Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_07-cv-00234/USCOURTS-almd-2_07-cv-00234-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
K.C. Bentley
Defendant
City of Montgomery, Alabama
Defendant
Ron Cook
Defendant
Charles E. McQuirter
Plaintiff
Gwendolyn P. McQuirter
Plaintiff
Roosevelt Perkins
ThirdParty Defendant
Tiffany Riley
ThirdParty Defendant

Document Text:

Also pending before this Court are the third party claims brought by Defendants 1

against Tiffany Riley and Roosevelt Perkins pursuant to Alabama law. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

GWENDOLYN P. MCQUIRTER & )

CHARLES E. MCQUIRTER, )

 )

PLAINTIFFS, )

 )

v. ) CASE NO. 2:07-cv-234-MEF

 )

CITY OF MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA, )

a Municipal Corporation, K.C. BENTLEY, ) (WO - Do Not Publish)

& RON COOK, )

 )

DEFENDANTS. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Gwendolyn McQuirter (“McQuirter”), a woman whose name and driver’s license

photography was used in a press release issued by the police department regarding arrests

made in a prostitution sting, and her husband bring this action against the City of

Montgomery, Alabama and two of its police officers for an alleged violation of the Driver’s

Privacy Protection Act. In addition to seeking a statutory remedy under the DPPA,

McQuirter also brings a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for damages for the violation of

the DPPA. Additionally, McQuirter and her husband bring a variety of claims pursuant to

Alabama law. 

1

Both McQuirter and Defendants have moved for summary judgment on McQuirter’s

federal claims. For the reasons set forth in this Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court

Case 2:07-cv-00234-MEF-WC Document 51 Filed 02/12/08 Page 1 of 16
2

finds that Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all of McQuirter’s

federal claims. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claims

brought pursuant to Alabama law and these claims will be dismissed without prejudice. 

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims in this action pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 1367. No challenge is made to the personal jurisdiction over

the parties or the appropriateness of venue; both of which are supported by the facts of this

case. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is

appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The party asking for summary judgment “always bears

the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 323. The movant can meet this burden

by presenting evidence showing there is no dispute of material fact, or by showing the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on which

Case 2:07-cv-00234-MEF-WC Document 51 Filed 02/12/08 Page 2 of 16
 Although not specifically mentioned in the Notice of Removal, this Court has 2

supplemental jurisdiction over the majority of the claims in this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367. Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint invokes that statute. See Doc. # 11. 

3

it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322-23.

Once the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56(e) “requires the nonmoving party

to go beyond the pleadings and by [its] own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324. To avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party

“must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material

facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). On the

other hand, a court ruling on a motion for summary judgment must believe the evidence of

the non-movant and must draw all justifiable inferences from the evidence in the non-moving

party's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). After the

nonmoving party has responded to the motion for summary judgment, the court must grant

summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 13, 2007, McQuirter and her husband filed this lawsuit in the Circuit

Court for Montgomery County, Alabama. On March 15, 2007, Defendants removed the

action to this Court invoking its subject matter jurisdiction over certain of the claims pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. 

2

Case 2:07-cv-00234-MEF-WC Document 51 Filed 02/12/08 Page 3 of 16
 In this Court’s view, the Second Amended Complaint contains little in the way of 3

an explanation of the factual predicate for the federal claims against the City of Montgomery.

It is only alleged that Cook and Bentley were employed by the MPD and acting within the

line and scope of their employment with the MPD. There are no allegations in the Second

Amended Complaint that identify any official policy or custom of the City of Montgomery

4

The claims currently brought in this lawsuit are set forth in Plaintiffs’ Second

Amended Complaint (Doc. # 11). Specifically, McQuirter and her husband bring claims

against the City of Montgomery and two employees of the Montgomery Police Department

(“MPD”): K.C. Bentley (“Bentley”) and Ron Cook (“Cook”). Count I sets forth McQuirter’s

claim against Cook and Bentley for negligence under Alabama tort law. Count II sets forth

McQuirter’s claim against Cook and Bentley for “intentional infliction of emotional distress”

under Alabama law. Count III sets forth McQuirter’s claim against Cook and Bentley for

libel per se under Alabama law. Count IV sets forth McQuirter’s claim against Cook and

Bentley for slander per se under Alabama law. Count V sets forth McQuirter’s claim against

