Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05108/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05108-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Felix Manuel Bermudez
Petitioner
Joe McGrath
Respondent

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28 This information is derived from the petition for writ of habeas corpus, Respondent’s answer to the petition, and 1

the exhibits submitted in support of Respondent’s answer.

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FELIX MANUEL BERMUDEZ, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

JOE McGRATH, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:04-CV-5108 OWW SMS HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant to

a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Kern, following his conviction by jury

trial on March 14, 2001, of four counts of assault with a firearm (Cal. Penal Code § 245(a)(2)), four

counts of attempted robbery of an inhabited dwelling (Cal. Penal Code §§ 664, 212.5), and discharge

of a firearm at an inhabited dwelling (Cal. Penal Code § 246). See Exhibits A, C, Respondent’s

Answer to the Petition (hereinafter “Answer”). On April 11, 2001, Petitioner was sentenced to serve

a total determinate term of twenty-three years and four months in state prison. Id.

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28 “RT” refers to the Reporter’s Transcript. 2

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 2

Thereafter, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the California Court of Appeal, Fifth

Appellate District (hereinafter “5 DCA”). On October 1, 2001, the 5 DCA issued an unpublished th th

opinion affirming the judgment. See Exhibit C, Answer. 

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court on

November 25, 2002. See Exhibit D, Answer. On April 9, 2003, the petition was denied with citation

to In re Waltreus, 62 Cal. 2d 218 (1965). See Exhibit E, Answer. 

On January 5, 2004, Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas petition in this Court.

Petitioner raises two grounds for relief: 1) Petitioner claims the trial court erred in refusing to grant

Petitioner’s motion for mistrial based on a prospective juror’s comments regarding Officer Madden;

and 2) Petitioner claims there was insufficient evidence to support the Forest Avenue conviction. 

On July 7, 2004, Respondent filed an answer to the petition. Respondent contends that

Petitioner has procedurally defaulted his claims. He further alleges the claims are without merit. 

On August 9, 2004, Petitioner filed a traverse. 

 FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Prosecution - Brockton Court crimes

On October 11, 2000, at around 8:45 p.m., Fred Eckles was at his home at 5117 Brockton

Court in Bakersfield. (RT 47-48.) He was watching a game with his friends, Kniela Inouye (aka 2

“Corn”) and Luis Sandoval. (RT 48-49, 582.) His roommate, Kiki, was in the back bedroom. (RT

50.) Eckles heard a car door slam and looked through the window to see who it was. (RT 50.) He

saw a burgundy-colored two-door sports car, though he was not sure of the make and model. (RT

51.) He saw a male and a female exit the vehicle. (RT 51.) The two people knocked on the side door

near the kitchen, and Eckles opened it approximately half a foot. (RT 53, 56-57.) Corn had gone to

the door as well and was standing near Eckles. (RT 58.)

Eckles saw and recognized the female. (RT 53.) She was black, short, bald, chunky, and had

a round face. (RT 53.) He knew her to go by the name of “Smoke.” (RT 53.) Smoke had been to the

house before and had purchased Ecstasy from his roommate, Alex Qualls. (RT 56.) Smoke asked to

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U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 3

see Qualls. (RT 56.) Eckles told her to wait, because Qualls was not present, but his friend Corn

would sell drugs in Qualls’ absence. (RT 57.) Corn then passed by Eckles and stood outside the

doorway. (RT 60.) At that point, Eckles heard a male voice say, “Lay your punk ass down.” (RT 58.)

He saw a man through the crack in the door holding a gun. (RT 58.) He described the person as a

black male approximately 6' 2" tall wearing a wide-brimmed fishing hat and a hooded sweatshirt

with black sleeves and white on the front. (RT 59, 62.) He recognized the person to be someone he

knew as Felix who often “hung out” with Smoke. (RT 65.) Eckles identified Petitioner in court to be

that person. (RT 66.) 

When Eckles looked through the crack in the door he saw Petitioner pointing the gun at Corn.

(RT 59.) Corn then turned and ran back inside the house and Petitioner slammed the door shut. (RT

58-60.) Eckles heard three gunshots, and he ran to the back of the house and climbed out the back

window along with Corn and Luis. (RT 61.) Eckles admitted that he had initially told officers that

Petitioner was a thin, clean-shaven male in his 20's , approximately 5' 10" tall, 145 pounds, having

short black hair and dark complexion. (RT 61-62.) He had also described Petitioner as wearing a

gray T-shirt and baggy blue jeans. (RT 62.) 

When Eckles returned home that night, he found two bullet holes in the front door and one in

the front of the house. (RT 63.) At some point thereafter, Eckles contacted Officer Clay Madden of

the Bakersfield Police Department. (RT 70.) Eckles knew Madden as they had played basketball

together for several years. (RT 71.) Eckles told Madden that Smoke and Petitioner had committed

the shooting. (RT 71.) Eckles told Madden he would cooperate with the investigation and testify at

trial. (RT 72.) Approximately three to five days later, Madden contacted Eckles and showed him a

photographic lineup. (RT 73.) Eckles looked at the lineup and identified Petitioner as the shooter.

(RT 74-75.) Approximately three to four days after Eckles identified Petitioner, someone contacted

Eckles’ roommate wanting to make a deal with Eckles regarding his identification of Petitioner. (RT

75-76.) In November of that year, Eckles went to an in-person lineup but did not identify Petitioner

as the shooter. (RT 76-77.) Based on his subsequent conversations with Corn, Eckles recanted his

identification stating he no longer believed Petitioner was the shooter. (RT 77.)

