Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_09-cv-02038/USCOURTS-cand-4_09-cv-02038-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael J. Astrue
Defendant
Dina R. Harvey
Plaintiff

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1 On February 2, 2010, Defendant filed a motion to strike a

portion of Plaintiff’s twenty-six page brief opposing Defendant’s

cross-motion for summary judgment. Defendant characterizes this

brief as a reply, normally limited to fifteen pages under Civil

Local Rule 7-3; Plaintiff characterizes it as an opposition,

normally limited to twenty-five pages. Although Plaintiff’s brief

appears to be over-long under either interpretation, the Court

denies the motion to strike. 

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DINA R. HARVEY,

Plaintiff,

 v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,

Defendant. /

No. 09-02038 CW

ORDER DENYING

PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AND GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(Docket No. 15)

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Dina R. Harvey moves for summary judgment. 

Defendant Michael J. Astrue in his capacity as Commissioner of the

Social Security Administration opposes the motion and cross-moves

for summary judgment. Having considered all of the papers filed by

the parties, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion for summary

judgment and GRANTS Defendant's cross-motion for summary Judgment.1

//

//

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BACKGROUND

I. Procedural History

On March 23, 2005, Plaintiff filed an application for Social

Security Disability Benefits under Title II of the Social Security

Act (SSA). Administrative Record (AR) 162. On the same day, she

also filed an application for Supplemental Security Income under

Title XVI. AR 167. Plaintiff alleged that she became disabled on

June 15, 1999, due to back and foot pain. AR 76. On June 28,

2005, both claims were denied. AR 72-80. On July 20, 2005,

Plaintiff filed a request for reconsideration, which was denied on

November 10, 2005. AR 81-83, 84-89. In January, 2006, Plaintiff

filed a timely request for hearing. AR 90-91. On May 14, 2008,

Plaintiff, represented by a non-attorney representative, appeared

and testified at a hearing held before an Administrative Law Judge

(ALJ). AR 29-71. On June 25, 2008, the ALJ determined that

Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social

Security Act because she could perform a significant number of jobs

in the national economy. AR 12-24. 

On July 31, 2008, Plaintiff submitted an appeal to the Social

Security Appeals Council, challenging the ALJ's decision. AR 491-

498. On September 21, 2008, Plaintiff submitted new evidence: a

form filled out on August 7, 2008 by Dr. Anna Silva, one of

Plaintiff's treating physicians. On March 6, 2009, the Appeals

Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. AR 17-10. 

Plaintiff obtained counsel and initiated the present action for

judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking summary judgment

or, in the alternative, remand to the Commissioner for further

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2

There is some dispute about Plaintiff’s actual academic

abilities, but the record contains a transcript showing that

Plaintiff graduated from high school on June 16, 1989. AR 211. A

community college transcript shows several years of classes

undertaken on a part-time basis. AR 221-223.

3

Bilateral plantar fasciitis is a condition stemming from

inflammation of the plantar fascia which results in foot or heel

pain. Stedman’s Medical Dictionary 652 (27th Ed. 2000)(hereinafter

Stedman’s). The plantar fascia is a sheet of fibrous tissue below

the skin of the sole of the foot. Id. at 648, 649. 

3

proceedings.

II. Factual History

A. Plaintiff's Personal History

Plaintiff was born on March 23, 1971. She graduated from high

school and attended some college classes.2

 She worked as a

customer service representative at a car dealership for several

months in 1995, and as a childcare provider from 1996 to 1999. AR

178. Plaintiff worked until July 1, 1999, when back and foot pain

made her unable to lift the children or stand for more than an hour

at a time. AR 178. She has not worked since that time. AR 40. 

Plaintiff’s last date insured for purposes of her Title II

disability insurance benefits claim was December 31, 2004. 

B. Plaintiff’s Physical Medical History

Plaintiff’s medical documents indicate a long history of

bilateral plantar fasciitis3. AR 21. Plaintiff’s condition

reportedly improved with orthotics in 1996, but worsened again in

2003. AR 21. 

On August 16, 2004, podiatrist David Lin, D.P.M., examined

Plaintiff, noting a prior diagnosis of plantar fasciitis and

previous “conservative treatment” including stretching, orthotics,

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4The hallux is the largest toe on the foot.

4

and injections, all with little relief. AR 288. 

On January 6, 2005, Plaintiff’s feet were examined by

podiatrist John Schuberth, D.P.M.. AR 281. He found “no

abnormalities whatsoever,” except for some thickening under the

hallux4

 of the left foot consistent with the findings of an MRI

performed shortly before his examination. AR 281. Although

Plaintiff did complain of occasional back pain, Dr. Schuberth noted

no history of spine treatment. AR 281. He thought that surgery

would be unlikely to improve Plaintiff’s symptoms, and believed

that work with a pain specialist might allow her to become more

functional. AR 281.

In a February 23, 2005 letter summarizing Plaintiff’s medical

history, Plaintiff’s primary care provider, Dr. Silva, noted that

Plaintiff experienced continuing pain despite stretching,

orthotics, cortisone injections and anti-inflammatories. AR 274. 

