Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-05161/USCOURTS-ca10-90-05161-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jose Rafael Abello-Silva
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FILED 

Unit.ed St.ates Court of Appo,.lo Tenth Circuit PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

NOVO G 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER --------------- Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

JOSE 

) 

Plaintiff - Appel lee, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 90-5161 

) 

RAFAEL ABELLO-SILVA, ) 

) 

Defendant - Appellant. ) 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. 87-CR-140-B) 

Tony M. Graham, United States Attorney (David E. O'Meilia and 

Kathryn H. Phillips, Assistant United States Attorneys with him on 

the brief), Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Randy Schaffer P.C., Houston, Texas; for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before MOORE, and McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and KANE*, Senior 

District Judge. 

KANE, Senior District Judge. 

*Honorable John L. Kane Jr., United States Senior District Judge 

for the District of Colorado, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 90-5161 Document: 010110096869 Date Filed: 11/06/1991 Page: 1 
Appellant, Jose Rafael Abello-Silva, (hereafter Abello) a 

citizen of the Republic of Colombia, was extradited to the United 

States to face drug conspiracy charges. Indicted for conspiring 

to import cocaine and marijuana in violation of 21 u.s.c. §§ 963 

and 960(b) (1) (B), (G); and conspiring to possess with the intent 

to distribute and distribution of cocaine and marijuana in 

violation of 21 u.s.c. §§ 846 and 841(b) (1) (A), Abello was 

convicted of both counts. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of 

30 years imprisonment on each count and fined a total of 

1 $ 5,000,000. 

Abello challenges his conviction by raising the following 

points of error: 1) the circumstances of his extradition violate 

the doctrine of specialty because he was tried on a second 

superseding indictment which was not part of the extradition 

request served on the Colombian government; 2) the extensive pretrial publicity made the Northern District of Oklahoma an improper 

venue for the trial; 3) the defense was denied access to 

exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 

83 (1963); and 4) the prosecutor tainted the trial with 

inflammatory comments during closing arguments. We affirm the 

conviction. 

The government's case against Abello portrayed him as an 

1 The length of appellant's imprisonment is limited by agreement 

between the United states and Columbia. The Republic of Columbia 

has been under martial law for most of the past 30 years. 

Presidential Decree No. 1860 dated August 18, 1989 authorizes the 

extradition of Columbian nationals and defines the circumstances 

under which extradition may take place. Article S(a) of Decree 

No. 1860 restricts the term of imprisonment for extradited 

Columbian nationals to no more than 30 years. 

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important figure in a jet-set cocaine clan which supplied drugs to 

an eager American market. Narrated by the testimony of nine coconspirators, the government described appellant's extensive 

Colombian drug manufacturing and distribution operation. The most 

damaging testimony came from co-conspirator, Boris Olarte. In 

1986, Olarte found himself in jail in the Northern District of 

Oklahoma. In May, 1987, unhappy in his surroundings, he agreed to 

cooperate with the United States Government. While in prison, 

Olarte orchestrated a drug transaction which involved Abello. The 

contact person who arranged a meeting was Olarte's common law 

wife, Clara Lacle. 

The proposed transaction was actually an attempt to revive an 

earlier deal which never took place. According to Olarte, he and 

Abello previously met in Aruba with two other co-conspirators, 

Robert Jamieson and Frank Palmero, to discuss smuggling a cocaine 

shipment into the United States. The plan was abandoned. By May, 

1987, Olarte was cooperating with the government, and he 

identified Abello as a target. At Olarte's suggestion, Lacle 

flew to Florida in June, 1987 with two FBI agents to revive the 

Aruba transaction. Based on these events, Abello was indicted, 

extradited and convicted of participating in a drug importation 

and distribution conspiracy. 

I. Extradition and the Doctrine of Specialty. 

Abello was extradited to the United States in October, 1989 

under a superseding indictment. The indictment charged him with 

two counts: 1) conspiracy to import schedule I and II controlled 

substances; and 2) conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 

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marijuana and cocaine. The request for extradition was presented 

to the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Relation by the United States 

Embassy in Bogota on October 20, 1989. The request contained a 

reference to an October 7, 1987 superseding indictment from the 

Northern District of Oklahoma. Copies of the arrest warrant and 

superseding indictment were included. Under the heading of "Overt 

Acts," the indictment contains lengthy discussion of the drug 

conspiracy but only a brief mention of Abello. Included in the 

extradition request itself, however, was the following narration 

of facts. 

The facts of the case indicate that in 1986 and 1987, 

Abello-Silva actively participated in the planning of a 

shipment of 500 kilograms of cocaine into the United 

States from Colombia. The proposed shipment was planned 

by Abello-Silva and his associates at meetings in both 

Colombia and Aruba, but was ultimately abandoned because 

of difficulties in communication among the coconspirators. 

Vol. 3, Doc. 244, Exhibit F. 

A second superseding indictment was obtained after Abello was 

extradited to the United States. The second superseding 

indictment, returned by the grand jury on January 3, 1990, charged 

Abello with the identical two offenses set out in the first 

superseding indictment. Added, however, were more facts detailing 

Abello's illegal activities. While the first superseding 

indictment was directed at several alleged co-conspirators and a 

plethora of criminal activity, the second indictment was directed 

only at Abello and focused on his particular role in the 

conspiracy. 

The second superseding indictment linked Abello with members 

of the "Medellin" and "Cali" drug cartels and drug kingpins like - 4 -

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Pablo Escobar-Gaviria, Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez-Gacha and Jorge 

Ochoa-Vasquez. The new indictment expanded on the scope of 

Abello's drug smuggling activities and detailed the mechanics of 

his cocaine and marijuana smuggling operation. 

