Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-07230/USCOURTS-caDC-98-07230-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
ADT Security Systems, Inc.
Appellee
Edward Coward
Appellant

Document Text:

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 6, 1999 Decided November 12, 1999

No. 98-7230

Edward Coward,

Appellant

v.

ADT Security Systems, Inc.,

Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 95cv02062)

H. Vincent McKnight, Jr., argued the cause and filed the

briefs for appellant.

Max H. Lauten argued the cause and filed the brief for

appellee.

Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Wald and Williams,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge Edwards.

Opinion filed by Circuit Judge Williams concurring in part

and dissenting in part.

USCA Case #98-7230 Document #476913 Filed: 11/12/1999 Page 1 of 16
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Edwards, Chief Judge: Appellant, Edward Coward, alleges

that, in violation of 42 U.S.C. s 1981 (1994), his employer,

ADT Security Systems, Inc. ("ADT"), intentionally discriminated against him by paying him less than similarly situated

white employees who hold the same job titles. The District

Court, however, found Mr. Coward's allegations baseless. As

a result, it granted ADT's motion for summary judgment.

This marks the second time that the District Court has

granted summary judgment in ADT's favor. When the case

was first heard, the District Court ruled that Mr. Coward had

failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination. See

Boling v. ADT Sec. Sys., No. 95-2062, 1997 WL 198111

(D.D.C. Apr. 11, 1997). On appeal, this judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded to the District Court for

further proceedings. See Coward v. ADT Sec. Sys., 140 F.3d

271 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("Coward I").

On remand, the District Court recognized that there was

no longer a question as to whether Mr. Coward had met the

burden of establishing a prima facie case. See Coward v.

ADT Sec. Sys., Civ. Act. No. 95-2062, Mem. Op. at 3, 7

(D.D.C. Nov. 18, 1998), reprinted in Joint Appendix ("J.A.")

142,204, 142,208. The District Court also recognized that

there were at least three genuine issues of fact before it:

whether similarly situated white employees were better compensated than the plaintiff; whether the plaintiff's salary

grade reflected wage discrimination; and whether the plaintiff was still in fact working as a Telecommunications Network Facilities Manager ("TNFM") even after being reclassified to a lower position title. See id. at 3, reprinted in J.A.

142,204. However, the District Court noted that the decision

in Coward I referred only to "genuine issues of fact, not

genuine issues of material fact." Id. at 4, reprinted in J.A.

142,205. Thus, the District Court assumed that the "materiality" of these factual issues remained to be determined. The

District Court also was convinced that the judgment of the

Court of Appeals did not compel a jury trial; this made sense,

because the decision in Coward I merely directed the trial

court to complete the summary judgment inquiry prescribed

by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), to

USCA Case #98-7230 Document #476913 Filed: 11/12/1999 Page 2 of 16
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

determine whether ADT could proffer a nondiscriminatory

reason for Mr. Coward's lower salary and grade, and whether

Mr. Coward could rebut such a proffer. See Coward I, 140

F.3d at 276.

After reviewing the evidence before it, the District Court

concluded that Mr. Coward had failed to show that his duties

were comparable to those of other TNFMs and that there

was no evidence to indicate that the reduction in his job grade

was motivated by race. See Mem. Op. at 9, reprinted in J.A.

142,210. In short, the District Court held that "the plaintiff

failed to introduce any evidence or even argue any rationale

for finding the defendant's reasons merely a pretext for

discrimination." Id.

On appeal, Mr. Coward again asserts that the trial judge

has usurped the jury's fact-finding function in resolving material issues of fact. Mr. Coward's most compelling argument

is that ADT failed to offer a reasonable business justification

for the salary and grade disparities that occurred before April

19, 1995, i.e., before the date when he was reclassified and

demoted from an E-9 to an E-8 salary grade. On this point,

Mr. Coward notes that only the District Court, not the

defendant, proffered the explanation that any disparities between Mr. Coward and white employees who were also

classified as TNFMs must have been attributable to the fact

that Mr. Coward's duties were "narrower" than those of the

other TNFMs. See Initial Br. of Appellant at 18-19; see also

Mem. Op. at 7-8, reprinted in J.A. 142,208-09 (providing the

District Court's "logical inference" that ADT's proffered justification extended to the pre-reclassification period).

