Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-06042/USCOURTS-ca10-95-06042-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Reginald Andre Robinson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FILED ·~ Ualtecl States Coart of Appe&~ 

Tenth Circuit PUBLISH 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 14 1995 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. No. 95-6042 

REGINALD ANDRE ROBINSON, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. CR-88-189-C) 

Patrick M. Ryan, United States Attorney, and Jim Robinson, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and 

Deborah Watson, Attorney, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., 

for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

June E. Tyhurst, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before BALDOCK, HOLLOWAY, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 95-6042 Document: 01019279485 Date Filed: 08/14/1995 Page: 1 
This direct appeal challenges an order of the district judge 

revoking supervised release and imposing a sentence of 12 months' 

imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 3583. The defendant-appellant 

argues that because he had served the maximum five-year prison 

term provided in the statute under which he was convicted, 18 

U.S.C. § 924(c), the judge had no authority to impose the 

additional sentence for imprisonment under the supervised release 

statute. A timely appeal was taken from the order of the district 

court.l 

I 

The order in question was entered as the ruling on a motion 

to dismiss a petition on supervised release. The petition was 

filed on August 20, 1993, by the United States Probation Office, 

which alleged that defendant had violated the conditions of his 

supervised release. In September 1988 defendant had entered a 

guilty plea to one count of an indictment which charged him with 

violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), carrying a firearm during a drug 

trafficking offense. In the district court the government 

dismissed the other four counts of the indictment, and defendant 

was sentenced to five years' imprisonment as the statute provided 

and three years' supervised release to commence on defendant's 

release from imprisonment. 

1 

The defendant-appellant has requested oral argument; the 

government's brief states that argument is not necessary. After 

examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has 

determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

2 

Appellate Case: 95-6042 Document: 01019279485 Date Filed: 08/14/1995 Page: 2 
After defendant's release from federal custody in 1993 when 

he completed serving sentence on the underlying firearms 

offense, defendant 

He had been sentenced 

his 

returned to the Western District of Oklahoma. 

there and had commenced the period of 

supervised release in that district. A petition on supervised 

release was filed in August 1993 by the United States Probation 

Office. The petition alleged violation of defendant's conditions 

of supervised release. It stated, inter alia, that defendant had 

left the Western District of Oklahoma without permission; that he 

was arrested in August 1993 by Los Angeles, California, police 

officers in Compton, California, and charged with being a felon in 

possession of a firearm; and that he was convicted and sentenced 

to imprisonment in California. After serving part of that 

California sentence, defendant was placed on state parole status. 

Defendant was taken into custody in October 1994 by federal 

officers on the petition on supervised release and a federal 

warrant. On November 9, 1994, defendant moved in the court below 

to dismiss the petition on supervised release. He argued, as he 

does on appeal, that because he had served the maximum sentence 

(five years) provided by 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), the judge had no 

authority to impose an additional term of imprisonment under 18 

U.S.C. § 3583. The district judge disagreed, holding that 

pursuant to § 3583 a court is authorized to revoke supervised 

release; that such a result follows from the statute's language; 

and that United States v. Purvis, 940 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1991); 

United States v. Wright, 2 F.3d 175, 180 (6th Cir. 1993); United 

States v. Jamison, 934 F.2d 371, 373-75 (D.C. Cir. 1991); and 

3 

Appellate Case: 95-6042 Document: 01019279485 Date Filed: 08/14/1995 Page: 3 
United States v. Hoffman, 733 F. Supp. 314, 315-16 (D. Alaska 

1990), support her ruling. 

On this reasoning the motion to dismiss the petition for 

supervised release was denied. At a hearing on January 24, 1995, 

below, defendant appeared personally and with his counsel, the 

Assistant Federal Public Defender. He stipulated to the facts 

alleged in the petition on supervised release. After being 

satisfied that the stipulation was knowingly and voluntarily 

entered, the judge found that defendant had violated the terms of 

his supervised release as alleged. After hearing from all counsel 

and defendant personally, the judge imposed a term of 12 months' 

incarceration for the violations of supervised release, providing 

that defendant should be credited with time already served in 

federal custody awaiting decision 

proceeding since October 11, 1994. 

appeals. 

II 

on the supervised release 

From this order, defendant 

The arguments before us concern a single legal ruling of 

statutory interpretation below, which we review de novo. United 

States v. Rockwell, 984 F.2d 1112, 1114 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 

113 S. Ct. 2945 (1993). 

The defendant argues that additional imprisonment in these 

circumstances is not supported by the text or the legislative 

history of the supervised release statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3583. He 

says that the order here conflicts with the statute of conviction 

-- 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) -- which limits incarceration to five years; 

that there is no clear and unambiguous expression of an intent to 

4 

Appellate Case: 95-6042 Document: 01019279485 Date Filed: 08/14/1995 Page: 4 
supersede the maximum imprisonment provided by that statute of 

conviction. Defendant points out that § 3583 does not require a 

court to impose supervised release in every case; that only if 

the statute of conviction requires supervised release is the 

sentencing court required to impose it, citing United States v. 

