Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01834/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01834-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of the Army
Respondent
Angela M. Nelson
Petitioner

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

ANGELA M. NELSON,

Petitioner

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,

Respondent

______________________ 

2016-1834

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. DA-1221-15-0197-W-1.

______________________ 

Decided: September 7, 2016 

______________________ 

ANGELA M. NELSON, Lake Charles, LA, pro se.

JEFFREY D. KLINGMAN, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by 

BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., 

ELIZABETH M. HOSFORD. 

______________________ 

Before MOORE, CHEN, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.

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2 NELSON v. ARMY

PER CURIAM. 

Angela M. Nelson, proceeding pro se, appeals from a 

final order of the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) 

affirming an initial decision that denied Nelson’s request 

for corrective action under the Whistleblower Protection 

Act, 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) (2012), amended by Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012, Pub. L. 

No. 112–199, 126 Stat. 1465 (WPA), after the Department 

of the Army forced her to resign during her probationary 

period. See Nelson v. Dep’t of the Army, No. DA-1221-15-

0197-W-1, 2016 WL 791724 (M.S.P.B. Feb. 29, 2016) 

(Final Order); Nelson v. Dep’t of the Army, No. DA-1221-

15-0197-W-1, 2015 WL 6689792 (M.S.P.B. Oct. 30, 2015) 

(Initial Decision).1 Because the MSPB did not err in

concluding that Nelson failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the Army retaliated 

against her for making protected disclosures under the 

WPA, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

On June 2, 2014, Nelson began serving as a Clinical 

Nurse in the Department of Behavioral Health at the 

Bayne-Jones Army Community Hospital in Fort Polk, 

Louisiana, subject to a one-year probationary period. On 

August 22, 2014, the Army informed Nelson that it would 

be terminating her for unsatisfactory performance and 

conduct, if she did not resign. She opted to resign, effective that same day. 

On September 9, 2014, she filed a complaint with the 

Office of Special Counsel (OSC), alleging that the Army 

 

1 Hereinafter, for ease of reference, we will cite to 

the Respondent’s Appendix, which contains paginated 

versions of the Initial Decision and Final Order. See

Resp’t App. at 7–14 (Final Order); id. at 15–28 (Initial 

Decision).

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NELSON v. ARMY 3

forced her resignation and that it did so in retaliation for 

protected, whistleblowing disclosures she made at a July 

14, 2014 meeting2 that included her then-supervisor. At 

that meeting she generally disclosed to her supervisor 

that her then-trainer harbored a hostile and disrespectful 

attitude toward her, mistreated her, and had been unwilling to train her. See Resp’t App. at 9–10, 20–21. The 

OSC terminated its investigation of Nelson’s allegations 

on November 17, 2014, and Nelson appealed to the MSPB. 

On appeal, an Administrative Judge (AJ) in an initial 

decision determined that Nelson had not demonstrated by 

a preponderance of the evidence that she made any protected disclosures under the WPA. See id. at 20–22. More 

specifically, the AJ found that no reasonable observer 

could conclude that her trainer’s attitude and conduct 

toward her demonstrated an abuse of authority. See id.

at 21 (“The events . . . as described by . . . [Nelson], do not 

indicate that [her trainer] used abusive language or that 

[the trainer] behaved in a denigrating, harassing, or 

intimidating manner toward [Nelson]. Viewed through 

the lens of a disinterested observer, the events appear to 

be within the bounds of appropriate workplace behavior.”). Similarly, the AJ found that no reasonable observer could conclude that Nelson’s trainer refused to train 

her, and so there was also no abuse of authority in that 

regard. Id. at 22. Accordingly, the AJ refused to order 

corrective action against the Army. Id. 

Nelson petitioned for review of the AJ’s initial decision with the MSPB. On review, Nelson “[did] not point 

 

2 There is some ambiguity as to when this meeting 

occurred, but any ambiguity is irrelevant to the outcome 

of this appeal as the meeting undisputedly happened 

before she resigned from the Army. See Resp’t App. at 9 

n.3 (some “evidence suggests that the meeting occurred on 

or about August 6, 2014”). 

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4 NELSON v. ARMY

to any specific error in the initial decision.” Id. at 11. She 

stated her “disappoint[ment]” with the initial decision and 

re-presented her abuse-of-authority allegations against 

her trainer. Id. The MSPB rejected the petition for 

review and affirmed the AJ’s initial decision, rendering it 

the final decision of the MSPB. Id. at 8. 

Nelson appeals the MSPB’s final decision, and we 

have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9)

(2012).

DISCUSSION

Review of a MSPB decision is limited by statute. See

5 U.S.C. § 7703(c) (2012). We may only set aside the 

decision if it is “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 

discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) 

obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or 

regulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported by 

substantial evidence.” Id. Our function here is to determine whether the MSPB decision is supported by substantial evidence; we do not review the decision de novo. 

McMillan v. Dep’t of Justice, 812 F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed. 

Cir. 2016) (“The correct ‘standard is not what the court 

would decide in a de novo appraisal, but whether the 

administrative determination is supported by substantial 

evidence on the record as a whole.’” (quoting Parker v. 

U.S. Postal Serv., 819 F.2d 1113, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 1987))). 

Substantial evidence is “relevant evidence” that “a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Ingram v. Dep’t of the Army, 623 F. App’x 

1000, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting McLaughlin v. Office 

of Pers. Mgmt., 353 F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). A 

petitioner bears the burden of establishing reversible 

error in the MSPB decision. Harris v. Dep’t of Veterans 

Affairs, 142 F.3d 1463, 1467 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 

The WPA prohibits an agency from taking an adverse 

personnel action in response to a protected disclosure 

made by an employee. E.g., Agoranos v. Dep’t of Justice, 

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NELSON v. ARMY 5

602 F. App’x 795, 801 (Fed. Cir. 2015). A disclosure is 

protected if the employee “reasonably believes” the disclosure shows “(i) any violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or (ii) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, 

an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger 

to public health or safety . . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A). 

