Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-10024/USCOURTS-ca9-14-10024-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
James Evans
Appellee
September McConnell

United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

SEPTEMBER MCCONNELL,

Defendant,

and

JAMES EVANS,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 14-10024

D.C. No.

3:13-cr-00079-

LRH-WGC-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Larry R. Hicks, District Judge, Presiding

Argued September 11, 2014

Submitted May 14, 2015

San Francisco, California

Filed May 20, 2015

Before: Stephen Reinhardt, Raymond C. Fisher,

and Marsha S. Berzon, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Berzon

 Case: 14-10024, 05/20/2015, ID: 9543488, DktEntry: 30-1, Page 1 of 20
2 UNITED STATES V. EVANS

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel vacated the district court’s order granting

James Evans’ motion to suppress evidence of illegal drugs

and a firearm found in a search of his car following a traffic

stop, and remanded.

Applying Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609

(2015), the panel held that, by conducting an ex-felon

registration check and a dog sniff, both of which were

unrelated to the traffic violation for which he stopped Evans,

an officer prolonged the traffic stop beyond the time

reasonably required to complete his traffic mission, and so

violated the Fourth Amendment, unless there was

independent reasonable suspicion justifying each

prolongation. The panel remanded to the district court for

consideration in the first instance of whether the officer’s

prolongation of the traffic stop was supported by independent

reasonable suspicion.

COUNSEL

Elizabeth O. White (argued), Appellate Chief and Assistant

United States Attorney; Daniel G. Bogden, United States

Attorney, Reno, Nevada, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

 Case: 14-10024, 05/20/2015, ID: 9543488, DktEntry: 30-1, Page 2 of 20
UNITED STATES V. EVANS 3

Janice A. Hubbard, Reno, Nevada, for Defendant-Appellee

James Evans.

OPINION

BERZON, Circuit Judge:

The United States appeals the district court’s order

granting James Evans’ motion to suppress evidence of illegal

drugs and a firearm found in a search of his car following a

traffic stop. We vacated submission pending the Supreme

Court’s decision in Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct.

1609 (2015), and now hold that the officer’s prolongation of

the traffic stop to conduct both an ex-felon registration check

and a “dog sniff” violated the Fourth Amendment unless the

officer had independent reasonable suspicion to support the

prolongations. Because the district court did not address

whether the officer had such reasonable suspicion, we vacate

and remand.

I.

A.

Over the course of 2012 and 2013, Detective Blaine

Beard, a Washoe County Sheriff’s Deputy assigned to the

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) task force in Reno,

Nevada, received information from two jailhouse sources that

Evans was distributingmethamphetamine in the Reno-Sparks

 Case: 14-10024, 05/20/2015, ID: 9543488, DktEntry: 30-1, Page 3 of 20
4 UNITED STATES V. EVANS

area.1 Beard never “confirm[ed]” or “verif[ied]” this

information, however, as, according to him, the task force

didn’t “have the time at that point to dedicate towards an

investigation into Mr. Evans.”

In the summer of 2013, Beard met with an informant, who

had played a minor role in a different investigation Beard was

conducting into drug activities in the area. Beard testified

that the informant told him that he “had traveled to the

Sacramento Valley on more than one occasion with Mr.

Evans for the purpose of picking up a load of

methamphetamine from a source of supply in that area,” and

that Evans was picking up five to ten pounds of

methamphetamine every two to three weeks. According to

the informant, Evans would stay at a Super 8 Motel a few

miles from the supply source, acquire the “load,” and return

the following day to Nevada.

Based on this information, Beard obtained authorization

from a state court judge to obtain “pings” showing the

location of a cell phone Beard believed Evans was using for

drug distribution activities. In the early evening of July 22,

2013, Beard received GPS ping data showing that the cell

phone was leaving Nevada, traveling westbound. Later that

night, the cell phone pinged from a parking lot of a Super 8

Motel in Sacramento. Beard requested that two officers with

the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Office drive by the Super 8

1 This background is pieced together from both the audio-video

recording of the traffic stop that the government introduced into evidence

without objection, and the law enforcement officers’ testimony at the

suppression hearing. As we discuss below, however, the district court did

not make factual findings at the hearing. We thus express no opinion as

to the testimony’s credibility.

