Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-05-03130/USCOURTS-caDC-05-03130-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Daniel Dorcely
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 25, 2006 Decided July 21, 2006

No. 05-3130

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

DANIEL DORCELY,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 01cr00454-04)

Melissa J. Stofko argued the cause for the appellant. Peter

M. Brody, appointed by the court, was on brief.

Florence Pan, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the

cause for the appellee. Kenneth L. Wainstein, United States

Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese, III and Daniel P. Butler,

Assistant United States Attorneys, were on brief. Suzanne C.

Nyland and Thomas J. Tourish, Jr., Assistant United States

Attorneys, entered appearances.

Before: SENTELLE, HENDERSON and GARLAND, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

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KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Daniel

Dorcely was convicted of making a false statement to the

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and acquitted of

conspiracy to commit money laundering and conspiracy to

defraud the government. Applying the sentencing regime

prescribed in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), the

district court sentenced Dorcely to 24 months’ incarceration and

ordered him to pay restitution in the amount of $63,315.51. In

sentencing Dorcely, the district court took into account

Dorcely’s role in the conspiracies, finding by a preponderance

of the evidence that he was involved in them notwithstanding his

acquittal on those offenses. Dorcely appeals his sentence. He

argues that the district court’s consideration of acquitted conduct

violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments and in the alternative

was unreasonable. He also claims that the restitution order

impermissibly considered losses other than those caused by the

conduct of which he was convicted. We affirm in part and

vacate in part, concluding that his sentence of 24 months’

incarceration was neither unconstitutional nor unreasonable but

that the restitution order must be remanded for the district

court’s reconsideration. 

I.

The appellant, Daniel Dorcely, owned and operated Dany

Enterprises, a struggling cellular telephone sales business. On

December 20, 1999, he opened a bank account at the Adelphi,

Maryland branch of Bank of America and deposited $110 into

the account. Dorcely thereafter enlisted in the U.S. Army and,

before leaving for basic training at Fort Benning, Georgia, made

“Tyrone Wallace,” the alias of his cousin, Stateson François, a

signatory on the Dany Enterprises bank account. On March 15,

Dorcely and François met with Albert Mundy, the Bank of

America Adelphi branch manager. According to Mundy,

Dorcely introduced François as “Tyrone Wallace” and advised

Mundy that a substantial sum of money from a school contract

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would be deposited into the Dany Enterprises account over the

next months. 

On March 30, 2000, the Department of Education (DOE)

direct-deposited $906,705 into the Dany Enterprises account

with the annotation, “Bennett County School, Impact Aid.”

That same day, “Wallace” made a withdrawal of $60,600 from

the account. Of that amount, he obtained a cashier’s check for

$46,900 made out to Capitol Cadillac. François and John

Holmes, a co-conspirator, used the cashier’s check to purchase

a Cadillac Escalade in the name of “Timothy Robbins,”

Holmes’s alias. 

On April 4, DOE direct-deposited another $18,368.43 into

the Dany Enterprises account. François and Dorcely’s brotherin-law, Dominique Germain, obtained two cashier’s checks from

the Dany Enterprises account on that day: one for $50,000 made

out to Wilson Powell Lincoln Mercury and another for $48,000

made out to Lustine Chevrolet. François and Holmes purchased

a Lincoln Navigator with the former. They attempted to buy a

Chevrolet Corvette with the latter. The manager of the

Chevrolet dealership, suspicious of the duo, delayed the sale by

refusing the cashier’s check ostensibly because the dealership’s

name was misspelled. After François and Holmes left to obtain

a new cashier’s check, the manager contacted the FBI. 

The FBI determined that the funds in the Dany Enterprises

account had been fraudulently obtained and froze the account on

April 5, 2000, at which time the account had a balance of

$766,473.43. The FBI discovered that the funds had been

obtained from DOE, which had earmarked them for underfunded elementary and secondary schools in South Dakota under

a program called “Impact Aid.” Apparently an unknown DOE

employee conspired with the two and altered the school

districts’ bank account information in the DOE computer

system, diverting Impact Aid funds to the Dany Enterprises

account.

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During its investigation, the FBI contacted Dorcely at Fort

Benning, Georgia. Special Agent Thomas Chadwick telephoned

Dorcely on April 18, 2000. During their conversation, Dorcely

informed Chadwick that “Tyrone Wallace” was a “buddy,”

denying that “Wallace” was related to him. 1/27/2004 Tr. at 85.

