Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-95-03196/USCOURTS-caDC-95-03196-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Vonda Michelle Dortch
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 13, 1996 Decided October 29, 1996

No. 95-3165

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

DUANE COLBERT EDWARDS,

APPELLANT

-

No. 95-3196

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

VONDA MICHELLE DORTCH,

APPELLANT

-

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

Nos. 95cr00164-01 and 95cr00164-03

John C. Floyd, III argued the cause for appellant Duane Colbert

Edwards.

Lisa B. Wright, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued the cause

for appellant Vonda Michelle Dortch. A.J. Kramer, Federal Public

Defender, and Santha Sonenberg and Amy Seidman, Assistant Federal

Public Defenders, were on brief.

James G. Flood, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause

for the appellee. Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, and

John R. Fisher and Thomas C. Black, Assistant United States

Attorneys, were on brief. Elizabeth Trosman entered an appearance.

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Before: HENDERSON and RANDOLPH, Circuit Judges; and BUCKLEY,

Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Duane C. Edwards and

Vonda M. Dortch both pleaded guilty to one count of distribution of

cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and

841(b)(1)(A). In this consolidated appeal Edwards and Dortch both

challenge the length of their respective sentences. Edwards

challenges his sentence on the grounds that the different

punishment for crimes involving cocaine base versus powder cocaine

under statutory mandatory minima as well as the United States

Sentencing Guidelines (guidelines) is (1) in violation of the

fifth, eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States

Constitution; (2) a bill of attainder in violation of article I,

section 9 of the Constitution; and (3) ambiguous so that the rule

of lenity should apply to shorten his sentence. Edwards also

claims that Congress did not have the power under the Commerce

Clause to enact the statute under which he was sentenced because it

reaches drug activities that occur entirely intrastate. Dortch

challenges her sentence on the grounds that the district court

committed two errors under the guidelines in failing to grant her

(1) a "minor participant" reduction and (2) a "diminished capacity"

reduction. We affirm the sentences of both Edwards and Dortch.

I.

In the spring of 1995 the United States Park Police received

information that Dortch was selling cocaine base in Washington D.C.

In the ensuing months an undercover officer contacted Dortch

several times and attempted to obtain cocaine base from her. The

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contacts led to a series of four drug sales. Dortch played a role

in each transaction and Edwards was involved in the final

transaction.

First, on April 5, 1995, Dortch agreed to arrange for the sale

of 62 grams of cocaine base to the undercover officer. The next

day Dortch arrived at the agreed upon location in an automobile

driven by David Henderson. Dortch entered the officer's car first

and asked the officer if he would give her drugs in exchange for

having arranged the deal. The officer refused. Henderson then

entered the car and exchanged the 62 grams of cocaine base for

$1700. Dortch then left the car while Henderson remained.

Henderson gave the officer his telephone number and indicated that

in the future they could cut Dortch out of the deal.

Second, on April 28, 1995, Dortch sold 58.6 grams of cocaine

base to the undercover officer in exchange for $1700.

Third, Dortch introduced the undercover officer to a runner

for a drug dealer who later exchanged 62 grams of what turned out

to be baking soda for $1800 with the understanding that $100 was to

go to Dortch. When the officer contacted Dortch and told her that

he had been given baking soda, Dortch promised she would give him

125 grams of cocaine base.

Fourth, Dortch agreed to arrange for a sale of cocaine base to

take place on June 15, 1995. Dortch arrived in a car driven by

Edwards. While Edwards waited in the car, Dortch got in the

undercover officer's vehicle and sold him 126.6 grams of cocaine

base for $3400. Officers arrested Dortch and Edwards after this

transaction. A search of Edwards's car uncovered an additional

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1If a defendant qualifies for the "safety valve," the

district court imposes the sentence without regard to any

statutory mandatory minimum. The relevant considerations are the

defendant's criminal history, whether the offense involved death

or injury or other violence, whether the defendant had a

leadership role in the offense and the extent of the defendant's

cooperation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1)-(5). 

61.61 grams of cocaine base.

