Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01428/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01428-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Accessories Marketing, Inc.
Cross-Appellant
Sealant Systems International, Inc.
Cross-Appellant
TEK Corporation
Appellant
TEK Global, S.R.L.
Appellant

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

SEALANT SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL, INC., 

ACCESSORIES MARKETING, INC.,

Plaintiffs-Cross-Appellants

v.

TEK GLOBAL, S.R.L., TEK CORPORATION,

Defendants-Appellants

______________________ 

2014-1405, 2014-1428

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of California in Nos. 5:11-cv-00774-PSG 

and 5:11-cv-01649-PSG, Magistrate Judge Paul S. Grewal.

______________________ 

Decided: June 11, 2015

______________________ 

 STANLEY M. GIBSON, Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Marmaro, LLP, Los Angeles, CA, argued for plaintiffs-cross 

appellants. Also represented by GREGORY S. CORDREY, 

ANDREW I. SHADOFF. 

DANIEL E. JACKSON, Keker & Van Nest, LLP, San 

Francisco, CA, argued for defendants-appellants. 

______________________ 

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2 SEALANT SYS. INT’L, INC. v. TEK GLOBAL, S.R.L. 

Before DYK, O’MALLEY, and WALLACH, Circuit Judges.

WALLACH, Circuit Judge. 

In this patent infringement suit, each side asserts the 

other infringed its patent on tire repair technology. 

Because the district court erred in certain aspects of its 

claim construction and obviousness analysis, this court 

reverses the summary judgment of obviousness with 

respect to the asserted claims of U.S. Patent No. 

7,789,110 (the “’110 patent”). This court also reverses the 

district court’s denial of judgment as a matter of law 

(“JMOL”) on obviousness with respect to the asserted 

claims of U.S. Patent No. 6,789,581 (the “’581 patent”), 

vacates the injunction imposed by the district court, 

affirms the district court’s denial of attorney fees, and 

remands for further proceedings. 

BACKGROUND

TEK Global, S.R.L. (“TEK Global”) is an Italian limited liability company and assignee of the ’110 patent, 

which is generally directed to a kit for repairing and 

inflating inflatable articles, particularly tires. See ’110 

patent col. 1 ll. 1–3. In November 2010, TEK Global sued 

Sealant Systems International, Inc. (“Sealant”), a California corporation engaged in the sale and manufacture of 

tire repair kits, for infringement of the ’110 patent in the 

United States District Court for the Southern District of 

New York. 

In February 2011, Sealant filed suit against TEK 

Global in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, seeking declaratory judgment of 

invalidity and noninfringement of the ’110 patent. Asserting a lack of personal jurisdiction in the New York 

court, Sealant successfully moved to transfer the New 

York case to the Northern District of California and the 

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SEALANT SYS. INT’L, INC. v. TEK GLOBAL, S.R.L. 3

two cases were consolidated in May 2011. TEK Global’s 

affiliate TEK Corp., a Michigan corporation (collectively, 

“TEK”), was later named as a defendant in Sealant’s 

Second Amended Complaint. 

Accessories Marketing Inc. (“AMI”) is the “manufacturing arm” of Sealant, and the two entities are described 

as “sister companies.” J.A. 72 n.187. Both AMI and 

Sealant are owned by Illinois Tool Works, and both are 

California corporations with their principal place of 

business in Grover Beach, California.

On April 29, 2011—two months after Sealant’s initial 

complaint for declaratory relief was filed—AMI purchased 

the ’581 patent, which also claims a kit for repairing and 

inflating tires, from non-party IDQ Operating, Inc. AMI 

was added as a plaintiff in Sealant’s consolidated action 

in a First Amended Complaint dated June 17, 2011, 

which asserted AMI (but not Sealant) suffered damages 

caused by TEK Global’s infringement of the ’581 patent. 

In March 2014, the district court granted Sealant and 

AMI’s motion for summary judgment of invalidity of the 

’110 patent and denied TEK’s motion for summary judgment of invalidity of the ’581 patent. The district court 

found substantial evidence supported the jury’s infringement verdict as to the ’581 patent, and thus declined to 

grant JMOL that the ’581 patent was invalid and not 

infringed, and entered a permanent injunction. Sealant 

Sys. Int’l, Inc. v. TEK Global, S.R.L., No 5:11-cv-0074-

PSG (N.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2014) (“Order Granting Post-Trial 

Motions”) (J.A. 31–94). 

