Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00623/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00623-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
F. Chavez
Respondent
Ralph Raul Contreras
Petitioner

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BACKGROUND

Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254. Doc. 1. After declining to proceed before a magistrate judge, this case was 

assigned to District Judge Anthony W. Ishii and Magistrate Judge Jennifer L. Thurston.

Docs. 9, 10. In July 2013, this case was fully briefed. Docs. 13, 16. Also in July 2013, 

Petitioner moved to appoint counsel, which was denied by Judge Thurston. Docs. 15, 17. In 

September 2015, Judge Thurston entered an order disqualifying herself from all 

proceedings. Doc. 18. The case was reassigned to Magistrate Judge Sandra M. Snyder, the 

undersigned. Petitioner now requests clarification as to the good cause identified for Judge 

Thurston’s disqualification and renews his request for the appointment of counsel. Doc. 19. 

DISCUSSION

Regarding Judge Thurston’s disqualification, a “magistrate judge of the United 

States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably 

be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). This self-disqualification can be for any reason that the 

RALPH RAUL CONTRERAS

Petitioner,

v.

F. CHAVEZ, Warden

Respondent.

1:13 -cv-0623-AWI-SMS (HC) 

ORDER RE. REQUEST FOR 

CLARIFICATION AND RENEWED MOTION 

FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

(Doc. 19)

Case 1:13-cv-00623-AWI-SMS Document 20 Filed 03/09/16 Page 1 of 2
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judge’s impartiality might be reasonably questioned including, but not limited to, personal 

bias, personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts, the judge’s prior service as a lawyer 

in private practice or governmental employment in the matter in controversy, or that the 

judge or any person within the third degree relationship to the judge or her spouse is a party, 

lawyer, witness, or interested party to the proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)-(b). This case has 

been reassigned to the undersigned and will proceed before her and Judge Ishii accordingly. 

Regarding Petitioner’s request for appointment of counsel, there currently exists no 

absolute right to appointment of counsel in habeas proceedings. See, e.g., Anderson v. 

Heinze, 258 F.2d 479, 481 (9th Cir. 1958); Mitchell v. Wyrick, 727 F.2d 773, 774 (8th Cir. 

1984). However, Title 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B) authorizes the appointment of counsel 

at any stage of the case if "the interests of justice so require." See Rule 8(c), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Cases. The court should only appoint counsel under "exceptional 

circumstances" and after evaluating the likelihood of success on the merits and the ability of 

the petitioner to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues 

involved. See Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983).

Petitioner argues that it is in the interests of justice to appoint counsel. However, he 

does not identify what facts demonstrate exceptional circumstances exist such that the 

interests of justice require appointment of counsel. At this time, Petitioner has not 

demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits and he appears sufficiently able to 

articulate her claim. The Court does not find that Petitioner’s case falls under exceptional 

circumstances such that the interests of justice require the appointment of counsel.

ORDER

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner's request for appointment 

of counsel is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 9, 2016 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:13-cv-00623-AWI-SMS Document 20 Filed 03/09/16 Page 2 of 2