Abello alleges the second superseding indictment violates the 

"doctrine of specialty." After extradition was complete, Abello 

was tried under an indictment containing broader allegations of 

facts than the indictment on which his extradition was based. The 

government responds it prosecuted Abello for the identical crimes 

contained in both indictments. According to the government, the 

doctrine of specialty is about parallel offenses and not parallel 

facts in an indictment. Further, raising the doctrine is within 

the province of the asylum country and the asylum country must 

itself object. The District Court, in a March 7, 1990 order, 

ruled in favor of the government. Since the issue involves a 

legal dispute about the specialty doctrine, our review is de novo. 

Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 791-92 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. 

denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986). 

Abello refers to several diplomatic communications which 

purportedly register Colombia's objection to prosecuting Abello on 

the second superseding indictment. The government argues the 

diplomatic notes merely relay concerns expressed by defense 

counsel and not the official position of the Republic of Colombia. 

This distinction is important, the government argues, because the 

asylum state is the party with standing to raise the specialty 

issue. We conclude the dispute over who raised the objection is 

irrelevant. Although there is disagreement whether a criminal 

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defendant may raise the specialty doctrine in his own right, 2 

we 

recently held in United States v. Levy. 905 F.2d 326, 328 n. 1 

(10th cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 s. ct. 759 (1991) that a 

criminal defendant may raise the issue himself. 

The diplomatic communications serve a second purpose in 

Abello's argument. He asserts any legal dispute over emphasis on 

"facts" or "offenses" in applying the specialty doctrine is 

resolved by the laws of the asylum country: Colombia in this 

case. He argues the second superseding indictment charges him 

with additional wrongdoing which constitutes a separate matter; 

whether a new, separate matter was added is for Colombia to 

decide. 

Abello cites United States v. Paroutian, 299 F.2d 486, 490-

91 (2nd Cir. 1962): "So the test whether trial is for a 'separate 

offense' should be not some technical refinement of local law, but 

whether the extraditing country [Colombia] would consider the 

offense actually tried 'separate.'" Attempting to show Colombian 

law focuses on the particular "deeds" of the accused and would 

scrutinize the "facts" presented in the extradition request, 

Abello cites Articles 650 and 651 of the Colombian Code of 

Criminal Procedure (1987). 

Abello, however, fails to support his claim that Colombian 

2 Traditionally, the doctrine of specialty was a privilege of the 

asylum state designed to protect its "dignity and interests, 

rather than a right accruing to the accused." Shaprio ~ 

Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 906 (2d cir. 1973). See generally 

Restatement (Third of foreign Relations Law of the United States§ 

477, comment b, (1987); accord Demjanjuk ~ Petrovsky. 776 F.2d 

571, 583-84 (6th cir. 1985), cert. denied 475 U.S. 1016 (1986). 

Contra: United States~ Cuevas, 847 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1988), 

cert. denied 489 U.S. 1012 (1989). 

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law controls the dispute. We perceive only two situations where 

Colombian law is relevant. First, precedent in this country 

directs that the asylum country's law defines the doctrine of 

specialty. Second, the United States, by treaty, agrees to be 

bound by foreign law. We find neither. The quoted passage from 

Paroutian refers to the court's deference to the asylum country's 

interest in protecting its residents. It is not a statement about 

international choice of laws. As a creature of international law, 

the specialty doctrine forbids the requesting country from 

prosecuting an extradited defendant for more than it set out in 

its extradition request. "The doctrine of 'specialty' prohibits 

the requesting nation from prosecuting the extradited individual 

for any offense other than that for which the surrendering country 

agreed to extradite.'' United States v. Cuevas, 847 F.2d 1417, 

1426 (9th Cir. 1988). See also Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d at 

782; United States v. Rauscher, 119 ·u.s. 407 (1886). 

The Paroutian court recognized the asylum country's desire to 

extradite only those individuals against whom a substantial case 

lies. A reviewing court places itself in the position of the 

asylum country and inquires whether the asylum state would consent 

to the extradition. In other words, we examine whether there is 

sufficient evidence in the request for extradition to grant the 

request. If the accused is tried for a matter different from the 

one mentioned in the request, the requesting country has not 

satisfied the concerns of the asylum state. The asylum state, 

therefore, would refuse the extradition request because it was not 

presented with the case against its resident and had no 

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opportunity to scrutinize the extradition request. In Paroutian, 

the court believed the asylum state, once fully apprised of the 

facts, would conclude the accused stood trial only for those 

offenses for which he was extradited. The deference to the asylum 

state in Paroutian cannot be construed to mean the asylum state's 

jurisprudence governs the specialty doctrine as applied in the 

United States. 

As for consenting to be bound by foreign law, we recognize 

that extradition exists only by agreement between states. 

Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States 

§ 475, comment b (1987). Hence, the extradition of individuals 

occurs subject to any limitation either country imposes. Cuevas, 

847 F.2d at 1427. The limitations which appear in Decree No. 1860 

are few. The accused must not be sentenced to more than thirty 

years and the death penalty may not be sought. The only provision 

of the Colombian Code of Criminal Procedure mandated in the Decree 

is a reference to Article 660. Article 660, however, deals with 

individuals who committed an earlier offense in Colombia and are 

later sought for extradition on another matter. The article 

states the accused must first complete his sentence in Colombia 

before extradition takes place. 

Unless otherwise directed by treaty or statute, we will look 

to United States precedent to understand and apply the specialty 

doctrine. The bulk of authority describes the doctrine in terms 

of parallel offenses and not parallel facts. For example, 

Abello's own reference to Paroutian belies his contention that the 

specialty doctrine is about additional facts and not offenses, 

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"the test is whether the trial is for a 'separate offense.'" 

