Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01791/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01791-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Clark E. Ducart
Respondent
Lue Seng Thao
Petitioner

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LUE SENG THAO,

Petitioner,

v.

CLARK E. DUCART,

1

Respondent.

No. 2:14-cv-1791 KJN P

ORDER

I. Introduction

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding without counsel, has filed a petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner consented to proceed before the 

undersigned for all purposes. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). On August 27, 2014, petitioner filed an 

application to proceed in forma pauperis as required by this court’s August 5, 2014 order. 

Examination of the in forma pauperis application reveals that petitioner is unable to afford 

the costs of suit. Accordingly, the application to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 

 

1

 Clark E. Ducart is the present warden of Pelican Bay State Prison, and is substituted as 

respondent herein. Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d); see Brittingham v. United States, 982 F.2d 378, 379 

(9th Cir. 1992).

Case 2:14-cv-01791-WBS-KJN Document 10 Filed 10/29/14 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

This action is proceeding on the original petition filed July 25, 2014, and signed by 

petitioner on July 14, 2014. On July 25, 2014, petitioner also filed a notice of unexhausted claims 

and a request to hold proceedings in abeyance. (ECF No. 3.) Petitioner claims that his petition 

contains unexhausted claims, known as a “mixed” petition, and seeks to stay this case pending 

exhaustion of his state court remedies. Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 276 (2005). For the 

following reasons, the court denies the motion for stay without prejudice. 

II. Motion to Stay

A. Stay and Abeyance Procedures

Two procedures are available to federal habeas petitioners who wish to proceed with 

exhausted and unexhausted claims for relief. The “Kelly procedure,” outlined in Kelly v. Small, 

315 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2003), has been described by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to 

involve the following three-step process:

(1) petitioner amends his petition to delete any unexhausted claims, 

(2) the court stays and holds in abeyance the amended, fully 

exhausted petition, allowing petitioner the opportunity to proceed to 

state court to exhaust the deleted claims, and (3) petitioner later 

amends his petition and re-attaches the newly-exhausted claims to 

the original petition.

King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir. 2009). A petitioner who proceeds under Kelly will 

be able to amend his petition with newly exhausted claims if they are timely under the statute of 

limitations governing the filing of federal habeas petitions. If a petitioner’s newly-exhausted 

claims are untimely, he will be able to amend his petition to include them only if they share a 

“common core of operative facts” with the claims raised in the original federal petition. In this 

regard, the Kelly procedure, unlike the alternative procedure discussed below, is a riskier one for 

a habeas petitioner because it does not protect a petitioner’s unexhausted claims from expiring 

during a stay and becoming time-barred. See King, 564 F.3d at 1140-41; see also Duncan v. 

Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 172-75, (2001) (unlike the filing of a state habeas petition, the filing of a 

federal habeas petition does not toll the statute of limitations).

As the Ninth Circuit explained in King, the United States Supreme Court has authorized a 

second procedure for pursuing both exhausted and unexhausted claims, set forth in Rhines, 544 

Case 2:14-cv-01791-WBS-KJN Document 10 Filed 10/29/14 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

U.S. at 277. Under the Rhines procedure, the petitioner may proceed on a “mixed petition,” i.e., 

one containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims, and his unexhausted claims remain 

pending in federal court while he returns to state court to exhaust them. See King, 564 F.3d at 

1140; Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654, 660 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Rhines concluded that a district court 

has discretion to stay a mixed petition to allow a petitioner time to return to state court to present 

unexhausted claims.”). 

A petitioner who proceeds under Rhines can, in many instances, avoid a statute of 

limitations problem with respect to his unexhausted claims. See King, 564 F.3d at 1140. 

However, the requirements are more stringent for the granting of a stay under Rhines, as 

compared to Kelly. The Supreme Court has cautioned that a “stay and abeyance [under the 

Rhines procedure] should be available only in limited circumstances,” and “district courts should 

place reasonable time limits on a petitioner’s trip to state court and back.” Rhines, 544 U.S. at 

277-78. District courts should not grant a stay under Rhines if the petitioner has engaged in 

abusive litigation tactics or intentional delay, or if the unexhausted claims are plainly meritless. 

