Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-15-10008/USCOURTS-ca9-15-10008-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellant
Tony Williams
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

TONY WILLIAMS,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 15-10008

D.C. No.

2:14-cr-00334-RFB-VCF-1

ORDER AND AMENDED

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Richard F. Boulware, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted January 7, 2016

San Francisco, California

Filed September 20, 2016

Amended January 11, 2017

Before: J. Clifford Wallace and Alex Kozinski, Circuit

Judges and Robert H. Whaley,

*

 Senior District Judge.

Order;

Opinion by Judge Wallace

* The Honorable Robert H. Whaley, Senior District Judge for the U.S.

District Court for the Eastern District of Washington, sitting by

designation.

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2 UNITED STATES V. WILLIAMS

SUMMARY**

Criminal Law

The panel filed (1) an order amending an opinion and

denying a petition for panel rehearing and, on behalf of the

court, a petition for rehearing en banc; and (2) an amended

opinion reversing the district court’s order granting a motion

to suppress evidence of crack cocaine in the defendant’s

pockets and the firearm in his vehicle.

The panel held that police officers had reasonable

suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop based on the

information they possessed and the reliability of a telephone

tip. 

After the initial stop, the officers developed probable

cause to arrest the defendant because he obstructed them in

their attempt to enforce Nevada Revised Statute § 171.123,

which dictates that police officers may detain a suspect

whom the officers have reasonable suspicion has committed,

is committing, or is about to commit a crime, in order to

obtain that individual’s identity. The panel held that the

government did not waive its argument that the officers had

probable cause to arrest the defendant for violating § 171.123

where before the district court the government argued

generally that the officers had probable cause to arrest him

because he ran. The panel held that the officers conducted a

valid search incident to arrest when they searched the

defendant’s pockets and found crack cocaine.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. WILLIAMS 3

The panel further held that the officers lawfully searched

the defendant’s vehicle because, under the totality of the

circumstances, they had probable cause to believe that it

contained contraband or evidence of drug dealing.

The panel remanded the case for further proceedings.

COUNSEL

Adam M. Flake (argued), Assistant United States Attorney;

Elizabeth O. White, Appellate Chief; Daniel G. Bogden,

United States Attorney; United States Attorney’s Office, Las

Vegas, Nevada; for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Amy B. Cleary (argued) and Eric J. Choi, Assistant Federal

Public Defenders; Rene L. Vallardes, Federal Public

Defender; Office of the Federal Public Defender, Las Vegas,

Nevada; for Defendant-Appellee.

ORDER

The opinion filed on September 20, 2016, and appearing

at 837 F.3d 1016, is hereby amended. An amended opinion is

filed concurrently with this order. The full court has been

advised of the petition for rehearing en banc, and no judge

has requested a vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc.

Fed. R. App. P. 35. The petition for rehearing and rehearing

en banc is DENIED.

No further petitions for en banc or panel rehearing shall

be permitted.

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4 UNITED STATES V. WILLIAMS

OPINION

WALLACE, Circuit Judge:

The government appeals from the district court’s order

granting Williams’s motion to suppress evidence of the crack

cocaine in his pockets and the firearm in his vehicle. We have

jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3731, and we reverse.

I.

We review de novo an order granting a motion to

suppress. See United States v. Crawford, 372 F.3d 1048, 1053

(9th Cir. 2004) (en banc). “A determination whether there

was reasonable suspicion to support an investigatory ‘stop

and frisk’ is a mixed question of law and fact, also reviewed

de novo.” United States v. Burkett, 612 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th

Cir. 2010). The district court’s factual findings are reviewed

for clear error. Crawford, 372 F.3d at 1053 (citing United

States v. Hammett, 236 F.3d 1054, 1057–58 (9th Cir. 2001)).

II.

At 4:40 a.m., a person who identified himself as Tony

Jones telephoned a Las Vegas police hotline to report an

adult, black male sleeping inside a grey Ford Five Hundred

car. Jones reported that the man was “known to sell drugs in

the area,” did not live in the adjacent apartment complex, and

Jones expressed that he “just wanted the person moved out of

the area.” Jones provided the operator with his phone number

and address.

The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (Metro)

dispatched two officers on duty in the reported area, Alvin

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UNITED STATES V. WILLIAMS 5

Hubbard and Thomas Keller. Hubbard and Keller were on

patrol in a marked Metro patrol car, with Hubbard driving.

When Hubbard and Keller arrived at the apartment complex

the caller had identified, they saw a grey Ford Five Hundred

car in the parking lot. The Ford had temporary license plates,

preventing the officers from securing an initial vehicle check.

