Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-06510/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-06510-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Billy Alabsi
Plaintiff
Savoya, LLC
Defendant

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BILLY ALABSI,

Plaintiff,

v.

SAVOYA, LLC,

Defendant.

Case No. 18-cv-06510-KAW 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 

TRANSFER; GRANTING IN PART 

AND DENYING IN PART MOTION TO 

DISMISS

Re: Dkt. Nos. 22, 34

Plaintiff Billy Alabsi brings this putative class and collective action against Defendant 

Savoya, LLC, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and various California 

labor laws and regulations. (First Amend. Compl. ("FAC"), Dkt. No. 29.) Defendant now moves 

to: (1) transfer the case to the Northern District of Texas, and (2) to dismiss the complaint. (Def.'s 

Mot. to Transfer, Dkt. No. 22; Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. No. 34.) Having considered the 

parties' filings, the relevant legal authority, and the arguments made at the March 21, 2019 

hearing, the Court DENIES Defendant's motion to transfer and GRANTS IN PART and DENIES 

IN PART Defendant's motion to dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant operates a chauffeured limousine and luxury car transportation service. (FAC ¶ 

15.) Plaintiff worked as a driver for Defendant for approximately two years in San Francisco, 

California. (FAC ¶ 9.) While working for Defendant, Plaintiff used the fictitious business name, 

Translinks Limo. (See Vendor Service Agreement ("VSA") at AP000001-2, Dkt. No. 23-1; Plf's 

RJN re Mot. to Dismiss, Exh. A, Dkt. No. 45.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant derives all or nearly all of its revenue from providing 

transportation services, relying on drivers like Plaintiff. (FAC ¶ 15.) The vast majority of 

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Defendant's business comes from corporate clients and recurrent contracts, rather than individual 

members of the general public. (FAC ¶ 17.) Plaintiff further alleges, however, that Defendant 

misclassified its drivers as independent contractors, rather than employees. (FAC ¶¶ 15, 29.) 

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant has and exercises extensive control over its drivers, 

assigning specific customers, locations, pickup times, and destinations. (FAC ¶ 18.) Further, 

while drivers have the right to decline assignments, they are penalized for declining jobs by not 

receiving future jobs from Defendant. (FAC ¶ 19.) Defendant also requires drivers to provide 

their own vehicles, which must usually be black, less than three years old, free of any visible 

damage, and be on Defendant's list of approved sedans and SUVs. (FAC ¶ 20.) Plaintiff requires 

drivers to use environmentally responsible maintenance procedures, including recycling used oil, 

batteries, antifreeze, and tires. (FAC ¶ 20.) Vehicles must be stocked with an umbrella, bottled 

water, newspapers, maps, GPS device, and a detailing kit. (FAC ¶ 21.) They must also be free of 

magazines, tissues, candy, promotional materials, or items hanging from the rearview mirror. 

Vehicles must be non-smoking and have a neutral order, and not contain visible air fresheners. 

(FAC ¶ 21.) Drivers must use tablets with computer-generated signage, cannot speak unless 

spoken to, confirm radio and temperature preferences with passengers during the first five minutes 

of the trip, and never discuss rates with passengers. (FAC ¶ 22.)

Defendant monitors its drivers by requiring that they keep Defendant's app on and use 

status update buttons to indicate when they are onsite, when the passenger is onboard, and when 

the passenger is dropped off. (FAC ¶ 23.) Drivers must arrive at jobs fifteen minutes early, or 

"spot time," and attend meetings, which they are not compensated for. (FAC ¶¶ 32-33.) 

Defendant also requires that drivers have liability insurance in a minimum amount set by 

Defendant, that Defendant is listed as an Additional Insured on the insurance policy, and that the 

policy come from an insurance carrier with an A.M. Best rating of A-VII. (FAC ¶ 24.) Finally, 

Defendant has the right to terminate drivers without cause with 30 days' notice. (FAC ¶ 25.)

Plaintiff asserts that by misclassifying drivers as independent contractors, Defendant fails 

to reimburse drivers for expenses including vehicle costs and other operation costs such as 

garaging, fuel, maintenance, repair, cleaning, licensing, insurance premiums, cell phone and 

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tablets services, and stocking the vehicle with Defendant-required items. (FAC ¶ 29.) Plaintiff 

further alleges that after taking into account these expenses, drivers may earn less than minimum 

wage. (FAC ¶ 67.) For example, Plaintiff estimates his average weekly expenses to exceed $800, 

but that he sometimes made less than $800 -- including in the week of May 13-19, 2018 -- when 

few jobs were available. (FAC ¶ 67.) Plaintiff also points to the failure to pay for spot time and 

the mandatory meetings. (FAC ¶ 68.)

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant failed to pay overtime because Defendant 

compensated its drivers at the same rate schedule for all hours worked, including overtime. (FAC 

¶ 76.) For example, Plaintiff states that he worked in excess of forty hours in the week of June 3 

through June 9, 2018, but was not paid overtime compensation for the hours he worked in excess 

of forty hours. (FAC ¶ 77.)

On April 25, 2018, Plaintiff signed a new VSA in his capacity as an officer of Translinks 

Limo. (VSA at 1.) The VSA included a choice of law and forum selection clause, which stated:

Governing Law. This Agreement will be governed by and construed 

in accordance with the laws of the State of Texas, without giving 

effect to any choice of law or conflict of law provisions or rule. The 

choice of competent jurisdiction located in Dallas County, Texas 

shall have sole and exclusive jurisdiction over any proceeding 

relating to or arising out of this Agreement.

(Id. ¶ 11g.)

On October 24, 2018, Plaintiff filed the instant putative class and collective action against 

Defendant. (Compl., Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff seeks to bring a class action on behalf of all drivers 

who worked for Defendant in California, and a collective action of all drivers who worked for 

Defendant in the United States. (See FAC ¶¶ 2-3.) On December 10, 2018, Defendant filed a 

motion to dismiss and a motion to transfer the case. (See Dkt. No. 19; Def.'s Mot. to Transfer.) 

On January 9, 2019, Plaintiff filed his amended complaint, bringing claims for: (1) failure to pay 

minimum wage in violation of the FLSA; (2) failure to pay overtime in violation of the FLSA; (3) 

failure to pay minimum wage compensation in violation of California Labor Code §§ 1194 and 

1197, and Industrial Welfare Commission ("IWC") wage orders; (4) failure to pay overtime in 

violation of California Labor Code §§ 510, 1194, and 1198, and IWC wage orders; (5) failure to 

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reimburse business expenses in violation of California Labor Code § 2802; (6) failure to provide 

and/or authorize meal and rest periods in violation of California Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512, 

and IWC wage orders; (7) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements in violation of 

California Labor Code § 226; (8) waiting time penalties in violation of California Labor Code §§ 

201-203; (9) unfair business practices in violation of California Business & Professions Code § 

17200 et seq.; and (10) civil penalties pursuant to the Private Attorneys General Act. (FAC at 12-

26.) Defendant then filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint, and the Court terminated 

the prior motion to dismiss as moot. (Dkt. No. 41.)

On January 11, 2019, Plaintiff filed his opposition to Defendant's motion to transfer the 

case. (Plf.'s Opp'n to Mot. to Transfer, Dkt. No. 31.) On January 25, 2019, Plaintiff filed his 

opposition to Defendant's motion to dismiss. (Plf.'s Opp'n to Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. No. 39.) That 

same day, Defendant filed its reply in support of its motion to transfer. (Def.'s Reply re Mot. to 

Transfer, Dkt. No. 39.) On March 6, 2019, Defendant filed its reply in support of its motion to 

dismiss. (Def.'s Reply re Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. No. 46.) On March 13, 2019, Plaintiff filed 

objections to Defendant's request for judicial notice in support of the reply. (Dkt. No. 48.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Request for Judicial Notice

A district court may take judicial notice of facts not subject to reasonable dispute that are 

"capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot 

reasonably be questioned." Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); United States v. Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 331, 

333 (9th Cir. 1993). A court may, therefore, take judicial notice of matters of public record. 

