Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00052/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00052-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Catrina Johnson
Plaintiff
WindCreek Casino
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

CATRINA JOHNSON, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 16-0052-WS-M

 )

WINDCREEK CASINO, HOTEL, ) 

 )

Defendant. )

 ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the defendant’s motion to dismiss. (Doc. 

7). The plaintiff has filed a response, (Doc. 15), and the motion is ripe for 

resolution.

The defendant has presented the affidavit of the Tribal Chair of the Poarch 

Band of Creek Indians (“the Tribe”), which establishes that the defendant is 

owned by the Tribe and operated by the Poarch Band of Creek Indians Gaming 

Authority (“the Authority”). (Doc. 7-1). The defendant argues that the plaintiff’s 

lawsuit is thus barred by the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity. 

“Indian tribes have long been recognized as possessing the common-law 

immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers.” Freemanville 

Water System, Inc. v. Poarch Band of Creek Indians, 563 F.3d 1205, 1207 (11th

Cir. 2009) (internal quotes omitted). Tribal sovereign immunity applies 

“regardless of the type of relief sought,” unless “Congress has authorized the suit 

or the tribe has waived its immunity.” Id. at 1208 (internal quotes omitted). The 

Tribe is an Indian tribe for purposes of application of these principles. Id. at 1206; 

Alabama v. PCI Gaming Authority, 801 F.3d 1278, 1282 (11th Cir. 2015). 

Moreover, the Authority “shares in the Tribe’s immunity because it operates as an 

arm of the Tribe.” Id. at 1287. The defendant rightly concludes that, because it is 

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owned by the Tribe and operated by an arm of the Tribe, suit against it is barred by 

tribal sovereign immunity.

As noted, a tribe may lose immunity by abrogation or waiver. “Only 

Congress, and not a state legislature, can abrogate tribal immunity, because tribal 

immunity is a matter of federal law and is not subject to diminution by the State.” 

Furry v. Miccosukee Tribe, 685 F.3d 1224, 1230 (11th Cir. 2012) (internal quotes 

omitted). The only federal statute the plaintiff mentions is the Indian Gaming 

Regulatory Act (“IGRA”), and she does not suggest it as a source of abrogation. 

At any rate, “[n]othing in IGRA indicates that Congress abrogated the sovereign 

immunity of tribes that elect to engage in class II gaming ....” Tamiami Partners, 

Ltd. v. Miccosukee Tribe, 63 F.3d 1030, 1048 (11th Cir. 1995).

Because the plaintiff has the burden of establishing subject matter 

jurisdiction, she must show that the defendant has waived its immunity. 

Thompson v. McHugh, 388 Fed. Appx. 870, 872 (11th Cir. 2010); Ishier v. Internal 

Revenue, 237 Fed. Appx. 394, 398 (11th Cir. 2007). The plaintiff has not done so; 

indeed, she does not even allege a waiver.

Instead, the plaintiff invokes Ex parte Young. That doctrine provides “an 

exception to sovereign immunity in lawsuits against state officials for prospective 

declaratory or injunctive relief to stop ongoing violations of federal law,” and the 

Eleventh Circuit has “extended the Ex parte Young doctrine to tribal officials.” 

PCI Gaming Authority, 801 F.3d at 1288. But the plaintiff has not sued any tribal 

officials or any individuals of any description. Nor has she sought prospective 

equitable relief; all her complaint demands is $3 million in damages. (Doc. 4 at 

2). The doctrine therefore cannot save her lawsuit.

“Tribal sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional issue.” Furry, 685 F.3d at 

1228; accord Taylor v. Alabama Intertribal Council Title IV J.T.P.A., 261 F.3d 

1032, 1034 (11th Cir. 2001). Because the defendant is covered by such immunity, 

which has been neither abrogated nor waived, the Court lacks subject matter 

jurisdiction to entertain this action. 

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For the reasons set forth above, the motion to dismiss is granted. This 

action is dismissed for want of subject matter jurisdiction.

DONE and ORDERED this 15th day of June, 2016.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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