Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_14-cv-08044/USCOURTS-alnd-2_14-cv-08044-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Daphne Collette Tate
Petitioner
United States of America
Respondent

Document Text:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

DAPHNE COLLETTE TATE, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) 2:14-cv-8044-LSC

) (2:13-cr-0082-LSC-TMP-1)

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Respondent. )

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

I. Introduction

This is a motion to vacate, set aside or correct a sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255, filed by Petitioner Daphne Collette Tate (“Tate”) on July 24, 2014. (Doc. 1.)

Tate challenges her convictions and sentences resulting from her plea of guilty to

possession of a counterfeit check, bank-fraud conspiracy, possession of stolen mail,

and aggravated identity theft arising out of her membership in a multi-state check

counterfeiting ring. For the reasons set forth below, Tate’s § 2255 motion is due to

be denied.

II. Background

A superseding indictment was entered on March 27, 2013, charging Tate and

five co-defendants with various crimes related to check counterfeiting. Tate was

FILED

 2015 Feb-24 AM 11:08

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:14-cv-08044-LSC Document 5 Filed 02/24/15 Page 1 of 21
charged with one count of uttering and possessing a counterfeit security, aiding and

abetting in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 513(a) and 2 (Count 1); one count of conspiracy

to commit bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1349 and 1344 (Count 2); four

counts of possession of stolen mail matter, aiding and abetting in violation of 18

U.S.C. §§ 1708 and 2 (Counts 3 through 6); and five counts of aggravated identity

theft, aiding and abetting in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028A and 2 (Counts 7 through

11). (Doc. 19 in criminal case .) The indictment also contained a notice of the 1

Government’s intent to seek forfeiture against Tate under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C)

and 28 U.S.C. § 2461 for the offense charged in Count 2. (Id.) 

On April 30, 2013, Tate signed a plea agreement and pled guilty in this Court

to Counts 1, 2, 3, 7, and 9. (Docs. 31 (plea agreement) and doc. 159 (transcript from

guilty plea hearing)). Tate stipulated that the crimes involved a loss of over $200,000. 

She also consented to pay restitution jointly and severally with any convicted codefendants in the amounts and to the victims determined by the Court at the time of

sentencing and to an entry of forfeiture jointly and severally with any convicted codefendants in an amount to be determined by the Court at sentencing. (Doc. 31.) In

exchange for Tate’s plea, the Government stated that it would move the Court to

 All citations to docket entries will hereafter refer to entries in Tate’s criminal 1

proceeding, unless otherwise noted.

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dismiss Counts 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, and 11 of the superseding indictment at sentencing.

Tate’s plea agreement contained an appeal waiver with limited exceptions. 

Tate’s pre-sentence investigation report (“PSR”) stated that the statutory

maximum term of imprisonment on Count 1 is 10 years; 18 U.S.C. § 513(a); the

maximum term of imprisonment on Count 2 is 30 years, 18 U.S.C. § 1349, 1344; and

the maximum term of imprisonment on Count 3 is five years, 18 U.S.C. § 1708. The

PSR stated that Counts 1, 2, and 3 are grouped for Sentencing Guidelines

(“Guidelines”) calculation purposes, U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d), and calculated a total

offense level of 25 on these counts consisting of: 1) a base offense level of seven,

pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(a)(1); 2) a 12-level increase because the loss amount was

over $200,000 and under $400,000, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1); 3) a fourlevel increase because the offense involved more than 50 victims, pursuant to

U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)B); 4) a three-level increase because Tate was a manager or

supervisor and the criminal activity involved five or more participants or was

otherwise extensive, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b); 5) a two-level increase for

obstruction of justice pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1; and 6) a three-level decrease for

acceptance of responsibility pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) and (b). (See Doc. 72 in

criminal case.) Combinedwith a criminal history category ofII, the total offense level

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of 25 yielded an advisory Guidelines range of 63 months to 78 months imprisonment

on Counts 1, 2, and 3. The PSR also noted that the Guidelines sentence on Count 3

would be capped at 60 months imprisonment, which is the statutory maximum

sentence on that count, U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(a). For Counts 7 and 9, the PSR stated that

the statutory sentence is two years on each count, 18 U.S.C. § 1028A, and that the

terms of imprisonment on Counts 7 and 9 shall not run concurrently with any other

term of imprisonment imposed on Tate under any other provision in law, including

any term of imprisonment onCounts 1, 2, and 3, 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(b)(2). However,

at the Court’s discretion, it may run the two, 2-year terms concurrently with one

another. 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(b)(4). The PSR noted that the Guidelines sentence for

Counts 7 and 9 is the term of imprisonment required by statute, which is two years

consecutive on each count. 

