Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-08-02666/USCOURTS-ca8-08-02666-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Samuel Melbern Steward
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Robert W. Pratt, Chief Judge, United States District Court for

the Southern District of Iowa. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 08-2666

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* Southern District of Iowa.

Samuel Melbern Steward, aka *

Sam Steward, * [PUBLISHED]

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: November 16, 2009

Filed: March 17, 2010

___________

Before MURPHY, SMITH, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

The government appeals the district court's1

 determination that Samuel

Melbern Steward's prior Iowa conviction for operating a vehicle without the owner's

consent (OVWOC) does not qualify as a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. §

4B1.2(a). We affirm. 

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I. Background

Steward was indicted for and pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to

distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),

(b)(1)(A), and 846. At the time of his conviction, Steward had two prior felonies: an

OVWOC conviction, in violation of Iowa Code § 714.7, and a conviction for assault

with intent to inflict serious injury, in violation of Iowa Code § 708.2(1). 

At the time of Steward's sentencing hearing, this court's precedent held that

OVWOC offenses were "crimes of violence" and "violent felonies" under U.S.S.G.

§ 4B1.2. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 417 F.3d 990 (8th Cir. 2005); United

States v. Sprouse, 394 F.3d 578 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Sun Bear, 307 F.3d

747 (8th Cir. 2002). At sentencing, the district court determined that Steward was a

career offender under U.S.S.G. §§ 4B1.1 and 4B1.2 based on his convictions for

OVWOC and assault with intent to inflict serious injury and calculated Steward's

Guidelines range as 292 to 365 months' imprisonment. 

Prior to sentencing, Steward had moved for a downward departure from the

career offender guideline and a variance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) from the

Guidelines based on, inter alia, the disparate impact of the 100-to-1 crack-to-powder

cocaine disparity and the disparity between his sentence and that of his "kingpin"

coconspirator. The district court rejected the argument that an unwarranted disparity

existed between Steward's sentence and his coconspirator, finding that the

coconspirator's substantial assistance was "the reason for the dramatic differences in

sentences." As for the remainder of Steward's arguments, the district court examined

this court's precedent and concluded that such precedent justified only a "minor

variance given the record that ha[d] been established by the defendant . . . specifically

the nature and characteristics of the defendant referred to at page 15 of defendant's

brief . . . ." Applying the "minor variance," the district court sentenced Steward to 260

months' imprisonment. 

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Steward appealed his sentence and, while his appeal was pending, the Supreme

Court decided Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007), and Gall v. United

States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007). This court vacated Steward's sentence and remanded to the

district court for resentencing in light of Kimbrough and Gall. 

After this court's remand to the district court but before Steward's resentencing,

the Supreme Court decided Begay v. United States,553 U.S. 137 (2008), holding that

the New Mexico felony offense of driving under the influence of alcohol is not a

"violent felony" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). In light of Begay,

Steward filed a sentencing memorandum prior to his resentencing, arguing that the

Begay analysis controlled and that his OVWOC conviction no longer qualified as a

career offender predicate offense. 

At the resentencing hearing, the district court identified the "first issue" as

whether the "advisory guideline applies in the case. To do that I have to determine the

application of the Begay, B-E-G-A-Y, case and whether or not Mr. Steward is a career

offender." The government agreed that this was the issue. The court ruled that "the

Begay case makes the predicate offense [of OVWOC] inapplicable" based on its

understanding of Begay, which was "[t]hat the Supreme Court has now a categorical

approach to what's a violent felony for purposes of interpretation of the career

offender." The district court then found that the appropriate Guidelines range was 168

to 210 months' imprisonment and sentenced Steward to 188 months' imprisonment.

The district court did not discuss any further departure. 

II. Discussion

The government appeals, arguing that the district court (1) violated this court's

mandate directing the district court to resentence Steward in light of Kimbrough and

Gall when it considered Begay and (2) erred in determining that the OVWOC offense

does not qualify as a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). 

