Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_04-cr-02148/USCOURTS-azd-4_04-cr-02148-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Irma Irene Jimenez-Gutierrez
Defendant
United States of America
Plaintiff

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Document numbers refer to the Clerk's Record in this case.

WO

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Irma Irene Jimenez Gutierrez, 

Petitioner,

v.

United States of America,

Respondent.

_______________________________________

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CR 04-2148 TUC-DCB

CV 06-227 TUC-DCB

ORDER

Pending before this Court is Petitioner's "Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct

Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody" (Petition) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The

Court grants Defendant's motion, vacates and reenters the Defendant's Judgment, and

appoints new counsel to represent her for purposes of her direct appeal.

The Petitioner argues that, even though she waived her right to appeal, her

constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel was violated because she asked her

attorney to file an appeal and he refused to do so. (Document 26: Petition at 5;

Memorandum at 2, 3-4, 6-1-2.)1

A. Conviction and Sentence

Petitioner pleaded guilty on April 15, 2005, to violating Title 21, U.S.C. §

841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(A)(viii) for possession with intent to distribute approximately 12.78

kilograms of methamphetamine (Count 1) and Title 21, U.S.C. § 952(a), 960(a)(1) and

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(b)(1)(H), importation of approximately 12.78 kilograms of methamphetamine (Count II). 

(Document 7: Indictment.)

On June 24, 2005, the Court sentenced the Petitioner to 47 months imprisonment

and 3 years supervised release to run concurrently on both counts, and a $200.00 special

assessment. (Document 25: Judgment of Conviction.) Petitioner was not sentenced

pursuant to a Plea Agreement, but she waived her right to file an appeal in exchange for a

recommendation from the Government for an additional one point reduction in her

offense level for acceptance of responsibility. She was sentenced accordingly.

B. 28 U.S.C. § 2255: Waiver

Title 28 of the United States Code, Section 2255 provides for collateral review of

Petitioner's sentence as follows: 

A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of

Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the

sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or law of the

United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such

sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized

by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court

which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence. 

A motion for such relief may be made at any time.

28 U.S.C. § 2255.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has found that there are “strict standards for

waiver of constitutional rights.” United States v. Gonzalez-Flores, 418 F.3d 1093, 1102

(9th Cir. 2005). It is impermissible to presume waiver from a silent record, and the Court

must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional

rights. Id. In this action, Petitioner’s waiver was clear, express, and unequivocal.

The right to petition for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, like the right to bring a

direct appeal, is statutory. United States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1992)

(citing see Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977) ("The right of appeal, as we

presently know it in criminal cases, is purely a creature of statute....")). Like the waiver

of the right to a direct appeal, a knowing and voluntary waiver of rights under 28 U.S.C.

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§ 2255 is enforceable. Id. (citing United States v. Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318,

321(9th Cir.1990)). 

Plea agreements are contractual in nature and their plain language will generally

be enforced if the agreement is clear and unambiguous on its face. United States v.

Jeronimo, 398 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005). Therefore, an express waiver of

appellate rights is enforceable if the language of the waiver encompasses the right to

appeal on the grounds raised and the waiver is knowingly and voluntarily made. Id.

A defendant may waive the statutory right to bring a § 2255 action challenging

the length of his sentence, United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431, 433 (9th Cir. 1994);

Abarca, 985 F.2d at1014. The only claims that cannot be waived are claims that the plea

or waiver itself was involuntary or that ineffective assistance of counsel rendered the plea

or waiver involuntary. See Lampert, 422 F.3d at 871 (holding that a plea agreement that

waives the right to file a federal habeas petition pursuant to § 2254 is unenforceable with

respect to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim that challenges the voluntariness of

the waiver); Pruitt, 32 F.3d at 433 (expressing “doubt” that a plea agreement could waive

a claim that counsel erroneously induced a defendant to plead guilty or accept a particular

part of the plea bargain), Abarca, 985 F.2d at 1014 (expressly declining to hold that a

waiver forecloses a claim of ineffective assistance or involuntariness of the waiver); see

also Jeronimo, 398 F.3d at 1156 n.4 (summarizing Pruitt and Abarca, but declining to

decide whether waiver of all statutory rights included claims implicating the voluntariness

of the waiver). 

