Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-10342/USCOURTS-ca9-13-10342-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Susan Tomsha-Miguel
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

SUSAN TOMSHA-MIGUEL,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-10342

D.C. No.

1:12-cr-00153-

LJO-SKO-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Lawrence J. O’Neill, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

May 14, 2014—San Francisco, California

Filed September 4, 2014

Before: Susan P. Graber, William A. Fletcher,

and Richard A. Paez, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Paez;

Dissent by Judge W. Fletcher

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2 UNITED STATES V. TOMSHA-MIGUEL

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed a conviction for impersonating an

officer or employee of the United States in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 912, in a case in which the defendant, the proprietor

of a tax services business center, in an attempt to assuage the

concerns of a client, prepared a letter responding to her

client’s tax problems using the letterhead of a United States

Representative, signed the letter on behalf of a fictional

congressional aide, and faxed the letter to the client from her

fax machine.

The panel rejected the defendant’s contention that there

was insufficient evidence to support her conviction. The

panel held that a jury could reasonably conclude that the

defendant’s actions (1) constituted an effort to “assume to act

in the pretended character” and amounted to impersonation of

a federal officer or employee, and (2) were “consistent with

the assumed character” of a government official and in

furtherance of the impersonation.

The panel held that the prosecutor’s comments at trial

were not improper and did not meet the plain error standard.

Rejecting the defendant’s contention that § 912 is an

unconstitutional restriction on speech, the panel applied

intermediate, rather than strict, scrutiny because § 912

criminalizes conduct with “an expressive element” as distinct

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. TOMSHA-MIGUEL 3

from pure speech. The panel held that because it promotes

the goals of governmental integrity and maintaining the good

repute of governmental service, § 912 survives intermediate

scrutiny. The panel rejected the defendant’s contention that

§ 912 is facially overbroad.

Because the government need not establish an intent to

defraud as a separate element of a § 912 offense, the panel

held that the district court did not err in denying the

defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment for failure to

allege such intent, nor in preventing her from raising her lack

of intent to defraud as an affirmative defense.

Dissenting, Judge W. Fletcher would hold that the

defendant did not assume or pretend to be a federal employee.

COUNSEL

Heather Williams, Federal Public Defender, and Jeremy S.

Kroger, Assistant Federal Public Defender (argued), Fresno,

California, for Defendant-Appellant.

Edward P. Sullivan, Trial Attorney,United States Department

of Justice (argued), Mythili Raman, Acting Assistant

Attorney General, Jack. L. Smith, Section Chief CounselPublic Integrity Section, Barak Cohen, Trial Attorney, Public

Integrity Section for the United States Department of Justice;

Washington D.C., for Plaintiff-Appellee.

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4 UNITED STATES V. TOMSHA-MIGUEL

OPINION

PAEZ, Circuit Judge:

Susan Tomsha-Miguel (“Tomsha-Miguel”) is the

proprietor of a small tax services business in Atwater,

California. In early 2011, in an attempt to assuage the

concerns of one of her long-time clients, Tomsha-Miguel

prepared a letter responding to her client’s tax problems using

the formal letterhead of a United States Representative. 

Tomsha-Miguel then signed the letter on behalf of a fictional

congressional aide and faxed the letter to the client from her

fax machine. Her misguided actions were ultimately

discovered when the client sought additional information

concerning the letter from the congressman’s office, and she

was subsequently charged, and ultimately convicted, of

impersonating an officer or employee of the United States in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 912.

In this appeal, Tomsha-Miguel challenges her conviction

on several grounds. She contends that there was insufficient

evidence to convict her under § 912 because the government

did not show that she committed an act consistent with the

assumed impersonation. Additionally, she argues that

prosecutorial misconduct occurred during trial and that the

statute as written is an unconstitutional restriction on free

speech. Finally, Tomsha-Miguel argues that the district court

erred in denying her motion to dismiss the indictment for

failure to allege intent to defraud and in denying her request

to raise an affirmative defense of a lack of intent to defraud. 

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

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UNITED STATES V. TOMSHA-MIGUEL 5

I.

The evidence at trial established that Tomsha-Miguel

owned a small business in Atwater, California, where she

provided bookkeeping and tax services to local businesses.1

In early 2011, one of Tomsha-Miguel’s clients, Juan Garcia

(“Garcia”) sought her assistance in resolving a tax dispute

with the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”). In March 2011,

Tomsha-Miguel contacted former Congressman Dennis A.

