Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-12-01095/USCOURTS-caDC-12-01095-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Elaine Joan Mittleman
Petitioner
Postal Regulatory Commission
Respondent
United States Postal Service
Intervenor for Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 16, 2013 Decided July 8, 2014

No. 12-1095

ELAINE JOAN MITTLEMAN,

PETITIONER

v.

POSTAL REGULATORY COMMISSION,

RESPONDENT

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,

INTERVENOR

Consolidated with 12-1110, 12-1157

On Petitions for Review of Orders

 of the Postal Regulatory Commission

Elaine J. Mittleman argued the cause and filed the briefs for

petitioners.

Abby C. Wright, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Stuart F.

Delery, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Ronald C.

Machen, Jr., U.S. Attorney, Michael S. Raab and Jeffrey E.

Sandberg, Attorneys, Stephen L. Sharfman, General Counsel,

USCA Case #12-1095 Document #1501235 Filed: 07/08/2014 Page 1 of 15
2

Postal Regulatory Commission, and R. Brian Corcoran, Deputy

General Counsel.

Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, SRINIVASAN, Circuit

Judge, and SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge GARLAND.

GARLAND, Chief Judge: The petitioners in these

consolidated cases do not want their local post offices closed. 

They unsuccessfully opposed the closures of the three post

offices at issue by the United States Postal Service,

unsuccessfully appealed the Postal Service’s determinations to

the Postal Regulatory Commission, and now seek review of the

Commission’s decisions in this court. Because one of the

petitions has become moot, and because the other two involve

Commission decisions that are not subject to judicial review,

their current effort is likewise unsuccessful.

I

The Postal Reorganization Act Amendments of 1976

created a series of procedural steps that the United States Postal

Service must follow before “closing or consolidat[ing]” a post

office. Pub. L. No. 94-421, § 9(a), 90 Stat. 1303, 1310-11

(codified as amended at 39 U.S.C. § 404(d)). Before making a

determination to close or consolidate, the Postal Service must

give adequate notice to those served by the post office to ensure

that they have an opportunity to present their views. Id.

§ 404(d)(1). The Postal Service must also consider a list of

factors set out in the statute. Id. § 404(d)(2)(A)(i)-(v). If the

Postal Service decides to close or consolidate, it must commit its

decision, including its findings regarding the listed factors, to

writing and make that decision publicly available. Id.

§ 404(d)(3). “A determination of the Postal Service to close or

USCA Case #12-1095 Document #1501235 Filed: 07/08/2014 Page 2 of 15
3

consolidate any post office may be appealed by any person

served by such office to the Postal Regulatory Commission.” Id.

§ 404(d)(5).1

These consolidated cases involve challenges to the planned

closures of three postal facilities: the Pimmit Branch in Fairfax

County, Virginia; the Venice Post Office in Venice, California;

and the Spring Dale Post Office in Spring Dale, West Virginia. 

On January 7, 2010, the Postal Service notified customers

of the Pimmit Branch that services might be discontinued in

light of the recent opening of a new, larger post office less than

two miles away. After seeking and receiving comment, the

Postal Service made a final determination to close the branch

and did so on November 10, 2011. Petitioner Elaine Mittleman

appealed that determination to the Postal Regulatory

Commission, contending, inter alia, that the Postal Service failed

to follow the proper procedures for closure. The Commission

reasoned that, under its precedents, it did not have jurisdiction

to hear the appeal because the relocation of postal services from

the Pimmit Branch to another nearby facility was not a “closure”

(or a “consolidation”)2

 within the meaning of the statute. 

1

The 2006 Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act

established the Postal Regulatory Commission as “an independent

establishment of the executive branch.” Pub. L. No. 109-435,

§ 601(a)(1), 120 Stat. 3198, 3238 (2006) (codified at 39 U.S.C. § 501). 

It is the successor to the Postal Rate Commission, which had

substantially the same review authority under the Postal

Reorganization Act Amendments of 1976. See Pub. L. No. 94-421,

§ 9(b)(5), 90 Stat. at 1310-11 (codified at 39 U.S.C. § 404(b)(5)

(1976)).

