Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-35650/USCOURTS-ca9-13-35650-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Hoyt Crace
Appellee
Robert Herzog
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HOYT CRACE,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v.

ROBERT HERZOG,

Respondent-Appellant.

No. 13-35650

D.C. No.

3:12-cv-05672-RBL

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Ronald B. Leighton, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

October 7, 2014—Seattle, Washington

Filed August 14, 2015

Before: Richard A. Paez, Jay S. Bybee,

and Consuelo M. Callahan, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Bybee;

Dissent by Judge Callahan

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2 CRACE V. HERZOG

SUMMARY*

Habeas Corpus

The panel affirmed the district court’s judgment granting

a habeas corpus petition brought by a Washington state

prisoner who was convicted by a jury of two misdemeanor

offenses and one count of attempted second degree assault, a

felony, and received a life sentence without the possibility of

parole under Washington’s three-strikes law.

Petitioner claimed that his trial counsel was deficient for

failing to request a jury instruction on “unlawful display of a

weapon,” a lesser included offense of second degree assault,

because, had he been convicted of unlawful display of a

weapon, rather than attempted second degree assault, he

would have avoided a third strike.

Agreeing with the Third Circuit, the panel held that the

Washington Supreme Court’s rejection of petitioner’s claim

under Strickland v. Washington was an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law under the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. The panel held

that, in determining whether there was a reasonable

probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have

been different if counsel had performed adequately,

Strickland’s prejudice prong required an assessment of the

likelihood that petitioner’s jurywould have convicted only on

the lesser included offense, rather than an assessment of

whether sufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict. 

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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CRACE V. HERZOG 3

On de novo review, the panel concluded that petitioner’s

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel warranted relief. 

The panel concluded that it was reasonably probable that, if

given an additional option, the jury would have convicted the

petitioner only of unlawful display of a weapon. The panel

also concluded that counsel’s failure to request the lesser

included offense instruction constituted deficient performance

under Strickland.

Dissenting, Judge Callahan wrote that the Washington

Supreme Court’s decision was not contrary to or an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law,

and so AEDPA compelled deference to the state court. 

Accordingly, she would reverse the district court’s grant of

habeas relief. 

COUNSEL

Robert W. Ferguson, Attorney General, Paul D. Weisser

(argued), Senior Counsel, Attorney General’s Office,

Corrections Division, Olympia, Washington, forRespondentAppellant.

Jeffrey Erwin Ellis (argued), Law Offices of Alsept & Ellis,

Portland, Oregon, for Petitioner-Appellee.

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4 CRACE V. HERZOG

OPINION

BYBEE, Circuit Judge:

In 2004, a Washington jury convicted Hoyt Crace of two

misdemeanor offenses and one count of attempted seconddegree assault—a felony—stemming from an incident in

which he brandished a sword at a police officer. The

attempted assault conviction constituted Crace’s third strike

under Washington’s three-strikes law, and he received a life

sentence without the possibility of parole.

After Crace’s conviction became final, he brought a claim

for postconviction relief under Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668 (1984), arguing that his trial counsel was

deficient for failing to request a jury instruction on “unlawful

display of a weapon,” a lesser included offense of second

degree assault. Had Crace been convicted of unlawful

display of a weapon, rather than attempted second-degree

assault, he would have avoided a third strike.

The Washington Supreme Court rejected Crace’s

Strickland claim. The court held that, because Crace’s jury

had found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of attempted

second-degree assault, Strickland required a reviewing court

to presume that the jury would have reached the same verdict

even if instructed on a lesser offense. In light of that

presumption, the court concluded that defense counsel’s

failure to request a lesser-included-offense instruction caused

no prejudice to Crace.

We hold that the Washington Supreme Court’s decision

was an unreasonable application of clearlyestablished federal

law under AEDPA and, on de novo review, we conclude that

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CRACE V. HERZOG 5

Crace’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel warrants

relief. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment

granting Crace’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

I

Hoyt Crace spent the morning of August 16, 2003, doing

repairs to the windows of a mobile home owned by an

acquaintance of his in Tacoma, Washington.1 Crace was

living in this trailer while its owner was away. Sometime

around ten in the morning, a neighbor who lived in the same

trailer park came by and asked Crace if he ever “g[o]t high”;

Crace, who has a history of drug use, responded that he did. 

The two began drinking together and, over the next several

hours, Crace consumed eight to ten alcoholic coolers, roughly

a gram of cocaine, two painkillers, and a “quarter piece” of

heroin. Around one or two in the afternoon, the neighbor

departed. Crace lay down to watch a video and soon fell

asleep.

Crace awoke around 2:00 a.m. in a panicked state. He

was “hearing voices and seeing things” and felt that someone

or something was “going to brutally murder” him and that he

needed to escape. He left the trailer where he was staying in

an attempt to locate the trailer of two women whom he knew,

where he hoped to find “safe haven” from his pursuers.

Crace mistakenly entered the trailer of a neighbor, Rita

Whitten. After screaming and then rifling through Whitten’s

1 We take this narrative from the various witnesses, including Crace,

who testified at trial. Our account derives from the testimony offered that

the jury might have credited. We do not adopt any particular theory of

what, in fact, occurred.

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kitchen cabinets, he ran back outside. Crace eventuallymade

his way back to the trailer where he was staying; he went

inside, grabbed a sword off of the wall, and began running

down the street, screaming for help.

Theron Hardesty, a Pierce County sheriff’s deputy,

arrived at the trailer park around 2:30 a.m. after receiving a

call regarding a potential burglary. A resident informed

Hardesty that a man armed with a sword was at large in the

trailer park. Hardesty quickly located Crace, who was

jumping up and down in the middle of the street and

screaming.

Crace saw Hardesty’s flashlight beam and, although he

could not tell who was holding the flashlight, began running

towards it, “trying to find somebody to be around” for

protection. As Crace approached, Hardestydrew his handgun

and ordered Crace to drop the sword. Crace did not comply

immediately, but when he got within about 50 feet away from

Hardesty, he realized Hardesty was a police officer and

dropped the sword.

Hardesty then ordered Crace to get down on the ground. 

Crace continued to run toward Hardesty, however, because he

feared that if he were to lie down in the middle of the street,

he would be killed. Crace ran until he was about seven feet

from Hardesty, at which point he complied with Hardesty’s

orders and got down on the ground.

Hardesty put Crace in handcuffs, placed him in the back

of his patrol car, and went to interview Rita Whitten. During

the interview, Hardesty heard bystanders “screaming” in the

parking lot, and he returned to find that Crace had kicked out

the left rear window of the car. Crace was terrified at having

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CRACE V. HERZOG 7

been left alone and had kicked out the window in a desperate

attempt to get Hardesty to return. Several additional deputies

arrived soon afterwards and helped restrain Crace. Hardesty

read Crace his Miranda rights, and Crace told him that he had

been chased by “four or five” pursuers. Hardesty determined

that Crace was “obviously on some type of street drug.”

Crace was subsequently charged with first-degree

criminal trespass, second-degree malicious mischief, and

second-degree assault. The trial court ordered an evaluation

of Crace’s competency to stand trial, and two

psychologists—one employed by the state and one by the

defense—examined Crace. The court found Crace

competent, and the case proceeded to trial. Crace’s theory of

defense at trial was that he suffered from diminished capacity

on the night of August 16 due to the influence of the alcohol

and drugs he had consumed, leaving him unable to form the

intent required for any of the charged offenses.

After the close of the evidence, the trial court instructed

the jury on the three charged offenses and on attempted

second-degree assault, a lesser included offense of seconddegree assault. The jury deadlocked on the second-degree

assault charge, but it convicted Crace of attempted seconddegree assault. It also convicted on first-degree criminal

trespass and second-degree malicious mischief. The latter

two offenses are misdemeanors, but the attempted seconddegree assault conviction—a felony—counted as Crace’s

third strike under Washington’s three-strikes law. Crace

received a life sentence without the possibility of parole for

that offense.

After the Washington courts affirmed his conviction on

direct appeal, Crace filed a “personal restraint petition” with

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8 CRACE V. HERZOG

the Washington Court of Appeals, alleging, among other

things, that his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to

request a jury instruction on “unlawful display of a weapon,”

which is another lesser included offense of second-degree

assault.2 A conviction for unlawful display of a weapon,

which is a misdemeanor, would not have resulted in Crace’s

receiving a third strike.

