Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-01846/USCOURTS-ca7-14-01846-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Willie J. Harris
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 14-1846

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

WILLIE J. HARRIS,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division.

No. 2:10-cr-00123-PPS-APR-1 — Philip P. Simon, Chief Judge.

ARGUED FEBRUARY 25, 2015 — DECIDED JULY 1, 2015

Before BAUER, FLAUM, and MANION, Circuit Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge. On May 10, 2013, defendant-appellant, Willie J. Harris, was convicted of two counts of fraud and

one count of conspiracy to commit fraud with identification

documents in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028(a)(7), 1028(f),

1029(b)(2), and 1349, three counts of production and trafficking

in counterfeit devices (credit card fraud) in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 1029(a)(2), and one count of aggravated identity theft

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A. The district court sentenced

Case: 14-1846 Document: 35 Filed: 07/01/2015 Pages: 16
2 No. 14-1846

Harris to 156 months’ imprisonment and ordered him to pay

$299,298.67 in restitution. On appeal, Harris contends that the

court erroneously denied his pretrial motion to suppress and

that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction.

He also appeals his sentence, arguing that the district court

erred in applying a number of sentencing enhancements and

imposed an unreasonable sentence. For the reasons that follow,

we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND 

From 2007 to 2010, Harris was involved in a conspiracy to

commit account takeover fraud, in which he and seven coconspirators fraudulently added themselves as authorized

users on existing credit card accounts without the account

holders’ knowledge or permission. Once added, Harris and

his co-conspirators took out cash advances, cashed convenience checks, and made fraudulent purchases with the

victims’ accounts. The scheme lasted three years, involved

over fifty victims, and resulted in approximately $300,000 in

pecuniary loss.

Harris’ fraudulent transactions began in Indiana in 2007.

During 2007, he added co-conspirators as authorized users of

victims’ credit cards. He also directed co-conspirators to draw

on these accounts through cash advances and checks. Sometime amid the 2007 activity, he relocated to Atlanta, Georgia,

but continued fraudulently adding users to victims’ credit

cards in Indiana. 

On April 7, 2008, Harris and one of his co-conspirators,

seventeen-year-old Darriell Watkins, attempted to obtain a

$4,500 cash advance at a Chase Bank branch in Munster,

Case: 14-1846 Document: 35 Filed: 07/01/2015 Pages: 16
No. 14-1846 3

Indiana. Watkins went into the bank, while Harris waited

outside in his truck. The credit card Watkins used for the

advance had been issued on the account of a man named Mark

Sulzman, without his authority or permission. Suspicious of

the legality of the transaction, the bank alerted the Munster

Police Department. Upon arrival, an officer arrested Harris

and placed him in the back of a police car. Another officer

searched Watkins, discovering the fraudulent credit card, a

second credit card not in Watkins’ name, and a slip of paper

containing Sulzman’s birth date, social security number, credit

card numbers, address, phone number, his mother’s maiden

name, and his bank password. When Watkins was placed in a

patrol car, she asked an officer to retrieve her personal belongings from Harris’ truck—namely, a backpack, a coat, and

“school stuff.” The officer returned a backpack, a notebook that

he found under the backpack, and a wallet to Watkins, all of

which were in plain view in the truck.

Watkins and Harris were both interviewed thereafter.

During her interview, Watkins explained that the backpack

recovered from the truck was hers, but the notebook and

wallet belonged to Harris. When asked, Harris admitted the

wallet was his, but said the notebook belonged to Watkins.

Because both of them disclaimed ownership, the notebook

remained in police custody. The notebook contained a litany of

personal information about fourteen people, including birth

dates, addresses, social security numbers, credit card numbers,

and security codes. A fingerprint examination revealed 48/50

prints pulled from the notebook matched Harris’ prints.

Eventually, both Watkins and Harris were released from

custody.

Case: 14-1846 Document: 35 Filed: 07/01/2015 Pages: 16
4 No. 14-1846

In March 2009, law enforcement began investigating

Harris after he was connected to $26,000 worth of suspicious

transactions. The investigation continued into 2010, when local

police and postal inspector Cecil Frank executed a search

warrant on Harris’ Atlanta apartment. They seized computers,

thumb drives, and Harris himself. A second notebook containing personal information about a host of people was also

discovered.

Harris was indicted on June 21, 2010. The indictment

alleged a conspiracy from March 2007 to January 2010

to commit identity theft and credit card fraud. Seven coconspirators were also indicted.1

 With the exception of one

person, all of Harris’ co-conspirators pleaded guilty.