United States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980).

B. Motion to Transfer

Generally, "[a] district court has discretion to decline to exercise jurisdiction in a case 

where litigation in a foreign forum would be more convenient for the parties." Lueck v. 

Sundstrand Corp., 236 F.3d 1137, 1142 (9th Cir. 2001). The party moving to dismiss based on 

forum non conveniens has the burden of showing that there is an adequate alternative forum and 

that the balance of private and public interest factors favors dismissal. Id. at 1142-43. "A 

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plaintiff's choice of forum will not be disturbed unless the private and public interest factors 

strongly favor trial in the foreign [forum]." Dardengo v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc. (In re Air Crash 

Over the Midatlantic), 792 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1094 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 

Factors relating to the parties' private interests include relative ease 

of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for 

attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of 

willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be 

appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems that make 

trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive. Public-interest 

factors may include the administrative difficulties flowing from 

court congestion; the local interest in having localized controversies 

decided at home; [and] the interest in having the trial of a diversity 

case in a forum that is at home with the law. The Court must also 

give some weight to the plaintiffs’ choice of forum.

Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for W. Dist. of Tex., 134 S. Ct. 568, 581 n.6 (2013) 

(internal quotations and citations omitted). Thus:

The standard to be applied is whether, in light of these factors, 

defendants have made a clear showing of facts which either (1) 

establish such oppression and vexation of a defendant as to be out of 

proportion to the plaintiff's convenience, which may be shown to be 

slight or nonexistent, or (2) make trial in the chosen forum 

inappropriate because of considerations affecting the court's own 

administrative and legal problems. 

Cheng v. Boeing Co., 708 F.2d 1406, 1410 (9th Cir. 1983) (internal quotations omitted).

Section 1404(a) provides: "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of 

justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might 

have been brought or to any district or division to which all parties have consented." As with a 

motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens, a district court considering a § 1404(a) motion to 

transfer in the absence of a forum-selection clause "must evaluate both the convenience of the 

parties and various public-interest considerations." Atl. Marine Constr. Co., 134 S. Ct. at 581. 

Thus, the district court must "weigh the relevant factors and decide whether, on balance, a transfer 

would serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses and otherwise promote the interest of 

justice." Id. (internal quotations omitted).

C. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may file a motion to dismiss based 

on the failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. A motion to dismiss under Rule 

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12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250

F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001).

In considering such a motion, a court must "accept as true all of the factual allegations 

contained in the complaint," Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (citation 

omitted), and may dismiss the case or a claim "only where there is no cognizable legal theory" or 

there is an absence of "sufficient factual matter to state a facially plausible claim to relief." 

Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009); Navarro, 250 F.3d at 732) (internal quotation 

marks omitted).

A claim is plausible on its face when a plaintiff "pleads factual content that allows the 

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). In other words, the facts alleged must demonstrate 

"more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action 

will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

"Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action" and "conclusory statements" are 

inadequate. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Epstein v. Wash. Energy Co., 83 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th 

Cir. 1996) ("[C]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat 

a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim."). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 

probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

unlawfully . . . When a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's 

liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief." 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (internal citations omitted).

If the court grants a motion to dismiss, it should grant leave to amend even if no request to 

amend is made "unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the 

allegation of other facts." Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Request for Judicial Notice

The parties make multiple requests for judicial notice, most of which are unopposed. 

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Many of the requests are for sources that are from government sources, such as the U.S. District 

Court's Judicial Caseload Profiles or other government websites. Those requests are unopposed, 

and thus the Court GRANTS the requests for judicial notice as to: (1) the U.S. District CourtsCivil Statistical Tables for the Federal Judiciary, Table C-5; (2) the U.S. District Courts Judicial 

Caseload Profiles for N.D. Cal. and N.D. Texas; (3) the California Secretary of State website 

search results for "Translinks Limo;" (4) the City and County of San Francisco website search 

result showing the registration of "Translinks Limo;" and (5) the San Francisco Municipal 

Transportation Agency's new taxicab driver presentation.

The Court also GRANTS Defendant's request for judicial notice of the Delaware 

Department of State entity details for "Translink Limo, LLC." (Def.'s RJN ISO Reply re Mot. to 

Dismiss, Exh. B, Dkt. No. 47.) While Plaintiff opposes this request, courts have found that the 

accuracy of the . . . Delaware Secretary of State's website[] cannot reasonably be questioned as 

federal courts frequently rely on the accuracy of information obtained from government websites." 

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Weems, CV 15-7768 RSWL (PJWx), 2016 WL 1118206, at *3 (C.D. 

Cal. Mar. 22, 2016). The Court notes, however, that there is no information on the entity details 

that shows any connection of this entity to Plaintiff.

The Court DENIES Defendant's request to take judicial notice of the VSA. (Def.'s RJN 

ISO Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. No. 36.) Defendant argues judicial notice is warranted because the 

complaint relies on the VSA. While the Court may consider the VSA because it is essential to the 

complaint, this does not make it "capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources 

whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." Fed. R. Evid. 201(b).

The Court also DENIES Defendant's request to take judicial notice of the website, 

translinklimo.com. (Def.'s RJN ISO Reply re Mot. to Dismiss, Exh. C.) While "[c]ourts have 

taken judicial notice of websites maintained by parties to the action as reliable," Defendant makes 

no showing that Plaintiff maintains this website or that it is connected to him. Kane v. Delong, 

Case No. 13-cv-5021-KAW, 2014 WL 894587, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2014).

B. Motion to Transfer

Defendant argues that transfer to the Northern District of Texas is required because of the 

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VSA's forum-selection clause. (Def.'s Mot. to Transfer at 6-9.) In the alternative, Defendant 

contends that the § 1404 factors weigh in favor of transfer. (Id. at 9-17.) The Court disagrees.

i. Forum Selection Clause

"The enforceability of the forum selection clause in [a] contract is controlled by Bremen v. 

Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972), wherein the Supreme Court held that forum selection 

clauses are presumptively valid." Murphy v. Schneider Nat'l, Inc., 362 F.3d 1133, 1140 (9th Cir. 

2004). Because a forum selection clause is presumptively valid, it should be honored "absent 

some compelling and countervailing reason." Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12. Thus, "[t]he party 

challenging the clause bears a 'heavy burden of proof' and must 'clearly show that enforcement 

would be unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause was invalid for such reasons as fraud or overreaching.'" Murphy, 362 F.3d at 1140 (quoting Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15.) Courts recognize three 

circumstances in which enforcement of a forum selection clause would be unreasonable: (1) if the 

inclusion of the forum selection clause was the product of fraud or overreaching, (2) if the party 

challenging the forum selection clause would effectively be deprived of his day in court if the 

clause is enforced, or (3) if enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in 

which the suit was brought. Id.

Plaintiff does not assert that there was fraud or overreach, or that litigating in Texas would 

be so burdensome as to deprive him of his day in court. Instead, Plaintiff argues that the forum 

selection clause contravenes California's strong public policy, as embodied in California Labor 

Code § 925.1 (Plf.'s Opp'n to Mot. to Transfer at 3-6.) Section 925 states, in relevant part:

(a) An employer shall not require an employee who primarily 

resides and works in California, as a condition of employment, to 

agree to a provision that would do either of the following:

 

1

In the alternative, Plaintiff argues that the VSA's choice of law provision would also contravene 

California's policies. (Plf.'s Opp'n to Mot. to Transfer at 6-9.) While the Court need not consider 

this argument because § 925 renders the forum selection clause unenforceable, the Court "[c]ourts 

in the Ninth Circuit have generally agreed that the choice-of-law analysis is irrelevant to 

determining if the enforcement of a forum selection clause contravenes a strong public policy." 

