Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-00725/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-00725-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Rudy Rojas
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RUDY ROJAS,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

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1:09-cv-0725 SKO

ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S

SOCIAL SECURITY COMPLAINT

(Doc. 1)

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the

"Commissioner" or "Defendant") denying his application for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI")

pursuant to Title XVI of the Social Security Act (the "Act"). 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). The

matter is currently before the Court on the parties' briefs, which were submitted, without oral

argument, to the Honorable Sheila K. Oberto, United States Magistrate Judge.1

The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge. (Docs. 8, 10.) On April 7,

1

2010, the action was reassigned to the Honorable Sheila K. Oberto for all purposes. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Fed. R. Civ.

P. 73; see also L.R. 301, 305.

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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was born in 1965, has completed an eighth-grade education, and can read and write. 

(AR 54.) Plaintiff last worked in 2003 in a packing house where he lifted boxes and operated a

machine to destroy them. (AR 54-55.) Plaintiff has had diabetes for 15 years; he stepped on a nail

in 2005, causing an infection in his right foot. (AR 56.) Plaintiff's wound never healed, and his toes

and part of his foot were amputated in November 2007; Plaintiff was prescribed a wheelchair. (AR

57-58.) 

On January 20, 2006, Plaintiff filed an application for SSI, alleging disability beginning on

May 2, 2004, due to diabetes, foot infection, and back pain. (AR 128-34, 150.) On July 17, 2006,

Dr. M. O. Nawar, a state agency physician, assessed Plaintiff's physical residual functional capacity

("RFC "). (AR 212-16.) The doctor opined that Plaintiff could occasionally lift and/or carry up to

20 pounds and frequently up to 10 pounds. He could (1) stand and/or walk for a total of about six

hours in an eight-hour workday; (2) sit for about six hours in an eight-hour workday; and (3) perform

unlimited pushing and/or pulling. (AR 213.) Dr. Nawar determined that Plaintiff could frequently

balance, kneel, crawl, and climb ramps and stairs, but never ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. (AR 214.) 

He could occasionally stoop and crouch. (AR 214.) Plaintiff had no manipulative, visual, or

communicative limitations. (AR 214-15.) Because of Plaintiff's limitation due to back pain, he was

to avoid concentrated exposure to hazards such as machinery and heights. (AR 215.) 

On February 17, 2007, Dr. Damania, an internist, performed a consultative examination of

Plaintiff. (AR 246-49.) Dr. Damania's diagnoses included insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus,

hypertension, and a diabetic right foot. (AR 248-49.) After examining Plaintiff and reviewing his

medical records, Dr. Damania's functional assessment of Plaintiff was as follows: "[Plaintiff] should

be able to walk perhaps only two hours. There are no restrictions for sitting. No assistive device

necessary." (AR 249.) "He should be able to lift 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently." 

(AR 249.) "There are no postural limitations. There are no manipulative limitations. There are no

visual or communicative limitations. Workplace environmental limitations would include climbing,

balancing, prolonged standing, and prolonged walking." (AR 249.)

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On March 2, 2007, Dr. L. V. Bobba, another state agency physician, assessed Plaintiff's

physical RFC. (AR 250-54.) Dr. Bobba opined that Plaintiff could (1) occasionally lift and/or carry

up to 20 pounds and frequently up to 10 pounds; (2) stand and/or walk for a total of at least two

hours in an eight-hour workday; (3) sit for about six hours in an eight-hour workday; and (4) perform

unlimited pushing and/or pulling. (AR 251.) Dr. Bobba also determined that Plaintiff could

frequently stoop, kneel, and crouch, and could occasionally climb, balance, and crawl. (AR 252.) 

Plaintiff had no manipulative, visual, or communicative limitations, but was to avoid uneven terrain. 

(AR 252-53.)

On December 17, 2007, one month after Plaintiff's surgical amputation, Dr. Srinivasan, a

resident internist, completed a "Medical Source Statement of Ability to Do Work-Related Activities

(Physical)" form. (AR 335-41.) Dr. Srinivasan opined that Plaintiff could (1) lift and carry ten 2

pounds occasionally, (2) sit three hours at one time for a total of two hours in an eight-hour workday,

(3) stand three hours at one time for a total of one hour in an eight-hour workday, and (4) walk one

hour at one time for a total of one hour in an eight-hour workday. (AR 335-36.)

