Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04226/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04226-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Charles L. Craft
Petitioner
George Stratton
Respondent

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES LEE CRAFT,

Petitioner,

 vs.

GEORGE STRATTON, Warden,

Respondent. 

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No C 04-4226 JSW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

Charles Lee Craft , a state prisoner currently incarcerated at Kern Valley

State Prison in Delano, California, filed this pro se petition for a writ of habeas

corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging the constitutional validity of his state

conviction. Per order filed on January 12, 2005, the court found that the petition,

when liberally construed, stated a cognizable federal habeas action under § 2254

and ordered Respondent to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not

be granted. Respondent filed an answer. Petitioner subsequently filed a traverse. 

This pro se habeas petition is now before the court for consideration of the

claims on the merits. For the reasons discussed below, the petition is denied. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On August 9, 2000, Petitioner was convicted in Lake County and was

sentenced to life without possibility of parole. Court Transcript (“CT”) at 4386,

5434. Petitioner was found guilty of first-degree murder and the allegation of

personal use of a firearm. At a trial on the special circumstances of a prior

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murder and the allegation of a prior serious felony on August 14, 2000, the jury

found the special circumstances to be true. 

The California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment on April 17, 2003

and the Supreme Court of California denied review on July 9, 2003. Petitioner

timely filed the instant federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus. This court

has subject matter jurisdiction over this habeas action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254

and, because Petitioner was convicted in Lake County, this action is in the proper

venue. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The California Court of Appeal summarized the facts underlying the case

as follows: 

In 1995, defendant was hired by Richard and Kathleen Sacks as a

caretaker for their 245-acre ranch in Lake County. Among the

buildings situated on the property were a dilapidated yellow

farmhouse and a double-wide mobile home. Defendant was allowed to

live in the mobile home, but defendant was to use only one of the three

bedrooms.

The Sacks family had plans to move gradually from their ranch in

Hollister onto the Lake County property, and over the course of

several months in 1996 the family brought carloads of belongings and

stored them in the yellow house and in the master bedroom of the

mobile home. The Sackses' daughter, Desiree, was planning to move

into the upper story of the yellow house, and she brought most of her

possessions to the ranch. They were stored in cardboard boxes

carefully arranged along the sides of the upstairs room. Desiree also

brought up a dresser, and she placed a music stand on top of it.

Richard and Kathleen Sacks were planning to live in the mobile home.

Kathleen Sacks had several boxes of expensive rock quartz crystals

that were placed in a small closet in the master bedroom. Richard

Sacks had a collection of about 15 reptiles (snakes and lizards) housed

in aquarium-type cages. They were put along the walls in the master

bedroom, and two mirrored closet doors were removed to make room

for reptile cages in the larger closet. The Sackses also brought some

tools, including a Weed-Eater, and fishing equipment.

The Sackses imposed certain rules for defendant: no smoking, no

drinking, no dogs, no visitors. Despite those restrictions, in May 1996,

defendant agreed to let Gerald Hebert stay on the ranch at the request

of a mutual friend, Joan Turner. Defendant was not happy with the

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2

 Joan Turner had helped Hebert apply for food stamps, which were

mailed to her in Clearlake every month. She would then telephone

Hebert and he would ride into town to get them. Once defendant

picked up Hebert's food stamps instead.

3

 One of defendant's assigned tasks as caretaker had been to fill in that

hole to make the area safe for the horses the Sackses intended to have

on the ranch.

4

 Due to the body's state of decomposition, none of the victim's blood

was available for matching. DNA samples were obtained from bone,

teeth, and pubic hair.

3

arrangement. He told his friend Tracy Demato at one point that things

were “bad” between him and Hebert and he was going to ask Hebert to

move. On another occasion, defendant told Demato that he had gotten

Hebert's food stamps and Hebert would be angry.2

In late August 1996, Hebert went to San Francisco for about two

weeks to work on a plumbing job with his friend, William Lyons.

Hebert was paid $300 in cash. Although he spent some of the money,

he returned to Lake County with about $200 in his wallet. William

Lyons brought Hebert back to the ranch and also brought a futon that

Hebert had retrieved from storage in San Francisco.

On August 31, Joan Turner telephoned the Sackses' ranch and spoke to

defendant, who volunteered to pick up Hebert's food stamps. Mrs.

Turner did not feel comfortable with that arrangement and declined the

offer. She later reached Hebert, who bicycled into town to get his food

stamps. Hebert was last seen by Joan Turner's husband riding his

bicycle in Clearlake on Saturday afternoon, August 31, 1996.

On Friday, September 6, 1996, the Sackses arrived at the ranch with

another load. On their arrival, defendant told the Sackses someone had

broken into the house. While Richard Sacks unloaded their goods,

Kathleen Sacks, her daughter Desiree, and her niece Julie went

walking on the property. They soon came upon two dogs who had

uncovered the body of a man partially buried in a large hole by the

creek.3

 The dead man was not immediately identifiable, as he had no

wallet and an empty, unzipped fanny pack was buried with him.

Through fingerprints, the sheriff's investigators identified him as

Gerald Hebert. The fanny pack was later identified as belonging to

Hebert. 

Hebert had been buried in the hole without shoes. A pair of bloody

tennis shoes of the type worn by Hebert were found in a garbage pile

on the Sackses' ranch inside a broken terrarium. Through DNA tests,

the blood on the tennis shoes was found to match Hebert's DNA.4

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Hebert's empty wallet was later found in the closet of defendant's

bedroom of the mobile home. His driver's license, social security card,

and other identity cards were found, along with a plastic insert that had

been in the wallet, in the garbage outside the rear door of the mobile home.

The sheriff's investigators obtained from Willie Harris a red duffle bag

with a Marlboro logo that defendant had left with him on the day the

body was found. The bag had belonged to Hebert. Defendant later

consented to a search of that bag, and inside the investigators found

shoes belonging to Desiree Sacks.

Hebert's blood-splattered bicycle was later retrieved by the

investigating sheriff's deputies from the home of Willie Harris, a friend

of defendant. A blood-stained tent was located on the Sackses' ranch

between the mobile home and the trash dump. The blood on the tent

matched Hebert's DNA, as did blood stains found on Hebert's bicycle

and on one of defendant's leather boots.

The forensic examination revealed that Hebert had been killed by

gunshot wounds several days before his body was found. One shot

entered his back and traveled upward. The position of the wound,

together with the blood splatters on the bicycle, suggested that Hebert

had been shot while hunched over sitting on his bicycle. The second

shot would have been instantly fatal; it grazed Hebert's shoulder and

entered the base of his skull. The bullet removed from Hebert's skull

came from an 8-millimeter rifle.

