Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-07-01354/USCOURTS-ca8-07-01354-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mark Carmel
Appellant
United States
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable E. Richard Webber, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 07-1354

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Eastern

* District of Missouri.

Mark Carmel, *

also known as Smiley, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: May 6, 2008

Filed: May 15, 2008

___________

Before MURPHY, COLLOTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Mark Carmel appeals the 120-month prison sentence the district court1

 imposed

after he pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of ammunition, in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Carmel’s counsel has moved to withdraw and has filed a brief

under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), arguing that the appeal waiver

contained in Carmel’s plea agreement is not enforceable because the agreement itself

Appellate Case: 07-1354 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/15/2008 Entry ID: 3434447
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was not entered into knowingly and voluntarily. More specifically, Carmel maintains

that he did not understand he was agreeing to a 120-month prison sentence.

We will enforce an appeal waiver where both the plea agreement and the appeal

waiver were entered into knowingly and voluntarily, the appeal falls within the scope

of the waiver, and no miscarriage of justice would result. See United States v. Andis,

333 F.3d 886, 889-92 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc). After reviewing the record, we

conclude that Carmel knowingly and voluntarily entered into his plea agreement and

appeal waiver. We note that, during the plea hearing, the court advised Carmel that

he was waiving “important appeal rights,” fully quoted the terms of the appeal waiver,

and referred several times to the “agreed 120-month sentence.” The court repeatedly

asked Carmel if he understood, and each time Carmel responded, “Yes, sir.” Cf.

Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977) (“Solemn declarations in open court

carry a strong presumption of verity.”). We also conclude that Carmel’s appeal falls

within the scope of the appeal waiver, which provided that he waived all rights to

appeal his sentence unless his prison term exceeded 120 months (the statutory

maximum), and that enforcing the waiver would not result in a miscarriage of justice.

See Andis, 333 F.3d at 891-92; see also United States v. Estrada-Bahena, 201 F.3d

1070, 1071 (8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (enforcing appeal waiver in Anders case).

Having reviewed the record independently under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75,

80 (1988), we have found no nonfrivolous issue for appeal beyond the scope of the

waiver. Therefore, we enforce the appeal waiver and dismiss the appeal. We grant

counsel leave to withdraw, subject to the condition that counsel promptly comply with

the requirements of Part V of this Court’s Plan to Implement the Criminal Justice Act

by advising Carmel of the procedures for filing a petition for writ of certiorari pro se.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 07-1354 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/15/2008 Entry ID: 3434447