Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-22-01297/USCOURTS-caDC-22-01297-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Hospital de la Concepcion
Respondent
National Labor Relations Board
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 14, 2023 Decided July 5, 2024

No. 22-1272

HOSPITAL DE LA CONCEPCION,

PETITIONER

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

RESPONDENT

Consolidated with 22-1297

On Petition for Review and Cross-Application 

for Enforcement of an Order 

of the National Labor Relations Board

David Fortney argued the cause for petitioner. On the 

brief was José R. González-Nogueras.

Brady Francisco-FitzMaurice, Attorney, National Labor 

Relations Board, argued the cause for respondent. With him 

on the brief were Jennifer A. Abruzzo, General Counsel, Ruth 

E. Burdick, Deputy Associate General Counsel, David S. 

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Habenstreit, Assistant General Counsel, and Usha Dheenan, 

Supervisory Attorney.

Before: HENDERSON, MILLETT and PILLARD, Circuit 

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Hospital de 

la Concepción, Inc. (HDLC) petitions the court for review of a 

decision and order of the National Labor Relations Board 

(NLRB or Board), reported at 371 NLRB No. 155 (Sept. 29, 

2022). In that decision, the Board affirmed and adopted with 

modifications the findings of an Administrative Law Judge 

(ALJ). The ALJ found that HDLC violated Section 8(a)(1) and 

(5) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 

§ 158(a)(1) & (5), by failing to bargain with the labor union 

which represents four units of HDLC’s employees, Unidad 

Laboral de Enfermeras(os) y Empleados de la Salud (Union), 

before reducing those employees’ work hours and by failing to 

provide the Union with requested information relevant to the 

decision to reduce work hours. HDLC asserts that it was 

privileged under the operative collective-bargaining 

agreements (CBAs) to unilaterally reduce employees’ work 

hours without bargaining, that it had no obligation to provide 

the Union with the information requested and, in the 

alternative, that it satisfied any such obligation by responding 

to the Union’s requests. The Board cross-applies for 

enforcement of its decision and order. For the reasons set forth 

below, we deny HDLC’s petition and grant the NLRB’s crosspetition for enforcement. 

I. Background

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HDLC operates an acute care hospital in San German, 

Puerto Rico. On March 12, 2020, then-Governor of Puerto Rico 

Wanda Vázquez-Garced declared a state of emergency in 

response to the COVID-19 pandemic. On March 15, 2020, 

Governor Vázquez-Garced issued an executive order requiring 

residents to remain in their homes and non-essential businesses 

to suspend in-person operations. The stay-at-home provision 

was subject to several enumerated exceptions; in relevant part, 

residents were permitted to leave their homes to keep medical 

appointments, visit a hospital, laboratory or other healthcare 

facility, and travel to and from workplaces deemed essential 

and therefore not subject to the closure provision—including 

hospitals. Although the March 15 executive order expired on 

March 30, subsequent executive orders issued on March 30 and 

April 12 extended the lockdown measures set forth in the initial 

order and imposed additional restrictions including the 

suspension of all elective medical procedures through May 3, 

2020.

By mid-April, HDLC observed a decline in its average 

daily patient volumes. J.A. 917. Based on internal financial 

projections, HDLC predicted that its operating expenses would 

eclipse its revenues beginning in March 2020 and continuing 

through the rest of the year. J.A. 1373. On April 14, 2020, 

HDLC announced by letter addressed to all employees that it 

intended to “implement certain suspensions without salary of 

several employees,” “reduce the compensation of the exempt 

employees” and “reduce the work schedule[s] of many 

employees that will continue to provide services at the 

Hospital.” J.A. 1369. By way of explanation, the letter stated 

that HDLC was “forced to [make] a series of difficult 

decisions” to stem the “unexpected enormous financial impact 

related to the effects of this pandemic in the increase in cost of 

the necessary materials and equipment for protection, the 

dramatic reduction in the census of patients and the limitations 

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imposed by the Executive Orders in the services that [HDLC] 

can provide.” J.A. 1368–69. That day, HDLC began 

distributing individualized letters to affected employees 

specifying their reduced hours.

