Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-01086/USCOURTS-ca10-89-01086-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Duvalier Antonio Davis
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FI LED 

United Stat~s Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circnir 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 16 1990 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

DUVALIER ANTONIO DAVIS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

TENTH CIH.CUIT 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

ROBERT L. I-IOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 89-1086 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COORT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(NO. 88-CH.-322) 

William D. Welch, Assistant United States 

Norton, United States Attorney and Kathryn 

States Attorney, with him on the brief), 

Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Attorney (Michael J. 

Meyer, Assistant United 

Denver, Colorado, for 

Philip A. Cherner of Stayton & Brennan, D~nver, Colorado, for 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Before McKAY, ANDERSON, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

Duvalier Antonio Davis appeals the judgment and sentence 

entered. against him following his plea of guilty to possession 

with intent to distribute a schedule II controlled substance; 

crack cocaine, in violation of 21 u.s.c. §§ 84l(a)(l) and 

(b)(l)(A). Vol. I tab 28. On appeal, Davis argues: ( 1) the 

trial court abused its discretion in refusing to permit a 

conditional plea; (2) the trial court erred in denying the 

Appellate Case: 89-1086 Document: 01019583463 Date Filed: 04/16/1990 Page: 1 
defendant's motion to suppress evidence; and (3) the trial court 

abused its discretion by refusing to depart from .the sentencing 

guidelines. Appellant's Brief at i. We affirm. 

BACKGROUND 

On November 18, 1988 a federal grand jury in Denver, Colorado 

indicted Davis on three counts: (I} possession with intent to 

distribute more than 50 grams of crack (a mixture or substance 

containing cocaine base) in violation of 21 u.s.c. §§ 84l(a)(l} 

and 84l(b}(l}(A}(iii); (II} employing or using a person under the 

age of 18 years of age to aid and abet the possession with intent 

to distribut~ more than 50 grams of crack in violation of 21 

u.s.c. §§ 845b(a}(l} and 845b(b}; and (III} distribution of 

cocaine in violation of 21 u.s.c. § 84l(a}(l}. Vol. I. tab 1. 

Davis initially pleaded not guilty to the charges, Vol. I tab 2 

and filed three motions to suppress evidence. Vol. I tabs 5, 8, 

and 9. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied those 

motions. Vol. II at 59. 

Thereafter, Davis negotiated a plea agreement with the 

government. Under the agreement, Davis agreed to enter a 

conditional guilty plea to Count I of the indictment, reserving 

his right to appeal the court's pretrial orders pursuant to Fed. 

R. Crim. P. ll(a}(2). In exchange for the guilty plea, the 

government agreed to dismiss Counts II and III of the indictment. 

Vol. I tab, 14. The trial court, however, refused to accept 

Davis' conditional guilty plea. Vol. IV at 6. On February 1, 

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1989, Davis pleaded guilty to Count I of the indictment without 

an~~quali£ications, and the government dismissed th~ remaining two 

counts of the indictment. Vol. IV at 8, 13. The court 

subsequently imposed a sentence of 135 months of incarceration, a 

five year supervised release, and a fifty-dollar assessment. Vol. 

I, tab 28, Vol. VI at 38. The sentence was within the applicable 

guideline range. 

EFFECT OF THE GUILTY PLEA 

Davis argues the trial court erred in denying two of the 

three motions to suppress evidence. Appellant's Brief at 10. In 

response, the government argues that because Davis pleaded guilty, 

the trial court's rulings on the suppression motions are 

nonreviewable. Appellee's Brief at 7. Further, the government 

.argues that Davis' guilty plea precludes appellate review of the 

trial court's refusal to accept the conditional plea. We agree 

with the government. 

By entering a voluntary1 plea of guilty, Davis waived all 

1 Davis does not contest the fact that his guilty plea was 

voluntary. The record indicates the trial court painstakingly 

assured the propriety of the guilty plea. After the court 

exercised its prerogative and refused to accept the conditional 

plea, the court recessed to enable Davis to confer privately with 

counsel. Vol. IV at 7. When court reconvened, Davis responded to 

the court that he would plead guilty: 

THE COURT: Mr. Davis, in regard to your desire to 

appeal the Court's pretrial orders, what are your wishes 

in that regard now, please? 

MR. DAVIS: I will plead guilty. 

THE COURT: Without any qualifications; is that correct? 

