Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-23-12139/USCOURTS-ca11-23-12139-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Deshawn Martin
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-12139

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

DESHAWN MARTIN, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 8:22-cr-00187-WFJ-TGW-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-12139

Before ROSENBAUM, LAGOA, AND ABUDU, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Deshawn Martin appeals his sentence of 240 months’ imprisonment for conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and Hobbs 

Act robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a), (b), 2, and 371. 

Martin argues that the district court procedurally erred at sentencing by failing to give any consideration to the guideline sentencing 

range. He also argues that the district court substantively erred by 

imposing a sentence that was unreasonable because it did not give 

sufficient weight to the guideline range and created unwarranted 

sentencing disparities between Martin and similar offenders. After 

careful review, we affirm in part and vacate in part the district 

court’s sentence and remand for resentencing.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Deshawn Martin and his codefendant Shinel Waldrop were 

charged with conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and Hobbs 

Act Robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a), (b), 2, and 371 

(Counts One and Two). Martin was charged with an additional

count of using a gun during a crime of violence in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). In a written plea agreement, Martin pled

guilty to Counts One and Two in exchange for the government 

dismissing Count Three. 

The plea agreement set forth the factual bases of the charged 

offenses as follows: on October 15, 2021, Martin robbed a Mobil 

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gas station with a weapon before getting into a car with Waldrop, 

who drove them away. Martin also stipulated to four additional 

robberies that he committed in the plea agreement.

Shortly after Martin pleaded guilty, the district court sentenced Waldrop. The government highlighted that Waldrop cooperated by providing information on Martin’s additional robberies and was assisting the government on pending murder 

charges against Martin in New York. During sentencing, Waldrop 

talked about her abusive relationship with Martin and said that she

only agreed to help him with robberies out of fear. For example, 

she reported to the police an instance of physical abuse on October 

15, 2021, and another one in November 2021. She also added that 

she would likely be deported back to Trinidad after serving her sentence. In light of a substantial-assistance motion filed by the government, Waldrop’s offense level was reduced to 15, placing her in 

criminal history category of I. The district court sentenced Waldrop to 18 months in prison and made some comments. The district court urged Waldrop to find a female support network so that 

she would not “be a punching bag for the next Alpha male that 

comes along.” And if Waldrop was subjected to supervised release

instead of deportation after serving her sentence, the district court 

imposed a special condition in which Waldrop could have “[n]o 

contact with [Martin], ever.” The district court said that she was 

“going to be a very old lady” when Martin got out of prison, and it

did not want Waldrop to waste the “whole life ahead of [her].” And 

if she violated that condition, she would be imprisoned for three 

years. 

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Turning to Martin’s first sentencing, the first amended 

presentencing investigation report (“PSI”) assigned Martin a total 

offense level of 21, a criminal history category of IV, and a guideline 

range of 57 to 71 months’ imprisonment. But that PSI did not include the four additional robberies that Martin stipulated to in his 

plea agreement. While the district court denied the government’s 

motion to revise the PSI, it ultimately continued the sentencing 

hearing to allow for a recalculation of Martin’s guideline range to 

account for the four robberies. 

Martin’s counsel objected to the continuance, arguing that 

the government failed to object to the guideline calculations within 

the designated period, especially since the government and the probation officer were aware of those four robberies when preparing 

the first amended PSI. 

The district court stated that if Martin wanted to waive the 

correction to the PSI, he needed to waive it himself. But the district 

court cautioned Martin that his sentence would “certainly not [be] 

within the prior calculation” or even within the larger, recalculated 

guideline range. The district court also explained that he was “not 

making any predictions,” but wanted to “respectfully and politely 

disabuse...Mr. Martin, of any belief that [it] was going to sentence 

him in the guidelines as they were calculated or maybe even as they 

are calculated under the new” PSI given his past and present criminal troubles. 

The final, second amended PSI was filed and reported the 

following conduct. Martin and Waldrop traveled to Tampa, 

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Florida on October 15, 2021. Along the way, they stopped by Plant 

City, where Waldrop bought a black hoodie and gloves from one 

store and a BB gun from another. They stayed in a hotel in Plant 

City until dark before driving to a Mobil gas station in Waldrop’s 

red Mustang. Martin, wearing the black hoodie and gloves and 

brandishing the BB gun, forced the two owners of the gas station 

to open the cash register and hand over the cash. Martin then ran 

to Waldrop’s car, and they drove back to their hotel. Several days 

later, on October 26, 2021, Martin and Waldrop flew from Orlando, Florida to Ronkonkoma, New York and committed another 

robbery. 

