Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-mc-80129/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-mc-80129-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
California State Bar
Defendant
Bryan Robinson
Plaintiff

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRYAN ROBINSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

CALIFORNIA STATE BAR,

Defendant.

Case No. 15-mc-80129-JD 

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT & 

RECOMMENDATION

Re: Dkt. Nos. 1, 4, 8

The Court has carefully reviewed Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley’s report and 

recommendation, which recommends denial of plaintiff Bryan Robinson’s ex parte motion for a 

temporary restraining order against the California State Bar to enjoin it from proceeding with 

disciplinary proceedings against him, and for an order to show cause why a preliminary injunction 

should not issue. See Report and Recommendation (“R&R”), Dkt. No. 4. Magistrate Judge 

Corley pointed out that the Ninth Circuit, along with numerous judges in this district, have held 

that Younger abstention generally requires federal courts to refrain from enjoining ongoing 

California State Bar disciplinary proceedings. See R&R at 3:25-4:5 (citing cases).

Mr. Robinson filed objections to the R&R, see Dkt. No. 8, as permitted by Rule 72(b) of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Court determines de novo the portions of the report 

and recommendation that he objects to.1 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The 

Court finds that the R&R was correctly decided.

Mr. Robinson concedes that the Ninth Circuit precedent cited by Magistrate Judge Corley 

requires Younger abstention in cases like this, but claims nevertheless that “[t]he Ninth Circuit 

incorrectly interprets the Younger abstention doctrine as an absolute unrebuttable presumption that 

always weighs in favor of the State Bar, when the opposite position is supposed to be the case.” 

 

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The Court overlooks on this one occasion the fact that Mr. Robinson’s objection did not comply 

with Civil Local Rule 72-3’s requirement that Rule 72(b) objections must be characterized as a 

“Motion for De Novo Determination of Dispositive Matter Referred to Magistrate Judge” and 

“must specifically identify the portions of the Magistrate Judge’s findings, recommendation or 

report to which objection is made.”

Case 3:15-mc-80129-JD Document 9 Filed 05/28/15 Page 1 of 2
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United States District Court

Northern District of California

See Dkt. No. 8 at 2:1-3. As a preliminary matter, this is simply incorrect: the Ninth Circuit does 

not apply a presumption either for or against abstention, but has simply concluded in similar cases 

that abstention is warranted based on a straightforward application of the test set forth by the 

Supreme Court in Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432, 

437 (1982). Nor is it the case that courts must put a finger on the scales either for or against 

abstention: “[I]n addressing Younger abstention issues, district courts must exercise jurisdiction 

except when specific legal standards are met, and may not exercise jurisdiction when those 

standards are met; there is no discretion vested in the district courts to do otherwise.” Green v. 

City of Tucson, 255 F.3d 1086, 1093 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc). But the more fundamental problem 

is that no matter what the frankly doubtful merits of Mr. Robinson’s position may be, district 

courts are “bound by the law of their own circuit.” Zuniga v. United Can Co., 812 F.2d 443, 450 

(9th Cir. 1987). It is not this Court’s place to find that the Ninth Circuit incorrectly interprets 

Younger abstention, even if it were inclined to do so, which is not the case. Consequently, in this 

and all other respects, the Court finds Magistrate Judge Corley’s report and recommendation to be 

correct.

The Court also notes that Mr. Robinson’s initial motion indicates that a state bar 

disciplinary hearing was scheduled to begin less than two hours after he filed his ex parte motion. 

See Dkt. No. 1-1 at 3. Now that the hearing has presumably occurred, it is unclear whether Mr. 

Robinson seeks any further relief against the state bar. But to the extent Mr. Robinson’s motion is 

not moot, the Court agrees that the motion should be dismissed for the reasons given in Magistrate 

Judge Corley’s report. Consequently, the Court adopts the report and recommendation in full. 

Mr. Robinson’s ex parte motion for a temporary restraining order and order to show cause is 

denied. The clerk will enter final judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 28, 2015

________________________

JAMES DONATO

United States District Judge

Case 3:15-mc-80129-JD Document 9 Filed 05/28/15 Page 2 of 2