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Parties Involved:
Jaron Brice
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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FOR THE DISTRICT Of COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 24, 2013 Decided May 6, 2014

No. 09-3071

UNITED STATES Of AMERICA,

APPELLEE

V.

JARON BRICE,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:05-cr-00367-1)

Jonathan S. Jeffress, Assistant federal Public Defender,

argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were

A.J Kramer, Federal Public Defender, and Rosanna li

Taormina, Assistant federal Public Defender.

Lauren R. Bates, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Ronald C.

Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney, and Elizabeth Trosman andElizabeth H Danello, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge, and WILLIAMS and

SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge

KAVANAUGH.

Opinion concurring in the judgment filed by Senior

Circuit Judge WILLIAMs.’

KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge: Brice was convicted for

crimes arising out of a major sex trafficking operation in

which he prostituted and sexually abused multiple teenaged

girls and adult women. Brice was convicted in federal district

court in 2006 and sentenced to a within-Guidelines sentence

of 30 years in prison. In his initial appeal, we affirmed his

conviction, but remanded for further fact-finding on one

narrow sentencing issue. See United States v. Brice, 296 F.

App’x 90, 91 (D.C. Cir. 200$). On remand, the Government

argued that Brice’s original 30-year sentence was still

appropriate. But the District Court disagreed with the

Government and instead sentenced Brice to a belowGuidelines sentence of 25 years.

Although he received a below-Guidelines sentence in his

re-sentencing, Brice has again appealed his sentence. Among

other things, Brice raises a new argument about the District

Court’s alleged lack of impartiality — based on events not at

the re-sentencing or even at the original sentencing, but rather

back at the 2006 trial, particularly in a transcribed ex parte

sidebar with the prosecution on February 21, 2006. In the

sidebar, the District Court and prosecutor discussed how one

of the detained material witnesses (that is, one of the women

alleged to have been sexually abused by Brice) should enter

NOTE: Portions of the opinion concurring in the judgment contain Sealed Information, which has been redacted.
the courtroom for her testimony. The judge concluded that

the witness should enter in the same way as other innocent

witnesses, from the back of the courtroom with the jury

present. The judge and prosecutor also discussed the

possibility that one of the detained material witnesses might

assert the fifth Amendment when called to testify.

The problem for Brice at this point is that he did not raise

the impartiality argument in his initial appeal even though he

could have done so. Under our precedents, we therefore may

not reach the merits of this impartiality claim at this time.Two separate lines of this Court’s precedents require that

result. first, this Court has definitively stated that motions to

recuse based on

a judge’s alleged bias or lack of impartiality

must be raised “within

a reasonable time after the grounds”

for recusal “are known.” United States v. Barrett, 111 F.3d

947, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1997). We have further said that if the

motion is not filed in

a reasonable time, the objection is

deemed waived and may not be considered on appeal. Id.The underlying rationale for that rule of procedure is

straightforward: “[Al defendant cannot take his chances with

a judge and then, if he thinks that the sentence is too severe,

secure

a disqualification and

a hearing before another judge.”

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, our caseshave set forth

a general rule of appellate procedure that, at

least absent exceptional circumstances, “where an argument

could have been raised on an initial appeal, it is inappropriate

to consider that argument on

a second appeal following

remand.” United States v. Henry, 472 f.3d 910, 913 (D.C.

Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also

Hartman v. Duffey, $8 F.3d 1232, 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1996)

(“We do not reach the merits of defendant’s arguments on this

issue because of the defendant’s failure to pursue it in its prior

appeal.”).
In this case, each of those lines of precedent applies and

independently precludes us from reaching the merits of

Brice’s impartiality claim. In the initial appeal, Brice plainly

could have raised his impartiality argument based on the

February 21, 2006, ex parte sidebar. The relevant February

21, 2006, trial transcript necessary to raise this impartiality

issue was available to Brice’s appellate counsel during the

first appeal. Brice says that during the initial appeal, his

appellate counsel did not have access to transcripts of the

district court’s sealed pre-trial hearings on February 15 and

17, 2006, which occurred with defense counsel present and

concerned several issues relating to the material witnesseswho had been detained and were potential trial witnesses.

