Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-93-06144/USCOURTS-ca10-93-06144-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Aetna Casualty and Surety Company
Amicus Curiae
Continental Insurance Company
Appellee
Downtown Airpark, Inc.
Appellant
Fireman's Fund Insurance Company
Appellee
Insurance Environmental Litigation Association
Amicus Curiae

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

. FILED 

Umted States Court or App~ll 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 0 5 1995 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

MACKLANBURG- DUNCAN CO. ; MAGNETIC 

PERIPHERALS, INC.; MCDONNELL 

DOUGLAS CORPORATION; PPG 

INDUSTRIES; WEYERHAUSER COMPANY; 

WOLVERINE CORPORATION, 

vs. 

Plaintiffs-Appellants 

and Cross-Appellees, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

AETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY; ) 

·CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY; ) 

INTERSTATE FIRE AND CASUALTY ) 

COMPANY; STONEWALL INSURANCE ) 

COMPANY, ) 

Defendants-Appellees 

and Cross-Appellants 

and 

HOME INDEMNITY COMPANY, 

Defendant. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

DOWNTOWN AIRPARK, INC., a Delaware) 

corporation, ) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

vs. 

CONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 

a New Hampshire corporation; 

FIREMAN'S FUND INSURANCE COMPANY, 

a California corporation, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

Nos. 93-6143 

93-6163 

No. 93-6144 

Appellate Case: 93-6144 Document: 01019280234 Date Filed: 12/05/1995 Page: 1 
vs. ) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

ROYAL N."HARDAGE; UNITED STATES 

POLLUTION CONTROL; OKLAHOMA 

NATIONAL STOCKYARDS COMPANY; 

DAL-WORTH, INDUSTRIES; DOUBLE 

EAGLE; SAMUEL BISHKIN, doing 

business as Eltex Chemical; L 

BEARING COMPANY; KERR-MCGEE 

CORPORATION; CATO OIL; PPG 

INDUSTRIES; THE FIRESTONE TIRE 

AND RUBBER COMPANY; FOSTER FEED & 

SEED CO.; TEXACO, INC.; POWELL 

SANITATION SERVICE, INC., 

& s ) 

) 

) 

Defendants, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

HARDAGE STEERING COMMITTEE ) 

MEMBERS: ADVANCE CHEMICAL ) 

DISTRIBUTION, INC.; ALLIED-SIGNAL, ) 

INC.; AT&T TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; ) 

ASHLAND OIL, INC.; ATLANTIC ) 

RICHFIELD COMPANY; BORG-WARNER ) 

CORPORATION; EXXON CORPORATION; ) 

GENCORP, INC.; BULL HN INFORMATION) 

SYSTEMS INC.; MAREMONT CORPORATION;) 

MCDONNELL-DOUGLAS CORPORATION; ) 

MOBIL CHEMICAL COMPANY; NALCO ) 

CHEMICAL COMPANY; OKLAHOMA GAS & ) 

ELECTRIC COMPANY; THE OKLAHOMA ) 

PUBLISHING COMPANY; ROCKWELL ) 

INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION; TEXAS ) 

INSTRUMENTS, INCORPORATED; ) 

UNIROYAL, INC. ; UOP, INC. ; ) 

WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION; ) 

WEYERHAEUSER COMPANY; DIFFEE MOTOR ) 

COMPANY; FRUEHAUF CORPORATION, ) 

Fruehauf Division; FRUEHAUF ) 

CORPORATION, doing business as ) 

Hobbs Trailer; MCALESTER PUBLIC ) 

SCHOOLS; BOB MCBROOM, doing ) 

business as American Furniture ) 

Stripping, individually; SOONER ) 

FORD TRUCK SALES, INC., ) 

vs. 

Defendants-Third-PartyPlaintiffs-Appellants 

and Defendants-Third-PartyPlaintiffs-Appellees, 

A. H. BELO, doing business as 

Dallas Morning News; JOC OIL, 

-2-

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Nos. 93-6158 

93-6181 

Appellate Case: 93-6144 Document: 01019280234 Date Filed: 12/05/1995 Page: 2 
Morning News; ACME FENCE & IRON 

CO.; ALAMO GROUP TEXAs, INC.; AAR ) 

OKLAHOMA, INC.; AIRCRAFTSMAN, INC.;) 

AGNEW AUTO PARTS; AMERICAN ) 

NATIONAL CAN CORPORATION; ANADITE, ) 

INC.; ARROW TANK TRUCKS; AZTEC ) 

MANUFACTURING; ARROW INDUSTRIES; ) 

AVIALL OF TEXAS, INC.; BASF; BETZ ) 

LABORATORIES, INC.; BLANKS ) 

ENGRAVING; BEAZERS MATERIALS; ) 

BLACKWELL ZINC COMPANY, INC.; ) 

BROADWAY MACHINE & MOTOR SUPPLY, ) 

INC.; THE BUCKET SHOP, INC.; ) 

CHARLES MACHINE WORKS, INC.; ) 

CONTAINER SUPPLY, INC.; CARNATION ) 

COMPANY; CONTAINER CORP. OF ) 

AMERICA; CONTINENTAL CAN COMPANY, ) 

INC.; COOK PAINT & VARNISH CO.; ) 

CTU OF DELAWARE; COUNTRY HOME MEAT ) 

COMPANY; DART INDUSTRIES; DELTA ) 

FAUCET COMPANY; DEL PAINT ) 

CORPORATION; DIXICO, INC.; ) 

DOWNTOWN AIRPARK, INC.; DRILEX ) 

SYSTEMS, INC.; DUBOIS CHEMICALS, ) 

INC.; DRESSER INDUSTRIES, INC.; ) 

DRILLERS ENGINE & SUPPLY, INC.; ) 

FISHER CONTROLS; GAF; E C ) 

INDUSTRIES; FRED JONES ) 

MANUFACTURING COMPANY; GENERAL ) 

DYNAMICS; GENERAL MOTORS ) 

CORPORATION; GLIDDEN COMPANY; SCM ) 

CORPORATION; GROENDYKE TRANSPORT, ) 

INC.; GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY; ) 

GOODYEAR TIRE AND RUBBER, INC.; ) 

H. W. ALLEN; HUDIBERG CHEVROLET; ) 

INGERSOLL-RAND OILFIELD PRODUCTS ) 

COMPANY; HINDERLITER TOOL; ) 

JOHNSON CONTROLS, INC.; JOHNSON & ) 

JOHNSON MEDICAL, INC.; ORTHO ) 

PHARMACEUTICAL CORP.; ) 

JOHNSON-JOHNSON HOSPITAL; SURGIKOS,) 

INC.; KELLY MOORE PAINT; KERR ) 

GLASS MANUFACTURING; JONES-BLAIR ) 

CO.; LAIDLAW WASTE; W. J. ) 

LAMBERTON; MASTER MOTOR ) 

REBUILDERS, INC.; FIXTURE MORRIS ) 

CO.; MADIX; GEORGE MCKIDDIE, doing) 

business as Capitol Grease Co.; ) 

MOTOROLLA; NORTHROP WORLDWIDE ) 

AIRCRAFT, doing business as Earl D.) 

