Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cv-00878/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cv-00878-9/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert Burton
Respondent
James Michael Feci
Petitioner

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES MICHAEL FECI,

Petitioner, 

v. 

ROBERT BURTON, 

Respondent. 

No. 2:20-cv-00878-DJC-CKD

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this habeas corpus 

action filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his voluntary manslaughter 

conviction for shooting his roommate, Matthew Lambert.

1

 Upon careful consideration of the 

record and the applicable law, the undersigned recommends denying petitioner’s habeas corpus 

application on the merits.

I. Factual and Procedural History

Following a jury trial in the Sacramento County Superior Court, petitioner was convicted 

of voluntary manslaughter with a firearm enhancement. ECF No. 1 at 1-2. In so doing, the jury 

found petitioner not guilty of both murder in the first and second degree as the prosecution had 

argued.2

 See ECF No. 65-3 at 192 (verdict form). On January 5, 2018, he was sentenced to a 

1 Hereinafter referred to as “Lambert.”

2

 Petitioner was charged with the first degree murder of Lambert, but the prosecution argued, 

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total prison term of 15 years. ECF No. 65-4 at 9 (Felony Abstract of Judgment). 

Petitioner appealed to the California Court of Appeal which affirmed his conviction. ECF 

No. 65-8 (direct appeal opinion). The California Supreme Court denied his petition for review on 

February 26, 2020. ECF No. 65-10. 

After independently reviewing the record, this court finds the state appellate court’s 

summary of the evidence accurate and adopts it herein.3

Lambert and a close friend, Michael Carbahal, moved into a house 

together in September 2015. The following summer, they allowed 

[petitioner], his wife, K., and four children to move into the house.4

[Petitioner] had known Lambert for five or six years and, according 

to his testimony, considered Lambert to be his “best friend.” He had 

not known Carbahal for as long, about three years, and met him 

through Lambert. Carbahal suffered from and took medication for 

several mental health issues, including depression, anxiety, bipolar 

disorder, and schizophrenia, during the time he lived in the house.

[Petitioner] and his family moved into the house about two months 

before the events resulting in Lambert’s death. 

We begin our recitation of these events a day or two before Lambert 

died. Lambert’s girlfriend, V., was over at the house. While 

intoxicated, she became involved in some sort of dispute with one of 

the neighbors and began spraying a hose at the neighbor over the 

back yard fence. Law enforcement officers came to the house, but 

the record is unclear as to the outcome of their visit. 

Either the next day or the day after, [petitioner], K., and Carbahal 

were “sitting around” the house “making jokes” about the incident 

with the hose. As Carbahal explained, [petitioner] did “an 

impression” of V. that was “pretty funny.” [Petitioner] and K. also 

expressed concern about V. using methamphetamine and said they 

did not want drug use at the house. Lambert was at work when this 

conversation took place, but V. was in his room and overheard 

enough of what was being said to put together they were talking 

about her. 

When Lambert got home from work that afternoon, V. “told him how 

they were making fun of [her].” Lambert said he had told them not 

to make her feel uncomfortable at the house, so he would be moving 

out; V. said [petitioner] and his family should be the ones to move. 

They then lay down together and Lambert fell asleep. While Lambert 

slept, V. got up and picked up pizza for them to eat. When he woke 

alternatively, that petitioner should be convicted of second degree murder. 

3

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (emphasizing that “a determination of a factual issue made by a State 

court shall be presumed to be correct” unless the petitioner rebuts it by clear and convincing 

evidence). 

4

 In light of the procedural posture of this case, the court has substituted the word “petitioner” for 

“defendant.” These substitutions appear in brackets. 

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up some time later, they ate some of the pizza and V. told him she 

would be going back to her house that night. Lambert became upset, 

went into the kitchen, and started knocking various items off of the 

counter and onto the floor. He also woke up Carbahal, who was 

sleeping on a couch in the living room, by flicking him in the 

forehead with his finger. Lambert asked Carbahal whether he had 

been talking about his girlfriend and told him, “don’t talk shit behind 

my back.” After a brief argument between these two, K. came out of 

the room she shared with [petitioner] and their children. She told 

Lambert, “Fuck you,” Lambert responded, “Shut up, you fat bitch,” 

and the argument escalated from there, ending a couple minutes later 

with Lambert telling K. that he wanted them to move out in the next 

30 days. Lambert then returned to his room.

[Petitioner] was not at the house when these arguments occurred. He 

got home a short time later and sat on the arm of one of the couches 

while Carbahal told him what had happened. Lambert then came out 

of his room and confronted [petitioner].

Carbahal could not remember what was said between the two, but 

described the conversation as short and added: “It wasn’t even 

yelling really.” When Lambert started to walk back to his room, 

[petitioner] made a parting comment about V., “something like, for 

that tweaker broad or something.” Hearing the comment, Lambert 

turned around and said, “talking shit again behind my back.” He then 

rushed [petitioner] and tackled him on the couch.

