Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00836/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00836-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Regina Pangerl
Plaintiff
Peoria Unified School District
Defendant
T.P.
Plaintiff

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Regina Pangerl, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Peoria Unified School District, 

Defendant.

No. CV-14-00836-PHX-JJT

ORDER 

At issue are Plaintiff Regina Pangerl’s Motion in Limine as to the Administrative 

Record (Doc. 43, “Mot. to Exclude”), to which Defendant Peoria Unified School District 

(“the District”) filed a Response (Doc. 49, “Resp. to Mot. to Exclude”); Plaintiff’s 

Motion to Supplement the Administrative Record (Doc. 44, “Mot. to Supplement”), to 

which the District filed a Response (Doc. 50, “Resp. to Mot. to Supplement”); the 

District’s Motion to Quash Plaintiff’s Subpoena Duces Tecum (Doc. 59), to which 

Plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. 61); and Plaintiff’s Request for Status of these Motions 

(Doc. 62). 

I. BACKGROUND 

In the first cause of action of the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), Plaintiff 

raises a claim against the District on behalf of herself and her minor daughter, T.P., to 

appeal an administrative decision under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 

20 U.S.C. § 1415(i) (“IDEA”). (Doc. 40, FAC ¶¶ 1, 66-68.) Plaintiff alleges T.P. has 

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learning disabilities and the District failed to provide her with a Free Appropriate Public 

Education (“FAPE”) from 2010 to 2013, as required under IDEA, by among other things 

failing to properly develop and design an Individualized Education Program (“IEP”), 

failing to provide the requisite speech and language, reading, math and writing instruction 

services, failing to fully assess T.P., failing to provide an appropriate plan to allow T.P. to 

transition out of high school, and retaliating against T.P. for her parents’ attempts to 

enforce their rights under special education laws. (FAC ¶¶ 14-18, 23, 67.) On January 13, 

2013, Plaintiff filed a Due Process Complaint with the Arizona Department of Education, 

Exceptional Student Services, Dispute Resolution Unit. (FAC ¶ 20.) Administrative Law 

Judge (“ALJ”) Eric A. Bryant held hearings on Plaintiff’s Due Process Complaint 

between September 3, 2013, and October 8, 2013, and issued a Decision on March 18, 

2014, ordering the District to provide T.P. with an additional 40 hours of special 

education math instruction but denying all other requested relief. (FAC ¶¶ 21, 25, 27-28.) 

 In the FAC, Plaintiff alleges ALJ Bryant erred by, among other things, considering 

irrelevant or extrinsic evidence and disregarding relevant evidence, finding the transition 

plan in the IEPs to be appropriate, finding the District properly implemented most aspects 

of the IEPs, and finding the District provided T.P. with a FAPE over the relevant period 

with the exception of math instruction. (FAC ¶ 68.) Plaintiff requests that the Court 

vacate the ALJ’s March 18, 2014 Decision, find that the District denied T.P. a FAPE, 

award compensatory education services for the 2011-2013 school years as well as 

transition services, and award Plaintiff her expenses, attorneys’ fees and costs in 

enforcing T.P.’s special education rights. (FAC at 22-23.) 

 Plaintiff filed her Complaint in this action on April 21, 2014, alleging a single 

cause of action under IDEA to appeal the administrative decision. (Doc. 1.) On 

August 18, 2014, Plaintiff served the Complaint on the District. (Doc. 7.) On 

September 8, 2014, the District filed its Answer to Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 11), and 

on October 27, 2014, the Court ordered that Plaintiff file any evidentiary motions by 

December 15, 2014 and that the parties file simultaneous Opening Briefs by April 10, 

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2015. (Doc. 19.) On December 12, 2014, Plaintiff filed an emergency motion to extend 

the time to file evidentiary motions (Doc. 21), which the Court granted, giving Plaintiff 

until February 17, 2015 to file evidentiary motions and the parties until June 15, 2015 to 

file Opening Briefs (Doc. 22). 

