Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-05-03058/USCOURTS-caDC-05-03058-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Guidel Olivares
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 6, 2006 Decided December 19, 2006

No. 05-3058

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

GUIDEL OLIVARES,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 04cr00355-07)

Andrew J. Delehanty, appointed by the court, argued the

cause and filed the briefs for appellant.

David B. Goodhand, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Kenneth L.

Wainstein, U.S. Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and Roy

W. McLeese, III and Barbara E. Kittay, Assistant U.S.

Attorneys.

USCA Case #05-3058 Document #1011955 Filed: 12/19/2006 Page 1 of 15
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1

 The government proffered evidence of six bank robberies:

(1) January 22nd at the Bank of America in the 5900 block of Blair

Road, N.W.: The robbers were armed with assault rifles and stole

(“netted”) over $144,000. (2) March 5th at Riggs Bank in the 7600

block of Georgia Avenue, N.W.: Armed with an assault rifle and

pistols, the robbers netted over $92,000. (3) May 10th at the Chevy

Chase Bank in the 3600 block of St. Barnabas Road in Temple Hills,

Maryland: The robbers were armed with assault rifles and netted

$54,000. One of the robbers who was acting as a lookout outside of

the bank fired his assault rifle at a Prince Georges County police

officer who entered the bank’s parking lot. (4) May 27th at the Chevy

Chase Bank at 5823 Eastern Avenue, Chillum, Maryland: Armed with

assault rifles, the robbers netted over $18,000. (5) June 12th at the

Industrial Bank at 2012 Rhode Island Avenue, N.E.: Inside the bank,

one of the robbers seized a security officer’s .38 caliber revolver and

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and ROGERS and

KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: Guidel Olivares appeals the

judgment of conviction on the ground that the district court erred

in denying his request for a downward adjustment of four levels

under Sentencing Guidelines § 3B1.2 because of his minimal

role in the charged conspiracy and in denying a downward

departure of six months because he was an alien facing

deportation. Upon examining our standard of review under an

advisory sentencing Guidelines scheme, we find neither legal

error nor grounds to conclude that the sentence was otherwise

unreasonable. Accordingly, we affirm.

I.

Olivares and others were indicted in connection with a

series of bank robberies in 2004.1 He pleaded guilty to

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3

fired a round of ammunition at the bank’s vault in an unsuccessful

attempt to acquire access; still, the robbers netted over $30,000 from

bank tellers. (6) June 29th at the SunTrust Bank at 5000 Connecticut

Avenue, N.W.: Inside the bank one of the robbers fired two rounds of

ammunition into the ceiling; they netted over $23,000. 

conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 371.

Although there was no evidence that Olivares was present at any

of the bank robberies or related shootings, the proffered

evidence showed that on April 23, two of the bank robbers shot

two men with a Taurus handgun and a Glock 19 handgun that

they had purchased from Olivares. Further, after the June 29

robbery, three of the robbers “stashed” their gear and money at

Olivares’ apartment on Sherman Avenue in Northwest

Washington, D.C. Olivares accepted money for keeping two

suitcases. During the execution of a search warrant at Olivares’

apartment, officers recovered money from the bank robberies,

four AK-47 assault rifles, an AR-15 rifle receiver, an AR-15

assault rifle, three Glock handguns, three INTRATEC TEC-9

semi-automatic assault weapons, a MAC-9 firearm, a MAC-90

assault rifle, a Beretta handgun, two Cobray-11 handguns, and

various magazines, barrels, and ammunition. All of the items

belonged to the robbers and had been used in connection with

the bank robberies.

The district court sentenced Olivares to imprisonment for

fifty-seven months, followed by three years of supervised

release, and payment of $23,000 in restitution. The Guidelines

range was fifty-one to sixty-three months. This was based on

the finding that Olivares’ base level offense was twenty; the

addition of ten points: (1) two points because the property of a

financial institution was taken, (2) seven points because a

weapon was discharged in the course of the offense, and (3) one

point because the loss exceeded $10,000; and the subtraction of

three points each because of Olivares’ acceptance of

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4

responsibility and because of his relatively minimal role in the

conspiracy. The district court rejected Olivares’ requests for a

four-point downward adjustment for his role in the offense as a

“minimal participant” and for a six-month downward departure

as a deportable alien. The total offense level was twenty-seven

and Olivares had a criminal history category of I. 

II.

