Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02146/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02146-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Brion Dodd Johnson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-2146

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Northern

* District of Iowa.

Brion Dodd Johnson, *

*

Defendant - Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: October 12, 2005

Filed: March 9, 2006

___________

Before BYE, BEAM, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

BYE, Circuit Judge.

Brion Dodd Johnson challenges his convictions and sentence for knowingly

possessing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2),

and knowingly receiving child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)

and (b)(1). We reverse.

I

The events leading to Johnson's convictions began when his former girlfriend,

Evonne Huston, delivered three compact discs (CDs) containing visual depictions of

child pornography to the Marion, Iowa, police department. Huston told police she

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obtained the CDs from Tony Herman, Johnson's roommate, whom she claimed told

her Johnson was in possession of child pornography. Based on this information,

police obtained a search warrant and seized a computer tower and a server containing

nine hard drives. Police also seized printed material from Johnson's bedroom

consisting of two fictionalized accounts entitled "Whore Child" and "Revenge is

Sweet," detailing the abduction and forcible rape of a thirteen-year-old girl and the

incestuous rape of a fifteen-year-old girl. At trial, Johnson's fiancée testified Johnson

downloaded the stories from a client's computer to show the client the computer had

been used to access objectionable material.

 

 Authorities sent the computers to a forensic laboratory for analysis. The

analysis determined there were hundreds of thousands of files on the server, including

201 zip files containing images of child pornography. Twelve of the files had been

opened or unzipped, while the remaining files remained zipped. The forensic analysis

showed the zip files containing child pornography, including the twelve unzipped

files, were last accessed within a matter of seconds of each other. At trial, Johnson

argued this proved he did not view any of the images because it would be impossible

to unzip and view over 200 images in a matter of seconds.

The government presented evidence showing the zip files were downloaded to

a directory in Johnson's computer named "Bri [Brion's] zips," meaning Johnson

intentionally saved them to a file bearing his name. Further, each of the files was

password protected indicating Johnson intended to restrict access to them. Johnson,

however, argued the downloaded zip files were password protected before he

downloaded them by whoever created the larger file from which they were

downloaded.

In addition to the forensic evidence, the government called Johnson's roommate,

Herman, who testified he had on at least one occasion seen Johnson viewing child

pornography on his computer. Herman testified Johnson told him he had accessed the

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content inadvertently and immediately deleted it – Herman confirmed Johnson had

deleted some child pornography. Herman, however, also testified Johnson told him

he accessed the prohibited material while working with authorities to uncover child

pornography – a claim Johnson stipulated at trial was untrue. Finally, Herman

testified Johnson told him he was concerned police might find prohibited material on

his computer in a password-protected zip file. 

The government also presented testimony from Johnson's friend, Joe Tallman,

who testified Johnson attempted to explain away the investigation into his computer

use as arising out of his attempts to help authorities locate "bad websites." According

to Tallman, Johnson told him the investigation began when three CDs containing

information related to the investigation went missing and were turned over to police

by a confidential informant. 

The government next presented the testimony of four registered sex offenders

with whom Johnson was housed while awaiting trial, who testified Johnson admitted

1) he had child pornography on his computer, 2) the CDs turned over to the police

were his, 3) he knew how to locate child pornography on the computer, and 4) he was

going to trial because there was no way he could get caught.

Finally, the government offered the two stories found in Johnson's bedroom

under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Over Johnson's objection, the

district court admitted the evidence because "the stories demonstrate defendant's

interest in and predisposition to possess child pornography." The trial court instructed

the jury it could consider the evidence to prove Johnson's "inherent tendency to

commit the acts charged in the Indictment."

Johnson testified the CDs turned over to police by Huston were not made with

any software on his computer and only one of the images contained on the CDs was

located on his computer. Johnson further testified Huston was motivated by

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vindictiveness and gave the CDs to police to frame him. Johnson also claimed the

files were downloaded inadvertently and he never viewed any of the prohibited

material.

The jury convicted Johnson, and at sentencing the district court imposed various

enhancements, including a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice. The

district court concluded the enhancement was warranted because Johnson lied during

his testimony. Based on an adjusted base offense level of thirty and a criminal history

category of III, Johnson's guideline sentencing range was 121 to 151 months. The

district court sentenced Johnson to 151 months and stated "even if I am wrong about

the computation of the advisory guideline sentence, [] my sentence would be the same,

because it is reasonable after considering the balance of the [18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)]

factors."

