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Parties Involved:
Allen L. Murdock
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 19, 2012 Decided February 10, 2012 

No. 11-3068 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

APPELLANT

v. 

ALLEN L. MURDOCK,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:10-cr-00135-1) 

Mary B. McCord, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellant. With her on the briefs were Ronald C. 

Machen, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese III, 

Assistant U.S. Attorney. 

David W. Bos, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued 

the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was A.J. 

Kramer, Federal Public Defender. 

Before: TATEL and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges, and 

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge. 

USCA Case #11-3068 Document #1357614 Filed: 02/10/2012 Page 1 of 9
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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL. 

TATEL, Circuit Judge: The question in this criminal case 

is whether appellee’s statements, which the government 

concedes the police obtained in violation of his rights under 

Miranda v. Arizona, are nonetheless admissible for purposes 

of impeachment should he testify at trial. The district court 

held they were not. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, 

we reverse. 

I.

On May 1, 2009, at approximately 1:00 a.m., police 

officers were called to a house at 4800 Dix Street NE, 

Washington, D.C. There they found a body, blood-soaked, 

riddled with bullets, and later identified as Prince Wright. The 

ensuing investigation, conducted by Detective Daniel Whalen 

of the Metropolitan Police Department, led to defendant and 

appellee, Allen L. Murdock, then incarcerated in the 

Baltimore City Jail. 

At Detective Whalen’s request, Murdock was transferred 

from the jail to the Baltimore City Police Department for 

interrogation. The interview took place in an approximately 

seven-by-seven-foot windowless room. Detective Whalen, 

accompanied by a detective from the Baltimore City Police 

Department, conducted the interview. Neither officer was 

armed. 

At the start of the interview, Detective Whalen 

introduced himself, explained to Murdock that he was in 

custody, and informed him that their conversation was being 

recorded. Detective Whalen did not beat around the bush: he 

told Murdock that he was there as part of an investigation into 

the murder of Prince Wright, that the police had an 

outstanding warrant for his arrest, and that he would be 

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extradited to the District of Columbia. Detective Whalen 

explained that he was not interested in having “a discussion 

about whether [Murdock was] there . . . [when the] murder 

occurred.” Interrogation Rec. 3:37–3:50. But if Murdock 

played no role in the murder, “this [was his] opportunity to 

straighten it out.” Id. at 4:53. Detective Whalen explained to 

Murdock that he had no obligation to speak, but asked him 

whether he wished to talk anyway. Murdock declined, saying 

that he was unaware of what had happened. When Detective 

Whalen demanded a yes or no answer, Murdock responded, 

“No.” id. at 8:04–8:21. When Detective Whalen again asked 

Murdock, “You don’t want to talk to me?” Murdock again 

said “no.” id. at 8:25. Detective Whalen then explained to 

Murdock that he would “read [him his] rights . . . [and] ask 

[him] just one or two basic questions.” Id. at 8:24–8:36. After 

reading him his rights, the Detective immediately began 

questioning Murdock, who then readily answered questions 

for forty-five minutes. 

On May 20, 2011, Murdock was indicted in the United 

States District Court for the District of Columbia on one count 

of first-degree premeditated murder while armed, D.C. Code 

§§ 22–2101, –4502, one count of possession of a firearm 

during a crime of violence, id. § 22–4504(b), and one count of 

conspiracy to distribute and possess with the intent to 

distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 

§§ 841(b)(1)(B)(ii), 846. Murdock filed a motion to suppress 

statements he made during the interview. In response, the 

government conceded that the questioning violated 

Murdock’s Miranda rights and represented that it would 

therefore not use the Defendant’s statement in its case in 

chief. Nonetheless, the government argued, Murdock’s 

statements were admissible for purposes of impeachment 

should he choose to testify. The district court disagreed, 

holding that “[b]ased on the totality of the facts, . . . 

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[Murdock’s] statements were not voluntary and were made in 

violation of his Miranda rights. The Defendant clearly said—

twice—‘no’ to Detective Whalen’s question as to whether he 

wanted to talk about the murder.” United States v. Murdock, 

No. 10-135, slip op. at 3 (D.D.C. May 26, 2011). According 

to the district court, 

Not only was the Defendant in custody, about 

which there is no question, but he was certainly aware 

that he was in a very problematic situation, and would 

most likely face a first degree murder charge. When 

he said “no” the first time, all questioning should 

have stopped. When he said “no” the second time, all 

questioning should have stopped. The Defendant 

made clear that he did not wish to answer any 

questions. . . . Given the fact that Defendant was in 

custody on an unrelated charge, that he had been told 

in no uncertain terms that he would be extradited, 

arrested, and probably charged with murder, and that 

his two refusals to talk were ignored by Detective 

Whalen, the statements he gave were certainly not 

voluntary. 

