Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_01-cv-05140/USCOURTS-caed-1_01-cv-05140-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ian Charles Brown
Petitioner
Roy A. Castro
Respondent

Document Text:

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IAN CHARLES BROWN,

Petitioner,

vs.

ROY A. CASTRO,

 Respondent.

Case No. CV F01-5140 JKS

O R D E R

INTRODUCTION

Ian Brown petitions for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Docket Nos. 13

(Third am. pet.); 16 (Answer). Brown was convicted of first-degree murder and having personally

used a weapon in the commission of the crime. See Docket No. 16, Ex. N at 2. He contends that

habeas relief is warranted on two grounds. First, he argues that the trial court erred in refusing to allow

the psychotherapist of a government witness to testify regarding that witness’s credibility over the

invocation of a state psychotherapist-patient privilege. Second, Brown argues that the trial court erred

in failing to give certain jury instructions regarding corroboration of an accomplice’s testimony and

aider and abettor status.

BACKGROUND

By information filed in November of 1995, Brown and his brother Jason Brown (Jason) were

charged with the first-degree murder of Jerome Perry. It was further alleged that Brown had used a

dangerous or deadly weapon, to wit: a glass flower pot, to commit the offense. The prosecutor made

offers in both cases. Brown rejected the offer. Jason, however, elected to accept the offer that he plead

guilty to first-degree robbery and assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury in exchange

for his truthful testimony at the trial of his brother, Brown. Jason complied with the terms of his plea

bargain and testified at Brown’s jury trial. 

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Jason testified to the following: Jason had known Perry for six or seven months and he and

Brown had been to Perry’s house on several occasions prior to the murder. Reporter’s Transcript (RT)

at 107. Jason and Brown went to Perry’s house on the evening of the murder and the three commenced

drinking alcohol. RT at 108–12. Jason got sick and vomited and then passed out or fell asleep. RT at

112. When he regained consciousness he saw Brown punching Perry and choking him. RT at 112,

121. Perry tripped when trying to get away, at which point Jason kicked him. RT at 115–16. 

Thereafter Jason saw Brown strike Perry with a glass pot three times and heard more strikes. RT at

116–19. Jason asked Brown what he was doing, where after Brown dropped the pot and went to wash

his hands. RT at 119. Jason took Perry’s truck keys and also took some money that was in Perry’s

pocket and Jason and Brown left in Perry’s truck. 

DISCUSSION

Brown’s petition post-dates the April 24, 1996, enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), which governs federal court procedure for habeas corpus petitions. 

AEDPA permits a federal court to grant relief in habeas petitions only if the state court’s decision: (1)

was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States”; or (2) “was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1)–(2). “The first prong applies both to questions of law and to mixed questions of law and

fact, while the second prong applies to decisions based on factual determinations.” Davis v. Woodford,

384 F.3d 628, 637 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). A state court’s determination is “‘contrary to’

federal law if the state court (1) ‘applies a rule that contradicts the governing law’ set forth in Supreme

Court case authority or (2) applies controlling law to a set of facts that are ‘materially

indistinguishable’ from a Supreme Court decision but nevertheless reaches a different result.” OrtizSandoval v. Clarke, 323 F.3d 1165, 1169 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing and quoting Lockyer v. Andrade, 538

U.S. 63, 73 (2003)). A state court’s decision is an “unreasonable application” of federal law if it is

“objectively unreasonable,” which “requires the state court decision to be more than incorrect or

erroneous.” Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75.

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 California Evidence Code § 1014 reads: 

Subject to Section 912 and except as otherwise provided in this article, the patient,

whether or not a party, has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from

disclosing, a confidential communication between the patient and psychotherapist if the

privilege is claimed by:

(a) The holder of the privilege.

(b) A person who is authorized to claim the privilege by the holder of the

privilege.

(c) The person who was the psychotherapist at the time of the confidential

communication . . . .

ORDER 

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I. Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege 

Brown argues that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation and his

Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Brown sought to call Dr. Schaeffer, a psychologist who

had been retained by Jason’s attorney to assist in the defense of Jason. RT at 301, 303. Apparently his

aim in calling Dr. Schaeffer was to discredit Jason’s testimony by revealing Jason’s psychological

status and history. Brown argued that any privilege1 was waived when Jason’s attorney provided

Brown’s attorney with Dr. Schaeffer’s report. RT at 301. On the stand, Jason asserted the privilege

and the trial judge found that the psychotherapist-patient privilege did apply. RT at 303. Based on

assertion of the privilege, Brown’s attorney did not call Dr. Schaeffer to testify. Brown’s attorney

further stated: “Part of my decision to not call Dr. Schaeffer is because of the large amount of

testimony that I’ve already elicited from other witnesses regarding Jason Brown’s psychological

history and his condition prior to March of 1995.” RT at 304. 

The California Court of Appeal declined to rule on whether the trial court erred regarding the

application of Jason’s psychotherapist-patient privilege. Docket No. 16, Ex. N at 22. Instead, the

court concluded that even if it decided those issues in his favor, Brown could not show that he was

unduly prejudiced by the trial court’s rulings on the privilege issue. Id. The court found that nothing

in the record showed that: (1) Brown’s ability to confront and cross-examine Jason or any other

prosecution witness was hampered by the ruling; (2) while Dr. Schaeffer’s direct testimony was not

available, the court did permit Brown to use the content of the psychological report to cross examine

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2

 In Jaffee v. Redmond, 415 U.S. 1 (1996), the Supreme Court held that in the civil suit arena “a

privilege protecting confidential communications between a psychotherapist and her patient ‘promotes

sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence.’” Id. at 11–10 (quoting

Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)). 