Rowen v. Soundview Commc'ns, Inc., No. 14-cv-5530-WHO, 2015 WL 899294, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 

Mar. 2, 2015). "[A]bsent a total foreclosure of remedy in the transferee forum, courts tether their 

policy analysis to the forum selection clause itself, finding the forum selection clause unreasonable 

only when it contravenes a policy specifically related to venue." Id.

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(1) Require the employee to adjudicate outside of California 

a claim arising in California.

(2) Deprive the employee of the substantive protection of 

California law with respect to a controversy arising in California.

(b) Any provision of a contract that violates subdivision (a) is 

voidable by the employee, and if a provision is rendered void at the 

request of the employee, the matter shall be adjudicated in 

California and California law shall govern the dispute.

In Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc., the Ninth Circuit invalidated a forum selection clause 

based solely on "California's strong public policy against enforcing such clauses in franchise 

agreements, as expressed in § 20040.5 of the California Business and Professions Code." 211 

F.3d 495, 497 (9th Cir. 2000). There, the Ninth Circuit explained:

Bremen teaches that a strong public policy may be 'declared by 

statute.' 407 U.S. at 15. By voiding any clause in a franchise 

agreement limiting venue to a non-California forum for claims 

arising under or relating to a franchise located in the statute, § 

20040.5 ensures that California franchisees may litigate disputes 

regarding their franchise agreement in California courts. We 

conclude and hold that § 20040.5 expresses a strong public policy of 

the State of California to protect California franchisees from the 

expense, inconvenience, and possible prejudice of litigating in a 

non-California venue. A provision, therefore, that requires a 

California franchisee to resolve claims related to the franchise 

agreement in a non-California court directly contravenes this strong 

public policy and is unenforceable under the directives of Bremen.

Id. at 498.

Analogizing to Jones, the district court in Karl v. Zimmer Biomet Holdings, Inc. held that § 

925 rendered the forum selection clause voidable per public policy. Case No. 18-cv-4176-WHA, 

2018 WL 5809428, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2018). Like § 20040.5, "[i]n Section 925, California 

expresses a strong public policy to protect employees from litigating labor disputes outside of their 

home state." Id.

Defendant counters that § 925 should not void the forum selection clause. First, Defendant 

urges the Court to rely on Yates v. Norsk Titanium US, Inc. (Def.'s Reply re Mot. to Transfer at 3.) 

In dicta, the Yates court concluded that the "[p]laintiff's singular reliance on state public policy" 

could not "outweigh[] the presumptively valid forum selection clause." Case No. SACV 17-01089 

AG (SKx), 2017 WL 8232188, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2017). The district court explained that 

"[f]ollowing the Supreme Court's decision in Stewart [Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 31 

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(1988)], district courts have recognized that a particular state's public policy is not dispositive as to 

the enforceability of a forum selection clause." Id. (internal quotation omitted). Thus, "[i]t 

follows that the prevailing policy in a particular forum is only one relevant factor for a court's 

consideration." Id. The Court finds Yates unpersuasive. Contrary to Yates's conclusion that 

public policy is merely a factor, Jones makes clear that a strong public policy alone can invalidate 

a forum selection clause. See 211 F.3d at 498.

Second, Defendant argues that § 925 does not apply in the instant case because the VSA is 

between two companies (Translinks Limo and Defendant), rather than an employer and an 

employee. (Def.'s Reply re Mot. to Transfer at 3.) Plaintiff, however, has stated that Translink 

Limo is not a company or even a separate entity, but is merely a fictitious business name. (See

Plf's RJN re Mot. to Dismiss, Exh. A, Dkt. No. 45.) The Ninth Circuit has found employeremployee relationships where the plaintiffs were required to use a fictitious business name and 

obtain a business license and commercial checking account to be hired. See Ruiz v. Affinity 

Logistics Corp., 754 F.3d 1093, 1096 (9th Cir. 2014). 

Third, Defendant contends that § 925 does not apply because the VSA is a vendor 

agreement, not an employment agreement. (Def.'s Reply re Mot. to Transfer at 4.) Defendant 

essentially argues that no employment relationship is created by the VSA; this case, however, is 

squarely about whether the VSA creates an employment relationship. Indeed, Plaintiff points to 

terms of the VSA itself in arguing there is an employment relationship, including insurance 

coverage requirements, termination of the agreement with thirty days' notice, the unilateral setting 

of rates, vehicle requirements, maintenance requirements, and driver behavior. (See VSA at 3, 7, 

12-16.) To the extent Defendant is relying on the fact that the VSA states it is a vendor 

agreement, permitting the label of the agreement to dictate whether § 925 applies would elevate 

form over substance, which would not be consistent with the strong public policy California has 

stated in protecting its citizens from litigating employment disputes in a foreign forum.

Fourth, Defendant disputes which standard applies to determine whether Plaintiff has 

adequately pled an employer-employee relationship. As discussed below, however, the Court 

finds that Plaintiff has adequately pled an employer-employee relationship under the FLSA's 

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economic reality test, California's Borello test, and the Dyanmex ABC test for IWC wage order 

claims.

Fifth, Defendant argues that § 925 does not apply to drivers who do not reside in 

California, and who may become members of Plaintiff's proposed collective action. (Def.'s Reply 

re Mot. to Transfer at 5.) Defendant's argument is premature, as those drivers are not currently 

members of this case, and may never become members if the collective action is not certified or 

the out-of-state drivers do not opt in. More importantly, the residency of other drivers does not 

affect Plaintiff's ability to void the forum selection clause as to his claims under § 925.

Finally, Defendants contend that Plaintiff fails to adequately plead his claims. (Def.'s 

Reply re Mot. to Transfer at 6.) As discussed below with respect to Defendant's motion to 

dismiss, while the Court agrees that the overtime claim is not adequately pled, the others are.

The Court concludes that § 925 expresses California's strong public policy to prohibit 

forum selection clauses that require California residents to litigate their employment disputes 

outside of the state, and therefore the forum selection clause is unenforceable.

ii. Transfer Factors

In the alternative, Defendant argues that transfer is warranted per the § 1404 factors.

a. Choice of Forum

Typically, "[t]he defendant must make a strong showing of inconvenience to warrant 

upsetting the plaintiff's choice of forum." Decker Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 

F.2d 834, 843 (9th Cir. 1986). Here, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's choice of forum is entitled 

to very little deference because Plaintiff seeks to bring a nationwide collective action. (Def.'s Mot. 

to Transfer at 10.) When a plaintiff "represents a class, the named plaintiff's choice of forum is 

given less weight." Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730, 739 (9th Cir. 1987) (internal citations omitted). 

"As deference accorded to a plaintiff's choice of forum decreases, a defendant's burden to upset the 

plaintiff's choice of forum also decreases." Glaxo Grp. Ltd. v. Genentech, Inc., Case No. 10-cv675-JSW, 2010 WL 1445666, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2010) (internal citation omitted). In 

weighing the deference due to the plaintiff's choice of forum, "consideration must be given to the 

extent of both [the plaintiff's] and the [defendant's] contacts with the forum, including those 

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relating to [the plaintiff's] cause of action." Lou, 834 F.2d at 739 (internal citation omitted).

In class actions, courts have given some deference to the named plaintiff's choice of forum 

where the plaintiff lived in the transferor district and the events at issue occurred in the transferor 

district. See Hendricks v. StarKist, Case No. 13-cv-729-YGR, 2014 WL 1245880, at *3 (N.D. 

