Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-55756/USCOURTS-ca9-14-55756-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Brian J. Farkas
Appellant
Emily Oberst
Appellee
Francisco Rios
Appellee
Betty D. Williams
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIAN J. FARKAS, an

individual,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

BETTY D. WILLIAMS, an

individual; FRANCISCO

RIOS, an individual; EMILY

OBERST, an individual,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 14-55756

D.C. No.

2:13-cv-03208-SJO-AGR

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

S. James Otero, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 8, 2016*

Pasadena, California

Filed May 24, 2016

* The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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2 FARKAS V. WILLIAMS

Before: Barry G. Silverman and Susan P. Graber, Circuit

Judges, and Jennifer A. Dorsey,

**

 District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Dorsey

SUMMARY***

Civil Rights

The panel affirmed the district court’s summary judgment

and dismissal of an action brought by a civil-service

employee under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of

Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

Plaintiff, an employee at a naval base, was placed on

administrative leave and directed to participate in an on-base

interview with a naval investigator concerning a budgetary

investigation. After he was cleared of the charges, he brought

a Bivens action against base administrators for employmentrelated due-process and First Amendment violations, and

against the investigator for Fourth Amendment violations. 

The panel first held that the Civil Service Reform Act of

1978 precludes employment-related Bivens claims by NonAppropriated Fund Instrumentality Program employees like

plaintiff, for whom Congress has provided other safeguards.

** The Honorable Jennifer A. Dorsey, United States District Judge for

the District of Nevada, sitting by designation.

 

*** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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FARKAS V. WILLIAMS 3

The panel further held that plaintiff did not suffer an

unconstitutional Fourth Amendment seizure when he was

asked to place his belongings in a lockbox per protocol during

his on-base interview with the naval investigator. The panel

concluded that plaintiff impliedly consented to the storage of

his belongings by voluntarily passing through an internal

checkpoint in a passage-restricted military installation.

COUNSEL

Richard Hamlish, Law Offices of Richard Hamlish, Westlake

Village, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Leon W. Weidman, Chief, Civil Division, and Jessica O.

Cheh, Assistant Attorneys General, and Stephanie Yonekura,

Acting United States Attorney, Los Angeles, California, for

Defendants-Appellees.

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4 FARKAS V. WILLIAMS

OPINION

DORSEY, District Judge:

Appellant Brian Farkas was a civil-service employee at a

naval base when he found himself at the center of a budgetary

investigation. He was placed on administrative leave and

directed to participate in an on-base interview with a naval

investigator. After Farkas was cleared of the charges, he

brought this Bivens1action against base administrators for

employment-related due-process and First Amendment

violations and against the investigator for Fourth Amendment

violations. The district court dismissed the employmentrelated claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and

entered summary judgment against Farkas on his Fourth

Amendment claim.

In this appeal, we consider whether the Civil Service

Reform Act of 1978 (“CSRA”) precludes employment-related

Bivens claims by Non-Appropriated Fund Instrumentality

Program (“NAFI”) employees like Farkas, for whom

Congress has provided other safeguards. We hold that it

does. We also evaluate whether Farkas suffered an

unconstitutional seizure when he was asked to place his

belongings in a lockbox per protocol during his on-base

interview with the naval investigator. We conclude that

Farkas suffered no Fourth Amendment violation because he

impliedly consented to the storage of his belongings by

voluntarily passing through an internal checkpoint in a

passage-restricted military installation.

1 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,

403 U.S. 388 (1971).

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FARKAS V. WILLIAMS 5

I. Procedural History

Farkas was a golf instructor at the naval base in Ventura

County, California, when he discovered that the pro shop’s

cashier was skimming cash from the register. Farkas blew

the whistle on the alleged theft only to find himself the target

of a criminal investigation into “a budgetary irregularity

concerning golf lesson revenue.” Base administration placed

Farkas on leave, and a Naval Criminal Investigative Services

(“NCIS”) detective investigated the theft and interviewed

Farkas on the base.

Although Farkas was ultimately cleared of wrongdoing,

reinstated, and given back pay, he commenced a Bivens

action to redress the severe emotional distress he claims he

suffered from the ordeal. He alleges that base administrators

retaliated against him for whistleblowing and violated his

due-process rights by placing him on leave without notice or

an opportunity to be heard. He also alleges that the NCIS

detective unconstitutionally seized him by directing him to

place his keys, wallet, and loose change in a lockbox during

the interview.

