Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-01-03073/USCOURTS-caDC-01-03073-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Richard A. Smith
Petitioner

Document Text:

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 21, 2002 Decided April 9, 2002

No. 01-3073

In Re: Richard A. Smith

Petitioner

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 89cr00036-03)

Kevin M. Schad argued the cause and filed the brief for

petitioner.

Patricia A. Heffernan, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for respondent. With her on the brief were Roscoe C.

Howard Jr., U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher and Roy W.

McLeese III, Assistant U.S. Attorneys. Mary-Patrice

Brown, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: Henderson, Randolph and Rogers, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Rogers.

Rogers, Circuit Judge: For Richard A. Smith, the remedy

afforded under 28 U.S.C. s 2255 is inadequate. Seeking

USCA Case #01-3073 Document #670274 Filed: 04/09/2002 Page 1 of 6
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

authorization to file a second motion under 28 U.S.C. s 2255,

as amended by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA")1, Smith demonstrates that

his conviction under 18 U.S.C. s 924(c) is unlawful in view of

the court's interpretation of the substantive provisions of that

statute. Nevertheless, the government contends, he fails to

make a prima facie showing under 28 U.S.C. s 2244(b)(3)(C)

as s 2255 requires. Smith has an alternative remedy, the

government urges, under 28 U.S.C. s 2241, and he is confined

in a district located in a circuit in which, the government

advises, he should prevail. Accordingly, we deny the application for authorization to file a second s 2255 motion in the

district court without reaching the question whether, as Smith

contends, there is an "actual innocence" exception to AEDPA.

I.

Following the affirmance of his conviction for drug and

weapon offenses, United States v. Harris, 959 F.2d 246 (D.C.

Cir. 1992), Smith filed a motion under s 2255, seeking vacation of his conviction under 18 U.S.C. s 924(c) in light of

Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 144 (1995). He withdrew that motion, with permission of the district court. Nine

months later Smith filed a motion under s 2255 motion

seeking relief on the ground that the act of trading drugs for

guns did not constitute a violation of s 924(c). The district

denied the motion, and this court, in 1999, denied Smith's

request for a certificate of appealability. The following year,

Smith filed his present request for authorization to file a

second s 2255 motion in the district court in view of United

States v. Stewart, 246 F.3d 728 (D.C. Cir. 2001), which held, in

light of Bailey's clarification that "use" under s 924(c)(1)

means "active employment of the firearm by the defendant,"

that the receipt of a gun during a drug transaction is not an

offense under s 924(c). See id. at 733.

There is no question that Smith's s 924(c) conviction is no

longer valid. In Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993),

the Supreme Court held that the defendant's offer to sell his

__________

1 See Pub. L. 104-132, s 105, 110 Stat. 1220.

USCA Case #01-3073 Document #670274 Filed: 04/09/2002 Page 2 of 6
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

gun for narcotics constituted "use" of the gun under 924(c).

See id. at 228-29. Then, in Bailey, the Court not only

clarified that "active employment" is required under s 924(c),

but stated that a firearm can be used without being carried

when a defendant displays or barters a firearm without

handling it. See Bailey, 516 U.S. at 146. This court, in turn,

held in Stewart that merely "receiving" a gun during a drug

transaction is not active employment because the "recipient

has not employed the gun, availed himself of the gun, or

derived any service from the gun by simply trading his drugs

for it." Stewart, 246 F.3d at 731. The court contrasted the

facts in Stewart where the defendant had "bartered for a

firearm" with the fact in Smith that the defendant had

"barter[ed] with a firearm," using his gun to trade it for

cocaine. See Stewart, 246 F.3d at 731-32. The court thus

adopted the view expressed by the Seventh Circuit in United

States v. Westmoreland, 122 F.2d 431, 435 (7th Cir. 1997),

that "there is no grammatically correct way to express that a

person receiving a payment is thereby 'using' the payment."

See Stewart, 246 F.3d at 731-32 (quoting Westmoreland, 122

F.3d at 435). Like the defendant in Stewart, Smith received

guns in exchange for drugs that he and his co-defendant sold.

See Harris, 959 F.2d at 258. Because Stewart "is an authoritative statement of what the statute meant before as well as

after [its holding]," Smith is entitled to benefit from the

Stewart interpretation of s 924(c). See United States v.

McKie, 73 F.3d 1149, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Rivers v.

Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 312-13 (1994)).

Under the language of the AEDPA statute, however, this

court's jurisdiction is limited to considering whether an application for authorization to file a second s 2255 motion in the

district court makes a prima facie showing that the petitioner

is entitled to relief; only the district court has jurisdiction to

determine the merits of the motion once the circuit authorizes

it. See 28 U.S.C. s 2255 p 8; id. s 2244(b)(3)(A)-(D); Felker

v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996); Corrao v. United States,

152 F.3d 188, 191 (2d Cir. 1998); U.S. v. Bennett, 119 F.3d

468, 470 (7th Cir. 1997). To obtain authorization to file a

second s 2255 motion, "a second or successive motion must

USCA Case #01-3073 Document #670274 Filed: 04/09/2002 Page 3 of 6
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

be certified ... to contain--(1) newly discovered evidence

...; or (2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive

to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was

previously unavailable." 28 U.S.C. s 2255 p 8. Our decision

in Stewart does not constitute new evidence. See In re

Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 247 (3d Cir. 1997). Neither is it a

new rule of constitutional law made retroactive by the Supreme Court. See Tyler v. Cain, 121 S.Ct. 2478, 2482 (2001).

