Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-01382/USCOURTS-caDC-97-01382-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Federal Highway Administration
Respondent
Truckers United for Safety
Petitioner

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 9, 1998 Decided April 

3, 1998

No. 97-1382

Truckers United for Safety,

Petitioner

v.

Federal Highway Administration,

Respondent

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Federal Highway Administration

Anthony J. McMahon argued the cause and filed the briefs

for petitioner.

Sandra Wien Simon, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for respondent, with whom Frank W.

Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, and Robert S. Greenspan, Attorney, were on the brief.

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Before: Randolph, Rogers and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Rogers.

Rogers, Circuit Judge: Truckers United for Safety

("TUFS"), a nonprofit trade association of motor carriers,

petitions for review of a portion of the regulatory guidance

issued by the Federal Highway Administration (the "Administration") for private parties seeking to comply with motor

carrier safety regulations. In a set of three questions and

answers published in this guidance, TUFS contends, the

Administration imposed strict liability on trucking companies

for certain regulatory violations committed by their employees and, in doing so, exceeded its statutory authority and

violated the companies' due process rights. Because these

substantive challenges are not ripe for review, we dismiss the

petition as to these challenges. TUFS also contends that the

Administration should have afforded interested parties notice

and an opportunity to comment under the Administrative

Procedure Act ("APA"). Because the questions and answers

were interpretative rules not subject to notice-and-comment

requirements, we deny the petition for review as to this

challenge.

I.

Under the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 and the Motor

Carrier Safety Act of 1984, the Federal Highway Administration has the authority to issue regulations pertaining to

commercial motor vehicle safety and to enforce those regulations. See 49 U.S.C. ss 521(b), 31133(a) (1994). Pursuant to

that authority, the Administration promulgated the Federal

Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, including the following

regulations:

s 390.11 Motor carrier to require observance of driver

regulations.

Whenever ... a duty is prescribed for a driver or a

prohibition is imposed upon the driver, it shall be the

duty of the motor carrier to require observance of such

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duty or prohibition. If the motor carrier is a driver, the

driver shall likewise be bound.

s 395.3 Maximum driving time.

(a) Except as provided [elsewhere] ... no motor carrier

shall permit or require any driver used by it to drive nor

shall any such driver drive:

(1) More than 10 hours following 8 consecutive hours

off duty; or

(2) For any period after having been on duty 15 hours

following 8 consecutive hours off duty.

(b) No motor carrier shall permit or require a driver of a

commercial motor vehicle to drive, nor shall any driver

drive, regardless of the number of motor carriers using

the driver's services, for any period after--

(1) Having been on duty 60 hours in any 7 consecutive

days if the employing motor carrier does not operate

commercial motor vehicles every day of the week; or

(2) Having been on duty 70 hours in any period of 8

consecutive days if the employing motor carrier operates commercial motor vehicles every day of the week.

s 395.8 Driver's record of duty status.

(a) Except for a private motor carrier of passengers

(nonbusiness), every motor carrier shall require every

driver used by the motor carrier to record his/her duty

status for each 24 hour period using the methods prescribed [herein]....

...

(e) Failure to complete the record of duty activities of

this section or s 395.15, failure to preserve a record of

such duty activities, or making of false reports in connection with such duty activities shall make the driver

and/or the carrier liable to prosecution.

...

49 C.F.R. ss 390.11, 395.3, .8 (1997).

The Administration has developed and periodically updated

regulatory guidance in question-and-answer format to assist

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parties bound by these regulations. See Regulatory Guidance

for the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, 62 Fed.

Reg. 16370 (1997) [hereinafter Regulatory Guidance]. In the

most recent edition of this regulatory guidance, published in

the Federal Register on April 4, 1997, the Administration

"consolidated previously issued interpretations and regulatory

guidance materials and developed concise interpretive guidance in question and answer form." Id. at 16370. Three

particular questions and answers within the guidance are of

concern here. First and second, in interpretation of 49

C.F.R. s 395.3:

Question 7: What is the liability of a motor carrier for

hours of service violations?

Guidance: The carrier is liable for violations of the hours

of service regulations if it had or should have had the

means by which to detect the violations. Liability under

the [Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations] does not

depend upon actual knowledge of the violations.

Question 8: Are carriers liable for the actions of their

employees even though the carrier contends that it did

not require or permit the violations to occur?

Guidance: Yes. Carriers are liable for the actions of

their employees. Neither intent to commit, nor actual

knowledge of, a violation is a necessary element of that

liability. Carriers "permit" violations of the hours of

service regulations by their employees if they fail to have

in place management systems that effectively prevent

such violations.

Id. at 16424. Third, in interpretation of 49 C.F.R. s 395.8:

Question 21: What is the carrier's liability when its

drivers falsify records of duty status?

Guidance: A carrier is liable both for the actions of its

drivers in submitting false documents and for its own

actions in accepting false documents. Motor carriers

have a duty to require drivers to observe the [Federal

Motor Carrier Safety Regulations].