Cook and Bentley for invasion of privacy under Alabama law. Count VI sets forth

McQuirter’s husband’s claim against Cook and Bentley for loss of consortium under

Alabama law. Count VII sets forth McQuirter’s claim against Cook and Bentley pursuant

to the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (“DPPA”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725. Count VIII sets

forth McQuirter’s claim against Cook and Bentley pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged

violations of McQuirter’s rights under the DPPA. Based on these claims McQuirter and her

husband demand punitive damages, compensatory damages, costs, and attorney’s fees from

Cook, Bentley, and the City of Montgomery.3

Case 2:07-cv-00234-MEF-WC Document 51 Filed 02/12/08 Page 4 of 16
as having caused the violations of the DPPA which form the predicate for all federal claims

in this action. 

 See Plaintiff Gwendolyn McQuirter’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to 4

Liability Against Defendants K.C. Bentley and Rob Cook on Counts VII (Violation of

Driver[sic] Privacy Protection Act), & VIII (42 U.S.C. § 1983) (Doc. # 31).

 See The Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants, City of Montgomery, K.C. 5

Bentley and Ron Cook (Doc. # 33). 

5

Defendants to this action have brought certain claims against two third party

defendants for fraud. The Court has jurisdiction over these claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1367. Neither third party defendant has elected to defend against the third party claims.

Consequently, the Defendants have had the Clerk of the Court enter default against the third

party defendants and have a motion pending for default judgment. 

Also pending before the Court are cross motions for summary judgment on the claims

of McQuirter and her husband against Defendants. McQuirter seeks a partial summary

judgment as to liability against Bentley and Cook on Counts VII and VIII, the sole federal

claims in this action. The City of Montgomery, Bentley and Cook seek summary judgment 4

on all of the claims against them. 

5

FACTS

When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court carefully considers all

deposition excerpts, discovery responses, and properly authenticated documents submitted

in support of and in opposition to the motion. In viewing the submissions of the parties, the

Court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.

Case 2:07-cv-00234-MEF-WC Document 51 Filed 02/12/08 Page 5 of 16
 Riley has been friends with McQuirter for several years and may have occasionally 6

lived at McQuirter’s home. Consequently, she knew McQuirter’s address and date of birth.

6

Because there are cross-motions for summary judgment in this case, the Court will have to

consider the facts and reasonable inferences to be drawn from the facts in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party as the Court considers each of the motions. 

On or about September 15, 2006, the Special Operations Division of the MPD

conducted a prostitution sting in the area of the Mobile Highway in Montgomery, Alabama.

During the sting, male undercover police officers picked up female prostitutes and took them

into custody. As a result of the sting, MPD police officers arrested ten women for

prostitution for allegedly offering sex for money. One of the ten women arrested was Tiffany

Riley (“Riley”). 

MPD policy requires the completion of certain paperwork for each arrest made by

MPD officers. Photographs of each person arrested must accompany the paperwork.

Bentley, an officer with the MPD, was assigned to the processing team responsible for

booking the ten women arrested on September 15, 2006 and preparing the necessary

paperwork documenting the arrest. 

Bentley processed the information on Riley. When Bentley asked her name, Riley lied

and told Bentley her name was Gwendolyn McQuirter. When Bentley asked Riley for her

address and date of birth, Riley provided Gwendolyn McQuirter’s address and date of birth.6

When Bentley asked Riley for her social security number, Riley did not provide one. 

Case 2:07-cv-00234-MEF-WC Document 51 Filed 02/12/08 Page 6 of 16
 LETS is a database provided by the Alabama Criminal Justice Information Center. 7

The information in the LETS database is obtained from many different agency records such

as records from the Bureau of Vital Statistics, the Administrative Office of the Courts, the

Department of Public Safety, and the Department of Revenue. 

7

 As previously stated, Bentley was required to attach a copy of a photograph of each

person arrested to the paperwork she submitted to her supervisors. Sometimes prior booking

photographs from earlier arrests are used for this purpose, but there was no such photograph

available of McQuirter. Instead of making a new photograph, Bentley accessed the Law

Enforcement Tactical System (“LETS”) to obtain a photograph of Gwendolyn McQuirter. 7

LETS permits law enforcement to access information contained on an individual’s driver’s

license records, including the driver’s license photograph. 