The Court of Appeals initially denied Crace’s personal

restraint petition in an unpublished opinion. Crace moved for

reconsideration, and the court, in a divided opinion, granted

that motion and subsequently issued a new decision granting

Crace’s petition. In re Crace, 236 P.3d 914 (Wash. Ct. App.

2010), rev’d, 280 P.3d 1102 (Wash. 2012). The court applied

Strickland’s test for ineffective assistance of counsel and held

that Crace had satisfied both prongs of that test. First, the

court held that Crace’s trial counsel had performed

deficiently by failing to request an instruction on unlawful

display of a weapon, given that a conviction for that offense

rather than for attempted assault would have saved Crace

from a third strike and a life sentence. Id. at 930–31. 

Second, it held that Crace had shown that he was prejudiced

by his counsel’s failure because, under Washington law,

Crace would have been entitled to an instruction on the

offense of unlawful display of a weapon if his attorney had

requested it, and there was a reasonable probability that the

2 A person commits the offense of unlawful display of a weapon by

“carry[ing]” or “display[ing] . . . any firearm, dagger, sword, knife or

other . . . weapon apparently capable of producing bodily harm, in a

manner, under circumstances, and at a time and place that either manifests

an intent to intimidate another or that warrants alarm for the safety of

other persons.” Wash. Rev. Code § 9.41.270(1) (emphasis added).

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CRACE V. HERZOG 9

outcome of the trial would have been different if that

additional instruction had been given. Id. at 931–33.

The state appealed, and the Washington Supreme Court

reversed by a vote of 7–2. In re Crace, 280 P.3d at 1102. 

The high court did not decide whether Crace’s attorney’s

performance was deficient because it determined that Crace

could not satisfy Strickland’s prejudice prong. The court

explained that, when reviewing a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel, it was required to “assume that the jury

would not have convicted the defendant unless the State had

met its burden of proof” and that “the availability of a

compromise verdict [thus] would not have changed the

outcome of the trial.” Id. at 1109. The court determined that,

“in light of” these presumptions and of the fact that there was

sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict, it could not

“say in all reasonable probability that counsel’s error . . .

contributed to Crace’s conviction on attempted second degree

assault.” Id.

Crace next filed a habeas corpus petition in the Western

District of Washington. A magistrate judge of that court

recommended granting Crace’s petition. The magistrate

judge agreed with the Washington Court of Appeals’

conclusion that Crace’s attorney’s performance had been

deficient. Turning to the issue of prejudice, she explained

that the Washington Supreme Court’s prejudice analysis

involved an “incomplete and unreasonable application of

Strickland.” She explained that the Washington Supreme

Court had “completely avoided the [prejudice] prong of

Strickland”; rather than analyzing “what difference an

instruction on the lesser crime of unlawful display of a

weapon would have had on the outcome of” the trial, the

Washington Supreme Court had simply assumed that such an

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10 CRACE V. HERZOG

instruction would have made no difference. The magistrate

judge noted that, under such an approach, “no defendant

could ever show prejudice when counsel failed to offer a

lesser included offense instruction,” as long as sufficient

evidence supported the jury’s verdict. On de novo review,

she concluded that Crace had shown that he was prejudiced

by his attorney’s failure and recommended granting relief.

In a separate opinion resting on the same reasoning, the

district court adopted the magistrate judge’s Report and

Recommendation and granted Crace’s habeas corpus petition. 

This appeal followed.

II

We review the district court’s order granting a writ of

habeas corpus de novo. Merolillo v. Yates, 663 F.3d 444, 453

(9th Cir. 2011). Our review of the Washington Supreme

Court’s decision, however, is constrained by AEDPA; we

must defer to that decision unless it was “contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). If we determine that

“the requirements of AEDPA have been met, we must also

determine, applying a de novo review standard, [that] there

has been a constitutional violation” before we may grant

habeas corpus relief. See Butler v. Curry, 528 F.3d 624, 641

(9th Cir. 2008).

III

The “clearly established” Supreme Court law at issue in

this case is Strickland v. Washington, in which the Court held

that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel has “two

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CRACE V. HERZOG 11

components”: First, a defendant must show that his

attorney’s performance was “deficient,” in that it “fell below

an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland,

466 U.S. at 687–88. Second, he must show that he was

prejudiced by his attorney’s actions or omissions, by

demonstrating that there is a “reasonable probability that, but

for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694.

We analyze the question of prejudice first, since it is the

only prong of Strickland that the Washington Supreme Court

addressed.

A. AEDPA Review of the Washington Supreme Court’s

Prejudice Determination

The Washington Supreme Court’s conclusion thatCrace’s

attorney’s failure to request an instruction on unlawful

display of a weapon did not prejudice Crace was based on the

court’s holding in an earlier case, State v. Grier, 246 P.3d

1260 (Wash. 2011). In Grier, a defendant convicted of

second-degree murder argued on appeal that her trial counsel

had been ineffective by failing to request a jury instruction on

the lesser included offense of manslaughter. Id. at 1266. The

court rejected this claim on the grounds that the defendant

could not show any prejudice caused by her attorney’s failure. 

Id. at 1274.

The Grier court quoted Strickland for the proposition that,

when analyzing prejudice, a reviewing court “should

presume, absent challenge to the judgment on grounds of

evidentiary insufficiency, that the judge or jury acted

according to law.” Id. at 1272 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 694). The court interpreted this language to mean that it

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was required to presume that the defendant’s jury had

convicted her of murder because the jury found that the

elements of murder had been proved beyond a reasonable

doubt. The court then concluded that, given that

presumption, it could also assume that “the availability of a

compromise verdict would not have changed the outcome” of

the trial, id. at 1274; if the jury had thought the defendant

guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt, it necessarily

would have reached the same verdict even if it had been

instructed on lesser included offenses.

In Crace’s case, the Washington Supreme Court applied

both of the presumptions “recognized in Grier.” It first

presumed that Crace’s jury must have found that each of the

elements of attempted second-degree assault had been proved

beyond a reasonable doubt when it convicted him. It then

determined that the evidence was sufficient to support such

a verdict and presumed, on that basis, that an instruction on

the lesser included offense of unlawful display of a weapon

would have made no difference to the outcome of the trial;

the jury would still have convicted Crace of attempted

second-degree assault even if it had been instructed on

another lesser included offense.

The Washington Supreme Court’s methodology is a

patently unreasonable application of Strickland, and its

decision in this case is thus unworthy of deference under

AEDPA. Strickland did instruct reviewing courts to presume

that trial juries act “according to law,” but the Washington

Supreme Court (both in Grier and in this case) has read far

more into that instruction than it fairly supports and, as a

result, has sanctioned an approach to Strickland that sidesteps

the reasonable-probabilityanalysis that Strickland’s prejudice

prong explicitly requires.

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CRACE V. HERZOG 13

In counseling reviewing courts to presume that juries act

according to law, the Strickland Court sought to prohibit

lower courts from basing findings of prejudice on the

possibility of freak acts of “lawless[ness]” by judges and

juries that are outside the ordinary course of criminal justice. 

The passage immediately following the language quoted in

Grier explains this point:

An assessment of the likelihood of a result

more favorable to the defendant must exclude

the possibility of arbitrariness, whimsy,

caprice, “nullification,” and the like. A

defendant has no entitlement to the luck of a

lawless decisionmaker, even if a lawless

decision cannot be reviewed.

466 U.S. at 695. In other words, a court may not find

Strickland prejudice by concluding that a different choice of

tactics by defense counsel could have persuaded the judge or

jury to make an arbitrary and improper decision in the

defendant’s favor. Rather, “[t]he assessment of prejudice

should proceed on the assumption that the decisionmaker is

reasonably, conscientiously, and impartially applying the

standards that govern the decision.” Id.

