Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-02416/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-02416-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
California Correctional Health Care Services
Defendant
Troy Junell Gachett
Plaintiff

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

TROY JUNELL GACHETT, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CALIFORNIA CORRECTIONAL 

HEALTH CARE SERVICES, 

Defendant. 

No. 2:16-cv-2416 AC P 

ORDER 

 Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 

state law and has requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 

Plaintiff has consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge for all purposes 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Local Rule 305(a). ECF No. 9. 

I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 

 Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(a). ECF Nos. 2, 8. However, the court will not assess a filing fee at this time. Instead, the 

complaint will be summarily dismissed. 

II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints 

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

Case 2:16-cv-02416-AC Document 11 Filed 01/03/17 Page 1 of 7
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“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

 A claim “is [legally] frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 

Cir. 1984). “[A] judge may dismiss [in forma pauperis] claims which are based on indisputably 

meritless legal theories or whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Jackson v. Arizona, 

885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation and internal quotations omitted), superseded by statute 

on other grounds as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000); Neitzke, 490 

U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, 

has an arguable legal and factual basis. Id. 

“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of 

what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 

However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more 

than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual 

allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. (citations 

omitted). “[T]he pleading must contain something more . . . than . . . a statement of facts that 

merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.” Id. (alteration in original) 

(quoting 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure ' 1216 (3d 

ed. 2004)). 

“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell 

Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). In reviewing a complaint 

under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, 

Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trs., 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), as well as construe the pleading 

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in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor, Jenkins v. 

McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 

III. Complaint 

Plaintiff alleges that he was sent a Notice of Data Breach on May 17, 2016, that advised 

him that a breach occurred on February 25, 2016, when an unencrypted laptop was stolen from a 

personal vehicle. ECF No. 1 at 3. He goes onto allege that the letter stated that the records at 

issue “if any” were his “incarceration records dated between 1996 and 2014” and that he is at risk 

for identity theft. Id. Plaintiff alleges that this potential breach constituted negligence on the part 

of California Correctional Health Care Services (CCHCS). Id. 

IV. Standing 

As a threshold matter, plaintiff has failed to name a proper defendant. He has only named 

CCHCS, which is a state agency and therefore not a person under § 1983. Will v. Mich. Dept. of 

State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (“[N]either a State nor its officials acting in their official 

capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.”). Assuming that plaintiff could substitute an appropriate 

individual as defendant, the speculative allegations of the complaint still fail to establish that 

plaintiff has standing because he cannot show an injury-in-fact. 

“[F]ederal courts are required sua sponte to examine jurisdictional issues such as 

standing.” B.C. v. Plumas Unified Sch. Dist., 192 F.3d 1260, 1264 (9th Cir.1999). The Article 

III case or controversy requirement limits federal courts’ subject matter jurisdiction by requiring 

that plaintiffs have standing. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of 

Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982). To have Article III standing, a plaintiff must 

plead and prove that he has suffered sufficient injury to satisfy the “case or controversy” 

requirement of Article III of the United States Constitution. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 

S. Ct. 1138, 1146 (2013) (“‘One element of the case-or-controversy requirement’ is that plaintiffs 

‘must establish that they have standing to sue.’” (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 

(1997))). To satisfy Article III standing, a plaintiff must therefore allege: (1) injury-in-fact that is 

concrete and particularized, as well as actual or imminent; (2) that the injury is fairly traceable to 

the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) that the injury is redressable by a favorable ruling. 

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Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 (2010) (citation omitted); Lujan v. 

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). “The party invoking federal jurisdiction 

bears the burden of establishing these elements . . . with the manner and degree of evidence 

required at the successive stages of the litigation.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (citations omitted). 

To the extent plaintiff may be attempting to bring a claim pursuant to the Health Insurance 

Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), which requires the confidentiality of 

medical records, “HIPAA itself does not provide for a private right of action.” Webb v. Smart 

Document Solutions, LLC, 499 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Standards for Privacy of 

Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 82462-01, 82601 (Dec. 28, 2000) (to 

be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 160 and 164) (“Under HIPAA, individuals do not have a right to court 

action.”)). However, the Ninth Circuit has held that the constitutional right to informational 

privacy extends to medical information. Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 

1260, 1269 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The constitutionally protected privacy interest in avoiding disclosure 

of personal matters clearly encompasses medical information and its confidentiality.”) (citing Doe 

v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 941 F.2d 780, 795 (9th Cir. 1991)). In this case, however, 

the disclosure of plaintiff’s medical information, and therefore any injury, is entirely speculative. 

