Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00312/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00312-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rigoberto Mendoza Guesar
Petitioner
United States of America
Respondent

Document Text:

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

 Plaintiff/Respondent, ) CR 07-01135 PHX NVW 

) CIV 09-00312 PHX NVW (MEA)

v. )

) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

RIGOBERTO MENDOZA GUESAR, )

) 

Defendant/Movant. )

)

______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE NEIL V. WAKE:

Mr. Rigoberto Mendoza Guesar (“Movant”) filed a motion

to correct, vacate, or set aside his criminal convictions and

sentences, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, on February 13, 2009.

Respondent filed a response opposing the motion (“Response”)

(Docket No. 9) on May 14, 2009. The time allowed for filing a

reply or traverse to the response expired on or about June 14,

2009.

I. Procedural History

A criminal complaint filed October 12, 2007, charged

Movant and four co-defendants with one count of conspiracy to

cultivate marijuana and one count of cultivation of more than

1000 marijuana plants. The complaint also charged three of the

co-defendants, but not Movant, with one count of possession of

a firearm during and in furtherance of a drug crime. 

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On May 28, 2008, Movant entered into a written plea

agreement which provided he would plead guilty to one count of

conspiracy to cultivate more than 1000 marijuana plants on

federal lands. See Response, Exh. A. The plea agreement

provided that, in return for Movant’s guilty plea, the

government would recommend a sentence at the lower end of the

guidelines range, assuming Movant was determined to be “safety

valve eligible.” Id., Exh. A. Movant acknowledged in the plea

agreement that two weapons were found at the location of the

marijuana cultivation. Id., Exh. A. 

In the plea agreement Movant waived any right to appeal

or collaterally attack his conviction and sentence if the

sentence was in accordance with the plea agreement. Id., Exh.

A at 4. The signed plea agreement states the agreement was read

to Movant in Spanish and that Movant had discussed the plea

agreement and its terms with his counsel. Id., Exh. A. 

Movant entered his guilty plea on May 28, 2008. See

Criminal Docket No. 76. An interpreter was present at the

hearing conducted by the Court regarding Movant’s guilty plea

and the plea agreement. See Response, Exh. D. 

At the plea hearing Movant’s counsel averred to the

Court that he had spent more time than usual with Movant because

of Movant’s limited education, but that he was certain Movant

understood the plea agreement. Id., Exh. D. Counsel further

averred to the Court that counsel was “fluent” in Spanish, but

that he had also used an interpreter when speaking with Movant.

Id., Exh. D at 5. Movant indicated he was satisfied with his

counsel’s representation. Id., Exh. D at 5-6. 

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At the plea hearing Movant allowed twice that someone

had read the plea agreement, in Spanish, to Movant, and that he

understood the plea agreement. Movant stated that no threats or

force were used to induce him to enter into the plea agreement

and that he understood he did not have to sign the plea

agreement. Id., Exh. D at 7-8. Movant stated he understood he

was giving up his right to appeal and to collaterally attack his

conviction and sentence. Id., Exh. D at 10.

Additionally, at the hearing Movant’s counsel indicated

that he had discussed the defense of duress with his client.

Counsel stated he believed the defense would not support

acquittal, because Movant “was never actually threatened by

anyone.” Id., Exh. D at 23-24. Counsel averred to the Court

that there was an “imperfect duress” defense which he believed

weighed in favor of a downward departure from the relevant

guidelines range regarding Movant’s sentence. Both defense

counsel and Movant acknowledged that Movant’s teen-aged son was

also working in the marijuana patch at the time Movant was

apprehended.

At the plea hearing, the Court advised Movant that the

minimum sentence for the crime of conspiracy to cultivate

marijuana was ten years imprisonment, and that the maximum

penalty for this crime was life in prison. Id., Exh. D at 11.

At the plea hearing the Court and counsel for Movant and the

government discussed whether the plea agreement allowed for

Movant’s guideline sentencing range to be adjusted pursuant to

the “safety valve” provisions. Id., Exh. D at 13-14. 

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1 Movant was evidently interviewed several times by the FBI prior to

his trial. On one occasion Movant told the FBI he had crossed the border

in order to work in a marijuana cultivation enterprise, tending the plants.

 

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The relevant sentencing guidelines range was determined

to be 57 to 71 months imprisonment, based on an offense level of

25 and a criminal history category of 1 and Movant’s entitlement

to the “safety valve” provisions of the guidelines. Id., Exh.

B. At the sentencing hearing Movant’s counsel argued that

Movant had a minimal role in the conspiracy, i.e., that Movant

was hired by others to “take care of” the marijuana plants.

