Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-94-01308/USCOURTS-caDC-94-01308-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael P. Cronin
Petitioner
Federal Aviation Administration
Respondent

Document Text:

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 12, 1995 Decided January 16, 1996

No. 94-1308

MICHAEL P. CRONIN,

PETITIONER

v.

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,

RESPONDENT

Consolidated with

95-1054

On Petitions for Review of Orders of the

Federal Aviation Administration and the United States

Department of Transportation

Martha L. Walfoort argued the cause for petitioner Michael P. Cronin, with whom Edgar N. James

was on the brief.

Suzanne L. Kalfus argued the cause for petitioners and intervenors, with whom Jerry Anker, Arthur

M. Luby, Edward J. Gilmartin, Edgar N. James, Martha L. Walfoort, Joseph Guerrieri, Jr. and

Debra L. Willen were on the briefs. Judith A. Scott, Mark D. Schneider, Susan L. Catler, Gary

Green and Marcus C. Migliore entered appearances.

Christine N. Kohl, Attorney, United States Department ofJustice, argued the cause for respondents,

with whom Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, Leonard Schaitman, Attorney, Paul M.

Geier, Assistant GeneralCounsel, United States Department of Transportation, and Peter J. Plocki,

Attorney, were on the brief.

Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, BUCKLEY and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge EDWARDS.

EDWARDS, Chief Judge: Pursuant to the directives of the Omnibus Transportation Employee

Testing Act of 1991, 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 45101-45106 (1995) ("Act" or "Testing Act"), the Department

of Transportation ("DOT") and the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") issued regulations

USCA Case #94-1308 Document #172796 Filed: 01/16/1996 Page 1 of 12
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

establishing procedures under which air carriers are to test employees who perform safety-sensitive

functions for alcohol and drug misuse. The regulations provide that an employee who is found to

have committed certain alcohol- or drug-related misconduct is permanently barred from performing

the same duties that he or she performed before such misconduct. Moreover, the permanent bar

prevents the employee from performing such duties for any employer. In this consolidated case,

petitioners Michael P. Cronin (an airline pilot) and Air Line Pilots Association ("ALPA") (a labor

organization representing a great many of the pilots who are covered by the regulations), as well as

several other labor union intervenors, challenge the alcohol testing regulations. Their principal claim

isthat the regulations violate procedural due process because they do not provide a requisite hearing

for persons who may be subject to the permanent employment bar.

Although petitioners have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the alcohol testing

regulations, we find that their claim is not yet ripe for review by this court. Significant institutional

interests favor postponement of such review. For one thing, adjudication may well prove

unnecessary, for it is far from clear what procedural protections will be offered to persons facing

sanctions under the regulations. Furthermore, in the event that an air carrier employee faces adverse

action and is allegedly denied the requisite procedural due process, such a claim is best considered

in the context of a specific factual setting. There are so many possible scenarios that might arise

under the regulations that we cannot possibly guess at the precise nature of a claimed denial of

procedural due process until one actually arises.

It is eminently clear, as the Government conceded at oral argument, that procedural due

process protections must be afforded to any employee subjected to the permanent employment bar

mandated by the regulations. However, sufficient procedural due process likely will be provided by

several procedural systems already in place to address claims from employees who suffer adverse

actions under the new regulations. Also, given the gravity of the permanent employment bar, and in

light of the Government's concession that procedural due process protections are constitutionally

required, there is good reason to think that additionalproceduralsafeguards will be adopted to ensure

that due process is available to all affected persons. In any event, given the fact-specific nature of

USCA Case #94-1308 Document #172796 Filed: 01/16/1996 Page 2 of 12
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

procedural due process inquiries, we think it unadvisable to consider the issue at this time in the

context of a broad facial challenge to the regulations. We will leave the resolution of such challenges

to case-by-case dispositions in concrete enforcement actions.

Moreover, postponing review will not subject petitioners to any countervailing hardship.