On appeal, Johnson argues 1) the district court erred in admitting the stories

under Rule 404(b), 2) the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdicts of

guilty, and 3) the district court erred in applying a sentencing enhancement for

obstruction of justice under United States Sentencing Guidelines § 3C1.1.

II

Johnson argues the district court erred by admitting the stories about the rape

of two teenage girls under Rule 404(b). He contends the evidence was inadmissible

because it was only offered to prove his criminal disposition and was unfairly

prejudicial.

 

Rule 404(b) states: "Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible

to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith."

The rule excludes evidence of specific bad acts used to circumstantially prove a

person has a propensity to commit acts of that sort. Propensity evidence, whether of

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a person's general character or examples of specific bad acts, is ordinarily excluded

because of the likelihood the jury may misuse it. 

Character evidence is of slight probative value and may be very

prejudicial. It tends to distract the trier of fact from the main question of

what actually happened on the particular occasion. It subtly permits the

trier of fact to reward the good man and to punish the bad man because

of their respective characters despite what the evidence in the case shows

actually happened. 

Fed. R. Evid. 404 advisory committee notes (1972).

Rule 404(b) provides, however, evidence of prior bad acts "may . . . be

admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." Rule

404(b) is thus "a rule of inclusion rather than exclusion and admits evidence of other

crimes or acts relevant to any issue in the trial, unless it tends to prove only criminal

disposition." United States v. Simon, 767 F.2d 524, 526 (8th Cir. 1985) (internal

quotations omitted). Thus, evidence of prior bad acts "probative of the crime charged"

is not excluded under Rule 404(b), United States v. DeLuna, 763 F.2d 897, 913 (8th

Cir. 1985), and we will only find error in a 404(b) question if the district court abused

its discretion, Simon, 767 F.2d at 526.

Other acts evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b) if it is 1) relevant to a

material issue raised at trial, 2) similar in kind and close in time to the crime charged,

3) supported by sufficient evidence to support a jury finding the defendant committed

the other act, and 4) its probative value is not substantially outweighed by its

prejudicial value. United States v. Kern, 12 F.3d 122, 124-25 (8th Cir. 1993).

The government argues the evidence was admissible under Rule 404(b) because

it was probative of the crime charged. It contends the evidence was properly admitted

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because, according to the district court, it demonstrated Johnson's "predisposition" to

possess child pornography and his "inherent tendency" to commit the crimes charged

in the indictment. Johnson argues evidence of propensity to commit acts of a certain

type is clearly inadmissible under Rule 404(b), United States v. Heidebur, 122 F.3d

577, 579 (8th Cir. 1997), and the district court's stated basis for admitting the evidence

was erroneous and an abuse of discretion. We agree. Rule 404(b) precludes

propensity evidence and we see no relevant distinction between it and evidence

tending to prove a predisposition or inherent tendency.

 

Nonetheless, the government contends Johnson has misconstrued the district

court's ruling. It argues the court used the words "inherent tendency" and

"predisposition" to mean the evidence was relevant to prove Johnson knowingly and

intentionally possessed the prohibited material and to disprove any claim of mistake.

According to the government, the stories, like some of the images of child

pornography found on Johnson's computer, depict acts of violence perpetrated against

young girls, and the similarities demonstrate his interest in such materials. In other

words, a person who possesses written material of the sort involved here is more likely

to knowingly possess or receive child pornography of a similar ilk.

 

This argument is essentially the same one rejected in United States v. Heidebur.

In Heidebur, the defendant was charged with knowingly possessing sexually explicit

photographs of his twelve-year-old stepdaughter. Id. at 578. At trial, the government

offered testimony from the defendant's wife who stated she caught him alone with the

daughter in a locked bedroom just days before discovering the photographs. Id. at

579. The wife testified she accused the defendant of sexually abusing her daughter

and he confessed. Id. The government also offered the testimony of an FBI agent

who stated the defendant confessed to having sexual contact with his stepdaughter and

to taking the sexually explicit photographs. Id. The defendant was convicted, and on

appeal argued the district court erred in admitting the evidence under Rule 404(b),

because it was improper propensity evidence. The government argued the admission

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was proper because "evidence that the defendant had sexually exploited his

stepdaughter tends to show that he knowingly possessed explicit photos of her." Id.

at 581. At oral argument, the government went even further and argued the evidence

was admissible because it was more probable a person who was having a sexual

relationship with a twelve-year-old would possess explicit sexual photographs of the

child than would someone who was not having such a relationship. Id. at 581 n.4. We

rejected the argument, holding: "This . . . is virtually the definition of inadmissible

propensity evidence. We cannot see any way in which the defendant's abuse of his

stepdaughter is probative of his knowing possession of the photographs, other than by

establishing a propensity for these kinds of crimes." Id.

