Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-05-05363/USCOURTS-caDC-05-05363-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Federal Trade Commission
Appellee
Kevin Trudeau
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 10, 2006 Decided July 28, 2006

No. 05-5363

KEVIN TRUDEAU,

APPELLANT

v.

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 05cv00400)

David J. Bradford argued the cause for appellant. With him

on the briefs were Daniel J. Hurtado and Daniel Mach.

Lewis Yelin, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, argued

the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Peter D.

Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth L. Wainstein, U.S.

Attorney, and Douglas N. Letter, Litigation Counsel.

Before: HENDERSON and GARLAND, Circuit Judges, and

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

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GARLAND, Circuit Judge: Plaintiff Kevin Trudeau

challenges a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) press release that

reported the settlement of a case the agency brought against him

for false and misleading advertising. Trudeau alleges that the

press release is itself false and misleading, and that, in issuing

it, the FTC exceeded its statutory authority and violated his First

Amendment rights. The district court held that it lacked

jurisdiction to review Trudeau’s claims and, in the alternative,

that Trudeau failed to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted. 

This case raises a host of complicated questions regarding

the jurisdiction and authority of federal courts. In the end,

however, it comes down to whether Trudeau has the right to take

a red pencil to the language of the FTC’s press release. He does

not. Consequently, although we disagree with the district

court’s jurisdictional holding, we affirm its dismissal for failure

to state a claim. 

I

Plaintiff Trudeau is a best-selling author and producer of

radio and television information-commercials (“infomercials”).

He has used his books and infomercials to promote a wide

variety of products as cures for medical conditions ranging from

cancer and multiple sclerosis to hair loss and obesity. He has

also been an outspoken critic of the FTC.

In 2001 and 2002, Trudeau began marketing two new

products in nationally-televised infomercials. He billed the first,

a calcium supplement called “Coral Calcium Supreme,” as an

effective treatment for cancer, multiple sclerosis, lupus, heart

disease, and high blood pressure. He marketed the second, a

product called “Biotape” that consists of adhesive strips

resembling electrical tape, as a “space age mylar” that “connects

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the broken circuits” in the body. Trudeau v. FTC, 384 F. Supp.

2d 281, 284 (D.D.C. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Trudeau claimed that Biotape could provide permanent relief

from debilitating back pain, as well as pain due to arthritis,

sciatica, and migraine headaches. 

In June 2003, the FTC filed a complaint against Trudeau in

the United States District Court for the Northern District of

Illinois, alleging that Trudeau’s marketing of Coral Calcium

Supreme and Biotape was false and misleading, in violation of

the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 41 et seq. The

Commission also filed a motion for an order to show cause why

Trudeau should not be held in contempt for violating a 1998

court order that, among other things, prohibited him from

making unsubstantiated claims about consumer products. On

July 1, 2003, the parties agreed to, and the court entered, a

stipulated preliminary injunction barring Trudeau from making

the challenged representations about Coral Calcium Supreme

and Biotape. Eleven months later, after Trudeau had once again

started advertising Coral Calcium Supreme, the FTC asked the

court to hold Trudeau in contempt for violating the preliminary

injunction. On June 29, 2004, the court granted the

Commission’s motion, held Trudeau in contempt, and ordered

him to halt all advertising of Coral Calcium Supreme. See

Trudeau, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 284. 

On September 2, 2004, the parties agreed to, and the court

entered, a Stipulated Final Order for Permanent Injunction and

Final Judgment (“2004 Final Order”) that resolved all pending

FTC complaints against Trudeau. The 2004 Final Order

“permanently enjoin[s] and restrain[s]” Trudeau from

“producing, disseminating, [or] making . . . any representation

in an infomercial aired or played on any television or radio

media.” 2004 Final Order at 8. The order contains an exception

permitting Trudeau to make representations in “the television or

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radio media” in connection with “any book, newsletter or other

informational publication,” provided that the publication does

not refer to a product or service that Trudeau is promoting, is not

an advertisement for any product or service, and is not sold,

promoted, or marketed in conjunction with any product or

service that is related to the content of the publication. Id. at 9.

This exception is limited to infomercials that do not

“misrepresent the content of the book, newsletter or

informational publication.” Id. The order further bars Trudeau

from marketing “any product containing coral calcium” and

from making representations regarding the benefits of any

product unless the representations are true and not misleading.

Id. at 9-11.

The 2004 Final Order also enters “[j]udgment” against

Trudeau for “equitable monetary relief in the amount of two

million dollars,” id. at 16, but states that “[n]o portion of any

payments under the judgment herein shall be deemed a payment

of any fine, penalty or punitive assessment,” id. at 17-18. In

addition, the order states that Trudeau “expressly den[ies] any

wrongdoing or liability for any . . . matters,” and that “[t]here

have been no findings or admissions of wrongdoing or liability

. . . other than the finding against Kevin Trudeau for contempt”

for violating the July 2003 stipulated preliminary injunction. Id.

¶ 8.

On September 7, 2004, five days after entry of the 2004

Final Order, the FTC posted on its website a press release

entitled “Kevin Trudeau Banned from Infomercials,” and

subtitled “Trudeau Settles Claims in Connection with Coral

Calcium Supreme and Biotape.” App. 51. The press release is

the central focus of Trudeau’s suit against the Commission. 

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The first two paragraphs of the release describe the general

contours of the settlement incorporated in the 2004 Final Order.

The first sentence states: 

A Federal Trade Commission settlement with Kevin

Trudeau -- a prolific marketer who has either appeared

in or produced hundreds of infomercials -- broadly

bans him from appearing in, producing, or

disseminating future infomercials that advertise any

type of product, service, or program to the public,

except for truthful infomercials for informational

publications.

Id. After further describing the terms of the settlement, the first

paragraph ends with this statement: “Trudeau agreed to these

prohibitions and to pay the FTC $2 million to settle charges that

he falsely claimed that a coral calcium product can cure cancer

and other serious diseases and that a purported analgesic called

Biotape can permanently cure or relieve severe pain.” Id. 

The second paragraph details the settlement’s financial

terms. It states that “Trudeau is paying $500,000 in cash and

transferring residential property located in Ojai, California, and

a luxury vehicle to the Commission to satisfy the $2 million

monetary judgment against him.” Id.

The pertinent remaining portions of the press release are the

third and sixth paragraphs, and a disclaimer at the end of the

text. The third paragraph contains a quotation from Lydia

Parnes, Acting Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer

Protection, which states:

“This ban is meant to shut down an infomercial empire

that has misled American consumers for years. . . .

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1

FTC, Kevin Trudeau Banned from Infomercials: Trudeau

Settles Claims in Connection with Coral Calcium Supreme and

Biotape (Sept. 7, 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/09/

trudeaucoral.htm.

Other habitual false advertisers should take a lesson;

mend your ways or face serious consequences.”

Id. The sixth paragraph contains additional details about the

terms of the 2004 Final Order. It states that the 

settlement announced today permanently bans Trudeau

. . . from appearing in, producing, or disseminating

infomercials that advertise any product, service, or

program and, regardless of the advertising medium

used to make the claim, from making representations

that any product, program, or service can cure, treat, or

prevent any disease or provide health benefits.

