Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-02150/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-02150-10/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Roseville
Defendant
Daniel Hahn
Defendant
Stephan Moore
Defendant
Janelle Perez
Plaintiff
Roseville Police Department
Defendant
Cal Walstad
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JANELLE PEREZ, an individual,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF ROSEVILLE, ROSEVILLE 

POLICE DEPARTMENT, CHIEF 

DANIEL HAHN, an individual; 

CAPTAIN STEPHAN MOORE, an 

individual; and LIEUTENANT 

CAL WALSTAD, an individual,

Defendants.

No. 2:13-CV-2150-GEB-DAD 

ORDER GRANTING EACH DEFENDANT’S 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION

The following Defendants seek summary judgment on 

claims in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”): City of 

Roseville (“the City”), Roseville Police Department (“Police 

Department”), Police Department Chief Daniel Hahn, Police 

Department Captain Stephan Moore, and Police Department 

Lieutenant Cal Walstad. Plaintiff Janelle Perez alleges gender 

discrimination claims against each Defendant under Title VII of 

the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and under 

California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), and that 

Chief Hahn, Captain Moore, and Lieutenant Walstad (collectively 

the “Individual Officer Defendants”) violated her federal 

constitutional rights to intimate association, privacy, and due 

process. 

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I. LEGAL STANDARD

A party is entitled to summary judgment if 

“the movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the 

movant is entitled to summary judgment as a 

matter of law.” . . . The moving party has 

the burden of establishing the absence of a 

genuine dispute of material fact.

City of Pomona v. SQM N. Am. Corp., 750 F.3d 1036, 1049 (9th Cir. 

2014) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)) (citing Celotex Corp. v. 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). “A fact is ‘material’ when, 

under the governing substantive law, it could affect the outcome 

of the case.” Thrifty Oil Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. 

Ass’n, 322 F.3d 1039, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A “dispute about 

a material fact is ‘genuine,’ . . . if the evidence is such that 

a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 

party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Summary judgment “evidence 

must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of 

that party.” Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Todd, 642 F.3d 1207, 1215 

(9th Cir. 2011) (citing Johnson v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. 

Dist., 251 F.3d 1222, 1227 (9th Cir. 2001)).

A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is 

genuinely disputed must support the assertion 

by . . . citing to particular parts of 

materials in the record . . . or . . . 

showing that the materials do not establish 

the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, 

or that an adverse party cannot produce 

admissible evidence to support the fact. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). 

However, if the nonmovant does not 

“specifically . . . [controvert duly 

supported] facts identified in the [movant’s] 

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statement of undisputed facts,” the nonmovant 

“is deemed to have admitted the validity of 

the facts contained in the [movant’s] 

statement.” Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 527 

(2006). A district court has “no independent 

duty ‘to scour the record in search of a 

genuine issue of triable fact.’”

Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 

2010) (quoting Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 

1996)).

II. UNCONTROVERTED FACTS

Each party submitted facts concerning the motion. The

following facts are undisputed or “deemed” uncontroverted since 

they have not been controverted with specific facts as required 

by Local Rule 260(b).1 See Beard, 548 U.S. at 527 (stating when a 

party fails to “specifically . . . challenge the facts identified 

in [another party’s] statement of undisputed facts,” the validity

of the unchallenged facts is “deemed” to have been admitted). 

In 2011, Plaintiff applied for a Police Officer 

position with the City. (Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Statement of 

Undisputed Facts (“Def. SUF”) ¶ 3, ECF No. 35.) She was hired and 

received an “offer letter” from Chief Hahn dated January 4, 2012, 

which states she would “serve a probationary period of twelve 

(12) months[, and d]uring [her] probationary period [she] may be 

 

1 Local Rule 260(b) prescribes:

Any party opposing a motion for summary judgment or 

summary adjudication [must] reproduce the itemized 

facts in the [moving party’s] Statement of Undisputed 

Facts and admit those facts that are undisputed and 

deny those that are disputed, including with each 

denial a citation to the particular portions of any 

pleading, affidavit, deposition, interrogatory answer, 

admission, or other document relied upon in support of 

that denial.

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released from City service with or without cause at the sole 

discretion of the City.”2 (Hahn Decl. ¶ 4 Ex. A, ECF No. 32-1.)

Plaintiff began her probationary period on January 9, 

2012. (Def. SUF ¶¶ 8, 10.) She was given a patrol assignment and 

a few months into the assignment, she and another officer, Shag 

Begley (“Begley”) initiated a personal relationship; at the time, 

Plaintiff and Begley were both separated from, but legally 

married to other individuals. (Separate Statement of Add’l 

Material Facts ISO Pl. Opp’n (“Pl. SUF”) ¶¶ 8-10, ECF No. 36.) On 

or about June 6, 2012, Begley’s wife, Leah Begley, filed a 

citizen complaint concerning Plaintiff and Begley. (Def. SUF ¶¶ 

23-24.) She alleged in that complaint that Plaintiff and Begley 

were having an affair and “suggested that Begley and [Plaintiff] 

were engaging in romantic interactions while on-duty.” (Def. SUF 

¶¶ 26-27.) Internal Affairs (“IA”) opened an investigation of the 

complaint, which was headed by Lieutenant Troy Bergstrom. (Def. 

