Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cv-02576/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cv-02576-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Tony DeVille
Counter Claimant
Jane Doe
Counter Defendant
Tiffany Doe
Counter Defendant
El Dorado Union High School District
Counter Claimant
Justin Gatling
Counter Claimant
Tara Grudin
Counter Claimant
Chas Prior
Counter Claimant
Stephen Wehr
Counter Claimant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JANE DOE, an individual; and 

TIFFANY DOE, an individual;

Plaintiffs,

v.

EL DORADO UNION HIGH SCHOOL 

DISTRICT; CHAS PRIOR, 

Individually; STEPHEN WEHR, 

Individually; TONY DEVILLE, 

Individually; TARA GRUDIN, 

Individually; JUSTIN GATLING, 

Individually; and DOES 1 

THROUGH 20,

Defendants.

No. 2:18-cv-02576-JAM-CKD

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART MOTION FOR 

JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

Jane Doe and Tiffany Doe (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed a 

complaint against El Dorado Union High School District, and 

individual Defendants Chas Prior, Stephen Wehr, Tony Deville, 

Tara Grudin, and Justin Gatling (collectively “Defendants”), 

alleging Defendants violated Title IX and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, by 

failing to redress a hostile educational environment after 

Plaintiffs were sexually assaulted at El Dorado High School 

(“EDHS.”). Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 1,4-5. Currently before this 

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Court is Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. Mot. 

for Judgment on the Pleadings (“Mot.”), ECF No. 35-1. In this 

Motion, Defendants only seek judgment on the Title IX claims and 

section 1983 claims asserted against the individual Defendants. 

Id. at 1. Plaintiffs oppose this Motion. Opp’n, ECF No. 45.1 

For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS in part and 

DENIES in part Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs allege they were “repeatedly sexually harassed 

and sexually assaulted” by their teacher Daniel Mummy at El 

Dorado High School during the 2016-2017 school year. Compl. ¶ 4. 

Plaintiffs were both minors when the assault took place; Jane Doe 

and Tiffany Doe are fictitious names utilized to protect their 

privacy. Id. 

El Dorado High School is in the El Dorado Union High School 

District (“School District”). Id. ¶ 4. Id. Accordingly, 

Plaintiffs named the School District as a defendant in this case. 

Id. ¶ 7. At issue in this motion are the claims against school 

district employees—individual Defendants Chas Prior, Stephen 

Wehr, Tony Deville, Tara Grudin, and Justin Gatling. Mot. at 2. 

Defendant Chas Prior was the El Dorado High School Principal 

during the school year Plaintiffs were sexually assaulted. 

Compl. ¶ 8. Defendants Tara Grudin and Justin Gatling were the 

Vice Principals. Id. ¶¶ 11-12. Defendant Stephen Wehr was the 

1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 

scheduled for February 25, 2020.

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Superintendent of the School District and Defendant Tony Deville 

was the Assistant Superintendent of Human Resources (“The Title 

IX Coordinator”). Id. ¶¶ 9-10. 

Plaintiffs allege they were sexually assaulted by Mummy “in 

the classroom, hallway, doorway, and outdoor areas of the 

schoolyard during school hours.” Compl. ¶ 36. Plaintiffs 

maintain that individual Defendants, Prior, Grudin and Gatling

observed these actions. Id. 

Mummy was convicted of sexual molestation on October 2017. 

Id. ¶ 56. After he was arrested, Plaintiffs “were subjected to 

bullying and unsympathetic conduct by teachers and students.” 

Id. ¶¶ 57, 61-62. Plaintiffs’ parents attempted to address 

these issues with Principal Prior and Vice Principals Grudin and 

Gatling, yet they “took no actions to protect or support the 

Plaintiffs.” Id. ¶¶ 61, 64-65, 93, 95. Plaintiffs allege the 

other individual Defendants, School District’s Superintendent 

Wehr and Title IX Coordinator DeVille, were also informed of the 

sexual harassment but failed to investigate. Id. ¶¶ 83,86,89.

Defendants seek judgment on all claims against these five

individual Defendants. Mot. at 2. Plaintiffs are suing the 

individual Defendants for alleged violations of Title IX and 

Section 1983 in their individual capacities. 

Compl. ¶¶ 128,142,148,161. 

II. OPINION

A. Legal Standard

A party may move for judgment on the pleadings “[a]fter the 

pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial.” Fed. 

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R. Civ. P. 12(c). “Rule 12(c) is ‘functionally identical’ to 

Rule 12(b)(6) and . . . ‘the same standard of review’ applies to 

motions brought under either rule.” Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. 

Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1054 n. 4 (9th Cir.

2011). Accordingly, the Court “must accept all factual 

allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the 

light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Fleming v. 

Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009). The Court can 

properly grant judgment on the pleadings “when there is no issue 

of material fact in dispute, and the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Id. 

