Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca2-13-04825/USCOURTS-ca2-13-04825-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority
Appellee
Citigroup, Inc.
Appellant

Document Text:

13-4825-cv 

Citigroup, Inc. v. Abu Dhabi Investment Authority

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

August Term, 2014 

(Submitted: December 9, 2014 Decided: January 14, 2015) 

Docket No. 13-4825-cv 

________________________________________________________________________ 

CITIGROUP, INC., 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

- v. - 

ABU DHABI INVESTMENT AUTHORITY, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

________________________________________________________________________ 

Before: 

WESLEY, HALL, and LYNCH, Circuit Judges. 

 Appeal from the district court’s judgment dismissing the complaint of Citigroup, Inc. 

and compelling arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause contained in the parties’ 

contract. We hold that the “extraordinary remedies” authorized by the All Writs Act, 28 

U.S.C. § 1651, do not permit a district court to enjoin an arbitration based on whatever 

claim-preclusive effect may result from the court’s prior judgment when that judgment 

merely confirmed the result of the parties’ earlier arbitration without considering the merits 

of the underlying claims at issue in that arbitration. 

 AFFIRMED. 

LESLIE GORDON FAGEN (Brad S. Karp and Gregory F. 

Laufer, on the brief), Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & 

Garrison LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiff-Appellant 

Citigroup, Inc. 

SANFORD I. WEISBURST (Peter E. Calamari and TaiHeng Cheng, on the brief), Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & 

Sullivan, LLP, New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellee Abu 

Dhabi Investment Authority. 

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HALL, Circuit Judge: 

 

This case presents the question of whether the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), 

permits a federal district court to enjoin a second arbitration between parties to a contractual 

arbitration agreement based on what one party asserts is the claim-preclusive effect of a prior 

federal judgment confirming the result of the parties’ earlier arbitration. We hold that the 

“extraordinary remedies” authorized by the All Writs Act cannot be used to enjoin an 

arbitration based on whatever claim-preclusive effect may result from the district court’s 

prior judgment when that judgment merely confirmed the result of the parties’ earlier 

arbitration without considering the merits of the underlying claims at issue in that 

arbitration. We concur with the district court that Appellant Citigroup, Inc. has not 

demonstrated an adequate basis for an extraordinary injunction pursuant to the All Writs Act 

and affirm the judgment dismissing Citigroup’s complaint and compelling arbitration. 

BACKGROUD 

The facts are straightforward. Citigroup, Inc. and the Abu Dhabi Investment 

Authority (“ADIA”) were parties to an Investment Agreement under which ADIA invested 

billions of dollars in Citigroup. The Agreement contained an arbitration clause providing 

that “any dispute that arises out of or relates to the [Agreement], or the breach thereof, . . . 

will be decided through arbitration administered by the American Arbitration Association.” 

J.A. 163. In 2009, ADIA commenced arbitration proceedings pursuant to this clause, 

alleging that Citigroup had diluted the value of its investment by issuing preferred shares to 

other investors. See Abu Dhabi Inv. Auth. v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 12-cv-283, 2013 WL 789642, 

at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2013). It asserted claims of fraud, securities fraud, negligent 

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misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and breach of the implied 

covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Id. The arbitrators rejected ADIA’s claims and 

returned an award in favor of Citigroup after a lengthy and hard-fought proceeding that 

included extensive discovery and a multi-day hearing. Id. Citigroup moved in the United 

States District Court for the Southern District of New York for entry of an order confirming 

the award. The district court (Daniels, J.) granted Citigroup’s motion, rejecting ADIA’s 

arguments that the award should be vacated on the grounds that the arbitrators’ choice-oflaw ruling and two evidentiary rulings were made in manifest disregard of the law and 

prevented ADIA from presenting its case. See id. at *1, 9. ADIA appealed, and this Court 

affirmed, holding that the arbitrators did not act in manifest disregard of the law or exceed 

their authority. Abu Dhabi Inv. Auth. v. Citigroup, Inc., 557 F. App’x 66, 67–68 (2d Cir. Feb. 

19, 2014). 