 

In this case, the government argues Johnson's possession of stories about the

rape of young girls proves he is more likely to knowingly possess child pornography

because it demonstrates he has a particular "type of interest." We see no difference

between the government's failed argument in Heidebur and the argument advanced to

this court. Here, the government is also arguing the evidence was admissible because

it proves Johnson had a propensity to possess such materials. Moreover, we do not

believe the evidence directly rebuts Johnson's claim he mistakenly downloaded the

prohibited images. Johnson does not claim the visual depictions found on his

computer are not readily identifiable as prohibited child pornography. Rather, he

contends he inadvertently downloaded the images while searching for legitimate

online material. Offering the stories added nothing to aid the jury in determining

whether child pornography could be inadvertently downloaded. Instead, it encouraged

the jury to conclude Johnson intentionally and knowingly sought out images of child

pornography because he had a propensity to possess such materials. Accordingly, we

reject the government's proffered justification for offering the 404(b) evidence. 

 

The government next cites several cases holding Rule 404(b) permits the

introduction of evidence showing predisposition. These cases, however, do not

support the government's position because in each the defendant asserted an

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entrapment defense, and "where a defendant employs entrapment as a defense to

criminal liability, prior bad acts relevant to a defendant's predisposition to commit a

crime are highly probative and can overcome the Rule 404(b) bar." United States v.

Horn, 277 F.3d 48, 57 (1st Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). Here, Johnson is making no

claim of entrapment. 

There is no dispute Johnson downloaded files containing child pornography

onto his computer. Whether he did so knowingly, however, is disputed. The

discovery of the two printed stories in his bedroom, other than suggesting he is

someone who likes child-related pornography, does nothing to further the

government's claim he knew the computer files contained prohibited material. In light

of the district court's stated reasons for admitting the evidence, and its instructions to

the jury to consider the stories as evidence of Johnson's predisposition and inherent

tendency to commit the crimes charged, we conclude it was error to admit the

evidence under Rule 404(b).

Despite the district court's abuse of discretion, the government argues any error

was harmless.

 

Under Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, erroneous

evidentiary rulings that do not implicate constitutional rights are

harmless "if the reviewing court, after viewing the entire record,

determines that no substantial rights of the defendant were affected, and

that the error did not influence or had only a slight influence on the

verdict." In other words, evidentiary error requires reversal "only if the

jury may have been substantially swayed by the improperly-admitted

evidence." 

Heidebur, 122 F.3d at 581 (internal citations omitted).

 

The government presented evidence tending to show Johnson knowingly

possessed and received the child pornography discovered on his computer. The

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evidence, however, was not overwhelming. Johnson argued the files were

inadvertently downloaded and the government failed to establish he knew they

contained child pornography. In support of his claim, Johnson presented evidence

showing the files were downloaded while using an internet-based file-sharing program

and were never viewed. Additionally, though Johnson admitted he mistakenly

downloaded child pornography on occasion, Herman testified Johnson immediately

deleted the material when the content became apparent. Johnson also argued the

testimony of his cell mates should be disregarded because it was unspecific and each

was a convicted sex offender who testified as part of a deal with the prosecution.

Finally, Johnson presented evidence indicating Huston lied to police about his

possession of child pornography because the images on the CDs she gave police did

not match up with images on his computer, the CDs had been made on a different

computer, and Herman testified he did not give the CDs to Houston or tell her Johnson

was in possession of child pornography. 

To the extent the jury may have harbored doubts about whether Johnson knew

the files he downloaded contained child pornography, there was no doubt he

knowingly possessed the highly objectionable printed material. A vacillating juror,

told to consider the stories as evidence of propensity or inherent tendency, may have

concluded Johnson's possession of the stories was sufficient to bridge any doubts

about whether he knowingly possessed the child pornography. Because we cannot say

the improperly admitted evidence did not influence or had only a slight influence on

the verdict, we conclude the error was not harmless. See Heidebur, 122 F.3d at 581

(holding the Rule 404(b) error was not harmless despite uncontested evidence

showing the defendant confessed to taking the pictures).

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III

The order and judgment of the district court is reversed and the case is

remanded for a new trial. Because we reverse and remand we need not address

Johnson's remaining claims.

______________________________

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