On the day she discovered Hebert's body, Kathleen Sacks realized that,

despite her instructions to defendant, someone else had been living in

the mobile home. She found men's clothing, boots, and bedding in the

back bedroom. She and her husband also discovered that the yellow

house had been burglarized. Desiree's boxes had been ransacked.

Defendant was apologetic and assured the Sackses that he had an 8

millimeter rifle and could take care of the problem. Kathleen Sacks

was furious with defendant and told him to pack up his things.

That same day, when Hebert's body was found, defendant told the

investigating officers that he lived alone and no one had been on the

ranch for about a month. A week later, on September 14, 1996,

Deputies Stein and Navarro questioned defendant at the home of

defendant's girlfriend. Defendant acknowledged that Hebert had been

living in the mobile home, but he explained that he had not wanted to

reveal that information because his employers did not want anyone

else on the property. Defendant said he had last seen Hebert about a

week before the body was discovered. He assumed that Hebert had

moved back to San Francisco, as his futon, backpack and bicycle were

gone. Defendant admitted putting the broken aquarium in the garbage

dump, and he said he thought he had put Hebert's shoes inside the aquarium.

Also on September 14, the Sackses arrived at the ranch with another

load. They found the mobile home padlocked and all of defendant's

belongings gone. Also gone were all the reptiles, all the rock crystals,

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some items from the living room, virtually all the tools from the barn,

and substantial amounts from the yellow house. The missing items

included china, cookware, jewelry, art supplies, figurines, videotapes,

romance novels, fishing equipment, a sewing machine, and the

mirrored closet doors.

Several days earlier, defendant's friend, Allen Madden, agreed to let

defendant stay temporarily in an empty camper shell in his yard.

Madden helped defendant transport two truckloads of belongings from

the Sacks ranch to Madden's property. Defendant's friend, Tracy

Demato, later helped defendant move more goods to Madden's yard.

Among the items she helped move were several cardboard boxes and

some mirrored closet doors. In the course of the move, defendant

offered to sell Demato a futon bed.

As the days passed, Allen Madden noticed that more and more goods

kept appearing in his yard around the camper shell. Madden became

suspicious that defendant was bringing stolen property into the yard,

and he began to look through some of the things. Underneath a

disabled truck Madden found a zippered rifle case. Madden suspected

the rifle might be the murder weapon. Defendant had displayed an 8-

millimeter rifle in just such a case to Allen Madden at the Sackses'

ranch about a week before Hebert's body was discovered. Defendant

told Madden then that he wanted to trade the rifle for a pistol.

Tracy Demato, too, had seen defendant with a rifle in her visits to the

Sacks ranch. One time defendant was shooting into a hay bale with the

rifle propped up on a music stand. Defendant told her it was an 8-

millimeter rifle. Another time Demato saw the rifle in defendant's

bedroom. Defendant kept the rifle in a brown zippered case.

Allen Madden eventually turned the zippered rifle case over to

sheriff's deputies. And, after obtaining a search warrant, the

investigators opened the case to retrieve the rifle. That rifle was

determined to be the murder weapon. It had originally belonged to

William Lyons, a longtime friend of Hebert. In late August 1996,

Lyons visited Hebert at the Sacks ranch after a hunting trip, and

Hebert asked to borrow the rifle so that he could shoot some deer.

Lyons left the rifle in its brown zippered case with Hebert.

On September 28, 1996, defendant was arrested on unrelated charges

and held in custody. A few days later, on October 2, sheriff's

investigators went to the Madden home and took away a truckload of

boxes identified by the Maddens as brought by defendant. Allen

Madden also gave the officers a sewing machine and some artist's

paints that defendant had given to the family. The officers later took

more items from the camper shell pursuant to a search warrant. Among

the items taken was a pair of blood-stained leather boots that the

officers recognized as those defendant had been wearing in his

interview on September 14. And, the officers took a gray contractor's

nail pouch that was identified as Hebert's.

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5

 Sometime in early September defendant sold several snakes and a

lizard in their cages to John Campbell (then age 17), who had

expressed an interest in them after seeing them during a visit to the

ranch. The reptiles were returned to the Sackses.

6

 During a visit to the Sackses' ranch to see her friend Hebert, Annilee

Allen saw and admired several quartz crystals in defendant's bedroom.

Later, defendant came to her house in Clearlake and offered to sell her

some of the crystals. Ms. Allen paid $100 for one, but could not afford

to buy any others. Defendant left the rest of the crystals with her

nonetheless. Sometime in late August, Ms. Allen's boyfriend, William

Lyons, let defendant take back the crystals.

Defendant also offered to sell some rock crystals to Tracy Demato, but

she declined.

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Numerous items seized from the Madden property were identified by

the Sackses as stolen from their ranch. The officers also recovered

several stolen items (a music stand, books, videotapes, statues, vases)

that defendant had given to Tracy Demato. And, they retrieved several

stolen rock crystals that defendant had given to other friends. The

stolen items were returned to the Sackses.

While defendant was still living at the ranch, defendant told Tracy

Demato that he was selling the Sackses' snakes and other goods to pay

some bills, and he was mad at Hebert because Hebert had threatened to

tell the Sackses defendant was selling their snakes.5 Later, after

defendant moved to Allen Madden's yard, defendant told Demato that

he had shot Hebert.

Defendant also told Allen Madden he had killed Hebert. Defendant

explained that he had been angry at Hebert because Hebert had

threatened to tell the Sackses that he was selling drugs and not doing

the work. Hebert wanted to take over defendant's caretaker job.

Defendant told Madden he shot Hebert twice. But he found he could

not move the body alone, so he asked Willie Harris to help. The two

men used a tarp to wrap the body and put it in Harris's truck. Then

they drove to the hole by the creek and buried the body.

Defendant was interviewed by sheriff's investigators on January 15,

1997, and admitted that he took some of the Sackses' reptiles and

exchanged them for “crank.” He also admitted taking a dragon statue

and some of the rock crystals, selling some, and trading others for

some “dope.”6 But defendant said he gave away most of what he

took, making only enough money to buy cigarettes. Defendant

admitted shooting the 8-millimeter rifle at the ranch, but he said he

told Hebert to get rid of the rifle and he did not know where it was.

People v. Craft, No. A92932, 2003 WL 1889986 at **1-4 (Cal. Ct. App. April

17, 2003).

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court may entertain a petition for habeas relief “in behalf of a person

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court only on the ground that he is

in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The writ may not be granted unless the state

court’s adjudication of any claim on the merits: “(1) resulted in a decision that

was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2)

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Id. at §

2254(d). 

