Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06380/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06380-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert H. Henry
Not Party
Mark Roy Liles
Appellee
Gary Maynard
Not Party
James L. Saffle
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH FJLEPA'!'V'nb United State& C<'>~rt '!~ P.-- . Tenl~ C1rCUlv 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SE? 16 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

MARK ROY LILES, 

Petitioner-Appellee, 

v. 

JAMES L. SAFFLE, Warden, State 

Penitentiary at McAlester, 

Respondent-Appellant, 

and 

GARY MAYNARD, Director, Oklahoma 

Department of Corrections; ROBERT H. 

HENRY, Attorney General of Oklahoma, 

Respondents. 

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No. 90-6380 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. CIV-89-2271-W) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

William J. Mertens of Swidler & Berlin, Chartered, Washington, 

D.C., and Patti Palmer, Oklahoma Appellate Public Defender System, 

Norman, Oklahoma, for Petitioner-Appellee. 

Robert H. Henry, Attorney General of the State of Oklahoma and 

A. Diane Hammons, Assistant Attorney General, Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma, for Respondent-Appellant. 

Appellate Case: 90-6380 Document: 01019293507 Date Filed: 09/16/1991 Page: 1 
Before SEYMOUR, EBEL, Circuit Judges, and BABCOCK,** District 

Judge. 

**Honorable Lewis T. Babcock, District Judge, United States 

District Court for the District of Colorado, sitting by 

designation. 

SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge. 

Respondent James L. Saffle appeals from the district court's 

order granting habeas relief to petitioner Mark Roy Liles, under 

28 u.s.c. § 2254, from his conviction for first degree murder and 

sentence of death. 1 In vacating the conviction, the district 

court determined that, under Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), 

the state trial court had deprived petitioner of due process by 

denying his pretrial motion for state funds to employ a 

psychiatrist in aid of his defense. We affirm. 

On August 31, 1982, the State of Oklahoma charged petitioner 

with murder occurring during the commission of an armed robbery. 

See Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 701.7B. A jury convicted 

petitioner of first degree murder and sentenced him to death, 

finding the existence of two aggravating factors: the killing was 

especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, and petitioner posed a 

1 After exam~n~ng the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

2 

Appellate Case: 90-6380 Document: 01019293507 Date Filed: 09/16/1991 Page: 2 
continuing threat to society. See Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, 

§ 701.12. 

The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals upheld petitioner's 

conviction. Liles v. State, 702 P.2d 1025 (Okla. Crim. App. 

1985), cert. denied, 476 u.s. 1164 (1986). He subsequently 

challenged his conviction and sentence through two state 

post-conviction proceedings, again without avail. Liles v. State, 

No. PC-87-391 (Okla. Crim. App. July 9, 1987), cert. denied, 484 

U.S. 933 (1987); Liles v. State, No. PC-88-589 (Okla. Crim. App. 

Apr. 25, 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 353 (1989). 

Petitioner then filed this petition for habeas relief in the 

United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, 

asserting thirteen grounds for relief. He moved for summary 

judgment on the ground that the trial court had deprived him of 

due process by denying his motion for funds to employ a 

psychiatric expert. The district court granted petitioner's 

2 motion for summary judgment, relying upon Ake, 470 U.S. 68. 

On appeal, respondent challenges the district court's 

determination that the trial court deprived petitioner of due 

process by denying him psychiatric assistance at both the guilt 

and the sentencing phases of his trial. This court will review an 

order granting summary judgment de novo. Abercrombie v. City of 

Catoosa, 896 F.2d 1228, 1230 (lOth Cir. 1990). Summary judgment 

2 Because the United States Supreme Court decided Ake while 

petitioner's direct appeal was pending, this case does not present 

a retroactivity issue. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 u.s. 314, 

322-23 (1987). Further, the parties do not dispute that 

petitioner has exhausted his state court remedies concerning the 

issue presented by this appeal. See generally White v. Meachum, 

838 F.2d 1137, 1138 (lOth Cir. 1988). 

3 

Appellate Case: 90-6380 Document: 01019293507 Date Filed: 09/16/1991 Page: 3 
is appropriate only if there is no genuine issue of material fact 

and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (1991). 

