Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-03-01351/USCOURTS-caDC-03-01351-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Federal Labor Relations Authority
Respondent
National Treasury Employees Union
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 15, 2004 Decided March 8, 2005

No. 03-1351

NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION,

PETITIONER

V.

FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY,

RESPONDENT

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Federal Labor Relations Authority

Robert H. Shriver, III argued the cause for the petitioner.

Gregory O'Duden, General Counsel, and Barbara A. Atkin,

Deputy General Counsel, National Treasury Employees Union,

were on brief.

James F. Blandford, Attorney, Federal Labor Relations

Authority, argued the cause for the respondent. David M. Smith,

Solicitor, and William R. Tobey, Deputy Solicitor, Federal Labor

Relations Authority, were on brief.

Before: HENDERSON, RANDOLPH and GARLAND, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

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1At the outset of this case, the Customs Service was a part of the

United States Department of the Treasury. Since then, it has been

incorporated into the United States Department of Homeland

Security. See 6 U.S.C. § 203(1).

2 The proposals differ slightly in their wording:

Proposal 1[:] Unless it is clear that a matter at issue

was specifically addressed by the parties in [sic] this

Agreement or an existing Memorandum of

Understanding, the subject is appropriate for midterm bargaining.

Proposal 2[:] The Employer recognizes that the

Union in accordance with law and the terms of this

Agreement has the right to ... initiate bargaining on

its own and engage in mid-term bargaining over

Karen LeCraft Henderson, Circuit Judge: The National

Treasury Employees Union (NTEU or Union) petitions for

review of a decision by the Federal Labor Relations Authority

(FLRA or Authority) concluding that its proposals to define the

scope of the duty to bargain mid-term constitute only a

permissive subject of bargaining. Because the Authority failed

to adequately set forth its reasoning and also departed from

precedent without sufficient explanation, we remand the case.

I. Background

The NTEU serves as the exclusive bargaining representative

of employees of the U.S. Customs Service (Service or Agency).1

During the course of negotiations with the Agency over a new

collective bargaining agreement in 2001, the NTEU made two

proposals to require mid-term bargaining unless the matter at

issue was “specifically addressed” by the terms of the

agreement.2 The Agency refused to bargain over the proposals.

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matters not specifically addressed in this Agreement

or an existing Memorandum of Understanding.

See Nat’l Treasury Employees Union & United States Customs

Serv., 59 F.L.R.A. 217, 217 (2003).

It argued that the Union proposals involved a permissive, not

mandatory, subject of bargaining under the Federal Service

Labor-Management Relations Statute, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7135

(FSLMRS or Statute). The Union then filed a petition for

review with the FLRA on December 13, 2001. In a decision and

order dated September 25, 2003, the FLRA found the proposals

negotiable only at the election of the Agency. Nat’l Treasury

EmployeesUnion&U.S. Customs Serv., 59 F.L.R.A. 217(2003)

(Order). It concluded that the “covered by” doctrine, which —

in the absence of a collective bargaining agreement between the

parties to the contrary — limits the duty to bargain mid-term to

matters not (1) expressly contained or (2) inseparably bound up

with subjects covered in the agreement, see U.S. Dep’t of Health

& Human Serv., Soc. Sec. Admin., Baltimore, MD & Am. Fed’n

of Gov’t Employees, 47 F.L.R.A. 1004, 1016–18 (1993) (SSA),

“constitutes ... a statutory right” and that therefore an agency

may, but “cannot be required to,” bargain over a proposal

modifying the doctrine. Order, 59 F.L.R.A. at 220. Pursuant to

section 7123(a) of the FSLMRS, the Union then petitioned this

court for review.

II. Discussion

A.

We review orders of the FLRA in accordance with section 706

of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 5 U.S.C. §

7123(c). Thus, the Authority’s decision will not be set aside

unless it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or

otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

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3 At least one circuit took the opposite position, finding no duty

under the FSLMRS to bargain mid-term. Soc. Sec. Admin. v.

FLRA, 956 F.2d 1280, 1288–89 (4th Cir. 1992). 