Mills; PACKAGING CORPORATION OF ) 

AMERICA; PARKER-HANNIFIN CORP.; ) 

O'BRIEN CORPORATION; PRINTPACK, ) 

INC.; PROCTOR & GAMBLE ) 

-3-

Appellate Case: 93-6144 Document: 01019280234 Date Filed: 12/05/1995 Page: 3 
MANUFACTURING CO.; QUEBECOR ) 

PRINTING; MAXWELL COMMUNICATION; ) 

RIVERSIDE PRESS; RELIANCE ) 

UNIVERSAL, INC.; ROTEX CORPORATION;) 

SHERWIN WILLIAMS COMPANY; STAR ) 

MANUFACTURING; SERMATECH; ) 

SOUTHWEST ELECTRIC COMPANY; ) 

STEARNS & FOSTER BEDDING; SUSAN ) 

CRANE; SUBLETT & ASSOCIATES, INC.; ) 

TECCOR ELECTRONICS, INC.; TRW, ) 

INC.; TURBODEL; UNITED PLATING ) 

WORKS, INC.; VALLEY STEEL PRODUCTS ) 

COMPANY; UNIT PARTS COMPANY; ) 

UNITED STATES BRASS CORPORATION; ) 

VAN DER HORST USA; WASTE ) 

MANAGEMENT OF OKLAHOMA; WESTERN ) 

UNIFORM & TOWEL SERVICE; ZOECON ) 

CORPORATION; XEROX; MAGNETIC ) 

PERIPHERALS, INC.; CONSOLIDATED ) 

CLEAN.; ABCO, INC.; ADVANCE ) 

PACKAGING, INC.; AMEDCO STEEL ) 

INC.; AMERICAN TRAILERS; ANTHES ) 

INC., doing business as Anthes ) 

Hi-Reach; ARTHUR G. MCGEE & ) 

COMPANY; B & J TANK TRUCK SERVICE, ) 

INC.; B. W. SOLUTIONS, INC.; BACON) 

TRANSPORT COMPANY, INC.; BEAUTY ) 

CRAFT VANITIES; BLACKWELL ) 

INDUSTRIAL; PAUL BOONE, formerly ) 

doing business as Lawton Plating ) 

Co., individually; C & H SERVICES, ) 

INC.; CMI CORPORATION; CENTRAL ) 

OKLAHOMA EQUIPMENT CORPORATION; ) 

CIMARRON AIRCRAFT CORPORATION; ) 

CIMARRON MANUFACTURING COMPANY; ) 

CLIFTCO, INC.; DAY INTERNATIONAL ) 

CORPORATION; D-MAC LEASING, INC.; ) 

EUREKA TOOL COMPANY; FERRIS ) 

RESOURCES, INC.; HOBBS TRAILER; ) 

VERNON GARNEY, doing business as ) 

Auto Saver, individually; GLIDDEN ) 

COATING, a Division of SCM ) 

Corporation; HAMM & PHILLIPS ) 

SERVICE COMPANY; INDUSTRIAL ) 

FABRICATION CO.; JACKIE COOPER ) 

OLDS-GMC, INC.; JAMES BUTE ) 

COMPANY; WILLIAM JENKINS, doing ) 

business as Foster Septic Tank, ) 

individually; J. F. SMITH & SONS, ) 

INC.; KELSEY-HAYES CORPORATION, ) 

also known as Kelsey Axle & ) 

Brakes Co.; BILL LANCE; LARRY ) 

GOAD & COMPANY; LASSITER ) 

ENTERPRISES, INC.; MATERIALS ) 

-4-

Appellate Case: 93-6144 Document: 01019280234 Date Filed: 12/05/1995 Page: 4 
RECOVERY ENTERPRISES, INC.; RAY ) 

MCGEE, doing business as Quality ) 

Drum Service, individually; GREASE ) 

COMPANY; MEDLEY MATERIAL HANDLING ) 

INC.; METROPLEX SANITATION, INC.; ) 

MISTLETOE EXPRESS SERVICE, INC.; ) 

NAPKO CORPORATION; NEWMAN BROS. ) 

TRUCKING COMPANY; NOBLE CHEMICAL ) 

CORPORATION; THE CITY OF NORMAN; ) 

OKLAHOMA TANK SERVICE; OKLAHOMA ) 

TRANSPORTATION COMPANY; PAGE ) 

INDUSTRIES, INC.; POWELL ELECTRIC ) 

MANUFACTURING COMPANY; GEORGE ) 

POWELL, doing business as Powell ) 

Service Company, individually; ) 

PREMIER INDUSTRIAL CORP., doing ) 

business as Kent Industries; RWR ) 

STEEL COMPANY; RABAR ENTERPRISES, ) 

INC.; RAM TRANSPORTS, INC.; ) 

RELIANCE UNIVERSAL INC.; S & S ) 

PLATING COMPANY; SOLVENT ) 

MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC.; ) 

SOONER OIL PATCH SERVICES, INC.; ) 

SPECTOR RED BALL, INC.; ) 

STEELCRAFT, INC.; SUNWEST ) 

INDUSTRIES OF OKLAHOMA, INC.; ) 

RAYMOND SWITZER, doing business as ) 

Switaer & Gypsum Lime Company, ) 

individually; T.I.P., INC.; ) 

THERMO KING SALES & SERVICE OF ) 

OKLAHOMA, INC.; TRIANGLE ) 

ENGINEERING COMPANY; TRIGG ) 

DRILLING COMPANY, INC.; VICTOR ) 

EQUIPMENT CO.; WASTE SERVICES, ) 

INC.; WELCH ENTERPRISES, INC.; ) 

JIM WESLEY, doing business as ) 

Jim's Septic Tank, individually; ) 

WESTERN COMMERCIAL TRANSPORT, ) 

INC.; WESTRAN CORPORATION; WITCO, ) 

INC.; XAL CORPORATION; THOMAS ) 

