Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-05462/USCOURTS-caDC-98-05462-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dawnele Lyn Holbrook
Appellant
Janet Reno
Appellee

Document Text:

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 7, 1999 Decided November 26, 1999

No. 98-5462

Dawnele Lyn Holbrook,

Appellant

v.

Janet Reno, Attorney General,

Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 97cv01762)

Richard L. Swick argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant.

Anthony M. Alexis, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Wilma A.

Lewis, U.S. Attorney, and Mark E. Nagle and R. Craig

Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

USCA Case #98-5462 Document #479511 Filed: 11/26/1999 Page 1 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Before: Ginsburg, Rogers and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Tatel.

Tatel, Circuit Judge: Concluding that appellant, a new

agent trainee at the FBI Academy, had not forthrightly

answered questions about an alleged improper relationship

with her physical trainer, the FBI found her unsuitable to

become a Special Agent, reassigned her to her former job as

an Intelligence Assistant, and suspended her for five days.

Appellant filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, claiming that the FBI discriminated against her on the

basis of sex, created a hostile work environment by subjecting

her to an intrusive and abusive four-hour interview, and

retaliated against her when she filed an EEO complaint. At

the close of appellant's case, the district court, finding that

she had failed to produce evidence upon which the jury could

return a verdict in her favor on any of her claims, granted the

Government's motion for judgment as a matter of law. We

affirm.

I

After graduating from high school in 1987, Appellant Dawnele Lyn Holbrook went to work for the Federal Bureau of

Investigation. She received consistent "exceptional" job ratings and several promotions. Having put herself through

college, Holbrook entered the FBI Academy at Quantico in

1995 to begin training to become a Special Agent. Her

experience at the Academy forms the basis of this lawsuit.

Because the district court granted judgment as a matter of

law, we describe the facts in the light most favorable to

Holbrook. See McGehee v. CIA, 697 F.2d 1095, 1098 n.3

(D.C. Cir. 1983).

Holbrook performed well in new agent training. Having

developed shin splints during physical exercises, she was

referred for treatment to Joe Palermo, an FBI Agent, instructor, and physical trainer. Holbrook and Palermo became friends. They talked about his children and her career

goals. At one point, Holbrook went to Palermo's house to

pick up empty boxes to move some personal belongings.

USCA Case #98-5462 Document #479511 Filed: 11/26/1999 Page 2 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Seeking a quiet place to study, Holbrook went to his house

again the next week. Because bad weather had made the

roads dangerous, she accepted Palermo's invitation to spend

the night and slept on a downstairs couch. Holbrook spent

the night at Palermo's home on three other occasions, each

time sleeping on the couch.

At a party celebrating the end of the training program,

Special Agent Kevin Crawford, the primary instructor for

Holbrook's class at the Academy, observed "eye contact"

between Holbrook and Palermo. Suspecting an improper

relationship between the two, Crawford reported his observations to Special Agent Lisa Massaroni, the staff counselor

responsible for supervising the new agents in Holbrook's

class. Massaroni did not report the information to her superiors.

This was not the first time Crawford had taken an interest

in Holbrook. He had told Palermo that Holbrook was "fine"

and, on another occasion, that Holbrook could some day be

"the next Mrs. Palermo." Although Holbrook herself characterized Crawford as a "good instructor," she cited several

instances in which he was "unprofessional." For example, he

declared his preference for "long-haired blonds" (Holbrook is

blond) and made crude sexual allusions during class.

Crawford's suspicions about a Palermo/Holbrook relationship were heightened when, a week after the party, Palermo

told Crawford that Holbrook was sick and that the nurse had

told him that she should not participate in a training exercise

the next day. Questioning the nurse, Crawford learned that

although Holbrook had in fact been excused from the exercise, the nurse had never told Palermo about her illness.

Crawford reported Palermo's false statement about the nurse,

as well as his own suspicions of a relationship, to his superior,

Acting Unit Chief Brent Mosher. Mosher had heard about

the possible relationship from another instructor. He reported these suspicions to his superior, Assistant Director in

Charge of the Academy George Clow, and his deputy, Jeffrey

Higginbotham. Concerned that an instructor might be showUSCA Case #98-5462 Document #479511 Filed: 11/26/1999 Page 3 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

ing favoritism to a trainee, Higginbotham directed Unit Chief

Marlene Hunter and Agent Massaroni to interview Holbrook.

During the interview with Massaroni and Hunter, Holbrook

denied any romantic relationship with Palermo. Asked if she

had been to his home on a date, she answered no. The

investigation was closed.

