Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-03705/USCOURTS-ca7-14-03705-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Danielle Pickett
Appellant
Sheridan Health Care Center
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14-3705

DANIELLE PICKETT,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

SHERIDAN HEALTH CARE CENTER,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 07 CV 01722 — Manish S. Shah, Judge

____________________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 21, 2015 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 16, 2016

____________________

Before POSNER, WILLIAMS, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. Danielle Pickett filed a Title VII 

retaliation lawsuit against her employer Sheridan Health 

Care Center. Ernest T. Rossiello & Associates represented her.

After a two-day trial, the jury awarded Pickett $65,000 in 

damages. She then filed a motion for attorney’s fees. The disCase: 14-3705 Document: 38 Filed: 02/16/2016 Pages: 12
2 No. 14-3705

trict court granted in part and denied in part the motion, finding, among other facts, that the hourly market rate for Rossiello’s services was $400, not the $540–$620 that was requested. 

Pickett appealed the award of attorney’s fees, arguing that the 

$400 hourly rate was arbitrarily decided and erroneously reduced based on the existence of a contingent fee agreement 

between Pickett and Rossiello, among other improper factors. 

The appeal was successful. We concluded that the district 

court erred by making impermissible considerations when 

calculating the hourly rate. We vacated the reward and remanded for further proceedings. Pickett v. Sheridan Health Care 

Ctr., 664 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 2011).

On remand, the district court determined that the evidence supported a $425 hourly rate for Rossiello and awarded 

fees based on that hourly rate. It also determined that the 

claim to attorney’s fees for the work done on remand had 

been waived. Pickett appealed, arguing that the district court 

failed to rely on the district court’s pre-remand factual findings and erroneously relied on a case that was wrongly decided. This time, we disagree. We find no legal error or abuse 

of discretion, and therefore, affirm the district court’s fee 

award.

I. BACKGROUND

This appeal stems from harassment and retaliation claims

brought by Danielle Pickett in 2007 under Title VII of the Civil 

Rights Act of 1964. Pickett worked as a housekeeper at the 

Sheridan Health Care Center, a nursing home. She alleged 

that residents of the nursing home sexually harassed her and 

that Sheridan fired her for complaining about it. Sheridan 

won summary judgment on the harassment claim, but the retaliation claim went to trial. At trial, Pickett prevailed on the 

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No. 14-3705 3

retaliation claim and was awarded $65,000. We affirmed this 

judgment in Pickett v. Sheridan Health Care Center, 610 F.3d 434 

(7th Cir. 2010) (“Pickett I”). 

A year after the trial, but before we affirmed the judgment 

in Pickett I, Pickett filed a motion for attorney’s fees, which 

was stayed because of the pending appeal. The motion sought 

fees for work done by her attorney Ernest Rossiello and his 

associates and paralegals. The motion did not request prejudgment interest. Following Pickett I, the district court lifted 

the stay, and Pickett renewed her motion to include additional hours accumulated. Pickett also sought reimbursement 

for an associate working under Rossiello’s supervision while 

Rossiello was suspended from practice1 as well as fees paid 

to outside counsel. Again, the motion did not request prejudgment interest. 

On March 29, 2011, the district court granted in part and 

denied in part Pickett’s motion for fees. Relevant to this appeal, the district court determined that Rossiello’s market rate 

was $400 per hour and that 175 hours of the approximately 

225 hours submitted were proper. The district court excluded 

hours it found duplicative and hours accumulated while Rossiello was suspended from practice. Pickett appealed the fee 

award. Pickett v. Sheridan Health Care Ctr., 664 F.3d 632 (7th

Cir. 2011) (“Pickett II”).

In Picket II we vacated the $400 per hour fee award. We 

found that the district court improperly calculated the rate for 

 1 Rossiello was suspended from the practice of law twice during this 

lawsuit, once from February 2008 to June 2008 and also from October 2011 

to July 2012.

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several reasons. First, the district court relied on the Consumer Price Index and the Laffey Matrix (collectively, “price 

indexes”) in its calculations, evidence that neither party provided nor was given an opportunity to address. Second, the 

district court considered the fact that Rossiello would receive 

a contingency fee in addition to the court ordered fees, which 

we found to be an impermissible consideration. Third, the 

district court improperly disregarded evidence of Rossiello’s 

hourly rate in cases where the defendant did not contest the 

fee award. We also found the district court erred in declining 

to award fees to an outside counsel because they were not prepaid. Finally, we determined that the district court failed to 

provide a clear explanation of the basis of its hourly rate calculation. We vacated and remanded the case for the district 

court to recalculate the hour rate and attorney fee award in 

light of our opinion. Pickett II, 664 F.3d at 654–55.

