Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cr-00403/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cr-00403-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dale Washington Orman
Defendant
United States of America
Plaintiff

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Dale Washington Orman, 

Defendant. 

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CR-05-403-PHX-DGC

ORDER

Defendant Dale Washington Orman has been charged wit h the crime of felon in

p ossession of a firearm. Doc. #1. Defendant was arrested on August 20, 2004, when he

was found to be carrying a concealed handgun in the Paradise Valley Mall in Phoenix,

Arizona. Defendant has filed a mot ion to suppress, the Government has filed a response,

and Defendant has filed a reply . Docs. ##15, 22-23. The Court held an evidentiary hearing

on November 23, 2005. Doc. #24. Seven witnesses testified and Defendant presented

several exhibits. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant the motion to

suppress in part.

Factual Background

The Court heard conflicting testimony from several officers and Defendant. The

Court found the officers’ testimony to be more credible. As a result, the Court has

resolved several factual disputes in the Government’s favor. The facts that follow

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1

 Mr. Hoskinson could not recall at the hearing whether the APS employee had

reported his observations to a Mall security person or maintenance employee. Officer

Ferragamo testified that he was told the report had been made to a Mall security officer.

Because the inquiry in this motion is whether Officer Ferragamo possessed reasonable

suspicion or probable cause, the Court will focus on what he knew.

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represent the Court’s findings based on these credibility determinations.

On August 20, 2004, Officer John Ferragamo of the Phoenix Police Department was

working as an off-duty police officer at the Paradise Valley M all (“Mall”). Officer Brody

Tomasi was working in the same capacity at the Mall. 

At approximately 3:45 p.m., Officer Ferragamo was contacted by the Mall’s security

director, Donald Hoskinson, who informed Officer Ferragamo that he had received a radio

call from another Mall security officer. The calling officer reported that an employee of the

local electric utility, Arizona Public Service (“APS”), had been working outside the Mall

and had seen a man place a handgun in his boot and ent er the Mall. The APS employee

described the man as white, wearing a white tank t op, and covered with tattoos. From the

description of event s it was also apparent that the man was wearing boots. The APS

employee reported that the individual had entered the southwest side of the Mall near

Starbucks. The APS employee wished to remain anonymous.1

On the basis of this report, Officer Ferragamo accompanied Mr. Hoskinson in

walking through the Mall and looking for the individual in question. While doing so, the

officer received a radio report that another security officer had seen an individual meet ing

the description near the Dillard’s dep art ment st ore on the northeast end of the Mall. As

Officer Ferragamo entered this area, he saw a white male in a white tank top, covered with

tatoos, walking toward him. Officer Ferragamo made eye contact with the individual,

approached him, and said words to t he effect: “Excuse me, sir, may I speak to you?” At

this point Officer Ferragamo was standing six to eight feet from the individual. T he

individual to whom he was sp eaking, who later turned out to be Defendant, responded

“sure.” Because other patrons of the Mall were walking through the area, Officer

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Ferragamo motioned to the right side of the walkway and suggested they step out of the

foot traffic in order to converse.

Once they had st ep ped to the side, near the front window of a store, Officer

Ferragamo stepped closer to Defendant and informed him that the officer had information

Defendant might be carry ing a gun in the Mall. Officer Ferragamo asked if this was true.

Defendant confirmed that he was carrying a weapon and apologiz ed. Although the APS

employee had reported that the gun was placed in a boot, Officer Ferragamo could not see

a bulge in Defendant’s boots. He did see a small bulge under Defendant’s shirt. Officer

Ferragamo asked Defendant where the gun was locat ed. Defendant pointed to the bulge

in his shirt. Officer Ferragamo then retrieved the weapon from Defendant’s waistband. 

During this encount er Officer Ferragamo stood close to Defendant. He did not draw

his service weapon. He was carrying a black radio in his right hand. The conversation

occurred in a cordial tone. Defendant was calm and cooperative. The entire conversation

lasted three or four minutes.

