Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-07-03027/USCOURTS-caDC-07-03027-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Franklin H. Pettiford
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 14, 2008 Decided February 26, 2008

No. 07-3027

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

FRANKLIN H. PETTIFORD,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 06cr00162-01)

Mary E. Davis, appointed by the court, argued the cause for

appellant. With her on the brief was Christopher Davis,

appointed by the court.

Patricia A. Heffernan, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Jeffrey A. Taylor,

U.S. Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese, III, Assistant U.S.

Attorney.

Before: HENDERSON, RANDOLPH, and GARLAND, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

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2

GARLAND, Circuit Judge: After a jury trial, defendant

Franklin H. Pettiford was found guilty of possession with intent

to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base. Pettiford

contends that the district court that presided over his case erred

in the following ways: (1) by admitting evidence of a prior drug

trafficking offense at trial; (2) by denying his motion for a new

trial based on newly discovered evidence; and (3) by denying his

motion for judgment of acquittal on the ground that the evidence

was insufficient to prove that the cocaine base found in his car

was crack cocaine. We reject these challenges and affirm the

judgment of the district court.

I

On May 11, 2006, Officer David Augustine of the

Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) stopped a 2003 Ford

Expedition because of a burned-out headlight. Defendant

Pettiford was the sole occupant of the vehicle, and Augustine

determined that its registration was expired. Augustine let the

defendant go with a warning notice regarding the headlight.

Four days later, on May 15, 2006, MPD officers James

Chastanet and Theodore Brosey stopped the same Ford

Expedition. Pettiford was again the sole occupant. This time,

the officers arrested Pettiford for driving an unregistered vehicle

and searched the passenger compartment incident to the arrest.

In the center console, located between the driver’s and

passenger’s seats, Chastanet found a clear plastic bag. The bag

contained: (1) loose “medium clusters of white, rock-like

substances”; (2) a medium-size ziplock bag with “a large cluster

of white, rock-like substance”; and (3) three smaller ziplock

bags with “medium and small rock-like substances.” 11/27/06

Tr. 129. The police also found in the console a digital scale,

plastic gloves, and envelopes. The white, rock-like substances

field-tested positive for cocaine base.

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3

On June 13, 2006, a grand jury indicted Pettiford on one

count of possession with intent to distribute five grams or more

of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and

841(b)(1)(B)(iii). Pettiford’s first trial began on September 26,

2006, but ended in a mistrial on October 2, 2006, when the jury

was unable to reach a unanimous verdict. The case was reassigned to another judge, and a second trial commenced on

November 27, 2006. The second trial resulted in the conviction

that is the subject of this appeal.

At trial, Officer Augustine testified that he had stopped

Pettiford in the Ford Expedition on May 11, 2006, four days

before his arrest. Officer Chastanet then recounted the events

leading up to and following Pettiford’s arrest on May 15,

including the discovery of the plastic bag of drugs and the other

paraphernalia in the center console of the Ford Expedition.

Based on his prior experience in making crack cocaine arrests,

Chastanet testified that he recognized the white, rock-like

substances to be crack cocaine. The parties stipulated that a

DEA chemist had analyzed the seized substances and

determined them to be 71% cocaine base and to weigh a total of

18.8 grams. Detective Anthony Washington, who qualified as

an expert witness in the distribution and use of narcotics,

identified the substances seized from Pettiford’s vehicle as

“cocaine base which is also known as crack cocaine” in

Washington, D.C. 11/27/06 Tr. 184. Detective Washington

further opined that the packaging of the cocaine base and the

presence of the digital scale and gloves were consistent with the

wholesale distribution of crack cocaine. The ziplock bags, he

said, contained “what we call eight balls, 3.5 grams which is an

eighth of an ounce” of crack. Id. at 185. In that form, he said,

the wholesale value of the drugs found in the Ford was $700; if

broken down into $10 or $20 bags for street distribution, the

same amount of crack would be worth between $2600 and

$2800. 