Dorcely further stated that he had met “Wallace” only seven or

eight months before and that “Wallace,” who had expressed an

interest in cellular telephone sales, was running Dany

Enterprises in his absence. Id. Chadwick later met with

Dorcely face-to-face. Dorcely at that time falsely stated that

“Tyrone Wallace” and François were two different people. Id.

at 86–87.

The government charged Dorcely with one count of

conspiracy to defraud the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 371, one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) and one count of making a false

statement to the FBI in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.

Following trial, the jury convicted Dorcely of making a false

statement to the FBI and acquitted him of both conspiracy

charges.

The district court conducted Dorcely’s first sentencing

hearing on June 4, 2004, applying the then-mandatory U.S.

Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines). The Guidelines specified

a sentencing range of zero to six months for the false statement

conviction. The government argued for a sentencing range of 24

to 30 months because, it maintained, it had proved by a

preponderance of the evidence that Dorcely had participated in

the conspiracy, which constituted “relevant conduct” under the

Guidelines. Over Dorcely’s objection, the district court agreed

with the government and sentenced Dorcely to 24 months’

incarceration. The government also sought restitution, which

the district court ordered in the amount of $63,315.51. 

Following Dorcely’s sentencing, the United States Supreme

Court decided Blakely v. Washington, 524 U.S. 296 (2004). In

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light of Blakely, Dorcely moved for reconsideration of his

sentence. After the High Court granted certiorari in Booker,

supra, the district court stayed the execution of the sentence to

“await a decision by the Supreme Court as to whether its

decision in Blakely v. Washington applies to the United States

Sentencing Guidelines.” United States v. Dorcely, No. 01–454,

slip op. at 1 n.2 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 6, 2004) (citation omitted).

Dorcely also appealed his sentence to this court and asked us to

hold the appeal in abeyance pending Booker. We granted his

motion. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Booker,

Dorcely moved this court to vacate his sentence and remand for

resentencing, which motion we granted. See United States v.

Dorcely, 2005 WL 583132, *1 (D.C. Cir. March 11, 2005).

The district court held Dorcely’s resentencing hearing on

July 19, 2005. Over Dorcely’s objection, it concluded that

Booker did not affect its authority to consider Dorcely’s

participation in the conspiracies under the preponderance of the

evidence standard and again sentenced Dorcely to 24 months’

incarceration. It also reimposed the order of restitution in the

amount of $63,315.51. 

II.

A.

Dorcely first contends that his sentence, based in part on

acquitted conduct, violated his Sixth Amendment right to trial

by jury and his Fifth Amendment right to due process of law.

We review issues of law relating to sentencing de novo. See,

e.g., United States v. Alexander, 331 F.3d 116, 130 (D.C. Cir.

2003); United States v. Gaviria, 116 F.3d 1498, 1518 (D.C. Cir.

1997) (per curiam). Applying this standard of review, we find

no constitutional error in Dorcely’s sentence. 

We were recently presented with the same question this case

presents: whether a sentence based on acquitted conduct violates

the Sixth Amendment. See United States v. Edwards, 424 F.3d

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1

In United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997), the Supreme

Court had earlier rejected a challenge to the sentencing court’s

consideration of acquitted conduct based on the double jeopardy

clause.

1106, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 2005). There we observed that the

Supreme Court “has not, however, determined whether the

practice violates the Sixth Amendment,”1 but we did not

address the issue because we remanded the case in accordance

with United States v. Coles, 403 F.3d 764, 771 (D.C. Cir. 2005)

(per curiam). We now reach the question and decide that a

sentencing court may base a sentence on acquitted conduct

without offending the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to

trial by jury. In so holding, we agree with every circuit that has

considered the question post-Booker. See United States v.

Ashworth, 139 F. App’x 525, 527 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S.

Ct. 765 (2005); United States v. Duncan, 400 F.3d 1297,

1304–05 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 432 (2005); United

States v. Magallanez, 408 F.3d 672, 684–85 (10th Cir.), cert.

denied, 126 S. Ct. 468 (2005); United States v. Price, 418 F.3d

771, 787–88 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Vaughn, 430 F.3d

518, 525–27 (2d Cir. 2005). 

Before Booker, we had held that a sentencing court may

consider conduct of which the defendant was acquitted provided

the conduct was proved by a preponderance of the evidence.

See, e.g., United States v. Yelverton, 197 F.3d 531, 535 n.3 (D.C.

Cir. 1999) (citing United States v. Thomas, 114 F.3d 228, 261

(D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v. Dozier, 162 F.3d 120, 125

(D.C. Cir. 1998)). Nothing in Booker undermines our precedent.

