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Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Winston Delano Weaver
Appellant

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 24, 2000 Decided December 15, 2000

No. 99-3063

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Winston Delano Weaver,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 92cr00038-01)

Ed Wilhite, appointed by the court, argued the cause and

filed the brief for appellant.

Ryan H. Rainey, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Wilma A.

Lewis, U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher and Elizabeth Trosman, Assistant U.S. Attorneys. Mary-Patrice Brown, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance.

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Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Rogers and Garland,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Rogers.

Rogers, Circuit Judge: Winston Delano Weaver appeals

the denial of his motion under 28 U.S.C. s 2255 to vacate his

conviction because of ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to obtain information about the three suicide attempts of

a government witness.1 He contends that the district court

erred in denying his motion without an evidentiary hearing to

determine the significance of the attempts and why they had

not been ascertained or disclosed prior to trial. Assuming

that trial counsel's performance was deficient, we hold that,

given the relative unimportance of the witness to Weaver's

conviction, the degree to which the witness was impeached,

and the strength of the government's other evidence, Weaver

has failed to show the requisite prejudice. Accordingly, we

affirm.

I.

The government introduced evidence at Weaver's trial to

show that on four separate occasions he supplied quantities of

cocaine to an undercover officer of the Metropolitan Police

Department. That evidence showed that Weaver supplied

the drugs in response to arrangements made by Antonio

"Hub" Johnson, who was a government informant working

with Officer Dale Sutherland.

The first sale occurred on November 14, 1991. Sutherland

had told Johnson to contact Weaver. Johnson did so and

informed Weaver that Sutherland wanted to buy three ounces

of powder cocaine for $3000. That evening, the three men

met. While Sutherland waited in his truck, Johnson accompanied Weaver into a restaurant (near the intersection of 18th

Street and Columbia Road, N.W.) where Weaver retrieved a

__________

1 The district court certified this issue for appeal by Order of

November 10, 1999. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified at 28

U.S.C. s 2253(c)(1)(B) (1996)).

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bag containing powder cocaine. Weaver and Johnson returned to Sutherland's truck, Johnson showed the cocaine to

Sutherland, and the three men then left the area. The

second sale occurred on November 21, 1991. Johnson again

asked Weaver to sell Sutherland powder cocaine, this time

four-and-a-half ounces for $3500. The three men met that

afternoon (at the corner of Benning Road and H and Florida

Streets, N.E.) and Johnson accompanied Weaver to a pay

phone nearby, where Weaver telephoned the cocaine supplier.

The supplier stated that he would be ready to make the

exchange in an hour, so the three men reconvened then at the

corner of 18th Street and Columbia Road, N.W., where the

first exchange had taken place. Weaver retrieved the drugs

from the same place as he had before and gave the drugs to

Johnson, who delivered them to Sutherland. Weaver and

Sutherland agreed to continue to do business together. The

third sale occurred on December 18, 1991, when Weaver

retrieved, again from the same area, two ounces of powder

cocaine for Johnson to deliver to Sutherland for $2200.

Weaver was arrested on December 30, 1991 in connection

with a planned fourth undercover sale, which was to take

place in a shopping center parking lot. On this date, Sutherland negotiated with Weaver, again through Johnson, for the

purchase of eighteen ounces of powder cocaine; the telephonic negotiations were recorded.2 A video camera recorded

__________

2 In the first telephone call, Johnson asked Weaver if he could

get half a kilo and an additional two-and-a-half ounces of cocaine;

Weaver said he would try. At Sutherland's direction, Johnson told

Weaver that he had given Sutherland some of his own money for

the cocaine and, hence, wanted to remain involved in transactions

between Weaver and Sutherland. In a second telephone call,

Weaver suggested that the three men meet at his house, but

Johnson refused, expressing concern over robberies of drug buyers.

In a third telephone call, Sutherland spoke directly to Weaver, who

assured Sutherland that he would find a safe place to make the

exchange; Weaver said he would talk to his supplier about making

the exchange at a local hotel. In the fourth telephone conversation,

the three men agreed to meet in a shopping center parking lot at

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parts of the transaction, and several undercover police officers were positioned in the parking lot for the surveillance

operation.

Before going to the shopping center, Johnson drove Weaver to a parking lot (near 46th Street and Fletcher Johnson

High School in Southeast) where Weaver saw his supplier,

Gregory Barnes, in a car with George Denny. Weaver left

Johnson's car and spoke to Barnes. At the same time, Denny

got out of Barnes' car and into the back seat of Johnson's car.