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4

To buttress its proof that Pettiford knowingly possessed the

crack cocaine found in the Ford’s console, and that he

specifically intended to distribute the drugs, the government

moved pretrial to introduce evidence that Pettiford had also

possessed cocaine with intent to distribute it just three weeks

earlier, on April 27, 2006. Over Pettiford’s objection, the court

ruled that proof of the prior crime was admissible. Rather than

have the government call live witnesses, Pettiford agreed that

the prosecutor could read the jury a redacted transcript of his

guilty plea to that prior offense in District of Columbia Superior

Court. Appellant’s Br. 15. 

According to the Superior Court transcript that was read to

the jury, the prosecutor in that case proffered and Pettiford

agreed to the following facts. On April 27, 2006, MPD officers

observed Pettiford engage in an apparent drug sale. They then

watched him walk to a blue Mercedes, open the front passenger

door, reach inside, bend over into the vehicle, withdraw, shut the

door, and place something on the ground near the car. The

officers subsequently stopped Pettiford and searched the car,

which was registered in his name. In the Mercedes’ center

console, the police found 48 ziplock bags containing white,

rock-like substances that field-tested positive for cocaine.

After the government concluded its case-in-chief, the

defense presented its evidence, which consisted solely of the

introduction of a certified “Vehicle Record” for the 2003 Ford

Expedition. The Record stated that, as of April 30, 2006, the

Ford Expedition was registered to a Marisa Ardelia Beam of

Annandale, Virginia. Following closing arguments, the case

was submitted to the jury.

On November 29, 2006, the jury convicted Pettiford of the

crime charged in the indictment, and on February 27, 2007, the

district court sentenced him to 86 months’ incarceration.

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Pettiford now appeals, leveling three attacks on his conviction.

He contends that the district court erred: (1) by admitting

evidence of the prior drug trafficking offense, in violation of

Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 403; (2) by denying

Pettiford’s motion for a new trial, which was based on the fact

that his plea of guilty to the prior offense was later vacated as

involuntary; and (3) by denying his motion for judgment of

acquittal, which argued that the evidence was insufficient to

prove that the cocaine base in the Ford Expedition was crack

cocaine. Pettiford also asks that the case be remanded to the

district court for resentencing in light of the U.S. Sentencing

Commission’s recent decision to lower the U.S. Sentencing

Guidelines’ sentencing ranges for certain crack cocaine offenses.

II

We first consider Pettiford’s claim that the district court

erred, under Rules 404(b) and 403, by admitting evidence that

he had possessed with intent to distribute cocaine on a prior

occasion. 

A

Rule 404(b) provides that “[e]vidence of other crimes,

wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a

person in order to show action in conformity therewith,” but that

it can “be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of

motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,

identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” FED. R. EVID.

404(b); see United States v. Pindell, 336 F.3d 1049, 1056 (D.C.

Cir. 2003). “We review a claim that a district court improperly

admitted evidence under Rule 404(b) solely to determine

whether the court abused its discretion.” Pindell, 336 F.3d at

1056-57. We find no abuse of discretion here. 

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1

See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 488 F.3d 1011, 1019 (D.C. Cir.

2007) (stating that evidence of the defendant’s prior crack sale was

admissible to prove knowledge and intent regarding crack found in the

defendant’s apartment); United States v. Douglas, 482 F.3d 591, 600

(D.C. Cir. 2007) (rejecting a challenge to the use of the defendant’s

prior arrest for selling crack at his trial for possession with intent to

distribute crack); United States v. Rogers, 918 F.2d 207, 210 (D.C.

Cir. 1990) (holding that the defendant’s prior distribution of crack was

admissible to prove that he had intent and knowledge regarding crack

found in a gym bag).

The district court admitted the evidence of Pettiford’s prior

crime to show that, in the instant case, he possessed the crack

found in the Ford Expedition’s console knowingly and/or

intentionally, and that he did so with the specific intent to

distribute it. These mental states are elements of the offense

with which Pettiford was charged. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)

(making it unlawful to “knowingly or intentionally . . . possess

with intent to . . . distribute” a controlled substance). And, as

quoted above, Rule 404(b) expressly approves admission of

prior crimes evidence to prove these elements. See also United

States v. Bowie, 232 F.3d 923, 930 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“Intent and

knowledge are . . . well-established non-propensity purposes for

admitting evidence of prior crimes or acts.”). Accordingly, we

have repeatedly approved the admission of such evidence under

the Rule.1

Pettiford does not dispute these general propositions but

argues that, in his case, “the other crimes evidence was not

needed to prove possession” or state of mind. Appellant’s Br.