Four units of HDLC’s employees—medical technologists; 

technical employees and practical nurses; registered nurses; 

and diet, cafeteria and maintenance employees—are 

represented by the Union. Although the record does not reflect 

the precise number of unit employees whose hours were 

reduced, HDLC does not dispute the ALJ’s finding that “the 

reduction in work hours . . . affected approximately 349 unit 

employees’ pay and other benefits, such as vacation, sick time, 

holidays, continuing education, and Christmas bonuses, which 

are accrued based upon the number of hours or days worked 

per the CBAs,” Hospital De La Concepcion, 371 NLRB No. 

155, slip op. at 7 (Sept. 29, 2022). 

On April 15, 2020, Union Representative Ariel Echevarria 

emailed HDLC’s Human Resources Director, Jorge Rodriguez 

Diaz, requesting that HDLC withdraw its decision to 

implement a reduction in employees’ work schedules because 

HDLC had provided the Union with neither notice nor an 

opportunity to bargain over the decision before its 

implementation. J.A. 376. Echevarria alternatively requested 

that, if HDLC declined to withdraw the decision, it provide the 

Union with information responsive to several requests for 

information relevant to its April 14th action. See J.A. 376–77. 

HDLC declined to withdraw its decision and only partially 

responded to the Union’s information requests. 

On May 7, 2020, the Union filed a charge against HDLC 

with the NLRB, alleging that HDLC had negotiated in bad faith 

by implementing a reduction in work hours, temporarily 

closing the Endoscopy Department without notifying or 

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negotiating with the Union and refusing to provide the Union 

with information it requested related to those decisions. On 

March 17, 2021, the Union amended the charge to allege that 

HDLC violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by 

unilaterally reducing the work hours of the unit employees 

without notice to or negotiation with the Union and by refusing 

to furnish requested information necessary for it to perform its 

duties as the exclusive bargaining representative of the unit 

employees. The ALJ found that HDLC violated the Act as 

alleged and issued a recommended order. Hospital De La 

Concepcion, 371 NLRB No. 155, slip op. at 13–16 (Sept. 29, 

2022) (requiring HDLC to rescind the changes it unilaterally 

implemented in April 2020, negotiate with the Union before 

implementing any changes in wages, hours or other terms and 

conditions of employment of the represented employees, and 

make affected employees whole for any loss of earnings and 

other benefits suffered as result of the changes, including by 

compensating affected employees for the adverse tax 

consequences, if any, of receiving lump-sum backpay awards). 

On review, the Board affirmed the ALJ’s findings and 

conclusions with some modifications and adopted the 

recommended order with amendments to the remedy. Id. at 1. 

As modified, the Board’s order requires HDLC to: (1) rescind 

the changes it unilaterally implemented to the unit employees’ 

terms and conditions of employment in April 2020; (2) provide 

the Union with notice and opportunity to bargain over any 

changes in unit employees’ wages, hours or other terms and 

conditions of employment before implementing such changes; 

(3) make the affected employees whole for any loss suffered as 

a result of the reduction in scheduled hours; (4) compensate 

affected employees for the adverse tax consequences, if any, of 

a lump-sum backpay award; (5) furnish to the Union the 

information it requested in April 2020; and, (6) post and 

electronically distribute a remedial notice. Id. at 2–3.

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II. Analysis

HDLC mounts several challenges to the Board’s decision 

and order. First, it argues that the Board erred in concluding 

that it violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by failing to 

bargain with the Union over its decision to reduce unit 

employees’ work hours because, in its view, the CBAs 

authorized it to take such action unilaterally. Second, with 

respect to the same violation, HDLC argues that the Board 

erred by failing to consider whether it had a sound arguable 

basis to interpret the CBAs as authorizing it to reduce 

employees’ work schedules without bargaining. Third, HDLC 

argues that the Board erred in concluding that it violated 

Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by failing to respond to the 

Union’s requests for information relevant to the decision to 

reduce unit employees’ work hours because, in its view, it had 

no statutory obligation to provide the requested information; in 

the alternative, HDLC argues that it provided the Union with 

the information it requested. Fourth, HDLC argues that the 

Board erred by finding that it had not established that its failure 

to bargain was excusable under the economic exigency 

defense. Finally, HDLC argues that the Board erred in 

calculating the make-whole remedy insofar as it failed to 

exclude the interim earnings of any employees who obtained 

other employment during the period their hours were reduced. 