Dr. Srinivasan also stated that Plaintiff had to use crutches to walk. (AR 336.) Plaintiff

could occasionally operate foot controls with both feet. (AR 337.) Plaintiff could never (1) climb

stairs, ramps, ladders, or scaffolds, (2) balance, (3) stoop, (4) kneel, (5) crouch, (6) crawl, (7) work

at unprotected heights or around moving mechanical parts, or (8) operate a motor vehicle. (AR 338-

39.) Plaintiff was also to avoid (1) humidity and wetness, (2) dust, odors, fumes, and pulmonary

irritants, (3) extreme cold, (4) extreme heat, (5) vibrations, and (6) moderate office noise. (AR 339.) 

Additionally, Plaintiff could not (1) shop, (2) travel without a companion, (3) walk a block on

uneven terrain, (4) use public transportation, or (5) climb a few steps with the use of a single hand

rail. (AR 340.) 

The Commissioner denied Plaintiff's application initially and again on reconsideration;

consequently, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). (AR 77-

A medical source statement is a statement by an acceptable medical source about what a claimant can still do

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despite his impairments based on the acceptable medical source's findings. 20 C.F.R. § 416.913(b)(6). "Acceptable

medical sources" include licensed physicians. Id. § 416.913(a)(1).

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98, 100-05.) On December 18, 2007, ALJ Christopher Larsen held a hearing. During the course of

the hearing, the ALJ asked a vocational expert ("VE") the hypothetical question of whether a person

could perform any jobs in the national economy if he were of the same age, education, and work

experience as Plaintiff and (1) could lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently;

(2) could stand and walk a total of two hours per day; (3) could sit for six hours per day; (4) could

never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; and (5) had to avoid concentrated exposure to hazards. (AR

66.) The VE testified that such an individual could perform the jobs of semi-automatic sewing

machine operator, ticket seller, and tacking machine operator, which are all light and unskilled 3

work. (AR 67-69.) If such an individual were restricted from using either foot to operate a foot

control, the individual could work at the light exertional level as a ticket seller or cashier. (AR 73.) 

There would be no jobs available, however, if such an individual could only (1) lift and carry 10

pounds occasionally and less than 10 pounds frequently; (2) stand and walk for a total of two hours

in an eight-hour day; and (3) sit for a total of two hours in an eight-hour day. (AR 69-70.) 

Plaintiff testified at the hearing that he lived with his sister and was able to attend to his

personal needs. (AR 62.) He also stated that he did no housework or yard work and that he was

unable to drive. (AR 62-63.) Plaintiff stated that his daily activities consisted of watching television

while lying down or in a seated position. Further, Plaintiff stated that he did not recall being treated

by Dr. Srinivasan, a physician who completed a medical source statement on Plaintiff's behalf one

day before the hearing. (AR 59, 335-41.) 

On March 10, 2008, the ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff not disabled since the date

of his application on January 20, 2006. (AR 12-23, 48-76.) Specifically, the ALJfound that Plaintiff

(1) had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the application date of January 20, 2006; (2)

has an impairment or a combination of impairments that is considered "severe" based on the

requirements in the Code of Federal Regulations; (3) does not have an impairment or combination

of impairments that meets or equals one of the impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart

P, Appendix 1; (4) has no past relevant work; and (5) could perform jobs that exist in significant

"Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects

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weighing up to 10 pounds." 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b).

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numbers in the national economy. (AR 17-23.) Plaintiff sought review of this decision before the

Appeals Council. On March 23, 2009, the Appeals Council denied review. (AR 2-5.) Therefore,

the ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481. 

On April 23, 2009, Plaintiff filed a complaint before this Court seeking review of the ALJ's decision. 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in rejecting Dr. Srinivasan's opinion in favor of the opinions of

Dr. Damania and the state agency medical consultants.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

The ALJ's decision denying benefits "will be disturbed only if that decision is not supported

by substantial evidence or it is based upon legal error." Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir.

1999). In reviewing the Commissioner's decision, the Court may not substitute its judgment for that

of the Commissioner. Macri v. Chater, 93 F.3d 540, 543 (9th Cir. 1996). Instead, the Court must

determine whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards and whether substantial

evidence exists in the record to support the Commissioner's findings. See Lewis v. Astrue, 498 F.3d

909, 911 (9th Cir. 2007).

"Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance." Ryan v.

Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008). "Substantial evidence" means "such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. NLRB, 305

U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). The Court "must consider the entire record as a whole, weighing both the

evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner's conclusion, and may

not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence." Lingenfelter v. Astrue,

504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

APPLICABLE LAW

An individual is considered disabled for purposes of disability benefits if he is unable to

engage in any substantial, gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or

mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted, or can be expected to

last, for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A),

1382c(a)(3)(A); see also Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 23 (2003). The impairment or

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impairments must result from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities that are

demonstrable by medically accepted clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and must be of

such severity that the claimant is not only unable to do his previous work, but cannot, considering

his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial, gainful work that

exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)-(3), 1382c(a)(3)(B), (D).

