Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-14-01135/USCOURTS-caDC-14-01135-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Consolidated Communications, Inc.
Petitioner
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, Local 702
Intervenor for Respondent
National Labor Relations Board
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 4, 2016 Decided September 13, 2016

No. 14-1135

CONSOLIDATED COMMUNICATIONS, INC., DOING BUSINESS AS 

ILLINOIS CONSOLIDATED TELEPHONE COMPANY,

PETITIONER

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

RESPONDENT

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS,

AFL-CIO, LOCAL 702,

INTERVENOR

Consolidated with 14-1140

On Petition for Review and Cross-Application

for Enforcement of an Order 

of the National Labor Relations Board

Robert T. Dumbacher argued the cause for petitioner. 

With him on the briefs were Kurt G. Larkin, David C. 

Lonergan, and Amber M. Rogers.

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Joel A. Heller, Attorney, National Labor Relations Board, 

argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were 

Richard F. Griffin, Jr., General Counsel, John H. Ferguson, 

Associate General Counsel, Linda Dreeben, Deputy Associate 

General Counsel, and Jill A. Griffin, Supervisory Attorney.

Christopher N. Grant argued the cause and filed the brief 

for intervenor. 

Before: TATEL, BROWN, and MILLETT, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge MILLETT.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge MILLETT.

MILLETT, Circuit Judge: After collective-bargaining 

negotiations soured between Consolidated Communications, 

Inc. (“Consolidated”) and the International Brotherhood of 

Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, Local 702 (“Union”), Union 

members launched a strike at several company facilities. 

After the dust settled and the strikers returned to work, 

Consolidated disciplined several employees for alleged 

misconduct during the strike and eliminated a workplace 

position held by a union worker. The National Labor 

Relations Board found that both Consolidated’s disciplinary 

actions and its unilateral elimination of a bargaining-unit 

position violated the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 

§§ 158(a)(1), (3) and (5). Consolidated now petitions for 

review of the Board’s decision, while the Board crosspetitions for enforcement of its order. 

We enforce the portions of the Board’s order determining 

that Consolidated’s suspensions of Michael Maxwell and Eric 

Williamson, as well as the company’s elimination of the 

bargaining-unit position, violated the Act. However, we grant 

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Consolidated’s petition for review and deny crossenforcement for that portion of the order addressing 

Consolidated’s discharge of Patricia Hudson, and remand 

because the Board applied an erroneous legal standard in 

evaluating Hudson’s strike misconduct. 

I

Consolidated is a telecommunications company that 

provides commercial and residential telephone, television, and 

broadband services. The company maintains numerous 

facilities in Illinois, including a garage in Taylorville and a 

general warehouse known as the Rutledge Building on 17th 

Street in Mattoon. Consolidated’s corporate headquarters is 

also in Mattoon. 

The Union represents a unit of employees at 

Consolidated’s Taylorville and Mattoon facilities whose work 

was covered by a collective-bargaining agreement that 

expired in November 2012. Numerous bargaining sessions 

for a new contract failed, and negotiations between

Consolidated and the Union stalled. Union members then 

began a strike on December 6, 2012. Employees picketed at 

several company locations, including the Taylorville garage, 

the Rutledge Building, and the Mattoon corporate 

headquarters. The Union informed the strikers that they could 

also picket at any commercial sites where Consolidated 

employees were performing work, a practice known as 

“ambulatory picketing.” J.A. 183. 

During the strike, Consolidated continued to operate 

through the use of replacement workers, out-of-state 

employees, and managers. Consolidated hired the Huffmaster 

Security Company to guard the facilities, direct traffic across 

picket lines, and advise non-striking employees about how to 

conduct themselves during the strike. Non-striking 

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employees were instructed to be “extremely cautious in their 

dealing with strikers to ensure everyone’s safety” and to 

“[r]eport any incidents to the Command Center.” J.A. 59.

The strike lasted almost a week, with the strikers 

returning to work on December 13, 2012. In the course of the

strike, Consolidated received written and verbal reports of six 

specific incidents of alleged misconduct by strikers Michael 

Maxwell, Patricia Hudson, Brenda Weaver, and Eric 

Williamson. After meeting individually with each employee, 

Consolidated suspended all four employees indefinitely 

without pay pending investigation of the allegations. Several 

days later, Consolidated confirmed two-day suspensions for 

Maxwell and Williamson and discharged Hudson and 

Weaver. 

In early 2013, Consolidated decided to fill Hudson’s job 

as an Office Specialist in the Fleet Department, but not 

Weaver’s former position of Office Specialist in the Facilities

Department. Consolidated assigned the Fleet Department job, 

as well as some of Weaver’s former duties, to another 

bargaining-unit employee. Consolidated did not notify or 

bargain with the Union in advance of those decisions. Upon 

learning of them, the Union immediately objected and 

demanded a return to the status quo and the opportunity to 

bargain over the changes. In April, Consolidated informed 

the Union that it was transferring some of Weaver’s former 

duties outside of the bargaining unit. 

The Union filed unfair labor practice charges against 

Consolidated objecting to both the disciplinary actions and the 

unilateral elimination of a bargaining-unit position. The 

General Counsel for the Board subsequently issued a 

complaint alleging that Consolidated violated Sections 8(a)(3) 

and (1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(3) & (1), by 

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discharging Hudson and Weaver and suspending Maxwell 

and Williamson for alleged misconduct that the General 

Counsel alleged either did not occur or was insufficiently 

egregious to warrant such discipline. The complaint also 

alleged that Consolidated violated Sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of 

the Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5) & (1), by eliminating a 

bargaining-unit position without notifying or bargaining with 

the Union.

The case was heard by a National Labor Relations Board 

Administrative Law Judge, who found that Consolidated

acted unlawfully in disciplining Hudson, Weaver, Maxwell, 

and Williamson. The ALJ declined to rule on the Section 

8(a)(5) claim pertaining to the eliminated unit position. 

In July 2014, the Board affirmed the ALJ’s rulings, 

findings, and conclusions. The Board also concluded that 

Consolidated violated Section 8(a)(5) by reassigning and 

eliminating the job duties of the Office Specialist-Facilities 

position without notice of bargaining.1

 

II

On review, the Board’s factual findings and application 

of law to those facts must be sustained if they are “supported 

by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole.” 

29 U.S.C. § 160(e). While our review is deferential, we will 

not “rubber-stamp NLRB decisions,” and we “examine 

carefully both the Board’s findings and its reasoning.” Erie 

Brush & Mfg. Corp. v. NLRB, 700 F.3d 17, 21 (D.C. Cir. 

2012) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “[W]e 

 1 The Union and Consolidated separately settled their dispute over 

Weaver’s termination, so Consolidated does not seek review of that 

aspect of the Board’s decision. 

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do not reverse the Board’s adoption of an ALJ’s credibility 

determinations unless * * * those determinations are 

‘hopelessly incredible,’ ‘self-contradictory,’ or ‘patently 

unsupportable.’” Cadbury Beverages, Inc. v. NLRB, 160 F.3d 

24, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting Capital Cleaning 

Contractors, Inc. v. NLRB, 147 F.3d 999, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 

1998)).

Sections 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act prohibit an employer 

from interfering with, restraining, coercing, or discriminating 

against employees in the exercise of their statutory rights to, 

among other things, join together in collective action and

strike. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(3) & (1). Under the Act, an 

employer ordinarily must reinstate striking employees at the 

conclusion of a strike. See National Conference of Firemen 

and Oilers, SEIU v. NLRB, 145 F.3d 380, 384 (D.C. Cir. 

1998); NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 378–

379 (1967). However, “serious misconduct by strikers is not 

protected by the Act,” and an employer’s imposition of 

“reasonable discipline, including the refusal to reinstate 

employees for such misconduct, does not constitute an unfair 

labor practice.” National Conference of Firemen and Oilers, 

145 F.3d at 384. 

An employer’s discipline of an employee for strike 

conduct constitutes an unfair labor practice if (i) “the 

discharged employee was at the time” of the alleged 

misconduct “engaged in a protected activity,” (ii) the 

employer knew the employee was engaged in a protected 

activity, (iii) the alleged misconduct during that protected 

activity provided the basis for discipline, and (iv) the 

“employee was not, in fact, guilty of that misconduct.” NLRB 

v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21, 23 (1964). 