Id. The paragraph also explains that “[t]he order’s ban on future

infomercials exempts infomercials for books, newsletters, and

other informational publications.” Id. Finally, the release

concludes with the following disclaimer:

Note: This stipulated final order is for settlement

purposes only and does not constitute an admission by

the defendants of a law violation. A stipulated final

order has the force of law when signed by the judge.

Id. at 52 (bolded in original). 

The press release remains on the FTC’s website to this day.1

At the top-right corner, it prominently features a link to “Related

Documents,” one of which is a copy of the 2004 Final Order.

Five months after the press release was posted, Trudeau asked

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2

Trudeau also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, which

the district court denied. In light of its decision to grant the FTC’s

motion to dismiss, the court concluded, inter alia, that Trudeau had no

likelihood of success on the merits. Because we affirm the district

court’s grant of the FTC’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion, we affirm the denial

of the preliminary injunction as well. See Michigan State v. Miller,

103 F.3d 1240, 1249 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that a court may not

issue a preliminary injunction where the plaintiff has no likelihood of

the FTC to edit and/or remove the webpage. The FTC refused,

and this suit followed. 

On February 28, 2005, Trudeau filed a complaint against

the FTC in the United States District Court for the District of

Columbia, seeking only declaratory and injunctive relief. The

complaint charged that the FTC had “retaliat[ed] against

Trudeau” for his criticism of the agency by “issuing a press

release that falsely characterize[d],” Compl. ¶ 48, and

“intentionally and deliberately misrepresented,” id. ¶ 49, the

2004 Final Order. That conduct, Trudeau asserted, “exceeded

the FTC’s authority under 15 U.S.C. § 46(f) [and] violated the

First Amendment.” Compl. ¶ 50. The FTC responded with a

motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), and

for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted under

Rule 12(b)(6).

The district court granted the FTC’s motion to dismiss.

First, the court concluded that it lacked subject-matter

jurisdiction because the press release was not “a ‘final agency

action’” under “section 704 of the [Administrative Procedure

Act],” 5 U.S.C. § 704. Trudeau, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 289. 

Second, the court held, “in the alternative, that [Trudeau’s]

claims failed to state a viable cause of action as a matter of law.”

Id. at 288.2

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success on the merits); Transohio Sav. Bank v. Dir., Office of Thrift

Supervision, 967 F.2d 598, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (affirming denial of

preliminary injunction where the district court properly concluded that

the plaintiff had “no likelihood of success on the merits”).

Trudeau now appeals. We review the district court’s

dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction de novo. See

Mwani v. Bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2005). We apply

the same de novo standard to the dismissal for failure to state a

claim. See Gilvin v. Fire, 259 F.3d 749, 756 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

“In determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim, we

may consider only the facts alleged in the complaint, any

documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint

and matters of which we may take judicial notice.” EEOC v. St.

Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624-25 (D.C. Cir.

1997). In this case, both the FTC’s press release and the 2004

Final Order were attached as exhibits to Trudeau’s complaint.

See Compl. ¶¶ 18, 19. 

II

We begin with the district court’s dismissal of the complaint

on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the

matter. The dismissal implicates two different jurisdictional

questions, which we address below.

A

The district court concluded that it lacked subject-matter

jurisdiction over Trudeau’s claims because the FTC’s press

release was not final agency action under § 704 of the APA, 5

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3

The district court and the parties refer to § 10(c) of the APA,

codified at 5 U.S.C. § 704, as “§ 704 of the APA.” We adopt that

convention as well.

4

See Air Courier Conference v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 498

U.S. 517, 523 n.3 (1991) (“The judicial review provisions of the APA

are not jurisdictional.”).

U.S.C. § 704.3 Trudeau, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 288-89, 294 & n.13.

Although the FTC pressed this jurisdictional position below, it

did not brief it on appeal and declined to make it at oral

argument. See Oral Arg. Tape 23:03-28:15. Nonetheless,

because the district court determined that § 704’s final agency

action requirement was jurisdictional and granted the FTC’s

motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(1), we must address the question. See LoBue v.

Christopher, 82 F.3d 1081, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“We must,

of course, examine not only our own jurisdiction but also that of

the court below, regardless of whether the parties have neglected

the issue, addressed it only obliquely, or even tried to waive

it.”). 

Section 704 of the APA states, inter alia, that “[a]gency

action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for

which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject

to judicial review.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. The district court

interpreted this provision to mean that “the presence of final

agency action is a jurisdictional issue.” Trudeau, 384 F. Supp.

2d at 294 n.13. The APA, however, is not a jurisdictionconferring statute. As the Supreme Court held in Califano v.

Sanders, “the APA does not afford an implied grant of subjectmatter jurisdiction permitting federal judicial review of agency

action.” 430 U.S. 99, 107 (1977).4

 Because § 704’s declaration

that final agency action is “subject to judicial review” is not a

grant of jurisdiction, even if we were to infer by negative

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5

But see infra Part III (noting that the negative implication is

limited to precluding a cause of action under the APA).

6

See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Norton, 415 F.3d 8, 13

(D.C. Cir. 2005); Indep. Petroleum Ass’n of Am. v. Babbitt, 235 F.3d

588, 594 (D.C. Cir. 2001); DRG Funding Corp. v. Sec’y of HUD, 76

F.3d 1212, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Public Citizen v. Office of the U.S.

Trade Rep., 970 F.2d 916, 918 (D.C. Cir. 1992). None of these

opinions considered or applied Sanders, 430 U.S. at 107, or Air

Courier Conference, 498 U.S. at 523 n.3. See supra note 4 and

accompanying text. Nor did any have the benefit of the “bright line”

that the Court recently drew between jurisdictional and

nonjurisdictional requirements in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 126 S. Ct.

1235, 1245 (2006). See infra note 7.

7

In Arbaugh, the Court unanimously held that the number-ofemployees requirement for application of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §

2000e(b), is not jurisdictional, but rather “relates to the substantive

adequacy of [a plaintiff’s] Title VII claim.” 126 S. Ct. at 1238-39.

Noting that the distinction between “‘subject-matter’ jurisdiction over

a controversy[] and the essential ingredients of a federal claim for

relief” are “sometimes confused or conflated,” id. at 1238, the Court

established a “readily administrable bright line” to separate the two:

If the Legislature clearly states that a threshold limitation on

a statute’s scope shall count as jurisdictional, then courts

implication that agency conduct not amounting to final agency

action is not “reviewable,”5 that inference would not deprive a

federal court of any jurisdiction it otherwise has.

It is true that some of our opinions have loosely referred to

the final agency action requirement as “jurisdictional.”6 That is

hardly surprising, as “‘[j]urisdiction . . . is a word of many, too

many, meanings.’” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 126 S.Ct. 1235,

1242 (2006) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better

Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998)).7 Or, as Judge Friendly

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and litigants will be duly instructed and will not be left to

wrestle with the issue. But when Congress does not rank a

statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts

should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.

Id. at 1245 (internal citations omitted). Because Congress did not

clearly state that the final agency action requirement of APA § 704 is

jurisdictional, it falls on the nonjurisdictional side of the line the Court

has drawn. 

