Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-3_14-cr-00306/USCOURTS-almd-3_14-cr-00306-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John W. Mitchell
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHERN DIVISION 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

 ) 

v. ) CASE NO. 3:14-cr-306-MHT-WC 

 ) 

JOHN W. MITCHELL ) 

 ) 

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

 Before the court is Defendant’s Motion to Compel Production of Grand Jury 

Testimony (Doc. 56), the Government’s Response (Doc. 64); and Defendant’s Reply 

(Doc. 67). For the reasons that follow, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the motion 

be DENIED. 

Defendant moves this court to enter an order directing the Government to produce 

all grand jury testimony taken regardless of whether the witness will testify at trial. 

Def.’s Mot. (Doc. 56) at 1. He asserts that the production of all grand jury testimony is 

necessary because the Government has only produced transcripts of eight witnesses eight 

months before trial, and that, consequently, his Sixth Amendment right to the effective 

assistance of counsel is impaired because, lacking transcripts of such testimony, 

counsel’s ability to prepare for trial and cross-examine witnesses is inhibited. 

Additionally, Defendant asserts that the Government cannot know who will testify at trial 

this early in the proceeding and that, at a minimum, the Government should be required 

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to turn over the testimony of its “case agent” before the grand jury. Id. at 2. 

Furthermore, Defendant contends that Rule 16(a)(1)(G), requiring production of expert 

witnesses, means that “any testimony of an expert, not just a summary prepared by the 

particular expert” should be produced. Id. at 3. 

 In response, the Government states that there is no basis in criminal pretrial 

discovery for compelling grand jury testimony of witnesses not testifying at trial. Gov’t’s 

Resp. (Doc. 64) at 4. The Government argues that criminal pretrial discovery is distinct 

from, and narrower than, civil pretrial discovery, and that the Jenks Act does not require 

production of a witness’s statements until the witness has testified on direct examination 

in the Government’s case in chief. Id. at 4. Finally, the Government asserts that it has 

met all pretrial discovery requirements under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 

16(a)(1)(G), which requires production of any written summary of expert testimony 

planned for use during the case-in-chief. Id. at 5. 

 In general, it is the “policy of the law that grand jury proceedings be kept secret . . 

. .” Blalock v. United States, 844 F.2d 1546, 1555 (11th Cir. 1988). However, the district 

court has the discretion to compel production of grand jury transcripts in limited 

circumstances. United States v. Wingo, 723 F. Supp. 798, 802 (N.D. Ga. 1989). In order 

to overcome grand jury secrecy, a defendant has the burden of showing a particularized 

need that “outweighs the benefits of maintaining the secrecy.” Id. at 802 (quoting In re 

Subpoena to Testify before Grand Jury, 864 F.2d 1559, 1562 (11th Cir. 1989)). 

“Particularized need is not shown by a general allegation that grand jury materials are 

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necessary for the preparation of a motion to dismiss.” United States v. Burke, 856 F.2d 

1492, 1496 (11th Cir. 1988). Thus, general allegations will not suffice as a means for 

compelling the production of grand jury testimony. See United States v. Smith, 449 F. 

App’x 791, 793 (11th Cir. 2011). To establish a particularized need, the Defendant must 

demonstrate that “(1) circumstances have created certain difficulties peculiar to this case; 

(2) those circumstances could be alleviated by access to specific grand jury materials; and 

(3) the disclosure of those materials would not do ‘disproportionate harm to the salutary 

purpose of secrecy embodied in the grand jury process.’” United States v. Castronuovo, 

No. 10-80149-CR, 2012 WL 7050590, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 14, 2012) (quoting United 

States v. Elliot, 849 F.2d 554, 558 (11th Cir. 1988)). See also United States v. Price, 582 

F. App’x 846, 849 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Aisenberg, 358 F.3d 1327, 

1348-49 (11th Cir. 2004)). 

Defendant cites to no authority for the proposition that he is entitled to all of the 

grand jury testimony, or that the circumstances described in his motion evince the 

“particularized need” required for such disclosure.1

 Rather, Defendant simply argues that 

 

1

 The only citation to authority in Defendant’s motion is his citation of Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 

855 (1966), which Defendant appears to cite for the general proposition that, “‘where the ends of justice 

require it,’” a federal court has the power “to direct disclosure of grand jury testimony ‘preliminarily to or 

in connection with a judicial proceeding.’” See Def.’s Mot. (Doc. 56) at 6-7. Of course, as a general 

matter, this is not in dispute. However, Dennis does not support any contention that Defendant has 

sufficiently demonstrated a “particularized need” for the disclosure of all grand jury testimony in this 

case. In Dennis, the Court found that the defendants had sufficiently demonstrated the requisite 

“particularized need” because “the Government concedes that the importance of preserving the secrecy 

of the grand jury minutes is minimal and also admits the persuasiveness of the arguments advanced in 

favor of disclosure[.]” 384 U.S. at 871-72. In pertinent part, the Court noted that the grand jury 

testimony the defendants were seeking to obtain so that they could compare it with subsequent trial 

testimony concerning the conspiracy that was the subject of the criminal case was “relatively fresh” at the 

time of the grand jury as compared to the trial testimony several years later. Id. at 872. Thus, because a 

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“[t]here is not a single policy, reason, legal conclusion or justification to not grant 

defendant’s motion” because, he asserts, he has demonstrated a “particularized need,” 

grand jury proceedings have concluded, “[t]here is no fear of interference by defendant 

with the witnesses,” and the Government should not be “allowed to ‘cherry pick’ what it 

wants the defense to have and not have.” Def.’s Mot. (Doc. 56) at 5-6. However, the 

undersigned does not agree that Defendant has indeed demonstrated the “particularized 

need” for the grand jury testimony he seeks. In short, Defendant’s abiding desire to view 

such testimony merely for purposes of trial preparation simply does not suffice. 

