Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-14-05157/USCOURTS-caDC-14-05157-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals
Appellant
United States Department of Agriculture
Appellee
Thomas J. Vilsack
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 14, 2015 Decided August 11, 2015

No. 14-5157

PEOPLE FOR THE ETHICAL TREATMENT OF ANIMALS,

APPELLANT

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND 

THOMAS J. VILSACK, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS 

SECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 

AGRICULTURE,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:13-cv-00976)

Matthew D. Strugar argued the cause for the appellant. 

Jeffrey S. Kerr and Delcianna Winders were with him on 

brief.

William E. Havemann, Attorney, United States 

Department of Justice, argued the cause for the appellees. 

Ronald C. Machen, United States Attorney at the time brief 

was filed, and Michael J. Singer, Attorney, were with him on 

brief.

USCA Case #14-5157 Document #1567172 Filed: 08/11/2015 Page 1 of 36
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Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, and HENDERSON and 

MILLETT, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

Dubitante opinion filed by Circuit Judge MILLETT.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: In 2004, 

the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA or 

Agency) announced that, for the first time, it intended to 

apply the protections of the Animal Welfare Act (AWA or

Act), 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131 et seq., to birds. Although the Agency 

has taken steps to craft avian-specific animal welfare 

regulations, it has yet to complete its task after more than ten 

years and, during the intervening time, it has allegedly not 

applied the Act’s general animal welfare regulations to birds. 

Frustrated with the delay, People for the Ethical Treatment of 

Animals (PETA) sued the USDA, arguing that its inaction 

amounted to agency action “unlawfully withheld,” in 

violation of section 706(1) of the Administrative Procedure 

Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). The district court granted the 

USDA’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the USDA’s 

enforcement decisions are committed by law to its discretion. 

See id. § 701(a)(2). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm

on different grounds. 

I. BACKGROUND

In 1966, the Congress enacted the AWA to, inter alia,

“insure that animals intended for use in research facilities or 

for exhibition purposes or for use as pets are provided humane 

care and treatment” and “to assure the humane treatment of 

animals during transportation in commerce.” 7 U.S.C. 

§ 2131(1)–(2). To effect these goals, the Congress instructed 

the USDA to “promulgate standards to govern the humane 

handling, care, treatment, and transportation of animals by 

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dealers, research facilities, and exhibitors.” Id. § 2143(a)(1). 

For some animals, the USDA is required by statute to 

promulgate species-specific regulations, see id. 

§ 2143(a)(2)(B) (dogs and primates), and it retains the 

discretion to promulgate species-specific regulations for other 

covered animals, see id. § 2151. It has done so for, inter alia, 

hamsters, guinea pigs, rabbits and marine mammals. See 9 

C.F.R. §§ 3.25–3.28; 3.50–3.53; 3.100–3.104. All other 

animals benefit from the protection of the AWA’s general 

animal welfare regulations, which establish “minimum 

requirements” for “handling, housing, feeding, watering, 

sanitation, ventilation, shelter from extremes of weather and 

temperatures, adequate veterinary care, and separation by 

species.” 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(2)(A); see 9 C.F.R. §§ 3.125–

3.128.

Compliance with the Act and with the USDA’s 

implementing regulations is accomplished through the Act’s 

licensure, inspection and investigation requirements. Its

predicate licensure requirement provides that animal 

“dealer[s]” and “exhibitor[s]” must “obtain[] a license” from 

the USDA before they “buy, sell, offer to buy or sell, 

transport or offer for transportation” any “animal.” 7 U.S.C. 

§ 2134. Upon receiving an application for licensure from a 

dealer or exhibitor, the USDA issues a license “in such form 

and manner as [it] may prescribe.” Id. § 2133. The Act also 

allows the USDA to unearth violations of the Act by 

“mak[ing] such investigations or inspections as [it] deems 

necessary.” Id. § 2146(a) (emphasis added). It has 

promulgated regulations providing that, before obtaining a 

license, “[e]ach applicant must demonstrate that his or her 

premises and any animals, facilities, vehicles, equipment, or 

other premises used or intended for use in the business 

comply with the regulations and standards” set by the USDA 

and “must make his or her animals, premises, facilities, 

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vehicles, equipment, other premises, and records available for 

inspection . . . to ascertain the applicant’s compliance with the 

standards and regulations.” 9 C.F.R. § 2.3(a).

Although seemingly broad, the Act’s scope turns on the 

USDA’s definition of “animal.” 7 U.S.C. § 2132(g). When 

first enacted, the AWA protected only “dogs, cats, monkeys 

(nonhuman primate mammals), guinea pigs, hamsters, and 

rabbits.” See Pub. L. No. 89-544, § 2(h), 80 Stat. 350, 351 

(1966). For years, the USDA excluded birds from the Act’s 

protection. See USDA, Miscellaneous Amendments to 

Chapter, 36 Fed. Reg. 24,917, 24,919 (Dec. 24, 1971).

Their status changed in 2002, when the Congress 

amended the AWA’s definition of “animal” to exclude “birds 

. . . bred for use in research.” 7 U.S.C. § 2132(g). 

Interpreting the Congress’s exclusion of research avians to 

mean the inclusion of all other birds, the USDA updated its 

regulations on June 4, 2004, to make explicit that birds would 

thenceforth benefit from the Act’s protections. Animal 

Welfare; Definition of Animal, 69 Fed. Reg. 31,513, 31,513 

(June 4, 2004); see also 9 C.F.R. § 1.1. On the same day it 

announced that it would apply the Act to birds not bred for 

use in research, however, the USDA announced that it “d[id]

not believe that the general standards” under the AWA, which 

were promulgated with an eye toward mammalian care, were 

appropriate for birds. See Animal Welfare; Regulations and 

Standards for Birds, Rats, and Mice, 69 Fed. Reg. 31,537, 

31,539 (June 4, 2004). The USDA issued an Advance Notice 

of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) for avian-specific animal 

welfare regulations. Id.

In the ensuing notice-and-comment period, the USDA 

received over 7,000 comments from a wide range of sources. 

Based on the comments, the USDA consulted with 

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veterinarians, economists, industry members, related 

government agencies and others to develop a set of avianspecific regulations. It also assigned the Animal and Plant 

Health Inspection Service (APHIS)—the USDA sub-agency 

that administers the AWA—to assist with the process. The 

APHIS then hired an avian health-and-welfare expert to help

it accomplish its task.

Despite these efforts, the USDA “has repeatedly set, 

missed, and then rescheduled deadlines for the publication of 

proposed bird-specific regulations.” PETA v. USDA (PETA 

I), 7 F. Supp. 3d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2013). During this time, the 

USDA has allegedly not applied the AWA’s licensure and 

inspection provisions or the general animal welfare 

regulations to birds, although it has informally visited 

facilities accused of avian mistreatment. There is apparently 

some confusion at the Agency about whether the AWA 

applies to birds at all. Despite its regulatory pronouncement 

that birds are AWA-regulated animals, see Animal Welfare; 

Definition of Animal, 69 Fed. Reg. at 31,513, the USDA has 

responded to some bird-related complaints by insisting that 

birds are not regulated under the AWA and do not fall within 

the jurisdiction of the USDA. Indeed, the USDA responded 

to a Freedom of Information Act request by stating that 

“[a]gency employees conducted a thorough search of their 

files and advised our office that birds are not being 

regulated.” PETA I, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 6.

