Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06096/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06096-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Donald Eugene Ryans
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

P U B L I S H 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

. PlLtiD. 

Urnted Sp1tc!I Co~rt of Appeals tenth C1!"cuit 

ft:iY 8 1990 

ROBERT 1... HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 89-6096 

DONALD EUGENE RYANS d/b/a 

RYANS MOVING & STORAGE and 

WESTSIDE MOVERS, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. CR-89-12-W) 

David Seidman, Attorney, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 

(Charles F. Rule, Assistant Attorney General, Judy L. Whalley, 

Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and John J. Powers, III, 

Attorney, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; Alan A. Pason, 

Katherine A. Schlech, Dana M. Campbell and David B. Shapiro, 

Attorneys, Department of Justice, Dallas, Texas, were also on the 

brief) for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

William J. Skepnek, Hall, Estill, Hardwick, Gable, Golden & 

Nelson, P.C., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma (Kindanne C. Jones, Hall, 

Estill, Hardwick, Gable, Golden & Nelson, P.C., Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma and C. Kevin Morrison, Tulsa, Oklahoma, were also on the 

brief) for Defendant-Appellee 

Ellen Yankever Suni, Univeristy of Missouri at Kansas City School - of Law, · Kansas City, Missouri, for Arnicus Curiae National 

Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Inc. 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, LOGAN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges 

HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge 

Appellate Case: 89-6096 Document: 010110285108 Date Filed: 05/08/1990 Page: 1
,Qe government appeals from a pretrial order of the district 

granting the defendant-appellee's motion to suppress 

evidence as to two tape recordings in this criminal proceeding. 

This court has jurisdiction of the appeal pursuant to 18 u.s.c. 

§ 3731. 

I 

A. 

Defendant-appellee Donald Eugene Ryans ("Ryans") was charged 

with conspiring, together with unnamed co-conspirators, to 

restrain and suppress competition in the provision of moving 

services from Fort Sill, Oklahoma, in unreasonable restraint of 

interstate trade and commerce, in violation of Section 1 of the 

Sherman Act. Ryans moved to suppress three tape recordings of 

conversations between himself and Mr. Hughen, an immunized 

government informant, on the ground, inter alia, that the 

conversations were recorded in violation of Disciplinary Rule 7-

104(A)(l) of the Code of Professional Responsibility [hereinafter 

DR 7-104(A)(l), the "disciplinary rule", or the "rule"]. 

Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court suppressed 

two of the tapes on the ground that the disciplinary rule had been 

violated. This appeal followed and this court stayed the trial 

pending the appeal. 1 We conclude that the district court erred in 

its application of the disciplinary rule in the circumstances of 

this case and improperly suppressed the recordings, and reverse. 

1 

Ryans does not challenge the district court's denial 

motion with respect to the one tape not suppressed. 

therefore concerned only with the second and third 

recordings. 

2 

of his 

We are 

tape 

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In 1985 the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice 

began a nationwide investigation of national moving carriers and 

agents who were engaged in the transport of household goods for 

military personnel. In March or April of 1986, attorneys in the 

Antitrust Division's Dallas, Texas, office instructed Special 

Agent Granville Long of the F.B.I. in Lawton, Oklahoma, to begin 

an investigation of movers at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Shortly 

thereafter one of the suspected conspirators, Kenneth Hughen, then 

president of the local movers' association, agreed to cooperate 

with the government in exchange for immunity from prosecution. 

(Long Tr. at 19; Hughen Tr. at 68-70.) 

Hughen agreed to record telephone conversations with numerous 

investigation ''targets," including Ryans. (Long Tr. at 21.) 

Government prosecutors instructed Hughen to call members of the 

movers' association and engage in conversation concerning the 

alleged agreements and rate setting practices, and to record his 

conversations. (Hughen Tr. at 82-83.) .The prosecutors acted 

primarily through Agent Long, although the record shows that on at 

least one occasion the government attorneys met directly with 

Hughen. (Hughen Tr. at 68-70.) Although Hughen had already 

agreed to cooperate with the government, the prosecutors issued a 

grand jury subpoena to Hughen, much like those issued to each of 

the investigation targets, to conceal his newfound loyalty. This 

stage of the investigation lasted approximately three months, 

during which time Hughen recorded some conversations. Three of 

these were telephone conversations with Ryans. 

