Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-07-01192/USCOURTS-ca8-07-01192-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Paul Allen Cook
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Nanette K. Laughrey, United States District Judge for the

Western District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 07-1192

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

v. * Western District of Missouri.

*

Paul Allen Cook, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: October 15, 2007

Filed: October 25, 2007

___________

Before BYE, BOWMAN, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Paul Allen Cook entered into a written agreement with the government to plead

guilty to possession with intent to distribute marijuana. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).

In return for Cook's guilty plea, the government dismissed the remaining charges

against him. The District Court1

 sentenced Cook to fifty-seven months of

imprisonment. Cook appeals, arguing that the government breached the plea

agreement by advocating for a drug quantity greater than the quantity to which he and

the government stipulated in the plea agreement. We dismiss.

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We first address the government's argument that because the plea agreement

included a provision requiring Cook to waive the right to appeal his sentence, we must

dismiss this appeal. Where a defendant's appeal falls within the scope of an appeal

waiver, where both the plea agreement and the waiver were entered into knowingly

and voluntarily, and where no miscarriage of justice or illegal sentence would result

from the enforcement of the plea agreement, we will enforce the agreement and

dismiss the defendant's appeal. See United States v. Andis, 333 F. 3d 886, 889–92

(8th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 

Cook agreed to waive "his right to appeal his sentence . . . on any ground except

a sentence imposed in excess of the statutory maximum or an illegal sentence, that is,

sentencing error more serious than misapplication of the Sentencing Guidelines, an

abuse of discretion, or the imposition of an unreasonable sentence." Plea Agreement

at 11. Cook does not dispute that he entered into the plea agreement knowingly and

voluntarily. And despite his arguments to the contrary, Cook's sentence is not illegal.

See Andis, 333 F.3d at 892 ("[A] sentence is illegal when it is not authorized by law;

for example, when the sentence is in excess of a statutory provision or otherwise

contrary to the applicable statute." (citations and quotations omitted)). We conclude

that the plea agreement—including the provision requiring that Cook waive his right

to appeal—is valid and enforceable and that Cook's appeal should be dismissed. 

Even if we considered the merits of Cook's argument on appeal, namely, that

a miscarriage of justice occurred because the government breached the plea

agreement, we would affirm the sentence imposed by the District Court. As we noted

in Andis a miscarriage of justice, although never exhaustively defined by our court,

has been interpreted to include a sentence in excess of the applicable statutory

maximum, a sentence based on constitutionally impermissible factors, a sentence

imposed without effective assistance of counsel, and a sentence in violation of the

terms of a plea agreement. Id. at 891. We review issues pertaining to the

interpretation and enforcement of a plea agreement de novo. United States v. Has No

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Horses, 261 F.3d 744, 750 (8th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1150 (2002). "Plea

agreements are contractual in nature, and should be interpreted according to general

contract principles." United States v. DeWitt, 366 F.3d 667, 669 (8th Cir. 2004). In

order to satisfy due process, the government must fulfill any promise it makes in a

plea agreement that constitutes a significant element of the defendant's consideration

or inducement for entering into the agreement. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S.

257, 262 (1971). 

In this case, the plea agreement began with a statement of facts establishing that

Cook and other individuals had been conducting marijuana-distribution operations out

of Cook's Sturgeon, Missouri, residence. The amount of marijuana distributed from

Cook's home was described by one witness as "large" and "in excess of 100 pounds

[approximately 45 kilograms] . . . on several occasions." Plea Agreement at 2. When

law-enforcement officers executed a search warrant at Cook's residence, they

recovered "scales, drug paraphernalia, [and] approximately 40 pounds [roughly 18

kilograms] of marijuana." Id. at 3. The plea agreement did not contain an express

stipulation to the total drug quantity for which Cook would be held responsible. It

did, however, specify that the applicable United States Sentencing Guidelines section

for Cook's offense of conviction was "U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, which provides for a base

offense level of at least 20, but could be as high as 28." Id. at 7.

 

At the plea hearing, the government recited the facts as stated in the plea

agreement and offered to provide testimony of the two witnesses identified in the

agreement in order to prove the total drug quantity attributable to Cook. The

government stated that one of its witnesses would testify that "close[] to a thousand

pounds" (or about 454 kilograms) of marijuana had been stored at Cook's residence.

Tr. of Hr'g on Change of Plea at 13. Another witness would testify that "at least 120"

additional pounds (or about 54 kilograms) of marijuana had been stored at Cook's

residence. Id. Cook objected to the government's statement regarding drug quantity,

asserting that the plea agreement limited the quantity of marijuana for which he was

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responsible to the roughly 18 kilograms of marijuana seized from his home at the time

of his arrest. The District Court ordered a Presentence Investigation Report (PSR),

which attributed 271.3 kilograms of marijuana to Cook. PSR at 12. Cook filed

objections to the PSR, again disputing the drug-quantity calculation and urging an 18-

kilogram limit on that amount. 

The District Court held two sentencing hearings at which both Cook and the

government called witnesses. At the conclusion of the second hearing, the District

Court determined that Cook's base offense level was 26, a level corresponding with

at least 100 but less than 400 kilograms of marijuana. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(7). 

Cook now argues that he reasonably believed the terms of the plea agreement

limited his drug-quantity exposure to the roughly 18 kilograms of marijuana seized

from his residence. Cook's argument fails. Cook agreed that the base offense level

for his offense of conviction would be "at least 20, but could be as high as 28." Plea

Agreement at 7. By stipulating to a base offense level of "at least 20" and "as high as

28," Cook effectively stipulated to a quantity of marijuana falling within the range

represented by those offense levels. A base offense level of 20 corresponds to at least

40 but less than 60 kilograms of marijuana, and a base offense level of 28 corresponds

to at least 400 but less than 700 kilograms of marijuana. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(6),

(10). By entering into the plea agreement, Cook admitted responsibility for a quantity

of marijuana of between 40 and 700 kilograms. The government did not advocate for

a drug quantity outside the agreed-upon range.

Cook argues that our decision in United States v. DeWitt compels us to

conclude that the government breached the plea agreement in this case. In DeWitt,

the government and the defendant stipulated in the plea agreement to a specific drug

quantity for which the defendant would be held accountable. 366 F.3d at 669. We

held that the government breached the plea agreement when it initiated the

presentation of evidence for the purpose of attributing a greater drug quantity to the

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defendant pursuant to the broad relevant-conduct provision in the plea agreement. Id.

at 669–70. In contrast to the plea agreement in DeWitt, however, the plea agreement

in this case did not limit the government to a specific drug quantity, and the drug

quantity advocated by the government was well within the corresponding baseoffense-level range identified in the plea agreement. We conclude that the

government did not breach the plea agreement.

In sum, the waiver-of-appeal provision in the plea agreement forecloses Cook's

arguments on appeal and therefore the appeal is dismissed. And furthermore, even if

the waiver-of-appeal provision were unenforceable, Cook's arguments on appeal fail,

and we would affirm the judgment of the District Court.

______________________________

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