Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-14-03010/USCOURTS-caDC-14-03010-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Melvin Knight
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 9, 2016 Decided June 10, 2016

No. 14-3010

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

MELVIN KNIGHT,

APPELLANT

Consolidated with 14-3016

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:13-cr-00131-2)

(No. 1:13-cr-00131-1)

Howard B. Katzoff, appointed by the court, argued the 

cause for the appellants. With him on the joint briefs were 

Mary E. Davis and Christopher M. Davis.

Daniel J. Lenerz, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Elizabeth 

Trosman and Suzanne Grealy Curt, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: HENDERSON, ROGERS, and KAVANAUGH, Circuit 

Judges.

USCA Case #14-3010 Document #1618611 Filed: 06/10/2016 Page 1 of 12
2

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge KAVANAUGH.

KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge: Shortly after midnight on 

January 28, 2013, Tamika Yourse heard gunfire outside her 

Washington, D.C., home. Looking out her window, she saw 

two men, one of whom had a gun, trying to force her neighbor 

Edmund Peters and a woman into Peters’ apartment. Ms. 

Yourse called 911. A large number of police officers 

responded to the call and swarmed the premises.

At the scene, the police arrested Melvin Knight and Aaron 

Thorpe for the D.C. Code offense of kidnapping while armed, 

as well as other D.C. Code offenses. The next day, Knight 

and Thorpe appeared in D.C. Superior Court. They were held 

without bond pending a preliminary hearing scheduled for 

February 1, 2013.

In the District of Columbia, the U.S. Attorney’s Office is 

the prosecutor for most criminal cases in D.C. Superior Court. 

At the February 1 preliminary hearing, the federal prosecutor

stated on the record that the Government had extended a plea 

offer of one count of assault with a deadly weapon to Knight 

and Thorpe. The offers were “wired,” meaning that each offer 

was contingent on acceptance by the other defendant. The 

hearing continued on February 19, 2013. The prosecutor

again mentioned the plea offer, but stated that Knight and 

Thorpe had not accepted it. The hearing went forward, and 

Knight and Thorpe continued to be held without bond. The

D.C. Superior Court later set a trial date of May 15, 2013.

In early May, however, the U.S. Attorney’s Office

dropped the charges in D.C. Superior Court and obtained a 

federal grand jury indictment against Knight and Thorpe. The 

federal indictment charged each defendant with the federal 

offense of being a felon in possession of a firearm, as well as 

USCA Case #14-3010 Document #1618611 Filed: 06/10/2016 Page 2 of 12
3

the D.C. Code offenses of conspiracy, assault with a dangerous 

weapon, kidnapping while armed, burglary while armed, 

possession of a firearm during a crime of violence, and 

obstruction of justice. (In the unique structure of the District 

of Columbia, the U.S. Attorney may prosecute D.C. Code 

offenses in federal court so long as federal offenses are also 

charged.)

On June 12, 2013, the defense filed a motion to dismiss the 

indictment, arguing that the Government had violated the 

Speedy Trial Act. That Act requires an indictment or 

information within 30 days of an arrest for a federal criminal 

offense. The U.S. District Court denied the motion because 

the original arrest was for D.C. Code violations and therefore 

did not trigger the Speedy Trial Act’s 30-day clock. The

federal trial commenced on July 22, 2013. A jury found 

Knight and Thorpe guilty of all counts. The District Court 

sentenced Knight to 22 years and four months of imprisonment

and sentenced Thorpe to 25 years’ imprisonment.

On appeal, Knight and Thorpe raise several challenges. 

First, they claim that the Government violated the Speedy Trial 

Act. Second, Thorpe argues that his 25-year sentence was 

unreasonable. Third, both defendants assert that they received 

ineffective assistance of counsel regarding the plea offers they 

received in D.C. Superior Court.

We affirm the judgment of the District Court as to the 

Speedy Trial Act issue and Thorpe’s sentence. Consistent 

with our usual practice, we remand the ineffective assistance of 

counsel claims to the District Court for consideration in the 

first instance by that court.

USCA Case #14-3010 Document #1618611 Filed: 06/10/2016 Page 3 of 12
4

I

The Speedy Trial Act issue in this case arises primarily 

because of the unique status of the District of Columbia. The 

U.S. Attorney’s Office in the District of Columbia prosecutes 

both federal offenses and most D.C. Code offenses. The 

Office may prosecute D.C. Code charges in D.C. Superior 

Court. It may prosecute federal charges in U.S. District 

Court. And it may prosecute combined federal and D.C. Code 

charges in either U.S. District Court or D.C. Superior Court. 

See D.C. Code § 23-101.