Cal. Mar. 25, 2014). Here, Plaintiff is a resident of this district, and worked for Defendant 

exclusively in San Francisco. (FAC ¶ 9.) Plaintiff also seeks to represent a California class 

bringing claims under California labor law. (FAC ¶¶ 3-5.) This entitles Plaintiff's choice of forum 

to some deference. See Shultz v. Hyatt Vacation Mktg. Corp., Case No. 10-cv-4568-LHK, 2011 

WL 768735, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2011) (giving some weight to the plaintiff's choice of forum 

where the plaintiff lived and worked for the defendant in the district, and sought to represent both 

a nationwide class and a California class for violations of California law); Holliday v. Lifestyle 

Lift, Inc., Case No. 09-cv-4995-RS, 2010 WL 3910143, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2010) (same).

b. Convenience of Parties and Witnesses

Defendant argues that this factor weighs heavily in favor of transfer. First, Defendant 

contends that 119 of the 173 putative members of the nationwide collective action live in or east of 

Texas. (Def.'s Mot. to Transfer at 10.) In Holliday, however, the district court found it 

speculative to consider the convenience to unnamed members in a motion to transfer the case to 

Michigan. 2010 WL 3910143, at *7. There, 75 putative class members resided between Texas 

and the east coast, while 38 lived east of Colorado. Id. Thus, "because more putative class 

members actually reside in eastern states, transfer to Michigan might actually prove more 

convenient for plaintiffs as well as for defendants." Id. The district court then went on to find:

[N]o class has thus far been certified. Additionally, an employee 

must 'opt in' to litigation under the FLSA. [Cite.] No other SICM 

employee has done so. Moreover, the California subclass will 

almost certainly reside within this State. At least so far, Holliday is 

the only named plaintiff and it would be speculative for this Court to 

consider fairness and convenience to unnamed plaintiff in as yet 

undetermined locations. While the Court entertains the possibility 

that class members might reside in districts closer to Michigan than 

to California, it is premature and misguided to ground a convenience 

decision on parties who may never need or with to appear, or to 

assume the only "convenience" factor is distance.

Id.; see also Karl, 2018 WL 5809428, at *6 ("no class or collective has yet been certified, so 

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named plaintiff is the only plaintiff in this action and his convenience merits greater consideration 

than the putative class or collective members"). Such is the case here, where the collective action 

has yet to be certified, and drivers closer to Texas may never opt in. Thus, the Court finds that the 

location of yet-identified plaintiffs do not weigh in favor of transfer.

Next, Defendant argues that the Northern District of Texas is more convenient for 

Defendant and its witnesses, including the seven employee-witnesses most likely to testify in this 

case. (Def.'s Mot. to Transfer at 11-13.) This weighs slightly in favor of transfer. "[T]he 

convenience of a litigant's employee witnesses are entitled to little weight because litigants are 

able to compel their employees to transfer at trial, regardless of forum." Alul v. Am. Honda Motor 

Co., Inc., Case No. 16-cv-4384-JST, 2016 WL 7116934, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2016) (internal 

quotation omitted); see also Hendricks, 2014 WL 1245880, at *4 ("Even if StarKist is correct in 

claiming that it will provide more witnesses and those witnesses will provide the most relevant 

testimony in this case, StarKist still only refers to party witnesses, and not the non-party witnesses 

with which this factor is chiefly concerned. . . [T]his will not be a sufficient reason to justify a 

transfer[.]"). Transfer "is not appropriate merely to shift the inconvenience from one party to 

another." Alul, 2016 WL 7116934, at *4 (internal quotation omitted).

Finally, Defendant contends that the Northern District of Texas is more convenient for two 

anticipated third-party witnesses. (Def.'s Mot. to Transfer at 13-15.) Defendant identifies one 

driver in Houston, Texas and one driver in New York City, who will testify that they performed 

services for their own independent businesses and Defendant's contractors. (Id. at 14.) "The 

convenience of non-party witnesses is a more important factor than the convenience of party 

witnesses." Alul, 2016 WL 7116934, at *4 (internal quotation omitted). The Court finds this 

factor weighs in favor of transfer, although not heavily given there are only two witnesses 

identified. See id. at *4 ("a single third-party witness in a class action . . . weighs only slightly in 

favor of transfer").

Taken together, the Court finds this factor weighs somewhat in favor of transfer.

c. The Ease of Access to Evidence

Defendant argues that this factor weighs heavily in favor of transfer because most of the 

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documents relating to this case are located at Defendant's headquarters in Dallas, and the policies 

at issue were developed in Dallas. (Def.'s Mot. To Transfer at 15.) "Courts have differing 

opinions on the continuing relevance of this factor in the digital age." Alul, 2016 WL 7116934, at 

*5. Some courts have found that "where electronic discovery is the norm (both for electronic 

information and digitized paper documents), ease of access is neutral given the portability of 

information." Lax v. Toyota Motor Corp., 65 F. Supp. 3d 772, 780 (N.D. Cal. 2014); Hendricks, 

2014 WL 1245880, at *4 ("the transportation of documents generally is not regarded as a burden 

because of technological advances in document storage and retrieval"); Holliday, 2010 WL 

3910143, at *8 ("The reality of electronic communication and transmission at least dilutes the 

weight given to this convenience factor."). Others have found that "[w]hile technological 

developments have reduced the weight of this factor in the transfer determination, this factor 

nonetheless weighs in favor of transfer." Roe v. Intellicorp Records, Inc., Case No. 12-cv-2567-

YGR, 2012 WL 3727323, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2012). The Court finds this factor weighs 

only slightly in favor of transfer.

d. Familiarity of Forum with Applicable Law

Here, Plaintiff asserts claims under the FLSA, as well as various California labor laws. In 

Karl, the district court explained:

The two districts are equally familiar with federal law, which forms 

the basis of the putative FLSA collective action; however, this 

district is more familiar with the state laws underlying the California 

class action claims. But since other federal courts are fully capable 

of applying California law, this factor weighs only slightly against 

transfer.

2018 WL 5809428, at *6. Such is the case here. Accordingly, this factor weighs slightly against 

transfer.

e. Local Interest in Controversy

The Court finds this factor weighs somewhat in favor of transfer, as both states have a 

strong interest in the controversy. Texas has a strong interest because Defendant's corporate 

headquarters are located there, and thus Texas "has a significant interest in monitoring allegedly 

unlawful behavior of companies within its borders." Hendricks, 2014 WL 1245880, at *6; see 

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also Holliday, 2010 WL 3910143, at *8. Likewise, because Plaintiff is a California resident, 

California "has an interest in protecting the rights of [Plaintiff] and any other members of the 

California subclass." Holliday, 2010 WL 3910143, at *8 (finding this factor neutral); Hendricks, 

2014 WL 1245880, at *6 (same). Notably, in Karl, the district court found that this factor 

"tipp[ed] the scales against transfer" because "[s]ection 925 expresses California's interest in 

preventing contractual circumvention of its labor law." 2018 WL 5809428, at *7.

f. Relative Court Congestion

The Court finds this factor very slightly favors transfer. The median time from filing to 

disposition is shorter in the Northern District of Texas (7 months) than in this district (7.2 

months), as is the median time from filing to trial (28 months vs. 30 months). (See Def.'s RJN ISO 

Mot. to Dismiss, Exh. C.) The Court notes, however, that the median time from filing to 

disposition before pretrial is shorter in this district (6.4 months) than the Northern District of 

Texas (7.4 months). (See Def.'s RJN ISO Mot. to Dismiss, Exh. B.) Further, this district has far 

fewer cases that are over 3 years old (462 vs. 8,180). (Def.'s RJN ISO Mot. to Dismiss, Exh. C.) 

