Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01338/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01338-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rick Hill
Respondent
Samuel Sarmiento
Petitioner

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAMUEL SARMIENTO, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

RICK HILL, 

Respondent. 

No. 2:13-cv-1338 MCE AC 

ORDER 

 Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, has filed a petition for 

a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. As explained below, because of the Ninth 

Circuit’s recent opinion in Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc), petitioner 

will be required to show cause why his petition should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 

I. Factual Background 

Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder in 1988, following a guilty plea. ECF 

No. 10-1 at 2. He was sentenced to 16 years to life in prison. Id. His minimum eligible parole 

date (“MEPD”) was originally calculated to be September 29, 1997. Id. at 6. As a result, his first 

parole consideration hearing occurred in 1996, a year before his MEPD. Id. at 5.1

 

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 Sometime thereafter, for reasons that are not clear from the record, petitioner’s MEPD was 

recalculated to be February 6, 1998. ECF No. 10-1 at 5. Regardless of which MEPD is used, it is 

clear that petitioner’s present disciplinary challenge occurred long after his MEPD so this does 

not affect this court’s analysis. 

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Petitioner received a Rules Violation Report (“RVR”) for possessing a cell phone and 

charger in a prison facility. ECF No. 13 at 16-19. At a disciplinary hearing on October 10, 2011 

petitioner was found guilty of the RVR and assessed a 30 day loss of credit. Id. Petitioner filed 

the instant habeas corpus petition challenging the 2011 prison disciplinary proceeding. ECF No. 

1. He alleged the RVR was not supported by evidence of his constructive possession of the cell 

phone and charger because he had no knowledge or control of the contraband. Id. at 4. By way 

of relief, petitioner requested a reversal of his guilty finding, expungement of all references to the 

2011 disciplinary conviction, and an order that he be single celled “until such time as respondent 

does not hold him responsible for the actions of the convicts that are placed into his cell.” Id. 

II. Procedural History 

In response to the petition, respondent filed a motion to dismiss arguing the court lacked 

habeas jurisdiction because success on the merits would not necessarily affect the fact or duration 

of petitioner’s confinement. ECF No. 10. The court issued findings and recommendations that 

the motion to dismiss be denied, which were adopted in full. ECF Nos. 16 and 18. In denying 

the motion to dismiss, the court relied on Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1269 (9th Cir. 1989), 

the controlling law at the time, because expungement of petitioner’s 2011 RVR was “‘likely to 

accelerate the prisoner’s eligibility for parole’ and therefore could affect the duration of his 

confinement.” ECF No. 16 at 5. 

III. Legal Standards for Habeas Jurisdiction 

“[W]hen a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical 

imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate or a 

speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.” 

Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). In Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 

2016) (en banc), the Ninth Circuit recently addressed the issue of whether a habeas corpus action 

is the appropriate vehicle to challenge a disciplinary conviction when it will not necessarily 

impact the fact or duration of an inmate’s confinement. The Ninth Circuit held that if success on 

the merits of a petitioner’s challenged disciplinary proceeding would not necessarily impact the 

fact or duration of his confinement, his claim would not fall within “the core of habeas corpus,” 

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and that, unless a state prisoner’s claim lies at the core of habeas corpus, it may not be brought in 

habeas corpus. Id. at 934-35. 

The court in Nettles reasoned that “[s]uccess on the merits of Nettles’s claim would not 

necessarily lead to immediate or speedier release because the expungement of the challenged 

disciplinary violation would not necessarily lead to a grant of parole.” Id. This is “[b]ecause the 

parole board has the authority to deny parole on the basis of any grounds presently available to it, 

[so] the presence of a disciplinary infraction does not compel the denial of parole, nor does an 

absence of an infraction compel the grant of parole.” Id. at 935 (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). 

Petitioner, like Nettles, is indeterminately sentenced and has yet to be found suitable for 

parole. While the Parole Board may be more likely to find petitioner suitable for parole without 

the 2011 RVR on his record, the board could still deny parole on other grounds, therefore success 

on the merits will not necessarily impact the length of petitioner’s sentence. Based on the 

foregoing, petitioner will be required to show cause explaining why the court has jurisdiction over 

this habeas action in light of the decision in Nettles. 

IV. Conversion to Civil Rights Claim 

While the information currently before the court makes it appear likely that petitioner will 

be unable to maintain this case as a petition for habeas corpus, should that in fact be the case, it is 

possible he could present this claim as a civil rights action under § 1983. “[W]hen a prisoner’s 

claim would not necessarily spell speedier release, that claim does not lie at ‘the core of habeas 

corpus,’ and may be brought, if at all, under § 1983.” Nettles, 830 F.3d at 930 (some internal 

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 535 n.13 (2011)). 