Kniela Inouye, aka “Corn,” testified he was at Eckles’ home on October 11, 2000. (RT 111.)

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U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 4

He recalled that he, Eckles, and Luis had just finished watching a basketball game when he heard a

car pull up to the house and someone knock on the side door. (RT 112.) Eckles answered the door

and Corn went out. (RT 112.) He turned to the right and saw a man pointing a gun at his face. (RT

113.) He also saw a female who he described as black, short, “kinda chunky,” and having a short

haircut. (RT 114.) He recognized her as someone he had seen before. (RT 113-114.) He described

the male as taller than himself, approximately 5' 9" to 5' 10" tall. (RT 114.) As the male held the gun

at approximately 6 to 7 inches from Corn’s face, the male said, “Lay your bitch ass down.” (RT 115.)

Corn then turned around and went back into the house. (RT 115.) Corn did not recognize the man.

(RT 115.) As Corn went through the door, Eckles slammed the door on the male. (RT 116.) Corn

then turned to run and heard three gunshots. (RT 117. ) Corn fell as he was running and he heard one

of the bullets pass over his head. (RT 117.) Corn ran to the back of the house and followed Eckles

out of the back window. (RT 118.) Corn sustained injuries to his lip during his escape. (RT 118.) 

Bakersfield Police Officer Ryan Floyd responded to the shooting on October 11 and made

contact with Eckles, Corn and Luis. (RT 582-584, 588.) Corn and Luis were not able to provide

descriptions of the suspects. (RT 589.) However, Eckles was able to provide a description. (RT 589.)

Eckles stated the suspects were a black male and black female. (RT 589.) He stated the male suspect

possessed a gun. (RT 589.) Officer Floyd stated Eckles had recognized the suspects from seeing

them on prior occasions in the area of Third and Texas streets. (RT 590.) Eckles told Officer Floyd

that someone had told him the male suspect’s name was Felix. (RT 590.) Officer Floyd recovered

two 9-millimeter Luger shell casings at the location. (RT 592-594.) He located two gunshot holes in

the door and one gunshot hole in the plaster of the house. (RT 594-596.)

Bakersfield Police Officer Clay Madden was assigned the investigation of the case. (RT 296.)

On October 24, 2001, Madden re-interviewed Eckles about the crime. (RT 296.) Eckles stated he

knew who the shooter was, he provided Madden with Petitioner’s name, and he stated he was willing

to cooperate in the investigation. (RT 296-297.) Madden conducted a photo lineup on October 27.

(RT 301.) Eckles identified Petitioner as the shooter from a photograph in the lineup. (RT 303.) He

stated he was positive it was Petitioner because he had seen him on several occasions at parties. (RT

305.) Corn could not make an identification because he had been focusing on the gun. (RT 305.) 

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U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 5

Thereafter, Petitioner was arrested, and Officer Madden interviewed him. (RT 312-313.) 

Petitioner agreed to speak to Madden. (RT 314-315.) Madden explained to Petitioner that he had

been identified as the shooter at the Brockton Court incident. (RT 315.) Petitioner stated he did not

know anything about the incident. (RT 315.) Madden asked Petitioner if he knew Eckles, and

Petitioner stated he did not. (RT 315.) Madden asked if Petitioner had ever been to the Brockton

Court residence, and he stated he had not. (RT 315.) Madden then asked Petitioner if he knew a

woman who went by the name of “Smoke.” (RT 317.) Petitioner stuttered and responded he did not

know who Madden was talking about. (RT 317.) Madden told Petitioner that he must know who he

was talking about because Madden himself had contacted the two of them together on a prior

occasion. (RT 317.) Petitioner though for a moment and asked Madden if he was talking about “the

female.” (RT 317.) Petitioner stated he did know her and described her as a black female around 16

or 17 years old who resembled a male. (RT 318.) He also said she was short and fat. (RT 318.) He

stated he believed she was currently in juvenile hall, and he hadn’t spoken to her in some time. (RT

318.) 

Madden went to juvenile hall and interviewed Smoke. (RT 331.) She initially stated she did

not know anything about the incident, but had heard that Petitioner was responsible. (RT 332.)

Madden then told her, as a ruse, that she and Petitioner had been positively identified by the victims.

(RT 332.) She responded by saying, “I can’t believe he got me involved in this. I was there, but I

didn’t do anything.” (RT 332.) During the course of the interview, Madden did not provide Smoke

with any details of the crime. (RT 332.) 

Smoke stated she met up with Petitioner on October 11 at Central Cali Liquor. (RT 336.) She

stated that at Petitioner’s suggestion, they agreed to go to the Brockton Court residence to purchase

marijuana. (RT 336, 342.) She told Petitioner she did not have any money, and he told her not to

worry about it. (RT 336.) They then got into a burgundy 1991 Buick Skylark. (RT 336.) She said she

had never seen the car before. (RT 337.) Petitioner was very quiet in the car, which was not typical

of him. (RT 343.) When they arrived at the Brockton Court residence, Petitioner got out of the

vehicle, told Smoke to stay in the car, picked up a black fisherman’s hat, and started heading to the

residence. (RT 343.) As he neared the residence, he pulled the hat down over his face. (RT 343.)

