Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01373/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01373-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Nina Chiley
Plaintiff
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NINA CHILEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

Case No. 1:14-cv-1373-BAM

ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S 

SOCIAL SECURITY COMPLAINT 

Plaintiff Nina Chiley (―Plaintiff‖) seeks judicial review of the final decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security (―Commissioner‖) denying her application for supplemental 

security income (―SSI‖) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act.

1

 The matter is before the Court 

on the parties‘ briefs, which were submitted without oral argument to Magistrate Judge Barbara A. 

McAuliffe. The Court finds the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (―ALJ‖) to be supported 

by substantial evidence in the record as a whole and based upon proper legal standards. Accordingly, 

this Court affirms the agency‘s determination to deny benefits.

///

 

1

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties consented to conduct all further proceedings in this case before the 

Honorable Barbara A. McAuliffe, United States Magistrate Judge. (Docs. 6, 9). 

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FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

On November 2, 2011, Plaintiff filed her current application for SSI, alleging disability 

beginning March 1, 2011. AR 16.2 Plaintiff‘s application was denied initially and on 

reconsideration. AR 16. Subsequently, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law 

Judge (―ALJ‖). ALJ Timothy Snelling held a hearing on June 26, 2013, and issued an order denying 

benefits on July 26, 2013. AR 16-24. Plaintiff sought review of the ALJ‘s decision, which the 

Appeals Council denied, making the ALJ‘s decision the Commissioner‘s final decision. AR 1-3. 

This appeal followed.

Plaintiff’s Testimony

The ALJ held a hearing on June 26, 2013, in Stockton, California. AR 29-54. Plaintiff 

appeared and testified with the assistance of a translator. AR 31. She was also represented by nonattorney representative, Svetlana Kumansky. AR 31. 

Plaintiff was born on February 24, 1966, and was 47 years old at the time of the hearing. AR 

26. Plaintiff testified that she came to the United States from Ukraine with her husband and three 

small children. AR 47. Plaintiff currently has 6 children, all between the ages of 8 and 20, who live 

with her at her home. AR 47. Prior to suffering from her impairments, Plaintiff graduated from high 

school in Ukraine and was ―starting college to be a pre-school teacher‖ in the United States. AR 37. 

Plaintiff alleges disability due to ―severe back pain.‖ AR 38. Plaintiff alleged that her pain 

is so severe that she could not bend or lift a cup of tea without pain. AR 38-39. Plaintiff

experiences pain, which is usually at an 8 or 9 on a scale of 1-10 at night, when she ―tries to do 

something.‖ AR 39-40. Plaintiff further testified that when she tried to walk outside, after 15-10 

minutes, the pain in her left leg caused her to walk with a limp. AR 40. About twice per year, 

Plaintiff testified that she must use a walker and she could not do anything but lie down for 2 weeks1 month. AR 40-41. Due to her impairments, Plaintiff testified that she could only stand for 15-20 

minutes. AR 40. In addition to her back problems, Plaintiff testified that she has diabetes, which 

caused fatigue and numbing in her hands; because of this, Plaintiff needs to frequently lie down. AR 

 

2 References to the Administrative Record will be designated as ―AR,‖ followed by the appropriate page number.

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41. Plaintiff also testified that she has high blood pressure and shortness of breath, which prevents 

her from sleeping well at night. AR 42. 

Thereafter, the ALJ asked Plaintiff about her work history. In response to the ALJ‘s 

questions, Plaintiff testified that, as a caregiver for the elderly, she went to their homes, went 

shopping for her clients, and she cooked for them. AR 45. While Plaintiff testified that she paid 

income taxes, the ALJ indicated that her certified earnings report showed no earnings at all. AR 45. 

Plaintiff‘s representative claimed that this could result if Plaintiff jointly filed her taxes at that time 

with her husband. 

Medical Record

The entire medical record was reviewed by the Court. AR 180-408. The medical evidence 

will be referenced below as necessary to this Court‘s decision.

The ALJ’s Decision

Using the Social Security Administration‘s five-step sequential evaluation process, the ALJ 

determined that Plaintiff did not meet the disability standard. AR 16-24. More particularly, the ALJ 

found that Plaintiff had not engaged in any substantial gainful activity since November 2, 2011. AR 

18. Further, the ALJ identified hypothyroidism, diabetes mellitus, gastrophageal reflux disease, 

hypertension, degenerative disc disease at the L4-5 with herniation and nerve root compression, left 

lumbar spine radiculopathy and left leg paresthesia, and polyneuropathy as severe impairments. AR 

18. Nonetheless, the ALJ determined that the severity of Plaintiff‘s impairments did not meet or 

exceed any of the listed impairments. AR 19.

