Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-12-03043/USCOURTS-caDC-12-03043-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Paul Solofa
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 11, 2013 Decided March 21, 2014

No. 12-3043

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

PAUL SOLOFA,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:10-cr-00250-1)

Misha Tseytlin, appointed by the court, argued the cause 

for appellant. On the briefs were Matthew D. McGill and Erik 

R. Zimmerman, appointed by the court.

John-Alex Romano, Attorney, U.S. Department of 

Justice, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief 

were Mythiili Raman, Acting Assistant Attorney General, and 

Raymond N. Hulser, Principal Deputy Chief, Public Integrity 

Section. Kathleen A. Felton and Daniel A. Petalas, Attorneys, 

U.S. Department of Justice, and Elizabeth Trosman, Assistant 

U.S. Attorney, entered appearances.

Before: GRIFFITH and SRINIVASAN, Circuit Judges, and 

SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge.

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GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge: A jury convicted appellant Paul 

Solofa of witness tampering and obstruction of justice, and 

the district court sentenced him to 35 months in prison. Solofa 

challenges his conviction on the ground that his trial counsel 

provided ineffective assistance and his sentence on the ground 

that the district court improperly applied an enhancement 

under the Sentencing Guidelines. For the reasons set forth 

below, we affirm.

I

In 2008, the FBI undertook an investigation that 

uncovered a kickback scheme that defrauded the Department 

of Education (DOE) of American Samoa. The scheme was 

simple. Gustav Nauer, DOE’s head mechanic, ordered schoolbus parts from Oscar Mayer, who ran a company called 

Pacific Products, Inc. Mayer would not ship the parts, but 

Nauer would submit paperwork to the DOE vouching that he 

had. Mayer would then funnel to Nauer some of the funds he 

received from the DOE for the parts he never delivered. All 

told, between 2003 and 2006 Mayer paid Nauer nearly 

$300,000 for his involvement in this fraud. It isn’t entirely 

clear, nor is it relevant to this appeal, precisely what role 

Solofa played in the plot. He was the chief financial officer of 

DOE during the first year of the scheme and was friends with 

Mayer. At the very least, Solofa knew about the kickback

scheme and accepted hush money from Nauer to keep quiet 

about it. No bribery or fraud charges were brought against 

Solofa, and this case is not about his role in defrauding the 

DOE. This case is about Solofa’s role in the FBI investigation

of that fraud.

The investigation led to Mayer’s door, and he was called 

into the FBI’s office to be interviewed about his role in the 

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scheme. During the interview, the FBI agents confronted

Mayer with evidence of his complicity. Mayer did not 

respond to the allegations during the interview, but his 

lawyer, who was present, told the agents that Mayer would 

“get back” to them. In a private discussion after they left the 

interview, his lawyer advised Mayer to “tell them 

everything.” The next day, Mayer returned to the FBI office 

with his lawyer and fully acknowledged his part in the fraud.

Mayer also agreed to cooperate with the FBI’s ongoing

investigation of the scheme in exchange for a 

recommendation of leniency from the FBI to the prosecutor. 

The FBI arranged for Mayer to secretly record conversations 

with Solofa and Nauer that were intended to draw out what 

they knew about the kickbacks. In his first conversation with 

Solofa, Mayer did as the FBI instructed and told Solofa that

FBI agents had mentioned him by name when explaining that 

they needed to interview Mayer. Mayer voiced concern about

his upcoming interview with the FBI, putting on an air of 

anxiety, and asked Solofa what he should say and do during 

the questioning. In response, Solofa told Mayer to deny

giving cash to Nauer and suggested that he tell the FBI that he 

and Solofa had never had any dealings with one another 

regarding school-bus parts. Solofa added that the FBI could 

not trace their transactions, because all of them were made in 

cash. 

For the next conversation, the FBI gave Mayer a fake 

subpoena seeking various documents from Pacific Products

and told him to show it to Solofa as if it were genuine. Mayer 

did so, and asked Solofa how he should respond to the 

subpoena. Solofa told Mayer not to “hide anything” and to

“[j]ust give them copies of everything.” Solofa repeated this 

advice, telling Mayer that he had to produce everything that 

the FBI asked for. He even explained the best procedures for 

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responding fully. But, significantly, Solofa then changed 

course and reminded Mayer that “only you know[] 

everything. . . . So don’t give them any copy you don’t want 

to give them.” More than that, Solofa told Mayer to “burn” 

the copies of any documents that “you don’t want to give 

them” because that way “they won’t see it and you won’t 

worry that they might see it.” If Mayer burned a document, 

Solofa pointed out, then “nobody has a copy.” 