8 (emphasis added). This is so, he maintains, because the police

officers testified that they stopped the Ford Expedition on two

separate days, and that on both occasions Pettiford was its only

occupant. In addition, the government’s drug expert testified

that drug dealers keep their drugs close to them, and that the

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packaging of the cocaine base and the presence of the digital

scale and gloves were consistent with wholesale distribution of

crack cocaine. If the jury believed these witnesses, Pettiford

contends, this testimony was more than enough -- without resort

to the prior crimes evidence -- to prove that he knowingly or

intentionally possessed the crack with intent to distribute it.

Prior crimes evidence, however, does not become

“irrelevant if the government’s other evidence is sufficient to

establish the elements of the offense.” Douglas, 482 F.3d at 598

n.9. As the Supreme Court held in Old Chief v. United States,

“evidentiary relevance . . . [is not] affected by the availability of

alternative proofs of the element.” 519 U.S. 172, 179 (1997).

The fact that the government produced probative evidence of

Pettiford’s knowledge and intent does not preclude it from

offering additional evidence to establish those elements beyond

a reasonable doubt.

Pettiford insists that his case is on all fours with the decision

in United States v. Linares, 367 F.3d 941 (D.C. Cir. 2004). In

that case, in which the defendant was charged with being a felon

in unlawful possession of a firearm, this circuit held that the

district court erroneously permitted the government to present

evidence that Linares had possessed a handgun years earlier. In

the trial of the crime that was the subject of Linares’ appeal to

this court, eyewitnesses testified that he had held the gun in his

hand and fired it. Referring to that testimony, the Linares court

said: 

Given the evidence in this case, we do not understand

how Linares’ previous possession of a pistol makes it

any more likely that he knowingly possessed a gun this

time. In fact, it is hard to see how Linares could

possibly have possessed the gun unknowingly, i.e.,

without being aware that he possessed it or without

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realizing that the object in his hand was a gun. . . . If

the jury believed these eyewitnesses, then Linares

possessed the gun knowingly; if it did not, then it

should have acquitted based on the government’s

failure to prove possession rather than its failure to

prove knowledge.

Id. at 946. 

This case is substantially different from Linares. We have

no doubt that there was sufficient evidence from which a jury

could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Pettiford

possessed the crack in the center console, and that he did so

knowingly and with the requisite intent. But this is not a case in

which the jury had to either believe the witnesses and conclude

that the defendant knowingly possessed the crack with intent to

distribute it, or disbelieve them and find that he did not possess

the crack at all. Unlike the situation in Linares, the unlawfully

possessed object was not in Pettiford’s hand but in the console.

Unlike the object in Linares, the object here was not one that the

defendant could not help but recognize (like a gun), but rather

a white, rock-like substance, which -- as we noted in Linares

itself -- “a reasonable jury could conclude . . . [the defendant]

believed . . . to be some ‘innocuous substance.’” Douglas, 482

F.3d at 598-99 (quoting Linares, 367 F.3d at 951). And unlike

the crime charged in Linares, the government had to prove not

only that the defendant knowingly possessed the object, but also

that he did so with the intent to distribute it. As we explained in

Douglas, in the course of rebuffing a similar attempt to apply

Linares to a prosecution for possession with intent to distribute

crack, “‘a reasonable jury could . . . conclude [] that although

[the defendant] possessed the crack . . . , the government had

failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to

distribute it’” or that he knew it was a controlled substance.

Douglas, 482 F.3d at 598 (alterations in original) (quoting

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Linares, 367 F.3d at 952). Hence, the prior crimes “evidence is

relevant to the permissible Rule 404(b) purpose of proving

[Pettiford’s] knowledge” and intent, and “the district court did

not abuse its discretion in admitting” it. Id. at 599, 600.

B

Pettiford further argues that, even if the prior crimes

evidence satisfies Rule 404(b), it is nonetheless inadmissible

under Rule 403. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 182 (noting that

evidence admissible under Rule 404(b) may be excluded under

Rule 403); Douglas, 482 F.3d at 600. That rule provides that

evidence, “[a]lthough relevant, . . . may be excluded if its

probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of

unfair prejudice.” FED.R.EVID. 403. “[B]ecause the trial court

is in the best position to perform [that] subjective balancing[,]

. . . its decision should be reviewed only for grave abuse.”

