Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04094/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04094-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Asociacion Comerciantes Profesionales de Oakland
Miscellaneous
Cha Cha Enterprises, LLC
Plaintiff
City of Oakland
Defendant
Mi Pueblo San Jose, Inc.
Plaintiff

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MI PUEBLO SAN JOSE, INC, et al,

Plaintiffs,

 v

CITY OF OAKLAND,

Defendant. /

No C 06-4094 VRW

ORDER

On June 30, 2006, Mi Pueblo San Jose, Inc and Cha Cha

Enterprises, LLC ( “Mi Pueblo”) filed suit against the City of

Oakland, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and damages for

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution, 42 USC § 1983, 42 USC § 1981, California Government

Code § 6250, et seq, and Oakland Municipal Code § 2 20. Doc #1. 

On December 8, 2006, Asociacion Comerciantes Profesionales de

Oakland (“Asociacion”) moved to intervene in this litigation

pursuant to FRCP 24. Doc #35. Mi Pueblo and the City oppose

intervention. Doc ##40, 44. For the reasons set forth below,

Asociacion’s motion to intervene is DENIED.

//

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I

In early 2005, in anticipation of opening a full service

grocery store, Mi Pueblo leased a commercial building located at

1630 High Street in Oakland, California. Doc #1, ¶ 3-4, 7-8. On

July 22, October 3 and December 16, 2005, Mi Pueblo applied for,

and the City issued, all building permits necessary for the

proposed improvements. Id at ¶ 10. 

In February 2006, the City, through City Council

President Ignacio De La Fuente, issued a press release calling for

a “[p]rotest of Mi Pueblo” by “[u]nions,[n]eighbors, [and]

[m]erchants.” Doc #1, ¶ 19. In its release the City referred to

Mi Pueblo as the “Wal-Mart of the Latino Community.” Id. This

press release also quoted Hugo Guerrero, a spokesperson for

Asociacion:

The vibrant International Boulevard commercial

district is well known for its small mom-and-pop

stores * * * . Now we have a business coming in

from San Jose that intentionally targets these

kinds of vibrant areas to corner the market on all

these types of businesses, and drive them out of

business by artificially lowering their prices. We

will fight until the end to preserve our

livelihood.

Doc #1 at 43.

In April 2006, the City revoked Mi Pueblo’s building

permits. Id at ¶ 21-22. Mi Pueblo contacted the City Attorney’s

office on several occasions in order to appeal this decision. Doc

#1, ¶ 26. In June 2006, following over two months of

correspondence that produced no substantive response from the City,

Mi Pueblo filed this action seeking declaratory and injunctive

relief and damages pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment to the

United States Constitution, 42 USC § 1983, 42 USC § 1981,

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California Government Code § 6250, et seq, and Oakland Municipal

Code § 2 20. Doc #1. 

On July 7, 2006, Mi Pueblo moved for a temporary

restraining order against the City, see Doc #3, which this court

denied on August 17, 2006. Doc #23. This court also denied the

City’s motion to dismiss pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6) (Doc #20) on

October 4, 2006. Doc #29. 

In November 2006, Mi Pueblo and the City began settlement

negotiations and received approval for a settlement agreement from

the Oakland City Council during a December 19, 2006, meeting. Doc

#41, ¶ 2-3. On January 10, 2007, the parties filed a stipulation

for dismissal pursuant to FRCP 41(a)(1). Doc #48. 

Asociacion, which is a collective of approximately 60

merchants and residents in Oakland’s Fruitvale District

neighborhood, moved to intervene pursuant to FRCP 24 on December 8,

2006. Doc #35 at 1. Asociacion claims that the reissuance of

building permits to Mi Pueblo would adversely affect the character

of the Fruitvale District neighborhood and inflict economic damage

on its members. Doc #36 (Jiminez Decl), ¶ 2. Asociacion also

claims that the general operation of the grocery store requires a

conditional use permit conforming to Oakland Municipal Code § 17-

134-050. Doc #51, ¶ 2-6. Although Asociacion has attached a

proposed answer (Doc #37) that defends the City against the causes

of action asserted by Mi Pueblo, at oral argument Asociacion’s

counsel disclaimed any interest in Mi Pueblo’s allegations and

urged the court to hold a hearing on whether a conditional use

permit is required for the general operation of Mi Pueblo’s grocery

store. 

