Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00392/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00392-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jesus Betanzo Basilio
Plaintiff
City of Fairfield
Defendant
City of Fairfield Police Department
Defendant
Walt Tibbet
Defendant

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JESUS BETANZO BASILIO,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF FAIRFIELD, CITY OF 

FAIRFIELD POLICE DEPARTMENT, 

WALT TIBBET, DOES 1-100,

Defendants.

No. 2:16-cv-00392-JAM-EFB

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiff Jesus Betanzo Basilio (“Plaintiff”) sued the 

City of Fairfield (“the City”), the Fairfield Police 

Department (“FPD”), and FPD Chief of Police Walt Tibbet 

(“Tibbet”) (collectively “Defendants”) for civil rights and 

state law violations arising out of an interaction between 

Plaintiff and FPD officers (Doc. #1). Defendants move to 

dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. #9). Plaintiff opposes

the motion (Doc. #14).1

 

1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 

scheduled for June 14, 2016.

Case 2:16-cv-00392-JAM-EFB Document 18 Filed 07/14/16 Page 1 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Court takes the facts alleged by Plaintiff as true for 

purposes of this motion. In February 2014, FPD officers 

arrested Plaintiff at his residence. Compl. ¶ 11. Plaintiff is 

a Mexican-American male and was a minor at the time of the 

arrest. Id. The officers approached Plaintiff and yelled at 

him to get on the floor. Id. ¶ 12. Plaintiff was unarmed and 

complied with the officers’ requests. Id. The officers then 

slammed their knees into Plaintiff’s neck, shoulder, and face. 

Id. Some of the officers kicked Plaintiff in the temple. Id. 

Plaintiff was not resisting arrest while the officers were 

kicking him. Id.

One officer searched Plaintiff and forcefully pulled on 

Plaintiff’s testicles. Id. ¶ 15. The officer then placed 

Plaintiff in the back of his patrol car. Id. While in the 

patrol car, Plaintiff told officers that he was tired, did not 

feel well, and that his head hurt. Id. ¶ 19. Plaintiff fainted

in the back of the police car. Id. ¶ 20. 

When Plaintiff arrived at the police station, officers took 

him into an interrogation room. Id. ¶ 21. Plaintiff told 

police officers that we was in pain and that he needed aspirin 

and to be taken to the hospital. Id. ¶ 22. The officers did 

not take Plaintiff to the hospital and left him in the room for 

two hours. Id. Plaintiff fainted in the interrogation room. 

Id.

At some point, the officers came back into the room asked

Plaintiff about a suspect in a shooting. Id. ¶ 23. Plaintiff 

told the officers he “had no gang relations.” Id. Plaintiff 

Case 2:16-cv-00392-JAM-EFB Document 18 Filed 07/14/16 Page 2 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

was at the police station for five hours. Id. ¶ 26. Fairfield 

police officers then transported him to a hospital. Id. 

Plaintiff sued Defendants in February 2016, alleging seven

causes of action: (1) excessive force pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 (“§ 1983”), (2) denial of medical care pursuant to 

§ 1983, (3) violation of the Bane Act, (4) battery, 

(5) negligence, (6) false imprisonment, and (7) false arrest. 

Id. at 8-17. Defendants move to dismiss each of Plaintiff’s 

claims, except for the battery claim. Motion to Dismiss (“MTD”) 

at 1-2. 

II. OPINION

A. First Cause of Action: Excessive Force

Plaintiff brings his first cause of action for excessive 

force under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Compl. at 8. 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim must be dismissed to the 

extent that it is brought under the Fourteenth Amendment because 

an excessive force claim is limited to being brought under the 

Fourth Amendment. MTD at 4. Defendants are correct. The 

Supreme Court has explicitly held that:

all claims that law enforcement officers have used 

excessive force—deadly or not—in the course of an 

arrest, investigatory stop, or other “seizure” of a 

free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth 

Amendment and its “reasonableness” standard, rather 

than under a “substantive due process” approach. 

Because the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit 

textual source of constitutional protection against 

this sort of physically intrusive governmental 

conduct, that Amendment, not the more generalized 

notion of “substantive due process,” must be the guide 

for analyzing these claims.

