Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00314/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00314-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Craig Apker
Respondent
Gary Ronald Warren
Petitioner

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Gary Ronald Warren, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Craig Apker,

Respondent.

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No. CV-12-314-TUC-JGZ (BGM)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

(AMENDED )

Currently pending before the Court is Petitioner Gary Ronald Warren’s pro se Petition

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in Federal Custody

(“Petition”) (Doc. 1). Respondent Apker has filed his Return and Answer to Order to Show

Cause Why Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Should Not Be Granted (“Response”) (Doc.

16), and Petitioner filed his reply (Doc. 20). Petitioner has also filed a Motion by Petitioner

That This District Court Now Reach the Merits of This Habeas Corpus – 28 U.S.C. 2241

Now Pending a District Court Decision for Twenty-Two Months Since Filed April 25, 2012

(Doc. 25) and a Motion for Judicial Notice and Acknowledgement [sic] (Doc. 26). Pursuant

to Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure, this matter was referred to

Magistrate Judge Macdonald for Report and Recommendation. The Magistrate Judge

recommends that the District Court deny the Petition (Doc. 1). The Magistrate Judge further

recommends that the District Court deny as moot Petitioner’s Motion by Petitioner That This

District Court Now Reach the Merits of This Habeas Corpus – 28 U.S.C. 2241 Now Pending

a District Court Decision for Twenty-Two Months Since Filed April 25, 2012 (Doc. 25) and

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deny Petitioner’s Motion for Judicial Notice and Acknowledgement [sic] (Doc. 26)

I. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner is currently incarcerated at the United States Penitentiary Tucson (“USP

Tucson”) in Tucson, Arizona. See Petition (Doc. 1). On January 7, 1976, the United States

District Court, Eastern District of California, sentenced Petitioner to a fifteen (15) year term

for bank robbery (CR S-75-306), as well as a second fifteen (15) year term for bank robbery

(CR S-75-598) and a ten (10) year consecutive term for bank robbery (CR S-75-588).

Response (Doc. 16), Farrar Decl. (Exh. “A”) ¶ 3 & USDC, E.D. Cal. Judgment &

Commitment (“J & C”) Orders (Attach. “1”). The total term for this initial sentencing is

forty (40) years. Id. On December 2, 1976, the United States District Court, Eastern District

of Missouri sentenced Petitioner to a ten (10) year term for bank robbery and incidental

crimes (S-6-276CR) to be served consecutively to his initial forty (40) year sentence. Id.,

Exh. “A” ¶ 4 & USDC, E.D. Mo., J & C (Attach. “2”). On February 16, 1977, the United

States District Court, Central District of California, sentenced Petitioner to a four (4) year

term for bank robbery (CR-76-1050), and ordered the term to be served “consecutive to all

Federal sentences now being served.” Id., Exh. “A” ¶ 5 & USDC, C.D. Cal., J & C (Attach.

“3”). On June 20, 1977, the United States District Court, Southern District of West Virginia,

sentenced Petitioner to a twenty (20) year term for bank robbery and incidental crimes (CR

26-108), and ordered the sentence “to run concurrently with the sentence the defendant is

now serving.” Id., Exh. “A” ¶ 6 & USDC, S.D. W.Va. J & C Order (Attach. “4”). On

November 15, 1978, the United States District Court, Middle District of Florida, sentenced

Petitioner to a five (5) year term for escape (78-8-Cr-J-M), and ordered the sentence to “run

consecutively to the sentences the defendant is now serving.” Response (Doc. 16), Exh. “A”

¶ 7 & USDC, M.D. Fla., J & C (Attach. “5”). Additionally, on November 15, 1978, the court

sentenced Petitioner to a twenty (20) year term for bank robbery and incidental crimes (78-9-

Cr-J-M), and ordered that this sentence “shall run consecutively to the sentence imposed [on]

this date in Case No. 78-8-Cr-J-M, and to any other sentences the defendant is now serving.”

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1

The 89-year term is the number of years that Petitioner was sentenced to serve

consecutively, any additional years that were ordered to be served concurrently are not included in

this total.

2

This page number reflects the page displayed on the Sentence Monitoring Computation Data

printout. In the CM/ECF docket, the page is found at Doc. 16-1 at 51.

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Id. On December 10, 1979, the District Court, Western District of Virginia, sentenced

Petitioner to a twenty (20) year term for bank robbery and use of a firearm in the commission

of a felony (78-00004-C), directing that fifteen (15) years of the sentence “to run

concurrent[ly] to any sentence now being served[,] [and] [t]he remaining 5 years . . . to run

consecutive[ly] to any sentence now being served.” Id., Exh. “A” ¶ 8 & USDC, W.D. Va.

