Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-03275/USCOURTS-ca10-89-03275-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Steven Jean Hand
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH FILED 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT 

United Stata Court of Appeals Tenth circuit OF APPEALS -

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

STEVEN JEAN HAND, aka 

TIMOTHY R. EDWARDS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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SEP 0 7 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 89-3275 

APPEAL PROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D.C. NO. 89-10008-01) 

Jill M. Wichlens, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Michael G. 

Katz, Federal Public Defender, with her on the brief), Denver, 

Colorado, Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant. 

Robin D. Fowler, Assistant u.s. Attorney (Lee Thompson, United 

States Attorney, with him on the brief), Wichita, Kansas, 

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before MOORE, SETH, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge. 

Steven Hand appeals the judgment of conviction and sentence 

entered upon his plea of guilty to one count of aiding and abetting the manufacture of methamphetamine in violation of 21 u.s.c. 

§ 841(a)(l) and 18 u.s.c. § 2. Hand contends that the government 

violated its plea agreement to recommend a two-level reduction 

pased on his role as a minor participant in the offense as 

Appellate Case: 89-3275 Document: 01019708245 Date Filed: 09/07/1990 Page: 1 
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provided by u.s.s.G. § 3B1.2(b). He also complains that the 

district court failed to make factual findings concerning Hand's 

relative role in the methamphetamine operation. For the reasons 

discussed below, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND 

According to the terms of the plea agreement between Hand and 

the government, Hand pleaded guilty to one count of the superseding indictment and briefed government agents on unrelated drug 

trafficking activities in exchange for the government's promise 

to: dismiss the two remaining counts of the indictment: recommend 

a two-level reduction for Hand's acceptance of responsibility; and 

recommend a two-level reduction for his role as a "minor 

participant." In detailing the terms of the agreement, the 

prosecutor explained to the district court that the agreement to 

recommend a reduction for Hand's minor participation "was based on 

the government's understanding of [Hand's] role in the offense." 

Appellant's Opening Brief at p.3. After ascertaining the terms of 

the plea agreement, the district court accepted the guilty plea. 

The presentence report prepared in Hand's case recommended_ 

that no adjustment be made for Hand's role in the offense. At 

Hand's sentencing hearing, Hand personally testified concerning 

his role in the affair. He also called the probation officer who 

had prepared the presentence report to testify. The government 

cross examined both witnesses, eliciting factual detail concerning 

the exact nature of Hand's involvement, including certain factual 

clarifications which tended to offset some of the evidence 

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produced on direct examination by which Hand had hoped to 

demonstrate that his was a relatively small role. 1 

When asked by the district court to comment prior to sentencing, the government prosecutor stated: 

"Regarding role in the offense, we again recommend that 

this defendant receive a reduction for having a minor 

role in the offense. That was my assessment at that 

time. The court's well aware of the facts in this case 

and can make its own conclusion. We've agreed to recommend that, however." 

R. Vol. IV, p.69. The district court proceeded to sentence Hand 

to a term of incarceration of 97 months, making no provision for 

any reduction relating to Hand's role in the offense. When 

questioned by Hand's attorney as to the recommended reduction for 

minor participation, the court specifically indicated "the court's 

position only in that regard is [it's] not going to allow that 

portion of the government's recommendation." Id. at 77. 2 

1 On direct examination Hand testified, among other things, 

that he had only known a key codefendant a short time before his 

arrest, that at the time the two met, Hand did not know how to 

manufacture methamphetamine, that he had never before participated 

in its manufacture, that the codefendant asked Hand to perform 

"deliveries" of chemicals which he was told were not illegal, and 

that the codefendant offered to pay rent for a trailer in which 

the codefendants stayed. Hand further indicated that the 

codefendant originally stored equipment in a shed near the 

trailer, but due to cold weather requested to move it into the 

trailer itself--that there had been no equipment or chemicals in 

the trailer when it was first rented. Finally Hand testified that 

his involvement in the manufacturing process consisted of drying 

the methamphetamine by stirring it over a stove. On cross, the 

government elicited testimony from Hand to the effect that Hand 

himself signed the lease for the trailer, that Hand knew the 

chemicals and equipment he transported were for the manufacture of 

methamphetamine, that Hand had been paid for the deliveries, t~at 

the manufacturing in the trailer began four or five days after 

Hand moved in, and that Hand began personally participating in the 

manufacturing process about two weeks after he moved in. 

2 The government correctly concedes that Hand has not waived 

[continued on next page] 

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Hand now contends that the government violated the spirit, if 

not the letter, of the plea agreement both by eliciting unfavorable facts on cross examination during the sentencing hearing and 

by the prosecutor's comments that the court was free to reach its 

own conclusion based on the facts before it. We find no merit in 

Hand's argument. 

DISCUSSION 

I. THE PLEA AGREEMENT 

Where the government obtains a guilty plea predicated in any 

significant degree on a promise or agreement with the prosecuting 

attorney, such promise must be fulfilled to maintain the integrity 

of the plea. See, ~' Santobello v. New York, 404 u.s. 257, 262 

(1971); United States v. Stemm, 847 F.2d 636, 637 (lOth Cir. 

1988). In order to comply with the plea agreement, the government 

cannot rely upon a "rigidly literal construction of the language" 

of the agreement, nor may it accomplish "through indirect means 

what it promised not to do directly." United States v. Shorteeth, 

887 F.2d 253, 256 (lOth Cir. 1989) (citing United States v. Pogue, 

865 F.2d 226, 227 (lOth Cir. 1989); United States v. Greenwood, 

812 F.2d 632, 635 (lOth Cir. 1987); United States v. Stemm, 847 

F.2d at 638 n.l). 

