Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-50135/USCOURTS-ca9-12-50135-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Damien Lamar Anderson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

EDWIN CARR, AKA Edwin Luther

Carr, Jr.,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 12-50082

D.C. No.

2:09-cr-00618-

SVW-2

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MARK ANTHONY FRANKLIN,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 12-50089

D.C. No.

2:09-cr-00618-

SVW-3

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

DAMIEN LAMAR ANDERSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 12-50135

D.C. No.

2:09-cr-00618-

SVW-1

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2 UNITED STATES V. CARR

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MARK ANTHONY FRANKLIN,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 12-50144

D.C. No.

2:09-cr-00618-

SVW-3

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DAMIEN LAMAR ANDERSON,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 12-50169

D.C. No.

2:09-cr-00618-

SVW-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

December 2, 2013—Pasadena, California

Filed August 4, 2014

Before: Harry Pregerson, Marsha S. Berzon,

and Morgan Christen, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Christen

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UNITED STATES V. CARR 3

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed in part, reversed in part, and

remanded, in appeals and government cross-appeals arising

from a case in which a jury convicted Edwin Carr, Damien

Anderson, and Mark Franklin on counts related to the armed

robbery of a federal credit union.

The panel held that the district court did not err by

admitting an eyewitness’s pretrial identification testimony. 

The panel held that the pretrial identification procedure was

not impermissibly suggestive, and that despite an eighteenmonth delay between the robbery and the eyewitness’s

interrogation, the district court did not err by allowing the

jury to weigh her identification testimony.

The panel held that the evidence supports the jury verdict

that Carr was guilty of forced accompaniment under

18 U.S.C. § 2113(e). The panel held that the evidence

supported the jury’s finding that forced accompaniment was

foreseeable to all three defendants, and that to the extent the

district court vacated Anderson’s and Franklin’s convictions

under § 2113(e), it erred.

The panel held that the district court did not err by ruling

that the evidence did not support Franklin’s convictions for

use of firearms under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(d) and 924(c). 

Noting that the written judgment is inconsistent with the

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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4 UNITED STATES V. CARR

district court’s oral explanation of its decision to vacate

Franklin’s conviction under § 2113(d), the panel instructed

the district court on remand to enter an amended judgment

reflecting that Franklin was acquitted of the § 924(c) gun

charge and the § 2113(d) gun enhancement. 

The panel held that the district court’s Alleyne error –

application of the ten-year mandatory minimum pursuant to

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) without a supporting jury

finding – was harmless because all of the trial evidence

supported the court’s implicit finding that guns were

discharged during the course of the robbery.

The panel held that the district court sufficiently justified

its departure from the recommended guidelines range when

sentencingFranklin, and rejected Franklin’s argument that his

sentence is substantively unreasonable.

COUNSEL

Rasha Gerges (argued) and Christopher K. Pelham, Assistant

United States Attorneys; Robert E. Dugdale, Chief, Criminal

Division; Andre Birotte Jr., United States Attorney, Central

District of California, Los Angeles, California, for PlaintiffAppellee / Cross-Appellant.

Rebecca P. Jones (argued), San Diego, California, for

Defendant-Appellant / Cross-Appellee Franklin.

Michael J. Treman (argued), Santa Barbara, California, for

Defendant-Appellant / Cross-Appellee Carr.

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UNITED STATES V. CARR 5

Mark Yanis (argued), Costa Mesa, California, for DefendantAppellant / Cross-Appellee Anderson.

OPINION

CHRISTEN, Circuit Judge:

I. Introduction

Edwin Carr, Damien Anderson, and Mark Franklin were

each indicted on three counts related to the armed robbery of

a federal credit union. A jury found all of the defendants

guilty on all counts. They appeal their convictions and

sentences. The government cross-appeals, arguing the district

court erroneously vacated portions of the defendants’

sentences. We have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and

3731. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

II. Facts and Proceedings

Vons Federal Credit Union in Santa Fe Springs,

California, was robbed in February 2008. Edwin Carr,

Damien Anderson, and Mark Franklin were each indicted for:

(1) conspiracy to commit bank robbery in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 371; (2) bank robbery, along with enhancements

for the use of a firearm and forced accompaniment in

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a), (d), and (e) respectively;

and (3) use or possession of a firearm in relation to a crime of

violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).

At trial, the jury heard testimony from four eyewitnesses

to the crime: Lanita Fields, who was present at the crime

scene; Barbara Wilson, one of two tellers inside the credit

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6 UNITED STATES V. CARR

union; Nicole Cervantes, the other teller; and Robert Monken,

a security guard. The jury also heard testimony from police

officers and forensic scientists who investigated the scene and

collected physical evidence.

Fields testified that on the morning of the robbery, she

received a telephone call from an old boyfriend, Darius

Wilson, who asked her to meet him. Darius directed Fields

to a duplex where he asked Fields to participate in a bank

robbery. Fields agreed, and Darius took Fields inside the

duplex to meet some people. Fields testified that she was

introduced to eight or ten men she had not seen before. At

trial, Fields identified Carr, Anderson, and Franklin as having

been in the room. Fields testified that she spent about eight

to ten minutes inside the duplex, that she stood about five feet

away from the defendants, and that she could see them

clearly.

Fields left the duplex with several of the men. She

explained that two of them got into her car while Franklin

drove a red car with another man in it. The cars traveled in

a convoy toward the credit union. Fields used marijuana on

the way.

