Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cr-00086/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cr-00086-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
USA
Plaintiff
Eden Vasseur
Defendant

Document Text:

1 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME 

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MCGREGOR W. SCOTT 

United States Attorney 

CAMERON L. DESMOND 

Assistant United States Attorney 

501 I Street, Suite 10-100 

Sacramento, CA 95814 

Telephone: (916) 554-2700 

Facsimile: (916) 554-2900 

Attorneys for Plaintiff 

United States of America 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

EDEN VASSEUR, 

 Defendant. 

CASE NO. 2:20-CR-00086-TLN 

STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE 

TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; 

FINDINGS AND ORDER 

DATE: October 15, 2020 

TIME: 9:30 a.m. 

COURT: Hon. Troy L. Nunley 

This case was set for a change of plea on October 15, 2020. By this stipulation, the defendant 

now moves to continue the change of plea hearing to October 22, 2020, and to exclude time between 

October 15, 2020, and October 22, 2020 under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4]. 

On May 13, 2020, this Court issued General Order 618, which suspends all jury trials in the 

Eastern District of California “until further notice.” Further, pursuant to General Order 611, this Court’s 

declaration of judicial emergency under 18 U.S.C. § 3174, and the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council’s 

Order of April 16, 2020 continuing this Court’s judicial emergency, this Court has allowed district 

judges to continue all criminal matters to a date after May 2, 2020.1

 This and previous General Orders, 

as well as the declarations of judicial emergency, were entered to address public health concerns related 

to COVID-19. 

1

 A judge “may order case-by-case exceptions” at the discretion of that judge “or upon the 

request of counsel, after consultation with counsel and the Clerk of the Court to the extent such an order 

will impact court staff and operations.” General Order 618, ¶ 7 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2020). 

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Although the General Orders and declarations of emergency address the district-wide health 

concern, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act’s end-of-justice provision 

“counteract[s] substantive openendedness with procedural strictness,” “demand[ing] on-the-record 

findings” in a particular case. Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-therecord findings, there can be no exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). Id. at 507. Moreover, any such 

failure cannot be harmless. Id. at 509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 

(9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a judge ordering an ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit 

findings on the record “either orally or in writing”). 

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which Zedner emphasizes as both mandatory 

and inexcusable—General Orders 611, 612, 617, and 618 and the subsequent declaration of judicial 

emergency require specific supplementation. Ends-of-justice continuances are excludable only if “the 

judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such 

action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable unless “the court sets forth, in the record of 

the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of 

such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” Id.

The General Orders and declaration of judicial emergency exclude delay in the “ends of justice.” 

18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address continuances 

stemming from pandemics, natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has discretion to order a 

continuance in such circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-week ends-of-justice 

continuance following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. Furlow v. United States, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981). 

The court recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. Id. at 767-68; see also 

United States v. Correa, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Furlow to exclude time 

following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). The coronavirus 

is posing a similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated by the statutory 

rules. 

In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following 

case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-ofCase 2:20-cr-00086-TLN Document 30 Filed 10/16/20 Page 2 of 4
 

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justice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). 2 If continued, this Court should designate a new date 

for the status conference. United States v. Lewis, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any 

pretrial continuance must be “specifically limited in time”). 

STIPULATION 

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and 

through defendant’s counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 

1. By previous order, this matter was set for a change of plea on October 15, 2020. 

2. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and to protect the public, courtroom staff, and the 

parties, the court ordered that the change of plea be conducted by video conference. 

3. Defense counsel was unable to appear by the designated video-conference platform, 

Zoom, on October 15, 2020. 

4. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the change of plea hearing to 

October 22, 2020, at 9:30 a.m., and to exclude time between October 15, 2020, and October 22, 2020, 

under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). 

5. The government does not object to the continuance. 

6. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as 

requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date 

prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. 

7. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., 

within which trial must commence, the time period of October 15, 2020, to October 22, 2020, inclusive, 

is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results 

from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant’s request on the basis of the Court’s finding that 

the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the 

defendant in a speedy trial. 

/ / / 

/ / / 

2

 The parties note that General Order 612 acknowledges that a district judge may make 

“additional findings to support the exclusion” at the judge’s discretion. General Order 612, ¶ 5 (E.D. 

Cal. March 18, 2020). 

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8. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the 

Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial 

must commence. 

IT IS SO STIPULATED. 

Dated: October 15, 2020 MCGREGOR W. SCOTT 

United States Attorney 

/s/ CAMERON L. DESMOND 

 CAMERON L. DESMOND 

Assistant United States Attorney 

Dated: October 15, 2020 /s/ DANIEL RUSSO 

DANIEL RUSSO 

Counsel for Defendant 

Eden Vasseur

FINDINGS AND ORDER 

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED this 16th day of October, 2020. 

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