Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-06-01486/USCOURTS-ca3-06-01486-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Juan Reyeros
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

 

No. 06-1485

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

JORGE REYEROS,

 Appellant

(D.C. No. 00-cr-00822-1)

 

No. 06-1486

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

JUAN REYEROS,

 Appellant

(D.C. No. 00-cr-00822-2)

Case: 06-1486 Document: 00311992490 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/31/2008
2

 

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

District Judge: Honorable William G. Bassler

 

Argued: April 17, 2008

Before: SLOVITER, JORDAN, and ALARCON*, Circuit

Judges.

(Filed: July 31, 2008)

 

Peter Goldberger [ARGUED]

Law Office of Peter Goldberger

50 Rittenhouse Place

Ardmore, PA 19003-2276

Paul D. Petruzzi

100 N. Biscayne Blvd., Suite 1100

Miami, FL 33132

 

 *Honorable Arthur L. Alarcon, Senior Judge, United

States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by

designation.

Case: 06-1486 Document: 00311992490 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/31/2008
3

Neil M. Schuster

555 Northeast 15th Street, Suite 2C

Miami, FL 33132

Counsel for Appellant Jorge Reyeros

Neil M. Schuster [ARGUED]

555 Northeast 15th Street, Suite 2C

Miami, FL 33132

Counsel for Appellant Juan Reyeros

George S. Leone

Caroline A. Sadlowski [ARGUED}

Office of United States Attorney

970 Broad Street, Room 700

Newark, NJ 07120

Counsel for Appellee USA

 

OPINION OF THE COURT

 

JORDAN, Circuit Judge.

A jury convicted Jorge Reyeros and his brother, Juan

Reyeros, of offenses related to a conspiracy to import cocaine

Case: 06-1486 Document: 00311992490 Page: 3 Date Filed: 07/31/2008
 1

For convenience, we will refer to the brothers by their first

names.

 2

In 2003, after the events at issue here, the United States

Customs Service was divided into the Bureau of Customs and

Border Protection and the Bureau of Immigration and

Customs Enforcement, both of which are part of the

Department of Homeland Security. Reorganization Plan

Modification for the Department of Homeland Security, H.R.

4

into the United States.1 On appeal, each brother challenges

his conviction and Juan additionally challenges his sentence. 

Although both raise a number of issues on appeal, we focus

primarily on, first, Jorge’s contention that the evidence was

insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he

knew that the purpose of the conspiracy was to import cocaine

and, second, the brothers’ shared contention that they were

improperly denied access to certain documents in the

possession of the Colombian government, in violation of

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and the Jencks Act,

18 U.S.C. § 3500. For the reasons set forth below, we will

affirm.

 

I. Background

On August 20, 2004, a federal grand jury sitting in the

District of New Jersey returned a second superseding

indictment (the “Indictment”) against Jorge, Juan, Hernan

Uribe, and Rafael Garravito-Garcia. During the time period

charged in the Indictment, Jorge was employed as an

inspector for the United States Customs Service2

 (“Customs”)

Case: 06-1486 Document: 00311992490 Page: 4 Date Filed: 07/31/2008
Doc. No. 108-32 (2003). 

 3

The defendants were also charged with having attempted

to exceed authorized access, but it appears that aspect of the

charge was not a focus at trial.

5

in New Jersey. Counts 1 through 4 of the Indictment named

only Jorge and charged him, in Count 1, with conspiracy to

import cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963, and, in

Counts 2 through 4, with exceeding authorized access to a

Customs computer, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§§ 1030(a)(2)(B), (c)(2)(B) and 2. Specifically, the

Indictment alleged that, in 1997, Jorge conspired with

unnamed co-conspirators to import into the United States

cocaine concealed in cargo containers. It also alleged that

Jorge had, on multiple occasions in 1997, unlawfully accessed

a Customs computer database, obtained information

identifying containers designated for inspection by Customs,

and provided that information to his co-conspirators in

furtherance of the conspiracy.

Count 5 of the Indictment charged Jorge, Juan, Uribe,

and Garravito-Garcia with a separate conspiracy to import

cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963, while Count 6

charged them with exceeding authorized access to a Customs

computer and aiding and abetting exceeding authorized

access, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(2)(B), (c)(2)(B)

and 2.3

 The allegations of Count 5 are that, in 1999, Jorge,

Juan, Uribe, and Garravito-Garcia agreed to import cocaine

into the United States from Ecuador, concealed in cargo

containers filled with produce bound for Port Elizabeth, New

Case: 06-1486 Document: 00311992490 Page: 5 Date Filed: 07/31/2008
 4

It is not clear from the record when Juan first made that

motion. 

 5

The charges against Garravito-Garcia, the fourth defendant

named in the Indictment, were dismissed without prejudice on

January 18, 2007, apparently because the government has

6

Jersey. Count 6 describes how, in furtherance of that

conspiracy, Jorge unlawfully accessed a Customs computer

database in 1999 to research a company his co-conspirators

had identified as a potential recipient of the smuggled

cocaine.

The trial against Jorge and Juan began in October

2004. At some point, Juan moved for severance;4

 however,

his request was denied by the District Court. Thus, at trial the

government presented evidence of the 1997 conspiracy and

associated charges set forth in Counts 1 through 4 of the

Indictment, which named only Jorge as a defendant, and it

also presented evidence of the 1999 conspiracy and

unauthorized access charges set forth in Counts 5 and 6 of the

Indictment, which named both Jorge and Juan along with

Uribe and Garravito-Garcia.

Uribe testified at trial on behalf of the government. 

When the trial began, Uribe was in a Colombian prison,

where he was serving a sentence for drug trafficking and

conspiracy. He was, however, extradited to the United States

during the trial and immediately entered into a plea agreement

pursuant to which he agreed to cooperate with the

government.5

 At trial, Uribe testified that he became involved

Case: 06-1486 Document: 00311992490 Page: 6 Date Filed: 07/31/2008
been unable to locate him. 

 6

At some point, again it is not clear, Lagrotteria became

aware of Juan’s and Jorge’s roles in the conspiracy, including

that Jorge was the insider at Customs. 

7

in the 1999 conspiracy when Juan asked him for help

identifying an American company through which 400 to 500

kilograms of cocaine could be imported into the United

States. Uribe stated that Juan told him that Jorge was a

Customs inspector and could use that position to ensure

containers containing drugs could enter the United States

without being inspected. 

Uribe described how he sought the help of GarravitoGarcia to find an American company suitable to receive the

smuggled cocaine. Garravito-Garcia, in turn, contacted an

American acquaintance, James Lagrotteria, for assistance. 