Dr. Silva wrote that Plaintiff had enrolled in a chronic pain

treatment program, and explained that she was unable to work as a

nanny due to her chronic plantar fasciitis. AR 274.

On November 4, 2005, Frederick Gaines, M.D., spoke with

Plaintiff about pain management options. AR 318. He noted that

Plaintiff was encouraged to enter a chronic pain program because

surgery was unlikely to provider her with relief. AR 318. 

On December 16, 2005, Dr. Silva wrote another letter on

Plaintiff’s behalf, detailing Plaintiff’s history of plantar

fasciitis and also noting the onset of chronic low back pain. Dr.

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5 A Tarlov’s cyst is a cyst found in the lower spinal cord. 

Stedman’s 448. A cyst is a sac containing a gas, fluid, or

semisolid material with a membranous lining. Id. at 445-46. 

6 A bilateral endoscopic plantar fasciectomy is the excision

of strips of fascia from the sole of the foot. Stedman’s 652. 

7 Degenerative disc disease, also known as osteoarthritis of

the spine, is the erosion of the discs of the spine, resulting in

pain and loss of function. Stedman’s 1282. 

 

5

Silva referred to an MRI showing a Tarlov’s cyst5 and degenerative

changes in Plaintiff’s lower spine. AR 265. Dr. Silva stated that

Plaintiff was unable to work. AR 265. Specifically, Dr. Silva

opined that Plaintiff was unable to walk more than twenty-five to

thirty minutes, could not sit or stand for more than an hour, and

could not lift more than ten pounds. AR 265.

In November, 2006, Plaintiff underwent bilateral endoscopic

plantar fasciectomies.6 AR 348. Her surgeon, Dr. Jeffrey Amen,

reported “significant improvements in the symptoms” after the

surgery, although pain remained. AR 343. 

On February 1, 2007, Jessica Glassman, M.D., wrote a letter on

Plaintiff’s behalf, noting Plaintiff’s plantar fasciitis, as well

as degenerative disc disease7. AR 432. Dr. Glassman believed

Plaintiff was unable to work. AR 432. She noted that Plaintiff

was unable to sit or stand for more than twenty to thirty minutes

because of pain. AR 432.

On September 11, 2007, Plaintiff was examined by Calvin Pon,

M.D., for an orthopedic consultation. AR 359. Dr. Pon found that,

although Plaintiff could sit, stand or walk for only fifteen to

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thirty minutes at a time, she should be able to stand or walk for

four to six hours total during an eight hour work day, and sit for

a total of six hours. AR 361. He further found she should only

occasionally stoop, kneel, squat, climb ladders or crawl. AR 361. 

On April 9, 2008, Plaintiff had a second MRI scan of her lower

spine. AR 481. The MRI indicated that her spine was “essentially

unchanged,” and that she had mild degenerative disc disease. AR

481. 

C. Plaintiff’s Mental Medical History

In 1991, an examiner at Marin Community College indicated that

Plaintiff met the relevant criteria for a learning disability. AR

468. The examiner noted that Plaintiff had problems with verbal

comprehension, verbal expression, reading comprehension,

mathematical ability, vocabulary, and auditory memory recall. AR

469. Tests conducted by the examiner indicated that Plaintiff read

at the eighth-grade level and had only fourth-grade math skills. 

AR 469. 

On April 24, 2007, Plaintiff consulted psychiatrist David

Richman, M.D., who diagnosed her with depression resulting from

chronic pain, and prescribed anti-depressants. AR 408. On March

20, 2008, Dr. Richman submitted a mental impairment medical source

statement. AR 399. He indicated that Plaintiff suffered from

depression, with symptoms including appetite loss, sleep problems,

emotional problems, pervasive loss of interest, and decreased

energy. AR 399. Dr. Richman noted Plaintiff had been taking

Cymbalta, a prescription anti-depressant. AR 400. He did not

think Plaintiff had a low IQ or reduced intellectual functioning. 

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8In order to make a disability determination, the ALJ must

apply a sequential five-step evaluation process to the disability

claim pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520: (1) is the claimant engaged

in substantial gainful work activity; (2) if not, does the claimant

have a severe impairment, or combination of impairments; (3) if so,

are the impairments listed in, or as severe as, those listed in

Appendix 1; (4) if not, do the impairments preclude the claimant

from performing past relevant work; and (5) if so, is other work

precluded? 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)-(g). The plaintiff bears the

burden of persuasion in steps (1) through (4); the Commissioner has

the burden at step (5). Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 141

(1987); 20 C.F.R. § 1520(f). 

7

AR 401. He rated her ability to perform a wide variety of mental

abilities good-to-fair, and her functional limitations “moderate.” 

AR 402-03. He believed that she would probably need to miss work

three or more times per month because of her impairments. AR 401.

On September 12, 2007, Deborah von Bolschwing, Ph.D., examined

Plaintiff for a psychological disability evaluation. Dr.

Bolschwing found that Plaintiff possessed low-average to average

intelligence and general intellectual functioning, with mildly

fluctuating attention and concentration. AR 370. She opined that,

although Plaintiff might have mild dyslexia, it did not interfere

with her ability to perform cognitive tasks. AR 371.

