Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-10-03048/USCOURTS-caDC-10-03048-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Jonathan Wright
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 23, 2013 Decided November 8, 2013

No. 09-3087

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

LONNELL GLOVER,

APPELLANT

Consolidated with 10-3048, 10-3066

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:09-cr-00129)

Robert S. Becker, appointed by the court, argued the cause

and filed the joint brief for appellant Jonathan Wright.

Adam H. Kurland, appointed by the court, argued the cause

and filed the joint brief for appellant Lonnell Glover.

John P. Gidez, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for

appellee. With him on the brief were Ronald C. Machen Jr.,

U.S. Attorney, and Elizabeth Trosman, Suzanne Grealy Curt,

Anthony F. Scarpelli, and John K. Han, Assistant U.S.

Attorneys.

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Before: BROWN, Circuit Judge, and EDWARDS and

SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

SILBERMAN.

SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge: Appellants Lonnell

Glover and Jonathan Wright were convicted of conspiring to

possess and distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine. They

appeal on a number of grounds. We agree that with respect to

one of their claims their convictions must be reversed; the

district court erroneously admitted evidence obtained pursuant

to a “facially insufficient” warrant.

I.

Although the convictions in this case were for a conspiracy

to distribute cocaine, the FBI’s initial investigation was directed

at Glover’s distribution of PCP and heroin. The FBI obtained a

warrant to tap Glover’s cell phone, but Glover was careful to

speak only in code when using the cell phone. It was noticed,

however, that Glover had frequent meetings in his truck, so the

FBI obtained a warrant from Judge Collyer of the District Court

for the District of Columbia to place an audio recording device

in the truck. Unfortunately, the truck was parked at the

Baltimore BWI Airport, and the FBI’s affidavit in support of the

warrant made that plain. Nevertheless, the warrant explicitly

stated that FBI agents could forcibly enter the truck, regardless

of whether the vehicle was located in the District of Columbia,

District of Maryland, or the Eastern District of Virginia.

The bug worked. Glover was recorded discussing his PCPheroin business, as well as his plans to use funds from that

business to begin distributing cocaine. The cocaine – which was

to come from a Bahamian known as “Foot” – would be driven

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to Washington from Florida. Jonathan Wright was also

overheard in the truck, taking part in the conspiracy by joining

Glover’s plans to import the cocaine from the Bahamas.

The cocaine conspiracy began to unravel in June of 2007,

when another co-conspirator was apprehended at Miami

International Airport, attempting to smuggle large quantities of

cash into the Bahamas. A few weeks later, on June 19, Glover

was arrested in connection with his earlier PCP and heroinrelated activities. Wright was finally arrested for his role in the

cocaine conspiracy on May 14, 2008.

Glover was charged and convicted on PCP charges in a

separate trial. Both appellants, however, were indicted for the

cocaine conspiracy. The district judge held that the government

had violated the Speedy Trial Act, and dismissed the indictments

without prejudice. But the government reindicted appellants and

they were then convicted by a jury. This appeal followed.

II.

Although we reverse the conviction based on a defective

warrant, that would still permit a new trial (assuming the

government has adequate non-tainted evidence), so it is

necessary to confront, at the outset, appellants’ argument that

their indictment should have been dismissed because of the

government’s violation of the Speedy Trial Act or – in the case

of Wright – a related claim that the Sixth Amendment was

violated.

The Speedy Trial Act requires a trial court to dismiss an

indictment when the government fails to bring the defendant to

trial within 70 days, not counting certain “excludable days.” 18

U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). The district judge determined – and this is

undisputed – that the government had, indeed, violated the Act; 

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accordingly, he dismissed the indictments. Appellants argue that

the court erred, however, in dismissing the indictments without

prejudice. 

The Act lists certain (non-exclusive) factors that a trial

court must consider in determining whether to dismiss an

indictment with or without prejudice. Those are: “the

seriousness of the offense; the facts and circumstances of the

case which led to the dismissal; and the impact of a

reprosecution on the administration of this chapter and on the

administration of justice.” Id. 

