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Parties Involved:
Betty Ann Marsee
Appellant
United States Tobacco Co.
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 1 01989 

BETTY ANN MARSEE, as 

Administratrix of the 

estate of MARVIN SEAN 

MARSEE, deceased, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

UNITED STATES TOBACCO 

COMPANY, a New Jersey 

corporation, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

Submitted on the briefs: 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

86-2094 

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ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

Appeal From The 

United States District Court 

For The Western District 

Of Oklahoma 

(D. C. Civil No. 84-2777-R) 

Mack Muratet Braly of Mack Muratet Braly & Associates, P.C., 

Tulsa, Oklahoma, George w. Braly and Dania Deschamps-Braly, of 

Braly & Braly, Ada, Oklahoma, of counsel, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Alston Jennings of Wright, Lindsey & Jennings, Little Rock, 

Arkansas, Edwin J . Jacob and Timothy M. Finnegan of Jacob, 

Medinger & Finnegan, New York, New York, and Andrew M. Coats of 

Crowe & Dunlevy, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before SEYMOUR, SETH and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. 

SETH, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 86-2094 Document: 01019674348 Date Filed: 01/10/1989 Page: 1 
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); Tenth Cir. R. 34.1.8. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

The plaintiff, Betty Ann Marsee, brought this products 

liability action against the defendant, United States Tobacco 

Company, on behalf of the estate of her late son, Marvin Sean 

Marsee. Plaintiff alleged that defendant's snuff products caused 

her son to develop oral cancer which led to his early death. The 

case was tried to a jury which returned a verdict in favor of 

defendant after a five-week trial. On appeal the plaintiff 

challenges various evidentiary. and discovery rulings made by the 

trial court. 

It was undisputed at trial that Sean Marsee had used 

defendant's product, Copenhagen Brand Snuff, from the age of 

twelve until he developed cancer at the age of eighteen . It was 

estimated that Sean Marsee used four or more cans of the product 

per week during this six-year period. In April of 1983, Marsee 

was diagnosed with cancer of the right lateral border area of the 

tongue. Despite three operations the cancer spread throughout the 

oral cavity. Sean Marsee died nine months after his cancer was 

first diagnosed. 

The trial turned on the issue of whether the decedent's 

cancer was caused by his use of the defendant's product. 

Extensive discovery took place before the five-week trial. The 

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trial afforded plaintiff opportunity to introduce an impressive 

amount of evidence on the issue of causation. She called thirtyone witnesses, including fourteen experts, and introduced 140 

exhibits. Despite this effort plaintiff was unable to convince 

the jury that defendant's product caused her son's cancer. 

Given the scope and magnitude of the evidence presented at 

trial, this court ' s statements in Higgins v. Martin Marietta 

Corp., 752 F.2d 492, 498 (lOth Cir.), are especially worthy of 

consideration: 

"During a lengthy trial, the judge must make 

numerous rulings on evidence. Of necessity, 

these rul i ngs must be made wi thout any advance 

notice. Deference must be gi ven to the trial 

judge who i s most familiar wi th the 

circumstances surrounding the issues in 

question. 'The trial court's conduct of trial 

proceedings, includi ng rulings on motions and 

objections, will not be disturbed on appeal 

unless it affirmatively appears from the 

record that the trial court abused its 

discretion.' [Citations omitted.] 

"A jury verdict will only be set aside if 

manifest error affecting a substantial right 

of a party occurs or the litigant is deprived 

of a fair trial." 

Because we f i nd that plaintiff's contentions on appeal hold no 

meri t, we affirm the trial court's entry of judgment in favor of 

defendant. 

I. 

