Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-10078/USCOURTS-ca9-14-10078-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Chang Ru Meng Backman
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CHANG RU MENG BACKMAN,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 14-10078

D.C. No.

1:12-cr-00015-RVM-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern Mariana Islands

Ramona V. Manglona, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

February 11, 2016—University of Hawaii Manoa,

Honolulu, Hawaii

Filed March 30, 2016

Before: Susan P. Graber, Jay S. Bybee,

and Morgan Christen, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Graber

 Case: 14-10078, 03/30/2016, ID: 9920552, DktEntry: 55-1, Page 1 of 18
2 UNITED STATES V. BACKMAN

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed a conviction and sentence for sex

trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 1591(a).

The panel held that because § 1591(a) does not require

commission of a sex act, the district court correctly did not

give an instruction requiring the jury to find that the alleged

coercion was the but-for cause of the victim’s commercial

sex acts. The panel held that the commerce element in

§ 1591(a)(1) has no mens rea requirement, and that the

district court therefore correctly did not give an instruction

requiring the jury to find that the defendant knew her actions

affected interstate or foreign commerce.

The panel held that sufficient evidence supported the

jury’s finding of an effect on interstate commerce. 

The panel held that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to admit, under

Fed. R. Evid. 412, evidence that the victims engaged in

prostitution after the indictment period, where the motion did

not specify the evidence sought to be admitted. The panel

held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in

denying the defendant an eleventh-hour opportunityto amend

the Rule 412 motion. The panel held that exclusion of the

proffered evidence was within constitutional bounds because

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

 Case: 14-10078, 03/30/2016, ID: 9920552, DktEntry: 55-1, Page 2 of 18
UNITED STATES V. BACKMAN 3

the exclusion was neither arbitrarynor disproportionate to the

purposes of the notice requirement, in that the district court

could not conduct the in camera review and hearing

mandated by Rule 412 without knowledge of the identity of

the victims and the nature of the evidence.

The panel held that the district court correctly applied a

vulnerable victim sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G.

§ 3A1.1(b)(1).

COUNSEL

David G. Banes (argued), O’Connor Berman Dotts & Banes,

Saipan, Northern Mariana Islands, for Defendant-Appellant.

Garth R. Backe (argued) and Ross K. Naughton, Assistant

United States Attorneys, Saipan, Northern Mariana Islands,

for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

GRABER, Circuit Judge:

Defendant Chang Ru Meng Backman appeals her

conviction and sentence on one count of sex trafficking by

force, fraud, or coercion, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a). 

The jury convicted Defendant of forcing into prostitution a

Chinese woman who had been tricked into flying to Saipan

on promises of a work visa and a legal job, when in fact the

victim received only a tourist visa, was effectively

imprisoned, and was told repeatedly that she had nowhere to

turn and must engage in prostitution. On appeal, Defendant

 Case: 14-10078, 03/30/2016, ID: 9920552, DktEntry: 55-1, Page 3 of 18
4 UNITED STATES V. BACKMAN

argues that, under two recent Supreme Court decisions, the

jury instructions were improper; that there was insufficient

evidence to support the conviction; that the district court

erred in denying her motion under Federal Rule of Evidence

412 to admit evidence of the victim’s sexual conduct after the

indictment period; and that the district court erred by

applying a sentencing enhancement for a “vulnerable victim”

under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1). We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000

(“TVPA”) criminalizes, among other acts, sex trafficking by

force, fraud, or coercion. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a). The 2012

version of the statute, which applies here, provides:

Whoever knowingly—

(1) in or affecting interstate or foreign

commerce, or within the special maritime and

territorial jurisdiction of the United States,

recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides,

obtains, or maintains by any means a person;

or

(2) benefits, financially or by receiving

anything of value, from participation in a

venture which has engaged in an act described

in violation of paragraph (1),

knowing, or in reckless disregard of the fact,

that means of force, threats of force, fraud,

coercion described in subsection (e)(2), or any

combination of such means will be used to

 Case: 14-10078, 03/30/2016, ID: 9920552, DktEntry: 55-1, Page 4 of 18
UNITED STATES V. BACKMAN 5

cause the person to engage in a commercial

sex act, [is guilty of a crime].

