Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02222/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02222-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Hawkins
Defendant
Bernard L. Smith
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

BERNARD L. SMITH, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

HAWKINS, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:14-cv-2222-KJM-EFB P 

SCREENING ORDER AND ORDER 

GRANTING IFP; FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS RECOMMENDING 

MOTION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF BE 

DENIED 

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel in an action brought under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. In addition to filing a complaint, he has filed an application to proceed in forma 

pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, and a motion for injunctive relief.1 

I. Request to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 

 Plaintiff’s application makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (2). 

Accordingly, by separate order, the court directs the agency having custody of plaintiff to collect 

and forward the appropriate monthly payments for the filing fee as set forth in 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(1) and (2). 

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 The court previously issued findings and recommendations to dismiss this action after 

plaintiff failed to file a complaint in accordance with a court order. Plaintiff has now complied 

with that order and those findings and recommendations will therefore be vacated. 

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II. Screening Requirement and Standards 

 Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek 

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). The court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion 

of the complaint, if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 

relief.” Id. § 1915A(b). 

 A pro se plaintiff, like other litigants, must satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) 

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8(a)(2) “requires a complaint to include a short and 

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the 

defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554, 562-563 (2007) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). 

While the complaint must comply with the “short and plaint statement” requirements of Rule 8, 

its allegations must also include the specificity required by Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 

 To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than “naked 

assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 

action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-557. In other words, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of 

a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678. 

 Furthermore, a claim upon which the court can grant relief must have facial plausibility. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When considering whether a complaint states a 

claim upon which relief can be granted, the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 

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III. Screening Order 

The complaint names Dr. Hawkins, Chief Medical Officer Smith, the Pain Committee, 

Mule Creek State Prison, and Dr. Brahbah as defendants. Plaintiff alleges he has HIV and 

bladder cancer, accompanied by neuropathy and pain. On January 27, 2014, an HIV specialist 

allegedly ordered a specific pain medication and treatment plan for plaintiff, but Dr. Hawkins 

allegedly interfered with that plan by “falsely diagnosing” plaintiff and falsely claiming that 

plaintiff had refused to be interviewed as part of an appeal plaintiff was pursuing. After plaintiff 

filed the appeal against Dr. Hawkins, Dr. Hawkins allegedly retaliated against plaintiff by 

continuing to interfere with and deny plaintiff any treatment for his pain. Plaintiff claims that 

CMO Smith allowed subordinates to “choose which Dr reports can and will be accepted,” which 

rendered plaintiff’s pain treatment ineffective. Plaintiff also claims that Mule Creek State Prison 

“has failed to treat the pain and safety,” and “violated the Fourteenth Amendment to life.” In an 

unrelated claim, plaintiff alleges he suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of being 

stabbed eight times. He claims that defendant Brahban put his safety at risk by stating that 

plaintiff does not suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder. 

For the limited purposes of § 1915A screening and liberally construed, the complaint 

states a potentially cognizable First Amendment retaliation and Eighth Amendment deliberate 

indifference to medical needs claims against defendant Hawkins. However, the complaint fails to 

state a claim against Chief Medical Officer Smith, the Pain Committee, and Mule Creek State 

Prison, and the claims against Dr. Brahbah appear to be improperly joined. Claims against these 

defendants are therefore dismissed with leave to amend. 

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) the violation of a federal 

constitutional or statutory right; and (2) that the violation was committed by a person acting under 

the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 

930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). An individual defendant is not liable on a civil rights claim unless the 

facts establish the defendant’s personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or a causal 

connection between the defendant’s wrongful conduct and the alleged constitutional deprivation. 

See Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 

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(9th Cir. 1978). That is, plaintiff may not sue any official on the theory that the official is liable 

for the unconstitutional conduct of his or her subordinates. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 

(2009). In sum, plaintiff must identify the particular person or persons who violated his rights. 

He must also plead facts showing how that particular person was involved in the alleged 

violation. 

To succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim predicated on the denial of medical care, a 

plaintiff must establish that he had a serious medical need and that the defendant’s response to 

that need was deliberately indifferent. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006); see 

also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A serious medical need exists if the failure to 

treat the condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton 

infliction of pain. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. Deliberate indifference may be shown by the denial, 

delay or intentional interference with medical treatment or by the way in which medical care is 

provided. Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1988). 

To act with deliberate indifference, a prison official must both be aware of facts from 

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also 

draw the inference. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Thus, a defendant is liable if 

he knows that plaintiff faces “a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing 

to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Id. at 847. A physician need not fail to treat an inmate 

altogether in order to violate that inmate’s Eighth Amendment rights. Ortiz v. City of Imperial, 

884 F.2d 1312, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989). A failure to competently treat a serious medical condition, 

even if some treatment is prescribed, may constitute deliberate indifference in a particular case. 

