Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-73424/USCOURTS-ca9-12-73424-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Loretta E. Lynch
Respondent
Jessica Jhoana Tellez
Petitioner

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JESSICA JHOANA TELLEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney

General,

Respondent.

No. 12-73424

Agency No.

A078-250-502

OPINION

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Department of Homeland Security

Argued and Submitted August 30, 2016

Pasadena, California

Filed October 24, 2016

Before: Alex Kozinski and Jay S. Bybee, Circuit Judges,

and Donald E. Walter,* Senior District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Kozinski

*

 The Honorable Donald E. Walter, United States District Judge for

the Western District of Louisiana, sitting by designation.

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2 TELLEZ V. LYNCH

SUMMARY**

Immigration

The panel denied Jessica Tellez’s petition for review from

the Department of Homeland Security’s reinstatement of her

expedited removal order on the ground that she illegally

reentered the United States.

The panel held, on a question of first impression, that an

alien had previously “entered” the United States for the

purpose of the Immigration and Nationality Act’s

reinstatement provision’s “reentry” requirement when the

alien was issued a prior expedited removal order at a bordercrossing checkpoint.

The panel noted that its decision is limited to the

reinstatement provision’s definition of reentry, and that it

does not disturb the longstanding common-law definition of

“entry.” The panel wrote that it held only that the INA’s

reinstatement requirement of reentry after an initial removal

encompasses those who were removed after coming into the

U.S. at a border-crossing checkpoint and who subsequently

returned.

The panel also held that Tellez’s subsequent reentry was

illegal even though she presented herself at the border and

was waved through without question. 

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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TELLEZ V. LYNCH 3

COUNSEL

Matthew E. Roston (argued), Beverly Hills, California, for

Petitioner.

Craig Alan Newell, Jr. (argued) and Carmel A. Morgan, Trial

Attorneys; Shelley R. Goad, Assistant Director; Office of

Immigration Litigation, Washington, D.C.; for Respondent.

OPINION

KOZINSKI, Circuit Judge:

This case raises a question of first impression for the

federal courts: Has an alien “reentered” the United States for

the purpose of reinstating a removal order, 8 U.S.C.

§ 1231(a)(5), when she was previously removed at a bordercrossing checkpoint?

Jessica Tellez made her first known effort to cross the

U.S. border at San Ysidro in 2000. She claimed to be a U.S.

citizen, but a suspicious immigration officer referred her for

a secondary inspection. Tellez then admitted that she was a

Mexican citizen without a valid entry document. She was

deemed inadmissible and signed a statement acknowledging

that she could not return to the United States for five years. 

Tellez was then issued an expedited removal order under

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and was returned to Mexico. 

Undaunted, Tellez returned to the United States the following

week. She “dressed up in a nice, pretty dress,” and “smile[d]

at the immigration officer” from the passenger seat of a car. 

The officer waved the car through, and Tellez settled in the

United States.

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4 TELLEZ V. LYNCH

In 2012, Tellez applied for a waiver of inadmissibility and

adjustment of her status to that of a lawful permanent

resident. The applications were denied because she had

previously falsely represented herself as a citizen. The

Department of Homeland Security then reinstated Tellez’s

expedited removal order on the grounds that she had illegally

“reentered” the country. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5). Tellez

petitioned for review.

1. Tellez claims that the reinstatement of her removal

order is invalid because she did not “reenter” the United

States. She argues that her initial attempt to cross the border

did not constitute an initial “entry” that can create a

subsequent “reentry.”

The reinstatement provision states:

If the Attorney General finds that an alien has

reentered the United States illegally after

having been removed or having departed

voluntarily, under an order of removal, the

prior order of removal is reinstated from its

original date and is not subject to being

reopened or reviewed, the alien is not eligible

and may not apply for any relief under this

chapter, and the alien shall be removed under

the prior order at any time after the reentry.

8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (emphasis added). So what creates a

“reentry”? We hold that when, as here, an alien is issued an

expedited removal order at aU.S. border-crossing checkpoint,

that alien has entered the United States for the purpose of the

reinstatement provision’s “reentry” requirement.