Paroutian, 299 F.2d at 491. (emphasis added). In Levy we did not 

address the "facts" versus "offenses" distinction. Instead, Levy 

discussed the specialty doctrine in terms of parallel "charges," 

Levy. 905 F.2d at 328. "Charges" is akin to "offenses." Hence, 

we conclude the relevant inquiry is the nature of the offenses in 

the two indictments and not the different "facts" alleged in 

support of the offenses. 

Abello's argument implies the extradition request must be the 

definitive document in a government's case against the accused. 

This is not so The specialty doctrine specifically recognizes the 

possibility, for strategic reasons, that the evidence introduced 

at trial was withheld from the extradition request. "Thus, there 

is no right to object at trial to the introduction of evidence 

that was not part of the request for extradition, so long as the 

evidence is directed to the charge contained in the request for 

extradition." Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the 

United States§ 477, comment c (1987). The specialty principle is 

not a vehicle for discovery. 

Those cases cited by Abello which scrutinize the "facts" 

underpinning the request for extradition are distinguishable. 

Abello cites United States v. Sensi, 879 F.2d 888 (D.C. Cir. 

1989), and the importance the court places on the "established 

facts" and "evidentiary material." Id. at 895-96. Read in its 

entirety, Sensi informs the doctrine of specialty to "requir[e] a 

correspondence between the charges contained in the indictment and 

the facts presented to the [asylum country's] magistrate." Sensi, 

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879 F.2d at 895. In Abello's case, the "charges" in the request 

for extradition are the same as those for which he stood trial. 

Hence, he hopes for mileage from the "facts presented" language in 

Sensi. The reference to facts, however, stems from the 

extradition treaty between the United States and Britain; Britain 

was the asylum country in Sensi. 3 

Responding to this treaty language, Sensi applies a two part 

test. First, the charge must be an extraditable offense. Second, 

the charges must be established by sufficient "evidentiary 

material" presented to the magistrate in the asylum country." In 

this case, however, Abello never alleges drug trafficking is not 

an extraditable offense. The second prong of the test in Sensi 

requires the requesting country to present the asylum country with 

sufficient facts to grant the extradition request. 

In this case, the "established by the facts language" does 

not appear in Decree No. 1860. Regardless, nothing in the briefs 

indicates Abello is arguing there were insufficient facts to 

support the request for extradition. The absence of such a claim 

exposes a larger fallacy beneath Abello's entire extradition 

argument. He points to the scant references to himself in the 

3 The relevant section from the treaty provides: 

(1) A person extradited shall not be detained or 

proceeded against in the territory of the requesting 

Party for any offense other than an extraditable offense 

established by the facts in respect of which his extradition 

has been granted .. 

Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, United States-United Kingdom, 

art. XII (1) 28 U.S.T. 227, 233 T.I.A.S. No. 846B (emphasis 

added). 

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,, 

first superseding indictment. The Colombia government, 

nonetheless, found sufficient justification to extradite him on 

these facts. 

The second superseding indictment contained a great deal of 

incriminating information about Abello. The crux of the doctrine 

of specialty is the question: "whether the requested state has 

objected or would object to prosecution," Restatement (Third) of 

Foreign Relations Law of the United States§ 477, comment b 

(1987). If the Colombian government was satisfied by the first 

indictment and granted the extradition request, it would not 

object to prosecution for the same offenses under the second 

indictment when the second indictment presented an even stronger 

case. There is, of course, nothing in either instance touching 

upon the dignity, security or sovereignty of that government 

itself which might give rise to diplomatic considerations. 

Abello's reference to Caplan v~ Vokes, 649 F.2d 1336 

(9th Cir. 1981), makes the same mistake as his reference to Sensi. 

Caplan speaks about "offenses.'' ("The principle of specialty 

mandates a careful culling of extraditable offenses from nonextraditable offenses," Caplan, 649 F.2d at 1343). The references 

to "facts" are in the context of the "established by the facts •• 

11 language in an extradition treaty similar to the one in Sensi. 

Because there is no such treaty in the present case, Caplan must 

be distinguished. 

Abello refers to the court's emphasis on the "acts" alleged 

in the extradition request in United States v. Cuevas, 847 F.2d 

at 1428. This, too, is explained by the presence of treaty 

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language which controls extradition. Cuevas states the specialty 

doctrine is specifically about parallel "offenses." Id. at 1426. 

We acknowledge the Cuevas court's discussion about the specific 

acts by the accused. The reason for this discussion is a 

limitation in the extradition treaty between the United States and 

Switzerland. According to that treaty, the requesting country is 

enjoined from prosecuting the extradited individual for the 

"fiscal aspects" of the crime, id. at 1426-27. 

Since the requesting country must honor the limitations 

imposed by the asylum country, the Cueves court struggled with the 

ambiguous term, "fiscal aspects." To understand the term, the 

court considered the specific "acts" performed by the defendant to 

determine whether the defendant could be prosecuted. The inquiry 

into the acts alleged in the request for extradition was for the 

purpose of understanding a term in the extradition treaty. Since 

no such ambiguous term appears in the Colombian Decree, there is 

no need to focus on the specific acts alleged in the extradition 

request and second superseding indictment. 

Thus, we conclude the doctrine of specialty requires the 

defendant be tried only for those offenses which appear in the 

extradition request. The extradition document describes two 

offenses. The first count mentioned in the extradition request 

states Abello conspired to import cocaine into the United States. 

The first superseding indictment attached to the extradition 

request alleges violations of 21 u.s.c. §§ 952(a), 960(a) (1), 

960(b) (1) (B), (G), and 963; these sections concern the importation 

and conspiracy to import controlled substances into the United 

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States. Count one of the second superseding indictment charges 

Abello with committing the same offenses and lists the identical 

code sections. 

