Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-03-05142/USCOURTS-caDC-03-05142-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Central Intelligence Agency
Appellee
Robert Wilbur
Appellant

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Decided January 30, 2004

No. 03-5142

ROBERT WILBUR,

APPELLANT

v.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,

APPELLEE

On Motion for Summary Affirmance

(No. 01cr00271–01)

Robert Wilbur pro se.

Roscoe E. Howard, Jr., United States Attorney, and R.

Craig Lawrence and Wyneva Johnson, Assistant United

States Attorneys, were on motion for summary affirmance.

Before: HENDERSON, RANDOLPH and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed Per Curiam.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

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Per Curiam: Appellant Robert Wilbur appeals the district

court’s summary judgment in favor of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Wilbur v. CIA, 273 F. Supp. 2d 119

(D.D.C. 2003). Wilbur brought this action under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 552 et seq.,

seeking information pertaining to himself. The district court

correctly held that the CIA satisfied its obligation under the

FOIA to search for records responsive to Wilbur’s request.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment on that

ground, concluding that the court had subject matter jurisdiction to decide the issue.

I.

Because the district court’s memorandum opinion lays out

the factual background in detail, we summarize only briefly

the facts material to our decision. In February 1994 Wilbur

submitted a FOIA request through counsel, seeking records

regarding him maintained by the CIA, and subsequently

provided the biographical data, privacy waiver and certification of identity the CIA requires to process a request. Following a search of the record systems maintained by the

CIA’s Directorate of Operations and Directorate of Administration, on June 28, 1994 the CIA issued its initial decision

advising Wilbur that the agency was unable to identify any

information or records filed under his name and informing

him of his appeal rights.

Wilbur did not file an appeal until January 4, 1999. Two

weeks later the CIA notified Wilbur that his request for

appeal of the 1994 determination had been received and

accepted for consideration by the Agency Release Panel. On

September 14, 2000 Wilbur was advised that the agency had

located no responsive documents after examining the initial

searches by the Directorate of Operations and the Directorate

of Administration and conducting a new search of the Director of Central Intelligence area.

On February 28, 2001, proceeding pro se, Wilbur filed suit

in the district court. The CIA moved to dismiss for lack of

jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

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based on Wilbur’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies

within the time specified by the agency’s FOIA regulations

and failure to comply with the federal statute of limitations

for civil actions. Alternatively, the government moved for

summary judgment, which the district court granted.

At the outset the district court correctly observed that

‘‘exhaustion of administrative remedies is a mandatory prerequisite to a lawsuit under FOIA,’’ which ‘‘means that a

requester under FOIA must file an administrative appeal

within the time limit specified in an agency’s FOIA regulations or face dismissal of any lawsuit complaining about the

agency’s response.’’ 273 F. Supp. 2d at 123 (citing Oglesby v.

United States Dep’t of the Army, 920 F.2d 57, 61–64 65 n.9

(D.C. Cir. 1990)). The CIA’s FOIA regulations require that

any administrative appeal be received within 45 days of the

agency’s initial decision. 32 C.F.R. § 1900.42. Thus, the

district court reasoned, Wilbur’s appeal, which was dated

January 4, 1999, more than four years after the initial CIA

determination, ‘‘was late—as if it were never filed at all—and

[Wilbur] can be deemed to have failed to exhaust his administrative appeal rights.’’ Wilbur, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 123.

Accordingly, the district court concluded it ‘‘ha[d] sufficient

grounds to grant the CIA’s motion to dismiss under Rule

12(b)(1).’’ Id. at 123–24. Nonetheless, the court declined to

dismiss the complaint and proceeded to address the CIA’s

alternative motion for summary judgment ‘‘due to the fact

that the CIA accepted Mr. Wilbur’s very late-filed appeal and

treated it as if it were timely.’’ Id. at 124 (emphasis original).

Based on the agency’s affidavits, the district court determined

the CIA had ‘‘conducted a thorough, reasonable, good-faith

search of the CIA components that were reasonably likely to

maintain records of the type sought by Mr. Wilbur’’ and was

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 124–25.

II.

Exhaustion of administrative remedies is generally required before seeking judicial review ‘‘so that the agency has

an opportunity to exercise its discretion and expertise on the

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matter and to make a factual record to support its decision.’’

Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 61. Although exhaustion of a FOIA

request ‘‘is not jurisdictional because the FOIA does not

unequivocally make it so,’’ Hidalgo v. FBI, 344 F.3d 1256,

1258 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing I.A.M. Nat’l Pension Fund Ben.

Plan C. v. Stockton TRI Indus., 727 F.2d 1204, 1208 (D.C.

Cir. 1984)), still ‘‘as a jurisprudential doctrine, failure to

exhaust precludes judicial review if ‘the purposes of exhaustion’ and the ‘particular administrative scheme’ support such

a bar,’’ Hidalgo, 344 F.3d at 1258–59 (quoting Oglesby, 920

F.2d at 61).

As we held in Hidalgo, the FOIA’s administrative scheme

‘‘favors treating failure to exhaust as a bar to judicial review.’’

See Hidalgo, 344 F.3d at 1259 (construing 5 U.S.C.

§§ 552(a)(6)(A) & citing cases). Moreover, many agencies,

including the CIA, require that an administrative appeal be

filed within a time specified in the agency’s regulations in

order to satisfy the FOIA exhaustion requirement. See

Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 65 n.9; 32 C.F.R. § 1900.42 (CIA

regulation stating: ‘‘Appeals of decisions must be received by

the Coordinator within forty-five (45) days of the date of the

Agency’s initial decision. The Agency may, for good cause and

as a matter of administrative discretion, permit an additional

thirty (30) days for the submission of an appeal.’’).

Wilbur stands on a different footing from Hidalgo with

respect to the second jurisprudential factor. This action

presents no risk of undermining the purposes and policies

underlying the exhaustion requirement, namely, to prevent

premature interference with agency processes, to give the

parties and the courts benefit of the agency’s experience and

expertise and to compile an adequate record for review. See

Hidalgo, 344 F.3d at 1259 (citing Ryan v. Bentsen, 12 F.3d

245, 247 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (citing Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S.

749, 765 (1975))). Wilbur did not bypass the administrative

review process but pursued it to its end; he was simply late

(albeit four years late). Nevertheless, the CIA accepted the

appeal, processed it, reviewed the initial determination and

issued a final decision upholding the agency’s prior determination. Wilbur then availed himself of the right to seek

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judicial review as the CIA told him he could. In these

circumstances, the policies underlying the exhaustion requirement have been served. See Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 61–65;

Hidalgo, 344 F.3d at 1259–60. Accordingly, we conclude that,

because exhaustion is a prudential consideration rather than a

jurisdictional prerequisite, the district court was not precluded under these circumstances from deciding the merits of

Wilbur’s FOIA claim notwithstanding his failure to comply

with the CIA’s FOIA appeal deadline.*

Having concluded that judicial review of the FOIA decision

merits is not barred, we affirm the grant of summary judgment substantially for the reasons stated by the district court.

See Wilbur, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 124–25. Contrary to Wilbur’s

assertion on appeal, the fact that responsive documents once

existed does not mean that they remain in the CIA’s custody

today or that the CIA had a duty under FOIA to retain the

records. See Yeager v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 678 F.2d

315, 321 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (‘‘A requester is entitled only to

records that an agency has in fact chosen to create and

retain.’’); Miller v. United States Dep’t of State, 779 F.2d

1378, 1385 (8th Cir. 1985) (‘‘The fact that a document once

existed does not mean that it now exists; nor does the fact

that an agency created a document necessarily imply that the

agency has retained it.’’). Likewise, the agency’s failure to

turn up a particular document, or mere speculation that as

yet uncovered documents might exist, does not undermine the

determination that the agency conducted an adequate search

for the requested records. See Iturralde v. Comptroller of

Currency, 315 F.3d 311, 314 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Safecard

Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1991). In

sum, the CIA met its burden on summary judgment to

‘‘demonstrate beyond material doubt that its search was

reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents.’’

Nation Magazine v. United States Customs Serv., 71 F.3d

* Were the exhaustion requirement jurisdictional, this failure

would bar judicial review of the merits. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for

a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 93–94 (1998) (rejecting ‘‘hypothetical

jurisdiction’’ doctrine under which court assumes subject-matter

jurisdiction for sake of deciding merits).

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885, 890 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Accordingly, the judgment of the

district court is

Affirmed.

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