Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-50261/USCOURTS-ca9-14-50261-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Roxanne Lynn Eyraud
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ROXANNE LYNN EYRAUD,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 14-50261

D.C. No

 3:12-cr-02998-L-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

M. James Lorenz, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

September 3, 2015—Pasadena, California

Filed October 22, 2015

Before: Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Stephen S. Trott,

and Jay S. Bybee, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Trott

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2 UNITED STATES V. EYRAUD

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed the district court’s restitution order in

a case in which the defendant, who pled guilty to bank fraud,

stole $264,824.10 from her employer Rhino Building

Services (RBS).

The panel explained that the restitution authorization in

18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(4) covers the entirety of attorneys’ fees

awarded to RBS, not just those incurred leading up to and

during the grand jury proceedings, where RBS incurred those

fees as part of its continuing investigation of the extent of the

defendant’s thievery. The panel held that the district court’s

findings and determinations are fully supported by the

evidence. The panel wrote that contrary to counsel’s claim

about the district court’s supposed ignorance of the

“reasonably necessary” test, the district court was manifestly

aware of the law governing an award of attorneys’ fees. The

panel held that the district court properly concluded that

RBS’s taxes and penalties were foreseeable and directly and

proximately caused by the defendant’s embezzlement. The

panel wrote that the district court had no obligation to defer

to any abatement of penalties negotiated between RBS and

the IRS. 

The panel wrote that contrary to counsel’s argument, the

district court did not, in reducing RBS’s requested attorneys’

fees by $53,148.50, conclude that the fees incurred were not

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. EYRAUD 3

reasonably necessary, just that the billing rate charged was

too high.

The panel rejected the defendant’s statutory and due

process challenges to the district court’s reviewing counsel’s

original billing invoices in camera.

The panel rejected as foreclosed the defendant’s argument

that after Paroline v. United States, 134 S.Ct. 1710 (2014), a

jury, not a judge, must make the factual findings that support

an order of restitution.

COUNSEL

Joseph S. Camden (argued), Federal Defenders of San Diego,

Inc., San Diego, California, for Defendant-Appellant.

Laura E. Duffy, United States Attorney, Peter Ko, Assistant

United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate Section Criminal

Division, Melanie K. Pierson (argued), Assistant United

States Attorney, United States Attorneys’ Office, San Diego,

California, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

TROTT, Senior Circuit Judge:

I

Over a two-year period, Roxanne Eyraud stole

$264,824.10 from her employer Rhino Building Services

(“RBS”). Her embezzlement scheme involved writing extra

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4 UNITED STATES V. EYRAUD

payroll checks both to herself and to other unknowing

employees. She forged her employer’s signature on the

checks, cashed them, and kept all the money for herself. 

Also, she mischaracterized thirty-four entries in RBS’s

Quickbooks accounting program as tax payments made by

company check to the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”)

covering the period from November, 2006 to June, 2008. 

These bogus checks totaled $82,348.90 – money owed to the

IRS but not remitted. The phantom check payments entered

into Quickbooks were actually made payable to and cashed

by Eyraud. She hid the paper checks to conceal her forgery.

RBS discovered part of Eyraud’s theft in 2008 when an

auditor spotted approximately $150,000 worth of bogus

checks. She confessed and covered the loss with $150,000

from a well-to-do relative. Eyraud did not alert RBS to the

approximately $145,887.97 the auditor had not yet spotted,

nor did she tell the company she had kept for herself the

money listed in Quickbooks as paid to the IRS. The rest of

Eyraud’s thefts came to light in 2010.

II

Pursuant to a negotiated agreement, Eyraud pleaded guilty

to bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344, one count of

a ten count indictment. The court eventually sentenced her to

time served with three years of supervised release. In

addition, the court ordered her to pay restitution to RBS in the

amount of $425,445.44. This total included (1) $114,224.10

in unrecovered stolen money, (2) $128,372.02 in tax

deficiencies and penalties caused by her fraud, (3) $9,052 for

forensic accounting fees, and (4) $173,797.32 in attorneys’

fees.

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UNITED STATES V. EYRAUD 5

III

Because the March 11, 2013, plea agreement was

negotiated before RBS’s full loss had been calculated, the

agreement obligated the government to recommend

restitution in the amount of only $145,887.97. This number

represented Eyraud’s embezzled funds not yet repaid

($114,824.10) and the resulting tax penalties and interest

known as of the date of the agreement ($31,063.87). The sum

did not include RBS’s attorneys’ fees. On June 5, 2013, the

Probation Office informed the court that RBS would be

seeking considerably more in restitution than the amount

specified in the plea agreement. Attorneys’ fees now became

an issue.

