Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-07-02228/USCOURTS-ca10-07-02228-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ricardo Servin-Acosta
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

July 30, 2008

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. No. 07-2228

RICARDO SERVIN-ACOSTA,

Defendant - Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

(D.C. NO. 2:07-cr-00799-JCH-1)

Scott M. Davidson, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Defendant - Appellant.

William J. Pflugrath, Assistant United States Attorney, (Gregory J. Fouratt,

United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Albuquerque, New Mexico, for

Plaintiff - Appellee.

Before HARTZ, Circuit Judge, McWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge, and

HOLMES, Circuit Judge.

HARTZ, Circuit Judge.

Ricardo Servin-Acosta pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for

the District of New Mexico to a charge of illegal reentry after deportation. See

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8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1), (b). The district court sentenced him to 30 months’

imprisonment. On appeal he contends that the court miscomputed his offense

level under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) because it should not

have considered a minute order from a California court purportedly reflecting a

conviction of second-degree robbery, see Cal. Penal Code §§ 211, 212.5 (1993). 

He argues that (1) the minute order is insufficiently reliable to prove that he was

convicted of the offense and (2) even if the minute order proves the conviction, it

does not prove that he was convicted of “robbery” within the meaning of USSG

§ 2L1.2. We hold that (1) the minute order, together with other evidence before

the district court, was sufficient to prove the conviction, but (2) the evidence did

not establish that the conviction was for the crime of generic robbery, as required

by § 2L1.2. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we therefore remand

for resentencing.

I. BACKGROUND

Mr. Servin-Acosta was apprehended by Border Patrol agents in southern

New Mexico on March 4, 2007. An immigration check revealed that he had been

deported on April 30, 1993, after serving two years’ imprisonment for a

conviction in California state court for second-degree robbery. On May 1, 2007,

he pleaded guilty (without a plea agreement) to a one-count information charging

him with illegal reentry by an alien who had been deported.

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The probation office’s presentence report (PSR) assigned Mr. ServinAcosta a base offense level of eight. See USSG § 2L1.2(a). Because of the prior

conviction for robbery, which it termed a crime of violence, the PSR increased

the base offense level by 16 levels. See id. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). After a threelevel reduction for acceptance of responsibility, see id. § 3E1.1, Mr. ServinAcosta’s total offense level was 21. His California robbery conviction produced

three criminal-history points, placing him in criminal-history category II. As a

result, his Guidelines sentencing range was 41 to 51 months in prison.

Mr. Servin-Acosta filed a sentencing memorandum requesting a sentence of

12 months and a day. He objected to the imposition of the 16-level enhancement

for his robbery conviction, contending that there was insufficient evidence of the

conviction because the only evidence was a minute order that “d[oes] not bear

sufficient indicia of reliability.” R. Vol. I, Doc. 22 at 6. He pointed out that (1)

the name appearing on the minute order was “Ricardo Sevin” (omitting both the

“r” in “Servin” and “Acosta”); (2) the minute order was labeled “amended”

without indicating the nature of the amendment; (3) the minute order was missing

a paragraph; and (4) although the public defender’s name was handwritten on the

minute order, no one had checked a box used to indicate whether counsel was

present for his guilty plea. In addition, the sentencing memorandum might be

read as arguing that even if the minute order was sufficient to establish the

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existence of the robbery conviction, it was insufficient to prove that he had been

convicted of “robbery” within the meaning of USSG § 2L1.2.

The government filed a response to the sentencing memorandum. Attached

to the response were the California minute order, an immigration report created at

the time of Mr. Servin-Acosta’s March 4, 2007, arrest, and another immigration

report memorializing the 1993 deportation proceedings. The government’s

response stated:

The Defendant has not denied the fact that he was convicted of

robbery, but rather alleges that the government has failed to

sufficiently prove his prior conviction. He complains about the

Minute Order, but if anything, the Minute Order is more reliable than

an average docket report, which would withstand such scrutiny. The

Minute Order in this case includes the Defendant’s name . . . in

addition to the names of the judge, clerk, court reporter, prosecutor,

defense counsel, and interpreter. The Minute Order also clearly

states the dates in which the Defendant pled guilty and was

sentenced, the statute the Defendant violated, and the imposed

sentence of two years. Most importantly, the portion of the Minute

Order that includes a “certification after guilty plea to felony”

contains the judge’s signature.

