Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-13-20023/USCOURTS-ca5-13-20023-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jose Mario Castro-Najera
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-20023

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

JOSE MARIO CASTRO-NAJERA, also known as Jose Mario Castro Najera, 

also known as Jose Mario Castro, also known as Mario Castro-Najera,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:12-CR-351-1

Before REAVLEY, DENNIS, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Jose Mario Castro-Najera (Castro) appeals the 45-month belowguidelines sentence imposed following entry of his guilty plea to a charge of

illegal reentry after removal. We affirm.

Castro challenges the 16-level enhancement imposed under U.S.S.G. 

§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i) based on his Texas conviction for possession of cocaine with 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 12, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

 Case: 13-20023 Document: 00512897311 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/12/2015
No. 13-20023

intent to deliver, for which he received a sentence longer than 13 months. In 

his view, the Texas conviction did not qualify as a drug trafficking offense 

because Texas defines delivery more broadly than § 2L1.2’s drug trafficking 

offense, given that the Texas offense of delivery may be committed by 

administering a controlled substance, an act not within the purview of § 2L1.2. 

He contends further that, for the same reasons, the Texas offense does not 

qualify as an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2). 

Castro’s claims are foreclosed. See United States v. Teran-Salas, 767 

F.3d 453, 460-62 (5th Cir. 2014). In Teran-Salas, we concluded that there is 

no “realistic probability that Texas would prosecute [the] crime under an 

‘administering’ theory in a way that does not also constitute either ‘dispensing’ 

or ‘distributing’ under the federal sentencing guidelines.” 767 F.3d at 460; see 

id. at 458-62. Further, “[e]ven without considering the drug type or quantity, 

conviction under the administer prong is not a realistic probability because no 

previous Texas case has involved a conviction under this prong.” Id. at 461. 

Therefore, we held that the Texas offense of possession with intent to deliver 

cocaine was a drug trafficking offense under the Guidelines and an aggravated 

felony under § 1326(b). Id. at 461-62 & n.5. 

AFFIRMED.

2

 Case: 13-20023 Document: 00512897311 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/12/2015