III. Administrative Law Judge’s Disability Determination

In his June 25, 2008 decision, the ALJ employed the five-step

sequential evaluation process8 outlined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520,

and found that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the

SSA. AR 17. 

At step one of the five-part analysis, the ALJ found that

Plaintiff had not worked since the alleged disability onset date. 

AR 19. At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had three severe

impairments: chronic bilateral plantar fasciitis, degenerative

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Sedentary work “involves lifting no more than ten pounds at a

a time and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket

files, ledgers, and small tools.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(a);

416.929. It may involve occasional walking or standing. Id.

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disc disease of the lower spine and an affective disorder. AR 19. 

The ALJ noted that Plaintiff alleged that she had severe auditory

dyslexia, but failed to support her claim with any medical records

or other evidence. AR 19. Moreover, the ALJ noted that Dr.

Bolschwing found that Plaintiff had at most “mild” dyslexia and

that Dr. Richman similarly found no severe mental impairments. AR

371, 401. Accordingly, the ALJ found no severe auditory dyslexia. 

At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s

impairments, singly or in combination, were not severe enough to

meet or medically equal any of the impairments listed in Appendix 1

of the Regulations. AR. 20. 

Prior to steps four and five of the analysis, the ALJ weighed

the medical and other evidence in the record to assess Plaintiff’s

residual functional capacity (RFC). AR 20. The ALJ found that

Plaintiff had an RFC to perform sedentary9 work, as defined in 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a), “except with limitation to

occasional bending, stooping, crawling, squatting, crouching and

kneeling and the need for a sit or stand option every 30 minutes.” 

AR 20. The ALJ considered a variety of evidence in making his

determination, including Plaintiff’s testimony at the hearing and

the testimony of her relatives, and medical opinion evidence from

Drs. Amen, Bolschwing, Glassman, Richman and Silva. AR 21-23. The

ALJ afforded limited weight to the testimony of Plaintiff and her

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relatives to the extent that it alleged limitations in excess of

those described in his RFC, because he found that the testimony was

not entirely credible in light of the medical evidence and

Plaintiff’s prior conduct. AR 21. The ALJ also found that Dr.

Richman’s opinion that Plaintiff would need to be absent from work

more than three times per month was not supported by the record,

including Dr. Richman’s own statements, and thus was attributable

to Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. AR 22-23. 

At step four of the disability analysis, the ALJ found that

Plaintiff was precluded from working in her past relevant

occupations of childcare provider and customer service

representative. AR 23. The ALJ based this finding on the RFC

testimony and the testimony of a vocational expert (VE). 

At step five, based on the VE’s testimony, the ALJ concluded

that Plaintiff was capable of performing jobs existing in

significant numbers within the national and local economy. AR 23. 

In particular, the VE indicated that Plaintiff would be able to

perform the jobs of “Order Clerk” and “Final Assembler, Optical

Goods,” both of which allow for a sit/stand option every thirty

minutes, as Plaintiff’s RFC required. AR 24. Consequently, the

ALJ issued an unfavorable decision, finding that Plaintiff was not

disabled within the meaning of the SSA. AR 24.

IV. New Evidence Presented to the Appeals Council

As noted above, along with her appeal to the Social Security

Appeals Council, Plaintiff submitted an August 7, 2008 form filled

out by Dr. Silva, presenting in greater detail Dr. Silva’s opinion

on Plaintiff’s limitations. AR 500. On the form, Dr. Silva

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indicated that Plaintiff’s limitations dated from 1996, that

Plaintiff could sit for only ten minutes at a time, and stand or

walk for only five minutes at a time and that Plaintiff would

probably have to miss work at least twice a month. AR 500, 502. 

At the bottom of the form, Dr. Silva also wrote, “I think it’s

completely inappropriate for me to have completed this,” because

she had not treated Plaintiff since 2005. AR 504. 

LEGAL STANDARD

A district court reviewing a denial of Social Security

benefits reviews the final decision of the Commissioner. 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g). When the Appeals Council denies review to a claimant,

the ALJ’s decision becomes the Commissioner’s final decision. 20

C.F.R. § 404.981.

A court cannot set aside a denial of benefits unless the ALJ’s

findings are based upon legal error or are not supported by

substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);

Sandgathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Orteza v.

Shalala, 50 F.3d 748, 749 (9th Cir. 1995). It is more than a

scintilla but less than a preponderance. Sorenson v. Weinberger,

514 F.2d 1112, 1119 n.10 (9th Cir. 1975). 

To determine whether an ALJ’s decision is supported by

substantial evidence, a court reviews the record as a whole, not

just the evidence supporting the decision of the ALJ. Walker v.

Matthews, 546 F.2d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 1976). A court may not

affirm the Commissioner’s decision simply by isolating a specific

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quantum of supporting evidence. Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498,

501 (9th Cir. 1989). Rather, a court must weigh the evidence which

supports the Commissioner’s conclusions and that which does not. 

Martinez v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 772 (9th Cir. 1986).