///

Case 2:16-cv-00392-JAM-EFB Document 18 Filed 07/14/16 Page 3 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (emphasis in 

original). Plaintiff’s excessive force claim brought under 

the Fourteenth Amendment is dismissed. The excessive force 

claim remains to the extent it is brought under the Fourth 

Amendment. 

1. § 1983 Excessive Force Claim Against the City 

a. Plaintiff Fails to Allege a Policy or Custom 

That Caused His Constitutional Injury

Defendants argue that the City cannot be liable under 

§ 1983 because Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege Monell

liability. MTD at 4-5. A local government entity may be liable 

under § 1983 when the alleged constitutional injury was caused 

by the entity’s “policy or custom.” Monell v. Dep't of Soc. 

Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). A 

Plaintiff can successfully allege a policy or custom of a public 

entity by showing: (1) that “a longstanding practice or custom 

which constitutes the ‘standard operating procedure’ of the 

local government entity;” (2) “the decision-making official was, 

as a matter of state law, a final policymaking authority whose 

edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy 

in the area of decision;” or (3) “an official with final 

policymaking authority either delegated that authority to, or 

ratified the decision of, a subordinate.” Newman v. San Joaquin 

Delta Cmty. Coll. Dist., 814 F. Supp. 2d 967, 977 (E.D. Cal. 

2011) (quoting Rosenbaum v. City & Cty. of S.F., 484 F.3d 1142, 

1155 (9th Cir. 2007)). To “sufficiently state a claim under

Monell, [a] plaintiff must allege facts establishing a policy,

it is not enough simply to state that there is a policy.” Smith 

Case 2:16-cv-00392-JAM-EFB Document 18 Filed 07/14/16 Page 4 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

v. Stanislaus, 2012 WL 253241, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2012)

(emphasis added).

Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to allege a 

“longstanding practice or custom” because “Plaintiff’s factual 

allegations relate only to his particular incident, and there 

are no facts showing a practice or custom beyond the subject 

incident.” MTD at 6. Defendants are correct. In his 

complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the City “maintained or 

permitted one or more of the following official policies, 

customs, or practices,” and then lists several different 

practices in generic terms. Compl. ¶ 10. But Plaintiff does 

not provide facts to support these generic allegations. The 

facts in Plaintiff’s complaint relate only to one encounter with 

FPD. There are no facts supporting the existence of any 

“longstanding practice” which constitutes the “standard 

operating procedure” of the FPD. See Newman, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 

977. 

Defendants also argue that Plaintiff fails to allege a 

ratification claim. MTD at 6. “To prove Monell liability based 

on ratification, the plaintiff must show that the final 

policymaker in question had knowledge of the constitutional 

violation and actually approved of it. A mere failure to 

overrule a subordinate's actions, without more, is insufficient 

to support a section 1983 claim.” Kyles v. Baker, 72 F. Supp. 

3d 1021, 1044 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted). “The final policymaker's response to the 

subordinate's unconstitutional conduct must amount to more than 

acquiescence; he or she must have affirmatively approved both 

Case 2:16-cv-00392-JAM-EFB Document 18 Filed 07/14/16 Page 5 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

the subordinate's decision and the basis for it.” Id. Tibbet 

is the only potential “final policymaker” that Plaintiff 

identifies, and there are no facts to indicate that Tibbet 

“affirmatively approved” of anything that his subordinates did 

on the day of Plaintiff’s arrest. Plaintiff states that “only 

through discovery can Plaintiff perfect this allegation with 

evidence.” Opp. at 8. If that is true, then Plaintiff should 

not have included this allegation in his complaint. 

Plaintiff’s ratification claim is, therefore, dismissed with 

leave to amend.

b. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Against the 

City for Inadequate Training

Next, Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to state a 

claim based on inadequate training. MTD at 7. “[T]he 

inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for Section 

1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to 

deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the 

police come into contact.” Jones v. Cty. of Contra Costa, 2016

WL 1569974, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2016) (quoting City of 

Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)). 

