Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-07-02541/USCOURTS-ca8-07-02541-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Julio Garcia-Hernandez
Appellee
United States
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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Nos. 07-2310/2541

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United States of America,

Appellee/Cross-Appellant,

v.

Julio Garcia-Hernandez, 

Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

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Appeal from the United States

District Court for the 

Northern District of Iowa.

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Submitted: March 12, 2008

 Filed: July 7, 2008

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Before RILEY, GRUENDER and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

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GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

After a jury trial, Julio Garcia-Hernandez was convicted of conspiring to

distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§

841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) and 846, and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug

trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The district court denied GarciaHernandez’s motion for judgment of acquittal or, in the alternative, for a new trial and

sentenced him to 240 months’ imprisonment. Garcia-Hernandez appeals the district

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court’s denial of his post-trial motion. The Government appeals the district court’s

refusal to impose at least a three-level aggravating role enhancement to its advisory

United States Sentencing Guidelines determination and its decision to vary downward

from the advisory guidelines range. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm

Garcia-Hernandez’s convictions but vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing.

I. BACKGROUND 

In May 2006, Donald Steburg, Jr., provided information to members of the

Webster County Sheriff’s Department about his previous distribution and use of

methamphetamine. Steburg said he purchased methamphetamine from GarciaHernandez. Steburg and Garcia-Hernandez communicated with each other by phone,

and Steburg met with Garcia-Hernandez or his associates to get methamphetamine at

different locations, including Garcia-Hernandez’s trailer home and the Jo-Mart Motel.

While Steburg normally would pay cash for the methamphetamine, Garcia-Hernandez

sometimes fronted the methamphetamine to Steburg. At the time Steburg contacted

the officers, Garcia-Hernandez had left two voice messages for Steburg about the

$5,000 to $6,000 that Steburg owed him for past drug transactions.

Based on this information, law enforcement planned a controlled buy of

methamphetamine by Steburg from Garcia-Hernandez. Steburg called GarciaHernandez to arrange the buy. Steburg asked Garcia-Hernandez if he had any “work”

or “motorcycles,” words they used to refer to drugs, and they set up a meeting for the

next day. Iowa Division of Narcotics Enforcement Special Agent John Howard and

Steburg drove to Garcia-Hernandez’s trailer home for that meeting. Steburg was

outfitted with a wire transmitter. Once Garcia-Hernandez and Steburg were in the

trailer, Garcia-Hernandez told Steburg that he needed to pay his debts. Steburg

responded that he needed some time to get the money. Garcia-Hernandez directed

Steburg to meet him at the Jo-Mart Motel later that day with the money. 

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Special Agent Howard and Steburg later drove to the Jo-Mart Motel, and

Steburg entered a motel room with Jose Alejandro DeLuna-Ponce, GarciaHernandez’s cousin. Garcia-Hernandez was waiting in the room with Miguel Angel

Rolon-Ramos. Steburg saw a gun next to Garcia-Hernandez and turned to leave the

room. Garcia-Hernandez picked up the gun and instructed DeLuna-Ponce and RolonRamos to lock the door and block Steburg from leaving. Garcia-Hernandez demanded

money from Steburg, and Steburg said he would leave his cell phone with GarciaHernandez as an assurance that he would go to his vehicle to get the money and return

to the motel room. After Garcia-Hernandez told Steburg he had “work” for him, he

took Steburg’s cell phone and let Steburg leave to get the money. Steburg returned

to the vehicle and told Special Agent Howard that Garcia-Hernandez had a gun. They

left the parking lot.

During the meeting at the Jo-Mart Motel, other members of law enforcement

were conducting surveillance of the area. Special Agent Mark Minten of the Drug

Enforcement Administration monitored the conversations through the wire transmitter

that Steburg was wearing and observed from the tone of Steburg’s voice that

something had gone wrong when Steburg entered the room. After Steburg left the

motel room, Special Agent Minten received a call on his cell phone from Steburg’s

cell phone. During that call, Garcia-Hernandez made arrangements to sell

methamphetamine to Special Agent Minten. Sioux City Police Officer Mike Simons

also conducted surveillance from outside of the Jo-Mart Motel. After Steburg left the

motel room, Officer Simons observed Rolon-Ramos leave the motel room with his

right elbow tucked into his right side as he glanced around the area and went around

a corner of the motel. Rolon-Ramos then returned to the motel room. As GarciaHernandez, DeLuna-Ponce and Rolon-Ramos each left the motel room, they were

arrested. The officers searched the motel room and seized a small amount of

methamphetamine but did not find the firearm. They also did not find the firearm

after a search of the area surrounding the motel. 