Petitioners do not allege that any employee presently faces a real threat of being subjected to adverse

action under the regulations, and the Government concedes that any employee who alleges a

deprivation of procedural due process with respect to enforcement ofthe regulations can seek judicial

redress at the time of such deprivation. For these reasons, and because we find petitioners' other

claims to be without merit, we deny the petitions for review.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Challenged Regulations

In light of its finding that "increased testing" is "the most effective deterrent to abuse of

alcohol and use of illegal drugs" in the transportation industries, Congress passed the Omnibus

Transportation Employee Testing Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-143, title V, §§ 2(5) & 3(a), 105

Stat. 917, 952-53 (1991), which directed the FAA to prescribe regulations "that establish a program

requiring air carriers... to conduct preemployment, reasonable suspicion, random, and post-accident

testing of airmen, crewmembers, airport security screening contract personnel, and other air carrier

employeesresponsible for safety-sensitive functions(as decided by the [FAA] Administrator) for the

use of alcohol or a controlled substance in violation of law or [federal] regulation." 49 U.S.C.A. §

45102(a)(1) (1995). The Testing Act additionally provides that any person serving in a

safety-sensitive aviation position who either uses alcohol or a controlled substance while on duty, or

otherwise violatesthe alcohol and controlled substance regulations a second time, "may not carry out

the duties related to air transportation that the individual carried out before" such violation. Id. §

45103(c).

On December 15, 1992, DOT and its component agencies(including the FAA) published for

notice and comment proposed rules on alcohol testing. 57 Fed. Reg. 59,409 (1992); 57 Fed. Reg.

59,458 (1992). On February 15, 1994, DOT published final procedures for alcohol testing in various

USCA Case #94-1308 Document #172796 Filed: 01/16/1996 Page 3 of 12
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

regulated industries, including aviation. 59 Fed. Reg. 7340 (1994) (codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 40).

On the same day, the FAA issued its own industry-specific alcohol misuse regulations, which took

effect on January 1, 1995. 14 C.F.R. §§ 121.458, 121.459 & pt. 121, App. J (1995).

Asrequired by the Testing Act, an employee who uses alcohol on duty, or otherwise violates

the regulations a second time, is permanently prohibited from performing the safety-sensitive duties

he performed before such violation. 14 C.F.R. pt. 121, App. J, § V(B) (1995). The regulations do

not provide for a hearing, appeal, or other processin which an employee can challenge the test results

or the imposition of the permanent prohibition on performing safety-sensitive duties. In fact, DOT

consciously omitted hearing provisions,stating in the preamble to the final alcohol testing regulations

that "[t]he rules we have published today do not provide for a right to a hearing." 59 Fed. Reg. 7302,

7328 (1994).

The regulations also fulfill the edict of the Testing Act by directing employers to conduct,

inter alia, reasonable suspicion, random, and post-accident testing of "covered employees" specified

by the FAA as performing safety-sensitive functions. 14 C.F.R. pt. 121, App. J, §§ II & III (1995).

Employers are required to use "evidential breath testing devices" for both screening and confirmatory

alcohol testing; the regulations provide that a test is invalid if the employer does not follow the

prescribed testing procedures. 49 C.F.R. §§ 40.53 & 40.79 (1994). An employer's reasonable

suspicion determination "shall be based on specific, contemporaneous, articulable observations

concerning the appearance, behavior, speech or body odors of the employee." 14 C.F.R. pt. 121,

App. J, § III(D)(2) (1995). The regulations regarding random testing set the initial minimum annual

percentage rate at 25%, and provide for adjustment of the testing rate according to the current

violation rate for the entire industry. Id. § III(C)(1)-(4).

B. Review Sought by Petitioners Cronin and ALPA

Although he did not comment on the proposed regulations, Michael P. Cronin, a pilot

employed by American Airlines, Inc., petitioned this court for review of the FAA alcohol testing

regulations onApril11, 1994. Cronin challenges the FAA regulations on several grounds. He argues

that the permanent employment bar established by the regulationsissubject to the notice and hearing

USCA Case #94-1308 Document #172796 Filed: 01/16/1996 Page 4 of 12
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

1Although ALPA's "Petition to Modify Regulations" challenged not only the alcohol testing

regulations, but also other, drug testing regulations that were promulgated by the FAA pursuant

to the Testing Act, the brief submitted by ALPA addresses only the alcohol testing procedures. 

