Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-15-03072/USCOURTS-ca10-15-03072-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Albert Lawrence Vaughan
Appellant

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

ALBERT LAWRENCE VAUGHAN, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

No. 15-3072 

(D.C. Nos. 5:13-CV-04022-JAR & 

5:05-CR-40157-JAR-1) 

(D. Kan.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before BRISCOE, LUCERO, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Defendant Albert Lawrence Vaughan, currently serving a 198-month sentence 

for bank robbery, filed a notice of appeal from the district court’s dismissal of his 

28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence. We granted a 

certificate of appealability (COA) and appointed counsel to represent him on one 

issue: his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek dismissal 

 *

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

March 23, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

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based on his constitutional right to a speedy trial. We have jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

Vaughan was indicted in the federal District of Nevada in July 2005 on five 

counts of bank robbery. He was suspected of robbing banks in several states, and 

confessed to many of those robberies, but denied robbing any banks in Kansas. The 

Government offered Vaughan a global plea deal which would cover all suspected 

robberies, but Vaughan rejected it because he refused to plead guilty to any crime 

related to a Kansas robbery. Vaughan remained in custody during the Nevada 

prosecution and pleaded guilty in April 2007. On September 28, 2007, he was 

sentenced in the District of Nevada to 78 months’ imprisonment. 

On October 16, 2007, two weeks after his Nevada sentencing, Vaughan was 

arrested for a Kansas bank robbery. He learned that two years earlier, on December 

28, 2005, the Government had indicted him for robbing the Kansas bank on October 

15, 2004. Vaughan was arraigned and appointed counsel in the District of Kansas on 

October 18, 2007. It was undisputed before the district court that Vaughan was 

unaware of the Kansas indictment until he was arrested on October 16, 2007, and was 

unaware of any possible Kansas prosecution after he rejected the global plea deal.1

 

 1

 Prior to the grant of COA, the Government never disputed Vaughan’s 

assertion that he was unaware of the indictment until his arrest. For the first time on 

appeal the Government now argues that Vaughan was aware that the Government 

intended to prosecute him in Kansas, even if he was unaware of the indictment. It 

also filed a motion to supplement the record with new evidence not presented below, 

(continued) 

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Vaughan’s counsel did not move to dismiss the indictment on speedy-trial grounds. 

Vaughan was ultimately convicted for the Kansas robbery and sentenced to 198 

months, 120 months to be served consecutively to his Nevada sentence. This court 

affirmed Vaughan’s conviction on grounds unrelated to his § 2255 ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claim. United States v. Vaughan, 450 F. App’x 757 (10th Cir. 

2011). 

The district court denied Vaughan’s § 2255 motion without an evidentiary 

hearing. In relevant part, it ruled that Vaughan failed to show that the court probably 

would have granted a motion to dismiss the indictment on constitutional speedy-trial 

grounds, had his attorney filed such a motion. The district court concluded there was 

a greater than ordinary delay, but the Government had justifiably delayed the Kansas 

prosecution awaiting completion of the Nevada prosecution, Vaughan failed to assert 

his speedy trial rights, and he failed to make a particularized showing that he was 

prejudiced by the delay. 

 

which appears to show it transmitted a detainer against Vaughan to the District of 

Nevada on December 29, 2005, but which does not establish that the detainer was 

received or that Vaughan ever knew of the detainer. The Government offers no 

explanation why it did not present this evidence to the district court. Absent 

extraordinary circumstances, we do not consider evidence presented for the first time 

on appeal. Nulf v. Int’l Paper Co., 656 F.2d 553, 559 (10th Cir. 1981). We conclude 

the government’s motion to supplement the record on appeal does not present a “rare 

exception to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(e),” United States v. Toombs, 

713 F.3d 1273, 1281 (10th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted), and it 

therefore is denied. See Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 653 (1992) (stating 

“[t]he Government goes against the record again in suggesting that [the defendant] 

knew of his indictment years before he was arrested” where it failed to present such 

evidence below, and declining the Government’s attempt “to revisit the facts”). 