The Ford was flanked by a car on either side and a

parking curb in front. Hubbard stopped the patrol car behind

the grey Ford, blocking its exit. The officers turned on their

overhead lights, “take-down” lights, and spotlights, shining

them into the Ford’s windows. After the officers turned on

their lights, a black male, later identified as defendant Tony

Williams, sat up in the driver’s seat inside the Ford. Williams

looked to his left and right, then started his car. Williams

momentarily placed the car in reverse and then quickly

shifted the car back into park.

By the time Williams started the car, both officers were

approaching the Ford on foot. Hubbard approached the car on

the driver’s side, while Keller approached on the passenger’s

side with his handgun drawn. Hubbard yelled at Williams

through the Ford’s closed windows to turn off the engine and

exit the vehicle.

Williams complied and got out of the car. Hubbard

continued walking towards Williams, until he was within

three to four feet of him. Williams, without saying a word,

ran. He ran toward the front of the Ford and around the other

cars in the parking lot.

Keller ran after Williams on foot, and Hubbard joined the

pursuit in the patrol car. The pursuit lasted approximately one

minute. Two or three buildings away from the parking lot,

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6 UNITED STATES V. WILLIAMS

Williams fell and did not get up. He remained on the ground

where he had fallen with his hands out. Keller approached

with his gun drawn and stood over Williams. Hubbard arrived

shortly after in the patrol car, observed Williams prone on the

ground, performed a protective sweep of his backside, and

handcuffed him.

Hubbard then did a pat down of Williams’s backside.

Hubbard then helped Williams from the ground and brought

him to the front of the patrol vehicle. At that point, Hubbard

did a pat down of Williams’s front. He proceeded to reach

into all of Williams’s pants’ pockets. In the right front pocket,

Hubbard found a plastic bag containing crack cocaine. In the

left front pocket, Hubbard found $1,165.00.

Hubbard placed Williams in the back of the patrol car and

drove back to the parking lot where the Ford was still parked.

With Williams handcuffed in the back of the patrol car,

Hubbard began searching the Ford. Hubbard discovered that

the Ford was not registered to Williams but rather to a

company named Rodo. The officers never telephoned the

company, nor made a call to Metro dispatch to have the

vehicle towed or impounded.

As Hubbard searched the car, he found pots, pans, food,

and utensils. In the back seat, he found a purse; when he

unzipped it, he found a gun inside. Hubbard placed the purse

on the hood of the patrol car and contacted his sergeant, who

called for a detective from the firearms unit.

On October 8, 2014, a federal grand jury in Nevada

returned an indictment against Williams for being a felon in

possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)

and 924(a). The grand jury returned a superseding indictment

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UNITED STATES V. WILLIAMS 7

on December 10, 2014, adding charges for violating

21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) by possessing a

controlled substance with intent to distribute, and 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i) by possessing a firearm in furtherance of a

drug trafficking offense. Williams moved to suppress the

evidence of the crack cocaine and handgun found during the

search of Williams and the Ford. The district court granted

the motion, and the government now appeals.

III.

The government challenges the district court’s

suppression of the evidence on the grounds that (1) the

officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory

stop; (2) after the initial stop, the officers developed probable

cause to arrest Williams and perform a search incident to a

lawful arrest; and (3) the officers had probable cause to

search Williams’s vehicle.

A.

The government first argues that the district court erred in

concluding that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to

conduct an investigatory stop. The Fourth Amendment

permits brief investigative stops when a law enforcement

officer has reasonable suspicion that the person stopped is

engaged in criminal activity. Navarette v. California, 134 S.

Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014). Reasonable suspicion requires more

than a mere “hunch” of wrongdoing, but the degree of proof

needed is “considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a

preponderance of the evidence,” and “obviously less

demanding than that for probable cause.” United States v.

Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted). Whether reasonable suspicion

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8 UNITED STATES V. WILLIAMS

exists depends upon the totality of the circumstances

surrounding the stop, including “both the content of

information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.”

Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990); see also

Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1687.

In assessing the role of telephone tips in investigative

stops, the Supreme Court and our court have focused on

whether the tips have “sufficient indicia of reliability to

provide reasonable suspicion to make [an] investigatory

stop.” White, 496 U.S. at 327; United States v. Edwards,

761 F.3d 977, 983 (9th Cir. 2014). In White, an anonymous

tipster telephoned police to report that the defendant would be

leaving a particular apartment at a particular time in a

particular vehicle, and that the defendant would be heading

towards a specific motel in possession of cocaine. 496 U.S.

at 327. The police went to the identified apartment, saw a

vehicle matching the description, and pursued the vehicle as

it made its way to the specified motel. Id. Officers stopped

the vehicle just short of the motel and discovered marijuana

and cocaine inside. Id. The Court held that the anonymous tip

“exhibited sufficient indicia of reliability to justify the

investigatory stop” because the anonymous tipster predicted

the defendant’s future behavior and the officers corroborated

the tip through independent police work. Id. at 330–32.