 Case: 14-10024, 05/20/2015, ID: 9543488, DktEntry: 30-1, Page 4 of 20
UNITED STATES V. EVANS 5

Motel to verify that the car suspected to be Evans’ was at that

parking lot. At roughly 1:30 AM, the Sacramento County

officers confirmed the suspected car was in the lot.

Beard subsequently contacted Deputy Brandon Zirkle, a

deputy sheriff in the Washoe County Sheriff’s Office whom

Beard had known for “years.” Zirkle was canine-certified

and had his dog, Thor, with him that day. Thor was trained

in the detection of controlled substances.

Beard supplied Zirkle with information about Evans’ car,

explaining that the DEA suspected Evans was traveling from

California with narcotics and that Beard was receiving GPS

location information from Evans’ phone. Beard asked Zirkle

to assist him by positioning his patrol car on the I-80 highway

and pulling Evans’ car over once it traveled past Zirkle. 

Beard specifically requested that Zirkle “develop [his] own

probable cause to stop [the car]” to “possibly keep this event

separate from [Beard’s] ongoing investigation.”2

Following this conversation, Zirkle parked his patrol car

on I-80 on the Nevada side of the California-Nevada border

and waited for Evans’ vehicle to drive by. Beard, who had

been monitoring the GPS pings from Evans’ cell phone

throughout the day, learned that Evans left the Super 8 Motel

in the morning and drove east to Grass Valley, California,

where he stopped for several hours. At around 6:37 PM,

2 According to Zirkle, this type of stop — known as a “wall stop” — is

“basically a stand-alone case that would stand alone based on the initiating

officer’s own probable cause . . . without jeopardizing the ongoing

investigation.” That is, “the traffic stop [was to be] independent and clear

from the [DEA] investigation . . . to protect the [DEA’s] information and

the data and identities of the sources of information.”

 Case: 14-10024, 05/20/2015, ID: 9543488, DktEntry: 30-1, Page 5 of 20
6 UNITED STATES V. EVANS

DEA officers observed the suspected vehicle traveling

eastbound on I-80 about forty-five minutes west of Reno.

Beard relayed this information to Zirkle, who had been

waiting near I-80 for almost eleven hours.

Shortly after he was told that Evans was traveling

eastbound towards him, Zirkle observed a Chevrolet El

Camino with the reported license plate making a lane change

that caused the vehicle behind it to apply its brakes. After

following Evans for approximately a mile to a safe location,

Zirkle pulled Evans over for violating two Nevada traffic

laws prohibiting unsafe lane changes and following a vehicle

too closely. See Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 484B.223(1)(b) &

484B.127(1). The traffic stop began at 7:09 PM.

Approaching the car from the passenger’s side, Zirkle

asked Evans for his license and registration. Zirkle testified

that he smelled a “very strong odor of methamphetamine”

coming from inside the vehicle. Zirkle then asked Evans to

get out of the car. After telling Evans that he had made an

unsafe lane change, Zirkle asked Evans where he was coming

from; Evans answered that he was heading back to Reno from

Grass Valley3 where he had stayed for a couple days with

friends. Zirkle patted down Evans for weapons, then asked

him to wait by the patrol car while he “checked some

numbers” on the El Camino.

After checking the El Camino’s vehicle identification

number, Zirkle walked to the car and asked the passenger,

September McConnell, for her identification. According to

3 Grass Valley, California, is a few miles from Nevada City, California. 

Both the parties and the district court judge used the names “Grass

Valley” and “Nevada City” interchangeably.

 Case: 14-10024, 05/20/2015, ID: 9543488, DktEntry: 30-1, Page 6 of 20
UNITED STATES V. EVANS 7

Zirkle, McConnell appeared to be feigning sleep; Zirkle also

testified that McConnell’s hands were shaking and that her

pulse was racing in her neck to the extent that he could see

the heartbeat in her carotid artery. In response to Zirkle’s

questions, McConnell stated they were coming from

California, where they had stayed one night with Evans’

friend. At 7:13 PM (four minutes into the stop), Zirkle

informed Evans, who remained standing by Zirkle’s patrol

car, that he was not going to write a ticket, but that he needed

to run a check for outstanding warrants before letting him go.

Zirkle returned to his patrol car to prepare a records

check, which reveals whether the driver’s license is valid and

whether any warrants are outstanding for the holder’s arrest. 

