Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-00911/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-00911-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Brian Fowler
Petitioner
W. Knipp
Respondent

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

BRIAN FOWLER, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

W. KNIPP, 

Respondent. 

No. 2:11-cv-0911 JAM AC P 

ORDER 

 Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis and has filed a 

motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). ECF No. 35. 

Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to relief from judgment based on (1) his own “mistake, 

inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1); (2) “newly discovered 

evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a 

new trial under Rule 59(b),” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2); or (3) “any other reason that justifies 

relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). 

 In Gonzalez v. Crosby, the United States Supreme Court stated that “[u]sing Rule 60(b) to 

present new claims for relief from a state court’s judgment of conviction—even claims couched 

in the language of a true Rule 60(b) motion—circumvents AEDPA’s requirement that a new 

claim be dismissed unless it relies on either a new rule of constitutional law or newly discovered 

facts.” 545 U.S. 524, 531 (2005) (citing § 2244(b)(2)). In other words, “a state prisoner may not 

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rely on Rule 60(b) to raise a new claim in federal habeas proceedings that would otherwise be 

barred as second or successive under § 2254.” United States v. Buenrostro, 638 F.3d 720, 722 

(9th Cir. 2011) (citing Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 531). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A), a second or 

successive application for habeas relief may not be filed in district court without prior 

authorization by the court of appeals. Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 657 (1996). Prior 

authorization is a jurisdictional requisite. Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 152-53 (2007); 

Cooper v. Calderon, 274 F.3d 1270, 1274 (9th Cir. 2001) (once district court has recognized a 

petition as second or successive pursuant to § 2244(b), it lacks jurisdiction to consider the merits). 

“Under § 2244(b), the first step of analysis is to determine whether a ‘claim presented in a 

second or successive habeas corpus application’ was also ‘presented in a prior application.’” 

Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 530. “[A] ‘claim’ as used in § 2244(b) is an asserted federal basis for relief 

from a state court’s judgment of conviction.” Id. “A [Rule 60(b)] motion can also be said to 

bring a ‘claim’ if it attacks the federal court’s previous resolution of a claim on the merits, since 

alleging that the court erred in denying habeas relief on the merits is effectively indistinguishable 

from alleging that the movant is, under the substantive provisions of the statutes, entitled to 

habeas relief.” Id. at 532 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). The term “on the merits” 

refers “to a determination that there exist or do not exist grounds entitling a petitioner to habeas 

corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(a) and (d). When a movant asserts one of those grounds 

(or asserts that a previous ruling regarding one of those grounds was in error) he is making a 

habeas corpus claim.” Id. n.4. “[W]hen a Rule 60(b) motion attacks, not the substance of the 

federal court’s resolution of a claim on the merits, but some defect in the integrity of the federal 

habeas proceedings,” petitioner does not present a “claim” that would require the motion be 

treated as a habeas petition. Id. at 532-33. However, “an attack based on the movant’s own 

conduct, or his habeas counsel’s omissions . . . ordinarily does not go to the integrity of the 

proceedings, but in effect asks for a second chance to have the merits determined favorably.” Id. 

at 532 n.5. 

 By order filed September 2, 2016, this court adopted in full the findings and 

recommendations filed April 2, 2014 (ECF No. 24), and dismissed petitioner’s application for a 

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writ of habeas corpus on the merits. ECF No. 28. Approximately three months after petitioner 

was denied a certificate of appealability by the Ninth Circuit (ECF No. 34), he filed the instant 

motion (ECF No. 35). Petitioner seeks relief from judgment on the grounds that he committed 

excusable neglect and that he has new evidence that could not have been discovered earlier. ECF 

No. 35 at 7-17. He also asks that the court “consider ‘any other reason that justifies relief.’” Id. 

at 17. Petitioner appears to argue that his placement in Administrative Segregation and reliance 

on “jailhouse lawyers” constitutes the type of “extraordinary circumstances” that justify relief 

under Rule 60(b)(6). Id. at 2-5 

Petitioner’s first argument is that the Magistrate Judge’s analysis was flawed and that he 

committed “excusable neglect” by not adequately presenting his arguments in his objections to 

the findings and recommendations. Id. at 7-17. Both these grounds fall squarely within the 

examples given by the Supreme Court of Rule 60(b) motions that “would impermissibly 

circumvent the requirement that a successive habeas petition be precertified by the court of 

appeals as falling within an exception to the successive-petition bar.” Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 531-

32 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)). These arguments therefore constitute an unauthorized second 

or successive petition and this court lacks jurisdiction to consider them. 

Petitioner also argues that he has new evidence in the form of a revised declaration. Id. at 

12-14. Even assuming that the evidence petitioner presents is in fact new, his presentation of 

“new evidence in support of a claim already litigated” is also covered by the examples given by 

the Supreme Court of Rule 60(b) motions that are barred as second or successive petitions. 

Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 531-32 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)). Accordingly, this court lacks 

jurisdiction to consider the argument. The court notes that this particular claim would also fail to 

satisfy Rule 60(b)(2), as petitioner does not claim that the information contained in the 

declaration was not previously available, but instead argues that he did not know that the 

previously omitted information needed to be included in the declaration. ECF No. 35 at 12-14. 

 Finally, petitioner appears to argue that the circumstances of his incarceration constitute 

extraordinary circumstances justifying relief under Rule 60(b)(6). Id. at 2-5. “[A] movant 

seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6) [is required] to show ‘extraordinary circumstances’ justifying 

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the reopening of a final judgment.” Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 535 (quoting Ackermann v. United 

States, 340 U.S. 193, 199 (1950)). Petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication, which he asserts 

required him to rely on “jailhouse lawyers,” and placement in Administrative Segregation, which 

he claims made it difficult to obtain assistance because of his sex offender status, are 

circumstances faced by many prisoners and are not extraordinary, especially in light of 

petitioner’s demonstrated ability to file objections without assistance. See Rasberry v. Garcia, 

448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding “that a pro se petitioner’s lack of legal 

sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance” with respect to equitable tolling 

analysis); Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 2010) (“reliance on helpers who were 

transferred or too busy to attend to [petitioner’s] petitioner” did not establish extraordinary 

circumstance for equitable tolling) (citing Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009)); 

Zamudio v. Cate, No. 12-CV-703-BEN (MDD), 2014 WL 2624789, at *8 (S.D. Cal. June 12, 

2014) (“Petitioner’s status as a sex offender does not constitute extraordinary circumstances.”); 

McCoy v. Sisto, No. CIV S-08-1104 EFB P, 2010 WL 455464, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2010) 

(“Petitioner’s difficulty in obtaining assistance from other inmates in preparing his petitions due 

to his sex offender status does not constitute an extraordinary circumstance beyond his control.”). 

Because petitioner has failed to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances, his motion for relief 

pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) will be denied. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. The portion of petitioner’s motion for relief from judgment that seeks relief pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) and (2) constitutes an unauthorized second or successive 

petition and is dismissed without prejudice to refiling once petitioner receives authorization to 

proceed from the Ninth Circuit. 

2. The portion of petitioner’s motion for relief from judgment that seeks relief pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) is denied. 

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DATED: August 31, 2016 

 John A. Mendez___________________________ 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 

 

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