Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01499/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01499-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mule Creek State Prison Warden
Respondent
Gregory Wayne Rimpson
Petitioner

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

After reviewing the petition, the Court determined that the petition was untimely and ordered 

Petitioner to show cause why it should not be dismissed. (Doc. 10). Because Petitioner’s response fails 

to show that the petition was timely or that Petitioner qualifies for an exception to the timeliness bar

(Doc. 12), the Court will recommend that the petition be DISMISSED.

DISCUSSION

I. Review of Petition

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a petition 

if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is 

not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. The 

Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 8 indicate that the court may dismiss a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus, either on its own motion under Rule 4, pursuant to the respondent’s motion to dismiss, or after 

an answer to the petition has been filed. Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir.2001).

GREGORY WAYNE RIMPSON,

 Petitioner,

v.

MULE CREEK STATE PRISON WARDEN,

Respondent.

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Case No.: 1:15-cv-01499-LJO-JLT

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO 

DISMISS PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS 

CORPUS FOR VIOLATION OF THE ONE-YEAR 

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

ORDER DIRECTING THAT OBJECTIONS BE 

FILED WITHIN THIRTY DAYS

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The Ninth Circuit, in Herbst v. Cook, concluded that a district court may dismiss sua sponte a 

habeas petition on statute of limitations grounds so long as the court provides the petitioner adequate 

notice of its intent to dismiss and an opportunity to respond. 260 F.3d at 1041-42. By issuing the

Order to Show Cause, the Court afforded Petitioner the notice required by the Ninth Circuit in Herbst.

II. Limitation Period For a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 

1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas corpus 

filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997); 

Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997). 

The instant petition was filed on September 3, 2015, and thus, it is subject to the provisions of the 

AEDPA. 

The AEDPA imposes a one-year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a federal 

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, § 2244, subdivision (d) 

reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas 

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The 

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct 

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by 

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is 

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by 

the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral 

review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented 

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or 

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending 

shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In most cases, the limitation period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct 

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review became final. The AEDPA, however, is silent on how the one year limitation period affects 

cases where direct review concluded before the enactment of the AEDPA. The Ninth Circuit has held 

that if a petitioner whose review ended before the enactment of the AEDPA filed a habeas corpus 

petition within one year of the AEDPA’s enactment, the Court should not dismiss the petition pursuant 

to § 2244(d)(1). Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283,1286 (9th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 118 S.Ct. 899 (1998); Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Kelly), 127 F.3d 782, 784 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1395 (1998). In such circumstances, the limitations period would begin 

to run on April 25, 1996 and would expire one year later, i.e., on April 24, 1997. Patterson v. Stewart, 

2001 WL 575465 (9th Cir. Ariz.). 

Petitioner alleges he was convicted on January 11, 1994, and that he appealed his conviction to 

the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District (“5th DCA”), which affirmed his conviction on 

June 15, 1995 in case no. F021144. (Doc. 1, pp. 1-2). According to the California Rules of Court, a 

decision of the Court of Appeal becomes final thirty days after filing of the opinion, Cal. Rules of 

Court, Rule 8.264(b)(1), and an appeal must be taken to the California Supreme Court within ten days 

of finality. Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 8.500(e)(1). Thus, Petitioner’s conviction would become final 

forty days after the Court of Appeal’s decision was filed, or on July 25, 1995. However, the record 

indicates that remittitur issued on August 8, 1995; thus, the Court will accept that later date as the date 

when direct review became final. (Doc. 1, p. 164).

Because Petitioner’s direct appeal became final prior to the enactment of the AEDPA, the oneyear limitation period applicable to Petitioner’s 1994 conviction began on April 25, 1996 and expired 

on April 24, 1997. As mentioned, Petitioner did not file the instant petition until September 3, 2015, 

over nineteen years after his one-year limitation period expired. Thus, unless Petitioner is entitled to 

some form of tolling, his petition is untimely and should be dismissed. 

III. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Under the AEDPA, the statute of limitations is tolled during the time that a properly filed 

application for state post-conviction or other collateral review is pending in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(2). A properly filed application is one that complies with the applicable laws and rules 

governing filings, including the form of the application and time limitations. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 

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U.S. 4, 8 (2000). An application is pending during the time that ‘a California petitioner completes a 

full round of [state] collateral review,” so long as there is no unreasonable delay in the intervals 

between a lower court decision and the filing of a petition in a higher court. Delhomme v. Ramirez, 

340 F. 3d 817, 819 (9th Cir. 2003), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by Waldrip v. Hall, 548 

F. 3d 729 (9th Cir. 2008)(per curium)(internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see Evans v. 

Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 193-194 (2006); see Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 220, 222-226 (2002); see

also, Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Nevertheless, there are circumstances and periods of time when no statutory tolling is allowed. 

For example, no statutory tolling is allowed for the period of time between finality of an appeal and 

the filing of an application for post-conviction or other collateral review in state court, because no 

state court application is “pending” during that time. Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006-1007; Raspberry v. 

Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1153 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2006). Similarly, no statutory tolling is allowed for the 

period between finality of an appeal and the filing of a federal petition. Id. at 1007. In addition, the 

limitation period is not tolled during the time that a federal habeas petition is pending. Duncan v. 

Walker, 563 U.S. 167, 181-182 (2001); see also, Fail v. Hubbard, 315 F. 3d 1059, 1060 (9th Cir. 

2001)(as amended on December 16, 2002). Further, a petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling 

where the limitation period has already run prior to filing a state habeas petition. Ferguson v. 

Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (“section 2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of the 

limitations period that has ended before the state petition was filed.”); Jiminez v. White, 276 F. 3d 

478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001). Finally, a petitioner is not entitled to continuous tolling when the 

petitioner’s later petition raises unrelated claims. See Gaston v. Palmer, 447 F.3d 1165, 1166 (9th Cir. 

2006). 

Petitioner alleges that he filed the following state habeas petitions: (1) consolidated petitions

filed in the Superior Court of Merced County on September 5 and September 12, 2014, and denied on 

September 29, 2014 (Doc. 1, p. 165);

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(2) petition filed in the 5th DCA on November 12, 2014, and 

 

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In computing the running of the statute of limitations, the day an order or judgment becomes final is excluded and time 

begins to run on the day after the judgment becomes final. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(Citing Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).

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denied on December 2, 2014 (Doc. 1, p. 168); and (3) petition filed in the California Supreme Court 

on February 2, 2015 and denied on April 15, 2015. Although Petitioner does not specify the precise 

dates on which he filed all of these petition(s), the Court has accessed the California court system’s 

electronic database to ascertain the exact dates of filing and denial.

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However, none of these petitions entitles Petitioner to statutory tolling under the AEDPA 

because they were all filed after the one-year period expired. A petitioner is not entitled to tolling 

where the limitations period has already run prior to filing a state habeas petition. Green v. White, 223 

F.3d 1001, 1003 (9th Cir. 2000); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478 (9th Cir. 2001); see Webster v. Moore, 

199 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 2000)(same); Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820 (9th Cir. 

2003)(“section 2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before 

the state petition was filed.”); Jackson v. Dormire, 180 F.3d 919, 920 (8th Cir. 1999) (petitioner fails to 

exhaust claims raised in state habeas corpus filed after expiration of the one-year limitations period). 

Here, as mentioned, the limitations period expired on April 24, 1997, approximately seventeen years 

before Petitioner filed his first state habeas petition. Accordingly, he cannot avail himself of the 

statutory tolling provisions of the AEDPA. 

IV. Equitable Tolling

The running of the one-year limitation period under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) is subject to equitable 

tolling in appropriate cases. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 651-652, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2561 

(2010); Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct., 128 F.3d 1283, 1289 (9th Cir. 1997). The limitation period 

is subject to equitable tolling when “extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it 

impossible to file the petition on time.” Shannon v. Newland, 410 F. 3d 1083, 1089-1090 (9th Cir. 