Additionally, “failure to train may give rise to a Monell claim 

only when the training itself caused the constitutional 

violation – not in situations where an errant employee caused a 

constitutional violation, despite adequate training.” Jones, 

2016 WL 1569974, at *3. 

Plaintiff alleges that the City “[f]ail[ed] to provide 

adequate training and supervision to FPD Officers with respect 

to constitutional limits on force, detention, and provision of 

Case 2:16-cv-00392-JAM-EFB Document 18 Filed 07/14/16 Page 6 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

medical care.” Compl. ¶ 10(A). Plaintiff provides only 

conclusory allegations and no facts to support his claim that 

the City improperly trained its officers. Plaintiff’s claim 

against the City based on a failure to train theory is dismissed 

with leave to amend.

2. § 1983 Claims Against Tibbet

Defendant Tibbet argues that any claims against him in his 

official capacity should be dismissed. MTD at 8. When a 

plaintiff files suit against both a local government entity and 

an officer in his official capacity, “the court may dismiss the 

officer as a redundant defendant.” Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, 

Inc. v. L.A. Cty. Sheriff Dep't, 533 F.3d 780, 799 (9th Cir. 

2008). Claims against officers in their personal capacities, 

however, may remain. Fontana v. Alpine Cty., 750 F. Supp. 2d 

1148, 1155 (E.D. Cal. 2010). Plaintiff’s claims against Tibbet 

in his official capacity in this complaint are hereby dismissed

with prejudice.

“[A] supervisory official can be found liable in his 

individual capacity if there is a sufficient nexus between his 

own conduct and the constitutional violations committed by 

subordinates.” Johnson v. City of Vallejo, 99 F. Supp. 3d 1212,

1219 (E.D. Cal. 2015). “In a section 1983 claim, a supervisor 

is liable for the acts of his subordinates if the supervisor 

participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the 

violations of subordinates and failed to act to prevent them.” 

Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Defendant 

argues that Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Tibbet in 

his individual capacity because there are no facts showing that 

Case 2:16-cv-00392-JAM-EFB Document 18 Filed 07/14/16 Page 7 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

Tibbet “was present or even aware of the alleged acts at the 

time of the incident.” MTD at 9-10. Once again, Plaintiff 

fails to provide any facts to support his conclusory allegations 

regarding Tibbet’s actions. Thus, Plaintiff’s § 1983 excessive 

force claim against Tibbet in his individual capacity is

dismissed with leave to amend. 

B. Second Cause of Action: Failure to Provide Medical 

Services

The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects 

the rights of people in police custody “to not have officials 

remain deliberately indifferent to their serious medical needs.” 

Gibson v. Cty. of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Officers or prison officials act with “deliberate indifference”

if they “deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical 

treatment.” Palmer v. Plummer, 1995 WL 381882, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 

Jun. 20, 1995). But, “the indifference to the inmate’s medical 

needs must be substantial; inadequate treatment due to 

negligence, inadvertence, or differences in judgment between an 

inmate and medical personnel does not rise to the level of a 

constitutional violation.” Williams v. Ralston, 2014 WL 

3926990, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2014). 

Like his first cause of action, Plaintiff’s second cause of 

action is brought pursuant to § 1983. Compl. at 10. Thus, to 

hold the City liable for failure to provide medical treatment, 

Plaintiff must allege that a policy or practice of City caused 

the constitutional violation. Austin v. Cty. of Alameda, 2015 

WL 7180616, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2015).

Plaintiff fails to allege a policy or practice of 

Case 2:16-cv-00392-JAM-EFB Document 18 Filed 07/14/16 Page 8 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

deliberate indifference. The only facts Plaintiff provides to 

support the allegation of a policy or practice is his own 

experience with the FPD. This is insufficient to show that the 

City had a policy or practice of acting deliberately indifferent 

to the medical needs of those in custody. See Gaines v. Cty. of 

L.A., 2014 WL 2042243, at *5 (C.D. Cal May 16, 2014).

Defendants also argue that Plaintiff fails to state a 

deliberate indifference claim against Tibbet. MTD at 11-12. 

There are no facts alleged in this complaint sufficient to 

support a deliberate indifference claim against Tibbet. 