ENGEL; A-BETTER SANITATION SERVICE,) 

INC.; REAGENT CHEMICAL & RESEARCH, ) 

INC.; SUN EXPLORATION & PROD. CO.; ) 

CAMERON IRON WORKS; J.C. PENNEY ) 

CO., INC.; ROHM & HAAS SEEDS, ) 

INC.; PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY; ) 

SOUTH PRAIRIE CONSTRUCTION CO.; ) 

THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTE FE ) 

RAILWAY COMPANY; NORDAM CORP.; ) 

NATIONAL CAN CORP.; LAND & MARINE ) 

RENTAL CO., formerly known as ) 

Tesoro Land & Marine Rental Co.; ) 

CROWL MACHINE & HEAT TREATING CO.; ) 

CRANE CARRIER CO.; CORNING GLASS ) 

-5-

Appellate Case: 93-6144 Document: 01019280234 Date Filed: 12/05/1995 Page: 5 
WORKS; OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL; JOHN ) 

ZINK CO.; DURA-CHROME INDUSTRIES, ) 

INC.; THE DOW CHEMICAL CO., also ) 

known as Dow Industrial Service ) 

of the Dow Chemical Co.; Dowell ) 

Division of the Dow Chemical Co. ) 

& Brasos Oil & Gas Division of ) 

the Dow Chemical Co.; IUTS ) 

LIQUIDATING CORP., formerly known ) 

as Industrial Uniform & Towel ) 

Supply Inc.; CLYDE'S CARBURETOR ) 

SERVICE, INC.; AMOCO PROD. CO., ) 

formerly known as Pan American ) 

Petroleum; DOVER RESOURCES, INC; ) 

HUDIBURG CHEVROLET, INC.; AMF ) 

TUBOSCOPE; EASON OIL CO.; ) 

FOX-SMYTHE TRANSPORTATION CO.; ) 

INTERNATIONAL CRYSTAL MFG. CO.; ) 

KOBE, INC.; NELSON ELECTRIC, POWER) 

SERVICE, INC.; NEWSPAPER PRINTING ) 

CORPORATION; RYDER TRUCK RENTAL, ) 

INC., formerly known as Wilco ) 

Truck Rental, Inc.; SOUTHWEST ) 

ELECTRIC COMPANY; STAR MFG. CO. OF ) 

OKLAHOMA; CORKEN INTERNATIONAL ) 

CORP., formerly known as Corken ) 

Pump Co.; GLOW-LITE CORP., ) 

(ARTRA); FORD MOTOR CO.; MONSANTO ) 

COMPANY; CONOCO, INC.; WILLIAM C. ) 

WHITEHEAD; ILENE J. WHITEHEAD; ) 

E. I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS & CO.; ) 

CONTINENTAL OIL CO.; DAY ) 

INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, ) 

(Electric Hose & Rubber) ; CENTRAL ) 

SALES PROMOTION, INC.; W & W ) 

STEEL CO.; CHROMALLOY AMERICAN; ) 

BRITTAIN BROTHERS; ICO, INC., ) 

formerly known as Fodco, Inc., ) 

formerly known as Sucker Rod ) 

Service, formerly known as Rodcore,) 

Inc.; HOMCO INTERNATIONAL, doing ) 

business as A-1 Bit & Tool; TOM ) 

BROWN'S OPTICAL SERVICE, INC., ) 

FARMERS HOME ADMINISTRATION, ) 

) 

Third-Party-Defendants, ) 

) 

RALPH L. LOWE, ) 

) 

Fourth-Party-Defendant, ) 

) 

and ) 

) 

-6-

Appellate Case: 93-6144 Document: 01019280234 Date Filed: 12/05/1995 Page: 6 
) 

) 

AETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY; ) 

CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY; ) 

INTERSTATE FIRE AND CASUALTY ) 

COMPANY; STONEWALL INSURANCE ) 

COMPANY, ) 

Garnishee-Appellees and 

Garnishee-Appellants. 

) 

) 

) 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. Nos. CIV-92-1650-A; CIV-91-673-A; and CIV-86-1402-W) 

Susan L. Gates (Michael D. Graves with her on the brief) of Hall, 

Estill, Hardwick, Gable, Golden & Nelson, P.C., Tulsa, Oklahoma, 

for Plaintiffs-Appellants and Cross-Appellees in Appeal Nos. 

93-6143 and 93-6163, and Defendants-Third-Party-PlaintiffsAppellants and Defendants-Third-Party-Plaintiffs-Appellees in 

Appeal Nos. 93-6158 and 93-6181. 

F. Thomas Cordell, Jr., of Huckaby, Fleming, Frailey, Chaffin & 

Darrah, Chickasha, Oklahoma, (John Dexter Marble of Huckaby, 

Fleming, Frailey, Chaffin & Darah, Chickasha, Oklahoma, Victor C. 

Harwood, III, Edward Zampino, and Peter E. Mueller of Harwood 

Lloyd, Hackensack, New Jersey, with him on the brief), for 

Defendants-Appellees and Cross-Appellants in Appeal Nos. 93-6143 

and 93-6163, and Garnishee-Appellees and Garnishee-Appellants in 

Appeal Nos. 93-6158 and 93-6181. 

June L. Chubbuck of Chubbuck, Bullard & Hoehner, Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma, Ira Goldberg of Long & Levit, San Francisco, California, 

Eileen M. Morris, Kenneth W. Elliott, and Duncan Parks of Elliott 

& Morris, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, Donald R. Wilson and Brenda K. 

Peterson of Fenton, Fenton, Smith, Reneau & Moon, Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma, and Marjorie H. Mintzer of Sheft & Sheft, New York, New 

York, filed briefs for Defendants-Appellees and Cross-Appellants 

in Appeal Nos. 93-6143 and 93-6163, and Garnishee-Appellees and 

Garnishee-Appellants in Appeal Nos. 93-6158 and 93-6181. 

Richard C. Ford (Andrew M. Coats and Leanne Burnett with him on 

the brief) of Crowe & Dunlevy, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for 

Plaintiff-Appellant in Appeal No. 93-6144. 

Stephen P. Friot (Susan Moebius Henderson with him on the brief) 

of Spradling, Alpern, Friot & Gum, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for 

Defendants-Appellees in Appeal No. 93-6144. 

Larry Derryberry and Bert E. Marshall of Derryberry, Quigley, 

Parrish, Solomon & Blankenship, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, filed an 

-7-

Appellate Case: 93-6144 Document: 01019280234 Date Filed: 12/05/1995 Page: 7 
amicus curiae brief for the Insurance Environmental Litigation 

Association. 

