Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-09556/USCOURTS-ca10-94-09556-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Interstate Erectors, Inc.
Petitioner
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
Respondent

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FILED Unit~d States Court cf Appca~ 

Te:tth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 2 3 1996 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

INTERSTATE ERECTORS, INC. 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND 

HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION 

and 

ROBERT B. REICH, 

SECRETARY OF LABOR, 

Respondents. 

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PATRICK FISHER C~er!t 

No. 94-9556 

APPEAL FROM THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION 

(OSHRC No. 93-1160) 

Darrel J. Bostwick (Jeffery R. Price with him on the brief), of 

Walstad & Babcock, Salt Lake City, Utah, for the Petitioner. 

Edward o. Falkowski, United States Department of Labor (Thomas S. 

Williamson, Jr., Joseph M. Woodward, Ann Rosenthal, with him on the 

brief), Washington, D.C., for the Respondents. 

Before EBEL and McKAY, Circuit Judges, and COOK, Senior District 

Judge.* 

COOK, Senior District Judge. 

* Honorable H. Dale Cook, Senior United States District 

Judge for the Northern, Eastern and Western Districts of Oklahoma, 

sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 94-9556 Document: 01019287529 Date Filed: 01/23/1996 Page: 1 
Interstate Erectors, Inc. ("Interstate") seeks review of the 

determination of an Occupational Safety and Health Review 

Commission ("the Commission") administrative law judge ("ALJ") that 

Interstate willfully violated two safety standards under the 

Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 u.s.c. §§ 651-678. 

Specifically, Interstate was cited for willful violations of: (1} 

29 C.F.R. § 1926.105(a) 1 for failure to use practical methods to 

protect employees from falling off roof beams to the exterior of a 

building under construction where the workplace was more than 25 

feet above the ground, and (2) 29 C.F.R. § 1926.750(b) 2 for failure 

to either maintain solid decking on the first floor or to provide 

any other form of fall protection for employees working on roof 

beams where the potential fall distance exceeded 25 feet. The ALJ 

1 Section 1926.105(a) provides: 

Safety nets shall be provided when workplaces 

are more than 2 5 feet above the ground or 

water surface, or other surfaces where the use 

of ladders, scaffolds, catch platforms, 

temporary floors, safety lines or safety belts 

is impractical. 

2 Section 1926.750(b) (1) states in pertinent part: 

Temporary flooring skeleton steel construction in 

tiered buildings. 

(1) (i) 

(ii) 

The derrick or erection floor shall be solidly 

planked or decked over its entire surface 

except for access openings. Planking 

shall be laid tight and secured to prevent 

movement. 

On buildings or structures not adaptable to 

temporary floors, and where scaffolds are not 

used, safety nets shall be installed and 

maintained whenever the potential fall 

distance exceeds two stories or 25 feet. 

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Appellate Case: 94-9556 Document: 01019287529 Date Filed: 01/23/1996 Page: 2 
ordered Interstate to pay civil penalties totalling $63,000. The 

ALJ' s decision became a final order of the Commission when the 

Commission denied Interstate's petition for discretionary review. 

29 u.s.c. § 661(j). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 29 

u.s.c. § 660(a). 

The issues raised on appeal concern, 1) whether the 

Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") properly 

interpreted§§ 1926.105(a) and 1926.750(b) to require Interstate to 

employ fall protection devices at all times when practical to do 

so; 2) whether substantial evidence supports the Commission's 

finding that Interstate's violations of §§ 1926.105(a) and 

1926.750(b) were willful; and 3) whether the Commission abused its 

discretion in assessing penalties of $28,000 and $35,000, 

respectively, for the two violations. 

BACKGROUND 

Interstate Erectors, a Utah corporation, is a steel erection 

business owned and operated by Lynn, Robert, and John Clayburn. 

Incorporated in February of 1991, Interstate is the Clayburns' 

third business venture in the construction industry. The Clayburns 

have been engaged in the ironworking business since the early 

1970's, when John formed Clayburn, Inc. 

