Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00865/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00865-6/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alvin Dalton
Petitioner
Katavich
Respondent

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALVIN DALTON,

Petitioner,

v.

JOHN KATAVICH,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:15-cv-00865-AWI-EPG-HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

RECOMMENDING DENIAL OF PETITION 

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner Alvin Dalton is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In his petition for writ of habeas corpus, Petitioner 

raises the following claims for relief: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) selective 

enforcement of the law; (3) destruction of mitigating and exculpatory evidence; (4) the trial 

court‘s prejudicial and biased remarks against Petitioner; (5) the trial court‘s interference with 

defense cross-examination of prosecution‘s key witness; (6) prosecutorial misconduct; (7) unfair 

sentencing; and (8) the trial court‘s disregard of Petitioner‘s fundamental rights. 

For the reasons discussed herein, the Court recommends dismissal of Petitioner‘s second

and sixth claims for relief and denial of the petition.

I.

BACKGROUND

After his first trial ended in a mistrial, Petitioner was convicted in 2011 by a second jury 

in Fresno County Superior Court of second-degree murder (count 1) and two counts of

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unpremeditated attempted murder (counts 2 and 3). The jury found true the allegations that

Petitioner personally used a handgun in the commission of each count and that Petitioner 

intentionally discharged a firearm in the commission of each count, causing death or great bodily 

injury in counts 1 and 2. The jury also found true the allegation that Petitioner inflicted great 

bodily injury in the commission of count 2. Petitioner was sentenced to an aggregate 

imprisonment term of eighty-three years to life. People v. Dalton, No. F063443, 2014 WL 

435528, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2014).

On January 30, 2014, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, affirmed 

the judgment. Dalton, 2014 WL 435528, at *7. The California Supreme Court denied Petitioner‘s 

petition for review on April 16, 2014. (LDs

1

20, 21). Thereafter, Petitioner filed a petition for 

writ of habeas corpus in the Fresno County Superior Court. (LD 24). The petition was denied 

without prejudice on September 2, 2014. (LD 25). Petitioner filed another habeas petition in the 

Fresno County Superior Court, which denied the petition on November 18, 2014. (LDs 22, 23). 

Petitioner then filed a habeas petition in the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, 

which denied the petition without prejudice on February 5, 2015. (LDs 26, 27). Finally, 

Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the California Supreme Court, which summarily denied the 

petition on May 13, 2015. (LDs 28, 29). 

On June 8, 2015, Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 

(ECF No. 1). Respondent has filed an answer to the petition and Petitioner has filed a traverse. 

(ECF Nos. 31, 35).

II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS2

In March 2011, defendant Alvin Dalton shot his next door neighbor, Danetta H., 

and her two teenage children, Dazhane H. and Dezmon H., after intervening in a 

physical altercation involving defendant‘s girlfriend, Lora White. As a result of 

the shooting, Danetta died from a gunshot wound to the head, Dazhane suffered 

serious injuries requiring surgery, and Dezmon suffered superficial injuries.

. . . 

 

1

―LD‖ refers to the documents lodged by Respondent on October 26, 2015. (ECF No. 33).

2 The Court relies on the California Court of Appeal‘s January 30, 2014 opinion for this summary of the facts of the 

crime. See Vasquez v. Kirkland, 572 F.3d 1029, 1031 n.1 (9th Cir. 2009).

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On March 2, 2011, around 11:30 a.m., Danetta and Dazhane were walking home 

from a nearby store when Lora started spraying them with mace and another 

strong-smelling substance. Dazhane reacted by throwing Gatorade bottles and a 

water bottle towards Lora, and Danetta sprayed Lora with a mixture of water and 

insect spray.

Lora went inside her apartment and shortly remerged carrying a pot of steaming 

hot water. Lora ran towards Danetta and poured the water on her. Lora then hit 

Danetta multiple times with the pot. Dazhane ran over and grabbed Lora by the 

hair and hit Lora multiple times in the head.

Defendant, who had been outside fixing the lock on his door, went to grab 

Dazhane and pull her off Lora. As he pulled Dazhane away from Danetta and 

Lora, defendant said, ―Let it be a one-on-one fight.‖ Dazhane continued to hit and 

kick defendant as he moved her away from Danetta and Lora who were now both 

on the ground.

Dazhane was able to get away from defendant and called out for her brother, 

Dezmon. A few seconds later, Dezmon ran out of their apartment and tried to pull 

Lora off Danetta. In the meantime, defendant punched Dazhane in the face and 

she fell to the ground. After defendant punched Dazhane, Dezmon asked, ―You 

just going to hit my sister?‖ Defendant replied, ―yes.‖

Dezmon pushed defendant and punched him in the face. Defendant said, ―Oh, 

you‘re going to hit me, you're going to hit me?‖ Then defendant said, ―Fuck this 

shit‖ and pulled out a gun. After firing one shot into the air, defendant pointed the 

gun at Danetta and shot her two to three times. After Danetta fell to the ground, 

defendant pointed the gun at Dazhane and shot her twice. Defendant then pointed 

the gun at Dezmon and fired two shots.

Dezmon started walking towards defendant and said, ―You shot my mom‖ and 

―You killed my mom.‖ Defendant said ―yes‖ to each statement. Dezmon became 

angry, grabbed defendant‘s arm, and started wrestling with defendant standing up.

As they were wrestling, defendant touched Dezmon‘s chest with the gun and 

Dezmon heard a click. Lora came up next to them and asked defendant to give her 

the gun. Defendant handed Lora the gun and let go of Dezmon. Defendant then 

went into his apartment.

The defense

Defendant described living next door to Danetta as ―constant terrorism.‖ 

Defendant explained that Danetta had threatened him and his personal property 

many times, and had vandalized his patio, car, and truck.

On the night before the shooting, defendant came home to find his security screen 

door covered with a ―sludge material‖ including pasta. Lora had to let him in 

because he could not get his key in the lock. Defendant got three pots of hot water 

and took them outside to clean the door.

Around 11:00 p.m., Danetta came out and said, ―um-hum, you‘re going to be 

cleaning all night‖ and ―[m]e and my homeboys, we‘re going to jack you—you 

and your car tonight,‖ referring to the Strothers Boys gang. Dazhane was standing 

next to Danetta when she made this threat. Defendant took it to be a credible 

threat because Danetta had carried out all her past threats.

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After Danetta threatened him, defendant immediately went inside his home and 

armed himself. He then went back outside and threw hot water on the security 

screen door. It took him about 30 minutes to clean the door. Defendant also called 

the police that night. He estimated that there had been 50 such incidents in the 

past six months where the police had been called.

The next morning, defendant went outside to clean the lock on the security screen 

door. Dazhane tried to follow Lora inside their apartment, but defendant stopped 

her. He then turned his attention back to cleaning the lock. Next defendant heard 

Danetta and Dazhane cussing and yelling at Lora. He turned around and saw 

Danetta and Lora ―tangled‖ on the ground, and saw Dazhane kicking and 

punching Lora in the head. Defendant dropped what he was doing and ran over 

and pulled Dazhane off of Lora. Dazhane punched defendant in the face, kicked 

him in the legs and groin area, and tried to bite him in the chest.

Defendant then saw Dezmon run over to Lora and start pulling her hair and hitting 

her. Defendant ran over to protect Lora. Defendant saw Dezmon reach into his 

left pocket. As defendant was looking down, Dezmon punched him. Defendant 

then reached for his gun. Defendant explained he reached for his gun because he 

was in fear for his life based on the threat Danetta had made to him the previous 

night. Defendant reiterated that ―every time she would make a threat, she would 

follow through with it.‖

According to defendant, before he reached for his gun, all three family 

members—Danetta, Dazhane, and Dezmon—were hitting and kicking him. 

Defendant estimated he was hit five to six times and kicked three or four times. 

When defendant pulled out his gun, Danetta and Dazhane were standing facing 

him and Dezmon was behind him. Defendant fired his gun because he was in fear 

for his life and was trying to escape to his apartment.

Dalton, 2014 WL 435528, at *1–3 (footnote omitted).

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody 

pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws 

or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 

529 U.S. 362, 375 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed 

by the United States Constitution. The challenged convictions arise out of the Kings County 

Superior Court, which is located within the Eastern District of California. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 

28 U.S.C. § 2241(d).

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

of 1996 (―AEDPA‖), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its 

enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th 

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Cir. 1997) (en banc). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA and is 

therefore governed by its provisions.

Under the AEDPA, relitigation of any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court is 

barred unless a petitioner can show that the state court‘s adjudication of his claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2198 (2015); Harrington v. Richter, 562 

U.S. 86, 97–98 (2011); Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. Thus, if a petitioner‘s claim has been 

―adjudicated on the merits‖ in state court, the ―AEDPA‘s highly deferential standards‖ apply. 

Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2198. However, if the state court did not reach the merits of the claim, the 

claim is reviewed de novo. Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 472 (2009).

In ascertaining what is ―clearly established Federal law,‖ this Court must look to the 

―holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court‘s] decisions as of the time of the 

relevant state-court decision.‖ Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. In addition, the Supreme Court 

decision must ― ̳squarely address[] the issue in th[e] case‘ or establish a legal principle that 

 ̳clearly extend[s]‘ to a new context to the extent required by the Supreme Court in . . . recent 

decisions‖; otherwise, there is no clearly established Federal law for purposes of review under 

AEDPA and the Court must defer to the state court‘s decision. Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 

754 (9th Cir. 2008) (alterations in original) (quoting Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125, 

123 (2008)).

If the Court determines there is clearly established Federal law governing the issue, the 

Court then must consider whether the state court‘s decision was ―contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, [the] clearly established Federal law.‖ 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). A 

state court decision is ―contrary to‖ clearly established Supreme Court precedent if it ―arrives at 

a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state 

court decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court] has on a set of materially 

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indistinguishable facts.‖ Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A state court decision involves ―an 

unreasonable application of[] clearly established Federal law‖ if ―there is no possibility 

fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court‘s decision conflicts with [the Supreme 

Court‘s] precedents.‖ Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. That is, a petitioner ―must show that the state 

court‘s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that 

there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for 

fairminded disagreement.‖ Id. at 103.

If the Court determines that the state court decision was ―contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,‖ and the error is not structural, 

habeas relief is nonetheless unavailable unless it is established that the error ―had substantial and 

injurious effect or influence‖ on the verdict. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) 

(internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 

(1946)).

The AEDPA requires considerable deference to the state courts. The Court looks to the 

last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state court judgment. See Brumfield v. Cain, 

135 S. Ct. 2269, 2276 (2015); Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1094 n.1 (2013); Ylst v. 

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 806 (1991). ―When a federal claim has been presented to a state 

court and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the 

claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the 

contrary.‖ Richter, 562 U.S. at 99. Where the state court reaches a decision on the merits but 

provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a federal habeas court independently reviews the 

record to determine whether habeas corpus relief is available under § 2254(d). Walker v. Martel, 

709 F.3d 925, 939 (9th Cir. 2013). ―Independent review of the record is not de novo review of 

the constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine whether a silent 

state court decision is objectively unreasonable.‖ Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th 

Cir. 2003). The federal court must review the state court record and ―must determine what 

arguments or theories . . . could have supported, the state court‘s decision; and then it must ask 

whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are 

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inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme] Court.‖ Richter, 562 U.S. at 

102.

IV.

REVIEW OF CLAIMS

A. Selective Enforcement of the Law

In his second claim for relief, Petitioner asserts that the police violated his constitutional 

rights over fifty times from January 2010 to March 2011 by failing to arrest the victim, Danetta.3

(ECF No. 1 at 9, 224).4Petitioner also asserts that on January 24, 2011, Officer Estrada omitted 

evidence in his police report that Petitioner had asked Officer E. Claiborne to arrest Danetta for 

assault, battery, and vandalism of property. (Id. at 227). Respondent argues that this claim is not 

cognizable on federal habeas review because it does not directly implicate the validity of 

Petitioner‘s conviction or sentence. (ECF No. 31 at 24).

This claim was raised in all of Petitioner‘s state habeas petitions. The Fresno County 

Superior Court found that Petitioner failed to state a prima facie case for habeas relief under 

People v. Duvall, 9 Cal. 4th 464, 474 (1995), by not ―present[ing] any objective evidence that 

would substantiate the contentions.‖ (LD 23 at 3–4). The California Court of Appeal, Fifth 

Appellate District, denied the petition without prejudice because it did ―not provide an adequate 

factual context for the issues petitioner raises,‖ with citation to Duvall. (LD 27). The California 

Supreme Court summarily denied the petition. (LD 29).

As articulated in the petition, this claim is not directly relevant to Petitioner‘s request for 

habeas relief. Whether police officers allegedly violated Petitioner‘s constitutional rights on

multiple occasions prior to and separate from the March 2, 2011 incident, which gave rise to the 

convictions at issue here, was not a proper subject of the criminal proceeding against Petitioner. 

As the claim fails to attack the validity of Petitioner‘s custody, it is not an issue within this 

Court‘s federal habeas jurisdiction. Section 2254(a)‘s language ―explicitly requires a nexus 

between the petitioner‘s claim and the unlawful nature of the custody.‖ Bailey v. Hill, 599 F.3d 

 

3 To avoid confusion, the Court will refer to individuals as they were referenced by the California Court of Appeal in 

the January 30, 2014 opinion.

4

Page numbers refer to the ECF page numbers stamped at the top of the page.

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976, 980 (9th Cir. 2010). That is, the remedy that the petitioner seeks should ―directly impact—

and [be] directed at the source of the restraint on—his liberty.‖ Id. at 981.

The Court ―must construe pro se habeas filings liberally.‖ Allen v. Calderon, 408 F.3d 

1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488 (1989)). To the extent 

Petitioner argues that law enforcement‘s failure to arrest Danetta and the omission in the police 

report of Petitioner‘s request to have Danetta arrested for assault, battery, and vandalism provide 

justification for Petitioner‘s offense, that is an issue of whether such circumstances provide a 

legally valid excuse or justification for homicide under California law5and is not cognizable in 

federal habeas proceedings. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983) (―The role of 

federal habeas proceedings, while important in assuring that constitutional rights are observed, is 

secondary and limited. Federal courts are not forums in which to relitigate state trials.‖); Lewis v. 

Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990) (―[F]ederal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state 

law.‖). Accordingly, Petitioner‘s second claim for relief must be dismissed.

B. Judicial Misconduct

In his third, fourth, fifth, and eighth claims for relief, Petitioner asserts various instances 

of judicial misconduct. Petitioner alleges that the trial court altered the record on appeal, made 

prejudicial and biased remarks about Petitioner in the presence of the jury and media, improperly 

interfered with the cross-examination of the prosecution‘s key witness, and generally disregarded 

Petitioner‘s fundamental rights during the course of the trial. (ECF No. 1 at 11, 14, 17, 23). 

Respondent argues that the state court was not unreasonable in rejecting Petitioner‘s unsupported 

and incredible allegations of judicial misconduct. (ECF No. 31 at 26). 

These claims were raised in all of Petitioner‘s state habeas petitions. The Fresno County 

Superior Court found that Petitioner failed to state a prima facie case for habeas relief under 

 

5 The Court notes that at trial, Lora testified that she called the police approximately forty times due to Danetta. (5 

RT 744). Petitioner testified that the police were called approximately fifty times over the span of six months due to 

altercations that involved ―[a]ggressive assaults and vandalism by Danetta.‖ (6 RT 790–91). The Court addresses in 

section IV(E)(2)(a), infra, whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance for allegedly failing to investigate 

and pursue mitigating evidence in the police reports and for failing to introduce as evidence all of Danetta‘s criminal 

record and police contacts.

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Duvall6by not ―present[ing] any objective evidence that would substantiate the contentions.‖

(LD 23 at 3–4). The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, denied the petition 

without prejudice because it did ―not provide an adequate factual context for the issues petitioner 

raises,‖ with citation to Duvall. (LD 27). The California Supreme Court summarily denied the 

petition. (LD 29). The Court presumes that the California Supreme Court adjudicated the claim 

on the merits unless ―there is reason to think some other explanation for the state court‘s decision 

is more likely.‖ Richter, 562 U.S. at 99–100. Generally, federal courts ―look through‖ summary 

denials and review the last reasoned state court opinion. See Brumfield, 135 S. Ct. at 2276; Ylst, 

501 U.S. at 806. ―Where there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, 

[the Court presumes] later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the same 

claim rest upon the same ground‖ unless ―strong evidence can refute‖ the presumption. Ylst, 501 

U.S. at 803, 804. Accordingly, the Court finds that the California Supreme Court denied the 

judicial misconduct claims on procedural grounds under Duvall.

A federal court will not review a petitioner‘s claims if the state court has denied relief on 

those claims pursuant to a state law procedural ground that is independent of federal law and 

adequate to support the judgment. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729–30 (1991). This 

doctrine of procedural default is based on concerns of comity and federalism. Id. at 730–32.