Furthermore, the government has other documentation which

corroborates the Defendant’s robbery conviction. When the

Defendant was most recently arrested, a Border Patrol agent

completed a “Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien” form, known

as a Form I-213. In order to complete the form, the agent had to

check the Defendant’s criminal and immigration history. . . . When

the agent checked the Defendant’s criminal history, a report similar

to a [National Crime Information Center] report was generated, and

is included within the Form I-213. This report also showed that the

Defendant was convicted of robbery and sentenced to two years in

prison.

Within the Defendant’s immigration file was yet another

document, further corroborating his robbery conviction: a “Record

of Deportable Alien” form prepared on June 29, 1993, shortly after

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the Defendant was convicted of robbery. This form was prepared

when immigration authorities began deportation proceedings against

the Defendant. This form shows that the Defendant was referred to

deportation proceedings because he was convicted of second degree

robbery on March 10, 1992 in case number 4576047 in Fresno,

California. Again, this information is identical to the information

contained in the Minute Order. The form also contains additional

information about the Defendant, such as his birthdate, residence,

and parents’ names—information that is consistent with information

included in the PSR and provided by the Defendant.

Id. Doc. 23 at 4–5 (citations to record omitted).

At sentencing on September 4, 2007, Mr. Servin-Acosta reiterated his

objections to the PSR, but raised no concerns regarding the government’s factual

responses to his sentencing memorandum. The district court overruled the

objections, adopted the Guidelines calculations set forth in the PSR, and

sentenced him to a below-Guidelines sentence of 30 months’ imprisonment.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Proof of Prior Conviction

Mr. Servin-Acosta contends that the district court had insufficient evidence

to find that he had been convicted of second-degree robbery in California. We

are not persuaded. 

We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error. See United

States v. Hawley, 93 F.3d 682, 686–87 (10th Cir. 1996). The sentencing court

may find that the defendant has a prior conviction if it is satisfied by a

preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Martinez-Jimenez, 464 F.3d

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1205, 1209 (10th Cir. 2006). As we have stated, “A case summary obtained from

a state court and prepared by a clerk—even if not certified by that court—may be

sufficiently reliable evidence of conviction for purposes of enhancing a federal

sentence where the defendant fails to put forward any persuasive contradictory

evidence.” United States v. Zuniga-Chavez, 464 F.3d 1199, 1205 (10th Cir.

2006). Moreover, we have approved the use of a criminal-history report

generated by the National Crime Information Center to establish a prior

conviction when the defendant has failed to present any evidence that he is not

the person who is the subject of the report. See Martinez-Jimenez, 464 F.3d at

1210–12.

As proof of Mr. Servin-Acosta’s prior robbery conviction, the government

offered three sources: the minute order; a Form I-213 report created after

Mr. Servin-Acosta’s March 4, 2007, arrest; and another Form I-213 from his 1993

deportation proceedings. Mr. Servin-Acosta has not challenged the I-213 forms

or the government’s explanation of how they corroborate the minute order as

proof of his prior conviction. Nor has he presented any evidence that he was not

convicted of robbery in California. His argument amounts to little more than

reliance on a decision by the Ninth Circuit, United States v. Snellenberger, 493

F.3d 1015, 1019–20 (9th Cir. 2007). But Snellenberger does not help him. 

Although it said that a minute order cannot be used to prove the underlying

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conduct, it added that such an order can be used to prove the fact of a conviction. 

See id. at 1017 n.5.