The Washington Supreme Court’s decisions in Grier and

in this case overextended the foregoing principle. That

principle forbids a reviewing court from finding prejudice by

speculating that, if the defendant is permitted to roll the dice

again, the jury might convict on a lesser included offense

merely as a means of jury nullification, without regard for

whether that verdict is consistent with the evidence. But it

does not require a court to presume—as the Washington

Supreme Court did—that, because a jury convicted the

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defendant of a particular offense at trial, the jury could not

have convicted the defendant on a lesser included offense

based upon evidence that was consistent with the elements of

both. To think that a jury, if presented with the option, might

have convicted on a lesser included offense is not to suggest

that the jury would have ignored its instructions. On the

contrary, it would be perfectly consistent with those

instructions for the jury to conclude that the evidence

presented was a better fit for the lesser included offense. The

Washington Supreme Court thus was wrong to assume that,

because there was sufficient evidence to support the original

verdict, the jury necessarily would have reached the same

verdict even if instructed on an additional lesser included

offense.

As the Supreme Court has recognized in a related context,

a jury presented with only two options—convicting on a

single charged offense or acquitting the defendant 

altogether—“is likely to resolve its doubts in favor of

conviction” even if it has reservations about one of the

elements of the charged offense, on the thinking that “the

defendant is plainly guilty of some offense.” Keeble v.

United States, 412 U.S. 205, 212–13 (1973) (construing the

Major Crimes Act of 1885 not to preclude lesser-includedoffense instructions, in order to avoid constitutional

concerns); see also Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 611

(1982). It is therefore perfectly plausible that a jury that

convicted on a particular offense at trial did so despite doubts

about the proof of that offense—doubts that, with “the

availability of a third option,” could have led it to convict on

a lesser included offense. See Keeble, 412 U.S. at 213. 

Making this observation does not require us to speculate that

the jury would have acted “lawless[ly]” if instructed on an

additional, lesser included offense or to question the validity

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CRACE V. HERZOG 15

of the actual verdict. Rather, it merely involves

acknowledging that the jury could “rationally” have found

conviction on a lesser included offense to be the verdict best

supported by the evidence. See id.

In Grier (and, implicitly, in this case), the Washington

Supreme Court brushed Keeble aside as “inapposite in the

context of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Grier, 246 P.3d

at 1272. In that court’s view, applying Keeble’s reasoning in

a Strickland case requires a court to posit that “the jury would

not hold the State to its burden in the absence of a lesser

included offense instruction”—the kind of jury

“lawless[ness]” that Strickland precludes a court from

considering. Id. Not so. Keeble’s logic does not rest on the

proposition that juries deliberately and improperly choose to

convict in the absence of reasonable doubt. What Keeble

teaches us is that a lesser-included-offense instruction can

affect a jury’s perception of reasonable doubt: the same

scrupulous and conscientious jury that convicts on a greater

offense when that offense is the only one available could

decide to convict on a lesser included offense if given more

choices.3

3 The dissent is thus mistaken in claiming that “there is some tension”

between Strickland and Keeble and that fairminded jurists could

reasonably “resolve[]” this tension “in favor of Strickland.” Dissenting

Op. at 31–35 (citing Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103, 105 (2011)). 

Properly understood, Strickland and Keeble are entirely harmonious: 

Strickland requires courts to presume that juries follow the law, and

Keeble acknowledges that a jury—even one following the law to the

letter—might reach a different verdict when presented with additional

options.

Our conviction on this point is not shaken by the dissent’s observation

that sixteen state-court judges, including the eight Washington judges who

ruled against Crace at various stages below, have agreed with its view of

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Nothing in Strickland, therefore, forbids courts from

considering the possibility that a jury would have convicted

on a lesser included offense if given the option to do so. 

Indeed, just the opposite is true: in ineffective-assistance

cases involving a failure to request a lesser-included-offense

instruction, Strickland requires a reviewing court to assess

the likelihood that the defendant’s jury would have convicted

only on the lesser included offense. Cf. Keeble, 412 U.S. at

213 (“We cannot say that the availability of a third option . . .

could not have resulted in a different verdict.”). Only by

performing that assessment can a court answer the question

expressly posed by Strickland: whether there is a reasonable

probability that, if the defendant’s lawyer had performed

adequately, the outcome of the proceeding would have been

different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.4

Strickland and Keeble. Id. at 36 n.8. Although we do not impugn either

the character or the abilities of those judges, their rulings do not

automatically establish that “fairminded disagreement” on this question

is possible. The assessment of whether a question admits of fairminded

disagreement among jurists is not simply a matter of counting noses; after

all, in every federal habeas corpus case, there must be at least a few statecourt judges who have decided an issue adversely to the petitioner in order

for the case to come before us. Rather, a federal habeas court must decide

whether the applicable Supreme Court law leaves the issue raised by the

petitioner open or resolves it conclusively. We hold that Strickland and

Keeble demonstrate beyond doubt that the Washington Supreme Court’s

decision was wrong and that the requirements of AEDPA have therefore

been met.

4 Nothing we have said here affects a defense attorney’s ability to make

a strategic decision to forgo a lesser-included-offense instruction in order

to force the jury into an “all-or-nothing” decision. The reasonableness of

that decision would be examined under the performance prong of

Strickland.

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CRACE V. HERZOG 17

The Washington Supreme Court in essence converted

Strickland’s prejudice inquiry into a sufficiency-of-theevidence question—an entirely different inquiry separately

prescribed by Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979). 

This is so because, under the Washington Supreme Court’s

approach, a defendant can only show Strickland prejudice

when the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s

verdict—a circumstance in which the defendant does not need

to rely on Strickland at all because Jackson already provides

a basis for habeas relief. See id. (a petitioner “is entitled to

habeas corpus relief if it is found that upon the record

evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could

have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt”). And

conversely, if the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict,

there is categorically no Strickland error, according to the

Washington Supreme Court’s logic. By reducing the

question to sufficiency of the evidence, the Washington

Supreme Court has focused on the wrong question here—one

that has nothing to do with Strickland.

In the only other reported court of appeals decision on this

issue that we have found, the Third Circuit came to the same

conclusion that we do. Breakiron v. Horn, 642 F.3d 126 (3d

Cir. 2011). In that case, a defendant convicted of robbery

raised an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim based on his

attorney’s failure to request an instruction on the lesser

included offense of theft. Id. at 136. The Pennsylvania

Supreme Court rejected that claim, reasoning that no

prejudice occurred because sufficient evidence supported the

jury’s conviction on the robbery charge. Id. at 139. The

Third Circuit held that this decision was an unreasonable

application of Strickland, explaining that Strickland required

a court to “weigh all the evidence of record . . . to determine

whether there was a reasonable probability that the jury

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18 CRACE V. HERZOG

would have convicted [the defendant] only of theft if it had

been given that option. Merely noting that the evidence was

sufficient to convict does not accomplish that task.” Id. at

140.

So too here. By pronouncing as a matter of law that, as

long as there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s

verdict, no prejudice results from a defense attorney’s failure

to request a lesser-included-offense instruction, the

Washington Supreme Court has licensed Washington courts

to avoid analyzing prejudice in the way that ?Strickland

requires.5 This approach to Strickland is not merely wrong,

but “objectively unreasonable” under AEDPA.

B. De Novo Prejudice Analysis

Having determined that the Washington Supreme Court’s

decision on prejudice should receive no AEDPA deference,

we consider the issue of prejudice de novo.

We note, first, that Crace was legally entitled to a lesserincluded-offense instruction on unlawful displayof a weapon. 

Under Washington law, “a defendant is entitled to an

instruction on a lesser included offense if two conditions are

met. First, each of the elements of the lesser offense must be

a necessary element of the offense charged.” State v.

5 The dissent notes that the Washington court recited the proper

Strickland test before applying it. Dissent at 38–39. But the court’s

application ofthe law—not its recitation ofthe legal standard—is what we

hold to be objectively unreasonable. The dissent also argues that we

should presume the state court did not err in applying clearly established

law. Id. at 39–40. While we agree with this general proposition, a

presumption cannot save the Washington court’s patently unreasonable

application of the law here.

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CRACE V. HERZOG 19

Workman, 584 P.2d 382, 385 (Wash. 1978). Second, “the

evidence must raise an inference that only the lesser

included/inferior degree offense was committed to the

exclusion of the charged offense.” State v. FernandezMedina, 6 P.3d 1150, 1154 (Wash. 2000).