Cardoza’s office and requested that the Congressman contact

the IRS on behalf of Garcia to resolve the dispute. 

Congressman Cardoza’s office offered to assist, but asked

that Garcia complete a privacy release form. The

Congressman’s office promptly faxed the form, which was

printed below Congressman Cardoza’s official letterhead, to

Tomsha-Miguel.

Tomsha-Miguel did not return the release form. Instead,

she photocopied Congressman Cardoza’s letterhead onto a

letter that she drafted, and signed, under the fictional name of

William G. Darton, “Aide to Congressman Dennis A.

Cardoza.” The letter was addressed as follows:

April 7, 2011

Sundown RV Center, LLC

Juan H. Garcia, Managing Member

c/o Susan R. Tomsha-Miguel, EA

Fax: 209-357-0663

1 We take the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. 

See United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1161 (9thCir. 2010) (en banc).

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6 UNITED STATES V. TOMSHA-MIGUEL

Re: IRS situation

Dear Ms. Tomsha-Miguel,

The letter proceeded to explain that Garcia’s tax dispute was

under investigation by the Philadelphia Campus Director of

the Taxpayer Advocate Services and, although the Director

was in Washington, D.C., upon his return to Philadelphia, it

would be the office’s “number one priority.” Tomsha-Miguel

faxed the fraudulent letter to Garcia.

In April 2011, Garcia contacted Congressman Cardoza’s

office seeking information concerning the letter he had

received. After obtaining a copy of the letter, Congressman

Cardoza’s office informed Garcia that the letter was

fraudulent. They then contacted the Federal Bureau of

Investigation (“FBI”). The FBI interviewed Tomsha-Miguel

about her involvement with the letter. Although she initially

claimed that she had received the letter from Congressman

Cardoza’s office, she later admitted to photocopying the

letterhead and drafting and signing the letter herself.

In May 2012, a grand jury indicted Tomsha-Miguel on

one count of 18 U.S.C. § 912, impersonating an officer or

employee of the United States. Tomsha-Miguel filed a

motion to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that:

(1) § 912 was facially invalid because it violated the First

Amendment, and (2) the indictment failed to allege the

requisite element of intent to defraud. The district court

denied the motion and the case proceeded to trial before a

jury. At trial, Tomsha-Miguel sought leave to raise the

affirmative defense of lack of intent to defraud, but was

denied. After the close of evidence, Tomsha-Miguel moved

for a judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal

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UNITED STATES V. TOMSHA-MIGUEL 7

Procedure 29. The court denied the motion. The jury

subsequently returned a verdict of guilty, after which the

court sentenced Tomsha-Miguel to one year of probation and

fifty hours of community service. Tomsha-Miguel timely

appealed.

II.

A.

We turn first to Tomsha-Miguel’s argument that the

evidence presented bythe government at trial was insufficient

to support her conviction under § 912.2

In considering a

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “we are obliged

to construe the evidence ‘in the light most favorable to the

prosecution,’ and only then determine whether ‘any rational

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Nevils, 598 F.3d at 1161

(quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).

Section 912 provides,

Whoever falselyassumes or pretends to be

an officer or employee acting under the

authority of the United States or any

department, agency or office thereof, and acts

as such, or in such pretended character

demands or obtains any money, paper,

document, or thing of value, shall be fined

2 We review de novo the district court’s denial of the motion for

judgment of acquittal. United States v. Johnson, 444 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th

Cir. 2006).

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8 UNITED STATES V. TOMSHA-MIGUEL

under this title or imprisoned not more than

three years, or both.

The statute thus sets forth two distinct offenses; the first

where the defendant “assumes or pretends to be an officer or

employee acting under the authority of the United States . . .

and acts as such,” and the second where the defendant “in

such pretended character demands or obtains any money,

paper, document, or thing of value.” 18 U.S.C. § 912; see

also United States v. Mitman, 459 F.2d 451, 453 (9th Cir.

1972); Ninth Circuit Model Jury Instructions 8.50. TomshaMiguel was convicted of the first crime, which has two

elements: the impersonation of an officer or employee and

acting “as such.” Tomsha-Miguel argues that the government

wholly failed to prove either of these elements. She first

contends that her conduct does not satisfy the first element

because the forged letter was prepared “in care of” TomshaMiguel and “a person cannot pretend to herself that she is a

federal employee.”

