Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-93-03113/USCOURTS-caDC-93-03113-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Richard Anthony Miller
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 12, 1995 Decided December 12, 1995

No. 93-3113

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

RICHARD ANTHONY MILLER,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 92cr00327)

Allen E. Burns, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued the cause for the appellant. A.J. Kramer,

Federal Public Defender, was on the brief. Neil H. Jaffee, Assistant Federal Public Defender, entered

an appearance.

Lisa A. Hertzer, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for the appellee. Eric H. Holder,

Jr., United States Attorney, and John R. Fisher, Thomas J. Tourish, Jr., Sherri L. Evans and Sima

F. Sarrafan, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief. Thomas C. Black, Assistant

United States Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: SILBERMAN, SENTELLE and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

Separate concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Richard Anthony Miller appeals his

convictions on one count of bank fraud and one count of access device fraud. Finding no reversible

error, we affirm both convictions.

On appeal from a conviction, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the

government, allowing it the benefit of allreasonable inferencesthat may be drawn from the evidence

and permitting the jury to determine the weight and credibility of the evidence. United States v.

Sobin, 56 F.3d 1423, 1425 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 348 (1995); United States v. Butler,

924 F.2d 1124, 1126 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 871 (1991). So viewed the evidence reveals

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1Riggs maintains a hidden camera at each ATM location to photograph transactions every

three to five seconds. 

2This section provides:

Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or artifice

(1) to defraud a financial institution; or

(2) to obtain any of the moneys, funds, credits, assets, securities, or other

property owned by, or under the custody or control of, a financial institution, by

means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises;

the following facts.

Miller was employed as an aide to District of Columbia City Council member Wilhelmina

Rolark fromFebruary 1991 untilhe resigned on February21, 1992. During that time, he occasionally

cashed checks for Rolark, drawn on her account at Riggs National Bank (Riggs) and made out to

Miller. He last did so in December 1991.

In April 1991 Rolark acquired a new automated teller machine (ATM) card from Riggs, to

replace one she had lost, and selected a new four-digit personal identification number (PIN) to access

her account through the card. Her recollection at trial was uncertain but she believed that she

designated the last four digits of her home or car telephone number as her new PIN and that she

stored the new card in one of three locations at her home and office where she customarily kept

important personal items. She was certain that she never used the card herself or authorized Miller

to do so.

In March 1992, Rolark noticed a number of electronic withdrawalslisted on her last two bank

statements and notified Riggs. Riggs conducted an investigation and discovered that 41 electronic

withdrawals had been made between January 26 and March 2, 1992, totaling $11,100. During the

investigation, Rolark met with Lyle J. Theisen, a Riggs security employee, and was shown

photographs taken by security cameras at the locations and times of several withdrawals. She

identified the man in the photographs as Miller.1 As a consequence, he was arrested and indicted on

one count each of bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 13442and of access device fraud in violation

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shall be fined not than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.

18 U.S.C. § 1344. 

3This section provides:

(a) Whoever

...

(2) knowingly and with intent to defraud traffics in or uses one or more

unauthorized access devices during any one-year period, and by such conduct

obtains anything of value aggregating $1,000 or more during that period;

...

shall, if the offense affects interstate or foreign commerce, be punished as provided

in subsection (c) of this section.

18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(2). 

of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(2).3 He was convicted by a jury of both counts and was sentenced to six

months' imprisonment, suspended, and three years' probation. He appeals his convictions on several

grounds.

First, Miller argues his bank fraud conviction should be reversed because there was

insufficient evidence that he committed each element of the offense as it was charged to the jury.

Section 1344 makes it unlawful to participate in, alternatively, (1) "a scheme to defraud a financial

institution," 18 U.S.C. § 1344(1), or (2) "a scheme to obtain any ofthe moneys, funds, credits, assets,

securities, or other property owned by, or under the custody or control of, a financial institution, by

means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises," id. § 1344(2). The district

court, however, initially charged the jury only on the elements of a section 1344(2) violation,

instructing that the government bore the burden of proving "that the defendant Miller knowingly

executed a scheme to obtain the money owned by or under control of the financial institution by

means offalse orfraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises." Jury Instruction Transcript (Tr.

2) at 41. Miller contends there was no evidence he ever made any "misrepresentation" as required

under the district court's charge. We disagree.

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4

In fact, the ATM would not have dispensed more money than was in the account. See

Transcript of Testimony (Tr. 1) at 33-36. 

