Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca6-06-05519/USCOURTS-ca6-06-05519-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jeffrey Lynn Dial
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206

File Name: 08a0145p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JEFFREY LYNN DIAL,

Defendant-Appellant.

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No. 06-5519

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Tennessee at Columbia.

No. 05-00008—Robert L. Echols, District Judge.

Submitted: November 2, 2007

Decided and Filed: April 9, 2008 

Before: SILER, MOORE, and GILMAN, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ON BRIEF: J. Daniel Freemon, FREEMON LAW FIRM, Lawrenceburg, Tennessee, for

Appellant. Harold B. McDonough, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Nashville,

Tennessee, for Appellee.

MOORE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which GILMAN, J., joined. SILER, J.

(p. 6), delivered a separate concurring opinion.

_________________

OPINION _________________

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Defendant-Appellant Jeffrey Lynn Dial (“Dial”)

pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy “to knowingly and intentionally manufacture, distribute,

and possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of a mixture and substance containing a

detectable amount of methamphetamine,” in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), Joint Appendix

(“J.A.”) at 15 (Superseding Indictment at 3), and one count of possession of “one or more firearms

in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime,” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), J.A.

at 17 (Superseding Indictment at 5). The district court sentenced Dial to imprisonment for 97

months and 60 months, on each count respectively, with the terms running consecutively. The

district court applied an enhancement to Dial’s sentence for reckless endangerment during flight,

United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“U.S.S.G.”) § 3C1.2. On appeal, Dial argues that

there must be a nexus between the offense conduct for which he was convicted and the

1

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enhancement. For the following reasons, we hold that there is a nexus requirement embedded in

§ 3C1.2 and AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

On two separate occasions, April 1 and April 6, 2004, the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation

(“TBI”) obtained fifty-five grams of methamphetamine through an informant who purchased the

drugs from Dial. On April 8, 2004, Agent Darryl Richardson (“Richardson”) positioned his

unmarked vehicle on a rural dirt road “at a point in the road where [Dial] could see [Richardson’s]

emergency equipment flashing.” J.A. at 174 (Sent. Hr’g, Test. of Richardson at 130:10-11).

Richardson stood outside his vehicle wearing a vest that read “POLICE” in large, yellow letters and

drew his gun. Id. (Sent. Hr’g, Test. of Richardson at 130:11-13). A confidential source had relayed

to Richardson that Dial was returning to his home with “a substantial amount of methamphetamine.”

Id. (Sent. Hr’g, Test. of Richardson at 130:2-8). Richardson testified that he was making an

“investigatory stop”; he did not have a search or arrest warrant. J.A. at 183 (Sent. Hr’g, Test. of

Richardson at 139:1-2, 8-10).

Upon seeing Richardson, Dial stopped his vehicle, looked at Richardson, and then turned his

car to proceed up an embankment in order to go around Richardson’s vehicle. Dial’s vehicle struck

Richardson’s vehicle on Richardson’s left front corner as Dial’s vehicle came down the

embankment; when Dial’s vehicle “grabbed” Richardson’s vehicle and began to slowly drag it,

Richardson jumped into his vehicle because he feared for his safety. J.A. at 178 (Sent. Hr’g, Test.

of Richardson at 134:4-14). After a short movement, the two cars disengaged, and Dial left the

scene at a high rate of speed; Richardson testified that he did not immediately pursue Dial because

Dial had left the area before Richardson “developed or grasped [his] wits.” J.A. at 180 (Sent. Hr’g,

Test. of Richardson at 136:3-5). Richardson’s vehicle had some damage to the “front driver’s side

fender and light.” J.A. at 179 (Sent. Hr’g, Test. of Richardson at 135:2-4). By the time Richardson

located Dial’s car shortly afterwards, Dial had abandoned it in the woods.

On April 8, 2004, shortly after the encounter between Richardson and Dial, agents of TBI

obtained and executed a search warrant on Dial’s residence; they found several firearms and a small

amount of methamphetamine. On May 11, 2004, working with an informant again, TBI agents

obtained marijuana and methamphetamine from Dial at his residence.

A grand jury indicted Dial on March 23, 2005. Officers arrested Dial on April 20, 2005.

