Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-01079/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-01079-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Craig Brooks
Defendant
Thomas Gotshall
Defendant
Richard George Haley
Plaintiff

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD GEORGE HALEY,

Plaintiff, 

 v.

THOMAS GOTSHALL,

Defendant.

/

No. C 15-1079 WHA (PR) 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(Dkt. 34, 43) 

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, an inmate at Sonoma County Jail who is proceeding pro se, filed this civil

rights case under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Thomas Gotshall, an Assistant District Attorney at the

Sonoma County District Attorney’s Office who prosecuted plaintiff on charges involving

passing counterfeit checks. Defendant has filed a motion for summary judgment, plaintiff has

filed a motion to defer considering the motion for summary judgment, and defendant has filed a

reply brief. For the reasons discussed below, the motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

STATEMENT

The following facts are not in dispute. On September 27, 2014, plaintiff was arrested in

Santa Rosa, California, for passing a fraudulent check for over one thousand dollars at a

furniture store (Rosenthal Decl. ¶¶ 1-6). He was eventually charged in two separate cases on

multiple felony counts related to passing fraudulent checks, and those cases were later

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consolidated (Arnold Decl. Exhs. B, E, K, O, P). In addition to charges of passing fraudulent

checks, plaintiff was charged with six counts of unlawfully using identifying information —

commonly known as identity theft — of Citibank and Wells Fargo Bank, in violation of Section

530.5 of the California Penal Code (Second Arnold Decl. Exh. BB; Rosenthal Decl. Exh. U;

Adams Decl. Exh. Z). Specifically, three of the passed checks falsely represented that they

were issued by “Citibank West FSB” and listed Citibank’s website, and three other passed

checks falsely used Wells Fargo routing numbers (ibid.). On January 14, 2015, the identity

theft charges were dismissed following the preliminary hearing, and on March 9, 2015, plaintiff

pleaded no contest to one count of felony commercial burglary for entering the furniture store

with the intent to commit larceny in return for dismissal of all remaining counts (Arnold Decl.

Exhs. Q, S). One month later, he was sentenced to a four-year tem in Sonoma County Jail (id.

Exh. T).

The investigation of plaintiff’s property revealed that he was in possession of an Internal

Revenue Service (“IRS”) form SS-4 assigning an Employer Identification Number to “Apex

Holdings Ltd., Richard Haley Mbr” (“Apex”) (Adams Decl. Exh. Y). In his deposition,

plaintiff explained that Apex is a fictitious business name that he registered with the Sonoma

County Recorder’s Office (Second Arnold Decl. Exh. AA (“Pl. Depo.”) 56). Apex has no bank

account, no employees, no income, and never filed taxes, and its only asset is a provider

agreement that it obtained free of charge from the United States Postal Service (id. 71-73, 92-

93, 98, 101-03, 119).

Plaintiff makes two claims that were further elaborated upon in his deposition. First, he

claims that the 530.5 charges filed by defendant prevented the sale of Apex Holdings (Compl.

3). He asserts that he was going to sell Apex Holdings to a “business broker” in Ventura,

California for $325,000, but the offer was canceled because defendant charged him with

stealing the identity of Apex Holdings (Pl. Depo. 52-53, 59, 102-03, 111, 121-22, 134, 142,

171, 173-75). Plaintiff’s valuation of Apex Holdings is based solely upon its possession of the

free provider agreement with the postal service (id. 115-16). Plaintiff’s second claim is that

defendant entered his “false” 530.5 charges into a “life scan information system,” which rased

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his “bondability rating” (Compl. 3; Pl. Depo. 155-59, 160-61, 178). Because of his high rating,

he asserts that when he contacted a bail bondsman in January 2015 to post bail, the bail

bondsmen informed him that he could not do so because there was “no bail” (id. 41-42).

Plaintiff seeks money damages and injunctive relief, specifically to have removed a “hold” from

the postal service preventing from accessing his postal provider account on the internet, and a

“hold” from the IRS preventing him from transferring the APEX tax identification number to a

new purchaser (Compl. 3; Pl. Depo163, 167-68, 171.) He claims that the identity theft charges

caused the holds to be placed (ibid.).

ANALYSIS

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show that

there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Material facts are those which may affect

the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,248 (1986). A dispute

as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a

verdict for the nonmoving party. Ibid.

The moving party for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those

portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits which demonstrate the absence of a genuine

issue of material fact. Celotex Corp.v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). When the moving

party has met this burden of production, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings

and, by its own affidavits or discovery, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine

issue for trial. Ibid. If the nonmoving party fails to produce enough evidence to show a

genuine issue of material fact, the moving party wins. Ibid.

II. CLAIMS

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2)

that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. 

West v. Atkins, 87 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

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Plaintiff’s first claim — that defendant prevented the sale of Apex by charging him with

stealing Apex’s identity — is contradicted by the evidence. The records from plaintiff’s

prosecution show that he was charged with stealing the identity of Citibank and Wells Fargo

Bank, not Apex (Arnold Decl. Exhs. K, O). Plaintiff has not presented any evidence

contradicting these records, nor does he dispute them in his opposing papers. He concedes in

his deposition that his claims are based upon defendant having charged him with stealing the

identity of Apex (Pl. Depo. 130, 160, 162, 172-74). Because the evidence shows that he was

not charged with stealing the identity of Apex, summary judgment is warranted on his first

claim. 

