Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-03220/USCOURTS-ca10-90-03220-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
James Harold Underwood
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FILED 

Uaiccd St:atfi Court of Appeals 

'1.'enth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

JUL .. 8 1QD1 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

.ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

vs. 

JAMES 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

) No. 90-3220 

) 

HAROLD UNDERWOOD, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D.C. No. 89-40038-03) 

Submitted on the briefs:* 

Kenneth W. Starr, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, 

Washington, D.C., Lee Thompson, United States Attorney, Richard L. 

Hathaway, Assistant United States Attorney, Topeka, Kansas, for 

Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Robert D. Hecht of Scott, Quinlan & Hecht, Topeka, Kansas, for 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Before TACHA, BALDOCK and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

* After exam~n~ng the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case therefore is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 90-3220 Document: 01019293801 Date Filed: 07/08/1991 Page: 1 
BALDOCK, Circuit Judge. 

Defendant-appellant James Harold Underwood was a participant 

in a large marijuana growing and processing enterprise with fields 

. . K t" l 1n s1x ansas coun 1es. He pled guilty to one count of 

conspiracy to plant, cultivate, grow, harvest and possess with 

intent to distribute marijuana in violation of 21 u.s.c. §§ 846, 

802 & 812. The Sentencing Guidelines applied because the offense 

occurred after November 1, 1987. See 28 u.s.c. § 994(a); United 

States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (Nov. 1990) 

[hereinafter u.s.S.G.]. The district court sentenced defendant to 

235 months imprisonment, the minimum guideline term for 

defendant's offense category. Defendant appeals, raising 

guideline issues. We remand for resentencing in accordance with 

this opinion. 

Defendant argues that the district court erred in failing to 

state the reasons for the sentence. Our jurisdiction to review 

this issue arises from 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(l), which provides for 

appellate review of a sentence imposed in violation of law. 

Defendant contends that the court violated 18 u.s.c. § 3553(c), 

which provides: 

(c) Statement of reasons for imposing a sentence. -- The 

court, at the time of sentencing, shall state in open 

1 This is a companion case to United States v. Shewmaker, No. 

90-3207 & 90-3215, slip op. (lOth Cir. June 24, 1991) [1991 WL 

108584], and United States v. Bickett, No. 90-3214, unpub. order & 

judgment (lOth Cir. July 3, 1991). 

-2-

Appellate Case: 90-3220 Document: 01019293801 Date Filed: 07/08/1991 Page: 2 
court the reasons for its imposition of the particular 

sentence, and, if the sentence --

(1) is of the kind, and within the range, 

described in subsection (a)(4) [a guideline 

sentence], and that range exceeds 24 months, 

the reason for imposing a sentence at a 

particular point within the range; or 

(2) is not of the kind, or is outside the 

range, described in subsection (a)(4) [a 

guideline departure], the specific reason for 

the imposition of a sentence different from 

that described. 

In this case, the statute required the district court to 

articulate its sentencing rationale with two levels of 

particularity. First, subsection (c) required the court to state 

the general reason for the guideline sentence imposed. Second, 

because defendant's guideline range exceeded twenty-four months 

(235 to 293 months), subsection (c)(l) required the district court 

to state its reason for imposing the sentence "at the particular 

point within the range." Subsection (c)(2) was inapplicable 

because the district court did not depart from the guidelines. 

Although it is clear that the district court did not comply with 

subsection (c)(l), remand on this issue alone would be pointless 

because the defendant could not have received a more lenient 

sentence within the applicable guideline range; he received the 

guideline range minimum of 235 months. On remand, defendant would 

be left without a remedy. We therefore center our inquiry on the 

requirement of subsection (c) that the court state the general 

reason for the sentence imposed. 

In calculating defendant's offense level, the court adopted 

the presentence report including the recommendation of a 

-3-

Appellate Case: 90-3220 Document: 01019293801 Date Filed: 07/08/1991 Page: 3 
§ 2Dl.l(b)(l) two-point upward adjustment for firearm possession. 