Douglas, 482 F.3d at 596 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Rule 403 “does not bar powerful, or even ‘prejudicial’

evidence. Instead, the Rule focuses on the ‘danger of unfair

prejudice,’ and gives the court discretion to exclude evidence

only if that danger ‘substantially outweigh[s]’ the evidence’s

probative value.” United States v. Gartmon, 146 F.3d 1015,

1021 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (emphasis in Gartmon) (quoting FED. R.

EVID. 403). As we noted above, the 404(b) evidence in this case

was highly probative of Pettiford’s knowledge and intent. The

crack cocaine in the Ford Expedition was not in plain view, but

rather was hidden in the center console of a car registered to

someone else. The fact that, just three weeks earlier, the police

had found Pettiford distributing cocaine from the center console

of another car made it substantially more likely that he knew

that there was (and intended that there be) crack in the console

of the Ford -- and that he intended to distribute that crack. See

Douglas, 482 F.3d at 597 (“Evidence that [the defendant]

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2

See Crowder, 141 F.3d at 1210 (noting that “the effect of a

limiting jury instruction to protect the rights of the accused” is taken

into account in assessing the balance of prejudice and probativeness);

see also Pindell, 336 F.3d at 1057 n.9 (noting, in rejecting a Rule

404(b) challenge, that the district court had taken care to safeguard

against the jury drawing improper inferences from the prior crimes

evidence). 

previously possessed and distributed crack cocaine to an

undercover officer ‘has a tendency to make’ it ‘more probable,’

FED.R.EVID. 401, both that he knew the nature of the substance

. . . he was charged with possessing [in the case at issue] and

that he intended to distribute it.” (citation omitted)).

As we acknowledged in Douglas, the admission of prior

possession-with-intent-to-distribute evidence “almost

unavoidably raises the danger that the jury will improperly

‘conclude that because [the defendant] committed some other

crime, he must have committed the one charged in the

indictment.’” Id. at 601 (quoting United States v. Crowder, 141

F.3d 1202, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc)); see United States

v. Rogers, 918 F.2d 207, 211 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (same). But

“[t]his danger . . . ‘cannot give rise to a per se rule of

exclusion.’” Douglas, 482 F.3d at 601 (quoting Crowder, 141

F.3d at 1210). And as in Douglas, the record of Pettiford’s trial

indicates no “‘compelling or unique evidence of prejudice in this

case.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 49 F.3d 769, 777

(D.C. Cir. 1995)). 

Moreover, here, as in Douglas, the district court took the

appropriate steps to minimize the danger that the jury would use

the 404(b) evidence for an improper purpose.2

 Immediately

after the prosecutor read the transcript of the plea in the prior

case, the court carefully instructed the jury that it could consider

that evidence only to help decide whether the defendant

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11

possessed the cocaine base knowingly, intentionally, and with

specific intent to distribute it, and not for any other purpose.

The court made clear that the defendant was “not charged . . .

with any offense relating to the events of April 27, 2006,” that

the jury could “not consider this evidence to conclude the

defendant has a bad character or that he has a criminal

propensity,” and that it could not consider it “in deciding

whether the government has proved the defendant committed the

acts constituting the charged offense.” 11/27/06 Tr. 198-99.

The court gave the same instructions before sending the case to

the jury on the following day. In short, the district court took

proper “‘caution to guard the space between the permissible and

impermissible inferences by instructing the jury to consider the

evidence only for its proper purpose.’” Pindell, 336 F.3d at

1057 n.9 (quoting Mitchell, 49 F.3d at 777).

The only ground Pettiford offers for concluding that the

404(b) evidence was particularly prejudicial is that “the jury

heard that Pettiford admitted that the allegations [regarding the

prior crime] were true,” which he believes was “very stinging

evidence” in a short trial. Appellant’s Br. 11. As Pettiford

concedes, however, the only reason the jury heard his admission

is that he “agreed to have the [redacted] transcript of his plea in

Superior Court read to the jury” rather than have the government

“call[] live witnesses.” Appellant’s Br. 4; see Appellant’s Br.