Frustrated by these representations and by reports of birdrelated abuse and neglect, PETA sued the USDA on June 27, 

2013, invoking section 706(1) of the APA and requesting the 

district court to compel the USDA to take two actions it has 

allegedly “unlawfully withheld,” 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). PETA 

asked the court to “compel[] the USDA to . . . publish for 

public comment in the Federal Register, by a Court-ordered 

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deadline, proposed rule(s) specific to birds” and then 

“promulgate, by a Court-ordered deadline, standards specific 

to birds.” Compl. 7. Second, PETA requested the court to 

order the USDA to “immediately extend enforcement of the 

AWA to birds covered by the AWA, by enforcing the general 

AWA standards that presently exist.”1 The USDA responded 

with a motion to dismiss (or in the alternative, for summary 

judgment), arguing, first, that PETA lacked standing and,

second, that PETA failed to state a claim because the AWA 

leaves enforcement decisions to the USDA’s non-justiciable 

discretion.

The district court rejected the USDA’s standing 

argument. Recognizing that “an organizational plaintiff such 

as PETA [can] sue in its own right,” PETA I, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 

7, the district court found that PETA suffered two cognizable 

injuries. First, unless the USDA applied the AWA’s 

protections to birds, PETA could not redress bird 

mistreatment by filing complaints with the USDA and, as a 

result, PETA had to expend resources to seek relief through 

other, less efficient and effective means. Second, the USDA’s 

failure to protect birds meant, ipso facto, that the USDA was 

not creating bird-related inspection reports that PETA could

use to raise public awareness. Finding that “[t]hese are real, 

concrete obstacles to PETA’s work,” id., the district court also 

concluded that PETA had demonstrated the requisite 

causation and redressability, id. at 9.

 1

 The district court denied PETA’s requested mandatory 

injunctive relief requiring the USDA to promulgate bird-specific 

AWA regulations. See PETA I, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 13–15. PETA has 

abandoned that argument on appeal. 

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The district court nonetheless dismissed PETA’s suit, 

concluding that PETA failed to state a claim because

“individual decisions by USDA not to enforce the AWA with 

respect to particular avian incidents . . . are unreviewable [as] 

‘committed to agency discretion by law.’ ” Id. at 13 (quoting

5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)). It rejected PETA’s arguments that the 

AWA sufficiently constrained the USDA’s discretion to make

its enforcement decisions justiciable and that the USDA’s 

alleged policy of non-enforcement, under D.C. Circuit law, 

could be challenged in court. Regarding the former, the court 

reasoned that the AWA gave the USDA broad discretion to 

conduct “investigations or inspections as [it] deems 

necessary.” Id. at 11 (emphasis in original). On the latter, the 

court faulted PETA’s failure to “identify any concrete 

statement from USDA announcing a general policy not to 

regulate birds under the AWA” and credited the USDA’s

“expressed . . . official position on the matter” in its

“regulations bringing birds under the scope of the AWA.” Id. 

at 12 (quotation marks omitted).

2

 PETA moved for

reconsideration or, in the alternative, to amend its complaint,

both of which motions the district court denied. PETA then 

filed a timely notice of appeal. 

II. ANALYSIS

We review the district court’s dismissal de novo, 

“treat[ing] the complaint’s factual allegations as true and . . . 

grant[ing] [PETA] the benefit of all inferences that can be 

 2

 The district court did, however, comment that the “USDA 

would . . . be well advised to educate its officials on the agency’s 

policy regarding birds—namely, that birds are regulated by the 

AWA and do fall under the agency’s enforcement jurisdiction—and 

to ensure that they break their bad habit of misinforming the public 

on this matter.” PETA I, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 12 (emphases in original).

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derived from the facts alleged.” Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on 

Foreign Inv. in U.S., 758 F.3d 296, 314–15 (D.C. Cir. 2014)

(some alteration in original). We need not, however, accept 

the truth of “a legal conclusion couched as a factual 

allegation.” Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 193 (D.C. Cir. 

2006). To avoid dismissal, PETA must plead “sufficient 

factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on 

its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 

(2007)).

PETA has not alleged that the USDA’s delay in enforcing 

the AWA with regard to birds is arbitrary and capricious, in 

violation of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). See Compl. 6–7. And on 

appeal, PETA has abandoned its effort to require the USDA 

to promulgate bird-specific regulations, see Appellant’s 

Br. 25; Oral Arg. Recording 14:22–15:50, and does not 

pursue the allegation made in its complaint that the USDA 

“unreasonably delayed” enforcement of its general animal 

welfare regulations with regard to birds, in violation of 

section 706(1) of the APA, see Reply Br. 32–33. The only 

question before us, then, is whether PETA’s complaint states 

a claim that the USDA’s alleged policy of not enforcing the 

general regulations with respect to birds—without regard to 

the reasonableness vel non of the delay in enforcement—

constitutes agency action “unlawfully withheld,” in violation 

of section 706(1) of the APA. Before reaching that question, 

however, we must first address PETA’s standing to press its 

claim. See CTS Corp. v. EPA, 759 F.3d 52, 57 (D.C. Cir. 

2014) (“as a matter of constitutional duty,” court “must assure 

itself of its jurisdiction to act in every case”).

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A. STANDING

As an organization, PETA “can assert standing on its 

own behalf, on behalf of its members or both.” Equal Rights 

Ctr. v. Post Props., Inc., 633 F.3d 1136, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 

2011). Here, PETA asserts “organizational standing” only, 

“which requires it, like an individual plaintiff, to show ‘actual 

or threatened injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the 

alleged illegal action and likely to be redressed by a favorable 

court decision.’ ” Id. (quoting Spann v. Colonial Vill., Inc., 

899 F.2d 24, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1990)); see also Havens Realty 

Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 378–79 (1982) (in 

organizational-standing case, courts “conduct the same 

inquiry as in the case of an individual: Has the plaintiff 

alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the 

controversy as to warrant his invocation of federal-court 

jurisdiction?” (quotation marks omitted)). The key issue is 

whether PETA has suffered a “concrete and demonstrable 

injury to [its] activities,” mindful that, under our precedent, “a 

mere setback to [PETA’s] abstract social interests is not 

sufficient.” Equal Rights Ctr., 633 F.3d at 1138 (quotation 

marks omitted); see also Am. Legal Found. v. FCC, 808 F.2d 

84, 92 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“The organization must allege that 

discrete programmatic concerns are being directly and 

adversely affected by the defendant’s actions.”).3

 3

 On appeal, the USDA does not argue that PETA failed to 

demonstrate the causation and redressability prongs of standing. 

