Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-01478/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-01478-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
California Psychiatric Transitions, Inc.
Defendant
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Plaintiff

Document Text:

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT CASE NO. CV-F-08-1478 LJO DLB

OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

ORDER ON CROSS MOTIONS FOR

Plaintiff, SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Doc. 20, 22)

v.

CALIFORNIA PSYCHIATRIC

TRANSITIONS, INC.

Defendant.

 /

The parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ. P 56. 

Plaintiff the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) moves for summary

adjudication on certain of defendant’s affirmative defenses. Defendant California Psychiatric

Transitions, Inc. (“CPT’) moves for summary judgment on plaintiff’s retaliation claim. Each party filed

an opposition to the opposing party’s cross motion and also filed reply briefs. Pursuant to Local Rule

230(g), these motions were submitted on the pleadings without oral argument, and the hearing set for

July 14, 2010 was VACATED. Having considered the moving, opposition and reply papers, as well as

the Court’s file, the Court issues the following order. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Overview

Plaintiff EEOC, the federal agency charged with enforcing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, as amended (“Title VII”), brought this action on behalf of Charging Party Audel Mendoza

(“Mendoza”). The EEOC alleges that Mendoza was fired from his position as a mental health worker

at CPT in retaliation both for his association with Mariel Somera (“Somera”), a woman who had

complained of, and brought a sexual harassment charge against CPT, and because Mendoza engaged in

participation activity. Mendoza’s participation in Somera’s charge against CPT is the central issue in

CPT’s motion.

Defendant CPT operates a mental health rehabilitation facility in Delhi, California. (Doc. 22,

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CPT P&A p.1.) CPT’s president and Medical Director is John T. Hackett, M.D. and the facilities

director is James T. Drayton. CPT hired Mendoza in 2002 to counsel residents on activities of daily

living, daily charting and reporting, monitoring behavioral changes among other duties. (Doc. 22, CPT

P&A p. 2.) 

B. The Somera Charge

In 2003, Mariel Somera was hired by CPT as a dietary aide to assist in the kitchen. (Doc. 22

CPT P&A p.2.) She became friends with Mendoza, and they socialized with each other both inside and

outside of the workplace. In December 2003, Somera resigned her position at CPT and filed an EEOC 1

complaint regarding a claim of sexual harassment by her supervisor Larry Fuentes. On September 14,

2004, and on October 14, 2004, EEOC served CPT with a Notice of Charge of Discrimination on behalf

of Somera alleging that Somera was sexually harassed by Manager Larry Fuentes. (“Somera Charge”)

(Doc. 22 CPT P&A p. 3; Doc. 24 EEOC Response fact 11-12.) 

In early Spring 2005, the EEOC’s investigation into the Somera charge became more active. On

March 28, 2005, the EEOC mailed CPT Director, James Drayton, a Request for Information and on

April 23, 2005, investigator Malinda Tuazon held a teleconference with Drayton to arrange to come

on-site and interview witnesses. In its investigation, Mendoza was not identified as a witness either by

Somera or by CPT. (Doc. 24, EEOC Response facts 13-16.) In connection with her Charge, Somera

provided information to the EEOC in a Questionnaire, which did not list Mendoza as a potential witness.

CPT, in its response to the EEOC request for information, did not identify Mendoza as a potential

witness. At around the time EEOC began requesting information from CPT, Supervisor Latrice Wills

commented to Mendoza that she heard “he still talked” to Somera. Mendoza confirmed he still talked

to Somera. A few weeks later, on April 27, 2005, and a few days after the EEOC investigator spoke with

the Drayton about conducting an on-site visit, CPT fired Mendoza.

C. Mendoza’s Charge of Retaliation

Mendoza filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. In June 2005, the EEOC served notice

to CPT that Mendoza had filed a Charge of Discrimination claiming retaliation in violation of Title VII.

Mendoza and Somera ultimately married in 2008.

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The Charge stated as follows:

“I was hired by Respondent in September 2002. My position title was

Mental Heath Worker. On September 14, 2004, a coworker filed a charge

of discrimination against Respondent. (EEOC charge no.

370-2005-01635). I have provided information to the EEOC in

conjunction with that charge. In early April 2005, Latrice Wills,

Supervisor, made the comment, "I hear you still talk to Missy across the

street," in reference to my former coworker who filed the above

mentioned charge. On April 28, 2005, I was discharged.

“Respondent did not state a reason for its actions.

“I believe I have been retaliated against for engaging in protected

activity.” (Doc. 25, CPT P&A p. 3)(emphasis added).

CPT contends that Mendoza was an at will employee who was terminated because Mendoza had

disclosed confidential patient information. (Doc. 22, CPT P&A p. 6.) CPT contends the events stated

in the charge, in the highlighted portion above, never occurred.

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

A. Summary Judgment/Adjudication Standards

F.R.Civ.P. 56(b) permits a “party against whom reliefis sought” to seek “summary judgment on

all or part of the claim.” Summary judgment/adjudication is appropriate when there exists no genuine

issue as to anymaterial fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment/adjudication as a matter of law. 

F.R.Civ.P. 56( c); Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348,

1356 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9 Cir. 1987). th

The purpose of summary judgment/adjudication is to “pierce the pleadings and assess the proof in order

to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.” Matsushita Elec., 475 U.S. at 586, n. 11, 106 S.Ct.

1348; International Union of Bricklayers v. Martin Jaska, Inc., 752 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9 Cir. 1985). th

On summary judgment/adjudication, a court must decide whether there is a “genuine issue as to

any material fact,” not weigh the evidence or determine the truth of contested matters. F.R.Civ.P. 56

( c); Covey v. Hollydale Mobilehome Estates, 116 F.3d 830, 834 (9 Cir. 1997); see Adickes v. S.H. th

Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598 (1970); Poller v. Columbia Broadcast System, 368 U.S.