We review Board decisions with a “very high degree of 

deference.” Ozburn-Hessey Logistics, LLC v. NLRB, 833 F.3d 

210, 217 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting Bally’s Park Place, Inc. v. 

NLRB, 646 F.3d 929, 935 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). We set aside a

Board order only “when it departs from established precedent 

without reasoned justification, or when the Board’s factual 

determinations are not supported by substantial evidence.” 

King Soopers, Inc. v. NLRB, 859 F.3d 23, 29 (D.C. Cir. 2017)

(quotation omitted). “We owe no special deference to the 

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Board’s interpretation of contract language, but review it de 

novo, applying ‘ordinary principles of contract law.’” Dist. 4, 

Commc’ns Workers of Am. AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 59 F.4th 1302, 

1311 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (quoting Pac. Mar. Ass’n v. NLRB, 967 

F.3d 878, 885 (D.C. Cir. 2020)). With these principles in mind, 

we address HDLC’s arguments in turn and conclude that none 

supports granting its petition for review. 

A. Contract Coverage

“An employer violates Section 8(a)(5) and (1) if it makes 

a material, substantial, and significant change regarding a 

mandatory subject of bargaining without first providing the 

union notice and a meaningful opportunity to bargain about the 

change to agreement or impasse, absent a valid defense.” MV 

Transp., Inc., 368 NLRB No. 66, 2019 WL 4316958, at *4 

(Sept. 10, 2019) (citing NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 747 

(1962)). Mandatory subjects of bargaining include “wages, 

hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.” 

29 U.S.C. § 158(d); accord NLRB v. Wooster Div. of BorgWarner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958). It is undisputed that 

HDLC provided the Union with neither notice nor a 

meaningful opportunity to bargain about its decision to reduce 

unit employees’ work hours before implementing the change. 

Insofar as HDLC seeks to challenge the Board’s finding that 

the reduction constituted a material, substantial and significant 

change to the status quo as unsupported by substantial 

evidence, HDLC forfeited that argument by failing to address 

it in its opening brief. See N.Y. Rehab. Care Mgmt., LLC v. 

NLRB, 506 F.3d 1070, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Thus, we are left 

to consider HDLC’s argument that it had no obligation to 

bargain with the Union over its decision to reduce unit 

employees’ work hours because the CBAs authorized it to take 

such action unilaterally. 

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It is “well established” that an employer does not violate 

the NLRA by taking unilateral action with respect to otherwise 

mandatory subjects of bargaining if the CBA grants the 

employer the right to take such unilateral action. MV Transp., 

368 NLRB No. 66, 2019 WL 4316958, at *1; accord Pac. Mar. 

Ass’n, 967 F.3d at 890; see also NLRB v. U.S. Postal Serv., 8 

F.3d 832, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“[T]he duty to bargain under 

the NLRA does not prevent parties from negotiating contract 

terms that make it unnecessary to bargain over subsequent 

changes in terms or conditions of employment.”). “To conclude 

that a CBA covers the challenged unilateral conduct, the 

conduct must fall ‘within the compass or scope of contract 

language granting the employer the right to act unilaterally.’” 

Pac. Mar. Ass’n, 967 F.3d at 891 (quoting MV Transp., 368 

NLRB No. 66, 2019 WL 4316958, at *17). We interpret the 

relevant provisions of the CBAs de novo, according no 

deference to the Board’s contract interpretation. Postal Serv., 8 

F.3d at 837.

HDLC relies on Article XXXII (the “Management Rights” 

or “Administration Rights” Article) of the CBAs as authority 

for its unilateral implementation of reductions to unit 

employees’ work hours. Article XXXII provides as follows:

Nothing agreed herein will be understood as a 

limitation of the right of the Hospital to direct 

and administer its operations according to the 

criteria of its directors. Therefore, all of the 

rights, powers, authority and functions which 

up to the present has been exercised by the 

Board of Directors, or which in the future it may 

exercise in relation to the direction and 

administration of the Hospital, will correspond 

solely to the Hospital. It is expressly recognized 

that these rights, powers, authority and 

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prerogatives include, without any limitation 

whatsoever the full and exclusive control and 

operation of the hospital, the determination of 

the activities which the Hospital will be 

engaged in, the adoption of standards and 

procedures referring to the rendering of 

medical-hospital services, the method and 

manner in which said services will be rendered, 

the materials and equipment to be used by the 

Hospital and the medical, paramedical or office 

personnel that are required for said purposes; 