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nonjurisdictional defenses. United States v. Nooner, 565 F.2d 

633, 634 (10th. Cir. 1977). .The plea of guilty in Nooner 

foreclosed from review the trial court's earlier order denying the 

motion to suppress. Id. Nooner applied Supreme Court precedent 

as follows: 

MR. DAVIS: That's correct, your Honor. 

Vol. IV at 7-8. Defense counsel then withdrew the motions to 

suppress: 

THE COURT: ••. Mr. Elliott, on behalf of Mr. Davis, I 

take it you are withdrawing with prejudice those motions 

that have been filed previously, and the Court has ruled 

on; is that correct, please? 

MR. ELLIOTT: That is correct, your Honor. Likewise we 

would ask the Court to delete paragraph D [regarding the 

conditional plea] of the plea agreement, which is what 

the government consented to. 

THE COURT: Is this agreeable to you, Mr. Davis? 

MR. DAVIS: Yes, your Honor. 

THE COURT: The record will so reflect. 

Vol. IV at 8. The court advised Davis extensively on his 

constitutional rights and assured the propriety of the guilty plea 

before accepting the same. Id. at 8-22. 

Further, the Court reiterated at the plea hearing that one of 

the consequences of pleading guilty was the preclusion of 

appellate review of the suppression rulings. In discussing the 

Statement of the Defendant in Advance of Plea of Guilty, the court 

reiterated that by pleading guilty, Davis waived his right to 

appeal the suppression rulings: 

THE COURT: .•• there is some other language there that 

as a result of the conditional plea pursuant to Rule 

ll(a)(2), I may appeal the denial [of the] motion to 

suppress. You are withdrawing that opportunity to 

appeal that matter; is that correct, please? 

MR. DAVIS: That is correct. 

Id. at 21. 

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In Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 

S.Ct. 1602, 1608, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973), the Supreme 

Cour~ reaffirming the trilogy of cases Brady v. United 

States, 397 u.s. 742, 90 s.ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 

(1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 90 S.Ct. 

1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970); and Parker v. North 

Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 90 S.Ct. 1458, 25 L.Ed.2d 785 

(1970), declared as follows: 

[A] guilty plea represents a break in the 

chain of events which has preceded it in the 

criminal process. When a criminal defendant 

has solemnly admitted in open court that he is 

in fact guilty of the offense with which he is 

charged, he may not thereafter raise 

independent claims relating to the deprivation 

of constitutional rights that occurred prior 

to the entry of the guilty plea. He may only 

attack the voluntary and intelligent character 

of the guilty plea by showing that the advice 

he received from counsel was not within the 

standards set forth in McMann [supra]. 

Id.; See also, United States v.· Huff, 873 F.2d 709, 712 (3rd Cir. 

1989) (challenge to voluntariness of statements barred after entry 

of· guilty plea); United States v. Montilla, 870 F.2d 549, 552 (9th 

Cir. 1989) (''as a general rule, a guilty plea erases claims of 

constitutional violation arising before the plea"). Because the 

effect of the guilty plea was to waive all nonjurisdictional 

defenses, we need not and do not review the trial court's denial 

of Davis' suppression motions. 

Further, Davis' entry of an unconditional and voluntary 

guilty plea forecloses review of the court's refusal of the 

conditional plea. The law affords Davis neither a right to enter 

a conditional plea nor a right to enter a plea bargain. See Mabry 

v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 510 (1984) (defendant's "inability to 

enforce the prosecutor's of fer is without constitutional 

significance''); Montilla, 870 F.2d at 553 ("Montilla had no 

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Appellate Case: 89-1086 Document: 01019583463 Date Filed: 04/16/1990 Page: 5 
constitutional right to a plea bargain") (citing United States v. 

Osif, 789 F.2d.1404, 1405 (9th Cir. 1986)); Martinez v. Romero, 

626 F.2d 807, 809 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1019 (1980) 

(petitioner has "no constitutional right to a plea bargain on his 

own terms"). We agree with the observation of the Ninth Circuit 

in Montilla: "A forced choice between asserting a constitutional 

right at trial and accepting the government's offer, while 

undoubtedly difficult, is not unconstitutional." Id. at 553 

(citation omitted). While some may find this forced choice harsh, 

we find it to be lawful and hold that by pleading guilty to Count 

I of the indictment, Davis foreclosed appellate review of the 

suppression rulings and also the trial court's refusal to accept 

the conditional plea. 