The U.S. Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a 

speedy trial. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Congress has 

implemented that right for federal criminal defendants through 

legislation. As relevant here, the Speedy Trial Act provides: 

“Any information or indictment charging an individual with 

the commission of an offense shall be filed within thirty days 

from the date on which such individual was arrested or served 

with a summons in connection with such charges.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3161(b). Importantly for this case, the Act defines 

“offense” as “any Federal criminal offense.” Id. § 3172.

Knight and Thorpe were arrested for D.C. Code offenses 

on January 28, 2013. The Government obtained a federal 

grand jury indictment on May 7, 2013. More than 30 days 

therefore passed between the defendants’ January 28 arrest for 

D.C. Code offenses and their May 7 indictment for a federal 

offense. But the January arrest for D.C. Code violations did 

not trigger the Speedy Trial Act’s 30-day requirement. As 

this Court has previously ruled, an arrest for a D.C. Code 

offense is not an arrest for a federal criminal offense and 

therefore does not trigger the Speedy Trial Act’s 30-day clock. 

See United States v. Mills, 964 F.2d 1186, 1189-90 (D.C. Cir. 

1992) (en banc); see also United States v. Clark, 754 F.3d 401, 

USCA Case #14-3010 Document #1618611 Filed: 06/10/2016 Page 4 of 12
5

405 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Kelly, 661 F.3d 682, 689 

(1st Cir. 2011).

The defendants point out that the prosecutor, at their initial 

hearing in D.C. Superior Court on February 19, 2013, indicated 

that federal charges were possible. But as this Court stated in 

United States v. Seals, “whether the prosecutor contemplated 

the filing of, or only tentatively decided not to bring, federal 

charges at the time of the appellants’ arrests is irrelevant to 

deciding when the clock starts.” 130 F.3d 451, 455 (D.C. Cir. 

1997).

Knight and Thorpe also urge this Court to recognize a 

“ruse” exception to the Speedy Trial Act for situations where 

the Government arrests someone on D.C. Code charges with 

the intent to bring later federal charges after the Speedy Trial 

Act clock otherwise would have expired. But the Court has

previously declined to create such an exception to the Act. In 

United States v. Mills, the defendants were arrested for

violations of the D.C. Code. More than 30 days later, the 

Government obtained a federal indictment based on the same 

conduct. Mills, 964 F.2d at 1188. The Mills defendants

advanced the same argument that Knight and Thorpe do here –

namely, that without a ruse exception, the Government will be 

able to “park” defendants in D.C. Superior Court to avoid the 

Speedy Trial Act’s 30-day clock. See id. at 1192. But the 

Mills Court declined to adopt a ruse exception under the 

Speedy Trial Act.

Although the Mills Court declined to create such an 

exception under the Act, the Court recognized that a due 

process problem may arise when the Government parks a

defendant in D.C. Superior Court to avoid the Speedy Trial 

Act. The Court stated: “If a defendant showed that the U.S. 

Attorney deliberately arrested him on D.C. charges and 

USCA Case #14-3010 Document #1618611 Filed: 06/10/2016 Page 5 of 12
6

secured a Superior Court indictment in order to gain time to 

gather additional evidence for a federal prosecution, he might 

have a valid due process claim for pre-indictment delay.” Id. 

But Knight and Thorpe have not demonstrated a due process 

violation here. They have not demonstrated that they were 

deliberately arrested on D.C. Code charges in order for the 

Government to gain time to gather evidence for a federal 

prosecution.

Because the January arrests were for D.C. Code offenses, 

those arrests did not trigger the Speedy Trial Act’s 30-day 

clock. Therefore, no Speedy Trial Act violation occurred in 

this case.

II

Thorpe contests his 25-year sentence on a variety of

procedural and substantive grounds.

First, Thorpe raises the procedural argument that the 

District Court allegedly failed to consider all of the relevant 

Section 3553(a) factors – in particular, his intellectual 

disability. That objection is subject to plain error review 

because Thorpe did not raise it at his sentencing hearing. 

United States v. Wilson, 605 F.3d 985, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 

Thorpe has not pointed to any error, let alone a plain error.

At the sentencing hearing, the District Court heard 

arguments from the Government’s attorney and from Thorpe’s 

attorney. Both attorneys discussed Thorpe’s intellectual 

disability. In sentencing Thorpe, the District Court explained 

the Section 3553(a) factors to which it was giving particular 

weight and those that it found less compelling. The District 

Court emphasized Thorpe’s criminal history and the serious, 

dangerous nature of the crimes of conviction. Although the 

USCA Case #14-3010 Document #1618611 Filed: 06/10/2016 Page 6 of 12
7

District Court did not explicitly mention Thorpe’s intellectual 

disability, that does not mean that the District Court did not 

consider it. Indeed, given the parties’ discussions about 

Thorpe’s intellectual abilities, it is impossible to conclude that 

the District Court did not consider Thorpe’s disability as part of 

the mix of considerations. As this Court has said many times, 

there is no requirement that sentencing courts expressly list or 

discuss every Section 3553(a) factor at the sentencing hearing. 