The regulations provide that the ALJ must undertake a specific five-step sequential analysis

in the process of evaluating a disability. In the First Step, the ALJ must determine whether the

claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). 

If not, in the Second Step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has a severe impairment

or a combination of impairments significantly limiting her from performing basic work activities. 

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If so, in the Third Step, the ALJ must determine whetherthe

claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments that meets or equals the

requirements of the Listing of Impairments ("Listing"), 20 C.F.R. 404, Subpart P, App. 1. 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If not, in the Fourth Step, the ALJ must determine whetherthe claimant

has sufficient residual functional capacity despite the impairment or various limitations to perform

her past work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). If not, in Step Five, the burden shifts to the

Commissioner to show that the claimant can perform other work that exists in significant numbers

in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). If a claimant is found to be

disabled or not disabled at any step in the sequence, there is no need to consider subsequent steps. 

Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 1999); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.

DISCUSSION

The ALJ gave significant weight to the opinions of the state agencymedical consultants and 

the opinion of Dr. Damania, the consultative examiner. (AR 21.) Further, the ALJ afforded less

weight to the opinion of Plaintiff's treating physician, Dr. Srinivasan. Plaintiff maintains that the

ALJ erred in doing so.

A. Legal Standard

The medical opinions of three types of medical sources are recognized in Social Security

cases: "(1) those who treat the claimant (treating physicians); (2) those who examine but do not treat

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the claimant (examining physicians); and (3) those who neither examine nor treat the claimant

(nonexamining physicians)." Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). Generally, a

treating physician's opinion should be accorded more weight than opinions of doctors who did not

treat the claimant, and an examining physician's opinion is entitled to greater weight than a

nonexamining physician's opinion. Id. Where a treating or examining physician's opinion is

uncontradicted by another doctor, the Commissioner must provide "clear and convincing" reasons

for rejecting the treating physician's ultimate conclusions. Id. If the treating or examining doctor's

medical opinion is contradicted by another doctor, the Commissioner must provide "specific and

legitimate" reasons for rejecting that medical opinion, and those reasons must be supported by

substantial evidence in the record. Id. at 830-31; accord Valentine v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574

F.3d 685, 692 (9th Cir. 2009). The ALJ can meet this burden by setting out a detailed and thorough

summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making

findings. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008).

B. Analysis

Because the opinions of the examining physician Dr. Damania and the nonexamining state

agency medical consultants contradicted Dr. Srinivasan's opinion, the ALJ was required to provide

specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting Dr. Srinivasan's opinion. First, the ALJ legitimately 4

found that Dr. Srinivasan's opinion was internally inconsistent because the doctor opined that

Plaintiff can sit for three hours at a time, but only two hours total in an eight-hour workday, and can

stand three hours at a time, but only one hour total in an eight-hour workday. (AR 21, 336.) See

Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 2001) (ALJ provided specific and legitimate

reasons for rejecting treating doctor's opinion, as opinion was inconsistent with doctor's examination

notes as well as internally inconsistent and not supported by any findings made by treating doctor

or any other doctor); Young v. Heckler, 803 F.2d 963, 968 (9th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (treating

The parties dispute whether Dr. Srinivasan is a treating or examining physician. The distinction is irrelevant

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here, because in either case the ALJ need only provide specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting Dr. Srinivasan's

opinion. See Bray v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1228 & n.8 (9th Cir. 2009); Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31.

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doctor's conclusory opinion that claimant was disabled was properly rejected by ALJ when it was

internally inconsistent and not consistent with doctor's prior medical reports). 

Second, Dr. Srinivasan opined that Plaintiff's environmental limitations included avoiding

(1) unprotected heights; (2) moving mechanical parts; (3) operating a motor vehicle; (4) humidity

and wetness; (5) dust, odors, fumes, and pulmonary irritants; (6) extreme cold; (7) extreme heat;

(8) vibrations; and (9) moderate office noise. (AR 21, 339.) The ALJ found, however, that these

limitations did not correspond to any medically determinable impairment. (AR 21.)

In Rollins, the court held that the ALJ provided adequate reasons for not fully crediting the

opinion of the claimant's treating physician. Some of the treating physician's recommendations

"were so extreme as to be implausible and were not supported by any findings made by any doctor,"

including the treating physician. 261 F.3d at 856. In particular, the treating physician claimed that

the claimant's condition prevented her from engaging in any bending, stooping, crouching, crawling,

kneeling, climbing, and balancing, and also indicated that the claimant should never be exposed to

any smoke, fumes, dust, temperature extremes, humidity, vibrations, or noise, among other things. 