After driving about 30 minutes, the cars stopped a few

blocks from the credit union and a passenger got out of

Franklin’s red car and into Fields’s car. The men in Fields’s

car told her to drive to the credit union parking lot, which she

did.

At the time of the robbery, Vons Federal Credit Union

was located in a small trailer in the parking lot of Vons

Distribution Center. Stairs and a ramp led to a deck outside

the trailer, where customers walked up to be served through

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UNITED STATES V. CARR 7

three teller windows without entering the trailer. The trailer

had one door, which was locked at all times except to allow

credit union employees to enter and exit, and to accept

deliveries. Customers were never allowed to enter the trailer. 

Testimony at trial established that Franklin was a former

member of Vons Federal Credit Union and a former

employee of Vons Distribution Center.

One of the men in Fields’s car was dressed as a FedEx

employee. Fields identified this man as Damien Anderson,

and she testified that Anderson got out of her car and

approached the door of the credit union carrying a clipboard

and a box.

Barbara Wilson, one of two credit union tellers working

that morning, identified Edwin Carr as the man in the FedEx

uniform. Wilson testified that when she saw the man wearing

a delivery uniform approach the credit union, she opened the

door to accept the package. Before Wilson could sign for the

package, the man used the box to shove her back inside the

trailer. Realizing that this was a robbery, Wilson attempted

to push the robber out of the trailer doorway. She managed

to advance a few feet outside before being pushed back

inside. In the struggle, Wilson resisted the robber by

grabbing one of the small wooden tables mounted under the

teller windows outside the trailer. Eventually, the man

overpowered Wilson and pushed her to the floor of the trailer.

Nicole Cervantes was the other teller working that

morning. She testified that she heard Wilson say “Oh,

FedEx” and get up to open the door to the credit union. After

a minute or two, Cervantes left her station to see if Wilson

needed help. Standing three or four feet away, she saw a man

in a black sweatshirt in the middle of the trailer. The man

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8 UNITED STATES V. CARR

said, “This is a robbery” and forced Cervantes at gunpoint to

put cash into a black trash bag. Cervantes testified that her

interaction with the robber wearing a black sweatshirt lasted

about a minute. She also testified that the light was good and

that she stood a few feet to a few inches away from the

robber. Cervantes identified Damien Anderson as the second

robber.

The men ran out of the trailer with the garbage bag and

the money. Wilson recalled that the second robber pointed a

gun at her face as he passed, but she did not get a look at his

face. Wilson also testified that as he ran down the ramp

outside the credit union, the robber with the gun pointed it

over the fence at someone she could not see. Wilson

estimated that three minutes passed between the time the first

robber approached the credit union door and the time the

robbers fled.

Waiting outside in her car, Lanita Fields watched the

altercation in the credit union doorway. She told the jury that

a second robber left her car and entered the credit union after

the man in the FedEx uniform got out of her car. Fields

identified Edwin Carr as the second robber. She also testified

that a third, unidentified robber pulled out a gun, left her car,

and entered the credit union. According to Fields, Franklin

never got out of the red car.

As the robbery was in progress, Robert Monken, a

security guard at Vons Distribution Center, saw Barbara

Wilson fighting and shoving with a man on the platform

outside the credit union. Monken estimated that about ten

seconds later, three men ran out of the credit union and got

into Fields’s car. According to Monken, the last man out

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UNITED STATES V. CARR 9

pointed his gun directly at Monken as he walked down the

ramp.

Fields said the three men ran out of the credit union,

jumped in her car, and ordered her to drive. She saw Monken

pursuing them in his security van and testified that two of the

three men in her car started shooting at the security van as it

chased them.

Eventually, the men ordered Fields to stop in a residential

neighborhood where they got out of her car and ran into a

backyard. Monken was still following Fields, but she

managed to evade him.

Driving separately in a “maroon” Buick, Franklin was

stopped near the credit union shortly after the robbery was

reported. He told the arresting officer that he had been at

Vons Distribution Center looking for a job, but later stated

that he was in the area to have lunch with a friend. A search

of Franklin’s maroon Buick revealed a baseball cap and a cell

phone on which calls to and from Anderson had been made

and received on the morning of the robbery. DNA testing on

the baseball cap revealed DNA consistent with Anderson.

The government recovered several other pieces of

corroborating physical evidence. A black sweatshirt with

DNA on it consistent with Carr was found in a backyard near

where the robbers fled on foot after leaving Fields’s car. The

sweatshirt was found next to coins and money traced to the

robbery.

In addition to this testimony concerning the events that

occurred on the day of the robbery, the jury heard evidence

that Fields was interviewed by Agent Taglioretti of the FBI

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10 UNITED STATES V. CARR

eighteen months after the robbery. The interrogation was

recorded. Fields was told that surveillance cameras showed

her car at the scene of the robbery and that witnesses

identified her as one of the drivers. Confronted with evidence

of her involvement in the crime and told that she faced “very

serious” exposure to charges, Fields identified Carr, Franklin,

and Anderson as participants in the robbery. She selected

their photographs from a series of photos Taglioretti

displayed during the interrogation. At trial, Fields testified

about her pretrial identification of the defendants over their

objection.

