Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02096/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02096-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Crystal Lynn Van Antwerp
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CRYSTAL LYNN VAN ANTWERP,

Plaintiff,

v.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

No. 2:15-cv-2096 DB

ORDER

This social security action was submitted to the court without oral argument for ruling on 

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment.1 

Plaintiff argues that the Administrative Law Judge’s findings with respect to Listing 12.05C, 

residual functional capacity, and plaintiff’s subjective testimony were erroneous. For the reasons 

explained below, plaintiff’s motion is denied, defendant’s cross-motion is granted, and the 

decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) is affirmed. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 2, 2010, plaintiff filed an application for Supplemental Security Income 

(“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act (“the Act”), alleging disability beginning on

 

1

 Both parties have previously consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction over this action 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (See ECF Nos. 6 & 8.)

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September 1, 2009. (Transcript (“Tr”) at 105-11.) Plaintiff’s application was denied initially, (id.

at 66-70), and upon reconsideration. (Id. at 76-81.) Plaintiff requested a hearing before an 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ)”, and on October 13, 2011, an ALJ found that plaintiff was not 

disabled. (Id. at 20-27.) On April 18, 2013, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for 

review of the ALJ’s October 13, 2011 decision. (Id. at 1-3.)

Plaintiff filed a civil action in this court on June 13, 2013. (Id. at 588.) On July 29, 2014, 

the court issued an order approving the parties’ stipulation to remand the matter for further 

administrative proceedings. (Id. at 592-93.) 

On June 4, 2015, plaintiff appeared at yet another administrative hearing before an ALJ. 

(Id. at 549-86.) Plaintiff was represented by an attorney and testified at the administrative 

hearing. (Id. at 549-50.) The ALJ issued a partially favorable decision on July 29, 2015, finding 

that plaintiff became disabled on January 8, 2015. (Id. at 542.) The ALJ entered the following 

findings:

1. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

since the alleged onset date (20 CFR 416.971 et seq.).

2. Since the alleged onset date of disability, September 1, 2009, the 

claimant has had the following severe impairments: generalized 

anxiety disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), 

borderline intellectual functioning, Marfan Syndrome, bilateral 

hallux valgus and pes planus, bilateral subtalar degenerative joint 

disease, status post right anterior cruciate ligament repair with early 

patellofemoral arthrosis, obesity, and myofascial pain of the low 

back (20 CFR 416.920(c)).

3. Since the alleged onset date of disability, September 1, 2009, the 

claimant has not had an impairment or combination of impairments 

that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed 

impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 

416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926). 

4. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned 

finds that prior to January 8, 2015, the date the claimant became 

disabled, the claimant had the residual functional capacity to 

perform simple, unskilled work in an (sic) nonpublic setting with 

occasional fellow employee contact. Beginning on January 8, 

2015, the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform 

light work in a nonpublic setting with occasional fellow employee 

contact. She is frequently unable to perform work activities on a 

consistent basis due to interruptions from psychologically based 

symptoms. 

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5. The claimant has no past relevant work (20 CFR 416.965).

6. Prior to the established disability onset date, the claimant was a 

younger individual age 18-49. The claimant’s age category has not 

changed since the established disability onset date (20 CFR 

416.963).

7. The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to 

communicate in English (20 CFR 416.964).

8. Transferability of job skills is not an issue in this case because 

the claimant does not have past relevant work (20 CFR 416.968). 

9. Prior to January 8, 2015, considering the claimant’s age, 

education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there 

were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national 

economy that the claimant could have performed (20 CFR 416.969 

and 416.969a).

10. Beginning on January 8, 2015, considering the claimant’s age, 

education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there 

are no jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national 

economy that the claimant can perform (20 CFR 416.960(c) and 

416.966).

11. The claimant was not disabled prior to January 8, 2015, but 

became disabled on that date and has continued to be disabled 

through the date of this decision (20 CFR 416.920(g)).