That is a red herring. Those transcripts are not the relevant

transcripts for Brice’s impartiality argument based on the

February 21, 2006, ex parte sidebar. The relevant transcript is

the February 21, 2006, trial transcript. And during the initial

appeal, Brice had access to the February 21, 2006, trial

transcript. (In this appeal, Brice notably has not claimed

otherwise.) Indeed, in the initial appeal, Brice included

portions of the February 21 trial transcript in the joint

appendix, leaving no doubt that he had access to the transcript

necessary to advance this impartiality argument. See Joint

Appendix at 163-81, United States v. Brice, 296 F. App’x 90

(D.C. Cir. 200$) (No. 063135).2

2 In the current appeal, Brice notes in passing a comment about

Brice and one of the witnesses that the District Court made at theFebruary 15, 2006, pre-trial hearing. Brice’s counsel was present at

that hearing. At the conclusion of the relevant pre-trial hearings,

after initially objecting to the judge’s comment and seeking recusal,

Brice then expressly withdrew and thereby waived any recusal

claim based on that comment. Moreover, Brice could have raised
In short, in his initial appeal, Brice could have raised the

impartiality issue relating to the February 21, 2006, ex parte

sidebar. But he did not do so. Whether Brice did not raise it

in the initial appeal because of his attorney’s negligence or

because of his attorney’s deliberate strategy, our precedentsrequire us to conclude that Brice cannot raise it now in his

second appeal. See Henry, 472 F.3d at 913; Barrett, 111 F.3d

at 951.

To be clear, that does not mean that Brice is out of luck.

Brice can file a collateral Section 2255 motion in federaldistrict court. In such a motion, Brice can allege that his

attorney in the initial appeal provided ineffective assistance

by failing to raise an impartiality argument based on the

February 21, 2006, ex parte sidebar. (Brice’s counsel in the

initial appeal was different from Brice’s counsel in the current

appeal.) But what Brice cannot do under our case law is to

raise this impartiality issue for the first time in his second

appeal.

***

We have carefully considered all of Brice’s arguments in

this appeal. We affirm the judgment of the District Court.

So ordered.

an impartiality argument about that comment in his initial appeal,

but he did not do so.
judgment: The panel does not reach the merits of Brice’s

claim that the district judge’s “impartiality might reasonably

be questioned,”

a claim that if correct would have required the

district judge to recuse herself. See 2$ U.S.C. § 455(a). It

rests on two propositions: first, the rule created in United

States v. Barrett, 111 F.3d 947, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1997), that

failure to call for recusal “within

a reasonable time after the

grounds for it are known” waives any claim under § 455(a); second, the “general rule of appellate procedure” that where

an argument could have been raised on an earlier appeal, it is

inappropriate to consider the argument in

a later appeal

following

a remand, at least absent “exceptional

circumstances,” United States v. Henry, 472 f.3d 910, 913

(D.C. Cir. 2007). I agree that we are bound by Barrett,

though I can find no logic behind its silent choice that this

particular omission of counsel must be classified as waiver

(entailing no review at all), rather than forfeiture (allowing

review for “plain error”). And I believe the circumstances are

exceptional enough that counsel’s omission on the priorappeal should not prevent review ofthe current claim.

The substantive claim here is one of bias, and its facts are

surely exceptional. The key event was the initial appearance

of

a prosecution witness, an appearance designed by judge

and prosecutor—in an ex parte sidebar—to generate both

pathos and sympathy for the witness. The witness, known as

K.H., was among the women that the defendant evidently

controlled in the course of the prostitution offenses for which

he was ultimately found guilty. She and two others had been

held as material witnesses, after material-witness proceedings

conducted by the district judge who handled the trial.