464, 467, 82 S.Ct. 486 (1962); Loehr v. Ventura County Community College Dist., 743 F.2d 1310, 1313

(9 Cir. 1984). The evidence of the party opposing summary judgment/adjudication is to be believed and th

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all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts before the court must be drawn in favor of

the opposing party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (1986);

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348. The inquiry is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient

disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as

a matter of law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

To carry its burden of production on summary judgment/adjudication, a moving party “must

either produce evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or defense or

show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Companies, Inc., 210

F.3d 1099, 1102 (9 Cir. 2000); see High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d th

563, 574 (9 Cir. 1990). “[T]o carry its ultimate burden of persuasion on the motion, the moving party th

must persuade the court that there is no genuine issue of material fact.” Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1102;

see High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 574. “As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts

are material. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law

will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. 

“If a moving party fails to carry its initial burden of production, the nonmoving party has no

obligation to produce anything, even if the nonmoving party would have the ultimate burden of

persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1102-1103; see Adickes, 398 U.S. at 160, 90 S.Ct. 1598. 

“If, however, a moving party carries its burden of production, the nonmoving party must produce

evidence to support its claim or defense.” Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1103; see High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d

at 574. “If the nonmoving party fails to produce enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material

fact, the moving party wins the motion for summary judgment.” Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1103; see

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (1986) (“Rule 56( c) mandates the entry of

summary judgment, after adequate time for discoveryand upon motion, against a partywho fails to make

the showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on

which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”) 

“But if the nonmoving party produces enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact,

the nonmoving party defeats the motion.” Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1103; see Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322,

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106 S.Ct. 2548. “The amount of evidence necessary to raise a genuine issue of material fact is enough

‘to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.’” Aydin Corp.

v. Loral Corp., 718 F.2d 897, 902 (quoting First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-

289, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 1592 (1968)). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the

plaintiff’s position will be insufficient.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

DEFENDANT CPT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT ON THE RETALIATION CLAIM

The EEOC’s complaint alleges one cause of action on behalf of Mendoza for retaliation in

violation of Title VII. The complaint alleges:

“7. On or about April 27, 2005, Defendant engaged in the unlawful

practice of retaliation at its Merced County facility, in violation of

Section 704(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-3(a), by discharging

Charging Party for engaging in protected activity, including for his

association with and support of a co-worker who had complained about

unlawful sexual harassment.” (Doc. 1, Complaint.)

A. Overview of Parties’ Arguments

CPT moves for summary judgment on the grounds that there is no evidence to support the EEOC

allegations of retaliation. The EEOC’s allegation of “assistance” and “support” are unfounded because

either (1) the assistance or support did not exist, or (2) there is no causal nexus between the protected

conduct and the adverse employment action. Defendant CPT argues that there is no evidence that

Mendoza either participated in the enforcement of another charge or opposed any conduct made

unlawful by its terms and there is no evidence that CPT had actual knowledge of Mendoza’s alleged

participation. “Essential to a causal link is evidence that the employer was aware that the plaintiff had

engaged in protected activity.” Cohen v. Fred Meyer. Inc., 686 F.2d 793, 796 (9 Cir. 1982). CPT th

argues that the EEOC’s response to interrogatories does not demonstrate that Mendoza engaged in

protected conduct under Title VII. (Doc. 22, CPT P&A p. 10.) The interrogatory offered the following

evidence:

1. Mendoza friendship with Somera was known to Drayton.

2. On August 26, 2004, Somera filed a charge of discrimination.

3. Somera identified charging party Mendoza as a witness.

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4. On March 28, 2005, Drayton was mailed a request for information.

5. On April 23, 2005, EEOC investigator Tuazon telephoned Drayton.

6. Latrice Wills confirmed with Mendoza that he still talk to CP Somera.

7. Somera quit CPT’s employ in December 2003.

8. On April 28, 2005, fired Mendoza.

CPT argues that Mendoza concedes that he did not have any contact with the EEOC until May 2005 -

after his termination in April 2005 - had not spoken with anyone at CPT regarding Somera’s claim and

had no reason to believe that Drayton was aware he was supporting Somera. (Doc. 22, CPT P&A p. 12.)

The EEOC argues that its suit is based on two alternative theories; CPT fired Somera’s thenboyfriend, Mendoza, to punish her for complaining about sexual harassment, or alternatively, that CPT

anticipated Mendoza would assist Somera in her sexual harassment against CPT in the future. (Doc. 24,

EEOC Opposition p.1.) The EEOC argues that the prima facie case is met for preemptive retaliation. 

There is sufficient evidence that Drayton anticipated that Mendoza might engage in protected activity. 

James Drayton, CPT’s Facility Director, who made the decision to fire Mendoza, was aware of the

relationship between Mendoza and Somera. He confirmed that Mendoza was stillseeing Somera, while

her EEOC claim was pending, and he was fired Mendoza just weeks later. This evidence is sufficient

for the jury to conclude that Drayton fired Mendoza because he anticipated that Mendoza may engage

in protected activityin connection with Somera’ssexual harassment claim. Title VII prohibits retaliatory

acts because an employers fear that an employee might engage in protected conduct.

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B. Prima Facie Case Of Retaliation

Retaliation claims brought pursuant to Title VII are governed by a the McDonnell Douglas2

burden-shifting framework. Metoyer v. Chassman, 504 F.3d 919, 931 (9 Cir. 2007); Miller v. Fairchild th

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817 (1973).

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Industries, Inc., 797 F.2d 727, 730-731 (9 Cir. 1986) (order and allocation of proof for retaliation th

claims follow familiar scheme announced in McDonnell Douglas). “At the first step of McDonnell

Douglas, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation.” Metoyer, 504

F.3d at 931, n.6. If plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer “to

articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for adverse employment action. McDonnell

Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802. If the employer carries its burden, plaintiff must have an opportunity

to prove by a preponderance of evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the employer were not

its true reasons but were a pretext for discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.

Here, defendant CPT challenges whetherthe EEOC establishes a prima facie case of retaliation. 

Therefore, it is unnecessary to consider the remaining two steps of the McDonnell Douglas burdenshifting framework. 

 To make out a retaliation prima facie case, a plaintiff must demonstrate that:

1. He/she engaged in protected activity;

2. He/she suffered an adverse employment action; and

3. There was a causal link between his/her activity and the employment decision.

Stegall v. Citadel Broadcasting Co., 350 F.3d 1061, 1065-1066 (9 Cir. 2003). th

1. Engaged in Protected Activity - Element of the Prima Facie Case

Title VII forbids any employer from discriminating against any employee because he has

participated in anymannerin a Title VIIinvestigation. The relevant language of the Civil Rights statute

provides:

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to

discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment

... because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment

practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified,

assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding,

or hearing under this subchapter.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 704(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (emphasis added). 

