Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-18-07185/USCOURTS-caDC-18-07185-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
K&D LLC
Appellant
Donald J. Trump
Appellee
Trump Old Post Office LLC
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 22, 2019 Decided February 28, 2020

No. 18-7185

K&D LLC, TRADING AS CORK,

APPELLANT

v.

TRUMP OLD POST OFFICE LLC AND DONALD J. TRUMP,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:17-cv-00731)

Alan B. Morrison argued the cause for appellant. With him 

on the briefs were Mark S. Zaid and Bradley P. Moss.

Michael E. Kenneally argued the cause for appellees. With 

him on the brief were Eric W. Sitarchuk, Fred F. Fielding, and 

Rebecca Woods. Allyson N. Ho entered an appearance.

Before: GARLAND and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges, and 

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge.

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GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge: Cork Wine Bar, a restaurant on 

the edge of the District of Columbia’s U Street corridor, 

competes with President Donald Trump’s eponymous 

Pennsylvania Avenue hotel. Cork brought suit in the Superior 

Court of the District of Columbia alleging violations of the 

District’s common law of unfair competition. President Trump 

removed the suit to federal court under the federal officer 

removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). The district court

denied Cork’s motion to remand the case, then dismissed its 

complaint for failure to state a claim. We affirm.

I

At the motion-to-dismiss stage, “we accept as true all of 

the complaint’s factual allegations.” Owens v. BNP Paribas, 

S.A., 897 F.3d 266, 272 (D.C. Cir. 2018). K&D, LLC, owns 

Cork Wine Bar. The Trump International Hotel is a business 

held in trust for the sole benefit of President Trump. Trump Old 

Post Office, LLC, operates the Hotel and holds the lease to the 

historic Pennsylvania Avenue structure. The Hotel, which

opened in September 2016, features event spaces, a restaurant,

and a lounge, and competes with Cork to host private events 

for international delegations and domestic public-interest 

groups. 

Cork noticed that the competitive balance shifted toward 

the Hotel after the 2016 election, when the Hotel began to 

attract more of the lobbyists, advocacy groups, and diplomats 

that Cork had relied on to fill its event calendar. Cork alleges

that these customers chose the Hotel because of a “perception” 

that patronizing the Hotel “would be to their advantage in their 

dealings with” the Trump Administration. Compl. ¶ 18, J.A. 

28. President Trump and his associates have encouraged and

advanced this perception by, among other things, using the 

President’s surname as the Hotel’s logo and promoting the 

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Hotel during press conferences and meetings with government 

officials. As a result, “foreign dignitaries have . . . flocked to 

the Hotel,” id. ¶ 21, J.A. 29, including the Ambassador of 

Azerbaijan, whom Cork hosted prior to the election, id. 

¶¶ 27-28, J.A. 31.

On March 9, 2017, Cork filed suit in the District of 

Columbia Superior Court against President Trump and the 

Hotel. Cork raised a claim of unfair competition under District 

common law for “the unfair advantage that the [Hotel] . . . has 

gained from Defendant Donald J. Trump being the President of 

the United States,” id. ¶ 2, J.A. 25, and sought declaratory and 

injunctive relief. Cork did not raise any claim under the 

Constitution or laws of the United States.

Citing the federal officer removal statute, President Trump 

filed a timely notice of removal in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1442(a)(1). Cork promptly moved to remand the case, but the 

district court denied that motion in a minute order. Once in 

federal court, President Trump and the Hotel moved to dismiss 

Cork’s complaint for failure to state a claim. 

The district court granted their motion to dismiss, 

concluding that Cork’s allegations of unfair advantage caused 

by the Hotel’s association with President Trump did not 

amount to a cognizable unfair-competition claim under District 

law. Neither the President nor his Hotel had interfered with 

access to Cork’s business, the court held. Instead, Cork’s 

complaint boiled down to an assertion that businesses with 

famous proprietors cannot compete fairly—a proposition alien 

to unfair-competition law. Cork filed a timely appeal. 

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II

Cork first argues that the case was improperly removed 

from the District of Columbia court. We must resolve this

jurisdictional issue before turning to the merits.

If removal was proper under the federal officer removal 

statute, the federal court had “jurisdiction over all the claims 

and parties in the case.” District of Columbia v. Merit Sys. Prot. 

Bd., 762 F.2d 129, 132 (D.C. Cir. 1985). That statute allows

“any officer . . . of the United States” to remove to federal court 

a state suit that is “for or relating to any act under color of such 

office.” 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). 

