Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-05038/USCOURTS-ca13-15-05038-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Richard A. Coleman
Appellant
United States
Appellee

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

RICHARD A. COLEMAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2015-5038

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:14-cv-00413-CFL, Judge Charles F. 

Lettow. 

______________________ 

Decided: December 11, 2015

______________________ 

 RICHARD A. COLEMAN, Elizabeth City, NC, pro se.

 JOSEPH ASHMAN, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil 

Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by 

BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., STEVEN J.

GILLINGHAM. 

______________________ 

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2 COLEMAN v. US

Before MOORE, O’MALLEY, and TARANTO, Circuit 

Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Appellant Richard Coleman (“Appellant” or “Coleman”) appeals from the final decision of the United States 

Court of Federal Claims dismissing his complaint for lack 

of jurisdiction and denying his motion to amend his 

complaint. Coleman v. United States, No. 14-413C, 2014 

U.S. Claims LEXIS 1396, *13 (Fed. Cl. Dec. 12, 2014). 

For the following reasons, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

In early 2013, Coleman filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia 

against his ex-wife for slander, libel, defamation of character, and alienation of affection. See Coleman v. Silver, 

939 F. Supp. 2d 27, 28 (D.D.C. 2013). The district court 

dismissed Coleman’s complaint for failure to establish 

personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Id. at 29. 

Coleman then initiated the current suit in the Court 

of Federal Claims alleging that, by dismissing his case,

Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle, the district court judge who 

presided over the first case, committed acts of judicial 

misconduct and deprived him of due process under the 

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 

Constitution and equal protection under the Fourteenth 

Amendment. Specifically, he alleged that the judge 

willfully and prejudicially misrepresented the facts,

misapprehended the controlling law of personal jurisdiction, and gave an appearance of partiality in favor of the 

female defendant. He named as defendants both Judge

Huvelle and the United States government (the “Government”), as her employer. He additionally alleged that, in 

a separate proceeding Coleman brought against a community college, a former judge on the New Hampshire 

Superior Court and justices on the New Hampshire 

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COLEMAN v. US 3

Supreme Court violated N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 491:8, 

that the New Hampshire Supreme Court justices deprived 

him of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, and that a clerk of the United States Supreme 

Court violated his constitutional due process and equal 

protection rights. 

In lieu of an answer, the Government moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and failure to 

state a claim upon which relief could be granted. In 

response, Coleman filed a motion to amend his complaint 

to remove Judge Huvelle as an individual defendant and 

to bring two breach of contract claims against the United 

States based on the theory that, by filing suit in the 

district court, he had entered into a contract with the 

Government. Coleman alleged that the Government 

breached its contract with him when the court failed to 

provide him with a fair and impartial judge. The Court of 

Federal Claims granted the Government’s motion to 

dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 

the Rules of the Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC”) 

12(b)(1), and added that, even if the court had jurisdiction, Coleman’s complaint would be dismissed for failure 

to state a claim. Coleman, 2014 U.S. Claims LEXIS 1396, 

at *13. Coleman appeals. We have jurisdiction pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3). 

DISCUSSION

We review de novo the Court of Federal Claims’ dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Northrop Grumman Computing Sys. v. United 

States, 709 F.3d 1107, 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Waltner v. 

United States, 679 F.3d 1329, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 

The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1), grants the 

Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction over “any claim 

against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an 

executive department, or upon any express or implied 

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4 COLEMAN v. US

contract with the United States, or for liquidated or 

unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.” 

Brandt v. United States, 710 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 

2013) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1)). “The jurisdiction 

of the Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act is 

limited to actual, presently due money damages from the 

United States.” Todd v. United States, 386 F.3d 1091, 

1093-94 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (internal quotations omitted). 

“Thus, jurisdiction under the Tucker Act requires the

litigant to identify a substantive right for money damages 

against the United States separate from the Tucker Act 

itself.” Id. 

