Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00646/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00646-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Airport Land Company
Plaintiff
Tyco Electronics Corporation
Defendant

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Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 1

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal.

Local Rule 78-230(h). 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AIRPORT LAND COMPANY, a

California Limited

Partnership,

2:07-cv-00646-MCE-KJM

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

TYCO ELECTRONICS CORPORATION,

and DOES 1-20,

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

Through the present action, Plaintiff Airport Land Company

(“Plaintiff”) alleges that Defendant Tyco Electronics Corporation

(“Defendant”)and Does 1-20 are liable for environmental

contamination of Plaintiff’s real property. Specifically, 1

Plaintiff sues under theories of declaratory relief, breach of

contract, strict liability, public nuisance, private nuisance,

trespass, waste, negligence, and negligence per se.

Case 2:07-cv-00646-MCE -KJM Document 9 Filed 06/01/07 Page 1 of 7
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2

Presently before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted. For the reasons set forth below,

Defendant’s Motion is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is the owner of certain real property located in

San Joaquin County, California (“Property”). The Property was

leased to Citation Circuits pursuant to a ten-year lease on

October 1, 1993 (“Lease”). By October 1995, the Property was

occupied by Sigma Circuits. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant

purchased Sigma Circuits and that both Sigma Circuits and

Citation Circuits are predecessor companies of Defendant. 

Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant assumed all liabilities

of those companies, including the terms of the Lease. Plaintiff

attached a copy of the Lease to its Complaint.

According to Plaintiff’s Complaint, the Property at issue is

presently contaminated with hazardous waste and other hazardous

substances. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant and its

predecessors contaminated the Property by using hazardous

substances while operating their businesses. Plaintiff argues

that Defendant is required to clean-up the site and is liable for

damages arising from use of the Property.

Plaintiff filed its Complaint in the Superior Court for San

Joaquin County on March 12, 2007. Defendant removed the suit to

this Court on April 3, 2007. On April 9, 2007, Defendant moved

to dismiss this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

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3

STANDARD

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under

Rule 12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact must be accepted

as true and construed in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336,

337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)

requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief,” in order to “give the

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds

upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.

Ct. 99, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957). While a complaint attacked by a

Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual

allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the “grounds” of

his “entitlement to relief” requires more than labels and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action will not do. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 2007

U.S. LEXIS 5901, 20-22 (U.S. 2007) (internal citations and

quotations omitted). Factual allegations must be enough to raise

a right to relief above the speculative level. Id. at 21 (citing

5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216,

pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004) (“The pleading must contain something

more . . . than . . . a statement of facts that merely creates a

suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action”).

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4

If the court grants a motion to dismiss a complaint, it must

then decide whether to grant leave to amend. The court should

“freely give[]” leave to amend when there is no “undue delay, bad

faith[,] dilatory motive on the part of the movant, ... undue

prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of ... the amendment,

[or] futility of the amendment....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Foman

v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Generally, leave to amend is

only denied when it is clear that the deficiencies of the

complaint cannot be cured by amendment. DeSoto v. Yellow Freight

Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992).

ANALYSIS

1. Evidence of Assumption of Liability

Defendant argues that it is not a proper party to this

action because it is not a party to the Lease and Plaintiff has

not provided evidence that Defendant assumed the Lease

obligations. However, when reviewing a complaint, the court

reviews the factual allegations made in plaintiff’s complaint and

assumes them to be true. Yamaguchi, 109 F.3d at 1481. Adequacy

of evidence is not evaluated on a motion to dismiss. Id. Here,

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant purchased Sigma Circuits and

that as part of the purchase, Defendant assumed all liabilities

of Sigma and Citation. Indeed, a purchasing company may, in

certain instances, legally undertake the selling company’s

liabilities. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Brown &

Bryant, Inc., 159 F.3d 358, 361-362 (9th Cir. 1997). 

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5

Accordingly, at this early stage in the litigation, and presuming

all Plaintiff’s factual assertions as true, the Complaint is

sufficient to state a claim for relief.

Defendant, relying on an out of circuit case, also argues

that Plaintiff has pled itself out of court because the Lease

contradicts the allegations made in the Complaint. “Generally, a

district court may not consider any material beyond the pleadings

in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v.

Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir.1990);

see also Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d

912, 925 (9th Cir. 2001). However, the court may “consider

material which has been properly submitted as part of the

complaint” when deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Hal Roach

Studios, 896 F.2d at 1555 n.19. Here, Plaintiff does not allege

that Defendant was a party to the Lease. Rather, Plaintiff

alleges that Defendant was assigned the terms of the Lease when

it purchased Sigma Circuits. Therefore, the Lease itself does

not contradict Plaintiff’s allegations. Moreover, breach of

contract under the Lease is but one of Plaintiff’s claims.

Plaintiff brings several other claims, including a claim for

negligence per se under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). Under CERCLA, a

successor company can be liable for the acts of its predecessors.

Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 159 F.3d at 361. 

Accordingly, failure to expressly name Defendant in the Lease

does not alone preclude liability if, as Plaintiff alleges,

Defendant is the successor company of Sigma and Citation.

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6

2. Tyco Printed Circuit Group

In Defendant’s Reply brief, Defendant argues that the proper

party to this case is Tyco Printed Circuit Group LP. The basis

for this assertion is Plaintiff’s reliance on a Corrective Action

Consent Agreement of the California Environmental Protection

Agency (“Agreement”). The Agreement refers to the Property and

names the Respondent as Tyco Electronics Corporation Printed

Circuit Group Stockton Division. Defendant argues that Tyco

Electronics Corporation and Tyco Printed Circuit Group LP are two

separate entities and therefore Tyco Printed Circuit Group LP

should be substituted as the correct Defendant in this case. In

fact, Defendant made an offer to the Plaintiff to substitute Tyco

Printed Circuit Group LP as the defendant in exchange for

dismissing Tyco Electronics Corporation. However, the fact that

the California Environmental Protection Agency combined the names

of the two entities on the Agreement does not preclude Tyco

Electronics Corporation from being a Defendant in this case. 

Furthermore, the signatory on the Agreement is listed as Senior

Counsel of Tyco Electronics Corporation. While making no

assertion that the Agreement gives rise to any liability, neither

does the Agreement alone provide sufficient reason to grant

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss is DENIED.

Dated: June 1, 2007

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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