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A. Mandate

The government argues that this court's mandate limited the district court's

resentencing issues to the Supreme Court's decisions in Gall and Kimbrough and that

the district court had no authority to go beyond the scope of the mandate in

resentencing Steward when it considered Begay. 

In response, Steward argues that the district court was required to apply Begay,

as Begay was decided between the issuance of this court's mandate and his

resentencing. 

Although the government is correct that "[w]here a remand is limited to the

resolution of specific issues, those issues outside the scope of the remand are generally

not available for consideration," United States v. Walterman, 408 F.3d 1084, 1085

(8th Cir. 2005), such a rule should not "apply when the earlier panel decision is cast

into doubt by a decision of the Supreme Court." United States v. Williams, 537 F.3d

969, 975 (8th Cir. 2008) (explaining that the general rule that one panel should not

overrule another panel does not apply when an intervening Supreme Court decision

is handed down). Therefore, we hold that the district court correctly considered and

applied intervening Supreme Court precedent. 

B. Crime of Violence

The government also asserts that the OVWOC offense under Iowa law is a

"crime of violence" within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a).

In United States v. Lindquist, we expressly held that a prior Iowa

conviction for operating a vehicle without the owner's consent

constituted a "crime of violence" for purposes of § 2K2.1(a). 421 F.3d

751, 753–55 (8th Cir. 2005). Subsequently, the Supreme Court issued its

decision in Begay v. United States, holding that to be considered a

"violent felony" under the Armed Career Criminal Act, the crime must

be similar in kind to the example crimes listed in the statute. __U.S.__,

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128 S. Ct. 1581, 1583, 1585–86, 170 L. Ed.2d 490 (2008). In United

States v. Williams, we held that, in light of Begay, the Missouri offense

of auto theft without consent should no longer be considered a crime of

violence under § 2K2.1. 537 F.3d 969, 975–76 (8th Cir. 2008).

United States v. Murueta-Espinosa, 325 F. App'x 468, 469 (8th Cir. 2009)

(unpublished per curiam). We applied the rationale of Williams in Mureta-Espinosa

in holding "that the Iowa offense of operating a vehicle without the owner's consent

is no longer a 'crime of violence' for purposes of § 2L1.2." Id. at 470. We explained

that

Iowa's statute for operating a vehicle without the owner's consent is

analogous to Missouri's auto theft without consent statute. Compare

Iowa Code § 714.7 ("Any person who shall take possession or control of

any . . . vehicle . . . without the consent of the owner of such, but without

the intent to permanently deprive the owner thereof . . . .") with Mo. Rev.

Stat. § 570.030 ("A person commits the crime of stealing if he or she

appropriates property . . . of another with the purpose to deprive him or

her thereof . . . without his or her consent . . . ."). Iowa's statute and the

Missouri statute discussed in Williams are sufficiently similar such that

the decision in Williams controls this case.

Id. at 469–70. We noted that "[t]he distinction between 'crime of violence' under

§ 2K2.1 and under § 2L1.2" was "immaterial" to our decision. Id. at 470 n.2. 

Williams and Mureta-Espinosa are likewise controlling in the present case.

Although Williams involved § 2K2.1 and Mureta-Espinosa involved § 2L1.2, not

§ 4B1.2(a), we explained in Williams that "[t]he commentary to both § 2K2.1 and

§ 4B1.1 refer to § 4B1.2(a), which provides a definition of a 'crime of violence' that

is virtually identical to the definition of a 'violent felony' in the Armed Career

Criminal Act." 537 F.3d at 971. Furthermore, we stated that "[i]n construing whether

auto theft and auto tampering are crimes of violence, we look at what is commonly

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referred to as the 'otherwise' clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) or U.S.S.G.

§ 4B1.2(a)(2)." Id. at 972. 

Therefore, we hold that the Iowa offense of OVWOC is not a "crime of

violence" for purposes of § 4B1.2(a). 

III. Conclusion 

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

______________________________

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