Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-14-14158/USCOURTS-ca11-14-14158-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jose Angel Gonzalez
Petitioner
U.S. Attorney General
Respondent

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14-14158

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

Agency No. A087-003-203

JOSE ANGEL GONZALEZ, 

 Petitioner,

 versus

U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

 Respondent.

________________________

Petition for Review of a Decision of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

________________________

(August 10, 2015)

Before MARTIN, ROSENBAUM, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

USCA11 Case: 14-14158 Date Filed: 08/10/2015 Page: 1 of 9
2

Jose Angel Gonzalez, proceeding pro se, petitions for review of an order by 

the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing his pro se appeal from the 

Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision ordering his removal to Mexico. After careful 

review, we deny the petition in part and dismiss it in part.

I.

Gonzalez, a native and citizen of Mexico, became a legal permanent resident 

of the United States in April 2008. In February 2009, he was convicted, pursuant 

to a guilty plea, in Florida state court of possession of cannabis, in violation of Fla. 

Stat. 893.13(6)(a), and of possession of cannabis with intent to sell or deliver, in 

violation of Fla. Stat. § 893.13(1)(a). For these offenses, he was sentenced to 

eighteen months’ probation, which terminated in January 2010. 

In January 2011, the Department of Homeland Security commenced removal 

proceedings against Gonzalez after he sought admission to the United States at the 

Miami International Airport. DHS charged that he was removable as an alien 

convicted of a controlled substance offense, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), and as 

an alien who the immigration officer had reason to believe “is or has been an illicit 

trafficker in any controlled substance,” id. § 1182(a)(2)(C).

At a master calendar hearing, Gonzalez through counsel admitted that he

was an alien who had sought admission to the United States, but he denied the 

charges of removability. Based on conviction records submitted by the 

USCA11 Case: 14-14158 Date Filed: 08/10/2015 Page: 2 of 9
3

government, the IJ sustained both charges. Gonzalez did not seek any relief from 

removal. Instead, he requested a continuance of his removal proceedings while he 

pursued a collateral attack on his convictions in Florida court. Gonzalez sought to 

vacate his convictions under Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S. Ct. 1473

(2010), arguing that his plea counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to

advise him of the immigration consequences of a guilty plea. Over the 

government’s objection, the IJ granted a continuance. 

Gonzalez made two additional requests to continue the removal proceedings 

pending the United States Supreme Court’s and the Florida Supreme Court’s 

decisions on the question of whether Padilla applied retroactively. The IJ granted 

both requests and continued proceedings until March 2013. 

By March 2013, both the United States Supreme Court and the Florida 

Supreme Court had held that Padilla did not apply retroactively. See Chaidez v. 

United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013); Hernandez v. State, 124 So. 3d 757 (Fla. 

2012). Consequently, at a hearing in March 2013, the IJ denied Gonzalez’s request 

for another continuance. The IJ then issued an oral decision and order of removal, 

finding that Gonzalez was removable based on his drug-trafficking and controlledsubstance convictions and noting that his attorney had indicated that he was 

ineligible for any other relief from removal. 

USCA11 Case: 14-14158 Date Filed: 08/10/2015 Page: 3 of 9
4

Gonzalez filed a pro se notice of appeal to the BIA. In the materials he 

submitted to the BIA, he indicated that he was appealing because (1) the IJ erred in 

not further continuing his case pending his challenge to his criminal convictions

based on plea counsel’s ineffective assistance, (2) he was dissatisfied with his 

former immigration attorney because she did not properly advocate for him or 

advise him of the availability of asylum relief, and (3) he wished to apply for 

asylum relief based on the threat posed by Mexico’s ongoing drug war. 

On August 13, 2014, the BIA issued a decision dismissing Gonzalez’s 

appeal. The BIA concluded that the IJ properly denied Gonzalez’s request for a 

continuance because Gonzalez’s conviction was final for immigration purposes, 

notwithstanding his pending collateral attack, and he had not shown good cause for 

a continuance. Furthermore, the BIA found that Gonzalez did not comply with the 

procedural requirements set forth in Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 

1988), for raising a claim of ineffective assistance of immigration counsel. This 

petition for review followed. 