SUF ¶¶ 28-29.) Lieutenant Bergstrom concluded there was no 

evidence of sexual conduct between Plaintiff and Begley while onduty, but that Plaintiff and Begley “made a number of calls and

texts when one or both was on duty” and these communications were

“potentially” violations of Police Department policy. (Def. SUF 

¶¶ 36-38.) 

Lieutenant Bergstrom provided his IA report to Captain 

Moore “for review and decision about whether disciplinary action 

 

2 The “City” referenced in the letter is the department head, Chief 

Hahn, since Section 3.06.160 of the City of Roseville Personnel Rules & 

Regulation prescribes that probationary employees receive permanent employment 

“[i]f at the conclusion of the employee’s probationary period, the employee’s 

performance has been satisfactory in the opinion of the department head.” 

(Hahn Decl. Ex. B, ECF No. 31-1) (emphasis added.)

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should be imposed.” (Def. SUF ¶ 39.) Captain Moore assigned 

Lieutenant Walstad to review the report for the purpose of 

recommending findings; Lieutenant Walstad recommended in a memo 

dated July 10, 2012 that the Department find Plaintiff’s and 

Begley’s on-duty cellphone use violated Police Department policy.

(Def. SUF ¶¶ 42-43.) Captain Moore agreed with Lieutenant 

Walstad’s findings and “felt” Plaintiff should be released from 

probation, but Chief Hahn “disagreed and felt a reprimand was”

the appropriate sanction. (Def. SUF ¶¶ 49-50.) Captain Moore 

“issued a findings memo to each Perez and Begley stating that two 

alleged policy violations were ‘sustained;’” and he “also issued 

written reprimands dated August 23, 2012, to both Begley and

Perez, stating: (1) they made personal telephone calls while on 

duty that interfered with their work performance in violation of 

[Policy Manual] section 340.3.5(c); and (2) their personal 

relationship impacted and reflected unfavorably upon the 

Department in violation of [Policy Manual] section 340.3.5(aa).” 

(Def. SUF ¶¶ 51-52.)

Plaintiff and Begley appealed their reprimands and 

Plaintiff’s appeal meeting with Chief Hahn was scheduled to be 

held on September 4, 2012. (Def. SUF ¶¶ 53, 55.) At the 

conclusion of her appeal meeting, Chief Hahn advised Plaintiff 

she was being released from probation and provided her with a 

written notice of dismissal, effective September 4, 2012. (Def. 

SUF ¶¶ 55, 91, 94.) The written notice was prepared in advance of 

the meeting and Chief Hahn declares he “had already decided to 

terminate [Plaintiff’s probationary] employment based on . . .

additional information he had learned [before he met with 

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Plaintiff on her appeal]”. (Def. SUF ¶ 97.) 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Title VII and FEHA Claims

Each Defendant seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff’s 

discrimination claims, in which she alleges her probationary 

employment was terminated because of her gender. Defendants 

assert Plaintiff’s probation was terminated for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons that are unrelated to her gender. 

Specifically, Chief Hahn, who terminated Plaintiff’s employment 

approximately eight months after she commenced her twelve month 

probation period, declares he terminated her employment for three 

reasons:

[First,] [s]ometime between the conclusion of 

the IA investigation and September 4, 2012, 

[Chief Hahn] learned from Lieutenant Maria 

Richardson that some of the Department’s 

female officers had raised concerns about 

[Plaintiff’s] attitude and poor communication 

skills with them. When [he] learned this, 

[Chief Hahn] recalled there being similar 

issues of concern from [Plaintiff’s] 

background investigation report regarding her 

relationships with female officers at her old 

department[, the South San Francisco Police 

Department.]3

. . . . 

[When the Police Department] performed the 

customary pre-employment background 

investigation regarding Plaintiff, [it 

revealed] some issues of concern regarding 

her attitude and conflict with other female 

officers at her former department . . . [but] 

 

3 Plaintiff objects to this South San Francisco Police Department 

evidence arguing it is vague, ambiguous, hearsay, and improper character 

evidence. Defendants counter the evidence is not hearsay since it “is not 

offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but rather for its effect 

on” Chief Hahn, and that it is not improper character evidence since it is 

offered for the limited purpose of explaining Chief Hahn’s decision. (Def.s’ 

Reply to Mem. P&A Opp’n Def. Mot. Summ. J. ¶ 6, ECF No. 48-1.) In light of 

Defendants’ stated purpose of this evidence, the objections are overruled.

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it was unclear whether those conflicts were 

entirely her fault. 

. . . . 

[Second,] [s]ometime in mid-to late-August 

2012, [Chief Hahn] learned from Lieutenant 

Troy Bergstrom of a citizen complaint about 

[Plaintiff] that had come in through the 

Department’s online “complaint or concern” 

system. The complaint arose out of a domestic 

violence related call and what the 

complainant viewed as rude or inappropriate 

statements by [Plaintiff]. . . . Apparently 

[the complainant] did not wish to pursue it 

further, and [the Police Department] did not 

open a formal internal investigation. 