In United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), the

Supreme Court rendered the Sentencing Guidelines advisory and

instructed appellate courts to review sentences for

reasonableness in light of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. §

3553(a). Id. at 244-45, 260-61. Accordingly, under a postBooker framework for reviewing the reasonableness of

sentences, the court has adopted what amounts to a two-step

process. First, the court determines whether there was legal

error. “[A] sentence would not be ‘reasonable,’ regardless of

length, if legal errors, properly to be considered on appeal, led

to its imposition.” United States v. Price, 409 F.3d 436, 442

(D.C. Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Legal error encompasses not

only incorrect legal interpretations of the Guidelines, but also

incorrect applications of the Guidelines to the facts. Id. at 442-

45. Second, in the absence of legal error, the court reviews the

overall reasonableness of the district court’s sentence “to ensure

that it is reasonable in light of the sentencing factors that

Congress specified in [] § 3553(a).” Id. at 442 (citing Booker,

543 U.S. at 260-64); see also United States v. Dorcely, 454 F.3d

366, 373 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (and cases cited). “These factors

include, among others, the nature of the offense, the defendant’s

history, the need for the sentence to promote adequate

deterrence and to provide the defendant with needed educational

or vocational training, any pertinent policy statements issued by

the Sentencing Commission, the need to avoid unwarranted

sentencing disparities among similarly situated defendants, and

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2

 By order of September 29, 2006, the court directed the

parties to address how the court should review a sentencing judge’s

discretionary decision not to depart downward from a properly

calculated sentencing Guidelines range. 

the need to provide restitution to any victims.” Price, 409 F.3d

at 442 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)).

Olivares appeals the denial of a four-point downward

adjustment and of a six-month downward departure on the

ground of district court error. Because his claims of error are

based on the facts before the district court at sentencing, we

understand his claim to be, ultimately, that his sentence was

unreasonable. We address our standard of review for each of his

claims of error2 and then address the reasonableness of his

sentence. 

A.

Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Booker, 543 U.S.

220, this court reviewed the district court’s application of the

Guidelines to the facts under a due deference standard and

would accordingly have reviewed the district court’s three-point

downward adjustment for Olivares’ role in the offense under this

standard. See, e.g., United States v. Mellen, 393 F.3d 175, 183

(D.C. Cir. 2004) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)). In Booker, the

Supreme Court struck 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) as violative of the

Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury and instructed that

sentences shall be reviewed for reasonableness. Booker, 543

U.S. at 244-45, 260-61. This court noted the issue of whether

our pre-Booker precedent continues to control in United States

v. Tabron, 437 F.3d 63, 65 (D.C. Cir. 2006), but had no occasion

to address the issue as the sole claim was that in ascribing the

weapon possession to the defendant as relevant conduct, the

district court erred as a matter of law, id. at 65-66.

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3

 Ninth Circuit precedent is not entirely consistent with regard

to the standard of review. Although most cases have reviewed the

district court’s application of the Guidelines to the facts for abuse of

discretion, a few cases have applied a de novo standard of review. See

United States v. Williamson, 439 F.3d 1125, 1137 n.12 (9th Cir.

2006). 

4

 Although in Villegas, the Fifth Circuit asserted that “[i]t is

beyond question that before Booker, this court would have reviewed

the district court’s interpretation and application of the Guidelines de

novo,” 404 F.3d at 359, its precedent prior to Booker is less clear.

See, e.g., United States v. Sotelo, 97 F.3d 782, 799 (5th Cir. 1996)

(“This Court shall accept the trial court’s findings of fact during

sentencing unless they are clearly erroneous and shall give due

deference to the district court’s application of the Sentencing

Guidelines to the facts.”). In any event, any change in the law does

not appear to have occurred in response to Booker. 

A number of circuit courts of appeal have continued after

Booker to apply the pre-Booker due deference standard of

review to the district court’s application of the Guidelines to the

facts. See, e.g., United States v. Clay, 176 F. App’x 360, 362

(4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Ledesma, 160 F. App’x 183,

185 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Thomas, 327 F.3d

253, 255 (3d Cir. 2003)); United States v. Rowe, 159 F. App’x

693, 696 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Agudelo, 414 F.3d

345, 348 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Lincecum, 220

F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2000)); United States v. Iacullo, 140 F.

App’x 94, 96 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Doe, 398 F.3d

1254, 1257 (10th Cir. 2005). The few circuit courts of appeal

that applied a de novo or abuse of discretion standard prior to

Booker have also continued to apply these standards after

Booker. See, e.g., United States v. Kimbrew, 406 F.3d 1149,

1151 (9th Cir. 2005)3

 (citing United States v. Barnes, 125 F.3d

1287, 1290 (9th Cir. 1997)); United States v. Villegas, 404 F.3d

355, 359 (5th Cir. 2005)4; United States v. Turner, 400 F.3d 491,

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5

 Seventh Circuit precedent is not entirely clear with regard

to the standard of review prior to Booker. See, e.g., United States v.

