Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-08-05231/USCOURTS-ca4-08-05231-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mario Terrell Day
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.  No. 08-5231

MARIO TERRELL DAY,

Defendant-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond.

Richard L. Williams, Senior District Judge.

(3:08-cr-00403-RLW-1)

Argued: October 28, 2009

Decided: January 8, 2010

Before KING, SHEDD, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge King

wrote the opinion, in which Judge Shedd joined. Judge Davis

wrote a separate opinion dissenting in part and concurring in

the judgment in part.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Richard Daniel Cooke, OFFICE OF THE

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for

Appellant. Mary Elizabeth Maguire, OFFICE OF THE FEDAppeal: 08-5231 Doc: 29 Filed: 01/08/2010 Pg: 1 of 32
ERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Richmond, Virginia, for

Appellee. ON BRIEF: Dana J. Boente, Acting United States

Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, Michael C. Moore, Assistant

United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES

ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Michael S.

Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Alexandria, Virginia,

for Appellee.

OPINION

KING, Circuit Judge:

The Government pursues this interlocutory appeal from the

district court’s decision of December 1, 2008, suppressing

evidence obtained from defendant Mario Day by private

security guards. See United States v. Day, 590 F. Supp. 2d

796 (E.D. Va. 2008). The court’s decision was premised on

its determination that the security guards acted as Government

agents and contravened Day’s constitutional rights. More specifically, the court concluded that the security guards violated

Day’s Fourth Amendment rights, by conducting a search and

seizure beyond the scope authorized in Terry v. Ohio, 392

U.S. 1 (1968), and his Fifth Amendment rights, by conducting

a custodial interrogation without first giving Day the warnings

required under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

Because we conclude that the security guards were not acting

as Government agents, we reverse and remand.

I.

The relevant facts, as outlined by the district court, are as

follows:

On July 5, 2008, Officers Costa and Slader of the

American Security Group were on duty at the

Regency Lake apartment complex [in Chesterfield

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County, Virginia]. They are both "armed security

officers" with the power to arrest pursuant to Virginia Code Section 9.1-138 et seq. While patrolling,

the officers noticed a gathering at 6464 Planet Road.

Shortly after midnight, they observed individuals

later identified as Evan Moore and Mario Day, the

defendant, in the middle of the road arguing with

unseen individuals inside the apartment. The officers

observed Day retrieve a gun from a nearby Caprice.

Holding the gun at the "low and ready," Day began

advancing on the apartment while continuing to

shout at the individuals inside. Exiting their patrol

car, the officers drew their weapons and yelled at

Day to freeze as they ran towards him. Day immediately placed the gun on the floorboard of the Caprice

and raised his hands. The officers placed Day in

restraints and conducted a Terry search, wherein

they found no suspicious bulges or hard objects.

Nevertheless, and without giving any Miranda warnings, Officer Costa asked Day if he had "anything

illegal" on him. Day admitted he ha[d] a little marijuana; Officer Costa reached into Day’s pants pocket

and retrieved the marijuana. The officers also questioned Day about the firearm, which he said he was

carrying for his safety.

The officers contacted their superior, Lieutenant

Pentato, and the Chesterfield police department.

Chesterfield Police Officer Neville arrived and took

over custody of Day and Moore.

Day, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 799.

On September 3, 2008, a grand jury in the Eastern District

of Virginia indicted Day on a single count of being a drug

user in possession of a firearm, in contravention of 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(3), and on an additional count of possession of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). On October 17,

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2008, Day filed a motion to suppress "the firearm, marijuana

and all statements made by [him] on the day of his arrest."

J.A. 75.1 Thereafter, on November 12, 2008, the district court

conducted a hearing on the suppression motion.

By its decision of December 1, 2008, the district court

granted Day’s suppression motion in part and denied it in

part. More specifically, the court granted the suppression

motion "as to the marijuana and to all statements about the

firearm or marijuana," and denied the motion "as to the firearm" itself. Day, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 804.2

 In so ruling, the

court first determined that Officers Costa and Slader, though

private security guards, "were acting as governmental agents

in their interactions with Day." Id. at 802. Accordingly, the

court proceeded to consider whether Costa and Slader had

contravened Day’s constitutional rights. The court concluded

that, "[t]o ensure their safety and that of bystanders, the officers were justified in conducting the pat-down of Day’s clothing" and in "seiz[ing] . . . the plainly visible gun." Id. at 803.

The court further concluded, however, that once the pat-down

revealed "nothing indicative of either a weapon or contraband," the search was "no longer valid under Terry" — thus

requiring suppression of the marijuana. Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted). Finally, the court concluded that Day was in

custody when he was questioned by Costa and Slader, and

1Citations herein to "J.A. ___" refer to the contents of the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this appeal. 

2Notably, the district court ruled on the admissibility of Day’s statements not only to the private security guards (Officers Costa and Slader),

but also to the Chesterfield police officer called to the scene (Officer Neville). The Government "conceded that Officer Neville engaged in custodial

interrogation without advising Day of his Miranda rights," and the court

concluded that "any statements Day made to Neville about either the marijuana or the gun must be suppressed." Day, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 804. In this

interlocutory appeal, the Government does not challenge the court’s suppression of Day’s statements to Neville. Thus, our review is limited to the

status of Costa and Slader as Government agents and the suppression of

the marijuana and the statements made to them. 

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that, having already "secured the firearm and conducted a

fruitless Terry search," "the officers could not get a second

bite at the apple by engaging in custodial interrogation without issuing a Miranda warning." Id. at 804. The court therefore suppressed Day’s statements to Costa and Slader about

the marijuana and the firearm. See id.

On December 10, 2008, the day before Day’s trial had been

scheduled to begin, the Government timely noted this appeal.

In accordance with the jurisdictional predicate of 18 U.S.C.

§ 3731, the United States Attorney has certified that the

appeal "is not taken for the purpose of delay" and that the

excluded evidence constitutes "a substantial proof of a fact

material in the proceeding." J.A. 95. We thus possess jurisdiction pursuant to the provisions of § 3731.

II.

In assessing a trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress,

we review the court’s factual findings for clear error and its

legal determinations de novo. See United States v. Kellam,

568 F.3d 125, 132 (4th Cir. 2009). The Government’s primary

contention in this appeal is that the district court erred in concluding that Officers Costa and Slader were acting as Government agents at the time of their encounter with Day. As such,

the Government asserts that the court erroneously suppressed

the marijuana, as well as the marijuana- and firearm-related

statements. As explained below, we agree with the Government and thus reverse and remand.3

3

In these circumstances, we need not reach the Government’s alternative contention that the marijuana and marijuana-related statements should

not have been suppressed because the marijuana-related statements were

made during a Terry stop, and not during a custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings. Notably, this contention would not justify a complete reversal of the district court’s suppression rulings, as the

Government acknowledges that the firearm-related statements are inadmissible under Miranda if Costa and Slader were acting as Government

agents. 

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A.

