Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-14-11890/USCOURTS-ca11-14-11890-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Remberto Argueta
Appellant
William Espinoza
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14-11890

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 1:10-cr-00086-RWS-ECS-12

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 

 versus

WILLIAM ESPINOZA, 

a.k.a. Cheberria,

a.k.a. El Crazy, 

 Defendant-Appellant,

 

REMBERTO ARGUETA,

a.k.a. Pitufo,

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

________________________

(December 28, 2015)

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Before HULL, ROSENBAUM and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

William Espinoza and Remberto Argueta appeal their convictions and 

sentences following a joint trial in which a jury convicted them of various charges 

stemming from their involvement with the La Mara Salvatrucha gang (“MS-13”). 

After careful consideration of the briefs and the record, and for the reasons below, 

we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Course of Proceedings

Espinoza, Argueta, and 24 other defendants were indicted by a federal grand 

jury for their conduct associated with MS-13. According to the indictment, MS-13 

is one of the largest street gangs in the United States, with about 10,000 members. 

The indictment alleged that members of MS-13 have committed various criminal 

acts, including murder, robbery, illegal possession of firearms, and assault. In 

many instances, MS-13 members allegedly committed these acts in order to 

maintain or increase their position in the gang. 

Along with their codefendants, Espinoza and Argueta were indicted in Count 

1 for allegedly violating the conspiracy provision of the Racketeer Influenced and 

Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). Count 1 named 

Espinoza in three overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy and Argueta in two. 

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Some of these overt acts also served as the basis for specific crimes Espinoza and 

Argueta allegedly committed while in the gang.

Counts 22 through 25 applied to Espinoza. The indictment alleged that

Espinoza used a gun in an attempted murder on July 20, 2008 and charged him 

with committing a violent crime in aid of racketeering activities (“VICAR”), in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(5) (Count 22), and using a firearm in relation to 

this crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count 23). The 

indictment also charged Espinoza with aiding and abetting a VICAR murder on 

July 22, 2008, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1) (Count 24), and aiding and 

abetting the use of a firearm during this crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c) (Count 25). Espinoza offered to plead guilty to Counts 1, 22, and 23 but 

not Counts 24 and 25. The government rejected this offer.

Counts 16 and 17 applied to Argueta. Count 16 alleged that on April 13, 

2007, Argueta murdered a man, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1). Count 17 

alleged that Argueta used a firearm in relation to this crime of violence, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).

Before trial, both defendants filed motions to suppress. Espinoza moved to 

suppress a gun and ammunition found after a warrantless search of his bedroom.1

 

 

1 Espinoza also filed a motion to exclude statements he made to law enforcement officers 

allegedly without first receiving the warnings required under United States v. Miranda, 384 U.S. 

436 (1966), and another motion to exclude out of court photographic identification evidence, 

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He argued, inter alia, that his roommate’s consent to search their shared room was 

insufficient to authorize the search of his personal effects within that room. 

Argueta’s motion to suppress challenged the admission of statements he made to 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) agents, asserting that the waiver of 

his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), was invalid.2

 The 

magistrate judge considered evidence, described below in Part II.A, and, after 

making factual findings, recommended denying both motions. The district court 

adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendations over the defendants’ objections.

Both defendants also objected to the admission of two types of evidence. 

First, they objected to evidence of uncharged gang activity (the “RICO enterprise 

evidence”), which the government offered to support the RICO conspiracy claim. 

They argued that their offer to stipulate that the gang was an enterprise for 

purposes of the RICO conspiracy claim rendered this evidence inadmissible.

Second, invoking Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), the defendants 

objected to the admission of evidence that their codefendants confessed to certain 

crimes when those codefendants would not also testify at trial, arguing that the 

 

which he argued was a result of an unduly suggestive photo line-up. Espinoza later withdrew the 

Miranda-based motion. The district court denied his motion regarding the photo line-up. 

Espinoza does not appeal that denial, so we do not address it here.

2 Argueta also moved to suppress a statement he made in 2008. The district court denied 

this motion, and Argueta appeals that decision as well. This argument is moot, though, because 

the government did not present at trial any evidence regarding this 2008 statement.

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confessions violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the 

United States Constitution. The district court overruled these objections.

After a lengthy joint trial, the jury convicted Espinoza of one count of RICO 

conspiracy, one count of VICAR attempted murder, and one count of use of a 

firearm in relation to the crime of violence (Counts 1, 22, and 23, respectively). 

