Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-03-03037/USCOURTS-caDC-03-03037-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lydell Ellerbe
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notify

the Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made

before the bound volumes go to press.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 12, 2004 Decided July 2, 2004

No. 03-3037

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

LYDELL ELLERBE,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 00cr00352–01)

Dennis M. Hart, appointed by the court, argued the cause

for the appellant.

Valinda Jones, Assistant United States Attorney, argued

the cause for the appellee. Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., United

States Attorney, and John R. Fisher, Roy W. McLeese III

and Thomas C. Taylor, Assistant United States Attorneys,

were on brief.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

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Before: EDWARDS, HENDERSON and ROBERTS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Appellant Lydell Ellerbe appeals his conviction of six counts of unlawfully

distributing narcotics and transporting firearms and his sentence therefor. Ellerbe contends the trial court deprived him

of his right to legal representation under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and his speedy trial

right under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD).

We reject his IAD argument in toto and his Sixth Amendment objection insofar as it relates to his trial and conviction.

We agree, however, that the trial court denied him his right

to counsel at sentencing and therefore remand for the court

to offer Ellerbe the option to be resentenced with assistance

of counsel.

I.

During 2000 Ellerbe was videotaped selling undercover

police officers the following contraband items: ten assorted

firearms on April 10, a shotgun, two handguns and ten

dilaudid1

 tablets on May 5, fifteen boxes of shotgun shells and

ten dilaudid tablets on June 26, fifty dialudid tablets on July

19 and five-hundred dilaudid tablets on August 7. Based on

these transactions, on October 19, 2000, Ellerbe was indicted

on two counts of interstate transportation of firearms in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) (counts one and two),

four counts of unlawful distribution of dilaudid in violation of

21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) (counts three, five, six and

seven) and one count of using, carrying or possessing a

firearm during the commission of a drug trafficking offense in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (count 4). A bench warrant

issued and, because Ellerbe was then incarcerated by the

Virginia Department of Corrections, was lodged as a detain1 Dilaudid is a brand-name prescription painkiller containing hydromorphone, a Schedule II controlled substance under 21 U.S.C.

§ 812. See 21 C.F.R. § 1308.12(b)(1)(11). United States v. Shabazz, 933 F.2d 1029, 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

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er2

 against his release. On March 26, 2001 the United States

received a request for disposition of the charges in the

indictment under the IAD, to which both the Commonwealth

of Virginia and the District of Columbia are signatories and

which provides for a speedy trial (within 180 days of a

prisoner’s request for final disposition) of a prisoner incarcerated in a contracting state against whom a detainer has been

lodged based on an untried indictment in another contracting

state. 18 U.S.C. app. 2, § 2, art. iii. On March 22 the

district court issued a writ of habeas corpus prosequendum

pursuant to which Ellerbe was transported to the District of

Columbia. He was provided counsel from the Office of the

Public Defender which represented him at his arraignment on

May 8, 2001, during which a status hearing was set for June

6, 2001.

At the June 6 hearing Ellerbe requested new counsel and

the court agreed to appoint new, private counsel and to hold

another status conference after the appointment. The court

announced that the time lapse between then and the next

status conference would be ‘‘excluded from the speedy trial

calculation at [Ellerbe’s] own request.’’ 6/06/01 Tr. at 9.

Ellerbe agreed to the exclusion.

At the next conference, on June 14, 2001, new appointed

counsel entered an appearance on Ellerbe’s behalf. The

court set a trial date of July 24 and directed Ellerbe’s counsel

to file any pre-trial motions within two weeks. The court

informed the parties it would ‘‘adjust the trial schedule to the

motions.’’ 6/14/01 Tr. at 5. On July 24, the date on which the

trial had been scheduled to begin, Ellerbe complained to the

court of his lawyer’s ‘‘ineffective assistance’’ in refusing to file

motions Ellerbe had requested. His counsel informed the

court he could not in good conscience file the requested

motions, explaining that he and Ellerbe were having commu2 A ‘‘detainer TTT is a request by the State’s criminal justice

agency that the institution in which the prisoner is housed hold the

prisoner for the agency or notify the agency when release is

imminent.’’ New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 112 (2000) (citing Fex

v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43, 44 (1993)).