After the jury found all three defendants guilty of all

charges, the defendants filed motions for a new trial and

judgment of acquittal. The district court granted Franklin’s

Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal as to his firearms

convictions under § 2113(d) and § 924(c). The court’s

sentencing comments made it apparent that the court

considered Carr to be the robber who wore the FedEx

uniform, and Franklin, the robber who waited in the red or

maroon Buick, to be the “architect” of the robbery because he

had a history of working at Vons. The court expressed

concern that Franklin and Anderson could not have foreseen

that the FedEx robber would get into a shoving match with

Barbara Wilson at the door of the credit union, this tussle

being the basis for the forced accompaniment charge. But the

record is unclear regarding the court’s ruling on Anderson’s

and Franklin’s motions for acquittal of forced

accompaniment.

On appeal, defendants argue that the district court erred

by allowing Fields to testify about her pretrial identification

of them. They also argue that the evidence was insufficient

to support several of the charges. Franklin appeals his

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UNITED STATES V. CARR 11

sentence, and Anderson and Carr argue that the court’s

finding that they discharged firearms during the robbery was

reversible error under Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct.

2151 (2013). The government cross-appeals, arguing that the

district court erred by vacating Franklin’s and Anderson’s

sentencing enhancements for forced accompaniment under

§ 2113(e), and by vacating Franklin’s convictions for use and

possession of a firearm under § 2113(d) and § 924(c).

III. Discussion

A. The district court did not err by admitting Fields’s

pretrial identification testimony.

Before trial, the defendants joined in a motion to exclude

Fields’s pretrial identification of the defendants. The district

court denied the motion. All three defendants submit that this

was error, arguing that the pretrial identification procedure

was impermissibly suggestive and unreliable.

The constitutionality of pretrial identification procedures

is a question of law we review de novo. United States v.

Montgomery, 150 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1998). 

“[C]onvictions based on eyewitness identification at trial

following a pretrial identification by photograph will be set

aside . . . only if the [pretrial] photographic identification

procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to

a verysubstantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” 

Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968). This

involves a three-part inquiry. First, this court must determine

if the pretrial identification procedure was impermissibly

suggestive. United States v. Love, 746 F.2d 477, 478 (9th

Cir. 1984). Second, if the identification procedure was

unduly suggestive, the court must determine whether it was

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12 UNITED STATES V. CARR

sufficiently reliable such that it does not implicate the

defendant’s due process rights. Id. Third, even if the pretrial

identification procedure was suggestive and the identification

was unreliable, this court must examine the district court’s

failure to exclude the identification for harmless error. See

Ocampo v. Vail, 649 F.3d 1098, 1114 (9th Cir. 2011).

1. The pretrial identification procedure was not

impermissibly suggestive.

“An identification procedure is suggestive when it

emphasizes the focus upon a single individual thereby

increasing the likelihood of misidentification.” Montgomery,

150 F.3d at 992 (internal quotation marks, alteration, and

citation omitted). To determine if an identification procedure

was unduly suggestive, the court must examine the totality of

the surrounding circumstances. United States v. Bagley,

772 F.2d 482, 492 (9th Cir. 1985).

Both Fields and Agent Taglioretti described the contested

identification procedure at trial. Because only an audio

recording was made, Taglioretti and Fields were both

extensively questioned about the method Taglioretti used to

display the suspects’ photos during the questioning.

Agent Taglioretti explained that when the interview

began, he advised Fields that the situation was “veryserious.” 

The audio recording confirms that he repeated this at least

three times. According to Agent Taglioretti, Fields was very

upset and cried throughout most of the interview.

After askingFields some preliminaryquestions but before

giving Fields a Miranda warning, Agent Taglioretti described

what he knew about the robbery and the evidence that Fields

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UNITED STATES V. CARR 13

was involved. Taglioretti explained that while he was doing

this, he placed a series of twelve photographs, one after

another, face up, in a stack on the table. Agent Taglioretti

recalled that the photographs of the defendants were the last

three photos he laid on the table, so they ended up as the first

three photos at the top of the stack. He described the other

photographs in the pile as photos of men with similar

appearances. After he displayed the photos in the manner

described, Agent Taglioretti read Fields her Miranda rights

and began to ask questions about the robbery. Taglioretti did

not admonish Fields that the stack of photographs may not

include pictures of the suspects.

Agent Taglioretti testified that Fields spontaneously

identified the three defendants by separating their

photographs from the pile before he asked her about them. 

She did this after she had been told that she was implicated in

the robbery. Fields’s testimony substantially corroborated

Agent Taglioretti’s version of how the interrogation was

conducted.

Taglioretti informed Fields that it could take a year or two

before the case went to trial. This portion of the audio

recording captured Fields’s statement: “Well, unless I pin it

on these guys.” During the interrogation, Taglioretti did not

ask what Fields meant by this statement, but at trial Fields

testified that she meant “that these were the [people]

involved, like are they going to get it.”

The defendants joined in a motion to exclude evidence of

Fields’s pretrial identification, arguing that Agent Taglioretti

used an impermissibly suggestive procedure that differed

substantially from the version of events the government

described in its pretrial briefing. The district court denied the

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14 UNITED STATES V. CARR

motion, reasoning that the conflicting versions of the

interview went to the weight of the evidence, not its

admissibility. The district court later held an evidentiary

hearing on the issue outside the presence of the jury and

reached the same conclusion. The court found that while the

transcript of the interrogation was ambiguous and “it is clear

that there were things going on physically and visually that

weren’t captured on the audio,” Fields and Agent Taglioretti

were “essentially consistent” in their descriptions of what

happened during the interrogation. The court concluded it

had no reason to discredit Agent Taglioretti’s version of

events and denied the motion, reasoning that the procedure

described by the government was not impermissibly

suggestive.