On the record at hand, we have no choice but to reverse

and remand again for further proceedings before the District

Court. Although the District Court was correct in concluding

that ADT's justification for salary and grade disparities between Mr. Coward and TNFMs during the postreclassification period was not pretextual, the court erred in

reaching the same conclusion with respect to the period from

March 1994 to April 19, 1995, when Mr. Coward was promoted to and worked as a TNFM. As the District Court

USCA Case #98-7230 Document #476913 Filed: 11/12/1999 Page 3 of 16
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

apparently recognized, ADT offered no justification whatsoever for the salary and grade disparities that existed during

this period. Thus, it was not for the District Court to "infer"

a justification where none was forthcoming from the employer. The case must be remanded for a precise determination

as to whether ADT can proffer a nondiscriminatory reason

for Mr. Coward's lower salary and grade during the prereclassification period, and whether Mr. Coward can rebut

such a proffer, or whether the case must proceed to trial.

* * * *

In reviewing the District Court's grant of summary judgment, this court reviews the evidence de novo. See Hall v.

Giant Food, Inc., 175 F.3d 1074, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

Indeed, "a party is only entitled to summary judgment if the

record, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party, reveals that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact." Id. (quoting Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr.,

156 F.3d 1284, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc)) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Of particular importance in this

case, if material facts are susceptible to divergent inferences,

summary judgment is not available, because all inferences

must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. United States Envtl. Protection

Agency, 856 F.2d 309, 314 (D.C. Cir. 1988). In addition,

"summary judgment will not lie if ... the evidence is such

that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Giant Food, 175 F.3d at 1077 (quoting Aka, 156

F.3d at 1288) (internal quotation marks omitted). We review

the record in this case with these standards in mind.

* * * *

ADT has employed Edward Coward, an African-American

male, since October 3, 1974. A supplier of electronic security

systems and services, ADT maintains a salary grade structure consisting of grades E-3 through E-20. Each grade has

five salary steps. Salary ranges between grades overlap.

ADT assigns job titles, codes, and grades to every employee.

USCA Case #98-7230 Document #476913 Filed: 11/12/1999 Page 4 of 16
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Employees with the same job title may have different codes,

different grades, and even different duties; together, all of

these factors determine salary. Job titles generally reflect

duties performed and serve as an important factor in setting

salary. See Coward I, 140 F.3d at 272-73.

An E-8 for most of the last 18 years, Mr. Coward was

briefly promoted in March 1994 to a TNFM job, in a position

purportedly carrying a grade of E-9. Approximately one

year later, on April 19, 1995, ADT reclassified him from E-9

back to E-8, later changing his title to "Technical Support."

In his reclassified grade and position, Mr. Coward earned less

than most TNFMs, all of whom were white; however, he

earned more than most Technical Support staff. See id. at

273. The main point is that, following his reclassification, Mr.

Coward's job duties were narrower than those of employees

then working as TNFMs. Not surprisingly, ADT proffered

that, during the post-reclassification period, Mr. Coward

earned less than the cited white employees because he had

fewer job responsibilities. Mr. Coward offered nothing sufficient to refute this or to otherwise suggest that the explanation was pretextual.

The problem with this case arises with respect to the prereclassification period, i.e., the period when Mr. Coward

admittedly was assigned to the position of TNFM. Mr.

Coward claimed he was never given an E-9 grade and was

never given a salary commensurate with that grade upon

promotion. ADT argued otherwise. The District Court noted that the parties disagreed over these points, and the

record offers no clear answers.

Mr. Coward says that, in any event, he was paid less than

white TNFMs during the cited pre-reclassification period.