Lambert, a much larger man than [petitioner], began choking and 

punching him on the couch. [Petitioner] routinely carried a loaded 

revolver in a holster on his hip and was so armed when Lambert 

attacked him. He reached for his gun and removed it from its holster. 

As [petitioner] did so, Lambert released his throat and tried to take 

the gun from him. V. came into the living room when the fighting 

began and told Lambert to stop. Lambert responded that [petitioner]

had “pulled a gun on him.” K. also came into the living room around 

this time, said, “fuck that,” and jumped on Lambert’s back as he and 

[petitioner] struggled for possession of the gun. At this point, 

Carbahal also joined in the struggle, saying, “give me the fucking 

gun.” He was “yanking on” the gun in an attempt to disarm both men 

when “it just went off.”

No one was hit by this initial discharge, but both Lambert and 

Carbahal were knocked to the ground. [Petitioner], still standing and 

now in sole possession of the gun, pointed it at Lambert and fired a 

second round. The bullet hit Lambert in the jaw as he sat in a kneeling 

position on the floor, traveled through the soft tissues of his neck, 

fracturing the cervical vertebrae, and lodged in his back. Lambert 

immediately fell face down on the floor. Both K. and Carbahal 

started yelling at [petitioner]. K. was crying. Carbahal then noticed 

Lambert was moving. As he described, “it look[ed] like he was trying 

to do a pushup.” Carbahal also described [petitioner]’s response: 

“And [petitioner] takes two steps towards him and drops aim and he 

puts one in the back of his head.” V. confirmed [petitioner] “stepped 

forward and shot him again,” adding: “It was really quickly.” This 

bullet hit Lambert behind the right ear and traveled forward through 

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his brain from right to left, stopping when it hit bone on the left side 

of his skull. Loss of consciousness was instantaneous; death from 

blood loss and neurologic compromise quickly followed.

The foregoing description of the confrontation between [petitioner]

and Lambert is supported by the testimony of Carbahal and V., their 

prior statements to law enforcement officers, and the forensic 

pathologist’s description of the gunshot wounds inflicted on 

Lambert. [Petitioner], however, told a different story from the 

witness stand.

[Petitioner] testified Carbahal suffered from schizophrenia and 

bipolar disorder, routinely abused a variety of drugs, and that he 

drank alcohol, smoked marijuana, and used methamphetamine on the 

day Lambert died. He also suspected V. of using methamphetamine, 

but never actually witnessed her using the substance. The day he shot 

and killed Lambert, on his way home from taking two of his children 

to the park, [petitioner] spoke with K., who was “obviously upset” 

and said she got into an argument with Lambert and wanted to move 

out of the house. According to [petitioner], K. also told him Lambert 

threatened to kill him. When [petitioner] got home, his eight-yearold daughter told him the same thing. Rather than confront Lambert 

about these threats, [petitioner] knocked on his bedroom door 

because he saw there was pizza in the house and asked if his family 

could eat some of the pizza. Lambert was “calm, cool, collected, and 

he said that’s fine.” Five or ten minutes later, Lambert came out of 

the room and, as [petitioner] put it, “started talking about how we 

were talking trash about [V.] and he was upset about that” and went 

“back and forth between he was moving out to he wanted us to move 

out in 30 days to he wanted us out that day to us out at the end of the 

week.” At the end of the conversation, which included some yelling 

and cussing on the part of Lambert, [petitioner] agreed they would 

be out at the end of the week and Lambert went back to his room.

About half an hour later, Carbahal initiated a conversation with 

[petitioner] about Carbahal’s drug abuse and asked [petitioner] to 

take him to the methadone clinic. [Petitioner] initially said no 

because he was “frustrated” and “very upset” with Carbahal for being 

high around the children. As [petitioner] summarized what transpired 

next in the conversation: “I started to walk away. And he called back 

at me again, said and yelled please. And I turned back at him and he 

had, like, this look in his eyes like a child and he started to cry. And 

I’m, like, what? He’s, like, can you take me to get my meds, please?”

Ultimately, [petitioner] agreed to take Carbahal to the clinic the next 

day because he “felt bad for him” and “was still his friend,” as 

[petitioner] put it: “I didn’t want to turn my back on him.”

At this point in the conversation, according to [petitioner], Lambert 

came out of his room and into the living room. [Petitioner] gave 

Lambert “a friendly hey,” prompting Lambert to deliver a “hockey 

body check shove” that knocked [petitioner] off of the arm of the 

couch and onto the floor, causing him to hit his head in the entryway 

of the house.

Lambert then went into the kitchen and broke some glasses and a 

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plate. When [petitioner] got up, he told Lambert: “I’m not going to 

put my family in danger over [V.], you, and this whole situation.” 

