Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-02190/USCOURTS-ca10-92-02190-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellant
Rodolfo Venzor-Castillo
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS F I L b DA ..-la 

United States~rt~ P~ 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

APR 14 1993 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v . 

RODOLFO VENZOR-CASTILLO, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

No. 92-2190 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

For the District of New Mexico 

D.C. No . CR 92-324-JP 

Kelly H. Burnham, Assistant U.S . Attorney (Don J. Svet, United 

States Attorney, with her on the brief), Las Cruces, New Mexico, 

for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Charles A. Harwood, Silver City, New Mexico, for DefendantAppellee. 

Before MCKAY, Chief Circuit Judge, SETH, Senior Circuit Judge, and 

MOORE, Circuit Judge. 

MOORE, Circuit Judge . 

Appellate Case: 92-2190 Document: 010110200963 Date Filed: 04/14/1993 Page: 1 
The United States appeals from an order of the district court 

granting defendant Rodolfo Venzor-Castillo's motion to suppress 

evidence the government intended to introduce in defendant's trial 

for alien smuggling. The evidence was obtained from a Border 

Patrol stop of his vehicle. 

court's holding that the 

suspicion to make the stop. 

The government attacks the district 

Border Patrol agent lacked reasonable 

The district court found that the 

stop was unreasonable because it occurred approximately 235 miles 

from the United States-Mexico border on a road that is not a 

direct route from the border and passes through thirteen New 

Mexico towns and cities between the nearest border point of entry 

and the location of the stop. The court held the location was not 

"a reasonable distance from any external boundary of the United 

States" within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (3). We agree and 

affirm. 

The essential facts found by the district court are not 

disputed by the government. We shall, therefore, rely upon them. 

On June 14, 1992, United States Border Patrol Agent David 

Smith was patrolling New Mexico State Highway 36, a lightly 

traveled roadway in a remote area of the northern portion of 

Catron County, New Mexico. That part of Highway 36 is located in 

a sparsely populated area of Western New Mexico near the Arizona 

border, virtually in the center of the North-South axis of the 

state and approximately 235 miles north of the Mexican border. 

The district court f ound the most direct route to this portion o f 

Highway 36 starts at Palomas, Mexico, the nearest border c r ossing, 

-2-

Appellate Case: 92-2190 Document: 010110200963 Date Filed: 04/14/1993 Page: 2 
and passes through thirteen New Mexico towns . . 1 

or cities. In 

addition, the section of Highway 36 involved here is a segment of 

the highway route that extends from the Mexican border to I-40, an 

east-west interstate highway. The route traverses New Mexico 

Highways 11, 12, 32, and 117 and U.S. Highway 180. It is also 

noteworthy that Quemado, New Mexico, south of the point where 

Agent Smith was working, is on U.S. Highway 60, a direct link 

between Highway 36 and the nearby Arizona border. 

Agent Smith's supervisors recently had assigned him, an agent 

with over ten years of experience, to patrol the north Catron 

County area for a week because of an increase in cases of alien 

smuggling in the area. During the month prior to Agent Smith's 

assignment, local law enforcement authorities had reported nine 

cases involving the arrest of thirty undocumented aliens in that 

location. 

Border Patrol authorities believed alien smugglers were 

travelling through Catron County more frequently to avoid the 

permanent checkpoint located near Truth or Consequences, New 

Mexico. In their opinion, the Catron County route allowed 

smugglers to circumvent that known checkpoint and still return to 

I-25 for a direct route to Albuquerque and points north. 

At 4:00 p.m., within half an hour after arriving at this 

location, Agent Smith and two other agents were standing next to a 

marked Border Patrol vehicle along the edge of Highway 36. Agent 

1 The district court noted, "The route Agent 

assumed the defendant travelled - north from 

corridor then westward on New Mexico Highway 

County - totals approximately 350 road miles." 