TEK appeals the district court’s (1) denial of its motion for JMOL that the ’581 patent is invalid and not 

infringed, (2) damages award based on the ’581 patent, (3) 

issuance of a permanent injunction based on the ’581 

patent, and (4) grant of summary judgment of invalidity 

of the ’110 patent. Sealant and AMI cross-appeal the 

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4 SEALANT SYS. INT’L, INC. v. TEK GLOBAL, S.R.L. 

denial by the district court of their motion for attorney 

fees. This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(1) (2012). 

DISCUSSION

I. Although Sealant Lacks Standing to Assert the ’581 

Patent, AMI Properly Asserted It

“[A] suit for infringement of patent rights [must] ordinarily be brought by a party holding legal title to the 

patent.” Propat Int’l Corp. v. Rpost, Inc., 473 F.3d 1187, 

1189 (Fed. Cir. 2007). “The question of standing to sue is 

a jurisdictional one, which we review de novo.” Rite–Hite 

Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en 

banc). “‘[J]urisdiction of the [c]ourt depends upon the 

state of things at the time of the action brought.’” 

Karstens Prods., Inc. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 74 F.3d 

1258, at *3 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (unpublished) (quoting Keene 

Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 207 (1993)). “The 

party bringing the action bears the burden of establishing 

that it has standing.” Sicom Sys. v. Agilent Techs., Inc., 

427 F.3d 971, 976 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 

TEK argues Sealant does not have standing to assert 

claims based on the ’581 patent because Sealant has 

never held title to that patent, and AMI lacks standing 

because it did not own the ’581 patent when the suit was 

originally filed by Sealant. In Morrow v. Microsoft Corp., 

499 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2007), this court explained how 

standing requirements apply to three categories of patent 

plaintiffs: (1) patentees; (2) exclusive licensees; and (3) 

“those that hold less than all substantial rights to the 

patent and lack exclusionary rights under the patent 

statutes to meet the injury in fact requirement.” Id. at 

1340. Sealant is not an owner or assignee of the ’581 

patent, nor does it allege it is an exclusive licensee under 

the ’581 patent. Under Morrow, Sealant cannot cure a 

standing deficiency with respect to the ’581 patent by 

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adding AMI to the suit. See id. at 1341 (A “standing 

deficiency cannot be cured by adding the patent title 

owner to the suit.”). 

Although Sealant’s standing to request declaratory relief with respect to the ’110 patent is not in dispute, 

Sealant cannot establish standing to assert the ’581 

patent based on the case or controversy associated with 

the ’110 patent. “[S]tanding is not dispensed in gross. 

Rather, a plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each 

claim he seeks to press and for each form of relief that is 

sought.” Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 

734 (2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Sealant therefore lacks standing to assert the ’581

patent. 

The more relevant dispute over standing, however, 

centers not on Sealant but on AMI. TEK acknowledges 

AMI’s assertion that it could have brought a separate suit 

following its purchase of the ’581 patent, but argues this 

is irrelevant because AMI instead elected to assert its 

claims in Sealant’s previously-filed suit. 

It is true the Supreme Court has stated “the standing 

inquiry . . . focus[es] on whether the party invoking jurisdiction had the requisite stake in the outcome when the 

suit was filed,” Davis, 554 U.S. at 734, and that AMI did 

not have such a stake in February 2011 when the suit it 

later joined was filed. However, the relevant standing 

inquiry focuses on the time at which a given claim is 

asserted, which will often (as in Davis) be the time the 

suit is filed. See id. at 731 (indicating Davis “request[ed] 

that § 319 [of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 

2002] be declared unconstitutional” at the time he filed 

suit). The claim of infringement of the ’581 patent was 

not asserted until after the suit was in process. Because 

AMI owned the ’581 patent at the time it first asserted its 

claim against TEK, it has standing. 