8

Final agency action requirements can be jurisdictional in other

statutes that, unlike the APA, confer jurisdiction on federal courts.

See, e.g., Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 766 (1975) (holding that

the “final decision” requirement of a section of the Social Security Act

that confers subject-matter jurisdiction on district courts is a

“statutorily specified jurisdictional prerequisite”); North Am. Catholic

Educ. Programming Found. v. FCC, 437 F.3d 1206, 1209 (D.C. Cir.

2006) (stating that the “absence of finality is sufficient to preclude our

jurisdiction” under the Communications Act of 1934); Indep. Equip.

Dealers Ass’n v. EPA, 372 F.3d 420, 426 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (dismissing

a case for lack of jurisdiction because an EPA letter was not “‘final

action’ within the meaning of the judicial review provision” of the

and Justice Frankfurter put it more poetically, the word is “‘a

verbal coat of too many colors.’” In re Beck Industries, Inc.,

725 F.2d 880, 881 (2d Cir. 1984) (Friendly, J.) (quoting United

States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 39 (1952)

(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). In Reliable Automatic Sprinkler

Co. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, however, we made clear

that, where “judicial review is sought under the APA rather than

a particular statute prescribing judicial review, the requirement

of final agency action is not jurisdictional.” 324 F.3d 726, 731

(D.C. Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). And in a case decided just

last month, we followed Reliable, reaffirming that the APA’s

final agency action requirement is not jurisdictional. See Center

for Auto Safety v. NHTSA, No. 04-5402, 2006 WL 1715358, at

*7 (D.C. Cir. June 23, 2006) (citing Reliable, 324 F.3d. at 731).8

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Clean Air Act); Molycorp, Inc. v. EPA, 197 F.3d 543, 545 (D.C. Cir.

1999) (same under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act). 

9

See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 175 (1997) (stating that §

704 provides a cause of action for all “final agency action for which

there is no other adequate remedy in a court”); Japan Whaling Ass’n

v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 n.4 (1986) (holding that a

“right of action” is “expressly created” by § 704 of the APA “absent

some clear and convincing evidence of legislative intention to

preclude review”); Md. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Dep’t of Health &

Human Servs., 763 F.2d 1441, 1445 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“The

Supreme Court has clearly indicated that the Administrative Procedure

Act itself, although it does not create subject-matter jurisdiction, does

supply a generic cause of action in favor of persons aggrieved by

agency action.”).

Although the APA does not confer jurisdiction, what its

judicial review provisions, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06, do provide is a

limited cause of action for parties adversely affected by agency

action. See Center for Auto Safety, 2006 WL 1715358, at *7.9

Accordingly, we will need to address the “final agency action”

limitation of § 704 in Part III, where we consider whether

Trudeau has a valid cause of action for his claims against the

FTC. See Reliable, 324 F.3d at 731 (“If there was no final

agency action . . . , there is no doubt that appellant would lack

a cause of action under the APA.”).

Finally, because the APA neither confers nor restricts

jurisdiction, we must still determine whether some other statute

provides it. For that, we are assisted by Trudeau’s complaint,

see Compl. ¶ 7, which draws our attention to the general federalquestion statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Section 1331 gives the

district courts “original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising

under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”

28 U.S.C. § 1331. As we discuss in Part III, Trudeau asserts that

three different causes of action are applicable to his claims: (1)

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10See Hill v. Norton, 275 F.3d 98, 103 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (APA);

Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union 669 v. Herman, 234 F.3d 1316,

1319 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (APA); Five Flags Pipe Line Co. v. DOT, 854

F.2d 1438, 1439 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (nonstatutory actions); R.I. Dep’t of

Envtl. Mgmt. v. United States, 304 F.3d 31, 42 (1st Cir. 2002)

(nonstatutory actions); Hubbard v. EPA, 949 F.2d 453, 461-62 (D.C.

Cir. 1991) (First Amendment).

the APA; (2) a “nonstatutory action, independent of the APA,”

Appellant’s Br. 29; and (3) the First Amendment directly.

Section 1331 is an appropriate source of jurisdiction for all

three.10

B

A second jurisdictional question at issue in this case is

whether the United States has waived its sovereign immunity, so

that Trudeau may bring his claims against the FTC. See FDIC

v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994) (“Sovereign immunity is

jurisdictional in nature.”). The FTC raised sovereign immunity

as a bar before the district court but, once again, did not mention

immunity in its appellate briefs and declined to discuss it at oral

argument. See Oral Arg. Tape 23:03-28:15.

The district court suggested, see Trudeau, 384 F. Supp. 2d

at 288-89, 294, and Trudeau maintains, that Congress provided

the necessary waiver of immunity in the second sentence of

APA § 702, which reads:

An action in a court of the United States seeking relief

other than money damages and stating a claim that an

agency . . . acted or failed to act . . . shall not be

dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the ground

that it is against the United States or that the United

States is an indispensable party. 

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11See, e.g., Hubbard, 949 F.2d at 466 (holding, in a non-APA

case brought directly under the First Amendment, that “[s]ection 702

of the APA waives [sovereign] immunity for all suits seeking

[equitable] relief” (emphasis added)); Hubbard, 809 F.2d at 11 (same);

Clark v. Library of Congress, 750 F.2d 89, 102 (D.C. Cir. 1984)

(“[T]he 1976 amendments to § 702 of the Administrative Procedure

Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702, eliminated the sovereign immunity defense in

virtually all actions for non-monetary relief against a U.S. agency or

officer acting in an official capacity.” (emphasis added)); Sea-Land

Serv., Inc. v. Alaska Railroad, 659 F.2d 243, 244 (D.C. Cir. 1981)

(holding that § 702 “eliminat[es] [the] sovereign immunity defense in

all actions for specific, nonmonetary relief against a United States

agency,” including a suit under the Sherman Act (emphasis in

original)).

5 U.S.C. § 702. Trudeau has limited the relief he seeks to a

declaratory judgment and an injunction, and there is no doubt

that § 702 “waives the Government’s immunity from actions

seeking relief ‘other than money damages.’” Dep’t of Army v.

Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1999); see Hubbard v.

EPA, 809 F.2d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Dronenburg v. Zech, 741

F.2d 1388, 1390-91 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Nonetheless, the FTC

argued in the district court that § 702’s waiver was limited in

two additional respects. According to the FTC: (1) the waiver

applies only to actions arising under the APA; and (2) since

review under APA § 704 is limited to “final agency action,” the

waiver of sovereign immunity is similarly restricted to conduct

that falls within that compass.

We have previously, and repeatedly, rejected the FTC’s first

argument, expressly holding that the “APA’s waiver of

sovereign immunity applies to any suit whether under the APA

or not.” Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1328

(D.C. Cir. 1996).11 There is nothing in the language of the

second sentence of § 702 that restricts its waiver to suits brought

under the APA. The sentence waives sovereign immunity for

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12See Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1390 (noting that the Senate

Report “expressly stated that ‘the time [has] now come to eliminate

the sovereign immunity defense in all equitable actions for specific

relief against a Federal agency or officer acting in an official

capacity’” (quoting Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 108 (D.C. Cir.