Espinoza was acquitted of the charges in Counts 24 and 25. At sentencing, 

Espinoza requested a two-level reduction in his total offense level for acceptance 

of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 in the light of his pretrial offer to plead to 

the charges of which he was acquitted. The district court denied this request and 

concluded that the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range was 188 to 235 months. 

The district court did, however, consider Espinoza’s acceptance of responsibility 

when it addressed the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The court explained 

that, because it did not apply the acceptance of responsibility reduction, it would 

sentence Espinoza at the low end of the guidelines range. With an additional 60 

months tacked on as the statutory minimum for Count 23, the district court 

sentenced Espinoza to 248 months’ imprisonment and five years of supervised 

release. 

The jury convicted Argueta on all three charged counts: one count of RICO 

conspiracy (Count 1), one count of VICAR murder (Count 16), and one count of 

use of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence (Count 17). For Counts 1 and 16, 

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the district court sentenced Argueta to concurrent terms of life imprisonment, and 

for Count 17, the court sentenced him to an additional five years’ imprisonment to 

run consecutively. Argueta also was sentenced to five years of supervised release. 

This appeal followed.

B. The Trial

Two types of evidence presented at trial are relevant to this appeal: (1) the 

RICO enterprise evidence and (2) evidence of specific acts of violence the 

defendants committed in furtherance of the RICO enterprise.

1. RICO Enterprise Evidence

Four former MS-13 members, Kenedis Bonilla, Jose Delgado, Joseph Diaz, 

and Gustavo Lopez-Caal, provided testimony supporting the existence of a RICO 

enterprise including descriptions of drive-by shootings, murders, and aggravated 

assaults committed by MS-13 members other than the defendants. Bonilla testified 

about one instance in which he and other members of MS-13, armed with a bat, 

machete, knives, and a gun, surrounded a rival gang member and hit him in the leg 

with the machete. According to Bonilla, the MS-13 members chased the victim 

who ultimately got away. Bonilla also testified that, in December 2006, a fellow 

gang member was allowed to leave the gang in exchange for committing a drive-by 

shooting, ending in the death of a rival gang member. Bonilla further testified that 

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he was involved in at least four robberies and a stabbing and shooting of rival gang 

members.

Delgado, Diaz, and Lopez-Caal provided similar testimony about MS-13 

crimes. Delgado testified regarding a number of murders and an attempted 

murder, including the drive-by shooting Bonilla described and a shooting at a gas 

station where an MS-13 member known as Pink Panther killed a rival gang 

member. Diaz described how he drove a member named Lucky to a location 

where Lucky was killed by other MS-13 members and how he orchestrated a driveby shooting at an apartment complex. Lopez-Caal, who was an MS-13 member 

and government informant, testified about the 2007 murder of a rival gang member 

by another MS-13 member at a night club.

2. Specific Acts Attributed to the Defendants

The jury also heard evidence about Espinoza’s and Argueta’s participation 

in crimes in furtherance of the MS-13 enterprise. The jury learned of Espinoza’s 

involvement in a nightclub shooting, the basis for Counts 22 and 23, and a murder, 

the basis for Counts 24 and 25. Only the evidence supporting Counts 22 and 23 is 

material to this appeal.3

 As regards the nightclub shooting, the government 

introduced the testimony of Delgado, who confirmed that during a fight at a 

 

3 As regards the murder, the basis for Counts 24 and 25, the government introduced 

evidence that Espinoza was involved in an armed robbery ending in the death of the victim. 

Espinoza was acquitted of Counts 24 and 25.

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nightclub in the summer of 2008, Espinoza shot at a rival gang member, and the 

testimony of the victim of that shooting, who confirmed that he was jumped by 

about a dozen MS-13 gang members and shot on the night of July 20, 2008. The 

government played for the jury video from two surveillance cameras posted 

outside the nightclub that captured footage of Espinoza retrieving a gun from his 

car that night. 

The government also introduced evidence that Espinoza confessed to the 

2008 nightclub shooting. A DeKalb County Police Department detective relayed 

the substance of a subsequent interview with Espinoza. According to the detective, 

Espinoza confessed that he shot the victim in the stomach and then fled the scene. 

Contemporaneous with the detective’s testimony, the district court instructed the 

jury to consider Espinoza’s confession only when determining whether Espinoza 

was guilty of any crime alleged in the indictment, and not in relation to the charges 

against Argueta. Based on this and other evidence, the jury convicted Espinoza of 

RICO Conspiracy (Count 1), VICAR attempted murder (Counts 22), and use of a 

firearm in relation to a crime of violence (Count 23).