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TEK’s standing objection is more properly viewed as 

an objection to the joinder of AMI to Sealant’s existing 

suit rather than to AMI’s standing. AMI asserted infringement of the ’581 patent in a First Amended Complaint dated June 17, 2011. If TEK opposed AMI’s joinder 

or assertion of the ’581 patent as part of Sealant’s earlierfiled suit, it could have objected. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 

21 (“Misjoinder and Nonjoinder of Parties”). Instead, on 

October 6, 2011, TEK stipulated to the filing of a Second 

Amended Complaint in which AMI again asserted the 

’581 patent. J.A. 6467–69 (TEK “hereby stipulate[s] that 

Plaintiffs may file a Second Amended Complaint for . . . 

(2) Patent Infringement [of the ’581 patent] . . . , a copy of 

which is attached hereto.”). The Second Amended Complaint asserted “AMI is now the assignee of the entire 

right, title and interest in and to the ’581 Patent,” and 

alleged infringement by TEK. J.A. 250, 329. The district 

court found TEK did not object to AMI’s “standing” to 

seek damages for infringement of the ’581 patent. J.A. 24 

(“[A]s agreed upon by the parties, . . . AMI has standing.”). TEK has therefore waived any argument as to 

misjoinder of AMI. See P.J. McCluskey v. Marysville & N. 

Ry. Co., 243 U.S. 36, 40 (1917) (“[I]n view of the stipulation of the parties in the court below, agreeing to the 

substitution as plaintiff in error of the administrator of 

Nordgard, who died while the cause was [] pending, the 

motion to dismiss on the ground . . . that the administrator is not a proper party[] is based upon a mere irregularity which was waived.”). 

II. The District Court Erred in Construing the ’110 

Patent

Claim construction is a question of law, reviewed de 

novo, based on underlying findings of fact, which are 

reviewed for clear error. Teva v. Sandoz, 135 S. Ct. 831, 

837–38 (2015). When construing claims, “courts are 

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SEALANT SYS. INT’L, INC. v. TEK GLOBAL, S.R.L. 7

mony, dictionaries, and treatises, [but] such evidence is 

generally of less significance than the intrinsic record.” 

Virnetx, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 1316 (Fed. 

Cir. 2014) (citing Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 

1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). “The intrinsic record includes the 

specification and the prosecution history.” C.R. Bard, Inc. 

v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 388 F.3d 858, 861 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 

The parties agree the prior art discloses all the elements of Claim 1, the broadest claim, except for “a threeway valve” and “an additional hose.” SSI Sys. Int’l, Inc. v. 

TEK Global S.R.L., No. 11-cv-00774 PSG, at 7 (N.D. Cal. 

Mar. 7, 2013) (“Order Re TEK’s Motions for Summary 

Judgment of Damages and Invalidity”) (J.A. 1–25). The 

district court’s claim construction analysis therefore 

focused on these terms. Claim 1 recites:

A kit for inflating and repairing inflatable articles; the kit comprising a compressor assembly (2), 

a container (3) of sealing liquid, and connecting 

means (4, 5) for connecting the container to the 

compressor assembly (2) and to an inflatable article for repair or inflation, and being characterized 

by comprising an outer casing (6) housing said 

compressor assembly (2) and defining a seat (7) 

for the container (3) of sealing liquid, said container (3) being housed removably in said seat (7), 

and by comprising container connecting means (4, 

40) for stably connecting said container to said 

compressor assembly (2), so that the container, 

when housed in said seat (7), is maintained functionally connected to said compressor assembly 

(2), said kit further comprising of an additional 

hose (83) cooperating with said inflatable article; 

and a three-way valve (81) input connected to said 

compressor assembly (2), and output connected to 

said container (3) and to said additional hose (83) 

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to direct a stream of compressed air selectively to 

said container (3) or to said additional hose (83).

’110 patent col. 5 ll. 43–61 (emphases added). 

The district court rejected TEK’s asserted claim construction of “cooperating with” as meaning “directly 

connected to.” Order Re TEK’s Motions for Summary 

Judgment of Damages and Invalidity at 8. Because the 

district court relied upon only intrinsic evidence in reaching this conclusion, this court’s review is de novo. See 

Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 841 (“[W]hen the district court reviews 

only evidence intrinsic to the patent (the patent claims 

and specifications, along with the patent’s prosecution 

history), the judge’s determination will amount solely to a 

determination of law, and the Court of Appeals will 

review that construction de novo.”). 