-3-

Smith apparently 

Mexico in the I-25 

152 into Catron 

Appellate Case: 92-2190 Document: 010110200963 Date Filed: 04/14/1993 Page: 3 
Smith noticed the defendant's car as it headed north around a 

curve. When he first spotted the car, he observed four or five 

occupants seated upright. As the car approached Agent Smith, 

however, he saw the passengers in the back seat slide down. Agent 

Smith also noted the car appeared to be heavily loaded with its 

undercarriage close to the road surface causing the tail pipe to 

drag on the road when the car hit bumps. He stated the vehicle 

was a large, older model Cadillac, which he often found to be 

favored by alien smugglers. Agent Smith thought it noteworthy 

that the three occupants in the front seat stared straight ahead 

as they passed him instead of looking toward him and his 

companions or the marked patrol car as most travelers do under 

similar circumstances. 

Agent Smith and his partner followed the defendant's car for 

a few miles, observing, in the meantime, the car had a temporary 

license in the rear window instead of a license plate. With 

binoculars, Agent Smith also distinguished the tops of three heads 

in the back seat. The agents then stopped the car. After 

determining the five passengers were undocumented aliens, Agent 

Smith arrested the driver, defendant Venzor-Castillo. 

In ruling upon the defendant's motion to suppress the 

evidence obtained as a result of the stop, the district court was 

struck by the distance from the border at which the stop occurred . 

Interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (a ) (3 ) , which authorizes any 

immigration agent "without warrant within a reasonable 

distance from any external boundary of the United States, to board 

and search for aliens any vessel within the territorial waters of 

-4-

Appellate Case: 92-2190 Document: 010110200963 Date Filed: 04/14/1993 Page: 4 
the United States and any railway car, aircraft, conveyance, or 

vehicle," the court determined it was bound by "a legislative 

limitation on the range within which United States border patrol 

agents may patrol in an effort to detect alien smuggling." 

The regulations interpreting this section define a "reasonable 

distance" as "within 100 air miles from any external boundary of 

the United States." 8 C. F . R. § 287.l(a) (2). The district court 

also found, when the defendant was encountered, he was driving on 

a highway during a summer afternoon when legitimate tourist 

traffic is greater than at other times of the year. Finally, the 

court found the point of the stop is more than 100 direct air 

miles from the border. 

After analyzing the cases and the statute, the district court 

concluded the stop of the defendant violated the Fourth Amendment, 

stating: 

The distance of the stop from the border, coupled with 

the fact that the route to the closest border crossing 

point leads through thirteen different United States 

towns or cities before reaching the point of the stop, 

and the absence of specific information the defendant's 

vehicle recently had crossed the border, suggest that 

Agent Smith lacked reasonable suspicion to believe that 

the Cadillac was coming from the border area and that 

alien smuggling was occurring when he stopped the 

defendant's vehicle. 

Reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, we accept the 

trial c ourt's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. United 

St ate s v . McKinne ll, 888 F.2d 669, 672 (10th Cir. 1989 ) (citing 

United Sta t es v. Cooper, 733 F . 2d 1360, 1364 (10th Cir. ) , c ert. 

denied, 467 U.S. 1255 (1984 )). 

reasonablene ss unde r the 

"The ultimate de termi nation of 

f ourth ame ndment is, howev e r, a 

- 5 -

-- -- - ------ --

Appellate Case: 92-2190 Document: 010110200963 Date Filed: 04/14/1993 Page: 5 
conclusion of law that we review de novo. 11 Id. (citation 

omitted) . 

We start our analysis with a review of the legal and 

constitutional principles that bring us to the question at hand. 

The foundation of the review is the proposition that the right of 

government agents to stop and search travelers at international 

borders has never implicated Fourth Amendment principles. 

Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1925 ) . In 

particular, probable cause has never been required to justify 

invasive actions that take place there. Indeed, the Court stated 

in United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977): 

Border searches . from before the adoption of 

the Fourth Amendment, have been considered to be 

"reasonable" by the single fact that the person or item 

in question had entered into our country from outside. 

There has never been any additional requirement that the 

reasonableness of a border search depended on the 

existence of probable cause. 