The first telephone call to Ryans occurred on May 19, 1986, 

five days after Ryans had been served with a federal grand jury 

3 

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Jpoena duces tecum. A transcript of the conversation reveals 

that the two men discussed, among other things, the problems 

associated with complying with the subpoenas and the need for 

legal representation. 2 Hughen delivered the tape of the May 19 

interview to Agent Long on May 29, 1986. (Long Tr. at 31/ Hughen 

Tr. at 99.) 

2 

The following dialogue occurred: 

Mr. Hughen: 

Mr. Ryans: 

Mr. Hughen: 

Mr. Ryans: 

Have you talked to any attorney or anything 

like that? Do you plan--

I'm going--I'm going down tomorrow and go over 

that with old J. Roy [Cocke] and see what--

See what he has to say about it? 

--see what he thinks. 

Transcript of Conversation ("Tr. Conv."), May 19, 1986, p. 12, 

lines 2-7. 

* * * * 

Mr. Ryans: 

Mr. Hughen: 

Well, I don't know. I'm going to--I'm going 

down tomorrow and be advised. 

Yeah. I think you should. 

Id. at p. 16, lines 15-17. 

* * * * 

Mr. Ryans: 

Mr. Hughen: 

Mr. Ryans: 

I'll just lay the cards out on the table and 

let him know, all that I know and all that's 

going on and then let him advise on it. 

Yeah. Let him tell you, but--but you ought to 

tell him exactly what did happen and all that 

so--so he will know how to advise you. 

Yeah, I'm going to tell him exactly. 

Id. at p. 16, line 20 top. 17, line l; see also id. at p. 19, 

line 18 top. 20, line 3. 

* * * * 

Mr. Hughen: You might touch base with me after you talk to 

your lawyer and see what--let's kind of 

compare notes and see if our lawyers are all 

kind of going in the same direction and see if 

they're telling us about the same thing. 

Id. at p. 21, lines 5-8. 

4 

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The second tape recording was made on June 5, 1986. (Hughen 

Tr. at 100-101.) A transcript of this conversation also reveals 

that Ryans' legal representation was discussed. Ryans stated that 

he had met with and had obtained advice from his lawyer concerning 

the subject of the investigation. Indeed, in response to some 

prompting by Hughen, Ryans disclosed the substance of that advice. 

See Tr. Conv. at 26:8-29:18; 33:22 - 34:13. The June 5 tape was 

delivered to agent Long on June 12, 1986. (Hughen Tr. at 108.) 

The third taped conversation between Hughen and the defendant 

occurred on June 18, 1986, six days after Long received the second 

tape and one day after Ryans deliverd documents to Agent Long in 

compliance with the grand jury subpoena. (Long Tr. at 47-48.) A 

transcript of this conversation reveals that defendant Ryans 

reported to Mr. Hughen about his meeting with Agent Long the 

previous day and again discussed advice that he had received from 

counsel. Tr. Conv. at 42:18-21; 55:13-18; 61:24 - 63:4; 64:6-22. 

Mr. Hughen's inquiries into the substance of Ryans' attorneyclient communications were, according to agent Long, contrary to 

the instructions that he had given to Hughen sometime during the 

investigation. 3 (Long Tr. at 40-42.) Agent Long testified that 

sometime in May 1986 he advised one or more of the government 

prosecutors of his concerns regarding Mr. Hughen's performance as 

an informant. Id. The district court found that the government 

attorneys were aware that the recordings were being made and were 

informed of their contents. Order at 5. 

3 

The district court doubted that 

given. "The more credible evidence 

admonishments, if any were in fact 

Order at 3. 

5 

any such instructions were 

supports a finding that these 

given, were insufficient." 

Appellate Case: 89-6096 Document: 010110285108 Date Filed: 05/08/1990 Page: 5
B. 

Ryans was charged on January 19, 1989, in a one-count 

indictment with alleged price-fixing in violation of the Sherman 

Act, 15 u.s.c. § 1. Prior to trial Ryans moved to suppress 

introduction of the tapes on the ground that the conversations 

were recorded in violation of DR 7-104(A)(l). The district court 

denied the motion to suppress as to the first of the recordings, 

but granted Ryans' motion as to the second and third recordings. 

The court found that "[a]t the time these [second and third] 

tapes were made, it was clear that defendant Ryans had retained 

counsel regarding the investigation for which the recordings were 

made", id. at 9, and that the government prosecutors knew, either 

directly or indirectly through Agent Long, that Ryans was 

represented by counsel. Id. The court further found that Mr. 