[Petitioner] believed “evacuating” was his family’s only option. As

he started walking towards the hallway, [petitioner] “didn’t even get 

a chance to react” before Lambert charged at him, saying, “you’re 

gonna talk shit about my girl, I’ll fucking kill you.” Lambert then 

grabbed [petitioner] by the throat with both hands, carried him “five 

or six feet,” and “slammed [him] onto the couch.” On the couch, 

Lambert straddled [petitioner] with his knee on his diaphragm and 

choked him with both hands for 30 to 40 seconds, during which he 

made various threats, including that he would kill [petitioner] and his 

“whore wife.” Then Lambert released [petitioner]’s neck with one of 

his hands and repeatedly punched him in the face.

[Petitioner] “was starting to pass out” when Lambert reached for his 

gun and, as [petitioner] described, “he had this look in his eye like 

the wolf wants to eat me.” [Petitioner] “was scared to death” and also 

reached for the gun, but only to try to keep it holstered. When 

Lambert managed to remove the gun, [petitioner] yelled for Carbahal 

to help, but he was “just sitting there in his own little world.” 

[Petitioner] and Lambert struggled for control of the gun. Carbahal 

eventually grabbed the gun as well, but [petitioner] did not want him 

to have it either considering his mental illness and drug use. During 

this three-way struggle for control of the gun, K. came into the living 

room and jumped onto Lambert’s back. Carbahal then pulled 

[petitioner]’s hands away from the gun. Lambert, now with “full 

control” of the gun, “went back to choking” [petitioner]. As 

[petitioner] was starting to pass out for the second time, he heard K. 

pleading for his life and then heard the revolver “go from double 

action to single action” just before it discharged for the first time.

The discharge caused Lambert to stumble backwards and 

“somehow” [petitioner] got his gun back. [Petitioner] then yelled for 

K. to protect the children and told Carbahal to call 911 because he 

did not know whether anyone had been hit by the bullet. At this, 

Lambert said, “call the cops on me, I’ll fucking kill you” and again 

charged at [petitioner]. Still “breathing very heavy” and “in a lot of 

pain,” defendant fired the gun at Lambert in order to stop the threat 

to himself and protect his family from what he believed “would have 

been a massacre” if Lambert got the gun back.

[Petitioner] did not know whether Lambert was hit or not, but he fell 

to the floor on his hands and knees. Then, “quickly and effortlessly,” 

Lambert went from that position to “taking a knee like a football 

player” to being “almost upright.” Lambert said, “you and your 

family are fucking dead” as he quickly rose to his feet. Still afraid for 

his life, [petitioner] fired the fatal shot.

ECF No. 65-8 at 2-8.

At the conclusion of direct review, petitioner filed an application for writ of habeas corpus 

raising the same claims he had argued in state court.5 ECF No. 1. In claim one, petitioner 

5 After petitioner elected to abandon claims 2, 3, and 4, the court directed respondent to file an 

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contends that the admission of his wife’s statement to a police officer violated the Sixth 

Amendment Confrontation Clause and Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). His next 

two claims for relief challenge the trial court’s jury instructions on mutual combat (CALCRIM 

3471) and provoking a fight or quarrel (CALCRIM 3472) as a violation of his right to due process 

because they were not supported by substantial evidence and confused the jury. Lastly, petitioner 

submits that he is entitled to habeas relief based on the cumulative error of the first three claims 

for relief. 

Respondent filed an answer on April 6, 2023. ECF No. 63. First, respondent asserts that 

the California Court of Appeal’s decision was objectively reasonable in finding the Confrontation 

Clause violation amounted to harmless error. Next, respondent argues that the jury instruction 

challenges are meritless and were reasonably rejected by the state court as harmless. Even under 

de novo review, the jury instructions did not have a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict 

so as to entitle petitioner to habeas relief. ECF No. 63 at 23 (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 

U.S. 619, 637 (1993)). Lastly, according to respondent, the California Court of Appeal decision 

rejecting petitioner’s cumulative error claim was reasonable, assuming that this actually 

constitutes a federal constitutional claim. 

The time for petitioner to file a traverse has expired. Therefore, the matter has been fully 

briefed by the parties and is ready for decision. 

II. AEDPA Standard of Review

To be entitled to federal habeas corpus relief, petitioner must affirmatively establish that 

the state court decision resolving the claim on the merits “was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court 

of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” 

clauses of § 2254(d)(1) are different, as the Supreme Court has explained: 

A federal habeas court may issue the writ under the “contrary to” 

clause if the state court applies a rule different from the governing 

law set forth in our cases, or if it decides a case differently than we 

answer limited to claims 1, 5, 6 and 7. See ECF Nos. 58-59. Therefore, these Findings and 

Recommendations only address these claims which are pending before the court. 

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have done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. The court 

may grant relief under the “unreasonable application” clause if the 

state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle from our 

decisions but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular 

case. The focus of the latter inquiry is on whether the state court’s 

application of clearly established federal law is objectively 

unreasonable, and we stressed in Williams [v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 

(2000)], that an unreasonable application is different from an 

incorrect one. 

 

Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002).

“A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so 

long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” 

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 

664 (2004)). Accordingly, “[a]s a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a 

state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court 

was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in 

existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 103. 