Taken together, these differences are not particularly meaningful. Moreover, even if the court 

congestion was more disparate, a court "should not transfer a case on the basis of docket 

congestion after determining the balance of the other factors weigh against transfer." Hendricks, 

2014 WL 1245880, at *6 (internal quotation omitted).

g. Weighing the Factors

After considering all of the factors, the Court finds that transfer is not warranted. While 

Plaintiff's choice of forum is not entitled to great deference, it is still owed some deference, which 

the remaining § 1404 factors do not outweigh. Again, the convenience of witnesses weighs 

somewhat in favor of transfer, while ease of access to evidence weighs only slightly in favor of 

transfer. The local interest weighs against transfer, while the familiarity of the court with the 

applicable law weighs slightly against transfer. The remaining factors are neutral. The Court 

therefore DENIES Defendant's motion to transfer.

///

///

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C. Motion to Dismiss2

i. Plaintiff's Relationship with Defendant

First, Defendant argues that the complaint must be dismissed because "Plaintiff has not 

articulated the nature of his alleged employment relationship with [Defendant,]." (Def.'s Mot. to 

Dismiss at 7.) Defendant contends Plaintiff must specify whether Defendant is liable as a direct 

employer or a joint employer because the VSA was signed between Defendant and Translinks 

Limo, not Defendant and Plaintiff. (Id.) In support, Defendant points to Johnson v. Serenity 

Transportation, Inc., which found that "a plaintiff seeking to hold multiple entities liable as joint 

employers must plead specific facts that explain how the defendants are related and how the 

conduct underlying the claims is attributable to each defendant." 141 F. Supp. 3d 974, 990 (N.D. 

Cal. 2015). Here, however, Plaintiff does not seek to hold Translinks Limo liable for any alleged 

violations; he seeks only to hold Defendant liable for the alleged violations. Further, Plaintiff 

states that Translinks Limo does not exist as a separate entity. (See Plf.'s RJN re Mot. to Dismiss, 

Exh. A.) Thus, Plaintiff is not required to further plead the nature of his relationship with 

Defendant.

ii. Taxicab Driver Exemption

Next, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's claims fail because of the exemptions for taxicab 

drivers, relying primarily on the Second Circuit's recent ruling in Munoz-Gonzalez v. D.L.C. 

Limousine Serv., Inc., 904 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 2018). (Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 17-18.) The 

taxicab exemption "exemptions from the overtime require 'any driver employed by an employer 

engaged in the business of operating taxicabs.'" 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(17). In Munoz-Gonzalez, the 

Second Circuit determined that under the FLSA, a taxicab is: "(1) a chauffeured passenger vehicle; 

(2) available for hire by individual members of the general public; (3) that has no fixed schedule, 

 

2 Plaintiff requests that the Court strike portions of Defendant's motion to dismiss, arguing that 

Defendant is attempting to get around the 25-page limit by using twenty-three single-spaced 

footnotes. (Plf.'s Opp'n to Mot. to Dismiss at 21.) Defendant responds that the Local Rules permit 

single-spaced footnotes. (Def.'s Reply re Mot. to Dismiss at 15.) While Defendant is technically 

correct, it is also inappropriate to put substantive arguments in footnotes. See Estate v. Saunders 

v. C.I.R., 745 F.3d 953, 962 n.8 (9th Cir. 2014) ("Arguments raised only in footnotes, or only on 

reply, are generally deemed waived."). The Court denies Plaintiff's request to strike, but notes that 

it will not consider arguments raised only in footnotes and/or only on reply.

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fixed route, or fixed termini." 904 F.3d at 214. In so finding, the Second Circuit relied primarily 

on the dictionary definition of "taxicabs," as well as how the taxicab exemption fit within the 

structure of the FLSA itself. Id. at 214-15.

Without determining the persuasive value of Munoz-Gonzalez, the Court finds that based 

on Plaintiff's allegations, the taxicab exemption does not apply. Plaintiff has alleged in the 

operative complaint that the "vast majority of [Defendant's] business comes from corporate clients 

and recurrent contracts, rather than from individual members of the general public." (FAC ¶ 17; 

Plf.'s Opp'n to Mot. to Dismiss at 18.) In Munoz-Gonzalez, the Second Circuit acknowledged that 

"a company that received virtually all its business from recurrent contracts and corporate clients 

might not be 'available for hire by individual members of the general public' under [its] three-part

definition." 904 F.3d at 217. While Defendant argues that Plaintiff does not allege that members 

of the general public are prohibited from doing business with Defendant, Munoz-Gonzalez does 

not require a complete prohibition. Instead, it noted that the defendant's recurrent contracts 

"constituted a negligible amount -- less than 5%." Id.; contrast with McKinney v. Med. Grp. 

Transp. LLC, 988 F. Supp. 2d 993, 1002 (E.D. Wis. 2013) (concluding that a car service was not a 

taxicab company because it received 95 to 98% of its business through recurrent contracts). Thus, 

at this stage, the Court cannot conclude that the taxicab exemption applies.

iii. Employment Relationship

Defendant argues that all claims should be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to 

adequately allege that drivers are employees rather than independent contractors under any of the 

applicable tests. As explained below, the Court finds that based on Plaintiff's allegations, the 

Court cannot find that Defendant's drivers are independent contractors as a matter of law, 

particularly at the pleading stage.

a. FLSA

Under the FLSA, "'employees are those who as a matter of economic reality are dependent 

upon the business to which they render service.'" Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assocs., Inc., 603 

F.2d 748, 754 (9th Cir. 1979) (quoting Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947)). The 

Ninth Circuit has identified several factors for distinguishing employees from independent 

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contractors under the FLSA, which include:

1) the degree of the alleged employer's right to control the manner in 

which the work is performed;

2) the alleged employee's opportunity for profit or loss depending 

upon his managerial skill;

3) the alleged employee's investment in equipment or materials 

required for his task, or his employment of helpers;

4) whether the service rendered requires a special skill;

5) the degree of permanence of the working relationship; and

6) whether the service rendered is an integral part of the alleged 

employer's business.

Id. "The presence of any individual factor is not dispositive of whether an employee/employer 

relationship exists." Id. Rather, "[s]uch a determination depends 'upon the circumstances of the 

whole activity.'" Id. (quoting Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 772, 730 (1947)).

Defendant argues that as a matter of law, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that he is an 

employee relying primarily on Razak v. Uber Technologies, Inc., Civil Action 16-573, 2018 WL 

1744467 (E.D. Penn. Apr. 11, 2018). (Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 20.) There, the district court 

found at summary judgment that UberBlack drivers were independent contractors under the 

FLSA, applying the same factors. The Court finds that Razak is distinguishable, and that Plaintiff 

has alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate an employment relationship under the FLSA.

1. Employer Control

The Razak court found that the employer control factor weighed heavily in favor of 

independent contractor status. There, the contract between Uber and its drivers gave drivers the 

"sole right" to determine how long the driver would use the app and Uber's services. 2018 WL 

1744467, at *14. Drivers could hire sub-contractors, work for Uber's competitors, and log on to 

the Uber app as much or little as they wanted, subject to safety limitations. Id. at *15. Uber also 

did not require drivers to display its logo or colors on the vehicle, or require that drivers wear a 

uniform. Id. at *14. Drivers were free to reject trip requests for any reasons aside from unlawful 

discrimination, and independently decided where to go to offer rides. Id. at *4. No restrictions are 

placed on the drivers' ability to do personal activities while using the Uber app, including 

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accepting rides from private clients, sleeping, doing errands, smoking, and taking personal calls. 

Id. at *5. Uber did not require how vehicles would be maintained. Id. While the district court 

acknowledged that Uber could deactivate drivers for canceling trips, failing background checks, 

falling short of a particular rating, or soliciting payments outside of the Uber app, it ultimately 

found that the fact that Uber exercised some control over drivers when on the app did not convert 

such drivers into employees. Id. at *14-16. Instead, the district court compared the drivers to a 

carpenter or plumber who is hired to complete a renovation project for a homeowner. While the 

homeowner could impose certain requirements, such as not permitting certain fumes, footwear, or 

music, the conditions only applied when the carpenter or painter was in the home. Id. at *16.

