Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_24-cv-00567/USCOURTS-azd-4_24-cv-00567-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Raoul Garza
Plaintiff
Pima County Superior Court
Defendant
Catherine Woods
Defendant

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Raoul Garza,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Pima County Superior Court, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-24-00567-TUC-RCC

ORDER 

On November 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Complaint (Doc. 1) and Application to 

Proceed in District Court without Prepaying Fees or Costs (“IFP Application”). (Doc. 2.) 

The Court grants the IFP Application and dismisses this case with prejudice. 

I. IFP APPLICATION

Generally, parties who file an action in federal district court must pay a filing fee. 

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). However, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 permits indigent plaintiffs to apply for a 

fee waiver. Before granting a plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court must 

decide whether the litigant is truly unable to pay filing fees. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1); 

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 (9th Cir. 2000). Good cause appearing, the Court 

will grant the IFP Application. (Doc. 2.)

II. STATUTORY SCREENING OF IFP COMPLAINT

Even if the Court finds that a litigant is unable to pay, it has an additional, 

statutory obligation to screen a complaint before it may be served. 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2). As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained, “section 1915(e) not 

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only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that 

fails to state a claim.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). Additionally, 

a district court must screen and dismiss actions filed by a plaintiff proceeding in forma 

pauperis if the action “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from 

such relief,” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), or fails to plead a cognizable legal theory, 

Balistreri v. Pacific Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988).

District Court screening orders apply the same standard as applied to a Federal 

Civil Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 

2012). A complaint under 12(b)(6) must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While Rule 8 does 

not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the 

defendant unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content 

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Id. The complaint must contain more than “a statement of facts that 

merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp.,

550 U.S. at 555. Furthermore, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.

“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a 

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience 

and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. So, although a plaintiff’s specific factual 

allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether 

there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681. 

If the plaintiff “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” the district 

court must dismiss the claim. 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). But, a “complaint [filed by a 

pro se litigant] ‘must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by 

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lawyers.’” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 

III. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

Plaintiff’s Complaint against Pima County Superior Court (“PCSC”) and PCSC 

Judge Catherine Woods alleges his constitutional rights were violated when Judge Woods 

issued an order of protection against him, which was later dismissed. Plaintiff has not 

stated a claim entitling him to relief and amendment would be futile.

As to the allegations against Judge Woods, judges are absolutely immune from 

damages for all judicial, “even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are 

alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 

356 (1978); Sadoski v. Mosley, 435 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 2006); Harvey v. Waldron, 

210 F.3d 1008, 1012 (9th Cir. 2000). An act is “judicial” when it is a function normally 

performed by a judge and the parties dealt with the judge in the judge’s judicial capacity. 

Stump, 435 U.S. at 362; Crooks v. Maynard, 913 F.2d 699, 700 (9th Cir. 1990). Judge 

Woods’ issuance of a protective order was a judicial act performed within her subjectmatter jurisdiction. Therefore, the Court will dismiss Defendant Woods.

Second, the proper name of Defendant “Pima County Superior Court” is the 

“Superior Court of the State of Arizona in and for the County of Pima County,” and it is a 

state court. See Massengill v. Super. Ct. in and for Maricopa County, 416 P.2d 1009, 

1012 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1966) (citing Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 1); see also Ariz. Const. art. 6, 

§ 13 (the superior courts “constitute a single court”). Under the Eleventh Amendment to 

the Constitution of the United States, a state or state agency may not be sued in federal 

court without its consent. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 

(1984); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Furthermore, “a state is not a 

‘person’ for purposes of section 1983. Likewise[,] ‘arms of the State’ . . . are not 

‘persons’ under section 1983.” Gilbreath v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 931 F.2d 1320, 1327 

(9th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). State superior courts are “arms of the State” for 

Eleventh Amendment purposes. See Lucas v. Ariz. Sup. Ct. Fiduciary Certification 

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Program, 457 F. App’x 689, 690 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The Arizona Supreme Court . . . is an 

‘arm of the state’ for Eleventh Amendment purposes.”); Greater L.A. Council on 

Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103, 1110 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[A] suit against the 

Superior Court is a suit against the State, barred by the eleventh amendment.”). Thus, the 

Court will dismiss Defendant Pima County Superior Court.

Dismissal with prejudice is appropriate if the complaint’s deficiencies cannot be 

cured by amendment. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127–29 (9th Cir. 2000). Given the 

reasons stated above, the Court finds amendment would be futile and dismissal with 

prejudice is appropriate. 

IT IS ORDERED the IFP Application is GRANTED. (Doc. 2.) IT IS FURTHER 

ORDERED this matter is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Dated this 2nd day of December, 2024.

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