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II. DISCUSSION

“We review the district court’s legal rulings on a § 2255 motion de novo and 

its findings of fact for clear error. A claim for ineffective assistance of counsel 

presents a mixed question of fact and law, which we review de novo.” United States 

v. Orange, 447 F.3d 792, 796 (10th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). 

A. Constitutional Speedy-Trial Rights. The Sixth Amendment guarantees 

defendants in all criminal prosecutions “the right to a speedy and public trial.” U.S. 

Const. amend. VI. This right “attaches when he is arrested or indicted on federal 

charges, whichever comes first.” United States v. Banks, 761 F.3d 1163, 1181 

(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 308 (2014). Under the Constitution, “[t]he right 

of a speedy trial is necessarily relative,” and cannot “be quantified into a specified 

number of days or months.” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522-23 (1972) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). To determine whether this right has been violated, we 

consider (i) the length of the delay, (ii) the reason for the delay, (iii) whether the 

defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, and (iv) whether the delay prejudiced 

the defendant. Id. at 530. “This is a balancing test, so none of the factors is itself 

necessary or sufficient to conclude that the Sixth Amendment speedy trial right has 

been violated.” United States v. Hicks, 779 F.3d 1163, 1167 (10th Cir. 2015) 

(bracket and internal quotation marks omitted). The factors are related and must be 

considered together along with other relevant circumstances. Barker, 407 U.S. 

at 533. 

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1. Length of Delay. “[T]o trigger a speedy trial analysis, an accused must 

allege that the interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold 

dividing ordinary from ‘presumptively prejudicial’ delay.” United States v. Seltzer, 

595 F.3d 1170, 1176 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 

647, 651-52 (1992)). “The general rule is that the speedy trial right attaches when 

the defendant is arrested or indicted, whichever comes first.” Id. (internal quotation 

marks omitted). “Delays approaching one year generally satisfy the requirement of 

presumptive prejudice,” though “a court should take into consideration the nature of 

the charges.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

It is undisputed that there was a 22-month delay between the time Vaughan 

was indicted and when he was notified of the indictment and arrested.2

 “Two years is 

twice the time presumed to be ordinary.” Id. at 1176. We agree with the district 

court’s conclusion that this factor would have weighed in Vaughan’s favor had his 

counsel raised a speedy-trial challenge. See United States v. Batie, 433 F.3d 1287, 

1290 (10th Cir. 2006) (finding a 17-month delay for an armed bank robbery case 

presumptively prejudicial). 

2. Reason for the Delay. “The second factor, the reason for the delay, is 

especially important, and the burden is on the government to provide an acceptable 

rationale for the delay.” Banks, 761 F.3d at 1183 (internal quotation marks omitted); 

 2

 There was more than a four-year delay between Vaughan’s indictment and 

trial, but Vaughan did not challenge the post-arrest delay in his § 2255 motion or 

COA application; thus, we consider only the pre-arrest 22-month delay. 

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see also United States v. Ingram, 446 F.3d 1332, 1337 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Because the 

prosecutor and the court have an affirmative constitutional obligation to try the 

defendant in a timely manner . . . the burden is on the prosecution to explain the 

cause of the pre-trial delay.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Supreme Court 

has held that “different weights should be assigned to different reasons” for the 

delay. Boyer v. Louisiana, 133 S. Ct. 1702, 1706 (2013) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). “A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense is 

particularly serious, and should be weighted heavily against the government.” Id. at 

1706 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[N]egligence is . . . to be weighed more 

lightly . . . [but] still falls on the wrong side of the divide between acceptable and 

unacceptable reasons” for delay. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 657. 

