Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00273/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00273-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Willie Lee Conner
Petitioner
Cynthia D. Stewart
Respondent

Document Text:

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

WILLIE LEE CONNER, :

 :

Petitioner. :

 :

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 16-00273-CB-M

 :

CYNTHIA D. STEWART, :

 :

Respondent. :

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This is an action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by an Alabama 

inmate that was referred for report and recommendation pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), S.D. Ala. Gen.L.R. 72(a)(2)(R), and 

Rule 8 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. This action 

is now ready for consideration. The state record is adequate to 

determine Petitioner's claims; no federal evidentiary hearing is 

required. It is recommended that this habeas petition be 

denied, that this action be dismissed, and that judgment be 

entered in favor of Respondent, Cynthia D. Stewart, and against 

Petitioner, Willie Lee Conner. It is further recommended that 

any certificate of appealability filed by Petitioner be denied 

as he is not entitled to appeal in forma pauperis. 

Petitioner was convicted of first-degree robbery in the 

Baldwin Count Circuit Court on April 9, 2013 for which he was 

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sentenced to life in the penitentiary under the State habitual 

offender laws (Doc. 6, pp. 1-2; cf. Doc. 1, p. 2). Appeal was 

made to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama but it affirmed 

the conviction and sentence (Doc. 1, p. 3; accord Doc. 6, p. 2). 

The Alabama Supreme Court denied Conner’s petition for writ of 

certiorari (Doc. 6, Exhibit I). Ex parte Conner, 165 So.3d 556 

(Ala. 2014).

On October 28, 2014, Conner filed a State Rule 32 petition 

that was denied (Doc. 6, Exhibit J, pp. 5-38, 53). The Alabama 

Court of Criminal Appeals denied Petitioner’s appeal (Doc. 6, 

Exhibit N). The Alabama Supreme Court denied certiorari (Doc. 

6, Exhibit S). 

Petitioner filed a complaint with this Court on June 7, 

2016, claiming his trial attorney rendered ineffective 

assistance (Doc. 1). More specifically, Conner asserts that his 

trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance in that he (1) 

did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in his firstdegree robbery conviction and (2) denied him the right to 

confront his accuser (Doc. 1). Respondent has answered the 

Petition, asserting that this claim is without merit (Doc. 6).

In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the 

United States Supreme Court defined the showing a habeas 

petitioner must make to prevail on an ineffective assistance 

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claim:

First, the defendant must show that 

counsel's performance was deficient. This 

requires showing that counsel made errors so 

serious that counsel was not functioning as 

the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by 

the sixth amendment. Second, the defendant 

must show that the deficient performance 

prejudiced the defense. This requires 

showing that counsel's errors were so 

serious as to deprive the defendant of a 

fair trial, a trial whose result is 

reliable. Unless a defendant makes both 

showings, it cannot be said that the 

conviction . . . resulted from a breakdown 

in the adversary process that renders the 

result unreliable. 

Id. at 687.

Conner first claims that his Attorney was ineffective 

because he did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence 

that convicted him (Doc. 1, pp. 19-29). Petitioner relies on 

dissenting opinions written by Chief Justice Moore in the 

Alabama Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari on direct appeal 

and in the Rule 32 petition (see Doc. 6, Exhibit I, pp. 11-26

and Exhibit S, pp. 3-12). The facts before the jury, as 

presented by Justice Moore, were as follows:

On July 5, 2012, a cashier at a Lowe’s homeimprovement store in Foley informed Alvin 

Barnard, a loss-prevention manager at the 

store, that he had seen a man leave the 

store and it “looked like he had something 

in his pants.” Later that day the cashier 

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informed Barnard that the same man, 

subsequently identified as Conner, was back 

in the store. Barnard viewed Conner on the 

store’s video-surveillance system and saw 

him take a roofing nailer from a shelf in 

the tool department, place it down the front 

of his pants, and leave the store without 

paying for the roofing nailer.

Barnard and a colleague followed 

Conner, stopped him, identified themselves 

as loss-prevention managers, and asked 

Conner to come back into the store. Once 

inside the store, Conner said “I have a gun” 

and stuck his hand in his right front pants 

pocket. Perceiving Conner’s statement and 

movement as a threat of physical harm, 

Barnard wrestled Conner to the ground and 

subdued him. Barnard then searched Conner’s 

pockets, finding only a folding knife, which 

he removed. Conner also surrendered the 

nailer to Barnard. Without resisting, 

Conner allowed Barnard to escort him to the 

security office, where he signed a statement 

admitting the theft.