(emphasis added). Essential to that rationale is the principal 

fact that the person or object searched has come from across the 

border. See Carroll, 267 U.S . at 154; United States v. Montoya de 

Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537-38 (1985) . 

Nonetheless, to broaden the government's search authority, 

Congress enacted 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (a) (3) as part of the Immigration 

and Nationality Act. Notwithstanding the breadth of power 

ostensibly conferred by that section, the Supreme Court held the 

statute cannot allow conduct which violates the Constitution. 

Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973 ) . 

Consequently, in recognition of the government's power to exclude 

aliens and to effect that power 11 by routine inspections and 

-6-

Appellate Case: 92-2190 Document: 010110200963 Date Filed: 04/14/1993 Page: 6 
searches of individuals or conveyanc es seeking t o cross our 

borders," the Court c onceived the government's right t o stop and 

search without probable cause at places that are the "functional 

equivalent(]" of the border. Id. At the same time, howev er, the 

Court held a roving patrol 20 miles from the border "was o f a 

who lly different sort." Id. at 273. Because that stop was not at 

the functional equivalent of the border, the Court applied Fourth 

Amendment considerations and determined it was unreasonable. 

Expanding upon the power to stop in view of the important 

public consideration of protecting our borders, the Court held, 

subsequently, Border Patrol officers on roving patrol need not 

have probable cause to conduct investigatory stops. However, they 

"may stop vehicles only if they are aware of specific articulable 

facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that 

reasonably warrant suspicion that the vehicles contain aliens who 

may be illegally in the country." 

Ponce, 422 U. S . 873, 884 (1975) .

2 

United States v. BrignoniAlthough the Court made clear stops occasioned within a 

reasonable distance from the border may be predicated upon 

reasonable suspicion, it did not decide how to define the 

limitation in§ 1357(a) (3) that such stops be within a "reasonable 

distance" from the border.

3 We have found no other case in which 

2 We l ater held, "[A]n investigatory stop is j ustified when a n 

officer 'observe s unusual conduct which l eads him reasonably to 

conclude i n light o f his experience that c riminal activity may be 

afoot.'" Un ited States v . Monsisvais, 90 7 F . 2d 9 87 , 990 (10t h 

Cir. 1990 ) {quoting Te rry v. Ohio , 392 U.S . 1, 3 0 (1968 )) . 

3 

t o 

We note, as did the dist rict court, t he Supreme Court s eems 

have a ssumed in Brignoni - Ponc e that the 100 mile limit i n t he 

{Conti nue d t o next page. ) 

-7 -

Appellate Case: 92-2190 Document: 010110200963 Date Filed: 04/14/1993 Page: 7 
the concept was in issue. Nonetheless, this case requires that we 

determine whether the limitation contained in § 1357 (a ) (3 ) 

outweighs the remaining factors that lead to a determination of 

reasonable suspicion. 

No discussion of this issue can begin without a statement of 

the obvious: whether a stop is occasioned within a "reasonable 

distance" from the border cannot be gauged in finite terms. Thus, 

like other areas of the law in which we are governed by a standard 

of "reasonableness," we must base this judgement upon the totality 

of all the existing circumstances of a particular case.

4 

The government minimizes the issue of reasonability, however. 

Emphasizing the court must view the totality of all relevant 

circumstances as they are perceived by an experienced Border 

Patrol agent, Brignoni-Ponce, 442 U. S. at 885, the government 

argues the trial court erred in focusing on distance as the 

controlling factor in the analysis. Under the Brignoni-Ponce 

standard, the prosecution argues, distance from the border is only 

(Continued from prior page.) administrative regulation is a barrier which Border Patrol 

officers cannot cross. The court stated, "The only formal 

limitation on that discretion [to stop vehicles on the highway] 

appears to be the administrative regulation defining the term 

'reasonable distance' in§ 287(a ) (3) [8 U.S . C. § 1357 (a ) (3)] to 

mean within 10 0 air miles from the border." 422 U.S . at 882-83. 