After hearing the recordings of these conversations, a

grand jury returned an indictment charging Solofa with 

witness tampering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3) and 

obstruction of justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503. At 

trial, Solofa’s primary defense to both charges was that he 

lacked the requisite intent because he had no motivation to 

conceal the workings of a kickback scheme in which he had 

no part. The jury was not persuaded, and convicted Solofa on

both counts. The Guidelines range for each offense was 15-21 

months. At sentencing the district court applied an 

enhancement to Solofa’s base sentence because the offense 

“involved obstructing the investigation or prosecution of a 

criminal offense” as opposed to a civil or administrative 

investigation. U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(c)(1). The enhancement called 

for by (c)(1) resulted in a Guidelines range of 41-51 months 

for each offense. The court subtracted six months because, as 

a non-citizen, Solofa would not be able to spend that time in a 

halfway house. When all was said and done, the district court 

sentenced Solofa to 35 months for each offense, to be served 

concurrently. Solofa’s counsel objected to the district court’s 

use of the enhancement, arguing that although (c)(1) could be 

lawfully used to enhance a sentence based on Solofa’s crimes, 

its application to him resulted in a sentence that, compared to 

Nauer’s sentence of 25 months, was arbitrary and longer than

necessary.

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Solofa timely appealed his conviction and sentence. We 

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3742. 

II

Solofa challenges his conviction on the ground that his 

trial counsel gave him ineffective assistance by failing to raise 

an entrapment defense. To make out a case of ineffective 

assistance, an appellant must show not only that counsel’s 

performance was deficient, but that he suffered prejudice as a 

result. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 

The prejudice inquiry focuses on whether there is “a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.” Id. at 694. Where the error claimed is a failure to 

pursue an affirmative defense, “the resolution of the 

‘prejudice’ inquiry will depend largely on whether the 

affirmative defense likely would have succeeded at trial.” Hill 

v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). Solofa’s argument

founders on this requirement because he had no entrapment 

defense to raise.

Entrapment “has two related elements: government 

inducement of the crime, and a lack of predisposition on the 

part of the defendant to engage in the criminal conduct.” 

Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988). A

defendant arguing entrapment must show that “the criminal 

design originate[d] with the officials of the government, and

[that] they implant[ed] in the mind of an innocent person the 

disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce[d] its 

commission in order that they may prosecute.” Sorrells v. 

United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932). At a minimum, this 

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requires a showing that the government agent actually 

solicited or suggested the criminal conduct. See United States 

v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 436 (1973) (government deception 

does not constitute inducement unless the idea for the crime 

originated with the government agent); Sherman v. United 

States, 356 U.S. 369, 372-73 (1958); Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 

439-41; United States v. Borum, 584 F.2d 424, 428 (D.C. Cir. 

1978). There is no suggestion in the record that Mayer asked 

or encouraged Solofa to tamper with a witness, obstruct 

justice, or participate in any form of criminal activity. Mayer

simply stated that he had been contacted by the FBI and asked 

Solofa what he should do in response. Solofa could have 

given a wide variety of meaningful, lawful answers to the 

question; he chose instead to suggest that Mayer lie and burn 

documents. 

That Mayer lied to Solofa about the investigation is no 

help to Solofa’s argument. “[N]ot all fraudulent 

misrepresentations constitute inducement . . . .” United States 

v. Burkley, 591 F.2d 903, 913 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). They might “when the 

Government’s deception actually implants the criminal design 

in the mind of the defendant,” Russell, 411 U.S. at 436, but 

Solofa makes no claim that Mayer suggested the criminal 

activity. Instead, Solofa urges upon us a rule that any 

misrepresentation by the FBI absolves him of responsibility 

for the choice he made to tell Mayer to destroy evidence of a 

crime. But banning the use of undercover agents, which is 

essentially what Solofa is asking for, would “severely hamper 

the Government in ferreting out those organized criminal 

activities that are characterized by covert dealings.” Lewis v. 

United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966); id. at 208-09

(“Indeed, it has long been acknowledged by the decisions of 

this Court that, in the detection of many types of crime, the 

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Government is entitled to use decoys and to conceal the 

identity of its agents.” (citations and footnote omitted)). In the 

context of entrapment, the Court has long held that “[a]rtifice

and stratagem may be employed to catch those engaged in 

criminal enterprises.” Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 441. In Russell, an 

undercover government agent perpetrated an elaborate 

deception, playing the part of a drug dealer. 411 U.S. at 426. 