Over the following weekend, Holbrook became concerned

about having told the agents that she had not been to

Palermo's house for a date. Wanting to clarify that she had

been there, but not for a date, she went to see Massaroni.

Massaroni had prepared an electronic communication that

summarized the interview and stated that Holbrook denied

having been to Palermo's home. Holbrook corrected it to

read that she had been there "to pick up moving boxes."

When Clow and Higginbotham learned that Holbrook had

corrected the electronic communication, they obtained authorization from the FBI's Office of Professional Responsibility

("OPR") to open a formal investigation. Two agents reinterviewed Holbrook. According to Holbrook, the agents questioned her about her "entire sex life" and repeatedly asked

her whether she had had sexual relations with Palermo or

with other FBI agents. Although Holbrook told them that it

was difficult for her to answer their questions because she

had been sexually abused as a child, they continued the

questioning. Holbrook testified: "It was just very humiliating and very degrading and embarrassing to have to try to

explain a feeling inside or a scare to--to two people that you

don't know, and also to people that you know are holding your

career in their hands." "[A]t one point," Holbrook testified,

"they became very evasive in their questioning, where it

didn't matter if I had slept with Mr. Palermo one time or 50

times, that they just basically needed to know how many

times I had slept with him." The agent who testified at trial

disputed Holbrook's characterization of the meeting, claiming

that Holbrook's evasiveness prolonged the session, which

lasted four hours.

Based on this interview, Clow concluded that Holbrook had

lied about her visits to Palermo's house. He also concluded

USCA Case #98-5462 Document #479511 Filed: 11/26/1999 Page 4 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

that she had violated an order not to speak with Palermo

during the pendency of the OPR investigation. Finding

Holbrook unsuitable to become an FBI Agent, Clow removed

her from the Academy and reassigned her to her previous job

as an Intelligence Assistant.

OPR subsequently completed its investigation, finding that

Holbrook had committed three offenses: exercising poor

judgment by maintaining a personal relationship with an

instructor; initially lying to her superiors; and disobeying

Clow's order not to talk to Palermo. The Unit Chief of

OPR's Adjudication Unit, Charles Dixon, approved the OPR

staff's recommendation of a three-day suspension. The Academy had recommended only a letter of censure. Noting that

Holbrook's misconduct involved "lying and blatant insubordination," Dixon's superiors increased the suspension from

three to five days.

During the pendency of the OPR investigation, Holbrook

filed an EEO complaint challenging her removal from the

Academy. Unable to resolve the complaint, Holbrook filed

suit in the United States District Court for the District of

Columbia pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964. See 42 U.S.C. ss 2000e et seq. She claimed sex

discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation for having

filed the EEO complaint. After the district court denied the

FBI's pre-trial motions, Holbrook tried her case to a jury

over three days. She presented thirteen witnesses.

Following the close of her evidence, the district court

granted the Government's motion for judgment as a matter of

law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a), concluding that Holbrook had failed to produce evidence from

which the jury could find in her favor on any of her claims.

With regard to her discrimination claim, the district court

identified several breaks in the chain of causation between

Crawford's allegedly discriminatory remarks and Clow's decision to remove Holbrook from the Academy. The district

court also found that Holbrook had not identified any "similarly situated" employees and thus failed to make out a prima

facie case of indirect discrimination. Pointing to the absence

USCA Case #98-5462 Document #479511 Filed: 11/26/1999 Page 5 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

of any evidence relating to "pervasive conduct" or "intolerable

conditions," the district court found that no reasonable juror

could conclude that the four-hour interview amounted to

sexual harassment. Finally, observing that the evidence on

the retaliation claim was "thin to the point of abstraction," the

district court concluded that Holbrook had failed to produce

any evidence that the five-day suspension was influenced by

the filing of the EEO complaint. Holbrook appeals.

II

District courts may grant judgment as a matter of law only

if "there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for" the nonmoving party. Fed. R. Civ. P.

50(a)(1). We review grants of judgment as a matter of law de

novo, affirming only if we find, based on our own independent

review of the evidence, that no reasonable jury could reach a

verdict in the plaintiff's favor. In making this determination,

we view "the evidence in the light most favorable to [the

plaintiff] and resolve all conflicts in [the plaintiff's] favor."

Scott v. District of Columbia, 101 F.3d 748, 752-53 (D.C. Cir.

1996). Applying this standard, we consider each of Holbrook's claims in turn.