2

The petitioners did not contend below, nor do they now, that any

of the contested determinations involved “consolidations” under 39

U.S.C. § 404(d)(5). The Commission interprets a “consolidation” to

USCA Case #12-1095 Document #1501235 Filed: 07/08/2014 Page 3 of 15
4

According to the Commission’s interpretation of 39 U.S.C.

§ 404(d)(5), a closure subject to its review occurs only when the

Postal Service “eliminat[es] . . . facilities” within a community. 

PRC Order No. 1159, Docket No. A2011-90, at 11 (Pimmit

Branch, Falls Church, VA) (Jan. 20, 2012). Because the Postal

Service moved the services provided by Pimmit Branch to

another close-by facility in the same area, its action was not a

closure but rather a “rearrangement[] of postal facilities within

a community.” Id. at 10, 12. 

On April 26, 2011, the Postal Service advised the public

that it was considering closing and selling the Venice Post

Office building and moving its services 400 feet across the street

to what had been an annex facility. On July 18, following a

five-week comment period, the Postal Service announced that it

had decided to close the post office. Petitioners Venice

Stakeholders Association and Mark Ryavec (now joined by a

number of other concerned individuals and the Free Venice

Beachhead newspaper) appealed the determination to the Postal

Regulatory Commission, arguing that closure would severely

reduce or temporarily eliminate the availability of postal

services to the community. As in the Pimmit Branch case, the

Commission dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction

because it found that the Postal Service’s “relocation” of the

facility was not a “clos[ure]” within the meaning of 39 U.S.C.

§ 404(d)(5). PRC Order No. 1166, Docket No. A2012-17, at 8-9

(Venice Post Office, Venice, CA) (Jan. 24, 2012).

On March 18, 2011, the Postal Service distributed

questionnaires to customers of the Spring Dale Post Office

involve “management, not facilities” -- that is, “replacing postmasters

with officers-in-charge who are subordinate to postmasters in larger

communities.” PRC Order No. 436, Docket No. A82-10, at 8-9

(Oceana Station, Virginia Beach, VA) (June 25, 1982).

USCA Case #12-1095 Document #1501235 Filed: 07/08/2014 Page 4 of 15
5

concerning a possible decision to close that post office. On

April 6, the Postal Service held a community meeting

concerning possible closure, followed by a two-month comment

period. On October 21, 2011, the Postal Service posted its final

determination to close the Spring Dale Post Office, citing the

office’s vacant postmaster position, financial concerns, and the

minimal effect the closure would have on the community. 

Petitioner Paul McClung (later joined by other affected

individuals) filed an appeal with the Postal Regulatory

Commission, alleging faulty reasoning on the part of the Postal

Service as well as failure to comply with the proper procedures. 

After considering the merits of the challenge, the Commission

divided 2-2 regarding the closure of the Spring Dale Post Office,

which under Commission practice had the effect of affirming the

Postal Service’s determination. PRC Order No. 1262, Docket

No. A2012-68, at 2 n.4 (Spring Dale Post Office, Spring Dale,

WV) (Feb. 27, 2012).

In February and March 2012, the petitioners filed the

petitions now before us, contending that they are entitled to

judicial review of the Commission’s decisions and seeking

reversal and remand of those decisions.

II

 We begin by considering whether any of the petitioners’

challenges have become moot during the course of this

litigation. “In general, a case becomes moot when the issues

presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally

cognizable interest in the outcome.” Conservation Force, Inc.

v. Jewell, 733 F.3d 1200, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (internal

quotation marks omitted). This can happen when “the court can

provide no effective remedy because a party has already

obtained all the relief that it has sought.” Id. (internal quotation

USCA Case #12-1095 Document #1501235 Filed: 07/08/2014 Page 5 of 15
6

marks omitted). When a case is moot, a federal court is without

jurisdiction to decide it. Id.

On April 11, 2013, the Postal Service informed customers

of the Spring Dale Post Office that it had decided to keep that

office open, albeit with reduced hours. See Letter from David

C. Belt, Attorney, U.S. Postal Service to Mark J. Langer, Clerk

of Court, D.C. Circuit, at attach. (Oct. 11, 2013). The Postal

Service has advised us that this action has “the practical effect

of rescinding” its 2011 decision to close the post office, and that,

“in the event that the Postal Service later initiates a

discontinuance action and decides to close” the office again, it

will “comply with the process set forth in 39 U.S.C. § 404(d).” 

