Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-07098/USCOURTS-ca10-95-07098-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Wesley Allen Dorrough
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

· PUBLISH FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

llalted Scates Court or Appeals Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

WESLEY ALLEN DORROUGH, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

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No. 95-7098 

MAY 2 9 1996 

PATRICK FISHER 

Oerk 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. CR-89-21-1-S) 

Sheldon J. Sperling (John Raley, United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Assistant United 

States Attorney, Muskogee, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Stephen J. Greubel (Stephen J. Korr, Federal Public Defender, with him on the briefs), Assistant 

Federal Public Defender, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before TACHA, BRORBY and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

Defendant Wesley Allen Dorrough appeals his sentence under USSG §2D1.1, comment. (n.1 ). 

We have jurisdiction under 18 U.S. C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S. C. § 1291 and we affirm. 1 

1 The panel commends attorneys Stephen J. Greubel, who appeared on behalf of the 

appellant, and Sheldon J. Sperling, who appeared on behalf of the appellee, for the quality of their 

oral arguments and their candor before the court. 

Appellate Case: 95-7098 Document: 01019279328 Date Filed: 05/29/1996 Page: 1 
A jury convicted Mr. Dorrough of attempting to manufacture phenyl-2-propanone ("P2P") 

and amphetamine, possession of P2P with intent to manufacture amphetamine, conspiring to 

manufacture, possess, and distribute amphetamine under 18 U.S. C.§ 2 and 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846 

and traveling in interstate commerce in the aid and promotion of drug offenses. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 & 

1952. Under the version of the sentencing guidelines effective November 1, 1989, Mr. Dorrough 

was sentenced to 23 5 months incarceration. His sentence was calculated using the base offense level 

of34. This base offense level was determined by multiplying the entire 94liters of the liquid mixture 

which Mr. Dorrough was using to make P2P by its cocaine equivalency in accordance with the 

Sentencing Guideline's Drug Equivalency Table, USSG §2Dl.l. At the time ofhis sentencing, a 

footnote in the drug quantity table provided "the weight of a controlled substance set forth in the 

table refers to the entire weight of any mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of the 

controlled substance." USSG §2D 1.1( c) comment. (n. *) ( 1989). In reliance on this language, the 

prosecution did not produce evidence regarding the precise amount ofP2P contained in the liquid 

mixture. We affirmed Mr. Dorrough's conviction and sentence. United States v. Dorrough, 927 F.2d 

498 (lOth Cir. 1991). 

On November 1, 1993, the Sentencing Commission approved Amendment 484 to USSG 

§2Dl.l, comment. (n. 1), which provides: "Mixture or substance does not include materials that 

must be separated from the controlled substance before the controlled substance can be used." USSG 

App.C, amend. 484. This subsequent modification, which could lower Mr. Dorrough's guideline 

sentencing range, may be applied retroactively. USSG § lB 1.1 0( a) & (c). Mr. Dorrough filed a 

motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 claiming, among other things, his sentence should be 

2 

Appellate Case: 95-7098 Document: 01019279328 Date Filed: 05/29/1996 Page: 2 
recalculated in light of Amendment 484. The district court denied his motion. He appealed the 

district court's order and we remanded to the district court to determine whether Amendment 484 

warranted recalculation ofhis sentence. Dorrough v. United States, No. 94-7071, 1995 WL 43595 

(lOth Cir. Feb. 2, 1995). On remand, the district court conducted a hearing and held: 

You argue that 911iters ofP2P seized at your clandestine laboratory contained 

waste water that would need to be separated from the controlled substance before it 

could be used. Upon further review, the Court finds that you were in the process of 

manufacturing amphetamine when authorities seized the laboratory. The P2P that 

formed the basis of original offense level computations is a controlled substance 

recognized as an immediate precursor to the production of amphetamine. The 

guidelines take into account a percentage of waste in P2P evidenced by the sizeable 

decrease in drug equivalency ratios. 

The Court adopts by reference the second addendum to the Presentence 

Report, and I find by a preponderance of the evidence that offense level computation 

based on 91 liters ofP2P is reasonable and proper. 

Based on these findings, the sentence heretofore imposed will not be 

disturbed. 

Mr. Dorrough appeals this ruling claiming "the district court erred in reimposing a sentence 

based upon the entire amount of mixture found at defendant's laboratory, rather than upon the amount 

ofP2P actually present within said mixture. 

The retroactive application of a change in the offense level of the Sentencing Guidelines is not 

required by §lBl.lO(a), but rather falls within the district court's discretion. In United States v. 