Procedural default is an affirmative defense that the state must assert; otherwise the defense is 

waived. Vang v. Nevada, 329 F.3d 1069, 1073 (9th Cir. 2003). As Respondent has failed to raise 

procedural default as an affirmative defense to Petitioner‘s judicial misconduct claims, the Court 

will review these claims de novo. See Chaker v. Crogan, 428 F.3d 1215, 1221 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(reviewing claim de novo when state forfeited procedural default defense and there was no state 

court decision on the merits).

1. Judicial Conduct During the Cross-Examination of Dazhane

Petitioner‘s third, fourth, and fifth claims for relief arise from the trial court‘s conduct

 

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―To satisfy the initial burden of pleading adequate grounds for relief . . . [t]he petition should both (i) state fully 

and with particularity the facts on which relief is sought, as well as (ii) include copies of reasonably available 

documentary evidence supporting the claim, including pertinent portions of trial transcripts and affidavits or 

declarations.‖ Duvall, 9 Cal. 4th at 474.

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during the cross-examination of prosecution witness Dazhane. Petitioner alleges that during 

cross-examination, Dazhane became evasive, stopped answering defense counsel‘s questions, 

and then rolled her eyes and looked toward the jury and stated, ―He killed my mother.‖ (ECF No. 

1 at 153). Petitioner alleges that when defense counsel attempted to resume questioning the 

witness, ―the trial judge blurted out,  ̳Stop it, he killed her mother for Christ‘s sake,‘‖ and 

improperly put a complete halt to the cross-examination. (Id. at 153–54). Petitioner further 

alleges that the trial court and/or the court reporter thereafter tampered with the record and 

deleted these statements from the trial transcript. (Id. at 154).

The Court has reviewed the record, and the alleged statements made by Dazhane and the 

trial court during cross-examination are not found in the trial transcript. (2 RT7286–305, 350–

386). Petitioner alleges that the trial court ―put a complete halt‖ to the cross-examination after 

line 24 on page 353 of the record, which corresponds with the court‘s afternoon session on 

August 15, 2011. However, the record provides that Dazhane‘s cross-examination continued 

until the evening recess and even resumed the following day. (2 RT 386; 3 RT 397). ―[S]elfserving statements by a defendant that his conviction was constitutionally infirm are insufficient 

to overcome the presumption of regularity accorded state convictions.‖ Turner v. Calderon, 281 

F.3d 851, 881 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Allen, 

153 F.3d 1037, 1041 (9th Cir. 1998)). Petitioner has not provided any evidence, such as 

affidavits from his trial attorney, the media, or audience members present that day, to 

substantiate his allegation that the trial court altered volume II of the reporter‘s transcript to 

exclude the alleged statements made by Dazhane and the court. (ECF No. 1 at 152). Conversely,

the court reporter in this case certified that ―Volumes I through VI, pages numbers 1 through 

1115, comprise a full, true and correct statement of the proceedings as reflected therein.‖ (6 RT 

1115).

As Petitioner has failed to establish that the trial court made the alleged prejudicial and 

biased remark, completely halted the cross-examination of Dazhane before defense counsel was 

finished, and altered the trial transcript, the Court finds that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas 

 

7

―RT‖ refers to the Reporter‘s Transcript on Appeal lodged by Respondent on October 26, 2015. (ECF No. 33).

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relief on his third, fourth, and fifth claims and they must be denied.

2. Judicial Bias

In his eighth claim for relief, Petitioner asserts that the trial court disregarded Petitioner‘s 

fundamental rights during the course of the trial. (ECF No. 1 at 23). In support of this claim, 

Petitioner alleges, inter alia, that the trial court showed favoritism and gave assistance to the 

prosecution‘s key witness and ignored trial errors prejudicial to Petitioner. (Id. at 23–24).

The Supreme Court has long recognized that due process ―clearly requires a  ̳fair trial in a 

fair tribunal‘ before a judge with no actual bias against the defendant or interest in the outcome 

of his particular case.‖ Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904–05 (1997) (quoting Withrow v. 

Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46 (1975)). ―The Constitution requires recusal where  ̳the probability of 

actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.‘‖ 

Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 768, 788 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47). Thus, to 

establish a due process violation Petitioner need not prove actual bias, just an intolerable risk of 

bias. Hurles, 752 F.3d at 789. However, Petitioner must ―overcome a presumption of honesty 

and integrity in those serving as adjudicators.‖ Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47. The Supreme Court has 

held that in the absence of some extrajudicial source of bias or partiality, ―judicial rulings alone 

almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion‖ and ―judicial remarks during 

the course of trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or 

their cases ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge . . . [unless] they display a 

deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.‖ Liteky v. 

United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). See Larson v. Palmateer, 515 F.3d 1057, 1067 (9th Cir. 

2008) (applying Liteky in § 2254 habeas proceeding governed by the AEDPA).

Petitioner argues that the trial court showed favoritism and improperly gave assistance to

the prosecution‘s key witness, citing to the following exchange during cross-examination:

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Q. That‘s Exhibit D. Where was your 

brother?

[DAZHANE H.]: A. My brother, he was somewhere over here, I‘m 

not really for sure, but he was over here (pointing).

Q. ―Over here‖ is where, ma‘am? You need—make the pointer—

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[THE COURT]: She‘s not doing it on purpose. Trust me.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Q. Okay. That would be the area by 16 

in the middle of—where it says ―sidewalk,‖ and I would say in the 

middle of the 38-inch line mark. Would that be a fair statement, 

ma‘am?

A. Yeah, He was off.

(3 RT 420–21). Nothing in this exchange displays a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that 

would make fair judgment impossible. With respect to the assertion that the trial court ignored 

trial errors prejudicial to Petitioner, Petitioner does not demonstrate that the trial court‘s judicial 

rulings were the product of some extrajudicial source of bias or partiality. 

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Petitioner has failed to ―overcome [the] 

presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators.‖ Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47. 

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on his eighth claim and it must be denied.

C. Prosecutorial Misconduct

In his sixth claim for relief, Petitioner asserts that the prosecution engaged in misconduct 

by misstating the law regarding the heat of passion defense to the jury in closing arguments. 

(ECF No. 1 at 18, 155). Respondent argues that Petitioner‘s prosecutorial misconduct claim is 

procedurally defaulted. (ECF No. 31 at 28–29). On the merits, Respondent argues that the 

alleged prosecutorial misconduct was harmless. (ECF No. 31 at 29).

This claim was raised on direct appeal to the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate 

District, which found that Petitioner had forfeited the claim. Dalton, 2014 WL 435528, at *3–4. 

The claim also was raised in the petition for review, which the California Supreme Court 

summarily denied. (LDs 20, 21). Where ―the last reasoned opinion on the claim explicitly 

imposes a procedural default, [the Court] will presume that a later decision rejecting the claim 

did not silently disregard that bar and consider the merits.‖ Ylst, 501 U.S. at 803.

1. Procedural Default

A federal court will not review a petitioner‘s claims if the state court has denied relief on

those claims pursuant to a state law procedural ground that is independent of federal law and 

adequate to support the judgment. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729–30. This doctrine of procedural 

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default is based on concerns of comity and federalism. Id. at 730–32. However, there are 

limitations as to when a federal court should invoke procedural default and refuse to review a 

claim because a petitioner violated a state‘s procedural rules. Procedural default can only block a 

claim in federal court if the state court ―clearly and expressly states that its judgment rests on a 

state procedural bar.‖ Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263 (1989). 

Here, the California Court of Appeal found that Petitioner forfeited his prosecutorial 

misconduct claim under People v. Morales, 25 Cal. 4th 34, 43–44 (2001), by failing to make a 

timely objection when the misconduct occurred. Dalton, 2014 WL 435528, at *3. This is known 

as the contemporaneous objection rule. As the California Court of Appeal clearly and expressly 

stated that its decision on the prosecutorial misconduct claim rests on a state procedural bar, 

procedural default is appropriate if the state procedural bar is independent and adequate.

To qualify as ―independent,‖ a state procedural ground ―must not be  ̳interwoven with the 

federal law.‘‖ Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Michigan v. 

Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040–41 (1983)). ―To qualify as an  ̳adequate‘ procedural ground, a state 

rule must be  ̳firmly established and regularly followed.‘‖ Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307, 316 

(2011) (quoting Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53, 60 (2009)). That is, the state procedural bar must 

be ―clear, consistently applied, and well-established at the time of the petitioner‘s purported 

default.‖ Lee v. Jacquez, 788 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Collier v. Bayer, 408 

F.3d 1279, 1284 (9th Cir. 2005)). The Ninth Circuit has taken a burden-shifting approach to 

determining the adequacy of a state procedural ground. See Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573,

586 (9th Cir. 2003). First, the state must plead an independent and adequate state procedural bar 

as an affirmative defense. The burden then shifts to the petitioner ―to place that defense in issue.‖ 

Id. The petitioner‘s burden is ―modest,‖ Lee, 788 F.3d at 1128, and can be satisfied by ―asserting 

specific factual allegations that demonstrate the inadequacy of the state procedure, including 

citation to authority demonstrating inconsistent application of the rule,‖ Bennett, 322 F.3d at 

586. If the petitioner satisfies his burden, the burden shifts back to the state, which bears ―the 

ultimate burden of proving the adequacy‖ of the state procedural bar. Id. at 585–86.

