Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-00618/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-00618-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John W. Haviland
Respondent
Jerome Jackson
Petitioner

Document Text:

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JEROME JACKSON,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-09-0618 DAD P

vs.

JOHN W. HAVILAND, 

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In his petition before this court petitioner challenges the

sentence imposed by the Sacramento County Superior Court on November 16, 2006 pursuant to a

plea bargain in which petitioner pled no contest to two counts of assault with a deadly weapon 

in violation of California Penal Code § 245(a)(1). Pursuant to that plea agreement, petitioner

also admitted enhancement allegations for inflicting great bodily injury under circumstances

involving domestic violence in violation of California Penal Code § 12022.7(e) and having a

prior serious felony conviction within the meaning of the Three Strikes Law pursuant to

California Penal Code § 667(a). Petitioner seeks federal habeas relief on the ground that he

received ineffective assistance of counsel.

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Upon careful consideration of the record and the applicable law, the undersigned

will recommend that petitioner’s application for habeas corpus relief be denied.

BACKGROUND

I. Plea Bargain

On September 14, 2006, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty to various charges

brought against him, including attempted murder, stemming from an alleged domestic assault. 

(Reporter’s Transcript on Appeal (RT) at 11; Clerk’s Transcript on Appeal (CT) at 93-95.) At

that time petitioner also denied an alleged prior conviction for a three strikes offense. (Id.) 

On the same day, petitioner through his attorney of record, filed a motion to

dismiss the alleged strike pursuant to California Penal Code § 1385 (hereinafter “§ 1385

motion”) in which he sought a discretionary dismissal based on the facts that he not been

convicted of a felony for ten years prior to the then-current allegations, that he had been

sentenced to prison only once, and that his prior felony strike in 1988 was not serious enough to

merit a prison sentence. (CT at 112-119.)

At a hearing in the Sacramento County Superior Court on September 18, 2006,

the prosecutor argued that petitioner faced up to twenty-nine years in prison if he went to trial on

the attempted murder charge and was convicted. (RT at 18-19.) The prosecutor also stated that,

given petitioner’s criminal history, the prosecution would “argue strenuously” for the maximum

sentence to be imposed if that occurred. (Id.) Alternatively, the prosecutor offered petitioner a

plea bargain pursuant to which he would plead to the assault with a deadly weapon charge and

serve a sentence of fifteen years imprisonment, with credit for one year’s time already served. 

(Id. at 21-22.) The court noted that the plea offer was being made in open court and advised

petitioner: “You have excellent counsel, you are fortunate in that regard, and you can talk to him

and he can answer any questions that you have.” (Id. at 23.)

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As to the then-pending § 1385 motion, petitioner’s counsel informed the court as

follows: 

I have filed a motion to strike the strike, and that’s something Mr.

Jackson wanted done as soon as possible. It is a little premature at

this point because there is no decision on guilt for this case, but I

did file it and put my arguments in there about the age of the prior

and his conduct since.

(Id. at 26.)

Later in the hearing, and after further discussion with his attorney, pursuant to

plea agreement petitioner entered a no contest plea to assault with a deadly weapon and admitted

an enhancement for personally inflicting great bodily injury under circumstances involving

domestic violence. (RT at 39-40.) Notwithstanding the then-pending §1385 motion, petitioner

also admitted a prior strike. (Id. at 40.)

Pursuant to this plea agreement entered into by the parties, on November 16,

2006, petitioner was sentenced to 15 years in prison in keeping with the agreement. (CT at 167.)

II. Appeal

Petitioner appealed his judgment of conviction to the California Court of Appeal

for the Third Appellate District. (Resp’t’s Lod. Doc. 1.) On appeal, petitioner argued that he

was denied his constitutional rights to a speedy trial and due process. (Resp’t’s Lod. Doc. 2.) He

also argued that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to dismiss petitioner’s prior felony

strike pursuant to California Penal Code § 1385. (Id. at 4.) He did not argue on appeal that he

had received ineffective assistance of counsel. On October 31, 2007, petitioner’s judgment of

conviction was affirmed on appeal in a reasoned opinion. (Resp’t’s Lod. Doc. 3.)

