Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_23-cv-01577/USCOURTS-caed-1_23-cv-01577-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Jose Luis Maldonado
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE LUIS MALDONADO,

Plaintiff,

v.

MARTIN O’MALLEY,

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY,1

Defendant.

Case No. 1:23-cv-01577-HBK

ORDER REMANDING CASE TO 

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY2

(Doc. Nos. 12, 14)

Jose Luis Maldonado eeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of 

Social Security (“Commissioner” or “Defendant”) denying his application for supplemental 

security income and disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act. (Doc. No. 1). 

The matter is currently before the Court on the parties’ briefs, which were submitted without oral 

argument. (Doc. Nos. 12, 14-15). For the reasons stated, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion for 

summary judgment, denies Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and orders this matter 

1 The Court has substituted Martin O’Malley, who has been appointed the Acting Commissioner of Social 

Security, as the defendant in this suit. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).

2 Both parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. 

§636(c)(1). (Doc. No. 10). 

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remanded to the Commissioner of Social Security for further administrative proceedings.

I. JURISDICTION

Plaintiff filed for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income on April 

27, 2021, alleging an onset date of October 1, 2020. (AR 232-43). Benefits were denied initially 

(AR 64-101, 142-50), and upon reconsideration (AR 102-41, 152-57). Plaintiff appeared

telephonically before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on October 18, 2022. (AR 40-63). 

Plaintiff was represented by counsel and testified at the hearing. (Id.). The ALJ issued an 

unfavorable decision (AR 12-39), and the Appeals Council denied review (AR 1-6). The matter 

is now before this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

II. BACKGROUND

The facts of the case are set forth in the administrative hearing and transcripts, the ALJ’s 

decision, and the briefs of Plaintiff and Commissioner. Only the most pertinent facts are 

summarized here.

Plaintiff was 46 years old at the time of the hearing. (See AR 281). He graduated from 

high school. (See AR 294). Plaintiff has past relevant work history as a merchandise deliverer, 

store’s laborer, and industrial truck operator. (AR 46-49, 57). Plaintiff testified that he cannot 

work because his fingers get numb, and he has anxiety and feels like he’s going to faint. (AR 46). 

He reported dizzy spells seven times a week when he feels nervous, and it takes him 15 to 20 

minutes to calm down. (AR 50-51). Plaintiff testified that he gets nervous around a lot of people, 

and he has depression once in a while. (AR 51-52). He can run quick errands and only in stores 

that do not have a lot of people. (AR 52-53). He reported his fingers get numb nearly every day, 

multiple times throughout the day; and he has arthritis in his lower back. (AR 53-54). Plaintiff 

testified that he forgets things easily including directions from other people. (AR 55).

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court’s review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is 

governed by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The scope of review under § 405(g) is limited; the 

Commissioner’s decision will be disturbed “only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or 

is based on legal error.” Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012). “Substantial 

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evidence” means “relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Id. at 1159 (quotation and citation omitted). Stated differently, substantial evidence 

equates to “more than a mere scintilla[,] but less than a preponderance.” Id. (quotation and 

citation omitted). In determining whether the standard has been satisfied, a reviewing court must 

consider the entire record as a whole rather than searching for supporting evidence in isolation. 

Id.

In reviewing a denial of benefits, a district court may not substitute its judgment for that of 

the Commissioner. “The court will uphold the ALJ's conclusion when the evidence is susceptible 

to more than one rational interpretation.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 

2008). Further, a district court will not reverse an ALJ’s decision on account of an error that is 

harmless. Id. An error is harmless where it is “inconsequential to the [ALJ’s] ultimate 

nondisability determination.” Id. (quotation and citation omitted). The party appealing the ALJ’s 

decision generally bears the burden of establishing that it was harmed. Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 

U.S. 396, 409-10 (2009).

IV. FIVE-STEP SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS

A claimant must satisfy two conditions to be considered “disabled” within the meaning of 

the Social Security Act. First, the claimant must be “unable to engage in any substantial gainful 

activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be 

expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period 

of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). Second, the 

claimant’s impairment must be “of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous 

work[,] but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind 

of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 

1382c(a)(3)(B). 