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U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 6

Thinking he was going to fight someone, Smoke exited the vehicle as well. (RT 343.) Petitioner

approached the kitchen door and knocked. (RT 344.) Smoke was standing next to Petitioner. (RT

344.) When Eckles opened the door, Petitioner pointed the gun at him and told him to “lay down” or

“lay your ass down.” (RT 345.) Eckles then shut the door, and Petitioner began firing his gun into the

door. (RT 345.) Smoke then ran to the car and got inside. (RT 345.) 

Renee Dean (aka “Smoke”) testified at trial that she saw Petitioner in a burgundy Buick

Skylark at Central Cali Liquors. (RT 209, 211-212.) She had never seen him in that car before. (RT

212.) Petitioner struck up a conversation with her. (RT 213.) They had been in an argument a few

weeks before over some compact discs. (RT 213.) Prior to that argument, they had been friends and

would often spend time together either traveling around or smoking marijuana. (RT 213.) She

recalled that on two or three prior occasions, Officer Madden had contacted the two of them when

they were together. (RT 214.)

On this occasion, Smoke and Petitioner resolved their differences. (RT 215.) They decided to

obtain a bag of marijuana to smoke it together. (RT 215.) Petitioner suggested they purchase $20

worth of marijuana from a house on Brockton Court, and Smoke agreed. (RT 216, 218-219.) Smoke

stated they had purchased drugs there approximately four to five times before from someone she

knew as “Q.” (RT 216.) She remembered seeing someone she knew as Fred there on those occasions.

(RT 217.) She stated Petitioner had been to the house on several occasions as well. (RT 218.) She

testified she was wearing jean shorts, a blue-green sweater, and a blue and gray LA Dodgers hat. (RT

220.) Her hair was very short and bald on the sides. (RT 221.) Petitioner was wearing a black jersey

and pants. (RT 221.) 

When they arrived at the Brockton Court residence, Petitioner told Smoke to stay in the car;

normally, she would accompany him to the door. (RT 221.) Petitioner retrieved a black fisherman’s

hat from the seat and put it on. (RT 223.) As Petitioner approached the house, Smoke exited the

vehicle out of curiosity. (RT 223.) Petitioner approached the side door. (RT 225.) Her pager went off

as she was walking up the driveway. (RT 226.) When she looked up, she saw Petitioner standing at

the door with a chrome/silver gun. (RT 227.) She then heard Petitioner say, “Everybody lay down.”

(RT 228.) After that, she heard four gunshots. (RT 228.) She then ducked and ran back to the car.

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U.S. District Court

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(RT 229.) Petitioner got into the vehicle as well. (RT 229.) She asked Petitioner what had happened,

and Petitioner stated, “I was going to rob ‘em.” (RT 229.) 

Prosecution - Forest Street Crimes

On the same night as the Brockton Court incident, a similar incident took place at an

apartment located on Forest Street a few miles from Brockton Court in Bakersfield. (RT 130.) 

Jeanette Gomez lived in an apartment located at 1824 Forest Street. (RT 130.) She lived there

with her two sons, Arthur and Joseph. (RT 131.) She lived next door to her mother, her daughter,

and her nieces. (RT 132.) On the night in question, ahe was bathing her son Arthur in the bathroom

when her daughter, Vanessa, came in and asked to borrow a blow dryer. (RT 133.) When Jeanette

came out of the restroom, she saw a female in the living room. (RT 133.) The female was black,

around 19 years old, and had short hair. (RT 134-135.) A male then came into the living room from

the kitchen. (RT 136.) Jeanette asked the female what she was doing in the apartment but she did not

respond. (RT 136.) The male then said, “Give me your money, bitch.” (RT 137.) She told him she

didn’t have any money, and he told her again, “Give me your money, bitch.” (RT 137.) He then

slapped her and pulled out a gun. (RT 137.) She began to cry, pleading with him not to hurt her or

the kids. (RT 137.) He pointed the gun approximately two inches from her head. (RT 137-138.) He

told her if she didn’t give him any money, he would “smoke [her] away.” (RT 138.) 

At trial, Jeanette identified Petitioner as the perpetrator. (RT 139.) She had never seen him

prior to that incident. (RT 139.) She recalled he was wearing a gray shirt with gray khakis along with

a bandanna which covered his mouth. (RT 140.) She could clearly see the rest of his face. (RT 141.)

During the incident, Jeanette’s niece came in and saw something was wrong, so she left and called

911. (RT 141.) The female who had come in with Petitioner attempted to chase the niece down. (RT

141, 168-169.)

Vanessa Gomez testified she went into her mom’s house to borrow a blow dryer. (RT 172.)

She went into the bathroom to get the dryer, and when she came out of the bathroom with her

mother, Petitioner and Smoke were standing inside the apartment. (RT 172-173.) Petitioner was

wearing a blue bandanna on his face, and he wore a dark blue hat. (RT 174.) The bandanna covered

his lips, but his nose and eyes were visible. (RT 174.) She testified Petitioner then told her mother,

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“Give me the money, bitch.” (RT 175.) Petitioner was pointing a gun at her and her mother. (RT

175.) Petitioner also told Vanessa’s mother, “I’m going to smoke you away.” (RT 176.) Vanessa’s

cousin Monica then looked into the room. (RT 178.) Petitioner then pointed the gun at Monica and

told her, “Give me the money, bitch.” (RT 179.) Monica then ran from the room. (RT 179.) Smoke

tried to chase her down but didn’t catch her. (RT 178.) When Smoke returned, she said something to

Petitioner and they both left. (RT 178.) She saw them leave in a vehicle. (RT 181.) It was dark

outside, but she thought the car was either black or burgundy in color. (RT 181.) She remembered

telling the officers it was a burgundy car. (RT 181.) Vanessa identified Smoke from a lineup as the

woman who was with Petitioner. (RT 184.) She could not identify Petitioner because the bandanna

and hat covered much of his face. (RT 185.) 