The Supreme Court premised its decision in Ake on the 

principle that "a criminal trial is fundamentally unfair if the 

State proceeds against an indigent defendant without making 

certain that he has access to the raw materials integral to the 

building of an effective defense." 470 u.s. at 77. Applying that 

principle to the issue of "whether, and under what conditions, the 

participation of a psychiatrist is important enough to preparation 

of a defense to require the State to provide an indigent defendant 

with access to competent psychiatric assistance in preparing the 

defense," id., the Court determined that, although 

[a] defendant's mental condition is not necessarily at 

issue in every criminal proceeding, ... when a 

defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his 

sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant 

factor at trial, the State must, at a minimum, assure 

the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who 

will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in 

evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the 

defense. 

Id. at 82-83. Similarly, under certain circumstances, due process 

also entitles a criminal defendant to court-appointed psychiatric 

assistance during the sentencing phase of a capital proceeding. 

Id. at 83-84. 

A criminal defendant is entitled to psychiatric assistance at 

trial when he is able to make "an ex parte threshold showing to 

the trial court that his sanity is likely to be a significant 

factor in his defense." Id. at 82-83. See United States v. 

Austin, 933 F.2d 833, 841 (lOth Cir. 1991). 

4 

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[I]f "sanity" or "mental capacity" defenses [are) to be 

defense issues, they must be established by a "clear 

showing" by the indigent defendant as "genuine," "real" 

issues in the case. In order for a defendant's mental 

state to become a substantial threshold issue, the 

showing must be clear and genuine, one that constitutes 

a "close" question which may well be decided one way or 

the other. It must be one that is fairly debatable or 

in doubt. 

Cartwright v. Maynard, 802 F.2d 1203, 1211 (lOth Cir. 1986)(citing 

United States v. Sloan, 776 F.2d 926 (lOth Cir. 1985)), rev'd on 

other grounds, 822 F.2d 1477, 1478 n.2 (lOth Cir. 1987)(en bane), 

aff'd, 486 U.S. 356 (1988). General allegations supporting a 

request for court appointment of a psychiatric expert, without 

substantive supporting facts, and undeveloped assertions that 

psychiatric assistance would be beneficial to the defendant will 

not suffice to require the appointment of a psychiatrist to aid in 

the preparation of a criminal defense. Davis v. Maynard, 869 F.2d 

1401, 1407 (lOth Cir. 1989), vacated on other grounds, 110 S. Ct. 

1516 (1990); Cartwright, 802 F.2d at 1211. 

In cases such as this, in which the trial court denied a 

criminal defendant court-appointed psychiatric assistance prior to 

the Supreme Court's determination in Ake, but to which Ake's 

standard applies, the question presented is whether, "upon review 

of the entire record, [petitioner) could have made a threshold 

showing under Ake that 'his sanity at the time of the offense is 

to be a significant factor at trial f II Cartwright, 802 

F.2d at 1212 (emphasis in original). The record before this court 

5 

Appellate Case: 90-6380 Document: 01019293507 Date Filed: 09/16/1991 Page: 5 
supports the district court's determination that petitioner could 

have made this showing. 3 

The State of Oklahoma charged petitioner with first degree 

murder on August 31, 1982. He was already in police custody at 

that time. On February 9, 1983, court-appointed defense counsel 

applied to the state trial court for a determination of 

petitioner's competency, asserting that petitioner's "mental state 

and communications abilities [were] such that they seriously 

interfere[d] with his understanding of the proceedings against him 

and with his capability of aiding ... in preparation for trial." 

