Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-03202/USCOURTS-ca13-14-03202-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of Justice
Respondent
William B. Jolley
Petitioner

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

WILLIAM B. JOLLEY,

Petitioner

v.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Respondent

______________________ 

2014-3202

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. SF-4324-14-0405-I-1.

______________________ 

Decided: February 10, 2015 

______________________ 

WILLIAM B. JOLLEY, Brunswick, GA, pro se.

JEFFREY LOWRY, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil 

Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by FRANKLIN E.

WHITE, JR. 

______________________ 

Before REYNA, MAYER, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

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2 JOLLEY v. DOJ

William B. Jolley seeks review of a final order of the 

Merit Systems Protection Board (“board”) denying his 

request for corrective action based on alleged violations of 

the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment 

Rights Act of 1994 (“USERRA”), 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4335, 

by the Department of Justice. See Jolley v. Dep’t of Justice, No. SF-4324-14-0405-I-1, 2014 MSPB LEXIS 5917 

(Aug. 28, 2014) (“Board Decision”); Jolley v. Dep’t of 

Justice, No. SF-4324-14-0405-I-1, 2014 MSPB LEXIS 

2344 (Apr. 11, 2014) (“Initial Decision”). Because the 

board correctly determined that the Department of Justice was not Jolley’s “employer” for purposes of USERRA, 

we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Jolley is a former employee of the U.S. Department of 

Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”). In 2008, 

HUD transferred him from his position in Jacksonville, 

Florida to a position in Boise, Idaho. J.A. 76–78. Jolley 

thereafter requested that he be transferred from Boise to 

a position “east of the Mississippi River,” but HUD refused his request. On March 31, 2010, Jolley retired from 

his position with HUD. He alleges that his retirement 

was involuntary, asserting that he was forced to retire 

because HUD refused to grant his transfer request. 

In June 2010, Jolley filed suit in the United States 

District Court for the Southern District of Georgia. He 

alleged that HUD violated the Age Discrimination in 

Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34, when it 

forced him to retire. The district court dismissed Jolley’s 

claim, ruling that he had failed to provide the Equal 

Employment Opportunity Commission with notice of his 

intent to sue and that his complaint failed to state a claim 

under the ADEA upon which relief could be granted. 

Jolley v. Donovan, No. CV 210-097, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

145412, at *3–4 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 19, 2011).

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JOLLEY v. DOJ 3

On March 12, 2014, Jolley filed an appeal with the 

board, alleging that the Department of Justice had violated his rights under USERRA. He asserted that although 

he had been working at HUD, the Department of Justice 

acted as his “employer” for purposes of USERRA. See 

Board Decision, 2014 MSPB LEXIS 5917, at *4. In Jolley’s view, the Department of Justice became responsible 

for his allegedly involuntary retirement because it represented HUD in the ADEA litigation. Id. at *4. Jolley 

asserted that the Department of Justice “obtained responsibility” for his employment “by taking control of the 

adverse action for litigation and final decisions . . . .” 

Initial Decision, 2014 MSPB LEXIS 2344, at *4 (citations 

and internal quotation marks omitted).*

An administrative judge of the board dismissed Jolley’s appeal. The judge held that since the Department of 

Justice never paid salary or wages to Jolley or exercised 

any control over his employment opportunities at HUD, it 

could not be considered his “employer” for purposes of a 

USERRA claim. Id. at *6–7. Because USERRA only 

authorizes actions against an “employer,” the administrative judge concluded that the board was without jurisdiction to consider Jolley’s appeal. Id. at *7.

* The Department of Justice also provided legal advice to HUD in connection with two USERRA claims 

Jolley filed against HUD. See Jolley v. Dep’t of Hous. & 

Urban Dev., 299 F. App’x 969, 971–73 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 

(affirming a board decision rejecting Jolley’s claim that 

HUD violated USERRA when it failed to select him for 

several criminal investigator positions); Jolley v. Dep’t of 

Hous. & Urban Dev., 299 F. App’x 966, 968 (Fed. Cir. 

2008) (affirming a board decision rejecting Jolley’s claim 

that HUD’s use of “dual vacancy announcements” violated 

USERRA). 