On January 26, 2015, some nine months after filing her initial Complaint, Plaintiff 

filed a motion to amend the Complaint to add three new claims under the Rehabilitation 

Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Arizona law, which would change the 

complexion of this case from a straightforward appeal of an administrative decision to 

one that also includes federal and state law claims that would be resolved for the first 

time by the Court. (Doc. 29.) The District had no objection to Plaintiff’s filing of an 

Amended Complaint, but, considering that the amendment contained new claims of a 

distinct evidentiary character, the Court concluded it would be most efficient to resolve 

the appeal on the currently set schedule and turn to Plaintiff’s new claims thereafter, if 

necessary. (Docs. 35, 38, 39.) With the Court’s permission, Plaintiff filed the FAC on 

February 18, 2015. (Doc. 40.) 

Plaintiff filed another motion for extension of time on February 9, 2015 (Doc. 33), 

which the Court granted, giving Plaintiff until April 20, 2015 to file the evidentiary 

motions (Doc. 36). Plaintiff filed the present Motions on April 20, 2015 (Docs. 43, 44), 

and, after the Court granted the District an extension of time to respond, the District filed 

its Responses on June 24, 2015 (Docs. 49, 50). The Court effectively stayed litigation of 

Plaintiff’s other claims until resolution of Plaintiff’s first cause of action, the appeal of 

the administrative decision under IDEA. (Docs. 39, 57.) 

II. ANALYSIS 

 A. Motion to Exclude Evidence from the Administrative Record 

In the first Motion, styled a Motion in Limine, Plaintiff asks the Court to exclude 

from the pre-existing Administrative Record portions of evidence that Plaintiff believes 

the ALJ should not have considered in reaching his Decision. (Mot. to Exclude at 5.) The 

evidence at issue falls into four categories based on Plaintiff’s allegations: (1) evidence 

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not timely disclosed to Plaintiff; (2) evidence that predates or postdates the claim period; 

(3) evidence that the District obtained by illegal subpoena; and (4) other improper 

evidence. (Mot. to Exclude at 5-6.) Plaintiff does not provide any legal support for the 

proposition that, in an appeal of an administrative decision under IDEA, a district court 

may properly exclude or strike evidence contained in the pre-existing Administrative 

Record. 

In Response, the District points out that a motion in limine is a vehicle for 

obtaining a trial court’s guidance on the admissibility of evidence and is inappropriate in 

an appeal. (Resp. to Mot. to Exclude at 1-2.) The District contends that Plaintiff’s Motion 

amounts to a request for the Court to review the propriety of the ALJ’s evidentiary 

rulings in the context of Plaintiff’s appeal of the ALJ’s Decision. (Resp. to Mot. to 

Exclude at 2.) 

The Court agrees that the Administrative Record is the Administrative Record as it 

came to the Court and existed prior to the initiation of this appeal. Striking evidence 

contained in the Administrative Record and potentially considered by the ALJ, as urged 

by Plaintiff, is inappropriate. 

Moreover, while Plaintiff’s Motion is “in limine” to the extent Plaintiff filed it “at 

the threshold” of this appeal, the Motion is at the very least unconventional in the context 

of an appeal. In actuality, the Motion challenges the ALJ’s evidentiary rulings below, 

presenting issues that are ordinarily raised in a party’s Opening Brief on appeal. Indeed, 

the Court could construe Plaintiff’s Motion as an end-run around the page limitation on 

Plaintiff’s Opening Brief. Nevertheless, because the parties have fully briefed the 

propriety of the ALJ’s consideration of certain evidence in reaching his Decision, the 

Court will now examine those evidentiary rulings. The Court notes it can only reach 

conclusions regarding the ALJ’s consideration of certain evidence to the extent that is 

possible outside the Court’s ultimate evaluation of the propriety of the ALJ’s Decision as 

a whole—an evaluation the Court will undertake when this appeal is briefed. 

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On appeal, this Court reviews the ALJ’s factual determinations for “clear error” 

and the ALJ’s ultimate determination of the appropriateness of T.P.’s IEP de novo. 

