Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-09-06641/USCOURTS-ca4-09-06641-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Carlton N. Luck
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 09-6641

CARLTON N. LUCK, a/k/a C-4,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Virginia, at Charlottesville.

Norman K. Moon, District Judge.

(3:04-cr-00047-nkm-mfu-6; 3:08-cv-80065-nkm-mfu)

Argued: May 11, 2010

Decided: July 2, 2010

Before GREGORY and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and

Arthur L. ALARCÓN, Senior Circuit Judge of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,

sitting by designation.

Reversed, vacated, and remanded by published opinion. Judge

Gregory wrote the majority opinion, in which Senior Judge

Alarcón joined. Judge Shedd wrote a dissenting opinion.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Gregory Mokodean, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA SCHOOL OF LAW, Appellate Litigation Clinic,

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Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. Anthony Paul Giorno,

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Roanoke,

Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Neal L. Walters, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA SCHOOL OF LAW, Appellate Litigation Clinic, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant.

Timothy J. Heaphy, United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, Ronald M. Huber, Assistant United States Attorney,

Barbara Colberg, Third-Year Law Student, OFFICE OF THE

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlottesville, Virginia,

for Appellee.

OPINION

GREGORY, Circuit Judge: 

Carlton Luck ("Luck") appeals the district court’s partial

denial of his motion to set aside his conviction under 28

U.S.C. § 2255. Luck argues that his conviction for conspiracy

to distribute and possess with intent to distribute fifty grams

or more of cocaine base should be reversed because his trial

counsel was ineffective for failing to request an informant

instruction, declining to call impeachment witnesses, putting

Luck’s prior incarceration before the jury, and not sharing

Jencks material turned over by the government with Luck. We

find that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request an

informant instruction and vacate Luck’s conviction and sentence.1

I.

In 2005, Luck was indicted for conspiracy to distribute and

to possess with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of

cocaine base (Count One); using, brandishing, or carrying a

1Because we conclude that Luck’s conviction should be vacated as to

the issue of an informant instruction, we do not address the questions of

the impeachment witnesses, prior incarceration, and Jencks material. 

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firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime

(Count Two); and distribution of cocaine base (Counts Three

and Four). On March 21, 2005, he proceeded to trial on all

charges before a jury. 

At trial, the government presented evidence from three

main witnesses: the police officer investigating the case and

two paid informants.2 Atrina Johnson ("Johnson") and Jesse

Thompkins ("Thompkins") were the government’s main witnesses. Both were informants paid for providing information

to the police. Johnson approached the police on her own initiative to provide information about Luck because she wanted

to reduce her exposure for a robbery charge she was facing.

Thompkins also came forward without prompting by the

police. He provided information on Luck to benefit Johnson,

who was the mother of his child, and to earn money for himself. 

Johnson testified that she met Luck through Thompkins,

who was regularly purchasing cocaine base from Luck. Johnson also knew Luck because she regularly stored drugs in her

attic for another man known as JaB. She testified that when

JaB was arrested, Luck came to her house and retrieved the

drugs JaB stored there. Thereafter, while facing a state robbery conviction, Johnson asked the police if she could work

as an informant in return for a favorable report to her sentencing judge. Johnson then conducted two controlled buys for the

police. On March 18, 2004, she called Luck on his mobile and

asked him to sell her cocaine base. She then went to Luck’s

house and bought cocaine base from his brother. Johnson testified that she again called Luck on March 24, 2004, and

arranged to buy cocaine base, then went to his house and purchased it from him. Charlottesville Police Detective Brian

O’Donnell ("O’Donnell") wired Johnson with video and

2The government also presented testimony from a neighbor of Luck’s.

As his testimony went to the firearm count, which is not before this court,

it is not recounted here. 

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audio recording equipment for the buys, but the image and

sound quality were so poor that essentially nothing was

recorded. O’Donnell was not present at the buys, so he had no

direct knowledge of the dealings. Additionally, while he patted Johnson down before the buys, he did not search any of

her inner garments for narcotics. 

Thompkins also testified as to his knowledge of Luck’s

drug dealing. Thompkins frequently interacted with Luck,

buying cocaine base from Luck for personal use two to three

times a day for a year. He also testified that he saw Luck sell

drugs to other people. Additionally, Thompkins once sold

Luck a pit bull, for which Luck paid $100 in cash and $100

in cocaine base. 