Hughen was acting under the direct control and supervision of 

Agent Long and that he "participated actively in the conversations 

and deliberately elicited information from the defendant in the 

absence of counsel regarding the alleged conspiracy and 

communications between the defendant and his counsel . . " 

Order at 8. The court concluded that the government attorneys 

investigating the case had breached their ethical obligations 

under the disciplinary rule. 

The court then considered the available remedies, ranging 

from simple admonishment of the attorneys involved to dismissal of 

the indictment. The court thought that United States v. Thomas, 

474 F.2d 110 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1973), might 

be controlling and accordingly imposed the intermediate remedy of 

suppression. (Order at 9.) The government appeals. 

6 

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II 

The issue presented on appeal is whether the government's use 

of an informant to initiate and record conversations with a 

suspect prior to indictment, but after the suspect has retained 

counsel in connection with the subject matter of the criminal 

investigation, violates Disciplinary Rule 7-104(A)(l) of the Code 

of Professional Responsibility. 4 DR 7-104(A}(l) provides that 

During the course of his representation of a 

client a lawyer shall not: 

(1) Communicate or cause another to 

communicate on the subject of the representation 

with a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer 

in that matter unless he has the prior consent of 

the lawyer representing such other party or is 

authorized by law to do so. 

Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-104 (a)(l). 

Ryans contends, and the district court held, that the second 

and third tape recordings were made in violation of DR 7-104(A)(l) 

because at the time those tapes were made, Ryans was represented by 

counsel within the meaning of the rule, and that the government 

either directly or indirectly knew that Ryans was represented by 

counsel. Since Hughen was acting on behalf of the United States 

Attorney's office, all of his communications with Ryans were in 

violation of the rule and therefore should not be admitted in 

evidence. The government argues that Ryans was not represented by 

4 

The Code is not controlling in the federal courts, but it may 

be enforced pursuant to the courts' inherent supervisory power 

over the attorneys practicing before them. In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 

634, 645 n.6 (1985). The Western District of Oklahoma, through 

Local Rule 4(J)(4)(b), has incorporated those rules of 

professional responsibility adopted by the Oklahoma Supreme Court. 

Although the Oklahoma Court has since adopted the ABA Model Rules 

of Professional Conduct to govern attorneys' conduct in Oklahoma 

(effective July 1, 1988), at the time of the recordings at issue 

the Code of Professional Responsibility was in effect in Oklahoma. 

7 

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counsel within the meaning of the rule, and that in any case the 

disciplinary rule is not intended to prohibit investigative contact 

with a person--even if represented by counsel--prior to the 

accusatory phase of the criminal process. By analogy to the Sixth 

Amendment, the government argues that the rule should not attach 

until adversary proceedings have commenced. 

With the exception of the district court's finding that Ryans 

did not waive the attorney-client privilege, see note 13 infra, we 

accept the factual findings made below. With that exception, we 

believe the subsidiary historical factual findings of the court are 

supported by the record and therefore are not clearly erroneous. 5 

As our analysis shows, we disagree with the legal conclusion of the 

district court that the disciplinary rule applies before the 

commencement of adversarial proceedings. 

We first consider whether Ryans was entitled to the 

protection of DR 7-104(A)(l) when the recordings were made in May 

and June of 1986, that is approximately two and one-half years prior 

to his indictment by the grand jury in January of 1989. The parties 

do not dispute the applicability of DR 7-104(A)(l) to criminal 

cases, to public prosecutors, or to their agents, when they act as 

the "alter ego" of prosecuting attorneys. Cf. United States v. 

5 

The government vigorously disputes the district court's 

findings that "Ryans had retained courisel regarding the 

investigation for which the recordings were made," and that the 

prosecuting attorneys knew, either directly or indirectly, that 

Ryans was represented by counsel by the time the second and third 

tape recordings were made. See Order at p. 9. Although the 

record evidence is not overwhelming, we believe it amply supports 

the district court's conclusions. In any case, our decision on 

the applicability of the disciplinary rule to the facts of this 

case renders a closer evaluation of the government's position on 

this point unnecessary. 

8 

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Massiah, 307 F.2d 62, 66 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 377 

U.S. 201 (1964). It is now well settled that DR 7-104(A)(l) applies 

to criminal prosecutions as well as to civil litigation. United 

States v. Thomas, 474 F.2d 110 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 

932 (1973); see also United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 837-38 

(2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Jamil, 707 F.2d 638, 645 (2d Cir. 

1983) ("DR 7-104(A)(l) may be found to apply in criminal cases • 

to government attorneys [and] to non-attorney government law 

enforcement officers when they act as the alter ego of government 

prosecutors."); ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of 

Criminal Justice, Standard 3-4.1 (commentary). 

