Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-09-03101/USCOURTS-caDC-09-03101-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Manuel De Jesus Ventura
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 22, 2011 Decided July 1, 2011 

No. 09-3101 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

APPELLEE

v. 

MANUEL DE JESUS VENTURA, ALSO KNOWN AS MARIO 

HERNANDEZ-CHACON, 

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:04-cr-00288) 

 Beverly G. Dyer, Assistant Federal Public Defender, 

argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was A. 

J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender. Neil H. Jaffee, Assistant 

Federal Public Defender entered an appearance. 

Michelle Shamblin Stratton, Attorney, U.S. Department 

of Justice, argued the cause for 

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appellee. With her on the brief were Ronald C. Machen, Jr., 

United States Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese III and Angela 

G. Schmidt, Assistant U.S. Attorneys. 

 Before: SENTELLE, Chief Judge, BROWN and 

KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge BROWN. 

BROWN, Circuit Judge: Appellant Manuel DeJesus 

Ventura (“Ventura”) pleaded guilty to violating 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1326(a), and § 1326(b)(2), which together prohibit the 

illegal reentry of an alien who has been deported following an 

aggravated felony conviction. The district court twice 

sentenced Ventura. We reversed both times, remanding each 

time for resentencing—first, because the district court did not 

consider Ventura’s U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 

(“Guidelines”) range under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 

220 (2005), and second, because the district court incorrectly 

calculated Ventura’s Guidelines range when it did consider it. 

The district court’s most recent resentencing of Ventura 

resulted in an 84-month sentence, as the court varied upward 

from Ventura’s correctly calculated Guidelines range on the 

basis of the factors articulated in § 3553(a). The district court 

adequately explained its sentencing decision. We affirm. 

I

1

Ventura, a citizen of El Salvador, first entered the United 

States in 1997 and was deported within a month. He returned 

 

1

 Our previous opinion, United States v. Ventura, 565 F.3d 870 

(D.C. Cir. 2009) (Ventura II), sets out much of the relevant factual 

and procedural background of this case. We draw, often verbatim, 

from that decision in summarizing the background here. 

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to the United States in 1999 and while here committed the 

crime that has become the bugaboo of this case. In 2000, the 

Commonwealth of Virginia charged Ventura with felonious 

abduction in violation of Va. Code § 18.2-47, which prohibits 

the unlawful seizure or detention of another person. Ventura 

pleaded nolo contendere and the Virginia court found him 

“guilty as charged in the indictment,” Tr. of Plea Colloquy at 

17, Commonwealth v. Hernandez-Chacon, No. 98623 (Va. 

Cir. Ct. Dec. 18, 2000), sentencing him to 18 months in 

prison. Ventura’s run-ins with the law alerted the federal 

government (“Government”) that he had reentered the 

country; he was removed again. 

Ventura soon returned to the country a third time, and to 

his criminal ways. In 2004, the D.C. Superior Court 

sentenced Ventura to six years in prison for, among other 

crimes, armed assault with intent to commit robbery. While 

Ventura was serving that sentence, the Government realized 

Ventura was in the country yet again. This time, instead of 

immediately removing Ventura, the Government charged him 

with illegally reentering the United States after having been 

removed following conviction for an aggravated felony, in 

violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(2).2

 Ventura pleaded 

guilty. 

The district court first sentenced Ventura on March 7, 

2005. Then, the central dispute at sentencing was the 

 

2

 Section 1326(a) provides that “any alien who (1) has been denied 

admission, excluded, deported, or removed . . . and thereafter (2) 

enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the United 

States . . . shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more 

than 2 years, or both.” 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). An alien “whose 

removal was subsequent to a conviction for commission of an 

aggravated felony . . . shall be fined under such Title, imprisoned 

not more than 20 years, or both.” Id. § 1326(b)(2). 