On April 29, 2004, a warrant was executed on Luck’s

house. The search recovered scales and baggies commonly

used to package narcotics; however, no drugs were recovered.

The police also seized Luck’s mobile phone, which was the

number Johnson had called to set up the buys, and a phone

bill for the mobile phone showing that Luck was the account

holder. 

After the government presented its case in chief, Luck called several family witnesses in rebuttal. Both his mother and

his aunt testified that he came to Charlottesville after a period

of incarceration to turn his life around and that they had no

knowledge of his involvement with drugs. Luck’s uncle, who

lived with Luck, testified that he never saw him involved in

any drug transaction. 

After deliberating a short while, the jury returned a guilty

verdict on all counts, and Luck was subsequently sentenced

to 444 months imprisonment. Luck’s direct appeal was denied

by this Court. United States v. Luck, No. 05-4801, 200 Fed.

App’x 263 (4th Cir. Sept. 22, 2006). On June 23, 2008, Luck

filed a pro se motion to set aside his sentence under 18 U.S.C.

§ 2255 alleging that both his trial and appellate counsel pro4 UNITED STATES v. LUCK

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vided ineffective assistance. In particular, Luck argued that

trial counsel was ineffective for not requesting an informant

instruction, not calling impeachment witnesses, inadequately

preparing his mother and aunt to testify, not preventing the

admission of two photographs, and failing to give him access

to discovery materials. He also argued that appellate counsel

was ineffective by failing to argue that Luck’s indictment was

constructively amended by the trial judge’s instructions. 

The district court granted Luck’s motion with respect to the

issue of constructive amendment and ineffective assistance by

appellate counsel. Therefore, the court reversed Luck’s convictions on Counts Two, Three and Four. The district court

however denied Luck’s motion as to the rest of his claims and

affirmed his conviction on Count One. Luck timely appealed.3

II.

In an appeal of the denial of a motion under § 2255, this

Court reviews the district court’s decisions of law de novo.

United States v. Poindexter, 492 F.3d 263, 267 (4th Cir.

2007). The question of whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance is a mixed question of fact and law which this

Court reviews de novo. Smith v. Moore, 137 F.3d 808, 817

(4th Cir. 1998).

III.

The issue before this Court on appeal is whether Luck’s

trial counsel provided ineffective assistance on a number of

grounds. We address only his first argument: whether trial

counsel was unconstitutionally deficient for failing to request

3Luck was resentenced to 288-months imprisonment on August 11,

2009. His appeal of that sentence is currently pending before this court in

case 09-4744, and this Court denied his motion to consolidate with the

current case. As today we vacate his conviction, his pending case is now

moot and review will be denied. 

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an informant instruction. We find that counsel was ineffective

and vacate Luck’s conviction and sentence as to Count One

of the indictment.

A.

Questions of ineffective assistance of counsel are governed

by the Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668 (1984). There, the court detailed the two-prong

approach courts must use when deciding ineffective assistance questions. The defendant bears the burden of proof as

to both prongs of the standard. First, the defendant must show

that counsel’s representation "fell below an objective standard

of reasonableness" as measured by "prevailing professional

norms." Id. at 688. Courts should be deferential in this

inquiry, and have "a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional

assistance." Id. at 689. The defendant must therefore overcome the presumption that the representation "might be considered sound trial strategy." Id. (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). 

Second, the defendant must demonstrate that counsel’s

inadequate performance prejudiced him. Id. at 687. Thus, the

defendant must show "a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

would have been different." Id. at 694. A reasonable probability, in turn, is defined as "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. In cases where a

conviction has been the result of a trial, the defendant must

demonstrate that but for counsel’s errors, there is a reasonable

probability that he would not have been convicted.

B.

Luck argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because

he failed to request an "informant instruction" consisting of

the following:

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The testimony of an informer who provides evidence

against a defendant for pay, or for immunity from

punishment, or for personal advantage or vindication, must be examined and weighed by the jury with

greater care than the testimony of an ordinary witness. The jury must determine whether the informer’s testimony has been affected by interest or by

prejudice against a defendant.