Impersonation occurs when any person “assume[s] to act

in the pretended character” of a government official. United

States v. Lepowitch, 318 U.S. 702, 704 (1943) (internal

quotation marks omitted). “The most general allegation of

impersonation of a government official” is sufficient under

§ 912. Id. Here, Tomsha-Miguel crafted a fraudulent letter

when she prepared it on behalf of “William G. Darton,” the

fictional “Aide to Congressman Dennis A. Cardoza;” signed

the letter on behalf of the fictional aide; and copied the

official letterhead of Congressman Cardoza’s office into the

letter. The substance of the letter also related steps that the

Congressman’s office had purportedly taken on behalf of

Tomsha-Miguel’s client. In light of these facts, a jury could

reasonably conclude that these actions constituted an effort to

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UNITED STATES V. TOMSHA-MIGUEL 9

“assume to act in the pretended character” and amounted to

impersonation of a federal officer or employee.

B.

Tomsha-Miguel also argues that, even if the jury could

find that her actions met the impersonation element under the

first part of § 912, the government failed to present sufficient

evidence to show that she “acted as such,” as further required

by the statute. According to Tomsha-Miguel, after

fabricating the letter from William G. Darton, she took no

further action on behalf of the fictional aide. This is so, she

argues, because although Garcia was the addressee, the letter

was addressed to herself (“Dear Ms. Tomsha-Miguel”) and

was sent to Garcia in care of (“c/o”) herself. Further, after

preparing the letter, she faxed the letter to Garcia as if she

were sharing with her client a letter that she had received

from the Congressman’s office. Tomsha-Miguel contends

that these facts are insufficient to satisfy the “acting as such”

element of § 912.

We have not previously addressed the precise issue

presented by this case. Our sister circuits, however, have

generally agreed that § 912 requires only that the government

show “any overt act consistent with the assumed character.” 

United States v. Cohen, 631 F.2d 1223, 1224 (5th Cir. 1980). 

Although a defendant must engage in actions that go beyond

“mere bravado,” United States v. Robbins, 613 F.2d 688, 692

(8th Cir. 1979), it is sufficient to show that the defendant

“falsely assumed and pretended” and committed an act in

keeping with that assumed character, Cohen, 631 F.2d at

1124; see also United States v. Gayle, 967 F.2d 483, 487

(11th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (adopting the Cohen standard). 

Thus, in Cohen, the Fifth Circuit held that an indictment

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10 UNITED STATES V. TOMSHA-MIGUEL

alleging that Cohen impersonated a deputy attorney general,

and acted as such when he signed into a federal penitentiary

as the impersonated official, was sufficient to allege a

violation of § 912. Cohen, 631 F.2d at 1224. Similarly, in

Gayle, the Eleventh Circuit held that it was sufficient to

show, under § 912, that Gayle and his codefendant pretended

to be officers of the FBI and “acted as such in that they held

themselves out to be FBI agents.” Gayle, 967 F.2d at 488.

Here, Tomsha-Miguel falsely assumed the role of a

fictional congressional aide—William G. Darton—when she

prepared a fraudulent letter and then signed it in his name. 

She then faxed the letter to her client, Garcia, in order to

effectuate the impersonation and convince Garcia that the

Congressman’s office was seeking to resolve his tax dispute

with the IRS. In light of these facts, a reasonable jury could

conclude that Tomsha-Miguel’s actions were “consistent

with the assumed character” of a government official, and in

furtherance of the impersonation, when she transmitted the

fraudulent letter to Garcia. See Cohen, 631 F.2d at 1224. 

Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying TomshaMiguel’s motion for judgment of acquittal. See Nevils,

598 F.3d at 1161; see also United States v. Nyemaster, 116

F.3d 827, 828 (9th Cir. 1997) (explaining that upon review of

a judgment of acquittal we will “affirm if any rational

factfinder could find the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt”).

III.

Tomsha-Miguel next argues that her conviction should be

vacated because the government committed misconduct when

the prosecutor improperly focused the jury’s attention on the

social ramifications of Tomsha-Miguel’s actions and

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UNITED STATES V. TOMSHA-MIGUEL 11

encouraged jurors to disregard defense counsel’s arguments. 