[Third,] [o]n or about August 30, 2012, 

[Chief Hahn] had a conversation with Sargent 

Kelby Newton and Lieutenant Marc Glynn about 

a shift trade issue that had arisen involving 

[Plaintiff]. Sargent Newton, who at the time 

was . . . tasked with many scheduling and 

administrative matters, had contacted 

[Plaintiff] to determine when she would work 

the ‘back end’ of a shift trade she had . . . 

arranged with Begley . . . . Sargent Newton 

told [Chief Hahn that Plaintiff] had 

demonstrated a bad attitude with him on the 

phone, taking the position that it was none 

of the department’s business when she worked 

the trade shift, and that it was between her 

and Begley (which is how she said it was done 

at her old department). . . . Newton told 

[Chief Hahn that Plaintiff’s] attitude with 

him on the phone was so bad he actually asked 

her what he had done to upset her, and she 

told him words to the effect that it wasn’t 

him but the Department was treating her 

poorly. [Chief Hahn] was very concerned about 

the attitude [Plaintiff] had displayed with 

Sargent Newton. Newton later documented his 

conversation with [Plaintiff] in a written 

memo and [Chief Hahn] received a copy.

. . . . 

Shortly after [Chief Hahn’s] August 30 

conversation with Sargent Newton, [he] 

decided, based on all the new issues of 

concern [he] had recently learned from 

[Sargent Newton], Lieutenant Richardson, and 

Lieutenant Bergstrom, to release [Plaintiff] 

from probation.

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(Hahn Decl. ¶¶ 3, 14-17, 19, ECF No. 32.)

Defendants, through counsel, also argue a fourth reason 

for Plaintiff’s termination was “Chief Hahn’s knowledge from the 

IA report that Perez had engaged in personal communications while 

on duty and while involved in police duties.” (Mem. ISO Defs.’ 

Mot. Summ. J. (“Mot.”) 8:7-8, ECF No. 29.) However, Chief Hahn

avers he “did not release [Plaintiff] from probation based on the

results of the IA investigation . . . [since making] personal 

calls during work time . . . was a concern, but not one 

warranting termination.” (Hahn Decl. ¶ 27.) 

Plaintiff responds that each asserted legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her probationary employment 

was a pretext for gender discrimination, and that her gender was 

a motivating factor in the Chief’s termination decision.

Plaintiff’s Title VII and FEHA gender discrimination 

claims “operate under the same guiding principles,” and therefore 

“we need only assess her claim[s] under federal law.” Brooks v. 

City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 923 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing 

Beyada v. City of L.A., 65 Cal. App. 4th 511, 517 (1998)). 

1. Pretext

A “plaintiff may establish pretext either 

directly by persuading the court that a 

discriminatory reason more likely motivated 

the employer or indirectly by showing that 

the employer's proffered explanation is 

unworthy of credence.” If a plaintiff uses 

circumstantial evidence to satisfy this 

burden, such evidence “must be specific” and 

“substantial.” “An employee in this situation 

can not simply show the employer’s decision 

was wrong, mistaken, or unwise.” “Rather, the 

employee must demonstrate such weaknesses, 

implausibilities, inconsistencies, 

incoherencies, or contradictions in the 

employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for 

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its action that a reasonable factfinder could 

rationally find them unworthy of . . . 

credence . . . and hence infer that the 

employer did not act for the . . .

nondiscriminatory reasons.”

Dep’t of Fair Emp’t and Hous. v. Lucent Tech., Inc., 642 F.3d 

728, 746 (9th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added, internal citations 

omitted.) “In assessing whether the employer’s reason for the 

action is pretextual, ‘it is not important whether [the proffered 

justification] is objectively false,’ . . . . ‘[r]ather, courts 

only require that an employer honestly believed its reason for 

its actions, even if its reason is foolish, or trivial or even 

baseless.” Westendorf v. West Coast Contractors of Nev., Inc., 

712 F.3d 417, 425 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Villiarimo v. Aloha 

Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1063 (9th Cir. 2002)). “All of 

the evidence—whether direct or indirect—is to be considered 

cumulatively. Shelley v. Geren, 666 F.3d 599, 609 (9th Cir. 

2012).

a. Rapport with Female Co-Workers

Plaintiff responds to Chief Hahn’s averment that her 

probationary employment was terminated because of her negative 

rapport with female co-workers, contending this reason is a 

pretext for gender discrimination since she testified during her

deposition that she “did not think” she had ever worked with 

another female officer at the Police Department, and her July 

2012 performance evaluation listed her communication skills as

satisfactory. (O’Dowd Decl. Ex. C (“Perez Dep. Tr.”) 61:24-62:7, 

ECF No. 38; O’Dowd Decl. ¶ 13 Ex. U, ECF Nos. 37, 43.)4

 

4 Defendants object to Plaintiff’s performance evaluation arguing it 

has not been properly authenticated, Plaintiff lacks foundation, and the 

content of the evaluation is hearsay. (Pl. SUF ¶ 85.) Plaintiff’s counsel 

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Plaintiff’s testimony that she “did not think” she had 

worked with any female officers does not controvert Chief Hahn’s 

declaration that he learned she had “poor communication” with 

other female officers since an employee does have to engage in an

assigned work task with other officers to communicate with them.