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Id. at 16426. TUFS petitions for review of these three

questions and answers.

II.

TUFS contends that, by enacting a strict liability standard

for motor carriers, the agency exceeded its statutory authority and violated due process and thus that the offending

questions and answers should be vacated. The Administration denies that the questions and answers changed the

standards for motor carriers' liability and insists that, until it

has had a chance to apply the regulatory guidance in a

concrete factual setting, this petition is not ripe for review.

The agency is correct: under the test for ripeness announced

in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967), the

issues are not yet fit for judicial decision and TUFS will not

suffer any great hardship from waiting for judicial review in a

more appropriate action. See id. at 149.

Our determination of the fitness prong of the Abbott Laboratories test is guided by Aulenback, Inc. v. Federal Highway Administration, 103 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1997). In

Aulenback, a group of petitioners (including TUFS) challenged the Administration's reliance upon an internal guidance manual for determining whether certain motor carrier

practices posed an "imminent hazard" justifying orders to put

motor carriers out of service under 49 U.S.C. s 521(b)(5)(A).

See Aulenback, 103 F.3d at 159-61. The court held that this

challenge was not ripe for review because the agency had not

had a chance to clarify its position:

the agency has not had an opportunity to explain, in an

authoritative way, the purpose of the Manual and how it

is used. The court thus lacks an authoritative interpretation of the relevant provisions of that text, and petitioners fail to demonstrate that the court should consider

their challenge in a factual vacuum.

Id. at 167. Indeed, the court continued, even though the

challenged agency guidance appeared on its face to allow outof-service orders when the statute in question would not so

allow, "the [agency] might decline to follow the language of its

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Manual or might sufficiently narrow it that under a deferential standard of review ... , the court might be able to uphold

it." Id. Thus, the court concluded, the challenge was unfit

for judicial review. See id.

The substantive challenges in the instant petition are even

less fit for judicial review than the challenge in Aulenback.

TUFS claims that the three questions and answers clearly

demonstrate the imposition of strict liability on motor carriers

for their drivers' violations of maximum hours and record

keeping regulations. The Administration, on the other hand,

denies that the questions do any such thing; instead, the

agency insists, the regulatory guidance only represents an

attempt to codify already existing law, which, all agree, did

not impose such strict liability on motor carriers for their

drivers' actions. Indeed, the questions and answers do not

seem to impose strict liability on motor carriers; 1 certainly,

they do not do so with the clarity necessary for the court to

intercede without first giving the agency a chance to apply its

regulations in a concrete factual situation. See id. at 167. At

this point, TUFS can only speculate that the regulatory

guidance will be applied in the way they fear.

__________

1 The answer for question 7 states that a carrier is liable only

for violations "if it had or should have had the means by which to

detect the violations"--this implies not strict liability, but negligence. Regulatory Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. at 16424 (emphasis

added). The answer for question 8 does state that "[c]arriers are

liable for the actions of their employees," but continues: "Carriers

'permit' violations of the hours of service regulations by their

employees if they fail to have in place management systems that

effectively prevent such violations." Id. Again, this seems to

envision imposing liability only upon motor carriers that are at fault

in at least some way. Finally, although the answer for question 21

states that "[a] carrier is liable ... for the actions of its drivers in

submitting false documents," it does not state that carriers will be

strictly liable therefor. Id. at 16426. Rather, it suggests that

carriers will face liability only if they fail to fulfill their "duty to

require drivers to observe the [regulations]." Id. The standard of

liability thus seems to be one for negligence in allowing or failing to

detect drivers' submissions of false documents.

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Furthermore, TUFS does not contend that it will suffer

any great hardship from waiting for judicial review in a more

appropriate action, nor does it introduce any evidence to that

effect.2 Although "[a] hardship may be shown when a litigant

is forced to choose between risking serious sanctions and

incurring substantial costs of complying with an allegedly

unlawful agency directive," id. at 168, TUFS is not faced with

that choice. TUFS maintains that the regulatory guidance

replaces negligence with strict liability (that is, liability without fault). Even if this is true, TUFS makes no claim that

motor carriers will change their behavior in any significant

way in order to account for the employee violations for which

they would be liable under strict liability but not negligence.3

To the extent that the motor carriers' liability is expanded

under the questions and answers, they will be able to address

any resulting harm in any adjudication in which the agency

relies upon the regulatory guidance to impose strict liability.4

__________

2 TUFS instead relies on its contention that the petition raises

purely legal issues fit for judicial resolution. It observes that if the

court determined that the issues presented by the case were fit for

review, "there is no need to consider 'the hardship to the parties of

withholding court consideration.' " Action for Children's Television

v. FCC, 59 F.3d 1249, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 149). However, because the fitness for review of

TUFS petition is suspect, we must also consider the hardship issue.

3 Counsel for TUFS recognized as much at oral argument:

The Court: [The Court is] asking a practical question whether

the members of your association have in fact felt required to

change their practices because of these three answers to these

three questions.