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ

if a state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme

Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the

Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-12 (2000). “Under the ‘unreasonable application’

clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if a state court identifies the

correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413.

Based on this deferential standard, federal habeas relief will not be

granted “simply because [this] court concludes in its independent judgment that

the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law

erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” 

Id. at 411. While circuit law may provide persuasive authority in determining

whether the state court made an unreasonable application of Supreme Court

precedent, the only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 28

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U.S.C. § 2254(d) is in the holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme

Court as of the time of the state court decision. Id. at 412; Clark v. Murphy, 331

F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). 

In deciding whether a state court’s decision is contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, a federal court looks

to the decision of the highest state court to address the merits of the petitioner’s

claim in a reasoned decision. LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th

Cir. 2000). Because the Court finds that Petitioner does not present any

cognizable claims, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied on the

merits. 

DISCUSSION

 In his petition for writ of habeas corpus, Petitioner raises the following

grounds for relief: (1) the trial court violated Petitioner’s due process rights by

failing to properly instruct the jury regarding felony-murder; (2) the trial court

admitted Petitioner’s statement in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436

(1966); (3) the trial court’s admission of evidence of Petitioner’s drug use and

drug sales violated his rights to due process and a fair trial; (4) the trial court’s

refusal to turn over personnel records of one witness violated Petitioner’s right to

due process and to confront and cross-examine that witness; (5) Petitioner

suffered ineffective assistance of counsel due to counsel’s failure to request a

mistrial; (6) cumulative error; and (7) the trial court’s sentencing Petitioner to

life without parole due to a prior out-of-state conviction violated Petitioner’s due

process rights. 

A. Improper Jury Instruction

 Petitioner argues that the jury instructions on felony murder violated due

process because the jury was not instructed that theft is a lesser offense included

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within robbery. At trial, the prosecution presented two alternate theories of first

degree murder: premeditated murder and murder during the commission of a

robbery. Because the jury returned a general verdict and did not specify which

particular first-degree murder theory they relied on, Petitioner alleges that an

improper felony murder instruction would necessarily nullify his conviction. 

CT at 5269. We find that the jury was adequately instructed on the timing of

intent to steal and Petitioner’s argument is without merit. 

1. Legal Standard

To obtain federal relief for errors in the jury charge, a petitioner must

show that the ailing instruction by itself so frustrated the entire trial that the

resulting conviction violates due process. Id. at 72; Donnelly v. DeChristoforo,

416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974) (“[I]t must establish not merely that the instruction is

undesirable, erroneous or even 'universally condemned,' but that it violated

some [constitutional right]”). The omission of an instruction is less likely to be

prejudicial than a misstatement of law. Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 926,

971-72 (9th Cir. 2001). Moreover, the instruction may not be judged in

isolation, but must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole.

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991). In other words, the court must

evaluate jury instructions in the context of the overall charge to the jury as a

component of the entire trial process. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 169

(1982). 

Further, a jury instruction that omits an element of an offense is a

constitutional error subject to harmless error analysis. Neder v. United States,

527 U.S. 1, 8- 11 (1999); Evanchyk v. Stewart, 340 F.3d 933-940 (9th Cir.

2003) (holding that the harmless error analysis is also applicable to § 2254

cases). The omission will be found harmless unless it “had a substantial and

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injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.” California v. Roy,

519 U.S. 2, 4 (1996). 

2. Analysis

Without being instructed that theft is a lesser-included offense of

robbery, Petitioner argues that the jury did not consider whether his intent to

steal arose after the killing. If the jury was permitted to consider the lesser

crime of theft, Petitioner contends that the jury would not have determined that

he committed a robbery and, therefore, he would not have been found guilty of

felony murder. 

As a general rule, the Ninth Circuit has held that “the failure of a state

court to instruct on a lesser offense [in a non-capital case] fails to present a

federal constitutional question and will not be considered in a federal habeas

corpus proceeding.” Solis v. Garcia, 219 F.3d 922, 929 (9th Cir. 2000). An

exception to this rule may arise when the lesser included offenses “are

consistent with defendant’s theory of the case” and where substantial evidence

warrants the instruction on the lesser included offense. Id. at 929; see also

Vickers v. Ricketts, 798 F.2d 369, 371 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding due process

violation where “the jury was not given the option of finding him guilty of the

lesser included noncapital offense of second degree murder even though the

evidence would have supported such a verdict”). However, in this case,

Petitioner was not charged with robbery, but was instead charged with felony

murder involving an underlying robbery. Hence, theft is not a lesser-included

offense of felony murder and there is nothing constitutionally infirm in the trial

court’s failure to charge the jury on theft. 

Moreover, Petitioner’s claim fails because the overall jury instructions

adequately defined the specific intent for robbery and the essential elements

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necessary for a finding of felony murder. The jury was specifically instructed

that the crime of felony murder requires that the “unlawful killing” must

“occur[] [during the commission or attempted commission of the crime] of

Robbery.” CT at 5264. The jury instructions defined robbery as the taking of

another’s personal property “with the specific intent permanently to deprive that

person of the property” and accomplished “against the will of that person.” CT

at 5272. The Court of Appeal considered the instructions given to the jury as a

whole and found that they adequately conveyed the issue of the timing of the

formation of the intent to steal. Craft, 2003 WL 1889986 at *14.

Petitioner misunderstands the legal standard by contending that “it was

not robbery if the decedent’s property was taken after his death.” Petition at 15. 

Taking property will still be robbery even if the belongings were stolen after the

killing as long as the intent to steal arose either before or during the murder. If

the jury had found that Petitioner’s intent to steal from the victim did not arise

until after the murder, then there was no killing during the commission or

attempted commission of robbery and there would have been no finding of

felony-murder. See People v. Lewis, 25 Cal. 4th 610, 647 (Cal. 2001).

Further, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to reasonably

determine that Petitioner had intended to rob Hebert prior to killing him. 

Petitioner admitted to stealing reptiles, rock crystals, and a dragon statue from

the Sackses’ in order to buy drugs. Craft, 2003 WL 1889986 at *4. Petitioner

knew that Hebert had just picked up some food stamps and that Hebert had

returned with cash from working on a plumbing job in San Francisco for two

weeks. Id. Hebert’s empty wallet was later found in Petitioner’s bedroom, an

empty fanny pack was found near Hebert’s body, and Petitioner had taken

Hebert’s bicycle and duffle bag and given them to Willie Harris. Id. These

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facts alone support a jury finding that Petitioner’s intent to steal was formed

prior to the commission of the murder. See People v. Marshall, 15 Cal. 4th 1,

35 (1997) (“If a person commits a murder, and after doing so takes the victim’s

wallet, the jury may reasonably infer that the murder was committed for the

purpose of obtaining the wallet, because murders are commonly committed to

obtain money”).