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Not all misconduct is sufficient to disqualify a striker 

from the Act’s protection, however. See Allied Indus. 

Workers, AFL-CIO Local Union No. 289 v. NLRB, 476 F.2d 

868, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (“[N]ot every incident occurring on 

the picket line, though harmful to a totally innocent employer, 

justifies refusal to reemploy a picketing employee for acts that 

exceed the bounds of routine picketing.”) (quoting 

Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB, 374 F.2d 606, 608 (10th 

Cir. 1967)); Coronet Casuals, 207 NLRB 304, 304 (1973) 

(“[N]ot every impropriety committed in the course of a strike 

deprives an employee of the protective mantle of the Act.”).

Indeed, this court has previously noted that “[c]learly some 

types of impulsive behavior must have been within the 

contemplation of Congress when it provided for the right to 

strike.” Allied Indus. Workers, 476 F.2d at 879.

Consequently, “the employees’ right to organize and 

bargain collectively” must be balanced “against the 

employer’s right to maintain order and respect and the 

public’s right to safety.” Allied Indus. Workers, 476 F.2d at 

879. Striker misconduct justifies an employer’s disciplinary 

action if, “‘under the circumstances existing, it may 

reasonably tend to coerce or intimidate employees in the 

exercise of rights protected under the Act,’” including the 

right to refrain from striking. Clear Pine Mouldings, 268 

NLRB 1044, 1046 (1984), enf’d, 765 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 

1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1105 (1986) (quoting NLRB v. 

W.C. McQuaide, Inc., 552 F.2d 519, 528 (3d Cir. 1977)). As 

the Board explained in Clear Pine Mouldings, 

the existence of a “strike” in which some employees 

elect to voluntarily withhold their services does not 

in any way privilege those employees to engage in 

other than peaceful picketing and persuasion. They 

have no right, for example, to threaten those 

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employees who, for whatever reason, have decided 

to work during the strike, to block access to the 

employer’s premises, and certainly no right to carry 

or use weapons or other objects of intimidation. As 

we view the statute, the only activity the statute 

privileges in this context, other than peaceful 

patrolling, is the nonthreatening expression of 

opinion, verbally or through signs and 

pamphleteering * * *.

268 NLRB at 1047. 

“The Clear Pine standard is an objective one” and “does 

not call for an inquiry into whether any particular employee 

was actually coerced or intimidated.” Mohawk Liqueur Co., 

300 NLRB 1075, 1075 (1990). Rather, “‘[a] serious threat 

may draw its credibility from the surrounding circumstances 

and not from the physical gestures of the speaker,’” and an 

employer need not “‘countenance conduct that amounts to 

intimidation and threats of bodily harm.’” Clear Pine 

Mouldings, 268 NLRB at 1046 (quoting Associated Grocers 

of New England v. NLRB, 562 F.2d 1333, 1336 (1st Cir. 

1977), and W. C. McQuaide, Inc., 552 F.2d at 527).

The striker-misconduct standard thus offers misbehaving

employees greater protection from disciplinary action than 

they would enjoy in the normal course of employment. See

Midwest Regional Joint Board v. NLRB, 564 F.2d 434, 440 

(D.C. Cir. 1977) (“Absent a showing of anti-union 

motivation, an employer may discharge an employee for a 

good reason, a bad reason or no reason at all without running 

afoul of the labor laws.”).

There is a “burden-shifting element to the Burnup & Sims

test” for determining whether employer discipline of a striker 

amounts to an unfair labor practice. Shamrock Foods Co. v. 

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NLRB, 346 F.3d 1130, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003). The General 

Counsel must initially establish that the disciplined employee 

was a striker and that the employer took action against him or 

her for conduct associated with the strike. See In re Detroit 

Newspaper Agency, 340 NLRB 1019, 1024 (2003). The 

burden then shifts to the employer to demonstrate an honest 

belief that the disciplined employee engaged in misconduct. 

See id.; Shamrock Foods Co., 346 F.3d at 1134. Upon that 

showing, the burden shifts back to the General Counsel to 

show that the misconduct did not occur or that it was not 

serious enough to forfeit the protection of the National Labor 

Relations Act and to warrant the discipline imposed. See 

Shamrock Foods Co., 346 F.3d at 1134; In re Detroit 

Newspaper Agency, 340 NLRB at 1024; Burnup & Sims, 379 

U.S. at 23 n.3. It is the “General Counsel’s obligation to carry 

the ultimate burden of proving that illegal discrimination has 

occurred,” and “[t]o the extent that there is a lack of 

evidence” on either the absence of misconduct or the 

improper response of the employer, the dispute “must be 

resolved in favor of the employer.” Axelson, Inc., 285 NLRB

862, 864 (1987); see also Shamrock Foods Co., 346 F.3d at

1135 (The “General Counsel has the burden of showing that 

the employee did not, in fact, commit the misconduct.”) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

III

A. Maxwell

Michael Maxwell is a janitor at Consolidated. On the 

morning of December 8, 2012, he and several other 

bargaining-unit employees picketed Consolidated’s 

Taylorville garage, walking back and forth across the 

driveway entrance to the parking lot. 

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That morning, strike-replacement workers Leon Flood 

and Frank Fetchak left the parking garage in a company van 

with Flood driving and Fetchak in the passenger seat. As the 

van approached the exit, Maxwell and others in the picket line 

blocked the van from leaving. Flood stopped the van briefly 

and then began inching slowly forward towards the picketers. 

Maxwell continued to walk back and forth in front of the van 

between the headlights. 

At some point, Maxwell’s elbow or forearm made contact 

with the hood of the van. According to an email and incident 

reports written by Flood, Maxwell intentionally blocked the 

path of the van and leaned on the hood. Maxwell, however, 

testified that the van never stopped, but instead “[a]ll of a 

sudden took off” and hit him, causing him to bend in towards 

the van and brace himself against the hood with his arm. J.A.

341. Flood’s passenger Fetchak testified that Maxwell “laid 

on the van,” id. at 572, or “lean[ed] on the hood” for “less 

than a minute,” id. at 575. Maxwell then moved around to the 

driver’s side of the van. Maxwell claimed to have been 

scrambling to get out of Flood’s way, but then the van moved 

forward and hit him again, pushing him to the driver’s side. 

He gave Flood the middle finger and uttered its associated 

obscenity. Id. at 342; see also id. at 29, 574. Maxwell 

testified that he sustained a “slight yellowish bruise” on his 

right hip as a result of the incident. Id. at 346.

Consolidated informed Maxwell about “reports of [his] 

harassing, threatening, [and] intimidating behavior towards 

other [Consolidated] employees,” J.A. 30, and suspended him 

for violating the company’s “handbook/workplace violence 

policy,” which prohibits “any acts or threats of violence,” id.

at 22–23. See also id. at 30 (“You struck the vehicle, 

proceeded to the front of the vehicle and leaned on the hood 

for an extended period of time impeding [Flood’s] progress, 

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and then proceeded around the vehicle to the driver’s window 

and verbally harassed him.”).

Adopting the ALJ’s factual findings, the Board 

concluded that Maxwell “did not intentionally strike Leon 

Flood’s vehicle and did not threaten or intimidate Leon 

Flood.” J.A. 12. Instead, the Board determined that Flood hit 

Maxwell with the van, causing Maxwell to fall forward and 

brace himself by placing his forearm on the hood. While 

Maxwell “briefly impeded Flood’s progress in leaving the 

[Taylorville] garage,” “he did so no more than the other five 

picketers” at the scene. Id. at 4. 

In reaching those findings, the ALJ credited Maxwell’s 

account, rather than Flood’s written report (Flood did not 

testify at the hearing), reasoning that the testimony of Fetchak

did not contradict Maxwell “in any material way.” J.A. 4 n.5. 

Consolidated argues that finding was erroneous because 

Fetchak and Maxwell gave disparate testimony on several key 

points. For example, Maxwell claimed the van “[t]ook off 

like a bat out of hell,” id. at 340, whereas Fetchak testified 

that Flood was forced to stop the van close to the picket line 

and to inch slowly forward. Consolidated also notes that 

Fetchak testified that Maxwell put his arm on the hood and 

leaned against the van, while Maxwell claimed that the van 

hit him twice and that he was merely bracing himself.