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At the jury trial, the Government presented evidence that Garcia-Hernandez

conspired with various individuals to distribute 500 grams or more of

methamphetamine (Count 1) and possessed a firearm in furtherance of a drug

trafficking crime (Count 2). Steburg testified about his involvement with GarciaHernandez’s methamphetamine trafficking operation and the events surrounding

Garcia-Hernandez’s arrest. Jason Boldon testified that he obtained more than fifteen

pounds of methamphetamine from Garcia-Hernandez and his associates. Like

Steburg, he testified that he usually paid cash for the methamphetamine, but GarciaHernandez sometimes fronted him the drugs. Both Steburg and Boldon testified that

they would sell some of the methamphetamine they obtained from Garcia-Hernandez

to other people. The jury returned a guilty verdict against Garcia-Hernandez on both

counts.

At sentencing, the district court determined that Garcia-Hernandez’s base

offense level was 36 based on the quantity of methamphetamine involved in the

conspiracy. The Government sought at least a three-level upward adjustment for an

aggravating role pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, which Garcia-Hernandez opposed.

The district court declined to impose a three- or four-level upward adjustment because

it found that the conspiracy did not involve five or more participants and was not

otherwise extensive. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a), (b). The district court instead imposed

a two-level aggravating role adjustment because it found that Garcia-Hernandez

managed or supervised at least one other participant in the crime, DeLuna-Ponce. See

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c). Garcia-Hernandez’s advisory sentencing guidelines range for

the conspiracy conviction, based on a total offense level of 38 and a criminal history

category of I, was 235 to 293 months’ imprisonment. Garcia-Hernandez requested a

variance based, in part, on his inability to participate in an early release program due

to his illegal alien status. The district court granted a downward variance and

sentenced Garcia-Hernandez to 180 months’ imprisonment on the conspiracy

conviction and a mandatory, consecutive sentence of 60 months’ imprisonment on the

firearm conviction, for a total sentence of 240 months’ imprisonment. GarciaHernandez appeals his convictions, and the Government appeals his sentence.

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II. DISCUSSION

A. Post-Trial Motion

Garcia-Hernandez argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the

verdicts and that the district court erred by denying his motion for judgment of

acquittal or, in the alternative, for a new trial. We affirm Garcia-Hernandez’s

convictions.

1. Judgment of Acquittal

“We review de novo a district court’s denial of a motion for judgment of

acquittal.” United States v. McAtee, 481 F.3d 1099, 1104 (8th Cir. 2007). “We view

the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict and we draw all

reasonable inferences in the government’s favor . . . .” Id. “[W]e will uphold the

verdict if there is any interpretation of the evidence that could lead a reasonableminded jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States

v. Cole, 525 F.3d 656, 661 (8th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). “Both direct and

circumstantial evidence can be the basis of a conviction.” United States v. Beckman,

222 F.3d 512, 522 (8th Cir. 2000). Furthermore, we must not “weigh the evidence or

assess the credibility of witnesses.” United States v. Santana, 524 F.3d 851, 853 (8th

Cir. 2008).

a. Drug Distribution Conspiracy 

After reviewing the evidence presented to the jury, we find that the district court

did not err by denying Garcia-Hernandez’s motion for judgment of acquittal with

respect to his conspiracy conviction. “To establish that a defendant conspired to

distribute drugs under 21 U.S.C. § 846, the government must prove: (1) that there was

a conspiracy, i.e., an agreement to distribute the drugs; (2) that the defendant knew of

the conspiracy; and (3) that the defendant intentionally joined the conspiracy.” United

States v. Rolon-Ramos, 502 F.3d 750, 754 (8th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). “An

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agreement to join a conspiracy need not be explicit but may be inferred from the facts

and circumstances of the case.” United States v. Rodriguez-Mendez, 336 F.3d 692,

695 (8th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation omitted). Furthermore, “evidence of multiple

sales of resale quantities of drugs is sufficient in and of itself to make a submissible

case of a conspiracy to distribute.” United States v. Eneff, 79 F.3d 104, 105 (8th Cir.