Unbeknownst to the conspirators, however, Lagrotteria was

an informant for Customs and the United States Drug

Enforcement Administration (“DEA”). 

Garravito-Garcia introduced Uribe to Lagrotteria in

Colombia in March 1999 and the three men met to discuss

plans to import cocaine into the United States. At that

meeting, Lagrotteria was tasked with identifying an American

company suitable for receiving the imported cocaine,

particularly one with a warehouse in New York or New Jersey

and a history of importing produce. Lagrotteria was told that

the conspirators were working with a Customs official6

 and

that the official planned to check a Customs computer

Case: 06-1486 Document: 00311992490 Page: 7 Date Filed: 07/31/2008
8

database to see if any company Lagrotteria identified had

been flagged by Customs as having previously imported

contraband. 

In April 1999, Customs and DEA agents fabricated

records for a fictitious company they named “TJ Import

Produce.” They put the records in a Customs database and,

on April 8, 1999, at the behest of the government agents,

Lagrotteria informed Garravito-Garcia that he had identified

TJ Import Produce as a potential recipient of the cocaine the

conspirators hoped to import. A few days later, on April 12,

1999, Jorge accessed the Customs computer database and

examined the mock importation and inspection records for TJ

Import Produce. Subsequently, Uribe informed Lagrotteria

that TJ Import Produce had been investigated and was

suitable. 

Later that April, Lagrotteria traveled to Colombia to

meet Juan and to discuss with Uribe and Juan the

conspirators’ plans to import cocaine. At that meeting, Uribe

informed Juan and Lagrotteria that he was having trouble

locating 500 kilograms of cocaine. Juan responded that, to

make the conspiracy worth the risks involved, they needed to

import at least 500 kilograms of cocaine, and he suggested

that the conspirators try to locate and pool together smaller

quantities of cocaine in order to amass a large quantity. When

asked at trial why Juan required such a large amount of

cocaine, Uribe explained that Juan “told [him] many, many

times that Jorge needed that quantity -- Jorge Reyeros, his

brother, needed that quantity. He wouldn’t work with other

quantities, two or three hundred, or a hundred, it wasn’t any

good for him.” (Supplemental Appendix [“SA”] 3145.) 

When asked what he meant when he said that Jorge wouldn’t

“work with” smaller quantities, Uribe testified, “It means that

he wouldn’t take little amounts of drugs to use his Customs

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 7

During trial, the defendants sought and were denied

information that they contended was covered by the Jencks

Act.

9

position, it would be too little of a deal. He needed big deals. 

Big drug deals.” (Id.)

Uribe also testified that, instead of shipping cocaine

directly from Colombia to the United States, the conspirators

planned to ship the drugs through Ecuador, concealed in a

cargo container purportedly holding bananas. According to

Uribe, Juan explained that the container of drugs should be

shipped from Ecuador instead of Colombia because Jorge had

said it was “impossible to take anything out of Colombia.” 

(SA 3176.) Uribe further testified that the conspirators

planned to elude detection by shipping multiple containers at

one time, only one of which would contain drugs. Uribe

stated that Jorge was going to ensure that Customs would

inspect only the containers that did not contain drugs and

would let the container with the drugs “go by.” (SA 3148.) 

The conspirators never actually carried out their plan,

however, because they were not able to acquire cocaine. 

The jury found Jorge and Juan guilty of the charges

alleged in Counts 5 and 6 of the Indictment. It also

specifically found, through special interrogatories, that Jorge

and Juan had conspired to import more than 150 kilograms of

cocaine and that Jorge had unlawfully accessed the Customs

computer database in furtherance of the conspiracy. The jury

acquitted Jorge of the charges alleged in Counts 1 through 4. 

After trial, Jorge and Juan each moved for a judgment

of acquittal on Counts 5 and 6. In addition, each moved for a

new trial on a number of grounds, including erroneous

evidentiary rulings, violations of the disclosure obligations

imposed by Brady,

7

 and prosecutorial misconduct during

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 8

Section 952 of Title 21 prohibits the importation of a

controlled substance into the United States, and § 960 of that

title sets forth the penalties for importing a controlled

substance in violation of § 952. Section 963 of Title 21

provides that “[a]ny person who attempts or conspires to

commit any offense defined in this subchapter shall be subject

to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the

commission of which was the object of the attempt or

conspiracy.”

 9

 Section 1030(a)(2)(B) of Title 18 prohibits exceeding

authorized access of a computer and thereby obtaining

10

closing arguments. The District Court denied the defendants’

post-trial motions, and, on January 26, 2006, sentenced Jorge

to 292 months in prison and Juan to 235 months in prison. 

On appeal, Jorge and Juan challenge their convictions

and Juan challenges his sentence. We have jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 

II. Discussion

A. Sufficiency of the evidence

Jorge argues that, because the evidence presented at

trial was insufficient to permit the jury to find him guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt, the District Court erroneously

denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal on Counts 5 and

6. As noted earlier, Count 5 charged Jorge, Juan, Uribe, and

Garravito-Garcia with conspiring to import cocaine, in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963,8

 and Count 6 charged them with

exceeding authorized access in furtherance of the conspiracy

to import cocaine, and aiding and abetting exceeding

authorized access, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(2)(B),

(c)(2)(B) and 2.9

 Jorge’s challenge to the sufficiency of the

Case: 06-1486 Document: 00311992490 Page: 10 Date Filed: 07/31/2008
information from a United States agency, and § 1030(c)(2)(B)

provides an enhanced maximum penalty for violations of

subsection (a)(2), “if ... the offense was committed in

furtherance of any criminal or tortious act in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United States ... .” The Indictment

alleged that Jorge’s violation of § 1030(a)(2) was committed

in furtherance of the conspiracy to import cocaine alleged in

Count 5.

 10 Jorge argues that if we vacate his conviction for

conspiring in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963 (Count 5), his

conviction for exceeding unauthorized access of a Customs

computer in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (Count 6) must

also be vacated. The government does not address that

argument. And, in light of our decision to affirm Jorge’s

conspiracy conviction, we will not address it either.

11

evidence is a narrow one: he argues that his convictions must

be vacated because the government failed to introduce

sufficient evidence to establish that he knew that the specific

object of the conspiracy was to import cocaine.10 We

disagree.

In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence, we apply a “particularly deferential” standard of

review. United States v. Cothran, 286 F.3d 173, 175 (3d Cir.