In August 2013, while the district court’s confirmation judgment remained pending 

before this Court on appeal, ADIA served Citigroup with a new notice of arbitration 

pursuant to the Investment Agreement, again asserting claims of breach of contract and 

breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Shortly thereafter, Citigroup 

instituted this action pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, the All Writs Act, the 

Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq., and the district court’s “inherent 

authority to protect its proceedings and judgments.” By way of relief, Citigroup sought to 

enjoin the second arbitration on the ground that ADIA’s new claims were barred by the 

doctrine of claim preclusion, or res judicata, because they were or could have been raised in 

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the first arbitration.1 Citigroup maintained that the second arbitration constituted an 

“assault” on the district court’s March 2013 judgment confirming the first award, and that 

applying the All Writs Act to enjoin the second arbitration was necessary to protect the 

integrity of that judgment. ADIA moved to dismiss Citigroup’s complaint and to compel 

arbitration. 

The district court (Castel, J.) granted ADIA’s motions. After first flagging the strong 

federal policy favoring arbitration, the district court then pointed to our decision in National 

Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Belco Petroleum Corp. (“Belco”), 88 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 

1996), in which we held that the preclusive effect of a prior arbitration that had been 

confirmed by a state court was to be decided by the arbitrators, not the court. Given our 

holding in Belco, other similar decisions, and the parties’ “broad arbitration clause” governing 

“any dispute that arises out of the” Investment Agreement, the district court held that 

Citigroup’s preclusion defense was properly resolved in arbitration. See Citigroup, Inc. v. Abu 

Dhabi Inv. Auth., No. 13-cv-6073, 2013 WL 6171315, at *3–5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2013). 

Regarding Citigroup’s request to enjoin the second arbitration pursuant to the All 

Writs Act, the district court first observed that our decision in In re American Express Financial 

Advisors Securities Litigation, 672 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2011), “allow[ed] the possibility that, in 

certain circumstances, the All Writs Act could permit a court to enjoin an arbitration.” 

Citigroup, Inc., 2013 WL 6171315, at *5. The court noted, however, that we had previously 

																																																																		

1 The doctrine of claim preclusion, or res judicata, bars the subsequent litigation of any claims 

that were or could have been raised in a prior action. See Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 

452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981). 

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sanctioned the use of the Act to enjoin arbitration only when the arbitration threatened to 

undermine a longstanding federal consent judgment that encompassed extensive equitable 

relief. See Local 1814 Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, AFL-CIO v. N.Y. Shipping Ass’n, Inc., 965 F.2d 

1224, 1237–38 (2d Cir. 1992). Citigroup’s case, by contrast, presented only “garden-variety 

res judicata concerns” because there was “no separate, ongoing proceeding at risk of being 

undermined” by the second arbitration. Citigroup, Inc., 2013 WL 6171315, at *5. Accepting 

the argument that application of the All Writs Act was necessary in the circumstances of 

Citigroup’s case, the district court reasoned, would “swallow the Belco rule” because it 

“would apply to virtually any instance where a second arbitration is purportedly precluded by 

a federal court judgment confirming the first arbitration award.” Id. Accordingly, the court 

held that there was “no basis for an extraordinary remedy to issue under the All Writs Act.” 

Id. at *6. 

Citigroup timely appealed the resulting judgment. 

DISCUSSION 

 Here, it is undisputed that two sophisticated parties voluntarily contracted to 

arbitrate “any dispute” arising from or relating to their Investment Agreement. As provided 

for under the FAA, the district court’s March 2013 judgment merely confirmed the result of 

the parties’ earlier arbitration through a limited procedure that did not require consideration 

of the merits of the underlying claims. The sole issue in this appeal is whether the district 

court erred when it refused to enjoin the second arbitration pursuant to the All Writs Act 

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based on what Citigroup asserts is the claim-preclusive effect of the March 2013 judgment 

and instead compelled the parties to arbitrate ADIA’s second set of claims.2 

The resolution of this issue implicates competing considerations. On the one hand, 

the FAA expresses “a national policy favoring arbitration when the parties contract for that 

mode of dispute resolution.” Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 349 (2008). The FAA’s 

framework, moreover, authorizes the federal courts to conduct only a limited review of 

discrete issues before compelling arbitration, leaving the resolution of all other disputes to 

the arbitrators. See Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83–84 (2002). Set 

against these considerations, on the other hand, is the weighty practical concern for the 

integrity of federal judgments that could arise if parties felt free to relitigate in arbitration 

proceedings claims previously resolved by a federal court. See In re Am. Express Fin. Advisors 