The court explained that although the terms “connected to” and “connecting” appear earlier in claim 1, the 

applicant chose to use the term “cooperating with” in 

regard to the additional hose. Order Re TEK’s Motions 

for Summary Judgment of Damages and Invalidity at 8. 

The district court cited this court’s statement that “[t]he 

fact that [] two adjacent claims use different terms in 

parallel settings supports the . . . conclusion that the two 

terms were not meant to have the same meaning.” Aspex

Eyewear, Inc. v. Marchon Eyewear, Inc., 672 F.3d 1335, 

1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The fact pattern here differs from 

that in Aspex, however, because the term “additional 

hose” does not appear earlier in Claim 1; it is by reference 

to the term “additional hose” that the term “cooperating 

with” must be understood. 

In this case a person having ordinary skill in the art 

(“PHOSITA”) considering “addition hose 83” in the context of the specification could only conclude that it is 

connectable to a tire. The specification explicitly states 

“additional hose 83 [is] connectable to the tyre.” ’110 

patent col. 5 l. 13. It also states “[a]dditional hose 83 . . . 

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enables compressor assembly 2 to be used quickly and 

easily to inflate a flat tyre,” a function consistent with 

connection to the tire. Id. col. 5 ll. 29–31. Figure 7 shows 

hose 83 as external to the device, and the end of hose 83

appears to be connectable to a tire valve. Compare ’110 

patent fig.7 with ’110 patent fig.4 (illustrating hose 5, 

which the specification indicates is connected to a tire 

valve); see id. col. 2 ll. 47–48. 

The district court did not find these statements in the 

specification to be controlling because they “merely describe[] Figure 7 [which is] . . . a preferred . . . embodiment.” Order Re TEK’s Motions for Summary Judgment 

of Damages and Invalidity at 8 (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted). Such reasoning requires this court 

to consider two general principles that are often in some 

tension with one another. On the one hand, the patentee 

is generally “entitled to the full scope of his claims, and 

we will not limit him to his preferred embodiment or 

import a limitation from the specification into the claims.” 

Kara Tech. Inc. v. Stamps.com Inc., 582 F.3d 1341, 1348 

(Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323); see 

also Plantronics, Inc. v. Aliph, Inc., 724 F.3d 1343, 1350 

(Fed. Cir. 2013). Indeed, “[t]his court has expressly 

rejected the contention that if a patent describes only a 

single embodiment, the claims of the patent must be 

construed as being limited to that embodiment.” LiebelFlarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 906 (Fed. 

Cir. 2004). 

On the other hand, “the ordinary and customary 

meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term 

would have to a [PHOSITA],” and the PHOSITA “is 

deemed to read the claim term . . . in the context of the 

entire patent, including the specification.” Phillips, 415 

F.3d at 1313. Indeed, the specification is “the single best 

guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Id. at 1315, 

1321 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

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This court has “recognize[d] that the distinction between 

using the specification to interpret the meaning of a claim 

and importing limitations from the specification into the 

claim can be a difficult one to apply in practice.” Id. at 

1323. 

In this case, neither Sealant/AMI nor the district 

court point to any language in the specification describing 

the “additional hose 83” as sometimes not connectable to a 

tire. See Plaintiffs-Cross-Appellants’ Br. (“Sealant Br.”) 

52–56; Order Re TEK’s Motions for Summary Judgment 

of Damages and Invalidity at 6–8. There is simply no 

guidance or indication whatsoever of how the additional 

hose might “cooperate with” a tire, except as provided by 

the preferred embodiment. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1321 

(Adoption of “a dictionary definition entirely divorced 

from the context of the written description” is improper.). 

The meaning of “cooperate with” is therefore sufficiently 

“amorphous that one of skill in the art can only reconcile 

the claim language with the inventor’s disclosure by 

recourse to the specification.” Comark Commc’ns, Inc. v. 

Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1187 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (distinguishing between amorphous claim terms and those 

that are “clear and well-defined”). 

Sealant and AMI argue the district court’s construction is correct because “the ordinary meaning of ‘cooperating with’ means ‘working together, directly or indirectly.’” 

Sealant Br. 52–53. However, if such a dictionary definition of “cooperating with” were adopted, as Sealant and 

AMI propose, the patent would claim more than the 

patentee actually invented. See Smith v. Snow, 294 U.S. 

