Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-02552/USCOURTS-ca7-15-02552-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ryan Pouliot
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

Nos. 15-2373 & 15-2374

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JUSTIN EDWARDS,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Wisconsin.

Nos. 13-cr-56 & 14-cr-102 — Barbara B. Crabb, Judge.

____________________

No. 15-2552

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

RYAN POULIOT,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 14-cr–104 — James D. Peterson, Judge.

Case: 15-2552 Document: 36 Filed: 09/08/2016 Pages: 16
2 Nos. 15‐2373 , 15‐2374 & 15‐2552

____________________

ARGUED DECEMBER 10, 2015 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 8, 2016

____________________

Before POSNER, MANION, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

SYKES, Circuit Judge. In separate cases Justin Edwards and

Ryan Pouliot pleaded guilty to firearms offenses that carry

an enhanced base offense level under the Sentencing Guide‐

lines if the defendant has a prior conviction for a “crime of

violence.” See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a). At the time they were

sentenced, the version of the Guidelines then in effect de‐

fined “crime of violence” to include “any offense under

federal or state law ... that ... is burglary of a dwelling.” Id.

§ 4B1.2(a)(2).1 Both defendants have prior Wisconsin convic‐

tions for burglary; the district judge in each case counted the

convictions as crime‐of‐violence predicates and applied the

higher offense level. The defendants challenge the enhance‐

ment, arguing that a conviction under Wisconsin’s burglary

statute cannot serve as a predicate offense under § 2K2.1(a).

Because their appeals raise the same issue, we’ve consolidat‐

ed them for decision.  

To determine whether a prior conviction counts as a

crime of violence requires a categorical approach that focus‐

es on the statutory definition of the crime of conviction. If

                                                 

1 All references to the Sentencing Guidelines are to the 2014 version in

effect when Edwards and Pouliot were sentenced. The Sentencing

Commission has since amended § 4B1.2(a)(2), removing burglary of a

dwelling from the list of offenses that qualify as a crime of violence; the

amendment became effective on August 1, 2016. See 81 Fed. Reg. 4741,

4742 (2016).  

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Nos. 15-2373, 15-2374 & 15-2552 3

state law defines the offense more broadly than the Guidelines, the prior conviction doesn’t qualify as a crime of 

violence, even if the defendant’s conduct satisfies all of the

elements of the Guidelines offense. In a narrow set of circumstances, the sentencing court may go one step beyond 

the statute itself. When a single statute creates multiple 

offenses, the court may consult a limited universe of documents to determine which offense the defendant was convicted of committing. This inquiry is called the “modified 

categorical approach,” but it only applies to “divisible”

statutes. The Supreme Court recently clarified that a statute 

is considered divisible only if it creates multiple offenses by 

setting forth alternative elements. See United States v. Mathis, 

136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016).

Wisconsin defines burglary more broadly than the 

Guidelines: The relevant statute prohibits burglary of a 

“building or dwelling.” WIS. STAT. § 943.10(1m)(a). The 

judges in both cases consulted the state charging documents

to determine whether Edwards and Pouliot were convicted 

of burglary of a dwelling as required by § 4B1.2(a)(2). The 

documents revealed that both were charged with burgling a 

dwelling, so the judges applied a higher offense level under 

§ 2K2.1(a).

After Mathis, however, it’s clear that this recourse to statecourt charging documents was improper. The relevant 

subsection of Wisconsin’s burglary statute sets forth alternative means of satisfying the location element of the state’s 

burglary offense. Accordingly, we vacate the sentences and 

remand for resentencing.

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4 Nos. 15-2373, 15-2374 & 15-2552

I. Background

A. Edwards

In 2013 Justin Edwards was charged with possessing a 

firearm as a felon, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and possessing a 

short-barreled shotgun, see 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841, 5845(a)(2), 

5861(d). He was released on bond while an appeal of an 

evidentiary ruling was pending and quickly racked up 

multiple state-law charges in three separate cases. In September 2014 Edwards was again arrested and charged with 

two more federal gun crimes—another charge of possessing

a firearm as a felon and a charge of possessing a firearm as a 

drug user, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). Plea agreements were

reached in both the 2013 and the 2014 federal cases. 

Two disputes arose at sentencing. First, the judge determined that Edwards’s prior Wisconsin conviction for burglary of a “building or dwelling,” WIS. STAT. § 943.10(1m)(a), 

qualified as a crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a)(2) of the 

Guidelines. To make that determination, the judge consulted

the state charging documents—a criminal complaint and 

information. Both documents stated that Edwards “intentionally enter[ed] a dwelling, without the consent of the 

person in lawful possession of the place, and with intent to 

steal.” On that basis, and over Edwards’s objection, the 

judge applied a higher base offense level under § 2K2.1(a)(2).