Those distinctions, however, are not so material as to 

make the fact findings clearly erroneous. Maxwell’s “bat out 

of hell” comment refers to the vehicle’s movement from when 

Maxwell first saw the van, “coming out of the building,” not 

at the moment when he claims to have been hit. J.A. 340. 

While Maxwell maintained that the van never stopped, he did 

concede that the van was “going slower” when it allegedly hit 

him. Id. at 351–352. As for Maxwell’s contact with the van, 

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Fetchak acknowledged that “the reason [Maxwell] leaned his 

elbow on the van could have been because he was hit by the 

van on his hip.” Id. at 587 (conceding that this “could be an 

explanation” for the contact). 

Importantly, both Fetchak and Maxwell indicated that 

Maxwell’s encounter with the van was fleeting, not for “an 

extended period of time,” J.A. 30, as Consolidated alleges. 

See id. at 575 (Fetchak testifying that Maxwell leaned on the 

hood “15 seconds or so. * * * It was less than a minute.”); id. 

at 343 (Maxwell testifying it was “a minute at the most” from 

when he first saw Flood to when Flood pulled out of the 

driveway). There is also no evidence whatsoever that 

Maxwell ever “struck” the van; in fact, Fetchak’s testimony 

indicates otherwise. See id. at 580 (testifying that he did not 

see Maxwell raise his arm to strike the van); id. at 586

(“[Maxwell] didn’t hit the van. * * * I don’t think he struck it. 

* * * The definition of strike is making a striking motion, no, 

I don’t believe he did that.”). Thus, it was not “hopelessly 

incredible, self-contradictory, or patently unsupportable,” 

Cadbury Beverages, 160 F.3d at 28 (internal quotation marks 

omitted), for the ALJ to credit Maxwell’s account and find 

that Flood hit him. See also E.N. Bisso & Sons, Inc. v. NLRB, 

84 F.3d 1443, 1444–1445 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“[C]redibility 

determinations may not be overturned absent the most 

extraordinary circumstances such as utter disregard for sworn 

testimony or the acceptance of testimony which is on its 

fac[e] incredible.”) (quoting Amalgamated Clothing and 

Textile Workers Union v. NLRB, 736 F.2d 1559, 1563 (D.C. 

Cir. 1984)).

Accepting those fact findings as supported by substantial 

evidence, the Board did not err in concluding that Maxwell’s 

actions were not the type of seriously coercive or intimidating 

behavior that forfeits a worker’s protection under the National 

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Labor Relations Act. See, e.g., Consolidated Supply Co., Inc. 

& Successor Consol. Supply of Madison, Inc., 192 NLRB 

982, 988–989 (1971) (blocking a company truck 

“momentarily” is “the sort of trivial, rough incident[] which 

[is] to be expected during a long, contested strike where an 

employer attempts to continue operating with nonstrikers”); 

Medite of New Mexico, Inc. v. NLRB, 72 F.3d 780, 791 (10th 

Cir. 1995) (a “brief incident” in which several picketers 

gathered around a vehicle, called the driver a “scab,” and 

struck the car with picket signs, “does not amount to the type 

of serious conduct that would intimidate nonstriking 

employees from crossing the picket line and exercising their 

Section 7 rights”). 

By contrast, the cases on which Consolidated relies all 

involved more extreme or violent contact with and obstruction 

of non-strikers’ vehicles than Maxwell was found to have 

engaged in here.2 

 2 See Siemens Energy & Automation, Inc., 328 NLRB 1175, 1176 

(1999) (upholding discharge of striker that kicked a car passing 

through the picket line and threw roofing tacks onto the roadway at 

a vehicular entrance to the employer’s plant); GSM, Inc., 284 

NLRB 174, 174–175 (1987) (“Conduct such as kicking, slapping, 

and throwing beer cans at moving vehicles is intimidating enough 

in and of itself,” and constitutes “violent conduct which may 

reasonably tend to coerce or intimidate employees in the exercise of 

their rights protected under the Act.”); Teamsters Local 812 (PepsiCola Newburgh), 304 NLRB 111, 115–117 (1991) (“The blocking, 

hitting and kicking of vehicles by pickets” constituted picket line 

misconduct, as did a “Family Day” in which striking employees 

and their families carried out mass picketing, and placed themselves 

and their small children in front of company trucks as they 

attempted to leave.); CalMat Co., 326 NLRB 130, 135 (1998) 

(denying reinstatement for striker who “use[d] himself as a barrier 

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Because substantial evidence supports the Board’s 

finding that Maxwell did not engage in misconduct justifying

suspension, we deny that portion of Consolidated’s petition

and enforce the Board’s order as it applies to Maxwell.

B. Williamson

Eric Williamson, a switchman at Consolidated, was 

suspended for two separate incidents during the strike. 

Substantial evidence supported the Board’s determination that 

neither instance of alleged misconduct was severe enough to 

warrant his suspension.

One evening during the strike, Williamson and other 

strikers stood along the driveway of the Rutledge Building 

parking lot waving signs and chanting. At around 5:00 p.m., 

non-striking employee Dawn Redfern drove her car as part of 

a slow caravan of vehicles leaving the parking lot. According 

to Redfern, she was turning right out of the parking lot when 

she heard a loud smack and immediately stopped her car. 

Turning her interior light on and rolling down her car 

window, she noticed that the passenger-side mirror was 

folded in. Redfern addressed a group of picketers, yelling, 

“you just hit my car.” J.A. 611. Williamson purportedly 

responded, “No, you hit me.” Id. at 612. A Huffmaster 

security guard came over and instructed Redfern to put her 

window up and keep driving, which she did. Redfern’s 

husband later pushed the mirror back to its normal position. 

The car was not damaged. 

 

so the driver would have no choice but to stop,” and then proceeded 

to jump up onto the company truck, tear off the door handle, and try 

to assault the driver and damage the truck as security guards and 

police officers struggled to restrain him).

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Williamson offered a different account of the incident. 

He acknowledged that he had been standing near Redfern’s

car as she pulled out, and that he “made sure she [had] seen 

[his] sign” and “tried to yell ‘scab.’” J.A. 443. Williamson 

claimed that Redfern’s passenger-side mirror “grazed [his] 

whistle on [his] chest,” and “flexed in and flexed back.” Id. 

Redfern then allegedly “hammered on her brakes[,] rolled her 

window down” and accused Williamson of breaking her 

mirror. Id. Williamson responded that she had hit him, and 

then he turned and walked away. He asked a Mattoon Police 

Department officer at the picket line if the officer had seen

what had happened; the officer advised Williamson that he 

had done nothing wrong. During his testimony, Williamson 

repeatedly denied striking or pushing the mirror.

Williamson continued to picket at the Rutledge Building 

the following day. Non-striker Tara Walters testified that, as 

she arrived for work in the morning, Williamson looked 

towards her, grabbed his crotch, and “lifted up as a mean, 

hateful gesture.” J.A. 629–630. Williamson denied grabbing 

his crotch, claiming that he just yelled “scab” at Walters. Id.

at 440–441.

Consolidated accused Williamson of “threatening and 

intimidating a female * * * employee by striking her vehicle 

while * * * standing on the picket line,” and of “sexual 

harassment” in “making inappropriate gestures toward a 

female * * * employee while she was parking her vehicle,” 

J.A. 40. Williamson was suspended for violations of the 

“handbook/workplace violence policy” and the 

“handbook/sexual harassment policy.” Id. at 31–32.

The Board found no factual basis for Consolidated’s 

conclusion that Williamson intentionally struck Redfern’s car 

mirror. That decision is amply supported by the record—or, 

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more accurately, the utter lack of any record evidence that 

Williamson intentionally struck Redfern’s mirror as she drove 

by. Redfern herself conceded that she did not see “who did 

it,” J.A. 619, or have any basis for concluding that 

Williamson acted with intentionality to damage her mirror. 

Video footage of the picket line around that time only shows 

Redfern’s car driving by a group of strikers, with no footage 

of anyone at all coming into contact with the mirror. 

Accordingly, we uphold the Board’s determination that 

Williamson did not engage in any misconduct with respect to 

Redfern.

With respect to the Tara Walters incident, the Board 

discredited Williamson’s testimony and found that he did 

engage in misconduct by grabbing his crotch and making an 

obscene gesture toward Walters. The Board also held, 

however, that Williamson’s actions were not sufficiently 

egregious to warrant suspension. 

