Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01404/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01404-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Bank of America, N.A.
Defendant
Carthel Dennis Boring
Plaintiff
Nationstar Mortgage, LLC
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CARTHEL DENNIS BORING, an 

individual,

Plaintiff,

v.

NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC, a 

limited liability company; 

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., a 

national business 

association; and DOES 1-50, 

inclusive,

Defendants.

2:13-cv-01404-GEB-CMK 

ORDER GRANTING AND DENYING IN 

PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 

DISMISS AND DENYING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO STRIKE

Defendants Nationstar and Bank of America move under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) for dismissal 

of Plaintiff’s Complaint. Plaintiff’s Complaint is comprised of 

state claims under California Civil Code sections 2924(a), 

2923.6, and 2923.7; the implied covenant of good faith and fair 

dealing; and the California Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”). 

Defendants also move under Rule 12(f) for an order striking 

Plaintiff’s damages allegations in his claims alleged under 

sections 2924(a), 2923.6, and 2923.7 and his request for punitive 

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damages. Plaintiff opposes the dismissal motion but failed to 

respond to the motion to strike. 

I. LEGAL STANDARD

a. Rule 12(b)(6)

Decision on a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal motion requires 

determination of “whether the complaint's factual allegations, 

together with all reasonable inferences, state a plausible claim 

for relief.” United States ex rel. Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 

Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009)). “A claim has facial 

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that 

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

at 678 (citing Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 

(2007)).

When determining the sufficiency of a claim under Rule 

12(b)(6), “[w]e accept factual allegations in the complaint as 

true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to 

the non-moving party.” Fayer v. Vaughn, 649 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th 

Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, this 

tenet does not apply to “legal conclusions . . . cast in the form 

of factual allegations.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

“Therefore, conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted 

inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (“A pleading that offers 

‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action will not do.’”)

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b. Rule 12(f)

Rule 12(f) prescribes a “court may strike from a 

pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, 

impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). 

However, “Rule 12(f) does not authorize district courts to strike 

claims for damages on the ground that such claims are precluded 

as a matter of law.” Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi—Craft Co., 618 

F.3d 970, 974-75 (9th Cir. 2010).

II. JUDICIAL NOTICE

Defendants’ dismissal motion includes a request that

judicial notice be taken of the following documents recorded in 

the Butte County Recorder’s Office: 1) the Deed of Trust recorded

October 30, 2007; 2)the Corporate Assignment of Deed of Trust 

(the “Assignment”) recorded December 19, 2012; 3) the 

Substitution of Trustee (the “Substitution”) recorded January 15,

2013; 4)the Notice of Default and Election to Sell Under Deed of 

Trust (“Notice of Default”) recorded March 5, 2013; 5) the Notice 

of Trustee’s Sale (“Notice of Sale”) recorded May 31, 2013. 

(Def.’s Req. for Judicial Notice (“RJN”) 1:20–2:9, ECF No. 7.)

Plaintiff did not oppose the request. 

“As a general rule, ‘we may not consider any material 

beyond the pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.’ We 

may, however, . . . take judicial notice of ‘matters of public 

record.’” United States v. Corinthian Colls., 655 F.3d 984, 998-

99 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted) (quoting Lee v. City of 

Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2001)). Since the 

Deed of Trust, Notice of Default, and Notice of Sale are matters 

of public record, this portion of the judicial notice request is 

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granted. However, the request for judicial notice of the 

Assignment and the Substitution documents is denied since 

Defendants have not “explain[ed] what relevance these documents 

have to [the motion sub judice].” Ventura Mobilehome Communities 

Owners Ass'n v. City of San Buenaventura, 371 F.3d 1046, 1052 n. 

5 (9th Cir. 2004); see Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of 

Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022, 1025 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2006) (denying 

request for judicial notice where documents were “not relevant to 

resolution of th[e] appeal.”)

III. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND JUDICIALLY NOTICED MATTERS

The motion concerns the following allegations in the 

Complaint and information of which judicial notice has been 

taken. In 2007, Plaintiff refinanced his loan agreement with 

Countrywide Bank, FSB for his residential property (“the 

property”). (Compl. ¶ 12, ECF No. 1; RJN Ex. A.) In late 2008, 

Defendant Bank of America acquired Plaintiff’s loan from 

Countrywide. (Compl. ¶ 12.) Subsequently, Plaintiff applied for a 

loan modification. (Id. at ¶ 13.) In April 2011, Bank of America 

responded by “inform[ing] Plaintiff . . . that the reason he was 

not being modified was because he was not delinquent in his 

mortgage payments. [Bank of America told] Plaintiff that . . . 

to obtain a modification it was absolutely necessary for 

Plaintiff to stop making payments on his loan.” (Id.)

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Subsequently, Plaintiff missed three mortgage payments, and then 

 

1 Plaintiff contradicts himself concerning the year when Bank of America told

him that he must stop making payments before he could be considered for a loan 

modification by also alleging that he was told this in “April 2012.” (Compl. ¶ 

38.) However, several paragraphs in the Complaint indicate this communication

occurred in “April 2011.” (Id. at ¶¶ 2, 13, 14.) This contradiction is 

disregarded since it has no bearing on the motion. 

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submitted another loan modification application to Bank of 

America. (Id. at ¶ 14.) 

“[I]n November 2011, while Plaintiff was still in 

modification review, Plaintiff learned that Defendant Nationstar 

had obtained his mortgage.” (Id. at ¶ 15.) Shortly thereafter 

Plaintiff brought his account current. (Id.) 

Around January 2012, “Plaintiff began submitting his

loan modification application documents to Nationstar through his 

customer service manager, Amber Orenbaugh. In May 2012, Ms. 

Orenbaugh confirmed receipt of all documents necessary for the 

application, and Plaintiff awaited a response.” (Id. at ¶ 30.)

Plaintiff’s application remained open, and he never received a 

written determination of his eligibility for loan modification.

(Id. at ¶¶ 29-30.) 

In August 2012, Plaintiff attempted to make an online 

payment and learned that “his account had been frozen.”(Id. at ¶ 

16.) Plaintiff then attempted to contact a customer service 

manager to remedy the issue, but “he was put on hold or 

transferred between lines without any assistance.” (Id.) He

“endured [this] for weeks.” (Id.) 

“On or about September 6, 2012,” Plaintiff had a 

telephone conversation with a Nationstar representative during 

which Plaintiff requested “to make a telephonic payment, but was 

informed that he could not do so because his account was frozen.”

(Id. at ¶ 17.) Plaintiff was told to contact Ms. Orenbaugh2 for 

further information. “For months,” Plaintiff attempted to do so, 

 

2 Plaintiff identifies his customer service manager as both “Orenbaugh” (e.g.

Compl. ¶ 30) and “Orebaugh” (e.g. id. at ¶ 17). For consistency, this Order 

uses “Orenbaugh.” 

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but was unable to reach her. (Id.)

On March 5, 2013, Trustee Pite Duncan filed a Notice of 

Default concerning Plaintiff’s loan in the Butte County 

Recorder’s Office. (Id. at ¶ 18; RJN Ex. D.) “On or about May 8, 

2013, Plaintiff received a letter from Nationstar which indicated 

his Single Point of Contact had changed.” (Compl. ¶ 19.) Two days 

later, Plaintiff received a letter informing him that Nationstar 

had assigned him a different single point of contact. (Id. at ¶ 

20.) On May 31, 2013, Pite Duncan filed a Notice of Trustee’s 

Sale of Plaintiff’s property in the Butte County Recorder’s 

Office. (Id. at ¶ 21; RJN Ex. E.) “Then, on or about June 10, 

2013,” Plaintiff again received a letter from Nationstar 

informing him that Plaintiff’s single point of contact had 

changed. (Compl. ¶ 22.) All of Plaintiff’s single points of 

contact “refused to answer Plaintiff’s telephone calls . . . and 

did not communicate with Plaintiff.” (Id. at ¶ 29.)

