Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-05-05304/USCOURTS-caDC-05-05304-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Erie Insurance Group
Appellee
John D. Norman
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 18, 2006 Decided October 31, 2006

No. 05-5304

JOHN D. NORMAN,

APPELLANT

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND

ERIE INSURANCE GROUP,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 04cv01208)

John S. Kearns argued the cause and filed the brief for

appellant.

Beverly M. Russell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued

the cause for appellees. With her on the brief were Kenneth

L. Wainstein, U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence,

Assistant U.S. Attorney. Michael J. Ryan, Assistant U.S.

Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: RANDOLPH and TATEL, Circuit Judges, and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

TATEL, Circuit Judge: After appellant filed suit in the

Superior Court of the District of Columbia seeking damages

for injuries suffered in a car accident, the United States, acting

pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, removed the case to

federal court because the car’s driver was a federal employee

acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the

accident. By the time the case was removed, however, the

FTCA’s two-year statute of limitations had expired.

Accordingly, the district court, declining to equitably toll the

statute of limitations because appellant had failed to make

reasonably diligent efforts to discover the driver’s employer,

dismissed the complaint. We affirm.

I.

The Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b),

2671-2680, requires individuals with certain types of tort

claims against the United States to present those claims to the

appropriate agency and then to file suit within two years of

the events giving rise to the claims. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2401(b),

2675(a). Pursuant to a 1988 amendment to the FTCA, known

as the Westfall Act, Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563

(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671, 2674, 2679), tort

claims filed in state courts against federal employees acting in

the scope of their employment “shall be removed . . . by the

Attorney General to the district court of the United States

[where the action is pending] . . . . and the United States shall

be substituted as the party defendant.” 28 U.S.C. §

2679(d)(2). A plaintiff whose state suit is removed after the

FTCA’s two-year statute of limitations has expired may still

maintain the claim if “(A) the claim would have been timely

had it been filed on the date the underlying civil action was

commenced, and (B) the claim is presented to the appropriate

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Federal agency within 60 days after dismissal of the civil

action.” Id. at § 2679(d)(5). Put differently, removed claims

are barred when the plaintiff fails to file suit in state court

within the FTCA’s two-year statute of limitations, although

some courts—and this is the issue we face here—have

allowed such claims to proceed by equitably tolling the statute

of limitations. See, e.g., Glarner v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans

Admin., 30 F.3d 697, 700-02 (6th Cir. 1994). 

On January 4, 2001, while crossing a street in the

District of Columbia, Appellant John Norman was struck and

seriously injured by a rental car driven by Earnest Howe.

Shortly thereafter, acting through his attorney, Norman filed a

worker’s compensation claim and wrote Howe’s insurance

provider, USAA Insurance Company (“USAA”), declaring his

intent to pursue a tort claim. In response, USAA sent claim

forms to Norman’s attorney, instructing him to send all

correspondence, medical bills, and records directly to it.

After submitting the claim forms, Norman received $2,500

from USAA—the company’s maximum coverage for lost

wages. At the same time, Norman’s attorney received a letter

reiterating USAA’s earlier requests and asking him to update

the company about Norman’s health status and to send it any

additional information about the injury claim. 

Almost two and a half years later, on December 8,

2003, well after the two-year FTCA statute of limitations had

expired, USAA sent another letter to Norman’s attorney

informing him that at the time of the accident Howe worked

for the Environmental Protection Agency and was acting

within the scope of his employment. The letter recommended

that Norman file a claim with EPA. Attached was an earlier

letter from USAA to EPA dated November 21, also sent after

the statute of limitations had expired, informing the agency

that it was “previously advised of a possible exposure in this

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matter.” Appellant’s Opp’n to Mot. for Summ. Affirmance,

Ex. 4. 

