Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_00-cr-00872/USCOURTS-azd-3_00-cr-00872-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Vernon Austin
Defendant
United States of America
Plaintiff

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

UNITED STATES of AMERICA, )

) No. CR 00-872 PCT RCB

Plaintiff/Respondent, ) CIV 03-708 PCT RCB

)

vs. ) O R D E R

)

VERNON AUSTIN, )

)

Defendant/Movant. ) )

On June 16, 2003, Movant Vernon Austin filed an Amended Motion

to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2255. Am. Mot. (doc. # 63). The Court denied that motion on the

merits on January 5, 2005, but granted Austin leave to file a

motion for permission to file a second amended § 2255 motion. 

Order (doc. # 80). On November 10, 2005, the Court recognized that

it could not exercise jurisdiction over such a request due to the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's ("AEDPA")

limitation on successive § 2255 motions, and instructed Austin

that, in order to proceed, he would be required to obtain

authorization to file a second § 2255 motion from the United States 

Case 3:00-cr-00872-RCB Document 103 Filed 05/22/06 Page 1 of 11
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1

 Austin filed an application for leave to file a second or

successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion with the United States Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on January 18, 2006. The application

was denied on April 19, 2006. Mot. (doc. # 102), Ex. A.

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Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Id. Order (doc. # 94) at

2-3.1 In light of that jurisdictional limitation, the Court

acknowledged that Movant's earlier request for leave to file a

second § 2255 motion (doc. # 86) had been improvidently granted in

part, and modified its July 14, 2005 order (doc. # 90) accordingly

so that the request would be denied in its entirety. Id. at 3. On

November 21, 2005, Austin deposited a motion for reconsideration of

the Court's November 10 order in the United States Postal Mail at

the United States Penitentiary in Florence, Colorado. Mot. (doc. #

95) at 3; Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988) (petition by

pro se prisoner is deemed filed at the moment it is delivered to

prison officials for forwarding to the court clerk). On December

13, 2005, the Court denied that motion. Order (doc. # 97).

Currently pending before the Court are Austin's motion to stay

the proceedings or, in the alternative, to file an untimely appeal

(doc. # 98) and motion for certificate of appealability (doc. #

102). Having carefully considered the arguments raised, the Court

now rules.

I. Motion for Leave to File Untimely Appeal

Congress has vested the courts of appeals of the United States

with "jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the

district courts of the United States . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1291;

see also Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 330 (1938)

("There can be no question of the power of Congress thus to define

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and limit the jurisdiction of the inferior courts of the United

States."). The timely filing of a notice of appeal is a

jurisdictional requirement for the courts of appeals. Scott v.

Younger, 739 F.2d 1464, 1466 (9th Cir. 1984). In a civil case,

when the United States is a party, the notice of appeal must be

filed within 60 days after the date of entry of judgment in the

district court. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B).

There are two instances in which Congress has authorized the

district courts to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal

that are relevant here. First, upon a showing of excusable neglect

or good cause, a district court may extend the time for filing a

notice of appeal upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the

expiration of the time prescribed by Rule 4(a). Fed. R. App. P.

4(a)(5). Second, upon a showing that the moving party did not

receive notice of the entry of the judgment or order sought to be

appealed within 21 days after entry, a district court may reopen

the time to file an appeal upon motion not filed later than 180

days after the judgment is entered or within 7 days after the

moving party receives notice of the entry. Fed. R. App. P.

4(a)(6).

Austin's motion for leave to file an untimely appeal is based

on both Rule 4(a)(5) and Rule 4(a)(6). Mot. (doc. # 98). As

explained below, neither option provides the Court authority to

allow Austin to file an untimely notice of appeal.

A. Motion for Extension of Time

Under Rule 4(a)(5), the district court may extend the time for

filing a notice of appeal if two requirements are met: (1) the

motion for the extension of time is filed no later than 30 days

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2

 The Court first alerted Austin to the AEDPA's bar on

successive § 2255 motions in its order entered on November 10, 2005.

Order (doc. # 94). Austin filed his motion for extension of time on

January 3, 2006, well within the original 60-day period for filing a

notice of appeal as to that order. Mot. (doc. # 98).

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after the expiration of the original appeal period and (2) the

moving party makes a sufficient showing of excusable neglect or

good cause for not meeting the original deadline. Fed. R. App. P.

4(a)(5). The Ninth Circuit has stated that "[t]he requirement that

motions for extension be filed within thirty days of the original

deadline is mandatory and jurisdictional." Alaska Limestone Corp.

v. Hodel, 799 F.2d 1409, 1411 (9th Cir. 1986). Unlike statutes of

limitation, jurisdictional filing deadlines are not subject to

equitable tolling. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 281 (1988);

Oh v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 611, 613 (9th Cir. 2005).

The original judgment disposing of this action was entered on

January 5, 2005. Judgment (doc. # 81). Thus, Austin would have

had until March 5, 2005 to file his notice of appeal, and until

April 5, 2005 to file his motion for extension of time. Fed. R.

