Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_13-cv-08172/USCOURTS-azd-3_13-cv-08172-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Hopi Tribe
Plaintiff
Navajo Nation
Defendant

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Hopi Tribe, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Navajo Nation, 

Defendant.

No. CV-13-08172-PCT-GMS

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court are Plaintiff Hopi Tribe’s Motion to Vacate Arbitration 

Decision, (Doc. 3), Defendant Navajo Nation’s Motion to Dismiss the Hopi Tribe’s First 

Claim for Relief, (Doc. 14), and Motion to Dismiss the Hopi Tribe’s Second and Third 

Claims for Relief, (Doc. 15). For the reasons discussed below and based on the third 

claim from the Hopi’s Complaint, the Motion to Vacate is granted and the matter is 

remanded to arbitration. The Motion to Dismiss the First Claim is dismissed as moot. The 

Motion to Dismiss the Second and Third Claims is granted in part and denied in part. 

BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiff Hopi Tribe and Defendant Navajo Nation entered into an 

Intergovernmental Compact (the “Compact”) settling a long-standing dispute over, in 

part, access to each other’s lands and resources for religious purposes and the 

enforcement of trespass laws and other regulations against religious pilgrims. This action 

arises from a dispute over the meaning and applicability of the Compact. 

/ / / 

/ / / 

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In 1934, Congress established a Navajo reservation for the benefit of the Navajo 

people and for other Indians already located thereon in northeastern Arizona.1

 (Doc. 1 

(Compl.) ¶ 3 (citing Masayesva v. Zah, 65 F.3d 1445, 1450 (9th Cir. 1995)).) Forty years 

later, Congress passed the Navajo-Hopi Land Settlement Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 640d to 640d31, enabling the Navajo Nation and Hopi Tribe to sue each other as a means of settling 

their continuing dispute over which Party was entitled to which lands in the 1934 

reservation. Id. That year, the Hopi Tribe commenced an action against the Navajo 

Nation in this Court, which culminated in the Compact in 2006. Id. 

 The Compact was approved and made part of an Order issued by this Court. (Doc. 

1 (Compl.) ¶ 3 (citing Order & Final Judgment, Honyoama v. Shirley, Case No. 74-842 

(D. Ariz. Dec. 5, 2006), Doc. 1149).) Under the Compact, the Parties grant to each other 

the right to engage in traditional religious practices in designated areas. Some of those 

designated areas are drawn on a confidential map which is attached to the Compact as 

Exhibit B. The disputed substantive portion of the Compact states: 

The Navajo Nation grants to the Hopi Tribe, for the use and benefit of all 

current and future enrolled members of the Hopi Tribe, a permanent, 

irrevocable, prepaid, non-exclusive easement, profit, license, and permit to 

come upon the Navajo Lands, and to gather and remove fledgling Golden 

Eagles and hawks within the areas depicted on Exhibit B, and to gather and 

remove minerals and plant materials for religious and medicinal purposes 

from the Navajo Lands generally; provided, however, that such materials 

and things shall not be gathered for sale or other commercial purposes. This 

Compact does not grant to the Hopi Tribe or its members any easement, 

profit, license, permit, or right to gather or remove any Golden Eagle or 

hawk from any part of the Navajo Lands outside the areas depicted on 

Exhibit B, and this Compact does not prevent, limit or restrict the Navajo 

Nation from enforcing any law governing trespass, hunting or interference 

with wildlife against any person who comes upon any part of the Navajo 

 

1

 For purposes of the Navajo Nation’s motions to dismiss, the Court takes as true 

the allegations contained in the Hopi Tribe’s Complaint. Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 

1217 (9th Cir. 1996) (applying the standard to a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6)); 

Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883, 887 (6th Cir. 2002) (applying 

the same standard to a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(2)). 

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Lands outside the areas depicted on Exhibit B for the purpose of gathering 

or removing any Golden Eagle or hawk. This Compact does not waive, 

limit or restrict any right the Hopi Tribe or its members may have under the 

United States Constitution or federal law to come upon any part of the 

Navajo Lands outside the areas depicted on Exhibit B for the purpose of 

gathering or removing any Golden Eagle or hawk. 

(Doc. 3-1, Ex. 1 (Compact) § 2.4.) 