The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential analysis to determine whether a 

claimant satisfies the above criteria. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v). 

At step one, the Commissioner considers the claimant’s work activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If the claimant is engaged in “substantial gainful activity,” 

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the Commissioner must find that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 

416.920(b).

If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the analysis proceeds to step 

two. At this step, the Commissioner considers the severity of the claimant’s impairment. 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant suffers from “any impairment or 

combination of impairments which significantly limits [his or her] physical or mental ability to do 

basic work activities,” the analysis proceeds to step three. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). 

If the claimant’s impairment does not satisfy this severity threshold, however, the Commissioner 

must find that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c).

At step three, the Commissioner compares the claimant’s impairment to severe 

impairments recognized by the Commissioner to be so severe as to preclude a person from 

engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If 

the impairment is as severe or more severe than one of the enumerated impairments, the 

Commissioner must find the claimant disabled and award benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 

416.920(d).

If the severity of the claimant’s impairment does not meet or exceed the severity of the 

enumerated impairments, the Commissioner must pause to assess the claimant’s “residual 

functional capacity.” Residual functional capacity (RFC), defined generally as the claimant’s 

ability to perform physical and mental work activities on a sustained basis despite his or her 

limitations, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1), is relevant to both the fourth and fifth 

steps of the analysis.

At step four, the Commissioner considers whether, in view of the claimant’s RFC, the 

claimant is capable of performing work that he or she has performed in the past (past relevant 

work). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant is capable of 

performing past relevant work, the Commissioner must find that the claimant is not disabled. 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). If the claimant is incapable of performing such work, the 

analysis proceeds to step five.

At step five, the Commissioner considers whether, in view of the claimant’s RFC, the 

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claimant is capable of performing other work in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). In making this determination, the Commissioner must also 

consider vocational factors such as the claimant’s age, education, and past work experience. 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). If the claimant is capable of adjusting to other 

work, the Commissioner must find that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1520(g)(1), 416.920(g)(1). If the claimant is not capable of adjusting to other work, analysis 

concludes with a finding that the claimant is disabled and is therefore entitled to benefits. 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g)(1), 416.920(g)(1).

The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 

F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). If the analysis proceeds to step five, the burden shifts to the 

Commissioner to establish that (1) the claimant is capable of performing other work; and (2) such 

work “exists in significant numbers in the national economy.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560(c)(2), 

416.960(c)(2); Beltran v. Astrue, 700 F.3d 386, 389 (9th Cir. 2012).

V. ALJ’S FINDINGS

At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

since October 1, 2020, the alleged onset date. (AR 17). At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff 

has the following severe impairments: anxiety; depression; carpal tunnel syndrome; obesity; 

obstructive sleep apnea; hypertension; hyperlipidemia; status-post hernia repair; gout; liver 

disease; hypothyroidism; and lumbar spine degenerative disc disease with radiculopathy. (AR 

17). At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of a listed impairment. (AR 18). The 

ALJ then found that Plaintiff has the RFC:

to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 

416.967(b) with the following limitations: he is capable of frequently 

handling, fingering, feeling, and grasping with the bilateral hands; he 

is able to perform work that does not require driving as a part of work 

duties or require any work-related exposure to hazards, such as 

unprotected heights and unguarded moving machinery; he is capable 

of traveling to and from a single workplace but is otherwise incapable 

of traveling for work; he is able to understand, remember, and carry 

out simple instructions and tasks and work at a consistent pace 

throughout the workday at simple tasks but not at a production rate 

pace where each task must be completed within a strict time deadline, 

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such as work on a conveyor belt or assembly line, or within high 

quota demands, such as work with an hourly quota requirement; he 

is able to make occasional simple work-related decision in a job 

involving only occasional changes in a routine work setting; he is 

able to sustain concentration and persist at simple tasks, as described, 

up to 2 hours at a time with normal breaks during an 8-hour workday; 

and he is capable of no more than occasional interaction with the 

general public, co-workers, and supervisors but is incapable of 

performing tasks requiring conflict resolution, requiring him to direct 

the work of others or persuade others, or requiring him to work 

jointly or cooperatively with a co-worker or co-workers on tandem 

tasks or in a team environment.