After a Foley police officer arrived, 

Conner told the officer that he had not 

intended to resist Barnard but had lost his 

balance because of the weight of the nailer 

in his pants. He admitted that he had said 

he had a gun but stated that he was 

referring to the nailer as a “nail gun.” 

Barnard and the police officer testified for 

the prosecution at trial. The defense 

rested without calling any witnesses. The 

trial court charged the jury on first-degree 

robbery and the lesser-included offenses of 

third-degree robbery and third-degree theft 

of property. The jury returned a verdict 

finding Conner guilty of first degree 

robbery as charged in the indictment.

Ex parte Conner, 165 So.3d at 559 (Moore, C.J., dissenting). 

Alabama defines first-degree robbery as follows:

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(a) A person commits the crime of robbery in 

the first degree if he violates Section 13A8-43 and he

(1) Is armed with a deadly weapon or 

dangerous instrument; or

(2) Causes serious physical injury to 

another.

(b) Possession then and there of an article 

used or fashioned in a manner to lead any 

person who is present reasonably to believe 

it to be a deadly weapon or dangerous 

instrument, or any verbal or other 

representation by the defendant that he is 

then and there so armed, is prima facie 

evidence under subsection (a) of this 

section that he was so armed.

(c) Robbery in the first degree is a Class A 

felony.

Ala. Code § 13A-8-41. The code section referenced above is the 

statutory definition of third degree robbery, defined as such:

A person commits the crime of robbery 

in the third degree if in the course of 

committing a theft he:

(1) Used force against the person of 

the owner of any person present with intent 

to overcome his physical resistance or 

physical power of resistance; or

(2) Threatens the imminent use of force 

against the person of the owner or any 

person present with intent to compel 

acquiescence to the taking of or escaping 

with the property.

Ala. Code § 13A-8-43. Alabama Courts instruct us as well: 

The law is well settled that it is not 

necessary to prove that the defendant 

displayed a weapon during a robbery or that 

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he actually had a weapon to sustain a 

conviction of robbery in the first degree. 

Stewart v. State, 443 So.2d 1362 (Ala. 

Crim. App. 1983); Miller v. State, 431 So.2d 

586 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983); James v. State, 

405 So.2d 71 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981). In 

order to sustain a conviction for first 

degree robbery, the accused need only 

represent in some manner that he has a 

deadly weapon or instrumentality. James. 

Thus, the test to be applied is a subjective 

one which focuses on the victim’s reaction 

to the threats of the robber. Breedlove v. 

State, 482 So.2d 1277 (Ala. Crim. App. 

1985).

Bennett v. State, 584 So.2d 869, 870 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990). 

The undersigned notes again that Conner claims that his

trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance in not raising a 

sufficiency of the evidence claim. On habeas review, this Court 

does not decide whether Petitioner is guilty or innocent. The 

evidence was constitutionally adequate if there was evidence 

presented at the trial from which a reasonable trier of fact 

could find Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson 

v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). This Court further notes that 

all conflicts in the evidence are resolved in favor of the 

prosecution. Id.

The undersigned finds that the evidence at trial, as told 

by Justice Moore, satisfies Jackson because a reasonable jury 

could have found that Barnard subjectively believed Conner when 

he said he had a gun. Petitioner has not denied in this 

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petition that he made the statement, but asserts he was 

referring to the nail gun; he also stated he was reaching into 

his pants pocket because of the nail gun’s weight (see Doc. 1, 

p. 40). Even accepting Conner’s statement as true, under 

Bennett, it does not matter that Conner did not have a gun

because he said he had one. Under Justice Moore’s version of 

the facts, “[p]erceiving Conner’s statement and movement as a 

threat of physical harm, Barnard wrestled Conner to the ground 

and subdued him.” Ex parte Conner, 165 So.3d at 559. The 

undersigned finds that, under Bennett, the language of the 

statute has been satisfied: 

(a) A person commits the crime of robbery in 

the first degree if he violates Section 13A8-43 and he

(1) Is armed with a deadly weapon or 

dangerous instrument; or

(2) Causes serious physical injury to 

another.

(b) Possession then and there of an article 

used or fashioned in a manner to lead any 

person who is present reasonably to believe 

it to be a deadly weapon or dangerous 

instrument, or any verbal or other 

representation by the defendant that he is 

then and there so armed, is prima facie 

evidence under subsection (a) of this 

section that he was so armed.