1981) (quoting S.REP.NO.94-996, at 7-8 (1976)))). In Schnapper, we

added that “[w]e may also doubt whether, even in the absence of

section 702,” courts would be unable to “award[] equitable relief on

the basis of . . . constitutional claims.” 667 F.2d at 108 n.2.

“[a]n action in a court of the United States seeking relief other

than money damages,” not for an action brought under the APA.

Our previous examination of the legislative history of this

sentence confirms that conclusion. Congress added the sentence

to § 702 when it amended the section in 1976. See Pub. L.

94-574, 90 Stat. 2721, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). As we have

explained, “[t]he Judiciary Committees of both Houses, in their

reports on the 1976 amendment, identified as the measure’s

clear purpose ‘elimina(tion of) the sovereign immunity defense

in all equitable actions for specific relief against a Federal

agency or officer acting in an official capacity.’” Sea-Land

Serv., Inc. v. Alaska Railroad, 659 F.2d 243, 244 (D.C. Cir.

1981) (emphasis in original) (quoting S. REP. NO. 94-996, at 8

(1976) and H.R.REP.NO. 94-1656, at9(1976)).12 Moreover, the

Senate Report plainly indicated that Congress expected the

waiver to apply to nonstatutory actions, and thus not only to

actions under the APA. “The committee does not believe,” the

Report stated, that the amendment’s “partial elimination of

sovereign immunity, as a barrier to nonstatutory review of

Federal administrative action, will create undue interference

with administrative action.” S.REP. NO. 94-996, at 8 (emphasis

added). 

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13See S.REP. NO. 94-996, at 10 (stating that the amendment “will

be applicable only to functions falling within the definition of

‘agency’ in 5 U.S.C. section 701”); Clark, 750 F.2d at 102 (holding

that plaintiff “may not take advantage of [§ 702’s] waiver of sovereign

immunity since [defendant] Library of Congress is not ‘an agency’ as

defined under” the APA, but further holding that plaintiff’s “claims for

non-monetary, specific relief are not barred by sovereign immunity

[because it] is well-established that sovereign immunity does not bar

suits for specific relief against government officials where the

challenged actions . . . are alleged to be unconstitutional or beyond

statutory authority”).

14The APA defines both “agency,” 5 U.S.C. § 551(1), and

“agency action,” id. § 551(13).

Although we have never directly considered the contention

that the “final agency action” requirement of § 704 restricts §

702’s waiver of sovereign immunity, our holding that the waiver

is not limited to APA cases -- and hence that it applies

regardless of whether the elements of an APA cause of action

are satisfied -- removes the linchpin of the FTC’s argument.

Moreover, the language of the waiver sentence again provides

no support for the FTC’s contention. While the sentence does

refer to a claim against an “agency” and hence waives immunity

only when the defendant falls within that category,13 it does not

use either the term “final agency action” or the term “agency

action.”14 Nor does the legislative history refer to either

limitation. To the contrary, the House and Senate Reports’

repeated declarations that Congress intended to waive immunity

for “any,” H.R. REP. NO. 94-1656, at 3, and “all,” id. at 9; S.

REP. NO. 94-996, at 8, actions for equitable relief against an

agency make clear that no such limitations were intended.

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17

In sum, we hold that APA § 702’s waiver of sovereign

immunity permits not only Trudeau’s APA cause of action, but

his nonstatutory and First Amendment actions as well. We also

hold that the waiver applies regardless of whether the FTC’s

press release constitutes “final agency action.” Accord

Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) v. United States, 870 F.2d 518,

525 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that the government’s “attempt to

restrict the waiver of sovereign immunity to actions challenging

‘agency action’ as technically defined in § 551(13) offends the

plain meaning of the amendment”); Red Lake Band of Chippewa

Indians v. Barlow, 846 F.2d 474, 476 (8th Cir. 1988) (rejecting

the contention that the waiver in § 702 “exists only to allow

review of a final agency decision,” and holding that “[t]he

waiver of sovereign immunity contained in section 702 is not

dependent on application of the . . . review standards of the

APA”). The district court therefore had subject-matter

jurisdiction to hear Trudeau’s suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and

its dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(1) was erroneous.

III

Having concluded that there is jurisdiction, we now turn to

whether Trudeau has stated a claim upon which relief can be

granted. “Although the district court erroneously dismissed the

action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), we could nonetheless affirm

the dismissal if dismissal were otherwise proper based on failure

to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”

St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d at 624; see Reliable,

324 F.3d at 731.

Trudeau’s complaint asserts two claims against the FTC.

First, he contends that the FTC exceeded its statutory authority

under 15 U.S.C. § 46(f) when it issued the press release. Section

46(f) provides that the FTC “shall . . . have power” to “make

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18

15As Justice Cardozo observed, a “‘cause of action’ may mean

one thing for one purpose and something different for another.”

United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288 U.S. 62-67-68 (1933).

Courts often use the terms “cause of action” and “claim”

interchangeably; sometimes it is said that a “cause of action is a

necessary element of [a litigant’s] ‘claim.’” Davis v. Passman, 441

U.S. at 239. Here, we refer to a “cause of action” as the legal

authority (e.g., the APA) that permits the court to provide redress for

a particular kind of “claim” (e.g., that issuance of the press release

violated § 46(f)).

public from time to time such portions of the information

obtained by it . . . as are in the public interest.” 15 U.S.C. §

46(f). Trudeau argues that, by “intentionally and deliberately

misrepresent[ing] the nature of the Stipulated Order in its press

release,” Compl. ¶ 49, the agency acted contrary to the “public

interest” and therefore in excess of its authority under § 46(f).

Second, Trudeau claims that issuance of the press release

violated his First Amendment rights. He contends that the

Commission intended to retaliate against him “for expressing his

negative opinions about the FTC” by “issuing a press release

that falsely characterize[d] the Stipulated Order as containing a

finding of wrongdoing or liability on [his] part.” Compl. ¶ 48.

Whether these are claims “upon which relief can be

granted” depends in part on whether there is a cause of action

that permits Trudeau to invoke the power of the court to redress

the violations of law that he claims the FTC has committed. See

generally Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239-40 & n.18

(1979). It also depends on whether the allegations of Trudeau’s

complaint are legally sufficient to state the violations he claims.

We consider the cause of action question in this Part, and the

sufficiency of Trudeau’s claims in Part IV.15

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19

16Trudeau does not suggest that the Federal Trade Commission

Act itself provides a cause of action permitting a private party to

challenge a press release as in excess of the authority granted by §

46(f) of the Act.

17APA § 706, entitled “Scope of Review,” states in pertinent part:

The reviewing court shall . . . (2) hold unlawful and set

aside agency action . . . found to be . . . (B) contrary to

constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; [or] (C)

in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations

. . . .

5 U.S.C. § 706.

As we have noted, Trudeau identifies three causes of action

that he asserts authorize his suit: (1) the APA; (2) a nonstatutory

action; and (3) the First Amendment directly.16 Each involves

certain complexities of analysis.

