Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-14-03559/USCOURTS-ca8-14-03559-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Loretta E. Lynch
Respondent
Sintia Yolissa Rodriguez-Mercado
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-3559

___________________________

Sintia Yolissa Rodriguez-Mercado

lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioner

v.

Loretta E. Lynch, Attorney General of the United States

lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent

____________

Petition for Review of an Order of the

 Board of Immigration Appeals

____________

 Submitted: September 22, 2015

 Filed: December 23, 2015 (Corrected January 4, 2016)

____________

Before LOKEN, BENTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

____________

LOKEN, Circuit Judge.

Sintia YolissaRodriguez-Mercado, a citizen of Honduras, petitions for judicial

review of a final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying her

application for asylum, withholding ofremoval, and protection under the Convention

Against Torture. Rodriguez-Mercado challenges the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ’s”)

adverse credibility finding and alleges that the BIA failed to consider whether country

conditions independently established her eligibility for asylum relief. She has also

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moved to remand her case to the BIA to consider whether she is eligible for voluntary

departure. We deny the petition for review and the motion to remand. 

I.

Rodriguez-Mercado is eligible for asylum if the Attorney General determines

that she is a “refugee,” defined as a person who is unwilling to return to her country

of origin “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account

of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political

opinion.” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(b)(1)(A). A protected ground must be “at

least one central reason for persecuting the applicant.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i);

see Ortiz-Puentes v. Holder, 662 F.3d 481, 483 (8th Cir. 2011). Rodriguez-Mercado

alleges that repeated domestic violence by her former partner was persecution on

account of her membership in a particular social group, namely, “Honduran women

who are viewed as property by virtue of their positions within a domestic relationship

and who are unable to leave the relationship.” When private persons committed the

alleged persecution, as in this case, the asylum petitioner must establish that the

assaults “were either condoned by the government or were committed by private

actors that the government was unwilling or unable to control.” Osuji v. Holder, 657

F.3d 719, 721-22 (8th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted). 

An immigration officer interviewed Rodriguez-Mercado after she entered the

United States without inspection near Rio Grande City, Texas, on May 9, 2010. 

Rodriguez-Mercado admitted that she entered illegally, claimed she was seeking

employment in Virginia, and said she did not fear returning to Honduras. However,

when the Department of Homeland Security served a Notice to Appear that

commenced removal proceedings, she applied for asylum, withholding of removal,

and protection under the Convention Against Torture. Rodriguez-Mercado testified

at a credible-fear interview before an immigration officer that she fled Honduras

because her former partner and father of her child, Juan Carlos Izaguirre, repeatedly

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beat and raped her while they were living together, and she feared for her personal

safety if she returned to Honduras. 

Rodriguez-Mercado testified at length at the July 2012 asylum hearing. The

IJfound that her testimony was not credible, that inconsistencies in the testimony “go

to the heart of her asylum claim,” and that two “crucial” corroborating documents

were fabricated. Though Rodriguez-Mercado also submitted documents establishing

that domestic violence is widespread in Honduras, the IJ found that “none of these

documents are sufficiently detailed, relevant, or persuasive enough to rectify [her]

incredible testimony or otherwise establish thatshe meets the definition of a refugee.” 

The IJ denied the application and ordered Rodriguez-Mercado removed, also ruling

thatshe wasineligible for voluntary departure because she had not been in the United

States for one year before being served the Notice to Appear. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229c(b)(1)(A). 

Rodriguez-Mercado appealed the removal order to the BIA but did not appeal

denial of voluntary departure. The BIA dismissed the appeal in a written decision. 

Upholding the IJ’s adverse credibility finding, the BIA concluded:

We concur with the [IJ’s] conclusion that the respondent failed to

sustain her burden of proof to establish past persecution or a wellfounded fear of future persecution in Honduras, on account of any of the

grounds enumerated in the Act, in light of the fact that she failed to

provide credible testimony in support of her claim.

Rodriguez-Mercado petitions for judicial review of thisfinal order of removal. 

See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). When the BIA adopts the IJ’s findings of fact but adds its

own reasoning, we review the agency’s fact-finding in both decisions for substantial

evidence. Ali v. Holder, 686 F.3d 534, 538 (8th Cir. 2012). “Administrative findings

of fact, including credibility determinations, are conclusive unless any reasonable

adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Fesehaye v. Holder,

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607 F.3d 523, 526 (8th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted); see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). 