18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) (2012). At trial, the government

introduced evidence that the victim was tricked into flying

from China to Saipan on promises of a work visa and a legal

job but that, upon arrival, she was taken to Defendant’s

brothel, had her travel documents taken from her, and was

coerced into prostitution by Defendant. A jury acquitted

Defendant on two counts concerning two other alleged

victims. But the jury convicted her on the count pertaining to

the victim discussed in this opinion.

At sentencing, the district court adopted the presentence

report’s calculated Guideline range, 188 to 235 months, and

imposed a high-end sentence of 235 months’ imprisonment. 

Defendant timely appeals.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review for plain error challenges to the jury

instructions raised for the first time on appeal. United States

v. Moreland, 622 F.3d 1147, 1165–66 (9th Cir. 2010). We

review de novo the sufficiency of the evidence. United States

v. Garcia, 768 F.3d 822, 827 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied,

135 S. Ct. 1189 (2015). We review de novo the interpretation

of the Federal Rules of Evidence, but we review for abuse of

discretion the district court’s exclusion of evidence. United

States v. Torres, 794 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2015), petition

for cert. filed, ___ U.S.L.W. ___ (U.S. Oct. 27, 2015) (No.

15-6793).

“There is an intracircuit split as to whether the standard of

review for application of the Guidelines to the facts is de

 Case: 14-10078, 03/30/2016, ID: 9920552, DktEntry: 55-1, Page 5 of 18
6 UNITED STATES V. BACKMAN

novo or abuse of discretion.” United States v. Tanke,

743 F.3d 1296, 1306 (9th Cir. 2014). “There is no need to

resolve this split where, as here, the choice of the standard

does not affect the outcome of the case.” Id.

DISCUSSION

Defendant challenges (A) the jury instructions; (B) the

sufficiency of the evidence; (C) the exclusion of evidence

under Federal Rule of Evidence 412; and (D) the district

court’s application of a “vulnerable victim” sentencing

enhancement. We reject each of Defendant’s arguments.

A. Jury Instructions

Defendant argues that the jury instructions were

erroneous because (1) the instructions did not require “but-for

causation” pursuant to Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct.

881 (2014); and (2) the instructions did not require

knowledge of an effect on interstate or foreign commerce

pursuant to Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646

(2009). Because Defendant did not object to the instructions

before the district court, we review for plain error. Moreland,

622 F.3d at 1165–66. We conclude at step one of the plainerror inquiry that there was no error. Accordingly, we do not

reach the other prongs, such as whether the error was “plain.”

1. But-for Causation

In Burrage, 134 S. Ct. at 885, 892, the Supreme Court

held that a statute criminalizing drug distribution when “death

or serious bodily injury results from the use of such

substance” required proof of but-for causation. Here, the

statute requires that the defendant harbor a person (or take

 Case: 14-10078, 03/30/2016, ID: 9920552, DktEntry: 55-1, Page 6 of 18
UNITED STATES V. BACKMAN 7

another specified action) “knowing, or in reckless disregard

of the fact, that means of force, threats of force, fraud,

coercion described in subsection (e)(2), or any combination

of such means will be used to cause the person to engage in

a commercial sex act.” 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) (emphasis

added). Defendant asserts that, under the reasoning of

Burrage, the district court erred by not giving an instruction

requiring the jury to find that the alleged coercion was the

but-for cause of the victim’s commercial sex acts.

The district court did not err by declining to apply

Burrage here. Causation is not an element in a § 1591(a)

prosecution, because a commercial sex act need not even

occur: “Case law makes clear that ‘commission of a sex act

or sexual contact’ is not an element of a conviction under

18 U.S.C. § 1591.” United States v. Hornbuckle, 784 F.3d

549, 553 (9th Cir. 2015). “What the statute requires is that

the defendant know in the sense of being aware of an

established modus operandi that will in the future coerce a

prostitute to engage in prostitution.” United States v. Brooks,

610 F.3d 1186, 1197 n.4 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation

marks omitted). Because the statute does not require

commission of a sex act, the court correctly refused to require

the jury to find that Defendant caused a sex act to occur.

