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Parties Involved:
Louis Sullivan
Appellee
Jack R. Williams
Appellant

Document Text:

FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS United States ~~rt~f Ap~b Tenth C1rcu1t 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT OCT 2 f 1991 

JACK R. WILLIAMS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

LOUIS SULLIVAN, Secretary of Health & 

Human Services, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

) Clerk 

) 

) 

) 

) No. 91-6083 

) (D.C. No. CIV-90-306-AR) 

) (W.D. Okla.) 

) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before McKAY, Chief Judge, EBEL, Circuit Judges, and SAFFELS,** 

District Judge. 

**Honorable Dale E. Saffels, Senior District Judge, United States 

District Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

* 

The case is therefore ordered 

This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 91-6083 Document: 010110091409 Date Filed: 10/21/1991 Page: 1 
Claimant, Jack R. Williams, appeals the district court's 

Order of January 16, 1991, affirming the decision of the Secretary 

of Health and Human Services to deny Claimant's request for social 

security benefits. Claimant filed his application for Title II 

benefits on January 22, 1988, alleging disability since June 15, 

1983, resulting from limited vision. Claimant does not contest 

the district court's finding that he last met the insured status 

requirements of the Social Security Act on December 31, 1988. 

District Court Order, Appellant App. at 10. 

Claimant's request for benefits was denied initially and on 

reconsideration. After a de novo hearing, the administrative law 

judge (ALJ) also denied Claimant's request. The Appeals Council 

denied review of the ALJ's decision. Claimant filed his Complaint 

in federal district court on February 21, 1990, seeking review of 

the decision denying him benefits. The district court affirmed 

the agency decision. 

The Secretary has established a five-step evaluation process 

pursuant to the Social Security Act for determining whether a 

claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Act. See Williams 

v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988)(describing five 

steps in detail). If, at any step in the process, it is 

determined that a claimant is or is not disabled, the process 

stops. See Casias v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 933 F.2d 

799, 801 (10th Cir. 1991). 

In this case, the ALJ reached step four of the analysis, 

concluding that Claimant was capable of returning to his past 

relevant work. Alternatively, reaching step five, the ALJ also 

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Appellate Case: 91-6083 Document: 010110091409 Date Filed: 10/21/1991 Page: 2 
found that Claimant could perform other substantial gainful 

employment available in the national economy. Under either 

analysis, the ALJ found that Claimant was not disabled, a 

conclusion affirmed by the district court. On appeal, Claimant 

presents three issues: 1) did the ALJ err in concluding Claimant 

could return to his past relevant work, 2) did the ALJ err in 

determining Claimant could perform other available jobs, and 

3) did the ALJ properly evaluate the evidence regarding Claimant's 

alleged pain? 

When the Appeals Council denied Claimant's request to review 

the ALJ's decision, the ALJ's decision became the final decision 

of the Secretary for appeal purposes. See Williams, 844 F.2d at 

749. We review the Secretary's decision to determine whether his 

findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record and 

whether he applied the correct legal standards. Pacheco v. 

Sullivan, 931 F.2d 695, 696 (10th Cir. 1991). Evidence is not 

substantial if it is merely conclusory or overwhelmed by other 

evidence. Ellison v. Sullivan, 929 F.2d 534, 536 (10th Cir. 

1990). Failure to apply correct legal standards or to provide the 

appellate court with a sufficient basis to determine whether those 

standards have been properly applied is grounds for reversal. See 

Byron v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 1232, 1235 (10th Cir. 1984). 

Claimant first takes issue with the ALJ's determination that 

he could return to his past relevant work, arguing that the ALJ 

"wholly ignored" Claimant's "significantly limiting psychiatric 

condition" and his "severe ulcer condition." At the Secretary's 

request, Claimant underwent both psychological and psychiatric 

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Appellate Case: 91-6083 Document: 010110091409 Date Filed: 10/21/1991 Page: 3 
testing. Claimant also employed a psychiatrist who tested 

Claimant and testified at the de novo hearing. Review of the 

record on appeal indicates that, while evidence of Claimant's 

anxiety and depression is documented, substantial evidence 

supports the ALJ's determination that these conditions are not 

severe and do not affect Claimant's ability to function. 

Claimant has an extensive history of treatment for ulcers and 

related stomach pain. Claimant argues that "[t]he ALJ ignored the 

relationship between [Claimant's] severe digestive problems and 

the amount of stress required to perform [Claimant's] past 

relevant work II Brief of Appellant at 9. We agree. 

ALJ's opinion addressed Claimant's ulcer condition as follows: 

The claimant has had some problems with ulcers and has 

been treated therefor and occasionally those have 

reacted on him. On those occasions, it has been 

painful. He has been hospitalized and responded well to 

treatment. He does not complain of pain otherwise as a 

general rule. Further, the claimant's daily activities, 

historical accounts provided by physicians, and the 

claimant's own statements with regard to his daily 

activities clearly show that he is not restricted by 

pain or discomfort from engaging in basic work-related 

functions. 

ALJ Decision, Appellant Supp. App. at 7. 