 The Parties formed the Compact out of a “desire to resolve both the disputes 

involved in the Litigation and others.” (Id. at “Recitals”.) In the event that a dispute does 

arise under the Compact and negotiations fail, the Parties waive their sovereign immunity 

to resolve it through arbitration or suit as provided in the Compact. (Id. § 8.9.) Arbitration 

is conducted before a Joint Commission (the “Commission”) made up of two 

representatives from each party and a neutral fifth member. (Id. § 8.1.) It provides an 

arbitration framework as follows: 

Any dispute arising under this Compact that is not resolved by negotiation 

may be submitted to the Joint Commission for arbitration, which shall be 

commenced by mailing a written demand for arbitration setting forth in 

detail the dispute and the relief requested to each member of the Joint 

Commission and the other party, by registered or certified mail, postage 

prepaid. Arbitration before the Joint Commission shall be the only 

procedure and the only forum for resolution of such disputes unless and 

until the Joint Commission shall fail to make a decision within the period 

specified in Section 8.4. 

The Joint Commission shall establish its own rules and procedures not 

inconsistent with the terms of this Compact for the resolution of any dispute 

which is the subject of a demand for arbitration, hearing such evidence and 

argument as it may, in its discretion, choose to accept. When any dispute is 

so submitted, the Joint Commission shall decide and resolve the dispute by 

issuing a written Decision and Award signed by a majority of the 5 

members within 180 days after the date on which the demand for arbitration 

shall have been mailed to the last of the members of the Joint Commission 

and the other party. 

The Joint Commission in its Decision and Award shall have the authority to 

issue restraining orders, injunctions, declaratory judgments, and orders of 

specific performance enforcing the terms of this Compact, but shall not 

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have the authority to award damages, attorneys’ fees, or the costs of 

arbitration. 

(Id. §§ 8.3–8.5.) 

 The Compact authorizes federal court review of arbitration decisions and awards 

by this Court, but they “may be vacated or modified only on the grounds permitted under 

the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C § 1 et seq.) as it exists on the Effective Date.” (Id. § 

8.6.) In limited circumstances, the Compact also allows for original enforcement and 

dispute resolution proceedings in this Court. (Id. §§ 8.7–8.8.) This only occurs if the 

neutral fifth member of the Commission is not serving or appointed, or if the 

Commission “shall fail to issue a Decision and Award” within 180 days. (Id.) 

 In May 2012, a Navajo law enforcement officer stopped a member of the Hopi 

Tribe who was accessing a religious site located within a designated area that the officer 

believed was also part of an “allotment.” (Doc. 1 (Compl.) ¶ 41.) Allotments are parcels 

of land awarded by Congress to individual members of Indian tribes under the General 

Allotment Act (the “GAA”) and held in trust by the Secretary of the Interior of the United 

States. (Id. ¶ 42.) It is now uncontested that the site was not on an allotment, but the Hopi 

Tribe member may have entered or crossed an allotment at some earlier point. After the 

incident, the Parties entered into negotiations to resolve their dispute over access to 

allotted lands within the designated areas but were unsuccessful. (Id. ¶ 48.) 

The Navajo Nation has alerted the Hopi Tribe that criminal prosecution will 

follow future incidents involving Hopis accessing allotments. (Id. ¶ 45.) The Navajo 

Nation alleges that it does not have the authority to grant access to allotments. (Id. ¶ 46.) 

The Hopi Tribe maintains that, regardless of the allotted status of some of the land, the 

Tribe has been granted access to the designated areas under the Compact or that at a 

minimum the Navajo Nation has agreed not to interfere with access to the designated 

areas. (Id. ¶¶ 38–39.) 

 On October 23, 2012, the Hopi Tribe made a Demand for Arbitration to the 

Commission. (Id. ¶ 48.) The Hopi Tribe alleged that the Navajo Nation had breached the 

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Compact by denying access to allotments, and it requested2 

a declaratory judgment and an order of specific performance that . . . 

members of the Hopi Tribe can access and collect golden eagles and hawks 

from all areas depicted on Exhibit B in accordance with the terms of the 

Compact, without regard to the land status of the underlying lands, 

including whether the lands have been “allotted” to individual members of 

the Navajo Nation . . . . 