Here, however, Plaintiff has alleged other instances of control that make Razak

distinguishable. For example, unlike Uber drivers who could log on the Uber app as they liked, 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant assigns specific customers, and that they could not decline 

assignments without being penalized by not receiving future jobs. (FAC ¶ 18.) Defendant also 

enforced a strict dress code and requirements for drivers' vehicles, including maintenance 

procedures and vehicle contents. (FAC ¶¶ 19-21.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant dictated 

how drivers behaved prior to and during trips, including requiring that drivers use tablets with 

computer-generated signs, not speaking unless spoken to, confirming customer preferences during 

the first five minutes of the trip, and never discussing rates. (FAC ¶ 22.) Defendant also not only 

required drivers to maintain liability coverage from particular carriers in a specific amount, but to 

list Defendant as an additional insured. (FAC ¶ 24.) Defendant further had the right to terminate 

drivers without cause upon 30 day' notice. (FAC ¶ 25.) Defendant also required drivers to attend 

mandatory meetings. (FAC ¶ 68.)

These allegations could compel a finding that Defendant had the right to control its drivers. 

For example, in Ruiz, the Ninth Circuit found that the defendant had the right to control its drivers, 

as the defendant controlled its drivers' rates, schedules, and routes, equipment, and appearance. 

754 F.3d at 1101-02. Drivers were required to report to the defendant's office, and attend 

meetings. Id. at 1102. The defendant also had the right to monitor the progress of its drivers, and 

to terminate drivers without cause with sixty days' notice. Id. The Court finds that at this stage, 

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Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged facts that could demonstrate Defendant's drivers were subject to 

control sufficient to show an employment relationship.

2. Opportunity for Profit or Loss

Next, the Razak court found that this factor strongly favored a finding of an independent 

contractor relationship. 2018 WL 174467, at *16-17. Specifically, the district court explained 

that the drivers were permitted to work whatever hours they chose, including concentrating their 

efforts around "surge pricing," when rates were higher. Id. at *16. Drivers could also work for 

Uber's competitors, and choose not to accept trip requests to make money elsewhere. Id. at *17.

In contrast, in Flores v. Velocity Express, LLC, the district court found that this factor 

weighed in favor of employee status because the defendant had the ultimate authority to determine 

pay, including by "determin[ing] the customer, the rate of pay for a particular route, the stops, and 

the order of the stops before they even hired a driver to work the route." 250 F. Supp. 3d 468, 487 

(N.D. Cal. 2017). The Flores court also noted that to the extent the defendants argued that the 

driver could have made himself available for more routes, "a worker's ability to simply work more 

is irrelevant because more work may lead to more revenue, but not necessarily more profit." Id.

(internal quotation omitted).

Based on the allegations, the Court finds this case to be more comparable to Flores than 

Razak. Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant assigns them their clients, and that they are, as a 

practical matter, unable to turn down any jobs. (FAC ¶ 18.) Rates are also solely determined by 

Defendant. (FAC ¶ 16.) Further, there are no allegations of "surge pricing" here, such that 

Defendant's drivers could concentrate their hours during times when there were increased rates to 

maximize profit. Thus, the Court finds that this factor does not, as a matter of law, demonstrate an 

independent contractor relationship.

3. Investment in Equipment

"When analyzing this factor under the economic realities test, the Ninth Circuit has 

assessed the alleged employee's investment relative to the alleged employer's investment." Flores, 

250 F. Supp. 3d at 488; see also Real, 603 F.2d at 755. In Razak, the district court found that this 

factor strongly favored independent contractor status because UberBlack drivers had to purchase 

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or lease their own expensive vehicles. 2018 WL 1744467, at *17. Razak, however, did not 

compare the cost of the vehicles to Uber's costs.

Here, Plaintiff's allegations show that drivers invest significantly in their equipment, 

including the vehicle costs, operation costs, and insurance premiums. (See FAC ¶ 29.) There are 

no allegations regarding Defendant's costs, such that the Court can determine as a matter of law 

that this factor weighs in favor of an independent contractor status.

4. Whether the Services Rendered Requires a Special Skill

"It is generally accepted that 'driving' is not itself a 'special skill.'" Razak, 2018 WL 

1744467, at *18; see also Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 765 F.3d 981, 995 (9th Cir. 

2014). While the Razak court noted that UberBlack drivers replicated a limousine experience, 

such that drivers had to maintain a high level of customer service, the district court still concluded 

that this factor weighed in favor of finding employee status. Id. Such is the case here.

5. Degree of Permanence of the Working Relationship

Courts in the Ninth Circuit consider three factors: "whether the worker 'continuously 

provided services to the alleged employer for a long period of time; whether the worker had 'a 

fixed employment period; and whether the worker offered their services to different employers." 

Flores, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 491 (internal quotations and modification omitted).

In Razak, the district court found that this factor weighed heavily in favor of independent 

contractor status because drivers had complete freedom regarding how long they wished to work 

for Uber and the hours in which they serve. 2018 WL 1744467, at *18-19. Thus, there was "no 

permanence of the working relationship whatsoever, unless the driver wants it." Id. at *18.

The Ninth Circuit, however, has analyzed this factor differently, considering the overall 

length of the working relationship rather than how workers acted during their working time. For 

example, in Narayan v. EGL, Inc., the Ninth Circuit found that a contract which had automatic 

renewal clauses and that could be terminated by either party upon 30 days' notice or breach of the 

agreement was "a substantial indicator of an at-will employment relationship." 616 F.3d 895, 902-

03 (9th Cir. 2010). In other words, "[t]his was not a circumstance where a contractor was hired to 

perform a specific task for a defined period of time. There was no contemplated end to the service 

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relationship at the time that the plaintiff Drivers began working for [the defendant]." Id. at 903.

Here, Plaintiff worked for Defendant for approximately two years, and there does not 

appear to be a fixed period. (See FAC ¶ 9.) The absence of a defined period of time points to an 

employment relationship. See Narayan, 616 F.3d at 903. Additionally, the VSA states that 

"[e]ither party may terminate this Agreement, without cause, upon thirty (30) days written notice 

to the other party." (VSA ¶ 11a.) In Ruiz, the Ninth Circuit recognized that a "mutual termination 

provision is consistent with either an employer-employee or independent contractor relationship." 

754 F.3d at 1105. Finally, there are no allegations to whether drivers could offer their services to 

different employers. Based on these allegations, again, the Court cannot find that this factor 

favors a finding of independent contractor relationship as a matter of law.

6. Whether the Services Rendered are Integral to the Hiring Entity's 

Business

Where "the workers play an integral role in the alleged employer's business, this shows 

that the arrangement follows more closely that of an employer-employee relationship than an 

independent contractor dynamic." Flores, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 492. The Razak court found that 

"Uber drivers are an essential part of Uber's business as a transportation company," and that "it 

seems beyond dispute that if Uber could not find drivers, Uber would not be able to function." 

2018 WL 1744467, at *19. Thus, this factor weighed in favor of an employment relationship. Id. 

Defendant does not dispute that this factor weighs a favor of an employment relationship in this 

case as well. (Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 25.)

b. Borello Test

Exclusively in footnotes, Defendant argues that Plaintiff also fails to satisfy the Borello

test for his state law claims. (See Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 19-20 n.18; 22 n.19; 24 nn.20-22; 25 

n.23.) Arguments in footnotes are inappropriate. Estate of Saunders, 745 F.3d at 962 n.8. Even if 

the Court did consider this argument, it cannot conclude as a matter of law that Defendant's drivers 

are independent contractors.

California applies a right-to-control test, in which "'[t]he principal test of an employment 

relationship is whether the person to whom service is rendered has the right to control the manner 

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and means of accomplishing the result desired.'" Alexander, 765 F.3d at 988 (quoting S.G. Borello 

& Sons, Inc. v. Dep't of Indus. Relations, 48 Cal. 3d 341, 350 (1989)). Additionally, "[t]he right to 

terminate at will, without cause, is strong evidence in support of an employment relationship." Id.

