Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00560/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00560-8/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Paul Augusto
Defendant
City of Fairfield
Defendant
Tanya Creal
Plaintiff
Chuck Timm
Defendant

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The court has dismissed with prejudice claims against 1

defendant Fairfield Police Sergeant Chuck Timm. (June 7, 2007

Stipulation Order.) 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

TANYA CREAL,

NO. CIV. S-06-560 WBS PAN (JFM)

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

CITY OF FAIRFIELD, PAUL

AUGUSTO, CHUCK TIMM, DOES 1-

10,

Defendants.

 ----oo0oo----

Defendants City of Fairfield and Fairfield Police

Officer Paul Augusto (“defendants”) move for summary judgment.1

Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

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Acknowledging that plaintiff and defendants present

conflicting stories defendants argue that the record blatently

contradicts plaintiff’s version. “When opposing parties tell two

different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the

record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court

should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling

on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct.

1769, 1776 (2007). 

Defendants argue that Augusto’s version of the physical

altercation with plaintiff should be adopted by the court for

purposes of this motion. Officer Augusto testified that

plaintiff bit him. Plaintiff denies biting Augusto and maintains

she was punched by him several times. Defendants cite the

testimony of Missy Smith, the intake nurse at Northbay Medical

Center, and plaintiff’s medical records in support of Augusto’s

contention that he was bitten by plaintiff and applied a single

distraction blow as a reasonable means of self-defense. Smith

testified that plaintiff told her she had bitten Augusto. (Smith

Dep. 17:2-4.) Smith noted this information on plaintiff’s intake

form. (Id. 15:17-17:4.) Additionally, defendants proffer

plaintiff’s medical records indicating that the only hard sign of

injury was to the left side of plaintiff’s face area. (Addams

Decl. Ex. D p. 5.) 

On the other hand, the emergency department physician’s

record reflects that the injury to the left side of plaintiff’s

face also includes an injury to part of her ear, specifically the

left tympanic membrane. (Addam Decl. Ex. D p. 5; Harvey Dep.

15:3-5, 19:10-14.) Plaintiff also proffers testimony of her

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husband, Claude Caviness, indicating that her face the next day

was very swollen. (Caviness Dep. 17:2-4.) There was no medical

examination of Officer Augusto to confirm that he was bitten. 

This court cannot say that it would be unreasonable as a matter

of law for a jury to conclude from this evidence that Augusto

punched plaintiff several times. 

This is not a case like Scott v. Harris, supra. There,

the court declined to adopt respondent’s version of events--the

default on summary judgment--because the record blatantly

contradicted respondent’s version of the facts. 127 S. Ct. at

1775-76. However, the Supreme Court acknowledged the unusual

circumstances involved in that case, i.e. a videotape capturing

the events in question. Id. at 1775. Because “[r]espondent’s

version of events is so utterly discredited by the record that no

reasonable jury could have believed him[,] [t]he Court of Appeals

should not have relied on such visible fiction.” Id. at 1776.

For this court to adopt defendants’ version of the

facts would require a favorable interpretation of Smith’s

credibility and a weighing of the medical evidence. The court

cannot engage in either as those determinations are the province

of the jury. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255

(1986). Therefore, the court must adopt plaintiff’s version of

the disputed facts for purposes of this motion. 

A. Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment Claims

Plaintiff does not contest that there was probable

cause for her initial arrest. (Pl.’s Opp’n 9:2). Under the

Fourth Amendment, police may use only such force as is

objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Graham v.

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Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989); Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912,

914 (9th Cir. 1994). Summary judgment is appropriate if, after

resolving all factual disputes in favor of the plaintiff, the

district court concludes that the officer’s use of force was

objectively reasonable. Scott, 39 F.3d at 914. 

The court concludes that no reasonable jury could find

Augusto’s use of force, or the amount of force employed,

unreasonable under these circumstances. Plaintiff does not

contest that Augusto’s use of force in the presence of Timm was

constitutional. (Pl.’s Opp’n 10:10-11.) Accordingly, the

decision to use force and amount of force employed to execute the

initial arrest did not violate plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment

rights.

However, plaintiff alleges that Augusto’s subsequent

use of force was unreasonable, and it is a disputed material fact

whether Augusto punched plaintiff on several occasions and threw

her against the ground. In assessing whether Augusto’s use of

force was reasonable, the court must take plaintiff’s version as

true. 

To grant defendants’ motion the court must determine

that Augusto’s conduct was objectively reasonable under the

circumstances. Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. In assessing the

gravity of a particular intrusion on Fourth Amendment rights, the

factfinder must evaluate the type and amount of force inflicted. 

Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1440 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Graham,

490 U.S. at 396). When “weighing the governmental interests

involved the following should be taken into account: (1) the

severity of the crime at issue, (2) whether the suspect poses an

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immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and (3)

whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade

arrest by flight.” Id. 