It is axiomatic that "[t]he Fourth Amendment protects

against unreasonable searches and seizures by Government

officials and those private individuals acting as instruments or

agents of the Government." United States v. Jarrett, 338 F.3d

339, 344 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire,

403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971)) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). The Fourth Amendment, however, "does not

provide protection against searches by private individuals acting in a private capacity." Id. (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)). Similarly, "[t]he sole concern

of the Fifth Amendment, on which Miranda was based, is

governmental coercion." Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157,

170 (1986). Thus, regardless of whether the Fourth or Fifth

Amendment is at issue, we apply the same test to determine

whether a private individual acted as a Government agent. Cf.

United States v. Alexander, 447 F.3d 1290, 1294-95 (10th Cir.

2006).

First of all, under the applicable test, "[t]he defendant bears

the burden of proving that an agency relationship exists"

between the Government and the private individual. Jarrett,

338 F.3d at 344 (citing United States v. Ellyson, 326 F.3d 522,

527 (4th Cir. 2003)).4 As we have observed, "whether the requisite agency relationship exists ‘necessarily turns on the

degree of the Government’s participation in the private

party’s activities, . . . a question that can only be resolved in

light of all the circumstances.’" Jarrett, 338 F.3d at 344 (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 614

4

In Jarrett and Ellyson, we outlined the contours of the applicable test

in the context of a Fourth Amendment, rather than a Fifth Amendment,

claim. See Jarrett, 338 F.3d at 346-48 (assessing whether anonymous

computer hacker was acting as Government agent when he procured child

pornography files from defendant’s computer); Ellyson, 326 F.3d at 528-

29 (deciding whether defendant’s roommate acted as Government agent

when she located child pornography in shared residence and turned it over

to police). 

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(1989)) (alteration in original). This "is a fact-intensive

inquiry that is guided by common law agency principles."

Ellyson, 326 F.3d at 527. We have recognized "two primary

factors" to be considered: (1) "whether the Government knew

of and acquiesced in the private" individual’s challenged conduct; and (2) "whether the private individual intended to assist

law enforcement or had some other independent motivation."

Jarrett, 338 F.3d at 344; see also Ellyson, 326 F.3d at 527

(compressing two factors into "[o]ne highly pertinent consideration").

B.

Here, in concluding that the private security guards, Officers Costa and Slader, acted as Government agents during

their encounter with Day, the district court focused on the

Commonwealth of Virginia’s regulation of private security

guards. The court noted that Costa and Slader each was an

"armed security officer," as defined in the Code of Virginia.

See Day, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 799 (citing Va. Code. Ann. § 9.1-

138). And the court observed that "[t]hese officers were vetted, trained, and continue to be subject to disciplinary action

under the aegis of the state’s Criminal Justice Services

Board." Id. at 801; see also id. at 800 (discussing Va. Code

Ann. § 9.1-139(C), (F) (requiring an armed security officer to

obtain "a valid registration" by satisfying "compulsory minimum training standards established by the Board" and submitting to a "state and national fingerprint search"); Va. Code

Ann. § 9.1-141(C)(6) (empowering the Board, inter alia, to

"[r]eceive complaints concerning the conduct of [an armed

security officer], to conduct investigations, and to take appropriate disciplinary action if warranted")). Furthermore, of

utmost importance to the court was the fact that, "[w]ithout

limitation, the Virginia Code endows armed security officers

with the power to effect arrests for any offenses occurring in

an on-duty officer’s presence." Id. at 801 (citing Va. Code

Ann. § 9.1-146 (authorizing an armed security officer "to

effect an arrest for an offense occurring . . . in his presence"

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"while at a location which the [private security services] business is contracted to protect")).

Relevant to the first factor of the applicable agency test —

whether the Government "knew of and acquiesced in" the

challenged conduct of Officers Costa and Slader, see Jarrett,

338 F.3d at 344 — the district court determined that, in view

of Virginia’s regulatory scheme for armed security officers,

"the state is not a mere passive participant" in their conduct.

Day, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 801-02. "[R]ather," the court

explained, Virginia "affirmatively encouraged and enabled

these officers to engage in the complained-of conduct, for

without their state-granted authority, these officers could not

have acted as de facto police. In short, the state was the genesis of their power and activities rather than a mere passive

recipient of the largess of their actions." Id. at 802.5

With respect to the second factor of the applicable agency

test — whether Officers Costa and Slader "intended to assist

law enforcement or had some other independent motivation,"

see Jarrett, 338 F.3d at 344 — the district court found that

"[c]learly the officers acted with the intent of deterring crime

and assisting law enforcement." Day, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 802.

In light of all the circumstances, the court concluded that

Costa and Slader "were acting as governmental agents in their

interactions with Day." Id.

5As further support for the proposition that Officers Costa and Slader

"were operating as de facto police on the night in question," the district

court observed that "[t]he officers were ‘patrolling’ the area in their

unmarked sedan (a car of sufficient similarity to the stereotypical image

of an unmarked police car that a Chesterfield officer ‘assumed’ it must be

the security officers’ vehicle)," and that "[b]oth officers were wearing

black uniforms with gold emblems on the sleeves, displaying a gold badge

virtually identical to a police shield, and bearing handguns," rendering

them "the quintessential image of law enforcement." Day, 590 F. Supp. 2d

at 802. 

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C.

Although the district court’s analysis has some appeal, we

ultimately cannot agree that Day met his burden of proving an

agency relationship between the Government and Officers

Costa and Slader. Cf. United States v. Poe, 556 F.3d 1113,

1117 (10th Cir. 2009) (ruling that private bounty hunters did

not qualify as state actors); United States v. Shahid, 117 F.3d

322, 323 (7th Cir. 1997) (concluding that private security officers at shopping mall were not acting as agents of Government). In explaining why this is so, we address each factor of

the applicable agency test in turn.

1.

As discussed above, the first factor of the applicable test

concerns "whether the Government knew of and acquiesced

in the private" individual’s challenged conduct. Jarrett, 338

F.3d at 344. Significantly, "[i]n seeking to give content to this

factor, we have required evidence of more than mere knowledge and passive acquiescence by the Government before

finding an agency relationship." Id. at 345 (citing Ellyson, 326

F.3d at 527-28). Thus, for example, in the case of an alleged

Fourth Amendment violation, "simple acquiescence by the

Government does not suffice to transform a private search

into a Government search. Rather, there must be some evidence of Government participation in or affirmative encouragement of the private search before a court will hold it

unconstitutional. Passive acceptance by the Government is not

enough." Id. at 345-46.

In the district court’s view, because Virginia regulates

armed security officers — and particularly because it confers

on such officers the power to make certain arrests — the

Commonwealth "affirmatively encouraged" the challenged

conduct of Officers Costa and Slader. See Day, 590 F. Supp.

2d at 802. Virginia’s regulatory scheme, however, merely permitted Costa and Slader to arrest Day; it did not require or

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even encourage an arrest or any other complained-of action.

