Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-05081/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-05081-8/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
R.E.M. International
Plaintiff
United States Citizenship and Immigration Service
Defendant
United States Department of Homeland Security
Defendant
United States Department of State
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

R.E.M. INTERNATIONAL, a California

partnership, appearing through its managing

partner, Peter V.G. Jefferson,

Plaintiff,

 v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

STATE; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT

OF HOMELAND SECURITY; UNITED

STATES CITIZENSHIP AND

IMMIGRATION SERVICES,

Defendants. /

No. C 05-05081 WHA

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

DISMISS

INTRODUCTION

In this action under the Federal Tort Claims Act, defendants move to dismiss pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6). Defendants have shown that this action is barred by issue preclusion from

another previously-filed action concerning the same facts. Moreover, leave to amend would be

futile because plaintiff’s proposed Bivens claim would necessarily implicate the same facts. 

Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and this action must be DISMISSED.

STATEMENT

Plaintiff R.E.M. International is a California partnership that conducts research

regarding the development of thermal solar energy converters. R.E.M. filed a visa petition with

the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services to classify a prospective employee,

Antoniya G. Georgieva, as a non-immigrant worker in a specialty occupation under 8 U.S.C.

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1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) on July 19, 2002 (Compl. ¶ 10). On October 17, 2002, the California

Service Center of CIS approved the petition (ibid.). Georgieva appeared for an interview at the

United States Embassy in Sofia, Bulgaria before John P. Cooney, Vice Consul Chief for the

Non-Immigrant Visa Unit (id. at ¶ 11). Cooney, allegedly acting beyond his authority, had

someone from the embassy who was familiar with computers question Georgieva to assess her

educational qualifications. The petition was eventually returned to the California Service

Center with a recommendation that it be revoked (ibid.). 

Peter V.G. Jefferson, managing partner of R.E.M., asked Cooney several times to

reconsider the recommendation (id. at ¶ 12–15). On January 22, 2003, CIS issued a notice of

intent to revoke the petition based on the Embassy’s assertions that: (1) Georgieva did not have

the work experience or education to perform services in a specialty occupation; (2) the petition

had been submitted for the purpose of facilitating Georgieva’s entry into the United States; and

(3) it was suspected that the proffered job may not exist because the petition was filed by a

company whose manager and partner had recently expressed an interest in obtaining a visa for a

nanny (id. at ¶ 16). R.E.M. alleges that the decision was made exclusively on uncorroborated

assertions from a third party, Jefferson’s wife (id. at ¶ 17). R.E.M. filed a response on February

21, 2003, that indicated that Georgieva held the equivalent of a bachelor’s degree or higher in

computer science engineering and that she was fully qualified for the position (id. at ¶ 18). 

On May 20, 2003, CIS issued a decision revoking the petition (id. at ¶ 19). Plaintiff

timely appealed on June 19, 2003, and the Administrative Appeals Office affirmed the

revocation of the petition on February 3, 2004 (id. at ¶ 20). In its revocation, the AAO stated

“[t]he fact most important to the appeal is that, even if all the consular information in the notice

[of intent to revoke the visa petition] were discounted, the evidence in the record is not

sufficient to establish that the petition was properly approved” (Def.’s Exh. C at 5). That is, the

AAO stated that it did not rely on the information from a third party in affirming the denial of

the petition. 

R.E.M. filed an action in this Court under the Administrative Procedure Act on March

30, 2004, R.E.M. International v. Neufeld, C-04-1245 WHA. In that action, R.E.M. challenged

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the decision to revoke approval of the petition as arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or

otherwise not in accordance with the law. An order dated December 13, 2004, granted the

government’s motion for summary judgment. This Court held that CIS had considered the

relevant factors under the regulation in determining that R.E.M.’s unsubstantiated assertions,

specifically that the position required a college degree, were insufficient to meet the statutory

criteria (Def.’s Exh. B). The order also noted that R.E.M.’s allegation that the administrative

record had been “cleansed” of the first draft of the consular officer’s memorandum to CIS and

various letters from R.E.M.’s managing partner’s wife was irrelevant because the AAO’s

decision expressly stated that it did not rely on any of those documents (id. at 11–12). 