Id. 

It is important to differentiate common law negligence claims of malpractice from claims 

predicated on violations of the Eight Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. 

In asserting the latter, “[m]ere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not 

support this cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 

1980) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-106 (1976); see also Toguchi v. Chung, 391 

F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004). 

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Plaintiff fails to state a claim against defendant CMO Smith because the complaint does 

not include any factual allegations linking him to a violation of a federal constitutional or 

statutory right. The alleged supervisory role of Smith, as Chief Medical Officer, is not a proper 

basis for liability. 

In addition, the “Pain Committee” is not a proper defendant because the committee itself 

is not a “person acting under color of state law” and plaintiff may not bring suit against unnamed 

defendants. If plaintiff wishes to name an individual member of the committee as a defendant, he 

must identify that individual by name and allege that the individual personally participated in the 

violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right. 

 Mule Creek State Prison is also not a “person” subject to a § 1983 lawsuit. Moreover, 

state agencies, such as CDCR and its prisons, are immune from suit under the Eleventh 

Amendment. See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989); Lucas v. Dep’t 

of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (holding that prisoner’s Eighth 

Amendment claims against CDCR for damages and injunctive relief were barred by Eleventh 

Amendment immunity); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984) 

(Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to state agencies). 

Lastly, the claim against defendant Brahbah appears to be completely unrelated to the 

claims against defendant Hawkins. The claims against Hawkins and Brahbah could not all be 

properly joined together in a single action, as they involve discrete events that do not arise out the 

same occurrence and involve a common question of law or fact.2

 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). 

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 “The controlling principle appears in Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a): ‘A party asserting a claim . . . 

may join, [] as independent or as alternate claims, as many claims . . . as the party has against an 

opposing party.’ Thus multiple claims against a single party are fine, but Claim A against 

Defendant 1 should not be joined with unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2. Unrelated claims 

against different defendants belong in different suits, not only to prevent the sort of morass [a 

multiple claim, multiple defendant] suit produce[s], but also to ensure that prisoners pay the 

required filing fees-for the Prison Litigation Reform Act limits to 3 the number of frivolous suits 

or appeals that any prisoner may file without prepayment of the required fees. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(g).” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). 

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Plaintiff is granted leave to amend his claim against defendant Brahbah, only if he can cure these 

defects. Otherwise, plaintiff must pursue his claim against Brahbah in a separate action. 

Accordingly, plaintiff may either proceed only on the First Amendment and Eighth 

Amendment claims against defendant Hawkins, or he may amend his complaint to attempt to cure 

the deficiencies in his claims against the other named defendants. Plaintiff is not obligated to 

amend his complaint. 

Any amended complaint must cure the deficiencies identified above and also adhere to the 

following requirements: 

Any amended complaint must identify as a defendant only persons who personally 

participated in a substantial way in depriving him of a federal constitutional right. Johnson v. 

Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (a person subjects another to the deprivation of a 

constitutional right if he does an act, participates in another’s act or omits to perform an act he is 

legally required to do that causes the alleged deprivation). 

It must also contain a caption including the names of all defendants. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). 

Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by alleging new, unrelated claims. George 

v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). 

Any amended complaint must be written or typed so that it so that it is complete in itself 

without reference to any earlier filed complaint. E.D. Cal. L.R. 220. This is because an amended 

complaint supersedes any earlier filed complaint, and once an amended complaint is filed, the 

earlier filed complaint no longer serves any function in the case. See Forsyth v. Humana, 114 

F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997) (the “‘amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter 

being treated thereafter as non-existent.’”) (quoting Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 

1967)). 

The court cautions plaintiff that failure to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, this court’s Local Rules, or any court order may result in this action being dismissed. 

See E.D. Cal. Local Rule 110. 

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IV. Motion for Injunctive Relief 

Plaintiff requests a temporary restraining order requiring that he receive the pain 

medication that was ordered for him by the HIV specialist in January of 2014. Plaintiff claims 

that without the medication, he is in great pain. He claims the pain prevents him from exercising, 

limits his mobility, and puts his life in danger because he cannot defend himself. 

A temporary restraining order may be issued upon a showing “that immediate and 

irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard 

in opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A). The purpose of such an order is to preserve the status 

quo and to prevent irreparable harm “just so long as is necessary to hold a hearing, and no 

longer.” Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974). “The 

standards for granting a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction are identical.” 

Haw. County Green Party v. Clinton, 980 F. Supp. 1160, 1164 (D. Haw. 1997); cf. Stuhlbarg Int’l 

Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001) (observing that an 

analysis of a preliminary injunction is “substantially identical” to an analysis of a temporary 

restraining order). 