We apply a two-step test in officer-removal cases. First, 

the officer must “raise a colorable federal defense.” Jefferson 

Cty. v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 431 (1999). Second, the officer 

must show that the suit is one “for or relating to any act under 

color of [his] office.” 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). We must 

construe the statute liberally in favor of removal, Watson v. 

Philip Morris Cos., 551 U.S. 142, 147 (2007), and “we credit 

the [officer’s] theory of the case for purposes of both elements 

of” the removal inquiry, Acker, 527 U.S. at 432. 

A

Removal under section 1442(a) constitutes an exception to 

the well-pleaded-complaint rule. “[F]ederal jurisdiction 

generally exists only when a federal question is presented on 

the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Holmes 

Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 

831 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). But under 

section 1442(a), a suit may be removed “despite the nonfederal 

cast of the complaint” as long as the defendant presents a 

“colorable federal defense.” Acker, 527 U.S. at 431. The 

federal defense need only be “colorable,” not “clearly 

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sustainable.” Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 407 (1969). 

We do not “require the officer virtually to win his case before 

he can have it removed.” Acker, 527 U.S. at 431 (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

President Trump raised two federal defenses in his notice 

of removal. First, he argued that the District may not impose 

legal conditions on the lawful performance of his presidential 

duties. J.A. 59. Second, he claimed absolute presidential 

immunity from personal liability. Because we find the first 

defense colorable, we need not address the President’s 

alternative argument based on presidential immunity. 

The Supremacy Clause restricts the power of state and 

local governments to regulate federal offices and officeholders. 

See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 

(1819). In Johnson v. Maryland, for instance, the Supreme 

Court held unconstitutional a licensing regime that barred 

federal postal workers from operating vehicles until they 

passed a state exam. 254 U.S. 51, 57 (1920). Although a federal 

officer “does not secure a general immunity from state law,” a 

state cannot “control [the officer’s] conduct” when he or she is 

“acting under and in pursuance of [federal] laws.” Id. at 56-57. 

Thus, Maryland could not impose a restriction beyond “those 

that the [federal] Government ha[d] pronounced sufficient.” Id. 

at 57. 

This principle is not boundless. In Acker, several federal 

judges refused to comply with a county ordinance that imposed 

a “license or privilege tax” on any occupation not already 

regulated by a licensing regime. 527 U.S. at 428. Citing 

Johnson, the judges argued that the ordinance made it 

“unlawful” for them “to engage in” their federal office without 

paying. Id. at 440. But the Court disagreed, distinguishing the 

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“regulatory” law in Johnson, which is forbidden, from the mere 

“revenue-raising” provision in Acker, which is not. Id.

Claiming his defense relies upon Johnson, President 

Trump contends that Cork’s version of what District law 

requires works to regulate the “holding [of] federal office,” 

Trump Br. 14, because it would “forbid[] federal officials from 

owning interests in a D.C. business,” id. at 16. Any officer with 

a stake in such a business would face civil liability because of 

his official status, which amounts to conditioning the lawful 

exercise of federal power on compliance with “local legal 

requirements.” J.A. 59.

We think the President’s theory is colorable. Acker tells 

us that the “practical impact” of the relevant restriction “is 

critical” in this context. 527 U.S. at 440. And a state court’s 

decision to embrace Cork’s argument might impede federal 

officers. The Supremacy Clause might bar a state-law tort 

claim that applies only to federal officers or holds that 

ordinarily acceptable behavior—here, running a business—

triggers liability when undertaken by a federal officer.

To be clear, we take no position on the merits of President 

Trump’s defense. We need only conclude that, under his 

“theory of the case,” the defense is “colorable.” Id. at 431-32; 

see also id. at 431 (holding that, “although we ultimately reject 

[the judges’ theory,] it . . . presents a colorable federal 

defense”).

B

At the second step of our removal inquiry, President 

Trump must show that Cork’s suit was “for or relating to any 

act under color of [his] office.” 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). To 

satisfy this requirement, “the officer must show a nexus, a 

causal connection between the charged conduct and asserted 

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official authority.” Acker, 527 U.S. at 431 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Put differently, “[t]he circumstances that gave 

rise to the . . . liability” must “encompass” the defendant’s 

conduct in office. Id. at 433.1

President Trump characterizes Cork’s suit as an action “for 

or relating to” the act of simply holding office. Trump Br. 12. 

He argues that his position as President is “a necessary 

condition for Cork’s theory of liability,” and that his 

“assumption of office is what caused the alleged unfair 

competition to begin.” Id. at 30-31. 