The Supreme Court further clarified the factors used in

assessing the reliability of tips in Navarette. There, an

unidentified 911 caller reported that a truck ran her off the

road. 134 S. Ct. at 1686–87. A police officer responded to the

911 broadcast, located the truck, and pulled it over. Id. at

1687. Officers smelled marijuana when they approached the

truck and a subsequent search uncovered 30 pounds of

marijuana. Id. The Court held that the 911 call had sufficient

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UNITED STATES V. WILLIAMS 9

indicia of reliability to provide the officers with reasonable

suspicion that the truck ran the caller off the roadway,

reasoning that (1) the tip indicated that the caller had

eyewitness knowledge of the incident, “lend[ing] significant

support to the tip’s reliability,” id. at 1689; (2) police

corroborated the tip by verifying the truck’s location near

where the caller stated the incident occurred, id.; (3) the caller

used the 911 system, which identifies and traces callers, thus

increasing the tip’s veracity by “provid[ing] some safeguards

against making false reports with immunity,” id. at 1689–90;

and (4) the caller reported a specific and potentially ongoing

crime. Id. at 1690.

Applying the principles articulated in White and

Navarette, we hold that officers Hubbard and Keller had

reasonable suspicion to stop Williams based on the

information they possessed and the tip’s reliability. First, the

tipster, Tony Jones, telephoned a police hotline and provided

his name, address, and phone number. Second, the officers

verified the information Jones relayed through independent

observation. Jones provided officers withWilliams’s location

and the make of Williams’s car. When the officers arrived at

the specified parking lot, they found the reported grey Ford

Five Hundred with a man inside. Third, Jones provided

specific criminal allegations. Jones reported that Williams

was sleeping in a car in an adjacent apartment complex, even

though Williams did not live there. Jones also reported that

Williams was known to sell drugs in the area.

Fourth, the officers’ suspicion was increased when they

witnessed Williams’s behavior upon arriving at the parking

lot. When the officers shone the light on Williams’s car, he

popped up in the driver’s seat and immediately looked left

and right. Williams then proceeded to place the car in reverse.

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10 UNITED STATES V. WILLIAMS

The officers testified that this conduct was consistent with

someone who intended to flee the scene. Lastly, the incident

occurred in a high-crime area around 5:00 a.m. See Illinois v.

Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (Although “[a]n

individual’s presence in an area of expected criminal activity,

standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable,

particularized suspicion that the person is committing a

crime,” police can consider the “relevant characteristics of a

location in determining whether the circumstances are

sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation”). The

officers testified that they were aware of gang activities in the

area, and often responded to domestic violence and “party

calls” there.

Williams’s reliance on Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266

(2000), is unpersuasive. In J.L., an anonymous caller told

police “that a young black male standing at a particular bus

stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun.” Id. at 268.

Police went to the bus stop, frisked a young black male in

plaid, and seized a gun from his pocket. Id. The Court held

that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the

suspect, reasoning that the call “provided no predictive

information,” leaving the “police without means to test the

informant’s knowledge or credibility.” Id. at 271. The tip also

failed to allege more than “[a]n accurate description of a

subject’s readily observable location and appearance,” and

did not show how the tipster had knowledge of the alleged

“concealed criminal activity.” Id. at 272.

By contrast, the tip in this case not only provided an

accurate description of the suspect, but it also alleged

ongoing, observable criminal activity—a potential trespass.

Jones identified Williams’s location, car, and appearance and

also stated that Williams was sleeping in a car in an adjacent

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UNITED STATES V. WILLIAMS 11

apartment building’s lot, even though Williams did not live

there. Unlike the concealed criminal activity alleged in J.L.,

Jones provided predictive information concerningWilliams’s

activity, which the officers were able to immediately verify

when they arrived.

Even if there were a question as to whether the tip, on its

own, provided the officers with the requisite reasonable

suspicion to detain Williams, the tip was certainly sufficient

to justify further investigation. After receiving the

information provided by the tipster, the officers would have

been delinquent had they not driven over to the parking lot to

investigate the situation. The officers testified at the

evidentiary hearing that the reported conduct, if confirmed,

would be indicative of a potential DUI, as well as loitering or

trespassing. When they arrived, the officers faced a

potentially dangerous situation. They encountered a possible

drug dealer, sitting in a car with temporary license plates, in

a dark and deserted parking lot, in a high-crime area, during

the early hours of the morning. Accordingly, the officers

acted reasonably when they blocked in the driver with their

police car, turned on their police lights, and one of the

officers drew his gun. These actions led to Williams’s

subsequent suspicious conduct, which included placing his

car in reverse, ignoring the officers’ commands, and

ultimately darting away on foot.