The district court held that it lacked subject-matter

jurisdiction over Farkas’s claims against the base

administrators because Bivens claims brought by NAFI

employees2

are impliedly precluded by the CSRA.3

 And the

2 NAFIs are quasi-governmental entities that are “not funded by

congressional appropriation,” so NAFI employees “are paid out of the

earnings generated by the activities of the NAFI.” Calder v. Crall,

726 F.2d 598, 600 (9th Cir. 1984).

 

3

 5 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.

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6 FARKAS V. WILLIAMS

court granted summary judgment for the detective on

Farkas’s Fourth Amendment claim, reasoning that the storage

of Farkas’s personal effects did not amount to a restraint on

his freedom of movement to the degree associated with a

formal arrest.4 Farkas timely appealed. We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, review de novo,5 and affirm.

II. Discussion

A. The district court properly dismissed Farkas’s

employment-related Bivens claims because they are

precluded by the CSRA.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Bivens authorized

constitutional-violation claims against federal employees for

money damages in limited circumstances.6 But Bivens claims

are impliedly precluded when there are “special factors

counseling” against affording a constitutional remedy.

7 We

recognized in Moore v. Glickman that “[t]he presence of a

deliberately crafted statutory remedial system is one ‘special

factor’ that precludes a Bivens remedy.”8

 

4

Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994) (per curiam).

5 Naffe v. Frey, 789 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2015); John Doe 1 v.

Abbott Labs., 571 F.3d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 2009).

 

6 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397.

7 Moore v. Glickman, 113 F.3d 988, 991 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting

Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 421 (1988)).

 

8

Id.

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FARKAS V. WILLIAMS 7

The deliberately crafted statutory mechanism that bars

Farkas’s employment-related Bivens claims against the base

administrators is the CSRA. That Act provides a

comprehensive scheme of administrative and judicial-review

remedies for certain federal employees. Congress enacted the

CSRA to replace “an outdated patchwork of statutes and rules

built up over almost a century.”9 The goal was “a single

unified personnel policy [that takes] into account the

requirements of all the various laws and goals governing

Federal personnel management.”10 The CSRA “replaced the

patchwork system with an integrated scheme of

administrative and judicial review, designed to balance the

legitimate interests of the various categories of federal

employees with the needs of sound and efficient

administration.”11

The fact that Congress excluded NAFI employees from

the CSRA’s remedial scheme12does not prevent the Act from

precludingFarkas’s employment-related Bivens claims. Even

inadequate statutory remedies counsel against recognizing a

Bivens claim “if there are ‘indications that congressional

action has not been inadvertent.’”13 Applying this rule, we

9

Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 1991) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

 

10 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

 

11 Id. (quoting United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 445 (1988)).

 

12 See 5 U.S.C. § 2105(c).

13 Moore, 113 F.3d at 993 (quoting Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 423); see also

Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 377 (1983) (declining to recognize federal

employee’s First Amendment claim because the CSRA’s “elaborate

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8 FARKAS V. WILLIAMS

held in Blankenship v. McDonald that the CSRA precluded a

Bivens action by a federal court reporter who had no effective

remedies under the Act, reasoning that “congressional action

has not been inadvertent in providing certain remedies and

denying others to judicial employees.”14

The same is true for NAFI employees. Both circuits that

have considered whether Congress’s exclusion of NAFI

employees from the CSRA’s remedialscheme was intentional

concluded that “Congress deliberately exempted NAFI

employees from federal civil service rules to enable the

armed services to carry out the missions of non-appropriated

fund organizations with the maximum possible personnel

flexibility.”15 And the Fourth Circuit specifically held in

Zimbelman v. Savage that the CSRA’s exclusivity in the

federal-employment context—when combined with the

availability of other safeguards—counseled against creating

a Bivens remedy for NAFI employees who alleged that they

were terminated without a name-clearing opportunity in

violation of the Fifth Amendment.16

We find Zimbelman persuasive. Congress’s exclusion of

NAFI employees from the CSRA’s remedial scheme does not

remedial system” providedwhistleblower sufficient remedies, even though

they were “not as completely effective as a Bivens-type action based

directly on the Constitution”).

 

14 Blankenship v. McDonald, 176 F.3d 1192, 1195 (9th Cir. 1999).

15 McAuliffe v. Rice, 966 F.2d 979, 981 (5th Cir. 1992); Zimbelman v.

Savage, 228 F.3d 367, 371 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting McAuliffe, 966 F.2d

at 981).