15; see also Def.’s Mot. for New Trial at 1 (acknowledging that

the prosecutor used the transcript “with the consent of the

defense”). That agreement was a perfectly appropriate tactical

decision aimed at limiting the impact of the prior crimes

evidence: the transcript that the prosecutor read was brief (less

than three pages) and described the events in a matter-of-fact

way. There is nothing to suggest that it was more prejudicial

than the kind of prior crimes evidence that this court has

previously found admissible in other possession-with-intent-todistribute cases. See, e.g., Douglas, 482 F.3d at 601; Rogers,

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3

It appears that the judge ruled the plea involuntary because

Pettiford did not understand the penalties that he faced upon entering

the plea. See 2/27/07 Tr. 7-8.

918 F.2d at 210. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its

discretion in permitting the use of the transcript.

III

As just noted, the government -- with the agreement of the

defendant -- submitted its prior crimes evidence in the form of

a transcript of Pettiford’s Superior Court guilty plea. At the time

Pettiford agreed to this procedure, he had pending in Superior

Court a motion to withdraw that plea. Appellant’s Br. 15. On

January 29, 2007, two months after the jury found Pettiford

guilty in the instant case, the judge in the Superior Court case

vacated the plea as involuntary. Id.

3

 On February 15, Pettiford

moved for a new trial in this case pursuant to Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 33, which permits the district court to grant

a new trial “if the interest of justice so requires.” FED.R.CRIM.

P. 33. Pettiford’s motion was based on the claim that his guilty

plea constituted “newly discovered evidence.” FED.R.CRIM.P.

33(b)(1). The district court denied the motion, and Pettiford

contends that the denial was erroneous.

Under this circuit’s Thompson test, a district court may

grant a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence

only if the following five conditions are met: 

(1) the evidence must have been discovered since the

trial; (2) the party seeking the new trial must show

diligence in the attempt to procure the newly

discovered evidence; (3) the evidence relied on must

not be merely cumulative or impeaching; (4) it must be

material to the issues involved; and (5) of such nature

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that in a new trial it would probably produce an

acquittal.

United States v. Lafayette, 983 F.2d 1102, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1993)

(quoting Thompson v. United States, 188 F.2d 652, 653 (D.C.

Cir. 1951)). “In reviewing the District Court’s decision on a

new trial motion, we apply a deferential standard, and will

reverse only if the court abused its discretion or misapplied the

law.” Id. 

Questioning whether the vacation of Pettiford’s plea was

newly discovered evidence at all, the district court found that it

failed multiple prongs of the Thompson test. Without casting

doubt on the court’s findings regarding the other prongs, we

affirm its conclusion that there was no prospect that a new trial

would probably produce an acquittal. Pettiford’s contention is

that, “had the jury known that the admission was not voluntary,

it likely would not have given the 404(b) evidence much credit.”

Appellant’s Br. 16. But in a new trial, the jury would not learn

of the involuntariness of the guilty plea; indeed, the jury would

not hear of the guilty plea at all. The only reason the

government used the plea transcript in the first place was that

Pettiford’s counsel preferred a dry transcript to the live

testimony of police officers who would testify that they watched

him transact a drug deal and then found crack in the same

location in which it was found in this case -- in the center

console of an automobile. As the district court made clear, had

the defendant not preferred the use of the transcript, it would

have allowed the police officers to testify about what they

personally saw on April 27, 2006. 2/27/07 Tr. 3, 9. And we

agree with the court that there is no reason to suspect that, if

there were a new trial, the live testimony would have less impact

than the transcript had in the original trial. Id. 12-13. Indeed,

the defendant’s own tactical choice indicates that he, at least,

believed the opposite. We conclude that the district court did

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4

As we recounted in United States v. Eli:

In United States v. Brisbane, the court first rejected the

possibility that, for purposes of the statute, “‘cocaine base’.

. . include[s] all base forms of cocaine.” 367 F.3d 910, 913

(D.C. Cir. 2004). It then identified “two other options”:

“First, ‘cocaine base’ could mean only crack[,] . . . the only

form of cocaine that is both smokable and widely available.