(AR 25-26). At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is unable to perform any past relevant 

work. (AR 31). At step five, the ALJ found that considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work 

experience, and RFC, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that 

Plaintiff can perform, including: marker, routing clerk, housekeeping cleaner. (AR 33). On that 

basis, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social 

Security Act, from October 1, 2020, through the date of the decision. (AR 34).

VI. ISSUES

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision denying him

supplemental security income benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act and disability 

insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiff raises the 

following issues for this Court’s review:

1. Whether the ALJ properly considered Plaintiff’s mental and physical symptom claims; 

and

2. Whether the ALJ properly considered the medical opinion of Mircea Truta, M.D.

(Doc. No. 12 at 8-17).

VII. DISCUSSION

A. Symptom Claims

An ALJ engages in a two-step analysis when evaluating a claimant’s testimony regarding 

subjective pain or symptoms. Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2007). 

The ALJ first must determine whether there is “objective medical evidence of an underlying 

impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.” 

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Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “The claimant is not required to show that his impairment 

could reasonably be expected to cause the severity of the symptom he has alleged; he need only 

show that it could reasonably have caused some degree of the symptom.” Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 

F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Second, “[i]f the claimant meets the first test and there is no evidence of malingering, the 

ALJ can only reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of the symptoms if [the ALJ] 

gives ‘specific, clear and convincing reasons’ for the rejection.” Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 

1154, 1163 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal citations and quotations omitted). “General findings are 

insufficient; rather, the ALJ must identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence 

undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Id. (quoting Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 

1995)); Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he ALJ must make a 

credibility determination with findings sufficiently specific to permit the court to conclude that 

the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit claimant’s testimony.”). “The clear and convincing 

[evidence] standard is the most demanding required in Social Security cases.” Garrison v. 

Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1015 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Moore v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 278 

F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2002)).

Here, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be 

expected to cause some of the alleged symptoms; however, Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the 

intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the 

medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the reasons explained in this decision. 

Accordingly, these statements have been found to affect the claimant’s ability to work only to the 

extent they can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical and other 

evidence.” (AR 27). Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to provide clear and convincing reasons for 

discounting Plaintiff’s allegations of mental and physical dysfunction. (Doc. No. 12 at 8-13). 

The Court agrees.

First, Plaintiff argues the ALJ’s “mere recitation of the objective medical evidence was 

not a clear and convincing reason for discounting Plaintiff’s physical symptoms.” (Doc. No. 12 

at 12). It is well-settled in the Ninth Circuit that ALJs are not required “to perform a line-by-line 

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exegesis of the claimant’s testimony, nor do they require ALJs to draft dissertations when 

denying benefits.” See Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d 1266, 1277 (9th Cir. 2020); Smartt v. Kijakazi, 

53 F. 4th 489, 499 (9th Cir. 2022) (“The standard isn’t whether our court is convinced, but instead 

whether the ALJ’s rationale is clear enough that it has the power to convince.”)). However, “[a]n 

ALJ does not provide specific, clear, and convincing reasons for rejecting a claimant's testimony 

by simply reciting the medical evidence in support of his or her residual functional capacity 

determination.” Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 489 (9th Cir. 2015). Instead, “the ALJ

must specifically identify the testimony she or he finds not to be credible and must explain what 

evidence undermines the testimony.” Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 2001); 

Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 494 (“To ensure that our review of the ALJ’s credibility 

determination is meaningful, and that the claimant’s testimony is not rejected arbitrarily, we 

require the ALJ to specify which testimony she finds not credible, and then provide clear and 

convincing reasons, supported by the evidence in the record, to support that credibility 

determination.”). Here, a plain reading of the ALJ’s decision indicates that while he identified 