Evans approached Zirkle twice to inform him that he had had

trouble with his license and child support in the past, but that

it had been straightened out. Upon further questioning, Evans

also informed Zirkle that he had been arrested before. Zirkle

then contacted the police dispatch operator to call in a records

check. As Zirkle was calling in the records check, Nevada

State Trooper Jason Phillips appeared on the scene and spoke

with both Evans and McConnell.4 Minutes later, at nearly

7:20 PM, the operator returned with a clean records check on

the car, as well as on Evans’ and McConnell’s driver’s

licenses.

Zirkle then requested an ex-felon registration check on

Evans, as he had typed Evans’ name into the patrol car

computer and learned that Evans had a prior felony arrest

record. The check entailed inquiring into Evans’ criminal

history and then determining whether he was properly

4 Zirkle had contacted Phillips earlier, telling him to wait until Zirkle had

stopped the vehicle and then come to cover Zirkle on the stop.

 Case: 14-10024, 05/20/2015, ID: 9543488, DktEntry: 30-1, Page 7 of 20
8 UNITED STATES V. EVANS

registered at the address he provided to Zirkle.5 As he was

awaiting the results of the ex-felon registration check, Zirkle

testified that he sought “to see if [Evans] would continue to

give him the story that he gave . . . or change his story.” 

Zirkle asked Evans why McConnell had told him that they

had stayed in a motel, knowing that she had said they had

stayed with friends. According to Zirkle, Evans now said that

he and McConnell stayed at a motel in Sacramento before

driving to a friend’s house in Grass Valley. Zirkle told Evans

that he was just waiting on the results of the ex-felon

registration check, and that, if it returned with a proper

registration, Evans would be free to leave.

Zirkle and Phillips then entered the patrol car and

discussed for several minutes what they had heard from

Evans and McConnell. Phillips told Zirkle that he smelled a

strong odor of marijuana coming from the car; Phillips did

not mention smelling methamphetamine. After this

conversation, Zirkle asked Evans, who remained standing

outside the patrol car, what he had been in prison for. Evans

answered that it had been for “counterfeiting.”

5 Nevada requires any “convicted person” within the state for a period

of 48 hours or more to register with the county sheriff or chief of police. 

See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 179C.100(1). A “convicted person” includes any

person convicted in Nevada of “a category A felony” or “two or more

offenses punishable as felonies.” Id. § 179C.010(1)(a)–(b). Registration

involves submitting a written form with information including the

person’s name, description of his or her person, the “kind, character and

nature of each crime of which the person has been convicted,” and the

address of the person’s residence. Id. § 179C.100(4). Failure to register

is a misdemeanor. Id. § 179C.220.

 Case: 14-10024, 05/20/2015, ID: 9543488, DktEntry: 30-1, Page 8 of 20
UNITED STATES V. EVANS 9

At 7:26 PM, Zirkle called in to check on the status of the

ex-felon check. The dispatch operator indicated she was on

the phone with the records department to confirm everything.

At 7:28 PM, more than eight minutes after Zirkle called

in the ex-felon registration check, dispatch informed Zirkle

that Evans had been convicted two times for “drug-related

charges,” and that he was properly registered. Zirkle gave

Evans a warning, returned his license and paperwork, and

shook his hand, informing him that “you’re good to go.”

Immediately after Evans began to walk away, however,

Zirkle asked Evans if he could ask a few more questions. 

Evans turned and walked back to Zirkle. Zirkle inquired

whether Evans had any contraband in the car, mentioning

marijuana, methamphetamine, cocaine, and heroin; Evans

denied having any drugs. Zirkle then asked for Evans’

consent to search the car. Evans refused to consent.

At this time, “[b]ased on everything [he] had seen in the

stop,” Zirkle believed he had “reasonable suspicion to keep

[Evans] there further to run a narcotic detection dog around

the exterior of the vehicle.” Zirkle told Evans he was going

to deploy Thor around the exterior of the car and ordered

McConnell out of the car. After spending about three

minutes preparing Thor, Zirkle began to walk the dog around

the vehicle. Thor then allegedly alerted to the passenger door

of Evans’ car, indicating to Zirkle that he was “in the odor of

a controlled substance.” According to the dispatch log, the

canine alert was entered at 7:33 PM — about twenty-four

minutes after the traffic stop began. Zirkle told Evans and

McConnell that they were no longer free to leave, and

prepared to conduct a search of the car. Shortly thereafter,

several agents from DEA arrived.