Indeed, nothing in the regulatory scheme suggests that Costa

and Slader "would expect some benefit (e.g., receiving a

reward from the government) from taking the action, or

expect some detriment (e.g., getting in trouble with government authorities) from not acting." See Shahid, 117 F.3d at

327 (describing situations where Government knew of and

acquiesced in private party’s conduct). For example, although

armed security officers are generally subject to disciplinary

action by the Commonwealth, see Va. Code Ann. § 9.1-

141(C)(6), nothing in this record indicates that Virginia could

have disciplined Costa and Slader for failing to act as they did

toward Day.

In these circumstances, we cannot agree with the district

court that Virginia’s regulatory scheme served to "affirmatively encourage" Costa and Slader’s challenged conduct.

Rather, Costa and Slader were simply empowered by the

Commonwealth to make an arrest. This "‘[m]ere governmental authorization’" for an arrest by Costa and Slader, "‘in the

absence of more active participation or encouragement,’" is

insufficient to implicate the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.

See Jarrett, 338 F.3d at 345 (quoting United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788, 792 (9th Cir. 1981)); cf. Poe, 556 F.3d at

1124 (explaining that "Oklahoma’s extensive statutory regulation of the bail bonds industry, coupled with conferring the

powers of arrest," was insufficient to establish governmental

"knowledge of or acquiescence in the [bounty hunters’] challenged search" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Shahid,

117 F.3d at 327 (observing that "[t]he government cannot be

said to have induced" the challenged search by mall security

officers, who expected no "benefit or detriment from the government as a result of their actions").6

6

In certain circumstances, the conduct of a private party can be attributed to the Government as the result of a regulatory scheme. For example, in Skinner, the Supreme Court concluded that blood and urine tests

required by private railroads — in voluntary compliance with federal regu10 UNITED STATES v. DAY

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The proposition that Virginia did not participate in or

encourage the challenged conduct of Officers Costa and

Slader is reinforced by testimony given during the November

12, 2008 suppression hearing in the district court — testimony

uncontradicted by Day and not addressed by the court. Costa

testified that, as of the time of his encounter with Day on July

5, 2008, no law enforcement agency had ever given him any

directives concerning his work as a private security guard at

the Regency Lake apartment complex. More specifically,

Costa had received no instructions from the Chesterfield

police department regarding Day and expected no reward

from the police department for his actions that night. Similarly, Slader testified that no state or federal law enforcement

agency directed his day-to-day activities as a security guard,

that he received no compensation from any state entity, and

that he neither expected nor received any reward from the

Chesterfield police department in connection with Day. Additionally, Officer Neville of the Chesterfield police department

— who was called to the scene and assumed custody of Day

only after Costa and Slader’s challenged conduct occurred —

testified that he had never directed the activities of any private

security guards at the Regency Lake apartment complex.

According to Neville, although he had responded to a call at

the apartment complex prior to July 5, 2008, he had never

previously interacted with the security guards there.

lations governing these tests — implicated the Fourth Amendment. See

489 U.S. at 614-15. The Court explained that "specific features of the regulations combine to convince us that the Government did more than adopt

a passive position toward the underlying private conduct." Id. at 615. Such

features "removed all legal barriers to the testing authorized by" the regulations, "made plain [the Government’s] strong preference for testing,"

and expressed the Government’s "desire to share the fruits of such intrusions." Id. This case, by contrast, presents "the more usual situation in

which the government merely knows of or acquiesces in a private person’s

[conduct], whose fruits (e.g., drugs or a confession) are then appropriated

by the government for its own purposes." See Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 488 n.7 (4th Cir. 2006). 

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In light of this undisputed evidence, there simply is no

basis for concluding that the Government participated in or

affirmatively encouraged Costa and Slader’s challenged conduct. Accordingly, Day cannot satisfy his burden on the first

factor of the applicable agency test.

2.

The second factor of the agency test concerns "whether the

private individual intended to assist law enforcement or had

some other independent motivation." Jarrett, 338 F.3d at 344.

With respect to this factor, the district court found that

"[c]learly the officers acted with the intent of deterring crime

and assisting law enforcement." Day, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 802.

Of course, the objective of "deterring crime" is entirely consistent with Officer Costa and Slader’s responsibility to protect the tenants and property of the Regency Lake apartment

complex, irrespective of any simultaneous goal of assisting

law enforcement. See, e.g., J.A. 15 (testimony of Costa that

"we are there as a deterrent"). "In any event, even if the sole

or paramount intent of the security officers had been to assist

law enforcement, . . . such an intent would not transform a

private action into a public action" absent a sufficient showing

of Government knowledge and acquiescence under the first

factor of the agency test. See Shahid, 117 F.3d at 326 (internal

quotation marks omitted). Having concluded that Day failed

to satisfy the test’s first factor, he cannot yet establish that

Costa and Slader were acting as Government agents by satisfying the second factor. See Jarrett, 338 F.3d at 345 (recognizing that, because Government conceded second factor of

agency test, private individual’s status as Government agent

turned on first factor thereof).

D.

Finally, we address a theory of agency relied on by the district court and pursued in this appeal by Day: that, under the

"public function" test typically utilized for assessing a private

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party’s susceptibility to a civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, Virginia’s conferral of arrest powers on Officers

Costa and Slader was enough to render them de facto police.

See Day, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 800-01 ("‘Where private security

guards are endowed by law with plenary police powers such

that they are de facto police officers, they may qualify as state

actors under the public function test.’" (quoting Romanski v.

Detroit Entm’t, L.L.C., 428 F.3d 629, 637 (6th Cir. 2005)).

Our Court has applied such a test, in Rodriguez v. Smithfield

Packing Co., to determine whether a plant security official

was a state actor for purposes of § 1983 liability. See 338 F.3d

348, 354-55 (4th Cir. 2003). As we explained in Rodriguez,

"[t]he Fourth Circuit has held that ‘one of the paradigmatic

means by which a private party becomes subject to section

1983 is through the government’s conferral upon that party of

what is, at core, sovereign power’ — a power, in other words,

that is ‘traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State.’"

Id. at 354 (quoting Goldstein v. Chestnut Ridge Volunteer

Fire Co., 218 F.3d 337, 342 (4th Cir. 2000)); see also Romanski, 428 F.3d at 636 ("Under the public function test, a private

entity is said to be performing a public function if it is exercising powers traditionally reserved to the state . . . .").7

The Rodriguez plaintiffs brought § 1983 claims against a

plant security official, Daniel Priest, for constitutional violations allegedly committed during the plaintiffs’ August 22,

1997 arrests at the plant, in Bladen County, North Carolina,

by Priest and the Bladen County Sheriff’s Department. See

338 F.3d at 352. In analyzing whether Priest was a state actor

subject to § 1983 liability, we deemed the following facts to

be relevant to our inquiry:

7The parties dispute whether, in the circumstances of Day’s suppression

motion, it is appropriate to apply a "free-standing" public function test or

to utilize such a test as part of analyzing the first factor of the agency test.

Because we conclude that Officers Costa and Slader were not state actors

under the public function test, we need not resolve this issue. 

