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Parties Involved:
Kerry De Cay
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion *

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-30337

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

KERRY DE CAY,

Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:05-CR-186-1

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, CLEMENT, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Kerry De Cay pled guilty to conspiracy to commit mail fraud, mail fraud,

and obstruction of justice. After not having timely appealed, De Cay filed a

motion to set aside the judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The district court

essentially vacated, then reinstated the judgment of conviction, in order to allow

De Cay to file an out-of-time direct appeal. We DISMISS the appeal.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

January 6, 2010

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

 Case: 09-30337 Document: 0051997802 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/06/2010
No. 09-30337

2

De Cay seeks to raise substantive challenges to the district court’s

application of the bribery guideline, U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1, and the district court’s

determination that he was responsible for a loss greater than $1 million. The

Government argues that De Cay’s appeal is barred by the appeal waiver in his

plea agreement. Citing United States v. Robinson, 187 F.3d 516 (5th Cir. 1999)

and United States v. Baty, 980 F.2d 977 (5th Cir. 1992), De Cay maintains that

the appeal waiver is not enforceable because it was not knowing and voluntary.

De Cay claims he did not understand the meaning of the exception to the appeal

waiver for punishment in excess of the statutory maximum. He asserts that his

trial counsel incorrectly told him that he could appeal a sentence in excess of the

guidelines sentence range and that the explanation provided by his trial counsel

would allow an appeal challenging the district court’s guidelines sentence range

calculations. Additionally, De Cay argues for the first time on appeal that the

district court plainly erred by violating the obligation to explain fully the terms

of the appeal waiver to him. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(N).

A defendant may waive his right to appeal as part of a valid plea

agreement if the waiver is knowing and voluntary. United States v. McKinney,

406 F.3d 744, 746 (5th Cir. 2005). To determine whether an appeal of a sentence

is barred by an appeal waiver provision in a plea agreement, we conduct a

two-step inquiry: (1) whether the waiver was knowing and voluntary and

(2) whether the waiver applies to the circumstances at hand, based on the plain

language of the agreement. United States v. Bond, 414 F.3d 542, 544 (5th Cir.

2005). We review the validity of an appeal waiver de novo. United States v.

Burns, 433 F.3d 442, 445 (5th Cir. 2005).

At rearraignment, De Cay stated under oath that he had read and signed

the plea agreement. The district court explained to De Cay that the waiver of

appeal provision provided that De Cay could not appeal unless the district court

imposed punishment in excess of the statutory maximum. De Cay averred that

he understood the appeal waiver. 

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No. 09-30337

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Contrary to De Cay’s assertion, the appeal waiver was explicit and

unambiguous. While De Cay maintains that the phrase “statutory maximum

punishment” is an ambiguous legal term of art, the phrase used in an exception

to an appeal waiver has a “natural and ordinary meaning of the upper limit of

punishment that Congress has legislatively specified for violations of a statute.”

United States v. Cortez, 413 F.3d 502, 503 (5th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). The district court correctly informed De Cay of the

nature of the appeal waiver.

De Cay’s reliance upon Robinson and Baty is misplaced. In Robinson, the

district court did not explain the terms of the appeal waiver to the defendant,

and it did not ask the defendant whether he understood the terms of the appeal

waiver or the plea agreement. 187 F.3d at 517-18. Consequently, this court held

that the appeal waiver was not knowing and voluntary. Id. at 518. In Baty, the

defendant asked the district court what the appeal waiver provision meant on

multiple occasions during rearraignment, but she was not given a satisfactory

explanation. 980 F.2d at 978-79. Thus, this court held that the appeal waiver

was not knowing and voluntary. Id. at 979. In the present case, however, the

district court admonished De Cay regarding the terms of the appeal waiver, and

De Cay stated that he understood. Accordingly, both Robinson and Baty are

distinguishable. 

The district court informed De Cay of the terms of the appeal waiver and

De Cay stated that he understood them; therefore, the district court did not Rule

11. See United States v. Gonzalez, 259 F.3d 355, 358 (5th Cir. 2001). Moreover,

as DeCay stated that he understood the terms of the appeal waiver after they

were explained to him by the district court, the appeal waiver was both knowing

and voluntary, and it is, therefore, enforceable. See McKinney, 406 F.3d at 746.

The substantive claims De Cay seeks to raise do not fall within the exception to

the appeal waiver for claims challenging punishment in excess of the statutory

maximum. 

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No. 09-30337

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The appeal waiver bars De Cay’s appeal. See Bond, 414 F.3d at 544.

De Cay argues that even if the appeal waiver is enforceable, this court

should decline to enforce it under a miscarriage of justice exception. He

acknowledges that this court has not created such an exception to the

application of appeal waivers, but he requests that we adopt the position of other

circuits and create such an exception. De Cay maintains that the district court’s

errors at sentencing amounted to a miscarriage of justice. 

This court routinely has ruled that issues waived in a valid, enforceable

appeal waiver need not be considered. See, e.g., Bond, 414 F.3d at 546;

McKinney, 406 F.3d at 747. In the present case, we need not determine whether

we should adopt a miscarriage of justice exception to the enforcement of appeal

waivers because De Cay’s substantive claims are relatively standard challenges

to the district court’s guidelines sentence range calculation that would not fall

within a miscarriage of justice exception. See United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d

886, 891-92 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 562-63 (3d

Cir. 2001). De Cay “is bound to his obligations under the plea agreement,” and

the appeal waiver bars his appeal. McKinney, 406 F.3d at 747.

DISMISSED. 

 Case: 09-30337 Document: 0051997802 Page: 4 Date Filed: 01/06/2010