See United States v. Locke, 664 F.3d 353, 357 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 

(sentencing court not required “to address expressly each and 

every argument advanced by the defendant”) (citing Rita v. 

United States, 551 U.S. 338, 359 (2007)); see also United 

States v. Brinson-Scott, 714 F.3d 616, 627 (D.C. Cir. 2013); In

re Sealed Case, 527 F.3d 188, 191 (D.C. Cir. 2008); United 

States v. Simpson, 430 F.3d 1177, 1186-87 (D.C. Cir. 2005).

Second, Thorpe contends that his 25-year sentence is 

substantively unreasonable. This Court’s review of criminal 

sentences for substantive reasonableness is quite deferential. 

It “will be the unusual case when an appeals court can 

plausibly say that a sentence is so unreasonably high or low as 

to constitute an abuse of discretion.” United States v. 

Gardellini, 545 F.3d 1089, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

This is not such a case. Thorpe was convicted of being a 

felon in possession of a firearm, conspiracy, assault with a 

dangerous weapon, kidnapping while armed, burglary while 

armed, possession of a firearm during a crime of violence, and 

obstruction of justice. Thorpe had an extensive criminal 

history that included other violent felonies. In light of those 

facts, the District Court reasonably concluded that a 25-year

sentence was appropriate for Thorpe’s own chance at reform, 

to protect the community, and to deter others from engaging in 

similar behavior. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

USCA Case #14-3010 Document #1618611 Filed: 06/10/2016 Page 7 of 12
8

Third, Thorpe objects to the District Court’s 

determinations about which parts of his sentence are to run 

concurrently and which are to run consecutively. Thorpe was 

convicted of nine counts – one federal offense and eight D.C. 

offenses. The District Court sentenced him to a term of 

imprisonment for each offense. Some of the sentences for the 

D.C. offenses were concurrent to one another, and some were 

consecutive to one another. The sentence for the federal 

offense was consecutive to the sum total of the sentences for 

the D.C. offenses.

The federal Sentencing Guidelines and the D.C. Voluntary 

Sentencing Guidelines both address how to determine whether 

sentences for multiple offenses should run consecutively or 

concurrently. However, the federal Sentencing Guidelines do 

not apply to the sentencing of D.C. offenses. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3551(a). Likewise, the D.C. Voluntary Sentencing 

Guidelines do not apply to the sentencing of federal offenses. 

And neither set of guidelines addresses whether sentences for 

federal offenses should run consecutively or concurrently to 

the D.C. Code offenses when a defendant is convicted of both 

federal and D.C. Code offenses. This Court has said that 

because the Sentencing “Guidelines are silent on the issue, how 

a court is to relate a Guidelines sentence to a non-Guidelines 

sentence is a matter of discretion.” United States v. Cutchin, 

956 F.2d 1216, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Here, given the facts 

and circumstances of the offense and the offender, the District 

Court acted well within its discretion by making the sentence 

for the federal offense consecutive to the sum total of the 

sentences for the D.C. Code offenses, with a total sentence of 

25 years.

Thorpe also argues that the sentences for some of the D.C. 

Code offenses should have been concurrent to one another, 

rather than consecutive to one another. But Thorpe cites no 

USCA Case #14-3010 Document #1618611 Filed: 06/10/2016 Page 8 of 12
9

provision of the D.C. Voluntary Sentencing Guidelines or D.C. 

law requiring that the sentences for those particular D.C. Code 

offenses be concurrent to the sentences for the other D.C. Code 

offenses. The District Court did not misapply the D.C. 

Voluntary Sentencing Guidelines for the D.C. offenses.

Fourth, Thorpe argues that he should not have received a 

longer sentence than his co-defendant Knight. But Thorpe 

acknowledges that he has a more significant criminal history 

than Knight. The District Court did not abuse its discretion by 

sentencing Thorpe to a longer term of imprisonment than 

Knight. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).

Fifth, Thorpe claims that the District Court impermissibly 

increased his sentence after the sentencing hearing. He is 

incorrect. At the sentencing hearing, the District Court stated 

unequivocally: It “is the judgment of the Court that Aaron 

Thorpe is committed to the custody of Bureau of Prisons for 

300 months, 25 years.” Joint Appendix at 215. The District 

Court went on to list the count-by-count breakdown of the 

sentences for each offense and the ways in which those 

sentences would run consecutively or concurrently. It is true 

that the oral pronouncement of that count-by-count breakdown 

then added up to 20 years, rather than 25 years. Joint 

Appendix at 215-16. Two days later, however, the District 

Court entered an order clarifying that ambiguity in the oral 

pronouncement. The order repeated that Thorpe’s sentence 

was 25 years’ imprisonment. Joint Appendix at 220. It then 

listed each offense and the consecutive/concurrent designation 

for each. This time, those designations did add up to 25 years.

