Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02553/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02553-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Marcus Malcom Thurmon
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Judge for the Northern

District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-2553

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff-Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Northern District of Iowa.

Marcus Malcom Thurmon, *

also known as Freak, *

*

Defendant-Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: December 15, 2004

Filed: July 6, 2005

___________

Before BYE, HANSEN, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

BYE, Circuit Judge.

Marcus Thurmon was convicted of distributing 27.41 grams of a detectable

amount of cocaine base after a prior drug felony conviction, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), and 851. The district court1

 sentenced Thurmon to 30

years' imprisonment under the career offender provision of the United States

Sentencing Guidelines. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. Thurmon appeals his conviction and

sentence. Thurmon argues the district court abused its discretion by denying his

Appellate Case: 04-2553 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/06/2005 Entry ID: 1924227
-2-

motion for the appointment of a voice recognition expert. He challenges his sentence

pursuant to Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and United States v.

Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). We affirm both the conviction and sentence.

I

In March 2002, law enforcement officers worked with a confidential informant,

Eric Beard, to set up a controlled buy of cocaine base, otherwise known as "crack

cocaine," from Thurmon. Beard knew Thurmon because both had been housed

together for three months in 2000 at a jail in Iowa. On March 27, Beard called

Thurmon and arranged the purchase of an ounce of crack cocaine. Officers fitted

Beard with recording and monitoring devices. Beard then made a recorded and

monitored telephone call to a cell phone registered to Thurmon. During the call,

Beard and Thurmon agreed to meet at a Super Target store in Cedar Rapids, Iowa.

At the Super Target, officers monitored and recorded the purchase on audio and

video tapes. Beard was provided with $1,000 in pre-serialized funds. At

approximately 4:23 p.m., a blue-green four-door Cadillac with temporary plates

arrived at the Super Target parking lot. An unidentified female was driving the

Cadillac. Thurmon sat in the front passenger seat. After Beard climbed into the

backseat of the Cadillac, surveillance officers monitored the Cadillac while it was

driven around the parking lot and adjacent streets. Inside the Cadillac, Thurmon

handed Beard 27.41 grams of cocaine base in a Newport cigarette box and took the

pre-serialized funds from Beard. Throughout the transaction, Beard referred to

Thurmon by his nickname "Freak," a nickname which Thurmon has tattooed across

his back. After the Cadillac returned to the parking lot, Beard exited. Beard then

turned over the Newport cigarette box and recording equipment to the officers. After

the Cadillac left the Super Target, it was driven to an apartment complex where

Thurmon exited the vehicle and walked into an apartment building. He was not

apprehended by the police at that time. 

Appellate Case: 04-2553 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/06/2005 Entry ID: 1924227
-3-

On July 22, 2003, the government filed an indictment against Thurmon

charging him on one count of distributing approximately 27.41 grams of a detectable

amount of cocaine base after a prior drug felony conviction. Prior to trial, Thurmon

filed an ex parte motion for the appointment of a voice identification expert, which

the district court denied. 

At trial, Beard testified he identified and recognized the passenger in the front

seat of the Cadillac as Thurmon. Additionally, a police officer, who had at least three

prior encounters with Thurmon, testified he was able to identify Thurmon when the

Cadillac passed the officer's vehicle. Thurmon's ex-girlfriend, Tina Bennett, also

testified at trial that she could identify Thurmon as the passenger of the vehicle from

the videotape of the controlled buy. It was revealed Bennett was romantically

involved with Beard at the time the trial was taking place. 

Thurmon did not testify, but called several witnesses. Thurmon's girlfriend,

Nakisha Roberts, testified Thurmon was living in Iowa City during the transaction

and he had been with her at her pre-natal doctor's appointment the afternoon of the

controlled buy. The doctor's office's records indicated Roberts arrived for her

appointment on March 27, 2002, shortly before 2:00 p.m. The records did not

indicate whether Thurmon was with Roberts. The doctor spent approximately 15 to

20 minutes with Roberts during the appointment. Roberts testified she and Thurmon

then returned to her apartment in Coralville, Iowa, shortly before the elementary

school let out. The controlled buy took place at 4:23 p.m. the same day at a location

30 miles from Roberts's apartment. 