Id., Exh. F at 6-7. At the sentencing hearing the Court

concluded that there was no evidence that Movant’s role in the

conspiracy was the result of any duress. Id., Exh. F at 8. On

September 2, 2008, Movant was sentenced to 57 months

imprisonment. See Criminal Docket No. 101 & Response, Exh. F.

In his pro se section 2255 action Movant contends a

confession was coerced and that he did not receive the effective

assistance of counsel.1 See Civil Docket No. 1. Movant alleges

his counsel did not spend sufficient time with Movant to prepare

an adequate defense. Movant further asserts his counsel’s

performance was ineffective because a Spanish-language

translator was present at only one of an alleged six meetings

between Movant and his counsel. Movant also contends his

counsel did not submit evidence Movant believed should have been

submitted and that his counsel gave conflicting opinions as to

the sentence faced by Movant. Movant also asserts his

confession was not voluntary because he was threatened into

confessing by a co-defendant during a time when they were

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incarcerated at the same federal facility. Movant also alleges

in his section 2255 petition that he was in the United States at

the marijuana farm under false pretenses.

II. Discussion

A. Respondent contends the section 2255 motion must be

denied because Movant waived his right to collaterally attack

his conviction and sentence.

The plea agreement signed by Movant expressly waived

his right to collaterally attack any matter pertaining to

Movant’s conviction and sentence if the sentence imposed was

consistent with the written terms of the agreement. See

Response, Exh. A. The sentence imposed on Movant was consistent

with the terms of the plea agreement, i.e., the sentence was at

the lower end of the guidelines sentencing range. Because the

sentence imposed was in accordance with the plea agreement, the

plea agreement is valid. Therefore, Movant is bound by the plea

agreement’s waiver of his right to collaterally attack his

conviction and sentence. 

Because Movant legitimately waived his right to bring

this action challenging his sentence the section 2255 motion may

be summarily denied. See Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504,

508-09, 104 S. Ct. 2543, 2546-47 (1984) (“It is well settled

that a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty made by an

accused person, who has been advised by competent counsel, may

not be collaterally attacked.”); United States v. Jeronimo, 398

F.3d 1149, 1157 (9th Cir. 2005) (reaching this conclusion in the

context of a direct appeal wherein the defendant waived his

right to directly appeal or collaterally attack his conviction

and sentence in a plea agreement); United States v. Bolinger,

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940 F.2d 478, 480-81 (9th Cir. 1991). 

A plea agreement which waives the defendant’s right to

collaterally attack their sentence is not enforceable if the

waiver was involuntary. See, e.g., Jeronimo, 398 F.3d at 1156

(concluding the court did not have jurisdiction to consider the

appeal of a defendant who had waived this right in a plea

agreement because the agreement was knowing and voluntary on its

face, stating: “A defendant’s waiver of his appellate rights is

enforceable if (1) the language of the waiver encompasses his

right to appeal on the grounds raised, and (2) the waiver is

knowingly and voluntarily made”); United States v. White, 307

F.3d 336, 343 (5th Cir. 2002).

A collateral attack alleging ineffective assistance of

counsel in negotiating a plea agreement may be brought

notwithstanding a waiver of this right in the agreement, but

only if the agreement was involuntary or unknowing, or if the

court relied on an impermissible factor such as race, or where

the agreement is otherwise unlawful. See United States v.

Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1182 (10th Cir. 2001); Bridgeman v.

United States, 229 F.3d 589, 591 (7th Cir. 2000).

Movant’s contemporaneous statements regarding his

understanding of the plea agreement carry substantial weight in

determining if his entry of a guilty plea was knowing and

voluntary. Cf. United States v. Mims, 928 F.2d 310, 313 (9th

Cir. 1991) (reaching this holding in a section 2255 case);

United States v. Walker, 160 F.3d 1078, 1096 (6th Cir. 1998)

(holding, in a section 2255 case, that “a straightforward and

simple ‘Yes, your Honor’ is sufficient to bind a defendant to

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[the] consequences [of a plea agreement].”). Because he was

adequately informed of the consequences of his plea, Movant’s

guilty plea can be considered voluntary and knowing. See Boykin

v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 1712 (1969).

The undersigned concludes Movant’s guilty plea was voluntary and

made intelligently. See Chizen v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 560, 562

(9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1383

(9th Cir. 1986).