App. P. 4(a)(1)(B), 4(a)(5). However, he did not submit his motion

to file an untimely appeal until January 3, 2006. Mot. (doc. #

98). Because Austin failed to meet the jurisdictional filing

deadline, the Court is not authorized to grant Austin an extension

of time under Rule 4(a)(5).

Austin's motion was timely filed with respect to the orders

addressing the AEDPA's bar on successive § 2255 motions2

 (doc. ##

94, 97), but fails to make the required showing of excusable

neglect or good cause for not meeting the original deadline for

filing a notice of appeal. Austin's motion states, in relevant

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part, as follows:

Mr. Austin understands that an application with

the court of appeals for a second, or

successive motion/petition under 28 U.S.C. §

2255 is not appealable, and now moves in the

foregoing petition/motion requesting to stay

the proceedings, and or Toll [sic] the time in

which to submit an appeal until such time [sic]

the court of appeals renders a decision

regarding his application for a second or

successive § 2255 [sic].

. . . .

. . . Mr. Austin, [sic] would be deprived

of a fair opportunity to appeal the denial of

his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion/petition if he

pursue [sic] the ordered application with the

court of appeals if this court does not permit

and or grant a stay of the proceedings in this

matter.

Mot. (doc. # 98) at 2. Although Austin is correct that the denial

by the court of appeals of an application to file a second or

successive § 2255 motion is not appealable, see 28 U.S.C. §

2244(b)(3)(E), this does not explain how he would be limited in his

ability to appeal either the Court's November 10 and December 13

orders (doc. ## 94, 97) or, for that matter, the denial of his

amended § 2255 motion (doc. ## 80-81). Because Austin's motion

does not make a sufficient showing of excusable neglect or good

cause to extend the time to file a notice of appeal with respect to

the orders entered on November 10 and December 13, 2005 (doc. ##

94, 97), and is untimely with respect to the original judgment and

order entered on January 5, 2005 (doc. ## 80-81), the Court cannot

grant an extension under Rule 4(a)(5). Accordingly, Austin's

motion for extension of time (doc. # 98) will be denied.

B. Reopening the Time to File an Appeal

Under Rule 4(a)(6), the district court may reopen the time for

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3

 Although Austin's motion does not expressly invoke this

exception, the Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are liberally

construed so that it is generally unnecessary for a pro se litigant

to cite case law. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th

Cir. 1992); Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987).

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filing a notice of appeal if three requirements are met: (1) the

moving party did not receive notice of the entry of the judgment or

order sought to be appealed within 21 days after entry, (2) the

motion is filed within 180 days after the judgment or order is

entered or within 7 days after the moving party receives notice of

the entry, and (3) the court finds that no party would be

prejudiced. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6).

There is no indication that Austin failed to receive notice

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 77(d) of the entry of the

judgment or orders he now seeks to appeal (doc. ## 80-81, 94, 97)

within 21 days after entry. Indeed, the history of Austin's

filings responding to those orders strongly suggests that timely

notice was received in every instance. Austin's motion to reopen

the time to file an appeal (doc. # 98) will therefore be denied.

C. Unique Circumstances 

Finally, the Court construes Austin's motion as a request for

relief under the Supreme Court's "unique circumstances" exception

to the filing of a timely notice of appeal.3

The Supreme Court has held that, under certain unique

circumstances, an appellate court may have jurisdiction to hear an

appeal that was not filed within the prescribed time limits. 

Wolfsohn v. Hankin, 376 U.S. 203 (1964); Thompson v. INS, 375 U.S.

384 (1964); Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v. Cherry Meat Packers, Inc.,

371 U.S. 215 (1962); accord Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176,

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1188 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) ("If a time limit is jurisdictional,

it is not subject to the defenses of waiver, equitable tolling, or

equitable estoppel, although there may still be exceptions based on

unique circumstances."); Hernandez-Rivera v. INS, 630 F.2d 1352,

1354-55 (9th Cir. 1980) (discussing how Thompson and Harris Truck

Lines extended time for appeal under former Fed. R. Civ. P. 73(a),

predecessor of Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)).

The Supreme Court has since limited the unique circumstances

exception to those situations where "a party has performed an act

which, if properly done, would postpone the deadline for filing his

appeal and has received specific assurance by a judicial officer

that this act has been properly done." Osterneck v. Ernst &

Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 179 (1989); accord Lobatz v. U.S. W.

Cellular of Cal., Inc., 222 F.3d 1142, 1145 (9th Cir. 2000). In

the wake of Osterneck, the Ninth Circuit has strictly limited the

unique circumstances exception, holding that even "[a]mbiguous or

implicitly misleading conduct by courts does not release litigants

from their appeal deadlines. If a party believes a court has acted

ambiguously as to an appeal deadline, it bears the burden of

seeking clarification." Theodore v. Daglas (In re D.W.G.K. Rest.),

42 F.3d 568, 570 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting In re Slimick, 928 F.2d

304, 310 (9th Cir. 1990)).