Section § 2000e-3(a) has two separate clauses: an opposition clause, as well as an independent

participation clause. The “participation” clause is interpreted broadly. See Jute v. Hamilton Sundstrand

Corp., 420 F.3d 166 (2 Cir. 2005) (Congress intended exceptionally broad protection and expansive nd

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meaning to the terms “anyparticipation”). The anti-retaliation provision 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) is meant

to prevent harm to employees who report discriminatory employment practices or assist in the

investigation of these practices. Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville and Davidson County, Tenn., --

U.S. --, 129 S.Ct. 846, 852, 172 L.Ed.2d 650 (2009); Wu v. Thomas, 863 F.2d 1543, 1548 (11th Cir.

1989) (husband's participation in wife's EEOC proceeding was protected activity even though husband

had not filed his own charge); EEOC v. Nalbandian Sales, Inc., 36 F.Supp.2d 1206, 1213 (E.D. Cal.

1998) (Wanger, J.) (the court permitted suit on plaintiff’s claim that he was not rehired because his sister

had filed EEOC charges against the employer). The purpose of the anti-retaliation clause is to

“[maintain] unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms.” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S.

337, 345-46, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997). Under the participation clause, even a visit with

the EEO counselor constituted participation “in the machinery set up by Title VII.” Hashimoto v.

Dalton, 118 F.3d 671, 680 (9 Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 112 (1998). The participation clause th

includes those whom the employer has reason to believe is assisting the employee in protected activity. 

Wilken v. Cascadia Behavioral Health Care, Inc., 2007 WL 2916482, 27 (D.Or. 2007) (Employer had

every reason to believe co-workers and roommates were jointly and assisting each other).

Some courts disagree as to whether Title VII prohibits retaliation against an employee because

of the protected activities of other persons. Compare Elsensohn v. St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Office,

530 F.3d 368 (5th Cir. 2008) (spouse who did not provide information about FMLA claim and did not

testifyabout FMLA not protected byFMLA and retaliation claim dismissed); Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp.,

Inc., 283 F.3d 561 (3d Cir. 2002) (retaliation provisions of ADA and ADEA did not protect son of

employee who filed suit against employer), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 824 (2002); Freeman v. Barnhart,

2008 WL744827 (N.D.Cal. 2008) (only employees that have personallyengaged in statutorily protected

activity may bring retaliation claims).

/////

CPT argues that Mendoza concedes that he did not have contact with the EEOC until after May

2005-after his termination in April 2005. Therefore, CPT argues Mendoza was not engaged in a

protected activity and it is not reasonable for a jury to conclude that he was terminated for in retaliation. 

CPT argues that “associational” retaliation claims, (claims based solely upon a relationship with a

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charging party) are not cognizable under Title VII. (Doc. 28, Reply p.2-3.)

The EEOC has come forward with evidence which if believed establishes that Mendoza engaged

in “participation.” Mendoza participated in the filing and helpedSomera complete her EEOC complaint. 

The interrogatoryresponse, which CPT alleges is factuallydevoid, identifies that Mendoza was a witness

to the Somera events. In addition, as CPT acknowledges, the EEOC investigator “received from Somera

a list of names including Mendoza.” (Doc. 22, CPT P&A p.10.) Whether Mendoza engaged in

protected activity and the extent of participation are factual issues. There is evidence from which a

reasonable trier of fact could conclude the Mendoza participated “in the machinery set up by Title VII.”

Further, there is an inference that the employer knew that Mendoza was or may assist Somera

in her Charge. Upon formal notice of investigation of the Somera Charge, Mendoza’s supervisor asked

if Mendoza still spoke to Somera. There is evidence that it was known Mendoza and Somera were

romantically linked. Mendoza responded affirmatively, and shortly thereafter, he was terminated. The

participation clause includes those whom the employer has reason to believe is assisting the employee

in protected activity. 

Contrary to CPT’s argument, the EEOC has not relied solely upon Mendoza’s “associational”

relationship with Somera. The EEOC has raised issues of fact as to the protected activity Mendoza

engaged in in conjunction with the Somera Charge. Accordingly, the EEOC has carried its burden on

this element.

2. Adverse Employment Action - Element of the Prima Facie Case

CPT does not challenge this element of the prima facie case. There is not a dispute that Mendoza

suffered an adverse employment action. He was terminated from his employment at CPT.

3. Causal Connection - Element of the Prima Facie Case

“To establish causation, the plaintiff must show bya preponderance ofthe evidence that engaging

in the protected activity was one of the reasons for the adverse employment decision and that but for

such activity the decision would not have been made.” Kraus v. Presidio Trust Facilities

Division/Residential Management Branch, __ F.Supp.2d __, 2010 WL1293788 (N.D.Cal. 2010) (citing

Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1064 (9th Cir. 2002)). “The causal link may be

established by an inference derived from circumstantial evidence, ‘such as the employer’s knowledge

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that the [plaintiff] engaged in protected activities and the proximity in time between the protected action

and allegedly retaliatory employment decision.’” Jordan v. Clark, 847 F.2d 1368, 1376 (9 Cir. 1988) th

(quoting Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9 Cir. 1987)), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1006 (1989). th

An employer’s generalized concern that an employee might complain or assist in another’s complaint

about discrimination is sufficient to meet the prima facie element. Sauer v. Salt Lake City, 1 F.3d 1122,

1128 (10 Cir. 1993); Creighton v. City of Livingston, 2009 WL 3246825 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (Wanger, th

J.) (preemptive termination to head off a complaint was actionable under Cal. Labor Code, which was

fashioned after federal statutes.)

Here, CPT relies upon the purported inadequacy of the interrogatory response as the basis for the

motion. The interrogatory, however,identifies circumstantial evidence of potentiallyretaliatoryconduct. 