This hardly seems surprising, because if Mr. Coward was

concededly paid less than white TNFMs immediately after his

reclassification, he undoubtedly was paid less immediately

before the reclassification. In Coward I, we said that, "[h]aving identified eight higher-paid white employees, the majority

of TNFMs, Coward has satisfied the minimal requirements of

a prima facie case." Id. at 276. An ADT manager acknowlUSCA Case #98-7230 Document #476913 Filed: 11/12/1999 Page 5 of 16
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

edged in his deposition that there were company records

available to address salary disparities during the prereclassification period, yet none were offered. See Deposition

of Edward B. Pictroski at 86-87, reprinted in J.A. at 141,624-

25. And ADT did not assert before either the trial court or

this court that Mr. Coward was fabricating or otherwise

wrong in his claim that his salary was below what was being

paid to other TNFMs during the period when he was promoted to that position.

The District Court sought to escape the problem of ADT's

failure to explain the pre-reclassification period by finding a

"logical inference" to support a conclusion that Mr. Coward's

duties always have been narrower than other TNFMs.

Mem. Op. at 7-8, reprinted in J.A. 142,208-09. We reject

this approach as entirely unacceptable under McDonnell

Douglas and its progeny.

First, under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a party

alleging discrimination must establish a prima facie case of

prohibited discrimination. See 411 U.S. at 802. Once he has

done so, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the challenged employment decision. See id. If the employer presents such

reasons, then the complainant (who always carries the burden

of persuasion) has the opportunity to discredit the employer's

explanation. See id. at 804-05. In this case, Mr. Coward has

established a prima facie case-that is no longer in issue.

ADT was required to respond. And the District Court should

not have responded on behalf of ADT.

Second, as the District Court plainly recognized, there was

a significant difference between the alleged salary disparities

in the pre- and post-reclassification periods. In other words,

each period warranted a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason

for the challenged employment practices. And the District

Court also recognized, as do we, that ADT offered an explanation only for the post-reclassification period.

Third, the District Court's purported "logical inference"

that Mr. Coward's duties always have been narrower than

other TNFMs does not survive scrutiny. For one thing, it

USCA Case #98-7230 Document #476913 Filed: 11/12/1999 Page 6 of 16
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

does not follow that because Mr. Coward earned a salary

below the rate paid to TNFMs after he was demoted to a

lesser grade and a different title he necessarily should have

been paid at a lower rate during a period when he was

assigned to the higher TNFM position. The record here

indicates that job title carries weight in the assignment of job

grades and salaries, presumably because a job title denotes

something about job responsibilities.

Furthermore, there is at best confusion on the record here

as to whether Mr. Coward's job duties changed after he was

reclassified. Compare Deposition of Edward B. Pictroski at

75, reprinted in J.A. 141,613 (observing that when Mr. Coward's job changed from TNFM to Technical Support-SSO, his

duties changed), and Deposition of Edward Coward at 66,

124-25, reprinted in J.A. 141,862, 141,872 (recounting that

Mr. Coward was excluded from supervisory meetings after

his reclassification), with id. at 60, reprinted in J.A. 141,861

(noting Mr. Coward's statement that he was "basically doing

the same job" after he was demoted from his TNFM status).

It appears that ADT's management officials viewed Mr. Coward as being in a lesser position after reclassification and that

Mr. Coward's supervisory position in the company changed.

Thus, even if his day-to-day duties remained steady, his

status and responsibilities were diminished. If, as appears to

be the case, Mr. Coward's position diminished after reclassification, then there is no way to draw a "logical inference"

about what he should have been paid as a TNFM performing

greater duties before reclassification.

There is another potential material issue of fact yet to be

resolved on this record. As noted above, the District Court

recognized that the parties disagreed over whether Mr. Coward actually received his E-9 grade when he was promoted to

the TNFM position. The District Court dismissed this question as "immaterial," on the assumption that the "defendant

has introduced evidence that plaintiff's duties were narrower

in scope than employees at the E-9 salary grade." Mem. Op.

at 8, reprinted in J.A. 142,209. However, just as there is no

proffer from ADT to explain salary disparities during the preUSCA Case #98-7230 Document #476913 Filed: 11/12/1999 Page 7 of 16
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

reclassification period, there is also no proffer explaining why

Mr. Coward may not have received the E-9 grade. Indeed,

the District Court's observations on this point are perplexing,

because ADT argues that it did in fact promote Mr. Coward

and then later reclassified him to a lower grade and title.