Likewise, the second offense alleged in the extradition 

request mirrors the offense set out in the second superseding 

indictment. In the extradition document, Abello is charged with 

conspiring to distribute cocaine. The first superseding 

indictment alleges violations of 21 u.s.c. §§ 84l(a) (1), 

84l(b) (1) (A) (ii), (vii), and 846; these sections deal with the 

manufacture and distribution of controlled substances in the 

United States. Count two of the second superseding indictment 

also charges Abello with the same offenses and refers to the 

identical code sections. Because both counts of the second 

superseding indictment charge Abello with the same offenses as are 

mentioned in the extradition request, we find no violation of the 

specialty doctrine. 

II. Transfer of Venue. 

Abello's second argument is the district court abused its 

discretion in denying his motion for a change of venue. Abello 

states the jury was prejudiced by pre-trial publicity. Prejudice 

may be presumed, he argues, because of the national attention on 

drug trafficking and the unethical conduct of the prosecution. 

Alternatively, he asserts that if prejudice is not presumed, the 

totality of the circumstances demonstrates actual prejudice. 

Since the decision to transfer venue is within the trial court's 

discretion, we review for an abuse of discretion. United States 

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v. Neal, 718 F.2d 1505, 1510 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 469 

U.S. 818 (1984). 

Under F. R. Crim. P. 21(a), the court shall transfer venue if 

there exists "so great a prejudice against the defendant that the 

defendant cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial at any place 

fixed by law for holding court in that district." The 

Constitution guarantees the defendant "a fair trial by a panel of 

impartial, 'indifferent' jurors". Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 

723 (1961). The trial must be held in a tribunal "free of 

prejudice, passion, excitement, and tyrannical power." Sheppard 

v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966). 

Evaluating the effect of pre-trial publicity, however, is 

best accomplished by the trial judge. Hence, a reviewing 

court must "give great deference to the trial court's discretion." 

United states v. Tokoph, 514 F.2d 597, 606 (10th Cir. 1975). See 

also United States v. Smaldone, 485 ·F.2d 1333, 1345 (10th cir. 

1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974). Further, the trial 

court's decision is "entitled to a presumption of correctness and 

will not be overturned unless there is manifest error." United 

States v. Affleck, 776 F.2d 1451, 1454 (10th Cir. 1985). 

Abello's first venue argument is that pre-trial publicity was 

so inflammatory that prejudice may be presumed, and a change of 

venue is required as a matter of law. He argues overwhelming 

publicity coupled with the release of prejudicial information by 

the prosecution supports the presumption of prejudice. It is his 

burden to establish the presumption of prejudice. Murphy v. 

Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 800 (1975). Abella, however, has not 

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established an irrepressibly hostile attitude pervaded the 

community as the case law requires. 

Pre-trial publicity in topical criminal cases is inevitable. 

The publicity impacts defendant's rights only when it dictates the 

community's opinion as to guilt or innocence. Estes v. Texas, 381 

U.S. 532, 536 (1965). In rare cases, the community is so 

predisposed that prejudice can be presumed, and venue must be 

transferred as a matter of law. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 

(1966); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963). In 

cases like Estes, Rideau and Sheppard, prejudice was presumed 

because the news media influence "pervaded the proceedings," 

igniting extensive prejudice in the community. Murphy, 421 U.S. 

at 798-99 (1975). 

A review of the pre-trial publicity distinguishes this case 

from the situations in Estes, Rideau and Sheppard. In Estes, the 

trial was tainted by massive pre-trial publicity which totaled 11 

volumes of press clippings. In addition, initial pre-trial 

hearings and portions of the trial were televised to the entire 

community. Estes, 381 U.S. at 536. In Rideau, due process was 

compromised because the defendant's confession to the sheriff was 

filmed and televised on the local news. Rideau, 373 U.S. at 727. 

In Sheppard, pre-trial publicity filled 5 volumes of news 

clippings in a six month period. Reporters were given space next 

to the jury room and newspapers published the names and addresses 

of potential jurors. The jurors were peppered with letters and 

telephone calls regarding the upcoming trial. Sheppard, 384 U.S. 

at 342-43. 

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In contrast, pre-trial publicity in this case consisted of 31 

articles over a six month period; the articles appeared an average 

of five per month. There was no media circus as in the other 

cases. The jurors were anonymously selected and their identities 

protected. The news clippings themselves reveal mostly statements 

of fact gathered from public records and from pre-trial hearings. 

Despite accusations to the contrary, Abello points to nothing in 

the record indicating prosecutorial misconduct in the 

dissemination of pretrial information. 

We conclude presumed prejudice is rarely invoked and only in 

extreme situations. See Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 

U.S. 539, 554 (1976); Mayola v. Alabama, 623 F.2d 992, 997 (5th 

cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 913 (1981). Here, adverse 

publicity existed, but it "did not permeate the community to such 

a degree that empaneling a fair jury would have been impossible". 

United states v. Affleck, 776 F.2d at 1454. Therefore, no 

presumption of prejudice is found. 

Alternatively, Abello contends even if prejudice is not 

presumed, actual prejudice tainted his trial. Actual prejudice is 

shown by examining the totality of the circumstances. 

Due process requires that the accused receive a fair 

trial by an impartial jury free from outside influences. 

Given the pervasiveness of modern communications and the 

difficulty of effacing prejudicial publicity from the minds 

of jurors, the trial courts must take strong measures to 

ensure that the balance is never weighed against the accused. 

And appellate tribunals have the duty to make an independent 

evaluation of the circumstances. 

Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 362. 