2. Knowledge of an Effect on Interstate Commerce

In Flores-Figueroa, 556 U.S. at 647, the Supreme Court

considered a criminal statute punishing a person who

“knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful

authority, a means of identification of another person.” 

(Emphasis omitted.) The Court held that the adverb

“knowingly” applies to “means of identification of another

person” so that a conviction requires that the defendant knew

 Case: 14-10078, 03/30/2016, ID: 9920552, DktEntry: 55-1, Page 7 of 18
8 UNITED STATES V. BACKMAN

that the identification belonged to another person. Id. at 657. 

The Court reached its conclusion primarilybecause of “strong

textual reasons”: “As a matter of ordinary English grammar,

it seems natural to read the statute’s word ‘knowingly’ as

applying to all the subsequently listed elements of the crime.” 

Id. at 650.

Here, the statute requires proof that Defendant

“knowingly—(1) in or affecting interstate or foreign

commerce, or within the special maritime and territorial

jurisdiction of the United States, recruits, entices, harbors,

transports, provides, obtains, or maintains by any means a

person.” 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) (emphasis added). Defendant

asserts that, under the reasoning of Flores-Figueroa, the

district court erred by not giving an instruction requiring the

jury to find that Defendant knew that her actions affected

interstate or foreign commerce. In essence, Defendant argues

that, for every criminal statute, the word “knowingly” must

apply to all subsequent phrases in the statutory text.

We previously have rejected that general argument. In

United States v. Stone, 706 F.3d 1145, 1146–47 (9th Cir.

2013), the defendant argued that Flores-Figueroa required

that we apply the adverb “knowingly” to the commerce

element of a firearm statute. We disagreed: “[T]he Court in

Flores-Figueroa did not announce an ‘inflexible rule of

construction.’ Rather, statutory interpretation remains a

contextual matter.” Stone, 706 F.3d at 1147 (citation

omitted). Because of the firearm statute’s context and the

fact that the interstate commerce element is purely

jurisdictional, we held that the adverb “knowingly” did not

apply to the commerce element of the firearm statute. Id.

 Case: 14-10078, 03/30/2016, ID: 9920552, DktEntry: 55-1, Page 8 of 18
UNITED STATES V. BACKMAN 9

Here, it is most natural to read the adverb “knowingly” in

§ 1591(a) to modify the verbs that follow: “recruits, entices,

harbors, transports, provides, obtains, or maintains.” The

phrase “in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce”

describes the nature or extent of those actions but,

grammatically, does not tie to “knowingly.” See United

States v. Jefferson, 791 F.3d 1013, 1017–18 (9th Cir. 2015)

(holding that Flores-Figueroa does not apply to a criminal

statute because the “statutory text and structure are not

parallel to that of” the statute analyzed by the Supreme Court

in Flores-Figueroa), petition for cert. filed, ___ U.S.L.W.

___ (U.S. Feb. 3, 2016) (No. 15-8101); United States v.

Castagana, 604 F.3d 1160, 1166 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding

that, because the grammatical structure of the criminal statute

at issue differed from the statute at issue in Flores-Figueroa,

“Flores-Figueroa is simply not a useful model for

construing” the statute at hand).

Moreover, we agree with and adopt the Seventh Circuit’s

persuasive explanation for rejecting the argument that the

reasoning of Flores-Figueroa applies specifically to the

commerce element in § 1591(a). United States v. Sawyer,

733 F.3d 228 (7th Cir. 2013). The longstanding presumption

is that the jurisdictional element of a criminal statute has no

mens rea. Id. at 229 (citing United States v. Feola, 420 U.S.