The district court found that the evidence was sufficient:

I do think that the minute order is reliable, and I think the

government has proven the conviction by a preponderance of the

evidence, and I do note that the government came forth with

additional documentation that tends to support the reliability of the

previous conviction, so I will overrule the defendant’s argument on

that point.

R. Vol. III at 16. The court’s finding was not clear error.

B. Crime of Violence Under § 2L1.2

Mr. Servin-Acosta next contends that the district court erred in concluding

that a robbery conviction under Cal. Penal Code § 211 qualifies as a “robbery”

under USSG § 2L1.2’s definition of “crime of violence.” The application note to

this Guidelines provision defines “[c]rime of violence” as:

murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, forcible sex

offenses, statutory rape, sexual abuse of a minor, robbery, arson,

extortion, extortionate extension of credit, burglary of a dwelling, or

any other offense under federal, state, or local law that has as an

element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force

against the person of another.

Id. cmt. n.1(B)(iii) (emphasis added). Cal. Penal Code § 211 defines robbery as

“the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his

person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of

force or fear.” Mr. Servin-Acosta argues that the term robbery in the Guidelines

provision encompasses only “generic” robbery and that the California statute is

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broader than generic robbery. The California statute is broader, he says, because

it encompasses the use of force to effect an escape after the taking has occurred.

The government responds that Mr. Servin-Acosta’s conviction constitutes a

crime of violence because “robbery” is one of the felonies enumerated in

§ 2L1.2's definition of crime of violence. It asserts that “[t]he fact that the

robbery statute in California may not include the same application of force as a

generic robbery is irrelevant.” Aplee. Br. at 13.

We review de novo the district court’s interpretation of the Guidelines and

its determination that Mr. Servin-Acosta’s prior conviction for second-degree

robbery in California is a crime of violence. See United States v. Perez-Vargas,

414 F.3d 1282, 1284 (10th Cir. 2005). We disagree with the government’s

argument. 

A State’s designation of a criminal provision as its “robbery” statute does

not necessarily mean that it qualifies as “robbery” under § 2L1.2. When applying

the Guidelines, we have rejected the notion that whether a state conviction was

for an enumerated but undefined crime “depends upon how the crime is

characterized under state law.” United States v. Vasquez-Flores, 265 F.3d 1122,

1124 (10th Cir. 2001). In Vasquez-Flores the issue was whether the defendant’s

prior conviction was for an “aggravated felony” under the version of § 2L1.2 in

effect at the time. The commentary to the section cross-referenced the definition

of “aggravated felony” in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43), which included “a theft offense

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(including receipt of stolen property).” Id. at 1123 (internal quotation marks

omitted). We said that “in interpreting this sentencing guideline, we should adopt

a uniform generic definition of ‘theft offense (including receipt of stolen

property).’” Id. at 1124. Accordingly, in construing an enumerated offense in

§ 2L1.2's definition of crime of violence, we adopt a “uniform generic

definition.” Id. See also United States v. Romero-Hernandez, 505 F.3d 1082,

1087 (10th Cir. 2007) (adopting “ordinary, contemporary, and common”

definition of “forcible sex offense” under USSG § 2L1.2 (internal quotation

marks omitted)); United States v. Becerril-Lopez, 528 F.3d 1133, 1140–42 (9th

Cir. 2008) (adopting generic definition of “robbery” under USSG § 2L1.2);

United States v. Santiesteban-Hernandez, 469 F.3d 376, 378–79 (5th Cir. 2006)

(same). 

The government has made no effort to show that Mr. Servin-Acosta was

convicted of generic robbery. On the contrary, it has conceded that seconddegree robbery in California is broader than generic robbery, and it has presented

no evidence that Mr. Servin-Acosta’s specific offense was generic robbery. It

simply put all its eggs in one defective basket—the argument that “robbery is

robbery, period.” Accordingly, we must remand for further sentencing

proceedings.

III. CONCLUSION

We REMAND for resentencing.

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