Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-04-03062/USCOURTS-caDC-04-03062-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Reginald Curtis Carter
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 18, 2006 Decided June 13, 2006

No. 04-3062

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

REGINALD CURTIS CARTER,

 A/K/A REGGIE, A/K/A BLACK,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 00cr00252-03)

David B. Smith, appointed by the court, argued the cause for

appellant.

John P. Mannarino, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Kenneth L.

Wainstein, U.S. Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese, III, Martin D.

Carpenter, and Thomas J. Tourish, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

USCA Case #04-3062 Document #973103 Filed: 06/13/2006 Page 1 of 20
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Before: ROGERS, TATEL and BROWN, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: “Operation Hole in One” was a

multi-year investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation

(“FBI”) and the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”)

of a heroin trafficking operation in northeast Washington, D.C.

Reginald C. Carter was identified as being part of the trafficking

operation and he was subsequently convicted by a jury of

possession with intent to distribute heroin and conspiracy to

distribute and possess with intent to distribute heroin and

cocaine. On appeal, Carter challenges his conviction on the

ground the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress

evidence obtained from the wiretapping of his cell phone

because the government failed to meet its burden under the

wiretapping statute to prove that the wiretaps were necessary

and that it had limited the wiretapping of conversations not

pertinent to the investigation. Carter contends further, for the

first time on appeal, that the district court erred in instructing the

jury on the scope of his conspiratorial agreement and that he was

denied the effective assistance of trial counsel under the Sixth

Amendment to the Constitution in moving to suppress the

wiretap evidence. Carter also challenges his life sentence on

both procedural and substantive grounds.

Our decisions in United States v. Sobamowo, 892 F.2d 90

(D.C. Cir. 1989), and United States v Anderson, 39 F.3d 331,

342 (D.C. Cir. 1994), rev’d in part on other grounds by United

States v. Anderson, 59 F.3d 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1995), are

dispositive of Carter’s suppression claim under the wiretapping

statute. Likewise, our decision in United States v. Childress, 58

F.3d 693, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1995), demonstrates the district court

did not plainly err in instructing the jury on the scope-ofagreement requirement. Although Carter’s ineffective

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1

 Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson approved each of the

wiretap applications. Judge Ricardo Urbina presided at Carter’s trial.

assistance of counsel claim regarding his suppression motion

presents an interesting question regarding the scope of the

suppression remedy for a violation of the wiretap statute, the

court need not resolve this question because Carter cannot show

the requisite prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 687, 694 (1984). We must remand Carter’s case, however,

because the district court failed to point to evidence supporting

its finding that Carter was responsible for the distribution of

over 30 kilograms of heroin and failed to make the required

findings on Carter’s role as an “organizer or leader” of criminal

activity under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 3B1.1(a).

Childress, 58 F.3d at 722. In addition, Carter is entitled to a

limited remand in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220

(2005). See United States v. Coles, 403 F.3d 764, 769 (D.C. Cir.

2005). Accordingly, we remand the case to the district court on

Carter’s sentence but otherwise affirm the judgment of

conviction. 

I.

In December 1996, the FBI and the MPD began

investigating heroin trafficking in the Langston Carver Terrace

neighborhood in northeast Washington, D.C. The task force

engaged in undercover drug buys, search warrants, audio and

video surveillance, and, ultimately, court-authorized wiretaps.

A confidential informant alerted the task force in February 1999

that Carter was a possible supplier of heroin to a drug dealer,

Ricardo Lanier. In April 2000, the district court1

 approved the

wiretapping of Carter’s cell phone; the court extended the

wiretap authorization on two occasions. Over a 76-day period,

964 completed calls were made to and from Carter’s cell phone.

Of these calls, 600 were classified as “pertinent” to the

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investigation; of the 364 “non-pertinent” calls, the monitoring

agents limited (i.e., minimized) their taping of 100 calls.