See Joint Brief for the Petitioners and Intervenors ("Joint Brief") at 2-3 (The joint Statement of

Issues Presented for Review mentions only the alcohol testing regulations.). Thus, we do not

address the drug testing regulations in this opinion. 

requirements guaranteed by the Due Process Clause ofthe FifthAmendment. Cronin also argues that

the reasonable suspicion testing procedures established in the FAA regulations violate the Fourth

Amendment's ban on unreasonable searches, and constitute a delegation of coercive sovereign

authority that violatesthe Fifth Amendment's due process guarantee. Finally, Cronin asserts that the

FAA's selection of employees to be covered by the alcohol testing regulations, and the FAA's

industry-wide method of adjusting the annual random testing rate, are arbitrary and capricious.

ALPA, a labor organization representing some 42,000 pilots subject to the DOT and FAA

regulations, did comment on the proposed regulations, but did not seek judicialreview of the alcohol

misuse regulations issued on February 15, 1994. On October 27, 1994, however, ALPA filed a

"Petition to Modify Regulations" with DOT and the FAA, arguing that the regulations did not

establish sufficient procedural protections to accord with due process and should be modified, inter

alia, to provide some form of hearing for employees subject to permanent employment

disqualifications. ALPA further contended that such a hearing procedure was required by the Testing

Act itself, the Federal Aviation Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA").

By letter dated December 30, 1994, DOT and the FAA denied ALPA's petition, concluding

that the issues raised therein had been addressed in the rulemaking. On January 23, 1995, ALPA

petitioned this court for review ofthe agencies'December 30 decision. Additional labor organizations

representing various classes of airline employees have intervened in support of ALPA's petition,

which this court consolidated with Cronin's.1

II. ANALYSIS

A. Petitioners' Procedural Due Process Claims Are Not Ripe for Review

As an initialmatter, we note that petitioners have standing to presstheir claimthat the alcohol

testing regulations at issue do not afford procedural due process in accordance with the Fifth

USCA Case #94-1308 Document #172796 Filed: 01/16/1996 Page 5 of 12
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

2

In Pennell, the Court found that an association of landlords had standing to bring a facial

challenge to a city ordinance empowering a hearing officer to limit the amount of a landlord's rent

increase. The Court stated that "[t]he likelihood of enforcement, with the concomitant probability

that a landlord's rent will be reduced below what he or she would otherwise be able to obtain in

the absence of the Ordinance, is a sufficient threat of actual injury to satisfy Art. III's requirement

that "[a] plaintiff who challenges a statute must demonstrate a realistic danger of sustaining a

direct injury as a result of the statute's operation or enforcement.' " 485 U.S. at 8 (quoting

Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979)). 

3Apart from ripeness, we also note that there is a serious question whether ALPA's procedural

due process claim is precluded as a result of ALPA's failure to file for judicial review in a timely

manner. A petition for review of an order issued by DOT or the FAA "must be filed not later than

60 days after the order is issued." 49 U.S.C.A. § 46110(a) (1995). ALPA did not petition this

court for review within 60 days of February 15, 1994, when DOT and the FAA issued the alcohol

testing regulations at issue; rather, ALPA filed a "Petition to Modify Regulations" with the

agencies on October 27, 1994, and then petitioned this court for review within 60 days of the

agencies' December 30 denial of ALPA's petition.

We doubt that ALPA can escape the 60-day filing deadline that began running on

February 15, as it seeks to do, merely by relying on NLRB Union v. FLRA, 834 F.2d 191 (D.C.

Cir. 1987). In that case, we observed that, in some circumstances, a viable "method of obtaining

judicial review of agency regulations once the limitations period has run is to petition the agency

for amendment or rescission of the regulations and then to appeal the agency's decision." Id. at

Amendment. Cronin is a member of the regulated class, and ALPA may assert representational

standing to protect the rights of its members who fall within the regulated class. See National

Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1428, 1435 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Under Pennell v. City

of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988), the likelihood that the alcohol testing regulations will be enforced

against ALPA members providessufficient threat of injury to confer on ALPA standing to challenge

the constitutionality of the regulations.2 Likewise, we have held that an individual who belongs to

a specific class made subject to a challenged testing regulation has standing to attack the regulation

without offering evidence that he or she is particularly likely to be tested. See Amalgamated Transit

Union v. Skinner, 894 F.2d 1362, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Transit workers had "sufficiently personal

stake in the outcome of [a challenge to drug testing regulations] to satisfy Article III standing

requirements" where the workers were subject to drug testing under certain circumstances.); see also

Committee for GI Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466, 472 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (The court found standing

upon concluding that plaintiffmembers ofthe armed forces "are subject to all aspects ofthe on-going

[drug monitoring and rehabilitation] program which allegedly violates their constitutional rights.").

