Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00556/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00556-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John Buehler
Defendant
City of Modesto
Defendant
Bob Evers
Defendant
Mike Harden
Defendant
Dodge Hendee
Defendant
Roger Lee
Defendant
Modesto Fire Department
Defendant
Modesto Police Department
Defendant
Joe Pimentel
Defendant
Tom Reuscher
Defendant
Dick Ridenour
Defendant
George Souliotes
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GEORGE SOULIOTES,

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

CITY OF MODESTO, et al.,

 Defendants.

1:15-cv-00556 LJO SKO

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS (Doc. 47)

I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT TO PARTIES AND COUNSEL

Judges in the Eastern District of California carry the heaviest caseloads in the nation, and this 

Court is unable to devote inordinate time and resources to individual cases and matters. Given the 

shortage of district judges and staff, this Court addresses only the arguments, evidence, and matters 

necessary to reach the decision in this order. The parties and counsel are encouraged to contact the 

offices of United States Senators Feinstein and Boxer to address this Court’s inability to accommodate 

the parties and this action. The parties are required to reconsider consent to conduct all further 

proceedings before a Magistrate Judge, whose schedules are far more realistic and accommodating to 

parties than that of U.S. Chief District Judge Lawrence J. O'Neill, who must prioritize criminal and older 

civil cases.

Civil trials set before Chief Judge O'Neill trail until he becomes available and are subject to 

suspension mid-trial to accommodate criminal matters. Civil trials are no longer reset to a later date if 

Chief Judge O'Neill is unavailable on the original date set for trial. Moreover, this Court's Fresno 

Division randomly and without advance notice reassigns civil actions to U.S. District Judges throughout 

Case 1:15-cv-00556-LJO-SKO Document 61 Filed 06/29/16 Page 1 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

2

the nation to serve as visiting judges. In the absence of Magistrate Judge consent, this action is subject to 

reassignment to a U.S. District Judge from outside the Eastern District of California.

II. PROCEDURAL POSTURE

Plaintiff George Souliotes was incarcerated in state prison for approximately sixteen years due to 

his alleged involvement with a fire that occurred at a residential property he owned and rented in 

Modesto, California. First Am. Compl. for Damages. (“FAC”), Doc. 42, ¶¶ 18, 44. Three people died in 

the fire. Id. ¶ 18. On April 12, 2013 his judgment and sentence were vacated pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254 on the basis that his defense counsel was ineffective at his trial. Id. ¶¶ 42-42; Finding and 

Recommendation Regarding Pet. For Writ of Habeas Corpus (“F & R’s”), Req. for Judicial Notice 

(“RJN”), Ex. E, Doc. 47-10, at 90-93; Order Adopting Finding and Recommendation with Edits Listed 

Below, RJN, Ex. F, Doc. 47-11.1 On July 2, 2013, Plaintiff entered a nolo contendre plea to three counts 

of involuntary manslaughter on the basis that he failed to ensure that the property had an operable smoke 

alarm. FAC ¶ 43. In exchange, the State dismissed pending arson and murder charges and agreed to 

Plaintiff’s immediate release. Id. 

On April 10, 2015 Plaintiff, acting pro se, initiated this civil rights suit against the City of 

Modesto, the Modesto Police Department (“MPD”), the Modesto Fire Department (“MFD”,) and MPD 

(?) officers Mike Harden, Roger Lee, Dick Ridenour, John Buehler, Dodge Hendee, Joe Pimentel, Bob 

Evers and Tom Reuscher. Compl. Doc. 1. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on November 13, 2015 

(Doc. 34). 2

On December 1, 2015, the parties stipulated to allow Plaintiff to file an amended complaint in 

lieu of a response to the motion to dismiss and to extend filing deadlines. Docs. 38 & 41. Plaintiff filed 

 

1 A federal court “may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those 

proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.” U.S. ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 

F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992). 

2 This motion was terminated by the Court because it was mooted by the filing of the FAC. 

Case 1:15-cv-00556-LJO-SKO Document 61 Filed 06/29/16 Page 2 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

3

his FAC on December 14, 2015, in which he alleges that the individual defendants conspired to deprive 

him of his right to a fair trial and engaged in a malicious prosecution “undertaken pursuant to the policy 

and practice of the Modesto Police Department and the Modesto Fire Department.” FAC ¶¶ 58, 65, 79. 

Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants Mike Harden and Reuscher are liable as supervisors and that the 

MPD and MFD are liable for “failing to adequately train, supervise, and control its officers, such that 

their failure to do so manifests deliberate indifference.” Id. ¶ 89. 

After receiving an extension of time, Doc. 44, Defendants filed their motion to dismiss on 

February 26, 2016. Defs.’ Notice of Mot. and Mot. to Dismiss (“MTD”), Doc. 47. Defendants argue that 

Plaintiff’s claims fail pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Id. at 1. Plaintiff received two extensions of time, and

filed his response on April 22, 2016. Pl.’s Resp. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Pl.’s Am. Compl. 

(“Opposition”), Doc. 52. Defendants replied on May 9, 2016. Defs.’ Reply in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss 

(“Reply”), Doc. 57. The Court vacated the hearing set for the matter pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). Doc. 

58.

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND3

In the early morning hours of January 15, 1997, a fire broke out at 1319 Ronald Ave, a 

residential property located in Modesto, California. FAC ¶ 18. Plaintiff owned and rented the property. 

Id. Three tenants, an adult woman and her two young children, died in the fire. Id. Plaintiff maintains 

that he was home asleep at the time the fire broke out. Id. ¶ 19. 

MFD Investigator Tom Reuscher and MPD Officer Joe Pimentel were two of the first responders 

to arrive at the scene. Id. ¶¶ 21, 23. Monica Sandoval (a witness) identified herself to Pimentel as a 

neighbor and told him that she had observed a recreational vehicle drive down the street several times 

before the fire began. Id. at ¶ 23. Ms. Sandoval reported that, at some point shortly before the fire began, 

the vehicle was parked across the street from 1319 Ronald Avenue, after which a driver emerged, 

 

3 Background facts are drawn from the FAC, the truth of which the court must accept for purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion 

to dismiss.

Case 1:15-cv-00556-LJO-SKO Document 61 Filed 06/29/16 Page 3 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

4

carrying what appeared to be a pillowcase. Id. She observed the driver cross the street, enter the 

property, and return minutes later empty-handed. Id. Ms. Sandoval described the driver as being in his 

thirties or early forties, and as wearing glasses, blue denim jeans, a checkered shirt, and dark shoes. Id.

Ms. Sandoval also stated that she did not get a “clear look” at the driver and would not be able to 

identify him. Id.

Defendants Lee, Ridenour, Pimentel and Reuscher met with Ms. Sandoval to conduct follow-up 

interviews. Id. ¶ 25. Plaintiff alleges that at least one of these interviews was audio-recorded. Id. He 

also alleges that Ms. Sandoval made a sketch of the vehicle. Id. Plaintiff clams that neither the audio 

recordings nor the sketch was ever disclosed or produced. Id. 