We have held the regulation does not foreclose searches beyond the 

limit. United States v. Leyba, 627 F.2d 1059, 1065 (10th Cir. ) , cert. denied, 449 U.S . 987 (1980 ) . Because we believe the 

distance involved here was not reasonable in any case, we need not 

decide whether our holding in Leyba is in conflict. 

4 While law enforcement officers may regard this as a shifting 

and impossible standard upon which they are called to rely, it is 

the only test that can fairly be made applicable to a l l cases. 

Yet , although judged from the comfort o f hindsight, it is no t an 

impossible standard t o follow. 

- 8 -

Appellate Case: 92-2190 Document: 010110200963 Date Filed: 04/14/1993 Page: 8 
one of a number of factors. See id. at 884-85. Moreover, the 

government posits that because the Court only determined the 

standard required for a stop within 100 air miles of the border 

under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (3), Brignoni-Ponce does not imply agents 

cannot stop cars over 100 miles from the border or need more than 

reasonable suspicion for a stop. 

The government's argument is not without logic; however, it 

fails to recognize the foundation upon which the Border Patrol's 

authority to stop is based. We believe nothing previously said by 

the Court has denigrated the essential factor that the leeway of 

employing reasonable suspicion instead of probable cause is based 

upon the hypothesis that the person or object searched has come 

from outside the country. 

In most cases, distance is not a problem because stops are 

ordinarily made close to or on a direct route from the border. 

This case is different from the ordinary because of the enormity 

of the distance from the border coupled with the number of towns 

and cities through which the supposed route ran. When that factor 

is taken into consideration with the fact Agent Smith had no idea 

at all where defendant actually entered the road, 5 distance 

assumes a critical posture . As a consequence, all the other 

factors relied upon by Agent Smith diminish in value. Because the 

power of Border Patrol agents on roving patrol to make a stop 

founded only on reasonable suspicion originates with "the single 

fact that the person ... entered into our country from outside," 

5 In fact , as far as Agent Smit h knew at the time, defendant 

c ou l d have come from Arizona and not Mexico. 

- 9 -

----- -- --- --- - -

Appellate Case: 92-2190 Document: 010110200963 Date Filed: 04/14/1993 Page: 9 
Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 619, the first question we must ask is 

whether, under the circumstances of this case, it is reasonable 

for Agent Smith to have assumed defendant and his passengers came 

from the border. To hold otherwise is to ignore the origins of 

the government's right to conduct the invasive activity of 

stopping travelers en route. 

This conclusion is neither novel nor inconsistent with other 

authority. For example, United States v. Melendez-Gonzalez, 727 

F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1984), underscores the very point in issue 

here. The stop in that case was made only 60 miles from the 

international border. 

court stated: 

Yet, holding the stop unreasonable, the 

727 

When a person is traveling within our country, ... we 

are more hesitant to allow interference [than at the 

border], even if the vehicle is close to the border. 

For this reason, this Court has repeatedly emphasized 

that one of the vital elements in the Brignoni-Ponce 

reasonable suspicion test is whether the agents had 

reason to believe that the vehicle in question recently 

crossed the border. When the stop occurs a substantial 

distance from the border, we have found this element 

missing. 

F .2d at 411 (citations omitted). Similarly to the 

circumstances here, the road upon which Melendez-Gonzalez was 

stopped passed through two towns, causing the Fifth Circuit to 

observe, "If a vehicle is already past towns in this country, the 

mere fact that it is proceeding on a public highway leading from 

the border is not sufficient cause to believe the vehicle came 

from the border." Id. Additionally, we must be cognizant, as the 

Court was in Brignoni-Ponce, that "[r]oads near the border carry 

not only aliens seeking to enter the country illegally, but a 

large volume of legitimate traffic as well." 