Clayburn, Inc. became bankrupt and was dissolved in 1984 

following an accident in which an employee was killed in a fall. As 

a result of the accident, Clayburn, Inc. was cited for fall 

protection violations. The company was also cited for similar 

violations on several previous occasions. 

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Appellate Case: 94-9556 Document: 01019287529 Date Filed: 01/23/1996 Page: 3 
Upon the dissolution of Clayburn, Inc., the Clayburns formed 

CCC&T, which was similarly cited several times for fall protection 

violations. Following an incident in 1991 in which an employee 

injured himself in a fall, the Utah Occupational Safety and Health 

Division ("Utah OSH") issued a repeat fall protection citation to 

CCC&T. As part of a settlement agreement with Utah OSH, CCC&T 

arranged to have all its employees, including management, attend a 

training session in May of 1991. Interstate's foreman also 

attended. The training included explanations of OSHA's fall 

protection standards as contained in§§ 1926.105 and 1926.750. The 

need for 100 percent fall protection was also mentioned. 

In November of 1991, a CCC&T employee was involved in a fatal 

fall. In response, OSHA issued a citation alleging that CCC&T 

willfully violated § 1926.105(a). CCC&T entered into a settlement 

agreement, admitting the allegations. CCC&T was assessed a penalty 

of $24,000. CCC&T transferred its assets to Interstate in 1993. 

During meetings with Lynn and Robert Clayburn and Interstate's 

foreman in 1991 and 1992, OSHA explained its position with respect 

to the fall protection rules. OSHA informed the Clayburns that fall 

protection had to be supplied 100 percent of the time at heights 

over 25 feet. OSHA further informed the Clayburns that this 

requirement included employees moving along beams. OSHA 

additionally explained various methods of acceptable fall 

protection. 

On February 9, 1993, OSHA Compliance Officer, David Mahlum, 

visited a construction site where Interstate was erecting steel 

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Appellate Case: 94-9556 Document: 01019287529 Date Filed: 01/23/1996 Page: 4 
framework for a three-story building in Idaho Falls, Idaho. Mahlum 

observed two men working on the structure. The men were in view of 

the foreman. Although the roof was 42 feet above the ground, 

neither employee was secured to a fall protection device. The 

temperature was below freezing, and ice had formed on the beams. 

Mahlum witnessed one employee walking along an interior roof beam 

with no fall protection. 

Mahlum observed open holes beneath the employees in the 

interior of the building. These holes allowed for a 42 foot drop; 

the likely result of such a fall would be death. Mahlum estimated 

that 35 to 40 percent of the floor was uncovered. These holes were 

also in view of the foreman. 

The employees stated that the foreman told them to 11 coon" 3 the 

beams when moving about on the steel and tie off with a lanyard 

when they arrived at a stationary point. Mahlum testified that a 

catenary line, which was available at the site, would have provided 

adequate fall protection. Although the catenary line was feasible 

to install, the foreman concluded that the line was not necessary. 

The catenary line was, however, installed the day after the 

inspection, and the holes were covered. 

Lynn Clayburn testified that he knew of OSHA's interpretation 

of the fall protection standards and understood that OSHA requires 

100 percent fall protection for employees working at heights over 

25 feet. Clayburn stated, however, that since the standards do not 

3 To "coon" an I-beam is to walk on its lower flange with the 

upper flange between the legs. 

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specifically require 100 percent fall protection, he believed that 

OSHA's interpretation was incorrect. Clayburn further testified 

that the catenary line was not installed at the Idaho Falls site 

because he believed that belts and lanyards were adequate for 

stationary work, and alternative methods, such as "cooning," 

provided sufficient protection when moving about the beams. 

OSHA originally issued seven citations to Interstate as a 

result of Mahlum's inspection. Five of the citations were settled 

by the parties. The two remaining citations alleged that Interstate 

willfully violated 29 C.F.R. § 1926.105(a) by failing to protect 

employees from exterior falls of more than 25 feet from the roof 

framework of a building under construction, and that it willfully 

violated 29 C.F.R. § 1926.750(b) (1) by failing to protect employees 

from falls into the interior of the building. OSHA proposed maximum 

penalties of $70,000 per violation, for a total of $140,000. 