Plaintiff first contends that the trial court erred by 

refusing to allow her to enter in evidence the videotaped 

deposition of Louis Kahley, a severely disfigured, post-surgical 

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Appellate Case: 86-2094 Document: 01019674348 Date Filed: 01/10/1989 Page: 3 
cancer patient. Plaintiff claims the deposition was probative of 

whether Sean Marsee's tongue cancer was caused by the use of 

snuff. Mr. Kohley•s case was similar to .Mr. Marsee's in many 

respects. Both men were young when they began using snuff, both 

were healthy and active in athletics, and both developed oral 

cancer after using the defendant's products for several years. 

The trial court excluded the videotaped deposition under Fed. 

R. Evid. 403, citing the danger of unfair prejudice. This court 

has evinced a strong reluctance to upset a trial court's ruling on 

the admissibility of evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 403. 

11 Challenges under Rule 403 call for balancing the probative value 

of and need for the evidence against the harm likely to result 

from its admission ... McAlester v. United Air Lines, Inc., 851 

F.2d 1249, 1257 (lOth Cir.). This balancing task 11 is one for 

which the trial judge, because of his familiarity with the full 

array of evidence in the case, is particularly suited... Id. 

(quoting Rigby v. Beech Aircraft Co., 548 F.2d 288, 293 (lOth 

Cir o)). "The decision to exclude {or admit) evidence under this 

rule is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and will 

not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion ... K-B Trucking 

Co. v. Riss International Corp., 763 F.2d 1148, 1155 (lOth Cir.). 

In this case, the trial court was well within its discretion 

in excluding the videotape from evidence. It found the probative 

value of the deposition to be almost nonexistent and stated: 

"The fact that one other individual using 

smokeless tobacco also developed oral cancer 

similar to that suffered by sean Marsee 

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constitutes very little, if any, proof that 

smokeless tobacco caused Marsee's cancer." 

Marsee v. United States Tobacco Co., 639 F. Supp. 466, 468 (W.O. 

Okla.). Courts have demonstrated a strong tendency to discount 

the probative value of evidence of similar instances of disease on 

the issue of causation when the disease involved is "widespread 

a nd commonly understood to be caused by many factors." Grenier v. 

Dow Chemical Co., 628 F. Supp. 1529, 1531 (D. Me.). See also 

Amatucci v. Delaware and Hudson Ry. Co., 745 F.2d 180, 184 (2d 

Cir.) (evidence of other engineers who had heart attacks excluded 

because it was irrelevant to show plaintiff's heart attack was 

caused by employment as an engineer); In re "Agent Orange" Product 

Liability Litigation, 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1252-53 (E.D.N.Y.} 

(evidence that 17 of the roughly 7,500 persons who develop 

Hodgkin's Disease each year were exposed to Agent Orange is not 

probative on issue of whether exposure to Agent Orange causes 

Hodgkin's Di sease). 

In the absence of any evidence that Mr. Kahley's oral cancer 

was caused by the use of snuff, the trial court correctly held 

that any inferences the jury could have drawn from his case would 

have been purely conjectural. The trial court then balanced the 

low probative value of the deposition against the high likelihood 

that it would unfairly prejudi ce the defendant. In his 

deposition, Mr. Kahley described in detail the painful course of 

his treatment for oral cancer, including the surgical removal of 

parts of his tongue, neck, jaw, and the floor of his mouth. His 

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Appellate Case: 86-2094 Document: 01019674348 Date Filed: 01/10/1989 Page: 5 
tongue was missing, as was his chin and part of his jaw. Speech 

was so difficult for Mr. Kohley that his mother had to interpret 

his testimony. The trial .court held: 

"The grim physical condition of Kohley, 

coupled with the similarities of the Kohley 

case to Marsee's, might well have led the jury 

to give the Kohley testimony greater weight 

than it was due on the issue of causation of 

oral cancer." 

Marsee, 639 F. Supp. at 468-69. The trial court was clearly 

within its discretion in holding that the danger of unfair 

prejudice to defendant far outweighed the low probative value of 

the Kohley deposition. The deposition was properly excluded under 

Fed. R. Evid. 403. 

II. 