///

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In the instant case, Respondent asserts that ―[f]orfeiture for failure to object is a state 

procedural bar that is both independent and adequate, and is also consistently applied by 

California courts.‖ (ECF No. 31 at 29). Petitioner has not raised any challenges to the adequacy 

of California‘s contemporaneous objection rule and thus, has failed to place the defense in issue. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that the California Court of Appeal applied an independent and 

adequate state procedural rule, and Petitioner has procedurally defaulted this claim. See Howard 

v. Campbell, 305 F. App‘x 442, 444 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding failure to comply with California‘s 

independent and adequate contemporaneous objection rule results in a procedural default of a 

prosecutorial misconduct claim) (citing Rich v. Calderon, 187 F.3d 1064, 1069–70 (9th Cir. 

1999)).

A petitioner may obtain federal review of a defaulted claim by demonstrating either 

―(1)  ̳cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law,‘ 

or (2)  ̳that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.‘‖ 

Jones v. Ryan, 691 F.3d 1093, 1101 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750)). 

Although attorney error constituting ineffective assistance of counsel provides ―cause‖ to excuse 

procedural default, Coleman, 501 U.S. at 754, ineffective assistance generally must ―be 

presented to the state courts as an independent claim before it may be used to establish cause for 

a procedural default,‖ Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 489 (1986). Here, Petitioner presented an 

independent ineffective assistance claim regarding counsel‘s failure to object to the prosecutor‘s 

misstatement, which was denied. As discussed in section IV(E)(2)(h), infra, the Fresno County 

Superior Court‘s rejection of Petitioner‘s ineffective assistance claim is not an unreasonable 

application of clearly established federal law.8The Court finds that the alleged ineffectiveness of 

counsel for not objecting to the misstatement does not constitute cause to excuse the procedural 

default of the prosecutorial misconduct claim. As Petitioner has failed to establish cause and 

prejudice for his default, the Court finds that Petitioner is procedurally barred from bringing this 

 

8 The Ninth Circuit has not yet decided whether a state court determination on an ineffective assistance claim 

alleged as cause to excuse procedural default is subject to AEDPA deference. Jones, 691 F.3d at 1101 n.2. Even if 

AEDPA deference does not apply, the Court finds that the state court‘s determination is correct under de novo 

review.

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claim and it should be dismissed. In any case, Petitioner‘s claim is without merit.

2. Merits

In Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986), the Supreme Court held that a 

prosecutor‘s improper comments violate the Constitution if they ―so infected the trial with 

unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.‖ Id. at 181 (quoting 

Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)); Parker v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 

2153 (2012). As ―the appropriate standard of review for such a claim on writ of habeas corpus is 

 ̳the narrow one of due process, and not the broad exercise of supervisory power,‘‖ it ―is not 

enough that the prosecutors‘ remarks were undesirable or even universally condemned.‖ Darden, 

477 U.S. at 181 (citations omitted).

Petitioner challenges the following statement by the prosecutor during closing argument: 

So I guess, again, ask yourself: The fact that Dezmon took a swing 

at him, is that sufficient provocation that a reasonable person 

would be provoked to pulling out a gun and firing at Danetta, and 

then at Dazhane, and then Dezmon? Again, the evidence proves 

that it was not sufficient provocation.

(6 RT 960). In addressing whether counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to object to 

the prosecutor‘s statement sufficient to provide cause to excuse Petitioner‘s default, the 

California Court of Appeal found that the prosecutor‘s hypothetical question ―suggests an 

incorrect test for determining whether defendant acted in the heat of passion.‖ Dalton, 2014 WL 

435528, at *3. The Court does not disturb this finding. See Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 

(2005) (―[A] state court‘s interpretation of state law . . . binds a federal court sitting in habeas 

corpus.‖). The pertinent question becomes whether the prosecutor‘s misstatement of law ―so 

infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process,‖ 

which requires the Court to consider the misstatement in the context of the entire trial. Darden, 

477 U.S. at 181, 182.

The trial lasted several days. The trial court read instructions to the jury before the 

prosecutor presented his closing argument, which is when he made the misstatement of law. 

Thereafter, defense counsel made his closing argument, followed by the prosecutor‘s concluding 

argument. Before closing arguments, the trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 200, 

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which provides in pertinent part: ―You must follow the law as I explain it to you, even if you 

disagree with it. If you believe that the attorneys‘ comments on the law conflict with my 

instructions, you must follow my instructions.‖ (1 CT9188). The prosecutor noted at the 

beginning of his closing argument, before he made the misstatement of law:

And so if I say something or I have something on the screen that 

contradicts with what the Judge said, obviously he‘s the Judge, he 

makes the call as to what the law is. And so if something 

contradicts, you need to go with what the—you need to follow the 

law as the judge read it to you, and as you will have the packet of 

instructions the Judge will give you at the end of the trial.

(6 RT 921). In response to an objection during defense counsel‘s closing argument, the trial court 

instructed the jury that ―if [the attorneys] misstate the law . . . You‘ll have a copy of the 

instructions, and you‘ll see what the law is. Again, if there‘s a conflict between what I say on the 

law, and what any attorney says, follow my instructions.‖ (6 RT 1022–23). During the defense‘s 

closing argument, defense counsel emphasized that the heat of passion instruction ―is the most 

important instruction of them all‖ and stated:

Again, ladies and gentlemen, no matter what I say, what the 

prosecution says, you must decide whether Mr. Dalton was 

provoked and whether the provocation was sufficient. You must 

consider whether a person of average disposition would have been 

provoked and how such a person would react in the same situation, 

knowing the same facts. That‘s the key. 

(6 RT 1025, 1032).

In the instant case, the jury was instructed to follow the court‘s instructions on the law. 

On multiple occasions the jury was instructed that if there was a conflict between what the 

attorneys stated and the court‘s instructions, the jury was required to follow the court‘s 

instructions. In comparing the weight and influence of court instructions and arguments of 

counsel, the Supreme Court has observed:

[A]rguments of counsel generally carry less weight with a jury 

than do instructions from the court. The former are usually billed 

in advance to the jury as matters of argument, not evidence, and 

are likely viewed as the statements of advocates; the latter, we 

have often recognized, are viewed as definitive and binding 

 

9

―CT‖ refers to the Clerk‘s Transcript on Appeal lodged by Respondent on October 26, 2015. (ECF No. 33).

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statements of the law. Arguments of counsel which misstate the 

law are subject to objection and to correction by the court. This is 

not to say that prosecutorial misrepresentations may never have a 

decisive effect on the jury, but only that they are not to be judged 

as having the same force as an instruction from the court. And the 

arguments of counsel, like the instructions of the court, must be 

judged in the context in which they are made.

Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 384–85 (1990) (citations omitted). A jury is presumed to 

follow the court‘s instructions. Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000) (citing Richardson 

v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987)). Further, the defense‘s closing argument occurred after the 

prosecution‘s misstatement, and defense counsel took the opportunity to correctly state the law 

and emphasize that the court‘s heat of passion instruction is the most important instruction for 

the jury to consider. In light of this context, the prosecutor‘s misstatement of law did not ―so 

infect[] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.‖ 

Darden, 477 U.S. at 181.

D. Sentencing

In his seventh claim for relief, Petitioner challenges his sentence. (ECF No. 1 at 20). 

Petitioner asserts that the trial court was ―vindictive, overzealous, and unfair‖ in sentencing him

to consecutive terms with no possibility of probation, citing to Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 

(2003) (involving an Eighth Amendment claim). (ECF No. 1 at 258). Respondent argues that the 

claim is not cognizable on federal habeas review because it challenges the application of state 

sentencing laws. (ECF No. 34 at 33). Respondent contends that Petitioner has failed to establish 

that any error of state law or violation of the federal Constitution occurred with respect to his

sentence. (Id. at 34).

