Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_11-cr-08022/USCOURTS-azd-3_11-cr-08022-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
USA
Plaintiff
Jasper Williams
Defendant

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Jasper Williams,

Defendant. 

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CR-11-8022-PCT-GMS (LOA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This case arises on the Government’s May 31, 2013 Motion for Dangerousness

Assessment as authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 4246. (Doc. 100) After receiving an extension to

respond, Defendant Jasper Williams, through his appointed counsel, opposes the motion.

(Doc. 103) The Government’s motion has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge

by the assigned District Judge, the Hon. G. Murray Snow, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(A) and LRCrim 57.6(26). (Doc. 104) Because the recommendations herein may

be beyond the scope of a magistrate judge’s lawful authority absent the express consent of

the parties, out of an abundance of caution, this Magistrate Judge proceeds by Report and

Recommendation.

I. Background

On August 15, 2010, Defendant Jasper Williams, presently 40 years of age, was

arrested and charged by complaint with one count of Aggravated Sexual Abuse, in violation

of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153 and 2241(a), allegedly committed the previous day on the Navajo

Indian Reservation, District of Arizona. (Doc. 1) After defense counsel was appointed,

Case 3:11-cr-08022-GMS Document 109 Filed 06/27/13 Page 1 of 16
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 See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003).

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Defendant was temporarily detained by Magistrate Judge Mark E. Aspey in Flagstaff,

Arizona. (Docs. 3-4) On February 22, 2011, Defendant was indicted in Phoenix on one

count of Aggravated Sexual Abuse, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 2241(a), and

2246(2)(A), allegedly occurring on August 14, 2010. (Doc. 28)

A. Defendant’s Mental Health History in this Case

Shortly after counsel was appointed and had an opportunity to interact with

Defendant, defense counsel moved for a mental competency evaluation and “competency

restoration services.” (Doc. 13) On September 14, 2010, the Flagstaff Magistrate Judge

granted the motion, finding reasonable cause existed the Defendant was “presently suffering

from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is

unable to understand the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.” (Doc.

18) Defendant was transferred to the custody of the Attorney General pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

§ 4241(d) to determine whether his competency could be restored. (Id.) 

Concluding in January 2011 Defendant was not competent to proceed to trial, the

Federal Medical Center in Butner, North Carolina (“FMC-Butner”) submitted the report of

Dr. Robert Lucking, an FMC staff psychiatrist, indicating Defendant’s competency could be

restored if Defendant were properly medicated and requesting a Sell1 hearing to determine

if the involuntary administration of medication on Defendant would be appropriate. (Sealed

doc. 23) 

To assist Judge Snow in his decision whether to involuntary medicate Defendant at

an inevitable Sell hearing, avoid the bed space limitations existing at FMC-Butner, and

reduce the delays inherent in transporting Defendant back and forth from FMC-Butner and

Phoenix, on April 8, 2011, the parties stipulated, and Judge Snow ordered, Defendant receive

a dangerousness assessment prior to Defendant’s return to Phoenix for either a Sell hearing

or other hearing specified by either 18 U.S.C. § 4241(e) or § 4246(c). (Doc. 40) In that

order, Judge Snow directed that, “[i]f the Director of the Federal Medical Center certifies that

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2 Warden Revell erroneously believed the Flagstaff Magistrate Judge ordered the

evaluation and report on Defendant’s risk of danger instead of District Judge Snow, who sits

in Phoenix.

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in the absence of proper medication the Defendant’s release would create a substantial risk

of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to the property of another, he or she

shall prepare and transmit the certificate as is mandated by 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a).” (Id. at 1-2)

“Further, the Federal Medical Center shall promptly conduct and prepare the psychiatric or

psychological examination and report specified in 18 U.S.C. § 4246(b).” (Id. at 2)

In her cover letter accompanying FMC-Butner’s June 15, 2011 Forensic

Dangerousness Evaluation, Complex Warden Sara M. Revell advised that “[i]nsufficient

information [was] available to render an informed and accurate opinion of [Defendant’s] risk

of dangerousness to a reasonable degree of medical certainty[.]” (Sealed doc. 46 at 12) The

report informed Judge Snow that, when FMC-Butner notified defense counsel upon

Defendant’s arrival, defense counsel “[r]equested Mr. Williams not be interviewed as part

of the risk assessment to exercise his Fifth Amendment rights[.]” (Id. at 3) The report further

advised that:

The prediction of future violence is very difficult and declines in accuracy over time.