The Government argued before the district court that “the delay in arresting 

[Vaughan] . . . was due entirely to the fact that he was being prosecuted on federal 

bank robbery charges in the District of Nevada.” R. Vol. 1, at 105. It relied upon a 

Seventh Circuit case which held that “[i]t is generally accepted that a delay 

occasioned by the prosecution of the defendant in another jurisdiction is not a basis 

for a dismissal on constitutional speedy-trial grounds.” United States v. Ellis, 

622 F.3d 784, 791 (7th Cir. 2010). The Government added that “no evidence in [the] 

record suggests that the [G]overnment was dragging its feet, procured the delay for 

tactical reasons, or was otherwise at fault,” R. Vol. 1, at 105-06, noting that Vaughan 

was promptly arrested and brought to Kansas for arraignment as soon as the Nevada 

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prosecution was completed. The district court concluded that the reason for the delay 

weighed in favor of the government. We disagree. 

First, the Government’s argument failed to take into account Tenth Circuit 

law. In Seltzer, this court declined to adopt a broad holding, such as the Seventh 

Circuit’s in Ellis, that deferring arrest or arraignment pending completion of 

proceedings in another jurisdiction is necessarily a justifiable reason for delay. 595 

F.3d at 1178. We recognized that “awaiting the completion of another sovereign’s 

prosecution may be a plausible reason for delay in some circumstances, but that does 

not necessarily mean that it is a justifiable excuse in every case.” Id. Thus, we held 

“it is the government’s burden to explain why such a wait was necessary in a 

particular case. In other words, the government must make a particularized showing 

of why the circumstances require the conclusion of [the other jurisdiction’s] 

proceedings before the [instant] proceedings can continue.”3

 Id. 

The Government failed to make such a showing before the district court. It 

presented neither evidence nor argument on that point. For the first time on appeal, it 

argues a concurrent prosecution in two federal jurisdictions would have been 

logistically cumbersome and might have affected Vaughan’s speedy-trial rights in the 

Nevada proceedings or denied him access to his Nevada counsel during times he was 

 3

 The district court concluded Seltzer was distinguishable because this case 

involved potentially concurrent proceedings in two federal jurisdictions, whereas in 

Seltzer the federal prosecution was delayed for a state proceeding. The court did not 

cite any authority, and we find none, that supports its conclusion that the government 

need not make any particularized showing if it delayed prosecution for a proceeding 

in another federal district. We follow Seltzer as precedential authority. 

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transported to Kansas. While some of these points appear obvious, the Government 

would have been well served to have made a record of its rationale for its delay of the 

Kansas prosecution when the indictment was filed, or for our present purposes, to 

have raised these points before the district court during the § 2255 proceeding. 

Second, even accepting the Government’s newly proffered reasons why a 

delay in prosecuting Vaughan in Kansas was justified by the pending Nevada case, 

that does not explain why the Government failed to notify Vaughan of the indictment. 

The record does not indicate whether its failure to notify Vaughan of the indictment 

was intentional or a negligent oversight, but we will assume the latter.4

 

“‘Once federal prosecutors bring an indictment against a defendant, they have 

a duty to notify the District Court that the defendant should be arraigned and 

appointed counsel, and to bring the defendant to trial expeditiously.’” Seltzer, 

595 F.3d at 1177 (quoting United States. v. Battis, 589 F.3d 673, 680 (3d Cir. 2009)). 

“This duty persists even when [other] authorities have a strong interest in bringing 

their own case against the same defendant.” Id. at 1177-78 (brackets and internal 

quotation marks omitted). “The Government cannot indict a defendant and then 

 4

 As noted, the Government moved to submit supplemental evidence not 

presented below showing that a detainer was transmitted to Nevada shortly after the 

indictment, see note 1, supra, but even were we to consider this evidence, it does not 

establish that Vaughan was notified of any such detainer, or otherwise knew of the 

indictment. See United States v. Watford, 468 F.3d 891, 906 (6th Cir. 2006) 

(upholding the district court’s finding that a federal detainer had been lodged with 

state officials, but concluding defendant was not to blame for not asserting his speedy 

trial rights because “[i]t does not follow . . . that [defendant] necessarily had 

knowledge of the detainer”). 