Based on his review of the entire record, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the 

residual functional capacity (―RFC‖) to perform light work; and she can occasionally climb, balance, 

stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl. AR 17. Ultimately, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform a 

significant number of jobs that exist in the national economy. AR 23. 

SCOPE OF REVIEW

Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of the Commissioner‘s decision to 

deny benefits under the Act. In reviewing findings of fact with respect to such determinations, this 

Court must determine whether the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial 

evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g). Substantial evidence means ―more than a mere scintilla,‖ 

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Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971), but less than a preponderance. Sorenson v. 

Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119, n. 10 (9th Cir. 1975). It is ―such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.‖ Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 

389, 401 (1971). The record as a whole must be considered, weighing both the evidence that 

supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commission‘s conclusion. Jones v. Heckler, 760 

F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). In weighing the evidence and making findings, the Commission must 

apply the proper legal standards. E.g., Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988). 

This Court must uphold the Commissioner‘s determination that the claimant is not disabled if the 

Secretary applied the proper legal standards, and if the Commission‘s findings are supported by 

substantial evidence. Sanchez v. Sec’y of Health and Human Serv., 812 F.2d 509, 510 (9th Cir. 

1987); see also Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2002).

REVIEW

In order to qualify for benefits, a claimant must establish that he or she is unable to engage in 

substantial gainful activity due to a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which has 

lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 

1382c (a)(3)(A). A claimant must show that he or she has a physical or mental impairment of such 

severity that he or she is not only unable to do his or her previous work, but cannot, considering his 

or her age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work 

which exists in the national economy. Quang Van Han v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 1453, 1456 (9th Cir. 

1989). The burden is on the claimant to establish disability. Terry v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1275 

(9th Cir. 1990). 

DISCUSSION

 Plaintiff raises four arguments challenging the ALJ‘s decision. Plaintiff contends the ALJ 

erred when he: (1) discredited her treating physicians; (2) found that Plaintiff‘s back pain did not 

meet or equal Listing 1.04A; (3) improperly discredited Plaintiff‘s subjective symptoms; and (4) 

found that Plaintiff could speak English. (Doc. 14). 

1. The ALJ Properly Discounted the Opinions of Plaintiff’s Treating Physicians 

In her first issue, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to adopt the opinions of her 

two treating physicians, Dr. Blusoshetyn and Dr. Sukharev. (Doc. 14 at 7). The Commissioner 

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asserts, however, that the ALJ considered all of the medical evidence and properly rejected the 

treating physicians‘ opinions. (Doc. 15 at 12-15).

A. Legal Standard 

Cases in this circuit distinguish among the opinions of three types of physicians: (1) those 

who treat the claimant (treating physicians); (2) those who examine but do not treat the claimant 

(examining physicians); and (3) those who neither examine nor treat the claimant (nonexamining 

physicians). As a general rule, more weight should be given to the opinion of a treating source than 

to the opinion of doctors who do not treat the claimant. Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 (9th 

Cir. 1987). At least where the treating doctor‘s opinion is not contradicted by another doctor, it may 

be rejected only for ―clear and convincing‖ reasons. Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1396 (9th 

Cir. 1991). Even if the treating doctor‘s opinion is contradicted by another doctor, the 

Commissioner may not reject this opinion without providing ―specific and legitimate reasons‖ 

supported by substantial evidence in the record for so doing. Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 

(9th Cir. 1983).

The opinion of an examining physician is, in turn, entitled to greater weight than the opinion 

of a nonexamining physician. Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 502, 506 (9th Cir. 1990); Gallant v. 

Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1984). As is the case with the opinion of a treating physician, the 

Commissioner must provide ―clear and convincing‖ reasons for rejecting the uncontradicted opinion 

of an examining physician. Pitzer, 908 F.2d at 506. And like the opinion of a treating doctor, the 

opinion of an examining doctor, even if contradicted by another doctor, can only be rejected for 

specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Andrews v. 

Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1043 (9th Cir. 1995).