The applicability of DR 7-104(A)(l) to the investigative 

stage of a criminal prosecution presents a more difficult question. 

The federal courts of appeal that have considered this question are 

not in agreement. A number of courts have held that DR 7-104(A)(l) 

does not apply to situations like the one before us. See United 

States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1986); United 

States v. Fitterer, 710 F.2d 1328, 1333 (8th Cir.), (pre-indictment 

use of informant to gather information against represented suspect 

did not violate the rule), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 852 (1983); United 

States v. Kenny, 645 F.2d 1323, 1339 (9th Cir.) ("the government's 

use of such investigative techniques at this stage of a criminal 

matter does not implicate the sorts of ethical problems addressed by 

the Code."), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 920 (1981); United States v. 

Lemonakis, 485 F.2d 941, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (disciplinary rule not 

applicable prior to indictment and, in any case, use of an informant 

to initiate and record conversations with the defendant prior to his 

9 

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arrest or indictment did not violate the rule), cert. denied, 415 

U.S. 989 (1974). 

Three circuits, including this one, have held that the rule 

either does or may apply to a custodial, pre-indictment interview of 

a defendant in the absence of and without the consent of retained 

counsel. See United States v. Thomas, 474 F.2d 110, 112 (10th Cir.) 

(custodial, post-arrest interview), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932 

(1973); see also United States v. Killian, 639 F.2d 206, 210 (5th 

Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1021. (1981); United States v. 

Durham, 475 F.2d 208, 211 (7th Cir. 1973) (custodial, pre-indictment 

interview of a defendant in the absence of retained counsel 

"raise[s] ethical questions" under DR 7-104(A)(l)). Here we clearly 

are not concerned with a custodial interview. 

Only the Second Circuit has purported to apply the rule in a 

non-custodial, pre-indictment setting. See United States v. Hammad, 

858 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1988). 6 However, the Hammad court did not 

enforce the rule there because, the court said, "the government 

should not have its case prejudiced by suppression of its evidence 

when the law was previously unsettled in this area." 

842. 7 

858 F:.2d at 

6 

Prior to the Second Circuit's decision in Hammad, that court 

considered the applicability of DR 7-104(A)(l) to criminal 

investigations "doubtful," see United States v. Vasquez, 675 F.2d 

16, 17 (2d Cir. 1982), but the question remained open until 

Hammad. See,~, United States v. Jamil, 707 F.2d 638, 646 (2d 

Cir. 1983). 

7 

In United States v. Schwimmer, 882 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1989), 

the Second Circuit held that DR 7-104(A)(l) does not preclude a 

prosecutor from questioning a convicted defendant known to be 

represented by counsel before a grand jury. The court 

distinguished Hammad and held that the appearance and questioning 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

10 

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In United States v. Thomas, this court addressed the 

applicability of the disciplinary rule only in the limited context 

of a custodial, albeit pre-indictment, interview between a 

government agent and a defendant. There a special agent of the 

Albuquerque Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs interviewed 

Thomas in prison at Thomas' request in the absence of and without 

the knowledge of his attorney. After signing a waiver of his 

Miranda rights, Thomas gave the investigator a written statement. 

Although the defendant was not indicted until one day after the 

interview, he had been formally served with a criminal complaint on 

September 21, 1971; had counsel appointed on September 22; had 

appeared together with his appointed counsel at a preliminary 

hearing on September 28; and was in the custody of the state when 

the interview was conducted on October 18, 1971. 

At Thomas' trial, the statement was admitted over the 

objection of defense counsel and used during Thomas' crossexamination by the prosecution. The court held that this use of the 

statement violated both the letter and the spirit of the canons of 

ethics, 474 F.2d at 112, but refused to reverse the conviction 

because "[w]e have not passed on this question before and the 

prosecution had no notice of the position of this court on the 

subject until this appeal." Id. at 112. However, the court left no 

doubt that in the future evidence gathered through such violative 

conduct must be excluded. 

[O)nce a criminal defendant has either 

attorney or had an attorney appointed for 

(Footnote continued): 

retained an 

him by the 

of an immunized witness before a grand jury is "authorized by law" 

and therefore does not transgress the disciplinary rule. 882 F.2d 

at 28-29. 

11 

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court any statement obtained by interview from such 

defendant may not be offered in evidence for any purpose 

unless the accused's attorney was notified of the 

interview which produced the statement and was given a 

reasonable opportunity to be present. 