Abello asserts massive pre-trial publicity was directed at 

him and not an event. This magnifies the effect of the publicity. 

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As a result, every member of the venire had heard of Abello and 

his alleged crimes. The general questions to the jury panel 

during voir dire, Abello argues, were insufficient to dispel their 

pre-disposition toward him. Our review of the pretrial publicity 

and voir dire fails to divulge actual prejudice sufficient to 

suggest the trial judge's decision constituted an abuse of 

discretion. 

The trial court has broad discretion in "gauging the effects 

of allegedly prejudicial publicity and in taking measures to 

insure a fair trial." United states v. McDonald, 576 F.2d 1350, 

1354 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830 (1978). The 

"proper occasion for determining juror partiality is upon voir 

dire examination." United States v. Lamb, 575 F.2d 1310, 1315 

(10th cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 854 (1978). In our own 

review of the voir dire, we must determine "whether the judge had 

a reasonable basis for concluding the jurors selected could be 

impartial." United States v. Hueftle, 687 F.2d 1305, 1310 (10th 

Cir. 1982). Impartiality does not mean jurors are totally 

ignorant of the case. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how an 

intelligent venireman could be completely uninformed of 

significant events in his community. "It is sufficient if the 

juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict 

based on the evidence presented in court." Irvin, 366 U.S. at 

723; see also Murphy, 421 U.S. at 799-800. 

Abello asserts the trial judge erred by asking only general 

questions of the jurors. Since all admitted having prior 

knowledge of the case, he urges, the questions the judge asked 

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were insufficient. Abello points out the voir dire lasted only 6 

hours. Time, of course, is utterly irrelev,ant to sufficiency or 

adequacy. On the contrary an unreasonable expenditure of time in 

voir dire examination could suggest confusion, not completeness. 

Relying on Silverthorne v. United States, 400 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 

1968), he argues the judge did not "adequately dispel the 

probability of prejudice." This argument fails for two reasons. 

First, the Silverthorne holding requires the trial court to 

conduct extensive voir dire questioning of each individual juror 

in cases where all jurors have prior knowledge of the case and 

there is voluminous, inflammatory pre-trial publicity. 

"Voluminous" publicity in Silverthorne amounted to over 300 

articles published before to jury selection. The defendant in 

Silverthorne was the president of a failed San Francisco bank and 

well known to the community. In this case, Abello proffers only 

31 articles published over a six month period. There was "no 

massive, inflammatory publicity creat[ing) a hostile climate 

requiring extremely close scrutiny of jurors." United States v. 

Hall, 536 F.2d 313, 326 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 

919 (1976). 

Second, the trial judge, cognizant of the pre-trial 

prejudice, took adequate measures during voir dire to insure jury 

impartiality. At Abello's request, the trial judge asked 

questions incorporating six specific topics in several questions 

directed at each potential juror. Abello himself proposed the 

areas of inquiry and the trial judge accepted six of seven 

topics proposed. Also at Abello's request, the court submitted to 

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the venire an extensive written questionnaire prepared with the 

help of the defense. The judge excused all veniremen showing bias 

and questioned remaining jurors specifically about pretrial 

publicity and their ability to be fair and impartial. 

We believe the trial court adequately dispelled the 

possibility of prejudice through voir dire. Pretrial publicity 

was not overwhelming. Detailed areas of inquiry, suggested by the 

defendant, were incorporated into voir dire. While all veniremen 

had heard of the Abello, this fact alone does not warrant 

reversal. Potential jurors with pre-formed opinions were excused 

while remaining jurors repeatedly affirmed they could be fair and 

impartial. The court assured itself each juror "would decide 

impartially the case on the basis of what he or she heard in the 

courtroom, and not what he or she read in the paper or heard on 

TV." United states v. Cattle King Packing Co., 793 F.2d 232, 236 

(10th Cir. 1986) cert. denied, 479 U.S. 985 (1986). 

The present case is distinguishable from those cases where 

prejudice was presumed. Considering the totality of the 

circumstances, we believe actual prejudice was not established. 

We conclude the trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he 

denied Abello's transfer of venue motion. 

III. Brady Material. 

At trial, Abello attempted to call Tulsa Deputy Sheriff Tony 

Boutwell during his case-in-chief. Boutwell was called to testify 

that Olarte, the government's star witness, was charged with 

possessing marijuana while incarcerated in a Tulsa jail in 1988. 

In May, 1989, this state felony charge was dismissed in light of 

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Olarte's cooperation with federal authorities. In preparation for 

trial, Abella filed motions on January 29, and February 2, 1990, 

requesting the disclosure of all benefits conferred upon 

prosecution witnesses. Dismissal of Olarte's state marijuana 

charge was not disclosed by the prosecution. 

Abella argues this omission by the government is reversible 

error. Knowledge of Olarte's felony marijuana charge in state 

court is important impeachment evidence. According to Abella, the 

prosecutor helped arrange for the charges to be dropped. This 

indebtedness to the government casts doubt on the credibility of 

Olarte. Since Olarte was crucial to the government's case, Abella 

claims the evidence was useful to impeach Olarte's testimony as 

biased in favor of the government. 

The government points to a lengthy hearing conducted by the 

trial judge who concluded the defense knew of the evidence before 

trial. Regardless, it claims the proffered testimony was properly 

refused because it was impeachment evidence which may not be 

proven by extrinsic means. The government also argues the 

evidence was insignificant given the array of other impeachment 

evidence presented against Olarte by the Abella. Finally, the 

government points out that Olarte began cooperating with the 

government in May of 1987, well before the marijuana charge arose. 