First, it is clear that the APA “suppl[ies] a generic cause of

action in favor of persons aggrieved by agency action.” Md.

Dep’t of Human Res. v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 763

F.2d 1441, 1445 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see supra note 9.

Moreover, the APA’s “scope of review” provision permits us to

grant Trudeau’s request to hold the press release unlawful if we

find it “contrary to constitutional right” because of the asserted

First Amendment violation, or “in excess of statutory . . .

authority” because it exceeded the FTC’s powers under § 46(f).

5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B), (C).17 The problem with relying on the

APA, however, is that “§ 704 limits causes of action under the

APA” to “final agency action.” Center for Auto Safety, 2006

WL 1715358, at *7. Thus, although the absence of final agency

action would not cost federal courts their jurisdiction, see supra

Part II, it would cost Trudeau his APA cause of action.

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20

18The APA defines “sanction” as including: 

the whole or a part of an agency -- (A) prohibition,

requirement, limitation, or other condition affecting the

freedom of a person; (B) withholding of relief; (C)

imposition of penalty or fine; (D) destruction, taking,

seizure, or withholding of property; (E) assessment of

damages, reimbursement, restitution, compensation, costs,

charges, or fees; (F) requirement, revocation, or suspension

of a license; or (G) taking other compulsory or restrictive

action. 

5 U.S.C. § 551(10). 

As the district court noted, we have never found a press

release of the kind at issue here to constitute “final agency

action” under the APA. See Trudeau, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 289.

We first considered this question nearly sixty years ago in

Hearst Radio v. FCC, 167 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1948), in which

a plaintiff alleged that the FCC had issued a defamatory

publication that it knew to be false. The difficulty with the

plaintiff’s challenge, we said, was that suits under the APA are

limited to “agency action,” and that the FCC publication did not

come within the definition of that term. Id. at 227. The APA

defines “agency action” as “includ[ing] the whole or part of an

agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or

denial thereof, or failure to act.” 5 U.S.C. § 551(13). In Hearst

Radio, we concluded that, “[a]mong these words, the only one

approaching applicability to the publication . . . is the word

‘sanction,’” and that the definition of that word “does not cover

an act such as” the FCC publication. 167 F.2d at 227; see

Invention Submission Corp. v. Rogan, 357 F.3d 452, 459 (4th

Cir. 2004) (following Hearst Radio).18

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21

19See Impro Products, 722 F.2d at 849 (“[W]e find it troubling

that literal adherence to the Hearst Radio rule in a case like this one

would preclude judicial review under the APA of an agency’s

dissemination of information that is concededly false and, therefore,

completely inconsistent with [its] statutory purpose.”).

20The FTC further argues that, even if the press release is “agency

action,” it is not “final” agency action. Appellee’s Br. 20-21. 

We have twice questioned “the continued validity of the

Hearst Radio decision.” Impro Products, Inc. v. Block, 722 F.2d

845, 849 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see Indus. Safety Equip. Ass’n, Inc.

v. EPA, 837 F.2d 1115, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1988). In Industrial

Safety Equipment Ass’n, Inc. v. EPA, for example, we said that

“an agency intent on penalizing a party through adverse

publicity, especially false or unauthorized publicity, might well

merit a review of its action” as a sanction. 837 F.2d. at 1119.19

But we have never had the need either to reconsider Hearst

Radio, or to consider whether it is distinguishable. See Indus.

Safety Equip. Ass’n, 837 F.2d at 1119 (resolving case on the

ground that, because plaintiffs offered no evidence that the

publication was false or intended to penalize plaintiffs, it could

not qualify as a sanction); Impro Products, 722 F.2d at 849

(resolving case on statute of limitations grounds). And the FTC

insists that we are bound by Hearst Radio to conclude that its

press release is not subject to APA review because it does not

constitute agency action.20

Second, Trudeau argues that he may maintain his case as a

nonstatutory action. As we held in Chamber of Commerce v.

Reich, “[i]f a plaintiff is unable to bring his case predicated on

either a specific or general statutory review provision, he may

still be able to institute a non-statutory review action.” 74 F.3d

at 1327. Because “[j]udicial review is favored when an agency

is charged with acting beyond its authority,” Dart v. United

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22

21Ironically, in light of the allegations in this case, the font of the

nonstatutory review doctrine is American School of Magnetic Healing

v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94 (1902). That case held that a court had

power to grant relief to a plaintiff who challenged the Postmaster

General’s statutory authority to prevent him “from advertising,

fraudulently in the Postmaster General’s view, that he could cure

disease by the ‘proper exercise of the faculty of the brain and mind.’”

Reich, 74 F.3d at 1327 (quoting McAnnulty, 187 U.S. at 96).

States, 848 F.2d 217, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1988), “[e]ven where

Congress is understood generally to have precluded review, the

Supreme Court has found an implicit but narrow exception,

closely paralleling the historic origins of judicial review for

agency actions in excess of jurisdiction.” Griffith v. FLRA, 842

F.2d 487, 492 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Pursuant to this case law,

“judicial review is available when an agency acts ultra vires,”

even if a statutory cause of action is lacking. Aid Ass’n for

Lutherans v. United States Postal Serv., 321 F.3d 1166, 1173

(D.C. Cir. 2003).21

Trudeau contends that his § 46(f) claim falls within the core

of the doctrine of nonstatutory review because the issuance of a

false and misleading press release exceeds the FTC’s authority

to disseminate information “in the public interest.” 15 U.S.C. §

46(f). The FTC counters that nonstatutory review is available

only when an agency “violate[s] a ‘clear and mandatory’

statutory prohibition [or] a ‘specific and unambiguous statutory

command,’” and that § 46(f) does not fit that bill. Appellee’s

Br. 27 (quoting Griffith, 842 F.2d at 493). There certainly is no

question that nonstatutory review “is intended to be of extremely

limited scope,” Griffith, 842 F.2d at 493, and hence represents

a more difficult course for Trudeau than would review under the

APA (assuming final agency action) for acts “in excess of

statutory . . . authority,” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C).

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23

22See Hubbard v. EPA, 809 F.2d at 11 n.15 (holding that the

plaintiff could sue the EPA for violating the First Amendment because

“the court’s power to enjoin unconstitutional acts by the government

. . . is inherent in the Constitution itself”); see also Hartman v. Moore,

126 S. Ct. 1695, 1701 (2006) (holding that “[o]fficial reprisal for

protected speech ‘offends the Constitution [because] it threatens to

inhibit exercise of the protected right’” (quoting Crawford-El v.

Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588 n.10 (1998))); Beedle v. Wilson, 422 F.3d

1059, 1066 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[A] governmental lawsuit brought with

the intent to retaliate against a citizen for the exercise of his First

Amendment rights is itself a violation of the First Amendment.”); cf.

Passman, 442 U.S. at 242 (confirming that “a cause of action may be

implied directly under the equal protection component of the Due

Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment”). 

Third, Trudeau asserts that he has a direct cause of action

under the First Amendment. We have inferred such a cause

before,22 and the FTC concedes that it is available to Trudeau,

see Oral Arg. Tape at 29:54-30:04. Such a cause would,

however, be limited to Trudeau’s claim of unconstitutional

retaliation, and would not also cover -- as would the APA -- his

claim that the press release exceeds the FTC’s statutory

authority.

