Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-00826/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-00826-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Fresno
Defendant
Barry Stuart Halajian
Plaintiff
Kelly Yost
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BARRY STUART HALAJIAN,

Plaintiff,

vs.

KELLY YOST, in his Official and Private 

Capacity, the CITY OF FRESNO, A 

Municipal Corporation, DOES 1-20 inclusive,

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

Case No.: 1:24-cv-00826-JLT-SKO

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

THAT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 

DISMISS BE GRANTED

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

THAT PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO FILE 

AN UNTIMELY FILING BE GRANTED

(Doc. 5, 14)

OBJECTIONS DUE: 21 DAYS 

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Barry Halajian, proceeding pro se, initiated this action against Kelly Yost and the 

City of Fresno (the “City”) (collectively, “Defendants”) by filing a complaint on February 21, 

2024. (Doc. 1). Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 5) on July 15, 2024. 

Defendants filed a reply (Doc. 13) on August 5, 2024, highlighting that Plaintiff had not yet filed 

his opposition. Plaintiff filed his opposition on (Doc. 15) and a Notice and Motion for an 

Extension of Time to File an Opposition (Doc. 14) on August 22, 2024. The motion was referred 

to the undersigned for the preparation of findings and recommendations. (See Docs. 6, 12). For 

the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 

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(Doc. 11) be granted.

II. MOTION TO FILE A LATE OPPOSITION

As Defendants note, Plaintiff filed his opposition 24 days late. Under Local Rule 230(c), 

the Court may treat a late filing as a non-opposition. In Plaintiff’s motion to file a late opposition, 

he states that “I ask the court for an extension of time to file a reply brief to the Defendant’s 

motion to dismiss. I have been working out of town and have not had time to respond to the civil 

complaint because of out-of-town commitments. It also took about a week to receive this motion 

because of late mail delivery.” (Doc. 14 at 2). 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(1)(B), a court may extend the time for a party 

to file a motion after the time to do so has expired if the party failed to act because of “excusable 

neglect.” In assessing “excusable neglect,” courts consider four factors: “(1) the danger of 

prejudice to the non-moving party, (2) the length of delay and its potential impact on judicial 

proceedings, (3) the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control 

of the movant, and (4) whether the moving party's conduct was in good faith.” Pincay v. 

Andrews, 389 F.3d 853, 855 (9th Cir. 2004). While there is a risk Defendants will be prejudiced, 

they did not oppose Plaintiff’s motion for an extension. (See Docket). The remaining factors 

weigh in Plaintiff’s favor. Ultimately, the delay did not affect judicial proceedings, and Plaintiff 

acted in good faith. Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the undersigned recommends granting

Plaintiff’s Motion for an Extension of Time to File an Opposition (Doc. 14). Plaintiff is 

cautioned, however, failing to comply with court-imposed deadlines in the future may result in 

sanctions, including the striking of an untimely filing. 

III. REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Defendants request the Court take judicial notice of the following documents:

(1) Sections 400 and 500 of the Fresno City Charter;

(2) California Contractor’s State License Board Detail for License #417084;

(3) a Fresno County Fictitious Business Name (FBN) look-up for Industrial Electric 

Company;

(4) Excerpts of City of Fresno's Project Specifications for Project I.D. #WC00020;

(5) Excerpts of City of Fresno Standard Specifications dated February 2016;

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(6) The Final Notice of Completion for Project I.D. #SWC00020, recorded by Clerk 

of the City of Fresno;

(7) California Civil Code Sections 9350-9510;

(8) California Public Contract Code Sections 7100, 7102, 7107, 7200-7202;

(9) Legislative detail of City Council, dated February 4, 2021;

(10) Fresno’s City Resolution No. 2003-129, dated April 29, 2003; and

(11) California Public Contract Code Section 10226,

(Doc. 5-2).

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201, a court may properly take judicial notice of 

matters in the public record. See Marder v. Lopez, 450 F.3d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 2006). A court 

may take judicial notice of a public record not for the truth of the facts recited in the document, 

but for the existence of the matters therein that cannot reasonably be questioned. See Fed. R. 

