Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_06-cv-00504/USCOURTS-alsd-1_06-cv-00504-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael J. Astrue
Defendant
Teresa A. Mitchell
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

Effective February 1, 2007, Michael J. Astrue was confirmed by

the Senate to serve as the Commissioner of Social Security. Pursuant

to Rule 25(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Michael J.

Astrue should be substituted, therefore, for Commissioner Jo Anne B.

Barnhart as the Defendant in this suit. No further action need be

taken to continue this suit by reason of the last sentence of section

205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

TERESA A. MITCHELL, : 

Plaintiff, : 

vs. : 

 CIVIL ACTION 06-0504-KD-M 

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,1 : 

Acting Commissioner of

Social Security, : 

Defendant. : 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

 In this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3),

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of an adverse social security

ruling which denied claims for disability insurance benefits and

Supplemental Security Income (hereinafter SSI). The action was

referred for report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(B). Oral argument was heard on March 19, 2007. Upon

consideration of the administrative record, the memoranda of the

parties, and oral argument, it is recommended that the decision

of the Commissioner be affirmed, that this action be dismissed,

and that judgment be entered in favor of Defendant Michael J.

Astrue and against Plaintiff Teresa A. Mitchell.

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This Court is not free to reweigh the evidence or substitute

its judgment for that of the Secretary of Health and Human Services, Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir.

1983), which must be supported by substantial evidence. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). The substantial evidence test requires "that the decision under review be supported

by evidence sufficient to justify a reasoning mind in accepting

it; it is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance." 

Brady v. Heckler, 724 F.2d 914, 918 (11th Cir. 1984), quoting

Jones v. Schweiker, 551 F.Supp. 205 (D. Md. 1982).

Plaintiff was born October 24, 1969. At the time of the

administrative hearing, Mitchell was thirty-six years old, had

completed one year of college (Tr. 183), and had previous work

experience as a nurse’s aide and telemarketer (Tr. 193). In

claiming benefits, Plaintiff alleges disability due to obesity,

hypertension, and shortness of breath (Doc. 9 Fact Sheet).

The Plaintiff filed applications for disability insurance

benefits and SSI on August 18, 2004, asserting a disability date

of January 1, 2007 (Tr. 46-48, 158-64). Benefits were denied

following a hearing by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) who

determined that Mitchell was capable of performing her past

relevant work as a telemarketer (Tr. 10-21). Plaintiff requested

review of the hearing decision (Tr. 7-8) by the Appeals Council,

but it was denied (Tr. 4-6).

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Plaintiff claims that the opinion of the ALJ is not

supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, Mitchell

alleges that: (1) The ALJ did not perform the mental and

physical function-by-function analysis of her abilities as

required by SSR 96-8p; (2) the ALJ did not consider her morbid

obesity; and (3) she is not capable of performing her past

relevant work as a telemarketer (Doc. 9). Defendant has

responded to—and denies—these claims (Doc. 10). Before

discussing Mitchell’s claims, the Court will set out the medical

evidence of record.

Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Sid Crosby, a family

practitioner, on four occasions between October 30, 2003 and

August 11, 2004 (Tr. 108-16, 129). Mitchell was treated,

primarily, for a urinary tract infection (Tr. 116), pursuant to

an employment examination (Tr. 114), for uncontrolled

hypertension (Tr. 111), and for obesity (Tr. 108). At the time

of the last exam, the doctor noted that Plaintiff admitted that

she had not been taking her medications because of the expense

(Tr. 108). Generally, Dr. Crosby noted that, although Mitchell

was morbidly obese, she was in no acute distress; he noted no

limitations in her abilities and placed no restrictions on her

activities.

On October 15, 2004, Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Mohammed

A. Nayeem, a family practitioner, at the request of the Social

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Security Administration (Tr. 117-20, 130; see also Tr. 15). The

doctor generally noted that Mitchell suffered from morbid and

gross obesity, weighing in at 410 pounds; he specifically noted

that he could not measure her blood pressure because no cuff

would fit her arm. Dr. Nayeem performed numerous range-of-motion

measurements, finding her generally able to perform the requested

movements, though she was unable to heel/toe walk and squat. His

summary paragraph is set out herein completely:

Except for gross, exogenous, morbid

obesity, the physical examination was

unremarkable. She definitely needs bariatric

surgery. Otherwise, eventually her weight

will continue increasing and will go to 500

and even higher, and she will face serious

health problems. She definitely needs some

financial help, enough at least to get the

surgery done, and lose at least 200 pounds. 