Although the Supreme Court has ruled that Bailey is to be

retroactive, Bailey is a rule of statutory interpretation, not of

constitutional law. See Bousley v. U.S., 523 U.S. 614, 620

(1998).

The savings clause of s 2255 provides that if the "remedy

by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of

his detention," the prisoner may utilize s 2241 to collaterally

attack the legality of his conviction or sentence. See 28

U.S.C. s 2255 p 5. Varying standards have been adopted by

the circuits for determining when s 2255 is "inadequate or

ineffective." See Reyes-Requena v. U.S., 243 F.3d 893, 903-

04 (5th Cir. 2001) (surveying cases). See also In re Jones,

226 F.3d 328, 333-34 (4th Cir. 2000); Wofford v. Scott, 177

F.3d 1236, 1244 & n.3 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v.

Barrett, 178 F.3d 34, 52 (1st Cir. 1999); Triestman v. United

States, 124 F.3d 361, 377 (2d Cir. 1997); In re Dorsainvil, 119

F.3d at 251-52 (3d Cir.); cf. United States v. Hanser, 123

F.3d 922, 929-30 (6th Cir. 1997). Suffice it for the instant

case, the Seventh Circuit has explained that s 2255 "can

fairly be termed inadequate when it is so configured as to

deny a convicted defendant any opportunity for judicial rectification of so fundamental a defect in his conviction as having

been imprisoned for a nonexistent offense." In re Davenport,

147 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 1998). The government states

that this is just such a case. See Respondent's Br. at 22-25;

Respondent's Supplemental Br. at 4, 6-7. Smith is actually

innocent, having been convicted on the basis of an incorrect

understanding of s 924(c), and s 2255 relief is unavailable to

him.

Smith may therefore file a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus under 28 U.S.C. s 2241 in the district in which he is

USCA Case #01-3073 Document #670274 Filed: 04/09/2002 Page 4 of 6
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

confined. See, e.g., In re Nwanze, 242 F.3d 521, 525 (3d Cir.

2001); Lee v. Wetzel, 244 F.3d 370, 373 (5th Cir. 2001); In re

Jones, 226 F.3d at 334; Barrett, 178 F.3d at 50 n.10; In re

Davenport, 147 F.3d at 611-12; Triestman, 124 F.3d at 380;

Dorsainvil, 199 F.3d at 252. Smith maintains that the Seventh Circuit, wherein he is confined, will deny him relief

under s 2241 in view of 28 U.S.C. s 2244(a), which prohibits a

writ of habeas corpus if "the legality of such detention has

been determined by a judge or court ... on a prior application for a writ of habeas corpus, except as provided in section

2255," 28 U.S.C. s 2244(a). But the Seventh Circuit held in

Davenport that a prisoner in similar circumstances as Smith

is eligible to use the safety valve of s 2255 to file a petition

under s 2241. See Davenport, 147 F.3d at 610, 612.

Regarding s 924(c), the Seventh Circuit has held, in view of

the Supreme Court's decision in Bailey, that passively receiving a gun for drugs does not constitute "use" of a gun in a

drug offense under s 924(c). See Westmoreland, 122 F.3d at

435. In that case, the defendant received a gun from an

undercover agent. The Seventh Circuit observed that "the

defendant is on the passive side of the bargain. He received

the gun. He was paid with the gun. He accepted the gun.

But in no sense did he actively 'use' the gun.... A seller

does not 'use' a buyer's consideration." Id. at 435-36. Although the Seventh Circuit noted that it "might well" view

the case differently had the transaction occurred between two

defendants, as the government could conceivably charge the

party receiving the gun with aiding and abetting the party

supplying it, id. at 436 n.1, our decision confirming Smith's

convictions does not indicate that the government charged

Smith with aiding and abetting, see Harris, 959 F.2d at 259-

60, and the government makes no such representation here

that he was.

The Seventh Circuit also left open how it would view a case

where the defendant requested the gun in payment for the

drugs. See Westmoreland, 122 F.3d at 436 n.1. In his 1999

application for a certificate of appealability, Smith referred to

testimony of the informant and the police to the effect that he

and his co-defendant Harris did not participate in the request

USCA Case #01-3073 Document #670274 Filed: 04/09/2002 Page 5 of 6
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

for drugs. But see Harris, 959 F.2d at 249. Be that as it

may, the government, in urging this court to invoke the safety

clause of s 2255, and thereby avoid addressing potential

constitutional issues that might arise were there no "actual

innocence" exception to AEDPA, has stated that under Westmoreland, "Seventh Circuit law should permit petitioner to

raise, and to prevail upon, his Section 924(c) claim." Respondent's Supplemental Br. at 15. The court takes at face value

the government's representation, for the government will be

bound to argue in support of relief for Smith in the Seventh

Circuit. See New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742 (2001).

Should the government's interpretation of Seventh Circuit

law prove to be mistaken, Smith then may renew his contention in this court that there is an "actual innocence" exception

under AEDPA.

Accordingly, because Smith's other claim, that his life

sentence must be vacated pursuant to Appendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), also fails to establish a prima facie

showing, for the Supreme Court has not made Apprendi

retroactive for purposes of collateral review and the jury in

Harris was instructed to find the amount of drugs, we deny

the application for authorization to file a second s 2255

motion in the district court without reaching the question

whether there is an "actual innocence" exception to AEDPA.

USCA Case #01-3073 Document #670274 Filed: 04/09/2002 Page 6 of 6