Telman, 28 F.3d 94, 96 (lOth Cir. 1994), we noted "it is apparent from the language of§ lB l.lO(a)--

ie., 'may consider'-that a reduction is not mandatory but is instead committed to the sound discretion 

ofthe trial court." See also United States v. Holmes, 13 F.3d 1217, 1222 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding 

3 

Appellate Case: 95-7098 Document: 01019279328 Date Filed: 05/29/1996 Page: 3 
district court has discretion to apply Amendment 488 retroactively under lB 1.1 0( a)); United States 

v. Connell, 960 F.2d 191, 197 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding "l.Bl.lO(a) does not mandate the use of the 

lesser enhancement, but merely affords the sentencing court discretion to utilize it"). Under the abuse 

of discretion standard we will not reverse a district court's decision unless we have "a definite and 

firm conviction that the lower court made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of 

permissible choice in the circumstances." Moothart v. Bell, 21 F. 3d 1499, 1504 (lOth Cir. 1994) 

(internal quotation omitted). 

We also noted in Telman, that "[i]n determining whether to reduce a defendant's sentence due 

to a subsequent amendment, 18 U.S. C. § 3582(c) directs the district court to 'considerO the factors 

set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable' and determine whether 'reduction 

is consistent with the applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission."' 28 F. 3d 

at 96. See United States v. Avila, 997 F.2d 767, 768 (lOth Cir. 1993) (holding district court's power 

to reduce a sentence in light of a subsequent modification to the sentencing guidelines "is tethered 

to the factors contained in§ 3553(a)"). The factors to be considered under§ 3553(a) include: (1) 

the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) 

the need for the sentence imposed; (3) the kinds of sentences available; ( 4) the applicable sentencing 

range under the guidelines; ( 5) any pertinent Sentencing Commission policy statement; ( 6) the need 

to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants; and (7) the need to provide restitution 

to victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). There is no requirement that the district court make specific 

findings regarding each of the above factors as long as it states the reasons for its actions. United 

States v. Lee, 957 F.2d 770, 774-75 (lOth Cir. 1992) (internal quotation omitted). 

4 

Appellate Case: 95-7098 Document: 01019279328 Date Filed: 05/29/1996 Page: 4 
In this case, the sentencing court reviewed Mr. Dorrough's sentence in light of Amendment 

484 and after considering the relevant factors found the amendment did not warrant a change in Mr. 

Dorrough's sentence. See Telman, 28 F.3d at 97 (holding the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in failing to reduce defendant's sentence when it considered "a number" of the§ 3553(a) 

factors). In particular the court noted the case involved a clandestine laboratory engaged in the 

process of manufacturing amphetamines, P2P is a controlled substance and that the guidelines take 

into account a percentage of waste in· P2P as evidenced by a sizeable decrease in drug equivalency 

ratios. The district court also adopted the second addendum to the presentence report in its order. 

The second addendum recalculated the defendant's sentence in accordance with the amendment and 

also provided an alternative means of sentencing, as provided by USSG §2D 1.1, comment. (n.l ), 

which would resuh in Mr. Dorrough having the same offense level under the new guidelines as he had 

under the old. In light of the above record, we do not find the district court abused its discretion in 

refusing to modify Mr. Dorrough's sentence. 

The district court's order is AFFIRMED. 

5 

Appellate Case: 95-7098 Document: 01019279328 Date Filed: 05/29/1996 Page: 5 
No. 95-7098, United States y. Dorrough 

EBEL, Circuit Judge, concurring. 

Because I agree that Mr. Dorrough is not entitled to a reduction in his sentence, I 

concur in the judgment of the court, although I do so on a ground unrelated to the P2P 

quantity. I write separately, however, to express my disagreement with the majority's 

conclusions regarding the retroactive application of Amendment 484 in this case. 

The majority opinion assumes the district court decided not to give Amendment 

484 retroactive application "after considering the relevant factors" set forth at 18 U.S. C. § 

3553(a). The record before us, however, does not provide such a clear picture of the 

district court's reasoning. Indeed, at first glance, it appears the district court did in fact 

apply the amendment retroactively. The court adopted by reference the Second 

Addendum to the Presentence Report, which purported to calculate Mr. Dorrough's 

sentence "in accordance with the guideline manual in effect November 1, 1994." 

Because Amendment 484 became effective November 1, 1993, the sentencing court's use 

of the 1994 version of the guideline manual would indicate that the court at least 

attempted to apply the amendment retroactively. The majority opinion appears to 

acknowledge this possibility. ~ ante at 5 (" [T]he sentencing court reviewed Mr. 

Dorrough's sentence in light of Amendment 484 .... ") (emphasis added). 