Evidence from the wiretaps and surveillance indicated that

Lanier was receiving his supply of heroin from a larger drug

trafficking organization involving numerous individuals,

including Carter, Carter’s cousin Earl Garner, Jr. (“Junior”), and

Junior’s father Earl Garner, Sr. (“Senior”). In 1996 Carter and

Junior had approached Senior about setting up a heroin

distribution operation. The operation expanded in late 1998, and

again in 1999, when Carter and Senior established a drug “lab”

at an apartment in Maryland where they cut, weighed, and stored

the drugs and counted the money from the drug sales. In 2000,

Carter and Junior assumed a more visible role and more

responsibility for the drug sales after Senior became concerned

about police surveillance. By this time, Carter was distributing

14 to 500 grams of heroin weekly. To avoid detection by the

police, Carter and Senior eventually moved the contents of the

Maryland lab to an apartment in Washington, D.C.; Carter had

the only key to the apartment.

“Operation Hole in One” ended when Carter, the Garners,

and approximately 30 others were arrested on August 8, 2000.

At that time 300 law enforcement officials executed 35 search

warrants. Recovered was over one million dollars in cash,

several kilograms of heroin, drug paraphernalia, including

cutting materials, and nineteen firearms, including three from

the D.C. apartment. 

Carter was indicted on five counts: (1) conspiracy to

distribute and possess with intent to distribute heroin and

cocaine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(A)(i); (2) possession

with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin, 21 U.S.C.

§§ 841 and 841(b)(1)(B)(i); (3) violation of the felon-inpossession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); (4) participation in a

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continuing criminal enterprise, 21 U.S.C. § 848; and (5) the use

of a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking offense, 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(c)(1). The district court denied his pretrial motion to

suppress the wiretap evidence. A jury found him guilty on

Counts (1) and (2) and also found that the quantity of heroin

involved in the conspiracy count exceeded one kilogram.

Applying the mandatory Sentencing Guidelines then in effect,

the district court sentenced Carter to life imprisonment,

assigning him a base offense level of 38 after attributing 35

kilograms of heroin to him, U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(1), and a fourlevel enhancement for his role as an “organizer or leader” of

criminal activity, id. § 3B1.1(a). 

II.

A.

Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act

of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq., authorizes the district court to

approve an application for the interception of certain wire, oral,

or electronic communications. 18 U.S.C. § 2518. The wiretap

statute requires that an application for a wiretap shall be in

writing, under oath, and shall contain certain information

including “a full and complete statement of the facts and

circumstances relied upon by the applicant[] to justify his belief

that an order should be issued.” Id. § 2518(1). On the basis of

the facts submitted by the applicant, the district court may

authorize a wiretap upon finding that (1) probable cause exists

to believe that an individual has committed or is about to

commit one of certain enumerated offenses; (2) probable cause

exists to believe that “particular communications concerning

that offense will be obtained” through an interception; (3)

“normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed

or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried”; and (4)

probable cause exists to believe that the communication facility

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sought to be wiretapped “[is] being used, or [is] about to be

used, in connection with the commission of [the] offense.” Id.

§ 2518(3)(a-d); see United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 435

(1977). The determination that “normal investigative

procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear

to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous,” 18

U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c), is referred to as the “necessity

requirement,” and it is the “keystone of congressional regulation

of electronic eavesdropping.” United States v. Williams, 580

F.2d 578, 587-588 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 

The wiretapping statute also requires that “[e]very [wiretap]

order and extension thereof shall contain a provision that the

authorization to intercept shall be executed as soon as

practicable [and] shall be conducted in such a way as to

minimize the interception of communications not otherwise

subject to interception . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5). This is

referred to as the “minimization requirement.” Although “[t]he

statute does not forbid the interception of all nonrelevant

conversations,” the government must make reasonable efforts to

“minimize” the interception of such conversations. Scott v.

United States, 436 U.S. 128, 139-40 (1978). The statute also

provides that an order authorizing an interception cannot extend

“for any period longer than is necessary to achieve the objective

of the authorization, nor in any event longer than thirty days.”

18 U.S.C. § 2518(5). 

The wiretap statute provides that “no part of the contents of

[intercepted] communication and no evidence derived therefrom

may be received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other

proceeding . . . if the disclosure of that information would be in

violation of this chapter.” Id. § 2515. The “aggrieved person”

may move to suppress the introduction of wiretap evidence or its

fruits if “the communication was unlawfully intercepted,” the

“order of authorization or approval under which it was

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intercepted is insufficient on its face,” or if “the interception was

not made in conformity with the order of authorization or

approval.” Id. § 2518(10)(a)(i-iii); see Donovan, 429 U.S. at

433-34. 

B.