State Court Rec., vol. I, at 37. Defense counsel also requested 

that the trial court waive the notice requirement for the 

competency hearing, asserting that petitioner "is unable to 

communicate with his attorney to inform him of any relatives 

residing within or outside ... Oklahoma." Documentation, Ake 

claim, exh. 2. The trial court consented to waive the notice 

requirement. Id. 

The next day, after conducting a hearing on the application 

for a competency determination, the trial court ordered petitioner 

committed to the Oklahoma Department of Mental Health for sixty 

days for observation and examination, stating "there is a doubt as 

to the present competency of the said [defendant], by reason of 

personal observation of the defendant by this Court; and testimony 

regarding defendant's ability to understand the proceedings 

3 We have supplemented the record on appeal with petitioner's 

Documentation of Ake Claim and his Evidentiary Submission, both 

filed with the district court. See lOth Cir. R. 10.2.4. 

6 

Appellate Case: 90-6380 Document: 01019293507 Date Filed: 09/16/1991 Page: 6 
against the defendant and the defendant's capability of aiding the 

attorney in preparation for trial." Id., exh. 1. 

A month later, R. D. Garcia, M.D., the chief forensic 

psychiatrist at Eastern State Hospital where petitioner was 

confined, reported to the trial court that the hospital staff had 

determined that petitioner was capable of understanding the 

proceedings against him and of assisting his attorney with his 

defense and, that "[s]ince it is the consensus of our staff that 

[petitioner] is not in need of psychiatric treatment, we would 

therefore consider him as competent to stand trial at this time." 

Id., exh. 3 at 1. The report also indicated that petitioner had 

not displayed any behavior that would indicate that he should be 

considered dangerous to himself or others, "at least not as a 

result of any overt psychotic symptoms elicited during his period 

of confinement in the hospital." Id. at 2. 

The report further noted, however, that petitioner was being 

treated daily with 150 milligrams of Thorazine, a powerful 

antipsychotic medication, see Physician's Desk Reference 2116 

(44th ed. 1990), as well as 400 milligrams of Tegretal [Tegretol], 

an anticonvulsant medication, see id. at 988, and four milligrams 

of Cogentin, a medication used to treat parkinsonism, a common 

side effect of Thorazine, see id. at 1337. Documentation, Ake 

claim, exh. 3 at 2. The report to the court "of course 

recommend[ed] that this treatment be continued in order for 

[petitioner] to retain his present degree of stability." Id. 

Relying upon the hospital's evaluation, the state trial court 

determined that petitioner was competent to stand trial. 

7 

Appellate Case: 90-6380 Document: 01019293507 Date Filed: 09/16/1991 Page: 7 
Evidentiary submission, exh. 3. Petitioner returned to the 

Oklahoma County jail, where, according to jail records, he was 

medicated with Haldol, yet another antipsychotic medication, see 

Physician's Desk Reference at 1282. Documentation, Ake claim, 

exh. 6. 

Although Dr. Garcia noted in his report to the court that 

petitioner was well behaved while confined at the hospital and did 

not present any management problems, documentation, Ake claim, 

exh. 3 at 2, Dr. Garcia's notes also reflect that petitioner had 

to be secluded for combative behavior on February 18 and March 3 

and 4, 1983. Id., exh. 5 (state hospital records). In addition, 

on March 3, the staff also noted "definite sociopathic behavior" 

from petitioner. Id. 

On February 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29, the staff had to medicate 

petitioner with 100-milligram doses of Thorazine in order to 

control his combative or agitated behavior. Id. Petitioner's 

behavior continued to require administration of 400 milligrams of 

Thorazine daily, from March 1 through March 7, when the dosage was 

8 

Appellate Case: 90-6380 Document: 01019293507 Date Filed: 09/16/1991 Page: 8 
4 reduced to 150 milligrams a day. Id. Dr. Garcia recommended 

this medication continue after petitioner's release from the 

hospital. Id., exh. 3 at 2. On the day of his release, March 17, 

petitioner's agitated behavior required two milligrams of Ativan, 

4 In his dissent to the affirmance of petitioner's conviction 

on direct criminal appeal, Judge Parks noted that petitioner's 

treatment with antipsychotic medication should have indicated to 

the trial court that there were serious concerns presented 

regarding petitioner's mental condition. 