.CONDITIONAL PLEA 

Presuming he is entitled to appellate review of the issue, 

Davis argues the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to 

permit him to enter a conditional plea. Appellant's Brief at 6. 2 

We do not agree. Fed. R. Crim. P. ll(a)(2) provides: 

Conditional Pleas. With the approval of the court and 

the consent of the government, a defendant may enter a 

conditional plea of guilty or nolo contendere, reserving 

in writing the right, on appeal from the judgment, to 

review of the adverse determination of any specified 

pre-trial motion. A defendant who prevails on appeal 

shall be allowed to withdraw the plea. 

2 Although by pleading guilty, Davis waived appellate review of 

this issue, we choose to address the issue of refusal of the 

conditional plea to further clarify the absolute discretion of the 

trial judge in accepting or rejecting a tendered conditional plea. 

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Rule 11 "creates no enforceable 'right' to enter a conditional 

plea." United States v. Daniel, 866 F.2d 749, 751 (5th Cir. 1989) 

(quoting United States v. Fisher, 772 F.2d 371, 374 (7th Cir. 

1985)). Rather, the rule vests the trial court with discretion to 

permit entry 

history3 nor 

of the conditional plea. Neither legislative 

case law indicates that a criminal defendant is 

entitled to enter a conditional plea. 

Davis contends that by adopting Fed. R. Crim. P. ll(a)(2), 

Congress rejected certain challenges 4 to the rule, and that ''it 

would not be proper for a trial court to reject a conditional plea 

for any of those reasons alone." Appellant's Brief at 8. Davis 

further argues that the court's rationale for rejecting the 

conditional plea "amounted to a blanket prohibition on all 

conditional pleas" and that "failure to exercise discretion is 

itself an abuse of discretion." Appellant's Brief at 10. 

Davis' argument is flawed in at least two respects. First, 

the fact that Congress rejected arguments disapproving of 

conditional pleas does not mean that Congress implicitly required 

a court to make findings before refusing or accepting a 

3 "The legislative history indicates th .. , Lhe rule was intended 

primarily to aid courts and prosecutors, rather than defendants." 

Daniel, 866 F.2d at 751 n.l. 

4 The challenges mentioned by Davis are as follows: (1) the 

procedure would encourage a flood of litigation; (2) it tends to 

negate finality in the criminal process; (3) it impinges on the 

effectiveness of appellate review for lack of a full trial record, 

and; (4) it compels decision of constitutional questions that 

otherwise might be avoided pursuant to the harmless error 

doctrine. Appellant's ·Brief at 7-8. 

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conditional plea or that Congress thereby restricted the bases by 

which a district court can-deny a_ conditional plea. Davis is 

correct in observing that Rule ll(a)(2) does not "state what 

factors are to be considered by the court in guiding its 

discretion." Appellant's Brief at 8. The trial court has 

absolute discretion with regard to accepting or rejecting the 

conditional plea. The court can refuse to accept a conditional 

plea for any reason or for no reason. 5 

Second, the trial court's refusal of the conditional plea in 

this case was not a "blanket prohibition" of the plea. Even 

though the law does not require an explanation, the trial court 

stated his reasons for refusing the plea in this case: 

I am not going to go ahead and impose a penalty in 

this case after a presentence report and the Defendant 

can shop and see what he wants to do, and then take an 

appeal on the pretrial orders. 

The Defendant would have to withdraw unequivocally 

all motions before the Court accepts the plea. 

Considering the nature of what was inherent in those 

motions, I will not entertain a Rule 11 matter, so an 

interlocutory appeal can be taken up while the Defendant 

is serving his time •... 

Vol. IV at 6. Consequently, Davis' argument is not based entirely 

on fact. Even if the trial court's ruling amounted to a blanket 

prohibition of all conditional pleas, we are not persuaded that 

such a judicial outlook would constitute error in any given case. 

5 This same observation was made in United States v. Yasak, 884 

F.2d 996, 999 (7th Cir. 1989), regarding the assent of the 

government. The government "can refuse to assent to a conditional 

plea for any reason or no reason: Rule ll(a)(2) creates no 

enforceable right to enter a conditional plea." Id. (citing 

Fisher, 772 F.2d at 374). 

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Rule ll(a)(2) provides the court a procedural option to accept a 

conditional plea. We know of no.requirement.placed on the court 

to make findings when accepting or refusing a conditional plea. 

