Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-3_05-cv-03045/USCOURTS-arwd-3_05-cv-03045-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Nellie J. Rains
Plaintiff
SSA
Defendant

Document Text:

AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HARRISON DIVISION

NELLIE J. RAINS PLAINTIFF

v. CIVIL NO. 05-3045

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner

Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Nellie J. Rains appealed the Commissioner's denial of benefits to this court. On

June 29, 2006, judgment was entered remanding plaintiff's case to the Commissioner pursuant

to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. # 9). Plaintiff now moves for an award of

$1,837.50 in attorney's fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 2412, the Equal Access to Justice Act

(hereinafter "EAJA"), requesting compensation for 14.20 hours of work before the court at an

hourly rate of $125.00 and $13.95 in expenses. (Doc. # 10-13). The defendant has filed a

response, expressing no objections to this award. (Doc. # 14).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), the court must award attorney's fees to a

prevailing social security claimant unless the Commissioner's position in denying benefits was

substantially justified. The burden is on the Commissioner to show substantial justification for

the government's denial of benefits. Jackson v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir. 1986). After

reviewing the file, we find plaintiff is a prevailing party in this matter. Under Shalala v.

Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993), a social security claimant who obtains a sentence-four

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judgment reversing the Commissioner's denial of benefits and remanding the case for further

proceedings is a prevailing party. 

The Commissioner filed a response expressing no objection to the award of a reasonable

attorney's fee under the EAJA, the hourly rate requested by plaintiff’s counsel for attorney’s fees

or the number of hours expended by plaintiff's counsel. (Doc.# 14). The court construes this lack

of opposition to the award of a reasonable fee as an admission that the government's decision to

deny benefits was not "substantially justified." 

An award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA is appropriate even though at the conclusion

of the case, plaintiff’s attorney may be authorized to charge and collect a fee pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Recovery of attorney’s fees under both the EAJA and 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)

was specifically allowed when Congress amended the EAJA in 1985. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,

535 U.S. 789, 796, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 1822, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002), citing Pub.L. 99-80, §

3, 99 Stat. 186 (1985). 

To permit a fee award under the EAJA, assuming, of course, that the necessary

standard is met, in addition to that allowed by the district court out of a

claimant’s past-due benefits does no more than reimburse the claimant for his or

her expenses and results in no windfall for the attorney.

Meyers v. Heckler, 625 F.Supp. 228, 231 (S.D.Ohio 1985). Furthermore, awarding fees under

both acts facilitates the purposes of the EAJA, which is to shift to the United States the

prevailing party’s litigation expenses incurred while contesting unreasonable government action.

Id. See also, Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978 (8th Cir.1984).

In determining a reasonable attorney's fee, the court will in each case consider the

following factors: time and labor required; the difficulty of questions involved; the skill required

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to handle the problems presented; the attorney's experience, ability, and reputation; the benefits

resulting to the client from the services; the customary fee for similar services; the contingency

or certainty of compensation; the results obtained; and the amount involved. Allen v. Heckler,

588 F.Supp. 1247 (W.D.N.Y. 1984). 

However, the EAJA is not designed to reimburse without limit. Pierce v. Underwood,

487 U.S. 552, 573 (1988). The district court is "in the best position to evaluate counsel’s

services and fee request, particularlywhen the court has had the opportunity to observe firsthand

counsel’s representation on the substantive aspects of the disability claim." Hickey v. Secretary

of HHS, 923 F.2d 585, 586 (8th Cir.1991), quoting Cotter v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 359, 361 (8th

Cir.1989). The court can determine the reasonableness and accuracy of a fee request, even in

the absence of an objection by the Commissioner. See Decker v. Sullivan, 976 F.2d 456, 459

(8th Cir.1992) ("Although the issue was not raised on appeal, fairness to the parties requires an

accurately calculated attorney’s fee award.").

The Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, passed on March 29, 1996,

amended the EAJA and increased the statutory ceiling for the EAJA fee awards from $75.00 to

$125.00 per hour. See 28 U.S.C. § 2 412(d)(2)(A). Plaintiff requests attorney's fees under the

EAJA at an hourly rate of $125.00. We find plaintiff's attorney entitled to compensation at this

rate. 

The EAJA further requires an attorney seeking fees to submit "an itemized

statement...stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were

computed." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Attorneys seeking fees under federal fee-shifting

statutes such as the EAJA are required to present fee applications with "contemporaneous time

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records of hours worked and rates claimed, plus a detailed description of the subject matter of

the work." Id. Where documentation is inadequate, the court may reduce the award accordingly.

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 

We next address the number of hours plaintiff's counsel claims he spent working on this

case. Plaintiff’s counsel requests 0.10 hour on August 15, 2005 (received check from Nellie and

mailed same to Chris Johnson), from which we deduct 0.10 hour; and 0.10 hour on September

25, 2006 (converted affidavit to pdf and electronically transmitted affidavit of service), from

which we deduct 0.10 hour. This time cannot be compensated under the EAJA. Granville

House, Inc. v. Department of HEW, 813 F.2d 881, 884 (8th Cir.1987) (work which could have

been completed by support staff is not compensable under the EAJA). Accordingly, we deduct

0.20 hour from the total number of compensable hours sought.

Plaintiff’s counsel requests 0.25 hour on June 29, 2006 (received and reviewed the

Judgement from Judge Hendren. Computed time for EAJA application and posted same on paper

and computer calendars). This court concludes that the time submitted on the above referenced

date, should not have taken an attorney experienced in handling social security cases more than

five or six minutes to review these documents. Bowman v. Secretary of H.H.S., 744 F.Supp 898

(E.D.Ark. 1989). Therefore we are reducing the 0.15 hour submitted on the above date to 0.10

hour. Accordingly, 0.15 hour must be deducted from the total compensable time sought by

counsel. 

Finally, counsel seeks reimbursement for $13.95 in expenses incurred with regard to

postage. Such expenses are recoverable under the EAJA and we find $13.95 to be a reasonable

award. See Kelly v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 1333, 1335 (8th Cir. 1988).

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Based on the above, we recommend awarding plaintiff's attorney fees under the EAJA

for: 13.85 (14.20-0.35) hours for attorney’s fees, at the rate of $125.00 per hour, and $13.95 in

expenses for a total attorney's fee award of $1,745.20. This amount should be paid in addition

to, and not out of, any past due benefits which plaintiff may be awarded in the future. The

parties have ten days from receipt of our report and recommendation in which to file

written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely objections

may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are reminded that

objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the district court.

The parties are reminded that the award herein under the EAJA will be taken into account

at such time as a reasonable fee is determined pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406, in order to prevent

double recovery by counsel for the plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 13 day of September 2006. th

/s/ Beverly Stites Jones 

HON. BEVERLY STITES JONES

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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