This time around, the final, second amended PSI included 

the four additional robberies from Martin’s plea agreement: (1) on 

October 20, 2021, Martin entered a Circle K gas station in Orlando, 

Florida, pointed a BB gun at the employee’s face, and forced the 

employee to hand over the cash in the register; (2) on November 

5, 2021, Martin robbed a Subway restaurant in Orlando, Florida 

with a BB gun, forcing the employees to surrender the cash in the 

register and to lie on their stomachs for ten minutes; (3) later that 

month, on November 27, 2021, Martin returned to the Circle K 

with a BB gun and committed the same crime; and (4) on December 14, 2021, Martin robbed a Dunkin Donuts in Orlando, Florida 

by using a BB gun to force an employee to give him money from a 

cash register. He then forced two additional employees to lie on 

the floor, “slightly hit” one employee on the back of the head with 

the BB gun, and stole their wallets.

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In detailing his criminal history, the PSI stated that in 2013,

at age 17, Martin pleaded guilty to second-degree robbery and 

served 11 months in prison after he and two others knocked down, 

kicked, and punched a victim and stole his wallet. The victim identified Martin as the individual who threw the first blow but did not 

know who punched or kicked him afterward. In 2016, at age 19, 

he pleaded guilty to second-degree robbery after threatening a gasstation cashier with a BB gun and stealing $3,000 and a cell phone, 

for which he served six months in prison and then was released on 

parole. Four months later, he was imprisoned for 15 days for disorderly conduct. In 2018, about three months after his release from 

jail, Martin robbed a 7-Eleven store with a BB gun, taking $730 and 

a pack of cigarettes. He came back to that store less than three 

months later and took another $738. For the 7-Eleven robberies, 

Martin served 34 months. Martin committed the instant offenses

while on parole for the 2016 and 2018 robbery convictions. 

Robberies aside, Martin was arrested and indicted for domestic violence for allegedly punching Waldrop in the face in November 2021, but the charges against him were dropped. Finally, 

at the time of sentencing, Martin was facing a first-degree murder 

charge in New York for allegedly entering a business with a firearm 

and shooting a man at close range in the forearm, chest, and head.

The PSI’s discussion of Martin’s personal background noted 

the lack of parental figures in his life. He was raised by his paternal 

grandmother who emotionally and physically abused him, forced 

him to perform labor around the house, and locked him in his 

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room. As a result, Martin suffered from depression and anxiety and 

used marijuana daily to cope. 

The probation officer assigned Martin a base offense level of 

20 pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(a), and increased it by 10 levels for 

use of weapon that appeared to be a firearm to threaten victims, 

physically restraining them through threat of violence, and the 

multiple-count adjustment. The probation officer then decreased 

it by three levels for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to §

3E1.1. In the end, Martin’s total offense level was 27 with a criminal history category of IV, producing a guideline range of 100 to 

125 months’ imprisonment. The maximum statutory penalty for 

each count was 240 months’ imprisonment. 

The probation officer recommended 180 months’ imprisonment for each count to run concurrently after factoring in the mitigating factors—Martin’s abusive childhood and untreated mental 

health and substance abuse issues—and the aggravating ones—

prior robbery convictions in New York, pattern of immediate recidivism, and pending murder charge in New York. The government, highlighting the serious, violent, and dangerous nature of 

Martin’s offenses and his pattern of engaging in criminal behavior 

despite prior sentences, argued for 125 months’ imprisonment. 

Martin requested a sentence at the lower end of the guideline range 

or a downward variance, citing his childhood traumas, lack of parental figures, and avoidance of unwarranted sentencing disparity 

with Waldrop as justifications. He also stated that he accepted responsibility for his crimes and wanted to be present in his son’s life.

