Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_17-cv-00705/USCOURTS-caed-1_17-cv-00705-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Carlos Espinoza, Jr.
Petitioner
People of the State of California
Respondent

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CARLOS ESPINOZA, JR.,

Petitioner,

v.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF 

CALIFORNIA,

Respondent.

No. 1:17-cv-00705-DAD-JDP (HC)

ORDER ADOPTING RECOMMENDATION 

THAT THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS BE DENIED

(Doc. No. 13)

Petitioner Carlos Espinoza, Jr., a state prisoner proceeding on his own behalf, seeks the 

issuance of a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The matter was referred to a 

United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302.

On August 15, 2019, the assigned magistrate judge issued findings and recommendations 

recommending that the court deny the pending petition and decline to issue a certificate of 

appealability. (Doc. No. 13.) The findings and recommendations were served on petitioner and 

contained notice that any objections thereto were to be filed within fourteen days after service. 

(Id. at 13.) On August 30, 2019, petitioner moved for a sixty-day extension of time to file his 

objections to the findings and recommendations. (Doc. No. 14.) Although the assigned 

magistrate judge denied petitioner’s motion for an extension of time (Doc. No. 15), petitioner 

nonetheless filed untimely objections on September 23, 2019. (Doc. No. 16.) 

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Out of an abundance of caution, the undersigned has considered the petitioner’s untimely 

objections to the pending findings and recommendations. In accordance with the provisions of 28 

U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 304, this court has conducted a de novo review of this 

case. Having carefully reviewed the entire file, the court finds the findings and recommendations 

to be supported by the record and proper analysis.

Petitioner asserts a single claim in the pending petition; that he received ineffective 

assistance of counsel in connection with the rejection of a plea offer.

1

 The assigned magistrate

judge recommended that federal habeas relief be denied as to that claim, concluding that a 

reasonable jurist could conclude petitioner had failed to demonstrate prejudice as a result of his 

counsel’s allegedly deficient performance as required under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668 (1984). (Doc. No. 13 at 13.)

The Supreme Court has held:

To show prejudice from ineffective assistance of counsel where a 

plea offer has lapsed or been rejected because of counsel’s deficient 

performance, defendants must demonstrate a reasonable probability 

they would have accepted the earlier plea offer had they been 

afforded effective assistance of counsel. Defendants must also 

demonstrate a reasonable probability the plea would have been 

entered without the prosecution canceling it or the trial court refusing 

to accept it, if they had the authority to exercise that discretion under 

state law. To establish prejudice in this instance, it is necessary to 

show a reasonable probability that the end result of the criminal 

process would have been more favorable by reason of a plea to a 

lesser charge or a sentence of less prison time.

Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 147 (2012).

In his belated objections, petitioner argues that while a more favorable plea offer than the 

one he ultimately accepted was relayed to him, he was denied an opportunity to take advantage of 

that earlier, more favorable offer. (Doc. No. 16 at 15.) According to petitioner, the Public 

Defender’s Office “rendered it impossible” for him to communicate with any counsel while the 

plea offer was pending; he was effectively left without counsel the entire time his first attorney

 

1

 The circumstances under which this claim arises involve three different defense attorneys 

representing petitioner in the underlying state court criminal proceedings, with each replacing the 

other. Those circumstances are discussed in detail in the pending findings and recommendations 

and will not be repeated here. 

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was ill before eventually retiring; and his second attorney ultimately rejected the more favorable 

plea offer, one that would have been to a less serious charge but with the same sentence, without 

his authorization. (Id. at 15–16.) Although petitioner alleges that he tried to accept the arguably 

more favorable plea offer on two occasions (id. at 16), the assigned magistrate judge concluded 

that a reasonable jurist could conclude otherwise since petitioner’s representations were not 

supported by the record of the state court proceedings. (Doc. No. 13 at 12.) Specifically, the 

assigned magistrate judge based this conclusion on petitioner’s failure to explain why he 

allegedly requested more time to discuss with his father the more favorable offer that was being 

preliminarily explored by his third lawyer if petitioner had actually previously called the Public 

Defender’s Office to tell his first lawyer he was accepting that exact same offer. (Id. at 12.) In 

addition, the assigned magistrate judge noted that petitioner had made no showing as to why he

never mentioned his acceptance of the earlier, more favorable plea offer when he appeared in 

court to continue his trial date a month after, as he now claims, he had already decided to accept

the offer. (Id.)

