Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03970/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03970-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kyle Anthony Doolin
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Linda R. Reade, Chief Judge, United States District Court for

the Northern District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-3970

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Northern District of Iowa.

Kyle Anthony Doolin, *

* [UNPUBLISHED] 

Defendant - Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: September 25, 2007

 Filed: October 26, 2007

___________

Before BYE, BENTON and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Kyle Anthony Doolin appeals the district court’s1

 decision to revoke his

supervised release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). Finding six grounds for

revocation present, the district court revoked Doolin’s release, and sentenced him to

18 months in prison. He argues on appeal that the district court erred by: (1) failing

to continue the revocation hearing because his court-appointed attorney was not

prepared; and (2) revoking his supervised release because that finding was not

supported by the evidence. We affirm.

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We first consider the district court's decision to deny Doolin’s request for a

continuance. “We will reverse a district court’s decision to deny a motion for

continuance only if the court abused its discretion and the moving party was

prejudiced by the denial.” United States v. Thurmon, 368 F.3d 848, 851 (8th Cir.

2004) (quoting United States v. Controneo, 89 F.3d 510, 514 (8th Cir. 1996))

(emphasis added). The grant of continuances is disfavored and “should be granted

only when the party requesting one has shown a compelling reason.” Controneo, 89

F.3d at 514.

Doolin argues the district court should have granted him a continuance because

his court-appointed attorney was not prepared for the revocation hearing. Doolin

contends that his court-appointed attorney did not prepare for the hearing because he

knew Doolin had retained private counsel. The district court found this contention to

be without merit. After reviewing the record, we agree.

First, Doolin did not present any evidence that he had actually retained private

counsel. The district court contacted Doolin’s purportedly retained counsel and

learned that he had not been “technically retained,” had not made a formal appearance

for the record, and had made no effort to contact the Government regarding Doolin’s

case. Second, the district court observed that Doolin’s court-appointed attorney had

worked on his case for a month leading up to the revocation hearing and was therefore

familiar with the issues to be raised during it. Third, at no point during the revocation

hearing did Doolin represent to the district court that his court-appointed attorney had

failed to prepare for the hearing in light of his alleged hiring of private counsel. And

fourth, Doolin’s court-appointed attorney never represented to the district court that

he was unprepared for the hearing. Because Doolin did not present the district court

with a compelling reason for granting a continuance, we find that it did not abuse its

discretion by denying him one.

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We next consider the district court’s decision to revoke Doolin’s supervised

release. In reviewing a supervised release revocation, we review the district court’s

factual findings for clear error. See United States v. Carothers, 337 F.3d 1017, 1019

(8th Cir. 2003). The ultimate decision to revoke is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

See id.

Doolin argues there was insufficient evidence to support revocation. Having

reviewed the record, we conclude there was clearly “enough evidence . . . to satisfy

the district judge that the conduct of the probationer has not met the conditions of

probation.” United States v. Leigh, 276 F.3d 1011, 1012 (8th Cir. 2002). We are

therefore satisfied that the Government established by a preponderance of the

evidence that Doolin violated his supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), (g)

(“The [district] court may . . . revoke a term of supervised release, and require the

defendant to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release . . . if the court

finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a condition of

supervised release . . .").

Because the district court found Doolin violated his supervised release in six

different ways, and the Government presented ample testimony to establish the

majority (if not all) of these violations, we reject Doolin’s suggestion that this Court

should remand this matter because it is unclear what role his alleged wrongful

possession of wine (one of the violations of his supervised release) played in the

district court’s decision. He contends that when it is unclear whether the district

court’s disposition of a petition for revocation of supervised release would be the

same after some of the violations are not affirmed on appeal, this Court should remand

for a new revocation hearing. See United States v. Hill, No. 95-2437EM, 1995 U.S.

App. LEXIS 36113 (8th Cir. Dec. 21, 1995) (per curiam) (unpublished). In Hill, the

district court found that the defendant violated four conditions of his supervised

release and sentenced him to nine months’ imprisonment. On appeal, the government

conceded it had not proven the most serious of the alleged violations (driving a motor

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vehicle while intoxicated), but contended “the district court could properly base its

decision on the remaining violations and decide that revocation was warranted.” 1995

U.S. App. LEXIS 36113, at *2. This Court remanded because it could not tell from

the record whether the district court would reach the same disposition based on the

remaining three, less serious violations. 

In contrast, the record here reflects that aside from the alleged wrongful

possession of wine, Doolin committed a number of serious violations, including

assaulting his nephew, associating with a known felon and leaving the judicial district

on multiple occasions. The district court also based its decision to revoke Doolin’s

supervised release, in part, on the fact that it had previously modified his supervised

release (after an earlier violation) without resorting to incarceration, but that this more

lenient sanction had little positive impact on his behavior. Therefore, it is clear from

this record the district court would have revoked Doolin’s supervised release and

ordered him imprisoned regardless of the violation relating to the wine. While it is

possible the district court might not have sentenced Doolin to a term above the

guideline range absent a second law violation, that issue is not before us because he

did not challenge the length of his sentence on appeal. Because Doolin violated

multiple terms of his supervised release, the district court did not abuse its discretion

by ordering revocation.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court.

______________________________

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