B. Judicial Notice

In deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the 

Court is generally limited to the pleadings and may not consider 

extrinsic evidence. Shame On You Productions, Inc. v. Elizabeth 

Banks, 120 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1143-44 (C.D. Cal. 2015). However, 

the Court may consider “documents referenced extensively in the 

complaint, documents that form the basis of plaintiff's claims, 

and matters of judicial notice, when determining whether the 

allegations of the complaint state a claim upon which relief can 

be granted.” Lopez v. Regents of University of California, 5 F. 

Supp. 3d 1106, 1113 (N.D. Cal. 2013). The Court may take 

judicial notice of a fact that “is not subject to reasonable 

dispute because it . . . can be accurately and readily 

determined from sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably 

questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). 

Defendants ask the Court to take judicial notice of the 

Complaint for Damages and Demand for Jury Trial filed on 

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September 18, 2018. Defs’ Req. for Judicial Notice, ECF 35-2. 

Plaintiffs ask the Court to take judicial notice of Defendants’ 

Answer to the Complaint, ECF No. 16. Plfs’ Req. for Judicial 

Notice, ECF No. 46, Exh. A. Neither party objects to the 

others’ requests but both requests are unnecessary since both of 

these documents are court filings of which the Court already has 

knowledge. Moreover, the Court can only take judicial notice of 

the existence of these pleadings. As noted above, for purposes 

of this Motion, the Court must accept all factual allegations in 

the Complaint as true.

C. Analysis

1. Title IX Individual Liability 

Defendants argue Plaintiffs’ First and Second claims 

against the individual Defendants fail as a matter of law, 

because Title IX does not support claims against individuals. 

Mot. at 3. 

Title IX provides in relevant part:

[N]o person . . . shall, on the basis of sex, be 

excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits 

of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 

educational program or activity receiving financial 

assistance.”

20 U.S.C. § 1681. Whether Title IX supports individual 

liability claims is not well-established. The Supreme Court 

has yet to directly address this question, leaving other 

courts divided on the issue. Compare Doe v. Petaluma, 830 

F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (finding individuals may not 

be held liable under Title IX), with Mennone v. Gordon, 889 

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F. Supp. 53 (D. Conn. 1995) (finding Title IX does support 

individual claims). 

Defendants ask the Court to adopt the reasoning in

Petaluma. Reply at 4. In their opposition, Plaintiffs’

request the Court to instead adopt the reasoning in Mennone. 

Opp’n at 5-6. Plaintiffs overlook however, that only five 

years after Mennone was decided, the District of Connecticut 

found its reasoning in Mennone to be flawed when confronted 

with the same issue. See Norris v. Norwalk Public Schools, 

124 F. Supp. 2d 791, 797. Notably, the District of 

Connecticut found the analysis in Petaluma, to be far more 

persuasive than its own previous ruling. Id. at 796. While 

neither case is binding authority, the Court is persuaded by 

the reasoning in Petaluma, especially since it is consistent 

with statements made by the Supreme Court and the Ninth 

Circuit. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 528 U.S. 

629 (Supreme Court observed it had yet to “exten[d] damages 

liability under Title IX to parties outside the scope of 

[the government’s enforcement] power.” Id. at 641) and AlRifai v. Willows Unified School Dist., 469 Fed. Appx. 647, 

649 (9th Cir. 2012) (“As Plaintiffs concede, Title IX does 

not create a private right of action against school 

officials, teachers, and other individuals who are not 

direct recipients of federal funding.”) 

In Petaluma, a student attempted to hold her principal 

and counselor liable under Title IX for allegedly failing to 

protect her from sexual harassment by another student. 830 

F. Supp. at 1565, 1577. The court ultimately dismissed the 

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individual claims against the principal and counselor, 

finding that “individuals may not be held personally liable 

under Title IX.” Id. at 1577. The court found that 

“[s]ince the Act prohibits discrimination against 

beneficiaries in programs and activities that receive 

federal financial assistance . . . it is the educational 

institution that must be sued for violations of Title IX.” 

Id. at 1576-1577. Further, it found its conclusion was 

reinforced by the statutory provision for administrative 

enforcement, since it only refers to “actions federal 

agencies may take against institutions.” Id. The court was 

likewise persuaded by the Ninth Circuit’s holding that 

individuals may not be liable for discrimination under Title 

VII. Id. (citing Miller v. Maxwell’s Int’l Inc., 991 F.2d 

583, 587-88 (9th Cir. 1993)). It found that since the 

“evils [these two amendments] attack are so intimately 

related . . . it would make little sense to interpret Title 

IX to permit individual liability absent clear direction 

from Congress.” Id. 