Plaintiff’s claims of carpal tunnel syndrome, the analysis is almost entirely comprised of a 

chronological summary of the medical evidence including diagnosis of carpal tunnel syndrome, 

injections to treat carpal tunnel syndrome in June 2022 with no improvement in symptoms, 

complaints of numbness and tingling in his bilateral thumbs and index fingers during the same 

time period, and full strength in all extremities with no evidence of muscle wasting or atrophy in 

August 2022.3 (AR 28, 1736, 1742, 1747-48, 1757). Thus, the ALJ’s general finding that 

Plaintiff’s carpal tunnel symptom symptom claims were not supported by the objective medical 

evidence, without explanation as to how the medical evidence undermined his testimony, was not 

a clear and convincing reason, supported by substantial evidence, to reject his symptom claims.

Second, Plaintiff argues the ALJ’s rejection of Plaintiff’s mental health claims was not 

3 The ALJ also considered Plaintiff’s alleged physical impairments of sleep apnea, status-post hernia 

surgery, hypertension, hyperlipidemia, gout, hypothyroidism, liver disease, and obesity. (AR 28-29). 

However, as Plaintiff does not specifically challenge those findings in her opening brief the Court declines 

to consider them here. See Carmickle v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 n.2 (9th Cir. 

2008).

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supported by clear and convincing evidence because “the ALJ ignored all of Plaintiff’s abnormal 

mental status examinations.” (Doc. No. 12 at 9-10). The medical evidence is a relevant factor in 

determining the severity of a claimant’s pain and its disabling effects. Rollins v. Massanari, 261 

F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(2), 416.929(c)(2). However, an ALJ

may not “cherry-pick” aspects of the medical record and focus only on those aspects that fail to 

support a finding of disability. See Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1164 (9th Cir. 2014). 

Defendant correctly notes that the ALJ did acknowledge Plaintiff’s reports and treatment 

providers’ observations of panic attacks, feelings of hopelessness, fear of fainting/dizziness, 

concentration difficulty, emotional withdrawal or isolation, insomnia, and fatigue; as well as 

considering mental status examination findings observing that Plaintiff was alert and oriented, 

cooperative, “generally normal affect,” “coherent in his thoughts,” goal-directed, good insight, 

fair memory, fair insight, fair judgment, no hallucinations or delusions, euthymic mood, and wellorganized and goal-directed thought process. (AR 29). 

However, in support of this finding, the ALJ generally cites more than 750 pages of 

medical records over the course of more than two years of treatment, including ongoing normal 

and abnormal findings on mental status examination. (AR 29, 785-845, 970-1357, 1362-1730, 

1736-1756). As noted above, “the ALJ must specifically identify the testimony she or he finds 

not to be credible and must explain what evidence undermines the testimony.” Holohan v.

Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 2001); Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 494 (“To ensure that our 

review of the ALJ’s credibility determination is meaningful, and that the claimant’s testimony is 

not rejected arbitrarily, we require the ALJ to specify which testimony she finds not credible, and 

then provide clear and convincing reasons, supported by the evidence in the record, to support 

that credibility determination.”). Here, to the extent the ALJ specifically found that the objective 

evidence did not support Plaintiff’s symptom claims, a general citation to hundreds of treatment 

records that include both normal and abnormal findings, without identification or explanation as 

to how the medical evidence undermined his alleged mental health symptom claims was arguably 

not a clear and convincing reason, supported by substantial evidence, to reject his mental health 

symptom claims.

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In addition, Plaintiff correctly notes that the ALJ may not discredit a claimant’s testimony 

and deny benefits solely because the degree of pain alleged is not supported by objective medical 

evidence. (Doc. No. 12 at 10); Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001); Bunnell 

v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 346-47 (9th Cir. 1991); Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 601 (9th Cir. 