Johnson then drove Weaver and Denny to the Fairfax Village

parking lot, with Barnes following in his car. On the way,

Denny showed Johnson some of the cocaine. After the men

arrived in the shopping center parking lot, Sutherland and

Weaver argued about whether Sutherland would pay first or

Weaver would produce the drugs first. As soon as Sutherland agreed to produce the money before receiving the drugs,

he opened the hatch of his jeep to get the money, and the

arrest teams, by prearranged signal, moved in to make the

arrests. When Weaver appeared to be getting away, Sutherland revealed that he was a police officer and placed Weaver

under arrest.

Weaver and Barnes were indicted on four counts in connection with the events of December 30, 1991.3 At their consoli-

__________

though there were no negotiations as to the purchase price for the

eighteen ounces of powder cocaine at the December 30th sale,

Officer Sutherland testified that he "had assumed [the price] would

be about $14,000."

3 Weaver and Barnes were indicted for conspiracy to distribute

more than fifty grams of a mixture containing cocaine base, in

violation of 21 U.S.C. ss 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), and 841(b)(1)(C);

two counts of attempted distribution of a mixture containing cocaine

base within 1000 feet of a school zone, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

ss 846, 860(a) and 18 U.S.C. s 2; and unlawful use of a communication facility to facilitate the attempted distribution of a mixture

containing cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. ss 841(a)(1) and

843(b). In addition, on May 28, 1992, Weaver was indicted on seven

counts in connection with his drug distributions on November 14

and 21, and December 18, 1991. Weaver's appeals from his convictions were consolidated by the court.

dated trial, the government called Johnson, Sutherland, and

Denny, among others, as witnesses to testify against Weaver

and Barnes. As relevant to this appeal, Denny testified that

he sold drugs for Barnes, and that on December 30th, he

gave Weaver drugs that Barnes, not Johnson, supplied him.

Weaver testified in his own defense, claiming that although he

had used cocaine for at least twenty years, he had never

before sold it, and that on the four dates in question, he was

paying off a debt to Johnson, who had at one point sold drugs

to Weaver on credit. Weaver had not wanted to sell drugs,

but Johnson told him that Sutherland was "excited about the

purchase." Johnson even coached Weaver on how to act like

a drug dealer. When Weaver tried to back out of the

December 30th sale, Johnson struck him across the face with

a pistol, chipping Weaver's tooth. Weaver testified that he

had never before met Barnes and did not know who he was.

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Weaver also presented a witness who testified that Johnson

was selling drugs during the time that he was working with

the police. On April 21, 1992, a jury convicted Weaver on all

counts; a mistrial was declared as to Barnes.

Two years after his conviction was affirmed on appeal, see

United States v. Weaver, 55 F.3d 685 (D.C. Cir. 1995), Weaver filed a pro se motion under 28 U.S.C. s 2255 to vacate, set

aside, or correct his sentence on the ground of ineffective

assistance of counsel. As relevant here, Weaver alleged that

trial counsel had failed to obtain information that was available about Denny's three suicide attempts in the D.C. Jail.4

Weaver argued in his motion that although Denny was a

"scoundrel" and a "hyperfallacious perjuror," trial counsel

failed to impeach him, despite the fact that Denny's suicide

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4 In his pro se motion, Weaver also raised claims of prosecutorial misconduct and prosecutorial vindictiveness. In reply to the

government's opposition, Weaver claimed that he was entitled to

relief not only because trial counsel failed to obtain information

about Denny's three suicide attempts, but also because trial counsel

failed to seek production of evidence regarding Denny's ownership

of a safe, to impeach Denny for visitation with his fiancee, and to

contact a witness who would have testified that Johnson was selling

drugs while working for the government.

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attempts raised questions about his "competency as a witness." Weaver argued later, through counsel, that the suicide evidence was "probative of the ends to which Mr. Denny

would go to get out of jail."

The district court denied the motion without a hearing.

Relying on United States v. Smith, 77 F.3d 511, 516 (D.C.

Cir. 1996), for the proposition that "only a mental disorder

that would potentially impair a witness' ability or willingness

to tell the truth is enough to make a witness incompetent and,

consequently, a trial unfair," the district court found that

neither Denny's suicide attempts nor any prior mental history

indicated that he suffered from a mental illness that would

prevent him from testifying truthfully. Furthermore, the

court found that Denny had been "extensively crossexamined" and that "his competency to serve as a witness

was satisfactory."