The government filed a superseding indictment on June 29, 2005. Dial pleaded guilty to two counts

on December 7, 2005. The presentence report indicated that the parties “agree[d] to disagree” as

to whether a two-level enhancement should apply to Dial pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2 for reckless

endangerment during flight. J.A. at 236 (PSR at ¶ 11(iii)). On March 27, 2006, after hearing

testimony at the sentencing hearing related to the enhancement for reckless endangerment during

flight, the district court applied the enhancement and sentenced Dial to a total of 157 months of

imprisonment; Dial filed a timely appeal.

II. ENHANCEMENT FOR RECKLESS ENDANGERMENT

 DURING FLIGHT

A. Standard of Review

“[We] review[ ] the district court's application of the United States Sentencing Guidelines

de novo and the district court’s findings of fact at sentencing for clear error.” United States v. Hunt, 487 F.3d 347, 350 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Tocco, 306 F.3d 279, 284 (6th Cir.

2002)). Because the “question of what constitutes endangerment is a mixed question of law and fact

. . . [that] is highly fact-based,” we give “significant deference to the district court.” United States

v. Hazelwood, 398 F.3d 792, 796 (6th Cir. 2005).

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1

The Ninth Circuit assumed without deciding that § 3C1.2 had a nexus requirement because the government

did not disagree with the idea that such a requirement could exist. United States v. Duran, 37 F.3d 557, 559-60 (9th Cir.

1994) (“Because the government does not contest the nexus requirement, we will assume without so holding that

U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2 requires a nexus between the crime of conviction and the reckless endangerment.”).

B. Analysis

Dial raises one issue on appeal: whether the district court erred when it determined that a

two-level enhancement for reckless endangerment during flight applied to him. When determining

a defendant’s sentence, the district court first ascertains the base offense level and then applies

adjustments (if any) related to obstruction of justice. The United States Sentencing Guidelines (“the

Guidelines”) include an obstruction-of-justice adjustment that states the following: “If the defendant

recklessly created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person in the course

of fleeing from a law enforcement officer, increase by 2 levels.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2 (2006).

The courts look to general principles stated in the Guidelines when determining if an

enhancement, such as § 3C1.2, should apply. In this case, the relevant-conduct provision, U.S.S.G.

§ 1B1.3, is particularly important. Section 1B1.3 provides in pertinent part:

(a) Chapters Two (Offense Conduct) and Three (Adjustments). Unless otherwise

specified, . . . adjustments in Chapter Three[] shall be determined on the basis of the

following:

(1)(A) all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled,

commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant . . . that

occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation

for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or

responsibility for that offense. . . .

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a) (emphasis added).

The district court held that the two-level enhancement under § 3C1.2 for reckless

endangerment during flight applied, based on the events of April 8, 2004, because Richardson

testified that he feared for his safety and that an informant had told Richardson that Dial would have

drugs in his car at that time. J.A. at 204-05 (Sent. Hr’g Tr. at 160-61). Dial argues that the

enhancement should apply only when there is a “nexus between” the offense of conviction and the

reckless endangerment during flight. Appellant Br. at 15-16. Dial argues that there was not a nexus

between his methamphetamine and firearm convictions and his avoidance of Richardson on the rural

road. He argues that there were no overt acts or alleged transactions in furtherance of the conspiracy

to distribute methamphetamine that occurred on the day that he drove up an embankment to go

around Richardson’s vehicle. Finally, Dial argues that there was no risk of death or serious bodily

injury to anyone when he drove down the embankment.

Only the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has addressed in detail the issue

of whether there must be a nexus between the crime of conviction and any reckless endangerment

during flight in order to enhance a defendant’s sentence under § 3C1.2.1

 In United States v.