On appeal, Carr, Anderson, and Franklin renew their

argument that the pretrial identification procedure was

impermissiblysuggestive because Agent Taglioretti presented

Fields with only three photographs. This argument seems to

be based on the defendants’ supposition that because only

three photographs were mentioned in the audio recording,

only three photographs were displayed. But Taglioretti

testified that there were twelve photographs in the stack used

in the interrogation, and Fields testified that there were

“about ten” photographs in the stack. We agree with the

district court that the record of the interrogation is ambiguous

because there is no video, but we also agree with its

conclusion that the defense presented no reason to discredit

Agent Taglioretti’s account and we cannot conclude that

Agent Taglioretti unfairly focused Fields on the defendants

by displaying 10–12 photographs of men of similar

appearances during the interrogation.

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UNITED STATES V. CARR 15

The appellants also argue that Fields’s identification was

coerced by Agent Taglioretti’s repeated statements that

cooperation would help her avoid serious prison time. There

can be no question that Fields undoubtedly felt pressure to

cooperate — she was told the police had strong evidence that

she had participated as the getaway driver in the robbery, and

she knew that shots had been fired from her car. But some

degree of pressure to cooperate is exerted whenever the

police question a suspected criminal accomplice, and we

know of no authority holding that this alone renders an outof-court identification inadmissible. In these circumstances,

it is hard to imagine a procedure that would not put Fields

under pressure. Apart from the fact that she was personally

implicated, defendants cite no other reason to suspect Fields’s

identification of defendants was coerced. They do not, for

example, claim that she was deprived of food, friends, and

counsel, cf. Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 441–42 (1961), or

deprived of sleep, cf. Ashcraft v. State of Tennessee, 322 U.S.

143, 153 (1944), or subjected to extended interrogation, cf.

Chambers v. State of Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 238–39 (1940),

or that she was mentally disabled and subjected to misleading

questioning, cf. United States v. Preston, 751 F.3d 1008,

1017–18 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc), or that she was a juvenile

or without the benefit of proper Miranda warnings, cf. Doody

v. Ryan, 649 F.3d 986, 1009 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). The

jury was certainly aware of her incentive to cooperate in the

hope of receiving a lesser charge or a lighter sentence for

herself, but this incentive goes to the weight, not the

admissibility, of Fields’s testimony. See Manson v.

Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 113 n.14 (1977).

Defendants also challenge Fields’s identification on the

basis of the following exchange captured on the audio

recording of the pretrial interrogation:

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16 UNITED STATES V. CARR

Fields: How long will this take?

Agent Taglioretti: It’ll take awhile, it could

take like two years

Fields: Oh no!

Agent Taglioretti: Yeah, it could take one

year. You know it could

be over in one year. But

right now

Fields: (Crying) unless I pin it on 

these guys

Agent Taglioretti: I’m sorry?

Fields: Unless I pin it on, will I

have to (inaudible) with

them

Agent Taglioretti: Well, I have to talk to the

prosecutor. It’s possible

he could fashion it so that

you’re not going to court

with them . . . .

Counsel for all three defendants confronted Fields with this

exchange, and Carr’s counsel argued in summation that

Fields’s testimony should not be believed in light of these

statements. On appeal, defendants argue this exchange is

evidence that Fields felt compelled to identify someone,

regardless of whether the photos represented the real robbers. 

There is no question the jury could have interpreted this

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UNITED STATES V. CARR 17

exchange as showing that Fields had an incentive to

cooperate with the police, and that she likely understood she

would be positioned to negotiate for a more favorable

resolution of her own criminal liability if she identified her

accomplices. But Agent Taglioretti expressly told Fields that

he did not make charging decisions and could not promise

Fields leniency if she cooperated. We conclude that Agent

Taglioretti did not impermissibly coerce Fields’s testimony

such that it lacks sufficient reliability as a matter of law. The

entire exchange surely showed the jury that Fields felt

pressure, but the jury was free to disregard or discount

Fields’s identification testimony.

Finally, the appellants argue that the procedure Agent

Taglioretti used was tainted by his failure to admonish Fields

that the photos he showed her may not have included pictures

of the suspected robbers. Appellants cite no case holding that

the lack of this type of admonition renders an otherwise

permissible identification procedure unduly suggestive. This

omission did undermine the reliability of the identification

procedure and the jury was appropriately told of this

omission, but we cannot say that it rendered Fields’s

identification inadmissible. We conclude the district court

did not deny defendants due process by ruling that Agent

Taglioretti’s interrogation technique was not impermissibly

suggestive; the technique he used did not present a substantial

likelihood of irreparable misidentification.

2. The district court did not err by allowing the

jury to weigh Fields’s identification testimony.

On appeal, the defendants challenge Fields’s

identification testimonybecause therewas an eighteen-month

delay between the robbery and the interrogation. The

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18 UNITED STATES V. CARR

defendants argue that the delay made it impossible for Fields

to reliably identify the individuals who were involved in the

robbery. We agree that the eighteen-month delay gave the

jury a powerful reason to discount Fields’s testimony. But

because we conclude that the procedure used to interrogate

Fields was not impermissibly suggestive, we find no error in

the trial court’s decision to allow the jury to weigh this

testimony. See, e.g., Montgomery, 150 F.3d at 993 (analyzing

the reliability of an identification only after concluding the

pretrial procedure used to elicit the identification was

impermissibly suggestive).