Because of concern over K.H.’s mental health, she was to be

voir dired outside the presence of the jury. But the Assistant

U.S. Attorney spied

a chance for more impact, as he explained

in the ex parte sidebar:
I was hoping that there was some way that the jury

could see [the witness] come in to see the defendant for

the first time because I anticipate that there’s going tobe a reaction because she’s so in love with him andwhen she saw the photo spread, she sobbed, I was there.

But it sounds like if you were going to do the voir

dire that will be beforehand outside of the jury and thedefendant present.

Tr. of Feb. 21, 2006, at 203. The district court obliged,

helpfully suggesting the following: “You could call her as awitness, she could enter the courtroom. Have me excuse the

jury and do the voir dire. Then we can just do it in that

order.” Id. at 204.

The district court then set out to execute the plan. The

court called the marshal over and said that the witness, who

was then detained, should be treated “more like a victim than

a criminal,” id., and then laid out the proposal agreed on with

the prosecutor. The court deputy marshal responded by

noting that to bring a detained witness through the front door

was a policy deviation that would require the approval of his

chief. He proposed an alternative, but the judge insisted on

the original plan: “It’s important that she come in and that the

jury see her and the defendant the first time that they see each

other.” Id. at 206. To be sure that it came off, she said shewould speak to the supervisor. Evidently she did so, and the

staged entry proceeded just as the court and prosecutor had

planned.

The entry evidently did not strike defense counsel as odd

enough to trigger an inquiry or objection. Even thegovernment doesn’t claim that counsel’s inaction at trial

precludes review here; rather it rests on the fact that in the
first appeal (not handled by trial counsel), the transcripts

available to counsel included the text ofthe ex parte sidebar.

The doctrinal obstacle to our consideration of Brice’s

current claim is Barrett’s rule that a party waives anyobjection to the judge’s appearance of bias if he fails to raise

the issue “within a reasonable time after the grounds for

[disqualification] are known.” 111 F.3d at 951. As the

Barrett court expressly ruled against Barrett’s bias claim onthe merits, the waiver theory was quite unnecessary, as Judge

Tatel noted in his concurring opinion. Id. at 954. But because

the court appeared to rest the outcome in part on the waiver

theory, we are obliged to treat it as an alternative holding

Besides arranging the presentation of K.H., the district

court on other occasions showed some hostility to thedefendant. Standing alone, these expressions might notamount to much. In dismissing a defense contention during

one pre-trial hearing, the judge referred to Brice as “the

criminal,” but then instantly corrected herself—”or &! - - - -l

fnive me, allcd criminal.” Ir. of Feb. 14, 2006, at 26.
rather than mere dictum. Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337

U.s. 535, 537 (1949) (“[WJhere a decision rests on two or more

grounds, none can be relegated to the category of obiterdictum.”).

Barrett contains several curious features. First, in calling

defendant’s delay a “waiver” of defendant’s claim under 22

U.S.C. § 455, it completely overlooks what § 455 has to say

about waiver. Subsection 45 5(e) forbids a judge to “accept” a

waiver of any of the grounds set out in § 455(b), whereas for

§ 455(a), dealing with any instance where the judge’s

impartiality might “reasonably be questioned” (the subsection

relevant to our case), § 45 5(e) allows “waiver [to] be accepted

provided it is preceded by a full disclosure on the record ofthe basis for disqualification.” Before us, the parties haven’t

argued the matter at all. At a casual first glance, however, the

requirement of “a full disclosure on the record” conjures

something far more deliberate and elaborate than mere delay,

coupled with counsel’s imputed awareness of the transcript of

the ex parte dealings.