4 Whether a matter is “covered by” the agreement (and therefore

exempt from any requirement to bargain mid-term) is analytically

distinct from whether a party has “waived” its right to bargain midterm over that matter. See Dep’t of the Navy v. FLRA, 962 F.2d

The Authority is entitled to “considerable deference when ...

applying the general provisions of the [Statute] to the

complexities of federal labor relations.” Bureau of Alcohol,

Tobacco & Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U.S. 89, 97 (1983) (internal

quotation marks omitted). We defer to the FLRA’s

interpretation of the FSLMRS if it is “reasonable and coherent.”

Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees v. FLRA, 712 F.2d 640, 643

(D.C. Cir. 1983). “If an agency construes its charter erratically

or inconsistently, however, little or no deference will be owed

to its decisions.” Id. at 643 n.17 (citing Adamo Wrecking Co. v.

United States, 434 U.S. 275, 287 n.5 (1978), and Skidmore v.

Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).

The duty to bargain mid-term derives from the FSLMRS’s

command to both labor and management to “meet and negotiate

in good faith for the purposes of arriving at a collective

bargaining agreement.” 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(4). Although the

text of the FSLMRS imposes no explicit obligation to bargain

mid-term, we concluded in Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v.

F.L.R.A., 810 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1987), that mid-term

bargaining is required under the Statute based on the purpose

and legislative history of the Statute as well as analogous private

sector precedent. Id. at 298–301.3 The FLRA adopted our

position, holding that an agency has a duty to bargain over midterm proposals regarding matters not “contained in the

agreement unless the union has waived its right to bargain about

the subject matter involved.”4 Internal Revenue Serv. & Nat’l

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48, 50 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“A waiver occurs when a union knowingly

and voluntarily relinquishes its right to bargain over a matter; but

where the matter is covered by a collective bargaining agreement, the

union has exercised its bargaining right and the question of waiver

is irrelevant.”) (emphasis in original). Here, there is no issue of

waiver because the Union made the proposals during end-term

bargaining over a new collective bargaining agreement. 

Treasury Employees Union, 29 F.L.R.A. 162, 166 (1987). The

“contained in” exception to the duty to bargain was borrowed

from the private sector. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). The FLRA

gradually refined its understanding of the “contained in”

requirement, settling on the “covered by” test enunciated in SSA:

parties are free from any duty to bargain mid-term over matters

“expressly contained in” or “inseparably bound up with” a

contract term. 47 F.L.R.A. at 1016–18. This approach was

intended to balance the twin aims of the Statute: stability in

collective bargaining agreements and promotion of collective

bargaining to the broadest extent possible. See id. at 1018.

The issue of mid-term bargaining under the FSLMRS reached

the United States Supreme Court in Nat’l Fed’n of Fed.

Employees, Local 1309 v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 526 U.S. 86

(1999) (NFFE). There the Court held that “the Statute delegates

to the Federal Labor Relations Authority the legal power to

determine whether the parties must engage in mid-term

bargaining (or bargaining about that matter).” Id. at 88. It

further held that “Congress delegated to the Authority the power

to determine — within appropriate legal bounds — whether,

when, where, and what sort of mid-term bargaining is

required.” Id. at 98–99 (internal citations omitted). On remand

from the Supreme Court, the Authority iterated its earlier

interpretation that “under the Statute, agencies are obligated to

bargain during the term of a collective bargaining agreement on

negotiable union proposals concerning matters that are not

‘contained in or covered by’ the term agreement, unless the

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union has waived its right to bargain about the subject matter

involved.” U.S. Dep’t of the Interior & U.S. Geological Survey,

Reston, Virginia, 56 F.L.R.A. 45, 50 (2000) (Interior). Like the

instant case, Interior involved a union proposal made during

end-term negotiations over a new collective bargaining

agreement. The union proposal in Interior required mid-term

bargaining over all negotiable union proposals “not covered by

the provisions of this agreement.” Interior, 56 F.L.R.A. at 45.

The Authority held the proposal to be a mandatory subject of

bargaining because it “restates a statutory obligation” and “is not

otherwise inconsistent with federal law or government-wide

regulation.” Id. at 50.

B.

This case presents an issue left undecided by the FLRA in

Interior: the negotiability of a mid-term bargaining proposal that

does more than “restate[] a statutory obligation.” Id. Under the

Statute, mandatory subjects of bargaining are those that involve

“conditions of employment,” 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(12).