United States v. Brooks, 928 F.2d 1403, 1409 (4th Cir. 1991)

(quoting Devitt & Blackmar, Jury Practice and Instructions

§ 17.02 (3d ed. 1977)). He argues that this Court should follow several circuits in holding that this instruction is always

mandatory, or at the least, that in this case counsel was ineffective for failing to request the instruction. 

In Brooks, this Court faced the issue of when an informant

instruction is required, but did not answer that question one

way or the other because we found that the witnesses were not

"informers" within the meaning contained in the Devitt and

Blackmar treatise. 928 F.2d at 1409. Since then, the issue has

not again been raised before this Court, though we have

approved of the district court giving such an instruction in

several published cases. See, e.g., United States v. Sullivan,

455 F.3d 248, 258-59 (4th Cir. 2006) (stating that the jury was

properly given an informant instruction when requested by

counsel); United States v. Levenite, 277 F.3d 454, 463 (4th

Cir. 2002) (same); United States v. Anty, 203 F.3d 305, 310

(4th Cir. 2000) (same). The only discussion of the issue

occurred in an unpublished case prior to Brooks. There, Judge

Sprouse in dissent argued that because there was little corroborating evidence for informant’s testimony on the charge, the

court should have given an informant instruction. United

States v. Worthington, 911 F.2d 726, at *5 (4th Cir. 1990)

(table) (Sprouse, J., dissenting). Therefore, whether an informant instruction is required or advisable in a case involving

paid informants is an open question in this Circuit. 

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Among the other circuits that have considered this question, there is a consensus that an informant instruction is necessary when the informant’s testimony is uncorroborated by

other evidence. See United States v. Bosch, 914 F.2d 1239,

1247 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Hill, 627 F.2d 1052,

1054-55 (10th Cir. 1980); United States v. Garcia, 528 F.2d

580, 587-88 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Griffin, 382 F.2d

823, 828 (6th Cir. 1967). These courts have explained that an

informant instruction is necessary because a general witness

credibility instruction is not sufficiently cautionary for informants because of special concerns about the incentive that

they have to fabricate information for their own benefit. See

United States v. Williams, 59 F.3d 1180, 1183-84 (11th Cir.

1995) (stating that sole function of an informant instruction is

to make jury aware that an informant’s testimony is to be

viewed with caution); Garcia, 528 F.2d at 588 ("When the

case is close and the witness particularly unreliable . . . this

Court has declared that the failure to give a cautionary

instruction amounts to plain error."); see also On Lee v.

United States, 343 U.S. 747, 757-58 (1952) ("The use of

informers, accessories, accomplices, false friends, or any of

the other betrayals which are ‘dirty business’ may raise serious questions of credibility. To the extent that they do, a

defendant is entitled to broad latitude to probe credibility by

cross-examination and to have the issues submitted to the jury

with careful instructions."). In other words, the jury needs to

be instructed to scrutinize informant testimony more carefully

than other witnesses, even biased witnesses, because of the

potential for perjury born out of self-interest. See Alexandra

Natapoff, Snitching 77 (2009) ("[W]hen defendants do go to

trial, numerous exonerations reveal just how often juries

believe lying criminal informants, even when juries know that

the informant is being compensated and has the incentive to

lie. A report by the Center on Wrongful Convictions at Northwestern School of Law describes fifty-one wrongful capital

convictions, each one involving perjured informant testimony

accepted by jurors as true.").

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C.

While the case law regarding paid informants generally is

persuasive, we need not decide the question of whether and

when an informant instruction is required, however, because

on these facts it is clear that Luck’s counsel erred in failing

to request an informant instruction. This case presents the

classic case of a professional informant paid for his services,

which in turn makes it the obvious case for an informant instruction.4

See, e.g., Garcia, 528 F.2d at 588 (remarking, in an

analogous case where the government’s main witness was a

professional, paid witness, that there was "more than the usual

need for a cautionary instruction"). Both Johnson and Thompkins presented themselves to police, without any prompting,

as sources of evidence for hire. They sought out the police

and offered to gather evidence and testify in return for certain

benefits: time off of Johnson’s robbery sentence and financial

compensation. 