Petitioner’s reliance on People v. Ramkeesoon, 39 Cal. 3d 346 (1985), is

not instructive. Here, there was no fear of an “unwarranted all-or-nothing

choice” that would have guaranteed robbery and felony-murder convictions

irrespective of intent. Ramkeesoon, 39 Cal. 3d at 352. The Court of Appeal

considered Petitioner’s arguments and found that the failure to instruct on the

lesser did not violate his rights because the jury was not forced into such a

choice. People v. Craft, 2003 WL 1889986 at *14. First, Petitioner was not

actually charged with robbery and so the jury was not forced to choose between

robbery or theft. The instruction on robbery was only provided as relevant in

connection with the felony-murder charge. Id. Second, if the jury found that

Petitioner did not commit the requisite robbery for a first-degree felony murder,

they still could have found Petitioner guilty of second-degree murder. Id.; CT

at 5266, 5308. The Court of Appeal appropriately distinguished the present case

from Ramkeesoon by noting that “[t]he rule requiring the trial court to instruct

the jury sua sponte on theft as a lesser offense applies when the defendant has

been charged with the greater offense of robbery.” People v. Craft, 2003 WL

1889986 at *14. 

Because the jury instructions were clear on the necessary elements of

robbery and “juries are presumed to follow their instructions,” Richardson v.

Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987), there is no risk that any alleged omission in

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failing to instruct on theft as a lesser-included offense amounted to

constitutional error.

B. Violation of Miranda Rights 

Petitioner claims that the trial court erred in not suppressing his statement

to police on January 15, 1997 because the statement was involuntary and

violated Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 444 (1968). During his police interview,

Petitioner admitted to being a felon in possession of a firearm, CT at 3943, to

using crack, CT at 3955, and to trading stolen snakes for an “[e]ight ball of

crank,” CT at 4026. Petitioner asserts that these admissions were coerced

because “the officers declined to give appellant information about his property

to which he was entitled until or unless he talked to them.” Petition at 32. 

Additionally, Petitioner contends his statement was involuntarily made since he

was unaware that he was being questioned as the prime suspect in a murder

investigation. Id. at 34. 

1. Legal Standard 

In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Supreme Court held that

a person subjected to custodial interrogation must be advised that he has the

right to remain silent, that statements made can be used against him, that he has

the right to counsel, and that he has the right to have counsel appointed. These

warnings must precede any custodial interrogation, which occurs whenever law

enforcement officers question a person after taking that person into custody or

otherwise significantly deprive a person of freedom of action. Id at 444. 

The requirements of Miranda are “clearly established” federal law for the

purposes of federal habeas corpus review under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). Juan H. v.

Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1271 (9th Cir. 2005); Jackson v. Giurbino, 364 F.3d

1002, 1009 (9th Cir. 2004). The Ninth Circuit held that: (1) Miranda violations

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 Although the exclusionary rule under Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481-82,

494 (1976), bars federal habeas review of Fourth Amendment claims unless the

state did not provide an opportunity for full and fair litigation of those claims,

this jurisdictional restriction does not extend to a state prisoner's claim that his

conviction rests on statements obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. 

Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 686-95 (1993). 

14

are properly considered in federal habeas proceedings and (2) where statements

are used as evidence of guilt and there is no proper instruction to the jury

regarding the limited use of such statements, there is the possibility of federal

constitutional error. Hinman v. McCarthy, 676 F.2d 343, 348-49 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 459 U.S. 1048 (1982).7

Once properly advised of his rights, an accused may waive them

voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475. The

government must prove waiver by preponderance of the evidence. See

Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168-9 (1986). The waiver need not be

express and may be inferred where defendant understands his rights and

undertakes a course of conduct indicating waiver. North Carolina v. Butler, 441

U.S. 369, 373 (1979). In determining whether a defendant's will was overborne

and a statement was involuntary, the reviewing court must assess the totality of

the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,

412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973). Although the burden is on the government to prove

voluntariness, a waiver cannot be held involuntary absent official compulsion or

coercion. See Connelly, 479 U.S. at 170. A statement is involuntary and

subject to exclusion if it was the product of physical or psychological coercion

on the part of the police. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 US 534, 540 (1960). 

The remedy for a violation of Miranda rights is the suppression, at the

subsequent trial, of the incriminating statements the defendant made during

questioning. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479. Habeas relief should be granted if the

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admission of statements in violation of Miranda “had substantial and injurious

effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.” Jackson, 364 F.3d at 1010

(quoting Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 147 (1998)). 

 2. Analysis 

Petitioner alleges that his statement to police was in violation of his

Miranda rights and was made pursuant to coercive police tactics. Petitioner was

being held in custody pursuant to an outstanding warrant on an unrelated charge

on August 15, 1997 and, prior to waiving his Miranda rights, Petitioner claims

he asked the police about the items seized from the Madden’s property. 

According to Petitioner, the police stated that “it would all work out” and then

gave Petitioner his Miranda warning. Petition at 31. Petitioner claims these

tactics were deceptive and coerced him into waiving his Miranda rights in order

to learn about his seized property. 

There is no evidence in the record to support Petitioner’s claim that his

incriminating statements were obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. 

Petitioner presents no evidence that “the officers declined to give appellant

information about his property to which he was entitled until or unless he talked

to them.” Petition at 32. To the contrary, the police officers never expressly

stated that they would provide Petitioner with additional information regarding

his property if he waived his Miranda rights. Petitioner was already aware “that

everything he owned was taken by the police” pursuant to a search warrant, Id.

at 31; CT at 3924, so there is no merit to Petitioner’s claim that knowing which

items had been seized would affect his Miranda waiver. Even accepting

Petitioner’s version of events, there is nothing coercive or overbearing in the

police statements that they planned to discuss his property during the interview. 

Petition at 31. A lack of complete candor does not amount to coercion and does

not render Petitioner’s Miranda waiver involuntary.

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In response to Petitioner’s inquiry, the police assured Petitioner that, “[i]f

it all comes out right, you’ll get [your property] all back, naturally.” CT at 3925. 

