Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-14-03429/USCOURTS-ca8-14-03429-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Loretta E. Lynch
Respondent
Callen Marube
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-3429

___________________________

Callen Marube,

lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioner,

v.

Loretta E. Lynch, United States Attorney General,1

lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent.

____________

Petition for Review of an Order of the

 Board of Immigration Appeals

____________

 Submitted: September 21, 2015

 Filed: December 14, 2015

[Unpublished]

____________

Before WOLLMAN, COLLOTON, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

____________

PER CURIAM.

1

Loretta E. Lynch is automatically substituted for Eric H. Holder, Jr., pursuant

to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2).

Appellate Case: 14-3429 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/14/2015 Entry ID: 4346529 
Callen Marube, a native and citizen of Kenya, petitions for review of a decision

of the Board of Immigration Appeals denying her request for special rule cancellation

of removal. We deny the petition.

Marube entered the United States on an F-1 student visa in 2005 to attend

Wichita State University, but she never enrolled in classes. She married Terrell

Miller, a United States citizen, in 2006 and filed Forms I-130 and I-485 as an alien

relative to adjust her status to lawful permanent resident. The Department of

Homeland Security denied the Form I-130 application on the ground that Marube’s

marriage to Miller was fraudulent, and Marube withdrew her Form I-485 application. 

The Department then charged Marube as removable for failure to comply with

nonimmigrant status, for failure to fulfill a marital agreement that was made for the

purpose of procuring admission to the United States, and as an alien inadmissible at

the time of entry for seeking to procure admission into the United States by fraud.

At a hearing before an immigration judge, Marube admitted that she was

removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C)(i) for failure to comply with nonimmigrant

status. Marube filed an application for cancellation of removal under a special rule

of 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2), based on allegations that she was battered or subjected to

extreme cruelty by Miller and that removal would result in extreme hardship to her or

her daughter, a United States citizen. In the alternative, she sought voluntary

departure under 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b) in lieu of removal. The immigration judge held

a second hearing and received testimony from Marube, her second husband, and other

witnesses. The immigration judge also heard testimony from the immigration officer

who investigated Marube’s first marriage to Miller and determined the marriage to be

fraudulent.

The immigration judge denied Marube’s request for cancellation of removal. 

The immigration judge found that Marube was removable on two grounds: for failure

to comply with nonimmigrant status, and under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(G)(ii) for

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Appellate Case: 14-3429 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/14/2015 Entry ID: 4346529 
committing marriage fraud in her marriage to Miller. The immigration judge found

Marube’s testimony to be “mostly consistent” but noted “several omissions and

inconsistencies” and declined to give full weight to her testimony regarding her

marriage to Miller. Due to the finding of marriage fraud, the immigration judge

concluded that Marube was statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal under the

special rule for battered spouses and denied her application. 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229b(b)(2)(A)(iv). In lieu of removal, the immigration judge granted Marube’s

request for voluntary departure. Marube appealed the decision to the Board of

Immigration Appeals, arguing that the immigration judge’s credibility assessment and

findings of fact were clearly erroneous. The Board dismissed the appeal, and Marube

filed a timely petition for review.

We review the Board’s order as the final decision of the agency, but we lack

jurisdiction to review a discretionary decision to deny cancellation of removal. 8

U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i); Sanchez-Velasco v. Holder, 593 F.3d 733, 735 (8th Cir.

2010). We also lack jurisdiction to review any other decision “specified . . . to be in

the discretion of the Attorney General.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). We retain

jurisdiction to consider “constitutional claims or questions of law” raised in a petition

for review from the Board. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); Sanchez-Velasco, 593 F.3d at

735.

Marube raises two arguments in her petition for review. First, she argues that

the immigration judge’s decision to grant voluntary departure is inconsistent with his

determination that she had committed marriage fraud because voluntary departure

requires a finding of good moral character. 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(1)(B). Marube

appears to assert that the immigration judge’s finding of marriage fraud necessarily

implied a finding that Marube gave false testimony at her immigration hearing and

thus logically conflicted with a determination that she was a person of good moral

character for the purposes of voluntary departure. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6). 

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Appellate Case: 14-3429 Page: 3 Date Filed: 12/14/2015 Entry ID: 4346529 
We will not consider this contention, because Marube failed to raise it before

the Board. See Frango v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 726, 728 (8th Cir. 2006). Marube did

not argue that the immigration judge’s determinations on marriage fraud and voluntary

departure were inconsistent; rather, she took issue with the immigration judge’s

credibility determination and findings regarding marriage fraud in her agency appeal. 

The Board thus had no occasion to address the point. Marube has offered no good

reason why she should be exempted from the ordinary exhaustion requirement, and

we adhere to the general rule.

Second, Marube argues the immigration judge’s credibility findings were not

supported by substantial evidence. She asserts that the immigration judge focused on

minor inconsistencies in her testimony and ignored consistent statements in the record. 

This challenge to the immigration judge’s credibility determination lies squarely

within the agency’s discretion, and we lack jurisdiction to review it. 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229b(b)(2)(D) (“The determination of what evidence is credible and the weight to

be given that evidence shall be within the sole discretion of the Attorney General.”);

see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii); Hamilton v. Holder, 680 F.3d 1024, 1026-27

(8th Cir. 2012).

The petition for review is denied.

______________________________

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Appellate Case: 14-3429 Page: 4 Date Filed: 12/14/2015 Entry ID: 4346529