Summary judgment is warranted on the first claim for another reason. Plaintiff alleges

that there was an offer from an unidentified broker for $325,000 for Apex, but he offers no

evidence of this offer, he does not identify this broker or the purchaser or provide any evidence

of their existence, nor does he present any evidence of any kind of purchase agreement. In

addition, in light of the undisputed evidence that Apex’s only asset was a free agreement

obtained from the postal service, no reasonably inference can be drawn that anyone would offer

to buy it alone, let alone for the Apex, let alone for the generous sum alleged by plaintiff. 

Plaintiff’s allegations in support of his first claim also fail to establish a violation of his

constitutional rights. The disclosure of the fact of an arrest to a third party on criminal charges

is not in and of itself a constitutional violation. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976). 

To the extent plaintiff is asserting an injury to his reputation, moreover, that is not an interest

protected by due process. Id. at 710, 712. There must also be a deprivation of a tangible

interest in addition to the defamation, i.e. a “stigma plus.” Id. At 710-11; WMX Technologies v.

Miller, 80 F.3d 1315, 1320 (9th Cir. 1996). The allegedly prevented does not qualify as the

“plus” interest because in order to show “stigma plus,” plaintiff must show that the defamation

by the government was “accompanied by an injury directly caused by the government, rather

than an injury caused by the act of some third party.” Id. It is alleged that the broker withdrew

the offer, not the government. More importantly, the charges were not defamatory because

there is no dispute that the charges truthfully stated that plaintiff’s checks used the identifying

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information of Citibank and Wells Fargo Bank. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. V. Cohn, 420 U.S.

469, 489 (1975) (truth is a defense to defamation). As a result, the allegations in the first claim

do not establish a violation of any interest protected by due process. Nor is any other

constitutional right or federal law implicated by plaintiff’s first claim. 

Plaintiff’s second claim also fails on numerous grounds. He claims that defendant

entered the “false” charges that plaintiff stole the identity of Apex into a database that raised

plaintiff’s “bondability rating” to the point that he could not obtain bail. First, as described

above, the criminal records show that he was not charged with stealing Apex’s identity, and the

charges that he claims were “false” never existed. In addition, a bail bondsmen informed him in

January 2015 that he could not post bail because the records show that the state court had set

had his bail at “no bail” several months earlier, not because of his “bondability rating” (see

Arnold Decl. Exh. C). Finally, plaintiff asserts no violation of federal law arising from the

allegations relating to this claim, nor is any such violation apparent. Plaintiff states that his

“equal rights” were violated, which might be a reference to the Equal Protection Clause. 

However, there is no allegation, evidence or indication of any similarly situated person who was

treated differently from plaintiff, as is required to establish an equal protection violation. See

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). 

 It is noted that the injunctive relief plaintiff requests — removing the postal service and

IRS holds — are not available for the simple reason that there is no evidence beyond his

“assumption” that the charges or any other action or inaction by defendant caused the holds to

be placed (see Pl. Depo. 170, 173). Further, plaintiff has received instructions from both the

postal service and the IRS explaining how he can have the holds released without court

intervention (id. 163, 171).

In response to defendant’s motion, plaintiff filed a “motion to defer considering

defendant’s motion for summary judgment.” In the motion, he requests that consideration of

defendant’s summary judgment motion be “deferred” until the plaintiff can present his case to a

jury (dkt. 43 at 4). This is effectively an opposition to granting summary judgment, and it is

construed as such.

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Plaintiff’s opposition does not address the claims in his complaint, but rather makes a

new argument: that an email sent to his attorney by a Deputy District Attorney Craig Brooks (a

non-party) in November 2014 “publicly announced” that plaintiff would be prosecuted for

stealing Apex’s identity despite defendant’s “knowledge” that Apex was not a victim of

plaintiff’s identity theft (id. 1, 2, Exh. A). Plaintiff argues that this makes defendant liable

under Section 1983 for libel and for pursuing a different “plan” than charging plaintiff with

stealing Apex’s identity (id. 2). These are effectively new claims in that they were not alleged

in the complaint, and as such they would have to be added to this case by way of amendment

under Rule 15(a). It would be futile to allow plaintiff to amend the complaint to add these

claims because they do not state a cognizable basis for relief. Libel is not actionable under

Section 1983, see Paul, 424 U.S. at 710, and in any event defendant did not write the allegedly

libelous email. Any change in the prosecutor’s plan does not violate the federal constitution or

other federal law, and deciding not to pursue a certain charge is the type of decision-making

that is at the heart of prosecutorial immunity. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431

(1976); Botello v. Gammick, 413 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 2005). Plaintiff also appears to argue

that charging him with stealing Apex’s identity would have violated his civil rights because the

prosecutor had knowledge that such charges were false. There was no such violation, however,

because those charges were not filed; simply discussing the possibility of such charges with

plaintiff’s attorney violates no federal law.

Plaintiff has created no triable issue as to whether or not his federal constitutional or

statutory rights were violated by defendant. As a result, defendant is entitled to summary

judgment on plaintiff’s civil rights claims. 

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. The

Clerk shall enter judgment and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 16 , 2016. 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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