2005)(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “When external forces, rather than a 

petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the 

 

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The court may take notice of facts that are capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose 

accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); United States v. Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 331, 333 (9th 

Cir. 1993). The record of state court proceeding is a source whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned, and judicial 

notice may be taken of court records. Mullis v. United States Bank. Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 n.9 (9th Cir. 1987); Valerio v. 

Boise Cascade Corp., 80 F.R.D. 626, 635 n. 1 (N.D.Cal.1978), aff'd, 645 F.2d 699 (9th Cir.); see also Colonial Penn Ins. 

Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989); Rodic v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 615 F.2d 736, 738 (6th. Cir. 

1980). As such, the internet website for the California Courts, containing the court system’s records for filings in the Court 

of Appeal and the California Supreme Court are subject to judicial notice.

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statute of limitations may be appropriate.” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). 

“Generally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements: “(1) that 

he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his 

way.” Holland, 560 U.S. at 651-652; Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S. Ct. 1807 

(2005). “[T]he threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling under AEDPA is very high, lest the 

exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F. 3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002)(citation 

omitted). As a consequence, “equitable tolling is unavailable in most cases.” Miles, 187 F. 3d at 

1107. 

Petitioner has made no express claim of entitlement to equitable tolling and, based on the 

record now before the Court, the Court sees no basis for such a claim. Thus, the petition appears to be

untimely and should be dismissed.

V. Actual Innocence.

The petition refers to actual innocence several times. As a result, in the order to show cause,

the Court presumed Petitioner was raising that contention as a way to avoid dismissal for untimeliness. 

The Court discussed the Ninth Circuit rules for establishing a defense to untimeliness through actual 

innocence. In McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S.___, 2013 WL 2300806 (2013), the United States 

Supreme Court held that “actual innocence” could be an exception to the one-year limitation bar in the 

AEDPA:

We hold that actual innocence, if proved, serves as a gateway through which a petitioner may 

pass whether the impediment is a procedural bar, as it was in Schlup and House,

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or, as in this 

case, expiration of the statute of limitations. We caution, however, that tenable actualinnocence gateway pleas are rare: “[A] petitioner does not meet the threshold requirement 

unless he persuades the district court that, in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting 

reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Schlup, 513 U.S., 

at 329; see House, 547 U.S., at 538 (emphasizing that the Schlup standard is “demanding” and 

seldom met). And in making an assessment of the kind Schlup envisioned, “the timing of the 

[petition]” is a factor bearing on the “reliability of th[e] evidence” purporting to show actual 

innocence. Schlup, 513 U.S., at 332.

McQuiggin, at *3. The Supreme Court went on to explain that an “unexplained delay in presenting 

new evidence bears on the determination whether the petitioner has made the requisite showing, and, 

 

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Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 115 S.Ct. 851 (1995); House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 126 S.Ct. 2064 (2006). 

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thus, “a court may consider how the timing of the submission and the likely credibility of [a 

petitioner’s] affiants bear on the probable reliability of evidence [of actual innocence].” Id. at *11, 

quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 332. See also Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 932-933 (9th Cir. 2011)(en 

banc)(“a credible claim of actual innocence constitutes an equitable exception to AEDPA’s limitations 

period, and a petitioner who makes such a showing may pass through the Schlup gateway and have his 

otherwise time-barred claims heard on the merits.” ) The “Schlup gateway,” however, may only be 

employed when a petitioner “falls within the narrow class of cases...implicating a fundamental 

miscarriage of justice. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 314-315; McQuiggin, at *9. However, “[t]o ensure that the 

fundamental miscarriage of justice exception would remain ‘rare’ and would only be applied in the 

‘extraordinary case,’ while at the same time ensuring that the exception would extend relief to those 

who were truly deserving,” the Supreme Court explicitly limited the equitable exception to cases 

where a petitioner has made a showing of innocence. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 321. “The Supreme Court 

did not hold that a petitioner may invoke Schlup whenever he wants a trial do-over.” Lee, 653 F.3d at 

946 (Kozinski, J., concurring.)