-10-

422 U.S. at 882. 

Appellate Case: 92-2190 Document: 010110200963 Date Filed: 04/14/1993 Page: 10 
The further one gets from the border, the greater the likelihood 

the volume of legitimate travelers will increase. Thus, the more 

attenuated the international border becomes, the great er the 

significance distance assumes in the equation used to measure the 

power to stop only on reasonable suspicion when the officer has no 

knowledge whatever about the point of origin of a particular 

traveler's route. Naturally, if the officer has an articulable 

basis for believing that point was across an international border, 

distance will have far less significance in judging the 

reasonableness of the officer's decision. 

The government does not address this concern. Citing United 

States v. Leyba, 627 F.2d 1059, 1065 (10th Cir.), cert . denied, 

449 U. S. 987 (1980), the government merely contends that we have 

ruled, so long as Fourth Amendment considerations have been met, a 

stop is reasonable "even when the stop is made more than 100 miles 

beyond the border." Yet, we said only: 

Leyba interprets [§ 1357{a) (3)] as foreclosing searches 

beyond the 100 mile limit . We do not read Congress' 

intent as such. If Fourth Amendment considerations are 

met, such stops are permissible where "criminal activity 

is afoot." In any event, Leyba does not contest the 

Court's finding that the stop occurred less than 100 air 

miles from the United States-Mexican border. 

627 F.2d at 1065 . Nonetheless, the Leyba court was not called 

upon to decide whether the stop was otherwise within a reasonable 

distance from the i nternational border. Indeed, the situation 

which governed the Leyba court's decision is in stark contrast to 

this case. Here, the point of the stop was hundreds of miles 

beyond the border on a road bisecting a multitude of entry points, 

including an adjoining state. Those c ircumstances severely 

-11 -

- ---- - ----

Appellate Case: 92-2190 Document: 010110200963 Date Filed: 04/14/1993 Page: 11 
undercut any assumption the 

international border. Given 

point of origin was across an 

this distinction, we do not find 

ourselves in conflict with Leyba. 

The government also points to United States v. Magana, 797 

F.2d 777, 782 (9th Cir. 1986), a case in which a stop was made 

1500 miles north of the border, and argues the case demonstrates 

the factor of distance cannot be singled out as determinative of 

the issue of reasonableness. A careful reading of the opinion, 

however, makes clear the court did not consider the legislative 

limitation of reasonableness set forth in § 1357(a) (3). We are 

not persuaded, therefore, that Magana is valuable precedent for 

the problem we face. 

The government also cites United States v. Garcia, 732 F.2d 

1221, 1225 (5th Cir. 1984). We think, however, that case supports 

our view because, although concluding officers had reasonable 

suspicion under the totality of circumstances for a stop which 

occurred 115 miles from the border, the court noted, "[A] vital 

element of the Brignoni-Ponce test is whether the agent had 

'reason to believe that the vehicle [in question] had come from 

the border.'" 732 F.2d at 1223 (quoting United States v. Lamas, 

608 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. 1979) (citations omitted)). 

So that we shall be clearly understood, and to place this 

case in the context of all the others decided by this court 

involving stops by roving border patrols, we emphasize, when an 

immigration stop is justified only on reasonable suspicion, the 

distance from the border becomes critical when the circumstances 

will not permit a reasonable presumption the traveler came from 

-12-

Appellate Case: 92-2190 Document: 010110200963 Date Filed: 04/14/1993 Page: 12 
beyond the international border. The fact the defendant in this 

case could have entered the highway from any one of the thirteen 

towns and cities between the closest point of entry on the border 

and the point of the stop, coupled with the equally plausible fact 

he could have come from a neighboring state, simply inhibits a 

belief that the defendant and his passengers had recently crossed 

the Mexican border. Thus, we conclude the stop did not occur 

within a reasonable distance from any external boundary of the 

United States and, therefore, was contrary to the authority 

granted by 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (3). Under that circumstance, the 

standard of reasonable suspicion cannot be used to justify the 

agent's invasive action. 

AFFIRMED. 

-13-

Appellate Case: 92-2190 Document: 010110200963 Date Filed: 04/14/1993 Page: 13 
Appellate Case: 92-2190 Document: 010110200963 Date Filed: 04/14/1993 Page: 14