It is not clear what additional information Petitioner expected the police to

provide. Petitioner incorrectly cites to the California Penal Code for the

proposition that due process required the police officers to furnish him with the

search warrant. Petition at 35. A copy of the search warrant was left with Allen

Madden at the time of the seizure and there is no additional requirement that

Petitioner be provided a copy of the search warrant. Cal. Penal Code § 1535;

see People v. Calabrese, 101 Cal. App. 4th 79, 84 (2002) (citing City of West

Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234, 242-43 (1999) (“The United States Supreme

Court has not interpreted the Fourth Amendment to the United States

Constitution as requiring the officer executing the search warrant to display the

warrant or provide defendant a copy of it”). 

To determine voluntariness of a statement under Miranda, courts may

consider whether the defendant has previously had “considerable experience

with the police.” Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 726 (1979). Petitioner

conceded that he had previous police dealings and, in referencing his prior

North Carolina murder conviction (see infra Section G), Petitioner stated,

“[s]ome years ago I went through a homicide deal so I know what, what’s going

on and you were asking me questions and I answered them the best I could.” 

CT at 3914 (Transcript of Charles Craft Interview, Jan. 15, 1997.) 

Petitioner further alleges that his admissions would not have been made

if he had known he was a murder suspect. Petitioner states that “he never would

have spoken to law enforcement because it was obvious from the fact of the

search warrant that the items being search [sic] for related to a murder.” 

Petition at 31. Citing Supreme Court precedent, the Court of Appeal found that

“interrogating officers need not divulge the exact charges being investigated.” 

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People v. Craft, 2003 WL 1889986 at *9 (citing Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S.

564, 576 (1986)). Petitioner was at all times aware of Hebert’s murder and,

during the interview, Petitioner actually volunteered information about Hebert’s

murder before the police began questioning him. The investigating officer

repeatedly told Craft that he was the “one that brought up homicide.” CT at

3915-17. In the course of the lengthy interview, Craft explicitly expressed his

intent to cooperate with the police and stated, that “here’s a homicide

investigation. I don’t have any idea of what’s going on. I’ll work with you on

that, you ask me specific questions.” CT at 3912. Even if the police had

withheld information about Petitioner’s property, Petitioner’s awareness of an

ongoing homicide inquiry and his prior experience as a murder suspect make it

doubtful that he would waive his Miranda rights in a murder investigation just

to ascertain the whereabouts of his property, including kitchen equipment and

tools. CT at 3925. 

The Court of Appeal determined that Petitioner's will to exercise his right

to remain silent was not overborne by coercive police tactics or the failure to

disclose that he was a suspect in a murder investigation. There was no

indication from Petitioner's background or characteristics that he was incapable

of fully comprehending that he was waiving his Miranda rights by making a

statement to the police. It is uncontested that the police gave Petitioner his

Miranda warnings and that Petitioner did agree to speak with the police. As the

Court of Appeal correctly noted, “[t]he absence of a response to defendant’s

question about the property in the hands of the authorities did not invalidate

defendant’s waiver.” Id. at *9. 

In considering the totality of the circumstances, the Court of Appeal

determined that there was no improper coercion by the suggestion of the police

that he would learn the whereabouts of his property in the course of the

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interview and Petitioner at all times knew he had the right to remain silent. This

Court finds that the Court of Appeal's conclusion that Petitioner voluntarily

waived his Miranda rights by making a statement and was not overborne by

coercive police tactics is consistent with controlling federal law. 

C. Admission of Evidence of Drug Use and Drug Sales

Petitioner argues that, even if his statement to police was properly be

admitted, his damaging statements regarding drug use and drug sales should not

have been allowed into evidence. Petitioner claims that the trial court’s

admission into evidence of several prior uncharged incidents of his drug use and

drug sales denied him the fair trial guaranteed by the Due Process Clause. At

trial, Petitioner unsuccessfully moved to exclude all references to his use and

sale of drugs. RT at 3078. The court found the evidence to be relevant to his

motive to commit the murder and allowed the evidence to be presented. RT at

3084-86. 

1. Legal Standard

A state court's procedural or evidentiary ruling is not subject to federal

habeas review, however, unless the ruling violates federal law, either by

infringing upon a specific federal constitutional or statutory provision or by

depriving the defendant of the fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by due

process. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984); Jammal v. Van de Kamp,

926 F.2d 918, 919-20 (9th Cir. 1991). Accordingly, a federal court cannot

disturb on due process grounds a state court's decision to admit evidence of

prior crimes or bad acts unless the admission of the evidence was arbitrary or so

prejudicial that it rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. See Walters v. Maass,

45 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1995); Colley v. Sumner, 784 F.2d 984, 990 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 839 (1986). The Supreme Court has upheld the use

of prior illegal acts to show motive, planning, intent and other states of mind in

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the presently charged crimes. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 227 (1941).

 In California, the state court’s admission of evidence generally “depends

upon three principal factors: (1) the materiality of the fact sought to be proved

or disproved; (2) the tendency of the uncharged crime to prove or disprove the

material fact; and (3) the existence of any rule or policy requiring the exclusion

of relevant evidence.” People v. Robbins, 45 Cal. 3d 867, 879 (1988) (quoting

People v. Thompson, 27 Cal. 3d 303, 315 (1980)). 

2. Analysis

The admission of other crimes evidence violates due process only 

if there were no permissible inferences the jury could have drawn from the

evidence (in other words, no inference other than conduct in conformity

therewith). See McKinney v. Rees, 993 F.2d 1378, 1384 (9th Cir. 1993);

Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920. And even so, the evidence must be of such highly

inflammatory or emotionally charged quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial. 

See McKinney, 993 F.2d at 1384-85; Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920-21. That was not

the case here. The evidence of petitioner’s prior drug use and sales was

probative of petitioner’s intent and motive, and not so highly inflammatory or

emotionally charged as to necessarily prevent a fair trial. See id. 

Relying on the comparable fact pattern in People v. Felix, 23 Cal. App.

4th 1385, 1392 (1994), the Court of Appeal found that “a direct and logical

connection was made between defendant’s admitted drug use and the charged

offenses.” People v. Craft, 2003 WL 1889986 at *10. That Petitioner had

previously stolen from the Sackses in order to buy drugs permitted both the

inference that he stole from them here and that he was motivated to rob and kill

Hebert for drug money. Id. A further connection was found through the

evidence that Petitioner had told Allen Madden that he killed Hebert because he

was going to report to the Sackses that Petitioner was selling drugs. People v.

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Craft, 2003 WL 1889986 at *10. At trial, Petitioner’s counsel argued that the

admission of drug use “is highly prejudicial and any probative value is

substantially outweighed by the prejudice.” RT at 3018, 3092; see Cal. Evid.