But our review is limited; we can reverse the trial court’s

decision only for an abuse of discretion. “[W]hen the statutory

factors are properly considered, and supporting factual findings

are not clearly in error, the district court’s judgment of how

opposing considerations balance should not lightly be

disturbed.” See United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 337

(1988). We easily conclude the district judge’s decision meets

that standard. 

Appellants argue that their crime was not “serious,” that

the judge placed undue emphasis on the inadvertent nature of the

government’s violation, and that a dismissal without prejudice

undermines the deterrent effect of the Act. These contentions

are rather flimsy, and are, therefore, rejected. See United States

v. Wright, 6 F.3d 811, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (concluding that

conspiracy to distribute fifty grams of cocaine is a serious

offense, that the inadvertence of the government’s violation of

the Act is a relevant factor, and that deterrence does not require

dismissal with prejudice in all cases).

We also reject Wright’s separate claim that even if the

Speedy Trial Act was not violated, the Sixth Amendment was. 

The district court properly considered the four factors it was

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required to balance: “whether delay before trial was

uncommonly long, whether the government or the criminal

defendant is more to blame for that delay, whether, in due

course, the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, and

whether he suffered prejudice as the delay’s result.” Doggett v.

United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651 (1992). The court assumed

arguendo that the delay was long, but noted that part of the

delay was attributed to defendant and, most important, that the

defendant had not shown that his defense was prejudiced

because of the delay.1

* * * *

Which brings us to the core issue in this case – the

allegedly illegal warrant. Appellants argue that the warrant was,

in the language of the statute, “insufficient on its face” because

it was signed by Judge Collyer, in the District of Columbia,

authorizing the FBI to place the electronic bug in Glover’s truck

parked in Maryland – outside of the district court’s jurisdiction. 

The government contends that it is perfectly permissible for a

district judge to authorize the placement of such an electronic

listening device on a vehicle anywhere in the United States. 

Appellants point to both Title III of the Omnibus Crime

Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,2

 which authorizes wiretaps

or electronic bugs, as well as Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure, which partially implements the statute. But

before discussing the statute and Rule 41 we are obliged to deal

with the government’s argument that our review should be

limited to plain error because appellants never raised the

1

 Of course, there is inherent prejudice in loss of liberty, a factor that

the district court properly noted.

2

 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq.

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jurisdictional objection to the truck bug. Although Glover’s

written motion to exclude the truck bug evidence before Judge

Hogan3

 did not object to the warrant’s alleged jurisdictional

defect, at oral argument counsel seems to have asked that the

motion be amended to include that ground for objection:

I would again move to amend the motion to

include the . . . truck bu[g]. . . . I think . . . that the

requirements of . . . 41(b) apply. . . . [T]he judge

did not have the authority to issue a warrant to

apply a device on a vehicle that’s outside her

jurisdiction.

(Trial Tr. at 4-7, Sept. 10, 2008).

Admittedly, much of counsel’s argument was focused on

the device’s integrated GPS feature and related Fourth

Amendment concerns, which explains why Judge Hogan

apparently did not perceive that counsel was also objecting to

the facial sufficiency of the warrant. Although an argument need

not be made in a written submission to be preserved for review,

see Fraternal Order of Police v. United States, 173 F.3d 898,

902 (D.C. Cir. 1999), counsel should, of course, make every

effort to ensure that their arguments are clearly presented. The

reason we require counsel to preserve arguments is to ensure

that the district court has the opportunity to pass on those

arguments in the first instance. This purpose is undermined if

important arguments are not clearly presented. Ultimately,

3

 That motion was made in the PCP case. The earlier PCP case is

relevant here because Judge Huvelle – who presided over the trial that

led to the convictions in this case – stated that she would follow Judge

Hogan’s previous evidentiary rulings, that she would not consider

arguments previously made, and that she would treat all previous

arguments as preserved.

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however, we need not decide whether the argument was

preserved, because we find that appellants have demonstrated

plain error. See infra; In re Sealed Case, 573 F.3d 844, 847

(D.C. Cir. 2009) (A defendant’s conviction may be reversed,

even when he failed to preserve an argument, if he demonstrates

plain error.).