 Case: 14-10024, 05/20/2015, ID: 9543488, DktEntry: 30-1, Page 9 of 20
10 UNITED STATES V. EVANS

The resulting search turned up a doubled-bagged ziplock

sandwich bag containing methamphetamine and “small

bag[s]” of marijuana and crack cocaine, all of which were

contained in a “hard sunglass case . . . located in between the

driver and passenger seat of the vehicle.” Zirkle also found

an unloaded firearm in McConnell’s backpack. Evans and

McConnell were arrested.

B.

Evans and McConnell were indicted and charged with

conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute

five grams and more of methamphetamine; possession with

intent to distribute five grams and more of methamphetamine;

and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug

trafficking crime. Evans was also charged with being a felon

in possession of a firearm.

Evans moved to suppress the evidence seized from his

car, arguing, inter alia, that Zirkle unlawfully prolonged the

traffic stop by (1) continuing to detain Evans while he ran the

ex-felon registration check, and (2) conducting the dog sniff

“after the traffic stop was completed.” The government

responded that Zirkle had developed reasonable suspicion, if

not probable cause, of illegal drug activities in the course of

the traffic stop, and that the dog sniff was therefore justified. 

The government did not specifically address Evans’

contentions regarding the ex-felon registration check.

Following an evidentiary hearing in which both Zirkle

and Beard testified, the district court orally granted Evans’

motion. Observing that “this is a classic subterfuge traffic

stop,” the court concluded that “this kind of a traffic stop for

an extended period of time was an unlawful seizure . . . [in]

 Case: 14-10024, 05/20/2015, ID: 9543488, DktEntry: 30-1, Page 10 of 20
UNITED STATES V. EVANS 11

violation of federal law.” The court therefore held that as

Evans was “seized beyond the amount of time that’s

reasonable under our constitution,” the search was “an

unlawful one.”

At a detention hearing two months later, the district court

ordered Evans conditionally released pending the

government’s appeal.

II.

We review de novo the district court’s ruling on a motion

to suppress and for clear error the district court’s underlying

findings of fact. See United States v. Turvin, 517 F.3d 1097,

1099 (9th Cir. 2008).

Evans does not dispute that Zirkle had probable cause that

he had committed a minor traffic violation, and that,

therefore, the initial traffic stop was lawful. But “a seizure

that is lawful at its inception can violate the Fourth

Amendment if its manner of execution unreasonablyinfringes

interests protected by the Constitution.” Illinois v. Caballes,

543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005). In particular, “[a] seizure that is

justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to

the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the

time reasonably required to complete that mission.” Id.

Rodriguez v. United States recently fleshed out these

principles. In Rodriguez, a police officer, Struble, stopped

Rodriguez for “veer[ing] slowly onto the shoulder of [the

highway] for one or two seconds” in violation of Nebraska

traffic law. 135 S. Ct. at 1612. After collecting Rodriguez’s

license, registration, and proof of insurance, Struble ran a

records check on Rodriguez. Id. at 1613. Once the records

 Case: 14-10024, 05/20/2015, ID: 9543488, DktEntry: 30-1, Page 11 of 20
12 UNITED STATES V. EVANS

check on Rodriguez was complete, Struble returned to the

vehicle, asked for the passenger’s driver’s license, and began

to question the passenger about “where [they] were coming

from and where they were going.” Id. Struble again returned

to his vehicle, where he completed a records check on the

passenger. Id.6 Once the record checks were completed,

Struble returned to the vehicle “to issue [a] written warning”

to Rodriguez for the traffic violation. Id.

Although Struble conceded that the reasons for the traffic

stop at this point were “out of the way,” the officer

nonetheless asked Rodriguez for permission to walk his dog

around the vehicle. Id. After Rodriguez refused, Struble

instructed Rodriguez to exit the vehicle and wait for the

arrival of a second police officer. Several minutes later, after

a deputy sheriff arrived, Struble “retrieved his dog and led

him twice around the [vehicle].” Id. The dog alerted to the

presence of drugs, and a subsequent search of the vehicle

revealed a “large bag of methamphetamine.” Id. “All told,

seven or eight minutes had elapsed from the time Struble

issued the written warning until the dog indicated the

presence of drugs.” Id.