This Court sentenced Tate on August 28, 2013. See transcript of sentencing

hearing, doc. 160. Tate’s objections to the PSR were only to the two-level increase for

obstruction of justice and to the three-level increase for the manager or supervisor

role. The Government moved for a 20 percent downward departure from the low end

of the Guidelines range as calculated by the Court on Tate’s sentence for Counts 1,

2, and 3 because Tate provided substantial assistance to the Government pursuant to

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U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. The Court overruled Tate’s objections to the PSR, granted the

Government’s motion for the 20 percent downward departure, and granted the

Government’s oral motion to dismiss Counts 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, and 11. The Court

sentenced Tate to a total term of 74 months imprisonment: 50 months as to Counts

1, 2, and 3 concurrently with each other, plus 24 months as to Counts 7 and 9,

concurrently with each other but consecutively to the sentence imposed onCounts 1,

2, and 3. Tate was also sentenced to a term of supervised release of 60 months;

ordered to pay restitution jointly and severally with several co-defendants in the

amounts of $29,504.00 to Regions Bank, $28,634.33 to Wells Fargo, and $1,981.37 to

BBVA Compass; and also ordered to forfeit property in the amount of $60,119.70 to

the United States. A judgment reflecting the aforementioned terms as well as a final

order offorfeiture were both entered onAugust 30, 2013. (Docs. 77 and 78 in criminal

case.) Tate did not appeal. 

On May 15, 2015, the Government filed a motion pursuant to Rule 36 of the

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure seeking that the Court correct certain clerical

errors in the judgment and final order of forfeiture as to the restitution and forfeiture

provisions. The corrections pertained to which co-defendants owed certain

restitution amounts to which victims jointly and severally as well as the fact that Tate

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owed the forfeiture amount of $60,119.70 jointly and severally with her four codefendants. The Court granted the motion, entered an amended final order of

forfeiture on May 19, 2014 (doc. 145) and an amended judgment on May 21, 2014. 

(Doc. 147.)

On July 24, 2014, Tate filed the instant pro se § 2255 motion in this Court. The

Court conducted an initial review of her motion pursuant to Rule 4(b) of the Rules

Governing Section2255Proceedings which revealed that although Tate cited case law

relevant to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, she offered no facts in support

ofsuch a claim. Accordingly, the Court issued an order to Tate to show cause within

20 days why her motion should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted. (Doc. 2 in this action.) On September 28, 2014, Tate

filed a request to respond to the show cause order out of time. Attached to her

request, she submitted a form § 2255 motion in which she asserted four

additional/expanded claims:

1) “Plea not knowing and voluntary or intelligently made” — “I would

not have signed a plea agreement had I known that I would face

additional enhancements. I would have insisted on going to trial. 

Counsel did not inform me of additional enhancements that would or

could be placed upon my person after the plea agreement was signed.”

2) “Plea was induced by threat to prosecute third party” — “I was told

that my disabled son would be prosecuted if I did not enter into a plea

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agreement or plead guilty.”

 

3) “Failure to investigate” — “I was sentenced to a dollar amount that

was found to not be true and was later corrected. Had my attorney

investigated, she would have been aware of this error and the money

enhancement would have been lowered.”

4) Alleyne error — “My guideline range was enhanced on elements that

were not charged in the indictment, agreed to by me, or submitted to a

jury. This is a violation of my Due Process rights and rights to a trial by

jury. I was enhanced for role in the offense, loss amount, and victims.”

(Doc. 3 in this action.)

Although the Court granted Tate’s request for 15 additional days to respond to

the show cause order, Tate never submitted anything further. Accordingly, her §

2255 motion is ripe for review.