Both of these requirements are satisfied here. The

Washington courts have held that every element of unlawful

display of a weapon is a necessary element of second-degree

assault. State v. Ward, 104 P.3d 670, 672 (Wash. App. 2004),

abrogated on other grounds by Grier, 246 P.3d at 1271. And

as the Washington Court of Appeals concluded, there was

evidence to “support an inference that Crace only displayed

the sword and that he had no intent to create reasonable fear

or apprehension of bodily injury,” which is the specific intent

required for assault and attempted assault.

Crace testified that, when he grabbed his sword and ran

out into the street, he had no intent to harm anyone, but

simply was “scared” and “wanted people to come out.” 

Crace’s actions when Deputy Hardesty arrived on the scene

did not clearly suggest that he intended to harm or frighten

Hardesty, and Crace testified that he lacked such intent. 

Crace also presented testimony by a psychologist, Dr.

Vincent Gollogly, who explained that Crace’s mental

capacity had been so impaired on the night of August 16 that

he was not “able to realize the nature of what he was doing.” 

Dr. Gollogly acknowledged that some of Crace’s actions

could be described as purposeful, but he explained that

Crace’s actions were not intentional because Crace had been

in the throes of a “substance induced psychotic disorder” that

affected his perceptions and prevented him from forming

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20 CRACE V. HERZOG

criminal intent.6 Hardesty’s testimonythat it was “obvious[]”

that Crace was under the influence of drugs that night

provided support for Dr. Gollogly’s assessment.

Based on Dr. Gollogly’s opinion and the testimony of

Crace and Hardesty, a jury could rationally choose to convict

Crace only of unlawful display of a weapon. Indeed, that

offense appears to be tailor-made to apply to Crace’s conduct

as he and Dr. Gollogly described it. See Wash. Rev. Code

§ 9.41.270(1) (prohibiting “carry[ing] . . . any . . . sword . . .

in a manner, under circumstances, and at a time and place that

either manifests an intent to intimidate another or that

warrants alarm for the safety of other persons” (emphasis

added)).

Because both factors of the Washington test are satisfied,

the trial court would have been obligated to instruct the jury

on the lesser included offense of unlawful display of a

weapon if Crace’s counsel had requested such an instruction. 

And had that instruction been given, there is a reasonable

probability that the jury would have convicted Crace only of

that offense. As we have explained, the evidence could well

have led Crace’s jury to question whether he acted with the

specific intent required for attempted second-degree

assault—the only lesser included offense of second-degree

assault on which the jury was instructed and the only felony

6 Dr. Steven Marquez, the state’s psychologist, took the opposite

position, testifying that Crace showed an ability to engage in “goaldirected” behavior at the time of his arrest and that he believed that Crace

was a malingerer whose account of his own mental state was not

completely credible. This testimony, although in conflict with Dr.

Gollogly’s, does nothing to alter our conclusion that there is at least a

reasonable probability that the jury would have convicted Crace only of

unlawful display of a weapon.

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CRACE V. HERZOG 21

of which Crace was convicted. See Wash. Rev. Code

§§ 9A.28.020(1), 9A.36.021(1). At trial, however, the jury’s

only option short of convicting on attempted assault was to

acquit Crace outright. The fact that the jury “resolve[d] its

doubts in favor of conviction” on attempted assault, rather

than in favor of acquittal, does not imply that it was firmly

convinced of Crace’s capacity to form criminal intent. See

Keeble, 412 U.S. at 212–13.

We think it reasonably probable that, if given an

additional option, the jury would have convicted Crace only

of unlawful display of a weapon—which, unlike assault and

attempted assault, has no intent requirement.7

See Wash.

Rev. Code § 9.41.270. This probability is “sufficient to

undermine [our] confidence in the outcome” of the trial and

satisfies the prejudice prong of Strickland. 466 U.S. at 694.8

7 Contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, Dissenting Op. at 44, our

prejudice analysis does not depend in any way on the assumption that the

jury knew about the sentencing consequences of the various possible

verdicts. We refer to the sentencing consequences ofthe different charges

only in connectionwith our conclusion that Crace’s attorney—who, unlike

the jury, either knew or should have known about the implications of the

charges under Washington’s three-strikes law—performed deficiently by

failing to request an instruction on unlawful display of a weapon. See Part

IV, infra.

8 The dissent argues that Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 (1991),

compels a contrary conclusion. Dissenting Op. at 40–44. In Schad, the

Supreme Court held that no due process violation occurred at a murder

trial where the defendant’s jury was instructed on both first- and seconddegree murder but was not instructed on the lesser included offense of

robbery. (The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder). Schad,

501 U.S. at 648. The Court explained that because the jury had been

instructed on one lesser included offense—second-degree murder—it had

not been presented with an all-or-nothing choice between conviction on

first-degree murder and acquittal. Thus, the due process rule of Beck v.

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22 CRACE V. HERZOG

IV

It remains for us to decide whether Crace’s attorney’s

failure to request the lesser-included-offense instruction

constituted deficient performance under Strickland. Because

the Washington Supreme Court explicitly declined to reach

this issue, we review it de novo. See, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard,

545 U.S. 374, 390 (2005); Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 F.3d

1099, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006). We conclude that Crace’s

attorney’s performance was clearly deficient.

We are mindful that judicial review of an attorney’s

performance under Strickland must ordinarily be “highly

deferential” and incorporate a “strong presumption that

counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable

professional assistancewhich, under the circumstances, might

be considered sound trial strategy.” United States v. Span,

75 F.3d 1383, 1387 (9th Cir. 1996). A trial attorney’s failure

to request a jury instruction receives no deference, however,

Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980), which requires that a jury in a capital case

be instructed on a lesser included noncapital offense that is supported by

the evidence, was inapplicable. Schad, 501 U.S. at 645–48.

We do not agree with the dissent that Schad—which simply held that,

where one lesser included offense instruction has been given, a court need

not take the drastic step of vacating a conviction under Beck—establishes

that a conviction is per se “reliable” as long as one lesser included offense

instruction was given. Moreover, even if the dissent is right that, under

Schad’s logic, Crace’s conviction is marginally more “reliable” because

a lesser included instruction on attempted assault was given at his trial,

Dissenting Op. at 42, there remains a reasonable probability that Crace’s

jury would have convicted him only of unlawful display of a weapon if

instructed on that offense. That probability establishes that Crace was

prejudiced by his attorney’s failure to request such an instruction. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

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CRACE V. HERZOG 23

when it is based on “a misunderstanding of the law” rather

than “a strategic decision to for[]go one defense in favor of

another.” See id. at 1390; accord Richards v. Quarterman,

566 F.3d 553, 569 (5th Cir. 2009) (finding ineffective

assistance of counsel based on failure to request lesserincluded-offense instruction, where such failure was

“deficient and not a strategic decision”); United States v.

Alferahin, 433 F.3d 1148, 1161 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that

trial counsel was deficient, where he “did not intend

strategically to for[]go [a] materiality instruction” but rather

“had no idea that such an instruction was available to his

client as a matter of right”); United States ex rel. Barnard v.

Lane, 819 F.2d 798, 805 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that failure

to request an instruction on a lesser included offense

constituted deficient performance, where such failure was not

within the “spectrum of counsel’s legitimate tactical

choices”).

Crace’s attorney’s failure to request the instruction was

neither strategic nor deliberate. In a declaration submitted to

the Washington Supreme Court, he explicitly stated that the

“only reason [he] did not offer a lesser included instruction

for unlawful display of a weapon was because [he] did not

consider it.” The Washington Supreme Court did not

consider this declaration because it did not reach the

performance prong of Strickland, but the declaration is

properly before us and the state has made no attempt to

dispute its assertions. We therefore conclude that Crace’s

counsel made no strategic decision to forgo a lesser included

offense instruction that commands our deference, and we

hold that his outright failure even to consider the possibility

of requesting a lesser included offense constituted deficient

performance.

