Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-08-03024/USCOURTS-caDC-08-03024-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Shechem Lafayette
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 8, 2009 Decided November 3, 2009 

No. 08-3024 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

APPELLEE

v. 

SHECHEM LAFAYETTE, 

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:88-cr-00254-TFH-1) 

A. D. Martin, appointed by the court, argued the cause 

and filed the briefs for appellant. 

Peter S. Smith, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause 

for appellee. With him on the brief were Jeffrey A. Taylor, 

U.S. Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and Roy W. 

McLeese III, Assistant U.S. Attorney. 

Before: SENTELLE, Chief Judge, TATEL, Circuit Judge, 

and WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

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TATEL, Circuit Judge: Under section 3582(c)(2) of Title 

18 of the United States Code, district courts may reduce a 

defendant’s sentence if it was imposed based on a Sentencing 

Guidelines range that has since been lowered. Relying on this 

provision, appellant moved for a sentence reduction based on 

a recent Guidelines amendment and also sought to use his 

motion as a vehicle to gain the retroactive benefit of Apprendi 

v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and United States v. 

Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Because section 3582(c)(2) 

permits courts to consider only the consequences of 

Guidelines changes and does not reopen other elements of a 

sentence, we deny appellant’s Apprendi and Booker claims. 

And finding that the district court acted within its discretion in 

denying a sentence reduction based on the Guidelines 

amendment itself, we likewise reject the other aspects of his 

appeal. 

I. 

When we reviewed an earlier iteration of this case six 

years ago, we noted its “lengthy and tortured procedural 

history.” United States v. Lafayette, 337 F.3d 1043, 1046 

(D.C. Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Since 

then, the case has become only more byzantine, but 

fortunately the facts relevant to the present appeal can be 

summarized quite briefly. 

In 1988, a federal jury found appellant Shechem 

Lafayette guilty on all counts of a nine-count indictment for 

narcotics and firearms violations. Lafayette was “a leader of 

a group of five or more people” that “had actually taken over 

most of an apartment building” in the District of Columbia, 

where they had stored substantial quantities of drugs and 

guns. Hr’g Tr. at 28 (Mar. 27, 2008). The district court 

sentenced Lafayette to a prison term of 410 months followed 

by five years of supervised release, but later reduced that 

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sentence to 292 months after vacating two of his firearms 

convictions. This 292-month total comprised a 292-month 

term for Count Four of his original indictment (possession 

with intent to distribute of fifty grams or more of cocaine 

base) and concurrent terms of 240 months or less for each of 

the remaining counts. Having completed the 240-month 

sentences, Lafayette remains incarcerated only because of his 

sentence for Count Four, the focus of this case. 

Lafayette initiated this action in 2007 by filing a pro se 

motion for reduction of his Count Four sentence pursuant to 

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Although normally courts “may not 

modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed,” 18 

U.S.C. § 3582(c), section 3582(c)(2) allows them to do so in 

certain limited circumstances. Section 3582(c)(2) provides: 

[I]n the case of a defendant who has been sentenced 

to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing 

range that has subsequently been lowered by the 

Sentencing Commission . . . , upon motion of the 

defendant or the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or 

on its own motion, the court may reduce the term of 

imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth 

in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are 

applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with 

applicable policy statements issued by the 

Sentencing Commission. 

Lafayette recently became eligible for this exception 

thanks to Sentencing Guidelines Amendment 706, which 

lowered the base offense levels applicable to crack cocaine 

offenses. U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 706 (Nov. 1, 2007), made 

retroactive by U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 713 (Mar. 3, 2008). 

The government opposed Lafayette’s request for a reduced 

sentence, citing the serious nature of his crimes, his 

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disciplinary record while incarcerated, and his refusal to 

accept responsibility for his offenses. Following a hearing, 

the district court orally denied Lafayette’s motion for the 

reasons suggested by the government. 

On appeal, Lafayette presses two arguments. First, he 

contends that his section 3582(c)(2) motion reopened his 

Count Four sentence, entitling him to the benefit of Apprendi 

and Booker. Second, he argues that the district court abused 

its discretion in denying the requested sentence reduction. 

We appointed counsel to represent Lafayette. 

II. 

In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that “[o]ther than 

the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the 

penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum 

must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” 530 U.S. at 490. In Booker, the Court held that 

because Apprendi rendered the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 

unconstitutional as a system of mandatory rules, judges must 

henceforth treat them as advisory only. 543 U.S. at 243–46. 

