Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-17327/USCOURTS-ca9-13-17327-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kevin Chappell
Appellant
Steven Edward Crittenden
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

STEVEN EDWARD

CRITTENDEN,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v.

KEVIN CHAPPELL,

Warden,

Respondent-Appellant.

No. 13-17327

D.C. Nos.

2:97-cv-00602-KJM-GGH

2:95-cv-01957-KJM-GGH

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Kimberly J. Mueller, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

December 16, 2014—Pasadena, California

Filed October 26, 2015

Before: M. Margaret McKeown, Raymond C. Fisher

and Marsha S. Berzon, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Fisher;

Dissent by Judge McKeown

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2 CRITTENDEN V. CHAPPELL

SUMMARY*

Habeas Corpus

The panel affirmed the district court’s judgment granting

California state prisoner Steven Crittenden’s habeas corpus

petition challenging his conviction and death sentence for two

murders in a case in which Crittenden, who is AfricanAmerican, argued that the prosecutor excluded an AfricanAmerican prospective juror on account of her race in

violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment, as interpreted in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.

79 (1986).

The district court found the prosecutor was substantially

motivated by race, and granted the petition, after this court

remanded in light of Cook v. LaMarque, 593 F.3d 810 (9th

Cir. 2010), which clarified that a peremptory challenge

violates the Equal Protection Clause if it is motivated in

substantial part by race regardless of whether the strike would

have issued if race had played no role.

The panel rejected the state’s contention that Teague v.

Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), prohibits the retroactive

application of the standard articulated in Cook. The panel

explained that Cook merely clarified the standard of proof for

Batson claims; it did not set forth a new rule for purposes of

Teague.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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CRITTENDEN V. CHAPPELL 3

The panel reaffirmed that the California Supreme Court’s

decision is not owed deference under AEDPA, because it was

contrary to clearly established federal law, and the

presumption of correctness afforded to the state trial court’s

factual findings is rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. 

The panel held that the district court was not required to

conduct its own evidentiary hearing, because it did not reject

the magistrate judge’s credibility determination. 

The panel held that the district court’s finding that the

prosecutor was substantially motivated by race was not

clearly erroneous.

Judge McKeown dissented. She joined the majority as to

the Teague analysis and as to lack of deference to the

California Supreme Court. She parted ways with the

majority’s ultimate conclusion that the prosecutor’s challenge

to the single black juror was substantially motivated by race.

She would have deferred to the State trial court’s fact-bound

determination at Batson step one. She also would have

applied de novo review to the district court’s determination

at Batson step three because the panel shared the district

court’s task of reviewing a cold record.

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4 CRITTENDEN V. CHAPPELL

COUNSEL

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General of California; Michael

P. Farrell, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Stephanie A.

Mitchell, Deputy Attorney General, Eric Christoffersen

(argued), Supervising DeputyAttorneyGeneral, Sacramento,

California, for Respondent-Appellant.

Mark Goldrosen (argued), Law Office of Mark Goldrosen,

San Francisco, California; Michael L. Spiegel (argued), Law

Office of Michael Spiegel, New York, New York, for

Petitioner-Appellee.

OPINION

FISHER, Circuit Judge:

In 1989, a California jury convicted Steven Crittenden of

two murders and sentenced him to death. Crittenden, who is

African-American, filed a federal habeas petition, arguing the

prosecutor excluded an African-American prospective juror

on account of her race, in violation of the Equal Protection

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as interpreted in

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). The district court

initially denied Crittenden’s petition. The court found,

although race played a significant part in the peremptory

challenge, the prosecutor would have made the challenge

even if race had played no role, because of the prospective

juror’s opposition to the death penalty. We remanded in light

of Cook v. LaMarque, 593 F.3d 810 (9th Cir. 2010), which

clarified that a peremptory challenge violates the Equal

Protection Clause if it is “motivated in substantial part” by

race, id. at 815, “regardless of whether the strike would have

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CRITTENDEN V. CHAPPELL 5

issued if race had played no role.” Crittenden v. Ayers,

624 F.3d 943, 958–59 (9th Cir. 2010) (Crittenden I)

(emphasis added).1 On remand, the district court found the

prosecutor was substantially motivated by race, and granted

Crittenden’s petition.

The state presents several challenges on appeal: (1) under

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), the district court was

prohibited from retroactively applying the standard

articulated in Cook; (2) the district court failed to apply

deference to decisions by the California Supreme Court and

the state trial court, as required under the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA); (3) the

district court improperly rejected the magistrate judge’s

credibility determination without conducting its own

evidentiary hearing; and (4) the district court clearly erred by

finding the prosecutor was substantially motivated by race.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we

affirm. First, Cook merely clarified the standard of proof for

Batson claims; it did not set forth a new rule for purposes of

Teague. Second, as we held in Crittenden I, the California

Supreme Court’s decision is not owed deference under

AEDPA, because it was contrary to clearly established

federal law, and the presumption of correctness afforded to

the state trial court’s factual findings is rebutted by clear and

convincing evidence. Third, the district court was not

required to conduct its own evidentiary hearing, because it

1 We noted in Crittenden I that “the Supreme Court and this court have

used the words‘significant’ and ‘substantial’interchangeablyin analogous

contexts,” but we did not assume the district court’s finding of

“significant” bias necessarily was sufficient under Cook. 624 F.3d at 959

n.6.

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6 CRITTENDEN V. CHAPPELL

did not reject the magistrate judge’s credibilitydetermination. 

Finally, the district court’s finding that the prosecutor was

substantially motivated by race was not clearly erroneous.

The Supreme Court has eloquently explained a jury

selected without regard to race is a critical constitutional

right:

The jury acts as a vital check against the

wrongful exercise of power by the State and

its prosecutors. The intrusion of racial

discrimination into the jury selection process

damages both the fact and the perception of

this guarantee. Jury selection is the primary

means by which a court may enforce a

defendant’s right to be tried by a jury free

from ethnic, racial, or political prejudice, or

predisposition about the defendant’s

culpability. Active discrimination by a

prosecutor during this process condones

violations of the United States Constitution

within the very institution entrusted with its

enforcement, and so invites cynicism

respecting the jury’s neutrality and its

obligation to adhere to the law.

Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411–12 (1991) (citations and

internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, it is well

established that a Batson violation is structural error. See

Williams v. Woodford, 396 F.3d 1059, 1069 (9th Cir. 2005).

Given the district court’s careful analysis of the record

and its consequent findings, Crittenden is entitled under

Batson to a new trial before a properly selected jury. The

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CRITTENDEN V. CHAPPELL 7

district court’s judgment granting Crittenden’s habeas

petition is affirmed.

BACKGROUND

Jury selection in the state trial court took place between

November 1988 and February 1989.2

Initially, a pool of over

60 prospective jurors completed questionnaires asking them

about their backgrounds and beliefs. Question 56 asked about

their feelings regarding the death penalty. Manzanita Casey

was the only African-American prospective juror. In answer

to question 56, she wrote, “I don’t like to see anyone put to

death.” She also wrote that she could set aside her personal

feelings regarding what the law should be and follow the law

as the court explained it.

After filling out the questionnaires, the prospective jurors

appeared one-by-one for voir dire. During her voir dire,

Casey reiterated her opposition to the death penalty. She also

said, however, that her opposition would not prohibit her

from voting for a first-degree murder conviction or the death

penalty. At the conclusion of Casey’s voir dire, the

prosecutor challenged her for cause, “based upon her answer

that she doesn’t believe in the death penalty.” The court

denied the for-cause challenge.

After each prospective juror completed voir dire and

passed for-cause challenges, the prosecutor wrote a rating on

his copy of that juror’s questionnaire. He gave favorable

jurors one to four “Ts,” four being the most favorable, and

gave unfavorable jurors one to four “X”s, four being the most

2 A detailed account of the crime and the evidence underlying the

conviction and sentence is set out inCrittenden I. See 624 F.3d at 948–49.

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unfavorable. The prosecutor rated Casey XXXX, the most

unfavorable rating possible, and a rating he gave to only one

other prospective juror of the over 50 who went through voir

dire. The prosecutor later testified that, although he did not

remember the basis for individual ratings, his general practice

was to rate prospective jurors primarily based on their

position regarding the death penalty – “Xs were . . . I would

say, to a person, you were opposed to the death penalty and

strongly stated it. . . . Checkmarks were people who either

were for the death penalty or medium ground that I thought

to some degree I would be able to tolerate having on the

jury.” He testified he also considered “people’s backgrounds,

whether they’re employed, homeowners, what they had to

lose. I wanted people who had something to lose in society,

who might be victims of crime, solid citizens, preferablywell

educated.”

A pool of over 40 prospective jurors who had gone

through voir dire – including Casey – returned in February

1989 for the exercise of peremptory challenges. The court

seated an initial group of 12 jurors. The prosecution and

defense were allowed 26 peremptory challenges each. When

a prospective juror was challenged, the court would seat

another prospective juror who had gone through voir dire. 

The prosecutor based his challenges primarily on his ratings. 

He challenged all jurors who received one or more Xs.

Casey was seated after the prosecution’s 13th challenge. 

The prosecutor used his 14th challenge against a juror who

had received one T. He then used his 15th challenge against

Casey. At the time Casey was challenged, only one other

seated juror had received an unfavorable rating (i.e., one or

more Xs). After Casey was challenged, Crittenden

immediately moved for a mistrial under People v. Wheeler,

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CRITTENDEN V. CHAPPELL 9

583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978), arguing the peremptory challenge

was motivated by race. Wheeler is the California procedural

equivalent of Batson, and serves as an implicit Batson

objection for purposes of preserving a Batson claim. See

Crittenden I, 624 F.3d at 951 n.2. A Batson/Wheeler claim

has three steps: “first, ‘the defendant must make a prima facie

showing that a challenge was based on race;’ second, the

prosecution must offer a race-neutral basis for the challenge;

and third, the court must determine whether the defendant has

shown ‘purposeful discrimination.’” Cook, 593 F.3d at 814

(quoting Ali v. Hickman, 584 F.3d 1174, 1180 (9th Cir.

2009)).

In moving for a mistrial, Crittenden argued he had made

a prima facie showing because: (1) Casey was the only

African-American prospective juror; (2) she was a “solid

member of the . . . community in terms of age, family

composition, employment, length of residence, and so forth”;

(3) the prosecutor examined her “at greater length[] than

he’[d] examined other jurors”; and (4) in a different capital

case a year earlier, the same prosecutor struck the only

African-American prospective juror because he “was the

President [of] the Student Law Union of Minorities,” which

indicated to the prosecutor that the individual was “active in

law problems involving minorities” and had “sympathy for

minorities.”

The trial court denied the motion, finding Crittenden had

not made a prima facie showing that the challenge was based

on race. The trial court said it “would have expected a

peremptory challenge” against Casey because she had

expressed opposition to the death penalty and “couldn’t

decide whether or not she would be able to follow the law.”

Because the trial court denied the motion at step one of the

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10 CRITTENDEN V. CHAPPELL

Batson/Wheeler test, it did not request an explanation for the

challenge from the prosecution at step two. Ultimately 12

jurors were selected, each of whom had received one or more

Ts.

The California Supreme Court affirmed Crittenden’s

subsequent conviction and sentence on direct review in 1994. 

See People v. Crittenden, 885 P.2d 887 (Cal. 1994). It

affirmed the trial court’s finding that Crittenden had failed to

make a prima facie showing, holding:

Casey’s apparent opposition to, uncertainty

about, and repeatedly contradictory responses

pertaining to the death penalty, her indication

she might be unable to apply the law in that

regard, her apparent general apprehension at

serving on a jury for the first time, as well as

her concern over her transportation to the

court for trial, indicate there were legitimate,

race-neutral grounds upon which the

prosecutor reasonably might have challenged

her.