Nevertheless, we find that petitioners' procedural due process claims are not ripe for review.3

USCA Case #94-1308 Document #172796 Filed: 01/16/1996 Page 6 of 12
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

196. However, it is far from clear that, in the present situation, ALPA's petition to modify the

alcohol testing regulations brings this case within the reasoning of NLRB Union. For example,

although this court permitted the NLRB Union to appeal the FLRA's response to the union's

untimely petition for amendment, the opinion in NLRB Union took pains to note that such an

appeal was "the only remaining path to judicial consideration of the substantive validity of the

FLRA's regulations." Id. at 197 (emphasis added). The same situation does not exist here, for

ALPA and/or affected employees may challenge the legality of the regulations in an enforcement

action.

However, given that petitioner Cronin timely filed for review and raised essentially the

same procedural due process claim that ALPA asserts regarding the alcohol testing regulations,

see Petitioner Cronin's Amended Statement of Issues ¶ 6, we need not linger on the statutory

preclusion issue regarding ALPA's assertion of the same claim. 

In the context ofjudicialreview of agencyaction, the ripeness doctrine largely represents a prudential

attempt to balance the interests ofthe court and the agency in delaying review against "the petitioner's

interest in prompt consideration of allegedly unlawful agency action." Eagle-Picher Indus. v. EPA,

759 F.2d 905, 915 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Dole, 802 F.2d 474,

480 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("[I]f the interests of the court and agency in postponing review outweigh the

interests of those seeking relief, settled principles of ripeness squarely call for adjudication to be

postponed."), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 951 (1987). The Supreme Court established the framework for

reaching this balance in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967), where the Court

set forth a two-pronged test that requires a reviewing court "to evaluate both the fitness of the issues

for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration."

Under the "fitness of the issues" prong,

the first question for a reviewing court is "whether the disputed claims raise purely

legal questions and would, therefore, be presumptively suitable for judicial review."

Better Gov't, 780 F.2d at 92; see also Payne, 837 F.2d at 492; Eagle-Picher, 759

F.2d at 915. Next, we consider whether the court or the agency would benefit from

postponing review until the policy in question hassufficiently "crystallized" by taking

on a more definite form. Better Gov't, 780 F.2d at 92.

City of Houston v. HUD, 24 F.3d 1421, 1431 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The "court's interests in avoiding

unnecessary adjudication and in deciding issuesin a concrete setting,"Eagle-Picher, 759 F.2d at 915,

militate in favor of postponing review if, for example, the court finds "that resolution of the dispute

is likely to prove unnecessary," or "that the court's deliberations might benefit from letting the

question arise in some more concrete ... form," State Farm, 802 F.2d at 479 (internal quotation

USCA Case #94-1308 Document #172796 Filed: 01/16/1996 Page 7 of 12
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

4As discussed at oral argument, prior to the alcohol testing regulations challenged here, an air

carrier employee found by his or her employer to have engaged in alcohol-related misconduct

could have been considered for re-employment by the same carrier or another once the employee

had successfully completed a rehabilitation program. 

omitted).

Here, we find that these considerations weigh against immediate review of petitioners'

procedural due process claims. First, it is uncertain whether any employees will in fact be subjected

to the permanent employment bar without the benefit of procedural due process. There is no doubt,

and the Government concedes, that procedural due process protections must be afforded to any

employee subject to alcohol testing under the regulations who is deemed to have violated the

regulations in a manner that subjects the employee (or brings the employee substantially closer to

being subject) to the permanent employment bar mandated by the regulations. One reason for the

Government's concession on this issue is the gravity of the consequence of the employment

disqualification sanction: the employee is barred from performing the same duties for any employer,

a much harsher result than was likely prior to adoption of the regulations at issue in this case.4

Nevertheless, there are already several procedural systems in place to address the claims of

employees who suffer adverse actions under the new regulations. For instance, many employees

subject to the permanent employment prohibition also will be subject to FAA certificate revocation

hearings in which the employee may challenge the evidence offered to support the employer's

determination that the employee engaged in alcohol-related misconduct. Further, an employee can

file a complaint with the FAA if the specific testing procedures used violate the FAA's regulations.