The Court of Federal Claims properly rejected 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a basis for jurisdiction over Coleman’s 

claims against the individual judges and the clerk of the 

United States Supreme Court on the grounds that, under 

the Tucker Act, the United States is the only proper 

defendant in that court. Stephenson v. United States, 58 

Fed. Cl. 186, 190 (2003). Coleman argues that the court

erred because, other than Judge Huvelle, he never named 

the other individuals as defendants, and his amended 

complaint removed Judge Huvelle as a defendant, thereby 

curing any such defect. The amended complaint did not 

cure the jurisdictional defect, however. The Court of 

Federal Claims cannot hear Coleman’s claim under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 even against the United States. That 

statute is limited to actions under color of state (or territorial) law, not actions under federal law, and it applies 

only to “person[s]” committing such actions. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 (“Every person who, under color of any statute, 

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or 

Territory . . . .”). There is no substantial claim here, if 

there ever could be, that the United States was acting 

under color of state (or territorial) law or is a “person” 

doing so. See Canuto v. United States, 615 F. App’x 951, 

953 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Coleman's § 1983 claim is therefore 

insubstantial and was properly dismissed. See also 

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COLEMAN v. US 5

McCauley v. United States, 38 Fed. Cl. 250, 265 (Fed. Cl. 

1997). 

The court also properly dismissed Coleman’s claims 

alleging violations of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth 

and Fourteenth Amendments and the Equal Protection 

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Tucker Act 

limits the court’s jurisdiction over constitutional claims to 

those arising from money-mandating provisions, and the 

constitutional claims brought by Coleman are not such 

provisions. LeBlanc v. United States, 50 F.3d 1025, 1028 

(Fed. Cir. 1995) (finding no jurisdiction based on these 

same constitutional provisions). On appeal, Coleman

argues that the Tucker Act is not limited to moneymandating provisions. He points to 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(2)

in support of this assertion, which states that “monetary 

relief shall be limited to bid preparation and proposal 

costs.” But that provision is irrelevant; it pertains only to 

actions arising under 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b), which governs 

procurement protests. Accordingly, we find no error in

the court’s dismissal of Coleman’s constitutional claims. 

The court’s refusal to exercise jurisdiction over Coleman’s breach of contract claims against the Government 

was also proper. The court correctly determined that, as a 

matter of law, “the mere payment of a filing fee and other 

litigation-related expenses does not create a contract 

between a plaintiff and the United States.” Coleman, 

2014 U.S. Claims LEXIS 1396, at *11. See Garrett v. 

United States, 78 Fed. Cl. 668, 671 (Fed. Cl. 2007) (“Plaintiff offers no authority for the proposition that the filing of 

a complaint by a plaintiff, and the acceptance of that 

filing by a clerk of court, could constitute the making of a 

contract with the United States”); Stamps v. United 

States, 73 Fed. Cl. 603, 610 (Fed. Cl. 2006) (finding no 

jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claim alleging contract with 

the district court judge). Coleman argues that he never 

alleged that the “mere payment of a filing fee” or “filing a 

complaint alone” constituted a contract with the United 

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6 COLEMAN v. US

States, Appellant Reply Br. 13, but he fails to provide any 

other theory for his allegation that a “quid pro quo contract existed between the Plaintiff and the Defendant . . . 

in return for the Plaintiff’s payment of fees to the Defendant.” Amended Compl. at 1, Coleman, 2014 U.S. Claims 

LEXIS 1396. We find no support for Coleman’s proposition that filing a lawsuit established a contract with any

court. 

For these reasons, we find that the Court of Federal 

Claims properly granted the Government’s motion to 

dismiss. The court also properly denied Coleman’s motion 

to amend his complaint because, as explained above, 

removing Judge Huvelle as an individual defendant and 

adding the two contract claims would not have cured the 

aforementioned jurisdictional defects, rendering Coleman’s amendment futile. Fernandez de Iglesias v. United 

States, 96 Fed. Cl. 352, 362 (Fed. Cl. 2010) (“A court may 

deny leave if . . . an amendment would be futile.”). We

find it unnecessary to reach the question of whether the 

Court of Federal Claims was also correct to conclude that, 

even if it had jurisdiction, it could have dismissed Coleman’s complaint for failure to state a claim. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of 

the Court of Federal Claims.

AFFIRMED

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