Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_14-cv-00858/USCOURTS-almd-2_14-cv-00858-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lashun Hutson
Defendant
Peggy Strickland
Plaintiff

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

PEGGY STRICKLAND, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACT. NO. 2:14cv858-CSC

) (WO)

LASHUN HUTSON, )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER

On July 24, 2015, the plaintiff filed a FED R. CIV. P. 59(e) motion requesting that

the court vacate its July 9, 2015, final judgment which was entered pursuant to the court’s

memorandum opinion granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The

plaintiff requests that the court allow her to amend her response to the defendant’s motion

for summary judgment by submitting a deposition.

The plaintiff’s motion is based primarily on the deposition testimony of Officer Ed

Jones who was not deposed until June 29, 2015, well after the summary judgment

submission deadline of May 7, 2015. Strickland now contends that Jones’ testimony 1

demonstrates that a material factual dispute exists about whether the defendant “actually

took a statement from Strickland . . . [which] would deny Hutson probable cause . . .”

Rule 59(e) cannot be used to present evidence that could have been raised prior to

The plaintiff’s motion explains that Jones’ deposition had originally been scheduled for April

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23, 2015, but it was not taken because for undisclosed reasons Jones could not attend.

Case 2:14-cv-00858-CSC Document 40 Filed 07/31/15 Page 1 of 2
entry of judgment. Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11 Cir. 2007). The plaintiff

th

presents no reason why Jones’ deposition could not have been taken earlier. As noted in

the margin, the deposition had been scheduled before the summary judgment submission

deadline. Thus, the plaintiff was aware of the need for Jones’ testimony, and could have

moved the court to delay consideration of the motion for summary judgment until Jones’

testimony was available. See FED R. CIV. P. 56(d). In short, Jones’ testimony does not 2

constitute newly discovered evidence within the meaning of FED R. CIV. P. 59.

But more to the substantive point, the issue about whether Hutson took a statement

from Strickland does not establish a dispute of fact which precludes summary judgment. 

In its opinion, the court recognized the dispute, see Memorandum Opinion (doc. # 36) at 9

n.7, and after construing the facts favorably to Strickland found the dispute did not

matter, and it still does not. Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that the plaintiff’s FED R. CIV. P. 59 motion be and is hereby

DENIED.

Done this 31 day of July, 2015. st

 /s/Charles S. Coody 

CHARLES S. COODY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

That rule provides that if “a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified

2

reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition, the court may: (1) defer considering the

motion or deny it; (2) allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take discovery; or (3) issue any

other appropriate order.

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Case 2:14-cv-00858-CSC Document 40 Filed 07/31/15 Page 2 of 2