Under Booker, consideration of acquitted conduct violates the

Sixth Amendment only if the judge imposes a sentence that

exceeds what the jury verdict authorizes. Booker, 543 U.S. at

244 (“Any fact (other than a prior conviction) which is

necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum

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authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury

verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury

beyond a reasonable doubt.”). Here, Dorcely’s conviction on

the false statement count authorized a sentence of

“imprison[ment] not more than 5 years.” 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a).

His sentence of 24 months’ incarceration plainly falls within the

authorized sentence. 

We find two aspects of the Booker holding instructive here.

First, the Court noted that “when a trial judge exercises his

discretion to select a specific sentence within a defined range,

the defendant has no right to a jury determination of the facts

that the judge deems relevant,” further noting that a sentencing

court has “broad discretion in imposing a sentence within a

statutory range.” Booker, 543 U.S. at 233. While the Court did

not expressly address the sentencing court’s consideration of

acquitted conduct, we believe its language is broad enough to

allow consideration of acquitted conduct so long as the court

“deems [it] relevant.” Second, the Booker remedial opinion

expressly endorsed 18 U.S.C. § 3661, concluding that it poses

no Sixth Amendment problem. See id. at 251. Section 3661

provides, “No limitation shall be placed on the information

concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person

convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may

receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate

sentence” and permits a sentencing court to consider acquitted

conduct. See United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 151 (1997).

Dorcely next contends that the district court’s consideration

of acquitted conduct violated his due process right under the

Fifth Amendment. We disagree. The Supreme Court has

instructed that “[h]ighly relevant—if not essential—to [the

judge’s] selection of an appropriate sentence is the possession of

the fullest information possible concerning the defendant’s life

and characteristics.” Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247

(1949). It has therefore found that a sentencing court may

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2

The Court left open the question whether a higher standard of

proof might be necessary if relevant conduct dramatically increased

the sentence. See Watts, 519 U.S. at 156–57. Dorcely does not press

this argument. 

“consider[ ] a defendant’s past criminal behavior, even if no

conviction resulted from that behavior,” without violating due

process. Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 747 (1994)

(citing McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986)); cf. BMW

of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 573 n.19 (1996)

(“A sentencing judge may even consider past criminal behavior

which did not result in a conviction.”). 

Furthermore, we reject Dorcely’s claim that a sentencing

court’s use of acquitted conduct must be based not on a

preponderance of the evidence but instead evidence beyond a

reasonable doubt. In Watts, the Supreme Court held that “a

jury’s verdict of acquittal does not prevent the sentencing court

from considering conduct underlying the acquitted charge, so

long as that conduct has been proved by a preponderance of the

evidence.” Watts, 519 U.S. at 157. Dorcely characterizes the

Watts language as relating solely to the double jeopardy clause.

The Court’s discussion of the preponderance of the evidence

standard, however, also plainly encompasses the due process

clause. The Court upheld the Guidelines’ application of the

preponderance of the evidence standard to a sentencing court’s

consideration of relevant conduct, including acquitted conduct,

explaining that the application of “the preponderance standard

at sentencing generally satisfies due process.” Id. at 156.2

Moreover, before Booker, we rejected the argument that facts at

sentencing must be proved by a more stringent standard than

preponderance of the evidence, see, e.g., United States v. Long,

328 F.3d 655, 670–71 (D.C. Cir. 2003), including findings that

the defendant engaged in conduct of which he was acquitted,

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3

18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(3), providing jurisdiction to review a

sentence that “is greater than the sentence specified in the applicable

guideline range to the extent that the sentence includes a greater . . .

term of imprisonment . . . than the maximum established in the

guideline range,” is inapplicable because Dorcely challenges neither

the application of the Guidelines nor the calculation of his Guidelines

range.

4

Because our conclusion—that section 3742(a)(1) provides us with

jurisdiction to review any sentence for reasonableness—conflicts with

Circuit precedent, it has been considered separately and approved by

the full court. See Irons v. Diamond, 670 F.2d 265, 268 n.11 (D.C.

Cir. 1981). An Irons footnote is appropriate because we are

see, e.g., Yelverton, 197 F.3d at 535 n.3. Nothing in Booker

suggests a contrary result. 

B.

