Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-14-03324/USCOURTS-ca8-14-03324-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Willie Gonzalez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-3324

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Willie Gonzalez

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Nebraska - Omaha

____________

 Submitted: May 11, 2015

 Filed: July 2, 2015 

[Unpublished]

____________

Before WOLLMAN, SMITH, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

____________

PER CURIAM.

Willie Gonzalez pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess with intent to distribute

500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine in

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violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and the district court1

 sentenced him to 144 months’

imprisonment—a 24-month upward variance from the 120-month statutory mandatory

minimum sentence based on the quantity of methamphetamine involved. Gonzalez

appeals his sentence, and we affirm.

Gonzalez was originally indicted on one count of possession with intent to

distribute methamphetamine and was taken into custody. Prior to trial, he was

released from custody subject to several special conditions, including that he remain

in Nebraska and that he refrain from possessing or using drugs or alcohol. Within

weeks, however, a pretrial services officer filed a petition in the district court seeking

a warrant for Gonzalez’s arrest. The petition alleged that Gonzalez had violated the

terms of his pretrial release by testing positive for methamphetamine on two occasions

and by failing to appear for mandatory substance-abuse treatment. A warrant was

issued, and two days later, Gonzalez was arrested in Iowa in possession of 15 grams

of pure methamphetamine. Gonzalez admitted to violating the conditions of his

pretrial release, and his release was revoked. 

Gonzalez was later charged in a superseding indictment with the original count

of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and an additional count of

conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. Gonzalez pleaded guilty to the conspiracy

count without the benefit of a plea agreement, and a presentence investigation report

(PSR) was ordered. As relevant here, the PSR recommended a two-level increase to

Gonzalez’s base offense level under § 2D1.1(b)(1) of the United States Sentencing

Guidelines Manual (U.S.S.G. or Guidelines) for possession of a firearm in connection

with the conspiracy. Gonzalez objected to this recommendation.

1

The Honorable Richard G. Kopf, United States District Judge for the District

of Nebraska. 

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At the sentencing hearing, the government presented testimony to support

application of the firearm enhancement. Two cooperating witnesses testified that

methamphetamine trafficking had occurred at a tavern owned by Gonzalez and that

Gonzalez was involved in the trafficking. An Omaha police detective testified that

after receiving a tip about drug trafficking at the tavern, officers obtained warrants to

search the tavern and Gonzalez’s residence. When the detective and other officers

executed the warrant at the tavern, Gonzalez and one other individual were present,

and Gonzalez was standing near the bar. Officers searched Gonzalez and found a

small amount of methamphetamine on his person, as well as a small amount of

methamphetamine and a digital scale elsewhere in the tavern. Officers recovered a

firearm from a trash can located near the bar where Gonzalez had been standing and

ammunition matching the firearm from behind the bar. They also recovered

ammunition matching the firearm during the search of Gonzalez’s residence. 

Based on this evidence, the district court concluded that Gonzalez possessed the

firearm in connection with the drug-trafficking conspiracy and that the § 2D1.1(b)(1)

firearm enhancement applied. Gonzalez’s advisory Guidelines sentencing range with

the firearm enhancement would have been 87 to 108 months, but because the amount

of methamphetamine attributed to Gonzalez triggered a higher 120-month statutory

mandatory minimum sentence under § 841(b)(1), the mandatory minimum sentence

became the Guidelines range. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b) (“Where a statutorily required

minimum sentence is greater than the maximum of the applicable guideline range, the

statutorily required minimum sentence shall be the guideline sentence.”). Application

of the § 2D1.1(b)(1) firearm enhancement also meant that Gonzalez was ineligible for

safety-valve relief from the 120-month statutory mandatory minimum sentence. See

id. § 5C1.2(a)(2) (imposing requirement to qualify for relief that “the defendant did

not . . . possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon . . . in connection with the

offense”). After considering the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and taking into account

Gonzalez’s serious criminal conduct while on pretrial release, the district court

concluded that a 24-month upward variance from the 120-month mandatory minimum

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was appropriate and, as noted above, imposed a sentence of 144 months’

imprisonment. 