Defendant’s motion is in essence a general challenge to the secrecy of grand jury 

proceedings, not a demonstration of discrete reasons why he has a “particularized need” 

for the testimony he seeks. He first makes clear that he is simply unhappy with the grand 

jury witness transcripts which were provided to him because “these witnesses only 

provided general background information without ever testifying to any of the specific 

allegations contained in the indictment.” Def.’s Mot. (Doc. 56) at 1. He argues that “the 

Government cannot say with any degree of certainty that a witness will not be called at 

trial.” Def.’s Mot. (Doc. 56) at 2. However, the Government most certainly can identify 

those witnesses it intends to call at trial, and, absent a showing of some compelling 

reason to conclude otherwise, a court should defer to the Government’s representations in 

 

“conspiracy case carries with it the inevitable risk of wrongful attribution of responsibility to one or more 

of the multiple defendants,” disclosure of the subject grand jury testimony was needed to assure “that the 

doors that may lead to truth have been unlocked.” Id. at 873. Defendant makes no showing, and the 

undersigned does not discern, how the specific circumstances germane to the Court’s decision in Dennis

are analogous to his case. 

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this regard.2 To find otherwise would destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings 

based only on the hunch that the Government does not know what it is doing. 

As to Defendant’s argument about the purported impairment of his right to the 

effective assistance of counsel, if his logic prevailed, all defendants would be entitled to 

all testimony of all grand jury witnesses, regardless of whether such witnesses will testify 

at trial. Presumably, all defendants would like unfettered access to the entirety of grand 

jury proceedings in order to fish for “inconsistencies in facts and evidence,” inform and 

plan “trial strategy,” and “evaluate the likelihood of a successful affirmative defense[,]” 

but Defendant has presented no authority that the Sixth Amendment requires such 

disclosure to vindicate such generalized objectives. Likewise, the “situation” bemoaned 

by Defendant, that the Government’s ability to limit his access to sworn grand jury 

testimony effects “at least an indirect ability to limit (and possibly even control) the 

defendant’s attorney in his pretrial preparation and the development of trial strategy,” see

Def.’s Mot. (Doc. 56) at 3, is by no means specific or “peculiar” to him. That is simply 

how these things work. If Defendant would subvert the well-established and ostensibly 

lawful model of grand jury secrecy, he must provide the court with a clearer path to get 

 

2

 Defendant’s contention that he is entitled to the grand jury testimony of any “case agent” who “gathered 

documents, interviewed witnesses and presumably testified at the grand jury as to the findings of the 

Government’s experts[,]” Def.’s Mot. (Doc. 56) at 2, is well taken assuming the accuracy of what 

Defendant makes clear is his own presumption. And, the undersigned agrees that it “is more than simply 

conceivable that the case agent, at a minimum, will be used in some capacity at trial.” Id. However, the 

Government has made clear that the case agents in this case did not testify before the grand jury. Gov’t’s 

Resp. (Doc. 64) at 3. Even after the Government offered this definitive clarification, Defendant 

confusingly insists that a purported inconsistency between the Government’s expert reports and a 

paragraph in the Indictment, as well as his allegations of prosecutorial misconduct before the grand jury, 

“justifies an order requiring at a minimum production of the case agent’s testimony.” Def.’s Reply (Doc. 

67) at 2. The court simply cannot order the Government to disclose something that does not exist. 

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there, and a more compelling reason to follow him down that path, than a series of 

generalized grievances with grand jury secrecy which are in no way “peculiar” to him or 

this case.3

 

Elsewhere in his motion, it appears Defendant argues that he is entitled to 

disclosure of all grand jury testimony due to “grand jury abuse” characterized by what he 

describes as the “pervasive and systematic use of unfairly prejudicial testimony and the 

use of leading questions” before the grand jury. Def.’s Mot. (Doc. 56) at 4. Defendant 

has separately filed a motion to dismiss the indictment due to such “abuse.” See Def.’s 

Mot. To Dis. (Doc. 54). Presumably, Defendant believes that he is entitled to disclosure 

of all grand jury testimony so that he may uncover more of the “abuse” he believes is 

depicted in those transcripts made available to him. However, as discussed above, 

“[p]articularized need is not shown by a general allegation that grand jury materials are 

necessary for the preparation of a motion to dismiss.” Burke, 856 F.2d at 1496. 