SENTENCING GUIDELINES 

Finally, Davis argues the court abused its discretion in 

refusing to depart downward from the guidelines. He contends that 

because he made an offer of cooperation to the government and 

because of the disparity in sentencing between cocaine-based 

substances and powder cocaine, the trial court abused its 

discretion in refusing to depart downward. Appellant's Brief at 

16. "This court reviews sentences imposed under the Sentencing 

Guidelines according to the statutory standard provided by the 

Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and codified at 18 u.s.c. § 3742." 

United States v. Smith, 888 F.2d 720, 723 (10th Cir. 1989). 

Section 3742(e) provides, in relevant part: 

(e) Consideration.--Upon review of the record, the 

court of appeals shall determine whether the sentence--

(1) was imposed in violation of law; 

(2) was imposed as a result of an incorrect 

application of the sentencing guidelines; 

(3) is outside the applicable guideline range, 

and is unreasonable, having regard for--

(A) the factors to be considered in imposing a 

sentence, as set forth in chapter 227 of this 

title; and 

(B) the reasons for the imposition of the 

particular sentence, as stated by the district 

court pursuant to the provisions of section 

3553(c); or 

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(4) was imposed for an offense for which there 

is no applicable sentencing guideline and is 

plainly unreasonable. 

Because of the language of the statute and the legislative 

history, we conclude we lack jurisdiction to consider the issue of 

whether the court abused its discretion in refusing to depart 

downward from the guidelines. 

Davis stipulated that he possessed, with intent to 

distribute, 166.68 grams of crack. Vol. I, tab 14. Section 201.1 

of the sentencing guidelines places that quantity of crack at a 

base offense level of 34. The court gave Davis a two-point 

downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to 

§ 3El.l. Vol. I, tab 28. Thus, Davis' total offense level was 

computed at Level 32. Although the government urged the court to 

as~ign a criminal history at Category III (with its attendant 

guidelines range of 151-188 months), the court found Category II 

appropriate. Vol. VI at 28-33. Accordingly, the court determined 

the sentence guideline range was 135 months to 168 months, Vol. VI 

at 30, and the court imposed a sentence of 135 months. 

Rather than argue that the court miscalculated the base 

offense level or the criminal history category, Davis argues the 

court erred in failing to view the case from his perspective, 

Appellant's Brief at 15-18, and in not invoking the catchall 

provision of § 5K2.0 which permits the court to consider 

unenumerated factors in mitigation of sentence. Appellant's Brief 

at 17. Davis presents no argument and the record bears no 

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Appellate Case: 89-1086 Document: 01019583463 Date Filed: 04/16/1990 Page: 10 
indication.whatsoever that the court's refusal to depart from the 

guidelines was a violation of law. Rather, he argues the court 

abused its discretion in refusing to depart downward. 

Several other circuits have determined they have no 

jurisdiction to consider whether a trial court abused its 

discretion in refusing to depart from the guidelines. In United 

States v. Franz, 886 F.2d 973, 980 (7th Cir. 1989), for example, 

the Seventh Circuit held that 18 u.s.c. § 3742 does not confer 

appellate jurisdiction over refusals to depart. Id. at 980. In 

Franz, the court wrote: 

A review of the structure of section 3742 as a 

whole leads us to conclude that Congress did not intend 

a district court's decision refusing to depart from the 

guidelines to be appealable. As we have already noted, 

departures are an integral part of the guideline 

application process. Thus, a district court's decision 

to depart from the guidelines, no less than a court's 

decision refusing to depart, could be characterized as 

"an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines" 

appealable under 18 u.s.c. § 3742(a)(2). However, 

Congress thought it necessary to include specifically 

section 3742(a)(3), providing for appellate review of 

district court decisions to depart upward [emphasis 

added] from the guidelines, within the statute governing 

appellate jurisdiction. Therefore, if we were to 

interpret section 3742(a)(2) to allow appeals for 

departure-related decisions as incorrect applications of 

the guidelines, we would render section 3742(a)(3) 

redundant. Because Congress could not have intended 

such a specific provision to be mere surplusage, we 

conclude that Congress did not intend for departurerelated decisions, including refusals to depart, to be 

appealable under section 3742(a)(2). 

Id. at 978. 