Although it does not develop the issue, Gonzalez’s brief appears to argue that

the district court erred by finding that the firearm was connected to the conspiracy and

by applying § 2D1.1(b)(1). We review for clear error a district court’s factual finding

that a defendant possessed a firearm for purposes of a § 2D1.1(b)(1) firearm

enhancement. See United States v. Atkins, 250 F.3d 1203, 1213 (8th Cir. 2001). The

enhancement applies “if the [firearm] was present, unless it is clearly improbable that

the [firearm] was connected with the offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.11. In other

words, the government must establish “that the firearm was present and was probably

connected to the drug charge.” United States v. Torres, 409 F.3d 1000, 1003 (8th Cir.

2005). Proof of “a temporal and spatial nexus” among the firearm, the defendant, and

the drug-trafficking activity is sufficient. Id.

Based upon the earlier-described testimony presented at the sentencing hearing,

we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Gonzalez

possessed the firearm in connection with the conspiracy to distribute

methamphetamine and that the court properly applied the § 2D1.1(b)(1) firearm

enhancement.2

2

Gonzalez’s Guidelines sentencing range was 87 to 100 months with the firearm

enhancement and 70 to 87 months without the enhancement. In either event, because

the 120-month statutory mandatory minimum was greater, the 120-month mandatory

minimum became the advisory Guidelines sentence. The question whether the firearm

enhancement applied remains relevant, however, because it renders Gonzalez

ineligible for § 5C1.2(a) relief from the 120-month mandatory minimum sentence. 

See United States v. Muniz Ochoa, 643 F.3d 1153, 1157-58 (8th Cir. 2011)

(concluding that because evidence was sufficient to support application of the

§ 2D1.1(b)(1) firearm enhancement, safety-valve relief under § 5C1.2(a) was

unavailable).

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Gonzalez next argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. We

review a defendant’s sentence—whether it is inside or outside the Guidelines

range—under a “deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552

U.S. 38, 41 (2007). “A district court abuses its discretion ‘when it fails to consider

a relevant and significant factor, gives significant weight to an irrelevant or improper

factor, or considers the appropriate factors but commits a clear error of judgment in

weighing those factors.’” United States v. Strong, 773 F.3d 920, 926 (8th Cir. 2014)

(quoting United States v. Robison, 759 F.3d 947, 950-51 (8th Cir. 2014)), cert. denied,

135 S. Ct. 1872 (2015). In calculating an appropriate sentence, a district court has

“substantial latitude” to weigh the § 3553(a) sentencing factors, United States v.

Ruelas-Mendez, 556 F.3d 655, 657 (8th Cir. 2009), and “it will be the unusual case

when we reverse a district court sentence—whether within, above, or below the

applicable Guidelines range—as substantively unreasonable,” United States v.

Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 464 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quoting United States v.

Gardellini, 545 F.3d 1089, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 2008)). 

After considering the § 3553(a) factors, the court determined that a 24-month

upward variance was appropriate in light of Gonzalez’s conduct while on pretrial

release. As noted above, after he was originally indicted, Gonzalez repeatedly

violated the terms of his pretrial release by possessing and using methamphetamine,

by failing to appear for substance-abuse treatment, and by leaving the state of

Nebraska. When Gonzalez was eventually arrested in Iowa, he was in possession of

15 grams of pure methamphetamine. Given the fact that Gonzalez’s pretrial-release

violations, like the offenses charged in the indictment, involved methamphetamine,

the district court could properly conclude that Gonzalez posed a substantial risk of

recidivism and that an upward variance was warranted. The district court did not

abuse its substantial discretion in weighing the § 3553(a) factors, and the resulting

sentence is not substantively unreasonable. 

The judgment is affirmed.

______________________________

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