“Collateral attacks based on ineffective assistance of counsel claims that are

characterized as falling outside [the category of ineffective assistance of counsel claims

challenging the validity of the plea or the waiver] are waivable.” United States v.

Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 2001). See also Williams v. United States,

396 F.3d 1340, 1342 (11th Cir. 2005) (joining the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and

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Tenth Circuits in holding that “a valid sentence-appeal waiver, entered into voluntarily

and knowingly, pursuant to a plea agreement, precludes the defendant from attempting to

attack, in a collateral proceeding, the sentence through a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel during sentencing.”).

Upon review of the record in this case, it appears that the Petitioner plead guilty

to the Indictment without the benefit of a Plea Agreement, but at the time of sentencing

she waived her right to appeal, (document 25: Waiver), as follows: "Defendant Irma

Irene Jimenez-Gutierrez hereby: 1) Acknowledges that she is aware of her right to appeal

from the sentencing decisions of the United States District Court pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §

3742 and to collaterally attack such rulings; and 2) Waives the right in order to establish

her complete acceptance of responsibility in this matter." Id. Accordingly, the Court

gave her three points instead of two for acceptance of responsibility, a substantial

reduction from the guideline sentencing range of 51 to 63 months and the recommended

sentence of 55 months. (Presentence Report at ¶¶ 17, 39, 53.) The Court sentenced her

to 47 months. (Document 25: Judgment of Conviction.)

Petitioner alleges that in spite of having waived her right to directly appeal her

sentence and having received a substantial benefit from this waiver, she nevertheless

instructed her attorney to file an appeal and he refused. She asserts that this was

ineffective assistance of counsel.

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Failure to File Appeal

In the Ninth Circuit, assuming that after sentencing a defendant asks his lawyer

to appeal and his lawyer does not do so, even where a defendant has waived his right to

appeal, the lawyer has provided ineffective assistance of counsel. This is the law, "as

contrary to common sense as it seems." United States v. Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F.3d 1193,

1196 (9th Cir. 2004).

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A petitioner claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must allege specific facts

which, if proved, would demonstrate that (1) counsel's actions were “outside the wide

range of professionally competent assistance,” and (2) “there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-690. A petitioner fails to state a

claim for ineffective assistance if he fails to allege facts sufficient to meet either the

“performance” or “prejudice” standard, and the district court may summarily dismiss his

claim. Id. at 693. 

In Sandoval-Lopez, the court explained that, according to the Supreme Court in

Peguero v. United States, 526 U.S. 23 (1999), "'when counsel fails to file a requested

appeal, a defendant is entitled to resentencing and to an appeal without showing that his

appeal would likely have had merit.'" See also, Rodriguez v. United States, 395 U.S. 327

(1969). The Sandoval-Lopez court noted that this amounts to saying "'it is ineffective

assistance of counsel to refuse to file a notice of appeal when your client tells you to,

even if doing so would be contrary to the plea agreement and harmful to your client,' but

that is the law on filing a notice of appeal." Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F.3d at 1197.

"This proposition of law controls both the deficient performance prong of

Strickland and the prejudice prong." Id. It is deficient performance to not appeal, and

prejudice exists because "but for" his lawyer's refusal, defendant would have appealed. 

Id. "The prejudice in failure to file a notice of appeal cases is that the defendant lost his

chance to file the appeal, not that he lost a favorable result that he would have obtained

by appeal." Id. The mere expression of interest in appealing would not lead to the same

result as telling defense counsel to appeal. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 486

(2000) (where defendant never expresses desire to appeal, the inquiry is whether the

lawyer should have consulted with client about an appeal).