Lieutenant Crockett, the lieutenant supervising Bentley received the photographs and

paperwork from Bentley, including McQuirter’s driver’s license photograph. Lieutenant

Crockett put copies of the photographs along with the daily activity report on the desk of the

Major and the Captain. Lieutenant Crockett then contacted Cook, the on-call Public

Information Officer for the MPD and told him they had had a prostitution sting which

resulted in several arrests. Lieutenant Crockett told Cook where he could find copies of the

photographs of the women arrested in the prostitution sting. 

Cook immediately retrieved the photographs and took them to the MPD headquarters.

Cook prepared a press release on September 16, 2006 that stated in pertinent part that:

On Friday September 15, 2006, the Special Operations Division conducted a

prostitution sting in the area of Mobile highway [sic] and the West South Blvd.

Case 2:07-cv-00234-MEF-WC Document 51 Filed 02/12/08 Page 7 of 16
 It appears that police bulletins encompass “be on the lookout” police bulletins 8

advising the public of the risks associated with a suspect at large. 

8

As a result of this operation, ten prostitutes were taken into custody. Attached

is a photograph of each suspect. 

Cook distributed the press release and the photographs to the following media outlets:

Montgomery Advertiser, Associated Press, WSFA-TV-12, Alabama Public Television,

Tuskegee Times, Kevin Elkins of 1440 WLWI AM, WNCF-ABC-32, WLWI 92.3, and

WAKA-TV-8. Several of these media outlets aired or published stories on the arrests. Some

of the news coverage included display of the photographs, including McQuirter’s driver’s

license photograph.

The MPD’s Public Information Officer prepares news releases at the discretion of the

chief of police. Primarily, the MPD releases information when it feels an incident is of

significant public interest, if it is seeking to expose a public safety issue via the media, or if

it is actively seeking a criminal suspect. The MPD sends out press releases to the media on

high profile arrests or crimes and large scale special operations such as large scale drug

arrests, prostitution stings, and neighborhood take down operations. In some instances, MPD

releases photographs to the media along with news releases or police bulletins. Photographs 8

used in these releases are sometimes taken from driver’s license records. For example, this

might be done if the individual sought in a police bulletin had never been arrested and

photographed before. 

Case 2:07-cv-00234-MEF-WC Document 51 Filed 02/12/08 Page 8 of 16
 In Collier v. Dickinson, 477 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2007), a panel of the Eleventh 9

Circuit Court of Appeals held that the statutory right to privacy created by the DPPA was

enforceable separately under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

9

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs allege that Bentley obtained her driver’s license photograph and other

information from McQuirter’s motor vehicle record and that Cook released the photograph

to the media and the general public in violation of the Driver's Privacy Protection Act

(“DPPA”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725. Plaintiffs also seek damages for the alleged violation

of the DPPA under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Urging one reading of the DPPA which they contend 9

entitles them to judgment as a matter of law, Plaintiffs seek a partial summary judgment on

these claims. Urging another interpretation of the DPPA, Defendants seek judgment as a

matter of law because they contend that the undisputed material facts do not support a finding

of any violation of the DPPA by Bentley or Cook. Given that the relevant and material facts

as to these claims are not in dispute, the resolution of these motions depends on this Court’s

interpretation of the language of the DPPA. 

The DPPA “regulates the disclosure of personal information contained in the records

of state motor vehicle departments.” Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 143 (2000). State motor

vehicle departments require drivers and automobile owners to provide information and

photographs as a condition of obtaining driver’s licenses or automobile registrations. Id. 

Largely in response to mounting public safety concerns over stalkers' and other criminals'

Case 2:07-cv-00234-MEF-WC Document 51 Filed 02/12/08 Page 9 of 16
See also Margan v. Niles, 250 F. Supp. 2d 63, 68-69 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) for a 10

discussion of the intended purpose of the DPPA which is based on numerous citations to the

congressional record. 

10

access to the personal information maintained in state DMV records, Congress enacted the 10

DPPA to regulate the disclosure of such information. See 139 Cong. Rec. H1785-01 (1992);

139 Cong. Rec. E2742-02 (1993). 

The DPPA restricts the States’ ability to disclose a driver’s personal information

without the driver’s consent. Reno, 528 U.S. at 144. The DPPA provides, in relevant part:

a State department of motor vehicles, and any officer, employee, or contractor

thereof, shall not knowingly disclose or otherwise make available to any

person or entity:

(1) personal information, as defined in 18 U.S.C. 2725(3), about

any individual obtained by the department in connection with a

motor vehicle record, except as provided in subsection (b) of

this section; or

(2) highly restricted personal information, as defined in 18

U.S.C. 2725(4), about any individual obtained by the department

in connection with a motor vehicle record, without the express

consent of the person to whom such information applies, except

uses permitted in subsections (b)(1), (b)(4), (b)(6), and (b)(9)....

