Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cv-01125/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cv-01125-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jeffrey A. Beard
Defendant
Ikwinder Singh
Defendant
Steve Wilhelm
Plaintiff
Steven Hairl Wilhelm
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVE WILHELM, A.K.A. STEVEN 

HAIRL WILHELM,

Plaintiff,

v.

JEFFREY A. BEARD, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:18-cv-1125 DB P

ORDER

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 

has requested authority pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1, 

5, 7). Before this court is also a motion to expedite. (ECF No. 8). This proceeding was referred 

to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).

For the reasons stated below, the court shall grant plaintiff’s application to proceed in 

forma pauperis. Plaintiff will also be given the opportunity to amend the complaint. Finally, 

plaintiff’s motion to expedite will also be denied as improperly filed.

I. IN FORMA PAUPERIS APPLICATION

Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(a). (See ECF Nos. 5, 7). Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be 

granted.

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Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. §§ 

1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing fee in 

accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct 

the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and 

forward it to the Clerk of Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments of 

twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. 

These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of Court each time the 

amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(b)(2).

II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2).

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 

Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 

Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in 

support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 

U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); Palmer v. Roosevelt 

Lake Log Owners Ass’n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a complaint under 

this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hosp.

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Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor, Jenkins v. 

McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

III. PLEADING STANDARD

A. Generally

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. 

Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Section 1983 is not itself a source 

of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights conferred 

elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989).

To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) 

that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the 

alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. 

Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. Facial 

plausibility demands more than the mere possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, 

while factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78.

B. Linkage Requirement

Under Section 1983, a plaintiff bringing an individual capacity claim must demonstrate 

that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. See Jones v. 

Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). There must be an actual connection or link between 

the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

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Ortez v. Washington County, State of Oregon, 88 F.3d 804, 809 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Taylor 

v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989).

IV. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

Plaintiff names Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 

(“CDCR”), Jeffrey A. Beard and Dr. Ikwinder Singh of Valley State Prison1as defendants in this 

action. (ECF No. 1 at 1-2). The complaint alleges violations of right under the Equal Protection 

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). 

Of particular import to each of plaintiff’s claims is that he suffers from an extremely large 

prostate which prevents him from being able to urinate on demand. (See id. at 4).

A. Claim I

In Claim I, plaintiff alleges that on or around December 25, 2015, defendant Singh 

violated his rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when he 

denied his request to receive a chrono to have his blood drawn in lieu of having to provide a urine 

sample when randomly directed to do so.2 The record indicates that plaintiff made the request 

because having to urinate on demand causes him a great deal of stress and anxiety. (See ECF No. 

1 at 4-5). A subsequent appeal of defendant Singh’s decision not to give plaintiff the chrono was 

denied.3 (See id. at 4).

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1

 In the complaint, plaintiff fails to identify at which prison defendant Singh is employed. (See

ECF No. 1 at 1-2). However, because plaintiff alleges that the incidents in question took place at 

Valley State Prison (see id. at 1), the court presumes that this is where defendant Singh is 

employed.

2

 Plaintiff states that random urine samples are requested of him in order to test for controlled 

substances or alcohol use. (See ECF No. 1 at 7).

3

 For reasons that are unclear, it appears that prior to filing the instant action, on April 2, 2018, 

plaintiff had filed a habeas petition in this court in an attempt to remedy this incident. The case 

was Wilhelm v. Beard, No. 2:18-cv-0720 WBS GGH (“Beard I”). (See Beard I, ECF No. 1). 

Beard I was eventually identified as a civil rights matter, and on October 12, 2018, it was 

dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). (See Beard I, ECF Nos. 13, 15, 16). 

Plaintiff filed the instant action in May 2018, shortly after filing Beard I.