Because we have an independent obligation to satisfy ourselves that 

PETA has Article III standing, we must consider causation and 

redressability sua sponte and, having done so, agree with the 

district court that “the injuries complained of—USDA’s refusal to 

take enforcement action in response to PETA’s complaints and 

USDA’s failure to compile the information PETA wants to use in 

its educational materials—are caused by the agency” and “the 

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The United States Supreme Court has made plain that a 

“concrete and demonstrable injury to [an] organization’s 

activities—with the consequent drain on the organization’s 

resources—constitutes far more than simply a setback to the 

organization’s abstract social interests” and thus suffices for 

standing. Havens Realty Corp., 455 U.S. at 379. We, in turn, 

have elaborated as to when an organization’s purported injury 

is not sufficiently concrete and demonstrable to invoke our

jurisdiction. For example, “an organization’s diversion of 

resources to litigation or to investigation in anticipation of 

litigation is considered a ‘self-inflicted’ budgetary choice that 

cannot qualify as an injury in fact for purposes of standing.” 

Am. Soc. for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Feld Entm’t, 

Inc., 659 F.3d 13, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2011); see also Nat’l 

Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1428, 1434 

(D.C. Cir. 1995) (“An organization cannot, of course, 

manufacture the injury necessary to maintain a suit from its 

expenditure of resources on that very suit.”). “Nor is standing 

found when the only ‘injury’ arises from the effect of the 

regulations on the organizations’ lobbying activities,” Ams. 

for Safe Access v. DEA, 706 F.3d 438, 457 (D.C. Cir.)

(quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 267 

(2013), and cert. denied sub nom. Olsen v. Drug Enforcement 

Admin., 134 S. Ct. 673 (2013), or when the “ ‘service’ 

impaired is pure issue-advocacy,” Ctr. for Law & Educ. v. 

Dep’t of Educ., 396 F.3d 1152, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 2005).

4

 To 

 

remedies sought—an order compelling USDA to enforce the AWA 

with respect to birds . . .—would redress those injuries.” PETA I, 7 

F. Supp. 3d at 9. 

4

 But see Am. Soc. for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 659 

F.3d at 27 (“[M]any of our cases finding Havens standing involved 

activities that could just as easily be characterized as advocacy—

and, indeed, sometimes are.”).

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determine whether an organization’s injury is “concrete and 

demonstrable” or merely a “setback” to its “abstract social 

interests,” Havens Realty Corp., 455 U.S. at 379, we ask, first, 

whether the agency’s action or omission to act “injured the 

[organization’s] interest” and, second, whether the 

organization “used its resources to counteract that harm.” 

Equal Rights Ctr., 633 F.3d at 1140.

PETA’s mission is to prevent “cruelty and inhumane 

treatment of animals.” Compl. ¶ 5. It accomplishes this goal 

through “public education, cruelty investigations, research, 

animal rescue, legislation, special events, celebrity 

involvement, and protest campaigns.” Id. One of the 

“primary” ways in which PETA accomplishes its mission is 

“educating the public” by providing “information about the 

conditions of animals held by particular exhibitors.” Jeffrey 

S. Kerr Decl. ¶ 16 (Kerr Decl.). As the district court

explained, the USDA’s refusal to apply the AWA to birds 

“perceptibly impaired” PETA’s mission in two respects: it 

“precluded PETA from preventing cruelty to and inhumane 

treatment of these animals through its normal process of 

submitting USDA complaints” and it “deprived PETA of key 

information that it relies on to educate the public.” PETA I, 7 

F. Supp. 3d at 8 (alterations omitted). 

We agree that PETA has, at the dismissal stage,5

adequately shown that the USDA’s inaction injured its 

interests and, consequently, PETA has expended resources to 

counteract those injuries. Indeed, PETA’s alleged injuries are 

 5

 See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental 

Drugs v. Eschenbach, 469 F.3d 129, 132 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“At 

each stage of trial, the party invoking the court’s jurisdiction must 

establish the predicates for standing with the manner and degree of 

evidence required at that stage of trial.” (quotation marks omitted)). 

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materially indistinguishable from those alleged by the 

organizations in Action Alliance of Senior Citizens of Greater 

Philadelphia v. Heckler, 789 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1986). In 

that case, “four organizations that endeavor[ed], through 

informational, counseling, referral, and other services, to 

improve the lives of elderly citizens” sued the Secretary of the 

United States Department of Health and Human Services 

(HHS) because it had, inter alia, promulgated HHS-specific 

regulations that were allegedly inconsistent with 

“government-wide regulations” that “afford[ed] interested 

individuals and organizations a generous flow of information 

regarding services available to the elderly.” Id. at 935–37. 

According to the organizations, “the HHS-specific regulations 

. . . significantly restrict[ed] that flow.” Id. at 937. We 

reversed the district court’s dismissal for lack of standing, 

concluding that the plaintiffs had pleaded “the same type of 

injury as the plaintiffs in Havens Realty: the challenged 

regulations den[ied] the [plaintiffs] access to information and 

avenues of redress they wish to use in their routine 

information-dispensing, counseling, and referral activities.” 

Id. at 937–38. We held that, “[u]nlike the mere interest in a 

problem or [an] ideological injury,” the plaintiffs had “alleged 

inhibition of their daily operations, an injury both concrete 

and specific to the work in which they are engaged.” Id. at 

938 (quotation marks and citations omitted). 

So too here. Because PETA’s alleged injuries—denial of 

access to bird-related AWA information including, in 

particular, investigatory information, and a means by which to 

seek redress for bird abuse—are “concrete and specific to the 

work in which they are engaged,” id., we find that PETA has 

alleged a cognizable injury sufficient to support standing. In 

other words, the USDA’s allegedly unlawful failure to apply 

the AWA’s general animal welfare regulations to birds has 

“perceptibly impaired [PETA’s] ability” to both bring AWA 

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violations to the attention of the agency charged with 

preventing avian cruelty and continue to educate the public. 

See Am. Soc. for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 659 F.3d 

at 25. Because PETA has expended resources to counter 

these injuries, it has established Article III organizational 

standing.

The USDA makes two responses, neither of which we 

find persuasive. First, it argues that it is not “at loggerheads” 

with PETA’s mission of preventing cruelty to animals. 

Appellee’s Br. 17–18. It so contends because the USDA does 

not in fact mistreat animals nor do its actions directly result in 

the mistreatment of animals. The USDA, however,

misconstrues PETA’s alleged harms; they do not result from 

the mistreatment of birds by third parties but rather from “a 

lack of redress for its complaints and a lack of information for 

its membership,” both of which, PETA asserts, the USDA 

would provide if it complied with its legal obligations. See

PETA I, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 9. Moreover, although we have 

emphasized the need for “a direct conflict between the 

defendant’s conduct and the organization’s mission,” Abigail 

Alliance, 469 F.3d at 133, the USDA’s allegedly unlawful 

conduct does hamper and directly conflicts with PETA’s 

stated mission of preventing “cruelty and inhumane treatment 

of animals” through, inter alia, “public education” and 

“cruelty investigations.” Compl. ¶ 5. Finally, it bears noting 

that our “at loggerheads” requirement exists because, “[i]f the 

challenged conduct affects an organization’s activities, but is 

neutral with respect to its substantive mission,” then it is 

“ ‘entirely speculative’ whether the challenged practice will 

actually impair the organization’s activities.” Am. Soc. for 

Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 659 F.3d at 25, 27 (quoting 

Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. United States, 101 F.3d 1423, 

1430 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). Here, however, it is conceded that, if 

the USDA applies the AWA’s general welfare standards to 

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birds, it will employ the same inspection reports and redress 

mechanisms for birds that it currently uses for other species. 