Evid. 201. A court may also judicially notice a fact that is “not subject to reasonable dispute,” or 

a fact that is “generally known,” or “can be accurately and readily determined from sources 

whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(1)–(2). (“[A] court 

cannot take judicial notice of disputed facts contained in [judicially noticeable] public records.”) 

(citation omitted). 

Because the documents the Defendants request to be judicially noticed are either 

government-issued or matters of public record, the undersigned recommends granting 

Defendants’ request to take judicial notice of the documents, although the Court will not take 

notice of disputed facts therein. See, e.g., Gaetz v. City of Riverside, 5:23-cv-01368-HDV 

(SHKx), 2024 WL 1269311, at *10 (C.D. Cal. March 22, 2024) (taking judicial notice of a city’s 

charter); Love v. Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc., No. 20-CV-07523-CRB, 2021 WL 1176674, 

at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2021) (taking judicial notice of public website and documents 

maintained by government agencies); Diamond S.J. Enterp., Inc. v. City of San Jose, 395 F. Supp. 

3d 1202, 1217–18 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (finding the Court would take judicial notice of city and 

county decisions because “[p]ublic records, including judgments and other publicly filed 

documents, are proper subjects of judicial notice”) (citing United States v. Black, 482 F.3d 1035, 

1041 (9th Cir. 2007)); Soublet v. County of Alameda, No. 18-cv-03738, 2019 WL 12517063, at 

*16 n.8 (finding county code section proper subject of judicial notice) (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2019) 

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(citing City of Sausalito v. O'Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1224 n.2 (9th Cir. 2004)); 

IV. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In considering Defendants’ Motion, the Court accepts as true all factual allegations 

contained in the FAC. See, e.g., Rotkiske v. Klemm, 140 S. Ct. 355, 359 n.1 (2019) (citing 

Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 n.1 (2002)).

The City awarded a public contract to Dovali Construction, Inc. (“Dovali”) in February 

2021 to construct site improvements at two municipal city wells (Pump Stations 117 and 284) 

that provide potable water to the city. (Doc. 1 at 3; Doc. 5-2 at 180-81). The project included 

various specifications set by the City. Relevant to this case are two provisions related to the 

projection’s completion and a specification for an extension of time/liquidated damages: 

COMPLETION

When Contractor considers the Work ready for its intended use, the Contractor 

shall notify the City in writing that the Work is substantially complete. The 

Contractor shall attach to this request a list of all work items that remain to be 

completed and a request that the City prepare a Certificate of Substantial 

Completion. Within a reasonable time thereafter, the City and Contractor shall 

inspect the Work to determine the status of completion and to the extent that City 

agrees the Project is substantially complete. If the City does not consider the Work 

substantially complete, the City will notify Contractor in writing of the reasons 

therefore and Contractor shall promptly correct all items identified by the City . . . 

. The City shall record the Notice of Completion when the entire Work including, 

but not limited to Contractor's closeout document obligations are fully satisfied, 

Contractor's punch list( s) and work shall have been completed to the satisfaction 

of the City ....

EXTENSION OF TIME - - LIQUIDATED DAMAGES

The Contractor and City hereby agree that the exact amount of damages for failure 

to complete the work within the time specified is extremely difficult or impossible 

to determine. Contractor shall be assessed the sum as set forth in the Contract, as 

liquidated damages for each and every day the work required under the Contract 

Documents remains unfinished past the time for completion, as set forth in the 

Contract Documents, and any extensions of time granted by the City to the 

Contractor under the terms of the Contract Documents. The Contractor will pay to 

the City or City may retain from amounts otherwise payable to the Contractor, said 

amount for each day after failure to meet the requirements of the contract 

completion as scheduled in the Contract. For purposes of this item, section Work 

shall be considered complete in accordance with the provisions of the foregoing 

section entitled "COMPLETION" and issuance of a Certificate of Substantial 

Completion.