Violence is situational and depends on the confluence of specific factors and events.

The primary evaluator presented Mr. Williams before a risk assessment panel which

was conducted on 05/09/11. . . Defense Counsel sought to preserve the Fifth

Amendment rights of Mr. Williams and the Court ordered the staff of FMC Butner

notify Defense Counsel if the Defendant was to be separately questioned as part of the

evaluation. As it is necessary to interview the individual undergoing the risk

assessment, Defense Counsel was so notified. The Assistant U.S. Attorney assigned

to FMC Butner discussed this issue with Defense Counsel and advised the Risk Panel

not to interview Mr. Williams. . . .

Past history of violence: The prediction of future violence is difficult, however, a past

history of violence serves as the single best predictor. The relative probability of

dangerous behavior depends on the establishing of prior patterns of dangerous

behavior and understanding of the situational specificity of the behavior. The

probability of future dangerousness cannot be predicted based upon any single factor.

The probability of present/future dangerousness is highest when the present/future

biological, psychological, and environmental factors approximate[] the past

biological, psychological and environmental factors during which dangerous behavior

has occurred. The greater the similarity between past and present/future, the greater

the probability that dangerous behavior will repeat itself. Mr. Williams does not have

a substantial history of aggressive behavior[.]

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3

 It is unknown whether either counsel provided FMC-Butner with Defendant’s

confidential Pretrial Services report, sealed doc. 8; Defendant’s background records

identified in Dr. Daniel C. Cady’s September 7, 2010 competency evaluation, sealed doc. 16-

1; or any other documents that may be relevant to a defendant’s determination of

dangerousness.

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(Id. at 5) (emphasis added). Significantly, FMC-Butner’s risk panel concluded that, because

Defendant exercised his right to remain silent and “[d]ue to the sparse amount of background

information, . . . the Risk Panel was not able to formulate an opinion in regard to Mr.

Williams’ dangerousness if released from custody with any degree of medical certainty.”3

(Id. at 7)

Over the objection of Defendant’s Phoenix Assistant Federal Public Defender, on July

19, 2011, Judge Snow held a contested Sell hearing on the Government’s request to

involuntarily medicate Defendant and ordered Defendant be involuntarily medicated pursuant

to the protocol outlined in Judge Snow’s July 20, 2011 Order. (Doc. 54) After Defendant’s

unsuccessful appeal of Judge Snow’s ruling to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, on August

15, 2012, Judge Snow lifted the stay of his Sell decision and ordered Defendant transferred

back to FMC-Butner for further treatment and hospitalization, including the involuntarily

administration of haloperidol and other medications in an attempt to safely restore

Defendant’s competence to stand trial. (Doc. 81) 

On February 14, 2013 after the undersigned Magistrate Judge and counsel received

FMC-Butner’s request for additional time and treatment, sealed doc. 88, an Order to Show

Cause was directed to counsel, asking why the Court should not grant FMC-Butner’s request

for an additional 120-day period of commitment and treatment to attempt to restore

Defendant to competency. (Doc. 91) Counsel filed timely responses. (Docs. 92-93) Neither

side objected to FMC-Butner’s request that Defendant remain at its facility for an additional

120-day period of treatment, except defense counsel attached a number of conditions, which

were neither approved nor rejected. (Doc. 93)

Finally, on May 29, 2013, the Court conducted a telephonic conference with counsel

regarding FMC-Butner’s May 24, 2013 Forensic Evaluation, opining Defendant “[W]illiams

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is not competent to stand trial and cannot be restored to competency with further treatment

or education[.]” (Sealed doc. 96 at 9) Informal discussions were held whether a second

dangerousness evaluation would be appropriate due to the passage of nearly two years

between FMC-Butner’s June 15, 2011inconclusive evaluation on dangerousness, and the

May 24, 2013 report finding Defendant cannot be restored to competency with further

treatment or education. (Doc. 98) Counsel were directed to file a written motion and

response per Rule 47(a), Fed.R.Crim.P., on whether a dangerousness evaluation should now

be ordered as required by the federal statutory scheme. (Doc. 99 at 1-2) (citing United States

v. v. Yazzie, 2006 WL 2772636, at *6 (D. Ariz. Sept. 25, 2006) (quoting United States v.