At a sentencing hearing on September 23, 2013, RBS

appeared in court with private counsel to justify its request

for additional restitution. RBS’s appearance triggered a

series of additional hearings and multiple dueling

submissions by both RBS and Eyraud. On March 27, 2014,

RBS supplemented its request with twenty-six invoice

summaries – not the original invoices themselves – for

attorneys’ fees paid by RBS showing the attorney involved,

the number of hours worked, and the hourly rate of each

attorney. RBS also produced an eight-page sworn declaration

from their attorney explaining his law firm’s billing policy,

the extent of the legal and investigative work performed, and

the resumés of the attorneys who performed the work, as well

as a summary of the tax damage done to RBS by Eyraud’s

scheme, calculated byquarter. Counsel’s declaration asserted

that the withheld original invoices contained information

protected by both the attorney client and/or work product

privileges.

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6 UNITED STATES V. EYRAUD

At a contested hearing on April 3, 2014, RBS refined its

request, and the court took the issue of restitution under

submission, setting Eyraud’s sentencing for April 24, 2014. 

Because of its plea agreement, the government continued to

sit on the restitution sidelines.

On April 21, 2014, the court asked for the original

invoices relating to the summaries previously submitted. The

court said that it wanted to review the “billing rate and work

completed by each attorney . . . .” On April 23, 2014, RBS

filed the requested documentation ex parte, “for court’s eyes

only,” and in camera, once again asserting the attorney client

and/or work product privileges regarding “communications

and information” in the originals.

On April 24, the court sentenced Eyraud, but set a later

date to determine attorneys’ fees and prejudgment interest. 

The court denied Eyraud’s counsel’s request for the original

invoices, saying, “Well I’m not inclined to turn over the

billing records, but when I rule, I will . . . explain my ruling

to such a degree that you would be able to make any

objections.”

Final judgment day arrived on May 29, 2014, almost one

year after RBS entered the fray on its own behalf.

In explaining its analysis and findings of fact and

conclusions of law, the court indicated that the “backup

billing documentation” RBS had provided was consistent

with the invoice summaries. The court added that the

attorneys had been careful not to include any fees not related

to Eyraud’s criminal case. True to its promise, the court

explained its ruling in thoughtful detail. Counsel renewed his

objection to the court’s decision not to give him access to the

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UNITED STATES V. EYRAUD 7

original invoices. Counsel voiced his understanding that

“implicit in the . . . [court’s] order” was a denial of his

assertion that the material he sought was not protected by any

privilege.

IV

Issues

Eyraud presents us with six issues. First, whether the

district court “erred in concluding that the attorneys’ fees

incurred by RBS were reasonably necessary.” In his reply

brief, however counsel takes a different tack, now claiming

that the district court failed to apply the “reasonably

necessary” test, and was ignorant of the test altogether.

Second, whether the court denied statutory and

constitutional due process to Eyraud in denying access to the

original billing invoices submitted in camera by RBS.

Third, whether the district court failed to account for

$85,402.32 in the amount of attorneys’ fees awarded.

Fourth, whether the court erred in finding that RBS’s tax

penalty and interest loss were proximately caused by

Eyraud’s conduct.

Fifth, whether the IRS’s abatement of 30% of the

delinquent tax payments and interest was the true measure of

Eyraud’s damage to RBS, not the 70% Eyraud paid to the

government.

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8 UNITED STATES V. EYRAUD

Sixth, whether after Paroline v. United States, 134 S.Ct.

1710 (2014), a jury, not a judge, must make the factual

findings that support an order of restitution.

V

Standard of Review

We review the district court’s restitution order “for an

abuse of discretion, provided it is within the bounds of the

statutory framework. Factual findings supporting an order of

restitution are reviewed for clear error.” United States v.

Waknine, 543 F.3d 546, 555 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation

omitted). We review de novo Eyraud’s due process claims.

VI

Attorneys’ Fees

A. The Law

The Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (“MVRA”),

18 U.S.C. § 3663A, requires a district court to “order a

defendant to make restitution to a victim of certain specified

offenses.” United States v. Anderson, 741 F.3d 938, 951 (9th

Cir. 2013)(citation omitted). The amount of restitution is

limited to the victim’s “actual losses” that are a direct and

proximate result of the defendant’s offense. United States v.

Hunter, 618 F.3d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 2010). The MVRA

lists certain losses that are undoubtably compensable,

including “expenses incurred during participation in the

investigation or prosecution of the offense.” § 3663A(b)(4). 