On December 22, thirteen days before the expiration

of the District of Columbia’s three-year statute of limitations

for personal injury actions, D.C. Code § 12-301(3), Norman

sued Howe in D.C. Superior Court. Acting pursuant to the

Westfall Act, the United States removed the case to the

United States District Court for the District of Columbia and

substituted itself as defendant. The government then moved

to dismiss the case as time barred because Norman had failed

to file his superior court lawsuit within the FTCA’s two-year

statute of limitations. After Norman filed his opposition and

the government its reply, the district court directed Norman to

file a sur-reply by January 28, 2005, and scheduled a status

hearing for several days later. After Norman’s counsel

neither filed the sur-reply nor appeared at the status hearing,

the district court dismissed the case “without prejudice to a

motion for reconsideration” filed by February 14. Norman,

No. 04-cv-01208, Minute Order (D.D.C. Jan. 31, 2005)

(capitalization omitted). Norman’s attorney missed that

deadline as well. 

A month later, claiming that his failure to abide by the

court’s deadlines was attributable to his unfamiliarity with

electronic case filing, Norman’s lawyer filed a “Motion to

Reconsider and to Reinstate Complaint,” under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1). Rule 60(b)(1) allows a court to

grant relief from an adverse judgment if there was “mistake,

inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” To obtain Rule

60(b) relief, movant must give the district court “reason to

believe that vacating the judgment will not be an empty

exercise or a futile gesture.” Murray v. District of Columbia,

52 F.3d 353, 355 (D.C. Cir. 1995). In opposition to Norman’s

Rule 60(b)(1) motion, the government argued that Norman’s

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failure to exhaust administrative remedies with the EPA or to

file his lawsuit within the FTCA’s statute of limitations made

his claim futile.

On July 11, the district court denied Norman’s Rule

60(b)(1) motion and dismissed the case with prejudice.

Norman v. United States, 377 F. Supp. 2d 96, 101 (D.D.C.

2005). Although the court ruled that counsel’s failure to file a

sur-reply, to attend the status hearing, and to file his motion

for reconsideration on time constituted “excusable neglect”

within the meaning of Rule 60(b)(1), it nonetheless denied the

motion because Norman failed to make a case for equitably

tolling the statute of limitations, leaving him with no

“underlying meritorious claim.” Id. at 99-101 (citing

Lepkowski v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 804 F.2d 1310, 1314

(D.C. Cir. 1986)). In reaching this conclusion, the court relied

on a decision from the Northern District of Mississippi,

Bryant v. United States, 96 F. Supp. 2d 552 (N.D. Miss.

2000), in which the district court declined to toll the statute of

limitations because the plaintiff, injured in a car accident,

failed to investigate the defendant’s employment status during

the two years following the accident. Id. at 555. Bryant’s

reasoning, the district court here held, “applies with even

greater force in this case” because “[w]hile federal employees

may not be especially plentiful in Indianola, Mississippi, they

certainly are in Washington, D.C. and its metropolitan area.”

Norman, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 101. Given that Norman failed

“to act with reasonable diligence to determine, within the

limitations period, the circumstances surrounding his case that

may limit the causes of action available to him,” the district

court declined to equitably toll the statute of limitations. Id.

Absent tolling, Norman’s failure to exhaust his administrative

remedies deprived the district court of jurisdiction, making

him ineligible for Rule 60(b)(1) relief.

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II.

In Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S.

89, 93-96 (1990), the Supreme Court held that federal statutes

of limitations are not jurisdictional. The Court also held that,

“the same rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling

applicable to suits against private defendants should also

apply to suits against the United States.” Id. at 95-96. See

also Chung v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 333 F.3d 273, 276-77

(D.C. Cir. 2003). Acknowledging that equitable tolling

principles are far from clear, the Supreme Court observed that

courts have extended this relief “only sparingly” and have

generally denied it where a plaintiff “failed to exercise due

diligence in preserving his legal rights” or showed only “a

garden variety claim of excusable neglect.” Irwin, 498 U.S. at

96. Courts have more willingly granted equitable tolling

“where the claimant has actively pursued his judicial remedies

by filing a defective pleading during the statutory period, or

where the complainant has been induced or tricked by his

adversary’s misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to

pass.” Id. (footnote omitted). We too have allowed equitable

tolling, but “only in extraordinary and carefully circumscribed

circumstances,” Smith-Haynie v. District of Columbia, 155

F.3d 575, 580 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting Mondy v. Sec’y of the

Army, 845 F.2d 1051, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1988)), such as where

“despite all due diligence [a plaintiff] is unable to obtain vital

information bearing on the existence of her claim.” Id. at 579.