Id. at 904.

Between 1994 and 2000, Crittenden filed multiple state

and federal habeas petitions. The California Supreme Court

dismissed his state habeas petitions in 1994 and 1999. The

federal habeas petition was referred to a magistrate judge,

who conducted an evidentiary hearing in 2002. At the

hearing, the state produced through discovery new evidence

not considered by the state courts – specifically, the

prosecutor’s rating of each potential juror after the voir dire. 

The prosecutor also described his general practice of rating

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CRITTENDEN V. CHAPPELL 11

jurors, and testified that generally he “would try to get people

who were threes and fours with checkmarks, to sit on the

jury.” He testified the jury selection “took place over a long

period of time,” and the ratings reflected his “gut feeling at

the time that I spoke with jurors and was present when they

were examined. And it was at that time that I made a

decision.”

In 2005, the district court denied Crittenden’s federal

habeas petition. The district court disagreed with the state

trial court and the California Supreme Court, finding that,

although their step one finding was presumed correct,

Crittenden had rebutted the presumption and made a prima

facie showing that the challenge was based on race. The

district court based that finding on several facts, including:

(1) a comparative juror analysis; (2) the prosecutor used

“charged” terms when questioning Casey; (3) Casey was the

only prospective juror the prosecutor challenged for cause

based on general objections to the death penalty, and it was

well established that such objections did not warrant a forcause challenge; and (4) the prosecutor challenged the sole

African-American prospective juror in the previous capital

case. The court, therefore, proceeded to step two of the

Batson inquiry and found the state met its burden to proffer

a race-neutral justification for the challenge – Casey’s

opposition to the death penalty.

3 The court then proceeded to

step three, and found Crittenden had not proven purposeful

discrimination. Although the court found that “race played a

3 Because the prosecutor could not remember why he challenged Casey,

the state reconstructed from the record “what the prosecutor would have

said had he been asked his reason for exercising the peremptory

challenge,” relying on Johnson v. Love, 40 F.3d 658, 667 (3d Cir. 1994),

and United States v. Nicholson, 885 F.2d 481, 482–83 (8th Cir. 1989).

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significant part” in the peremptory challenge, and raceneutral factors could not “justify Casey’s XXXX rating,

especially when compared to other venire members,” the

court concluded the prosecutor “would have made the

challenge in the absence of the improper motivation” because

of Casey’s opposition to the death penalty. Crittenden

appealed.

On appeal, we held the California Supreme Court’s

decision with respect to Crittenden’s Batson claim was not

entitled to deference under AEDPA because, contrary to

clearly established federal law, at step one it “required

Crittenden to show a ‘strong likelihood’ that the prosecutor’s

challenge had been racially motivated.” Crittenden I,

624 F.3d at 954. We affirmed the district court’s

determinations at Batson step one and step two that

Crittenden had made a prima facie showing and the state had

articulated a race-neutral justification for the challenge. See

id. at 956–58.

At Batson step three, we declined to determine whether

Crittenden had proven the challenge was based on race,

because the district court had decided the question prior to

Cook, which clarified that “the proper analysis . . . is whether

the peremptory strike was ‘motivated in substantial part’ by

race . . . regardless of whether the strike would have issued if

race had played no role.” Id. at 958 (quoting Cook, 593 F.3d

at 815). Because the district court “was operating under the

erroneous impression” that it could apply so-called “mixedmotives” analysis, such that the presence of a race-neutral,

but-for cause for the challenge would defeat a Batson claim,

we remanded “to give the court an opportunity to apply the

proper standard, as articulated in Cook.” Id. at 958–59.

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CRITTENDEN V. CHAPPELL 13

On remand, the case again was referred to the magistrate

judge, who issued new factual findings in light of both the

district court’s previous factual determinations in Crittenden

I and other undisputed facts in the record. The magistrate

judge recommended the Batson claim be denied because “the

bias shown by the prosecutor . . . although significant, was

not substantial in terms of the prosecutor’s motivation.” 

Reviewing those findings de novo, the district court disagreed

with the magistrate judge’s ultimate recommendation and

instead found the prosecutor was substantially motivated by

race for four reasons. First, the prosecutor rated Casey far

more negatively than comparable white jurors. Second,

Casey was the only prospective juror the prosecutor

challenged for cause based on a general objection to the death

penalty, and it was well established that such objections did

not warrant a for-cause challenge. Third, the prosecutor

asked Casey a provocative question regarding the death

penalty, and twice used the charged term “gas chamber,”

whereas “no other juror was questioned in this manner with

use of the same charged term.” Fourth, “even if it is not

given great weight, [the prosecutor’s] strike of another black

juror in a prior trial suggests that he took account of race in

assessing how a juror would vote.” The court granted

Crittenden’s petition. The state appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo a district court’s grant of habeas

corpus relief. See Gallego v. McDaniel, 124 F.3d 1065, 1069

(9th Cir. 1997). A district court’s factual findings in granting

a habeas petition are reviewed for clear error. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 52(a)(6); Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 964 (9th

Cir. 2004). At Batson’s first step, whether the defendant has

made a prima facie showing is a mixed question of law and

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14 CRITTENDEN V. CHAPPELL

fact accorded a presumption of correctness in the habeas

context. See Tolbert v. Page, 182 F.3d 677, 681 n.6, 685 (9th

Cir. 1999) (en banc) (applying 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). At

Batson’s third step, it is “settled in this circuit” that

“[w]hether the defendant has satisfied the ultimate burden of

proving purposeful discrimination is, of course, a question of

fact reviewed for clear error.” Id. at 680 n.5.

Notwithstanding this authority, the dissent argues we

should review de novo the district court’s factual finding at

Batson step three because the district court relied solely on a

cold record, rather than testimony before the district judge. 

That argument is squarely foreclosed by Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 52(a)(6), which says, “[f]indings of fact, whether

based on oral or other evidence, must not be set aside unless

clearly erroneous.” (emphasis added). “[I]t is impossible to

trace the [dissent’s] theory[] . . . back to the text of Rule

52(a),” which applies “even when the district court’s findings

do not rest on credibility determinations, but are based

instead on physical or documentary evidence or inferences

from other facts.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C.,

470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985). The rationale for deference “is not

limited to the superiority of the trial judge’s position to make

determinations of credibility,” but also reflects that

“[d]uplication of the trial judge’s efforts . . . would very

likely contribute only negligibly to the accuracy of fact

determination at a huge cost in diversion of judicial

resources.” Id. at 574–75; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6)

advisory committee’s notes (1985 amendment) (explaining

that permitting de novo review of findings based on

documentary evidence would “tend to undermine the

legitimacy of the district courts in the eyes of litigants,

multiply appeals by encouraging appellate retrial of some

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CRITTENDEN V. CHAPPELL 15

factual issues, and needlessly reallocate judicial authority”).4

Accordingly, we properly review for clear error the district

court’s finding of purposeful discrimination at Batson step

three.

DISCUSSION

I. Teague does not prohibit the retroactive application of

the standard for Batson claims articulated in Cook

The state argues Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989),

prohibits the retroactive application of the standard for

Batson claims articulated in Cook. “Teague held that federal

habeas corpus petitioners cannot rely on new constitutional

rules of criminal procedure that took effect after their

convictions became final.” Boyd v. Newland, 467 F.3d 1139,

1145 (9th Cir. 2004), as amended on denial of reh’g (Oct. 26,

4 The dissent contends Rule 52(a)(6) does not apply here because the

district court made few true factual findings. That is belied by the district

court’s 11-page review of the magistrate judge’s factual findings on

remand and de novo review of the record. Those findings, which

underpinned the district court’s ultimate factual conclusion at Batson step

three, are hardly insignificant. In any event, we are bound by Rule

52(a)(6). As Anderson makes clear, “Rule 52(a) ‘does not make

exceptions or purport to exclude certain categories offactual findings from

the obligation . . . to accept a district court’s findings unless clearly

erroneous.’” 470 U.S. at 574 (quoting Pullman-Standard v. Swint,

456 U.S. 273, 287 (1982)). The dissent’s sole authority, Holder v.

Welborn, 60 F.3d 383, 388 (7th Cir. 1995), cites no authority and does not

even mention Rule 52(a)(6) or Anderson. It is therefore neither binding

on us nor persuasive. See Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573 (“In applying the

clearly erroneous standard to the findings of a district court sitting without

a jury, appellate courts must constantly have in mind that their function is

not to decide factual issues de novo.” (quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v.

Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969))).

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2006). It is undisputed that Crittenden’s conviction became

final several years before Cook, and that the relief requested

does not “fall[] within one of two exceptions to

nonretroactivity on habeas review.” Leavitt v. Arave,

383 F.3d 809, 816 (9th Cir. 2004). The question, then, is

whether Cook announced a new rule for purposes of Teague. 

We hold it did not.

“In general . . . a case announces a new rule when it

breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States

or the Federal Government.” Teague, 489 U.S. at 301. “To

put it differently, a case announces a new rule if the result

was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the

defendant’s conviction became final.” Id.

Here, our holding that Cook did not announce a new rule

follows from Boyd, which rejected a Teague challenge under

analogous circumstances. Boyd held the Supreme Court’s

decision in Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 (2005), did

not establish a new rule for purposes of Teague. See 467 F.3d

at 1146. Like Cook, Johnson clarified the standard for Batson

claims. Johnson rejected the California Supreme Court’s

holding that, to establish a prima facie case of discrimination

at step one, a defendant must show it is more likely than not

that a challenge was based on race. See 545 U.S. at 168. 

Instead, Johnson held, “a defendant satisfies the requirements

of Batson’s first step by producing evidence sufficient to

permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination

has occurred.” Id. at 170.

Boyd held Johnson “merely clarif[ied],” or “explain[ed]”

Batson. 467 F.3d at 1146. The same is true of Cook. 

Whereas Johnson clarified the standard at Batson step one,

Cook clarified the standard at Batson step three. Further,

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CRITTENDEN V. CHAPPELL 17

Boyd recognized Johnson was “an example of the Supreme

Court’s consistent interpretation of Batson to date.” Id. Like

Johnson, Cook’s clarification of Batson’s standard is

consistent with existing precedent, as neither the Supreme

Court nor this circuit had previously adopted mixed motives

analysis. See Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 485 (2008);

Kesser v. Cambra, 465 F.3d 351, 358 (9th Cir. 2006) (en

banc). Thus, like Johnson, Cook neither “breaks new ground

[n]or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal

Government.” Teague, 489 U.S. at 301.

This conclusion also is consistent with Tanner v.

McDaniel, 493 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2007). Tanner held the

Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S.

470 (2000), did not establish a new rule for purposes of

Teague. See 493 F.3d at 1142–44. Flores-Ortega held, in

relevant part, that “counsel has a constitutionally imposed

duty to consult with the defendant about an appeal when there

is reason to think either (1) that a rational defendant would

want to appeal (for example, because there are nonfrivolous

grounds for appeal), or (2) that this particular defendant

reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in

appealing.” Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 480. Flores-Ortega

held breach of this duty constituted ineffective assistance of

counsel under the Sixth Amendment.

Tanner concluded this holding in Flores-Ortega was not

a new rule, but merely an “application of” the “circumstancespecific reasonableness inquiry” dictated by Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Tanner, 493 F.3d at 1143. 