Dorcely argues in the alternative that his 24-month

imprisonment sentence was unreasonable. The Booker Court

directed the circuit courts of appeal to review sentences for

reasonableness, see Booker, 543 U.S. at 260–61, but it did not

expressly describe the jurisdictional basis therefor. Section

3742(a)(1) of Title 18 provides us with jurisdiction to review a

sentence that “was imposed in violation of law” and we believe

our jurisdiction to review for reasonableness must come from

this provision.3

 The government contends that section

3742(a)(1) does not give us jurisdiction to review a sentence

within a properly calculated Guidelines range, relying on our

pre-Booker precedent. See United States v. Hazel, 928 F.2d 420,

423–24 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (review of within Guidelines sentence

is limited to “determin[ing] whether the guidelines were

correctly applied”). We disagree, concluding that the Booker

decision has overruled our precedent on this point.4

 

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“overruling a more recent precedent which, due to an intervening

Supreme Court decision . . . a panel is convinced is clearly an

incorrect statement of current law.” Policy Statement on En Banc

Endorsement of Panel Decisions 2–3 (Jan. 17, 1996).

The government cites no post-Booker case law supporting its

position—nor could it. Every circuit that has considered the

issue has decided that section 3742(a)(1) provides appellate

jurisdiction to review any sentence for reasonableness. See

United States v. Chavez-Diaz, 444 F.3d 1223, 1228–29 (10th

Cir. 2006); United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 327–28 (3d

Cir. 2006); United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 25–26 (2d

Cir. 2006); United States v. Jiménez-Beltre, 440 F.3d 514, 517

(1st Cir. 2006) (en banc); United States v. Martinez, 434 F.3d

1318, 1321–22 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. McBride, 434

F.3d 470, 475–76 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Mickelson,

433 F.3d 1050, 1052–55 (8th Cir.2006); United States v.

Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 377 (4th Cir. 2006); United States

v. Plouffe, 445 F.3d 1126, 1127–29 (9th Cir. 2006); United

States v. Vaughn, 433 F.3d 917, 923–24 (7th Cir. 2006). We,

too, conclude that an unreasonable sentence is a sentence

“imposed in violation of law.” Cf. In re Sealed Case, 449 F.3d

118, 123 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“Booker . . . appears to assume there

is jurisdiction to hear an appeal to consider the reasonableness

of a sentence without regard to the merits of the claim.”). The

Booker remedial opinion is unequivocal on this point, declaring

that “the [Sentencing Reform] Act continues to provide for

appeals from sentencing decisions (irrespective of whether the

trial judge sentences within or outside the Guidelines range in

the exercise of his discretionary power under § 3553(a)).” 543

U.S. at 260 (emphasis added) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)–(b)).

Justice Scalia’s dissent accurately characterizes the remedial

opinion’s effect on appellate review: the reasonableness

standard now “appl[ies] across the board to all sentencing

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5

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) provides: 

Factors to be considered in imposing a sentence.--The court

shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than

necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph

(2) of this subsection. The court, in determining the particular

sentence to be imposed, shall consider--

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and

the history and characteristics of the defendant;

(2) the need for the sentence imposed–

(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense,

to promote respect for the law, and to

provide just punishment for the offense;

(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal

conduct;

(C) to protect the public from further crimes

of the defendant; and

(D) to provide the defendant with needed

educational or vocational training, medical

care, or other correctional treatment in the

most effective manner;

(3) the kinds of sentences available;

(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range

appeals, even to sentences within ‘the applicable guideline

range,’ where there is no legal error or misapplication of the

Guidelines.” Id. at 311 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part).

Accordingly, we now review any sentence, whether within the

Guidelines range or not, “to ensure that it is reasonable in light

of the sentencing factors that Congress specified in 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a).” United States v Price, 409 F.3d 436, 442 (D.C. Cir.

(2005).5

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established for--

(A) the applicable category of offense

committed by the applicable category of

defendant as set forth in the guidelines--

(i) issued by the Sentencing

Commission pursuant to section

994(a)(1) of title 28, United States

Code, subject to any amendments

made to such guidelines by act of

Congress (regardless of whether

such amendments have yet to be

incorporated by the Sentencing

Commission into amendments

issued under section 994(p) of title

28); and

(ii) that, except as provided in

section 3742(g), are in effect on the

date the defendant is sentenced; or

(B) in the case of a violation of probation or

supervised release, the applicable guidelines

or policy statements issued by the

Sentencing Commission pursuant to section

994(a)(3) of title 28, United States Code,

taking into account any amendments made

to such guidelines or policy statements by

act of Congress (regardless of whether such

amendments have yet to be incorporated by

the Sentencing Commission into

amendments issued under section 994(p) of

title 28);

(5) any pertinent policy statement--

(A) issued by the Sentencing Commission

pursuant to section 994(a)(2) of title 28,

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United States Code, subject to any

amendments made to such policy statement

by act of Congress (regardless of whether

such amendments have yet to be

incorporated by the Sentencing Commission

into amendments issued under section

994(p) of title 28); and

(B) that, except as provided in section

3742(g), is in effect on the date the

defendant is sentenced. 