III. Discussion

A. Timeliness and non-successive nature of Tate’s § 2255 motion

Because Tate filed her § 2255 motion within one year of the date that the

judgment of her conviction became final, the motion is timely. See 28 U.S.C. §

2255(f)(1). Further, nothing in the record indicates that Tate previously filed a § 2255

motion. Thus, the current motion is not “successive” within the meaning of §

2255(h). 

B. Several of Tate’s claims are barred by the appeal waiver in her plea

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agreement 

Tate’s signed plea agreement contained a waiver of her right to appeal her

conviction and/or sentence as well as her right to challenge her conviction and/or

sentence in a post-conviction proceeding, with limited exceptions: she may contest in

an appeal or in a post-conviction proceeding any sentence imposed in excess of the

applicable statutory maximum sentence; any sentence imposed in excess of the

Guidelines sentencing range determined by the Court at the time the sentence is

imposed; and claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. (Doc. 31 at 20-22.) 

An appeal waiver is enforceable if it was made knowingly and voluntarily.

United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1350–51 (11th Cir. 1993). An appeal waiver

will be enforced if either “the district court specifically questioned the defendant

about the waiver during the plea colloquy” or “the record clearly shows that the

defendant otherwise understood the full significance of the waiver.” United States v.

Crrinard–Henry, 399 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation marks omitted). 

During Tate’s change of plea hearing, the Court specifically questioned Tate about

the appeal waiver and confirmed that Tate understood its terms. See Transcript of

Change of Plea Hearing, doc. 159, at 20. Further, Tate does not dispute that she

knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to challenge her convictions and sentences

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in post conviction proceedings. Thus, Tate’s appeal waiver is valid and enforceable.

The particular claims that are barred by the waiver are discussed below.

C. Tate’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel related to her 

decision to plea guilty 

Tate’s first claim is that her guilty plea was “involuntary” as a result of

ineffective assistance of counsel because her attorney did not warn her of the

Guidelines enhancements that would be applied to her sentence. She claims that had

her attorney told her that her sentence would be enhanced because the loss amount

was over $200,000, the offense involved more than 50 victims, and she held a

supervisory role, she would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to

trial. Tate’s plea agreement does not bar this claim because the appeal waiver

contains an exception allowing her to bring an ineffective assistance of counsel claim

in a post-conviction motion. However, even taking Tate’s allegation as true that her

attorney did not discuss possible enhancements with her, she fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted.

Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel may be raised for the first time in a

§ 2255 motion as opposed to on direct appeal and are therefore not subject to a

procedural bar. Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003). The applicable

standard is well-established: post-conviction relief will not be granted on a claim of

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ineffective assistance of counsel unless the petitioner can shownot only that counsel’s

performance was deficient but also that such deficient performance prejudiced her

defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). More specifically, the

movant must show that: (1) her counsel’s representation fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for her

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different. Id. at 687-88. The court need not “address both components of the inquiry

if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.” Id. at 697. This two part

standard is applicable to ineffective-assistance claims arising out of the plea process. 

Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985). With regard to the prejudice prong in the

context of a guilty plea, the defendant must show “that there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s errors, [s]he would not have pleaded guilty and

would have insisted on going to trial.” Id. at 59. 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, which governs procedures related to

entering a plea of guilty, does not afford a criminal defendant the right to be apprised

of her applicable Guidelines range or the actual sentence the defendant will receive.

Rule 11 only requires that the court inform the defendant of the applicable mandatory

minimum and maximum statutory sentences and of its obligation to calculate the

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applicable sentencing guideline range and to consider that range, possible departures,

and other sentencing factors under 18U.S.C. § 3553(a). See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1);

see also commentary to Rule 11(c)(1) (indicating that a defendant should be informed

ofthe existence ofthe Guidelines but is not entitled to know what his Guidelines range

is prior to pleading guilty because a change of plea hearing takes place before the PSR

is formulated). Here, Tate’s signed plea agreement informed her of the applicable

mandatory and minimum statutory sentences for each of the counts that she pled

guilty to (doc. 31 at 2-4), and the Court complied with Rule 11 at Tate’s change of plea

hearing by advising her of the applicable statutory sentence as to each count that she

was pleading guilty to and confirming that she understood. (Doc. 159 at 15-18.) 