The opinion of a nonexamining physician cannot, by itself, constitute substantial evidence 

that justifies the rejection of the opinion of either an examining physician or a treating physician. 

Pitzer, 908 F.2d at 506 n. 4; Gallant, 753 F.2d at 1456. In some cases, however, the ALJ can reject 

the opinion of a treating or examining physician, based in part on the testimony of a nonexamining 

medical advisor. E.g., Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751-55 (9th Cir. 1989); Andrews, 53 

F.3d at 1043; Roberts v. Shalala, 66 F.3d 179 (9th Cir. 1995). For example, in Magallanes, the 

Ninth Circuit explained that in rejecting the opinion of a treating physician, ―the ALJ did not rely on 

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[the nonexamining physician‘s] testimony alone to reject the opinions of Magallanes‘s treating 

physicians . . ..‖ Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 752. Rather, there was an abundance of evidence that 

supported the ALJ‘s decision: the ALJ also relied on laboratory test results, on contrary reports from 

examining physicians, and on testimony from the claimant that conflicted with her treating 

physician‘s opinion. Id. at 751-52. The opinions of nonexamining physicians are substantial 

evidence where they are supported by clinical findings and objective tests. Id.

With regard to Plaintiff‘s treating physicians‘ opinions, the ALJ found: 

Sasha A. Bluoshteyn, M.D., who has treated the claimant, completed a medical 

source statement dated May 9, 2012. Dr. Bluoshteyn opined that the claimant can 

walk one hour during an eight hour workday without interruptions. She can stand one 

hour during an eight-hour workday for 20 minutes without interruption. She can sit 

for three hours during an eight-hour workday [and] for 10 minutes without 

interruption. She can never lift or carry. She is partially restricted in her ability to 

climb stairs or ladders. Dr. Bluoshteyn opined that the claimant is not capable of 

performing a full range of sedentary work. She is unable to work an eight-hour day 

for five days per week because of pain. Dr. Bluoshteyn reported that [the claimant] 

may have some improvement in pain. Further physical therapy may also improve 

symptoms. 

Dina Sukharev, M.D., who has treated the claimant at Paradise Medical Office, 

completed a medical source statement dated September 26, 2012. Dr. Sukharev 

opined that the claimant can lift or carry less than 10 pounds frequently. Dr. 

Sukharev noted that she was unable to access [sic] limitations related to the 

claimant‘s ability to sit. The claimant would need to alternate from standing to 

sitting. However, a specific frequency or duration of changing positions was unable 

to be assessed. Dr. Sukharev was also unable to assess any postural or environmental 

limitations. 

I give reduced weight to Dr. Bluoshteyn and Dr. Sukharev‘s opinions. The course of 

treatment pursued by the doctor has not been consistent with what one would expect 

if the claimant were truly disabled, as the doctor has reported. Furthermore, the 

treating physician‘s opinions are somewhat different. Dr. Sukharev reported that she 

was unable to access [sic] limitations in all areas except the claimant‘s ability to lift 

or carry. However, Dr. Bluoshteyn gave highly conservative limitations that are not 

supported by the objective findings. Further, the claimant‘s inability to comply with 

treatment is considered. Dr. Bluoshteyn himself mentioned that the claimant‘s pain 

may improve with physical therapy. 

AR 22-23. 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not provide specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting her 

treating physicians‘ opinions. (Doc. 14 at 10). Furthermore, Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in 

discounting the treating physicians‘ opinion because Plaintiff‘s course of treatment was not 

consistent with her disability. According to Plaintiff, the ALJ had a duty to specify what treatment 

would support her allegations of disability. (Doc. 14 at 9). The Court disagrees and finds that 

Plaintiff‘s argument is misguided. In evaluating the medical evidence, the ALJ summarized the 

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medical records and outlined the basis for his conclusions. The ALJ then rejected the treating 

physicians‘ opinions for several reasons which was his duty. AR 22-23. 

First, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff‘s treating physicians prescribed only conservative 

treatment despite reports that Plaintiff was significantly limited. AR 23. The ALJ reduced the 

weight accorded to Dr. Bluoshteyn‘s opinion because he opined that Plaintiff could never lift or 

carry any weight at all (AR 368), yet Plaintiff admitted that she could wash dishes and go grocery 

shopping with assistance. AR 144-145. An ALJ may reject the opinion of a treating physician who 

prescribed conservative treatment, yet opines that a claimant suffers disabling conditions. Rollins v. 

Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 2001) (ALJ properly rejected opinion of treating physician 

where physician had prescribed conservative treatment and plaintiff‘s activities and lack of 

complaints were inconsistent with the physician‘s disability assessment). It was not error for the ALJ 

to reject Plaintiff‘s treating physician evidence because the extreme limitations asserted by the 

treating physicians were not justified by the evidence. 

Second, an ALJ need not accept the opinion of even a treating physician if that opinion is 

inadequately supported ―by the record as a whole.‖ Batson v. Commissioner of Social Security 

Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004). Typically, the lack of medical evidence supporting a 

treating physician‘s opinion is a legitimate basis to reject it. See, e.g., Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 

1152, as amended on reh’g (9th Cir. 2001) (rejecting treating physician‘s opinion that claimant 

suffered from a herniated disk where no MRI scan ever showed a herniated disk); 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1527(c)(3) (in determining the weight to give to the opinion of a treating physician, the ALJ 

should consider factors such as the degree to which the opinion is supported by relevant medical 

evidence). Here, the treating physicians based their findings on Plaintiff‘s ―disk protrusion‖ of the 

―LR/L5.‖ Plaintiff, however, was also treated for her disk protrusion by Tamim Wafa, M.D., who 

administered a lumbar steroid injection. AR 240. During her hospital stay, Plaintiff was observed 

―ambulating to the restroom normally,‖ she was ―much improved with meds,‖ with ―no foot drop‖ 

and ―no weakness.‖ AR 251. After receiving the injection, Plaintiff was discharged to her home 

with ―all systems negative‖ except moderate pain. AR 250- 251. Dr. Wafa‘s treatment notes 

undermine the opinions offered by Drs. Bluoshteyn and Sukharev based on the same medical 

evidence. While Plaintiff argues that the objective medical evidence supports her treating 

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physicians‘ opinions and not the objective findings expressed by Dr. Wafa, this Court will not 

second-guess the ALJ‘s reasonable determination to the contrary, even if the evidence could give 

rise to inferences more favorable to Plaintiff. See Robbins v. Social Security Administration, 466 

F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006).

Similarly, the ALJ noted that, in rejecting the treating physician evidence, he took into 

consideration Plaintiff‘s refusal to participate in physical therapy as prescribed. AR 23. See 20 

C.F.R. § 416.930; Chaudhry v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 661, 672 (9th Cir. 2012) (―[I]f a claimant complains 

about disabling pain but fails to seek treatment, or fails to follow prescribed treatment, for the pain, 

an ALJ may use such failure as a basis for finding the complaint unjustified or exaggerated....‖), 

quoting Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 638 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). The ALJ noted that 

even treating physician Dr. Bluoshteyn noted that Plaintiff will experience improvement with 

physical therapy and medication. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1530(a) and 416.930(a) (―In order to get 

benefits, you must follow treatment prescribed by your physician if this treatment can restore your 

ability to work.‖); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1530(b) and 416.930(b) (―If you do not follow the prescribed 

treatment without a good reason, we will not find you disabled.‖). Based on this evidence, it was not 

error for the ALJ to find that the treating physicians‘ significant limitations are not supported by the 

record. 

Lastly, the ALJ noted that Dr. Sukharev‘s opinion was inconclusive as she opined that 

Plaintiff could not lift 10 pounds, could only stand and/or walk less than 2 hours in an 8-hour 

workday, and needed to alternate between standing and sitting, but she was unable to assess 

Plaintiff‘s ability to do anything else. Dr. Sukharev admitted that she could not assess Plaintiff‘s 

ability to sit, climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, reach, finger, handle, or feel, or how often 

Plaintiff needed to change positions. AR 22-23, 355-356. See Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 

642 (9th Cir. 1982) (where medical reports are inconclusive, ―questions of credibility and resolution 

of conflicts in the testimony are functions solely of the Secretary‖). It was not error for the ALJ to 

afford less weight to Dr. Sukharev‘s inconclusive and incomplete opinion. 

Here, instead of relying on the problematic opinions of the treating physicians, the ALJ gave 

substantial weight to the opinion of examining physician, Fariba Vesali, M.D. AR 22. The opinion 

of an examining physician may serve as substantial evidence when it is consistent with other 

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independent evidence in the record. See Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 632 (9th Cir. 2007). On 

February 13, 2012, Dr. Vesali, M.D., performed a comprehensive orthopedic evaluation of Plaintiff. 