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calculation of the appropriate sentencing range under the 

Guidelines. The base offense level for the crime of unlawful 

reentry is 8. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual 

(U.S.S.G.) § 2L1.2(a) (2004). The Guidelines direct the court 

to apply the greatest of several possible increases based on the 

criminal conviction that preceded the defendant’s removal. If 

the defendant was convicted of an “aggravated felony,” the 

court applies an 8-level increase. Id. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C). 

Because Ventura pleaded guilty to reentering the country after 

conviction for an aggravated felony, he did not contest the 

eight-level increase. But some aggravated felonies are also 

“crimes of violence,” which instead trigger a sixteen-level 

increase under the Guidelines. Id. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). The 

probation office’s presentence investigation report (“PSR”) 

concluded Ventura’s Virginia conviction was one such crime. 

Ventura disputed the PSR’s conclusion, arguing his 

aggravated felony conviction was not a crime of violence. 

Reading United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), to 

alleviate the need to make a specific finding about the 

applicable Guidelines range, the district court did not resolve 

this dispute. Instead, the court weighed the various factors set 

out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and sentenced Ventura to 93 

months in prison—a sentence that would have been within 

the applicable Guidelines range had the court expressly found 

Ventura to have been convicted of a crime of violence. 

Ventura appealed, and we reversed, explaining that under 

Booker “sentencing courts remain obligated to calculate and 

consider the appropriate guidelines range.” United States v. 

Ventura, 481 F.3d 821, 823 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Ventura I). 

Because the district court had “expressly eschewed making a 

specific finding as to the guidelines range applicable to 

Ventura,” id., we remanded for it to do so. 

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On remand, the district court concluded the Virginia 

abduction was a crime of violence and applied a 16-level 

increase to Ventura’s base offense level. The resulting 

Guidelines range was 77 to 96 months. The court sentenced 

Ventura to 84 months’ imprisonment, to be served 

consecutive to his six-year D.C. Superior Court sentence. 

Ventura again appealed, and we again reversed, explaining 

that Ventura’s Virginia’s conviction was not a crime of 

violence under the Guidelines. Because “the district court 

erred in calculating the advisory sentencing range,” we again 

remanded for resentencing. Ventura II, 565 F.3d at 880. 

The district court began its third effort at sentencing 

Ventura by classifying the Virginia abduction as an 

aggravated felony and calculating his Guidelines range as 

between 33 and 41 months. The Government sought an 

above-Guidelines sentence, however, arguing for an upward 

departure from the sentence as calculated under U.S.S.G. 

§ 2L1.2, because Ventura’s offense level “understate[d] the 

seriousness” of his Virginia abduction conviction. The 

Government argued in the alternative for a variance in light of 

Ventura’s repeated illegal entries and commission of an 

aggravated felony each time that he reentered. The district 

court declined the Government’s invitation to depart upward 

under the Guidelines, instead sentencing Ventura to 84 

months’ imprisonment—a variance based upon its assessment 

of the § 3553(a) sentencing factors. 

II 

On appeal, Ventura contends the district court erred by 

considering the underlying facts of his Virginia abduction 

conviction when sentencing him—namely, that the abduction 

involved the violent sexual assault of a minor. Next, Ventura 

argues the district court failed to give adequate reasons for 

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imposing an above-Guidelines sentence, and the sentence 

imposed was substantively unreasonable. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(c)(2) (requiring a district court to state the reasons for 

a variance). We address each of these arguments in turn. 

A 

At sentencing, the district court may make findings of 

fact under a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, 

regardless of whether “a jury has previously acquitted a 

defendant of the same conduct,” or the conduct is “previously 

untried.” United States v. Bras, 483 F.3d 103, 108 (D.C. Cir. 

2007) (emphasis omitted); see also Booker, 543 U.S. at 251 

(noting that the Court “held in United States v. Watts, that a 

sentencing judge could rely for sentencing purposes upon a 

fact that a jury had found unproved (beyond a reasonable 

doubt)” (citation and alteration omitted)). In so doing, the 

sentencing court “may accept any undisputed portion of the 

[PSR] as a finding of fact.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(A). For 

any disputed portion of the PSR, the sentencing court must 

either “rule on the dispute or determine that a ruling is 

unnecessary.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B). We review a 

sentencing court’s factual determinations for clear error, 

“without regard to whether the appellant requested findings, 

objected to them, or moved to amend the findings before the 

trial judge.” In re Sealed Case, 552 F.3d 841, 849 (D.C. Cir. 