Sex Discrimination

Title VII makes it an "unlawful employment practice for an

employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with

respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges

of employment, because of such individual's ... sex." 42

U.S.C. s 2000e-2(a)(1). Holbrook alleges that the FBI discriminated against her on the basis of her sex in violation of

Title VII when it found her unsuitable to become a Special

Agent and reassigned her to her former non-Agent job as an

Intelligence Assistant. Holbrook may prove her case in one

of two ways: she may provide direct evidence of her employer's discriminatory intent, or she may invoke the burdenshifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

411 U.S. 792 (1973). Holbrook pursues both avenues.

USCA Case #98-5462 Document #479511 Filed: 11/26/1999 Page 6 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Crawford's behavior forms the basis for Holbrook's direct

discrimination claim. Contending that "Crawford created an

unprofessional and sexually-charged environment" by indicating his preference for long-haired blonds, making various

sexual comments, and telling another instructor that Holbrook was "fine," Holbrook argues that "but for Mr. Crawford's gender-based interest in [her] personal life, she would

now be serving as an FBI agent." She argues that because

Crawford was the "driving force" in the process that led to

her termination, his improper comments amount to evidence

of direct discrimination.

Holbrook's direct discrimination case suffers from two fatal

flaws. First, not only did she introduce no evidence from

which the jury could have concluded that Crawford harbored

any discriminatory intent, but her counsel described Crawford's behavior as merely "sort of immature." Holbrook

herself testified only that Crawford was "a little unprofessional."

Second, even if the jury could have concluded from Crawford's "immature" behavior that he intended to discriminate

against Holbrook, Crawford's behavior cannot form the basis

of a direct discrimination claim because the record contains

no evidence that he participated in the Bureau's decision that

Holbrook was unsuitable to become an FBI Agent. As the

district court pointed out, there are at least two breaks in the

chain of causation between Crawford's actions and Holbrook's

removal from the Academy. Contrary to Holbrook's contention that Crawford was the "driving force" behind the investigation into an improper relationship between her and Palermo, Mosher, the Acting Unit Chief, testified that another

instructor had reported similar concerns. Even more important, it was not the investigation of Palermo--the investigation that Crawford may have initiated--that ultimately led to

Holbrook's removal from the Academy. Both Clow and

Higginbotham testified that they considered the Palermo

matter closed after Holbrook denied going to his house. Only

USCA Case #98-5462 Document #479511 Filed: 11/26/1999 Page 7 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

after Massaroni reported that Holbrook may have lied did

they reopen the investigation.

This case is controlled by Hall v. Giant Food, 175 F.3d

1074 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Hall held that a supervisor's discriminatory remarks could not be considered evidence of discrimination because the decision to dismiss the employee was

made not by the supervisor, but by the company's Director of

Transportation. See id. at 1079-80. Although the supervisor

had reported the employee's misconduct to the Director, the

Director "made an independent assessment of Hall's conduct." Id. at 1080. The same happened here. Clow "made

an independent assessment" of Holbrook's conduct and determined that she was unsuitable to become an FBI Agent.

Nothing in the record indicates either that Crawford had

input into Clow's decision or that Crawford discussed Holbrook's suitability with Clow or Higginbotham. Holbrook's

counsel never questioned Crawford on this critical point.

Holbrook's indirect discrimination claim fares no better.

To establish a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas

framework, Holbrook must demonstrate (1) that she is a

member of a protected class; (2) that she was similarly

situated to an employee who was not a member of the

protected class; and (3) that she and the similarly situated

person were treated disparately. See McDonnell Douglas,

411 U.S. at 802; Ramsey v. American Air Filter Co., Inc.,

772 F.2d 1303, 1307 (7th Cir. 1985). Although the McDonnell

Douglas framework "drops from the case" once the defendant

responds to the plaintiff's proof and offers rebuttal evidence,

it remains relevant here because the district court granted

judgment as a matter of law before the Government presented its case. United States Postal Service Bd. of Govs. v.

Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983).

To prove that she is similarly situated to a male employee,

a female plaintiff must demonstrate that she and the allegedly

similarly situated male employee were charged with offenses

of "comparable seriousness." See Lynn v. Deaconness Med.

Ctr., 160 F.3d 484, 488 (8th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation

USCA Case #98-5462 Document #479511 Filed: 11/26/1999 Page 8 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

marks omitted). A plaintiff must also demonstrate that "all

of the relevant aspects of her employment situation were

'nearly identical' to those of the male" employee. Neuren v.

Adduci, Mastriani, Meeks & Schill, 43 F.3d 1507, 1514 (D.C.