J & C Orders (Attach. “6”). On January 8, 1988, the United States District Court, District

of Oregon sentenced Petitioner to a twenty (20) year term for bank robbery (CR37-60033),

directing that the sentence be served “concurrently with the sentence presently being

served[.]” Id., Exh. “A” ¶ 9 & USDC, D. Ore., J & C (Attach. “7”). On December 23, 1988,

the United States District Court, District of Oregon, sentenced Petitioner to a fifteen (15) year

term for bank robbery (CR 88-207-01), “to be served concurrently with the sentence imposed

in CR37-60033.” Id., Exh. “A” ¶ 10, USDC, D. Ore., Judgment (Attach. “8”). On January

24, 1989, the United States District Court, Western District of Washington, sentenced

Petitioner to a five (5) year term for escape (CR87-193C), to run consecutively “to any and

all other sentences being served.” Id., Exh. “A” ¶ 11, USDC, D. Wa. J & C (Attach. “9”).

The Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) applied 219 days of presentence credit to Petitioner’s

sentence, and 405 days of inoperative time was applied for Petitioner’s four (4) instances of

escape. Response, Exh. “A” ¶ 12. Petitioner’s eligibility date was determined to be April

12, 1986 – one-third of the regular adult maximum sentence of thirty (30) years (equaling ten

(10) years), plus any inoperative time (405 days), minus any presentence time (219). Id.,

Exh. “A” ¶ 13. Petitioner’s two-thirds date is calculated as two-thirds of the entire 89-year

term, which is November 8, 2035.1

 Id., Exh. “A” ¶ 14, Sentence Monitoring Comp. Data

(Exh. “B”) at 11.2

 Petitioner’s full term date is July 11, 2065, determined by adding the

entire 89-year term to the date computation began, January 7, 1976, then subtracting

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presentence time credit of 219 days, and adding the 405 days of inoperative time. Id., Exh.

“A” ¶ 15, Exh. B. at 11.

On February 18, 1987, Petitioner received his initial parole hearing. Response (Doc.

16), Initial Hr’g Summ. (Exh. “C”). The United States Parole Commission (the

“Commission”) rated his severity category a seven (7), and his salient factor score a one (1),

with a guideline range of 276-400 months. Id. The hearing examiner recommended that

Petitioner be released after 276 months or twenty-three (23) years. Id. A second examiner

recommended a continuance for a fifteen (15) year reconsideration hearing in February 2002.

Id. The Commission continued Petitioner’s sentence “to a presumptive parole after the

service of 300 months, April 10, 2001, with special mental health aftercare condition.”

Response (Doc. 16), Notice of Action 3/12/1987 (Exh. “D”) at 1. Petitioner’s aggregate

guideline range was found to be 276-400 months to be served. Id. A statutory interim

hearing was scheduled for February 1989. Id.

On October 31, 1989, a statutory interim hearing was held. Response (Doc. 16), Hr’g

Summ. (Exh. “F”) at 1. Between the initial hearing and this statutory interim hearing,

Petitioner escaped from prison and was involved in a bank robbery. Id. Accordingly, the

panel recommended continuance to a fifteen year reconsideration hearing in November 2004,

and that Petitioner “not ever be returned to the community because subject presents a threat

to the public welfare and to release him earlier than statutorily required would promote

disrespect for the paroling process.” Id. at 2. The Commission continued the matter to a

fifteen (15) year reconsideration hearing in November 2004. Response (Doc. 16), Notice of

Action 11/20/1989 (Exh. “G”) at 1. The Commission further noted that Petitioner’s

aggregate guideline range was to be increased by 136-176 months added to the original

presumptive parole date of April 10, 2001, plus the time Petitioner was on escape status. Id.

On September 10, 1991, a prehearing assessment was conducted, noting “[a] decision

. . . to go above the guidelines because of the history of aggressive behavior and the fact that

[Petitioner] was serving terms for bank robbery and escape at the time of the instant

behavior.” Response (Doc. 16), SIH/Rescission Prehr’g Assessment (Exh. “E”) at 1. The

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prehearing assessment also noted an additional instance of misconduct within the institution.

Id. On October 22, 1991, Petitioner received a statutory interim hearing. Response (Doc.

16), Review Summ. 10/22/1991 (Exh. “H”). The hearing examiner recommended no change

in Petitioner’s fifteen (15) year reconsideration hearing in November 2004. Id. The

Commission ordered that there would be no change in the continuance to a fifteen (15) year

reconsideration hearing in November 2004. Response (Doc. 16), Notice of Action 11/5/1991

(Exh. “I”). Additionally, Petitioner was scheduled for a statutory interim hearing during

October 1993. Id.

On January 16, 1997, Petitioner’s prehearing assessment indicated that following to

Petitioner’s November 1991 statutory interim hearing, Petitioner had waived subsequent

statutory interim hearings. Response (Doc. 16) Prehearing Assessment 1/16/1997 (Exh. “J”).

On February 11, 1997, Petitioner received a statutory interim hearing/review hearing.

