Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00415/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00415-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Farm and Trade, Inc.
Plaintiff
FarmTrade, LLC
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FARM AND TRADE, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

FARMTRADE, LLC, a North Carolina 

limited liability company, and DOES 1 

through 25, inclusive,

Defendants.

No. 2:14-cv-00415-MCE-CMK

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiff Farm and Trade, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against Defendant 

Farmtrade, LLC (“FarmTrade” or “Defendant”), seeking cancellation of Defendant’s 

federal trademark registration, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1064, 1119, and relief under the Declaratory 

Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). Plaintiff also alleges claims for false designation of 

origin, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A), and for violations of California’s Unfair Competition 

Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200-17210. Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss 

(“Motion”) for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 

for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).1 Mot., March 18, 2014, ECF No. 7. 

 1 All further references to “Rule” or “Rules” are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless 

otherwise noted.

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Plaintiff filed a timely opposition. Opp’n, April 3, 2014, ECF No. 10. For the reasons set 

forth below, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction is GRANTED.2

BACKGROUND3

Plaintiff incorporated in California in July 2004 and has been using the trade 

name and service mark “Farm and Trade” (“Mark”) continuously in commerce at all times 

since. Plaintiff’s actual use of the Mark dates back to June 2003. Since then, Plaintiff 

has used the Mark to identify its international crop brokerage services and related 

advisory/consulting services which pertain to commodity crop trading and exporting. 

Rice is the primary crop for which Plaintiff offers these services, and thus Plaintiff acts as 

a buyer, broker, and consultant to rice growers in California and around the world. In 

this capacity, Plaintiff publishes a monthly Farm and Trade Report, a well-known report 

in the rice and crop commodity industry; The Rice Trader, a weekly bulletin devoted to 

analyzing the rice market; and Rice Today, a quarterly publication devoted to rice 

research, trends, development, and other factual market forecast data. These 

publications are widely regarded as preeminent rice market authorities, and Plaintiff is 

widely regarded as an international rice industry leader. 

Plaintiff also sponsors international conferences featuring world-renowned rice 

industry leaders, decision makers, and research experts. Additionally, through Plaintiff’s 

affiliate ICI, Plaintiff offers a fully integrated media source connecting clients to all critical 

aspects of the rice industry, including research, analysis, conferences, and trading. 

Plaintiff therefore states that it has actual and potential consumers of its services 

worldwide. According to Plaintiff, “the ‘Farm and Trade’ Mark has become publicly 

associated exclusively with Plaintiff. It has become so closely associated with Plaintiff 

 2 Because oral argument would not be of material assistance, the Court orders this matter 

submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal. Local R. 230(g).

3 The following recitation of facts is taken, at times verbatim, from Plaintiff’s Complaint. Compl., 

Feb. 7, 2014, ECF No. 1.

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that Plaintiff has developed appreciable goodwill and industry-wide name recognition, 

and thus established protectable common law trademark rights therein.” Compl. at 4.

Defendant operates an online trading floor for agricultural chemicals. Defendant’s 

website is XSAg.com, and is identified by the URL www.xsag.com. Defendant’s website 

and online trading floor is highly interactive, and operates similar to well-known ecommerce sites such as eBay.com and Amazon.com. Defendant’s online services are 

systematically marketed to California residents, and a significant number of Defendant’s 

customers include California residents.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant knew of Plaintiff’s use of, and rights in, the Mark. 

Defendant filed its articles of organization in North Carolina on December 14, 2012, then 

under the name “FarmTrader, LLC.” However, on February 7, 2013, Defendant changed 

its name to “FarmTrade, LLC” (“Accused Mark”). In May 2013, Defendant filed an 

application for Federal Registration of the Accused Mark. The United States Patent and 

Trademark Office (USPTO) issued a Notice of Allowance on December 10, 2013, 

assigning the Accused Mark serial number 85931184. Plaintiff did not discover 

Defendant’s application for registration until mid-December 2013, when Plaintiff received 

an online announcement that Defendant would change its name from XSAg.com to 

FarmTrade. This announcement, and thus Plaintiff’s notice, came after the USPTO had 

issued a Notice of Allowance and the time for filing an opposition to Defendant’s

application expired. 

After learning of Defendant’s intent to use the name FarmTrade, Plaintiff 

contacted Defendant by email on December 17, 2013, and formally demanded that 

Defendant cease and desist using the Accused Mark. Plaintiff informed Defendant that 

Plaintiff had already experienced multiple instances of customer confusion—that is, 

according to Plaintiff, “customers mistaking Defendant for Plaintiff or Plaintiff’s affiliate.” 