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Contractor shall not be charged for liquidated damages, as set forth above, 

because of any delays in completion of Work which are not the fault or negligence 

of Contractor, or its subcontractors, or persons or entitles for which it is 

responsible, including, but not restricted to acts of God, as set forth herein.

(Doc. 5-2 at 74) (emphasis added). The project specifications allotted 150 days to complete the 

project and set forth a liquidated damages provision that required Dovali to pay $500 per day for 

each calendar day of delay in completing the project. (Doc. 5-2 at 31). 

Dovali could subcontract work required for the project, but it was solely responsible to 

pay its subcontractors, and the project specifications required that Dovali do so promptly. (Doc. 

5-2 at 97, 98). Plaintiff entered a contract with Dovali to provide electrical construction materials 

and services for the project. (Doc. 1 at 3-6). The City gave Dovali the Notice to Proceed in May 

2021. (Doc. 1 at 17). 

Plaintiff faced several unanticipated delays during the project, as obtaining electrical 

equipment was complicated by the COVID-19 pandemic. (Doc. 1 at 6). The City submitted a 

request to the state’s Water Resource Control Board for additional funding to cover the rising 

material costs during that time. (Doc. 1 at 50). Plaintiff completed its portion of the project on 

February 15, 2024. (Doc. 1 at 5). Dovali sent the City a Notice of Completion on February 20, 

2024. (Doc. 5-2 at 110). 

Plaintiff alleges various injuries that generally related to his allegation that Defendants 

“refus[ed] to issue and with[held] payment due for labor, the furnishing of electrical construction 

materials and other related items.” (Doc. 1 at 3). Plaintiff alleges he is owed $200,000 based on 

the services he provided under the contract. (Doc. 1 at 43). Plaintiff also alleges “Plaintiff has 

been denied normal progress payments for labor and materials and profit that is usually made in 

installments.” (Doc. 1 at 14). Because Plaintiff has not been paid what he alleges he is owed, he 

has been unable to pay some of his employees, who have left his company. (Doc. 1 at 21). 

Plaintiff does not allege he entered a contract with Defendants. He seeks injunctive relief, 

“compelling the Defendants to pay the full amount of the money with interest owed for the 

services Plaintiff and Dovali provided without deductions of monetary sanctions that were 

imposed unlawfully because of the several delays that were outside of Plaintiff and Dovali’s 

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direct control.” (Doc. 1 at 35). Plaintiff also requests the Court to order Defendants to pay 

Dovali portions of the grants specifically designated for cost increases. (Doc. 1 at 35-36). 

V. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted “tests the legal sufficiency of a claim,” and dismissal is “proper if 

there is a ‘lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a 

cognizable legal theory.’” Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1241–42 (9th Cir. 

2011). “To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff’s complaint ‘must contain sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”’” Boquist v. 

Courtney, 32 F.4th 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2022) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); 

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

“At this stage, the Court must take all well-pleaded allegations of material fact as true and 

construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Great Minds v. Office Depot, 

Inc., 945 F.3d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 2019). “[D]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible 

claim is context specific, requiring the reviewing court to draw on its experience and common 

sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663–64. “‘[I]n practice, a complaint . . . must contain either direct or 

inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under 

some viable legal theory.’” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562.

In resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court's review is generally limited to the 

“allegations contained in the pleadings, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters properly 

subject to judicial notice.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1030–31 

(9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[C]onclusory allegations of law and 

unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” 

Caviness v. Horizon Cmty. Learning Ctr., Inc., 590 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 2010).

To the extent the pleadings can be cured by the allegation of additional facts, the plaintiff 

should be afforded leave to amend. Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv. Inc.,

911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990); Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 977 (9th Cir. 2013). 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) advises that “[t]he court should freely give leave when 

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justice so requires.” “This policy is ‘to be applied with extreme liberality.’” Eminence Capital, 

LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003).