Accordingly, the USDA’s challenged non-action plainly 

impairs PETA’s activities in a non-speculative manner by

“requir[ing]” PETA “to divert and redirect its limited 

resources to counteract and offset Defendant’s unlawful 

conduct and omissions.” Compl. ¶ 6. For example, PETA 

has alleged that: 

• “[It] has submitted numerous formal AWA 

complaints to the USDA regarding birds.” Kerr 

Decl. ¶ 7. 

• When it submits complaints to the USDA regarding 

AWA-covered animal mistreatment, the “USDA 

generally dispatches an inspector to the facility at 

issue to determine if any AWA violations are 

occurring, and the resulting USDA inspection reports 

are made available in an online database.” Id. ¶ 6.

• The USDA, however, “has consistently refused [to] 

take action on these complaints, asserting that it 

lacks jurisdiction and that it does not regulate birds.” 

Id. ¶ 7. 

• Consequently, PETA “has expended financial 

resources to investigate and respond to complaints 

about birds subjected to inhumane treatment, and/or 

to obtain appropriate and necessary relief for these 

animals,” Compl. ¶ 6, by alternative means, 

including “researching the labyrinth of local and 

state cruelty-to-animals and wildlife statutes, 

regulations, and policies, as well as federal animalrelated laws other than the AWA,” Kerr Decl. ¶ 9. 

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• “PETA is also forced to expend time and resources 

preparing and submitting complaints to the pertinent 

local, state, and/or federal agencies . . . , which 

would be unnecessary if the USDA was properly 

regulating birds used for exhibition under the 

AWA.” Id. ¶ 10; see also id. ¶ 11 (describing twelve 

“complaints PETA has been required to research and 

prepare as a result of the USDA’s failure to regulate 

birds under the AWA”).

• PETA “would not have needed to expend (or expend 

to the same extent) these resources absent [the 

USDA’s] failures to comply with its mandates under 

the AWA.” Compl. ¶ 6; see also Kerr Decl. ¶ 13 

(“But for the USDA’s failure to regulate birds under 

the AWA[,] PETA would not need to undertake 

these extensive efforts and expend the resources to 

do so.”).

• “If it prevails in this action, PETA will no longer 

have to expend as many resources pursuing other 

avenues . . . .” Kerr Decl. ¶ 14.

Additionally:

• “One of the primary ways in which PETA works to 

prevent cruelty to and inhumane treatment of 

animals used for entertainment is by educating the 

public, especially through informational services.” 

Id. ¶ 16; see also id. (describing variety of means by 

which PETA disseminates information).

• “The USDA’s AWA inspection reports are the 

primary source of information relied upon by PETA 

in preparing these educational materials.” Id. ¶ 17.

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• “[T]he USDA’s failure to regulate birds under the 

AWA . . . deprives PETA of information on which it 

routinely relies in its efforts to educate the public 

. . . .” Id. ¶ 15. 

• “This embargo on information regarding the 

conditions of birds used for exhibition directly 

conflicts with PETA’s mission to prevent cruelty to 

and inhumane treatment of animals and frustrates its 

public education efforts.” Id. ¶ 18.

• “As a result of the USDA’s failure to regulate birds 

under the AWA, PETA is required to expend 

resources to obtain information about the conditions 

of birds . . . , including through investigations, 

research, and state and local public records 

requests.” Id. ¶ 19.

• “But for the USDA’s failure to regulate birds under 

the AWA, PETA would not need to undertake . . . 

extensive efforts . . . .” Id. ¶ 20.

And finally, “PETA estimates that, as a direct result of the 

USDA’s failure to regulate birds . . . , it has been forced to 

expend more than $10,000 on staff attorney time not related 

to this litigation and related expenses” and it expects to

“continue expending more than $3,000 per year on the same 

unless and until the court grants the relief requested in this 

case.” Id. 

The USDA’s second argument—that PETA’s alleged 

injuries are self-inflicted and thus non-cognizable—fares no 

better. Granted, we have held that a “particular harm is selfinflicted” if “it results not from any actions taken by [the 

agency], but rather from the [organization’s] own budgetary 

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17

choices.” Fair Emp’t Council of Greater Wash., Inc. v. BMC 

Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d 1268, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994). That an 

organization “voluntarily, or willfully . . . diverts its 

resources, however, does not automatically mean that it 

cannot suffer an injury sufficient to confer standing.” Equal 

Rights Ctr., 633 F.3d at 1140 (alteration and citation omitted). 

We then ask whether the organization “undertook the 

expenditures in response to, and to counteract, the effects of 

the defendants’ alleged” unlawful acts “rather than in 

anticipation of litigation.” Id. As already noted, PETA 

redirected its resources in response to USDA’s allegedly 

unlawful failure to provide the means by which PETA would 

otherwise advance its mission—filing complaints with the 

USDA and using the USDA’s information for its advocacy 

purposes. Contrary to the USDA’s assertion, PETA did not

“bootstrap its way into court by alleging that agency inaction 

renders its advocacy efforts more expensive.” Appellee’s Br. 

21.

In sum, precedent makes plain that, if an organization 

expends resources “in response to, and to counteract, the 

effects of the defendants’ alleged [unlawful conduct] rather 

than in anticipation of litigation,” Equal Rights Ctr., 633 F.3d 

at 1140, it has suffered a “concrete and demonstrable injury”

that suffices for purposes of standing, Havens Realty Corp., 

455 U.S. at 379. PETA has expended—and must continue to 

expend—resources due to the USDA’s allegedly unlawful 

failure to apply the AWA’s protections to birds and its alleged 

injuries fit comfortably within our organizational-standing 

jurisprudence.

B. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

Having won the standing battle, PETA nonetheless loses 

the war. As noted, the sole non-jurisdictional question is 

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18

whether the USDA has a policy of non-enforcement that 

constitutes agency action unlawfully withheld, in violation of 

section 706(1) of the APA—regardless whether the nonenforcement has gone on for a reasonable or unreasonable 

length of time. The district court found, see PETA I, 7 F. 

Supp. 3d at 13, and, on PETA’s motion for reconsideration,

iterated, see PETA v. USDA (PETA II), 60 F. Supp. 3d 14, 18

(D.D.C. 2014), that the USDA’s enforcement decisions are 

“unreviewable because they are ‘committed to agency 

discretion by law.’ ” PETA I, 7 F.Supp. 3d at 13 (quoting 5 

U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)); see also PETA II, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 16–

19 (same). PETA maintains that the district court erred in two 

ways. PETA first argues that the Congress took away the 

USDA’s enforcement discretion because “[t]he clear 

implication of the AWA is that all entities wishing to sell or 

exhibit animals must first obtain a license from the USDA—

and the agency may not, consistent with the regime, announce 

to the world that no such license will be required to any 

facility that sells or exhibits an entire class of animals.” 