The jury also learned of Argueta’s involvement in the 2007 murder of a drug 

dealer in a hotel, the basis for Counts 16 and 17, and an overt act in furtherance of 

the RICO conspiracy alleged in Count 1. Former MS-13 member Omar Cubillos, 

who had pled guilty to the murder, testified that Argueta and another gang member 

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named Hidalgo both hid in a hotel room bathroom with two others waiting for the 

drug dealer to arrive. According to Cubillos, when the drug dealer arrived, 

Argueta and Hidalgo jumped out of the bathroom brandishing their guns. Cubillos 

explained that when the MS-13 gang members demanded drugs and money, a 

gunfight ensued. Cubillos testified that Argueta fired one or two shots before the 

gun jammed, at which point Argueta threw the gun to Cubillos who fixed and 

reloaded the weapon and then shot again towards the drug dealer. According to 

Cubillos, the MS-13 members, including Argueta, then fled the scene. The drug 

dealer collapsed just outside the hotel room and ultimately died from a gunshot 

wound to the torso.

Additional evidence the government presented at trial corroborated 

Cubillos’s testimony. Most significantly, an ICE agent testified that Argueta 

confessed to his involvement in the shooting during a March 23, 2010 interview—

the subject of Argueta’s unsuccessful motion to suppress. In particular, the ICE 

agent testified that Argueta admitted he hid in the bathroom with a gun, jumped out 

when the drug dealer arrived, and shot towards the ground near the drug dealer. 

The district court contemporaneously instructed the jury to consider this confession 

only as to the charges against Argueta, and not in any way with regard to the 

charges against Espinoza. 

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In addition, two government witnesses described the hotel shooting and

confirmed that Argueta was there with a gun. One of the two witnesses also 

testified that Argueta’s gun jammed and he threw it to Cubillos, that the drug 

dealer was shot and collapsed, and that the MS-13 members all fled the scene. 

Hotel surveillance footage showed, among other things, Argueta arriving at the 

hotel with other gang members and fleeing with the group after the shooting.4

II. DISCUSSION

The defendants appeal (1) the denial of their motions to suppress evidence; 

(2) the admission of the RICO enterprise evidence and their codefendant’s

confession; and (3) their sentences. Finding no error, we affirm.

A. Motions to Suppress

We review the denial of a motion to suppress under a mixed standard, 

reviewing the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its application of 

the law to those facts de novo, while construing the facts in the light most 

favorable to the prevailing party below. United States v. Lewis, 674 F.3d 1298, 

1302 (11th Cir. 2012). A district court’s choice between two permissible views of 

 

4 The jury also heard from Christian Escobar, a former member of a rival gang, who 

testified about a separate act of violence involving Argueta in October 2007. Escobar explained 

that Argueta confronted him and another man, confirmed that they were members of a rival 

gang, and pulled out a gun threatening to kill them. According to Escobar, he and the other man 

tried to use a parked car as a shield to protect themselves from Argueta. Escobar testified that 

they then ran away while Argueta fired shots toward them. Both men were shot, and Escobar 

sustained injuries to his back and ribs. This shooting served as an additional overt act in 

furtherance of the alleged RICO conspiracy in Count 1, of which Argueta was convicted.

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the evidence cannot be clear error. United States v. Ndiaye, 434 F.3d 1270, 1305 

(11th Cir. 2006). In conducting our review, “we afford substantial deference to the 

factfinder’s credibility determinations, both explicit and implicit.” Lewis, 674 F.3d 

at 1303. We defer to the district court’s factual determination “unless it is contrary 

to the laws of nature, or is so inconsistent or improbable on its face that no 

reasonable factfinder could accept it.” United States v. Ramirez-Chilel, 289 F.3d 

744, 749 (11th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).

1. Espinoza’s Motion to Suppress

The facts relevant to Espinoza’s motion to suppress, derived from the 

testimony of DeKalb County Detective Adam Tirado, are as follows.5

 Detective 

Tirado was assigned to investigate the shooting that took place on July 20, 2008 at 

a local nightclub. He visited the victim of the shooting, Jayro Arango-Sanchez, in 

the hospital and later at his home. Arango-Sanchez told him that he was shot in the 

stomach after a physical altercation at the club. At some point during the

investigation, Arango-Sanchez told Detective Tirado that Espinoza was the 

shooter.