Edwards pleaded guilty to one count of distribution of cocaine

base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) in connection with the June

15th drug sale. The drugs sold to the officer and the drugs found

in Edwards's car were combined to set a base offense level of 34

under the guidelines. Edwards received a three-point reduction for

acceptance of responsibility for a total offense level of 31, with

a range of 108-135 months' imprisonment. Edwards's offense carried

a statutory mandatory minimum of 120 months. 21 U.S.C. §

841(b)(1)(A). The district court sentenced Edwards to 120 months

to be followed by five years of supervised release.

Dortch pleaded guilty to one count of distribution of cocaine

base and aiding and abetting in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) and

18 U.S.C. § 2 in connection with the April 6th drug sale. In

setting the base offense level under the guidelines, the district

court included drug amounts from the first, second and fourth

transactions set out above. This resulted in a base offense level

of 34. Dortch was granted a three-level reduction for acceptance

of responsibility under section 3E1.1. Also, because Dortch

qualified for the "safety valve" under section 5C1.2,1 the

statutory mandatory minimum was not applied and she received a

further two-level reduction under section 2D1.1(b)(4) which

provides a reduction for certain drug offenses if the defendant

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qualifies for the "safety valve." With the reductions Dortch had

a total offense level of 29, with a range of 87-108 months'

imprisonment.

At her sentencing hearing, Dortch argued for a further

two-level "minor participant" reduction under section 3B1.2 of the

guidelines. Dortch claimed she was entitled to the reduction

because she was a mere go-between for drug suppliers and received

only a fraction of the profit from the deals. Dortch also sought

a downward departure based on "diminished capacity" under section

5K2.13 of the guidelines. To support her request, Dortch produced

an evaluation prepared by a psychologist. The evaluation stated

that Dortch had attempted to commit suicide in 1994 and concluded

that Dortch suffered from "a personality structure which is marked

by (1) extreme introversion; (2) an inability to interact and

connect with people; and (3) pronounced distrust of others."

Dortch App. at 23. The report also concluded that these features

of her personality "contributed to her involvement in this crime."

Id.

The district court found that Dortch was eligible for neither

a "minor participant" reduction nor a "diminished capacity"

departure. The court sentenced Dortch to 87 months in prison to be

followed by five years of supervised release.

II.

Edwards received a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence under

21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). Section 841(b)(1)(A) treats offenses

involving cocaine base and offenses involving powder cocaine

differently. The ten-year mandatory minimum applies if the offense

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involves 50 grams or more of cocaine base but, for offenses

involving powder cocaine, the ten-year mandatory minimum applies

only to offenses involving 5 kilograms or more. Edwards argues

that the sentencing policy disproportionately harms black

defendants, the predominant users of cocaine base, and therefore

violates various provisions of the Constitution.

Edwards first claims that the disparate impact on black

defendants violates the equal protection component of the due

process clause of the fifth amendment. We have previously rejected

identical challenges. United States v. Johnson, 40 F.3d 436, 439-

41 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1412 (1995); United

States v. Thompson, 27 F.3d 671, 678 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 115

S. Ct. 650 (1994). In Johnson we held that Congress had not acted

with a discriminatory purpose in setting greater penalties for

cocaine base crimes than for powder cocaine offenses. 40 F.3d at

440-41. We have also held that the punishment distinction between

cocaine base and powder cocaine in the statute survives rational

basis review. Thompson, 27 F.3d at 678; United States v. Cyrus,

890 F.2d 1245, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1989). We therefore reject

Edwards's fifth amendment challenge to the statute. Edwards also

claims that the severity of the sentences for cocaine base offenses

under the statute constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under

the eighth amendment. We have also previously rejected eighth

amendment challenges to the statute. Thompson, 27 F.3d at 678;

Cyrus, 890 F.2d at 1248. Finally, Edwards claims that the statute

violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.

But the fourteenth amendment does not apply to the federal

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government; an equal protection challenge to the statute must be

raised under the fifth amendment instead. As discussed above, we

have explicitly rejected a fifth amendment equal protection

challenge to the statute.

