Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-04013/USCOURTS-ca10-92-04013-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ernest L. Schickling
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

ERNEST L. SCHICKLING, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

FlLl-'D 

APPEALllnitad Sta• C'Au~1 Appea\e !r Tenth C\~\,Ut 

J~N 2 6 1993 

ROBERT L. HOECKER Clerk . 

No. 92-4013 

(D.C. No. 91-CR-103G) 

(D. Utah) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before LOGAN and TACHA, Circuit Judges, and CAUTHRON, District 

Judge**· 

Defendant-Appellant Ernest Lee Schickling pleaded guilty to 

aiding and abetting the manufacture of a controlled substance in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1). The United States District 

Court for the District of Utah sentenced him to a period of 151 

months imprisonment and six years supervised release. Schickling 

now contests that sentence. We exercise jurisdiction under 18 

u.s.c. § 3742 and affirm. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3 . 

** The Honorable Robin J. Cauthron, District Judge, United 

States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, 

sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 92-4013 Document: 010110159273 Date Filed: 01/26/1993 Page: 1 
I. 

This appeal arises out of a drug bust executed on April 14, 

1991 by the Drug Enforcement Administration ( 11 DEA11 ) . During all 

relevant times up until his release on April 13, 1991, Mr. 

Schickling was completing a prior drug-related sentence at a 

halfway house. While standing practically at the brink of 

freedom, however, Schickling secured his almost immediate return 

to prison by spearheading a scheme to manufacture methamphetamine. 

Following his arrest the day after his release from the 

halfway house , Schickling pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting 

the manufacture of a controlled substance -- P2P -- under 

§ 84l(a) (1). Based on a production capacity of methamphetamine 

between three and ten kilograms, and after an upward adjustment of 

two offense levels for Schickling's status as "organizer, leader, 

manager, or supervisor" of the criminal activity under§ 3Bl.l (c) 

of the United States Sentencing Guidelines {"U.S.S.G. 11 ), the 

district court arrived at an offense level of 34 . Because of 

Schickling's two prior drug convictions, the court arrived at a 

criminal history category of VI. The court then departed downward 

five offense levels under U.S.S.G. § 5Kl.1 and 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553{e). The resulting guidelines range was 151 to 188 months; 

the court sentenced Schickling to the minimum of 151 months. 

On appeal, Schickling alleges four sentencing errors: (1) 

the upward adjustment for "organizing" criminal behavior was 

erroneous; (2) the court failed to depart downward based on 

Schickling's poor health; (3) the criminal history category of VI 

was erroneous because Schickling's prior convictions did not 

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Appellate Case: 92-4013 Document: 010110159273 Date Filed: 01/26/1993 Page: 2 
warrant a finding that he was a "career offender"; and (4) 

Schickling's sentence was disproportionate to those received by 

his codefendants. We review the district court's application of 

the sentencing guidelines to the facts of a particular case with 

due deference, while reviewing questions of law de novo. United 

States v. Shewmaker, 936 F . 2d 1124, 1126 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. 

denied, __ U.S. __ , 112 S. Ct. 884, 116 L. Ed. 788 (1992). 

"Regarding factual determinations made by the district court, we 

apply a 'clearly erroneous' standard of review." Id. 

II. 

We first address Schickling's claim that the sentencing court 

erroneously adjusted upward under§ 3B1.1(c) for his role as the 

organizer or leader of the methamphetamine lab. Section 3B1.1(c) 

provides that "[i]f the defendant was an organizer, leader, 

manager, or supervisor in any criminal activity other than 

described in (a) or (b), increase by 2 levels." United States 

Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 3B1.1(c) (Nov. 1992). 

In applying this provision, the sentencing court must consider 

only the defendant's role in the offense for which he is 

convicted, not his role in any other criminal activity. United 

States v. Pettit, 903 F.2d 1336, 1341 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. 

denied, 111 S. Ct. 197 (1991). 

The government concedes that Schickling did not himself 

manufacture any of the substances underlying the instant offense. 

Moreover, the guilty plea is limited to aiding and abetting in the 

manufacture of the methamphetamine precursor, P2P. We thus 

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examine whether Schickling was the organizer or leader of the 

manufacture of P2P. 

Schickling contends that the government has no evidence of 

any "leadership" vis-a-vis P2P, the substance actually 

manufactured. He contends that the court instead relied on his 

prior criminal activities and on evidence that he intended to 

manufacture methamphetamine in finding him to be an organizer 

under§ 3Bl.l(c). At Schickling's sentencing hearing, the 

district court "rel[ied] on the Presentence Report, factual 

matters and the other materials that [he] received." The record 

does include information that, strictly speaking, is not relevant 

to Schickling's role vis-a-vis the P2P . For example, the 

government incorporated Schickling's self-professed stature as 

"the last great chef" and his statements regarding the manufacture 

of the final product, methamphetamine. 

Since Pettit, however, this court has held that "a sentencing 

court may consider the underlying scheme, as opposed to merely the 

offense of conviction, in determining role in the offense 

adjustments." United States v. Saucedo, 950 F.2d 1508, 1513 (10th 

Cir. 1991). Accordingly, the government presented substantial 

evidence regarding Schickling's role as organizer and leader of 

the entire operation. In March, 1991, Schickling's wife contacted 

a confidential informant seeking to locate a suitable lab site. 