Sec. Litig. (“American Express”), 672 F.3d 113, 140 (2d Cir. 2011). In recognition of this 

concern, several of our sister circuits have held that the All Writs Act, which empowers the 

federal courts to “issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective 

jurisdictions,” 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), permits district courts to enjoin arbitrations that threaten 

to undermine federal judgments. See, e.g., In re Y & A Grp. Sec. Litig., 38 F.3d 380, 382–83 

(8th Cir. 1994). Borrowing language from the Third Circuit, we have characterized these 

competing considerations as presenting “‘a high order challenge.’” American Express, 672 

F.3d at 140, 141 n.20 (quoting John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Olick, 151 F.3d 132, 138 (3d 

																																																																		

2 We review de novo the district court’s decision to compel arbitration. See Cap Gemini Ernst 

& Young, U.S., LLC v. Nackel, 346 F.3d 360, 364 (2d Cir. 2003). 

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Cir. 1998)). We now must decide the proper balance that should be struck between them in 

this case. 

In addition to manifesting a policy strongly favoring arbitration when contracted for 

by parties to a dispute, the FAA establishes a “body of federal substantive law of 

arbitrability[] applicable to any arbitration agreement within coverage of the Act,” Moses H. 

Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983), and also “supplies . . . a 

procedural framework applicable in federal courts,” Preston, 552 U.S. at 349. Under this 

framework, most disputes between parties to a binding arbitration agreement are 

“arbitrable,” meaning that they are to be decided by the arbitrators, not the courts. See 

Howsam, 537 U.S. at 83–84. There is one exception to this general rule: unless the parties 

“unmistakably” provide otherwise, courts are to decide “question[s] of arbitrability.” Id. at 

83. Such questions include disputes “about whether the parties are bound by a given 

arbitration clause” or “disagreement[s] about whether an arbitration clause in a concededly 

binding contract applies to a particular type of controversy.” Id. at 84. All other “questions 

which grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition are presumptively not for the 

judge, but for an arbitrator, to decide.” Id. at 84–85 (internal quotation marks omitted) 

(identifying time limits, notice, laches, and estoppel as examples of arbitrable questions). 

“[A]ny doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of 

arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself 

or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.” Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp., 

460 U.S. at 24–25. 

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The All Writs Act is a “residual source of authority to issue writs that are not 

otherwise covered by statute.” Penn. Bureau of Corr. v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 474 U.S. 34, 43 

(1985). Thus, while the Act authorizes a federal court to issue commands that are “necessary 

or appropriate to effectuate or prevent the frustration of orders it has previously issued in its 

exercise of jurisdiction otherwise obtained,” Sheet Metal Contractors Ass’n of N. N.J. v. Sheet 

Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, 157 F.3d 78, 82 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted), 

the remedies permitted under the Act are “extraordinary” and “should not be used simply to 

avoid the inconvenience of following statutory procedures that govern the particular 

circumstances,” United States v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of 

Am., AFL-CIO, 907 F.2d 277, 280 (2d Cir. 1990); see also Chappell & Co. v. Frankel, 367 F.2d 

197, 199–200 (2d Cir. 1966) (observing that the “prerogative writs [codified in § 1651(a)] 

have been reserved for extraordinary circumstances”). We review de novo a district court’s 

interpretation of the All Writs Act, United States v. Schurkman, 728 F.3d 129, 135 (2d Cir. 

2013), but will overturn its decision to grant or deny an injunction under the Act only upon 

identifying an abuse of discretion, see id.

In American Express, we considered an injunction that barred investors from 

arbitrating claims against a financial services company that the investors had previously 

released in a federal class action settlement over which the district court retained jurisdiction. 

672 F.3d at 118–19. Explaining that the FAA did not “explicitly confer on the judiciary the 

authority to . . . enjoin a private arbitration,” we nonetheless concluded that the injunction 

was proper in that case because the company, by entering into the settlement agreement, had 

effectively withdrawn its consent to arbitrate the released claims and the district court had 

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retained “exclusive” jurisdiction to implement the terms of that settlement agreement. See id.