This claim was raised in all of Petitioner‘s state habeas petitions. The Fresno County 

Superior Court found that Petitioner failed to raise a proper claim for habeas corpus relief under 

In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d 756, 759 (1953), and In re Harris, 5 Cal. 4th 813, 829 (1993).10 (LD 23 at 

5–6). The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, denied the petition without 

prejudice because it did ―not provide an adequate factual context for the issues petitioner raises,‖

 

10 Under the Dixon rule, a petitioner cannot raise a claim in a post-appeal habeas petition when that claim was not, 

but could have been, raised on direct appeal. Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d at 759.

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with citation to Duvall. (LD 27). The California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition. 

(LD 29). Where ―the last reasoned opinion on the claim explicitly imposes a procedural default, 

[the Court] will presume that a later decision rejecting the claim did not silently disregard that 

bar and consider the merits.‖ Ylst, 501 U.S. at 803. Procedural default is an affirmative defense 

that the state must assert; otherwise the defense is waived. Vang, 329 F.3d at 1073. As 

Respondent has failed to raise procedural default as an affirmative defense to Petitioner‘s 

seventh claim for relief, the Court will review the claim de novo. See Chaker, 428 F.3d at 1221.

With respect to Petitioner‘s contention that the trial court was ―vindictive, overzealous, 

and unfair‖ in sentencing him, Petitioner has failed to ―overcome [the] presumption of honesty 

and integrity in those serving as adjudicators.‖ Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47. Petitioner‘s claim relies 

on the trial court‘s judicial rulings with respect to his sentence, and Petitioner does not 

demonstrate that the trial court‘s rulings were the product of some extrajudicial source of bias or 

partiality. See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555 (―[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid 

basis for a bias or partiality motion.‖); Larson, 515 F.3d at 1067. To the extent that Petitioner 

challenges the trial court‘s application of California state law in imposing consecutive terms, that 

is an issue of state law not cognizable in federal habeas proceedings. See Wilson v. Corcoran, 

562 U.S. 1, 5 (2010) (per curiam) (―[I]t is only noncompliance with federal law that renders a 

State‘s criminal judgment susceptible to collateral attack in the federal courts.‖); Estelle v. 

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991) (―[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to 

reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions.‖).

Petitioner also cites to Ewing v. California, which involved an Eighth Amendment 

challenge to a sentence imposed by the California state court under the state‘s three strikes law.

―The Eighth Amendment, which forbids cruel and unusual punishments, contains a  ̳narrow 

proportionality principle‘ that  ̳applies to noncapital sentences.‘‖ Ewing, 538 U.S. at 20 (quoting 

Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996–97 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 

concurring in judgment)). The Eighth Amendment ―does not require strict proportionality 

between crime and sentence but rather forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly 

disproportionate to the crime.‖ Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 60 (2010) (quoting Harmelin, 

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501 U.S. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). The Supreme Court has advised that ―federal courts 

should be reluctant to review legislatively mandated terms of imprisonment, and that successful 

challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences should be exceedingly rare.‖ Ewing, 538 

U.S. at 22 (quoting Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374 (1982)).

In addressing an Eighth Amendment claim, the Court first begins with a threshold 

comparison between ―the gravity of the offense and the severity of the sentence.‖ Graham, 560 

U.S. at 60. In the ―rare case‖ that the threshold comparison ―leads to an inference of gross 

disproportionality,‖ the Court then engages in a comparative analysis with sentences imposed for 

other crimes in the same jurisdiction and for the same crime in other jurisdictions. Id. (quoting 

Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). Here, Petitioner, a first-time offender, 

was convicted of one count of second-degree murder and two counts of unpremeditated 

attempted murder. Multiple special allegations regarding use of a firearm and infliction of great 

bodily injury were found true. The sentences on the offenses and special allegations were 

imposed consecutively, and Petitioner was sentenced to an aggregate imprisonment term of 

eighty-three years to life. In Harmelin, a first-time offender was sentenced under state law to life 

without the possibility of parole for possessing 672 grams of cocaine, and the Supreme Court 

upheld the sentence, finding that it did not violate the Eighth Amendment. 501 U.S. 957. As 

Petitioner received a less severe sentence than the defendant in Harmelin even though his 

conduct was more serious, the Court finds that Petitioner‘s sentence is not ―grossly 

disproportionate‖ to the crime. 

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on

his seventh claim for relief, and it must be denied.

E. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In the instant petition, Petitioner claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for: (1) 

failing to prepare a robust defense; (2) failing to deliver three key defense witnesses for 

examination; (3) failing to challenge the prosecution‘s assertion that Lee Coleman was not a 

percipient witness; (4) allowing the trial judge to abuse the judicial process without objection; (5) 

failing to cross-examine a key prosecution witness effectively; (6) ―muzzl[ing]‖ Petitioner and

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refusing to answer Petitioner‘s questions at trial; (7) failing to be prepared for the sentencing

hearing; (8) failing to object to prosecutor‘s misstatement of law in closing argument; and (9)

failing to give his full attention to Petitioner‘s trial. (ECF No. 1 at 6–7, 130–31, 211–12). 

Further, Petitioner claims that his defense was prejudiced by trial counsel‘s cumulative errors. 

(Id. at 6, 131). Respondent argues that Petitioner has failed to show that the California Supreme 

Court‘s rejection of the claim triggered an exception to the relitigation bar of 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d). (ECF No. 31 at 20).

The Court notes that although Petitioner raised ineffective assistance of counsel in all of 

his state habeas petitions, he raises two additional grounds for the claim in the instant petition. 

This raises a potential exhaustion bar.

11 However, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2), the Court 

may deny an unexhausted claim on the merits ―when it is perfectly clear that the [petitioner] does 

not raise even a colorable federal claim.‖ Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 624 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(adopting the standard set forth in Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 135 (1987)).

1. Legal Standard

The clearly established federal law governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), which requires a petitioner to show that 

(1) ―counsel‘s performance was deficient,‖ and (2) ―the deficient performance prejudiced the 

defense.‖ Id. at 687. To establish deficient performance, a petitioner must demonstrate that 

―counsel‘s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness‖ and ―that counsel 

made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the  ̳counsel‘ guaranteed the 

defendant by the Sixth Amendment.‖ Id. at 688, 687. Judicial scrutiny of counsel‘s performance 

is highly deferential. A court indulges a ―strong presumption‖ that counsel‘s conduct falls within 

the ―wide range‖ of reasonable professional assistance. Id. at 687. To establish prejudice, a 

 

11 A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with a full and fair 

opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. O‘Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 

845 (1999); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971). To provide 

the highest state court the necessary opportunity, the petitioner must ―fairly present‖ the claim with ―reference to a 

specific federal constitutional guarantee, as well as a statement of the facts that entitle the petitioner to relief.‖ 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365; Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996). ―Fair presentation requires that the 

petitioner  ̳describe in the state proceedings both the operative facts and the federal legal theory on which his claim 

is based so that the state courts have a ―fair opportunity‖ to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing 

upon his constitutional claim.‘‖ Davis v. Silva, 511 F.3d 1005, 1009 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).

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petitioner must demonstrate ―a reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s unprofessional

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.‖ Id. at 694. A court ―asks whether 

it is  ̳reasonable likely‘ the result would have been different. . . . The likelihood of a different 

result must be substantial, not just conceivable.‖ Richter, 562 U.S. at 111–12 (citing Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 696, 693).

When § 2254(d) applies, ―[t]he pivotal question is whether the state court‘s application of 

the Strickland standard was unreasonable. This is different from asking whether defense 

counsel‘s performance fell below Strickland‘s standard.‖ Richter, 562 U.S. at 101. Moreover, 

because Strickland articulates ―a general standard, a state court has even more latitude to 

reasonably determine that a defendant has not satisfied that standard.‖ Knowles v. Mirzayance, 

556 U.S. 111, 123 (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). ―The standards 

created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both  ̳highly deferential,‘ and when the two apply in 

tandem, review is  ̳doubly‘ so.‖ Richter, 562 U.S. at 105 (citations omitted). Thus, ―for claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel . . . AEDPA review must be  ̳doubly deferential‘ in order to 

afford  ̳both the state court and the defense attorney the benefit of the doubt.‖ Woods v. Donald, 

135 S. Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015) (quoting Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 13 (2013)). When this 

―doubly deferential‖ review applies, the appropriate inquiry is ―whether there is any reasonable 

argument that counsel satisfied Strickland‘s deferential standard.‖ Richter, 562 U.S. at 105.

2. Exhausted Grounds

Petitioner raised ineffective assistance of counsel in his state habeas petitions. The Fresno 

County Superior Court denied the claim in a reasoned decision. (LD 23 at 2–3). The California 

Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, denied the petition without prejudice because it did 

―not provide an adequate factual context for the issues petitioner raises,‖ with citation to Duvall.