Compl. at 5. Defendant has done nothing to address Plaintiff’s complaints, and has 

taken no action to remedy the “actual or probable” consumer confusion caused by 

Defendant’s use of the Accused Mark.

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STANDARD

A. Rule 12(b)(1)

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and are presumptively without 

jurisdiction over civil actions. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 

377 (1994). The burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting 

jurisdiction. Id. Because subject matter jurisdiction involves a court’s power to hear a 

case, it can never be forfeited or waived. United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 

(2002). Accordingly, either party may raise lack of subject matter jurisdiction at any point 

during the litigation through a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). Arbaugh v. 

Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006); see also Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs v. Cnty. of 

Plumas, 559 F.3d 1041, 1043-44 (9th Cir. 2009). Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may 

also be raised by the district court sua sponte. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 

526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). Indeed, “courts have an independent obligation to determine 

whether subject matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any 

party.” Id.; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (requiring the court to dismiss the action if 

subject matter jurisdiction is lacking).

There are two types of motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction: a 

facial attack, and a factual attack. Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. Gen. Tel. & Elec. Corp., 

594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979). Thus, a party may either make an attack on the 

allegations of jurisdiction contained in the nonmoving party’s complaint, or may 

challenge the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, despite the formal 

sufficiency of the pleadings. Id.

When a party makes a facial attack on a complaint, the attack is unaccompanied 

by supporting evidence, and it challenges jurisdiction based solely on the pleadings. 

Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). If the motion to

dismiss constitutes a facial attack, the Court must consider the factual allegations of the 

complaint to be true, and determine whether they establish subject matter jurisdiction. 

Savage v. Glendale High Union Sch. Dist. No. 205, 343 F.3d 1036, 1039 n.1 (9th Cir. 

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2003). In the case of a facial attack, the motion to dismiss is granted only if the 

nonmoving party fails to allege an element necessary for subject matter jurisdiction. Id. 

However, in the case of a facial attack, district courts “may review evidence beyond the 

complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” 

Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039. 

In the case of a factual attack, “no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff’s 

allegations.” Thornill, 594 F.2d at 733 (internal citation omitted). The party opposing the 

motion has the burden of proving that subject matter jurisdiction does exist, and must 

present any necessary evidence to satisfy this burden. St. Clair v. City of Chico, 

880 F.2d 199, 201 (9th Cir. 1989). If the plaintiff’s allegations of jurisdictional facts are 

challenged by the adversary in the appropriate manner, the plaintiff cannot rest on the 

mere assertion that factual issues may exist. Trentacosta v. Frontier Pac. Aircraft Ind., 

Inc., 813 F.2d 1553, 1558 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Exch. Nat’l Bank of Chi. v. Touche 

Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1131 (2d Cir. 1976)). Furthermore, the district court may 

review any evidence necessary, including affidavits and testimony, in order to determine 

whether subject matter jurisdiction exists. McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 

(9th Cir. 1988); Thornhill, 594 F.2d at 733. If the nonmoving party fails to meet its 

burden and the court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the court must 

dismiss the action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

B. Rule 12(b)(6)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), all 

allegations of material fact must be accepted as true and construed in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336,337-38 

(9th Cir. 1996). Rule 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of 

what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). A 

complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not require detailed factual 

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allegations. However, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to 

relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). 

A court is not required to accept as true a “legal conclusion couched as a factual 

allegation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 

at 555). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the 

speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. 

Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216 (3d ed. 2004) (stating that the pleading 

must contain something more than “a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion 

[of] a legally cognizable right of action.”)). 

Furthermore, “Rule 8(a)(2) . . . requires a showing, rather than a blanket 

assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 n.3 (internal citations and 

quotations omitted). Thus, “[w]ithout some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard 

to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirements of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of 

the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.” Id. (citing 5 Charles 

Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, supra, at § 1202). A pleading must contain “only enough 

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. If the “plaintiffs . . . 

have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their 

complaint must be dismissed.” Id. However, “[a] well-pleaded complaint may proceed 

even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and ‘that a 

recovery is very remote and unlikely.’” Id. at 556 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 

232, 236 (1974)).

C. Leave to Amend

A court granting a motion to dismiss a complaint under either Rule 12(b)(1) or 

12(b)(6) must then decide whether to grant leave to amend. Leave to amend should be 

“freely given” where there is no “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of 

the movant, . . . undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the 

amendment, [or] futility of the amendment . . . .” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 

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(1962); Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(listing the Foman factors as those to be considered when deciding whether to grant 

leave to amend). Not all of these factors merit equal weight. Rather, “the consideration 

of prejudice to the opposing party . . . carries the greatest weight.” Id. (citing DCD 

Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 185 (9th Cir. 1987)). Dismissal without leave 

to amend is proper only if it is clear that “the complaint could not be saved by any 

amendment.” Intri-Plex Techs. v. Crest Group, Inc., 499 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007) 

(citing In re Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 2005); Ascon Props., Inc. v. 

Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Leave need not be granted where 

the amendment of the complaint . . . constitutes an exercise in futility . . . .”)).

ANALYSIS

A. Lack of Jurisdiction

Plaintiff asserts claims arising under the laws of the United States—namely, the 

Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. However, Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s 

Complaint should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff’s 

Mark is not protectable under the Lanham Act, and because Plaintiff has failed to plead 

a ‘commercial use’ of the mark. Id. 

As set forth above, “[a] federal court may dismiss a federal question claim for lack 

of subject matter jurisdiction ‘only if (1) the alleged claim under the Constitution or 

federal statutes clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purposes of 

obtaining jurisdiction; or (2) such a claim is wholly insubstantial and frivolous.’” Leeson, 

671 F.3d at 975. In short, while “jurisdictional dismissals in actions based on federal 

questions are ‘exceptional,’” Leeson v. Transam. Disability Income Plan, 671 F.3d 969, 

975 (9th Cir. 2012), if a complaint fails to present a plausible assertion of a substantial 

federal right, a federal court does not have jurisdiction, see Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 

682-83; Enea Embedded Tech., Inc. v. Eneas Corp., 08-CV-1595-PHX-GMS, 2009 WL 

648891 (D. Ariz. Mar. 11, 2009) (dismissing complaint for lack of subject matter 

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jurisdiction where plaintiff’s complaint failed to allege use of mark in commerce);

Banga v. Am. Express Cards, No. 2:06-cv-0880-GEB-GGH-PS, 2007 WL 474182, at *3 

(E.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2007) (dismissing complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 

where plaintiff's federal claim was outside the scope of the Lanham Act because plaintiff 

failed to allege a deceptive commercial statement); Hancock Park Homeowners Ass'n 

Est.1948 v. Hancock Park Home Owners Ass'n, No. CV 06-4584 SVW, 2006 WL 

4532986, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept.20, 2006) (dismissing complaint for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction where plaintiff's alleged federal claim was outside the scope of the Lanham 

Act because plaintiff failed to plead a commercial use of plaintiff's trademark).

1. Claims Arising Under the Laws of the United States

In this case, Plaintiff brings a claim for false designation of origin. Compl. at 5. 

To state a claim for relief under this section, a plaintiff must show that: 1) the terms or 

logos in question are valid and protectable trademarks; 2) the plaintiff owns these marks 

as trademarks; 3) the plaintiff used these marks in commerce; and 4) the defendants 

used false or misleading descriptions of fact or “terms or designs similar to plaintiff's 

marks without the consent of the plaintiff in a manner that is likely to cause confusion 

among ordinary purchasers as to the source of the goods.” Dr. JKL Ltd. v. HPC IT Educ. 

Ctr., 749 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1049 (N.D. Cal. 2010).

Here, the first issue is whether Plaintiff’s Mark is actually a valid and protectable 

trademark. There are five categories of trademarks: (1) generic; (2) descriptive; 

(3) suggestive; (4) arbitrary; and (5) fanciful. Yellow Cab Co. of Sacramento v. Yellow 

Cab of Elk Grove, Inc., 419 F.3d 925, 927 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). 

“[S]uggestive, arbitrary, or fanciful [terms] are automatically entitled to trademark 

protection because they are inherently distinctive.” Platinum Home Mortgage Corp. v. 

Platinum Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 722, 727 (7th Cir. 1998). “[T]his question—

which category a name fits into—is at least in part a question of fact.” Closed Loop 

Mktg., Inc. v. Closed Loop Mktg., LLC, 589 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1217 (E.D. Cal. 2008) 

(quoting Yellow Cab. Co., 419 F.3d at 929). 

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“Descriptive marks ‘define a particular characteristic of the product in a way that 

does not require any exercise of the imagination.’” Yellow Cab Co., 419 F.3d 925, 927 

(9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Productions, 406 F.3d 625, 632 

(9th Cir. 2005)). Although “[m]arks which are merely descriptive of a product are not 

inherently distinctive,” “[a] descriptive mark can receive trademark protection if it has 

acquired distinctiveness by establishing ‘secondary meaning’ in the marketplace.” Two 

Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992). “Generic marks give the 

general name of the product; they embrace an entire class of products.” Yellow Cab, 

419 F.3d at 927 (quoting Kendall–Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 150 F.3d 

1042, 1047 n.8 (9th Cir. 1998)). “Generic marks are not capable of receiving protection 

because they identify the product, rather than the product's source.” Id. (quoting KP 

Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 408 F.3d 596, 602 (9th Cir. 