Adams v. Oregon, 195 F.3d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir. 1999). The Court gives “due weight to 

the [ALJ’s] administrative proceeding and [does] not substitute [its] opinions of sound 

educational policy for those of the school authorities which [it is] reviewing.” Id. 

In determining the degree of deference owed to the administrative findings, 

[this] court, in recognition of the expertise of the administrative agency, 

must consider the findings carefully and endeavor to respond to the [ALJ’s] 

resolution of each material issue. After such consideration, [this] court is 

free to accept or reject the findings in part or in whole. Nevertheless, the 

amount of deference bestowed upon the [ALJ] is increased where [his] 

findings are thorough and complete. 

Id. (internal quotations omitted). 

 With regard to Arizona administrative hearings such as those the ALJ held, while 

the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply, all relevant evidence is admissible at the 

hearings. See A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(D). Evidence is relevant if it tends to make a fact 

more or less probable than it was without the evidence and the fact is of consequence in 

resolving the issue. See Ariz. R. Evid. 401; Fed. R. Evid. 401. The Court applies the 

“harmless error” test to the ALJ’s evidentiary rulings because, under IDEA, Plaintiff 

cannot bring an action in this Court for judicial review of the administrative proceedings 

conducted unless Plaintiff is “aggrieved” by the results of those proceedings. See 

20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A). In this context, harm is the loss of an educational opportunity 

for the child. See id.; R.B. ex rel. F.B. v. Napa Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 469 F.3d 932, 

942 (9th Cir. 2007). 

 1. Evidence Allegedly Not Timely Disclosed to Plaintiff

Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred when he admitted four exhibits that the 

District did not timely provide to Plaintiff prior to the hearings. (Mot. to Exclude at 6, 

Ex. A.) IDEA and the regulations implementing it prohibit the introduction of evidence at 

an administrative hearing that was not disclosed at least five business days before the 

hearing. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(2)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 300.512(a)(3). 

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With respect to the four challenged exhibits, the record shows that the District 

withdrew one of them—portions of Exhibit D36 Plaintiff claims were not timely 

disclosed—prior to the hearings, so it was not moved into evidence. Moreover, Plaintiff 

herself moved two others—Exhibits D54 and D60—into evidence at the hearings; 

Plaintiff cannot now claim harm from evidence that she herself moved to admit. 

The District concedes that it provided to Plaintiff the last challenged exhibit, 

D161, one day late, but points out that the ALJ explicitly found the District’s short delay 

was justified by Plaintiff’s tardiness in both filing and serving on the District an ALJordered clarification of one of the substantive issues. (See Resp. to Mot. to Exclude, Ex. 

B (citing Admin. R. (“A.R.”) at 3571-83).) The Court finds no error in the ALJ’s ruling, 

particularly in light of the facts that Plaintiff had received the substance of Exhibit D161 

prior to the deadline, Plaintiff did not object when the District moved Exhibit D161 into 

evidence, and Plaintiff does not demonstrate how admission of Exhibit D161 harmed her. 

Indeed, because the ALJ refers neither to Exhibit D161 nor its contents in his Decision, 

the effect of the admission of Exhibit D161 on his Decision is too attenuated for the 

Court to find harm. 

In sum, the Court finds no merit in Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ erred in 

admitting evidence Plaintiff alleges the District disclosed fewer than five days before the 

hearings. 

2. Evidence that Predates or Postdates the Claim Period 

Plaintiff next provides the Court with lists of exhibits in the Administrative Record 

that either predate or postdate the period Plaintiff argues is relevant for the purposes of 

evaluating T.P.’s IEPs, implying that the ALJ erred in considering these exhibits. (Mot. to 

Exclude, Exs. B, C.) As the District points out, many of these exhibits were never 

admitted into evidence, so Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ somehow erred with respect 

to admitting these exhibits is meritless. (See Resp. to Mot. to Exclude (citing Exhibits D3, 

D48, D49 and D53).) 