“Conditions of employment” are broadly defined to include

“personnel policies, practices, and matters ... affecting working

conditions.” Id. at § 7103(a)(14). The Authority’s approach

mirrors that of the private sector. See Gen. Elec. Co. & Int’l

Union of Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers, 173 N.L.R.B. 253, 257

(1968) (“[P]reliminary matters are just as much part of the

process of collective bargaining as the negotiation over wages,

hours, etc.”), enf’d 412 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1969). See also NLRB

v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958) (parties have

an “obligation ... to bargain with each other in good faith with

respect to ‘wages, hours and other terms and conditions of

employment’ ”). Either party may bargain to impasse over

mandatory topics. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. & Nat’l Treasury

Employees Union, 18 F.L.R.A. 768, 771 (1985) (FDIC).

Permissive subjects, by contrast, are those over which the parties

have no obligation to bargain, either because they do not involve

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“conditions of employment” or because they involve “proposals

that a party negotiate to limit a right granted to it by the Statute.”

U.S. Food and Drug Admin. & Am. Fed. Gov’t Employees, 53

F.L.R.A. 1269, 1274 (1998). Permissive subjects are not

bargained to impasse. FDIC at 771 (“Clearly, if parties are not

required to bargain over permissive subjects of bargaining, it

follows that parties cannot insist on bargaining to impasse with

respect to such matters....”). Because the parties do not dispute

that mid-term bargaining involves a condition of employment,

the question is whether the “covered by” doctrine embodies a

statutory right the agency cannot be required to waive and

therefore the Union’s proposals involve only a permissive

subject of bargaining.

The Union first argues that, under FLRA precedent, the

statutory right to decline mid-term bargaining extends only to

matters “resolved” by the collective bargaining agreement and

that the “covered by” test is simply a substitute for the parties’

intent. Under the Union’s theory, the only matters “resolved” by

the agreement are the ones intended by the parties to be

resolved. Accordingly, a proposal to delineate the scope of the

duty to bargain mid-term does not affect the statutory right

because it merely clarifies the parties’ intentions. The NTEU

relies heavily on U.S. Customs Serv., Customs Mgt. Ct. &

NTEU, 56 F.L.R.A. 809 (2000) (Customs), in which the

Authority held that the parties’ intent is an “integral component

of [the second prong] of the ‘covered by’ analysis to determine

whether the matter sought to be bargained is inseparably bound

up with and thus is plainly an aspect of a subject covered by the

contract.” Id. at 814. The Union also cites a 1997 memorandum

issued by the FLRA General Counsel declaring that “the parties

may agree that the contract contains the full understanding and

obligation of the parties to negotiate over a specific matter

during the term of the agreement.” FLRA Office of Gen.

Counsel Mem., The Impact of Collective Bargaining

Agreements on The Duty to Bargain And The Exercise of Other

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Statutory Rights, at 16 (March 5, 1997) (reprinted in Appendix

to Brief for Petitioner).

Although the Union’s view of FLRA precedent is not

unreasonable, we defer to the Authority’s interpretation of its

own precedent. The FLRA’s decision in Customs explains that

the second prong of the “covered by” doctrine requires a review

of “all the record evidence,” of which the parties’ intent is a

“requisite component” but not the entire inquiry. Customs, 56

F.L.R.A. at 814. In essence, in the FLRA’s view, the “covered

by” test defines the scope of mid-term bargaining in a manner

that may be broader or narrower than the parties’ intent. In

addition, the General Counsel Memorandum cited by the NTEU

merely states that the parties “may agree” to define the scope of

the duty to bargain mid-term, presumably including an

agreement to bypass the “covered by” doctrine; it does not,

however, address whether such a proposal would be a

mandatory or permissive subject of bargaining. Moreover, the

Union offers no statutory text, no FLRA decision and no case

law to buttress its claim that the operative language governing

the scope of the duty to bargain mid-term covers only “matters

resolved through the[] agreement,” Brief for Petitioner at 26

(emphasis added), as opposed to matters “‘covered by’ or

‘contained in’ a collective bargaining agreement.” Dep’t of the

Navy, Marine Corps Logistics Base v. FLRA, 962 F.2d 48, 53

(D.C. Cir. 1992) (emphases added). The “covered by” doctrine

embodies the FLRA’s long-standing interpretation of the scope

of the duty to bargain mid-term under the Statute; accordingly,

the Union’s attempt to redefine that interpretation fails. 