Then she won’t have any complaints.

(Tr. 120). 

Mitchell was also examined by Dr. Robert D. Lightfoot, a

family practitioner, on seven occasions between November 5, 2004

through December 21, 2005 (Tr. 131-57). The doctor treated her

regularly for morbid obesity and hypertension though there were

also complaints of back pain (Tr. 139-40), fluid on her legs (Tr.

137), a strained left calf muscle (Tr. 135-36), pain and swelling

in her right ankle, dizziness, and headaches (Tr. 133-34), and

the flu (131). On the first examination, the doctor encouraged

Plaintiff to return to work as soon as possible; he also noted

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It is noted that the ALJ went into greater detail in summarizing

the medical evidence (see Tr. 15-17) than the Court has done herein. 

However, as there were no complaints concerning the ALJ’s recounting

of the evidence, the Court sees no need for the longer recitation.

5

that Mitchell needed diet counseling and that a gastrointestinal

bypass was indicated though it was not available for socioeconomic reasons (Tr. 144). Dr. Lightfoot regularly encouraged

diet and exercise as well as weight reduction (Tr. 132, 134, 138,

140, 142, 144); the doctor also routinely stressed the need for

Plaintiff to be compliant with her medications (Tr. 132, 134,

136, 140, 142). The Court notes that Lightfoot generally found

Plaintiff to be in no acute distress and her systems normal; as

with Dr. Crosby, Lightfoot noted only self-reported limitations

in her abilities and placed no restrictions on her activities. 

This concludes the medical evidence of record conducted by

examining physicians.2

Plaintiff first claims that the ALJ did not perform the

mental and physical function-by-function analysis of her

abilities as required by SSR 96-8p (Doc. 9, pp. 6-8). Mitchell

has specifically quoted the following language from that ruling:

The [Residual Functional Capacity

(hereinafter RFC)] assessment must first

identify the individual's functional

limitations or restrictions and assess his or

her work-related abilities on a function-byfunction basis, including the functions in

paragraphs (b), (c), and (d) of 20 C.F.R.

404.1545 and 416.945. Only after that may

RFC be expressed in terms of the exertional

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levels of work, sedentary, light, medium,

heavy, and very heavy. 

SSR 96-8p, Titles II and XVI: Assessing Residual Functional

Capacity in Initial Claims, 1996 WL 374184, *1 at ¶ 4. The Court

notes further instructive language from that Ruling which states

as follows:

RFC is an issue only at steps 4 and 5 of

the sequential evaluation process. The

following are issues regarding the RFC

assessment and its use at each of these

steps.

RFC and exertional levels of work. The

RFC assessment is a function-by-function

assessment based upon all of the relevant

evidence of an individual's ability to do

work-related activities. At step 4 of the

sequential evaluation process, the RFC must

not be expressed initially in terms of the

exertional categories of "sedentary,"

"light," "medium," "heavy," and "very heavy"

work because the first consideration at this

step is whether the individual can do past

relevant work as he or she actually performed

it.

RFC may be expressed in terms of an

exertional category, such as light, if it

becomes necessary to assess whether an

individual is able to do his or her past

relevant work as it is generally performed in

the national economy. However, without the

initial function-by-function assessment of

the individual's physical and mental

capacities, it may not be possible to

determine whether the individual is able to

do past relevant work as it is generally

performed in the national economy because

particular occupations may not require all of

the exertional and nonexertional demands

necessary to do the full range of work at a

given exertional level.

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The Court notes that the ALJ sprinkled his findings throughout

the determination, in outline form, rather than listing them all at

the conclusion of the decision as is the usual method. The Court

finds nothing objectionable in this system of analysis though it

results in the announcement of the conclusion before the means to that

end is accomplished. 

4

The Court is aware that Plaintiff has raised a claim regarding

this finding; it will be addressed in short order.

7

Id. at *3. 