(Id. at 532-42.)

Plaintiff sought judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) by filing the complaint in 

this action on October 6, 2015. (ECF No. 1.)

LEGAL STANDARD

“The district court reviews the Commissioner’s final decision for substantial evidence, 

and the Commissioner’s decision will be disturbed only if it is not supported by substantial 

evidence or is based on legal error.” Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 2012). 

Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion. Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001); Sandgathe v. 

Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997).

“[A] reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm 

simply by isolating a ‘specific quantum of supporting evidence.’” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 

466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir.

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1989)). If, however, “the record considered as a whole can reasonably support either affirming or 

reversing the Commissioner’s decision, we must affirm.” McCartey v. Massanari, 298 F.3d 

1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2002). 

A five-step evaluation process is used to determine whether a claimant is disabled. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520; see also Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007). The five-step 

process has been summarized as follows:

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful activity? 

If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed to step 

two.

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? If so, 

proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is 

appropriate.

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination of 

impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 

404, Subpt. P, App. 1? If so, the claimant is automatically 

determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four.

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past work? If 

so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step five.

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional capacity 

to perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If 

not, the claimant is disabled.

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995).

The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 

process. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n. 5 (1987). The Commissioner bears the burden 

if the sequential evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.; Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 

1098 (9th Cir. 1999).

APPLICATION

Plaintiff’s pending motion asserts the following three principal errors: (1) plaintiff meets 

Listing 12.05C; (2) the ALJ’s residual functional capacity determination is erroneous; and (3) the 

ALJ improperly rejected plaintiff’s subjective testimony. (Pl.’s MSJ (ECF No. 16) at 12-19.

2

)

////

 

2

 Page number citations such as this one are to the page number reflected on the court’s CM/ECF 

system and not to page numbers assigned by the parties.

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I. Listing 12.05C

Plaintiff argues that “the ALJ erred in determining that plaintiff did not satisfy Listing 

12.05C and remand for calculation of benefits is warranted.” (Id. at 13.) At step three of the 

sequential evaluation, the ALJ must determine whether a claimant’s impairment or impairments 

meet or equal one of the specific impairments set forth in the Listings. 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). The physical and mental conditions contained in the 

Listings are considered so severe that “they are irrebuttably presumed disabling, without any 

specific finding as to the claimant’s ability to perform his past relevant work or any other jobs.” 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 (9th Cir. 1995). The Listings were “designed to operate as a 

presumption of disability that makes further inquiry unnecessary.” Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 

521, 532 (1990); see also Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 512 (9th Cir. 2001). If a claimant shows 

that his impairments meet or equal a Listing, she will be found presumptively disabled. 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1525-404.1526, 416.925-416.926.

The claimant bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of disability under the 

Listings. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 955 (9th Cir. 2002). To “meet” a listed 

impairment, the claimant must establish that her condition satisfies each element of the listed 

impairment. See Zebley, 493 U.S. at 530; Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1099 (9th Cir. 1999). 

To “equal” a listed impairment, the claimant “must establish symptoms, signs, and laboratory 

findings” at least equal in severity and duration to each element of the listed impairment. Id.

“A claimant satisfies Listing 12.05C, demonstrating ‘intellectual disability’ and ending the 

five-step inquiry, if [s]he can show: (1) subaverage intellectual functioning with deficits in 

adaptive functioning initially manifested before age 22; (2) a valid IQ score of 60 to 70; and (3) a 

physical or other mental impairment imposing an additional and significant work-related 

limitation.” Kennedy v. Colvin, 738 F.3d 1172, 1174 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, 

subpt. P, app. 1, § 12.05C).