Id. at 112. (emphasis added). Ryans now urges this court to extend 

the rule announced in Thomas to the situation before us: a noncustodial setting, prior to Ryans' charge, arrest, or indictment. 

Although the interview in Thomas occurred prior to his 

indictment, the formal adversary process had clearly begun. Thomas' 

Sixth Amendment right to counsel had already attached. See Moran v. 

Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 428-30 (1986) (right to counsel attaches upon 

"first formal charging proceeding" or as soon as "the government's 

role shifts from investigation to accusation."); see also Kirby v. 

Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972). We recognize that the court's 

language in Thomas might be read to apply to a non-custodial 

environment like the one before us, but we do not believe that 

Thomas requires a broader rule than was required by the facts before 

the court then. Thomas relied on authority from the Fifth and Ninth 

Circuits that involved the application of the then applicable canon 

of ethics only to custodial interrogation of the accused after the 

adversary process had begun. See United States v. Four Star, 428 

F.2d 1406, 1407 (9th Cir.) (condemning "in-custody interrrogation of 

an accused person known to be represented by counsel without 

affording counsel an opportunity to be present."), cert. denied, 400 

U.S. 947 (1970); Wilson v. United States, 398 F.2d 331, 333 (5th 

Cir. 1968) (denouncing "[g]overnment interrogation of a person in 

custody pending trial, in the absence of counsel which the 

interrogator knew had been appointed to represent the defendant"), 

cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1069 (1969); Coughlan v. United States, 391 

12 

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F.2d 371, 372 (9th Cir.) (denouncing interviews of "accused persons 

in jail in the absence of counsel"), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 870 

(1968). Nothing in the court's opinion in Thomas, or in the cases 

upon which it relied, suggests that the court intended to extend the 

protections of the disciplinary rule to non-custodial, preindictment investigative interviews. 

Moreover, the rule announced in Thomas is expressed in terms 

that clearly contemplate an adversarial relationship between the 

state and the defendant. See Thomas, 474 F.2d at 112 (holding 

expressed in terms of the ''criminal defendant", and the "accused"). 

We again emphasize the factual setting in Thomas: the defendant had 

been served with a criminal complaint, had had counsel appointed for 

him, had appeared with appointed counsel at a preliminary hearing, 

and was in custody at the time of the interview. We are persuaded 

that use of a statement obtained from the defendant under those 

circumstances, without the benefit of counsel, raises considerations 

qualitatively different from those presented here. 

Ryans relies heavily on the Second Circuit's decision in 

United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1988), and urges that 

we adopt its reasoning here. In Hammad, a government prosecutor 

directed an informant to arrange and record a meeting with 

represented suspects in an arson investigation. The prosecutor 

supplied the informant with a fictitious grand jury subpoena to 

"create a pretense that might help the informant elicit admissions • 

" 858 F.2d at 840. 8 The meeting occurred six months before 

8 

Ryans argues that Hughen's subpoena was a "sham'' inasmuch as 

Hughen's agreement to 

unnecessary. He argues, 

cooperate with the government made it 

therefore, that it is indistinguishable 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

13 

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the grand jury returned an indictment, which was based in large part 

on the informant's recordings. The trial court found that the 

government ''was clearly aware" that the suspect was represented by 

counsel at the time of the meeting and suppressed the tapes. United 

States v. Hammad, 678 F. Supp. 397 (E.D.N.Y. 1987). On appeal, the 

Second Circuit held that the disciplinary rule applied, and that "in 

light of the underlying purposes of the professional responsibility 

code and the exclusionary rule, suppression may be ordered [for a 

prosecutor's violation of DR 7-104(A)(l}] in the district court's 

discretion," 858 F.2d at 840, but reversed the district court's 

suppression of evidence under the rule as an "abuse of discretion." 

Id at 837. 

The court first rejected the government's argument that DR 7-

104(A}(l) is co-extensive with the Sixth Amendment, and hence, 

inapplicable prior to indictment. The court noted several decisions 

applying the rule irrespective of the Sixth Amendment, especially 

Judge Weinstein's opinion in United States v. Jamil, 546 F. Supp. 

646, 655-58 (E.D. N.Y. 1982): 

(Footnote continued): 

from the subpoena condemned as a "sham" in United States v. 