(internal quotation omitted). Other factors include: (1) whether the person performing services is 

engaged in a distinct occupation or business, (2) whether the work is usually done under the 

direction of the principal or by a specialist without supervision, (3) the skill required, (4) whether 

the principal or the worker supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and place of work, (5) the length 

of time for which the services are to be performed, (6) the method of payment, whether by the

time or by the job, (7) whether the work is part of the regular business of the principal, and (8) 

whether the parties believe they are creating an employer-employee relationship. Id. at 989.

Many of these factors overlap with the FLSA economic realities test discussed above, 

which again, do not as a matter of law demonstrate an independent contractor relationship. Again, 

with respect to control, Plaintiff was required to provide a particular vehicle, maintain the vehicles 

in a particular way, accept all jobs or risk being penalized with no future jobs, follow a strict dress 

code, stock his vehicle with specific items, behave in specified ways, attend mandatory meetings, 

and purchase insurance with Defendant listed as an additional insured. (See FAC ¶¶ 18-22, 24, 

68.) Such allegations could suggest a level of control that indicates an employee relationship. 

Contrast with Lawson v. Grubhub, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 3d 1071 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (finding after a 

bench trial no right to control where the defendant did not control which mode of transportation 

the plaintiff used to make deliveries, did not control the condition of that mode of transportation, 

did not control the plaintiff's appearance, did not require training or orientation, did not tell the 

plaintiff how to interact with customers, did not require specific supplies, and did not require the 

plaintiff to take on particular jobs). Notably, Defendant also had a right to terminate at will with 

30 days' notice, which can be strong evidence of the right to control. See Ayala v. Antelope Valley 

Newspapers, Inc., 59 Cal. 4th 522, 531 (2014) ("Perhaps the strongest evidence of the right to 

control is whether the hirer can discharge the worker without cause, because the power of the 

principal to terminate the services of the agent gives him the means of controlling the agent's 

activities.") (internal quotation omitted).

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As to the other factors that do not overlap with the FLSA economic realities' test, such 

factors are either in dispute or relatively neutral. For example, as to whether Plaintiff is engaged 

in a distinct occupation or business, the parties dispute whether Plaintiff had a separate business. 

If Plaintiff operated a distinct business of which Defendant was only one client, this could 

demonstrate an independent contractor relationship. If he did not, this could favor an employment 

relationship. See Lawson, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 1088-89. The method of payment is also unclear, as 

Plaintiff alleges that he could be paid either a flat-fee based on distance or hourly payments for 

trips lasting more than two hours. (FAC ¶ 16.) Finally, the parties' intent to create an independent 

relationship is neutral or only slightly favors an independent contractor relationship, as courts have 

repeatedly emphasized that "the label placed by the parties on their relationship is not dispositive." 

Lawson, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 1091; Alexander, 765 F.3d at 996-97. Thus, the Court concludes that 

Plaintiff has plausibly alleged an employment relationship as to the state labor law claims.

c. ABC Test

In Dynamex Operations W. v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court determined 

that the ABC test applies to claims arising from an IWC wage order. 4 Cal. 5th 903, 956-57. The 

ABC test:

presumptively considers all workers to be employees, and permits 

workers to be classified as independent contractors only if the hiring 

business demonstrates that the worker in question satisfies each of 

three conditions: (a) that the worker is free from the control and 

direction of the hiring entity in connection with the performance of 

the work, both under the contract for the performance of such work 

and in fact; and (b) that the worker performs work that is outside the 

usual course of the hiring entity's business; and (c) that the worker is 

customarily engaged in an independently established trade, 

occupation, or business of the same nature as the work performed.

4 Cal. 5th 903, 955-56 (2018). Thus, "[a] worker is an employee if the employer fails to prove any 

of the above factors." Karl, 2018 WL 5809428, at *3.

Defendant argues that it satisfies all three conditions. The Court disagrees, particularly 

with respect to Part B. Part B considers whether the workers could be "reasonably viewed as 

providing services to the business in a role comparable to that of an employee, rather than in a role 

comparable to that of a traditional independent contractor. Workers whose roles are most clearly 

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comparable to those of employees include individuals whose services are performed within the 

usual course of the business of the entity for which the work is performed . . . ." Dynamex, 4 Cal. 

5th at 959. For example:

when a retail store hires an outside plumber to repair a leak in a 

bathroom on the premises or hires an outside electrician to install a 

new electrical line, the services of the plumber or electrician are not 

part of the store's usual course of business and the store would not 

reasonably be seen as having suffered or permitted the plumber or 

electrician to provide services to it as an employee. On the other 

hand, when a clothing manufacturing company hires work-at-home 

seamstresses to make dresses from cloth and patterns supplied by 

the company that will thereafter be sold by the company, or when a 

bakery hires cake decorators to work on a regular basis on its 

custom-designed cakes, the workers are part of the hiring entity's 

usual business operation and the hiring business can reasonably be 

viewed as having suffered or permitted the workers to provide 

services as employees.

Id. at 959-60 (internal citations omitted).

Here, Defendant is alleged to "operate[] a chauffeured limousine and luxury car 

transportation business" that "derives all or nearly all of its revenue from the provision of 

transportation services." (FAC ¶ 15.) Drivers like Plaintiff provide the service of chauffeuring 

Defendant's clients. (FAC ¶ 15.) Thus, drivers provide the chauffeuring services that are the core 

of Defendant's business, making them akin to the seamstresses hired by a clothing manufacturing 

company to make clothing for sale by the company. See Dynamex, 4 Cal. 5th at 959-60.

Defendant previously acknowledged that under the FLSA economic realities test, the factor 

of whether the service rendered is an integral part of the alleged employer's business weighed in 

favor of employment status. (Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 25.) In its reply, Defendant argues that 

Part B of the ABC test is satisfied because in Razak, the district court used a similar analogy of 

plumbers and carpenters to explain why transportation network companies do not control their 

drivers. (Def.'s Reply re Mot. to Dismiss at 14.) Razak, however, was using this analogy in the 

context of employer control, not whether the worker was performing services within the usual 

course of the hiring entity's business. See 2018 WL 1744467, at *16. Simply because Razak and 

Dynamex were using similar analogies involving plumbers, electricians, and painters does not 

mean they were discussing the same issue. At the hearing, Defendant conceded that it could not 

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satisfy Part B.

Accordingly, because the Court finds that Defendant has not demonstrated Part B of the 

ABC test, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged an employment relationship as to 

the IWC claims.

iv. Sufficiency of Claims

a. Minimum Wage Claims

Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to adequately plead his minimum wage claim 

because he does not explain how he calculates Plaintiff's and the other drivers' compensation. 

(Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 9-14.) Defendant also contends that Plaintiff's minimum wage claims 

are implausible in light of the VSA's rate schedule, which provided for rates of $75-100/hour for 

trips that were more than two hours, and $90-284 for flat rate trips based on distance. (Id. at 9-11; 

see VSA at 9.) 

Here, Plaintiff alleges that he is responsible for expenses, including the cost of purchasing 

and maintaining an approved vehicle, liability insurance, cell phones and tablets, and clothing, and 

that these weekly expenses exceeded $800. (FAC ¶ 67.) Plaintiff further asserts that there were 

weeks such as between May 13 and 19, 2018, in which he earned less than that because few jobs 

were available. (FAC ¶ 67.) Plaintiff also alleges that he was not paid for all hours worked, such 

as the mandatory 15-minute "spot time" and mandatory meetings. (FAC ¶ 68.)

Defendant contends that these allegations are insufficient because the costs of obtaining the 

vehicles are not an employment-related expense. (Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 9-10.) Defendant, 

however, provides no authority that the costs of obtaining a vehicle are never reimbursable. 

