Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03746/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03746-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Pine Bluff
Appellee
Donna Green
Appellant

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Susan Webber Wright, Chief Judge, United States District

Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-3746

___________

Donna Green, *

*

Plaintiff-Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Arkansas.

City of Pine Bluff, Arkansas, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Defendant-Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: July 8, 2004

Filed: August 2, 2004

___________

Before WOLLMAN, LAY, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Donna Green appeals the district court’s1

 adverse grant of summary judgment

in her employment-discrimination suit against the City of Pine Bluff, Arkansas (“the

City”). Green asserted claims under Title VII, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth

Amendment, the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993 (“ACRA”), and other state laws.

Having carefully reviewed the record, we affirm. See Palesch v. Mo. Comm’n on

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Because we affirm the district court’s ruling on Green’s Title VII claims, we

necessarily affirm its ruling on her ACRA claims. See Henderson v. Simmons Foods,

Inc., 217 F.3d 612, 615 n.3 (8th Cir. 2000).

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Human Rights, 233 F.3d 560, 565-66 (8th Cir. 2000) (summary judgment standard

of review).2

Green’s employment as a police officer with the Pine Bluff Police Department

was terminated following an incident on September 4, 2000, in which Green heard

gunshots outside her apartment building and was next to her bedroom window when

it was smashed by a beer bottle. Without looking out the window, Green grabbed her

service weapon and fired four shots toward the ground. She then looked and saw her

estranged husband’s vehicle leaving the parking lot. When the police arrived at her

apartment, Green initially failed to disclose that she had fired her weapon, but she

later corrected her report. On October 2, 2000, the Chief of Police, Nathaniel Clark,

notified Green that she had been terminated for violating several department policies,

including those covering use of force, conduct unbecoming an officer, and dishonesty

or untruthfulness. The Pine Bluff Civil Service Commission unanimously upheld

Clark’s decision. Following her termination, Green alleged she had been sexually

harassed by Clark and her direct supervisor. She eventually filed suit, claiming she

was subjected to hostile work environment sexual harassment, terminated in

retaliation for complaining about the harassment, and disciplined more harshly than

her male co-workers.

We agree with the district court’s conclusion that Green failed to establish a

prima facie case of retaliation. See Krough v. Cessford Constr. Co., 336 F.3d 710,

712 (8th Cir. 2003) (to make out a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must

“show that she engaged in activity protected by Title VII, that an adverse employment

action occurred, and that a causal connection linked her protected activity and the

adverse employment action”). The record does not demonstrate that Green engaged

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in any protected activity. Green testified that she had not reported any of the

harassing behavior to her supervisors or anyone “up the chain of command.” The

only evidence that Green ever attempted to report the offensive behavior was her

request that another officer file a complaint on her behalf. The officer refused to file

the complaint, but it is unclear from the record when Green made the request and

whether the officer Green approached was responsible for taking such complaints.

Green has not come forward with any evidence to rebut Clark’s sworn statement that

he was unaware of any offensive behavior. Even if Green had established a prima

facie case, she has failed to present sufficient evidence to prove the City’s legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for her termination – her violation of several department

policies in connection with the discharge of her weapon and her subsequent

untruthfulness about the incident – was a pretext for intentional discrimination. See

id. (describing burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411

U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973), in a retaliatory discrimination case).

We also agree with the district court’s conclusion that Green failed to come

forward with evidence from which a reasonable jury could find she was subjected to

hostile work environment. Although Green testified that she endured unwelcome

sexual harassment during her employment, the evidence she presented failed to

demonstrate that the harassing conduct was so severe or pervasive that it altered the

conditions of her employment and created a hostile working environment. See Harris

v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). Green’s testimony, in general, shows

that she found the police department to be a good place to work and that she got along

with the other officers. On appeal, Green contends the district court erred by

disregarding a report prepared at the request of the Mayor of Pine Bluff following

complaints of sexual harassment by female police officers. We find that this report

is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact because the report is not

sworn or certified and consists largely of inadmissible hearsay. See Firemen’s Fund

Ins. Co. v. Thien, 8 F.3d 1307, 1310 (8th Cir. 1993); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

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Finally, we conclude the district court correctly granted summary judgment on

Green’s disparate treatment claim because Green failed to demonstrate that similarly

situated male police officers were treated differently. See Clark v. Runyon, 218 F.3d

915, 918 (8th Cir. 2000) (the employee must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that other individuals were similarly situated in all relevant respects;

individuals used for comparison “must have dealt with the same supervisor, have

been subject to the same standards, and engaged in the same conduct without any

mitigating or distinguishing circumstances”); Harvey v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 38

F.3d 968, 972 (8th Cir. 1994) (misconduct of more leniently disciplined employees

must be of comparable seriousness). Green compares herself to several male officers

who were not terminated for firing warning shots with their service weapons, being

untruthful, or engaging in other misconduct. However, she has not demonstrated that

the misconduct of the male officers was similar in all relevant respects to Green’s

misconduct or that their misconduct was comparable in seriousness to hers.

Furthermore, many of the male officers were disciplined under police chiefs other

than Clark.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

______________________________

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