II.

On appeal, Weaver contends that "[i]n the context of multiple allegations as to the ineffectiveness of [trial] counsel and

prosecutorial misconduct and the apparent multiple suicide

attempts by a key government witness George Denny, the

[district c]ourt [ ] was obligated to conduct a hearing regarding the significance of the attempts and why they had not

been ascertained and/or disclosed prior to trial." Weaver

maintains that it is "logically impossible to determine the

possible impact of a mental illness upon testimony without

knowing what the illness might be," and that Denny's suicide

attempts are "indicative of the desperation of a witness to

escape punishment." Continuing, Weaver maintains that "[a]

distinction should be made between the suicide attempts and

the underlying psychiatric disorder they might indicate."

Finally, he notes that the district court stated in its certification of appealability that he had made "a substantial showing

that he was denied his constitutional right to counsel by the

alleged ineffectiveness of counsel in failing to obtain information regarding Mr. Denny's three suicide attempts."

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Under Strickland, Weaver must demonstrate both that

trial counsel's performance was deficient or unreasonable

under the circumstances, and that the deficient performance

prejudiced the defendant such that there was "a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the

result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984); see also

Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986). A reasonable probability is "a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. In

Strickland, the Court labeled relevant findings regarding the

performance and prejudice prongs as mixed questions of law

and fact, see id. at 698; however, "that does not settle what

standard of appellate review is appropriate." United States

v. Askew, 88 F.3d 1065, 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Normally, the

court's review of the district court's findings of fact is "highly

deferential," such that the district court's findings will be

reversed only if they are "clearly erroneous," United States v.

Del Rosario, 902 F.2d 55, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)); see also

Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 (1988), while review of

the district court's legal conclusions is de novo. See id.;

United States v. Ahn, 231 F.3d 26, slip op. at 18 (D.C. Cir.

Nov. 14, 2000) (citing United States v. Pollard, 959 F.2d 1011,

1023 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). We need not decide which standard is

appropriate because even on de novo review we find no error.

See Askew, 88 F.3d at 1071.

Section 2255 provides that hearings shall be granted "[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief." 28

U.S.C. s 2255. When a s 2255 motion involves ineffective

assistance of counsel, a hearing is not required if the district

court determines that the "alleged deficiencies of counsel did

not prejudice the defendant." United States v. Sayan, 968

F.2d 55, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (citing United States v. Patterson,

652 F.2d 1046, 1047-48 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).

The ultimate question is whether, despite the fact that the

evidence presenting Denny's suicide attempts was not presented to the jury, Weaver received a fair trial, that is "a trial

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resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence." Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995). Our disposition of Weaver's

contention that a hearing was required might be different if,

as Weaver asserts on appeal, Denny had been a "key government witness" against him. Then, because the nature and

significance of Denny's suicide attempts is not a matter of

record, a hearing might have been in order. Further, because it is also unclear in the record when information about

the suicide attempts became available to the government and

defense counsel, the matter might need to have been explored

at a hearing. These issues might need to have been explored

if Denny had been a key witness against Weaver because

cross-examination regarding the extent of Denny's willingness

to exculpate Johnson might have demonstrated Denny's lack

of credibility to a greater extent than the defense attacks on

his credibility that the jury, in fact, heard. If Denny had

been a key witness inculpating Weaver, and the government's

evidence was otherwise weak, the jury's evaluation of Weaver's coercion defense could have been affected.

In contending that the district court abused its discretion in

summarily denying his motion, Weaver, however, faces a

series of hurdles. As to the performance prong of Strickland, the government notes, the district court found, and this

court has recognized, attempted suicide by itself does not

render a witness' testimony less credible. See United States

v. Brooks, 966 F.2d 1500, 1503 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Weaver has

not proffered any evidence suggesting that Denny was incompetent, much less that Denny could have been impeached by

information relating to his suicide attempts.5 Under the

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5 At oral argument, the government advised that during a later

trial, Denny asserted a privilege with respect to the disclosure of

evidence of his suicide attempts; the district court upheld the

privilege. Apparently, the defense did not challenge the assertion

of the privilege. In Smith, the court noted both that "evidence

regarding mental illness is relevant only when it may reasonably

cast doubt on the ability or willingness of a witness to tell the

truth," and that "[f]ederal courts often permit cross-examination

regarding a witness' previous mental history, and may even allow

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circumstances, having failed to proffer a basis to show that

counsel's performance was deficient, the district court was not

required to hold an evidentiary hearing. See Machibroda v.