Code § 352. The court denied the defense’s request and stated that “the People

feel that they need it for their case and they are going to argue what it means,

and whether the jury believes it or whether they don’t is your business.” RT at

3086. The trial court held that the Petitioner’s drug use and sales created a

permissible inference in demonstrating motive and we agree. See Cal. Evid.

Code § 1101(b). 

This Court is satisfied that proof of Petitioner’s motive was a clearly

material fact, that there was a strong tendency that evidence relating to

Petitioner’s drug activity could prove motive, and the probative value

outweighed any prejudicial effect. See Robbins, 45 Cal. 3d at 879. The jury

instructions explicitly stated:

“Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing

that the defendant committed [a crime] other than that for which

[he] is on trial

[This] evidence, if believed, [may not be considered by you

to prove that defendant is a person of bad character or that [he] has

a disposition to commit crimes. It may be considered by you

[only] for the limited purpose of determining if it tends to show:...

[The existence of the intent which is a necessary element of

the crime charged;]

[A motive for the commission of the crime charged;]...

For the limited purpose for which you may consider such

evidence, you must weigh it in the same manner as you do all

other evidence in the case”

CT at 5242. Because we must presume the jury followed instructions,

Richardson, 481 U.S. at 211, these limiting instructions about the admission of

past crimes further minimized any prejudicial impact. 

It simply cannot be said that the state courts’ rejection of petitioner’s 

claim was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court precedent, or that it involved an unreasonable

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determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The California Court of

Appeal reasonably concluded that the admission of the evidence of Petitioner’s

drug activity did not render petitioner’s trial fundamentally unfair in violation of

due process, “which means that the state court’s determination to that effect

must stand.” Early v. Packer, 123 S. Ct. 362, 366 (2002). 

D. Refusal to Grant Access to Personnel Record

Petitioner contends the trial court violated his right to due process and to

confrontation by denying his motion, during trial, for discovery of police

personnel records. Based on the discovery of a romantic relationship between

Lake County Sheriff’s Deputy David Perry and Jennifer Garcia, whose father

owned the property where Craft’s belongings were seized, Petitioner moved for

the disclosure of Perry’s personnel file. 

1. Legal Standard 

Under California’s Pitchess procedure, a criminal defendant has a limited

right to discovery of peace officer personnel records, specifically of complaints

made against the officer. Pitchess v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 531 (1974). 

The procedure has been codified. See Cal. Penal Code § 832.7, 832.8; Cal.

Evid. Code §§ 1043-1045. The Pitchess procedure follows two steps. First, the

defendant must make a written motion for peace officer personnel records that

describes the records sought and that is supported by “affidavits showing good

cause for the discovery or disclosure sought, setting forth the materiality thereof

to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation and stating upon

reasonable belief that such governmental agency identified has the records or

information from the records.” California Highway Scavone- Nancerol v.

Superior Court, 84 Cal. App. 4th 1010, 1019-20 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); Cal.

Evid. Code § 1043. Second, if a showing of good cause is made, the trial court

will conduct an in camera review of the records to determine whether they are

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relevant to the current proceedings. Id; Cal. Evid. Code § 1045. 

 In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the Supreme Court held that

“the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon

request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to

punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” 373

U.S. at 87. The Ninth Circuit has found that the Pitchess preliminary

requirement of good cause complies with Supreme Court precedent under Brady

(as modified in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 58 n. 15 (1987)) and has

held that California’s procedure is not contrary to Supreme Court precedent. 

Harrison v. Lockyer, 316 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003) (“We are not

instructed on how a defendant in a criminal case will know, or be able to make,

a preliminary showing that a police personnel file contains evidence material to

his defense. But we are clear that the California Supreme Court has faithfully

followed the United States Supreme Court [in requiring such a showing]”).

2. Analysis

 Petitioner claims that the trial court's denial of his Pitchess motion

violated his constitutional rights to due process and to confront witnesses

against him. The only federal question presented by Petitioner is whether he

was denied access to favorable and material evidence under Brady. During the

trial, Petitioner filed a motion to discover the personnel records of Deputy Perry. 

The motion was “based on the discovery that Deputy Perry of the Lake County

Sheriff’s Department had been dating [prosecution witness] Allen Madden’s

daughter, Jennifer (Garcia), at the time of the investigation, that during that

intimate relationship Deputy Perry shared information about the case with Ms.

Garcia, and that Deputy Perry had been disciplined.” People v. Craft, No.

A92932, 2003 WL 1889986 at *11 (Cal. Ct. App. April 17, 2003). 

The trial court found that Petitioner satisfied the first prong under

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Pitchess by establishing good cause and proceeded to the second step of

conducting an in camera hearing. Based on this hearing, the trial court did

provide defense counsel with some telephone logs from the personnel file that

demonstrated phone calls from the jail to the Madden residence, but otherwise

denied Petitioner’s motion to compel disclosure. Id.

The California Court of Appeal held that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in denying the Pitchess motion because “the personnel file contains

nothing favorable to the defendant and nothing that undermines the confidence

in the outcome of the case.” Craft, 2003 WL 1889986 at *12. To support its

finding, the Court of Appeal emphasized that the relationship between Officer

Perry and Jennifer Madden began after the seizure from the Maddens’ yard and

therefore could not have affected Allen Madden’s cooperation with the seizure. 

Further, the affair between Officer Perry and Jennifer Garcia was used by

defense counsel at trial to impeach both Officer Perry and Allen Madden. Id.

The factual findings by state courts are “presumed to be correct.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). To rebut this presumption, Petitioner must provide clear

and convincing evidence that the state courts’ determination of the facts was

erroneous. Here, Petitioner only presents conclusory allegations that the denial

of his Pitchess motion amounts to constitutional deprivation. Taylor v. Maddox,

366 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004). Petitioner has not established a Brady

violation. Giving deference to the trial and appellate court review of the in

camera transcripts and sealed personnel file, Petitioner has not established that

the requested personnel information contained material or favorable evidence

and there was no constitutional due process violation. See U.S. v. Bagley, 473

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 Petitioner also argued that the failure to grant the discovery motion violated

his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. The Supreme Court has explained

that the denial of discovery requests should be reviewed under the Due Process

Clause rather than the Confrontation Clause. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480

U.S. at 51-56. 

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U.S. 667, 674-75 (1985).8

 This Court is persuaded by the foregoing analysis

that the denial of the discovery motion filed by Petitioner did not violate his

constitutional rights. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on

this claim. 

E. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel for Failure to Request Mistrial

Petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of counsel as a result of defense 

counsel’s failure to request a mistrial following a witness’s inadvertent

admission of Petitioner’s prison history. During the guilt phase at trial, witness

Annilee Allen let slip that Petitioner told her that “he just got out of prison for

murder.” RT at 1871. Defense counsel immediately moved to strike the answer

and the trial court admonished the jury to disregard any stricken testimony. RT

at 1901; 2005.

1. Legal Standard

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is cognizable as a claim of

denial of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which guarantees not only

assistance, but effective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 686 (1984). See Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-08

(2000). The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be

whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the

adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just

result. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. 

In order to prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness of counsel

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claim, Petitioner must establish two things. First, Petitioner must establish that

counsel's performance was deficient and fell below an “objective standard of

reasonableness” under prevailing professional norms. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

687-88. Second, Petitioner must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel's

deficient performance and that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. The Strickland framework for

analyzing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is considered “clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States” for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) analysis

2. Analysis

Petitioner claims that his defense counsel’s failure to request a mistrial

after evidence was inadvertently admitted about his criminal history constitutes

ineffective assistance of counsel. Defense counsel’s decision not to request a

mistrial was not unreasonable and does not fall below an objective standard of

reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. Petitioner fails to

demonstrate how his attorney was incompetent or ineffective and does not

satisfy his burden of showing through evidentiary proof that counsel's

performance was deficient. See Toomey v. Bunnell, 898 F.2d 741, 743 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 960 (1990). Petitioner’s claim lacks merit and fails

to satisfy either prong under Strickland.

In the first instance, trial counsel was not deficient for failing to request a

mistrial. As the Court of Appeal noted, “a motion for mistrial presupposes that

the effect of the objectionable evidence was so prejudicial as to be incurable by

merely striking it and admonishing the jury to disregard it.” Craft, 2003 WL

1889986 at *13. Here, the witness’s admission about Petitioner’s prison history

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was curable by the court’s admonition. The trial court specifically instructed:

“I might also tell you now and then I will read some law to

you that might be an admonishment. If I strike anything from

the record and I read the law to you that you must treat that as

though you had never heard of it, all right, and that is the

language they use, so any time I do strike any testimony, that

shouldn’t enter into your deliberations and you should treat it

as though you never heard of it.”

RT at 2005. Petitioner contends that defense counsel was ineffective for only

requesting that the court strike the statement from the record and not moving for

a mistrial. Even the cases Petitioner cites for support only address ineffective

assistance for failing to object or request that damaging evidence be stricken,

rather than failure to move for mistrial. See Petition at 54; People v. Torres, 33

Cal. App. 4th 37, 48-49 (1995); People v. Sandlee, 70 Cal. App. 3d 477, 482-83

(1977). 

Petitioner’s claim additionally fails under the Strickland’s second prong,

since Petitioner has not established that prejudice resulted from the failure to

request a mistrial. See U.S. v. Gibson, 690 F.2d 697, 703-04 (9th Cir. 1982)

(holding no ineffective assistance for failing to object or strike testimony where

Petitioner made no showing of prejudice). To demonstrate prejudice for failure

to file a motion, Petitioner “must show that (1) had his counsel filed the motion,

it is reasonable that the trial court would have granted it as meritorious, and (2)

had the motion been granted, it is reasonable that there would have been an

outcome more favorable to him.” Wilson v. Henry, 185 F.3d 986, 990 (9th Cir.

1999). Petitioner presents no reasonable likelihood that, had counsel requested

a mistrial, the court would have granted the motion. 

Further, there is no evidence that Annilee Allen’s statements were

prejudicial enough to create a “reasonable likelihood” that it adversely affected

the jury’s verdict. First, Allen admitted at the outset of the interview that she

was feeling “[n]ervous and emotional” and was also accompanied by a friend

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during her testimony. RT at 1865. The statement about Petitioner’s history was

made in the context of the witness’s testimony that Craft may have been

exaggerating his past and trying to impress her with his gun. RT at 1871.

Petitioner relies largely on People v. Ozuna as evidence that jury

admonitions may be insufficient to cure damaging admissions. Ozuna,

however, is readily distinguishable from this case. Ozuna focused on the

element of prosecutorial misconduct and the “calculated” testimony that was 

“produced to prove defendant’s debased character and criminal disposition.” 

People v. Ozuna, 213 Cal. App. 2d 338, 342 (1963). Here, Annilee Allen’s

statement was an unexpected and accidental response to defense counsel’s

questioning. See People v. Jennings, 53 Cal. 3d 334, 374-75 (1991)

(distinguishing from Ozuna where defendant’s criminal history was not

“intentionally elicited from a prosecution witness by the deputy district

attorney”). In Petitioner’s case, the judge immediately struck the statement

from the record and provided an elaborate admonition the following day. 

As the Court of Appeal correctly noted, “the evidence of defendant’s

guilty was so strong that the jury was not likely to have been influenced in its

view of the facts by the slip by Ms. Allen.” Craft, 2003 WL 1889986 at *13;

see Luna v. Cambra, 306 F.3d 954, 966-67 (9th Cir. 2002) (“we must consider

the relative strength of the prosecution’s case in analyzing whether counsel’s

errors prejudiced [Petitioner]”). Because we find that the witness’s admission

was “an isolated incident in a very long trial and we are persuaded that the trial

court’s prompt and vigorous admission was effective to cure any prejudice,”

People v. Price, 1 Cal. 4th 324, 454-55 (1991), we deny Petitioner’s Strickland

claim. 

F. Cumulative Error

Petitioner claims that even if the errors in his trial did not separately

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cause him sufficient prejudice, the cumulative effect of the errors made his trial

fundamentally unfair. 

A. Legal Standard 

In some cases, although no single trial error is sufficiently prejudicial to

warrant reversal, the cumulative effect of several errors may still prejudice a

defendant so much that his conviction must be overturned. See Alcala v.

Woodford, 334 F.3d 862, 893-95 (9th Cir. 2003) (reversing conviction where

multiple constitutional errors hindered defendant's efforts to challenge every

important element of proof offered by prosecution). But, where no single

constitutional error exists, nothing can accumulate to the level of a

constitutional violation requiring reversal of petitioner's conviction. See

Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939, 957 (9th Cir. 2002). Cumulative error is

more likely to be found prejudicial when the government's case is weak. See

United States v. Frederick, 78 F.3d 1370, 1381 (9th Cir. 1996) (prejudice

resulting from cumulative effect of improper vouching by prosecutor, improper

comment by prosecutor about defense counsel, and improper admission of

evidence previously ruled inadmissible required reversal even though each error

evaluated alone might not have warranted reversal); see, e.g., Thomas v.

