Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01747/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01747-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Donald Douglas Bone
Petitioner
Eric Holder
Respondent

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Petitioner is in custody related to felony convictions. Because of the aggravated nature of the 

underlying felony convictions, Petitioner, a citizen of Canada, became subject to removal once his 

sentence has been completed. In this action, Petitioner challenges the placement of the detainer and 

issuance of the arrest warrant designed to effect his removal at the completion of his sentence. 

Respondent moves the Court to dismiss the matter based upon a lack of jurisdiction. Because this 

Court lacks the authority to consider the issuance of the detainer, the petition must be DISMISSED.

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding in propria persona with a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Both parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the United 

States Magistrate Judge for all purposes. (Docs. 10 & 23). 

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DONALD DOUGLAS BONE,

 Petitioner,

v.

ERIC HOLDER,

Respondent.

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ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS (Doc. 

24)

ORDER DISMISSING PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS (Doc. 1)

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO 

ENTER JUDGMENT AND CLOSE FILE

ORDER DECLINING TO ISSUE CERTIFICATE 

OF APPEALABILITY

Case 1:14-cv-01747-JLT Document 26 Filed 05/14/15 Page 1 of 6
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DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Dismiss.

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a petition 

if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is 

not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

Thus, a Respondent can file a Motion to Dismiss after the court orders a response, and the Court 

should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & 

n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982).

Respondent’s motion to dismiss is similar in procedural standing to a Motion to Dismiss for 

failure to exhaust state remedies or for state procedural default, and because Respondent has not yet 

filed a formal answer, the Court will review the motion pursuant to its authority under Rule 4.

B. Lack of Habeas Jurisdiction.

Federal courts are obligated to examine their own jurisdiction, and a federal court may not 

entertain an action over which it has no jurisdiction.” Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 865 (9th 

Cir.2000) (citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court 

determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). 

Here, Petitioner is a state prisoner serving a 24-year sentence resulting from his 1998

conviction in the Santa Clara County Superior Court of one count of continuous sexual abuse on a 

child, Cal. Pen. Code sec. 288.5, and four counts of lewd and lascivious conduct upon a child, Cal. 

Pen. Code sec. 288(a). Bone v. Lewis, 2006 WL 1390442 (N.D.Cal. May 19, 2006) at *1. The victim 

in all charges was Petitioner’s adopted daughter, whom Petitioner began sexually assaulting when she 

was four years old. Id., at *2. 

Because of the aggravated nature of the underlying felony convictions, Petitioner, a citizen of 

Canada, became subject to removal once his sentence has been completed. Accordingly, on May 17, 

1999, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (now Immigration and Customs Enforcement) 

issued a Notice of Custody Determination seeking to detain Petitioner at the end of his state sentence. 

(Doc. 4, p. 4). On the same date, INS issued an arrest warrant for Petitioner in order to commence 

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immigration and removal proceedings against Petitioner at the completion of his sentence. (Id., p. 6). 

The petition challenges the issuance of the detainer and the arrest warrant as follows: (1) the 

detainer deprives Petitioner of a protected liberty interest by precluding him from receiving a less 

stringent security classification, thus preventing Petitioner from enrolling in various prison programs 

and earning certain good-time credits; (2) various federal statutes of limitation have expired on the 

arrest warrant; (3) various federal statute of limitation have expired on the detainer; and (4) the federal 

statutes of limitation have expired on proceedings related to nationality, citizenship, and passports. 

(Doc. 1; 3; 25). Although Petitioner seeks to invoke various federal statutes of limitation in arguing 

that the detainer and arrest warrant are illegal, ultimately the petition challenges the legality and 

validity of the detainer.1 As discussed below, the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider such challenges, 

regardless of the legal bases. 

Federal habeas corpus jurisdiction is limited to petitions from persons who are “in custody in 

violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Maleng v. Cook, 

490 U.S. 488, 490 (1989). The “in custody” requirement is jurisdictional. Wilson v. Belleque, 554 

F.3d 816, 821 (9th Cir.2009) (“The text of the statute makes clear, and the Supreme Court has 

confirmed, that ‘custody’ is a jurisdictional prerequisite to habeas review under § 2241(c)(3).”)(citing 

Hensley v. Mun. Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351, 93 S.Ct. 1571, 36 L.Ed.2d 294 (1973)).

The Supreme Court has interpreted the above statutory language to mean “in custody” pursuant 

to the conviction or sentence under attack at the time the petition is filed, Maleng, 490 U.S. at 490–91, 

and the only exception is where a petitioner can show adverse legal collateral consequences that give 

rise to an injury-in-fact sufficient to satisfy the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III, § 2. 

Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998). 

An immigration detainer is merely a request to a law enforcement agency or prison to notify 

the United States Department of Homeland Security before it releases an alien upon completion of his 

 

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Petitioner argues, without citing any legal authority, that the arrest warrant gives rise to the collateral consequence of the 

detainer. However, in the Court’s view, the opposite is true, i.e., the detainer arises from the fact of Petitioner’s state 

conviction and empowers ICE, pursuant to federal regulations, to issue the arrest warrant once Petitioner has served his 

sentence. Thus, the gravamen of the petition is actually the purported illegality of the detainer.

