Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-15-01497/USCOURTS-caDC-15-01497-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Federal Communications Commission
Respondent
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners
Petitioner
United States of America
Respondent
Vonage Holdings Corporation
Intervenor for Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 8, 2017 Decided March 24, 2017

No. 15-1497

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REGULATORY UTILITY

COMMISSIONERS,

PETITIONER

v.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND UNITED

STATES OF AMERICA,

RESPONDENTS

VONAGE HOLDINGS CORPORATION,

INTERVENOR

On Petition for Review of an Order of 

the Federal Communications Commission

James Bradford Ramsay argued the cause for petitioner. 

With him on the briefs was Jennifer Murphy.

Matthew J. Dunne, Counsel, Federal Communications

Commission, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the

briefs were Robert B. Nicholson and Sean Sandoloski,

Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice, Jonathan B. Sallet,

General Counsel, Federal Communications Commission, David

M. Gossett, Deputy General Counsel, and Richard K. Welch,

Deputy Associate General Counsel. Jacob M. Lewis, Associate

USCA Case #15-1497 Document #1667619 Filed: 03/24/2017 Page 1 of 9
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General Counsel, Federal Communications Commission,

entered an appearance.

Elizabeth A. Bonner argued the cause for intervenor. With

her on the brief was Brita D. Strandberg.

Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, and HENDERSON and

ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: This petition challenges the Order of the

Federal Communications Commission authorizing

interconnected Voice-over-Internet-Protocol service providers

(“I-VoIPs”) to obtain North American Numbering Plan

telephone numbers directly from the Numbering Administrators

rather than through intermediary local phone service numbering

partners. Numbering Policies for Modern Communications, 30

FCC Rcd. 6839 (2015) (“Order”). The National Association of

Regulatory Utility Commissioners (“NARUC”) challenges the

Order, contending that the Commission has effectively classified

I-VoIP service as a Title II telecommunications service, or acted

arbitrarily by delaying a classification decision or by extending

Title II rights and obligations to I-VoIPs in the absence of

classification. Because NARUC fails to show that it has

standing to challenge the Order, the court lacks jurisdiction and

the petition is dismissed.

I.

The Communications Act, as amended by the

Telecommunications Act of 1996, defines two mutually

exclusive categories of communication services:

“telecommunications service” and “information service.” 47

U.S.C. § 153(24), (53). Providers of telecommunications

service are subject to regulation as common carriers under Title

II of the Act, id. § 153(51), while information services are not.

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See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs.,

545 U.S. 967, 974 (2005). 

Prior to the challenged Order, the Commission’s regulations

required “an entity requesting numbering resources to

demonstrate that it is ‘authorized’ to provide service in the area

for which it is requesting telephone numbers.” Order ¶ 20. The

entity had to produce “evidence of either a state certificate of

public convenience and necessity [ ] or a Commission license.”

Id. ¶ 4. Absent such evidence, I-VoIPs had to “partner with a

carrier,” usually a local exchange carrier (“LEC”), and pay that

carrier a Primary Rate Interface service fee in order to get 

telephone numbers. Id. ¶¶ 17 n. 54, 69. In 2004, the

Commission issued a notice of proposed rulemaking to classify

VoIP, among others, as a “telecommunications service,” In re

IP-Enabled Services, WC Docket No. 04–36, 19 FCC Rcd. 4863

(2004), but had taken no further action in that separate

proceeding when the challenged Order was issued. 

In 2005, the Commission began granting waivers of its rules

to permit I-VoIPs, including Vonage Holdings Corporation, to

“obtain numbers directly from the Numbering Administrators”

without a carrier partner. Order ¶ 4. I-VoIPs that received

direct number access through waivers had to “process[] port

requests directly rather than going through a LEC.” In re

Administration of the North American Numbering Plan, 20 FCC

Rcd. 2957, 2962 (2005), at ¶ 9. For I-VoIPs that did not receive

waivers, the regulations, beginning in 2007, imposed portability

requirements where “both an interconnected VoIP provider and

its numbering partner [ ] facilitate a customer’s porting request

to or from an interconnected VoIP provider.” In re Telephone

Number Requirements for IP-Enabled Service Providers, 22

FCC Rcd. 19531, 19532, 19548–49 (2007), at ¶¶ 1, 30, 31, 32,

aff’d Nat’l Tel. Coop. Ass’n v. FCC, 563 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir.

2009). 