Consolidated argues (Br. 51) that the Board improperly 

“inferred a legal standard of violence” as necessary to permit 

discipline. That misreads the decision. The Board, in fact, 

acknowledged that Williamson’s gesture was “totally uncalled 

for, and very unpleasant,” but nonetheless concluded that his 

actions could not objectively be perceived “as an implied 

threat” of the kind that would coerce or intimidate a 

reasonable employee from continuing to report to work during 

the strike. J.A. 13. Given the rough-and-tumble nature of 

picket lines and the fleeting nature of Williamson’s offensive 

misconduct, we cannot conclude that the Board erred in its 

assessment of the objective impact of this particular conduct

in this instance. See Allied Indus. Workers, 476 F.2d at 879 

(“‘Impulsive behavior on the picket line is to be expected 

especially when directed against nonstriking employees or 

strike breakers.’”) (quoting Montgomery Ward & Co., 374 

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F.2d at 608 ); NMC Finishing v. NLRB, 101 F.3d 528, 532 

(8th Cir. 1996) (noting the “rough and tumble economic 

activity permitted by the policies established by Congress 

through the NLRA”).

3

C. Hudson

At the time of the strike, Patricia Hudson was an Office 

Specialist in the fleet department of Consolidated. In one day, 

she purportedly participated in three back-to-back incidents of 

driving her car in a manner that obstructed and trapped 

vehicles in which non-striking workers were driving. 

Concluding that Hudson had engaged in “harassing, 

intimidating, threatening and reckless behavior” towards nonstrikers with “extremely dangerous vehicular activity on the 

strike line and on the public roads,” J.A. 52, Consolidated 

discharged Hudson for violation of the “handbook/workplace 

violence and/or employee conduct and work rules policies,” 

id. at 41. 

The Board ruled that Hudson did not engage in any 

misconduct that would warrant discharge. The Board was 

two-thirds correct. Substantial evidence supports its findings

 3 The Board ruled in the alternative that, even if Williamson’s 

conduct had been serious enough to forfeit the protection of the 

Act, Consolidated failed to meet its “burden” under Wright Line, 

251 NLRB 1083 (1980), “to establish that it would have suspended 

Williamson solely on the basis of the Tara Walters incident.” J.A. 

13. That is a complete misstatement of the law. The Wright Line

test applies “when an employer has discharged (or disciplined) an 

employee for a reason assertedly unconnected to protected 

activity.” Shamrock Foods, 346 F.3d at 1135. It has no application 

to striker misconduct cases. We accordingly do not credit the 

Board’s alternative ground for its disposition.

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18

that Hudson’s conduct toward non-strikers Sarah Greider and 

Kurt Rankin was not misconduct. But in analyzing the 

incident involving non-striker Troy Conley, the Board 

misapplied the governing legal standard.

1. The Greider and Rankin Incidents

On the morning of December 10, 2012, Hudson and 

Brenda Weaver walked the picket line at the Rutledge 

Building. At around 10:00 a.m., Hudson and Weaver decided 

to drive over to corporate headquarters to join the picket line 

there. Hudson and Weaver drove separately, with Hudson in 

front and Weaver behind. 

Non-striker Sarah Greider left the Rutledge Building 

parking lot at about that same time. Greider claims that, as 

she approached the parking lot exit and prepared to turn onto 

17th Street, Hudson pulled in front of her and Weaver pulled 

up behind, blocking her in. Greider testified that Hudson 

drove slowly and stopped and started several times, while 

Weaver followed immediately behind so that Greider could 

not back up. With parked cars and picketers on both sides of 

the roadway, 17th Street had been reduced to one lane, so

Greider could not get around Hudson. After approximately 

135–165 feet, Greider turned into the parking lot of an 

automobile dealership and cut across to a parallel street. 

Weaver did not follow her. 

Greider called the Command Center and reported that 

Hudson and Weaver had “blocked [her] in.” J.A. 653. She 

later completed an incident report claiming that Hudson had 

“refused to move or moved very slowly” in front of her car.

Id. at 47–49. 

Jonell Rich, another non-striker who witnessed the 

incident, testified that Hudson was in front of Greider going 

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“very slow, stopping, starting” on 17th Street, “and it stayed 

that way until [Greider] was able to turn into the [auto 

dealership] lot.” J.A. 689. Immediately after the incident, 

Rich texted Greider: “I just saw what Pat Hudson did to 

you.” Id. at 691.

Later that morning, Hudson and Weaver returned to the 

Rutledge Building, with Hudson driving her car and Weaver 

in the backseat. Around that time, manager Kurt Rankin 

drove his car toward an exit of the Rutledge parking lot. 

Rankin testified that Hudson’s car was parked to the side of 

the road and surrounded by people, but that as soon as he 

came up to the exit, “everybody turn[ed] around and got her 

vehicle moving in front of [him]” by “motioning” her toward 

the right. J.A. 312–313. A Huffmaster guard held Rankin up 

as Hudson passed the exit. Rankin then turned right onto 17th 

Street behind Hudson, who was driving very slowly. 

Rankin testified that Hudson “stop[ped] the brakes, 

move[d], stop[ped] the brakes,” so that he was continually 

moving very slowly as Hudson “controll[ed] the speed at 

which [he] could exit and get out of there.” J.A. 320. Hudson 

testified, however, that she was driving slowly because there 

were “picketers, cars parked on the side of the road, people 

crossing the road, [and] people coming in and out of [the auto 

dealership].” Id. at 529. When Rankin tried to speed up and 

go around Hudson, she allegedly swerved over into the left 

lane to prevent him from passing. As soon as he got past the 

vehicles parked along the road, Rankin put his truck into fourwheel drive and went around Hudson on the left by driving 

through a ditch. Rankin later filled out incident reports about 

the encounter. 

Three non-striking employees—Tara Walters, Jonell 

Rich, and Bernice Dasenbrock—witnessed the incident, 

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testifying that Hudson proceeded very slowly in front of 

Rankin and moved to the left when Rankin tried to pass. 

The Board ruled that there was no misconduct by Hudson 

in either incident. The Board found that on both occasions 

Hudson’s car ended up in front of the non-strikers by 

coincidence due to the actions of the Huffmaster guard 

directing traffic leaving the parking lot. The Board also found 

that Hudson was driving slowly because of activity and 

congestion on the road, not to harass or annoy Greider or 

Rankin. Finally, the Board found that Hudson did not 

repeatedly start and stop in the road in front of Greider and 

Rankin. In so finding, the Board dismissed the witnesses’ 

testimony as inconsistent or motivated by animus towards 

Hudson, and relied in part on the fact that neither the nonstrikers nor Consolidated reported the incidents to the 

Mattoon Police Department. 

Once again, substantial evidence supports the Board’s 

conclusions. Video footage of the picket line shows

Huffmaster personnel directing cars out of the parking lot, and 

in both incidents, a guard holds up the non-striker’s car as 

Hudson’s car drives by on 17th Street. In addition, record 

evidence supports the Board’s finding that Hudson’s slow 

pace was due to all the activity and congestion in the roadway 

rather than an intentional effort to harass or block Greider and 

Rankin. For example, Police Chief Jeffrey Branson testified 

that 17th Street is a “very well traveled road,” and that when 

he first arrived at the Rutledge Building that morning, he 

“was upset because the road was so congested.” J.A. 370–

371. Chief Branson also observed “a large crowd in the 

roadway,” id. at 372, and noted that cars leaving the facility 

were “taking care, driving slow, and they were all back to 

back,” going “[t]wo miles an hour” “because the crowd was 

so close,” id. at 373–374.

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Similarly, Union representative Brad Beisner testified 

that 17th Street was significantly narrowed during the strike 

due to picketers parking along both sides of the road, and 

people getting in and out of their cars to stay warm and dry. 

Beisner also testified that members of the public and strikers 

were “driving slowly” on 17th Street during the strike, and 

that he would go five to ten miles an hour. J.A. 191. Video 

footage of the area during the strike shows picketers walking 

up and down the road holding signs and getting close to cars. 