Construing Gonzalez’s appellate brief liberally, see Lorisme v. I.N.S., 129 

F.3d 1441, 1444 n.3 (11th Cir. 1997), Gonzalez contends that he was precluded 

from seeking relief from removal due to the ineffectiveness of his immigration 

attorney, and he suggests that he did in fact comply with the procedural 

requirements of Lozada. He also indicates that he may be eligible for asylum and 

USCA11 Case: 14-14158 Date Filed: 08/10/2015 Page: 4 of 9
5

cancellation of removal. Specifically, he contends that his Florida convictions do 

not render him ineligible for relief under this Court’s decision in Donawa v. U.S. 

Attorney General, 735 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2013). The government responds that 

we lack jurisdiction to consider Gonzalez’s petition for review because he has 

raised no colorable constitutional question or question of law. 

II.

We review our subject-matter jurisdiction de novo. Amaya-Artunduaga v. 

U.S. Att’y Gen., 463 F.3d 1247, 1250 (11th Cir. 2006). Under 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252(a)(2)(C), we generally lack jurisdiction to review a final order of removal 

against a petitioner who is removable for having committed certain criminal 

offenses, including controlled-substance offenses or drug-trafficking crimes. See 8 

U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2). Despite this broad jurisdictional bar, we retain jurisdiction to 

review “constitutional claims or questions of law” raised in a petition for review. 

Id. § 1252(a)(2)(D). “[Q]uestions of law,” as the phrase is used in 

§ 1252(a)(2)(D), include claims by a petitioner “challeng[ing] the application of an 

undisputed fact pattern to a legal standard.” Jean-Pierre v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 500 

F.3d 1315, 1322 (11th Cir. 2007). Thus, if we determine that an issue presents a 

mixed question of law and fact, we review the BIA’s legal conclusions de novo.

See id. at 1321-22. However, a “garden-variety abuse of discretion argument” 

USCA11 Case: 14-14158 Date Filed: 08/10/2015 Page: 5 of 9
6

does not qualify as a legal question within the meaning of § 1252(a)(2)(D). 

Alvarez Acosta v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 524 F.3d 1191, 1196-97 (11th Cir. 2008).

Also, “[w]e lack jurisdiction to consider a claim raised in a petition for 

review unless the petitioner has exhausted his administrative remedies with respect 

thereto.” Amaya-Artunduaga, 463 F.3d at 1250; see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (“A 

court may review a final order of removal only if the alien has exhausted all 

administrative remedies available to the alien as of right.”). 

III.

“It is well established in this Circuit that an alien in civil deportation 

proceedings, while not entitled to a Sixth Amendment right to counsel, has the 

constitutional right under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause right to a 

fundamentally fair hearing[,]” which includes the right “to effective assistance of 

counsel where counsel has been obtained.” Dakane v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 399 F .3d 

1269, 1273 & n.6 (11th Cir. 2004); see Gbaya v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 342 F.3d 1219, 

1221 (11th Cir. 2003). 

In Lozada, the BIA set forth the following three procedural requirements

that a petitioner must satisfy when seeking administrative relief from an order of 

removal on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel:

(1) that the motion be supported by an affidavit of the 

allegedly aggrieved respondent setting forth in detail the 

agreement that was entered into with counsel with 

respect to the actions to be taken and what 

USCA11 Case: 14-14158 Date Filed: 08/10/2015 Page: 6 of 9
7

representations counsel did or did not make to the 

respondent in this regard, (2) that counsel whose integrity 

or competence is being impugned be informed of the 

allegations leveled against him and be given an 

opportunity to respond, and (3) that the motion reflect 

whether a complaint has been filed with appropriate 

disciplinary authorities with respect to any violation of 

counsel’s ethical or legal responsibilities, and if not, why 

not.

Dakane, 399 F.3d at 1274 (quoting Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 639). We have held 

that “[t]he BIA does not abuse its discretion by filtering ineffective assistance of 

counsel claims through the screening requirements of Lozada.” Gbaya, 342 F.3d 

at 1223. In Gbaya, we left open the question of “whether the BIA may enforce 

strict compliance with Lozada or must also accept substantial compliance.” Id. at 

1222. 