At some point, some or all of the individual defendants drove Ms. Sandoval to Plaintiff’s home 

for the purpose of evaluating whether Plaintiff’s Winnebago was the same vehicle she observed the 

night of the fire. Id. ¶ 27. When she failed to positively identify the vehicle, some or all of the 

defendants relocated the Winnebago “and surrounded it with several marked police cars and law 

enforcement officers.” Id. At this point, Ms. Sandoval identified the Winnebago as the vehicle in 

question. Id. Plaintiff alleges that some or all of the defendants subsequently falsified their police reports 

such that descriptions Ms. Sandoval had previously given about the vehicle more closely matched his 

Winnebago. Id. ¶ 28. 

Plaintiff alleges that Evers and other defendants “reached an agreement to falsely claim that the 

cause of the fire was arson and that the culprit was Plaintiff.” Id. ¶ 29. Plaintiff alleges that some or all 

of the defendants also fabricated documents that showed his financial situation was precarious and that 

he had a “vendetta” against his tenants. Id. ¶ 30. Plaintiff states that at the time of the fire, his finances 

were “healthy and secure,” and although he had initiated eviction proceedings against the tenants, he had

allowed them to stay in place “through the holidays,” and that he was “actively negotiating” the sale of 

the property. Id. 

Plaintiff’s jury trial began on February 16, 1999. Id. ¶ 31. Plaintiff claims that the prosecution 

Case 1:15-cv-00556-LJO-SKO Document 61 Filed 06/29/16 Page 4 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

5

relied on “false ‘arson’ conclusions” reached by Reuscher and Evers, Ms. Sandoval’s “doctored” 

eyewitness testimony, and “falsified evidence suggesting that Plaintiff was in dire financial straits.” Id. 

Plaintiff alleges that the individual defendants also “failed to inform the prosecutors that the arson 

‘science’ they utilized was outdated and debunked.” Id. ¶ 32. Plaintiff claims that absent these activities, 

there would not have been probable cause for his prosecution. Id. In his defense, Plaintiff put forth 

evidence that challenged the conclusion that the fire had been intentionally set and that Plaintiff had a 

financial incentive to start the fire. Id. ¶ 32. Ultimately, the jury was not able to reach a unanimous 

verdict and the judge declared a mistrial. About a year later, Plaintiff was re-tried. Id. ¶ 35. The 

prosecution presented the same case as it did in the first trial. Id. ¶ 36. This time, Plaintiff was found 

guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment.4 As described above, Plaintiff successfully challenged his 

conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

IV. STANDARD OF DECISION

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is a challenge to the sufficiency of the 

allegations set forth in the complaint. A 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper where there is either a “lack of a 

cognizable legal theory” or “the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” 

Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). In considering a motion to dismiss 

for failure to state a claim, the court generally accepts as true the allegations in the complaint, construes 

the pleading in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and resolves all doubts in the 

pleader’s favor. Lazy Y. Ranch LTD v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 588 (9th Cir. 2008).

To survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim 

to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim 

has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

 

4

Plaintiff did not identify the charges in his FAC. According to the Findings and Recommendations adopted with respect to 

his habeas petition, he was prosecuted for arson and three counts of murder with special circumstances. F & R’s at 2. 

Case 1:15-cv-00556-LJO-SKO Document 61 Filed 06/29/16 Page 5 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

6

662, 678 (2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for 

more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

556). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops 

short of the line between possibility and plausibility for entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 557). 

“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual 

allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more 

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations omitted). Thus, “bare assertions . . . amount[ing] 

to nothing more than a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements’ . . . are not entitled to be assumed true.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681. In practice, “a complaint . . . must contain either direct or inferential allegations 

respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory.” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562. In other words, the Complaint must describe the alleged misconduct in 

enough detail to lay the foundation for an identified legal claim. To the extent that the pleadings can be 

cured by the allegation of additional facts, the plaintiff should be afforded leave to amend. Cook, Perkiss 

and Liehe, Inc. v. Northern California Collection Serv. Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations 

omitted).

V. ANALYSIS

A. Due Process Claims

Plaintiff alleges four due process violations: (1) suppressing exculpatory evidence, (2) 

fabricating evidence, (3) using suggestive eyewitness identification methods, and (4) conducting a 

reckless investigation against all individual Defendants. FAC ¶ 59. 

1. Suppression/Destruction of Evidence Claims

a. Legal Background

In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that “the suppression by the prosecution of 

Case 1:15-cv-00556-LJO-SKO Document 61 Filed 06/29/16 Page 6 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

7

evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either 

to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” 373 U.S. 83, 87 

(1963). “There are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable 

to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have 

been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” 

Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999). “[T]he materiality standard for Brady claims is met 

when ‘the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as 

to undermine confidence in the verdict.’” Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 698 (2004) (quoting Kyles v. 

Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995)). Brady claims generally involve “the discovery, after trial, of 

information which had been known to the prosecution but unknown to the defense.” United States v. 

Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). Whether or not the suppression of evidence amounts to a due process 

violation “must be evaluated in the context of the entire record.” Id. at 112-13.

While “the good or bad faith of the State” is “irrelevant” under Brady, the Supreme Court has 

found that “the Due Process Clause requires a different result when we deal with the failure of the State 

to preserve evidentiary material of which no more can be said than that it could have been subjected to 

tests, the results of which might have exonerated the defendant.” Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 

57 (1988). Thus, for the destruction or loss of evidence to amount to a constitutional violation, 

“evidence must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, 

and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other 

reasonably available means.” California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489 (1984)). Alternatively, “where 

lost or destroyed evidence is deemed to be only potentially exculpatory, as opposed to apparently 

exculpatory, the defendant must show that the evidence was destroyed in bad faith.” United States v. 

Estrada, 453 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 51). The bad faith 

requirement “both limits the extent of the police's obligation to preserve evidence to reasonable bounds 

and confines it to that class of cases where the interests of justice most clearly require it, i.e., those cases 

Case 1:15-cv-00556-LJO-SKO Document 61 Filed 06/29/16 Page 7 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

8

in which the police themselves by their conduct indicate that the evidence could form a basis for 

exonerating the defendant.” Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58.

b. Exculpatory or Impeachment Value of the Missing Evidence

To establish either a Brady or Youngblood claim, a plaintiff must show that the suppressed or 

withheld evidence was material to his case, either because it was exculpatory or because it was 

impeaching. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281; Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s

claims fail because he presents no basis for believing that the sketch or recording had exculpatory or 

impeachment value.

The parties do not identify any cases that deal with the pleading standards necessary for a Brady

or Youngblood claim to survive a motion to dismiss. However, their briefs (and the Court’s own 

research) identify many cases in which the materiality of suppressed or lost evidence has been analyzed 

at later stages of litigation. These cases provide guidance as to what Plaintiff must demonstrate to 

succeed on his claim. For example, in United States v. Drake, police had access to, but ultimately lost, 

surveillance video of a robbery. 543 F.3d 1080, 1083 (9th Cir. 2008). The Ninth Circuit found that the 

materiality element was not met here because “[t]he digital recording of the robbery here was far from 

clearly exculpatory; indeed, it is possible that it would have further incriminated [the defendant].” Id. at 

1090. Similarly, in Ford v. McDonald, a criminal defendant asserted that the loss of a recording of an 

interview with a witness amounted to a due process violation that was later summarized in a report. No. 