The Court, on its own motion, “may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any 

redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). “Immaterial 

matter is that which has no essential or important relationship to the claim for relief or the 

defenses being pleaded.” Bradley-Aboyade v. Crozier, No. 2:19-cv-01098-TLN-AC, 2021 WL 

3472238, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2021) (quoting Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 

(9th Cir. 1993), rev’d on other grounds, 510 U.S. 517 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

“Impertinent matter consists of statements that do not pertain, and are not necessary, to the issues 

in question.” Id.

When dismissing a complaint, the Ninth Circuit has stated that “leave to amend should be 

granted unless the district court ‘determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the 

allegation of other facts.’” Bly–Magee v. Cal., 236 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001). Where the 

Court has already granted a plaintiff leave to amend a complaint, however, the Court's discretion 

to decide whether to allow additional opportunities to amend is “particularly broad.” Miller v. 

Yokohama Tire Corp., 358 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 2004); accord Sateriale v. R.J. Reynolds 

Tobacco Co., 697 F.3d 777, 794 (9th Cir. 2012). In general, a pro se litigant will be granted an 

opportunity to amend deficient pleadings ordinarily. Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 908 (9th 

Cir. 2014). However, the Court may dismiss a complaint without leave to amend where its 

deficiencies will not be cured by an amendment. See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 

(9th Cir. 1995); see also Hartmann v. CDCR, 707 F.3d 1114, 1130 (9th Cir. 2013). 

VI. DISCUSSION

Much of Plaintiff’s complaint centers around the contractual relationship between Dovali 

and the Defendants, but he does not appear to allege a breach of contract claim on Dovali’s 

behalf. (Doc. 15 at 23) (“DOVALI has been pursuing an administrative process, mediation for 

months with attorney's fees of over $40,000.00 with no results or resolution. This is patently not 

fair. We all worked hard, did a great job that the COF has accepted. Why should my customer, 

DOVALI have to be blead to death financially spending money on high priced attorneys just to 

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get the money that we are all duly owed.”). For example, Plaintiff contends that many of the 

project delays resulted from the City’s management, which prevents Defendants from enforcing 

the liquidated damages provision in its contract with Dovali. (Doc. 1 at 8) (“Furthermore, the 

Defendants, YOST and his department, caused most if not all of the many project delays 

themselves due to poor management on their part. Even if the electrical equipment had arrived 

without delay, the COF mismanagement would have still been the cause of the delays in 

completing the project at hand.”); Doc. 1 at 11) (“Dovali has never received any reimbursement 

from the COF for these submitted cost over runs.”). 

Plaintiff, however, may only assert his own rights, and not the rights of others. See

Brumfield v. Dep’t of Veteran Affairs, No. 14–cv–04647–JSC, 2015 WL 294380, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 

Jan. 22, 2015). He cannot sue “to rectify wrongs done to others,” including friends and family. 

Id. Pro se litigants may not “pursu[e] claims on behalf of others in a representative capacity.” 

Simon v. Hartford Life and Accident Ins. Co., 546 F.3d 661, 664 (9th Cir. 2008). Plaintiff 

repeatedly alleges he is the relevant party in interest, as “it is the money that I am owed by the 

Defendants for services rendered by me that is the property in question: Since it was the plaintiffs 

interest in the property which was injured by the defendant's unlawful actions to violate my rights 

to due process and other rights complained of here, I am the owner of the cause of action and I am 

entitled to maintain the present action.” (Doc. 15 at 13). Plaintiff, however, has not demonstrated 

that he had a contract with Defendants, nor has he alleged how he and Dovali were in privity with 

one another. Accordingly, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to vindicate Dovali’s rights, Plaintiff 

is without standing to sue Defendants for breach of contract claim on Dovali’s behalf. See, e.g., 

Sehulster Tunnels/Pre-Con v. Traylor Brothers, Inc./ Obayashi Corp., 111 Cal.App.4th 1328, 

1348 (2003) (“Under the circumstances presented here, there is no contract between City and 

subcontractor Sehulster, and Sehulster cannot sue City directly because there is no privity of 

contract between them.”); Howard Contracting v. G.A. MacDonald Construction Co., 71 

Cal.App.4th 38, 60 (Cal. App. Dec. 21, 1998) (“When a public agency breaches a construction 

contract with a contractor, damage often ensues to a subcontractor. In such a situation, the 

subcontractor may not have legal standing to assert a claim directly against the public agency due 

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to a lack of privity of contract, but may assert a claim against the general contractor . . . As a 

subcontractor, [Plaintiff] had no standing to sue the City directly, particularly on a breach of 

contract theory, because [Plaintiff] and the City were not in privity of contract.”)