2005)).

“When a plaintiff pursues a trademark action involving a properly registered mark, 

that mark is presumed valid, and the burden of proving that the mark is generic rests 

upon the defendant. However, if the disputed term has not been federally registered,

and the defendant asserts genericness as a defense, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to 

show that the mark is nongeneric.” Yellow Cab Co., 419 F.3d at 927 (citing Filipino 

Yellow Pages v. Asian Journal Publs., Inc., 198 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 1999)). Here, 

Plaintiff’s Mark is not a registered mark, and Defendant asserts that the Mark is 

descriptive, in part because the USPTO determined that the name was not protectable 

when it rejected Plaintiff's application to register it as a trademark. Plaintiff contends that 

this rejection is not dispositive, because Plaintiff abandoned its application and thus the 

determination that the Mark is descriptive was not final. The USPTO’s “rejection has two 

consequences for this case. 

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First, plaintiff is not entitled to a presumption that the . . . mark . . . is protectable, and 

second, the PTO's evaluation may serve as a persuasive authority indicating that the 

mark is not protectable.” Closed Loop Mktg., Inc., 589 F. Supp. 2d at 1217 (citing

Schwan's IP, LLC v. Kraft Pizza Company, 379 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1021 (D. Minn.

2005)). 

With this persuasive authority from the USPTO in mind, the Court proceeds with 

its determination of whether the Mark is descriptive or generic. The Ninth Circuit has 

provided several articulations of the distinction between generic and descriptive marks. 

One way of describing the distinction is that “[a] generic, or common descriptive, term 

describes ‘the genus of which the particular product is a species’; [while] a merely 

descriptive mark ‘describes the qualities or characteristics of a good or service.’” Official 

Airline Guides v. Goss, 6 F.3d 1385, 1398 (9th Cir. 1993) (Ferguson, J., concurring and 

dissenting) (quoting Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194

(1985)). In Kendall–Jackson Winery v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, the Ninth Circuit held that a 

generic term “simply state[s] what the product is.” 150 F.3d 1042, 1047 n.8 (9th Cir.

1998). 

Another way to draw the distinction between generic and descriptive marks is the 

“who are you/what are you” test. “A [protectable] mark answers the buyer's questions 

‘Who are you?’ ‘Where do you come from?’ ‘Who vouches for you?’ But the generic 

name of the product answers the question ‘What are you?’” Yellow Cab Co., 419 F.3d at 

929-30 (citations omitted). Applying this test in Filipino Yellow Pages, the Ninth Circuit 

concluded that the name “‘Filipino yellow pages' answered the ‘what are you?’ question, 

and was thus a generic term . . . . [I]f asked, ‘What are you?’ . . . three competing 

companies could all answer ‘a Filipino yellow pages.’” Id. (internal citations omitted). 

Conversely, Yellow Cab Co., the Court found that the term “yellow cab” is non-generic, 

because

If one asks “What are you?” to companies called, for 

example, Checker Cab Co. or City Cab Co., one would 

expect the response “a taxicab company” or “a cab 

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company.” Posing the question: “Could you refer me to a 

yellow cab company?”, one would expect these same 

companies to point not to themselves, but to a business 

operating under the name “Yellow Cab.”

Id.

Applying this test, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s mark is descriptive. “Farm and 

Trade” does not answer the question “what are you?” Rather, it answers the question 

“who are you?” The “Farm and Trade” mark does not simply state what Plaintiff’s 

product or service is, and is therefore descriptive rather than generic. 

As a descriptive mark, Plaintiff’s Mark may receive trademark protection so long 

as it has “secondary meaning in the marketplace.” Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 768. 

“Secondary meaning” is a mental recognition in buyers' and potential buyers' minds that 

products connected with the symbol or device originate from or are associated with the 

same source. Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 632 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1980). 

Generally, secondary meaning is proven through evidence related to the amount and 

manner of advertising of the mark, sales volume, consumer testimony, whether use of 

the mark was exclusive, and consumer surveys. Fin. Exp. LLC v. Nowcom Corp., 

564 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1170 (C.D. Cal. 2008).

In this case, Plaintiff alleges nothing to show that its Mark has obtained a 

secondary meaning. Plaintiff states only that “the ‘Farm and Trade’ Mark has become 

publicly associated exclusively with Plaintiff. It has become so closely associated with 

Plaintiff that Plaintiff has developed appreciable goodwill and industry-wide name 

recognition, and thus established protectable common law trademark rights therein.” 