Southerland, 405 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2005), the Fifth Circuit held that there is a nexus requirement

embedded in § 3C1.2 because enhancements should be added pursuant to the general principles of

the Guidelines. Southerland, 405 F.3d at 268. Specifically, § 1B1.3(a) instructs that adjustments

to offense levels should be made when there is a connection between the act or omission at issue

(such as reckless flight) and the underlying offense of conviction. However, Southerland did not

require the government “to demonstrate that the underlying offense caused either the reckless

endangerment during flight or the flight itself”; the government needed to show only “that a

sufficient nexus” existed “between the underlying offense and the reckless flight.” Id. (emphasis

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2

In United States v. Lykes, 71 F. App’x 543 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1093 (2003), an unpublished (and

therefore non-binding) decision, we stated in a footnote that there was “no nexus requirement in the language of

§ 3C1.2.” Id. at 553 n.7. Lykes completely failed to consider the general principles embedded in the Guidelines,

specifically § 1B1.3; these general principles must be considered in any application of § 3C1.2, despite the fact that they

are not part of the “language” of § 3C1.2. In addition, Lykes’s observation of the absence of any caselaw addressing the

nexus requirement was not a compelling reason to hold that no nexus requirement existed; although Southerland had

not been decided when we considered Lykes, proper review of the Guidelines as a whole leads to the conclusion that a

nexus must be established between the offense of conviction and the reckless flight in order for an enhancement to be

warranted.

added). Southerland developed a five-part test for determining if a § 3C1.2 enhancement should

apply to a defendant:

[T]he government must show that the defendant (1) recklessly, (2) created a

substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury, (3) to another person, (4) in the

course of fleeing from a law enforcement officer, (5) and that this conduct “occurred

during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense,

or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense.”

Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3). When determining whether the flight and the offense of conviction

were connected sufficiently for the reckless-endangerment enhancement to apply, the Southerland

court looked “primarily to any evidence of the defendant’s state of mind while fleeing.” Id. To

supplement the inquiry into the defendant’s state of mind, the Fifth Circuit “examine[d] the temporal

and geographic proximity of the reckless endangerment during flight to the offense of conviction.”

Id. at 269.

Today, we adopt the Southerland approach. When applying § 3C1.2, the district court must

find a nexus between the offense for which the defendant was convicted and the conduct that

involved reckless endangerment during flight.2 Southerland, 405 F.3d at 268. The general

principles of the Guidelines require sentencing courts to consider acts and omissions involving the

offense for which the defendant was convicted. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3. The general principles do

not suggest that causation should enter into the analysis. Id. Thus, as Southerland held, “[t]he

government need not demonstrate that the underlying offense caused either the reckless

endangerment during flight or the flight itself, only that a sufficient nexus lie between the underlying

offense and the reckless flight.” Southerland, 405 F.3d at 268.

All of the parts of the Southerland test are satisfied here. First, the district court implied that

Dial was reckless when it found that Dial drove his car in such a manner that Richardson “was in

fear of being seriously hurt.” J.A. at 205 (Sent. Hr’g Tr. at 161:17). Indeed, Dial conceded in his

brief that “[s]uch conduct may be deemed reckless.” Appellant Br. at 12. Second, the district court

found that Dial created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury because Dial’s actions

could have forced Richardson’s car to hit Richardson. Dial drove up an embankment and back down

again in order to avoid being stopped by Richardson, who was wearing a vest labeled “POLICE”

across the front and standing outside his vehicle in the middle of a rural dirt road. When Dial

descended the embankment, his car struck Richardson’s vehicle in such a manner that Richardson

got back into his vehicle in order to prevent his own vehicle from hitting him. Dial argues that there

are insufficient facts to establish that there was substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury for

Richardson and attempts to support this argument with the facts that Richardson was not injured and

that Richardson’s car was not moved a great distance by the impact. In addition, Dial argues that

there was “no one present in the vehicle” when Dial began his attempt to go around Richardson’s

vehicle. Appellant Br. at 13. However, the district court’s finding that Richardson justifiably “was

in fear of being seriously hurt by his own car being forced into him” by Dial’s car is supported by

Richardson’s testimony at the suppression hearing and at the sentencing hearing. J.A. at 205 (Sent.