Ohnick, 803 F.2d 1485, 1486 (9th Cir. 1986)) (“Ohnick appeared in the [district] court for

a final determination on his competency to stand trial. The court found that neither was

Ohnick presently competent nor was there a substantial probability that he would obtain

competency in the foreseeable future. As a result, Ohnick was then subject to the provisions

of 18 U.S.C. § 4246.”); United States v. Rivera-Morales, 365 F.Supp.2d 1139 (S.D. Cal.

2005), affirmed by United States v. Rivera-Morales, 160 Fed. Appx. 648 (9th Cir. 2005).

B. The Pending Motion

The Government requests “[a]n order allowing the staff at Butner to conduct a risk

assessment to determine whether ‘defendant’s release would create a substantial risk of

bodily injury to another person or serious damage to property of another.’” (Doc. 100 at 2)

Because Defendant is currently hospitalized at FMC-Butner, transportation order is not

necessary.

Defendant objects to the Government’s motion, raising four ambiguous and legally

unsupported reasons why another dangerousness evaluation should not be ordered: 1)

defense counsel “has not had adequate opportunity to independently verify whether Mr.

Williams is competent to stand trial. . . and is therefore unable to agree or offer no [sic]

objection to the government’s request at this time[;]” 2) because FMC-Butner refused

counsel’s request for a video teleconference with Defendant absent a court order and this

Magistrate Judge refused to order one without more information, a 30-minute phone call with

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4

 To save time in order to reach the merits of the referral, a reply was not authorized

in the briefing order. (Doc. 99) Without seeking leave of the Court, however, the

Government filed a Reply. (Doc. 106) In a prompt response to the Court’s June 25, 2013

Order to Show Cause, the assigned prosecutor apologized for her inadvertent oversight and

advised she “[h]as spoken with defense counsel who indicated he had no objection to the

court considering the government’s reply.” (Doc. 106) Because the Reply provides current

information relevant to a second dangerousness evaluation, this Magistrate Judge will

exercise its wide discretion and allow the Reply, otherwise filed timely, vacate that portion

of its May 30, 2013 Order precluding a reply, and, of course, accept counsel’s apology.

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Defendant “to ascertain the client’s level of competency . . . was not sufficient for counsel

to determine whether to stipulate or offer no objection to the government’s motion[;]” 3)

FMC-Butner has previously, albeit unsuccessfully, attempted to do a dangerousness

evaluation and defense “[c]ounsel will continue to assert Mr. Williams’ Fifth Amendment

rights not to speak about this or any other alleged offense[;]” and, 4) “Given that a § 4246

evaluation has previously been ordered and undertaken in full, and because the government

has shown no changed relevant circumstances that would justify another evaluation, counsel

objects to BOP’s request for a second bite at the apple.” (Doc. 103) Other than citing the

relevant statute, 18 U.S.C. § 4246, defense counsel offers no authority to support his reasons

to oppose the Government’s motion. 

The Government’s Reply4

 to Defendant’s opposition to a second dangerousness

evaluation indicates the assigned prosecutor on this case recently communicated with legal

counsel at FMC-Butner, who spoke with Dr. Lucking, Defendant’s psychiatrist. (Id. at 2)

Assuming a second dangerous assessment is authorized, Dr. Lucking apparently “[b]elieves

that he will have enough information to make a determination of dangerousness, given that

the facility has had two years of observation and evaluation since the last assessment was

completed.” (Id.) The prosecutor acknowledges that, “[i]f [Defendant] is not found to be

dangerous and committable, then the charges will be dropped and he will be released.” (Id.)