Necessity. Carter contends that the district court abused its

discretion in finding the government had met its burden to

demonstrate the wiretap of his cell phone was necessary under

18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c). He asserts that the tap was sought

immediately upon discovering Carter’s role as Lanier’s supplier

without efforts by the government to attempt normal

investigative procedures. He further asserts that the wiretap

application omitted material facts from its affidavits in support

of the wiretap application and its extensions. 

Congress created the necessity requirement to ensure that

“wiretapping is not resorted to in situations where traditional

investigative techniques would suffice to expose the crime.”

United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 153 n.12 (1974). To

adhere to Congress’s purpose, a court will “give close scrutiny”

to a contested wiretap application and will “reject generalized

and conclusory statements that other investigative procedures

would prove unsuccessful.” Williams, 580 F.2d at 588.

Because, however, the “statutory command was not designed to

foreclose electronic surveillance until every other imaginable

method of investigation has been unsuccessfully attempted,” the

government will meet its burden of demonstrating necessity if

it shows that “other techniques are impractical under the

circumstances and that it would be unreasonable to require

pursuit of those avenues of investigation.” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted). 

In Sobamowo, this court held that “a court may authorize

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the wiretap of the phone of a member of an operation if

traditional investigative techniques have proved inadequate to

reveal the operation’s full nature and scope.” Sobamowo, 892

F.2d at 93 (citing United States v. Brown, 823 F.2d 591, 598

(D.C. Cir. 1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The

defendant contended that the government had failed to

investigate him adequately before resorting to a wiretap and

instead had improperly relied on prior affidavits submitted to

obtain a telephone wiretap of another defendant (Adair), who

was a purchaser of Sobamowo’s heroin. Id. The court rejected

the necessity challenge because “[e]vidence collected by the

government and detailed in the [prior Adair] affidavits revealed

that a conspiracy existed and that [Sobamowo] was connected

with it,” and because “[b]efore seeking to tap [his] telephone,

the government in fact attempted to gather information about

him in other ways.” Id. The court held that, “[c]onsidered in

conjunction,” the description of Adair’s conspiracy and the

earlier efforts to investigate Sobamowo described in the

Sobamowo affidavit were sufficient to justify the district court’s

determination that a wiretap was necessary. Id. Like the

defendant in Sobamowo, Carter faults the government’s reliance

on material in affidavits used in conjunction with an application

for a wiretap on another target (Lanier) and faults the

government for failing to investigate him using non-wiretap

techniques. The analysis in Sobamowo is therefore apt, and we

reach the same conclusion. 

The wiretap application of April 25, 2000, submitted on

behalf of “Operation Hole in One,” included a 52-page affidavit

by FBI Special Agent Lawrence Alexander describing the nature

of the task force’s drug investigation and explaining the need for

the wiretap. The affidavit recounted specific evidence, derived

from a pre-existing wiretap on Lanier’s cell phone and telephone

communications, that linked Carter to the Lanier heroin

trafficking organization. The affidavit thus established that

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Carter was a “member of an operation” by adducing evidence

that “a conspiracy existed and that [Carter] was connected with

it.” Id. Further, as did the affidavit in Sobamowo, the affidavit

here indicated that “[b]efore seeking to tap [Carter’s] telephone,

the government in fact attempted to gather information about

[him] in other ways.” Id. The affidavit stated that physical

surveillance of Carter had been conducted and that such

surveillance would be unlikely to succeed, both because of

counter-surveillance methods engaged in by Carter and because

physical surveillance alone would not generate detailed

information on the activities and associates of Carter, Senior,

and Lanier. The affidavit also stated reasons why other nonwiretap investigative techniques, such as physical surveillance,

undercover informants, infiltration, or a “buy-bust,” would be

inadequate to reveal the “full nature and scope” of the drug

conspiracy. Id. Because Carter was a “wholesale” drug supplier

and dealt with a small circle of “retail” or street-level drug

dealers with whom he was already familiar, Special Agent

Alexander averred that Carter’s operations were unlikely to be

susceptible to infiltration by normal investigative techniques.

Consequently, “[c]onsidered in conjunction,” the description of

the Lanier drug operation and the account of prior investigative

efforts against Carter justified the district court’s determination

that the wiretap of Carter’s cell phone was necessary. Id.