. . . The second option is that ‘cocaine base’ means any

cocaine that is smokable. . . . In addition to crack, [this]

includes in the definition ‘traditional’ freebase cocaine and

cocaine paste.” Id. at 914. In the end, the Brisbane court

concluded that it “need not choose between the[se] two

not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial.

IV

Pettiford also contends that the district court erred in

denying his motion for judgment of acquittal, which argued that

the evidence was insufficient to prove that the cocaine base

found in the Ford Expedition was crack cocaine. Pettiford’s

indictment charged him with violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and

(b)(1)(B)(iii), by possessing with intent to distribute five grams

or more of “cocaine base.” Under § 841, a “certain quantity of

‘cocaine base’ will trigger much stiffer penalties than an

equivalent quantity of powdered cocaine -- that is, ‘cocaine, its

salts, optical and geometric isomers, and salts of isomers.’”

United States v. Powell, 503 F.3d 147, 148 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2007).

Beginning with United States v. Brisbane, 367 F.3d 910 (D.C.

Cir. 2004), this court has held that, to “uphold the higher

penalties that § 841 prescribes for crimes involving ‘cocaine

base,’” the government must prove that the kind of cocaine base

seized was either “smokable cocaine base or crack cocaine.”

United States v. Johnson, 437 F.3d 69, 71 (D.C. Cir. 2006); see

United States v. Baugham, 449 F.3d 167, 171 (D.C. Cir. 2006).4

USCA Case #07-3027 Document #1101024 Filed: 02/26/2008 Page 14 of 19
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options,” because “the government did not prove that the

substance distributed was smokable and it did not prove that

it was crack.” Id. 

379 F.3d 1016, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 2004).

5

See, e.g., Eli, 379 F.3d at 1021 (upholding a conviction where

the evidence established that the substance was “‘rock-like,’” and a

chemist indicated that it was “smokable” and properly identified as

crack); Baugham, 449 F.3d at 183 (affirming a conviction where a

police witness testified that the substance was a “‘white rock

substance,’” distinguished the substance from powder cocaine, and

agreed that crack was “‘vernacular slang for cocaine base’”); United

States v. Lawrence, 471 F.3d 135, 139 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (affirming a

conviction where police witnesses testified that the substance was a

“large white rock substance” and that the sale “followed conventional

practices for the sale of crack cocaine,” and where an undercover

Our standard for reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence to establish such a statutory element is narrow: We

must accept the jury’s guilty verdict if we conclude that “‘any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential element[] of

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” United States v.

Arrington, 309 F.3d 40, 48 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).

Both Pettiford and the government stipulated that a DEA

chemist had determined that the substance found in the center

console was cocaine base. It is also agreed that the government

did not offer evidence that the substance was smokable cocaine

base. Thus, the only question before us is whether there was

sufficient evidence that the cocaine base the officers found was

crack cocaine. 

Following Brisbane, we have held that the government may

prove that cocaine base is crack cocaine in a variety of ways.5

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16

officer testified that the defendant gave him the substance in response

to his request to buy crack). 

6

The Johnson court cited the opinion in United States v. Eli,

which noted a DEA chemist’s testimony that the concentration of

cocaine base in crack cocaine is typically at least 50-60%. 437 F.3d

at 75 (citing Eli, 379 F.3d at 1021); see also Eli, 379 F.3d at 1021

(holding that purity of 36-44% did not disqualify a drug as crack, in

light of the chemist’s testimony that he had previously tested crack of

lower-than-typical purity). 

In United States v. Johnson, the government’s evidence, which

we found sufficient to sustain the defendant’s conviction, was

the following: a chemist testified that the substance recovered

from the defendant’s apartment was 55% cocaine base;6

 the

seizing officers “testified that the recovered drugs were ‘rock’

or ‘white rock,’ a description that suggests crack cocaine”; a

drug expert testified that paraphernalia found in the defendant’s

apartment, including a “‘cocaine cooking kit’” and a “digital

scale,” could be used to make crack cocaine; and the same

expert testified that the quantity and packaging of the drugs

found in the apartment were consistent with the street sale of

crack cocaine. 437 F.3d at 75. In United States v. Powell, the

evidence was as follows: testimony that the seized substance

was “‘rock-like’ and ‘off-white’ or ‘yellowish’ in color”;

testimony by a chemist that it was 83% cocaine base; testimony

by the seizing officer, experienced in crack cases, that the

substance was crack; and testimony by an expert in the

packaging and distribution of controlled substances that a

photograph of the seized material showed crack and not powder

cocaine. 503 F.3d at 148. “While not exactly overwhelming,”

we concluded that “the evidence was enough to enable a rational

trier of fact to determine that [the substance] was crack

cocaine.” Id. at 149.

