Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-15-03240/USCOURTS-ca10-15-03240-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Darnell Richmond
Petitioner

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

_________________________________

In re: DARNELL RICHMOND, 

 Movant.

No. 15-3240

(D.C. No. 2:09-CR-20069-KHV-1)

(D. Kan.)

_________________________________

ORDER

_________________________________

Before BRISCOE, PHILLIPS, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________

Darnell Richmond seeks authorization to file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2255 motion to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence. We deny the motion and 

dismiss this proceeding.

In 2009, Mr. Richmond pleaded guilty without a plea agreement to one count of 

bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). He was subject to a higher sentencing 

guidelines range because he qualified as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. The 

district court sentenced him to 151 months in prison, and we affirmed his sentence on 

appeal. See United States v. Richmond, 421 F. App’x 791, 792 (10th Cir. 2010). 

Mr. Richmond then filed a § 2255 motion, which the district court denied. The 

district court also denied his request for a certificate of appealability (COA). 

Mr. Richmond did not take any further action to appeal from the denial of his § 2255 

motion. In 2012, Mr. Richmond sought authorization from this court to file a second or 

successive § 2255 motion, but we denied his request. 

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

November 4, 2015

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

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Mr. Richmond has now filed another motion seeking authorization to file a second 

or successive § 2255 motion to challenge his sentence. He contends that the Supreme 

Court’s recent decision in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), establishes a 

new rule of constitutional law that entitles him to authorization. 

In Johnson, the Supreme Court held that “imposing an increased sentence under 

the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act violates the Constitution’s 

guarantee of due process.” Id. at 2563. Mr. Richmond explains that the reasoning in 

Johnson also applies to the residual clause in the career offender guidelines provision and 

therefore his prior convictions no longer qualify as crimes of violence.1

 He seeks to 

bring a new claim that his increased sentence under the residual clause of the career 

offender guidelines provision violates his due process rights under the Constitution. 

In order to be entitled to authorization, a second or successive claim must be based 

on “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the 

Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2). 

Mr. Richmond notes that the Seventh Circuit authorized a successive § 2255 after 

concluding that Johnson announced a new rule of constitutional law that was 

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review. See Mot. at 7 (citing Price v. 

United States, 795 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2015)).

We recently decided otherwise, declining to adopt the Seventh Circuit’s approach 

in Price. See In re Gieswein, --- F.3d ---, 2015 WL 5534388, at *5 (10th Cir. Sept. 21, 

 1 We recently held that Johnson’s rationale applies equally to the residual clause in 

the career offender guidelines provision, see United States v. Madrid, --- F.3d ---, 2015 

WL 6647060, at *3-4 (10th Cir. Nov. 2, 2015).

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2015). We explained that “[t]he Supreme Court has not held in one case, or in a 

combination of holdings that dictate the conclusion, that the new rule of constitutional 

law announced in Johnson is retroactive to cases on collateral review.” Id. A motion for 

authorization that relies on Johnson therefore does not meet the standard for authorization

in § 2255(h)(2). See id. 

Accordingly, we deny Mr. Richmond’s motion. This denial of authorization “shall 

not be appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition for rehearing or for a writ of 

certiorari.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E).

Entered for the Court

ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER, Clerk

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