Rodriguez was indicted for possession with intent to

distribute methamphetamine. Id. He moved to suppress the

evidence obtained from the car search, arguing that the stop

was unreasonably prolonged by the dog sniff in the absence

of reasonable suspicion to extend his detention. See id.

Although the district court found that Struble lacked

independent reasonable suspicion to extend the detention

 

6 Rodriguez did not challenge Struble’s prolongation of the traffic stop

to conduct the records check on the passenger, and the Court did not

address it.

 Case: 14-10024, 05/20/2015, ID: 9543488, DktEntry: 30-1, Page 12 of 20
UNITED STATES V. EVANS 13

once he had issued the written warning, it determined that the

seven-to-eight minute extension of the stop was “only a de

minimis intrusion on Rodriguez’s Fourth Amendment rights

and was therefore permissible.” Id. at 1613–14. 

Accordingly, it concluded that the prolongation did not

violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable

seizures. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the delay

constituted an acceptable de minimis intrusion. See United

States v. Rodriguez, 741 F.3d 905, 907–08 (8th Cir. 2014),

vacated and remanded, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015). The court

declined to address the district court’s conclusion that Struble

lacked independent reasonable suspicion to extend the

detention. See id. at 908.

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, explaining

that, like a Terry stop, a traffic stop is “‘[a] relatively brief

encounter,’” in which “the tolerable duration of police

inquiries . . . is determined by the seizure’s ‘mission.’” 

Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614 (quoting Knowles v. Iowa,

525 U.S. 113, 117 (1998), and Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407).

This “mission” is limited to “address[ing] the traffic violation

that warranted the stop” and “attend[ing] to related safety

concerns.” Id. “Authority for the seizure thus ends,”

Rodriguez held, “when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are

— or reasonably should have been — completed.” Id. Tasks

not related to the traffic mission, such as dog sniffs, are

therefore unlawful if they “add[] time” to the stop, and are not

otherwise supported by independent reasonable suspicion of

wrongdoing. Id. at 1616.

In so holding, Rodriguez specifically rejected the

government’s argument that an officer can prolong a traffic

stop to conduct a non-traffic-related task “so long as the

officer is reasonably diligent in pursuing the traffic-related

 Case: 14-10024, 05/20/2015, ID: 9543488, DktEntry: 30-1, Page 13 of 20
14 UNITED STATES V. EVANS

purpose of the stop, and the overall duration of the stop

remains reasonable in relation to the duration of other traffic

stops involving similar circumstances.” Id. As the Eighth

Circuit had not addressed whether “reasonable suspicion of

criminal activity justified detaining Rodriguez beyond

completion of the traffic infraction investigation,” the

Supreme Court remanded the case. Id. at 1616–17.

III.

Applying Rodriguez, we hold that, by conducting an exfelon registration check and a dog sniff, both of which were

unrelated to the traffic violation for which he stopped Evans,

Zirkle “prolonged [the traffic stop] beyond the time

reasonably required to complete” his traffic “mission,” and so

violated the Fourth Amendment, unless there was

independent reasonable suspicion justifying each

prolongation. Id. at 1612 (quotingCaballes, 543 U.S. at 407)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

A.

When stopping an individual for a minor traffic violation,

“an officer’s mission includes ‘ordinary inquiries incident to

[the traffic] stop.’” Id. at 1615 (alteration in original)

(quoting Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408). “[S]uch inquiries

involve checking the driver’s license, determining whether

there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and

inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of

insurance,” as these checks are aimed at “ensuring that

vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly.” Id.

After stopping Evans, Zirkle performed vehicle records

and warrants checks, tasks that are “ordinary inquiries

 Case: 14-10024, 05/20/2015, ID: 9543488, DktEntry: 30-1, Page 14 of 20
UNITED STATES V. EVANS 15

incident to the traffic stop.” Id. (alteration and internal

quotation marks omitted). After completing those record

checks, Zirkle then requested an additional one — an exfelon registration check on Evans, to inquire as to Evans’

criminal history and confirm whether Evans was registered at

the address he provided to Zirkle. A little over eight minutes

after calling in the ex-felon registration check, dispatch

informed Zirkle that Evans had been convicted two times for

“drug-related charges,” and that he was properly registered at

the address he had given Zirkle.