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II

FRCP 24 permits, under certain circumstances, the

intervention of a non-party in ongoing litigation. A non-party

seeking to intervene (applicant) may do so of right or by

permission of the court. The applicant bears the burden to

demonstrate that it meets the requirements of either FRCP 24(a) or

(b) for intervention. Petrol Stops Northwest v Continental Oil Co,

647 F2d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir 1981). In ruling on a motion to

intervene, however, “a district court is required to accept as true

the non-conclusory allegations made in support of [the]

intervention motion.” Southwest Center for Biological Diversity v

Berg, 268 F3d 810, 819-20 (9th Cir 2001). 

Under either provision of FRCP 24, the threshold inquiry

is whether the applicant’s motion to intervene is timely. Three

criteria govern the timeliness determination: “(1) the stage of the

proceedings; (2) whether the parties would be prejudiced; and (3)

the reason for any delay in moving to intervene.” Northwest Forest

Resource Council v Glickman, 82 F3d 825, 836-37 (9th Cir 1996)

(citing United States v Oregon, 913 F2d 576, 588 (9th Cir 1990),

cert denied, 501 US 1250 (1991)). 

Section (a) of FRCP 24 governs intervention of right:

Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to

intervene in an action: * * * when the applicant claims

an interest relating to the property or transaction which

is the subject of the action and the applicant is so

situated that the disposition of the action may as a

practical matter impair or impede the applicant’s ability 

to protect that interest, unless the applicant’s interest

is adequately represented by existing parties.

FRCP 24(a).

//

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To seek intervention of right, an applicant must make a

four-part showing: that (1) its motion is timely; (2) it has a

significantly protectible interest relating to the transaction that

is the subject of the action; (3) it is so situated that the

disposition of the action may practically impair or impede its

ability to protect its interest; and (4) its interest is not

adequately represented by the parties to the action. See Forest

Conservation Council v United States Forest Service, 66 F3d 1489,

1493 (9th Cir 1995); see also Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v

Wilson, 124 F3d 1050, 1061 (9th Cir 1997), cert denied, 524 US 926

(1998); Donnelly v Glickman, 159 F3d 405, 409 (9th Cir 1998). As a

general rule, the court should be “guided primarily by practical

and equitable considerations” and should “interpret the

requirements broadly in favor of intervention.” Donnelly, 159 F3d

at 409 (citing United States ex rel McGough v Covington Techs Co,

967 F2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir 1992)). 

III

A

1

The threshold determination for the court is whether

Asociacion’s motion to intervene is timely. As noted above, Mi

Pueblo commenced this action in late June 2006 and Asociacion moved

to intervene in early December 2006. Mi Pueblo charges that

Asociacion “waited too long” to intervene in this matter because it

was aware that Mi Pueblo planned to build a grocery store as early

as April 5, 2006. Doc #40, 6:6-8. 

//

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Yet timeliness is neither measured from the commencement

of litigation nor from the time the applicant first learned of the

litigation. Rather, “the focus is on the date the [applicant]

attempting to intervene should have been aware [its] ‘interest[s]

would no longer be protected adequately by the parties’ * * *.” 

Officers for Civil Justice v Civil Service Commission of City and

County of San Francisco, 934 F2d 1092, 1095 (9th Cir 1991) (quoting

Legal Aid Society v Dunlop, 618 F2d 48, 50 (9th Cir 1980);

additional internal citation omitted). 

For instance, in Officers for Civil Justice, 934 F2d at

1095, an applicant sought intervention sixteen years after the

filing of the original complaint and ten years after the district

court’s approval of a consent decree. The court found the

intervention timely because an existing party in the litigation had

adequately represented the applicant’s interests during the tenyear period of the consent decree and the applicant moved to

intervene only one month after his interests diverged from those of

the existing party. See id at 1095-96. 

Here, a divergence of interests surfaced when the City

commenced settlement negotiations, which began in the middle of

November 2006. Doc #41, ¶ 2. The proposed settlement would enable

Mi Pueblo to operate its grocery store in the Fruitvale District of

Oakland. Doc #51, ¶ 2. Mi Pueblo itself argues that the City

aggressively defended its case in opposing motions for preliminary

injunctive relief and in filing a motion to dismiss Mi Pueblo’s

claims. Doc #40, 3:13-20. Up until the time of settlement

negotiations, Asociacion justifiably relied on the City to defend

this lawsuit and forestall the reissuance of Mi Pueblo’s building

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permits. 