IV R. 48-49. In passing sentence, however, the court made no 

reference to defendant's firearm possession. Instead, the court 

incorporated the presentence report as a whole into its findings, 

referred to the applicable guideline range of 235 to 293 months, 

and sentenced defendant to a 235 month prison term "to reflect the 

seriousness of the offense and to provide punishment for the 

offense." IV R. 47. Defendant contends that a statement from the 

bench regarding the firearm enhancement was required by§ 3553(c). 

We broach this issue with the knowledge that Congress did not 

intend the § 3553(c) statement of reasons to be "a legal 

battleground" for challenges to sentences which are imposed within 

an appropriate guideline range. Sees. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 

2d Sess. 149, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 

3182, 3262-63. See also United States v. Garcia, 919 F.2d 1478, 

1481-82 (lOth Cir. 1990) (discusses s. Rep. No. 225 in holding 

that court did not have jurisdiction to "scrutinize sentencing 

justifications offered by the district court"). And we also take 

note of the legislative history which indicates that the statement 

of reasons should not be "subjected to such legalistic analysis 

that will • . • encourage judges to give reasons in a standardized 

manner." s. Rep. No. 225 at 3263. See also United States v. 

Georgiadis, No. 90-3224, slip op. at 3 (3d Cir. May 23, 1991) 

[1991 WL 84039] (emphasizing Congressional intent to avoid 

"standardized sentencing statements"); United States v. Beaulieu, 

900 F.2d 1531, 1535-36 (lOth Cir.) (particularized sentencing 

-4-

Appellate Case: 90-3220 Document: 01019293801 Date Filed: 07/08/1991 Page: 4 
statements are not required in the context of upward adjustments 

within the guidelines) (citing United States v. Duque, 883 F.2d 43 

(6th Cir. 1989); United States v. Reed, 882 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 

1989) and United States v. Mejia-Orosco, 867 F.2d 216 (5th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 492 U.S. 924 (1989)), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3252 

(1990). However, in this case we are not considering whether the 

court gave adequate reasons for its imposition of a sentence 

within an admittedly appropriate guideline range; such a review 

would be precluded. See Garcia, 919 F.2d at 1481-82. Instead, we 

consider whether the court gave any reason for the sentence 

imposed. See 18 u.s.c. § 3553(c). Only after this question is 

answered may we discern whether the court applied the appropriate 

guideline range. 

Our concern over the court's reasoning arises because of the 

unexplained§ 2Dl.l(b)(l) firearm possession enhancement. Section 

2Dl.l(b)(l) provides for a two-point upward adjustment for 

possession of a firearm during a drug offense, and the commentary 

indicates that the section applies as well to defendant's 

conspiracy to commit a drug offense. See United States v. 

Goddard, 929 F.2d 546, 548 (lOth Cir. 1991) (citing u.s.s.G. 

§ 201.1, comment. (n.3), and§ 201.4, comment. (n.3)). 

"'The ..• adjustment should be applied if the weapon was 

present, unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was 

connected with the [conspiracy] offense.'" Goddard, 929 F.2d at 

548 (quoting u.s.s.G. § 2Dl.l(b)(l), comment. (n.3)). The 

presentence report makes it clear that weapons were present in 

-5-

Appellate Case: 90-3220 Document: 01019293801 Date Filed: 07/08/1991 Page: 5 
this case. Specifically, the report indicates that the government 

seized weapons located on several of the marijuana farms involved 

in the overall conspiracy and that defendant acted to some unknown 

extent as a supervisor in the conspiracy. Also, the report 

indicates that the government seized a .22-caliber semiautomatic 

assault rifle from a pickup truck which was registered under 

defendant's name. The defendant's fingerprints were found on a 

beer can in the truck, but not on the rifle. Defendant contends 

that he had no knowledge of either the weapons found on the farms 

or the rifle in his truck. Regarding the rifle, he explains that 

he lent the truck to his common law wife who in turn lent the 

truck to her brother. The brother-in-law, according to defendant, 

placed the rifle under the pickup truck seat without defendant's 

knowledge. 