Response (Doc. 16), SIH/Review Hr’g Summ. (Exh. “K”). The hearing examiner found two

incidents of misconduct since his previous statutory interim hearing. Id. at 1-2. The

examiner recommended no changes, and a continuance to Petitioner’s fifteen (15) year

reconsideration hearing in November 2004. Id. at 3. The examiner noted that Petitioner’s

aggregate guideline range should also be increased 0-4 months due to the institutional

misconduct. Id. Accordingly, the Commission ordered no change in continuance to a 15

year reconsideration hearing in November 2004. Response (Doc. 16), Notice of Action

3/3/1997 (Exh. “L”). Additionally, the Commission ordered a 0-4 months increase in

Petitioner’s aggregate guideline range, and requested that BOP provide a current

psychiatric/psychological report to the Commission prior to the next statutory interim

hearing, which it scheduled for February 1999. Id.

On September 13, 2006, Petitioner received a fifteen (15) year reconsideration

hearing. Response (Doc. 16), Hr’g Summ. 9/13/2006 (Exh. “N”). The Commission ordered

a continuance to a fifteen (15) year reconsideration hearing in September 2021. Response

(Doc. 16), Notice of Action 10/18/2006 (Exh. “O”). The Commission assessed Petitioner’s

severity category, salient factor score and guideline ranges in light of his criminal history,

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institutional offenses, and multiple escapes. Id. The Commission calculated Petitioner’s

aggregate guideline range as 412-582 months to be served. Id. Petitioner appealed the

Commission’s ruling, and the National Appeals Board (“NAB”) affirmed. Response (Doc.

16), Notice of Action on Appeal 7/23/2007 (Exh. “P”). Although the NAB erroneously

references “the hearing examiner who presided at your revocation hearing[,]” the issues

regarding the hearing examiners recommendation and Petitioner’s eligibility for sex offender

treatment arose from Petitioner’s fifteen (15) year reconsideration hearing in September

2006. See id; Response (Doc. 16), Exhs. “N” & “O”. In affirming the Commission’s

actions, the NAB found that “because [Petitioner is] a Category Seven offender who

committed multiple robberies, escaped from secure custody four times, and committed bank

robbery while in escape status, the public safety precludes a release date at this time.”

Response (Doc. 16), Exh. “P.” The NAB further found “that the public safety outweighs

[Petitioner’s] need to qualify for pre-release sex offender treatment.” Id.

On January 4, 2011, Petitioner received a statutory interim hearing. Response (Doc.

16), Hr’g Summ. 1/4/2011 (Exh. “Q”). The hearing examiner recommended no change in

Petitioner’s fifteen (15) year reconsideration hearing date of September 2021. Id. at 2. The

hearing examiner cited Petitioner’s criminal history, including four escapes from

incarceration, and little program participation as a basis for his recommendation. Id. The

Commission ordered no change in Petitioner’s fifteen (15) year reconsideration date of

September 2021. Response (Doc. 16), Notice of Action 2/14/2011 (Exh. “R”). The

Commission scheduled Petitioner’s next statutory interim hearing during January 2013. Id.

Petitioner appealed the Commission’s decision. Petition (Doc. 1), Appeal 4/6/2011.

Petitioner challenged the aggregation of his sentences; the Commission’s and/or BOP’s

alleged failure to parole him at the expiration of his two-thirds date calculated solely from

his initial forty (40) year sentence; the Commission’s alleged failure to find him ineligible

for parole prior to May 2009, or alternatively July 2002, in violation of his due process

rights; that the Commission’s jurisdiction expired on November 1, 2002; the alleged denial

of interim hearings; the alleged denial of ever qualifying for parole; alleged illegal use of the

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Federal Savings Clause to extend the life of the Commission; and the alleged failure of the

Director of BOP and the Commission to uphold any of the laws cited by Petitioner. Id. The

NAB stated that Petitioner had been convicted “solely under the U.S. Code.” Response

(Doc. 16), Not. of Action on Appeal 5/4/2012 (Exh. “S”). Accordingly, Petitioner is

“considered for parole on the basis of a single parole eligibility and mandatory release date.”

Id. The NAB directed Petitioner to address any disputes regarding his parole eligibility date

or mandatory release date “with the Records Office which will determine the validity of [his]

claims and notify the Commission of any modification.” Id. The NAB further found

Petitioner’s jurisdictional argument without merit, and stated “the Commission has lawfully

maintained jurisdiction over [him].” Id. The NAB affirmed the Commission’s decision. Id.

On April 25, 2012, Petitioner filed a Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for a Writ of

Habeas Corpus by a Person in Federal Custody (Doc. 1). Petitioner challenges 1) the

aggregation of his sentences; 2) the calculation of his “two-thirds mandatory good time

release date” alleging violation of his due process and equal protection rights (mandatory

parole); 3) the alleged violation of his due process and equal protection rights and the Ex Post

Facto clause of the Constitution of the United States in the calculation of Petitioner’s

guideline dates (guideline date calculation); 4) the alleged violation of his due process and

equal protection rights in the Commission’s alleged failure to determine Petitioner’s

ineligibility for parole prior to his alleged “‘suitability’ date of July 2009” as required by 18

U.S.C. 4206(d); 5) the alleged violation of his due process and equal protection and rights

and the Ex Post Facto clause of the Constitution of the United States in the calculation of his

guideline range and the Commission’s alleged failure to make a finding of ineligibility before

the expiration thereof; 6) the alleged violation of his due process rights in the continued use

of the allegedly expired Commission; 7) the alleged violation of his due process and equal

protection and rights and the Ex Post Facto clause of the Constitution of the United States

based on the alleged expiration of 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4218(d) thereby prohibiting Petitioner

from correcting perceived violations of federal law; 8) the alleged violation of his due

process and equal protection rights based on the alleged expiration of 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-

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4218(d) and subsequent alleged prohibition of Petitioner from qualifying for parole; and 9)

the alleged violation of his Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights and the Ex Post Facto clause

of the Constitution of the United States based upon the allegedly “illegal[] use[] by

Congress” of the Federal Savings Clause to extend the life of the Commission. See Petition

(Doc. 1).

