Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-14-02569/USCOURTS-ca8-14-02569-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John and Mary Does 1-20
Appellee
Sandra Sue Grazzini-Rucki
Appellant
David Knutson
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-2569

___________________________

Sandra Sue Grazzini-Rucki, individually and on behalf of her children, N.J.R.,

S.V.R., G.J.R., N.G.R., and G.P.R., and all others similarly situated

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

David Knutson, an individual; John and Mary Does 1-20

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis

____________

 Submitted: March 10, 2015

 Filed: March 31, 2015

[Unpublished]

____________

Before WOLLMAN, BEAM, and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.

____________

PER CURIAM.

Dakota County, Minnesota, District Court Judge David Knutson presided over

a long, complicated family-law matter involving Sandra Grazzini-Rucki and her exhusband. Judge Knutson ordered that “[a]ll court proceedings of any type involving

the parties in this case are blocked exclusively to this court and the undersigned

Appellate Case: 14-2569 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/31/2015 Entry ID: 4259983 
judge.” While cases related to the marriage dissolution were pending, Grazzini-Rucki,

on behalf of herself and her five children, filed a federal lawsuit against Judge

Knutson, alleging tort claims and constitutional violations. Relying on the abstention

doctrine set forth in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the district court1

dismissed without prejudice Grazzini-Rucki’s claims for injunctive and declaratory

relief. The remaining claims were dismissed with prejudice on the basis of judicial

immunity. We affirm. 

Grazzini-Rucki has pointed to no error in the district court’s abstention

determination, and thus she has abandoned any argument that the district court erred

in dismissing her claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. See Jasperson v.

Purolator Courier Corp., 765 F.2d 736, 740 (8th Cir. 1985) (“A party’s failure to raise

or discuss an issue in [her] brief is to be deemed an abandonment of that issue.”); Fed.

R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A) (requiring that an appellant’s brief include an argument

section, containing the “appellant’s contentions and the reasons for them”). 

Moreover, we decline to consider any arguments that were raised for the first time in

her reply brief, see Jasperson, 765 F.2d at 740-41, and we proceed to whether Judge

Knutson is immune from suit. 

A judge is entitled to judicial immunity if he has not acted in clear absence of

all jurisdiction and if the act was a judicial one. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349,

359 (1978). To determine whether an act is judicial, we consider the “nature of the

function performed.” Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988). An act is judicial

“if it is a function normally performed by a judge and the parties dealt with the judge

in his judicial capacity.” Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 434 (10th Cir. 1985),

vacated as moot after remand from Supreme Court, 800 F.2d 230 (10th Cir. 1986). 

1

The Honorable Susan Richard Nelson, United States District Judge for the

District of Minnesota.

-2-

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Judicial acts do not “become less judicial by virtue of an allegation of malice or

corruption of motive.” Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227. 

Grazzini-Rucki argues that Judge Knutson’s self-assignment of related matters

was an administrative act, not a judicial one. The assignment of cases, however, “is

still a judicial function in the sense that it directly concerns the case-deciding

process.” Martinez, 771 F.2d at 434. Accordingly, to the extent Judge Knutson

assigned related matters to himself, we hold that such assignment constituted a judicial

act that entitles him to immunity from suit.

Grazzini-Rucki also argues that a listening session that Judge Knutson held,

during which he heard from the five children, was not a judicial act. We disagree. 

The listening session was held at the courthouse; was attended by the parties, the

attorneys, the guardian ad litem, and the therapist; and was recorded by a court

reporter. Although the sua sponte order to seal the transcript characterized the session

as “held for the sole purpose of facilitating therapy previously ordered by the Court,”

that characterization does not require the conclusion that the listening session was

something other than a judicial act. Given the flexibility that Minnesota’s custody

laws give to the court to determine the best interests of the children, we conclude that

the listening session constituted a function normally performed by a judge in deciding

custody disputes and involved Judge Knutson in his judicial capacity.2

 See, e.g.,

Minn. Stat. § 518.17 subds. 1-2 (listing factors for the court to consider to determine

the best interests of the child in custody matters); id. § 518.166 (allowing the court to

interview children and seek custody recommendations from professionals). Judge

Knutson thus is entitled to judicial immunity for claims related to the listening session. 

2

We note that immediately prior to the listening session, Grazzini-Rucki’s

attorney conceded that Minnesota statutes “allow the children to talk with the Judge

in chambers with attorneys present[,] and I would be comfortable with that and so

would my client. I think maybe you can get to the heart of some things because the

children might want to speak.” 

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Finally, the district court’s consideration of certain matters of public record did

not convert its ruling on the motion to dismiss into a summary-judgment ruling. See

Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that,

when considering a motion to dismiss, the court “may consider some materials that

are part of the public record or do not contradict the complaint, as well as materials

that are necessarily embraced by the pleadings” (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted)).

The judgment is affirmed.

______________________________

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