Tomsha-Miguel refers to three specific instances of allegedly

improper comments by the prosecutor. First, during his

opening statement, the prosecutor stated,“imagine what

happens if people have to doubt who those letters or phone

calls come from. You have to worry if the letters or phone

calls come from an imposter.” Second, during closing

argument the prosecutor cautioned, “when people can’t trust

and relyon communications fromgovernment, whether we’re

talking about police officers or federal judges or courthouses

or aides to Congressmen . . . then people stop paying attention

to them and then government can’t do the job that it’s

supposed to do.” Third, during his rebuttal, the prosecutor

reminded jurors, “I warned you I don’t know what the

defense lawyer is going to say when he gets his chance to talk

to you, but he might try to distract you . . . . Well, he’s trying

to distract you. He’s trying to confuse you.”

Because Tomsha-Miguel did not object to the

government’s comments at trial, we review these claims for

plain error. United States v. Sanchez, 659 F.3d 1252, 1256

(9th Cir. 2011). Plain error review requires that

(1) “there must be an error defect . . . that has

not been . . . affirmatively waived[] by the

appellant”; (2) “the legal error must be clear

or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable

dispute”; (3) “the error must have affected the

appellant’s substantial rights”; and (4) “if the

above three prongs are satisfied, the court of

appeals has the discretion to remedy the error

. . . if the error seriously affect[s] the fairness,

integrity or public reputation of judicial

proceedings.”

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12 UNITED STATES V. TOMSHA-MIGUEL

United States v. Mageno, No. 12-10474, 2014 WL 3893792,

at * 5 (9th Cir. Aug. 11, 2014) (alterations in original)

(quoting Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009)).

We have recognized that a prosecutor “may not urge

jurors to convict a criminal defendant in order to protect

community values, preserve civil order, or deter future

lawbreaking.” United States v. Nobari, 574 F.3d 1065, 1076

(9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Likewise,

a prosecutor may not “distort” the trial process by leading the

jury to believe that defense counsel is dishonest. United

States v. Rodrigues, 159 F.3d 439, 457 (9th Cir. 1998). Thus,

in Sanchez, we held that it was improper for a prosecutor to

caution jurors that their acceptance of a duress defense would

“send a memo” to drug traffickers that threats of violence

were acceptable. 659 F.3d at 1256. Similarly, in United

States v. Matthews, we held that a prosecutor’s comment that

the defense attorney was like an “octopus squirting ink,”

crossed the line of professionalism, although it was not plain

error. 240 F.3d 806, 819 (9th Cir. 2001), adopted in relevant

part, 278 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc). Here, however,

the prosecutor’s comments were well “within normal bounds

of advocacy” and did not prejudice Tomsha-Miguel nor

render her trial fundamentally unfair. United States v. Del

Toro-Barboza, 673 F.3d 1136, 1152 (9th Cir. 2012). 

Accordingly, the prosecutor’s comments were not improper

and certainly do not meet the plain error standard. See

Sanchez, 659 F.3d at 1256.

IV.

Tomsha-Miguel also raises a constitutional challenge to

§ 912, arguing that the district court should have granted her

motion to dismiss the indictment because the statute is an

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UNITED STATES V. TOMSHA-MIGUEL 13

unconstitutional content-based restriction on speech. We

review de novo the district court’s denial of a motion to

dismiss the indictment. United States v. Caruto, 663 F.3d

394, 397 (9th Cir. 2011).

Tomsha-Miguel contends that § 912 does not survive

strict scrutiny because it does not serve a compelling

government interest, is not narrowly tailored, and is facially

overbroad. We disagree. Although the constitutionality of

§ 912 is a matter of first impression for this court, the

Supreme Court’s dictum in United States v. Alvarez, 132 S.

Ct. 2537 (2012) (plurality opinion), provides guidance. In

Alvarez, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of

the Stolen Valor Act under the First Amendment and held

that the statute was an invalid content-based regulation of

speech. Id. at 2543. However, in so concluding, the plurality

opinion noted that statutes that prohibit false speech in order

to “protect the integrity of Government processes” and

“maintain the general good repute and dignity of government

service itself,” including § 912, were permissible restrictions

on free speech. Id. at 2546 (internal quotation marks and

ellipses omitted). Likewise, Justice Breyer’s concurring

opinion and Justice Alito’s dissent also noted that § 912 was

a constitutional restriction on free speech. Id. at 2554

(Breyer, J. concurring); id. at 2562 (Alito, J., dissenting). We

accord “great weight” to the statements in Alvarez that § 912

is a permissible restriction on free speech. See Coeur

D’Alene Tribe of Idaho v. Hammond, 384 F.3d 674, 683 (9th

Cir. 2004). Nonetheless, we recognize that § 912 was not at

issue in Alvarez, so we undertake our own analysis of

whether § 912 is an impermissible restriction under the First

Amendment.