(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence

disparities among defendants with similar records

who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and

(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of

the offense.

The government argues that the Booker language on which

we rely is only dictum. We disagree. The Booker Court

remanded for resentencing, adding that “if the sentence comes

before the Court of Appeals for review, the Court of Appeals

should apply the review standards set forth in this opinion,” that

is, review for reasonableness. 543 U.S. at 267. Furthermore,

even if the language were dictum, “carefully considered

language of the Supreme Court, even if technically dictum,

generally must be treated as authoritative.” Sierra Club v. EPA,

322 F.3d 718, 724 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v.

Oakar, 111 F.3d 146, 153 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted); citing Bangor Hydro-Elec. Co. v.

FERC, 78 F.3d 659, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“It may be dicta, but

Supreme Court dicta tends to have somewhat greater forceparticularly when expressed so unequivocally.”)). 

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6

Booker has not changed how the Guidelines range is to be

calculated. See United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir.),

cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 43 (2005). 

Exercising our jurisdiction, we consider the merits of

Dorcely’s claim that his sentence was unreasonable. He makes

two arguments: first, he argues that “any substantial increase in

a sentence based on acquitted conduct should be deemed

unreasonable per se, regardless whether such an increase is

determined to violate the accused’s constitutional rights,”

Appellant’s Br. at 24 (emphasis added); and, second, Dorcely

contends that even if we reject a per se rule, we should

nonetheless find that “the sentence imposed in this case plainly

is” unreasonable because it results in a fourfold increase in his

term of incarceration. Id. at 24–25. We reject both arguments.

We easily dispose of Dorcely’s categorical challenge to the

reasonableness of a sentencing court’s consideration of acquitted

conduct. Section 3661 of Title 18, which allows a sentencing

court to consider any information regarding a defendant’s

background, character and conduct, “codifies the longstanding

principle that sentencing courts have broad discretion to

consider various kinds of information.” Watts, 519 U.S. at 151.

The Supreme Court has interpreted the language of section 3661

to authorize the court’s consideration of acquitted conduct in

sentencing. See id. at 151–52.

The Guidelines also permit the sentencing court to consider

acquitted conduct. In the post-Booker world, the court must

calculate and consider the applicable Guidelines range but is not

bound by it.6

 Under the Guidelines, “the sentencing range for a

particular offense is determined on the basis of all ‘relevant

conduct’ in which the defendant was engaged and not just with

regard to the conduct underlying the offense of conviction.”

Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 393 (1995) (citing U.S.S.G.

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§ 1B1.3). Section 1B1.3 details the conduct the sentencing court

may consider in determining the applicable Guidelines range

and the commentary to that section states, “Conduct that is not

formally charged or is not an element of the offense of

conviction may enter into the determination of the applicable

guideline sentencing range.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, comment.,

backg’d. We have held that section 1B1.3 “is certainly broad

enough to include acts underlying offenses of which the

defendant has been acquitted.” United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d

624, 635 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Not only may the sentencing court

consider acquitted conduct in calculating the appropriate

Guidelines range but it may also consider that conduct in

determining the sentence within the range. Section 1B1.4 of the

Guidelines provides: “In determining the sentence to impose

within the guideline range, or whether a departure from the

guidelines is warranted, the court may consider, without

limitation, any information concerning the background,

character and conduct of the defendant, unless otherwise

prohibited by law. See 18 U.S.C. § 3661.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.4. 

We turn to Dorcely’s more circumscribed challenge to the

reasonableness of the fourfold increase in his sentence based on

acquitted conduct. The sentencing transcript reveals that the

district court considered both the Guidelines and the section

3553(a) factors, as Booker requires. See 7/19/05 Tr. at 31–37.

As noted earlier, Dorcely does not argue that his sentence was

improperly calculated under the Guidelines. We agree with our

sister circuits that a sentence within a properly calculated

Guidelines range is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of

reasonableness. See Alonzo, 435 F.3d at 554; United States v.

Green, 436 F.3d 449, 457 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v.

Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1054 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v.

Lincoln, 413 F.3d 716, 717 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v.

Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v.