Second, and again over Edwards’s objection, the judge

declined to apply an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction

under § 3E1.1 of the Guidelines because Edwards committed

multiple criminal offenses while on pretrial release for the

2013 charges. With the crime-of-violence enhancement and 

without an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction, the 

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Nos. 15-2373, 15-2374 & 15-2552 5

Guidelines range was 92–115 months. The judge imposed a 

sentence of 92 months, the bottom of the range.

B. Pouliot

In an unrelated case in the same district, Ryan Pouliot 

was charged with possessing a firearm and ammunition as a 

felon, and he too pleaded guilty. At sentencing the judge

determined that Pouliot’s prior Wisconsin burglary conviction qualified as a crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a)(2) of 

the Guidelines. As in Edwards’s case, the judge consulted

the charging documents in the underlying state proceedings

to make that determination; those documents revealed that 

Pouliot had been charged with burgling a dwelling. The 

judge accordingly rejected Pouliot’s objection and applied 

the crime-of-violence enhancement under § 2K2.1(a)(3), 

which yielded a Guidelines range of 84–105 months. The 

judge imposed a below-range sentence of 72 months.

II. Discussion

Edwards and Pouliot challenge the application of the

crime-of-violence enhancement based on their Wisconsin 

burglary convictions. Edwards also challenges the judge’s 

refusal to apply an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction

under § 3E1.1.

A. Crime-of-Violence Enhancement

Whether a prior conviction counts as a crime of violence 

is a question of law that we review de novo. United States v. 

Woods, 576 F.3d 400, 408 (7th Cir. 2009). The version of the 

Guidelines in effect when the defendants were sentenced 

listed “burglary of a dwelling” as a qualifying “crime of 

violence.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2). The defendants have prior 

convictions for burglary in violation of section 943.10(1m)(a) 

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6 Nos. 15-2373, 15-2374 & 15-2552

of the Wisconsin Statutes, but that statute is broader than the 

Guidelines; it makes burglary of a “building or dwelling” a 

Class F felony. The issue here is whether subsection (a) of 

the Wisconsin burglary statute is divisible. If it is, then it was 

appropriate for the judges in these cases to consult the state 

charging documents. If it’s not divisible, then a conviction 

under Wisconsin’s burglary statute doesn’t qualify as a 

crime of violence for purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines.

1. Divisibility

The concept of divisibility is an outgrowth of the categorical approach that governs the crime-of-violence determination under the Sentencing Guidelines.2 See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. 

at 2248–49. The categorical approach disregards the facts

underlying a prior conviction, focusing instead on the 

statutory definition of the offense. See id. at 2248 (citing

Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600–01 (1990)). If the 

statutory definition is the same as (or narrower than) the 

Guidelines definition, the prior conviction can be counted as 

a crime of violence. But if a statute defines an offense more

broadly than the Guidelines, the prior conviction doesn’t 

count, “even if the defendant’s actual conduct (i.e., the facts 

 

2 The categorical approach was developed in the context of the Armed 

Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), which enhances the sentence of a felon 

who has three prior convictions for a “violent felony.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). 

The ACCA definition of a violent felony is “closely analogous” to the 

Guidelines definition of a crime of violence. United States v. Woods, 

576 F.3d 400, 403–04 (7th Cir. 2009). Accordingly, we’ve held that the 

categorical approach applies when determining if a prior conviction 

qualifies as a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines, see id., 

and “we refer to cases dealing with the ACCA and the career offender 

guideline provision interchangeably,” United States v. Taylor, 630 F.3d 

629, 633 n.2 (7th Cir. 2010).

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Nos. 15-2373, 15-2374 & 15-2552 7

of the crime)” would fit within the Guidelines definition. Id.

Consequently, in most cases the sentencing judge’s inquiry 

is limited to “the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense.” Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602.

We say “most cases” because the categorical approach 

“may permit the sentencing court to go beyond the mere fact 

of conviction in a narrow range of cases where a jury was 

actually required to find all the elements” of the Guidelines 

offense. Id. This occurs when a statute is “divisible,” meaning it “sets out one or more elements of the offense in the 

alternative.” Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2281 

(2013). Under these circumstances a court may “consult a 

limited class of documents ... to determine which alternative 

formed the basis of the defendant’s prior conviction.” Id. The 

documents that may be consulted include charging papers, 

jury instructions, and any available plea agreements or plea 

colloquies. Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 20 (2005). 