Prior to trial, Harris moved to suppress the notebook found

in April 2008 on the ground that his arrest at the bank was

illegal, as was the removal of the notebook from his truck. The

district court denied the motion on April 18, 2013, concluding

that the officer had sufficient probable cause to search the

vehicle under the automobile exception. The district court also

found the search constitutionally permissible as incident to

Watkins’ arrest.

At trial, five of Harris’ co-defendants testified to Harris’

involvement in the scheme, describing his role as a leader. At

the close of the government’s case, Harris moved for judgment

of acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29.

With respect to the conspiracy charge, Harris argued that the

1

 There were seven additional co-conspirators who were not indicted due

to their status as minors. 

Case: 14-1846 Document: 35 Filed: 07/01/2015 Pages: 16
No. 14-1846 5

evidence showed two conspiracies, not one; as for the substantive counts, Harris stated only that “there doesn’t exist sufficient evidence to go forward on them.” The district court

rejected both arguments and denied the motion.

The jury found Harris guilty on all counts on May 10, 2013.

Two sentencing hearings followed. At the first on February 27,

2014, the district court overruled a number of Harris’ objections to Guidelines enhancements, including a sophisticated

means enhancement and a relocation enhancement. The court

also found that a two-level enhancement under United States

Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual (“U.S.S.G.”)

§ 3B1.4 applied because Harris used minors to commit the

offense, but elected to forego imposing it. The court next

applied a three-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b) to

Harris as a manager or supervisor of the scheme. Finally, the

court found that Harris obstructed justice, meriting a two-level

enhancement. At the second sentencing hearing on April 4,

2014, the district court added four points to Harris’ offense

level because the number of victims exceeded fifty. The court

also found that the total amount of loss was approximately

$300,000, warranting a twelve point enhancement under

U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(G).

As a result of the enhancements, Harris’ offense level was

32. With his criminal history category of III, the Guidelines

imprisonment range was set at 151 to 188 months. The court

imposed a below-Guidelines sentence of 132 months and

added the mandatory two-year consecutive sentence for the

aggravated identity theft count, for a total of 156 months’

imprisonment. 

Case: 14-1846 Document: 35 Filed: 07/01/2015 Pages: 16
6 No. 14-1846

II. DISCUSSION 

Harris raises a number of arguments on appeal. First, he

contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to

suppress the notebook found on April 7, 2008. Next, Harris

challenges whether sufficient evidence supports his conviction.

Finally, Harris raises several challenges to his sentence. We

will discuss each of his arguments in turn.

A. Denial of the Motion to Suppress 

Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the

Fourth Amendment, subject to a few well-established exceptions. The district court ruled that two recognized exceptions

applied to the warrantless search of Harris’ vehicle: the

automobile exception and a search incident to arrest exception.

Accordingly, the court denied Harris’ motion to suppress the

aforementioned notebook. Harris challenges this ruling on

appeal. We review a denial of a motion to suppress de novo as

to legal conclusions, and for clear error as to factual findings.

United States v. Glover, 755 F.3d 811, 815 (7th Cir. 2014). 

Under the automobile exception, “where there is probable

cause to believe that a vehicle contains contraband or evidence

of a crime, law enforcement may conduct a warrantless search

of the vehicle.” United States v. Zahursky, 580 F.3d 515, 521 (7th

Cir. 2009). Probable cause exists where, based on a totality of

the circumstances, “there is a fair probability that contraband

or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Id.

(quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). Law enforcement officers may draw reasonable inferences from the facts

based on their training and experience. Zahursky, 580 F.3d at

521. We review de novo the district court’s conclusion regarding

Case: 14-1846 Document: 35 Filed: 07/01/2015 Pages: 16
No. 14-1846 7

probable cause. United States v. Richards, 719 F.3d 746, 754 (7th

Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Williams, 627 F.3d 247, 251 (7th

Cir. 2010)). 

Harris contends that the automobile exception does not

excuse the warrantless search of his truck because the law

enforcement agent lacked probable cause to search his vehicle.

Specifically, he argues there was no reasonable basis for the

officer to believe there would be evidence of identity theft in

Harris’ truck based on Watkins’ arrest. But the record establishes that probable cause to search the truck did exist. Harris’

passenger, Watkins, had just been arrested and caught with

multiple credit cards not in her name, as well as a slip of paper

containing personal information about the name on at least one

of those cards. And Watkins’ means of transportation to the

bank, apparently for the purpose of committing fraud with

those credit cards, was Harris’ truck. Under those circumstances, it was reasonable to believe that there would be

further evidence of the identity fraud in the truck. See Zahursky,

580 F.3d at 521–22 (finding probable cause in support of

automobile exception to warrantless search where it was

reasonable for officers to believe defendant would leave

evidence of his crime in his car). Based on these facts, we find

that probable cause to search Harris’ vehicle existed and the

search was justified. Because the search was permissible under

the automobile exception, we need not consider whether the

search was permissible as incident to an arrest, the other

exception relied on by the district court and contested by

Harris.