II. The Federal Competency Scheme in Criminal Cases

The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the Government from

trying a defendant who is mentally incompetent. Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 354

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(1996); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966). The test to determine a defendant’s

competency to stand trial is set forth in Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (the “test

must be whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with

a reasonable degree of rational understanding - and whether he has a rational as well as

factual understanding of the proceedings against him.”). “The government has the burden of

demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is competent to stand

trial.” United States v. Hoskie, 950 F.2d 1388, 1392 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted).

The federal criminal code establishes a three-part statutory scheme for determining,

restoring, and committing a defendant, who is, or is believed to be, mentally incompetent to

stand trial in a criminal case. In upholding a facial constitutional challenge to 18 U.S.C. §

4248, the federal civil commitment statute enacted in 2006, the Supreme Court discussed the

congressional scheme addressing defendants believed to be mentally incompetent; “[t]he civil

commitment of individuals who are, or who become, mentally incompetent at any time after

their arrest and before the expiration of their federal sentence, §§ 4241, 4244, 4247–4248;

and [the scheme’s] various procedural safeguards, §§ 4242, 4246, 4247.” United States v.

Comstock, U.S. , 130 S.Ct. 1949, 1954-55, 176 L.Ed.2d 878 (2010).

First, a district court must determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether a

defendant suffers from a “mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to

the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings

against him or to assist properly in his defense.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) & (d); see also United

States v. Friedman, 366 F.3d 975, 978 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Second, if a defendant lacks sufficient mental competency to proceed to trial, a district

court “[s]hall commit the defendant to the custody of the Attorney General.” 18 U.S.C. §

4241(d). The Attorney General must then, “[h]ospitalize the defendant for treatment . . . for

such a reasonable period of time, not to exceed four months, as is necessary to determine

whether there is a substantial probability that in the foreseeable future [the defendant] will

attain the capacity to permit the trial to proceed[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1); see also United

States v. Loughner, 672 F.3d 731, 766 (9th Cir. 2012). 

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5 See United States v. Martin, 2011 WL 5220310 (D. N.M. Sept. 27, 2011) for the

similarities and interplay between the provisions in 18 U.S.C. §§ 4246 and 4248. 

6

 Surprisingly given the nature of the charge against Defendant, the Government has

not raised § 4248 (“Civil commitment of a sexually dangerous person”) in its motion. Thus,

the undersigned analyzes only § 4246 (“Hospitalization of a person due for release but

suffering from mental disease or defect”) in this report and recommendation. Section 4248

provides for the civil commitment of a person who, inter alia, “[h]as been committed to the

custody of the Attorney General pursuant to section 4241(d),” and is determined to be a

“sexually dangerous person” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 4247(a)(5). 18 U.S.C. §

4248(a). Section 4248 was enacted in July 2006 as a part of the Adam Walsh Child

Protection and Safety Act. See United States v. Turner, 689 F.3d 1117, 1119 (9th Cir. 2012).

For commitment findings pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4248, see United States v. Timms, 2012

WL 5182996 (E.D. N.C. Oct. 18, 2012). If a district court finds the Government has satisfied

its burden, a defendant must be committed to a suitable facility for mental treatment until he

is determined to no longer be sexually dangerous to others. See 18 U.S.C. § 4248(d); Turner,

689 F.3d at 1119-20. 

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Third, “[t]he final sentence of § 4241(d) makes this clear: ‘if, at the end of the time

period specified for a competency evaluation and possible restoration to competency], it is

determined that the defendant’s mental condition has not so improved as to permit

proceedings to go forward, the defendant is subject to the provisions of sections 4246 and

4248.’” United States v. Truax, 2008 WL 4924785, at *1 (D. Ariz. Nov. 17, 2008) (quoting

18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)), affirmed by United States v. Truax, 325 Fed. Appx. 591 (9th Cir.

2009), cert. denied, Truax v. U.S., 131 S.Ct. 550 (2010). “This language constitutes clear

authority for the Court to transport Defendant in furtherance of the purposes of § 4246(a).”