The phrase “clearly established Federal law” in § 2254(d)(1) refers to the “governing legal 

principle or principles” previously articulated by the Supreme Court. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 

U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003). Clearly established federal law also includes “the legal principles and 

standards flowing from precedent.” Bradley v. Duncan, 315 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(quoting Taylor v. Withrow, 288 F.3d 846, 852 (6th Cir. 2002)). Only Supreme Court precedent 

may constitute “clearly established Federal law,” but circuit law has persuasive value regarding 

what law is “clearly established” and what constitutes “unreasonable application” of that law. 

Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600 (9th Cir. 2000); Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 

1057 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Relief is also available under the AEDPA where the state court predicates its adjudication 

of a claim on an unreasonable factual determination. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The statute 

explicitly limits this inquiry to the evidence that was before the state court. See also Cullen v. 

Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011). Under § 2254(d)(2), factual findings of a state court are 

presumed to be correct subject only to a review of the record which demonstrates that the factual 

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finding(s) “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 

light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.” It makes no sense to interpret 

“unreasonable” in § 2254(d)(2) in a manner different from that same word as it appears in § 

2254(d)(1) – i.e., the factual error must be so apparent that “fairminded jurists” examining the 

same record could not abide by the state court factual determination. A petitioner must show 

clearly and convincingly that the factual determination is unreasonable. See Rice v. Collins, 546 

U.S. 333, 338 (2006). 

If petitioner meets either of the 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) standards, then the federal habeas 

court reviews the merits of the constitutional claim under pre-AEDPA standards in order to be 

entitled to relief. Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 

III. Analysis 

This court looks to the last reasoned state court decision in applying the 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d) standard. Wilson v. Sellers, 584 U.S. 122 (2018) (adopting the Ylst look through 

presumption of silent state court denials of relief even after the decision in Harrington v. Richter, 

562 U.S. 86 (2011)); see also Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797 (1991)(establishing the “look 

through” doctrine in federal habeas cases). In this case, the last reasoned state court decision 

denying all four claims for relief is the California Court of Appeal decision. Thus, this court 

“looks through” the subsequent silent denial by the California Supreme Court and reviews the 

California Court of Appeal’s decision for objective reasonableness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

See Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289, 297 n. 1 (2013). 

A. Confrontation Clause Challenge in Claim One 

In his first claim for relief, petitioner asserts that the trial court’s admission of his wife’s 

hearsay statement to a police officer on the night of the shooting violated Crawford v. 

Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), and his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. The repetition 

of this statement by the prosecutor during petitioner’s cross-examination rendered it prejudicial. 

According to petitioner, “[t]he jury’s complete rejection of the prosecutor’s theory of the case by 

its acquittal on the two murder counts, and its acceptance of [petitioner’s] voluntary manslaughter 

defense, establishes that the state’s evidence was weak, and that this was a close case.” ECF No. 

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1 at 58. 

The relevant factual background supporting this claim for relief was described by the 

California Court of Appeal.

During [petitioner]’s cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned 

him concerning several phone conversations he had with K., [his 

wife], while he was in jail. In one of these phone calls, [petitioner]

told K. that Lambert grabbed his gun. K. responded: “Oh he did?” 

Later, [petitioner] told K. “we need to make the case for deprivation 

of force.” In another phone call, they argued over the facts of the 

shooting, specifically Lambert’s position when [petitioner] fired the 

two shots that ended his life. In that conversation, when [petitioner]

said, “he fuckin’ pulled my gun and was pointing,” K. interjected, 

“Yes,” but then disagreed with [petitioner]’s conclusion of the 

sentence, “and was pointin’ it right at me,” saying: “No he pushing 

it . . . [¶] . . . [¶] towards your face. He was pushing it.” After 

[petitioner] finished his version of how the first shot was fired, K. 

said: “I - I yeah. See I - I don’t - yeah - I don’t - I don’t remember.” 

[Petitioner] also told K. their “job” would be to “discredit” Carbahal, 

to which K. acknowledged “he did see more than I did.” During a 

third conversation, after [petitioner] described what was required for 

the shooting to have been in self-defense, K. said, “it’s not like you 

chose - you did not choose to take out the gun[.]”

After questioning [petitioner] about these conversations, the 

prosecutor asked [petitioner] whether he had read all of the police 

reports in the case. [Petitioner] said he had. The prosecutor then 

asked whether he wanted to discredit Carbahal because he said 

[petitioner] was the one who pulled out the gun. [Petitioner] said he 

did not recall. The prosecutor asked whether Carbahal’s testimony 

was true, specifically that [petitioner] did pull out the gun, and that 

Lambert said as much during their struggle for the gun. [Petitioner]

disagreed with both portions of Carbahal’s testimony and agreed 

with the prosecutor that this disagreement was “part of the reason” 

he wanted to discredit Carbahal. Then, the prosecutor asked 

[petitioner] whether K. “makes the same comment that -- to the 

police that you pulled the gun out first and then [Lambert] makes a 

comment about you pull[ing] the gun out[.]” Defense counsel 

objected on hearsay grounds. The trial court overruled the objection. 