Carter’s other objections are unpersuasive. Carter’s focus

on the brief two-day period between his identification by an

informant and the wiretap application ignores that the affidavit

accompanying the original wiretap application states that the

task force had intercepted drug-related conversations between

Carter and Lanier as early as March 14, 2000, well over a month

before the government applied to wiretap Carter’s cell phone.

To the extent Carter challenges the district court’s extensions of

the wiretap authorization, his claim fails because no authority

indicates that the government must cease to request wiretaps as

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soon as it becomes clear that another technique, such as a search

warrant, may prove useful in a limited way. The necessity

requirement “was not designed to foreclose electronic

surveillance until every other imaginable method of

investigation has been unsuccessfully attempted.” Williams, 580

F.2d at 588 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although it

would likely have incriminated Carter, the immediate execution

of a search warrant on Carter’s D.C. drug-lab apartment would

not have revealed the “full nature and scope,” Sobamowo, 892

F.2d at 93, of Carter’s conspiracy and the premature execution

of a search warrant would have jeopardized the task force’s

effort to gather information about the rest of Carter’s drug

network by alerting Carter’s co-conspirators of the ongoing

investigation. Nor has Carter demonstrated that there were any

material omissions in the affidavits supporting the wiretap

application and extensions; the government’s failure to inform

the district court of the installation of a tracking device on

Carter’s car was of no moment because the affidavits set forth

the reasons why such physical surveillance was inadequate to

penetrate Carter’s conspiracy and because such an omission

does not undercut the fact that the government had “engaged in

an adequate range of investigative endeavors,” id., with regard

to Carter. 

In light of Sobamowo, then, Carter fails to demonstrate that

the district court abused its discretion in finding the government

had met its burden to demonstrate the wiretaps of his cell phone

were necessary under 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c). 

C.

Minimization. Carter also contends that the fact that only

27% of the non-pertinent calls were minimized demonstrates on

its face that the government failed to fulfill its statutory

obligation under 18 U.S.C. § 2815(5). He maintains that the

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district court therefore erred in denying his motion to suppress

without a hearing or an adequate explanation by the government

that it made reasonable efforts to minimize the interception of

non-pertinent calls.

In Anderson, the court observed that “[t]he Supreme Court

has indicated that the minimization requirement is not an

absolute prohibition on the interception of nonrelevant

conversations.” 39 F.3d at 342 (citing Scott, 436 U.S. at 135).

The court held there that a defendant who does not identify

“specific conversations that should not have been intercepted, or

even . . . a pattern of such conversations” has offered no

“concrete indications that the government failed to meet its

obligations to minimize intercepted communications,” and

thereby failed to show error by the district court. Id. Here,

Carter’s motion to suppress the cell phone wiretap evidence did

not identify any conversation or pattern of conversations by

which the district court could determine whether or not the

government had met its minimization obligations. Rather,

Carter only generally faulted the government’s failure to

minimize “communications unrelated to the purpose of the

interception,” such as “[c]onversations . . . particularly

pertaining to golf.” This is not an adequate objection. What the

wiretapping statute forbids is failure by the government to make

reasonable efforts to minimize interceptions of non-pertinent

communications; consequently, a defendant must identify

particular conversations so that the government can explain their

non-minimization. Having failed to identify “specific

conversations that should not have been intercepted, or even . .

. a pattern of such conversations,” Anderson, 39 F.3d at 342, the

issue of reasonable minimization was simply not in play. 

Carter repeatedly points to the fact that the government only

minimized 27% of non-pertinent calls. But in Scott, the

Supreme Court, in evaluating the reasonableness of the

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government’s efforts at minimization, explained that a high

interception rate of nonpertinent calls could be the outcome of

reasonable efforts at minimization in situations where the

intercepted calls were “very short,” “one-time only,” or were

“ambiguous in nature or apparently involv[ing] . . . guarded or

coded language.” Scott, 436 U.S. at 140. Consequently, “blind

reliance on the percentage of nonpertinent calls intercepted is

not a sure guide.” Id. Carter is thus precluded from relying

solely on the existence of a raw percentage of non-pertinent

intercepted calls as a means of demonstrating that some

conversations were intercepted when they would not have been

had reasonable attempts at minimization been made. Id. 

