Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_99-cr-00364/USCOURTS-azd-2_99-cr-00364-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Darnell Herring
Defendant
Jerry Lee Sueing
Defendant
United States of America
Plaintiff

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America, 

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

Darnell Herring, 

Defendant-Movant.

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CIV 04-93-PHX-RGS (JM)

CR 99-364-PHX-RGS

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Movant Darnell Herring's Motion to Vacate, Set Aside

or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The matter was referred to Magistrate

Judge Jacqueline Marshall for Report and Recommendation. On October 5, 2005, the

Magistrate Judge filed her Report and Recommendation with the Court. On November 14,

2005, Movant filed his Objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing a Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, the Court "must

make a de novo determination of those portions of the report ... to which objection is made,"

and "may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations

made by the magistrate." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); see Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391,

1394 (9th Cir. 1991).

BACKGROUND

On May 20, 1999, Defendants Darnell Herring and Jerry Lee Sueing ("Sueing") were

charged by indictment for violations of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), Possession with Intent to

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Distribute Crack Cocaine (Count 1), and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), Using or Carrying a Firearm

During and in Relation to a Drug Trafficking Crime (Counts 2 and 3). On April 5, 2000,

Sueing pleaded guilty to Count 2 of the Indictment, and was sentenced to 60 months

imprisonment on July 6, 2000.

On July 27, 2000, upon defense counsel's motion, the Court ordered that Movant be

committed to the Bureau of Prisons for the purpose of being examined for competency. On

December 6, 2000, the Court held a competency hearing in which it found Movant competent

to stand trial. On May 29, 2001, in an attempt to resolve the matter without trial, the parties

participated in a settlement conference before Magistrate Judge Lawrence Anderson. No

settlement was reached, and the matter proceeded to trial.

On June 27, 2001, the jury found Movant guilty on all three counts of the Indictment.

At sentencing on September 5, 2001, upon oral motion by the government, the Court

dismissed Count 2 of the Indictment and sentenced Movant to 210 months imprisonment on

Count 1 and 60 months imprisonment on Count 3, with the sentences to run consecutively.

Movant subsequently filed an appeal alleging insufficient evidence for conviction

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for carrying a weapon during and in relation to a drug sale.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction and Movant filed a petition for writ of certiorari,

which was denied.

DISCUSSION

In his Petition to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255,

Movant raises four claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Each claim is addressed by

the Magistrate Judge in her Report and Recommendation. The first issue contends that

Movant's counsel was ineffective for failing to request a downward departure pursuant to

United States Sentencing Guidelines ("U.S.S.G.") § 5K2.13 – permitting departure with

respect to non-violent offenses where the defendant may be suffering from "significantly

reduced mental capacity." The second issue alleges that Movant was incompetent to stand

trial and that his attorneys were ineffective because they failed to have his case dismissed on

that basis. The third issue addressed in the Report and Recommendation asserts that

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Movant's counsel Tate's performance was deficient because he "only came to the jail on one

occasion to visit with him. The visit lasted only about thirty minutes." This was significant,

Movant claims, because they were not able to discuss Movant's psychological examinations

and evaluations, thus leaving Movant "unaware if [counsel] even knew that he had been

psychologically examined and evaluated." The last issue contends that Movant's counsel was

ineffective for failing to interview Sueing, his co-defendant. Movant alleges that the

interview would have established that Sueing, unbeknownst to Movant, owned and possessed

the firearms that led to Movant's conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).

In her Report and Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the

Court issue an Order denying in part and granting in part Movant's Petition. Specifically,

with respect to Movant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to request a

downward departure, the Magistrate found that although Movant's mental history was

included in the Presentence Report and although his counsel requested that the Court "give

[Movant] the minimum sentence possible according to the guidelines," the Court may not

have been sufficiently aware of the potential for a downward departure. Accordingly, the

Magistrate recommended that Movant be resentenced after full consideration of the potential

for downward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13.

The Magistrate recommended denying Movant's remaining claims of ineffective

assistance.

Regarding Movant's claim concerning his alleged incompetence, the Magistrate found

that Movant's attorneys sought additional information on Movant's mental condition by filing

a Competency Motion. The Magistrate stated, "[t]hat the competency report ultimately

determined that Movant was competent to stand trial does not render counsel's performance

deficient under the first prong of Strickland."

With respect to Movant's claim relating to counsel's failure to visit, the Magistrate

found that Movant spoke with his counsel on at least three different occasions. Further, at

the sentencing hearing, Movant's counsel made it clear that he was aware of Movant's mental

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background when he referred to Movant's "extensive medical history" and "his mental

history."

Lastly, regarding Movant's claim pertaining to counsel's failure to interview Sueing,

the Magistrate stated that Movant's hindsight suggestion that his counsel present additional

witnesses does not demonstrate that counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient.