Tanner observed that “the general nature of the Strickland

standard requires courts to elaborate upon what an ‘objective

standard of reasonableness’ means for attorney performance

in innumerable factual contexts,” and “[e]ach time that a

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court delineates what ‘reasonably effective assistance’

requires of defense attorneys with respect to a particular

aspect of client representation, it can hardly be thought to

have created a new principle of constitutional law.” Id at

1143–44. (citations omitted). Similarly here, the general

nature of the Batson standard requires courts to elaborate

upon what constitutes “purposeful discrimination,” and

Cook’s explanation that “purposeful discrimination” may

exist even when there is also a race-neutral, but-for cause of

a prosecutor’s decision to challenge a juror did not create a

new principle of constitutional law. See Wright v. West,

505 U.S. 277, 309 (1992) (Kennedy, J. concurring) (“Where

the beginning point is a rule of this general application, a rule

designed for the specific purpose of evaluating a myriad of

factual contexts, it will be the infrequent case that yields a

result so novel that it forges a new rule, one not dictated by

precedent.”). Therefore, we hold Teague did not prohibit the

district court from applying the standard articulated in Cook.

II. The district court was not required to apply AEDPA

deference to the California Supreme Court’s decision

or the state trial court’s findings

A. The California Supreme Court’s decision was not

entitled to AEDPA deference because it was contrary

to clearly established law

The state next argues the district court failed to afford the

necessarydeference under AEDPA to the California Supreme

Court’s decision rejectingCrittenden’s Batson claim on direct

review. In Crittenden I, we held the California Supreme

Court’s decision was not entitled to AEDPA deference

because, contrary to clearly established federal law, “it

required Crittenden to show a ‘strong likelihood’ that the

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prosecutor’s challenge had been racially motivated” in order

to establish a prima facie case. Crittenden I, 624 F.3d at 954. 

That holding is the law of the case. See Hanna Boys Ctr. v.

Miller, 853 F.2d 682, 686 (9th Cir. 1988). We have

discretion to reconsider our prior decision when “intervening

controlling authority makes reconsideration appropriate” or

“the decision is clearly erroneous and its enforcement would

work a manifest injustice.” Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484,

1489 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (footnote omitted), overruled

on other grounds by Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383 (9th

Cir. 2012) (en banc). Neither circumstance exists here.

The state contends two cases decided after Crittenden I –

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011), and Johnson v.

Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088 (2013) – establish a presumption

that the California Supreme Court applied the correct federal

standard. Neither case stands for that proposition. Richter

held, “when a state court issues an order that summarily

rejects without discussion all the claims raised by a

defendant, including a federal claim that the defendant

subsequently presses in a federal habeas proceeding, the

federal habeas court must presume (subject to rebuttal) that

the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits.” Williams,

133 S. Ct. at 1091 (discussing Richter). Williams extended

that presumption to cases in which a state court addresses

“some issues but does not expressly address the federal claim

in question.” Id. Neither Richter nor Williams addressed

whether, when a state court does address a federal claim on

the merits, it should be presumed to have applied the correct

federal legal standard. Thus, neither provides a basis to

reconsider our prior holding.

In any event, any such presumption would not aid the

state here. At the time it decided this case, the California

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Supreme Court had erroneously concluded the “terms ‘strong

likelihood’ and ‘reasonable inference’ state the same

standard.” Johnson, 545 U.S. at 166. As we held in

Crittenden I, the California Supreme Court relied on that

erroneous conclusion when deciding Crittenden’s appeal,

conflating the two standards in its decision. See 624 F.3d at

952 (citing People v. Crittenden, 885 P.2d at 902).

The state also contends our holding is inconsistent with

our earlier decision in Boyd. We disagree. In Boyd, although

the state court first applied the “strong likelihood” standard

for a prima facie case of discrimination recognized by the

California Supreme Court, the state court “also held that

Petitioner ‘clearly did not establish a prima facie case of

group discrimination, even under federal precedent.’”

467 F.3d at 1144 (emphasis added). Because the state court

“recognized the difference between the two standards,” and

held the petitioner had “failed to establish a prima facie case

under either state or federal law,” Boyd held the court’s

“determination deserves deference.” Id.

Here, in contrast, the California Supreme Court did not

separately address the federal standard. It cited and discussed

only the erroneous “strong likelihood” standard, and

incorporated its discussion of the facts under that standard as

the basis for its denial of the Batson claim. See People v.

Crittenden, 885 P.2d at 902–06. As a result, the California

Supreme Court’s decision was contrary to clearly established

federal law, and the district court properly considered the

Batson claim “without the deference AEDPA otherwise

requires.” Crittenden I, 624 F.3d at 954 (quoting Panetti v.

Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953 (2007)).

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B. The state trial court’s factual findings were rebutted

by clear and convincing evidence

We also reject the state’s contention that Crittenden I

failed to afford a presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(e)(1) to the state trial court’s finding that Crittenden

did not establish a prima facie violation at Batson step one. 

We said in Crittenden I that “[w]e presume the state court’s

factual findings to be correct, a presumption the petitioner has

the burden of rebutting by clear and convincing evidence.” 

624 F.3d at 950. The district court found, and Crittenden I

affirmed, that Crittenden rebutted that presumption as to the

Batson step one finding. His clear and convincing evidence

included that the crime was racial in nature, Casey was the

only African-American juror in the venire and the only juror

subject to a meritless for-cause challenge, and there was a

disparity between the prosecutor’s rating of Casey and his

ratings of comparable white jurors. That ratings disparity,

discussed in further detail below, is new evidence not

presented to the state trial court.

We disagree with the dissent that Cullen v. Pinholster,

131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011), precludes Crittenden I’s

consideration of that new ratings evidence to rebut the trial

court’s factual finding at Batson step one. Pinholster

precludes the consideration of new evidence only for the

purpose of determining whether the last reasoned state court

decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of

clearly established law or an unreasonable determination of

the facts under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See Pinholster, 131 S.

Ct. at 1398 (“We now hold that review under § 2254(d)(1) is

limited to the record that was before the state court . . . .”). 

We have since clarified – after Pinholster and the cases cited

in the dissent – “If we determine, considering only the

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evidence before the state court,” the petitioner has satisfied

§ 2254(d), “we evaluate the claim de novo, and we may

consider evidence properly presented for the first time in

federal court.” Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 768, 778 (9th Cir.

2014) (citing Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1401); see also

Johnson v. Finn, 665 F.3d 1063, 1069 n.1 (9th Cir. 2011)

(holding Pinholster did not preclude the district court from

conducting an evidentiary hearing after concluding the state

court of appeal’s decision was contrary to clearly established

law under § 2254(d)(1)).5

In reviewing the merits of a habeas petitioner’s claim

after § 2254(d) is satisfied, we still defer to a state court’s

factual findings under § 2254(e) in two ways. First, those

findings are presumed to be correct, a presumption that can

be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence. See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Second, with limited exceptions,

new evidence cannot be considered if “the applicant has

failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court

proceedings,” id. § 2254(e)(2) – which is not the case here. 

The dissent would introduce a third layer of deference,

confining review of a state trial court’s factual findings under

5 This case law is consistent with authority in the Fifth and Sixth

Circuits. See Harris v. Haeberlin, 752 F.3d 1054, 1057 (6th Cir. 2014)

(“Pinholster is inapplicable to this case because it precludes consideration

of evidence introduced in federal court only when determining whether a

state [appellate] court’s adjudication of a claim involved an unreasonable

federal-law error. Here, by contrast, the evidence introduced in federal

court was not considered for the purpose of ascertaining whether the state

[appellate] court had unreasonablyapplied clearly-established federal law,

because we had already concluded that the state court had done so.”

(citation omitted)); Smith v. Cain, 708 F.3d 628, 635 (5th Cir. 2013)

(“Because the district court appropriately and correctly concluded that the

state court had unreasonably applied Batson under section 2254(d)(1)

based solely on the state court record, Pinholster is inapplicable.”).

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§ 2254(e)(1) to the record before the state trial court. But

nothing in Pinholster or Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984 (9th

Cir. 2014), requires limiting the record on review once a

federal court has found unreasonable the last reasoned state

court decision – here, that of the California Supreme Court. 

The state does not argue otherwise.

Here, Crittenden I held the California Supreme Court’s

decision was contrary to clearly established law under

§ 2254(d)(1) because it applied an improper legal standard at

Batson step one. Havingmade that determination, Crittenden

I properly turned to the merits of Crittenden’s Batson claim,

while affording a presumption of correctness to the state trial

court’s factual findings under § 2254(e). Thus, contrary to

the argument advanced by our dissenting colleague,

Crittenden I properly considered new evidence in rejecting

the state trial court’s Batson step one finding under § 2254(e).

III. The district court was not required to conduct its

own evidentiary hearing

The state next argues the district court erred by rejecting

the magistrate judge’s recommendation without conducting

its own evidentiary hearing, in violation of Johnson, 665 F.3d

at 1063. Johnson held, in the Batson context, “a district court

may not . . . reject a magistrate judge’s proposed credibility

determination without hearing and seeing the testimonyof the

relevant witnesses.” Id. at 1074. This case is distinguishable

because the magistrate judge did not make – and hence the

district court did not reject – any credibility determination

related to the prosecutor’s explanation for striking Casey,

because the prosecutor offered none.

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At the evidentiary hearing, which took place over a

decade after the trial, the prosecutor could not articulate a

race-neutral explanation for his peremptory challenge. 

Instead the state reconstructed a race-neutral justification

based on the evidence in the record. As the district court

stated, “the prosecutor’s credibility as to his articulated raceneutral reason was never at issue in this case.” Thus, the

district court did not reject any credibility determination by

the magistrate judge, but instead, based on the court’s

independent review of the record, drew different inferences

and reached different conclusions than the magistrate judge. 

The court was not required to conduct a new evidentiary

hearing.

IV. The district court’s finding that the challenge was

substantially motivated by race was not clearly

erroneous

Turning to the merits of Crittenden’s Batson claim, we

hold the district court’s finding that the prosecutor’s

challenge of Casey was substantially motivated by race was

not clearly erroneous. A finding is clearly erroneous if it is

“(1) ‘illogical,’ (2) ‘implausible,’ or (3) without ‘support in

inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record.’” 

Unites States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1262 (9th Cir. 2009)

(en banc) (quoting Anderson, 470 U.S. at 577). The court’s

finding of purposeful discrimination is supported by the facts

in the record. First and foremost, the court found the XXXX

rating of Casey was evidence of racial bias. A comparative

juror analysis shows the XXXX rating on which the

prosecutor based his challenge cannot be explained by

Casey’s death penalty views or other race-neutral factors. 

The prosecutor’s meritless for-cause challenge provides

additional support for the district court’s finding that he was

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substantially motivated by race. Further, because we

conclude the district court found only purposeful

discrimination, we reject the dissent’s contention the court

found or relied on unconscious bias.

A. Comparative Juror Analysis

“Comparative juror analysis is an established tool at step

three of the Batson analysis for determining whether facially

race-neutral reasons are a pretext for discrimination.” 

Crittenden I, 624 F.3d at 956 (citing Miller-El v. Dretke,

545 U.S. 231, 241 (2005)). The prosecutor’s ratings of

prospective jurors provide a useful basis for a comparative

juror analysis because he closely adhered to the ratings when

issuing challenges. Indeed, he testified that, when he

assigned the ratings after each voir dire, “it was at that time

that I made a decision.”

1. Comparison with Juror Smith

The district court found a comparison of Casey and

another juror, Lois Smith, weighed in favor of finding racial

bias. Smith was the only other prospective juror rated

XXXX. The court found Smith was a far worse juror for the

prosecution than Casey. It stated Smith’s “distinctly strong

and unshakable death penalty views and experiences with the

justice system made her the antithesis of a prosecution juror.” 

The court observed it was “puzzling why Casey received the

same rating as Smith, when no similarly glaring evidence for

prosecutorial disfavor of Casey exists.”