671, 676 n.9 (1975)). Nothing in the statute’s text or

legislative history suggests that Congress meant to upend that

presumption in this statute. Id. at 229–31; cf. United States

v. Maciel-Alcala, 612 F.3d 1092, 1101 (9th Cir. 2010)

(“These practical considerations [about the application of the

criminal statute at issue] are markedly different from those

 Case: 14-10078, 03/30/2016, ID: 9920552, DktEntry: 55-1, Page 9 of 18
10 UNITED STATES V. BACKMAN

involved in Flores-Figueroa.”). We hold that the commerce

element in § 1591(a)(1) has no mens rea requirement.1

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient on the

interstate or foreign commerce element. We must ask

“whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319

(1979) (emphasis omitted). Here, sufficient evidence

demonstrated an effect on both foreign and interstate

commerce. “[A]ny individual instance of conduct regulated

by the TVPA need only have a de minimis effect on interstate

commerce.” United States v. Walls, 784 F.3d 543, 548 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 226 (2015). “[A]n act or

transaction that is economic in nature and affects the flow of

money in the stream of commerce to any degree affects

interstate commerce.” Id. at 548–49 (internal quotation

marks omitted). Here, Defendant knew that the victim had

flown, in foreign commerce, from China to Saipan. Also, one

of the victim’s customers paid for the sex acts by checks

drawn on an out-of-state bank. Sufficient evidence therefore

supported the jury’s finding of an effect on interstate or

foreign commerce.

1

In addition to the Seventh Circuit, at least one other circuit has reached

the same conclusion, albeit in a pre-Flores-Figueroa case. United States

v. Evans, 476 F.3d 1176, 1180 n.2 (11th Cir. 2007). No circuit has

reached the opposite conclusion.

 Case: 14-10078, 03/30/2016, ID: 9920552, DktEntry: 55-1, Page 10 of 18
UNITED STATES V. BACKMAN 11

C. Exclusion of Evidence under Federal Rule of

Evidence 412

Defendant argues that the district court erred by denying

her motion to admit, under Federal Rule of Evidence 412,

evidence that the victims engaged in prostitution after the

indictment period. As relevant here, Rule 412 states:

(a) Prohibited Uses. The following

evidence is not admissible in a civil or

criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual

misconduct:

(1) evidence offered to prove that a victim

engaged in other sexual behavior; or

(2) evidence offered to prove a victim’s

sexual predisposition.

. . . .

(c) Procedure to Determine Admissibility.

(1) Motion. If a party intends to offer

evidence under Rule 412(b), the party

must:

(A) file a motion that specifically

describes the evidence and states the

purpose for which it is to be offered;

(B) do so at least 14 days before trial

unless the court, for good cause, sets a

different time;

 Case: 14-10078, 03/30/2016, ID: 9920552, DktEntry: 55-1, Page 11 of 18
12 UNITED STATES V. BACKMAN

. . . .

(2) Hearing. Before admitting evidence

under this rule, the court must conduct an in

camera hearing and give the victim and

parties a right to attend and be heard. Unless

the court orders otherwise, the motion, related

materials, and the record of the hearing must

be and remain sealed.

On April 10, 2013, the district court presided over a

hearing on the admissibility of certain evidence. At the end

of the hearing, the court noted that trial was set for May 20,

and the court turned to the issue of when any Rule 412

motions would be due. The court noted that, under Rule

412(c)(1)(B), the deadline is 14 days before trial “unless the

Court for cause sets a different time.” The court then

explained that, for scheduling reasons, the due date for a Rule

412 motion was set at April 29, instead of May 6. The court

gave the government until May 3 to file an opposition to any

Rule 412 motion filed by Defendant. Finally, the court

reaffirmed that a pretrial motions hearing would be held on

May 8.

Defendant filed a terse Rule 412 motion on May 3—four

days too late. The motion did not provide any details about

the proffered evidence, other than stating that Defendant

sought “to introduce evidence of the alleged victims’ sexual

conduct after the indictment period.” The motion refers to an

attached declaration of counsel. That declaration is not much

more specific, but it does note unspecified “sexual

commercial activities [that] occurred while [the victims] were

under the protection of the government.” The declaration

also states that “these sexual commercial activities also

 Case: 14-10078, 03/30/2016, ID: 9920552, DktEntry: 55-1, Page 12 of 18
UNITED STATES V. BACKMAN 13

occurred immediatelyafter [the victims] first left Defendant’s

premises on March, 2009, and as described by [a named

witness] in his deposition dated March 06, 2013.” That

nearly 100-page deposition covered many topics and spanned

a time period of many months. Significantly, the deposition

did not refer to any of the victims’ names.