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Priest was an auxiliary deputy sheriff[, i.e., a sworn

deputy sheriff who is not on the payroll and works

at the discretion of the County Sheriff,] invested

with the full panoply of powers afforded to full-time

deputies, including the power to arrest. The County

Sheriff had given Priest primary responsibility in his

role as auxiliary deputy sheriff for a broad range of

law enforcement work at the plant, from conducting

criminal investigations and making arrests to serving

civil and criminal papers. On August 22, Priest was

working in concert with the Sheriff’s Department to

provide security in a potentially volatile situation. He

had a deputy sheriff badge clipped on his belt, a

sheriff’s department radio, handcuffs, pepper spray,

and a gun. And he testified that he told [one of the

plaintiffs] "Sheriff’s Department, you are under

arrest," handcuffed him, and enlisted another deputy

to help him take [that plaintiff] out of the building

and to the waiting police car.

Id. at 354-55. Priest’s actions were, as we observed, "the natural result of [his] official role within Bladen County, in which

he was expected to perform law enforcement functions at the

. . . plant on behalf of the Sheriff’s Department." Id. at 355.

These circumstances compelled the conclusion "that Priest

was acting under color of state law when making arrests at the

[plant] on August 22." Id. In so ruling, we observed that "[i]t

is beyond dispute that the police function is ‘one of the basic

functions of government,’" and that "an arrest is ‘the function

most commonly associated with the police.’" Id. (quoting

Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 297, 298 (1978)). As such,

we explained, "[i]t would be hard to imagine . . . a more prototypically representative government function than Priest’s

use of his official capacity to effectuate the arrest of [the

plaintiffs]." Id.

In the Sixth Circuit’s Romanski decision, the plaintiff

sought to hold a casino security officer liable under § 1983 for

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unlawful arrest. See 428 F.3d at 634. The court concluded

that, "[w]here private security guards are endowed by law

with plenary police powers such that they are de facto police

officers, they may qualify as state actors under the public

function test." Id. at 637. By contrast, the court explained, private security guards afforded "some police-like powers but

not plenary police authority" do not qualify as state actors. Id.

The court defined plenary police powers to include a private

security guard’s state-conferred authority, "while on her

employer’s property during her working hours," to "make

warrantless arrests to the same extent as a public police officer." Id. at 638 n.3. Thus, because the casino security officer

had the same authority to make a warrantless arrest of the

plaintiff as that conferred on public peace officers, the court

concluded that she was a state actor. See id. at 638.

Unfortunately for Day, neither our Rodriguez decision nor

the Sixth Circuit’s Romanski decision is helpful to him. First

of all, the facts pertaining to the state actor issue are not

nearly as compelling as in Rodriguez, where the private party

was operating in his official role as an "auxiliary deputy sheriff," served under the direction of and in concert with the

Sheriff’s Department, and was "invested with the full panoply

of powers afforded to full-time deputies, including," but not

limited to, "the power to arrest." See 338 F.3d at 354-55.8

Moreover, even assuming we would agree with the Romanski

8Notably, we also deemed it relevant in Rodriguez that, at the time of

the challenged arrests, the private party was outfitted with an official deputy sheriff badge and verbally identified himself as being with the "Sheriff’s Department." See 338 F.3d at 355. Meanwhile, it was significant to

the district court that, at the time of their encounter with Day, Officers

Costa and Slader were driving a vehicle similar to an unmarked police car

and wearing police-type uniforms and badges. See Day, 590 F. Supp. 2d

at 802. However, absent evidence indicating, for instance, that Costa and

Slader’s car, uniform, and badges were official police items used at the

Government’s behest — similar to the evidence in Rodriguez — we are

not persuaded that such items support the proposition that Costa and

Slader were state actors. 

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court that plenary arrest authority alone could transform a private individual into a state actor, Officers Costa and Slader

did not possess the same power to make warrantless arrests

afforded to Virginia police officers. As discussed above, Virginia authorizes an armed security officer "to effect an arrest

for an offense occurring . . . in his presence." Va. Code Ann.

§ 9.1-146 (emphasis added). The Commonwealth empowers

police officers, by contrast, to "arrest, without a warrant, any

person who commits any crime in the presence of the officer

and any person whom he has reasonable grounds or probable

cause to suspect of having committed a felony not in his presence." Id. § 19.2-81 (emphasis added).9

 Indeed, not only is the

arrest power of armed security officers more circumscribed

than that of police officers, but it is also essentially the same

as that of any private citizen. See Hudson v. Commonwealth,

585 S.E.2d 583, 588 (Va. 2003) (recognizing that citizen may

make arrest for misdemeanor breach of peace or felony committed in his presence). Accordingly, unlike in Romanski,

Costa and Slader were not endowed with plenary arrest

authority, but rather were "permitted to exercise only what

were in effect citizens’ arrests." See Romanski, 428 F.3d at

9Section 19.2-81 of the Code of Virginia identifies nine categories of

officers authorized to make warrantless arrests for suspected felonies committed outside their presence — a comprehensive list that noticeably

excludes armed security officers. The nine categories of authorized officers include the following: "Members of the State Police force of the

Commonwealth"; "Sheriffs of the various counties and cities, and their

deputies"; "Members of any county police force or any duly constituted

police force of any city or town of the Commonwealth"; "The Commissioner, members and employees of the Marine Resources Commission

granted the power of arrest pursuant to § 28.2-900"; "Regular conservation

police officers appointed pursuant to § 29.1-200"; "United States Coast

Guard and United States Coast Guard Reserve commissioned, warrant,

and petty officers authorized under § 29.1-205 to make arrests"; "The special policemen of the counties as provided by § 15.2-1737, provided such

officers are in uniform, or displaying a badge of office"; "Conservation

officers appointed pursuant to § 10.1-115"; and "Full-time sworn members

of the enforcement division of the Department of Motor Vehicles

appointed pursuant to § 46.2-217." Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-81. 

16 UNITED STATES v. DAY

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639 (distinguishing Wade v. Byles, 83 F.3d 902, 906 (7th Cir.

1996) (concluding private security guard in public housing

authority building was not state actor)). We are therefore constrained to reject the proposition that, under the public function test, Costa and Slader were acting as de facto police and,

thus, were state actors.10

III.

Pursuant to the foregoing, we conclude that Day has not

met his burden of proving the existence of an agency relationship between the Government and the private security guards,

Officers Costa and Slader, whose conduct is under challenge.

Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s suppression of the

marijuana seized by Costa and Slader, as well as the firearmand marijuana-related statements made to them by Day. We

remand for such other and further proceedings as may be

appropriate.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

DAVIS, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part and concurring in

the judgment in part:

Officers Costa and Slader, uniformed, armed security officers clothed with broad law enforcement authority by, and

subject to pervasive regulation under, Virginia law, detained

10Our conclusion that Officers Costa and Slader were not state actors is

bolstered by an additional consideration: it does not appear that Virginia

would consider armed security officers to be state actors on these facts.