Interstate contested the citation, and a hearing was held before 

the ALJ in February of 1994. 

In a decision rendered in May of 1994, the ALJ found that 

Interstate violated § 1926.105(a) by allowing an employee to be 

exposed to a fall of more than 25 feet "while accessing his work 

area on an exterior beam." The judge held that the Secretary could 

prove a prima facia case under the standard by demonstrating that 

safety belts and lanyards were not used where practical. 

The ALJ additionally found that Interstate violated 

§ 1926.750(b) (1) because both of Interstate's employees at the 

Idaho Falls job site were allowed to work directly above large 

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Appellate Case: 94-9556 Document: 01019287529 Date Filed: 01/23/1996 Page: 6 
holes, thereby exposing them to a drop of 42 feet. The judge found 

that such holes were not "access openings" within the meaning of 

the standard, as they "clearly exceeded" that particular exception. 

The ALJ further concluded that Interstate willfully violated 

§ 1926.105{a). The judge found that although Interstate's 

management knew that OSHA took the position that 100 percent fall 

protection is required at heights over 25 feet, Interstate chose to 

substitute its own judgement as to the requirements of the 

standard. The judge also found that Interstate willfully violated 

§ 1926.750(b) {1) because Interstate evinced a complete lack of 

concern that its conduct violated OSHA's fall protection standards. 

The ALJ thus affirmed both citation items, but reduced the 

total amount of the proposed penalties to $28,000 and $35,000, for 

a total of $63,000, citing OSHA's failure to take into account all 

of the pertinent factors as required under the Act. Specifically, 

the judge determined that the size of Interstate's business 

warranted the imposition of a lesser penalty. 

DISCUSSION 

With respect to our standard of review, 29 u.s.c. § 660{a) 

mandates that the "findings of the Commission with respect to 

questions of fact, if supported by substantial evidence on the 

record considered as a whole, shall be conclusive." Additionally, 

the Commission's legal conclusions will generally be upheld if 

found not to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or 

otherwise not in accordance with law. 5 u.s.c § 706(2) {A). 

Likewise, OSHA's interpretations of its regulations are entitled to 

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Appellate Case: 94-9556 Document: 01019287529 Date Filed: 01/23/1996 Page: 7 
deference. Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 

499 u.s. 144, 111 s.ct. 1111 {1991). 

The essence of Interstate's petition centers upon whether 

Interstate can comply with § 1926.105(a) by having its employees 

use one of the specified fall protection methods only a portion of 

the time that such use is practical. Interstate maintains that use 

of fall devices for a substantial portion of the workday satisfies 

the above standards and that use of such devices during 100 percent 

of the time that it is practical to do so is not required under the 

law. We find Interstate's contentions on this point to be without 

merit. 

In Southern Colorado Prestress v. OSHRC, 586 F.2d 1342 {lOth 

Cir. 1978), this Court was called upon to determine whether an 

employer violates § 1926.105{a) by failing to employ safety nets 

when other means of fall protection are not utilized. We held that, 

regardless of the practicality of other devices, the standard 

requires the use of safety nets when other devices are not used. 

Interstate contends that Southern Colorado Prestress stands 

for the proposition that if no fall protection device is used at 

all during the workday, then a violation of the fall protection 

standards has occurred. Interstate maintains, however, that it is 

perfectly consistent with our decision in Southern Colorado 

Prestress to require OSHA to prove that construction workers are 

not secured to a fall protection device during a substantial 

portion of the workday before a violation of the standards may be 

found. 

