Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00146/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00146-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Victor Houx
Plaintiff
Audrey King
Defendant
Luke Koll
Defendant
David Lewright
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Plaintiff Victor Houx is appearing pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Individuals detained pursuant to California Welfare and Institutions 

Code § 6600 et seq. are civil detainees and are not prisoners within the meaning of the Prison 

Litigation Reform Act. Page v. Torrey, 201 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Now pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, filed June 19, 2015. 

Because Plaintiff’s claims in the first amended complaint are virtually identical to the claims presented 

in the original complaint, which was dismissed without leave to amend for failure to state a 

cognizable claim for relief, Plaintiff’s amended complaint must be dismissed with prejudice for failure 

to state a cognizable claim for relief. 

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VICTOR HOUX,

 Plaintiff,

v.

LUKE KOLL, et al.,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 1:15-cv-00146-LJO-SAB (PC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF FIRST 

AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE 

FOR FAILURE TO STATE A COGNIZABLE 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF

[ECF No. 8]

Case 1:15-cv-00146-LJO-SAB Document 10 Filed 07/08/15 Page 1 of 7
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I.

SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen Plaintiff=s complaint and dismiss the case, in whole or in part, if 

the Court determines it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. '

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)), and courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences,”

Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678.

Pro se litigants are entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any doubt 

resolved in their favor, Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121-23 (9th Cir. 2012); Hebbe v. Pliler, 

627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010), but Plaintiff=s claims must be facially plausible to survive 

screening, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each 

named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks 

omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a 

defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of 

satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d 

at 969.

II.

COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff is detained at Coalinga State Hospital in Coalinga, California, where the events giving 

rise to this action occurred. Plaintiff names Audrey King, Executor Director of Coalinga, Luke Koll, 

Psych Tech., and David Lewright, Former Unit 8 Supervisor, as Defendants.

On March 3, 2014, at approximately 4:15 p.m., Plaintiff was in his living area on Unit 8, when 

Luke Koll knocked loudly on Plaintiff’s dorm room door and announced in a loud voice, “locker 

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search.” Koll then entered Plaintiff’s privacy curtain, at which time Plaintiff got up from his bed and 

said “no problem.” Defendant Koll instructed Plaintiff to remove his shirt and Plaintiff complied. 

Koll then instructed Plaintiff to remove his shorts and boxer shorts. Plaintiff stated, “I’ll remove my 

pants and you can look into my boxer shorts” at which point he pulled out the top of my boxer shorts 

so defendant could see inside. 

Defendant then stated, “I need you to take off your shorts and boxers too.” At this point 

Plaintiff replied, “You can’t strip search me, besides there are females in the room.” The female staff 

member’s name is Ebony, who was in the process of searching another individuals living area in the 

same dorm whose privacy curtain was completely open as well. 

Defendant Koll then stated, “It’s OK, the curtains will cover you.” At this point Plaintiff again 

complained that Defendant could not stripe search him without cause. Defendant got a smug look on 

his face and replied, “This is a just cause search. I was ordered to perform this search on you.” 

Plaintiff then replied, “that doesn’t sound right.” Defendant then stated, “that’s the order.”

Defendant Koll was the only staff member present in Plaintiff’s bed area during the entire 

search with the curtain open. Plaintiff reluctantly complied with all Defendants’ order under protest. 

Plaintiff removed all of his clothing, and stood in front of him completely nude, while Koll inspected 

Plaintiff’s clothing. When Koll finished inspecting the clothing, he handed Plaintiff the clothes back 

and Plaintiff got dressed. Upon reflection, Plaintiff contends there were a couple of instances where 

Plaintiff noticed Defendant Koll looking at him while he was inspecting Plaintiff’s clothing. During 

the entire time, unit staff member Ebony and the other officers searching the other area in the dorm 

were approximately 7 to 10 feet away from where Plaintiff was and the curtains were fully open the 

entire time.

Thereafter, Koll without assistance proceeded to search Plaintiff’s living area in a reckless and 

indifferent manner. During the search, Koll requested and was provided with three gray property 

storage bins. He then began placing all of his property into the bins. When Plaintiff asked the reason, 

Koll replied “to categorize all your stuff.” 