Before BALDOCK, BARRETT, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge. 

Appellants in these three cases disposed of hazardous wastes 

at the Hardage hazardous waste site ("Hardage Site") near Criner, 

Oklahoma. In three separate actions before two district courts, 

Appellants claimed insurance companies that had sold umbrella 

liability or comprehensive general liability ("CGL") policies to 

entities that disposed of waste at the Hardage Site were obligated 

to provide coverage for environmental clean-up costs at the site. 

The insurance companies moved for summary judgment in each action 

on the grounds that the pollution exclusion clause of the CGL 

policies precluded coverage for damages arising from the disposal 

of waste at the Hardage Site. The insurance companies further 

argued that the discharges did not fall within the "sudden and 

accidental" exception to the pollution exclusion clause because 

the waste disposal at the Hardage Site was intentional, expected, 

and routine over a number of years. 

The district courts entered summary judgment in favor of the 

insurance companies in each action. Each appeal presents the same 

narrow issue: whether, under Oklahoma law, the ongoing, numerous 

waste discharges at the Hardage Site were "sudden and accidental" 

within the exception to the pollution exclusion clause of the CGL 

policies. Because this issue has split the state courts, we 

abated these appeals pending the Oklahoma Supreme Court's 

-8-

Appellate Case: 93-6144 Document: 01019280234 Date Filed: 12/05/1995 Page: 8 
definitive interpretation of the phrase "sudden and accidental" in 

a similar case involving the Hardage Site. Now that the Oklahoma 

Supreme Court has resolved the issue in Kerr-McGee Corp. v. 

Admiral Ins. Co., No. 81,294, 1995 WL 582406, P.2d (Okla. 

Oct. 3, 1995), we apply controlling state law to the instant 

appeals and affirm.1 

I. Background 

In 1972, Royal N. Hardage opened a hazardous waste disposal 

site near Criner, Oklahoma. The Oklahoma State Department of 

Health permitted the Hardage Site as an Industrial Hazardous Waste 

Land Disposal Facility in September 1972. Until shortly before 

the site closed in November 1980, the Hardage Site was the only 

landfill in Oklahoma licensed for disposal of industrial hazardous 

wastes. Between 1972 and 1980, approximately 400 companies 

generated over eighteen million gallons of waste that were 

disposed of at the Hardage Site, including oil recycling wastes, 

paint stripper, acids, caustics, lead, cyanide, arsenic, 

pesticides, and PCBs. 

During the early years at the Hardage Site, liquids and 

sludges from drums and tank trucks were mixed with soil and 

discharged into unlined pits, including the containment area known 

as the "main pit." Generally, wastes were not separated and 

different types of wastes were commingled in the same pits. As 

disposal areas filled, wastes were transferred to other areas. 

1 These cases were assigned to the same panel and involve the 

same legal issue. We therefore have consolidated our disposition 

of these cases herein. 

-9-

Appellate Case: 93-6144 Document: 01019280234 Date Filed: 12/05/1995 Page: 9 
Drums of waste were no longer emptied into pits, but were piled 

into a large mound of drums and barrels. Ultimately, the Hardage 

Site consisted of chemical impoundments, including a large unlined 

main pit, a series of small temporary pits, and two large barrel 

or sludge mounds. 

Activities at the Hardage Site resulted in environmental 

contamination. The contamination occurred through surface runoff 

from the containment area, deliberate placement of wastes outside 

the containment area, and the escape of substances from the 

containment area to areas at the site that did not provide 

containment protection. Specifically, contamination occurred as a 

result of: 

(a) spraying of substances from the Main Pit in an 

attempt to reduce its volume; 

(b) overflow of substances from the Main Pit as a 

result of heavy rainfall; 

(c) removal of waste from the Main Pit to be mixed with 

the soil at the Site and placed on what came to be 

referred to as the "Sludge Mound;" 

(d) deliberate breaching of the containment area to 

cause materials to flow to other portions of the 

Site; 

(e) surface runoff from the Sludge Mound and other 

unpermitted disposal areas during and following 

rainfall; 

(f) rupturing of drummed waste outside of the Main Pit 

as a result of improper handling; and, 

(g) transfer of substances from the Main Pit to 

unpermitted pits, ponds, and lagoons. 

Appeal No. 93-6143, Aplt. App. at 293; see also Appeal No. 

93-6144, Aplt. App. at 771-80. 

-10-

Appellate Case: 93-6144 Document: 01019280234 Date Filed: 12/05/1995 Page: 10 
In 1986, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") filed a 

civil action in the district court against Royal N. Hardage, the 

owner/operator of the Hardage Site, pursuant to its authority 

under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 

Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675, amended 

by Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. 

99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) .2 The EPA also named as defendants 

thirty-one companies, including Appellants in the instant appeals, 

who generated and disposed of waste at the Hardage Site. The EPA 

sought injunctive relief and reimbursement from the defendants for 

all investigatory, enforcement, and other response costs, and for 

future costs incurred by the United States ("the CERCLA action"). 

Most of the defendants in the CERCLA action organized 

themselves as the Hardage Steering Committee ("HSC") ,3 and 

eventually stipulated to liability under sections 106 and 107 of 

2 The EPA designated the Hardage Site a CERCLA facility 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (A), and ultimately placed the 

Hardage Site on the National Priorities List or "Superfund List." 

See 40 C.F.R. Pt. 300, App. B, at 211 (1994). For a history of 

enforcement actions regarding the Hardage Site, see United States 

v. Hardage, 750 F. Supp. 1460, 1468-69 (W.D. Okla. 1990), aff'd in 

part and rev'd in part, 982 F.2d 1436 (lOth Cir. 1992), cert. 

denied, 114 S. Ct. 300 (1993). 

3 The HSC members are: Advance Chemical Co., Kimball Chemical, 

Allied Signal, Bendix/Prestolite, UPO, ARCO Chemical, Ashland 

Chemical Co., AT&T Technologies, Inc., Western Electric, Borg 

Warner Corporation, Exxon Corporation, Firestone Tire & Rubber 

Co., Gencorp. Inc., General Tire & Rubber, Diversitech, Holley 

Special Products, Honeywell, Inc., Industrial Disposal, 

Macklanburg-Duncan, Magnetic Peripherals, Inc., Control Data, 

Maremont Corp., Mobil Chemical Co., McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 

Nalco Chemical Co., OK Gas and Electric Co., OK Publishing Co., OK 

Graphics, Mistletoe, PPG Industries, Inc., Rockwell, Inc., Aero 

Communication, North American Rockwell, Southwest Tube, Texaco, 

Inc., Texas Instruments Incorporated, Uniroyal, Inc., Westinghouse 

Electric Corporation, Weyerhauser Company, and Wolverine 

Corporation. 