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Appellate Case: 94-9556 Document: 01019287529 Date Filed: 01/23/1996 Page: 8 
Interstate misconstrues the necessary implication of Southern 

Colorado Prestress. In deciding that the employer violated 

§ 1926.105(a) because its employees were not using any form of fall 

protection whatsoever, so that nets were required, we said, 

it (is] only reasonable that [§ 1926.105(a)] 

contemplates that one of the listed safety 

devices will be used when the described danger 

of height is involved .... From this premise 

the standard is simply laying down the 

requirement of one designated safety device -

nets - if others are impractical and therefore 

not used. Furthermore, the standard is not 

intended to point out escape routes by which 

no device need be used if one of the 

alternative devices can be shown to be 

practical even though not in fact used. 

(emphasis in original). Id. at 1350. 

The clear implication and logical extension of our reasoning in 

Southern Colorado Prestress is that the standard requires an 

employer to use one of the listed safety devices at all times when 

employees are exposed to heights above 25 feet. When we said that 

the standard "contemplates that one of the listed safety devices 

will be used when the described danger of height is involved," we 

did not qualify this to mean that the standard only requires 

employers to utilize fall protection devices during a substantial 

portion of the day, while permitting employees to be exposed to 

fall hazards during other times. To add such a qualification would 

serve to warp the plain language of Southern Colorado Prestress. 

Interstate places great reliance upon L.R. Willson & Sons, 

Inc. v. Donovan, 685 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Willson I), as 

support for its argument that the use of protection devices during 

a substantial portion of the workday is sufficient to satisfy the 

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standard. The court in Willson I held that OSHA bears the burden of 

proving that the use of safety belts and lanyards are impractical 

so that safety nets are required. The court went on to hold that in 

order to meet that burden, OSHA must prove that employees cannot 

use their belts and lanyards during a substantial portion of the 

workday. Id. at 677. 

Interstate misapprehends Willson I. The court in Willson I was 

faced with the issue of construing the term "impractical" as it is 

used in § 1926.105 (a). Since the court found the term to be 

ambiguous, it developed the "substantial portion of the workday" 

test for the sole purpose of determining when a particular safety 

device becomes "impractical," thereby necessitating the 

installation of safety nets or other fall protection devices. Id. 

at 675. Hence, the "substantial portion of the workday" test only 

addresses the limited issue of whether a particular safety device 

is practical. Notwithstanding Interstate's broad interpretation of 

Willson I, the test does not provide a shield to an employer who 

fails to use fall protection devices when such devices are, in 

fact, practical, even if employees are protected most of the day. 

Indeed, the D.C. Circuit held in Century Steel Erectors, Inc. 

v. Dole, 888 F.2d 1399, 1402-03 (D.C. Cir. 1989), that OSHA may 

establish a prima facia case under § 1926.105(a) by showing that 

safety belts were not used where practical. The substantial portion 

of the workday test was held not to apply in Century because the 

use of safety devices was found to be practical on the occasions 

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that they were not used. Id. at 1404. Thus, Interstate's reliance 

on Wilson I is misplaced. 

Interstate also places some reliance on Secretary of Labor v. 

Falcon Steel Co., Inc., 16 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1179 (1993), as 

further support for its argument. In particular, Interstate cites 

the suggestion in Falcon Steel that a "fair statement of industry 

practice and custom on safety belts . is that ironworkers move 

freely about enroute from one location to another, but that they 

tie off when stationary." Id. at 1193. The ALJ, however, correctly 

noted that where the practicality of a safety device is clearly 

demonstrated in a given case, industry practice is irrelevant. 

Interstate also contends that "cooning" the beams was an 

adequate fall protection method, which satisfied the standard. As 

the ALJ found, "cooning" is not enumerated in the standard as an 

approved method of fall protection. Thus, we agree with the ALJ 

that Interstate may not implement an alternative measure of 

protection in place of those specified. 

Interstate admits that§ 1926.105(a) is applicable to exterior 

falls to which its employees may have been exposed at its Idaho 

Falls worksite. The evidence presented at the hearing clearly shows 

that one of Interstate's employees was in fact exposed to a fall 

hazard while on an exterior beam. Interstate does not dispute the 

fact that the use of approved safety devices was practical 

throughout the workday. The ALJ found that the use of a "catenary 

line on the structure's perimeter was practical, in that such a 

line was available, feasible, and was installed the day following 

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the OSHA inspection." The ALJ further found that " [ i] nstallation of 

a catenary line would have afforded ironworkers a means of tying 

off while moving about the steel, thus providing 100% fall 

protection." 