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24 CRACE V. HERZOG

Indeed, we would find that Crace’s attorney’s actions

were manifestly unreasonable even if we thought that he had

consciously chosen not to request the instruction. In certain

circumstances, it may be reasonable for a defense attorney to

opt for an “all-or-nothing” strategy, forcing the jury to choose

between convicting on a severe offense and acquitting the

defendant altogether. But once the trial court decided to

instruct the jury on one lesser included offense—i.e.,

attempted second-degree assault—there was no longer any

conceivable reason for Crace’s counsel not to request an

instruction on a second lesser included offense. An all-ornothing strategy was also clearly inappropriate in this case,

given that a conviction only for unlawful display of a weapon

would have spared Crace a third strike and thus decades of

prison time.

We conclude that Crace’s attorney’s performance “fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland,

466 U.S. at 687–88. Because Crace has satisfied both prongs

of Strickland, his conviction for attempted second-degree

assault cannot stand.

V

We hold that the Washington Supreme Court’s

application of Stricklandwas objectivelyunreasonable, which

removes its decision from the protection of AEDPA. We also

conclude, on de novo review, that Crace’s claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel merits habeas corpus relief. We

therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.

AFFIRMED.

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CRACE V. HERZOG 25

CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

The Washington Supreme Court had to decide what

effect, if any, defense counsel’s failure to request a jury

instruction on a lesser included offense had on Crace’s

conviction for attempted assault. The Washington Supreme

Court held that because sufficient evidence supported Crace’s

conviction for attempted assault, the presence of a second

lesser included offense instruction would not have changed

the outcome of his trial. My review of the applicable

Supreme Court law and the conflicting decisions by other

courts on this issue compels me to conclude that the

Washington Supreme Court’s decision was not contrary to or

an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme

Court law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Therefore, as

AEDPA compels us to defer to the state court, I respectfully

dissent.

I

Robert Crace is a persistent offender in Washington. His

rap sheet discloses a burglary in 1981, robbery in 1981, two

counts of robbery in 1988, robbery in 1991, burglary and

possession of stolen property in 1995, burglary in 1999, and

attempting to elude a police officer in 2002. The robberies in

1988 and 1991 were violent crimes that constituted “strikes”

under Washington’s three strikes law.

It is against this backdrop that we consider the largely

undisputed facts in this instant case: Crace was arrested again

in 2003 after he consumed several legal and illegal drugs and

ran toward a police officer with a drawn sword. He was

charged with second degree assault, first degree criminal

trespass, and second degree malicious mischief. At trial, the

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26 CRACE V. HERZOG

jury was instructed on assault with a deadly weapon and its

lesser included offense, attempted assault with a deadly

weapon. That instruction read:

If you are not satisfied beyond a

reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty

of Assault in the Second Degree, the

defendant may be found guilty of any lesser

crime, the commission of which is necessarily

included in the crime charged, if the evidence

is sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt

of such lesser crime beyond a reasonable

doubt.

The crime of Assault in the Second

Degree necessarily includes the lesser crime

of Attempted Assault in the Second Degree.

When a crime has been proven against a

person and there exists a reasonable doubt as

to which of two or more crimes that person is

guilty, he or she shall be convicted only of the

lowest crime.

The jury was also instructed as to first degree criminal

trespass and second degree malicious mischief. The jury

deadlocked on assault but convicted Crace of attempted

assault with a deadly weapon. The jury also convicted Crace

of first degree criminal trespass and second degree malicious

mischief.

Trespass and malicious mischief are not felonies under

Washington state law, but assault and attempted assault are. 

Thus, Crace’s conviction for attempted assault resulted in a

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CRACE V. HERZOG 27

third strike, and Crace was sentenced to life without the

possibility of parole under Washington’s three strikes law.1

Crace filed a direct appeal, which was unsuccessful.2

Crace then filed a personal restraint petition in

Washington State Court, asserting, among other things, that

his counsel was ineffective for failing to request a second

lesser included offense instruction for unlawful display of a

weapon. See Wash. Rev. Code § 9.41.270. A conviction of

unlawful display of a weapon would have been a gross

misdemeanor and would not have constituted Crace’s third

strike. Id. In an unpublished decision dated January 20,

2010, the Washington Court of Appeals denied Crace’s

petition, reasoning that the evidence did not support a lesser

included offense instruction. In re Crace, 154 Wash. App.

1016 (2010) (unpublished). However, on July 28, 2010, the

1

 In November 1993, Washington state voters approved Initiative 593,

commonly referred to as the “three strikes law.” The law requires trial

courts to sentence “persistent offenders” to life imprisonment without

possibility of parole. A “persistent offender” is defined as one convicted

of three felonies considered a “most serious offense” under the Revised

Code of Washington § 9.94A.570. Despite vigorous debate about the

wisdom of three strikes laws, the law has been upheld against

constitutional challenge. See, e.g., State v. Manussier, 921 P.2d 473

(Wash. 1996) (en banc) (holding three strikes law is constitutional), cert.

denied, 520 U.S. 1201 (1997); State v. Thorne, 921 P.2d 514 (Wash.

1996); and State v. Rivers, 921 P.2d 495 (Wash. 1996).

 

2 On direct appeal, Crace challenged the sufficiency of the evidence of

his attempted assault conviction. The WashingtonCourt of Appeal upheld

his conviction, reasoning that a jury could reasonably conclude that Crace

intended to hurt the officer or to instill fear of harm in him. State v.

Crace, 128 Wash. App. 1021 (2005) (unpublished). The court also noted

that he had waived objections to the second and third definitions of

assault. Id. at *6. Crace has not challenged these rulings in his habeas

petitions.

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Court of Appeals reversed itself, holding that Crace’s counsel

was deficient for failing to request an instruction for the

lesser included offense of unlawful display of a weapon and

that Crace was prejudiced by his counsel’s failure. In re

Crace, 236 P.3d 914, 932–33 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010). One

judge dissented.

The Washington Supreme Court en banc reversed the

Court of Appeals in another divided opinion. The court

assumed, without holding, that the failure of Crace’s counsel

to request a lesser included offense instruction for unlawful

display of a weapon was deficient, but held that Crace could

not have been prejudiced. Because there was sufficient

evidence to convict Crace of the greater offense, attempted

assault, there was no reasonable probability that the outcome

would have been different had the lesser included offense

instruction had been given. Two judges dissented. In re

Crace, 280 P.3d 1102, 1110 (Wash. 2012).

Crace then filed this habeas petition in federal district

court. The district court granted relief, and the State3 timely

appealed.

II

The majority errs by failing to defer to the Washington

Supreme Court’s decision under AEDPA. Title 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1) prohibits a court from granting an application

for a writ of habeas corpus unless the state court’s

“adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

3 Respondent-Appellant is Robert Herzog, the Superintendent of the

Monroe Correctional Complex in Monroe, Washington.

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CRACE V. HERZOG 29

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States.” The clearly established

law in this case includes Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668 (1984), which sets forth the standard governing

ineffective assistance of counsel claims in habeas

proceedings. Under Strickland, a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel has two components. First, a defendant

must show that his attorney’s performance was “deficient,”

in that it “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88. Second, he must show that

he was prejudiced by his attorney’s actions or omissions, by

demonstrating that there is a “reasonable probability that, but

for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694.

Here, the Washington Supreme Court considered the

second prong of Strickland: whether Crace’s counsel’s failure

to request a jury instruction for a lesser included offense was

prejudicial such that a “reasonable probability” existed that,

if the instruction had been given, the result of the proceeding

would have been different.

Notably, the question presented to the Washington

Supreme Court differs from ineffective of assistance of

counsel claims in which habeas petitioners allege that they

have been prejudiced by their counsels’ failure to present

certain evidence. In those instances, the relevant question is

how the factual findings would have been affected if defense

counsel had introduced the additional evidence, considering

the “totality of the evidence before the judge or jury.”

Strickland, 466 U.S. 695–96. But Crace’s petition has

nothing to do with the evidence presented in his case. He

does not allege that he would have introduced any other

evidence to support his innocence. He does not allege that

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30 CRACE V. HERZOG

the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of

attempted assault. Nor does he contend that the jury was

erroneously instructed as to the law. Rather, he contends that

the jury should have been provided additional law: his

counsel failed to request a jury instruction on unlawful

display of a weapon, a lesser included offense.4In this

context, the Washington Supreme Court found there was no

reasonable probability that the outcome would have been

different had the lesser included offense instruction been

given.

