Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-2_06-cv-00147/USCOURTS-alsd-2_06-cv-00147-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jo Anne B. Barnhart
Defendant
Steven Lucy
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1 Effective February 1, 2007, Michael J. Astrue was confirmed by the Senate to

serve as the Commissioner of Social Security. Accordingly, pursuant to the provisions of Rule

25(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Astrue is substituted for Jo Anne B. Barnhart as

the proper defendant in this action.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

STEVEN LUCY, :

Plaintiff, :

vs. : CA 06-0147-C

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, :

Commissioner of Social Security,1

:

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This cause is before the Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule

54(d)(2)(D) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on plaintiff’s motion for

an award of attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”),

28 U.S.C. § 2412. (Doc. 28; see also Doc. 31) Upon consideration of all

pertinent materials contained in this file, it is determined that plaintiff should

receive a reasonable attorney’s fee in the amount of $1,624.68 under the EAJA

for legal services rendered by his attorney in this Court. 

Case 2:06-cv-00147-C Document 32 Filed 07/05/07 Page 1 of 12
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FINDINGS OF FACT

1. On February 6, 2007 this Court entered a Rule 58 judgment

reversing and remanding this cause to the Commissioner of Social Security

pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further proceedings. (Doc.

24; see also Doc. 23) 

2. The application for attorney’s fees under the EAJA was filed on

April 19, 2007 (Doc. 28), some sixty-two (62) days after entry of final

judgment (compare id. with Doc. 24). In the application, plaintiff requested

attorney’s fees in the amount of $1,626.59 to compensate his attorney for the

time spent representing him before this Court as of the date of the filing of the

fee application. (See Doc. 28)

3. The Commissioner of Social Security initially filed a response

to the application on May 8, 2007 in which he contended that his position in

this litigation was substantially justified. (See Doc. 30) However, this response

was withdrawn in the parties’ joint stipulation and amended EAJA petition

filed on July 2, 2007. (Doc. 31)

Plaintiff, through counsel, hereby files his amended

application to the Court for an award of attorney fees, costs of

court, and expenses of litigation under the Equal Access to

Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412. Plaintiff asks for an award of

attorney’s fees in the amount of $1,624.68 to be paid to

plaintiff’s attorney calculated at the rate of $161.66 per hour for

Case 2:06-cv-00147-C Document 32 Filed 07/05/07 Page 2 of 12
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10.05 hours of work on this case in federal court and on remand

before the Social Security Administration. Request for payment

of EAJA fees for attorney time representing plaintiff before the

agency on remand is made pursuant to Sullivan v. Hudson, 490

U.S. 877 (1989). The time spent by counsel for plaintiff is

detailed on an Affidavit attached hereto.

With respect to a determination of the hourly rate to

apply in a given EAJA case, for services performed by

attorneys, the express language of the Act provides in pertinent

part as follows:

“The amount of fees awarded under this

subsection shall be based upon prevailing market

rates for the kind and quality of the services

furnished, expect that . . . attorney fees shall not

be awarded in excess of [$125.00] per hour unless

the court determines that an increase in the cost of

living or a special factor, such as the limited

availability of qualified attorneys for the

proceedings involved, justifies a higher fee.”

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A)[]. 

This Court determined the prevailing hourly rate in the

Southern District of Alabama was $125.00 in September 2001.

Boone v. Apfel, CA 99-0965-CB-L (S.D. Ala. 2001).

It should be noted [that] one of the factors in determining

whether to raise the rate above $125.00 per hour is an increase

in the cost of living. The maximum EAJA rate of $125.00 was

indicated in 1997, ten years ago. The United States Department

of Labor provides information regarding the rise in the cost of

living, adjusted monthly, on its website. The most recent

Consumer Price Index (CPI) includes the year 1997. The annual

CPI for 1997 was 157.4; the annual CPI for 2006 was 195.6.

According to the U.S. Department of Labor, there has been a

significant increase of 24% in cost of living in the intervening

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years. In this District, the prevailing rate of $125 was set in

September 2001, over five years ago. The annual CPI for 2001

was 171.4; the annual CPI for 2006 was 195.6, again a

significant 14% increase. Yet this increase has not been

reflected in attorney fees granted under the EAJA in this district.

The parties acknowledge that no precedent exists in this

district for awarding EAJA fees above the rate of $125 per hour.

However, there comes a time when the increasing cost of living

must be addressed.

The parties present for consideration the following

formula to be used in calculating EAJA fees including a

reasonable cost-of-living adjustment.

($125/hour) x (CPI-U Annual Average “All Items

Index”, South Urban, for month and year of

temporal midpoint)/152.4, where 152.4 equals the

CPI-U of March 1996, the month and year in

which the $125 cap was enacted.

