Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-02-05047/USCOURTS-caDC-02-05047-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mary Frances Berry
Appellee
Peter N. Kirsanow
Appellant
Cruz Reynoso
Appellee
United States Commission on Civil Rights
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant
Victoria Wilson
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 1, 2002 Decided May 9, 2002

No. 02-5047

United States of America and

Peter N. Kirsanow, in his official capacity as

Member, United States Commission on Civil Rights,

Appellants

v.

Victoria Wilson, et al.,

Appellees

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the District of Columbia

(No. 01cv02541)

---------

Gregory G. Katsas, Deputy Assistant Attorney General,

U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for appellants.

With him on the brief were Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., U.S.

Attorney, Douglas N. Letter, Jacob M. Lewis and Ara B.

Gershengorn, Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice.

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Leon Friedman and Theodore V. Wells, Jr. argued the

cause for appellees. With them on the brief were Julia

Tarver, Geoffrey F. Aronow and Paul S. Mandell.

Before: Sentelle, Randolph and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Sentelle.

Sentelle, Circuit Judge: On January 13, 2000, President

Clinton appointed appellee Victoria Wilson to the United

States Commission on Civil Rights under a commission expressly stating that the appointment was "for the remainder

of the term expiring November 29, 2001," left vacant by the

death in office of a prior member. After November 29, 2001,

President Bush, treating Wilson's commission as having expired on that date, appointed appellant Peter Kirsanow to

succeed her. At the next meeting of the Commission, that

body recognized Wilson as a continuing member on her

assertion that she was entitled to a full six-year term on the

Commission running from January 13, 2000, to January 12,

2006. The United States and Kirsanow filed this action

seeking a declaratory judgment that Wilson's term had expired and that Kirsanow is now a member of the Commission.

The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of

Wilson. The United States and Kirsanow appealed. Because

we agree with appellants that Wilson's term had expired, we

reverse the District Court and remand with instructions for it

to enter summary judgment for the appellants.

I. Background

The United States Commission on Civil Rights ("the Commission") is charged with investigating allegations of deprivation of voting rights on the basis of "color, race, religion, sex,

age, disability, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. s 1975a(a)(1).

In addition, the Commission is empowered to conduct studies

and disseminate information relating to discrimination. Id.

s 1975a(a)(2). The Commission's functions are purely investigatory and advisory--it has neither the power to enforce

federal law, nor to promulgate any rules with the force of law.

See Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 441 (1960); cf. United

States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001).

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The Commission was first created in 1957, and as originally

established was composed of six members serving open-ended

terms at the pleasure of the President. See Pub. L. No.

85-315 s 101(b), 71 Stat. 634 (1957). Congress reauthorized

and reorganized the Commission in 1983 by expanding it from

six to eight members, providing that not more than four of

the members could at any one time be from the same party,

dividing the appointment power between the President and

Congress, establishing that the President could only remove

members for neglect of duty or malfeasance, and staggering

the terms of the Commissioners. Specifically, the 1983 Act

stated that the "term of office of each member of the Commission shall be six years; except that (A) members first

taking office shall serve as designated by the President,

subject to [provisions staggering the initial appointments],

and (B) any member appointed to fill a vacancy shall serve for

the remainder of the term for which his predecessor was

appointed." Pub. L. No. 98-183 s 2(b)(2), 97 Stat. 1301 (1983)

("the 1983 Act"). The staggering provisions created two

groups of four commissioners each. The first group would

serve for three years, at which point their successors would

be appointed to six-year terms. The second group would

serve for six years from the outset. See id. s 2(b)(3). Under

this structure, the terms of office would be regularly staggered with half of them expiring every three years. The 1983

Act provided for the Commission to expire in 1989. Nonetheless the Commission continued to operate via the process of

annual appropriations until reauthorized.

In 1994 the Commission was formally reauthorized. Pub. L.

No. 103-419, 108 Stat. 4338 (1994) ("the 1994 Act"). This Act

has been dubbed an effort to "more concisely rewrite[ ] the

1983 [Act]." H.R. Rep. No. 103-775, at 4, reprinted in 1994

U.S.C.C.A.N. 3532, 3533 (1994). Like the 1983 Act, the 1994

Act provides that "[t]he term of office of each member of the

Commission shall be 6 years." 42 U.S.C. s 1975(c). However,

instead of the initial staggering provisions that followed in the

1983 Act, the 1994 Act merely provided: "The term of each

member of the Commission in the initial membership of the

Commission shall expire on the date such term would have

expired as of September 30, 1994." 42 U.S.C. s 1975(c). The

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Act did not contain any language referring to filling vacancies. The 1994 Act did preserve the division of appointment

power between the President and Congress, as well as the

requirements for partisan balance, and the limitations on

presidential removal of members. See 42 U.S.C. s 1975(b), (e).