Here, on May 6, 2010, Dr. Robert Bilbrey examined plaintiff using, in part, the Weschsler 

Adult Intelligence Scale-III. (Tr. at 283-87.) Plaintiff’s verbal IQ score 64 and full scale IQ was 

69. (Id. at 285.) The ALJ’s decision discussed Dr. Bilbrey’s finding, stating:

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Although psychological testing conducted by Dr. Bilbrey revealed 

scores in the mildly mentally retarded range, Dr. Bilbrey did not 

diagnose mental retardation. Indeed, Dr. Bilbrey noted that the 

scores were inconsistent with her fluent speech and higher 

functional history. He opined that she might have borderline 

intellectual functioning or a learning disorder. 

(Id. at 534.) The ALJ went on to state that in January of 2015, plaintiff was administered the 

same test by a different doctor and obtained a full scale IQ score of 75. (Id.) The ALJ found that 

score to be consistent with plaintiff’s “average grades with some special education support,” and 

the fact that plaintiff “attended some college classes where she obtained a certificate in office 

administration.” (Id.) In this regard, the ALJ found that plaintiff’s impairment or impairments 

did not meet or equal Listing 12.05. (Id.)

An ALJ may find that an IQ score is not valid. See Thresher v. Astrue, 283 Fed. Appx. 

473, 475 (9th Cir. 2008). Although the Ninth Circuit has not stated what factors the ALJ may 

consider in finding an IQ to be invalid, “[c]ourts outside the Ninth Circuit permit an ALJ to 

consider several factors in assessing the validity of test results, such as evidence of malingering or 

feigning results, daily activities inconsistent with the alleged impairment, and psychologists’

opinions that are supported by objective medical findings.” Martinez v. Colvin, No. 1:14-cv0578 SKO, 2015 WL 4662620, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2015); see, e.g., Hancock v. Astrue, 667 

F.3d 470, 474 (4th Cir. 2012) (“We agree with our sister circuits that an ALJ has the discretion to 

assess the validity of an IQ test result and is not required to accept it even if it is the only such 

result in the record.”); Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1087 (10th Cir. 2007) (“We conclude that it 

was proper for the ALJ to consider other evidence in the record when determining whether Lax’s 

IQ scores were valid and that the record contains substantial evidence to support a finding that 

Lax’s IQ scores were not an accurate reflection of his intellectual capabilities.”); Markle v. 

Barnhart, 324 F.3d 182, 186 (3rd Cir. 2003) (“the Commissioner is not required to accept a 

claimant’s IQ scores and may reject scores that are inconsistent with the record”); Clark v. Apfel, 

141 F.3d 1253, 1255 (8th Cir. 1998) (same); Lowery v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 

1992) (“a valid I.Q. score need not be conclusive of mental retardation where the I.Q. score is 

inconsistent with other evidence in the record on the claimant’s daily activities and behavior”). 

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Here, in finding Dr. Bilbrey’s score invalid, the ALJ relied upon Dr. Bilbrey’s finding that 

plaintiff’s score was “unexpected” and “inconsistent with her presentation of fluent speech and 

higher functioning history.” (Tr. at 287.) The ALJ also relied upon plaintiff’s history of 

attending college classes, as well as the conflicting higher IQ score. (Id. at 534.) In this regard, 

the ALJ permissibly considered whether plaintiff’s IQ score was valid, found that it was not, and 

that finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record. See generally APPENDIX 1 TO 

SUBPART P OF PART 404—LISTING OF IMPAIRMENTS, 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 

1, §12.00 D(1)(6)(a) (July 20, 2015) (“However, since the results of intelligence tests are only 

part of the overall assessment, the narrative report that accompanies the test results should 

comment on whether the IQ scores are considered valid and consistent with the developmental 

history and the degree of functional limitation.”).

Accordingly, the court finds that plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment on the 

claim that the ALJ erred in determining that plaintiff did not meet or equal listing 12.05C.