The Franz court also explained that the legislative history 

supported the position that an appellate court had no jurisdiction 

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to review a district court's decision not to depart from the 

applicable sentencing guidelines range: 

The Senate Report accompanying the bill that ultimately 

was adopted as the Sentencing Reform Act makes it clear 

that not all sentences are to be appealable under 

section 3742. "This section establishes a limited 

practice of appellate review of sentences in the Federal 

criminal justice system." S.Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 

2nd Sess. 149 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. 

& Admin. News 3182, 3332 .... 

Id. at 978-979. 

Subsequently, the Third Circuit also declined to consider the 

argument that the district court erred by refusing to impose a 

sentence below the minimum guideline range when a defendant had 

cooperated with the government and had been an important witness 

against two other. individuals. It held: 

· [W]e do not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal on this 

issue pursuant to 18 U.S.C.A. § 3742(a)(2) .... Since it 

is a matter left for the district court's discretion to 

refuse to depart from the Guidelines, and since [the 

appellant] does not allege that the sentence is an 

improper application of the Guidelines, nor that it is a 

violation of the law, we must affirm it. 

United States v. Wickstrom, 893 F.2d 30, 33 (3d Cir. 1989) 

(citations omitted). See also United States v. Guerrero, 894 F.2d 

261 (7th Cir. 1990) (applying Franz, a sentence within the 

guideline range and not imposed in violation of law, or as a 

result of an incorrect application of the guidelines should be 

affirmed); United States v. Tucker, 892 F.2d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 1989) 

("a district court's decision not to depart from the Guidelines is 

not appealable"); United States v. Whyte, 892 F.2d 1170, 1175 n.14 

(3d Cir. 1989) (discretionary refusal to depart is nonreviewable, 

but refusal to depart based upon misperception of statute is 

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appealable)i United States v. Colon, 884 F.2d 1550, 1554 (2d Cir.) 

(decision not to. depart . from the .. guidelines is 11 inherently 

discretionary" and "Congress did not intend to provide appellate 

review of sentences that are within the Guidelines correctly 

applied and are not illegal under [specific subsections]"), cert. 

denied, 110 S.Ct. 553 (1989). We are persuaded that the other 

circuits have analyzed the question properly, and we know of no 

contrary authority. 

We therefore join the Third. and Seventh Circuits and hold 

that we do not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal over the trial 

court's discretionary refusal to depart downward· from the 

gui~~lines. In short, when a sentence is within the guideline 

range and is not imposed in violation of law, 6 or as a result of 

an incorrect application of the guidelines,7 then the district 

court's refusal to exercise its discretion to depart downward from 

the guideline range is not appealable. 

Davis also argues the court abused its discretion in refusing 

to mitigate the sentence based upon the "gross disparity in 

6 The question is not presented, and we do not decide, whether a 

discretionary 

u.s.c. § 3553 

§ 3742(e)(l). 

(3d Cir. 1989) 

part). 

refusal to depart downward can ever violate 18 

and therefore be reviewed under 18 u.s.c. 

See United States v. Denardi, 892 F.2d 260, 275-85 

(Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 

7 Of course, if a district court does not exercise its discretion 

to depart downward because it feels legally prohibited from doing 

so, i.e., it incorrectly concludes that it has no discretion to 

depart downward, the sentence is reviewable under 18 u.s.c. 

§ 3742(e)(2). United States v. Lowden, No. 89-2052, slip op. at 

7-8 (10th Cir. March 29, 1990). 

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Appellate Case: 89-1086 Document: 01019583463 Date Filed: 04/16/1990 Page: 13 
sentencing ~nder the guidelines between cocaine base and powder 

~ocaine." Appellant's Brief at 17. --Although we have concluded we 

have no jurisdiction to review this issue, we note that other 

circuits have considered constitutional arguments arising from the 

disparate treatment of the two substances and have upheld the 

legality of the guidelines. See United States v. Buckner, 894 

F.2d 975 (8th Cir. 1990) (the "100 to 1 ratio'' of cocaine to 

cocaine base in the guidelines does not violate the due process 

clause of the Fifth Amendment or the cruel and unusual punishment 

clause of the Eighth Amendment); United States v.. Cyrus, 890 F.2d 

1245, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (the substantially higher term for 

cocaine base possession than for possession of untreated cocaine 

did not violate the Eighth Amendment against cruel and unusual 

punishment, the distinction between cocaine and cocaine base was 

not arbitrary and irrational i~ violation of equal protection, and 

the distinction was not unconstitutionally vague). 