Cir. 1995) (quoting Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 40

F.3d 796, 802 (6th Cir. 1994)). Neuren concluded that a

female associate at a law firm who was terminated because of

her failure to get along with others was not similarly situated

to a less senior male associate who had trouble with legal

writing. 43 F.3d at 1514. Barbour v. Browner, 181 F.3d

1342 (D.C. Cir. 1999) concluded that two EPA employees with

similar job descriptions, one a GS-12 and the other a GS-13,

were not similarly situated. In making this determination,

Barbour relied on the fact that the GS-13 performed several

duties that the GS-12 (the plaintiff) did not. Id. at 1345.

With this standard in mind, we turn to Holbrook's evidence.

She claims to be similarly situated to three employees: two

new agent trainees allowed to become FBI Agents despite

their misconduct and Palermo himself. The district court

concluded that none was similarly situated to Holbrook, and

we agree.

Holbrook's counsel elicited from Clow only sketchy details

about the first of the agent trainees. Calling the trainee a

"class clown," Clow expressed concerns about his suitability

to become an FBI Agent, explaining that the trainee "said

inappropriate things at inappropriate times" and "was an

instigator of class misbehavior." Despite this immature behavior, the trainee was permitted to graduate. From what

little we know about the trainee, we share the district court's

view that his situation was not "nearly identical" to Holbrook's. Holbrook's offenses--lack of forthrightness and disobedience--and immature behavior are hardly of "comparable

seriousness."

The second trainee admitted to drinking before driving.

Although the FBI reprimanded the agent for poor judgment,

it allowed him to graduate. As the district court concluded,

this trainee is not similarly situated to Holbrook because, like

the first trainee, he was accused of "misconduct of a type that

USCA Case #98-5462 Document #479511 Filed: 11/26/1999 Page 9 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

does not involve honesty and forthrightness, which is what

Ms. Holbrook's case was about."

Palermo's offense, unlike the offenses of the two agent

trainees, is comparable to Holbrook's. Holbrook was disciplined for lying and disobedience; Palermo was disciplined

for lying and engaging in an improper relationship with a

subordinate. At this point, however, the similarity between

Palermo and Holbrook ends. Palermo was a fifteen-year FBI

veteran with supervisory responsibilities. Holbrook was a

probationary trainee. Neuren's conclusion that the two law

firm associates were not similarly situated rested in part on

the difference in their seniorities. Because "the partners

weren't as pressed to make a decision regarding [the less

senior male employee's] partnership prospects as they were

with [the plaintiff's]," the plaintiff could not create an inference of discrimination by reference to the fact that she was

fired but he was not. 43 F.3d at 1514. If the difference in

seniority between the Neuren plaintiff and another associate

undermined her claim that they were similarly situated, we

cannot see how Holbrook, a probationary trainee, could possibly be similarly situated to a fifteen-year veteran with supervisory responsibilities. Indeed, in McKenna v. Weinberger,

729 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1984), we expressly held that a

probationary employee was not similarly situated to a permanent employee, noting that "agency regulations mandated

that probationary employees with serious performance problems were to be terminated, even if those problems would not

have been good cause for terminating a permanent employee." Id. at 789-90.

Holbrook and Palermo are not similarly situated for another, related reason. As the FBI points out, their different

seniorities made it impossible for the FBI to discipline them

similarly. Because Palermo had been an Agent for fifteen

years, finding him unsuitable to become an Agent (Holbrook's

sanction) was simply not an option. Because Holbrook was a

probationary trainee, reassigning her to a different Agent

position (Palermo's sanction) was likewise not an option. And

with respect to the sanction that the FBI could impose on

USCA Case #98-5462 Document #479511 Filed: 11/26/1999 Page 10 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

both--suspension--Palermo's was more severe (his two

weeks versus her five days).

Sexual Harassment

Two types of sexual harassment are actionable under Title

VII: quid pro quo and hostile work environment. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-66 (1986). This

case involves the latter. Holbrook argues that the intrusive

nature of the questioning during the four-hour interview with

the two agents, together with the abusive manner in which

she says it was conducted, created a hostile work environment. To violate Title VII, Meritor requires that workplace

harassment be "sufficiently severe or pervasive to 'alter the

conditions of [the victim's] employment' " and " 'unreasonably

interfer[e] with an individual's work performance.' " Id. at

67, 65 (internal citations omitted).

In evaluating the sufficiency of the harassment evidence, it

is important to keep in mind that Holbrook does not claim

that Crawford's "unprofessional" and "immature" behavior

contributed to the allegedly hostile work environment. She

focuses only on the four-hour interview, testifying that she

was questioned about "basically every sexual relationship" in

which she had ever been involved.

Fully crediting Holbrook's version of the interview, the

jury could have concluded that it covered intrusive subjects of

an extremely personal nature not at all relevant to the

investigation. The jury could also have found that these

questions were asked in an abusive and degrading manner.