1996). Additionally, the length of time participants know each other and their

“established methods of payment” may support the existence of a conspiracy. United

States v. Washington, 318 F.3d 845, 852 (8th Cir. 2003). 

Steburg testified that he purchased at least ten pounds of methamphetamine for

further distribution from Garcia-Hernandez and his associates over several months.

While DeLuna-Ponce sometimes delivered the methamphetamine to Steburg, Steburg

testified that he always made the arrangements for those meetings with GarciaHernandez. Steburg also testified that he met Garcia-Hernandez at various locations

to conduct the drug transactions and, while he usually paid cash for the

methamphetamine, Garcia-Hernandez sometimes fronted the methamphetamine to

Steburg. When he fronted the methamphetamine to Steburg, Steburg would then sell

the drugs to other individuals and repay Garcia-Hernandez with that money. 

Steburg also testified about the events on the day of Garcia-Hernandez’s arrest.

Garcia-Hernandez told Steburg at Garcia-Hernandez’s trailer that Steburg needed to

pay his debt. Garcia-Hernandez then met Steburg at the Jo-Mart Motel where GarciaHernandez threatened Steburg with a gun, demanded payment, and instructed

DeLuna-Ponce and Rolon-Ramos to prevent Steburg from leaving the room. GarciaHernandez also discussed more “work” he had for Steburg before keeping Steburg’s

cell phone and letting him leave the room to get the money.

Garcia-Hernandez argues that “[a]bsent Steburg’s questionable testimony, there

is not an indictable conspiracy.” Appellant’s Br. at 10. He contends that Steburg

testified falsely to avoid going to prison for his drug dealings. However, in reviewing

the denial of a judgment of acquittal, it is not our role to assess Steburg’s credibility.

See Santana, 524 F.3d at 853. Steburg provided testimony about his involvement in

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an extensive methamphetamine distribution conspiracy with Garcia-Hernandez and

others. The jury assessed Steburg’s credibility and quite reasonably determined that

a methamphetamine distribution conspiracy existed and that Garcia-Hernandez

knowingly participated in it. Therefore, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient

for a reasonable jury to find that Garcia-Hernandez was guilty of conspiring to

distribute methamphetamine. 

b. Possession of a Firearm

The district court also did not err in denying Garcia-Hernandez’s motion for

judgment of acquittal with respect to his firearm conviction. To establish that a

defendant possessed a firearm in violation of § 924(c), the Government must prove

that “(1) he committed a drug trafficking crime, and (2) he possessed a firearm in

furtherance of that crime.” Rolon-Ramos, 502 F.3d at 757. We have already held that

sufficient evidence supported Garcia-Hernandez’s methamphetamine distribution

conspiracy conviction. We now turn to the second element, whether sufficient

evidence supports the jury’s conclusion that Garcia-Hernandez possessed a firearm

in furtherance of that conspiracy. 

Garcia-Hernandez argues that there was insufficient evidence that he possessed

a firearm because the officers did not recover any firearm at the Jo-Mart Motel.

However, “proof that a defendant possessed a firearm may be established solely by

eyewitness testimony where the gun is not recovered or introduced at trial.” United

States v. Anderson, 78 F.3d 420, 423 (8th Cir. 1996). Garcia-Hernandez also argues

that Steburg’s testimony is contradicted by the fact that he did not mention the

presence of the firearm while he was in the motel room. We disagree with GarciaHernandez’s contention that Steburg’s failure to verbally reference the presence of the

gun in the motel room contradicts his testimony that Garcia-Hernandez had a gun.

Steburg immediately told Special Agent Howard of the gun when he left the motel

room. Furthermore, Special Agent Minten, who was listening to the conversation

through the wire transmitter, heard Steburg’s voice when he entered the motel room

and noticed that something was wrong with the situation. This would be consistent

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with Steburg’s testimony that he saw a gun in the motel room and that GarciaHernandez pointed the gun at him. Additionally, Officer Simons observed RolonRamos leave the motel room with his elbow tucked into his side as if he was hiding

something, which could explain why the gun was not found. 

Garcia-Hernandez then argues that Steburg’s testimony is not sufficient to

establish his possession of a firearm because it does not establish the item Steburg saw

was a firearm, and not a toy gun. Steburg’s testimony, though, is sufficient to

establish that Garcia-Hernandez possessed a firearm. See Anderson, 78 F.3d at 423;

see also United States v. Jones, 16 F.3d 487, 491 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that “[t]he

mere possibility that the object seen by witnesses may have been a sophisticated toy

or other facsimile does not necessarily create a reasonable doubt, nor is the

government required to disprove that theoretical possibility”). 