We, in turn, must determine, through the lens of AEDPA,

whether the Washington Supreme Court’s decision was

contrary to or an unreasonable application of Strickland. The

majority does not hold that the state court decision was

contrary to Strickland. Rather, the majority holds that the

Washington Supreme Court’s decision was an unreasonable

application of Strickland. Maj. Op. 4–5. Even if this were a

close issue, Supreme Court authority compels us to defer to

the state court decision. Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187,

2198 (2015) (citing Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101

(2011)). When evaluating a state court’s application of

federal law, the Supreme Court instructs:

Under § 2254(d), a habeas court must

determine what arguments or theories

supported or [] could have supported, the state

court’s decision; and then it must ask whether

it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree

that those arguments or theories are

4 As discussed in Part III, a jury instruction for unlawful display of a

weapon would have been Crace’s second jury instruction on a lesser

included offense, as the jury was already instructed on attempted assault.

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CRACE V. HERZOG 31

inconsistent with the holding in a prior

decision of this Court.

Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102; id. at 103 (“[T]he state court’s

ruling on the claim . . . [must be] so lacking in justification

that there was an error well understood and comprehended in

existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded

disagreement.”).

The Washington Supreme Court’s decision is not

objectively unreasonable. As the majority notes, the

Washington Supreme Court relied on its previous decision in

State v. Grier, 246 P.3d 1206 (Wash. 2011) (en banc), cert.

denied, 135 S. Ct. 153 (2014). Grier interpreted Strickland

as providing that when analyzing prejudice a reviewing court

“should presume, absent challenge to the judgment on

grounds of evidentiary insufficiency, that the judge or jury

acted according to law.” Id. at 1272 (quoting Strickland,

466 U.S. at 694). In other words, Grier held that because the

jury had returned a guilty verdict, the court was required to

presume the jury had found each of the elements of second

degree murder had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Id. at 1273.

Grier noted that Strickland’s holding that jurors are

presumed to follow the law is in tension with Keeble v.

United States, 412 U.S. 205 (1973), which recognized that

jurors may disregard the law. Grier, 246 P.3d at 1272–73. 

At issue in Keeble was whether an Indian prosecuted under

the Major Crimes Act was entitled to a jury instruction on a

lesser included offense when that lesser offense was not one

of the crimes enumerated in the Act. 412 U.S. at 205–06. 

The government argued that the Act prohibited inclusion of

a lesser included offense instruction and also suggested that

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32 CRACE V. HERZOG

the defendant could actually benefit from the exclusion of a

lesser included offense instruction, as the omission might

result in acquittal. Id. at 209, 212–13. The Court, however,

held that the defendant was entitled to the lesser included

offense notwithstanding its omission in the Act noting:

True, if the prosecution has not established

beyond a reasonable doubt every element of

the offense charged, and if no lesser offense

instruction is offered, the jury must, as a

theoretical matter, return a verdict of

acquittal. But a defendant is entitled to a

lesser offense instruction—in this context or

anyother—preciselybecause he should not be

exposed to the substantial risk that the jury’s

practice will diverge from theory. Where one

of the elements of the offense charged

remains in doubt, but the defendant is plainly

guilty of some offense, the jury is likely to

resolve its doubts in favor of conviction. In

the case before us, for example, an intent to

commit serious bodily injury is a necessary

element of the crime with which petitioner

was charged, but not of the crime of simple

assault. Since the nature of petitioner’s intent

was very much in dispute at trial, the jury

could rationally have convicted him of simple

assault if that option had been presented. But

the jury was presented with only two options:

convicting the defendant of assault with intent

to commit great bodily injury, or acquitting

him outright. We cannot say that the

availability of a third option—convicting the

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CRACE V. HERZOG 33

defendant of simple assault—could not have

resulted in a different verdict.

Id. at 212–13.

Thus, the Washington Supreme Court could reasonably

find some tension in the Supreme Court guidance. Strickland

holds that a court is to assume that the jury follows the law

and, therefore, that juries only convict defendants if they find

all elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt, while

Keeble instructs that a defendant should not be exposed to the

substantial risk that a “jury’s practice will diverge from

theory” and “resolve its doubts in favor of conviction” where

the only other option is acquittal. Keeble, 412 U.S. at

212–13.

Grierresolved the tension between Strickland and Keeble

in favor of Strickland, the more recent Supreme Court

opinion. The Washington Supreme Court held that “Keeble

is inapposite in the context of ineffective assistance of

counsel” and “skews the Strickland standard” that presumes

jurors follow the law. Grier, 246 P.3d at 1273. The court

explained that the proposed instruction would have directed

the jury not to consider a lesser included offense if it was

convinced that the defendant was guilty of the greater

offense. Id. at 1272–73. Thus, because the jury returned a

guilty verdict on the greater offense of second degree murder,

a proposed instruction on manslaughter would not have

changed the result: Grier was not prejudiced. Id. at 1272–74. 

Applying Grier’s holding here, the Washington Supreme

Court held that Crace had failed to demonstrate any prejudice

from his counsel’s failure to request a second lesser included

instruction on unlawful display of a weapon in light of his

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34 CRACE V. HERZOG

conviction of the greater offense, attempted assault. In re

Crace, 280 P.3d at 1109.5

Similar positions have been espoused by the Supreme

Court of Florida in Sanders v. State, 946 So. 2d 953 (Fla.

2006), reh’g denied, and by Judge Wilson of the Supreme

Court of Missouri, albeit in a dissenting opinion, in McNeal

v. State, 412 S.W.3d 886 (Mo. 2013) (en banc), cert. denied

134 S. Ct. 2292 (May 19, 2014).6

In Sanders, the Florida

Supreme Court explained that “any finding of prejudice

5

Strickland informs us that if the petitioner challenges the sufficiency

of the evidence, then jurors are no longer presumed to follow the law. 

466 U.S. at 694. Although Crace challenged the sufficiency of evidence

on direct appeal, he did not renew that argument in his habeas petitions. 

Additionally, no direct evidence suggests that the jury did not follow the

law here.

 

6

 Judge Wilson ably explained in his dissent in McNeal:

Because McNeal’s jury found him guilty of burglary

. . . there are only two ways to conclude that this lesserincluded offense instruction likely would have changed

the outcome . . . . They are: (1) that the jury did not

believe the evidence was sufficient to prove McNeal

guilty of burglary beyond a reasonable doubt but,

because it was placed in an all-or-nothing position by

the absence of the trespass instruction, the jury

improperly convicted McNeal despite its oath and the

court's instructions, or (2) that the jury did believe the

evidence was sufficient to prove McNeal guilty of

burglary beyond a reasonable doubt but, if it had been

given the lesser-included offense instruction, the jury

would have improperly ignored the evidence (as well as

its oath) and convicted McNeal of the lesser offense as

an act of leniency, grace, or other form of nullification.

McNeal, 412 S.W.3d at 895 (Wilson, J. dissenting).

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resulting from defense counsel’s failure to request an

instruction on lesser-included offenses necessarily would be

based on a faulty premise” that, “if given the choice, a jury

would violate its oath, disregard the law, and ignore the trial

court’s instructions.” Sanders, 946 So. 2d at 959. Because

Strickland prohibits this type of speculation, the court held

that the defendant was not prejudiced by a refusal to give an

instruction of a lesser included offense.7

Our case presents a similar situation. Crace’s jury found

him guilty of attempted assault. The only way a lesser

included instruction for unlawful display of a weapon could

have changed the outcome is if the jury improperly convicted

him of attempted assault or if the jury would have convicted

him of unlawful display of a weapon as an act of “leniency,

grace, or other form of nullification.” See McNeal,

412 S.W.3d at 895 (Wilson, J., dissenting).

The majority and the Third Circuit disagree with the

approach taken by the Washington Supreme Court, the

Florida Supreme Court, and Judge Wilson in Missouri. See

Maj. Op. and Breakiron v. Horn, 642 F.3d 126 (3d Cir. 2011). 

But this only illustrates that fairminded jurists disagree on

whether counsel’s failure to request a lesser included offense

instruction prejudices the defendant. Therefore, the majority

has not shown that the Washington Supreme Court’s ruling

“‘was so lacking in justification that there was an error well

understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any

possibility for fairminded disagreement.’” Davis, 135 S. Ct.