Lafayette argues that his Count Four sentence violates 

both principles: when the district court originally imposed the 

sentence, it (1) believed the Guidelines were mandatory, 

which would now violate Booker, and (2) acted without a jury 

finding of drug quantity, which under Apprendi would now be 

required for any sentence longer than 240 months for 

possession with intent to distribute. See United States v. 

Fields, 251 F.3d 1041, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“Apprendi . . . 

applies to sentences predicated on drug quantity where 

progressively higher statutory maximums are triggered by 

findings of progressively higher quantities of drugs.”). 

Lafayette contends that by denying his section 3582(c)(2) 

motion, the district court effectively reimposed his sentence 

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and unearthed its latent defects. Although this is not the first 

time Lafayette has attempted to gain the retroactive benefit of 

Apprendi and Booker, see Lafayette, 337 F.3d at 1046–48; 

Lafayette v. United States, No. 88-254-1 (D.D.C. July 29, 

2004), it is the first time he has tried to do so pursuant to 

section 3582(c)(2). As it presents a pure question of law, we 

consider this new version of his arguments de novo. See

United States v. McCoy, 313 F.3d 561 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 

Section 3582(c)(2) provides a circumscribed opportunity 

for district courts to give sentencing relief when the 

Sentencing Guidelines are changed. A defendant’s right to 

file under this exception to the usual finality of sentencing 

decisions is triggered only by a Guidelines amendment. 

Given this, we think it would be quite incongruous, to say the 

least, if section 3582(c)(2) provided an avenue for sentencing 

adjustments wholly unrelated to such an amendment. Indeed, 

under Lafayette’s construction of the provision, every 

retroactive Guidelines amendment would carry a significant 

collateral windfall to all affected prisoners, reopening every 

aspect of their original sentences. 

That section 3582(c)(2) is not so broad is clear from the 

applicable Sentencing Commission policy statement, which 

imposes an independent limit on district courts’ discretion. 

See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (reductions must be “consistent 

with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing 

Commission”). The statement warns that “proceedings under 

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) . . . do not constitute a full 

resentencing of the defendant.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(3). The 

Guidelines direct courts to “determin[e] whether, and to what 

extent, a reduction in the defendant's term of imprisonment 

. . . is warranted” by “determin[ing] the amended guideline 

range that would have been applicable to the defendant if the 

amendment(s) to the guidelines listed in subsection (c) had 

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been in effect at the time the defendant was sentenced.” Id. § 

1B1.10(b)(1). Emphasizing the limited nature of the section 

3582(c)(2) remedy, the Guidelines further direct that “[i]n 

making such determination, the court shall substitute only the 

amendments listed in subsection (c) for the corresponding 

guideline provisions that were applied when the defendant 

was sentenced and shall leave all other guideline application 

decisions unaffected.” Id. These statements leave no doubt 

that section 3582(c)(2) cannot be made the basis for all—or 

indeed most—challenges to a sentence. 

Seeking to avoid this conclusion, Lafayette argues that 

the district court “reimpos[ed]” his prior sentence and thereby 

violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendment anew. Appellant’s 

Br. 16. But whatever verb one uses to describe the district 

court’s action, the court did not start from scratch. To the 

extent Lafayette’s sentence may have constitutional 

infirmities, they are features of earlier sentencing decisions, 

not the district court’s latest, narrow section 3582(c)(2) 

determination. 

Lafayette relies on United States v. Hicks, 472 F.3d 1167 

(9th Cir. 2007), but that decision addresses a different issue. 

Hicks holds that when a court reduces a sentence pursuant to 

section 3582(c)(2), it must treat the amended Guidelines 

range as advisory in determining the extent of the reduction. 

Id. at 1170. If Hicks is correct, it is because a section 

3582(c)(2) sentence reduction requires a new Guidelines 

calculation, and it is that calculation, not the calculation in the 

original sentence, that raises a Booker problem. Here, the 

district court denied Lafayette’s request for a reduction, so his 

sentence is not based on any new calculation at all. Instead, 

Lafayette seeks to challenge a Guidelines determination made 

years ago. Section 3582(c)(2) cannot bear such a claim. 

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Moreover, as a result of Hicks, district courts in the Ninth 

Circuit now have more, not less, discretion in section 

3582(c)(2) proceedings than the Sentencing Commission’s 

policy statement would otherwise allow. Here, the district 

court already had discretion within the revised Guidelines 

range to do anything from leaving Lafayette’s sentence 

untouched, as it did, to ordering him released immediately. 

We thus see no way that Hicks could have made any 

difference. 

Given this, and as the Third and Seventh circuits have 

both held in cases brought under section 3582(c)(2), the 

proper vehicle for Lafayette’s Booker and Apprendi

arguments is a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See United 

States v. McBride, 283 F.3d 612, 614–16 & n.1 (3rd Cir. 