ED CV 09-0275, 2010 WL 3929454, at *9 (C.D. Cal. July 23, 2010), report and recommendation 

adopted, No. ED CV 09-0275, 2010 WL 3929453 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2010). The Court found that 

Petitioner’s belief that the recording “might have revealed that [the witness] said ‘something completely 

different’” from his trial testimony rested on “unadulterated speculation” and that it was also possible 

“that the recording might have contained additional evidence that would inculpate, and not exculpate, 

Petitioner.” Id. at 10. Critically, in these cases defendant-petitioners had no basis for claiming what was 

contained in the evidence. In contrast, in Tennison v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, the Ninth Circuit 

Case 1:15-cv-00556-LJO-SKO Document 61 Filed 06/29/16 Page 8 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

9

found a Brady violation may have occurred where police officers did not turn over to prosecutors 

statements a defense witness made to them indicating that they had arrested the wrong man and 

contradicting the account of another key witness. 570 F.3d 1078, 1091 (9th Cir. 2009).

Construing the facts in a light most positive to Plaintiff, the Court must credit his allegations that 

Defendants withheld, and perhaps destroyed, a recording in which Ms. Sandoval, the sole eyewitness,

originally described the suspect and vehicle she saw the night of the incident “in a manner that did not 

match either Plaintiff or his vehicle.” FAC ¶ 25. The Court must also credit his allegation that 

Defendants withheld and perhaps destroyed a sketch she made depicting a vehicle that did no match his

own. Id. These allegations are different from those in Drake and Ford because in those cases, defendants 

could not show that the suppressed materials said anything in particular. Here, Plaintiff has alleged that 

the evidence does show something—that statements and drawings of the perpetrator did not match him. 

While the statements are not of such obvious value as the ones suppressed in Tennison, they are enough 

to it is difficult to see how these things would not, at least potentially, have value showing that Plaintiff 

was not the man whom Ms. Sandoval saw on the night of the fire. Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 

(9th Cir. 2011) (“Plaintiff's complaint may be dismissed only when defendant's plausible alternative 

explanation is so convincing that plaintiff's explanation is implausible.”). Thus, Plaintiff has alleged

facts that plausibly suggest these materials potentially had exculpatory or impeachment value. 

c. Prejudice/Comparable Evidence

Materiality is a necessary, but not the sole, condition for establishing a claim under either Brady 

or Youngblood. Under Brady, a plaintiff must show that his case was prejudiced. Strickler, 527 U.S. at

281-82.

5 Under Youngblood, a plaintiff must show that the evidence is of such a nature that the 

defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.” 

 

5 While it is not clear that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to meet the materiality standard in Brady, in an abundance of 

caution the Court analyzes whether the facts alleged meet the prejudice element. 

Case 1:15-cv-00556-LJO-SKO Document 61 Filed 06/29/16 Page 9 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

10

Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489. Defendants argue that because Plaintiff did not establish that “the 

underlying information was exclusively in the government’s possession” or that “he did not have 

reasonable access to the same information,” he fails to state a claim under either standard. MTD at 17-

18.6

(1) Prejudice

In evaluating whether a Defendant is prejudiced by the suppression of evidence, courts review 

the trial record to determine whether there is “a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence 

would have produced a different verdict.” United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 627 (9th Cir. 2000). In

Howell, witnesses for the prosecution testified that they had found about $2000 in cash on a defendant’s 

person, though it was stated in a report (turned over to defendants) that this money was found on a 

witness, not him. Id. at 623. It was later revealed that the prosecutor was aware that the report was 

erroneous, but contended that he/she had no duty to disclose the mistake to the defense because the 

defendant “knew the truth and could have informed his counsel.” Id. The Ninth Circuit found that this 

conduct did not amount to a constitutional violation because the record showed that “the defense was 

able to effectively cross-examine the witnesses about the inconsistency between their trial testimony and 

the nondisclosed evidence, and that the prosecution introduced significant evidence independent of the 

evidence withheld by the government, including the confession of the defendant.” Id. at 627. Under 

such circumstances no prejudice resulted because “there was no reasonable probability that the 

suppressed evidence would have produced a different verdict.” Id. Similarly, in United States v. Wilson, 

a habeas petitioner alleged that the government had withheld testimony given by an investigating 

officer’s girlfriend regarding the officer’s “alleged intention to ‘set up’ [the petitioner] by framing him 

for an arms exportation conviction.” 901 F.2d 378, 381 (4th Cir. 1990). The Fourth Circuit found that 

 

6 The parties treat the evaluation of prejudice and comparable evidence as if they are one and the same. While the case law 

appears to have similar logical underpinnings, there is no precedent for treating the analyses as interchangeable. Therefore, 

the Court will analyze these elements separately. 

Case 1:15-cv-00556-LJO-SKO Document 61 Filed 06/29/16 Page 10 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

11

while the girlfriend’s statements “could have helped [petitioner’s] case,” there was no Brady violation 

because he was free to question the girlfriend at trial. Id. 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim fails under Brady because he does not allege facts that 

suggest that his trial was prejudiced. MTD at 19. Pointing to the trial transcripts, they observe that 

Plaintiff can and did cross-examine Ms. Sandoval, as well as the officers who interviewed her, regarding 

her recollections of the night of the fire. Id. Plaintiff acknowledges that he was able to cross-examine 

Defendants at trial.7 Opposition at 20. However, he argues that his claims are viable because his 

pleadings cannot be read to show that these examinations were sufficient to protect his due process 

rights. The Court agrees that the FAC is silent on this point, but not that this silence supports the 

viability of his claim.

A Brady claim is fundamentally about the integrity of the trial, and whether the suppression of 

favorable evidence has “undermine[d] confidence in the verdict.” Banks, 540 U.S. at 698. Here, Plaintiff 

fails to allege facts that show the suppressed evidence affected the trial. Plaintiff refers to Ms. 

Sandoval’s role in the trial summarily, stating that the prosecution’s case depended in part on her 

“doctored eyewitness testimony.” FAC ¶ 31. Plaintiff does not explain, however, what made her trial 

testimony “doctored.” For example, he does not allege that her testimony at trial differed from the 

statements she had previously given to police; nor does he allege that her own account of the night in 

question changed over time. Because it is not clear why Ms. Sandoval’s trial testimony is suspect, it is 

also not clear how production of the recording or the sketch may have affected the outcome of the trial. 

Thus Plaintiff’s allegation that officers suppressed the recording and sketch is not sufficient to “nudge[] 

his claim” that their suppression prejudiced his case “across the line from conceivable to plausible.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680. Thus, he fails to allege a plausible claim under Brady.

 

7

Plaintiff qualifies this acknowledgement by saying that his ability to cross-examine them is “a topic that has been and will 

continue to be a matter of serious debate.” Opposition at 20. However, it is unclear what about the cross-examinations is 

subject to debate.