We have never squarely addressed whether equitable tolling

applies to the FTCA’s statute of limitations, and we need not

do so here, for Norman has failed to meet the due diligence

requirement for equitable tolling. Cf. Thomas v. U.S. Parole

Comm’n, No. 03-5289, 2004 WL 758966 (D.C. Cir. April 7,

2004) (assuming without deciding that equitable tolling

applies to FTCA).

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In support of his argument that he exercised due

diligence, Norman emphasizes that he filed suit within the

District of Columbia’s three-year statute of limitations. If that

were enough for equitable tolling, however, the FTCA’s

statute of limitations would have no bite. Plaintiffs injured in

the District of Columbia or in any other jurisdiction where the

statute of limitations is longer than two years could evade the

FTCA statute by filing within the period prescribed by the

state statute. Congress expressly rejected this proposition in

the Westfall Act, which allows timely filed state-court tort

claims removed to federal court to proceed only if the statecourt action was filed within the FTCA’s two-year statute of

limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(5). 

Norman next argues that he exercised due diligence

because immediately following the accident he filed a

worker’s compensation claim with his employer and a

liability claim with USAA. But Norman failed to present the

worker’s compensation claim and the relevant USAA letters

to the district court. See Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339, 371

(D.C. Cir. 1978) (noting that an appellate court cannot

consider new evidence that parties failed to introduce in the

district court). Moreover, nothing in either the claim or the

letters demonstrates the due diligence necessary for equitable

tolling. At a minimum, due diligence requires reasonable

efforts to learn the employment status of the defendant. See,

e.g., T.L. ex rel. Ingram v. United States, 443 F.3d 956, 964

(8th Cir. 2006) (no due diligence where plaintiff failed to

inquire into employment status of her doctor, who made no

attempt to conceal his federal employee status); Gonzalez v.

United States, 284 F.3d 281, 291-92 (1st Cir. 2002) (same);

Gould v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 905 F.2d 738,

744 (4th Cir. 1990) (“[P]laintiffs have an affirmative duty to

inquire as to the legal identity of the defendant.”). Neither the

worker’s compensation claim nor the liability claim indicates

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Norman or his attorney made any efforts prior to the

expiration of the FTCA’s two-year statute of

limitations—much less reasonably diligent efforts—to

discover Howe’s employer. The liability claim could have

provided evidence of due diligence had Norman not waited

until the last minute to file his lawsuit and, notwithstanding

reasonable discovery, failed to learn that Howe worked for

EPA.

Next, Norman argues the district court should have

equitably tolled the statute of limitations because his failure to

file suit within the limitations period was the insurance

company’s fault. “[T]he insurance carrier,” he argues, “. . .

failed to timely notify [Norman] that Mr. Howe was working

for the EPA at the time of the accident, and that [Norman’s

bodily injury claim] must be filed against the EPA under

FTCA.” Appellant’s Br. 6. According to Norman, USAA

compounded the error “by advising [Norman’s] counsel in

writing that Mr. Howe was a ‘USAA member’ and by paying

first party no fault personal injury protection benefits of

$2,500.00 to [Norman].” Id. But USAA’s payment to

Norman simply fulfilled its obligations under state law; the

company had no obligation either to inform Norman of

Howe’s status or to instruct him about where to file his claim.

It is the plaintiff who must exercise due diligence, not the

defendant or the defendant’s insurance company. Norman

insists he and his lawyer “were induced by [USAA] into

allowing the filing deadline under FTCA to pass,” and USAA

“[c]onveniently” notified Norman of Howe’s employment

status after the expiration of the statute of limitations, too late,

“as USAA knew,” to help Norman. Appellant’s Br. 12-13.