This variant of the categorical approach has been dubbed the 

“modified categorical approach.” Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 

2281.

Until recently, the circuits were split regarding what 

qualifies as a divisible statute. Some had held that any 

statute containing a list of alternatives is divisible, while

others distinguished between statutes that list alternative 

elements (thus creating multiple offenses) and statutes that 

create a single offense with alternative means of satisfying 

an element of that offense. See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2250–51, 

2251 n.1. The Supreme Court resolved the split in Mathis, 

holding that a statute is divisible only if it creates multiple 

offenses by listing one or more alternative elements. Id. at 

2253–54. A statute that defines a single offense with alternaCase: 15-2552 Document: 36 Filed: 09/08/2016 Pages: 16
8 Nos. 15-2373, 15-2374 & 15-2552

tive means of satisfying a particular element is indivisible

and therefore not subject to the modified categorical approach. Id. at 2251.3

2. Wisconsin’s Burglary Statute

With this framework in place, we proceed to the central 

question presented here: Is subsection (a) of Wisconsin’s 

burglary statute divisible? As we’ve just explained, the 

answer depends on whether subsection (a) defines multiple 

offenses by listing alternative elements or instead lists

alternative means of committing a single offense. “Elements 

are the constituent parts of a crime’s legal definition—the 

 

3 Like the Supreme Court’s other decisions addressing the categorical 

approach, Mathis dealt with whether a prior conviction qualifies as a 

violent felony under the ACCA. The Court highlighted three reasons for 

its “adher[ence] to an elements-only inquiry”: (1) the ACCA’s use of the 

word “conviction” mandates it; (2) a contrary approach would “raise 

serious Sixth Amendment concerns”; and (3) “an elements-focus avoids 

unfairness to defendants” by preventing factual admissions that a 

defendant had no reason to contest in a prior proceeding from serving as 

the basis for an enhanced penalty. United States v. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 

2252–53 (2016). After United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), the 

Guidelines no longer raise the same Sixth Amendment concerns as the 

ACCA. But the Guidelines do use the same language of “conviction” and 

create the same potential for unfairness to defendants in sentencing. Cf. 

United States v. Jones, 2016 WL 3923838, at *4 (2d Cir. July 21, 2016) 

(applying the reasoning of Mathis to the career-offender guideline). 

And Mathis itself indicates that its holding applies in the immigration context, where Sixth Amendment concerns are similarly immaterial. 

136 S. Ct. at 2253 n.3; accord Gomez-Perez v. Lynch, 2016 WL 3709757, at *2 

& n.4 (5th Cir. July 11, 2016). These reasons, along with our precedents 

treating ACCA and Guidelines cases interchangeably for purposes of the 

categorical approach, lead us to conclude that Mathis applies with equal 

force in the context of the career-offender guideline. 

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things the prosecution must prove to sustain a conviction.” 

Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Means, in contrast, are legally extraneous facts that “need 

neither be found by a jury nor admitted by a defendant.” Id. 

The distinction is both familiar and important because 

“[c]alling a particular kind of fact an ‘element’ carries certain 

legal consequences.” Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 

817 (1999). “[A] jury in a federal criminal case cannot convict 

unless it unanimously finds that the Government has proved 

each element” of an offense, but all members of the jury 

need not agree on “which of several possible means the 

defendant used to commit an element of the crime.” Id.; see 

also Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2156 (2013). 

Multiplicity challenges likewise turn on the elements of the 

charged offenses: The Double Jeopardy Clause permits 

successive punishment or prosecution of multiple offenses 

arising out of the same conduct only if each offense contains 

a unique element. See United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 

696, 703–04 (1993) (citing Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 

299, 304 (1932)); accord United States v. Larsen, 615 F.3d 780, 

788 (7th Cir. 2010) (“In multiplicity challenges the elements of 

each offense—not the specific offense conduct—determine 

whether two offenses are the same for purposes of double 

jeopardy.”). After Mathis the divisibility of a statute rests on 

the same distinction between elements and means. 136 S. Ct. 

at 2254–55.