Edwards also argues that the differential treatment of cocaine

base and powder cocaine offenses amounts to a bill of attainder in

violation of article I, section 9 of the Constitution. Edwards

rests his argument on language from United States v. Brown, 381

U.S. 437 (1965), that bills of attainder encompass not only

legislative acts that name specific persons but also legislation

that applies to readily ascertainable classes of individuals.

According to Edwards, Congress had information that imposing

harsher penalties for cocaine base offenses would

disproportionately affect black defendants. He concludes that

blacks are an "easily ascertainable class" targeted by the law and

therefore the law is a bill of attainder. Edwards Opening Brief at

27. Edwards's argument fails. The vice of a bill of attainder is

that it impermissibly singles out a person or class of persons for

punishment without judicial determination of guilt. See Nixon v.

Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 468 (1976); Brown, 381

U.S. at 450. The statute under which Edwards was sentenced,

however, does not single out any particular class but rather by its

plain terms applies to "any person." 21 U.S.C. § 841(b). Neither

does the statute impose a penalty without judicial determination of

guilt. The statute is one of general applicability providing for

post-conviction punishment.

Edwards next argues that the terms "cocaine base" and

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"cocaine" as used in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) are ambiguous

and therefore the rule of lenity requires that the less severe

penalty be applied. In Edwards's plea agreement he agreed that his

offense involved 170 grams of cocaine base. Treated as "cocaine

base" this amount of drugs yields a ten-year mandatory minimum

sentence under the statute. If treated as "cocaine," there would

be no mandatory minimum under the statute. Edwards argues that

cocaine base and powder cocaine are pharmacologically

indistinguishable; therefore, the term "cocaine" in the statute,

which covers offenses involving powder cocaine, should apply

equally to cocaine base. Edwards concludes that because both terms

cover the substance involved in his offense, the rule of lenity

requires the application of the less severe penalty.

The rule of lenity is not applied unless there is a "grievous

ambiguity or uncertainty." Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453

(1991) (quoting Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 831

(1974)). There is no "grievous" ambiguity in the terms "cocaine

base" and "cocaine." We find ample support to conclude that

Congress intended the stiffer penalties associated with "cocaine

base" to apply to offenses involving crack cocaine and the less

severe penalties to apply to offenses involving powder cocaine.

Edwards does not dispute the point. Indeed, his equal protection

argument is premised on the claim that a discriminatory purpose can

be inferred from the fact that Congress treated cocaine base and

powder cocaine differently. Likewise our decisions rejecting

constitutional challenges to the statute assume that the statutory

scheme plainly distinguishes between cocaine base and powder

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cocaine. See, e.g., Johnson, 40 F.3d at 438 ("These cases involve

a constitutional challenge to the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 ...

which punishes crimes involving "crack' cocaine more severely than

those involving an equivalent amount of powder cocaine."). Thus

Edwards's rule of lenity claim appears to be not that congressional

intent to treat the substances differently cannot be ascertained

but rather that the statute fails to unambiguously give effect to

that intent inasmuch as the substances are pharmacologically

indistinguishable. Whatever the pharmacological similarities,

however, we find no ambiguity in the terms "cocaine base" and

"cocaine" and join the other circuits that have rejected rule of

lenity challenges to the statute. See United States v. Jackson, 84

F.3d 1154, 1159-61 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Booker, 70

F.3d 488, 489-94 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1334

(1996); United States v. Jackson, 64 F.3d 1213, 1219-20 (8th Cir.

1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 966 (1996); United States v.

Fisher, 58 F.3d 96, 98-99 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 329

(1995).

Finally, Edwards claims that Congress acted beyond its powers

under the Commerce Clause in enacting section 401(a)(1) of the

Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Drug Act), because it regulates intrastate drug

activities that do not substantially affect interstate commerce.

Edwards relies on the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.

Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), which struck down the Gun-Free

School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (Gun Act), on the

ground that Congress had exceeded its power under the Commerce

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2Even if we were to find that Congress exceeded its power

under the Commerce Clause in enacting the Drug Act, this would

not affect the outcome here. These drug transactions took place

in the District of Columbia. Assuming, arguendo, that there are

limitations on Congress' power to regulate local drug activities

elsewhere in the country, Congress has the power to police drug

activity in the District of Columbia under article I, section 8

of the Constitution. 