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The Order revised the regulations to allow I-VoIPs, without

state certification, to “obtain telephone numbers directly from

the Numbering Administrators, subject to several conditions

designed to minimize number exhaust and preserve the integrity

of the numbering system.” Order App. C ¶ 3. Following a sixmonth trial period that demonstrated “there are no technical

barriers preventing interconnected VoIP providers from

accessing numbering resources directly,” Order ¶ 4, the

Commission concluded direct access would “facilitate

innovative technologies and services that will benefit both

consumers and providers, and further the Commission’s

recognized pro-consumer, pro-competition, and public safety

goals,” id. ¶ 2. The Commission thereby allowed number access

“directly to interconnected VoIP providers, without regard to

whether they are [common] carriers,” id. ¶ 78, noting that it had

yet to classify “interconnected VoIP services as either

telecommunications services or information services,” id. ¶ 79

n. 282. The revised regulations continued to ensure that users of

I-VoIP services would obtain the benefits of local number

portability, regardless of whether the I-VoIP provider obtained

numbers directly or through a carrier partner. Id. ¶ 55. 

The Commission rejected NARUC’s argument that its

exclusive authority over numbering under 47 U.S.C. § 251(e)(1),

is limited by provisions imposing number portability and cost

recovery obligations on “telecommunications carriers.” See 47

U.S.C. §§ 251(b) & (e), 153(37) & (51). It interpreted these

provisions to set a statutory floor that did not limit the

Commission’s authority to extend numbering requirements to

other service providers. See Order ¶¶ 79–82. 

NARUC petitions for review of the Order.

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II.

As a threshold matter, the Commission and Vonage

Holdings Corporation maintain that NARUC members lack 

standing under Article III of the Constitution to challenge the

Order because NARUC has failed to show its members suffered

any injury-in-fact as a result of the Order. In the Commission’s

view, NARUC members were not harmed by the Order and any

harm stems from the Commission’s failure to date to classify

VoIP services as a “telecommunications service, subject to Title

II common carriage regulation.” Resp’t’s Br. 22. Vonage

Holdings Corporation, in turn, argues that the Order does not

change the rights or responsibilities of NARUC members but

maintains the status quo ante authority of the state commissions

to regulate VoIPs. Intervenor’s Br. 17–18. 

“[A]n association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its

members when [ ] its members would otherwise have standing

to sue in their own right; [ ] the interests it seeks to protect are

germane to [its] purpose; and [ ] neither the claim asserted nor

the relief requested requires the participation of individual

members in the lawsuit.” Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert.

Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977); Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Nat’l

Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 489 F.3d 1279, 1289 (D.C. Cir.

2007). So, to establish standing under Article III, NARUC must

demonstrate that: (1) at least one of its members was injured in

fact, meaning an “actual or imminent, not conjectural or

hypothetical” injury; (2) the injury was caused by the Order; and

(3) the court can redress the injury. Lujan v. Defenders of

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (citations omitted). 

Where, as here, NARUC members are not directly regulated by

the challenged agency action, standing is “substantially more

difficult to establish.” Id. at 562; see Pub. Citizen, Inc., 489

F.3d at 1279. Furthermore, “[b]are allegations are insufficient

[ ] to establish a petitioner’s standing,” and where that standing

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is not self-evident, the petitioner in its opening brief “must

support each element of its claim to standing by affidavit or

other evidence.” Sierra Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d 895, 898, 899

(D.C. Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted); Scheduling Order 2 (Feb.

24, 2016) (citing D.C. Cir. Rule 28(a)(7)). Although the court

sua sponte may seek supplemental submissions to satisfy itself

that the petitioner has Article III standing, see American Library

Association v. FCC, 401 F.3d 489, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2005), no

supplemental submission is needed here. 

Although NARUC bears the “burden of proof . . . to show

a substantial probability that it has been injured,” Sierra Club,

292 F.3d at 899 (quotation omitted), NARUC does not address

standing in its opening brief beyond a single sentence, asserting

without elaboration that “the Order undermines its members’

authority directly and indirectly.” Pet’r’s Br. 17. In its Reply

Brief, NARUC states standing is “evident” from its opening

brief, Reply Br. 12, because the Order “impacted” state

commissions’ ability to carry out “tasks central to a federal

scheme,” id. at 15. Essentially, then, NARUC maintains its

standing is self-evident and consequently it is relieved of the

obligation of present affidavits or other evidence in support of

standing. See Sierra Club, 292 F.3d at 899. NARUC offers two

theories of standing in its Reply Brief but neither is persuasive,

and its standing is not self-evident. 