The decision maker, Drayton, had knowledge of the personal relationship between Mendoza and

Somera. The interrogatory identifies that Mendoza was identified as a witness and Mendoza was fired

shortly after notice to Drayton of the Somera Charge. The timing of adverse employment action can

provide strong evidence of retaliation. Stegall v. Citadel Broadcasting Co., 350 F.3d 1061, 1069 (9th

Cir. 2003); Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir.1987) (causation was found from

proximity alone where the adverse actions occurred within three months after protected activity, two

weeks after charge investigated, and less than two months after investigation ended); Miller v. Fairchild

Indus., Inc., 885 F.2d 498, 505 (9th Cir.1989) (causation established when terminations occurred

forty-two and fifty-nine days after EEOC hearings), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1056 (1990). The record

indicates there is evidence suggesting CPT could have terminated Mendoza because of a fear that he

would engage in protected activity. Drayton had Mendoza fired immediatelyafter learning of the Somera

Charge, and, at that time, Drayton was aware that Mendoza was friendly with Somera. This pattern of

events could raise a reasonable inference that Mendoza’s termination was driven by fear that he would

assist in the complaint by Somera. Accordingly, there is evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact

could find that plaintiff meets this prima facie element.

CPT argues that Mendoza’s status as a witness was never disclosed to CPT, including to

Drayton, prior to Mendoza’s termination. The extent of CPT’s knowledge of Mendoza as a potential

witness, however, is a question of fact. The “participation” clause certainly does not require formal

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notification that Mendoza was a witness. Here, the evidence shows that it was common knowledge that

Mendoza and Somera were in a relationship. After Drayton was informed of Somera’s complaint,

Mendoza’s supervisor questioned Mendoza about it to some extent. (“Do you still talk to Missy across

the street.”) Mendoza was fired shortly thereafter. 

CPT argues that there is no casual connection because it did not have actual knowledge of any

protected activity. It argues that actual knowledge of the protected activity is an essential part of a

retaliation claim, citing Yartzoff v. Thomas, 808 F.2d 1372, 1376 (9 Cir. 1987). In its reply, CPT argues th

that proximity in time is insufficient to establish causal connection. (Doc. 28, Reply p.9-10.) CPT

argues that it is not sufficient that the defendant could or should have known of the protected activity;

the defendant must have actual knowledge. (Doc.22, CPT Moving Papers p. 15.)

Yartzoff does not stand for that proposition. The Court in Yartzoff held that causation may be

“inferred from circumstantial evidence, such as the employer's knowledge that the plaintiff engaged in

protected activities and the proximity in time between the protected action and the allegedly retaliatory

employment decision.” Yartzoff, 809 F.2d at 1376. The other case cited by CPT, Frazier v. UPS, 2005

WL 1335245 (E.D. Cal. 2005), states that complaints “cannot be viewed in a vacuum.” Indeed, whether

CPT had actual knowledge is an issue of fact. As stated above, the EEOC has presented circumstantial

evidence upon which a reasonable jury could believe that CPT had knowledge that Mendoza would

provide assistance to Somera in her sexual harassment charge. Accordingly, theEEOC has raised issues 3

of fact as to the prima facie claim of retaliation.

EEOC’s MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The EEOC moves for summary adjudication on the following issues:

(1) The EEOC has satisfied its conditions precedent to bringing suit,

(2) Defendant’s third affirmative defense for collateral estoppel,

(3) Defendant’s fourth affirmative defense for exhaustion of administrative remedies,

(4) Defendant’s seventh affirmative defense for California Labor Code §2911,

(5) Defendant’s twelfth affirmative defense for unclean hands,

 The other decision cited by CPT is an unpublished decision, Gomez v. United States Postal Serv., 32 Fed. Appx.

3

889, 892 (9th Cir. 2002). See FRAP 32.1.

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(6) Defendant’s thirteenth affirmative defense for waiver, and

(7) Defendant’s eighteenth affirmative defense for laches.

A. Conditions Precedent to Suit by the EEOC

The EEOC is required to fulfill certain basic requirements for administrative procedures under

Title VII prior to filing suit. The EEOC must (1) receive a timely charge of unlawful employment

practice and provide notice to the employer thereof; (2) conduct an investigation; (3) determine that

reasonable cause exists to believe that discrimination has occurred; and (4) attempt to eliminate any such

alleged unlawful employment practice byinformal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion.

EEOC v. Pierce Packing Co., 669 F.2d 605, 607 (9th Cir.1982); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. Thus, the basic

requirements that must be met include a timely and valid charge, an investigation, a finding of cause,

and an attempt at conciliation.

1. The Charge as a Condition Precedent

Before a potential plaintiff may sue for discrimination under Title VII, the plaintiff must first

exhaust his or her administrative remedies. Sommatino v. U.S., 255 F.3d 704 (9th Cir. 2001) (verbal

statements and email do not comply with the administrative claim requirements). “A private plaintiff

must first file an EEOC complaint against the allegedly discriminatory party before bringing a Title VII

suit in federal court. Stache v. Int'l Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftsmen, AFL-CIO, 852 F.2d

1231, 1233 (9th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 815 (1989). An employment discrimination charge

is to be construed liberally and an employee need not make allegations with legal precision. Sommatino

v. U.S., 255 F.3d at 710.

The EEOC presents evidence hat it has met this condition precedent. It is undisputed that

Mendoza filed a charge within 300 days of his termination. (Doc. 25, CPT Response fact 1.) It is

undisputed that CPT received notice of the charge. (Doc. 25, CPT Response fact 2.) Thus, it is

undisputed that a charge of discrimination was filed against CPT and that the EEOC provided notice to

CPT of the charge of discrimination. 

CPT argues that “[w]hile it remains undisputed that a charge of discrimination was filed and that

the EEOC sent it to CPT, the charge itself contained, at least in part, allegations that were known to be

factually unsupportable at the time.” (Doc. 25, Opposition p.6.) CPT argues that the Mendoza Charge

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contained false information which was known to the EEOC. CPT argues that the EEOC drafted the

Mendoza Charge knowing that Mendoza had not affirmatively assisted the EEOC in the Somera Charge

until after Mendoza had been terminated. Thus, CPT argues the EEOC presented a Charge which

contained “at best irrelevant and misleading” charge of retaliation. (Dco. 25, CPT P&A p.7.)