Id. at 1. Accordingly, because the petitioners in the Spring Dale

case have received all the relief they sought, their petition is

moot and must be dismissed. See Iron Arrow Honor Soc’y v.

Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 70 (1983); Conservation Force, 733 F.3d

at 1204.

The Postal Regulatory Commission acknowledges that the

petitions regarding the two other post offices are not moot. Oral

Arg. Recording at 29:37-30:53. Although the Postal Service no

longer occupies the buildings that housed the Pimmit Branch

and Venice Post Office, the Commission represents that, if this

court were to set aside and remand the challenged decisions, the

Postal Service may be able to offer the petitioners some relief. 

Id. Accordingly, we must proceed to address the remaining two

petitions.

III

Citing the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the

petitioners ask us to “hold unlawful and set aside” the Postal

Regulatory Commission’s final decisions because they are

“‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not

USCA Case #12-1095 Document #1501235 Filed: 07/08/2014 Page 6 of 15
7

in accordance with law.’” Pet’rs’ Br. 25 (quoting 5 U.S.C.

§ 706(2)(A)). The problem for the petitioners is that the same

provision of the Postal Reorganization Act Amendments that

grants the Commission authority to review “[a] determination of

the Postal Service to close or consolidate any post office,” 39

U.S.C. § 404(d)(5), withdraws the authority that the APA would

otherwise grant a court to review the Commission’s review.

Section 404(d)(5) provides that “[t]he Commission shall

review” a determination to close or consolidate a post office and

“shall set aside any determination” of the Postal Service that it

finds to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or

otherwise not in accordance with the law.” 39 U.S.C.

§ 404(d)(5). But this provision also declares that “chapter 7 of

title 5 shall not apply to any review carried out by the

Commission under this paragraph.” Id. Chapter 7 of title 5 of

the United States Code, titled “Judicial Review,” is the part of

the APA that provides a cause of action for judicial review. 

Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 185 (D.C. Cir. 2006); see Bond

v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2363 (2011). The chapter

entitles a person aggrieved by agency action to “judicial review

thereof,” 5 U.S.C. § 702, and provides that “final agency action

for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court [is]

subject to judicial review,” id. § 704. It also authorizes a

reviewing court to “hold unlawful and set aside agency

actions . . . found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of

discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,” id. § 706,

precisely the relief that the petitioners seek here. Accordingly,

by declaring that the judicial review chapter “shall not apply” to

a review carried out by the Commission, Congress has precluded

this court from examining the Commission’s handiwork under

the APA.

The petitioners maintain that the phrase, “chapter 7 of title

5 shall not apply to any review carried out by the Commission

USCA Case #12-1095 Document #1501235 Filed: 07/08/2014 Page 7 of 15
8

under this paragraph,” merely means that chapter 7 does not

impose any requirements on the Commission’s own review of a

closure.3 But none of the provisions of chapter 7 imposes any

requirements on an agency’s own decisions. Rather, they all

refer to aspects of judicial review. See id. § 702 (right of

“judicial review”); id. § 703 (form and venue of “proceeding for

judicial review”); id. § 704 (kinds of agency actions “subject to

judicial review”); id. § 705 (relief that a “reviewing court” may

issue “pending judicial review”); id. § 706 (scope of review by

“the reviewing court”).4

3

The petitioners do not argue that § 404(d)(5)’s preclusion of

APA review is inapplicable because the Commission found that the

Postal Service actions at issue here involved “rearrangements” or

“relocations” rather than closures. See Oral Arg. Recording at 7:45-

9:40. The Commission’s view is that the phrase “chapter 7 of title 5

shall not apply to any review carried out by the Commission under this

paragraph,” 39 U.S.C. § 404(d)(5), encompasses “any review” by the

Commission, including one that results in a determination that there

was no closure and thus that the paragraph does not apply. We need

not resolve the question, however, because the petitioners did not raise

it. Cf. Air Courier Conference of Am. v. Am. Postal Workers Union,

498 U.S. 517, 523 n.3 (1991) (noting that, because “[t]he judicial

review provisions of the APA are not jurisdictional,” issues regarding

them can “be waived by the parties”).