In determining the rate of adjustment under the EAJA,

the Court will use the Consumer Price Index (CPI) compiled by

the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics. Taylor Group, Inc.

v. Johnson, 95 F.Supp. 1545, 1552 (M.D. Ala. 1995). Taylor

does not preclude the use of the local or regional CPI-U in

determining the rate of inflation over the statutory rate[.] [S]ee

also Mannio v. West, 12 Vet. App. 242, 243 (1999) (holding the

local consumer price index (CPI) will be applied where one is

available); Cox Constr. Co. v. U.S., 17 Cl.Ct. 29, 37 (1989)

(holding that “in view of the diverse nature of various cities’ and

regions’ economies, it is concluded that recognizing the [costof-living] increases actually experienced by the EAJA applicant

is the fairer course”).

The appropriate endpoint for computing the cost of living

adjustment is the temporal midpoint of the period during which

the compensable services were rendered.[] Levernier Constr.,

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Inc. v. U.S., 21 C. Ct. 683, 694 (1990), vacated in part on

reconsideration, 22 Cl. Ct. 247, rev’d on other grounds, 947

F.2d 487 (1991). The temporal midpoint is calculated by

computing the number of days from the date the claim was

prepared until the date of the Magistrate or District Judge’s

Order and Judgment.

In this case, the Complaint was prepared on February 27,

2006, and the Magistrate Judge issued his Judgment and Order

on February 6, 2007. The temporal midpoint therefore is August

17, 2006.

Using this formula and the statistics for southern urban

areas, the $125 per hour statutory cap, adjusted for inflation,

would be $161.66: ($125/hour x 197.1)/152.4, where 197.1

equals the CPI-U for August 2006, the temporal midpoint of this

case, and 152.4 equals the CPI-U for March 1996, the month

and year in which the $125 cap was enacted.

The parties agree the Application is brought within the

time limit stated in 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B), that is, within 30

days of the date that the judgment entered in this case was no

longer appealable.

The parties further agree Plaintiff is entitled to receive

attorney’s fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act

because he is the prevailing party in this action, is an individual

whose net worth did not exceed two million dollars at the time

the action was filed as is demonstrated by plaintiff’s attached

affidavit, and the position of the United States in this case, either

at the agency or in this litigation, was not substantially justified.

There are no special circumstances in this case which

make an award under the EAJA unjust.

This application is supported by an affidavit of plaintiff’s

attorney.

Case 2:06-cv-00147-C Document 32 Filed 07/05/07 Page 5 of 12
2 "[A] party who wins a sentence-four remand order is a prevailing party." Shalala

v.Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302, 113 S.Ct.2625, 2632, 125 L.Ed.2d 239 (1993). 

6

Defendant hereby agrees to the calculations of attorney

fees as set out above and withdraws its Objection to Plaintiff’s

Application for Attorney Fees under the Equal Access to Justice

Act.

(Id. at 1-3) 

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The Equal Access to Justice Act requires a district court to

"award to a prevailing party . . . fees and other expenses . . . incurred by that

party in any civil action . . ., including proceedings for judicial review of

agency action, brought by or against the United States . . ., unless the court

finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that

special circumstances make an award unjust." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). It

is imminently clear in this case that plaintiff is a prevailing party under the

EAJA2

 and that the position of the United States in this case was not

substantially justified, the parties having stipulated as much (Doc. 31).

2. The EAJA requires a prevailing party to file an application for

attorney's fees within thirty (30) days of final judgment in the action. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2412(d)(1)(B). The thirty-day clock did not begin to run in this case until

this Court's reversal and remand order of February 6, 2007 became final,

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which occurred at the end of the sixty (60) days for appeal provided under

Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, see Shalala v.

Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302, 113 S.Ct. 2625, 2632, 125 L.Ed.2d 239 (1993),

that is, April 7, 2007. The application filed in this case, bearing a date of April

9, 2007, is timely since it was filed within thirty days of April 7, 2007.

3. The EAJA, like 42 U.S.C. § 1988, is a fee-shifting statute. The

Supreme Court has indicated that "'the most useful starting point for

determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably

expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.'" Watford

v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 1562, 1568 (11th Cir. 1985) (EAJA), quoting Hensley v.

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983)(§

1988); see Jean v. Nelson, 863 F.2d 759, 772-773 (11th Cir. 1988) (discussing

the reasonableness of the hours expended in the context of contentions by the

government that the fee requests were not supported by sufficient

documentation and often involved a duplication of effort), aff'd sub nom.

Commissioner, I.N.S. v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 110 S.Ct. 2316, 110 L.Ed.2d 134

(1990).

This calculation provides an objective basis on

which to make an initial estimate of the value of

a lawyer's services. The party seeking an award

of fees should submit evidence supporting the

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hours worked and the rates claimed. Where the

documentation of hours is inadequate, the district

court may reduce the award accordingly. The

district court also should exclude from this initial

fee calculation hours that were not "reasonably

expended." . . . Cases may be overstaffed, and the

skill and experience of lawyers vary widely.

Counsel for the prevailing party should make a

good-faith effort to exclude from a fee request

hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise

unnecessary, just as a lawyer in private practice

ethically is obligated to exclude such hours from

his fee submission. "In the private sector, 'billing

judgment' is an important component in fee

setting. It is no less important here. Hours that

are not properly billed to one's client also are not

properly billed to one's adversary pursuant to

statutory authority."