Mathis offers some practical guidance for drawing the 

distinction in this particular context. First, a decision by the 

state supreme court authoritatively construing the relevant 

statute will both begin and end the inquiry. Id. at 2256; see 

also Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 636 (1991) (“If a State’s 

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10 Nos. 15-2373, 15-2374 & 15-2552

courts have determined that certain statutory alternatives 

are mere means of committing a single offense, rather than 

independent elements of the crime, we simply are not at 

liberty to ignore that determination ... .”). Absent a controlling state-court decision, the text and structure of the statute 

itself may provide the answer. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256; see 

also Schad, 501 U.S. at 636 (“The question whether statutory 

alternatives constitute independent elements of the offense ... is a substantial question of statutory construction.”).

Failing those “authoritative sources of state law,” sentencing 

courts may look to “the record of a prior conviction itself” 

for the limited purpose of distinguishing between elements 

and means. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256–57. 

The parties haven’t directed us to a decision of the 

Wisconsin Supreme Court that construes subsection (a) of 

the state’s burglary statute, and our own search has yielded 

none. Accordingly, we’re on our own and turn first to the 

text and structure of the statute itself. Section 943.10(1m) 

provides: 

Whoever intentionally enters any of the following places without the consent of the person in lawful possession and with intent to 

steal or commit a felony in such place is guilty 

of a Class F felony:

(a) Any building or dwelling; or

(b) An enclosed railroad car; or

(c) An enclosed portion of any ship or vessel; or

(d) A locked enclosed cargo portion of a

truck or trailer; or

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(e) A motor home or other motorized type of 

home or a trailer home, whether or not any 

person is living in any such home; or

(f) A room within any of the above.

The statute thus criminalizes the act of intentionally entering certain types of locations without consent and with 

the intent to steal or commit a felony. Subsections (a)–(f) 

describe the various locations that the statute covers, any 

one of which will satisfy the location requirement for burglary. The phrase “building or dwelling” is one of several 

disjunctively phrased lists that appear within these subsections. 

The statute’s text and structure suggest that the components of each subsection are merely “illustrative examples” 

of particular location types. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256. That’s

clearly true for subsections (c)–(e) given the virtually synonymous terms contained within these subsections. See, e.g., 

Manson v. State, 304 N.W.2d 729, 736 (Wis. 1981) (“If the 

[statutory] alternatives are similar, one crime was probably 

intended.”). There’s no plausible argument that the Wisconsin legislature intended to create a distinct offense for entering a “ship” as opposed to a “vessel,” a “truck” as opposed 

to a “trailer,” or a “motor home or other motorized home” as 

opposed to a “trailer home.” These subsections simply 

identify several different ways of describing a particular 

location.

To put the question in double-jeopardy terms: The statutory structure does not suggest that each subsection creates 

multiple crimes; a ship is a particular type of vessel, but a 

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12 Nos. 15-2373, 15-2374 & 15-2552

prosecutor couldn’t charge two counts of burglary for a 

single act of breaking into a ship.

Read in this context, the phrase “building or dwelling” in 

subsection (a) is best understood as likewise providing two 

examples of enclosed structures rather than creating two 

separate offenses. Reinforcing that conclusion is the fact that 

those alternatives carry the same punishment. Cf. Mathis, 

136 S. Ct. at 2256 (“If statutory alternatives carry different 

punishments, then under Apprendi they must be elements.”). 

On its face subsection (a) of Wisconsin’s burglary statute 

thus identifies two means of committing a single crime rather 

than alternative elements.

To the extent that we have lingering uncertainties about 

whether “building” and “dwelling” are elements or means,

Mathis suggests that we resolve them by looking to the

record of the defendant’s prior conviction. Because both 

defendants pleaded guilty in the underlying state-court 

proceedings, the record is limited to the charging documents 

and in Edwards’s case, the plea colloquy. See Descamps, 

133 S. Ct. at 2285 n.2 (noting that courts may look to any of 

the Shepard documents, including the “indictment, jury 

instructions, plea colloquy, and plea agreement”). The Court 

explained in Descamps (and reiterated in Mathis) that these 

documents will likely “reflect the crime’s elements.” Id.; 

Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256–57. 

The Shepard documents are of little use here. Cf. Mathis, 

136 S. Ct. at 2257 (“Of course, such record materials will not 

in every case speak plainly ... .”). Under Wisconsin law the

complaint and information, which are the documents that

initiate proceedings against a criminal defendant, must 

allege every element of the crime charged, but they may also 

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Nos. 15-2373, 15-2374 & 15-2552 13

(and usually do) include additional facts that need not be 

proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. 