Allen, 24 F.3d 1180, 1189 (lOth Cir. 1994). 

Defendant reasons that § 3583(a) expressly defers to the 

statute of conviction when the latter contains more specific 

requirements than the supervised release statute. Defendant 

maintains that § 924(c) takes precedence over the more general 

text of the supervised release statute which provides for 

discretion to revoke, modify or extend the term of supervised 

release for violations. Appellant's Brief at 5-6. 

The key provisions in the supervised release statute do not 

support the defendant's position.2 We feel that the provisions of 

2 

The critical statutory provisions appear in 18 U.S.C. § 3583: 

(a) In general. The court, in imposing a 

sentence to a term of imprisonment for a felony or a 

misdemeanor, may include as a part of the sentence a 

requirement that the defendant be placed on a term of 

supervised release after imprisonment, except that the 

court shall include as a part of the sentence a 

requirement that the defendant be placed on a term of 

supervised release if such a term is required by statute 

(e) Modification of conditions or revocation. 

The court may, after considering the factors set forth 

in section 3553 (a) (1), (a) (2) (B), (a) (2) (C), (a) (2) (D), 

(a) ( 4 ) , (a) ( 5 ) , and (a) ( 6 ) - -

(3) revoke a term of supervised release, and 

5 

Appellate Case: 95-6042 Document: 01019279485 Date Filed: 08/14/1995 Page: 5 
' 

§ 3583(a) are clear and unambiguous in extending to the sentencing 

judge discretionary authority "as a part of the sentence" to 

impose the supervised release period requirement. Moreover, the 

same statute in§ 3583(e) (3) unambiguously gives discretion to 

revoke a term of supervised release and "require the defendant to 

serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release 

" We are persuaded by Judge Reinhardt's cogent reasoning 

interpreting the statute in United States v. Purvis, 940 F.2d 

(Footnote continued) : 

require the defendant to serve in prison all or part of 

the term of supervised release authorized by statute for 

the offense that resulted in such term of supervised 

release without credit for time previously served on 

post release supervision, if the court, pursuant to the 

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure applicable to 

revocation of probation or supervised release, finds by 

a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant 

violated a condition of supervised release, except that 

a defendant whose term is revoked under this paragraph 

may not be required to serve more than 5 years in prison 

if the offense that resulted in the term of supervised 

release is a class A felony, more than 3 years in prison 

if such offense is a class B felony, more than 2 years 

in prison if such offense is a class C or D felony, or 

more than one year in any other case; .... 

18 U.S.C. § 3583 (emphasis added). 

The district court apparently referred to the version of the 

statute in effect before the 1994 amendments became effective. We 

see no substantive difference in the language of the above quoted 

portions of the statute that would impact on the issue submitted, 

so we refer to the current language. One difference of potential 

importance has not been discussed by the parties. The 1994 

amendments to subsection (g) make it mandatory for supervised 

release to be revoked and the defendant incarcerated if he 

possesses a firearm in violation of the conditions of supervised 

release, as Robinson admittedly did. Because the district court 

plainly did not rely on that provision, relying on the 

discretionary power to revoke in subsection (e) (3) instead, we 

need not consider whether revocation of the term of supervised 

release imposed as a part of Robinson's original 1988 sentence 

under this amendment to the statute would pose ex post facto 

problems. 

6 

Appellate Case: 95-6042 Document: 01019279485 Date Filed: 08/14/1995 Page: 6 
1276, 1278 (9th Cir. 1991). The district judge here in her 

persuasive order noted that defendant makes the same argument that 

Purvis rejected, namely that "the total imprisonment that may be 

imposed pursuant to a combination of the initial sentence of 

imprisonment and a revocation of supervised release may not exceed 

the statutory maximum II 940 F .2d at 1278. The 

Circuit concluded: 

We hold that § 3583 authorizes the revocation of 

supervised release even where the resulting 

incarceration, when combined with the period of time the 

defendant has already served for his substantive 

offense, will exceed the maximum incarceration 

permissible under the substantive statute. 

Id. at 1279 (footnote omitted). 

Ninth 

We agree with this interpretation of § 3583, as did the 

district judge here. We find no deference, which the defendant 

here does, to the statute of conviction by the supervised release 

statute in this connection. Instead we feel the supervised 

release statute unambiguously authorized the imposition of the 

twelve months of incarceration as ordered here. The contrary 

interpretation suggested by defendant would impair the deterrent 

mechanism which we feel was obviously intended by Congress. 