Based upon the circumstances noted above, the findings and recommendations therefore 

concluded that petitioner had not made a showing sufficient to meet the prejudice prong of the 

Strickland test. The undersigned agrees with this conclusion2since petitioner has failed to show 

that absent the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, he would have accepted the arguably 

more favorable plea offer before it was inadvertently rejected by his second attorney. See Frye, 

 

2

 The California Court of Appeal concluded that petitioner had failed to establish that his second 

attorney’s inadvertent rejection of the prosecution’s more favorable plea offer without petitioner’s 

knowledge or consent constituted ineffective assistance. People v. Espinoza, Case No. FO72381, 

2016 WL 6892244, at *7–8 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2016). The pending findings and 

recommendations specifically declined to reach the question of whether trial counsel’s 

performance was constitutionality deficient. (Doc. No. 13 at 12.) For good reason, the 

undersigned declines to reach this question as well in light of the conclusion that petitioner has 

failed to establish prejudice. Nonetheless, the undersigned has serious doubt that that the state 

appellate court’s determination that defense counsel’s performance—rejecting a plea offer 

without consulting with the client and without confirming the terms of last plea offer—was not 

constitutionally deficient is one with any reasonable basis in the law. See Jones v. Woods, 114 

F.3d 1002, 1012 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Jones further argues that his trial lawyer failed to inform him of 

the prosecution’s offer of a plea bargain before he rejected it on Jones’s behalf. . . . [W]e believe 

this contention, if proven, might rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel[.]”). 

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566 U.S. at 147; Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 164 (2012) (noting that to establish prejudice in 

this context the petitioner must show, among other things, that “there is a reasonable probability 

that the plea offer would have been presented to the court (i.e., that the defendant would have 

accepted the plea and the prosecution would not have withdrawn it in light of intervening 

circumstances), that the court would have accepted its terms, and that the . . . sentence . . . under 

the offer’s terms would have been less severe than under the judgment and sentence that in fact 

were imposed”); Jones, 114 F.3d at 1012 (“In order to prove prejudice where counsel fails to 

inform the petitioner about a plea offer, the petitioner must prove there was a reasonable 

probability he would have accepted the offer.”). In this case, it is undisputed that petitioner was 

informed by his counsel of the arguably more favorable plea offer and, in fact, petitioner never 

accepted that offer over a period of time extending at least six months. This fact belies 

petitioner’s after-the-fact claim that he wanted to accept that offer. 

Finally, the court declines to issue a certificate of appealability. A petitioner seeking writ 

of habeas corpus has no absolute right to appeal; he may appeal only in limited circumstances. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2253; Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335–36 (2003). Rule 11 of the Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Cases requires that a district court issue or deny a certificate of 

appealability when entering a final order adverse to a petitioner. See also Ninth Circuit Rule 22-

1(a); United States v. Asrar, 116 F.3d 1268, 1270 (9th Cir. 1997). A certificate of appealability 

will not issue unless a petitioner makes “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 

right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This standard requires the petitioner to show that “jurists of 

reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists 

could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” 

Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327; accord Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

In the present case, the court finds that reasonable jurists would not find the court’s 

determination that petitioner has failed to establish prejudice stemming from his counsel’s alleged 

ineffective assistance debatable or conclude that the petition should proceed further. Thus, the 

court declines to issue a certificate of appealability.

/////

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Accordingly:

1. The findings and recommendations issued on August 15, 2019 (Doc. No. 13) are 

adopted;

2. This petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied; 

3. The court declines to issue a certificate of appealability; and

4. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of respondent and 

close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 27, 2020 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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