However, so long as any loss – not just those incurred during

investigation or prosecution – is an “actual loss” suffered as

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UNITED STATES V. EYRAUD 9

a result of a defendant’s qualifying crime and the MVRA’s

causation standard is satisfied, a district court must include

the amount of that loss in its restitution order. See Hunter,

618 F.3d at 1064; United States v. Peterson, 538 F.3d 1064,

1074 (9th Cir. 2008).

Normally but not exclusively, the government proves the

amount of loss and causation by a preponderance of the

evidence. See Peterson, 538 F.3d at 1074–75. However, the

statute setting the procedure for awarding restitution under

the MVRA, 18 U.S.C. § 3664, also “authorizes the district

court to allow a victim to prove up its own claim for

restitution when the court deems it appropriate to do so.” 

United States v. Gamma Tech Indus., Inc., 265 F.3d 917, 924

(9th Cir. 2001).

When a victim does prove up its claim, it does not do so

as a formal party to the proceedings, but as someone damaged

by the defendant’s crime. Id. at 924–25; §§ 3663(a)(1)(A);

3664(a). We note that in Gamma Tech, the government

vigorously opposed allowing the third-party victim to bring

its own restitution request. See Gamma Tech, 265 F.3d at

922. Here, RBS was similarly left to fend for itself in its

request for restitution because the government’s earlier plea

deal with Eyraud tied its hands.

A meaningful difference exists between the role a victim

like RBS plays at a restitution hearing and that of the

prosecutor. See United States v. Alverson, 666 F.2d 341, 349

(9th Cir. 1982). The victim’s interest is focused on making

itself whole. The non-party victim does not advocate for a

larger fine or longer prison sentence. And even if the victim

were to do so, the district court would be powerless to

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increase the amount of restitution for solely punitive reasons. 

See Hunter, 618 F.3d at 1064.

B. Analysis

The law is settled that a court may include attorneys’ fees

in a restitution order when the victim incurred the expenses

to participate in law enforcement’s investigation and

prosecution of a defendant. See § 3663A(b)(4); United States

v. Gordon, 393 F.3d at 1044, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004). To

qualify as investigation costs under § 3663A(b)(4), the fees

must be “reasonably necessary” to aid in the investigation or

prosecution of the defendant. See Waknine, 543 F.3d at 559. 

This principle covers the portion of attorneys’ fees that RBS

incurred during its initial criminal investigation alongside the

FBI into Eyraud’s fraud and during the grand jury

proceedings. See Gordon, 393 F.3d at 1057 (approving

“investigation costs [that] were incurred in response to five

grand jury subpoenas and a number of government requests

requiring [the victim] to analyze vast amounts of

documentation and electronic information”).

However, this is not the end of the story. We have

adopted “a broad view of the restitution authorization [for

investigation costs],” holding that “investigation costs –

including attorneys’ fees – incurred by private parties as a

direct and foreseeable result of the defendant’s wrongful

conduct may be recoverable.” Gordon, 393 F.3d at 1056–57

(citations omitted) (alteration in original). For instance, in

United States v. Cummings, 281 F.3d 1046, 1051–53 (9th Cir.

2002), we concluded that § 3663(b)(4) – the companion

statute to § 3663A(b)(4) – was broad enough to serve as the

basis for a restitution award for a mother’s attorneys’ fees in

a separate child custody proceeding where the father had

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UNITED STATES V. EYRAUD 11

improperly retained the children abroad. We have concluded

that the MRVA is similarly expansive. See United States v.

Hayward, 359 F.3d 631, 642 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that

parents were entitled to restitution under § 3663A(b)(4) for

“reasonable costs in obtaining the return of their victimized

children from London and in making their children available

to participate in the investigation and trial”).

The textual reach of § 3663A(b)(4) manifestly covers the

entirety of the attorneys’ fees awarded to RBS, not just those

incurred leading up to and during the grand jury proceedings. 

RBS incurred those fees as part of its continuing investigation

of the extent of Eyraud’s thievery. Eyraud created the need

for this investigation by concealing the full measure of her

wrongdoing when she was first confronted and then cutting

a favorable deal with the government before RBS discovered

the extent of her crime. Because she had disguised her

scheme through multiple false entries in the company’s

Quickbooks and tax ledger, Eyraud should have anticipated

– especially after her lack of candor – that unearthing the full

consequences of her embezzlement would take additional

time, effort, and money.

As GammaTech holds, a victim may prove up its own

claim for restitution. Section 3664(d)(4) invites a victim

seeking recompense privately to submit in camera

information and documents revealing the full amount of a

loss. In light of the MVRA’s broad remedial purpose and the

statutes implementing that purpose, it stands to reason that

the term “investigation” must cover a victim’s reasonable

investigation, not only one conducted by a government

agency. Consequently, the award of attorneys’ fees to RBS

was proper.