United States, 368 U.S. 487, 495 (1962); United States v.

Green, 680 F.2d 183, 184, 189 (D.C. Cir. 1982). But assuming

Weaver has met the performance prong of Strickland, by

showing that information about Denny's suicide attempts was

available for trial counsel to discover and could have been

used to impeach Denny's testimony by showing that he was

so desperate not to testify against Johnson that he would do

and say anything to stay out of jail, Weaver must still

demonstrate a "reasonable probability" that the outcome of

his trial would have been different.6 Strickland, 466 U.S. at

694.

At the outset, Weaver's attempt to show prejudice as a

result of the cumulative effect of alleged errors by trial

counsel and the district court is an attempt to circumvent the

provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act,7 and this he knows he cannot do. See United States v.

Winston Delano Weaver, 195 F.3d 52, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

Because Weaver did not appeal the district court's certification, only his allegation regarding trial counsel's failure to

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ment purposes," provided there is a sufficient temporal nexus. 77

F.3d at 516.

6 The district court found that the government disclosed Denny's suicide attempts on May 12, 1992 (after the jury returned its

verdict in Weaver's trial). Weaver points to no evidence that would

have alerted defense counsel to Denny's suicide attempts before

then.

7 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act requires a

defendant to obtain a certificate of appealability from the district

court in order to pursue an appeal, see 28 U.S.C. s 2253(c)(1)(B),

and provides that "[t]he certificate of appealability ... shall indicate

which specific issue or issues satisfy the showing required by

paragraph (2)." Id. s 2253(c)(3) (emphasis added). Paragraph (2)

provides that a certificate of appealability may be issued only if the

defendant makes a "substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." Id. s 2253(c)(2).

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learn of Denny's suicide attempts is properly before the

court. See id.

Additionally, characterizing Denny as a "key government

witness" against Weaver both misstates the nature of Denny's

role at Weaver's trial and ignores the key eyewitness testimony against Weaver by informant Johnson and undercover

officer Sutherland, as well as the December 30th video and

telephonic recordings.8 Denny's testimony was, at most,

cumulative with respect to Weaver. Moreover, Weaver's

attempt to distinguish United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377

(D.C. Cir. 1997), is unpersuasive. In Moore, the court rejected the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of trial

counsel because "[e]ven had [trial counsel] located the[ ]

[missing] witnesses, the testimony they allegedly would have

provided was tangential at best," and in light of the strong

evidence against the defendant, any error by counsel would

have been harmless. Id. at 391. Similarly here, the strength

of the government's evidence against Weaver would remain

virtually unchanged had Denny never testified.

To the extent that Denny's suicide attempts could have

further impeached his testimony, the district court could

properly conclude that the extensive cross-examination of

Denny provided the jury with strong grounds to doubt his

credibility. Not only was Denny cross-examined about his

own past drug-selling activities, his possession of weapons, his

assaultive conduct against his girlfriend, and his false statements about his prior criminal conduct to authorities, including the trial judge and his probation officer, but the jury also

learned about his agreement to cooperate with the government. In closing argument, trial counsel continued to attack

the credibility of the government's witnesses, arguing that

both Johnson's and Denny's necks were on the line and that

they were trying to "work[ ] a beef off for the police, and

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8 Even if, as Weaver's counsel argued in closing argument at

trial, the tape recordings were not entirely clear, transcriptions

were made available to the jury. In any event, the recordings

provided some corroboration of the eyewitness' testimony against

Weaver. See supra n.2.

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would say anything to Mr. Weaver and do anything to get

Mr. Weaver involved in this transaction."

Because Denny played an insubstantial role with regard to

the evidence against Weaver, the district court properly ruled

that Weaver had failed to meet his burden of showing prejudice under Strickland, and that the verdict was "worthy of

confidence."9 Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434. Accordingly, because

Weaver fails to show that the district court abused its discretion in denying his s 2255 motion without an evidentiary

hearing, we affirm the order denying the motion.

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9 Weaver's contention that the district court may have failed to

apply the correct prejudice standard is patently meritless. In its

memorandum opinion, the district court set forth Strickland's twopronged test and concluded, upon reviewing Weaver's allegations,

that "[trial c]ounsel's performance was not deficient and did not

prejudice [Weaver's] presentation to the jury." See, e.g., Walton v.

Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 653 (1990).

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