The court’s findings from the comparative analysis of

Casey and Smith were not clearly erroneous. Smith also

recounted what she described as a “horrendous” experience

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with law enforcement in which her husband was wrongly

implicated in a crime by an eyewitness who had identified

him notwithstanding that he is white and the suspect was

African-American. She said she “would be extra cautious”

because of that experience. The district court reasoned this

experience would have been of particular concern to the

prosecution because “a key element of [the] evidence against

[Crittenden] at trial was that eye witnesses had seen a black

man matching [Crittenden’s] description near the victims’

home when the murders occurred.”

Casey, in contrast, presented no similar negative

experiences with law enforcement. And, as the court

correctly noted, aside from her death penalty views, Casey

was a “model prosecution juror according to [the

prosecutor’s] own criteria.” The prosecutor testified he

looked for jurors who were “employed, homeowners . . .

people who had something to lose in society, who might be

victims of crime, solid citizens, preferably fairly well

educated.” Casey had been married for 42 years, had two

adult children, went to church on Sundays, had lived in the

same home for 17 years, and said she was concerned about

drugs and street gangs.

Although Caseyopposed the death penalty, she repeatedly

affirmed that her opposition would not prohibit her from

following the court’s instructions, applying the proper

standard of proof or voting to impose the death penalty. The

trial judge asked “whether your feelings concerning the death

penalty would influence your vote to the extent . . . that you

would not vote for a first degree murder conviction,” and she

answered, “No.” The judge then asked whether her death

penalty views would cause her to refuse to vote for special

circumstances that would implicate the death penalty, and she

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answered, “No.” The judge then asked whether her death

penalty views would cause her to “automatically and in every

case vote against the imposition of the death penalty,” and

she answered, “No.”

When questioned by defense counsel, Casey again said

she could conceive of a situation in which the death penalty

might be appropriate, she would be willing and able to vote

for the death penalty if a crime were “awful bad” and she had

no “qualms” about applying the court’s instructions regarding

the proper standard of proof. The prosecutor then began his

examination by asking Casey, “Now, I gather[] . . . that you

do not believe in the death penalty?” Casey answered:

I really don’t. But if it is bad, . . . really bad

and I felt that, you know – I hate death. I

don’t know how to express myself, really. 

But I really hate to see anybody be put to

death. And I hate to see someone take a life. 

I don’t care whose it is. So – it is – it is hard

for me to express it. But I could, if proven to

me, to, no doubt, that it was a crime, then I

don’t think I would hesitate.

Upon further questioning, Casey expressed some hesitation,

saying, “if it is proven to me, truly proven to me, and I feel

deep down inside that he did it, I could. I think I could. . . . 

I have to say I think I could. This is all new to me. So I am

very upset with it.” She also said she thought her feelings

about the death penalty would make it difficult for her to

make a decision regarding the death penalty, and she did not

know whether it would substantially impair her ability to

fairly evaluate the evidence. She then reaffirmed, though,

that her feelings about the death penalty would not cause her

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to “lean[] toward life instead of death,” and that she could

vote for the death penalty if she “heard facts and

circumstances which warranted it.”

Although Casey and Smith both expressed opposition to

and reservations about imposing the death penalty, the voir

dire transcripts support the court’s conclusion that Smith was

the worse juror for the prosecution. Smith arguably

expressed stronger opposition to the death penalty than did

Casey – she said she found the prospect of serving on a jury

in a death penalty case “horrifying” – and recounted a

“horrendous” experience with law enforcement caused by

mistaken eyewitness identification. The court did not clearly

err by concluding the comparison of Casey and Smith

supports the conclusion that the prosecution’s challenge of

Casey was substantially based on her race.6

2. Comparison with Clark and Krueger

The district court also found a comparison of Casey with

jurors Gisela Clark and Mary Krueger provided “strong

evidence of discriminatory motive.” The court found,

although Clark and Krueger “are demographically similar to

Casey, except they are both white,” and although they

“expressed death penalty views generally unfavorable to the

prosecution,” they were both rated at least TT, and selected

to serve on the jury.

The court’s comparative analysis of Casey and Clark is

supported by the evidence. The prosecutor rated Clark 

6

In reaching this conclusion, the district judge on remand agreed with

the district judge who reviewed the case prior to the first appeal, as well

as the magistrate judge.

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TTT. Aside from race, Clark was demographically

comparable to Casey. She had been married for 34 years

before her husband passed away, lived in the same home for

21 years and identified as Catholic. On her questionnaire,

Clark wrote that she was “against” the death penalty. At voir

dire, she expressed strong opposition to the death penalty and

serious reservations about her ability to vote for it:

My opinion is this. First of all I am Catholic,

and I have been brought up no matter what, I

cannot take somebody’s life, I don’t feel that

I am better than the next person. Or another

reason I think that I am not quite sure which is

the worse thing a person can do. Whether the

worse thing is murder or the worse thing is

defrauding someone of their life savings. And

I always felt – even voting for it, I felt if I am

for it, I should be the one that should execute

it more or less. My feelings. But, I shouldn’t

ask someone else to do it for me. And,

therefore, I feel opposed to it. I just don’t feel

I should take someone’s life.

The trial judge then asked Clark whether, no matter what

the circumstances might be, she would ever vote to sentence

someone to his death, and she answered, “Probably not.” On

further questioning from the judge, she provided a more

equivocal answer: “I have never been in that predicament. I

am not quite sure how I would react. I feel the person should

be punished for their crime. Maybe I could. I am not sure

what would happen.” After a few more questions, the judge

again asked, “would you in every case automatically vote for

life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, and would

you never vote to impose the death penalty,” and she again

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equivocated, stating, “I don’t – I am really not sure.” In

contrast, when the trial judge asked Casey whether she would

automatically, in every case, vote against the imposition of

the death penalty, Casey answered, unequivocally, “No.”

To be sure, in response to questioning from defense

counsel, Clark expressed a greater willingness to vote for the

death penalty than she had earlier. Defense counsel asked, if

“information indicated that not only were the crimes bad, but

there were aggravating matters about this defendant that were

also brought to your attention – if those matters that you

heard indicated to you that death was the appropriate verdict,

would you be able to vote for such a verdict?” Clark

answered, “Yes.” Later, though, Clark again equivocated. 

The prosecutor asked, “Are you telling us now that your

feelings about the death penalty are not so strong and that you

could actually fairly and impartially decide on the penalty in

the case?” Clark replied:

Probably. I have, like I said, I have never

been in this kind of predicament, so I am sure

if the law would be, have to be applied, I

would, probably could. But I am not a

hundred percent sure. I would have to see

what happens during the whole trial to be

convinced. I really don’t know. I can’t really

tell you how I feel about it. All my life I felt

I can’t take someone’s life. But that doesn’t

mean – I have never be in this kind of

predicament. I mean in this kind – so I don’t

know. It is possible I could be completely

convinced.

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In sum, Clark and Casey were demographically similar,

apart from race, and both similarly equivocated regarding

their ability to vote for the death penalty. But the prosecutor

rated Clark TTT, and selected her to serve on the jury,

whereas he rated Casey XXXX, attempted to strike her for

cause and then used a peremptory challenge against her. As

we noted in Crittenden I, even if Clark was clearer than

Casey about her ability to vote for a death verdict and to be

decisive, “both expressed hesitancy or uncertainty,” and “the

wide difference between [the prosecutor’s] rating of Ms.

Casey and Ms. Clark is evidence from which an inference of

discrimination could have been drawn.” 624 F.3d at 956 &

n.3. That wide difference in ratings provides strong

additional support for the district court’s finding that the

prosecutor was substantially motivated by race. See

Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 241 (“If a prosecutor’s proffered reason

for striking a black panelist applies just as well to an

otherwise-similar nonblack who is permitted to serve, that is

evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination to be

considered at Batson’s third step.”).

The district court’s comparative analysis of Casey and

Krueger also is supported by the evidence. The prosecutor

rated Krueger TT and 1⁄2 T. On her questionnaire, Krueger

wrote, “no one should receive [the] death penalty.” At voir

dire, the trial judge asked Krueger about her death penalty

views, and she said, “I think I would have to be absolutely

sure that the person were without a doubt guilty of the crime

before I would be able to say a death penalty.” The judge

also asked Krueger whether she would “automatically and in

every case vote for life without the possibility of parole and

never vote for a death penalty,” and Krueger answered, “No. 

I think I would be able to vote for the death penalty.”

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The prosecutor then asked Krueger again about her

“general feeling about the death penalty,” and she answered,

“Well, I feel very strongly that someone, who is in life – in

prison without any parole is – to me is close to death. I mean,

there’s nothing that they can do, but be there. But at the same

time, I – I, myself, would have to have no doubt in my mind,

that the individual was guilty, before I would be able to vote

for the death penalty.”

Thus, like Casey, Krueger expressed opposition to the

death penalty and some hesitation about applying it, but also

said multiple times she could follow the law and vote for the

death penalty in certain circumstances. We held in

Crittenden I the “marked difference” in the ratings of Casey

and Krueger “adds to the evidence from which . . . an

inference [of discrimination] could be drawn . . . given the

demographic similarity and somewhat analogous views on

the death penalty.” 624 F.3d at 956. Although Krueger

arguably expressed less hesitancy than Casey about her

ability to vote for the death penalty, the marked difference in

their ratings provides additional support for the district

court’s finding that race substantiallymotivated the challenge

of Casey. See Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 241.

3. Comparison with Sullivan and Tennies

Finally, the district court found a “comparison of [other]

anti-death penalty jurors reveals that anti-death penalty views

were not X or T determinative.” The court found prospective

juror Suzanne Tennies, who was rated TT, had “repeatedly

expressed strong anti-death penalty views during voir dire,

. . . [the prosecutor] noted on her questionnaire ‘probably

wouldn’t vote for DP.’” Similarly, the court found

prospective juror Frances Sullivan, who was rated TT,

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“stated he would ‘automatically and in every case vote for life

without possibility of parole and never vote for the death

penalty.’” Although neither Tennies nor Sullivan was

selected for the jury, the court found their positive ratings

provided further evidence that the state’s proffered raceneutral reason for Casey’s XXXX rating and challenge – her

opposition to the death penalty – was pretextual.7

The court’s findings with respect to Tennies and Sullivan

are supported by the evidence. Tennies wrote on her

questionnaire, “I’m not for the death penalty.” At voir dire,

the trial judge asked whether Tennies would absolutely and

in every case refuse to vote for the death penalty, and she

answered, “No.” When defense counsel then asked her the

same question, though, Tennies equivocated, saying, “Ireally

feel strongly against the death penalty. But I – on the other

hand, I would have to hear the whole facts of the case. So, it

is kind of a hard question for me to answer.”8 The prosecutor

then asked her what she meant by her statement that she did

not believe in the death penalty, and she explained:

Well, I just kind of feel that – there have been

cases, you know, I have read – not lately, but,

7 The dissent maintains the district court’s comparison to Sullivan and

Tennies was “misplaced” because neither was allowed to serve. We

disagree. The district court properly relied on all of the prosecutor’s

ratings because the ratings all were made before Casey was struck, all

were relied on when the prosecutor exercised his peremptory strikes, and

all indicate – when examined together, in their entirety – the prosecutor’s

initial assignment of ratings was substantially motivated by race.

8 Both Sullivan and Tennies, like Casey, and like Smith, Clark and

Krueger, also later said they could follow the law and, in some

circumstances, vote for the death penalty.

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you know, years and years ago, where they

found the person they put to death was

innocent, so somebody came forth and said

they committed the crime. I can’t remember

exact, you know, things. So I just always felt

that, you know, that would be wrong. You

know, unless you knew a hundred percent that

person was guilty.