18 U.S.C. § 2721(a). Under this statute, personal information means 

information that identifies an individual, including an individual’s photograph,

social security number, driver identification number, name, address (but not

the 5-digit zip code), telephone number, and medical or disability information,

but does not include information on vehicular accidents, driving violations,

and driver’s status.

18 U.S.C. § 2725(3). As used in this statute, “highly restricted personal information” means

Case 2:07-cv-00234-MEF-WC Document 51 Filed 02/12/08 Page 10 of 16
11

“an individual’s photograph or image, social security number, medical or disability

information.” 18 U.S.C. § 2725(4). 

As is obvious from the text of § 2721(a), “[t]he DPPA's prohibition of nonconsensual

disclosures is also subject to a number of statutory exceptions.” Reno, 528 U.S. at 145. As

the United States’ Supreme Court has explained, the DPPA’s provisions allow “private

persons who have obtained drivers' personal information for one of the aforementioned

permissible purposes to further disclose that information for any one of those purposes.” Id.

at 146. Importantly, the DPPA was not intended to restrict or hinder law enforcement and

crime prevention strategies even if those strategies might include releasing personal

information to the general public. See, e.g., Parus v. Kroeplin, 402 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1006

(W.D. Wisc. 2005) (quoting 139 Cong. Rec. S15962 (Nov. 17, 1993)).

At issue in this case is whether 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(1), one of the statutory exceptions

to the prohibition on nonconsensual disclosures, covers: 1) Bentley’s action in obtaining

McQuirter’s photograph or other information from the State of Alabama’s driver’s license

records or 2) Cook’s disclosure of McQuirter’s photograph to various media outlets with the

press release. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(1) provides that protected information may be disclosed

as follows: “[f]or use by any government agency, including any court or law enforcement

agency, in carrying out its functions, or any private person or entity acting on behalf of a

Federal, State, or local agency in carrying out its functions.” 

Plaintiffs’ claims under the DPPA and pursuant to § 1983 for alleged violations of the

Case 2:07-cv-00234-MEF-WC Document 51 Filed 02/12/08 Page 11 of 16
12

DPPA arising out of Bentley’s accessing of McQuirter’s driver’s license records fail because

Bentley’s actions are within the exception set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(1). It is

undisputed that Bentley accessed the LETS system from which she obtained information and

a photograph from McQuirter’s driver’s license record while acting as an authorized law

enforcement user of that system in order to complete booking paperwork requirements of her

employer, the MPD, a law enforcement agency. “A law enforcement agency may use

protected personal information so long as the agency is ‘carrying out’ a ‘law enforcement

function.’” Parus, 402 F. Supp. at 1006 (no violation of DPPA as a matter of law where

police dispatcher gave motor vehicle information to another law enforcement agent who had

requested it). Accord, Mechler v. Hodges, No. C-1-02-948, 2005 WL 1406102 at *7 (S.D.

Ohio June 15, 2005) (no violation of DPPA found where use and disclosure of social security

number was in conjunction with duties of law enforcement agency and its attempt to verify

identity of a suspect). Similarly, this Court cannot find that Bentley’s actions in this case in

any way constituted a violation of the DPPA because her actions were carrying out a law

enforcement function. Bentley accessed the information in order to complete the processing

of an arrest and to properly report it to her superior officers as her job required her to do with

all arrests she processed. Creating and maintaining criminal records and communicating with

supervisory personnel regarding arrests made during a shift easily constitute carrying out a

law enforcement function. 