Other courts have recognized § 455(e)’s strictures on

waiver yet gone on to insist on timeliness, i.e., to treat delay

as effecting a de facto waiver. United States v. York, 888 F.2d

1050 (5th Cir. 1929), offers perhaps the most extensive

justification. (Barrett, treating delay and waiver as

interchangeable yet not mentioning what § 455(e) had to say

on waiver, evidently saw no need for reconciling its delay rule

with the statute.) The York court acknowledged that

§ 455(e)’s bar on waiver of § 455(b) violations “suggests that

Congress believed the gain in protecting against actual bias,

prejudice, or conflict of interest outweighs the loss to judicial

economy in prohibiting waivers.” Id. at 1055. And the courtfurther observed that the “motivation behind a timeliness

requirement is also to a large extent one ofjudicial economy.”
Id. The “also” is a puzzler, as the language of § 455(e) on its

face made the values protected by § 455(b) trumps over

judicial economy. No matter. The court went on to offer this

rationale for a timeliness requirement:

[TJhe gains in judicial economy from a timeliness

requirement are greater than those from permittingwaiver. Since both parties must agree to any waiver, no

new trial will be saved by waiver once the outcome oftrial has been determined. In fact, once any party senses

that the proceedings have been favorable to it up to thatpoint, no waiver is likely to occur. On the other hand, atimeliness requirement will proscribe motions that wouldhave invalidated a hilly completed trial.

Id. In other words, the gain in judicial economy from atimeliness requirement exceeds the hypothetical gain from

allowing waiver, so it is reasonable, the court thought, to

suppose that Congress was not ruling out a timeliness

requirement. This is true, of course, to the extent that one

focuses exclusively on waivers after the litigation outcome is

known or at any rate heavily foreshadowed: in those cases,waiver achieves no judicial economy at all, as the loser,having little or no incentive to preserve the outcome, will notwaive. But as waivers normally will not occur in those

circumstances at all, it seems very doubtful that the scenario

played any role in Congress’s resolution of the balance.

Moreover, the argument does little to refute the rule’s

apparent anomaly: while recognizing that deliberate waiver of

§ 455(b) values is impossible, it allows an easy loss of those

values through mere neglect. And while deliberate waiver of

§ 455(a) is possible but seemingly very difficult, occurring

only—so far as appears on the text of the statute—through a

rather formal ceremony, the timeliness rule makes loss easy
through neglect. As an absolute bar, a timeliness requirement

of course entirely ignores the purpose of § 455(a), which is

“to promote public confidence in the impartiality of the

judicial process.” H.R. Rep. No. 93-1453, at 5 (1974).

Many courts have nonetheless accepted such a timeliness

requirement. See, e.g., Kolon Indus. Inc. v. E.i DuPont de

Nemours & Co., — F.3d —,2014 WL 1317695 (4th Cir. Apr.

3, 2014); United States v. Brinkworth, 68 f.3d 633, 639 (2d

Cir. 1995); United States v. Owens, 902 F.2d 1154, 1156-57

(4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Nobel, 696 F.2d 231, 23 6-37

(3d Cir. 1982); Delesdernier v. Forterie, 666 f.2d 116, 121 &

n.3 (5th Cir. 1982). The 7th Circuit initially read § 455(e) limits on waiver as barring any timeliness requirement, SCA

Servs., Inc. v. Morgan, 557 F.2d 110, 117 (7th Cir. 1977), but

then noted in dictum a readiness to rethink the matter, Union

Carbide Corp. v. US. Cutting Service, 782 F.2d 710, 716-17

(7thCir. 1986).

Not only Barrett but the other cases insisting on

timeliness lay great stress on a concern—which to be sure is

plausible—that a party might “take his chances” with a judge,

and then raise the recusal issue if unhappy with the outcome.

Barrett, 111 F.3d at 951 (internal quotation marks omitted).

But neither Barrett nor the others explains why that risk is so

great in connection with § 455 that an absolute bar is the

solution, rather than, as for all other rulings or omissions not

challenged until appeal, merely limiting relief to review for

plain error.