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B. Claim II

1. Defendant Singh

In Claim II, plaintiff alleges that he has been discriminated against and that his rights 

under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) have been violated. (See ECF No. 1 at 5). In 

support of this argument, plaintiff states that defendant Singh’s denial of the requested chrono 

“deprived [him] of a constitutionally sufficient notice and an opportunity to be heard before the 

deprivation was complete.” (Id. at 5) (brackets added). As a result, plaintiff argues, defendant 

Singh’s actions “caused deprivation of a federal right that can be fairly attributable to the State.” 

(Id. at 5).

b. Defendant Beard

With respect to defendant Beard, in Claim II, plaintiff also alleges that defendant Beard 

has discriminated against him and has violated his rights under the ADA. (See ECF No. 1 at 5). 

Specifically, plaintiff states that because defendant Beard “created the policy that fostered the 

action,” defendant Beard has “deprived [him] of the same constitutional right as did [sic] Dr. 

Singh.” (See id. at 5) (brackets added).

V. DISCUSSION

A. Claim I

Construing the complaint liberally,4the court finds following: (1) that based on the facts 

provided, Claim I is not an equal protection claim; it is a claim which appears to allege a 

deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s serious medical needs on the part of defendant Singh, and (2) 

this deliberate indifference claim as currently presented fails to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted.

“To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of 

the Fourteenth Amendment a plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with an intent or 

purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class.” Lee v. 

 

4 This court is obligated to liberally construe the pleadings of pro se litigants. See Estelle v. 

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (stating pro se documents are to be liberally construed); see also

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (stating pro se pleadings are held to less stringent 

standard than those drafted by lawyers).

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City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 

1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1154 (1999)).

The facts plaintiff alleges against defendant Singh in Claim I neither assert that plaintiff 

was being discriminated against by defendant Singh, nor identify any particular protected class5

to which plaintiff belongs. (See ECF No. 1 at 4). For these reasons, plaintiff’s characterization of 

Claim I as an equal protection claim is improper.

Claim I is effectively an Eighth Amendment claim. Ultimately, it argues that it was 

improper for defendant Singh to deny plaintiff the option of being able to submit a blood test 

instead of a urine test when being randomly tested for controlled substances and alcohol. (See

generally ECF No. 1 at 4). Construing the claim liberally, it also argues that as a result of 

defendant Singh refusing to give plaintiff a chrono for a blood test, defendant Singh was 

deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s prostate condition and that this indifference has caused 

plaintiff stress and anxiety, affecting his mental and emotional state in violation of his rights 

under the Eighth Amendment. (See id. at 4).

Construed as an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim, Claim I fails to state a 

claim as well. This is because “[in order] to prevail on a claim involving choices between 

alternative courses of treatment, a prisoner must show that the chosen course of treatment was 

medically unacceptable under the circumstances and was chosen in conscious disregard of an 

excessive risk to the prisoner’s health.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted) (citing Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 

(9th Cir. 1996)); see also Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations 

omitted).

“[W]here a defendant has based his actions on a medical judgment that either of two 

alternative courses of treatment would be medically acceptable under the circumstances, plaintiff 

has failed to show deliberate indifference as a matter of law.” Jackson, 90 F.3d at 332 (citations 

 

5

 To the extent plaintiff may believe that any disability he has places him in a protected class, he 

is mistaken. It is well-settled that the disabled do not constitute a suspect class for equal 

protection purposes. See Coakley v. Murphy, 884 F.2d 1218, 1221-22 (9th Cir. 1989).

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omitted). Here, plaintiff has not provided any facts to support an implied assertion that defendant 

Singh’s decision not issue plaintiff a chrono that would have permitted him to submit blood 

instead of a urine sample for random drug testing was medically unacceptable under the 

circumstances. (See generally ECF No. 1). Furthermore, “[a] difference of opinion between a 

physician and [a] prisoner . . . concerning what medical care is appropriate does not amount to 

deliberate indifference.” Colwell, 763 F.3d at 1068 (citations omitted) (brackets added). Finally,

plaintiff arguably contends that defendant Singh’s decision to deny him a chrono to submit a 

blood sample was medically unacceptable. This, plaintiff alleges, caused him stress and anxiety. 