The ex-felon registration check, unlike the vehicle records

or warrants checks, was wholly unrelated to Zirkle’s

“mission” of “ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated

safely and responsibly.” Id. Rather, it was “a measure aimed

at ‘detect[ing] evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.’” 

Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Indianapolis v. Edmond,

531 U.S. 32, 40–41 (2000)). Indeed, Zirkle himself testified

that when he decided to run the various checks, he believed

he had “something more than a simple traffic violation here.” 

That the ex-felon registration check “occur[ed] before . . . the

officer issue[d] a ticket” is immaterial; rather, the “critical

question” is whether the check “prolongs— i.e., adds time to

— the stop.” Id. at 1616 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The ex-felon registration check in this case took

approximately eight minutes; in other words, almost half of

the duration of the pre-dog sniff detention can be attributed to

the dispatch operator’s processing of Evans’ criminal history

and ex-felon registration. During this processing time, Zirkle

continued to pose questions to Evans, many of which had no

relation to the traffic violation or Evans’ prior whereabouts.

Put another way, all “tasks tied to the traffic infraction

[had been] — or reasonably should have been — completed”

 Case: 14-10024, 05/20/2015, ID: 9543488, DktEntry: 30-1, Page 15 of 20
16 UNITED STATES V. EVANS

by the time Zirkle instigated the eight-minute ex-felon

registration check. Id. at 1614. Consequently, Zirkle violated

Evans’ Fourth Amendment rights to be free from

unreasonable seizures when he prolonged the traffic stop to

conduct this task, unless he had independent reasonable

suspicion justifying this prolongation.7

To be sure, Rodriguez recognized that “an officer may

need to take certain negligibly burdensome precautions in

order to complete his mission safely,” as traffic stops can be

“especially fraught with danger to police officers.” 

Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1616 (emphasis added) (internal

quotation marks omitted). But, as discussed, the time it took

to complete the ex-felon registration check here was hardly

negligible; indeed, conducting the check effectively doubled

the length of Evans’ detention. Furthermore, the ex-felon

registration check in no way advanced officer safety. Zirkle

only conducted the ex-felon check after he had told Evans

that he would not be cited for the traffic violation. The check

7 Even before Rodriguez, courts observed that extending traffic stops to

perform criminal history checks may be unlawful. In United States v.

Boyce, 351 F.3d 1102, 1107 (11th Cir. 2003), for example, the officer did

not request a criminal history check “until several minutes after he had

written the warning [for a traffic violation].” Boyce held that “the criminal

history check could not be part ofthe original traffic stop investigation and

could not be the basis for prolonging Boyce’s detention.” Id. The “traffic

violation investigation was complete” before the officer ran the criminal

history check, and, therefore, the defendant “was free to go” unless the

officer had independent reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity. 

Id.; see also United States v. Finke, 85 F.3d 1275, 1280 (7th Cir. 1996)

(rejecting a “bright line rule” permitting a criminal history check as a

“constitutional part of all or most traffic stops . . . because often criminal

history checks take longer to process than the usual license and warrant

requests, and after a certain point meaningful additional time could . . .

constitute an unreasonable detention of the average traveller”).

 Case: 14-10024, 05/20/2015, ID: 9543488, DktEntry: 30-1, Page 16 of 20
UNITED STATES V. EVANS 17

thus was inversely related to officer safety; that is, Zirkle

would have been safer had he let Evans go once he

determined there was no reason to cite him. “[S]afety

precautions taken in order to facilitate” investigation of other

crimes, Rodriguez held, do not relate to an officer’s traffic

mission. Id. Such unrelated “precautions,” which do not

“stem[] from the mission of the stop itself,” therefore cannot

justify extending a traffic stop. Id.8

B.

Rodriguez squarely controls this case in another respect

as well. A “dog sniff,” Rodriguez explained, “is not fairly

characterized as part of the officer’s traffic mission.” Id. at

1615. Consequently, a dog sniff that “‘prolong[s] [the stop]

beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e]

mission’ of issuing a ticket for” the traffic offense, “violates

the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures”

unless the officer had independent reasonable suspicion to

support such a prolongation. Id. at 1612 (third alteration in

original) (quoting Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407).