The 

Subsequently, the ALJ concluded that Claimant could return to 

his past relevant work. In reaching this conclusion, we believe 

the ALJ improperly applied the legal standards, by ignoring the 

possible effects of work-related stress on Claimant's ulcers. At 

the hearing, the ALJ discussed the stressful effects of Claimant's 

job: 

He was in a position before where he had the supervision 

responsibility of for 45 men. And that was really 

bugging his ulcers and it really got to him. And I'm 

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Appellate Case: 91-6083 Document: 010110091409 Date Filed: 10/21/1991 Page: 4 
accepting that as a fact. I mean when you've got a lot 

of responsibility, the acid in your stomach just dumps 

in there. 

In dismissing Claimant's ulcers as disabling or restrictive of his 

job-related functions, the ALJ focused on Claimant's daily 

activities and his response to treatment for ulcers some five 

years after he had left his job. Because the ALJ failed to 

consider the effect of job-related stress on his ulcer condition, 

ignoring pertinent evidence in the record, the ALJ's determination 

that Claimant could return to his past relevant work is reversed. 

In light of our further disposition, we remand this case to the 

Secretary for further consideration. 

Claimant also argues that the ALJ gave no weight to his 

treating physician's opinion that his ulcer condition was chronic, 

painful, and "disabling." Although the district court's opinion 

summarizes evidence which may contradict the conclusions of 

Claimant's treating physician, the ALJ failed to mention this 

evidence. Substantial weight should be given a treating 

physician's opinions. Williams, 844 F.2d at 758. If, on remand, 

the Secretary believes the opinion of Claimant's treating 

physician should be disregarded, he should provide specific and 

legitimate reasons for doing so. Id. 1 

Because the ALJ proceeded to step five as an alternative 

basis for denying Claimant's application, we do likewise. If it 

is determined that a claimant is not able to return to his past 

relevant work, the burden shifts to the Secretary to show that the 

1 Appellee contends the ALJ "properly rejected this physician's 

opinion." Our review of the ALJ's opinion fails to reveal any 

support for this statement. 

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Appellate Case: 91-6083 Document: 010110091409 Date Filed: 10/21/1991 Page: 5 
claimant can perform other jobs available in the national economy. 

The Secretary must consider the claimant's residual functioning 

capacity, age, education, and work experience. See Williams, 844 

F.2d at 751. 

Claimant argues that the ALJ erred in finding he could 

perform other jobs in the national economy because the ALJ failed 

to properly consider Claimant's age. During the vast majority of 

the time period for which Claimant requests benefits, he was over 

age fifty-five, a person of advanced age pursuant to 20 C.F.R. 

S 404.1563(d). At the time of Claimant's hearing, he was sixty 

years old, a person close to retirement age under 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1563(d). We agree that the ALJ failed to apply the proper 

standards required by this regulation. 

To satisfy his burden at step five with regard to a person 

both of advanced age and close to retirement age who cannot 

perform medium work, the Secretary cannot simply identify 

alternative jobs that Claimant could perform. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1563(d) requires that he consider whether 1) Claimant's 

skills are transferable, and 2) Claimant's skills are highly 

marketable. Emory v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1092, 1094 (10th Cir. 

1991). The ALJ made no findings regarding Claimant's residual 

functioning capacity for medium work, or the marketability or 

transferability of his skills. 

We disagree with Appellee that testimony in the record 

evidences Claimant's skills as highly marketable. In our opinion, 

it supports the opposite proposition. Nonetheless, the ALJ's 

failure to make a finding " 'forecloses the possibility of finding 

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Appellate Case: 91-6083 Document: 010110091409 Date Filed: 10/21/1991 Page: 6 
that substantial evidence supports the Secretary's decision.'" 

Id. at 1095 (quoting Varley v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 

820 F.2d 777, 781 (6th Cir. 1987)). In light of the ALJ's failure 

to consider the effect of Claimant's age as required by 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1563, the ALJ's finding that Claimant could perform other 

jobs available in the national economy is reversed. If, on 

remand, the Secretary reaches step five of the evaluation process, 

he should consider 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563 and make findings in 

connection therewith. 

Finally, Claimant contends the ALJ ignored his allegations of 

pain. While we do not reach this issue in light of our remand on 

Claimant's first two issues, we note that the ALJ's opinion 

appears to contradict evidence in the record on appeal without 

explanation, and appears to focus unduly on Claimant's ability to 

perform his daily activities. In considering Claimant's 

allegations of pain, a nonexertional limitation, the Secretary 

should consider the medical evidence, whether an appropriate nexus 

exists to the alleged pain, and, finally, Claimant's credibility. 

See Williams, 844 F.2d at 753. 

Additionally, we again note the period of time for which 

Claimant can apply for benefits, namely June 15, 1983, through 

December 31, 1988. It is now almost three years after Claimant's 

eligibility for benefits terminated. On remand, the Secretary 

should keep that time period in mind in making additional 

findings. 

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the United States 

District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma is REVERSED. 

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Appellate Case: 91-6083 Document: 010110091409 Date Filed: 10/21/1991 Page: 7 
The cause is REMANDED to the district court 

proceedings consistent with this order & judgment. 

Entered for the Court 

David M. Ebel 

Circuit Judge 

8 

for further 

Appellate Case: 91-6083 Document: 010110091409 Date Filed: 10/21/1991 Page: 8