the right to establish work shifts; to make 

changes to the same and to assign personnel to 

cover said shifts, the right to create new 

positions, to establish job descriptions for all of 

the work posts or positions, to change said job 

descriptions, the right to conduct 

reorganizations, whether partial or total of all of 

its operations, to eliminate departments and to 

establish others; to adopt new measures and/or 

procedures and to make technological changes 

in all of its operations, the right to maintain the 

order and the efficiency in the hospital; the right 

to deem all of its operations terminated as well 

as also the right to transfer all of its operations 

or any part of the same to any other entity, 

corporation or institution. It also includes the 

right to promote and to put into effect safety 

measures and measures of conduct, the 

determination of the number of employees, the 

selection of new employees and the direction of 

all of its employees, including, without any 

limitation whatsoever, the right to employ, reemploy, select and train new employees and the 

right to assign, reassign, temporarily suspend, 

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reinstate, promote, withdraw, discipline, 

remove and transfer its employees. . . . 

J.A. 369–70 (emphases added); see also J.A. 121–22, 205–06, 

288–89. 

HDLC asserts that the language emphasized in the 

foregoing excerpt of Article XXXII encompasses reductions to 

employees’ work hours. We disagree. The right to establish and 

make changes to work shifts is not synonymous with a right to 

make changes to the total number of hours worked. Although 

changes to an employee’s shifts will affect his “hours” in the 

sense of starting and ending times, such changes do not 

necessarily effect a change in his total number of work hours

per week. See Control Servs., 303 NLRB 481, 483–84 (1991), 

enforced, 961 F.2d 1568 (3d Cir. 1992) (unpublished table 

decision) (clause reserving employer’s right to “schedule hours 

of employment” did not authorize employer to unilaterally 

reduce the number of hours employees would work).

Management rights clauses purporting to reserve the 

employer’s right to reduce employees’ working hours are 

commonly found in collective-bargaining agreements. Where 

found, the right to reduce work hours tends to be stated

explicitly and separately from the right to change work shifts. 

See, e.g., MV Transp., 368 NLRB No. 66, 2019 WL 4316958, 

at *21 (reserving company’s right to, inter alia, “decide and 

assign all schedules, work hours, [and] work shifts”); Sts. Mary 

& Elizabeth Hosp., 282 NLRB 73, 81 (1986) (reserving right 

to “establish, determine and change: shift starting and quitting 

times, daily and weekly hours of work, and number, time and 

length of shifts for groups of employees and or individual 

employees”); S-B Mfg. Co., 270 NLRB 485, 490 (1984) 

(reserving right to “determine the number of employees, the 

number of hours, and the schedules of employment”). The 

rights to promote and to put into effect safety measures and 

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measures of conduct and to determine the number of 

employees in no way imply a concomitant right to reduce 

employees’ work hours. And although HDLC characterized the 

hour reductions as “temporary suspensions without pay” in its 

April 14, 2020 letter announcing the measure, J.A. 1369, the 

individualized letters it distributed to affected employees 

informed them not that they were “temporarily suspended” but 

that their work schedules were reduced, J.A. 878–915, 1150–

1308.1

HDLC’s proposed interpretation of Article XXXII sits in 

tension with Article XIII of the CBAs (“Working Days”), 

which states that, for all unit employees, “[t]he weekly regular 

work days will be of 40 hours within a period of 168 hours each 

week” and “[t]he regular daily work day will be of 8 hours 

within a period of 24 consecutive hours.” J.A. 102, 184, 267, 

350. Article XIII also provides that unit employees will receive 

additional pay for “[e]very hour worked in excess of 8 hours a 

1 We note that the joint appendix includes a few individualized 

letters that refer to temporary suspensions rather than reductions in 

work schedule. See, e.g., J.A. 1331. The record establishes that the 

employees who received letters containing such language voluntarily 

requested temporary suspension or unpaid leave—with two 

exceptions: letters to Joel Vázquez Linares (Indoor Trolley Driver, 

Security Department) and Julio Rodríguez Colón (Outdoor Trolley 

Driver, Security Department) dated April 6, 2020 and March 30, 

2020, respectively, purported to inform them that they were 

temporarily suspended, J.A. 1328, 1329, and no other evidence in the 

record suggests that they requested the suspension. Given that the 

dates of these letters pre-date the April 14, 2020 letter to all 

employees, that we do not know whether these employees were 

represented by the Union, and that the General Counsel represented 

in his briefing to the Board that no bargaining unit employees were 

subjected to a non-disciplinary suspension like that described in the 

letters to Vázquez Linares and Rodríguez Colón, J.A. 1876, we 

discount them in our analysis.