Construing the record in favor of the nonmoving party,

Augusto punched plaintiff several times as a result of her

screaming for her husband and moving around in the back seat of

the car. The court cannot conclude as a matter of law that

Augusto’s use of force was reasonable. Plaintiff was initially

arrested for vehicular misdemeanors. (Timm Decl. Ex. A.) It is

disputed whether plaintiff was a severe threat to Augusto’s

safety and whether she resisted. If plaintiff is believed,

Augusto’s use of force was unreasonable under the Graham factors. 

Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 645 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Viewing the

facts in a light most favorable to Hansen, the officers used

excess force on Hansen by unreasonably injuring her wrist and arm

as they handcuffed her.” (reversing district court’s grant of

summary judgment)). Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary

judgment on plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim must be denied for

Augusto’s subsequent use of force during the battery arrest.

B. Augusto’s Qualified Immunity

 As an affirmative defense, defendants assert that

Augusto is entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity

protects “government officials performing discretionary functions

. . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct

does not violate clearly established statutory or constitution

rights of which a reasonable person should have known.” Romero

v. Kitsap County, 931 F.2d 624, 627 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)) (internal

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quotations omitted). The test for qualified immunity thus

“necessitates three inquires: 1) the identification of the

specific right violated; 2) the determination of whether that

right was so ‘clearly established’ as to alert a reasonable

officer to its constitutional parameters; and 3) the ultimate

determination of whether a reasonable officer could have believed

lawful the particular conduct at issue.” Id. 

The right not to be subjected to unreasonable force

during an arrest is clearly established. Police may use only

such force as is objectively reasonable under the circumstances. 

Graham, 490 U.S. at 397 (1989); Scott, 39 F.3d at 914. If

plaintiff’s testimony is believed by the factfinder, Officer

Augusto’s use of force in conjunction with the arrest for battery

was not objectively reasonable. 

The final step in analyzing qualified immunity requires

an objective analysis of whether the officer’s conduct in this

instance was reasonable. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,

641 (1987). The relevant inquiry is whether a “reasonable

officer” in the defendant’s position could have believed that the

conduct at issue was lawful. Id. If plaintiff’s testimony is

credited, Officer Augusto is not entitled to qualified immunity

under the “reasonableness standard” of the Fourth Amendment. 

According to plaintiff, Augusto punched plaintiff numerous times

and threw her against the ground. The medical record also shows

injury. Under these circumstances, no reasonable officer could

believe that punching plaintiff and throwing her to the ground

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See Davis v. City of Las Vegas, 478 F.3d 1048, 1057 2

(9th Cir. 2007) (“Any reasonable officer . . . would have known,

in light of the Graham factors and our case law interpreting

them, that swinging a handcuffed man into a wall head-first

multiple times and then punching him in the face while he lay

face-down on the ground, and breaking his neck as a result, was

unnecessary and excessive.”); Benas v. Baca, 159 Fed. Appx. 762,

764-65 (9th Cir. 2005) (where officer’s use of force in the form

of a closed-fist punch to plaintiffs face was so severe that it

precludes summary judgment, there are also material factual

disputes as to whether police officer reasonably should have

known that his conduct violated “clearly established” law so that

qualified immunity should not have been granted on summary

judgment); Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir.

1993) (no reasonable officer could believe that fastening

handcuffs so tightly around his wrist that they caused Palmer

pain and left bruises that lasted for several weeks was

constitutional). 

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was constitutional. Qualified immunity is an affirmative 2

defense, and defendants have failed to meet their requisite

burden. DeNieva, 966 F.2d at 486. 

C. Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment Claims 

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

provides that “no State shall . . . deny to any person within its

jurisdiction equal protection of its laws.” “The central purpose

of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the

prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of

race.” Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238 (1976). In a §

1983 claim alleging a violation of equal protection, a plaintiff

“must prove that the defendant acted in a discriminatory manner

and that the discrimination was intentional.” Fed. Deposit Ins.

Corp. v. Henderson, 940 F.2d 465, 471 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing

Stones v. Los Angeles Cmty. College Dist., 796 F.2d 270, 275 (9th

Cir. 1986)) (further citations omitted). Further, a plaintiff

need “only produce evidence sufficient to establish a genuine

issue of fact as to the defendant’s motivations.” Id. 

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Monell refers to Monell v. Department of Social 3

Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), in which the

Supreme Court held that a local government can be sued under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 when execution of a government’s policy or custom

results in a violation of constitutional rights. 

8

The only evidence of racial animus plaintiff proffers

is her deposition testimony that Augusto made remarks about her

hair. (Pl.’s Am. Resp to Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Facts #

46.) However, plaintiff admitted that she interpreted these

remarks as race-biased but that he had not said anything in

particular that she could identify as showing racial animus. 

(Id.; Creal Dep. 81:14-82:15.) No reasonable jury would conclude

that plaintiff has established intentional discrimination;

therefore, her claim fails as a matter of law. Fed. Deposit Ins.

