Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-04197/USCOURTS-ca8-06-04197-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Duane Bradley McCoy
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Robert W. Pratt, United States District Judge for the Southern

District of Iowa. Judge Pratt now serves as Chief Judge for the Southern District of

Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-4197

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Southern District of Iowa.

Duane Bradley McCoy, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: April 13, 2007

Filed: April 20, 2007

___________

Before MELLOY, BOWMAN, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.

Duane Bradley McCoy entered a conditional guilty plea to a charge of

possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (2000). After sentencing,

he filed this appeal, challenging the order of the District Court1

 denying his motion to

suppress. We affirm.

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On January 14, 2004, Detective Randy Hutchinson of the Albia, Iowa, police

department was contacted by a day-care provider who reported the alleged sexual

abuse of a four-year-old girl by McCoy, the live-in boyfriend of the girl's mother. An

employee of the Iowa Department of Human Services, the Albia police chief, and

Hutchinson went to the mother's residence. The child, her mother, and McCoy were

all interviewed, and ultimately McCoy was arrested for sexually assaulting the child.

When McCoy declined a request to search his laptop computer, the police chief took

custody of the computer. The next day, Hutchinson secured a warrant, authorized by

a state magistrate judge, to search McCoy's computer and his car. The child

pornography that was the subject of the charge to which McCoy pleaded guilty was

found during a forensic investigation of the computer.

McCoy first challenges the District Court's conclusion that the search of his

computer was supported by probable cause. We review the court's legal conclusion

de novo and any supporting factual findings for clear error. United States v. Gettel,

474 F.3d 1081, 1085–86 (8th Cir. 2007). On review, we consider the totality of the

circumstances "to ensure that the magistrate had a 'substantial basis for . . .

conclud[ing]' that probable cause existed." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238–39

(1983) (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960)). 

By definition, probable cause "deals 'with probabilities. These are . . . the

factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent

men . . . act.'" Id. at 241 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175

(1949)) (alterations by this Court). Hutchinson's sworn application for the search

warrant set out in detail the accusations of the four-year-old alleged victim of McCoy's

sexual abuse. The application also noted that McCoy's girlfriend had told Hutchinson

that McCoy had a pornographic CD-ROM whose title—"Teen Tryouts, Audition

2"—indicated that underage persons may have been involved. Moreover, Hutchinson

averred that after an initial denial, McCoy admitted that indeed there was "old

pornography" on his computer. Search Warrant Application at 3, Attachment A.

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According to the District Court, the items retrieved from the car included "a

pair of female toddler underwear, nude images of female adults, and a three-bladed

knife." Mem. Op. & Order of Oct. 26, 2004, at 7. It seems unlikely that any of these

items would be used as evidence to prove that McCoy possessed child pornography,

especially since the authorities found actual child pornography on his computer. But

McCoy sought suppression in the District Court, and he appeals that court's denial, so

we will decide the issue.

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Taken together, we conclude that these facts—alleged sexual abuse of a toddler,

possession of pornography likely involving minors, and pornography admittedly on

McCoy's computer—establish probable cause to search the computer for pornography

involving children. Based on the information in Hutchinson's warrant application, the

magistrate made a "practical, common-sense decision" that there was a "fair

probability" that evidence of a crime (possession of child pornography) would be

found on McCoy's computer. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.

As for the search of McCoy's car, the warrant application did not provide any

additional facts to support a finding of probable cause to search the vehicle

specifically. That is, nothing was set out to indicate why Hutchinson thought there

was a fair probability he would find child pornography in a search of McCoy's car.2

 The District Court determined that the warrant application did not establish probable

cause to search the vehicle. But the court decided that the good-faith exception to the

Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applied in this case. United States v. Leon, 468

U.S. 897 (1984) (setting out the exception). That is, "Hutchinson acted reasonably in

relying on the state magistrate's determination that [McCoy's] vehicle, in fair

probability, would provide contraband or evidence of illegal activity." Mem. Op. &

Order of Oct. 26, 2004, at 11. On appeal, McCoy argues that Hutchinson did not act

in good faith. We review the District Court's application of the Leon exception

de novo. See United States v. Hallam, 407 F.3d 942, 945 (8th Cir. 2005).

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It is clear from the evidence presented at the suppression hearing that the state

magistrate, when authorizing the warrant, was not acting as a "rubber stamp" for

Hutchinson in his quest to search the car. Leon, 468 U.S. at 914 (quoting Aguilar v.

Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964)). The magistrate sought additional information,

questioning Hutchinson about the basis for his interest in searching McCoy's vehicle.

Hutchinson disclosed to the magistrate in conversation that he wanted to search the

car because he had seen that McCoy had an unusual amount of personal property in

the car and because McCoy kept the vehicle locked, not allowing access to anyone

else. Because there is no indication in the record that Hutchinson conveyed this

additional information to the state magistrate judge under oath, we agree that the

warrant application did not establish probable cause to search McCoy's car. Cf.

United States v. Olvey, 437 F.3d 804, 807 (8th Cir. 2006) (noting that probable cause

must be determined from the warrant affidavit alone if there is no evidentiary hearing

before the issuing magistrate). Nevertheless, we conclude that Hutchinson acted in

good faith in executing the warrant based on the magistrate's approval. Hutchinson

was aware that the magistrate knew the precise reasons that Hutchinson thought he

might find evidence in the car. He was fully justified in believing that the magistrate

relied on that additional information—which Hutchinson believed to be true even if

he did not testify to it under oath—when authorizing the warrant. We hold that

conducting the search in reliance on the warrant was "objectively reasonable" and that

the Leon exception therefore applies. Leon, 468 U.S. at 919.

The District Court's denial of McCoy's motion to suppress is affirmed.

______________________________

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