After obtaining an arrest warrant, Detective Tirado and several uniformed 

officers arrived at Espinoza’s home. A man named Jose Marvin came to the door 

and allowed the officers to enter. The officers spotted Espinoza peering out of one 

 

5 Detective Tirado was the only witness to testify at Espinoza’s suppression hearing.

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of the bedrooms and then slinking back into the room to hide. The officers 

followed Espinoza into the room, promptly arrested and handcuffed him, took him 

outside, and placed him in a squad car. One police officer stood watch outside the 

police car while the others remained in the house with Marvin. 

Marvin then told the officers he was renting the house and consented to a 

search. Marvin explained to the detectives that he and Espinoza shared a bedroom. 

He showed the detectives their shared room, which contained two twin beds 

against opposite walls, about eight to nine feet apart. Clothing and other articles 

sat in piles next to each bed. Marvin showed the officers “exactly where he slept 

and what part of the room he slept in and explained what part of the room Mr. 

Espinoza slept in.” Doc. 571 at 16.6

 Although there was no marked division 

between the two sides of the room, Marvin “made it clear . . . that they had 

different sides of the room.” Id. at 69. The officers searched a pile of clothing 

stacked in a corner, “in the open,” on Espinoza’s side of the room. Id. at 29. The 

clothing was sitting on a suitcase or a stack of suitcases. Within the pile of

clothing, the officers found a gun and ammunition.

Espinoza moved to suppress the gun and ammunition, arguing that the law 

enforcement officers erroneously relied on the consent of his roommate, Marvin, to 

justify the search of his personal property. The magistrate judge disagreed, 

 

6 “Doc” refers to the docket number on the district court docket.

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concluding that Marvin shared common authority over the bedroom such that he 

could consent to the search of the room. He further determined that Marvin had 

authority to consent to a search of the pile of clothes on Espinoza’s side of the 

room, despite evidence that the two men had separate designated sides of the room. 

And he found that, “[w]hether the clothes were on the floor next to the suitcases or 

piled in an open suitcase, they were in the open and easily accessible to anyone 

with access to the room.” Doc. 719 at 15. For these reasons, he recommended 

denying the motion to suppress. The district court adopted the report and 

recommendation over Espinoza’s objection.

On appeal, Espinoza argues that the district court erred in admitting the gun 

and ammunition found during the warrantless search of his home for two reasons, 

both of which we reject.

7

 

First, Espinoza argues that Marvin lacked the authority to consent to a search 

of his side of the room. The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the 

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 

unreasonable searches and seizures[.]” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Ordinarily, the 

 

7 In his post-hearing brief in support of his motion to suppress, Espinoza also argued that 

the search of his bedroom was unconstitutional because the police removed him from the 

premises to thwart his ability to object to the search of his bedroom. See Georgia v. Randolph, 

547 U.S. 103, 121 (2006) (recognizing that an absent co-tenant’s objection to a search does not 

render an otherwise consensual search unconstitutional “[s]o long as there is no evidence that the 

police have removed the potentially objecting tenant from the entrance for the sake of avoiding a 

possible objection”). Espinoza does not raise this argument on appeal, and thus we do not 

consider it.

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Fourth Amendment requires that police obtain a warrant before entering an 

individual’s home to search for evidence. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 

(1990). One exception to this requirement is if the individual whose property is 

searched, or a third-party with common authority over the property, consents to the 

search. Id. “Common authority . . . rests . . . on mutual use of the property by 

persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes . . . .” United 

States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974). “[C]ommon authority over 

premises or effects is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting person with whom 

that authority is shared.” Id. at 170. 

Marvin had common authority to consent to search his shared bedroom, 

including Espinoza’s designated side of the room. Detective Tirado testified that 

Marvin answered the door when the officers arrived and informed the officers that 

he was a renter of the property and that he shared a bedroom with Espinoza. Based 

on these undisputed facts, the district court did not err in finding that Marvin had 

“joint access or control for most purposes.” Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 181 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Although the district court could have found, based 

upon Detective Tirado’s testimony, that Marvin’s access or control ended at the 

imaginary line between the two sides of the room, the district court did not clearly 

err in finding otherwise. In other words, evidence that the two men had separate, 

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designated sides of the room does not compel a finding in this case that they lacked 

joint access for most purposes over the entire shared bedroom. 

Second, Espinoza argues that Marvin lacked the authority to consent to a 

search of items in Espinoza’s suitcases. Espinoza analogizes this case to those 

involving a consensual search of shared space leading to a search of a private 

container in that space. See United States v. Jaras, 86 F.3d 383, 389-90 (5th Cir. 