Setting those allegations aside and construing the complaint liberally, the Court interprets 

Plaintiff’s complaint to allege the following claims: (1) a violation of the Equal Protection 

Clause; (2) a violation of Plaintiff’s substantive and procedural due process rights under the 

Fourteenth Amendment; (3) a violation of the Fourth Amendment; (4) a violation of the Bill of 

Attainder Clause; (5) a violation of the Contract Clause; (6) Negligent Interference with 

Prospective Economic Advantage; and (7) Intentional Infliction of Emotion Distress. (See Doc. 

1). Plaintiff’s first five claims are pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A. Constitutional Claims Under § 1983

1. Plaintiff Has Not Sufficiently Alleged Monell Liability

Defendants contend the Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s claims based on the U.S. 

Constitution because Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege liability under § 1983. “[A] litigant 

complaining of a violation of a constitutional right must utilize 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Azul-Pacifico, 

Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 973 F.2d 704, 705 (9th Cir. 1992). Municipalities, like the City, are 

answerable only for their own decisions and policies, and they are not vicariously liable for the 

constitutional torts of their agents. Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). 

To establish liability under Monell, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) that he [or she] possessed a 

constitutional right of which he was deprived; (2) that the [local governmental entity] had a 

policy; (3) that this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional right; 

and (4) that the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation.” Oviatt v. Pearce, 

954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A

municipality can be held liable under section 1983 for constitutional injuries pursuant to: “(1) an 

official policy; (2) a pervasive practice or custom; (3) a failure to train, supervise, or discipline; or 

(4) a decision or act by a final policymaker.” Horton v. City of Santa Maria, 915 F.3d 592, 602-

03 (9th Cir. 2019). “Whether a particular official has final policy-making authority is a question 

of state law.” Jessen v. Cnty. of Fresno, 808 F. App'x 432, 435 (9th Cir. 2020). 

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Plaintiff has failed to allege that Defendants had a policy; that this policy amounts to 

deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional right; and that the policy is the moving 

force behind the constitutional violation, as required to establish Monell liability for any of 

Plaintiff’s constitutional claims. Oviatt, 954 F.2d at 1474. At most, Plaintiff alleges “[t]he [City] 

has established a ‘pattern and practice’ of conducting their business affairs in unethical manners 

by taking advantage of contractors and vendors who get involved with the [City] unaware of how 

this City . . . operate[s].” (Doc. 1 at 28). These facts do not identify any specific policy by the 

Defendants, let alone how that policy is the “moving force” behind a constitutional violation. It is 

not clear how “taking advantage of contractors” amounts to a constitutional violation. Plaintiff 

may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, and the complaint “must contain 

sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to 

defend itself effectively.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). The allegations 

must also plausibly suggest Plaintiff is entitled to relief “such that it is not unfair to require the 

opposing party to be subjected to the expense of discovery and continued litigation.” Id. 

Plaintiff's conclusory allegations do not establish that the practices were widespread and so well 

settled as to constitute a custom or usage, nor has he connected any policy to a specific 

constitutional injury. See infra. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends dismissing Plaintiff’s 

claims under § 1983. 

Because Plaintiff also fails to state constitutional violations (in addition to failing to allege 

Monell liability for those violations) the undersigned will address them briefly below.

2. Plaintiff Has Not Alleged a Violation of the Equal Protection Clause

Plaintiff alleges he is “being discriminated against as someone who operates an Electrical 

Contracting business in Fresno and was unfortunate to be under contracted that is associated with 

[the City].” (Doc. 1 at 13). Plaintiff contends he is “being treated differently than other 

contractors who are similarly situated in other counties and cities.” (Doc. 1 at 15).