We agree. The fact that Donald Trump is President is 

indispensable to Cork’s claim. Cork’s complaint expressly 

targets “the unfair advantage that the Trump International 

Hotel . . . has gained from Defendant Donald J. Trump being 

the President of the United States.” Compl. ¶ 2, J.A. 25

(emphasis added). Indeed, Cork conceded at oral argument that 

its unfair-competition claim is “based entirely” on President 

Trump’s status as a federal officeholder. Oral Arg. Tr. 

19:22-25. As a result, Cork argues, the ongoing unfair 

1 Congress added the words “or relating to” to the statue in 2011. See

Removal Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-51, 

§ 2(b)(1)(A), 125 Stat. 545, 545. Our sister circuits read this 

language as relaxing the nexus requirement, such that “a connection 

or association between the act in question and the federal office” now 

suffices. In re Commonwealth’s Motion to Appoint Counsel Against 

or Directed to Def. Ass’n of Phila., 790 F.3d 457, 471 (3d Cir. 2015) 

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sawyer v. Foster 

Wheeler LLC, 860 F.3d 249, 258 (4th Cir. 2017); Caver v. Cent. Ala. 

Elec. Coop., 845 F.3d 1135, 1144 (11th Cir. 2017). We need not 

decide the effect of the amended language in this case, because 

Cork’s suit qualifies even under the pre-amendment Acker standard.

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competition can be remedied by President Trump’s immediate 

resignation from office. Compl. ¶ 42, J.A. 33.

A suit that hinges on President Trump’s status as President 

of the United States has a causal connection to his “asserted 

official authority.” Acker, 527 U.S. at 431 (internal quotation

marks omitted). If Cork is right about the District’s common 

law, the President has a legal duty to either resign from office 

or divest from the Hotel. As explained immediately below, an 

officer’s failure to comply with a legal duty imposed by his 

official status is an “act under color of [his] office,” and a suit 

seeking to impose liability “for” that failure surely qualifies for 

removal under section 1442(a)(1).

Cork argues that the removal statute applies only when a 

plaintiff challenges a specific official act, and that its suit does 

no such thing. This argument evokes the dissenting opinion in 

Acker. There, Justice Scalia construed the target of the state suit 

as the judges’ refusal to pay the occupation tax. Id. at 445 

(Scalia, J., dissenting). Because that act of resistance was 

neither “required by” the judges’ “official duties” nor “taken in 

the course of performing” those duties, he concluded that the 

suit was ineligible for removal. Id. 

But the Acker majority rejected that narrow approach. Id. 

at 432 (majority opinion). Rather than frame the targeted “act” 

as the judges’ unofficial resistance, the Court looked to the 

“circumstances that gave rise to the tax liability,” which 

included the judges’ continued exercise of official authority in 

Jefferson County, Alabama. Id. at 433. Similarly, President 

Trump’s continued exercise of official authority is a 

prerequisite to liability under Cork’s tort theory.

Because President Trump has raised a colorable federal 

defense and demonstrated that Cork’s suit falls within the 

scope of section 1442(a)(1), we conclude that this case was 

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properly removed, and the district court possessed subjectmatter jurisdiction.

III

We turn now to the merits. The district court dismissed 

Cork’s complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Our review is de novo. Citizens for 

Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. DOJ, 922 F.3d 480, 486 

(D.C. Cir. 2019). 

When “considering common law claims, federal courts 

must apply existing law—we have no power to alter or expand 

the scope of D.C. tort law.” Pitt v. District of Columbia, 491 

F.3d 494, 507 (D.C. Cir. 2007). In other words, “[w]e must 

apply the law of the forum as we infer it presently to be, not as 

it might come to be.” Tidler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 851 F.2d 418, 

424 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (quoting Dayton v. Peck, Stow & Wilcox 

Co., 739 F.2d 690, 694-95 (1st Cir. 1984)).

The District’s case law does not define unfair competition 

“in terms of specific elements,” but rather by way of example, 

describing “various acts that would constitute the tort if they 

resulted in damage.” Furash & Co. v. McClave, 130 F. Supp. 