OSHA interprets § 1926.105(a) to require the use of 

appropriate safety devices 100 percent of the time that such use is 

practical. OSHA therefore maintains that an employer violates 

§ 1926.105(a) by failing to use appropriate safety devices at any 

time it is practical to do so. The ALJ determined that the 

Secretary's interpretation of the standard is the only reasonable 

interpretation. We will not disturb the ALJ' s findings in this 

matter. We therefore foreclose any perceived ambiguity contained in 

Southern Colorado Prestress and hold that the failure to provide 

approved fall protection devices during all times in which the 

described danger of height is involved constitutes a violation of 

§ 1926.105(a), unless the defenses of "impossibility" or "greater 

hazard" are established. 4 

With respect to the citation issued pursuant to§ 1926.750(b), 

Interstate apparently asserts the same defense as it did in 

response to the§ 1926.105(a) violation. That is, Interstate places 

great reliance upon the substantial portion of the workday test by 

arguing that OSHA failed to establish that Interstate's employees 

were not protected during a substantial portion of the workday. 

Again, Interstate misconstrues the substantial portion of the 

4 For a discussion concerning the defenses of "impossibility" 

and "greater hazard," see Southern Colorado Prestress, 586 F.2d at 

1351. 

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workday test to mean something which was never intended. It is 

therefore clear that Interstate's argument is wholly unsupported, 

and its contentions can be quickly dismissed. 

Sections 1926.750(b) and 1926.105(a) are not identical 

standards and cannot therefore be interpreted in a like manner. 

Without qualification, § 1926.750(b) (1) requires certain fall 

protection measures to be employed. Specifically, solid decking 

must be installed within two floors below a work area. On 

structures not adaptable to temporary floors, the employer must 

install either scaffolds or safety nets whenever employees work at 

heights over 25 feet. Moreover, since § 1926.750 (b) does not 

mention the term "impractical," the substantial portion of the 

workday test cannot apply to that standard. As noted above, the 

substantial portion of the workday test was developed for the sole 

purpose of determining the point at which a particular fall 

protection device becomes "impractical," as that word is used in 

§ 1926.105(a). Hence, that particular test is germane only to a 

§ 1926.105(a) inquiry. Additionally, whereas§ 1926.105(a) applies 

to exterior fall protection, § 1926.750(b) is designed to protect 

against interior falls. See, e.g. , Willson I ( § 1926. 750 (b) ( 1) 

specifies only measures for interior fall protection while § 

1926.105(a) provides the only standard for exterior fall 

protection) . 

The record shows that two Interstate employees were allowed to 

"coon" the beams directly above large holes in the uncompleted 

first floor decking, thereby exposing themselves to interior fall 

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hazards of 42 feet. Further, the employees and the openings were in 

plain view of the foreman. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ's 

finding that these holes "clearly exceeded" the exception provided 

for access openings. Since the record indicates that none of the 

required fall protection measures were in place, we will not 

disturb the ALJ' s determination that Interstate violated 

§ 1926.750(b)(l)(ii). 

The ALJ additionally found that Interstate ''willfully" 

violated the above standards, thus allowing for the imposition of 

greater penalties. In defining behavior which rises to the level of 

willfulness, we have said that, 

The failure to comply with a safety standard 

under the Occupational Safety and Health Act 

is willful if done knowingly and purposely by 

an employer who, having a free will or choice, 

either intentionally disregards the standard 

or is plainly indifferent to its requirement. 

An omission or failure to act is willfully 

done if done voluntarily and intentionally. 

Kent Nowlin Const. Co. v. OSHRC, 593 F.2d 368, 372 (lOth Cir. 1979) 

(quoting United States v. Dye Const. Co., 510 F.2d 78 (lOth cir. 

1975)). 