The 1994 Act provided for the Commission to terminate on

September 30, 1996, 42 U.S.C. s 1975d, however, it has again

continued to operate pursuant to annual appropriations.

On November 30, 1995, then-President Clinton appointed

retired Judge A. Leon Higginbotham to a six-year term as a

member of the Commission. His commission stated that his

appointment was "for a term expiring November 29, 2001."

He replaced Arthur A. Fletcher, whose term expired on

November 29, 1995. On December 14, 1998, Judge

Higginbotham died in office. To fill this vacancy, President

Clinton appointed appellee, Victoria Wilson, to the Commission on January 13, 2000. Her commission expressly states

that her appointment was "for the remainder of the term

expiring November 29, 2001." Treating Wilson's term as

having expired on November 29, President Bush appointed

appellant Peter Kirsanow on December 6, 2001, to succeed

Wilson on the Commission. Kirsanow was administered the

oath of office by D.C. Superior Court Judge Maurice A. Ross;

however, the Chair of the Commission, Mary Frances Berry,

refused to recognize him or allow him to participate in

Commission activities. The Chair instead continued to recognize Wilson as a member of the Commission and allowed her

to participate as such.

The United States and Kirsanow (collectively "appellants")

filed this action in the United States District Court for the

District of Columbia seeking declaratory relief against Wilson. The Commission, Mary Frances Berry (Chair), and

Cruz Reynoso (Vice-Chair), moved to intervene. The United

States objected that neither the Commission nor its officers

in their official capacity have the right to appear in litigation

without the permission of the Attorney General, which they

had not obtained. See 28 U.S.C. s 516 ("Except as otherwise

authorized by law, the conduct of litigation in which the

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United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party ... is

reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, under the

direction of the Attorney General."). The district court summarily permitted the intervention. As the United States has

not raised this issue on appeal, claiming "it has no practical

effect upon the issues presented, since Wilson herself is

entitled to defend against the government's complaint," we do

not decide whether this intervention was permissible. The

parties filed dispositive motions and on February 4, 2002, the

district court issued an oral ruling granting Wilson's motion

for summary judgment.

The district court concluded that "the 1994 Amendments

Act ... does not mandate regularly staggered terms. Rather, its plain language clearly requires that all Commissioners

serve six-year terms, regardless of whether, as in this case,

their predecessors completed their terms." Thus, under the

district court's reading of the statute, Wilson would be entitled to serve a full six years, until January 12, 2006. The

district court first found that the language of 42 U.S.C.

s 1975(c) "is perfectly clear. It contains no exceptions, qualifications, not for delayed appointments and not for appointments to fill unexpired terms." Second, the court noted that

a staggering provision had been proposed, but not adopted by

Congress in the 1994 Act. Third, the district court relied on

the removal of the staggering and vacancy provisions from

the 1983 Act, holding that "when Congress affirmatively

deletes language which had been included in pre-existing

legislation, then Congress means what it said."

Finally, the court rejected appellants' argument that failure

to maintain staggering would undermine "the bipartisan nature of the Commission as well as its integrity and credibility." The court found "nothing to suggest that the absence of

such a requirement would frustrate Congress' purpose." Although acknowledging that its ruling would eliminate "uniformly staggered terms," the court opined that its decision

would not result in the "complete elimination of all staggering." Even so, the court reasoned that the "staggered term

requirement was only one amongst a large constellation of

protections that were introduced by the 1983 Act" and "[a]ll

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of these protections, except staggered terms, remain expressly included in the 1994 Act." The district court concluded

that "[i]f Congress believes that the regularly staggered

terms should be among these protections, then, of course, it is

free to make its intention explicit by including express language in the statute."

The United States and Kirsanow filed this appeal.

II. Analysis

This case involves a pure legal question of statutory interpretation. Our review of statutory interpretation by a district court is de novo. See, e.g., Butler v. West, 164 F.3d 634,

639 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

A.

We begin our analysis with the language of the statute.

See, e.g., Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., Inc., 534 U.S. 438, 122

S. Ct. 941, 950 (2002). "Our first step in interpreting a

statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a

plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular

dispute in the case. Our inquiry must cease if the statutory

language is unambiguous and 'the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.' " Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337,

340 (1997) (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises,

Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240 (1989)). In determining the "plainness

or ambiguity of statutory language" we refer to "the language

itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and

the broader context of the statute as a whole." Id. at 341

(citing Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469,

477 (1992); McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 139 (1991)).

