Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-04026/USCOURTS-ca8-05-04026-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Ronald Williams
Appellant

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Richard H. Kyle, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-4026

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

v. * District of Minnesota.

*

Ronald Williams, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: March 12, 2007

Filed: March 20, 2007

___________

Before RILEY, BOWMAN, and ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Ronald Williams pleaded guilty to one count of conspiring to distribute crack

cocaine, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846, and one count of distributing crack

cocaine, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Williams was originally sentenced to 262 months

of imprisonment, but this Court remanded for resentencing after United States v.

Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). See United States v. Killingsworth, 413 F.3d 760 (8th

Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 633 (2005). At resentencing, the District Court1

calculated an advisory guidelines range of 262 to 327 months of imprisonment and

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sentenced Williams to 204 months of imprisonment. Williams appeals, arguing that

his sentence is unreasonable. We affirm.

After Booker, a sentencing court must first determine the applicable guidelines

range. United States v. Haack, 403 F.3d 997, 1002–03 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S.

Ct. 276 (2005). Next, the court should decide whether any traditional departures

under the guidelines are appropriate. Id. at 1003. Finally, the court must consider the

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors to determine whether to impose a non-guidelines

sentence. Id. We review the ultimate sentence for reasonableness. United States v.

Tobacco, 428 F.3d 1148, 1151 (8th Cir. 2005). In determining whether the sentence

is reasonable, we ask if the district court abused its discretion, considering whether:

(1) the court failed to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant

weight; (2) the court gave significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor; or (3)

the court considered only the appropriate factors but in weighing those factors

committed a clear error of judgment. Haack, 403 F.3d at 1003–04 (citation and

quotations omitted).

Williams contends that his sentence is unreasonable for three reasons: first, the

100:1 crack/powder cocaine ratio creates an unwarranted sentencing disparity; second,

his criminal history is overstated; and third, the District Court did not adequately

consider the § 3553(a) factors. Williams also contends that the District Court abused

its discretion by failing to give "any consideration" to these arguments. Appellant's

Br. at 9. Finally, Williams reasserts the arguments that he advanced and this Court

rejected in his first appeal. These arguments concerned the validity of his guilty plea,

the constitutionality and accuracy of his obstruction-of-justice enhancement, and the

propriety of the District Court's refusal to grant an acceptance-of-responsibility

reduction. See Killingsworth, 413 F.3d at 764–65.

Williams's argument regarding the disparity created by the crack/powder

cocaine ratio is without merit. This Court recently held that "neither Booker nor

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§ 3553(a) authorizes district courts to reject the 100:1 quantity ratio and use a different

ratio in sentencing defendants for crack cocaine offenses." United States v. Spears,

469 F.3d 1166, 1176 (8th Cir. 2006) (en banc). Spears reiterated the conclusion of

previous panels that sentences within the guidelines range are not unreasonable solely

on account of the crack/powder disparity. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 453 F.3d

1024, 1027 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Cawthorn, 429 F.3d 793, 803 (8th Cir.

2005). The District Court adequately considered and rejected Williams's argument

that it should apply a smaller ratio and correctly stated, "[O]bviously the Congress of

the United States . . . [has not] reached that conclusion." Sent. Tr. at 17–18.

Williams's argument that his criminal history is overstated also fails. The

District Court properly determined a criminal history category of IV based on

Williams's prior convictions that included a prostitution offense, disorderly conduct,

and multiple DWI convictions. We do not agree that Williams's criminal history was

overstated or that the District Court failed to adequately consider this argument.

Williams's final argument that the District Court failed to properly consider the

§ 3553(a) factors is wholly incorrect. The District Court provided much more than

a rote rehearsal of these factors; in fact, it meticulously considered each factor in light

of the circumstances of this case before ultimately arriving at the sentence of 204

months. We are firmly convinced that the sentence the District Court imposed is

reasonable.

We do not consider the arguments again raised by Williams after their rejection

in the first appeal, because the law-of-the-case doctrine applies. See United States v.

Palmer, 297 F.3d 760, 766 (8th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1143, cert. denied,

537 U.S. 1213, and cert. denied 538 U.S. 937 (2003).

Accordingly, we affirm the District Court.

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