Id. The government filed a motion to reconsider, which the 

district court denied. 

The government now appeals, arguing that the district 

court erred in concluding that Murdock’s statements to 

Detective Whalen were involuntary. We have jurisdiction 

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (providing for appellate review 

of “decision[s] or order[s] of a district court suppressing or 

excluding evidence . . . in a criminal proceeding”). 

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II.

 The government “do[es] not contest the district court’s 

conclusion that Detective Whalen questioned [Murdock] in 

violation of Miranda by failing to scrupulously honor 

[Murdock’s] right to cut off questioning.” Appellant’s Br. 16 

(alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). But as the 

government points out, statements made by a defendant in 

circumstances violating the strictures of Miranda “are 

admissible for impeachment if their trustworthiness . . . 

satisfies legal standards.” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 

397–98 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted). For 

example, in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), the 

Supreme Court held that statements obtained in violation of 

Miranda, though inadmissible as part of the government’s 

case in chief, were admissible for purposes of impeachment 

should the defendant choose to testify. Reiterating this 

holding in a later case, the Court explained that “the 

impeaching material would provide valuable aid to the jury in 

assessing the defendant’s credibility”; that “the benefits of 

this process should not be lost”; and that officers are 

“sufficient[ly] deterre[d]” from violating a suspect’s Miranda 

rights “when the evidence in question is made unavailable to 

the prosecution in its case in chief.” Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 

714, 722 (1975) (internal quotation marks omitted). To deal 

with any potential abuse, the Court instructed that “[i]f, in a 

given case, the officer’s conduct amounts to an abuse, that 

case, like those involving coercion or duress, may be taken 

care of when it arises measured by the traditional standards 

for evaluating voluntariness and trustworthiness.” Id. at 723. 

In order to introduce statements at trial—whether in its 

case in chief or as impeachment evidence—the government 

bears the burden of proving that the statements were 

voluntary. See Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972). 

Voluntariness turns on whether the “defendant’s will was 

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overborne” when he gave his statement, Schneckloth v. 

Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973), and the test for this is 

whether the statement was a “product of an essentially free 

and unconstrained choice by its maker.” Culombe v. 

Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961). The “ultimate issue of 

‘voluntariness’ is a legal question,” Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 

104, 110 (1985), that “requires [a] careful evaluation of all the 

circumstances of the interrogation,” Mincey, 437 U.S. at 401, 

including but not limited to the defendant’s age and 

education, the length of detention, whether the defendant was 

advised of his rights, and the nature of the questioning, 

Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226; see also Withrow v. Williams, 

507 U.S. 680, 693 (1993). We “review[] the district court’s 

factual findings for clear error . . . [and] give due weight to 

inferences drawn from those facts by the district court.” 

United States v. Bailey, 622 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 

As noted above, the district court emphasized three 

circumstances of Murdock’s interrogation: that Murdock was 

in custody, that Detective Whalen told Murdock that “he 

would be extradited, arrested, and probably charged with 

murder,” and that Murdock twice said “no” when asked by 

the detective whether he would like to talk. As the 

government observes, however, the first two factors are 

inherent in any custodial interrogation, i.e., the suspect will be 

in custody and will understand that the government is 

conducting an investigation in order to determine whether to 

bring criminal charges. See Hass, 420 U.S. at 722–23 (“[The 

defendant] properly sensed, to be sure, that he was in 

‘trouble’; but the pressure on him was no greater than that on 

any person in like custody or under inquiry by any 

investigating officer.”). And although the third factor 

establishes a Miranda violation, the Supreme Court has held, 

in no uncertain terms, that a Miranda violation alone is 

insufficient grounds for suppressing statements offered to 

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impeach the defendant’s testimony. See generally Harris, 401 

U.S. 222; Hass, 420 U.S. 714. The detective’s failure to honor 

Murdock’s Miranda right is certainly relevant to whether 

Murdock’s statements were voluntary, but it is insufficient by 

itself to establish involuntariness. See, e.g., Parsad v. Greiner, 

337 F.3d 175, 184 (2d Cir. 2003) (“The mere fact that police 

officers improperly question a suspect after he invokes his 

right to remain silent during a custodial interrogation does not 

render his subsequent statements the product of coercion.”). 