Following remand, in January 2012, Pickett filed a motion 

for attorney’s fees on remand. The motion requested fees for 

the life of the case and for the first time requested prejudgment interest. The case was transferred to several judges before the district court ruled on the motion and issued the fee 

order that is the subject of this appeal on November 13, 2014.

The district court determined that as of November 2014, 

Rossiello’s current market hourly rate was $425 per hour. The 

court considered Pickett’s evidence of prior fee awards Rossiello received and affidavits from other attorneys who have 

practiced employment law as long as Rossiello and charged 

$450–$745 per hour for employment discrimination work. 

The district court considered the affidavits but did not find 

that they established Rossiello’s rate because each affiant’s 

reputation was not similar to Rossiello’s, i.e., they did not 

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No. 14-3705 5

have a disciplinary history similar to Rossiello’s. The district 

court noted that Rossiello did work that many litigators with 

his experience would assign to younger associates who bill at 

a cheaper rate, suggesting that the market rate for that work 

would be lower. The affidavits suffered from other infirmities 

that led the district court to find that they were not sufficient 

to establish Rossiello’s hourly rate. The district court also reviewed Rossiello’s prior fee awards in cases Sheridan submitted for consideration, including a recent decision finding that 

Rossiello’s rate in another employment case was $425, see 

Johnson v. GDF, Inc., No. 07 CV 3996, 2014 WL 463676, at *21

(N.D. Ill. Feb. 5, 2014), and recent awards in similar civil rights 

cases tried by similarly experienced attorneys. It also reviewed the Consumer Price Index.

Next, the district court ordered payment for the hours already approved by the district court prior to Pickett II at the 

rate of $425 per hour. The district court then considered several requests by Pickett to increase the hours for which Rossiello would be compensated. The district court approved the 

time requested for Rossiello’s work on Pickett II, less the time 

spent on administrative tasks. The district court also awarded 

prejudgment interest as to the Pickett II fees because Pickett 

had timely requested it. The district court rejected additional 

hours submitted for paralegal and associate work completed 

in preparation for trial because the hours were not included 

in the pre-Pickett II fee applications. The district court also 

found that any claim for prejudgment interest as to fees incurred before Pickett II was waived because prejudgment interest on those fees was not requested until after remand. It 

also found that the following statement made in the reply to 

the motion for attorney’s fees on remand waived any claim 

for fees incurred to adjudicate the motion for attorney’s fees 

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on remand: “Counsel does not seek any reimbursement for 

time spent while suspended or on the instant motion.” The 

court noted that even if it did not find the claim for fees on 

remand waived, it would have exercised its discretion and denied the fees because Pickett abandoned key issues identified 

in Pickett II, raised arguments and added time that could have 

been put before the court prior to Pickett II, and “submitted 

unsolicited and irrelevant supplemental authority,” all of 

which was not a good use of the court’s time. Pickett now appeals the second fee order.

II. ANALYSIS

On appeal, Pickett again primarily challenges the district 

court’s determination of the proper hourly rate for Rossiello’s 

services. Specifically, Pickett argues that the district court: 

(1) exceeded the scope of the Pickett II remand by disregarding the three affidavits submitted in support of Rossiello’s 

hourly rate; (2) erred by considering the hourly rate the district court awarded Rossiello in a different case to determine 

the proper hourly rate in Pickett’s case; (3) erred by denying 

her request for prejudgment interest on the attorney fee 

award; and (4) erred by denying the request for attorney’s fees 

for services rendered after Pickett II. We review an award of 

attorney’s fees for abuse of discretion. Pickett II, 664 F.3d at 

639. We review de novo any legal analysis that is part of the 

district court’s decision. Jaffee v. Redmond, 142 F.3d 409, 412–13 

(7th Cir. 1998); see also Pickett II, 664 F.3d at 639.

Pickett argues that the district court exceeded the scope of 

the remand by re-evaluating all of the evidence, the affidavits 

in particular, and finding Rossiello’s disciplinary history relevant. In Pickett II, because of the district court’s errors, “we 

vacate[d] the award of attorneys’ fees for Rossiello's services, 

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No. 14-3705 7

and we remand[ed] for further proceedings consistent with 

th[e] opinion.” 664 F.3d 654–55. We noted that we remanded 

the case “to give the district court an opportunity to reevaluate the evidence consistent with our conclusions.” Id. at 647. 

