Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-08-07121/USCOURTS-caDC-08-07121-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Montgomery Blair Sibley
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 20, 2009 Decided May 1, 2009

No. 08-7121

IN RE: MONTGOMERY BLAIR SIBLEY,

RESPONDENT

Montgomery Blair Sibley argued the cause and filed the

briefs for respondent.

Brian D. Netter, appointed by the court, argued the cause as

amicus curiae. With him on the brief was Andrew J. Pincus.

Before: SENTELLE, Chief Judge, TATEL and GRIFFITH,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge SENTELLE.

SENTELLE, Chief Judge: In March 2008, the Supreme Court

of Florida suspended Montgomery Blair Sibley from the practice

of law for three years for two counts of misconduct: contempt

of court for his failure to pay child support and filing frivolous

claims and appeals. Sibley is a member of the bar of this court.

Pursuant to Rule 46 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure

and this court’s inherent powers, we issued an order to show

cause why the imposition of reciprocal discipline on Sibley

would be unwarranted. We subsequently appointed amicus

curiae to assist the court and heard argument at Sibley’s request.

The issues before the court are whether the procedures

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employed by the Florida Supreme Court and the Referee

appointed by that court were so lacking in notice or the

opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due

process and whether the Florida Supreme Court issued a

sanction with such infirmity of proof as to require further

review. We find that Sibley has failed to demonstrate that there

was a lack of notice or infirmity of proof and thus suspend

Sibley from practicing before this court for three years, nunc pro

tunc to May 12, 2008, on the same conditions as imposed by the

Florida Supreme Court.

Background

Pursuant to a marital settlement agreement, Sibley was

obligated to pay his former wife $4,000 per month in child

support if he moved out of South Florida. Sibley moved out of

the area in May 2000 and failed subsequently to pay any child

support. On August 5, 2002, the Circuit Court of the Eleventh

Judicial Circuit found that Sibley’s financial situation had not

substantially changed since he agreed to the marital settlement

and, therefore, found him to be in contempt of court for wilfully

failing to pay the support in violation of the court’s order. The

court sentenced Sibley to a deferred 90 days of imprisonment

pending an opportunity for Sibley to purge himself of the

contempt by making three monthly installments to satisfy his

overdue child support obligations. The court subsequently

increased the sentence for contempt to an indefinite term or until

the contempt was purged. When Sibley missed the first

payment, the Eleventh Judicial Circuit ordered Sibley’s

immediate incarceration. On appeal, the Third District Court of

Appeal upheld Sibley’s contempt and child support orders

finding that Sibley could either sell personal property or ask his

wealthy father for the amount. Sibley v. Sibley, 833 So. 2d 847,

848-49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002). The appellate court noted

that Sibley’s conduct constituted “the very epitome of a wilful,

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contemptuous refusal to obey a binding order of the court.” Id.

at 849. One judge dissented, noting that the record did not

adequately support the proposition that Sibley had sufficient

personal property to sell to obtain the purge amount and that the

assets of Sibley’s father were not considered by the trial court

and thus could not be considered on appeal. Id. at 850-53

(Cope, J., dissenting). Sibley unsuccessfully petitioned for

review by the Florida Supreme Court, Sibley v. Sibley, 854 So.

2d 660 (Fla. 2003), and the Supreme Court of the United States

denied Sibley’s motion for a stay, 540 U.S. 1100 (2004), as well

as his petition for writ of certiorari, 540 U.S. 1109 (2004).

In a related proceeding, the Third District Court rejected an

appeal by Sibley of two Circuit Court orders compelling

payment of attorneys fees for Sibley’s former wife and tuition

for Sibley’s children. The Third District Court granted Sibley’s

former wife’s motion for sanctions and barred Sibley from

representing himself in further appeals. Sibley v. Sibley, 885 So.

2d 980 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). The court noted that Sibley

had initiated 25 self-represented appeal proceedings in Florida

courts, 24 of which were found meritless, and filed at least 12

federal court actions in Florida (all dismissed) against various

judges assigned to his cases, the court system, and his former

wife, plus a federal action in Delaware against his former wife

which was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id.

at 986. Because Sibley’s numerous appeals served as “an

unending source of vexatious and meritless litigation,” the

appellate court barred Sibley from further self-representation in

that court. Id. at 988. The Florida Supreme Court denied

Sibley’s petition for review, Sibley v. Sibley, 901 So. 2d 120

(Fla. 2005), and the United States Supreme Court denied

certiorari, 546 U.S. 813 (2005).