Case 1:15-cv-00556-LJO-SKO Document 61 Filed 06/29/16 Page 11 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

12

(2) Comparable Evidence

As with the analysis of prejudice, when courts evaluate whether or not comparable evidence 

exists they look to the entire trial record. In Trombetta, for instance, the Supreme Court considered 

whether the destruction of breathalyzer samples violated a plaintiff’s due process rights. 467 U.S. 479 at 

489. The Trombetta Court found that even if the samples had exculpatory value because they were 

inaccurately analyzed by police, it “d[id] not follow that respondents were without alternative means of 

demonstrating their innocence.” Id. at 490. This is because the few sources of error that could lead to a 

faulty breathalyzer analysis could be introduced at trial through other means. Id. Accordingly, courts 

have rejected Youngblood claims where the facts point to “any reasonably available evidence which 

would be comparable.” United States v. Cooper, 983 F.2d 928, 932 (9th Cir. 1993). 

For example, Elmore v. Foltz involved a situation where officers had audio recordings of the 

petitioner allegedly selling heroin to an informant. 768 F.2d 773, 774 (6th Cir. 1985). The state never 

produced the tapes and they were destroyed for budgetary reasons after trial. Id. The Sixth Circuit 

ultimately held that this did not amount to a constitutional violation, in part because the petitioner was 

able to raise doubts about the informant’s reliability at trial. Id. at 778. While the Court recognized that 

“no better tool exists for impeaching [the informant] than a tape directly contradicting him,” it held that 

“[u]nder Trombetta, though, all that matters is that some reasonable alternative means exists for 

attempting to do what one would have attempted to do with the destroyed evidence.” Id. In contrast, in 

Cooper, the Ninth Circuit considered whether comparable evidence existed for laboratory equipment 

that was seized and destroyed prior to defendants’ trial for methamphetamine production. 983 F.2d at 

932. The defendants alleged that one of the destroyed pieces of equipment was a 125-gallon reaction 

vessel that was custom reconfigured to facilitate manufacture of a particular (and legitimate) 

pharmaceutical. Id. Their expert testified that if the vessel was designed in that manner, then it could 

not have been used for manufacturing methamphetamine. Id. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the 

defendants that there was “no adequate substitute for the laboratory equipment” and the government’s 

Case 1:15-cv-00556-LJO-SKO Document 61 Filed 06/29/16 Page 12 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

13

failure to preserve it violated their due process rights. Id. 

As above, Defendants argue that Ms. Sandoval’s availability at trial presented a reasonable 

alternative to the recording and the sketch. MTD at 18-19. Plaintiff, again, argues that his sparse 

allegations cannot be read in a manner that suggests that comparable evidence existed. Opposition at 19-

21. Accordingly, the Court comes to a similar conclusion with respect to his claim under Youngblood as 

it did under Brady. Plaintiff has not alleged facts that suggest that either the recording or the sketch were 

unique, as was the case with the lab equipment in Cooper. Rather, his facts suggest a situation in which 

many individuals would be competent to discuss what was said in the interview and what was drawn in 

the picture, just as witnesses were able to testify as to the material that was recorded in Elmore and the 

samples that were destroyed in Trombetta. 

For the above reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not alleged facts from which it can 

conclude that Defendants suppressed or destroyed evidence in violation of his due process rights. 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim. Plaintiff will be allowed to 

amend this claim.8

2. Fabrication of Evidence

a. Legal Background

In Devereaux v. Abbey, the Ninth Circuit recognized that the deliberate fabrication of evidence 

may serve as a basis for a due process claim where: “(1) Defendants continued their investigation of [a 

plaintiff] despite the fact that they knew or should have known that he was innocent; or (2) Defendants 

used investigative techniques that were so coercive and abusive that they knew or should have known 

that those techniques would yield false information.” 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc). 

 

8 Defendants argue that Plaintiff should not be granted leave to amend because he cannot plausibly allege the recording or 

sketch are exculpatory without violating Rule 11. MTD at 19; see also MTD at 3 (“[N]o amendments would pass Rule 11 

scrutiny.”). This Court takes allegations of misconduct very seriously and will not assume that attorneys will knowingly 

mislead the Court. Counsel is advised that threatening to move for sanctions without having a credible basis to do so is 

questionable conduct in and of itself.

Case 1:15-cv-00556-LJO-SKO Document 61 Filed 06/29/16 Page 13 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

14

However, “[t]hese methods are not themselves independent causes of action.” Bradford v. Scherschligt, 

803 F.3d 382, 386 (9th Cir. 2015). “Rather, they are methods of proving one element—intent—of a 

claim that the government deliberately fabricated the evidence at issue.” Id. “Fundamentally, the 

plaintiff must first point to evidence he contends the government deliberately fabricated.” Id. 

Fabrication of evidence claims usually arise out of situations in which evidence comes to light 

that contradicts facts asserted by officials in their testimony or reports. Perhaps for this reason, they are 

usually decided at summary judgment. For example, in Costanich v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 

witnesses came forward and testified that they had not made statements that had been attributed to them 

by a social worker in her report. 627 F.3d 1101, 1112 (9th Cir. 2010).

9

The Ninth Circuit found a due 

process violation because “[t]he errors in [the social worker’s] report are not questions of tone or 

characterization but actual misrepresentations.” Id. at 1113. In contrast, in Gausvik v. Perez, it was

revealed that a police officer investigating allegations of child abuse inaccurately stated in his probable 

cause affidavit that the children tested “positive” for child abuse when the tests were only “suggestive” 

or “consistent” with child abuse and incorrectly stated that eight children accused the plaintiff of child 

abuse when, in fact, only two had positively identified him. 345 F.3d 813, 817 (9th Cir. 2003). The 

Ninth Circuit held that although the officer “may have been careless or inaccurate,” it did not show that 

 

9

For example,

Duron's report indicated that she had interviewed thirty-four people. She later admitted 

that she had made only brief contact with eighteen of the individuals listed. The 

misrepresentations about interviewing the children's doctors were especially significant. 

The suggestion that she interviewed three of the therapists and received reports from a 

fourth lent credibility to her report, but, as Duron testified at the ALJ hearing, she did not 

actually speak to ‘[m]edical professionals’. . .

Other witnesses pointed out that the report contained evidence or statements they never 

made. For example, according to Duron's report of her interview with Diane Isley, the 

guardian ad litem for F., Isley stated that Costanich, in reference to a child that might try 

to run away, said she would ‘chain the little s[----] to the bed.’ Isley declared in a sworn 

letter, however, that she never made this statement and that she never talked to Duron 

about such a child. Duron also reported that another aide, Crystal Hill, said that Costanich 

was ‘always calling E. a f[ ---] c[ ---], and b[-----].’ In a sworn letter, however, Hill 

stated: ‘I have never seen her directly swear face to face at one of the children.’

Id.

Case 1:15-cv-00556-LJO-SKO Document 61 Filed 06/29/16 Page 14 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

15

the officer continued the investigation despite knowing that plaintiff was innocent. Id. Therefore, the 

officer was entitled to summary judgment . Id.