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As for the admitted exhibits Plaintiff argues predate the relevant period, Plaintiff 

does not identify for the Court whether the ALJ relied on any of these exhibits in 

reaching his Decision and thus whether Plaintiff could have been harmed by their 

admission. Furthermore, the Court does not agree with Plaintiff’s contention that any 

evidence that predates the preparation period of the IEPs at issue is per se irrelevant. (See 

Mot. to Exclude at 6-7.). Plaintiff misapprehends Adams in support of her argument. In 

Adams, the court concluded that evidence of a child’s progress after implementation of an 

IEP was not relevant to the inquiry whether the IEP was appropriate when implemented. 

See 195 F.3d at 1149; Marc M. ex rel. Aidan M. v. Dep’t of Educ., Hawai’i, 726 F. Supp. 

2d 1235, 1243 (D. Hawai’i 2011). Adams does not stand for the proposition that an ALJ 

may not consider as relevant any evidence from outside the statute of limitations period, 

as Plaintiff would have the Court believe. In her Opening Brief in this appeal, Plaintiff 

may identify evidence that was admitted over her objection on these grounds and that she 

believes was not relevant to the ALJ’s Decision, if she can also show how admission of 

that evidence harmed her by, for example, the ALJ’s reliance on that evidence in his 

Decision. 

 Evidence that postdates the IEPs at issue may or may not be irrelevant to the 

ALJ’s Decision under Adams. E.M. ex rel. E.M. v. Pajaro Valley Unified Sch. Dist. Office 

of Admin. Hr’gs, 652 F.3d 999, 1006 (9th Cir. 2011) (“But that exclusive use of hindsight 

is forbidden does not preclude consideration of subsequent events. The clear implication 

of permitting some hindsight is that additional data, discovered late in the evaluation 

process, may provide significant insight into the child’s condition, and the reasonableness 

of the school district’s action, at the earlier date.”) However, Plaintiff again does not 

point to specific postdated evidence admitted over her objection on these grounds and 

identify why it was irrelevant, whether the ALJ relied on it, and how its admission 

harmed her. Plaintiff may do so in her Opening Brief in this appeal, but must do so on an 

individualized, exhibit-by-exhibit basis. 

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3. Evidence Allegedly Obtained by Illegal Subpoena 

Plaintiff next provides the Court with a list of exhibits that Plaintiff alleges the 

District obtained by subpoena from New Way Learning Academy, a private school T.P. 

attended, but did not provide to Plaintiff prior to the hearings. (Mot. to Exclude, Ex. D.) 

 The District points out a number of defects in Plaintiff’s argument, and the Court 

agrees with all of them. First, the record shows that six of the exhibits Plaintiff lists were 

never admitted into evidence. Of the remaining exhibits, Plaintiff did not object to their 

admission on these grounds at the hearings, thus waiving the right to raise the propriety 

of their admission in this Court. Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th 

Cir. 1996) (“By failing to object to evidence at trial and request a ruling on such an 

objection, a party waives the right to raise admissibility issues on appeal.”); United States 

v. Gomez-Norena, 908 F.2d 497, 500 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[A] party fails to preserve an 

evidentiary issue for appeal not only by failing to make a specific objection, but also by 

making the wrong specific objection.”) Even if Plaintiff had objected to the admission of 

these exhibits, she does not now show how their admission harmed her. For all of these 

reasons, Plaintiff’s challenge in this Court to the ALJ’s admission of the New Way 

Learning Academy exhibits has no merit. 

4. Other Evidence 

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred when he admitted Exhibit D156, a redacted 

version of a letter, when an unredacted version was apparently available. (Mot. to 

Exclude at 10.)1

 Once again, Plaintiff waived her challenge in this Court by failing to 

object to the admission of Exhibit D156 at the hearings. 

For all the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine as 

to the Administrative Record (Doc. 43). 

 

1

 Plaintiff also argues again, at length, that the ALJ should not have admitted 

Exhibit D161, which the District provided to Plaintiff one day beyond the five day deadline for disclosures. Plaintiff’s argument has no merit for all the reasons the Court 

already set forth in this Order. 