We may reverse the BIA’s determination that Rodriguez-Mercado was not eligible

for asylum “only if the evidence [she] presented . . . was such that a reasonable

factfinder would have to conclude that the requisite fear of persecution existed.” INS

v. Elias-Zacharias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992). “We review questions of law de novo

and accord substantial deference to the BIA’s interpretation of immigration law and

agency regulations.” Zheng v. Holder, 698 F.3d 710, 713 (8th Cir. 2012) (quotation

omitted). 

II.

Rodriguez-Mercado argues that substantial evidence does not support the IJ’s

adverse credibility finding. “When the BIA has adopted and affirmed the IJ’s adverse

credibility determination, we defer to those findings if supported by specific, cogent

reasons for disbelief.” R.K.N. v. Holder, 701 F.3d 535, 538 (8th Cir. 2012), quoting

Osonowo v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 922, 927 (8th Cir. 2008). 

At the hearing, Rodriguez-Mercado testified that Izaguirre would hit her when

he came home drunk and high. He became more abusive after she became pregnant,

and on three occasions he came home drunk and high and raped her. She reported

him to the police on one occasion, but the police did nothing. Izaguirre told her he

“gave them money so they wouldn’t do anything to him.” He refused to take her to

the hospital to have the baby and tried to prevent family members from taking her. 

When the baby wastwo months old, Rodriguez-Mercado left Izaguirre and moved in

with her sister three hours away. Izaguirre found her, and Rodriguez-Mercado

returned to live with him because, “I was afraid that he was going to take my son

from me and that he would do something to me” because “he was a very violent

person.” One year later, she left her son with her mother and fled to the United

States. If she returned to Honduras, Izaguirre would find her because it is a small

country, and the police would not protect her because he gives them money. 

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After cross examination by DHS counsel and questioning by the IJ, the IJ

found that Rodriguez-Mercado’s testimony and asylum application lacked detail and

contained multiple material omissions and inconsistencies, some of which were

central to her claim: (i) Rodriguez-Mercado’s hearing testimony contradicted her

asylum application as to when the abuse started, the actions of Izaguirre and her

mother and sister on the day she went to the hospital, and whether Izaguirre raped her

“almost every time that he would come home drunk and high,” or only three times. 

(ii) The hearing testimony contradicted her statement to the border patrol thatshe had

never been harmed in Honduras and came to the United States to seek work. (iii)

Rodriguez-Mercado admitted providing two false corroborating documents-- a letter

from a “neighbor” who “witnessed when [Izaguirre] beat her” but was written by

Rodriguez-Mercado’s aunt who lived three hours away, and a letter from a woman

who went with Rodriguez-Mercado to the police station stating that Izaguirre “on

various occasions in front of me, threatened to kill her, battered and mistreated her

physically,” when in fact the woman was not a neighbor and never witnessed

Izaguirre abusing Rodriguez-Mercado. The IJfurther found thatRodriguez-Mercado,

when provided an opportunity to explain, “testified in an evasive and unresponsive

manner.” Based on these inconsistencies, the IJ found her not credible. 

The BIA reviewed the adverse credibility finding for clear error, see 8 C.F.R.

§ 1003.1(d)(3)(i), and concluded that the IJ “supported his adverse credibility finding

with specific and cogent reasons based on the record.” Accordingly, the BIA agreed

that Rodriguez-Mercado failed to sustain her burden to prove past or future

persecution “in light of the fact that she failed to provide credible testimony in

support of her claim.” After careful review of the record, we agree. The numerous

contradictions and inconsistencies went to the heart ofRodriguez-Mercado’s claim--

the extent and duration of Izaguirre’s alleged persecution, whether the persecution

was on account of her membership in a particular social group (as opposed to his

controlled substance addictions), and whether the Honduran police were unable or

unwilling to control persecution by this private actor. As in Tebyasa v. Holder, 593

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F.3d 707, 711 (8th Cir. 2010), Rodriguez-Mercado’s “numerous inconsistencies,

some going to the heart of the claim, provide a specific, cogent reason to disbelieve

[her] claim of persecution.” 