IV. DISCUSSION

a. Nationstar’s Threshold Conclusory Dismissal Argument

Nationstar’s dismissal motion contains a conclusory and 

ambiguous argument that Plaintiff’s 2923.6 and 2923.7 claims 

should be dismissed because these statutes are part of

California’s recently enacted Homeowner Bill of Rights, which

Nationstar contends “materially affects a lender’s contractual 

right of enforcement upon a borrower’s default and was enacted 

after [Plaintiff’s] loan was originated . . . .” (Defs.’ Mot. to 

Dismiss (“Defs.’ Mot.”), 4: 12-13, ECF No. 6.) However, this 

portion of Nationstar’s motion lacks sufficient clarity to 

satisfy Rule 7(b)(1)’s requirement that a motion “state with 

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particularity the grounds for seeking the order” and “the relief 

sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1)(B)-(C). Therefore, this portion 

of the motion is denied. See generally Yates v. Delano Retail 

Partners, LLC, C 10-3073 CW, 2012 WL 2563850, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 

June 28, 2012) (“The purpose of [Rule 7(b)(1)’s] particularity 

requirement . . . is to afford notice of the grounds and prayer 

of the motion[,] . . . providing [the opposing] party with a 

meaningful opportunity to respond and the court with enough 

information to process the motion correctly.” (quoting 

Registration Control Systems, Inc. v. Compusystems, Inc., 922 

F.2d 805, 807 (Fed. Cir. 1990))).

b. Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.7

Nationstar also argues that Plaintiff’s 2923.7(c) claim

should be dismissed because it is premised on the erroneous

conclusion that this statute proscribed Nationstar from changing 

Plaintiff’s “original single point of contact (‘SPOC’) to three 

other SPOCs in May and June 2013.” (Defs.’ Mot. 7:18-19.)

Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that his SPOC changed three 

times during the referenced time period. (See Compl. ¶¶ 19, 20,

22.) 

Section 2923.7(a) prescribes: “Upon request from a 

borrower who requests a foreclosure prevention alternative, the 

mortgage servicer shall promptly establish a single point of 

contact and provide to the borrower one or more direct means of 

communication with the single point of contact.” Cal. Civ. Code § 

2923.7(a) (emphasis added). Section 2923.7(c) prescribes: “The 

single point of contact shall remain assigned to the borrower's 

account until the mortgage servicer determines that all loss 

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mitigation options . . . have been exhausted . . . .” Cal. Civ. 

Code § 2923.7(c). Furthermore, section 2923.7(e) prescribes: 

“‘[S]ingle point of contact’ means an individual or team of 

personnel each of whom has the ability and authority to perform 

the responsibilities [of a SPOC].” 

Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to state a 

claim under section 2923.7(c), since they do not plausibly infer 

that Nationstar failed to provide Plaintiff with an SPOC during 

the period he references in his Complaint. Therefore, this claim 

is dismissed.

Nationstar also seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim 

alleged under section 2923.7(b)(1), in which Plaintiff alleges 

that any assigned SPOCs failed to communicate with him and 

“refused to answer Plaintiff’s telephone calls . . . .” (Compl. ¶ 

29.) Plaintiff also alleges in his Complaint that he submitted a 

“complete [loan] modification application” prior to being 

assigned SPOCs. (Id.) 

Section 2923.7(b)(1) prescribes: “The [SPOC] shall be 

responsible for . . . [c]ommunicating the process by which a 

borrower may apply for an available foreclosure prevention 

alternative and the deadline for any required submissions to be 

considered for these options.” Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.7(b)(1)

(emphasis added).

Since Plaintiff alleges he had completed his loan 

modification application before any assigned SPOC failed to 

communicate with him, Plaintiff has not alleged a viable claim 

Nationstar’s motion to dismiss this claim is granted.

///

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c. Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.6(c)

Nationstar argues that Plaintiff’s 2923.6(c) claim 

should be dismissed because it is based on the erroneous notion 

that this statute has retroactive application to Nationstar’s 

alleged actions on which this claim is based. However, the 

essence of what Plaintiff alleges is that Nationstar violated 

section 2923.6(c) by recording the Notice of Default and the 

Notice of Sale after the effective date of this statute and while 

Plaintiff’s loan modification application was pending. Therefore, 

this portion of the dismissal motion is denied.

Nationstar argues in the alternative that Plaintiff’s 

2923.6(c) claim should be dismissed because Plaintiff’s “loan 

modification application was denied” before the effective date 

section 2923.6(c), and “[a]s a result, Plaintiff did not have a 

complete loan modification application pending . . . when the 

foreclosure notices were recorded . . . .” (Defs.’ Reply, 3:9-11, 

ECF No. 11.) However this argument is premised on factual 

information not contained in the Complaint and which has not been 

shown appropriate for consideration when deciding a dismissal 

motion. Therefore, this portion of the motion is denied. 

d. Cal. Civ. Code § 2924(a)

Nationstar seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s 

2924(a)(2)&(3) claim, in which Plaintiff alleges that Nationstar 

should not have recorded the Notice of Sale on May 31, 2013.