(LD 27). The California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition. (LD 29). The Court 

presumes that the California Supreme Court adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Richter, 

562 U.S. at 99. As federal courts review the last reasoned state court opinion, the Court will 

―look through‖ the California Supreme Court‘s summary denial and examine the reasoned 

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decision of the Fresno County Superior Court. See Brumfield, 135 S. Ct. at 2276; Ylst, 501 U.S. 

at 806.

In rejecting the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the Fresno County Superior Court 

stated:

First, Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of 

counsel at trial. Specifically, Petitioner argues that his trial attorney 

provided ineffective assistance when he failed to: (1) produce Rose 

Robinson, Lee Coleman, and Angeline White as witnesses for the 

defense, (2) object when the prosecution incorrectly explained the 

law regarding the concept of ―heat of passion‖ to the jury, [3] 

answer Petitioner‘s questions at trial, [4] introduce Petitioner‘s 

prescriptions for high blood pressure and diabetes, his lack of a 

prior criminal record, a loose leaf binder, and Danetta Henry‘s 

criminal record as evidence at trial, [5] effectively cross-examine 

Dezmon Hamilton, [6] object to either the trial court‘s imposition 

of consecutive sentences or the trial court‘s ―overbearing‖ 

demeanor at trial, and [7] challenge the prosecution‘s assertion that 

Lee Coleman was not a ―percipient witness.‖ In addition, 

Petitioner maintains that his attorney also provided ineffective 

assistance of counsel when he mispronounced the names of 

Danetta Henry and Dazhane Henry during trial and when he 

informed Petitioner that he would be handcuffed if he spoke out of 

turn.

Initially, the Court notes that Petitioner has failed to attach a proof 

of service of his petition on the District Attorney of Kern County, 

where he is currently confined. Consequently, Petitioner has failed 

to attach a proper proof of service of his petition for writ of habeas 

corpus. (Pen. Code, § 1475.)

Nevertheless, even had Petitioner attached a proper proof of 

service, the Court finds that Petitioner has failed to present a viable 

claim for habeas corpus relief.

In order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner 

must allege facts showing that (1) his counsel‘s representation fell 

below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that his 

defense suffered prejudice as a result. (Strickland v. Washington 

(1984) 466 U.S. 668, 690–92.) The Court finds that Petitioner has 

failed to prove that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance 

of counsel because Petitioner has not established that there is a 

reasonable probability that the result of his criminal proceeding 

would have been more favorable had his attorney taken the above 

actions. (In re Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 974, 1019–20 [stating that 

court may dispose of ineffective assistance of counsel claim if 

petitioner has not demonstrated sufficient prejudice without 

deciding if counsel‘s performance was deficient].)

As Petitioner has not demonstrated that his defense suffered 

prejudice as a result of his counsel‘s alleged deficient performance, 

the Court finds that Petitioner has failed to present a viable claim 

for habeas corpus relief with respect to the claims supporting his 

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first contention.

(LD 23 at 1–3).

If a petitioner‘s claim has been adjudicated on the merits in state court, the AEDPA‘s 

deferential standards apply; otherwise, the claim is reviewed de novo. Cone, 556 U.S. at 472. 

―Under AEDPA, an adjudication on the merits is  ̳a decision finally resolving the parties‘ claims 

. . . that is based on the substance of the claim advanced, rather than on a procedural, or other, 

ground.‘‖ Amado v. Gonzalez, 758 F.3d 1119, 1130 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Lambert v. 

Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 969 (9th Cir. 2004)). In determining whether the state court‘s 

adjudication was on the merits or procedural, the Court considers the reasons, if any, set forth in 

the state court decision. Amado, 758 F.3d at 1131 (citing James v. Ryan, 733 F.3d 911, 916 (9th 

Cir. 2013)). AEDPA deference also applies to alternative holdings on the merits. Calbourne v. 

Ryan, 745 F.3d 362, 383 (9th Cir. 2014), overruled on other grounds by McKinney v. Ryan, 813 

F.3d 798 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc). 

In this case, the Fresno County Superior Court found that Petitioner had failed to attach a 

proper proof of service of his state habeas petition. However, the court went on to hold that ―[a]s 

Petitioner has not demonstrated that his defense suffered prejudice as a result of his counsel‘s 

alleged deficient performance, the Court finds that Petitioner has failed to present a viable claim 

for habeas corpus relief with respect to the claims supporting his first contention.‖ (LD 23 at 3). 

Given that the Fresno County Superior Court proceeded to address the merits of the claim and 

because its conclusion that Petitioner failed to present a viable claim was based on Petitioner‘s 

failure to satisfy Strickland‘s prejudice prong, the Court finds that AEDPA deference applies to 

the state court‘s decision on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

a. Failure to Prepare Robust Defense

Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to prepare a robust defense 

in that he did not investigate and pursue mitigating evidence in police reports and did not

introduce as evidence the victim‘s criminal record and police contacts, which was contained in a 

loose-leaf binder on the defense table at trial. (ECF No. 1 at 144, 146, 215–17). Petitioner also 

asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce at trial Petitioner‘s prescriptions 

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for high blood pressure and diabetes medication. (Id. at 144, 217–18). 

At a pretrial in limine hearing, defense counsel informed the trial court that there were 

over 124 police contacts between Petitioner‘s residence and the parties and that although 

Petitioner was not personally present at all of these, he was present at a majority of them. (1 RT 

30). Regarding whether evidence of theses prior incidents could be introduced, the trial court 

declared:

Then the Court‘s ruling, I will allow the introduction of evidence 

of prior incidents of—I guess it‘s threats or violence, coming from 

any of the three victims.

. . . 

[W]ith the testimony being—and it goes to his state of relevance—

to his state of mind, and what he knew about these folks when the 

altercation occurred, because he had personal knowledge, either 

having witnessed these events, or these events happened at his 

apartment while he wasn‘t there, but they happened to a person 

with whom he lived, and those events were related to him; as long 

as that foundation is laid, that it was—he was told about it, or he 

witnessed it, then I see no reason to exclude that. But again, the 

foundation must first be laid before introduction of the conduct or 

statements attributed to the victims.

(1 RT 34–35). Based on the trial court‘s in limine ruling, defense counsel could only introduce 

Danetta‘s prior police contacts that Petitioner had personally witnessed or that Petitioner had 

been informed of. Petitioner does not allege that he personally witnessed or had been informed of 

all of Danetta‘s prior police contacts or that he knew of Danetta‘s criminal history. Therefore, it 

was not unreasonable for the Fresno County Superior Court to conclude that counsel‘s alleged

failure to investigate and pursue evidence in the police reports and counsel‘s failure to introduce

all of Danetta‘s prior police contacts did not prejudice the defense. 

Petitioner also claims that counsel ―refused to acquiesce‖ to Petitioner‘s request to 

introduce evidence of his prescriptions for high blood pressure and diabetes medication. (ECF 

No. 1 at 144). Petitioner argues that his health ―was a contributive factor that built up stress, fear, 

and dread over the past 14 months of harassments and provocation perpetrated by Danetta.‖ (Id.). 

Petitioner fails to establish how ―there is a reasonable probability that . . . the result of the 

proceeding would have been different‖ if counsel had introduced evidence of his prescriptions 

for medication. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Thus, it was not unreasonable for the Fresno County 

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Superior Court to conclude that counsel‘s failure to introduce evidence of Petitioner‘s 

prescriptions did not prejudice the defense. 

The Court finds that the Fresno County Superior Court‘s decision is not contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, nor is it based on an unreasonable 

determination of fact. Its ruling that Petitioner did not demonstrate prejudice as a result of 

counsel‘s failure to introduce as evidence Danetta‘s criminal record and police contacts and 

Petitioner‘s prescriptions for high blood pressure and diabetes medication is not ―so lacking in 

justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond 

any possibility for fairminded disagreement.‖ Richter, 562 U.S. at 103. Accordingly, Petitioner is 

not entitled to habeas relief for ineffective assistance of counsel on this ground.

b. Failure to Produce Key Defense Witnesses to Testify at Trial

Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to produce Rose Robinson, 

Lee Coleman, and Angeline White as witnesses for the defense at trial. (ECF No. 1 at 209–11). 

Petitioner claims that Rose Robinson (―Robinson‖) could have provided mitigating and 

exculpatory testimony. (ECF No. 1 at 106). According to a police report, on January 24, 2011, 

Robinson witnessed two altercations between Danetta and Lora. (ECF No. 1 at 344–45). 