Id. A “dangerousness hearing” is then conducted in accordance with the provisions of 18

U.S.C. §§ 4246 and 42485

 to determine whether the defendant would pose a “substantial risk

of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to property of another” if released.6

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U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1); see also United States v. Godinez-Ortiz, 563 F.3d 1022, 1032 (9th Cir.

2009) (“[W]e conclude the district court acted within its authority in temporarily returning

Godinez-Ortiz to FMC-Butner to provide the director with an opportunity to consider

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whether to issue a dangerousness certificate pursuant to § 4246. The duration of such

commitments is controlled by 18 U.S.C. § 4247(b).”). A civil commitment proceeding under

18 U.S.C. § 4246 is completely separate from the criminal prosecution. See United States v.

Sahhar, 917 F.2d 1197, 1205-06 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to

a jury trial in “criminal prosecutions” is inapplicable to civil commitment proceedings under

18 U.S.C. § 4246); United States v. Lapi, 458 F.3d 555, 560 (7th Cir. 2006) (a hearing

pursuant to § 4246 “is a matter completely separate from the merits of the action - whether

Mr. Lapi committed the bank robbery for which he is being prosecuted[.]”) (citations

omitted); U.S. v. Abregana, 574 F. Supp.2d 1123 (D. Haw. 2008).

If a defendant is found to be dangerous and was initially committed pursuant to §

4241(d), the director of the FMC facility must “transmit [a dangerousness] certificate to the

clerk of the court for the district in which the person is confined [and] . . . the clerk of the

court that ordered the commitment.” 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a). A few circuits have concluded

that, absent a § 4246(a) dangerousness certification, a district court lacks statutory authority

to conduct a dangerousness hearing. See United States v. Bonin, 541 F.3d 399, 400-01 (5th

Cir. 2008) (citing Lapi, 458 F.3d at 562). Upon receipt of a § 4246(a) dangerousness

certification, the district court must conduct a hearing to determine whether the defendant

“[i]s presently suffering from a mental disease or defect as a result of which his release

would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to

property of another.” Id. A dangerousness certificate stays the defendant’s release pending

completion of procedures contained in 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a). Id. After a dangerousness

hearing is conducted and, upon a clear and convincing finding the defendant is too dangerous

to be released, the defendant is subject to indefinite commitment under 18 U.S.C. § 4246. See

18 U.S.C. § 4246(a), (d); United States v. Rivera-Morales, 365 F. Supp.2d 1139, 1141-42

(S.D. Cal. 2005), affirmed by United States v. Rivera-Morales, 160 Fed. Appx. 648 (9th Cir.

2005); Godinez-Ortiz, 563 F.3d at 1031-32.

If a defendant is found incompetent, not likely to attain competency in the reasonably

foreseeable future, and not dangerous within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 4246, the Bail

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7

 Other district courts have criticized the lack of clarity and direction in 18 U.S.C. §

4246. See United States v. Acosta-Soberanis, 2012 WL 1801978, at *17 (N.D. Ga. April 3,

2012) (citing United States v. Jackson, 2009 WL 691973, at *3 (E.D. Pa. March 16, 2009)

(“[S]everal courts have recognized that § 4246 contains troubling gaps in the statutory

scheme.”) (alteration added) (citing cases) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States

v. Wheeler, 744 F. Supp. 633, 636 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (noting the “black hole” of legislation in

§ 4246)).

8

 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part,

“[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself[.]”

U.S. Const. amend. V.

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Reform Act may not apply and that defendant may be released under § 4246(e).7 See 18

U.S.C. § 4246(e); United States v. Chaudhry, 630 F.3d 875, 878 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding no

basis for appellate court to exercise jurisdiction over government’s appeal where defendant

was found incompetent, not restorable, not dangerous, and because an appeal was pending,

noting the district court “[s]et conditions on Chaudhry’s release, apparently releasing him

under 18 U.S.C. § 3143 (rather than § 4246).”); United States v. Magassouba, 544 F.3d 387,

406 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. West, 2007 WL 1851305, at *1 (D. Colo. June 26, 2007)

(“[S]ince Defendant was incompetent but was not found to be dangerous within the meaning

of § 4246, I found that Defendant must be released from custody. Accordingly, I granted

Defendant's Motion for Forthwith Release from Custody.”).