[T]he psychiatric report indicated that during the 

period of the psychiatric examination, the [petitioner) 

was being maintained on 150 milligrams of Thorazine per 

day. Thorazine is an extremely powerful psychotropic 

drug. Its most common use is for the management of 

manifestations of psychotic disorders. See Physician's 

Desk Reference (39th Ed. Barnhart 1985), at 1977. In a 

special warning box, the Physician's Desk Reference 

states that Thorazine "is not the first drug to be used 

in therapy for most patients with non-psychotic anxiety 

because certain risks associated with its use are not 

shared by common alternative treatments . • • . When 

used in the treatment of non-psychotic anxiety [it] 

should not be administered in doses of not [sic) more 

than 100 mg. per day ..•. " Id. Therefore, assuming 

that the State's doctors were following standard medical 

practice, the fact that [petitioner) was being 

maintained on 150 milligrams of Thorazine per day 

strongly indicates that the doctors were concerned with 

"the management of manifestations of psychotic 

disorders." [Further], the psychiatric report 

recommended that the [petitioner] continue his Thorazine 

treatment "in order for him to retain his present degree 

of stability." The fact that Thorazine therapy was 

administered during the [petitioner's] psychiatric 

examination and the recommendation for continuation 

belie the psychiatric report's assertion that the 

[petitioner] was "not in need of psychiatric treatment," 

and indicate that the doctors entertained serious 

concern about his mental stability. . . . [T]he 

doctor's concern about [petitioner's] mental condition 

was further illustrated by the fact that the psychiatric 

report suggested that [petitioner] be referred "to a 

mental health clinic in his locale for follow-up care on 

an out-patient basis as might be indicated." 

Liles, 702 P.2d at 1039. 

9 

Appellate Case: 90-6380 Document: 01019293507 Date Filed: 09/16/1991 Page: 9 
an anti-anxiety medication, see Physician's Desk Reference at 

2348. Documentation, Ake claim, exh. 5. 

In addition to this treatment, the hospital staff implemented 

precautions in caring for petitioner, in light of his depression 

and threatened suicide. Id. Petitioner also received medication 

for insomnia and headaches throughout his stay at the hospital. 

Id. 

Further notations in the hospital records indicate that, on 

March 1, petitioner experienced "strong inner feelings of wrath 

and anger" that he believed to be the product of his being 

possessed by a "violent alter ego" named Rock. Id. Several days 

later, petitioner became very angry, stating that he would "kill 

someone on the ward before the night (was] over," and claiming 

that he was no longer himself, but had become Rock and that Rock 

would take care of things. Id. At that time, petitioner claimed 

Rock had committed the murder. Id. 

Dr. Garcia noted that petitioner "may be considered 

potentially dangerous, daring, with temper tantrums and a short 

fuse, very easily ready to fight, as an aggressive and explosive 

individual, but not psychotic." Id. Dr. Garcia ultimately 

diagnosed petitioner as having a dysthmic personality disorder and 

an intermittent explosive disorder, along with a continuous 

alcohol dependence and episodic mixed substance abuse. Id. 

Notations in the records also indicated petitioner suffered from 

an "organic personality syndrome (intermittent explosive 

disorder)" and "mild focal brain damage secondary to cerebral 

trauma." Id. 