(see generally ECF No. 1 at 4) However plaintiff makes no assertion that defendant Singh’s 

decision was done in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to plaintiff’s health (see generally

id.).

To the extent that Claim I asserts an Eighth Amendment argument of deliberate 

indifference to serious medical need on the part of defendant Singh, it fails to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). Plaintiff will, however, be given the 

opportunity to amend this claim in a first amended complaint.

B. Claim II

In Claim II, plaintiff alleges discrimination and a violation of his rights under the ADA.

(see ECF No. 1 at 5), However he provides neither legal nor factual support for these general

allegations. (See generally id. at 5). This is true regarding plaintiff’s allegations against

defendants Singh and Beard. (See generally id. at 5).

While the court is obligated to liberally construe pro se pleadings, a litigant is not entitled 

the benefit of every conceivable doubt. On the contrary, the court is obligated to draw only 

reasonable factual inferences in a litigant’s favor. See Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 958 (9th 

Cir. 2010) (citing McKinney v. De Bord, 507 F.2d 501, 504 (9th Cir. 1974)).

Plaintiff has provided neither sufficient facts nor law to support his allegation in Claim I 

that defendants Singh and Beard have violated his rights under the ADA and/or have 

discriminated against him. Claim I fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. As a 

result, plaintiff will be given the opportunity to amend it as well in a first amended complaint.

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VI. MOTION TO EXPEDITE

Plaintiff’s motion to expedite asks the court to rule on Wilhelm v. Beard, No. 2:18-cv0720 WBS GGH (“Beard I”). (See ECF No. 8). A review of Beard I indicates that it is a habeas 

case that was filed prior to this action; that it was assigned to a different magistrate and district 

court judge, and that it has been closed. (See Beard I, ECF Nos. 1, 15, 16). Accordingly, the 

motion to expedite was improperly filed in this case, and it will be denied as such.

VII. OPTIONAL LEAVE TO AMEND

Plaintiff is being given the opportunity to amend the complaint. If plaintiff chooses to file 

an amended complaint, it will take the place of the original complaint. See Lacey v. Maricopa

Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 925 (9th Cir. 2012) (amended complaint supersedes original). Any amended 

complaint should observe the following:

An amended complaint must identify as a defendant only persons who personally 

participated in a substantial way in depriving plaintiff of a federal constitutional right. Johnson 

v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (a person subjects another to the deprivation of a 

constitutional right if he does an act, participates in another's act or omits to perform an act he is 

legally required to do that causes the alleged deprivation).

An amended complaint must also contain a caption including the names of all 

defendants. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by alleging 

new, unrelated claims. See George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007).

Any amended complaint must be written or typed so that it is complete in itself without 

reference to any earlier filed complaint. See L.R. 220 (E.D. Cal. 2009). This is because an 

amended complaint supersedes any earlier filed complaint, and once an amended complaint is 

filed, the earlier filed complaint no longer serves any function in the case. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 

F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967) (“The amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter being 

treated thereafter as non-existent.”), overruled on other grounds by Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 

F.3d 896 (2012).

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis filed June 15, 2018 (ECF No. 5) is 

GRANTED;

2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. Plaintiff 

is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the 

appropriate agency filed concurrently herewith;

3. Plaintiff’s complaint filed May 4, 2018 (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED with leave to 

amend;

4. Within thirty days of the date of service of this order, plaintiff shall file a first 

amended complaint. Failure to file an amended complaint within the time allotted may result in 

the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute, and

5. Plaintiff’s motion to expedite, filed November 15, 2019 (ECF No. 8), is DENIED as 

improperly filed.

Dated: February 10, 2020

DLB:13

DB/ORDERS/ORDERS.PRISONER.CIVIL RIGHTS/wilh1125.scrn

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