Id. The court in Rollins found that there was no indication in the record regarding the basis for these

restrictions, and the claimant herself had never claimed to have any problems with many of the

conditions and activities that the treating physician instructed her to avoid. Id.

Here, as in Rollins, the lack of a basis for Dr. Srinivasan's opinion regarding Plaintiff's

environmental limitations was a specific and legitimate reason for the ALJ to discount the doctor's

opinion. See also Batson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004)

(affirming ALJ's rejection of the controverted opinion of claimant's treating physician because the

opinion was conclusory, in checklist form, and not supported by the record as a whole, or by

objective medical findings); Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002) ("The ALJ need

not accept the opinion of any physician, including a treating physician, if that opinion is brief,

conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical findings."); Crane v. Shalala, 76 F.3d 251, 253

(9th Cir. 1996) (ALJ properly rejected doctor's opinion because it was in the form of check-off

reports with no explanation of the basis of the conclusions). 

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Further, the ALJ's observation that Plaintiff sat down at the hearing in contravention of Dr.

Srinivasan's opinion that Plaintiff could never stoop was another legitimate reason to discount the

doctor's opinion. (AR 21.) See Verduzco v. Apfel, 188 F.3d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 1999); Morgan v.

Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999) ("The inclusion of the ALJ's personal

observations does not render the decision improper."). In addition, in rejecting Dr. Srinivasan's

opinion, the ALJlegitimately considered Plaintiff's testimony at the hearing that he did not recollect

being treated by Dr. Srinivasan, as the ALJ must consider, inter alia, the nature and extent of the

treatment relationship when deciding not to give a treating source's opinion controlling weight. See

20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2)(ii); see also Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751, 755 (9th Cir. 1989)

(ALJ need not recite "magic words" to reject treating physician's opinion–court may draw specific

and legitimate inferences from ALJ's opinion). The fact that Plaintiff could not remember his

treating physician strongly suggests that the treatment relationship between the two was minimal. 

A minimal treatment relationship is a proper factor to consider when assigning weight to a medical

opinion. See Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751. Thus, the ALJ did not err in considering this factor in

assigning less weight to Dr. Srinivasan's opinion.

Moreover, Dr. Srinivasan's opinion was contradicted by the opinion of Dr. Damania, the

consulting examiner who found, after examining Plaintiff in February 2007, that he could (1) walk

for two hours; (2) sit without restrictions; (3) lift 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently;

and (4) work as long as no climbing, balancing, prolonged standing, and prolonged standing were

involved. (AR 249.) Dr. Damania's opinion, in turn, was supported by a state agency physician in

March 2007. (AR 250-54.) See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(f)(2)(i) (state agency physicians and

psychologists are considered highly qualified physicians and psychologists who are also experts in

Social Security disability evaluation). An examining source's contrary opinion, resting on his own

independent examination of the claimant, is a specific and legitimate reason for discounting the

opinion of a treating physician. Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001); Andrews

v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995).

Plaintiff maintains, however, that the ALJ erred in giving significant weight to medical

opinions rendered months before his surgical amputation in November 2007, rather than affording

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controlling weight to Dr. Srinivasan's opinion given a month after Plaintiff's surgery. Indeed, a

treating physician's most recent medical reports can be highly probative. Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240

F.3d 1157, 1165 (9th Cir. 2001); cf. Stone v. Heckler, 761 F.2d 530, 532 (9th Cir. 1985) (in a case

involving a claimant with a worsening condition, holding that medical evaluations prepared several

months before hearing are not substantial evidence sufficient to rebut more recent conclusions by

a treating doctor). However, in a case where the most recent medical report by a treating physician

was "brief and conclusionary in form with little in the way of clinical findings," the Ninth Circuit

has held that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's conclusion that the claimant was not

precluded from performing his past relevant work. Young, 803 F.2d at 968 (distinguishing Stone). 

Here, as noted, Dr. Srinivasan's medical source statement provided no details as to clinical

examinations or assessments used to reach the doctor's conclusions. Thus, Dr. Srinivasan's opinion

was rendered conclusory and unsupported by objective medical evidence. Under such

circumstances, the ALJ was not required to give greater deference to Dr. Srinivasan's more recent

findings. See id.

In sum, the ALJ gave specific and legitimate reasons, supported by the record, for rejecting

Dr. Srinivasan's opinion. Accordingly, the ALJ's findings are supported by substantial evidence and

are legally correct.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial

evidence in the record as a whole and is based on proper legal standards. Accordingly, the Court

DENIES Plaintiff's appeal from the administrative decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. 

The Clerk of this Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Defendant Michael J. Astrue,

Commissioner of Social Security, and against Plaintiff Rudy Rojas.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 11, 2010 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

ie14hj UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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