3Section 3B1.2 provides:

Based on the defendant's role in the offense, decrease

the offense level as follows: (a) If the defendant was

a minimal participant in any activity, decrease by 4

levels. (b) If the defendant was a minor participant in

Clause in enacting the statute. We have previously denied a

Commerce Clause challenge to the Drug Act. United States v. Davis,

561 F.2d 1014, 1018-20 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 929

(1977). The Court's decision in Lopez leaves Davis intact. In

Lopez the Court held that the conduct prohibited by the Gun Act did

not have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 115 S. Ct.

at 1630-31. By contrast, the Drug Act includes specific findings

that intrastate drug activity has a substantial effect on

interstate drug activities and that effective control of drug

activities occurring intrastate requires both interstate and

intrastate regulation. 21 U.S.C. § 801. We follow the other

circuits that have upheld the Drug Act against a post-Lopez

Commerce Clause challenge.2 See, e.g., United States v. Wacker, 72

F.3d 1453, 1474-75 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Leshuk, 65

F.3d 1105, 1111-12 (4th Cir. 1995).

III.

Dortch argues that the district judge erred in denying her a

two-level "minor participant" reduction under section 3B1.2 of the

guidelines.3 Dortch first claims that the district court applied

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any criminal activity, decrease by 2 levels. In cases

falling between (a) and (b) decrease by 3 levels. 

the incorrect legal standard in denying the minor participant

reduction. This claim raises a question of law that we review de

novo. See United States v. Kim, 23 F.3d 513, 516-17 (D.C. Cir.

1994). We have previously stated the legal standard applicable to

the minor participant reduction as follows:

Before it may find that a defendant was a minor

participant in the offense ... the evidence available to

the court at sentencing must, at a minimum, show (i) that

the "relevant conduct" for which the defendant would,

within the meaning of section 1B1.3(a)(1), be otherwise

accountable involved more than one participant ... and

(ii) that the defendant's culpability for such conduct

was relatively minor compared to that of the other

participant(s).

United States v. Caballero, 936 F.2d 1292, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

It is undisputed that there were multiple participants involved in

the "relevant conduct" for which Dortch is accountable. Dortch's

claim is that the district court denied the minor participant

reduction without making the necessary findings of relative

culpability required by the second part of the legal standard set

forth above. In denying the minor participant reduction, the

district judge stated at the sentencing hearing:

Now, I want you to know that based upon my review of the

records, I do believe you were more than a facilitator

and that you voluntarily and knowingly did what brings

you before the court.

Dortch Sent. Tr. at 29.

Dortch argues that this statement shows that the district

judge equated Dortch's status as "more than a facilitator" coupled

with the fact that she acted "voluntarily and knowingly" with

ineligibility for the minor participant reduction. Dortch argues

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4In accord with Caballero, we reaffirm the impropriety of a

per se rule in this context. Thus it would be incorrect to say

that as a matter of law one who is "more than a facilitator"

could never qualify for the minor participant reduction. 

However, we suspect that it is a rare case in which a defendant

can be accurately described as "more than a facilitator" and yet

also be relatively less culpable than other participants so as to

qualify for the minor participant reduction. 

further that the sentencing judge erroneously imposed a per se rule

that a defendant who is "more than a facilitator" and acts

"knowingly and voluntarily" can never qualify for the minor

participant reduction even if that person's culpability is

relatively minor compared to that of other participants. The

adoption of such a per se rule would be contrary to our holding in

Caballero where we held that the district court erred in granting

the two-level minor participant reduction based on the defendant's

generic status as a "courier." 936 F.2d at 1299-1300. The

Caballero holding, however, does not mean that we will reverse

every time the district court fails to use the magic words

"relative culpability" or does not make explicit findings of

relative culpability on the record. The import of Caballero is

simply that the district court must assess the defendant's role in

the specific criminal conduct and not gauge his culpability

generically. We believe that the district judge did just that in

this case.4

In deciding the issue we do not view the single statement in

which the judge explained her denial of the reduction in isolation.