After Koll finished, and all of Plaintiff’s property was in the gray bins on the floor, Plaintiff 

asked Koll if he was going to return his things back where he found them. Koll replied, “I’m 

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categorizing.” At this point, another staff member told Defendant Koll “we’re done.” At that point, 

Koll stood up, looked at Plaintiff with a smile and stated, “You can put it all back now.”

III.

DISCUSSION

As a civil detainee, Plaintiff is entitled to treatment more considerate than that afforded pretrial 

detainees or convicted criminals. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 931-32 (9th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff’s 

right to constitutionally adequate conditions of confinement is protected by the substantive component 

of the Due Process Clause. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1982). 

A determination whether Plaintiff’s rights were violated requires “balancing of his liberty 

interests against the relevant state interests.” Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321. Plaintiff is “entitled to 

more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of 

confinement are designed to punish,” but the Constitution requires only that courts ensure that

professional judgment was exercised. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321-22. A “decision, if made by a 

professional, is presumptively valid; liability may be imposed only when the decision by the 

professional is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or 

standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a 

judgment.” Id. at 322-23; compare Clouthier v. County of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1243-44 (9th 

Cir. 2010) (rejecting the Youngberg standard and applying the deliberate indifference standard to a 

pretrial detainee’s right to medical care, and noting that pretrial detainees, who are confined to ensure 

presence at trial, are not similarly situated to those civilly committed). The professional judgment 

standard is an objective standard and it equates “to that required in ordinary tort cases for a finding of 

conscious indifference amounting to gross negligence.” Ammons v. Washington Dep’t of Soc. & 

Health Servs., 648 F.3d 1020, 1029 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

A. Strip Search

The Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 

558 (1979); Byrd v. Maricopa Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 629 F.3d 1135, 1140 (9th Cir. 2011); 

Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 332 (9th Cir. 1988). The reasonableness of the search is 

determined by the context, which requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the 

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invasion of personal rights the search entails. Bell, 441 U.S. at 558-559 (quotations omitted); Byrd, 

629 F.3d at 1141; Bull v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964, 974-75 (9th Cir. 2010); 

Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217, 1227 (9th Cir. 2010); Michenfelder, 860 F.2d at 332-34.

Because the Fourth Amendment right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures 

applies to incarcerated prisoners, the same Fourth Amendment right applies to civilly detained 

sexually violent predators. Hyrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 993 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Thompson v. 

Souza, 111 F.3d 694, 699 (9th Cir. 1997)). However, the reasonableness of the search involving a 

civilly detained SVP is determined by reference to the detention context. Hydrick, 500 F.3d at 993. 

“SVP’s have been civilly committed subsequent to criminal convictions and have been adjudged to 

pose a danger to the health and safety of others.” Id. at 900. Civilly detained SVP’s have a 

diminished right to privacy. Cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 557 (1979); Hydrick, 500 F.3d at 990. 

The government’s legitimate interests in conducting a search of a civilly detained SVP or his room 

mirrors those that arise in the prison context, such as the safety and security of guards and others in the 

facility, order within the facility, and the efficiency of the facility’s operations. Id. at 993; see Jones v. 

Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 932 (9th Cir. 2004). A search will violate a civilly detained SVP’s Fourth 

Amendment rights if its “arbitrary, retaliatory, or clearly exceeds the legitimate purpose of detention.” 

Meyers v. Pope, 303 F. App’x 513, 516 (9th Cir. 2008); Hydrick, 500 F.3d at 993. 

Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to give rise to a Fourth Amendment violation. The bare 

assertion that Plaintiff was searched does not support a claim, as Plaintiff is not entitled to be entirely 

free from institutional searches. Bell, 441 U.S. at 558; see also Seaton v. Mayberg, 610 F.3d 530, 535-

36 (9th Cir. 2010) (civil detainee awaiting commitment proceedings was not a free person with full 

civil rights). While Plaintiff claims that the strip search was conducted “with the curtain open” and 

other individuals, including a female officer, were within approximately seven to ten feet, there is no 

showing that any other officer beside Koll was involved in the search. See Michenfelder, 860 F.2d at 

334 (mere presence of female prison staff in the general vicinity likely did not violate the Fourth 

Amendment). Indeed, Plaintiff admits that Koll was the only staff member present in Plaintiff’s bed 

area during the entire search and the only individual who conducted the search. On the record before 

the Court, there are no facts to support a claim that Plaintiff was subjected to an unreasonable search 

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by Defendants. Plaintiff was previously given leave to amend and failed to cure the deficiencies 

outlined by the Court, and further leave to amend is not warranted. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 

1130 (9th Cir. 2000); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-1449 (9th Cir. 1987). 

With respect to Plaintiff’s living area and property, there must be a “reasonable expectation of 

privacy in the area invaded” for a Fourth Amendment claim to lie. Espinosa v. City and County of 

San Francisco, 598 F.3d 528, 533 (9th Cir. 2010); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525 (1984); Bell, 

441 U.S. at 556-557. The contours of an involuntarily confined civil detainee’s right to privacy in his 

room in a secure treatment facility are unclear, but assuming Plaintiff retains any reasonable 

expectation of privacy at all in his living area at Coalinga State Hospital, it would necessarily be of a 

diminished scope given Plaintiff’s civil confinement. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 556-57 (discussing 

detainee’s expectation of privacy in cell or room at detention facility); see also Pesci v. Budz, No. 

2:12-cv-227-FtM-29SPC, 2012 WL 4856746, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 12, 2012) (civil detainee did not 

have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his dormitory); Rainwater v. Bell, No. 2:10-cv-1727 GGH 

P, 2012 WL 3276966, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2012) (finding, on summary judgment, that civil 

detainee did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his jail cell); Pyron v. Ludeman, Nos. 10-

3759 (PJS/JJG), 10-4236 (PJS/JJG), 2011 WL 3293523, at *6 (D. Minn. Jun. 6, 2011) (finding motion 

to dismiss should be granted because a search of a civil detainee’s personal items in his cell does not 

violate the Fourth Amendment), report and recommendation adopted in full, 2012 WL 1597305 (D. 

Minn. Jul. 29, 2011); Riley v. Doyle, No. 06-C-574-C, 2006 WL 2947453, at *5 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 16, 

2006) (civil detainee denied leave to proceed on Fourth Amendment claim arising out of repeated 

contraband searches because there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in avoiding routine cell 

inspections and searches); but see Hoch v. Tarkenton, No. 1:10-cv-02258-DLB PC, 2013 WL 

1004847, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2013) (finding cognizable Fourth Amendment claim arising from 

contraband search of civil detainee’s hospital room); Stearns v. Stoddard, No. C11-5422-BHS-JRC, 

2012 WL 1596965, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 11, 2012) (recognizing that whether a civil detainee 

housed in a secure facility has any expectation of privacy in his room is an open question and finding 

entitlement to summary judgment on Fourth Amendment claim based on qualified immunity), report 

and recommendation adopted in full, 2012 WL 1597305 (WD. Wash. May 7, 2012). 

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Therefore, Plaintiff’s bare allegation that his living area and property were subjected to 

searches is insufficient to support a viable claim under the Fourth Amendment, and Plaintiff’s first 

amended complaint does not state a claim for relief. Further, it is clear to the Court that Plaintiff is 

incapable of curing the deficiencies of the first amended complaint with respect to his claim by 

amendment. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s complaint shall be dismissed with prejudice and without leave to 

amend. See Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (holding that a pro 

se litigant must ordinarily be given leave to amend unless it is absolutely clear that deficiencies in a 

complaint cannot be cured by further amendment). 

IV.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiff’s first amended complaint be DISMISSED, with prejudice, for failure to state 

a cognizable claim for relief; and

2. The instant action be DISMISSED in its entirety.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty (30) days 

after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may file written objections 

with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 

Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 

result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014)

(citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 8, 2015 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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