2002) (quoting United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 187 (3d

Cir. 1998)). We do not weigh the evidence or decide the

credibility of the witnesses. Id. Instead, “[w]e must view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the Government and

sustain the verdict if any rational juror could have found the

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

“One of the requisite elements the government must

show in a conspiracy case is that the alleged conspirators

shared a ‘unity of purpose’, the intent to achieve a common

Case: 06-1486 Document: 00311992490 Page: 11 Date Filed: 07/31/2008
12

goal, and an agreement to work together toward the goal.” 

United States v. Wexler, 838 F.2d 88, 90 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing

United States v. Kates, 508 F.2d 308, 310-11 (3d Cir. 1975)). 

Accordingly, “[i]n order for us to sustain a defendant’s

conviction for conspiracy, the government must have put

forth evidence ‘tending to prove that defendant entered into

an agreement and knew that the agreement had the specific

unlawful purpose charged in the indictment.’” United States

v. Idowu, 157 F.3d 265, 268 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Wexler,

838 F.2d at 91).

Jorge acknowledges that the evidence presented by the

government is sufficient to support a finding that he accessed

the Customs computer database for an improper reason. It is

a concession practically compelled by the evidence. Jorge

researched the importation and inspection records of the

fictitious TJ Import Produce within a few days of Lagrotteria

telling Garravito-Garcia that he had identified that company

as a potential vehicle for importing cocaine. After Jorge

accessed those records, Uribe informed Lagrotteria that TJ

Import Produce had been investigated by his contact in

Customs and was an acceptable recipient of the to-besmuggled cocaine. The evidence is thus damning enough

that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the

government, it is more than sufficient to support a finding that

Jorge knew the purpose of the conspiracy was to import some

form of contraband. Cf. United States v. Iafelice, 978 F.2d

92, 97 n.3 (3d Cir. 1992) (“There is no requirement ... that the

inference drawn by the jury be the only inference possible or

that the government’s evidence foreclose every possible

innocent explanation.”). That finding is further supported by

Uribe’s testimony that the conspirators planned to ship the

container full of drugs from Ecuador instead of Colombia

because Juan relayed that Jorge had said it was “impossible to

take anything out of Colombia.” (SA 3176.) 

Case: 06-1486 Document: 00311992490 Page: 12 Date Filed: 07/31/2008
13

 Perhaps recognizing that the evidence supports the

conclusion that he knew he was involved in a conspiracy to

bring something illegal into the country, Jorge argues on

appeal that the record fails to show he knew the specific

purpose of the conspiracy was to import cocaine, rather than

some other form of contraband. To support his argument,

Jorge cites a number of cases in which we reversed drug

possession and distribution conspiracy convictions for lack of

evidence that the defendant knew the purpose of the

conspiracy involved drugs. See, e.g., United States v.

Cartwright, 359 F.3d 281, 286-90 (3d Cir. 2004); Idowu, 157

F.3d at 268-70; United States v. Thomas, 114 F.3d 403, 405-

06 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v. Salmon, 944 F.2d 1106,

1113-15 (3d Cir. 1991); Wexler, 838 F.2d at 91-92. For

example, Jorge relies on Wexler, in which we held that

evidence sufficient to support a finding that a defendant acted

as a lookout for a drug transaction was nevertheless

insufficient to support a finding that the defendant was aware

that drugs were involved in the transaction. Wexler, 838 F.2d

at 91-92. Although we noted in that case that it was “more

likely than not that [the defendant] suspected, if not actually

knew, that some form of contraband was involved” in the

transaction for which he acted as a lookout, we concluded that

the record lacked any evidence from which the jury could

reasonably infer that the defendant knew that the contraband

involved was drugs. Id. at 92. There, we reasoned that the

evidence was “just as consistent ... with a conspiracy to

transport stolen goods, an entirely different crime.” Id.; see

also Idowu, 157 F.3d at 266-67 (“[E]ven in situations where

the defendant knew that he was engaged in illicit activity, and

knew that ‘some form of contraband’ was involved in the

scheme in which he was participating, the government is

obliged to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant

had knowledge of the particular illegal objective

contemplated by the conspiracy.”). 

Case: 06-1486 Document: 00311992490 Page: 13 Date Filed: 07/31/2008
 11In context, the plain implication is that Jorge was

speaking not only about some controlled substance but

specifically about cocaine, and the jury specifically found that

object of the conspiracy was to import cocaine.

14

In this case, however, unlike in Wexler and the other

cases cited by Jorge, there is no evidentiary deficiency. Here,

the government offered evidence showing that Jorge knew

full well that the purpose of the conspiracy was to import a

massive amount of cocaine. Uribe testified that, at an April

1999 meeting with Lagrotteria and Juan, he told them he was

having trouble locating 500 kilograms of cocaine. According

to Uribe, Juan insisted that they needed to import at least that

much because, as Uribe elaborated, Juan said “many, many

times that Jorge needed that quantity -- Jorge Reyeros, his

brother, needed that quantity. He wouldn’t work with other

quantities, two or three hundred, or a hundred, it wasn’t any

good for him.”11 (SA 3145.) As earlier noted, when asked

what was meant by saying that Jorge wouldn’t “work with”

smaller quantities of cocaine, Uribe testified, “It means that

he wouldn’t take little amounts of drugs to use his Customs

position, it would be too little of a deal. He needed big deals. 

Big drug deals.” (Id.) That testimony is sufficient to allow a

rational juror to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that

Jorge was aware that the purpose of the conspiracy was to

import cocaine, as opposed to some other form of

Case: 06-1486 Document: 00311992490 Page: 14 Date Filed: 07/31/2008
 12Other evidence supports that conclusion as well. For

example, a jury could reasonably infer that Jorge would ask

his own brother, Juan, the nature of the contraband for which

he was putting his Customs career at risk. In addition,

Lagrotteria testified that Jorge was to receive a percentage of

the value of any cocaine imported, which suggests that Jorge

would want to know the nature of the contraband so that he

could understand the expected payoff. Those pieces of

evidence buttress the direct statement of knowledge attributed

to Jorge by his brother Juan.

 13The original indictment was returned by the grand jury on

December 21, 2000, and it charged Jorge and Juan with a

single count of conspiring to exceed unauthorized access to a

Customs computer database. 

15

contraband.12 We therefore reject Jorge’s challenge to the

sufficiency of the evidence.