That omission leads directly to another frailty of Barrett:

it completely disregards the distinction between waiver and

forfeiture drawn by the Supreme Court’s decision in United

States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993). Because waiver is “the
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of

a known

right,” Id. at 733 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464

(1938)),

a waiver (if valid and effective) “extinguish[es]” the

erroneous character of the relevant ruling. Id. By contrast,

mere forfeiture has no such effect; an error, despite the

absence of

a timely objection, remains an error for purposes of

Rule 52’s provision for review of “plain error.” Id. at 73 3-34;

accord United States v. Laslie, 716 F.3d 612, 614 (D.C. Cir.2013); In re Sealed Case, 356 f.3d 313, 317 (D.C. Cir. 2004).

Barrett neither recognizes that plain error review is an option,

nor offers an explanation as to why it is not enough of

a

gaming deterrent in the context of § 455(a). The same

objection of course applies to the decisions in other circuits

that insist on timeliness but do not call it waiver.

In fact, many courts apply plain error review to § 45 5(a) claims unchallenged at trial. See, e.g., United States v.

Berger, 375 f.3d 1223, 1227 (11th Cir. 2004) (reviewingunder plain error after failure to seek recusal below); United

States v. Kimball, 73 f.3d 269, 273 (10th Cir. 1995) (same);

United States v. Franklin, 197 F.3d 266, 270 (7th Cir. 1999)

(noting the “specter of ‘sand bagging” and applying plain

error review as

a result); Baldwin Hardware Corp. v. FrankSu

Enter. Corp., 78 f.3d 550, 557 (fed. Cir. 1996) (applying

plain error); United States v. Schrether, 599 F.2d 534, 535 (3d

Cir. 1979) (noting the concern about gaming and applying

plain error standard as

a result); see also Noli v. Comm ‘r, 860

f.2d 1521, 1527 (9th Cir. 1988).

Indeed, even the government may have no faith in the

waiver theory, or even waiver in timeliness’s clothing. In itsbriefing here it makes no claim of either version and offers no

citation to Barrett. It rather argues, in alignment with the

many circuits applying more standard remedies for an
omission by counsel, merely that we resolve the issue under a

plain error standard. Resp. Br. at 17; see also Brief for United

States at 20-2 1, United States v. Lang, 364 F.3d 1210 (10th

Cir. 2004) (No. 02-4075).

Were it not for Barrett, we would almost certainly regard

Brice’s failure to raise the issue earlier as forfeiture, not

waiver, and we would review under plain error (absent other

obstacles). On the facts of this case, I believe the impartiality

of the judge “might reasonably be questioned,” § 455(a), even

if reviewed under the plain error standard. As Brice doesn’t

challenge the trial outcome but asks only for resentencing, it isgoverned by our rule cutting more slack for assertions of plain

error when only sentencing is at stake. United States v. Saro,

24 f.3d 283, 287-88 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

The panel opinion also cites a second, independent reason

for withholding review. Under conventional appellate

procedures, we do not consider arguments raised for the firsttime on a second appeal if they might have been raised on

initial appeal. Though generally true, this is “a prudential rule

rather than a jurisdictional one,” Crocker v. Piedmont

Aviation, Inc., 49 F.3d 735, 739-40 (D.C. Cir. 1995),

motivated by a “practical concern for judicial economy,” id. at

740. Accordingly, we “always possess[J discretion to reach”

issues not raised on initial appeal, though this discretion “is

normally exercised only in exceptional circumstances, where

injustice might otherwise result,” id. (internal quotation marks

omitted); cf. US. National Bank of Oregon v. Independent

Ins. Agents ofAmerica, Inc., 50$ U.S. 439, 447 (1993). The

ex parte cooperation of the court and prosecutor in this case

certainly strikes me not only as “exceptional” but also as

creating exceptional circumstances. See Yesudian ex rel.

United States v. Howard Univ., 270 F.3d 969, 971 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (exercising such discretion, and noting that the bar

presented by a “failure to raise an issue in an initial appeal is

far from absolute”).

So, contrary to the majority I do not view our appellate

procedures as controlling the outcome of this case. Rather,

we have a straightforward application of Barrett, and are

therefore bound to follow it, however much it may be in

tension with 2$ U.S.C. § 455, with Olano, and with our

standard treatment of claimed errors not raised in district

court,