Moreover, Tate initialed the page in her signed plea agreement in which she

confirmed that her counsel had explained to her the existence of the Guidelines and

their advisory nature, as follows:

Defendant’s counsel has explained to the defendant, that in light of the

United States Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, the

federal sentencing guidelines are advisory in nature. Sentencing is in the

court’s discretion and is no longer required to be within the guideline

range. The defendant agrees that, pursuant to this agreement, the court

may use facts it finds by a preponderance of the evidence to reach an

advisory guideline range, and defendant explicitly waives any right to

have those facts found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

(Doc. 31 at 22.) Additionally, at her change of plea hearing, the Court explained to

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Tate that her sentence would be imposed in consideration of the Guidelines, as

follows:

THE COURT: Another thing I need to make sure you do

understand is the range of punishment. There

is two ranges of punishment we are going to

talk about. One is the sentencing guidelines

range and the other is the statutory range.

The advisory guideline range is just that, it’s

advisory. I assume your lawyer has told you

what she anticipates, has she done that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes she has.

THE COURT: I can tell you this. She might have it exactly

correct but again might have it incorrect. 

Nobody can tell youwhat your guideline range

will end up being until we have your

sentencing hearing, do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

(Doc. 159 at 14-15.) The Court thus complied with Rule 11 by ensuring that Tate was

sufficiently informed of the consequences of her guilty plea. See United States v.

Mosley, 173 F.3d 1318, 1327 (11th Cir. 1999) (“When a defendant is informed of a

mandatory statutory sentence at his plea colloquy and sentenced within that range, .

. . the failure to advise of a Sentencing Guidelines sentencing range is harmless error

under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(h), as long as the defendant knew that

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the SentencingGuidelines existed andthattheywould affect his sentence.”) (footnote

omitted); see also United States v. Stephens, 906 F.2d 251, 254 (6th Cir. 1990)

(“Because appellant was fully aware that his ultimate sentence under the agreement

was subject to later determination by the court based on a variety of factors at the time

he entered into it, the fact that he did not know specifically that he would be subject

to sentencing in [a particular] range does not mean that it was entered into

unknowingly and unintelligently.”). Under these circumstances, the alleged failure

of Tate’s lawyer to predict and inform her of which Guidelines enhancements would

be applied by the Court at sentencing does not establish that her lawyer’s

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, as required for a

Strickland claim. See United States v. Smith, 143 F. App’x 559, 561 (5th Cir. 2005)

(rejecting claim by a defendant that his attorney’s failure to inform him of a potential

career offender enhancement rendered his plea involuntary). Habeas relief is not

warranted on this claim. 

D. Tate’s claim that she was induced to enter a guilty plea by an alleged

threat related to her disabled son 

Well over a year after pleading guilty, Tate alleges for the first time that she was

induced to enter the plea by a threat that her disabled son would be prosecuted if she

did not plead guilty. However, she fails to explain anywhere in her pleadings who

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made the alleged threat, in what manner it was communicated to her, or when it was

communicated to her. 

“A guilty plea, if induced by promises or threats which deprive it of the

character of a voluntary act, is void. A conviction based upon such a plea is open to

collateral attack.” Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962). At the same

time, plea bargaining retains its benefits of certainty and efficiency “only if

dispositions by guilty plea are accorded a great measure of finality.” Blackledge v.

Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977). “[T]he representations of the defendant, his lawyer,

and the prosecutor at [a plea] hearing, as well as any findings made by the judge

accepting the plea, constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral

proceedings.” Id. at 73–74 (explaining that if the record reflects the procedures of

plea negotiation and includes a verbatim transcript of the plea colloquy, a petitioner

challenging her plea will be entitled to an evidentiary hearing “only in the most

extraordinary circumstances”). “The subsequent presentation of conclusory

allegations unsupported by specifics is subject to summary dismissal, as are

contentions that in the face of the record are wholly incredible.” Id. at 74.

At Tate’s change of plea hearing, the Court asked her if anyone had threatened

her or coerced her in any way to get her to plead guilty, to which she answered no. 

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(Doc. 159 at 20.) The Court then asked her if anyone made her any promise other

than in the plea agreement to get her to plead guilty, to which she answered no. (Id.) 

