Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-70803/USCOURTS-ca9-12-70803-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Salvador Amaya Andrade
Petitioner
Loretta E. Lynch
Respondent

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SALVADOR AMAYA ANDRADE,

Petitioner,

v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney

General,

Respondent.

No. 12-70803

Agency No.

A029-143-032

OPINION

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted May 6, 2015*

Seattle, Washington

Filed August 27, 2015

Before: J. Clifford Wallace, Andrew J. Kleinfeld,

and Morgan Christen, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam Opinion

* The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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2 ANDRADE V. LYNCH

SUMMARY**

Immigration

The panel denied a petition for review of the Board of

Immigration Appeals’ denial of deferral of removal under the

Convention Against Torture.

The panel held that the evidence did not compel the

conclusion that petitioner established it was more likely than

not he would be tortured in El Salvador due to his non-gang

tattoos. 

COUNSEL

Alma David, Rios & Cruz, P.S., Seattle, Washington, for

Petitioner.

James A. Hurley, Attorney, Thomas B. Fatouros, Senior

Litigation Counsel, and Stuart F. Delery, Principal Deputy

Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Office of

Immigration Litigation, Department of Justice, Washington,

D.C., for Respondent.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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ANDRADE V. LYNCH 3

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Petitioner Salvador Andrade, a native and citizen of El

Salvador, seeks review of a decision issued by the Board of

Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the Immigration

Judge’s denial of his application for deferral of removal under

the Convention Against Torture.

In 1988, Andrade, then a teenager, illegally entered the

United States. Twelve years later he was convicted of child

molestation.1

In 2008, twenty years after he came to the

United States, Immigration and Customs Enforcement

initiated removal proceedings. Andrade conceded that his

child molestation conviction makes him ineligible for

withholding of removal, but sought deferral of removal under

the Convention Against Torture. His mother and sisters, who

still live in El Salvador, have warned of the dangers from

gangs there.

The BIA held that Andrade had not established a

likelihood that he would be tortured upon his return to El

1 Andrade was convicted of child molestation in the third degree under

Revised Code of Washington § 9A.44.089. Revised Code of Washington

§ 9A.44.089 provides, in pertinent part, that:

A person is guilty of child molestation in the third

degree when the person has, or knowingly causes

another person under the age of eighteen to have,

sexual contact with another who is at least fourteen

years old but less than sixteen years old and not married

to the perpetrator and the perpetrator is at least

forty-eight months older than the victim.

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4 ANDRADE V. LYNCH

Salvador, or that its government would perpetrate or turn a

blind eye to the torture. Andrade petitions for review,

arguing that the BIA failed to give reasoned consideration of

country conditions, and that the record compelled the

conclusion that torture was likely, largely because his tattoos

would cause him to be perceived as a gang member.

The record is oddly devoid of a picture of Andrade’s

tattoos. All we have is his declaration in support of his

asylum petition, and his testimony and the judge’s

observation in his hearing before the Immigration Judge. 

Andrade says in his declaration that he got two tattoos in

about 2000, one on his bicep, and one on the back of his neck. 

They are decorative, not gang-related, showing his initials

and the initials of his girlfriend in around 2000. The

Immigration Judge asked him to roll up his sleeve, and said

“[t]he respondent appears to have a, a pictorial tattoo in the

area of his right bicep.”

Andrade’s country conditions argument is that the BIA

did not give “reasoned consideration” to the evidence that

deportees and anyone thought to be a gang member will

likely be arrested and interrogated, and sometimes are abused

by police officers shouting obscenities at them or beating

them, and that vigilante squads sometimes kill them. He says

that there is evidence that the Salvadoran government turns

a blind eye to the possibility of these death squad murders.

Andrade is right that failure of the BIA to consider

evidence of country conditions constitutes reversible error

where the Country Report has been submitted as evidence, it

addresses the risk of torture, and the BIA does not even

mention it. Aguilar Ramos v. Holder, 594 F.3d 701, 705 (9th

Cir. 2010) (citing Al-Saher v. INS, 268 F.3d 1143, 1147–48

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ANDRADE V. LYNCH 5

(9th Cir. 2001); Kamalthas v. INS, 251 F.3d 1279, 1284 (9th

Cir. 2001)).

In this case, unlike Aguilar-Ramos, the BIA gave

extensive and careful consideration to the CountryReport and

other materials in evidence regarding conditions in El

Salvador. The BIA said that the evidence clearly indicated

that suspects, deportees arriving in El Salvador, were subject

to arbitrary investigations and detentions, and that former

gang members were subject to reprisals, and took note of the

evidence of widespread violent crime, gang-related violence,

impunity from prosecution and judicial corruption, and

vigilante squads. The BIA’s consideration of the Country

Report and other materials distinguishes the Aguilar-Ramos

line of authority, applicable to cases where it did not give

consideration to submitted materials. Substantial evidence,

including the Country Report and other materials, supported

the BIA’s conclusion that Andrade had not proved that

“deportees (with or without tattoos) are likely to experience

mistreatment rising to the level of torture.” (emphasis in

original).

Andrade’s individualized evidence of a likelihood of

torture was that he bore tattoos, and could not afford what it

would cost to remove them. We held in Cole v. Holder that

the BIA’s failure to give reasoned consideration to the risk of

torture in Honduras on account of the petitioner’s gang

tattoos required remand. 659 F.3d 762, 773 (9th Cir. 2011). 

One of Cole’s expert witnesses had testified that he had more

than a 75% chance of being killed by gang members there

because of his Crips tattoos, in addition to risk from

vigilantes. Id. Cole’s tattoos were not his girlfriend’s and his

initials, like Andrade’s. They were gang tattoos, from when

he had been in the Crips gang: a teardrop under his eye, a G

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6 ANDRADE V. LYNCH

behind his ear, and Crips tattoos on his calves, arms and back. 

Id. at 765.

Cole establishes that the BIA must consider the risk of

torture posed by conspicuous tattoos that display affiliation

with a gang, for deportation to a country where gang

members are routinely tortured. It does not establish that any

tattoos are enough to justify Convention Against Torture

relief. The BIA took note of Andrade’s tattoos, and that he

was not a former gang member and that the tattoos were not

gang-related. Substantial evidence supported the BIA’s

denial of relief on the ground that Andrade’s individual

characteristics, being deported from a richer country and

bearing non-gang tattoos, failed to establish a probability of

torture upon his return to El Salvador.

To obtain Convention Against Torture relief, a petitioner

must establish “that it is more likely than not that he or she

would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of

removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2); Cole, 659 F.3d at 770. 

The petitioner bears the burden of proof, 8 C.F.R.

§ 208.16(c)(2), and the BIA’s factual findings must be upheld

“unless the evidence in the record compels a contrary

conclusion.” Cole, 659 F.3d at 770 (quoting Arteaga v.

Mukasey, 511 F.3d 940, 944 (9th Cir. 2007)). The evidence

in the record did not compel a contrary conclusion in this

case.

Petition DENIED.

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