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day” at rates ranging from “time and a half (1-1/2)” to “two 

times the regular hourly pay of the employee,” depending on 

the unit. Id. Moreover, each version of Article XIII includes a 

section establishing the “work shifts” for each unit, expressed 

in intervals of start times and end times, and a disclaimer that 

the establishment of work shifts “will not limit the employer, 

who[,] for needs of the service, can assign other work times.” 

Id. at 102, 184–85, 267–68, 350–51. That Article XIII 

addresses the regular number of hours worked per day and per 

week separately from the times of day constituting a work shift

forecloses, we conclude, an interpretation of Article XXXII’s 

“right to establish work shifts [and] make changes to the same” 

as encompassing the right to reduce the total number of hours 

an employee works per week.

HDLC argues that other provisions of the CBAs 

demonstrate that the parties did not intend to “impose a 

minimum number of guaranteed hours per day, per week or per 

month.” Blue Br. 21. Even if that were true, it would lend little 

support to HDLC’s contract coverage defense. To avail itself 

of the defense, HDLC must show that some provision in the 

CBAs affirmatively permits it to unilaterally reduce 

employees’ hours; the mere absence of a provision expressly 

prohibiting such action is insufficient. See Bath Iron Works

Corp., 345 NLRB 499, 502 (2005), aff’d sub nom. Bath Marine 

Draftsmen Ass’n v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2007) (“In the 

unilateral change cases, the issue is whether the contract 

privileges the conduct.”). Accordingly, we find no error in the 

Board’s conclusion that the CBAs did not authorize HDLC to 

unilaterally reduce its employees’ hours. 

B. Sound Arguable Basis

HDLC next argues that the Board should have considered 

whether HDLC had a sound arguable basis for interpreting the 

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CBAs to authorize it to unilaterally reduce employees’ work 

hours. The Board correctly determined that the sound arguable 

basis analysis has no application to this case, in which the 

General Counsel “alleged and litigated only a unilateral-change 

violation,” not a contract-modification violation. See 371 

NLRB No. 155, slip op. at 1 n.4.

The “unilateral change” case and the “contract 

modification” case are fundamentally different 

in terms of principle, possible defenses, and 

remedy. In terms of principle, the “unilateral 

change” case does not require the General 

Counsel to show the existence of a contract 

provision; he need only show that there is an 

employment practice concerning a mandatory 

bargaining subject, and that the employer has 

made a significant change thereto without 

bargaining. The allegation is a failure to 

bargain. In the “contract modification” case, 

the General Counsel must show a contractual 

provision, and that the employer has modified 

the provision. The allegation is a failure to 

adhere to the contract. . . . [T]he issue [in a 

contract modification case] is whether the 

contract forbade the conduct. In the unilateral 

change cases, the issue is whether the contract 

privileges the conduct.

Bath Iron Works Corp., 345 NLRB at 501–02; accord Pac. 

Mar. Ass’n, 967 F.3d at 884–85. An employer charged with an 

unfair labor practice based on a contract modification theory 

may raise the defense that it had a “sound arguable basis” for 

its contrary interpretation of the CBA and that it was not 

“motivated by union animus or acting in bad faith.” Bath Iron 

Works, 345 NLRB at 502 (quotation and ellipses omitted). 

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Because a unilateral change case requires no showing of a 

contractual provision modified by the employer, whether the 

employer had a sound arguable basis for its interpretation of a 

particular term of the CBA is immaterial. 