B. Brady and Jencks

Next, the defendants contend that the District Court

erred in failing to order the prosecution to turn over

documents filed with Colombian authorities by Uribe as he

opposed his extradition to the United States. The defendants

acknowledge that, at the time of the trial, the documents they

sought were not, and had never been, in the actual possession

of the United States government. The District Court held that,

under the circumstances, the United States government was

not obligated to obtain and produce documents that the

government had never seen and that were in the possession of

a foreign sovereign. We agree with that ruling.

Uribe was first named as a defendant in this case in a

superseding indictment returned by the grand jury on June 28,

2001.13 Counts 5 and 6 of the first superseding indictment

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 14The prosecution produced a copy of that report to the

defense during the trial.

16

charged Jorge, Juan, Uribe, and Garravito-Garcia with

conspiracy to import cocaine, attempting to exceed authorized

access to a Customs computer, and aiding and abetting the

attempt to exceed authorized access. When the first

superseding indictment was returned in 2001, Uribe was, as

we have noted, in a Colombian prison serving a sentence for

drug trafficking and conspiracy. While investigating this

case, the United States sought to question Uribe. To that end,

it sent to the government of Colombia a document entitled,

“Vienna Convention Mutual Legal Assistance Request.” (SA

3753.) The request asked Colombian authorities to interview

Uribe using questions provided by the United States and then

to provide a written summary of Uribe’s responses. But

instead of questioning Uribe and providing his answers to the

United States, Colombian authorities permitted United States

Customs investigators to personally interview Uribe in

Colombia. 

 That interview took place over the course of two days

on November 19 and 20, 2002 and was memorialized by

Customs investigators in a written report.14 The report

indicates that, before the interview, Maria Cristina Munoz, a

Colombian prosecutor, read to Uribe and his attorney the

questions contained in the United States’ Mutual Legal

Assistance Request in the presence of the Customs

investigators and Carmen Colon, a United States Department

of Justice Judicial Attache. After Munoz finished reading the

questions, Munoz and Colon left the room and the Customs

investigators interviewed Uribe.

Following the interview, the United States asked

Colombia to extradite Uribe to face the charges in Counts 5

and 6 of the first superseding indictment. Uribe opposed

Case: 06-1486 Document: 00311992490 Page: 16 Date Filed: 07/31/2008
17

extradition but failed to prevent it; he arrived in the United

States on December 13, 2004, after the grand jury returned the

second superseding indictment, and after the trial of Jorge and

Juan had begun. The same day Uribe arrived, he entered into

a plea agreement which provided that he cooperate with the

United States government and plead guilty to conspiracy to

import cocaine into the United States. The next day, he pled

guilty in accordance with the agreement, and, two days after

that, he testified on behalf of the government at the trial of

Jorge and Juan. 

When it became apparent that Uribe was coming to the

United States and would testify, the defendants asked the

District Court to compel the prosecution to obtain and

produce, among other things, any documents Uribe had filed

with Colombian authorities to oppose his extradition. The

defendants contended that, even if the prosecution did not

actually possess such documents, it had a duty under Brady v.

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C.

§ 3500, to acquire them. The essence of the defendants’

argument was that the prosecution constructively possessed

any documents possessed by the Colombian authorities

relating to Uribe’s extradition because Colombia had

cooperated with the United States both by permitting United

States officials to interview Uribe and by acting upon the

United States’ request to extradite him. 

On December 14, 2004, during the trial, the District

Court held a hearing to consider the defendants’ discovery

demands. At the hearing, the government took the position

that it had no obligation to obtain and turn over the documents

sought by the defense. Nevertheless, the prosecutor

represented that the United States was attempting to obtain

documents from Uribe’s attorney in Colombia and that it

would turn over whatever it obtained. As earlier noted, the

District Court denied the discovery demands. It ruled that the

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 15Despite the District Court’s ruling, it appears that the

prosecution did obtain some documents from Uribe’s attorney

and did turn them over to the defense. 

18

prosecution was not in actual or constructive possession of the

documents sought by the defense and was therefore not

required under Brady or the Jencks Act to obtain and produce

them.15 The defendants wrongly say that was error. 

Brady stands for the proposition that “the suppression

by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon

request violates due process where the evidence is material

either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith

or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. A

Brady violation has three components: the evidence at issue

must be favorable to the defendant; it must be material; and it

must have been suppressed by the prosecution. United States

v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 209 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v.

Perdomo, 929 F.2d 967, 970 (3d Cir. 1991). Evidence is

material “if there is a reasonable probability that, had the

evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” United States v.

Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). Material evidence can

include evidence that may be used to impeach a witness. Id.

at 676; Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). 

Brady prohibits the prosecution from “supress[ing]”

material, favorable evidence, 373 U.S. at 187, but that does

not mean that the prosecution’s duty to disclose is limited to

evidence within the actual knowledge or possession of the

prosecutor. It is well-settled that the prosecution has a duty to

learn of and disclose information “known to the others acting

on the government’s behalf in the case ... .” Kyles v. Whitley,

514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995). Accordingly, it has been held that

a state prosecutor has a duty to obtain and turn over to the

defense favorable evidence known to a state police officer

Case: 06-1486 Document: 00311992490 Page: 18 Date Filed: 07/31/2008
19

who investigated the case. Id. at 437-38. Similarly, a federal

prosecutor is charged with knowledge of information

possessed by other agents of the federal government when

those agents are a part of a “prosecution team,” which

includes federal personnel involved in the investigation as

well as the prosecution of a case. Pellulo, 399 F.3d at 216-18;

see also United States v. Antone, 603 F.2d 566, 569 (5th Cir.

1979) (“[T]his Court has declined to draw a distinction

between different agencies under the same government,

focusing instead upon the ‘prosecution team’ which includes

both investigative and prosecutorial personnel.”).

In some cases, the government’s obligations under

Brady may extend even further. We have held that, under

certain circumstances, evidence possessed by state agents may

be constructively possessed by a federal prosecutor such that

the prosecutor has a duty to obtain that evidence and disclose

it to the defense. See United States v. Risha, 445 F.3d 298,

303-06 (3d Cir. 2006); see also Antone, 603 F.2d at 569-70. 

In Risha, we called this issue “cross-jurisdiction constructive

knowledge.” Risha, 445 F.3d at 299. We considered in that

case whether it was proper to impute to a federal prosecutor

the knowledge of state agents that a witness who had testified

in a federal criminal case expected leniency with respect to

unrelated state charges, in return for his cooperation in the

federal case. Id. Although the federal prosecutor did not

know that the witness expected leniency in state court in

return for his testimony, we concluded that the federal

prosecutor might, under certain circumstances, be deemed to

have constructive knowledge of that information if it was

known to the state agents. Id. at 306.