The dog sniff Rodriguez held unconstitutional was

essentially identical to the one conducted in this case. As did

the officer in Rodriguez, Zirkle stopped Evans for a routine

traffic violation and conducted several traffic-related

8

In his motion to suppress, Evans argued that Zirkle “exceeded the

purpose of the [traffic] stop by . . . continuing to detain [] Evans to run his

criminal history and then to see if he was registered to his current

address.” The district court did not specifically address this prolongation,

however, as it resolved the motion on other grounds. On remand, the

district court may consider whether Zirkle had independent reasonable

suspicion that Evans was an unregistered felon, so as to permit the

extension of the stop to conduct the ex-felon registration check.

 Case: 14-10024, 05/20/2015, ID: 9543488, DktEntry: 30-1, Page 17 of 20
18 UNITED STATES V. EVANS

inquiries. Once he received the results of the ex-felon

registration check, Zirkle gave Evans a warning, shook

Evans’ hand, returned his license and paperwork, and

informed him that “you’re good to go.” As in Rodriguez,

once the warning was issued, Zirkle’s “mission . . . to address

the traffic violation that warranted the stop, and attend to

related safety concerns” was complete. Id. at 1614 (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted). Yet, Zirkle then reinitiated questioning, asking Evans whether contraband was

present in the vehicle. When Evans refused to provide

consent to a search, Zirkle, again as in Rodriguez, told Evans

to wait outside his car until the officers conducted a dog sniff.

“[T]he Government’s endeavor to detect crime in general

or drug trafficking in particular,” Rodriguez held, cannot

justify prolonging an ordinary traffic stop to conduct a canine

narcotics investigation. Id. at 1616. Such “[o]n-scene

investigation into other crimes . . . detours” from an officer’s

traffic mission. Id. Like the ex-felon registration check, the

dog sniff was, under Rodriguez, a task “aimed at detect[ing]

evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing,” rather than an

“ordinary inquir[y] incident to [the traffic] stop.” Id. at 1615

(first and third alterations in original) (internal quotation

marks omitted). Prolonging the traffic stop to perform this

task, without independentreasonable suspicion, was therefore

unlawful.

IV.

We recognize that an officer may prolong a traffic stop if

the prolongation itselfissupported byindependent reasonable

suspicion. See id. at 1615; United States v. Mendez, 476 F.3d

1077, 1080 (9th Cir. 2007). Reasonable suspicion “exists

when an officer is aware of specific, articulable facts which,

 Case: 14-10024, 05/20/2015, ID: 9543488, DktEntry: 30-1, Page 18 of 20
UNITED STATES V. EVANS 19

when considered with objective and reasonable inferences,

form a basis for particularized suspicion.” United States v.

Montero–Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (en

banc). “We review reasonable suspicion determinations de

novo, reviewing findings of historical fact for clear error and

giving ‘due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by

resident judges and local law enforcement officers.’” United

States v. Valdes-Vega, 738 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 2013)

(en banc) (quoting United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952,

968 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc)).

Here, the government argues that, in the course of the

traffic stop, Zirkle developed reasonable suspicion that the

car contained contraband. In particular, it points to the odor

of methamphetamine, McConnell’s nervousness, Evans’

changing story about his travels and prior convictions, and the

information Beard supplied to Zirkle. Evans disputes

whether these facts are supported by the record, and contends

that, even if so, they are insufficient to establish reasonable

suspicion as to the contraband. Evans also argues that, in any

event, there was no reasonable suspicion to justify the eight

minute delay for the ex-felon registration check.

In granting Evans’ motion to suppress, the district court

did not make the “findings of historical fact” and the

“inferences drawn from those facts” critical to resolving the

parties’ dispute concerning reasonable suspicion. Id.

Whether Zirke possessed independent reasonable suspicion

to prolong the detention depends in part on whether the

district court finds the officers’ testimony concerning the

relevant facts credible, and in part on whether the information

the officers had provided reasonable suspicion justifying the

dual delay. We therefore remand to the district court for

consideration in the first instance of whether Zirkle’s

 Case: 14-10024, 05/20/2015, ID: 9543488, DktEntry: 30-1, Page 19 of 20
20 UNITED STATES V. EVANS

prolongation of the traffic stop was supported by independent

reasonable suspicion.

VACATED AND REMANDED.

 Case: 14-10024, 05/20/2015, ID: 9543488, DktEntry: 30-1, Page 20 of 20