Plaintiff next contends that the trial court erred by 

sustaining defendant's hearsay objection to testimony proffered by 

Dr. Kent Westbrook, one of· plaintiff's experts, on recent cases of 

oral cancer among young people who dip snuff. Dr. Westbrook was 

called by plaintiff in her case-in-chief and again in rebuttal to 

testify on the issue of causation. 

During his testimony, Dr. Westbrook expressed his opinion 

that, in general, the use of snuff is a cause of oral cancer. He 

also expressed the opinion that Sean Marsee's cancer of the tongue 

was caused by use of defendant's snuff products. The former 

opinion was based on Dr. Westbrook's experience in treating oral 

cancer patients and on his review of the literature on oral 

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cancer. -The latter opinion was based on his review· of Sean 

Marsee's case history. 

Later, during his redirect examination, Dr. Westbrook 

testified as follows that he was aware of other young oral cancer 

patients who had used snuff: 

"Q. . • . Do you have any knowledge that 

would be relied upon generally by people in 

your field of recent cases of oral cancer in 

young people who are snuff dippers? 

"A. There are some cases that I have talked 

to doctors about that appear to be oral 

cancers associated with snuff dipping. These 

are cases that [plaintiff's counsel) gave me 

the name of the doctore I called the doctor 

and talked· with them about the patients." 

Transcript at 1069-70. Following this exchange, the trial court 

sustained defendant's hearsay objection to any further testimony 

by Dr. Westbrook on the details of these conversations. The trjal 

court did not strike the testimony of Dr. Westbrook that he was 

aware of other oral cancer cases among young snuff dippers. It 

simply excluded the details of what he had been told over the 

telephone about these cases. 

Plaintiff argues that the trial court misapplied Fed. R. 

Evid. 703 by excluding the details of Dr. Westbrook's 

conversations regarding other oral cancer cases. This argument in 

itself misconstrues the operation of the rule. Rule 703, entitled 

"Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts," states: 

"The facts or data in the particular case upon 

which an expert bases an opinion or inference 

may be those perceived by or made known to him 

at or before the hearing. If of a type 

reasonably relied upon by experts in the 

particular field in forming opinions or 

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Appellate Case: 86-2094 Document: 01019674348 Date Filed: 01/10/1989 Page: 7 
inferences upon the subject, the facts or data 

need not be admissible in evidence." 

This rule simply outlines what types of facts or data an expert 

may rely upon when giving an expert opinion. The rule governs 

whether the expert's opinion testimony is admissible. If the 

expert bases an opinion on facts that meet the criteria of the 

rule, i.e., on facts that are reasonably relied upon by experts in 

his particular field, the opinion is admissibl e. See, ~, 

Ponder v. Warren Tool Corp., 834 F.2d 1553, 1556-57 (lOth Cir.}; 

In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 723 F.2d 

238 (3d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Matsushita Electric 

Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U. S. 574. 

In this case, the trial court did not exclude any of the 

opinion testimony of Dr. westbrook. Instead, the court merely 

prevented the witness from testifying in detail on certain facts 

that helped him form those opinions. It is not disputed that 

these facts·, namely the substance of Dr. Westbrook's telephone 

conversations with other doctors concerning cases of oral cancer 

among young snuff users, amounted to hearsay. This testimony 

would have been inadmissible had the plaintiff attempted to 

introduce it in any context other than as a basis for 

Dr. Westbrook's opinions. 

Fed. R. Evid. 705 permits inquiry on cross-examination into 

the facts underlying an expert's opinion even if those facts would 

be otherwise inadmissible. This case, however, presents an issue 

not addressed by either Rule 703 or 705: whether such 

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inadmissible evidence may be brought· out on direct examination. 

The trial court found that it was inherently unreliable since the 

information had been supplied to Dr. Westbrook by plaintiff's 

counsel after the doctor had been retained to testify in this 

case, and thus held that it could not be brought out on direct 

examination. 