Garcia-Hernandez next argues that any gun he possessed at the Jo-Mart Motel

was not possessed in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. “The term ‘furtherance’

as used in § 924(c) should be given its plain meaning, ‘the act of furthering,

advancing, or helping forward.’” Id. at 758 (quotation and alteration omitted). A

person’s possession of a firearm furthers a drug distribution conspiracy crime when

he uses it to frighten another person into paying a debt owed for a previous drug

transaction. Id.; see also United States v. Hamilton, 332 F.3d 1144, 1149 (8th Cir.

2003) (holding that a gun furthered a drug trafficking crime when the defendant used

it to frighten people into returning drugs he believed were stolen from him and to

discourage them from stealing drugs in the future). Garcia-Hernandez contends that

the evidence proves, at most, that he sought the payment of a debt from Steburg, not

necessarily a drug debt. He bases this argument, in part, on the fact that the

Government was not able to complete a controlled buy between Garcia-Hernandez

and Steburg. However, in light of Steburg’s testimony and the context in which

Garcia-Hernandez brandished the gun, we believe a jury could reasonably conclude

that Garcia-Hernandez pointed the gun at Steburg in order to further his efforts to

collect money that Steburg owed him for methamphetamine that Garcia-Hernandez

had fronted to Steburg in a prior transaction. Garcia-Hernandez’s actions in the motel

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room were part of the drug trafficking crime, and the firearm that Garcia-Hernandez

possessed in the motel room furthered this crime because its use was intended to

ensure that Steburg would pay Garcia-Hernandez for previous drug transactions. See

Rolon-Ramos, 502 F.3d at 758. Therefore, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient

to establish that Garcia-Hernandez possessed a firearm in the motel room in

furtherance of the methamphetamine distribution conspiracy. 

2. New Trial

We review a district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial for an abuse of

discretion. United States v. Sturdivant, 513 F.3d 795, 802 (8th Cir. 2008). We “may

‘vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires.’” Id.

(quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a)). We also 

may weigh the evidence and evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.

However, the authority to grant a new trial should be exercised sparingly

and with caution. The jury’s verdict must be allowed to stand unless the

evidence weighs heavily enough against the verdict such that a

miscarriage of justice may have occurred.

Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted) (alteration omitted). Applying this

standard of review, including weighing the evidence and evaluating the credibility of

the witnesses, we find that the jury’s verdicts do not result in a miscarriage of justice.

Steburg’s testimony regarding his purchase of multiple pounds of methamphetamine

from Garcia-Hernandez and his payment method was corroborated by Boldon’s

testimony that he similarly purchased multiple pounds of methamphetamine from

Garcia-Hernandez and was sometimes fronted the drugs. Furthermore, GarciaHernandez used Steburg’s cell phone at the Jo-Mart Motel to call Special Agent

Minten and arrange another drug sale just before his arrest. Although the evidence

with respect to the firearm count is not as compelling, we cannot conclude that the

evidence weighs so heavily against the verdict as to create a miscarriage of justice.

Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying GarciaHernandez’s motion for a new trial. 

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 B. Sentencing

The Government argues that the district court erred in sentencing GarciaHernandez because it did not impose a three- or four-level upward adjustment based

on a finding that the conspiracy had at least five participants and because it varied

downward based on an inappropriate factor. In reviewing his sentence, we

must first ensure that the district court committed no significant

procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating)

the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to

consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly

erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence–

including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. ---, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). If the district court did

not commit a procedural error, we then determine whether the sentence is

substantively reasonable under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Id. We find that the

district court committed procedural errors in its imposition of an aggravating role

enhancement and its reliance on an improper factor in granting a downward variance.

1. Aggravating Role Enhancement

“We review for clear error the district court’s factual findings underlying the

imposition of a sentencing enhancement based on the defendant’s role in the offense.”

United States v. McDonald, 521 F.3d 975, 978 (8th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted).