When an identification procedure is not unduly

suggestive, nor barred by Evidence Rule 403,1it is the duty

of the jury to assess the reliability of the evidence. See

Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347–48 (1981) (“[T]he

proper evaluation of evidence under the instructions of the

trial judge is the very task our system must assume juries can

perform. Indeed . . . the only duty of a jury in cases in which

identification evidence has been admitted will often be to

assess the reliability of that evidence.”). The jury is equipped

to make these determinations because “[c]ounsel can both

cross-examine the identification witnesses and argue in

summation as to factors causing doubts as to the accuracy of

the identification — including reference to both any

suggestibility in the identification procedure and any

countervailing testimony such as alibi.” Id. (quoting

Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 113 n.14).

1 The defendants did not argue at trial or in their briefing on appeal that

the probative value of Fields’s pretrial identification is outweighed by a

danger of unfair prejudice or misleading the jury under Evidence Rule

403.

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UNITED STATES V. CARR 19

In this case, Fields’s testimony was seriously tested at

trial. The defense seized the opportunity to extensively

cross-examine both Agent Taglioretti and Fields, and the

eighteen-month delay between the robbery and Fields’s

identification was emphasized in the defendants’ closing

arguments. Fields was also confronted with other weaknesses

in her testimony, including her criminal history, her use of

marijuana on the way to the robbery, her motivation to

cooperate with the prosecution in return for a reduced

sentence, and the discrepancies between Fields’s testimony

and the tellers’ testimony about which robber wore the FedEx

uniform and how many robbers entered the credit union. 

These weaknesses were similarly emphasized in the

defendants’ closing arguments. Agent Taglioretti was crossexamined about the identification procedure he used, his

failure to admonish Fields that the suspects’ photos might not

have been included in the stack of photos, and the

inconsistency between Fields’s testimony and the tellers’

identification. The jury was also aware that there were

reasons to decide that Fields’s testimony was reliable: unlike

the tellers, she spent eight to ten minutes in the duplex with

the defendants where she was only five feet away from them

and she could see them clearly. She also spent about 30

minutes in the car with two of them en route to the credit

union. We conclude the jury was well-positioned to weigh

the strengths and weaknesses of Fields’s identification, and

decide whether it found the testimony persuasive. The

district court did not err by admitting this evidence.

B. The evidence supports the jury’s verdict that Carr

was guilty of forced accompaniment.

In its closing argument, the prosecution stressed its view

that the evidence showed Carr was guilty of forced

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20 UNITED STATES V. CARR

accompaniment because he shoved Barbara Wilson and

forced her back into the credit union trailer after she managed

to push her way outside.2 The prosecution argued that the

other defendants were guilty of forced accompaniment as coconspirators in the robbery. See United States v. Douglass,

780 F.2d 1472, 1475–76 (9th Cir. 1986) (conspirators are

liable for the foreseeable criminal acts of co-conspirators

committed in furtherance of conspiracy). After the juryfound

all three defendants guilty of forced accompaniment,

defendants moved for acquittal, arguing that the

government’s evidence was insufficient to support this

charge. As noted, the district court denied the motion. 

Defendants argue on appeal that the evidence did not suffice

to prove that the shoving match rose to the level of forced

accompaniment, and that even if it did, forced

accompaniment was unforeseeable to co-conspirators

Franklin and Anderson.

When considering a challenge to a verdict based on the

sufficiency of the evidence, we “consider the evidence

presented at trial in the light most favorable to the

prosecution” and determine whether “this evidence, so

viewed, is adequate to allow any rational trier of fact [to find]

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt.” United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1163-64

(9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted).

2

18 U.S.C. § 2113(e) provides a sentencing enhancement for aggravated

conduct committed during a bank robbery, including when a robber

“forces any person to accompany him without the consent of such

person.”

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UNITED STATES V. CARR 21

Carr argues that Wilson’s testimony that the robber in the

FedEx uniform engaged her in a shoving match was

insufficient to support a sentencing enhancement under

18 U.S.C. § 2113(e), because the movement of Wilson’s body

in and out of the credit union doorway was too minimal to

qualify as forced accompaniment. Because all three

defendants were convicted of this charge on the theory that

they were equally culpable as co-conspirators, all defendants

join in this argument.3

“On its face, the enhancing elements [of § 2113(e)] are

that a defendant (1) in the course of committing a bank

robbery (2) forces a person (3) to accompany him (4) without

that person’s consent.” United States v. Strobehn, 421 F.3d

1017, 1019 (9th Cir. 2005). Our court concluded in Strobehn

that this forced accompaniment enhancement was applicable

where a defendant accosted a security guard in a bank parking

3 As we have observed, there was conflicting testimony about whether

Carr was the robber dressed in a FedEx uniform. Wilson testified that it

was Carr who wore the FedEx uniform, but it is not entirely clear how

well Wilson saw the FedEx robber’s face. She testified that she is 5'3"

tall, that the robber was considerably taller, and that she used her head as

a battering ram, planting her feet and pushing her head into the robber’s

chest in an effort to force him back outside. The second teller, Cervantes,

only recalled a robber who wore black, pointed a gun at her, and instructed

her to put cash in a garbage bag. Fields, the getaway driver, spent several

minutes with the robbers inside the duplex and about thirty minutes

driving them to the credit union. She testified that it was Anderson who

wore the FedEx uniform. The uniform was not among the physical

evidence retrieved by the police, but they did retrieve a black sweatshirt

with DNA on it consistent with Edwin Carr. The jury was not asked to

make a finding regarding which defendant wore the uniform, but the

district court seems to have credited Wilson’s testimony that it was Carr,

and the court’s sentencing remarks indicate that the court considered

Anderson and Franklin potentially guilty of forced accompaniment only

under the government’s accomplice liability theory.