In this action, the ALJ faithfully recounted all of the

medical evidence and discussed Plaintiff’s reporting of her daily

activities (Tr. 15-17). The ALJ then rendered his fifth finding,

viz., that “the claimant has the residual functional capacity to

sedentary work activity sedentary work activity [sic] which

involves lifting and/or carrying no more than 10 pounds at a time

and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files,

ledgers, and small tools” (Tr. 17).3

 Next, the ALJ found that

Mitchell’s obesity did not provide a basis for finding her

disabled (Tr. 17).4 The next finding was that Plaintiff was not

credible as her testimony of limitation was unsupported by the

medical evidence (Tr. 18); the Court notes that Mitchell has not

challenged this finding (see Doc. 9). 

The ALJ then noted “the paucity of medical evidence in this

case,” before finding that Plaintiff was capable of sedentary

work (Tr. 19). The ALJ discounted Mitchell’s allegation of

depression to Dr. Nayeem, finding it to be no more than a mild

problem as she had never undergone treatment or taken medication

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Even though Plaintiff’s third claim—that she is incapable of

performing the job of telemarketer—would normally be addressed later

in this report, the Court finds it expeditious to address it now.

8

for any mental health problem (Tr. 19; see also Tr. 117). The

ALJ then noted that there was “no objective evidence that the

claimant is incapable of sitting for up to six hours with normal

break periods as required by sedentary work. No physician of

record has restricted the claimant from prolonged sitting” (Tr.

19). The ALJ went on to note that Plaintiff had told Dr. Nayeem

that sitting was not a problem for her (Tr. 19; see also Tr.

117). The ALJ then discussed the testimony of the Vocational

Expert and found Mitchell capable of performing her previous

relevant work as a telemarketer (Tr. 20).

The Court notes that Plaintiff has the burden of proving

that she cannot perform her past relevant work.5 Macia v. Bowen,

829 F.2d 1009, 1012 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Sryock v. Heckler,

764 F.2d 834, 835 (11th Cir. 1985)). However, the Eleventh

Circuit Court of Appeals has further held that

[a]lthough a claimant bears the burden

of demonstrating an inability to return to

his past relevant work, the Secretary has an

obligation to develop a full and fair record. 

Nelms v. Bowen, 803 F.2d 1164, 1165 (11th

Cir. 1986); Cowart v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d

731, 735 (11th Cir. 1981). Where there is no

evidence of the physical requirements and

demands of the claimant's past work and no

detailed description of the required duties

was solicited or proffered, the Secretary

cannot properly determine whether the

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Mitchell incorrectly credited the State Agency Physician for

these findings, though she gave the correct page citation. Dr. Nayeem

was the author of these comments, however.

9

claimant has the residual functional capacity

to perform his past relevant work. Nelms,

803 F.2d at 1164. 

Schnorr v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 578, 581 (11th Cir. 1987). 

Plaintiff has challenged the finding that she can perform

work as a telemarketer, arguing that she can not squat and has

difficulty walking because of her obesity (Doc. 9, p. 7; cf. Tr.

1206

). Mitchell also noted that she had difficulties with

postural limitations and complains that the ALJ failed to

consider the mental requirements of the job (Doc. 9, p. 7). The

Court notes that the evidence of record regarding Plaintiff’s job

is limited to a notation in a Social Security form on which a

worker stated that Mitchell had said that “she did not have to

lift anything and just sat behind a desk and solicited and called

people to sell things but no one called her” (Tr. 93). 

The Court first notes that Plaintiff’s assertion that she

had difficulty walking was not supported by Dr. Nayeem’s

conclusions. His specific findings were that “[s]he walked with

a normal gait without any problem [though s]he could not perform

heel/toe walk because of her extreme and gross obesity;” he did

also note that she could not squat (Tr. 120). As for postural

limitations, a non-examining physician indicated that Mitchell

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would frequently be limited in her ability to balance, stoop,

kneel, crouch, and crawl while occasionally being limited in

climbing stairs (Tr. 123). 

The Court notes that Plaintiff’s job as a telemarketer, as

she described it, required no squatting, balancing, stooping,

kneeling, crouching, crawling, or climbing. Furthermore, the ALJ

found that Mitchell had no severe mental impairments (Tr. 19), a

finding that this Court finds is supported by substantial

evidence. Even though Plaintiff has asserted that the ALJ did

not develop the record with regard to the duties and

responsibilities of being a telemarketer (Doc. 9, p. 11), the

Court notes that Mitchell had the opportunity to provide that

information in a form completed in the processing of these

applications and declined to do so (see, e.g., Tr. 70-76). 