Defendant concedes that weapons were present, but argues that 

the government did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence 

that he knew of either the weapon in his pickup truck or the 

weapons seized on the farms. Three circuit courts, interpreting a 

prior version of the guidelines, have held that§ 2Dl.l(b)(l) 

requires a finding of scienter. See United States v. Fiala, 929 

F.2d 285, 289 (7th Cir. 1991): United States v. Suarez, 911 F.2d 

1016, 1021 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Burke, 888 F.2d 862 

(D.C. Cir. 1989). As the first court to address the issue, the 

Burke court relied principally on guideline § 1B1.3(a) which 

contains the general governing principles for the application of 

the firearm enhancement and the other specific offense 

-6-

Appellate Case: 90-3220 Document: 01019293801 Date Filed: 07/08/1991 Page: 6 
characteristics in § 2. At the time of the Burke decision, 

§ 1B1.3 provided: 

Relevant Conduct (Factors that Determine the Guideline 

Range) 

The conduct that is relevant to determining the 

applicable guideline range includes that set forth 

below. 

(a) Chapters Two (Offense Conduct) and Three 

(Adjustments). Unless otherwise specified, .•. (ii) 

specific offense characteristics . . . shall be 

determined on the basis of the following. 

(1) all acts and omissions committed or aided 

and abetted by the defendant, or for which the 

defendant would be otherwise accountable, that 

occurred during the commission of the offense 

of conviction, in preparation for that 

offense, or in the course of attempting to 

avoid detection or responsibility for that 

offence, or that otherwise were in furtherance 

of that offense; 

(3) all harm or risk of harm that resulted 

from the acts or omissions specified in 

subsection[] (a)(1) •.. , if the harm or 

risk was caused intentionally, recklessly or 

by criminal negligence . • • . 

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 (Jan. 1988) (emphasis supplied). The Burke court 

held that subsection (3) above requires a court to make a finding 

regarding scienter before adjusting pursuant to§ 2D1.1(b)(1). We 

agree that the plain language of the guideline as quoted above 

requires a finding of scienter; however, the scienter proviso in 

subsection (3) was deleted effective November 1989 -- before 

defendant was sentenced. Under the new guideline it is clear that 

scienter is not required; simple possession alone will suffice for 

-7-

Appellate Case: 90-3220 Document: 01019293801 Date Filed: 07/08/1991 Page: 7 
a firearm enhancement. See Fiala, 929 F.2d at 289; Suarez, 911 

F.2d at 1021. Nevertheless, we apply the old language, as 

interpreted by the Burke court, to this case because the old 

guideline is less onerous for the defendant and was in effect at 

the time of the offense. 2 Normally, district courts are to apply 

the sentencing guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing 

rather than the guidelines in effect on the date of the offense. 

See 18 u.s.c. § 3553(a)(4) & (5). But the ex post facto clause 

prohibits retroactive application of a changed guideline if the 

change disadvantages the defendant. See Miller v. Florida, 482 

u.s. 423, 430, 433 (1987). See also United States v. Smith, 930 

F.2d 1450, 1452 n.3 (lOth Cir. 1991). Given the decreased burden 

of the government, we have little trouble concluding that 

retroactive application of the changed guideline would 

disadvantage the defendant in this case. See Fiala, 929 F.2d at 

289 (applying the old guideline requirement of scienter because 

retroactive application of changed guideline disadvantaged 

defendant); Suarez, 911 F.2d at 1021-22 (same, with discussion of 

ex post facto clause). 

Under the Burke analysis, a defendant who personally 

possesses a firearm during a drug offense is subject to the 

§ 2Dl.l(B)(l) adjustment only if he knowingly possessed the weapon 

or if he was criminally negligent in his unwitting possession. 

Burke, 888 F.2d at 867-68. And criminal negligence may be 

2 The indictment period for the present offense ended in July 

1989, before the effective date of the amendment. 