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B. Motion to Supplement the Administrative Record 

In her Motion to Supplement, Plaintiff asks the Court for leave to provide 

additional evidence beyond the Administrative Record for the Court’s consideration in 

determining whether the District provided T.P. with a FAPE, and Plaintiff generalizes 

this proposed evidence in two groups: (1) admitted evidence that is missing from the 

Administrative Record provided to the Court, and (2) additional rebuttal evidence. 

Judicial review in IDEA cases differs from that in other agency actions, in which 

courts are generally confined to the administrative record. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2). For 

this Court to determine whether to supplement the administrative record with additional 

evidence in an IDEA case, the proper inquiry is whether the proposed additional evidence 

is relevant, non-cumulative and otherwise admissible. Pajaro Valley, 652 F.3d at 1004-

05; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(ii). In reviewing an ALJ’s decision under IDEA, 

additional evidence may be excluded in this Court’s discretion where the proposed 

evidence repeats or embellishes evidence from the administrative hearings, or changes 

the character of the proceeding from one of review to a trial de novo. Ojai Unified Sch. 

Dist. v. Jackson, 4 F.3d 1467, 1473 (9th Cir. 1993). “A practicable approach . . . is that an 

administrative hearing witness is rebuttably presumed to be foreclosed from testifying” 

for the purpose of the appeal in the district court. Id. (quoting Town of Burlington v. 

Dep’t of Educ., 736 F.2d 773, 791 (1st Cir. 1984)). “In ruling on motions for witnesses to 

testify, a court should weigh heavily the important concerns of not allowing a party to 

undercut the statutory role of administrative expertise, the unfairness involved in one 

party’s reserving its best evidence for trial, the reason the witness did not testify at the 

administrative hearing, and the conservation of judicial resources.” Id. (quoting Town of 

Burlington, 736 F.2d at 790-91). 

In addition to showing that proposed additional evidence is relevant, noncumulative and otherwise admissible, the party proffering the additional evidence must 

show that there is a justification for the fact that it is missing from the administrative 

record. Id. “The reasons for supplementation will vary; they may include gaps in the 

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administrative transcript owing to mechanical failure, unavailability of a witness, an 

improper exclusion of evidence by the administrative agency, and evidence concerning 

relevant events occurring subsequent to the administrative hearing. The starting point for 

determining what additional evidence should be received, however, is the record of the 

administrative proceeding.” Id. (quoting Town of Burlington, 736 F.2d at 790-91). 

1. Missing Evidence 

Plaintiff claims, and the District agrees, that two audio recordings that the ALJ 

admitted at the hearings—Exhibits S52 and S80—were not part of the Administrative 

Record provided to this Court. Accordingly, the Court will order the District to 

supplement the Administrative Record with these Exhibits. Plaintiff also states that she 

intends to prepare certified transcripts of these audio recordings. (Mot. to Supplement 

at 6.) Although Plaintiff did not ask the ALJ for leave to make a certified transcript of the 

audio recordings let alone try to move transcripts into evidence, and although the Court 

could find transcripts duplicative of the audio recordings themselves, the Court will 

permit Plaintiff, at her own expense, to provide the District and the Court with certified 

transcripts of the audio recordings, should she desire. The Court will also give the District 

the opportunity to make any objections to the transcripts. 

Plaintiff also argues that a number of other Exhibits—S75 through S79—are 

missing from or mis-located in the Administrative Record. (Mot. to Supplement at 6.) As 

the District points out, however, the record shows that the ALJ determined that these 

Exhibits were duplicative of others and eliminated the duplication. (Resp. to Mot. to 

Supplement at 6 (citing A. R. at 7683).) 

2. Additional Rebuttal Evidence 

Plaintiff asks to supplement the Administrative Record with 79 pieces of 

additional evidence because she believes the ALJ did not give her a fair opportunity to 

rebut the District’s evidence at the hearings. (Mot. to Supplement at 7, Ex. B.) She also 

asks that, if the Court denies her motion to exclude evidence she believes was wrongly 

admitted by the ALJ, she be given additional time to provide the Court with additional 

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rebuttal evidence, which is “too substantial to present to the Court at this time.” (Mot. to 

Supplement at 7.) As discussed above, the Court is denying Plaintiff’s motion to exclude 

evidence from the Administrative Record because Plaintiff failed to object to the ALJ’s 

admission of the evidence she now asks the Court to exclude, among other problems. 