Additionally, Plaintiff does not address in his opposition

Defendants’ arguments regarding the second cause of action. 

Plaintiff merely summarizes the law, but does not provide any 

analysis to show that he has properly stated a deliberate 

indifference claim against the City or Tibbet. Plaintiff’s 

second cause of action is dismissed with leave to amend.

C. Third Cause of Action: Bane Act

The Bane Act creates an individual cause of action where “a 

person . . . whether or not acting under the color of law, 

interferes by threat, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to 

interfere by threat, intimidation, or coercion” with a right 

secured by federal or state law. Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(a). “In 

order to state a claim under this statute, Plaintiff must plead 

facts showing violence or intimidation by threat of violence by 

the accused defendant.” Clifford v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 

2012 WL 1565702, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2012), aff'd, 584 F. 

App'x 431 (9th Cir. 2014). Pleading a violation of the Bane Act 

requires a plaintiff to show “both a constitutional violation 

Case 2:16-cv-00392-JAM-EFB Document 18 Filed 07/14/16 Page 9 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

and that the violation was brought about by threats, 

intimidation, or coercion.” Sandoval v. Cty. of Sonoma, 2016 WL 

612905, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2016). Additionally, “in the 

context of claims involving wrongful detention, courts have 

found that the [Bane Act] requires a showing of coercion 

independent from the coercion inherent in the wrongful detention 

itself.” Avila v. California, 2015 WL 6003289, at *2 (E.D. Cal. 

Oct. 14, 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis 

added).

Plaintiff does not allege a constitutional violation or use 

of threats or coercion by Tibbet. Plaintiff’s Bane Act claim

against Tibbet in his official capacity is dismissed with 

prejudice (because such a claim is duplicative of a claim 

against the City) and the Bane Act claim against Tibbet in his 

individual capacity is dismissed with leave to amend. 

As to the liability of the City under the Bane Act, “public 

entities may be held liable for injuries proximately caused by 

their employees within the scope of employment if the act or 

omission would have given rise to a cause of action against that 

employee or his personal representative.” Morse v. Cty. of 

Merced, 2016 WL 3254034, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Jun. 13, 2016)

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, the 

City can be held liable under the Bane Act if the acts of the 

police officers themselves give rise to a Bane Act claim. 

Plaintiff alleges wrongful acts by various police officers, 

but all such acts are in the context of the alleged false arrest 

and false imprisonment. In Plaintiff’s opposition, he fails to 

specifically identify any facts in his complaint which indicate 

Case 2:16-cv-00392-JAM-EFB Document 18 Filed 07/14/16 Page 10 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

threats, intimidation, and coercion which are independent from 

intimidation and coercion inherent in the alleged false arrest 

and imprisonment itself. Plaintiff’s Bane Act claim against the 

City is, therefore, dismissed with leave to amend. 

D. Fifth Cause of Action: Negligence

Plaintiff brings his negligence claim against both the City 

and Tibbet. Compl. at 14. “Public entities in California are 

not liable for state-law tort claims for any injuries caused by 

their conduct except where such liability is expressly 

authorized by statute.” Dias v. City of San Leandro, 2011 WL 

2837597, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 15, 2011); Cal. Gov’t Code 

§ 815.2. Thus, the City is immune from liability under a common 

law negligence claim. Additionally, Plaintiff’s allegations in 

support of his negligence claim are conclusory and not supported 

by any facts showing that Tibbet was involved in the FPD’s 

interactions with Plaintiff. Thus, Plaintiff fails to plead a 

common law negligence claim against Tibbet. 