Tennies then said she would not have difficulty signing the

jury verdict to impose the death penalty if she thought the

defendant deserved it, and her feelings against the death

penalty would not interfere with her ability to make a

decision as a juror.

Although Tennies said she could vote for the death

penalty, she also expressed clear opposition to and hesitancy

about imposing it. Therefore, Tennies’ TT rating supports

the district court’s finding that “anti-death penaltyviews were

not X or T determinative,” and its resulting inference that the

state’s proffered race-neutral justification – opposition to the

death penalty – for rating Casey XXXX and challenging her,

was pretextual.

With respect to Sullivan, although he wrote on his

questionnaire that he was “for” the death penalty, at voir dire

he said he would automatically and in every case vote for life

without possibility of parole and never vote for the death

penalty. The trial judge asked him to clarify, and he said, “I

have reservations about the death penalty. I can’t see a

person sitting around ten years on death row and then putting

them to death after he had been punished already for ten

years. It don’t make sense to me.” Sullivan went on to say,

however, that he would not have a problem following the law,

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and his reservations would not affect his ability to determine

whether to impose the death penalty. Although Sullivan

expressed less hesitation than Casey, given his stated

concerns about the death penalty, his TT rating also supports

the district court’s finding that “anti-death penaltyviews were

not X or T determinative.”

4. Comparison with other seated jurors when Casey

was challenged

At the time Casey was challenged, only one other seated

juror had received an unfavorable rating. The magistrate

judge found the makeup of the jury at that time was “critical”

because, although Casey should not have been rated XXXX,

she should have been rated with at least one X, given her

opposition to and equivocation regarding the death penalty. 

Had she been rated with one X, the prosecutor likely still

would have challenged her. As a result, the magistrate judge

reasoned, the makeup of the jury at the time Casey was

challenged shows that “she would have been stricken

regardless of her race.”

The district court properly declined to grant this factor

substantial weight. Initially, as the court explained, we

cannot assume, even if “Casey objectively deserve[d] to be in

the X category, [the prosecutor] himself actually was

motivated to put her in that category for nondiscriminatory

reasons.” As discussed above, white prospective jurors

expressed similar views regarding the death penalty yet were

rated with multiple Ts. Therefore, Casey, too, might have

been rated with Ts if race had not been a factor.

More significantly, even assuming there were a raceneutral justification for at least a single X rating of Casey,

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and such a rating would have led to the challenge, that is not

the dispositive question. Under the standard articulated in

Cook, the question is whether race was a substantial

motivating factor. See Cook v. LaMarque, 593 F.3d 810,

814–15 (9th Cir. 2010); Crittenden I, 624 F.3d at 958. 

Independent, race-neutral reasons for the challenge do not

preclude a finding that race also was a substantial motivating

factor. See Kesser v. Cambra, 465 F.3d 351, 359 (9th Cir.

2006) (en banc) (“A court need not find all nonracial reasons

pretextual in order to find racial discrimination”). Here, as

the district court reasoned, the XXXX rating “virtually

assured Casey would be struck at some point.” Because the

prosecutor essentially predetermined at the outset that Casey

would be challenged, the makeup of the jury at the time she

was in fact challenged is entitled to little weight.9

In sum, because jurors comparable in their death penalty

views and otherwise were rated with Ts, and some were

selected for the jury, the comparative juror analysis

significantly weakens the government’s race-neutral

explanation for Casey’s XXXX rating and challenge. That

analysis is strong evidence in support of the district court’s

finding that the challenge of Casey was substantially

motivated by race.10

9 The dissent errs by focusing on the magistrate judge’s supposition that

Casey would have been stricken regardless of her race. That is not now,

and has never been, the Batson standard, as Cook makes clear.

10 We are not persuaded by the state’s argument that “the record reveals

a number of non-discriminatory factors that are more plausible reasonsfor

the [XXXX] rating than racial bias,” including Casey’s concern about

transportation to and from the court, her general indecision and her

reluctance to serve on a jury. As discussed earlier, Clark and Tennies both

expressed indecision about their ability to vote for the death penalty, yet

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B. The for-cause challenge

The district court also found the prosecutor’s for-cause

challenge of Casey based on her general opposition to the

death penaltywas evidence he was substantiallymotivated by

race. In Crittenden I, we held:

the circumstances of the prosecutor’s

for-cause challenge of Ms. Casey also add to

the evidence from which an inference of

improper discrimination could be drawn. The

prosecutor said he challenged her for cause

because she did not believe in the death

penalty; however, it was well established law

at the time that challenges for cause based on

a juror’s general objections to the death

penalty were improper.

624 F.3d at 956–57 (citing Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412,

424 (1985)).

The state contends the for-cause challenge was made in

good faith because Casey’s voir dire responses suggested her

opposition to the death penalty “substantially impaired her

ability to be a juror.” The prosecutor, though, did not make

the for-cause challenge on that ground. Instead, he stated

“[t]he People voice a challenge for cause based upon her

were rated with at least two checkmarks. Further, as the magistrate judge

found, “[a]lthough Casey raised a concern that she would need to make

arrangements to get to the court, after being questioned and reassured by

the judge, her transportation issue appeared resolved.” Finally, Casey’s

statement that serving on a jury was “scary” is not sufficient to account for

the significant difference in juror ratings.

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answer that she doesn’t believe in the death penalty.” Not

only was it clearly established at the time of the trial that

general opposition to the death penalty did not provide a basis

for a for-cause challenge, but also as discussed above, Casey

repeatedly said she would be able to follow the instructions

of the court and vote for the death penalty.

The magistrate judge agreed that “the meritless cause

challenge . . . evidenced an ulterior motive to remove” Casey

from the jury, but gave this evidence little weight because he

found the prosecutor also had challenged prospective juror

Jonell Moreno for cause based on her general objections to

the death penalty. The district court reasonably concluded,

however, that Moreno had voiced more than general

objections to the death penalty. Moreno said she would not

want to be the foreperson of the jury because she would not

want to sign the death verdict. As the district court

concluded, “Moreno’s stronger and more specific objection

to the death penalty materially distinguishes Moreno from

Casey.” The for-cause challenge thus provides some

additional support for the district court’s finding that the

prosecutor’s challenge of Casey was substantially motivated

by race.

Viewed cumulatively, Casey’s XXXX rating, which

essentially predetermined that she would be challenged, the

wide disparity between her rating and the ratings of

comparable white jurors and the meritless for-cause challenge

provide sufficient evidence from which the district court

logically could find the prosecutor’s decision to challenge

Casey was substantially motivated by race. See United States

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v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1262 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).11

The district court did not clearly err.

C. Unconscious Bias

The dissent contends the district court erroneously based

its finding of a Batson violation in part on unconscious bias. 

The district court’s decision refutes that reading. As the court

explained, it undertook “a sensitive inquiry into [the]

circumstantial and direct evidence of intent” and found the

prosecutor engaged in “purposeful discrimination.” Its order

repeatedlyarticulated the court’s holding that the prosecutor’s

strike “was motivated in substantial part by race,” and

affirmatively rejected the proposition that that holding was

“based on the existence of unconscious discrimination.” 

According to the district court, the evidence thus left “no

doubt” that a conscious, “racially discriminatory impetus”

motivated the prosecutor’s strike of Casey.

11 The district court also found the prosecutor’s challenge of an AfricanAmerican prospective juror in a prior capital case provided “some

evidence” of discriminatory motive. In that case, the prosecutor said the

“most important[]” reason for striking the juror was that “he was the

President of the Student Law Union of Minorities . . . which indicates to

me a sympathy for minorities, and in this case, since the Defendant is a

minority, People feel that there would be a bias in that regard.” In

Crittenden I, we held that “[t]he probative value of this information is

weak because it is a single instance and the trial court denied the Batson

objection in that case.” 624 F.3d at 957 n.4. The district court found this

evidence was entitled to “slight weight.” We agree this evidence does not

add significantly to Crittenden’s case. The district court also relied on the

prosecutor’s allegedly disparate mode of questioning Casey, as compared

to other prospective jurors. For the reasons we stated in Crittenden I, we

do not find that factor to “add significantly to [Crittenden’s] prima facie

case.” 624 F.3d at 957 n.4.

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The dissent makes much of the district court’s passing

comment that “[t]he [side-by-side juror] comparisons

demonstrate that . . . [the prosecutor] was motivated,

consciously or unconsciously, in substantial part by race.” 

But all the court meant was, whatever the explanation for the

prosecutor’s racial motive, that motive was a substantial

reason for his use of a peremptory strike. As the court

clarified:

[T]he court cannot, and does not, address why

[the prosecutor] was motivated by race. The

court cannot say whether [he] thought Casey

would be partial to petitioner “because of their

shared race,” Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, or if he

was influenced solely by “conscious or

unconscious racism,” id. at 106. And it need

not. The court’s reference to the potential for

unconscious racism . . . clarif[ied] that the

court in no way sought to impugn [his]

character as it undertook the Batson inquiry

. . . .

In other words, why the prosecutor had a conscious racial

motive to strike Casey in the first place – whether or not

“unconscious racism” partly explained that motive – was

simply irrelevant to the Batson inquiry.

12

12

It was relevant, of course, to the prosecutor’s reputation. The district

court’s reference to “unconscious racism” spared him from being found

a racist. By suggesting the prosecutor may have had more benign racial

motives for the strike, or that his racial motive may have been influenced

by unconscious racism, the court hoped to shield the prosecutor from

possible disrepute. As the court made clear, however, this effort was not

designed to – and did not – detract from the court’s key finding that the

strike was consciously motivated by race.

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We agree. And because we uphold the district court’s

finding of a conscious racial motive, we do not – and need

not – address whether unconscious bias can establish a

Batson violation.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the judgment of the district court.

AFFIRMED.

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

Due process demands that no defendant should face a

biased jury. Nonetheless, the mental gymnastics demanded

by a retrospective jury analysis taking place decades after the

trial suggest that Justice Marshall was prescient in his

concurrence in Batson: “The decision today will not end the

racial discrimination that peremptories inject into the juryselection process. That goal can be accomplished only by

eliminating peremptory challenges entirely.” Batson v.

Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102–03 (1986) (Marshall J.,

concurring).

I part ways with the majority’s ultimate conclusion that

Crittenden has proven that the prosecutor’s challenge to the

single black juror was substantially motivated by race in

violation of Batson. 476 U.S. 79. I join the majority as to

Part I (the Teague analysis) and Part II.A (the lack of AEDPA

deference to the California Supreme Court’s Wheeler

analysis). Otherwise, I respectfully dissent.

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Let me turn now to what happened in this case in 1989. 

In observing voir dire, the trial judge characterized potential

juror Manzanita Casey as “indecisive” and noted that she

“couldn’t decide whether or not she would be able to follow

the law.” He presciently observed that a “Wheeler motion

would be inappropriate.” Striking a juror who is a death

penalty “wobbler” is hardly a basis to impute purposeful

discrimination to the prosecutor. In light of the evidence

presented in state court, and the heavy deference we owe to

the trial judge’s firsthand observations, we should not disturb

the trial court’s fact-bound determination that Crittenden did

not make out a prima facie case of discrimination under

Batson.

Crittenden’s case does not improve under step three of the

Batson analysis. At this stage, our review is de novo because

the California Supreme Court invoked the wrong legal

standard. But de novo review does not mean that we can,

after the fact, stack inference upon inference, impute motive

when none was demonstrated, or use new evidence to

construct a hypothetical record that never existed. Because

the evidence is ultimately inconclusive as to the prosecutor’s

state of mind in 1989, and does not clearly support pretext,

Crittenden failed to prove purposeful discrimination.