In sum, but for APA § 704’s requirement of “final agency

action,” the cause of action provided by the APA offers Trudeau

the more inclusive (covering both his § 46(f) and constitutional

claims) and more expansive (as compared to the narrow scope

of nonstatutory review) vehicle for asserting his claims. By the

same token, if Trudeau’s claims would fail review under the

APA even assuming the press release satisfied the requirement

of § 704, they could not succeed under any other vehicle. As we

explain in the next Part, we have concluded that Trudeau’s

claims would indeed fail, even with the benefit of that

assumption. We are permitted to proceed in this manner

because “[w]hether a cause of action exists is not a question of

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24

23Because we conclude that Trudeau cannot establish this element

as a matter of law, see infra Part IV.C, we do not address the other

elements of his claims. See, e.g., Hartman, 126 S. Ct. at 1704 (stating

that the elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim include

“retaliatory animus,” “cause,” and “injury”); Hoover v. Radabaugh,

307 F.3d 460, 466 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that a retaliatory adverse

action “must constitute an injury that would likely chill a person of

ordinary firmness from engaging in the protected [First Amendment]

jurisdiction, and may be assumed without being decided.” Air

Courier Conference v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517,

523 n.3 (1991) (citing Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 476 n.5

(1979)); see Impro Products, 722 F.2d at 846 (assuming that an

allegedly false and misleading press release constituted “final

agency action,” but holding that relief was nonetheless barred by

the statute of limitations). 

IV

Having found that there is jurisdiction to consider

Trudeau’s claims, and having assumed that there is a cause of

action available to assert them, we now discuss why the

allegations of Trudeau’s complaint are nonetheless legally

insufficient to state claims upon which relief can be granted. In

subpart A, we identify an essential element of both of Trudeau’s

claims; in subpart B, we explain why the existence of that

element may be resolved on a motion to dismiss; and in subpart

C, we conclude that Trudeau has failed to establish that element

as a matter of law. 

A

An essential element common to both of Trudeau’s claims

is the contention that the FTC’s press release is false or

misleading.23 Trudeau’s complaint charges that the FTC

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25

activity,” and that it must be “motivated at least in part as a response

to the exercise of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights”).

24See also Appellant’s Br. 39 (“Trudeau’s allegations that the

news release was misleading . . . suffice to state a claim that the

agency has exceeded its authority under §46(f).”). 

25See also Appellant’s Br. 37 (“Trudeau alleges that he publicly

criticized the FTC -- clearly a protected exercise of First Amendment

rights -- and that the FTC, in retaliation, attempted to injure him by

releasing false information. Nothing more is necessary.”).

retaliated against him by issuing a press release that “falsely

characterize[d],” Compl. ¶ 48, and intentionally

“misrepresented,” id. ¶ 49, the 2004 Final Order. That conduct,

the complaint asserts, both “exceeded the FTC’s authority under

15 U.S.C. § 46(f) [and] violated the First Amendment.” Compl.

¶ 50. Similarly, Trudeau’s appellate briefs charge that “the FTC

exceeded the authority granted by [15 U.S.C. § 46(f)] by

releasing a materially false and misleading news release,”

Appellant’s Br. 39 (citing Compl. ¶¶ 19-25),24 and violated the

First Amendment “by disseminating false information about the

Stipulated Order” in retaliation for Trudeau’s protected activity,

id. at 37 (citing Compl. ¶ 49).25 

The district court suggested that, to succeed on his claims,

Trudeau would have to establish that the press release was

“obviously false.” Trudeau v. FTC, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 296. As

that stricter standard is unnecessary to resolve the case, we do

not address it. That said, we do believe that Trudeau must show

that his allegations are sufficient to establish that the press

release was at least false or misleading. Our insistence on that

standard is justified because those are the claims that Trudeau

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26

26At oral argument, Trudeau suggested a standard at once more

lenient and more vague, contending that even a true statement would

be sufficient if it caused the plaintiff to suffer a “palpable injury.”

Oral Arg. Tape at 6:29. For the reasons stated in the following

paragraph, we are doubtful that such a standard has any application to

the circumstances of this case. In any event, oral argument is too late

to raise a matter for appellate consideration. See Robertson v. Am.

Airlines, Inc., 401 F.3d 499, 504 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Ark Las Vegas

Rest. Corp. v. NLRB, 334 F.3d 99, 108 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2003); C.J.

Krehbiel Co. v. NLRB, 844 F.2d 880, 883 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1988).

27Trudeau concedes that no court has ever decided in a plaintiff’s

favor the kind of claims he advances here. See Oral Arg. Tape at

17:42-18:33, 19:11-19:15. The closest case appears to be B.C. Morton

International Corp. v. FDIC, in which the court recognized a nonmonetary cause of action in tort for “the issuance by [an] agency of a

press release deliberately misrepresenting the application of federal

law for the specific purpose of destroying plaintiff’s business.” 305

F.2d 692, 693 (1st Cir. 1962) (emphasis added). 

made in the district court and in his appellate briefs,26 and

because he cites no case that would support a lesser standard.27

That standard is also justified by the interests that are at

stake here. As we said in FTC v. Cinderella Career & Finishing

Schools, Inc., in the course of holding that § 46(f) authorizes the

FTC to issue factual press releases concerning pending

adjudicatory proceedings:

If the unsophisticated consumer is to be protected in

any measure from deceptive or unfair practices, it is

essential that he be informed in some manner as to the

identity of those most likely to prey upon him utilizing

such prohibited conduct. Certainly advice through

news media as to actions being taken by a government

agency in his behalf constitutes a prophylactic step

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27

28See Indus. Safety Equip., 837 F.2d at 1118 (declaring that

agency publications serve an essential role in “promoting Congress’

clear mandate that government information, particularly from

consumer-oriented agencies, reach the public,” and that an agency’s

ability to warn the public “would be crippled were [it] not permitted

to use the quick and cheap instrument of publicity”). 

29Compare Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 676 (6th Cir. 1998)

(holding that the plaintiff’s allegation that the defendant sheriff

released “confidential and highly personal details” about the plaintiff

in retaliation for her criticism of him was sufficient to state a cause of

action under the First Amendment).

30See Indus. Safety Equip., 837 F.2d at 1118 (noting “two separate

goals of fair administrative process: protecting parties from false or

unauthorized agency news releases and promoting Congress’ clear

mandate that government information, particularly from consumeroriented agencies, reach the public”); Cinderella, 404 F.2d at 1313-14

(holding that, although a press release may result “in a substantial

tarnishing of the name, reputation, and status of the named respondent

. . . , [i]f the unsophisticated consumer is to be protected in any

measure from deceptive or unfair practices, it is essential that he be

addressed ultimately to the elimination of the conduct

prohibited by the statute. The Commission, in

attempting to bring its action relative to what it has

reason to believe is unlawful conduct to the attention of

the widely spread public by the issuance of factual

press releases, is, we conclude, acting within its

authority as defined by the statute.