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14 UNITED STATES V. TOMSHA-MIGUEL

Because § 912 criminalizes conduct with “an expressive

element,” as distinct from pure speech, we apply intermediate

scrutiny to determine the constitutionality of the statute. See

United States v. Perelman, 695 F.3d 866, 871–72 (9th Cir.

2012) (applying intermediate scrutiny to 18 U.S.C. § 704(a),

which prohibited the wearing of false military medals, an

action this court also deemed to be expressive conduct). 

Under intermediate scrutiny, a government regulation “is

sufficiently justified” if it “is within the constitutional power

of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial

governmental interest; if the governmental interest is

unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the

incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms

is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that

interest.” United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377

(1968).

As Alvarez made clear, the government has the

constitutional power to prohibit the impersonation of federal

officials and employees, and that prohibition serves the

substantial government interests of “protect[ing] the integrity

of Government processes,” and “maintaining the general

good repute and dignity of . . . government . . . service itself.” 

132 S. Ct. at 2546 (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted). These interests are also unrelated to the

suppression of free expression, because § 912 “does not

prevent the expression of any particular message or

viewpoint.” See Perelman, 695 F.3d at 872. Rather, the

government’s interests are concerned solely with the act of

impersonation itself, not the content of the impersonation.

As to the final prong of the O’Brien test, the Supreme

Court has explained that “an incidental burden on speech is

no greater than is essential, and therefore is permissible under

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UNITED STATES V. TOMSHA-MIGUEL 15

O’Brien, so long as the neutral regulation promotes a

substantial government interest that would be achieved less

effectively absent the regulation.” Rumsfeld v. Forum for

Academic & Inst’l Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 67 (2006)

(internal quotation marks omitted). In Perelman, we held that

that test was met where the statute “in at least some measure”

promotes the underlying governmental interests, even if it “is

not the most effective mechanism.” 695 F.3d at 873. Here,

§ 912 promotes the goals of governmental integrity and

maintaining the good repute of governmental service by

prohibiting the false impersonation of government officials. 

Accordingly, § 912 survives intermediate scrutiny.

3

Tomsha-Miguel also argues that § 912 is facially

overbroad because it results in the prohibition of a wide

spectrum of innocent speech, including political parodies,

theatrical performances, and student mock government

exercises. A statute is overbroad “if a substantial number of

its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to a

statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” United States v. Stevens,

130 S. Ct. 1577, 1587 (2010) (internal quotation marks

omitted). “The overbreadth claimant bears the burden of

demonstrating, from the text of the law and from actual fact,

that substantial overbreadth exists.” Virginia v. Hicks,

539 U.S. 113, 122 (2003) (internal quotation marks and

brackets omitted).

3 Tomsha-Miguel argues that § 912 is a content-based restriction on

speech that should be subject to strict scrutiny. For reasons explained in

the text, intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review. 

However, even were we to apply strict scrutiny, § 912 is still a

constitutional restriction on speech as it is justified by a compelling

governmental interest in the integrity of government processes and it is

narrowly tailored to address only intentionally deceptive conduct. See

Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011).

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16 UNITED STATES V. TOMSHA-MIGUEL

We do not interpret § 912 to reach as broadly as TomshaMiguel contends. Because § 912’s statutory elements

incorporate an intent to deceive, the statute reaches only those

acts that are intentionally deceptive. See Lepowitch, 318 U.S.

at 704 (holding that the elements of § 912 implicitly

incorporate an intent to defraud). We held similarly in

Perelman, when we noted that § 912 was an example of a

statute encompassing “a narrow range of conduct” limited to

“intentionally deceptive acts.” 695 F.3d at 871; see infra

Section V. Accordingly, § 912 does not reach the “innocent”

speech that Tomsha-Miguel identifies. Tomsha-Miguel

concedes that “[i]f the statute contains this [intentionally

deceptive] restriction, then intermediate scrutiny should be

applied, the statute is not overbroad, and its applications

comport with the requirements of the First Amendment.” We

hold that § 912 is a constitutionally permissible restriction on

free speech.