Further, there was little corroborating evidence beyond the

informants’ testimony. There was literally no corroborating

evidence for Thompkins’ claims that he was buying cocaine

base from Luck several times a day for a year. Additionally,

while Johnson was equipped with recording equipment for her

buys, the quality of the recordings was so poor that they were

not even used at trial. Detective O’Donnell somewhat corroborated her testimony by observing that she came back from

the buys with cocaine base, but he also admitted that he did

not conduct a thorough search before Johnson interacted with

Luck. Therefore a reasonable lawyer would have been concerned that the uncorroborated testimony of paid informants

could have been "manufactured . . . out of whole cloth" for

the benefit of the informant alone. Griffin, 382 F.2d at 829

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

4Furthermore, as discussed in Part III.D below, if requested, the trial

judge should have given the informant instruction in this case, thus rendering Luck’s counsel’s failure to request the instruction even more deficient.

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From the facts above, a reasonable attorney would have

requested an informant instruction. If there was ever a time to

ask to have the jury instructed that paid informants raise special issues about credibility, this was the case. See Robert S.

Hunter, Fed. Trial Handbook: Criminal § 75.22 (2009)

("While the testimony of an informer is competent evidence,

it should be accompanied by instructions designed to call the

attention of the jury to the character of the informer, leaving

to the jury the question of the value and credibility of his testimony."). Furthermore, there is no indication that failing to

request the instruction had any root in trial strategy. Luck’s

counsel cross-examined both Thompkins and Johnson about

the consideration they received from the government for their

investigation and testimony. In general, Luck’s counsel’s

defense strategy seems to be focused on discrediting the government’s witnesses, rather than offering his own explanation

of the events. Thus, were we to hold that failing to complete

the strategy and request an informant instruction was a tactical decision by counsel, we would "conjure up [a] tactical

decision[ ] an attorney could have made, but plainly did not."

Griffin v. Warden, 970 F.2d 1355, 1358 (4th Cir. 1992).

Therefore, Luck has established that his attorney’s conduct

met the performance prong of Strickland.

D.

Having determined that Luck has established the performance prong, we now consider whether he has shown prejudice. Our inquiry regarding the prejudice prong is twofold: (1)

whether the instruction, if requested, should have been given;

and (2) if the instruction had been given, was there a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would

have been different. As to the first issue, if requested, the trial

court should have given the informant instruction. There is no

debate that in a case like this where the government produces

very little evidence beyond the uncorroborated testimony of

paid informants, an informant instruction should have been

given. See Sullivan, 455 F.3d at 258-59 (noting, in a case

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which involved testimony by a co-defendant, that the district

court properly warned the jury to especially consider the credibility of testimony by a biased witness); Garcia, 528 F.2d at

588 ("When the case is close and the witness particularly

unreliable . . . this Court has declared that the failure to give

a cautionary instruction amounts to plain error."). 

The second issue then concerns whether giving the informant instruction could have reasonably changed the probability of the outcome of the trial when the district court gave a

general credibility instruction. In this case, the district court

gave the jury general instructions regarding witness credibility including:

You are the sole judges of credibility or believability

of each witness and the weight to be given the witness’s testimony. In weighing the testimony of a witness, you should consider his relationship to the

government or to the defendant; his or her interest,

if any, in the outcome of the case . . . .

Therefore, whatever punishment . . . another defendant may or may not have — there’s no other defendant in here. We’re talking about any other

conspirator in this case — may or may not have

received in the past or any punishment that he or she

may or may not receive in the future should not enter

into your deliberations unless you feel the witness is

somehow motivated to make the statements they did

on the stand in an effort to help them.

Of course, this does not prevent you from considering the motivation or credibility of a particular witness who may have chosen to testify in hopes of

receiving a lighter or reduced sentence. However,

while you should carefully consider the motivation

and credibility of each witness, the specific punishUNITED STATES v. LUCK 11

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ment he or she may or may not receive is a matter

strictly for the court.