Baldwin, 304 N.W.2d 742, 746 (Wis. 1981) (“[W]hile a charging document must always allege facts necessary to support 

a conviction, it does not follow that a conviction requires 

proof of every fact alleged in a complaint.”). Similarly, the 

recitation of a crime’s elements during a plea colloquy may 

include as much or as little factual detail as necessary for the 

defendant to understand the nature of the charges against 

him. See State v. Brown, 716 N.W.2d 906, 2006 WI 100, ¶ 52. 

Indeed, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has “encourage[d] 

circuit court judges to translate legal generalities into factual 

specifics when necessary to ensure the defendant’s understanding of the charges.” Id. ¶¶ 56, 58. The upshot of these 

rules is that in Wisconsin neither the charging documents 

nor a plea colloquy will necessarily reflect only the elements 

of a crime. 

These two appeals illustrate a practical difficulty that can 

arise in applying the Mathis/Descamps rule. In the state-court 

proceedings against Edwards and Pouliot, the complaint 

and information specify that each defendant was charged 

with burgling a dwelling. If Wisconsin law required that all 

facts alleged in the charging documents be proved to a jury 

beyond a reasonable doubt, we could conclude that “dwelling” is an element. But because the charging documents may 

allege additional facts, the inclusion of “dwelling” tells us 

nothing about whether it’s an element of burglary or simply 

a factual description of the type of enclosed structure the 

defendant entered. Edwards’s plea colloquy is similarly 

unhelpful: It includes a recitation of the “elements of burglary as they apply to [Edwards’s] case.” (Emphasis added.) In 

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14 Nos. 15-2373, 15-2374 & 15-2552

short, the record materials simply do not speak to whether 

“building” and “dwelling” are elements or means. 

Left with only the text and structure of Wisconsin’s burglary statute, we conclude that subsection (a) lists alternative 

means rather than elements and is therefore indivisible. That 

conclusion resolves this appeal: The elements of the crime of 

conviction “cover a greater swath of conduct” than the 

elements of the Guidelines offense, so the defendants’ 

burglary convictions cannot serve as predicate offenses 

under § 2K2.1(a). Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2251. Edwards and 

Pouliot are entitled to resentencing. 

B. Acceptance-of-Responsibility Reduction

Edwards raises an additional challenge to his sentence.

He argues that the district judge erred by refusing to apply 

an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction under § 3E1.1 of 

the Guidelines. We review the judge’s decision for clear 

error. United States v. Seller, 595 F.3d 791, 793 (7th Cir. 2010).

Section 3E1.1(a) calls for a two-level reduction in the defendant’s offense level “[i]f the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense.” Application note 3 explains that entry of a guilty plea before trial 

and truthfully admitting any additional relevant conduct 

“will constitute significant evidence of acceptance of responsibility” but “may be outweighed by conduct of the defendant that is inconsistent with such acceptance of responsibility.” § 3E1.1 cmt. n.3. Continued criminal activity is the sort 

of conduct that is inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility. United States v. McDonald, 22 F.3d 139, 144 (7th Cir. 

1994). However, “the Guidelines do not authorize the court 

to adopt a per se rule denying a reduction when a defendant 

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Nos. 15-2373, 15-2374 & 15-2552 15

engages in further criminal activity.” United States v. Bothun, 

424 F.3d 582, 587 (7th Cir. 2005).

Edwards has wisely omitted a challenge to the judge’s 

finding that he continued to engage in criminal activity 

while on pretrial release for his 2013 offenses. Instead he 

argues that the judge wrongly thought that this conduct

necessarily precluded an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction. This argument rests on the following comment by the 

judge: 

I understand that [Edwards] thinks he should 

receive the credit because he did cooperate 

with investigators, he never contested his criminal conduct, and he was arrested without incident. However, the other part of that --

what’s required for that reduction is that he 

voluntarily terminate his criminal conduct and 

associations and he did not do that.

Edwards argues that the judge’s reference to “what’s required” for acceptance-of-responsibility credit means that 

she treated his continued criminal activity as categorically 

disqualifying. 

We disagree. The judge expressly acknowledged that 

Edwards’s guilty plea and admission of other relevant 

conduct weighed in favor of the downward adjustment. 

That’s enough to satisfy us that she understood the law and 

considered factors both for and against an acceptance-ofresponsibility reduction. See id. And given how extensive 

Edwards’s continued criminal activity was, the judge’s 

determination that it outweighed Edwards’s cooperation 

was not clear error.

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16 Nos. 15-2373, 15-2374 & 15-2552

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the defendants’

sentences and REMAND for resentencing. 

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