In the end, Crittenden’s case should not rise or fall on the

after-the-fact significance imputed to the prosecutor’s XXXX

rating of Casey.

1 The majority’s analysis boils down to a

1 Crittenden’s other evidence does not add significantly to the analysis. 

As the prior panel opinion and the majority note, the prosecutor’s other

case involving an unsuccessful Wheeler challenge adds little; the same is

true with respect to the prosecutor’s “gas chamber” voir dire question. See

Crittenden v. Ayers, 624 F.3d 943, 957 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Crittenden

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feeling that although perhaps Casey deserved an XX or even

XXX rating, the fourth X looms large and could only signify

racial bias. This entire mode of analysis is folly, for it grafts

scientific certitude onto a back-of-the-hand rating system,

which the prosecutor himself described as a “de minimus

approach.” According to the prosecutor, the precise number

of Xs “wasn’t a very scientific notation,” and the same juror

“could have been a two or a three, or a three or a four.” We

have no Rosetta Stone to unlock the meaning of the fourth X;

it is a mistake to order a new trial based on this speculative

foundation as to a single juror.

I. Batson Step One—Crediting the Trial Court’s

Factual Finding

Under Batson step one, Crittenden must “show[] that the

totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of

discriminatory purpose.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 93–94. The

state trial court found that Crittenden did not meet this

standard. Under both the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) and Batson principles,

overturning such a finding requires “exceptional

circumstances.” Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2201 (2015)

(quoting Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 477 (2008)). 

Because there is nothing amiss about the trial court’s

finding—much less exceptionally wrong—that conclusion

should have ended the matter. Instead, the majority secondguesses the fact-bound decision of the state trial judge with a

I”). The prosecutor’s earlier for-cause challenge of Casey is similarly

unpersuasive and wasn’t even mentioned by Crittenden’s counsel in

making his Wheeler motion. The prosecutor also unsuccessfully

challenged a white juror for cause based on similar anti-death penalty

statements.

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raft of new evidence introduced in federal habeas

proceedings. I dissent from this upside-down approach to

deference.

The starting point is AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1),

under which the trial court’s factual finding is “presumed

correct” and Crittenden “has the burden of rebutting that

presumption by ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” Ayala,

135 S. Ct. at 2199–2200 (quoting Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S.

333, 338–39 (2006)). In light of AEDPA’s mandate, “we

normally review the state trial court’s fact-specific

determination of whether a defendant has made a prima facie

case of a Batson violation deferentially, applying AEDPA’s

‘statutory presumption of correctness.’” Fernandez v. Roe,

286 F.3d 1073, 1077 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Wade v.

Terhune, 202 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2000)). In contrast,

“where the trial court has applied the wrong legal standard,

AEDPA’s rule of deference does not apply.” Id.; see also

Cooperwood v. Cambra, 245 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2001).

Nothing reflects that the trial court applied the wrong

legal standard or otherwise erred in its application of Batson

step one. Importantly, neither the majority nor Crittenden

suggests otherwise. Although, in 1994, the California

Supreme Court conflatedBatson’s “reasonable inference” test

with Wheeler’s more stringent “strong likelihood” test, see

Majority Part II.A, there is no reason to think that the trial

judge committed that same mistake five years earlier.2Nor can

2

In denying Crittenden’s prima facie case, in February 1989, the trial

judge did not detail the standard he was applying. Before 1994, we

presume that California state courts applied the correct Batson standard. 

Terhune, 202 F.3d at 1196–97. Even absent the Batson-specific

presumption, the Supreme Court repeatedly has “instruct[ed] us to give

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Crittenden summon clear and convincing evidence that the

trial court erred in assessing whether there was a prima facie

case of purposeful discrimination based on the evidence

before the state court. The prima facie determination is a

factual inquiry that is “peculiarly within a trial judge’s

province,” Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2201 (quoting Snyder,

552 U.S. at 477), because the trial judge plays a pivotal role

supervising voir dire and is “best situated to evaluate both the

words and the demeanor of jurors who are peremptorily

challenged, as well as the credibility of the prosecutor who

exercised those strikes,” id. See also Tolbert v. Page,

182 F.3d 677, 683 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (noting that, at

Batson step one, “the trial judge’s unique perspective of voir

dire enables the judge to have first-hand knowledge and

observation of critical events” and to “personally witness[]

the totality of circumstances that comprises the ‘factual

inquiry’” at issue, making heavy deference appropriate). 

In his Wheeler motion, Crittenden’s counsel made two

primary points. He noted that the same prosecutor faced an

unsuccessful Wheeler challenge in a previous case. 

Additionally, Casey, as an African-American, was “a member

of a cognizable racial group” and was in fact the “only

member of the identifiable group” among the voir dire

panelists. Neither contention satisfied the requirements for a

prima facie showing.

state courts the benefit of the doubt when the basis for their holdings is

unclear.” James v. Ryan, 733 F.3d 911, 916 (9th Cir. 2013). 

Significantly, we owe deference to the state trial court notwithstanding the

California Supreme Court’s subsequent legal error. See Rever v. Acevedo,

590 F.3d 533, 537 (7th Cir. 2010).

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The prosecutor’s earlier Wheeler challenge was “weak”

evidence because, as we explained in Crittenden’s first

appeal, it was “one isolated incident in which the trial court

denied the Batson objection,” and “it did not add significantly

to his prima facie case,” Crittenden I, 624 F.3d at 957 n. 4. 

Nor does “the fact that the juror was the one Black member

of the venire,” in and of itself, “raise an inference of

discrimination.” Terhune, 202 F.3d at 1198 (quoting United

States v. Vasquez-Lopez, 22 F.3d 900, 902 (9th Cir. 1994)).

“More is required.” Id.

Benchmarked against the defense counsel’s proffer at the

prima facie stage, the trial judge gave specific reasons, based

on his firsthand observations, for finding no inference of

discrimination. Even before the prosecutor and defense

counsel began jury selection, Crittenden’s counsel alerted the

trial judge that he planned to make a Wheeler motion—and

already had prepared a written motion to that effect—if the

prosecutor struck Casey, the sole black member of the venire. 

The judge therefore was acutely attuned to the issue of

discrimination and took notes on Casey’s demeanor and voir

dire answers. The judge’s notes and impressions “revealed

that at the very time that we questioned Ms. Casey, my exact

quotation is: ‘This is a case where a Wheeler motion would

be inappropriate, because of the fact that she is indecisive and

cannot guarantee that she would vote in a certain way.’ . . . 

She couldn’t decide whether or not she would be able to

follow the law.”

Context is key. Before striking Casey, the prosecutor

used peremptorystrikes against 14 white jurors—consistently

targeting those who expressed doubt about the death penalty. 

To cite a few examples, the prosecutor used his first

peremptory against juror Smith, who stated, “I do not believe

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in [the death penalty] as a general rule—there are

exceptions.” The prosecutor used his fourth peremptory

against juror Gilbert, who described himself as an “extremely

liberal person” and said he “would have a difficult time

voting for the death penalty.” The sixth strike removed juror

Pisarek, who generally opposed the death penalty but

recognized it was the law and, unlike Casey, was unequivocal

that she could vote for it. The prosecutor’s tenth strike went

against juror Works, who believed that “all life is precious”

but added that she wouldn’t conscientiously object to voting

for the death penalty. The prosecutor struck juror Henley,

whom he labeled as “Borderline DP weak” despite Henley’s

bland statement on his juror questionnaire that “[t]here are

times and circumstances when I have considered [the death

penalty] appropriate.”

The strike of Casey hardly stands out. Casey opposed the

death penalty, and the death penalty was the overriding focus

of Crittenden’s capital trial. On her juror questionnaire,

Casey wrote: “I don’t like to see anyone put to death.” 

During her voir dire question-and-answer session, Casey

continued to express hesitancy about capital punishment. “I

am against death—being put to death,” she said at one point. 

“And I am against people killing people.” Given the

prosecutor’s pattern of peremptory strikes and Casey’s death

penalty views, the trial judge understandably cited “abundant

[] reasons” why he expected and accepted a peremptory

challenge against her.

The prior panel compared Casey to two white

jurors—Clark and Krueger—who ultimately served on

Crittenden’s jury. Crittenden I, 624 F.3d at 957. However,

that prior decision was issued before Cullen v. Pinholster,

131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011). Now, “[w]hen examining a

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petitioner’s habeas claim through the AEDPA lens, we

‘focus[] on what a state court knew and did,’” and “thus

consider ‘how the [state court] decision confronts [the] set of

facts that were before [it],’ rather than how it should have

confronted a new set of facts presented for the first time in

federal court.” Jamerson v. Runnels, 713 F.3d 1218, 1226

(9th Cir. 2013) (last four alternations in original) (quoting

Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1399)). The two white jurors entered

the jury box after the prosecutor struck Casey and the trial

judge denied Crittenden’s Wheeler motion. Hence, when the

trial judge denied the prima facie case, he could not have

divined that Clark and Krueger later would be permitted to

serve on the jury. Nor did Crittenden’s counsel renew his

Wheeler motion at any subsequent point. A post-hoc,

comparative analysis in these circumstances has no place in

evaluating the trial court’s finding of fact at the prima facie

stage. Even if the juror analysis is appropriate, the

comparison hardly provides clear and convincing evidence

that the trial judge got it wrong, because both subsequently

seated white jurors are readily distinguishable from Casey. 

See Section II.B.

In repudiating the trial court’s prima facie finding, the

majority mistakenly relies on evidence produced at the 2002

federal evidentiary hearing—namely, the prosecutor’s

notations rating jurors in the margins of their questionnaire

sheets. No state court was ever privy to this evidence. As we

recently explained, “after Pinholster, a federal habeas court

may consider new evidence only on de novo review, subject

to the limitations of § 2254(e)(2).” Murray v. Schriro,

745 F.3d 984, 1000 (9th Cir. 2014). As we explained in

Murray, Pinholster cabins our review under § 2254(e)(1),

because it “eliminated the relevance of ‘extrinsic’ challenges

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when we are reviewing state-court decisions under AEDPA.” 

Id. at 999.

Of course, where the conditions for de novo review are

satisfied—i.e., when the factual finding is rebutted under

§ 2254(e)(1)—Pinholster may allow for new evidence

adduced during federal habeas proceedings. But first things

first: Because our review under step one is constrained by

AEDPA deference and Crittenden has not effectivelyrebutted

the trial court’s initial factual finding, we are not in de novo

review mode at this stage. This conclusion follows from a

faithful reading of Murray. I acknowledge that the postMurray cases cited by the majority may be in tension with

Murray, given that they appear to support new fact-finding

simply on the basis that the California Supreme Court alone

rendered a decision contrary to clearly established law under

§ 2254(d)(1). See Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 768, 778 (9th Cir.

2014); Johnson v. Finn, 665 F.3d 1063, 1069 n.1 (9th Cir.

2011). That error cannot be imputed to the state trial court,

however. Under Murray, the situation here is clear: the state

trial court did not err in its factual finding that Crittenden

failed to carry his burden, and therefore our review is cabined

by the evidence before the trial court. In any event, the

majority lacks authority to overrule Murray and cannot

escape its holding simply by dismissing it as an earlier

case–indeed, it was decided in 2014, the same year as Hurles. 

See Rodriguez v. AT&T Mobility Servs. LLC, 728 F.3d 975,

979 (9th Cir. 2013). Crediting the state trial court’s factual

finding, I would denyCrittenden’s habeas petition at step one

of the Batson analysis.