Although plaintiff has not attached a copy of the letter provided to him, a number of 

lawsuits have been filed in this district making the same allegations of a data breach that plaintiff 

makes in the instant case. The notification of the potential breach was provided as an attachment 

in many of those actions and read as follows: 

We do not know if any sensitive information was contained in the 

laptop. To the extent any sensitive information may have been 

contained in the laptop, we do not know if the information included 

any of your information. If your information was included, the 

nature of the information may have included confidential medical, 

mental health, and custodial information. To the extent any 

sensitive information may have been contained in the laptop, we 

estimate that it would have been limited to information related to 

your custody and care, if any, between 1996 and 2014. 

Seastrunk v. Cal. Corr. Health Servs., 2:16-cv-1424 AC P, 2016 WL 3549623, at *2, 2016 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 85685, at *3-4 (E.D. Cal. June 30, 2016) (quoting notice of potential breach); 

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Compton v. Cal. Corr. Health Care Servs., 2:16-cv-1606 AC P, 2016 WL 3916320, at *2, 2016 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94773, at *3-4 (E.D. Cal. July 20, 2016); Gonzalez v. Matolon, 2:16-cv-1281 

MCE KJN P, 2016 WL 7178519, at *2, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170937, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 

2016). The notification mirrors plaintiff’s allegations that his sensitive information was only 

potentially subject to a breach due to the theft of the laptop and further demonstrates the 

speculative nature of plaintiff’s claims. 

While potential future harm can in some instances confer standing, plaintiff must face “a 

credible threat of harm” that is “both real and immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical.” 

Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations and internal quotation 

marks omitted) (holding that threat of potential identity theft created by theft of a laptop known to 

contain plaintiffs’ unencrypted names, addresses, and social security numbers was sufficient to 

confer standing, but that “more conjectural or hypothetical” allegations would make threat “far 

less credible”); Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013) (“[A]n injury must 

be concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent.”) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). Plaintiff’s allegations are based upon a notification which states that his information 

may have been contained on the laptop and that he may be at risk for identity theft. ECF No. 1 at 

3. In other words, whether plaintiff’s sensitive information has even been compromised is 

unknown. Plaintiff cannot state a claim for relief based upon the speculative breach of his 

sensitive information, and his claim for violation of his constitutional right to informational 

privacy will therefore be dismissed without prejudice for lack of standing. See Fleck & Assoc., 

Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 471 F.3d 1100, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 2006) (dismissal for lack of standing is 

without prejudice). 

V. State Law Claims 

 The complaint also alleges negligence on the part of CCHCS. Because plaintiff has failed 

to state a cognizable claim for relief under federal law, this court declines to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s putative state law claim.1 Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. 

 

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 The court takes no position on whether plaintiff would be able to successfully pursue his claim 

in state court. 

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Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988) (when federal claims are eliminated before trial, district courts 

should usually decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction). 

VI. No Leave to Amend 

If the court finds that a complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim, the court 

has discretion to dismiss with or without leave to amend. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-

30 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Leave to amend should be granted if it appears possible that the 

defects in the complaint could be corrected, especially if a plaintiff is pro se. Id. at 1130-31; see 

also Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (“A pro se litigant must be given 

leave to amend his or her complaint, and some notice of its deficiencies, unless it is absolutely 

clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.”) (citing Noll v. 

Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987)). However, if, after careful consideration, it is clear 

that a complaint cannot be cured by amendment, the court may dismiss without leave to amend. 

Cato, 70 F.3d at 1005-06. 

The undersigned finds that, as set forth above, plaintiff lacks standing and that amendment 

would be futile because the notification plaintiff bases his allegations on establishes only 

speculative injury that is neither real nor immediate. Because plaintiff lacks standing to pursue 

his federal claims, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state 

law claims and will dismiss the complaint in its entirety. 

VII. Summary 

The complaint will be dismissed without prejudice because the facts show only that 

plaintiff’s sensitive information might have been stolen, and the letter plaintiff relies on 

establishes that he will not be able to show that his information was actually stolen because it is 

not known what was on the laptop. Plaintiff’s injury is therefore too speculative to support a 

claim. Because plaintiff’s federal claims are being dismissed, the court will decline jurisdiction 

of the state law claims and dismiss them. 

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In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this action is dismissed 

without prejudice. 

DATED: January 3, 2017 

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