As the Government observes in its brief, not only would the FAA be obligated to investigate such a

complaint (provided there is a reasonable ground for an investigation), but if the investigation reveals

a violation, the agency would also be obligated to provide notice and a hearing before issuing an

order to compel compliance with the regulations. See 49 U.S.C.A. § 46101(a)(1), (4) (1995).

Ultimately, one or more of these procedures may provide procedural due process for employees

facing adverse actions under the regulations.

In addition, given the gravity of the sanction and the Government's recognition of the need

USCA Case #94-1308 Document #172796 Filed: 01/16/1996 Page 8 of 12
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

5We need not address the agency's potential interests in delaying review, because, as discussed

infra, we find that there is no countervailing hardship to petitioners to offset the court's interests

in delay. See National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs, 851 F.2d at 1429 ("With this court's

interest in postponing review on one side of the Abbott Laboratories balance, and no

countervailing hardship to the petitioners on the other side, the [agency's] assertion that its own

interests further tip the balance in favor of delay is of no moment."). 

for procedural protections, it is certainly likely that additional fora and procedures will be adopted

to fill any voids that presently exist in procedural due process protections for affected persons.

Should such protections not be forthcoming, however, the courtsstand ready to redress meritorious

claims involving concrete actions. It makes no sense for us to anticipate a wrong when none may

ever arise. "The interests of the court therefore favor postponing review until it is clear that judicial

intervention is required, and will be consequential." National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v.

United States Dep't of Energy, 851 F.2d 1424, 1429 (D.C. Cir. 1988).

The Government has acknowledged that any employee who is in fact deprived of procedural

due process with respect to enforcement of the regulations can seek redress in court at the time of

such deprivation, and is free to challenge the agency's regulations in the context of the specific

enforcement action. At that point, a court would be faced with a concrete factual setting within

which to evaluate the due processrequirements. Given the variable nature of procedural due process,

and given the variety of procedural schemes already in place (or likely to be adopted), we think it

unadvisable to consider petitioners' facial challenge to the regulations, rather than allowing the

contours of due processto be fleshed out on a case-by-case basisin any enforcement actionsthat may

arise.

Finally, having found that the court'sinterestsfavor deferring reviewofpetitioners'procedural

due process claims,5 we move on to the "hardship" prong of the Abbott Laboratories test, under

which we must consider petitioners' countervailing interests in immediate review. See 387 U.S. at

149. "It is well settled that for an institutional interest in deferral to be outweighed, postponing

review must impose a hardship on the complaining party that is immediate, direct, and significant."

State Farm, 802 F.2d at 479-80. We find that petitioners can make out no such hardship. The

primary injury alleged by petitioners is not a present hardship resulting from the regulations

USCA Case #94-1308 Document #172796 Filed: 01/16/1996 Page 9 of 12
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

6We find no merit in petitioners' arguments that the failure of the FAA's regulations to provide

for hearings prior to imposition of the permanent employment bar violates statutory, as opposed

to constitutional, requirements. 

7The statute provides that a reviewing "court may consider an objection to an order of the

[DOT] Secretary or [the FAA] Administrator only if the objection was made in the proceeding

conducted by the Secretary or Administrator or if there was a reasonable ground for not making

themselves, but rather a future injury that may result from enforcement of the regulations in

circumstances where procedural due process is not satisfied. See National Ass'n of Regulatory Util.

Comm'rs, 851 F.2d at 1429 (The court found that no countervailing hardship would result from

postponing review of an agency "Notice" establishing a method for allocating costs, where "[a]ny

injury [petitioners] allege is a hypothetical future injury owing to the [agency's] expected use of the

methodology in [a future] Report, not a present hardship resulting from the Notice itself.").