There is therefore no basis to conclude that the district court

abused its discretion in failing sua sponte to hold an evidentiary

hearing, see United States v. Santora, 600 F.2d 1317, 1320 (9th

Cir. 1979), or to require the government to provide a detailed

explanation of the low percentage of minimized non-relevant

calls. 

III. 

In light of trial counsel’s failure to conform to the

particularization requirements of Scott and Anderson in moving

to suppress the wiretap evidence and its fruits, Carter contends

that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed

by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution and seeks a remand

for an evidentiary hearing. When, as here, a defendant raises an

ineffective assistance claim for the first time on appeal, the court

will remand the case to the district court for an evidentiary

hearing unless the trial record “conclusively shows that the

defendant is entitled to no relief.” United States v. Geraldo, 271

F.3d 1112, 1115-16 (D.C. Cir. 2001). A remand is unnecessary

here.

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Assuming trial counsel’s failure to pursue properly Carter’s

minimization claims amounts to a failure to meet the standard

for attorney performance under the first prong of the test for

ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland, 466 U.S. at

687, Carter cannot show the requisite prejudice. Under the

second prong of the Strickland test, Carter must show that there

is a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different.” Id. at 694. A “reasonable probability is a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”

Id.; see United States v. Moore, 394 F.3d 925, 931 (D.C. Cir.

2005). The government maintains that Carter suffered no

prejudice due to his trial counsel’s ineffective assistance because

Carter’s only remedy for the government’s failure to minimize

was suppression of the non-relevant calls and a civil cause of

action against the government for damages. Carter responds that

such a remedy would be meaningless, particularly as he lacks

the wherewithal to pursue a claim for civil damages under the

statute. 

The Supreme Court has yet to address the scope of

suppression for a violation of the statutory minimization

requirement. See Scott, 436 U.S. at 135 n.10; see generally

Donovan, 429 U.S. at 433-34. The question is open in this

circuit. See Anderson, 39 F.3d at 342 (dictum); United States v.

Scott, 516 F.2d 751, 760 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (dictum), aff’d by

Scott, 436 U.S. at 128. We need not answer the question. Carter

has failed to show a “reasonable probability,” Strickland, 466

U.S. at 687, that if his trial counsel had properly raised the

minimization argument in the motion to suppress the district

court would have found the government’s efforts at

minimization to be unreasonable. 

Carter maintains that “numerous personal calls” between

himself and his grandmother, wife, daughter, and stockbroker

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were not minimized or were not minimized soon enough. He

does not explain, however, how effective counsel could have

demonstrated to the district court that the interception of these

calls indicated that the government’s efforts at minimization

were in violation of the statute. Carter cannot rely solely on the

raw percentage of intercepted non-pertinent calls to demonstrate

that the government failed to comply with its obligations to

minimize. See Scott, 436 U.S. at 140. He cannot deny that the

task force made some effort to minimize interception of nonpertinent calls: 100 non-pertinent calls had been minimized and

over 62% of all intercepted calls were pertinent. And, as the

Supreme Court observed in Scott, 436 U.S. at 139, the fact that

the investigation of a target is part of a larger investigation of “a

widespread conspiracy” and the fact that the target and his coconspirators communicate in code language are circumstances

that would justify “more extensive surveillance” by the

government. Scott, 436 U.S. at 140. Moreover, before the

wiretap on Carter’s phone commenced, the prosecutor instructed

the task force agents on their minimization duties and

periodically reviewed the records of call interceptions for

compliance. The three district court orders approving the

wiretaps on Carter’s cell phone required a report after ten days

on the investigation’s progress and on the need for continued

surveillance, thus ensuring the interceptions were judicially

monitored during the execution of the wiretaps. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 2518(6); United States v. Wilson, 835 F.2d 1440, 1446 (D.C.

Cir. 1987). On the face of the record, then, it is unclear whether

the government’s minimization efforts constituted a violation of

the wiretapping statute. 