Although Petitioner did not witness how either of those altercations started, Petitioner intervened 

to break them up. (Id. at 346). Robinson did not witness the March 2, 2011 incident that gave rise 

to Petitioner‘s convictions. Although Robinson could testify to the January 24, 2011 incidents to 

demonstrate the antagonistic relationship between the victim and Lora, the trial testimony

thoroughly established the nature of the relationship. As Robinson‘s purported testimony would 

be cumulative, it was not unreasonable for the Fresno County Superior Court to conclude that 

counsel‘s failure to call Robinson as a witness did not prejudice the defense. See Wong v. 

Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15, 22–23 (2009); Gulbrandson v. Ryan, 738 F.3d 976, 990 (9th Cir. 2013).

Petitioner claims that Lee Coleman (―Coleman‖) was a witness favorable to the defense 

who made statements to the police directly related to Petitioner‘s case. (ECF No. 1 at 107, 210–

11). Coleman stated that he knew Danetta and her son and that Danetta was always fighting with 

Lora. (Id. at 272). The night before the March 2, 2011 incident, Coleman observed Danetta

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throwing some unknown type of liquid from a large pan on a neighboring apartment‘s front door 

just minutes after the police had left. On March 2, 2011, Coleman was playing video games in 

his living room when he heard six or seven gunshots. When Coleman looked out of his bedroom 

window, from which he has a clear view of the courtyard, he saw Danetta on the ground and 

Dezmon pinning a man against an apartment door, trying to take a gun away the man. Coleman 

heard someone yell out, ―You shot everyone.‖ (Id. at 272–73). Dazhane, Lora, and Petitioner all 

testified regarding the victim pouring ―sludge material‖ on Petitioner‘s door the night before the 

shooting. Petitioner and multiple percipient witnesses testified about the shooting. Given that 

Coleman did not personally observe the shooting and that his purported testimony would be 

cumulative, it was not unreasonable for the Fresno County Superior Court to conclude that 

counsel‘s failure to call Coleman as a witness did not prejudice the defense. See Wong, 558 U.S. 

at 22–23; Gulbrandson, 738 F.3d at 990. 

With respect to Angeline White, Petitioner fails to allege what testimony she would give 

such that ―there is a reasonable probability that . . . the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.‖ Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Thus, it was not unreasonable for the Fresno County 

Superior Court to conclude that counsel‘s failure to call Angeline White as a witness did not 

prejudice the defense. 

The Court finds that the Fresno County Superior Court‘s decision is not contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, nor is it based on an unreasonable 

determination of fact. Its ruling that Petitioner did not demonstrate prejudice as a result of 

counsel‘s failure to call Rose Robinson, Lee Coleman, and Angeline White as witnesses is not 

―so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing 

law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.‖ Richter, 562 U.S. at 103. Accordingly, 

Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief for ineffective assistance of counsel on this ground.

c. Failure to Challenge Assertion that Lee Coleman Was Not Percipient 

Witness

Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the 

prosecution‘s claim that Lee Coleman was not a percipient witness. (ECF No. 1 at 147). The 

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prosecution made this claim when the court was ruling on which prior convictions of potential 

witnesses would be admissible for impeachment. (1 RT 133–35). Based on the prosecution‘s 

representation that Coleman was not a percipient witness, and given that Coleman had not 

testified at the first trial and seemed unlikely to testify at the second trial, the trial court reserved 

its ruling on Coleman. (1 RT 137, 139). Coleman did not testify at Petitioner‘s second trial. As 

discussed above, Coleman did not witness the shootings, but did witness the aftermath when

Dezmon attempted to take the gun away from Petitioner. 

Petitioner fails to demonstrate how ―there is a reasonable probability that . . . the result of 

the proceeding would have been different‖ if counsel had challenged the prosecution‘s 

representation that Coleman was not a percipient witness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Thus, it 

was not unreasonable for the Fresno County Superior Court to conclude that counsel‘s failure to 

do so did not prejudice the defense. The state court‘s decision is not ―so lacking in justification 

that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility 

for fairminded disagreement.‖ Richter, 562 U.S. at 103. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to 

habeas relief for ineffective assistance of counsel on this ground.

d. Failure to Object to Trial Court’s Alleged Abuse of Judicial Process

Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object when the trial 

judge engaged in misconduct during Dazhane‘s cross-examination. (ECF No. 1 at 145). As 

discussed in section IV(B)(1), supra, Petitioner failed to establish that that the trial court made 

the alleged prejudicial and biased remark or completely halted the cross-examination of Dazhane 

before defense counsel was finished. Thus, it was not unreasonable for the Fresno County 

Superior Court to conclude that counsel‘s alleged failure to object to the trial court‘s alleged 

misconduct during Dazhane‘s cross-examination did not prejudice the defense. The state court‘s 

decision is not ―so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and 

comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.‖ Richter, 562 

U.S. at 103. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief for ineffective assistance of 

counsel on this ground.

///

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e. Failure to Effectively Cross-Examine Dezmon

Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to preserve 

Petitioner‘s credibility by not effectively cross-examining Dezmon. (ECF No. 1 at 219–20). 

Specifically, Petitioner argues that when counsel questioned Dezmon, counsel should have 

established, consistent with Petitioner‘s testimony later in the trial, that Petitioner never met, 

saw, or made eye contact with Dezmon before March 2, 2011. (ECF No. 1 at 220). On direct 

examination, Dezmon testified as follows:

[PROSECUTOR] Q. [D]o you know how long Mr. Dalton lived in 

Apartment 14 next to you?

[DEZMON H.] A. Uhm—he was there before we lived there, so I 

don‘t know how long. Just as long as we‘ve been living there.

Q. Okay. And did you ever have any conversations with him? Did 

you ever talk to him?

A. No.

Q. Did you ever see him in the complex?

A. Yes.

Q. How often would you see Mr. Dalton in the complex?

A. Pretty often.

Q. Did you ever see him as he was coming and going out of his 

apartment?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you ever see him as you were coming and going out of your 

apartment?

A. No.

Q. Did you ever make any small talk with Mr. Dalton, like, ―Hey, 

how it‘s going‖ or ―Bye‖?

A. No.

(1 RT 91–92). On cross-examination, defense counsel confirmed that Dezmon had never spoken 

with Petitioner before the date of the victim‘s death. (2 RT 174). 

Dezmon‘s testimony is not incompatible with Petitioner‘s testimony. It is possible that 

while Dezmon saw Petitioner coming and going from Petitioner‘s apartment, Petitioner never 

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met or saw Dezmon. Petitioner fails to establish how ―there is a reasonable probability that . . . 

the result of the proceeding would have been different‖ if counsel had clearly established that 

Petitioner never met, saw, or made eye contact with Dezmon before March 2, 2011. Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 694. Therefore, it was not unreasonable for the Fresno County Superior Court to 

conclude that counsel‘s failure to do so did not prejudice the defense. The state court‘s decision 

is not ―so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in 

existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.‖ Richter, 562 U.S. at 103. 

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief for ineffective assistance of counsel on this 

ground.

f. “Muzzling” Petitioner and Failure to Answer Petitioner’s Questions 

During Trial

Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective because counsel ―muzzled‖ Petitioner 

by telling him that if Petitioner ever spoke out of turn, the bailiff would handcuff Petitioner. 

(ECF No. 1 at 7). Petitioner also asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to answer

Petitioner‘s questions during the trial, especially regarding the numerous side bars, and for 

threatening to walk out if Petitioner did not stop asking questions. (ECF No. 1 at 143, 7).

Petitioner states that counsel‘s failure to answer his questions left Petitioner ―in the dark about 

the scope and direction of his trial.‖ (Id. at 144). Petitioner fails to demonstrate how ―there is a 

reasonable probability that . . . the result of the proceeding would have been different‖ if counsel 

had not ―muzzled‖ Petitioner or if counsel had answered Petitioner‘s questions during trial.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Thus, it was not unreasonable for the Fresno County Superior Court 

to conclude that counsel‘s admonition for Petitioner not to speak out of turn and counsel‘s failure 

to answer Petitioner‘s questions during trial did not prejudice the defense. The state court‘s 

decision is not ―so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and 

comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.‖ Richter, 562 

U.S. at 103. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief for ineffective assistance of 

counsel on this ground.