Dr. Vesali noted that Plaintiff did not use an assistive device for walking. AR 290. Upon 

examination, Plaintiff complained of pain on range-of-motion testing in the spine, straight leg raising 

was negative seated bilaterally, and she complained of low back pain with radiation to the left leg 

and foot in the supine position. AR 291. Dr. Vesali noted tenderness in the left leg and low back. 

AR 291. Plaintiff however demonstrated normal muscle bulk and tone, strength of 5 out of 5 in the

upper and lower extremities, and 2+ deep tendon reflexes. AR 291-292. Dr. Vesali found that 

Plaintiff could sit for 6 hours in an 8-hour day with breaks every hour for stretching and changing 

positions. Plaintiff could also lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently with 

occasional postural activities. AR 292. Dr. Vesali‘s opinion is consistent with the opinions of the 

State Agency physicians and the record as a whole. The ALJ assessed the reviewing physicians‘

opinions as follows: 

L. Kiger, M.D., a State agency medical consultant, completed a medical source 

statement dated February 28, 2012. Dr. Kiger opined that the claimant can lift or 

carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently. She can stand and walk six 

hours during an eight hour workday. She can sit six hours during an eight-hour 

workday. She can occasionally climb ramps or stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, 

or crawl and never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. 

J. Linder, M.D., a State agency medical consultant, completed a medical source 

statement dated October 24, 2012. Dr. Linder opined that the claimant can lift or 

carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently. She can stand and walk six 

hours during an eight-hour work day. She can sit six hours during an eight-hour 

workday. She can occasionally climb ramps or stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, 

or crawl and never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds. 

AR 22. 

The ALJ gave more weight to the opinions of Dr. Vesali because she gave a thorough physical 

examination. AR 22. Dr. Vesali‘s opinion was also consistent with the opinions of the revieiwing 

physicians and was further bolstered by Plaintiff‘s conservative treatment and failure to follow 

prescribed treatment. AR 22. Given that Dr. Vesali‘s opinion is supported by other evidence in the 

record, the ALJ was correct to credit her opinion as substantial evidence.

The ALJ summarized the facts and conflicting evidence in a detailed and thorough manner, 

stating his interpretation and making findings. Thus, his conclusion is entitled to deference. The ALJ 

provided legally sufficient reasons, based on substantial evidence in the record, for discounting the 

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opinions of Drs. Bluoshteyn and Sukharev. See Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998) 

(specific and legitimate reasons can be set forth by a ―detailed and thorough summary of the facts 

and conflicting clinical evidence, stating [the ALJ‘s] interpretation thereof, and making findings‖) 

(citing Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751). Accordingly, remand on this issue is not warranted.

2. The ALJ Did Not Err at Step Three 

Next, Plaintiff contends that she meets Listing 1.04 (disorders of the spine) because her 

degenerative disc disease and nerve root compression meet the requirements for this listing. The 

Commissioner responds that Plaintiff‘s subjective belief, unsupported by evidence in the record, fails 

to establish that her impairments meet or equal Listing 1.04A.

At step three, the ALJ determines whether ―a claimant‘s impairment meets or equals an 

impairment listed in [20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, appendix 1].‖ Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 

1099 (9th Cir. 1999). The Listing of Impairments describes specific impairments of each of the 

major body systems ―which are considered severe enough to prevent a person from doing any 

gainful activity.‖ Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1525). If a claimant meets or equals a listed impairment 

he or she will be found disabled at this step without further inquiry. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1099 (citing 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d)).

A claimant bears the burden of proving that his or her impairments satisfy all the criteria of a 

particular listing. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1099 (―[Claimant] had to establish that he [or she] met or 

equaled each of the following characteristics of a listing.‖). ―For a claimant to show that his [or her] 

impairment matches a listing, it must meet all of the specified medical criteria. An impairment that 

manifests only some of those criteria, no matter how severely, does not qualify.‖ Sullivan v. Zebley, 

493 U.S. 521, 530, 110 S. Ct. 885, 107 L. Ed. 2d 967 (1990) (emphasis in original). If a claimant‘s 

impairment or combination of impairments meets or exceeds a ―listing,‖ no specific finding is 

necessary as to the claimant‘s ability to perform his or her past relevant work or any other jobs. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520(d).