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criminal sentence so that DHS may take custody of the alien for removal proceedings. 8 C.F.R. § 

287.7; see also Galaviz–Medina v. Wooten, 27 F.3d 487, 493 (10th Cir.1994) (“A detainer usually 

serves only as a notice to federal prison authorities that the INS is going to be making a decision about 

the deportability of the alien in the future.”). Accordingly, as the Ninth Circuit has explained, “‘the 

bare detainer letter alone does not sufficiently place an alien in INS custody to make habeas corpus 

available.’” Campos v. I.N.S., 62 F.3d 311, 314 (9th Cir.1995) (quoting Garcia v. Taylor, 40 F.3d 

299, 303 (9th Cir.1994) (superseded by statute on other grounds, as recognized in Campos)); United 

States v. Female Juvenile, A.F.S., 377 F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir.2004) (“[A]n INS detainer is not, standing 

alone, an order of custody. Rather, it serves as a request that another law enforcement agency notify 

the [Immigration and Naturalization Service] before releasing an alien from detention so that the INS 

may arrange to assume custody over the alien.”); Zolicoffer v. United States Dep't of Justice, 315 F.3d

538, 540 (5th Cir.2003) (collecting cases, including Campos, and agreeing that absent an order of 

removal, “prisoners are not ‘in custody’ for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2241 simply because the INS has 

lodged a detainer against them”). In short, the detainer is only a notification that a removal decision 

will be made at some later date. Campos, 62 F.3d at 313–14. Because Petitioner is not in DHS custody 

and is not challenging the conviction for which he is currently incarcerated, the Court lacks 

jurisdiction to consider Petitioner's habeas claims.

Consequently, contrary to Petitioner’s assertions, an ICE detainer does not place a petitioner 

“in custody” for purposes of obtaining habeas corpus relief. Garcia v. Taylor, 40 F.3d 299, 303 (9th 

Cir.1994) (“[T]he bare detainer letter alone does not sufficiently place an alien in [Immigration and 

Naturalization Service]2 custody to make habeas corpus available.”), superseded by statute on other 

grounds as stated in Campos v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 62 F.3d 311, 314 (9th 

Cir.1995). Although there appears to be one exception to the detainer rule, Petitioner does not qualify 

for it. The Ninth Circuit has:

broadly construed “in custody” to apply to situations in which an alien is not suffering any 

actual physical detention; i.e., so long as he is subject to a final order of deportation, an alien is 

deemed to be “in custody” for purposes of the [Immigration and Nationality Act], and 

therefore may petition a district court for habeas review of that deportation order.

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See Nakaranurack v. United States, 68 F.3d 290, 293 (9th Cir.1995). However, Petitioner has not 

alleged that he is subject to a final order of removal. To the contrary, Petitioner expressly admits that 

“there is no order of removal.” (Doc. 25, p. 1). Thus, the exception is inapplicable here. Petitioner is 

“in custody” pursuant to his state criminal conviction, not pursuant to either the immigration detainer 

or the federal arrest warrant. Hence, no federal habeas jurisdiction exists, and Petitioner cannot 

proceed with a habeas corpus petition concerning ICE's actions. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c).

In addition, Petitioner's challenge is not cognizable in a habeas corpus action; indeed, it is

expressly precluded by federal law. Title 8 U.S.C. § 1252 allows only very limited judicial review of 

ICE orders and decisions. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (stating which orders are reviewable and listing 

requirements to seek judicial review); Reno v. American–Arab Anti–Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 

471 (1999) (interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) to find no judicial review of ICE's “decision or action to 

commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders”). 

Moreover, even if the foregoing were not true, this Court is without power to compel ICE to 

hold a removal hearing for a non-citizen, such as Petitioner, as to whom ICE has lodged a detainer. 

See Campos, 62 F.3d at 313-14. In the Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 

1994, Pub.L.No. 103-416, Congress prohibited the Federal courts from compelling ICE to proceed 

with deportation or removal proceedings. See Campos, 62 F.3d at 312-314. Likewise, the Illegal 

Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub.L.No. 104-208, sets forth that Federal 

courts have no authority to review the Attorney General’s decision or action to “commence 

proceedings, adjudicate cases,” or “execute removal orders.” 8 U.S.C. § 122(g). Because 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252(g) specifically precludes the court from reviewing ICE’s decision to commence removal or 

deportation proceedings, the Court is without the power to compel ICE to take any specific action with 

respect to a detainer or potential removal hearing. For all of these reasons, the Court concludes that it 

lacks habeas jurisdiction to proceed. Accordingly, the petition must be dismissed. 

Moreover, the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability. A state prisoner seeking a 

writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal a district court’s denial of his petition, and 

an appeal is only allowed in certain circumstances. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-336 

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(2003). If a court denied the petition, the Court may issue a certificate of appealability only when the 

petitioner makes a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). 

To make a substantial showing, the petitioner must establish that “reasonable jurists could debate 

whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or 

that the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further’.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 (1983)).

In the present case, the Court finds that Petitioner has not made the required substantial 

showing of the denial of a constitutional right to justify the issuance of a certificate of appealability. 

Reasonable jurists would not find the Court’s determination that Petitioner is not entitled to federal 

habeas corpus relief debatable, wrong, or deserving of encouragement to proceed further. Thus, the 

Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability. 

ORDER

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY ORDERS as follows:

1. The motion to dismiss (Doc. 24) is GRANTED;

2. The petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction;

3. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment and close the file.

4. The Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 14, 2015 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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