She told him that she already had produced P2P and methamphetamine 

and that "she and her husband intended to continue the operation 

upon his release from the state halfway house." Another resident 

at the halfway house testified that Schickling had threatened him 

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into providing a suitable lab site. On April 5, 1991, the 

informant met with both Mr. and Ms. Schickling. At that time, 

Schickling stated that the early stages of production were 

complete and that they would be finishing the process on April 9, 

1991. The government then presented an abundance of evidence 

relating to Schickling's activities regarding the lab while he was 

o n a weekend release and after his release from the halfway h ouse 

on April 13, 1 991. 

Because the district judge did not explicitly state the 

factors on which he determined that Schickling was the organizer 

or leader of the P2P manufacturing, we could remand this issue to 

the district court with instructions to consider whether it would 

have reached the same result without the impermissible 

information. See United States v. Padilla, 947 F . 2d 893, 895 

(10th Cir. 1991). It is obvious on this record, however, that, 

even after excluding all of the evidence relating to Schickling's 

e xpertise as a methamphetamine cook, the district court had 

sufficient evidence to determine that Schickling was the organizer 

and leader of the entire operation, which necessarily included the 

manufacture of the precursor, P2P. Therefore, any error made in 

this regard was harmless. See United States v. Moore, 919 F.2d 

1471, 1478 (1 0th Cir. 1990). 

Schickling also appears to argue that, because he was 

residing in the halfway house and was under twenty-four hour 

supervision, he could not possibly have been the organizer or 

leader of this criminal enterprise. We disagree . Section 

3Bl.l(c) does not expressly exclude supervised individuals. We 

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already have discussed Schickling's role in the entire 

manufacturing operation. While the concept is admittedly 

discomforting, we cannot say that the district court's 

determination that Schickling succeeded in organizing the 

manufacture of P2P from the government-supervised halfway house 

was clearly erroneous. 

Schickling next challenges the district court's failure to 

depart downward under U.S.S.G. § SHl.4 based on Schickling's 

medical condition. Even conceding that Schickling has an 

extraordinary physical impairment, "[i]t is established law in 

this circuit, and in every circuit which has considered the 

jurisdictional issue, that an appellate court does not have 

jurisdiction to review a district court's discretionary refusal to 

depart downward from the sentencing guidelines." United States v. 

McHenry, 968 F.2d 1047, 1048 (10th Cir. 1992) . 

Although Schickling attempts to rescue this issue from 

jurisdictional demise by arguing that the district judge was 

unable to properly exercise its discretion because it failed to 

conduct an evidentiary hearing on the issue, that argument is 

without merit. When the district judge discretionarily departed 

from the guidelines for other reasons, he expressly referred to 

Schickling's "serious medical problems" and found further 

departure to be "unwarranted." Schickling's attempt to recast the 

issue into a claim that the district court incorrectly applied the 

guidelines based on a lack of information or understanding thus 

does not withstand scrutiny. See United States v. Bromberg, 933 

F . 2d 895, 897 (10th Cir. 1991). The district court was aware of 

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the issue, determined that it had enough information on which t o 

exercise its discretion, and acted accordingly. We there fore lack 

jurisdiction to review that determination. 

Schickling next challenges his criminal history category. In 

order to be sentenced as a career offender under§ 4Bl.1, 

(1) the defendant [must be] at least eighteen years old 

at the time of the instant offense, (2) the instant 

offense of conviction [must be] a felony that is either 

a crime o f violence or a controlled substance o ffe nse, 

and (3) t he defendant [must have] at least two prior 

felony c o nv ictions of eithe r a crime of violence or a 

controlled substance offense. 

U.S.S . G. § 4Bl.1. Schickling has two prior convictions for drugrelated offenses. In 1984, he was convicted of the manufacture of 

a controlled substance (marijuana) and sentenced to ninety days in 

jail and three years probation. In 1989, he was convicted of 

possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) and 

sentenced to prison for one to fifteen years. 

Based on these two convictions, the district court sentenced 

Schickling as a "career offender" under U.S.S.G. § 4Bl.1. The 

defendant concedes that he was at least eighteen years old and 

that violation of 21 U. S . C. § 84l(a) (1) is a controlled substance 

felony. On appeal, Schickling contends that the 1984 conviction 

can not serve as a prior conviction because the offense was 

"small-time." We fail to see, however, how the 1984 conviction is 

not a controlled substance felony for purposes of career offender 

status. Section 4Bl.1 does not provide an exception for 

purportedly "small-time" prior convictions that otherwise satisfy 

the express criteria, and we decline to read such an exception 

into it. Should a court determine that a particular defendant's 

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criminal past is undeserving of "career offender" status, it has 

discretion to depart from the guidelines under 18 U.S.C. 3553 (b ) . 

United States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019, 1023 (10th Cir. 1991) . 

The district judge, who clearly understood his ability to depart, 

elected not to do so in this instance. To the extent that 

Schickling challenges the district court's decision not to depart, 

we lack jurisdiction over that discretionary determination. 

McHenry, 968 F.2d at 1048. 

Finally, Schickling challenges his sentence as 

disproportionate to those received by other persons involved in 

the criminal activity, his wife's sentence included. Congress 

passed the sentencing guidelines, however, to eliminate sentencing 

discrepancies. Given that Schickling's sentence is appropriate 

under Congress's guidelines, his grievance is not with the courts 

but with the Congress that determined that career offenders who 

organize and preside over criminal activity deserve longer 

sentences than their first-offense followers. 

AFFIRMED . 

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