We held that a case-by-case analysis was appropriate

when considering a federal prosecutor’s constructive

knowledge, and we set forth three questions as relevant to the

analysis: “(1) whether the party with knowledge of the

Case: 06-1486 Document: 00311992490 Page: 19 Date Filed: 07/31/2008
 16Implied though not stated in this inquiry into

“intermingling” is the idea that the federal government would

be the controlling entity in a federal-state partnership. 

Whether that is a sound assumption in all cases is open to

debate. If the Risha test were applicable in the context of

cooperation between the United States and a foreign

sovereign, a proposition not without doubt (see infra), simply

showing an “intermingling” of assets would clearly not be

sufficient to show the control assumed in Risha.

20

information is acting on the government’s ‘behalf’ or is under

its ‘control’; (2) the extent to which state and federal

governments are part of a ‘team,’ are participating in a ‘joint

investigation’ or are sharing resources; and (3) whether the

entity charged with constructive possession has ‘ready access’

to the evidence.” Id. at 304. The first question concerns the

“intermingling” of the forces of the federal government with

the forces of the state sovereign.16 Id. The second question is

closely related to the first and asks whether the federal

government and the state “are part of a team or are engaged in

a joint effort” or whether they had a “close working

relationship.” Id. at 305. The last question considers whether

the information the defense alleges should have been

disclosed was available to the prosecution if it had sought to

discover it. Id. In Risha, we opined that facts indicating that

a state agent was heavily involved in the prosecution and

knew of impeachment evidence would support a conclusion

that federal prosecutors had constructive knowledge of that

evidence. Id. at 306.

Our holding in Risha relied, in part, on the opinion of

the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in

United States v. Antone. In that case, the Fifth Circuit

considered whether knowledge of state investigative agents

should be imputed to federal prosecutors where there was a

joint investigative task force composed of FBI agents and

Case: 06-1486 Document: 00311992490 Page: 20 Date Filed: 07/31/2008
21

state agents. Antone, 603 F.2d at 568-69. The defendants

argued that evidence that a witness’s attorney fees had been

paid by the state was material because it could have been used

to impeach the witness, and they argued further that the state

agents’ knowledge of that evidence should be imputed to the

federal prosecutors for purposes of determining whether the

evidence had been suppressed in violation of Brady. Id. at

569-70.

The Fifth Circuit agreed that the state agent’s

knowledge should be imputed to federal prosecutors. The

Court first noted that, if the investigators with knowledge of

the evidence had worked for a federal agency, their

knowledge would have been imputed to the prosecution for

Brady purposes. Id. at 569. The Court went on to consider

whether evidence in the possession of the state investigators

should be treated differently because those investigators

represented a different sovereign. Instead of imposing a

“rigid distinction” between knowledge possessed by the

federal and state agencies, the court endorsed a “case-by-case

analysis of the extent of interaction and cooperation between

the two governments.” Id. at 570. The Fifth Circuit

ultimately concluded that the knowledge of the state

investigators should be imputed to the federal prosecutors in

that case because the federal and state investigative agencies

had “cooperated intimately from the outset of [the]

investigation” and the degree of cooperation was “extensive.” 

Id. According to the Court, the state investigators essentially

“functioned as agents of the federal government under the

principles of agency law” and “were in a real sense members

of the prosecutorial team.” Id.

The situation in the present case is markedly different. 

First, and most obviously, it involves a foreign sovereign,

which implicates issues that may well make a showing of

effective federal control of foreign evidence more sensitive

Case: 06-1486 Document: 00311992490 Page: 21 Date Filed: 07/31/2008
 17We assume, for purposes of discussion only, that the

evidence sought by the defendants was both favorable to the

defense and material, focusing instead on Brady’s

requirement that the evidence must have been in the

possession of the prosecution.

22

and demanding than is suggested by the Risha factors. But

even if Risha were the operative test, the defendants do not

meet that less demanding standard.17 The first Risha

factor–whether the individuals with possession of the

requested information were acting on the federal

government’s “behalf” or were under its “control”–does not

support a determination of constructive possession in this

case. Risha, 445 F.3d at 304. There is nothing of record to

indicate that the nation of Colombia was somehow under

American control in the investigation of this case, or that any

Colombian authorities were members of a United States

“prosecution team.” Unlike the state agents in Antone,

Colombian authorities did not function as agents of the United

States government. It is true that the Colombian government

acted at the request of the prosecution in permitting the

federal investigators to interview Uribe; however, beyond the

initial recitation of the officially propounded questions, no

Colombian officials participated in that interview or any other

part of the investigation. Moreover, while Colombian

officials naturally participated in the Colombian judicial

proceeding that resulted in Uribe’s extradition, those

authorities did not function as agents of the United States

government or act under its control. Instead, they acted on

behalf of their own government in responding to a request

from the United States. The level of cooperation extended by

the Colombian government, while admirable, appears to have

been nothing more than the comity called for by treaty and

custom. We decline to adopt the defendants’ suggestion that

a determination of constructive possession is appropriate

Case: 06-1486 Document: 00311992490 Page: 22 Date Filed: 07/31/2008
 18The defendants point to a document that, they say,

suggests there was a joint investigation. The document is a

letter sent by Uribe in July 2004 to a Colombian Magistrate,

in which Uribe states that Maria Cristina Munoz, a Colombian

prosecutor, informed him in 2001 that United States Customs

agents wanted to interview him. In the letter, Uribe states that

he “spontaneously” told Munoz what he knew about the

conspiracy now at issue. (Joint Appendix 456.) The

defendants seem to contend that that letter establishes the

existence of a joint investigation between the United States

and Colombia. 

 It is questionable whether the defendants’ argument

with respect to Uribe’s July 2004 letter is properly put to us at

all since it does not appear to have been presented to the

District Court. In any event, the fact that Uribe spoke to a

Colombian prosecutor regarding the events alleged in the

Indictment does not indicate the existence of a joint

investigation. The relevant question, again, is not whether a

Colombian official may have learned of evidence relevant to

this case, but whether the Colombian government was

engaged in a cooperative investigation with the United States

government. Uribe’s letter does not suggest that it was. No

more persuasive is the defendants’ contention that a joint

investigation is shown by evidence that Carmen Colon, a

United States Department of Justice Judicial Attache,

contacted Uribe’s Colombian attorney regarding the United

23

whenever a foreign government responds to a request from

the United States for investigative or judicial assistance. 

Nor does the second Risha factor support a

determination of constructive possession. There was no joint

investigation by the United States and Colombian

governments regarding the events alleged in the Indictment. 