2009) (Edwards and Silberman, JJ., concurring).3

 

3

 The Government argues “plain error” review applies because 

Ventura did not object to the district court’s consideration of the 

facts underlying Ventura’s Virginia conviction. Under either 

standard, our conclusion is the same. 

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The district court undeniably relied, in part, on the 

underlying facts of the Virginia abduction when sentencing 

Ventura. The court stated: 

[Ventura] has a penchant for returning and not 

only returning, but committing violent 

crimes . . . And in that most recent violent 

crime where he used force to take a minor 

down an alley, sexually assault her, and only 

through good fortune she escaped, he 

demonstrated his willingness to use force 

against our most vulnerable citizens, our 

minors . . . [T]here’s nobody in a position that 

I’m aware of to quibble with the minimum 

factual predicate of that prior offense in 

Virginia: minor; force; sexual assault, who 

escaped through dear good fortune on her part 

and resistance on her part. 

Sent’g Tr. at 8. The facts supporting the district court’s 

characterization of the Virginia abduction derived from the 

PSR, which under Rule 32(i)(3)(A) the court may find as fact 

unless disputed. 

Ventura contends the district court’s reliance on his 

Virginia abduction conviction was in error because he pleaded 

nolo contendere, and therefore did not admit to the underlying 

facts of the offense. It is unclear whether Ventura contends 

his nolo contendere plea should prevent the district court from 

finding facts in relation to his Virginia conviction altogether, 

or whether he contends the district court should not have 

accepted the PSR’s findings of facts given his nolo 

contendere plea. His argument fails however it is construed. 

If a sentencing court may find facts related to acquitted or 

untried conduct, a fortiori it may find facts charged in an 

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indictment to which a defendant pleaded nolo contendere. Cf. 

United States v. Dorcely, 454 F.3d 366, 372–73 (D.C. Cir. 

2006); Booker, 543 U.S. at 251; 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (“No 

limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the 

background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of 

an offense which a court of the United States may receive and 

consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate 

sentence.”) Further, Rule 32(f)(1) allows 14 days for a 

defendant to “state in writing any objections, including 

objections to material information” contained in a PSR. 

Ventura failed to do so, and, consequently, the district court 

properly accepted the PSR’s findings as fact. Fed. R. Crim. P. 

32(i)(3)(A). Ventura’s nolo contendere plea does not 

constitute a Rule 32 objection. A contrary holding would 

render Rule 32(f) a mere administrative request. 

 Ventura suggests two other reasons the district court’s 

consideration of the facts underlying his Virginia conviction 

was in error. First, at oral argument, Ventura argued “[t]here 

is no obligation for the defense to dispute facts,” because 

“Ventura had a right to remain silent with respect to any 

criminal allegations.” Oral Arg. Tr. at 5, 6. It is true, under 

Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 327–28 (1999), the 

defendant maintains a right to remain silent at a sentencing 

hearing and a sentencing court may not draw an adverse 

inference from the defendant’s silence in finding facts relating 

to the circumstances and details of a crime, id. at 329–30. But 

Mitchell and Rule 32(i)(3)(A) are not inconsistent. Had 

Ventura disputed the facts contained in his PSR, the district 

court would have had to “rule on the dispute or determine that 

a ruling is unnecessary.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B). In that 

event, Mitchell would preclude the district court from making 

an adverse inference from Ventura’s failure to testify. But 

because Ventura did not dispute the PSR, no ruling was 

necessary and Mitchell does not apply. 