Parolin, 239 F.3d 922, 928 (7th Cir. 2001) (“In the sentencing context

. . . the district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines to the

facts is afforded due deference.”). Any change in the law, however,

does not appear to have occurred as a result of Booker.

500 (7th Cir. 2005).5 As explained by the Eleventh Circuit: 

Although Booker established a “reasonableness”

standard for the sentence finally imposed on a

defendant, the Supreme Court concluded in Booker that

district courts must still consider the Guidelines in

determining a defendant’s sentence. Nothing in

Booker suggests that a reasonableness standard should

govern review of the interpretation and application as

advisory of the Guidelines by a district court. 

United States v. Crawford, 407 F.3d 1174, 1178 (11th Cir. 2005)

(citations omitted). Similarly, the Fifth Circuit in Villegas

explained:

Booker left standing all sections of the Sentencing

Reform Act other than §§ 3553(b)(1) and 3742(e).

Thus, § 3742(a) still remains in force, providing that

“[a] defendant may file a notice of appeal in the district

court for review of an otherwise final sentence if the

sentence . . . was imposed as a result of an incorrect

application of the sentencing guidelines.” Moreover,

§ 3742(f) still provides: “If the court of appeals

determines that . . . the sentence was imposed in

violation of law or imposed as a result of an incorrect

application of the sentencing guidelines, the court shall

remand the case for further sentencing proceedings

with such instructions as the court considers

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appropriate.” The survival of these provisions further

counsels that we maintain our review of the district

court’s interpretation . . . .

404 F.3d at 361-62 (first two omissions in original) (internal

citations omitted). 

We need not decide whether our due deference standard, see

Mellen, 393 F.3d at 183, survives excision of 18 U.S.C. §

3742(e), because Olivares fails to show legal error. Cf. Tabron,

437 F.3d at 65-66. Olivares does not deny what the evidence

shows regarding his participation in the conspiracy or his

admissions to the district court during the FED. R. CRIM. P. 11

colloquy. Nevertheless, in challenging the district court’s denial

of a full four-point downward adjustment as error, Olivares

contends that his “participation could hardly be less.”

Appellant’s Br. at 7. 

The district court noted Olivares’ acts of selling two guns

to the robbers and of agreeing to store weapons used in the bank

robberies at his apartment. The court reasoned that while

Olivares had a “more confined role than some of the other

conspirators,” his acts were nonetheless “very important roles”

in the overall conspiracy because he directly “facilitated” the

conspiracy’s goals, including trying to kill a person whom the

conspirators suspected of stealing one of their weapons and

making sure that the robbers did not get caught.

The district court further noted Olivares’ admission during

the plea colloquy that he knew the weapons hidden at his

apartment had been used in bank robberies. The district court

took into account that although Olivares may not have known

that the guns that he sold to his co-conspirators would be used

to shoot the person who was suspected of stealing weapons, “he

certainly was aware that he was providing two illegal weapons

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for illegal use,” and that although he may have lacked

knowledge of the scope of the conspiracy before he agreed to

keep the weapons, when he agreed to store them, he knew that

the weapons had been used in bank robberies. The district court

reasoned that:

[I]n terms of his role it would appear if you compare it

to the others which is part of the process here that in

terms of his knowledge and his role that it’s a much

more discreet role although serious. * * * I think he’s

more than a minor [participant]. . . . I would not see

him in the usual role as the minimal participant that

would be comparable here. But I do think because he

didn’t have the full knowledge of what was happening

that he’s entitled to more than a minor [participant

adjustment], so I’ll give him [a] three points

adjustment in terms of his role.

Assuming the due deference standard would apply, given

the district court’s acknowledgment of Olivares’ lack of full

participation and of full knowledge of his co-conspirators’

activities, there is no basis on which this court can conclude that

the district court’s ruling on the § 3B1.2 request is not entitled

to due deference. In any event, Olivares can point to no legal

error underlying the district court’s ruling. Its factual findings

are not clearly erroneous and its reasoning addresses the

pertinent considerations presented by his request and the

evidence before the court.

B.

Prior to Booker, this court held that a district court’s denial

of a downward departure was unreviewable if the record

showed that the district court understood that it, in fact, had

authority to depart downward. See United States v. Pinnick, 47

F.3d 434, 439 (D.C. Cir. 1995). After Booker, some courts of

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appeal have continued to apply their analogous pre-Booker

standards of review to discretionary downward departures. See,

e.g., United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 333 (3d Cir. 2006);

United States v. Winingear, 422 F.3d 1241, 1245-46 (11th Cir.