At approximately 9:05 p.m., Bakersfield Police Officer Joel Loera responded to the Forest

Street apartment. (RT 203-204.) Loera stated Jeanette and Monica provided him with a description

of the male suspect. (RT 205.) They described him as a black male, 19 to 20 years old, five foot ten,

175 pounds, wearing a tan long sleeve jersey, blue jeans, and a bandanna around his face. (RT 205.)

Vanessa told him the suspects left in a compact burgundy four-door vehicle. (RT 207.) 

Officer Madden interviewed Smoke about the Forest Street crimes at juvenile hall. (RT 347.)

Smoke told him it was her idea to go to the Forest Street apartment to obtain drugs. (RT 348.)

Madden stated Smoke told him that she had asked Petitioner to stay in the car when they arrived at

the address, because she did not want Petitioner to do what he had done at the Brockton Court

address. (RT 347-348.) When she arrived at the Forest Street address, she initially went to the wrong

apartment. (RT 348-349.) Upon realizing she was at the wrong apartment, she then went to the front

apartment. (RT 348-349.) She told Madden she knocked on the front door and Vanessa answered.

(RT 349, 351.) At Vanessa’s invitation, Smoke entered the apartment and closed the door. (RT 350.)

Petitioner then opened the door and entered wearing a blue bandanna over the lower portion of his

face. (RT 351.) When Petitioner entered, he pointed a gun at Vanessa and Vanessa’s mother and told

them, “Lay down, bitch.” (RT 352.) Another Hispanic female then came into the apartment, and

Petitioner pointed the gun at her telling her, “Come here, bitch.” (RT 353.) The female ran from the

apartment. (RT 354.) Then, Smoke and Petitioner left the apartment. (RT 354.) They departed in

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Petitioner’s vehicle, and Petitioner dropped Smoke off at her girlfriend’s house. (RT 355.) Smoke

described the gun to Madden as a small chrome gun, either a .22 or .25 caliber automatic. (RT 355.) 

Smoke testified that after she and Petitioner left Brockton Court, they went to the Forest

Street apartment to obtain marijuana. (RT 230.) She stated it was her idea to go there and that

Petitioner had never been to that apartment. (RT 231.) She admitted she had purchased marijuana

from a middle-aged Hispanic lady at that apartment on three prior occasions. (RT 232.) When they

arrived at the Forest Street address, Smoke told Petitioner to stay in the car, because she didn’t want

him to do what he had done at the Brockton Court residence. (RT 235.) Smoke knocked on the side

door and a lady answered. (RT 237.) When Smoke asked to purchase marijuana, the lady told her to

go to the front apartment. (RT 237.) Smoke then went to the front apartment and knocked on the

door. (RT 237.) A teenage girl answered the door, and Smoke asked to purchase marijuana. (RT

237.) The girl asked her to wait inside the apartment. (RT 237.) At this point, Petitioner pushed past

Smoke and entered the apartment. (RT 237.) The Hispanic woman that Smoke had purchased

marijuana from in the past emerged from another room, and Petitioner shouted for everyone to “lay

down.” (RT 238.) Petitioner had a blue bandanna over his face and a hat pulled down across his

head. (RT 239.) Petitioner pointed his gun at the woman and the teenager, and Smoke ran out of the

room. (RT 239.) Smoke remembered seeing the woman she had initially made contact with poke her

head in to see what was occurring. (RT 240.) The woman let out a small scream and ran away. (RT

240.) Smoke ran to the car and got in. (RT 241.) Approximately sixty seconds later, Petitioner

emerged from the apartment and got into the car. (RT 241.) They drove away, and Smoke demanded

that Petitioner let her out of the vehicle because she was angry at what he had done. (RT 242.) At

Chester and Fourth Streets, Petitioner let Smoke out of the vehicle. (RT 242.) Smoke stated she

agreed to testify against Petitioner in return for a reduction in her sentence from five years to three

years. (RT 251.) 

Smoke testified that Petitioner had been involved in gang activity. (RT 256.) She personally

witnessed one occasion when Petitioner struck a member from a rival gang. (RT 257.) 

Defense

Fontaine Sherman was a close friend of Petitioner, and he provided an alibi for him. (RT

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390.) He testified that he and Petitioner had traveled to Las Vegas on October 8 and returned on

October 10. (RT 391.) At approximately 8:00 a.m., on October 11, Fontaine contacted Petitioner and

asked him to return a rental truck to Fontaine so Fontaine could then return it to the rental company.

(RT 392-393.) About 15 to 20 minutes later, Petitioner showed up at Fontaine’s house in the white

Ford F-150 rental truck. (RT 393-394.) Fontaine also testified that Petitioner owned a blue Chevrolet

Impala which he had purchased from Fontaine. (RT 394.) When Petitioner showed up, they traveled

to the rental car facility and exchanged the truck for another truck. (RT 398.) Fontaine stated he was

with Petitioner all day until 10:00 p.m. (RT 398.) They had separated from around 2:00 p.m. until

2:30 p.m., but from 2:30 p.m. on, they were together. (RT 399.) At around 8:00 p.m., Fontaine

testified Petitioner dropped him off at his home. (RT 400.) They then played video games. (RT 400-

401.) Fontaine’s girlfriend left the house around 8:45 p.m. to get food. (RT 401.) She returned

around 8:45 p.m. (RT 403.) Petitioner had been sitting on the couch during this time. (RT 403.)