III. The Fifth Amendment

“The Fifth Amendment can be asserted in any proceeding, civil or criminal,

administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory and it protects against any disclosures

which the witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead

to other evidence that might be so used.”8 United States v. Bodwell, 66 F.3d 1000, 1001 (9th

Cir. 1995) (quoting Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1972) (internal

quotation marks omitted). It is also well-established in Fifth Amendment jurisprudence that

“[t]he Fifth Amendment prohibits only compelled testimony that is incriminating.” Hiibel v.

Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177, 189 (2004). “To qualify for the Fifth

Amendment privilege, a communication must be testimonial, incriminating, and compelled.”

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Id. “The standard for determining whether a claim of privilege is justified is whether the

claimant is confronted by substantial and real, and not merely trifling or imaginary, hazards

of incrimination.” United States v. Vavages, 151 F.3d 1185, 1192 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting

United States v. Rubio-Topete, 999 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1993)) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). Although a dangerousness evaluation under § 4246 may be civil

in nature, a defendant may properly assert his Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination in such a hearing. In Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 374-75 (1986), however,

the Supreme Court held a state could use an alleged sexually violent person’s refusal to talk

to the state’s doctors against him because the proceeding to determine whether a detainee

under an Illinois statute was a sexually violent person was not criminal in nature.

Recently, in the context of a pretrial competency hearing pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §

4241, the Ninth Circuit addressed the concern that, if a defendant were to testify at the

hearing, the defendant’s testimony may later be used against him by the Government - “a

concern we take seriously.” United States v. Gillenwater, F.3d , 2013 WL 2930502,

at *12 (9th Cir. 2013). The Ninth Circuit acknowledged it “[h]as supervisory authority ‘to

mandate procedures deemed desirable from the viewpoint of sound judicial practice although

in nowise commanded by statute or by the Constitution.’” Id. (citation omitted). The court

then instructed the district court in Gillenwater that:

if another competency hearing is held at which [the defendant] testifies, the

district court [should] enter an order barring the use of such testimony at [the

defendant’s] trial except, if otherwise permissible, to impeach [the defendant]

were he to testify at trial - as is the rule in the context of a defendant’s testimony

at a suppression hearing.

Id. (citing United States v. Beltran-Gutierrez, 19 F.3d 1287, 1291 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding

that consistent with the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, a defendant’s testimony at a

suppression hearing could be used at trial only to impeach the defendant and not to prove his

guilt) (footnote in quotation omitted)). Footnote 14, however, is instructive:

 We express no view as to whether such an instruction is required by either the

Constitution or statute. However, we are of the view, pursuant to our supervisory

power, that such an order should be entered in any case where a criminal

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defendant wishes to testify at his competency hearing, in order that such right to

testify shall not have a negative consequence in any subsequent trial where he

does not testify or a negative consequence, other than impeachment, in a

subsequent trial where he does testify.

Id. (emphasis added). 

In light of the Ninth Circuit’s instruction in Gillenwater regarding a defendant’s Fifth

Amendment privilege in a closely-related competency issue in a criminal case, this

Magistrate Judge will recommend a similar order be entered if a dangerousness hearing is

held in the case sub judice.

IV. Discussion

Due to Defendant’s presently undisputed, non-restorable mental incompetence and

despite his significant time and treatment at FMC-Butner, there are few alternatives the

District Court of Arizona has at this time. Absent a Government dismissal motion, a

dangerousness evaluation pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246 is mandated by the statute itself and

controlling case law. See § 4241(d) (“[I]f, at the end of the time period specified, it is

determined that the defendant’s mental condition has not so improved as to permit

proceedings to go forward, the defendant is subject to the provisions of sections 4246 and

4248.”); Truax, 2008 WL 4924785, at *1. No doubt, Defendant would prefer the indictment

be dismissed and he be released. 