///

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g. Failure to Be Prepared for Sentencing

Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to be prepared for the 

sentencing hearing in that counsel did not raise certain mitigating circumstances and did not

object to the imposition of consecutive sentences. (ECF No. 1 at 147, 221–22). Petitioner 

contends that counsel should have presented the following evidence at sentencing: that Petitioner 

had no prior convictions, that he was threatened the night before his arrest and provoked over 

short and long periods of time, and his medical history. (ECF No. 1 at 222). Petitioner‘s lack of 

criminal history and his medical history were included in the report of the probation officer 

presented to the trial court before sentencing. (1 CT 272, 276). At sentencing, the trial court 

indicated that it had received the probation report. (6 RT 1089). Additionally, Petitioner‘s 

daughter and sister spoke at the sentencing hearing in support of Petitioner, emphasizing 

Petitioner‘s good character, lack of criminal history, and the threats and malicious behavior of 

Danetta. (6 RT 1097–1104). Before imposing sentence, the trial court stated:

And Mr. Dalton is an enigma. Prior to the events on March 2nd, 

2011, at about ten before noon, he was a—yeah, a college 

graduate, gainfully employed at the same location for over—let‘s 

see—17 years. And as some of the letters point out—brother, 

uncle, father—but prior—the prior two years or so to March 2nd, 

2011, this feud penetrated his life, and now he is going to be 

defined by the actions that he took in those brief moments of 

March 2nd, 2011, at about 11:49 a.m. There were many other 

options to take on that morning. But as I said—as I will say, I sat 

through the entire trial, heard the evidence, heard the testimony of 

Mr. Dalton himself, understood the layout of the complex and the 

numerous shots that were fired, and I‘ll never understand that 

decision. But nonetheless, I have to impose judgment here, Mr. 

Dalton.

(6 RT 1107–08). These statements demonstrate that the trial court was aware of Petitioner‘s lack 

of criminal history, the extent of the antagonistic relationship between Danetta and Petitioner, 

and the events that occurred the night before the shooting. Thus, it was not unreasonable for the 

Fresno County Superior Court to conclude that counsel‘s failure to specifically argue these

mitigating circumstances himself during the sentencing hearing did not prejudice the defense. 

Petitioner also contends that ―trial counsel‘s failure to object to, or even discuss, the trial 

judge handing down consecutive sentences with no chance of probation . . . was prejudicial.‖ 

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(ECF No. 1 at 221). Pursuant to California Penal Code section 12022.53(g), Petitioner was not 

eligible for probation, and the trial court acknowledged that it had no discretion to consider 

probation. (6 RT 1107). With respect to the second-degree murder conviction (count 1), 

California Penal Code section 190(a) mandates an imprisonment term of fifteen years to life. 

California Penal Code section 12022.53(d) mandates a consecutive term of twenty-five years to 

life when a defendant personally and intentionally discharges a firearm and proximately causes 

great bodily injury or death to any person other than an accomplice. The trial court 

acknowledged that it had no discretion regarding the sentence for count 1. (6 RT 1091). Contrary 

to Petitioner‘s contention, counsel informed the trial court that it had some discretion with 

respect to the length of the sentences for counts 2 and 3 and whether they would run consecutive 

or concurrent. (6 RT 1092–93). The trial court found that aggravating factors outweighed those 

in mitigation and ordered the imprisonment terms for counts 2 and 3 to run consecutively. (6 RT 

1109). Based on the foregoing, it was not unreasonable for the Fresno County Superior Court to 

conclude that counsel‘s alleged failure to object to the trial court‘s imposition of consecutive 

sentences with no consideration of probation did not prejudice the defense.

The Court finds that the Fresno County Superior Court‘s decision was not contrary to, or 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, nor was it based on an 

unreasonable determination of fact. Its ruling that Petitioner did not demonstrate prejudice as a 

result of counsel‘s alleged deficient performance at the sentencing hearing is not ―so lacking in 

justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond 

any possibility for fairminded disagreement.‖ Richter, 562 U.S. at 103. Accordingly, Petitioner is 

not entitled to habeas relief for ineffective assistance of counsel on this ground.

h. Failure to Object When Prosecutor Misstated Law on Heat of Passion

Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor‘s 

misstatement of law regarding the heat of passion defense during closing argument. (ECF No. 1 

at 130, 211–12). As discussed in section IV(C)(2), supra, the prosecutor‘s misstatement did not 

―so infect[] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.‖ 

Darden, 477 U.S. at 181. The jury was instructed on multiple occasions that if there was a 

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conflict between what the attorneys stated and the court‘s instructions, the jury was required to 

follow the court‘s instructions. Additionally, at the beginning of his closing argument, the 

prosecutor cautioned the jurors, ―And so if I say something . . . that contradicts . . . you need to 

follow the law as the judge read it to you . . .‖ (6 RT 921). Moreover, the defense‘s closing 

argument occurred after the prosecution‘s misstatement, and defense counsel took the 

opportunity to correctly state the law and emphasize that the court‘s heat of passion instruction is 

the most important instruction for the jury to consider. Thus, it was not unreasonable for the 

Fresno County Superior Court to conclude that counsel‘s failure to object to the prosecutor‘s 

misstatement of law regarding heat of passion did not prejudice the defense. See Cunningham v. 

Wong, 704 F.3d 1143, 1159 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding, on habeas review, that counsel‘s failure to 

object to improper comment in closing argument did not prejudice petitioner where trial judge 

explained to the jury that closing arguments are not evidence). The state court‘s decision is not 

―so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing 

law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.‖ Richter, 562 U.S. at 103. Accordingly, 

Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief for ineffective assistance of counsel on this ground.

3. Unexhausted Grounds

In his state habeas petition in the California Supreme Court, Petitioner did not raise that 

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to give his full attention to Petitioner‘s trial. Further, 

Petitioner did not argue that he was prejudiced by trial counsel‘s cumulative errors. Pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2), the Court may deny an unexhausted claim on the merits ―when it is 

perfectly clear that the [petitioner] does not raise even a colorable federal claim.‖ Cassett, 406 

F.3d at 624.

a. Failure to Give Full Attention to Petitioner’s Trial

Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to give his full attention to 

Petitioner‘s trial. (ECF No. 1 at 7). Petitioner alleges that while counsel was in court representing 

Petitioner, counsel simultaneously listened on his cell phone to a proceeding in another 

courtroom. (Id.). Petitioner fails to submit any additional facts regarding at what point in the 

proceeding this conduct occurred, how long counsel was listening on his cell phone to the other 

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proceeding, or how specifically counsel‘s conduct affected defense of Petitioner‘s case. 

Petitioner fails to demonstrate how ―there is a reasonable probability that . . . the result of the 

proceeding would have been different‖ if counsel had not listened to another proceeding while 

simultaneously representing Petitioner in court. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. See United States v. 

Petersen, 777 F.2d 482, 484 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding defendants failed to show prejudice when 

attorney had not been sleeping or dozing during a substantial portion of the trial, and may not 

have been sleeping at all). The Court finds that Petitioner has not satisfied the prejudice prong of 

Strickland.

12 As it is ―perfectly clear‖ that Petitioner does not raise a colorable ineffective 

assistance claim with respect to counsel‘s alleged failure to give his full attention to Petitioner‘s 

case, the Court may deny the claim on the merits pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2).

b. Cumulative Errors

Petitioner asserts that his defense was prejudiced by counsel‘s ―cumulative 

ineffectiveness.‖ (ECF No. 1 at 131). The Ninth Circuit ―ha[s] previously recognized that 

 ̳prejudice may result from the cumulative impact of [counsel‘s] multiple deficiencies.‘‖ Woods 

v. Sinclair, 764 F.3d 1109, 1139 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 

1333 (9th Cir. 1978)). As discussed above, Petitioner has not demonstrated prejudice as to the 

individual grounds of ineffective assistance. ―[T]he nature of the claims does not support a 

conclusion of cumulative prejudice,‖ and counsel‘s performance ―did not render [Petitioner‘s] 

trial fundamentally unfair.‖ Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 654 (9th Cir. 2004). Thus, 

Petitioner is not entitled to relief on his claim of cumulative deficiency. See Woods, 764 F.3d at 

1139. As it is ―perfectly clear‖ that Petitioner does not raise a colorable ineffective assistance 

claim with respect to counsel‘s alleged cumulative deficiencies, the Court may deny the claim on 

the merits pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2).

///

///

 

12 ―[A] court need not determine whether counsel‘s performance was deficient before examining the prejudice 

suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. . . . If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness 

claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be 

followed.‖ Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.

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V.

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that:

1. Petitioner‘s second and sixth claims for relief in the petition for writ of habeas corpus be 

DISMISSED; and

2. The petition for writ of habeas corpus be DENIED.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District 

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local 

Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within 

THIRTY (30) days after service of the Findings and Recommendation, any party may file 

written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be 

captioned ―Objections to Magistrate Judge‘s Findings and Recommendation.‖ Replies to the 

objections shall be served and filed within fourteen (14) days after service of the objections. The 

assigned United States District Court Judge will then review the Magistrate Judge‘s ruling 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within 

the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court‘s order. Wilkerson v. 

Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th 

Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 5, 2016 /s/

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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