Hubbard, 273 F.3d. 1164, 1180 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that the only substantial

evidence implicating the defendant was the uncorroborated testimony of a

person who had both a motive and an opportunity to commit the crime). 

B. Analysis 

This Court has not found that the state courts violated Petitioner's

constitutional rights by denying his claims. Since we find no constitutional

errors, there can be no cumulative effect of constitutional error. Mancuso, 292

F.3d at 957. Additionally, any potential errors were found by the state court

and this court to be harmless. As set forth above, the prosecution's case against

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Petitioner was strong. Cf. Frederick, 78 F.3d at 1381. Petitioner's case is not

one of the rare cases in which cumulative errors denied him a fair trial. Cf.

Alcala, 334 F. 3d at 893-95. Therefore, this Court denies Petitioner’s claim for

relief on the basis of cumulative error.

G. Out-of-State Conviction

Finally, Petitioner claims that his prior murder conviction in North

Carolina should not have been used as the basis of his special circumstances

conviction here. Petitioner argues that the elements for second-degree murder

in North Carolina differ from those in California and that his North Carolina

conviction does not fit the definition for second-degree murder in California as

required under California law. Petitioner contends that he would not have been

sentenced to life without possibility of parole if the jury had not found true the

special circumstance of Petitioner’s prior murder. Petition at 58. 

1. Legal Standard

Under California law, if it is necessary to review the record of a prior 

criminal proceeding in order to determine whether a prior conviction qualifies

under California’s various sentencing enhancement statutes, the responsibility

for this inquiry falls upon the court, rather than the jury. People v. McGee, 38

Cal.4th 682 (2006). While there is no federal constitutional right to a jury trial

on the fact of a prior conviction, United States v. Zepeda, 234 F. 3d 411, 414-15

(9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 966 (2001), California law provides a

criminal defendant with a statutory right to have a jury determine “whether or

not the defendant has suffered the prior conviction.” Cal. Penal Code § 1025(b)

(2001); Dillard v. Roe, 244 F.3d 758, 769 & n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). In 1997,

however, the controlling statute was amended to also provide that the court,

rather than the jury, shall determine “whether the defendant is the person who

has suffered the prior conviction,” except when the prior conviction is charged

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as an element of the offense or as a special circumstance pursuant to Penal Code

§ 190.2. See Cal. Penal Code § 1025(c), (d) (2001); Dillard, 244 F.3d. at 770

n.15. Under Penal Code § 190.2, special circumstances may be found where,

(2) The defendant was convicted previously of murder in the first

or second degree. For purposes of this paragraph, an offense

committed in another jurisdiction, which if committed in

California would be punishable as first or second degree murder,

shall be deemed murder in the first or second degree. 

Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(2). 

2. Analysis

Petitioner concedes that he was convicted of second-degree murder in

North Carolina in 1975, but contends that this prior conviction should not have

been used as a sentencing enhancement. According to Petitioner, the definition

of malice differs in North Carolina and California and his prior conviction in

North Carolina would not be considered a second-degree murder in California. 

Petition at 61-62. The California Court of Appeal considered the elements of

each state’s statute and found that the mental state required under North

Carolina law is equivalent to the “express and implied” forms of malice under

California’s second degree murder statute. Craft, 2003 WL 1889986 at *15. 

Because this Court finds that the elements of second-degree murder in North

Carolina and California are virtually identical, the trial court correctly admitted

Petitioner’s prior conviction and Petitioner has not established that he is entitled

to relief for any constitutional violation.

The only Supreme Court precedent Petitioner offers to support his

argument of a constitutional violation is one in which the prior conviction itself

was constitutionally defective. See U.S. v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972). In this

case, however, Petitioner does not challenge the constitutionality of his prior

murder conviction and only disputes the California state courts’ interpretation of

state law. On its face, this does not appear to state a claim cognizable under

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federal habeas review. See Hendricks v. Zenon, 993 F.2d 664, 674 (9th Cir.

1993) (“[Petitioner] cites no authority for the proposition that a state appellate

court's refusal to reverse a sentence on state law grounds is a violation of federal

due process guarantees”).

Nor does Petitioner’s reliance on People v. Maldonado, 186 Cal. App. 3d

863 (1986), as “highly analogous” support his claim of a constitutional

violation. Petition at 63. In Maldonado, the court found that the minimum

elements for malice in Texas did not satisfy the California standard for malice

aforethought since “[t]here was no requirement that the defendant had been

subjectively aware of the risk created; it was sufficient that a reasonable person

would have been aware of the risk.” Id. at 866. Petitioner provides no evidence

of any comparable material difference between the elements of second-degree

murder in California and North Carolina. 

Petitioner misstates the legal standard under In re Christian S., 7 Cal. 4th

768, 778 (1994), by claiming that malice in California always requires a

“wrongful intent.” Petition at 60. While this is the standard for express malice

under California Penal Code, Section 188, Petitioner ignores the elements of

implied malice. Implied malice arises “when no considerable provocation

appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned

and malignant heart.” Ca. Penal Code § 188. The Court of Appeals correctly

noted that North Carolina’s standard is equivalent and, while not explicitly

calling it implied malice, states that malice exists “when an act which is

inherently dangerous to human life is done so recklessly and wantonly as to

manifest a mind utterly without regard for human life and social duty and

deliberately bent on mischief.” Craft, 2003 WL 1889986 at *15 (quoting State

v. Reynolds, 297 S.E. 2d 532, 536 (N.C. 1982). We agree with the Court of

Appeals holding that the North Carolina conviction properly qualified for the

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special circumstance finding since “[w]e can discern no distinction between the

element of malice required under North Carolina law and the element required

by California law.” Craft, 2003 WL 1889986 at *15. Petitioner is therefore not

eligible for relief on this claim.

 CONCLUSION

The state court’s denial of Petitioner’s habeas petition is not contrary to

or an unreasonable application of established federal law as determined by the

Supreme Court. Therefore, Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus must

be DENIED. The Clerk shall enter judgment and close the file. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 24, 2007 _____________________

JEFFREY S. WHITE

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CRAFT,

Plaintiff,

 v.

STRATTON et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV04-04226 JSW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on October 24, 2007, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing

said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by

depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office

delivery receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Catherine Amy Rivlin

California Attorney General

Criminal Appeals, Writs & Trials

455 Golden Gate Avenue

Suite 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102-7004

Charles L. Craft

P96662

P.O. Box 5103

Delano, CA 93216

Dated: October 24, 2007

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Jennifer Ottolini, Deputy Clerk

Case 3:04-cv-04226-JSW Document 36 Filed 10/24/07 Page 33 of 33