1996) (holding that a driver of a car lacked authority to consent to the search of his 

passenger’s suitcase contained in the trunk of the car); United States v. SalinasCano, 959 F.2d 861, 863-66 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that a girlfriend lacked the 

authority to consent to search her boyfriend’s closed suitcase found in her 

apartment). Here, in contrast, although the record was unclear as to whether the 

clothing in which the gun and ammunition were found was merely piled in a corner 

by the bed or lying in an open suitcase, Detective Tirado’s testimony 

unequivocally established that the clothing itself was lying in the open. 

Accordingly, the district court’s finding that the police searched clothing lying in 

the open in a shared bedroom was not clearly erroneous. And thus, the search of 

the clothing did not exceed the scope of Marvin’s authority to consent. 

For these reasons, the district court did not err in admitting the gun and 

ammunition found in Espinoza’s home.

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2. Argueta’s Motion to Suppress

The facts relevant to Argueta’s motion to suppress, derived from evidence 

presented during the suppression hearing, are as follows. In March 2010, Argueta 

was in state prison on aggravated assault charges to which he had pled guilty. He 

was released from state custody on March 16, 2010 and sent to an ICE detention 

facility. Meanwhile, ICE Agent Jason Tyler arranged for Argueta to be brought to 

an ICE office for interrogation before he was booked into custody on the charges 

in this case. Questioning the accused before arrest in this way was Tyler’s general 

practice.

As planned, at around midnight on March 23, 2010, Argueta was awakened

and transferred to another ICE detention facility in Atlanta for questioning and 

arrest. He arrived at the ICE facility around 3:00 AM. According to Argueta, he 

spent the rest of the night shackled by his ankles to another inmate, unable to sleep. 

He believed that he was on the verge of being deported. He was unaware that he 

had already been indicted on the charges in this case.

Several hours later, at around 9:00 AM, Agent Tyler and ICE Agent James 

Ballard arrived to interview Argueta about his involvement with MS-13. Initially, 

the agents did not tell Argueta why they were interviewing him or that he had been 

indicted. Agent Tyler maintained that this nondisclosure was not a conscious, 

strategic decision to withhold information from Argueta. Meanwhile, Argueta 

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continued to believe throughout the interview that he was being questioned on an 

immigration matter, even though he was asked no questions about immigration. 

At the beginning of the interview, Tyler read Argueta his Miranda rights in 

his native language, Spanish, and Argueta signed a waiver in Spanish. Although at 

the suppression hearing Argueta denied signing the waiver form, he acknowledged 

that the signature on the waiver looked like his handwriting. According to the 

agents, Argueta also orally waived his Miranda rights. Tyler testified that Argueta 

appeared to understand the Miranda warnings and provided appropriate responses 

to all questions. Agent Ballard, who is fluent in Spanish, testified that he had no 

trouble understanding the questions that Tyler asked. The agents made no 

promises or threats, and Tyler never told Argueta that he would only use his 

statements in immigration proceedings. 

Argueta was then asked about the hotel murder, the basis for Counts 16 and 

17, and in response, Argueta made several incriminating statements, which he later 

testified were untrue. He testified at the suppression hearing that, despite the 

Miranda warnings, he believed he was not free to remain silent. He explained that 

he had a first grade education and, although he was a native Spanish speaker, he 

did not read Spanish well.

On appeal, Argueta argues that his Miranda waivers were not knowing and 

voluntary and thus, his resulting statements were inadmissible. “Miranda protects 

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a person’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by requiring law 

enforcement authorities to advise a person subject to custodial interrogation of 

certain rights and to respect the person’s invocation of those rights.” United States 

v. Bernal-Benitez, 594 F.3d 1303, 1318 (11th Cir. 2010). A person may waive his 

Miranda rights “provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and 

intelligently.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. “The Government must prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and 

intelligently waived his Miranda rights.” Bernal-Benitez, 594 F.3d at 1318. We 

apply a two-part test to determine whether a Miranda waiver was freely given:

First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the 

sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than 

intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have 

been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being 

abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only 

if the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation 

reveal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of 

comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights 

have been waived.

Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In assessing the voluntariness of a statement, we “consider the totality of the 

circumstances, including the details of the interrogation and the defendant’s 

characteristics.” Bernal-Benitez, 594 F.3d at 1319. The Court’s focus is “on 

whether the police overreached, considering factors such as the [accused’s] lack of 

education, or his low intelligence, the lack of any advice to the accused of his 

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constitutional rights, the length of detention, the repeated and prolonged nature of 

the questioning, and the use of physical punishment such as the deprivation of food 

or sleep.” Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

“Generally, courts have held statements involuntary because of police trickery only 

when other aggravating circumstances were also present.” United States v. Farley, 

607 F.3d 1294, 1329 (11th Cir. 2010).

The district court did not err in denying Argueta’s motion to suppress. The 

testimony introduced at the evidentiary hearing established that Argueta was 

advised of his rights in his native language both orally and in writing and then 

waived these rights both orally and in writing. No threats or promises were made

and both agents testified that Argueta appeared to understand his rights. Although 

Argueta denied signing the 2010 waiver and testified that he did not understand his 

rights, the district court credited the agents’ testimony over Argueta’s. The district

court’s choice between two plausible views of the evidence cannot be clear error. 

Ndiaye, 434 F.3d at 1305.

We reject Argueta’s argument that the Miranda waiver was involuntary or 

uninformed based on evidence that he was purposefully sleep-deprived, that the 

ICE agents intentionally withheld that he had been indicted, and that Argueta was 

uneducated. Although in some cases “slowly mounting fatigue” may be part of an 

overall scheme to wear down a witness, see Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 322

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(1959), the district court did not clearly err in finding otherwise here. The record 

contains no evidence that Argueta was so sleep deprived that he was unable to 

understand the agents’ questions. Further, Argueta cites to no authority that 

requires interrogating officers to disclose at the outset that an individual is facing 

an active indictment, and the record contains no evidence that the officers 

affirmatively attempted to mislead him. C.f. Farley, 607 F.3d at 1328-31 (holding 

that even if authorities trick a witness into thinking that an investigation is about 

terrorism, rather than a crime for which the witness is a suspect, such trickery does 

not negate a Miranda waiver where there was no evidence the authorities promised 

to limit questioning to the subject of terrorism or otherwise assured the witness that 

the statements could not be used against him). Thus, Argueta’s erroneous belief 

that he was being interrogated for immigration purposes, even if resulting from the 

agents’ decision to withhold information about the indictment, does not undermine 

the otherwise valid Miranda waiver. Finally, the record contains no evidence that 

Argueta’s lack of education affected his comprehension. For these reasons, the 

district court’s determination that Argueta voluntarily and knowingly waived his 

Miranda rights was not clearly erroneous.8

 

 

8 Because there was no error, this Court need not decide whether the admission of the 

2010 statement was harmless error, as the government argues.

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B. Evidentiary objections

The defendants raise two additional evidentiary challenges. First, they argue 

that the district court erred in admitting evidence of uncharged gang activity to 

support the existence of a RICO enterprise in the light of the defendants’ offer to 

stipulate that MS-13 constitutes a RICO enterprise under the statute. Second, they 

argue that, under Bruton, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), the admission of their 

codefendant’s confession violated their rights under the Confrontation Clause of 

the Sixth Amendment because neither codefendant testified at trial. 

We generally review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of 

discretion and “will reverse only if the resulting error affected the defendant’s 

substantial rights.” United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088, 1119 (11th Cir. 2002) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Bruton claims are based on the district court’s 

evidentiary rulings; we therefore review such claims for an abuse of discretion. 

See United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1275 (11th Cir. 2007).

1. Uncharged Gang Activity

Espinoza and Argueta argue that the district court erroneously admitted the 

testimony of Bonilla, Delgado, Diaz, and Lopez-Caal, which described crimes 

committed by other MS-13 members (see Part I.B.1), because neither defendant 

was involved in the gang when those crimes were committed, and neither 

defendant was aware of the crimes. They argue that their offer to stipulate that 

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MS-13 was a RICO enterprise, as that term is defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4),

9

rendered this evidence irrelevant, or at least established that the probative value of 

this evidence was outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice. We disagree.

The stipulation offer did not strip the testimony of its relevance for two 

reasons. First, the RICO enterprise evidence was relevant not only to whether MS13 was an enterprise—the limited subject of defendants’ stipulation offer—but also 

to whether defendants’ conduct was related to and part of the continued criminal 

activity of the gang, an additional element of a RICO conspiracy. See United 

States v. Browne, 505 F.3d 1229, 1257 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Gonzalez, 

921 F.2d 1530, 1545-46 (11th Cir. 1991) (“In addition to predicate crimes, a RICO 

conspiracy charge requires proof of an enterprise, of the continuity of racketeering 

activity, and of the defendant’s knowledge of, agreement to, and participation in 

the conspiracy.”). Thus, even if the government had accepted the offer to stipulate, 

it could still have relied on the RICO evidence to prove RICO continuity. 