The disputed provision, 42 U.S.C. s 1975(c) provides: "The

term of office of each member of the Commission shall be 6

years. The term of each member of the Commission in the

initial membership of the Commission shall expire on the date

such term would have expired as of September 30, 1994."

Appellants contend, contrary to the district court's holding,

that the language of the first sentence of s 1975(c) is ambiguous, as the expression "term of office" is subject to at least

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two plausible interpretations. Appellants concede that one

very plausible interpretation of s 1975(c) is that advocated by

Wilson and adopted by the district court: Each individual

member of the Commission, however appointed, whenever

appointed, is entitled to serve a six-year period of time--i.e.,

the term runs with the person. Under this interpretation,

each member of the Commission would receive a six-year

term running from the date of her appointment. However,

appellants argue that another plausible reading of s 1975(c) is

that the first sentence establishes six-year terms of office,

beginning and ending on fixed dates, irrespective of whether

and when individuals are appointed to fill them. Under this

reading, each member of the Commission must be assigned to

a fixed, six-year 'slot' of time--i.e., the term runs with the

calendar. We agree with appellants that the ambiguity in the

first sentence of s 1975(c) permits either of the readings

suggested.

As Attorney General Brewster explained more than a

century ago, "[t]here are two kinds of official terms." Commissioners of the District of Columbia, 17 Op. Att'y Gen. 476,

476 (1882). One kind of "term" refers to a period of personal

service. In that case, "the term is appurtenant to the person." Id. Another kind of "term" refers to a fixed slot of

time to which individual appointees are assigned. There,

"the person is appurtenant to the term." Id. at 479. In

other words, a "term of office" can either run with the person

or with the calendar. As an example of the latter, Article II

of the Constitution provides that the President shall hold

office during a "Term of four Years." U.S. Const. Art. II,

s 1, cl.1. Even before enactment of the Twentieth Amendment, which established specific dates for the end of the

President's term, it was understood that presidential terms

ran four years with the calendar, not four years with the

person, regardless of whether an individual assumed office

after his predecessor failed to serve out a full term. Thus,

contrary to appellees' position, it is not clear that the expression "term of office ... shall be 6 years" found in s 1975(c) is

unambiguous. Indeed, far from it. The very appointment of

Wilson by President Clinton to serve only the remainder of

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Judge Higginbotham's term demonstrates the ambiguity in

the statutory provision calling for six-year "term[s] of office."

The district court erred in holding that s 1975(c) unambiguously requires that all Commissioners be appointed for six

years, regardless of whether their predecessors completed

their terms. This error undermines the district court's judgment, because the remainder of its analysis rests on that

erroneous premise as its point of departure.

B.

Finding that the expression "term of office" in 42 U.S.C.

s 1975(c) is ambiguous, we are left to resolve that ambiguity.

In resolving the ambiguity, we consider the broader context

of s 1975(c) and the structure of the 1994 Act as a whole, as

well as the contextual background against which Congress

was legislating, including relevant practices of the Executive

Branch which presumably informed Congress's decision, prior

legislative acts, and historical events. Finally, we explore the

policy ramifications of the suggested interpretations of

s 1975(c). Each of these considerations leads us to the

conclusion that, in enacting the 1994 Act, Congress did not

disrupt the staggering of terms of Commission members

created in the 1983 Act. Therefore we hold that Wilson was

appointed by President Clinton only to fill the unexpired term

of Judge Higginbotham, as her commission indicates, and her

service as a Commissioner terminated on November 29, 2001.

As a result, Kirsanow, having been validly appointed to a

vacant seat on the Commission on December 6, 2001, for a

term expiring November 29, 2007, and having taken the oath

of office, is a member of the United States Commission on

Civil Rights.

1.

Appellants argue that in order to properly interpret 42

U.S.C. s 1975(c) we must construe both of its two sentences

together, rather than as separate and unrelated. Taken

together, appellants contend that it is evident that the 1994

Act retained "fixed slots of time to which individual members

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of the Commission are 'appurtenant.' " The second sentence

of 42 U.S.C. s 1975(c) provides that the "term of each member of the Commission in the initial membership of the

Commission shall expire on the date such term would have

expired as of September 30, 1994," under the 1983 Act. The

"initial membership" of the Commission is defined as "the

members of the United States Commission on Civil Rights on

September 30, 1994," in other words, the members then

serving on the Commission pursuant to the 1983 Act. 42

U.S.C. s 1975(b). Appellants argue that in maintaining the

staggering of "initial terms" of the Commission, as inherently

provided for by the second sentence of s 1975(c), the 1994

Act perpetuated a self-replicating system of staggered terms.