The rule announced in McQuiggin is not a type of equitable tolling, which provides for an 

extension of the time statutorily prescribed, but an equitable exception to § 2244(d)(1). McQuiggin at 

*7. Moreover, the Court noted that actual innocence, if proven, merely allows a federal court to 

address the merits of a petitioner’s constitutional claims; the Court has yet to address whether “a 

freestanding claim of actual innocence” provides a separate basis for granting habeas relief. 

McQuiggin at *7.

However, the petition fails to meet Schlup’s exacting standard. Petitioner makes the claim of 

actual innocence and includes this allegation along with claims of ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel and violations of due process at trial. (E.g., Doc. 1, p. 22). However, as discussed above, 

actual innocence means just that: factual and actual innocence of the charge, not merely legal 

innocence. In other words, “actual innocence” is not met merely by presenting constitutional claims 

the might require reversal of his conviction and a new trial. Unless Petitioner can produce evidence 

establishing his factual innocence of the charges for which he was convicted in 1994 under Schlup, he 

cannot use the actual innocence doctrine to avoid the one-year limitation period. 

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In his response to the Order to Show Cause, Petitioner again argues actual innocence. 

However, repeated readings of Petitioner’s response reveals no evidence of factual innocence. 

Instead, Petitioner’s argument appears to be twofold. First, Petitioner contends that he was convicted 

on insufficient evidence because no physical evidence tied him to the victim’s murder and the 

prosecution’s eyewitnesses were not credible. Again, this is not the type of proof of actual innocence 

envisioned in Schlup and McQuiggen. Petitioner is essentially asking this Court to re-weigh the 

credibility of the multiple witnesses at trial who identified him as the shooter, and to agree with him 

that the prosecution witnesses were so lacking in credibility that no reasonable juror could have 

convicted him. This weighing of credibility was already done by the jury, the trial judge, the Court of 

Appeal, and the California Supreme Court. Petitioner has not presented new evidence that would meet 

the “demanding” standard in Schlup that no reasonable juror would have found him guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Schlup, 513 U.S., at 329.

Second, Petitioner argues that his ineffective assistance claims are legitimate and should be 

heard on the merits. What Petitioner fails to appreciate is that this Court does not have the latitude to 

disregard the timeliness bar simply because a petitioner believes he has legitimate constitutional 

claims. The mere fact that the claims themselves may be meritorious does not in any way establish 

actual innocence. At best, they might establish entitlement to habeas relief. However, absent a 

showing of actual innocence that would avoid the timeliness bar, this Court cannot reach the merits of 

Petitioner’s claims. Nothing in either the petition nor the response to the order to show cause meet

Schlup’s demanding standard which would show that this is one of those “rare” instances where actual 

innocence has been proven. 

The burden of demonstrating that the AEDPA’s one-year limitation period was sufficiently 

tolled, whether statutorily or equitable, rests with the petitioner. See, e.g., Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 

U.S. 408, 418 (2005); Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir. 2005); Smith v. Duncan, 297 

F.3d 809, 814 (9th Cir. 2002); Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002). For the reasons 

discussed above, the Court finds and concludes that Petitioner has not met his burden with respect to 

the tolling issue. Accordingly, the petition is late and should therefore be dismissed. 

///

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RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the habeas corpus petition be 

DISMISSED for Petitioner’s failure to comply with 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)’s one year limitation period.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the United States District Court Judge 

assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the 

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within 21 days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with the court 

and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate 

Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and filed within 10

days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the objections. The Court will then review the 

Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to 

file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 21, 2016 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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