J.A. 457, 459.5 It is true that the district court’s general

instructions on witness credibility contained all of the elements of the informant instruction. However, the informant

instruction is sui generis; it alerts jurors to the potentially

unique problems that inhere where an individual is paid to

inculpate a defendant. Cf. Anty, 203 F.3d at 310 (citing

Edward H. Devitt et al., Federal Jury Practice and Instructions § 15.02 (4th ed. 1992)) (discussing the creation of the

special credibility instruction as one of the reasons why paid

informant testimony may be considered). By summarizing the

tools that the jury must use to evaluate credibility and applying it specifically to the case of the informant, the instruction

more effectively cautions the jurors to think closely about the

testimony. See Natapoff at 198 ("Jury instructions are a classic and crucial vehicle for shaping verdicts. Because jurors are

the ultimate fact finders in criminal trials, charged with the

task of evaluating witness credibility and figuring out what

"really" happened, their evaluation of the informant testimony

is central to the criminal process."). Indeed, we have, in several cases, approvingly noted that the jury was given an informant instruction as one of the reasons why there was no

prejudice to the defendant when the witnesses against him

were paid informants. See, e.g., Levenite, 277 F.3d at 463

(acknowledging the dangers of working with a paid witness

but stating that because, among other things, the informant

instruction was given "the necessary safeguards were fully

employed"). Our case law also suggests that corroboration is

an important factor as to the reliability and trustworthiness of

paid informant testimony. Id. at 462. 

Therefore, our precedent counsels that had the informant

instruction been given, there is a reasonable probability that

the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. The

5

"J.A. __" refers to the joint appendix filed by the parties upon appeal.

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government’s case was built entirely on a foundation of paid

informant testimony. There was minimal physical evidence.

No government agent had ever observed Luck engaged in

drug activity. Merely giving general instructions as to witness

credibility is not sufficient to give confidence that the outcome was not tainted by prejudice. In this case in particular,

there was a significant incentive for the government’s two

main witnesses to give testimony for their own benefit, both

in terms of financial compensation and a reduction in sentence. Therefore, Luck’s trial counsel was ineffective when he

failed to request an informant instruction when it would have

been reversible error for the court to refuse to give it if

requested, and that ineffectiveness prejudiced the outcome of

Luck’s trial because the jury was not cautioned to consider the

special problems of credibility posed by the government’s

paid informants.

IV.

Because we find that Luck’s counsel was unconstitutionally

defective in a way that prejudiced Luck, we reverse the decision of the district court and grant his Section 2255 motion.

We therefore vacate his conviction and sentence on Count

One.

REVERSED, VACATED, AND REMANDED

SHEDD, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

Because I believe the district court properly held that Luck

did not meet Strickland’s second requirement of prejudice

regarding his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for

failure to request a paid informant instruction, I would affirm.

Accordingly, I dissent from the majority’s opinion.

In examining the prejudice prong, the district court found

that

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Luck fails to establish that a reasonable probability

exists that the outcome of the case would have been

different if the Court had given the special instruction. . . . Defense counsel cross-examined Johnson

and Thompkins about their possible biases after they

testified on direct examination about the benefits the

government would grant them for their assistance.

Counsel also cross-examined police investigator

O’Donnell about the awards Johnson and Thompkins

received for testifying after O’Donnell thoroughly

described during direct examination the various benefits informants can receive. Counsel also addressed

the prosecution witnesses’ motivations during his

closing argument. Furthermore, the court instructed

the jury on witness credibility in general. . . . After

reviewing the record, Luck fails to state a plausible

claim . . . that there is a reasonable probability that

any additional jury instruction would have led the

jury to acquit Luck.

J.A. 560-61 (internal citations omitted).

Assuming Luck’s trial counsel’s performance was deficient, I do not believe Luck has carried his burden to prove

that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to request a

paid informant instruction. The jury was aware of possible

biases by Johnson and Thompkins against Luck. In addition

to cross-examining both of these informant-witnesses, Luck’s

attorney also cross-examined the investigating detective as to

their interests in testifying against Luck. Finally, Luck’s attorney addressed these witnesses’ motivations when making his

closing argument.

In short, the jury was made aware on several occasions that

two of the prosecution’s witnesses were receiving either

financial consideration or a reduced punishment in exchange

for testifying against Luck. Yet, the jury nevertheless convicted Luck. Given these facts, I do not believe that Luck has

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shown "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694

(1984). Accordingly, I dissent from the majority’s view and

would affirm the decision of the district court.

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