II. ANALYSIS

A. Jurisdiction

“Federal courts are always ‘under an independent obligation to examine their own

jurisdiction,’ . . . and a federal court may not entertain an action over which it has no

jurisdiction.” Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting FW/PBS,

Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231, 110 S.Ct. 596, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990), overruled

in part on other grounds by City of Littleton, Colo. v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., 541 U.S. 774

(2004)). “Generally, motions to contest the legality of a sentence must be filed under § 2255

in the sentencing court, while petitions that challenge the manner, location, or conditions of

a sentence’s execution must be brought pursuant to § 2241 in the custodial court.” Id. at 864.

Therefore, a proper characterization of the petition is necessary to a determination of

jurisdiction. Id.

Here, Petitioner does not claim that the sentencing court imposed an illegal sentence,

rather he seeks relief with respect to the calculation of his parole eligibility and Commission

findings regarding his suitability for parole while incarcerated at a federal facility. As such,

Petitioner is challenging the manner, location or condition of the execution of his sentence.

See e.g., United States v. Saeteurn, 504 F.3d 1175, 1180 n. 12 (9th Cir. 2007) (“a habeas

petition brought pursuant to § 2241 is sufficient to safeguard a prisoner’s right to be

considered eligible for early release.”); Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 858 (9th Cir. 2003)

(“a prisoner may seek a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for ‘expungement of

a disciplinary finding from his record if expungement is likely to accelerate the prisoner’s

eligibility of parole.’”) (quoting Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1269 (9th Cir. 1989));

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Tucker v. Carlson, 925 F.2d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1991) (a prisoner’s challenge to the “manner

in which his sentence was executed . . . [is] maintainable only in a petition for habeas corpus

filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.”); Weinstein v. U.S. Parole Comm’n., 902 F.2d 1451,

1452 (9th Cir. 1990) (“The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to

review a claim by a federal prisoner challenging a decision of the United States Parole

Commission.”); Rogers v. United States, 180 F.3d 349 (1st Cir. 1999) (section 2241 petition

is appropriate vehicle to challenge the correctness of a jail-time credit determination, once

administrative remedies have been exhausted). Such a challenge must be brought pursuant

to § 2241 in the custodial court. At the time of filing the Petition, Petitioner was incarcerated

at USP – Tucson in Arizona. Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction over this matter.

Francis v. Rison, 894 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1990).

B. Exhaustion

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated:

[28 U.S.C. § 2241] does not specifically require petitioners to exhaust direct appeals

before filing petitions for habeas corpus. [Footnote omitted.] However, we require,

as a prudential matter, that habeas petitioners exhaust available judicial and

administrative remedies before seeking relief under § 2241.

Castro-Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds,

Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 126 S.Ct. 2422, 165 L.Ed.2d 323 (2006). “The

requirement that federal prisoners exhaust administrative remedies before filing a habeas

corpus petition was judicially created; it is not a statutory requirement.” Brown v. Rison, 895

F.2d 533, 535 (9th Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds by Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 54-

55, 115 S.Ct. 2021, 2023-24, 132 L.Ed.2d 46 (1995). “Nevertheless, ‘[p]rudential limits like

jurisdictional limits and limits on venue, are ordinarily not optional.’” Puga v. Chertoff, 488

F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007) (alterations in original) (quotingCastro-Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d

1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales,

548 U.S. 30, 126 S.Ct. 2422, 165 L.Ed.2d 323 (2006)).

“Courts may require prudential exhaustion if ‘(1) agency expertise makes agency

consideration necessary to generate a proper record and reach a proper decision; (2)

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relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative

scheme; and (3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct is own mistakes

and to preclude the need for judicial review.’” Id. (quoting Noriega-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 335

F.3d 874, 881 (9th Cir. 2003). “When a petitioner does not exhaust administrative remedies,

a district court ordinarily should either dismiss the petition without prejudice or stay the

proceedings until the petitioner has exhausted remedies, unless exhaustion is excused.”

Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). Exhaustion

may be excused if pursuing an administrative remedy would be futile. Fraley v. United

States Bureau of Prisons, 1 F.3d 924, 925 (9th Cir. 1993).