Hence, the incremental benefit to Olarte from the marijuana 

dismissal was insignificant for impeachment purposes in light of 

the multiple federal narcotics trafficking charges he faced. 

In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), the Supreme 

Court held "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence 

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favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where 

the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment 

irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosection. 11 

See Bowen v. Maynard, 799 F.2d 593, 602 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. 

denied, 479 U.S. 962 (1986). This widely cited passage 

establishes the prosecutor's broad duty to disclose exculpatory 

evidence to the defense. The prosecutor's duty is based on the 

requirements of due process. The defendant's right to due process 

is violated when material evidence is suppressed thus undermining 

confidence in the outcome of the trial. 

For evidence to fall under the rule in Brady, it must be both 

exculpatory and material, Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. The impeachment 

evidence here at issue is exculpatory. This court has stated, 

"Impeachment evidence merits the same constitutional treatment as 

exculpatory evidence." Bowen, 799 F.2d at 610; see Giglio v. 

United states, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). 

h f th d . t ' t ' l't 4 Te gravamen o e 1spu e is ma er1a 1 y. If the evidence 

sought to impeach Olarte did not materially affect the ultimate 

outcome, there is no reversible error. As the Court held in 

United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 n. 7 (1985), 

"Furthermore, a rule that the prosecutor commits error by any 

failure to disclose evidence favorable to the accused, no matter 

4 The parties dispute when and whether the defense knew Olarte's 

state marijuana conviction was dismissed. The defense claims it 

learned of the dismissal during trial but after it could 

effectively use the evidence in its cross-examination through 

extrinsic evidence in its case-in-chief. See Fed. R.Evid. 608(b). 

The trial court specifically found that the defense knew of 

the marijuana charge before trial. We express no opinion on this 

finding, nor do we rule on the Rule 608(b) evidentiary issue. We 

believe the materiality of issues resolves the Brady problem. 

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how insignificant, would impose an impossible burden on the 

prosecutor and would undermine the interest in the finality of 

judgments." Hence, materiality is the key to understanding the 

application of Brady. 

The Brady issue in this case is a mixed question of law and 

fact. "The materiality of withheld evidence under Brady and its 

possible effect on the verdict are mixed questions of fact and law 

reviewed de novo. 11 United states v. Buchanan, 891 F.2d 1436, 1440 

(10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 s. ct. 1829 (1990); see also 

Bowen v. Maynard, 799 F.2d 593, 610 (10th Cir 1986), cert. denied, 

479 U.S. 962 (1986). We review de novo the trial court's decision 

the evidence was not material. 

The standard of materiality required to set aside a criminal 

conviction for violating Brady depends on the specificity of the 

defendant's request and the prosecutor's conduct. The Supreme 

Court in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103-107 (1976), 

described three different materiality standards corresponding to 

several situations where Brady problems arise. It is clear from 

the record at trial that the defense made a specific pretrial 

request for any benefit or consideration bestowed on a government 

wi 't ness. 5 Our conclusion is buttressed by the Court's conclusion 

5 In his February 2, 1990 motion, defendant requested from the 

government, 

Any and all consideration or promise of consideration given 

to or on behalf of each witness or expected or hoped for by 

the witness. By "consideration" Defendant refers to 

absolutely everything, whether bargained for or not, which 

arguably could be of value or use to a witness ••• 

including, but not limited to, formal or informal, direct or 

indirect: immunity, leniency, favorable treatment or 

recommendations or other assistance with respect to any 

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in United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 669-70, that a request for 

"any deals, promises or inducements made to witnesses in exchange 

for their testimony" is considered specific under Agurs. Hence, 

we apply the second Agurs materiality standard. 6 

Under this standard, a Brady violation is established upon a 

showing that "suppressed evidence might have affected the outcome 

of the trial.'' Agurs, 427 U.S. at 104; United States v. Buchanan, 

891 F.2d at 1441. This relatively low materiality standard exists 

because of the relative position of the parties. The government's 

hand is stacked with cards the defense lacks. It can immunize 

witnesses and gather information beyond the reach of the 

defendant. With this power comes the government's responsibility 

pending or potential criminal, parole, probation, pardon, 

clemency, civil, tax court, court of claims administrative or 

other dispute with Government or with any other parties •••• 

Vol. 1, Doc. 241 at 2. 

6 We acknowledge that many subsequent cases construing Brady deal 

with exculpatory evidence uncovered after the trial has ended. 

Here, the defense knew of the evidence at least midway through the 

trial. (Defense contends they learned of the evidence after it 

could be effectively utilized.) 

The materiality standard, however, is the same whether the 

defense learned during or after trial. 

The [Brady] problem arises in two principle contexts. First, 

in advance of trial, and perhaps during the course of trial 

as well, the prosecutor must decide what, if anything, he 

should voluntarily submit to defense counsel. Second, after 

trial a judge may be required to decide whether a 

nondisclosure deprived the defendant of his right to due 

process. Logically, the same standard must apply at both 

times. 

Agurs, 427 U.S. at 107-08. 

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to use it fairly. 

In United States v. Bagley, the Supreme Court further 

discussed the three Agurs materiality standards. Like this case, 

Bagley dealt with impeachment evidence useful to the defense but 

not disclosed by the prosecutor even after a specific request was 

made by the defense. On the issue of the materiality, the Court 

held, "The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable 

probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, 

the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 

'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine 

confidence in the outcome." Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682. 

since the appellant in this case made a specific request upon 

the government for aid rendered on Olarte's behalf, Bagley permits 

us to consider carefully any specific difficulties in the 

presentation or timing of the appellant's defense. While we 

continue to apply the "reasonable probability" language, 

The reviewing court should assess the possibility that 

such effect might have occurred in light of the totality 

of the circumstances and with an awareness of the difficulty 

of reconstructing in a post-trial proceeding the course that 

the defense and the trial would have taken had the defense 

not been mislead by the prosecutor's incomplete response. 

