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Parties Involved:
Zac Demyers
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-13432

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ZAC DEMYERS, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cr-00044-MLB-RDC-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-13432

Before JILL PRYOR, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Zac DeMyers appeals his 57-month sentence following his 

conviction for one count of conspiracy to make false statements in 

connection with the purchase and unlawful export of firearms from 

the United States. DeMyers argues that the government breached 

his plea agreement by arguing for, and providing evidence for, a 

higher base offense level than the one it promised to recommend. 

We review whether the government breached a plea agreement de novo. United States v. Copeland, 381 F.3d 1101, 1104 (11th 

Cir. 2004). We will affirm the district court's factual findings on the 

scope of the plea agreement unless they are clearly erroneous. Id.

at 1105. 

When a guilty plea rests “in any significant degree on a 

promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be 

a part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be 

fulfilled.” Id. (quoting Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 

(1971)) (quotation mark omitted). Thus, the government is bound 

by any material promise that induces the defendant to plead 

guilty. United States v. Hunter, 835 F.3d 1320, 1324 (11th Cir. 

2016). Ultimately, we must consider whether the government’s actions were inconsistent with the defendant's reasonable understanding of the agreement. Id. The government cannot pay mere 

“lip service” to the agreement nor engage in conduct completely 

incompatible with the agreement’s terms. United States v. Taylor, 

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23-13432 Opinion of the Court 3

77 F.3d 368, 371 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Canada, 960 

F.2d 263, 269 (1st Cir. 1992)). We have found that the government 

breaches the plea agreement when a defendant reasonably relies 

on a promise within the agreement and the government “advocated a position taken in the PSI that was incompatible with fulfillment of the promise.” Id. 

However, “[t]he solemnization of a plea agreement does not 

preclude the government from disclosing pertinent information to 

the sentencing court.” United States v. Boatner, 966 F.2d 1575, 1578 

(11th Cir. 1992). When the government makes a promise regarding a sentencing recommendation but retains the right to disclose 

other information to the court, it does not break the promise if it 

later discloses information that undercuts the recommendation. 

See e.g., United States v. Horsfall, 552 F.3d 1275, 1282-83 (11th Cir. 

2008) (allowing the government to present victim impact evidence 

when the plea agreement authorized it to inform the court of “all 

facts pertinent to the sentencing process”). The government has a 

duty to ensure “that the court has complete and accurate information concerning the defendant, thereby enabling the court to 

impose an appropriate sentence.” United States v. Block, 660 F.2d 

1086, 1091 (5th Cir. Unit B. Nov. 1981). 1

In United States v. Johnson, we held that the government violated the plea agreement because rather than just answering the 

1 Decisions issued by Unit B of the former Fifth Circuit are binding precedent 

in the Eleventh Circuit. Stein v. Reynolds Secs., Inc., 667 F.2d 33, 34 (11th Cir. 

1982). 

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4 Opinion of the Court 23-13432

court’s questions, the government “abandoned the agreement”

and “became an enthusiastic advocate for a ‘fact’ at odds” with the 

stipulated facts. 132 F.3d 628, 630-31 (11th Cir. 1998) (“This case 

[was] not one in which [the government was] subject to much 

pointed probing by the district judge, ultimately prying information from the [government] contrary to the plea agreement.”).

Here, we conclude that the government did not breach the 

plea agreement because the plea agreement explicitly provided that 

both parties had the right to inform the court and probation office 

of all the facts and circumstances of the case. The government did 

not abandon the agreement when it stated the higher base offense 

level was accurate because, even though the information ultimately undermined its recommendation, the government was answering the court’s questions and giving the court information

about the case. C.f. Johnson, 132 F.3d at 630-31; see e.g., Horsfall, 552 

F.3d at 1282-83. 

AFFIRMED.

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