Mi Pueblo further contends that permitting Asociacion to

intervene at this stage in the litigation would unfairly prejudice

the existing parties by disrupting the settlement achieved by the

parties after one month of negotiations. Doc #40 at 5:3-5. In

support, Mi Pueblo cites a number of cases that denied intervention

due to the imminence of settlement; none applies here. Settlement

in those cases arose after litigation had lasted years, not months

or weeks. See Aleut Corp v Tyonek Native Corp, 725 F2d 527, 530

(9th Cir 1984) (denying an applicant’s motion for intervention on

“the eve of settlement,” but doing so because it occurred after

several years of litigation); Ragsdale v Turnock, 941 F2d 501, 504

(7th Cir 1991) (denying intervention “[a]fter pursuit of litigation

for several years” and after the parties “expended great effort in

working out a settlement”); City of Bloomington v Westinghouse

Electric Corp, 824 F2d 531, 535 (7th Cir 1987) (intervention

untimely when filed after 11 months of settlement negotiations); 

National Rural Telecom Co-op v DirecTV, 319 F Supp 2d 1094, 1104-05

(intervention untimely after four years of litigation). 

Given that Asociacion did not engage in unreasonable

delay before filing its motion to intervene, along with the absence

of protracted litigation in this matter, the court finds that

neither Aleut nor the other cases cited by Mi Pueblo pertain to the

present suit. 

Finally, Mi Pueblo asserts that intervention would

inflict unfair prejudice because oral argument for the motion

occurred a mere eight days before the discovery cutoff and a few

months before trial, which is presently set for May 5, 2007. Doc

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#40 at 6:1-5. The proximity of discovery deadlines and trial

dates, however, does not by itself engender unfair prejudice to the

parties. In Smith v Marsh, 194 F3d 1045, 1051 (9th Cir 1999), the

Ninth Circuit denied intervention due to untimeliness because the

case had already “progressed substantially,” I e, the district

court had already heard arguments and ruled on motions for class

certification and summary judgment. Id at 1050-51. See also id at

1051 (noting that this “substantial engagement” with the issues

“weighed heavily” against permitting intervention). Here, although

the court has ruled on Mi Pueblo’s application for a temporary

restraining order and the City’s motion to dismiss, such rulings

hardly constitute “substantial engagement” with the issues of the

case as contemplated by Smith. 

Although Asociacion knew of Mi Pueblo’s plans to build a

grocery store as early as April 2006, it did not realize its

interests diverged from those of the City until November 2006, a

few weeks before it moved to intervene; hence, this court cannot

identify a reason why the motion should be considered untimely. 

Because Asociacion has not intervened at too late a stage in the

litigation and because the court perceives no prejudice to the

parties, the timeliness requirement of FRCP 24 is satisfied.

2

FRCP 24(a)(2) also requires that Asociacion demonstrate

an “interest relating to the property or transaction which is the

subject of the action.” “An applicant has a ‘significant

protectable interest’ in an action if (1) it asserts an interest

that is protected under some law, and (2) there is a ‘relationship’

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between its legally protected interest and the plaintiff[s’]

claims.” Donnelly, 159 F3d at 409 (quoting Northwest Forest

Resource Council, 82 F3d at 837). Additionally, “[a]n application

generally satisfies the ‘relationship’ requirement only if the

resolution of the plaintiff’s claims will actually affect the

applicant.” Id at 410 (citing Montana v United States

Environmental Protection Agency, 137 F3d 1135, 1141-42 (9th Cir

1998), cert denied, 525 US 921 (1998); Greene, 996 F2d at 976-78). 

Finally, “the ‘interest’ test is primarily a practical guide to

disposing of lawsuits by involving as many apparently concerned

persons as is compatible with efficiency and due process.” County

of Fresno v Andrus, 622 F2d 436 (9th Cir 1980) (internal citation

omitted).