Further, Plaintiff’s testimony that she “did not think” she had 

worked with any female officer does not evince that she remembers 

whether she in fact worked with a female officer. Nor does 

Plaintiff’s July 2012 performance evaluation support drawing a 

reasonable inference of gender discrimination since it reported 

how Plaintiff’s performance was perceived before Chief Hahn spoke 

with Lieutenant Richardson “[s]ometime between the conclusion of 

the IA investigation and September 4, 2012.” (Hahn Decl. ¶ 14.)5

Therefore Plaintiff has not presented evidence from which a

reasonable inference could be drawn that Chief Hahn’s reliance on 

this reason for terminating her probationary employment was a 

pretext for gender discrimination. 

b. “Agitated” Communication with a Superior

Plaintiff responds to Chief Hahn’s averment that her 

probationary employment was terminated because he learned from

 

declares that the document was created by the Police Department and produced 

by Defendants in discovery. Therefore, Defendants’ authentication and 

foundation objections are overruled. See Orr v. Bank of Am., NT&SA, 285 F.3d 

764, 777 n.20 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Maljack Prods., Inc. v. GoodTimes Home 

Video Corp., 81 F.3d 881, 889 n. 12 (9th Cir. 1996) for the proposition that 

“documents produced by a party in discovery were deemed authentic when offered 

by the party-opponent.”). Further, Defendants have not shown that the content 

of the documents are hearsay in the situation here where they are used 

“against an opposing party.” Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2). 

5 Chief Hahn does not specify when “the conclusion of the IA 

investigation” occurred. (Hahn Decl. ¶ 14.) However, it is uncontroverted that 

Lieutenant Bergstrom provided his IA report to Captain Moore for review by at 

least July 10, 2012, (Def. SUF ¶¶ 39, 42-43), and that Captain Moore “issued a 

findings memo to . . . [Plaintiff] stating that two alleged policy violations 

[against her] were ‘sustained’” on August 23, 2013. (Def. SUF ¶¶ 51-52.)

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Sargent Newton that Plaintiff had an “agitated” discussion with 

Newton, contending it is a pretext for gender discrimination, and 

that this is evidenced by Chief Hahn’s violation of standard 

operating procedure by forcing Sargent Newton to write a memo

about the matter. Plaintiff supports her position citing Sargent 

Newton’s deposition testimony in which he testified that after 

speaking on the phone with Plaintiff, he was called to Lieutenant 

Glynn’s office and upon arrival he saw Lieutenant Glynn, Captain 

Moore, and Chief Hahn; Sargent Newton only expected to see 

Lieutenant Glynn; Newton’s superiors then asked him to write a 

memo about his conversations with Plaintiff. (Newton Dep. Tr. 

38:14-39:13.) Sargent Newton also testified it was “weird” that 

he was asked to write a memo since he “ha[d] never written a memo 

about a phone conversation before” in seventeen years working for 

the Police Department, and when he saw Captain Moore and Chief 

Hahn he “kn[ew] something [was] going on.” (Newton Dep. Tr. 

38:15-39:6.) 

However, this evidence does not “demonstrate such 

weaknesses . . . in . . . [Chief Hahn’s] proffered legitimate 

reason[] for [terminating Plaintiff’s probationary employment]

that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find [this 

termination reason] unworthy of . . . credence.” Lucent Tech., 

Inc., 642 F.3d at 746 (internal citations omitted). Chief Hahn 

did not need a memo memorializing the communications to justify 

relying on them as a basis for terminating Plaintiff’s 

probationary employment. Chief Hahn declares he spoke to Sargent 

Newton directly about the issue before Sargent Newton wrote the 

memo, averring: 

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On or about August 30, 2012, I had a 

conversation with Sgt. Kelby Newton and Lt. 

Marc Glynn about a shift trade issue that had 

arisen involving Perez. Sgt. Newton, who at 

the time was the day shift sergeant tasked 

with many scheduling and administrative 

matters, had contacted Perez to determine 

when she would work the “back end” of a shift 

trade she had apparently informally arranged 

with Begley without using the Department’s 

approval form. During our conversation, Sgt. 

Newton told me Perez had demonstrated a bad

attitude with him on the phone, taking the

position that it was none of the department’s 

business when she worked the trade shift, and 

that it was between her and Begley (which is 

how she said it was done at her old 

department). Perez also apparently inquired 

as to whether it was Lt. Richardson who gave 

Newton direction to follow up on the matter 

(it had not been − Newton was performing his 

typical duties and reporting the issue to his 

own lieutenant, Lt. Glynn). Newton told me 

Perez’ attitude with him on the phone was so 

bad that he actually asked her what he had 

done to upset her, and she told him words to 

the effect that it wasn’t him but the

Department was treating her poorly. I was 

very concerned about the attitude Perez had 

displayed with Sgt. Newton.

(Hahn Decl. ¶¶ 16-17.) Plaintiff has not presented a genuine 

issue of material fact concerning whether Chief Hahn honestly 

believed Plaintiff had an agitated conversation with Sargent 

Newton, and displayed a bad attitude that concerned him. 

c. Citizen Complaint Concerning Domestic 

Violence Call

Plaintiff also contends that Chief Hahn’s averment that

her probationary employment was terminated because of a citizen 

complaint, in which it was alleged that Plaintiff was rude during 

a domestic violence investigation, is a pretext for gender 

discrimination. Plaintiff cites Chief Hahn’s deposition testimony 

where he “testified that he felt no need to get [Plaintiff’s] 

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side of the story” as support for this contention; Plaintiff 

contends this failure “mitigates the importance of the [citizen] 

complaint” and “bears on the complaint’s veracity.” (Mem. P&A 

Opp’n Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. (“Opp’n”) 14:17-21, ECF No. 34.) 