“The Equal Protection Clause [of the Fourteenth Amendment] requires the State to treat 

all similarly situated people equally.” Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 891 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(citation omitted). To state an equal protection claim under section 1983, “a plaintiff must show 

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that the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon 

membership in a protected class.” Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) 

(citations omitted). “Intentional discrimination means that a defendant acted at least in part 

because of a plaintiff's protected status.” Maynard v. City of San Jose, 37 F.3d 1396, 1404 (9th 

Cir. 1994) (emphasis removed) (citation omitted). Plaintiff must allege facts to support a finding 

of discriminatory intent because of the plaintiff's membership in a suspect class, such as race. 

Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir. 2005). Even construing the 

complaint liberally, Plaintiff has failed to allege he is a member of a protected class and that the 

Defendant acted with the intent of discriminating against Plaintiff for his membership in that 

protected class. “[N]aked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action” do not state a claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-57 (2007). 

Without more, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause.

3. Plaintiff Has Not Alleged a Violation of the Due Process Clause

Plaintiff alleges that “[w]ithout a court order or a warrant to seize personal property, the 

Defendants cannot seize and withhold personal property, such as money due from a construction 

contract. It is a violation of the COF’s own contract with Dovali and the Plaintiff’s due process 

rights.” (Doc. 1 at 8). Plaintiff also alleges “[h]olding back money that is due and owing without 

a court order is an unlawful act that is done without judicial due process along with making false 

claims that Plaintiff has not delivered on time when the supply chain issues which are out of 

anyone's control have caused the delays.” (Doc. 1 at 8). Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants

have “side-stepped the clearly stated procedural requirements under the U.S. Constitution,” as 

Plaintiffs allege the Defendants’ decision to impose penalties was an “arbitrary and capricious act 

with no legitimate government purpose other than to save money.” (Doc. 1 at 27). 

The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects against the deprivation of 

liberty or property by the government without due process. Portman v. County of Santa Clara, 

995 F.2d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 1993). “Claims under the Due Process Clause may be either 

procedural or substantive in nature.” Alexander v. County of San Mateo, No. 20-cv-05179-RS, 

2020 WL 6577499, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2020). “A section 1983 claim based upon procedural 

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due process . . . has three elements: (1) a liberty or property interest protected by the 

Constitution; (2) a deprivation of the interest by the government; (3) lack of process.” Portman v. 

County of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 1993). Substantive due process claims center 

on whether an interest may be infringed upon at all. Witt v. Dep't of Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 817 

(9th Cir. 2008). “These two types of claims share a threshold requirement: ‘the plaintiff's 

showing of a liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution.’” Alexander, 2020 WL 

6577499, at *2 (quoting Engquist v. Oregon Dep't of Agr., 478 F.3d 985, 996 (9th Cir. 2007), 

aff'd, 553 U.S. 591 (2008). A person has a protected property interest in a benefit only if they 

“have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” City of Castle Rock v. Gomez, 545 U.S. 748, 756 

(2005). 

Both of Plaintiff’s Due Process Clause claims fail because he has failed to identify a 

liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution. Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated 

Plaintiff’s procedural and substantive due process rights by enforcing the liquidated damages 

provision of the project specifications, which totaled more than $200,000. (Doc. 1 at 28). 

Plaintiff has not demonstrated, however, that Defendants levied these charges against Plaintiff. 

Instead, Plaintiff’s exhibits showed that the City charged Dovali for more than $207,000 in 

liquidated damages. (Doc. 1 at 92-93). Plaintiff has not established how it had a protected 

property interest in Dovali receiving payments from the City. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not 

sufficiently alleged a claim under the Due Process Clause. Engquist, 478 F.3d at 996

4. Plaintiff Has Not Alleged a Violation of the Fourth Amendment

Plaintiff alleges “[t]he withholding of the full amounts of payments is an administrative 

act without a court order, which seizes Plaintiff’s property, the payment of money owed without a 

warrant or any judicial process, is a breach of the COF’s own contract with Dovali and also 

violates the Fourth Amendment.” (Doc. 1 at 4). Plaintiff also seeks “injunctive relief for the 

threat of the violation of the Fourth Amendment.” (Doc. 1 at 34).