If there is substantial evidence to support the decision of

the ALJ, it is well-settled that the decision must be affirmed even

when there is evidence on the other side. Hall v. Sec’y of Health,

Educ., & Welfare, 602 F.2d 1372, 1374 (9th Cir. 1979). The ALJ’s

decision should also be affirmed when the evidence is susceptible

to more than one rational interpretation. Gallant v. Heckler, 753

F.2d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984). If supported by substantial

evidence, the findings of the Commissioner as to any fact shall be

conclusive. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Vidal v. Harris, 637 F.2d 710,

712 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Under the Social Security Act, "disability" is defined as the 

inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason

of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which

can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve

months. 42 U.S.C. § 423 (d)(1)(A). The impairment must be so

severe that the claimant "is not only unable to do his previous

work but cannot . . . engage in any other kind of substantial

gainful work." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). In addition, the

impairment must result "from anatomical, physiological, or

psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically

acceptable clinical and laboratory techniques." 42 U.S.C. 

§ 423(d)(3). 

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DISCUSSION

Plaintiff argues that: (1) the Appeals Council failed

adequately to weigh new evidence Plaintiff submitted to it after

the ALJ’s determination; (2) the ALJ failed properly to weigh the

opinions of Plaintiff’s treating physicians; (3) the ALJ erred by

not rating Plaintiff’s alleged mental impairment severe; (4) the

ALJ improperly discredited Plaintiff’s subjective testimony; 

(5) the ALJ improperly determined Plaintiff’s RFC; and (6) the ALJ

violated SSR 00-4P in relying on VE testimony contrary to the

Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT).

I. New Evidence Presented to the Appeals Council

The Appeals Council must review a case if “new and material

information is submitted” after the ALJ’s determination. 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.970(b). In order to be material, evidence “must ‘bear

directly and substantially on the matter in dispute.’” Mayes v.

Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 462 (9th. Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). 

When new evidence is considered, the Appeal Council will order

review of a case when it finds that the ALJ’s decision is against

the weight of all the evidence currently in the record. 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.970(b). Remand is appropriate “‘only where there is a

reasonable possibility that the new evidence would have changed the

outcome’” of the ALJ’s decision. Booz v. Sec’y of Health and Human

Servs., 734 F.2d 1378, 1380-81 (9th Cir. 1984) (citations omitted).

Plaintiff argues that the form filled out by Dr. Silva,

submitted to the Appeals Council after the ALJ’s decision,

constituted new and material evidence and that the Appeals Council

failed adequately to consider it in affirming the ALJ’s

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determination that Plaintiff was not disabled. Defendant argues

that Dr. Silva’s 2008 form was not material because it merely

reiterated findings summarized in her 2005 letters and was based on

the same underlying examination.

Although the content of Dr. Silva’s 2005 letters and 2008 form

was based on the same physical examinations of Plaintiff, they

express quite different conclusions. In Dr. Silva’s December 16,

2005 letter, she stated that Plaintiff “cannot walk longer than

twenty-five to thirty minutes before developing heel pain,” and

that she “cannot sit or stand for long periods of time (more than

one hour).” AR 431. In the 2008 submission, Dr. Silva indicated

that Plaintiff can walk for only five minutes without rest, and can

sit for only ten minutes without needing to get up. AR 502. 

Furthermore, in the 2008 submission, Dr. Silva indicated that

Plaintiff “cannot” sit or stand for any portion of an eight hour

work day, and would need to take unscheduled breaks every five

minutes as a result of her pain. AR 502. 

The Appeals Council found that Dr. Silva’s 2008 opinion was

not supported by the medical evidence. AR 7-8. As Defendant

points out, Dr. Silva’s 2008 opinion was based on the same

underlying physical findings as her 2005 letter. She provides no

reason why her assessment of Plaintiff’s ability to walk and sit

was revised dramatically downward three years later. The

assessments in the 2008 letter do not match the assessments of the

two physicians who examined Plaintiff prior to 2005, Dr. Lin and

Dr. Schuberth. AR 288, 281. Dr. Silva herself stated that she

thought it was “completely inappropriate” for her to have filled

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out the assessment three years after her last contact with

Plaintiff, thus implying that her 2008 opinion was not reliable. 

AR 504. Given these facts, there is no reasonable possibility that

the ALJ would have made a different decision had he had the benefit

of Dr. Silva’s 2008 opinion. Therefore, remand on this basis is

not warranted.

II. Weighing of Physician Opinion Testimony

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed properly to weigh the

testimony of her treating physicians.

"Although a treating physician's opinion is generally afforded

the greatest weight in disability cases, it is not binding on an

ALJ with respect to the existence of an impairment or the ultimate

determination of disability." Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144,

1149 (9th Cir. 2001). The issue of whether a claimant is disabled

under the meaning of the Social Security Act is an issue reserved

for the Commissioner, and therefore the opinion of a treating

physician that a claimant is disabled will not be given special

significance. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e)(1), 416.927(e)(1). Such

opinions, however, "must not be disregarded." Social Security

Regulations (SSR) 96-5p at 5. 

On issues not reserved for the Commissioner, where the

treating physician's opinion is not contradicted by an examining

physician, that opinion may be rejected only for "clear and

convincing reasons." Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1102 (9th

Cir. 1999); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Where a treating physician’s opinion is contradicted by another

doctor, the Commissioner may reject the treating physician’s

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opinion, but must provide “specific, legitimate reasons” supported

by substantial evidence in the record for doing so. Matney v.

Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992). Physician opinions

that are conclusory and inadequately supported by clinical findings

need not be credited. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th

Cir. 2001).

When the opinion of a medical source “is inadequate for [the

Commissioner] to determine whether [a claimant] is disabled,” –-

i.e., when it is ambiguous -- the ALJ must attempt to re-contact

the medical source to obtain clearer and more complete information. 

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(e), 416.912(e).

A. Dr. Silva

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly failed to consider

treating physician Dr. Silva’s opinion, expressed in her December

2005 letter, that Plaintiff was unable to work. Plaintiff concedes

that the issue of disability is reserved to the Commissioner, and

thus that Dr. Silva's opinion is due no special significance. She

argues, however, that the ALJ improperly disregarded Dr. Silva’s

2005 opinion or, alternatively, that the opinion was incomplete or

ambiguous so that the ALJ was under a duty to re-contact her.

Because Dr. Silva’s opinion that Plaintiff could not work was

on an issue reserved for the Commissioner under 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1527(e)(1), this portion of Dr. Silva’s opinion was not due

any special significance or weight. However, the ALJ remained

under an obligation to consider Dr. Silva’s determination. See SSR

96-5p. 

Here, the ALJ properly considered Dr. Silva’s opinion. The

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ALJ interpreted Dr. Silva’s statement in her February, 2005 letter

that Plaintiff was “unable to work as a nanny” to mean that

Plaintiff would be able to undertake other, less demanding work. 

AR 22. The ALJ also noted that, in her December, 2005 letter, Dr.

Silva spelled out Plaintiff’s capacity for other work more clearly,

indicating ability to walk and stand for twenty-five to thirty

minutes and sit for up to one hour, and ability to lift up to ten

pounds. AR 22. It is clear that the ALJ interpreted Dr. Silva’s

statement to mean that Plaintiff could not work in any job which

did not accommodate the restrictions noted in the letter, all of

which the ALJ incorporated into his RFC. 

Nor was Dr. Silva’s opinion incomplete. Dr. Silva stated that

Plaintiff was unable to work due to persistent pain, and then noted

“specifically” the impairments noted above and accepted by the ALJ

in his RFC. AR 431. Dr. Silva thus laid out in detail her

conclusions, both as to ultimate disability and as to the factors

contributing to her determination that Plaintiff was unable to

work. The ALJ was under no duty to re-contact Dr. Silva because

her opinion was not ambiguous or otherwise inadequate to determine

whether Plaintiff was disabled.

B. Dr. Glassman

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly failed to consider

Dr. Glassman’s opinion that Plaintiff’s impairments made her unable

to work, or, alternatively, that the ALJ had a duty to re-contact

Dr. Glassman because Dr. Glassman’s opinion was ambiguous. 

As stated above, ability to work is an issue reserved for the

Commissioner, so the ALJ was under a duty only to consider Dr.

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Glassman’s opinion, not to give it any special significance. The

ALJ noted that he considered Dr. Glassman’s letter, including her

opinion that Plaintiff was unable to work. AR 22. Nor was the

opinion ambiguous. Although her letter opinion was brief, Dr.

Glassman indicated the medical impairments Plaintiff suffered from,

and that Plaintiff was unable to sit or stand for more than twenty

to thirty minutes because of pain. AR 432. The ALJ accepted Dr.

Glassman’s opinion about Plaintiff’s ability to sit and stand, and

incorporated it into his RFC. AR 22. The ALJ was under no duty to

re-contact Dr. Glassman simply because her statement was shorter

than that of other treating physicians who agreed with her

diagnosis. 

C. Dr. Richman

Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred when he rejected Dr. Richman’s

opinion that Plaintiff would have to be absent from work more than

three times a month.

The ALJ rejected Dr. Richman’s opinion because he found it

unsupported by the record, including Dr. Richman’s own records

which indicated that Plaintiff's mood was more stable as a result

of treatment with anti-depressants. AR 22. Therefore, the ALJ

attributed Dr. Richman’s opinion regarding work absence to

Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, which the ALJ determined to lack

credibility, and he disregarded the opinion for that reason. AR

22.

The ALJ properly concluded that Dr. Richman’s opinion about

Plaintiff’s projected work absence was not supported by the record. 

Emails exchanged between Dr. Richman and Plaintiff indicate that

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Plaintiff’s depression was being adequately controlled by her

medication and that she was “feeling good.” AR 438, 458. 

Similarly, Dr. Bolschwing, an examining psychologist, found that

Plaintiff’s depression appeared to be well controlled by

medication. AR 371. 

Because Dr. Richman’s opinion that Plaintiff would be absent

from work more than three times per month was contradicted, the ALJ

was required to present only “specific, legitimate reasons” for

discounting it. See Matney, 981 F.2d at 1019. The ALJ noted the

conflict between Dr. Richman’s opinion and his records showing that

Plaintiff’s depression was being controlled by prescription

medication. AR 22. This constitutes a specific and legitimate

reason for disregarding Dr. Richman’s opinion, and thus the ALJ did

not err.

III. Subjective Testimony

A. Plaintiff's Subjective Testimony

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly found her not

credible because he failed to provide clear and convincing reasons

for doing so.

In Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1402, 1407-08 (9th Cir. 1986),

the Ninth Circuit developed a threshold test to determine the

credibility of a claimant's subjective symptom testimony. Under

Cotton, a claimant "must produce objective medical evidence of an

underlying impairment 'which could reasonably be expected to

produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.'" Bunnell v. Sullivan,

947 F.2d 341, 344 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (quoting Cotton, 799

F.2d at 1407-08); see also Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282

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(9th Cir. 1996). 

Once a claimant meets the Cotton test, "the Commissioner may

not discredit the claimant's testimony as to subjective symptoms

merely because they are unsupportable by objective evidence. 

Unless there is affirmative evidence showing that the claimant is

malingering, the Commissioner's reason for rejecting the claimant's

testimony must be 'clear and convincing.'" Lester, 81 F.3d at 834

(quoting Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 1989));

Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281. When listing the findings supporting a

conclusion that a plaintiff's testimony is incredible, the ALJ must

consider "all of the available evidence" in analyzing the severity

of the claimed pain. SSR 88-13. Factors to be analyzed include:

(1) the nature, location, onset, duration, frequency, radiation,

and intensity of any pain; (2) precipitating and aggravating

factors; (3) type, dosage, effectiveness and adverse side effects

of any pain medications; (4) treatment, other than medication, for

relief of pain; (5) functional restrictions; and (6) the

plaintiff's daily activities. Id.; see Fair, 885 F.2d at 603

(types of activities ALJ may rely on to find pain allegations not

credible include the type of daily activities performed by

plaintiff and whether plaintiff sought or followed treatment);

Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1166 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding

rejection of plaintiff's alleged pain justified where plaintiff had

little evidence of spinal abnormalities, had not used strong pain

medication, had not participated in pain management or physical

therapy, and limited daily activities by choice not necessity). 

When pain is an issue, the plaintiff's demeanor at a hearing before

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the ALJ is not conclusive evidence of the plaintiff's credibility. 

Gallant, 753 F.2d at 1455. Medical evidence is still relevant in

determining the severity of a plaintiff's alleged pain and its

disabling effects. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2); Rollins, 261 F.3d

at 857.

Here, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had presented evidence

of a medical impairment that could be reasonably expected to

produce the sort of pain she alleged. Accordingly, the ALJ was

required to present "clear and convincing" reasons for rejecting

Plaintiff's testimony. Lester, 81 F.3d at 834. 

The ALJ found Plaintiff’s testimony not credible to the extent

that it alleged limitations in excess of the RFC. AR 21. The ALJ

provided four specific reasons for his finding. First, the ALJ

found that Plaintiff's testimony conflicted with the opinions of

her treating and examining physicians, who all indicated that she

had greater ability to work than her testimony suggested. AR 21. 

Second, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not taking pain medication

and had refused it in the past, suggesting that her pain was not as

severe as she alleged. AR 21. Third, the ALJ noted that the

record showed there was no indication of treatment for plantar

fasciitis between 1996 and 2003. Finally, the ALJ noted that

Plaintiff's statement that she obtained no relief from surgery in

2006 was directly contradicted by the statement of her surgeon, who

noted "significant improvement in the symptoms." AR 21. The ALJ

provided a list of facts from the record supporting his

determination. AR 21-22. In the list, the ALJ noted that MRI

scans of Plaintiff’s back showed mild degeneration not consistent

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with Plaintiff’s allegedly disabling lower back pain. AR 22. 

Plaintiff argues the ALJ's statement that "all" physicians who

examined her found that she had a greater capacity for work than

she claimed is inaccurate because Dr. Silva and Dr. Glassman opined

that she was unable to work. Strictly speaking, the ALJ's

statement was inaccurate in light of the statements of these two

doctors. However, as noted above, these opinions were on issues

reserved to the Commissioner; apart from these issues, the opinions

of the two doctors indicated that Plaintiff had the ability to

perform in accordance with the ALJ's RFC. Thus, although the ALJ

could have more clearly stated that Plaintiff's alleged pain and

dysfunction was inconsistent with the physical findings of all

treating and examining doctors, any error was in choice of words

rather than in substance. The ALJ correctly noted that, to the

extent that Plaintiff's subjective complaints indicated pain and

dysfunction that conflicted with the ALJ's RFC, they conflicted

with the physical limitations noted by her treating and examining

doctors.

 Next, Plaintiff asserts that, to discount her testimony, the

ALJ improperly relied upon the fact that she was not taking pain

medication at the time of the hearing. Plaintiff argues that

although she was not taking pain medication at the time of the

hearing, she has taken a variety of pain medications over the

years, and, thus, the ALJ's reasoning is not "clear and

convincing."

The ALJ's reasoning was not improper. When a claimant alleges

severe pain, but receives minimal treatment, an ALJ may properly

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question the credibility of the testimony. Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d

597, 603-604 (9th Cir. 1989). Furthermore, the ALJ did not assert

that Plaintiff has never taken pain medication, but instead noted

that on at least two occasions -- at the hearing itself, in 2008,

and two years before, in 2005 -- Plaintiff complained of severe

pain but refused treatment with pain medication. AR 21, 43, 305. 