Plaintiff also states Chief Hahn testified that the complaint 

never rose to the level of a formal investigation and that he did 

not know if anyone had ever talked with Plaintiff about the 

incident; and that when Chief Hahn was asked if he was 

“interested in hearing [Plaintiff’s] side of the story,” he

answered, “Well, we would have [if] it was an internal affairs 

complaint, but it never became one.” (O’Dowd Decl. Ex. A (“Hahn 

Dep. Tr.”) 55:24-56:7, ECF No. 38.) 

Even if Chief Hahn’s reliance on the complaint is 

considered trivial, when viewing this evidence in the light most 

favorable to Plaintiff as required under the summary judgment 

standard, Plaintiff has not shown that Chief Hahn’s declared 

reliance on the complaint was a pretext for gender 

discrimination. 

d. Cumulative Evidence

Plaintiff argues that the cumulative weight of the 

evidence evinces that Chief Hahn’s stated reasons for terminating 

her employment were pretext for gender discrimination. Defendants 

respond that Plaintiff has not countered their

evidentiary showing with specific facts from 

which a reasonable inference can be drawn

that Defendants’ proffered explanation for 

her release from probation is a pretext for 

discrimination[;] and [d]istilled to its 

essence, [Plaintiff’s] . . . attempt to 

establish pretext relies on her own 

speculative belief that Chief Hahn was 

motivated by her gender when he released her 

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from probation.

(Def. Reply (“Reply”) 8:8-12, ECF No. 48.) Defendants also 

respond that Plaintiff has not overcome the same actor inference

principle, which creates a strong presumption that there was no 

discriminatory reason for terminating her probationary 

employment, under the circumstances here where Plaintiff was 

hired and fired by the same individual within a 12-month period. 

“[W]here the same actor is responsible for both the 

hiring and firing of a discrimination plaintiff, and both actions 

occur within a short period of time, a strong inference arises 

that there was no discriminatory motive.” Bradley v. Harcourt, 

Brace & Co., 104 F.3d 267, 270-71 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that 

terminating an employee after 12-months occurred within a short 

period of time). It is uncontroverted that Chief Hahn was the 

decision-maker responsible for both hiring Plaintiff in January 

2012 and terminating her probationary employment in September 

2012. (Def. SUF ¶¶ 7-8, 94-95.) “The same-actor inference is a 

‘strong inference’ that a court must take into account on a 

summary judgment motion.” Schechner v. KPIX-TV, 686 F.3d 1018, 

1026 (9th Cir. 2012).

Chief Hahn is entitled to the strong inference arising 

from the same-actor principle, and this inference weighs heavily 

against the inferences Plaintiff seeks to have drawn from the 

evidence on which she relies in support of her gender

discrimination claims. 

2. Mixed-Motive Theory

Plaintiff argues that even if there is insufficient 

evidence from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that 

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the stated reasons for terminating her probationary employment 

were pretext for gender discrimination, she still defeats

Defendants’ motion under a mixed-motive theory since her 

“evidence show[s] [that her termination] was motivated, at least 

in part, by [her] gender.” (Opp’n 15:27-28.) Specifically, 

Plaintiff argues Begley and male probationary officers were 

treated more favorably by the Police Department than she was, and 

that their more favorable treatment evinces that her gender was a 

motivating factor in Chief Hahn’s decision to terminate her 

probationary employment.6

Even where “the evidence . . . permit[s] a finding that 

[an employer] has a legitimate reason for [terminating a 

plaintiff’s employment],” summary judgment in favor of the 

employer is error if “a reasonable factfinder could conclude that 

the [termination] decision was motivated at least in part by 

[plaintiff’s] gender.” Dominguez-Curry v. Nev. Transp. Dep’t, 424 

F.3d 1027, 1041 (9th Cir. 2005). Under the mixed-motive theory, 

“unlawful [termination] is established when the complaining party 

demonstrates that . . . [gender] was a motivating factor for [her 

termination], even though other [legitimate] factors also 

motivated the [termination].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (emphasis 

added).

///

 

6 Plaintiff also cites the experiences of another female officer, 

Officer Greene, who claims she experienced gender discrimination when applying 

for a promotion at the Police Department, in support of her argument that 

gender was a motivating factor in Chief Hahn’s decision to terminate 

Plaintiff’s employment. However, Plaintiff fails to present evidence that 

Chief Hahn was involved in Officer Greene’s allegedly discriminatory 

experience at the Police Department and therefore, Plaintiff fails to show 

this evidence is relevant to her claims. 

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a. Begley’s Treatment

Plaintiff argues her mixed-motive gender discrimination

position is evinced by the following differences between how the 

Police Department treated her and how it treated Begley: (1) she 

“was terminated, while Begley was not;” (2) “the [Police] 

Department included a female sergeant in [Plaintiff’s] IA 

notification meeting” yet “[t]his female sergeant was not present

when Begley was notified” of the IA investigation; and, (3)

although one of Chief Hahn’s stated reasons for terminating 

Plaintiff’s probationary employment was an “agitated” 

conversation she had with a superior, Begley had a similar 

conversation with his superior but “was not reprimanded or 

terminated for this behavior.” (Opp’n 11:20-25.)