Based on the totality of the circumstances surrounding the

stop, the officers had reasonable suspicion to briefly detain

Williams, and the district court erred in concluding otherwise.

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12 UNITED STATES V. WILLIAMS

B.

1.

The government contends that the officers had probable

cause to arrest Williams because he obstructed the officers in

their attempt to enforce Nevada Revised Statute (N.R.S.)

§ 171.123. Section 171.123 dictates that police officers may

detain a suspect whom the officers have reasonable suspicion

has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime,

in order to obtain that individual’s identity.

1 When the suspect

fails to identify himself after officers have detained him under

reasonable suspicion, the suspect violates N.R.S. § 199.280

(Nevada’s obstruction statute), which makes it unlawful for

a person to “willfully resist[], delay[] or obstruct[] a public

officer in discharging or attempting to discharge any legal

duty of his or her office.”

As explained above, the officers had reasonable suspicion

to conduct an investigatory stop: a caller reported that

Williams was sleeping in his car outside of an apartment

building that Williams did not live in; the caller reported that

he knew Williams to be a drug dealer; Williams acted as if he

intended to flee when officers approached him; and the

conduct occurred in a high-crime area early in the morning.

Accordingly, the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop

Williams and, pursuant to section 171.123, could approach

1 N.R.S. § 171.123(1) and (3) provide: “Any peace officer may detain

any person whom the officer encounters under circumstances which

reasonably indicate that the person has committed, is committing or is

about to commit a crime. . . . The officer may detain the person pursuant

to this section only to ascertain the person’s identity and the suspicious

circumstances surrounding the person’s presence . . . .”

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UNITED STATES V. WILLIAMS 13

Williams to ascertain his identity. Instead of speaking with

the officers, Williams immediately ran, preventing the

officers from discharging their duty under section 171.123

and, accordingly, violating Nevada’s obstruction statute.

In holding that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest

Williams, the district court concluded that simply fleeing

from an officer, while it establishes reasonable suspicion,

does not establish probable cause that the individual violated

Nevada’s obstruction statute. See United States v. Smith,

633 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[A] person’s ‘headlong,’

‘unprovoked’ flight upon seeing a police officer, when it

occurs in a high-crime neighborhood, is sufficient to establish

reasonable suspicion that the person is involved in criminal

activity.”) (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124–25

(2000)). The district court, however, ignored the interplay

between section 171.123 and Nevada’s obstruction statute.

The officers did not have probable cause to arrest Williams

on the basis of the obstruction statute alone; rather, the

officers had probable cause to effectuate an arrest because

Williams obstructed officers in their efforts to enforce section

171.123.

Williams nevertheless contends that the government

waived its argument that the officers had probable cause to

arrest him for violating N.R.S. § 171.123. Before the district

court, the government argued that the officers had probable

cause to arrest Williams; however, the government failed to

specify that the officers had probable cause to arrest Williams

because he violated N.R.S. § 171.123, and the district court

never addressed that statute.

Our court applies “a ‘general rule’ against entertaining

arguments on appeal that were not presented or developed

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14 UNITED STATES V. WILLIAMS

before the district court.” Peterson v. Highland Music, Inc.,

140 F.3d 1313, 1321 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).

However, we have made it clear that “it is claims that are

deemed waived or forfeited, not arguments.” United States v.

Pallares-Galan, 359 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 2004); see

Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 379

(1995). Specifically, “[o]nce a federal claim is properly

presented, a party can make any argument in support of that

claim; parties are not limited to the precise arguments they

made below.” Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 534

(1992).

Our court’s opinion in United Sates v. Guzman-Padilla,

573 F.3d 865 (9th Cir. 2009), is instructive. In GuzmanPadilla, the defendant moved to suppress evidence of 479.95

kilograms of marijuana that border patrol agents seized when

the defendant crossed the Mexican-American border. Id. at

874–76. Before the district court, the government argued

generally that the agents’ seizure of the defendant’s vehicle

did not require probable cause. Id. at 873, 877 n.1. On appeal,

the government argued more specifically that the agents did

not need probable cause to seize the defendant’s vehicle

because of the border search exception to the Fourth

Amendment. Id. at 874, 877 n.1. Our court held that, because

the government had advanced its probable cause argument

before the district court, it was not circumscribed from

advancing a more specific argument in support of its theory.