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The district court adopted the guideline calculations in the 

final, second amended PSI and sentenced Martin to 240 months’ 

imprisonment on each count to run concurrently. Although the 

district court stated that it would not consider Martin’s pending 

charges in New York for sentencing purposes, it justified its upward 

variance by detailing his past robberies, noting the repeated use of 

a weapon that appeared to be a firearm to threaten and rob other 

people. It noted that the use of a BB gun, instead of an actual gun, 

was irrelevant because “no one is going to say, oh, that’s a BB gun, 

I’m not afraid.” It also highlighted how Martin used the gun to tap,

but not hard, a Dunkin Donuts employee on the head and to force

several employees, including a pregnant one, to lie on the ground 

under threat of fire. 

The district court continued to focus on Martin’s criminal 

past, from his conviction at 17 years old to his robbery of a gas station at 19. It commented that, all in all, there was “a remarkable 

amount of violence” and found the guideline range “woefully insufficient.” Therefore, it decided to “vary[] upward based upon the 

violence, the recidivism, the need for specific deterrence, meaning 

to lock up Mr. Martin, and the need for general deterrence to protect the public and deter others from this activity.” Had Martin 

been informed about the possibility of serving his sentence consecutively in his plea agreement, the district court noted that it “would 

have given [him] 40 years.” The district court concluded that accounting for the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, “240 months [wa]s the 

minimum” and “the sentence imposed [wa]s sufficient but not 

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greater than necessary to comply with the statutory purposes of 

sentencing.”

Martin objected to the sentencing “for appellate reasons.” 

The district court clarified that the objection was to the “substantive unreasonableness of the sentence,” to which Martin agreed. 

This appeal timely followed. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing a sentence for reasonableness, we utilize a 

two-step process to first ensure that the district court committed 

no significant procedural error and then determine whether the 

sentence was substantively reasonable. Gall v. United States, 552 

U.S. 38, 51 (2007). When reviewing for procedural reasonableness, 

we ordinarily consider legal issues de novo and review factual findings for clear error. United States v. Rothenberg, 610 F.3d 621, 624 

(11th Cir. 2010). But if the defendant failed to preserve a challenge 

to the procedural error at sentencing, then we review for plain error. United States v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2014).

For substantive reasonableness of a sentence, we review under an abuse-of-discretion standard, considering the § 3553(a) factors and the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Boone, 97 

F.4th 1331, 1338–39 (11th Cir. 2024). The party challenging the 

sentence bears the burden of showing that it is unreasonable. Id.

III. ANALYSIS

On appeal, Martin presents two issues: (1) the district court 

procedurally erred when imposing his sentence because it failed to 

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give any consideration to the guideline range; and (2) the district 

court’s above-guideline sentence of 240 months was substantively 

unreasonable and created unwarranted sentencing disparities. We 

address each one in turn. 

A. Procedural Error

A district court commits a procedural sentencing error by, 

among other things, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors or failing to explain the chosen sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. Section 

3553(a) “explicitly directs sentencing courts to consider the Guidelines” and “district courts must begin their analysis with the Guidelines and remain cognizant of them throughout the sentencing process.” Id. at 50 n.6. 

“To preserve an issue for appeal, one must raise an objection 

that is sufficient to apprise the trial court and the opposing party of 

the particular grounds upon which appellate relief will later be 

sought,” using clear and simple language that cannot be misunderstood. United States v. Straub, 508 F.3d 1003, 1011 (11th Cir. 2007) 

(quotation marks and citation omitted). Otherwise, the challenge 

is not preserved, and we review for plain error. Vandergrift, 754 

F.3d at 1307. To establish plain error, a defendant must show: (1) 

an error, (2) that was plain or obvious, (3) that affected the defendant’s substantial rights, and (4) that seriously affected the fairness, 

integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings. United States v. 

Aguilar-Ibarra, 740 F.3d 587, 592 (11th Cir. 2014).

To start, Martin frames his challenge as one of substantive 

reasonableness, but whether the district court erred in imposing a 

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sentence without considering the guideline range is a procedural 

one. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 49, 50 n.6, 51. And it is an objection that 

he did not preserve at sentencing. While he raised a broad objection to the sentence “for appellate reasons,” his objection did not 

sufficiently apprise the district court that he sought to object on 

procedural grounds, especially after the court clarified, and he confirmed, that he objected to only the substantive reasonableness of 

his sentence. See Straub, 508 F.3d at 1011. Accordingly, his procedural challenge is reviewed for plain error. See Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 

at 1307.