As scheduled, the district court presided over the pretrial

motions hearing on May 8. In response to the court’s

questioning, Defendant’s lawyer confessed that he had

remembered the due date as May 3, not April 29. The court

imposed a fine of $100 on Defendant’s lawyer for the

untimeliness but stated that the court would not hold the

untimeliness against Defendant.

Turning to the merits of the motion, the government’s

lawyer raised the issue of specificity: “[W]e don’t have

specific evidence, Your Honor, the specifics. Whether it’s in

the form of testimony, whether it’s the form of another

witness coming forward. We have vague references to [the

named witness’] testimony but what testimony?” The court

agreed:

Rule 412 requires more details than the

allegation that there’s some other sexual

conduct[.] [E]ven in the declaration that you

submitted . . . in support of the motion and

notice is very vague. Vague as to who. We

have three victims in this case and in regards

to what particular instances we are dealing

with a period from August of 2008 to March

of 2009. So you need more particular

information even if we were to consider it.

 Case: 14-10078, 03/30/2016, ID: 9920552, DktEntry: 55-1, Page 13 of 18
14 UNITED STATES V. BACKMAN

The court held that the “Rule 412 motion has failed to

comply with Rule 412(c)(1)(A) that requires that the party

must file a motion that specifically describes the evidence.” 

Defendant’s lawyer then moved to amend the motion, which

the government lawyer “vehemently oppose[d].” The court

ruled: “I am denying the defendant’s motion for [Rule] 412

admission for any sexual conduct of the alleged victims

pursuant to Rule [412(c)] for failing to specifically describe

the evidence and your request to amend your motion because

it is untimely and given the lack of opportunity that will be

given to the Government, is denied.” The court elaborated:

A lot of the contents in your motion, as

well as the declaration, are more conclusory

and general reference. Again, we are dealing

with three victims. When we discussed the

issue of the Rule 15 deposition, I myself

pointed out the only names I heard that [the

witness] referenced were, I believe, [two

common first names] and no one ever

attached those names to any of the three

victims that were actually named in the

indictment.

So your declaration doesn’t even help me

pinpoint this information as to which victim

and how this is relevant to the case. So on the

face of your own motion and declaration, this

is far short of the notice requirement to give

the Government an opportunity to properly

respond by any particular arguments of fact or

law.

 Case: 14-10078, 03/30/2016, ID: 9920552, DktEntry: 55-1, Page 14 of 18
UNITED STATES V. BACKMAN 15

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in denying Defendant’s motions. The Rule

requires that the party “file a motion that specifically

describes the evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 412(c)(1)(A). That

requirement makes sense in light of another of the Rule’s

procedural requirements—this one imposed on the

court—that, “[b]efore admitting evidence under this rule, the

court must conduct an in camera hearing and give the victim

and parties a right to attend and be heard.” Fed. R. Evid.

412(c)(2). Because Defendant’s Rule 412 motion specified

neither the precise evidence sought to be admitted nor the

particular victims at issue, the court was unable to comply

with the Rule’s procedural requirements. Given all the

circumstances, including that trial was scheduled for less than

two weeks from the date of the hearing and that consideration

of an amended motion would require a response from the

government and an additional hearing involving the parties

and the victims, it was not an abuse of discretion to deny

Defendant an eleventh-hour opportunity to amend the Rule

412 motion.

We also conclude that the exclusion of the proffered

evidence was within constitutional bounds, because the

exclusion was “neither arbitrary nor disproportionate to the

purposes of the notice requirement.” LaJoie v. Thompson,

217 F.3d 663, 670 (9th Cir. 2000). As just noted, the district

court did not deny the motion on timeliness grounds (even

though the motion was late); instead, the court denied the

motion because it was vague as to the precise nature of the

evidence and because it failed to identify the victims. 

Without knowledge of the identity of the victims and the

nature of the evidence, the court could not conduct the in

camera review and hearing mandated by the Rule.