A. Listing 1.04A Criteria 

Listing 1.04 requires a finding of disability for an individual who (a) has a ―[d]isorder[] of 

the spine‖ such as ―herniated nucleus pulposus, spinal arachnoiditis, spinal stenosis, osteoarthritis, 

degenerative disc disease, facet arthritis, or vertebral fracture,‖ (b) that results in compromise of a 

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nerve root or the spinal cord, and (c) which is accompanied by the additional requirements set forth 

under section 1.04(A), 1.04(B), or 1.04(C). 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 1.04. Section 

1.04(A), the section at issue here, requires ―[e]vidence of nerve root compression characterized by 

neuro-anatomic distribution of pain, limitation of motion of the spine, motor loss (atrophy with 

associated muscle weakness or muscle weakness) accompanied by sensory or reflex loss and, if there 

is involvement of the lower back, positive straight-leg raising test (sitting and supine).‖ Id. § 

1.04(A).

A claimant‘s diagnosis is not the sole criterion for determining whether he or she meets the 

listing criteria. ―The statute generally defines  ̳disability‘ in terms of an individualized, functional 

inquiry into the effect of medical problems on a person‘s ability to work.‖ Sullivan, 493 U.S. 521 at 

528. ―The mere existence of an impairment is insufficient proof of disability.‖ Matthews v. Shalala, 

10 F.3d 678, 680 (9th Cir. 1993). A plaintiff bears the burden of producing medical evidence 

establishing the existence of an impairment, its severity, and how it affects the plaintiff‘s 

functioning. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512 (c).

All musculoskeletal disorders included within 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P. App. 1, Listing 

1.00, require that the claimant‘s condition result in loss of function. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P. 

App. 1, Listing 1.00 B.1. ―Regardless of the cause(s) of a musculoskeletal impairment, functional 

loss for purposes of these listings is defined as the inability to ambulate effectively on a sustained 

basis for any reason, including pain associated with the underlying musculoskeletal impairment, or 

the inability to perform fine and gross movements effectively on a sustained basis for any reason, 

including pain associated with the underlying musculoskeletal impairment.‖ 20 C.F.R. Part 404, 

Subpt. P. App. 1, Listing 1.00 B.2.a. The claimant‘s inability to ambulate effectively must have 

lasted or be expected to last at least 12 months. Id.

Inability to ambulate effectively means an extreme limitation of the ability to walk; 

i.e., an impairment that interferes very seriously with the individual‘s ability to 

independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities. Ineffective ambulation is 

defined generally as having insufficient lower extremity functioning (see 1.00J) to 

permit effective ambulation without the use of a handheld assistive device(s) that 

limits the functioning of both lower extremities.

20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P. App. 1, Listing 1.04A.2.b.

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Plaintiff fails to establish that she meets the requirements for Listing 1.04A for two reasons. First, 

the ALJ evaluated the medical evidence in the record and noted that ―Plaintiff does not use an 

assistive device for ambulation.‖ AR 21. Further, the ALJ noted that ―there is no hard and fast 

evidence regarding the poor use of [Plaintiff‘s] extremities.‖ AR 22. The evidence cited by the 

ALJ is furthered supported by Plaintiff‘s own statements to her treating physician Dr. Sukharev

which indicated that ―Plaintiff refused to use a walker or cane.‖ AR 355. Because the ALJ found 

that Plaintiff did not require an assistive device to ambulate, Plaintiff does not meet all the 

requirements on Listing 1.04A. 

Second, while Plaintiff alleges that she meets this Listing, she does not cite to supporting 

evidence—as is her burden. See Burch, 400 F.3d at 683 (claimant bears the burden of proving that 

she has an impairment that satisfies the criteria of a listed impairment). While an MRI shows 

degenerative disc disease, and disk protrusion (AR 270), Plaintiff does not demonstrate the requisite 

motor loss, sensory or reflex loss. AR 240. See Coelho v. Colvin, 525 Fed.Appx. 637, 639 (9th Cir. 

2013) (unpublished) (citing the absence of evidence of motor loss, sensory loss, or reflex loss, the 

ALJ reasonably concluded that claimant‘s spinal impairment did not meet Listing 1.04(A); although 

claimant argues that the ALJ‘s explanation was inadequate, claimant was required to support her 

claim with objective medical evidence, but only cites medical findings that either were remote in 

time or merely repeated her self-report of symptoms – the ALJ was ―entitled to disregard these 

findings without additional elaboration‖); see also Shaw v. Astrue, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7413, 

2013 WL 204742 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2013) (Plaintiff failed to identify medical evidence 

demonstrating he meets or equals a listing and therefore failed to carry his burden).

