Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-15-01424/USCOURTS-ca10-15-01424-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Federal Bureau of Prisons
Appellee
Darren Foster
Appellee
Patricia Rangel
Appellee
Robert Dale Shepard
Appellant
Daniel Shepherd
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

ROBERT DALE SHEPARD, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

PATRICIA RANGEL, ADX, General 

Population Unit Manager, individually and 

in her official capacity; DARREN 

FOSTER, ADX Counselor, individually 

and in his official capacity; DANIEL 

SHEPHERD, ADX, Correctional Officer, 

individually and in his official capacity; 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 15-1424 

(D.C. No. 1:12-CV-01108-RM-KLM) 

(D. Colo.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before LUCERO, MATHESON, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Robert Shepard appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to reopen the 

time to appeal. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we vacate the district 

court’s order and remand for further proceedings. 

 *

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

July 29, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

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2 

The district court dismissed Shepard’s complaint on December 24, 2014. 

Shepard did not file a timely notice of appeal. On June 15, 2015, he filed a motion to 

reopen the time for filing a notice of appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) and Fed. R. 

App. P. 4(a)(6). In the motion, Shepard alleged that, despite his diligence in 

attempting to determine whether a final order had entered, he had not received notice 

of the court’s final judgment. He also asserted that defendants would not suffer 

prejudice from reopening the time to appeal. Without receiving a response from the 

defendants, the district court denied the motion, holding Shepard had failed to 

demonstrate that defendants would not be prejudiced by reopening the time to appeal. 

This appeal followed.1

We “review the district court’s determination of whether to grant a motion for 

an extension of time within which to file a notice of appeal for an abuse of 

discretion.” Ogden v. San Juan Cty., 32 F.3d 452, 455 (10th Cir. 1994). Rule 4(a)(6) 

of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that a district court “may reopen the 

time to file an appeal” for a fourteen-day period if: (1) the moving party did not receive 

notice of entry of the order sought to be appealed; (2) the motion is filed within 180 days 

after entry of the judgment or order, or within fourteen days after the moving party 

 1

 The district court entered its order denying the motion to reopen on September 1, 

2015. The notice of appeal was therefore due by October 31. Fed. R. App. P. 

4(a)(1)(B)(iii) & (iv). Shepard provided a certificate of service stating that the notice was 

placed in the prison’s legal mail system on October 30, 2015, and that first-class postage 

was pre-paid. Thus, Shepard’s notice of appeal was timely under the prison mailbox rule. 

Id. 4(c); see also Price v. Philpot, 420 F.3d 1158, 1165-66 (10th Cir. 2005). 

Appellate Case: 15-1424 Document: 01019664502 Date Filed: 07/29/2016 Page: 2 
3 

receives notice of the entry; 2 and (3) “the court finds that no party would be prejudiced.” 

Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). We have observed that the movant bears the burden of 

demonstrating that he did not receive timely notice of the judgment he seeks to 

appeal. See Portley-El v. Milyard, 365 F. App’x 912, 916 (10th Cir. 2010) 

(unpublished). The advisory committee note to Rule 4 explains that “prejudice” 

means more than simply having to oppose the appeal and risk reversal, as these are 

“consequences that are present in every appeal.” Fed. R. App. P. 4 advisory 

committee’s note to 1991 amendment. In this context, prejudice requires more. 

Prejudice “might arise, for example, if the appellee had taken some action in reliance 

on the expiration of the normal time period for filing a notice of appeal.” Id.; see 

also TBG, Inc. v. Bendis, 36 F.3d 916, 921-22 (10th Cir. 1994) (party who settled 

claim because the time to appeal a settlement had expired would be prejudiced by 

extending time to appeal). 

Shepard argues the district court erred in requiring him to prove that 

defendants would not be prejudiced by a reopening. We agree, as do the defendantappellees. The defendants never objected to the motion to reopen nor identified any 

prejudice they might suffer. Nor did the district court identify any such prejudice—it 

merely held Shepard failed to prove the absence of prejudice. But Shepard’s motion 

did assert that “no prejudice will ensue to any defendant,” and we reject the 

 2

 Shepard argued that he had not received notice even at the time of filing his 

motion, but had only speculated that final judgment must have entered based on 

conversations in the prison. For purposes of this appeal, we assume without deciding 

that Shepard never received notice, and the fourteen-day limitation does not apply. 

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4 

contention that a plaintiff bears the burden to further prove the negative. The mere 

absence of proof of non-prejudice is not a reasonable basis for refusing to reopen the time 

to appeal when the plaintiff has asserted the absence of prejudice and the defendant has 

failed to object. 

Although a district court retains discretion whether to grant a motion to reopen 

once the Rule 4(a)(6) requirements are satisfied, see Clark v. Lavallie, 204 F.3d 

1038, 1040 (10th Cir. 2000), “a motion to a court’s discretion is a motion, not to its 

inclination, but to its judgment; and its judgment is to be guided by sound legal 

principles,” Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 139 (2005) (quotation 

and alteration omitted). In other words, “[d]iscretion is not whim.” Id. Yet the 

district court did not undertake the threshold determination of whether granting the 

motion would prejudice the defendants. The absence of fact-finding is particularly 

notable because defendant-appellees agree that the record contains “no evidence 

demonstrating prejudice.” The district court abused its discretion by failing to make 

findings as to whether Shepard satisfied the requirements of Rule 4(a)(6). Accord 

Summers v. Sec’y, Florida Dep’t of Corr., 569 F. App’x 846, 848 (11th Cir. 2014) 

(unpublished). 

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5 

The district court order denying Shepard’s motion to reopen is VACATED. 

We REMAND for further proceedings not inconsistent with this order and judgment. 

Shepard’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED.

Entered for the Court 

Carlos F. Lucero 

Circuit Judge 

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