. . . . 

The Hopi Tribe also seeks a preliminary and permanent injunction 

enjoining the Navajo Nation from . . . interfering with Hopi religious 

practitioners who access or gather eagles from the areas depicted on Exhibit 

B in accordance with the terms of the Compact, including, but not limited 

to, barring the Navajo Nation from bringing any legal action against 

members of the Hopi Tribe for coming onto or collecting eagles from 

“allotments” within the areas depicted on the Exhibit B map . . . . 

(Doc. 21, Ex. 2 (Demand for Arbitration) at 7–8.) 

 In response, the Navajo Nation filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction 

and authority to grant relief on November 30, 2012. (Doc. 1 (Compl.) ¶ 56; Doc. 21-1, 

Ex. 4 (Navajo Nation’s Mot. to Dismiss).) The Nation argued that the Commission lacked 

authority and jurisdiction to grant the Hopi Tribe relief for three reasons: (1) the language 

of the Compact does not grant or require access to allotted lands; (2) the requested relief 

implicates property rights held by allottees and the United States which are not parties to 

the Compact and have not subjected themselves to the Commission’s jurisdiction; and (3) 

the allottees and the United States are necessary parties to any proceeding in which such 

relief can be obtained, but have not been and cannot be joined in the arbitration. (Doc. 

21-1, Ex. 4 (Navajo Nation’s Mot. to Dismiss) at 2, 5–6.) 

 At an arbitration hearing on April 9, 2013, Judge Kenneth Fields stated the 

 

2

 The Hopi Tribe also alleged that the Navajo Nation was not performing its 

obligations under Article 4 of the Compact to prevent new development in NonDevelopment Zones depicted therein. Although the Hopi Tribe submitted that dispute to 

arbitration, it does not bring that dispute to this Court. (See Doc. 1 ¶¶ 15, 18.) 

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Commission’s intention that it would grant the Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 

(Doc. 1 (Compl.) ¶ 59; Doc. 21-2, Ex. 6 (April 9, 2013 Hearing) at 90, 92.) On April 17, 

the Commission issued a written Decision granting the Motion. (Doc. 21-2, Ex. 9 

(Arbitration Decision).) The Decision states that “[the Commission] lacks jurisdiction to 

consider the dispute involving allotted lands since it has no jurisdiction over the allotment 

holders and the U.S. Secretary of the Interior (the allotment trustee) under the [Compact]. 

The jurisdiction lies with the United States District Court.” (Id. at 2.) Further, “should the 

U.S. Courts determine that the Joint Commission has jurisdiction over the allotments then 

the Commission would take such jurisdiction.” (Id.) 

The Hopi Tribe filed this action on July 5. (Doc. 1 (Compl.).) The Tribe first 

alleges breach of the Compact and brings that claim under Section 8.8 because it asserts 

that the Commission failed to issue a Decision and Award. (Id. at 12–13.) Next, the 

Tribe alleges that the Commission’s decision to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction 

should be vacated under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) for failure to hear evidence 

pursuant, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3), and to make a mutual, final, and definite arbitration award, 

id. § 10(a)(4). (Id. at 13–15.) The Tribe requests the Court to declare that the Navajo 

Nation agreed not to prevent access to the allotted lands within its boundaries to the Tribe 

and that the Nation may fulfill that agreement by not enforcing regulatory laws on those 

lands. (Id. at 15.) The Tribe further requests the Court to enjoin the Nation from taking 

any enforcement actions against members of the Tribe for accessing sites on the 

allotments. (Id.) In the alternative, the Tribe seeks an order vacating the Commission’s 

decision, finding that the Commission has jurisdiction, and remanding the matter for an 

evidentiary hearing and ruling on the merits. (Id.) 

The Hopi Tribe filed a separate Motion to vacate the arbitration on the grounds 

described above. (Doc. 3.) The Navajo Nation moved to dismiss all of the Hopi Tribe’s 

claims. (Docs. 14, 23.) This Court held a hearing on the matter on October 18, 2013. 