at 140–41 & n.20. In so holding, we “pause[d] to note” that some of our sister circuits had 

authorized the use of the All Writs Act to enjoin arbitrations in similar circumstances to 

prevent the relitigation of federal judgments. Id. at 141 n.20 (citing cases). We found it 

unnecessary to consider whether we agreed with that practice given our conclusion that the 

district court’s authority to enter the injunction flowed from its retention of jurisdiction over 

the settlement agreement. Id. We thus left unanswered the question of “whether the 

dictates of the All Writs Act might, in another case without the type of jurisdictional 

retention present [in American Express], give a district court the authority to enjoin arbitration 

to prevent re-litigation.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

In this case the district court did not retain jurisdiction over the March 2013 

judgment, much less in a manner comparable to the court’s retention of jurisdiction over the 

settlement agreement in American Express. Citigroup contends that because American Express 

left unresolved whether the All Writs Act permits courts to enjoin an arbitration in the 

absence of such “jurisdictional retention,” Judge Castel erred when he concluded, in 

Citigroup’s words, that the court “lacked the power to prevent ADIA from frustrating the 

[c]ourt’s final judgment” by bringing new claims that were or could have been raised in the 

parties’ first arbitration. Citigroup Br. 27. We disagree with that assertion. The FAA’s 

policy favoring arbitration and our precedents interpreting that policy indicate that it is the 

arbitrators, not the federal courts, who ordinarily should determine the claim-preclusive 

effect of a federal judgment that confirms an arbitration award. Citigroup, moreover, has 

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failed to demonstrate that the circumstances of this case justify use of the federal courts’ 

authority codified in the All Writs Act to obtain a different result. 

 We reason from our prior decisions interpreting the FAA that the determination of 

the claim-preclusive effect of a prior federal judgment confirming an arbitration award is to 

be left to the arbitrators. In Belco, we held that the claim-preclusive effect of a prior 

arbitration award confirmed by a state court judgment was an issue for the arbitrators to 

decide rather than the federal court. 88 F.3d at 135–36. In so holding, we reasoned that 

claim preclusion was not a question of arbitrability because it, like other affirmative defenses 

such as time limits and laches, was a legal defense to the opposing party’s claims and, as 

such, was “itself a component of the dispute on the merits.” Id. Several months later, we 

held in United States Fire Ins. Co. v. National Gypsum Co. (“National Gypsum”) that the 

arbitrators, not the court, were also to decide whether the doctrine of issue preclusion, or 

collateral estoppel, barred a party from arbitrating certain issues that had previously been 

resolved in litigation resulting in a federal judgment. 101 F.3d 813, 816–17 (2d Cir. 1996). 

Noting that Belco involved the preclusive effect of a prior arbitration, we concluded in 

National Gypsum that its reasoning was nonetheless equally applicable to the “issue-preclusive 

effect of a prior judgment” because issue preclusion is also an affirmative defense that is 

“part of the dispute on the merits.” Id. at 817. 

 Given our holdings in Belco and National Gypsum that arbitrators are to resolve the 

claim-preclusive effect of an arbitration award confirmed by a state court and the issuepreclusive effect of a federal judgment, it is a simple intuitive step to conclude that 

arbitrators should also decide the claim-preclusive effect of a federal judgment confirming an 

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arbitral award. This is especially so because Citigroup has not challenged the validity of the 

arbitration clause at issue in this case and that clause, like the one in Belco, is sufficiently 

broad to cover any dispute over whether ADIA’s current claims were or could have been 

raised during the first arbitration. Compare Belco, 88 F.3d at 136 (dispute concerning 

applicability of claim preclusion sent to arbitrators when the arbitration clause covered “all 

disputes which may arise under or in connection with” the underlying contract), with J.A. at 

163 (arbitration clause covering “any dispute that arises out of or relates to the [Investment 

Agreement], or the breach thereof”). And even if we harbored some doubt as to whether 

the claim preclusion dispute in this case is arbitrable, we would resolve that doubt in favor of 

arbitration. See Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24–25. 

Citigroup argues that this case warrants a different result because it, unlike Belco, 

involves the claim-preclusive effect of a prior federal judgment. In support, Citigroup points 

to the various decisions we cited in American Express in which other courts have sanctioned 

the use of the All Writs Act to enjoin arbitrations that threaten federal judgments. See In re 

Y&A Grp., 38 F.3d at 382–83 (holding that the district court had authority under the All 

Writs Act to enjoin arbitration to protect its earlier consent judgment where the arbitral 

panel had declined to afford that judgment preclusive effect); Hartley v. Stamford Towers Ltd. 