The government contends that the question of whether Gonzalez complied 

with the requirements of Lozada is a factual one outside of this Court’s limited 

jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). To the extent that Gonzalez claims 

that he did, in fact, comply with Lozada’s requirements, he effectively challenges 

the BIA’s factfinding, which we lack jurisdiction to review in this case.1

 See Jean-

 

1 As part of his brief on appeal, Gonzalez submitted letters showing that he filed a bar 

complaint against his immigration attorney and, apparently, his plea counsel in the underlying 

criminal case. However, even if we had jurisdiction to review the BIA’s factfinding, these letters 

are not properly before us because they were not part of the administrative record before the 

BIA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), (b)(4)(A); Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1278-81 (11th 

Cir. 2001). Moreover, the letters are dated after the BIA issued its decision dismissing 

Gonzalez’s appeal, so they do not show that he complied with the requirements of Lozada in 

presenting his arguments to the BIA.

USCA11 Case: 14-14158 Date Filed: 08/10/2015 Page: 7 of 9
8

Pierre, 500 F.3d at 1322. But “in so far as [Gonzalez] challenges the application 

of an undisputed fact pattern to a legal standard,” we have jurisdiction to review 

his claim. See Jean-Pierre, 500 F.3d at 1322. In other words, we have jurisdiction 

to review whether a fact pattern constitutes “substantial, if not exact, compliance, 

with the procedural requirements of Lozada.” See Dakane, 399 F.3d at 1274

Here, the BIA found that Gonzalez did not (1) file an affidavit detailing what 

aspect of his agreement with his attorney was violated, (2) provide notice to his 

attorney of the allegations of ineffective assistance, or (3) submit a bar complaint 

filed with the appropriate authorities or an explanation of why no complaint was 

presented. In Gbaya, we held that a petitioner did not establish substantial 

compliance with Lozada because he had failed to “submit[] a sworn affidavit 

attesting to the relevant facts of his ineffective assistance claim” and to “provide[] 

his former counsel with notice and an opportunity to respond.” Gbaya, 342 F.3d at 

1222. Therefore, under Gbaya, it is clear that Gonzalez failed to comply 

substantially with the procedural requirements of Lozada. 

Because § 1252(a)(2)(C) limits our review of Gonzalez’s final order of 

removal, we also lack jurisdiction to review the IJ’s simultaneous denial of 

Gonzalez’s request to continue removal proceedings. See Alvarez Acosta, 524 

F.3d at 1195-97 & n.12. Gonzalez does not claim that the IJ applied an improper 

legal standard in denying his request for a continuance, and a “garden-variety

USCA11 Case: 14-14158 Date Filed: 08/10/2015 Page: 8 of 9
9

abuse of discretion argument” does not qualify as a legal question within the 

meaning of § 1252(a)(2)(D). See id. at 1196-97; see also Zafar v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 

461 F.3d 1357, 1362 (11th Cir. 2006) (stating that the denial of motion for 

continuance is reviewed for an abuse of discretion).

Finally, Gonzalez’s claim that he is eligible to apply for cancellation of 

removal or for asylum, based on this Court’s decision in Donawa, is not properly 

before us.2

 During his removal proceedings, Gonzalez did not apply for relief in 

the form of cancellation of removal or asylum, nor did he challenge the 

classification of his 2009 cannabis convictions. Because Gonzalez did not exhaust 

his administrative remedies with respect to these contentions, we do not consider

Gonzalez’s present arguments on these issues. See Amaya-Artunduaga, 463 F.3d 

at 1250. In so far as these challenges relate to the merits of his claim of ineffective 

assistance of immigration counsel, we also do not reach them because Gonzalez 

did not substantially comply with Lozada. 

In sum, Gonzalez’s petition for review is DENIED IN PART and 

DISMISSED IN PART.

 

2 In Donawa, we held that Fla. Stat. § 893.13(1)(a)(2), as amended by Fla. Stat.

§ 893.101, was not a “drug trafficking crime,” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2), and therefore 

was not a “drug trafficking aggravated felony” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). 735 F.3d at 

1279-82. Thus, Gonzalez suggests that Donawa affects whether Gonzalez’s conviction under the 

same statute, § 893.13(1)(a), qualifies as an “aggravated felony” for purposes of determining his 

eligibility for cancellation of removal or asylum. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b(a)(3), 1158(b)(2)(B)(i). 

We do not reach this question, however, because it is not properly before us.

USCA11 Case: 14-14158 Date Filed: 08/10/2015 Page: 9 of 9