Because Movant does not produce any evidence indicating

he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter into the agreement,

the undersigned concludes the plea agreement was valid, as was

Movant’s voluntary waiver of his right to collaterally attack

his sentence. Accordingly, the section 2255 petition should be

denied and dismissed. Compare United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d

431, 433 (9th Cir. 1994) (“we doubt that a plea agreement could

waive a claim of ineffective of assistance of counsel based on

counsel’s erroneously unprofessional inducement of the defendant

to plead guilty or accept a particular plea bargain.”).

B. Movant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims

are without merit.

Furthermore, to the extent that the Court might

conclude Movant is not bound by his waiver of his right to this

action, his ineffective assistance of counsel claims may be

denied on the merits.

To prevail on a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel, Movant must show 1)

his attorney’s performance was unreasonable

under prevailing professional standards; and

2) there is a reasonable probability that but

for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the

results would have been different. United

States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1465 (9th

Cir. 1994) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at

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687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064). “Strickland

defines a reasonable probability as ‘a

probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.’” Id.

United States v. Span, 75 F.3d 1383, 1386-87 (9th Cir. 1996),

citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052,

80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).

To establish that his counsel’s conduct was

unconstitutionally substandard, a section 2255 petitioner must

establish that no competent counsel would have acted as his

counsel acted, i.e., that his counsel’s acts were unreasonable.

United States v. Fredman, 390 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2004);

Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1176-77 (11th Cir. 2001).

Movant must overcome a strong presumption that his counsel’s

representation was within a wide range of reasonable

professional assistance. See United States v. Molina, 934 F.2d

1440, 1447 (9th Cir. 1991). Counsel is not ineffective if

counsel “fails” to raise a meritless argument. See, e.g.,

Wilson v. Henry, 185 F.3d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 1999); James v.

Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 27 (9th Cir. 1994); Morrison v. Estelle, 981

F.2d 425, 427-28 (9th Cir. 1992); Baumann v. United States, 692

F.2d 565, 572 (9th Cir. 1982). Additionally, Movant bears the

burden of providing sufficient evidence from which the Court can

conclude his counsel was ineffective. See Turner v. Calderon,

281 F.3d 851, 878 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the context

of cases wherein the defendant did not go to trial are also

governed by the doctrine of Strickland. See, e.g., Hill v.

Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57, 106 S. Ct. 366, 369 (1985); Fields v.

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Attorney General, 956 F.2d 1290, 1296-97 (4th Cir. 1992). When

a defendant challenges a conviction or sentence resulting from

a plea agreement the “prejudice” prong of the Strickland test is

modified; the defendant must show there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, he would not

have pled guilty to the charges against him, but instead would

have insisted on going to trial. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 106

S. Ct. at 370. Accord Fields, 956 F.2d at 1297; Craker v.

McCotter, 805 F.2d 538, 542 (5th Cir. 1986).

An affidavit attached to the Response indicates

Movant’s counsel met with Movant on at least ten occasions, on

one occasion for over two hours. See Response, Exh. E. The

affidavit indicates Spanish is Movant’s counsel’s first

language, counsel having spent the first six years of his life

in Uruguay with Spanish-speaking grandparents. Id., Exh. E.

This Court has reviewed the pleadings submitted by the

parties, including the transcripts of the plea hearing and the

plea agreement, and defense counsel’s affidavit. Counsel’s

performance was not deficient and resulted in a plea agreement

which was substantially advantageous to Movant. Although more

than 7000 marijuana plants were actually located, Movant was

charged with cultivation of 1000 plants. Additionally, although

he acknowledged he was aware of the presence of the guns at the

site, Movant was not charged with possession of a firearm in

connection with a drug crime, a conviction on which would have

resulted in a mandatory consecutive five-year term of

imprisonment. 

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Movant has not established his counsel’s advice as to

the consequences of the plea was not within the range of

competence demanded of criminal attorneys. Furthermore, there

is no reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged

errors, Movant would not have pled guilty but instead would have

insisted on going to trial. 

III. Conclusion

Movant waived his right to collaterally attack his

conviction and sentence in the written plea agreement. Because

Movant’s sentence was in accordance with the plea agreement and

because Movant provides no evidence that his plea was coerced by

the government, unknowing or involuntary, Movant’s waiver of his

right to seek collateral relief should be affirmed and his

section 2255 action dismissed. Additionally, Movant’s claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel are not meritorious.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Guesar’s Motion to

Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence, be denied and dismissed

with prejudice. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

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specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil

Procedure for the United States District Court for the District

of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. 

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 900 (2003).

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver

of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact

and conclusions of law in an order or judgment entered pursuant

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 25th day of June, 2009.

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