1, 14 (1935) (“[I]f the claim were fairly susceptible of two 

constructions, that should be adopted which will secure to 

the patentee his actual invention, rather than to adopt a 

construction fatal to the grant.”). There is nothing in the 

patent indicating the patentee conceived of how the hose 

might “cooperate with” an inflatable article other than by 

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connecting to it directly as a conduit for air. See ’110 

patent col. 5 l. 31 (The additional hose can be “used quickly and easily to inflate a flat tyre.”). More generally, this 

court has cautioned against “elevating the dictionary” to 

excessive prominence. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1321. 

For these reasons, the “cooperating with” limitation is 

properly construed as requiring direct connection to the 

tire, and the district court erred in finding otherwise. 

III. The District Court Erred in Granting Summary 

Judgment that the ’110 Patent Would Have Been Obvious

A patent is obvious and therefore invalid if “the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented 

and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a 

whole would have been obvious at the time the invention 

was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to 

which said subject matter pertains.” 35 U.S.C. § 103

(2006).1 Obviousness is a question of law based on (1) the 

scope and content of the prior art, (2) the differences 

between the claims and prior art, (3) the level of ordinary 

skill in the pertinent art, and (4) objective indicia of 

nonobviousness. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 

383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). 

A. The District Court Clearly Erred in Evaluating 

the Scope and Content of the Prior Art

“The content of prior art presents an issue of fact that 

this court reviews only for clear error.” Nat’l Steel Car, 

Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry., Ltd., 357 F.3d 1319, 1335 (Fed. 

1 Section 103 has since been amended. See Leahy 

Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(c), 125 

Stat. 284, 287–88 (2011) (“AIA”). However, because the 

application that led to the ’110 patent was filed before 

March 16, 2013, the pre-AIA § 103(a) applies. See AIA, 

125 Stat. at 293.

 

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Cir. 2004). Two prior art references, U.S. Patent Application Publication 2003/0056851 (“Eriksen”) and Japanese 

Patent No. 2004-338158 (“Bridgestone”), were considered 

by the district court. TEK conceded “Eriksen disclose[s] 

all the elements within claim[s] 1, 26 and 27 of the ’110

Patent except ‘a three-way valve’ and ‘an additional 

hose.’” Order Re TEK’s Motions for Summary Judgment 

of Damages and Invalidity at 7. The district court found 

Bridgestone, which was not before the examiner, discloses 

an air tube 54 that works together with a tire, even 

though it is not directly connected to the tire, and that air 

tube 54 therefore represents the element of “an additional

hose 83 cooperating with” the tire. See id. at 9. 

Bridgestone fig.1.

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’110 patent fig.7. 

Under the proper construction of “cooperating with,” 

however, Bridgestone does not disclose an “additional 

hose cooperating with” the tire because air tube 54 is not 

directly connected to the tire as is additional hose 83 in 

the ’110 patent (see figures, above). Air tube 54 also 

cannot, without joint hose 66, “be used quickly and easily 

to inflate a flat tyre,” id. col. 5 ll. 29–31, because only joint 

hose 66 is connected to the tire in Bridgestone. See 

Bridgestone fig.1. In light of these differences, the district 

court clearly erred in finding Bridgestone disclosed the 

element of an “additional hose [] cooperating with” the 

tire.

B. There Was Insufficient Evidence of a Motivation to Combine Eriksen with Bridgestone to 

Produce the Claimed Invention

The motivation to combine prior-art references is a 

question of fact, reviewable only for clear error. See Grp. 

One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 407 F.3d 1297, 1304 

(Fed. Cir. 2005). The district court found a motivation to 

combine Eriksen and Bridgestone, noting “both Eriksen 

and Bridgestone offer nearly identical solutions,” to “the 

same problem” of “repairing deflated tires with air and/or 

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sealing liquids.” Order Re TEK’s Motions for Summary 

Judgment of Damages and Invalidity at 10 (citing Tokai 

Corp. v. Easton Enters., Inc., 632 F.3d 1358, 1371 (Fed. 

Cir. 2011) (This court has “consistently stated that courts 

may find a motivation to combine prior art references in 

the nature of the problem to be solved, and that [t]his 

form of motivation to combine evidence is particularly 

relevant with simpler mechanical technologies.”) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted)). 