-11-

Appellate Case: 93-6144 Document: 01019280234 Date Filed: 12/05/1995 Page: 11 
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606, 9607. The HSC in turn filed 

third-party complaints against approximately 180 third-party 

defendants that had disposed of waste at the Hardage Site, 

including Downtown Airpark, Inc. and Double Eagle Refining Company 

("Double Eagle"). The HSC sought contribution and reimbursement 

from Downtown Airpark and Double Eagle of the HSC's costs expended 

in taking response and remedial actions at the Hardage Site.4 As 

relevant to Appeal No. 93-6144, Downtown Airpark settled HSC's 

third-party claim for $408,043.00. As relevant to Appeal Nos. 

93-6143 and 93-6158 the district court entered summary judgment in 

favor of HSC, finding that Double Eagle was liable to HSC in the 

amount of $16,172,408.00 (the "HSC judgment"). The HSC judgment 

represents Double Eagle's proportionate share of the costs to 

implement the remedy at the Hardage Site. 

During the years Double Eagle and Downtown Airpark disposed 

of waste at the Hardage Site, each company purchased various CGL 

policies from several insurance companies.5 The relevant coverage 

language in each policy is substantially similar, and obligates 

the insurer to defend and indemnify the insured for liability 

claims for damages based on bodily injury or property damage 

caused by an occurrence. The policies define an occurrence as: 

4 Downtown Airpark, a corporation in the aircraft painting and 

maintenance business, and Double Eagle Refining Company, a 

corporation in the business of re-refining waste oil, disposed of 

hazardous wastes at the Hardage Site. 

5 Double Eagle purchased CGL policies from Aetna Casualty and 

Surety Company, Continental Casualty Company, Interstate Fire and 

Casualty Company, and Stonewall Insurance Company. Downtown 

Airpark purchased CGL policies from Continental Insurance Company 

and Fireman's Fund Insurance Company. 

-12-

Appellate Case: 93-6144 Document: 01019280234 Date Filed: 12/05/1995 Page: 12 
11 an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to 

conditions, which results in bodily injury or property damage 

neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured. 11 

Each policy also includes a qualified pollution exclusion clause 

which excludes coverage for: 

[B]odily injury or property damage arising out of the 

discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke, 

vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, 

liquids or gases, waste materials or other irritants, 

contaminants or pollutants into or upon land, the 

atmosphere or any watercourse or body of water; but this 

exclusion does not apply if such discharge, dispersal, 

release or escape is sudden and accidental. 

Appeal No. 93-6143, Aplt. App. at 339 (emphasis added); see also 

Appeal No. 93-6143, Aplt. App. at 360, 389, 393, 408, 413; Appeal 

No. 93-6144, Aplt. App. at 413, 436, 449, 476. Simply put, the 

clause excludes coverage for a pollution discharge which causes 

bodily injury or property damage unless the discharge is 11 Sudden 

and accidental. 11 

The instant appeals involve two separate actions by the HSC 

to recover the HSC judgment from insurance companies that issued 

CGL policies to Double Eagle, and an action by Downtown Airpark to 

obtain coverage from insurance companies that sold Downtown 

Airpark CGL policies during the years it disposed of waste at the 

Hardage Site. The following sections summarize the relevant 

procedural background of each case on appeal. 

A. Hardage Steering Committee 

1. Appeal No. 93-6143 

On August 25, 1992, six members of HSC filed a federal 

diversity action for a declaratory judgment against five insurance 

-13-

Appellate Case: 93-6144 Document: 01019280234 Date Filed: 12/05/1995 Page: 13 
companies that had issued CGL policies to Double Eagle during the 

years Double Eagle disposed of waste at the Hardage Site. For 

clarity, we refer to the six members of HSC who brought this 

declaratory judgment action as 11 HSC. 11 As a judgment creditor of 

Double Eagle, HSC sought a declaratory judgment that the CGL 

policies issued by the insurance companies to Double Eagle 

provided coverage to satisfy the HSC judgment. The insurance 

companies moved for summary judgment on the grounds the pollution 

exclusion clause of the CGL policies precluded coverage for 

damages arising from Double Eagle's disposal of waste at the 

Hardage Site. Further, the insurance companies argued that Double 

Eagle's waste disposal did not fall within the 11 sudden and 

accidental 11 exception to the pollution exclusion clause because 

the discharges of waste were intentional, expected, and routine 

over a number of years. 

The district court determined that HSC's claims were 

11 indistinguishable 11 from those presented in Oklahoma Publishing 

Co. v. Kansas City Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 805 F. Supp. 905 

(W.D. Okla. 1992), a case decided by the same district court and 

involving a company that, like Double Eagle, disposed of waste at 

the Hardage Site and sought coverage from insurance companies that 

had sold it CGL policies. In Oklahoma Publishing Co., the 

district court ruled that under Oklahoma law, 11 the phrase 'sudden 

and accidental' requires a discharge that is both abrupt and 

unexpected or unintended by the insured. 11 Id. at 910. Because 

the discharges at the Hardage Site occurred over a number of years 

pursuant to an intended disposal plan at the Hardage Site, the 

-14-

Appellate Case: 93-6144 Document: 01019280234 Date Filed: 12/05/1995 Page: 14 
district court in Oklahoma Publishing Co. concluded "they cannot 

as a matter of law be deemed to be 'sudden and accidental.'" Id. 

at 910. Consequently, in Oklahoma Publishing Co. the district 

court ruled that the insurance companies did not have to provide 

coverage for the environmental clean-up costs at the Hardage Site 

because the contamination at issue was excluded from coverage 

under the pollution exclusion clause of the CGL policies. Id. 

Applying its decision in Oklahoma Publishing Co., the 

district court concluded that Double Eagle's long-term disposal of 

waste did not fall within the "sudden and accidental" exception to 

the pollution exclusion clause. Consequently, the district court 

concluded that the unambiguous language of the pollution exclusion 

clause precluded from coverage Double Eagle's liability for the 

contamination at the Hardage Site. The district court therefore 

entered summary judgment in favor of the insurance companies. HSC 

appealed. 