A preliminary injunction will not issue unless necessary to prevent threatened injury that 

would impair the courts ability to grant effective relief in a pending action. Sierra On-Line, Inc. 

v. Phoenix Software, Inc., 739 F.2d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir. 1984); Gon v. First State Ins. Co., 871 

F.2d 863 (9th Cir. 1989). A preliminary injunction represents the exercise of a far reaching 

power not to be indulged except in a case clearly warranting it. Dymo Indus. v. Tapeprinter, Inc., 

326 F.2d 141, 143 (9th Cir. 1964). In order to be entitled to preliminary injunctive relief, a party 

must demonstrate “that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable 

harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an 

injunction is in the public interest.” Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1127 (9th Cir. 

2009) (citing Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008)). The Ninth Circuit has 

also held that the “sliding scale” approach it applies to preliminary injunctions—that is, balancing 

the elements of the preliminary injunction test, so that a stronger showing of one element may 

offset a weaker showing of another—survives Winter and continues to be valid. Alliance for Wild 

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Rockies v. Cottrell, 622 F.3d 1045, 1050 (9th Cir. 2010). “In other words, ‘serious questions 

going to the merits,’ and a hardship balance that tips sharply toward the plaintiff can support 

issuance of an injunction, assuming the other two elements of the Winter test are also met.” Id. 

In cases brought by prisoners involving conditions of confinement, any preliminary injunction 

“must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds 

requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct the harm.” 18 

U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). 

 The merits of plaintiff claims against Dr. Hawkins are premised on the allegation that he 

was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s serious medical needs by failing to treat his pain and by 

interfering with the pain medication plan that was ordered by the HIV specialist. However, 

plaintiff does not establish that he is likely to succeed on this claim and a preliminary injunction 

requiring Mule Creek State Prison medical staff to provide him with a specific pain medication 

must be denied. Plaintiff’s motion is not accompanied by a sworn declarations or any other 

evidence establishing a likelihood of success in this action, or that the injunction sought is 

necessary to preserve the court’s ability to grant effective relief on his claim and that it is the least 

intrusive means for doing so. The allegations against Dr. Hawkins, while sufficient to meet the 

liberal pleading requirements for stating a cognizable claim for relief, do not demonstrate that 

plaintiff is being denied any form of pain management or that he will suffer irreparable harm 

without the court’s intervention. 

Plaintiff also fails to present evidence establishing that the balance of equities tips in his 

favor. He claims the fact that he has had a chronic illness for nineteen years “outweighs any 

unjustifiable acts presented by the Defendants.” ECF No. 12 at 1. However, plaintiff does not 

describe in any detail the purportedly “unjustifiable acts” or show how those act relate, if at all, to 

his nineteen years of suffering. There is also no showing that the requested injunctive relief is in 

the public interest. Thus, plaintiff has not made the showing required to meet his burden as the 

party moving for preliminary injunctive relief, and his request must be denied. 

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 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 8) is granted. 

2. Plaintiff shall pay the statutory filing fee of $350. All payments shall be collected 

in accordance with the notice to the CDCR filed concurrently herewith. 

3. The November 18, 2014 findings and recommendations (ECF No. 16) are vacated. 

4. The allegations in the pleading are sufficient at least to state potentially cognizable 

First Amendment retaliation and Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to 

medical needs claims against defendant Hawkins. The remaining claims and 

defendants are dismissed with leave to amend within 30 days of service of this 

order. Plaintiff is not obligated to amend his complaint. 

5. With this order the Clerk of the Court shall provide to plaintiff a blank summons, a 

copy of the December 24, 2014 complaint (ECF No. 19), one USM-285 form and 

instructions for service of process on defendant. Within 30 days of service of this 

order plaintiff may return the attached Notice of Submission of Documents with 

the completed summons, the completed USM-285 form, and two copies of the 

endorsed complaint. The court will transmit them to the United States Marshal for 

service of process pursuant to Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Defendant Hawkins will be required to respond to plaintiff’s allegations within the 

deadlines stated in Rule 12(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

6. Failure to comply with this order may result in a recommendation that this action 

be dismissed. 

Further, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that plaintiff’s motion for injunctive relief (ECF 

No. 12) be denied. 

 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections 

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within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. 

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: April 27, 2015. 

 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

BERNARD L. SMITH, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

HAWKINS, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:14-cv-2222-KJM-EFB P 

 

NOTICE OF SUBMISSION OF 

DOCUMENTS 

 

Plaintiff hereby submits the following documents in compliance with the court’s 

Screening Order: 

 1 completed summons form 

 1 completed forms USM-285 

 2 copies of the endorsed December 24, 2014 complaint 

Dated: 

 ____________________________ 

 

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