Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-01212/USCOURTS-ca10-91-01212-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Colorado College
Not Party
Bradley J. Stratton
Appellant
Vail Associates, Inc.
Appellee
Vail/Broadmoor, Inc.
Appellee

Document Text:

FIL~ P '

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALst.Jnitxd ~ C~~ A'P:~ 

Te;:.ili C •r:".u , . 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

BRADLEY J. STRATTON, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

VAIL ASSOCIATES, INC., a Colorado 

corporation; VAIL/BROADMOOR, INC . , a 

Colorado corporation; 

Defendants-Appellees, 

and 

COLORADO COLLEGE, a non-profit 

corporation, 

Defendant . 

APR 10 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKEE 

> Clerl: 

) 

) 

) 

) No. 91-1212 

) (D.C. No. 90-F-1074) 

) ( D. Colo . ) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before SEYMOUR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, and SAM,** District 

Judge. 

**Honorable David Sam, District Judge , United States District 

Court for the District of Utah, sitting by designation. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 91-1212 Document: 010110240426 Date Filed: 04/10/1992 Page: 1
assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

This is an appeal from summary judgment entered by the 

district court in favor of Defendants Vail Associates, Inc. and 

Vail/Broadmoor, Inc. Plaintiff brought this negligence action to 

recover for injuries suffered in an accident while practicing with 

the Colorado College ski team at Defendants' ski area. Relying on 

certain provisions of the Colorado Ski Safety Act of 1979, Colo. 

Rev. Stat. SS 33-44-101 through 33-44-114, the district court 

held, as a matter of law, Plaintiff had assumed the risk of the 

particular condition that caused his injuries, and 

judgment for Defendants accordingly. 1 

entered 

We review this summary judgment determination de novo, 

applying the same legal standard used by the district court under 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Applied Genetics Int'l, Inc. v. First 

Affiliated Sec., Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir. 1990). We 

likewise withhold deference and exercise de nova review with 

respect to the district court's underlying interpretation of the 

operative state statute. See United States v. Johnson, 941 F.2d 

1102, 1111 (10th Cir. 199l)(citing Salve Regina College v. 

Russell, 111 S. Ct. 1217, 1225 (1991)). 

1 A third defendant, Colorado College, sought and was denied 

summary judgment on other grounds. However, shortly after this 

appeal was filed, Colorado College was dismissed out on 

stipulation. We therefore have jurisdiction pursuant to the 

ripening principle established in Lewis v. B.F . Goodrich Co . , 850 

F.2d 641, 645 (10th Cir. 1988). 

2 

Appellate Case: 91-1212 Document: 010110240426 Date Filed: 04/10/1992 Page: 2
Recitation of a few pertinent facts is necessary to frame the 

legal issue raised by this appeal. At the time of Plaintiff's 

accident, the Colorado College ski team was engaged in a regularly 

scheduled practice at Defendants' ski area pursuant to a prior 

financial arrangement between the parties. The team was then not 

(1) involved in a competition, (2) preparing for one to be held at 

Defendants' ski area some ti.me later, or even (3) using a course 

previously designated by Defendants for ski competition. Rather, 

the team was simply training on one of Defendants' public slopes 

in preparation for a competition to be held elsewhere at some 

future date. On his second run through the practice course set up 

by the team, Plaintiff fell, slid downhill for a distance, and 

allegedly struck an exposed steel ladder rung on an otherwise 

padded lift tower. 

The particular statutory provision relied on by the district 

court for its holding that Plaintiff had assumed the risk of his 

injury reads as follows: 

(1) The ski area operator 

beginning of a competition, 

reasonable visual inspection of 

the competition is to be held. 

shall, prior to the 

allow each competitor a 

the course or area where 

(2) The competitor shall be held to assume the risk of 

all course conditions including, but not limited to, 

weather and snow conditions, course construction or 

layout, and obstacles which a visual inspection should 

have revealed. No liability shall attach to a ski area 

operator for injury or death of any competitor 

proximately caused by such assumed risk. 