Rodriguez-Mercado argues the IJ erred by failing to evaluate her testimony in

light of the effects of sexual abuse. She relies on a 1995 internal Department of

Justice Memorandumto INS AsylumOfficers explaining that victims ofsexual abuse

often have trouble speaking about their experiences and these difficulties can make

the victim appear to be lying or cause memory loss. However, immigration judges

are not required to follow the Memorandum’s recommended interviewing techniques. 

See Zewdie v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 804, 809 n.7 (8th Cir. 2004). Moreover,

Rodriguez-Mercado did not fail to disclose alleged sexual abuse. The relevant

inconsistency wastelling a border patrol officer when she first arrived in this country

that she was here to seek work in Virginia and had no fear of returning to Honduras. 

This inconsistency suggested a willingness to overstate alleged abuse to support her

claim for asylum relief. When asked to explain the inconsistencies, RodriguezMercado never hinted they were due to fear, embarrassment, or memory issues. 

Rodriguez-Mercado further argues that the IJ impermissibly “shroud[ed] his

decision” by basing it on demeanor. Like the BIA, we disagree. Congress has

expressly declared that an IJ “may base a credibility determination on the demeanor

. . . of the applicant or witness.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (b)(1)(B)(iii). Here, after carefully

explaining the many inconsistencies in Rodriguez-Mercado’s hearing testimony and

prior interviews, the IJ noted that she “often testified in an evasive and nonresponsive manner, especially when asked to explain the discrepancies between her

testimony in court and her sworn statement to [the border patrol].” This was a proper

use of demeanor to buttress an analysis that, as the BIA explained, satisfied the IJ’s

obligation to provide specific and cogent reasons based on the record. 

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III. 

Rodriguez-Mercado next contends, relying heavily on Hassan v. Gonzales, 484

F.3d 513 (8th Cir. 2007), that the BIA erred by basing its decision on the IJ’s adverse

credibility finding without considering whether her evidence of Honduran country

conditions, without more, was sufficient to establish that she is eligible for relief. 

In Hassan, we reviewed the denial of asylum to a petitioner who was found

incredible as to one claim, but who also provided unrefuted evidence that she had

suffered female genital mutilation (“FGM”) in Somalia, her country of origin. Id. at

515-18. Based on a Department of State report that 98% of women in Somalia had

undergone FGM, we concluded that forced FGM is persecution on account of

membership in the particular social group of Somali females. Hassan, 484 F.3d at

515, 518. Thus, Hassan established past persecution, and the government failed to

show changed country conditionsthat would rebut the presumption of a well-founded

fear of future persecution. Id. at 518-19. 

By contrast, in this case Rodriguez-Mercado’s lack of credibilitymeant that she

failed to prove past persecution. Moreover, as the IJ and BIA found, she failed to

present credible evidence thatshe was a “refugee” -- a person (i) who was persecuted,

(ii) on account of her membership in a particular social group, and (iii) by a private

actor the government of Honduras was unable or unwilling to control. The IJ

specifically considered Rodriguez-Mercado’s country conditions evidence and

concluded that it was not “sufficiently detailed, relevant, or persuasive enough to

rectify [Rodriguez-Mercado’s] incredible testimony or otherwise establish that she

meets the definition of a refugee.” Because Rodriguez-Mercado failed to establish

that she was a refugee under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42), the IJ and BIA denied her

application for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. There was no error. 

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IV.

Rodriguez-Mercado moved to remand the case to the BIA so thatshe may seek

voluntary departure from the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b). She

accompanied the motion with recent materials that we may not consider because they

are outside the administrative record on appeal. In her appeal to the BIA, RodriguezMercado did not challenge the IJ’s denial of voluntary departure. “When an issue is

abandoned before the BIA, it is not preserved for our review.” Nyonzele v. INS, 83

F.3d 975, 984 (8th Cir. 1996). Moreover, only the Attorney General has authority to

grant the discretionary statutory benefit of voluntary departure. Rife v. Ashcroft, 374

F.3d 606, 615 (8th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, we deny the motion to remand. We of

course do not address whether Rodriguez-Mercado may be eligible for voluntary

departure or other relief from the agency. 

We deny the petition for review and the motion to remand. 

______________________________

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