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DISCUSSION 

I. Order of Remedies 

 The Hopi Tribe asks the Court for two alternative forms of relief based on 

different enforcement mechanisms provided in the Compact. Initially it asks for this 

Court to resolve the dispute under section 8.8 of the Compact, which authorizes direct 

litigation in this Court if the Commission fails to issue a timely “Decision and Award.” In 

the alternative, it asks the Court to vacate the Commission’s determination that it lacked 

jurisdiction and remand under section 8.5, which authorizes judicial review pursuant to 

the FAA. The Court must consider whether the Compact indicates which mechanism of 

relief should be considered first. 

 The Compact establishes a clear hierarchy for enforcement and dispute resolution. 

First, section 8.2 states that the parties “shall attempt in good faith to negotiate and 

resolve any dispute arising under this Compact.” (Doc. 3-1, Ex. 1 (Compact) § 8.2.) 

These negotiations must occur before the dispute can be submitted to the Commission for 

arbitration. (Id. §§ 8.2–8.3.) Arbitration before the Commission is the next step in the 

hierarchy, and “shall be the only procedure and the only forum for resolution of such 

disputes unless and until the Joint Commission shall fail to make a decision within [180 

days].” (Id. § 8.3.) While this Court may review the outcome of arbitration, direct 

litigation in this Court is only permitted “[i]n the event” that the Commission is missing 

its neutral fifth member or that it “fail[s] to issue a Decision and Award within [180 

days].” (Id. § 8.3.) 

 The Compact makes it clear that negotiation between the Parties is the preferred 

method of resolution followed by an arbitration in which both Parties are represented on 

the Commission. Direct litigation in this Court is only permitted in two narrow and 

exceptional circumstances. This is in keeping with the recitals in the Compact which 

emphasize the sovereign autonomy of the parties and their desires to live in harmony as 

neighbors. (Id. at “Recitals.”) The Court will therefore address whether relief can be 

granted by reviewing the Commission’s arbitration decision under the FAA before 

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considering the exceptional mechanism of direct litigation. 

II. Review Under the Federal Arbitration Act 

 Under the Compact, the Parties waive sovereign immunity to authorize this Court 

to vacate or modify a decision of the Commission “only on the grounds permitted under 

the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. §1 et seq.) as it exists on the Effective Date.” (Doc. 

3-1, Ex. 1 (Compact) § 8.6.) The FAA authorizes district courts to enforce or vacate an 

arbitration award entered pursuant to an agreement between parties. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 9–

11. Judicial review of an arbitration award is “both limited and highly deferential.” 

Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1288 (9th Cir. 2009). The Act 

permits vacatur of arbitration awards in several circumstances, including: 

(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in . . . 

refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the 

controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights 

of any party have been prejudiced; or . . . 

(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so 

imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite 

award upon the subject matter submitted was not made. 

9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2006). The burden of establishing grounds for vacatur is on the party 

seeking it. U.S. Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Nat’l Ins. Co., 591 F.3d 1167, 1173 (9th Cir. 

2010). The Hopi Tribe argues for vacatur for two reasons. 

 First, the Hopi Tribe contends that the Commission refused to hear pertinent and 

material evidence before dismissing the Demand for Arbitration. Under the FAA, an 

arbitrator must provide parties with an “adequate opportunity to present its evidence and 

arguments.” U.S. Life, 591 F.3d at 1175 (quoting Sunshine Mining Co. v. United 

Steelworkers of Am., 823 F.2d 1289, 1295 (9th Cir. 1987)). Nonetheless, arbitrators enjoy 

“wide discretion to require the exchange of evidence, and to admit or exclude evidence, 

how and when they see fit.” U.S. Life, 591 F.3d at 1175 (internal citation omitted). 

 Second, the Hopi Tribe also argues that by dismissing its claims for lack of 

jurisdiction, and not resolving the dispute over the meaning of the Compact, the 

Commission exceeded its powers or imperfectly executed them. “The Federal Arbitration 

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Act ‘requires courts to enforce privately negotiated agreements to arbitrate, like other 

contracts, in accordance with their terms.’” W. Employers Ins. Co. v. Jefferies & Co., 

Inc., 958 F.2d 258, 261 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Volt Info. Sciences v. Leland Stanford Jr. 

Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)). Parties “have a right to arbitration according to the 

terms for which it contracted,” and “arbitrators can also ‘exceed their powers’ . . . when 

they fail to meet their obligations, as specified in a given contract, to the parties. Id. at 

261–62 (emphasis in original). 

 Here, the parties entered into a Compact and agreed that its terms would be 

binding upon both the Navajo Nation and the Hopi Tribe. As part of that contractual 

agreement, they agreed that “any dispute arising under [the] Compact” would be resolved 

through the procedures established by the Compact. (Doc. 3-1, Ex. 1 (Compact) §§ 8.2–

8.3.) In most cases, including this one, arbitration between the two parties before the 

Commission was agreed to be “the only procedure and the only forum for resolution of 

such disputes.” (Id. § 8.4.) The Compact explicitly provides that tribal members do not 

“have the right as an individual to institute or participate in any legal proceeding 

involving [the] Compact.” (Id. § 8.4.) Therefore, the Compact clearly dictates that 

arbitration before the Commission, involving only the two parties to the Compact, is the 

only forum and only procedure in which to resolve disputes about the meaning of the 

Compact. 

 The Commission exceeded its powers when it determined that the federal court 

and not the Commission should resolve the dispute over the meaning of the Compact 

because in doing so it failed to meet its obligation to provide arbitration according to the 

terms of the Compact. The parties only agreed to relinquish their sovereign immunity and 

be sued in federal courts so that the District of Arizona could conduct a review of the 

Commission’s decisions as limited by the Federal Arbitration Act, or in the exceptional 

case where the Commission is not properly constituted or fails to issue a Decision and 

Award. The agreement by both Parties to submit to arbitration is a fundamental aspect of 

the Compact because the sovereign immunity of both Parties limits the availability of 

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standard judicial proceedings. In other words, a claim that the Navajo Nation agreed 

under the Compact not to prosecute Hopis present on allotted lands that fall within the 

boundaries of the Navajo Nation when the Hopis are accessing such lands for purposes 

identified in the Compact would have to be brought in the first instance to the 

Commission and not to federal court. It could not be brought in federal court because the 

Tribes have not agreed to waive their sovereign immunity to bring it here in the first 

instance. This reality does not change merely because the overall nature of the claim also 

implicates the interests of the holders of the allotment and the federal government as their 

Trustee. The Commission has the jurisdiction to interpret and implement the terms of the 

Compact as among those who are bound by it. It is, in fact, the only entity that, barring 

one of the exceptions discussed above, has such jurisdiction in the first instance. 

 While the Commission can decide what the parties did or did not agree to do under 

the Compact with respect to allotted lands, this decision does not necessarily bind the 

allottees or the federal government as their Trustee in determining what Hopis, as a legal 

matter, may or may not do as an absolute matter on allotted lands within the Navajo 

Nation Indian Reservation. It can only bind those to whom the Compact extends. 

Nevertheless, that the Commission may not be able to resolve all the rights of all persons 

as it relates to such allotted lands, does not prevent the Commission from deciding what 

the Compact permits and to whom it applies, subject to the limited review provided this 

Court by the Compact itself. 

 Here, the Commission chose not to resolve a dispute over the meaning of the 

Compact out of apparent concern as to what the practical effect of its interpretation might 

be on non-parties to the Compact. Nevertheless, the Commission, in this respect, is not 

akin to a court of law. It is neither its job, nor its jurisdiction, to adjudicate or even to 

protect all conceivable rights pertaining to the affected land within either of the 

reservations. Such a function belongs to the nations who govern such land, and to the 

extent it may be applicable, to the United States government as trustee. The job of the 

Commission is to determine the extent to which, if any, the parties to the Compact have 

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agreed to act or not to act with respect to the activities that are the subject of the 

Compact. It is not the job of the commission to decide the rights that the allottees 

themselves may have against their own governments under tribal, or other law. Nor is it 

the job of the Commission to apply any other possibly applicable tribal or federal law, 

except the terms of the Compact. The reality that its decision may have some practical 

effects on others does not relieve it from resolving, in the first instance, the dispute about 

the meaning of the Compact and then determining what orders it may or may not issue in 

order to bring those bound by the Compact into compliance. 