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delay a case indefinitely, without any notice to a federal judge, merely because it is 

aware of [another] proceeding involving the same defendant.” Id. at 1178 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). “[T]here exists a constitutional duty to try defendants on 

pending charges regardless of whether they are in federal custody on unrelated 

charges.” Jackson v. Ray, 390 F.3d 1254, 1262 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Smith v. 

Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 377 (1969)). 

The Government denies that it intentionally delayed the Kansas trial to gain 

some tactical advantage over Vaughan, but courts have held that the reason-for-delay 

factor weighs against the government when it cannot explain its failure to arrest or 

notify the defendant of an indictment. See United States v. Schreane, 331 F.3d 548, 

555 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that government’s decision to delay a defendant’s trial 

until state completed its prosecution was “a valid reason for delay,” but ruling the 

reason-for-delay factor weighed against the government in part because the state 

failed to notify the defendant of the federal detainer) (internal quotation marks 

omitted); United States v. Erenas-Luna, 560 F.3d 772, 777-78 (8th Cir. 2009) 

(second Barker factor “weigh[ed] decidedly against the government” where no 

intentional delay but defendant was unaware of the indictment and the government 

was “clearly seriously negligent” for failing to take appropriate actions to apprehend 

him) (internal quotation marks omitted); Ingram, 446 F.3d at 1339-40 (weighing 

reason-for-delay factor against government where defendant was unaware of the 

Kansas indictment and government gave no reasonable explanation for its neglect in 

executing the warrant for two years). 

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Because the Government failed to make any particularized showing before the 

district court why awaiting completion of the Nevada prosecution was necessary, and 

provided no explanation why Vaughan was not notified of the indictment, we 

conclude this factor would have weighed against the Government had Vaughan’s 

counsel raised a speedy-trial challenge. 

3. Assertion of Right. The third Sixth Amendment speedy-trial factor is 

whether Vaughan asserted his speedy-trial right. It is undisputed that he did not. On 

direct appeal, the Government argued this factor weighed against Vaughan because 

he failed to assert his speedy-trial right prior to his arrest. The Government did not 

dispute, or address the relevancy of, Vaughan’s assertion that he had no knowledge 

of the indictment prior his arrest.5

Vaughan argued that he could not have asserted his right during the 22-month 

delay prior to his arrest because he did not know about the indictment. He is not 

challenging any delay following his arrest, and he asserts that as soon as he was 

 5

 As noted, the Government argues for the first time on appeal that Vaughan 

was aware it intended to prosecute him in Kansas, even if he was unaware of the 

indictment, and thus could have asserted his rights. See n.1, supra. Were we to 

consider this new argument, it would not alter our analysis. “A defendant has no 

duty to bring himself to trial; the [government] has that duty. . . . ” Barker, 407 U.S. 

at 527 (footnote omitted). Further, as Vaughan had no counsel on the undisclosed 

Kansas charges, and believed there was no Kansas indictment, Vaughan could 

reasonably and correctly have concluded—were he conversant in speedy-trial law 

without an attorney—that he lacked any speedy trial rights until he was indicted. See 

United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 311 (1986) (holding the government’s 

obvious desire to prosecute was insufficient to allow defendants to invoke speedy 

trial rights prior to arrest or indictment). 

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arrested, he told his trial counsel he wanted to go to trial right away, thus evidencing 

his desire for a speedy trial. 

Noting that the burden of protecting one’s speedy-trial rights is not placed on 

the defendant, see Barker, 407 U.S. at 527, the district court concluded that the third 

Barker factor neither weighed for nor against Vaughan. We agree that this factor 

should be deemed neutral here, given Vaughan’s assertion he had no knowledge of 

the indictment during the relevant 22-month delay. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 653-54; 

(where a defendant was unaware of the indictment prior to arrest, he “is not to be 

taxed for invoking his speedy trial right only after his arrest”); Erenas-Luna, 

560 F.3d at 778 (holding, where defendant was unaware of his indictment until his 

arrest, that “the third Barker factor had no application”); United States v. Watford, 

468 F.3d 891, 906 (6th Cir. 2006) (“In the absence of a District Court finding that 

[defendant] had knowledge of the federal detainer, and absent record evidence of 

such knowledge, we conclude that [defendant] is not to blame for failing to assert his 

speedy trial rights despite the detainer.”). 