Each time MillerinsertedRolark's card into anATM and entered her personalfour-digit code,

he represented to Riggsthat he had authority to withdraw fundsfromRolark's account, just as he had

previously represented each time he presented a bank teller with one of her checks. Miller argues that

making unauthorized electronic withdrawals is akin to check-kiting which other circuits have found

cannot, by itself, constitute mail fraud. See, e.g., United States v. Doherty, 969 F.2d 425, 427-28

(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 607 (1992); United States v. Medeles, 916 F.2d 195 (5th

Cir.1990); United States v. Bonnett, 877 F.2d 1450, 1456-57 (10th Cir.1989). We find the analogy

inapt. The rationale underlying those courts' holdings is that "a check does not "make any

representation as to the state of [an account holder's] bank balance,' and hence cannot be

characterized as true or false." Doherty, 969 F.2d at 427 (quoting Williams v. United States, 458

U.S. 279, 284-85 (1982)). Miller likewise made no representation regarding the balance in Rolark's

account when he requested the various electronic withdrawals.4 What he did do, however, was to

enter Rolark's PIN, which acts as a sort of electronic signature authorizing an ATM to release

available funds. That he did so without Rolark's knowledge or permission is tantamount to cashing

a check with a forged signatureconduct we have expressly held violates section 1344(2). See

United States v. Sayan, 968 F.2d 55, 62 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (forged endorsements on checks "constitute

affirmativemisrepresentations which support a charge offalse pretenses"). Nor do we find persuasive

Miller'sreliance on United States v. Briggs, 939 F.2d 222, 226-27 (5th Cir. 1990), in which the Fifth

Circuit found that a defendant who ordered unauthorized wire transfers from her employers' bank

accounts had not violated section 1344(2) because "[s]o far as the sparse record discloses, Briggs

made no explicit false representations,statements, or promisesin carrying out herscheme." 939 F.2d

at 226. The Briggs court was careful to note that "precisely how [the defendant] effected these

transfers is unclear" and further observed that "where the defendant falsely represents that she is

acting under her employer's authority, we would have little trouble concluding that such conduct is

squarely prohibited by the statute." Id. at 227. Here, of course, we know exactly how Miller

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accomplished the ATM withdrawalsby using Rolark's PIN to communicate hissupposed authority

to do soand we have no trouble concluding this conduct falls within the statute's proscription.

Miller next challenges three aspects of the district court's jury instructions, none of which

constitutes reversible error.

Miller first asserts the district judge erred by telling the jury that "[t]he evidence in the case

did not establish that any person was actually defrauded but only that the accused acted with intent

to defraud," Tr. 2 at 42, thereby improperly relieving the government of its burden of proving the

element of intent to defraud. Because Miller failed to object to the instruction at trial we review it

for plain error and reverse only ifit was prejudicial, that isif "a miscarriage ofjustice would otherwise

result.' " United States v. Boyd, 54 F.3d 868, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Olano,

113 S. Ct. 1770, 1779 (1993)). While the language Miller cites may have improperly suggested intent

had been established, we do not think it sufficiently prejudiced Miller to constitute plain error.

Elsewhere in the instructions, the court made it clear to the jurors that "intent to defraud" was one

of the necessary elements to be proved and that the government bore the burden of affirmatively

proving each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Tr. 2 at 40-41. Reading the

instructions as a whole, therefore, we do not believe the court'sisolated misstatement was plain error.

Cf. United States v. Whoie, 925 F.2d 1481, 1485-86 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (no plain error in failure to

instruct jurythat government bore burden of disproving inducement to overcome entrapment defense

where instructions, considered as a whole, made clear that government bore burden of proving

defendant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt).

Miller next assertsthe court erred in charging the jury that money obtained in violation of the

bank fraud statute can be "owned by or under control of the financial institution," Tr. 2 at 41. Only

subsection (2), he argues, permits conviction for obtaining money merely under the bank's control,

while subsection (1) requires that it actually be owned by the bank. In light of our conclusion that

the evidence supported Miller's conviction under subsection (2), and Miller's own insistence that his

bank fraud conviction can be upheld, if at all, only under that subsection, we conclude this argument

has lost whatever weight it may otherwise have had.

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5After he explained at length how ATM transactions require transmission of information to a

"central switching station which is located in the midwestern part of the United States," Theisen

responded "yes" to the question "Now you have indicated that when the ATM transaction goes

through this process that the transaction itself affects interstate commerce?" Tr. 1 at 35, 39. 

For a similar reason, we reject Miller's claimthat the district court erred in charging that "false

pretenses" can support a bank fraud conviction. Subsection (2) of the bank fraud statute, under

which Miller must be assumed to have been convicted, expressly criminalizesschemesto obtain bank

funds "by means of false or fraudulent pretenses." Thus, there was no error in the challenged

instruction.