What the jury could not have concluded--because neither

Holbrook's testimony nor any other evidence at trial addressed the issue--was that the interview either " 'alter[ed]

the conditions' " of Holbrook's employment or " 'unreasonably

interfer[ed] with [her] work performance,' " as Meritor requires. 477 U.S. at 67, 65 (internal citations omitted). Did

the nature of the questioning change the nature of Holbrook's

job? Did the questioning change how Holbrook felt about

her job? Did it interfere with her job performance or make it

more difficult for her to do her job? Did it change how

USCA Case #98-5462 Document #479511 Filed: 11/26/1999 Page 11 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

people treated her? The jury would have had no way of

knowing answers to questions that Holbrook's attorney never

asked.

All the record reveals about Holbrook's post-interview

work environment is that she returned to her non-Agent job,

where she continued to perform exceptionally well. To be

sure, Holbrook did testify that it was "difficult" to return to

her former job "with everybody knowing that [she] didn't

accomplish what [she] set out to do." What other people

thought about whether she had accomplished her goals, however, has nothing to do with the effects of the interview, the

basis of her sexual harassment claim. We thus agree with

the district court that no reasonable jury could have found

that the interview created a hostile work environment.

Retaliation

We turn finally to Holbrook's claim that the FBI retaliated

against her for filing the EEO complaint. Because she did

not file the complaint until after the FBI determined that she

was unsuitable to become a Special Agent, her retaliation

claim focuses only on the five-day suspension. And because

the OPR investigation began before she filed her EEO complaint, her retaliation cause of action boils down to her claim

that "her punishment was progressively increased" from a

letter of censure to a five-day suspension.

Claims of retaliation are governed by the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. See Carney v. The American

University, 151 F.3d 1090, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1998). To establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff must show that (1) she

engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) her employer

took an adverse personnel action against her; and (3) a causal

connection between the two exists. Id. at 1095. If a prima

facie case is established, the burden of production shifts to

the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for the adverse action. The employee must then

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the asserted

reason is a pretext for retaliation. See McKenna, 729 F.2d at

790.

USCA Case #98-5462 Document #479511 Filed: 11/26/1999 Page 12 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Holbrook has easily satisfied the first two elements of a

prima facie case. She engaged in statutorily protected activity by filing an EEO complaint. She was subject to adverse

personnel action when she was suspended for five days.

To satisfy the third element of a prima facie case--a causal

connection between the statutorily protected activity and the

adverse personnel action--Holbrook must show that the FBI

"had knowledge of [her] protected activity, and that the

adverse personnel action took place shortly after that activity." Mitchell v. Baldrige, 759 F.2d 80, 86 (D.C. Cir. 1985).

Charles Dixon, the head of the OPR Adjudication Unit who

recommended the three-day suspension, testified that he

knew about Holbrook's EEO complaint. But the record does

not establish that Dixon's superiors knew about the complaint

when they increased the suspension from three to five days.

Holbrook's counsel never called them to testify.

We need not decide whether Dixon's knowledge alone could

be sufficient to make out a prima facie case, for even if

Holbrook had established a prima facie case, the FBI has

satisfied its burden of articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Holbrook's five-day suspension, and Holbrook has offered no evidence of pretext. As to the FBI's

burden, Dixon explained that Holbrook's conduct--lying, disobedience, and poor judgment--merited a sanction more serious than a letter of censure. He also characterized the threeday suspension that he recommended as "relatively minor."

While the record contains no direct testimony explaining why

Dixon's superiors increased the suspension to five days, one

of the superiors wrote in a note that "lying and blatant

insubordination[ ] [d]eserve more than three [days] unless

there is strong precedent in opposition." The OPR report

reviews Holbrook's misconduct in detail, canvasses prior

cases involving discipline of new agent trainees, and concludes

that a five-day suspension is appropriate. Holbrook, moreover, points to no evidence from which the jury could have

inferred that these plainly nondiscriminatory explanations

were a pretext for punishing her for filing the EEO complaint. As the district court found, "There was absolutely no

credible suggestion on this record that anybody was influUSCA Case #98-5462 Document #479511 Filed: 11/26/1999 Page 13 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

enced or that [the decision to suspend Holbrook for five days]

was affected in any way by the pendency of the plaintiff's

EEO complaint." The only relevant evidence is to the contrary: asked by Government counsel if he had been influenced by the filing of the EEO complaint, Dixon said no.

Because Holbrook offered no evidence on which the jury

could have found in her favor on any of her claims, we affirm.

So ordered.

USCA Case #98-5462 Document #479511 Filed: 11/26/1999 Page 14 of 14