7 The Eleventh Circuit, in an unpublished decision, has held that the

Florida Supreme Court’s reasoning in Sanders was not an unreasonable

application of Strickland. Santiago v. Sec’y, Fla. Dept. of Corr., 472 F.

App’x 888, 889 (11th Cir. 2012).

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at 2199 (quoting Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103). Far from it:

fairminded jurists can and do disagree as to whether the

failure to request an instruction on a lesser included offense

can be prejudicial when the jury convicts on the greater

offense and there is no question as to the sufficiency of the

evidence.8 As the Supreme Court has not reconciled the

statements in Strickland and Keeble, it is not objectively

unreasonable for the Washington Supreme Court to read

Strickland as limiting Keeble.

9

See Harrington, 562 U.S. at

8 A preliminary count reveals that judges who have considered this

issue—whether the failure to request an instruction on a lesser included

offense can be prejudicial when the jury convicts on the greater

offense—are equally divided. At least 16 judges would find that the

petitioner has not shown a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s

failure to request a lesser included offense instruction, the outcome of the

proceeding would have been different. See discussion infra; In re Crace,

280 P.3d at 1109–10 (seven judges in the majority); In re Crace, 236 P.3d

at 933 (one judge dissenting); Sanders, 847 So. 2d at 960 (five justices

concurring in opinion); McNeal, 412 S.W.3d at 893 (two judges

dissenting). But at least 16 others judges would. See Maj. Op.; Crace v.

Herzog, No. C12-5672 RBL/KLS, 2013 WL 3338498 (W.D. Wash. July

2, 2013) (district judge adopting magistrate judge’s recommendation of

grant of habeas relief); In re Crace, 280 P.3d. at 1110 (two Washington

Supreme Court justices dissenting); In re Crace, 236 P.3d at 933 (two

Washington appellate judges in majority); Breakiron, 642 F.3d at 128

(three circuit judges); McNeal, 412 S.W. 3d at 893 (five judges in

majority). Although not dispositive, the fact that so many other

conscientious jurists have reached the same conclusion as the Washington

Supreme Court certainly bears some relevance as to whether the state

court’s reasoning was “so lacking in justification that there was an error

well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility

for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103.

9 A somewhat similar, and hence instructive, situation confronted the

Supreme Court in Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003), in which the

Court held that it had not established a “clear or consistent path for courts

to follow” in determining “whether a particular sentence for a term of

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105 (“The Strickland standard is a general one, so the range

of reasonable applications is substantial.”).

The majority nonetheless suggests that the Washington

Supreme Court’s decision was unreasonable because it

converted Strickland’s prejudice inquiryinto a sufficiency-ofthe-evidence question prescribed by Jackson v. Virginia, 443

U.S. 307 (1979). Maj. Op. 17. The majority’s conclusion is

based on the following text in the state court’s opinion:

Assuming without deciding that counsel was

deficient, consistent with Grier, we cannot say

in all reasonable probability that counsel’s

error—failure to seek the lesser included

offense—contributed to Crace’s conviction on

attempted second degree assault. There was

sufficient evidence from which a juror could

conclude Crace committed this offense. 

Evidence established he intended to cause

Deputy Hardesty fear and apprehension. RP

at 143–45 (cross-examination of Crace

suggesting that he rushed the deputy thinking

Hardestymight be an assailant); RP at 208–17

(testimony from State’s psychologist

suggesting Crace was not only capable of

forming intent, but was also malingering,

which might have undermined his credibility

with the jury). Indeed, if failing to request the

years can violate the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 72. Because the precise

contours of the Eighth Amendment’s disproportionality principle were

unclear, it was not objectively unreasonable for the California Court of

Appeals to conclude that a three strikes sentence of 50 years to life for

petty theft was not grossly disproportionate. Id. at 70, 75–77.

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lesser-included instruction was deficient

performance, it occurred during an otherwise

strategic and tactically driven presentation by

counsel. In light of the presumptions we

recognized in Grier, it would be difficult to

show prejudice in such a context, and Crace

has failed to do so here.

In re Crace, 280 P.3d at 1109.

There is no dispute that the Washington court recited the

correct Strickland standard at length in the preceding sections

of the opinion. See, e.g., id. at 1106 (“Strickland arrived at a

measure of prejudice that requires the defendant to show a

‘reasonable probability’ that but for counsel’s deficient

representation, the outcome of the proceeding would have

been different.”); id. at 1107 (“Strickland’s test is ultimately

concerned with ‘the fundamental fairness of the proceeding

whose result is being challenged.’” (quoting Strickland,

466 U.S. at 696)); id. (“‘In every case the court should be

concerned with whether, despite the strong presumption of

reliability, the result of the particular proceeding is unreliable

because of a breakdown in the adversarial process that our

system counts on to produce just results.’” (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696)).

In its application of Strickland, the Washington Supreme

Court considered the sufficiency of the evidence against

Crace for attempted assault and concluded it was presumptive

evidence that Crace could not show a reasonable probability

of a different outcome if the jury had been instructed on the

lesser included offense of unlawful display of a weapon. The

court’s review of the sufficiency of the evidence supporting

Crace’s conviction is not inconsistent with Strickland; to the

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CRACE V. HERZOG 39

contrary, the court would have been remiss if it did not

evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the

verdict. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695–96 (“[A] court

hearing an ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality of

the evidence before the judge or jury. . . . [A] verdict or

conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more

likely to have been affected by errors than one with

overwhelming record support.”). Thus, the Washington

court’s consideration of the sufficiency of the evidence is not

enough to overcome the presumption that the court knew and

followed the applicable clearly established law. See

Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)

(holding that a “readiness to attribute error is inconsistent

with the presumption that state courts know and follow the

law”); see also Woods v. Donald, 135 S. Ct. 1372, 1376

(2015) (per curiam); Poyson v. Ryan, 743 F.3d 1185, 1198–99

(9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2302 (2014).; Lopez

v. Schriro, 491 F.3d 1029, 1037 (9th Cir. 2007), cert denied,

128 S. Ct. 1227 (2008). Accordingly, I would hold the

court’s decision was a reasonable application of Strickland.

10

10 The majority’s concern that the Washington Supreme Court created

a categorical rule such that no prejudice can ever be found for failing to

request a lesser included offense instruction if there is sufficient evidence

of the greater offense is overstated. See Maj. Op. 18. First, the court’s

language disclaims a categorical rule: “in light of the presumptions we

recognized in Grier, it would be difficult to show prejudice in such a

context, and Crace has failed to do so here.” In re Crace, 280 P.3d at

1109 (emphasis added). Second, even if the Washington Supreme Court

was creating a categorical rule, such a rule may be sound in these limited

circumstances in which the only error Crace asserts is that his counsel did

not request a jury instruction on a second lesser included offense when the

jury was already instructed as to one lesser included offense. See also

infra Part III.

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40 CRACE V. HERZOG

As Supreme Court authority compels deference to the

decision of the Washington Supreme Court, I would reverse

the district court’s grant of habeas relief.11

III

The reasonableness of the Washington Supreme Court’s

perspective is buttressed by the fact that the jury was

presented with one lesser included offense instruction. This

enhances the verdict’s reliability and compels the conclusion

that the Washington Supreme Court decision was not

unreasonable. See Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 636

(1980); Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 645–47 (1991). Beck

concerned an Alabama statute that precluded giving the jury

any lesser included offense instructions in capital cases. Id.

at 628–29, n.3. The Court invalidated the statute, holding that

due process entitles a defendant to a lesser included offense

instruction in a capital case to protect against the risk of an

unwarranted conviction. Id. at 637 (“Such a risk cannot be

tolerated in a case in which the defendant’s life is at stake.”).

The Court subsequently limited Beck’s reach in Schad,

holding that, even in a capital case, a defendant is not entitled

to every lesser included offense jury instruction supported by

the evidence. 501 U.S. at 645–47. In Schad, the habeas

11 To be sure, some of my colleagues disagree with the Court’s

interpretation of AEDPA. See, e.g., Stephen R. Reinhardt, The Demise of

Habeas Corpus and the Rise of Qualified Immunity: The Court’s Ever

Increasing Limitations on the Development and Enforcement of

Constitutional Rights and Some Particularly Unfortunate Consequences,

113 Mich. L. Rev. 1219 (2015). But even those colleagues concede that

we are “bound to follow [the Court’s] rulings . . . because the system of

law that we so admire and respect contains a hierarchy in which the

Supreme Court rests at the top.” Id. at 1254.