Fontaine ate the food his girlfriend had brought him and continued to play video games. (RT 403.)

At around 10:00 p.m., Petitioner left. (RT 403.)

Fay Dodson was Fontaine’s girlfriend. (RT 426.) She testified Petitioner and Fontaine

returned from Las Vegas on October 10. (RT 426.) On October 11, Petitioner and Fontaine showed

up at her house around 8:30 p.m. (RT 432.) They were at the house playing video games until a little

after 10:00 p.m. (RT 433.) Fay testified she left the house during that time for approximately 10 to

15 minutes to pick up food. (RT 434.) Fay stated she remembered the details of the 11 because she th

had attempted to order a Mike Tyson fight from the cable television company, but the company

informed her the fight would not take place until the 15 . (RT 442.) th

Ailey Foster was Fay Dodson’s and Fontaine Sherman’s friend and neighbor. (RT 572.) She

knew Petitioner through them. (RT 572.) On October 10, she saw Petitioner and Fontaine arriving at

Fay’s residence in a white Ford pickup truck. (RT 572.) They were carrying large duffel bags. (RT

572.) On the evening of October 11, she went upstairs to find her neighbor Fay so they could go eat

Chinese food. (RT 576.) At that time, she saw Petitioner and Fontaine sitting on the couch. (RT

576.) She then left with Fay to pick up Chinese food. (RT 577.) They were gone for approximately

15 to 20 minutes, and when they returned, Petitioner was still sitting on the couch. (RT 577.)

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Petitioner’s fiancée, Korrian Morrison, lived with Petitioner. (RT 445-446.) They had two

children together. (RT 446.) She testified she had never seen Petitioner act violently toward anyone.

(RT 446.) She further testified Petitioner came home on October 11 at around 10:45 p.m. (RT 450.)

Fontaine Sherman also testified he had never known Petitioner to become violent toward him or

anyone else. (RT 408.) 

Prosecution’s Rebuttal

Officer Madden testified he was contacted by Fontaine Sherman at the preliminary hearing in

the parking lot during the lunch break. (RT 600-601.) Madden stated Fontaine told him Petitioner

could not possibly have done the crime because Petitioner was with him in Vegas on October 11.

(RT 601.) Fontaine did not tell Madden anything about the two of them playing video games at

Fontaine’s home during the time in question. (RT 602.) 

The parties then stipulated that the Mike Tyson fight occurred on Friday, October 20, 2000.

(RT 603.) 

Sean Vose was the branch general manager of Enterprise Rent-A-Car in Bakersfield. (RT

604.) He testified with respect to two rental contracts involving Fontaine Sherman. (RT 607.) He

stated Fontaine rented a white Ford F150 four-wheel drive truck on October 6. (RT 613.) He further

stated Fontaine switched vehicles on October 18 and rented another white Ford F150. (RT 613.)

However, a note handwritten by Sean Vose indicated the trucks were switched either on October 10

or October 16. (RT 629-630.) Sean Vose could not explain the discrepancies. (RT 630.) The

contract further stated Fontaine did not have permission to drive out of state. (RT 612.) On October

20, Fontaine returned and closed out the first rental contract. (RT 614.) 

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant

to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

375 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S.

Constitution. In addition, the conviction challenged arises out of the Kern County Superior Court,

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which is located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d). Accordingly,

the Court has jurisdiction over the action. 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. 

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114

F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997), quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5 Cir.1996), cert. th th

denied, 520 U.S. 1107 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997)

(holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant petition was

filed after the enactment of the AEDPA; thus, it is governed by its provisions.

II. Legal Standard of Review

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The instant petition is reviewed under the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act which became effective on April 24, 1996. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70

(2003). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus will not be granted unless the

adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Lockyer,

538 U.S. at 70-71; see Williams, 529 U.S. at 413.

As a threshold matter, this Court must "first decide what constitutes 'clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.'" Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71,

quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In ascertaining what is "clearly established Federal law," this Court

must look to the "holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions as of the time

of the relevant state-court decision." Id., quoting Williams, 592 U.S. at 412. "In other words, 'clearly

established Federal law' under § 2254(d)(1) is the governing legal principle or principles set forth by

the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision." Id.

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Finally, this Court must consider whether the state court's decision was "contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law." Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72,

quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). “Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the

writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a

question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of

materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413; see also Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72. 

“Under the ‘reasonable application clause,’ a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state

court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably

applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. 

“[A] federal court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state court decision applied clearly established federal law

erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A

federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state

court’s application of clearly established federal law was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. 

 Petitioner has the burden of establishing that the decision of the state court is contrary to or

involved an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court precedent. Baylor v. Estelle,

94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996). Although only Supreme Court law is binding on the states,

Ninth Circuit precedent remains relevant persuasive authority in determining whether a state court

decision is objectively unreasonable. See Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th

Cir.1999). 

AEDPA requires that we give considerable deference to state court decisions. The state

court's factual findings are presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). We are bound by a state's

interpretation of its own laws. Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 621 (9th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 537

U.S. 859 (2002), rehearing denied, 537 U.S. 1149 (2003). 