Id. at 877 n.1.

The situation in our present case is nearly identical to

Guzman-Padilla. Before the district court, the government

argued generally that the officers had probable cause to arrest

Williams because he ran. On appeal, the government argued

more specificallythat the officers had probable cause to arrest

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UNITED STATES V. WILLIAMS 15

Williams for violating N.R.S. § 171.123 when he ran. The

government, having advanced its probable cause theory

before the district court, is able to make a more precise

argument on appeal as to why the officers had probable

cause.

2.

Because the officers lawfully arrested Williams, the

government contends that the officers conducted a valid

search incident to arrest when they searched Williams’s

pockets and found crack cocaine. The Supreme Court and our

court have already held that a search incident to a lawful

arrest is not limited to simple pat-down of the suspect and can

“involve a relatively extensive exploration” of the areas

within the arrestee’s immediate control. United States v.

Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) (internal quotation marks

omitted); see also United States v. Maddox, 614 F.3d 1046,

1048 (9th Cir. 2010). Those areas include the arrestee’s

person and the inside pockets of the arrestee’s clothing. See

Robinson, 414 U.S. at 224–25. Here, the officers had

probable cause to arrest Williams and performed a valid

search incident to arrest of Williams’s person—which

lawfully extended to the insides of Williams’s pockets—after

apprehending Williams for obstruction.

C.

Lastly, the government contends that the officers lawfully

searched Williams’s vehicle because they had probable cause

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16 UNITED STATES V. WILLIAMS

to believe the Ford contained contraband or evidence of drug

dealing.

2

Officers may conduct a warrantless search of an

automobile, including containers within it, when they have

probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband

or evidence of criminal activity. United States v. Ewing,

638 F.3d 1226, 1231 (9th Cir. 2011); see Wyoming v.

Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 302 (1999) (“When there is

probable cause to search for contraband in a car, it is

reasonable for police officers . . . to examine packages and

containers without a showing of individualized probable

cause for each one”). Probable cause exists when, based on

the totality of the circumstances, there is a “fair probability

that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a

particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).

Under the totality of the circumstances, the officers had

probable cause to believe that evidence of contraband would

be found in Williams’s vehicle. Before arriving on the scene,

the officers received information from Metro dispatch that

Williams was sleeping in his car in an unauthorized location

and was known to deal drugs in the area. Moreover, the

officers approached the vehicle earlyin the morning—around

5:00 a.m.—and were in a high-crime neighborhood. When

officers approached the vehicle, Williams popped up, looked

around, and temporarily placed the car in reverse. After

Williams got out of the vehicle, he immediately fled the

scene. Officers caught Williams after he tripped and fell to

2 The government also argues that the officers legally searched the

vehicle as a search incident to a lawful arrest. Because we hold that the

officers had probable cause to search the vehicle, we do not address the

government’s alternative argument.

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UNITED STATES V. WILLIAMS 17

the ground. In searching Williams’s person after effectuating

a lawful arrest, Hubbard found individually wrapped crack

cocaine in plastic containers. He also found $1,165.00 in cash

in small denominations. Based on the information the

officers had prior to making the arrest—and the contraband

they found during the arrest—the officers had probable cause

to believe that the vehicle which Williams had only just fled

contained further contraband or other evidence of drug

dealing.

Williams argues that because the officers arrested him for

“obstructing by running,” there is no conceivable evidence

related to the obstruction charge that the officers could find

in the vehicle. Williams ignores the evidence which emerged

as soon as the officers conducted a lawful search incident to

arrest: the individually wrapped packages of crack cocaine in

his pockets. The crack cocaine provided the officers with the

probable cause necessary to arrest Williams for drug

possession and drug dealing, two crimes in which a vehicle

could reasonably contain further evidence.

Williams also contends that the government waived its

right to argue on appeal that the officers had probable cause

to search his vehicle because it failed to raise the argument

with the district court. Williams’s argument fails: the district

court considered whether the officers had probable cause to

conduct a warrantless search of Williams’s vehicle and held

that the police had none. Our court does not deem an issue

waived “if the district court actually considered it.” Cmty.

House, Inc. v. City of Boise, 490 F.3d 1041, 1054 (9th Cir.

2007) (citing Harrell v. 20th Century Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 203,

205 n.1 (9th Cir. 1991)).

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18 UNITED STATES V. WILLIAMS

IV.

In conclusion, the district court erred in concluding that

the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to detain Williams;

lacked probable cause to arrest Williams; unlawfully

performed a search incident to arrest; and lacked probable

cause to conduct a warrantless search of Williams vehicle.

We therefore reverse and remand for proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

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