-8-

Appellate Case: 90-3220 Document: 01019293801 Date Filed: 07/08/1991 Page: 8 
established if the defendant, "in addition to having direct 

physical control of the weapon, . failed to take reasonable 

steps that would have disclosed the weapon in question." Id. at 

868 (emphasis in original). Defendant contends that the 

government presented no proof of his knowledge or his criminal 

negligence with respect to the assault rifle which the authorities 

seized from his truck. Regarding the other weapons which were 

seized on the farms, defendant contends that he had no knowledge 

of the weapons and that the possession of such weapons by his 

codefendants was not reasonably foreseeable. Defendant has 

recited the correct test for imputation of a codefendant's weapons 

possession to a defendant for purposes of a§ 2Dl.l(b)(l) 

enhancement. Under§ 1Bl.3(a)(l), quoted above, a defendant's 

specific offense characteristics, including the firearm 

enhancement, are to be determined on the basis of "all acts and 

omissions committed or aided and abetted by the defendant, or for 

which the defendant would otherwise be accountable." u.s.s.G 

§ 1Bl.3(a)(l). The commentary suggests that an act "for which the 

defendant would otherwise be accountable" includes any act by a 

codefendant taken "in furtherance of the execution of [a] jointly 

undertaken criminal activity [if the act] was reasonably 

foreseeable by the defendant." u.s.s.G. § 1B1.3, comment. (n.l). 

We recently endorsed the commentary's interpretation, and, 

furthermore, held that reasonable foreseeability of weapons 

possession by a codefendant may be inferred if the codefendant 

knowingly possessed the weapon. See United States v. McFarlane, 

-9-

Appellate Case: 90-3220 Document: 01019293801 Date Filed: 07/08/1991 Page: 9 
No. 90-3257, slip. op. at 3 (lOth Cir. May 21, 1991) [1991 WL 

81110] (citing United States v. Aguilara-Zapata, 901 F.2d 1209, 

1215 (5th Cir. 1990)). 3 See also United States v. Williams, 894 

F.2d 208 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. White, 875 F.2d 427, 

433 (4th Cir. 1989). Defendant has anticipated our holding in 

McFarlane, arguing that the government did not demonstrate that 

any of his coconspirators knowingly possessed any of the firearms 

seized on the farms. Therefore, defendant contends, the court 

erred in attributing the weapons possession to him. 

For§ 2Dl.l(b)(l) to apply, the government must prove weapons 

possession by a preponderance of the evidence. See Goddard, 929 

F.2d at 549. And we review the district court's determination for 

clear error. Id. at 548-49 (citing 18 u.s.c. § 3742(e)). See 

also McFarlane, No. 90-3257, slip. op. at 4 (knowledge of 

codefendant's possession is a factual issue to be reviewed for 

clear error). "(W]e will not reverse the district court unless 

the court's finding was without factual support in the record, or 

if after reviewing all the evidence we are left with the definite 

3 In Goddard, we held that a coconspirator's weapons possession 

could be attributed to the defendant pursuant to§ 2Dl.l(b)(l) 

without reliance on the reasonable foreseeability test of 

§ 1Bl.3(a)(l) because the commentary to§ 2Dl.l(b)(l) suggests 

that the provision is applicable directly to conspiracies. 929 

F.2d at 548. This is not to say that§ 1Bl.3(a)(l) is 

inapplicable in all conspiracy cases. In the Goddard case, the 

defendant's sentence was enhanced "because of his knowing and 

voluntary complicity with the possessor of the gun where he knew 

the gun was present and it was connected to the conspiracy." Id. 

at 549. In the present case, it is not clear whether defendant 

knew of the weapons possession by coconspirators; thus, it is 

proper to look to the § 1B1.3 reasonable foreseeability test as 

articulated in McFarlane, No. 90-3257, slip op. at 3. 

-10-

Appellate Case: 90-3220 Document: 01019293801 Date Filed: 07/08/1991 Page: 10 
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." United States 

v. Beaulieu, 893 F.2d 1177, 1181-82 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied 110 

s. Ct. 3302 (1990). In this case, however, we have no factual 

finding to review. The court simply stated the guideline range 

and referred to the accuracy of the presentence report. 

The presentence report documented the firearms involved in 

this case, but it made no reference to the required finding that 

the defendant knowingly possess the firearms or that a 

codefendant's possession be reasonably foreseeable. Although our 

cases clearly do not require the district court to make 

particularized findings for guidelines adjustments such as 

§ 2Dl.l(b)(l), at a minimum, the court must make a finding that 

the requirements for the adjustment have been satisfied. For 

example, in Beaulieu, the leading Tenth Circuit case in this area, 

the court below dealt with a § 3Cl.l adjustment for obstruction of 

justice resulting from a defendant's perjurious testimony. 900 

F.2d at 1532. At the sentencing hearing, the district court in 

that case found: 

The evidence at trial concerning [defendant], was 

overwhelming in the Court's view. And the jury flatly 

rejected the testimony that he provided. 