If a prisoner is unable to obtain an administrative remedy because of his failure to

appeal in a timely manner, then the petitioner has procedurally defaulted his habeas corpus

claim. See Nigro v. Sullivan, 40 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Francis, 894 F.2d at

354; Martinez, 804 F.2d at 571). If a claim is procedurally defaulted, the court may require

the petitioner to demonstrate cause for the procedural default and actual prejudice from the

alleged constitutional violation. See Francis, 894 F.2d at 355 (suggesting that the cause and

prejudice test is the appropriate test); Murray, 477 U.S. at 492 (cause and prejudice test

applied to procedural defaults on appeal); Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 800 F.2d

905, 906-08 (9th Cir.1986) (cause and prejudice test applied to pro se litigants).

Here, Respondent avers that Petitioner has exhausted his administrative remedies.

Response (Doc. 16), Farrar Decl. (Exh. “A”) ¶ 16. The record reflects that Petitioner has

properly filed appeals regarding the Commission’s actions. Accordingly, the Court

concludes that Petitioner has exhausted his administrative remedies.

C. Successive Petition

“A ‘successive petition” raises grounds identical to those raised and rejected on the

merits on a prior petition.” Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 445 n. 6, 106 S.Ct. 2616,

2622 n. 6, 91 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986) (citing Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 15-17, 83

S.Ct. 1068, 1077-78, 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963)); See also Campbell v. Blodgett, 997 F.2d 512,

515-516 (9th Cir. 1992) (“A claim is successive if it was raised in an earlier petition, or if it

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fails to raise a ground for relief that is new or different than a claim raised in an earlier

petition and previously determined on the merits.”). Section 2244(a), 28 U.S.C., provides:

No circuit or district judge shall be required to entertain an application for a

writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the detention of a person pursuant to a

judgment of a court in the United States if it appears that the legality of such

detention has been determined by a judge or court of the United States on a

prior application for a writ of habeas corpus, except as provided in section

2255.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(a). “When a district court denies consideration of the merits of a petition

on the ground that it is abusive or successive, [the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals will]

review for abuse of discretion.” Campbell, 997 F.2d at 516.

Petitioner filed a prior petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241

in the District of Colorado. See Petition (Doc. 1), Warren v. Ashcroft, No. 04-1020 (D.C.

No. 02-MK-2125), (10th Cir., Dec. 21, 2004). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals

considered “whether 18 U.S.C. § 4206(d) (repealed) applies to all of the sentences imposed

on petitioner between 1976 and 1989, including those imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a)(2)

(repealed) and 18 U.S.C. § 4205(b)(2) (repealed).” Id. The court “[a]gree[ed] with the

district court that § 4206(d) does apply to all of [Petitioner’s] sentences” and that there was

no violation “of the principles of ex post facto and double jeopardy . . . [or] his rights to due

process and equal protection.” Id. Accordingly, this Court finds that, to the extent that

Petitioner’s arguments overlap, the legality of Petitioner's detention has been determined by

a judge or court of the United States on a prior application for a writ of habeas corpus.

Nevertheless, because the Court does not have the previously filed petition to fully assess the

overlap, it will decide the current Petition on the merits.

D. Aggregation of Sentences

Petitioner asserts that the Commission improperly aggregated his sentences. Petition

(Doc. 1) at 10. Petitioner argues that because 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a)(2) (repealed) applies to

his initial forty-year sentence, and 18 U.S.C. § 4205(a) & (b)(2) (repealed) apply to the

subsequent forty-nine years of sentences, the Commission is required to treat these as a

“mixed sentence” for purposes of determining his mandatory two-thirds parole release date.

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Id. at 33.

18 U.S.C. § 4205(b) “is simply a 1976 recodification of 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a)(2).”

Bowles v. United States, 49 Fed. Appx. 768, 2002 WL 31248606 (10th Cir. (Colo.)); See also

Brady v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 600 F.2d 234, 235 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing 18 U.S.C.§

4205(b)(2) (formerly 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a)(2))); United States v. Whitley, 473 F.Supp. 23, 24-

25 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (citing § 4208(a) (now § 4205(b)), 18 U.S.C.). When a prisoner

receives multiple terms of imprisonment, the BOP aggregates those sentences for

administrative purposes. See 18 U.S.C. § 4161 (enacted June 25, 1948, c. 645, 62 Stat. 853;

June 29, 1951, c. 176, 65 Stat. 98; Pub.L. 86-259, Sept. 14, 1959, 73 Stat. 546; Pub.L.

87-665, Sept. 19, 1962, 76 Stat. 552; repealed by P.L. 98-473, Title II, § 218(a)(4), Oct. 12,

1984, 98 Stat. 2027) (“When two or more consecutive sentences are to be served, the

aggregate of the several sentences shall be the basis upon which the deduction shall be

computed.”); C.F.R. § 2.5 (“multiple sentences are aggregated by the Bureau of Prisons

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 4161 and 4205, such sentences are treated as a single aggregate

sentence for the purpose of every action taken by the Commission pursuant to these rules,

and the prisoner has a single parole eligibility date as determined by the Bureau of Prisons.”);

18 U.S.C. § 3584(c) (enacted by Pub. L. 98-473, Title II, § 212(a)(2), Oct. 12, 1984, 98 Stat.

2000) (“Multiple terms of imprisonment ordered to run consecutively or concurrently shall

be treated for administrative purposes as a single, aggregate term of imprisonment.”).