First, NARUC maintains that the Commission’s actions

injure its members’ “designated role in Congress[’s] plan,”

Reply Br. 19, by allowing I-VoIP service providers to obtain

telephone numbers without being classified as

“telecommunications carriers,” Pet’r’s Br. 33. This failure to

classify I-VoIPs, NARUC suggests, denies states certain

regulatory authority that applies only to telecommunications

carriers. Yet NARUC does not challenge the I-VoIP’s ability to

obtain numbers directly. Instead, it maintains that the Order has

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the effect of classifying I-VoIPs as a Title II telecommunications

service and this court should either confirm that fact, see Pet’r’s

Br. 17–33, or vacate the Order and remand this matter to require

the Commission to so classify I-VoIPs by a date certain, see id.

at 62. It is undisputed that if the Commission had so classified

I-VoIP service providers they would have direct access to

numbers and number portability rights and obligations. See

Order ¶ 4; Pet’r’s Br. 39. Consequently, NARUC has shown no

injury-in-fact that is caused by the Order, but at most only harm

as a result of the legal route and rationale the Commission used

to reach its result. Because NARUC has not demonstrated it

was “adversely affected by the Commission’s holding,” its

objection to the Order’s underlying rationale is not the kind of

harm that generally constitutes injury-in-fact. Int’l Bhd. of Elec.

Workers v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 862 F.2d 330, 334

(D.C. Cir. 1988); cf. Telecomm. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC,

917 F.2d 585, 588 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 

Moreover, although NARUC asserts the Order diminishes

its members’ regulatory authority, it never ties that claimed

harm to the regulatory changes made in the Order. Specifically,

NARUC states that I-VoIP’s “unresolved [classification] status”

undercuts its members’ authority to “arbitrate interconnection

disputes between telecommunications carriers,” Pet’r’s Br. 13;

Reply Br. 14 n. 4 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 252) (emphasis in

original), and to protect “customers of telecommunications

services,” Pet’r’s Br. 9 n. 11 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 253) (emphasis

in original). The Order addresses only direct number access and

enhanced portability, leaving undisturbed the Commission’s

separate classification proceeding. Order ¶ 79 n. 282. “Because

this Order is not the source” of the harm arising from the

Commission’s classification delay, NARUC’s claim of injury is

misdirected. Cf. Nat’l Tel. Coop. Ass’n v. FCC, 563 F.3d 536,

541–42 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Absent affidavits or other supporting

evidence, NARUC fails to explain how it suffers a concrete,

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particularized injury simply because I-VoIPs are not yet

classified by the Commission. NARUC identifies no state

authority that depends on whether interconnected VoIP is

classified by the Commission as a telecommunications service;

instead, all the statutory provisions NARUC invokes depend on

whether I-VoIP is a telecommunications service. See, e.g.,

Pet’r’s Br. 13 (citing 47 U.S.C. §§ 252, 253(b)). Under

NARUC’s view that “I-VoIP is a [t]elecommunications

[s]ervice,” Pet’r’s Br. 28, the states can already exercise those

statutory powers. NARUC fails to explain what additional

concrete benefit the Commission classification would provide to

states. Therefore, NARUC fails to identify a concrete harm

inflicted by the Order’s inaction on classification. 

Second, NARUC maintains its members are injured by the

“Order’s raison d’etre — which is to permit I-VoIP providers

the option to bypass either becoming State-certified or dealing

with a State-certified carrier.” Reply Br. 12 (citing Order ¶ 21). 

It maintains that its members suffered an injury because “the

Order substitutes a necessarily less direct and arguably more

burdensome procedure for States” to carry out their role in

“actively polic[ing] utilization (to avoid State area code

exhaustions).” Reply Br. 13; see Oral Arg. Tape 6:15–6:50;

9:28–9:40. The Commission has delegated to state commissions

the authority to “resolve matters involving the introduction of

new area codes within their states,” which includes “[d]irecting

whether area code relief will take the form of a geographic split,

an overlay area code, or a boundary realignment.” 47 C.F.R.

§ 52.19(a); see Order ¶ 27 n. 88. NARUC does not explain how

these proceedings have become more burdensome, much less

how the Order has caused a more burdensome procedure for the

state commissions to carry out their delegated duties. That

objection overlooks that the Commission has preserved the

numbering authority of state commissions. See Order ¶ 24. The

Order requires I-VoIP service providers to “file requests for

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numbers with the relevant state commission(s) at least 30 days

before requesting numbers from the Numbering Administrators,”

id. ¶ 24, and I-VoIPs that directly access numbers are required to

“adher[e] to the numbering authority delegated to state

commissions for access to data and number reclamation,” id. ¶

27. Indeed, when NARUC’s counsel was asked during oral

argument to describe, in light of Paragraph 24, how the Order

harmed NARUC, counsel appeared to deflect the question,

responding that its members “were not happy” with the Order. 

Oral Arg. Tape 32:30–34:20. Unhappiness, however, does not

meet the first prong of Article III standing. Because it is not

self-evident that state commissions’ procedures have become

more burdensome for NARUC members, NARUC fails to

demonstrate an injury-in-fact. Again, “[b]are allegations” are

insufficient. Sierra Club, 292 F.3d at 898.

Accordingly, because NARUC has failed to demonstrate an

injury-in-fact, and thus failed to establish Article III standing to

challenge the Order, the court lacks jurisdiction and the petition

for review is dismissed.

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