Defendants reply that Begley’s employment was not 

terminated since “there is no evidence of him engaging in the 

behavior that collectively led” Chief Hahn to release Plaintiff 

from probation, and even if Plaintiff could show her probation 

was terminated as a result of the IA investigation, Begley 

“successfully passed probation years ago and had a positive 

performance history,” showing he had a “dissimilar employment 

status” to Plaintiff. (Reply 3:5-16.) Defendants support their 

position citing the uncontroverted facts that Begley “was hired 

by the City in 2007, successfully completed his probationary 

period, and had a positive performance history.” (Def. SUF ¶ 25.) 

Defendants also argue that Begley’s “heated exchange” with 

Lieutenant Bergstrom is not evidence that Plaintiff’s gender was 

a motivating factor in her termination since “[t]he circumstances 

of the Begley/Bergstrom exchange were different from the 

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[Plaintiff]/Newton exchange.” (Reply 3:23-26.) Specifically, 

Defendant argues “Begley and Bergstrom had an established 

relationship . . . and Bergstrom invited Begley to say what was 

on his mind . . . . [while Plaintiff] and Newton had no such 

history . . . [;] nor did she ask for or receive the proverbial 

‘permission to speak freely.” (Reply 3:26-4:1.) Defendants cite 

the following uncontroverted fact in support for their position: 

when Begley and Bergstrom had what Plaintiff refers to as a 

“heated argument,” “Bergstrom invited Begley (who he ‘knew pretty 

well’) to say what was on his mind and not beat around the bush.” 

(Def. SUF ¶ 41.)

Plaintiff supports her position concerning IA 

notification meeting by citing Lieutenant Bergstrom’s deposition 

testimony where he testified he brought a female sergeant with 

him to inform Plaintiff of the IA investigation, but he was not 

accompanied by a female officer when he informed Begley of the IA 

investigation. Lieutenant Bergstrom explained the difference in 

this treatment in his deposition as follows: because of “[t]he 

type of allegation that it was, [he thought] it might make 

[Plaintiff] feel more comfortable if [a female] was there[;]” 

however, Bergstrom was not accompanied by a female sergeant when 

he informed Begley of the IA investigation since Begley is “male” 

and Bergstrom “kn[ew] Officer Begley, so it’s different.” (O’Dowd 

Decl. Ex. F Bergstrom Dep. Tr. 40:20-42:12, ECF No. 38.) 

Plaintiff also relies on Begley’s deposition testimony

to show that he also had an agitated conversation with a superior 

and yet was not disciplined. Begley testified he had a “heated 

argument” with Lieutenant Bergstrom after he was notified about 

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the IA investigation; both men yelled, but “nothing came of” it. 

(Begley Dep. Tr. 90:16-92:12.)

Although Plaintiff argues Begley should have been 

terminated since she was terminated, the evidence does not 

support drawing a reasonable inference that Begley engaged in the 

conduct that Chief Hahn declares justified releasing Plaintiff

from her probationary employment position. Nor has Plaintiff 

explained how having a female officer present when she was 

informed about the IA investigation demonstrates that her gender 

was a motivating factor in the termination decision. Moreover, 

Chief Hahn has not been shown to lack credence regarding his 

concern about the bad attitude Plaintiff displayed when 

communicating with a superior officer about a shift scheduling 

matter. 

b. Treatment of Male Probationary Officers

Plaintiff also argues that the Police Department 

treated male probationary officers more favorably than she was 

treated, and that this evinces her gender was a motivating factor 

in Chief Hahn’s decision to terminate her employment. Plaintiff 

argues “male lateral officers with similar or less experience 

[than she had]. . . were released early from the field training 

program, while [Plaintiff] was required to do the full ten (10) 

work weeks.” (Opp’n 12:9-11.) Plaintiff supports of her position 

citing the field evaluations of a male officer, but does not 

identify where the evaluations indicate the length of the 

officer’s field training, (O’Dowd Decl. Ex. L);7 and cites her 

 

7 Plaintiff also cites to her own deposition testimony where she 

testified that three male officers completed their field training program in 

less than ten weeks, however she “d[id not] remember” the source of this 

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declaration in which she avers that she spent ten “work weeks” in 

field training while a male coworker spent only nine.8 (Perez 

Decl. ¶ 2.) Plaintiff also argues that Captain Moore testified

“he wanted to terminate [Plaintiff’s employment] as soon as she 

was the subject of the initial IA, based on his . . . ‘personal 

experience . . . that a problem in someone’s . . . probationary 

period is often a red flag for future problems,’” yet “[a]t least 

two . . . male [probationary] officers . . . were the subject of 

IA investigations and were not terminated.”

9 (Opp’n 12:8-17.)

Plaintiff supports her position citing the uncontroverted facts

that Captain Moore “felt” that after the IA report was completed, 

releasing Plaintiff from probation would have been appropriate 

“based on his training with regard to probationary employees.” 

(Def. SUF ¶ 50). Plaintiff also cites her own declaration, in 

which Plaintiff declares she “served as a witness in an IA 

investigation” of a male probationary officer who was said to 

have been “rude and unprofessional to a citizen during a traffic 

stop,” but who “was allowed to pass probation.” (Perez Decl. ¶

 

information about the first two officers and testified that she heard about 

the third officer from “his own mouth.” Defendants object to this statement as 

hearsay. The objection is sustained. 