Adopting the reasoning in Petaluma, this Court finds 

that the five individual Defendants in this case may not be 

held personally liable under Title IX. The Court therefore 

GRANTS judgment for these Defendants on Plaintiffs’ First 

and Second claims under Title IX, finding that they fail as 

a matter of law. 

2. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Defendants also seek judgment on Plaintiffs Third and Fourth 

claims for violation of section 1983, claiming they are immune

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from liability under the Eleventh Amendment. Mot. at 4. 

Plaintiffs argue Defendants are not immune because their claims 

are asserted against the individual Defendants in their 

individual capacity, not in their official capacity. 

Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to create a private cause 

of action for violations of the United States Constitution. 

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-691 (1978). 

Local governing bodies are considered “persons” under the statute 

and are therefore subject to liability under section 1983. Id. 

However, “local governing units that are considered part of the 

State for Eleventh Amendment purposes” are immune from liability. 

Id. at 690 n. 54. 

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution 

provides that “[t]he judicial power of the United States shall 

not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, 

commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by 

citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any 

foreign state.” U.S. Const. Amend. XI. School districts are 

considered a state agency for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. 

Belanger v. Madera Unified Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 248 (9th Cir. 

1992). Official-capacity suits “generally represent only another 

way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer 

is an agent.” Monell, 436 U.S. 690, n.55. Since “[t]he State of 

California has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity with 

respect to claims brought under section 1983 in federal court,” 

official-capacity suits against California school officials are 

precluded under the Eleventh Amendment. Brown v. Cal. Dep’t of 

Corr., 554 F.3d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 2009). Personal-capacity 

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suits, on the other hand, are not barred by the Eleventh 

Amendment. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). This is so 

even in personal-capacity suits attempting to hold a state 

official liable for “actions taken in their official capacities.” 

Id.

Plaintiffs do not dispute their suit would be barred had 

they sued the Defendants in their official capacities. Opp’n at 

8-9. They do dispute, however, Defendants’ attempt to 

characterize their suit as an official-capacity suit. Id. 

Plaintiffs maintain they are suing the individual Defendants in 

their individual capacity. Id. Defendants argue that while it 

may seem on its face that Plaintiffs have brought forth a 

personal-capacity suit, they are merely using a pleading device 

“to circumvent congressional intent” and hold the school 

vicariously liable for alleged violations of Title IX. Reply at 

6-7. The Court disagrees. 

In determining whether a suit is an individual or official 

capacity suit, the Court “must consider the ‘essential nature’ of 

the proceeding.” Eaglesmith v. Ward, 73 F.3d 857, 860 (9th Cir. 

1996) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Dept of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459. 

464 (1945)). “[W]hen the action is in essence one for the 

recovery of money from the state, the state is the real, 

substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke its 

sovereign immunity from suit even though individual officials are 

nominal defendants.” Ford Motor Co., 323 at 464. However, when 

an action “seeks damages against [defendants] personally, the 

Eleventh Amendment does not restrict [plaintiffs] ability to sue 

in federal court.” Hafer, 502 U.S. at 31. 

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Here, the intent of the Third and Fourth causes of action 

are to bring recourse on behalf of Plaintiffs against these five

individual Defendants. This is made explicit in their Complaint. 

For example, in their Fourth cause of action, Plaintiffs allege

“the individual Defendants . . . are liable for compensatory and 

punitive damages for their creation of an actual, particularized 

danger that Plaintiffs would be sexually abused by a known, 

sexual predator teacher, done in deliberate indifference. . . .” 

Compl. ¶ 157. Plaintiffs’ Complaint shows that they seek redress 

for the emotional and psychological damages they allegedly 

suffered from the harassment fostered by the deliberate 

indifference of these individually named Defendants. Compl ¶¶ 

153, 164.

Defendants’ contention that Plaintiffs’ allegation that 

“individual defendants were acting within the course and scope of 

their employment,” Compl. ¶ 13, is “clearly an attempt to hold 

the School District vicariously liable.” is without merit. Reply 

at 7-8. It is well-established that “state officers [are not

immune under the Eleventh Amendment] from personal liability 

under section 1983 solely by virtue of the “official” nature of 

their acts.” Hafer, 502 U.S. at 31. Thus, that the individual 

Defendants “acted pursuant to their respective capacities, or 

‘under color of state law’” does not imply they are being sued in 

their official capacities. Opp’n at 11. 

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have made clear the 

“essential nature” of their Third and Fourth Claims as personal 

capacity claims. Id. The Court therefore need not address

Plaintiffs’ argument regarding Defendants’ Answer to their 

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Complaint. Opp’n at 12. Based on the essential nature of their 

claims alone, it is clear the Eleventh Amendment does not bar 

these claims. The Court therefore DENIES judgment on these 

claims. 

III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS in part 

and DENIES in part Defendants’ motion for judgment on the 

pleadings.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 19, 2020

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