Though there is little evidence in this record of Plaintiff’s

telemarketing job, she has provided the evidence of it and stated

that she can do it as she described it. The Court finds that the

ALJ’s conclusion that Mitchell is capable of performing her past

relevant work is supported by substantial evidence. With regard

to Plaintiff’s first claim—that the ALJ did not perform the

mental and physical function-by-function analysis of her

abilities—the Court finds that although the ALJ may have not

strictly followed the dictates of SSR 96-8p, he has reached the

right conclusion, which is supported by substantial evidence, and

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The Court again notes that Plaintiff has not challenged this

finding.

11

that any error made was, at most, harmless.

Mitchell next claims that the ALJ did not consider her

morbid obesity (Doc. 9, pp. 8-11). More specifically, she claims

that the ALJ failed to properly consider the impact of her

obesity on her RFC. Plaintiff references SSR 02-1p, Titles II

and XVI: Evaluation of Obesity, 2000 WL 628049 in making her

argument.

The ALJ referenced this Social Security ruling as well and

found that although her obesity was a severe impairment, it did

not lend itself toward a disability finding (Tr. 17). The ALJ

went on to find that Plaintiff’s complaints of limitation were

not supported by the medical evidence,7

 specifically noting that

Dr. Nayeem reported an, essentially, normal examination (Tr. 18). 

The ALJ then described Mitchell’s self-reported daily activities

(id.). The ALJ then noted that Plaintiff had failed to follow a

prescribed medication regimen, even though community resources

could have provided support in the purchase of those medicines

(id.).

Plaintiff has argued that the ALJ’s finding was

inappropriate “[b]ecause of the risks and potential side effects

of surgery for obesity” (Doc. 9, p. 11) (quoting SSR 02-1p). The

Court, however, does not read the ALJ’s comments to refer to her

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failure to have surgery as it is not the Court’s understanding

that the medications that Plaintiff was not taking were related

to her obesity (see Tr. 134, 143; see also Tr. 105). In any

event, even if the ALJ’s remarks did contemplate her failure to

have surgery, the medial evidence of record supports the ALJ’s

conclusion that Plaintiff can perform her past relevant work as a

telemarketer in spite of her obesity. Mitchell’s complaints

otherwise are without merit.

Plaintiff has raised three claims in bringing this action. 

All are without merit. Upon consideration of the entire record,

the Court finds "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Perales, 402

U.S. at 401. Therefore, it is recommended that the Secretary's

decision be affirmed, see Fortenberry v. Harris, 612 F.2d 947,

950 (5th Cir. 1980), that this action be dismissed, and that

judgment be entered in favor of Defendant Michael J. Astrue and

against Plaintiff Teresa A. Mitchell.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS

AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION

AND FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

1. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation or

anything in it must, within ten days of the date of service of

this document, file specific written objections with the clerk of

court. Failure to do so will bar a de novo determination by the

district judge of anything in the recommendation and will bar an

attack, on appeal, of the factual findings of the magistrate

judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d

736, 738 (11th Cir. 1988); Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404

(5th Cir. Unit B, 1982)(en banc). The procedure for challenging

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the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge is set

out in more detail in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which

provides that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a

magistrate judge in a dispositive matter, that is, a

matter excepted by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), by filing

a “Statement of Objection to Magistrate Judge’s

Recommendation” within ten days after being served with

a copy of the recommendation, unless a different time

is established by order. The statement of objection

shall specify those portions of the recommendation to

which objection is made and the basis for the

objection. The objecting party shall submit to the

district judge, at the time of filing the objection, a

brief setting forth the party’s arguments that the

magistrate judge’s recommendation should be reviewed de

novo and a different disposition made. It is

insufficient to submit only a copy of the original

brief submitted to the magistrate judge, although a

copy of the original brief may be submitted or referred

to and incorporated into the brief in support of the

objection. Failure to submit a brief in support of the

objection may be deemed an abandonment of the

objection.

A magistrate judge’s recommendation cannot be appealed to a

Court of Appeals; only the district judge’s order or judgment can

be appealed.

2. Transcript (applicable where proceedings tape recorded). 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), the

magistrate judge finds that the tapes and original records in

this action are adequate for purposes of review. Any party

planning to object to this recommendation, but unable to pay the

fee for a transcript, is advised that a judicial determination

that transcription is necessary is required before the United

States will pay the cost of the transcript.

DONE this 20th day of March, 2007.

s/BERT W. MILLING, JR. 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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