Hammad. We do not agree. The Second Circuit relied on United 

States v. Martino, 825 F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1987) for the proposition 

that fake subpoenas were improper, but that case seems to say 

exactly the opposite. See id. at 760 ("If government officials 

may pose as nonexistent sheiks1n an elaborately concocted scheme 

••• , supply a necessary ingredient for a drug operation ••• , 

and utilize landing strips, docking facilities, and other 

accoutrements of an organized smuggling operation •.• , all in 

order to catch criminals, then their use of a subpoena in the name 

of an undercover agent to enable him to retain his credibility 

with suspected criminals seems innocuous by comparison."). In any 

event, the subpoena at issue in this case was not fictitious; it 

was simply unnecessary. Government agents may "employ appropriate 

artifice and deception to ferret out illegal activities." United 

States v. Szycher, 585 F.2d 443, 449 (10th Cir. 1978). 

14 

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Judge Weinstein exhaustively considered the 

government's contention that DR 7-104(A)(l) is coextensive with the Sixth Amendment. He noted that 

several courts have hinted at this unity and treated the 

disciplinary rule as little more than an appendage to 

the constitutional provision, without independent import 

in this context. Such treatment, however, makes the 

rule superfluous, and 'is neither apparent nor 

compelling.' The Sixth Amendment and the disciplinary 

rule serve separate, albeit, congruent purposes. 

858 F.2d at 838-39 (citations omitted). Following this lead, the 

court reasoned that whereas the Constitution defines only the 

"minimal historic safeguards" which criminal defendants must receive 

(quoting McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943)), the 

Model Code of Professional Responsibility imposed a broader duty on 

attorneys "to maintain the highest standards of ethical conduct." 

(quoting Preamble, Model Code of Professional Responsibility 

(1981)). The court said: 

The Code is designed to safeguard the integrity of the 

profession and preserve public confidence in our system 

of justice. It not only delineates an attorney's duties 

to the court, but defines his relationship with his 

client and adverse parties. Hence, the Code secures 

protections not contemplated by the Constitution. 

858 F.2d at 839. 

Finally, the Hammad opinion rejected the invitation to tie 

the Code's applicability to the time of indictment. The court 

reasoned that because the timing of an indictment's return lies 

substantially within the control of the prosecutor, "a government 

attorney could manipulate grand jury proceedings to avoid its 

encumbrances." Id. 

Having decided that DR 7-104(A)(l) applies in a preindictment, non-custodial context, the court was faced with a 

dilemma: how to apply the rule to communications made during a 

criminal investigation without crippling legitimate law enforcement 

15 

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activity. See, ~.g., United States v. Fitterer, 710 F.2d 1328, 1333 

(8th Cir), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 852 (1983). Rejecting the 

district court's limiting construction of the rule, see Hammad, 678 

F. Supp. at 401, the court instead carved out an exception to the 

rule for "legitimate investigative techniques." 858 F.2d at 839. 

The court reasoned that, by its terms, DR 7-104(A}(l) only applies 

to attorney communications that are not otherwise "authorized by 

law." Therefore, since a prosecutor's office authorizes him to 

conduct and supervise criminal investigations, "[a]s we see it, 

under DR 7-104(A)(l), a prosecutor is 'authorized by law' to employ 

legitimate investigative techniques in conducting or supervising 

criminal investigations, and the use of informants to gather 

evidence against a suspect will frequently fall within the ambit of 

such authorization." 858 F.2d at 839. The court agreed with the 

district court's conclusion that the use of a sham subpoena was 

improper and thus not protected by this exception. Nevertheless, 

the Second Circuit reversed the district court's suppression of 

evidence under the rule as an abuse of discretion, reasoning that 

"the government should not have its case prejudiced by a suppression 

of its evidence when the law was previously unsettled in this area." 

Id. at 842. 

We must disagree with the Hammad opinion's interpretation of 

the rule. We are not convinced that the language of the rule calls 

for its application to the investigative phase of law enforcement. 

In contrast to DR 7-104(A)(2), which prohibits a lawyer representing 

a client from giving advice to a ''person" who is not represented by 

counsel, DR 7-104(A)(l) prohibits communications with a "party." 

Black's Law Dictionary defines party as "a litigant, or a person 

16 

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directly interested in the subject matter of a case." Moreover, the 

rule concerns a lawyer's conduct "[d]uring the course of his 

representation of a client," and is limited to communication "on the 

subject matter of the representation" with a party represented by 

counsel "in that matter." Although the Code does not define these 

terms, the rule appears to contemplate an adversarial relationship 

between litigants, whether in a criminal or a civil setting. This 

interpretation is consistent with the policies underlying the 

disciplinary rule and the ethical canon from which it derives. We 

agree, for example, with the District of Columbia Circuit's 

conclusion that the contours of the "subject matter of the 

representation" are uncertain during the investigative stage of the 

case, and therefore less susceptible to the damage of "artful" legal 

questions which the disciplinary rule is designed in part to avoid. 