III. Procedural Default

Respondent contends Petitioner has procedurally defaulted his claims by failing to timely

present them to the California Supreme Court. Respondent points to the California Supreme Court’s

citation to In re Waltreus, 62 Cal.2d 218 (1965), in the Courts’ denial of Petitioner’s state habeas

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petition. See Exhibit E, Answer.

A federal court will not review claims in a petition for writ of habeas corpus if the state court

has denied relief on those claims on a state law ground that is independent of federal law and

adequate to support the judgment. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). This doctrine

of procedural default is based on the concerns of comity and federalism. Id., at 730-32.

There are limitations as to when a federal court should invoke procedural default and refuse

to evaluate the merits of a claim because the petitioner violated a state’s procedural rules. 

Procedural default can only block a claim in federal court if the state court “clearly and expressly

states that its judgment rests on a state procedural bar.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263 (1989). 

In addition, the state law ground must be independent of federal law. “For a state procedural

rule to be ‘independent,’ the state law basis for the decision must not be interwoven with federal

law.” LaCrosse, 244 F.3d at 704, citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983); Morales

v. Calderon, 85 F.3d 1387, 1393 (9 Cir. 1996), quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 (“Federal habeas th

review is not barred if the state decision ‘fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be

interwoven with federal law.’”) “A state law is so interwoven if ‘the state has made application of

the procedural bar depend on an antecedent ruling on federal law [such as] the determination of

whether federal constitutional error has been committed.’” Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1152

(9 Cir. 2000), quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75 (1985). th

Also, a federal court may only impose a procedural bar on claims if the procedural rule that

the state used is adequate to support the judgment. To be adequate, “the state’s legal grounds for its

decision must be firmly established and consistently applied.” King v. LaMarque, ___ F.3d ___,

2006 WL 2684539 *1 (9 Cir. 2006), citing Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 583 (9 Cir. 2003). th th

To be firmly established and consistently applied, the rule must be clear and certain. King, 2006 WL

2684539 *1, citing Melendez v. Pliler, 288 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9 Cir. 2002); see also Fields v. th

Calderon, 125 F.3d 757, 760 (9 Cir. 1997) (The state procedural rule used must be clear,

th

consistently applied, and well-established at the time of the petitioner's purported default). 

If the court finds an independent and adequate state procedural ground, “federal habeas

review is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the procedural default and actual

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prejudice, or demonstrate that the failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental

miscarriage of justice.” Noltie v. Peterson, 9 F.3d 802, 804-805 (9 Cir. 1993); Coleman, 501 U.S. th

at 750; Park, 202 F.3d at 1150. 

A denial and citation to In re Waltreus refers to California’s procedural rule that “issues

actually raised and rejected on appeal cannot be renewed in a petition for writ of habeas corpus.” 

Forrest v. Vasquez, 75 F.3d 562, 563 (9 Cir. 1996), quoting In re Harris, 5 Cal.4th 813, 829 (1993). th

In Ylst v. Nunnemaker, the Court concluded that a Waltreus citation is neither a ruling on the merits

nor a denial on procedural grounds thereby having no bearing on a petitioner’s ability to raise a claim

in federal court. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 805 (1991). Thus, federal court’s must “look

through” the petition to the state court’s prior decision and determine the grounds for the prior

denial. Id. at 803, 806; Forrest, 75 F.3d at 563-64. 

However, if a claim was raised on direct appeal but not in a petition for review to the

California Supreme Court the court need not “look through” a denial because a citation to In re

Waltreus indicates a procedural bar to bringing the claim in federal court. Id. The Ninth Circuit has

reasoned that in these circumstances, the procedural bar results not from the violation of the In re

Waltreus rule barring claims raised and rejected on appeal, but from the failure to follow Rule 28(b)

of the California Rules of Court. Id. Rule 28(b) requires that a petition for review to the California

Supreme Court be filed within 10 days after the appellate court decision becomes final.

In this case, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s state habeas petition with

citation to In re Waltreus, 62 Cal.2d 218, 225 (1965), after Petitioner failed to timely present his

claims in a petition for review. See Exhibit E, Answer. Accordingly, Petitioner’s claims were

defaulted under Rule 28(b). See Forrest, 75 F.3d at 563-64. Petitioner does not contend that the state

law ground was inadequate to support the state court judgment or that the state law ground was not

independent of federal law. Petitioner does allege there was cause for his procedural default. He

claims his appellate counsel was ineffective by failing to file a petition for review after the appellate

court’s denial of his direct appeal. Petitioner claims appellate counsel was constitutionally obliged to

file the petition for review. In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the Supreme Court held

that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to counsel on his first

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appeal as of right. However, this right does not extend to representation on a petition for review to

the state supreme court. After the appellate court denied the direct appeal, appellate counsel’s

constitutional obligations to represent Petitioner ceased. It was Petitioner’s duty to pursue a petition

for review. Therefore, Petitioner has not demonstrated cause for his procedural default. 

Furthermore, Petitioner has not shown that failure to consider the claims will result in a

fundamental miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, Petitioner has procedurally defaulted his claims.

Nonetheless, the Court will address the claims as they are also meritless.

IV. Review of Petitioner’s Claims

A. Ground One

Petitioner claims the trial court erred in refusing to grant Petitioner’s motion for mistrial

based on a prospective juror’s comments regarding Officer Madden.

