Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-06151/USCOURTS-ca10-94-06151-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert Lee Green
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

vs. 

ROBERT LEE GREEN, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

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FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

JUN 0 2 1995 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

No. 94-6151 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. CR-93-174-L) 

Submitted on the briefs:* 

Vicki Miles-LaGrange, United States Attorney, James F. Robinson, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for 

Plaintiff-Appellee. 

William P. Earley, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Oklahoma 

City, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, McKAY and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge. 

Defendant Robert Lee Green appeals his sentence imposed 

pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(e). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and 

we affirm. 

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously to honor the parties' request for a 

decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(f); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case therefore is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 94-6151 Document: 01019279265 Date Filed: 06/02/1995 Page: 1 
In July and August 1993, Defendant armed himself, entered the 

Rockwell Bank in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and robbed it. In 

February 1994, Defendant pleaded guilty to: (1) robbing a bank 

with a dangerous weapon--i.e., a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), 

(d); (2) carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of 

violence, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1); and (3) felon in possession of a 

firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1). 

Prior to sentencing, the government served notice that it 

would seek to have Defendant sentenced as an armed career criminal 

pursuant to the ACCA. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (specifying a 

minimum of fifteen years imprisonment and maximum of $25,000 fine 

for one who violates 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and has three previous 

qualifying convictions) . The notice cited three prior convictions 

as a basis for the enhancement: (1) a 1959 Oklahoma conviction 

for second degree burglary; (2) a 1967 conviction for robbery with 

firearms and assault and battery with a dangerous weapon;1 and (3) 

a 1975 conviction for robbery with firearms. Defendant objected 

to the use of his 1959 second degree burglary conviction to 

enhance his sentence contending the information before the 

district court was insufficient to show that he committed second 

degree burglary. The district court overruled Defendant's 

objection holding: 

The 1959 Information alleges that defendant was charged 

with breaking and entering into a building with the 

intent to commit a crime. Defendant's argument that the 

1 The district court treated the two 1967 convictions as one 

predicate conviction for purposes of sentencing under § 924(e). 

See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (1) (prior convictions must be "committed on 

occasions different from one another"). The government does not 

challenge this ruling on appeal. 

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Appellate Case: 94-6151 Document: 01019279265 Date Filed: 06/02/1995 Page: 2 
information does not clearly reflect that defendant 

himself entered the building and had the requisite 

intent is contradicted by the plain language of the 

information. 

Vol. I. Doc. 30 at 4. Thus, the court sentenced Defendant as an 

armed career criminal to 271 months imprisonment, followed by five 

years supervised release. This appeal followed. 

On appeal, Defendant contends the district court erred in 

using his 1959 Oklahoma second degree burglary conviction to 

enhance his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). We review a 

sentence enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) de novo. See United 

States v. Hill, No. 93-5130, 1995 WL 246332, at *2 (lOth Cir. 

April 26, 1995) (en bane). The government must prove a sentence 

enhancement by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. 

In determining whether Defendant's Oklahoma burglary 

conviction can be used to enhance his sentence under§ 924(e), we 

employ a 11 formal categorical approach, looking only to the 

statutory definition[] of the prior offense[], and not to the 

particular facts underlying th[at] conviction[] . 11 Taylor v. 

United States, 495 u.s. 575, 600 (1990). We examine the statutory 

elements of Defendant's Oklahoma burglary conviction to determine 

whether they substantially correspond with the generic elements of 

burglary adopted in Taylor. Id. at 602. 

In Taylor, the Supreme Court defined burglary for purposes of 

§ 924(e) as 11 any crime ... having the basic elements of unlawful 

or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in. a building or 

structure, with intent to commit a crime. 11 Id. at 599 (emphasis 

added) . In comparison, the Oklahoma burglary statute under which 

Defendant was convicted employs a broader definition of burglary: 

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Appellate Case: 94-6151 Document: 01019279265 Date Filed: 06/02/1995 Page: 3 
Every person who breaks and enters any building or any 

part of any building, room, booth, tent, railroad car, 

automobile, truck, trailer, vessel or other structure or 

erection, in which any property is kept, or breaks into 

or forcibly opens, any coin-operated or vending machine 

or device with the intent to steal any property therein 

or to commit any felony, is guilty of burglary in the 

second degree. 

Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1435 (West 1983) (emphasis added). See 

Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599 ("A few States' burglary statutes 

define burglary more broadly, ~, by eliminating the requirement 

that the entry be unlawful, or by including places, such as 

automobiles and vending machines, other than buildings."). 

Because the Oklahoma statute defines burglary in terms broader 

than the Taylor definition, Defendant's conviction cannot as a 

categorical matter provide a basis for enhancement under the ACCA. 

See. e.g., Hill, 1995 WL 246332, at *2. 

Nevertheless, where a defendant has been convicted under a 

state statute defining burglary broader than Taylor, the 

conviction may be used for enhancement purposes "if the charging 

document coupled with another document sufficiently enables the 

sentencing court to determine whether the defendant's prior 

conviction constitutes a violent felony." Id. Thus, the issue we 

must resolve in this case is whether the government produced 

sufficient evidence for the district court to conclude that 

Defendant's 1959 burglary conviction fell with the ambit of 

Taylor's definition and thus constituted a violent felony for ACCA 

enhancement purposes. 

To support Defendant's enhancement, the government introduced 

the charging information and the "judgment and sentence" to 

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Appellate Case: 94-6151 Document: 01019279265 Date Filed: 06/02/1995 Page: 4 
Defendant's 1959 burglary conviction. The charging information 

alleged: 

[D]efendant, acting conjointly and together with SCOTT 

STINE CHEATWOOD ... did then and there wilfully, 

unlawfully, wrongfully, burglariously and feloniously 

break and enter into a one-story brick building, known 

as DALE'S FOOD MARKET, located at 409 N.W. 30th Street 

... with the unlawful, wrongful and felonious intent 

then and there on the part of the said defendant to 

take, steal and carry away by stealth and fraud . 

some or all of the property therein contained . . . . 

Aplee. App. Tab 15. The resulting judgment indicated that 

Defendant was sentenced for second degree burglary after having 

been "informed of the nature of the charge." The government 

contends that by pleading guilty to an information which alleged 

all the elements of a generic burglary as defined in Taylor, 

Defendant's 1959 conviction properly counts toward enhancement. 

Defendant argues, however, that his burglary conviction 

cannot be used to enhance his sentence under§ 924(e) because it 

is impossible to determine whether Defendant himself committed 

acts sufficient to satisfy the elements of a generic Taylor 

burglary--i.e., unlawfully entering a building with intent to 

commit a crime therein. Specifically, Defendant contends that the 

1959 information does not indicate that Defendant·himself 

unlawfully entered a building with the intent to commit a crime 

therein because the information charged him with "acting 

conjointly and together with" another individual to perpetrate the 

burglary. 

We reject Defendant's argument because we have recently held 

that by pleading guilty, a defendant admits he committed all the 

well-pleaded facts contained in the indictment. See Hill, 1995 WL 

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Appellate Case: 94-6151 Document: 01019279265 Date Filed: 06/02/1995 Page: 5 
246332, at *4. In the instant case, Defendant's burglary 

information included all the elements of a Taylor burglary because 

it alleged that Defendant unlawfully entered a building with the 

intent to commit a crime. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at. 599. That the 

information also alleged that Defendant acted conjointly with 

another does not alter the fact that by pleading guilty, Defendant 

admitted that"' [he] did the discrete acts described'" in the 

information. Hill, 1995 WL 246332, at *4 (quoting United States 

v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989)). Because the record indicates 

Defendant pleaded guilty to a charge supported by an information 

which satisfied the Taylor definition, we hold the government 

established by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant's 

1959 burglary conviction was a violent felony for enhancement 

under the ACCA. 

AFFIRMED. 

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Appellate Case: 94-6151 Document: 01019279265 Date Filed: 06/02/1995 Page: 6