There is “a ‘strong presumption’that statements made by the defendant during h[er]

plea colloquy are true.” United States v. Cardenas, 230 F. App’x 933, 935 (11th Cir.

2007) (citing United States v. Medlock, 12 F.3d 185, 187 (11th Cir. 1994)).

“[T]herefore, ‘when a defendant makes statements under oath at a plea colloquy,

[s]he bears a heavy burden to show h[er] statements were false.’ “ Id. (quoting United

States v.Rogers, 848 F.2d 166, 168 (11th Cir.1988)). Tate was placed under oath at the

beginning of her guilty plea proceeding before she was asked any questions by the

Court. Tate has made no attempt to explain how and why her guilty plea testimony

that she was not coerced should now be deemed false.

An evidentiary hearing is not required on frivolous claims, conclusory

allegations unsupported by specifics, or contentions that are wholly unsupported by

the record. Peoples v. Campbell, 377 F.3d 1208, 1237 (11th Cir. 2004). Tate is not

entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

E. Tate’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel related to the

amended judgment and final order of forfeiture

Tate alleges that she “was sentenced to a dollar amount that was found to not

be true and was later corrected. Had my attorney investigated, she would have been

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aware of this error and the money enhancement would have been lowered.” (Doc. 3

at 21.) Insofar as this claim alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, it is not barred by

her appeal waiver. Tate is presumably taking issue with the fact that the Court

corrected clerical errors in the judgment and final order of forfeiture some months

after they were entered. The restitution portion of the first judgment stated that Tate

owes $29,504.00 to Regions Bank; $28,634.33 to Wells Fargo; and $1981.37 to BBVA

Compass. It stated that Tate owes these amounts jointly and severally with any

convicted co-defendants. The judgment was corrected to specify that the total

amount of restitution owed to Wells Fargo Bank is $43,104.00, and that of that total

amount, Tate and the four co-defendantsowe$28,634.33 jointly and severally, and the

four co-defendants (not including Tate) owe $14,469.67 jointly and severally. It was

also corrected to specify that the total amount of restitution owed to Regions Bank is

$29,504.00, and that of that total amount, Tate and the four co-defendants owe

$22,697.29 jointly and severally, and Tate and three out ofthe four co-defendants owe

$6,806.71 jointly and severally. Finally, it was corrected to specify that the $1981.37

owed to BBVA is owed jointly and severally by Tate and the four co-defendants. 

None of the dollar amounts Tate owes in restitution was altered by these clerical

corrections. As to the final order of forfeiture, which imposed a money judgment

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against Tate in the amount of $60,119.70, it was corrected to impose that same money

judgment amount against Tate jointly and severally with the four other co-defendants,

and the judgment was amended to reflect that as well.

Tate’s claim fails for several reasons. First, one of the two requirements of the

Strickland test is to show that the defendant was prejudiced by the attorney’s

misconduct. 466 U.S. at 687. Tate cannot show that she was prejudiced by the fact

that her attorney did not discover these errors at an earlier time because she was not

subject to any changes in her sentence by the correction of these errors. Indeed, a

court cannot even correct a clerical error under Fed. R. Crim. P. 36 if the change

would“fundamentally alter [the defendant’s] sentence”by increasing the restitution

obligation. United States v. Portillo, 363 F.3d 1161, 1165 (11th Cir. 2004). In other

words, a clerical error contemplated by Rule 36 is by definition one that does not affect

a defendant’s sentence such that she would have to be re-sentenced. Second, Tate’s

argument that her 12-level enhancement based on a loss amount of over $200,000

would have somehow not been applicable had her attorney discovered these clerical

errors is misplaced. Tate stipulated to this loss amount in her plea agreement, long

before restitution amounts were even determined. (Doc. 31 at 15.) Indeed, she

stipulated to the fact that the face value ofstolen checks and money orders recovered

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during the search her residence exceeded $236,000. (Id.) To the extent she is arguing

that based on the amount of restitution, the loss amount for Guidelines enhancement

purposes should be lower, the argument lacks merit because restitution and amount

of loss for the purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 are not the same. This is because a party

may suffer an actual pecuniary loss without seeking restitution. See United States v.