Appellant’s Br. 31 (quotation marks and emphasis omitted). 

PETA further contends that the USDA’s failure to apply the 

general AWA standards is a judicially reviewable “wholesale 

abdication of enforcement as to an entire biological class over 

the course of a dozen years.” Id. at 29 (emphasis omitted).

“[A] party must first clear the hurdle of [section] 701(a),” 

which prohibits judicial review of agency action “to the extent 

that . . . agency action is committed to agency discretion by 

law.” Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 828 (1985)

(quotation marks omitted). Section 701(a)(2) of the APA is 

not, however, a jurisdictional bar. See Oryszak v. Sullivan, 

576 F.3d 522, 524–25 & n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2009). For that 

reason, we need not decide whether the USDA has in fact 

adopted a general policy of non-enforcement that could be 

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19

subject to review under the APA.

6

 Instead, we affirm the 

district court on the alternative ground that PETA failed to 

plausibly allege that the USDA’s decade-long inaction

constitutes agency action unlawfully withheld. See Munsell v. 

USDA, 509 F.3d 572, 592–93 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (concluding 

requirement was non-jurisdictional but affirming dismissal on 

alternative ground supported by record).

In Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA), 

the Supreme Court set out the “limits the APA places upon 

judicial review of agency inaction.” 542 U.S. 55, 61 (2004). 

Relevant here, the Court held that “a claim under [section] 

706(1) can proceed only where a plaintiff asserts that an 

agency failed to take a discrete agency action that it is 

required to take,” id. at 64 (emphases in original), and cannot

be used “to enter general orders compelling compliance with 

broad statutory mandates,” id. at 66. It explained that the

“discrete agency action” limitation “precludes . . . broad 

programmatic attack[s]” and the “required agency action” 

limitation “rules out judicial direction of even discrete agency 

action that is not demanded by law.” Id. (emphasis in 

original). If, for example, “an agency is compelled by law to 

act within a certain time period, but the manner of its action is 

left to the agency’s discretion, a court can compel the agency 

to act, but has no power to specify what the action must be.” 

Id. at 65.

The USDA argues that PETA cannot satisfy the SUWA 

test. We agree. PETA insists that the USDA must 

“promulgate[] standards that apply to all animals covered by 

the AWA, 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(1), and apply those standards 

 6

 Similarly, we need not decide whether the district court 

imposed a “heightened pleading standard” on PETA’s allegation of 

agency policy. Appellant’s Br. 45.

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20

through the licensure system, id. § 2133.” Reply Br. 33

(emphasis in original). But even if the USDA has adopted an 

interim policy of non-enforcement pending the adoption of 

bird-specific regulations, as PETA alleges, nothing in the 

AWA requires the USDA to apply the general animal welfare 

standards to birds (which standards it views, at best, as 

ineffective and, at worst, as hazardous to avians, see Animal 

Welfare; Regulations and Standards for Birds, Rats, and 

Mice, 69 Fed. Reg. at 31,538–397

) before it has promulgated

more appropriate bird-specific regulations. Cf. Cutler v. 

Hayes, 818 F.2d 879, 892–93 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (upholding 

FDA policy of “postponing enforcement of the [Food, Drug, 

and Cosmetic] Act’s efficacy requirement . . . until the 

completion of [the agency’s] OTC drug review program” 

because “Congress has not given FDA an inflexible mandate 

to bring enforcement actions against all violators of the Act” 

(footnote omitted)). Therefore, even assuming that the USDA 

“is compelled by law to act,” SUWA, 542 U.S. at 65, we have 

no power to say that it must do so before finalizing its birdspecific regulations, at least in light of PETA’s abandonment 

of its argument that the USDA “unreasonably delayed” 

enforcement, see Reply Br. 32–33. Moreover, the AWA’s 

mandatory licensure requirement is directed to “dealer[s]” and 

“exhibitor[s]” of animals, not to the USDA. See 7 U.S.C. 

§ 2134. While section 2133 of the AWA provides that the 

USDA “shall issue licenses to dealer[s] and exhibitor[s] upon 

application therefor in such form and manner as [it] may 

prescribe,” id. § 2133, this congressional directive does not 

mean that the USDA must demand licensure in all instances. 

Thus, we cannot say that the USDA has failed to take action it 

 7

 See also, e.g., Johanna Briscoe Decl. ¶ 17 (“APHIS also 

recognizes that breeding requirements for certain species preclude 

daily cleaning and human interference (i.e. nesting birds may 

purposely crush their eggs if a stranger enters the vicinity.”)). 

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21

was “required to take.” SUWA, 542 U.S. at 64 (emphasis in 

original).

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s 

judgment of dismissal.

So ordered.

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MILLETT, Circuit Judge, dubitante: If the slate were 

clean, I would feel obligated to dissent from the majority’s

standing decision. But I am afraid that the slate has been 

written upon, and this court’s “organizational standing” 

precedent will not let me extricate this case from its grasp. Or

at least not without making fine distinctions that would just 

skate around the heart of the problem. The majority opinion

holds that standing exists because the government’s inaction

injured PETA’s “interest” in having the Animal Welfare Act 

enforced against certain third parties, and because PETA 

chose to devote its own resources to make up for the 

government’s enforcement “omission.” Maj. Op. 11 

(emphases added).

That ruling is in grave tension with Article III precedent 

and principles, such as the principle that an individual’s 

interest in having the law properly enforced against others is 

not, without more, a cognizable Article III injury. See, e.g.,

Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973); Sargeant 

v. Dixon, 130 F.3d 1067, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1997). It is also 

hard to reconcile with the general rule that a plaintiff’s 

voluntary expenditure of resources to counteract 

governmental action that only indirectly affects the plaintiff

does not support standing. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA,

133 S. Ct. 1138, 1148–1151 (2013).

At bottom, PETA thinks the government should do more 

to enforce the law against bird exhibitors, and so has 

voluntarily taken steps to protect birds itself. That may be 

laudable, but it is not an Article III redressable injury. If

circuit precedent has brought us to the point where 

organizations get standing on terms that the Supreme Court 

has said individuals cannot, then it may be time, in an 

appropriate case, to revisit the proper metes and bounds of 

“organizational standing.”

USCA Case #14-5157 Document #1567172 Filed: 08/11/2015 Page 22 of 36
2

I should note, at the outset, that my views do not in any 

way question the sincerity of PETA’s concern for neglected 

and abused birds or its desire to better their conditions. Nor 

can I criticize the majority for its decision. The majority 

opinion hews faithfully to precedential lines, as we must at 

this procedural juncture. See General Comm. of Adjustment, 

GO-386 v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 295 F.3d 

1337, 1340 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (circuit precedent “binds us, 

unless and until overturned by the court en banc or by 

[h]igher [a]uthority”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“Organizational standing” started from the commonsense determination that organizations, like individuals, can

suffer direct and concrete injuries for Article III purposes.

See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1974). At least 

in the form seen here, the doctrine traces its origins to the 

Supreme Court’s decision in Havens Realty Corp. v. 

Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982). In that case, Housing 

Opportunities Made Equal (“HOME”), a group dedicated to 

achieving equal housing opportunity, and individual plaintiffs 

brought a Fair Housing Act challenge to the racially

discriminatory housing practices of an apartment complex 

owner. See id. at 367–369. The Fair Housing Act “conferred 

on all ‘persons’ a legal right to truthful information about 

housing,” id. at 373, by making it unlawful to “represent to 

any person because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap,

familial status, or national origin that any dwelling is not 

available for inspection, sale, or rental when such dwelling is 

in fact so available,” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d).

After first holding that an individual plaintiff had 

standing, Havens, 455 U.S. at 374, the Supreme Court went 

on to rule that HOME had standing as well, id. at 379. That is 

unsurprising because the Fair Housing Act specifically 

defines the “persons” entitled to truthful housing information 

USCA Case #14-5157 Document #1567172 Filed: 08/11/2015 Page 23 of 36
3

to include “associations” as well as “one or more individuals.”

42 U.S.C. § 3602(d). HOME had also identified how the 

discriminatory misinformation it was given about housing 

opportunities directly frustrated and unraveled its efforts to 

match individuals with available housing. In particular,

HOME alleged that the challenged racial steering practices 

“frustrated * * * its efforts to assist equal access to housing 

through counseling and other referral services,” and forced it

“to devote significant resources to identify and counteract” 

the unlawful conduct targeted at it. Havens, 455 U.S. at 379. 

The Supreme Court concluded that, because the alleged

practices had “perceptibly impaired [the group’s] ability to 

provide counseling and referral services,” the organization

had plainly suffered an injury in fact. Id. That “concrete and 

demonstrable injury to the organization’s activities” and

“consequent drain on the organization’s resources,” the Court 

stressed, represented “far more than simply a setback to the 

organization’s abstract social interests,” which could not have 

conferred standing. Id.

Havens’ recognition of HOME’s organizational standing 

makes sense. Federal law vested HOME with a specific legal 

right to truthful, non-discriminatory housing information, and 

Havens Realty’s racially disparate misinformation targeted 

HOME along with the individuals it was aiding. The 

apartment owner’s violations unraveled again and again the 

work and resources that HOME had put into providing 

housing and equal housing opportunities for its clients. Put 

simply, what HOME used its own resources, information, and 

client base to build up, Havens Realty’s racist lies tore down. 

That is the type of direct, concrete, and immediate injury that 

Article III recognizes. See Fair Elections Ohio v. Husted, 770

F.3d 456, 460 n.1 (6th Cir. 2014) (Havens involved a 

statutory entitlement to truthful information, and “[t]he 

misinformation provided by the Havens defendants, i.e.[,] a 

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4

lie told to black renters, including a member of the 

organization, that no rental units were available, directly 

interfered with the organization’s ability to provide truthful 

counseling and referral services.”); see also American Canoe 

Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Louisa Water & Sewer Comm’n, 389 

F.3d 536, 550 (6th Cir. 2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part 

and dissenting in part) (HOME’s injury was “specific, 

cognizable, and particular” because the group “encountered 

significant difficulty helping individual plaintiffs counteract 

discrimination directed at them in a localized area”); 13A C.

Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure 

§ 3531.2, at 100 (3d ed. 2008) (HOME “was engaged in 

specific efforts to aid particular people who in fact had been 

injured by housing discrimination”).

The problem is not Havens or the concept of 

organizational standing. The problem is what our precedent 

has done with Havens. As this case illustrates, our 

organizational standing precedents now hold that the required 

Article III injury need not be what the defendant has done to 

the plaintiff; it can also be what the defendant has not done to 

a third party. And the manifestation of that injury is not that 

the defendant has torn down, undone, devalued, or otherwise 

countermanded the organization’s own activities or deprived 

it of a statutorily conferred right. It is instead a failure to 

facilitate or subsidize through governmental enforcement the 

organization’s vindication of its own parallel interests. See 

Maj. Op. 11–13, 17; Action Alliance of Senior Citizens of 

Greater Philadelphia v. Heckler, 789 F.2d 931, 937 (D.C. Cir. 

1986) (senior citizens group’s “programmatic concerns” 

hampered by agency regulations that (i) limited the 

information the agency had previously provided in other 

contexts, and (ii) made raising certain challenges within the 

agency more difficult); id. at 937–938 (by pleading denial of 

“access to information and avenues of redress they wish to 

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5

use in their routine information-dispensing, counseling and 

referral activities,” organizations “have alleged inhibition of 

their daily operations” sufficient for standing purposes).1

That takes standing principles to—and I think over—the 

brink. To be clear, PETA does not claim here that the 

Department of Agriculture directly contributes to the unlawful 

mistreatment of birds that PETA aims to halt, or has denied 

PETA information to which any law or regulation entitles it.

Nor does PETA claim that the government has dismantled,

affirmatively undermined, or engaged in a campaign of 

misinformation that has damaged PETA’s independent efforts 

to protect birds. Instead, as the majority opinion explains, 

PETA’s asserted Article III injuries are: 

x PETA has filed complaints on which the Department 

has not acted; PETA then chose to expend resources 

pursuing “alternative means” of protecting birds; if it 

prevails, PETA will not have to expend “as many 

resources” pursuing other types of bird protection. 

Maj. Op. 14–15 (quoting Kerr Decl. ¶¶ 9, 14).

1 See also ASPCA v. Feld Entertainment, Inc., 659 F.3d 13, 27 

(D.C. Cir. 2011) (reserving the question whether an organization

has standing based on “expend[ing] additional resources on public 

education to rebut the misimpression, allegedly caused by [the 

defendant’s] practices”); compare also Center for Law & Educ. v. 

Department of Educ., 396 F.3d 1152, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 

(rejecting organizational standing where “the only ‘service’ 

impaired is pure issue-advocacy”), with Feld Entertainment, 659 

F.3d at 26–28 (impairment of a group’s ability to provide advocacy 

services may qualify as injury where a defendant’s conduct is “at 

loggerheads” with the group’s mission) (quoting National Treasury 

Employees Union v. United States, 101 F.3d 1423, 1429 (D.C. Cir.

1996)).

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6

x PETA is not receiving inspection reports for birds 

that the Department has voluntarily produced after 

enforcement efforts involving other animals, and the 

absence of such reports means that PETA expends 

resources compiling its own information to educate

the public; if successful, PETA would rely on the 

government’s reporting and undertake less 

“extensive” efforts of its own. Maj. Op. 15–16

(quoting Kerr Decl. ¶ 20).

Neither of those should count as judicially redressable

under Article III.

Inaction on PETA Complaints

The Department’s failure to act on PETA’s complaints

should be a complete non-starter for Article III purposes. The 

cases are legion holding that PETA has no legally protected or 

judicially cognizable interest in the enforcement of the

Animal Welfare Act against third parties for its own sake.