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An examination of the district court record through the

prism of the relevant statutes and cases reveals no error or

failure to exercise appropriate discretion. The court’s

consideration of RBS’s interests as well as Eyraud’s was

thorough and a model of careful due process. The court’s

findings and determinations are fully supported by the

evidence, including the court’s decision about RBS’s tax

penalty and interest loss. Eyraud’s cooked Quickbooks were

directly responsible for the IRS penalties incurred by RBS. 

Contrary to counsel’s claim about Judge Lorenz’s supposed

ignorance of the appropriate test, the court was manifestly

aware of the law governing an award of attorneys’ fees.

Moreover, the court properly concluded that RBS’s taxes

and penalties were foreseeable and directly and proximately

caused byEyraud’s embezzlement, with no break in the chain

of causation. An intervening cause that is not “directly

related to the offense conduct” will sever the causal chain. 

United States v. Meksian, 170 F.3d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir.

1999); see also Gamma Tech, 265 F.3d at 928 (“The causal

chain may not extend so far, in terms of the facts or the time

span, as to become unreasonable.”). Nevertheless, the

“[d]efendant’s conduct need not be the sole cause of the

loss,” and “we have approved restitution awards that included

losses at least one step removed from the offense conduct

itself.” Id.

In United States v. Peterson, 538 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir.

2008), we rejected an argument similar to Eyraud’s. There,

homebuilders were convicted of submitting gift letters that

falsely claimed that borrowers had received the down

payments for HUD-insured home loans from their relatives,

rather than from the homebuilders. Id. at 1067–69. When the

borrowers defaulted on their loans, the district court ordered

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UNITED STATES V. EYRAUD 13

the homebuilders to compensate HUD for its losses. The

homebuilders argued that HUD’s losses were caused by the

borrowers defaulting on the loans, not the fraudulent gift

letters. Id. at 1077. We held that the borrowers’ default was

not a superceding cause that relieved the homebuilders’

restitution obligation because the borrowers would not have

qualified for the loans in the first instance without the false

letters. Id.

Similarly, Eyraud’s fraud was the first link in the causal

chain. The period for which RBS sought to recover its tax

deficiencies and losses began at a time when it was current on

its taxes. It was only after Eyraud depleted RBS’s coffers and

entered false tax payments on the books that RBS again fell

behind on its payments to the IRS. As the district court

found, Eyraud’s theft “created the circumstances under which

the harm or loss occurred.” Meksian, 170 F.3d at 1263

(quoting United States v. Spinney, 795 F.2d 1410, 1417 (9th

Cir. 1986)). Moreover, RBS’s restitution request focused on

the time period most directly related to Eyraud’s losses. As

a result, it was reasonable to hold Eyraud responsible for

RBS’s taxes that had gone unpaid and the penalties incurred

as a result of Eyraud’s fraud.

Contrary to Eyraud’s assertion, the negotiated amount of

the IRS’s abatement did not relieve the court of its

responsibility to determine the amount of loss. See

§ 3664(f)(1)(A) (commanding that “[i]n each order of

restitution, the court shall order restitution to each victim in

the full amount of each victim’s losses as determined by the

court”). Quite simply, the IRS did not determine the amount

of restitution owed to RBS because of Eyraud’s fraud, and the

district court had no obligation to defer to any reduction in

penalties negotiated between RBS and the IRS.

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Furthermore, by examining the original invoices, the

court reduced RBS’s requested attorneys’ fees by $53,148.50. 

Contrary to counsel’s unsupported argument, the court did

not conclude in making this reduction that the fees incurred

were not reasonably necessary, just that the billing rate

charged was too high.

Counsel’s assertion that the court overlooked $85,405.32

of RBS’s request is without merit. The colloquy between

court and counsel reveals without ambiguity that the court

had approved the requested total minus the familiar lodestar

reduction. Counsel said he understood the amount being

requested and that the court had approved was “a total of

$226,995.32.” At the time, counsel said nothing about a

missing $85,405.32, and he did not respond when the court

said, “I can be more specific as far as the amounts of money

by the different attorneys. I don’t know if that’s what you’re

interested in.” One wonders why counsel did not timely raise

this question during the hearing when given the opportunity

to request clarification on the precise amounts awarded.