Thurmon also called as a witness the apartment manager of the building to

which the Cadillac was driven after the controlled buy. The apartment manager

testified Thurmon did not have an ownership interest in any unit in the building.

Thurmon's friend Robert Roberts, who made rap music with Thurmon, testified he

was familiar with Thurmon's voice and did not believe it was Thurmon's voice on the

Appellate Case: 04-2553 Page: 3 Date Filed: 07/06/2005 Entry ID: 1924227
-4-

police recordings. On October 28, 2003, after a two-day trial, the jury returned a

guilty verdict. 

At the sentencing hearing, on June 15, 2004, Thurmon stipulated he qualified

as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. In light of the stipulation, the parties

agreed any remaining contested issues such as drug quantity and role in the offense

were moot. The district court determined Thurmon's total adjusted offense level was

37, criminal history category VI, and that the applicable sentencing range was 360

months to life in prison. The district court imposed a sentence of 360 months'

imprisonment, eight years of supervised release, and a $100 special assessment. 

II

Thurmon argues the district court denied him the effective assistance of trial

counsel by erroneously denying his request for a voice identification expert to review

the audiotapes gathered by the police. Although Thurmon characterizes this claim

as a denial of the right to the effective assistance of counsel, we believe Thurmon's

claim is more appropriately viewed as an argument that the district court violated the

Criminal Justice Act. Section 3006A(e)(1) of the Criminal Justice Act provides: 

Counsel for a person who is financially unable to obtain investigative,

expert, or other services necessary for adequate representation may

request them in an ex parte application. Upon finding, after appropriate

inquiry in an ex parte proceeding, that the services are necessary and

that the person is financially unable to obtain them, the court, or the

United States magistrate judge if the services are required in connection

with a matter over which he has jurisdiction, shall authorize counsel to

obtain the services.

18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1). 

Appellate Case: 04-2553 Page: 4 Date Filed: 07/06/2005 Entry ID: 1924227
-5-

It is Thurmon's burden to establish an expert is necessary for an adequate

defense. United States v. Bertling, 370 F.3d 818, 819 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing United

States v. Valverde, 846 F.2d 513, 517 (8th Cir. 1988)). In analyzing a claim that

§ 3006A(e)(1) was violated, we consider whether Thurmon "demonstrated a

reasonable probability that the requested expert would aid in his defense and that

denial of the funding would result in an unfair trial." United States v. Ross, 210 F.3d

916, 921 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing Little v. Armontrout, 835 F.2d 1240, 1244 (8th Cir.

1987) (en banc)). We review the district court's ruling pertaining to the funding of

an expert witness under § 3006A(e) for an abuse of discretion. Id. (citing United

States v. Casal, 915 F.2d 1225, 1230 (8th Cir. 1990)). 

Before the district court, Thurmon argued he needed a voice identification

expert to establish it was not his voice on the recordings. Thurmon claims the

expert's testimony could have been of substantial weight to his defense because the

videotapes did not clearly depict the individual in the Cadillac selling the drugs. We

do not believe the district court was required to appoint a voice identification expert

in this case because the facts do not reasonably suggest Thurmon was not the

individual in the Cadillac at Target who sold crack cocaine to Beard. See United

States v. Janis, 831 F.2d 773, 778 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding district court did not err

in denying request for voice analysis expert where "underlying facts do not suggest

the slightest support for [defendant's] theory of the case"). Beard, who was

acquainted with Thurmon, testified Thurmon was in the Cadillac and sold him the

crack cocaine. Throughout the transaction, Beard referred to Thurmon by his

nickname "Freak," and the purchase was arranged by a recorded call to Thurmon's

cell phone. Additionally, an officer who had three previous encounters with Thurmon

testified he recognized Thurmon as the Cadillac passed the officer's vehicle.

Thurmon's ex-girlfriend testified she recognized Thurmon on the videotape and his

voice on the audiotapes. Although Thurmon's girlfriend testified Thurmon

accompanied her to a pre-natal doctor's appointment the afternoon of the controlled

Appellate Case: 04-2553 Page: 5 Date Filed: 07/06/2005 Entry ID: 1924227
-6-

buy, the appointment was at 2:00 p.m. in the afternoon, whereas the controlled buy

took place at 4:23 p.m. 