New terms begin based on when the old, staggered terms

end. Thus the structure created by Congress in 1983 and

preserved in 1994 would automatically endure.

Appellees would have us read the two sentences of

s 1975(c) as unrelated. According to appellees, the first sentence alone sets the term of office for six years, and the

second sentence simply addresses the transitional issue of the

terms of the "initial membership" of the Commission, allowing the existing members of the Commission to finish the

terms to which they had been appointed. However, as discussed in Part II.A, supra, read alone, the first sentence of

s 1975(c) is ambiguous. It is susceptible to an interpretation

that each member appointed to the Commission receives six

years from her date of appointment, regardless of whether

her predecessor left office early, and regardless of whether

there was a delay in her appointment. This is the interpretation urged by the intervenors. This interpretation would not

only grant Wilson a full six-year term, it would effectively

extend the terms of others on the Commission. Yet, an

equally plausible interpretation is that terms of the Commissioners run for six years with the calendar. Rather than

counting from the date of appointment, the six years of

members' term are counted from the expiration of their

predecessors' term. This is the common practice of the

Executive Branch in making appointments to staggered

boards and commissions. See, e.g., Office of Legal Counsel,

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Department of Justice, Memorandum for the Executive

Clerk, "Term of a Member of the Mississippi River Commission," at 1 (May 27, 1999) (observing that "to preserve the

staggering required by statute, each member may serve only

until the passage of the specified number of years calculated

from the expiration of his predecessor's term, even if the

member's confirmation and appointment take place after that

prior term has expired"). Thus, despite any delay in appointment, a Commissioner's term would expire six years from the

day her predecessor's expired. Both are six-year terms--the

question is which Congress intended here.

Reading the first sentence of s 1975(c) together with the

second sentence, the latter provides an "anchor"--fixed times

for terms of Commissioners to expire, based on the "term[s]

of each member of the Commission in the initial membership

of the Commission." It is "a 'fundamental canon of statutory

construction that the words of a statute must be read in their

context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory

scheme.' " FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529

U.S. 120, 132 (2000) (quoting Davis v. Michigan Dep't of

Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989)). Thus, it is a more

faithful construction of s 1975(c) to read it as a whole, rather

than as containing two unrelated parts. It is the "classic

judicial task" of construing related statutory provisions "to

'make sense' in combination." United States v. Fausto, 484

U.S. 439, 453 (1988). The second sentence does indeed

address the transitional issue of the terms of the "initial

membership," but in doing so, it also creates a pattern of

staggered appointments. Staggered terms must run with the

calendar, rather than with the person, to preserve staggering.

Thus, taken with the history and background against which

Congress was legislating, discussed infra, it simply makes

more sense to read s 1975(c) as creating terms of office

running with the calendar from the date of expiration of a

predecessor's term. That being the case, any appointment to

fill a vacancy for an unexpired term, such as Wilson's appointment, must only be for the duration of that unexpired term.

For it to be otherwise would disrupt the fixed and staggered

six-year terms that run with the calendar.

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At oral argument, we raised with counsel for appellees the

question of the effect of their proffered interpretation, as

adopted by the district court, on the terms of those members

who, like Berry and Reynoso, were appointed to succeed

Commissioners who had served their full terms, when the

successor did not take office until the lapse of some period of

time after the termination of the prior Commissioner's service. Counsel argued for a two-track application of the

statute, contending that when an appointee's predecessor had

served out her full term, but there was a delay in the

nomination of the new appointee, that new appointee could

permissibly serve less than a full six years, because such a

discrepancy was only minor. However, when the appointee is

replacing a predecessor who had failed to serve out a full

term, such as here, the new appointee should serve a new, full

six years from the date of her appointment. This anomalous

result further undermines appellee's interpretation of the

statute. We have difficulty believing that Congress sub

silentio created two different tracks with full six-year terms

for those Commissioners who succeeded appointees who by

reason of death or resignation did not serve out their full

terms, but truncated terms for those who succeeded members

who served for six years but whose vacancy was not immediately filled by presidential appointment. Nothing in

s 1975(c) gives any indication that the phrase "the term of

office of each member of the Commission" has two different

meanings for two distinct classes of commissioner not otherwise recognized in the statute. The lack of such differentiation and appellee's concession that "delayed appointees" serve

terms shortened by the interval between the expiration of

their predecessors' term and the date of their appointment

further supports our interpretation that, read together, the

two sentences of s 1975(c) create fixed six-year terms that

run with the calendar.