We also noted that our view of the evidence was that substantial evidence supported rates much lower than the ones Rossiello requested and some evidence supported the rates requested. Id. at 646. We instructed the district court to re-determine Rossiello’s reasonably hourly rate without considering 

the contingent fee. Id. at 640, 645. We further instructed the 

district court to allow the parties to comment on whether and 

how the price indexes should be used to determine Rossiello’s 

reasonable hourly rate. Id. at 651. “[T]he general rule [is] that 

upon a reversal and remand for further consistent proceedings the case goes back to the trial court and there stands for 

determination of the issues presented as though they had not 

been determined before, pursuant, of course, to the principles of 

law enunciated in the appellate court’s opinion which must be 

taken as the law of the case at the new trial.” Graefenhain v. 

Pabst Brewing Co., 870 F.2d 1198, 1207 (7th Cir. 1989). 

On remand, the district court followed our Pickett II instructions. It did not consider the contingent fee. The parties 

had the opportunity to comment on the applicability of the 

price indexes. The district court considered evidence of Rossiello’s fee awards in other cases and did not consider independent evidence. It also explained its fee determination. 

Thus, the district court acted within the scope of the remand. 

Moreover, we did not limit the district court’s review of the 

evidence, so the district court did not exceed the scope of the 

remand by re-evaluating the evidence. The district court was 

free to reconsider the affidavits and afford them whatever 

weight it deemed appropriate. See Pickett II, 664 F.3d at 646 (“A 

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district court ‘is entitled to determine the probative value of 

each evidentiary submission.’” (quoting Batt v. Micro Warehouse, Inc., 241 F.3d 891, 895 (7th Cir. 2001))); accord Small v. 

Richard Wolf Med. Instruments Corp., 264 F.3d 702, 707 (7th Cir. 

2001) (“Although the district court must consider submitted 

evidence of the hourly rates of attorneys with comparable experience, the court is ‘entitled to determine the probative 

value of each submission and must arrive at its own determination as to a proper fee.’”). And we also find that the district 

court’s determination was reasonable, so there was no abuse 

of its discretion.

To the extent Picket argues the district court erred by considering Rossiello’s disciplinary history in determining a reasonable hourly rate for him, we disagree. Since Rossiello’s

work is based on a contingent fee, “the Supreme Court and 

this court have instructed courts to rely on the hourly rates 

that attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and reputations charge for similar work.” Pickett II at 641. Disciplinary 

action has an impact on the lawyer’s reputation. See, e.g., Precision Specialty Metals, Inc. v. United States, 315 F.3d 1346, 1352 

(Fed. Cir. 2003) (reviewing a district court’s reprimand of a 

lawyer in an order, noting that “a judicial reprimand is likely 

to have [a seriously adverse effect] upon a lawyer’s reputation 

and status in the community and upon his career”). Since discipline is a factor in a lawyer’s reputation and the court had 

to consider Rossiello’s reputation in calculating his hourly 

rate, the district court did not err by considering Rossiello’s 

disciplinary history.

Pickett’s remaining arguments warrant just a short discussion. She argues that the district court was not permitted to 

consider the hourly rate the district court decided represented 

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No. 14-3705 9

a reasonable rate for Rossiello’s services in Johnson v. GDF, 

No. 07-CV-03996, 2014 WL 463676 (7th Cir. Feb. 5, 2014) because, in her view, it was erroneously decided. Although the 

Johnson plaintiff initially appealed that order, the parties settled and requested that we dismiss the appeal, which we did.

“[B]y agreeing to a settlement the parties to an appeal renounce the right to challenge the decision that was appealed.” 

Marseilles Hydro Power LLC v. Marseilles Land & Water Co., 481 

F.3d 1002, 1003 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. 

v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18 (1994)). Further, the order 

was not vacated. 

We typically do not vacate district court orders merely because the parties settled on appeal because at the time the district court entered its order, it had a live controversy before it, 

“and, while not binding on anyone, [the district court’s] reasoning may be helpful to other courts to the extent that it is 

persuasive.” Clark Equip. Co. v. Lift Parts Mfg. Co. Inc., 972 F.2d 

817, 820 (7th Cir. 1992). The order was helpful to the district 

court here. Rossiello represented the plaintiff in Johnson, 

which was also an employment case.2

We have said, “a previous attorney’s fee award is useful 

for establishing a reasonable market rate for similar work.” 

Pickett II, 664 F.3d at 648. So, the district court was acting in 

accordance with the principles outlined in Pickett II when it

considered Rossiello’s fee award in Johnson. The district court 

did not err by considering, as part of its analysis, Rossiello’s 

hourly rate as determined in Johnson. See Small, 264 F.3d at 708 

 2 The parties indicate that the affidavits submitted here are the same 

ones used in Johnson.