At the motion to dismiss phase, district courts have looked to whether a plaintiff alleges the 

existence of evidence that would corroborate their claim. For example, in Sommer v. United States, a 

plaintiff alleged that investigators “ignored the initial autopsy findings, the inconsistencies in the lab test 

results, [and] the opinion of several independent forensic toxicologists,” all of which pointed to the fact 

that a victim was not poisoned with arsenic. 713 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1199 (S.D. Cal. 2010). The Court 

found that Plaintiff stated a viable Devereaux claim because the plaintiff “made specific, non-conclusory 

allegations that, if proven, would be sufficient to establish that [investigators] continued to investigate 

[her] despite knowing or having sufficient evidence that they should have known that [the victim] was 

not murdered.” Id. at 1201. In contrast, in Masody v. Klopot, the trial court found that a plaintiff failed to 

allege a viable Devereaux claim where he alleged that his spouse, who accused him of domestic 

violence, “fooled [investigators] with her convincing allegations against Plaintiff.” No. 14-CV-04562-

MEJ, 2015 WL 1264852, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2015). Ultimately, the fact that investigators 

believed his spouse’s allegations over his version of events was not sufficient to support a deliberate 

fabrication of evidence claim. Id. at *4. 

b. Whether Plaintiff Sufficiently Alleges that Defendants Fabricated Evidence

Plaintiff claims that individual defendants fabricated evidence by: 1) making false 

representations that Plaintiff’s financial situation was “precarious” and that Plaintiff “had a vendetta 

against his tenants” (FAC ¶ 30) and 2) falsifying police reports to make Ms. Sandoval’s descriptions of 

the vehicle she saw more consistent with Plaintiff’s Winnebago (FAC ¶ 28). Defendants argue that 

Plaintiff’s claim “goes to conclusions in the unspecified reports, not to any false facts contained in them, 

which is insufficient to support a claim.” Opposition at 15.

The Court agrees that Plaintiff’s claim about how Defendants may have characterized his 

financial situation and his relationship with his tenants is insufficient because it fails to identify which 

Case 1:15-cv-00556-LJO-SKO Document 61 Filed 06/29/16 Page 15 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

16

statements were misrepresented and what evidence was falsified with respect to these allegations. Thus, 

the claim fails at the threshold level because it does not identify the evidence in question. Bradford, 803 

F.3d at 386. This also means that it is not clear what basis he had for concluding that such evidence was 

falsified or fabricated. 

Further, unlike the plaintiff in Sommer, Plaintiff does not allege the existence of evidence that 

plausibly suggests that Defendants knew or should have known that he was innocent or that they used 

investigative techniques that they knew or should have known would yield false information. 263 F.3d 

at1076. First, Plaintiff fails to allege facts that suggest that the individual Defendants knew or should 

have known Plaintiff was innocent. While Plaintiff claims that Reuscher’s conclusion that the fire was 

arson was “totally wrong,” (FAC ¶ 21), he also claims that MFD officers were not adequately trained to 

investigate arson (FAC ¶¶ 54-55). Thus, to the extent that Defendants may have been wrong about the 

fire being cause by arson, the facts alleged suggest this conclusion would have been the result of 

inadequate training at most, not an intent to deceive. Defendants would not have violated Plaintiff’s due 

process rights even if their conclusions resulted from a “careless or inaccurate” investigation. See 

Gausvik, 345 F.3d at 817.

Plaintiff alleges that at the time of the fire his finances were “healthy and secure,” that he had 

“willingly agreed to allow [his tenants] to continue living in the apartment,” and the property that burned 

down “was valuable, as evidenced by the fact that Plaintiff was actively negotiating its sale.” However, 

even if Plaintiff believed his finances to be “healthy and secure” and his relationship with his tenants to 

be positive, it is not unconstitutional for Defendants to come to alternative conclusions in their reports, 

absent evidence of intent to falsify evidence. Under Devereaux, intent can be established with proof that 

Defendants continued their investigation of plaintiff despite the fact that they knew or should have 

known that he was innocent; or (2) used investigative techniques that were so coercive and abusive that 

they knew or should have known that those techniques would yield false information. 263 F.3d at 1076.

Plaintiff does not allege that such evidence exists here. While Plaintiff may have been “negotiating” the 

Case 1:15-cv-00556-LJO-SKO Document 61 Filed 06/29/16 Page 16 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

17

sale of his house, that in and of itself does not mean that his finances were not otherwise sound- or even 

that the sale was likely. Similarly, the fact Plaintiff “willingly agreed” to allow his tenants to stay at his 

property “through the holidays” does not plausibly suggest that it was a deliberate falsification to infer 

that he had a poor relationship with them, especially since Plaintiff admits that he had initiated eviction 

proceedings against them. FAC ¶ 30.10 As the Masody court concluded, it does not violate due process 

for investigators to disbelieve Plaintiff’s version of the events. 2015 WL 1264852, at *4. 

Similarly, Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants altered Ms. Sandoval’s testimony also fails at the 

threshold level because it does not identify the evidence or testimony in question. While Plaintiff claims 

that Defendants “falsified their reports,” he does not identify any particular report, nor does he show that 

such a report was relied upon by prosecutors or otherwise affected the fairness of his trial. Further, the 

claim is factually insufficient. Plaintiff is entitled to a presumption of truth that there was some 

difference between Ms. Sandoval’s description of Plaintiff’s vehicle and how that description was 

characterized in a report, and that the characterization in the report more closely resembled his vehicle. 

However, Plaintiff is not entitled to a presumption that the difference resulted from a deliberate 

fabrication. While a court might infer intent at the pleading stage, here the absence of factual details 

makes such an inference unreasonable. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 664 (“While legal conclusions can provide the 

complaint's framework, they must be supported by factual allegations.”). Most tellingly, the FAC is 

silent on the magnitude and extent of the alleged changes. In contrast, the Costanich plaintiff pointed to 

evidence that directly contradicted the social worker’s report. 627 F.3d at 1112; 713 F. Supp. 2d at

1199. Here, Plaintiff only presents a vague allegation that a description in a police report did not exactly 

match Ms. Sandoval’s original description. Without some facts indicating that the changes were 

significant or that the Defendants were acting with unlawful intent, the Court cannot reasonably infer 

 

10 Arguably, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding Ms. Sandoval’s identification of his vehicle (FAC ¶ 27) could be interpreted as 

alleging factual support under the second prong of Devereaux. Plaintiff, however, does not make this argument. Moreover, 

the Court is not aware of any case law that supports a conclusion that the allegations concerning the Defendants’ treatment of 

Ms. Sandoval was coercive. See section (V)(A)(3), below. 

Case 1:15-cv-00556-LJO-SKO Document 61 Filed 06/29/16 Page 17 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

18

that they deliberately falsified evidence under the second prong of Devereaux. 

For these reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s due process 

claim based on his theory that Defendants fabricated evidence. Plaintiff is granted leave to amend this 

claim. 

3. Suggestive Eye Witness Identification

In the heading of Plaintiff’s due process claim, he seeks to hold Defendants liable for 

“suggestive eyewitness identification,” but does not make clear which facts are tied to this claim. FAC at 

14: 6-7. Defendants interpret this claim to refer to Ms. Sandoval’s identification of Plaintiff’s vehicle. 