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Based on a recommendation from the Second Judicial

Circuit Grievance Committee, on July 12, 2006 the Florida Bar

filed a complaint against Sibley alleging two violations of the

rules regulating the Florida Bar. Count I alleged that Sibley

violated Florida Bar Rule 4-8.4(h), which provides that a lawyer

engages in misconduct if he should “wilfully refuse, as

determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, to timely pay

a child support obligation.” Count II alleged that Sibley violated

Florida Bar Rule 4-3.1, which prohibits a lawyer from making

a claim in court “unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing

so that is not frivolous.” Pursuant to Florida Bar Rule 3-7.6(a),

a Referee was designated to handle Sibley’s case. 

Sibley sought extensive discovery from the Florida Bar and

sought subpoenas for the depositions of the judge on the circuit

court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit and judges on the Florida

Third District Court of Appeal, as well as “documentary

evidence to contradict the findings of fact in the Third District

Court of Appeals’ decision.” Sibley also filed several writs of

prohibition. All of the motions were denied. Sibley then

responded to the charges with “affirmative defenses”; the

Referee struck the “defenses” pursuant to a motion from the

Florida Bar but noted Sibley could raise the same issues during

the final hearing. When the Referee was unable to reach Sibley

to set a mutually convenient time for the final hearing, the

Referee scheduled the final hearing for April 16, 2007. Five

days prior to the hearing, Sibley filed a “Motion to Dismiss or,

Alternatively, Fifth Affidavit and Motion to Disqualify, or

Alternatively, Motion to Continue Hearing.” In his motion,

Sibley indicated he had professional obligations that would

prevent him from appearing in April but that he would make

himself available by telephone for a “scheduling hearing.” The

Referee denied the motion. On the final hearing date, Sibley

failed to appear and the Referee conducted the hearing without

him. After the final hearing both parties submitted proposed

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1

 Sibley also challenged the Referee and the justices’

authority in federal court. The United States District Court for the

Northern District of Florida rejected Sibley’s argument that 4 U.S.C.

§§ 101 and 102 imposed oath of office obligations that the Referee

and justices did not fulfill. See Sibley v. Florida Bar, No. 4:08cv219-

RH/WCS, 2008 WL 3471781 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 11, 2008). Sibley filed

reports to the Referee. Sibley also filed a request with the

Florida Supreme Court to subpoena the Referee so he could

advance his theory that the Referee was acting improperly. 

The Referee issued his report concluding that a court of

competent jurisdiction had found that Sibley wilfully refused to

pay his child support obligation in a timely manner and,

therefore, recommended that Sibley be found guilty of violating

Rule 4-8.4(h). The Referee also concluded that the Third

District Court of Appeals’ sanction of Sibley for filing vexatious

and meritless litigation warranted recommending that Sibley be

found guilty of violating Rule 4-3.1. The Referee recommended

a three-year suspension in light of six aggravating factors:

Sibley’s “dishonest or selfish motive,” his “pattern of

misconduct,” “multiple offenses,” intentional failure to comply

“with rules or orders of the disciplinary agency,” “refusal to

acknowledge the wrongful nature” of the conduct, and his

“substantial experience in the practice of law.” 

The Florida Supreme Court, after full briefing but without

oral argument, approved the Referee’s report and entered a

suspension order. Florida Bar v. Sibley, 979 So. 2d 221 (Fla.

2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 41 (2008). The suspension order

was stayed until May 12, 2008, to allow Sibley to seek review

in the Supreme Court of the United States. Sibley then filed

post-discipline motions challenging the authority and power of

the Referee and some of the Florida Supreme Court justices to

act as constitutional officers.1

 Specifically, Sibley asserted that

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a separate petition for writ of habeas corpus in district court that was

rejected because Sibley was not in custody. Sibley v. Lewis, No.