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nication problems. The court then discussed with Ellerbe the

motions he wished to file. During the discussion, Ellerbe

revealed he had filed complaints against his lawyer with the

bar associations of both Virginia and the District of Columbia.

The lawyer then moved to withdraw and the court again

suspended the speedy trial clock until a third lawyer could be

appointed, to which Ellerbe again agreed. On July 25 the

court requested a new lawyer to represent Ellerbe but she

declined after Ellerbe told her he did not wish her to represent him.

On September 6, 2001 the court held a status conference to

determine Ellerbe’s competence both to stand trial and to

represent himself. A lawyer from the Public Defender’s

Office was appointed, temporarily, to represent Ellerbe at the

hearing. After temporary counsel reported to the court that

Ellerbe felt he lacked the legal knowledge to represent

himself and wished the assistance of counsel, the court advised Ellerbe that it would appoint a fourth lawyer but that

the lawyer would be the last such appointment. It then

ordered the case ‘‘continued until the entry of an appearance

of the next—and last—attorney that Mr. Ellerbe will have.’’

9/6/01 Tr. at 18.

In a memorandum dated October 10, 2001 the newly appointed counsel, Edward Sussman, advised the court that he

did ‘‘not see how the standard attorney-client relationship will

work in this case.’’ Gov’t Rec. Mat. tab L, at 1. He

therefore suggested that ‘‘the court explore having the defendant act as his own counsel with an attorney acting in an

advisory capacity.’’ Id. at 1-2. At a status hearing on

October 12, 2001 the court appointed Sussman as Ellerbe’s

legal advisor and set a motions hearing for November 13,

2001. At the motions hearing, Ellerbe argued on his own

behalf, with Sussman interceding sporadically. At the conclusion of the hearing Ellerbe complained that the court itself

had acknowledged he was not knowledgeable enough to represent himself. The court then offered (disregarding its

previous ultimatum) to appoint another lawyer to represent

Ellerbe. Ellerbe emphatically turned down the offer and

stated: ‘‘No matter where it takes me[,] I’ll continue the way

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I’m going.’’ 11/13/2001 Tr. at 37. At a subsequent hearing

on November 30, 2001, when the court expressed concern

about Ellerbe’s competence to represent himself, Ellerbe

replied: ‘‘[Y]ou were the one who told me that I had to

represent myself’’ but then continued: ‘‘That’s the way I want

it to be.’’ 11/30/01 Tr. at 4. Uncertain of Ellerbe’s competence, the court ordered him committed for psychological

evaluation.

In a report filed with the district court on January 22, 2002,

the government psychologists who examined Ellerbe stated

he was ‘‘not viewed as suffering from a significant mental

disease or defect’’ that would render him ‘‘not able to understand the charges, court procedures, or adequately assist with

his defense provided he chooses to do so’’ but advised that

‘‘[b]y virtue of his limited educational opportunities, below

average mental ability and moderate paranoid traits’’ they did

‘‘not view him as capable of conducting his own self defense.’’

Gov’t Rec. Mat. tab P, at 7. At a conference on March 7,

2002, the court agreed that Ellerbe was competent to stand

trial but also concluded that ‘‘by decree of the Supreme

Court’’ he was therefore competent to represent himself as

well. 3/7/02 Tr. at 1-2. The court nonetheless ‘‘implore[d]’’

Ellerbe not to do so and Ellerbe relented. Id. at 2. He

consented to be represented by Sussman with the understanding that he would listen to his counsel’s advice and not

revisit motions the court had already resolved. Trial was

scheduled for June 18, 2002.

A few weeks later Ellerbe wrote the court complaining that

Sussman would not file motions he wished filed. In response,

the court conducted a motions hearing on March 28, 2002 at

which Ellerbe stated he was ‘‘going to represent [him]self’’

with Sussman returning to the status of legal advisor.