MTD at 11-12. Plaintiff confirmed that this conduct is the basis of this claim. Opposition at 17-18. 

The parties dispute whether the procedure Defendants used was so suggestive that it necessarily 

caused “a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 

98, 116, (1977). This standard, however, was established to determine “the admissibility of 

identification testimony for . . . confrontations” of a criminal defendant. Id. at 114. Indeed, every case 

cited by the parties involved identification of a criminal defendant, as opposed to his personal effects.

See, e.g. Mason v. United States, 414 F.2d 1176, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (“[S]howing of a single 

photograph is, like all identification procedures involving a single suspect, highly suggestive.”). Thus, it 

is unclear that identification procedures used to identify objects can support a due process claim under 

section 1983. 

Defendants argue, however, that, to the extent that Plaintiff’s claim may be actionable, they

would be entitled to qualified immunity. MTD at 23. The Court agrees. Plaintiffs did not identify (nor 

could the Court find) any cases that suggest that it is clearly established that in-field identification of a 

vehicle can amount to unconstitutionally suggestive eyewitness identification.

The Court therefore GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s due process claim to the 

extent that it is based on “suggestive eyewitness identification.” Because amendment would be futile, 

Plaintiff is not granted leave to amend this claim. 

Case 1:15-cv-00556-LJO-SKO Document 61 Filed 06/29/16 Page 18 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

19

4. Reckless Investigation

Plaintiff also alleges in a heading that Defendants may be liable under section 1983 for 

conducting a reckless investigation. FAC at 14:7-8. Again, Plaintiff does not tie any facts to this claim. 

Defendants argue that the Court should disregard this allegation because a “reckless investigation” is not 

a cognizable claim under section 1983. MTD at 9, n.7. Plaintiff does not respond to this argument in his 

Opposition. Nor could this Court find any cases where the Ninth Circuit recognized “reckless 

investigation” as an independent cause of action. In Tennison, 570 F.3d at 1089, a panel referred to the 

fact that the Eighth Circuit recognized “a substantive due process cause of action for reckless 

investigation.” The Tennison Court, however, used this case by analogy to determine the level of 

culpability necessary to succeed on a Brady claim. Id. On this basis, it found that a section 1983 plaintiff 

may be able to succeed on a claim that “police officers acted with deliberate indifference to or reckless 

disregard for an accused's rights or for the truth in withholding evidence from prosecutors” because such 

a claim is “consistent with the standard imposed in the substantive due process context, in which 

government action may violate due process if it ‘shocks the conscience.’” Id. Moreover, in Devereaux, 

the Ninth Circuit recognized that there is “no constitutional due process right” to have an “investigation 

carried out in a particular way.” 263 F.3d at 1075.11 In light of the above, the Court agrees that a 

“reckless investigation,” in and of itself, does not present a cause of action under § 1983. Thus, the 

Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs due process claim, to the extent that it is based 

on a theory or “reckless investigation.” Because amendment would be futile, Plaintiff is not granted 

leave to amend this claim.

B. Malicious Prosecution Claims

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim must fail because Plaintiff’s 

criminal case was not terminated in his favor. MTD at 19. Plaintiff counters that while he plead nolo 

 

11 While the Devereaux Court found that investigatory conduct that is “coercive” or “abusive” may violate due process rights, 

the Ninth Circuit has never suggested that officers may be liable for conduct that falls below that standard. 263 F.3d at 1076. 

Case 1:15-cv-00556-LJO-SKO Document 61 Filed 06/29/16 Page 19 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

20

contendre to involuntary manslaughter, the charges of arson and murder were dismissed. Opposition at 

22; see also FAC ¶ 43. He argues that his malicious prosecution claim is viable as to the dismissed 

claims because the factual grounds for the charges are distinct. Id. 

A malicious prosecution claims is viable under section 1983 when “the prosecution is conducted 

with the intent to deprive a person of equal protection of the laws or is otherwise intended to subject a 

person to a denial of constitutional rights.” Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir.1985) (en 

banc). Thus, a malicious prosecution plaintiff “must show that the defendants prosecuted her with 

malice and without probable cause, and that they did so for the purpose of denying her equal protection 

or another specific constitutional right.” Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th 

Cir.1995). A malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 is based on state law elements. Usher v. City of 

Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 562 (9th Cir. 1987). In order to establish a cause of action for malicious 

prosecution a plaintiff must plead and prove that “the prior proceeding, commenced by or at the 

direction of the malicious prosecution defendant, was (1) pursued to a legal termination favorable to the 

plaintiff; (2) brought without probable cause; and (3) initiated with malice.” Villa v. Cole, 4 Cal. App. 

4th 1327, 1335 (1992).

Plaintiff cites to Heck, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994), and its progeny, for the theory that he has a 

viable claim if his plea doesn’t “necessarily imply the invalidity” of the criminal prosecution to which he 

entered a plea. Opposition at 23. These cases, however, are distinct because they are based on 

constitutional, not state law, violations. Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 762 (9th Cir. 2014) (plaintiff’s 

Fifth Amendment claims not Heck-barred); Beets v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 669 F.3d 1038, 1040 (9th Cir. 

2012) (excessive force claims Heck-barred); Lockett v. Ericson, 656 F.3d 892, 898 (9th Cir. 2011)

(Fourth Amendment claims not barred by Heck); Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 853 (9th Cir. 2003)

(considering whether plaintiff’s “federal constitutional rights of Due Process and Equal Protection” were 

violated); Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 825 (9th Cir. 2001) (Fourth Amendment claims not barred by 

Heck). 

Case 1:15-cv-00556-LJO-SKO Document 61 Filed 06/29/16 Page 20 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

21

As Defendants point out, Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim is grounded in state law.

Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004) (“We look to California law to 

determine the legal effect of the state court's action because we have incorporated the relevant elements 

of the common law tort of malicious prosecution into our analysis under § 1983.”). Under California 

law, “[a]n individual seeking to bring a malicious prosecution claim must generally establish that the 

prior proceedings terminated in such a manner as to indicate his innocence.” Id. at 1068. California 

courts have found that, “as a matter of law, [] the favorable termination which is essential to the plaintiff 

in a malicious prosecution action can not be based on the dismissal of the criminal charges remaining 

after the defendant in a criminal proceeding has entered a plea of nolo contendere to one or more of the 

charges in the accusatory pleading pursuant to a plea bargain.” Cote v. Henderson, 218 Cal. App. 3d 

796, 804 (1990). In other words, “[t]he entire action must terminate in a plaintiff's favor in order for a 

plaintiff to maintain a claim for malicious prosecution.” Nhia Kao Vang v. Decker, 607 F. App'x 728, 

729 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Crowley v. Katleman, 8 Cal. 4th 666 (1994)).

 Here, Plaintiff admits that he pled nolo contendre, and that the murder and arson charges 

brought against him were dismissed as part of a plea bargain. FAC ¶ 43. Because the “entire action” was 

not resolved in his favor, his allegations do not support the conclusion that the “prior proceedings 

terminated in such a manner as to indicate his innocence.” Nhia Kao Vang, 607 F. App'x at 729. He is 

therefore precluded from bringing a claim of malicious prosecution. Id. Accordingly, the Court 

GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claims, FAC ¶¶ 63-72, with 

prejudice. 