Harris makes a third argument challenging the district

court’s denial of his motion to suppress. He argues that the

Case: 14-1846 Document: 35 Filed: 07/01/2015 Pages: 16
8 No. 14-1846

notebook is “fruit of the poisonous tree” stemming from his

illegal arrest, and must be suppressed as a result. But Harris

misunderstands the law. An illegal arrest does not bar the

admission of evidence otherwise untainted by the constitutional violation. United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 471–76

(1980). In Crews, the Supreme Court held that even though the

defendant was arrested without probable cause in violation of

the Fourth Amendment, a subsequent in-court identification

was admissible because it was untainted by the illegal arrest.

Id. at 477. So, in light of Crews, we need not reach the issue of

whether or not Harris’ arrest was valid; even if Harris had

been arrested without probable cause, the arrest would not bar

admission of the notebook, the only evidence he wishes to

suppress, found as a result of a valid automobile search.

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

Harris next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in

support of his identity theft, aggravated identity theft, and

credit card fraud convictions. In reviewing whether sufficient

evidence supports a conviction, we view the evidence in the

light most favorable to the prosecution. United States v. Groves,

470 F.3d 311, 323 (7th Cir. 2006). We will affirm if any rational

trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime beyond

a reasonable doubt, and will overturn only if the record is

devoid of evidence from which a reasonable jury could find

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. 

Harris fails to contest any specific element of any of the

challenged convictions. Instead, the basis of his challenge to

each conviction is the same—that the evidence supporting the

convictions stemmed from biased testimony and was therefore

Case: 14-1846 Document: 35 Filed: 07/01/2015 Pages: 16
No. 14-1846 9

insufficient to support the convictions. Harris’ argument fails

for a simple reason—we do not weigh the evidence or reassess

the credibility of witnesses on appeal, United States v. Griffin,

310 F.3d 1017, 1022 (7th Cir. 2002), a point of law Harris

concedes. Nevertheless, Harris contends that the testimony

was biased and incredible for two reasons: the testifying codefendants were Harris’ family and friends, and they avoided

jail time by testifying against Harris. Harris essentially invites

us to re-weigh the evidence, but, again, that is not our role. The

jury remains the proper assessor of the credibility of the

witnesses, not us. See id. Unless the testimony is incredible as

a matter of law, we must uphold the verdict. United States v.

Dennis, 115 F.3d 524, 535 (7th Cir. 1997). Here, the jury was

aware of the plea agreements signed by the co-defendants and

defense counsel argued the bias of the testifying witnesses in

his closing statement. The jury elected to convict even when

presented with these credibility issues, as it was free to do.

Accordingly, the convictions stand.

C. Sentencing Enhancement Challenges 

Harris next challenges several offense level enhancements

that the district court applied at sentencing. He contends that

the district court erroneously applied the number of victims

enhancement, the manager or supervisor enhancement, and

sophisticated means or relocation enhancement. As a result, he

seeks remand and resentencing.

1. Number of Victims Enhancement

The Guidelines provide for a two-level increase of a

defendant’s offense level if the offense involved ten or more

victims, and a four-level increase if the offense involved fifty

Case: 14-1846 Document: 35 Filed: 07/01/2015 Pages: 16
10 No. 14-1846

or more victims. See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A)–(B). Over Harris’

objection, the district court found that the total number of

victims was more than fifty and thus applied a four-level

increase to Harris’ offense level. On appeal, Harris contends

that the district court violated the ex post facto clause by

applying a Guidelines edition promulgated after his criminal

acts. See Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 186 L.Ed.2d 84

(2013) (holding the ex post facto clause is violated when a

defendant is sentenced under current Guidelines providing

higher sentencing range than Guidelines in effect at the time of

the offense). Although Harris challenged the number of victims

enhancement as a factual matter below, this constitutional

challenge is new. Because this argument is raised for the first

time on appeal, we review the district court’s application of the

Guidelines for plain error. See United States v. Middlebrook, 553

F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 2009) (applying plain error review where

defendant’s loss calculation argument on appeal was completely different from the loss calculation argument raised at

sentencing). Under plain error review, the defendant must

show (1) an error or defect that (2) is clear or obvious and (3)

affects the defendant’s substantial rights. United States v. Butler,

777 F.3d 382, 388 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing United States v. Olano,

507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993)). 