CPT’s position is that the EEOC should not have received the charge. CPT has not cited any

authority for the proposition that in receiving information for a potential charge, the EEOC must

investigate the information, prior to, receiving it. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.20 (“The Commission shall

receive information concerning alleged violations of title VII, the ADA, or GINA from any person.

Where the information discloses that a person is entitled to file a charge with the Commission, the

appropriate office shall render assistance in the filing of a charge.”) A charge must be in writing and

under oath or affirmation. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(b). The charge is necessary to initiate the

administrative process. Casavantes v. California State Univ., Sacramento, 732 F.2d 1441 (9 Cir. 1984) th

(intake questionnaire sufficient to begin the process), abrogated by See Fed. Express Corp. v.

Holowecki, -- U.S. --, 128 S.Ct. 1147, 1154-59, 170 L.Ed.2d 10 (2008) (discussing approach to be used

in determining whether intake questionnaire constitutes “a charge”). There is no authority that the

EEOC must, first, investigate a potential charge before it accepts the claim as a charge. 

The EEOC has been given broad authority not just to respond to individual instances of

discrimination, but to investigate discrimination independently in an effort to eradicate it from the

economy. See E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 296 n. 11, 122 S.Ct. 754, 151 L.Ed.2d 755

(2002) (noting that “[w]e have generally been reluctant to approve rules that may jeopardize the EEOC's

ability to investigate and select cases from a broad sample of claims” because “it is crucial that the

Commission's ability to investigate charges of systemic discrimination not be impaired”). Title VII does

not impose a “pre-investigation” investigation on the EEOC. Indeed, Title VIIrequires an investigation

after a charge is received, and provides a mechanism for dismissal of an unfounded charge. 42 U.S.C.

§2000e-5(b) (“If the Commission determines after such investigation that there is not reasonable cause

to believe that the charge is true, it shall dismiss the charge and promptly notify the person claiming to

be aggrieved”). Title VII does not impose “pre-investigation” as a condition for receiving a charge.

2. The Investigation as a Condition Precedent

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The second condition precedent to the EEOC filing suit in federal court is that the EEOC must

conduct an investigation of the charge. EEOC v. Pierce Packing Co., 669 F.2d at 607. After a charge

is filed, The EEOC next must notify the alleged wrongdoer of the charge, conduct an investigation, and

determine whether reasonable cause exists to believe that the charge is true. Id.

CPT argues that the EEOC did not conduct an adequate investigation prior to filing suit. (Doc.

25, Opposition p.6.) CPT argues that the EEOC did not conduct a genuine investigation into the

Mendoza’s charge. CPT argues that at the time the charge was sent to CPT, there was no evidence that

Mendoza had participated or assisted in another EEOC charge. There was no evidence that Mendoza

had provided information to the EEOC on Somera’s Charge and thereafter terminated for it. CPT argues

that the EEOC did not investigate CPT’s reason for terminating Mendoza - disclosure of confidential

patient information. Investigator Tuazon did not conduct any witness interviews and did not contact the

Department of Mental Health. (Doc. 25, Opposition p.9.) CPT argues that because the EEOC did not

conduct a genuine investigation, it did not satisfy a condition precedent to filing suit.

The EEOC points out that there are no judicial “standards” to evaluate whether an EEOC’s

investigation has satisfied its condition precedent. EEOC argues that it conducted “some” investigation

and cites communications between investigator Tuazon and Mendoza, the EEOC’s Request for

Information from CPT and letters from Drayton and CPT’s Counsel. It argues that “some” investigation

is all that is needed to satisfy its condition precedent. 

Federal courts generally accord deference to an agency's administrative decisions, rule-making,

and operating procedures, as well as to their interpretations of their governing statute. See Chem. Mfrs.

Ass'n v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 125, 105 S.Ct. 1102 (1985) (an agency charged

with administering a “complex statute” is entitled to considerable deference and the court is precluded

from substituting its judgment for that of the agency if the agency action was sufficiently rational); 

United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 106 S.Ct. 455, 88 L.Ed.2d 419 (1985)

(“[a]n agency's construction of a statute it is charged with enforcing is entitled to deference if it is

reasonable and not in conflict with the expressed intent of Congress”). In addition, deference to the

EEOC's determinations is consistent with the Administrative Procedures Act which provides that an

agency's actions, findings, and conclusions should be set aside if found to be “arbitrary, capricious, an

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abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706.

The Ninth Circuit has not directly addressed the issue of whether adequacy of the EEOC

investigation may be challenged in subsequent litigation. Several other courts have concluded that the

adequacy of the EEOC investigation may not be challenged. The Court in E.E.O.C. v. Gold River

Operating Corp., 2007 WL 983853, 3 (D.Nev. 2007) concluded that "an employer may not litigate the

adequacy of the EEOC's investigation and determination” and citing to various other circuits. Other

courts that have considered the subject are in agreement that an employer may not litigate the adequacy

of the EEOC's investigation or determination. See e.g., EEOC v. Walner & Assocs., 91 F.3d 963, 968

n. 3 (7th Cir.1996) ("This determination of reasonable cause is only an administrative prerequisite to a

court action and has no legally binding significance in subsequent litigation.") (citation omitted); EEOC

v. St. Anne's Hosp., 664 F.2d 128, 131 (7th Cir.1981) ("A reasonable cause determination is not to

adjudicate a claim but to notify an employer of the Commission's findings."); EEOC v. Chicago

Miniature Lamp Works, 526 F.Supp. 974, 975 (N.D.Ill.1981) ("no pre-merits judicial inquiry into the

basis for EEOC's investigation findings is proper in the ensuing Title VII action."); EEOC v. KECO

Indus., Inc., 748 F.2d 1097, 1100 (6th Cir.1984) ("It was error for the district court to inquire into the

sufficiency of the Commission's investigation."). 

In particular, in EEOC v. Keco Indus., Inc., 748 F.2d 1097, 1100 (6th Cir. 1984), the court held

it was error for the district court to consider the EEOC’s investigation. The EEOC had found reasonable

cause on a charge of sex discrimination. Id. at 1098. The district court granted defendant’s summary

judgment on the grounds that the EEOC did not have grounds to find cause. Id. at 1099. On appeal, the

Sixth Circuit reversed the district court finding the court erred in evaluating the sufficiency of the

investigation. Id. at 1100. The appellate decision was largely grounded in the public policy concern that

this “line of inquiry would deflect the efforts of both the court and the parties from the main purpose of

this litigation: to determine whether (the defendant) has actually violated Title VII.” Id. 