Other courts have admitted expert opinion testimony but have 

excluded hearsay evidence offered in support of that testimony, 

both on direct and cross-examination. See Bryan v. John Bean 

Division of FMC Corp., 566 F.2d 541, 544-47 {5th Cir.); Rose Hall, 

Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Overseas Banking Corp., 576 F. Supp. 107, 

158 (D. Del.), aff'd without opinion, 740 F.2d 958 (3d Cir.), 

cert. denied, 469 u.s. 1159. In Bryan, the court excluded the 

evidence on the ground that it was unnecessary and unreliable, 

factors also present in this case. 

A review of the circumstances surrounding the trial court's 

ruling, however, dictates that this court need not resolve this 

issue. under Fed . R. Civ. P. 61 and Fed. R. Evid. l03(a), this 

court will not set aside the verdict of a jury based on an error 

in the admission or exclusion of evidence unless the error 

prejudicially affects a substantial right of a party. See Beacham 

v. Lee-Norse, 714 F.2d 1010, 1014 (lOth Cir.); Rasmussen Drilling, 

Inc. v. Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp., 571 F.2d 1144, 1149 (lOth Cir.), 

cert. denied, 439 u.s. 862. In this case the trial court's ruling 

did not prejudicially affect a substantial right of plaintiff. 

The substance of Dr. Westbrook's telephone conversations was 

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Appellate Case: 86-2094 Document: 01019674348 Date Filed: 01/10/1989 Page: 9 
admitted into evidence. The jury thus heard the doctor testify 

that he was aware of other cases of oral cancer among young people 

who chewed tobacco. Only the detailed descriptions of these cases 

were excluded. Further, a careful review of Dr. Westbrook's 

testimony reveals that at no time during his lengthy direct and 

cross-examinations, when his opinions and their bases were 

extensively explored, did he testify that these cases played any 

role in the formulation of his opinions. It was only on redirect 

that Dr. Westbrook mentioned these cases, and even then he did not 

state that they played a part in forming his opinions. While it 

can be surmised that these cases helped to reinforce those 

opinions, the fact that Dr. Westbrook did not mention them in 

connection with any specific opinion precludes any finding that 

the trial court•s ruling affected a substantial part of 

plaintiff's case. 

III. 

Plaintiff next contends that the trial court erred by 

excluding the testimony of Drs. Connolly and Glass. This 

testimony was offered in rebuttal on the issue of causation. 

Drs. Connolly and Glass would have testified to the presence of an 

epidemic of oral cancer, including cancer of the tongue, among 

young people who use snuff. Plaintiff contends that this evidence 

was offered to rebut the defense•s theory that tongue cancers 

among young people were anomalous. 

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The admission of· rebuttal testimony is subject to the 

discretion of the trial court . Grant v. Brant, 796 F.2d 351, 356 

(lOth Cir.); Whiteley v. OKC Corp., 719 F.2d 1051, 1055 (lOth 

Cir.). The exclusion of the testimony of Drs. Connolly and Glass 

presents no abuse of that discretion. The issue of an epidemic of 

oral cancer among young snuff users was in fact raised during the 

plaintiff's case-in-chief. One of plaintiff's experts, 

Dr. Breslow, testified to the matter on direct examination. 

Another of plaintiff's experts , Dr. Westbrook, testified on the 

issue on cross-examination. As related earlier, Dr. Westbrook 

also testified on the existence of current cases of tongue cancer 

among young snuff users during his redirect examination. The 

rebuttal testimony of Drs. Connolly and Glass was thus cumulative 

and repetitive of issues that ha~ been raised during plaintiff's 

case-in-chief, and the trial court was well within its discretion 

in excluding it. See Grant, supra. 

IV. 

Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by excludi ng 

from evidence a chart comparing the dosages of nitrosamines that 

caused cancer in laboratory animals during an experiment with the 

dosages of nitrosamines Sean Marsee was exposed to over the course 

of the six years he used snuff. We disagree . 