P’ship, 1994 WL 463497, at *3–5 (9th Cir. Aug. 26, 1994) (unpublished) (court had authority 

pursuant to the Act to enjoin arbitration when its final judgment approving a class action 

settlement reserved jurisdiction to enforce the settlement and enjoined class members from 

bringing subsequent claims grounded in the same factual basis); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Elzanaty, 

929 F. Supp. 2d 199, 219–20 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (temporarily enjoining arbitration pursuant to 

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the Act to protect ongoing litigation in federal court after determining that it “would severely 

threaten any judgment of th[e] [c]ourt to have pending arbitrations or future arbitrations 

result in inconsistent rulings”); see also John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Olick, 151 F.3d 132, 

137–39 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that the district court, rather than the arbitrators, should have 

decided the preclusive effect of the district court’s earlier judgment on the merits). There is, 

however one significant difference between the precedent established in the cases to which 

Citigroup cites and the circumstances here. The relevant judgments given preclusive effect 

via the All Writs Act in those cases followed from federal judicial proceedings addressing the 

merits of the underlying claims. Thus, in the cases on which Citigroup relies, the main 

justification given for resorting to the All Writs Act is that the district court that resolved the 

merits of a case is in the best position to protect its judgment because it is the most familiar 

with what it considered and decided in the proceedings leading to that judgment. See, e.g., In 

re Y&A Grp. Sec. Litig., 38 F.3d at 382–83 (“The district court, and not the arbitration panel, 

is the best interpreter of its own judgment.”).3 

We need not, and do not, consider whether we agree with this justification because it 

is simply absent from this case. Citigroup seeks to preclude a second arbitration based on 

the district court’s March 2013 confirmation judgment because it fears that the second 

																																																																		

3 The limited scope of Y&A Group is underscored by the concurring opinion of the late 

Judge Richard Arnold, who specifically noted that the final order of the district court 

approving the settlement agreement in that case had specifically enjoined class members 

from brining further claims, a fact he regarded as “dispositive.” Judge Arnold went on to 

note that “[i]n general, when parties agree to submit a matter to arbitration, they contract for 

the arbitrator’s decision on legal questions . . . include[ing] defenses, such as res judicata,” 

and that he did not read the opinion “to hold general that courts may, by injunction, control 

the decision of arbitrators on questions of issue or claim preclusion.” 38 F.3d at 384. 

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arbitration will give ADIA an opportunity to relitigate the same underlying substantive 

claims that were or could have been raised in the parties’ first arbitration. The district 

court’s March 2013 judgment, however, simply confirmed the arbitration award, which 

ordinarily is “a summary proceeding that merely makes what is already a final arbitration 

award a judgment of the court.” D.H. Blair & Co., Inc. v. Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95, 110 (2d Cir. 

2006) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 9 U.S.C. §§ 10, 11 (setting forth the limited 

statutory grounds under which a district court may vacate or modify an arbitration award);

Willemijn Houdstermaatschappij, BV v. Standard Microsystems Corp., 103 F.3d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1997) 

(“[T]he court’s function in confirming or vacating an arbitration award is severely limited.” 

(internal quotation marks omitted)).4 Indeed, in confirming the award, the district court did 

not review the merits of any of ADIA’s substantive claims or the context in which those 

claims arose. Instead, it considered only whether the arbitration panel’s evidentiary rulings 

and application of New York choice-of-law principles violated the FAA. See generally Abu 

Dhabi Inv. Auth. v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 12-cv-283, 2013 WL 789642 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2013). 

Under these circumstances, a district court unfamiliar with the underlying circumstances, 

transactions, and claims, is not the best interpreter of what was decided in the arbitration 

																																																																		

4 Citigroup itself observed in its memorandum of law in support of its motion to confirm the 

award that “[a]rbitration awards are subject to severely limited judicial review” and that, 

under the FAA, “a court must confirm an arbitration award unless it concludes that one of 

the enumerated grounds for refusing to enforce the award is present.” See Abu Dhabi Inv. 

Auth. v. Citigroup Inc., S.D.N.Y. dkt no. 12-cv-283, doc. 28 at 11 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

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proceedings, the result of which it merely confirmed.5 Accord Emp’rs Ins. Co. of Wausau v. 