Counsel: They can't change, your honor. You cannot create

perfection, and I suggest that the rule requires perfection.

4 In the addendum to its reply brief, TUFS includes documents

from a recent prosecution of a motor carrier by the Administration

in which, TUFS claims, the Administration has been applying a

strict liability-based enforcement policy. Even assuming these

documents are properly before the court, TUFS' remedy lies in a

challenge in that proceeding or another of its kind, not in the kind

of facial challenge presented in the instant case.

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Thus, neither prong of the ripeness inquiry supports

TUFS' petition for review. To the extent that TUFS wishes

to challenge the substance of the regulatory guidance, it must

wait until the Administration actually applies it in a concrete

factual situation; indeed, when and if the Administration does

so, TUFS may find such application unobjectionable. Accordingly, we dismiss the petition for review as to TUFS' arguments that, in promulgating the regulatory guidance, the

Administration has exceeded its statutory authority and violated the Fifth Amendment.

III.

TUFS' further contention, that the set of three questions

and answers in the regulatory guidance is invalid because the

Administration did not provide interested parties with notice

and an opportunity to comment in accordance with the APA,

is similarly unpersuasive. See 5 U.S.C. ss 553, 706(2)(A)

(1994). Under the APA, legislative rules are subject to

notice-and-comment requirements, whereas interpretative

rules are not. See id. s 553(b); American Mining Congress

v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1108-12

(D.C. Cir. 1993). To distinguish between the two, the court

asks

whether the purported interpretive rule has 'legal effect',

which in turn is best ascertained by asking (1) whether in

the absence of the rule there would not be an adequate

legislative basis for enforcement action or other agency

action to confer benefits or ensure the performance of

duties, (2) whether the agency has published the rule in

the Code of Federal Regulations, (3) whether the agency

has explicitly invoked its general legislative authority, or

(4) whether the rule effectively amends a prior legislative

rule.

Id. at 1112. Although this inquiry may be "fuzzy" in some

cases, see American Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037,

1046 (D.C. Cir. 1987), in the instant case, each of these

criteria points toward the same conclusion: the three quesUSCA Case #97-1382 Document #342740 Filed: 04/03/1998 Page 8 of 10
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tions and answers represent interpretative rules not subject

to the APA's notice and comment requirements.

First, as discussed, the three questions and answers do not

appear to impose a new strict liability standard on motor

carriers, and thus the Administration has no apparent need to

rely upon them for authority to take any enforcement action.

The regulations in force both before and after the Administration issued the regulatory guidance provided that motor

carriers have a duty to require their drivers' compliance with

the regulations, see 49 C.F.R. s 390.11, and in particular, with

the maximum hours of duty and record keeping regulations

with which the regulatory guidance in question is concerned,

see id. ss 395.3, .8. The regulatory guidance appears only to

elaborate upon that duty, and then only in a manner consistent with earlier applications of the regulations. See Used

Equip. Sales v. Department of Transp., 54 F.3d 862, 866

(D.C. Cir. 1995). Even if the regulatory guidance did not

exist, the Administration could rely upon prior authority to

apply the rules embodied in the three challenged questions

and answers.

Second, the regulatory guidance is not published in the

Code of Federal Regulations. It was published only in the

Federal Register, and the Administration gave no indication

there that it would publish the Regulatory Guidance again

elsewhere. See Regulatory Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. at 16370.

Third, the Administration did not invoke its legislative

authority in publishing the regulatory guidance. To the

contrary, the Administration explained that this was "interpretive guidance" meant to "provide the motor carrier industry with a clearer understanding of the applicability of many

of the requirements contained in the [Federal Motor Carrier

Safety Regulations] in particular situations." Id. Although

the label an agency places on a rule is not dispositive, see

Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 59 F.3d 1249, 1257

(D.C. Cir. 1995), the label, as indicative of intent, does carry

some weight in our consideration whether the underlying rule

is legislative or interpretative.

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Finally, the three questions and answers do not amend a

prior legislative rule. As noted, they appear consistent with

prior law. It is true that the preamble to the regulatory

guidance states that "[a]ll prior interpretations and regulatory guidance ... issued previously in the Federal Register, as

well as [Administration] memoranda and letters, may no

longer be relied upon as authoritative insofar as they are

inconsistent with the guidance published today." Regulatory

Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. at 16370. The preamble simply puts

carriers on notice that older interpretive materials may now

be outdated. This is consistent with the guidance's purpose

of "consolidat[ing] previously issued interpretations and regulatory guidance materials." Id. No substantive change in

prior law is apparent.

All four factors indicate that the Administration was not

required to afford interested parties notice and an opportunity to comment before promulgating the three questions and

answers (and, concomitantly, that the three questions and

answers do not have the binding effect of legislative rules).

Hence, TUFS' claim under the APA fails, and we deny the

petition for review as to that claim.

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