Although Mr. Hoskinson had walked through the Mall with Officer Ferragamo, he

stopped before Officer Ferragamo reached Defendant. He did not participate in the contact

or the conversation. Rather, after Defendant and Officer Ferragamo had stepped to the

side, Mr. Hoskinson stood in the center of the hallway, about 20 feet away , watching the

conversation. As Defendant was facing Officer Ferragamo, Mr. Hoskinson would have

been behind and slightly to the left of t he officer, but within Defendant’s view. Mr.

Hoskinson was wearing business clothes. He was not carrying a weapon or wearing a

badge.

Officer Tomasi was located in a different part of the Mall when Officer Ferragamo

was informed of the report from the APS employee. Listening to his radio, Officer Tomasi

walked to the northeast end of the Mall, arriving on the scene after Officer Ferragamo had

made contact with Defendant . Officer Tomasi stopped approximately ten feet away from

Officer Ferragamo and Defendant in order t o monitor the surrounding circumstances. He

was standing to the left and rear of Defendant. He did not participate in the contact or

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securing of the weapon. His gun was not drawn. 

Two additional police officers, Roger Larson and Oscar Bernal, entered the Mall

after being informed by a Mall security officer that there was an individual in the Mall

carrying a gun. Officer Larson approached Officer Ferragamo as he was speaking with

Defendant and after Officer Ferragamo had retrieved Defendant's gun. Officer Larson did

not participate in the conversation. He observed t hat the conversation was calm and that

Defendant was cooperative. He saw no coercion. 

Officer Bernal also observed the conversation between Defendant and Officer

Ferragamo. He testified that it looked like a casual conversation. 

Defendant's wife was in the Mall with him. She was standing nearby during his

conversation with Officer Ferragamo. Officer Larson spoke with Defendant's wife in t he

Mall and lat er in the Mall security office. She reported that the gun belonged to her and

that she had asked her husband t o carry it . She handed Officer Larson a paper indicating

that her civil rights had been restored, but report ed that neither she nor Defendant had a

permit to carry a concealed weapon. Officer Larson asked if Defendant was a prohibited

possessor, and she said yes. Officer Larson could not recall if Defendant's wife conveyed

this information in the Mall or later in the security office.

After obtaining Defendant's gun, Officer Ferragamo informed Defendant that he

wanted to continue the conversation in t he M all security office. Defendant agreed.

Defendant and his wife then accompanied Officers Ferragamo and Tomasi in walking

several hundred yards to the security office. Defendant was not handcuffed and was not

told that he had been placed under arrest. During the walk to the security office Officer

Ferragamo asked Defendant his name, address, date of birth, and social security number.

He did not ask further questions about the weapon. 

Officer Ferragamo provided the following testimony about events that occurred

upon the group's arrival at the security office:

Q. When you reached the security office, what occurred then?

A. I advised Mr. Orman he was under arrest for carrying a concealed

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weapon in the mall and I told him because we’re in a secure, locked

office and Officer Tomasi was there, I wasn’t going to place him in

handcuffs, just asked him to have a seat in the chair.

Q. What did you do next?

A. With this personal information I conducted some records checks.

Hr’g Tr. at 16. 

After completing the records check, Officer Ferragamo read Defendant his Miranda

rights and interviewed him. Defendant confirmed that he had several prior arrests and that

he had served time in prison. He explained that the firearm belonged to his wife, that he

and his wife had driven to the M all in an older Bronco that had no top, and that he had

taken the gun into the Mall because he did not want to leave it in the open vehicle.

Discussion

A. Did the Initial Stop Violate Defendant's Fourth Amendment Rights?

Defendant contends that his initial encounter with Officer Ferragamo constituted

an investigative stop and a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Such a stop does not

violate the Fourth Amendment “if the officer’s action is supported by reasonable suspicion

to believe that criminal activity may be afoot.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273

(2002) (quotations and citations omitt ed). If an encounter is purely consensual and does

not rise to the level of an investigatory stop, it falls “ out side the gambit of the Fourth

Amendment’s guarant ee against unreasonable searches and seizures[.]” United States v.

Kim, 25 F.3d 1426, 1430 (9th Cir. 1994). 