The Board also found no credible evidence that Hudson 

had started and stopped repeatedly in front of Greider and 

Rankin. Greider made no mention of Hudson stopping and 

starting in her incident report, and there is no record of her

making such a claim to Consolidated managers at the 

Command Center at the time. The video footage of the 

Greider Incident, though limited, also does not show any 

evidence of stopping and starting. Rich’s testimony was 

inconsistent as to whether and how often Hudson stopped in 

front of Greider. Compare J.A. 689 (testifying that she did 

not know if Hudson stopped more than once or whether 

Hudson actually came to a complete stop), with id. at 700–702 

(testifying that she saw Hudson come to a complete stop in 

front of Greider twice). 

Rankin testified that Hudson would “stop the brakes, 

move, stop the brakes,” J.A. 320, but only noted Hudson “at 

some time totally stopp[ing]” in one incident report. Video 

footage of the incident shows Hudson’s car slowing down 

after Rankin’s truck turns behind it, and the two vehicles get 

very close to each other as they drive up 17th Street, but 

Hudson’s car does not ever fully stop within view of the 

camera. Other testimony about the incident offered equivocal

support at best for Rankin’s version of events. Walters 

testified that she did not see Hudson start and stop in front of 

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Rankin, and Rich mentioned the two vehicles coming to a 

complete stop only when Rankin attempted to go around 

Hudson at some point.

4

 

The Board also found conflicting evidence regarding 

Rankin’s claim that Hudson moved to the left of the road to 

prevent him from passing. The allegation was not in Rankin’s 

incident reports, and Rankin never told Consolidated prior to

Hudson’s discharge that she swerved or that he twice tried to 

pass her. To be sure, Walters and Rich testified that they saw 

Hudson move to the left in front of Rankin, but the general 

reliability of their testimony was undermined by noteworthy 

gaps or inconsistencies. For example, neither Walters nor 

Rich remembered any vehicles passing Hudson and Rankin 

going south on the other side of 17th Street—something about 

which Rankin, Weaver, and Hudson all testified. 

When confronted with competing versions of evidence, 

we defer to the Board’s credibility determinations absent the 

starkest error. See NLRB v. Augusta Bakery Corp., 957 F.2d 

1467, 1477 (7th Cir. 1992). We therefore hold that 

 4

 Consolidated complains that the Board improperly imposed a 

duty on the employer to contact the police about these incidents. 

Such contact, while certainly not dispositive, can be a factor 

relevant to witness credibility and the seriousness of the misconduct 

in question. See, e.g., Precision Window Mfg., Inc. v. NLRB, 963 

F.2d 1105, 1108 (8th Cir. 1992) (threatened employer’s call to 

police was evidence of the threat); Axelson, Inc., 285 NLRB 862, 

865 (1987) (the “threatening, intimidating character” of striker’s 

statement was apparent where non-striker felt threatened enough to 

report the incident to the police). Anyhow, the Board’s reliance on 

that factor was limited in the Greider and Rankin incidents, and 

substantial evidence would exist even without consideration of that 

factor. 

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substantial evidence underlay the Board’s determinations that 

Hudson did not engage in misconduct in the Greider and 

Rankin incidents.

2. The Conley Incident

Between the Greider and Rankin Incidents, as Hudson 

and Weaver were en route in separate cars to picket at 

Consolidated’s corporate headquarters, Hudson noticed a 

company truck on Route 16, a four-lane highway in Mattoon. 

Manager Troy Conley was driving, and replacement worker 

Larry Diggs was a passenger. Hudson testified that she 

decided to follow the truck to see if it was traveling to a 

commercial worksite where striking employees could set up 

an ambulatory picket. Weaver followed her. What happened 

next is strongly disputed.

Conley testified that he was driving east in the right lane 

on Route 16, when he heard honking and saw Weaver drive 

up in the left lane beside him with a picket sign in her 

passenger seat. She went past Conley’s truck, signaled and 

moved into the right lane in front of him. Less than a minute 

later, Conley saw Hudson drive up in the left lane, pass him, 

and proceed parallel to Weaver. Conley then “saw some hand 

motioning going on by Pat [Hudson], and they immediately 

slowed both cars down.” J.A. 537.5

 Conley did not know 

 5 Hudson and Weaver testified that they had not previously 

discussed following company vehicles, and were not able to 

communicate with each other during the drive because Hudson did 

not have a cell phone. Hudson had decided on her own to follow 

Conley when she saw him turning onto Route 16. Weaver testified 

that she followed without initially knowing what Hudson was 

doing, but eventually noticed the company truck and assumed 

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24

how fast any of the cars were traveling, and he conceded that 

Weaver and Hudson could have been driving the speed limit 

while in front of him.6

Conley testified that he slowed down, signaled, and went 

into the left lane behind Hudson to see if she would let him 

pass. She did not. Conley then moved back into the right 

lane behind Weaver. At some point, three cars came up 

behind Hudson in the left lane, and she moved in to the right

lane ahead of Weaver to allow them to pass her. Conley 

signaled left and moved into the left lane behind the third car, 

but again could not pass because Hudson moved back into the 

left lane, intentionally cutting him off. Conley slowed down 

and moved back into the right lane behind Weaver. 

Conley subsequently turned off of the road, even though 

it was not the most direct route to the job site, because he 

“was feeling very harassed” and “was trying to avoid 

conflict.” J.A 540. As a result, Conley had to drive a longer 

route to his destination. Once he reached the job site, Conley 

called the Command Center to report what had happened, and 

later filled out an incident report. 

Diggs, Conley’s passenger, testified that he saw one car 

come speeding up beside their truck, stop and look for a 

moment, and then pull in front of the truck. He testified that a 

second car then pulled up beside the first car and “both of 

them slowed down at a fairly fast pace.” J.A. 591. Diggs 

explained that, “after [other] cars started stacking up behind 

 

Hudson was following it to see if it was going to a commercial 

worksite. 

6 The speed limit on Route 16 in that area generally ranges from 45 

to 55 mph. 

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[the truck],” he “saw some motion between the two cars that 

were in front of us.” Id. at 592. The car in the left lane

(Hudson) pulled in front of the car in the right lane (Weaver)

to let the stacked cars come through. But when Conley 

attempted to pass, the two cars “pulled back, paralleling each 

other, and continued to block us from going at the normal 

speed that we were trying to travel at.” Id. Diggs did not 

know whether Hudson and Weaver were driving at the speed 

limit and conceded that they could have been, but added that 

“they were traveling much slower than everyone else was 

traveling prior to them pulling in front of us.” Id. at 597.

Weaver and Hudson had a different recollection from 

Conley and Diggs. According to Weaver, she had decided to 

pull up beside the truck to “see who was driving * * *, so that 

if we followed him to a site where we could picket, we could 

report it back to the Union.” J.A. 413. She also said that she 

wanted to find out if the driver was someone with “the 

credentials to drive the type of truck he[] [was] driving to do 

the work,” such as a commercial driver’s license, id., although 

she conceded that she was unaware of any special 

requirements to drive a pickup truck.7

 Weaver testified that 

she was driving at “normal speed—the speed limit,” J.A. 403, 

and that Hudson did not cut Conley off. 

Hudson testified that she had no idea why Weaver passed 

Conley or “what her intentions were,” but she also passed 

Conley in order to “stay with Brenda [Weaver].” J.A. 481, 

516–518. Hudson denied that she and Weaver paralleled their 

vehicles in front of Conley to create a rolling blockade or that 

she ever cut off Conley. Instead, Hudson said she just passed 

Conley in the left lane and then pulled into the right lane 

 7 Conley testified to driving a four-wheel drive Chevy truck that did 

not require a commercial driver’s license. 

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between Weaver and Conley. She also did not recall Conley 

ever changing lanes or trying to pass. 

Hudson and Weaver did not follow Conley after he 

turned off of the road because they could not turn their cars 

around at that point in the highway. Hudson and Weaver also 

testified that, because Conley turned off, they each assumed 

he was heading to a residential, not a commercial, location, 

where strikers could not picket. 

Consolidated argues that the Conley Incident, which 

occurred on a public highway approximately three miles away 

from the picket line, should not have been subject to the 

striker misconduct standard at all, but instead should have 

been evaluated as ordinary employee misconduct. 

Consolidated also argues that, even under the striker 

misconduct standard, Hudson’s behavior was sufficiently 

serious to forfeit the protection of the National Labor 

Relations Act. We reject Consolidated’s first argument, but 

conclude that the Board committed reversible legal error in 

evaluating Hudson’s misconduct. 