The trial court excluded the chart from evidence under Fed. 

R. Evid. 403. It held that the chart had the potential to mislead 

the jury and that it was cumulative of other evidence that had 

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been admitted. Without commenting on the chart's potential to 

mislead, the record demonstrates that the chart was cumulative and 

repetitive. The information contained in the excluded exhibit was 

in fact received into evidence. One of plaintiff's experts, 

Dr. Hecht, whose videotaped deposition was shown to the jury, 

described the chart and testified at length and in detail about 

the information contained in the chart. Dr. Lijinski, another of 

plaintiff's experts, also testified about the information 

contained in the chart and commented that the comparison depicted 

by the chart was useful. 

Error may not be predicated upon the exclusion of cumulative 

evidence. See Lutz v . Weld County School District No. 6, 784 F.2d 

340, 344-4 5 (lOth Cir . ) . The facts reflected in the chart were 

explained to the jury in detail; Thus, its exclusion did not 

prejudicially affect any substantial right of plaintiff. 

v. 

Plaintiff next · contends that the trial court erred when it 

excluded two published reports, the report of the International 

Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) and the report of the 

Consensus Development Conference of the National Institute of 

Health (NIH), offered on the issue of causation. This contention 

is also without merit. 

The trial court excluded the reports as hearsay. It 

correctly held that the reports failed to qualify under the 

hearsay exceptions of Fed. R. Evid. 803(8}, 803(24) or 804(b)(5). 

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Marse~, 639 F. Supp. at 470. The reports fail to qualify for the 

exception of Rule 803{8) since they were not prepared by a public 

office or agency as required by this rule. The IARC report is a 

review and critique of the literature on the causation of cancer, 

conducted at a conference attended by scientists from various 

countries. The NIH report was prepared by a panel of scientists 

and non-scientists after a conference at which invited speakers 

presented papers concerning different aspects of smokeless 

tobacco. Neither document reflects the findings of a governmental 

agency authorized by law to report on the adverse health effects 

of smokeless tobacco. 

The trial court also correctly held that the reports do not 

qualify for the "catch-all" exceptions of Rules 803(24) and 

804{b}(5). In or~er for these exceptions to apply, the trial 

court must find that "the interests of justice will best be served 

by the admission" of the evidence. Here, the trial court found 

that the interests of justice did not require the admission of the 

reports into evidence. 

"Since these reports merely repeated a great 

deal of other material introduced into 

evidence, the ends of justice did not require 

the admission of these reports. This is 

particularly true in view of the fact that 

much of the information contained in these 

reports was otherwise admitted into evidence 

through expert witness testimony." 

Marsee, 639 F.2d at 470. This finding by the trial court is amply 

supported by the record and will not be upset on appeal. 

Plaintiff's lawyers had numerous witnesses read significant 

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portions of the reports to the jury. During the cross-examination 

of several defense witnesses, counsel read selected portions of 

the reports and asked if the witness agreed. Finally, many of the 

articles reviewed in the reports were received into evidence as 

exhibits. 

VI. 

Plaintiff next contends that the trial court erred by 

allowing defendant to admit a series of learned articles on the 

issue of notice. Prior to this ruling, the trial court ruled that 

scientific articles offered by plaintiff and published prior to 

the diagnosis of Sean Marsee's cancer could be admitted as 

exhibits on the issue of notice. These articles all indicated 

that snuff posed·a health threat to those who used it. After 

plaintiff's articles were admitted, defendant offered its own 

scientific articles as exhibits on the issue of notice. The trial 

court admitted the articles, noting that it would be ••unbalanced 

and unfair" to give the jury access to plaintiff's articles but 

deprive them of defendant's. 

Plaintiff offers two grounds for its contention that the 

articles were improperly admitted. First, it claims the articles 

were hearsay. The hearsay rule i s irrelevant in this instance, 

however, since the articles were not admitted to prove the truth 

of the matter asserted. Instead, they were admitted on the issue 

of whether the defendant had notice of the potential dangers its 

product posed to consumers. 