Nothing in the record supports these allegations, however, and

Norman points to no evidence suggesting either that USAA

learned of Howe’s employment status prior to the expiration

of the statute of limitations or that the conversation referenced

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in the November 21 letter to EPA occurred prior to that time.

Supra pp. 3-4. Even had USAA deliberately withheld

information about Howe’s employment status, that would not

help Norman since he seeks equitable tolling against the

government, not against USAA.

Norman argues that in order to obtain equitable

tolling, “Claimants . . . should only be required to prove that

the information [about federal employee status] was not

provided timely and that the Claimant was prejudiced as a

result.” Appellant’s Br. 7. Neither USAA nor the federal

government, however, had any obligation to inform Norman

of Howe’s employment status. See Gould, 905 F.2d at 745.

Moreover, if prejudice were enough, then equitable tolling

would no longer be restricted to “extraordinary and carefully

circumscribed circumstances,” Smith-Haynie, 155 F.3d at

580, because missing a statute of limitations, by definition,

always causes prejudice. 

Finally, Norman relies on three decisions from other

circuits. But two of the cases—Hammer v. Cardio Medical

Products, Inc., No. 02-2723, 2005 WL 1163431 (3d Cir. May

18, 2005) and Soofi v. KFC National Management Co., No.

94-6268, 1996 WL 28962 (6th Cir. Jan. 24, 1996)—are

improperly cited unpublished opinions. Under this court’s

rules, parties may cite unpublished opinions of other courts of

appeal only in accordance with the rules of those courts. D.C.

Cir. R. 28(c)(2). In violation of Third Circuit Rule 28.3(a),

Norman failed to include Hammer’s docket number and date,

and in violation of Sixth Circuit Rule 28(g), he failed to attach

a copy of Soofi to his brief. 

In any event, neither Hammer nor Soofi nor the Sixth

Circuit decision in Glarner v. U.S. Department of Veterans

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Administration provides Norman with any help. In Glarner

and Hammer, the courts indicated that equitable tolling was or

might be available because defendants misled pro se

plaintiffs. Specifically, in Glarner the court tolled the statute

of limitations because the Department of Veterans

Administration, in violation of its own regulations, gave the

pro se plaintiff the incorrect form on which to file a medical

malpractice complaint. 30 F.3d at 701-02. And in Hammer

the court remanded to the district court to consider equitable

tolling because the employer failed to post statutorily required

notices, leaving the plaintiff unaware of her rights. 2005 WL

1163431 at *2-*3. By contrast, Norman was represented by

counsel from the outset and points to no evidence that EPA

misled him about Howe’s employment status, much less that

the agency learned of the accident and Howe’s role in it

during the two-year statutory period. In the third case, Soofi,

the Sixth Circuit suggested that equitable tolling might be

appropriate for a plaintiff who, having timely filed his original

complaint, relied on a court order suggesting that the filing

period would be tolled until his health improved. 1996 WL

28962 at *2-*3. Because Norman waited until after the

expiration of the FTCA’s statute of limitations to file his

superior court action, there was no court that could have

misled him during the limitations period.

For all of these reasons, we agree with the district

court that Norman has failed to demonstrate due

diligence—although not because the accident occurred in

Washington, D.C. instead of in Mississippi. We think it

entirely unworkable to calibrate the required level of due

diligence to the number of federal employees living in the

region where the accident occurs. Suppose, for example, an

accident occurs in Chicago, a federal regional center having

far more federal employees than Mississippi but far fewer

than Washington, D.C. Would the standard for due diligence

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in Chicago fall somewhere between the Mississippi and

Washington standards? The question answers itself: due

diligence must have the same meaning everywhere.

Norman’s claim for equitable tolling fails because at no time

during the FTCA’s two-year statute of limitations did he make

any effort—diligent or otherwise—to identify Howe’s

employer.

III.

Because Norman failed to exercise due diligence he

was not entitled to equitable tolling, and without equitable

tolling, reinstating his case would be “an empty exercise or a

futile gesture,” Murray, 52 F.3d at 355. We affirm.

So ordered.

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