Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-14-01249/USCOURTS-ca8-14-01249-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Christopher Curtis Kelley
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-1249

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Christopher Curtis Kelley

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

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 Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Jefferson City

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 Submitted: April 23, 2015

 Filed: May 29, 2015

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Before RILEY, Chief Judge, SMITH and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

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RILEY, Chief Judge.

On the morning Christopher Kelley’s arson trial was to begin, Kelley moved

for substitute counsel or, alternatively, to proceed pro se. The district court denied 1

the motion. At trial, a jury found Kelley guilty on both arson counts. Kelley directly

The Honorable Beth Phillips, United States District Judge for the Western

1

District of Missouri.

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appealed the district court’s orders regarding his representation at trial. We affirmed

in part and, retaining jurisdiction, remanded to the district court for clarification of

the denial of Kelley’s motion to proceed pro se. See United States v. Kelley, 774

F.3d 434, 442 (8th Cir. 2014) (Kelley I). On remand, the district court issued an order

clarifying its decision, and, back in this court, the parties submitted supplemental

briefs. After careful review, we affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

We repeat those facts relevant to this appeal following remand. On April 22,

2013, the first day of trial, Kelley’s public defender informed the district court that

Kelley did not want the public defender to represent him. The district court excluded

the prosecutor from the courtroom, although at Kelley’s request, some observers

remained. Kelley explained to the district court that Kelley had not had a chance to

view all the evidence against him and he had several communication problems with

his attorney. The district court replied, 

I think [the public defender] has very clearly explained that he is making

decisions in your best interests. . . . And so I am not at this point or at

any point in this trial going to grant your request for a new attorney or

to discharge [the public defender].

Kelley then stated, “Since you won’t provide substitution, I would like to move for

the court to allow me to represent myself, contingent upon getting a continuance for

me to review the evidence and prepare.” The district court then replied, 

I do not believe that granting a continuance at this point is appropriate

or necessary. This case has been set for trial on at least one other

occasion. The case is ready to move forward. You have expressed

identical, if not very similar concerns with respect to [the public

defender] I know for a long period of time now, and I don’t believe that

a continuance is necessary, nor appropriate. 

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Now, knowing that I’m not going to grant a continuance, is it your wish

that you proceed pro se and without [the public defender] representing

you?

(Emphasis added). Kelley never answered the question orally. At that point, an

“unidentified female”—later identified as Kelley’s girlfriend—shouted, “Has [the

district judge] seen the document?” The district court acknowledged there was a

document on the bench, and the public defender stated it was from Kelley. The

district court called for a recessin the proceedingsso she could look at the document:

Kelley’s pro se “motion to replace court appointed attorney for ineffective assistance

of counsel.” Kelley wrote, 

If the Court refuses to appoint another attorney to properly represent me

in spite of the fact that I am still willing to work with an attorney, I

object that this will be a denial of due process. . . . I am ignorant of the

laws, of the court rules, and of court procedure. If the court expects me

to either represent myself or accept inadequate counsel, it would be a

denial of due process.

Kelley requested two alternate “remedies”: 

1. If the court allows, counsel will withdraw and the court will appoint

new counsel and grant a continuance. 

2. If the court denies substitution, I move for the court to allow me to

represent myself with the understanding that I am forced to exercise a

choice between incompetent or unprepared counsel and appearing pro

se.

When the district judge returned to the courtroom after the recess, she stated, 

I have had the opportunity to review the motion to replace

court-appointed attorney for ineffective assistance of counsel that Mr.

Kelley provided. And, Mr. Kelley, I don’t see anything in this document

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that changes my opinion or is essentially anything new from the

conversation that you and I had. . . . So I’m going to deny your motion,

deny your request for substitute counsel, and proceed today with a trial.

After a three-day trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict on both arson counts. Kelley

appealed the district court’s denial of his request to proceed pro se, among other

issues.

II. DISCUSSION

“The right to self-representation . . . is not absolute. Once the defendant makes

a clear and unequivocal request to represent himself, a court may nonetheless deny

the request in certain circumstances,” such as when the request is untimely, the

defendant “engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct,” or the defendant is

unable to produce a “valid waiver” of right to counsel. United States v. Edelmann,

458 F.3d 791, 808 (8th Cir. 2006) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Faretta v.

California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “If [a

defendant’s] request” to “assert his right to self-representation” “is clear and

unequivocal, a Faretta hearing must follow.” Bilauski v. Steele, 754 F.3d 519, 522

(8th Cir. 2014). “We review the district court’s decision [to deny a request to proceed

pro se] de novo.” United States v. Mosley, 607 F.3d 555, 558 (8th Cir. 2010);

see Kelley I, 774 F.3d at 441-42.

After leaving the courtroom to read Kelley’s written motion, the district court

denied Kelley’s pro se request. On remand, the district court clarified that it found

Kelley’s request “neither timely nor unequivocal.” See Edelmann, 458 F.3d at 809

(rejecting a request to proceed pro se when, among other “special facts of th[e] case,”

the defendant did not file the motion until four to five days before trial); see also

United States v. Wright, 682 F.3d 1088, 1090 (8th Cir. 2012) (finding untimely a

request to proceed pro se made on the first day of trial). The district court found

Kelley’s “request was meant to further delay trial. . . . Essentially, [Kelley] contended

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that his due process rights would not be violated only if the Court appointed him new

counsel and granted a continuance.” Quoting Edelmann, 458 F.3d at 809 (internal

quotations and marks omitted), the district court reasoned, “The content of [Kelley’s]

requests combined with the fact that [Kelley] vacillated between requests for

appointment of new counsel and a request to proceed pro se on the morning of trial

showed that his request to proceed pro se was a ‘manipulative effort to present

particular arguments’ rather than ‘a sincere desire to dispense with the benefits of

counsel.’”

Considering the totality of the circumstances, we agree with the district court

that Kelley’s request was neither timely nor unequivocal. We conclude the district

court did not err by not convening a Faretta hearing, see Bilauski, 754 F.3d at 522,

and the district court properly denied Kelley’s request to proceed pro se.

III. CONCLUSION

We now fully affirm Kelley’s conviction. 

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