Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-01050/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-01050-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Richard Telucci
Plaintiff

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD TELUCCI, No. 830-0, 

Plaintiff(s),

 vs.

UNKNOWN NAMED, Supervising

Deputy San Francisco County Public

Defender,

Defendant(s). 

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No. C 15-1050 CRB (PR)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND

(Dkt. #4)

Plaintiff, a former prisoner now civilly committed to the custody of the

California Department of State Hospitals after a San Francisco County Superior

Court jury found him to be a sexually violent predator under the Sexually Violent

Predators Act, Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6600 et seq. (SVPA), has filed a pro se

complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In a nutshell, plaintiff alleges that he was

deprived of effective assistance of counsel and consequently subjected to

irrational mental health assessments in the course of his civil commitment

proceedings due to the Supervising Deputy San Francisco County Public

Defender’s failure to adequately train and supervise plaintiff’s deputy public

defender to effectively challenge such irrational assessments. Plaintiff seeks

prospective relief, namely an injunction protecting him from being subjected to

future irrational mental health assessments, and leave to proceed in forma

pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

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1

The financial reporting and full filing fee requirements of § 1915(a)(2) & (b)

apply only to “prisoners,” i.e., individuals who, at the time they seek to file their civil

actions, are detained as a result of being accused of, convicted of, or sentenced for

criminal offenses, and therefore do not apply to individuals civilly committed under

SVPA. See Page v. Torrey, 201 F.3d 1136, 1139-40 (9th Cir. 2000).

2

Good cause shown, plaintiff’s motion (dkt. #4) for leave to proceed in

forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 is GRANTED.1

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Federal courts must dismiss a case filed in forma pauperis under § 1915 at

any time if the court determines that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to

state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a

defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Pro se

pleadings must be liberally construed, however. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police

Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two 

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States

was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting

under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

B. Legal Claims

It is well established that a public defender does not act under color of

state law, an essential element of an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, when

performing a lawyer’s traditional functions, such as entering pleas, making

motions, objecting at trial, cross-examining witnesses and making closing

arguments. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1981). It matters not

that the public defender failed to exercise independent judgment or that he was

employed by a public agency; it is the nature and context of the function

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performed by the public defender that is determinative under Polk County. 

Miranda v. Clark County, Nevada, 319 F.3d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

Polk County left open the possibility that a public defender may be liable

under § 1983 for “administrative and possibly investigative functions.” Polk

County, 454 U.S. at 324-25. In Branti v. Finkely, 445 U.S. 507 (1980), the Court

already had held that chief public defenders may be subject to § 1983 liability for

their hiring and firing decisions. 445 U.S. at 324-25. The Ninth Circuit more

recently added that the head of a county public defender’s office, as the

administrative head of an organization formed to represent criminal defendants,

may be held accountable under § 1983 for a policy that leads to a denial of an

individual’s constitutional right to effective representation of counsel. See

Miranda, 319 F.3d at 468-71 (plaintiff complained of policy of administering lie

detector test to all defendants and allocating minimal resources for preparation of

defense to those clients who appear guilty because they failed the polygraph, and

of policy to assign the least-experienced lawyers on staff to capital cases without

training or experience in the special demands of such cases). But the policy must

amount to “deliberate indifference to the [constitutional] requirement that every

criminal defendant receive adequate representation.” Id. at 470 (citing City of

Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989)). 

Because a civil detainee facing involuntary commitment to a mental

hospital is “constitutionally entitled to counsel,” United States v. Budell, 187

F.3d 1137, 1141 (9th Cir. 1999), plaintiff will be provided with an opportunity to

amend to name as defendant San Francisco Public Defender Jeff Adachi and

allege, if possible, facts showing a deliberate pattern and policy of refusing to 

train and prepare deputy public defenders for civil commitment cases under

SVPA. See Miranda, 319 F.3d at 471. Plaintiff is advised that an isolated

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assignment of an inexperienced or poorly trained lawyer will not do. Plaintiff

must set forth facts sufficient to state a claim of “‘deliberate indifference to

constitutional rights’ in the failure to train lawyers to represent clients [facing

civil commitment proceedings under SVPA].” Id. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the complaint is dismissed with leave to amend,

as indicated above, within 28 days of this order. The pleading must be simple

and concise and must include the caption and civil case number used in this order

and the words FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT on the first page. Failure to

file a proper amended complaint within the designated time will result in the

dismissal of this action.

Plaintiff is advised that the amended complaint will supersede the original

complaint and all other pleadings. Claims and defendants not included in the

amended complaint will not be considered by the court. See King v. Atiyeh, 814

F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987).

SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 15, 2015 

CHARLES R. BREYER

United States District Judge

G:\PRO-SE\CRB\CR.15\Telucci, R.15-1050.dwlta.wpd

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