If defense counsel were interested in verifying whether Defendant is presently

mentally incompetent and, of course, assuming counsel’s viewing and speaking with his

client again since the July 19, 2011 Sell hearing would confirm it, nothing has precluded

defense counsel from traveling to North Carolina to meet with his client in person. Defense

counsel has apparently refused to travel to North Carolina to personally visit his client due

to, perhaps, budgetary issues, or failed to associate the Federal Public Defender’s Office in

the Eastern District of North Carolina, the judicial district in which FMC-Butner is located.

These failures should not impede the congressional statutory mechanism designed to secure

a judicial determination of a criminal defendant’s competency, thereby protecting

Defendant’s fair trial rights and the integrity of judicial proceedings; risk the safety of the

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public by releasing a mentally incompetent, but possibly dangerous, person back into society

after what has been described as a “brutal sexual assault,” doc. 106 at 2; and further frustrate

the fair and orderly resolution of this challenging case.

Defendant has offered no legal authority that a district court may not order a second

dangerousness evaluation, where, as here, the first one failed because the risk panel was

unable to render an opinion because Defendant exercised his right to remain silent and was

provided a “sparse amount of background information” on him. (Sealed doc. 46 at 7) 

While this appears to be an issue of first impression in the Ninth Circuit, there is

authority that, when it is appropriate to do so, a district court may authorize more than one

psychological or psychiatric report under 18 U.S.C. § 4246. See 18 U.S.C. § 4246(b);

Chaudhry, 630 F.3d at 879 (in dicta stating, “[a]s long as the district court and the

government choose to not dismiss the indictment against Chaudhry, the government may

continue to file requests for Chaudhry’s competency to be reviewed.”) (citing, inter alia, 18

U.S.C. § 4241(a) and Lapi, 458 F.3d at 561 (indicating “the district court can reevaluate a

defendant’s competency . . . under 18 U.S.C. § 4241 at any time so long as a federal

indictment remains pending[.]”)); United States v. Martinez-Haro, 645 F.3d 1228, 1233 (10th

Cir. 2011); United States v. Arendas, 2011 WL 3477021, at *2 (D. Utah Aug. 9, 2011)

(finding it appropriate to order a defendant’s second competency evaluation because “since

the time of the first competency hearing, the Court has received personal correspondence

from Defendant that has given the Court reason to question its original finding of

competency.”); United States v. Hardy, 770 F.Supp.2d 410, 411 (D. Me. 2011) (holding a

district court “[o]rder additional psychiatric or psychological examinations and reports as

necessary before determining whether civil commitment is appropriate.”). Of course, the

district court’s discretion to order a subsequent evaluation is not limitless. See United States

v. Locklear, 483 Fed. Appx. 842, 846-47 (4th Cir. 2012) (reversing district court’s order for

a third evaluation “because [the district court] [was] not of the same opinion as the doctors

charged with making [the dangerousness] determination [and] was ‘not comfortable’ with

releasing Locklear right away and . . . did not ‘accept the Butner findings.’”); United States

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v. Martin, 2011 WL 5220310, at *15 (D. N.M. Sept. 27, 2011) (recognizing it has the

authority to order a second psychological or psychiatric report under 18 U.S.C. § 4246, but

refusing to do so in this case.)

In Martinez-Haro, the district court ordered a second competency evaluation, on

motion from the Government, after an initial evaluation found the defendant to be

incompetent to stand trial. 645 F.3d at 1229. On an interlocutory appeal, the defendant

argued that 18 U.S.C. § 4241(b) only authorizes the district court to order a single

competency examination. In rejecting defendant’s arguments, the Tenth Circuit wrote:

[T]he statute authorizes district courts to order competency hearings as need be.

The statute does not contain any language restricting a district court from

ordering multiple hearings. The statute does not state that the court may order

only one psychiatric or psychological examination. And the statute does not state

that the court may order just a single psychiatric or psychological examination.