And it surely cannot be said that a higher job grade is

insignificant, for, although some salaries overlap two grades,

higher grades carry higher scales of pay. Thus, Mr. Coward,

like any employee, obviously would have been better off with

a higher than with a lower salary grade.

* * * *

The District Court was correct in concluding that ADT

offered a legitimate business justification for salary and grade

disparities between Mr. Coward and TNFMs during the postreclassification period, and that Mr. Coward failed to show

that this justification was a pretext for unlawful discrimination. However, the court erred in reaching the same conclusion with respect to the period from March 1994 to April 19,

1995, when Mr. Coward was assigned to work as a TNFM.

If there is an explanation to be offered for the prereclassification period, it must come from ADT, not the

District Court.

As indicated above, our review of the record reveals material issues of fact yet to be resolved in the trial court. This

might require a trial of the issues, but we are not sure about

this. In candor, it appears that the record in this case is a bit

of a muddle, so we do not know whether this matter is still

susceptible to disposition pursuant to summary judgment.

The problem now is that ADT has failed to proffer explanations with respect to practices occurring during a specific

time period, and Mr. Coward has had no occasion to respond

to any such proffers. It is possible that this can be done

after the parties are permitted to supplement the existing

record before the District Court and then offer appropriate

motions. However, if the material issues of fact survive

supplementation and any new motions for summary disposition, the case will have to proceed to trial.

For the reasons given herein, the judgment of the District

Court is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The case is

hereby remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

USCA Case #98-7230 Document #476913 Filed: 11/12/1999 Page 8 of 16
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Williams, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting

in part: The majority affirms the district court's grant of

summary judgment for the period of time after April 19,

1995,1 but remands the case on the theory that certain

unidentified wage and grade disparities existed between

plaintiff Edward Coward and other Telecommunications Network Facilities Managers ("TNFMs") between March 1994

and April 19, 1995, disparities that it believes ADT failed to

justify. I think the remand is unwarranted. Coward has not

established a prima facie case for the earlier period; ADT's

nondiscriminatory explanation for Coward's pay and grade

for the period after April 19, 1995 is, moreover, equally

applicable to the prior period and stands equally unrebutted.

I believe the district court properly ordered summary judgment in ADT's favor on Coward's entire claim, and therefore

respectfully dissent.

* * *

Under the familiar burden-shifting framework in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), Coward has

the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the

evidence that he was performing work substantially equal to

that of a white employee who was compensated at a higher

rate than he was. Coward v. ADT Security Sys., Inc., 140

F.3d 271, 273 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("Coward I"). In the first

appeal in this case, we determined that Coward had established a prima facie case of wage discrimination. See id. at

275-76. Coward I did not, however, specify the time period

covered by the prima facie case. Yet the majority now

assumes that Coward I must have found a prima facie case

for the entire period addressed in Coward's complaint.

"Coward has established a prima facie case--that is no longer

in issue. ADT was required to respond." Maj. Op. at 6.

Under this logic, the recognition by a panel of this court that

a prima facie case existed for any period of time compels the

conclusion (under law-of-the-case principles) that the prima

__________

1 Presumably, the majority also affirms the grant of summary

judgment in ADT's favor on Coward's retaliation claim.

USCA Case #98-7230 Document #476913 Filed: 11/12/1999 Page 9 of 16
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

facie case extends to the entire period covered by plaintiff's

allegations. But allegations are notoriously not evidence.

The only evidence in the record concerns wage and grade

disparities after April 19, 1995. Thus the panel leaves unanswered the question of what it is to which ADT must respond.