Indeed, there is no indication that the two governments shared

any investigative resources whatsoever.18 See

Case: 06-1486 Document: 00311992490 Page: 23 Date Filed: 07/31/2008
States’ desire to secure Uribe’s testimony. The defendants

have not explained how evidence of communications between

an agent of the United States government and Uribe’s

attorney demonstrates that there was a joint investigation

between the United States and the government of Colombia.

The defendants’ briefs also refer to a document that

they claim to have recovered after trial from a Colombian

court extradition file. That document appears to be a letter

sent by Uribe to the Attorney General of Colombia in May

2004 and is strikingly similar to Uribe’s July 2004 letter to the

Colombian Magistrate. Moreover, the May 2004 letter was

never presented to the District Court and is not properly part

of the record on appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 10(a). 

Despite the lack of evidence indicating a joint

investigation, the defendants argue that the District Court

should have held an evidentiary hearing regarding their

contention that the United States and Colombia undertook

such an investigation. However, as just indicated, the

defendants did not provide any good cause for a hearing. Put

simply, they have failed, both before the District Court and on

appeal, to articulate how an evidentiary hearing would have

helped them establish that there was a joint investigation. 

Because they did not make a threshold showing that a

material fact was in dispute, their demand for an evidentiary

hearing warranted no more consideration than the District

Court gave it. Cf. United States v. Panitz, 907 F.2d 1267,

1273 (1st Cir. 1990) (“The test for granting an evidentiary

hearing in a criminal case [is] substantive: did the defendant

make a sufficient threshold showing that material facts were

in doubt or dispute?”); Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Martinez,

780 F.2d 302, 306-08 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that an

evidentiary hearing regarding an alleged Brady violation was

appropriate when an affidavit submitted by the defendant to

the district court raised “genuine issues of material fact”)

(quoting United States v. Dansker, 565 F.2d 1262, 1264 (3d

24

Case: 06-1486 Document: 00311992490 Page: 24 Date Filed: 07/31/2008
Cir. 1977)).

25

Moon v. Head, 285 F.3d 1301, 1310 (11th Cir. 2002)

(refusing to impute to a Georgia state prosecutor evidence

possessed by Tennessee law enforcement officials when there

was no evidence that Tennessee officials and Georgia

prosecutors had participated in a joint investigation). 

Finally, the third Risha factor–whether the federal

government had “ready access” to the sought-after

information–does not support a determination of constructive

possession. Risha, 445 F.3d at 304. The record suggests that

the prosecution did not have access to the documents in

Uribe’s Colombian court file, aside from those documents it

was able to obtain from Uribe’s attorney in Colombia. Cf.

United States v. Hughes, 211 F.3d 676, 688 (1st Cir. 2000)

(holding that the prosecution was not required to produce

crime scene photographs in the possession of the Mexican

government because “the government has no duty to produce

evidence outside of its control”); United States v. Friedman,

593 F.2d 109, 120 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that Brady did not

require evidence seized by the Chilean government to be

produced when the federal government had no access to the

evidence). More importantly, though, we could not conclude

that the prosecution had constructive possession of the

requested documents in this case even if it could have

acquired them. The mere fact that documents may be

obtainable is insufficient to establish constructive possession. 

Without a showing that evidence is possessed by people

engaged in the investigation or prosecution of the case, we

have declined to hold that the evidence was constructively

possessed by federal prosecutors, despite its being in the

possession of another agent of the federal government and

Case: 06-1486 Document: 00311992490 Page: 25 Date Filed: 07/31/2008
 19This, of course, assumes that the exculpatory information

in question was not known to the prosecutors.

26

therefore presumably obtainable.19 See, e.g., Pelullo, 399

F.3d at 218 (holding that information known to officials in the

United States Department of Labor was not constructively

known to federal prosecutors when there was no indication

that the prosecution and the officials engaged in a joint

investigation or that the prosecution had any control over the

officials); United States v. Merlino, 349 F.3d 144, 154 (3d

Cir. 2003) (holding that there is no “duty on the prosecutor’s

office to learn of information possessed by other government

agencies that have no involvement in the investigation or

prosecution at issue”) (quoting United States v. Morris, 80

F.3d 1151, 1169 (7th Cir. 1996)).

In sum, after examining the factors set forth in Risha,

we conclude that the United States was not in constructive

possession of evidence, if there were any, possessed by

Colombian authorities, and thus there was no violation of

Brady in this case.

We also reject the defendants’ argument that the

prosecution was obligated by the Jencks Act to turn over

documents filed by Uribe in Colombia in opposition to his

extradition. Jencks requires the prosecution to produce a

witness statement “in the possession of the United States

which relates to the subject matter as to which the witness has

testified.” 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b). We have held that the phrase

“in the possession of the United States” should be read to

“require production only of statements possessed by the

prosecutorial arm of the federal government.” Merlino, 349

F.3d at 155 (quoting United States v. Dansker, 537 F.2d 40,

61 (3d Cir. 1976)); see also United States v. Weaver, 267 F.3d

231, 245 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he Jencks Act only applies to

evidence in the possession of the United States, and not state

Case: 06-1486 Document: 00311992490 Page: 26 Date Filed: 07/31/2008
 20 We recognize the existence of authority from the United

States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that suggests

the United States might have a duty under the Jencks Act to

attempt to obtain and produce written statements that are in

the actual possession of another sovereign when the two

governments have engaged in a joint investigation. See

United States v. Paternina-Vergara, 749 F.2d 993, 998 (2d

Cir. 1984) (holding that the most the Jencks Act requires

when there is a joint investigation is “a good-faith effort to

obtain the statements of prosecution witnesses in the

possession of the foreign government” and concluding that

the prosecution in that case had made such an effort). We

need not address that issue today, however, because, as

explained above, there was no joint investigation in this case. 

Cf. United States v. Durham, 941 F.2d 858, 860-61 (9th Cir.

1991) (holding that a federal prosecutor had no obligation

under the Jencks Act to provide written statements in the

possession of a state agency, noting that federal and state

agencies had not undertaken a joint investigation in that case). 

 21The defendants contend that the prosecution committed a

number of other Brady violations unrelated to the alleged

suppression of evidence in the possession of Colombian

authorities. As those additional arguments are vague,

conclusory, and, ultimately, unpersuasive, we address them

27

authorities ... .”); Friedman, 593 F.2d at 120 (holding that the

Jencks Act did not require the production of evidence that had

been seized by the Chilean government). In this case, the

documents sought were allegedly located in Uribe’s

Colombian court file. We reject any general assertion, and

certainly any assertion on this record, that Colombian courts

serve as an arm of the United States government.20 Therefore,

we also reject the defendants’ argument that the prosecution

was required to obtain and turn over those documents under

the Jencks Act.21

Case: 06-1486 Document: 00311992490 Page: 27 Date Filed: 07/31/2008
no further. 