See Goldstein, 218 F.3d at 347 ("Another factor relevant to the state actor

determination is how the state itself views the entity."). The Court of

Appeals of Virginia has concluded in similar circumstances, for example,

that private department store security guards were not state actors required

to give Miranda warnings. See Mier v. Commonwealth, 407 S.E.2d 342,

345-46 (Va. Ct. App. 1991); see also Coston v. Commonwealth, 512

S.E.2d 158, 160 (Va. Ct. App. 1999) (recognizing "[t]he general rule" that

"a private security officer" is not "a public officer or public employee").

UNITED STATES v. DAY 17

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Appellee Mario Day at gunpoint, handcuffed him, searched

his car and his person, and interrogated him, and thereby collected critical evidence for the government in its prosecution

of Day. The majority expansively concludes, nevertheless,

that the officers’ actions were not "fairly attributable" to the

Commonwealth. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary

Schs. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295; id. at 312 (Thomas,

J., dissenting). Consequently, the majority concludes that the

constraints imposed by the federal constitution on governmental investigations of criminal activity had no application

in this case. I respectfully dissent from this holding.

Under the facts and circumstances shown on this record,

when Officer Costa retrieved the marijuana from Day’s pants

pocket, J.A. 22, and when he questioned the handcuffed Day

about Day’s possession of the handgun while they awaited the

arrival of a local law enforcement officer to take custody of

Day, id., Officer Costa was engaged in traditional law

enforcement activity plainly intended, as a matter of law, to

aid in the prosecution of Day for criminal offenses. Officer

Costa’s actions were made possible by and legitimized by

Virginia law; no private citizen could have achieved what he

did on behalf of the government under the circumstances

presented here.

Accordingly, Officer Costa’s interrogation of Day regarding the latter’s possession of "anything illegal," his subsequent search of Day’s pants pocket and seizure of the

marijuana, and his later questioning regarding Day’s possession of the handgun, are all subject to scrutiny under prevailing constitutional standards, every bit as much as they would

be if Officer Costa was a sworn governmental law enforcement officer.

I am persuaded that, tested by those constitutional standards, Day’s admission that he possessed marijuana was the

product of neither an unreasonable seizure of his person nor

of custodial interrogation, and that the subsequent seizure of

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the marijuana was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

By the time that Officer Costa questioned Day regarding the

handgun, however, Day’s detention had ripened into an arrest.

Accordingly, the handgun inquiry constituted an unwarned

custodial interrogation, contravening the mandate of Miranda

v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Thus, I would reverse the

district court’s suppression of the marijuana and Day’s admission that he possessed it, but affirm the district court’s suppression of Day’s statements to Costa regarding the handgun.

I.

The Supreme Court has never considered whether or under

what circumstances "state action" inheres in the exercise of

traditional police functions by state-authorized and regulated

armed security guards. Cf. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436

U.S. 149, 163 n.14 (1978); Romanski v. Detroit Entertainment, L.L.C., 428 F.3d 629, 636 (6th Cir. 2005) ("The

Supreme Court has explicitly declined to decide the question

of whether and under what circumstances private police officers may be said to perform a public function[.]").

The appropriate test for determining whether Officers

Costa and Slader should be deemed state actors under the circumstances shown here, and therefore whether well-settled,

constitutionally-rooted constraints on criminal investigations

apply, is the public function test. Under this test, a private

actor is deemed a state actor if the function performed is traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State. Lugar v.

Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982); Goldstein v. Chestnut Ridge Volunteer Fire Co., 218 F.3d 337, 342

(4th Cir. 2000) (citing United Auto Workers v. Gaston Festivals, Inc., 43 F.3d 902, 906 (4th Cir. 1995)). That public function must be "traditionally exclusively reserved to the State."

Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974); see

Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 157. 

As the Supreme Court has suggested, "police protection" is

among those functions "which have been administered with a

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great[ ] degree of exclusivity by States and municipalities[.]"

Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 163. This court has echoed the

Supreme Court’s recognition, noting that "the police function

is ‘one of the basic functions of government,’ [and] a ‘most

fundamental obligation of government to its constituency.’"

Rodriguez v. Smithfield Packing Co., Inc., 338 F.3d 348, 355

(4th Cir. 2003) (citing Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 297

(1978)). "It would be hard to imagine, in other words, a more

prototypically representative government function than [a private security guard’s] use of his official capacity to effectuate

[an] arrest." Id.

Our sister circuits apply a totality of the circumstances test

to determine whether private security guards should be treated

as state actors, paying special attention to the arrest powers

granted to private security guards and the extent to which the

guards are licensed by and regulated by the state. E.g.,

Romanski, 428 F.3d at 640; Payton v. Rush-Presbyterian-St.

Luke’s Medical Ctr., 184 F.3d 623, 630 (7th Cir. 1999). 

In Romanski, the court held that private security officers

licensed by the state and having plenary arrest powers

(although those arrest powers only applied when the guards

were on duty and on their employer’s property) were properly

deemed to act "under color of law" in a suit brought pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 428 F.3d at 640.1 There, a private security guard at a casino detained and interrogated a patron suspected of stealing a token and the patron sued, alleging Fourth

Amendment violations. The district court held that the casino

employee was a state actor as a matter of law because she

possessed the same arresting authority enjoyed by the police.

Id. at 634-35. 

1The "state action" inquiry mirrors the "under color of law" inquiry.

Lugar, 457 U.S. at 929; Philips v. Pitt County Memorial Hosp., 572 F.3d

176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) ("The statutory color-of-law prerequisite is synonymous with the more familiar state-action requirement—and the analysis for each is identical."); Haavistola v. Cmty. Fire Co., 6 F.3d 211, 215

(4th Cir. 1993). 

20 UNITED STATES v. DAY

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On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 636. As cited

by the district court here, the Sixth Circuit held that "where

private security guards are endowed by law with plenary

police powers such that they are de facto police officers, they

may qualify as state actors under the public function test[,]"

id. at 637, and found that the casino guard had sufficient

authority to qualify as a de facto police officer. The guard was

also licensed and vetted by Michigan’s department of state

police. By statute, the guard had "the authority to arrest a person without a warrant as set forth for public peace officers . . .

." Id. (citing Mich. Comp. Laws §338.1080). Thus, the

Romanski standard looks to whether a private security guard

is licensed by the state and has "plenary police powers." Cf.

Lindsey v. Detroit Entertainment, LLC, 383 F.3d 824, 830

(6th Cir. 2007) (holding that casino security guards who were

not licensed by the state were not state actors). 

The Seventh Circuit applied a similar test in reversing the

grant of a motion to dismiss a § 1983 claim. Payton, 184 F.3d

at 630. In Payton, the plaintiff brought a § 1983 claim based

on his allegation that two hospital security guards detained,

arrested, beat, struck, and kicked him without provocation. Id.

at 625. The district court granted the guards’ motion to dismiss on the basis that they did not act under color of law. Id.

Plaintiff appealed and the Seventh Circuit reversed and

remanded, holding that the guards could be deemed to act

under color of law because they had plenary arrest power and

were subject to the same rules as police officers. Id. at 628.