Plaintiff gives the Court no way to properly weigh the various concerns involved 

in allowing supplementation of the Administrative Record. Under IDEA, Plaintiff has the 

burden to make an individualized showing, for each proffered piece of additional 

evidence, that the evidence is relevant, non-cumulative and otherwise admissible. Pajaro 

Valley, 652 F.3d at 1004-05. Plaintiff must also explain why the evidence is missing from 

the Administrative Record, whether due to an unavailable witness, a mechanical failure, 

or some other reason. Ojai, 4 F.3d at 1473. Moreover, to justify additional testimony 

from a witness who testified at the hearings, Plaintiff must rebut the presumption against 

such testimony, including explaining why the witness did not provide the now-proffered 

testimony at the hearings in the first place. Id. 

All that Plaintiff provides in support of her request to supplement the 

Administrative Record is a generalized proffer of the evidence in Exhibit B to the 

Motion. (Mot. to Supplement, Ex. B.) For example, the very first proffer is a description 

of additional testimony from T.P. to explain that she did not complete her Economics 

class assignments by herself. Plaintiff does not explain why T.P. did not give this 

testimony at the hearings in the first place or examine how the testimony is relevant, noncumulative and otherwise admissible. Exhibit B thus fails to make the required showing 

for any proffered additional evidence and—although the Court reviewed each generalized 

description of proffered evidence in Exhibit B and endeavored to weigh the relevant 

concerns—the Court was unable to find that Plaintiff made the requisite showing such 

that the Court could authorize Plaintiff to supplement the Administrative Record. 

 The Court must also deny Plaintiff’s request for more time to identify even more 

additional evidence for the Court that Plaintiff states was “too substantial to present to the 

Court” at the time of Plaintiff’s filing of the Motion to Supplement. By participating in 

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the hearings, Plaintiff knew what evidence the ALJ admitted. Plaintiff filed this action on 

April 21, 2014 and served the Complaint on the District four months later, on August 18, 

2014. (Docs. 1, 7.) On October 27, 2014, the Court ordered that Plaintiff file any 

evidentiary motions by December 15, 2014. (Doc. 19.) The Court granted Plaintiff’s 

requests for two extensions of time, eventually setting the evidentiary motion deadline on 

April 20, 2015. (Docs. 21, 33.) Plaintiff thus had an entire year from the filing of the 

Complaint to the evidentiary motions deadline to identify additional evidence Plaintiff 

desired to bring to this Court in its consideration of Plaintiff’s administrative appeal, and 

Plaintiff has never argued to the Court that any of the proposed additional evidence is 

new or previously unavailable. Plaintiff has provided the Court with absolutely no reason 

for Plaintiff’s inability to proffer the desired additional evidence in a timely fashion. The 

Court cannot now countenance yet another extension to allow Plaintiff time to try to 

substantiate supplementing the Administrative Record, a burden Plaintiff utterly failed to 

carry in the present Motion to Supplement. Accordingly, except to the limited extent 

identified above, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s Motion to Supplement and the associated 

request for more time to file another Motion to Supplement. 

C. The District’s Motion to Quash Plaintiff’s Subpoena Duces Tecum 

The District asks the Court to quash a subpoena duces tecum issued by Plaintiff to 

Valley Schools Insurance Trust, the District’s insurance carrier (Doc. 59), arguing that, in 

prior Orders (Docs. 39, 57), the Court explicitly stayed discovery with respect to 

Plaintiff’s newly-added claims until the resolution of Plaintiff’s first cause of action, the 

administrative appeal. In response, Plaintiff argues that, under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 45(d)(3), the District lacks standing to challenge a subpoena issued to a nonparty and that, in any event, the subpoena seeks documents related to Plaintiff’s first 

cause of action, the administrative appeal, which is not subject to the discovery stay on 

Plaintiff’s newly filed claims. (Doc. 61.) 