Moreover, as stated above, any employee subjected to the permanent bar without adequate

process could file suit to challenge both the imposition of the bar and the constitutionality of the

regulations. Thus, this is not a case where "the fact that a claim may not be reviewable in the future

is a factor to be weighed in the "hardship' prong of the ripeness test." City of Houston, 24 F.3d at

1432 n.10. Here, as in City of Houston, " "[t]he only hardship [petitioners] will endure as a result of

delaying consideration of thisissue isthe burden of having to file another suit.' " Id. at 1432 (quoting

Webb v. Department of Health &Human Servs., 696 F.2d 101, 107 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). We therefore

similarly conclude, as a prudential matter, that petitioners' procedural due process claims are

premature at this time.6

B. Petitioner Cronin's Separate Constitutional Claims Are Precluded

Petitioner Cronin claims that the reasonable suspicion testing called for under the FAA's

regulations violates the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, because such testing constitutes a Fourth

Amendment search that must be supported by probable cause, and because the reasonable suspicion

testing regulations delegate coercive sovereign authority to private employers without sufficiently

circumscribing the employers' discretionary exercise of that authority. However, judicial review of

these claimsis precluded under 49 U.S.C.A. § 46110(d) (1995), becauseCronin failed to demonstrate

in his briefing before this court that these objections were raised during the rulemaking.7

USCA Case #94-1308 Document #172796 Filed: 01/16/1996 Page 10 of 12
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

the objection in the proceeding." 49 U.S.C.A. § 46110(d) (emphasis added). 

After oral argument in this case, Cronin requested leave to supplement the parties' Appendix

with excerpts from the comments submitted to the FAA during its rulemaking. Cronin asserts that

the cited comments did indeed raise both the Fourth Amendment issues and the delegation concerns

before the agency. However, Cronin did not produce or cite to this documentation at a time when

the Government could have considered and responded to it during briefing or at oral argument;

instead, in his reply brief, Cronin relied largely on DOT's discussion of Fourth Amendment issues in

the regulations' preamble, which we find insufficient to satisfy the specific requirements of section

46110(d). Cronin's present attempt to alter the basis of his argument by citing to newly-discovered

comments comes too late, especially given that some of the comments Cronin now cites are nothing

more than vague incantations of the phrase "probable cause," which the Government could well have

argued (had it been given the opportunity) do not establish that Cronin's specific objections were

sufficiently raised before the agency. It is well established that this court will not entertain arguments

raised for the first time in a party's reply brief. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.

v. EPA, 25 F.3d 1063, 1071 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("[B]ecause petitioners waited until the reply brief

to raise [a new argument], the [agency] was given no chance to respond, either by discounting the

evidence cited by petitioners or pointing the court to record evidence supporting the [agency's]

conclusion."); Herbert v. National Academy of Sciences, 974 F.2d 192, 196 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ("To

consider an argument discussed for the first time in reply would be manifestly unfair to the appellee

who, under our rules, has no opportunity for a written response."). In light of this rule, we are

disinclined in thissituation to entertain arguments based on evidence cited byCronin for the first time,

not in his reply brief, but after oral argument.

In any event, even if we were to accept Cronin's belated filing and were to find that the cited

comments satisfy the requirements of section 46110(d), the variable nature of probable cause, like

the variable nature of procedural due process, would counsel against finding Cronin's claimsripe for

review. The Government properly acknowledged at oral argument that these constitutional issues

may be raised in actions contesting enforcement of the regulations, should any hereafter arise. Such

USCA Case #94-1308 Document #172796 Filed: 01/16/1996 Page 11 of 12
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

8Cronin's APA-based claims, regarding the FAA's selection of categories of employees to be

covered by the alcohol testing regulations and the method of adjusting the random testing rate,

are so obviously lacking in merit that no discussion of these issues is necessary. 

enforcement actions would provide a more appropriate forum in which to resolve any Fourth and

Fifth Amendment issues regarding the reasonable suspicion testing, and we decline to reach those

issues here.8

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the petitions for review are denied.

So ordered.

USCA Case #94-1308 Document #172796 Filed: 01/16/1996 Page 12 of 12