“Federal law opens two main avenues to relief on complaints 

related to imprisonment: a petition for habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 

2254, and a complaint under the Civil Rights Act . . . , 42 U.S.C. § 

1983. Challenges to the validity of any confinement or to 

particulars affecting its duration are the province of habeas corpus.” 

An inmate’s challenge to the circumstances of his confinement, 

however, may be brought under § 1983. 

Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 579 (2006) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Muhammad v. 

Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004)). 

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“[A] district court may construe a petition for habeas corpus to plead a cause of action 

under § 1983 after notifying and obtaining informed consent from the prisoner.” Nettles, 830 

F.3d at 936. “‘If the complaint is amenable to conversion on its face, meaning that it names the 

correct defendants and seeks the correct relief, the court may recharacterize the petition so long as 

it warns the pro se litigant of the consequences of the conversion and provides an opportunity for 

the litigant to withdraw or amend his or her complaint.’” Id. (quoting Glaus v. Anderson, 408 

F.3d 382, 388 (7th Cir. 2005)). 

If petitioner is unwilling or unable to persuade the court that Nettles does not bar habeas 

jurisdiction in this case, he may convert his claim into a civil rights action under § 1983. 

However, petitioner is informed that a habeas corpus action and a prisoner civil rights suit differ 

in a variety of respects, such as the proper defendants, type of relief available, filing fees and the 

means of collecting them, and restrictions on future filings. Nettles, 830 F.3d at 936 (quoting 

Robinson v. Sherrod, 631 F.3d 839, 841 (7th Cir. 2011)). The exhaustion requirements for a § 

1983 case also differ from those required in a habeas action.2 These differences “‘may make 

recharacterization impossible or, if possible, disadvantageous to the prisoner compared to a 

dismissal without prejudice of his petition for habeas corpus.’” Id. 

If petitioner chooses to convert his claim he will be required to amend his complaint so 

that it names the proper defendants and seeks the correct relief. Converting the claim into a civil 

rights action will also obligate petitioner for the full amount of the $350.00 filing fee, even if 

petitioner proceeds in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.3 Petitioner will be responsible for 

an initial partial filing fee and thereafter payments from petitioner’s trust account will be 

forwarded to the clerk of court any time the amount in the account exceeds $10 until the filing 

fees are paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)(A), (B); § 1915(b)(2). 

Petitioner also has the option of dismissing his habeas petition without prejudice to 

refiling his claim as a § 1983 case. However, he is warned that if he dismisses and refiles he will 

 

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 Inmates are required to exhaust available administrative remedies before bringing a civil rights 

suit under § 1983. 

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 Petitioner’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis in this action was granted and included the 

documentation necessary to grant in forma pauperis status in a civil rights suit. ECF Nos. 2, 4. 

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be subject to a possible statute of limitations bar as well as the other challenges inherent in 

bringing his claim as a § 1983 case discussed above. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 385 

(2007) (The statute of limitations in a § 1983 action is that provided by the state for personalinjury torts).4

Once petitioner informs the court of whether he will show cause, consent to 

recharacterization of his claim, or voluntarily dismiss this action, he will receive further 

instructions from the court on how to proceed. If petitioner chooses to show cause and is not able 

to persuade the court that it has habeas jurisdiction, he will be given a second opportunity to 

convert his claim into a § 1983 case. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that within fourteen days of service of this 

order petitioner shall return the attached form advising the court whether he would like to: 

1. Respond, explaining why Nettles does not prevent this court from exercising jurisdiction 

over his habeas petition, 

2. Convert his habeas petition into a § 1983 claim, or 

3. Dismiss this action without prejudice to refiling his claim as a § 1983 claim, subject to any 

statute of limitations issues. 

DATED: October 24, 2016 

 

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 California law provides a two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury actions, plus an 

additional two years tolling the statute of limitations based on the disability of imprisonment. See 

Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 335.1, 352.1). 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAMUEL SARMIENTO, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

RICK HILL, 

Respondent. 

No. 2:13-cv-1338 MCE AC P 

PETITIONER’S NOTICE ON HOW TO 

PROCEED 

 Check one: 

_____ Petitioner wants to respond to the courts order and explain why Nettles v. Grounds, 830 

F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc), does require his petition be dismissed. 

_____ Petitioner wants to convert his habeas petition into a § 1983 claim and file an amended 

complaint. 

_____ Petitioner wants to dismiss this action without prejudice to refiling his claim as a § 1983 

claim, subject to any statute of limitations issues 

DATED:_______________________ 

 Samuel Sarmiento 

Petitioner pro se 

Case 2:13-cv-01338-MCE-AC Document 22 Filed 10/25/16 Page 6 of 6