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Parties Involved:
Miguel Bustamante
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is *

unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record. See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2)(C).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted March 17, 2010*

Decided March 17, 2010

Before

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 09-3096

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MIGUEL BUSTAMANTE,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 08 C 3508

James F. Holderman,

Chief Judge.

O R D E R

FBI agents uncovered drugs and a handgun in Miguel Bustamante’s car, and he was

sentenced to 123 months’ imprisonment on the charges that followed. Bustamante asked

the district court to vacate his sentence, 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming, as relevant here, that his

attorney was ineffective for not moving to suppress his admission that the car was his, a

statement he made without the benefit of Miranda warnings. The district court denied the

motion but granted Bustamante a certificate of appealability. We affirm the judgment. 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 09-3096 Page 2

Bustamante, a suspected player in a cocaine conspiracy, was arrested at the home of

a female companion. Before giving him Miranda warnings, agents asked Bustamante if a

car parked behind the building belonged to him, and he admitted that it did. Later, after

he had invoked his right to counsel, agents obtained his consent to search the vehicle and

found cocaine and a handgun inside its console. Bustamante was charged for his role in

the drug conspiracy, 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), as well as possession with intent to

distribute cocaine, id. § 841(a)(1), unlawful possession of a firearm after a felony conviction,

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and carrying a firearm in relation to a drug offense, id. § 924(c)(1). He

moved to suppress the evidence found inside his car, asserting only that his consent to

search was obtained in violation of Miranda; he said nothing about suppressing his related

admission that he was the car’s owner. The district court denied the motion, and

Bustamante later pleaded guilty to all but the conspiracy charge. On direct appeal he

challenged the district court’s ruling on his suppression motion, but we affirmed the

judgment, concluding that there had been no constitutional violation because a request for

consent to search a vehicle is not “interrogation” for purposes of Miranda. United States v.

Bustamante, 493 F.3d 879, 892 (7th Cir. 2007). 

In his § 2255 motion, Bustamante argued that his attorney provided ineffective

assistance by not moving to suppress his admission that he was the owner of the vehicle

parked outside his girlfriend’s apartment. To establish that he received ineffective

assistance of counsel, Bustamante was required to prove that his lawyer’s performance was

deficient and that, but for the alleged deficiency, he would not have pleaded guilty. See Hill

v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); United

States v. Peleti, 576 F.3d 377, 383 (7th Cir. 2009). When a claim of ineffective assistance is

premised on an attorney’s failure to file a motion to suppress, the defendant must prove

that the motion would have been meritorious. United States v. Cieslowski, 410 F.3d 353, 360

(7th Cir. 2005). 

The government concedes that Bustamante would have prevailed if his attorney had

moved to suppress his admission of ownership. As we have held, where the police do

more than ask for consent to search and inquire “as to ownership of that which is searched,

the inquiry crosses the threshold into testimonial incrimination and is therefore barred

unless the safeguards of Miranda have been put in place.” United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d

1088, 1098-99 (7th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Henley, 984 F.2d 1040, 1042-43 (9th Cir.

1993); United States v. Monzon, 869 F.2d 338, 341-42 (7th Cir. 1989). 

But that is not enough to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was

constitutionally deficient. Even assuming that the district court would have granted a

motion to suppress Bustamante’s admission, the government’s case against him would

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No. 09-3096 Page 3

have remained the same because his consent to search the car and the physical evidence

that was discovered would still be admissible. See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 633-

34 (2004) (plurality opinion); United States v. Renken, 474 F.3d 984, 988 (7th Cir. 2007). 

Bustamante has never asserted, and there is no reason to believe, that the government

would have been unable to connect him to the vehicle without his admission of ownership. 

Cf. Henley, 984 F.2d at 1044-45; see also Gentry v. Sevier, No. 08-3574, 2010 WL 668901, at *9

(7th Cir. Feb. 26, 2010) (concluding that counsel’s performance was constitutionally

deficient where motion to suppress evidence would have been meritorious and

government could not have convicted defendant without the excluded evidence). For

example, although the record is silent about whether the car was registered to Bustamante,

his girlfriend told agents that the keys to the car found during a search of her bedroom

belonged to him. An attorney is not required to pursue an argument that can lead only to a

dead end for his client. Cf. United States v. Harris, 394 F.3d 543, 555-56 (7th Cir. 2005); United

States v. Rezin, 322 F.3d 443, 446 (7th Cir. 2003). Bustamante had nothing to gain from

having his admission of ownership excluded, and thus his lawyer’s decision to forego a

motion to suppress was a sound strategic decision that cannot give rise to a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel. See Cieslowski, 410 F.3d at 360-61.

AFFIRMED.

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