Based on its erroneous interpretation of claim scope, 

the district court erred in determining that Sealant and 

AMI “‘demonstrate[d] by clear and convincing evidence 

that a skilled artisan would have had reason to combine 

the teaching[s] of [Eriksen and Bridgestone] to achieve the 

claimed invention.’” Order Granting Post-Trial Motions 

at 23 (quoting In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litig., 676 F.3d 1063, 

1068–69 (Fed. Cir. 2012)) (emphasis added). Even if a 

skilled artisan would be motivated to combine the two 

references, as the district court found, this would not 

produce the claimed invention because neither Bridgestone nor Eriksen teach the use of “an additional hose [] 

cooperating with” the tire. 

For these reasons, the district court erred in granting 

summary judgment that the asserted claims of the ’110 

patent would have been obvious. While we reverse the 

district court’s grant of summary judgment of obviousness 

with respect to the asserted claims of the ’110 patent, 

Sealant has not had an opportunity to make a case for 

invalidity in light of this court’s claim construction. A 

remand is therefore required. 

IV. The ’581 Patent Is Invalid and the District Court 

Erred in Denying Judgment as a Matter of Law

When reviewing a denial of JMOL, this court applies 

the standard of review according to the law of the regional 

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circuit, in this case the Ninth Circuit. See Wechsler v. 

Macke Int’l Trade, Inc., 486 F.3d 1286, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 

2007). The Ninth Circuit “reviews de novo an order 

granting or denying JMOL,” and will reverse a denial of 

JMOL where “‘the evidence, construed in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party, permits only one reasonable conclusion, and that conclusion is contrary to the 

jury’s verdict.’” Id. at 1291 (quoting Pavao v. Pagay, 307 

F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 2002)).

Sealant and AMI argue substantial evidence supports 

the jury’s finding that TEK failed to prove the prior art 

disclosed both the receptacle and port of independent 

claim 27. Sealant Br. 17–18. Claim 27 of the ’581 patent 

recites: 

A tire repair device, comprising: 

a housing; 

an air compressor disposed within said housing; 

an air flow path from said air compressor adapted 

to be connected to a tire; 

a receptacle formed in said housing in communication with said air flow path; 

and a port disposed in said receptacle in communication with said air flow path adapted to sealingly 

receive a bottle of tire sealant,

wherein when said air compressor is activated 

and a bottle of tire sealant is received in said receptacle, air from said air compressor is forced into the bottle and pushes tire sealant out of the 

bottle, into said receptacle, into said air flow path, 

and into the tire.

’581 patent col. 9 l. 58–col. 10 l. 5 (emphases added). 

The specification indicates port 40 (fig.3) is located at 

the base of cap 48 (figs.1 & 3) in receptacle 14 (fig.1). See 

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’581 patent figs.1, 3. Figure 5, reproduced below, illustrates “a sectional view of the receptacle port of [Figure 

3].” Id. col. 3 ll. 63–64. 

’581 patent figs.1, 3, 5. 

U.S. Patent Application Publication 2004/0173282 A1 

(the “’282 publication”) discloses both the receptacle and 

port elements of claim 27 of the ’581 patent. See ’581 

patent col. 9 ll. 63–67. Figure 4 of the ’282 publication 

illustrates “screw socket 18,” ’282 publication ¶ 18 (see

J.A. 2363, 2365), into which the “container [of sealant] 4” 

is inserted, id. ¶¶ 15, 18. The “screw socket” of the ’282 

publication is a “port” within the meaning of the ’282 

patent. See Sealant Sys. Int’l, Inc. v. TEK Global, S.R.L., 

No 11-cv-0074-PSG, at 10–12 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2012) 

(“Claim Construction Order”) (J.A. 25.1–25.31). AMI’s 

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SEALANT SYS. INT’L, INC. v. TEK GLOBAL, S.R.L. 17

expert Dr. King conceded this during trial, stating “socket 

18 . . . meets the court’s definition of a port in the claim 

construction order.” J.A. 4381; see also id. (Question: 

“You just testified screw socket 18 is a port . . . .” Answer: 

“That’s correct.”). The port of claim 27 of the ’581 patent 

is therefore disclosed in the form of screw socket 18 of the 

’282 publication. 

’282 publication fig.4. 