1989). Defendant contends the ALJ properly considered objective medical evidence as a reason 

to discount Plaintiff’s symptom claims, along with inconsistency with Plaintiff’s daily activities, 

inconsistent statements undermining Plaintiff’s mental health claims,4and conservative mental 

health treatment. (Doc. No. 14 at 5-6). However, Defendant’s argument appears partially based 

on the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion, after evaluating the medical opinion evidence, that 

“[c]onsideration of the record as a whole, including the claimant’s reported activities of daily 

living, treatment modalities, the longitudinal medical record, and the opinion evidence shows the 

claimant’s allegations of disabling symptoms and limitations are not entirely consistent with and 

supported by the medical evidence and other evidence in the record.” (AR 31); Rollins, 261 F.3d 

at 857 (ALJ may consider a claimant’s activities that undermine reported symptoms). Parra v. 

Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 751 (9th Cir. 2007) (evidence of “conservative treatment” may be sufficient 

to discount a claimant's testimony regarding the severity of an impairment); 20 C.F.R. § 

416.929(c)(4).

While the ALJ properly referenced factors relevant to his assessment of Plaintiff’s 

subjective allegations pursuant to Social Security Rule (SSR) 16-3p and 20 C.F.R. § 

416.929(c)(3), 404.1529(c)(3) (AR 27), he did not identify the specific testimony that he found 

4 Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s symptom claims were undermined by “inconsistencies in the evidence.” 

(Doc. No. 14 at 5). The ALJ may consider inconsistencies in the evidence and “the extent to which there 

are any conflicts between” plaintiff’s statements and statements by medical sources about how symptoms 

affect plaintiff. 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(4) Here, presumably in support of his argument, Plaintiff 

generally cited the ALJ’s summary of the medical evidence that included Plaintiff’s denial of anxiety and 

depression in February 2021, as compared to his report of anxiety in October 2021. (AR 29). However, as 

argued in Plaintiff’s reply, the ALJ “did not identify inconsistencies in Plaintiff’s statements to providers, 

or the type and effectiveness of mental health treatment, as reasons for discounting his allegations of 

mental dysfunction.” (Doc. No. 15 at 40). Rather, a plain reading of the ALJ’s decision indicates he was 

summarizing the mental health treatment record, including Plaintiff’s statements. Thus, the Court declines 

to consider this “reason” as it was not offered by the ALJ in the decision as reasons to discount Plaintiff’s 

symptom claims. Bray v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1226 (9th Cir. 2009) (the Court 

“review[s] the ALJ's decision based on the reasoning and factual findings offered by the ALJ—not post 

hoc rationalizations that attempt to intuit what the adjudicator may have been thinking.”). 

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not to be credible, nor did he offer explanations for how Plaintiff’s reported activities of daily 

living and “treatment modalities” (AR 31) undermine Plaintiff’s specific symptom claims, 

particularly as to her claimed mental health limitations. See Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 

1195 (9th Cir. 2001) (“the ALJ must specifically identify the testimony she or he finds not to be 

credible and must explain what evidence undermines the testimony.”); Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 

494. 

Moreover, even were the Court to consider the “reasons” given by the ALJ as part of the 

summary of medical evidence, as argued by Defendant, it is unclear that they are supported by 

substantial evidence. As to daily activities, in the summary of the medical evidence the ALJ 

references Plaintiff’s reports that he “lifted weights” at two treatment visits, without any further 

information, and another general report in August 2022 that his carpal tunnel just started to get 

worse but previously had only “minimal” effect on his “daily life.” (AR 28, 1751, 1759, 1726). 

Singular discrepancies fail to justify the wholesale dismissal of a claimant's testimony. See 

Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 883–84 (9th Cir. 2006). In addition, the ALJ failed to

identify or explain with requisite specificity any “specific conflicts between” Plaintiff’s daily 

activities and her reported mental health symptoms. (Doc. No. 15 at 3; See AR 29).