Furthermore, Carter’s “minimization arguments are

couched in the broadest of terms.” Chagnon v. Bell, 642 F.2d

1248, 1262-63 (D.C. Cir. 1980). He proffers no facts or

affidavits containing “information as to the number, timing,

frequency, or subject matter,” id., of a pattern of conversations

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alleged to be inadequately minimized, information that could

enable this court to conclude that a remand is required for a

determination of whether he was prejudiced. The government

posits in its brief, see Appellee’s Br. at 20 n.18, that many of the

non-minimized calls may have been of brief duration and may

have been made during “the early stages of surveillance” when

“the agents may be forced to intercept all calls to establish

categories of non-pertinent calls which will not be intercepted

thereafter,” Scott, 436 U.S. at 141. The government also

suggested during oral argument that some non-minimized calls

may have been intercepted because they appeared to involve the

use of code words. For example, the conversations pertaining

to golf, which Carter cited as evidence of the government’s

failure to minimize interception of innocent conversations,

might well have initially appeared suspicious to agents of

“Operation Hole in One,” which was so named because

members of the Lanier drug trafficking organization would

frequently meet at a golf course. 

Carter neither cites record evidence nor proffers other

evidence that would cast doubt on the government’s posited

explanations. The three examples of improperly intercepted

calls that Carter cites, see Appellant’s Reply Br. 12 n.1—a

three-minute call on the sixth day of the wiretap, a five-minute

call regarding golf that was in fact minimized by the intercepting

agents, and a two-minute call—fall short of establishing that

with effective trial counsel Carter could have succeeded in

demonstrating unreasonable efforts at minimization by the

government. Although Carter claims that record citations were

not possible because “the telephone logs kept by the monitoring

officers are not part of the [district court] record,” id., nothing

barred him from proffering facts that, if credited, would

demonstrate a reasonable probability that with effective counsel

he would have been able to show the wiretaps were inadequately

minimized. Cf. United States v. Taylor, 139 F.3d 924, 932-33

USCA Case #04-3062 Document #973103 Filed: 06/13/2006 Page 15 of 20
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(D.C. Cir. 1998); United States v. Pinkney, 543 F.2d 908, 916

(D.C. Cir. 1976). “Without such facts, there can be no support

. . . for the contention that the [wiretap] was inadequately

minimized.” Chagnon, 642 F.2d at 1263. 

Absent either a record that on its face supports his claim or

evidence that would support a finding that the government

engaged in a pattern of violations, Carter’s virtually unsupported

assertion that effective counsel could have persuaded the district

court to conduct a hearing or to require a detailed explanation by

the government regarding the reasonableness of its minimization

efforts cannot suffice to show a “reasonable probability” the

district court would have found the government’s minimization

efforts were unreasonable. There is thus no reason to remand

the case for a hearing on prejudice. See Geraldo, 271 F.3d at

1115-16. 

IV. 

The district court instructed the jury that it must find

whether Carter “knew or should have known that the total

amount of the mixture or substance containing heroin involved

in the conspiracy was one kilogram or more.” The jury was

instructed that it had to make this finding beyond a reasonable

doubt. The jury was also instructed that a “crime” or “illegal

action” cannot be attributed to co-conspirators unless it was

committed “in order to further or somehow advance” the

conspiracy’s objectives. The jury verdict form, in turn,

instructed the jury that Carter could be held responsible for his

co-conspirators’ drug possession or distribution only if such

possession or distribution was both foreseeable to Carter and “in

furtherance of” Carter’s conspiracy.

 In Childress, 58 F.3d at 722, the court described “two

substantive limitations on a defendant’s responsibility for acts

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undertaken by co-conspirators”: those acts “must be ‘in

furtherance of’ the same conspiracy to which the defendant has

agreed, and they must be reasonably foreseeable to the

defendant.” Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. n.1) (1989)).

Carter does not challenge the district court’s instructions on the

foreseeability element but contends that the district court failed

to instruct the jury properly regarding its findings on the

quantity of drugs that fell within the “scope” of Carter’s

conspiratorial agreement. Because Carter raises this objection

for the first time on appeal, our review is for plain error. See

Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 465-67 (1997); United

States v. Gaviria, 116 F.3d 1498, 1509 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United

States v. Spann, 997 F.2d 1513, 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The

words “in furtherance of” accurately convey the “scope”

element of co-conspirator liability, Childress, 58 F.3d at 722,

and the jury verdict form reflects that the jury found Carter

responsible for over one kilogram of heroin based upon a correct

statement of the law of co-conspirator liability. See United

States v. Washington, 106 F.3d 983, 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

Consequently, Carter fails to show plain error because the jury

instructions would have not led the jury to attribute to him

actions of his co-conspirators falling outside the “scope” of his

conspiratorial agreement. 

V.