Standing alone, failure to take pain medication despite alleging

severe pain might not be sufficient to constitute "clear and

convincing reasons," but it was not improper for the ALJ to

consider this factor in making his credibility determination.

Plaintiff also argues that the absence of treatment for

plantar fasciitis prior to 2003 is an improper basis to question

her credibility, because it is irrelevant to her current status. 

Although Plaintiff’s pre-2003 treatment is not directly relevant to

her post-2003 disability, she alleges disability beginning on July

15, 1999. Thus, the fact that Plaintiff received minimal treatment

for the first four years of her alleged disability was a valid

basis for the ALJ to question her credibility. See Fair, 885 F.2d

at 603-604 (holding that lack of treatment for allegedly severe

conditions is a proper basis for an ALJ to question the credibility

of a claimant’s testimony).

Next, Plaintiff argues that the contradiction between her

statements about the efficacy of her 2006 surgery and her surgeon's

statements was an improper basis for the ALJ to question her

credibility. 

When questioned by the ALJ, Plaintiff claimed no improvement

following her 2006 orthopedic surgery. AR 21, 44. The ALJ noted

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that this directly contradicted the statements of Plaintiff's

surgeon, who noted "significant improvement in the symptoms" postsurgery, although some pain remained. AR 21, 343. The ALJ's

determination that this conflict undermined Plaintiff's credibility

was not improper. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to consider

this contradiction in light of the record as a whole, and

particularly in the light of testimony from Plaintiff's parents and

husband corroborating her statement that the surgery provided no

relief. However, as discussed below, the ALJ properly gave limited

weight to this testimony, based as it was on Plaintiff’s

statements, for the same reasons he questioned Plaintiff's

testimony.

Finally, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ's stated findings

regarding Plaintiff’s credibility were insufficiently precise and

failed to show with sufficient clarity which portion of Plaintiff's

testimony the ALJ rejected and which portion he accepted.

When making a credibility determination, an ALJ “must

specifically identify what testimony is credible and what testimony

undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999).

Here, the ALJ held that Plaintiff's "statements concerning the

intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of [her] symptoms are

not credible to the extent that they are inconsistent with the

residual functional capacity assessment herein." AR 21. The ALJ's

RFC determination indicated that Plaintiff had the ability to do

sedentary work, with limitations on posture and a stand/sit option

every thirty minutes. AR 20. Thus, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's

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claim of severe impairments was not credible, while her testimony

that was consistent with this assessment was credible. He noted

particular statements by Plaintiff that were not credible,

including her statements about the 2006 surgery, her pain at times

she was not taking pain medication, and the severity of her lower

back pain. AR 21-22.

These findings were sufficiently precise and clear to allow

the Court to determine which portion of Plaintiff's testimony the

ALJ rejected. 

Thus, the ALJ provided an adequately detailed summary of his

credibility findings, and none of the reasons given by the ALJ for

questioning Plaintiff's credibility were improper. Taken as a

whole, and in light of the ALJ's citation to the record to support

each of his findings, the ALJ provided "clear and convincing"

reasons for crediting only that portion of Plaintiff's subjective

pain testimony he found consistent with his RFC.

B. Testimony of Plaintiff's Family Members

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ rejected the corroborating

testimony of her family members without giving specific reasons for

doing so.

When an ALJ discounts the testimony of a lay witness, he must

give reasons that are germane to that witness. Dodrill v. Shalala,

12 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 1993). When an ALJ properly rejects the

testimony of a claimant, and the testimony of witnesses testifying

in the claimant's favor is substantially similar to the testimony

of the claimant, the ALJ's statement of reasons for rejecting the

claimant's testimony can also be used to reject the witnesses'

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testimony. See Valentine v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d

685, 694 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that ALJ's reasons for rejecting

claimant's testimony also showed that ALJ gave germane reasons for

rejecting substantially similar testimony of testifying witnesses). 

Here, the ALJ gave “limited weight” to the testimony of

Plaintiff’s family members, because he determined that their

testimony essentially reiterated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. 

AR 21. Accordingly, because the ALJ properly determined that

portions of Plaintiff's testimony lacked credibility, he also

provided germane reasons for questioning the credibility of

portions of the testimony of her family. 

IV. The ALJ's RFC Determination

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's RFC determination is not

supported by substantial evidence because he failed to find

Plaintiff's auditory dyslexia "severe" within the meaning of 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii).

The ALJ based his finding that Plaintiff did not have severe

auditory dyslexia primarily on the report of Dr. Bolschwing, a

psychological consultive evaluator who examined Plaintiff in

September, 2007. AR 19. Dr. Bolschwing reported that Plaintiff's

intellectual functioning was in the low average to average range,

with "mildly fluctuating attention and concentration." AR 370. 

Treating psychologist Dr. Richman indicated in a March, 2008

assessment that Plaintiff did not have a low IQ or reduced

intellectual functioning. The examiner who assessed Plaintiff when

she entered community college thought she might have dyslexia, and

found that her reading ability was at the eighth grade level and

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her computational ability at the fourth grade level. AR 469. The

ALJ considered the testimony of Plaintiff's parents that she had

auditory dyslexia, and that she was given an Individual Educational

Plan during her school years. Even though the ALJ found that the

weight of the evidence showed that any auditory dyslexia was mild,

not "severe" within the meaning of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii),

he included Plaintiff’s reading and computational limitations in

his RFC. AR 20.