The purpose of the McDonnell Douglas framework is to

"sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual question of

intentional discrimination." Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.8 (1981). In the panel's

hands it seems to have quite the opposite effect: by assuming

the existence of a prima facie case for a period where the

evidence shows none, it blunts rather than sharpens the

inquiry, requiring the defendant to explain what has not been

shown even to exist.

Indeed, the panel appears to reason that once allegations

are filed, a prima facie case exists unless the defendant comes

forward with proof of its absence. Thus it faults ADT for not

reaching back into its records unbidden to establish a prima

facie case for Coward, saying that although an ADT manager

said there were salary records for the period before April 19,

1995, "none were offered." Maj. Op. at 6. Use of the passive

voice is telling: Yes, no one bothered to show a wage disparity for that period--neither Coward, who had the burden, nor

ADT, which didn't. I do not understand why ADT should be

penalized for Coward's omission. The majority persists in

shifting the initial burden onto ADT: "And ADT did not

assert before either the trial court or this court that Mr.

Coward was fabricating or otherwise wrong in his claim that

his salary was below what was being paid to other TNFMs

during the period ... when he was promoted to that position." Maj. Op. at 6 (emphasis added). Again, as Coward's

"claims" are not evidence, ADT had no need to rebut them.

The majority invokes the principle of continuity, saying

that as Coward was paid less than certain comparison employees in the post-reclassification period it stands to reason

that he was paid less in the period immediately preceding

classification. Maj. Op. at 5. The principle of continuity is

generally a sound one: the basic reason why we believe the

USCA Case #98-7230 Document #476913 Filed: 11/12/1999 Page 10 of 16
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

sun will rise tomorrow is the persistence of the pattern--of

its rising, day after day, and, in our modern sophisticated

times, the persistence of all the complex associated astronomic phenomena. In this case, however, use of the principle is

questionable. First, the majority's whole claim that ADT's

stated explanation does not cover the earlier period turns on

the notion--false, as it turns out--that Coward suffered some

painful downgrade on April 19, 1995. If he had, the inference

of continuity would be self-evidently inapplicable as a matter

of fact. Second, there were hard data in the record in the

post-April 19, 1995 period; Coward offered none for the

period before, although, as the majority rightly notes, the

data were available to him. So the parties unsurprisingly

focused most clearly on the later time. Thus use of the

principle of continuity to create a prima facie case is procedurally askew. In short, Coward's failure to offer evidence

for a prima facie case should end the matter.

* * *

Nonetheless, it turns out that even if we assume a prima

facie case for the earlier period, ADT's evidence rebuts any

inference of discrimination. The majority theorizes that the

record is in conflict over ADT's justification of supposed

disparities. Its analysis turns essentially on two propositions

that in reality are contradicted by the evidence. First, it

asserts that there may have been some material reduction in

Coward's duties in the Spring of 1995. If true, then of course

ADT's evidence--showing that his post-April 19, 1995 responsibilities were less than those of the employees with whom

Coward compared himself--would not work for the prior

period. But in fact the record is plain that there was no such

reduction in duties. To summarize the basic evidence: (1)

Soon after Coward was moved to the Sales and Service Office

("SSO") in Springfield, VA, in February 1994, he received the

title TNFM. (2) In the Spring of 1995 ADT concluded that

Coward, who was the only employee designated a TNFM who

worked outside of a Customer Monitoring Center ("CMC"), a

class of facility different from the SSO at Springfield, was

doing less demanding work than the TNFMs at CMCs. (3)

USCA Case #98-7230 Document #476913 Filed: 11/12/1999 Page 11 of 16
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

ADT therefore reclassified Coward out of TNFM status and

into "Technical Support-SSO." (4) Accordingly, when ADT's

evidence showed that for the period after April 19, 1995

Coward's work demanded less than that of the then remaining TNFMs (his supposed comparison employees), it simultaneously showed that his prior work demanded less than that

of the other TNFMs--the same group of comparison employees. In short: post-April 19, 1995--Coward's work was less

than TNFMs; pre-April 19, 1995--his work was less than

that of "other" TNFMs, a group to which he was added only

because of confusion over his job title.