The Fourth Amendment provides that the right of the people to be secure in their persons, 

houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. 

U.S. Const. amend. IV. To establish a viable Fourth Amendment claim, a plaintiff must show not 

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only that there was a search and seizure as contemplated by the Fourth Amendment, but also that 

said search and seizure was unreasonable and conducted without consent. See Rakas v. Illinois, 

439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978); United States v. Rubio, 727 F.2d 786, 796–97 (9th Cir. 1983).

Plaintiff has not alleged that he or his property was seized so as to implicate the Fourth 

Amendment. Again, Plaintiff has not established there was any contract between Plaintiff and 

Defendant. Plaintiff instead alleges that Defendants withheld payment to Dovali, who in turn, 

withheld payment from Plaintiff. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for violation of 

the Fourth Amendment.

5. Plaintiff Has Not Alleged a Violation of the Bill of Attainder

Plaintiff alleges “[t]he Defendants took on the role of a Judicial Branch of government

when issuing fines for late delivery of the service panel when this was prohibited under Article 

One, Section Ten, which prohibits a Bill Of Attainder. The above-named Tort-feasor, YOST 

claimed Plaintiff and Dovali is not allowed to receive payment for services and hundreds of 

thousands of dollars expended for labor and materials. This constitutes theft of personal property 

and is a bill of attainder.” (Doc. 1 at 14). Plaintiff repeatedly asserts that Defendants functioned 

“in a judicial capacity,” though it is unclear what this means. 

Under the Constitution, Congress shall pass “[n]o Bill of Attainder.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 

9, cl. 3. “A bill of attainder is ‘a law that legislatively determines guilt and inflicts punishment 

upon an identifiable individual without provision of the protections of a judicial trial.’” SeaRiver 

Maritime Financial Holdings, Inc. v. Mineta, 309 F.3d 662, 668 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Nixon v. 

Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 468, (1977)). “Three key features brand a statute a bill of 

attainder: that the statute (1) specifies the affected persons, and (2) inflicts punishment (3) without 

a judicial trial.” Mineta, 309 F.3d at 668 (footnote omitted) (citing Selective Serv. Sys. v. 

Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 847 (1984)). Plaintiff has failed to 

identify a statute that amounts to a bill of attainder. Without a “bill,” Plaintiff cannot allege his 

rights were violated by a bill of attainder. See Mineta, 309 F.3d at 668.

6. Plaintiff Has Not Alleged a Violation of the Contracts Clause

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants breached their contract by compelling Plaintiff, without 

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compensation, to expand the scope of the project. (Doc. 1 at 24). Plaintiff contends this amounts 

to a seizure of property, which then violates the Contract Clause. (Id.). Plaintiff contends 

Defendants violated the Contract Clause by “failing to honor and uphold the construction contract 

under which dictates Plaintiff must be paid for products and services, including but not limited to 

all the labor, material and profit Plaintiff is entitled to.” (Doc. 1 at 38).

The Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution prevents states from passing laws that impair 

contractual obligations. U.S. Const. Art. 1 § 10. “It regulates the legislative power of states, not 

the acts or decisions of state officers or individuals.” Hill v. Newsom, No. 2:19-cv-1680 DAD 

AC P, 2022 WL 16722216, at *4 (Nov. 4, 2022). Plaintiff has not alleged the state legislature has 

impaired his contract with another party (nor has Plaintiff alleged he has a contract with 

Defendant). Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to allege a claim under the Contracts Clause. U.S. 

Const. Art. 1 § 10.