A reasonable belief is one that a disinterested observer 

with the employee’s knowledge of essential facts could 

reasonably conclude that the disclosed information constituted a protected disclosure. See Lachance v. White, 174 

F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1999). “A purely subjective 

perspective of an employee” is not enough. Id. And 

relevant here, “[a]n abuse of authority is comprised of an 

arbitrary and capricious exercise of power by a Federal 

official or employee that adversely affects the rights of 

any person or results in personal gain or advantage to the 

official or preferred other persons.” Yeh v. Merit Sys. Prot. 

Bd., 527 F. App’x 896, 900 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citing Doyle v. 

Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 273 F. App’x 961, 964 (Fed. Cir. 

2008)). 

Where the employee proves by a preponderance of the 

evidence that (1) the employee made a protected disclosure as defined in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8), and (2) the protected disclosure was a contributing factor to the adverse 

personnel action, the MSPB must order corrective action 

against the agency, unless the agency demonstrates by 

clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken 

the same personnel action notwithstanding the protected 

disclosure. E.g., Ellison v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 7 F.3d 

1031, 1034 (Fed. Cir. 1993).

Even after we afford the pro se petitioner liberal construction of her appellate brief, we cannot disturb the 

MSPB’s final order. Nelson failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that her disclosures were 

protected by the WPA. 

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First, substantial evidence supports the MSPB’s finding that Nelson’s trainer did not refuse to train her. The 

MSPB reviewed training logs, emails, and witness statements, all of which supported that Nelson in fact received 

training from her trainer until she requested a new trainer. Resp’t App. at 12, 22. 

Second, we agree that Nelson’s trainer’s attitude and 

conduct toward her could not be reasonably viewed as an 

abuse of authority. At most, she disclosed to her supervisor that she had a strained working relationship with her 

trainer and that they did not get along. But such disclosures do not find protection under the WPA. See Suggs v. 

Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 415 F. App’x 240, 242 (Fed. Cir. 

2011) (“We agree with the [MSPB] that . . . statements 

relating to conflict with a superior do not rise to the level 

of fraud, waste, or illegal activity, the disclosure of which 

the WPA protects.” (citing Willis v. Dep’t of Agric., 141 

F.3d 1139, 1143 (Fed. Cir. 1998))); Reardon v. Dep’t of 

Homeland Sec., 384 F. App’x 992, 994 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (no 

protected disclosure where there was a “disagreement 

over managerial decisions”); Winfield v. Dep’t of Veterans 

Affairs, 348 F. App’x 577, 580 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 

(“[D]isclosure . . . simply outlined . . . general misgivings 

about . . . working conditions, training, office equipment, 

work hours, professional development, and lack of supervisory support. . . . Whistleblower protection does not 

extend to an employee’s personal grievances about his 

job.”); Riley v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 315 F. App’x 267, 

270 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[P]ersonal disagreements with 

legitimate managerial decisions . . . fall far short of 

demonstrating any violations of law, gross mismanagement, abuse of authority, or reporting of any other kind of 

activity that could be considered a whistleblowing disclosure.”); Willis, 141 F.3d at 1143 (“Discussion and even 

disagreement with supervisors over job-related activities 

is a normal part of most occupations.”); Powell v. Dep’t of 

the Air Force, 132 F.3d 54 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (unpublished 

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table decision recognizing that disclosure of supervisor 

“mismanagement” is “not . . . the subject of a protected 

disclosure under the WPA”); see also Langer v. Dep’t of 

Treasury, 265 F.3d 1259, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 

(“[D]isclosures of trivial violations do not constitute 

protected disclosures [under the WPA].” (citing Herman v. 

Dep’t of Justice, 193 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). 

Nelson contends that the MSPB did not consider all of 

the evidence she submitted in support of her allegations 

against her trainer. See Pet’r Br. at 1. We presume that 

the MSPB reviewed and considered all evidence in the 

record. See, e.g., Williams v. U.S. Postal Serv., 520 F. 

App’x 957, 960 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. 

Daig Corp., 789 F.2d 903, 906 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). And that 

presumption stands unrebutted. Not only does Nelson 

fail to recite what evidence the MSPB ignored, but the 

record also reflects that the MSPB considered and examined “numerous” submissions from her, which detailed the 

complaints she had about her trainer. Resp’t App. at 9; 

see also id. at 20. 

Finally, Nelson accuses the Army of fabricating evidence. See Pet’r Br. at 2. She has not, however, provided 

us with any reason—except for her say-so—to doubt the 

MSPB’s assessment of the evidence in the record, including its reliability. And “it is not this court’s function to reweigh the evidence.” Pedeleose v. Dep’t of Def., 625 F. 

App’x 534, 537 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Schab v. Dep’t of 

Veterans Affairs, 142 F. App’x 449, 450 (Fed. Cir. 2005); 

Bieber v. Dep’t of the Army, 287 F.3d 1358, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 

2002)); see also Briley v. Nat’l Archives & Records Admin., 

236 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“In addition, the 

[MSPB’s] credibility determinations are ‘virtually unreviewable on appeal.’” (quoting Rogers v. Dep’t of Defense 

Dependents Sch., 814 F.2d 1549, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1987))).

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8 NELSON v. ARMY

CONCLUSION

The MSPB did not err in denying Nelson’s request for 

corrective action because she did not meet her burden of 

proving that the WPA protected any disclosures she made 

during her employment with the Army. Accordingly, we 

affirm the MSPB’s final order.

AFFIRMED

COSTS. 

No Costs.

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