Here, Petitioner was sentenced to serve eighty-nine (89) years consecutively.

Petitioner improperly refers to his aggregate sentence as a “mixed sentence.” All of his

sentences occurred in the federal system, as such the aggregate is not a “mixed sentence.”

Moreover, the distinction that Petitioner attempts to make between 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a)

(1958) and 18 U.S.C. § 4205 (1976) does not exist. See Bowles v. United States, 49 Fed.

Appx. 768, 2002 WL 31248606 (10th Cir. (Colo.)) (18 U.S.C. § 4205(b) “is simply a 1976

recodification of 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a)(2).”); See also Brady v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 600 F.2d

234, 235 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing 18 U.S.C.§ 4205(b)(2) (formerly 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a)(2)));

United States v. Whitley, 473 F.Supp. 23, 24-25 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (citing § 4208(a) (now

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§ 4205(b)), 18 U.S.C.). Accordingly, BOP correctly calculated Petitioner’s aggregate

sentence of eighty-nine (89) years. Further, the earliest date that Petitioner could then be

eligible for parole was April 12, 1986. Response (Doc. 16), Exh. “A” ¶ 13 (one-third of the

regular adult maximum sentence of thirty (30) years (equaling ten (10) years), plus any

inoperative time (405 days), minus any presentence time (219)).

E. Mandatory Parole

Petitioner alleges that the Commission failed to release him “at the expiration of [his]

two-thirds mandatory good time release date of February 2003.” Petition (Doc. 1) at 34.

Based upon this alleged failure, Petitioner alleges violations of his due process and equal

protection rights. Id. at 11, 34.

Petitioner’s argument is based solely on the incorrect assumption that his entire 89

year sentence was improperly aggregated. Petitioner believes that he should have been

entitled to parole in February 2003. As discussed, supra, BOP properly aggregated

Petitioner’s consecutive sentences. As such, Petitioner’s full term date is July 11, 2065,

determined by adding the entire 89-year term to the date computation began, January 7, 1976,

then subtracting presentence time credit of 219 days, and adding the 405 days of inoperative

time. Id., Exh. “A” ¶ 15, Exh. B. at 11. Petitioner’s two-thirds date is calculated as twothirds of the entire 89-year term, which is November 8, 2035. Id., Exh. “A” ¶ 14, Exh. “B”

at 11; see also Wyatt v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 191 F.3d 462, 1999 WL 691042, *1 (9th Cir.

1999) (“The Parole Commission acted within its statutory authority by concluding that the

aggregated sentence was also the proper term for determining parole eligibility[.]”).

Petitioner received his initial parole hearing on February 18, 1987. Response (Doc. 16), Exh.

“C”. Petitioner has not yet reached his two-thirds date. Therefore, Petitioner’s arguments

are without merit.

F. Guideline Date Calculation

Petitioner asserts violations of his due process and equal protection rights and the Ex

Post Facto clause of the Constitution of the United States. Petition (Doc. 1) at 12-12B, 35-

42. Petitioner believes that his range should be 312 to 412 months. Id. Petitioner’s

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argument is based upon the divided terms (forty (40) and forty-nine (49) years) that he

advocates for supra.

Petitioner’s argument is without merit. As previously discussed, BOP properly

aggregated Petitioner’s eighty-nine (89) year term. Accordingly, the guideline correct

guideline range is 412-582 months as calculated by the Commission. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.5

(Multiple sentences that are aggregated by the BOP are treated as a single sentence for every

action taken by the Commission.).

G. Ineligibility Determination

Petitioner argues that the Commission failed “to find that [he] was ineligible [for

parole] under the criteria of 1976 Title 18 U.S.C. 4206(d) . . . in violation of due process and

equal protection.” Petition (Doc. 1) at 42, 19-23B, 43-45. Petitioner continues to rely on two

separate sentences, as opposed to the single eighty-nine (89) year aggregate. See id.

Section 4206(d), 18 U.S.C., provides:

Any prisoner, serving a sentence of five years or longer, who is not earlier

released under this section or any other applicable provision of law, shall be

released on parole after having served two-thirds of each consecutive term or

terms, or after serving thirty years of each consecutive term or terms of more

than forty-five years including any life term, whichever is earlier: Provided,

however, That the Commission shall not release such prisoner if it determines

that he has seriously or frequently violated institution rules and regulations or

that there is a reasonable probability that he will commit any Federal, State, or

local time.

18 U.S.C. § 4206(d) (emphasis in original).

“It is undisputed that Petitioner is eligible for parole as of the date of April 12, 1986.”

Response (Doc. 16) at 11 n. 4. Furthermore, the Commission has held multiple statutory

interim hearings regarding Petitioner’s suitability for parole since his initial hearing on

February 18, 1987. See Response (Doc. 16), Exhs. “C,” “D,” “F,” “G,” “H,” “J,” “K,” “L,”

“N,” “O,” “Q,” & “R.” The Commission has ordered no change in Petitioner’s fifteen (15)

year reconsideration date of September 2021. Id. at Exh. “R.” Additionally, the Commission

has properly determined Petitioner’s one-third and two-thirds date, with a range of 412-582

months. Petitioner has not been incarcerated for 582 months. See Response (Doc. 16), Exh.