4

There are other provisions of the APA that do apply to an

agency’s own decisionmaking. They are contained in chapter 5 of title

5, which is titled “Administrative Procedure.” See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-

58. Indeed, the sentence in 39 U.S.C. § 404(d)(5) upon which we

have been focusing states in full: “The provisions of section 556,

section 557, and chapter 7 of title 5 shall not apply to any review

carried out by the Commission under this paragraph.” 39 U.S.C.

§ 404(d)(5) (emphasis added). The italicized sections impose

procedural requirements on certain kinds of agency hearings. Section

404(d)(5) renders those requirements, like the chapter on judicial

review, inapplicable to the Commission’s review of Postal Service

USCA Case #12-1095 Document #1501235 Filed: 07/08/2014 Page 8 of 15
9

The conclusion that § 404(d)(5) precludes judicial review

under the APA is supported by precedent regarding an

analogous statutory section. That section, 39 U.S.C. § 410(a),

provides that “no Federal law dealing with public or Federal

contracts, property, works, officers, employees, budgets, or

funds, including the provisions of chapter[] . . . 7 of title 5, shall

apply to the exercise of the powers of the Postal Service.” 39

U.S.C. § 410(a) (emphasis added). As a consequence, we have

observed that “the Postal Service is exempt from review under

the Administrative Procedure Act.” N. Air Cargo v. U.S. Postal

Serv., 674 F.3d 852, 858 (D.C. Cir. (2012); see Carlin v.

McKean, 823 F.2d 620, 622-23 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Nat’l Easter

Seal Soc’y for Crippled Children & Adults v. U.S. Postal Serv.,

656 F.2d 754, 766-67 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Other circuits have

reached similar conclusions regarding the effect of § 410(a). 

See Currier v. Potter, 379 F.3d 716, 725 (9th Cir. 2004); Booher

v. U.S. Postal Serv., 843 F.2d 943, 945 (6th Cir. 1988); Harrison

v. U.S. Postal Serv., 840 F.2d 1149, 1155 (4th Cir. 1988).5

The conclusion that § 404(d)(5) precludes judicial review

of Commission decisions regarding closures and consolidations

under the APA is confirmed by the legislative history of the

section. The debates surrounding the Postal Reorganization Act

Amendments included a disagreement about the appropriate

amount of process to give to persons aggrieved by the closure of

their local post office. The Senate version included judicial

review in the United States Courts of Appeals, while the House

determinations to close or consolidate post offices.

5

In Air Courier Conference of America v. American Postal

Workers Union, the Supreme Court declined to decide whether

§ 410(a) exempts the Postal Service from judicial review under the

APA because the issue was not encompassed in the Court’s grant of

certiorari. See 498 U.S. at 522-23.

USCA Case #12-1095 Document #1501235 Filed: 07/08/2014 Page 9 of 15
10

version contained no review provision at all, leaving the

determination entirely in the hands of the Postal Service. H.R.

Rep. No. 94-1444, at 18 (1976) (Conf. Rep.). Taking a middle

ground, the Conference Committee adopted the Senate

provision, “except that the right of appeal to a United States

court of appeals is deleted and instead there shall be a right of

appeal to the Postal Rate Commission” -- the predecessor to the

Postal Regulatory Commission. Id. (emphasis added). This

result appears to have been intended to strike a balance between

providing protection for postal patrons and ensuring the

efficiency of postal operations. 

The petitioners contend that, even if § 404(d)(5) precludes

APA review of Commission decisions regarding closures and

consolidations, another provision of title 39 nonetheless

authorizes it. That provision is § 3663, which states: “A person,

including the Postal Service, adversely affected or aggrieved by

a final order or decision of the Postal Regulatory Commission

may . . . institute proceedings for review thereof by filing a

petition in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia. The court shall review the order or decision in

accordance with section 706 of title 5 . . . .” 39 U.S.C. § 3663.6

Were it not for § 404(d)(5), section 3663 would indeed

appear to authorize APA review of all final decisions of the

Commission. But given that § 404(d)(5) precludes APA review

6

Section 3663 also provides that review shall be in accordance

with “chapter 158 and section 2112 of title 28.” Id. Chapter 158 is

commonly known as the Hobbs Act. “While the Hobbs Act specifies

the form of proceeding for judicial review of ICC orders, see 5 U.S.C.