28

C. Other challenges to the convictions

Jorge and Juan raise a number of other issues related to

their convictions, none of which, either alone or in

combination, warrant a new trial. First, Juan challenges the

District Court’s decision to deny his motion for severance. 

We review under an abuse-of-discretion standard a district

court’s decision not to sever defendants. Zafiro v. United

States, 506 U.S. 534, 538-39 (1993). Even if a district court

abuses its discretion, however, reversal is not required absent

a demonstration of “clear and substantial prejudice resulting

in a manifestly unfair trial.” United States v. Hart, 273 F.3d

363, 370 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(b) states that

defendants may be charged together in an indictment “if they

are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction,

or in the same series of acts or transactions, constituting an

offense or offenses.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(b). It further

provides that “[a]ll defendants need not be charged in each

count.” Id. Rule 14(a), in turn, permits a court to sever

defendants’ trials if the joinder of defendants in an indictment

“appears to prejudice a defendant.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 14(a). 

“[W]hen defendants properly have been joined under Rule

8(b), a district court should grant a severance under Rule 14

only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would

compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or

prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt

or innocence.” Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539. 

Juan does not contend that he and Jorge were

improperly charged together in the Indictment. Instead, he

appears to argue that the District Court abused its discretion in

declining to sever his trial from Jorge’s because evidence of

Case: 06-1486 Document: 00311992490 Page: 28 Date Filed: 07/31/2008
 22Portions of Juan’s brief appear to suggest that the District

Court should have granted his motion for severance not

because the joint trial created a risk of prejudice but because

of what actually developed during trial. But, of course, the

question of whether the District Court abused its discretion in

denying his motion for severance should be judged as of the

time the motion was ruled on. 

29

the separate conspiracy alleged in Counts 1 through 4, counts

which name only Jorge as a defendant, had the potential to

lead a jury to conclude Juan was involved in that conspiracy

and thus to unfairly lead the jury to find Juan guilty on Counts

5 and 6.22 Juan further argues that the joint trial subjected him

to actual prejudice, not only because the jury heard evidence

that was only relevant to Counts 1 through 4, but also because

the prosecutor confused Jorge’s and Juan’s names on multiple

occasions.

In denying Juan’s motion to sever, the District Court

concluded that any potential prejudice to Juan resulting from

the joint trial could be cured by limiting instructions, which

the District Court gave. We agree. The risk of unfair

prejudice in this case was not such that the District Court was

bound to grant Juan’s motion to sever. Cf. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at

540 (“[E]ven if there were some risk of prejudice, here it is of

the type that can be cured with proper instructions, and ‘juries

are presumed to follow their instructions.’”) (quoting

Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987)). 

However, even if we agreed with Juan that the District

Court abused its discretion in denying his motion to sever, he

has failed to demonstrate “clear and substantial prejudice

resulting in a manifestly unfair trial.” Hart, 273 F.3d at 370

(internal quotation marks omitted). There is no reason to

believe that the jury failed to understand the District Court’s

instructions regarding how to use the evidence offered against

Case: 06-1486 Document: 00311992490 Page: 29 Date Filed: 07/31/2008
 23The defendants’ argument that the District Court

improperly admitted testimony regarding a phone

conversation between Juan and Lagrotteria lacks merit

because the record reflects that the Court struck that

testimony and instructed the jury not to consider it. For the

same reason, there is nothing to the defendants’ argument that

the District Court erroneously admitted testimony from Uribe

that the jury might have understood to refer to prior drug

deals by the defendants. Finally, we cannot conclude that

District Court abused its discretion in admitting Lagrotteria’s

testimony regarding the amount of profit his co-conspirators

told him he could expect to receive for his participation in the

conspiracy. 

30

Jorge on Counts 1 through 4. Moreover, although “evidence

of a codefendant’s wrongdoing in some circumstances

erroneously could lead a jury to conclude that a defendant was

guilty,” Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539, Juan’s assertion that the jury

so erred in this case has no force, given the jury’s acquittal of

Jorge on Counts 1 through 4. Finally, although it appears that

the prosecutor mixed up Jorge’s and Juan’s names on more

than one occasion, the trial transcript indicates that, on each

occasion, the prosecutor either corrected himself or was

corrected by the Court. After examining the record, we are

unpersuaded that Juan suffered any prejudice, let alone clear

and substantial prejudice, by being tried with his brother, and

we therefore reject his challenge to the District Court’s denial

of his motion to sever.

Next, the defendants allege that many of the District

Court’s evidentiary rulings constituted abuses of discretion. 

These complaints truly warrant little comment. Suffice it to

say that, having examined the record, we see no abuse of

discretion in the experienced District Judge’s even-handed

rulings on evidentiary questions.23 We also reject Juan’s

assertion that the District Court abused its discretion in failing

Case: 06-1486 Document: 00311992490 Page: 30 Date Filed: 07/31/2008
31

to grant a mistrial after Lagrotteria testified regarding an

unrecorded phone conversation he had with Juan, during

which Juan was “clowning around” and told Lagrotteria that

Juan had a gun to Uribe’s head. (SA 594.) The District Court

immediately struck that portion of Lagrotteria’s testimony and

instructed the jury to disregard it. Assuming, without

deciding, that the challenged testimony was inadmissible, we

believe that the Court’s instruction was more than sufficient

to cure any unfair prejudice. 

In addition, we reject the defendants’ argument that the

District Court abused its discretion in failing to grant a

mistrial as a result of alleged prosecutorial misconduct during

closing arguments. Again, we are unpersuaded that the

challenged comments, assuming they were improper, affected

the jury’s ability to judge the evidence fairly. 

Finally, we decline the invitation to aggregate these

alleged errors and then conclude the defendants were deprived

of a fair trial. Even when all of the defendants’ complaints

are combined, the District Court’s handing of this highly

contentious case was admirable, not error-ridden.

D. Sentencing

We turn last to Juan’s challenge to his sentence. He

argues that he should be re-sentenced because, prior to his

sentencing, the District Judge spoke with Uribe off the record. 

The record in this regard is less than clear but it does appear

that the District Judge did speak with Uribe before sentencing

and that their discussion was outside of the presence of the

parties and was not transcribed. We are nevertheless

compelled to conclude that Juan waived any objection he

might otherwise have had regarding that discussion.