Murdock argues that the totality of circumstances 

demonstrates that his statements were involuntary. He relies 

primarily on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Collazo v. Estelle, 

940 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1991). There, the defendant was taken 

to an interview room and advised of his Miranda rights. The 

officers refused the defendant’s request to talk with his wife. 

He then asked to speak to an attorney, to which an officer 

responded: “[i]t’s up to you”; “[t]his is your last chance to 

talk to us though”; “[o]nce you get a lawyer, he’s gonna say 

forget it”; “don’t talk to the police”; and “might be worse for 

you.” Id. at 414. The officer then left the room. Three hours 

later, prior to being provided counsel, the defendant 

confessed. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that these statements 

were involuntary and thus inadmissible. According to 

Murdock, his statements were equally involuntary: Detective 

Whalen threatened him with charges, suggested that it 

behooved him to talk, and refused to accept his claim that he 

knew nothing about what happened the night of the murder. 

In particular, Murdock argues, “Detective Whalen tricked him 

into believing that a statement might lead to no charges being 

filed.” Appellee’s Br. 24. In support of this argument, 

Murdock relies on the following statements made by 

Detective Whalen: (1) “I’ve gotten the warrant for you . . . 

[and] I’ve got the ball rolling . . . [and] this is your 

opportunity to stop that ball from rolling . . . . I can stop the 

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process,” Interrogation Rec. 6:40; and (2) “[i]f on the other 

hand, you wanna just roll the dice and just say, you know, 

prove it, or I’m not gonna say anything to incriminate 

myself . . . I’ll take your silence, or your denials, and . . . I’ll 

make my own conclusions about what that means, and we’ll 

just move forward,” id. at 8:00. These techniques, Murdock 

contends, are incompatible “with a system that presumes 

innocence and assures that a conviction will not be secured by 

inquisitorial means.” Miller, 474 U.S. at 116. 

As the government points out, however, the key fact in 

Collazo was the officer’s “menacing” admonition that 

requesting a lawyer might leave the defendant “worse” off. 

940 F.2d at 416. Detective Whalen never suggested that 

things would be worse for Murdock if he exercised his right 

to remain silent or that it would be against Murdock’s interest 

to speak with a lawyer. In addition, the detective’s statements 

“did not amount to a promise that no charges would be 

brought if [Murdock] spoke to him, or to a promise of 

leniency. At most, the detective was saying that he would 

investigate any explanation [Murdock] might offer about what 

happened inside the house when Prince Wright was 

murdered.” Appellant’s Reply Br. 5–6. More fundamentally, 

the detective’s statements—little more than “we’ll look into 

your explanation and we won’t charge you if you’re right”—

hardly amount to a situation where Murdock’s “will was 

overborne,” Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226. Thus, as the 

government argues, the only similarity between this case and 

Collazo is that the interrogating officer violated the suspect’s 

Miranda rights. 

The government emphasizes other factors indicating that 

Murdock’s statements were voluntary: (1) Murdock “was a 

33-year-old adult who had been incarcerated previously,” 

Appellant’s Br. 25; (2) he had been given water and did not 

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complain of physical discomfort, id. at 26; (3) he agreed 

during the interview that “ ‘everything [was] alright,’ ” id.

(quoting Interrogation Rec. at 1:10:02); (4) he showed “no 

apparent mental impairment, understood the detective’s 

questions, and gave intelligent answers,” id.; (5) the interview 

took place in a standard interrogation room and “lasted only a 

little over an hour,” id. at 27; (6) Detective Whalen “made no 

false statements about the evidence,” id.; and (7) Murdock 

was offered no promises, id. at 28. The government claims 

that the district court ignored these factors. The district court, 

however, explained that its decision was “[b]ased on the 

totality of the facts,” Murdock, No. 10-135, slip op. at 3, and 

we take it at its word. See, e.g., Addamax Corp. v. Open 

Software Found., Inc., 152 F.3d 48, 55 (lst Cir. 1998) (“[T]he 

district court was not required to make findings on every 

detail, was not required to discuss all of the evidence that 

supports each of the findings made, and was not required to 

respond individually to each evidentiary or factual contention 

made by the losing side.”). That said, although it is possible 

that the police could subtly overcome the will of a thirtythree-year-old man even if he was provided water, had no 

apparent mental impairment, and generally answered 

questions intelligently, nothing in this case (other than the 

conceded Miranda violation) undermines the record evidence 

of voluntariness. Without more, we must find that the 

government has met its burden. 

III.

The judgment of the district court is reversed. 

So ordered.

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