Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-03232/USCOURTS-ca10-90-03232-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Juan M. Aldrete
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

:.- ILE D 

United States Court cf Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 2 6 1 91 

&OBERT L. I-IOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

JUAN M. ALDRETE, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

No. 90-3232 

(D.C. No. 90-40006-01) 

(D. Kan.) 

Before SEYMOUR, ANDERSON, and TACHA, Circuit Judges. 

Defendant-appellant Juan Aldrete appeals a district court 

judgment sentencing him to ninety-three months' imprisonment 

following his guilty plea to distribution of cocaine in violation 

of 21 u.s.c. § 84l(a)(l) and carrying a firearm in relation to 

this offense in violation of 18 u.s.c. § 924(c)(l). On appeal, 

Aldrete argues the district court erred in determining the base 

level offense under the Sentencing Guidelines according to the 

amount of cocaine present before government testing destroyed part 

of it. He also argues the district court erred in not departing 

downward from the Guidelines based on his voluntary participation 

in an in-patient drug treatment program, his exceptional 

employment record, and letters of support from members of the 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-3232 Document: 010110031306 Date Filed: 03/26/1991 Page: 1 
community. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 u.s.c. § 1291 and 

affirm. 

Aldrete contends the district court denied him due process by 

determining the base offense level from government measurements of 

the cocaine that could not be verified because they were made 

prior to the government's destruction some cocaine during testing. 

We accept a district court's findings regarding drug quantity 

unless clearly erroneous. United States Y..!.. Donaldson, 915 F.2d 

612, 614 (10th Cir. 1990). As we pointed out in Donaldson, the 

destruction of evidence may amount to a violation of due process. 

Id. Constitutional error exists when the destroyed evidence 

"possess[es] an exculpatory value that was apparent before the 

evidence was destroyed, and [is] of such a nature that the 

defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other 

reasonably available means." California Y..!.. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 

479, 489 (1984). In cases where the evidence may be exculpatory 

when destruction occurs, a defendant bears the burden of showing 

bad faith on the part of the government in failing to preserve 

potentially useful evidence. Arizona Y..!.. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 

57-58 (1988); United States Y..!.. Malbrough, 922 F.2d 458, 463 (8th 

Cir. 1990); Donaldson, 915 F.2d at 614. The presence or absence 

of bad faith by the government must necessarily turn on the 

government's knowlege of the evidence's exculpatory value at the 

time it was destroyed. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 366 n.**· 

Here, the destroyed cocaine had exculpatory value in 

sentencing only to the extent that if it were combined with the 

remaining cocaine, then the total amount might have been less than 

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Appellate Case: 90-3232 Document: 010110031306 Date Filed: 03/26/1991 Page: 2 
300 grams. The presentence report indicated the quantity of 

cocaine Aldrete had distributed was 300.58 grams, which results in 

a base level offense of 22. Aldrete argues the total amount also 

might have weighed less than 300 grams because the quantity left 

after testing weighed less than 300 grams, thereby resulting in a 

base offense level at 20. It is impossible to reweigh the total 

amount of cocaine as Aldrete requested because the government 

chemist who analyzed the cocaine had failed to weigh the quantity 

used and destroyed in testing. 

Here, Aldrete did not offer evidence the chemist knew the 

destroyed cocaine had exculpatory value at the time of testing. 

Instead, Aldrete argues we should infer bad faith from the 

chemist's failure to weigh the drug quantity used in testing 

because the those actions seem contrary to standard operating 

procedures. We disagree. Aldrete presented no evidence at the 

sentencing hearing to show standard operating procedures require 

separate measurement of test samples. Further, he does not 

contend it was improper or contrary to standard operating 

procedures for the government to test drug purity -- a procedure 

that necessarily involves some destruction of evidence. Based on 

the record, we conclude Aldrete has not met his burden of proof 

regarding bad faith. We hold the district court's finding 

regarding the quantity of cocaine from the pre-testing weight is 

not clearly erroneous. 

Aldrete attempts to distinguish this case from the situtation 

in Donaldson, where we noted the government offered no explanation 

why the evidence was destroyed. We find no merit in this 

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Appellate Case: 90-3232 Document: 010110031306 Date Filed: 03/26/1991 Page: 3 
argument. Regardless whether or how the government explains the 

destruction of evidence, the burden of proof regarding bad faith 

remains on the defendant. 

Finally, Aldrete contends the district court should have 

departed downward from the Guidelines because of his voluntary 

participation in an in-patient drug treatment program, his 

exceptional employment record, and letters of support from members 

of his community. We do not have appellate jurisdiction under 18 

u.s.c. § 3742 to review a district court's decision not to depart 

downward from the Guidelines unless the court erroneously believes 

it lacks discretion to depart downward. United State Y...!.. Soto, 918 

F.2d 882, 883-84 (10th Cir. 1990). 

Here, the district court understood the discretion to depart 

downward from the Guidelines. Acknowledging it had "no leeway" in 

sentencing Aldrete to five additional years under section 

924(c)(l), the court turned to sentencing for the cocaine offense. 

The court stated: "[F]or a downward departure it takes something 

unusual. And the Court just doesn't find anything .... 

[T]here's nothing unusual in this case." From these statements, 

we are convinced the district court understood it has discretion 

to depart downward when there are mitigating circumstances not 

adequately taken into account by the Guidelines but decided there 

are no circumstances here warranting a departure. Therefore, we 

do not have appellate jurisdiction to review the court's 

discretionary decision not to depart downward. We AFFIRM. 

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ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Deanell Reece Tacha 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 90-3232 Document: 010110031306 Date Filed: 03/26/1991 Page: 4