2d 48, 57 (D.D.C. 2001). We have previously identified three 

species of unfair competition under District law: “passing off 

one’s goods as those of another, engaging in activities designed 

solely to destroy a rival[,] and using methods themselves 

independently illegal.” Ray v. Proxmire, 581 F.2d 998, 1002 

(D.C. Cir. 1978). Later, in its most recent statement on the 

subject, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals listed as 

forms of unfair competition “defamation, disparagement of a 

competitor’s goods or business methods, intimidation of 

customers or employees, interference with access to the 

business, threats of groundless suits, commercial bribery, 

inducing employees to sabotage, [and] false advertising or 

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deceptive packaging.” B & W Mgmt., Inc. v. Tasea Inv. Co., 

451 A.2d 879, 881 n.3 (D.C. 1982) (citing WILLIAM PROSSER,

HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 956-57 (4th ed. 1971)).

Cork makes no meaningful attempt to square its unfaircompetition claim with District law. The gravamen of Cork’s 

complaint is that so long as the President retains a stake in the 

Hotel, Cork cannot fairly compete, because of the “perception” 

that Hotel patrons will receive favorable treatment from the 

Trump Administration. Although Cork suggests in passing that 

President Trump and the Hotel are “impair[ing]” competition 

and “interfer[ing] with access” to its business, Cork Br. 44-45, 

its claim bears little resemblance to the examples listed in Ray 

and B & W Management, and Cork cites no case showing that 

the allegations here fall into those categories of unfair 

competition.

President Trump argues that we have expressly rejected 

Cork’s theory of unfair competition. In Ray v. Proxmire, the 

plaintiff, a tour operator, alleged that Senator William 

Proxmire’s wife had leveraged “the prestige and contacts 

enjoyed by a senator’s wife” to promote her rival tour 

company. 581 F.2d at 1002. The Senator’s wife “secured entry 

to the vice-presidential mansion, the west lawn of the Capitol, 

State Department entertaining rooms and . . . Senate office 

buildings,” and “offer[ed] the opportunity to meet wives of 

governmental officials and to see their private homes.” Id. at 

1003. We rejected the plaintiff’s unfair-competition claim, 

explaining that “financial success does not become unlawful 

simply because it is aided by prominence.” Id. 

Given Cork’s failure to cite any contrary precedent, we see

no reason to conclude that District common law recognizes 

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anything like Cork’s unfair-competition claim.2 During oral 

argument, we asked Cork to cite any case—from any 

jurisdiction—in which a plaintiff successfully advanced a 

similar theory. Cork conceded that no such case exists. Oral 

Arg. Tr. 3:23-4:2, 10:8-22, 11:9-11, 12:3-4 (“There are no 

other cases because, your Honor, I believe what the Defendant 

did here is unique.”); see also Reply Br. 18 (“[T]here are no 

decisions of any court[] . . . in which the facts are remotely 

similar to this case.”). 

Cork’s case cannot survive that concession. Instead of 

citing case law, Cork appeals to the ongoing evolution of 

common-law claims like unfair competition and cites generic

passages from the Second and Third Restatements of Torts. 

Cork Br. 42-44. Cork’s allegations may one day constitute 

actionable unfair competition in the District. But we must “take 

the law of the appropriate jurisdiction as we find it,” Tidler, 

851 F.2d at 424, and Cork offers no indication that the common 

law of the District—or, indeed, of any jurisdiction—has 

evolved to encompass its theory of unfair competition. We 

therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal of Cork’s 

complaint. 

In fairness, Cork did not plan on having its common-law 

claim adjudicated in a court incapable of adapting the common 

law to fit these allegations. Now that the suit has been properly 

removed to federal court, Cork urges us to certify the core 

question of District law—i.e., the validity of its unfair2 Cork argues that a provision in the lease agreement between the 

General Services Administration and the Hotel evinces a “common 

understanding” that “elected officials [may not] benefit from their 

financial interests in leases of government property.” Cork Br. 47; 

see also Compl. ¶ 10, J.A. 26 (describing section 37.19 of the lease). 

But Cork articulates no link between the lease provision and the 

District’s common law of unfair competition, and we see none.

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competition theory—to the District of Columbia Court of 

Appeals. 

We decline that request. The decision to certify is a 

discretionary one, and “[t]he most important consideration 

guiding the exercise of [our] discretion” is whether we are 

“genuinely uncertain” about the correct answer under existing 

state law. Id. at 426. When the law “provide[s] a discernible 

path,” we follow it. Id. Here, Ray and B & W Management

provide that path by demonstrating that District law does not 

recognize Cork’s claim, and Cork fails to identify any case

suggesting an alternative route. Moreover, Cork did not argue

that this “case is one of extreme public importance,” a 

traditional element of our certification analysis. Metz v. BAE 

Sys. Tech. Sols. & Servs. Inc., 774 F.3d 18, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 

IV

The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 

So ordered.

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