Instead, we look to the entire circumstances of the sentencing

hearing as well as the record. In the first place, Dortch's

attorney argued for the minor participant reduction by telling the

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court: "Essentially, Ms. Dortch was what I believe the law would

classify her to be a facilitator, and that's why we are asking the

Court to adjust her role in the offense to that of a minor

participant." Dortch Sent. Tr. at 8. It was perfectly reasonable

for the district court to deny Dortch the reduction in the same

terms her attorney used. Moreover, the details of Dortch's role in

the offense were rehearsed at the hearing and the judge concluded

that Dortch was more than a facilitator "based upon [her] review of

the records." Dortch Sent. Tr. at 29. We find that this shows the

district judge properly examined Dortch's role in the charged

offense and not the role of defendants who are "more than

facilitators" generally. In contrast, the district judge in

Caballero stated that the defendant was entitled to the reduction

because "people like this defendant ... really are just couriers

and do not have a major responsibility for the drug plague that

plagues this country." 936 F.2d at 1299.

Dortch argues in the alternative that even if the district

judge did apply the correct legal standard, she nevertheless erred

in finding that the facts precluded the minor participant

reduction. In other words, Dortch contends that as a matter of

fact her "culpability ... was relatively minor compared to that of

other participant(s)." Caballero, 936 F.2d at 1299. We review the

district court's factual findings under the clearly erroneous

standard and we accord "due deference to the district court's

application of the guidelines to the facts." Kim, 23 F.3d at 517

(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(4)); see also Koon v. United States,

116 S. Ct. 2035, 2046-47 (1996); United States v. Graham, 83 F.3d

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5Section 5K2.13 provides:

If the defendant committed a non-violent offense while

suffering from significantly reduced mental capacity

not resulting from voluntary use of drugs or other

intoxicants, a lower sentence may be warranted to

reflect the extent to which reduced mental capacity

contributed to the commission of the offense, provided

that the defendant's criminal history does not indicate

a need for incarceration to protect the public. 

1466, 1481-82 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (applying these standards of review

in affirming denial of minor participant reduction).

Dortch claims she was relatively less culpable than Edwards

and Henderson because they supplied the drugs while she was only

the go-between who arranged the deals. She also claims that she

realized a relatively small profit compared to Henderson and

Edwards. We disagree with Dortch's assessment of her relative

culpability. Dortch played an instrumental role in each of the

drug transactions. She did more than simply exchange names and

telephone numbers. The record shows that at least once Dortch

actually handled the drugs and exchanged them for money. On

another occasion Dortch requested payment in drugs for her services

in arranging the deal. On the facts of the case, the district

court did not err in denying the minor participant reduction.

Dortch also argues that the district court erred in denying a

"diminished capacity" downward departure under section 5K2.13 of

the guidelines.

5 The district court interpreted "diminished

capacity" under the guidelines to refer to diminished intellectual

capacity. Dortch Sent. Tr. at 14. Dortch contends that diminished

capacity refers not only to intellectual capacity but also

encompasses psychological or behavioral disorders. If such a

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psychological or behavioral disorder serves as the basis for the

departure, however, there must be an accompanying inability to

reason. See United States v. Goosens, 84 F.3d 697, 701 (4th Cir.

1996); United States v. Cantu, 12 F.3d 1506, 1512-13 (9th Cir.

1993). The district judge below simply stated that there could be

no reduction absent diminished "intellectual capacity."

"Intellectual capacity" means one's ability to reason or make

judgments. The district judge's statement, "I don't know why we

would suggest that because she may have psychological problems that

she has intellectual capacity problems," Dortch Sent. Tr. at 15, is

not to the contrary. We take this statement to mean not that

psychological or behavioral disorders can never support a

diminished capacity reduction but only that Dortch failed to

establish that any psychological problems she may have had

diminished her ability to reason. The record supports the district

court's finding. Dortch produced only a report from a psychologist

opining that she suffered from "extreme introversion, ... an

inability to interact or connect with people and ... pronounced

distrust of others." Dortch App. at 23. These traits do not

entitle Dortch to a diminished capacity departure. Moreover, there

was nothing in the report to suggest that her personality problems

contributed to the crime by diminishing her ability to reason.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the district court

are

Affirmed.

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