See Lemonakis, 485 F.2d at 956. 

The rule requires that the lawyer respect an adverse party's 

choice to be represented by skilled counsel. The rule appears to be 

intended "to protect a defendant from the danger of being 'tricked' 

into giving his case away by opposing counsel's artfully crafted 

questions." Jamil, 707 F.2d at 646. Logically, these concerns are 

implicated after the parties are in an adversarial relationship. 

Cf. United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 189 (1984) (Sixth 

Amendment right to counsel attaches only where "the accused [is] 

confronted, just as at trial, by the procedural system, or by his 

expert adversary, or by both."). 

During the investigative stage of a criminal proceeding, 

counterveiling policies militate against a broad reading of DR 7-

104(A)(l). We agree with the majority of courts which have 

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considered the question that DR 7-104(A)(l) was not intended to 

preclude undercover investigations of unindicted suspects merely 

because they have retained counsel. See United States v. Sutton, 

801 F.2d 1346, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1986); United States v. Fitterer, 710 

F.2d 1328, 1333 (8th Cir.) ("We do not believe that DR 7-104(A)(l) • 

• • was intended to stymie undercover operations when the subject 

retains counsel."), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 852 (1983); United States 

v. Vasquez, 675 F.2d 16, 17 (2d Cir. 1982) (per curiam) ("Such a 

principle would simply enable criminal suspects, by retaining 

counsel, to hamper the government's conduct of legitimate 

investigations. Even assuming this provision of the Code to be 

applicable to a criminal investigation, which is doubtful, it was 

not intended to lead to such a result."); United States v. Kenny, 

645 F.2d 1323, 1339 (9th Cir.) ("[T]he government's use of such 

investigative techniques at this stage of a criminal matter does not 

implicate the sorts of ethical problems addressed by the Code."), 

cert. denied, 452 U.S. 920 (1981); United States v. Lemonakis, 485 

F.2d 941, 955-56 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (the "communication" proscribed by 

the Code "does not in our view embrace the initiation and recording 

of the conversations between [the informant] and appellants."), 

cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989 (1974). A broader interpretation of the 

rule to cover this type of investigative activity would seem 

inconsistent with the general view expressed by the Supreme Court in 

Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966). 

Columbia Circuit observed in Lemonakis: 

As the District of 

(W]e cannot say that at this stage of the Government's 

investigation of a criminal matter, the public interest 

does not permit advantage to be legally and 

ethically taken of 'a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that 

a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing 

will not reveal it.' 

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Lemonakis, 485 F.2d at 956 (quoting Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302) 

(emphasis added). Under Ryans' view of the rule, once the subject 

of an investigation retains counsel, investigators would be unduly 

restricted in their use of informants to gather additional 

evidence. 9 

We hold that DR 7-104(A)(l)'s proscriptions do not attach 

during the investigative process before the initiation of criminal 

proceedings. On these facts, we hold that the adversarial process 

had not yet begun. Although Ryans had been targeted for 

investigation and had been served with a grand jury subpoena duces 

tecum, he had not been charged, arrested or indicted, or otherwise 

"faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society, and 

immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal 

law." Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972) (describing the 

onset of adversarial proceedings for purposes of the Sixth 

Amendment right to counsel); see Fitterer, 710 F.2d at 1333 

(rejecting contention that where counsel had been retained for 

grand jury investigation, DR 7-104(A)(l) was intended to restrict 

undercover investigations). 

Ryans argues that the interpretation of the disciplinary rule 

we adopt renders it meaningless in the criminal context because it 

gives no protections beyond those provided by the Sixth Amendment 

and the decisions which implement it. We do not agree. The 

argument overlooks the fact that exclusion of evidence is not the 

9 The Second Circuit recognized that a broad reading of the 

disciplinary rule would impede investigatory practices, see,~, 

Hammad, 858 F.2d at 839 (noting that career criminals with 

permanent "house counsel" could immunize themselves from 

infiltration by informants, especially where counsel are retained 

in connection with an ongoing fraud or criminal enterprise), and 

therefore exempted such practices from the rule's prohibitions. 