 

16 Zimbelman, 228 F.3d at 371.

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FARKAS V. WILLIAMS 9

appear inadvertent; indeed, the statute expressly exempted

them from the CSRA’s coverage in 5 U.S.C. § 2105(c). And

Farkas was not without remedies against the base

administrators. Title 10 U.S.C. § 1587 grants NAFI

employees whistleblower protection and vests the Secretary

of Defense with the responsibility to prevent and correct

retaliation against NAFI employees who report illegal or

wasteful activities; the Secretary has adopted regulations to

carry out that responsibility.

17 The Department of the Navy

has similarly promulgated grievance procedures for NAFI

employees who suffer adverse personnel actions.18 These

special factors counsel against recognizing a Bivens action for

Farkas’s employment-related claims, and we hold that the

district court properly declined to do so.

B. Farkas did not suffer an unconstitutional seizure

because he impliedly consented to the interview

conditions.

We turn to Farkas’s claim that the NCIS detective seized

him during the interview by requiring Farkas to place his

keys, wallet, and loose change in a lockbox before entering

the interview room. We affirm the district court’s entry of

summary judgment because Farkas impliedly consented to

17 DEP’T OF DEF. DIRECTIVE, NONAPPROPRIATED FUND

INSTRUMENTALITY (NAFI)EMPS.WHISTLEBLOWER PROT.PROGRAM,NO.

1401.03 (June 13, 2014), available at http://www.dodig.mil/Resources/

PolicyReferences/whistleblower/DoDD_1401_03.pdf(last visitedMay 4,

2016).

18 See DEP’T OF DEF. DIRECTIVE, PERSONNEL POLICY MANUAL FOR

NAFI EMPS., CNIC 5300.2 (May 10, 2011), available at

http://www.navymwr.org/resources/download/a549d8566b63426ba53b

00df6edeaf0e.pdf (last visited May 4, 2016).

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10 FARKAS V. WILLIAMS

this limited restraint on his freedom by voluntarily entering

the passage-restricted base and agreeing to enter the interview

room.19

Consensual encounters between civilians and the

government are “outside the ambit of the Fourth

Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable searches and

seizures.”20 We have applied this principle in the context of

military bases, holding that the usual Fourth Amendment

analysis does not apply because visitors give their implied

consent to be searched and seized when entering a military

base.21 As we reasoned in Morgan v. United States, the

typical trappings of a military base (e.g., “[t]he barbed-wire

fence, the security guards at the gate, the sign warning of the

possibility of search”) “combine to puncture any reasonable

expectations of privacy for a civilian” who voluntarily

enters.22

The same trappings identified in Morgan were at play

here. The Ventura County naval base is a restricted-access

19 See Kling v. Hallmark Cards Inc., 225 F.3d 1030, 1039 (9th Cir.

2000) (stating that the court may affirm on any ground supported by the

record).

20 United States v. Redlightning, 624 F.3d 1090, 1103 (9th Cir. 2010)

(quoting United States v. Kim, 25 F.3d 1426, 1430 (9th Cir. 1994)). In his

complaint, Farkas alleged that the detective also violated his Fourth

Amendment rights with a pat-down search, and the district court

summarily adjudicated this claim in the detective’s favor. On appeal,

Farkas concedes that the search was constitutional.

 

21 Morgan v. United States, 323 F.3d 776, 782 (9th Cir. 2003).

22

Id. at 781–82 (quoting United States v. Jenkins, 986 F.2d 76, 79 (4th

Cir. 1993)).

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FARKAS V. WILLIAMS 11

military base. Each point of entry is gate-guarded and dotted

with warning signs alerting visitors that access is restricted,

all persons and vehicles are subject to search, the base is

patrolled by military working dogs, and violators will be

prosecuted. Farkas’s assertion that his consent did not extend

to the storage of his personal items is belied by the objective

circumstances. Farkas passed the warning signs, met the

investigator in the parking lot, and agreed to place his

belongings into a lockbox before voluntarily entering the

interview room. By passing through an internal checkpoint,

which the investigator was required to administer, Farkas

reaffirmed by his conduct what had been established at the

gate: that he impliedly consented to the possibility of a Fourth

Amendment intrusion.23

AFFIRMED.

23 In his brief, Farkas makes a passing reference to a possible Fourth

Amendment claim arising from the taking of his fingerprints and

photograph before he was allowed to leave the interview. Because this

potential issue was not developed in the brief, we deem it waived and

decline to reach it. See Greenwood v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 28 F.3d 971,

977 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[A] bare assertion does not preserve a claim,

particularly when, as here, a host of other issues are presented for

review.”).

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