The prosecutor then restated the question: “In the police report your 

wife tells the police I believe on two occasions that it was you who 

pulled the gun out; correct?” Defense counsel again objected on 

hearsay grounds. Following an off-the-record discussion, the trial 

court again overruled the objection, stating: “For the effect on the 

hearer I would permit the question to be asked.” After the prosecutor 

repeated the question a third time, [petitioner] answered: “She says 

that, yes.”

After eliciting [petitioner]’s response, i.e., K. told police [petitioner]

was the one who first pulled out the gun, something he knew from 

having read a police report containing K.’s out-of-court statement, 

the prosecutor asked [petitioner] whether he agreed with the 

statement. [Petitioner] disagreed and said he did not believe K. was 

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in the living room when the gun was pulled. 

The jury was not instructed K.’s out-of-court statement could not be 

considered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, specifically that 

[petitioner] was the one who pulled the gun on Lambert. Moreover, 

in closing argument, the prosecution told the jury to do just that, 

arguing they should not believe [petitioner]’s testimony in this regard 

because “[K.], [Carbahal], and [V.] all in one way or another tell you 

[petitioner] pulled the gun out.” 

ECF No. 65-8 at 8-10. 

1. Last Reasoned State Court Opinion

After determining that the challenged statement contained two separate levels of hearsay 

from petitioner’s wife as well as the police officer who wrote the report, the California Court of 

Appeal concluded that the statement was used by the prosecutor to prove the truth of the matter 

asserted, thus resulting in the improper admission of hearsay evidence. ECFR No. 65-8 at 12-13. 

Next, the state court determined that the statement was “testimonial” under clearly established 

Supreme Court precedent since Crawford because the wife “was questioned, not as part of an 

investigation into an ongoing emergency, but as part of an investigation into possibly criminal 

past conduct.” ECF No. 65-8 at 16. Because petitioner did not have an opportunity to crossexamine his wife during trial, the state court determined that the admission of the testimonial 

hearsay violated petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. ECF No. 65-8 at 17. 

Ultimately, the California Court of Appeal deemed this error to be harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt. ECF No. 65-8 at 17 (applying Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), 

standard of harmless error). In so doing, the court reasoned as follows: 

[We first note the case against [petitioner] for murder was strong. 

However, the jury did not convict [petitioner] of murder, instead 

convicting him of voluntary manslaughter. The case against 

[petitioner] for that crime was overwhelming. As we have previously 

set forth in some detail, the testimony of Carbahal and V.[, Lambert’s 

girlfriend], provided a compelling version of events in which 

[petitioner] was physically assaulted by Lambert after [petitioner]

called V. a “tweaker.” Lambert, much larger than [petitioner], 

quickly got the upper hand in the fight and was choking and punching 

[petitioner] when [petitioner] pulled out his gun to defend himself. 

At this point, Lambert and [petitioner] struggled for possession of the 

gun, K. jumped onto Lambert’s back to try to pull him off of 

[petitioner], and Carbahal also joined in the struggle for the gun. The 

gun discharged, hitting no one, but knocking Lambert and Carbahal 

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to the ground. [Petitioner], now in sole possession of the gun, pointed 

and fired a second round at Lambert, hitting him in the jaw. Lambert 

fell face down on the floor. As Lambert struggled to get up, “like he 

was trying to do a pushup,” [petitioner] took two steps towards him 

and fired a third round into the back of Lambert’s head, killing him. 

The testimony of Carbahal and V., supporting this account of the 

shooting, was materially consistent both with each other’s testimony 

and with their prior statements to police, and was also consistent with 

the forensic pathologist’s testimony describing the injuries suffered 

by Lambert.

In contrast to this account, [petitioner]’s version of the shooting was 

inherently unbelievable. We decline to repeat it here, except to point 

out that [petitioner]’s vague account of “somehow” getting his gun 

back after it initially discharged was itself less than convincing. More 

importantly, however, his testimony that Lambert “quickly and 

effortlessly” rose from the floor after being shot the first time, while 

saying, “you and your family are fucking dead,” was impossible 

given the nature of the first gunshot wound inflicted upon Lambert. 

That bullet hit Lambert in the jaw, traveled through the soft tissues 

of his neck, fracturing the cervical vertebrae, and lodged in his back. 

We have no doubt he was trying to get up, as Carbahal described, but 

no reasonable juror would have believed he was quickly and 

effortlessly rising to his feet while threatening [petitioner] and his 

family when the fatal shot was fired. Thus, even if the jury believed 

that [petitioner] believed he needed to fire that shot in self-defense, 

no reasonable juror would have found such a belief reasonable.

Stated simply, based on the compelling testimony of both Carbahal 

and V., their prior statements to police, the forensic pathologist’s 

testimony, and [petitioner]’s patently incredible account of events, 

the very best [petitioner] could have hoped for was a voluntary 

manslaughter conviction.