II. Residual Functional Capacity Determination

A claimant’s Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) is “the most [the claimant] can still 

do despite [his or her] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a); 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(1); see also

Cooper v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152, n.5 (9th Cir. 1989) (“A claimant’s residual functional capacity 

is what he can still do despite his physical, mental, nonexertional, and other limitations.”). In 

conducting an RFC assessment, the ALJ must consider the combined effects of an applicant’s 

medically determinable impairments on the applicant’s ability to perform sustainable work. 42 

U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(B); Macri v. Chater, 93 F.3d 540, 545 (9th Cir. 1996). The ALJ must 

consider all of the relevant medical opinions as well as the combined effects of all of the 

plaintiff’s impairments, even those that are not “severe.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a); 416.945(a); 

Celaya v. Halter, 332 F.3d 1177, 1182 (9th Cir. 2003). “[A]n RFC that fails to take into account a 

claimant’s limitations is defective.” Valentine v. Commissioner Social Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 

685, 690 (9th Cir. 2009). The ALJ must determine a claimant’s limitations on the basis of “all 

relevant evidence in the record.” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 

2006).

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Here, plaintiff first argues that the ALJ “gave no reasons” for finding plaintiff “less 

limited on the same evidence” in the July 29, 2015 decision than in the October 13, 2011 

decision. (Pl.’s MSJ (ECF No. 16) at 14.) As noted by defendant, however, the October 13, 2011 

decision was reversed by this court, pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, and the matter remanded 

for further proceedings. (Def.’s MSJ (ECF No. 19) at 13.) In this regard, this court did not 

previously opine as to the propriety of the October 13, 2011 decision. And what is before this 

court now is only the ALJ’s July 29, 2015 decision.

Next, plaintiff argues that plaintiff’s “Marfan Syndrome impairments . . . . establish she 

has further limitations” than those found by the ALJ. (Pl.’s MSJ (ECF No. 16) at 15.) As noted 

above, however, the ALJ is tasked with determining plaintiff’s RFC. RFC is “the most [the 

claimant] can still do despite [his or her] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a); 20 C.F.R. § 

416.945(1). Plaintiff’s argument simply states that plaintiff’s deformed feet and lax knees, 

establish further limitations. (Pl.’s MSJ (ECF No. 16) at 15.) That does not address whether 

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC determination in spite of plaintiff’s deformed feet 

and lax knees. 

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ “granted too much weight to the Agency consulting 

orthopedist Dr. Simmonds.” (Id.) In this regard, Dr. John Simmonds examined plaintiff on May 

12, 2010, and opined that plaintiff could perform light exertional work with some postural 

limitations. (Tr. at 292, 538.) The ALJ’s decision afforded Dr. Simmonds’ opinion “good 

weight.” (Id. at 538.)

In this regard, the ALJ found that Dr. Simmonds was a specialist, his opinion was based 

on Dr. Simmonds’ own examination, and that it was “generally consistent” with the opinions 

afforded by the nonexamining physicians and the treatment record. (Id. at 538.) See Orn v. 

Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 632 (9th Cir. 2007) (“when an examining physician provides independent 

clinical findings that differ from the findings of the treating physician, such findings are 

substantial evidence”); Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 594 n.4 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(5)) (“opinion of a specialist about medical issues related to his or her area 

of specialty’” should be given greater weight); Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 

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1995) (“reports of the nonexamining advisor need not be discounted and may serve as substantial 

evidence when they are supported by other evidence in the record and are consistent with it”).

The ALJ did, however, afford “little weight” to Dr. Simmonds’ opined postural 

limitations. (Tr. at 538.) In this regard, the ALJ found that those limitations were inconsistent 

with plaintiff’s ability to “care for her son, change positions without difficulty, climb stairs 

without problems, and perform household activities . . . .” (Id.) That finding is consistent with 

the record. 

For example, Dr. Simmonds found that plaintiff’s “joint range of motion [was] within 

normal limits,” and plaintiff was “able to get onto and off the examination table and assume a 

supine position without any assistance or difficulty.” (Id. at 290.) The ALJ also noted that 

examinations revealed that plaintiff had “no difficulty walking up and down stairs or chang[ing] 

positions.” (Id. at 537.) 