Our interpretation is consistent with widely held traditional

understandings of statutes defining terms of office. The

second edition of American Jurisprudence notes that

"[w]here both the duration of the term of an office and the

time of its commencement or termination are fixed by a

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constitution or statute, a person elected or appointed to fill a

vacancy in such office holds for the unexpired portion of the

term...." 63C Am. Jur. 2d Public Officers and Employees

s 148 (1997). The controversy before us involves just such a

term of office. The first sentence of s 1975(c) fixes the

duration of the term: six years. The second sentence of

s 1975(c) fixes the time of termination: the terms of the

initial members expire at dates determinable from preexisting

law. It is thus unsurprising that President Clinton issued a

commission appointing appellee Wilson "for the remainder of

the term expiring November 29, 2001." Reading s 1975(c) as

a whole, we conclude that it creates fixed six-year terms of

office that run with the calendar, rather than with the person.

Thus, having been appointed to fulfill the remainder of Judge

Higginbotham's term, expiring November 29, 2001, Wilson's

time on the Commission is up.

2.

Our interpretation of s 1975(c) is further confirmed by

background considerations such as relevant practices of the

Executive Branch. Congress is presumed to preserve, not

abrogate, the background understandings against which it

legislates. See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 163

(1997); Norfolk Redev. & Hous. Auth. v. Chesapeake &

Potomac Tel. Co., 464 U.S. 30, 35 (1983). "[L]ongstanding

practices" of the Executive Branch can "place[ ] a 'gloss' on

Congress's action in enacting" a particular provision. Ass'n

of Civilian Technicians v. FLRA, 269 F.3d 1119, 1122 (D.C.

Cir. 2001). Here the consistent treatment of appointments by

the Executive Branch provides such a "gloss."

Neither the 1983 Act nor the 1994 Act explicitly addressed

delays in appointments of members after a predecessor's

term had expired. Yet, it appears that every presidential

appointee to the Commission since 1983 has been appointed

to a term of office expiring six years from the date her

predecessor's term expired. Even after the passage of the

1994 Act, with the changes appellees claim it made to the

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"terms of office," President Clinton appointed no less than

four members to the Commission for terms of less than six

years. Three of these were delayed appointments, and the

fourth is Victoria Wilson. Congress has reappropriated funds

for the Commission, effectively reauthorizing it, each year

since it was supposed to terminate in 1996, and yet it has not

once suggested that the Executive Branch's implementation

of the law was incorrect. It is not that the President's

"interpretation" of 42 U.S.C. s 1975(c) is due deference, as

suggested by appellants, but rather that the Executive

Branch's interpretation of the law through its implementation

colors the background against which Congress was legislating. Congress is presumed to be aware of established practices and authoritative interpretations of the coordinate

branches. E.g., National Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U.S.

140, 147 (1920) ("Congress is presumed to have legislated

with knowledge of such an established usage of an executive

department of the government."); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S.

575, 580 (1978); In re North, 50 F.3d 42, 45 (D.C. Cir. 1995)

(Special Division). Here the Executive Branch's consistent

practice provides a presumptive default.

Similarly, the practice of appointing members to the Commission on Civil Rights is but an example of what has been

the unbroken position of the Attorney General and the Justice Department on executive appointments. As noted in an

opinion issued by the Office of Legal Counsel on May 27,

1999, Term of a Member of the Mississippi River Commission:

Ordinarily, when a statute provides for an appointee to

serve a term of years, the specified time of service begins

with the appointment. Case of Chief Constructor Easby,

16 Op. Att'y Gen. 656 (1880). A different rule generally

applies to commissions whose members have staggered

terms. There, to preserve the staggering required by

statute, each member may serve only until the passage of

the specified number of years calculated from the expiration of his predecessor's term, even if the member's

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confirmation and appointment take place after that prior

term has expired.

(Emphasis added.) This latter rule has been consistently

applied to executive appointments to the Commission on Civil

Rights both in its previous incarnation under the 1983 Act

and as constituted under the 1994 Act. Appointments have

run six years from the date of the expiration of a predecessor's term--not from the date of appointment.1 It is of

course possible that the consistent practice of Presidents

Clinton and Bush in appointing members of the Commission

has been consistently wrong. However, we do not agree with

appellee's interpretation compelling that conclusion. Rather,

we hold that Presidents Clinton and Bush have it right. That

is, the 1983 Act clearly intended to create staggering. The

1994 Act preserved this structure by providing for six-year

terms with the terms of the initial Commissioners expiring

according to their commissions under the 1983 Act.