Interstate contends that even if violations occurred, such 

violations were "serious" at most. Interstate points to 

commendations received from Utah OSH in recognition of Interstate's 

compliance with safety regulations, including fall protection 

requirements. Interstate further maintains that employees had 

safety belts and lanyards and were instructed to use them whenever 

practical; the employees only untied when moving between work 

points. Additionally, Interstate claims that the ALJ made no 

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finding of a repeat violation, and that this case does not 

demonstrate disregard or indifference to the safety of employees. 

Finally, Interstate argues that the standards at issue were 

ambiguous, and therefore Interstate properly relied upon industry 

practice of not requiring 100 percent fall protection. 

The record indicates that Interstate's management was told 

numerous times by OSHA officials that fall protection is required 

whenever practical. Furthermore, the record reveals that these same 

managers of Interstate had been cited by OSHA in the past for 

failure to maintain adequate fall protection measures, and that 

fatal accidents resulted from such violations. The fact that such 

citations and reprimands were made upon companies other than 

Interstate and that Interstate previously had a "stellar" record is 

immaterial in this case, since the managers and officers of 

Interstate were on notice of OSHA's interpretation of the standards 

at issue. Although it is true that the ALJ made no finding of a 

repeat violation committed by Interstate, such a showing is not 

required to demonstrate willfulness. In any event, it is apparent 

from the record that the officers and managers of Interstate are 

indeed personally guilty of repeat violations of OSHA's fall 

protection standards. 

The record shows that Interstate's management was amply aware 

of OSHA's interpretation of the safety standards, requiring 100 

percent fall protection at heights over 25 feet. Interstate, 

however, elected to adopt its own interpretation of the standards, 

thereby leaving its employees exposed to fall hazards while moving 

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• along the beams. In light of Interstate's previous dealings with 

OSHA on matters similar to the ones surrounding this case, we 

cannot accept Interstate's argument that it placed a good faith 

reliance on its own reasonable interpretation of an otherwise 

ambiguous standard. We therefore uphold the ALJ's determination 

that Interstate's blatant and continual disregard of OSHA's 

requirements constitutes a willful violation of the regulations at 

issue. 

We turn finally to the issue of the civil penalties imposed 

upon Interstate. It is well settled that the assessment of 

penal ties is within the sound discretion of the administrative 

agency. This Court will not therefore disturb the sanctions imposed 

by an agency unless the punishment exceeds the range of sanctions 

permitted by law, or the penalty is so harsh that it amounts to an 

abuse of discretion. Giesler v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 686 

F.2d 844, 849 (lOth Cir. 1982} (citing Boyce v. United States, 211 

Ct.Cl. 57, 543 F.2d 1290, 1292 (1976)). The relevant statute is 29 

u.s.c. § 666(a), which reads: 

Any employer who willfully or repeatedly 

violates the requirements of section 654 of 

this title, any standard, rule, or order 

promulgated pursuant to section 655 of this 

title, or regulations prescribed pursuant to 

this chapter, may be assessed a civil penalty 

of not more than $70,000 for each violation, 

but not less than $5, 000 for each willful 

violation. 

Furthermore the "Commission shall have authority to assess all 

civil penalties provided in this section, giving due consideration 

to . . . the size of the business of the employer being charged, 

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• the gravity of the violation, the good faith of the employer, and 

the history of previous violations." 29 u.s.c. § 666(j). 

Given the history of personal noncompliance by the managers 

and officers of Interstate, we do not believe that the ALJ abused 

his discretion in assessing a total of $63,000 in penalties for the 

two violations. Indeed, previous sanctions do not appear to have 

deterred Interstate's management from repeating prior violations of 

the fall protection standards. 

The penalties imposed by the ALJ clearly do not exceed the 

range of sanctions permitted by law, nor are they excessive. The 

ALJ had the authority to impose a penalty of $70,000 for each 

violation. After careful consideration, however, the ALJ determined 

that a lesser penalty would be appropriate in the instant case. We 

cannot find error in the ALJ's decision, and we therefore conclude 

that the sanctions imposed were proper and well within the 

discretion of the ALJ. 

AFFIRMED 

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