2. Appeal No. 93-6158 

On the same day HSC filed the declaratory judgment action 

against Double Eagle's insurers, HSC also initiated a garnishment 

proceeding in the CERCLA action to recover on the HSC judgment 

from Double Eagle's insurers.6 Proceeding as garnishors pursuant 

to Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 1171, HSC alleged that the CGL policies 

6 The HSC initiated the garnishment proceeding in the original 

CERCLA action in which HSC, proceeding as third-party-plaintiffs, 

obtained the HSC judgment against Double Eagle. The record does 

not reveal why HSC sought to recover on the same HSC judgment in 

two separate actions from the same four insurance companies, i.e., 

the separate declaratory judgment action and the garnishment 

proceeding in the CERCLA action. 

-15-

Appellate Case: 93-6144 Document: 01019280234 Date Filed: 12/05/1995 Page: 15 
obligated the garnishee insurance companies to provide coverage to 

Double Eagle in the amount of the $16,172,408.00 HSC judgment that 

represented Double Eagle's share of the costs to implement the 

remedy at the Hardage Site. As judgment creditor of Double Eagle, 

HSC contended it was entitled to garnish the insurance coverage 

due Double Eagle in the possession of the garnishee insurance 

companies. 

The garnishee insurance companies moved for summary judgment. 

The district court cited Oklahoma Publishing Co., and ruled "that 

the pollution exclusion clauses contained in the garnishees' 

insurance policies are not ambiguous and . . preclude coverage 

in this proceeding for any damage arising from the purposeful and 

deliberate discharge of hazardous substances by Double Eagle 

pursuant to its disposal plan at the Hardage Site." Consequently, 

the district court entered summary judgment in favor of the 

garnishee insurance companies. HSC appealed. 

B. Downtown Airpark~-Appeal No. 93-6144 

On May 13, 1991, Downtown Airpark filed a federal diversity 

action seeking a declaratory judgment against the Continental 

Insurance Company and Fireman's Fund Insurance Company, two 

insurers that had sold Downtown Airpark CGL policies during the 

years it disposed of waste at the Hardage Site. Downtown Airpark 

sought coverage under the CGL policies for its liability 

associated with the environmental contamination at the Hardage 

Site. Specifically, Downtown Airpark claimed the insurance 

companies were obligated to defend and indemnify Downtown Airpark 

-16-

Appellate Case: 93-6144 Document: 01019280234 Date Filed: 12/05/1995 Page: 16 
for the $408,043.00 it had paid to settle HSC's third-party claim 

for contribution and reimbursement of HSC's response costs at the 

Hardage Site.7 

The district court adopted the reasoning in Oklahoma 

Publishing Co. and concluded that Downtown Airpark's discharges of 

waste at the Hardage Site were not "sudden and accidental" but 

"were pursuant to [Downtown Airpark's] routine business practice 

concerning waste disposal." Consequently, the district court 

entered summary judgment in favor of the insurance companies, 

ruling that the insurance companies had no duty to defend or 

indemnify Downtown Airpark for its settlement with HSC. Downtown 

Airpark appealed. 

II. 

HSC and Downtown Airpark contend the district courts erred in 

entering summary judgment in favor of the insurance companies. 

Specifically, HSC and Downtown Airpark maintain the district 

courts erroneously construed "sudden and accidental" under 

7 Downtown Airpark also sought coverage from the insurance 

companies for its liability associated with the Mosley Road 

Landfill in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, a CERCLA facility listed on 

the National Priorities List or "Superfund List." See 40 C.F.R. 

Pt. 300, App. B, at 211 (1994). On December 16, 1987, the EPA 

identified Downtown Airpark as a potentially responsible party for 

its disposal of waste at the Mosley Road Landfill. Consequently, 

in the instant declaratory judgment action in the district court, 

Downtown Airpark claimed that the insurance companies were 

obligated to provide coverage for its liability arising from the 

Mosley Road Landfill. On appeal, Downtown Airpark maintains that 

the legal and factual issues regarding the Hardage Site "are 

identical with respect to Mosley Road and the Court's decision 

should apply equally to both sites." Appeal No. 93-6144, Aplt. 

Br. at 3 n.1. For convenience our opinion refers only to the 

Hardage Site; however, our decision applies to Downtown Airpark's 

claims against its insurers regarding the Mosley Road Landfill. 

-17-

Appellate Case: 93-6144 Document: 01019280234 Date Filed: 12/05/1995 Page: 17 
Oklahoma law to mean "abrupt or quick and unexpected or 

unintended." HSC and Downtown Airpark argue that "sudden and 

accidental" under Oklahoma law means "unexpected and unintended." 

HSC and Downtown Airpark allege that Double Eagle and Downtown 

Airpark disposed of waste at the Hardage Site with the expectation 

that it would remain contained and would not pollute the 

environment. The environmental contamination at the Hardage Site 

was therefore "sudden and accidental" within the exception to the 

pollution exclusion clause HSC and Downtown Airpark assert, 

because it was neither expected nor intended. Consequently, 

according to HSC and Downtown Airpark, the insurance companies are 

obligated to provide coverage for the clean-up costs attributed to 

Double Eagle and Downtown Airpark because the contamination falls 

within the "sudden and accidental" exception to the pollution 

exclusion clause. 

"We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de 

novo, applying the same legal standard used by the district 

court." Frandsen v. Westinghouse Corp., 46 F.3d 975, 977 (lOth 

Cir. 1995). Summary judgment is proper only if "the pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 

(1986) . "All facts and reasonable inferences must be construed in 

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Allen v. 

Minnstar, Inc., 8 F.3d 1470, 1476 (lOth Cir. 1993); see also 

-18-

Appellate Case: 93-6144 Document: 01019280234 Date Filed: 12/05/1995 Page: 18 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). 

A. 

Our jurisdiction over Appeal Nos. 93-6143, 93-6163, and 

93-6144 arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. There is a jurisdictional 

issue, however, underlying Appeal Nos. 93-6158 and 93-6181 that 

neither the district court nor the parties noticed, but of course, 

one that we do not waive. ~, Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. 

Co. of America, 114 S. Ct. 1673, 1675 (1994). HSC initiated the 

garnishment proceeding in the district court under case number 

CIV-86-1401-W, the CERCLA action in which the EPA filed suit 

against Royal N. Hardage and HSC. Federal question jurisdiction 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 42 U.S.C. § 9613(b) provided the 

jurisdictional basis in the district court for the CERCLA action. 

It is unclear, however, whether the district court's ancillary or 

supplemental jurisdiction extends to the Oklahoma state law 

garnishment proceeding HSC brought against nonparties to the 

CERCLA action, namely the insurance companies that sold Double 

Eagle CGL policies. This issue has divided the circuits. Compare 

Citizens Elec. Corp. v. Bituminous Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No. 