At the court’s hearing on the present motion,

Asociacion’s counsel disclaimed unequivocally any interest in the

constitutional and statutory claims that form the basis of Mi

Pueblo’s complaint against the City. Rather, Asociacion asserts an

economic interest in preventing Mi Pueblo from obtaining its

building permits and competing with Asociacion’s members. Doc #36

(Jiminez decl) at 2:7-9. Asociacion alleges that Mi Pueblo must

obtain a conditional use permit for the operation of its grocery

store and that this court should hold a hearing to give Asociacion

an opportunity to express publicly its opposition to Mi Pueblo’s

expansion into the Fruitvale District. See Doc #35 at 4:4-14; Doc

#50 at 2:27-3:2. In response, Mi Pueblo argues that Asociacion’s

economic interest bears no relation to the subject matter of the

action because Mi Pueblo’s asserted claims are actionable only

against a government entity. Doc #40 at 6:22-27. Furthermore,

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both Mi Pueblo and the City contend that Mi Pueblo may operate as a

grocery store without a conditional use permit so long as it

refrains from selling alcoholic beverages.

To establish a significant protectible interest,

Asociacion must first demonstrate that its interests are protected

by law. Donnelly, 159 F3d at 409. It is not necessary for a

prospective intervenor to assert an interest that is protected by

the statutes under which the suit arises. Sierra Club, 995 F2d

1478, 1484 (9th Cir 1993). It “is generally enough that the

interest is protectable under some law * * * .” Id (emphasis

added). For example, the court in State of California ex rel Bill

Lockyer v United States, 450 F3d 436, 441 (9th Cir 2006), held that

a Congressional appropriations rider created an interest

protectible under “some law.”

Asociacion contends that its interests are protected by

Oakland Municipal Code § 17-134-050, which prohibits the issuance

of any conditional use permit that would “adversely affect the

livability or appropriate development of * * * the surrounding

neighborhood” or harm “desirable neighborhood character.” 

Furthermore, the procedure for obtaining a conditional use permit

requires public notice and the opportunity for public

participation. Id, § 17-134-040. Because the individuals and

businesses that comprise Asociacion are precisely those recognized

by this municipal code, the interests asserted by Asociacion are

protected under “some law.” 

Intervention is inappropriate, however, because

Asociacion has failed to demonstrate a relationship between its

asserted interests and the present litigation. See Sierra Club,

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995 F2d at 1484. An economic interest must be “concrete and

related to the underlying subject matter of the action” to trigger

the right to intervene. United States v Alisal Water Corp, 370 F3d

915, 919-20 (9th Cir 2004) (citing Arakaki v Cayetano, 324 F3d

1078, 1085 (9th Cir 2003). In Alisal, the United States sued the

defendant alleging that it violated the Safe Water Drinking Act. 

Id at 918. The applicant, a judgment creditor of Alisal, sought to

intervene, arguing that the litigation would impair its ability to

collect a judgment against Alisal. Id. The court rejected the

creditor’s theory, concluding that the creditor’s economic interest

was not protectible in the litigation because it was too attenuated

from “the public health and environmental issues that were the

backbone of [the] litigation.” Id at 920. The Alisal court

recognized that “a mere interest in property that may be impacted

by litigation is not a passport to participate in the litigation

itself.” Id at 920 n3. Holding otherwise, the court concluded,

“would create a slippery slope where anyone with an interest in the

property of a party to a lawsuit could bootstrap that stake into an

interest in the litigation itself.” Id. 

The Alisal decision controls the present case. 

Asociacion’s economic interests, like those asserted by the

unsuccessful intervenors in Alisal, do not relate to the underlying

claims in the suit. Mi Pueblo seeks relief under the United States

Constitution and federal and state statutes arising out of the

City’s revocation of its building permits. Asociacion asks this

court to usurp the City’s permit process and hold a hearing

concerning Mi Pueblo’s effect on the surrounding neighborhood. 

Even if the court had jurisdiction to hold such a hearing, the

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issues it would entail do not relate to the present litigation. 

With respect to the City’s alleged infringement of Mi Pueblo’s

constitutional rights, Asociacion’s counsel at oral argument put it

best: Asociacion “has no dog in that fight.” Without a dog,

Asociacion gets no ticket to the dog fight. To hold otherwise

would lead the court from the kennel to the “slippery slope”

against which the Alisal court admonished. 