Nationstar contends section 2924(a)(4) authorized it to record 

this Notice of Sale. However, since Plaintiff’s section 2923.6(c) 

claim survives the motion, Nationstar has not shown it was 

entitled to record the challenged Notice of Sale. Therefore, this 

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portion of the motion is denied.

e. Good Faith and Fair Dealing

i. Nationstar

Nationstar seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim in 

which he alleges breach of the implied covenant of good faith and 

fair dealing, arguing this claim does not contain sufficient 

factual allegations to state an actionable claim. Plaintiff 

alleges in this claim that Nationstar “blocked” his account, and 

therefore made it impossible for him to submit loan payments. 

(Compl. ¶ 16-17.) “The covenant of good faith is read into 

contracts in order to protect the express covenants or promises 

of the contract.” Careau & Co. v. Sec. Pac. Bus. Credit, Inc., 

222 Cal. App. 3d 1371, 1393 (1990) (internal quotation marks 

omitted) (quoting Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 

654, 690 (1988)). Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to state 

a claim. Therefore, this portion of the motion is denied.

ii. Bank of America

Bank of America also seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s 

claim alleging breach of the implied covenant of good faith and 

fair dealing, arguing this claim fails to allege that Bank of 

America caused Plaintiff to suffer harm. Causation of harm is an 

element of this claim. Reinhardt v. Gemini Motor Transp., 879 F. 

Supp. 2d 1138, 1145 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (quoting Rosenfeld v. 

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 732 F. Supp. 2d 952, 968 (N.D. Cal. 

2010)). Since Plaintiff has not alleged how Bank of America 

harmed him, this dismissal motion is granted. 

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f. Unfair Competition Law

i. Standing

Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s UCL claims, 

arguing Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing statutory 

standing.

To have standing to state a UCL claim, a plaintiff must 

have “suffered injury in fact and . . . lost money or property as 

a result.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204. “To satisfy the . . . 

standing requirement . . . a party must . . . (1) establish a 

loss or deprivation of money or property sufficient to qualify as 

injury in fact, i.e., economic injury, and (2) show that that 

economic injury was the result of, i.e., caused by, the unfair 

business practice . . . that is the gravamen of the claim.” 

Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 4th 310, 322 (2011)

Plaintiff fails to allege that Bank of America caused 

him any injury. Therefore, Bank of America’s motion to dismiss 

Plaintiff’s UCL claims against it is granted.

Plaintiff alleges Nationstar caused him injury when it 

had the Notices of Default and Sale recorded, in violation of 

section 2923.6(c), and froze his account; he alleges these 

actions harmed his credit and resulted in the commencement of 

foreclosure proceedings against his property. (Compl. ¶¶ 18, 21, 

30-31, 39.) “[D]amage to credit” is a “loss of money or property” 

within the meaning of the UCL, Rex v. Chase Home Fin. LLC, 905 F. 

Supp. 2d 1111, 1147 (C.D. Cal. 2012), as is the initiation of 

foreclosure proceedings. See Jenkins v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 

N.A., 216 Cal. App. 4th 497, 522 (2013) (finding initiation of 

foreclosure proceedings constitutes loss of property under UCL); 

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Griley v. Nat'l City Mortgage, CIV. 2:10-1204 WBS, 2011 WL 

219574, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2011) (same). Therefore this 

portion of Nationstar’s motion is denied. 

ii. Nationstar’s Arguments Seeking Dismissal of 

Plaintiff’s Claims Alleged under the “Fraudulent,” 

“Unlawful,” and “Unfair” Portions of the UCL.

Nationstar seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s following 

claims alleged under the UCL, arguing that Plaintiff has not 

alleged plausible claims: 1) fraudulent business acts or 

practices, 2) unlawful business acts or practices, and 3) unfair 

business acts or practices. “The UCL prohibits ‘unfair 

competition,’ which is broadly defined to include ‘ . . . acts or 

practices which are unlawful, or unfair, or fraudulent.” Davis v. 

HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 691 F.3d 1152, 1168 (9th Cir. 

2012)(quoting Cel-Tech Commc'ns, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular 

Tel. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163, 180 (1999)).

A. Fraudulent Business Acts or Practices 

Nationstar argues Plaintiff’s UCL fraudulent business 

acts or practices claim should be dismissed because Plaintiff has 

not pled fraudulent business acts or practices with specificity.

A UCL claim grounded in fraud must satisfy the pleading 

standard of Rule 9(b), under which “[a]verments of fraud must be 

accompanied by ‘the who, what, when, where, and how’ of the 

misconduct charged.” Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 

1124 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 

F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003)). 

Plaintiff’s UCL claim is comprised of the conclusory

allegations that “Defendants’ conduct” constituted “fraudulent 

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business practices.” (Compl. ¶¶ 43, 46.) These allegations fail 

to meet the Rule 9(b) pleading standard. Therefore, Plaintiff’s 

claim under the “fraudulent” prong of the UCL is dismissed. 

B. Unlawful Business Acts or Practices

Nationstar argues Plaintiff’s UCL unlawful business 

acts or practices claim should be dismissed, contending Plaintiff

has not successfully alleged that Nationstar committed a 

predicate statutory violation. The unlawful conduct portion of 

the UCL “borrows violations of other laws and treats them as 

unlawful [acts or] practices that the unfair competition law 

makes independently actionable.” Cel-Tech Commc'ns, Inc. v. Los 

Angeles Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163, 180 (1999). Since 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant recorded Notices of Default and 

Sale in violation of 2923.6(c), Nationstar’s motion to dismiss 

this claim is denied. See Rubio v. Capital One Bank, 613 F.3d 

1195, 1204 (9th Cir. 2010) (“By properly alleging a [Truth in 

Lending Act] violation, [Plaintiff] has also alleged a UCL 

violation under the prong of the UCL that prohibits ‘unlawful’

business acts or practices.”) 

C. Unfair Business Acts or Practices

Nationstar seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s UCL unfair 

business acts or practices claim, contending Plaintiff has not 

defined unfairness “in connection with a legislatively declared 

policy.” (Defs.’ Mot. 14:16-22.) However, Plaintiff has alleged

that Nationstar violated section 2923.6(c). Therefore, 

Nationstar’s motion to dismiss this claim is denied. See Rubio, 

613 F.3d at 1205 (finding Plaintiff has “show[n] that 

[Defendant’s] practice violates public policy as declared by 

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‘specific . . . statutory . . . provisions’ . . . by successfully 

alleging a [Truth in Lending Act] violation.” (quoting Gregory v. 

Albertson's, Inc., 104 Cal. App. 4th 845, 854 (2002))).

g. Motion to Strike 

Defendants move to strike Plaintiff’s allegations in 

which he seeks damages under sections 2924(a), 2923.6, and 

2923.7, arguing that “Plaintiff cannot recover damages [under 

these sections] unless a trustee’s deed has been recorded.” 

(Defs.’ Mot. to Strike 2:16-17, ECF No. 5.) Defendants also seek 

to have Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages stricken, arguing 

they are not recoverable on any claim. Since “Rule 12(f) does not 

authorize district courts to strike claims for damages on the 

ground that such claims are precluded as a matter of law,” 

Defendants’ motion to strike is denied. Whittlestone, 618 F.3d at 

974-75.

V. CONCLUSION 

For the stated reasons, Bank of America’s motion to 

dismiss Plaintiff’s claims alleged against it for breach of the 

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and for violation 

of the UCL is granted. Nationstar’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s 

claims alleged against it under section 2923.7(c), section 

2923.7(b)(1), and the “fraudulent” prong of the UCL is also

granted. The remaining portion of the dismissal motion is denied. 

Defendants’ motion to strike is also denied. Plaintiff is granted 

fourteen (14) days from the date on which this order is filed to 

file an amended complaint addressing the deficiencies in any

dismissed claim. Plaintiff is notified that a dismissal with 

prejudice could be entered under Rule 41(b) if Plaintiff fails to 

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file an amended complaint within the prescribed time period. 

Dated: January 6, 2014

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