The nature and extent of an EEOC investigation into a discrimination claim is a matter within

the discretion of EEOC. In U.S. E.E.O.C. v. NCL America, Inc., 536 F.Supp.2d 1216, 1222 (D.Hawaii

2008), the Court stated that an EEOC investigation--although a condition precedent to the EEOC's

bringing of a lawsuit--simply requires that some investigation be made, and that challenges to the

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adequacy of the investigation are subject to a deferential standard of review. Similarly, in E.E.O.C. v.

Nestle Co., 1982 WL 234, 1 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (Karlton, J.), the Court denied a motion for summary

judgment that the EEOC failed to investigate. A charge of company-wide sex discrimination was filed

with the EEOC. The court found that the “EEOC undertook a reasonable investigation of that charge.”

The EEOC discovered, inter alia, that the defendant employed no women at all in salaried, “white-collar”

positions at its Ripon facility. The EEOC, relying on its expertise in these matters, concluded that it had

sufficient data upon which to base a determination that defendant had engaged in sex discrimination in

regard to these positions. The EEOC so informed the defendant, and offered it an opportunity to meet

and either convince the EEOC that its findings were improper, or to work out a voluntary compliance

scheme- i.e., to engaged in “conciliation.” Thus, courts give deference to the EEOC administrative

decisions.

Applying a deferential standard of review to the EEOC's investigative efforts, there is evidence

to support a finding that the EEOC satisfied the statutory condition precedent of an “investigation.” 

Here, EEOC conducted some form of investigation. It interviewed the charging party, Mendoza (See

Doc. 25, CPT Response to Facts 6), collected documents from CPT, ascertained CPT’s position on the

Mendoza charge, and obtained a statement from James Drayton (See Doc. 25, CPT Response to Facts

6). Further, the EEOC was not entirely acting within a vacuum because the EEOC was involved with

and had investigated two previously filed and related charges by former employees, Somera and Soares. 

(Doc. 25, CPT Response to Facts 6; Doc. 24 CPT Facts 8, 9, 14.) Thus, given the deference the Court

must exhibit to the administrative agency’s discretion, and the investigation conducted by the EEOC,

the investigation was not an abuse of discretion or arbitrary and capricious.

CPT argues that the EEOC should have done more. It argues that a “genuine” investigation

should have taken place and that the investigation at issue here was entirely lacking. CPT argues that

the EEOC should have interviewed additional witnesses, such as Latrice Wills, John Hacket, Larry

Fuentes, a representative of the California Department of Mental Health, to verify the charge and CPT’s

claims of legitimate termination of Mendoza. 

Whether the EEOC could or should do more is within the discretion of the EEOC. 

3. Reasonable Cause and Conciliation Efforts as Conditions Precedent

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CPT does not argue that the EEOC failed to satisfy the third condition; it was notified of the

finding of reasonable cause. The EEOC issued its Letter of Determination finding that there was

reasonable cause to believe that CPT had retaliated against Mendoza. (Doc. 25, CPT Statement of Facts

fact 7 (“Not disputed that the EEOC issued the Letter of Determination.”)

CPT argues that the EEOC’s conciliation efforts were patently unreasonable. CPT argues that

there was no evidence to support the charge. CPT argues that the EEOC changed the basis for the Notice

of Determination and then gave CPT only a few days to respond to the new Letter of Determination

(“LOD”). CPT argues that the EEOC artificially constrained conciliation efforts because the EEOC 4

gave CPT minimal time to respond to the September 15 Amended LOD.

If the EEOC determines after investigation that there is reasonable cause to believe a charge is

true, the Commission must “endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by

informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). During this

conciliation stage, the EEOC does not act as a neutral mediator between the Charging Party (the

complaining employee) and the Respondent (the employer), but rather pursues its own agenda: to

“eliminate the alleged unlawful employment practice.” See E.E.O.C. v. Champion Chevrolet, 2009 WL

2835101 (D.Nev.2009); EEOC v. Hometown Buffet, Inc., 481 F.Supp.2d 1110, 1114-15 (S.D.Cal.2007)

Courts have generally rejected efforts to challenge conciliation, concluding that the issue is only

whether EEOC attempted conciliation, not how hard it actually tried to obtain settlement. See E.E.O.C.

v. Costco Companies, Inc., 2000 WL 33116546 (S.D. Cal. 2000). While it is a jurisdictional

requirement to filing suit, the law requires no more than a good faith attempt at conciliation by the

EEOC; in doing so, the EEOC must outline the basis for its determination of discrimination, offer an

opportunity for voluntary compliance, and respond flexibly to the reasonable attitudes of the employer. 

E.E.O.C. v. Lockheed Martin Global Telecommunications, Inc., 514 F.Supp. 2d 797 (D. Md. 2007);

The EEOC issued a Letter of Determination on August 2007 and then vacated that determination and issued an

4

Amended Letter of Determination on September 15, 2008. (Doc. 25, CPT Response fact 7; Doc. 25, CPT Response fact 18.)

The initial LOD stated in pertinent part: “The evidence demonstrates that there is a casual connection between Charging

Party’s association with an individual who engaged in protected activity and his termination. The evidence further [sic] that

the reason asserted by Respondent for Charging Party’s termination is pretextual.” The Amended LOD deleted this language,

and substituted, “Based on the evidence of record, there is reasonable cause to believe that Respondent retaliated against

Charging Party in violation of the statute.”

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E.E.O.C. v. California Psychiatric Transitions, Inc., 644 F.Supp. 2d 1249 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (Wanger,

J.)(EEOC letters notifying former employer that it found reasonable cause to believe that female

employees and similarly situated employees were subjected to sexual harassment and inviting employer

to conciliate all claims against it was sufficient to satisfy EEOC's obligation to attempt conciliation of

similarly situated employee's hostile work environment claims before bringing suit); E.E.O.C. v.