As to “treatment modalities,” the ALJ cites a single recommendation that Plaintiff should 

undergo physical therapy for his carpal tunnel syndrome, and generally finds, with general 

citation to more than 750 pages of mental health treatment for more than two years, that mental 

health treatment was “conservative and consisted of counselling and prescribed psychotropic 

medications.” (AR 28-29). As above, a singular recommendation that Plaintiff should undergo 

physical therapy would not rise to the level of substantial evidence of conservative treatment so as 

to undermine Plaintiff’s carpal tunnel symptom claims (See Robbins, 466 F.3d at 883-84); and, as 

noted by the ALJ, Plaintiff also received the arguably less conservative treatment of injections for

his carpal tunnel syndrome (AR 1747-48). Moreover, Plaintiff correctly notes that the ALJ “did 

not explicitly find that the prescribed treatment was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s reported mental 

dysfunction,” and further argues that “[m]ental health treatment by way of counseling and 

prescribed psychiatric medications was not ‘conservative,’ nor was it inconsistent with his degree 

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of mental dysfunction.” (Doc. No. 15 at 4); see Scott H. v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 2023 WL 

4249276, *4 (D. Or. June 29, 2023) (finding ALJ erred by relying on “conservative treatment” 

with therapy and prescription medication as a reason to discount Plaintiff’s mental health 

symptom testimony and noting “this does not fit the Ninth Circuit’s mold of ‘conservative 

treatment’ as a matter of law.”) (collecting cases).

Thus, as argued by Plaintiff, to the extent the ALJ relied on “objective evidence” to 

discount Plaintiff’s mental and physical symptom claims, it is well-settled in the Ninth Circuit 

that an ALJ may not discredit a claimant’s pain testimony and deny benefits solely because the 

degree of pain alleged is not supported by objective medical evidence. Rollins, 261 F.3d at 857; 

Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 346-47; Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 489. As discussed above, the additional 

“reasons” given by the ALJ for discounting Plaintiff’s symptom claims were not supported by 

substantial evidence. Because lack of corroboration by the objective evidence cannot stand alone 

as a basis for rejecting Plaintiff’s symptom claims, the ALJ’s finding is inadequate.

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the ALJ did not provide clear and 

convincing reasons, supported by substantial evidence, for rejecting Plaintiff’s symptom claims. 

On remand, the ALJ must reconsider Plaintiff’s mental and physical symptom claims.

B. Additional Assignment of Error

Plaintiff also argues the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the treating source opinion of 

Mircea Truta, M.D. (Doc. No. 12 at 13-17). Because the ALJ’s consideration of this issue is 

interrelated with a reevaluation of Plaintiff’s symptom claims, including a review of the medical 

evidence as it relates to Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, the Court declines to address this 

challenge in detail here. On remand, the ALJ is instructed to reconsider Plaintiff’s mental and 

physical symptom claims and conduct a new sequential analysis, including a reassessment of the 

medical opinion evidence, if necessary.

C. Remedy

Plaintiff contends that the proper remedy in this case is a remand for further 

administrative proceedings. (Doc. No. 12 at 18); see Treichler v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 

775 F.3d 1090, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 2014) (remand for benefits is not appropriate when further 

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administrative proceedings would serve a useful purpose). The Court agrees. Here, the ALJ 

improperly considered Plaintiff’s symptom claims, which calls into question whether the assessed 

RFC, and resulting hypothetical propounded to the vocational expert, are supported by substantial 

evidence. “Where,” as here, “there is conflicting evidence, and not all essential factual issues 

have been resolved, a remand for an award of benefits is inappropriate.” Treichler, 775 F.3d at 

1101. On remand, the ALJ should reevaluate Plaintiff’s mental and physical symptom claims, as 

well as all relevant medical evidence, including medical opinions. The ALJ should order 

additional consultative examinations and, if appropriate, take additional testimony from medical 

experts. The ALJ should conduct a new sequential analysis, reassess Plaintiff’s RFC and, if 

necessary, take additional testimony from a vocational expert which includes all of the limitations 

credited by the ALJ.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 12) is GRANTED.

2. Defendant’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 14) is DENIED.

3. Pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C.§ 405(g), the Court REVERSES the 

Commissioner’s decision and REMANDS this case back to the Commissioner of 

Social Security for further proceedings consistent with this Order. 

4. An application for attorney fees may be filed by separate motion within thirty (30) 

days.

5. The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff, terminate any motions and 

deadlines, and close this case.

Dated: December 2, 2024 

HELENA M. BARCH-KUCHTA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:23-cv-01577-HBK Document 16 Filed 12/02/24 Page 13 of 13