404 F.2d 1308, 1314 (D.C. Cir. 1968).28 Although there are

important interests on the other side of the balance as well, they

do not arise in a case involving the dissemination of information

that concerns a public-record document regarding a commercial

matter (e.g., the 2004 Final Order),29 and that is neither false nor

misleading.30

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28

informed in some manner as to the identity of those most likely to prey

upon him utilizing such prohibited conduct”).

31See Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002)

(stating that “Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is appropriate where the

allegations contradict the claim asserted”); see also Bennett v.

Schmidt, 153 F.3d 516, 519 (7th Cir. 1998). 

B

Trudeau insists that whether the FTC’s press release is false

or misleading is a question of fact that cannot be determined on

a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).

It is true that “the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not

require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he

bases his claim,” and that “a complaint should not be dismissed

for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that

the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that

would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 46-

47 (1957); see Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506

(2002). It is thus possible that, had Trudeau’s complaint simply

alleged that the FTC issued a false press release about him that

was retaliatory and beyond the FTC’s authority, his complaint

might have survived a motion to dismiss. See Sparrow v. United

Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 2000). (Of

course, the text at issue would eventually have been flushed out

by a motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 56.) But it also “is possible for a plaintiff to plead too

much: that is, to plead himself out of court by alleging facts that

render success on the merits impossible.” Id.

31 Here, Trudeau’s

complaint makes quite clear which text he regards as false

(specified sentences in the press release), and why he regards it

as false (because of specified inconsistencies with the 2004

Final Order). And because he has attached all of the relevant

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29

text to the complaint, see Compl. Ex. A (2004 Final Order); id.

Ex. B (press release), it is appropriate for a court to examine that

material in ruling under Rule 12(b)(6). See St. Francis Xavier

Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d at 624-25; see also Kaempe v. Myers,

367 F.3d 958, 965 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Hoffman-Pugh v. Ramsey,

312 F.3d 1222, 1225 (11th Cir. 2002); Durning v. First Boston

Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987).

Moreover, although “[i]n considering the claims dismissed

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), we must treat the complaint’s factual

allegations as true [and] must grant plaintiff the benefit of all

reasonable inferences from the facts alleged,” Sparrow, 216

F.3d at 1114, “we are not bound to accept as true a legal

conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” Papasan v. Allain,

478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986), or to “accept inferences drawn by

plaintiffs if such inferences are unsupported by the facts set out

in the complaint,” Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns Corp., 16 F.3d

1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see Papasan, 478 U.S. at 286.

Trudeau contends that whether a statement is false is always a

factual matter and never a legal conclusion. We do not agree

that the truth or falsity of a statement can never be decided as a

matter of law.

Moldea v. New York Times Co., for example, involved an

analogous situation: a district court’s grant of summary

judgment to a defamation defendant on the pleadings and

without discovery. 15 F.3d 1137 (D.C. Cir.), modified on reh’g,

22 F.3d 310 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Based solely on a comparison of

the plaintiff’s book and the book review that allegedly

mischaracterized it, the district court concluded that defamatory

statements in the review were not actionable as a matter of law

because “no reasonable juror could find them to be false.” 15

F.3d at 1139. On appeal, we agreed with the district court as to

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30

32Our initial opinion in Moldea reversed the district court’s grant

of summary judgment on the ground that two other statements could

not be deemed true “as a matter of law” because “a reasonable juror

could conclude that [they were] false.” 15 F.3d at 1146-47. On

reconsideration, we held that while “[s]uch a standard might be

appropriate in the case of an ordinary libel,” it was “an inappropriate

measure of an interpretation of a book.” 22 F.3d at 317. For book

reviews, we concluded that a “supportable interpretation” standard

was appropriate, held that a “reasonable person could find that the

review’s characterizations were supportable interpretations of the

book,” and therefore affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor

of the defendant. Id. (emphasis omitted). The “supportable

interpretation” standard is, of course, substantially more favorable to

the FTC than the “no reasonable juror” standard we apply in this case.

33In Trudeau’s case, the district court could also have converted

the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment

pursuant to Rule 12(b). FOP Dep't of Corr. Labor Comm. v. Williams,

375 F.3d 1141, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Similarly, this court could

characterize “the district court’s dismissal as a grant of summary

judgment under Rule 56(c).” Id.

two of the statements in the review. Id. at 1148-49; see Moldea,

22 F.3d at 312-13.32 

We have also applied this “no reasonable juror” (or “no

reasonable person”) test to a motion to dismiss. See Browning

v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 247-48 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (affirming the

dismissal of a defamation claim under Rule 12(b)(6) because

“no reasonable person would be able to infer that [the defendant]

was accusing [the plaintiff] of deceitfulness”).33 So have other

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31

34See Hoffman-Pugh, 312 F.3d at 1227 (affirming the dismissal

of a defamation complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) because, “construing

the [allegedly defamatory] book as a whole,” the book could not

reasonably be read as accusing the plaintiff of murder); cf. Karedes v.

Ackerley Group, Inc., 423 F.3d 107, 118 (2d Cir. 2005) (reversing a

district court’s dismissal of a defamation claim because, “on this

record,” a “reasonable jury could conclude that the [news article] was

false”); Durning, 815 F.2d at 1269 (reversing the Rule 12(b)(6)

dismissal of a claim that a securities offering was misleading because,

upon examining the offering, the court could not conclude that “no

reasonable investor” could read the offering as the defendant

suggested).

35In his reply brief, Trudeau contends that he is entitled to

introduce empirical evidence of how an average consumer would

likely perceive the release. See Reply Br. 24. The cases he cites for

this proposition, however, rely on the elements of statutory causes of

action that Trudeau does not (and cannot) assert here. See Clorox Co.

v. Proctor & Gamble Commer. Co., 228 F.3d 24, 36-37 (1st Cir. 2000)

(Lanham Act); Johnson v. Revenue Mgmt. Corp., 169 F.3d 1057,

1060-61 (7th Cir. 1999) (Fair Debt Collection Practices Act).

circuits.34 We will do so here as well.35

C

Trudeau alleges that the FTC’s press release falsely and

misleadingly characterizes the 2004 Final Order in four respects:

it “[1] falsely stat[es] that Trudeau had been banned entirely

from infomercials, [2] erroneously impl[ies] that the settlement

was a judicial finding that Trudeau was a habitual false

advertiser, [3] falsely impl[ies] that the $2 million was a fine,

and [4] conspicuously omit[s] the fact that there has been no

finding of false advertising.” Appellant’s Br. 1-2. We consider

each of these allegedly “false and misleading assertions and

implications,” id. at 6, below.

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1. “First and foremost,” Trudeau objects to the press

release’s repeated use of the word “ban” to describe the 2004

Final Order. Appellant’s Br. 6. For example, the headline of the

release states: “Kevin Trudeau Banned from Infomercials.”

App. 51. Similarly, Acting Director Parnes is quoted as stating:

“This ban is meant to shut down the infomercial empire that has

misled American consumers for years.” Id. at ¶ 3. Trudeau

contends that the use of the term “ban” or “banned” is

“inaccurate and misleading” in two respects. Appellant’s Br. 7.