Furthermore, the consistent practice of the Executive

Branch with respect to the filling of midterm vacancies on

other bodies with staggered term members has been to fill

those vacancies for the duration of the unexpired term,

preserving the staggering of terms. That this practice has

been longstanding is illustrated by a dispute in the 19th

century remarkably similar to the case at bar. In 1882, the

Attorney General was asked by the President for his opinion

__________

1 At oral argument we requested information on Congress's

own practices in making appointments to the Commission. The

information appellees have provided shows that, unlike the Executive Branch, Congress has been inconsistent in its appointments

under both the 1983 Act and the 1994 Act, generally failing to

indicate termination dates for appointees, and on one occasion

indicating the appointment was to run six years from the date of

appointment. See 142 Cong. Rec. H1233-06 (1996) (Reappointment

of Carl Anderson). Most recently however, the Speaker of the

House appointed Abigail Thernstrom on January 6, 2001. See 147

Cong. Rec. H46-02 (2001). Thernstrom's initial appointment was

apparently only to fill the remainder of a vacant seat, because she

was reappointed by the Speaker, without objection, to the Commission "for a 6-year term beginning on February 12, 2002." See 148

Cong. Rec. H229-09 (2002). This most recent action by the House

of Representatives is consistent with our interpretation of the

statute.

of the term of office of a Commissioner of the District of

Columbia who had been appointed after his predecessor failed

to serve out a full term. See Commissioners of the District of

Columbia, 17 Op. Att'y Gen. 476, 476 (1882). The governing

statute provided for staggering with respect to the initial

appointment of the two Commissioners, but was silent about

both subsequent appointments and the filling of vacancies.

Nonetheless, the Attorney General concluded that a Commissioner appointed to fill a vacancy could serve only for the

remainder of his predecessor's unexpired term. As noted in

Part II.A, supra, the Attorney General distinguished between

terms running with the person and terms running with the

calendar. He concluded that there must be "some apt expression of ... intent" to create the latter kind of term, and

found such an "apt expression" from the initial staggering of

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terms. Id. at 477. Were it to be otherwise, the staggering of

the Commission would deteriorate, and frustrate Congress's

purpose in establishing staggering in the first place. See id.

at 477-78. He concluded that "[t]he fact that no express

provision is made for filling vacancies which might arise by

death or resignation is not significant." Id. at 478. In

appointing Victoria Wilson for the remainder of Judge

Higginbotham's term of office, President Clinton was following an established Executive Branch practice which was

known to Congress. Had Congress intended to disrupt the

staggering of members in its 1994 reauthorization of the

Commission on Civil Rights, it could have affirmatively indicated that was its intent.

Appellee Wilson argues that if we held that each member

of the Commission receives a six-year term of office running

from the date of their appointment, her appointment, though

reflected in her commission as "for the remainder of the term

expiring November 29, 2001," would be effective as a six-year

appointment expiring on January 12, 2006. In support of this

proposition appellees cite Quackenbush v. United States, 177

U.S. 20, 27 (1900), which notes in passing that "the terms of

[a] commission cannot change the effect of the appointment

as defined by ... statute." That may be. But arguably

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Wilson may not have been validly appointed in the first

instance.2 It seems intuitive, as a matter of separation of

powers, that the language of a nomination, confirmation, and

commission cannot alter a statutory term, since it is given to

Congress "under its legislative power" to "establish[ ] ...

offices, the determination of their functions and jurisdiction,

the prescribing of reasonable and relevant qualifications and

rules of eligibility of appointees, and the fixing of the term for

which they are to be appointed and their compensation--all

except as otherwise provided by the Constitution." Myers v.

United States, 272 U.S. 52, 129 (1926) (Taft, C.J.) (emphasis

added). Indeed, this appears to be the position of the Department of Justice. See, e.g., Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, Memorandum for the Executive Clerk,

"Term of a Member of the Mississippi River Commission," at

2 (May 27, 1999); Case of Chief Constructor Easby, 16 Op.

Att'y Gen. 656, 657 (1880).