Plaintiffs’ claims under the DPPA and pursuant to § 1983 for alleged violations of the

Case 2:07-cv-00234-MEF-WC Document 51 Filed 02/12/08 Page 12 of 16
13

DPPA arising out of Cook’s release of McQuirter’s driver’s license photograph also fail

because Cook’s actions are within the exception set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(1). It is

undisputed that acting as the Public Information Officer for the MPD, Cook released

McQuirter’s driver’s license photograph to various media outlets along with a press release

announcing the results of a large prostitution sting operation. It is undisputed that the MPD

releases information when it feels an incident is of significant public interest, when it is

seeking to expose a public safety issue via the media, or when it is actively seeking a criminal

suspect. When it does so, it is using private persons or entities, namely various media outlets,

in carrying out its law enforcement functions. Such releases can apprize the public of risks

created by dangerous suspects at large, can bolster public confidence in law enforcement

activities, can advise the public of information needed to increase public safety, and can act

as both a general and a specific deterrent to criminal activity. Given that these law

enforcement functions are served by the use of the media to disseminate such information

to the public, the Court finds that Cook’s actions come within the limits of permissible law

enforcement conduct under 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(1), which allows redisclosure for use by

private persons or entities acting on behalf of federal state or local agencies in carrying out

agency functions.

The reading of the statute in the manner Plaintiffs urge would prohibit law

enforcement agencies from ever releasing information or photographs from driver’s license

records to anyone other than a court or another law enforcement agency. This argument not

Case 2:07-cv-00234-MEF-WC Document 51 Filed 02/12/08 Page 13 of 16
14

only misreads the clear language of § 2721(b)(1), but it also is inconsistent with the intent

and purpose of the statutes. Moreover, such an approach would impede legitimate law

enforcement activities. For example, law enforcement agencies would be prohibited from

adequately warning the public about dangerous suspects at large. Additionally, law

enforcement agencies would be prevented from soliciting the assistance of the public in

locating suspects or missing persons. 

As a matter of law, Defendants have established that they are entitled to judgment

on all of Plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to federal law (Counts VII and VIII) because all of

the conduct Plaintiffs challenge falls with the ambit of the § 2721(b)(1) exception to the

prohibitions of the DPPA. All claims pursuant to Counts VII and VIII are predicated on

alleged violations of the DPPA. The Court has found that the DPPA was not violated. 

Consequently, the Court need not address the question of whether both McQuirter and her

husband have claims for violations of the DPPA or whether the City of Montgomery can

be liable under either the DPPA or § 1983 for the actions of Cook and Bentley. 

Because this Court has concluded that summary judgment is due to be granted as

to all of the federal claims asserted in this case, the Court declines to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over all state law claims and those claims will be remanded to

state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Graham v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 193 F.3d

1274, 1282 (11th Cir.1999) (“If no federal claim survives summary judgment, the court

sees no reason why the other claims should not be dismissed or remanded pursuant to 28

Case 2:07-cv-00234-MEF-WC Document 51 Filed 02/12/08 Page 14 of 16
15

U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).”).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:

1. Plaintiff Gwendolyn McQuirter’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to

Liability Against Defendants K.C. Bentley and Rob Cook on Counts VII (Violation of

Driver[sic] Privacy Protection Act), & VIII (42 U.S.C. § 1983) (Doc. # 31) is DENIED.

2. The Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants, City of Montgomery, K.C.

Bentley and Ron Cook (Doc. # 33) is GRANTED only with respect to all claims pursuant to

the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (Count VII) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count VIII). 

3. The claims set forth in Count VII and Count VIII of the Second Amended

Complaint are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

4. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over all claims pursuant

to state law (Counts I through VI and the Third Party Claims) and such claims are due to be

REMANDED to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County Alabama. The Clerk of the Court

is DIRECTED to take all steps necessary to effect this remand.

5. Any pending motions not addressed by this Memorandum Opinion and Order,

namely: the portions of the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants City of

Montgomery, K.C. Bentley and Ron Cook (Doc. # 33) directed to the claims pursuant to

Alabama law (Counts I through VI) and the Third Party Plaintiffs[sic] Motion for Default

Judgment Against Third Party Defendants, Tiffany Michele Riley and Roosevelt Perkins

Case 2:07-cv-00234-MEF-WC Document 51 Filed 02/12/08 Page 15 of 16
16

(Doc. # 37), are left for resolution by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Alabama

after remand.

6. Due to these rulings, the trial setting in this case is hereby STRICKEN. 

7. A separate final judgment will be entered. 

DONE this the 12th day of February, 2008.

 /s/ Mark E. Fuller 

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:07-cv-00234-MEF-WC Document 51 Filed 02/12/08 Page 16 of 16