 Case: 14-10078, 03/30/2016, ID: 9920552, DktEntry: 55-1, Page 15 of 18
16 UNITED STATES V. BACKMAN

Moreover, this case is unlike LaJoie in an important

respect. There, the government “conceded that [the

proffered] evidence was relevant.” Id. at 671. Here, by

contrast, to the extent that we can discern the nature of

Defendant’s proffered evidence, its relevance, if any, is slight. 

We doubt that evidence that the victim engaged in

commercial sex acts after she had been coerced into

prostitution has a bearing on whether Defendant earlier took

coercive actions. But, even assuming some relevance, the

court’s exclusion of the vaguely and insufficiently described

evidence was neither arbitrary nor disproportionate to the

purposes behind Rule 412's procedural requirements.

D. “Vulnerable Victim” Enhancement

The district court imposed a two-level sentencing

enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1): “If the

defendant knew or should have known that a victim of the

offense was a vulnerable victim, increase by 2 levels.” The

district court found that the victim qualified as a vulnerable

victim for many reasons: She was tricked into arriving on the

false promise of a work visa, when all she actually had was

a tourist visa that prevented her from working legally; she

“had no ties or family or friends on Saipan”; she “did not

speak or read or understand any English whatsoever”; she

needed to earn money for “her son, due to an injury he

sustained”; “she was effectively under lock and key, in that

she was limited in her movement, when and where she could

go [and she] was always accompanied by [Defendant] or her

agent”; and “she was repeatedly informed of the fact that she

had nowhere else to turn to, and that if she did not comply,

she would not be able to earn any other income, because of

her illegal Immigration status.” See United States v. Peters,

962 F.2d 1410, 1417 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that, in

 Case: 14-10078, 03/30/2016, ID: 9920552, DktEntry: 55-1, Page 16 of 18
UNITED STATES V. BACKMAN 17

determining vulnerability under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1, the

sentencing court may consider “the characteristics of the

defendant’s chosen victim, the victim’s reaction to the

criminal conduct, and the circumstances surrounding the

criminal act”).

The Guideline “applies to offenses involving an unusually

vulnerable victim in which the defendant knows or should

have known of the victim’s unusual vulnerability.” U.S.S.G.

§ 3A1.1 cmt. n.2. Vulnerability is not measured against the

general population. United States v. Castellanos, 81 F.3d

108, 110 (9th Cir. 1996). Instead, an “unusually vulnerable

victim is one who is less able to resist than the typical victim

of the offense of conviction.” United States v. Castaneda,

239 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

Here, the offense of conviction is “[s]ex trafficking . . . by

force, fraud, or coercion,” and the statute is part of the

Trafficking Victims Protection Act. Defendant correctly

points out that, in Castaneda, 239 F.3d at 982–83, we held

that victims of a Mann Act sex-trafficking crime were not

unusuallyvulnerable because “indebtedness, low income, and

lack of financial resources or other options that would permit

[the victims] to support themselves or pay for their passage

back to the Phillippines if they left the club” do not

“distinguish them from the typical victims of a Mann Act

violator.” We also acknowledge that, in enacting the TVPA,

Congress recognized that victims ofsex traffickingoften have

some of the same vulnerabilities that the district court found

here. 22 U.S.C. § 7101. We nevertheless conclude that the

vulnerability enhancement was proper—both because of the

high number of vulnerabilities and the depth of the individual

vulnerabilities. For example, the victim was not only

 Case: 14-10078, 03/30/2016, ID: 9920552, DktEntry: 55-1, Page 17 of 18
18 UNITED STATES V. BACKMAN

estranged from her home community, she had no ties at all on

the geographically remote island of Saipan. Similarly, she

did not merely have poor English skills; she “did not speak or

read or understand any English whatsoever,” and she was

illiterate in her native language as well. (Emphasis added.) 

And she had more than typical indebtedness because of her

injured son. Viewing all the circumstances, the district court

correctly applied the vulnerability enhancement.

AFFIRMED.

 Case: 14-10078, 03/30/2016, ID: 9920552, DktEntry: 55-1, Page 18 of 18