2005); United States v. Puckett, 422 F.3d 340, 344-45 (6th Cir.

2005); United States v. Frokjer, 415 F.3d 865, 874-75 (8th Cir.

2005); United States v. Burdi, 414 F.3d 216, 220 (1st Cir.

2005); United States v. Sierra-Castillo, 405 F.3d 932, 936 (10th

Cir. 2005). 

As explained by the Third Circuit in Cooper, its pre-Booker

rule was based on the fact that 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)-(b), which

set forth the circumstances in which a defendant may appeal a

sentence, did not authorize an appeal from a discretionary

refusal to depart and thereby indicated that Congress intended

to foreclose review. Cooper, 437 F.3d at 333 (citing United

States v. Denardi, 892 F.2d 269, 271-72 (3d Cir. 1989)).

Because Booker left § 3742(a)-(b) intact, id. (citing Booker, 543

U.S. at 260), the court concluded that “Booker does not compel

us to reverse [our] precedent” with regard to review of denials

of downward departures, id. The Tenth Circuit similarly

explained that because Booker preserved § 3742(a), this court

“continues to have the same jurisdiction to review Guidelines

sentences as it had before” Booker. Sierra-Castillo, 405 F.3d at

936 n.3. Other circuits have advanced similar rationales. See

Winingear, 422 F.3d at 1245-46; Frokjer, 415 F.3d at 874-75.

The Tenth and the Eighth Circuits have concluded that in a

post-Booker world although the district court’s refusal to depart

is unreviewable, the sentence itself remains subject to review

for reasonableness. See, e.g., United States v. Chavez-Diaz,

444 F.3d 1223, 1227-30 (10th Cir. 2006); Frokjer, 415 F.3d at

874-76. 

By contrast, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have adopted

a different approach based on the conclusion that “the concept

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6

 The Ninth Circuit stated:

 We think the better view is to treat the scheme

of downward and upward “departures” as essentially

replaced by the requirement that judges impose a

“reasonable” sentence. The discretion that the district

court judge employs in determining a reasonable

sentence will necessarily take into consideration

many of the factors enumerated in Section 5K of the

Sentencing Guidelines, but to require two exercises

— one to calculate what departure would be

allowable under the old mandatory scheme and then

to go through much the same exercise to arrive at a

reasonable sentence — is redundant. In addition, the

use and review of post-Booker departures would

result in wasted time and resources in the courts of

appeal, with little or no effect on sentencing

of a discretionary departure . . . ‘has been rendered obsolete in

the post-Booker world.’” United States v. Vaughn, 433 F.3d

917, 923-24 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Arnaout,

431 F.3d 994, 1003 (7th Cir. 2005)). In Vaughn, the Seventh

Circuit concluded that an advisory Guidelines sentencing

scheme brings discretionary departures under Booker

reasonableness review. See id. The Seventh Circuit reasoned

that “what is at stake is the reasonableness of the sentence, not

the correctness of the departures as measured against preBooker decisions that cabined the discretion of sentencing

courts to depart from guidelines that were then mandatory.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). Hence, under Booker’s

requirement that sentences be reviewed for reasonableness in

light of the factors in § 3553(a), “the district court’s refusal to

depart from the advisory sentencing range” must be scrutinized

as part of that review. Id. at 924. The Ninth Circuit adopted the

Seventh Circuit’s approach in United States v. Mohamed, 459

F.3d 979, 986-87 (9th Cir. 2006).6

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decisions. After all, if a district court were to employ

a post-Booker “departure” improperly, the sentencing

judge still would be free on remand to impose exactly

the same sentence by exercising his discretion under

the now-advisory guidelines. Such a sentence would

then be reviewed for reasonableness, in which case it

is the review for reasonableness, and not the validity

of the so-called departure, that determines whether

the sentence stands. Further, even if a district court

judge were to misapply a departure, this error would

still be subject to harmless error review. Presumably,

this court would then review the sentence for

reasonableness to determine whether the improper

departure was harmless. If we were to declare the

sentence reasonable, then the erroneous departure

would be harmless. If we were to declare the

sentence unreasonable, then the sentence would be

invalid both because of the erroneous departure and

because it is unreasonable. In any case, our review

of the so-called departure would have little or no

independent value.

 

 For these reasons, we side with the Seventh

Circuit and we elect to review the district court’s

application of the advisory sentencing guidelines only

insofar as they do not involve departures.

Mohamed, 459 F.3d at 986-87 (citations omitted).

The Seventh Circuit subsequently applied Vaughn to a

review of a denial of a discretionary downward departure:

“Until recently we refused to address arguments by criminal

defendants who sought below-Guideline sentences, at least

when district judges recognized their authority to depart.