During voir dire, one of the prospective jurors claimed he had known Officer Madden quite

well and for quite some time. (ART 82.) The juror then stated he knew Officer Madden to be “a 3

pretty fair guy.” (ART 83.) The trial court then questioned the juror about his relationship with

Officer Madden. (ART 83.) The court also inquired into the juror’s ability to be impartial in the case.

(ART 84-85.) The court then fully admonished the prospective jurors that they must be impartial.

(ART 85.) 

Defense counsel then moved for a mistrial based on the prospective juror’s comment that

Officer Madden was “a pretty fair guy.” (ART 100.) Although the juror was ultimately excused with

a peremptory challenge, defense counsel argued that the entire jury panel was tainted and biased by

the prospective juror’s positive opinion of Officer Madden’s credibility. (ART 100-01.) The trial

court denied the motion finding the jury panel had not been tainted. (ART 102-04.) The court was

satisfied that the jurors had been extensively admonished that they must judge each witness

independently and according to the same standards. The trial court also noted that the prosecutor had

spent an extensive amount of time eliciting another juror’s own negative experience with

inappropriate methods used by an investigator for the District Attorney’s Office. The court found no

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prejudice resulting from the juror’s comment regarding Officer Madden. (ART 104.) 

This claim was first presented on direct appeal to the 5 DCA. The 5 DCA denied the claim th th

on October 1, 2001, in a reasoned opinion. See Exhibit C, Answer. Petitioner did not timely present

the claim to the California Supreme Court in a petition for review; however, he attempted to present

it in a habeas petition. As previously discussed, the petition was denied as procedurally defaulted.

See Exhibit E, Answer. Although the California Supreme Court did not rule on the merits of the

claim, the 5 DCA did and found the claim to be meritless. Under the AEDPA, the 5 DCA’s th th

decision is entitled to deference. See, e.g., McCain v. Gramley, 96 F.3d 288, 290 (7 Cir. 1996). th

In rejecting the claim, the 5 DCA stated: th

[W]e believe the trial court dispelled any possible bias the prospective juror’s comment

might have created in the minds of the other prospective jurors. (See People v. Martinez,

supra, 228 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1466-1467 [trial judge is in better position than reviewing court

to gauge the level of bias and prejudice created by juror comments; conclusion of trial judge

on question of juror group bias and prejudice is entitled to great deference and is reversed on

appeal only upon a clear showing of abuse of discretion].) In neither People v. Medina,

supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 888-889 [several prospective jurors made statements betraying a

belief the defendant was guilty], People v. Martinez, supra, 228 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1468-1471

[prospective jurors made comments about the defendant’s likely guilt, his language, the

ineffectiveness of the criminal justice system, and the infallibility of police officers], nor

People v. Nguyen, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at pp. 32, 40-42 [prospective juror made statements

about supposed cultural practices of certain ethnic group], did the reviewing court find

reversible error in the trial court’s decision not to discharge the entire venire on factual

records in each of those cases considerably more aggravated than the factual record before us

in this case. If no mistrial was required in any of those instances, none is required here.

Appellant makes no effort to discuss (or even cite) these cases or the principles of law they

articulate, and his argument is at base a conclusory assertion and assumption that the juror’s

remarks “poisoned” the entire panel.

See p. 3, Exhibit C, Answer.

 When a jury is exposed to facts that have not been introduced into evidence, a defendant has

effectively lost the rights of confrontation, cross-examination, and the assistance of counsel with

regard to the extraneous information. Dickson v. Sullivan, 849 F.2d 403, 406 (9 Cir.1988), citing th

Marino v. Vasquez, 812 F.2d 499, 505 (9 Cir. 1987); see also Gibson v. Clanon, 633 F.2d 851, 854 th

(9th Cir. 1980); Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1191 (9th Cir.1993) (introduction of extraneous

prior bad acts evidence during deliberations constitutes error of constitutional proportions), cert.

denied, 510 U.S. 1191 (1994). However, a petitioner is entitled to habeas relief only if it can be

established that the constitutional error had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in

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determining the jury's verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993). “If the trial judge

adequately cured the defect so that no actual prejudice resulted, the error is harmless and the

defendant is not entitled to the writ.” Thompson v. Borg, 74 F.3d 1571, 1574 (9 Cir. 1996). th

In this case, the trial court found no prejudice resulted from the prospective juror’s statement.

In addition, the court extensively admonished the jury with respect to the impartiality required of

them. The appellate court also concluded the statement caused no prejudice to Petitioner. Likewise,

this Court concludes no prejudice resulted from the statement. There is nothing in the record which

would tend to show the statement had any effect on the venire. In addition, the trial court thoroughly

questioned the prospective juror, admonished the panel regarding their duty to be impartial, and

thereby dispelled any possible bias the statement could have caused. The trial court and the appellate

court were confident the statement caused no prejudice to Petitioner. 

 Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the state court rejection of his claim was contrary to,

or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States, or a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The claim should be rejected.

B. Ground Two

In his second and final claim for relief, Petitioner contends there was insufficient evidence to

support the Forest Avenue verdict. He alleges only one witness made an attempt to identify

Petitioner as the perpetrator of the Forest Avenue crimes; however, this witness could not identify

Petitioner because the perpetrator’s face was covered and not visible. In addition, Petitioner states

the witness selected someone other than Petitioner at the live in-person line-up. 