On the question of whether the Conley incident qualified 

as strike-related behavior, the General Counsel bears the 

burden of showing that Hudson’s conduct occurred “in the 

course of” the strike. Shamrock Foods, 346 F.3d at 1136; 

Burnup & Sims, 379 U.S. at 23. Conduct need not occur at 

the picket line to be “in the course of protected activity.” 

Confrontations between striking and non-striking employees 

are typically treated as strike-related conduct even when they 

occur miles away from the picket line or strike site. See, e.g.,

Consolidated Supply Co., 192 NLRB at 988–989 (following 

company truck onto roadway, forcing it to drive slowly, and 

blocking it); Axelson, 285 NLRB at 865 (following nonstriker home, cruising slowly past his house, and parking 

USCA Case #14-1135 Document #1635356 Filed: 09/13/2016 Page 26 of 41
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close enough to see and be seen); Gibraltar Sprocket Co., 241 

NLRB 501, 501–502 (1979) (following non-striker’s car); 

Otsego Ski-Club-Hidden Valley, Inc., 217 NLRB 408, 413 

(1975) (same); Federal Prescription Serv., Inc., 203 NLRB 

975, 993 (1973) (same).

For example, in Detroit Newspaper Agency d/b/a Detroit 

Newspapers v. NLRB, 342 NLRB 223, 236–237 (2004), a 

striker had parked in front of a Cracker Barrel Store along 

with his wife and two young children when he noticed a 

company van parked nearby. The striker and his family 

engaged in a confrontation with the driver in which they 

repeatedly called him a “scab” and slapped the driver’s van. 

Id. at 236. The employer discharged the striker, reasoning 

that, “because there was no picket line or any strike-related 

activity going on in the vicinity,” the striker-misconduct 

analysis should not be applied. Id. The Board disagreed, 

finding that the striker “was on strike at the time of this 

incident, which involved his attempt to remonstrate with an 

employee concerning his status as a strike replacement, and 

that in doing so he was exercising rights protected by the 

Act.” Id. The Board further explained that, to obtain 

protection under the striker-misconduct standard, “[t]here is 

no requirement that” the employee “be a part of some kind of 

formal strike-related activity.” Id. The Board also noted “that 

the [employer] considered [the discharged employee] to be a 

striker, and that it handled the matter according to the 

procedures it had set up for reporting, investigating, and 

taking action on incidents of alleged misconduct by striking 

employees.” Id.

In other words, geography by itself is not dispositive of 

whether conduct is strike related. The central consideration 

instead is whether the employee undertakes the conduct for a 

purpose related to or in furtherance of the strike. See Burnup 

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& Sims, 379 U.S. at 23–24. Moreover, Consolidated’s 

reliance on location is particularly inapt here because the 

company had facilities in multiple locations and worksites in 

still more.

Accordingly, Hudson’s conduct falls comfortably within 

the zone of strike-related activity covered by the National 

Labor Relations Act. The Conley incident took place when 

Hudson was traveling between picket sites and was scoping 

out potential alternative locations for ambulatory pickets.

Moreover, Consolidated itself must have understood that 

strike-related purpose because it treated the Conley Incident 

as striker misconduct, dealing with Hudson through its 

established procedures for such conduct.8

However, we vacate the Board’s determination that 

Hudson did not engage in misconduct punishable under the 

Act because the Board’s determination rests on a 

misapplication of the Clear Pine Mouldings standard and the

Burnup & Sims burden of proof. 

The central legal question before the Board was whether 

Hudson’s driving behavior—on a public highway with 

vehicles traveling at speeds of 45 to 55 mph, and with 

uninvolved third-party vehicles in the area—“may reasonably 

tend to coerce or intimidate” Consolidated employees like 

Conley and Diggs. Clear Pine Mouldings, 268 NLRB at 

1046. The burden of proof on that question rests squarely on 

the General Counsel’s shoulders. The General Counsel must 

establish either that no misconduct occurred, or that the 

 8 Accordingly, the distinction Consolidated attempts to draw 

between following Conley and being in front of Conley on Route 16 

is irrelevant, since Hudson was engaged in conduct related to the 

strike either way. 

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misconduct was not of sufficient severity to forfeit the law’s 

protection of striker activity. See Axelson, 285 NLRB at 864;

Schreiber Mfg., 725 F.2d at 416. 

The Board misapplied that standard here. The Board 

decision stressed the “absence of violence.” J.A. 12; see id. at 

9–10. But that asked the wrong question. The legal test to be 

applied is straightforwardly whether the striker’s conduct, 

taken in context, “reasonably tended to intimidate or coerce 

any nonstrikers.” Batesville Casket Co., 303 NLRB 578, 581 

(1991); see Clear Pine Mouldings, 268 NLRB at 1045–1046 

(expressly rejecting a requirement of violence and instead 

adopting an “objective test” of “whether the misconduct is 

such that, under the circumstances existing, it may reasonably 

tend to coerce or intimidate employees in the exercise of 

rights protected under the Act”) (emphasis added) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted). While violence or its 

absence can be relevant factors in that reasonableness 

analysis, the Board had to take the next analytical step. It had 

to consider, consistent with precedent, all of the relevant 

circumstances, and evaluate the objective impact on a 

reasonable non-striker of misconduct committed on a highspeed public roadway with third-party vehicles present. See, 

e.g., Oneita Knitting Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 375 F.2d 385, 392

(4th Cir. 1967) (strikers who drove their car in front of a nonstriker’s car, would not permit the non-striker to pass, and 

shouted obscene remarks and names had engaged in 

misconduct “which was calculated to intimidate the nonstrikers, and which was inherently dangerous in that it 

involved obstruction of the public highway”); International 

Paper Co., 309 NLRB 31, 36 (1992) (striker engaged in 

“hazardous driving designed * * * to intimidate replacement 

employees and other of Respondent’s personnel,” including 

following non-strikers cars “dangerously close” with his 

truck, driving and weaving alongside them closely, and “after 

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30

passing them, driving at a speed designed to assure only a 

small separation between the two vehicles thus creating a 

danger of collision”), enf’d sub nom. Local 14, United 

Paperworkers Int’l Union v. NLRB, 4 F.3d 982 (1st Cir. 1993)

(Table).

Compounding its error, the Board held that “any 

ambiguity as to whether [Hudson’s misconduct] was serious 

enough to forfeit the protection of the Act should be resolved 

against [Consolidated].” J.A. 13. That improperly shifted the 

burden of proof from the General Counsel to Consolidated. 

Because the General Counsel bears the burden of proving that 

the misconduct is shielded by the Act, any ambiguity or 

equivocation in the evidence on the question of the conduct’s 

seriousness “must be resolved in favor of the employer[.]” 

Axelson, 285 NLRB at 864.

9

 

Those legal errors in application of the striker misconduct

standard require that we grant this portion of Consolidated’s 

petition for review, vacate the Board’s decision on Hudson’s 

discharge, and remand for further proceedings.

10

IV

 9 That the Board had articulated the burden of proof properly earlier 

in the decision, J.A. 13, is of no help when the law is flatly 

misstated in the dispositive analysis of a specific argument. 

10 We take the Board at its word that, on remand, it will not “rely 

on the [ALJ’s] speculation as to what might have motivated Troy 

Conley’s testimony,” given the total absence of record evidence 

that could support the ALJ’s findings of bias, anger, or a desire to 

see Hudson terminated. J.A. 1 n.2.

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Consolidated argues lastly that the Board failed to make 

the necessary findings of fact and provided no legal analysis 

in determining that Consolidated violated Sections 8(a)(5) and 

(1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5) & (1), in unilaterally 

eliminating the Office Specialist-Facilities position. That

claim has no merit.

It is well-established that an employer commits an unfair 

labor practice if it makes a unilateral change in a term or 

condition of employment involving a mandatory subject of 

bargaining without bargaining to impasse. See Brewers and 

Maltsters, Local Union No. 6 v. NLRB, 414 F.3d 36, 41–42 

(D.C. Cir. 2005); Litton Financial Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 

U.S. 190, 198–199 (1991). The elimination of bargainingunit jobs is a mandatory subject of bargaining within the 

meaning of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. See Finch, Pruyn & 

Co., Inc., 349 NLRB 270, 277 (2007) (“The Board has long 

held the elimination of unit jobs, albeit for economic reasons, 

is a matter within the statutory phrase ‘other terms and 

conditions of employment’ and is a mandatory subject of 

bargaining[.]”) (citation omitted); Regal Cinemas, Inc. v. 