However, we are not considering an attempt by a President

to intentionally circumvent a statute. Nor is this a case of

mere scrivener's error. Rather, it is clear that President

Clinton intended to appoint Wilson to the remainder of a

term and not to a full six-year term, a position he reasonably

believed existed. Were we to read the statute as prohibiting

appointments to the remainder of a term then either Wilson's

appointment must be to a six-year term, or alternatively, it

was to a non-existent position--the remainder of a term--

raising a question as to the validity of her appointment in the

first instance. It could be seen as an attempt by the President to appoint Wilson to a position that did not exist. In

that case Wilson would never have been a valid member of

the Commission in the first instance. However, because we

read the statute as preserving staggering and thus permitting

__________

2 Wilson accepted her commission from President Clinton with

it expressly stating that it was "for the remainder of the term

expiring November 29, 2001." Subsequently she failed to challenge

the terms of her commission prior to its expiration. Therefore she

is arguably bound by those terms, and estopped from asserting an

alleged violation of 42 U.S.C. s 1975(c). However, given our resolution, we need not decide.

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the appointment of Wilson to the remainder of a term of

office, that problem need not concern us. As a result, Wilson's

appointment by President Clinton was valid, but her term of

office has subsequently expired.

3.

In addition to Executive Branch practices implementing a

statute, background considerations, or "context," include related provisions in historically antecedent statutes. E.g.,

Dep't of Commerce v. U.S. House of Rep., 525 U.S. 316, 339-

40 (1999). We need not rely on legislative history, of which

there is little of relevance, to determine that staggering of

terms was an important feature of the 1983 Act--the plain

text and the historical events surrounding the 1983 reauthorization of the Commission demonstrate that fact. Congress

went to great lengths to put various structural features in

place to preserve the independence, autonomy, and nonpartisan nature of the Commission. Clearly staggering was

one of those features. See Pub. L. No. 98-183 s 2(b)(2), (3),

97 Stat. 1301 (1983). The 1983 Act was enacted at a time when

Congress was responding to President Reagan's decision to

remove and replace first two, then a total of five, members of

the Commission. See Congressional Research Service, Tenure of Members of the Civil Rights Commission, Memorandum to House Subcommittee on the Constitution, at 2-3, 5

(Dec. 14, 2001). Thus it is evident that in staggering the

membership (among other features), Congress was insulating

the Commission from carte blanc replacement at any given

time. To suggest that Congress abolished this practical

structural feature without any indication that it intended to--

evidenced by the fact that the Clinton and Bush Administrations continued to treat the Commission as a body with

staggered membership--presents a highly improbable scenario. There is no evidence in or external to the 1994 Act that

Congress meant to disrupt the system it had meticulously put

into motion.

Appellees suggest that we can deduce Congress's intent to

alter the terms of office created by the 1983 Act because the

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sentatives to reauthorize the Commission provided that "the

current staggering of terms shall continue in effect." H.R.

4999 s 2(c), 103d Cong. (1994). Appellees contend that the

removal of this language demonstrates that Congress intended to disrupt the staggering created by the 1983 Act. However, it is at least equally plausible that Congress considered

such language simply unnecessary in light of the addition of

the provision that the terms of "initial" members "shall expire

on the date such term would have expired as of September

30, 1994." 42 U.S.C. s 1975(c). This language demonstrates

that Congress intended to preserve the structure created

under the 1983 Act.

Indeed, Congress used virtually the exact same language in

defining the six-year term of office in both the 1983 and 1994

Acts: "The term of office of each member of the Commission

shall be 6 years." 42 U.S.C. s 1975(c); Pub. L. No. 98-103

s 2(b)(2).3 If anything this suggests that "term of office"

retains the same meaning as it did in 1983. Since there is

apparently no dispute that under the 1983 Act a "term of

office" ran with the calendar, that same understanding would

apply to the 1994 Act.

Appellees' strongest argument that Congress intended to

alter the structure of the Commission in adopting the 1994

Act is that it eliminated the provision providing that "any

member appointed to fill a vacancy shall serve for the remainder of the term for which his predecessor was appointed."

Pub. L. No. 98-103 s 2(b)(2)(B). This argument is not without

force. As this Court has recognized: "Where the words of a

later statute differ from those of a previous one on the same

or related subject, the Congress must have intended them to

have a different meaning." Muscogee (Creek) Nation v.