Finally, Miller argues that the district court erred in admitting, over his objections, Theisen's

testimonyto two "legalconclusions," namely that Miller's withdrawals "affected interstate commerce"

and that they constituted bank fraud. See Christiansen v. National Savs. &Trust Co., 683 F.2d 520,

529 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("The duty to issue [legal] conclusions devolve [sic] on the courts and lay legal

conclusions are inadmissible in evidence.") (citations omitted). To the extent that the former isolated

statement may have been improper, it was harmless given the witness's lengthy and uncontroverted

testimonyregarding the interstate scope ofATM transactions. See United States v. Newman, 49 F.3d

1, 7 (1st Cir. 1995); Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359, 364-65 (2d Cir. 1992); Torres v. County of

Oakland, 758 F.2d 147, 151 (6th Cir. 1985).5 As for the latter testimony, it was not given as

Theisen's legal opinion but only to explain factually why Riggs conducted its investigation and

credited $11,000 to Rolark's account, to wit: "because of ... what was determined as bank fraud

through the unauthorized use of her ATM card." Tr. 1 at 74.

For the preceding reasons, the appellant's convictions are

Affirmed.

SENTELLE, Circuit Judge, concurring in the result: I cannot join the majority in its affirmance

of Miller's conviction on the basis of 18 U.S.C. § 1344(2). That subsection, as I read it, requires

elementally the making of a false or fraudulent pretense, representation or promise. The theory in this

case is that Miller, by entering Rolark's PIN into the ATM, falsely represented that he had the

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authority to draw funds from Rolark's account. This theory seems to assume that an act consistent

with a supposed set of facts is representing that the supposed set of facts is indeed true; because it

is not true, the "implied representation" is a false one. I see no reason why this same theory would

not cover such a wide range of imaginable conduct as to criminalize under this and other false

representation statutes conduct far beyond what a legislative body, or a citizen contemplating the

statute, could conceivably expect these statutesto encompass. For example, a person who puts a key

in a lock could be said to impliedly represent that he has the authority to open that lock. If he lacks

that authority, he becomesliable not only for the consequences of hisillegal entry but also for having

made a false representation. As with illegal entry, the same for theft. So, too, in assaults, the person

committing the unpermitted touching could be said to be impliedly and falsely representing himself

to have consent to touch the victim. None of these things seems to me to be a representation, let

alone a criminally false one.

I do not read United States v. Sayan, 968 F.2d 55, 62 (D.C. Cir. 1992), relied upon by the

majority, to compel the contrary result. The discussion of the forgeries in the Sayan case involved

the sufficiency of the government's evidence to support a conviction of bank larceny in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 2113(b). The gist of the portion quoted by the majority, in context, seems to me to be

that the forgeriestogether with the other check writing behavior committed bythe defendant in Sayan

together constituted sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that she had unlawfully "tak[en] and

carr[ied] away with the intent to steal or purloin" bank funds. I do not read Sayan as coming to grips

with the question even of whether a forged signature standing alone is sufficient to make out a

misrepresentation in violation of § 1344(2), let alone to require that other conduct even farther

removed from the making of a representation falls within that statute.

Unlike the majority, I do find persuasive Miller'sreliance on United States v. Briggs, 939 F.2d

222, 226-27 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1016 (1993). In that case, as in this one, the

government's evidence would have supported a conclusion that the defendant ordered the transfer

of funds by a bankin that case by wire transfer order, in this case by ATM operations. The Fifth

Circuit held, I believe rightly, that "the bare act of instructing a bank to transfer funds is not a factual

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representation...." Therefore, that circuit held "it cannot be a misrepresentation, a false

representation, or any kind ofrepresentation." Id. at 226 (emphasisin the original). I do not see how

ordering byATM machine is anymore a representation than ordering bywire. I would therefore hold

consistently with the Fifth Circuit that evidence of such an order does not make out a violation of §

1344(2).

I would nonetheless join my colleagues in upholding the conviction of Miller. Because I

would not convict under § 1344(2), unlike my colleagues, I would reach the question of the

sufficiency of the evidence under 18 U.S.C. § 1344(1) and hold the evidence to be sufficient. To

convict appellant under this subsection, the government was required to prove "a recognizable

scheme formed with the intent to defraud a financial institution." United States v. LeDonne, 21 F.3d

1418, 1425 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 584 (1995). I see nothing in the statute or in

authoritative interpretations of it requiring that the scheme defrauds the institution of funds it owns

as opposed to funds in which its interest is as a trustee or bailee. That the fraud is directed at a

particular account, as opposed to the general funds and credits of the bank, should not in my view

affect the sufficiency of the evidence.

Thus, I would affirm the conviction, but on the basis ofsection 1344(1) rather than 1344(2).

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