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 33-44-110. Attributing to the quoted language 

its commonly accepted and understood meaning, Climax 

Molybdenum Co. v. Walter, 812 P.2d 1168, 1173 (Colo. 1991); Triad 

3 

Appellate Case: 91-1212 Document: 010110240426 Date Filed: 04/10/1992 Page: 3
Painting Co. v. Blair, 812 P.2d 638, 644 (Colo. 1991), we are 

constrained to conclude that section 33-44-110 does not, at least 

on the strength of its own plain terms, apply to the facts 

presented here. Plaintiff's injury simply did not arise from the 

condition of a course or area where a competition was to be held. 

However, the district court ' s analysis did not end with 

section 33-44-110. In accordance with the general principle that 

the various sections of a statute must be read as a whole, see 

Adams County Sch. Dist. No. 50 v. Dickey. 791 P.2d 688, 691 (Colo. 

1990), as well as the corollary that definitional provisions 

ordinarily control the judicial interpretation of defined terms 

employed elsewhere in the statute, ~ Industrial Comm'n v. 

Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 88 P.2d 560, 563 (Colo. 1939); In 

re Storage Technology Corp., 48 B.R. 862, 865 (D . Colo. 1985), the 

district court read section 33-44-110 very broadly in light of the 

definition of "competitor" in section 33-44-103(2), which includes 

"a skier 

II 

summary 

actually engaged in competition or in practice therefor 

(Emphasis added.) See order regarding motions for 

judgment at 9. Thus, the district court held that "the 

plaintiff assumed any risks when he 'engaged in the practice' for 

an upcoming competition. That [Defendants ' ski area] was not 

holding the actual competition or that the competition was not 

occurring in the immediate future is of no consequence under the 

express language of the statute." Id. 

The statutory language emphasized by the district court must, 

however, be read in conjunction with the qualifying phrase which 

4 

Appellate Case: 91-1212 Document: 010110240426 Date Filed: 04/10/1992 Page: 4
directly follows,~ Estate of David v. Snelson, 776 P.2d 813, 

818 (Colo. 1989), and the latter limits the notion of 

practice-for-competition to practice runs on a "slope or trail or 

portion thereof designated by the ski area operator for the 

purpose of competition." Section 33-44-103(2)(emphasis added). 

As already indicated in our recitation of the pertinent facts, 

Defendants do not even assert, much less attempt to substantiate 

by reference to the record, that the slope used by the ski team on 

the occasion of Plaintiff's injury was currently--or had ever 

been--designated for competition, as opposed to practice. This 

concession is fatal to Defendants' assumption of risk defense 

under the plain terms of the statute, with which our inquiry 

properly begins and ends. See Thiret v. Kautzky, 792 P.2d 801, 

806 (Colo . 1990); Kane v. Town of Estes Park, 786 P.2d 412, 415 

(Colo. 1990). 

The limited scope of our disposition bears emphasis. The 

sole issue raised, argued, and resolved on this appeal concerns 

the applicability of the assumption of risk defense set out in 

section 33-44-110. We express no opinion whatsoever regarding the 

viability of Plaintiff's negligence claim, or the merits of 

Defendants' numerous other potential defenses thereto, under the 

statutory provisions and common law principles governing the 

duties of skiers and ski area operators generally, see Colo. Rev. 

Stat.§§ 33-44-104, -106 to -110; Pizza v. Wolf Creek Ski Dev . 

Corp., 711 P.2d 671, 677-78 (Colo. 1985); Calvert v . Aspen Skiing 

Co., 700 F. Supp. 520, 522 (D. Colo. 1988). 

5 

Appellate Case: 91-1212 Document: 010110240426 Date Filed: 04/10/1992 Page: 5
The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Colorado in favor of Defendants Vail Associates, Inc. 

and Vail/Broadmoor, Inc. is REVERSED, and the cause is REMANDED 

for further proceedings. 

Entered for the Court 

Stephen H. Anderson 

Circuit Judge 

6 

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