The Court concludes that Officer Ferragamo’s initial encounter with Defendant was

consensual and not an investigatory stop requiring Fourth Amendment protection. The

officer approached Defendant in a p ublic place, surrounded by other Mall patrons, and

asked if he could speak to Defendant. Defendant agreed. Officer Ferragamo suggested

that they step to the side, out of the way of foot traffic, and the ensuing conversation was

calm and non-coercive. Defendant participated in the conversation voluntarily. Such a

consensual encounter between law enforcement and a cit iz en does not implicate Fourth

Amendment concerns. Id. 

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Defendant testified that the encounter was coercive and forceful. He asserted that

Officer Ferragamo approached Defendant swiftly, spoke in a commanding voice, had his

hand on his weapon, backed Defendant against a wall, and “got in his face.” He testified

t hat he could not leave. This description of events is contradicted by the testimony of

Officers Ferragamo, Tomasi, Larson and Bernal, and Mr. Hoskinson, all of whom the Court

found to be credible. The Court concludes that the conversation in t he M all was

consensual.

Even if Officer Ferragamo’s initial contact with Defendant constituted an

investigative stop, the Court finds it to be supported by reasonable suspicion. Officer

Ferragamo received news that a third party – an APS employee – had seen a person carry

a gun into the Mall. The Ninth Circuit has held that “ [f]or a third-party report of suspected

criminal activity to form the basis of an officer’s reasonable suspicion, that report must

possess sufficient indicia of reliability.” United States v. Fernandez-Castillo, 324 F.3d

1114, 1117 (9th Cir. 2003). The Court finds that the report from the APS employee was

sufficiently reliable to pass constitutional muster. 

Mr. Hoskinson reported to Officer Ferragamo that the APS employee wanted to

remain anonymous. The Supreme Court has held that purely anonymous t ip s cannot form

the basis for reasonable suspicion. See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270 (2000). The Ninth

Circuit has further explained, however, that “[w]hile ‘a tip might be anonymous in some

sense, it may have’ certain other features, either supporting reliability or narrowing the

likely class of informants, so that the tip does p rovide the lawful basis for some police

action.” United States v. Terry-Crespo, 356 F.3d1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Florida,

529 U.S. at 275 (Kennedy , J., concurring)). For example, an informant identified as an

emp loy ee of the Montana Department of Transportation was not regarded by the Ninth

Circuit as purely anonymous. Fernandez-Castillo, 324 F.3d at 1118; see Terry-Crespo, 356

F.3d at 1174. In this case, the informant was identified as an employee of APS working at

the Mall. Like the Montana Department of Transportation information conveyed in

Fernandez-Castillo, this information narrowed the likely class of informants – the tip was

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2

 Defense counsel argued during the evidentiary hearing that the officer’s ability to

locate the employee is irrelevant in this case because Officer Ferragamo never actually

located him. But it is not the actual identification of the informant that the Ninth Circuit has

found significant. Rather, it is t he informant's willingness to place himself at risk of being

identified and sanctioned if the his tip is false that gives credence t o his report. Id. By

reporting his observations to Mall personnel in this case, the APS employee placed himself

at risk of sanction, adding some degree of reliability to his tip.

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not purely anonymous.

The Ninth Circuit also accords greater reliability to tips from individuals who expose

themself to some legal sanction by making the report. “‘If an informant p laces his

anonymity at risk, a court can consider this factor in weighing the reliability of the tip.’”

Terry-Crespo, 356 F.3d at 1176 (quoting Florida, 529 U.S. at 276 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).

Officer Ferragamo testified that he could have identified the APS employee by determining

which APS employees were working at the Mall that day. The employee's willingness t o

place his anony mity at risk by reporting to Mall personnel, thereby exposing himself to

possible legal sanction if the tip was false, adds a measure of reliability to his tip. Id.

2

Moreover, the information received by Officer Ferragamo made clear that the tip

contained current informat ion. The APS employee reported that he had observed the

subject place a gun in his boot and enter the southwest door of the Mall. His immediate

report to Mall securit y reflected the contemporaneous nature of the information, a currency

that was confirmed when Mall security personnel promptly located an individual matching

the unique characteristics described by the employee. The Ninth Circuit has recognized

that “reports made contemporaneously with a complainant’s observations are generally

more reliable than t hose reports made later in time.” Fernandez-Castillo, 325 F.3d at 1119.