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22 UNITED STATES V. CARR

lot, and forced the guard at gunpoint to walk to the bank door,

open it, and lie on the floor. Id. at 1018. We declined to read

a “substantiality” requirement into the degree of movement

required by the statute, holding that the enhancement was

applicable even where the victim “was moved for only a few

seconds, over a matter of feet, and without increasing the

danger already inherent in an armed bank robbery.” Id. at

1019. Strobehn left open the possibility that some movement

might be too slight to qualify as forced accompaniment: “we

do not hold that § 2113(e) ‘plainly’ applies to any forced

accompaniment, no matter how slight.” Id. at 1020 n.1.

Here, Wilson testified that she was standing in the credit

union when she opened the door to receive the robber dressed

as a FedEx employee. She was pushed deeper into the credit

union, but she responded by shoving the robber’s chest with

her head. She was able to push the robber, and get herself, a

few feet outside the credit union. Wilson was screaming and

testified that she was trying to get outside to summon help

and to escape danger. Once outside, she grabbed a small

table mounted below the windows of the credit union and

hung on while the robber tried to force her back inside. 

Wilson was overpowered after a few seconds; she was thrown

inside the credit union and knocked to the floor where she

remained until the robbers fled.

Although Wilson was only moved a few feet, it is

undisputed that she was forced into the credit union where a

bank robbery was in progress, clearly against her will. She

was prevented from summoning help, and she was not

allowed to flee from an obviously dangerous situation. We

do not find these facts to be appreciably different from those

in Strobehn, where the victim was forced to walk inside a

building to facilitate the commission of an armed robbery. 

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UNITED STATES V. CARR 23

As the Seventh Circuit has held, “[c]learly, the phrase ‘forces

any persons to accompany him without . . . consent’

encompasses forcing someone outside a building to enter the

building.” United States v. Davis, 48 F.3d 277, 279 (7th Cir.

1995). We conclude that the evidence supported Carr’s

conviction for forced accompaniment.

C. The evidence supported the jury’s finding that

forced accompaniment was foreseeable as to all

three defendants.

None of the government’s evidence showed that Franklin

exited the red car. He and Anderson argue that even if the

shoving match in the doorway constituted forced

accompaniment, their convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(e)

should be vacated because it was unforeseeable to them that

the FedEx robber would use force to gain access to the credit

union. They argue that the evidence showed a plan for the

FedEx robber to trick the tellers into opening the door, not to

enter by force or the show of force. Their contention on

appeal is that it was not foreseeable that two women, working

in a credit union without a security guard, would resist an

armed robbery. But Barbara Wilson apparently had a

different idea about the extent to which she was willing to

acquiesce in the armed robbery of the credit union where she

was employed. Once she realized the credit union was being

robbed, Wilson used all her strength to escape and flee. 

Having reviewed the record, we conclude that reasonable

jurors could find that the struggle in the doorway was

foreseeable to all the accomplices.

As a preliminary matter, it is unclear from the record

whether the district court granted Anderson’s and Franklin’s

post-verdict motions for acquittal of their forced

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24 UNITED STATES V. CARR

accompaniment convictions under § 2113(e).4 The

government argues in its cross-appeal that the district court

did not apply the sentencing enhancement under § 2113(e) to

Franklin or Anderson, and that it erred by failing to do so. 

We conclude the evidence supports the jury’s finding that

forced accompaniment was foreseeable to all three

conspirators.

The evidence must be considered in the light most

favorable to the prosecution. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307, 319 (1979). Wilson testified that the robber in the

FedEx uniform began to push her into the credit union almost

immediately, before she had realized he was a fraud. This

suggests that the robber’s actions were part of a plan to trick

the teller into unlocking the door so he could force his way in

once the door was open. Though others may have reacted

differently, reasonable jurors could also conclude that an

employee like Wilson, who thought she was accepting a

delivery but instead found herself being forcefully shoved,

would shove back. Wilson’s battering ram technique may

have been unique, but it was at least momentarily effective,

and reasonable jurors could decide that it was foreseeable an

employee would attempt to flee rather than remain in harm’s

4

In its order of judgment, the district court found Anderson guilty of

“armed bank robbery and forced accompaniment in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 2113(a), (d), (e) as charged in Count 2.” Franklin was similarly found

guilty of violating § 2113(e). But at the sentencing hearing, the district

court treated Carr as the FedEx robber, repeatedly stating that Anderson

could not have foreseen the forced asportation. And when announcing

Anderson’s sentence, the district court did not appear to rely on the tenyear mandatory minimum that would result from a conviction under

§ 2113(e). Similarly, the district court declared that “[a]s to defendant

Franklin, he is not under my rulings subject to any mandatory minimums

. . . .”

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UNITED STATES V. CARR 25

way and watch her place of employment get robbed. This is

particularly the case given the nature of the robbery, the

absence of security in the trailer, and the small area where the

tellers worked. To the extent the district court vacated

Anderson’s and Franklin’s convictions under § 2113(e), it

erred, and we grant the government’s cross-appeal. The

government’s evidence supported all three convictions for

forced accompaniment.

D. The district court did not err by ruling that the

evidence did not support Franklin’s convictions

for use of firearms.