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II. Batson Step Three: Failure to Establish the

Prosecutor’s Purposeful Discrimination

Even if it were appropriate to reach the ultimate Batson

step three question of purposeful discrimination, I would still

deny the petition because Crittenden has not shown that the

prosecutor harbored substantial racist intent.3 Decades after

the voir dire, we are like archaeologists without a framework

trying to piece together forgotten motives from small shards

of imperfect and inconclusive evidence. The record does not

establish that the prosecutor was “motivated in substantial

part by discriminatory intent.” Cook v. LaMarque, 593 F.3d

810, 815 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Snyder, 552 U.S. at 485).

A. Batson Standard of Review

The majority starts off on the wrong foot in its phase three

Batson analysis, categorically deferring to the district court

under a clear-error standard. The appropriate standard of

review, given a context where we share the district court’s

task of reviewing a cold record, should be de novo review.4

3 Under Batson step three, I agree with the majority that we could

properly consider the new evidence from the 2002 federal evidentiary

hearing. See Johnson v. Finn, 665 F.3d 1063, 1069 n.1 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Our review on this issue is de novo and the evidentiary limitations in

§ 2254(e)(2) do not apply because Crittenden cannot be faulted for a “lack

of diligence” in the state courts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 432

(2000).

4 Even under a clear-error standard, I would reverse the district court.

The weak evidence of racial motivation, the state court’s factual finding

on Casey’s demeanor and decisiveness, and the district court’sreliance on

a theory of unconscious bias counsel denial of the petition.

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We routinely recite Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure and the “clear error” standard without putting the

rule in context. Notably, in Batson itself, the Court stated that

a “reviewing court ordinarily should give [factual findings]

great deference,” but only because “the trial judge’s findings

in the context under consideration here largely will turn on

evaluation of credibility.” 476 U.S. at 98 n.21 (emphasis

added). Our cases applying Batson likewise continue to

emphasize that deference is due particularly where the facts

go to the demeanor and credibility of the prosecutor. Cook,

593 F.3d at 815–16 (quoting Hernandez v. New York,

500 U.S. 352, 365 (1991)).

What gets lost in this case is the layer-upon-layer review

at issue. Because there was no step three analysis in the state

courts, both we and the district court review the habeas

petition de novo. To the extent there were true factual

findings at the district court level, I agree that we should

evaluate those findings under a “clear error” analysis. 

However, the reality is that aside from a handful of nondeterminative factual findings made by the magistrate judge,

which the district court neither relied on nor contested, the

district court was simply reviewing a cold record of

documentary evidence.

In short, our task is identical to that of the district court:

applying the familiar tools of comparative juror analysis to a

fixed record. In the unusual context of this case where

nothing hinges on testimony from the evidentiaryhearing, our

review should be de novo. See Holder v. Welborn, 60 F.3d

383, 388 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that no deference is owed

to a district court deciding Batson habeas case on a cold

record). The majority and I simply disagree on the standard

of review.

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The only factual findings and credibility considerations

were made by the magistrate judge at the 2002 evidentiary

hearing. At that hearing, the prosecutor testified that he “did

not remember anything of significance to the exercise of his

peremptory challenge” against Casey, which had occurred

some 13 years earlier. (emphasis in original). The magistrate

judge found that the prosecutor was “forthright in his factual

testimony” about his lack of an independent recollection of

the events of Crittenden’s voir dire. Otherwise, the

prosecutor testified about administrative matters, such as his

handwriting and markings on juror questionnaires. The

prosecutor also spoke, in general terms, about his

methodology for ranking jurors, though he couldn’t recall

why he ranked any particular juror positively or negatively. 

The magistrate judge credited the prosecutor’s testimony as

to those matters and ultimately recommended denying

Crittenden’s habeas petition after analyzing the

questionnaires and voir dire transcript, concluding that the

prosecutor harbored “significant” but not “substantial” bias

in striking Casey.

The district court did not disturb any of the magistrate’s

uncontroversial specific findings, which even if credited do

not dictate whether the prosecutor’s peremptorystrike against

Casey was legitimate. At best, the absence of specific

evidence about the prosecutor’s methodology simply means

that Crittenden lacks evidence of animus. The district court

rejected the magistrate’s ultimate recommendation to deny

Crittenden’s habeas petition without holding a new

evidentiary hearing, precisely because the live testimony and

underlying factual findings from the 2002 hearing do not alter

the outcome of the case. See Majority Op. Part III. The

district court’s analysis was based entirely on a retrospective

review of the records from voir dire.

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The habeas standard of review vis-a-vis Batson depends

on which court’s findings and determinations are under

review. Of course in Batson itself, the Supreme Court

emphasized the importance of giving deference to the trial

court and reversing only in the case of clearly erroneous

findings. 476 U.S. at 98 n.21. As we explained, “the trial

judge’s unique perspective of voir dire enables the judge to

have first-hand knowledge and observation of critical events”

and to “personally witness[] the totality of circumstances that

comprises the ‘factual inquiry’” under Batson, making

deference appropriate. Tolbert, 182 F.3d at 683. “An

appellate court can read a transcript of the voir dire, but it is

not privy to the unspoken atmosphere of the trial court—the

nuance, demeanor, body language, expression and gestures of

the various players.” Id. at 683–84. None of those rationales

for deference apply here, where the federal district court

played no role in voir dire, had no occasion to soak in the

“unspoken atmosphere of the trial court,” id., and never took

stock of the demeanor and body language of the prosecutor

and jurors.

Nor is this a case in which the district court reconstructed

the Batson hearing and following testimony made credibility

determinations that affect the disposition of the Batson step

three inquiry. The majority states that “the magistrate judge

did not make—and hence the district court did not

reject—any credibility determination.” Maj. Op. 23. This

view is not precisely accurate as the magistrate judge did

credit the prosecutor’s testimony—it was just that the

prosecutor’s testimony didn’t have any substance. Compare

with Harris v. Haeberlin, 752 F.3d 1054, 1061 (6th Cir. 2014)

(deferring to federal district court where it made credibility

determinations based on newly discovered videotape

evidence of voir dire and the prosecutor’s live testimony, so

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that the case turned on “in-person credibility assessments

which clearly the district court is in the best position to

make”) (internal citation omitted); Jordan v. Lefevre,

293 F.3d 587, 594 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that, once a district

court reconstructs a Batson hearing in federal habeas

proceedings, “we will accord deference to the reconstructing

court’s credibility assessments”).

As a point of stark comparison, a recent Eleventh Circuit

case involving a reconstructed Batson hearing is instructive. 

Madison v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 761 F.3d 1240 (11th

Cir. 2014). Significantly, in deferring to the district court, the

Eleventh Circuit noted that the district court judge did more

than consider “the prosecutor’s trial notes and the testimony

authenticating it.” Id. at 1247. The court explained:

The District Court heard the live testimony of

Mr. Madison’s trial prosecutor and had the

opportunity to observe his demeanor when he

offered his explanations for striking the jurors

he did. While [the prosecutor] Mr. Cherry

relied on his notes to provide his reasons for

striking individual jurors, he never testified

that he had no recollection of the decisions he

made during Mr. Madison’s voir dire. In fact,

Mr. Cherry was able to answer several

questions about his strategy in picking the

jury, his awareness of the Mobile County

District Attorney Office’s history of Batson

violations, and his experience as a defense

attorney. His testimony about these things

went beyond the four corners of his voir dire

notes.

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Id. at 1247–48. Because the prosecutor provided substantive

testimony and was cross examined by defense counsel, “the

District Court was in a superior position to assess [the

prosecutor’s] credibility and the genuineness of his

explanations for striking black jurors at Batson’s third step.” 

Id. at 1248.

Unlike in Madison, the prosecutor here testified that he

had no recollection of Casey and provided no explanation for

striking her that “went beyond the four corners of his voir

dire notes.” Id. The facts are fixed in a cold record, so our

Batson step three analysis involves nothing more than a runof-the-mill review of the voir dire records and comparative

juror analysis. This case is closely akin to Welborn, where

the Seventh Circuit concluded that de novo review of the

federal district court’s Batson step three determination was

appropriate:

Although the magistrate judge was able to

hear the explanations given by the prosecutors

at the Batson hearing, she was not in the same

position to make credibility determinations as

is a trial judge who has the opportunity to

observe the responses from the venire and to

hear the attorney’s explanation for a

peremptory immediately after it is exercised. 

In fact, the prosecutors admitted that at the

time of the Batson hearing, they had little, if

any, recollection of the actual voir dire, and

found it necessary to testify with aid from the

voir dire transcript and from their

contemporaneously taken notes. Therefore

since [the magistrate judge, the district judge],

and the members of this panel all have

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basically been provided with only a cold

record from which to determine if a Batson

violation occurred at Holder’s jury trial, we

find that no deference is warranted under

these circumstances.

60 F.3d at 388. Likewise, I conclude that no deference to the

federal district court is warranted: the prosecutor had no

recollection of why he struck Casey and the magistrate judge,

the district court, and the Ninth Circuit are all working from

the same decades-old records from voir dire in rendering the

ultimate Batson step three determination.

B. Batson Step Three: Purposeful Discrimination

The remaining question is whether, in striking Casey, the

prosecutor had a discriminatory purpose. “‘Discriminatory

purpose’ . . . implies more than intent as volition or intent as

awareness of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker

. . . selected . . . a particular course of action at least in part

‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon

an identifiable group.” Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S.

352, 360 (1991) (plurality) (quoting Person. Admin. of Mass.

v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)). The touchstone, as

described in our caselaw, is whether race was a “substantial

motivating factor” in the prosecutor’s decision to strike

Casey. Cook, 593 F.3d at 815.

Gleaning the secret truth of the prosecutor’s state of mind

is rarely simple, especially years or decades after the trial has

drawn to a close. Our assignment is doubly difficult because

we’re missing the key piece of evidence—the prosecutor’s

explanation for striking Casey. That testimony is often the

focal point of the step three analysis. However, the

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prosecutor should hardly be penalized for his honesty. He

merely declined to manufacture a convenient reason post hoc.

I don’t begrudge the majority its careful comparative

juror analysis. A lot of ink has been spilled in these habeas

proceedings now going on 16 years.5 That so many diligent

jurists have reached differing and conflicting conclusions

underscores that the prosecutor’s notes, while slightly

illuminating, are ultimately inconclusive. In my view, the

prosecutor’s XXXX rating of Casey cannot bear the weight

ascribed to it by the majority, nor can a rehashing of the voir

dire transcript trump the trial court’s factual finding on

Casey’s demeanor. In proving purposeful discrimination, the

“burden of persuasion rests with, and never shifts from,” the

defendant—Crittenden. Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162,

171 (2005) (quoting Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768

(1995)). Whether the standard of review of the district

court’s phase three determination is clear error or de novo,

Crittenden has failed to meet his burden.

5 To recap the tortured procedural history of this case: In January 1999,

the magistrate judge issued a Finding and Recommendation (“F&R”)

stating that the California courts did not unreasonably deny Crittenden’s

prima facie Batson challenge. In May 2002, the district court rejected the

F&R and ordered an evidentiary hearing, which was held in December

2002. The magistrate judge concluded that “race played some part in the

prosecutor’s evaluation of Ms. Casey” but that race was “not the real

reason or effective reason for her being stuck from the jury.” The district

court agreed and deniedCrittenden’s habeas petition, but the NinthCircuit

reversed in Crittenden I. 624 F.3d at 959–60. On remand, the

magistrate’s third F&R recommended that although the prosecutor’s racial

motivation in striking Casey was “significant,” it was “not substantial”

and again recommended denial of the Batson claim. The district court

rejected that conclusion and found that the “prosecutor was motivated,

consciously or unconsciously, in substantial part by race” and therefore

granted Crittenden’s petition. This appeal followed.