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7

Powell noted that a characteristic of crack cocaine is that it can

be vaporized before the cocaine molecule decomposes, and hence can

be smoked without losing the narcotic effect. 503 F.3d at 149 n.2; see

Andrew C. Mac Nally, A Functionalist Approach to the Definition of

“Cocaine Base” in § 841, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 718 (2007).

This case is governed by Johnson and Powell. The

chemist’s report stated that the substances seized from the center

console were 71% cocaine base. Based on his experience in

“prior arrests dealing with crack cocaine,” Officer Chastanet

testified that the “white, rock-like substance” he seized from

Pettiford’s car was “crack cocaine.” 11/27/06 Tr. 127. The

government’s narcotics expert described the process by which

crack is made, noting that the end result is a “rock state form.”

Id. at 182. Examining a photograph of the seized substance, he

opined that the “cluster of white . . . rock-like substance . . . was

cocaine base which is also known as crack cocaine” in

Washington, D.C. Id. at 181. The expert further opined that the

cocaine base seized was packaged in amounts (“eight balls”)

that were consistent with the wholesale distribution of crack. Id.

at 185. And he went on to say that the digital scale found in

Pettiford’s car was typical of equipment used in wholesale crack

transactions. Id. at 187. The defendant offered no contrary

evidence.

Pettiford argues that this evidence was insufficient because

there was no testimony that the substance was smokable, and no

testimony that the paraphernalia (scale and gloves) could only be

used in the sale of crack. But Johnson and Powell make clear

that, although useful, see Powell, 503 F.3d at 149 & n.2,

“evidence about the substance’s smokability” is not required to

sustain a finding that it is crack, Johnson, 437 F.3d at 75; see

Powell, 503 F.3d at 148.7 Nor have we required the presence of

paraphernalia (or packaging material), let alone proof that the

paraphernalia could only be used in connection with crack. See

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Powell, 503 F.3d at 149.

Because the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable juror

to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance

Pettiford possessed was crack cocaine, we affirm his conviction

for violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) and (b)(1)(B)(iii).

V

Finally, Pettiford asks that we remand his case to the district

court so that he may file a motion, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §

3582(c)(2), for a reduced sentence in light of recent actions of

the U.S. Sentencing Commission. Those actions lower the

Sentencing Guidelines ranges for certain categories of offenses

involving crack cocaine and permit district courts to apply the

lower ranges retroactively. See Notice of Final Action

Regarding Amendments to Policy Statement § 1B1.10, Effective

March 3, 2008, 73 Fed. Reg. 217 (Jan. 2, 2008); Notice of

Submission to Congress of Amendments to the Sentencing

Guidelines, 72 Fed. Reg. 28558 (May 21, 2007). The

government does not dispute that Pettiford may be eligible for

consideration of a reduction in his sentence. But it maintains

that we should simply affirm the judgment below; Pettiford can

then file a motion for a reduced sentence pursuant to §

3582(c)(2). Neither party has articulated any substantive

difference attending these alternative procedural dispositions.

To the contrary, both agree that Pettiford can make the same

arguments in favor of a reduction regardless of which procedural

disposition we direct. Oral Arg. Recording at 7:37-7:43, 13:46-

13:56.

It thus appears that resolution of this dispute is without

practical consequence. In this case, moreover, the effective date

of the Guidelines amendment that Pettiford intends to ask the

district court to apply retroactively has not yet arrived. See 73

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Fed. Reg. at 217. Hence, he is not yet eligible to be considered

for a reduced sentence. We therefore affirm the district court’s

judgment and leave it to the defendant to file an appropriate

motion when he becomes eligible.

VI

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court

is

Affirmed.

USCA Case #07-3027 Document #1101024 Filed: 02/26/2008 Page 19 of 19