Courts in this district have acknowledged that plaintiffs could seek reimbursement for vehicles. 

See Johnson v. Serenity Transp., Inc., Case No. 15-cv-2004-JSC, 2018 WL 3646540, at *14 (N.D. 

Cal. Aug. 1, 2018) (finding for purposes of class certification that there were common questions 

regarding whether the purchase of vehicles was a necessary expense for which the plaintiffs could 

be reimbursed).

Defendant also argues that it is not plausible that Plaintiff's hourly rate could be reduced to 

below $7.25 based solely on his expenses. (Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 10-11.) In particular, 

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Defendant points to Plaintiff's allegation that he and other drivers "frequently work more than 40 

hours per week." (FAC ¶ 76.) A driver, however, can work more than 40 hours in one week and 

fewer hours in another week, such that their pay from jobs is less than their expenses.

Finally, Defendant points to cases such as Yucesoy v. Uber Technologies, Inc. and Tan v. 

GrubHub, Inc., where the courts rejected minimum wage claims because the plaintiffs failed to 

allege information about the hours they were counting as compensable work time. (Def.'s Mot. to 

Dismiss at 11-14.) In both cases, however, the plaintiffs were alleging that their entire shift was 

compensable, even when they were not driving a passenger or making food deliveries. Yucesoy, 

Case No. 15-cv-262-EMC, 2016 WL 493189, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2016); Tan, 171 F. Supp. 3d 

998, 1008-09 (N.D. Cal. 2016). Thus, what plaintiffs were doing while waiting for a job was at 

issue because whether such waiting time was compensable was "a fact-specific inquiry that looks 

[at] the degree to which an employee is free to engage in personal activities." Yucesoy, 2016 WL 

493189, at *5. Here, Plaintiff is not alleging that his waiting time is compensable for purposes of 

his minimum wage claim; rather, he is alleging that there were weeks where he earned less than 

his weekly expenses. (See FAC ¶ 67.) Thus, the facts regarding his waiting time is not at issue.

The Court finds that Plaintiff had adequately alleged his minimum wage claim.

b. Overtime Claims

The Court, however, concludes that the overtime claim is not adequately pled. In Landers 

v. Quality Communications, Inc., the Ninth Circuit found that "at a minimum, a plaintiff asserting 

a violation of the FLSA overtime provisions must allege that she worked more than forty hours in 

a given workweek without being compensated for the hours worked in excess of forty during that 

week." 771 F.3d 638, 645 (9th Cir. 2014). Such allegations must provide "sufficient detail about 

the length and frequency of [the] unpaid work to support a reasonable inference that he worked 

more than forty hours in a given week." Id. at 646. Thus, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal 

of the plaintiff's overtime claim where the plaintiff failed to allege "any detail regarding a given 

workweek when [the plaintiff] worked in excess of forty hours and was not paid overtime for that 

given workweek . . . ." Id.

At the hearing, Plaintiff argued that per Landers, he need only identify a specific week in 

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which he worked more than forty hours. The Court disagrees. In Bush v. Vaco Technology 

Services, LLC, the plaintiff alleged that she regularly worked more than ten hours a day and more 

than sixty hours a week, and that she was paid a "fixed salary." Case No. 17-cv-5605-BLF, 2018 

WL 2047807, at *8 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2018). The district court found these allegations 

insufficient because there were no "facts regarding 'what period of time or type of conduct' she is 

counting as hours worked." Id. at *9; see also Tan, 171 F. Supp. 3d 998 ("There are no allegations 

about what period of time or type of conduct Plaintiffs are counting as hours worked. Without 

these basic factual allegations, the Court cannot conclude that Plaintiffs' . . . overtime claims are 

plausible.").

Here, Plaintiff alleges that drivers were paid "according to the same rate schedule for all 

hours worked, including overtime hours." (FAC ¶ 76.) Plaintiff also alleges that drivers "often 

worked in excess of forty hours per workweek," and that he "worked in excess of forty hours 

during the week of June 3 through 9, 2018." (FAC ¶¶ 76-77.) Plaintiff does not, however, 

adequately identify what types of work he considers to be compensable. For example, while 

Plaintiff appears to allege that his hours include driving time, "spot time," and mandatory 

meetings,3at the hearing he also stated that his compensable time included checking for referrals 

and checking personalized text messages. (See FAC ¶¶ 32-33.) Thus, it is not clear what type of 

conduct Plaintiff is counting as hours worked, such that the Court can determine whether the 

drivers were working overtime. The Court therefore DISMISSES the overtime claim with leave to 

amend.

c. Expenses, Meal and Rest Periods, Itemized Wage Statements, and Waiting 

Time Penalties

Defendant also asserts that Plaintiff fails to adequately allege his other claims, relying 

exclusively on a string cite. (Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 16-17.) The Court disagrees.

With respect to his § 2802 claim, Plaintiff has identified the unreimbursed expenses, which 

include the cost of obtaining vehicles, operation, maintenance, garaging, repair, cleaning, 

 

3 Plaintiff does not state how long these meetings lasted, or how frequent they were.

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licensing, insurance premiums, cell phone and tablets, and keeping the car stocked with items like 

umbrellas. (FAC ¶ 97.) Plaintiff also alleges that these expenses were required by Defendant. 

(FAC ¶¶ 19-21, 24.) No more is required. See Tan, 171 F. Supp. 3d at 1005 ("Section 2802 

claims are sufficiently pled where the complaint identifies the particular expenses that were not 

reimbursed and affirmatively alleges that the expenses were part of the plaintiff's job duties.").

For his meal and rest periods claim, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has no policies in 

place to ensure lawful meal and rest breaks are provided. (FAC ¶ 103.) The absence of a policy 

can form the basis of liability. See Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 4th 1004, 1033 

(2012) ("An employer is required to authorize and permit the amount of rest break time called for 

under the wage order for its industry. If it does not . . . it has violated the wage order and is 

liable."); Bradley v. Networkers Int'l., LLC, 211 Cal. App. 211 Cal. App. 4th 1129, 1150 (2012) 

("Networkers argues Brinker is not controlling because . . . here plaintiffs are challenging the fact 

that the employer's lack of a policy violated the law. This is not a material distinction . . . .").

As to the accurate itemized statements claim, Plaintiff identifies the failure to show the 

total hours worked, which he alleges injured drivers because they were unable to accurately 

monitor the number of hours worked and thus seek all accrued overtime and minimum wage pay. 

(FAC ¶¶ 113-14.) Such allegations are sufficient for pleading purposes. See Johnson, 141 F. 

Supp. 3d at 1004 (finding sufficient allegations where the "[p]laintiff allege[d] that their wage 

statements did not show the actual and total number of hours worked and that, as a result, they 

have been precluded from accurately monitoring the number of hours worked, determining 

whether they have been lawfully compensated for all hours worked, and seeking any owed 

overtime").

Finally, Plaintiff has sufficiently pled the waiting time claim by asserting that he was not 

paid his minimum wage, overtime wages, meal and rest period premiums, and business expenses 

after leaving Defendant's employment. (FAC ¶¶ 119-21.) Defendant does not explain what more 

is needed. Contrast with Yang v. Francesca's Collections, Inc., Case No. 17-cv-4950-HSG, 2018 

WL 984637, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2018) (finding sufficient allegations where the plaintiff 

alleged that she resigned and that the defendant failed to pay her unpaid overtime").

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES the motion to transfer, and GRANTS IN 

PART AND DENIES IN PART the motion to dismiss. Plaintiff's overtime claim is dismissed 

with leave to amend. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint addressing the deficiencies 

identified in this order within ninety days of the date of this order, along with any other 

amendments (i.e., additional subclasses). No new claims may be pled without leave of court or by 

stipulation.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 25, 2019

__________________________________

KANDIS A. WESTMORE

United States Magistrate Judge

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