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petitioner was charged with and convicted of first degree

murder and was sentenced to death. Id. at 629. Although the

jury was instructed on a lesser included offense of second

degree murder, the petitioner argued that he was entitled to a

jury instruction for a second lesser included offense, robbery. 

Id. at 629, 645. The Court rejected this argument, explaining

that the defendant was not faced with an “all-or-nothing”

situation where the jury had to convict him of a capital crime

or acquit him.

The goal of the Beck rule, in other words, is to

eliminate the distortion of the factfinding

process that is created when the jury is forced

into an all-or-nothing choice between capital

murder and innocence. This central concern

of Beck simply is not implicated in the present

case, for petitioner’s jury was not faced with

an all-or-nothing choice between the offense

of conviction (capital murder) and innocence.

Id. at 646–47 (internal citations and quotation marks

omitted). Schad’s theory of defense at trial was that he

merely stole the victim’s property but did not murder him. 

He complained that refusing a lesser included instruction for

robbery or theft deprived the jurors of the “opportunity to

return a verdict in conformity with their reasonable view of

the evidence.” Id. at 647. The Court rejected this argument:

[T]he fact that the jury’s “third option” was

second-degree murder rather than robbery

does not diminish the reliability of the jury’s

capital murder verdict. To accept the

contention advanced by petitioner and the

dissent, we would have to assume that a jury

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unconvinced that petitioner was guilty of

either capital or second-degree murder, but

loath to acquit him completely (because it was

convinced he was guilty of robbery), might

choose capital murder rather than

second-degree murder as its means of keeping

him off the streets. Because we can see no

basis to assume such irrationality, we are

satisfied that the second-degree murder

instruction in this case sufficed to ensure the

verdict’s reliability.

Id. Thus, following Schad, once one lesser included offense

instruction is given, the risk of a compromise verdict is

diminished. See Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 955

(9th Cir. 2001) (“Beck does not require trial courts to provide

sua sponte instructions on each theory that could justify a

lesser included offense. Rather, it merely requires courts to

provide instructions on the lesser included offenses, thus

preventing the State from forcing juries to make an ‘all or

nothing’ choice between acquittal and capital murder.”); cf.

People v. Horning, 102 P.3d 228, 252 (Cal. 2004) (“‘Beck’s

principles [are] satisfied if the jury [i]s provided some

noncapital third option between the capital charge and

acquittal.’”) (quoting People v. Sakarias, 995 P.2d 152 (Cal.

2000)).

Keeble, Beck, and Schad support the conclusion that

Crace’s conviction for attempted assault was not a

compromise verdict. Crace’s jury was not presented with an

“all-or-nothing choice” between conviction and innocence. 

Rather, Crace’s jury was instructed on a number of potential

verdicts, including the greater offense of assault and the

lesser included offense of attempted assault, as well as

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malicious mischief and trespass. The jury’s mixed verdict,

acquitting Crace of assault, but finding him guilty of

attempted assault, mischief, and trespass suggests that it had

no misgivings about acquitting Crace when it deemed

appropriate to do so.12

Moreover, Crace’s counsel’s failure to request a second

lesser included offense instruction for unlawful display of a

weapon was not prejudicial because the jury was not

presented with the all-or-nothing choice contemplated in

Keeble and Beck. As the Supreme Court held in Schad,

where a jury has been instructed on both a greater and lesser

included offense, the conviction is reliable. 501 U.S. at

647–48.13 Reliability is the touchstone of Strickland’s

prejudice analysis. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 393 n.

17 (2000) (Strickland’s prejudice component “focuses on the

question [of] whether counsel’s deficient performance renders

the result of the trial unreliable or the proceeding

fundamentally unfair”); cf. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,

434 (1995) (“The question is not whether the defendant

would more likely than not have received a different verdict

with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a

12 Indeed, the jury’s inability to reach a verdict on assault may be the

result of the jury rejecting Crace’s defense that he lacked the requisite

intent required for both assault and attempted assault, and instead

determining that the government had not shown the required actusreus for

assault.

13 The majority dismisses Schad as a due process case that did not

squarely address ineffective assistance of counsel, but neither did Keeble. 

In any event, the point is that Schad and Keeble shed light on the question

of whether the absence of a second lesser included offense instruction

renders Crace’s verdict unreliable. While the majority concludes to the

contrary, I would defer to the Washington Supreme Court’s reconciliation

of Keeble and Strickland in light of Beck and Schad.

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fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of

confidence.”). Thus, there is no basis under Strickland to

conclude that if Crace’s counsel had requested another lesser

included offense instruction, the jury would have returned a

different verdict.

Even if I could agree that defense counsel’s failure to

request a jury instruction for one lesser included offense

created a reasonable probability that the outcome could be

different, I cannot agree with the majority that defense

counsel’s failure to request a second lesser included offense

instruction created a reasonable probability that the outcome

would have been different. Taken to its logical conclusion,

defense counsel would be obligated to request all potentially

relevant lesser included offense instructions to avoid a

compromise verdict. Therefore, I would hold that Crace has

not shown that the Washington Supreme Court decision was

unreasonable.

IV

The majority’s reluctance to accept that counsel’s failure

to request an instruction on the lesser included offense of

unlawful display of a weapon may reasonably be considered

harmless may stem from the stark fact that attempted assault

is a felony while unlawful display of a weapon is a

misdemeanor and, thus, not a “strike” under Washington’s

three strikes law. But the jury did not know the sentencing

consequences of its verdict on the various charges. Nor is

there any suggestion that if the jury had been provided with

an instruction for the lesser included offense of unlawful

display of a weapon that the jurors would have understood

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that charge to be a misdemeanor.14 Washington law prohibits

a jury from considering matters related to sentencing in noncapital cases. See State v. Hicks, 181 P.3d 831, 836 (Wash.

2008) (en banc) (“[W]here the jury has no sentencing

function, it should not be informed on matters that relate only

to sentencing.”); see also Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S.

573, 579 (1994) (“[P]roviding jurors sentencing information

invites them to ponder matters that are not within their

province, distracts them from their factfinding

responsibilities, and creates a strong possibility of

confusion.”). In accordance with these principles, Crace’s

jury was instructed:

You have nothing whatever to do with any

punishment that might be imposed in case of

a violation of the law. The fact that

punishment may follow conviction cannot be

considered by you except insofar as it may

tend to make you careful.

You are officers of the court and must act

impartially and with an earnest desire to

determine and declare the proper verdict. 

Throughout your deliberations you will permit

neither sympathy nor prejudice to influence

your verdict.15

14 Apparently one juror on Crace’s jury wrote an article in a local

newspaper about the experience, and said that she “came to consider the

possibility that Mr. Crace was facing a third strike” because she “had read

about the law and understood the process.” She, however, “did not

discuss [her third strike theory] with anyone else.” In re Crace, 236 P.3d

at 922.

 

15 There is no indication that Crace objected to this instruction.

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Thus, the fact that Crace’s conviction for attempted assault

was a felony that triggered Washington’s three strikes law

neither undermines the jury’s verdict nor provides any

support for the argument that the verdict would have been

different if the jury was been instructed on another lesser

included offense that was a misdemeanor. 

* * *

The wisdom of Washington’s three strikes law is not

before us, nor are we called upon to determine the correctness

of the Washington Supreme Court’s interpretation of 

Strickland and Keeble. Rather, pursuant to AEDPA, we are

limited to inquiringwhether the Washington Supreme Court’s

decision is unreasonable. Davis, 2015 WL 2473373, at *9. 

I would find the Washington court’s interpretation of U.S.

Supreme Court opinions neither contrary to nor an

unreasonable application of clearly established law.

Fairminded jurists may conclude that the jury’s conviction of

Crace on the lesser included offense of attempted assault on

sufficient evidence renders his counsel’s failure to seek an

instruction on another lesser included offense harmless.

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

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