Second, generally a party is not required to accept a stipulation and can 

insist on proving the fact or element of an offense. Parr v. United States, 255 F.2d 

 

9 An enterprise includes “any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other 

legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.” 

18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). The existence of a RICO enterprise is one element of a RICO conspiracy. 

See United States v. Browne, 505 F.3d 1229, 1257 (11th Cir. 2007). 

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86, 88 (5th Cir. 1958).10 “A syllogism is not a story, and a naked proposition in a 

courtroom may be no match for the robust evidence that would be used to prove 

it.” Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 189 (1997). This general rule “is 

qualified by Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.” United States v. O’Shea, 

724 F.2d 1514, 1516 (11th Cir. 1984). Thus, we ask not whether the enterprise 

evidence remained relevant after the offer to stipulate, but whether admitting such 

evidence violated Rule 403 in the light of the offer to stipulate. We conclude that 

it did not.

Under Rule 403, the “court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative 

value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice.” Fed. R. 

Evid. 403. The decision whether to exclude evidence under Rule 403 “is 

committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, tempered by the particular 

facts presented.” O’Shea, 724 F.2d at 1516 (internal quotation marks omitted). A 

party’s offer to stipulate is only one factor that the trial court should consider in 

making a determination under Rule 403. Id. 

The admission of the enterprise evidence did not violate Rule 403 because 

the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by a danger

of unfair prejudice. The enterprise evidence was highly probative because it 

 

10 Decisions of the former Fifth Circuit rendered prior to the close of business on 

September 30, 1981, are binding on this Court. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 

1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).

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showed not only the type of crimes the MS-13 RICO enterprise was engaged in, 

providing relevant context for the jury to understand how the enterprise functioned,

but, as noted above, also tended to prove that the crimes defendants committed 

were a continuation of the RICO enterprise. A stipulation would “rob th[is] 

evidence of much of its fair and legitimate weight.” Parr, 255 F.2d at 88 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). And the enterprise evidence, although prejudicial, did 

not specifically name either defendant. Under these circumstances, we cannot say 

that the district court abused its discretion when it overruled the defendants’

objection to this evidence.

2. Confessions

Espinoza and Argueta next argue that the district court abused its discretion 

in allowing the government to introduce their confessions at trial, where neither 

defendant testified. In particular, Espinoza challenges the admission of Argueta’s 

confession regarding the hotel shooting, and Argueta challenges the admission of 

Espinoza’s confession regarding the nightclub shooting. Relying on Bruton, the 

defendants argue that, although their confessions did not directly implicate each 

other, the confessions served as proof of overt acts in furtherance of the RICO 

conspiracy, thus triggering a confrontation right under the Sixth Amendment.

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right of a 

criminal defendant “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. 

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amend. VI. “Ordinarily, a witness whose testimony is introduced at a joint trial is 

not considered to be a witness ‘against’ a defendant if the jury is instructed to 

consider that testimony only against a codefendant.” Richardson v. Marsh, 481 

U.S. 200, 206 (1987). In Bruton, the Supreme Court carved out a “narrow 

exception” to this principle. Id. at 207. There, the Court held that the admission of 

a codefendant’s confession, which on its face inculpated the defendant at their joint 

trial, violated the Confrontation Clause despite a curative instruction given to the 

jury. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 125-26. The Court concluded that because of the 

substantial risk that the jury, despite instructions to the contrary, would consider 

the facially incriminating, extrajudicial statements in determining the defendant’s 

own guilt, admission of such confessions violated the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 

135. 

“Since Bruton, the Supreme Court has cautioned against blind application of 

the Bruton rule: ‘The Confrontation Clause has never been held to bar the 

admission into evidence of every relevant extrajudicial statement made by a 

nontestifying declarant simply because it in some way incriminates the 

defendant.’ ” United States v. Arias, 984 F.2d 1139, 1142 (11th Cir. 1993) 

(quoting Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 73 (1979)). Only those statements by a 

non-testifying defendant that directly inculpate or powerfully incriminate the 

codefendant give rise to a constitutional violation. Id. No Bruton problem exists

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where the statement “was not incriminating on its face, and became so only when 

linked with evidence introduced later at trial.” Marsh, 481 U.S. at 208. 

The district court did not err in admitting Espinoza’s and Argueta’s 

statements. Neither defendant’s statement directly inculpated, powerfully 

incriminated—or even mentioned—the other defendant. Arias, 984 F.2d at 1142. 