4. Prejudice to Defendant. The burden of proof is on the defendant to show 

that the delay in prosecution prejudiced him. United States v. Larson, 627 F.3d 1198, 

1208-09 (10th Cir. 2010). “In cases of extreme delay, the defendant may rely on the 

presumption of prejudice and need not present specific evidence of prejudice . . . 

[but g]enerally, the court requires a delay of six years before allowing the delay itself 

to constitute prejudice.” Id. at 1209. Because this case does not present an instance 

of such extreme delay, Vaughan would have had to present specific evidence of 

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prejudice in a speedy-trial motion. We require a showing of actual prejudice; the 

mere “possibility of prejudice is not sufficient to support [the] position that . . . 

speedy trial rights were violated.” United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 315 

(1986). 

Vaughan must “make a particularized showing of prejudice which addresses 

the interests the speedy trial right was designed to protect.” Hicks, 779 F.3d at 1169. 

The Supreme Court has identified three fundamental interests that the speedy trial 

right is intended to promote: “(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; 

(ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility 

that the defense will be impaired.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 532. The interest given the 

most weight is the third, which implicates “the fairness of the entire system.” Id. 

Here, the focus of the prejudice inquiry is only on whether the delay prejudiced 

Vaughan’s defense. 

Vaughan alleges that, had he been timely arrested for the Kansas robbery, he 

would have been appointed counsel and would have been able to secure and 

ultimately present at trial testimony and business records from his brother to show 

that he was working at his brother’s landscaping business in Colorado on the day of 

the robbery. He asserted that other employees of the landscaping business would 

also have corroborated that fact, and other witnesses would have testified he was in 

Colorado on the days prior to the Kansas robbery. But, he says, the landscaping 

business dissolved, the records were lost, and the alibi witnesses found jobs 

elsewhere. R. Vol. 1, at 53. The district court ruled Vaughan failed to meet his 

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burden to show specific prejudice because he failed to support his allegations with 

any evidence. 

We agree with the district court that Vaughan did not make a particularized 

showing of prejudice. “Defendants must present specific evidence of prejudice.” 

Banks, 761 F.3d at 1183-84 (emphasis added). Vaughan did not attach any 

supporting evidence to any § 2255 pleading or request an evidentiary hearing to 

support his allegation of prejudice. 

At issue is whether witnesses or evidence were lost while the Nevada 

prosecution was pending. Vaughan does not identify by name a single alibi witness, 

other than his brother. Vaughan provides no explanation or evidence why his brother 

was unavailable at trial to provide an alibi defense because of the 22-month delay. 

Vaughan did not present any evidence establishing that his brother’s landscaping 

business ever had records showing he had worked the day of the Kansas robbery, nor 

evidence that such records were, in fact, lost. Indeed, Vaughan does not even 

articulate when these business records were lost, so it is purely speculative that they 

were lost during a time frame relevant to the 22-month delay. 

He asserts only that landscape employees and neighbors could have placed him 

in Colorado in the days prior to the robbery, but this proffer is both too speculative 

and involves too wide a time frame to suggest a meaningful alibi. See United States 

v. Margheim, 770 F.3d 1312, 1330 (10th Cir. 2014) (no showing of prejudice when 

defendant failed to demonstrate that “the so-called missing witness’s testimony was 

vital to [the] defense”), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1514 (2015); Jackson, 390 F.3d at 

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1265 (“In arguing that the unavailability of a witness impaired the defense, a 

defendant must state with particularity what exculpatory testimony would have been 

offered . . . [and] present evidence that the delay caused the witness’s unavailability.” 

(brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)). Vaughan does not state what effort, 

if any, was made to locate these witnesses, when they became unavailable, or 

specifically why these witnesses could not be located even if they no longer worked 

at the landscaping business. In contrast to the evidence presented at trial,6

 Vaughan’s 

conclusory allegations of lost alibi evidence is insufficient to make out a showing of 

prejudice. 

In summary, we conclude Vaughan demonstrated that the Government’s delay 

was more than ordinary, that the reason for the delay weighed in his favor, that the 

third factor was neutral, but he failed to make any particularized showing that the 

delay prejudiced his defense. “Failure to show prejudice caused by the delay is 

nearly fatal to a speedy trial claim.” Hicks, 779 F.3d at 1168 (internal quotation 

marks omitted); Margheim, 770 F.3d at 1329 (“[I]n most circumstances, failure to 

specify prejudice will eviscerate the defendant’s [speedy-trial] claim.”). 

 B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. The Sixth Amendment 

guarantees criminal defendants the right to effective assistance of counsel. See 

 6

 Four employees in the Kansas bank gave descriptions of the robber that were 

consistent with Vaughan’s gender, race, height, weight, and a distinctive baseball hat 

Vaughan was known to wear; one employee picked Vaughan out of a lineup; and 

there was evidence of many similarities between the Kansas robbery and another 

robbery Vaughan had confessed to. Vaughan, 450 F. App’x at 758-62. 

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Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-85 (1984). To establish ineffective 

assistance of counsel, a criminal defendant must demonstrate: (1) that his trial 

counsel was deficient such that he was deprived of “reasonably effective assistance”; 

and (2) that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced his case, meaning “that there 

is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of 

the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 687, 694. Thus, to succeed on his 

§ 2255 motion, Vaughan must show a reasonable probability that, had his counsel 

filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on speedy-trial grounds, it would have been 

granted. 

In assessing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, courts “must apply a 

‘strong presumption’ that counsel’s representation was within a ‘wide range’ of 

reasonable professional assistance.” United States v. Rushin, 642 F.3d 1299, 1306 

(10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 104 (2011) and 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). We strongly presume “that an attorney acted in an 

objectively reasonable manner and that an attorney’s challenged conduct might have 

been part of a sound trial strategy.” Bullock v. Carver, 297 F.3d 1036, 1046 

(10th Cir. 2002). “[N]ot every decision on the part of defense counsel to forego 

filing a motion to dismiss upon an apparent [speedy trial] violation . . . is suspect 

under Strickland’s first prong.” Rushin, 642 F.3d at 1307 (analyzing a claim counsel 

was ineffective for not moving to dismiss under the Speedy Trial Act). “Unlike a 

panel of federal appellate judges, defense counsel observes the relevant proceedings, 

knows of materials outside the record, and interacts with the client, with opposing 

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counsel, and with the trial judge.” Id. (brackets omitted). Depending on the 

circumstances, “a reasonable attorney in the sound exercise of his or her professional 

judgment arguably might . . . decide[] to forgo the filing of a motion to dismiss the 

indictment as largely ineffective, an imprudent use of limited resources, or even 

unwarranted gamesmanship.” Id. at 1308. We are not persuaded that Vaughan has 

overcome the strong presumption that his attorney had sound strategical reasons for 

not moving to dismiss the indictment on speedy-trial grounds. 

We further conclude that Vaughan did not make a particularized showing of 

prejudice in conjunction with all of the Barker factors sufficient to justify dismissal 

of his indictment on constitutional speedy-trial grounds. Because Vaughan failed to 

show prejudice from the delay between his indictment and arrest, we conclude he 

cannot show that he was he was prejudiced under Strickland by counsel’s failure to 

move for dismissal on speedy-trial grounds. 

Vaughan has not shown that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective for 

failing to raise a constitutional speedy-trial claim. The Government’s Motion to 

Supplement the Record is denied. The district court’s denial of § 2255 relief is 

affirmed. 

Entered for the Court 

Mary Beck Briscoe 

Circuit Judge 

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