 Finally, plaintiff argues that the “imagining evidence was not reviewed” by an examining or 

nonexamining physician and, therefore, this matter must be remanded so that they may be 

“assessed by an acceptable medical source.” (Pl.’s MSJ (ECF No. 16) at 16-17.) Plaintiff, 

however, cites no authority in support of this argument nor was the court able to locate any.3

Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment on 

the claim that the ALJ’s RFC determination constituted error. 

III. Subjective Testimony

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ “improperly discredited or ignored” plaintiff’s testimony 

concerning non-exertional impairment. (Id. at 17.) The Ninth Circuit has summarized the ALJ’s 

task with respect to assessing a claimant’s credibility as follows:

To determine whether a claimant’s testimony regarding subjective 

pain or symptoms is credible, an ALJ must engage in a two-step 

analysis. First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has 

presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment 

which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other 

 

3

 In a footnote, plaintiff cites a number of cases for the proposition that an ALJ cannot arbitrarily 

substitute the ALJ’s judgment for that of a competent medical opinion. (Pl.’s MSJ (ECF No. 16) 

at 16.) That, however, is not at issue in this action as the record contains competent medical 

opinions which the ALJ adopted. 

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symptoms alleged. The claimant, however, need not show that her 

impairment could reasonably be expected to cause the severity of 

the symptom she has alleged; she need only show that it could 

reasonably have caused some degree of the symptom. Thus, the 

ALJ may not reject subjective symptom testimony . . . simply 

because there is no showing that the impairment can reasonably 

produce the degree of symptom alleged.

Second, if the claimant meets this first test, and there is no evidence 

of malingering, the ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony about 

the severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and 

convincing reasons for doing so . . . .

Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). “The clear and convincing standard is the most demanding required in Social Security 

cases.” Moore v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 278 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2002). “At 

the same time, the ALJ is not required to believe every allegation of disabling pain, or else 

disability benefits would be available for the asking . . . .” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 

(9th Cir. 2012).

“The ALJ must specifically identify what testimony is credible and what testimony 

undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Valentine, 574 F.3d at 693 (quoting Morgan v. Comm’r 

of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999)). In weighing a claimant’s credibility, an 

ALJ may consider, among other things, the “[claimant’s] reputation for truthfulness, 

inconsistencies either in [claimant’s] testimony or between [her] testimony and [her] conduct, 

[claimant’s] daily activities, [her] work record, and testimony from physicians and third parties 

concerning the nature, severity, and effect of the symptoms of which [claimant] complains.” 

Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2002) (modification in original) (quoting 

Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997)). If the ALJ’s credibility finding is 

supported by substantial evidence in the record, the court “may not engage in second-guessing.” 

Id. 

Here, the ALJ considered plaintiff’s testimony and found that plaintiff’s medically 

determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the symptoms alleged but that 

plaintiff’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of those symptoms 

were “not entirely credible prior to January 8, 2015 . . . .” (Tr. at 537.) 

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In this regard, the ALJ found that plaintiff’s allegations were inconsistent with the fact 

that plaintiff’s impairments were “controlled with minimal treatment.” (Id.) The ALJ noted that 

plaintiff had “not required surgery, chiropractic adjustments, acupuncture, pain management 

treatment, use of a TENS unit, extensive physical therapy, or frequent changes in medications.” 

(Id.) “[E]vidence of ‘conservative treatment’ is sufficient to discount a claimant’s testimony 

regarding severity of an impairment.” Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 751 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Accordingly, the court finds that plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment with 

respect to the claim that the ALJ’s treatment of plaintiff’s subjective testimony constituted error. 

CONCLUSION

The court has found that plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment on any claim. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 16) is denied;

2. Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 19) is granted; 

3. The decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is affirmed; and

4. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment for defendant, and close this case

Dated: March 27, 2017

DLB:6

DB\orders\orders.soc sec\vanantwerp2096.ord

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