Harris argues that the 2008 Guidelines edition should have

applied to his sentence and that the court erred in applying a

later edition. Notably, the 2008 edition limited the definition of

victims to those who suffered actual loss or bodily injury as a

result of the offense. See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2), cmt. n.1 (2008).

One year later, in 2009, the Guidelines Commission added

Application Note 4(E), which expanded “victim” to include

Case: 14-1846 Document: 35 Filed: 07/01/2015 Pages: 16
No. 14-1846 11

“any individual whose means of identification was used

unlawfully or without authority,” regardless of actual monetary loss. See id. at U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2), cmt. n.4(E) (2009).

This provision remains in effect to this day.

Harris is correct that under the 2008 Guidelines, the

number of victims in his case would have been less than fifty,

as many did not suffer actual loss. But later versions of the

Guidelines, which include the expanded “victim” definition,

apply. In United States v. Hallahan, 756 F.3d 962 (7th Cir. 2014),

we held if any of a defendant’s criminal conduct occurred after

a revised edition of the Guidelines becomes effective, that

edition applies to all of the defendant’s offenses without

violating the ex post facto clause. Id. at 979. Harris’ conduct

spanned from 2007 to 2010, easily encompassing the 2009

addition of Application Note 4(E). Therefore, the district court

correctly counted as victims individuals whose identification

was used without authority, in addition to those who suffered

actual monetary loss. The district court did not plainly err in

applying a four-level victim enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G.

§ 2B1.1(b)(2).

2. Manager or Supervisor Enhancement 

The district court applied a three-level enhancement to

Harris’ sentence based on his role as a manager or supervisor

in the identity theft conspiracy. The enhancement is appropriate for a defendant who acts as “a manager or supervisor ...

and the criminal activity involved five or more participants.”

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b). Harris objected to the enhancement, so we

review the district court’s factual determinations for clear

error, United States v. Walsh, 723 F.3d 802, 807 (7th Cir. 2013);

Case: 14-1846 Document: 35 Filed: 07/01/2015 Pages: 16
12 No. 14-1846

whether those facts support an enhancement is reviewed

de novo, United States v. Pabey, 664 F.3d 1084, 1094 (7th Cir.

2011). We reverse a district court’s application of a Guidelines

enhancement only if we are left with a “definite and firm

conviction that a mistake has been made.” United States v.

Johnson, 489 F.3d 794, 796 (7th Cir. 2007).

In deciding to apply the enhancement, the district court

credited testimony from Harris’ co-defendants. Each testified

that Harris recruited them into the scheme and that they took

their instruction and direction from him. They also testified

that Harris would accompany them to the Bureau of Motor

vehicles to help them obtain the fraudulent identification,

which was corroborated by videotape on at least one occasion.

Additionally, Harris made travel arrangements for the coconspirators in furtherance of the fraud on multiple occasions.

On these facts, the district court had sufficient factual basis to

apply the manager or supervisor enhancement and did not err

in doing so.

3. Sophisticated Means and Relocation Enhancement 

The sophisticated means enhancement and the relocation

enhancement are both found in U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(9) (2010).

That provision of the Guidelines provides that if the conduct

at issue involved sophisticated means or relocation, a two-level

enhancement applies. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(9)(A) and (C) (2010). 

The district court found that Harris’ conduct involved both

sophisticated means and relocation; accordingly, the court

applied U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(9)’s two-level enhancement to

Harris’ sentence. Again, we review the district court’s factual

determinations for clear error because Harris raised this

Case: 14-1846 Document: 35 Filed: 07/01/2015 Pages: 16
No. 14-1846 13

objection at sentencing, and we review whether those facts

support an enhancement de novo. Pabey, 664 F.3d at 1094. We

will review the district court’s reasoning as to each ground

separately.

Application Note 8(B) to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 states that a

scheme employs “sophisticated means” if it involves “especially complex or especially intricate offense conduct pertaining to the execution or concealment of an offense.” U.S.S.G.

§ 2B1.1(b), cmt. n.8(B) (2010). The enhancement is warranted

when the defendant’s offense, viewed as a whole, shows a

greater level of planning or concealment than typical fraud of

its kind. United States v. Ghaddar, 678 F.3d 600, 602 (7th Cir.

2012) (per curiam).

Harris contends that the enhancement was not warranted

because his scheme was amateur in that he kept victims’

information in notebooks, he and co-conspirators were caught

multiple times, and he had fraudulent credit cards sent to his

home. But the district court found that Harris used multiple

aliases, obtained false state identification cards in two states to

support those aliases, and then used those aliases to obtain

fraudulent cards on victims’ accounts. The district court also

found that the scheme lasted three years and involved numerous victims. See, e.g., United v. Anobah, 734 F.3d 733, 739 (7th

Cir. 2013) (affirming application of sophisticated means

enhancement where scheme spread over two states, used false

documents, false loan applications, and false documents to

support the misinformation contained in the loan applications).