However, Dr. King opined screw socket 18 does not 

meet the requirements of the claim element because it is 

not disposed in a receptacle. J.A. 4381. He stated the 

’282 publication did not disclose a receptacle “because 

there’s not a wall [around the port],” i.e., around screw 

socket 18. J.A. 4384. However, claim 27 does not recite a 

“wall,” and the district court construed “receptacle formed 

in said housing” according to its ordinary meaning. Claim 

Construction Order at 7. The district court explained that 

“[t]he word ‘receptacle’ connotes depth” and a PHOSITA 

would understand the term to mean “something that 

receives or contains something.” Id. No reasonable juror 

could conclude that the unnumbered hole in the housing 

in Figure 4 of the ’282 publication, which contains the 

screw socket, does not possess depth. See J.A. 4385 (Dr. 

King: “[The ’282 publication] has a hole that the socket 

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18 SEALANT SYS. INT’L, INC. v. TEK GLOBAL, S.R.L. 

goes in.”). This indicates the ’282 publication discloses 

both the port and the receptacle as claimed in the ’581 

patent. See Blackboard, Inc. v. Desire2Learn, Inc., 574 

F.3d 1371, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[T]he conclusion of 

anticipation is dictated by the testimony of [the patent 

owner’s] own witnesses and the documentary evidence 

that was presented to the jury.”).

The district court, however, found “a genuine dispute 

exists whether [the ’282 publication] discloses ‘a receptacle formed in the housing,’” as required by claim 27 of the 

’581 patent, citing the argument of Sealant and AMI that 

“the hole in the housing [of the ’282 publication] does not 

perform the function of sealingly receiving the container 

of sealant,” and that “only the screw socket identified as 

18 does.” Order Re TEK’s Motions for Summary Judgment of Damages and Invalidity at 20–21 (capitalization 

omitted). However, claim 27 states “a port disposed in 

said receptacle . . . [is] adapted to sealingly receive a 

bottle of tire sealant.” ’581 patent col. 9 ll. 65–66 (emphasis added). Claim 27 does not require the receptacle to 

sealingly receive the bottle of sealant, except to the extent 

the port, which is in the receptacle, does so. See id. col. 9 

l. 63–col. 10 l. 5.

Because claim 27 of the ’581 patent is anticipated by 

the ’282 publication, the district court’s finding of no 

anticipation is reversed and the jury’s infringement 

verdict and damages award, as well as the district court’s 

order permanently enjoining TEK from infringing the ’581 

patent, are vacated.2 

With one exception, Sealant and AMI do not separately argue the validity of claims other than claim 27, so this 

2 Because we vacate the jury’s damages award, the 

parties’ dispute over how the award was calculated is 

moot. 

 

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SEALANT SYS. INT’L, INC. v. TEK GLOBAL, S.R.L. 19

court will not separately consider them. See Sud-Chemie, 

Inc. v. Multisorb Techs., Inc., 554 F.3d 1001, 1009 (Fed. 

Cir. 2009) (declining to consider the independent validity 

of certain claims where the appellant did not separately 

argue they were patentable). The one exception is claim 

42, which recites: 

A tire repair device, comprising:

a housing;

an air compressor within said housing; 

an air flow path from said air compressor adapted 

to be connected to a tire; and 

a reservoir formed in said housing in communication with said air flow path adapted to receive tire 

sealant, 

wherein when said air compressor is activated 

and tire sealant is received in said reservoir, air 

from said air compressor is forced into said reservoir and pushes tire sealant out of said reservoir, 

into said air flow path, and into the tire.

’581 patent col. 11 ll. 29–41 (emphasis added). When 

asked “[w]hat difference, if any, existed between the 

claimed invention [of the ’581 patent] and the prior art,” 

the jury stated only “[t]he two piece system (receptacle 

and port).” J.A. 28. Claim 42 recites neither a receptacle 

nor a port. See ’581 patent col. 11 ll. 29–41. 

Nevertheless, the district court denied TEK’s motion 

for JMOL that claim 42 was anticipated, reasoning that 

“testimony from both parties’ experts [that none of the 

prior art disclosed a reservoir] constitutes substantial 

evidence supporting the jury’s verdict on anticipation.” 