Hometown Buffet, Inc., 481 F.Supp. 2d 1110 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (EEOC discharged its statutory obligation

to conciliate prior to filing action against employer under Title VII; though EEOC could have done more

to facilitate conciliation)

A district court's dissatisfaction with an EEOC conciliation attempt “is not the appropriate

standard of review. The district court should only determine whether the EEOC made an attempt at

conciliation. The form and substance of those conciliations is within the discretion of the EEOC as the

agency created to administer and enforce our employment discrimination laws and is beyond judicial

review.” E.E.O.C. v. CaliforniaPsychiatricTransitions,Inc., 644F.Supp.2d 1249, 1273 (E.D.Cal.2009)

(Wanger, J.). 

CPT argues that the conciliation efforts were faulty because the EEOC failed to support its LOD

or the Amended LOD with reference to specific evidence to support the charge. The conciliation

requirement, however, does not necessitate that the EEOC disclose all of the underlying evidence or

information to the employer. See E.E.O.C. v. Hibbing Taconite Co., 266 F.R.D. 260, 274 (D.Minn.

2009) and E.E.O.C. v. Champion Chevrolet, 2009 WL 2835101 at *7 (D.Nev. 2009) (the EEOC had

conciliated in good faith where the employer had received adequate explanation for the reasonable cause

finding and settlement proposal, and that "[t]he EEOC's failure to disclose the identities of potential

witnesses should not have affected [the employer's] ability to consider the demand"). 

Here, the EEOC provided CPT with sufficient information to ensure that CPT knew the basis

of the charge, and was able to participate in the conciliation process fully. Indeed, the Mendoza Charge 

stemmed from the Somera Charge, for which the EEOC and CPT were in active litigation when the

LODs were sent to CPT. After the first LOD in August 2007, the EEOC requested conciliation. (Doc. 

25, CPT Response fact 8.) CPT responded with objections, among other things, to the LOD and asked

for information regarding mitigation and damages. (Doc. 25, CPT Response fact 11.) CPT also offered

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to agree to workplace discrimination training and dissemination of material to the workforce. In

September 2007, the EEOC responded with the information requested and set a date forCPT’s response. 

(Doc. 25, CPT Response fact 12.) In October 2007, when CPT responded, it offered to reinstate

Mendoza and settle for $5,000. (Doc. 25, CPT Response fact 14.) The EEOC countered with an

$60,000 offer, comprised of both back pay and emotional distress damages. (Doc. 25, CPT Response

fact 15.) In January 2008, CPT responded with an objection to the amount requested in settlement and

requested objective verification of the emotional distress damages, among other things. (Doc. 25, CPT

Response fact 16.) In April 2008, with the parties $50,000 apart and eight months into the conciliation

efforts, the EEOC sent a letter indicating that conciliation was futile and non productive. (Doc. 25, CPT

Response fact 17.) 

An Amended LOD in September 2008 was sent to CPT. At that time, CPT and the EEOC were

involved in litigation regarding the Somera Charge and the parties were in depositions together. The

Amended LOD requested a quick return around response of one day. CPT did not respond within the

allotted time but responded on September 29, 2008, a few days later, with an offer of $7,500 in

settlement of the Mendoza Charge. By that time, the EEOC had referred the matter to litigation and this

action was commenced on September 30, 2008.

Applying a deferential standard of review to the EEOC's conciliation efforts, there is evidence

that the EEOC satisfied the statutory condition precedent of conciliation. The EEOC engaged in a

several months conciliation effort and was unsuccessful. It offered settlement opportunities, responded

to CPT’s extension requests and to CPT’s requests for information to substantiate the damages. 

CPT argues that EEOC failed to provide conciliation because the EEOC vacated the initial LOD

with the Amended LOD, and demanded an immediate response to its amended determination. (Doc. 25,

CPT P&A p. 10.) CPT argues this is not good faith conciliation efforts. CPT cites E.E.O.C. v. Pacific

Maritime Ass'n, 188 F.R.D. 379, 381 (D.Or. 1999) for the proposition that the court must make an

inquiry into whether “the EEOC had made satisfactory and good faith efforts in the conciliation

process.” 

Here, the underlying charge and the basis for the charge did not change in the Amended LOD. 

The Mendoza Charge remained the same that he had been terminated in retaliation for his participation

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with the Somera Charge. Having engaged in several months of conciliation, it was in the discretion of

the EEOC to determine the extent of further conciliation. The EEOC did not refuse to be flexible with

respect to timing; compare EEOC v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 340 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2003) (after

3 year investigation, EEOC gave employer 12 business days to respond and refused to grant any

extensions); did not refuse to negotiate, compare EEOC v. Agro Distributors, LLC, 442 F. Supp. 2d 357

(S.D. Miss. 2006) (EEOC's submission of an all-or-nothing proposal evidenced its failure to conciliate

in good faith). The Court should not “examine the details of the offers and counteroffers between the

parties, nor impose its notions of what the agreement should provide.” E.E.O.C. v. Pacific Maritime

Ass'n, 188 F.R.D. 379, 381 (D. Or. 1999). The EEOC charge did not change from the time that the

EEOC investigated, and began conciliation efforts. Thus, the issues were available for the CPT to

“confront.”

Given the deferential standard of review, the Court finds that the EEOC has satisfied the

conditions precedent to filing suit. The EEOC is charged with remedying discriminatory practices. The

Court may not substitute its judgment by finding “questions of fact” as to whether the conditions were

satisfied. The EEOC properly received a charge of retaliatory conduct. There is no authority for CPT’s

proposition that the EEOC was required to investigate the merits of the charge before receiving it. After

the charge was filed, the EEOC performed some investigation of the Mendoza Charge. The EEOC was

not operating in a vacuum with the Charge because the EEOC had investigated the related Somera

Charge. Nonetheless, the EEOC did some investigation and attempted to determine CPT’s position on

the charge. The EEOC also provided notice of the reasonable cause determination. While CPT

disagrees reasonable cause existed, the determination is within the discretion of the EEOC and there is

no evidence that the determination was either an abuse of the discretion, or “arbitrary and capricious.”

Finally, the EEOC satisfied conciliation efforts. It engaged in an eight month conciliation effort, and 

it was in the discretion of the EEOC to determine the extent of further conciliation. 