Finally , t his was not an informant tip that was “devoid of specifics,” a shortcoming

that often undermines the reliability of anonymous reports. Id. at 1123. The report

described the subject in some detail, including the fact that he was white, wearing boots,

wearing a white tank top, covered wit h tattoos, and in the Mall. This level of detail adds

to the reliability of an informant’s report. Id. at 1123. 

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When evaluating an investigat ory stop, the Court must look at the totality of the

circumstances to determine whet her the officer had a particularized and objective basis for

suspecting wrongdoing. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273. “Although an officer’s reliance on a mere

‘hunch’ is insufficient to justify a stop, the likelihood of criminal act ivit y need not rise to

the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a

preponderance of the evidence standard.” Id. at 274 (quotations and citations omitted).

Considering the facts set forth above, the Court concludes that the report from the APS

employ ee contained sufficient indicia of reliability to provide Officer Ferragamo with a

“reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity may be afoot.” Id. at 273. Thus,

even if the officer’s initial cont act with Defendant constituted an investigatory stop, it did

not violate the Fourth Amendment. 

B. Was Defendant’s Arrest Unconstitutional?

Officer Ferragamo did not inform Defendant he was under arrest until they reached

the Mall security office. The officer testified, however, t hat in his view Defendant was

under arrest and no longer free to leave once he had been found carrying a concealed

weapon in the M all. Although Officer Ferragamo formed this mental conclusion while still

in the Mall conversing with Defendant , he did not place Defendant under arrest or restrain

Defendant or otherwise alter his course of action to suggest that Defendant ’s status had

changed. Rat her, he informed Defendant that he would like to continue the conversation

in the Mall security office and Defendant agreed to accompany him there.

Defendant argues that an arrest occurred at the point when Officer Ferragamo

formed the mental intent to arrest Defendant, even if the officer’s actions did not change

at that time. T he Court cannot agree. To identify when an arrest occurs the Court must

look at object ive criteria to determine whether a reasonable person in Defendant’s position

would consider himself under arrest. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, (1980)

(Stewart, J., concurring) (“[A] person has been ‘seized’ within the meaning of the Fourth

Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable

person would have believed that he was not free to leave.”); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,

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502 (1983) (quoting Mendenhall); see also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991)

(“Our cases make clear that a seizure does not occur simply because a police officer

approaches an individual and asks a few questions. So long as a reasonable person would

feel free ‘to disregard t he police and go about his business,’ the encounter is

consensual[.]”) (citation omitted). Factors to consider include the length of the stop, “the

display of a weapon by an officer, some p hy sical touching of the person of the citizen, or

the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance wit h the officer’s request

might be comp elled.” Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 544; see United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S.

675, 685 (1985) (stating that the length of the stop is a relevant factor).

In this case, no such objective factors existed while Officer Ferragamo was speaking

with Defendant in t he M all. The entire conversation lasted three or four minutes.

Defendant was not restrained; he had agreed to talk to the officer; the conversation was

calm and cordial and occurred in a public place with other Mall patrons in the immediate

vicinity. Officer Ferragamo did not draw his gun, did not tell Defendant he was restrained

from leaving, and did not otherwise act coercively. Based on these facts, a reasonable

person would not believe he was under arrest . See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555 (“The

respondent was not seized simply by reason of the fact t hat t he agents approached her,

asked if she would show t hem her t icket and identification, and posed to her a few

questions. Nor was it enough to establish a seizure that the person asking the quest ions

was a law enforcement official.”); Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 687 (holding that a 20-minute

detention of a susp ect did not constitute an arrest where the agent conducted his

investigation in a diligent and reasonable manner).

Officer Ferragamo did place Defendant under arrest upon arriving at the Mall

security office. To be valid under the Fourth Amendment, this arrest must have been

supported by probable cause to believe Defendant had committed a crime. See United

States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971) (“To legally arrest and detain, t he Government

must assert probable cause t o believe the arrestee has committed a crime.”); Mallory v.

United States, 354 U.S. 449, 456 (1957) (“[W]homever the police arrest they must arrest on

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3

 Defendant , on t he other hand, testified that Officer Ferragamo asked him in the

Mall if he had ever been “busted” or “done hard time.” Defendant testified that he

responded yes to both questions and told the officer he had been in prison in New Jersey.