Turning to the likely impact of K.’s out-of-court statement that 

[petitioner] pulled the gun on Lambert, we acknowledge this 

statement corroborated the testimony of Carbahal and V. in this 

regard, and undermined [petitioner]’s contrary testimony. However, 

whether [petitioner] or Lambert was the first to pull out the gun was 

not very important in terms of [petitioner]’s culpability. Assuming

for purposes of analysis that K.’s statement was not admitted, and 

without the statement the jury believed [petitioner]’s testimony that 

Lambert pulled the gun on him, the first discharge of the gun was the

result of a struggle for the gun, did not result in anyone being hit, and 

there was no dispute [petitioner] had sole possession of the gun when 

he intentionally fired the second two rounds at Lambert. The 

important shot for purposes of assessing [petitioner]’s culpability 

was the final shot. And as we have explained, [petitioner]’s 

testimony with respect to the circumstances under which he fired that 

shot was unbelievable for reasons independent of K.’s statement 

regarding who initially pulled out the gun. Moreover, even without 

this statement, the jury would have understood K. did not agree with 

[petitioner]’s account of events from the various jailhouse phone 

calls admitted into evidence.

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We have no difficulty concluding beyond a reasonable doubt that 

K.’s out-of-court statement concerning [petitioner] pulling out the 

gun did not contribute to [petitioner]’s voluntary manslaughter 

conviction. 

ECF No. 65-8 at 17-19. 

2. Clearly Established Federal Law

The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause provides that, “[i]n all criminal 

prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against 

him.”6

 U.S. Const. amend. VI. In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004), the Supreme 

Court held that, before testimonial hearsay evidence may be admitted, “the Sixth Amendment 

demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for crossexamination.” Subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court have further defined the types of 

statements that are “testimonial.” See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006); Michigan v. 

Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (2011). In Davis, 547 U.S. at 822, the Supreme Court concluded that 

statements “are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such 

ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past 

events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.” If testimonial statements have been 

admitted at trial without the guarantee of confrontation, the court must conduct a harmless error

analysis to determine whether the error justifies relief. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 

684 (1986). 

3. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) Analysis 

Because the California Court of Appeal determined that the admission of the statement 

violated petitioner’s right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment, the ultimate issue before 

the court is whether the California Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the error was harmless was 

objectively reasonable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).7 See Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 18 

6

 This right is applied to state criminal prosecutions through the Fourteenth Amendment. See

Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). 

7

 In the interests of judicial economy, the undersigned finds it unnecessary to determine whether 

the California Court of Appeal unreasonably applied Crawford in determining that the petitioner’s 

wife’s statement to police constituted testimonial hearsay. 

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(2003) (per curiam) (explaining that on federal habeas review the question is whether the state 

court’s harmless error analysis was objectively reasonable). The undersigned finds that the state 

court applied the correct harmless error standard on direct review, and that, ultimately, its 

conclusion that the error was harmless was not objectively unreasonable. In this case, petitioner’s 

wife’s statement only concerned a tangential aspect of the case that did not address whether 

petitioner fired the final shot in self-defense as he claimed. When properly viewed in light of the 

evidence as a whole, the undersigned concludes that petitioner has not demonstrated that jurists of 

reason would disagree with the California Court of Appeal’s harmless error analysis. See

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. at 101 (emphasizing that “[a] state court's determination that a 

claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on 

the correctness of the state court's decision.”) (citation omitted). Thus, he is not entitled to habeas 

relief on claim one. 

B. Jury Instruction Challenges in Claims Five and Six

As described in petitioner’s opening brief on appeal, “this case came down to whether 

[petitioner] acted in self-defense, as he claimed, or killed Lambert under a sudden heat of 

passion.” ECF No. 1 at 22. The first jury instruction that petitioner challenges concerning mutual 

combat was requested by the prosecution and objected to by the defense at trial. Petitioner 

submits that there was not substantial evidence that petitioner actually engaged in mutual combat 

to support giving the instruction. Additionally, petitioner argues that there is a reasonable 

likelihood that the jury applied CALCRIM 3471 in a way that shifted the burden of proof to him 

to establish that he acted in self-defense, thereby violating his right to due process.8 With respect 

8

 CALCRIM No. 3471, as given to the jury in this case, provides: 

A person who engages in mutual combat or who starts a fight has a right to self-defense

or imperfect self-defense, only if: 

 

1. He actually and in good faith tried to stop fighting; 

2. He indicated, by word or by conduct, to his opponent, in a way that a reasonable 

person would understand, that he wanted to stop fighting and that he had stopped 

fighting; 

AND 

3. He gave his opponent a chance to stop fighting. 

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to CALCRIM 3472, petitioner asserts that there was not substantial evidence to justify instructing 

the jury with it because there is no evidence suggesting that petitioner provoked a fight with 

Lambert.9

1. Last Reasoned State Court Opinion

The California Court of Appeal assumed the challenged instructions were improperly 

given, but denied relief finding the error was harmless. “[The evidence overwhelmingly 

established defendant’s conduct, at the very least, amounted to voluntary manslaughter. 