This claim was also first presented on direct appeal to the 5 DCA. The claim was denied on th

October 1, 2001, in a reasoned opinion. See Exhibit C, Answer. Petitioner did not timely present the

claim to the California Supreme Court in a petition for review; however, he attempted to present it in

a habeas petition. As previously discussed, the petition was denied as procedurally defaulted. See

Exhibit E, Answer. Although the California Supreme Court did not rule on the merits of the claim,

the 5 DCA did and found the claim to be meritless. Under the AEDPA, the 5 DCA’s decision is th th

entitled to deference. See, e.g., McCain v. Gramley, 96 F.3d 288, 290 (7 Cir. 1996). th

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In rejecting the claim, the 5 DCA stated: th

There was sufficient evidence to support the convictions on counts 8 through 11 (the

Forest Avenue incident) because there was other testimony corroborative of Smoke’s

testimony that appellant was the perpetrator of the Forest Avenue crimes. (Pen. Code,

§ 1111.) Jeanette, who had never seen appellant before the incident but spent 10 to 20

minutes with him in her apartment during the incident, identified appellant from a

photographic lineup. She was sure of her identification, although she expressed her fear of

testifying. She later failed to identify appellant from an in-person lineup, but she did identify

him again at trial. Jeanette described the perpetrator as wearing a blue bandanna, but no hat.

Vanessa did not identify appellant as the perpetrator, but she did describe the burgundy car.

She described the perpetrator as wearing a blue bandanna and a hat.

Although this other identification evidence was inconsistent in some particulars, it

was enough to justify a jury’s rational conclusion that Smoke was telling the truth. (People v.

DeJesus (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1, 25 [corroborating evidence may be entirely circumstantial;

it may be slight and entitled to little consideration when standing alone; only a portion of

accomplice’s testimony need be corroborated, and corroborative evidence need not establish

every element of the offense charged; all that is required is that the evidence connect

defendant with the commission of the crime in such a way as may reasonably satisfy the jury

that accomplice is telling the truth]; People v. Cuevas, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 265 [out-ofcourt identification generally has greater probative value than in-court identification made

after suggestions of others have intervened; id. at pp. 271-272 [a single witness’s out-of-court

identification may be sufficient evidence to prove identity].)

Furthermore, Jeanette’s identification of appellant and Vanessa’s identification of the

burgundy car were not inherently improbable or factually impossible. (People v. Allen, supra,

165 Cal.App.3d at p. 623.)

See pp. 6-7, Exhibit C, Answer (footnotes omitted).

In reviewing sufficiency of evidence claims, California courts expressly follow the Jackson

standard enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). See People v. Johnson, 26 Cal.3d

557, 575-578 (1980); see also People v. Thomas, 2 Cal.4th 489, 513 (1992). Pursuant to the

Supreme Court’s holding in Jackson, the test in determining whether a factual finding is fairly

supported by the record is as follows:

“[W]hether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; see also Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 781 (1990). 

Sufficiency claims are judged by the elements defined by state law. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324

n. 16. This Court must presume the correctness of the state court’s factual findings. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(e)(1); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459 (1986). This presumption of correctness

applies to state appellate determinations of fact as well as those of the state trial courts. Tinsley v.

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Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 525 (9 Cir.1990). Although the presumption of correctness does not apply to th

state court determinations of legal questions or mixed questions of law and fact, the facts as found by

the state court underlying those determinations are entitled to the presumption. Sumner v. Mata, 455

U.S. 539, 597 (1981). 

As argued correctly by Respondent, Smoke’s testimony by itself was sufficient evidence of

Petitioner’s culpability as the perpetrator. See United States v. Whitten, 706 F.2d 1000, 1007 (9th

Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984) (The uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice is

enough to sustain a conviction unless the testimony is incredible or unsubstantial on its face.);

United States v. Escalante, 637 F.2d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 856 (1980).

Her testimony was neither incredible nor unsubstantial on its face. In addition as discussed by the

appellate court, there was substantial corroborative evidence of Smoke’s testimony and identification

of Petitioner as the perpetrator. Jeanette, one of the victims, identified Petitioner in a photographic

lineup and at trial. Victims Jeanette and Vanessa also described the blue bandanna, a hat, and a

burgundy car utilized by the perpetrator. This evidence corroborated Smoke’s testimony. While there

were discrepancies in each witness’s testimony, this did not render the evidence insufficient. The

reviewing court “must respect the exclusive province of the [trier of fact] to determine the credibility

of witnesses, resolve evidentiary conflicts, and draw reasonable inferences from proven facts . . . .”

United States v. Ramos, 558 F.2d 545, 546 (9th Cir.1977). Any discrepancies could be challenged by

defense counsel on cross-examination. United States v. Ginn, 87 F.3d 367, 369 (9 Cir. 1996). th

Clearly in this case, the jury took the discrepancies into consideration but believed Smoke’s

corroborated testimony.

In sum, there was substantial evidence in the form of accomplice testimony, corroborative

eyewitness testimony, and circumstantial evidence from which the jury could have found beyond a

reasonable doubt that Petitioner committed the Forest Avenue crime. Thus, Petitioner has failed to

demonstrate that the state court rejection of his claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, or a

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The claim should be denied.

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RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus

be DENIED. It is FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Clerk of Court be DIRECTED to enter

judgment.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned District Judge, pursuant to

the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served

by mail) after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with the court and

serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and filed within ten (10)

court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the objections. The Court will then

review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9 Cir. 1991). th

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 10, 2006 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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