V.

Finally, Tomsha-Miguel argues that the district court

erred in denying her motion to dismiss the indictment for

failure to allege intent to defraud, and that the district court

should have allowed her to raise the issue as an affirmative

defense at trial. We review de novo a challenge to the legal

sufficiency of an indictment. Caruto, 663 F.3d at 397; United

States v. Gurolla, 333 F.3d 944, 951 n.8 (9th Cir. 2003).

Prior to 1948, the offense of falsely impersonating a

federal official required a showing of an intent to defraud, by

providing that, “[w]hoever with intent to defraud either the

United States or any person engaged in an act of

impersonation, shall be guilty of a felony.” 18 U.S.C. § 76

(1940). In 1948, however, the statute was recodified and

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UNITED STATES V. TOMSHA-MIGUEL 17

amended to its present form, which does not include any

reference to an “intent to defraud.” 18 U.S.C. § 912. The

Reviser’s Notes to the amendment explain that the words

“with intent to defraud” were omitted as meaningless in light

of Lepowitch. 18 U.S.C. § 912 Reviser’s Note (citing

Lepowitch, 318 U.S. at 704). In Lepowitch, the Supreme

Court considered an indictment under § 912 that did not

allege acting with intent to defraud. 318 U.S. at 703. The

Court held that the indictment was sufficient, concluding that

“the words ‘intent to defraud’ in the context of this statute, do

not require more than that the defendants have, by artifice and

deceit, sought to cause the deceived person to follow some

course he would not have pursued but for the deceitful

conduct.” Id. at 704. Accordingly, we have held that an

indictment is no longer required to allege an intent to defraud,

as reiteration of the elements of § 912 is sufficient to fully

inform the defendant of the crime of which he was charged. 

United States v. Mitman, 459 F.2d 451, 453 (9th Cir. 1972). 

We have also held that a defendant is not entitled to raise an

affirmative defense of lack of intent to defraud under § 912

because “an intent to defraud is not a separate element of

18 U.S.C. § 912” and, thus, the affirmative defense is

“irrelevant because it does not negate any of the elements of

[§] 912.” United States v. Bushrod, 763 F.2d 1051, 1053 (9th

Cir. 1985) (per curiam).

Tomsha-Miguel’s argument that this approach is

inconsistent with the case law of our sister circuits is

unavailing; the majority of our sister circuits have also held

that the government need not establish an intent to defraud as

a separate element of a § 912 offense. See United States v.

Wilkes, 732 F.2d 1154 (3d Cir. 1984); United States v. Cord,

654 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1981); United States v. Rosser,

528 F.2d 652 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United States v. Rose,

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18 UNITED STATES V. TOMSHA-MIGUEL

500 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Guthrie, 387

F.2d 569 (4th Cir. 1967). We therefore hold that the district

court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss the

indictment, nor in preventing Tomsha-Miguel from raising

her lack of intent to defraud as an affirmative defense.

AFFIRMED.

W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent.

Ms. Tomsha-Miguel was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C.

§ 912, which provides, in relevant part:

Whoever falsely assumes or pretends to be an

officer or employee acting under the authority

of the United States . . . and acts as such . . .

shall be fined . . . or imprisoned[.]

The central question in this case is whether Ms. TomshaMiguel falsely assumed or pretended to be a federal

employee. I would hold that Ms. Tomsha-Miguel did not do

so.

It is undisputed that Ms. Tomsha-Miguel wrote a letter to

herself using the letterhead of Congressman Cardoza and

signed the letter using the name William Darton, a

nonexistent aide to Congressman Cardoza. She then sent the

letter to her client, pretending that she had contacted

Congressman Cardoza’s office and that William Darton had

written the letter to her.

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UNITED STATES V. TOMSHA-MIGUEL 19

Ms. Tomsha-Miguel performed two acts, neither of which

qualifies as assuming or pretending to be William Darton. 

First, she wrote a letter to herself using the name of the

fictitious aide Darton. In so doing, she did not assume or

pretend to herself, or to anyone else, that she was Darton. 

Second, she sent the letter to her client, pretending that she

had contacted Darton and that Darton had written the letter to

her. In so doing, she did not assume or pretend to herself, or

to her client, that she was Darton.

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