Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00858/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00858-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert Duane Franklin
Plaintiff
Ruiz
Defendant
R. Villagrana
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT DUANE FRANKLIN,

Plaintiff,

v.

R. VILLAGRANA, 

Defendant.

 /

CASE No. 1:13-cv-00858-MJS (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S

COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

 (ECF No. 1)

AMENDED COMPLAINT DUE WITHIN

THIRTY (30) DAYS 

SCREENING ORDER

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 3, 2013, Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed what was

construed as a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1.) The

Complaint is now before the Court for screening.

II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 

The Court must screen civil rights complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §

1915A(a); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 506

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U.S. 915 (1992). The Court must dismiss a complaint if the action is frivolous or

malicious or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary

relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)(2). 

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the ‘deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.”

Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990), quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method

for vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,

393–94 (1989).

III. SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff is an inmate at Avenal State Prison (“AVP”). He calms that Warden

Wofford, Correctional Officer Ruiz and Correctional Officer Villagrana are retaliating

against him for his recent actions in another case, Franklin v. Whitten, et al., E.D. Cal.

Case No. 2:12-cv-2647 JFM (PC) (hereinafter, “Whitten”). He says they are harassing

him, confiscating his glasses, and not responding to his inmate (CDCR Form 22)

requests and related correspondence. As a result, he is being denied the ability to

exhaust his administrative remedies and access the court.

Plaintiff seeks permission to file a new civil rights action against Defendants for

claimed harassment, retaliation and denial of access to court. He suggests he is

proceeding in accordance with the terms of resolution of the Whitten case.

The Whitten court provided in its order on voluntary dismissal that Plaintiff

retained the ability to file a new action against Defendants. (Cal. Case No. 2:12-cv-2647

JFM, ECF Nos. 20-23). Nothing therein suggests Plaintiff needs this Court’s prior

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approval for filing another action. Because Plaintiff’s request for leave to file a civil rights

complaint also identifies the claims Plaintiff wants to pursue, the Court will accept the

writing as a complaint so as to protect its date of receipt as a filing date. The Court also

will proceed here to analyze the claims therein to see if a cognizable claim is asserted

and, if not, advise Plaintiff of the standards which must be met to assert such a claim.

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Pleading Requirements Generally

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1)

that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2)

that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law.

See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243,

1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .“ Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009), citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

555 (2007). A plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state

a claim that is plausible on its face.’ ” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the

mere possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations

are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 1949–50.

B. Harassment

Plaintiff complains of unspecified racial harassment. Mere verbal harassment is

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not, by itself, actionable. “[V]erbal harassment or abuse . . . is not sufficient to state a

constitutional deprivation[.]” Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987),

quoting Collins v. Cundy, 603 F.2d 825 (10th Cir. 1979). 

Plaintiff can not state a federal claim based solely upon verbal harassment. 

C. Retaliation

Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner's First Amendment rights to speech

and to petition the government may support a § 1983 claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d

527, 532 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995).

“Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five

basic elements: (1) an assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an

inmate (2) because of (3) that inmate's protected conduct, and that such action (4)

chilled the inmate's exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not

reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559,

567–68 (9th Cir.2005); accord Watson v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114–15 (9th Cir.

2012); Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009).

In order to state a claim, a plaintiff must allege specific facts demonstrating that a

defendant took an adverse act because of plaintiff's First Amendment activity. The

plaintiff's protected conduct must have been a “ ‘substantial’ or ‘motivating’ factor

behind the defendant's conduct.” Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 1271, quoting Soranno's

Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989). The adverse action must

not have reasonably advanced a legitimate correctional goal.

Plaintiff makes the bare allegation that Defendants took adverse action against

him because of Whitten, However, he alleges no facts in support such a conclusion. 

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Thus, while Plaintiff may indeed believe Whitten was the motive, there is nothing in his

filing to suggest the allegation is based on more than pure speculation or surmise. 

The Court will give Plaintiff leave to amend to try to assert such a claim. To do

so, Plaintiff must set forth facts sufficient to suggest Defendants acted adversely to

Plaintiff because of his First Amendment activity. The protected conduct must have

been a “ ‘substantial’ or ‘motivating’ factor behind the defendant's conduct.” The

adverse action must not have reasonably advanced a legitimate correctional goal.

D. Access to Court

Plaintiff has a constitutional right of access to the courts, and prison officials may

not actively interfere with his right to litigate. Silva v. Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1101–02

(9th Cir. 2011). Prisoners also enjoy some degree of First Amendment rights in their

legal correspondence. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 824–25 (1977). However, to

state a viable claim for relief, Plaintiff must allege he suffered an actual injury, i.e., 

prejudice to contemplated or existing litigation, such as being denied the ability to meet

a filing deadline or present a non-frivolous claim. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349

(1996). Delays in providing legal materials or assistance are “not of constitutional

significance” if the delay is reasonably related to legitimate penological purposes. Id. at

362.

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to suggest he actually suffered an injury or loss

as a result of any alleged delay in responding to his inmate requests or as a result of his

glasses having been confiscated. A delayed response to requests, standing alone, 

does not constitute actual injury. The absence of an injury precludes an access claim.

Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415–16 (2002).

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The Court will allow leave to amend. Plaintiff must explain in reasonable detail

how he suffered an actual injury with respect to contemplated or existing litigation.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND ORDER

Plaintiff’s request that the Court permit him to file this action is unnecessary and

disregarded. 

Plaintiff's Complaint does not state a claim for relief under § 1983. The Court will

grant Plaintiff an opportunity to file an amended complaint. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d

1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987).

If Plaintiff opts to amend, he must demonstrate that the alleged acts resulted in a

deprivation of his constitutional rights. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1948–49. Plaintiff must set

forth “sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’ ” Id. at

1949, quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Plaintiff must also demonstrate that each

named Defendant personally participated in a deprivation of his rights. Jones v.

Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).

Plaintiff should note that although he has been given the opportunity to amend, it

is not for the purposes of adding new claims. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th

Cir. 2007). Plaintiff should carefully read this Screening Order and focus his efforts on

curing the deficiencies set forth above.

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 220 requires that an amended

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general

rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375

F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once an amended complaint is filed, the original complaint

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no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in

an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be

sufficiently alleged. The amended complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “First

Amended Complaint” refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original signed

under penalty of perjury. Plaintiff's amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a). Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a

right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk's Office shall send Plaintiff (1) a blank civil rights amended

complaint form and (2) a copy of his Complaint, filed June 3, 2013;

2. Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted;

3. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days from

service of this Order; and

4. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this Order,

this action shall be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim

and failure to prosecute, subject to the “three strikes” provision set forth in

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Silva v. Di Vittorio 658 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2011). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 23, 2013 /s/Michael J. Seng 

12eob4 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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