The Union’s second argument — that even if the “covered by”

test defines the scope of a statutory right, it is not a “unilateral”

statutory right, and thus not subject to permissive bargaining

only — has more purchase. Many provisions of the FSLMRS

confer benefits and impose obligations in varying degrees on

labor and management. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 7111 (agency must

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5

 These sections are commonly referred to as the union (§§ 7102,

7114) and management (§ 7106) rights clauses. Section 7102 sets

out the right of employees to participate in a labor organization and

engage in collective bargaining, while section 7114 explains the

obligations of the union both to its members and to the management

group with which it negotiates. Section 7106 details management’s

authority to, inter alia, make staffing and budget determinations free

from bargaining. 

grant exclusive recognition to elected labor organization); id. at

§ 7115 (upon request, agency must pay union dues from

employee’s paycheck); id. at § 7119 (Federal Mediation and

Conciliation Services available to either party); id. at § 7121

(collective bargaining agreement must include grievance

procedure). Not all of these provisions constitute “statutory

rights” that must be waived before they are negotiable. For

instance, in Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees v. FLRA, 712 F.2d

640 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (AFGE), we held that the scope of a

statutorily-defined grievance procedure was a mandatory subject

of bargaining notwithstanding the fact that bargaining might

displace the “standard arrangement” set forth in the Statute. Id.

at 644. See also U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Internal Revenue

Serv. & NTEU, 37 F.L.R.A. 1423 (1990) (agency proposal to

permit unilateral reassignment of employees a mandatory

subject of bargaining despite union’s statutory right to bargain

over reassignment decisions).

In AFGE we examined the negotiability of proposals that seek

to alter the statutory scheme. We noted in particular the

difference between provisions that confer “unilateral rights” on

one of the parties — like the rights clauses found at 5 U.S.C. §§

7102, 7106 and 71145 — and a provision that “describes in

neutral terms a clause that must be included in every collective

bargaining agreement.” AFGE, 712 F.2d at 646. “At a

minimum,” we found, “section 7106 demonstrates that Congress

knew how to write a provision defining permissive subjects of

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bargaining unambiguously.” Id. “The Act securely establishes

that all ‘conditions of employment’ are presumed to be

mandatory subjects of bargaining....” Id. at 649. This statement

holds true “unless the Act explicitly or by unambiguous

implication vests in a party an unqualified ‘right.’ ” Id. at 647

n.27.

Subsequent decisions by the FLRA have adopted the

reasoning of AFGE that limits permissive subjects of bargaining

to “‘unilateral rights specifically vested in one party.’” U.S.

Food &DrugAdmin.& Am. Fed. Gov’t Employees, 53 F.L.R.A.

1269, 1275 (1998) (quoting AFGE, 712 F.2d at 646) (FDA). See

also Am. Fed. of Gov’t Employees, Local 225 & U.S. Dep’t of

theArmyArmament Research,Dev.and Eng’g Ctr., 56 F.L.R.A.

686 (employee performance rating formula falls within statutory

management rights under section 7106(a)(2) and therefore a

permissive subject of bargaining); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. Food

Safety and Inspection Serv. & Nat’l Joint Council of Food

Inspection Locals, 22 F.L.R.A. 586, 592 (1986) (statutory right

to file unfair labor practice charge under section 7118 a

permissive subject of bargaining). In FDA, the FLRA noted that

“unilateral rights may be specifically spelled out in the Statute”

or “rooted in more general statutory and policy consideration

[sic].” FDA, 53 F.L.R.A. at 1275. In order to remain consistent

with AFGE, however, any general statutory or policy

consideration giving rise to a unilateral right must be manifested

in the Statute by “unambiguous implication.” AFGE, 712 F.2d

at 647 n.27. 

The Authority’s decision fails to address this precedent. “It is

well-established in this circuit that where an agency departs

from its prior cases, it must offer a reasoned explanation for its

change in view.” Dep’t of the Navy, Marine Corps Logistics

Base v. FLRA, 962 F.2d 48, 56 (D.C. Cir. 1992). The FLRA

ignored FDA’s discussion (which echoed our AFGE holding) of

unilateral rights in its treatment of the “covered by” doctrine.

