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Parties Involved:
Dario Pinson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-10420

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

DARIO PINSON, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 1:15-cr-20184-CMA-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 24-10420

Before JILL PRYOR, BRASHER, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Dario Pinson, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s 

denial of his pro se motion for compassionate release under 18 

U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), as modified by § 603(b) of the First Step Act.1 

On appeal, Pinson argues that the district court did not provide a 

sufficient basis for its denial of his motion, show that it properly 

weighed the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, or respond to all of his arguments. After careful review, we affirm.

We review a district court’s denial of a prisoner’s 

§ 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for abuse of discretion. United States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 911 (11th Cir. 2021). Abuse of discretion review 

“means that the district court had a range of choice” and that we 

“cannot reverse just because we might have come to a different 

conclusion.” Id. at 912 (quotations omitted). A district court 

abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard, follows 

improper procedures in making the determination, or makes 

clearly erroneous factual findings. United States v. Barrington, 648 

F.3d 1178, 1194 (11th Cir. 2011).

A district court has no inherent authority to modify a defendant’s sentence and may do so “only when authorized by a statute or rule.” United States v. Puentes, 803 F.3d 597, 605–06 (11th Cir. 

2015). A district court may reduce a term of imprisonment under 

1 Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018).

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24-10420 Opinion of the Court 3

§ 3582(c)(1)(A) “if (1) the § 3553(a) sentencing factors favor doing 

so, (2) there are extraordinary and compelling reasons for doing so, 

and . . . (3) doing so wouldn’t endanger any person or the community within the meaning of [U.S.S.G.] § 1B1.13’s policy statement.” 

United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234, 1237 (11th Cir. 2021) (quotations omitted). The district court may consider these factors in any 

order, and the absence of any of the three forecloses a sentence reduction. See id. at 1237–38. “A court must explain its sentencing 

decisions adequately enough to allow for meaningful appellate review. This standard of review, though, does afford district courts 

a range of choice, and we cannot reverse just because we might 

have come to a different conclusion.” United States v. Giron, 15 

F.4th 1343, 1345 (11th Cir. 2021) (quotations and citation omitted).

The relevant policy statement for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A) provides that the district court may grant a defendant’s motion for compassionate release “if, after considering 

the factors set forth in . . . § 3553(a),” the court determines that, 

among other things, “[t]he defendant is not a danger to the safety 

of any other person or to the community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3142(g).” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(a). Section 3142(g) states that, to reasonably assure the safety of any other person and the community, 

a court should consider: (1) the nature and circumstances of the 

offense charged, including whether the offense is a crime of violence or involves a firearm; (2) the weight of the evidence against 

the person; (3) the history and characteristics of the person, including their criminal history; and (4) the nature and seriousness of the 

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4 Opinion of the Court 24-10420

danger to any person or the community that would be posed by 

the person’s release. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).

Factors under § 3553(a) that the district court may consider 

include the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and 

characteristics of the defendant, the seriousness of the crime, the 

promotion of respect for the law, just punishment, protecting the 

public from the defendant’s crimes, and adequate deterrence. Id.

§ 3553(a). The court need not address each § 3553(a) factor nor all 

of the mitigating evidence. Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1241. An acknowledgment that the court considered all applicable § 3553(a) factors 

along with “enough analysis that meaningful appellate review of 

the factors’ application can take place” is sufficient. Id. at 1240–41 

(quotations omitted). The weight given to any § 3553(a) factor is 

committed to the discretion of the district court. Id. at 1241. 

Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Pinson’s motion for compassionate release. While the district 

court’s instant order was a paperless order, it specifically referenced 

a recent order from 2021, which had denied Pinson’s first motion 

for compassionate release after conducting a thorough analysis. Indeed, as a panel of this Court observed in affirming the district 

court’s 2021 order, that order addressed a range of § 3553(a) factors;

it described in detail specific, relevant factors as they applied to Pinson’s case; and, among other things, it determined, based on Pinson’s criminal and disciplinary history and offense conduct, that 

Pinson’s release may endanger the community. See United States v. 

Pinson, No. 21-10721 (11th Cir. June 3, 2022) (unpublished). After 

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24-10420 Opinion of the Court 5

referencing the 2021 order, the district court’s instant order added 

that the reasons in the previous order “remain[ed] valid today” and 

that Pinson “continues to pose a danger to the safety of the community.” The instant order also acknowledged Pinson’s argument 

that an intervening change in the law could constitute an extraordinary and compelling circumstance, and determined that even if 

changes in the law had done so, “in Defendant’s case they do not 

override consideration of the section 3553(a) factors and the 

Court’s finding that Defendant continues to pose a danger to the 

safety of the community.” These explanations were more than sufficient for us to conduct meaningful appellate review. Giron, 15 

F.4th at 1345.

As for Pinson’s claim that the district court’s instant order 

did not address his mitigation arguments concerning his rehabilitation efforts while incarcerated or his argument that he could not 

endanger the community while still incarcerated, the district 

court’s 2021 order -- which, as we’ve noted, was referenced by the 

district court here -- acknowledged, and rejected, similar arguments from Pinson. Regardless, the district court was not required 

to directly address each of Pinson’s mitigation arguments. Tinker, 

14 F.4th at 1241.

In short, the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying Pinson’s motion for compassionate release based on its assessment that the § 3553(a) factors and the risk of danger to the 

community still weighed against an expedited release. Moreover, 

because these bases for denial are dispositive, we need not reach 

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6 Opinion of the Court 24-10420

Pinson’s other arguments concerning whether consideration of his 

health qualified as an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for his 

release. Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1237–38.

AFFIRMED.

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