Any error in giving the jury these instructions was manifestly harmless under any standard of 

prejudice.” ECF No. 65-3 at 20. 

2. Clearly Established Federal Law

Erroneous jury instructions do not support federal habeas relief unless the infirm 

instruction so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process. Estelle v. 

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973)); see also

Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974) (stating that “‘it must be established not 

merely that the instruction is undesirable, erroneous, or even ‘universally condemned,’ but that it 

violated some [constitutional right]”). The challenged instruction may not be judged in artificial 

isolation but must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record 

If the defendant meets these requirements, he then had a right to self-defense if the 

opponent continued to fight. 

However, if the defendant used only non-deadly force, and the opponent responded with 

such sudden and deadly force that the defendant could not withdraw from the fight, then 

the defendant had the right to defend himself with deadly force and was not required to try 

to stop fighting, communicate the desire to stop to the opponent, or give the opponent a 

chance to stop fighting. 

A fight is mutual combat when it began or continued by mutual consent or 

agreement. That agreement may be expressly stated or implied and must occur before the 

claim to self-defense arose. 

See ECF No. 65-3 at 157 (Clerk’s Transcript) (italics in original).

9

 CALCRIM No. 3472, as given to the jury, provides: “A person does not have the right to selfdefense if he provokes a fight or quarrel with the intent to create an excuse to use force.” ECF 

No. 65-3 at 155. 

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overall. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. Moreover, relief is only available if there is a reasonable 

likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that violates the 

Constitution. Id. at 72–73. 

3. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) Analysis 

The undersigned finds that the state court’s harmless error analysis is not objectively 

unreasonable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Petitioner does not suggest, much less point to any 

portion of the record, that would indicate that the jury misinterpreted the instructions given. His 

argument is purely speculative. Moreover, with respect to CALCRIM 3471, the totality of the 

record does not support petitioner’s argument that the jury would have used this instruction to 

improperly shift the burden of proof on self-defense to him. During closing argument, defense 

counsel emphasized, over and over, that the prosecution had the burden of proving that the killing 

was not done in self-defense. “And, again, I can’t emphasize this enough. The district attorney 

has the massive burden of proving beyond all reasonable doubt that the killing was not justified. 

They have to essentially disprove self-defense to leave you no doubt that it does not apply.” ECF 

No. 65-2 at 185. A review of the trial record in this case does not suggest that the jury would 

have applied CALCRIM 3471 as petitioner suggests. See Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5–6 

(1994) (stating that “the proper inquiry is not whether the instruction ‘could have’ been applied in 

an unconstitutional manner, but whether there was a reasonable likelihood that the jury did so 

apply it.”). As the jury was properly instructed on the correct burden of proof and the jury 

instructions given, as a whole, do not suggest any ambiguity or misinterpretation by the jury, the 

state court did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law in finding any error was 

harmless. See Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 57 (2008) (per curiam) (reversing grant of habeas 

relief on jury instruction claim finding harmless error analysis applied). 

Furthermore, petitioner’s arguments that CALCRIM 3471 and 3472 were not supported 

by substantial evidence only views the trial evidence myopically from the defense perspective. It 

ignores the record evidence as a whole. During the jury instruction conference, the prosecutor 

argued, and the trial court agreed, that there was a sufficient basis that petitioner provoked a fight 

or quarrel with the victim based upon petitioner’s disparaging comments about the victim’s 

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girlfriend. ECF No. 65-2 at 141. According to the trial court, “[The] People are going to argue it 

and I think the jury should be given instructions so they can determine, A, whether or not it 

applies, and, B, if it applies, how they are to use it.” ECF No. 65-2 at 141. When the prosecution 

evidence is considered instead of just the defense evidence in isolation, this court does not find 

petitioner’s argument to be persuasive. Reviewing the challenged instructions in the context of 

the overall trial record, as required by Estelle, this court does not find that state court’s 

determination that any error in CALCRIM 3471 and 3472 was harmless was objectively 

unreasonable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. 

Even assuming that this court found the state court decision was unreasonable under § 

2254(d), petitioner would still have to demonstrate that these jury instructions resulted in actual 

prejudice to him as a matter of de novo review under Brecht. See Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 

141, 146-147 (1998). Petitioner does not even attempt to argue that the challenged jury 

instructions rose to the level of having “a substantial and injurious effect on the jury verdict.” 

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). This court finds that the use of CALCRIM 

3471 and 3472 was harmless under Brecht. For all these reasons, petitioner is not entitled to 

habeas relief on his jury instruction challenges raised in claims five and six even when de novo 

review is applied. 

C. Cumulative Error Claim Raised in Claim Seven

Lastly, petitioner argues that the combined prejudice from all of his foregoing claims rises 

to the level of an independent constitutional violation entitling him to relief based on cumulative 

error. 