Order Re TEK’s Motions for Summary Judgment of 

Damages and Invalidity at 23. However, in light of the 

expert testimony and the disclosure of the ’282 publicaCase: 14-1428 Document: 3-2 Page: 19 Filed: 06/11/2015
20 SEALANT SYS. INT’L, INC. v. TEK GLOBAL, S.R.L. 

tion, no reasonable juror could conclude the ’282 publication fails to disclose a reservoir. 

The district court construed “reservoir” to mean “cavity where sealant collects separate from the container.” 

Claim Construction Order at 12. The ’282 publication 

discloses “a cavity 25 . . . from where the air passes between the inner walls of the cavity 25 and the outer walls 

of the connector pipe 19 down to the continuation of the 

compressed air duct 21.” ’282 publication ¶ 19. See J.A. 

4099 (Dr. Kazerooni: “Once you put a cap in there, there’s 

a cavity.”). As described in the ’581 patent, a user can 

“pour[] tire sealant into reservoir 215, replace[] the cap on 

orifice 214, and activate[] switch 18 to turn on the air 

compressor.” ’581 patent col. 7 ll. 36–38. Nothing in the 

record suggests the cavity of the ’282 publication could not 

receive sealant in a similar manner, such as by applying 

sealant to the inside of the cap prior to inserting it into 

the socket. Figure 3 (below) illustrates cavity 25, which 

includes the triangular region between connector pipe 19 

and plug 22 as well as the space between the inner walls 

of plug 22 and the outer walls of the connector pipe 19. 

’282 publication fig.3. 

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SEALANT SYS. INT’L, INC. v. TEK GLOBAL, S.R.L. 21

Although the cavity disclosed in the ’282 publication 

may be small, AMI’s expert Dr. King indicated there is no 

minimum size for the cavity in order for it to constitute a 

reservoir. See J.A. 4345 (agreeing that “even one milliliter [of sealant flowing out of the container] would be a 

sufficient amount to have a reservoir”). The ’282 publication therefore anticipates claim 42 of the ’581 patent. The 

district court’s denial of JMOL as to claim 42 is thus also 

reversed, and the jury’s infringement verdict and damages award, and the district courts’ injunction as to claim 

42, are also vacated. 

V. Sealant and AMI’s Request for Attorney Fees Is 

Denied 

“The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable 

attorney fees to the prevailing party.” 35 U.S.C. § 285. 

Applying this court’s precedent in Brooks Furniture 

Manufacturing, Inc. v. Dutailier International, Inc., 393 

F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2005), the district court denied 

Sealant and AMI’s motion for attorney fees. 

Sealant and AMI argue the district court’s denial of 

its motion for attorney fees should be vacated and remanded because the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, 

Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014), has rendered the standard 

applied by the district court no longer valid. The Court in

Octane Fitness “reject[ed] the Federal Circuit’s requirement that patent litigants establish their entitlement to 

fees under § 285 by clear and convincing evidence,” thereby overruling Brooks Furniture. Octane Fitness, 134 S. 

Ct. at 1758. It also rejected this court’s requirement that 

a case may be deemed exceptional under § 285 only “when 

there has been some material inappropriate conduct, or 

when the litigation is both brought in subjective bad faith 

and objectively baseless.” Id. at 1752 (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). 

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22 SEALANT SYS. INT’L, INC. v. TEK GLOBAL, S.R.L. 

However, Octane Fitness did not alter the requirement that attorney fees may be awarded “to the prevailing party.” 35 U.S.C. § 285. Because this court holds 

AMI’s ’581 patent invalid, and reverses summary judgment of invalidity with respect to TEK’s ’110 patent, 

Sealant and AMI are no longer “prevailing parties” for 

purposes of § 285. See SSL Servs., LLC v. Citrix Sys., 

Inc., 769 F.3d 1073, 1086 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“To be the 

prevailing party, we require: (1) that the party received at 

least some relief on the merits, and (2) [t]hat relief must 

materially alter the legal relationship between the parties 

by modifying one party’s behavior in a way that directly 

benefits the opposing party.”) (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted). The district court’s denial of Sealant’s attorney fees request, predicated on the now vacated 

judgment, is therefore affirmed. 

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the decision of the district court is 

AFFIRMED-IN-PART, REVERSED-IN-PART, 

VACATED-IN-PART, AND REMANDED FOR 

FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

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