Hr’g Tr. at 161:16-19). In addition, actual harm to Richardson and the distance of movement of the

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vehicle are irrelevant; the provision at issue, § 3C1.2, is not concerned with actual harm, but with

the “substantial risk” of “serious bodily injury.” Also, that Richardson was outside his vehicle when

Dial began his attempt to drive around it does not eliminate the substantial risk of serious bodily

harm that Richardson faced; in fact, Richardson testified at both the suppression and sentencing

hearings that the risk of injury was sufficiently great that he felt unsafe outside his vehicle, and he

got into his vehicle in order to avoid injury from the vehicles. Based on this evidence, the district

court found that Dial created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury. The third part of

the Southerland test—creation of a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury for another

person—is easily met here. Clearly Richardson was the specific other person at risk on these facts.

The fourth part of the Southerland test requires that Dial created the risk of bodily harm to

Richardson while Dial was fleeing from a law enforcement officer. The district court found that

Dial “had reason to believe that” Richardson was standing in the middle of the road near his vehicle

with a vest labeled “POLICE” “at least to question him, if not arrest him, at the scene,” J.A. at 205

(Sent. Hr’g Tr. at 161:11-13); thus, Dial’s decision to evade Richardson by trying to drive around

him led the district court to find that Dial “was fleeing from the officer” when he created the risk.

Id. (Sent. Hr’g Tr. at 161:24-25).

Finally, we conclude that this situation meets the fifth part of the Southerland test because

there is a sufficient nexus between Dial’s flight on April 8, 2004 and his underlying offense for

conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. The district court’s findings of fact about Dial’s mindset

at the time of his flight, supported by the temporal and geographic proximity between the flight and

the conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, lead to this conclusion. Officers had used an

informant to purchase methamphetamine from Dial on two occasions in April prior to his encounter

with Richardson on April 8, 2004; indeed, an informant had indicated that Dial would be carrying

a quantity of methamphetamine down the road when Richardson attempted to stop Dial on April 8.

As noted above, the district court found that Dial “had reason to believe that [Richardson] was at

least to question him, if not arrest him, at the scene.” J.A. at 205 (Sent. Hr’g Tr. at 161:11-13).

Thus, Dial’s attempt to avoid Richardson (by going around Richardson’s vehicle) connected directly

to the ongoing methamphetamine conspiracy of which he was a part: Dial was attempting to prevent

detection of the ongoing conspiracy. In addition, temporal proximity can be established because

Dial’s flight on April 8, 2004 fell within the time period of the conspiracy to distribute

methamphetamine, which ran from April 2004 to April 20, 2005, to which he pleaded guilty.

Finally, there is geographic proximity between the location of the conspiracy and the location of his

reckless flight. Thus, although Dial argues that there were no overt acts or alleged transactions in

furtherance of the conspiracy on April 8, 2004, it appears that the enhancement should apply because

Dial’s attempt to go around Richardson’s vehicle and his hasty departure were an attempt “to avoid

detection or responsibility” for the conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine,

an offense for which he was convicted in this case. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3.

Therefore, we conclude that all parts of the Southerland test are satisfied, and the district

court did not err in applying the enhancement for reckless endangerment during flight pursuant to

U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2 in calculating Dial’s sentence.

III. CONCLUSION

Because there was a nexus between Dial’s flight on April 8, 2004 and his conviction for

conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine, and because the other factors

required for an enhancement under § 3C1.2 for reckless endangerment during flight were satisfied,

we conclude that the district court’s decision to apply the enhancement was proper. We AFFIRM

the district court’s judgment.

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No. 06-5519 United States v. Dial Page 6

_________________

CONCURRENCE

_________________

SILER, Circuit Judge, concurring. I concur in the majority decision affirming the district

court’s judgment. However, I write separately to say that it is not necessary to find a nexus

requirement embedded in USSG § 3C1.2. Thus, I would leave to another day the resolution of that

decision. 

Like the decision in United States v. Duran, 37 F.3d 557, 559-60 (9th Cir. 1994), I would

assume without deciding that § 3C1.2 had a nexus requirement. Obviously, unlike Duran, the

Government in the case at bar did not agree with the idea that such a requirement could exist.

Nevertheless, I think that the nexus issue could be better resolved in a case in which a district court

enhanced a sentence based upon conduct which did not have a nexus between the offense of

conviction and the reckless endangerment during flight. Therefore, I would find that regardless of

whether there is a nexus requirement under the Guidelines, the district court properly enhanced the

sentence for reckless endangerment. 

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