Through its written order, the District Court permissibly

clarified an ambiguity in the oral pronouncement. The oral 

“pronouncement of the sentence constitutes the judgment of 

the court.” United States v. Love, 593 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 

USCA Case #14-3010 Document #1618611 Filed: 06/10/2016 Page 9 of 12
10

2010). But a district court may use a written judgment to 

clarify an ambiguous oral pronouncement. Id. We “will not 

remand for the district court to correct a written judgment that 

clarifies – rather than contradicts – the oral pronouncement of 

the sentence.” Id. So it is here.

We affirm Thorpe’s sentence.

III

Finally, Knight and Thorpe contend that their attorneys

provided ineffective assistance during plea negotiations. As 

is this Court’s usual practice, we remand to the District Court 

so that it may consider their ineffective assistance claims in the 

first instance.

To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance, a 

defendant “must show not only that counsel’s performance was 

deficient, but that he suffered prejudice as a result.” United 

States v. Solofa, 745 F.3d 1226, 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citing 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).

This Court allows defendants to raise ineffective 

assistance claims on direct appeal, as well as in collateral 

proceedings. As the Supreme Court has stated, however, 

ineffective assistance claims “ordinarily will be litigated in the 

first instance in the district court, the forum best suited to 

developing the facts necessary to determining the adequacy of 

representation during an entire trial.” Massaro v. United 

States, 538 U.S. 500, 505 (2003). This Court’s typical 

practice on direct appeal, therefore, is to remand “colorable” 

claims of ineffective assistance to the district court. See

United States v. Mohammed, 693 F.3d 192, 202 (D.C. Cir. 

2012). We do so without first substantially analyzing the 

merits of those claims. See id. The Court does not 

USCA Case #14-3010 Document #1618611 Filed: 06/10/2016 Page 10 of 12
11

“reflexively remand,” but neither does it “hesitate to remand 

when a trial record is insufficient to assess the full 

circumstances and rationales informing the strategic decisions 

of trial counsel.” Id.

Here, the defendants allege that their attorneys were 

ineffective in pre-trial plea negotiations in the D.C. Superior 

Court. The defendants claim that they never actually rejected 

the Government’s plea offers and that the plea offers were 

never explained to them. Knight and Thorpe say that they 

would have accepted the wired plea offers if their attorneys had 

properly explained the offers’ terms and conditions.

The Government asserts that a remand is unnecessary in 

this case because the defendants cannot establish prejudice. 

In some circumstances, even without hearing from trial 

counsel, we can determine that there was no possibility of 

prejudice from counsel’s allegedly deficient performance. In 

those cases, we may affirm because a remand would serve no 

purpose. See United States v. Pole, 741 F.3d 120, 126-27 

(D.C. Cir. 2013). This is not such a case. The Government 

argues that the record conclusively establishes that neither 

defendant ever intended to plead guilty. The Government 

blames Knight and Thorpe for not contradicting the 

prosecutor’s in-court statement in the Superior Court 

proceedings that both defendants had rejected a plea offer. 

But the Government’s argument does not conclusively resolve 

the point because the defendants’ in-court silence could be 

consistent with the defendants’ claim that they did not 

understand the plea offers.

The Government also notes that Thorpe’s attorney 

confirmed in open court, with the defendants present, that a 

plea offer had been extended. But again, the record does not 

reveal anything about plea discussions between the defendants 

USCA Case #14-3010 Document #1618611 Filed: 06/10/2016 Page 11 of 12
12

and their Superior Court attorneys – or a lack thereof. We

cannot fairly interpret Knight’s and Thorpe’s in-court silence, 

or the comments of Thorpe’s attorney, without first hearing 

from Knight’s and Thorpe’s Superior Court attorneys.

We therefore remand “to allow the district court to address 

the claims – and the government’s responses – in the first 

instance.” Id. at 127. In doing so, we conclude only that 

Knight’s and Thorpe’s claims of ineffective assistance are 

colorable, not that they have demonstrated ineffective 

assistance.

* * *

We remand the case to the District Court so that the 

District Court may address Knight’s and Thorpe’s claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel in the first instance. In all 

other respects, we affirm the judgment of the District Court.

So ordered.

USCA Case #14-3010 Document #1618611 Filed: 06/10/2016 Page 12 of 12