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Second, plaintiff claims that defendant's articles were 

irrelevant on the issue of notice. She claims that only those 

arti~les tending to demonstrate the hazardous character of the 

defendant's product are relevant on the issue of whether the 

defendant had notice that its product was potentially dangerous. 

This argument cannot stand up to scrutiny. "The 

determination of whether evidence is relevant is within the sound 

discretion of the trial court, and that decision will not be 

disturbed on appeal absent a showing of a clear abuse of 

discretion." Whiteley v. OKC Corp., 719 F.2d 1051, 1057 (lOth 

Cir.); Averitt v. Southland Motor Inn of Oklahoma, 720 F.2d 1178, 

1181-82 (lOth Cir.). For purposes of determining if i t had notice 

of the hazardous character of its product, defendant was 

cha!geable with knowledge of the entire body of scientific 

learning and literature relating to that product in existence at 

the time of Sean Marsee's death. The issue is whether the.thenexisting sci entific and medical evidence as a whole tended to show 

the product was dangerous. Defendant's articles were relevant on 

this issue, and the trial court was clearly within its discretion 

in determining that the jury should consider the "whole picture'' 

instead of only articles offered by plaintiff. 

Plaintiff also complains that the trial court failed to issue 

a limiting instruction to the jury to the effect that the articles 

were offered only on the issue of notice. The record 

demonstrates, however, that plaintiff neither asked for such an 

instruction nor ob jected to its absence. 

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VII. 

Plaintiff also complains of one answer given by Dr. Byers, an 

expert witness called by the defendant, during the qualification 

portion of his testimony. Dr. Byers is a surgeon specializing in 

the treatment of cancers of the head and neck at the M.D. Anderson 

Hospital. He was asked by defense counsel if he had discussed the 

fact that he was going to testify at this trial with his superiors 

at M.D. Anderson. The witness responded as follows: 

"A. Yes, ·that was one of the first things I 

did when I was contemplating appearing here 

was to touch base [with superiors at M.D. 

Anderson], to sort of inform them what my 

plans were, what my intentions were, what the 

situations, the various ramifications 

potentially of this might generate, and I must 

say that I had their unequi vocal support." 

Transcript at 3392. 

Plaintiff interprets this answer as a statement that 

Dr. Byers• superiors agreed with the substance of his testimony. 

She objects to the statement as "obvious, blatant, prejudicial 

hearsay" that inferred to the jury that "other experts, • . . present and testifying in court, support the testimony of the 

witness." Pl. Br. at 37. 

not 

In fac t, Dr. Byers said no such thing. What he did say was 

that his superiors supported his decision to testify. In other 

words, he had their permission to appear. This trivial reference 

by Dr. Byers can in no way be said to have affected any 

substantial right of plaintiff. 

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VIII. 

Finally, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by 

allowing defendant to redact various documents before they were 

produced to plainti ff prior to trial. Plaintiff made a motion to 

compel the production of the redacted portions of the documents 

during a hearing on the Friday before trial. The trial judge 

reviewed the redacted material over the weekend, and held on the 

first day of trial that all of the redacted material was both 

irrelevant and protected by either the work product or attorneyclient privilege. 

This court has held that "the trial court [has] broad 

discretion as to the control of discovery, ..• and rulings will 

not be set aside short of an abuse of discretion." Shaklee Corp. 

v. Gunnell, 748 F.2d 548, 550 (lOth Cir. )· (citations omitted). In 

particular, rulings on the relevancy of materials sought for 

discovery are within the trial court's discretion. Ryan v. 

Hatfield, 578 F.2d 275, 276 (lOth Cir.) . We find no abuse of 

discretion on this issue. The plaintiff was not prejudiced by the 

ruling and it will not be upset on appeal. 

The judgment of the trial court is therefore AFFIRMED. 

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