HDLC suggests that the Board was obligated to consider 

its sound arguable basis defense because, insofar as the Board 

decision relied on the finding that the CBAs guaranteed unit 

employees a minimum of 40 hours per week, its violation was 

in fact a contract modification under the guise of a unilateral 

change. We do not read the Board’s decision to expressly find 

that Article XIII “guaranteed” unit employees 40 work hours 

per week. Our reading of the Board decision comports with that 

of the Board, that is, it looked to Article XIII “not as a 

contractual guarantee of a minimum number of hours that 

HDLC altered, but as one piece of evidence supporting the past 

practice and status quo of scheduling employees for 40 hours 

per week,” Red Br. 28. In any event, “the authority of the Board 

and the law of the contract are overlapping, concurrent 

regimes,” and “the Board may proscribe conduct which is an 

unfair labor practice even though it is also a breach of 

contract.” NLRB v. Strong, 393 U.S. 357, 360–61 (1969). As 

this court recognized in Pacific Maritime Association, the same 

set of facts may support either a contract modification charge 

or a unilateral change charge. See 967 F.3d at 884. 

Accordingly, we reject HDLC’s argument that the Board erred 

by failing to consider a defense not relevant to the theory under 

which it was charged. 

C. Failure to Respond to Information Requests

HDLC asserts two grounds for its challenge to the Board 

finding that it violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act when 

it refused to provide certain information requested by the 

Union relevant to HDLC’s decision to unilaterally reduce unit 

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employees’ work hours. First, HDLC argues that it had no duty 

to provide the Union with any information related to the 

decision because it had no duty to bargain over the decision. 

This argument is unavailing because, as noted supra, HDLC 

had a duty to bargain over the decision to reduce unit 

employees’ work hours. Because HDLC makes no challenge 

on appeal to the relevancy of the requested information to the 

decision to reduce unit employees’ work hours, our conclusion 

that HDLC had a duty to bargain over that decision compels 

the conclusion that it had the concomitant duty to provide the 

Union with the information it requested. Conversely, were we 

to conclude that HDLC had no duty to bargain over the 

decision, that would not compel the conclusion that HDLC had 

no duty to provide the Union with the requested information 

because it would leave unaddressed the Board’s additional 

basis for concluding that HDLC’s refusal to provide the Union 

with the requested information constituted a violation of 

Sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act: that the requests “put 

[HDLC] on notice that the Union considered [HDLC]’s 

conduct to be contrary to [HDLC]’s contractual and/or 

statutory obligations, and thus that the Union sought the 

information for the legitimate non-bargaining purposes of 

policing its contracts with [HDLC] by evaluating the merits of 

potential contractual grievances and/or unfair labor practices.” 

Hospital de la Concepcion, 371 NLRB No. 155, slip op. at 2 

n.4; see also Stericycle, Inc., 370 NLRB No. 89, 2021 WL 

663731, at *1 n.5 (Feb. 17, 2021) (requiring employer to supply 

information requested for the purpose of investigating a 

potential grievance); Contract Carriers Corp., 339 NLRB 851, 

858 (2003) (“[T]he union need not demonstrate that the 

contract has been violated in order to obtain the desired 

information.”). 

Second, HDLC asserts that it fulfilled any duty it had to 

respond to the Union’s information requests. The record belies 

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HDLC’s assertion that it provided the Union with the 

information it requested regarding the decision to reduce unit 

employees’ work hours. HDLC provided only a partial 

substantive response to certain of the Union’s information 

requests; HDLC “responded” to the balance of the Union’s 

information requests only in the sense that it raised objections 

to them. See J.A. 1145–49. HDLC further argues that, because 

the Union never replied to HDLC’s responses to the 

information requests, HDLC “believed no more information 

was pending or owed to the Union.” Blue Br. 38. But HDLC’s 

letter rejecting as irrelevant a full fifteen of the Union’s 

eighteen information requests arrived on May 6, 2020, 

J.A. 1145–49, and the Union filed its grievance protesting 

HDLC’s failure to provide the requested information the very 

next day, see J.A. 1–2. The record evidence thus does not 

reflect that the Union somehow misled HDLC into believing 

that HDLC had responded in full. Because HDLC had a duty 

to respond to the Union’s information requests and the record 

demonstrates that it failed to do so, we find no error in the 

Board’s conclusion that HDLC violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) 

of the Act by failing to provide information that was relevant 

to a mandatory subject of bargaining and independently 

relevant to the Union’s investigation of a potential grievance. 