Id. at 278. Further, under Rhines, “‘stay-and-abeyance is only appropriate when the district court 

determines there was good cause for the petitioner’s failure to exhaust his claims first in state 

court.’” King, 564 F.3d at 1139 (quoting Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277-78).2

The decisions in both Kelly and Rhines “are directed at solving the same problem --

namely, the interplay between AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations and the total exhaustion 

requirement first articulated in Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982).” King, 564 F.3d at 1136.

B. Petitioner’s Motion

As set forth above, petitioner specifically seeks to stay this case under Rhines. While not 

entirely clear, it appears that petitioner contends he demonstrates good cause because, based on 

his review of the trial transcripts, he determined that additional issues had not been raised. (ECF 

No. 3 at 3.) Petitioner argues that any default in failing to raise these claims in the petition for 

review was the result of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Petitioner contends he raised 

 

2

 The Kelly procedure, which remains available after Rhines, does not require a showing of good 

cause. King, 564 F.3d at 1140.

Case 2:14-cv-01791-WBS-KJN Document 10 Filed 10/29/14 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

these claims in the petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the California Supreme Court to 

fully and fairly present the claims for review on the merits. Petitioner argues that he is entitled to 

file a protective petition, relying on Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 416-17 (2005) 

(“petitioner’s reasonable confusion about whether a state filing would be timely would ordinarily 

constitute ‘good cause’ under Rhines.”) Petitioner asks the court to hold the petition in abeyance 

under Rhines to provide the California Supreme Court with the opportunity to rule on the 

collateral challenge, because denial of his motion would foreclose petitioner from seeking federal 

habeas relief on such claims. (ECF No. 3 at 5.)

C. Comparison of Claims

In the original petition, petitioner raises the following claims: (1) the trial court erred 

when it denied the motion to suppress statements made to police officers because those 

statements were made involuntarily, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 

States Constitution; and (2) defense counsel was ineffective, in violation of the Sixth 

Amendment, for failing to adequately articulate the suppression motion. Both of these claims 

were raised on direct appeal, in the Court of Appeal, and the California Supreme Court, and were 

denied on the merits. (ECF No. 1 at 31; 32.) Thus, the instant petition contains fully exhausted 

claims and is not a mixed petition.

In his separately filed notice and request to stay this case, petitioner lists his unexhausted 

claims: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel based on (a) defense counsel’s statement that 

petitioner “is indeed guilty of some of the crimes he’s charged with. He’s guilty of assault with a 

deadly weapon and he’s guilty of . . . shooting at an occupied motor vehicle.” (ECF No. 3 at 8.); 

(b) defense counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s use of petitioner’s co-defendant’s 

statements against petitioner; (c) failure to object and file a motion for mistrial based on an 

alleged violation of the Confrontation Clause; and (2) the trial court erred when it denied 

petitioner’s motion to suppress his statements made to police officers. 

D. Discussion 

The instant petition includes only exhausted claims. However, in his motion, petitioner 

states that he filed a petition in the California Supreme Court raising his unexhausted claims on 

Case 2:14-cv-01791-WBS-KJN Document 10 Filed 10/29/14 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

July 18, 2014. (ECF No. 3 at 1.) The California Supreme Court website reflects that petitioner 

filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on August 4, 2014, in Case No. S220439, and that the 

case was closed on October 15, 2014. See California Appellate Courts Case Information 

Website, Case No. S208953, <http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov> (updated and accessed 

October 28, 2014). Thus, it appears that petitioner has now exhausted his state court remedies as 

to his proposed new claims, and no stay is required. Petitioner’s motion for stay is denied without 

prejudice, and petitioner is granted leave to file an amended petition in which he raises all of his 

exhausted claims for relief.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Petitioner is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 9); 

2. Clark E. Ducart is substituted as respondent herein; 

3. Petitioner’s motion for stay (ECF No. 3) is denied without prejudice; and 

4. Within thirty days from the date of this order, petitioner is granted leave to file an 

amended petition raising all of his exhausted claims or, in the alternative, petitioner shall inform 

the court that he wishes to proceed on the original petition. Failure to comply with this order will 

result in the issuance of a briefing order on petitioner’s original petition. 

Dated: October 29, 2014

/thao1791.stay

Case 2:14-cv-01791-WBS-KJN Document 10 Filed 10/29/14 Page 5 of 5