Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-05073/USCOURTS-ca10-91-05073-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jane A. Malone
Appellant
Mapco, Incorporated
Appellee

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

FEB 1 :;_ 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKEe 

Clerl: 

JANE A. MALONE, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

MAPCO, INCORPORATED, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) No. 91-5073 

) (D.C. No. 89-C-1029-E) 

) (N.D. Okla.) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before LOGAN and BARRETT, Circuit Judges, and KELLY,** District 

Judge. 

**Honorable Patrick F. Kelly, District Judge, United States 

District Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The case is therefore ordered 

Plaintiff appeals from an adverse judgment entered by the 

district court in favor of defendant, her former employer. She 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 91-5073 Document: 010110222520 Date Filed: 02/11/1992 Page: 1 
brought this action to redress alleged age, race, and sex 

discrimination under federal employment discrimination laws and 

under Oklahoma common law regarding wrongful discharge in 

violation of public policy. Plaintiff also complained of alleged 

sexual harassment by her supervisor, an employee of defendant. 

The district court held Oklahoma common law inapplicable in light 

of the availability of overlapping federal remedies. It dismissed 

plaintiff's claim 

in administrative 

granted summary 

of sexual harassment for failure to exhaust it 

proceedings. Finally, the district court 

judgment for defendant on the merits of 

plaintiff's discriminatory discharge claims because plaintiff was 

unable to rebut defendant's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 

for firing her. 

We begin our analysis with the summary judgment 

determination, which we review de nova using the same standard 

employed by the district court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). See 

Abercrombie v. City of Catoosa, 896 F.2d 1228, 1230 (10th Cir. 

1990). After careful review of the record, we 

district court that plaintiff failed to meet 

demonstrating, at least as a triable issue 

agree with the 

her burden of 

of fact, that 

defendant's express, nondiscriminatory reason for discharging her 

was merely a pretext to obscure the operation of age, race, and/or 

gender bias. See generally MacDonald v. Eastern Wyo. Mental 

Health Ctr., 941 F.2d 1115, 1121-22 (10th Cir. 1991); Merrick v. 

Northern Natural Gas Co., 911 F.2d 426, 430-32 (10th Cir. 1990). 

Plaintiff's state claim for wrongful discharge in violation 

of public policy, see Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24 (Okla. 

2 

Appellate Case: 91-5073 Document: 010110222520 Date Filed: 02/11/1992 Page: 2 
1989), is based on the clear legislative mandate against 

discriminatory termination articulated in the federal employment 

discrimination statutes. Given our adverse disposition of 

plaintiff's claims for discriminatory discharge asserted directly 

under the federal laws, we hold that her tort claim premised upon 

those same laws could not, in any event, prevail on the merits. 

Consequently, we need not and do not reach the legal issue upon 

which the district court's determination turned. 

Finally, we agree with the district court's rejection of 

plaintiff's claim for pre-termination sexual harassment due to her 

failure to exhaust administrative remedies, an established 

prerequisite for judicial redress of such conduct. See generally 

Gulley v. Orr, 905 F.2d 1383, 1384 (10th Cir. 1990). Plaintiff 

never so much as remotely alluded to the issue in the 

administrative charges she filed, see Appellant's App. at 30-44, 

and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) did not 

mention the matter in its initial, adverse determination, .§_gg id. 

at 45. Plaintiff did make two references to sexual harassment in 

her letter requesting administrative review. See id. at 48, 51, 

52. However, we believe that a party cannot use a request for 

administrative review of a prior agency determination to bring 

before the agency charges that are not related to those previously 

brought. Despite the exhaustion requirement, a party can sue on a 

claim that was omitted from an administrative charge if the 

omitted claim is "reasonably related" to charges made to the 

administrative agency or if the omitted claim "could reasonably be 

expected to follow" from the agency's investigation of the charge 

3 

Appellate Case: 91-5073 Document: 010110222520 Date Filed: 02/11/1992 Page: 3 
that was before it. E.g., Nicol v. Imagematrix, Inc., 767 F. 

Supp. ·744, 753 (E.D. Va. 1991). However, we hold that plaintiff's 

sexual harassment claim is not reasonably related to her claims of 

discriminatory discharge based on race, sex, and age and could not 

reasonably be expected to follow from the EEOC's investigation of 

her initial charges. Thus, plaintiff's failure to allege sexual 

harassment in her initial administrative charges precluded her 

from bringing that claim in court. 

Accordingly, the judgment of the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

James K. Logan 

Circuit Judge 

4 

Appellate Case: 91-5073 Document: 010110222520 Date Filed: 02/11/1992 Page: 4