Ala. Code § 13A-8-41(a) and (b). The undersigned also found 

that the requirements of robbery third degree have been met: 

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A person commits the crime of robbery 

in the third degree if in the course of 

committing a theft he:

(1) Used force against the person of 

the owner of any person present with intent 

to overcome his physical resistance or 

physical power of resistance; or

(2) Threatens the imminent use of force 

against the person of the owner or any 

person present with intent to compel 

acquiescence to the taking of or escaping 

with the property.

Ala. Code § 13A-8-43.

So even though a conviction did not require their presence, 

Conner had a folding knife and a nail gun that unbalanced him. 

The jury saw the knife and nail gun, believed the testimony 

presented, and chose from a range of verdicts to convict

Petitioner of first degree robbery.

The undersigned finds that the trial evidence reasonably 

led the jury to find Petitioner guilty of first-degree robbery 

beyond a reasonable doubt under Jackson. Though Justice Moore 

argues that its State Court decisions are wrong, Ex parte 

Conner, 165 So.2d at 561-63, they are, nevertheless, Alabama’s 

law. The undersigned finds Conner has not demonstrated that his 

Attorney was deficient in not challenging evidence as 

insufficient when State law holds otherwise. This particular 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim is without merit.

Conner also claims his attorney rendered ineffective 

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assistance by denying him the right to confront an accuser, 

Jennifer Byers, by not calling her as a witness; Conner asserts 

irreconcilable differences between Byers’ testimony and the 

other evidence (Doc. 1, pp. 30-35). Petitioner also asserts his 

Attorney should have included him in the decision not to call 

the witness.

The undersigned notes that the Sixth Amendment provides, in 

pertinent part that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused 

shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses 

against him . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 

Plaintiff’s Trial Attorney, in an affidavit prepared for 

the Rule 32 hearing, defended his decision to not call Byers:

I was informed that Ms. Jennifer Bryers 

was not going to be called as a witness at 

Mr. Connor’s trial the Friday preceding his 

trial on Monday. I filed a “Motion to Suppress” any statements, or evidence from or 

about Ms. Bryers concerning the incident 

giving rise [sic] the pending charges 

against Mr. Connor. The court held a 

hearing on the motion prior to the 

commencement of the trial and out of hearing 

and view of the jury. The Court granted the 

motion as a Motion in Limine and informed 

the State they could not use or refer to Ms. 

Bryers’ statements during the trial. No 

statements or evidence was presented that 

Mr. Connor took a knife out of his pocket or 

attempted to take a knife out of his pocket 

during the trial; however, there was a 

mention of a cell phone found on the floor 

after the struggle during the trial. The 

States witness mentioned that Ms. Byers had 

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been present and participated in the 

struggle with Mr. Conner in store, but did 

not mention her statements or any accusation 

which might have been made by her.

(Doc. 1, p. 62, Lowell Aff.). The Appellate Court held that the 

Attorney’s decision to suppress Byers’s statement was reasonable 

trial strategy, and not ineffective assistance, stating: 

[A]side from his bare allegation that his 

defense was prejudiced by counsel’s failure 

to call Byers to testify at trial because 

her testimony would have allegedly impeached 

Barnard, Conner offered no facts indicating 

what Byers’s testimony would have been or 

how Byers’s testimony would have impeached 

Barnard as he claims. In fact, the exhibits 

that Conner attached to his petition 

indicate that both Byers’s statements and 

Barnard’s statements about the incident were 

the same. Therefore, Conner has not shown 

that trial counsel’s performance was outside 

of the “wide range of reasonable 

professional assistance,” Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 689, nor has he shown that there is 

a reasonable probability that, if counsel 

had ensured Byers testified or that her 

statements were entered into evidence, the 

result of the trial would have been 

different. Accordingly, this issue does not 

entitle Conner to any relief.

(Doc. 6, Exhibit N, pp. 4-5). 

The undersigned has reviewed Petitioner’s arguments and 

finds, like the Alabama Criminal Court’s assessment above, that 

Conner has not demonstrated irreconcilable differences between 

Byers’s and Barnard’s testimony. The undersigned has reviewed 

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the two affidavits, finding Barnard’s barely decipherable and 

Byers’s expressing strong evidence of guilt (see Doc. 1, p. 37; 

see generally, pp. 37-40) (“[Conner] then began to resist, 

swinging his arms violently, and stated several times that he 

had a gun; . . . [he also had] a silver 4” pocket knife on his 

person”). 

