Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01677/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01677-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Brian K. Small
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted October 23, 2015

Decided October 23, 2015

Before

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 15-1677

Appeal from the

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

BRIAN K. SMALL,

Defendant-Appellant.

United States District Court for the 

Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 14-CR-18

Barbara B. Crabb,

Judge.

O R D E R

After he was imprisoned and fined for tax evasion, Brian Small retaliated against 

the former Secretary of the United States Department of the Treasury and a Bureau of 

Prisons employee by attempting to file false liens against them for more than 100 million 

dollars. He pleaded guilty to one count of filing false liens against public officials, see

18 U.S.C. § 1521, and he received a below-guidelines sentence of 20 months’ imprisonment. Small filed a notice of appeal, but his appointed counsel seeks to withdraw under 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), because he is unable to identify a nonfrivolous 

issue. We invited Small to respond, see 7TH CIR. R. 51(b), but he did not. Because 

counsel’s analysis appears to be thorough, we limit our review to the subjects he 

discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. 

Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 15-1677 Page 2

Counsel first considers whether Small could challenge the validity of his guilty 

plea but neglects to say whether he discussed this possibility with his client. 

See United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Knox, 

287 F.3d 667, 670–71 (7th Cir. 2002). Counsel’s omission, however, does not require that 

we deny the Anders motion because his discussion and our review of the record 

persuade us that any challenge to the guilty plea would be frivolous. The transcript of 

the plea colloquy shows that the district court substantially complied with Rule 11 of the 

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See United States v. Blalock, 321 F.3d 686, 688–89 (7th 

Cir. 2003); United States v. Akinsola, 105 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1997). The court advised 

Small of the trial rights he waived by entering a guilty plea, the charges against him, the 

maximum penalties (including fine, imprisonment, and supervised release), the role of 

the sentencing guidelines, and the judge’s discretion in applying the guidelines. See FED.

R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1). The court also ensured that Small’s guilty plea was supported by an 

adequate factual basis and made voluntarily. See id. R. 11(b)(2), (3).

The remaining potential arguments raised by counsel concern the legality of the 

sentence imposed. Counsel asks whether Small could challenge the six-level “official 

victim” increase under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2(b) on grounds that his attempt to file the false 

liens were unsuccessful and no victim was actually harmed. See U.S.S.G. §§ 2A6.1, 

cmt. n.2, 3A1.2(b). But counsel correctly concludes that this challenge would be frivolous 

because the official need not be harmed to be a victim. See United States v. McCaleb, 

908 F.2d 176, 178–79 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Drapeau, 188 F.3d 987, 991 (8th Cir. 

1999).

Counsel next considers challenging a six-level increase under U.S.S.G. 

§ 2A6.1(b)(1) for attempting to carry out a threat. We agree with counsel that such a 

challenge would be frivolous because an expressed intent to harm property is a threat, 

see United States v. England, 507 F.3d 581, 589 (7th Cir. 2007), and Small warned the 

Secretary in writing that he would file a lien against the Secretary’s property unless the 

Secretary paid off his debt.

Finally, counsel asserts that it would be frivolous to contest the reasonableness of 

Small’s sentence. His 20-month sentence is substantially shorter than his calculated 

guideline range of 51 to 63 months, and thus it is presumptively reasonable, Rita v. 

United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007); United States v. Martinez, 650 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 

2011). Counsel has not identified a reason to disturb that presumption. The district court 

properly acknowledged Small’s history and characteristics, including his roles as a 

parent and as the primary caretaker for his ailing mother, and his steady work history 

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over many years at the same company. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). The court also 

considered the nature and circumstances of the offense: Small demonstrated a pattern of 

antigovernment behavior, and he committed the offense while completing his sentence 

for tax evasion. See id. We agree with counsel that a challenge to Small’s sentence would 

be frivolous.

We GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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