In its cross-appeal, the government argues that the district

court erred by granting Franklin’s post-judgment motion for

acquittal of his firearms charges under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)5

and § 2113(d).6 After the jury returned its verdict, Franklin

filed a motion for judgment of acquittal of his convictions for

the firearms charges. Franklin argued that the prosecution

introduced no evidence that he was present at the robbery or

that he used or possessed a weapon, or knew that a weapon

would be used or possessed by the other robbers. Franklin

also argued that there was no evidence that a firearm was

5

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) provides that if a firearm is used or carried

or possessed in the furtherance of any crime of violence, a five year

minimum sentence shall be imposed in addition to the sentence imposed

for the crime of violence. Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), the

minimum additional penalty increases to 10 years if the firearm is

discharged.

6

18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) provides a separate offense if, in the course of

committing or attempting to commit a bank robbery, a robber “assaults

any person, or puts in jeopardy the life of any person by the use of a

dangerous weapon or device.”

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displayed or discussed before the robbery. The district court

found “[t]here was no evidence that Franklin was at the scene

of the credit union during the robbery when firearms were

displayed or during the getaway when firearms were

discharged.” The district court further found that, because

Franklin and his co-conspirators were aware of the age of the

tellers,7

the lack of security cameras or guards, and the

absence of customers inside the credit union, “the robbery

would not be the sort of ‘takeover’ robbery that would

typically necessitate the use of firearms for crowd control.” 

The court concluded “[t]he evidence presented at trial, taken

in the light most favorable to the government, does not

support a conclusion that it was reasonably foreseeable to

Franklin that a firearm would be used in the robbery.”

In Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647–48

(1946), the Supreme Court held that a co-conspirator is

responsible for the foreseeable acts of his partners in crime. 

Whether an act is foreseeable is a fact-driven and casespecific inquiry, conducted under the deferential standard of

review common to all sufficiency of the evidence claims. See

United States v. Lewis, 787 F.2d 1318, 1324 (9th Cir. 1986).

Here, there was no direct evidence linking Franklin to the

use of firearms, and no evidence that guns were discussed or

present at the planning meeting. This omission distinguishes

the present case from those the government relies upon,

where a gun or guns were displayed or discussed by coconspirators before the commission of a crime. See, e.g.,

United States v. Hoskins, 282 F.3d 772, 776-77 (9th Cir.

2002), overruled in part on other grounds by United States v.

7 Barbara Wilson testified that she was 59 at the time of trial. 

Cervantes’s age is not clear from the record.

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UNITED STATES V. CARR 27

Contreras, 593 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc); United

States v. Alvarez-Valenzuela, 231 F.3d 1198, 1204–05 (9th

Cir. 2000).

The government’s only support for its argument that use

of a firearm was foreseeable to these defendants is: (1) this

was a “takeover” style robbery in which the robbers would

have to subdue the credit union employees; and (2) the fact

that more than one robber had a firearm is evidence that guns

were part of the robbery plan. Despite these contentions, the

government can point to no evidence that the robbers

discussed the use of firearms before the robbery, and there

was no testimony that firearms were displayed before the

robbery. “[A] finding of reasonable foreseeability must be

based upon something more than . . . observations about bank

robberies in general.” United States v. Zelaya, 114 F.3d 869,

871 (9th Cir. 1997). Because no evidence showed that the

robbers planned to use guns to subdue or intimidate the

tellers, or that Franklin was aware that at least one of his coconspirators was carrying a gun, the district court did not err

by granting Franklin’s motion for judgment of acquittal on

the firearms-related charges.

We do note that the district court’s written judgment is

inconsistent with its oral explanation of its decision to vacate

Franklin’s conviction under § 2113(d).8 On remand, the

8 After the jury returned its verdict finding all defendants guilty on all

counts, defendants filed Rule 29 motions for a judgment of acquittal on

the forced accompaniment charge (§ 2113(e)), and the firearms charges

(§ 2113(d) and § 924(c)). The court denied these motions “with the

exception of Franklin’s motion to dismiss the firearms charges as applied

to him under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d).” Consistent

with its finding that there was no evidence of a plan to use guns, the court

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28 UNITED STATES V. CARR

district court shall enter an amended judgment reflecting that

Franklin was acquitted of the § 924(c) gun charge and the

§ 2113(d) gun enhancement.

E. The district court’s Alleyne error was harmless.

Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), anyone who uses or carries a

firearm in relation to a crime of violence is subject to a

mandatory minimum sentence of five years, id.

§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i). This enhancement is to be imposed in

addition to the punishment for the particular crime of

violence. It rises to a ten-year enhancement if the firearm

was discharged during commission of the underlying crime. 

Id. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii).

The jury found that both Carr and Anderson “us[ed] and

carr[ied] a firearm during and in relation to a crime of

violence” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), but the jury did

not make any findings about whether either Anderson or Carr

discharged their weapons. At sentencing, the district court

found that the defendants were responsible for discharging

firearms, and ruled that § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii)’s ten-year

mandatory minimum penalty applied.9 Both Carr and

acquitted Franklin of the charge under § 924(c) in its judgment order, but

it erroneously entered judgment against him under § 2113(d).

9 We are mindful that Fields testified a third robber participated in the

armed robbery, and that Monken testified that three robbers fled the credit

union. Neither Carr nor Anderson argue on appeal that the evidence was

insufficient to show which two robbers in the getaway car fired shots at

the pursuing security van. At trial, Fields was asked “So there are three

men in the car, and two are firing, and you’re not sure which of the two?” 

Fields replied, “I know which of the two.” But she was not asked to

identify the two shooters.