C. Supervisory Liability

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Harden and Reuscher are liable because they “personally knew 

about, facilitated, approved, and/or condoned this pattern and practice of misconduct, or least [sic] 

recklessly caused the alleged deprivation by their actions or by their deliberately indifferent failure to 

act.” FAC ¶ 82. Defendants argue that this claim should be dismissed Plaintiff did not allege any facts 

Case 1:15-cv-00556-LJO-SKO Document 61 Filed 06/29/16 Page 21 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

22

supporting these allegations. MTD at 22-23. In his Opposition, Plaintiff points to several places in his 

pleadings where he attributed certain acts to Reuscher and explained that Reuscher and Harden were 

necessarily included in allegations attributed to “all Defendants.” He claims that his identification of 

them as “supervisors” in the context of these actions is sufficient to invoke supervisory liability. 

Opposition at 26-27.

Under § 1983 case law, supervisory liability may be imposed against an official who “set in 

motion a series of acts by others, or knowingly refused to terminate a series of acts by others, which he 

knew or reasonably should have known, would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.” Larez v. 

City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991). Thus, a supervisor may be liable for his “own 

culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates; for his 

acquiescence in the constitutional deprivations of which the complaint is made, or for conduct that 

showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” Id.

As Defendants point out, Plaintiff fails to identify any specific conduct or activity that would link 

the events of which they are accused to their supervisory roles. For example, Plaintiff alleges that 

Harden “assigned Lee to be a case officer” and “was responsible for delegating the investigative 

responsibilities to Modesto Police Department officers, including the MPD Defendant Officers.” FAC ¶ 

24. He also claims that Reuscher was “the lead Fire Inspector” and “falsely claimed it was an arson 

fire.” Id. ¶ 21. Plaintiff however, does not allege that either Harden or Reuscher “set in motion” or 

“knowingly refused to terminate” any events that lead to a constitutional injury. Thus he has not shown 

that either Reuscher or Harden may be culpable in their capacity as supervisors. Accordingly, the Court 

GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s supervisor liability claims against Reuscher and 

Harden, FAC ¶¶ 81-86. Plaintiff is granted leave to amend these claims. 

D. Conspiracy Claims

Plaintiff alleges that “the Individual Defendants reached an agreement amongst themselves to 

frame Plaintiff for the crime and, and to thereby deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional rights, all as 

Case 1:15-cv-00556-LJO-SKO Document 61 Filed 06/29/16 Page 22 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

23

described in the various Paragraphs of the Complaint.” FAC ¶¶ 29, 74. In a footnote, Defendants argue 

that this claim is insufficient. MTD at 23 n. 13. Plaintiff argues that he alleges that “Reuscher and Evers 

“fraudulently criminalized the nature of the fire” and that the MPD Defendants “knowingly coerced” 

Sandoval to implicate Plaintiff and “falsified and fabricated police reports . . .” Opposition at 26-27. The 

Court agrees that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts that make it plausible that Defendants conspired to 

frame him. Plaintiff rests most of the factual basis for these allegations on his assertion that Reuscher 

was “totally wrong” about the fact that fire was caused by arson and that his conclusion was “at odds 

with the scientific community.” FAC ¶¶ 21-23. Being wrong, however, is not a constitutional violation. 

Gausvik, 345 F.3d at 817. Similarly, the allegations that Lee, Ridenour, Pimentel and Reuscher 

“knowingly coerced” Sandoval are based on the slim facts surrounding her identification of Plaintiff’s 

vehicle. As discussed above, these allegations are insufficient to implicate Defendants under section 

1983. In sum, facts alleged by Plaintiff are insufficient for this Court to “draw the reasonable inference” 

that and of the Defendants are liable for conspiring to violate his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Thus, the 

Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim. Plaintiff is granted leave to amend this claim.

E. Monell Claims

Municipalities and local governments can be liable for damages under section 1983 when “action 

pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature cause[s] a constitutional tort.” Monell v. Dep't of 

Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Local governments are not liable, however, 

for simply employing a tortfeasor. Id. at 694–95 (“Instead, it is when execution of a government's policy 

or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to 

represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 

1983.”). A government entity may be liable under section 1983 claim if a policy, practice, or custom of 

the entity can be shown to be “a moving force behind a violation of constitutional rights.” Dougherty v. 

City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011).

The Ninth Circuit has recognized four distinct ways to demonstrate a municipal policy or 

Case 1:15-cv-00556-LJO-SKO Document 61 Filed 06/29/16 Page 23 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

24

custom:

(1) “[W]hen execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made 

by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to 

represent official policy, inflicts the injury . . .”

(2) where “the constitutional tort was the result of a longstanding practice 

or custom which constitutes the standard operating procedure' of the local 

government entity . . . ”

(3) by showing that “the tortfeasor was an official whose acts fairly 

represent official policy such that the challenged act constituted an official 

policy . . .” or

(4) by showing that “an official with final policymaking authority either 

delegated that authority to, or ratified the decision of, a subordinate.”

Price v. Sery, 513 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).12

Plaintiff claims that the 

MPD had no established or clear policy regarding the following issues 

pertaining to eyewitness identification and exculpatory (Brady) 

information: (a) ensuring that eyewitness identification procedures 

complied with the requirements of due process, including those set out in 

Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977) and Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S.

188 (1972); (b) ensuring that MPD detectives and officers, whether 

through inadvertence or design, did not provide information to potential 

eyewitnesses that influenced the identification; (c) fully and completely 

documenting MPD detectives’ and officers’ interactions with 

eyewitnesses; (d) adequately training MPD detectives and officers not to 

influence eyewitness identifications and to provide exculpatory eyewitness 

identification information to the prosecutor(s) in the event the eyewitness 

made an identification; and (e) adequately supervising MPD detectives 

and officers to ensure that eyewitness identifications were not influenced 

by officers conducting them, and to ensure that exculpatory eyewitness 

identification information was provided to the prosecutor(s).

FAC ¶ 48. Plaintiff also alleges that the MFD is liable for failing to train its officers, including 

Defendants Reuscher and Evers, in current standards for fire investigation. Id. ¶¶ 54-55. Defendants 

argue that these allegations fail because they do not demonstrate that the City of Modesto has a pattern 

or practice of unconstitutional behavior. In Plaintiff’s response, he states that he “dedicates nearly four 

 

12 Courts may combine the first two prongs for efficiency. See, e.g. Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1147 (9th Cir. 

2005). This Court follows the example laid out in Price for simplicity.

Case 1:15-cv-00556-LJO-SKO Document 61 Filed 06/29/16 Page 24 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

25

pages of his complaint to describing the City of Modesto’s policies and practices” and draws the legal 

conclusion that Defendants’ argument “does not hold water.” Opposition at 30-31. 

Under the first prong, liability arises through the adoption of a formal policy, defined as “a 

deliberate choice to follow a course of action ... made from among various alternatives by the official or 

officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question.” Oviatt 

By & Through Waugh v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Pembaur v. City of 

Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483–484 (1986)). “Failure to train may amount to a policy of ‘deliberate 

indifference,’ if the need to train was obvious and the failure to do so made a violation of constitutional 

rights likely.” Dougherty, 654 F.3d at 900 (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989)). 