Here, we do not find that the district court plainly or procedurally erred by failing to consult the guideline range. Indeed, the 

district court, at sentencing, calculated and acknowledged the 

guideline range several times, including commenting on how it 

was “insufficient.” And none of Martin’s arguments to the contrary 

are availing. 

Martin argues that the district court already decided what 

kind of sentence to impose on Martin before the guideline range 

was calculated when it told Waldrop that she would be a “very old 

lady” before Martin was released from prison. But Martin 

overreads the significance of that comment. At Waldrop’s sentencing, the parties acknowledged that Martin was facing a first-degree 

murder charge in New York. The “very old” comment could reasonably be construed as opining on a likely outcome once Martin 

was sentenced for both his federal and state crimes. There is no 

indication that the district court had already decided Martin’s 

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sentence for the instant offenses before the guideline range was calculated. 

Martin points to two additional comments by the district 

court: (1) its discussion of waiving any corrections to the PSI, and 

(2) its statements that his sentence would “extremely likely” vary 

upward above any guideline calculations. But those comments are

taken out of context. The district court explicitly stated that it was 

“not predicting anything or making promises” on Martin’s sentencing and solely wished to “respectfully and politely disabuse” Martin 

of any expectation of a within-guideline-range sentence given his 

lengthy criminal record. As for the comment about waiving corrections to the PSI, the district court only noted that Martin must 

be present in court so he could waive it. Under either instance, we 

do not find that there was any plain or obvious error. 

B. Substantive Reasonableness

To determine whether a district court committed a substantive error in sentencing, we look to whether the district court (1) 

failed to consider relevant factors that were due significant weight; 

(2) gave significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor; or 

(3) committed a clear error of judgment by balancing the proper 

factors unreasonably. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th 

Cir. 2010) (en banc). In order to determine whether a district court 

has committed a clear error in judgment, appellate courts must 

make the sentencing calculus themselves and review each step the 

district court took in making it. Id. 

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But we are mindful that even if we might reasonably have 

concluded that a different sentence was appropriate, that is insufficient to justify reversal of the district court. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. So 

we will vacate a sentence “if, but only if, [we are] left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear 

error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a 

sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190. 

We give “due deference” to the district court to consider and 

weigh the proper sentencing factors. United States v. Shabazz, 887 

F.3d 1204, 1224 (11th Cir. 2018) (quotation marks omitted). Some 

factors set out in § 3553(a) include the guideline range, the nature 

and circumstances of the offense, the criminal history of the defendant, the seriousness of the crime, adequate deterrence, and 

protection of the public. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Though the district 

court must consider all the § 3553(a) factors, it does not have to 

mention each factor explicitly at the sentencing hearing. United 

States v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2005), abrogated on other 

grounds by Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007). Instead, an 

acknowledgement by the district court that it considered the 

§ 3553(a) factors is sufficient. United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 

1281 (11th Cir. 2007). The district court also does not have to give 

all the factors equal weight and is given discretion to attach more

weight to one factor over another. United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 

789 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir. 2015). 

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Congress specifically commands the district court to consider the guidelines because they represent “an accumulation of 

knowledge and experience” and were promulgated over time by 

an expert agency with a statutory charge. United States v. Hunt, 459 

F.3d 1180, 1184 (11th Cir. 2006). Guidelines are important because 

they promote uniformity, and a district court must give the guideline range “real weight” in imposing a sentence. Irey, 612 F.3d at 

1217 (quotation marks omitted). The district court, however,

maintains discretion to give heavier weight to any of the § 3553(a) 

factors or combination of factors than to the guideline range. Hunt, 

459 F.3d at 1184-85. We have clarified that the “advisory guidelines 

range is but one of many considerations” that a sentencing court 

must consider when sentencing a defendant, and we have “not attempted to specify any particular weight that should be given to 

the guidelines range, and...rejected any across-the-board prescription regarding the appropriate deference to give the Guidelines.” 

Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1254 (quotation marks omitted). Still, we

have held that sentences were substantively unreasonable where 

the district court did not adequately consider the guideline range. 

See United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1200 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that the district court erred in not giving any “real weight” to 

the guideline imprisonment range of 97 to 120 months when sentencing the defendant to probation).