 

3

 Also unavailing is Defendant’s contention that he is entitled to additional grand jury testimony under 

the theory that Rule 16(a)(1)(G) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which requires the 

Government to provide the Defendant with “a written summary of the testimony that the government 

intends to use under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence during its case-in-chief at 

trial[,]” requires the Government to disclose “a summary of any testimony of an expert, not just a 

summary prepared by the particular expert.” Def.’s Mot. (Doc. 56) at 3. Defendant reasons that, “if the 

case agent or any other witness testified at grand jury as to the conclusions of the Government experts that 

testimony is a ‘summary’ of the expert’s report that is required to be disclosed. A summary of the expert 

testimony is the same regardless of who is doing the summarizing and regardless of how many summaries 

exist.” Id. at 3-4. Defendant cites no authority for his proposition that a witness’s testimony at the grand 

jury may constitute a “written summary” for purposes of Rule 16(a)(1)(G). Nor has Defendant provided 

any authority for his assertion that the Rule encompasses disclosure of a summary prepared by persons 

other than the relevant expert witness. Defendant concedes that he has been given “summaries prepared 

by the two respective Government experts.” Def.’s Mot. (Doc. 56) at 3. The Government clarifies that it 

has disclosed “the original reports of its experts, supplemental reports of its experts, and a written 

summary of testimony the Government intends to use in its case-in-chief.” Gov’t’s Resp. (Doc. 64) at 5. 

On the information before the court, there is no basis upon which to question whether the Government has 

complied with Rule 16(a)(1)(G). 

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Moreover, because Defendant has filed a separate motion to dismiss based upon this 

perceived grand jury abuse, the undersigned will leave a more in-depth discussion of 

Defendant’s argument about such abuse to the recommendation addressing that motion. 

It is sufficient for present purposes to note that the undersigned’s belief that Defendant 

has embellished both the extent and the severity of any perceived “abuse” of the grand 

jury process and that, therefore, he has failed to show that such “abuse” somehow 

constitutes a “particularized need” for disclosure of all grand jury testimony. 

Defendant’s final argument appears to be that his “need to review all grand jury 

testimony is especially significant for preparation of the defense with regard to the 

general accepted standard among cardiologist[s] for stent placement due to the conflict in 

the allegations of the indictment and the reports of the two identified Government 

experts.” Def.’s Mot. (Doc. 56) at 4. In short, the Indictment alleges that it is “generally 

accepted among cardiologists that a coronary stent was not ‘medically necessary’ absent 

a diagnosis of at least a 70 percent (70%) lesion or 70% stenosis in the artery and 

symptoms of blockage.” Ind. (Doc. 1) ¶ 26. However, Defendant asserts, the 

Government’s expert reports indicate “a more liberal standard.” Def.’s Mot. (Doc. 56) at 

5. Defendant fails to indicate how his defense to the charges, including challenging the 

allegation in paragraph 26 of the Indictment, if he believes that is central to his case, can 

only be advanced by his review of all of the grand jury testimony, and he does not 

explain how the perceived “inconsistency” between the Government’s experts and 

paragraph 26 could constitute the requisite “particularized need” for disclosure of all 

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grand jury testimony. Certainly, Defendant is not encumbered from locating his own 

experts or other evidence to challenge any allegation about generally accepted standards 

among cardiologists or from impeaching any testimony about such standards with the 

expert reports he believes indicate “a more liberal standard.” Moreover, he does not 

argue, for example, that, similar to Dennis, testimony before the grand jury is uniquely 

likely to provide a basis to question the veracity of ¶ 26 or any other allegation in the 

indictment. Indeed, the Government makes clear in its response to Defendant’s separate 

Motion to Strike Surplusage in the Indictment (Doc. 55) that the cardiologists who 

testified before the grand jury, whose testimonies have been provided to Defendant, 

uniformly testified “that the prevailing guideline for placement of a stent is the 70% level 

recited in paragraph 26 of the indictment.” Def.’s Resp. (Doc. 65) at 5. Rather, it simply 

appears that Defendant is attempting to divine some basis to permit his desired fishing 

expedition through the secret grand jury proceedings. This he may not do without a 

stronger showing of a “particularized need” to do so. 

For all of the foregoing reasons, the undersigned finds that Defendant has failed to 

show a “particularized need” for the disclosure of all grand jury testimony that outweighs 

the veil of secrecy surrounding grand jury proceedings. Accordingly, it is the 

RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that Defendants’ Motion to Compel 

Production of Grand Jury Testimony (Doc. 56) be DENIED. 

 It is further

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ORDERED that the parties are DIRECTED to file any objections to the said 

Recommendation on or before May 18, 2015. Any objections filed must specifically 

identify the findings in the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which the party is 

objecting. Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be considered by the 

District Court. The parties are advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of 

the court and, therefore, it is not appealable. 

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in 

the Magistrate Judge’s report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the 

District Court of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on 

appeal factual findings in the report accepted or adopted by the District Court except 

upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 

(5th Cir. 1982); see Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982); see 

also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (adopting as 

binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to 

the close of business on September 30, 1981). 

Done this 4th day of May, 2015. 

 /s/ Wallace Capel, Jr. 

 WALLACE CAPEL, JR. 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

 

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