Case: 06-1486 Document: 00311992490 Page: 31 Date Filed: 07/31/2008
 24It’s unclear what the parties understood “in camera” to

mean. Statements by the prosecution indicate that it

contemplated the defendants being present during the portion

of Uribe’s cross-examination that was to be taken in camera. 

32

Prior to sentencing, the defendants moved for

downward departures under the advisory Guidelines. The

government opposed the motions and offered to put Uribe on

the stand at the sentencing hearing to provide a factual

rebuttal to the defendants’ contentions. The government

requested, however, that the District Court limit the

defendants’ cross-examination regarding the identity of one of

Uribe’s cocaine suppliers because Uribe believed he would be

in mortal danger if he openly named the supplier. The

defendants objected to any limitation being placed upon

Uribe’s cross-examination, but Juan’s counsel expressly

affirmed he had no objection to the sensitive portion of

Uribe’s testimony being taken “in camera.”24 (SA 3816.) 

On the morning of the sentencing hearing, counsel for

both sides spoke with the District Judge in chambers prior to

the hearing. That conference was not placed on the record. 

Later, at the beginning of the sentencing hearing, the District

Judge noted that the defendants had agreed during the off-therecord conference to withdraw their motions for downward

departures and that, as a result, the government was no longer

seeking to introduce Uribe’s testimony at the sentencing

hearing. The government still offered to have Uribe testify, if

the District Judge believed such testimony would be relevant

in determining the appropriate sentences to impose. The

Judge indicated, however, that he did not need to hear from

Uribe, that Uribe’s testimony would only have been relevant

to the defense motions for downward departure, which had

been withdrawn. The Court proceeded to sentencing without

further discussion on that point.

Case: 06-1486 Document: 00311992490 Page: 32 Date Filed: 07/31/2008
33

After the Court had imposed sentence, counsel for Juan

stated, “I forgot earlier after the ex parte meeting with Mr.

Uribe to register my objection.” (SA 3713.) The following

exchange then took place, in which the District Court

understandably displayed its consternation:

THE COURT: That’s very

fine, but I don’t recall that ever

being indicated to me before I

engaged in this exercise. I didn’t

hear any objection from anybody. 

...

What are you saying to

me?

[JUAN’S COUNSEL]:

That we did not have an

opportunity on the record to

object to the ex parte proceeding.

THE COURT: Where have

you been? I came out here a

number of times before I began

the sentencing and I never heard

anything about this. In fact, I kept

Uribe here in the event there

would be a problem about my

decision or your decision to not

proceed with the motion to depart. 

[JORGE’S COUNSEL]:

Your Honor advised us, me and

advised [another of Juan’s

counsel] and myself and [Juan’s

counsel] had an opportunity to

Case: 06-1486 Document: 00311992490 Page: 33 Date Filed: 07/31/2008
34

object had we so determined. So I

absent myself from --

THE COURT: I appreciate

that. I try to bend over backwards

to make this a fair proceeding. I

really do.

[JORGE’S COUNSEL]:

No question about that.

...

THE COURT: ... You

[Juan’s counsel] made the

objection for the record. Let me

make something for the record. 

You know, every time I do

this I regret it. It’s only happened

to me one time before. ...

Every time, at counsel[’]s

request, Judge can we see you in

chambers before you come out? I

thought to myself well, you know,

these are respected attorneys. I

rely on what they say. I don’t

have any problem discussing

preliminarily something that’s of

concern to them. So, I didn’t have

a Court Reporter in there which

reflects my trust in counsel. And

then to come out here now and

have defense counsel tell me that

Case: 06-1486 Document: 00311992490 Page: 34 Date Filed: 07/31/2008
35

they object to my ex parte

proceeding. In fact --

[JORGE’S COUNSEL]:

Not me.

THE COURT: I recognize

it’s [Juan’s counsel].

In fact, in chambers off the

record I think I originally said

government counsel will conduct

the [sic] examinaiton. Then I said

to myself well, that doesn’t make

any sense. Why should I have

government counsel in here with

defense counsel in here. So, I’ll

talk to the witness, Mr. Uribe,

myself with no counsel present. I

never heard a single objection

about that. ...

(SA 3713-15.) 

On appeal, Juan alleges that the District Judge may

have improperly relied on information he obtained by Uribe

during their private discussion in deciding upon the sentence

to impose. He requests that we vacate Juan’s sentence and

remand for re-sentencing before a different judge. Although

the precise basis for his assertion of error is not entirely clear,

he appears to contend that the conversation between Uribe

and the District Judge violated his right to due process

because any comment Uribe might have made was untested

and unreliable. 

Case: 06-1486 Document: 00311992490 Page: 35 Date Filed: 07/31/2008
 25We note, however, that there is no indication from the

transcript of the sentencing proceeding that, when deciding

upon the sentences to impose, the District Judge relied in any

way upon information he might have received from Uribe

during their private discussion.

 26We emphasize, though, that district courts should avoid

off-the-record discussions with either counsel or witnesses. 

As this case demonstrates, such a procedure may tempt a

disappointed party to adopt dubious tactics to overturn a

decision. Although counsel’s “I forgot to object” ploy is

devoid of merit, it provides a cautionary tale. 

36

After examining the transcript of the sentencing

proceeding, we conclude that Juan waived whatever argument

he might have had because he agreed to have the District

Court speak with Uribe off the record and alone prior to the

sentencing hearing.25 The transcript indicates that the Court

explicitly gave all counsel, including counsel for both Jorge

and Juan, an opportunity to structure how certain information

relevant to the defendants’ downward departure motions

would be received from Uribe. Counsel not only failed to

object, they played a direct role in developing how the

discussion with Uribe would take place. Under those

circumstances, the Judge understood–and it was entirely

reasonable for him to understand–that Juan, through his

counsel, had agreed to the Judge speaking with Uribe

privately prior to the sentencing hearing. Cf. United States v.

Mitchell, 85 F.3d 800, 807-09 (1st Cir. 1996) (counsel’s lack

of objection coupled with behavior suggesting assent

constituted a waiver). We share the District Court’s distress

at gamesmanship so blatant that even counsel for Juan’s

brother distanced himself from it, and we hold that Juan’s late

objection was waived.26

Case: 06-1486 Document: 00311992490 Page: 36 Date Filed: 07/31/2008
37

III. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the

District Court’s judgments of conviction and sentence. 

Case: 06-1486 Document: 00311992490 Page: 37 Date Filed: 07/31/2008