NLRB, 317 F.3d 300, 310–312 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (company

violated Section 8(a)(5) in eliminating bargaining-unit 

positions and transferring work to managers without first 

bargaining with union).

Here, the Board specifically found that Consolidated 

decided in January or February 2014 not to fill Brenda 

Weaver’s job as the Office Specialist in the Facilities 

Department, and assigned some of the duties of that position 

to another position. The Board also found that Consolidated 

did not provide the Union with advance notice or an 

opportunity to bargain about its decision to eliminate the

position, which reduced the size of the bargaining unit. 

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Because Consolidated had a duty under settled law to 

notify and bargain with the Union before reassigning job 

duties and eliminating the Office Specialist-Facilities 

position, the Board properly concluded that Consolidated 

violated Section 8(a)(5). Those essential facts are all that is 

necessary to find a violation of the duty to bargain. See 

Finch, Pruyn & Co., 349 NLRB at 277 (“It is undisputed that 

the [employer] never bargained with [the union] over the 

elimination of the [unit] position. The [employer]’s unilateral 

action and failure to fulfill its bargaining obligation is thus 

plainly established on the record before us.”). 

Consolidated argues that the parties stipulated that 

Weaver’s position of Office Specialist was never 

“eliminated,” and that Consolidated continues to employ 

Office Specialists in the bargaining unit. But that misreads 

the stipulation. It does not say that the Office SpecialistFacilities position was preserved. The stipulation instead 

reiterates that Consolidated planned to abandon filling the 

position and to transfer Weaver’s duties to other employees.11 

That Consolidated continues to employ Office Specialists 

elsewhere in the company is beside the point. The bargaining 

unit is still down by one if Weaver’s position is eliminated. 

 11 See J.A. 55 (“February 26, 2013 was the first time the Employer 

informed the Union of the decision not to fill one of the vacated 

Office Specialist positions.”); id. at 56 (Consolidated later 

attempted to “discuss/bargain over not filling Weaver’s position” 

and “offered several options regarding the Office Specialist duties 

that Weaver previously performed, including 1) paying the Office 

Specialist who was performing new duties a premium; 2) diffusing 

the duties even further and sharing with other Office Specialists; or 

3) moving the duties to a Company affiliate.”). 

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33

Consolidated also contends that it has responded and 

agreed to the Union’s request for bargaining. Perhaps. But 

that was only after Consolidated had already decided to 

eliminate the Office Specialist-Facilities position. That does 

not suffice. The bargaining must come before the position is 

eliminated. See Brewers and Maltsters, 414 F.3d at 42 (“[A]n 

employer’s unilateral change in a term or condition of 

employment without first bargaining to impasse violates 

section 8(a)(5) and (1).”) (emphasis added); International 

Ladies’ Garment Workers Union v. NLRB, 463 F.2d 907, 919 

(D.C. Cir. 1972) (“[N]o genuine bargaining * * * can be 

conducted where [the] decision has already been made and 

implemented.”) (citation omitted) (alterations in original).

V

For the foregoing reasons, we grant Consolidated’s

petition for review and deny the Board’s application for 

enforcement with respect to Consolidated’s discharge of 

Patricia Hudson. We deny the petition for review and enforce 

the Board’s order in all other respects, and remand for further 

proceedings on the Hudson discharge consistent with this 

opinion.

So ordered.

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1

MILLETT, Circuit Judge, concurring: As the opinion 

explains, our deferential standard of review and the record in 

this case support the conclusion that Eric Williamson’s 

offensive, but fleeting and isolated, obscene gesture did not 

amount to striker misconduct so egregious that it forfeited the 

protection of the National Labor Relations Act. 

I write separately, though, to convey my substantial 

concern with the too-often cavalier and enabling approach 

that the Board’s decisions have taken toward the sexually and 

racially demeaning misconduct of some employees during 

strikes. Those decisions have repeatedly given refuge to 

conduct that is not only intolerable by any standard of 

decency, but also illegal in every other corner of the 

workplace. The sexually and racially disparaging conduct 

that Board decisions have winked away encapsulates the very 

types of demeaning and degrading messages that for too much 

of our history have trapped women and minorities in a 

second-class workplace status. 

While the law properly understands that rough words and 

strong feelings can arise in the tense and acrimonious world 

of workplace strikes, targeting others for sexual or racial 

degradation is categorically different. Conduct that is 

designed to humiliate and intimidate another individual 

because of and in terms of that person’s gender or race 

should be unacceptable in the work environment. Full stop. 

Yet time and again the Board’s decisions have given 

short shrift to gender-targeted behavior, the message of which 

is calculated to be sexually derogatory and demeaning. 

According to Board precedent, such conduct was supposedly 

not extreme enough to constitute a “threat.” For example, in 

Calliope Designs, 297 NLRB 510 (1989), the Board ruled that 

a striker calling a non-striker a “whore” and a “prostitute,” 

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and adding that she was “having sex with [the employer’s] 

president,” was not “serious misconduct” and thus was not 

sanctionable, id. at 521. That same striker repeatedly called a 

second female employee “a ‘whore’ and told [her] she could 

earn more money by selling her daughter, another nonstriker, 

at the flea market.” Id. Completely protected, the Board 

decision said.

Similarly, in Gloversville Embossing Corp., 297 NLRB 

182 (1989), the Board’s ruling deemed it acceptable for a 

striker to yell at female non-strikers to come see “a real man” 

and then to “pull[] down his pants and expose[] himself,” id. 

at 193–194. And in Robbins Company, 233 NLRB 549 

(1977), the Board’s order required the reinstatement of a 

striker who “made crude and obscene remarks and 

suggestions regarding sex, including an invitation to ‘make 

some extra money at his apartment that night’” to a female 

employee, id. at 557. See also Nickell Moulding, 317 NLRB 

826, 828 (1995), enforcement denied, NMC Finishing v. 

NLRB, 101 F.3d 528, 532 (8th Cir. 1996) (reinstating striker 

who targeted a non-striker by carrying on the picket line a 

homemade sign reading “Who is Rhonda F [with an X 

through F] Sucking Today?”).

The Board’s rulings have been equally unmoved by 

racially derogatory and demeaning epithets and behavior. 

See, e.g., Airo Die Casting, Inc., 347 NLRB 810, 811–812 

(2006) (protecting a striker who raised both middle fingers 

and shouted “fuck you nigger” at an African-American 

security guard); Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. and United Steel, 

Paper and Forestry, Rubber Manufacturing, Energy, Allied 

Industrial and Service Workers International Union, 363 

NLRB No. 194 (2016) (requiring reinstatement of picketer 

who called out: “Did you bring enough KFC for everybody?” 

and “Hey, anybody smell that? I smell fried chicken and 

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watermelon,” in reference to African-American replacement 

workers). 

Nothing in the Board’s decisions has offered any 

plausible justification, and I can conceive of none, for 

concluding that the rights of workers—all workers—are 

protected by turning picket lines into free zones for sexually 

or racially abusive and demeaning conduct. Instead, the 

Board’s rulings dismiss such abhorrent behavior as 

“unpleasantries” that are just part and parcel of the 

contentious environment and heated language that ordinarily 

accompany strike activity. Gloversville, 297 NLRB at 194 

(“[N]onstriking employees and replacement workers must be 

prepared to contend with some unpleasantries in a strike 

situation. * * * [The striker’s] conduct, while censurable, is 

within the bounds of permissible picket line misconduct[.]”); 

see also Airo Die Casting, Inc., 347 NLRB at 812 (“[The 

striker’s] conduct on the picket line, the use of obscene 

language and gestures and a racial slur, standing alone 

without any threats or violence, did not rise to the level where 

he forfeited the protection of the Act.”); Polynesian 

Hospitality Tours, 297 NLRB 228, 252 (1989) (“While one 

can sympathize with [the female manager] because of the 

rudeness and vulgarity demonstrated toward her, * * * [none 

of the activity] ever reached the level that it would * * * even 

come close to removing an employee from the protection of 

the Act * * * [since no misconduct] went beyond the use of 

epithets, vulgar words, profanity, vulgar gestures, and the 

like.”).