4:08cv243-RH/WCS, 2008 WL 3982654 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 24, 2008).

they were without authority to act because they allegedly failed

to properly execute loyalty oaths with their respective courts.

The Florida Supreme Court rejected this argument. Florida Bar

v. Sibley, 995 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 2008), cert. denied, 2009 WL

425340 (Feb. 23, 2009). 

Analysis

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 46(b)(1)(A) provides

that “[a] member of the court’s bar is subject to suspension or

disbarment by the court if the member . . . has been suspended

or disbarred from practice in any other court.” After considering

any response from the attorney, the court shall impose the

identical discipline unless the attorney demonstrates that:

(1) the procedure was so lacking in notice or

opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of

due process; or

(2) there was such an infirmity of proof establishing

the misconduct as to give rise to the clear conviction

that this Court could not, consistent with its duty,

accept as final the conclusion on that subject; or

(3) the imposition of the same discipline by this Court

would result in grave injustice; or

(4) the misconduct warrants substantially different

discipline.

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D.C. Cir. Rules, App. II, Rule IV(c); see also Selling v. Radford,

243 U.S. 46, 51 (1917) (establishing same criteria for reciprocal

discipline based on state court discipline order). The burden of

showing why the court should not impose reciprocal discipline

rests with Sibley. In re Calvo, 88 F.3d 962, 967 (11th Cir.

1996); In re Theis, 662 F.2d 771, 772 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (noting

that Selling found state disbarment gives rise to rebuttable

presumption that attorney lacks character to remain member of

federal bar). Sibley only alleges that he was not afforded the

requisite due process during his disciplinary proceedings and

that there was an infirmity of proof establishing the misconduct

and thus we only address these two issues. 

A. Due Process

Sibley challenges the sufficiency of the Florida disbarment

proceedings, contending that the suspension order is void

because the Florida Supreme Court justices and the Referee

failed to take the requisite oaths. This argument, however, has

been fully litigated and rejected by the Florida state courts.

Florida Bar v. Sibley, 995 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 2008), cert. denied,

129 S. Ct. 1348 (2009). In addition, Sibley pursued this

challenge in the United States District Court for the Northern

District of Florida and the challenge was dismissed pursuant to

the Rooker-Feldman bar on collateral attacks against a state

court decision. Sibley v. Florida Bar, No. 4:08cv219-RH/WCS,

2008 WL 4525395 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 3, 2008). See also In re

Cook, 551 F.3d 542, 547-48 (6th Cir. 2009), Richardson v.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 83 F.3d 1513, 1514-15

(D.C. Cir. 1996). Because administration of the relevant oaths

is a question of state law, this court cannot look beyond the

controlling decisions of the Florida state courts. 

Sibley also asserts that the length of the proceedings in and

of itself was a violation of due process, as was the failure of the

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Florida Bar to present charges “under oath” or to allow him the

opportunity to call specific witnesses in his defense. Contrary

to Sibley’s assertions, the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth

Amendment of the Constitution simply does not apply to noncriminal cases such as this attorney discipline case. In re Calvo,

88 F.3d at 967 (“Disbarment proceedings are not criminal

proceedings.”). Moreover, only a little over a year and a half

passed between the filing of the formal complaint against Sibley

on July 12, 2006, and his suspension by the Supreme Court of

Florida on March 7, 2008. In addition, there is no requirement

that charges be brought under “oath,” only that “formal charges

[be made] in writing that give fair and adequate notice of the

nature of the alleged misconduct.” Model Rules for Lawyer

Disciplinary Enforcement R. 11(D); see also In re Ruffalo, 390

U.S. 544, 550 (1968) (procedural due process includes “fair

notice of the charge”). Sibley’s reliance on Ex Parte Burr, 22

U.S. 529 (1824) is misplaced. Ex Parte Burr does not require

disciplinary proceedings to be brought under oath but rather

details the unusual circumstances in which Burr did not have

charges brought against him but instead invited the Court to

undertake disciplinary proceedings. The witnesses Sibley

sought to produce were the trial judge who held Sibley in

contempt for failure to pay his child support and five judges on

the Florida Third District Court of Appeal who found Sibley to

be filing meritless appeals. The Referee’s denial of Sibley’s

motion to subpoena these “witnesses” was well within his

discretion. See United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422

(1941) (integrity of mental process of a judge cannot be subject

to scrutiny). Furthermore, Sibley has no confrontation right in

an attorney discipline case. See Rosenthal v. Justices of the

Supreme Court of Cal., 910 F.2d 561, 565 (9th Cir. 1990).