[Booker,] which abolished ‘departures’ by making the

Guidelines advisory, abolished this rule too.” United States v.

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Boscarino, 437 F.3d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted)

(citing Vaughn, 433 F.3d 917). Noting its pre-Booker reasoning

“that a request for a below-guideline sentence did not fit any of

the categories in 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), which authorizes

appellate review of sentences at defendants’ behest,” the court

concluded that “[a]fter Booker . . . an ‘unreasonable’ sentence

is an unlawful sentence, and § 3742(a)(1) authorizes the

correction of any illegal sentence.” Id. “Because sentences

within the Guideline range are presumptively but not

conclusively reasonable,” the court stated, “we are authorized

to entertain contentions that a particular Guideline sentence is

unreasonably high.” Id.; see also United States v. Lacy, 165 F.

App’x 475, 477 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting Vaughn, 433 F.3d at

924). 

Whether this court applies its pre-Booker precedent or

embraces the approach of the Seventh and Ninth Circuits,

Olivares’ contentions fail. He requested a six-month downward

departure because he was an alien subject to deportation. In

United States v. Smith, 27 F.3d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1994), this court

held that “a downward departure may be appropriate where the

defendant’s status as a deportable alien is likely to cause a

fortuitous increase in the severity of his sentence.” Id. at 655-

56. The court emphasized, however, that a finding that an

individual’s deportable alien status would likely “lead to worse

conditions” was insufficient to justify a departure. Id. at 655.

Instead, a court should only depart if it is “persuaded that the

greater severity is undeserved.” Id. 

Under our pre-Booker precedent, this court held that the

district court’s denial of a discretionary downward departure is

only reviewable if the court’s denial “rests on a

‘misconstruction of its authority to depart.’” Pinnick, 47 F.3d

at 439 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 938 F.2d 1293, 1296

(D.C. Cir. 1991)); see also United States v. Stewart, 104 F.3d

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1377, 1392 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The record shows that the district

court was aware of its authority to depart and declined to do so.

Under Pinnick, our review for legal error is at an end.

 

Olivares contends that there was cause for a Smith

departure, and that in light of the district court’s unclear ruling

a remand is required for further explanation. The district court

explained, however, that “I did not grant [] a Smith departure

per se. I gave [Olivares] what I thought was an appropriate

sentence.” On appeal, Olivares focuses on the district court’s

use of “per se” as implying that some departure was given that

was related to Smith. He contends that it is unclear how it was

related, observing that “[t]he record should be clearer.”

Appellant’s Br. at 14 (citing In re Sealed Case, 199 F.3d 488,

491 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). We find no lack of clarity as would

require a remand. Because the district court recognized its

authority to depart under Smith, the district court’s decision not

to depart is unreviewable, see Pinnick, 47 F.3d at 439, except as

Olivares’ sentence is reviewable for reasonableness.

C. 

Finally, the combined impact on Olivares’ sentence of the

denial of his request for a four-point downward adjustment for

his minor role and for a downward departure does not render his

sentence unreasonable. Olivares’ sentence was in the middle of

the Guidelines sentencing range, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4),

and thereby presumptively reasonable, see Dorcely, 454 F.3d at

376, based on the district court’s consideration of other relevant

factors under § 3553(a). Olivares, in fact, received three-fourths

of the downward adjustment that he requested in view of the

nature of his participation in the conspiratorial scheme. He

points to no basis on which this court could conclude that the

district court failed to consider a relevant factor under §

3553(a). See United States v. Ayers, 428 F.3d 312, 314-15

(D.C. Cir. 2005). 

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Indeed, the district court’s explanation for its denial of a

full four-point downward adjustment establishes the basis on

which to conclude that the sentence was reasonable. In view of

Olivares’ role, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), and the nature and

seriousness of the conspiracy, see id. § 3553(a)(1), (2)(A), the

district court granted him most of the benefit of his first (minor

role) request and effectively afforded him some of the benefit

of his second (Smith) request. Olivares points to nothing from

which this court could conclude that his sentence is

unreasonable because the district court did not depart downward

six months. The instruction in Smith is that alien status is not

alone a basis for a lesser sentence and the departures in United

States v. Gomez, 431 F.3d 818 (D.C. Cir. 2005), and United

States v. White, 71 F.3d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1995), on which

Olivares relies, were based on sentencing considerations not

present here. Although Olivares seeks to diminish his

participation in the conspiracy, we affirm in light of the district

court’s reasoned evaluation of his actions, his admitted

knowledge with regard to the likely violent nature of the

conspiracy, and the general goal of the Guidelines themselves.

See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2), (4), (6).

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