 

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4 JOLLEY v. DOJ

On August 28, 2014, the board vacated the administrative judge’s initial decision, concluding that Jolley’s 

appeal should not have been dismissed on jurisdictional 

grounds. Board Decision, 2014 MSPB LEXIS 5917, at *7–

8. According to the board, Jolley satisfied the “liberal 

pleading standard for USERRA claims” by alleging that 

he served in the military and that he was denied a benefit 

of employment because of that service. Id. at *8. The 

board determined, however, that Jolley’s USSERA claim 

failed on the merits. Because there was no showing that 

the Department of Justice ever paid Jolley wages for work 

performed or “exercised control over his personal employment opportunities at HUD,” it could not be considered his employer for purposes of a USERRA claim. Id. at 

*10. Jolley then filed a timely appeal with this court.

DISCUSSION

Our review of a board decision is circumscribed by 

statute. We can set aside such a decision only if it is: “(1) 

arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 

not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been 

followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” 5 

U.S.C. § 7703(c); see Marino v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 243 

F.3d 1375, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

USERRA bars “public and private employers from 

discriminating against their employees on the basis of 

military service” and “guarantees non-career service 

members reemployment rights upon the completion of 

their military commitments.” Erickson v. U.S. Postal 

Serv., 636 F.3d 1353, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2011); see also 

Sheehan v. Dep’t of the Navy, 240 F.3d 1009, 1012 (Fed. 

Cir. 2001). It provides that “a member of . . . a uniformed 

service shall not be denied . . . any benefit of employment 

by an employer on the basis of that membership . . . .” 38 

U.S.C. § 4311(a) (emphasis added). As the board correctly 

determined, Jolley had no right to bring a USERRA claim 

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JOLLEY v. DOJ 5

against the Department of Justice because it was not his 

“employer.” See Board Decision, 2014 MSPB LEXIS 5917, 

at *8–10.

Under USERRA, an “employer” is defined as “any 

person, institution, organization, or other entity that pays 

salary or wages for work performed or that has control 

over employment opportunities . . . .” 38 U.S.C. 

§ 4303(4)(A). Jolley produced no evidence that the Department of Justice paid him a salary or wages for work 

he performed. See Board Decision, 2014 MSPB LEXIS 

5917, at *9. Nor was there any showing that it exercised 

control over his “employment opportunities,” 38 U.S.C. 

§ 4303(4)(A), at HUD. Accordingly, the Department of 

Justice does not meet the definition of an “employer” 

under USERRA.

The Department of Justice represented HUD during 

adjudication of the ADEA claim Jolley filed in district 

court. It also provided legal advice to HUD in connection 

with the appeals he filed against HUD with the board. 

The Department of Justice did not, however, become 

Jolley’s employer by virtue of the fact that it provided 

HUD with legal representation and advice. See Initial 

Decision, 2014 MSPB LEXIS 2344, at *7 (“The fact that 

[the Department of Justice] represented HUD does [not]

give it ownership of, or responsibility for, that agency’s 

employment relationship with [Jolley].”). Contrary to 

Jolley’s assertions, providing legal counsel to HUD did not 

give the Department of Justice authority to “control” his 

employment. See Satterfield v. Borough of Schuylkill 

Haven, 12 F. Supp. 2d 423, 438 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (concluding that individuals who had “no . . . power” over the 

plaintiff could not be considered his “employers” for 

purposes of USERRA); Silva v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,

2009 M.S.P.B. 189 ¶ 15 (2009) (emphasizing that a government agency will be deemed an “employer” under 

USERRA only when it exerts “control” over a plaintiff’s 

employment opportunities).

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6 JOLLEY v. DOJ

On appeal, Jolley argues that the Department of Justice violated 5 C.F.R. § 1201.25(c) by failing to properly 

respond to an acknowledgement order issued by the 

board’s administrative judge. Jolley does not, however, 

identify any specific documents that the Department of 

Justice failed to produce in response to the acknowledgment order. Jolley further contends that the Department 

of Justice “has remained silent on the issues,” and has not 

adequately responded to the allegations in his complaint. 

We disagree. Before the board, the Department of Justice 

responded directly to the merits of Jolley’s appeal, arguing that it could not be held responsible under USERRA 

for any adverse actions taken against him because it had 

never been his employer. It explained that “it took no 

action against [Jolley] because of his military status and 

indeed [took] no action [against him] at all.” Board Decision, 2014 MSPB LEXIS 5917, at *10.

We have considered Jolley’s remaining arguments, 

but do not find them persuasive. Accordingly, the decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

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