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Here, Defendant does not allege a mere expression of an interest in appealing,

but asserts that she requested, and her attorney refused, an appeal. If true, there has been

ineffective assistance of counsel.

The court in Sandoval-Lopez, explained that in cases such as this, "'ineffective

assistance of counsel' is a term of art that does not mean incompetence of counsel." Id. at

1198-99. In other words, the defendant was "probably lucky to have a lawyer who

exercised such wise judgment." Id. at 1197. For example, filing the notice of appeal

will breach the sentencing agreement the defendant entered into with the Government and

give the Government the option of freeing itself from the restraint of the plea bargain. Id.

at 1198. She may be very foolish to risk losing the advantage of her negotiated sentence

of 47 months on an appeal almost sure to go nowhere in light of her express waiver of her

appellate rights, especially since if she prevails and gets a new sentence without the

waiver there will only be two points subtracted from her offense level for acceptance of

responsibility. This means that at resentencing she will face a guideline sentencing range

of 51 to 63 months, with a recommended sentence of 55 months. "Nevertheless the client

has the constitutional right, under Flores-Ortega and Peguero, to bet on the possibility of

winning the appeal and then winning an acquittal, just as a poker player has the right to

hold the ten and queen of hearts, discard three aces, and pray that when he draws three

cards, he gets a royal flush." Id. at 1199.

In Sandoval-Lopez, the court suggested that when a defendant makes an

allegation that counsel has been ineffective by failing to file a requested appeal, "two

things can happen: 1) the district court can hold an evidentiary hearing to decide whether

petitioner's allegation is true, and if it is, vacate and reenter the judgment, allowing the

appeal to proceed; or 2) if the state does not object, the district court can vacate and

reenter the judgment without a hearing and allow the appeal to proceed, assuming without

deciding that the petitioner's claim is true." Id. at 1198. The government might choose to

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not object to free itself from the restraint of the agreement or because getting the appeal

dismissed based on Defendant's waiver of this right would be less work than an

evidentiary hearing. Id.

The Court finds that the most expeditious course of action is to allow the

Petitioner to proceed with her appeal. The Court notes, however, that Petitioner is pro se

and filed her habeas Petition wherein she stated her intent to file an appeal, without

advice of counsel. Given the possible extreme consequence that the Government may

seek to withdraw from the negotiated sentencing agreement if Petitioner files a Notice of

Appeal, this Court gives her one last chance to reconsider this intended course of action.

"Assuming without deciding that the Petitioner's claim is true," id., the Court

vacates and reenters the Judgment of Conviction, allowing the Petitioner an opportunity

to file an appeal. The Court appoints counsel for purposes of proceeding with her appeal.

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by

a Person in Federal Custody, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (document 26) filed in CR 04-

2148 TUC DCB and (document 1) filed in CV 06-227 TUC DCB is GRANTED, and the

Clerk of the Court shall enter Judgment accordingly.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the relief being requested by Petitioner having

been granted as provided below, the Clerk of the Court shall close the civil case: CV 06-

227 TUC DCB.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner having filed an Application to

Proceed in Forma Pauperis, the Court finds that she is without means to retain counsel for

an appeal.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Maria Davila is appointed to represent the

Defendant under the Criminal Justice Act for purposes of proceeding with a direct appeal. 

The Clerk of the Court shall send a copy of this Order to Ms. Davila.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner shall file a notice with this Court

after consulting with counsel, as to whether she wishes to reconsider filing her appeal or

wants to proceed.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in the event Petitioner wants to proceed with

her appeal, the Criminal Judgment (document 25) entered in this case on July 5, 2006

shall be vacated and reentered by the Clerk of the Court to allow Petitioner to file a

Notice of Appeal.

DATED this 2nd day of October, 2006.

copy to Davila by cjs 10/03/06

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