The statute specifies that “[w]henever any wire or oral

communication has been intercepted, no part of the contents of

such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be

received in evidence in any . . . proceeding . . . if the disclosure

of that information would be in violation of this chapter.” 18

U.S.C. § 2515. The statute further specifies that an 

aggrieved person . . . may move to suppress the

contents of any wire or oral communication

intercepted pursuant to this chapter, or evidence

derived therefrom, on the grounds that–

(i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted;

(ii) the order of authorization or approval under

which it was intercepted is insufficient on its face;

or

(iii) the interception was not made in conformity

with the order of authorization or approval. 

Id. § 2518(10)(a) (emphasis added).

The relationship between paragraphs (i) and (ii) of the

statute is, at first glance, rather puzzling, since it would appear

that if the authorization was “insufficient on its face,” the

communication would be necessarily “unlawfully intercepted.”

But the Supreme Court has recognized a broad reading of

paragraph (i) would render (ii) and (iii) redundant and “drained

of meaning.” United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 575 (1974);

accord United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 432 (1977);

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United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 525 n.14 (1974); cf.

United States v. Johnson, 696 F.2d 115, 119-21 (D.C. Cir. 1982)

(interpreting analogous provisions of the District of Columbia

Code). Therefore, the Court read paragraph (i) as requiring a

broad inquiry into the government’s intercept procedures to

determine whether the government’s actions transgressed the

“core concerns” of the statute, whereas (ii) is a mechanical test;

either the warrant is facially sufficient or it is not. See Giordano,

416 U.S. at 527. 

Although a number of our sister circuits have imported

the core concerns test into paragraph (ii), we think this approach

is contrary to the plain text of the statute. See United States v.

Traitz, 871 F.2d 368, 379 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Vigi,

515 F.2d 290, 293 (6th Cir. 1975); United States v. Robertson,

504 F.2d 289, 292 (5th Cir. 1974). Suppression is the mandatory

remedy when evidence is obtained pursuant to a facially

insufficient warrant. There is no room for judicial discretion.

Indeed, applying the “core concerns” test to paragraph (ii) would

turn the Supreme Court’s approach on its head, elevating policy

over text. In construing the phrase “unlawfully intercepted” in

paragraph (i), the Supreme Court only turned to congressional

policies after first applying traditional tools of statutory

construction, which indicated that a limiting construction was

necessary to avoid rendering paragraphs (ii) and (iii)

“surplusage.” Giordano, 416 U.S. at 526; see also D. Ginsberg

& Sons v. Popkin, 285 U.S. 204, 208 (1932) (It is a “cardinal

rule that, if possible, effect shall be given to every clause and

part of a statute.”). But applying the “core concerns” test to

paragraph (ii) would actually treat that paragraph as

“surplusage”– precisely what the Supreme Court tried to avoid

in Giordano.

Turning then to the jurisdictional language of Title III,

it permits a judge to “authoriz[e] or approv[e] interception of

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wire, oral, or electronic communications within the territorial

jurisdiction of the court in which the judge is sitting (and outside

that jurisdiction but within the United States in the case of a

mobile interception device authorized by a Federal court within

such jurisdiction).” 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (emphasis added). 

To be sure, the parenthetical phrase is somewhat

ambiguous. It seems reasonable to read the words “such

jurisdiction” in the phrase as referring back to the jurisdiction in

which the judge is sitting; i.e., in this case, the District of

Columbia, since the provision mentions no other jurisdiction. It

is also possible that the phrase, by implication, refers to the

jurisdiction in which the mobile interception device is installed.

Under either reading, the parenthetical makes clear that a judge

cannot authorize the interception of communications if the

mobile interception device was not validly authorized, and a

device cannot be validly authorized if, at the time the warrant is

issued, the property on which the device is to be installed is not

located in the authorizing judge’s jurisdiction. A contrary

reading would render the phrase “authorized by a Federal court

within such jurisdiction” completely superfluous.

Indeed, the legislative history – ironically brought to our

attention by the government in a 28(j) letter – confirms our

conclusion that the government’s interpretation is implausible.

According to a Senate Judiciary Committee report, the objective

of the language was to ensure that warrants remain effective in

the event a target vehicle is moved out of the issuing judge’s

jurisdiction after a warrant is issued, but before a surveillance

device can be placed in the vehicle. S. Rep. No. 99-541, at

106(a) (1986).4

4

 Presumably, the statute also permits a judge to authorize extensions

to eavesdropping warrants after the vehicle has left the jurisdiction, so

long as the listening device was lawfully placed.