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TELLEZ V. LYNCH 5

We find our way to this conclusion by starting with the

plain meaning of the provision in question. See United States

v. Migi, 329 F.3d 1085, 1087 (9th Cir. 2003). The

Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) doesn’t define the

term reentry—or, for that matter, entry. But common sense

and a stack of dictionaries can tell us that the word enter

means “[t]o come or go into.” The American Heritage

Dictionary of the English Language 436 (1976); see also

United States ex rel. Claussen v. Day, 279 U.S. 398, 401

(“The word ‘entry’ by its own force implies a coming from

outside.”). Under this definition, Tellez entered the country

when she left Mexico and came into the sovereign territory of

the United States at the San Ysidro border-crossing station.

In addition, the section of the INA under which Tellez

was first returned to Mexico—a provision that authorizes the

“expedited removal ofinadmissible arriving aliens,” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225 (emphasis added)—necessarily implies an initial

entry. The verb remove is ordinarily defined as “[t]o move

from a position occupied.” American Heritage Dictionary,

supra, at 1101. It makes no sense to speak of removing

someone who has not yet entered or never occupied a

position—say, removing Clint Eastwood from the papacy or

removing a colony from Mars. Entry implies movement in;

removal implies movement out. Tellez must have first

entered U.S. territory in order to be removed from it. Having

entered once, her second entry was a reentry.

We acknowledge that the definition of entry developed at

common law has a narrower and more technical meaning: 

Entry “has not been accomplished until physical presence is

accompanied by freedom from official restraint.” United

States v. Pacheco-Medina, 212 F.3d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir.

2000) (internal reference omitted). We have also used this

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6 TELLEZ V. LYNCH

judge-made definition to interpret some criminal provisions

of the INA. See id. at 1163–65; see also United States v.

Lombera-Valdovinos, 429 F.3d 927, 928 (9th Cir. 2005)

(noting that the term enter, for the purposes of 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326, “has a narrower meaning than its colloquial usage”). 

Our decision today—which is limited to the reinstatement

provision’s definition of “reentry”—does not disturb this

longstanding common-law definition. We hold only that the

INA’s reinstatement provision, which requires reentry after

an initial removal, encompasses those who, like Tellez, were

removed after coming into U.S. territory at a border-crossing

checkpoint and subsequently returned to the United States.

Our interpretation of the reinstatement provision is

supported by the “fundamental canon of statutory

construction that the words of a statute must be read . . . with

a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” Food

& Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,

529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (internal reference omitted). 

Congress intended the reinstatement provision to sweep

broadly. It expanded the provision in 1996 to cover all aliens

who reenter the United States after being removed; its

predecessor applied to only a subset of illegal reentrants. See

De Sandoval v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 440 F.3d 1276, 1279 (11th

Cir. 2006) (comparing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) with its

predecessor 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f) (1994)). The legislative

history of the 1996 amendment confirms that Congress

sought to streamline the removal process and cover all

entering aliens who violate a prior removal order. See id. at

1282 (discussing H. Rep. No. 104–469 and S. Rep. No.

104–249). It would be puzzling for Congress to significantly

expand the reinstatement provision, yet leave open a trucksized hole for all aliens first removed from a border crossing.

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TELLEZ V. LYNCH 7

2. Tellez also claims that she did not reenter the United

States illegally under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) because she

presented herself at the border and was waved through

without question. But a successful entry can still be an illegal

entry. See Tamayo-Tamayo v. Holder, 725 F.3d 950, 952

(9th Cir. 2013) (holding on similar facts that an entry was

illegal because petitioner “lacked valid documentation that

permitted him to enter”). There’s no question that Tellez

lacked valid documentation and intended to dupe border

officials into letting her enter: Just a week before her

successful entry, she signed a document acknowledging that

she was prohibited from entering the country for five years. 

A pretty dress and charming smile are not substitutes for a

visa. Her reentry was illegal.

DENIED.

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