B. State Law Claims

Plaintiffs allege two claims under state law: negligent interference with a prospective 

economic advantage and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendants cntend that 

“Plaintiffs cause of action [under state law] . . . attempts to assert a tort claim against the City of 

Fresno under state common law. In doing so, he ignores that a tort theory cannot be asserted 

against the City of Fresno except as otherwise provided by statute. No statute has been provided 

by Plaintiff.” (Doc. 5-1 at 26).1 

Under the California Government Claims Act, “a public entity is not liable for injury 

arising from an act or omission except as provided by statute.” Hoff v. Vacaville Unified Sch. 

Dist., 19 Cal. 4th 925, 932 (1998); Cal. Gov. Code, § 815, subd. (a). Accordingly, in California, 

“all government tort liability must be based on statute.” Id.; Churchman v. Bay Area Rapid 

Transit Dist., 39 Cal. App. 5th 246, 250 (2019). Plaintiffs are required to plead the statutory basis 

1 Defendants allege Plaintiff has failed to comply with the statutory requirements of the California Tort Claims Act, 

California Government Code § 810 et seq. Plaintiff alleges he “has exhausted his administrative remedies by the way 

of mailing Notice and Opportunity to YOST via Registered Mail more than once.” (Doc. 1 at 16). The Court will 

assume without deciding that Plaintiff has sufficiently presented his claim to the responsible public entity as required 

by California law.

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for a claim against a government entity or employee. Morse v. Cty. of Merced, 2016 WL 

3254034, at *6 (E.D. Cal. June 13, 2016) (citing Susman v. City of Los Angeles, 269 Cal. App. 2d 

803, 808–09 (1969)); see also Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Dist., 40 Cal. 3d 780, 795 (1985). 

“Since the duty of a governmental agency can only be created by statute or ‘enactment,’ the 

statute or ‘enactment’ claimed to establish the duty must at the very least be identified.” Searcy, 

177 Cal. App. 3d at 802. Plaintiff has not identified a statutory basis for liability. Without as 

much, Plaintiff’s state law claims must be dismissed. Fisher v. Army National Guard, 2021 WL 

5989798, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2021) (“Plaintiff's Second, Third, and Fourth Causes of Action 

are not pleaded with particularity and fail to adequately identify a specific statutory basis for 

direct liability. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the Second, Third, and Fourth 

Causes of Action be dismissed.”); Barone v. Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, 2024 WL 

3001397, at *11 (C.D. Cal. March 29, 2024) (dismissing a claim where Plaintiff did not allege a 

statutory basis for the claim).

VII. LEAVE TO AMEND

When dismissing a complaint, the Ninth Circuit has stated that “leave to amend should be 

granted unless the district court ‘determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the 

allegation of other facts.’” Bly–Magee v. Cal., 236 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001). Where the 

Court has already granted a plaintiff leave to amend a complaint, however, the Court's discretion 

to decide whether to allow additional opportunities to amend is “particularly broad.” Miller v. 

Yokohama Tire Corp., 358 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 2004); accord Sateriale v. R.J. Reynolds 

Tobacco Co., 697 F.3d 777, 794 (9th Cir. 2012). In general, a pro se litigant will be granted an 

opportunity to amend deficient pleadings ordinarily. Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 908 (9th 

Cir. 2014). However, the Court may dismiss a complaint without leave to amend where its 

deficiencies will not be cured by an amendment. See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 

(9th Cir. 1995); see also Hartmann v. CDCR, 707 F.3d 1114, 1130 (9th Cir. 2013). Because the 

Court cannot determine that Plaintiff's complaint could not possibly be cured by alleging other 

facts, the Court recommends granting Plaintiff leave to amend.

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VIII. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends the following:

(1) Defendants’ Motion and Request for Leave to File a Late Opposition (Doc. 14) be 

GRANTED;

(2) Defendants’ request for judicial notice (Doc. 5-2) be GRANTED; and

(3) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED with leave to amend.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the district judge assigned to this 

action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and this Court's Local Rule 304. Within twenty-one

(21) days of service of this recommendation, any party may file written objections to these 

findings and recommendation with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document 

should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendation.” The 

district judge will review the magistrate judge's findings and recommendation pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified 

time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th 

Cir. 2014).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 14, 2024 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto .

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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