Thurmon cites United States v. Schultz, 431 F.2d 907 (8th Cir. 1970), for the

proposition that the district court should have relied on the judgment of his defense

attorney. In Schultz, the defendant's attorney learned the defendant in the recent past

had been hospitalized as a mental patient several times, was diagnosed as a manic

depressive, and acted bizarrely. Defense counsel moved for the appointment of an

independent psychiatrist for the purpose of developing the defense that the defendant

lacked the competency to commit the crime knowingly. The district court denied the

motion. We reversed. We stated "[w]hile a trial court need not authorize an

expenditure under subdivision (e) for a mere 'fishing expedition,' it should not

withhold its authority when underlying facts reasonably suggest that further

exploration may prove beneficial to the accused in the development of a defense to

the charge." Id. at 911. We held that based on the facts the defendant's attorney had

learned there was a reasonable basis on which to investigate the defendant's

competency, and the defendant was entitled to the appointment of an independent

psychiatrist to support the defense. In the instant case, the facts did not provide

Thurmon's attorney with a reasonable basis to investigate whether the voice on the

audio recordings belonged to Thurmon. 

Furthermore, Thurmon has not demonstrated a voice identification expert was

necessary for a fair trial. Thurmon was able to present his defense through witnesses

who were familiar with his voice. At trial, Robert Roberts testified it was not

Thurmon's voice on the audiotapes. Thurmon was also able to cross-examine the

government's witnesses who identified his voice on the audiotapes. Because

Thurmon failed to show a voice identification expert would aid his defense or was

necessary for a fair trial, we hold the district court did not abuse its discretion in

denying Thurmon's motion for the appointment of a voice identification expert. 

Appellate Case: 04-2553 Page: 6 Date Filed: 07/06/2005 Entry ID: 1924227
-7-

III

Thurmon challenges his sentence under Blakely and Booker, arguing the

district court erred by sentencing him as a career offender under the Guidelines

without submitting the facts necessary for the enhancement to a jury to be proved

beyond a reasonable doubt. We now know this is not the nature of a Booker error.

In United States v. Pirani, we explained the nature of the Booker error to include

"[a]ll sentences imposed by a district court that mistakenly (though understandably)

believed the Guidelines to be mandatory." 406 F.3d 543, 553 (8th Cir. 2005) (en

banc).

Because Thurmon failed in the district court to raise an objection based on

Apprendi, Blakely, or the Sixth Amendment, we review the claim for plain error.

Pirani, 406 F.3d at 550. To establish plain error, it is Thurmon's burden to establish

"(1) 'error,' (2) that is 'plain,' and (3) that 'affect[s] substantial rights.'" Johnson v.

United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S.

725, 732 (1993)). If Thurmon establishes all three factors, we may exercise our

discretion to notice the forfeited error "only if (4) the error seriously affects the

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Id. (internal

quotations and citations omitted). 

Thurmon has established the first two plain error factors. In Booker, the

Supreme Court held the mandatory federal sentencing guidelines system is

unconstitutional. The district court in this case erred "by applying the Guidelines as

mandatory, and the error is plain." Pirani, 406 F.3d at 550. In order to demonstrate

the error affected his substantial rights, Thurmon "must show a 'reasonable

probability,' based on the appellate record as a whole, that but for the error he would

have a received a more favorable sentence." Id. at 552. The district court sentenced

Thurmon at the bottom of the Guideline range. However, in Pirani, we held

"sentencing at the bottom of the range is the norm for many judges, so it is

Appellate Case: 04-2553 Page: 7 Date Filed: 07/06/2005 Entry ID: 1924227
-8-

insufficient, without more, to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the court

would have imposed a lesser sentence absent the Booker error." Id. at 553. Our

review of the record leads us to conclude Thurmon cannot establish the third plain

error factor. Because Thurmon failed to establish the third factor, it is unnecessary

to examine whether the error "seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public

reputation of judicial proceedings." Id.

 

IV

The judgment and sentence are affirmed.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 04-2553 Page: 8 Date Filed: 07/06/2005 Entry ID: 1924227