ORDER 

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prosecution witnesses; and (3) defense counsel believed that calling Dr. Schaeffer would be cumulative

in light of the testimony of other family members regarding Jason’s psychological condition. Id. 

Due process in a the context of a criminal trial means, “in essence, the right to a fair

opportunity to defend against the [Government’s] accusations.” Chambers v. Miss., 410 U.S. 284, 294

(1973). To this end, the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment secures the right of defendants

to confront witnesses. “This right is secured for defendants in state as well as federal criminal

proceedings . . . .” Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974). The “‘primary interest secured by [the

Confrontation Clause] is the right of cross-examination.”’ Id. (quoting Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S.

415, 418 (1965). However, “the right to confront and to cross-examine is not absolute and may, in

appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.” 

Chambers v. Miss., 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973). “Even relevant and reliable evidence can be excluded

when the state interest is strong.” Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447, 1450 (9th Cir. 1983). In

Washington v. Texas the Supreme Court held that the petitioner was “denied his right to have

compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor because the State arbitrarily denied him the

right to put on the stand a witness who was physically and mentally capable of testifying . . . and whose

testimony would have been relevant and material to the defense.” 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967). The Court

noted, however, that “[n]othing in this opinion should be construed as disapproving testimonial

privileges, such as the privilege against self-incrimination or the lawyer-client or husband-wife

privileges.” Id. at n. 21.2

Here, Brown was given a fair opportunity to defend against the charges he faced. This fair

opportunity included the right to confront and cross-examine to the appropriate extent in light of the

legitimate interests protected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege. While the California Court of

Appeal declined to rule on this issue, its conclusion that no prejudice resulted therefrom is supported

by the record. Several of Brown’s family members testified to Jason’s psychological state based on

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behavior they personally observed. See Docket No. 16, Ex. N at 16–17. Jason himself testified that he

sometimes experienced delusions and had experienced psychological problems since roughly age 14. 

Id. at 14. Furthermore, Brown’s attorney acknowledged that Dr. Schaeffer’s testimony would

essentially be cumulative given the extensive testimony of other witnesses regarding Jason’s

psychological state. RT at 304. The trial court’s decision to recognize the psychotherapist-patient

privilege for communications between Jason and Dr. Schaeffer did not deprive Brown of due process

or inappropriately hamper his opportunity to confront and cross-examine. In light of the law and the

record, the California Court of Appeal’s conclusion is not contrary to, or an unreasonable application

of, clearly established federal law.

II. Accomplice Instructions

Brown argues that the trial court erred in failing to give instructions regarding the need for

corroboration of accomplice testimony and for failing to instruct that Jason was an accomplice as a

matter of law. While the trial court did not issue an accomplice as a matter of law instruction, it did

instruct on the principles of felony murder, including felony murder aider and abettor. The court also

instructed the jury on how to determine whether a witness was an aider and abettor and how to

evaluate that witness’s testimony accordingly. The California Court of Appeal concluded that,

if the decision to take the victim’s truck did not occur until after the fatal blow was struck, then

the taking of the truck amounts to theft, not robbery, and cannot support a felony murder

conviction. One version of Jason’s testimony tended to show that there had been no discussion

regarding the theft of the truck until after the fatal blow was struck. There was no evidence to

show that Jason aided and abetted in [Brown’s] premeditated murder of the victim (the other

theory presented to the jury in support of a murder conviction). Hence, it was entirely proper

for the trial court to leave the decision regarding Jason’s aider and abettor status to the jury.

 

Docket No. 16, Ex. N at 30 (internal citations omitted). 

Corroboration of accomplice testimony is not constitutionally mandated and failure to give

cautionary accomplice instructions does not implicate the Constitution. See United States v.

Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 352 (1969) (“When we look at the requirements of procedural due process,

the use of accomplice testimony is not catalogued with constitutional restrictions.”); (United States v.

Lopez, 803 F.2d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice is enough

to sustain a conviction unless the testimony is incredible or unsubstantial on its face.”); Takacs v.

Engle, 768 F.2d 122, 127 (6th Cir. 1985) (“If uncorroborated accomplice testimony is sufficient to

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support a conviction under the Constitution, there can be no constitutional right to instruct the jury that

it must find corroboration for an accomplice’s testimony.”). Inasmuch as the trial court’s failure to

instruct that Jason was an accomplice as a matter of law implicates federal law, the issue is controlled

by the deferential standards of AEDPA. The California Court of Appeal’s conclusion that given the

conflicting evidence it was not reversible error to leave the matter of Jason’s aider and abettor status to

the jury was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. See RT

at 116–17; see also United States v. Johnson, 516 F.2d 209, 213 (8th Cir. 1975) (“Where the evidence

is unclear on the question of the status of witnesses as accomplices, it is not reversible error to refuse to

name such witnesses as accomplices.”); United States v. Callis, 390 F.2d 606, 607–08 (6th Cir. 1968)

(“While the court did not charge that the witnesses in question were accomplices because it was not

clear to it that they were . . . there was no reversible error.”). 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

The petition for a writ of habeas corpus at Docket No. 13 is DENIED. The Court is of the

view that a certificate of appealability should be addressed now, rather than after Brown’s claims and

the issues they present fade with memory. The standard for granting a certificate of appealability has

been stated as follows: “Where a district court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits . . .

[t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of

the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” United States v. Zuno-Arce, 339 F.3d 886, 888–89 (9th

Cir. 2003) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). Brown has made no such showing

and a certificate of appealability will therefore be DENIED. Brown may seek a certificate of

appealability directly from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals motions panel.

Dated at Anchorage, Alaska, this 2 day of August 2005.

/s/ James K. Singleton

JAMES K. SINGLETON, JR. 

United States District Judge 

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