However, the outcome reached by the district court suggests that the court did not 

apply the amendment retroactively, or if it did do so, that it erred in its application of the 

amendment. The district court stated that it was calculating Mr. Dorrough's sentence 

Appellate Case: 95-7098 Document: 01019279328 Date Filed: 05/29/1996 Page: 6 
based on the entire 91liter mixture containing P2P, even though Amendment 484 

explicitly directs a sentencing court to exclude from the drug quantity calculation those 

"materials that must be separated from the controlled substance before the controlled 

substance can be used" U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l, comment. (n.l). Because the 91liter 

chemical mixture was seized from Mr. Dorrough's laboratory before processing was 

completed, no one disputes that it would have been necessary to separate the various 

chemical by-products from the mixture before the P2P then in the solution could be used 

for its intended purpose of manufacturing amphetamine. ~United States Sentencing 

Commission, Guideline Manual, App. C., amend 484 ("The chemicals seized before the 

end of processing are also not usable in that form because further processing must take 

place before they can be used."). If the nature of the lab mixture was such that the usable 

and nonusable materials could not be separated, then Amendment 484 required the 

district court "to use any reasonable method to approximate the weight of the" P2P in the 

mixture. U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l, comment. (n.1). 1 Thus, if the district court was attempting to 

apply Amendment 484, I believe the court erred in calculating Mr. Dorrough's sentence 

based on the entire 91liter mixture containing P2P, rather than the actual amount ofP2P 

therein. ~United States v. Deninno, 29 F.3d 572, 579 (lOth Cir. 1994) ("[T]he full 

amount of the waste water need not be used in the calculation of quantity of the 

1 Mr. Dorrough presented the district court with a reasonable method of 

approximating the amount ofP2P in the mixture; namely, a chemist who testified that the 

chemicals seized from Mr. Dorrough's laboratory could have produced at most 8. 85 

kilograms, or 19. 5 pounds, of P2P. 

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Appellate Case: 95-7098 Document: 01019279328 Date Filed: 05/29/1996 Page: 7 
[controlled substance]."), cert denied, 115 S. Ct. 1117 (1995); United States v. Levay, 76 

F.3d 671, 673 (5th Cir. 1996) ("Under the amended guideline, only the actual weight of 

the controlled substance is applied in calculating the base offense level, not the aggregate 

weight of any mixture .... "). 

The ambiguity regarding whether the district court in fact applied Amendment 484 

retroactively merely underscores a more obvious judgment that can be drawn from the 

district court's opinion, which is that the district court in any event failed to undertake a 

proper retroactivity analysis. As the majority correctly observes, whether to give 

retroactive application to a guideline amendment is a decision that rests within the 

discretion of the district court after the court evaluates the factors set forth at 18 U.S. C. § 

3553(a). Although we have stated in another context that a sentencing court need not 

"make specific findings relating to each of the[§ 3553(a)] factors considered," United 

States v. Lee, 957 F.2d 770, 774-75 (lOth Cir. 1992) (addressing the factors in connection 

with a challenge to the revocation of supervised release under § 3583), the sentencing 

court nevertheless remains obligated to state clearly the reasons for its decision. ld. In 

many other sentencing areas, we have required district courts to make explicit findings of 

fact to support their sentence calculations. See, e.g., United States y. Roberts, 14 F.3d 

502, 522 (lOth Cir. 1993) ("In enhancing a defendant's sentence based on his role in tlie 

offense, a district court must make specific factual findings as to that role."); United 

States v. Molina-Cuartas, 952 F.2d 345, 348 (1Oth Cir. 1991) ("In order to impose a 

sentence based on a quantity of drugs, the trial court's factual findings must be 

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Appellate Case: 95-7098 Document: 01019279328 Date Filed: 05/29/1996 Page: 8 
determined by a preponderance of the evidence."), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 995 (1992). I 

see no reason why consideration of a sentence reduction under§ 3582(c), which 

specifically directs the district court to consider the factors set forth in § 3553(a), should 

be treated any differently. As an appellate court we are always hindered, and often 

completely prevented, from effectively reviewing the district court's exercise of 

sentencing discretion if the district court fails to address the statutorily-mandated factors 

that Congress has said should direct and guide that discretion. 

In any event, even if we were not to require the sentencing court to address 

explicitly the statutory factors, at a very minimum we require the sentencing court to 

"state the reasons for its action,"~' 957 F.2d at 775, and it goes without saying that the 

reasons provided by the court must have some correlation to the statutory factors set forth 

in§ 3553(a), ~United States v. Avila, 997 F.2d 767, 768 (lOth Cir. 1993) (holding that 

the district court's power to reduce a sentence in light of a subsequent amendment to the 

guidelines "is tethered to the factors contained in § 3553(a)"). In my opinion, the district 

court in this case has failed to comply with even this minimal requirement. The district 

court's order makes no reference to§ 3553(a), nor do any of the court's stated reasons for 

denying Mr. Dorrough's sentence reduction bear any relation to the criteria set forth in § 

3553(a). At one point, the district court did rely on the fact that the sentencing guidelines 

"take into account a percentage of waste in P2P, evidenced by the sizeable decrease in 

drug equivalency ratios." RO.A. Vol. X, p. 7. While this statement may be interpreted 

as reflecting the district court's concern about sentencing disparities, ~ 18 U.S. C. § 

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Appellate Case: 95-7098 Document: 01019279328 Date Filed: 05/29/1996 Page: 9 
3553(a) (directing sentencing courts to consider, inter alia, "the need to avoid 

unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants"), I do not believe it is a correct 

statement of the law. 