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 Finally, Ventura contends Shepard v. United States, 544 

U.S. 13 (2005), “limits the evidence a court may rely on at 

sentencing,” and a sentencing court cannot “evade 

Shepard . . . by imposing a non-guideline sentence.” When 

we held Ventura’s Virginia’s conviction was not a crime of 

violence under the Guidelines, we reasoned that Shepard 

precluded the sentencing court from looking to Ventura’s 

state court plea colloquy—the basis for the PSR’s factual 

description of the abduction—for the purpose of calculating 

the Guidelines range. Ventura II ̧ 565 F.3d at 879. Of course, 

the oddity of allowing the district court to consider certain 

evidence when relying upon the § 3553(a) factors, but not 

when determining the applicable Guidelines range is not lost 

on us. But Shepard is distinguishable for this very reason—it 

pertains to calculating a Guidelines range, not a variance on 

the basis of § 3553(a)’s sentencing factors. As the Supreme 

Court recently reiterated, the Guidelines serve only as “the 

starting point and the initial benchmark” before considering 

the § 3553(a) factors. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 

(2007). Here, the district court correctly calculated Ventura’s 

Guidelines range, and its subsequent findings of fact about 

Ventura’s Virginia offense were not clearly erroneous. 

B 

 Ventura next argues the district court committed 

procedural error by failing to give adequate reasons for 

imposing a sentence outside the Guidelines and that his 84 

month sentence is substantively unreasonable. When a 

sentencing court fashions a sentence outside the Guidelines, it 

must state “the specific reason for the imposition of a 

sentence different from that described, which reasons must 

also be stated with specificity in [the written order of 

judgment and commitment.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2); see 

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also United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 2005) 

(“[T]he farther the judge’s sentence departs from the 

guidelines sentence . . . , the more compelling the justification 

based on factors in section 3553(a) that the judge must offer 

in order to enable the court of appeals to assess the 

reasonableness of the sentence imposed.”). “Our review for 

both procedural soundness—including whether the district 

court considered the necessary factors and adequately 

explained a deviation from the Guidelines—and the 

substantive reasonableness of sentences is for abuse of 

discretion.” United States v. Wilson, 605 F.3d 985, 1033–34 

(D.C. Cir. 2010). 

Ventura’s arguments are easily dismissed, as each 

restates Ventura’s objections to the district court’s 

consideration of the facts underlying the Virginia abduction. 

First, Ventura says the district court did not give “substantial 

consideration to the guidelines and § 3553(a)” because “no 

evidence demonstrated that the [Virginia] abduction involved 

violence, or a sexual assault, or a victim who was a minor.” 

But the sentencing hearing transcript refutes Ventura’s claim. 

It shows the district court addressed each of the factors set 

forth in § 3553(a), with an especially sharp focus on the 

seriousness of Ventura’s offense (§ 3553(a)(2)(A)), the need 

to protect the public (§ 3553(a)(2)(C)), and the need to 

promote respect for the law (§ 3553(a)(2)(A)). Sent’g Tr. at 

9. Similarly, Ventura argues his sentence is substantively 

unreasonable because the district court would have 

(presumably) given a lower sentence absent consideration of 

the Virginia abduction. But given our conclusion above—the 

district court’s consideration of the facts underlying the 

Virginia abduction was proper—we need not consider the 

counterfactual Ventura poses. We must defer to the district 

court’s judgment when it has presented a “reasoned and 

reasonable decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on the whole, 

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justified the sentence.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 59–60. Because the 

district court did that here, it did not abuse its discretion. 

III 

 After its failure to consider the Guidelines when 

sentencing Ventura, we reversed the district court. We 

reversed again after the district court subsequently calculated 

Ventura’s Guidelines range incorrectly. Sentencing Ventura 

for a third time, the district court considered the § 3553(a) 

factors and gave Ventura a sentence 43 months above the 

upper bound suggested by the Guidelines. In so doing, the 

district court considered the nature of Ventura’s prior Virginia 

abduction conviction. This was not in error because Ventura 

did not dispute the PSR’s description of the offense. Neither 

did the district court abuse its discretion by failing to give 

sufficient reasons for its variance from the Guidelines, nor by 

fashioning a substantively unreasonable sentence. The 

sentence of the district court is 

Affirmed. 

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