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Rather, the Authority merely stated that it had previously

“expressly, and in [its] view correctly, held that the ‘covered by’

defense constitutes a right under the Statute.” Order, 59

F.L.R.A. at 220 (citing Soc. Sec. Admin. & Am Fed. Gov’t

Employees, 55 F.L.R.A. 374, 377 (1999) (SSA II)). This

approach might have sufficed had SSA II thoroughly addressed

the precedent. SSA II, however, was equally conclusory in its

discussion of the nature of the “covered by” doctrine. SSA II

involved the scope of the agency’s duty to bargain mid-term

under the terms of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)

ratified by the parties as part of the collective bargaining

agreement. The MOU modified the scope of “covered by” in

the context of a mid-term bargaining proposal. Id. at 376. In

finding that the agency had waived the full scope of the doctrine,

the FLRA, without elaboration, stated that “a statutory right,

such as the refusal to bargain based on an affirmative ‘covered

by’ defense pertaining to the parties’ collective bargaining

agreement, is subject to waiver.” Id. at 377. Notwithstanding

its use of the phrase “statutory right,” the Authority’s declaration

failed to shed much light on the issue presented here. First, its

unsupported reference to the “covered by” defense as a statutory

right was unnecessary to the holding and is therefore dictum.

Second, the Authority’s statement did not address whether the

“covered by” defense is a “unilateral right” within the meaning

of AFGE and FDA, that is, subject only to permissive

bargaining. Third, the Authority was discussing the waiver of

a statutory right under a collective bargaining agreement, not the

negotiability of a proposal to modify that right. As noted earlier,

supra note 4, the waiver inquiry is not relevant in the context of

end-term negotiations over a new collective bargaining

agreement. Thus, the issue is not whether the Union’s proposals

seek a “partial[] waive[r]” of the “covered by” doctrine or

whether the latter “flows from the Statute,” but instead whether

the “covered by” defense is a unilateral right explicitly or by

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unambiguous implication conferred by the Statute. See AFGE,

712 F.2d at 646–47 & n.27.

C.

The Authority’s order also fails to explain (or even to discuss)

the relationship between the Union proposals at issue and both

FLRA and private sector precedent regarding zipper and

reopener clauses. A zipper clause is a provision in a collective

bargaining agreement that waives the right of either party to

raise issues for bargaining during the term of the agreement,

whether or not the matter was considered during initial

bargaining over the agreement. Internal Revenue Serv. & Nat’l

Treasury Employees Union, 29 F.L.R.A. 162, 166 (1987). A

reopener clause specifies the conditions under which a party

may seek to renegotiate a term “covered by” the agreement.

See, e.g., NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282, 286 (1957)

(describing reopener clause). 

The Union argued before the FLRA that its proposals were

“‘similar to mid-term reopener and zipper clause proposals

which also allow the parties to determine for themselves what

matters can and cannot be negotiated during the life of the

parties’ term agreement.’” See Order, 59 F.L.R.A. at 219. The

FLRA declared the Union’s argument “without merit” for two

reasons. Id. at 221. First, it characterized the Union’s argument

as premised on the view that the “covered by” test is a

contractual rather than statutory right; a view the Authority

simply “rejected.” Id. But this one-word response fails to

explain how the Authority distinguished the Union proposals

from a reopener clause. Moreover, as our foregoing discussion

of “statutory rights” should make clear, the issue cannot be so

easily disposed of. The dispositive question is not whether the

proposal involves a “statutory right” but whether that right is

“unilateral.” See AFGE, 712 F.2d at 646–47 & n.27. 

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Second, the FLRA treated its earlier cases discussing the

negotiability of reopener clause proposals as “not dispositive”

because “in none of those cases does the record reflect that an

agency made the claim, as the Agency does here, that those

proposals constituted permissive subjects of bargaining.” Order,

59 F.L.R.A. at 221. The Authority, however, has often ordered

an agency to bargain over a reopener proposal. See, e.g., Am.

Fed. Gov’t Employees & U.S. Dep’t of Energy,47 F.L.R.A. 470,

471–73(1993);Nat’lAss’nGov’t Employees&Veterans Admin.