In addition, the Magistrate found that Movant failed to demonstrate prejudice from counsel's

alleged failure to present Sueing's testimony. As the Ninth Circuit held in its decision on his

direct appeal, the facts were sufficient to sustain his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), as

the government provided "sufficient evidence that [Movant] had a gun in his proximately

located vehicle ... ."

Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge recommended that Movant's Motion to Vacate, Set

Aside or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 be denied in part and granted in part,

and that the Court resentence Movant.

Movant subsequently filed his Objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and

Recommendation objecting to the Magistrate's recommendation denying his claims for

ineffective assistance based on counsel's failure to have his case dismissed due to his alleged

incompetence and counsel's failure to visit.

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees criminal

defendants the right to effective assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 686 (1984). When ineffective assistance of counsel is claimed, the standard to be

used is "whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial

process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." Id.

To prevail on such a claim, the defendant not only must show that "counsel's

performance was deficient," but that "the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Id.

at 687. Thus, unless both of these showings are made, "it cannot be said that the conviction

... resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable." Id.

There is a strong presumption that the performance of counsel falls within the wide

range of professional assistance. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986).

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With respect to attorney performance, the proper standard to be used "is that of reasonably

effective assistance" under "prevailing professional norms." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88.

Therefore, "the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688; see United States v. Vincent, 758 F.2d 379, 381 (9th

Cir. 1985) (defendant must show counsel's errors reflect failure to exercise skill, judgment,

or diligence of reasonably competent attorney).

Counsel, furthermore, has wide latitude in deciding how best to represent a client and

making tactical decisions. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. The competence of counsel "is

presumed," and thus "[t]he reasonableness of counsel's performance is to be evaluated from

counsel's perspective at the time of the alleged error and in light of all the circumstances."

Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 381, 384. Not surprisingly, therefore, "the standard of review is

highly deferential." Id. at 381. As the Supreme Court has explained:

It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's assistance after

conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining

counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular

act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. A fair assessment of attorney

performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting

effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged

conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time.

Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must

indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range

of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the

presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action "might be

considered sound trial strategy."

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (citations omitted).

As previously noted, to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the

defendant also must "affirmatively prove prejudice." Id. at 693. It is not enough to show that

"particular errors of counsel were unreasonable," and that they had "some conceivable effect

on the outcome" of the proceeding. Id. Rather, it must be shown that "there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would

have been different." Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is that which is "sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. When determining whether prejudice exists, the

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court "'must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury.'" Kimmelman, 477

U.S. at 381 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695).

Movant first objects to the Magistrate's recommendation denying his claim for

ineffective assistance based on counsel's failure to have his case dismissed due to his alleged

incompetence.

The Court's review of the record reveals that Movant's counsel filed a motion asking

the Court to order Movant to submit to a psychological evaluation to determine if Movant

was competent to stand trial. The Court granted counsel's motion, and had Movant placed

in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons – United States Medical Center for Federal Prisoners,

for this purpose.

The Court subsequently reviewed the psychological evaluation performed by Christina

A. Pietz, Ph.D., and held a competency hearing wherein it found that Movant was competent

to stand trial. Movant fails to offer anything to contradict this determination. Accordingly,

Movant has not established that his counsel was deficient under Strickland.

Movant next objects to the Magistrate's recommendation denying his claim for

ineffective assistance arguing that his counsel was deficient for failure to visit. A review of

the record demonstrates that counsel met with Movant on at least three different occasions.

At sentencing, counsel noted that he met with Movant at CCA Florence on one occasion.

(See Sentencing Transcript at 16.) Counsel stated that he set the matter for a settlement

conference in front of Magistrate Judge Anderson, wherein the Magistrate explained to

Movant the potential ramifications of proceeding to trial. (See id.) Counsel continued

stating that he "talked with [Movant] again before we started trial. And then we proceeded

to trial because that was his wish." (Id.) Movant failed to object to any of these statements.

Further, at the sentencing hearing, counsel established his knowledge of Movant's

medical background stating, "[Movant] does have an extensive medical history which the

other two lawyers that had this case before I was involved went back into extensively, went

into his high school records, his mental history and things that have happened. Those things

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are categorized in his Presentence Report ... ." The Court finds that Movant's counsel was

not deficient for failure to visit.

With regard to the remaining claims of ineffective assistance of counsel raised in

Movant's Petition, Movant filed no specific objection to the Magistrate's recommended

disposition. While the Court will adopt the Magistrate's findings regarding Movant's claim

of ineffective assistance based on counsel's failure to interview Sueing without further

discussion, the Court will address the Magistrate's recommendation concerning Movant's

allegation of ineffective assistance for counsel's failure to request a downward departure

pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13.