Plaintiff appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. It affirmed

the grant of summary judgment on December 11, 2006 (Def.’s Exh. A). 

R.E.M. filed this action on December 8, 2005. The complaint alleged claims for (1)

negligence; (2) denial of due process; (3) violation of equal protection; (4) and retaliation. The

action was stayed on July 20, 2006, pending the outcome of the appeal to the Ninth Circuit. 

This motion was filed on August 8, 2007. 

ANALYSIS

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims alleged

in the complaint. “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not

need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his

‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of

the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, ___ U.S. ____,

127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964–65 (May 21, 2007). “All allegations of material fact are taken as true and

construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff. However, conclusory allegations of law and

unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim.” Epstein v. Wash. Energy Co., 83 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1996).

1. PROPER DEFENDANT UNDER THE FTCA.

Defendants first argue that the United States is the only proper defendant for claims

brought under the FTCA. For torts committed by federal agencies and federal employees acting

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within the scope of their duties, the exclusive remedy is a suit against the United States. 28

U.S.C. 2679(b)(1). Under the FTCA, the only proper defendant is the United States. Lance v.

United States, 70 F.3d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir. 1995). Here, plaintiff brings this action under the

FTCA, thus the United States Department of State, the United States Department of Homeland

Security, and the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services are not proper defendants. 

All claims against them must be dismissed. Plaintiff asked permission to substitute the United

States as the sole defendant in this action, however, as explained below, doing so would be

futile. 

2. ISSUE PRECLUSION.

Defendants argue that issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, bars this action. To

invoke issue preclusion, a party must show: “(1) the issue at stake is identical to an issue raised

in the prior litigation; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior litigation; and (3) the

determination of the issue in the prior litigation must have been a critical and necessary part of

the judgment in the earlier action.” Littlejohn v. U.S., 321 F.3d 915, 923 (9th Cir. 2003). 

A key question is whether the party in the previous action had a full and fair opportunity

to litigate the action. Ibid. Determining whether or not a party had a full and fair opportunity to

litigate requires examining at least two factors. First, the Court must look at whether procedural

opportunities unavailable in the first action could cause a different result in the second action. 

Maciel v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 489 F.3d 1018, 1023 (9th Cir. 2007). Second, the Court

must look at the parties’ incentives to litigate in the prior action. “If a party had good reason

not to contest an issue vigorously during the first action and did not, in fact, vigorously contest

the issue, that party generally should be entitled to relitigate the issue during the second action.” 

Ibid. 

Defendants argue that the Court already determined that the denial of Georgieva’s

petition was not arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise contrary to law, so plaintiff is precluded

from relitigating the issue in this action. In R.E.M. Int’l v. Neufeld, C 04-1245 WHA, this Court

granted summary judgment for defendant holding that CIS’s revocation of Georgieva’s visa

application was appropriate under the law (Def.’s Exh. B). This Court also held that the

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exclusion of third party statements and the first draft of Cooney’s memorandum from the

administrative record was proper because the AAO did not rely on those documents in making

its decision. The decision was upheld by the Ninth Circuit (id. at Exh. A). 

Here, both actions consider the issue of whether the denial of Georgieva’s petition for a

visa was proper — the prior action considered it under the Administrative Procedure Act, while

this action considers it as a tort claim. The issue was actually litigated because it was reached

in deciding the defendant’s summary judgment motion in that action. Moreover, the

determination of that issue was critical to the outcome of the action. Denial of Georgieva’s

petition was the central issue in that action as it is in this one. 

Plaintiff contends that it did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in

the first action. There, as here, R.E.M. argued that the decision to deny Georgieva’s petition

was based on unsubstantiated information submitted to CIS. R.E.M. did not get access to

certain letters sent by the managing partner’s wife claiming that Georgieva’s position with the

company was a sham, and a first draft of a memorandum from John Cooney, chief of the

Non-Immigrant Visa Unit at the embassy in Sofia, Bulgaria, which expressed similar concerns. 