Other courts of appeals have reached the same result. In 

United States v. Wright, 2 F.3d 175, 179-80 (6th Cir. 1993), the 

Sixth Circuit also rejected a similar contention made there in 

opposition to the imposition of a sentence of federal 

incarceration for violation of the conditions of supervised 

release. The specific question raised there was stated by the 

Sixth Circuit to have been 

7 

Appellate Case: 95-6042 Document: 01019279485 Date Filed: 08/14/1995 Page: 7 
whether the district court abused its discretion by 

sentencing defendant to a period of 36 months 

incarceration for the supervised release violation, when 

defendant had already served 36 months incarceration on 

his original sentence and the total of the two sentences 

imposed ~llegedly exceeds the maximum penalty for the 

underlying offense, five years. 

Id. at 176. 

The court rejected the defendant's contention. It first 

pointed out that because the defendant there had pled guilty to 

three counts, "under the applicable statutes, defendant could have 

received a maximum of eleven years, not five years as he contends 

II Id. at 179. Then the court stated this alternative 

ground for affirming: 

Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the 36-month 

sentence for the violation of supervised release when 

combined with the 30-month incarceration on the 

underlying offense did violate the statutory maximum, 

the sentence imposed by the district court for the 

violation of supervised release would still be proper. 

First, a different statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3583, authorizes 

imposition of a term of supervised release in addition 

to the maximum term of imprisonment provided for in 

prohibiting the underlying offense. See United States 

v. Montenegro-Rojo, 908 F.2d 425, 432-33 (9th Cir. 

1990). 

Accordingly, it is possible for a defendant to be 

sentenced and serve the statutory maximum term of 

imprisonment for the offense and after his release from 

prison to be subject to further imprisonment if he 

violates the terms of his supervised release. 

Therefore, the sentence imposed by the district court 

for the violation of supervised release is not an abuse 

of discretion, even if when combined with defendant's 

original sentence it exceeded the statutory maximum for 

the underlying offense. 

2 F.3d at 179-80. Accord United States v. Celestine, 905 F.2d 59, 

60 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Hoffman, 733 F. Supp. 314, 

315-16 (D. Alaska 1990). 

8 

Appellate Case: 95-6042 Document: 01019279485 Date Filed: 08/14/1995 Page: 8 
·, 

Similarly, in several appeals from original sentences courts 

have upheld the imposition of a term of supervised release in 

addition to a term of imprisonment over the objection that the 

potential for a period of imprisonment in excess of the statutory 

maximum was legally invalid, thus explicitly or implicitly 

endorsing the conclusion we reach here. ~' United States v. 

Jenkins, 42 F.3d 1370 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. Watkins, 

14 F.3d 414, 415 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Jamison, 934 

F.2d 371, 372-75 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United States v. 

Montenegro-Rojo, 908 F.2d 425, 431-34 (9th Cir. 1990); United 

States v. Butler, 895 F.2d 1016, 1017-18 (5th Cir. 1989) 

cert. denied, 498 U.S. 826 (1990). Further, based on the same 

reasoning that supervised release is a separate part of the 

original sentence, several courts have held that on revocation of 

supervised release, the length of time for which a defendant may 

be incarcerated pursuant to § 3583 is not limited by the maximum 

guideline range applicable to his original sentence. United 

States v. Mandarelli, 982 F.2d 11 (1st Cir. 1992) (per Breyer, 

then C.J.); United States v. Smeathers, 930 F.2d 18, 19 (8th Cir. 

1991); United States v. Stephenson, 928 F.2d 728, 730-31 

(6th Cir. 1991) ("The possibility of reincarceration for violation 

of a condition of supervised release is a cornerstone of the 

sentencing structure."); United States v. Dillard, 910 F.2d 461, 

466-67 (7th Cir. 1990). 

Additionally, in United States v. Soto-Olivas, 44 F.3d 788, 

790 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2289 (1995), employing 

the same rationale that supervised release is a separate part of 

9 

Appellate Case: 95-6042 Document: 01019279485 Date Filed: 08/14/1995 Page: 9 
the original punishment, the court held that double jeopardy did 

not bar a subsequent prosecution for the same conduct which had 

formed the basis for the revocation of supervised release and 

imprisonment under § 3583. The court there specifically noted 

that the nature of Congress' plan for supervised release means 

that one who, like Robinson, violates the terms of release may be 

required to serve a total period of imprisonment greater than the 

maximum provided under the statute of conviction. Id. 

We are convinced that the interpretation of the statutes by 

the district judge is clearly correct and accordingly her order is 

AFFIRMED. 

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