OneBeacon Am. Ins. Co., 744 F.3d 25, 28–29 (1st Cir. 2014) (reasoning that because a federal 

judgment confirming an arbitration award “does not address the steps leading to the 

decision on the merits,” there is “no reason why that [judgment] should give the federal 

court the exclusive power to determine the preclusive effect of the arbitration”); Chiron Corp 

v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 207 F.3d 1126, 1133–34 (9th Cir. 2000) (reasoning that the policy 

underlying vesting district courts with authority to determine the claim-preclusive effect of 

their own judgments “is not served . . . when the district court merely confirmed the 

decision issued by another entity, the arbitrator, and was not uniquely qualified to ascertain 

[the] scope and preclusive effect” of that decision). Thus, even assuming, as we stated in 

American Express, that there “might” be circumstances under which the All Writs Act 

authorizes district courts to enjoin arbitration to prevent relitigation of their prior judgments, 

this case does not present them. 6 

																																																																		

5 We note also that the district judge who denied Citigroup’s request to enjoin the second 

arbitration pursuant to the All Writs Act was not the judge who originally confirmed the 

result of the first arbitration. Compare Citigroup, Inc. v. Abu Dhabi Inv. Auth., No. 13-cv-6073, 

2013 WL 6171315, at *3–5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2013) (Castel, J.), with Abu Dhabi Inv. Auth., 

2013 WL 789642, at *1 (Daniels, J.). 

6 Citigroup’s claim preclusion argument is premised only on the resolution of ADIA’s 

underlying substantive claims raised in the first arbitration. Citigroup does not argue, in 

other words, that we should give preclusive effect to the district court’s determination in its 

March 2013 decision that the first arbitration panel’s evidentiary rulings and choice-of-law 

decision did not violate the FAA. We express no opinion as to whether the All Writs Act 

would authorize the district court to enjoin an arbitration that threatens to undermine the 

district court’s resolution of one of those issues. 

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One additional consideration supports our conclusion. Were we to agree with 

Citigroup that the preclusive effect of federal confirmation judgments should be decided by 

the courts, we would effectively create in this circuit a hierarchy of judgments confirming 

arbitration awards: the claim-preclusive effect of confirmation judgments issued by state 

courts would, pursuant to Belco, always be decided by the arbitrators, while the claimpreclusive effect of federal confirmation judgments may be decided by the federal courts 

pursuant to their authority under the All Writs Act. This seems an anomalous result, 

especially because we are required to afford state-court judgments full faith and credit, see 28 

U.S.C. § 1738, and are obliged to accord recognition to the preclusive effect of state court 

judgments, see Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95–96 (1980). Citigroup has not explained why 

it is an appropriate use of the All Writs Act’s “extraordinary remedies” to treat state and 

federal confirmation judgments differently. The better rule, we think, is to treat them the 

same and, in line with Belco and National Gypsum, permit the arbitrators to determine the 

preclusive effect of both. 

In a final sally, Citigroup argues that if we do not permit the use of the All Writs Act 

to protect federal judgments confirming arbitration awards, we effectively would be 

relegating those judgments to “second-class status” as compared to federal judgments 

following from proceedings on the merits. This outcome, it posits, would be violative of the 

FAA, which provides that an order confirming an arbitral award “shall have the same force 

and effect, in all respects, as, and be subject to all the provisions of law relating to, a 

judgment in an action.” 9 U.S.C. § 13. But Citigroup’s argument presents a false choice. 

The question before us is not whether federal judgments confirming arbitration awards 

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should be given less preclusive “force and effect” than other federal judgments.7 The 

relevant question is instead when, if ever, a federal court’s interest in protecting the integrity 

of prior federal judgments authorizes it to use the All Writs Act to reserve for itself the 

exclusive prerogative to determine the claim-preclusive effect of those judgments. In 

answer, we hold only that when the prior federal judgment merely confirmed an arbitration 

award through a limited procedure that did not involve consideration of the merits of the 

underlying claims, the FAA’s framework favoring the submission of disputes to arbitration 

and our precedents in cases addressing comparable issues preclude a district court from 

using the All Writs Act to enjoin a subsequent arbitration of claims that one party asserts are 

barred by the prior arbitration. 

CONCLUSION

 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

																																																																		

7 Indeed, Citigroup has made no effort to demonstrate that an arbitration panel would not 

give claim-preclusive effect to the district court’s March 2013 confirmation judgment if 

appropriate. 

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