Furthermore, it is irrelevant that Harris might have done

a better job concealing his fraud; in determining the applicability of the sophisticated means enhancement, it does not

Case: 14-1846 Document: 35 Filed: 07/01/2015 Pages: 16
14 No. 14-1846

“matter that [Harris’s] own sloppiness or errors of judgment

may have contributed to the unraveling of his scheme.” United

States v. Wayland, 549 F.3d 526, 529 (7th Cir. 2008). Rather, the

level of planning or concealment in relation to typical fraud of

its kind is determinative. See Ghaddar, 678 F.3d at 602. Based on

the facts presented, the district court did not clearly err in

applying the sophisticated means enhancement.

The district court also found that Harris relocated his

scheme to another jurisdiction to evade law enforcement

within the meaning of the Guidelines. See U.S.S.G.

§ 2B1.1(b)(9)(A) (2010) (“If ... the defendant relocated, or

participated in relocating, a fraudulent scheme to another

jurisdiction to evade law enforcement ... increase [the defendant’s offense level] by 2 levels.”). The evidence at trial

established that Harris initiated the scheme in Indiana and

eventually expanded to at least Georgia. The court credited

trial testimony suggesting Harris left Indiana for Georgia to

escape the scrutiny he was under by law enforcement; an

investigator testified that upon being served a warrant for the

search of his Atlanta apartment, Harris said, “I left Indiana.

What else did you want me to do?,” indicating a desire to

evade investigation. Once in Georgia, the scheme marched

on in the same manner as before, even involving the same coconspirators. Indeed, several co-defendants testified to that

effect, describing how Harris would fly them down to Georgia

in order to participate in the scheme. In sum, there was a

sufficient factual basis for the district court to impose the

relocation enhancement. Because there was sufficient factual

basis for U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(9)’s two-level enhancement under

either the sophisticated means rationale or the relocation

Case: 14-1846 Document: 35 Filed: 07/01/2015 Pages: 16
No. 14-1846 15

rationale, the district court did not err in applying the enhancement to Harris’ sentence.

D. Unreasonable Sentence Challenge

Finally, Harris challenges his below-Guidelines sentence as

unreasonable. We review the reasonableness of a sentence for

an abuse of discretion, United States v. Turner, 569 F.3d 637, 640

(7th Cir. 2009), and note that a below-Guidelines sentence is

“presumptively reasonable against an attack by a defendant

claiming that the sentence is too high.” United States v. Liddell,

543 F.3d 877, 885 (7th Cir. 2008).

To rebut that presumption, Harris contends that his belowGuidelines sentence was unreasonable given the disparities

between his sentence and those of his co-defendants, who

received no jail time. Section 3353 instructs a court to consider

“the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among

defendants with similar records who have been found guilty

of similar conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). Harris argues

that his sentence violates this instruction. But, “a sentencing

difference is not a forbidden ‘disparity’ if it is justified by

legitimate considerations, such as rewards for cooperation.”

United States v. Boscarino, 437 F.3d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 2006)

(emphasis in original). Here, the mere differences between

Harris’ sentence and his co-defendants’ sentences do not

amount to an improper disparity. For Harris, the district court

initially calculated a final Guidelines range of 151 to 188

months, but imposed a below-Guidelines sentence of 132

months. Combined with the mandatory two years for the

aggravated identity theft, Harris was sentenced to a total of

156 months’ imprisonment. Unlike Harris, his co-defendants

Case: 14-1846 Document: 35 Filed: 07/01/2015 Pages: 16
16 No. 14-1846

received no jail time. But his co-defendants all cooperated

with the government, offering testimony about the scheme

at trial and against Harris. Such cooperation is typically

rewarded with lesser sentences, and results in a warranted

disparity in sentencing. See United States v. Gonzalez, 765 F.3d

732, 739–70 (7th Cir. 2014); Boscarino, 437 F.3d at 638. 

In addition to the effect of the co-defendants’ cooperation,

the facts of the case support a different sentence for Harris.

Harris was the ringleader in the scheme and initiated the

illegal activity; by comparison, his co-defendants merely

followed his direction. Harris has failed to rebut the presumption of reasonableness and the district court did not abuse its

discretion in imposing Harris’ sentence.

III. CONCLUSION 

For the aforementioned reasons, we AFFIRM Harris’

convictions and sentence. 

Case: 14-1846 Document: 35 Filed: 07/01/2015 Pages: 16