Bagley. 473 U.S. at 683. 

As generously as Brady tries to treat defendants who make 

specific requests of the government, we cannot conclude the 

evidence at issue would have changed the outcome of the trial with 

any "reasonable probability." The prosecutor's case revolved 

around the jury's belief in Olarte as a witness. Abello's 

defense required that Olarte be discredited. Both were 

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accomplished. Olarte provided the link between Abello and drug 

trafficking in the Northern District of Oklahoma. If the jury 

believed Olarte and his incriminating testimony, they would 

convict Abello. 

Olarte testified for three days. During his testimony, the 

twenty-seven year old Olarte admitted on direct examination to 

pleading guilty to five felonies. The felonies stem from his role 

in marijuana and cocaine importation and distribution 

conspiracies. The penalties for these convictions totaled two 

life imprisonment sentences and fines of ten and a half million 

dollars. In exchange for pleading guilty to these offenses and 

for cooperating as a government witness, Olarte received a 

sentence of only ten years. In addition, the government agreed to 

dismiss other drug-related charges like those related to 

membership in a continuing criminal enterprise against him and his 

wife. Finally, Olarte disclosed he·filed a motion under F. R. 

Crim. P. 35(b) requesting a sentence reduction in light of his 

continued cooperation. 

The exposure of Olarte's felony convictions and extensive 

criminal involvement in the drug trade during the early 1980s 

creates two lasting impressions upon the jury. First, Olarte is a 

celebrated criminal whose character is suspect; second, Olarte is 

indebted to the government and continues to benefit from 

testifying against former co-conspirators. In his crossexamination of the witness, Abella expanded on these two themes to 

impeach the witness' credibility in the eyes of the jury. At 

defense counsel's suggestion, Olarte repeatedly admitted he was 

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testifying to avoid spending time in jail. Olarte admitted he had 

lied in previous trial appearances for his own benefit. Defense 

counsel used transcripts from Olarte's previous testimony to 

expose inconsistencies in his present testimony on numerous 

subjects. These inconsistencies included important details about 

the timing of his Aruba meeting with Abello. 

Cross-examination by defense counsel exposed a host of other 

illegal activities undertaken by Olarte in order to facilitate his 

narcotics trafficking operation. One line of questioning, 

particularly relevant to the state marijuana dismissal, was 

Olarte's disclosure that he paid a fellow inmate $20,000 to help 

him break out of the Tulsa county jail. The plan included a 

helicopter airlift from the jail yard while hired mercenaries kept 

the guards at bay. 

The record is replete with impeachment evidence against 

Olarte. It is possible, as the court theorized in Barkauskas v. 

Lane, 878 F.2d 1031, 1034 (7th Cir. 1989), that learning of the 

state marijuana dismissal could have "pushed the jury over the 

edge into the region of reasonable doubt." We are not persuaded. 

The Supreme Court articulated a materiality test which permits 

reversal when the outcome of the trial is affected. Although 

Abello made a specific request for benefits conferred upon 

government witnesses, we conclude there is no "reasonable 

probability" the jury would have returned a different verdict had 

it known about the additional impeachment evidence. We conclude 

the evidence was not material under Brady and its progeny. 

IV. Prosecutor's Closing Argument. 

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A. Appeal to Ethnicity. 

Pointing to portions of the prosecutor's closing statement, 

Abello argues the government made several references to his 

Colombian nationality. Nationality or ethnicity, according to 

Abello, was a theme running through the prosecutor's closing 

argument. For example, the prosecutor stated Abello, "secure in 

the comfort of Colombian corruption. laughs at American 

justice." Vol. 57 at 7838-39. At the end of his statement, the 

prosecutor triumphantly declared, Abello is the "biggest fish 

landed by the United states out of that Colombian sea of 

narcotics. Don't let him go." Vol. 57 at 7877. 

This appeal to ethnicity or nationality, Abello argues, is 

inflammatory and prejudicial; it denies the accused his right to a 

fair trial. Abello, however, did not object to these statements 

at trial. Hence, we review for "plain error" affecting 

substantial rights of the accused. F. R. Crim. Pro. 52(b); see 

United States v. Young. 470 U.S. 1, 14 (1985). 

Abello argues the prosecutor committed error in two ways. 

First, by stressing Abello's Colombian nationality, the prosecutor 

improperly appealed to the patriotism of the jury. Second, the 

prosecutor took advantage of the "war on drugs" hysteria 

flickering through the headlines of the nation's newspapers. 

Abello relies on United States v. Doe, 903 F.2d 16 (D.C. cir. 

1990). There, the court reversed the trial court's conviction of 

defendants on drug and firearm charges. The court found 

reversible error in the prosecutor's closing argument. In his 

argument, the prosecutor repeatedly referred to "Jamaicans" taking 

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over the crack cocaine trade in Washington, o.c .. The prosecutor 

described a city under siege with Jamaican drug pushers taking 

over apartments and intimidating residents with guns and violence. 

This improper reference to the ethnicity of the defendants, 

according to the court, was not harmless beyond a reasonable 

doubt; the prosecutor was appealing to latent prejudice against 

black Jamaicans. The court then summarized the evidence on which 

the defendants were convicted. The court concluded the evidence, 

in several important areas, was weak. The court also rejected the 

government's claim that it was merely repeating the testimony of a 

government witness; that witnesses' testimony had been discredited 

by the court. Because of these shortcomings in the government's 

case, the court believed there was an opportunity for the 

prosecutor's inflammatory closing remarks to infect the jury's 

deliberation. 