This formulaic recitation is not sufficient to show that “Farm and Trade” has secondary 

meaning in the marketplace. Plaintiff’s Complaint does not include any allegations 

showing that there is a mental recognition in the minds of consumers, or potential 

consumers, that Plaintiff’s services and products are connected with Plaintiff’s Mark and 

come from the same source. Thus, Plaintiff fails to show its Mark is entitled to protection 

under the Lanham Act.

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Plaintiff’s second cause of action is for cancellation of registered mark, pursuant 

to 15 U.S.C. §§ 1064 and 1119. Plaintiff states that “Defendant claims ownership of the 

registration of the Accused Mark. The registration, however, should be cancelled . . . 

because it was improvidently allowed despite Plaintiff’s superior common law rights in 

the Mark, which are presently harmed by the registration and subject to continuing harm 

in the absence of cancellation.” Compl. at 6. However, the Accused Mark is not yet 

registered—Defendant has attached evidence showing that Defendant has applied for 

registration, and has received a Notice of Allowance, but must complete additional steps 

before Defendant’s Mark is registered with the USPTO. 

“Registration is central to the statutory scheme and the court's ability to cancel or 

otherwise affect a service mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1064 allows the filing of ‘[a] petition to 

cancel a registration of a mark . . . within five years of the date of the registration of the 

mark or at other specified times.’” Whitney Info. Network, Inc. v. Gagnon, 353 F. Supp. 

2d 1208, 1211 (M.D. Fla. 2005).

Federal courts are given the power to cancel registered marks by 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1119. That section provides: 

In any action involving a registered mark the court may 

determine the right to registration, order the cancelation of 

registrations, in whole or in part, restore canceled 

registrations, and otherwise rectify the register with respect to 

the registrations of any party to the action. Decrees and 

orders shall be certified by the court to the Commissioner, 

who shall make appropriate entry upon the records of the 

Patent and Trademark Office, and shall be controlled thereby.

15 U.S.C. § 1119. Thus, a registered mark must exist before an action “involv[es] a 

registered mark.” Id. A mark does not become registered until the USPTO registers it. 

Whitney Info. Network, 353 F. Supp. 2d at 1211; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (“The term 

‘registered mark’ means a mark registered in the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office under this chapter.”).

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Thus, to state a claim under these statutory provisions, Defendant must hold a 

registered trademark with the USPTO. The existence of a pending application is not 

sufficient. Plaintiff therefore fails to state a successful claim for cancellation of a 

registered mark.

Because neither of Plaintiff’s claims which purport to present a case or 

controversy arising under the laws of the United States is, at this point, a meritorious 

claim, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case. 

2. Declaratory Judgment Act

Plaintiff’s third claim is for relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act. The 

Declaratory Judgment Act confers authority on any court of the United States to “declare 

the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, 

whether or not further relief is or could be sought.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). However, it 

requires the party seeking declaratory relief to establish “a case of actual controversy” 

within the court's jurisdiction. Id. The Declaratory Judgment Act is not an independent 

basis for subject-matter jurisdiction. Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 

667, 671-72 (1950). Rather, the party seeking declaratory judgment must establish that 

the court has jurisdiction from some other source. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 

300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937).

Because neither of Plaintiff’s claims arising under the laws of the United States 

survive, the Court does not have jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s request for a declaratory 

judgment. As such, this claim is dismissed.

3. Supplemental Jurisdiction

Plaintiff’s final claim alleges violations of California’s Unfair Competition Law, Cal. 

Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200-17210. A district court, within its discretion, may decline to 

exercise supplemental jurisdiction if it has dismissed all claims over which it once had 

original jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 

383 U.S. 715, 725–26 (1966) (“Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before trial . 

. . the state claims should be dismissed as well.”). Here, because Plaintiff has not 

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successfully brought a claim over which the Court has original jurisdiction, the Court 

declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this remaining claim. Plaintiff’s fourth 

claim is therefore dismissed.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons just stated, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) is GRANTED. 

ECF No. 8. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief 

can be granted is DENIED AS MOOT. 

Not later than twenty (20) days following the date this Memorandum and Order is 

electronically filed, Plaintiff may file an amended complaint. If no amended complaint is 

filed within said twenty (20) day period, without further notice to the parties, the causes

of action dismissed by virtue of this Memorandum and Order will be dismissed with 

prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 23, 2014

Case 2:14-cv-00415-MCE-CMK Document 14 Filed 04/23/14 Page 14 of 14