D. Exigent Circumstances

HDLC next argues that the Board erroneously concluded 

that HDLC’s failure to bargain with the Union over the 

decision to reduce unit employees’ scheduled work hours 

before implementing the reduction was not excused by exigent 

circumstances. Although the Board has recognized an 

economic exigency exception to an employer’s obligation to 

bargain, application of that exception is limited to 

“extraordinary events which are ‘an unforeseen occurrence, 

having a major economic effect [requiring] the company to 

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take immediate action.’” Hankins Lumber Co., 316 NLRB 837, 

838 (1995) (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting 

Angelica Healthcare Servs., 284 NLRB 844, 853 (1987)). The 

employer invoking the economic exigency exception bears a 

heavy burden. RBE Elecs. of S.D., Inc., 320 NLRB 80, 81 

(1995). “Absent a dire financial emergency, the Board has held 

that economic events such as loss of significant accounts or 

contracts, operation at a competitive disadvantage, or supply 

shortages do not justify unilateral action.” Id. Moreover, 

“business necessity is not the equivalent of compelling 

considerations which excuse bargaining. Were that the case, a 

respondent faced with a gloomy economic outlook could take 

any unilateral action it wished or violate any of the terms of a 

contract which it had signed simply because it was being 

squeezed financially.” Hankins Lumber Co., 316 NLRB at 838 

(citing Farina Corp., 310 NLRB 318, 321 (1993)). 

On this record, we find no error with the Board’s 

conclusion that HDLC failed to carry its burden to demonstrate 

that the economic exigencies exception privileged its unilateral 

reduction in employees’ scheduled work hours. HDLC argues 

that it faced an “uncertain situation” because the COVID-19 

pandemic and related lockdowns “had an economic impact on 

the Hospital.” Blue Br. 33. But, on the record before us, HDLC 

has failed to offer “evidence that its financial situation was so 

dire that it either had to implement its final offer when it did” 

without bargaining first “or suffer financial ruin.” U.S. Testing 

Co., 324 NLRB 854, 854 (1997). The Board’s determination 

that HDLC’s claim that it reasonably expected to sustain 

operating losses unless it reduced labor costs starting in April 

was insufficient to support application of the exception 

comports with Board precedent on the economic exigency 

exception, which sets a high bar for finding “compelling” 

circumstances and restricts “requiring immediate action” to the 

literal sense of each word in that phrase. See, e.g., Seaport 

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Printing & Ad Specialties, Inc., 351 NLRB 1269, 1270 (2007) 

(finding that employer was excused from bargaining layoffs 

when mayor ordered a mandatory evacuation of the city due to 

the impending arrival of a hurricane, forcing closure of the 

employer’s facility, but that employer was not excused from 

bargaining over the effects of the layoff decision and related 

personnel decisions after the hurricane had passed).

E. Exclusion of Interim Earnings

Finally, HDLC argues that the court should modify the

Board’s make-whole remedy to exclude interim earnings, if 

any, of employees who obtained other employment during the 

period their hours were reduced. The Board determined that the 

method of calculating backpay awards established in Ogle 

Protection Service, 183 NLRB 682 (1970), applied because 

unit employees were neither laid off nor terminated. See 

Deming Hosp. Corp. v. NLRB, 665 F.3d 196, 200 (D.C. Cir. 

2011). In Community Health Services, Inc., 361 NLRB 333, 

334–38 (2014), the NLRB established as a matter of policy that 

interim earnings should not be deducted when the Ogle method 

of calculating backpay is applied in cases involving economic 

loss but no cessation of employment. HDLC did not challenge 

the General Counsel’s cross-exceptions to the ALJ’s 

recommendation, which explicitly requested that the Board 

apply Ogle as modified by Community Health Services. J.A. 

1877. HDLC’s failure to object regarding the inclusion of 

interim earnings in an answering brief before the Board 

deprives this court of jurisdiction to review it. See Parkwood 

Dev. Ctr., Inc. v. NLRB, 521 F.3d 404, 410 (D.C. Cir. 2008); 

29 U.S.C. § 160(e). Accordingly, we cannot consider HDLC’s 

argument that the Board should have excluded interim earnings 

from its remedy. 

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For the foregoing reasons, we deny HDLC’s petition for 

review and grant the Board’s cross-application for enforcement 

of its order. 

So ordered.

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