 There is no requirement that every person who might be affected by an arbitration 

must be a party in the arbitration proceedings. Lindland v. U.S. Wrestling Ass’n, Inc., 230 

F.3d 1036, 1039 (7th Cir. 2000). In Lindland, a wrestler who did not make the Olympic 

team prevailed in an arbitration proceeding that ordered a rematch in which the wrestler 

won. Id. at 1037. The United States Olympic Committee and USA Wrestling argued that 

the arbitration award was not valid because another wrestler, who would lose his spot on 

the Olympic team, was not included in the arbitration. Id. at 1039. The court held that 

“[t]he notion, advanced . . . , that an arbitration must include 

all persons who could be affected by the outcome is novel and 

would work a revolution in arbitral proceedings. Neither 

[organization] has cited any authority for the proposition that 

a person potentially affected by an arbitration is a necessary 

party to it.” 

Id. The court went on to note that the other, non-party wrestler is “not ‘bound’ by the 

result, but USA Wrestling is, and it must implement the award.” Id. As shown in 

Lindland, the Commission can resolve the arbitration dispute between the Parties even if 

the rights of third-parties may be affected. In this case, the parties explicitly agreed in the 

Compact that no other party may ever be included in a dispute over the meaning of the 

Compact. 

 The Commission must determine the obligations of the Parties under the Compact 

before it can determine the appropriate remedies. The Parties disagree about the 

interpretation of the Compact. The Commission must look at the language of the 

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Compact and any parole evidence permitted under the construction provisions of the 

Compact itself to determine whether the Navajo Nation promised either rights of access 

or rights against enforcement. 

 The Commission has broad remedial authority to implement its interpretation of 

the Compact. This Court will not address the permissibility of the various remedies the 

Parties have suggested, having no need to do so unless and until it is appropriate for this 

Court to again take up this matter.

 In addition to the arguments over the legality of various remedies, the Hopi Tribe 

and Navajo Nation make various other arguments that do not affect the outcome here. 

The Hopi argue that the Commission did not consider material evidence in reaching its 

decision, but the Commission never reached the meaning of the Compact in a way that 

would have required it to hear evidence on that issue. The Navajo Nation argues that the 

outcome of arbitration should be given great deference. However, the Commission 

determined that it had no jurisdiction and therefore it made no award. It made no factual 

determinations or interpretation of the Compact and so there is little for this Court to 

defer to.3

 The only legal determination the Commission made was that it lacked 

jurisdiction and that the dispute should be heard in this Court. As discussed above, that 

determination was mistaken. 

 The Commission explicitly ruled that if this Court determines that the Commission 

has jurisdiction then it would hear the matter. The Commission has jurisdiction over this 

matter because it is a dispute arising under the Compact. To the extent that the 

Commission interprets the Hopi Tribe to request it to order relief against the allotment 

 

3

 While the Commission did generally say that it was granting the motion to 

dismiss for the reasons stated in the Navajo Nation’s motion, that does not mean that it 

adopted every legal position advanced in that motion. In fact the written decision and 

order specifies that the motion was granted in part and denied in part. Critically, if the 

Commission had actually adopted the Navajo Nation’s position that the Compact does 

not cover allotted lands, then there would have been no reason to dismiss for lack of 

jurisdiction over those lands. 

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holders directly, it need not do so unless for some reason or purposes it determines that 

they are covered by the terms of the Compact. 

CONCLUSION 

 The Commission has jurisdiction to decide the meaning of the Compact and has 

the authority to direct those bound by the Compact to fulfill their commitments under it. 

Therefore, the Commission’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is vacated and the matter is 

remanded for further action by the Commission. Because arbitration by the Commission 

is the preferred method of dispute resolution, the Court will not consider whether the 

exceptional method of direct litigation in this Court might also have been permissible 

under section 8.8. 

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate Arbitration 

Decision, (Doc. 3), is granted. The matter is remanded to the Commission, and the Clerk 

is directed to terminate this action. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Hopi 

Tribe’s Second and Third Claims for Relief, (Doc. 15), is granted in part and denied in 

part. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Hopi 

Tribe’s First Claim for Relief, (Doc. 14), is dismissed as moot.

 Dated this 8th day of November, 2013. 

Case 3:13-cv-08172-GMS Document 37 Filed 11/08/13 Page 13 of 13