8 Defendant objects to the field training evaluation as “untimely, 

unauthenticated hearsay within hearsay.” (Pl. SUF ¶ 7.) However, O’Dowd 

declares the document is “[a] true and correct copy of Doe #3’s field training 

evaluations, received in Defendants’ Responses to Plaintiff’s Request for 

Production of Documents Set Two.” (O’Dowd Decl. ¶ 4.) Therefore, Defendants 

authentication objection is overruled. See Orr, 285 F.3d at 777 n.20 (citing 

Maljack Prods., Inc., 81 F.3d at 889 n. 12 (9th Cir. 1996) for the proposition 

that “documents produced by a party in discovery were [considered properly 

authenticated] . . . when offered by the party-opponent.”). Defendant also 

objects to consideration of Plaintiff’s averments from her declaration since 

the averments are hearsay. However, Defendants have not shown that the cited 

portion of the declaration is hearsay and therefore the objection is 

overruled. 

9 Plaintiff also argues that “at least one male officer was also 

given the option to resign in lieu of release from Probation,” and Plaintiff 

“was never afforded this opportunity,” but what Plaintiff cites does not 

support her assertion. 

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27, ECF No. 41.) Plaintiff further cites the deposition testimony 

of Chief Hahn and Captain Moore in which they testify about an IA 

investigation into whether a male probationary officer flirted 

with a woman while on-duty, in which no “significant findings... 

were sustained,” and the officer successfully completed his 

probationary period. (Hahn Dep. Tr. 94:20-95:18; Moore Dep. Tr. 

77:6-78:18.) 

Defendants reply that the length of Plaintiff’s field 

training program is not evidence that gender was a motivating 

factor in her termination, and cite the uncontroverted facts 

which establish: that “[t]he actual length of an individual

police officer’s field training program can be either longer or 

shorter than [10-weeks]” since “the program is not rigidly 

applied to each officer in exactly the same way, nor is it always 

a 10-week program.” (Reply 4:14-26; Def. SUF ¶¶ 13, 17.) 

Defendants also argue that although Plaintiff “contends that two 

probationary male officers were . . . treated differently because 

they were subject to IA investigations and still passed probation 

. . . . [t]here is no evidence that these officers were similarly 

situated to [Plaintiff], nor is there any inference to be drawn 

that there were somehow treated more favorably.” (Reply 5:15-

6:1.) 

Since the uncontroverted facts show that the length of 

the Police Department’s field training program is variable, 

Plaintiff’s evidence that certain male probationary officers 

finished the program more quickly than Plaintiff does not support 

drawing a reasonable inference that Plaintiff’s gender was a 

motivating factor in Chief Hahn’s decision to terminate her 

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employment. Nor has Plaintiff shown that any IA investigation

concerning a male probationary officer resulted in a finding that 

a claim was sustained. Therefore, Plaintiff has not identified 

specific and substantial evidence from which the reasonable 

inference can be drawn that her gender was a motivating factor in 

Chief Hahn’s decision to terminate her probationary employment. 

Since Plaintiff has not identified evidence from which

a reasonable inference could be drawn either that Chief Hahn’s

stated reasons for terminating her probationary employment were

pretext for gender discrimination or that Plaintiff’s gender was 

a motivating factor in Chief Hahn’s decision to terminate her 

probationary employment, Defendants’ summary judgment motion on 

Plaintiff’s discrimination claims is granted.

B. Right to Intimate Association and Privacy

Each Individual Officer Defendant seeks summary 

judgment on Plaintiff’s federal constitutional claim in which she 

alleges her First Amendment right to intimate association and 

privacy was infringed, arguing that his qualified immunity 

defense shields him from this claim. Plaintiff alleges that her 

“private sexual activities were . . . protected by the 

Constitution from unwarranted governmental intrusion,” and “[t]he 

internal affairs investigation [into her relationship with 

Begley] and the manner in which [the investigation] was conducted 

by [the Individual Officer] Defendants violated [her]

constitutional right[s].” (FAC ¶¶ 89, 95, 97, ECF No. 15.) Each 

Individual Officer Defendant argues “no authority has ever held 

that the right to privacy [or intimate association] protects a 

police officer from inquiry into aspects of her personal life 

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that impact her work . . . and therefore [Plaintiff] cannot 

sustain her burden of showing that her right to privacy [and 

intimate association] was clearly established at the time of the 

investigation.” (Mot. 21:24-28.) 

Plaintiff responds the Ninth Circuit showed her right 

to privacy and intimate association was clearly established at 

the time of the IA investigation in Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 

726 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1983), where it “held that the 

Constitution prohibits unregulated, unrestrained employer 

inquiries into personal, sexual matters that have no bearing on 

job performance.” (Opp’n 19:4-5.)

The plaintiff in Thorne completed a polygraph 

examination as part of her application to the police force; 

during which she admitted to a past relationship with a member of 

the police force, which resulted in a miscarriage. 726 F.2d at 

462. The polygraph examiner “inquired into any . . . sexual 

relations Thorne may have had within the police department, 

whether on duty or off,” and ultimately declined to hire her. Id.

at 469. The Ninth Circuit held that it was inappropriate for the 

police department to refuse to hire Thorne based on the past 

information disclosed during the polygraph examination since it

had no bearing on her job performance and “[i]n the absence of 

any showing that [a] private, off-duty [personal relationship]... 

h[as] an impact upon an applicant’s on-the-job performance . . . 

reliance on these private non-job-related considerations by the 

state in rejecting an applicant for employment violates the 

applicant’s protected constitutional interests.” Id. at 471

(emphasis added). 