Ultimately, the ALJ‘s conclusion that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination 

of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments is adequately supported 

by his discussion of the evidence in the record. See Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1197, 1200-01 

(9th Cir. 1990). Moreover, Plaintiff failed to provide contrary evidence supporting her theory that 

her impairments do indeed meet or equal a Listing, particularly that she demonstrates the requisite

loss of function for the statutory period. Therefore, the ALJ did not err at Step Three. 

///

///

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3. The ALJ Gave Sufficient Reasons to Reject Plaintiff’s Subjective Testimony

Plaintiff next contends the ALJ failed to provide legally adequate reasons to reject her 

credibility. (Doc. 14 at 12-14). The Court disagrees.

 In deciding whether to admit a claimant‘s subjective complaints of pain, the ALJ must engage 

in a two-step analysis. Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1196 (9th Cir. 2004). 

First, the claimant must produce objective medical evidence of her impairment that could reasonably 

be expected to produce some degree of the symptom or pain alleged. Id. If the claimant satisfies the 

first step and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ may reject the claimant‘s testimony 

regarding the severity of her symptoms only if she makes specific findings and provides clear and 

convincing reasons for doing so. Id. The ALJ must ―state which testimony is not credible and what 

evidence suggests the complaints are not credible.‖ Mersman v. Halter, 161 F.Supp.2d 1078, 1086 

(N.D. Cal. 2001) (―The lack of specific, clear, and convincing reasons why Plaintiff‘s testimony is 

not credible renders it impossible for [the] Court to determine whether the ALJ‘s conclusion is 

supported by substantial evidence.‖); SSR 96-7p (ALJ‘s decision ―must be sufficiently specific to 

make clear to the individual and to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the 

individual‘s statements and reasons for that weight.‖). Other factors an ALJ may consider include: 

(1) the applicant‘s reputation for truthfulness, prior inconsistent statements or other inconsistent 

testimony; (2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a 

prescribed course of treatment; and (3) the applicant‘s daily activities. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 

1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1996).

Here, because there is no allegation of malingering and the ALJ found that ―claimant‘s 

medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms‖ 

(AR 17), the ALJ‘s reasons must be clear and convincing. Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 

492-493 (9th Cir. 2015). Even if ―the ALJ provided one or more invalid reasons for disbelieving a 

claimant‘s testimony,‖ if he ―also provided valid reasons that were supported by the record,‖ the 

ALJ‘s error ―is harmless so long as there remains substantial evidence supporting the ALJ‘s decision 

and the error  ̳does not negate the validity of the ALJ‘s ultimate conclusion.‘‖ Molina v. Astrue, 674 

F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 

1195-97 (9th Cir. 2004)).

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The ALJ provided several reasons for rejecting Plaintiff‘s credibility, including Plaintiff‘s 

noncompliance with prescribed treatment, her questionable work history, and her overall 

conservative treatment. AR 21. The Court finds that the ALJ‘s reliance on these factors are clear 

and convincing reasons to reject Plaintiff‘s credibility. 

First, the ALJ considered Plaintiff‘s work history in two ways. Initially, the ALJ noted 

Plaintiff‘s poor work history. Plaintiff testified that she previously held various jobs ranging in 

duration from 4 to 6 months. An ALJ may properly consider a claimant‘s poor or nonexistent work 

history in making a negative credibility determination. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 

(9th Cir. 2002) (―The ALJ may consider at least the following factors when weighing the claimant‘s 

credibility:...  ̳[her] work record ...‘‖); see, e.g., Aarestad v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 450 Fed. App‘x. 

603, 604 (9th Cir. 2011) (unpublished) (affirming ALJ‘s determination of claimant‘s testimony as 

partially not credible where claimant ―worked only sporadically before the alleged onset of disability 

(which suggests that her decision not to work was not based on disability)‖); Burkstrand v. Astrue, 

346 Fed. Appx. 177, 179 (9th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (―limited work history‖ negatively impacted 

credibility).