B. Affirmative Defenses

1. The Collateral Estoppel and Waiver defenses

The EEOC argues that the third and thirteenth affirmative defenses (for collateral estoppel and

waiver), fail because there is no factual support. The EEOC argues that defendant, in responding to

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discovery, stated that “it had no supporting facts.” The EEOC argues that because defendant failed to

identify any facts supporting these defenses, the defenses should be dismissed.

Defendant CPT’s opposition does not address the motion on the affirmative defenses of (1) third

affirmative defense for collateral estoppel, and (2) thirteenth affirmative defense for waiver. (Doc. 25,

Opposition p. 11–21.) The EEOC has shown that CPT lacks evidence to support this affirmative

defense. CPT has not come forward with evidence demonstrating that there is a material issue of fact

regarding these two affirmative defenses. Accordingly, summary adjudication is appropriate.

2. The Exhaustion of Remedies and Unclean Hands Defenses

The EEOC argues that fourth and twelfth affirmative defenses (exhaustion of administrative

remedies and unclean hands) fail because they are predicated upon defendant’s misunderstanding of the

EEOC’s obligations to discharge its conditions precedent to suit. The EEOC argues that these

affirmative defenses are based upon defendant’s claim that the EEOC failed to adequately investigate

and engage in conciliation efforts.

In its opposition, CPT relies upon its arguments as to the inadequate investigation and the

factually erroneous Mendoza Charge for its affirmative defenses of exhaustion of remedies and unclean

hands defenses. (Doc. 25, CPT Opposition p. 11.) CPT argues that the unclean hands doctrine "is a

self-imposed ordinance that closes the doors of a court of equity to one tainted with an inequitableness

or bad faith relative to the matter in which he seeks relief, however improper may have been the

behavior of the defendant." Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324

U.S. 806, 814 (1945). CPT argues that the EEOC disseminated “unfounded and factually unsupportable

charges of discrimination.” (Doc. 25, CPT Opposition p. 11.)

The Court agrees with the EEOC’s reply brief. (Doc. 27, Reply p.7.) CPT’s opposition is coterminous with CPT’s position that the EEOC failed to satisfy its conditions precedent. Since the Court

finds as a matter of law the conditions precedent were satisfied under the deferential standard of review, 

there is no issue of fact as to the failure to exhaust administrative remedies and unclean hands, in the

context of this EEOC initiated lawsuit. 

3. At-will Employment Affirmative Defense to Title VII

The EEOC argues that the seventh affirmative defense of at-will employment must fail. The

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EEOC argues that Labor Code §2922, the at-will employment statute, is not an affirmative defense to

a claim of discriminatory conduct. State law cannot vitiate federal discrimination law. (Doc. 20, EEOC

P&A p. 17.)

In federal pleading, an answer must “affirmatively state anyavoidance or affirmative defense ...”

Fed.R.Civ.P 8(c)(1). An affirmative defense is an assertion raising new facts and arguments that, if true,

will defeat plaintiff's claim, even if all allegations in complaint are true. See Saks v. Franklin CoveyCo.,

316 F.3d 337, 350 (2nd Cir. 2003); Wolf v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 71 F.3d 444, 449 (1st Cir.

1995) (test is whether potential defense would bar right of recovery “even if the general complaint were

more or less admitted to”).

CPT acknowledges in its opposition that “termination pursuant to the ‘at-will’ doctrine is not a

defense to Title VII discrimination.” (Doc. 25, Opposition p. 12.) Indeed, an at-will employee may not

be terminated in violation of public policy. Freund v. Nycomed Amersham, 347 F.3d 752, 758 (9th

Cir.2003) (holding that “at will” employment relationships allow employers to discharge employees for

any reason that does not violate public policy). At-will employment is not a defense to a termination

for discriminatory reasons. Accordingly, the motion will be granted on this affirmative defense.

4. Laches Affirmative defense

The EEOC argues that the eighteenth affirmative defense of laches fails as a matter of law. The

EEOC argues it did not unreasonably delay in filing suit and there has not been prejudice to CPT. EEOC

argues that there is no unreasonable or inexcusable delay between the filing of the Charge and the filing

of the EEOC complaint - 39 months. The investigation and conciliation efforts continued throughout

the period and the company was fully informed of the charges it had to defend. (Doc. 20, PA& p. 19-

20.) CPT has not been prejudiced by any delay. The EEOC argues that CPT is aware of all of the

witnesses and all of the documents.

Laches requires(1) unreasonable and inexcusable delayin filing lawsuit, and (2) the delaycaused

substantial prejudice to defendant. California School Employees Ass'n v. Tustin Unified, 148

Cal.App.4th 510, 521, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 739 (2007).

CPT has not opposed the motion as to the affirmative defense of laches.

It took 39 months form the date Mendoza files his discrimination charge to the date that the

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EEOC filed suit. This time, nonetheless, does not by itself show inexcusable or unreasonably delay. 

Consideration must be made of the EEOC workload and resources. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC,

432 U.S. 355, 360 (1977) (nothing in Title VII requires that the EEOC bring an enforcement action

within a maximum about of time). Since there is no evidence of unreasonable and inexcusable delay

in filing the lawsuit or that defendant has been prejudiced, summary adjudication on this defense is

appropriate.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS and DENIES the cross-motions for summary

judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication as follows:

1. DENIES defendant CaliforniaPsychiatricTransitions’ motion for summaryjudgment on

the claim of retaliation,

2. GRANTS the EEOC’s motion on defendant’s affirmative defense that it failed to satisfy

its conditions precedent to bringing suit,

3. GRANTS the EEOC’s motion on Defendant’s third affirmative defense for collateral

estoppel,

4. GRANTS the EEOC’s motion on Defendant’s fourth affirmative defense for exhaustion

of administrative remedies,

5. GRANTS the EEOC’s motion on Defendant’s seventh affirmative defense for California

Labor Code §2911,

6. GRANTS the EEOC’s motion on Defendant’s twelfth affirmative defense for unclean

hands,

7. GRANTS the EEOC’s motion on Defendant’s thirteenth affirmative defense for waiver,

and

8. GRANTS the EEOC’s motion on Defendant’s eighteenth affirmative defense for laches.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 8, 2010 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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