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Each movant can prevail on his “qualified immunity 

[defense] . . . [if] his . . . conduct d[id] not violate clearly 

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 

reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 

U.S. 800, 818 (1982). “[Q]ualified immunity is an affirmative 

defense, and the burden of proving the defense lies with the 

official asserting it.” Houghton v. South, 965 F.2d 1532, 1536 

(9th Cir. 1992). “[D]etermining whether the law was clearly 

established ‘must be undertaken in light of the specific context 

of the case, not as a broad general proposition.’” Estate of Ford 

v. Palmer, 301 F.3d 1043, 1050 (9th Cir. 2002). 

It is uncontroverted that in June 2012, Leah Begley 

filed a citizen complaint in which she alleged Plaintiff and 

Begley were having an affair and “suggest[ed] that Begley and 

[Plaintiff] were engaging in romantic interactions while onduty.” (Def. SUF ¶¶ 23, 26-27.) It is also uncontroverted that 

after receiving this complaint, the Police Department initiated 

an IA investigation into Plaintiff’s and Begley’s conduct. (Def. 

SUF ¶ 28.) The Ninth Circuit’s holding in Thorne does not show 

that the IA investigation into Plaintiff’s relationship with 

Begley violated a clearly established constitutional right to 

privacy and intimate association under the circumstances in which 

the investigation was conducted. The Ninth Circuit limited its 

holding in Thorne to circumstances where there was an “absence of 

any showing that [the applicant’s] private, off-duty personal 

activities. . . [had] an impact upon [her] . . . on-the-job 

performance.” 726 F.2d at 471. Here, the IA investigation into 

Plaintiff’s conduct resulted from a citizen complaint that 

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suggested Plaintiff was engaged in a personal relationship with 

Begley while on-duty. Therefore, Plaintiff’s alleged right to 

privacy or intimate association was not clearly established “in 

light of the specific context of the case” and therefore each 

Individual Officer Defendant’s summary judgment motion is 

granted. Estate of Ford, 301 F.3d at 1050. 

C. Due Process Name-Clearing Hearing

Each Individual Officer Defendant seeks summary 

judgment on Plaintiff’s claim in which she alleges she was denied 

her federal due process right to a name-clearing hearing prior to 

her termination, arguing Plaintiff did not have this right since 

no stigmatizing information about her was published in connection 

with her termination. 

As early as 1972, in Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 

408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972), the United States 

Supreme Court established that a terminated 

employee has a constitutionally based liberty 

interest in clearing h[er] name when 

stigmatizing information regarding the 

reasons for [her] termination is publicly 

disclosed. Failure to provide a “nameclearing” hearing in such a circumstance is a 

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s due 

process clause.

Cox v. Roskelley, 359 F.3d 1105, 1110 (9th Cir. 2004). This right 

also applies to probationary employees. Vanelli v. Reynolds Sch. 

Dist. No. 7, 667 F.2d 773, 777 (9th Cir. 1982) (applying the 

right to a name clearing hearing in the context of a probationary 

employee). However, a name-clearing hearing is only required

where the stigmatizing charge was “made in connection with 

termination of employment.” Matthews v. Harney Cnty., Or., Sch. 

Dist. No. 4, 819 F.2d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Plaintiff contends that the stigmatizing information 

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about which she complains was published in connection with her 

termination when Captain Moore wrote to Leah Begley in response 

to Leah Begley’s complaint since a reasonable inference can be 

drawn from Captain Moore’s letter that the Police Department 

concluded Plaintiff engaged in a personal relationship with 

Begley while on-duty. It is uncontroverted that the letter 

Captain Moore sent to Leah Belgey in response to her citizen 

complaint is dated August 16, 2012 and states:

The Roseville Police Department has completed 

its inquiry into the personnel complaint you 

filed alleging your husband and a co-worker 

were engaged in a personal relationship while 

on duty. The following findings have been 

made as a result of the investigation [1] 

Unsatisfactory work performance-SUSTAINED 

[and] [2] Conduct unbecoming-SUSTAINED. 

(O’Dowd Decl. Ex. S, ECF No. 43.) 

Captain Moore’s August 16 letter to Leah Begley does 

not indicate Plaintiff’s employment was being terminated as a 

result of Leah Begley’s complaint. The letter does not specify 

whether the findings were sustained against Plaintiff, Begley, or 

both. Further, it is uncontroverted that Plaintiff’s probationary 

employment was not terminated until September 4, 2012, nine days 

after the date on Captain Moore’s letter, and Chief Hahn avers 

that the findings sustained as a result of Leah Begley’s

complaint were not a basis for his decision to terminate

Plaintiff’s probationary employment. (Def. SUF ¶ 94; Hahn Decl ¶

27.) Therefore, Plaintiff has not presented evidence from which a

reasonable inference could be drawn that stigmatizing information 

about her was published in connection with her termination. 

Accordingly, each Individual Officer Defendant’s summary judgment 

motion on Plaintiff’s Due Process claim is granted. 

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IV. Conclusion

For the stated reasons, each Defendant’s summary 

judgment motion is GRANTED. Judgment shall be entered in favor of 

each Defendant.

Dated: June 18, 2015

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