2002); United States v. Smith, 241 F.3d 546, 548 (7th Cir. 

2001). Even if, following the Seventh Circuit’s lead, we were 

to treat Lafayette’s constitutional claims as having been filed 

under section 2255, we would again deny them. See 

Lafayette, 337 F.3d 1043 (denying previous section 2255 

petition). Because Lafayette has sought relief under section 

2255 several times, any further petition would require him to 

show either new, clear, and convincing evidence of 

innocence—not at issue here—or “a new rule of constitutional 

law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the 

Supreme Court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). Moreover, “the 

Supreme Court is the only entity that can ‘make’ a new rule 

retroactive” within the meaning of this provision, and only an 

express holding or a combination of cases that “necessarily 

dictate retroactivity of [a] new rule” will suffice. Tyler v. 

Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 663, 666 (2001) (internal alterations to 

first quotation omitted). The Supreme Court “has not ‘made’ 

either [Booker or Apprendi] retroactive within the meaning of 

§ 2255,” In re Zambrano, 433 F.3d 886, 888 (D.C. Cir. 2006), 

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a fact that would be fatal to Lafayette’s attempt to gain the 

benefit of these cases. 

III. 

We turn next to Lafayette’s arguments that fall within the 

four corners of section 3582(c)(2). Because section 

3582(c)(2) unambiguously grants discretionary authority to 

the district court—it says district courts “may” grant a 

reduction—we follow the familiar standard for review of 

sentencing decisions: we “first ensure that the district court 

committed no significant procedural error . . . . [and] then 

consider the substantive reasonableness of the [court’s 

decision] under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. 

United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). 

Lafayette offers a host of reasons why he thinks the 

district court’s decision flunks even this deferential review: 

the court considered factors it should not have, it failed to 

consider other required factors, and it weighed the factors it 

did consider in an unreasonable fashion. These arguments are 

all without merit. 

In deciding whether to grant a reduction, the district 

court’s discretion must be guided by “the factors set forth in 

section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable.” 18 

U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). These factors include “the nature and 

circumstances of the offense and the history and 

characteristics of the defendant” as well as “the need for the 

sentence imposed . . . to protect the public from further crimes 

of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(c). Here, 

carefully evaluating these factors, the district court observed 

that Lafayette “has never . . . accept[ed] responsibility in any 

way for the multiple offenses for which he was convicted,” 

Hr’g Tr. at 26, considered the severity of Lafayette’s original 

crimes, id. at 27–30, and noted several incidents in prison 

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involving “violence as well as an attempted importing of 

narcotics.” Id. at 31. The district court viewed Lafayette’s 

educational and legal work while in prison as evidence of 

rehabilitation, id. at 30–31, yet concluded that such 

considerations could not “overcome the potential danger to 

the community if he’s released at this time.” Id. at 31. All 

the factors considered by the court were appropriate under 

section 3553(a), and although the court did not touch on every 

item mentioned by this section, a district judge acting 

pursuant to section 3582(c)(2), just as in a more typical 

sentencing proceeding, has no obligation to “consider every § 

3553(a) factor in every case.” In re Sealed Case, 527 F.3d 

188, 191 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Given this, the district court’s 

decision was more than adequate to demonstrate that it 

“considered the parties’ arguments and ha[d] a reasoned basis 

for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking authority.” Rita 

v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). Likewise, the 

conclusion that the district court reached based on this 

analysis represented a reasonable exercise of its discretion. 

Finally, Lafayette asks that even if we deny his request 

for a reduced prison term, we remand for the district court to 

shorten his upcoming five-year term of supervised release. 

Even assuming that section 3582(c)(2), which on its face only 

allows courts to reduce a “term of imprisonment,” can be 

stretched to cover other aspects of a sentence, the district 

court correctly denied any reduction because Lafayette’s fiveyear term of supervised release is mandated by 21 U.S.C. § 

841(b)(1)(A). That section provides that “any sentence under 

this subparagraph shall, in the absence of . . . a prior 

conviction, impose a term of supervised release of at least 5 

years.” Because Lafayette’s Count Four sentence was a 

“sentence under this subparagraph,” the district court had no 

authority to grant the requested reduction. See United States 

v. Paulk, 569 F.3d 1094, 1095–96 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding 

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that district courts may not reduce sentences based on a 

mandatory statutory minimum under section 3582(c)(2) and 

collecting cases from other circuits reaching the same result). 

For the reasons stated above, we affirm. 

So ordered. 

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