Under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a), a district court should increase a defendant’s offense level

by four levels if he “was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five

or more participants or was otherwise extensive.” If a defendant was a “manager or

supervisor” of a criminal activity involving five or more participants or that was

otherwise extensive, then a district court should increase the defendant’s offense level

by three levels. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b). If a defendant was a manager or supervisor of

a criminal activity that did not involve five or more participants and was not otherwise

extensive, then a district court should increase the defendant’s offense level by two

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levels. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c). For U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 purposes, “[a] ‘participant’ is a

person who is criminally responsible for the commission of the offense, but need not

have been convicted.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.1. “Participants . . . include

intermediaries who sell drugs on behalf of the defendant.” United States v. Matlock,

109 F.3d 1313, 1317 (8th Cir. 1997). 

The district court determined that Garcia-Hernandez was a manager or

supervisor of the conspiracy but that the conspiracy only involved three participants:

Garcia-Hernandez, DeLuna-Ponce and Rolon-Ramos. The district court held that

Steburg and Boldon were merely customers of Garcia-Hernandez and not participants

in the conspiracy. Therefore, the district court only increased Garcia-Hernandez’s

total offense level by two levels. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c). The Government argues

that the district court should have added at least three offense levels because five or

more participants were involved in the conspiracy. Garcia-Hernandez argues that the

district court correctly determined that Steburg and Boldon were only customers of

Garcia-Hernandez.

The Government has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence

that the aggravating role enhancement is warranted. See United States v. Mesner, 377

F.3d 849, 851-52 (8th Cir. 2004). We find that the district court clearly erred in

finding that the Government failed to satisfy its burden of proving by a preponderance

of the evidence that there were five participants in the conspiracy, and, therefore, the

district court erred by not adding at least three levels pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a),

(b). Steburg and Boldon both testified that they received large amounts of

methamphetamine from Garcia-Hernandez and his associates during numerous

meetings at various locations. They also both testified that they sold some of this

methamphetamine to other individuals. When they purchased the methamphetamine

from Garcia-Hernandez and his associates, they mostly paid cash for the

methamphetamine, but Garcia-Hernandez sometimes fronted the methamphetamine.

When he fronted the methamphetamine, they were required to repay him after selling

the methamphetamine to others. Therefore, Steburg and Boldon, though not

convicted, were criminally responsible for the commission of the methamphetamine

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1

Because we hold that Steburg’s and Boldon’s participation in the conspiracy

resulted in five or more participants, we need not address the Government’s arguments

concerning whether other individuals participated in the conspiracy or whether the

conspiracy was “otherwise extensive” under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b).

2

Because we hold that the district court committed procedural errors, we do not

address the next step of the Government’s argument and determine whether GarciaHernandez’s sentence is substantively unreasonable because he is not similarly

situated with the other defendants. See Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597; United States v.

Desantiago-Esquivel, 526 F.3d 398, 401-02 (8th Cir. 2008) (remanding the case for

resentencing after determining that the district court committed a procedural error and

declining to review the sentence for substantive reasonableness at that time because

of the procedural error); see also United States v. Smart, 518 F.3d 800, 804-05 (10th

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distribution conspiracy offense and, therefore, were participants in the offense, along

with Garcia-Hernandez, DeLuna-Ponce and Rolon-Ramos. See Matlock, 109 F.3d at

1317. The district court clearly erred in holding otherwise.1

 

2. Downward Variance

The Government also argues that the district court granted Garcia-Hernandez

a downward variance based on an improper factor. While the district court stated that

its “main reason for this variance is going to be . . . the need to avoid unwarranted

sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found

guilty of similar conduct,” Sentencing Tr. at 133, the district court also based its

decision to vary on the fact that prisoners who are United States citizens are eligible

for early release programs but prisoners who are illegal aliens are ineligible for this

early release. However, Garcia-Hernandez’s conviction for possessing a firearm, in

violation of § 924(c), makes him ineligible for early release, regardless of whether he

is a United States citizen or an illegal alien. See 28 C.F.R. § 550.58(a)(1)(vi)(B).

Therefore, the district court committed a procedural error by relying on an erroneous

factor. See Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597; United States v. Burnette, 518 F.3d 942, 949 (8th

Cir. 2008), petition for cert. filed, --- U.S.L.W. --- (U.S. June 4, 2008) (No. 07-11317)

(stating that a district court commits a procedural error when it considers an improper

factor).2

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Cir. 2008) (stating that “whether any . . . disparity [between codefendants] justifies a

sentencing variance in a given case raises a . . . question . . . of substantive

reasonableness”).

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III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Garcia-Hernandez’s convictions but vacate

his sentence and remand for resentencing consistent with this opinion.

_____________________________

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