Section 5K2.13 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines authorizes a sentencing

court to depart downward in certain circumstances because of a defendant's significantly

reduced mental capacity:

A sentence below the applicable guideline range may be warranted if the

defendant committed the offense while suffering from a significantly reduced

mental capacity. However, the court may not depart below the applicable

guideline range if (1) the significantly reduced mental capacity was caused by

the voluntary use of drugs or other intoxicants; (2) the facts and circumstances

of the defendant's offense indicate a need to protect the public because the

offense involved actual violence or a serious threat of violence; or (3) the

defendant's criminal history indicates a need to incarcerate the defendant to

protect the public. If a departure is warranted, the extent of the departure

should reflect the extent to which the reduced mental capacity contributed to

the commission of the offense.

U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13 (2000).

The text of the guideline plainly prohibits a sentencing court from departing

downward if it first finds that a circumstance identified in any one of the three prongs is

present. In other words, if a sentencing court determines that (1) the defendant's condition

resulted from voluntary intoxication or drug use; (2) the present offense involved actual

violence or a serious threat of violence, evidencing a need to protect the public; or (3) the

defendant's criminal history demonstrates a need to protect the public, then the court lacks

authority to depart downward under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13. See United States v. Davis, 264

F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that the district court correctly concluded that the

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circumstances of the third prong of § 5K2.13 were present eliminated its authority to depart

downward).

According to the facts set forth in the Presentence Report, to which neither Movant

nor his counsel filed objections, Movant was diagnosed with cocaine dependence, PCP

dependence, self-induced psychotic disorder, and adult antisocial behavior. Although prior

medical records reflected initial diagnoses of schizophrenia and psychotic condition, it was

later determined that both of these conditions were drug induced and complicated by heavy

drug abuse. Further, in prior presentence reports, Movant indicated that he may abuse

alcohol and that alcohol has been a factor in his criminal history. The Presentence Report

also states that Movant became addicted to cocaine in 1986 and used that drug on almost a

daily basis. Movant stated that he felt his paranoia stemmed from his abuse of cocaine. The

Presentence Report also reflects an extensive criminal history – Criminal History Category

VI. Movant's criminal history includes convictions for theft, burglary, possession of narcotic

drugs, and forgery.

Having received the Presentence Report, Movant's counsel would have been aware

of all of these facts. Thus, in light of Movant's extensive criminal history demonstrating a

need to protect the public coupled with his long history of substance abuse, which may have

caused or contributed to his mental condition, it is readily apparent that Movant's counsel

could not have properly sought a downward departure as circumstances implicating the first

and third prongs of U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13 are present in this case.

"The reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined or substantially

influenced by the defendant's own statements or actions ... . [W]hen a defendant has given

counsel reason to believe that pursuing certain investigations would be fruitless or even

harmful, counsel's failure to pursue those investigations may not later be challenged as

unreasonable." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. It follows that the same applies to fruitless

arguments. In the instant matter, Movant's counsel had reason to conclude that pursuing a

downward departure would be fruitless.

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Moreover, nothing in the record demonstrates that Movant was suffering from a

diminished capacity at the time he committed the crimes at issue. Section 5K2.13 permits

departure with respect to non-violent offenses where the defendant may be suffering from

"significantly reduced mental capacity." The departure is designed to "reflect the extent to

which the reduced mental capacity contributed to the commission of the offense." U.S.S.G.

§ 5K2.13 (emphasis added). A significantly reduced mental capacity prevents the defendant

from appreciating "the wrongfulness of the behavior comprising the offense" or controlling

"behavior that the defendant knows is wrongful." Id. cmt. n.1. Movant has failed to come

forward with any evidence demonstrating that his alleged mental impairments prevented him

from appreciating the wrongfulness of his conduct or rendered him unable to control his

behavior at the time he committed the offense.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Movant has failed to demonstrate that counsel's

failure to pursue a downward departure pursuant to § 5K2.13 fell below an objective standard

of reasonableness and prejudiced his case.

Having reviewed the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, and

Movant's objections thereto, the Court concludes that Movant's Motion to Vacate, Set Aside

or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 will be denied. Since the Court finds that

Movant's Objections are without merit, the Court will hereby incorporate and adopt the

Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation in part. The Court rejects, however, the

Magistrate's recommendation regarding Movant's claim that his counsel was ineffective for

failing to request a downward departure.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons set forth,

IT IS ORDERED that the Court adopts the Report and Recommendation of the

Magistrate Judge in part (Doc. #133). The Court rejects the Report and Recommendation

with respect to Movant's claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to request a

downward departure; however, the Court adopts the Report and Recommendation in all other

respects;

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Movant's Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct

Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. #106) is DENIED.

DATED this 28th day of February, 2007.

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