The opinions of examining and treating physicians are

"substantial evidence." Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041

(9th Cir. 1995). Because neither of the physicians who assessed

Plaintiff's mental functioning found a severe mental impairment,

the Court finds that the ALJ's determination that Plaintiff's

auditory dyslexia was not severe was supported by substantial

evidence.

V. Testimony of Vocational Expert

A. Sit/Stand Option

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly relied on the

testimony of the VE in determining that there were two jobs

Plaintiff could do that allow for the sit/stand option specified in

the RFC. Plaintiff argues the VE’s testimony conflicted with the

DOT, because the DOT did not indicate whether the jobs had a

sit/stand option, and the ALJ was therefore required to explore the

conflict before crediting the VE’s testimony.

In determining whether there are jobs a claimant is capable of

performing, an ALJ may consult a VE, whose "recognized expertise

provides the necessary foundation for his or her testimony." 

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Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217-18 (9th Cir. 2005). If

there is a conflict between the testimony of the VE and the DOT,

neither “trumps” the other, and the ALJ is required to resolve the

conflict by determining if the explanation given by the VE is

reasonable and provides a basis for relying on the VE’s testimony

rather than the DOT. SSR 00-4p. When a claimant has unusual

limitations on his or her ability to sit or stand, a VE should be

consulted to clarify the implications for the occupational base. 

SSR 83-12.

Here, the ALJ did consult a VE, and incorporated Plaintiff's

requirement of a sit/stand option every thirty minutes in his

hypothetical to the VE. AR 62. The VE responded that there were

at least two jobs that an individual with Plaintiff's impairments

would be able to perform, Order Clerk and Final Assembler, Optical

Goods. AR 62. The VE clarified that both jobs provided a

sit/stand option at least every thirty minutes. AR 62. After some

questioning of the VE by Plaintiff's representative, the ALJ asked

the VE if any aspects of her testimony deviated from the DOT. AR

66. The VE replied that it had not. AR 66. 

The ALJ complied with the requirements of SSR 83-12. He

properly consulted a VE, who indicated that there were jobs

Plaintiff was capable of performing even though she required a

stand/sit option every thirty minutes. He also confirmed with the

VE that her testimony did not deviate from the DOT. 

A conflict must exist between the VE’s testimony and the DOT

in order to the trigger the ALJ’s responsibility under SSR 00-4p to

resolve the conflict. Here, the DOT is silent on whether the jobs

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in question allow for a sit/stand option. See DOT 209.567-014

(Order Clerk); DOT 713.637-018 (Final Assembler, Optical Goods). 

Plaintiff cites Novak v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2009 WL 1922297

(D.S.C. 2009) for the proposition that the DOT’s silence creates a

conflict. In Novak, the ALJ treated the DOT’s silence on an issue

as a conflict with the VE’s testimony, but did not explore the

conflict, and the District Court held that he had thus failed to

comply with the procedure required by SS 00-4p. Id. at 3. The

court remanded the case to the ALJ. Id.

The Court does not find Novak persuasive. Where the DOT does

not include information about a particular aspect of a job -- such

as the existence of a sit/stand option -- it is proper to consult

with a VE, as SSR 83-12 instructs. Such testimony supplements the

DOT, rather than conflicting with it. Accordingly, the ALJ did not

err. 

B. Math and Reading Limitations

Plaintiff also argues that the job of Order Clerk requires a

reasoning ability in excess of Plaintiff's RFC, which limited her

to "simple, repetitive tasks." AR 20.

The VE stated that the job of Order Clerk required

mathematical ability in the low average range (the tenth to thirtythird percentile) and general learning ability in the average

range. AR 64. She indicated, however, that she believed that a

person with Plaintiff's academic abilities (characterized as sixth

grade reading and fourth grade math by Plaintiff’s representative)

would be able to perform the job. AR 65-66. Even assuming,

however, that the job required a higher reasoning level than

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Plaintiff possesses, the VE was unequivocal that the job of Final

Assembler, Optical Goods required no such reasoning ability and

that a person with Plaintiff's mental limitations would be able to

do such a job. AR 64. The VE noted that 1,500 such jobs existed

in the local economy. AR 64. 

Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in finding that Plaintiff was

capable of performing work with significant numbers of jobs in the

local economy. See Barker v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 882

F.2d 1474 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that Ninth Circuit has

established no minimum number of jobs, and that a total of 1,266

jobs was significant). 

CONCLUSION

Because the ALJ properly applied the five-step analysis to

conclude that Plaintiff was not disabled, and for the more specific

reasons outlined above, Defendant did not commit reversible error. 

The Court finds that the ALJ's decision that Plaintiff is not

disabled within the meaning of the SSA was supported by substantial

evidence in the record and was based upon proper legal standards. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is DENIED and

Defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. The Clerk

shall enter judgment accordingly and close the file. Each party

shall bear his or her own costs. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 16, 2010 

United States District Judge

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