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Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Terry B. Young
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted March 26, 2020*

Decided March 27, 2020

Before

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge

No. 19-2964

TERRY B. YOUNG,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 

Eastern Division.

No. 1:02-cv-00390

Sarah L. Ellis,

Judge.

O R D E R

In this appeal, Terry Young continues his quest to recover about $133,000 in 

assets that the government seized to partially satisfy a $6 million criminal forfeiture 

order issued in 1999. Young never appealed the forfeiture judgment, but he contends 

* We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs 

and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would 

not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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that it is “void” and unenforceable, so he has bombarded the district court with various 

motions seeking the return of his property. After striking out on a fourth motion

purportedly under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), Young appeals. We affirm the 

district court’s decision denying the motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

In 1999, Young, along with multiple codefendants, was convicted after a jury trial

of drug crimes and money laundering. The jury also returned a special forfeiture 

verdict finding the defendants jointly and severally liable for $6 million in drug 

proceeds. The final judgment reflected Young’s sentence of life imprisonment and his 

liability for the $6 million. On appeal, we affirmed Young’s conviction but vacated his 

sentence. United States v. Mansoori, 304 F.3d 635, 642 (7th Cir. 2002). Young, however, 

did not contest the forfeiture. On remand, the district court reduced Young’s sentence 

on one count of conviction but again imposed a sentence of life imprisonment on the 

top count; in the amended judgment, the court stated that aside from the modifications 

in that order, the original judgment “is to stand.” Again, Young appealed the sentence 

without challenging the forfeiture judgment. We affirmed. United States v. Mansoori,

480 F.3d 514, 525 (7th Cir. 2007).

In the meantime, in 2002, Young separately filed this civil action seeking the 

return of property—about $133,000 in substitute assets seized by the government as 

proceeds of drug trafficking—under what was then Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 

41(e).1 He argued that there was no valid forfeiture judgment with respect to those 

assets. The district court denied the motion, and we dismissed the appeal because 

Young did not pay the filing fee. So he filed another “Rule 41” motion, which was 

denied. On appeal, we rejected the argument that, to be valid, a forfeiture judgment 

must identify the specific accounts from which the funds would be drawn. United States 

v. Young, 489 F.3d 313, 315 (7th Cir. 2007). 

More importantly, we recognized that in his motion, Young really challenged a 

component of his sentence and therefore the “judgment itself.” Id. at 316. Such a 

challenge must be raised “on direct appeal or not at all.” Id. at 315. Noting that “a 

district court’s jurisdiction to alter a judgment of conviction after sentencing is 

extremely limited,” we could imagine “no exception that would authorize Young’s 

belated challenge to a criminal forfeiture.” Id. at 316 (citing United States v. Zingsheim, 

1 The 2002 reorganization of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 41 moved 

the provision authorizing a motion to return property to Rule 41(g).

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384 F.3d 867, 871 (7th Cir. 2004)). Thus, the district court lacked jurisdiction to address 

the motion, and we modified the judgment to reflect a jurisdictional dismissal. Id.

Undeterred, Young kept the civil docket alive by moving, ostensibly under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4), to vacate the “void” judgment of forfeiture and 

have his assets returned. Young argued that the forfeiture had been wiped out when his 

sentence was vacated on direct appeal, and he was never “resentenced” to any 

forfeiture. The district court denied the motion as untimely. Young tried again, and the 

district court denied the next motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, citing our 

2007 decision to that effect. The court denied Young’s third “Rule 60(b)(4)” motion for 

the same reason and threatened him with sanctions for continuing to file frivolous 

motions. Ignoring the district court’s advice that he should appeal the order if he 

disagreed with it, Young filed a fourth motion that was met with the same response. 

Finally, Young appealed.

As we have already explained to Young, he could challenge his criminal 

forfeiture only through direct appeal. Young, 489 F.3d at 315–16. See also United States v. 

Bania, 787 F.3d 1168, 1171–72 (7th Cir. 2015). That ship sailed a decade ago; now, the 

district court lacks jurisdiction to alter the judgment of conviction. Calling the judgment 

“void” does nothing to change that—but we note that the district court in fact

incorporated the original forfeiture judgment into the amended judgment order. (And 

in later amendments, not relevant here, the district court included similar language.)

We further note that the district court could have denied all but the first of the

“Rule 60(b)” motions summarily because they were procedurally improper. See Bell v. 

Eastman Kodak Co., 214 F.3d 798, 801 (7th Cir. 2000) (district court should not consider an 

improper Rule 60(b) motion on its merits). Young failed to appeal the denial of the first 

one; that did not entitle him to repeat the same arguments in a second motion, let alone 

a third and fourth. See Stoller v. Pure Fishing Inc., 528 F.3d 478, 480 (7th Cir. 2008) (A 

Rule 60(b) motion is not a substitute for a timely appeal.) The time to appeal was within 

60 days of the first order denying relief, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B); the last three identical 

motions were nuisance filings (which, unlike an appeal, did not cost Young any money 

to file in the already-open civil case). The district court was right to threaten sanctions 

and should not hesitate to impose them if Young resurrects his challenge in any form. 

We, too, warn Young that he must put this issue to rest; this is now the second 

time we have told him that he does not have a path to challenge the forfeiture. Filing 

further frivolous appeals will result in monetary sanctions, see McCready v. eBay, Inc.,

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453 F.3d 882, 892 (7th Cir. 2006), and, if they are not paid promptly, an order forbidding 

him from filing papers in any court within this circuit, see Support Sys. Int’l, Inc. v. Mack, 

45 F.3d 185, 186 (7th Cir. 1995).

AFFIRMED

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