But “the mere fact of deceit,” which is what Solofa relies 

upon here, could not “defeat [the] prosecution.” Id. at 435-36; 

see also Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 548 (1992)

(observing, in an entrapment case, that “there can be no 

dispute that the Government may use undercover agents to 

enforce the law”).

Solofa also argues that Mayer induced the crimes by 

invoking their friendship. Although we have raised the 

possibility that “pleas based on . . . friendship can satisfy the 

inducement prong,” we have yet to find an instance where 

they have been sufficiently strong to do so. United States v. 

Evans, 216 F.3d 80, 90 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (internal quotation

marks omitted). In any event, a resort to the bonds of

friendship can only be an inducement if it is a plea to break

the law. Even assuming that Mayer’s words and conduct

elicited feelings of friendship from Solofa, the fact remains 

that Mayer never asked or suggested that he engage in 

criminal activity. See id. (finding no inducement where the 

defendant “independently decided to provide the drugs out of 

friendship,” not “because of any plea from” his friend). This 

case is thus a far cry from Sherman v. United States, cited by 

Solofa. There, an informant played on the defendant’s 

sympathy by pretending to be an addict struggling toward 

recovery and expressly and repeatedly asking for illegal 

narcotics. See 356 U.S at 371, 373. At most, Mayer provided 

Solofa the opportunity to obstruct an investigation and tamper

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with a witness, but Solofa made the decision to commit these 

crimes on his own. To make out the defense of entrapment, it 

is not enough that the “government merely afford[ed]

opportunities or facilities for the commission of the offense.”

Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 441; see also Mathews, 485 U.S. at 66.

Given that Mayer did not suggest, solicit, or encourage 

Solofa’s participation in any criminal activity, his counsel had 

no viable entrapment defense to invoke. This conclusion is so 

clear from the record that there is no need to remand Solofa’s 

ineffectiveness claim to the district court for factual 

development. See United States v. Bell, 708 F.3d 223, 225 

(D.C. Cir. 2013). 

Because Solofa cannot show that his counsel’s failure to 

invoke the defense of entrapment prejudiced him, we need not 

address whether his counsel’s decision not to pursue the 

defense was somehow an unprofessional error. See Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 697 (“If it is easier to dispose of an 

ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient 

prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course 

should be followed.”).

III

The district court sentenced Solofa under section 2J1.2 of 

the Guidelines to concurrent sentences of the same length, one 

for witness tampering, the other for obstruction of justice. 

Section 2J1.2(c)(1) provides for an enhancement where “the 

offense involved obstructing the investigation or prosecution 

of a criminal offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(c)(1). Solofa, who 

was convicted of attempting to tamper with a witness and 

obstruct justice, argues that (c)(1) does not reach his crimes. 

That enhancement, he maintains, applies only to those cases 

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in which a defendant actually tampers with a witness or 

obstructs an investigation and not where he only makes the 

attempt. Appellant’s Br. 38. Nowhere in the text of (c)(1), 

Solofa observes, is there mention of “attempt” or “intent” or 

“effort” or “purpose,” the words used elsewhere in the 

Guidelines to capture inchoate crimes. Id. at 38-40. But

Solofa raises this argument for the first time on appeal, and

we can consider its merits only under plain error review. See

In re Sealed Case, 573 F.3d 844, 847 (D.C. Cir. 2009).

An error is plain only when the district court failed to 

follow an “absolutely clear legal norm.” United States v. 

Purvis, 706 F.3d 520, 524 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Here, every circuit to consider the issue has 

held that the (c)(1) enhancement covers attempts. See United 

States v. Gallimore, 491 F.3d 871, 876 (8th Cir. 2007); United 

States v. Giovanelli, 464 F.3d 346, 354 (2d Cir. 2006); United 

States v. Brenson, 104 F.3d 1267, 1284-85 (11th Cir. 1997); 

United States v. Aragon, 983 F.2d 1306, 1315-16 (4th Cir. 

1993); see also United States v. Flemmi, 402 F.3d 79, 96 n.27 

(1st Cir. 2005); United States v. Roche, 321 F.3d 607, 610 n.2 

(6th Cir. 2003). We cannot say that there is “an absolutely 

clear legal norm” against applying (c)(1) to attempts when six 

of our sister circuits have unanimously ruled otherwise. See 

United States v. Andrews, 532 F.3d 900, 909 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 

(finding the absence of plain error partly because of a circuit 

split on the issue); United States v. Sullivan, 451 F.3d 884, 

896 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (same). Solofa’s sentence stands. 

IV

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Solofa’s conviction 

and sentence.

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