3/28/02 Tr. at 43. The court reluctantly acceded.

At a final pre-trial hearing on April 25, 2002 the court

addressed a claim, proffered by Ellerbe for the first time,

that his speedy trial right under the IAD had been violated.3

3 Although Ellerbe had previously claimed violation of his rights

under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, this was the first

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The court found no violation because most, if not all, of the

continuances ‘‘were caused by Mr. Ellerbe’s own decisions

about lawyers in the case.’’ 4/25/02 Tr. at 19.

On June 19, 2002, at the conclusion of a three-day trial, the

court dismissed count four of the indictment, alleging use of a

firearm during a drug trafficking offense, and the jury convicted Ellerbe of the remaining six counts. Following the

verdict, the court relieved Sussman of his appointment and on

June 20, 2002 issued an order formally declaring that Sussman had ‘‘no duty of representation in connection with posttrial motions, sentencing, or appeal.’’ Gov’t Rec. Mat. tab T,

at 2. Ellerbe represented himself at sentencing and the

court, adopting the recommendations of the pre-sentence

report, sentenced Ellerbe to a total term of 108 months’

incarceration to be followed by three years of supervised

release.4

II.

We address separately the arguments Ellerbe urges on

appeal.

A. Right to Counsel

First, Ellerbe contends the district court deprived him of

his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by forcing him to

represent himself in the criminal proceeding. We reject this

claim as it relates to the trial portion of the proceeding

because Ellerbe knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily

waived his right to counsel and elected to represent himself

during this phase. We further conclude, however, that the

district court erred in failing to ascertain whether the waiver

extended beyond the trial to the sentencing phase.

time he had invoked the IAD since his initial request for final

disposition on March 26, 2001.

4 The judge sentenced Ellerbe to concurrent terms of 60 months

on counts one and two and concurrent terms of 108 months on

counts three, five, six and seven.

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‘‘The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of our Constitution guarantee that a person brought to trial in any state or

federal court must be afforded the right to the assistance of

counsel before he can be validly convicted and punished by

imprisonment.’’ Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807

(1975). Concomitantly, ‘‘[t]he Sixth Amendment right to the

assistance of counsel implicitly embodies a ‘correlative right

to dispense with a lawyer’s help’ ’’ so that ‘‘ ‘an accused, in the

exercise of a free and intelligent choice, and with the considered approval of the court, may waive trial by jury, and so

likewise may he competently and intelligently waive his Constitutional right to assistance of counsel.’ ’’ Id. at 813, 814

(quoting Adams v. United States, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 275

(1942)). The district court repeatedly and emphatically encouraged Ellerbe to accept the assistance of counsel but

Ellerbe, with equal determination, rejected the offers of legal

assistance. Although he sporadically, and unenthusiastically,

accepted appointment of counsel, in each instance he quickly

reversed course, expressing dissatisfaction with counsel’s performance. In the end, recognizing his limited legal abilities,

he accepted Sussman’s assistance as standby advisory counsel

while yet insisting on conducting his own defense at trial.

On appeal Ellerbe asserts that he did not knowingly waive

his right to counsel because he repeatedly acknowledged his

inability to defend himself—a view shared by the federal

psychologists who evaluated him. The Supreme Court has

expressly held, however, that a defendant who is competent

to stand trial is also competent to waive his right to assistance of counsel—all that is necessary is that he do so

intelligently and voluntarily. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S.