Second, the majority suggests that the record is in conflict

over whether Coward ever received an elevation from pay

grade E-8 to pay grade E-9. It is obscure why the majority

regards this as material: the record is crystal clear that the

two pay grades overlapped almost completely. The difference in the mid-point of the grades as of January 1, 1995 was

very small--less than $3500 ($35,644 v. $38,971); but the

spread of each grade was huge: E-8 sprawled from $28,826

to $42,241, and E-9 from $31,265 to $46,288. See Joint

Appendix ("J.A.") 1776.2 In any event, as we shall see,

Coward did get moved to E-9 and then back to E-8; his

actual salary kept increasing throughout the entire period

and was at all times within the range for both grades.

Sprinkled over the majority's torture of the record is the

further suggestion that ADT failed even to claim that its

post-April 19, 1995 defense embraced the earlier period.

This is not true. Accordingly, in addressing the evidence I

will also note the correspondence between the evidence and

ADT's reasoning.

Coward's duties. Coward and ADT agree that Coward

received the title TNFM in March 1994. Despite the "promotion," Coward testified that his duties remained basically

the same when he acquired and then lost the title TNFM and

the pay grade E-9. He said, "[The TNFM title] was not a

promotion. It was just something that was set up to match

__________

2 I omit the initial two numbers from each citation to the Joint

Appendix.

USCA Case #98-7230 Document #476913 Filed: 11/12/1999 Page 12 of 16
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

the jobs that I was doing.... It was actually what I had

been doing for the past 10 or 12 years." Deposition of

Edward Coward ("Coward Dep.") at 57, J.A. 1851, 1861. He

continued, "I assume [the title Technical Support-SSO is] just

another ADT term because I'm basically doing the same job."

Id. His opening brief here agreed: "To date, there has been

little, if any, change in Coward's responsibilities as a TNFM."

Appellant's Initial Br. at 3.

In the Spring of 1995, the Mid-Atlantic Division president

reviewed the duties of all Capital Region employees. During

this review, ADT found that the only nominal TNFM at an

SSO (i.e., Coward) had narrower duties and responsibilities

than other TNFMs. See Swinarski Decl. at 7 p 21, J.A. 1773

(stating that Coward's pay grade was changed for reasons of

internal equity after ADT determined that his duties were

"significantly narrower than those of the [TNFMs] assigned

to CMC's."). Because ADT compared Coward to all of the

other TNFMs in the region at a time when Coward's duties

were as broad as they had ever been, its reasons for paying

him less than TNFMs at CMCs apply to the entire period at

issue in this case.

ADT's summary judgment motion invokes this evidence.

See ADT's Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment at 9-10, J.A. at 2182-83. Although ADT

referred to the division president's review both in its discussion of the decision to lower Coward's pay grade and the

subsequent decision to change his title, the point of the pay

grade analysis in ADT's motion for summary judgment is that

effective April 19, 1995, Coward's pay grade was adjusted to

match the scope of his duties before and after that date. See

id. His title, however, was not changed until ADT decided

that it would not assign additional duties to Coward to bring

him in line with others who held the TNFM title. See

Deposition of Edward B. Pictroski ("Pictroski Dep.") at 64,

73-76, J.A. 1602, 1611-12 (noting that Coward did not receive

the title Technical Support-SSO until May 17, 1995, once

ADT determined that it would continue to confine the broader

telecommunication networking duties to workers at CMCs).

ADT made the point explicitly in its motion for summary

USCA Case #98-7230 Document #476913 Filed: 11/12/1999 Page 13 of 16
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

judgment. See ADT's Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment at 10, J.A. 2183.

Coward's poster child comparison worker--supposedly doing the same work but paid more--was John Wyatt, a TNFM

in Baltimore. It is now undisputed that his network and

management duties exceeded those of Coward; indeed, he

decided which continuing education courses workers such as

Coward would take. See Coward Dep. at 102-03, J.A. at

1868-69. But his duties had not suddenly eclipsed Coward's

after April 1995: he served as a facilities manager from the

time he started with ADT in 1987 into the period of litigation

itself. See Deposition of Michael Kennelly ("Kennelly Dep.")

at 43-44, J.A. 1644, 1686-87 (identifying Wyatt as having

started his facilities management work as of 1987 and having

broader duties than Coward because he was responsible for

the facilities for a large portion of the Mid-Atlantic Division).

