Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-74056/USCOURTS-ca9-13-74056-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Juan Carlos Fuentes
Petitioner
Loretta E. Lynch
Respondent

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JUAN CARLOS FUENTES,

Petitioner,

v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney

General,

Respondent.

No. 13-74056

Agency No.

A075-698-012

OPINION

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted August 31, 2016*

Pasadena, California

Filed September 14, 2016

Before: Barry G. Silverman, Raymond C. Fisher

and Paul J. Watford, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam Opinion

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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2 FUENTES V. LYNCH

SUMMARY**

Immigration

The panel dismissed in part and denied in part Juan Carlos

Fuentes’ petition for review of the Board of Immigration

Appeals’ decision denying his cancellation of removal

application for failure to establish that he resided

continuously in the United States for seven years after

having been “admitted in any status” pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229b(a)(2).

The panel held that an applicant has not been “admitted

in any status” for purposes of establishing the requisite

residency by virtue of being listed as a derivative beneficiary

on a parent’s applications for asylum and relief under the

Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act. 

The panel further held that an applicant’s receipt of

authorization to work in the United States under 8 C.F.R.

§ 274a.12(c) would also not establish admission.

The panel dismissed the petition in part, holding that it

lacked jurisdiction over Fuentes’ contention that he was

“admitted in any status” based on the years of presence he

established in connection with his own NACARA

application, for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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FUENTES V. LYNCH 3

COUNSEL

Kiran Nair, Law Office of Kiran Nair, Orange, California, for

Petitioner.

Walter Bocchini, Trial Attorney; Linda S. Wernery, Assistant

Director; Stuart F. Delery, Assistant AttorneyGeneral; Office

of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of

Justice, Washington, D.C.; for Respondent.

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Juan Carlos Fuentes petitions for review of the decision

of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing his

appeal of the decision of the Immigration Judge (IJ) denying

his application for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229b(a). Applying Medina-Nunez v. Lynch, 788 F.3d

1103 (9th Cir. 2015), and In re Reza-Murillo, 25 I. & N. Dec.

296 (BIA 2010), we hold the BIA properly concluded Fuentes

was not “admitted in any status” for purposes of cancellation

of removal when he was listed as a derivative beneficiary on

his mother’s asylum and Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central

American Relief Act (NACARA) applications and received

work authorization in the United States. We dismiss in part

and deny in part the petition for review.

To be eligible for cancellation of removal, Fuentes had to

establish he “resided in the United States continuously for 7

years after having been admitted in any status.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229b(a)(2) (emphasis added). Fuentes, who entered the

United States without inspection in 1996, was admitted in

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4 FUENTES V. LYNCH

2004, when he was granted legal permanent resident (LPR)

status. His continuous residence ended in 2009, when he

committed a controlled substance offense, so he does not

satisfy the seven years of continuous residency requirement.

Fuentes contends he does satisfy the requirement because

he should be deemed to have been “admitted in any status”

when his mother listed him as a derivative beneficiary on her

asylum and NACARA applications and when, as an

applicant, he received authorization to work in the United

States. He relies principally on Garcia-Quintero v. Gonzales,

455 F.3d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 2006), holding individuals

accepted into the Family Unity Program (FUP) are “admitted

in any status” for purposes of § 1229b(a)(2), and Garcia v.

Holder, 659 F.3d 1261, 1263 (9th Cir. 2011), holding

individuals paroled as Special Immigrant Juveniles under

8 U.S.C. § 1255(h) are “admitted in any status” for purposes

of § 1229b(a)(2).

In Medina-Nunez v. Lynch, 788 F.3d 1103, 1105 (9th Cir.

2015), however, we afforded Chevron deference to In re

Reza-Murillo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 296 (BIA 2010). In RezaMurillo, the BIA held, contrary to Garcia-Quintero, that

individuals accepted into the FUP are not considered

“admitted in any status” for purposes of cancellation of

removal. See Reza-Murillo, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 299. The BIA

recognized there may be cases in which there are “compelling

reasons,” id., to deem individuals “admitted in any status”

notwithstanding their lack of admission under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(13)(A) (“The terms ‘admission’ and ‘admitted’

mean, with respect to an alien, the lawful entry of the alien

into the United States after inspection and authorization by an

immigration officer.”), such as with persons granted LPR

status, see In re Rosas-Ramirez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 616 (BIA

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FUENTES V. LYNCH 5

1999). See id. at 299–300. But the Board concluded such

reasons did not exist in the case of FUP participants. See id.

In Medina-Nunez, 788 F.3d at 1105, we afforded Chevron

deference to Reza-Murillo, abrogating Garcia-Quintero, and

held acceptance into the FUP does not constitute admission

for purposes of § 1229b(a)(2).

Individuals in Fuentes’ position, who have been listed as

derivative beneficiaries on a parent’s asylum and NACARA

applications and who have been afforded authorization to

work in the United States, have no stronger claim to having

been “admitted” into the United States than individuals

accepted into the FUP. FUP participants have not merely

applied for, but have been accepted into, a special

immigration status. See Garcia-Quintero, 455 F.3d at 1009. 

They have protection against removal, freedom to travel

outside the United States, work authorization under 8 C.F.R.

§ 274a.12(a)(14) and status recognition under a federal

regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 236.16. See id. at 1009–10, 1017–18. 

Because Fuentes enjoyed fewer benefits than FUP

participants, his claim to admission is no greater than – and

in fact is weaker than – persons accepted into the FUP. Thus,

under Reza-Murillo and Medina-Nunez, he was not “admitted

in any status” before he obtained LPR status in 2004. The

BIA therefore properly dismissed Fuentes’ appeal from the

IJ’s denial of his application for cancellation of removal.

Even under our pre-Medina-Nunez case law, which

remains controlling precedent to the extent it is consistent

with Reza-Murillo, Fuentes’ contention that he was “admitted

in any status” because he was listed as a derivative

beneficiary on his mother’s asylum and NACARA

applications would be unpersuasive. See, e.g., Vasquez de

Alcantar v. Holder, 645 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2011)

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(noting the submission of an application for adjustment of

status “does not connote that the alien’s immigration status

has changed, as the very real possibility exists that the

[government] will deny the alien’s application altogether”

(quoting United States v. Elrawy, 448 F.3d 309, 313 (5th Cir.

2006))); Sudomir v. McMahon, 767 F.2d 1456, 1462 (9th Cir.

1985) (with respect to asylum applicants who enter or remain

in the United States illegally and then apply for asylum,

“[t]heir presence is tolerated during the period necessary to

process their applications” but “it has not been legitimated by

any affirmative act”). Nor would his work authorization

under 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c) establish his admission. See

Guevara v. Holder, 649 F.3d 1086, 1091–92 (9th Cir. 2011)

(noting distinctions between work authorization under

8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(a) and (c) and holding an individual is not

“admitted in any status” merely because he or she has been

granted work authorization).

Finally, to the extent Fuentes contends he was “admitted

in any status” based on the seven years of presence he

established in connection with his own NACARA

application, this argument is not before us because it was not

presented to the BIA. See Tijani v. Holder, 628 F.3d 1071,

1080 (9th Cir. 2010) (“We lack jurisdiction to review legal

claims not presented in an alien’s administrative proceedings

before the BIA.”).

PETITION DISMISSED IN PART AND DENIED IN

PART.

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