cases pending in the same district. Investors Research Co.

v. United States District Court for the Central District of

California, 877 F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 1989). However, it is

necessary that the actions have a common question of law or fact.

Enterprise Bank v. Saettele, 21 F.3d 233, 235 (8th Cir. 1994).

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The purpose of consolidation is not only to enhance efficiency of

the trial court by avoiding unnecessary duplication of evidence

and procedures, but also to avoid inconsistent adjudications.

E.E.O.C. v. HBE Corp., 135 F.3d 543, 551 (8th Cir. 1998).

Consolidation is inappropriate if it leads to inefficiency,

inconvenience, or unfair prejudice to a party. Fed. R. Civ. P.

42(b). The Court should weigh the interests of judicial

convenience against any potential for delay, confusion, and

prejudice caused by consolidation. Southwest Marine, Inc. v.

Triple A Machine Shop, Inc. 720 F.Supp. 805, 807 (N.D. Cal.

1989).

Here, the claims in the two suits are exactly the same legal

claims except that a claim for sexual battery is present in the

Valdez suit; the defendants are the same; and the defenses are

substantially the same. Both suits thus involve common issues of

law, for example, the reasonableness of a male officer’s searches

of females involving intrusions of similar but slightly varying

extents; the Defendants’ intentions; the reasonableness of

Defendant Williams’ conduct and of Defendant City’s training,

hiring, and supervision of Defendant Williams; scope of

employment; justification; immunity; and so forth.

The cases also present common questions of fact, such as

Defendant Williams’ intent. Plaintiff argues, and Defendant does

not dispute, that evidence regarding the two (or perhaps three)

different search scenarios will be cross-admissible on the issue

of intent, an element of the intentional torts alleged in both

cases.

Consolidation of the actions will reduce expenditure of

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resources by the Court and the parties. 

Defendant objects that the searches are widely divergent in

their characteristics, that Plaintiff Valdez had previous contact

with Defendant Williams whereas Plaintiff Ordonez did not,

Plaintiff Valdez was arrested later while Ordonez was not, and

only Plaintiff Valdez alleges sexual battery, an intentional

tort. The Court finds that these distinctions are slight factual

differences that do not disturb what are otherwise two cases

presented common legal issues and common as well as similar

questions of fact. 

Defendant objects that the jury will be confused by the

presence of a sexual battery claim in one case but not in the

other. However, the legal issues presented by such a claim appear

to be straightforward; it does not appear that there would be a

likelihood of confusion or that clearly instructing the jury

would not suffice to separate the issues for consideration. Cf.

Southwest Marine, Inc. v. Triple A Mach. Shop, Inc., 720 F.Supp.

805, 807 (N.D.Cal. 1989). Defendants argue that they will suffer

prejudice, citing United States v. Kanuer, 149 F.2d 519 (7th Cir.

1945 (approving consolidation of many actions against separate

defendants for fraudulent acquisition of a certificate of

naturalization where there were common issues arising from the

fact that all defendants were members of the German-American

Bund); Tucker v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 73 F.R.D. 316 (D.C.N.Y.

1976) (disapproving consolidation of an action against an

accounting firm to recover for alleged securities violations with

an action brought by purchasers of debt securities of

corporation's wholly owned subsidiary against same accounting

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firm where in addition to different issues of materiality, there

was a strong possibility of prejudice to a party due to delay

which would be required in one of the actions, and additional

confusion would arise because a jury demand had been made in only

one action); and Arroyo v. Chardon, 90 F.R.D. 603 (D. Puerto Rico

1989) (declining to consolidate nine cases involving separate

claimants, all of whom alleged they had been demoted from

supervisory positions within the department of education for

political reasons, despite similarity of legal issues because of

possible prejudice to the defendants due to differences in each

plaintiff’s factual circumstances, the number of witnesses, the

number of cases, and the absence of any appreciable saving of

time or expenses). Here, there are fewer factual differences, 

plaintiffs, and factual situations; the law is not particularly

complex. There is no significant risk of undue prejudice or

confusion. The two cases are both at early stages of development,

and both appear to involve jury demands. Significant savings of

resources would result from consolidation. 

The Court exercises its discretion to grant Plaintiff’s

motion for consolidation.

III. Procedure

Generally a motion to consolidate involves noticing the

consolidation motion in all cases sought to be consolidated. 

Plaintiff here filed a notice of motion only in the Valdez case.

However, it is clear that the motion is intended to affect both

cases; further, all parties have received notice of the motion.

No party has objected to the form of the motion. Further, the

Court may grant consolidation of actions on its own motion. In re

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Adams Apple, Inc., 829 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th Cir.1987). Therefore,

plaintiff’s procedural deviation should not prevent

consolidation.

IV. Disposition

Accordingly, it IS ORDERED that 

1) Plaintiff’s motion to consolidate actions number 1:05-cv00326-AWI-SMS AND 1:05-cv-01025-AWI-SMS for all purposes IS

GRANTED, and the actions ARE CONSOLIDATED for all purposes; and

2. The parties ARE DIRECTED TO FILE all future papers in

action number 1:05-cv-00326-AWI-SMS with a caption of Valdez v.

City of Woodlake, et al.; and

3. The Clerk of Court IS DIRECTED to file all future papers

in action number 1:05-cv-00326-AWI-SMS, and to close action

number 1:05-cv-01025-AWI-SMS.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 8, 2006 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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