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only possible remedy under the disciplinary rule. Violations of 

DR 7-104(A)(l) may furnish a basis for sanctions against the 

offending attorneys. We do not address appropriate remedies for 

violations of DR 7-104(A)(l) here since we hold that the rule does 

not apply until the commencement of criminal proceedings. 

The amicus argues that remedial action is warranted in this 

case because the prosecutor permitted Hughen to systematically 

invade Ryans' attorney-client relationship. The important 

policies underlying the disciplinary rule would be undermined, the 

amicus says, if the fruits of the prosecutor's "orchestrated 

effort to obtain information from defendant and others in this 

case" are not suppressed. While we agree that this is a troubling 

issue and do not commend the government's conduct, we do not 

believe that the disciplinary rule should apply in these 

circumstances. We are persuaded that the perceived threat to the 

integrity of the attorney-client relationship is outweighed here 

by the government's interest in effective law enforcement. 10 When 

the government's role shifts from investigation to accusation, 

however, then the balance of the interests at stake shifts. 

Clearly, if adversary proceedings had begun here, this would be a 

different case. Cf. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985); Brewer 

10 

This is clearly not an example of government conduct that is 

"so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar 

the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a 

conviction." United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 

(1973); see United States v. Warren, 747 F.2d 1339, 1341-44 (10th 

Cir. 1984); United States v. Gamble, 737 F.2d 853, 856-60 (10th 

Cir. 1984). 

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v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977); Massiah v. United States, 377 

U.S. 201 (1964).ll 

The district court was concerned with Hughen's persistent 

inquiry into confidential attorney-client communications, not only 

in his conversations with Ryans, but also in his conversations 

with the other association members. 12 Thus, at the evidentiary 

hearing on Ryans' suppression motion, the court asked counsel to 

address in their briefs to the court the "heightened sensitivity, 

if any, we have in this case by reason of the interrogations with 

regard to the attorney/client communications .... " (Tr. 

at 85). We feel the purpose of the disciplinary rule is to 

prohibit all communications between an attorney and a represented 

party, but after initiation of adversary proceedings. It does not 

afford any special protection to communications otherwise 

protected by the attorney-client privilege. 13 

11 

This is not a case where government prosecutors have placed 

an informant directly in the "defense camp" (of an indicted 

defendant) and thereby gained access to confidential defense 

planning. Such a knowing invasion of the defense camp would taint 

the entire prosecution with a Sixth Amendment violation. See 

Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977); United States v. Levy"; 

577 F.2d 200 (3d cir. 1978). 

12 

Of the 991 pages of transcript of conversations recorded by 

Hughen, 302 pages contain references to the subjects' 

communications with their attorneys. (Tr. at 85; Def. 's Exh. 5). 

13 

We note that these tapes are not protected by the attorneyclient privilege. The attorney-client privilege is lost if the 

client discloses the substance of an otherwise privileged 

communication to a third party. United States v. Bump, 605 F.2d 

548 (10th Cir. 1979); see also United States v. Jones, 696 F.2d 

1069 (4th Cir. 1982) ("any voluntary disclosure by the client to a 

third party waives the privilege"). This is true even if the 

disclosure is inadvertent. See ~, Weil v. Investment/ 

Indicators, Research & Management, Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 24 (9th Cir. 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

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III 

Accordingly, the district court's order suppressing the 

second and third tape recordings is REVERSED; the order staying 

trial on the instant criminal charge is VACATED; and the cause is 

REMANDED to the district court for further proceedings in accord 

with this opinion. 

(Footnote continued): 

1981) (voluntary disclosure of the content of, a privileged 

attorney communication, even if inadvertent, "constitutes waiver 

of the privilege"); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352, 

1356 (4th Cir. 1984) (same); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 604 

F.2d 672, 675 (D.C. Cir.) ("An intent to waive [the attorneyclient] privilege is not necessary for such a waiver to occur."), 

cert. denied, 444 U.S. 915 (1979); 8 Wigmore on Evidence§ 2327 at 

635 (McNaughton rev. 1961 & 1987 Supp.). But see Helman v. 

Murry's Steaks, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 1099,---rI04(D. Del. 1990) 

(inadvertent disclosure by counsel does not waive the privilege). 

Here, Ryans willingly, though unwittingly, disclosed the substance 

of his attorney's advice to Hughen, and thereby waived the 

privilege. "[T]he confidentiality of communications covered by 

the privilege must be jealously guarded by the ·holder of the 

privilege lest it be waived. The courts will grant no greater 

protection to those who assert the privilege than their own 

precautions warrant." In Re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. 

Cir. 1989). 

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