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To begin, the prosecutor testified that Xs meant a venire

member was “opposed to the death penalty and strongly

stated it . . . Checkmarks were people who either were for the

death penalty or medium ground that I thought to some

degree I would be able to tolerate having on the jury.” The

more Xs the juror received, the less favorably the prosecutor

viewed that juror; the more checkmarks, vice versa. The

prosecutor made the ratings after reviewing the written juror

questionnaires and listening to the voir dire answers of each

member of the venire.

By the time Casey entered the jury box, the prosecutor

already had used peremptories against seven of the nine

venire members to whom he gave a negative rating of at least

one X. The prosecutor did not strike Casey at the first

opportunity upon her draw to the jury box; instead, he

removed a juror with a “T?” rating. He then struck Casey. 

When the prosecutor did so, the jury box included the

following venire members, as rated by the prosecutor:

• Corrao—TTT

• Casey—XXXX

• Fisher—T

• Rehm—T

• Tennies—TT

• Naess—T

• Bertrando—XXX

• Shalley—T

• McMahan—TTT

• Stewart—(no rating but listed as one of

the “good jurors” by the prosecutor; she

was later excused for hardship).

• Fortier—TTT

• Curtis—TTT

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Facing a potential jury in which a majority held neutral or

favorable views toward the death penalty, the prosecutor did

what anyone would expect: he struck Casey and then

Bertrando, who stated on his juror questionnaire that “killing

people isn’t right no matter who is doing it” and that life

imprisonment actually is a “worse punishment.” Having

removed every juror with at least an X rating, the prosecutor

used his remaining peremptories against those with a T or

TT? rating. The jury ultimately was comprised exclusively

of jurors with at least a TT rating; all but two scored even

higher.

As I described earlier, see Section I, the prosecutor used

his first 14 peremptories against white jurors, many of whom

expressed less doubt about the death penalty than did Casey. 

The upshot is that, by the time Casey was seated in the jury

box, the prosecutor already had removed most of the jurors he

considered unfavorable to the case for capital punishment—

even those whose death penalty views bent more toward

ambivalence than opposition. Leaping to racism as the

substantial explanation for the strike against Casey ignores

the obvious, because Casey and Bertrando fell right in line

with the prosecutor’s pattern of previous strikes. Overall, the

prosecutor used 21 of his 26 peremptories against venire

members who opposed the death penalty in some fashion. As

the magistrate judge noted, Casey “would have been stricken

regardless of her race.”

Nor is Casey the only juror who received the XXXX

rating. The prosecutor also gave Smith, who was white, the

same rating, so race is hardly the only reason for the fourth X. 

The majority says that Smith was more deserving of the

XXXX rating because she “arguably expressed stronger

opposition to the death penalty than did Casey.” But it takes

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no leap of logic to conclude the opposite, as the magistrate

judge did: “Arguably, this four ‘X’ juror was more disposed

to render a death verdict than Mrs. Casey.” As one example,

the prosecutor asked Smith whether her views would impair

her ability to fairly and impartially consider the evidence in

favor of the death penalty. Smith’s response: “I don’t think

so. I think that there are circumstances where I would be able

to agree with the death penalty.” When the prosecutor asked

Casey the nearly word-for-word identical question, her

answer came with a heavy dose of hesitation: “I can’t say yes. 

I can’t say no. I really don’t—don’t know.”

Smith had a negative run-in with law enforcement, when

her husband apparently was falsely identified by a witness to

a crime, and described the prospect of jury service as

“horrifying” and “frightening.” But in a similar vein, Casey

found the idea of capital jury service “scary” and was “very

upset about it.” Although Smith used stronger adjectives,

both potential jurors exhibited a demeanor poorly suited to

sentencing someone to death, setting them apart from others

in the jury pool who were ideologically opposed to capital

punishment.

The majority emphasizes that Casey’s substantive death

penalty answers alone did not warrant the XXXX rating, but

this view obscures what the trial court said about Casey—that

“she is indecisive” and “couldn’t decide whether or not she

would be able to follow the law.” Unlike the array of

appellate and federal judges to weigh in over the 26 years

since Crittenden’s conviction, the trial judge was there. He

supervised voir dire, personally questioned Casey, and took

notes on her answers and demeanor. We shouldn’t lightly

disregard his impressions. See, e.g., § 2254(e)(1); Cook,

593 F.3d at 816 (“[W]e must defer to the trial judge’s

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findings regarding the demeanor of the individuals in the

courtroom.”).

The voir dire transcript confirms Casey’s apparent angst

and anguish. Asked about the prospect of serving on the jury,

she replied: “Not good,” and explained: “It is scary.” Later,

when asked whether she could be open and objective about

whether to impose the death penalty, Casey equivocated: “I

can’t say fully. I would try.” She continued, “I can’t sit here

and really say for sure if I could . . . I have to say I think I

could. This is all new to me. So I am very upset with it.” 

She agreed with the prosecutor that she’d have difficulty

reaching a decision on the death penalty. Her testimony

cannot be characterized as coming to a concrete, definitive

willingness to vote for the death penalty. The prosecutor

came away with the same impression—writing “[c]an’t say

if would set aside” on Casey’s juror sheet.

The trial judge’s factual finding that Caseywas indecisive

separates her from juror Clark, who described herself as a

“pretty decisive person” who makes big decisions without

guilt or self-doubt. Significantly, Clark also articulated a

distinctly law-and-order outlook. In prior jury service, Clark

had voted to convict a criminal defendant of drunk driving

and said she was “really disturbed” by a holdout juror who

wanted to acquit because that juror “hated cops. It was very

disturbing to me.” When defense counsel asked Clark

whether she “believed in law enforcement,” she responded,

“I certainly do.” She later added: “I feel very strongly that

people should be punished for what they do. I feel very

strongly about the law.” Not surprisingly, the prosecutor’s

notations say that, aside from her death penalty views, Clark

was an “[o]therwise strong” prosecution juror. By contrast,

Casey had never served on a jury, made no similar pro-police

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statements, and can fairly be described as tentative in her

answers.

The majority’s focus on potential jurors Sullivan and

Tennies is also misplaced. Maj. Op. 32–35. The prosecutor

used peremptories on both of them after having struck Casey. 

Comparative juror analysis is supposed to comprise

“side-by-side comparisons of some black venire panelists

who were struck and white panelists allowed to serve.” 

Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 241 (2005). Sullivan and

Tennies were not “allowed to serve,” so any comparison

between them and Casey is not illuminating. In other words,

that the prosecutor struck Casey, Sullivan, and Tennies—all

of whom expressed varying degrees of hesitancy about the

death penalty—does nothing to prove racial bias.6

With the evidence stacked against the proposition that

race was the real reason for striking Casey, the district court

concluded that Crittenden has met his burden under Batson

by showing that the prosecutor was motivated at minimum by

unconscious bias. Although I am very sympathetic to the

notion of unconscious bias—stealth bias is destructive and

6 The majority cites Sullivan and Tennies as proof that anti-death penalty

views were not determinative, because they both expressed some

hesitation about the death penalty yet received TT ratings. This overreads

the significance of the rating notations, elevating them to scientific

certainty and excluding evaluation ofthe jurors’ other characteristics. The

four-month voir dire featured extensive questioning on the death penalty

from the judge, prosecutor, and defense counsel. The prosecutor used 21

of his 26 peremptories against jurors who opposed the death penalty,

including Sullivan and Tennies. The magistrate noted that a review of the

“entire voir dire transcript” shows that “for the most part” the proceedings

“focused on the death penalty . . . .” Just because the prosecutor didn’t

view all jurors who expressed anti-death penalty sentiments as exactly the

same hardly shows that the entire enterprise was a sham.

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real, even though it is often difficult to document—it is not an

easy fit within the Batson framework, which focuses on the

purpose of the prosecutor rather than the subconscious social

and cultural factors that influence decisionmaking.

7 The

Supreme Court has never endorsed the view that unconscious

bias can form the basis for a Batson challenge.8 The only

circuit court to address the issue held that “evidence of

‘subconscious’ discrimination is not relevant” to purposeful

discrimination under Batson. United States v. Roebke,

333 F.3d 911, 913 (8th Cir. 2003).

The majority puts a wishful spin on the district court’s

decision. Maj. Op. 40–41. To recap: the district court held

that the prosecutor “was motivated, consciously or

unconsciously, in substantial part by race” and granted

7 To be sure, Batson’srequirement of purposeful discrimination does not

lack for critics. Recently, for example, the Washington Supreme Court

bluntly declared that “Batson is . . . failing us,” because modern-day

racism isn’t overt but is embodied in “stereotypes that are ingrained and

often unconscious.” State v. Saintcalle, 309 P.3d 326, 334–36 (Wash.

2013) (en banc). “Unconscious stereotyping upends the Batson

framework,” which is “only equipped to root out ‘purposeful’

discrimination, which many trial courts probably understand to mean

conscious discrimination.” Id. at 336.

8 Two Supreme Court justices have referenced unconscious or

subconscious bias in the Batson context. In Batson itself, Justice Marshall

concurred to warn that “trial courts are ill equipped to second-guess”

facially neutral reasons offered by prosecutors, who may not be conscious

of their own bias. 476 U.S. at 105, 106 (Marshall, J., concurring). In

Miller-El, Justice Breyer echoed Justice Marshall’s views and cited

evidence that, despite Batson, widespread racial discrimination in jury

selection has persisted. 545 U.S. at 267–68 (Breyer, J., concurring). Both

concurrences pointed out shortcomings with the Batson framework and

advocated eliminating peremptories altogether; neither is a binding

pronouncement of Batson law.

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Crittenden’s habeas petition. Upon the government’s motion

for a stay pending appeal, the district court left its earlier

decision intact and added some interpretive gloss that it

meant to “leave[] no doubt that it concluded [the

prosecutor’s]strike of Caseywas purposeful discrimination.” 

However, the district court went on to reiterate that it couldn’t

say “why [the prosecutor] was motivated by race”—i.e.,

whether “by conscious or unconscious racism,” so the court

hardly disavowed its unconscious racism theory. In any

event, the district court did not retract or amend its order

granting the writ, which is the order under review on appeal.

In sum, Crittenden has not shown that the prosecutor’s

strike was motivated by purposeful discrimination. The

record simply does not support the conclusion that reference

to Casey’s demeanor and death penalty views were pretext

for racial bias. In a case such as this, we should be especially

wary of overreading isolated snippets of a voluminous voir

dire transcript. As the Supreme Court recently reminded, in

capital cases jurors often will express varying degrees of

hesitancy about imposing the death penalty. Ayala, 135 S. Ct.

at 2201. Both prosecution and defense must make “fine

judgment calls about which jurors are more or less willing to

vote for the ultimate punishment. These judgment calls may

involve a comparison of responses that differ in only nuanced

respects, as well as a sensitive assessment of jurors’

demeanor.” Id. Prosecutors must act on instinct; they don’t

have the hindsight-laden benefit of a leisurely review of a

complete transcript. The prosecutor’s actions here fit well

within that band of discretion, so far as the cold record

reveals.

This case calls to mind Justice Breyer’s observation that

the Batson inquiry can be an “awkward, sometime hopeless,

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task of second-guessing a prosecutor’s instinctive

judgment—the underlying basis for which may be invisible

even to the prosecutor exercising the challenge.” Miller-El,

545 U.S. at 267–68 (Breyer, J., concurring). In view of the

record of what actually happened, the trial judge’s findings

and the ultimate composition of the jury, our retrospective

parsing simply cannot elevate ambiguous, speculative

foundation to proof that the prosecutor was motivated in

substantial part by racism.

I respectfully dissent.

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