The Court does not criticize defense counsel for putting 

[defendant] on the stand . . . • 

But the [defendant's] testimony was flatly contradicted 

by the other evidence at trial. 

And the Court believes that a defendant who testifies 

falsely at trial should be subject to an increased 

offense level. And I am more than adequately persuaded 

that the defendant perjured himself during his testimony 

at trial. 

-11-

Appellate Case: 90-3220 Document: 01019293801 Date Filed: 07/08/1991 Page: 11 
Id. at 1535. We held that "the Guidelines do not require 

'findings' for adjustments more specific than were the reasons 

here expressed by the trial judge at sentencing." In no way, 

however, did we hold that the trial court was not required to make 

any finding regarding the guideline adjustment. See also United 

States v. Maldonado-Campos, 920 F.2d 714, 719 (lOth Cir. 1990) 

(district court was not required to announce reasons supporting a 

factual finding concerning § 3Dl.2, but was at least required to 

make a finding). The Ninth Circuit has cited Beaulieu for the 

proposition that 18 u.s.c. § 3553(c) (exclusive of subsections 

(c)(l) and (c)(2)) requires that the district court at least state 

"its general reasons for its imposition of the particular 

sentence • • " United States v. Lockard, 910 F.2d 542, 544 

(9th Cir. 1990). And the Third Circuit has held that "[t]his 

general requirement is satisfied when a district court indicates 

the applicable Guidelines range, and how it was chosen." 

Georgiadis, No. 90-3224, slip. op. at 2. We agree with the courts 

that have held that§ 3553 subsection (c), without regard to 

subsections (c)(l) and (c)(2), requires a district court to make a 

general statement of its reasoning for the sentence imposed. 

Otherwise, we would be left in a "zone of speculation" on 

appellate review. United States v. Donaldson, 915 F.2d 612 (lOth 

Cir. 1990). 

Certainly the statement of reasoning does not have to be 

particularized, but, in this case, the court made no statement. 

It referenced only to the accuracy of the presentence report as a 

-12-

Appellate Case: 90-3220 Document: 01019293801 Date Filed: 07/08/1991 Page: 12 
whole. we do not know whether the firearm enhancement resulted 

from the weapon found in defendant's truck or the weapons found on 

the farms or both, and upon review of the record we may only 

speculate as to whether the district court applied the correct 

legal standard for attributing the weapons to defendant. 

Regarding the court's reference to the accuracy of the presentence 

report, we are dubious about the probation officer's awareness of 

the proper standard for a§ 2Dl.l(b)(l) firearm adjustment. We 

therefore REMAND for resentencing. 4 Upon remand, the district 

court is instructed simultaneously to vacate the prior sentence 

and resentence with at least a general statement noting the 

appropriate guideline range and how it was calculated. Also, the 

court is instructed to make a finding as to whether defendant 

knowingly possessed weapons or if the weapons possession by his 

codefendants was reasonably foreseeable. If the court finds that 

a§ 2Dl.l(b)(l) firearm adjustment is not indicated, and therefore 

sentences defendant to a lesser term, the court is instructed to 

comply with 18 u.s.c. § 3553(c)(l)'s requirement of a statement of 

reasons for the particular point chosen within the guideline 

range. 

4 Defendant also contends that his constitutional due process 

rights were violated at the sentencing hearing by hearsay 

testimony regarding his drug related activities while on release 

after his arrest for this offense. Upon careful review of the 

testimony, we find that it does not lack the "minimal indicium of 

reliability" required by the due process clause. Beaulieu, 893 

F.2d at 1181 (citing United States v. Sunrhodes, 831 F.2d 1537, 

1543 (lOth Cir. 1987) and u.s.s.G. § 6Al.3, comment.). In any 

event, the district court expressly stated that the testimony had 

no bearing on the sentencing determination. 

-13-

Appellate Case: 90-3220 Document: 01019293801 Date Filed: 07/08/1991 Page: 13