95-1707, 1995 WL 615209, at *3, F.3d (7th Cir. Oct. 20, 

1995) (ruling that a garnishment action in a CERCLA suit is "part 

of the main action . . by virtue of the supplemental 

jurisdiction") and Skevofilax v. Quigley, 810 F.2d 378, 385 (3d 

Cir.) (en bane) ("We hold, therefore, that the district court has 

ancillary jurisdiction to adjudicate a garnishment action by a 

judgment creditor against a nonparty to the original lawsuit which 

may owe the judgment debtor an obligation to indemnify against the 

-19-

Appellate Case: 93-6144 Document: 01019280234 Date Filed: 12/05/1995 Page: 19 
judgment, or any other form of property."), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 

1029 (1987) with Berry v. McLemore, 795 F.2d 452, 455 (5th Cir. 

1986) ("The writ of garnishment ... is an action separate and 

independent from the action giving rise to the judgment 

debt .. [Therefore,] this court's ancillary jurisdiction to 

enforce its judgment does not extend to these garnishment 

actions.") (emphasis added) .8 

As a preliminary matter, we must determine whether this issue 

is governed by the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1367, or by Tenth Circuit ancillary jurisdiction caselaw. In 

1990 Congress codified the district court's supplemental 

jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1367, a statute "intended to supplant 

the related and somewhat overlapping concepts of ancillary and 

pendent jurisdiction." Kelley v. Michaels, 59 F.3d 1055, 1058 

(lOth Cir. 1995); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Section 1367 

applies "to civil actions commenced on or after" December 1, 1990. 

Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 310, 104 

Stat. 5089, 5114 (1990). Because the CERCLA action was filed in 

1986, Tenth Circuit ancillary jurisdiction caselaw suppplanted by 

§ 1367 governs whether the district court in the CERCLA action had 

8 The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to determine 

whether a federal district court has ancillary jurisdiction to 

enforce a judgment, obtained against a corporation under the 

Employment Retirement Income Security Act, in a subsequent 

proceeding brought against a former officer and controlling 

shareholder of the corporation. See Thomas v. Peacock, 39 F.3d 

493 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 1997 (1995). In 

Thomas, the Fourth Circuit expressly declined to consider whether 

a garnishment action falls within the ancillary jurisdiction of a 

federal district court. Id. at 501 & n.9. The Supreme Court's 

resolution of Thomas therefore will not resolve this precise 

issue. 

-20-

Appellate Case: 93-6144 Document: 01019280234 Date Filed: 12/05/1995 Page: 20 
jurisdiction over the garnishment proceeding. See Miller v. 

Glanz, 948 F.2d 1562, 1567 n.4 (lOth Cir. 1991) (applying law in 

effect prior to enactment of § 1367 because action was filed 

before December 1, 1990). 

"Ancillary jurisdiction is an 'ill-defined concept,' that 

permits jurisdiction over . . . third-party claims that are 

related to the principal case but do not enjoy a separate basis 

for subject matter jurisdiction." Sandlin v. Corporate Interiors, 

Inc., 972 F.2d 1212, 1215-16 (lOth Cir. 1992). In Sandlin, we 

noted that a state law garnishment action against a third party 

holding property of a judgment debtor is "within the ancillary 

'enforcement' jurisdiction of the federal court, at least if the 

garnishee admits the debt." Id. at 1216 (emphasis added). 

However, when the garnishment proceeding is premised on an alleged 

indemnity agreement between a judgment debtor and an insurer, such 

as in the instant case, a district court does not automatically 

assume ancillary jurisdiction but, in some instances, must require 

an independent basis for federal jurisdiction. "[W]hen 

postjudgment proceedings seek to hold nonparties liable for a 

judgment on a theory that requires proof on facts and theories 

significantly different from those underlying the judgment, an 

independent basis for federal jurisdiction must exist." Id. at 

1217 (interpreting H.C. Cook Co. v. Beecher, 217 u.s. 497, 498-99 

(1910)). 

Applying Sandlin to Appeal Nos. 93-6158 and 93-6181, when HSC 

initiated the state law garnishment proceeding in the CERCLA 

action, it sought to hold the nonparty insurance companies liable 

-21-

Appellate Case: 93-6144 Document: 01019280234 Date Filed: 12/05/1995 Page: 21 
on facts and theories that were not significantly different from 

the facts adduced in the CERCLA action that produced the HSC 

judgment. The CERCLA action and the garnishment proceeding each 

required a determination whether Double Eagle generated and 

disposed of hazardous wastes at the Hardage Site, and whether the 

waste discharges resulted in contamination at the site. 

Consequently, we conclude that in the CERCLA action the district 

court had ancillary jurisdiction over the garnishment proceeding 

HSC filed under Oklahoma state law to recover on the HSC judgment 

from the nonparty insurance companies that had provided CGL 

policies to Double Eagle. Cf. LaSalle Nat'l Trust, N.A. v. 

Schaffner, 818 F. Supp. 1161, 1164-65 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (ruling 

that district court had supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367 

over third-party action by CERCLA defendants asserting state-law 

indemnity claims against insurers because CERCLA complaint and 

indemnity claims involved same facts) . Because the district court 

had ancillary jurisdiction over the garnishment proceeding in the 

CERCLA action, we have jurisdiction over Appeal Nos. 93-6158 and 

93-6181 under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

B. 

Turning to the merits, the instant appeals present a single 

narrow issue: whether, under Oklahoma law, the ongoing, numerous 

waste discharges at the Hardage Site by Double Eagle and Downtown 

Airpark were "sudden and accidental" within the exception to the 

pollution exclusion clause of the CGL policies. At the time of 

the district courts' decisions, the Oklahoma Supreme Court had not 

yet addressed this issue of Oklahoma state law. Subsequent to the 

-22-

Appellate Case: 93-6144 Document: 01019280234 Date Filed: 12/05/1995 Page: 22 
filing of the instant appeals, however, the Oklahoma Supreme Court 

granted interlocutory review of the question whether the pollution 

exclusion clause precludes coverage for the long-term disposal of 

hazardous waste at the Hardage Site. Because the interpretation 

of the phrase "sudden and accidental" in the pollution exclusion 

clause has split the state courts,9 we abated our resolution of 

these cases until the Oklahoma Supreme Court rendered a definitive 

ruling on this issue of Oklahoma law. 

In Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., No. 81,294, 1995 WL 

582406, P.2d (Okla. Oct. 3, 1995), the Oklahoma Supreme 

Court certified for review the question "whether a pollution 

exclusion clause in a general liability insurance contract applies 

9 See Quaker State Minit-Lube, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 

52 F.3d 1522, 1527 n.2, 1528 n.3 (lOth Cir. 1995) (discussing 

split of authority); St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Warwick 

Dyeing Corp., 26 F. 3d 1195, 1200 (1st Cir. 1994) (same) . 

Generally, state courts divide on whether the term 

"sudden" in the phrase "sudden and accidental" is 

ambiguous because "sudden" arguably means "unexpected" 

or "unintended," both synonyms of "accidental," in 

addition to "abrupt" or "quick." Jurisdictions that 

conclude "sudden" is ambiguous generally interpret the 

phrase "sudden and accidental" in favor of the insured 

to mean "unexpected and unintended," but not "abrupt or 

quick and unexpected or unintended." ... Courts that 

have concluded "sudden and accidental" means "unexpected 

and unintended" without reference to a temporal element 

of 11 abrupt" or 11 quick" interpret the pollution exclusion 

clause in favor of the insured, and conclude that 

instances of gradual or continuous pollution are 11 unexpected and unintended," and thereby within the 

exception to the pollution exclusion clause. 

Quaker State Minit-Lube, Inc., 52 F.3d at 1527 n.2. Courts that 

have concluded that 11 sudden and accidental" is unambiguous and 

means "abrupt or quick and unexpected or unintended," interpret 

the pollution exclusion clause to preclude coverage for 

continuous, routine, gradual, or continuous discharges of 

pollutants. Id. at 1528 & n.3. 

-23-

Appellate Case: 93-6144 Document: 01019280234 Date Filed: 12/05/1995 Page: 23 
to the long-term disposal of hazardous waste." Id. at *1. 

Plaintiff Kerr-McGee Corporation brought an action against 

insurance companies that had sold it CGL policies substantively 

identical to the CGL policies in the instant appeals. Kerr-McGee 

claimed that the insurance companies should reimburse Kerr-McGee 

for clean-up costs associated with its long-term disposal of 

hazardous waste at the Hardage Site. 

The Oklahoma state trial court entered judgment in favor of 

Kerr-McGee, finding that the phrase "sudden and accidental" is 

ambiguous as a matter of law. The trial court interpreted the 

phrase in favor of the insured, and ruled that routine, long-term 

disposal of waste at the Hardage Site is "sudden and accidental" 

and thereby excepted from the pollution exclusion clause. Id. at 

*1-2. 

The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted immediate review of the 

trial court's interpretation of "sudden and accidental" pursuant 

to Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 952(b) (3). Construing the pollution 

exclusion clause, the Oklahoma Supreme Court concluded that "the 

terms 'sudden' and 'accidental' in the pollution exclusion clauses 

are unambiguous." Id. at *3. The Oklahoma Supreme Court observed 

that "[t]he ordinary and popular meaning of 'sudden' necessarily 

includes an element of time. Decisions finding ambiguity have 

focused on technical distinctions crafted by lawyers rather than 

the ordinary understanding of the word. . . . Clearly. the 

ordinary meaning of 'sudden' cannot describe the gradual routine 

disposal of industrial waste that occurred over a number of 

years." Id. at *3 (emphasis added). The Oklahoma Supreme Court 

-24-

Appellate Case: 93-6144 Document: 01019280234 Date Filed: 12/05/1995 Page: 24 
further noted that the focus of the term 11 accidental 11 in the 

pollution exclusion clause is on 11whether the 'discharge, 

dispersal, release, or escape' was unexpected or unintended. 11 Id. 

Applying this interpretation, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that 

the waste discharges at the Hardage Site were not 11 unexpected or 

unintended 11 because Kerr-McGee intentionally disposed of the 

waste. See id. Because 11 Kerr-McGee's long-term disposal of 

industrial waste [at the Hardage Site] was neither sudden nor 

accidental 11 the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed the trial court 

and ruled that the pollution exclusion clause precludes coverage 

for the long-term disposal of hazardous waste. Id. at *3-4. 

Kerr-McGee governs the appeals by HSC and Downtown Airpark 

and mandates that we affirm the district courts' entry of summary 

judgment in favor of the insurance companies. Based on undisputed 

facts, Double Eagle and Downtown Airpark generated and disposed of 

hazardous waste numerous times at the Hardage Site pursuant to 

long-term, routine, disposal practices. In the words of the 

Oklahoma Supreme Court, 11 [c]learly, the ordinary meaning of 

'sudden' cannot describe the gradual routine disposal of 

industrial waste that occurred over a number of years. 11 

Kerr-McGee, 1995 WL 582406, at *3. Further, the environmental 

contamination at the Hardage Site occurred through deliberate 

placement of wastes outside the containment area, spraying of 

substances from the Main Pit to reduce its volume, intentional 

placement of wastes on the sludge mound, and deliberate breaching 

of the containment area. ~, Appeal No. 93-6143, Aplt. App. at 

293. Such deliberate waste disposal actions cannot be described 

-25-

Appellate Case: 93-6144 Document: 01019280234 Date Filed: 12/05/1995 Page: 25 
as accidental. See id. Under Oklahoma law, therefore, we hold 

that the long-term disposal of waste and resulting contamination 

at the Hardage Site by Double Eagle and Downtown Airpark were not 

"sudden and accidental" within the exception to the pollution 

exclusion clause. Kerr-McGee, 1995 WL 582406, at *3. 

Consequently, the district courts did not err in ruling on summary 

judgment that the pollution exclusion clause of the CGL polices 

precludes coverage for the environmental clean-up costs attributed 

to Double Eagle and Downtown Airpark. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the 

district courts' entry of summary judgment in favor of the 

insurance companies in Appeal Nos. 93-6143, 93-6144, and 93-6158. 

We DISMISS Appeal Nos. 93-6163 and 93-6181.10 

10 In Appeal Nos. 93-6163 and 93-6181, the insurance companies 

cross-appeal the district courts' denial of their motions to 

strike certain exhibits that HSC attached to its responses to the 

insurance companies' motions for summary judgment. Because we 

affirm the district courts' entry of summary judgment in favor of 

the insurance companies, the insurance companies' cross-appeals 

are moot. We therefore dismiss the cross-appeals as moot. See 

Morgan v. City of Albuquerque, 25 F.3d 918, 919 (lOth Cir. 1994). 

-26-

Appellate Case: 93-6144 Document: 01019280234 Date Filed: 12/05/1995 Page: 26