§ 703, it is the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) that codifies the

nature and attributes of judicial review.” ICC v. Bhd. of Locomotive

Eng’rs, 482 U.S. 270, 282 (1987). Section 2112 governs the record

on review and enforcement of agency orders. 28 U.S.C. § 2112.

USCA Case #12-1095 Document #1501235 Filed: 07/08/2014 Page 10 of 15
11

of Commission decisions regarding closures and consolidations,

we must attempt “to harmonize and give meaningful effect to”

these seemingly contradictory provisions. New Process Steel,

L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674, 680 (2010); see Nat’l Ass’n of

Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 678-79

(2007). This can readily be accomplished by employing the

“well established canon of statutory interpretation . . . that the

specific governs the general.” RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v.

Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2070-71 (2012). As the

Court explained in RadLAX, “[t]he general/specific canon is

perhaps most frequently applied to statutes in which a general

permission or prohibition is contradicted by a specific

prohibition or permission. To eliminate the contradiction, the

specific provision is construed as an exception to the general

one.” Id. at 2071. Here, the general permission of judicial

review under the APA granted by § 3663 is contradicted by the

specific prohibition of § 404(d)(5). Harmonization is achieved

by reading § 3663 as authorizing judicial review for the broad

run of Commission decisions, with the specific exception that

§ 404(d)(5) establishes for decisions regarding closures and

consolidations. 

The fact that § 3663 was enacted in 2006 as part of the

Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act (PAEA), while the

section that is now § 404(d)(5) was part of the earlier Postal

Reorganization Act Amendments of 1976, does not change our

conclusion. As the Supreme Court said in National Association

of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife: 

While a later enacted statute . . . can sometimes operate

to amend or even repeal an earlier statutory

provision . . . , repeals by implication are not favored

and will not be presumed unless the intention of the

legislature to repeal [is] clear and manifest. We will

not infer a statutory repeal unless the later statute

USCA Case #12-1095 Document #1501235 Filed: 07/08/2014 Page 11 of 15
12

expressly contradict[s] the original act or unless such

a construction is absolutely necessary . . . in order that

[the] words [of the later statute] shall have any

meaning at all. Outside these limited circumstances, a

statute dealing with a narrow, precise, and specific

subject is not submerged by a later enacted statute

covering a more generalized spectrum.

551 U.S. at 662-63 (internal quotation marks omitted). There is

nothing in the text of the general review provision of § 3663 that

communicates a “clear and manifest” intention to repeal the

limitation that § 404(d)(5) imposed on review of Commission

decisions regarding post office closures and consolidations. The

text does not even mention § 404(d)(5), let alone “expressly”

contradict it. And such a construction is not necessary to give

the words of § 3663 “any meaning at all,” as those words

provide a right of review for the broad run of Commission

decisions that do not cover the “narrow, precise, and specific

subject” of post office closures and consolidations.

Nor is there anything in the history of PAEA to indicate that

Congress intended § 3663 to repeal the judicial review limitation

of § 404(d)(5). To the contrary, PAEA made numerous changes

to other provisions of § 404,7

 including striking and revising a

7

For example, PAEA inserted new subsections 404(b) and (c),

which contained provisions regarding classes of mail and rates of

postage. See PAEA § 1010(e), Pub. L. No. 109-435, 120 Stat. 3198,

3261-62 (2006). (At the same time, it redesignated subsections 404(b)

and (c) as (d) and (e), respectively. Id.) PAEA also inserted new rules

for determining the date upon which an appeal from a Postal Service

closure decision is considered “received by” the Commission. See id.