This t est imony, if accepted, arguably would provide probable cause to believe Defendant

had been convicted of a felony and therefore was a prohibited possessor. As noted

above, however, the Court finds Officer Ferragamo's version of the encounter to be more

credible.

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‘p robable cause.’ It is not the function of the police to arrest . . . at large and to use an

interrogating process at police headquarters in order t o determine whom they should

charge before a committing magistrate on ‘probable cause.’”). The Court concludes that

the arrest at the security office was not supported by probable cause. At t he t ime of arrest,

Officer Ferragamo knew only that Defendant was carrying a concealed weapon. But

carrying a concealed weapon is not a crime in Arizona if the person has a permit. Officer

Ferragamo did not ask Defendant if he had a permit prior to the arrest , nor did he ask if

Defendant was a prohibited possessor. The officer testified that he asked these questions

only after Defendant was arrested.3

Although Officer Larson talked with Defendant’s wife about the lack of permit s and

Defendant’s status as a prohibited possessor, Officer Larson could not recall whether this

conversation occurred in the Mall or later at the security office. Thus, his testimony

cannot be used to establish that the officers knew the information before Defendant was

placed under arrest upon arriving at the security office.

Officer Ferragamo testified that Defendant should have produced a concealed

weapon permit if he had one, implying that his failure to do so provided a reasonable basis

for concluding he did not have one. T he defense investigator, David Toledo, testified at

the hearing and produced a copy of his Arizona concealed weapon permit, which stated

on the back t hat it must be shown to a police officer “upon request.” The Court cannot

conclude that Defendant’s failure t o p roduce a permit without request provided probable

cause to believe he had committed a crime. See United States v. Grant, 476 F. Supp. 400,

405 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (probable cause did not exist because “[t]he informant had not

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indicated t o t he agents that Grant was a convicted felon, or did not have a permit for his

weapons, or that they were ot herwise illegal.”); cf. United States v. Adams, 225 F. Supp. 2d

86, 90, 94 (D. Maine 2002) (holding that a police officer had probable cause to believe that

the defendant was unlawfully carrying a weapon in a vehicle where “he asked her if she

had a concealed weapons permit, and she said she did not”).

Because the Court concludes that the arrest of Defendant in t he security office was

invalid, all evidence procured as a result of that arrest must be suppressed. See Segura v.

United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984) (“Under this Court’s holdings, the exclusionary rule

reaches not only primary evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure,

but also evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality or ‘fruit of the

poisonous tree.’”) (citations omitted). The Court therefore will order t he suppression of

information obtained by the Government that cannot be shown to have been obtained

before Defendant was arrested upon his arrival at the security office. See Wong Sun v.

United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963) (“[V]erbal evidence which derives so immediately

from an unlawful entry and an unauthorized arrest . . . is no less the ‘fruit ’ of official

illegality than the more common tangible fruits of the unwarranted intrusion.”).

C. Miranda rights.

Defendant also argues that his Miranda rights were violated by questioning in the

Mall. Miranda applies, however, only to cust odial int errogations. See Miranda v.

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (“[T]he prosecution may not use statements . . . stemming

from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural

safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.”) (emphasis added);

Krantz v. Briggs, 983 F.2d 961, 963 (9th Cir. 1993) (“ T he rules of police procedure

established by Miranda v. Arizona apply only t o ‘custodial interrogation.’”), overruled

on other grounds by Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99 (1995). The questioning in the

Mall was consensual, not custodial. Defendants rights therefore were not violated by the

Mall encounter. See United States v. Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F.3d 1118, 1127 (9th Cir.

2005) (“Rodriguez -Preciado’s admission to possessing cocaine was not made during a

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custodial interrogat ion, and therefore the fact that he was not given Miranda warnings

prior to this admission does not require sup p ression.”). The Court need not address the

later questioning in the security office because it occurred after the invalid arrest and

therefore will be suppressed.

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to suppress (Doc. #15) is granted in part

and denied in part as set forth above.

DATED this 9th day of December, 2005.

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