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(finding no abuse of discretion where the district court considered Rossiello’s fee award in similar cases to determine 

Rossiello’s hourly rate in Small).

Pickett next argues that Rossiello is entitled to prejudgment interest on her attorney’s fee award because she was not 

awarded fees based on Rossiello’s current hourly rate. She 

also maintains that she did not waive a claim to prejudgment 

interest by failing to request prejudgment interest before remand because prejudgment interest is presumptively 

awarded. We review a district court’s decision on whether to 

award prejudgment interest for abuse of discretion. Shot v. 

Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Med. Ctr., 338 F.3d 736, 745 (7th 

Cir. 2003).

Prejudgment interest “is simply an ingredient of full compensation that corrects judgments for the time value of 

money.” Matter of P.A. Bergner & Co., 140 F.3d 1111, 1123 (7th 

Cir. 1998). “The basic purpose of prejudgment interest is to 

put a party in the position it would have been in had it been 

paid immediately.” Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. v. Yellow Freight Sys., 

Inc. 325 F.3d 924, 935 (7th Cir. 2003). The decision to award 

prejudgment interest lies within the discretion of the district 

court. United States v. Bd. of Educ. of Consol. High Sch. Dist. 230, 

Palos Hills, Ill., 983 F.2d 790, 799 (7th Cir. 1993). But, “[p]rejudgment interest should be presumptively available to victims of federal law violations,” Gorenstein Enters., Inc. v. Quality Care-USA, Inc., 874 F.2d 431, 436 (7th Cir. 1989), “unless 

there is a sound reason not to do so,” Matter of Milwaukee 

Cheese Wis., Inc., 112 F.3d 845, 849 (7th Cir. 1997). We have said 

that if a plaintiff has failed to plead prejudgment interest relief 

in her complaint, the plaintiff must request prejudgment interest, at the latest, in a post-trial motion or else it is waived. 

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See Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412, 424 n.9 (7th Cir. 

1989), overruled in part on other grounds by Saxton v. Am. Tel. & 

Tel. Co., 10 F.3d 526, 533 & n.12 (7th Cir. 1993). We have found 

no abuse of discretion where a district court has denied a 

party’s request for prejudgment interest that was made for the 

first time after a remand and a second entry of judgment. See 

McKnight v. Gen. Motors Corp., 973 F.2d 1366, 1373 (7th Cir. 

1992). The district court determined that the request for prejudgment interest for the portion of the original fee petition 

that remained due was untimely. Pickett admits that she did 

not request prejudgment interest before Pickett II,3 and she 

did not request it in her complaint. We find no abuse of discretion as to the prejudgment interest finding in light of the 

untimely request.

Moreover, courts must base attorney’s fees awards on “the 

market rate for services rendered.” Smith v. Vill. of Maywood, 

17 F.3d 219, 221 (7th Cir. 1994) (quoting Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 

U.S. 274, 283 (1989)). Since payment for services in civil rights 

litigation often comes by court order years after the services 

were performed, the court must account for the delay in payment of attorney’s fees. Id. To account for the delay, a district court has the discretion to choose one of two methods to 

calculate the fee award. Id. It may calculate the fee award for 

services rendered in prior years using the attorney’s current

hourly billing rate. Mathur v. Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ., 317 F.3d 

738, 744–45 (7th Cir. 2003). Or it may also calculate the fee 

award using the hourly rate the lawyer charged at the time 

 3 The district court found that “Rossiello did not seek prejudgment 

interest during the first round of litigation over the fee petition.” On appeal, Pickett conceded that the district court “correctly stated that prejudgment interest had not been requested early on.”

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the lawyer performed the services for the client (the “historical rate”) and add interest to that amount. See id. Since the district court awarded fees based on Rossiello’s current hourly 

rate, not the historical rate, no interest was due on the $425.

Pickett’s last argument is that the district court erred by 

finding that she waived her claim for attorney’s fees incurred 

for pursuing fees on remand. She asserts on appeal that she 

did not intend to waive any fees for the fee motion. However, 

in her reply to her motion for attorney’s fees on remand, 

Pickett stated, “Counsel does not seek any reimbursement for 

time spent while suspended or on the instant motion.” In light 

of this assertion, the district court found that she waived her 

claim to fees for pursuing fees on remand. We agree. A plain

reading of the statement is that Pickett’s counsel did not intend to seek fees for the work done in connection with the 

motion for attorney’s fees on remand. So, Pickett waived her 

claim to attorney’s fees.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, we AFFIRM the district court. 

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