Med. Ctr., 24 F.L.R.A. 147, 148–49 (1986); Am. Fed. Gov’t

Employees & Fed. Deposit Ins. Co., 21 F.L.R.A. 870, 889–91

(1986). While these decisions do not expressly refer to a

reopener provision as a mandatory subject of bargaining, they do

involve the agency’s refusal to bargain over a reopener proposal

and the resulting issuance of a bargaining order. In Am. Fed.

Gov’t Employees & Soc. Sec. Admin., 58 F.L.R.A. 341 (2003)

(AFGE II), the union proposed a limited reopener clause

regarding the implementation of a new computer program. Id.

at 342. The agency refused to bargain, claiming that the

proposal required the waiver of its statutory management rights

under section 7106 of the Statute. Id. This is precisely the

argument made by the Agency here, which the Authority treats

as a claim that the issue is a permissive subject of bargaining.

But in AFGE II, the Authority rejected the argument and ordered

the agency to bargain. Id. at 342–43 (agency “failed to

establish” reopener proposal “affect[ed]” its management rights

under Statute). Cf. id. at 343 (criticizing majority for failing to

acknowledge “long and consistent[]” precedent that reopener

proposal constitutes mandatory bargaining subject) (Member

Pope, concurring).

Additionally, although a reopener clause is a mandatory

subject of bargaining in the private sector, see McAllister Bros.

& Local 333, United Marine Div. Int’l Longshoreman’s Ass’n.,

312 N.L.R.B. 1121, 1129 (1993) (citing cases), the FLRA

conceded at oral argument that the implication of its opinion is

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that a reopener clause would be only a permissive subject in the

federal sector. Yet while the FLRA declares that it imported the

“covered by” doctrine from the NLRB, it has failed to justify its

departure from the NLRB’s approach to reopener clauses by

either identifying “practical distinctions between private and

governmental needs” or offering “some evidence in the

language, history, or structure of the statute suggesting that

Congress intended a different result.” Am. Fed. Gov’t

Employees v. FLRA, 853 F.2d 986, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1988)

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

The precedent regarding the negotiability of a zipper clause is

not as well established as that for the reopener clause. In one of

the few cases involving a proposed zipper clause, rather than the

implementation of a negotiated zipper clause, the parties seemed

to assume that a zipper clause is a permissive subject of

bargaining. Am. Fed. Gov’t Employees & Dep’t of the Navy, 44

F.L.R.A. 543, 546 (1992) (“The Agency conceded before the

Arbitrator [with respect to zipper clause] that a party may not

insist to impasse on a permissive subject of bargaining.”). Id. at

548 (according to union the “disagreement [was over] a

permissive subject for bargaining — the union’s refusal to agree

[to] zipper language”). While two members of this court have

expressed their opinion that bargaining over a zipper clause may

be mandatory, neither the FLRA nor our court has squarely

addressed this issue. See FLRA v. Internal Revenue Serv., 838

F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Edwards, J. and Silberman, J.,

concurring in denial of reh’g) (disputing that FLRA precedent

established zipper clause as permissive subject of bargaining);

See also Interior, 56 F.L.R.A. at 54 (declining to address

negotiability of zipper clause). In the private sector, the

precedent is also not clearly established. Only the Ninth Circuit

appears to have decided the question, concluding that the zipper

clause is a mandatory subject of bargaining. NLRB v. Tomco

Communications, Inc., 567 F.2d 871, 879 (9th Cir. 1978).

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The Authority omits any discussion of the relationship

between a zipper clause and the Union’s proposals. In some

respects, the Union’s proposals are arguably more analogous to

zipper clauses than they are to reopeners. While a reopener

clause is ordinarily limited to particular contractual provisions

and by certain triggering circumstances, a zipper clause, like the

Union proposals, alters the scope of the duty to bargain midterm with respect to virtually all contract terms (or, in the case

of the Union proposals, all terms not resolved by the agreement).

In Interior, the Authority expressed its intent to wait to

determine the negotiability of a zipper clause until the issue is

“squarely presented.” Interior, 56 F.L.R.A. at 54. While this

case may not present the issue as squarely as the Authority

might like, its short-shrift dismissal of the Union’s arguments

regarding the relationship between its proposals and a zipper

clause provides us once again with little basis upon which to

uphold the Authority’s decision.

For the foregoing reasons, we remand the case to the

Authority for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

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