While the statute does not explicitly address the issue raised by Martinez-Haro,

it does state that “if the court finds it appropriate, [then the court can order an

examination] by more than one such examiner.” 18 U.S.C. § 4247(b). Nothing in

this language limits the second examiner to the initial examination of the

defendant nor does the language restrict the ability of the court to order a second

examination after the initial examination. Therefore, we refuse to read into the

statute’s language the restriction suggested by Martinez-Haro. Instead we read the

statute to authorize a district court to order a second competency hearing when

appropriate.

Id. at 1233 (emphasis added). The district court ordered the second evaluation because the

first evaluation specifically recommended further testing in Spanish and the examining

doctor “expressed a willingness to revise her conclusion based on further testing.” Id. (“we

conclude that in this case it would be prudent for the district court to order an additional

competency examination.”) The Tenth Circuit held these were “legitimate reasons for the

district court to order a second competency examination.” Id.

Finally, defense counsel’s assertion that Defendant will continue to assert Fifth

Amendment rights is an inadequate basis to deny a second dangerousness evaluation. After

the Ninth Circuit’s guidance in Gillenwater and if an order is entered barring the use of any

admissions given by Defendant as a part of a second dangerousness evaluation, the concern

for asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege is significantly reduced. Moreover, even if

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Defendant elects to assert the privilege again, a second risk panel may have, as Dr. Lucking

has apparently surmised, sufficient information to make a determination of dangerousness,

given that FMC-Butner has had over two years to observe and evaluate the Defendant since

the last assessment was completed and signed on June 15, 2011. (Sealed doc. 46 at 2)

V. Conclusion

In light of the very serious allegations in the indictment; the prior medical findings

that Defendant is neither mentally competent nor restorable to competency with further

treatment or education; the mandatory language in 18 U.S.C. § 4246 that a dangerousness

evaluation be conducted; the inability of FMC-Butner to reach any conclusion on the

dangerousness issue as explained herein; and the extensive time FMC-Butner has had to

observe, treat, and evaluate Defendant, this Magistrate Judge finds good cause exists to grant

the Government’s motion and recommend a second dangerousness evaluation. This is clearly

not a scenario where the Government or a district court wants “a second bite at the apple,”

as defense counsel has described, because either did not agree on the first dangerousness

evaluation. For the reasons explained herein, the first risk panel was simply unable to

formulate an opinion regarding Defendant’s dangerousness with any degree of medical

certainty if he were released from custody.

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS RECOMMENDED as follows:

1. the Government’s Motion for Dangerousness Assessment, doc. 100, be

GRANTED. Defendant shall remain committed to the custody of the Attorney General until

further order of the Court, pending Defendant’s dangerousness assessment and any

subsequent dangerousness or other hearing in the District Court of Arizona. FMC-Butner

must promptly perform a dangerousness assessment on Defendant as required by 18 U.S.C.

§ 4246(a), provide a written psychiatric or psychological report directly to the Hon. G.

Murray Snow, United States District Judge, and counsel of record in this case, and file the

original report under seal. If Defendant is found to be dangerous, the director shall transmit

a certificate to the Clerk of Court for the District Court of Arizona and otherwise comply

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with 18 U.S.C. § 4246;

2. Defendant be found mentally incompetent to proceed to trial and there is no

substantial likelihood Defendant will obtain competence in the foreseeable future;

3. Defendant cannot be restored to competency with further treatment or education

in the foreseeable future;

4. Any admissions by Defendant against his penal interests obtained during, and as

a part of, the second dangerousness evaluation ordered herein be barred from use at

Defendant’s trial in this case and any other criminal trial except, if otherwise permissible, to

impeach Defendant if he were to testify at trial; and

5. Both counsel promptly provide FMC-Butner with all of Defendant’s relevant

mental healthcare records not currently in FMC-Butner’s possession, police reports, and

other documents, including the sealed Pretrial Services report, doc. 8, related solely to the

issue of dangerousness to assist FMC-Butner in conducting a dangerousness evaluation of

Defendant pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246. 

IT IS ORDERED that the portion of the Magistrate Judge’s May 30, 2013 Order

precluding a Reply (“A Reply is not permitted.”) is VACATED, nunc pro tunc, to May 30,

2013.

Dated this 27th day of June, 2013.

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