Trudeau argues that the word “ban” is misleading because

the order did not “completely bar Trudeau from infomercials; .

. . the agreement expressly permits Trudeau to produce and

appear in infomercials for books and other publications.” Id.

But the release does not say that Trudeau is completely barred

from infomercials. To the contrary, the very first sentence of the

release notes the precise caveat to which Trudeau avers: “A

Federal Trade Commission settlement with Kevin Trudeau . . .

broadly bans him from . . . disseminating future infomercials

that advertise any type of product . . . , except for truthful

infomericals for informational publications.” App. 51 at ¶ 1

(emphasis added). And the sixth paragraph states that “[t]he

order’s ban on future infomercials exempts infomercials for

books, newsletters, and other informational publications.” Id. at

¶ 6. 

Trudeau also insists that “the term ‘banned’ is inapposite”

because he “agreed, as part of the Stipulated Order, not to

produce certain types of infomercials; the sort of coercion

implied by the term ‘banned’ never figured into the settlement.”

Appellant’s Br. 7 (emphasis in original). Trudeau did agree, and

the first paragraph of the release makes that quite clear to the

reader, stating that “Trudeau agreed to these prohibitions . . . to

settle” the FTC’s charges. App. 51 at ¶ 1. But Trudeau’s

agreement to the order’s terms does not render the word “ban”

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33

36Compare 2004 Final Order at 8 (declaring that Trudeau is

permanently “enjoined” from disseminating specified representations

in infomercials), with WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY

754 (defining “enjoin” as “to prohibit . . . by judicial order”). 

inapposite. The dictionary defines “ban” as “to prohibit

esp[ecially] by legal means the . . . dissemination . . . of,”

WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 169 (Philip

Babcock Gove ed., 1993) (emphasis added), and that is exactly

what the 2004 Final Order did, see 2004 Final Order at 7 (listing

“prohibited business activities” (emphasis added)); id. at 30

(declaring that “[t]his Part II prohibits the making of any

representations for” specified products (emphasis added)).36

Moreover, because the 2004 Final Order was entered by the

district court, it surely is coercive: Trudeau may disregard the

Order only upon pain of punishment for contempt, a penalty he

has previously received. See 2004 Final Order ¶ 8 (noting that

the district court had previously found Trudeau in contempt for

violating the July 2003 stipulated preliminary injunction); see

also id. ¶ 7 (declaring that “the provisions of this Order are

binding upon Defendants”); id. at 29 (providing that the district

court “shall retain jurisdiction over this matter for purposes of

. . . enforcement of this Order”).

2. Trudeau’s second contention is that the press release

erroneously implies that the settlement represents a judicial

finding that Trudeau was a habitual false advertiser. In

particular, he focuses on the release’s third paragraph:

“This ban is meant to shut down an infomercial empire

that has misled American consumers for years,” said

Lydia Parnes, Acting Director of the FTC’s Bureau of

Consumer Protection. “Other habitual false advertisers

should take a lesson; mend your ways or face serious

consequences.”

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34

App. 51 at ¶ 3. Trudeau does not contend that the FTC or its

officials acted improperly by asserting their own views. His

contention is that “a reader could reach no conclusion other than

that the court had found Trudeau to have engaged in false

advertising, and had imposed a ‘ban’ as punishment.”

Appellant’s Br. 9 (emphasis added). 

That contention is wrong. By its use of quotation marks,

the paragraph makes clear that the statement is that of Acting

Director Parnes -- not that of the district court. Moreover, by the

time a reader gets to that quotation, he or she has already read

the italicized subtitle of the release, which states: “Trudeau

Settles Claims with Coral Calcium Supreme and Biotape”

(underlining added), as well as the release’s first paragraph,

which states that Trudeau “agreed” to the provisions of the

Order to “settle” the FTC’s charges. App. 51 at ¶ 1. And before

concluding the release, the reader will also see the bolded note

stating: “Note: This stipulated final order is for settlement

purposes only and does not constitute an admission by the

defendants of a law violation.” Id. at 52 (italics added). Given

this context, no reasonable reader could conclude that the Acting

Director’s Parnes’ assertions reflected a “judicial finding.”

Appellant’s Br. 6. 

3. Trudeau next contends that the press release inaccurately

characterizes the $2 million that he must pay under the order.

Here, he focuses on paragraph two of the release, which states:

Trudeau is paying $500,000 in cash and transferring

residential property . . . and a luxury automobile to the

Commission to satisfy the $2 million monetary

judgment against him[.]

Appellant’s Br. 9 (quoting App. 51 at ¶ 2) (emphasis added by

Appellant). According to Trudeau: “[T]he fund was part of a

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35

37See, e.g., Appellant’s Br. 7, 44 (complaining of assertedly false

information on the FTC’s “informational web page”).

voluntary settlement agreement and not a ‘judgment’ at all.

Nevertheless, the news release overtly characterizes it as a fine,

and thus misleads readers into the belief that it was imposed by

the court as a punishment for false advertising.” Appellant’s Br.

9-10.

Trudeau’s contention suffers from three fatal defects.

Contrary to his premise, the $2 million fund is in fact part of a

“judgment” against him, as the 2004 Final Order expressly

states. See 2004 Final Order at 16 (entering “Judgment for

equitable monetary relief in the amount of two million dollars”).

Contrary to his assertion, the news release nowhere, overtly or

otherwise, characterizes the $2 million as a “fine.” And contrary

to his implication, the press release makes clear, repeatedly, that

the fund was part of a voluntary settlement agreement. See, e.g.,

App. 51 at subtitle (“Trudeau Settles Claims”); id. at ¶ 1

(announcing an FTC “settlement with Kevin Trudeau”); id.

(stating that “Trudeau agreed . . . to pay the FTC $2 million to

settle charges”).

4. Finally, Trudeau asserts that the press release is

misleading because it fails to expressly state, as the 2004 Final

Order did, that there had been “no findings or admissions of

wrongdoing or liability” with respect to Trudeau. 2004 Final

Order ¶ 8. As we said above, we do not believe that a

reasonable reader could construe the press release as suggesting

that there had been such a finding; accordingly, an express

disavowal was unnecessary to prevent such a reader from being

misled. In any event, the online version of the release -- which

is the version upon which Trudeau focuses his attention37 --

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contains a link to the 2004 Final Order, prominently displayed

in bold at the top-right corner of the webpage. The link permits

any interested reader to compare the release with the order itself,

including its disavowal of a judicial finding. See 2004 Final

Order ¶ 8. With the terms of the order just two mouseclicks

away, any potential misreading of the release can easily be

averted.

D

The district court found that “the differences between the

press release and the stipulated order are minor or illusory.”

Trudeau v. FTC, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 296. We agree. Contrary

to Trudeau’s contention, this is not a case in which only “a

highly skilled jurist or an FTC staff member, carefully parsing

the language of the publication,” would not be misled. Reply

Br. 22. Rather, this is a case in which no reasonable person

could misinterpret the press release in the ways that Trudeau

suggests. Accordingly, Trudeau’s complaint is legally

insufficient to state a claim.

V

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the

district court dismissing Trudeau’s complaint for failure to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

Affirmed.

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