§ 1006(a), 120 Stat. at 3258 (codified at 39 U.S.C. § 404(d)(6)). In

addition, PAEA substituted the Postal Regulatory Commission for the

Postal Rate Commission throughout the statute, including in § 404(d)

as the entity authorized to review Postal Service determinations to

USCA Case #12-1095 Document #1501235 Filed: 07/08/2014 Page 12 of 15
13

provision of that section.8

 It also struck many other provisions

of the Postal Reorganization Act as that Act stood in 2006.9

Nonetheless, Congress left completely intact the provision of

§ 404(d)(5) that precludes APA review of Commission decisions

regarding post office closures and consolidations. Accordingly,

we find no indication of a congressional intention to repeal

§ 404(d)(5)’s elimination of APA review, let alone a “clear and

manifest” intention.

Finally, we acknowledge that the absence of a cause of

action for judicial review under the APA does not necessarily

foreclose all judicial review. See Trudeau, 456 F.3d at 184 &

n.5, 188-90 (noting that, where review is precluded under the

APA, other causes of action may still be available).10 As we

said in Trudeau v. FTC, even when “‘a plaintiff is unable to

close post offices. See id. § 604(a), 120 Stat. at 3241. It made many

other additions to § 404 as well. See id. § 102, 120 Stat. at 3200; id.

§ 403(b)(2), 120 Stat. at 3227.

8

PAEA § 102, 120 Stat. at 3200 (striking a subsection that

authorized the Postal Service to provide nonpostal services and

replacing it with a subsection that significantly limits its ability to do

so).

9

See, e.g., PAEA § 201, 120 Stat. at 3200-05 (striking what were

then 39 U.S.C. §§ 3621-22 and replacing them with new language); id.

§ 205, 120 Stat. at 3216-17 (striking what was then 39 U.S.C. § 3662

and replacing it with new language); id. § 404, 120 Stat. at 3227-29

(striking some subsections of 39 U.S.C. § 409 and replacing them with

new language).

10See also Air Courier Conference of Am., 498 U.S. at 523 n.3

(“The judicial review provisions of the APA are not jurisdictional . . . . 

Whether § 410(a) exempts the Postal Service from APA review is in

essence a question whether Congress intended to allow a certain cause

of action against the Postal Service.”).

USCA Case #12-1095 Document #1501235 Filed: 07/08/2014 Page 13 of 15
14

bring his case predicated on either a specific or general statutory

review provision, he may still be able to institute a non-statutory

review action.’” Id. at 189 (quoting Chamber of Commerce v.

Reich, 74 F.3d 1322,1327 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). Indeed, we have

found such “non-statutory” review available for certain Postal

Service decisions, notwithstanding the preclusion of APA

review under 39 U.S.C. § 410(a). See N. Air Cargo, 674 F.3d at

858; Aid Ass’n for Lutherans, 321 F.3d at 1172-73.

But while such review may be available, it is quite narrow. 

It is available only to determine whether the agency has acted

“ultra vires” -- that is, whether it has “exceeded its statutory

authority.” Aid Ass’n for Lutherans, 321 F.3d at 1173; see N.

Air Cargo, 674 F.3d at 858; Trudeau, 456 F.3d at 190; cf.

Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 188 (1958) (concluding that

judicial review of an NLRB order was available,

notwithstanding that the challenged order did not come within

the judicial review provision of the National Labor Relations

Act, because the NLRB’s order was “made in excess of its

delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition in the

Act [that] is clear and mandatory”). Here, however, the

petitioners do not contend that the Commission exceeded the

scope of its statutory authority in dismissing their appeals

regarding the Pimmit Branch and the Venice Post Office. If

anything, they contend that the Commission did precisely the

opposite: that it improperly constrained its own authority by

finding that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the cases. 

Accordingly, neither APA review nor non-statutory review of

the Commission’s decisions is available.

IV

For the foregoing reasons, the petition regarding the Spring

Dale Post Office is dismissed as moot, and the petitions

USCA Case #12-1095 Document #1501235 Filed: 07/08/2014 Page 14 of 15
15

regarding the Pimmit Branch and the Venice Post Office are

denied.

So ordered.

USCA Case #12-1095 Document #1501235 Filed: 07/08/2014 Page 15 of 15