Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_18-cr-00016/USCOURTS-caed-1_18-cr-00016-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Miguel Angel Corrales
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

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MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

VINCENZA RABENN

Assistant United States Attorney

501 I Street, Suite 10-100

Sacramento, CA 95814

Telephone: (916) 554-2700

Facsimile: (916) 554-2900

Attorneys for Plaintiff

United States of America

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

MIGUEL ANGEL CORRALES,

Defendant.

CASE NO. 1:18-CR-00016 

STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE 

TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; 

FINDINGS AND ORDER 

DATE: May 4, 2020 

TIME: 10 a.m. 

COURT: Hon. Dale A. Drozd 

This case was set for a change of plea on March 30, 2020. On March 17, 2020, this Court issued 

General Order 611, which suspends all jury trials in the Eastern District of California scheduled to 

commence before May 1, 2020. This General Order was entered to address public health concerns 

related to COVID-19. By its own motion, this Court vacated the hearing on March 30, 2020 and 

continued the hearing to May 4, 2020. This Court excluded time under the Speedy Trial Act pursuant to 

18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) as well as 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) based upon this Court's finding that the 

ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in 

a speedy trial in light of the public health emergency posed by the coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak. 

This stipulation and order seeks to include case-specific reasons as to why time should be excluded in 

this case.

Although the General Order addresses the district-wide health concern, the Supreme Court has 

emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act’s end-of-justice provision “counteract[s] substantive 

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openendedness with procedural strictness,” “demand[ing] on-the-record findings” in a particular case. 

Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no 

exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). Id. at 507. And moreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. Id.

at 509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a 

judge ordering and ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record “either 

orally or in writing”).

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which Zedner emphasizes as both mandatory 

and inexcusable—the General Order requires specific supplementation. Ends-of-justice continuances 

are excludable only if “the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of 

justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a 

speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable unless “the court sets 

forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that the ends of justice 

served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in 

a speedy trial.” Id.

The General Order excludes delay in the “ends of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code 

T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address continuances stemming from pandemics, 

natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has discretion to order a continuance in such 

circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-week ends-of-justice continuance 

following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. Furlow v. United States, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court 

recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. Id. at 767-68; see also United 

States v. Correa, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Furlow to exclude time following the 

September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). The coronavirus is posing a 

similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated by the statutory rules. 

In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following 

case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-ofjustice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). 

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STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and 

through defendant’s counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on May 4, 2020. 

2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until June 23, 

2020, and to exclude time between May 4, 2020, and June 23, 2020, under Local Code T4. 

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: 

a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case 

includes investigative reports and related documents in electronic form, as well as audio and 

video recordings. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made 

available for inspection and copying.

b) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to consult with this client, review 

the current charges, conduct investigation and research related to the charges, and to review 

discovery in this matter. 

c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested 

continuance would deny him/her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking 

into account the exercise of due diligence.

d) The government does not object to the continuance.

e) In addition to the public health concerns cited by General Order 611 and 

presented by the evolving COVID-19 pandemic, an ends-of-justice delay is particularly apt in 

this case because:

• The change of plea hearing involves individuals with high-risk factors, such as 

age and medical conditions;

• Counsel or other relevant individuals have been encouraged to telework and 

minimize personal contact to the greatest extent possible. It will be difficult to 

avoid personal contact should the hearing proceed.

f) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the 

case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the 

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original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. 

g) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, 

et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of May 4, 2020 to June 23, 2020, 

inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] 

because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant’s request on the basis of 

the Court’s finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest 

of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the 

Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial 

must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

Dated: April 10, 2020 MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

/s/ VINCENZA RABENN

VINCENZA RABENN

Assistant United States Attorney

Dated: April 10, 2020 /s/ Roger Wilson

Roger Wilson

Counsel for Defendant 

MIGUEL ANGEL CORRALES

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ORDER

Pursuant to the parties’ stipulation and good cause shown, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the 

change-of-plea hearing currently set for May 4, 2020, is hereby continued to June 22, 2020, at 10:00 

a.m. in Courtroom 5. The time period of the date of this order to June 22, 2020, inclusive, is deemed 

excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and 3161(h)(7)(B)(i), (ii) and (iv) because it results 

from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant’s request on the basis of the Court’s finding that 

the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the 

defendant in a speedy trial.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 11, 2020 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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