The court noted that, under the applicable law, the private

guards possessed "all of the powers of the regular police

patrol; and therefore, that they must "conform to and be subject to all the rules and regulations governing police officers

of the city." Id. at 630; see also Henderson v. Fisher, 631 F.2d

1115, 1119 (3rd Cir. 1980) (holding that university security

guards with plenary arrest powers on campus are state actors

for the purposes of §1983 claims); cf. Wade v. Byles, 83 F.3d

902, 906 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that a private security guard

is not a public actor when he lacks plenary arrest authority

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and can only arrest people for criminal trespass pending the

arrival of the police). 

Under these persuasive precedents, when private security

guards have "plenary police powers," Romanski, 428 F.3d at

637, and are licensed and heavily regulated by the state, they

may be deemed public actors. Courts do not withhold state

actor status based on whether a guard’s arrest powers are limited to a specific geographical area. See Payton, 184 F.3d at

629-30 (arrest powers limited to hospital grounds); Romanski,

428 F.3d at 639-40 (arrest powers limited to casino grounds).

Instead, the courts examine the scope of authority granted by

the state to the officers and evaluate the extent of the regulation imposed by the state. Where guards have limited powers,

e.g., Wade, 83 F.3d at 905-06; Johnson v. LaRabida Children’s Hospital, 372 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 2004), they are

not deemed public actors. When guards enjoy "plenary police

powers," however, they may, depending on the circumstances

presented, assume the obligations of a state actor. 

Properly viewed, then, in an appropriate case, private

armed security guards in Virginia may be treated as public

actors. This is in part because they have generous arrest

authority. The guards may effectuate an arrest for any offense

occurring in their presence while on the premises they guard,

and even for some (primarily shoplifting-related) offenses not

occurring in their presence. Va. Code Ann. §9.1-146.2 Under

the statute, there are even circumstances when the law

requires that private security guards be deemed "arresting

officers." Id. In fact, few differences exist in the scope of

arrest authority between a private security guard and a state

2This court has been willing to afford an extraordinarily broad construction to the "in the presence" criterion. U.S. v. McNeill, 484 F.3d 301, 312

(4th Cir. 2007) (holding that Maryland’s "in the presence" requirement for

arrests "does not mandate that every element of the crime occur in the officer’s presence, so long as the officer had sufficient evidence of all the elements and some were committed in his presence"). 

22 UNITED STATES v. DAY

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officer. Both may arrest for any crime committed in their

presence, and for some misdemeanor crimes committed outside their presence. An additional power vested in the police

is that they may arrest individuals for more numerous crimes

committed outside of their presence. But of course, police

officers themselves are limited to making arrests for crimes

committed outside their presence to situations where they

have "reasonable grounds or probable cause to suspect of having committed a felony not in his presence." Va. Code Ann.

§ 19.2-81. This difference in arrest power is sufficiently insignificant to declare that Virginia guards possess authority akin

to plenary authority.3See Romanski, 428 F.3d at 638 n.3

(defining plenary police powers as state-conferred authority,

"while on her employer’s property during her working hours,"

to "make warrantless arrests to the same extent as a public

police officer"). Manifestly, the power to arrest confers the

power to search in a wide range of circumstances. See Chimel

v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 759 (1969). Such authority was

precisely that exercised by Officer Costa in this case. 

Private security guards are also subject to a high level of

government regulation. See Va. Code Ann. §9.1-138 et seq.

As the court below explained, and the majority opinion notes,

private security guards are "vetted, trained, and continue to be

subject to disciplinary action under the aegis of the state’s

Criminal Justice Services Board." Maj. Op. at 7; Day, 590 F.

3The majority argues that the private security guard’s role is the same

as a private citizen with respect to arrest authority. See Maj. Op. at 15-16

(citing Hudson v. Commonwealth, 585 S.E.2d 583, 588 (Va. 2003)). This

assertion is not true. See Va. Code Ann. §9.1-146. Private security guards

have arrest authority that extends beyond crimes committed in their presence. Id. Additionally, in some cases, the statute actually transforms a private security guard into an "arresting officer," a privilege never accorded

to citizens undertaking citizens’ arrests. Id. It will be the rare citizen who

effects an "arrest" employing handcuffs; so-called "bounty hunters" may

well comprise a set of one. United States v. Poe, 556 F.3d 1113, 1123-24

(10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S.Ct. 395, 2009 WL 1604770 (U.S.

Oct. 13, 2009). 

UNITED STATES v. DAY 23

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Supp. 2d at 801. Additionally, Virginia regulations require

armed security officers to obtain a "valid registration" by satisfying "compulsory minimum training standards established

by the Board" and submitting to a "state and national fingerprint search." Day, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 800 (discussing Va.

Code Ann. § 9.1-139). Virginia also employs the Criminal

Justice Services Board to "[r]eceive complaints concerning

the conduct of [an armed security officer], to conduct investigations, and to take appropriate disciplinary action if warranted." Maj. Op. at 7 (discussing Va. Code Ann. § 9.1-141).

In short, Virginia has a comprehensive regulatory scheme for

its private security guards. 

Because under Virginia law armed security guards are subject to extensive government regulation and enjoy extensive

police powers, and because Officers Costa and Slader actually

exercised those powers in this case, I would affirm the district

court’s order insofar as it deemed the private security guards

in this case public actors in connection with their apprehension of Day, and I would require them to adhere to the same

constitutionally-rooted constraints as ordinary police officers.

This conclusion finds ample support among the courts of

appeals.4

II.

The majority, instead of applying a public function test tailored to armed private security guards, relies on a test

intended to aid in the assessment of the activities of private

individuals who become police informants and who mine

information and report or deliver it to law enforcement. That

test, the Jarrett/Ellyson test, inquires whether the government

4Romanski, 428 F.3d at 640; Rodriguez, 338 F.3d at 355; Payton, 184

F.3d at 627-630; Lusby v. T.G. & Y. Stores, Inc., 749 F.2d 1423 (10th Cir.

1984); Henderson v. Fisher, 631 F.2d 1115, 1118-19 (3rd Cir. 1980);

Traver v. Meshriy, 627 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1980); El Fundi v. Deroche, 625

F.2d 195, 196 (8th Cir. 1980). 

24 UNITED STATES v. DAY

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knew of and acquiesced in the private individual’s challenged

conduct, and whether the private individual intended to assist

law enforcement or had some other independent motivation.

Maj. Op. at 7. But that test is inapplicable here for at least two

reasons.5 First, it was derived from a very different factual

context and should not be remolded to control these facts.

United States v. Jarrett, 338 F.3d 339, 344-46 (4th Cir. 2003)

(determining that an anonymous computer hacker was not acting as a Government agent when he procured child pornography files from defendant’s computer and delivered via email

to law enforcement); United States v. Ellyson, 326 F.3d 527-

28 (4th Cir. 2003) (determining that defendant’s live-in girlfriend did not act as government agent when she located child

pornography in their shared residence and turned it over to

police because she acted of her own accord and not under the

direction of the police).