389, 391 (1993) (‘‘[T]he competency standard for pleading

guilty or waiving the right to counsel is [not] higher than the

competency standard for standing trial.’’); id. at 401-02

(‘‘competence to waive’’ right to assistance of counsel is ‘‘a

shorthand for the ‘intelligent and competent waiver’ requirement of Johnson v. Zerbst[, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)]’’). ‘‘[T]he

defendant’s ‘technical legal knowledge’ is ‘not relevant’ to the

determination whether he is competent to waive his right to

counsel’’; his ‘‘ability to represent himself has no bearing

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upon his competence to choose self-representation.’’ Id. at

400 (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975)

(emphasis original)). Ellerbe’s dogged insistence on representing himself at trial constituted an intelligent and voluntary waiver of his right to appointed counsel at trial and we

will therefore not entertain his Sixth Amendment claim on

appeal. Cf. United States v. Fazzini, 871 F.2d 635, 641-42

(7th Cir. 1989) (‘‘defendant who refused to cooperate with

numerous appointed counsel, who was warned of the consequences that his failure to cooperate would have, and who

insisted, despite his conduct, that he was not waiving his right

to appointed counsel TTT knowingly and intelligently waived

his right to appointed counsel’’); United States v. Moore, 706

F.2d 538, 540 (5th Cir. 1983) (‘‘conclud[ing] that a persistent,

unreasonable demand for dismissal of counsel and appointment of new counsel TTT is the functional equivalent of a

knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel’’).

We reach a different conclusion regarding Ellerbe’s right to

counsel at sentencing. A criminal defendant is ‘‘ ‘as much

entitled to effective representation by counsel at sentencing

as at any other critical stage of his trial.’ ’’ United States v.

Green, 680 F.2d 183, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (quoting United

States v. Pinkney, 543 F.2d 908, 914 (D.C. Cir. 1976); citing

American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal

Justice, Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and

Procedures § 5.3(e) (1968)). The district court, however,

made no effort to ascertain whether Ellerbe desired representation at sentencing. The court sua sponte discharged

Sussman at the close of the trial and did not thereafter take

any action to protect Ellerbe’s Sixth Amendment right to

further representation. As a consequence Ellerbe was left to

negotiate the United States Sentencing Guidelines unassisted

even by advisory counsel. Ellerbe also demonstrated the

‘‘likelihood of harm’’ needed to put the government to the

burden of ‘‘disprov[ing] actual injury’’ from the lack of representation. United States v. Green, 680 F.2d at 188 (citing

United States v. Wood, 628 F.2d 554, 561 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).

In sentencing Ellerbe the district court adopted the recommendation of the pre-sentence report to increase Ellerbe’s

base offense level by four levels for ‘‘possessing a firearm in

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connection with a drug offense,’’ 9/5/02 Tr. at 8, pursuant to

U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5). Without benefit of legal advice, Ellerbe did not contest the increase which changed his sentencing range from 87/108 months to 108/135 months. Yet case

law supports the contention, urged by Ellerbe on appeal,

‘‘that more than ‘mere possession’ is required to establish the

possession prong’’ of section 2K2.1(b)(5) and that instead the

enhancement for possession applies when ‘‘the firearm had

some potential emboldening role in [the] defendant’s felonious

conduct.’’ United States v. Polanco, 93 F.3d 555, 566-67 (9th

Cir. 1996) (internal quotation omitted; alteration original);

see also United States v. Bowie, 198 F.3d 905, 913 (D.C.

Cir.1999) (upholding section 2K2.1 increase where defendant’s

‘‘possession of the weapon emboldened him, or appeared to,

and his reaching for the weapon showed his intent to use it to

facilitate’’ felony); Gov’t Br. at 49 (‘‘Appellant correctly states

that the mere possession of a firearm is not sufficient to

support this adjustment.’’).5

 We note, however, that, if on

remand Ellerbe rejects assistance of counsel, his sentence will

stand as originally entered and that an appeal therefrom will

bear little chance of success under the applicable ‘‘plain

error’’ standard of review. See United States v. Thomas, 361

F.3d 653, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (where defendant fails to raise

objection to sentence in district court, ‘‘our review is limited

to scrutiny for plain error under Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 52(b)’’ (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,

731 (1993); United States v. Joaquin, 326 F.3d 1287, 1290

(D.C. Cir. 2003))).6

5 The government argues on appeal that a section 2k2.1(b)(5)

increase is justified because Ellerbe had reason to believe the

purchasers would use the firearm in connection with a felony.