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UNITED STATES V. CARR 29

Anderson received ten-year enhancements for discharging

firearms during the robbery.

After defendants filed their notices of appeal, the

Supreme Court handed down its decision in Alleyne,

extending the reasoning of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.

466 (2000), to mandatory minimum sentences. Apprendi

established the principle that, “[o]ther than the fact of a prior

conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime

beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted

to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S.

at 490. Analogously, Alleyne held that “[f]acts that increase

the mandatory minimum sentence are . . . elements and must

be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable

doubt.” 133 S. Ct. at 2158. Alleyne’s holding applies to the

defendants’ appeals because they were still pending when

Alleyne was decided. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314,

328 (1987).

The government concedes that the trial court’s application

of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii)’s ten-year mandatory

minimum enhancement was not supported by any jury

finding, and thus it presumptively violated the Supreme

Court’s ruling in Alleyne. But the government correctly notes

that this court has held that Apprendi errors do not require

reversal if the government can show the errors were harmless. 

United States v. Salazar-Lopez, 506 F.3d 748, 755 (9th Cir.

2007). An Apprendi error is harmless only “where a

reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the

omitted element was uncontested and supported by

overwhelming evidence, such that the jury verdict would

have been the same absent the error.” Neder v. United States,

527 U.S. 1, 17 (1999).

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The government argues there is no reasonable probability

that the jury would have acquitted Anderson or Carr of

discharging a firearm because there was overwhelming and

uncontroverted evidence adduced at trial that two of the coconspirators shot at the security van during the course of the

getaway. We agree. The government presented the jury with

undisputed evidence through Fields and Monken that the

robbers fired at Monken’s car while fleeing the scene. This

evidence was not challenged by the defense, no conflicting

evidence was introduced, and the defendants did not argue in

closing that no shooting had taken place. Moreover, as the

jury was required to decide whether the defendants had

“us[ed] and carr[ied] a firearm” during the crime, the

defendants had incentive to present at trial any evidence

tending to show that firearms were not used. We therefore

conclude the Alleyne error was harmless because all of the

trial evidence on this point supported the court’s implicit

finding that guns were discharged during the course of the

robbery.

F. The district court sufficiently justified its

departure fromthe recommended guidelines range

when sentencing Franklin.

The district court calculated Franklin’s sentencing

guideline range as 92–115 months and sentenced Franklin to

a total of 144 months in prison. The court explained that

Franklin “was involved in this crime as a co-conspirator and

seemingly the architect — or one of the architects.” Franklin

argues that the judge committed procedural error by failing

sufficiently to justify an above-guidelines sentence. We do

not find this argument persuasive.

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UNITED STATES V. CARR 31

Franklin did not object to his sentence before the district

court, so we review it for plain error.10 United States v.

Rangel, 697 F.3d 795, 805 (9th Cir. 2012). A judge must

explain the rationale relied upon when imposing an aboveguidelines sentence, and the explanation must be sufficient to

permit meaningful appellate review. United States v. Carty,

520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (citing Rita v.

United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007)).

Here, the district court noted that Franklin’s sentence was

based on “the court’s consideration of the guidelines and the

sentencing factors under § 3553(a), the nature and

circumstances of the offense, and the history and

characteristics of the defendant.” The court mentioned

Franklin’s serious prior convictions, including convictions

involving the use of firearms. Finally, citing evidence that

Franklin had previously worked at Vons Distribution Center

and been a member of the credit union, the district court

resolved that Franklin was likely the architect, or one of the

architects, of the robbery scheme.

We conclude that the district court’s justification, though

brief, was not inadequate. Franklin’s apparent role as

mastermind of the robbery is not reflected in the

recommended sentencing range for his crimes of conviction

and it was within the district court’s discretion to account for

this role with an above-guidelines sentence. The district court

10

“Plain error will be found only if the error was highly prejudicial and

there was a high probability that the error materially affected the verdict.” 

United States v. Bosch, 951 F.2d 1546, 1548 (9th Cir. 1991) (quotation

omitted). To prove plain error, Franklin must show that “(1) there is

‘error’; (2) it was ‘plain’; and (3) the error affected ‘substantial rights.’” 

United States v. Garrido, 713 F.3d 985, 994 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting

United States v. Recio, 371 F.3d 1093, 1100 (9th Cir. 2004)).

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32 UNITED STATES V. CARR

did not commit plain error by imposing an above-guidelines

sentence. Franklin’s argument that his sentence was

substantively unreasonable fails for the same reasons.

IV. Conclusion

If the district court vacated Anderson’s conviction for

false accompaniment under § 2113(e), it erred and we reverse

this portion of its judgment in case number 12-50135 and

grant the government’s cross-appeal in case number 12-

50169. If the district court vacated Franklin’s conviction for

false accompaniment under § 2113(e), it erred and we reverse

this portion of its judgment in case number 12-50089 and

grant the government’s cross-appeal in case number 12-

50144.

The government’s cross-appeal regarding Franklin’s gun

conviction under § 924(c) and corresponding sentencing

enhancement under § 2113(d) in case number 12-50144 is

denied. On remand, the district court shall enter a corrected

judgment in case number 12-50089 reflecting its acquittal of

Franklin on the § 924(c) gun charge and the § 2113(d) gun

enhancement.

The remainder of the district court’s judgments in cases

number 12-50082, 12-50089, 12-50135, 12-50144, and 12-

50169 are affirmed.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and

REMANDED.

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