Here, one defendant’s statement incriminated the other only when linked with 

additional RICO enterprise evidence and specific evidence of the other’s role in 

MS-13. In other words, absent additional evidence linking Espinoza or Argueta to 

the MS-13 RICO enterprise, the confession of one codefendant had no 

incriminating effect on the other. Accordingly, in this case, admitting one 

codefendant’s statements as evidence against the other did not violate Bruton.

We reject the defendants’ argument that because the confessional statements

may be proof that a RICO enterprise existed, which is a necessary element of the 

RICO conspiracy charged against both defendants, the statements trigger a 

confrontation right under Bruton. If the defendants were correct, then any 

incriminating statement made by one nontestifying coconspirator would be 

inadmissible against the other, whether or not the statement facially incriminated 

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the other codefendant. Bruton’s narrow exception to the general rule of 

admissibility does not extend this far.11

C. Sentencing

1. Espinoza: Acceptance of Responsibility

Espinoza argues that the district court erred in declining to reduce his base 

offense level under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 for acceptance of responsibility. “We review 

a denial of a reduction of sentence for an acceptance of responsibility for clear 

error, and that finding is entitled to great deference on review and should not be 

disturbed unless it is without foundation.” United States v. Knight, 562 F.3d 1314, 

1322 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Section 3E1.1 provides a two-level reduction in the offense level “[i]f the 

defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense.” 

U.S.SG. § 3E1.1(a). Generally, “[t]his adjustment is not intended to apply to a 

defendant who puts the government to its burden of proof at trial by denying the 

essential factual elements of guilt, is convicted, and only then admits guilt and 

expresses remorse.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, comment (n.2). However, in “rare 

situations a defendant may clearly demonstrate an acceptance of responsibility for 

his criminal conduct even though he exercises his constitutional right to a trial.” 

Id. One example of such a rare situation is where the defendant does not contest 

 11 Because we hold that no Bruton violation occurred, we do not address the 

government’s alternative harmless error argument. 

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the factual basis for his guilt but nonetheless goes to trial “to make a constitutional 

challenge to a statute or a challenge to the applicability of a statute to his conduct.” 

Id.

The district court did not commit clear error in declining to apply the 

guidelines reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Although Espinoza offered 

to plead guilty to Counts 1, 22 and 23, he ultimately contested those counts 

factually by, inter alia, challenging the admissibility of evidence in support of 

those counts. See supra Part II.A.1 and note 1. See United States v. Gonzalez, 70 

F.3d 1236, 1238 (11th Cir. 1995) (“By challenging the admissibility of the 

essential evidence against him, [the defendant] attempted to avoid a determination 

of factual guilt and to thereby escape responsibility for his crime.”). In this light, 

Espinoza’s plea offer was not by itself a clear demonstration of the acceptance of 

responsibility. Thus, the district court had sufficient foundation to reject 

Espinoza’s request for a reduction in his base offense level under section 3E1.1.

2. Argueta: Life Sentence

Argueta argues for the first time on appeal that his concurrent life sentences 

violate the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution because he did not 

personally commit the murder for which he was convicted. Ordinarily, an 

allegation that a sentence amounts to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of 

the Eighth Amendment raises a legal question subject to de novo review. See 

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United States v. Flanders, 752 F.3d 1317, 1342 (11th Cir. 2014). “However, when 

a defendant fails to raise an Eighth Amendment challenge to a sentence in the 

district court, we review that challenge on appeal for plain error.” Id. 

“Plain error occurs if (1) there was error, (2) that was plain, (3) that affected 

the defendant’s substantial rights, and (4) that seriously affected the fairness, 

integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Wright, 

607 F.3d 708, 715 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). An error is 

plain if it is clear or obvious. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993). 

We have explained that “where the explicit language of a statute or rule does not 

specifically resolve an issue, there can be no plain error where there is no 

precedent from the Supreme Court or this Court directly resolving it.” United 

States v. Chau, 426 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

Argueta concedes that no precedent from the Supreme Court or this Court 

directly resolves the issue he raises.12 We agree. Thus, Argueta cannot show plain 

error. 

 

12 Argueta adopts the Eighth Amendment argument raised by his codefendant Dimas 

Alfaro-Granados, who expressly conceded that “from a Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit 

[perspective,] the cases do not support his position and that he will have to persuade the United 

States Supreme Court to reverse itself on these issues for any relief.” Br. of Appellant AlfaroGranados at 16 n.6, United States v. Alvarado-Linares, et al., No. 13-14994 (11th Cir. Mar. 17, 

2014).

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III.CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, we affirm Espinoza’s and Argueta’s 

convictions and sentences.

AFFIRMED.

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