The decreased drug equivalency ratio between amphetamine and P2P cannot be 

explained on the basis of accounting for "waste" associated with P2P. The drug 

equivalency ratio remains constant throughout the manufacturing process and yet the 

amount of "waste" associated with the P2P is much greater earlier in the manufacturing 

process than it is late in the process. That is, as I understand it, the P2P becomes more 

concentrated in the mixture as it is being manufactured. Thus, under the district court's 

interpretation of the guidelines, a defendant is punished more severely earlier in the 

manufacturing process (when the P2P is more diluted and less usable) than he is later in 

the process when the manufacturing is complete and the P2P is pure. Contrary to the 

district court's suggestion, I believe P2P is punished less severely than amphetamine 

simply because it is not as dangerous a controlled substance. P2P is not an ingestible 

drug, and additional ingredients must be chemically combined with it in order to 

manufacture the finished amphetamine product. 

Finally, when the§ 3553(a) factors are addressed, I am led to conclude that it 

would be an abuse of discretion to hold that Amendment 484 does not apply retroactively 

in this case. The factors set forth in§ 3553(a) are the following: (1) the nature and 

circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the 

need for the sentence imposed; (3) the kinds of sentences available; ( 4) the applicable 

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Appellate Case: 95-7098 Document: 01019279328 Date Filed: 05/29/1996 Page: 10 
sentencing range under the guidelines; (5) any pertinent Sentencing Commission policy 

statement; ( 6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants; and 

(7) the need to provide restitution to victims. 18 U.S. C. § 3553(a). Applied to Mr. 

Dorrough's case, I believe the first four factors and the seventh factor are either neutral or 

irrelevant. The district court emphasized that the nature and circumstances of the offense 

involved a clandestine laboratory engaged in the process of manufacturing amphetamines. 

However, because all illegal drug labs manufacture illegal substances and are presumably 

clandestine, it is difficult to understand how this supports a finding against retroactivity. 

The sixth factor actually supports applying Amendment 484 retroactively; a defendant 

sentenced under the pre-Amendment 484 guidelines could receive a much harsher 

sentence for precisely the same conduct as a defendant sentenced after the effective date 

of Amendment 484. See, e.g., United States v. Levay, 76 F. 3d 671, 673 (5th Cir. 1996) 

(noting that application of Amendment 484 would reduce that particular defendant's base 

offense level by 20 points). The fifth factor also may support retroactivity because the 

fact that U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(c) includes Amendment 484 in relatively select company of 

guideline amendments that may be applied retroactively suggests perhaps some threshold 

presumption of retroactivity. 

While I part with the majority's conclusions regarding the retroactivity and 

Amendment 484 issues, I nevertheless concur in the judgment. The Second Addendum to 

the Presentence Report, which the district court adopted by reference into its order, offers 

an alternative (and I believe a correct) method for sentencing Mr. Dorrough that results in 

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a sentence identical to that originally imposed. The sentencing guidelines provide that 

"[i]fthe offense involved both a substantive drug offense and an attempt or conspiracy, 

the total quantity involved shall be aggregated to determine the scale of the offense." 

U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l, comment. (n.l2) (parenthetical omitted). Further, where the amount of 

drugs seized does not reflect the scale of the offense, the guidelines direct the sentencing 

court to "approximate the quantity of the controlled substance ... consider[ing], for 

example, ... the size or capability of any laboratory involved." Id.; see also United 

States y. Sturmoski, 971 F.2d 452, 456, 462 (lOth Cir. 1992) (estimating drug quantity 

based on the capability of the laboratory and the amount of precursor chemicals seized); 

United States y. Short, 947 F.2d 1445, 1456-57 (lOth Cir. 1991) (estimating drug quantity 

based on characteristics of drug laboratory), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 989 (1992). Because 

Mr. Dorrough was convicted of attempt and conspiracy to manufacture amphetamine (in 

addition to possession of P2P), he may be sentenced for the approximate amount of 

amphetamine he intended to manufacture. At the original sentencing hearing, the 

government criminalist testified that Mr. Dorrough's laboratory was capable of producing 

approximately 100 pounds of amphetamine. ~ Second Addendum to Presentence 

Report. Based on this estimate, Mr. Dorrough would still have been assigned a base 

offense level of 34 under U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l(c)(3). For this reason, I do not believe Mr. 

Dorrough is entitled to a reduced sentence and thus I concur in the judgment of the court. 

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