Williams, 436 F.3d 706, 708 (6th Cir. 2006). Dorcely does not

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18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1) reads: 

[The district court shall award restitution] in all sentencing

proceedings for convictions of, or plea agreements relating to

charges for, any offense--

(A) that is--

(i) a crime of violence, as defined in section 16;

(ii) an offense against property under this title, or

under section 416(a) of the Controlled Substances

Act (21 U.S.C. 856(a)), including any offense

committed by fraud or deceit; or

come close to rebutting this presumption. The district court’s

explanation for Dorcely’s 24-month incarceration

sentence—that “a part of any sentence . . . is a component of

retribution,” 7/19/05 Tr. at 31, that “the Guidelines . . . set a

bench mark for what is reasonable,” id. at 36, to prevent “vast

disparit[ies] between what somebody would get going before

one judge as compared to what somebody would get when [he]

would go before another judge,” id. at 35, and that Dorcely

“was, in fact, responsible or a played a role, at least, in causing

those monies to then be diverted from that account and used for

illegal purposes,” id. at 36—was reasonable. 

C.

Finally, Dorcely contests the restitution order, arguing that

it was impermissibly based on conduct other than that of which

he was convicted. The district court ordered Dorcely to pay

restitution in the amount of $63,315.51 “as indicated in the

presentence report [PSR].” Id. at 37. The PSR provided that

“[u]nder 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1) and (3), the Court shall enter

an order for restitution.” PSR ¶ 77. Section 3663A(a)(1)

requires the district court to order restitution if the defendant is

convicted of an “offense described in subsection (c).”7 Because

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(iii) an offense described in section 1365 (relating to

tampering with consumer products); and

(B) in which an identifiable victim or victims has suffered a

physical injury or pecuniary loss.

18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1) (emphasis added). Notwithstanding the

word “and,” the government invites us to read subsections (A) and (B)

in the disjunctive; under the government’s theory, see Appellee’s Br.

42 n.21, restitution applies if the defendant committed an offense

enumerated under (A) or if “an identifiable victim or victims has

suffered a physical injury or pecuniary loss” under (B). The

government’s interpretation does violence to the statutory text. Under

the plain terms of section 3663A, restitution is available only if the

defendant meets both (A) and (B).

8

18 U.S.C. § 3663 permits restitution if a defendant is convicted

of “an offense under this title [title 18] . . . other than an offense

described in section 3663A(c).” 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(A). As noted

supra p. 16–17, Dorcely’s false statement conviction is not an offense

described in section 3663A(c). Moreover, his conviction under 18

U.S.C. § 1001 is plainly an “offense under this title [title 18].”

Dorcely was not convicted of such an offense, restitution under

section 3663A was unwarranted. 

Although the district court incorrectly ordered restitution

under section 3663A, we note that the order would also be

improper under the permissive restitution provisions of 18

U.S.C. § 3663.8 This provision permits (but does not require)

the district court to order “the defendant [to] make restitution to

any victim of such offense” “when sentencing a defendant

convicted of an offense under this title [title 18].” 18 U.S.C. §

3663(a)(1)(A). As Dorcely’s false statement conviction falls

under Title 18, he can be ordered to pay restitution but only for

the loss caused by “such offense.” In interpreting section 3663,

we are guided by the Supreme Court’s decision in Hughey v.

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9

Section 3579(a)(1) authorized the sentencing court to order “a

defendant convicted of an offense” to “make restitution to any victim

of such offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3579(a)(1) (1982 ed., Supp. IV).

United States, 495 U.S. 411 (1990), which interpreted section

3663’s predecessor, 18 U.S.C. § 3579(a)(1).9 The Court held

that under section 3579(a)(1) restitution may be ordered only

“for the loss caused by the specific conduct that is the basis of

the offense of conviction.” Hughey, 495 U.S. at 413. It made

clear that a defendant charged with multiple offenses but

convicted of only one offense cannot be ordered to pay

restitution for losses resulting from the other charged offenses.

Id. We believe the reasoning of Hughey applies with equal force

to section 3663 and conclude that restitution under 18 U.S.C. §

3663(a)(1) may be ordered only “for the loss caused by the

specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction.”

Indeed, the government correctly concedes that “[a]lthough it is

unclear what the restitution amount of $63,315.51 represents, it

seems highly unlikely that it properly reflects the loss caused

solely by the false statement.” Appellee’s Br. 44. 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Dorcely’s sentence of

24 months’ incarceration. We vacate the order of restitution,

however, and remand for further proceedings consistent with

this opinion. 

So ordered.

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