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The government points to a handful of cases in which

courts have found that an “interception” under Title III takes

place at both the location of the listening post and at the location

of a tapped phone.5 The government argues that in light of these

cases, we should recognize that an issuing court has the power

to authorize covert, trespassory entries onto private property,

anywhere in the country, for purposes of placing surveillance

equipment. The only jurisdictional limitation the government

acknowledges is that the listening post must be located in the

issuing court’s jurisdiction. 

Of course, the statute does not refer to a “listening post,”

and none of the cases cited by the government addresses the

jurisdiction of the issuing court to authorize law enforcement

officers to covertly place a listening device on private property.

All of those cases addressed phone taps, and as the Seventh

Circuit explained, “a tap is not placed in the telephone handset

itself; it is attached to the telephone line at some distance from

the handset.” United States v. Ramirez, 112 F.3d 849, 853 (7th

Cir. 1997); see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,

464 (1928) (holding that a wiretap was not a search because

“[t]here was no entry of the houses or offices of the

defendants”), overruled in part by Katz v. United States, 389

U.S. 347 (1967). Whatever the merits of those decisions, they do

not address the issue before us.6

5 See United States v. Luong, 471 F.3d 1107, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006);

United States v. Ramirez, 112 F.3d 849, 852-53 (7th Cir. 1997);

United States v. Denman, 100 F.3d 399, 403 (5th Cir. 1996); United

States v. Rodriguez, 968 F.2d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 1992).

6

 For reasons that elude us, the government also cites Dalia v. United

States, 441 U.S. 238, 251-54 (1979), which holds only that Title III

permits the surreptitious placement of a listening device on private

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To the extent that there is uncertainty over the proper

interpretation of the statute, Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure, which partially implements the statute, is

crystal clear. It states that “a magistrate judge with authority in

the district has authority to issue a warrant for a person or

property outside the district if the person or property is located

within the district when the warrant is issued but might move or

be moved outside the district before the warrant is executed.”

Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(b)(2) (emphasis added). So, therefore, we

have a warrant issued in our case which appears, on its face, to

be in violation of the rule (and the statute). 

The government’s position regarding Rule 41 is, to put

it kindly, rather confusing. Government counsel largely ignores

the rule, but implicitly suggests that it is inconsistent with the

statute, which, if true, would have presented us with a rather

difficult problem. But as we have explained, Rule 41 and Title

III are consistent in that they impose the same geographic

limitations on warrants to install listening devices.

The government also argues that territorial jurisdiction

is not a “core concern” of Title III, and that therefore

suppression is not the appropriate remedy for the violation in

this case. But, as we explained supra, the Supreme Court has

repeatedly made clear that the “core concerns” test is a

construction of the term “unlawfully intercepted” in paragraph

(i), not paragraph (ii). Even if we thought that an inquiry into the

core concerns of the statute were permitted under paragraph (ii),

we would, nevertheless, agree with the Fifth Circuit, which

recently held that territorial jurisdiction is a core concern of

property. It has nothing to do with the authorizing judge’s

geographical jurisdiction.

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Title III. United States v. North, 728 F.3d 429, 437 (5th Cir.

2013). 

Nor do we think that the jurisdictional flaw in the

warrant can be excused as a “technical defect.” It is true that

several of our sister circuits have declined to hold paragraph (ii)

violated because of technical errors. See, e.g., United States v.

Moore, 41 F.3d 370, 375 (8th Cir. 1994) (inadvertent failure of

magistrate to sign order is a “mere technical defect” not

warranting suppression); United States v. Traitz, 871 F.2d 368,

379 (3d Cir. 1989) (inadvertent omission of one page of an order

does not render the order insufficient on its face where the order

still meets all statutory requirements).7

 Even if we assume that

an imperfect authorizing order could be thought facially

sufficient, we do not see how a blatant disregard of a district

judge’s jurisdictional limitation can be regarded as only

“technical.”