Hodel, 851 F.2d 1439, 1444 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Further, there

are numerous statutes creating boards and commissions that

expressly provide for filling vacancies. However, here we

have not a new agency, but a Commission that Congress had

already established and was merely reauthorizing. In the

process Congress removed provisions pertaining to the initial

__________

3 The only difference is that the 1983 Act spelled out "six."

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staggering of the Commission which also included the vacancy provision. What that leaves is not different words, as in

Muscogee (Creek) Nation, but rather silence. And not just

silence, but silence coupled with ambiguous terms, wellestablished practices of the Executive Branch, and the perpetuation of a staggered board in the 1994 Act by providing

that the terms of "initial" members "shall expire on the date

such term would have expired as of September 30, 1994,"

under the 1983 Act. Had Congress intended to change the

established practice for appointing members of the Commission on Civil Rights, it could have affirmatively indicated its

intent to do so. It did not. "Congress is unlikely to intend

any radical departures from past practice without making a

point of saying so." Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 234

(1999). These contextual considerations lead us to the conclusion that the 1994 Act maintained the structure of the Commission as reauthorized in 1983, and thus Wilson was appointed to fill an unexpired term, rather than to a new term of her

own.

4.

Finally, we observe that our interpretation, unlike that

urged by appellees, avoids anomalous results. As noted

above, the creation of staggered terms was one of several

structural features adopted in the 1983 Act to establish the

Commission as an independent, bipartisan entity, to insulate

it from political influence, and to protect its integrity and

credibility. The district court contended that its decision

would not result in "the complete elimination of all staggering," but acknowledged that its decision would result in the

"absence of uniformly staggered terms." The district court

further contended that "there is little, if any, substantive

difference between those two." We disagree. There is a

substantial difference in having predictable terms ensuring

that membership will turn over in a periodic and foreseeable

manner, and having unpredictable vacancies that permanently

disorder member terms. Not the least difference is the

diffusion of appointment authority across presidential administrations. Moreover, there is no apparent reason Congress

would originally create fixed, staggered terms, as it did under

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the 1983 Act, only to have them become unpredictably destaggered over time as some members of the Commission

resign, retire, are removed, or die.

Even more telling is the fact that the construction urged by

appellees would invite the very sort of political manipulation

leading to the reorganization of the Commission in 1983. For

example, de-staggering could arise from concerted resignations near the end of a President's term, allowing an outgoing

President to appoint several members of the Commission at

once, precluding his successor from appointing any members

of the Commission. Such "absurd results" are strongly disfavored. Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575

(1982). Congress was attempting to insulate the Commission

from this kind of carte blanc replacement at any given time.

Appellees have no argument as to why these same policy

considerations were no longer relevant in 1994 when Congress reauthorized the Commission. The absence of any

policy justification for the construction urged by appellees

provides yet an additional reason to conclude that Congress,

when it established the "initial membership" of the Commission in the 1994 Act, see 42 U.S.C. s 1975(c), preserved the

staggering it had set in motion in the 1983 Act, and did not

intend for the benefits of that provision to be destroyed as

some future appointees, either because of random events or

strategic behavior inevitably failed to serve out their terms.

III. Conclusion

Since the founding of the republic presidential appointees

and their commissions have been a source of litigation, if

not consternation. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1

Cranch) 137, 154 (1803). Here Wilson's commission corresponds to the terms of the statute pursuant to which she

was appointed a member of the United States Commission

on Civil Rights--42 U.S.C. s 1975. Part (c) of s 1975 provides that the "term of office of each member of the Commission shall be 6 years." The district court erred in

holding that this provision unambiguously requires all

Commissioners be appointed for six years, regardless of

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whether their predecessors completed their terms. Rather,

s 1975(c) is also susceptible to the entirely reasonable interpretation that it establishes fixed terms of six years for

members of the Commission--terms that run with the calendar--regardless of delay in appointment or the filling of

mid-term vacancies. Having considered the two sentences

of s 1975(c) in conjunction, practices of the Executive

Branch in making appointments to this Commission and

other bodies, the prior legislation, and the policy ramifications of the suggested interpretations of s 1975(c), we hold

that the latter interpretation is correct. In enacting the

1994 Act, Congress did not disrupt the staggering of terms

of Commission members created in the 1983 Act. Therefore, mid-term vacancies are to be filled only for the remainder of the unexpired term. Wilson was properly appointed by President Clinton only for the remainder of the

unexpired term of Judge Higginbotham, as her commission

indicates, and her service as a Commissioner terminated

on November 29, 2001. Kirsanow, having been validly appointed to a vacant seat on the Commission, and having

taken the oath of office, is a member of the United States

Commission on Civil Rights "with all the powers, privileges, and emoluments thereunto of right appertaining"

and has been since December 6, 2001. We reverse the

district court and remand with instructions to enter summary judgment for the United States and Kirsanow. It is

So ordered.

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