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants are liable for 

negligence per se because they violated California Government 

Code § 845.6. Compl. ¶ 55. Section 845.6 states that 

“[n]either a public entity nor a public employee is liable for 

injury proximately caused by the failure of the employee to 

furnish or obtain medical care for a prisoner in his custody; 

but . . . a public employee, and the public entity where the 

employee is acting within the scope of his employment, is liable 

if the employee knows or has reason to know that the prisoner is 

in need of immediate medical care and he fails to take 

reasonable action to summon such medical care.” Cal. Gov't Code 

Case 2:16-cv-00392-JAM-EFB Document 18 Filed 07/14/16 Page 11 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

§ 845.6. “Liability under section 845.6 is limited to serious 

and obvious medical conditions requiring immediate care.” Jett 

v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 2006). Complaining 

about a headache and asking for medication is insufficient to 

trigger liability under § 845.6. Irvine v. City & Cty. of San 

Francisco, 2001 WL 967524, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 12, 2001); 

Kinney v. Contra Costa Cty., 8 Cal. App. 3d 761, 770 (1970). As 

to the facts alleging that Plaintiff fainted in the police car 

and in the interrogation room, Plaintiff does not show that any 

officer “kn[ew] or ha[d] reason to know” that Plaintiff fainted 

and was in need of medical attention. 

Plaintiff’s common law negligence claim against the City is 

dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff’s common law negligence 

claim against Tibbet is dismissed with leave to amend. 

Plaintiff’s § 845.6 claims against the City and Tibbet are 

dismissed with leave to amend. 

E. Sixth and Seventh Causes of Action: False Imprisonment

and False Arrest

“False arrest and false imprisonment are not separate 

torts. False arrest is but one way of committing a false 

imprisonment.” White v. City of Laguna Beach, 679 F. Supp. 2d 

1143, 1158 (C.D. Cal. 2010). “Under California law, the 

elements of a claim for false imprisonment are: (1) the 

nonconsensual, intentional confinement of a person; (2) without 

lawful privilege; and (3) for an appreciable period of time, 

however brief.” Hernandez v. Cty. of Marin, 2012 WL 1207231, at 

*8 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2012). 

Defendants argue that “no statutory basis is alleged for a 

Case 2:16-cv-00392-JAM-EFB Document 18 Filed 07/14/16 Page 12 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

false imprisonment claim against the City, thus the claim 

against it is not cognizable.” MTD at 15. As discussed above, 

a state entity in California is immune from tort liability 

unless some statute abrogates that immunity. Plaintiff fails to 

identify a statute under which Plaintiff can base the City’s 

liability. Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim against the 

City is dismissed with leave to amend. 

Plaintiff’s seventh cause of action for false arrest is 

dismissed with prejudice as duplicative of Plaintiff’s false 

imprisonment claim.

III. ORDER

Plaintiff’s first cause of action for excessive force, to 

the extent it is brought under the Fourteenth Amendment, is 

dismissed with prejudice but remains to the extent it is brought 

under the Fourth Amendment. 

Plaintiff’s claims against Chief Tibbet in his official 

capacity are dismissed with prejudice. 

Plaintiff’s common law negligence claim against the City

(sixth cause of action) is dismissed with prejudice. 

Plaintiff’s false arrest claim (seventh cause of action) is 

dismissed with prejudice. 

Plaintiff’s remaining claims against Tibbet in his 

individual capacity and against the City that were challenged in 

this motion to dismiss are dismissed with leave to amend.

Plaintiff shall file his amended complaint within twenty 

days from the date of this Order. Defendants’ responsive 

pleadings are due within twenty days thereafter. The Court 

Case 2:16-cv-00392-JAM-EFB Document 18 Filed 07/14/16 Page 13 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

advises that failure to cure the defects identified in this 

Order may be grounds for dismissal of those claims without 

further leave to amend. Dick v. Am. Home Mortgage Servicing, 

Inc., 2013 WL 5299180, at *6 (E.D. Cal. 2013). If Plaintiff 

elects not to amend his complaint, the case will proceed on the 

remaining claims and Defendants shall file their answer to the 

complaint within thirty days from the date of this Order. 

Finally, Defendants’ reply brief is five pages longer than 

the page limit allowed by the Court in its Order re Filing 

Requirements (Doc. #7-2). As indicated by the Order, the Court 

did not consider any arguments made past the fifth page of the 

reply. Counsel for Defendants must pay a $250.00 sanction 

($50.00 per page for the five pages over the limit) within ten 

days of the date of this order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 13, 2016

Case 2:16-cv-00392-JAM-EFB Document 18 Filed 07/14/16 Page 14 of 14