Corp., 940 F.2d at 471. Moreover, plaintiff does not contest

that she has failed to establish intentional discrimination. 

(Opp’n 8 (stating that plaintiff makes no claim of racial or

gender discrimination).) Accordingly, the court will grant

defendants’ motion with regard to plaintiff’s Fourteenth

Amendment claims. 

D. City of Fairfield’s Monell Liability

Plaintiff seeks to hold defendant City of Fairfield

liable for Augusto’s alleged constitutional violations on a 

Monell theory. The Supreme Court has made it clear that “a 3

municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat

superior theory.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of NY, 436 U.S.

658, 691 (1978). The City of Fairfield may be sued under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, when “the action that is alleged to be

unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement,

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ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and

promulgated by that body’s officers.” Id. at 690. In the

alternative, the city may be liable where the municipality’s

failure to train employees amounts to “deliberate indifference”

to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact. 

City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989); Alexander v.

City and County of San Francisco, 29 F.3d 1355, 1367 (9th Cir.

1994). A plaintiff bringing a Monell claim must demonstrate both

that a constitutional deprivation occurred and that the

municipality was the “moving force behind the injury alleged.” 

Id. at 385; Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th

Cir. 1986). 

Plaintiff submitted a formal complaint after the

incident with Augusto. (Creal Decl. Ex. 1.) Plaintiff contends

that the city denied the complaint. (Id. ¶ 17.) Plaintiff

argues that these actions demonstrate that the City of Fairfield

sanctioned Augusto’s conduct as within normal policies, patterns,

and practices of the Fairfield Police Department. (Opp’n 16-17.) 

To prevail on this theory, however, a plaintiff has “to prove

‘the existence of a widespread practice that . . . is so

permanent and well settled as to constitute a ‘custom or usage’

with the force of law.’” Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342,

1348-1349 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting City of St. Louis v.

Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1989) (internal quotations

omitted)). A plaintiff may attempt to prove the existence of a

custom or informal policy with evidence of repeated

constitutional violations for which the errant municipal official

was not discharged or reprimanded. See McRorie v. Shimoda, 795

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F.2d 780, 784 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Plaintiff has not produced such evidence. Nor did

plaintiff present evidence of a pattern of failures of the City

of Fairfield failing to discipline officers for utilizing

excessive force. In fact, plaintiff relies on this singular

instance with Augusto. There is no evidence of unpunished,

repeated constitutional violations or any evidence indicating a

widespread practice of the City tolerating uses of excessive

force by its officers. Moreover, a single incident like the

allegations against Augusto do not rise to the “level of the

‘well-settled,’ ‘widespread’ practices contemplated in the cases

discussing municipal liability.” Sloman v. Tadlock, 21 F.3d

1462, 1470 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Thompson v. City of Los

Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1444 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing cases)); see

also Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 941 F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir.

1991) (a single incident alleged in a complaint, especially if it

involved only actors below the policy-making level, does not

suffice to show a municipal policy) (citing cases)). 

Accordingly, the court will grant defendants’ motion to dismiss

plaintiff’s Monell claims. 

E. State Law Claims

Plaintiff alleges five causes of action under state

law: assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional

distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and

respondeat superior liability (against City of Fairfield only). 

Defendants argue that the city is not liable because

Augusto is not liable and that a municipality may not be sued in

tort absent statutory authority permitting such a suit. (Defs.’

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Mot. for Summ. J. 23:22-24:23.) However, with regard to

Augusto’s liability, for the reasons discussed above, the court

cannot conclude that Augusto’s actions surrounding the battery

arrest were reasonable as a matter of law. With regard to the

City’s liabililty, § 815.2 of the California Government code

provides for respondeat superior liability as follows: “A public

entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or

omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of

his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this

section, have given rise to a cause of action against that

employee . . . .” 

Thus, the City of Fairfield may be liable if Augusto

committed torts against plaintiff, which is the basis for

plaintiff’s allegations here. See Hoff v. Vacaville Unified Sch.

Dist., 19 Cal 4th 925, 933 (1998). The complaint states claims

for assault and battery, intentional and negligent infliction of

emotional distress. Further, California Government Code § 825

requires a municipality to pay a judgment against its employees

unless liability arose outside the scope of the defendant

employee’s employment and an agreement existed between the

municipality and defendant employee so providing. Cal. Gov’t

Code § 825(a).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:

(1) defendants’ motion for summary judgment on

plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment causes of action be, and the

same hereby is, GRANTED;

(2) defendants’ motion for summary judgment on

plaintiff’s federal claims as against defendant City of Fairfield

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be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED;

(3) defendants’ motion for summary judgment on

plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims be, and the same hereby is,

GRANTED, as to the arrest of use of force during the initial

arrest for vehicular crimes, but DENIED, as to the subsequent

battery arrest and use of force concurrent and subsequent

thereto; and

(4) in all other respects, defendants’ motion for

summary judgment be, and the same hereby is, DENIED. 

DATED: July 9, 2007

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