See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 

U.S. 26, 37 (1976) (It is “settled doctrine that the exercise of 

prosecutorial discretion cannot be challenged by one who is 

himself neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution.”);

Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 619 (“[I]n American jurisprudence at 

least, a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in 

the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.”).2

2 See also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 574–578 

(1992) (no standing based on generalized objection to insufficient 

enforcement of the law); High Plains Wireless, L.P. v. FCC, 276 

F.3d 599, 606 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (no “standing to object to the 

agency’s refusal to sanction” a third party); Sargeant, 130 F.3d at 

1069 (“[T]he interests Mohwish proffers—in the prosecution of 

USCA Case #14-5157 Document #1567172 Filed: 08/11/2015 Page 27 of 36
7

Nor does PETA’s sincere and deep “interest” (Maj. Op. 

11) in promoting the humane treatment of birds get it across 

the Article III threshold. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 

727, 739 (1972) (Article III does not permit “any group with a 

bona fide ‘special interest’” in the law’s enforcement to bring 

suit.); Gettman v. DEA, 290 F.3d 430, 433 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 

(“Petitioners seem to believe that their ‘commitment’ to their 

cause and the alleged importance of their cause is enough to 

confer Article III standing. It is not.”).3

Since those general interests in the law and its 

enforcement will not suffice, PETA needed to identify a 

specific and concrete “legally protected interest” of its own

that has been injured by the government’s non-enforcement

practices. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. But neither PETA nor the 

majority opinion has done so. Unlike HOME’s specific 

informational right under the Fair Housing Act, absolutely 

nothing in the Animal Welfare Act invests PETA with any 

right to have its complaints acted upon or its resourceallocations eased.

That the Department of Agriculture accepts such private 

complaints without any apparent statutory requirement to do 

government officials and in seeing that the laws are enforced—are 

not legally cognizable within the framework of Article III.”).

3 See also Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for 

Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 486 (1982)

(“[S]tanding is not measured by the intensity of the litigant’s

interest or the fervor of his advocacy.”); Feld Entertainment, 659 

F.3d at 24 (“[A]n organization’s abstract interest in a problem is 

insufficient to establish standing, ‘no matter how longstanding the 

interest and no matter how qualified the organization is in 

evaluating the problem.’”) (quoting Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 739).

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8

so is not enough. The “deprivation of a procedural right 

without some concrete interest that is affected by the 

deprivation—a procedural right in vacuo—is insufficient to 

create Article III standing.” Summers v. Earth Island 

Institute, 555 U.S. 488, 496 (2009). Thus, “absent the ability 

to demonstrate a ‘discrete injury’ flowing from the alleged 

violation,” PETA “cannot establish standing merely by 

asserting that the [agency] failed to process its complaint in 

accordance with law.” Common Cause v. FEC, 108 F.3d 413, 

419 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

If PETA is not injured in any legally relevant sense by 

the government’s failure to act on its complaints, how can its 

decision to incur additional expenses in the wake of that 

failure be anything other than a self-chosen consequence of 

any governmental non-enforcement decision? I cannot 

imagine that Simon would have come out differently if the 

Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization had just added 

an allegation that it had chosen to expend its own resources to 

shine a light on hospitals’ mistreatment of the indigent that 

the Internal Revenue Service’s tax decisions allegedly 

tolerated. Nor, I presume, could Linda R.S. have gotten into 

court if she had just added to her complaint an allegation that, 

absent prosecution, she would have to expend her own 

resources hiring a private investigator or asking the employer

of her child’s father to garnish his wages. Article III’s 

requirement of a concrete injury to a legally protected interest 

demands more than just creative pleading. 

Underscoring the point, the Supreme Court recently held 

that, where concerns about governmental action that was not 

targeted at the plaintiffs did not constitute an Article III 

injury, the costs voluntarily incurred in response to those 

concerns could not fill in the gap either. See Clapper, 133 S. 

Ct. at 1152. Surely that case would not have been decided 

USCA Case #14-5157 Document #1567172 Filed: 08/11/2015 Page 29 of 36
9

differently if Amnesty International had simply alleged that it 

had to divert its resources to educate the public about how to 

protect themselves against government surveillance. 

Finally, PETA’s contention that its resources will be 

better allocated if its complaints are acted upon runs into a 

fierce separation-of-powers headwind. The claim of injury 

here is simply that, given the Executive Branch’s chosen level 

of enforcement under the Animal Welfare Act, PETA must

expend more resources than it would otherwise have to in 

pursuit of its parallel goals. See Maj. Op. 15 (if the suit is 

successful, PETA “will no longer have to expend as many

resources pursuing other avenues”) (emphasis added) (quoting 

Kerr Decl. ¶ 14). While this case alleges non-enforcement, if 

standing exists here, then there is no meaningful reason why 

suit could not be brought every time an organization believes 

that the government is not enforcing the law as much, as 

often, or as vigorously as it would like. And maybe a 

different group could sue if it believes the law is being 

enforced too much and so chooses to use its resources to 

advise the public about the harms of over-enforcement. 

Article III’s standing requirement is meant to “help[] 

preserve the Constitution’s separation of powers and 

demarcates ‘the proper—and properly limited—role of the 

courts in a democratic society.’” Coalition for Mercury-Free 

Drugs v. Sebelius, 671 F.3d 1275, 1278–1279 (D.C. Cir. 

2012) (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 498). Yet hinging judicial 

superintendence of Executive enforcement decisions on

nothing more than a group’s unadorned interest in the law’s 

purposes, combined with just a dash of volitional counterexpenditures, would make the courts “virtually continuing 

monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action.”

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 

737, 760 (1984)).

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10

Failure to Produce Enforcement Reports

PETA’s claim of informational injury should not open 

the Article III door either, for one simple reason: Even as 

alleged by PETA, there is no suggestion that anything in the 

Animal Welfare Act or any regulation gives PETA any legal

right to such information or reports. PETA thus may claim 

that its resource-allocation decisions are injured by the 

absence of such reports from the agency; but that injury is not 

even colorably tied to a “legally protected interest” in 

obtaining that information, as Lujan requires, 504 U.S. at 560. 

To be sure, the majority opinion’s contrary determination 

just walks the path that circuit precedent has trodden. In 

Action Alliance, this court held that a group promoting the 

interests of the elderly had organizational standing because 

the Secretary of Health and Human Services failed to apply to 

her Department the same age discrimination regulations 

applied to other federal agencies. This court reasoned that, if 

the Department had followed the same information-disclosure 

regulations as other agencies, then it would have produced 

more information, which the plaintiff group could then use to 

refer its members to services or to provide age-discrimination 

counseling. Action Alliance, 789 F.2d at 935, 937.

Action Alliance was perhaps justifiable on its facts. As in 

Havens itself, the information sought was arguably required 

to be disclosed at least by regulation, and was being put to a 

specific use by the plaintiffs seeking to protect the legal rights 

of the elderly individuals they served. See Cass R. Sunstein,

Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins

and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 664 (1999). 

But in subsequent cases, we have relied on Action 

Alliance for the proposition that organizational standing may 

exist more broadly whenever “information is essential to the 

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11

injured organization’s activities, and where the lack of the 

information will render those activities infeasible.” 

