Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-00340/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-00340-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ivan Kilgore
Petitioner
A. J. Malfi
Respondent

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IVAN KILGORE,

Petitioner,

v.

A. J. MALFI, warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 07-340 SI (pr)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

INTRODUCTION

Ivan Kilgore filed this pro se action for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254. The matter is now before the court for consideration of Kilgore’s motion for stay and

abeyance. The court concludes that Kilgore has rushed to federal court prematurely and is not

in danger of running afoul of the statute of limitations. The court will deny the motion for stay

and abeyance. Also, because Kilgore’s state habeas petition challenging the same conviction

is now pending, the court will dismiss this action under the exhaustion doctrine. 

DISCUSSION

A. Motion For Stay And Abeyance

Kilgore’s conviction is quite recent and he filed his federal petition before his conviction

even became final. According to this petition and attachments thereto, he was sentenced in April

2006, and the California Supreme Court denied his petition for review on December 13, 2006.

He filed his federal petition on January 18, 2007, when the one-year limitations period had not

even started because he still was within the time during which he could petition for writ of

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certiorari. The one-year habeas statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) normally starts

on the date on which the judgment becomes final after the conclusion of direct review, which

includes the 90-day period during which a petitioner can file a petition for writ of certiorari.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A); Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999) (direct

review period included the 90-day period during which the petitioner could have filed a petition

for writ of certiorari, regardless of whether he did so). 

The one-year limitations period is tolled for the "time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). The limitations period also can be

equitably tolled. Kilgore filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme

Court on April 16, 2007 and that petition is now pending. The limitations period is tolled during

the pendency of that state habeas petition. 

A district court may stay a mixed habeas petition to allow the petitioner to exhaust his

unexhausted claims in state court. Rhines v. Webber, 544 U.S. 269, 277-78 (2005). In Rhines,

the Court discussed the stay-and-abeyance procedure for mixed habeas petitions. Rhines

cautioned district courts against being too liberal in allowing a stay because a stay works against

several of the purposes of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

("AEDPA") in that it "frustrates AEDPA's objective of encouraging finality by allowing a

petitioner to delay the resolution of the federal proceedings" and "undermines AEDPA's goal of

streamlining federal habeas proceedings by decreasing a petitioner's incentive to exhaust all his

claims in state court prior to filing his federal petition." Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277. A stay and

abeyance "is only appropriate when the district court determines there was good cause for the

petitioner's failure to exhaust his claims first in state court," the claims are not plainly meritless,

and there are no intentionally dilatory litigation tactics by the petitioner. Id. at 277-78. 

Kilgore’s motion falters on the requirement that there be good cause for his failure to

exhaust his claims first in state court. He claims that his “good cause” for failure to first exhaust

is the “combination of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and the recent obtaining of trial

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transcripts.” Motion, p. 1. The court disagrees. No stay would be necessary but for Kilgore’s

rush to federal court because the limitations period had not even started when he filed his federal

petition and his state habeas petition will toll the limitations period. The docket sheet for the

habeas petition pending in the California Supreme Court California Supreme Court shows that

ten days after Kilgore filed his petition there, he filed a motion to amend the petition. His rush

to federal court and his need to amend the state habeas petition just ten days after filing it

indicate unnecessarily hasty action. While a prisoner should be diligent in pursuing his claims,

at a certain point he also needs to remember the adage “haste makes waste.” Kilgore’s rush to

avoid the statute of limitations is creating unnecessary work for him and for the courts that must

deal with the consequences of his haste. Kilgore is nowhere near the end of one-year limitations

period, such that a stay is necessary to avoid his claims from being rejected as time-barred. The

motion for a stay and abeyance is DENIED. (Docket # 6.) 

B. Exhaustion Problem

Kilgore’s motion for a stay and abeyance reveals a problem with this action: the petition

must be dismissed under the exhaustion doctrine because of the pendency of the state court

habeas petition challenging the same conviction. Prisoners in state custody who want to

challenge either the fact or length of their confinement in federal court by a petition for a writ

of habeas corpus are first required to exhaust state judicial remedies, either on direct appeal or

through collateral proceedings, by presenting the highest state court available with a fair

opportunity to rule on the merits of each and every issue they seek to raise in federal court. See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A),(c); Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981). If available state

remedies have not been exhausted as to all claims, the district court must dismiss the petition.

See id. at 4-5. The exhaustion requirement is not satisfied if there is a pending post-conviction

proceeding in state court. See Sherwood v. Tomkins, 716 F.2d 632, 634 (9th Cir. 1983). If an

appeal or collateral challenge of a state criminal conviction is pending, a would-be federal

habeas petitioner must await the outcome of the state court action before his state remedies are

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considered exhausted, even where the issue to be raised in the petition for writ of habeas corpus

has been finally settled in the state courts. See id. Even if the federal constitutional question

raised by the petitioner cannot be resolved in a pending state action, that action may result in the

reversal of the petitioner's conviction on some other ground, thereby mooting the federal

question. See id. (citations omitted); cf. Phillips v. Vasquez, 56 F.3d 1030, 1036 (9th Cir. 1995)

(allowing death penalty defendant's habeas challenge to guilt determination even though state

court challenge to his sentence of death was still pending; extraordinary delay in adjudicating

the latter excused exhaustion requirement and, unlike Sherwood, there was no danger that the

pending state appeal would moot the federal court's decision). Kilgore’s state habeas petition

may be successful and thereby moot the federal question. 

Kilgore must await the outcome of the pending state court challenge to his conviction

before presenting his claims in federal court. Until that proceeding is concluded, a habeas

petition in this court is premature and must be dismissed. 

CONCLUSION

The motion for stay and abeyance is DENIED. (Docket # 6.) 

The petition is DISMISSED without prejudice to Kilgore filing a new petition after he

exhausts state court remedies as to all claims he wants to present in federal court. If and when

he returns to federal court, Kilgore is cautioned not to file an amended petition in this action and

not to use the case number for this action because this action is being closed today. When he

files a new petition, he should put no case number on the first page, and should submit it with

the $5.00 filing fee or a completed in forma pauperis application. At that time, the court will

give the new petition a new case number. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 17, 2007 

 SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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