“Q.” As such, Petitioner’s claims are without merit.

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H. Commission Expiration

Petitioner argues that the Commission’s expiration on October 31, 2002 left it

“without any legal statutory authority over this prisoner’s confinement, beyond October 31,

2002, in absence of a parole release date, that was required prior to October 31, 2002[.]”

Petition (Doc. 1) at 24, 46. Petitioner further argues that his parole has never been

“continued to expiration.” Id. at 46. Respondent argues that Petitioner “was not guaranteed

release on November 1, 2002[,]” and “cannot show prejudice from the one-day interlude.”

Response (Doc. 16) at 13.

“The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, [(“SRA”)]

abolished the United States Parole Commission and repealed most of the preexisting

statutory framework governing parole of federal prisoners.” Stange v. U.S. Parole Comm’n,

875 F.2d 760, 761 (9th Cir. 1989). “The Act became effective on November 1, 1987.” Id.

(citations omitted). Congress provided, however, that the Commission would continue to

operate for five (5) years after the effective date of the SRA. Id. (citations omitted). Section

235(b)(3) of the SRA required the Commission to set final release dates, within the

applicable guideline range, for those still incarcerated after the five-year (5) period. 18

U.S.C. § 3551(b)(3). See id.; Feist v. Schultz, 2006 WL 657003, *3 (E.D. Cal.). “[J]ust

over thirty days [after enactment] later, Section 2(b)(2) of the Sentencing Act of 1987

amended Section 235(b)(3) to eliminate the requirement that the Parole Commission set a

parole date within the guideline range, effectively restoring the Parole Commission’s

discretion to what it was prior to the SRA.” Feist, 2006 WL 657003 at *3. “In 1990, the

Judicial Improvements Act extended the life of the Parole Commission for another five years

until October 31, 1997. Pub.L. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990).” Id. Congress, then passed

the Parole Commission Phaseout Act in 1996, extending the Commission until November

1, 2002. Pub.L. 104-232, 110 Stat. 3055 (1996); see Feist, 2006 WL 657003 at *3. “On

November 2, 2002, Congress passed the 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations

Act which extended the existence of the Parole Commission for another three years until

October 31, 2005. Pub.L. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758 (2002).” Feist, 2006 WL 657003 at *3.

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Subsequently, the life of the Commission has been further extended, most recently in 2013.

See United States Parole Commission Extension Act of 2013. Pub.L. No. 113-47, § 2, 127

Stat. 572.

Although “there was a one-day hiatus where the Parole Commission was apparently

in suspension[,]” Petitioner was not entitled to immediate release on November 1, 2002.

Feist, 2006 WL 657003 at *5. The “Amended Section 235(b)(3) required the Commission

to set a final release date but the Commission had discretion to set a date outside the

guidelines.” Id. This “subsection is a ‘‘winding up’’ provision’ designed to give the Parole

Commission a five-year transition period during which the Commission ‘should discharge

its final responsibilities toward those sentenced under the preexisting law.’” Stange, 875 F.2d

at 761-62 (citations omitted). As such, “the Commission [was only] to decide on a release

date for prisoners within its jurisdiction early enough to permit an appeal of the release date.”

Id. at 762. “Forcing the Commission to immediately set a parole release date for all the

prisoners in its jurisdiction is plainly not required by the statute, and would frustrate the

statute’s purpose of giving the Commission a five-year transition period to wind up its

business.” Id. The Commission’s March 3, 1997 Notice of Action (Response, (Doc. 16),

Exh. “L”) regarding Petitioner, increased his aggregate guideline range, requested a current

psychiatric/psychological report from BOP, and ordered no change in continuance to a fifteen

(15) year reconsideration hearing in November 2004. Accordingly, Petitioner could not have

a reasonable expectation that the release date would be anything other than the continuance

to a fifteen (15) year reconsideration hearing decision that he had previously received. See

id.

I. Commission Expiration and Periodic Review

Petitioner argues that the expiration of the Commission has denied him “the ability

to have any of the herein alleged federal law violations corrected, at a legal preiodic [sic]

review under 1976 Title 18 U.S.C. 4208(h), in violation of due process and equal protection

and Ex Post Facto of the constitution [sic].” Petition (Doc. 1) at 25, 47 (emphasis in

original). As discussed, supra, although the Commission may have technically been

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suspended for one day between November 1 and 2, 2002, Petitioner did not suffer any

prejudice. See Feist, 2006 WL 657003, *4 (no entitlement to immediate release based upon

one-day hiatus of the Commission).

Section 4208(h) provides, in relevant part, that “[i]n any case in which release on

parole is not granted, subsequent parole determination proceedings shall be held not less

frequently than . . . (2) twenty-four months in the case of a prisoner with a term or terms of

seven years or longer.” 18 U.S.C. § 4208(h) (repealed); see also 28 C.F.R. § 2.14(a)(1)(ii).