The district court also has wide discretion to decide whether 

the § 3553(a) factors justify a variance. United States v. Rodriguez, 

628 F.3d 1258, 1264 (11th Cir. 2010), abrogated on other grounds by 

Van Buren v. United States, 593 U.S. 374 (2021). A major variance 

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should be supported by a more significant justification than a minor variance. Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. In any event, “[a]fter settling on 

the appropriate sentence, [the district court] must adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review 

and to promote the perception of fair sentencing.” Id. It must articulate a reasoned basis for exercising its “own legal decisionmaking authority.” Rita, 551 U.S. at 356.

In imposing a variance, the district court can consider conduct already considered when calculating the guideline range. 

United States v. Johnson, 803 F.3d 610, 619–20 (11th Cir. 2015). Additionally, “a sentencing court may impose an upward variance 

based upon uncharged conduct as it relates to the history and characteristics of the defendant, as well as the need to promote respect 

for the law, afford adequate deterrence, and protect the public.” 

United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349, 1355–56 (11th Cir. 2022). The 

sentencing court may impose an upward variance if it concludes 

that the guideline range was insufficient in light of a defendant’s 

criminal history. Johnson, 803 F.3d at 619; see also United States v. 

Hunt, 941 F.3d 1259, 1263–64 (11th Cir. 2019) (holding that an upward variance from 37 months’ to 60 months’ imprisonment was 

substantively reasonable because defendant had previously been 

charged with robbery 3 times and convicted of first-degree robbery 

with the use of a firearm). We have upheld upward variances 

matching the statutory maximum as reasonable when necessary to 

achieve the purposes set out in § 3553(a). See United States v. OsorioMoreno, 814 F.3d 1282, 1286, 1288 (11th Cir. 2016) (affirming a 57-

month upward variance to the statutory maximum sentence of 120 

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months’ imprisonment in light of the defendant’s lengthy criminal 

history, including repeated acts of violence against women and law 

enforcement officers).

Another sentencing factor district courts must consider is 

the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among similar offenders. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). This directive arises from a 

purpose of the guidelines to provide certainty and fairness in sentencing. United States v. Docampo, 573 F.3d 1091, 1102 (11th Cir. 

2009). Thus, “[a] well-founded claim of disparity . . . assumes that 

apples are being compared to apples.” Id. at 1101 (quotation marks 

omitted). When considering a claim of disparity, we first consider 

whether the defendant is similarly situated to defendants he presents as comparators who received a different sentence. United 

States v. Duperval, 777 F.3d 1324, 1338 (11th Cir. 2015). We have

made clear that there can be no unwarranted sentencing disparities 

between codefendants who are not similarly situated. United States 

v. Johnson, 980 F.3d 1364, 1386 (11th Cir. 2020). We have also indicated that the defendant’s arguments about unwarranted disparity 

should be specific enough for it to “gauge.” United States v. Hill, 643 

F.3d 807, 885 (11th Cir. 2011) (noting that the defendant’s argument that there was an unwarranted disparity between his sentence and others who have been convicted of fraud crimes 

throughout the country “would be difficult to gauge”).

Addressing Martin’s specific contention on unwarranted 

sentencing disparity first, we find that Martin failed to show that 

his sentence was disparate to those imposed on similarly situated 

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offenders.1 To the extent that Martin argued in his sentencing 

memorandum that his likely sentence was unjustifiably disparate 

to Waldrop’s, he is not similarly situated to Waldrop because she 

was cooperating with law enforcement, was found by the district 

court to be a victim of Martin’s abuse who was participating out of 

fear, and was facing deportation, which was its own form of punishment, general deterrence, and protection of the public. See Johnson, 980 F.3d at 1386. And while on appeal he argues that his sentence was unjustifiably disparate to the sentences of other defendants convicted of Hobbs Act robbery, he fails to identify a single 

comparable defendant who received a lesser sentence. Without an 

apple-to-apple comparator, Martin’s argument for disparity is not 

specific enough to gauge any disparity. See Docampo, 573 F.3d at 

1102.

Still, we cannot find that Martin’s sentence was substantively reasonable. After a review of the sentencing record, we see 

no compelling justification to vary upward by 115 months and sentence Martin to the statutory maximum for a Hobbs Act robbery. 