In this case, the evidence against Abella was abundant. 

There is plenty of testimony which supports the government's 

declaration that corruption in Colombia allowed drug trafficking 

to flourish and drug traffickers to live lavish lives. Nowhere 

does Abella argue that the evidence against him was lacking such 

that rhetoric and race took the place of substantive evidence in 

the jury's mind. We have stated that appellate review of the 

prosecutor's comments during argument at trial must occur in the 

context of the entire record. United States v. Washita Const. 

Co., 789 F.2d 809, 822 (10th Cir. 1986). 

In this case, closing argument occurred over several hours 

and summarized a trial lasting several weeks. Focussing on a 

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handful of statements by the prosecutor misconstrues his entire 

presentation. Having read both closing arguments in their 

entirety, we conclude ethnicity or nationality was not used to 

manipulate the prejudices of the jury. The specific statements 

cited by the Abello were supported by the testimony of several 

witnesses. Judged in its entirety, we cannot conclude the 

prosecutor's reference to the defendant's Colombian nationality 

deprived him of a fair trial. 

B. Prosecutor Expressed Personal Opinions. 

During the rebuttal portion of the government's closing 

argument, the prosecutor made the following statement. 

The defendant tells you please take my word for it, 

please disbelieve 23 liars that the government has 

gotten together and conspired and told to lie, made 

up the lie, convinced them to lie. Ladies and gentlemen, 

I'm not that good. I'm not that motivated. I wouldn't do 

that, to ask people to come into this courtroom --

(objection] to get people to get on that witness stand. 

Vol. 57 at 7949-50. According to Abello, the prosecutor injected 

himself and the integrity of his position into the jury's 

consideration. By stating he would not manufacture false 

testimony, he indirectly vouches for the credibility of the 

government witnesses. The statement also implies the prosecutor 

knew of additional evidence, not known to the jury, which further 

enhances the credibility of government witnesses. 

We reach a different conclusion. The statement came on the 

heels of the appellant's own closing argument. In that argument, 

defense counsel argued Abello was himself a victim of a conspiracy 

created by the government. The government manufactured an alleged 

drug conspiracy through perjured testimony. When Abello himself 

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testified, he accused every government witness of lying. His 

counsel in his closing remarks charged the prosecution with 

assembling a massive fraud on the court. 

Now, I submit to you, people, that the testimony of 

people like [witness] being sponsored by this government 

is graphic and audible testimony to the desperation of the 

government to try and make this case come alive against 

[Abello] by having this huge chart and all these other 

accusations ••• Now people, I submit to you that the 

evidence shows that the assertions by Olarte and Lacle that 

there was a conspiracy involving [Abello) with them in Aruba 

is built on sand, it's false, it cannot stand the scrutiny • 

• . on their black, untrusting and untruthful souls it's 

exposed for what it is. It's a lie and it's a lie that 

they've sold to the United States of America. 

Vol. 57 at 7911-12. Abello also implied he was targeted by the 

prosecution because of the notoriety the prosecutors would obtain 

from the trial. 

Attacking the credibility of government witnesses and the 

foundation of the government's case is legitimate. There is also 

nothing improper with attacking the·motivation of the prosecutor. 

These arguments, however, invite rebuttal from the prosecution. 

We recognize that "considerable latitude is given the prosecutor 

in replying to an argument raised by defense counsel's closing 

statement." Washita, 789 F.2d at 823. See United States v. 

Dickey, 736 F.2d 571, 596 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 

1188 (1985). The prosecutor in this case could have more artfully 

rebutted the charge that he orchestrated a parade of liars to the 

witness stand. He had the right, however, to deny he supplied 

untruthful witnesses; he also had the right to defend the 

integrity of his position. 

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c. Appearance of FBI Agent Weber. 

In his opening statement, defense counsel told the jury 

special agent Martin Weber would testify. The government objected 

claiming it did not intend to call Weber. In response, defense 

counsel stated he would call Weber. Weber was the FBI case agent 

responsible for assembling the evidence against Abello. During 

the trial, the defense tried to call Weber as a witness. Defense 

counsel tried several times to subpoena Weber and filed affidavits 

in support of the subpoena. The trial court concluded Weber could 

provide no relevant, admissible testimony on any of the subjects 

mentioned in the affidavits and quashed the subpoenas. Abello 

does not challenge the trial court's decision on this matter. 

Abello does object, however, to the prosecutor's reference to 

defense counsel's failure to call Weber as a witness as promised. 

In the rebuttal portion of his closing argument, the prosecutor 

stated, "In [defense counsel's) opening statement he told you that 

Mr. Marty Weber will be up here to testify. He had the right to 

call Weber to testify -- [objection) •••• " Vol. 57, at 7957. 

Abello argues this reference to Weber's absence was an improper 

reference to evidence not in the record which invited the jury to 

reach a conclusion unfavorable to him. 

We find no error. Defense counsel referred to Weber in his 

opening statement. The prosecutor's reference to Weber's absence 

and Abello's right to call him as a witness was proper. 

Factually, it is true that Abello had the right to call Weber 

provided Weber could contribute admissible evidence. By 

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inference, nothing in the prosecutor's comments suggest an 

ulterior motive or that Abello was hiding from Weber's testimony. 

conversely, the party drawing conclusions from Weber's 

absence was Abello. The defense's suggestion was that Weber was 

at the controls of a government conspiracy to trap Abello. The 

prosecutor had the right to respond to the cloud cast on Weber's 

role in the investigation. It did so without any negative 

implications about Abello's failure to produce Weber as a witness. 

v. Conclusion. 

Finding no reversible error, the district court's verdict is 

AFFIRMED. 

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