Because the government did not use this rationale below and the

sentencing judge did not rely on it, we may not uphold the increase

on this basis. See United States v. Fields, 242 F.3d 393, 397 (D.C.

Cir. 2001) (rejecting rationale on which neither sentencing judge

nor pre-sentence report relied).

6 Given the likelihood of resentencing on remand we do not reach

the substance of Ellerbe’s claim that the four-level increase constitutes reversible error.

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B. IAD Speedy Trial

The IAD provides in relevant part:

Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a party

State, and whenever during TTT the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party State any

untried indictment, information, or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the

prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within one hundred

and eighty days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court

of the prosecuting officer’s jurisdiction written notice of

the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final

disposition to be made of the indictment, information, or

complaintTTTT

18 U.S.C. app. 2, § 2, art. iii(a). Ellerbe contends his speedy

trial right under this provision was violated because he was

not tried within 180 days after he delivered his request for

final disposition on March 26, 2001. We disagree.

The IAD ‘‘is designed ‘to encourage the expeditious and

orderly disposition of TTT charges [outstanding against a

prisoner] and determination of the proper status of any and

all detainers based on untried indictments, informations, or

complaints.’ ’’ United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 343

(1979) (quoting 18 U.S.C. app. 2, § 2, art. i (alteration original)). Its strictures, however, are far from absolute. The

IAD’s text expressly directs that the period be tolled ‘‘whenever and for as long as the prisoner is unable to stand trial,’’

18 U.S.C. app. 2, § 2, art. vi(a), which courts have construed

to include those periods of delays caused by the defendant’s

own actions. See United States v. Johnson, 953 F.2d 1167,

1172 (9th Cir. 1992) (IAD period is tolled when delay is

‘‘excludable’’ under Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, ‘‘because it is attributable to a defendant’s own motions’’); United States v. Cephas, 937 F.2d 816, 819 (2d Cir. 1991) (IAD art.

vi ‘‘allows exclusions of all those periods of delay occasioned

by the defendant’’) (internal quotations omitted); United

States v. Nesbitt, 852 F.2d 1502, 1516 (7th Cir. 1988) (‘‘periods

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of delay occasioned by the multiple motions filed on behalf of

the defendant[ ] operate to toll the running of [IAD] Articles

III and IV’’); United States v. Walker, 924 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir.

1991) (‘‘Courts have consistently applied this language ‘to

exclude all those time periods of delay occasioned by the

defendant.’ ’’ (quoting United States v. Taylor, 861 F.2d 316,

321 (1st Cir. 1988))). In this case the delays to which Ellerbe

objects were caused by Ellerbe’s own conduct—notably his

penchant for frivolous motions and his erratic stance on legal

representation.

On June 6, 2001 Ellerbe requested new counsel, stalling the

proceedings until counsel could be appointed. When new

counsel entered an appearance on June 14, 2001, the court set

a trial date of July 24 and gave Ellerbe’s counsel two weeks

to file pre-trial motions. On July 24, 2001 Ellerbe disclosed he

had filed a complaint against his second lawyer requiring

appointment of yet a third lawyer, whom Ellerbe discharged

shortly thereafter. All of this prompted the September 6,

2001 competency conference and Sussman’s appointment.

The next two months were largely consumed by the need for

the newly appointed Sussman to become familiar with the

case and to file pre-trial motions and by Ellerbe’s changing

position on legal representation (as well as his filing of yet

more motions). After the November 30 hearing an additional

delay of more than one month was caused by the need for the

competency evaluations, which necessitated the follow-up

hearing on March 7, 2002. Thereafter, more time was required for the reinstated Sussman to file motions and prepare

for trial and for the court to address additional pre-trial

motions filed by Ellerbe both before and after he resumed

self-representation. In sum, given Ellerbe’s obstructive conduct throughout the period from arraignment to trial, he

cannot now complain of the many delays his conduct caused.

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, Ellerbe’s conviction is affirmed

and his sentence is remanded with instructions to the trial

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court to resentence Ellerbe with the representation of counsel

should Ellerbe so elect.

So ordered.

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