Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-07-01760/USCOURTS-ca8-07-01760-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ricardo L. Rye
Appellant
Social Security Administration
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable John F. Forster, Jr., United States Magistrate Judge for the

Eastern District of Arkansas, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by

consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 07-1760

___________

Ricardo L. Rye, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Arkansas.

Social Security Administration, *

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: July 25, 2008

Filed: August 7, 2008

___________

Before MELLOY, COLLOTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Ricardo L. Rye appeals the district court’s1

 decision affirming the denial of

disability insurance benefits (DIB). Rye alleged disability since March 2002 from

arthritis and pain-related depression. After a hearing, an administrative law judge

(ALJ) determined that (1) Rye’s back problems and Hepatitis C (HCV) were severe

impairments, but not of listing-level severity alone or combined; (2) his subjective

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complaints were not fully credible; (3) he had the residual functional capacity (RFC)

to perform light work; and (4) based on the testimony of a vocational expert (VE), he

could perform two of his past jobs and also other specified jobs. The Appeals Council

denied review, and the district court affirmed. Having carefully reviewed the record

and considered Rye’s arguments, we find no basis for reversal. See Hamilton v.

Astrue, 518 F.3d 607, 610 (8th Cir. 2008) (standard of review). 

We find no inaccuracies in the ALJ’s summary of the evidence related to Rye’s

degenerative joint disease and HCV. Even if Rye had some pain from degenerative

joint disease and this condition would likely worsen over time, that does not

necessarily mean his pain was disabling before his insured status expired in March

2006, see Gowell v. Apfel, 242 F.3d 793, 796 (8th Cir. 2001) (real issue is severity

of claimant’s pain); Pyland v. Apfel, 149 F.3d 873, 876 (8th Cir. 1998) (to qualify for

DIB, claimant must establish existence of disability before expiration of his insured

status); and there was no medical-record support for a diagnosis of HCV or any

related treatment or reported symptoms, see Kirby v. Astrue, 500 F.3d 705, 707-08

(8th Cir. 2007) (discussing severity of impairment, which claimant has burden of

establishing). We further conclude that the ALJ properly discounted Dr. Campos’s

physical-RFC findings, and that the ALJ’s physical-RFC findings are supported by

substantial evidence. We question whether Dr. Campos qualifies as a treating

physician, and the doctor himself testified that his RFC findings were unreliable and

based entirely on Rye’s reports, and that an orthopedist’s opinion would be entitled

to more weight. See Kirby, 500 F.3d at 709 (consulting physician’s opinion was not

entitled to deference, and it was based on subjective complaints and conflicted with

another consultant’s opinion); Page v. Astrue, 484 F.3d 1040, 1043 (8th Cir. 2007)

(noting that it is ALJ’s responsibility to determine RFC based on medical records,

observations of treating physicians and others, and claimant’s own description of his

limitations). 

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There is also substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s rejection of Rye’s

contention that he has disabling organic brain syndrome and depression. Among other

things, Rye did not allege organic brain syndrome as a basis for disability until the

hearing, and then he did so only indirectly, cf. Dunahoo v. Apfel, 241 F.3d 1033, 1039

(8th Cir. 2001) (fact that claimant did not allege depression on benefits application is

significant even if evidence of depression was later developed); he never sought

treatment for organic brain syndrome or depression; and neither of the consulting

psychologists diagnosed depression. Thus, the ALJ was not required to adopt the

related mental-RFC findings of the two psychologists. Finally, we decline to address

Rye’s remaining arguments. See Ahlberg v. Chrysler Corp., 481 F.3d 630, 634 (8th

Cir. 2007) (“points not meaningfully argued in an opening brief are waived”).

Accordingly, we affirm.

______________________________

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