Smiley, 210 F. App’x 972, 975 (11th Cir. 2006) (“The fact that the [victims] did not

seek restitution does not mean they did not sustain an actual loss.”). Finally, to the

extent Tate is challenging the restitution amount, she is prohibited from doing so in

a § 2255 motion because relief from restitution is not a remedy authorized by the

statute. See Blaik v. United States, 161 F.3d 1341, 1342-43 (11th Cir. 1989). Habeas

relief is not warranted on this claim.

F. Tate’s claim that the Court erred under Alleyne v. United States, 133

S. Ct. 2151 (2013), by applying enhancements based on facts not

found by a jury

Tate’s final claim is that she was denied her Sixth Amendment right to a jury

trial because the enhancements applied to her sentence for her role in the offense, the

loss amount, and the number of victims were based on factors that were not charged

in the indictment, were not found beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury, and were not

admitted to by her. 

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As an initial matter, Tate’s claim is foreclosed by the appeal waiver in her plea

agreement, as it does not fall into the limited exceptions contained therein. Tate was

neither sentenced in excess of the statutory maximum on any count nor was she

sentenced in excess of the applicable Guidelines range on any count. To the contrary,

the Court sentenced Tate to the low end of the Guidelines range on Counts 1, 2, and

3, and then granted a downward departure of twenty percent due to substantial

assistance on that sentence. Additionally, the Court chose to run the mandatory

statutory two-year sentences on Counts 7 and 9 concurrently with each other rather

than consecutively. In any event, the Court has already determined that Tate’s appeal

waiver was entered into knowingly and voluntarily. As such, the Court need not

consider this claim. See Bushert, 997 F.2d at 1350–51(appeal waivers entered into

knowingly and voluntarily are enforceable). 

Additionally, even if Tate had not waived this claim, Alleyne does not apply to

her case. The Eleventh Circuit has explained why, as follows: 

In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court held that a fact,

other than a prior conviction, that increases the maximum penalty for a

crime is an element of the crime that must be submitted to a jury. 530

U.S. 466, 490–91 (2000). In Alleyne, the Supreme Court extended

Apprendi’s holding to facts, other than a prior conviction, that increase

the mandatory minimum prescribed by a statute, while recognizing that

such facts are distinct from fact-findings that guide judicial discretion in

selecting a punishment within limits fixed by law. Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at

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2161 & n.2. Indeed, the Supreme Court cautioned that its holding did

not disturb judicial fact findings at sentencing for facts that do not impact

the statutory punishment. See id. at 2163.

Accordingly, a district court may continue to make guidelines

calculations based upon judicial fact findings and may enhance a

sentence—so long as its findings do not increase the statutory maximum

or minimum authorized by facts determined in a guilty plea or jury

verdict. See United States v. McGarity, 669 F.3d 1218, 1257 (11th Cir.

2012) (concluding that under an advisory guidelines regime, judicial

fact-findings that support a sentence within the statutory maximum set

forth in the United States Code do not violate the Sixth Amendment);

United States v. Dean, 487 F.3d 840, 854 (11th Cir. 2007).

United States v. Charles, 757 F.3d 1222, 1225 (11th Cir. 2014).

As in Charles, the Court’s finding that Tate had a supervisory role in the

offense, that the offense had 50 or more victims, and that the loss amount was over

$200,000, affected Tate’s advisory Guidelines range but did not increase the statutory

minimum or maximum sentence for any of Tate’s convictions. Enhancing her

sentence based on this judicial fact-finding was therefore not Alleyne error.2

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Tate’s § 2255 motion is due to be denied and this

action dismissed with prejudice. 

 Moreover, and as already noted, Tate’s signed plea agreement waives any right to have 2

the facts used to reach a Guidelines range found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. (Doc. 31 at

22.)

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This Court may issue a certificate of appealability “only if the applicant has a

made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.

2253(c)(2). To make such a showing, a “petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable

jurist would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable

and wrong,” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000), or that “the issues

presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003) (internal quotations omitted). This Court finds

Tate’s claims do not satisfy either standard.

A separate order will be entered.

Done this 24 day of February 2015. th

 

L. Scott Coogler

United States District Judge

[160704]

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