To be sure, a district court has discretion to impose a longer sentence than what the guideline range suggests, but that discretion is 

not limitless. And here, there is a disconnect between the factors 

1 Martin arguably insufficiently apprised the district court of its sentencingdisparity argument during sentencing. See Straub, 508 F.3d at 1011. If he did, 

then we review under an abuse-of-discretion standard. If he did not, then we 

review for plain error. But we need not resolve this question because even 

under the more demanding abuse-of-discretion standard, Martin’s argument 

still fails. 

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that the district court cited to calculate the sentence and the facts it 

purported to consider in justifying that sentence. 

To start, although the district court acknowledged the 

guideline range, it only mentioned that it was “woefully insufficient” without referencing the upper or lower bounds of the range. 

And when it sentenced Martin to 240 months, it only noted that 

the sentence varied upward, but made no calculation or comment 

on the size of the 115-month upward variance. And the district 

court framed the 240-month sentence as “the minimum,” suggesting that the sentence was the shortest possible punishment, when 

in fact, it was imposing the statutory maximum penalty for a Hobbs 

Act robbery. It also commented that, but for the plea agreement, 

it would have imposed two consecutive maximum sentences—so 

480 months’ imprisonment for a robbery with a BB gun, which is a 

355-month upward variance—again without any reference to the 

guideline range. 

Taken in aggregate, we question whether the district court 

gave “real weight” to the guideline range—which represents the 

knowledge, experience, policies, and purposes of the Sentencing 

Commission, which is composed of judges, lawyers, and policymakers—or relied on its own judgment that 240 months was the 

minimum possible sentence for a defendant like Martin. See Pugh, 

515 F.3d at 1200.

And while the district court has discretion to determine that 

other § 3553(a) factors outweigh the guideline range, it still failed 

to justify such an extreme upward variance. First, the district court 

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commented on the “remarkable amount of violence” in Martin’s 

criminal history. But aside from the pending New York charge 

which the district court announced would not be factored into sentencing, all remaining offenses involved only BB guns or no weapons at all. In Martin’s first robbery offense in 2013, Martin did not 

carry a weapon, committed the offense with two other people, and 

was only confirmed to have delivered the “initial blow” to the victim and not the subsequent violent beating. And the brandishing

of the BB gun in his robberies presented a threat of violence, but 

Martin did not fire the weapon, so we can’t say he engaged in actual 

violence. While he did use the BB gun to tap an employee on the 

head during one of the robberies, the district court noted that it 

was not a hard tap. In sum, Martin’s criminal history, New York 

charge aside, is a far cry from the “remarkable amount of violence” 

that the district court characterized. 

Second, the district court stated that a long sentence was 

necessary to specifically deter Martin, a repeat offender. It noted 

Martin’s prior sentences and violations of parole. But Martin’s 

longest sentence at that point was 34 months. Specific deterrence 

is important, but the district court failed to explain why a 115-

month upward variance to the statutory maximum of 240 months’ 

imprisonment was necessary to specifically deter Martin when the 

guideline suggested a range between 100 and 125 months. Put otherwise, sentencing Martin to the low end of the guideline range—

100 months—would still be 200% longer than any sentence he had 

previously served. 

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Third, the district court stated that the upward variance was 

necessary to protect the public from Martin and generally deter 

others from committing similar crimes. But it again failed to explain how Martin’s personal history, characteristics, criminal history, and conduct in perpetrating robberies with a BB gun posed a 

greater risk than other Hobbs Act robbery offenders to justify the 

statutory maximum. It also seems counterintuitive for the district 

court to impose such an extreme punishment to deter others from 

committing similar crimes when the guideline—as an accumulation of knowledge, experience, policies, and expertise of the Sentencing Commission—counseled for a much shorter sentence. 

We conclude that the district court abused its discretion by 

giving inadequate consideration to the guideline range and weighing Martin’s criminal history and the need for specific and general 

deterrence unreasonably based on the facts it purported to consider, including Martin’s largely nonviolent criminal history and 

limited time in prison prior to the instant offenses. See Irey, 612 

F.3d at 1189, 1217; Hunt, 459 F.3d at 1184-85; Gall, 552 U.S. at 50; 

Rita, 551 U.S. at 356. Thus, we vacate Martin’s sentence and remand for resentencing. 

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED AND REMANDED IN 

PART.

USCA11 Case: 23-12139 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 01/14/2025 Page: 20 of 20