10 

Appellate Case: 90-6380 Document: 01019293507 Date Filed: 09/16/1991 Page: 10 
Lance A. Portnoff, Ph.D., a clinical neuropsychologist and a 

consultant at Eastern Hospital, reported that, after examining and 

testing petitioner, his findings 

that 

are suggestive of bilateral tempero-limbic dysfunction 

secondary to brain trauma and polydrug abuse . . . • 

These findings are consistent with the reported episodes 

of dyscontrol, which can occur with such a locus of 

damage because of irritation or disinhibition of limbic 

structures mediating instinctual aggressive drives 

. . • . [T]he behavior described by the patient is 

consistent with an organic intermittent explosive 

disorder secondary to traumatic contusion of mesial 

hemisphere structures. Such patients have diminished 

control over aggressive patterns of response, 

particularly if further disinhibiting influences such as 

drugs or alcohol are ingested. Because of the close 

proximity of limbic aggressive and memory structures, 

often the irritative effect which triggers tendencies 

for explosiveness also impairs memory encoding for the 

duration of the irritative ictus. 

[T]hese test findings are more consistent with a 

nonpsychotic [rather] than psychotic mental status, 

characteristic of adjustment disorder of mixed emotional 

features, organic personality syndrome (intermittent 

explosive disorder), alcohol abuse, continuous, mixed 

substance abuse, unspecified, and mild focal brain 

damage secondary to cerebral trauma. 

In his subsequent affidavit, Dr. Portnoff further explained 

the results of my evaluation [of petitioner in 1983] 

were consistent with the presence of an organic 

impairment, or physical dysfunction to [petitioner's] 

brain. The results suggested the presence of an organic 

intermittent explosive disorder secondary to traumatic 

contusion of mesial hemisphere structures. Persons 

experiencing this problem may have a diminished ability 

to control aggressive impulses, and, as a result of 

damage to their brains, they may be capable of 

explosive, violent behavior during ictal, or 

seizure-like states. They may then have no memory or 

impaired memory of their violent behavior. 

11 

Appellate Case: 90-6380 Document: 01019293507 Date Filed: 09/16/1991 Page: 11 
Id., exh. 8 at 1 (Affidavit of Lance A. Portnoff, Ph.D. (March 17, 

1990)). 

In corroboration of Dr. Portnoff's diagnosis, petitioner 

offered the affidavit of Russell R. Monroe, M.D., a professor of 

psychiatry at the University of Maryland School of Medicine. 

After examining petitioner's hospital records, Dr. Monroe 

concluded that there is a significant possibility that 

[petitioner] experiences an episodic behavioral disorder 

associated with a limbic ictus. Such a condition may 

lead an individual to commit acts of violence over which 

he lacks control in an ordinary sense, and which are not 

in an ordinary sense intentional. The possibility of a 

behavioral disorder associated with a limbic ictus is 

consistent with the findings in the February 25, 1983 

neuropsychological evaluation conducted by 

L.A. Portnoff, Ph.D. 

In my op1n1on, further evaluation • . . is 

justified by the significant possibility that if 

[petitioner] indeed killed Mr. Yarbrough, he did so as a 

result of a brain disorder that produced a seizure-like 

event. 

Id., exh. 9 at 1-2, 3 (Affidavit of Russell R. Monroe, M.D. 

(October 24, 1988)). 

In addition to Dr. Portnoff's findings concerning possible 

mental conditions affecting petitioner, Dr. Portnoff reported, on 

February 25, 1983, that although petitioner had a factual and 

rational understanding of the charges against him, because of his 

depression, he was at that time incompetent to stand trial. Id., 

exh. 5. In his affidavit, Dr. Portnoff explained that his 

competency determination was not included in the hospital's report 

to the trial court because he "was considered a consultant only, 

and was not a part of the forensic team assigned to [petitioner] 

12 

Appellate Case: 90-6380 Document: 01019293507 Date Filed: 09/16/1991 Page: 12 
at Eastern State Hospital." Id., exh. 8 at 1. Dr. Portnoff 

further asserted that 

[a]t that time it was the policy of Eastern State 

Hospital to report to the trial courts only the opinion 

on competency of their Chief Forensic Psychiatrist, Dr. 