There is no question that Emily Post rules do not apply to 

a strike. “[S]ome types of impulsive behavior must have been 

within the contemplation of Congress when it provided for the 

right to strike.” Allied Indus. Workers, AFL-CIO Local Union 

No. 289, 476 F.2d 868, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Accordingly, 

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when looking at the “rough and tumble of an economic 

strike,” NMC Finishing v. NLRB, 101 F.3d 528, 531 (8th Cir. 

1996), the Board can quite appropriately make allowance for 

“a trivial rough incident,” Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. 

Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 293 (1941), and 

can certainly leave room for the “normal outgrowths of the 

intense feelings developed on picket lines,” NLRB v. Wichita 

Television Corp., 277 F.2d 579, 585 (10th Cir. 1960). See 

also Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat’l Ass’n of Letter 

Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 272–273 (1974) (noting that 

federal labor policies “favor[] uninhibited, robust, and wideopen debate in labor disputes,” and that “freewheeling use of 

the written and spoken word * * * has been expressly fostered 

by Congress and approved by the [Board]”); id. at 283 

(“Federal law gives a union license to use intemperate, 

abusive, or insulting language without fear of restraint or 

penalty if it believes such rhetoric to be an effective means to 

make its point.”).

So giving strikers a pass on zealous expressions of 

frustration and discontent makes sense. Heated words and 

insults? Understandable. Rowdy and raucous behavior? 

Sure, within lawful bounds. But conduct of a sexually or 

racially demeaning and degrading nature is categorically 

different. Calling a female co-worker a “whore” or exposing 

one’s genitals to her is not even remotely a “normal 

outgrowth[]” of strike-related emotions. In what possible way 

does propositioning her for sex advance any legitimate strikerelated message? And how on earth can calling an AfricanAmerican worker “nigger” be a tolerated mode of 

communicating worker grievances? 

Such language and behavior have nothing to do with 

attempted persuasion about the striker’s cause. Nor do they 

convey any message about workplace injustices suffered, 

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wrongs inflicted, employer mistreatment, managerial 

indifference, the causes of employee frustration and anger, or 

anything at all of relevance about working conditions or 

worker complaints. Indeed, such behavior is flatly forbidden 

in every other corner of the workplace because it is 

dangerously wrong and breathes new life into economically

suffocating and dehumanizing discrimination that we have 

labored for generations to eliminate. Brushing that same 

behavior off when it occurs during a strike simply legitimates 

the entirely illegitimate, and it signals that, when push comes 

to shove, discriminatory and degrading stereotypes can still be 

a legitimate weapon in economic disputes. 

Tellingly (and thankfully), it seems to be an isolated few 

who undertake such abusive behavior. The overwhelming 

majority of those involved in strikes are able to effectively 

communicate their grievances and viewpoints without resort 

to racial- or gender-based attacks. That just proves that there 

is no legitimate communicative or organizational role for such 

misconduct. 

And by the way, the Board is supposed to protect the 

rights of all employees covered by the Act. See Rights We 

Protect, National Labor Relations Board, 

https://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect (last visited Aug. 17, 

2016) (“The National Labor Relations Board protects the 

rights of most private-sector employees to join together, with 

or without a union, to improve their wages and working 

conditions.”). Holding that such toxic behavior is a routine 

part of strikes signals to women and minorities both in the 

union and out that they are still not truly equals in the 

workplace or union hall. For when the most important 

labor/management battles arise and when the economic 

livelihood of the employer and the employees is on the line, 

the Board’s decisions say that racial and misogynistic 

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epithets, degrading behavior, and race- and gender-based 

vilification are once again fair game.

We have cautioned the Board before against assuming 

that “the use of abusive language, vulgar expletives, and 

racial epithets” between employees “is part and parcel of the 

vigorous exchange that often accompanies labor relations.” 

Adtranz ABB Daimler-Benz Transp., N.A., Inc. v. NLRB, 253 

F.3d 19, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). It is both “preposterous” and insulting to ensconce 

into labor law the assumption that “employees are incapable 

of organizing a union or exercising their other statutory rights 

under the National Labor Relations Act without resort to 

abusive or threatening language” targeted at a person’s gender 

or race. Id. at 26; see also id. (expressing concern about a 

Board decision indicating that “it is perfectly acceptable to 

use the most offensive and derogatory racial or sexual 

epithets, so long as those using such language are engaged in 

union organizing or efforts to vindicate protected labor 

activity”). 

In this case, the Board also reasoned that crotch-grabbing 

must be condoned because it was not a threat to the female 

employee that Williamson targeted. Maybe not in this 

instance given the absence of record evidence documenting an 

adverse effect on Walters. But the problem is that the Board’s 

decisions seem in too many cases to answer that question 

from the perpetrator’s perspective, oblivious to the dark 

history such words and actions have had in the workplace 

(and elsewhere). See, e.g., Airo Die Casting, Inc., 347 NLRB 

at 812 (finding testimony from management officials about 

the reaction of a security guard targeted with a racial slur—

“visibly shaken and offended”—to be “somewhat 

exaggerated” because “anyone examining the actual [video] 

recording of [the striker’s] activity would be hard pressed to 

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see any threatening or aggressive conduct”); Polynesian 

Hospitality Tours, 297 NLRB at 252 (“[W]hile * * * one must 

concede that employees’ conduct was somewhat rude and 

vulgar, it seems scarcely surprising * * * that some of them 

became angry at [the manager], referred to her as a ‘bitch,’ 

and that some of them yelled that she should be fired[.] * * * 

[T]he actions of the employees in this case [are] valid protests 

of a supervisor’s illegal actions against them.”); Cooper Tire 

& Rubber Co., 363 NLRB No. 194 (finding that, “even 

though [the picketer’s] statements were offensive and racist, 

and certainly may have been disrespectful to the dignity and 

feelings of African-American replacement workers, there is 

no evidence to establish that the statements contained overt or 

implied threats, that they coerced or intimidated employees in 

the exercise of their rights protected under the Act, or that 

they raised a reasonable likelihood of an imminent physical 

confrontation”). 

Nor do the Board’s decisions grapple with the enduring 

effects in the workplace of such noxious language and 

behavior. The assumption that such gender- and race-based 

attacks can be contained to the picket line blinks reality. It 

will often be quite hard for a woman or minority who has 

been on the receiving end of a spew of gender or racial 

epithets—who has seen the darkest thoughts of a co-worker 

revealed in a deliberately humiliating tirade—to feel truly 

equal or safe working alongside that employee again. Racism 

and sexism in the workplace is a poison, the effects of which 

can continue long after the specific action ends. Cf. Meritor 

Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (“‘One can 

readily envision working environments so heavily polluted 

with discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional 

psychological stability of minority group workers[.]’”) 

(quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), 

cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972)); Harris v. Forklift Sys., 

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510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993) (“A discriminatorily abusive work 

environment, even one that does not seriously affect 

employees’ psychological well-being, can and often will 

detract from employees’ job performance, discourage 

employees from remaining on the job, or keep them from 

advancing their careers.”). 

Accordingly, if the Board’s decisions insist on letting the 

camel’s nose of racial and gender discrimination into the 

work environment, the Board should also think long and hard 

about measuring the “threats” associated with such sexually 

or racially degrading behavior from the perspective of a 

reasonable person in the target’s position, and how nigh 

impossible it is to cabin racism’s and sexism’s pernicious 

effects. Cf. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 

U.S. 75, 81 (1998) (Under Title VII, “the objective severity of 

harassment should be judged from the perspective of a 

reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, considering ‘all 

the circumstances.’”) (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 23). 

To be sure, employees’ exercise of their statutory rights 

to oppose employer practices must be vigorously protected, 

and ample room must be left for powerful and passionate 

expressions of views in the heated context of a strike. But 

Board decisions’ repeated forbearance of sexually and racially 

degrading conduct in service of that admirable goal goes too 

far. After all, the Board is a component of the same United 

States Government that has fought for decades to root 

discrimination out of the workplace. Subjecting co-workers 

and others to abusive treatment that is targeted to their gender, 

race, or ethnicity is not and should not be a natural byproduct 

of contentious labor disputes, and it certainly should not be 

accepted by an arm of the federal government. It is 2016, and 

“boys will be boys” should be just as forbidden on the picket 

line as it is on the assembly line. 

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