 This is not a case in which the Court has given any specific

assurances that Austin has performed an act, which if properly

done, would postpone the deadline for filing his notice of appeal. 

The Court has not previously granted Austin an extension of time to

file a notice of appeal with which he subsequently complied, see

Harris Truck Lines, Inc., 371 U.S. at 217, or given any specific

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assurance that he has timely and properly filed a motion enumerated

in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5) that would extend

the time to file his notice of appeal, see Thompson, 375 U.S. at

386-87 (motion to reconsider), Wolfson v. Hankin, 321 F.2d 393

(D.C. Cir. 1963) (motion for rehearing).

It is possible that, prior to the Court's November 10 order

(doc. # 94) alerting him to the AEDPA's bar on successive § 2255

motions, Austin did not understand that his amended § 2255 motion

had been entirely disposed of by the Court's January 5 order (doc.

# 80). Cf. Order (doc. # 80) at 2 ("[T]he Court's resolution of

the R&R will not be case dispositive."). However, the Court's

January 5 order stated that the amended § 2255 motion had been

"denied and dismissed with prejudice." Id. at 6. The judgment

that followed (doc. # 81) likewise reflected the case dispositive

nature of the order by terminating Austin's case. Should there

have been any perceived ambiguity as to the finality of the Court's

denial and dismissal of the amended § 2255 motion and the deadline

to appeal that decision, the burden was on Austin to seek

clarification. See Theodore, 42 F.3d at 570. Therefore, the Court

cannot extend the time for Austin to file a notice of appeal under

the doctrine of unique circumstances as interpreted by the Ninth

Circuit. Austin's motion for leave to file an untimely appeal

(doc. # 98) will be denied.

II. MOTION FOR CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Although the untimeliness of Austin's appeal would render his

pending motion for a certificate of appealability (doc. # 102)

moot, the Court will nevertheless discuss why that motion would be

denied on the merits.

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Before a movant can appeal the denial of a § 2255 motion, a

certificate of appealability must issue. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Fed.

R. App. P. 22(b). A certificate of appealability may issue under

28 U.S.C. § 2253 "only if the applicant has made a substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. §

2253(c)(2). The certificate of appealability must "indicate which

specific issue or issues satisfy" the requirement. 28 U.S.C. §

2253(c)(3).

In his amended § 2255 motion, Austin alleged that trial

counsel was deficient for failing to (1) introduce evidence of the

victim and Austin drinking Lysol and hair spray, which resulted in

difficulties breathing, (2) check DNA samples for Lysol and hair

spray, (3) cross-examine the victim's sister about the victim and

Austin drinking Lysol and hair spray, and (4) present evidence of

Austin's relationship with, and love for, the victim. Mot. (doc. #

63) at 4-5. A meritorious claim of ineffective assistance requires

the movant to demonstrate that (1) counsel's representation fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) the

deficient performance actually prejudiced the defense. Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-91 (1984); Hasan v. Galaza, 254

F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2001). In reviewing counsel's

performance, the Court "strongly presume[s] that counsel's conduct

was within the wide range of reasonable assistance, and that he

exercised acceptable professional judgment in all significant

decisions made." Hughes v. Borg, 898 F.2d 695, 702 (9th Cir. 1989)

(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). To establish prejudice, the

movant must demonstrate "a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would

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have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

As explained in the Court's January 5 order denying the

amended § 2255 motion, much of Austin's ineffective assistance

claims failed to satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test. 

Austin's trial counsel did introduce evidence of the victim and

Austin drinking hair spray, he cross-examined the victim's sister

regarding the same, and he presented evidence of Austin's close

relationship with the victim. See Order (doc. # 80) at 3-5. In

addition, the fact that Austin was not charged until more than one

year after the victim's death demonstrates that counsel's decision

not to check DNA samples could be explained by a reasonable belief

that any such test would be futile. Id. at 5.

Even if counsel's performance could be regarded as objectively

unreasonable, the Court explained that Austin could still not

satisfy the second prong of Strickland by showing that his defense

was prejudiced as a result. The government's expert testified

regarding physical signs of strangulation, and noted that the

condition of the victim's body was not consistent with death caused

by internal trauma from the ingestion of Lysol or hair spray. Id.

at 5-6. Accordingly, the Court finds that Austin has not presented

a claim of denial of the federal right to the effective assistance

of counsel that would be debatable among jurists of reason. See

Morrison v. Mahoney, 399 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Finally, Austin concedes that he "understands that a second

motion to amend is not permissible under provisions that are set

forth in the AEDPA." Mot. (doc. # 98) at 2. The motion for

certificate of appealability would therefore be denied on the

merits.

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Austin's motion for leave to file

an untimely appeal (doc. # 98) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Austin's motion for certificate of

appealability is DENIED and dismissed as moot (doc. # 102).

DATED this 22nd day of May, 2006.

Copies to counsel of record and pro se movant.

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