R.D. Garcia. Any dissenting views from other staff 

members were not reported. At that time Dr. Garcia's 

view of competency to stand trial evaluations would have 

prevented him from considering either [petitioner's] 

depression or his apparent brain damage in determining 

competency. Dr. Garcia was of the belief that only 

psychotic individuals could be considered incompetent, 

and any individual who was non-psychotic was therefore 

competent. 

In the time I was employed at Eastern State Hospital by 

far most of the patients I saw there I considered to be 

competent. In my opinion [petitioner's] depression and 

incompetency [were] very real, and he was in no way 

malingering. 

Id. at 1-2. 

In an effort to suggest possible causes for petitioner's 

brain injuries, the affidavit of petitioner's mother asserted that 

he suffered physical and sexual abuse as a child, periods of head 

banging, head injuries from an automobile accident in which his 

head went through the windshield, repeated headaches, and episodes 

of sleepwalking. Evidentiary submission, exh. 29 (Affidavit of 

LaDonna Meadows (March 21, 1990)). A childhood acquaintance of 

petitioner also attested to the fact that, when petitioner was 

fourteen years old, he fell approximately fifteen feet off a 

cliff, hit his head, and was unconscious for a time. Id., exh. 30 

(Affidavit of Chuck Richmond (March 16, 1990)). The hospital 

records indicate petitioner said that he had suffered repeated 

minor head trauma from boxing. Documentation, Ake claim, exh. 5. 

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In her affidavits, petitioner's mother also stated that a 

psychiatrist treated petitioner for a time while he was in 

elementary school, Affidavit of LaDonna Meadows (June 3, 1987), 

and that, prior to his joining the Marines at age seventeen, 

petitioner had serious psychological problems, including 

exhibiting a split personality, Affidavit of LaDonna Meadows 

(June 4, 1987). "There were times when [petitioner] would only 

respond to you if you called him by the name of 'Rock.' There 

were times that he would disappear into the woods for days, and 

not remember much about it." Evidentiary submission, exh. 29 

at 4. Petitioner's mother further attested that, while petitioner 

was in the Marines, she received notice from the Marine Corps that 

he had received psychiatric treatment. Id. 

Petitioner's mother chronicled several episodes of explosive 

violence occurring throughout petitioner's life. He had, at 

various times, attempted to strike his mother, attempted to cut 

his brother with a broken bottle, and threatened to shoot his 

brother. Affidavit of LaDonna Meadows (June 3, 1987). He had 

also beaten his girlfriend, then disappeared for several days, 

finally emerging from the woods in a dazed state. Id. 

Petitioner's mother also witnessed occurrences suggesting to her 

that petitioner had killed his prized pet pit bulls. Id. When 

asked about the pets, petitioner insisted someone had killed them 

while he was away from home. Id. 

Immediately preceding the murder, petitioner's pregnant wife 

had left him. Affidavit of LaDonna Meadows (June 4, 1987). 

Petitioner, according to his mother's affidavit, fell into a deep 

14 

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Appellate Case: 90-6380 Document: 01019293507 Date Filed: 09/16/1991 Page: 14 
depression and again was found wandering dazed in the woods. Id. 

At the time of the murder, petitioner was in Oklahoma searching 

for his wife. Id. 

In light of petitioner's history of mental problems, his 

treatment with antipsychotic medication, and the conflicting 

diagnoses of his incompetency and his mental condition in general, 

this record sufficiently supports the district court's 

determination that petitioner could have made a sufficient 

showing, under Ake, that his sanity was likely "to be a 

significant factor at trial." See Cartwright, 802 F.2d at 1212. 

Respondent contends that petitioner cannot claim the state 

court's denial of a court-appointed psychiatrist deprived him of 

due process because he failed to assert an insanity defense at 

trial, unlike the defendant in Ake who presented an insanity 

defense even though the trial court had denied him psychiatric 

assistance. See 470 U.S. at 72. In his motion seeking state 

funds in order to employ a psychiatrist or psychologist, defense 

counsel did assert that he had 

reason to believe that [petitioner] suffers from mental 

disease or defect, that would affect his capacity to 

appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or conform 

his [conduct to the] requirements [of the] law. 