Competitive Enterprise Institute v. NHTSA, 901 F.2d 107, 122 

(D.C. Cir. 1990); see also Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. 

Espy (“Espy II”), 29 F.3d 720, 724 (D.C. Cir. 1994)

(extending a similar rule to the Animal Welfare Act); Animal 

Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Espy (“Espy I”), 23 F.3d 496, 

501–502 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (same).4

This case, however, goes even further. At least in earlier 

cases, there was something somewhere in the law that at least 

required the agency to generate the reports in the first instance

(even assuming that would be enough to create a private right 

to such information). In our Animal Welfare Act cases, for 

example, the Secretary was required to include the 

information at issue in an annual report submitted to 

Congress. See Espy I, 23 F.3d at 501.5 In this case, PETA 

points to nothing that requires the Department to generate the 

enforcement reports that it finds so helpful, let alone a legal 

4 We have also concluded, in the cases brought under the Animal 

Welfare Act, that the organization alleging informational injury 

failed to establish that the zone-of-interests test had been met. See

Espy II, 29 F.3d at 724; Espy I, 23 F.3d at 502–504. But the 

government has not raised that challenge to PETA’s suit here. That 

would not in any event affect the jurisdictional analysis, because 

the Supreme Court has since made clear that the zone-of-interests 

analysis is not a standing inquiry required by Article III. See

Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 

1377, 1388 & n.4 (2014).

5 That requirement has since been eliminated. See Federal Reports 

Elimination and Sunset Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-66, § 3003,

109 Stat. 707; see also 7 U.S.C. § 2155 codifications note.

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12

basis for asserting an enforceable private right to such 

information. Nor does PETA claim to be using the 

information to educate other individuals who are protected by 

the statute about their legal rights.

That presses the concept of informational standing far

beyond anything the Supreme Court itself has recognized. In

FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998), the Supreme Court 

recognized a claim of informational injury when: (i) on the 

plaintiff’s view of the law, the government or a third party

was required by statute to make public the information at 

issue, id. at 21, and (ii) the plaintiff’s interest in the 

information was “directly related” to the exercise of the 

person’s own individual right to vote, “the most basic of 

political rights,” id. at 24–25.

We have thus recognized that “[o]nly if the statute grants 

a plaintiff a concrete interest in the information sought will he 

be able to assert an injury in fact.” Nader v. FEC, 725 F.3d 

226, 229 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Absent such a statutory basis, we 

have held that the claim of informational standing fails.6 At 

least we had until today.

Furthermore, unlike Akins where the claim was premised 

on a desire to have information about a group’s role in an 

election in which the plaintiff intended to vote, PETA has 

identified no concrete piece of information in the agency’s 

possession that it is seeking, let alone that it has any legal 

right to. The agency would not even acquire the desired 

information unless it were first to enforce the law as PETA 

6

 See Feld Entertainment, 659 F.3d at 23–24; see also Ethyl Corp. 

v. EPA, 306 F.3d 1144, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (standing available at 

least where statute requires information to be publicly disclosed and 

plaintiff plausibly claims that the information would help it).

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desires. But if PETA lacks Article III standing to require the 

agency to enforce the law against third parties, it surely 

cannot get standing through the back-door route of claiming 

injury by the absence of post-enforcement reports. 

To be sure, the Supreme Court’s decision in Akins did not 

specifically displace our precedent finding organizational 

standing when the failure to provide information “impinge[d] 

on the plaintiff’s daily operations or [made] normal operations 

infeasible.” Akins v. FEC, 101 F.3d 731, 735 (D.C. Cir. 

1996), vacated by 524 U.S. at 29; Competitive Enterprise 

Institute, 901 F.2d at 122 (similar). But as this case makes all 

too clear, the broad reach of our case law is getting 

increasingly hard to square with Supreme Court precedent 

handed down since Action Alliance.

First, the notion that an organization’s “desire to supply 

* * * information to its members” and the “‘injury’ it suffers 

when the information is not forthcoming” are “without more”

sufficient to establish standing runs headlong into “the 

obstacle of Sierra Club v. Morton.” Foundation of Economic

Trends v. Lyng, 943 F.2d 79, 84–85 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Sierra 

Club held that a group’s “mere ‘interest in a problem’” could 

not suffice for standing purposes, 405 U.S. at 739, and “[i]t is 

not apparent why an organization’s desire for information 

about the same * * * problem should rest on a different 

footing,” Foundation of Economic Trends, 943 F.2d at 85; see 

Akins, 101 F.3d at 746 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (arguing that 

Action Alliance was inconsistent with Sierra Club).

To the extent, then, that PETA has organized one of its 

many operations around disseminating information to which it 

does not have a legal entitlement, I can see no sound basis for 

elevating the government’s failure to facilitate those 

operations to the level of an Article III injury. Doing so just 

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14

confuses an inconvenience with an “injury in fact” to a 

“legally protected interest,” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.

Second, PETA does not seek information that is in any

way connected to the exercise of a right conferred by the 

Animal Welfare Act, akin to the linkage between information 

and voting in Akin. PETA’s purpose in seeking this 

information appears to be simply to have the information for 

its own educational and promotional materials, so that it can 

conserve or redirect its own resources. But “[t]o hold that a 

plaintiff can establish injury in fact merely by alleging that he 

has been deprived of the knowledge as to whether a violation 

of the law has occurred”—whatever the personal use it 

intends to make of that knowledge—“would be tantamount to 

recognizing a justiciable interest in the enforcement of the 

law.” Common Cause, 108 F.3d at 418.

Finally, it is hard to see how the doctrine we have 

embraced can practically be cabined. “‘[I]nformational 

injury,’ in its broadest sense, exists day in and day out, 

whenever federal agencies are not creating information a 

member of the public would like to have.” Foundation of 

Economic Trends, 943 F.2d at 85. If PETA’s position is 

correct, any organization could, as part of its mission to 

advance enforcement of a given law, begin disseminating 

information an agency chooses to publish, and thereby gain a

legally protected interest in preserving that flow of 

information through some form of “informational adverse 

possession.” Could an organization disseminate reports based 

on a U.S. Attorney’s Office’s public press releases and 

consequently claim a justiciable interest in the enforcement of 

the federal criminal code because it would generate more 

press releases? Surely not. And why should the group status 

matter at all? See Common Cause, 108 F.3d at 417 

(“[S]tanding requirements apply with no less force to suits 

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15

brought by organizational plaintiffs.”). The same principles 

that prevent any individual caped crusader from using the 

courts to vindicate his or her views as to the proper 

enforcement of the laws should preclude the same gambit by a 

group of likeminded individuals. As for Batman or Wonder 

Woman, so too for the Justice League.

* * *

At bottom, standing in this case is grounded on a claimed 

(i) protection from making voluntary resource choices when 

responding to the government’s failure to enforce the law 

against third parties, and (ii) information generated as a 

byproduct of the government’s enforcement activities without

any alleged statutory obligation to make it at all, let alone to 

make it public. I find it mighty difficult to see any real 

daylight between that claim of standing and the grant of a 

justiciable interest in the enforcement of the law that we have 

long said Article III does not permit.

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