 Nor does Asociacion’s asserted interest in forcing Mi

Pueblo to obtain a conditional use permit for the general operation

of its grocery store render intervention proper. Doc #50 at 2:27-

3:2. The present litigation concerns the propriety of the

revocation of building permits and the denial of access to public

records. All existing parties agree that Mi Pueblo does not

require a conditional use permit to operate a grocery store. The

settlement agreement reinstates the building permits (thereby

allowing Mi Pueblo to proceed to open a store) and requires Mi

Pueblo to obtain a conditional use permit for the sale of alcohol

through the normal public approval process. Whether a conditional

use permit is required for the general operation of Mi Pueblo’s

store is not related to Mi Pueblo’s constitutional claims against

the City. Accordingly, Asociacion does not have a significant

protectible interest in this litigation.

 

3

In order to intervene as of right, Asociacion must also

establish that its ability to protect its interest will be impaired

or impeded by the disposition of this litigation. City of Los

Angeles, 288 F3d at 397. Even if Asociacion asserted a significant

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protectible interest, such an interest would not be impaired or

impeded by this litigation because the proposed settlement does not

affect Asociacion’s rights; indeed, the proposed settlement simply

restores the status quo between the parties. After Mi Pueblo

opens, Asociacion is free to assert that Mi Pueblo operates its

grocery store in violation of the City’s zoning restrictions.

The Ninth Circuit arrived at a similar conclusion in

United States v City of Los Angeles, 288 F3d 391 (9th Cir 2002), in

which the United States threatened to sue the City of Los Angeles

and its police department under 42 USC § 14141, which prohibits

government authorities from engaging in a pattern or practice that

deprives individuals of federal rights. Id. Before the United

States filed suit, the parties agreed to enter into a consent

decree. Id at 396. Several community groups sought intervention,

alleging they had suffered from the unconstitutional conduct that

was the subject of the consent decree. Id at 397. The court

concluded it was “doubtful” that the consent decree between the

United States and the City of Los Angeles impeded the intervening

parties’ interests because the decree did not prevent the

intervenors from bring their own suit against City of Los Angeles

police officers. Id. 

Like the community groups in City of Los Angeles, none of

Asociacion’s asserted interests is impaired by the proposed

settlement. As discussed previously, if Mi Pueblo fails to operate

its store in conformance with validly issued permits or zoning

regulations, Asociacion may invoke the procedures under the Oakland

Municipal Code. Accordingly, intervention is also improper 

because alternative forums exist for Asociacion to vindicate its

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asserted interests.

4

Finally, FRCP 24(a)(2) requires that a prospective

intervening party demonstrate that its interests are not being

adequately represented by the current parties. The factors to

consider with respect to adequate representation are: (1) whether

the interest of a party is such that it will undoubtedly make all

the applicant’s arguments; (2) whether the party is capable and

willing to make such arguments; (3) whether the applicant would

offer any necessary elements to the proceedings that the parties

would otherwise neglect. City of Los Angeles, 288 F3d at 398. 

Asociacion cannot establish a finding of inadequate

representation because it does not have significant protectible

interest in this litigation. That is, the City cannot represent an

interest that does not pertain to the underlying litigation. See

United States v 36.96 Acres of Land, 100 FRD 78, 81 (ND Ind 1983)

(“Because the [intervenor] does not assert an interest in the

property subject to this action, it has no protectable interest

that can be impaired or impeded. Nor does it have the right to

assert that its interest is being inadequately represented by the

existing parties.”). 

B

In the alternative, Asociacion argues that the court

should exercise its discretion to permit Asociacion to intervene. 

For reasons discussed above, the court finds Asociacion’s motion to

intervene timely. 

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Section (b) of FRCP 24 governs permissive intervention:

Upon timely application, anyone may be permitted to

intervene in an action: * * * when an applicant’s claim

or defense and the main action have a question of law or

fact in common. * * * In exercising its discretion the

court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly

delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the

original parties.

FRCP 24(b).

“A court may grant [permissive] intervention under

FedRCivP 24(b) where: (1) the [applicant] shows independent ground

for jurisdiction; (2) the motion is timely; and (3) the applicant’s

claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact

in common.” Greene v United States, 996 F2d 973, 978 (9th Cir

1993) (citing Venegas v Skaggs, 867 F2d 527, 529 (9th Cir 1989),

aff’d, 495 US 82 (1990)); see also Donnelly, 159 F3d at 412;

Northwest Forest Resource Council, 82 F3d at 839. “The existence

of a ‘common question’ is liberally construed.” Bureegong v

Uvawas, 167 FRD 83, 85 (CD Cal 1996) (internal citations omitted). 