Those documents ultimately were not included in the administrative record. Plaintiff now

contends that it should get access to those documents through discovery in this action. 

This issue was already addressed, however, in the prior action. When faced with the

same argument, the order granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment acknowledged

that the AAO’s decision expressly did not rely on the documents that plaintiff complains it did

not receive. The decision stated that “it has accorded no weight to the consular officer’s

speculations about the petitioner’s motivations and about whether the proffered position

actually exists” and that “even if all the consular information in the notice were discounted, the

evidence in the record is not sufficient to establish that the petition was properly approved”

(Def.’s Exh. C at 5). The summary-judgment order acknowledged that, and held that the fact

that plaintiff never received those documents was irrelevant to determining whether the decision

to deny R.E.M’s petition was arbitrary and capricious. The order stated (id. at Exh. B at

11–12):

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Plaintiff also alleges that the administrative record was “cleansed

of” the first draft of Mr. Cooney’s memorandum and various

letters from Mrs. Jefferson (Jefferson Decl. ¶ 10). This is

irrelevant, however, in light of the fact that the AAO’s decision

expressly disclaimed any reliance on Mr. Cooney’s speculations

or these “missing” documents (AR 67). Because these documents

were not considered by AAO in its final agency decision, the fact

that they do not appear in the administrative record is

inconsequential. 

Accordingly, it has already been determined that those documents are not relevant in

determining whether defendants breached any duty by affirming the denial of Georgieva’s

petition. Plaintiff has already had a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue.

Plaintiff maintains that because it did not have access to those documents, it was denied

the opportunity to address the accusations leveled at Jefferson, R.E.M.’s managing partner, by

his wife. It could not fully address the denial of the petition because they did not have all

relevant documents. Plaintiff launches into wild speculation that there might be admissions by

Neufeld and Cooney in those documents that would show that the decision was made on an

improper basis. Plaintiff’s argument completely ignores that the issue of whether it should have

access to those documents was already determined. One of the purposes of issue preclusion is

to preserve judicial resources by barring relitigation of issues. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v.

Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979). R.E.M. will not be allowed another shot at reopening an issue

that has already been decided by this Court. 

Plaintiff also seems to argue that it did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the

action because it was dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. This was simply not true

— this Court’s order, upheld by the Ninth Circuit on appeal, granted summary judgment to the

defendants on the basis that the decision to deny the petition was not arbitrary, capricious, or

otherwise contrary to law. The order was based on a review of the record on summary

judgment, not on subject-matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, this action is barred by issue

preclusion, and defendants’ motion to dismiss must be GRANTED. Because of this, this order

need not address defendants’ alternative grounds for dismissing this motion including lack of

redressable injury, interference with contract, foreign country exception, and others.

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3. LEAVE TO AMEND.

In its opposition, plaintiff asked for leave to amend their complaint in the event this

motion was granted. Plaintiff suggested that it could amend its complaint to allege a claim

under Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). At the

hearing on this motion, plaintiff stated that it wished to bring a Bivens claim against Donald W.

Neufeld, Director of the California Service Center of CIS, based on his decision to first approve

and then later revoke the petition. Such amendment would not correct the defects in this

complaint because issue preclusion would still apply. The prior action already addressed the

question of whether the decision to revoke her petition was arbitrary and capricious. Moreover,

plaintiff would again argue that the decision to deny Georgieva’s petition was made on an

improper basis because of the documents allegedly withheld by the government. As stated

above, review of Neufeld’s decision did not take those documents into account, so bringing

such a claim would be futile. Accordingly, plaintiff will not be granted leave to amend. 

CONCLUSION

For all of the above-stated reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED. 

Accordingly, this action is DISMISSED, and judgment will be entered in favor of defendants. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 13, 2007. WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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