As to petitioner’s claim regarding the § 1385 motion, the California Court of

Appeal reasoned as follows:

Defendant’s final claim is that the court abused its discretion in

denying defendant’s motion to dismiss his strike prior pursuant to

Penal Code section 1385. On September 14, 2006, defense counsel

filed a motion to dismiss the strike allegation pursuant to Penal

Code section 1385. At the time, defendant had not yet changed his

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plea to no contest. Four days later, defendant entered into a plea

agreement in which he agreed to a stipulated term of 15 years,

based on a three-year middle term for assault with a deadly

weapon, doubled to six years under the three strikes law, five

additional years for the prior serious felony conviction, and an

additional four years for the domestic violence enhancement.

Before defendant decided to accept the offer, defense counsel

noted the recently filed Penal Code section 1385 motion “is a little

premature at this point because there is no decision on guilt for this

case, but I did file it and put my arguments in there about the age of

the prior and his conduct since.”

The motion was never mentioned at sentencing. The principle that

failure to renew a motion constitutes a waiver or an abandonment

has been applied in a wide variety of contexts. (See People v.

Kenner (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 56, 62 [failure to renew a pending

motion for self-representation under Faretta v. California (1975)

422 U.S. 806 [45 L.Ed.2d 562]]; People v. Murtishaw (1989) 48

Cal.3d 1001, 1036-1037 [failure to renew motion to exclude a

victim from the courtroom].) Defendant’s failure to renew the

motion at sentencing forfeits the claim on appeal.

(Id.)

Petitioner then filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court, making

the same three arguments he had presented to the state appellate court. (Resp’t’s Lod. Doc. 4.)

Under the heading “Conclusion,” in his petition for review petitioner stated: 

The plea should be reversed to correct constitutional violation, on

all three arguments, supra. Further, respondant [sic] contention of

the 1385 motion, has no merit, because the motion was filed prior

to sentencing, but was overlooked by defense counsel and the

court, but this does not constitute a waiver or an abandonment or

forfeits. If this is the case before us, this would bring us to another

issue of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (I.A.C.) which is an

arguable error.

(Id. at 6) (emphasis added). The California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition for

review on January 16, 2008. (Resp’t’s Lod. Doc 4.)

ANALYSIS

I. Standards of Review Applicable to Habeas Corpus Claims

A writ of habeas corpus is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only on the basis of

some transgression of federal law binding on the state courts. See Peltier v. Wright, 15 F.3d 860,

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861 (9th Cir. 1993); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Engle v.

Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982)). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the

interpretation or application of state law. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991);

Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000); Middleton, 768 F.2d at 1085. Habeas

corpus cannot be utilized to try state issues de novo. Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 377

(1972). 

This action is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d

1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003). Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) sets forth the following standards for

granting habeas corpus relief:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall

not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on

the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the

claim -

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

See also Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792-93 (2001); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362

(2000); Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 2001). If the state court’s decision

does not meet the criteria set forth in § 2254(d), a reviewing court must conduct a de novo review

of a habeas petitioner’s claims. Delgadillo v. Woodford, 527 F.3d 919, 925 (9th Cir. 2008). See

also Frantz v. Hazey, 513 F.3d 1002, 1013 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (“[I]t is now clear both that

we may not grant habeas relief simply because of § 2254(d)(1) error and that, if there is such

error, we must decide the habeas petition by considering de novo the constitutional issues

raised.”).

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The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state

court judgment. Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). If the last reasoned

state court decision adopts or substantially incorporates the reasoning from a previous state court

decision, this court may consider both decisions to ascertain the reasoning of the last decision. 

Edwards v. Lamarque, 475 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). Where the state court

reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a federal

habeas court independently reviews the record to determine whether habeas corpus relief is

available under § 2254(d). Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003); Pirtle v.

Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002). When it is clear that a state court has not reached

the merits of a petitioner’s claim, or has denied the claim on procedural grounds, the AEDPA’s

deferential standard does not apply and a federal habeas court must review the claim de novo. 

Nulph v. Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003). 

II. Petitioner’s Claim

A. Exhaustion

Respondent argues that petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is

unexhausted because he failed to present it to the California Court of Appeal and, in his petition

for review to the California Supreme Court, only mentioned it in passing. See Casey v. Moore,

386 F.3d 896, 918 (9th Cir. 2004 (federal constitutional claims not exhausted where raised for

first and only time to state’s highest court on discretionary review). (Answer at 6.) The

undersigned agrees that the record before this court establishes that petitioner has failed to

exhaust his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

The exhaustion of state court remedies is a prerequisite to the granting of a

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). If exhaustion is to be waived, it must

be waived explicitly by respondent’s counsel. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3). A waiver of exhaustion,

thus, may not be implied or inferred. A petitioner satisfies the exhaustion requirement by

providing the highest state court with a full and fair opportunity to consider all claims before

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presenting them to the federal court. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971); Middleton v.

Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1986). This requires

petitioner to have “characterized the claims he raised in state proceedings specifically as federal

claims.” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 999 (9th Cir. 2005) (emphasis in original)

(internal citation omitted). “In short, the petitioner must have either referenced specific

provisions of the federal constitution or cited to federal or state cases involving the legal standard

for a federal constitutional violation. Mere ‘general appeals to broad constitutional principles,

such as due process, equal protection, and the right to a fair trial,’ do not establish exhaustion.” 

Id. (quoting Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999)). 

Here, not only did petitioner raise his ineffective assistance claim for the first time

on discretionary review to the California Supreme Court, but he referred to the potential claim

only briefly and without any citation to authority. This does not constitute a “full and fair”

presentation so as to satisfy the exhaustion requirement.

Respondent correctly notes, however, that a federal court has the power to deny an

unexhausted habeas claim on the merits. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). A federal court considering a

habeas petition may deny an unexhausted claim on the merits when it is perfectly clear that the

claim is not “colorable.” Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 624 (9th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, the

undersigned now turns to the merits of petitioner’s claim.

B. Ineffective Assistance

Petitioner alleges that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The

United States Supreme Court has enunciated the standards for judging ineffective assistance of

counsel claims. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). First, a defendant must

show that, considering all the circumstances, counsel’s performance fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. To this end, the defendant must identify

the acts or omissions that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional

judgment. Id. at 690. The court must then determine whether in light of all the circumstances,

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the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professional competent assistance. 

Id. Second, a defendant must affirmatively prove prejudice. Id. at 693. Prejudice is found where

“there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is “a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. See also United States v. Murray, 751

F.2d 1528, 1535 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schaflander, 743 F.2d 714, 717-718 (9th Cir.

1984)(per curiam).

Here, petitioner argues that his attorney’s failure to “renew” the § 1385 motion to

strike the prior felony after petitioner had entered his no contest plea pursuant to the plea

agreement constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. (Pet. at 7 .) Petitioner states that at the 1

September 18, 2006 hearing his “trial counsel apparently took the 1385 motion off the court’s

calendar and preserved the right to renew the 1385 motion at a later (or, perhaps, an appropriate)

time.” (Id. at 10.) Petitioner complains that, while his attorney could have sought a § 1385

dismissal of petitioner’s prior strike any time before entry of judgment, he failed to pursue this

line of defense. Rather, petitioner claims, his attorney advised him to take the plea and then, “to

Petitioner’s detriment, never renewed the 1385 motion.” (Id. at 10-12.)

Petitioner’s argument in this regard is disingenuous. It fails to acknowledge that

in admitting to a prior strike as part of the plea bargain he entered into, petitioner was clearly

giving up his right to contest the prior strike allegation notwithstanding the § 1385 motion 

previously filed by his counsel. As respondent observes, once petitioner admitted to the prior

strike at the time he entered his plea on September 18, 2006, the § 1385 motion was moot. In

failing to “renew” the § 1385 motion, petitioner’s attorney acted in an objectively reasonable

manner. For, it was reasonable to assume that if petitioner attempted to contest the prior felony

strike in violation of his plea agreement, the entire plea bargain would unravel and petitioner

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would once again be facing a possible twenty-nine year sentence alluded to by the prosecutor. 

For this same reason, petitioner’s attorney did not prejudice petitioner by failing to renew the 

§ 1385 motion. Because petitioner has no colorable claim for federal habeas relief, his

unexhausted petition should be denied on its merits.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s application for

a writ of habeas corpus (Doc. No. 1) be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within twentyone days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. Failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order.

Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir.

1991). In any objections he elects to file petitioner may address whether a certificate of

appealability should issue in the event he elects to file an appeal from the judgment in this case.

See Rule 11, Federal Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (the district court must issue or deny a

certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant).

DATED: August 12, 2010.

DAD:3

jack0618.hc

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