The government’s last refuge is a plea that we recognize

the government’s “good faith” and, therefore, import a good

faith exception to Title III’s remedy of suppression. The

Supreme Court has done so regarding Fourth Amendment

violations, see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 911 (1984),

where there is no explicit textual remedy. Here, of course,

Congress has spoken: The statute requires suppression of

evidence gathered pursuant to a facially insufficient warrant. See

United States v. Rice, 478 F.3d 704, 711 (6th Cir. 2007). In any

event, it is quite a stretch to label the government’s actions in

seeking a warrant so clearly in violation of Rule 41 as motivated

by “good faith.” 

7

 We express no opinion on whether the defects in either of these cases

should be viewed as merely technical.

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As we noted, supra, we think the failure to preclude the

truck bug evidence was not only error – it was plain error. See

In re Sealed Case, 573 F.3d at 851. Plain, because the language

of Rule 41 is quite clear; indeed, the government’s reluctance to

come to grips with the language is, in that respect, quite

revealing. And as we have explained, the statutory remedy is

automatic. The last factor to be considered in plain error analysis

– whether the error is prejudicial, and whether it seriously

affected the “fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

proceedings” – is in this case indisputable. United States v.

Venable, 269 F.3d 1086, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The truck bug

recordings were, in the words of the prosecuting attorney at trial,

some of the “most incriminating” and “most powerful” evidence

at trial, and there is a high likelihood that this evidence affected

the outcome. See United States v. Saro, 24 F.3d 283, 287 (D.C.

Cir. 1994). Accordingly, appellants’ convictions must be reversed.

* * * *

Appellants raise several additional arguments that would

be relevant, assuming there is a new trial. Glover claims he was

entitled to severance because Wright’s defense strategy was to

blame Glover; Wright’s lawyer was, in effect, a “second”

prosecutor” who actually told the jury Glover would “get what’s

coming to him.” Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure does permit a district judge to sever if a defendant

appears to be prejudiced, but the question is left to the district

judge’s discretion in light of the “strong interests” in favor of

joint trials. See United States v. Celis, 608 F.3d 818, 844 (D.C.

Cir. 2009). And the Supreme Court has explicitly held that

severance is not required merely because one defendant accuses

another of committing the crime. See Zafiro v. United States,

506 U.S. 534, 539-41 (1993). (It is instead perhaps prejudicial

when damaging evidence is either admissible against only one

defendant or exculpatory evidence is available to only one

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defendant. Id. at 539.) It follows, therefore, that the district

judge was well within his discretion in denying severance. 

There remain two evidentiary issues. The district judge

refused to allow defense counsel to point out to the jury that two

persons with apparent knowledge of relevant events had not

been called as a witness. In other words, the trial judge

determined that appellants wished to make a “missing witness”

argument – asking the jury to infer that a missing witness would

have supported a party’s version of events. Such an argument is

only permitted after a showing that the one party (the

government here) has the unique ability to produce the witness,

a showing the defendants did not make. See United States v.

Pitts, 918 F.2d 197, 199 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Appellants argue that

they were not really seeking to make a missing witness

argument, instead only highlighting the lack of certain evidence.

Their preferred label does not change the substance of their

argument; it was a missing witness argument by another name.

Of course, this issue could be revisited if there is a new trial.

Perhaps more significant, Glover argues that the district

court erred in admitting evidence of his PCP and heroin dealings

as “inextricably intertwined” with evidence of the charged

cocaine conspiracy. The conversations recorded by the truck bug

did unquestionably include Glover describing plans to use

revenues from the PCP-heroin dealing to fund the cocaine

conspiracy, so we think they were legitimately described as

inextricably intertwined. Although the precise contours of the

inextricably intertwined doctrine are murky, see United States

v. Bowie, 232 F.3d 923, 927-28 (D.C. Cir. 2000), as to at least

these recorded conversations, we think the district court’s

conclusion was correct. But that evidence would no longer be

available at a new trial. Whether any equally probative evidence

of the PCP-heroin dealings would be admissible is not really

before us. If the government does attempt to introduce additional

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“other crimes” evidence at a retrial, we encourage the district

court to address Rule 404(b) before applying the inextricably

intertwined doctrine, as there is a “danger that finding evidence

‘inextricably intertwined’ may too easily slip from analysis to

mere conclusion.” Id. at 928.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse appellants’

convictions and remand for a new trial.

So ordered.

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