In order to receive such a hearing, the prisoner must submit an application. 28 C.F.R. §

2.11(a); see also, Brockett v. Rison, 15 F.3d 1083, 1994 WL 18974, *1 (9th Cir. (Cal.)). “A

prisoner who declines either to apply for or waive parole consideration is deemed to have

waived parole consideration.” 28 C.F.R. § 2.11(c); see also, Brockett, 15 F.3d 1083, 1994

WL 18974 at *1. Petitioner has consistently received statutory interim hearings. See

Response (Doc. 16), Exhs. “C,” “D,” “F,” “G,” “H,” “J,” “K,” “L,” “N,” “O,” “Q,” & “R.”

When he has not received hearings, the record reflects that he either waived them expressly,

or failed to file an application, and is therefore deemed to have waived the hearing. See

Response (Doc. 16), Exh. “M;” 28 C.F.R. § 2.11(c). Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim is

without merit.

J. Denial of Parole

Petitioner argues that the “[e]xpiration of the United States Parole Comm’n since

October 31, 2002 through to the present has, and does now, and in the future, denies this

prisoner the legal statutory mandatory right to ever qualify for parole and for a discharge

from parole under 1976 Title 18 U.S.C. 4201-4218(d), 4208(H) and 4210(E)[.]” Petition

(Doc. 1) at 25, 47 (emphasis in original). As discussed, supra, the Commission still exists,

and Petitioner has continued to receive statutory interim hearings and fifteen (15) year

reconsideration hearings. Moreover, “Congress has specifically rebutted the presumption of

reviewability of the Commission’s substantive decisions to grant or deny parole, and,

therefore, these decisions may not be reviewed[.]” Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539,

1545 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc).

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On January 4, 2011, Petitioner received a statutory interim hearing. Response (Doc.

16), Exh. “Q.” Based upon Petitioner’s criminal history, including four escapes from

incarceration, and little program participation, the Commission ordered no change in

Petitioner’s fifteen (15) year reconsideration date of September 2021. Response (Doc. 16),

Exhs. “Q” & “R.” In light of the Commission’s continued existence, and its ongoing

consideration of Petitioner’s suitability for parole, Petitioner’s claim is without merit.

K. Extension of Commission

Petitioner reiterates his previous arguments regarding the expiration of the

Commission on November 1, 2002, adding that such expiration was jurisdictional and

therefore any extensions of the Commission violated of his Constitutional rights. Petition

(Doc. 1) at 26-27, 48-52. Petitioner’s claims are without merit. As discussed, supra,

Congress has validly extended the life of the Parole Commission, most recently in 2013. See

United States Parole Commission Extension Act of 2013. Pub.L. No. 113-47, § 2, 127 Stat.

572. The establishment and extension of the Commission is a valid exercise of Congress’s

legislative power. See U.S. Const., Art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall

be vested in a Congress of the United States[.]”); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,

109 S.Ct. 647, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989) (historical review of criminal sentencing system);

United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 188, 99 S.Ct. 2235, 2242, 60 L.Ed.2d 805 (1979)

(“The decision as to when a lawfully sentenced defendant shall actually be released has been

committed by Congress, with certain limitations, to the discretion of the Parole

Commission.”). The Commission is validly in existence, and therefore, Petitioner’s claim

should be denied.

L. Motion for Judicial Notice

Petitioner seeks this Court to take judicial notice of an article from the Prison Legal

News. “The court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute

because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can

be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be

questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). The article refers to a California state prisoner and issues

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regarding his denial of parole by the California state parole board. Because the Court does

not rely upon the article, Petitioner’s motion should be denied. See Courtney v. Goltz, 736

F.3d 1152, 1155 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2013) (“The Courtneys . . . have asked that we take judicial

notice of this article. Because we do not rely upon the article, we deny the motion.”)

IV. RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons delineated above, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District

Judge enter an order:

(1) DENYING Petitioner’s Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for a Writ of Habeas

Corpus by a Person in Federal Custody (Doc. 1);

(2) DENYING AS MOOT Petitioner’s Motion by Petitioner That This District

Court Now Reach the Merits of This Habeas Corpus – 28 U.S.C. 2241 Now

Pending a District Court Decision for Twenty-Two Months Since Filed April

25, 2012 (Doc. 25);

(3) DENYING Petitioner’s Motion for Judicial Notice and Acknowledgement

[sic] (Doc. 26); and

(4) DECLINING to issue a certificate of appealability. Reasonable jurists would

not find the Court’s ruling debatable. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, any party may serve and file written objections within fourteen (14) days after

being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to

another party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 72(b)(2). No replies shall be filed unless leave is granted from the District Court. If

objections are filed, the parties should use the following case number: CV-12-314-TUCJGZ.

 . . .

 . . .

 . . .

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Failure to file timely objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate

Judge may result in waiver of the right of review. The Clerk of the Court shall send a copy

of this Report and Recommendation to all parties.

DATED this 6th day of March, 2014.

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