The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff apparently provided questionable testimony as to her work 

history. Plaintiff testified that she worked part-time as a teacher‘s assistant in a child care center in a 

college for 6 months in 2010 and as a caregiver for senior citizens for 4 months. AR 37-38, 44-46, 

137. Plaintiff also testified that she reported this work on her tax return; however neither of these 

jobs appeared on Plaintiff‘s certified earnings report. AR 45, 131. Such inconsistencies are a proper 

basis for a negative credibility finding. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1112 (―ALJ may consider 

inconsistencies either in the claimant‘s testimony or between the testimony and the claimant‘s 

conduct‖).

Second, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff was not compliant with prescribed treatment. AR 21. 

―[U]nexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course 

of treatment‖ is a relevant factor in weighing a plaintiff‘s credibility. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 

1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008). Here, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff was instructed to participate in 

education regarding care of her diabetes, to start taking a particular medication, to watch her diet, 

and check her glucose, but she failed to do so and physicians noted she was noncompliant regarding 

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her diabetes, hypertension, and pain medication. AR 186, 188, 217, 223, 225, 313, 326, 328, 333, 

341, 342. Indeed, Plaintiff refused to have her glucose tested on a number of occasions. AR 310, 

378, 384. The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff cancelled or missed a number of appointments. AR 21, 

195, 196, 225. Plaintiff cannot obtain benefits if he or she fails to follow prescribed treatment that 

would enable her to work. 20 C.F.R. § 416.930. It was not error for the ALJ to find that Plaintiff‘s 

subjective complaints lacked credibility based on her failure to follow prescribed treatment. 

Finally, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff‘s treatment was conservative. AR 21. Indeed, treatment 

notes in the record indicate that ―Plaintiff responded favorabl[y] to epidural block, at this time it is 

reasonable to continue conservative care.‖ AR 219. Evidence of conservative treatment may be 

considered in a credibility determination, Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 750-51 (9th Cir. 2007) 

(―[E]vidence of  ̳conservative treatment‘ is sufficient to discount a claimant‘s testimony regarding 

severity of an impairment[.]‖).

Given the above, the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons that are supported by 

substantial evidence when concluding Plaintiff‘s subjective symptom testimony was not credible. 

The ALJ clearly identified what testimony he found not credible and what evidence undermined 

Plaintiff‘s complaints. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d at 834. If the ALJ‘s finding is supported by 

substantial evidence, the court ―may not engage in second-guessing.‖ Thomas, 278 F.3d at 959. 

Accordingly, the ALJ‘s credibility findings are free of legal error.

4. Plaintiff’s English Ability 

Lastly, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ‘s finding that she could communicate in English. 

Plaintiff argues that there was no substantial evidence to support the ALJ‘s finding regarding 

Plaintiff‘s ability to speak English. The Court disagrees. 

In assessing Plaintiff‘s credibility, the ALJ found that ―the claimant alleges an inability to 

communicate in English. However, I note that the claimant attended and completed college courses

for approximately four years. She was a care provider for senior citizens for four months. The 

claimant states that prior to that she was a teacher assistant for six months in 2010.‖ Also, ―she 

completed written agency questionnaires in English.‖ AR 21. There is no indication that Plaintiff‘s 

classes were in Russian. Additionally, although Plaintiff purported to need an interpreter at the 

administrative hearing and at a consultative exam, she did not need the assistance of an interpreter 

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during her medical exams with her own physicians. AR 211, 249, 251, 289. See Flores v. Colvin, 

546 Fed.Appx. 638, 640 (9th Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (ALJ properly found that claimant ―could 

understand basic verbal English‖ based on evidence that claimant ―was taking courses in English and 

math at a community college,‖ and he had ―worked for twelve years in a grocery store and was 

required to converse, at least to some degree, in English with his supervisors, co-workers, and 

customers‖), citing Burch, 400 F.3d at 681 (holding that when evidence is susceptible to more than 

one rational interpretation, the ALJ‘s conclusion must be upheld). The Court finds that substantial 

record evidence supports the ALJ‘s determination that Plaintiff is capable of communicating in

English. See § 416.964(b)(5).

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ‘s decision is supported by substantial 

evidence in the record as a whole and is based on proper legal standards. Accordingly, this Court 

DENIES Plaintiff's appeal from the administrative decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. 

The Clerk of this Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Defendant Carolyn W. Colvin, 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security and against Plaintiff, Nina Chiley.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 11, 2016 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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