1. Last Reasoned State Court Opinion

The California Court of Appeal concluded in the last sentence of its opinion that “the 

cumulative prejudicial effect of the confrontation violation and assumed instructional errors does 

not require reversal.” ECF No. 65-8 at 21. Having supplied no rational for this conclusion, this 

federal habeas court is tasked with determining what reasons exist in the record that could have 

supported the state court judgment. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011). 

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2. Clearly Established Federal Law

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal recognizes a free-standing claim of cumulative error in 

federal habeas proceedings when “the combined effect of multiple trial court errors violates due 

process” thus rendering the trial fundamentally unfair. Parle v. Runnels, 505 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 

2007)(citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298 (1973)). A due process violation occurs 

when “the combined effect of the errors had a ‘substantial and injurious effect or influence on the 

jury's verdict.’” Parle, 505 F.3d at 927 (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637). 

3. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) Analysis 

The undersigned finds that even taken cumulatively, the assigned evidentiary and jury 

instructional errors in this case are not sufficient to render petitioner’s trial fundamentally unfair 

in violation of due process. The court has already concluded that petitioner’s two jury instruction 

challenges, even when put together, did not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence on 

the jury’s verdict when reviewed de novo. See supra at Section B(3). Thus, the only remaining 

error to add to the prejudice analysis is the admission of petitioner’s wife’s statement that was

contained in the police report. 

This erroneously admitted statement concerned who was responsible for pulling the gun 

from petitioner’s side holster before the first shot was fired. However, in this case, the jury was 

asked to decide whether petitioner was acting in self-defense when the second and third gunshots 

that killed Lambert were made. “[I]n determining whether the combined effect of multiple errors 

rendered a criminal defense ‘far less persuasive’ and had a ‘substantial and injurious effect or 

influence’ on the jury's verdict, the overall strength of the prosecution's case must be considered 

because ‘a verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more likely to have been 

affected by errors than one with overwhelming record support.’” Parle, 505 F.3d at 928 (quoting 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696 (1984)). 

This court is not convinced that even all three errors taken cumulatively had a substantial 

and injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict. Petitioner’s testimony was so thoroughly 

cross-examined at trial that the undersigned cannot conclude that his self-defense argument would 

have ever persuaded a jury that firing the third and final gunshot was reasonably necessary to 

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defend against the danger from Lambert in order to result in a total acquittal. A few examples

from petitioner’s cross-examination illustrate this point:

Q: I mean you’re now all of a sudden clear, well, I’m in a tough 

situation, but, you know I’m gonna wait and see if he gets up ‘cause 

I only want to use reasonable force. That’s what you’re telling us? 

A: I wouldn’t put it in that kind of condescending tone but – 

ECF No. 65-2 at 26. 

Q: So you’re telling your wife... that after the shot, she goes away, 

that Matt came and got you in a headlock. That’s what you’re telling 

her; is it not?

A: I’ve had nightmares about headlocks. 

Q: This is what you’re telling her. 

A: Yes. 

Q: This is the story that you’re coming up with. 

A: No. My story – my testimony is not changing. 

ECF No. 65-2 at 53. 

Q: And the law that you read basically says that for self-defense you 

have to be in imminent danger; right? 

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. And so in court it’s just a coincidence that you use the 

exact same words.

A: I have a good vocabulary. 

Q: So it’s a coincidence then; right? 

A: When I speak publicly, yes I have a good vocabulary.... 

Q: Is it a coincidence, yes or no? 

A: No. 

ECF No. 65-2 at 57. 

 In light of this cross-examination of petitioner at trial, the undersigned does not find that 

the claim of self-defense was rendered “far less persuasive” based on the evidentiary and jury 

instructional errors in this case. See Parle, 505 F.3d at 928 (explaining prejudice standard for 

cumulative error claim). The jury’s rejection of self-defense and its verdict of voluntary 

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manslaughter was based on a credibility assessment of petitioner’s testimony. Therefore, 

petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on his cumulative error claim. 

IV. Plain Language Summary for Pro Se Party 

The following information is meant to explain this order in plain English and is not 

intended as legal advice.

The court has reviewed your habeas corpus application and the trial court record in your 

case. The undersigned is recommending that your habeas petition be denied on the merits. 

If you disagree with this result, you have 14 days to explain why it is incorrect. Label 

your explanation “Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations.” The 

district court judge assigned to your case will then review the entire record and make the final 

decision in your case.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s application for a writ of 

habeas corpus be denied.

 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” In his objections petitioner 

may address whether a certificate of appealability should issue in the event he files an appeal of 

the judgment in this case. See Rule 11, Federal Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (the district 

court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the 

applicant). A certificate of appealability may issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2253 “only if the applicant 

has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3). 

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 Any response to the objections shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the 

objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 

waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 

1991). 

Dated: June 14, 2024 

12/feci0878.merits.F&R

_____________________________________

CAROLYN K. DELANEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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