Sibley also argues that the Referee’s failure to grant a

continuance for the final hearing date violated due process.

Sibley, however, received notice of the final hearing date and

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moved for a continuance. When that continuance was denied,

Sibley simply elected not to appear. Thus, Sibley has in no way

shown that the proceedings were so lacking in fairness that his

due process rights were violated.

Sibley also challenges the Referee’s striking of his

“affirmative defenses.” While the Referee did grant the Florida

Bar’s motion to strike the affirmative defenses, he later provided

that even though the motion to strike was granted, Sibley could

raise his defenses during the final hearing. Therefore, Sibley

could have raised any defenses at the final hearing, but he chose

not to attend.

Finally, Sibley asserts that the Referee’s adoption of much

of the Florida Bar’s report as his own renders the Referee’s

report infirm. For this proposition, Sibley relies on Anderson v.

City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 572 (1985), in which the

Supreme Court noted that it had “criticized courts for their

verbatim adoption of findings of fact prepared by prevailing

parties . . . .” Sibley’s reliance is poorly taken, as the Supreme

Court went on to suggest “that even when the trial judge adopts

proposed findings verbatim, the findings are those of the court

and may be reversed only if clearly erroneous.” Id. (citing

United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 615 n.13

(1974)). In any event, we are not sitting as a court of review to

discover error in the Referee’s or the Florida courts’

proceedings. We only ask whether that procedure “was so

lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a

deprivation of due process; or there was such an infirmity of

proof establishing the misconduct as to give rise to the clear

conviction that this Court could not, consistent with its duty,

accept as final the conclusion on that subject . . . .” D.C. Cir.

Rules App. II, Rule IV(c). The adoption by a court of the courtappointed referee’s report meets none of those criteria.

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B. Infirmity of Proof

Sibley also challenges the factual basis for his suspension,

arguing that the contempt order for failing to pay child support

was not based upon record evidence. Relying on the dissenting

opinion in the Third District Court of Appeal, Sibley alleges that

the Florida Supreme Court found that his father, and not Sibley,

had failed to pay the child support. This is simply not the case.

In her contempt order, the trial court judge in Sibley’s state

divorce proceeding very clearly found that Sibley’s actions were

“the essence of wilful refusal to obey a Court order.”

Respondent’s Appendix at 12, 13. That order and the courtimposed sanction were upheld on appeal. Even the dissenting

opinion upon which Sibley relies addressed only the propriety

of the purge amount; no judge questioned the finding of a wilful

violation underlying the contempt citation. And in any event,

Sibley seems to forget that once the majority of a court has

spoken, the best the dissent can do is offer one judge’s opinion

as to what the case law should be but is not. The dissent is thus

doubly immaterial.

Sibley also challenges the finding that he violated Florida

Bar Rule 4-3.1 which prevents lawyers from bringing claims

“unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not

frivolous.” The Third District Court of Appeal concluded that

Sibley was “an unending source of vexatious and meritless

litigation.” Sibley, 885 So. 2d at 988. Sibley asserts that because

the court did not specifically find that his litigation was

“frivolous,” the requirements of Rule 4-3.1 are not met. It is

clear, however, from the full reading of the decision noting that

Sibley had filed 24 unsuccessful meritless appeals in state court,

among others, that the standards of Rule 4-3.1 are met. There is,

therefore, no infirmity of proof as to this charge.

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Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we suspend Sibley from

practicing before this court for three years, nunc pro tunc to

May 12, 2008, on the same conditions as imposed by the Florida

Supreme Court. Sibley’s reinstatement to the bar of this court

is contingent upon certification that he has met the conditions of

reinstatement imposed by the Florida Supreme Court. Sibley is

prohibited from holding himself out to be an attorney at law

licensed to practice before the United States Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia Circuit during the suspension.

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