Carter contends that his life sentence must be set aside and

the case remanded for resentencing because the district court’s

factual findings were inadequate to permit meaningful appellate

review of the determination that (1) 30 kilograms of heroin were

properly attributable to him, establishing a base offense level of

38 under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, and (2) his role in the conspiracy

warranted a four-point enhancement in his offense level under

U.S.S.G. §3B1.1(a). Carter also contends that he was denied the

effective assistance of counsel at sentencing because his counsel

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failed to argue that Carter exerted no authority or control over

his co-conspirators.

Carter’s contention that the district court lacked authority at

sentencing to find the quantity of drugs attributable to him and

that thus he is subject only the statutory maximum of twenty

years in prison, see Apprendi v. United States, 530 U.S. 466

(2000), is baseless; he was charged with and convicted of

conspiracy to violate 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(i), which carries

a maximum sentence of life. However, in determining the

quantity of drugs attributable to a defendant, the sentencing

judge must point to evidence sufficient to support its findings.

See, e.g., United States v. Stover, 329 F.3d 859, 871 (D.C Cir.

2003). At sentencing, the district court did not point to evidence

that Carter alone distributed over 30 kilograms of heroin, nor

does the government contend that the record could support such

a finding. Rather, the government maintains that 30 kilograms

of heroin were properly attributable to Carter because the district

court credited testimony indicating that this quantity of heroin

fell within the scope of Carter’s conspiratorial agreements with

the two Garners and Lanier. The district court, however, did not

make sufficient findings on the scope of Carter’s conspiratorial

agreement with the Garners and Lanier to warrant the attribution

to Carter of drugs sold by Carter’s co-conspirators. See United

States v. Tabron, 437 F.3d 63, 68 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Childress, 58

F.3d at 710. For example, although the government in its brief

on appeal contends that the evidence at trial supported the

attribution of more than 30 kilograms of heroin to Carter

because his agreement encompassed the “cutting” of pure heroin

by his customers, the district court did not find that “cut”

quantities sold by dealers such as Lanier were properly

attributable to Carter. Such a finding is necessary before a

district court may sentence a defendant for conduct ostensibly

within the scope of his conspiratorial agreement. Nor did the

district court’s adoption of the findings in the presentence report

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fill the gap; “when facing a claim of factual inaccuracy, the

district court cannot satisfy th[e] requirement [to make findings]

by simply adopting the presentence report.” United States v.

Thomas, 114 F.3d 228, 255 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v.

Graham, 83 F.3d 1466, 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

 The district court’s findings also do not support a four-level

enhancement for Carter’s role as an “organizer” or “leader” of

criminal activity under U.S. Sentencing Guideline § 3B1.1(a).

The district court found only that Carter was a “point of contact”

for heroin for several people and that Carter had “persons

delegated to him,” not that Carter exercised authority over

others or was “hierarchically superior” to them. United States

v. Quigley, 373 F.3d 133, 140 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The

“[Sentencing] [G]uidelines punish organizers and leaders more

severely” than mere participants only because “the more control

(that is, responsibility) the offender exercises over the

conspirators, the more culpable that offender is, and the greater

sentence she deserves.” Id. at 139-40. One who occupies an

“organizer” or “leader” position plays a role distinct from the

role of a mere “‘hub’ or ‘orchestrator’” of the conspiracy. Id.

Absent findings by the district court on Carter’s degree of

control or authority over his associates, the district court could

not enhance his sentence under § 3B1.1(a). See United States v.

Graham, 162 F.3d 1180, 1185 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Thomas, 114

F.3d at 261.

Accordingly, we remand the case to the district court to

make the necessary findings in support of the life sentence or, in

the absence of such findings, to resentence Carter, but otherwise

affirm the judgment of conviction. Further, although Carter is

not entitled to a full re-sentencing in light of Booker, 543 U.S.

220, 268, see United States v. Gomez, 431 F.3d 818, 824 (D.C.

Cir. 2005), he is entitled to a limited remand under Coles, 403

F.3d at 769, because “[a]t sentencing, the district court said

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nothing from which we can deduce what course it would have

taken in the absence of a mandatory Guidelines regime.” United

States v. Mejia, No. 02-3067, 2006 WL 1506853, *15 (D.C. Cir.

June 2, 2006); Gomez, 431 F.3d at 824. 

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