We must construe the plea agreement according to what Hand 

"reasonably understood" when he entered his plea. United States 

[continued from previous page] 

his objection to the possible breach of the plea agreement by 

failing to object at the sentencing hearing. See United States v. 

Shorteeth, 887 F.2d 253, 255 (lOth Cir. 1989) (no waiver based on 

failure to object to plea agreement breach). 

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v. Shorteeth, 857 F.2d at 256; United States v. Stemm, 847 F.2d at 

638. Because the agreement cannot be reasonably interpreted as 

proscribing a proper cross examination of Hand and the other witness at sentencing, the government's cross examination did not 

violate the plea agreement. 

A promise to "recommend a reduction" is not a promise to 

stand mute in the face of incorrect or misleading testimony 

offered before the trial court. The prosecutor here did not 

characterize the evidence elicited on cross examination, nor did 

he argue the effect of such evidence to the sentencing judge. 3 

The prosecutor properly performed his responsibility in informing 

the court so that its decision would not be tainted by incomplete 

and inaccurate information. 4 In this context, the plea agreement 

did not restrict the court's access to this information, nor could 

such an agreement properly do so. See, ~' United States v. 

Shorteeth, 887 F.2d at 255 (expressing "considerable doubt" 

3 This case is unlike those cited by Hand in which a prosecutor, having promised a recommendation of leniency or no recommendation whatsoever, proceeds to argue the opposite position to 

the sentencing judge. See, ~' United States v. Moscahlaidis, 

868 F.2d 1357, 1361 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Greenwood, 

812 F.2d 632, 635-36 (lOth Cir. 1987); United States v. Crusco, 

536 F.2d 21, 26 (3d Cir. 1976). Accord United States v. Stemm, 

847 F.2d at 639 n.2. Merely eliciting factual information or 

challenging evidence presented by a defendant through appropriate 

cross examination is not necessarily an improper attempt to 

persuade or convince the sentencing judge to reject the promised 

recommendation. 

4 Arguably, the effect of Hand's evidence at sentencing, had it 

been allowed to pass unchallenged and unclarified, might have been 

to persuade the district court that a reduction of three or even 

four levels was appropriate under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. The government's agreement to recommend a two-level reduction cannot 

reasonably be interpreted as a promise not to interfere with 

Hand's abortive attempt at a greater reduction than the one 

recommended. 

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whether parties to a plea agreement can ordinarily restrict 

information available to district court for sentencing determinations); United States v. Stemm, 847 F.2d at 639 ("Disclosure of 

information as to the nature of the offense and each defendant's 

role is proper and within the Government's duty to provide, 

despite a promise that the Government would make no recommendation 

as to sentence."); United States v. Williamsburg Check Cashing 

Corp., 905 F.2d 25, 28 (2d Cir. 1990) ("To read the agreement as 

appellants suggest would require the judge to sentence in the 

dark. Such an agreement to keep the judge ignorant of pertinent 

information cannot be enforceable, because a sentencing court 

'must be permitted to consider any and all information that 

reasonably might bear on the proper sentence .... '") (quoting 

Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 563 (1984)); United States 

v. Ramon Mata-Grullon, 887 F.2d 23, 24 (1st Cir. 1989) (Although 

government may not do "end-runs" around its plea agreements, "the 

government must bring all relevant facts to the judge's 

attention."). 

Hand's contention concerning the prosecutor's statement in 

recommending a reduction for minor participation is equally 

unavailing. At most, the prosecutor's comments may have demonstrated a lack of enthusiasm for the recommendation. A criminal 

defendant has no right, as a matter of law, to an "enthusiastic" 

recommendation by a prosecuting attorney in compliance with a plea 

agreement. United States v. Benchimol, 471 U.S. 453, 455-56 

(1985). Although the prosecutor's simple statement that the court 

could reach its own conclusion was unnecessary and probably 

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imprudent under the circumstances, it was not tantamount to an 

argument that the recommendation should be disregarded or that the 

reduction would be improper. The government in no way breached 

its plea agreement. 

II. FINDINGS OF FACT 

Hand claims that the sentencing court failed to make findings 

of fact as to information contained in the presentence report as 

required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)(D). That Rule requires a 

district court to make specific findings of fact only "[i]f the 

comments of the defendant and the defendant's counsel allege 

any factual inaccuracy in the presentence investigation report." 

See United States v. Johnson, No. 89-6345, slip op. at 7 (lOth 

Cir. Aug. 14, 1990). Hand has not identified any fact contained 

in the presentence report which he alleged to be inaccurate. 

Rather, he appears to contest the report's legal conclusion, based 

on the facts therein, that Hand does not qualify for a reduction 

relating to his role in the offense. That conclusion is not a 

finding of fact and Hand's argument concerning the appropriate 

weight and effect to be given the facts surrounding his 

participation in the drug scheme does not implicate Rule 

32(c)(3)(D). 5 

5 We note that the district court in fact made specific 

findings concerning the accuracy of the presentence report. The 

court stated: "the presentence investigation report, as corrected 

by the court today, is accurate with the modifications that the 

court has made this morning, and those findings are incorporated 

in the following sentence." R. Vol. IV, p.75. 

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CONCLUSION 

The government did not breach its agreement to recommend a 

reduction in offense level based on Hand's role in the drug 

operation. Hand's disagreement over the conclusion to be drawn 

from the facts contained in the presentence report does not allege 

factual inaccuracies therein requiring any specific findings by 

the sentencing court. The judgment of the district court is 

AFFIRMED. 

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