In its brief on summary judgment ADT pointed to the WyattCoward comparison, never suggesting any time limits on the

contrast in duties.3 See ADT's Supplemental Memorandum

in Support of Summary Judgment at 10 & n.5, J.A. at 2183 &

n.5 (noting that Wyatt had substantial network and management duties that exceeded those assigned to Coward).

The majority concludes its analysis of Coward's duties by

suggesting that no comparison can be drawn between Coward

and the TNFMs because Coward's responsibilities declined

after he was reclassified. As we have seen, the evidence in

fact shows that the reclassification occured simply to bring

Coward's title into line with his real responsibilities. There is

no evidence supporting the idea that the reclassification

brought on a reduction in duties. The majority cites the

testimony of ADT's director of benefits and compensation,

Edward B. Pictroski. See Maj. Op. at 7. While Pictroski

testified that Coward's "duties" changed when his job

changed from TNFM to Technical Support-SSO, see Pictroski Dep. at 75, J.A. at 1614, it is plain that this referred only

__________

3 Of course its reference to pay alluded to the only pay

comparison data in the record, which did relate to the post-April 19,

1995 period.

USCA Case #98-7230 Document #476913 Filed: 11/12/1999 Page 14 of 16
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

to the uncontested fact (indeed, the tautology) that Coward's

general job description changed when he was classified as

Technical Support-SSO. Pictroski explicitly acknowledged

that he had no idea what Coward actually did on a day-to-day

basis. See id. at 76, J.A. at 1614. Given that ADT offered

him solely to describe corporate policy, see Appellee's Br. at

10-11, the ignorance is hardly surprising.

The majority also cites Coward's exclusion from supervisory meetings as evidence that his duties changed. Maj. Op. at

7. But Coward gave this testimony about exclusion from a

supervisors' meeting on October 1, 1996, at least 19 months

after the supposed down-grading. Coward stated explicitly

that the exclusion occured "a few days earlier." See Coward

Dep. at 66, J.A. at 1862 (emphasis added); see also id. at 65-

66, J.A. at 1862 (explaining that he had complained about the

exclusion in "a conversation I had with my immediate boss

last week concerning my status with the company" (emphasis

added)). Obviously such attendance could not have been a

critical difference between the TNFM and Technical

Support-SSO jobs if it took until late September of 1996 for

ADT to stop inviting Coward to the meetings, or at least for

Coward to notice his exclusion. The change described by

Coward (assuming it occurred) was plainly a change within

the period for which we all agree summary judgment was

proper, not a change between the two periods.

The elevation to salary grade E-9. There is no basis for

the majority's uncertainty as to whether Coward ever received the E-9 grade. See Maj. Op. at 7-8. Coward's

"Personnel Data Maintenance Form" shows the shift from

E-9 to E-8 effective April 19, 1995, J.A. 1799. No change in

actual pay occurred at the time; this is unsurprising as there

was no change in duties and his pay at the time was comfortably within the ranges for both nominal pay grades. See J.A.

1776 (listing the salary ranges for each grade).

In short, even if we accept the majority's application of the

continuity principle (i.e., the supposition that Coward must

have earned less than some TNFMs prior to his reclassification because he earned less than some TNFMs after reclassiUSCA Case #98-7230 Document #476913 Filed: 11/12/1999 Page 15 of 16
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

fication), it turns out that ADT's explanation of the superficial

discrepancies of the post-April 19, 1995 era covers the entire

period that Coward's complaint--though not his evidence--

purported to put in issue.

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the court's judgment

affirming summary judgment for the period after April 19,

1995, but dissent from it insofar as it remands the case for

further proceedings.

USCA Case #98-7230 Document #476913 Filed: 11/12/1999 Page 16 of 16