“Mere negligence in training or supervision, however, does not give rise to a Monell claim.” Id. “Only 

where a failure to train reflects a ‘deliberate’ or ‘conscious’ choice by a municipality—a ‘policy’ as 

defined by our prior cases—can a city be liable for such a failure under § 1983.” City of Canton, Ohio, 

489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989). “‘[D]eliberate indifference’ is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof 

that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs 

of Bryan Cty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997). “A pattern of similar constitutional violations 

by untrained employees is ‘ordinarily necessary’ to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of 

failure to train.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011)13 This determination is necessary 

because Section 1983 does not encompass vicarious liability. Clouthier v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 591 

F.3d 1232, 1253 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[T]o hold cities liable under section 1983 whenever policymakers fail 

to overrule the unconstitutional discretionary acts of subordinates would simply smuggle respondeat 

superior liability into section 1983 law creating an end run around Monell.”). Here, Plaintiff alleges that 

 

13 The Supreme Court provided examples of where deliberate indifference might be inferred in City of Canton, Ohio: “For 

example, city policymakers know to a moral certainty that their police officers will be required to arrest fleeing felons. The 

city has armed its officers with firearms, in part to allow them to accomplish this task. Thus, the need to train officers in the 

constitutional limitations on the use of deadly force, can be said to be ‘so obvious,’ that failure to do so could properly be 

characterized as ‘deliberate indifference’ to constitutional rights. It could also be that the police, in exercising their discretion, 

so often violate constitutional rights that the need for further training must have been plainly obvious to the city 

policymakers, who, nevertheless, are ‘deliberately indifferent’ to the need.” 489 U.S. 378, 390 n. 10 (1989).

Case 1:15-cv-00556-LJO-SKO Document 61 Filed 06/29/16 Page 25 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Modesto failed to train its firefighters to standards established by the National Fire Protection 

Association, id. at ¶ 54, but does not suggest either that the failure to adopt them was the result of a 

conscious choice or that any policy maker was even aware of the 1992 guidelines. Nor does the FAC

describe facts that would suggest that the need for such training was obvious or that the conduct at issue 

was part of a pattern of unconstitutional behavior. Thus, under the first prong of Price, Plaintiff fails to 

allege a viable claim. 

Under the second prong, a plaintiff can maintain a claim by alleging that a “longstanding practice 

or custom” has evolved, but this requires a showing of more than “isolated or sporadic incidents.” 

Hunter v. Cty. of Sacramento, 652 F.3d 1225, 1233 (9th Cir. 2011). Rather, “the custom must be so 

‘persistent and widespread’ that it constitutes a ‘permanent and well settled [municipal] policy.’” Id. 

Although there is no bright line between “isolated or sporadic incidents” and “persistent and widespread 

conduct” is not clearly delineated, one or two incidents are an insufficient showing to support a Monell 

claim. Compare Davis v. City of Ellensburg, 869 F.2d 1230, 1233–34 (9th Cir. 1989) (single incident of 

excessive force inadequate to establish liability); Meehan v. County of Los Angeles, 856 F.2d 102, 107 

(9th Cir.1988) (two incidents insufficient) with Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1147-48 (9th 

Cir. 2005) (triable issue of fact existed as to whether Seattle had an unconstitutional policy or custom of 

suppressing certain political speech based on six incidents). Here, Plaintiff alleges that he was subjected 

to each type of conduct one or two times (suppression and/or destruction of materials from one 

interview, falsification of one police report, use of suggestive identification procedures on one 

occasion). FAC ¶¶ 25-30, 32. However, one or two occasions of misconduct is not enough to show 

conduct that is “so persistent and widespread’ that it constitutes a ‘permanent and well settled 

[municipal] policy.” Hunter, 652 F.3d at 1233. 

Under the third prong, liability hinges on the Supreme Court's holding “that municipal liability 

may be imposed for a single decision by municipal policymakers under appropriate circumstances.” 

Case 1:15-cv-00556-LJO-SKO Document 61 Filed 06/29/16 Page 26 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

27

Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 480 (“[T]he power to establish policy is no more the exclusive province of the 

legislature at the local level than at the state or national level.”). This liability only attaches “where the 

decisionmaker possesses final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered ” 

and a “deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives by the 

official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in 

question.” Id. at 481, 483 (“[W]here action is directed by those who establish governmental policy, the 

municipality is equally responsible whether that action is to be taken only once or to be taken 

repeatedly.”). Here, Plaintiff does not allege facts that suggest that any one individual established a 

policy that lead to his alleged constitutional injuries. Thus, he does not have a viable claim under this 

theory. 

The fourth prong reflects the fact that policymakers may delegate their authority to another 

official. Liability may arise “if a particular decision by a subordinate was cast in the form of a policy 

statement and expressly approved by the supervising policymaker ... [or] if a series of decisions by a 

subordinate official manifested a ‘custom or usage’ of which the supervisor must have been aware.”

Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1348 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 

U.S. 112, 126 (1988)). However, a policymaker must “approve a subordinate's decision and the basis for 

it before the policymaker will be deemed to have ratified the subordinate's discretionary decision.” Id. 

(emphasis in original). Here, Plaintiff does not allege that a City policy-maker has delegated authority to 

a subordinate that was related to his constitutional injuries. Therefore, he fails to allege a viable theory 

under the fourth prong. Because Plaintiff has not alleged facts that plausibly suggest that the City is 

liable for his constitutional injuries, the Court will GRANT Defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim. 

Plaintiff will be given the opportunity to amend this claim.

VI. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Doc. 47, as follows:

The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants violated his 

Case 1:15-cv-00556-LJO-SKO Document 61 Filed 06/29/16 Page 27 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

28

due process rights based on Plaintiff’s theories that Defendants suppressed, destroyed and fabricated 

evidence as well as his reckless investigation and witness identification theories. Plaintiff is granted 

leave to amend his Brady/Youngblood and his fabrication of evidence claims, but not his reckless 

investigation or witness identification theories. 

The Court GRANTS Defendants motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants are liable 

under section 1983 based on Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claims, FAC ¶¶ 64-72. Plaintiff is not 

granted leave to amend this claim, because amendment would be futile. 

The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s supervisor liability claims against 

Reuscher and Harden, FAC ¶¶ 81-86, and his Monell claims against the City of Modesto, FAC ¶¶ 87-90. 

Plaintiff is granted leave to amend these claims. 

Plaintiff shall file any amended complaint within 14 days of this order. 

No later than 21 days after service of any amended complaint, Defendants shall file a response 

thereto. 

Plaintiff is cautioned that this will be the last opportunity to amend. Plaintiff should only amend 

if amendment will not be futile based on the law and holding in this Order. This court does not have the 

resources to review and write extensive orders on how to write, rewrite and submit pleadings. This order 

gives the proper direction for the last time.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 29, 2016 /s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill _____ 

UNITED STATES CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:15-cv-00556-LJO-SKO Document 61 Filed 06/29/16 Page 28 of 28