As the district court explained at the restitution hearing,

RBS’s requested attorneys’ fees included $35,162.50 in

“grand jury billings” and $71,265.00 for “restitution billing,”

two figures that total to $106,427.50. The court went on to

explain that after reducing the attorneys fees via the lodestar

method, the court had landed on $173,797.32 as the final

amount owed. Though Eyraud’s math is not quite accurate,

what we gather to be counsel’s contention is that there is a

gap between the attorneys fees that the district court

explained orally at the restitution hearing ($106,427.50) and

the attorneys fees later awarded by the district court

($173,797.32).

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UNITED STATES V. EYRAUD 15

The transcript demonstrates that the district court was not

attempting to give a thorough accounting of every invoice

submitted by RBS, but rather highlighting several of RBS’s

primary requests. Indeed, the court only orally discussed

invoices 8, 9, and 11–21, leading us to the obvious inference

that invoices 1–7 and 10 contained additional billing requests

that the court did not orally address. If counsel had wanted

further clarification, he should have requested it when given

precisely that opportunity.

VII

Due Process

A. Statutory Procedure

Counsel argues that his client had a statutory right to

access counsel’s original invoices. 18 U.S.C. § 3664 and

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 govern how a

restitution award is set. § 3664(c). Under § 3664(a), a

district court must order the probation officer “to obtain and

include in its presentence report, or in a separate report, . . .

information sufficient for the court to exercise its discretion

in fashioning a restitution order.” Once the report is

complete, § 3664(b) requires the district court to “disclose to

both the defendant and the attorney for the Government all

portions of the presentence or other report . . . described in

subsection (a) of this section” – in other words, the reports

that probation prepared.

Counsel relies entirely on subsections (a) and (b) to argue

that the district court improperly reviewed the billing

statements in camera. His argument is patently flawed. 

Those sections are inapposite. RBS’s in camera invoices

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were not part of probation’s report. They were submitted

separately to comply with the district court’s careful order. 

Therefore, the applicable subsection is (d)(4), not subsections

(a) and (b). Subsection (d)(4) says, “After reviewing the

report of the probation officer, the court may require

additional documentation or hear testimony. The privacy of

any records filed, or testimony heard, pursuant to this section

shall be maintained to the greatest extent possible, and such

records may be filed or testimony heard in camera.” This

section requires the district court to protect the privacy of

RBS’s submissions “to the greatest extent possible,” and

specifically authorized the submission of the documents in

camera. Accordingly, there was no statutory error.

B. Due Process

We begin by noting that counsel did not protect the record

on this issue by asking the district court for a protective order

preserving the original invoices under seal so they might be

reviewed on appeal. 9th Cir. R. 27-13. This lapse leaves us

with the district court’s description of them as simply

corroborative of what counsel already had seen. That being

the unchallenged state of the record, Eyraud was not denied

due process – unless we were to conclude somehow that

§ 3664(d)(4) is unconstitutional on its face, which we do not.

To date, no circuit to consider the argument has

concluded that the Due Process Clause requires full

disclosure of all the information relied on by a court at

sentencing. Stewart v. Erwin, 503 F.3d 488, 495 (6th Cir.

2007) (observing “the federal appellate courts that have

considered this issue have uniformly concluded that”

Supreme Court precedent “do[es] not recognize such a federal

due process right to full disclosure”); United States v. Curran,

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926 F.2d 59, 62 (1st Cir. 1991) (“[T]here is no judicial

precedent which holds that the Due Process Clause requires

disclosure of all information relied upon by the sentencing

court.”). We have endorsed a similar conclusion in United

States v. Baldrich, 471 F.3d 1110, 1114–15 (9th Cir. 2006),

where we considered the constitutionality of Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 32(e)(3) which permits a district court to

withhold probation’s sentencing recommendation from the

defendant. We held that Rule 32(e)(3) does not violate due

process, so long as a defendant is appraised of the “factual

information underlying” the recommendation. Id. at 1114. 

A similar principle governs this case.

Prior to sentencing, Eyraud had access to the law firm’s

declaration describing the work it performed relating to

Eyraud’s fraud and the invoice summaries listing the amount

of time that work took. The district court confirmed that

those documents accurately reflected the pertinent

information contained in the privileged billing records. Thus,

counsel had “the factual information underlying” the ruling. 

Baldrich, 471 F.3d at 1114. With this information in hand,

Eyraud was able to challenge the legal basis for the court’s

order. Eyraud was afforded adequate notice and a meaningful

opportunity to be heard.

Finally, United States v. Green, 722 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir.

2013), forecloses counsel’s pro forma invocation of Paroline

v. United States, 134 S.Ct. 1710 (2014), to undo the district

court’s work. We held in Green that Apprendi v. New Jersey,

530 U.S. 466 (2000), does not apply to restitution orders, and

Paroline does not invalidate that holding.

AFFIRMED.

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