Hensley, supra, 461 U.S. at 433-434, 103 S.Ct. at 1939-1940 (citations

omitted); see also id., at 437, 103 S.Ct. at 1941 ("[T]he fee applicant bears the

burden of establishing entitlement to an award and documenting the

appropriate hours expended and hourly rates."); ACLU of Georgia v. Barnes,

168 F.3d 423, 428 (11th Cir.1999) (“If fee applicants do not exercise billing

judgment, courts are obligated to do it for them, to cut the amount of hours for

which payment is sought, pruning out those that are ‘excessive, redundant, or

otherwise unnecessary.’ Courts are not authorized to be generous with the

money of others, and it is as much the duty of courts to see that excessive fees

and expenses are not awarded as it is to see that an adequate amount is

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awarded.”); Norman v. Housing Authority, 836 F.2d 1292, 1301 (11th Cir.

1988) ("Excluding excessive or otherwise unnecessary hours under the rubric

of 'billing judgment' means that a lawyer may not be compensated for hours

spent on activities for which he would not bill a client of means who was

seriously intent on vindicating similar rights, recognizing that in the private

sector the economically rational person engages in some cost benefit

analysis."). 

4. In Norman, supra, the Eleventh Circuit indicated that "the

measure of reasonable hours is determined by the profession's judgment of the

time that may be conscionably billed and not the least time in which it might

theoretically have been done." 836 F.2d at 1306. 

5. Because the defendant now interposes no objection whatsoever

to the fee petition, the Court finds that plaintiff’s counsel reasonably spent

10.05 hours on legal tasks in this case.

6. With respect to a determination of the hourly rate to apply in a

given EAJA case, for services performed by attorneys, the express language

of the Act, as amended by the Contract with America Advancement Act of

1996, provides in pertinent part as follows:

The amount of fees awarded under this subsection

shall be based upon prevailing market rates for

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the kind and quality of the services furnished,

except that . . . attorney fees shall not be awarded

in excess of $125.00 per hour unless the court

determines that an increase in the cost of living or

a special factor, such as the limited availability of

qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved,

justifies a higher fee.

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (Cum.Supp. 1997).

7. In Meyer v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 1029 (1992), the Eleventh Circuit

determined that the EAJA establishes a two-step analysis for determining the

appropriate hourly rate to be applied in calculating attorney's fees under the

Act.

The first step in the analysis, . . . is to determine

the market rate for "similar services [provided] by

lawyers of reasonably comparable skills,

experience, and reputation." . . . The second step,

which is needed only if the market rate is greater

than $[125] per hour, is to determine whether the

court should adjust the hourly fee upward from

$[125] to take into account an increase in the cost

of living, or a special factor.

Id. at 1033-1034 (citations and footnote omitted).

8. For years, the prevailing market rate in the Southern District of

Alabama has been $125.00 per hour. See, e.g., Willits v. Massanari, CA 00-

0530-RV-C; Boggs v. Massanari, 00-0408-P-C; Boone v. Apfel, CA 99-0965-

CB-L. The Court finds that it is now time to adjust this rate to account for the

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3 The parties have stipulated, a stipulation the Court specifically endorses, that

“[t]he appropriate endpoint for computing the cost of living adjustment is the temporal midpoint

of the period during which the compensable services were rendered[,]” and, futher, that “[t]he

temporal midpoint is calculated by computing the number of days from the date the claim was

prepared until the date of the Magistrate or District Judge’s Order and Judgment.” (Doc. 31, at 3) 

11

increase in the cost of living. To that end, the Court specifically adopts the

formula proposed by the parties to be used in calculating all future awards of

attorney’s fees under the EAJA: “($125/hour) x (CPI-U Annual Average ‘All

Items Index’, South Urban, for month and year of temporal midpoint3

)/ 152.4,

where 152.4 equals the CPI-U of March 1996, the month and year in which the

$125 cap was enacted.” (Doc. 31, at 2) 

9. The temporal midpoint in this case was August 17, 2006, the

complaint having been prepared on February 27, 2006 (Doc. 31, at 3) and the

Court having entered its order and judgment on February 6, 2007 (Docs. 23-

24). The CPI-U for August of 2006 was 197.1. Plugging the relevant numbers

into the foregoing formula renders the following equation: $125x197.1/152.4.

Completion of this equation renders an hourly rate of $161.66. 

10. In consideration of the foregoing, the plaintiff should be awarded

an attorney's fee in the amount of $1,624.68 under the EAJA for the 10.05

hours his attorney spent performing work traditionally performed by attorneys

in social security cases. 

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CONCLUSION

The Court ORDERS that plaintiff be awarded attorney's fees in the

amount of $1,624.68 under the Equal Access to Justice Act, representing

compensation for 10.05 hours of service by William T. Coplin, Jr., Esquire, at

the cost-of-living-adjusted rate of $161.66 an hour.

DONE and ORDERED this the 5th day of July, 2007.

s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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