The need for a psychologist [or] psychiatrist is 

clear . . . . Clearly, there is a need to determine 

whether [petitioner] had the ability to distinguish 

right from wrong at the time he allegedly committed 

these particular acts. A determination of this fact is 

relevant and material in determining guilt. It is 

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further necessary for determining mitigating 

circumstances as authorized in 21 o.s. 1976 Supp. 

§ 701.10. 

Evidentiary submission, exh. 4 at 2. 

In Ake, the Supreme Court held that, upon the requisite 

showing, a criminal defendant will be entitled to "access to a 

competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination 

and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the 

defense." 470 u.s. at 83 (emphasis added). One of the functions 

of such a court-appointed psychiatric expert, therefore, is to 

assist the defense in determining whether an insanity defense is 

viable or warranted under the circumstances of a particular case. 

Id. at 82; see also Smith v. McCormick, 914 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th 

Cir. 1990); United States v. Fazzini, 871 F.2d 635, 637 (7th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 517 (1989). "The right to 

psychiatric assistance . . . means the right to use the services 

of a psychiatrist in whatever capacity defense counsel deems 

appropriate--including to decide, with the psychiatrist's 

assistance, not to present to the court particular claims of 

mental impairment." Smith, 914 F.2d at 1157. Petitioner is 

therefore not precluded from asserting a due process challenge to 

the denial of his motion seeking a court-appointed psychiatrist 

simply because he did not proceed with an insanity defense after 

the denial of his motion for court-appointed psychiatric 

assistance. Indeed as the Court recognized in Ake, given the 

complex nature of mental disease, "the testimony of psychiatrists 

can be crucial and 'a virtual necessity if an insanity plea is to 

16 

Appellate Case: 90-6380 Document: 01019293507 Date Filed: 09/16/1991 Page: 16 
have any chance of success.'" Ake, 470 U.S. at 81 (citation 

omitted). 

Respondent next argues that petitioner cannot establish his 

entitlement to psychiatric assistance at the penalty phase of his 

trial because the state did not present any psychiatric evidence 

concerning the aggravating factor of petitioner's future 

dangerousness. In Ake, the Supreme Court determined that the 

state court had deprived the defendant of due process by denying 

him court-appointed psychiatric assistance in "presenting evidence 

to rebut the State's evidence of his future dangerousness." 470 

U.S. at 83. The Court held that due process entitles a criminal 

defendant to psychiatric assistance "when the State presents 

psychiatric evidence of the defendant's future dangerousness." 

Id. Although the Court discussed the necessity of psychiatric 

assistance to enable a defendant to respond to and challenge the 

state's psychiatric evidence concerning defendant's future 

dangerousness, the Court did not expressly limit a defendant's 

right of psychiatric assistance to situations where the state 

first presents psychiatric evidence. See id. at 83-84. Rather, 

the Court stated that "[t]he variable on which we must focus is 

. the probable value that the assistance of a psychiatrist 

will have in this area, and the risk attendant on its absence." 

Id. at 84. In this case, because the state presented evidence 

concerning petitioner's future dangerousness, albeit not 

psychiatric evidence, and because petitioner established the 

likelihood that his mental condition could have been a significant 

mitigating factor, the district court correctly determined that 

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the state trial court deprived petitioner of due process by 

denying him court-appointed psychiatric assistance at the 

sentencing phase of his trial. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Oklahoma granting petitioner habeas relief is 

AFFIRMED. The stay of the district court's order is dissolved. 

Respondents are to release petitioner from custody on the 

ninety-first day following the date of this opinion unless, within 

ninety days from the date of this opinion, the State of Oklahoma 

has elected to retry petitioner. 

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