If the applicant meets these three criteria, the

determination whether to permit intervention is committed to the 

discretion of the court. Donnelly, 159 F3d at 409. In its

discretion, the court may grant an applicant permissive

intervention for a limited purpose: for example, to gain access to

discovery materials under seal. San Jose Mercury News, Inc v

United States Dist Court – Northern Dist (San Jose), 187 F3d 1096,

1100 (9th Cir 1999). The Ninth Circuit has also approved

permissive intervention under FRCP 24(b) to allow a non-party to

seek the modification of a protective order, even if that

protective order was the product of a settlement between the

original parties. See Beckman Industries, Inc v International Ins

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Co, 966 F2d 470, 473 (9th Cir 1992). 

Normally, “permissive intervention to litigate a claim on

the merits requires * * * an independent ground for jurisdiction.” 

Canatella v State of California, 404 F3d 1106, 1117 (9th Cir 2005)

(citing Beckman Indus. v Int’l Ins Co, 966 F2d 470, 473 (9th Cir

1992). It remains an open question, however, whether a separate

ground for federal jurisdiction is necessary if the permissive

intervenor merely seeks to join claims already before the court. 

Schwarzer, et al, California Practice Guide, 7-85 at ¶ 7:268

(2006). 

The Ninth Circuit has suggested that an independent

ground for jurisdiction is not required when a party seeks to join

claims already before the court and does not seek to interject new

claims. Blake v Pallan, 554 F2d 947, 956 (9th Cir 1977). In

Blake, a California commissioner sought intervention in a lawsuit

concerning federal and state securities law. Id at 950. The

commissioner’s complaint in intervention did not, however, seek to

join plaintiffs’ claims, but instead raised three new state law

claims. Id at 955. The court rejected intervention, explaining

that the Ninth Circuit “has consistently rejected arguments to

accept jurisdiction over a new party not then involved in the

litigation in federal court where jurisdiction over that party is

based solely upon a state law claim over which there is no

independent ground of federal jurisdiction.” Id (emphasis added). 

In dicta, the court speculated that if the commissioner simply

adopted the plaintiff’s claims, it “could be argued that

jurisdiction would have been based on the fact that the state law

claims in which the commissioner would have intervened were already

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properly before the court.” Id. Accordingly, although acting on

behalf of an existing party may not require an independent ground

for jurisdiction, the assertion of a new claim does.

Asociacion’s inconsistent theories of intervention render

it difficult for the court to ascertain whether an independent

ground for jurisdiction is necessary here. On the one hand,

Asociacion has filed a proposed answer that seeks to defend the

City against the claims made by Mi Pueblo. See Doc #37

(intervenor’s proposed answer). Under Blake, this proposed answer

may not require an independent ground for jurisdiction. On the

other hand, at oral argument, Asociacion’s counsel asserted that

Asociacion does not seek to defend against Mi Pueblo’s claims. 

Instead, Asociacion asks for a hearing on whether a conditional use

permit is required for the general operation of Mi Pueblo’s grocery

store. Yet Mi Pueblo provides no authority suggesting that an

independent ground of jurisdiction exists for this court to hold

such a hearing. 

The next issue is whether Asociacion’s claims have an

issue of law or fact in common with the suit between the existing

parties. For reasons discussed above, Asociacion’s proposal to

have a hearing on whether Mi Pueblo requires a conditional use

permit to operate a grocery store shares no common issue of law or

fact with the claims underlying this litigation, I e, whether the

City violated Mi Pueblo’s rights in revoking its building permits.

Even if Asociacion could satisfy Rule 24(b)’s

requirements, this court would still have discretion to deny

Asociacion’s intervention. Donnelly, 159 F3d at 409. Because

Asociacion has not demonstrated — indeed, it disclaims — any

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interest in the underlying subject matter of the litigation, this

court denies permissive intervention. 

IV

The actions of the City as they appear in the record now

before the court seem troubling. But the party apparently

aggrieved, Mi Pueblo, has settled the matter. It is not the office

of this court to permit intervention by a party that possesses no

palpable interest in the dispute that is properly at bar and now

appears resolved.

For the reasons stated above, Asociacion’s motion to

intervene (Doc #35) is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

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