Under Rule 45(d)(3)(A), a party to a lawsuit does not have standing to move to 

quash a subpoena issued to a non-party based on inadequate time to comply, geographical 

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limits, privilege or undue burden. By contrast, Rule 45(d)(3)(B) allows either a non-party 

to whom a subpoena was issued or a person “affected by a subpoena” to move to quash 

the subpoena to protect trade secrets, confidential information, or certain undisclosed 

experts’ opinions. None of these are the basis of the District’s motion to quash the 

subpoena issued to its insurer. Rather, the District contends that Plaintiff’s subpoena was 

issued outside of an authorized discovery period. 

The District does not attempt to demonstrate that it has standing to file the instant 

Motion to Quash on behalf of a non-party, and the Court would find that the District 

lacks the requisite standing. See, e.g., Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 

965, 973-74 (C.D. Cal. 2012). However, Plaintiff has no basis to engage in discovery in 

this matter at this time. In their Proposed Case Management Plan (Doc. 16), the parties 

did not identify any discovery they intended to conduct apart from Plaintiff’s proposal to 

conduct discovery if the Court granted her Motion to Supplement the Administrative 

Record. As a result, at the Scheduling Conference, the Court did not set a discovery 

period for Plaintiff’s appeal of the administrative decision. (Doc. 19.) The Court has 

stayed discovery on Plaintiff’s newly-filed claims and, as discussed above, the Court is 

denying Plaintiff’s request to supplement the record with respect to the administrative 

appeal except as it pertains to exhibits the ALJ admitted into evidence but are missing 

from the Administrative Record provided to this Court. Plaintiff has not sought leave 

from the Court to conduct any other discovery in this matter, whether on the District or 

non-parties. 

Under its inherent authority to manage its cases, the Court may deny a subpoena—

or any discovery requests—that a party issues outside the authorized discovery period. 

See, e.g., McNerney v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 164 F.R.D. 584, 587-88 (W.D.N.Y. 

1995). Accordingly, in the Court’s discretion, the Court will quash Plaintiff’s subpoena 

duces tecum issued on Valley Schools Insurance Trust. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED denying Plaintiff Regina Pangerl’s Motion in 

Limine as to the Administrative Record (Doc. 43). In her Opening Brief in this appeal, 

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Plaintiff may identify specific evidence that she alleges predates or postdates the relevant 

time period and the ALJ admitted into evidence over her objection on these grounds, if 

she can show that the evidence was irrelevant, the ALJ relied on it, and its admission 

harmed her. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting in part and denying in part Plaintiff’s 

Motion to Supplement the Administrative Record (Doc. 44). The District shall 

supplement the Administrative Record with Exhibits S52 and S80 by March 4, 2016. 

Plaintiff, at her discretion and expense, may provide certified transcripts of these Exhibits 

to the Court and the District by March 18, 2016. Any objections the District may have to 

the certified transcripts shall be made in writing to the Court by April 1, 2016. Plaintiff’s 

Motion to Supplement the Administrative Record is denied in all other respects, because 

Plaintiff failed to make the requisite showing that the proposed additional evidence is 

relevant, non-cumulative and otherwise admissible or explain why it is missing from the 

Administrative Record.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to the Court’s August 20, 2015 Order 

(Doc. 53), the parties shall file simultaneous Opening Briefs on the merits of Plaintiff’s 

first cause of action, namely the appeal of the administrative decision under IDEA, by 

April 1, 2016. The parties’ simultaneous Responses are due April 22, 2016. The parties 

shall not file Replies without leave of Court. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying the District’s Motion to Quash Plaintiff’s 

Subpoena Duces Tecum (Doc. 59). However, under the Court’s inherent authority, the 

Court quashes Plaintiff’s subpoena duces tecum on Valley Schools Insurance Trust 

because Plaintiff issued it outside an authorized discovery period. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Plaintiff’s Request for Status of these 

Motions (Doc. 62) as moot. 

 Dated this 29th day of January, 2016. 

 

 Honorable John J. Tuchi 

 United States District Judge 

Case 2:14-cv-00836-JJT Document 63 Filed 01/29/16 Page 14 of 14