Davis does not argue and the record does not indicate that 

the court's refusal to depart from the guidelines was a violation 

of law. Thus, we hold we do not have jurisdiction to review, as a 

matter of abuse of discretion, the trial court's refusal to depart 

downward from the guidelines. 

AFFIRMED. 

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No. 89-1086 - UNITED STATES OF AMERICA~v. DUVALIER ANTONIO DAVIS 

McKAY~ Circuit Judge, concurring in par~and dissenting in part: 

By this decision, the court converts a rule into a license. 

In dealing with the language of Rule ll(a)(2), the court reads 

into the phrase ''with the approval of the court" a license for 

trial courts to withhold their approval for any reason or no reason without the possibility of review under any circumstances. In 

our legal system, the instances are extremely rare in which grants 

of authority are absolutely insulated from review. We should not 

read the language of Rule ll(a)(2) as one of those rare examples. 

Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 9.s. 336 

(1976), provides a striking example of just how unusual the cases 

are in which judicial action escapes all review. Before the 

Thermtron decision, 28 u.s.c. § 1447(d) looked like as clear a 

prohibition of appellate review as one could write. With respect 

to orders remanding removed cases to state courts, section 1447(d) 

states that: "An order remanding a case to the State court from 

which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise 

II 28 u.s.c. §l447(d) (1982). In Thermtron, a district 

court remanded a case to the state court from which it was removed 

for the reason that the district court's docket was too crowded 

for the district court to hear the case on a timely basis. See 

Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 335. The Supreme Court held, however, that 

although section 1447(d) normally protected remand orders from 

Appellate Case: 89-1086 Document: 01019583463 Date Filed: 04/16/1990 Page: 15 
review, a crowded docket was not a permissible reason for remand-

· ing a case to state court. See id. 'at 351. 

Thermtron proves, therefore, that even where Congress 

announces an express policy against review, there may be reasons 

given by a trial court for a decision that may subject the decision to appellate review. In my judgment, nonreviewability must 

be read into the language of Rule ll(a)(2) in order to reach our 

present result, unlike Thermtron where the language of section 

1447(d) was express. ~ fortiori, some limited scrutiny of clearly 

unlawful reasons remains under Rule ll(a)(2). In this case, I am 

persuaded that the trial court gave the one reason that it cannot 

give ·as a basis for its decision. 

As the majority has noted, the trial court gave an explana~ 

tion of why it refused to give its consent to a Rule ll(a)(2) 

plea. I can read the court's statement no other way than to say 

it rejects the underlying premise of Rule ll(a)(2) and therefore 

will exercise no discretion whatever. As the majority noted, the 

court said in support of its decision: 

I am not going to go ahead and impose a penalty in 

this case after a presentence report and the Defendant 

can shop and see what he wants to do, and then take an 

appeal on the pretrial orders. 

The Defendant would have to withdraw unequivocally 

all motions before the Court accepts the plea. Considering the nature of what was inherent in those motions, 

I will not entertain a Rule 11 matter, so an interlocutory appeal can be taken up while the Defendant is serving his time . • . • 

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Appellate Case: 89-1086 Document: 01019583463 Date Filed: 04/16/1990 Page: 16 
Record, vol. 4~ at 6. It may be that if the .court had given no 

reason,.but held·subjectively ~his attitude, its decision would 

have escaped review. It may also be true, as has often been said, 

that a willful trial judge can find a way to disguise successfully 

even inappropriate decisions. One should not ascribe such motivation to trial judges, and this judge has not done so. The trial 

court having been forthright, I believe it is our duty to review 

the matter and inform the trial judges that however broad their 

discretion may be, they do not have authority to refuse to exer-

- cise the discretion that Congress deliberately has given them simply because they don't like the policy that underlies Congress's 

choice. 

Aside from this issue, I agree with what the majority has 

said about the other issues in the case.* My differe11ce is th~t I 

would remand to the trial court with direction to exercise Rule 

ll(a)(2) discretion. 

* As I understand the court's opinion, even in the broad 

discretion granted for departure from the guidelines, it correctly 

has reserved the power of the circuit to review that exceptionally 

broad discretion if not correctly applied or if the application is 

illegal. United States v. Colon, 884 F.2d 1550, 1554 (2d Cir.), 

cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 553 (1989). · 

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