Second, the majority misses the forest for the trees. The

appropriate analysis requires an evaluation of the totality of

the circumstances. Jarrett and Ellyson provide two illustrative

examples of that test, but they should not be read to supplant

the test itself. In fact, this court "has articulated a number of

5Arguably, the facts here satisfy the Jarrett/Ellyson test. The second element is fulfilled: the guards clearly intended to assist law enforcement

when they detained, searched and interrogated Day. The majority opinion

seemingly concedes this point, arguing that this case turns on the test’s

first element. Maj. Op. at 12. Further, Virginia’s statutory scheme comes

very close to satisfying the test’s first element. The Commonwealth cloaks

these guards with a comprehensive imprimatur of state authority. The

guards must pass background checks and meet state training requirements,

and when they do, the Commonwealth imbues them with expansive arrest

and search powers. It even considers them to be, at times, arresting officers. Va. Code Ann. §9.1-146. Although the Commonwealth may not have

advance knowledge of every individual arrest and search undertaken by a

private security guard, the same is true of its sworn law enforcement officers. The Commonwealth cannot feign ignorance when armed private

security guards do exactly what they are trained, regulated, licensed, and

authorized to do: detain and arrest individuals, execute attendant searches,

and conduct interrogations of suspects. 

UNITED STATES v. DAY 25

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different factors or tests in different contexts," for the public

function test and the facts "which would convert the private

party into a state actor [vary] with the circumstances of the

case." Goldstein, 218 F.3d at 342-43 (citing Lugar, 457 U.S.

at 937).

I would limit application of the Jarrett/Ellyson test to cases

involving private persons acting as police informants, a methodology supported by the analysis in the cases themselves. In

both cases, this court explicitly eschewed a formalistic test,

instead noting that the analysis is fact-intensive, Ellyson, 326

F.3d at 527, and "can only be resolved in light of all of the

circumstances." Jarrett, 338 F.3d at 344 (quoting Skinner v.

Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 614-15

(1989)).

Thus, Jarrett and Ellyson provide a useful framework for

analyzing government informants under the public function

test. But those two cases do not transform the general inquiry

into a strict two-factor analysis. The overarching issue

remains whether the conduct of the private actors is fairly

attributed to the state. Brentwood Academy, 531 U.S. at 295.

In Jarrett and Ellyson, this court focused on the two aspects

of the totality of the circumstances, factors that were particularly relevant as to government informants acting without

governmental supervision.

But the appropriate test for this case must focus on the particularities of armed private security guards, their authority

and the manner in which they exercise that authority, a fundamentally different scenario than that presented with regard to

government informants, and one discussed only in persuasive

precedent from our sister circuits. Private security guards

have arrest authority and are subject to significant governmental regulation, two factors completely absent from the

analysis for government informants.6 Accordingly, instead of

(Text continued on page 28)

6The majority opinion also cites to Virginia court decisions to bolster

its approach. Maj. Op. at 17 n.10. Because this case addresses a federal

26 UNITED STATES v. DAY

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constitutional issue, I do not find the Virginia courts’ analyses particularly

useful. Cf. Virginia v. Moore, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 1608 (2008) ("[I]t is not the

province of the Fourth Amendment to enforce state law.") Further, the

cases cited by the majority do not support its assertion that armed security

officers may never be deemed state actors. 

The majority cites Goldstein for the proposition that it should consider

how the courts of Virginia view the state action issue. Maj. Op. at 17 n.10.

In Goldstein, the court held that a volunteer fire company in Maryland was

a state actor under a totality of the circumstances test. Goldstein, 218 F.3d

at 348. This court assessed four factors in its analysis: "(1) the indicia of

state involvement; (2) the functions carried out by the actor; (3) the nature

of the relationship between the state and the actor; and (4) the powers and

authorities that had been conferred upon the actor by the state." Id. The

majority is correct that Goldstein states that the courts sometimes consider

the state’s analysis as a part of the totality of the circumstances test,

although even the majority gives this requirement short shrift, addressing

it only in a single footnote added to the last page of the opinion. 

But Goldstein actually undercuts the majority’s preferred approach

here. The court in Goldstein applied a totality of the circumstances test.

Id. at 342. This test is of course the same one rejected by the majority in

favor of the crabbed two-pronged approach derived from Ellyson and Jarrett. 

Moreover, the Virginia case law cited by the majority fails to support

the majority’s case. Mier, Maj. Op. at 17 n.10, is inapposite because it is

factually distinguishable. Mier v. Commonwealth, 407 S.E.2d 342 (Va.

App. 1991). In Mier, the court held that mall security guards were not public actors because their authority was limited to temporarily detaining

apprehended shoplifting suspects. Id. at 346. But the guards in Mier

enjoyed significantly less authority than Officers Slader and Costa. The

guards drew their authority from Va. Code §18.2-105.1, a statute that

solely permits the detention of suspected shoplifter for one hour pending

the arrival of a law-enforcement officer, and Va. Code §18.2-105, repealed

and replaced by §8.01-226.9, which exempts the detainer from civil liability. Id. at 345. 

In Coston, the Court of Appeals of Virginia held that when a registered

security officer is "engaged in a duty specifically granted by statute, that

officer is a public officer or public employee." Coston v. Commonwealth,

512 S.E.2d 158, 159-160 (Va. App. 1999). In Coston, the security guard

was acting pursuant to Va. Code § 19.2-74, which entitles a registered

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following a test created for a distinguishable set of facts, I

prefer a specific fact-based inquiry targeted at the authority

granted by statute to, and its exercise by, armed private security guards, similar to the test used in Sixth and Seventh Circuits.

III.

As explained above, I would conclude that Day satisfied his

burden of establishing that the armed private security guards

who detained and searched him must be deemed state actors.

Turning, then, to the merits of the district court’s suppression

order, I conclude that the district court (1) erred when it suppressed Day’s statement about the marijuana and when it suppressed the physical evidence itself, but (2) did not err in

suppressing Day’s statement regarding his possession of the

handgun.7

security officer to issue summons. The court treated the officer as a private

security guard because he acted pursuant to his duty "specifically granted

by statute." The same reasoning applies to the instant case. Officers Costa

and Slader acted pursuant to authority specifically granted by statute when

they detained defendant Day for a Terry stop. Va. Code Ann. 9.1-146 ("A

registered armed security officer of a private security services business

while at a location which the business is contracted to protect shall have

the power to effect an arrest for an offense occurring (i) in his presence

on such premises."). 

7There is some uncertainty in the record as to whether the district court

intended to suppress the marijuana seized from Day under Miranda. In

any event, it is settled that the exclusionary rule does not apply to physical

evidence discovered as a result of a Miranda violation. United States v.

Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 634 (2004); U.S. v. Sterling, 283 F.3d 216, 219 (4th

Cir. 2002). Day does not contend otherwise. Rather, he argues that the

marijuana was properly suppressed as the fruit of an unreasonable search

under the Fourth Amendment. For the reasons stated in text, I reject this

contention. 