The undersigned finds that Conner's Attorney’s decision not 

to call Byers as a witness was good, tactical strategy and that 

Petitioner has not demonstrated that his Attorney was deficient 

in representing him. See Caderno v. U.S., 256 F.3d 1213, 1217 

(11th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1167 (2002) ("There is a 

strong presumption that counsel's performance was reasonable and 

adequate, with great deference shown to choices dictated by 

reasonable trial strategy"). The undersigned further finds, as 

did the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, that Petitioner has 

not shown how he was prejudiced because his Attorney suppressed 

Byers’s statement and decided not to call her as a witness. 

Conner also claims his attorney should have discussed the 

decision not to call the witness with him. The Court notes: 

A lawyer shall abide by a client’s 

decisions concerning the objective of 

representation, . . . and shall consult with 

the client as to the means by which they are 

to be pursued. . . . In a criminal case, the 

lawyer shall abide by the client’s decision, 

after consultation with the lawyer, as to a 

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plea to be entered, whether to waive jury 

trial and whether the client will testify. 

Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.2(a). The Alabama 

Court of Criminal Appeals has held that “[a]n attorney can only 

make recommendation to a client as to how conduct his defense; 

the ultimate decision, however, lies with the client.” Burton 

v. State, 651 So.2d 641, 656 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993), aff’d, 651 

So.2d 659 (Ala. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1115 (1995). 

The undersigned already found no merit in Petitioner’s 

argument that his Attorney was ineffective for not calling Byers 

as a witness as no prejudice was shown. As such, Conner can 

demonstrate no prejudice in his Attorney’s failure to consult 

with him about calling the witness. Any assertion otherwise is 

without merit.

Conner has asserted two particular instances of ineffective 

assistance of counsel in bringing this action. Both are without 

merit. Therefore, it is recommended that this habeas petition 

de denied, that this action be dismissed, and that judgment be 

entered in favor of Respondent, Cynthia D. Stewart and against 

Petitioner Willie Lee Conner.

Furthermore, pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing 

§ 2254 Cases, the undersigned recommends that a certificate of 

appealability (hereinafter COA) be denied. 28 U.S.C. foll. § 

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2254, Rule 11(a) (“The district court must issue or deny a 

certificate of appealability when it enters a final order 

adverse to the applicant”). The habeas corpus statute makes 

clear that an applicant is entitled to appeal a district court’s 

denial of his habeas corpus petition only where a circuit 

justice or judge issues a COA. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). A COA 

may issue only where “the applicant has made a substantial 

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2253(c)(2). When the merits of a claim are reached, a COA 

should issue only when the petitioner demonstrates "that 

reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of 

the constitutional claims debatable or wrong." Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). As the Court has found that 

Conner failed to assert sufficient facts to support a claim of 

constitutional error, “[t]he petitioner must demonstrate that 

reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of

the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack, 529 U.S. 

at 484. It is suggested that Conner cannot make that showing.

CONCLUSION

It is recommended that Petitioner’s petition for writ of 

habeas corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, be denied and 

that this action be dismissed. It is further recommended that 

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judgment be entered in favor of Respondent, Cynthia D. Stewart, 

and against Petitioner, Willie Lee Conner. Finally, it is 

recommended that any certificate of appealability filed by 

Petitioner be denied as he is not entitled to appeal in forma 

pauperis. 

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS 

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on 

all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects 

to this recommendation or anything in it must, within fourteen 

(14) days of the date of service of this document, file specific 

written objections with the Clerk of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1); FED.R.CIV.P. 72(b); S.D. ALA. L.R. 7(c). The parties 

should note that under Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party 

failing to object to a magistrate judge's findings or 

recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in 

accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives 

the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order 

based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the 

party was informed of the time period for objecting and the 

consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence of 

a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for 

plain error if necessary in the interests of justice.” 11th 

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Cir. R. 3-1. In order to be specific, an objection must 

identify the specific finding or recommendation to which 

objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and 

specify the place in the Magistrate Judge’s report and 

recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An 

objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the 

briefing before the Magistrate Judge is not specific. 

DONE this 13th day of September, 2016.

s/BERT W. MILLING, JR. 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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