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A.

Officer Costa did not violate Day’s Miranda rights when he

asked him "if he had anything illegal on him[,]" J.A. 22,

because the question was not part of a custodial interrogation.

Law enforcement officers making an arrest must give

Miranda warnings before conducting custodial interrogations.

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. Custodial interrogation is "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person

has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id. But Miranda warnings are unnecessary before questioning a suspect during a

Terry stop. United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1108-09

(4th Cir. 1995). Here, Costa’s question (put to Day in the initial moments of the latter’s detention by the former) was

merely intended to safeguard the situation during a Terry stop.

An individual is in custody "when, under the totality of the

circumstances, a suspect’s freedom from action is curtailed to

a ‘degree associated with formal arrest.’" U.S. v. Colonna,

511 F.3d 431, 435 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Berkemer v.

McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984)). The operative question

is whether, viewed objectively, a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would have understood that he was in custody.

Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 422. Among the facts to be considered

are "the time, place and purpose of the encounter, the words

used by the officer, the officer’s tone of voice and general

demeanor, the presence of multiple officers, the potential display of a weapon by an officer, and whether there was any

physical contact between the officer and the defendant."

United States v. Weaver, 282 F.3d 302, 312 (4th Cir. 2002).

In this circuit, an officer’s use of a drawn weapon and/or

handcuffs does not necessarily transform a Terry stop into an

arrest. Further, even a complete restriction of liberty is valid

under Terry if the restriction is brief. United States v. Sinclair,

983 F.2d 598, 602 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that drug dealers

were not in custody merely because law enforcement officers

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drew their guns during a Terry stop as a reasonable safety precaution); United States v. Crittendon, 883 F.2d 326, 328 (4th

Cir. 1989) (holding that a stop and frisk is not necessarily

converted into an arrest when defendant was handcuffed prior

to the pat down search).

Here, Day was not in custody for purposes of Miranda

when he admitted, in response to Costa’s question regarding

whether he possessed "anything illegal," that he possessed

marijuana. The place of the arrest suggests that it was merely

a brief detention: defendant was outside his own car, in a public place; not inside the guards’ car or at the police station.

Only two guards and one car were present at the time of the

detention. Further, the officers used their firearms and handcuffs for their own safety, just as in Sinclair and Crittendon.

As the government notes, the incident started with a screaming match between multiple individuals, and the guards’

actions were necessary and reasonable to safeguard the situation and ensure the public safety. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 (permitting actions "reasonably related in scope to the

circumstances which justified the interference in the first

place."); United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235 (1985)

(finding officers conducting Terry stops may "take such steps

as [are] reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety

and to maintain the status quo during the course of the stop.").8

8To be sure, some factors do militate in favor of a finding of custody.

The officers commanded Day to "freeze" as they ran towards him. At least

one gun was pointed at Day the entire time, and he was handcuffed and

frisked. J.A. 22. The detention occurred in the middle of the night, more

than one guard was present, and Day’s liberty was severely restricted. J.A.

20-21, 31. These factors would make a reasonable person believe that he

was not free to leave, but under Fourth Circuit precedent, shouting, guns,

and handcuffs do not instantaneously transform the guards’ stop into an

arrest—instead, courts must analyze the totality of the circumstances. Ultimately, the circumstances here comprise a Terry stop-and-frisk and not

Miranda custody. U.S. v. Moore, 817 F.2d 1105, 1108 (4th Cir. 1987)

(collecting cases and concluding that drawing weapons, handcuffing a suspect, placing a suspect in a patrol car for questioning, or using or threatening to use force does not necessarily elevate a lawful stop into a custodial

arrest for Miranda purposes). 

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As Day was not in custody for Miranda purposes in the

earliest moments of his encounter with the officers, Day’s

admission during those moments that he possessed marijuana

should not have been suppressed as the product of unwarned

custodial interrogation.

B.

Once Day admitted that he possessed marijuana, a reasonable law enforcement officer would have probable cause to

arrest Day and to search his person incident to the arrest. See

U.S. v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81, 83 (4th Cir. 1989), abrogated on

different grounds, U.S. v. Angle, 230 F.3d 113 (4th Cir. 2000).

Viewed objectively, as it must be, Cloaninger ex rel. Estate

of Cloaninger v. McDevitt, 555 F.3d 324, 334 (4th Cir. 2009)

(citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)), that is precisely

what occurred here. Thus, Costa’s search of Day’s pants

pocket was reasonable: it was fully supported by probable

cause to arrest Day, and was incident thereto.

C.

After Day admitted to possessing marijuana and after the

marijuana had been seized, the Terry stop initiated by Costa

and Slader ripened into a de facto arrest; i.e., custody. That is,

after the officers secured the illegal substance, a critical aspect

of the encounter shifted: its purpose. Before the drugs were

secured, Costa and Slader acted to stabilize a potentially dangerous situation and to investigate the circumstances before

them. But when they discovered that Day possessed illegal

narcotics, their goal evolved into detaining Day until the local

law enforcement arrived. This change in purpose, in combination with the passage of time, alters the custody analysis.9

See

Weaver, 282 F.3d at 312.

9Although the proper analysis is whether a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would have understood that he was in custody, Berkemer,

468 U.S. at 422, it is telling that the local law enforcement officer testified

that when he arrived, Costa and Slader held Mario Day "in custody." J.A.

45. 

UNITED STATES v. DAY 31

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While Costa held Day in custody and awaited the arrival of

local law enforcement officers, he questioned Day as to the

reasons why he was in possession of the weapon. J.A. 24-25.

This questioning indisputably qualifies as an interrogation,

and as previously explained, Day was in custody during this

period. Accordingly, I would affirm the district court’s order

suppressing the statements made by Day to officer Costa

regarding his ownership and possession of the weapon.

IV.

In sum, Officer Costa essentially conducted a full blown

investigation into the circumstances confronting him when he

encountered Mario Day on July 5, 2008. The officer entered

Day’s vehicle to search it and to seize the handgun he had

observed Day place on the floorboard. J.A. 21-22. He

detained Day at gunpoint and handcuffed him. J.A. 22. He

questioned him regarding Day’s possession of "anything illegal," and upon learning that Day possessed marijuana, he

searched Day’s person and seized the marijuana, as any reasonable and respectable law enforcement officer would. Id.

He then proceeded to question Day about the firearm. J.A. 24-

25. All these acts were for the benefit of a potential prosecution of Day on any and all criminal offenses that might be laid

against him. Virginia law made the collection of the disputed

evidence possible. It is difficult to imagine how anyone but a

law enforcement officer could have achieved these results.

It is undoubtedly true that the Fourth Amendment "does not

provide protection against searches by private individuals acting in a private capacity," Jarrett, 338 F.3d at 344 (emphasis

added). But that is not what the record here shows.

* * *

For the reasons stated, I would affirm in part and reverse

in part the district court’s order suppressing evidence and

remand this case for further proceedings.

32 UNITED STATES v. DAY

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