Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-02411/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-02411-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Kuwana Partee
Plaintiff

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KUWANNA PARTEE, No. CIV S-08-2411-CMK

Plaintiff, 

vs. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY,

Defendant.

 /

Plaintiff, who is proceeding with retained counsel, brings this action for judicial

review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

Pursuant to the written consent of all parties, this case is before the undersigned as the presiding

judge for all purposes, including entry of final judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Pending

before the court are plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 17) and defendant’s crossmotion for summary judgment (Doc. 20). 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff received social security benefits based on disability as a child. In an

October 30, 2000, application for benefits filed while plaintiff was a minor, plaintiff claimed

disability began on September 1, 1999. In her motion for summary judgment, plaintiff asserts

that her disability results from borderline intellectual functioning and “an anxiety condition

brought on by gunshot wounds in September 2000.” Eligibility was automatically redetermined

upon plaintiff turning 18 and, on August 17, 2005, it was determined that plaintiff was no longer

disabled as of April 23, 2005. Following denial of reconsideration, plaintiff requested an

administrative hearing, which was held on April 16, 2007, before Administrative Law Judge

(“ALJ”) Mark C. Ramsey. In a June 13, 2007, decision the ALJ concluded that plaintiff was no

longer disabled as of April 23, 2005, based on the following relevant findings:

1. As of April 23, 2005, the claimant has had the following severe

impairments: borderline intellectual functioning and anxiety disorder;

2. These impairments do not meet or medically equal an impairment listed in

the regulations; 

3. As of April 23, 2005, the claimant has had the residual functional capacity

for unlimited exertional activity with the ability to perform simple

unskilled work without frequent public or fellow employee contact; and

4. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual

functional capacity, as of April 23, 2005, the regulations establish that the

claimant was able to perform a significant number of jobs in the national

economy.

Plaintiff appealed and, on December 21, 2007, the Appeals Council issued a

decision remanding for further proceedings before the ALJ. In its decision, the Appeals Council

stated:

The Administrative Law Judge found that, as of April 23, 2005, the

claimant was no longer disabled. In reaching this conclusion, the

Administrative Law Judge found that the claimant has the residual

functional capacity to perform work at all exertional limits. The

Administrative Law Judge also found that the claimant was limited to

unskilled work without frequent public contract or frequent contact with

fellow employees (Decision, page 5, Finding 5). Vocational expert

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testimony was not obtained. However, given these significant nonexertional limitations, vocational expert evidence should have been

obtained. Therefore, a remand is necessary to obtain vocational expert

evidence and determine whether jobs are available based on the limitations

found. 

A second hearing was held before the ALJ on March 14, 2008, at which time a vocational expert

offered testimony. In a June 24, 2008, decision, the ALJ again concluded that plaintiff was not

disabled as of April 23, 2005. After the Appeals Council declined further review on September

5, 2008, this appeal followed.

II. SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE

The certified administrative record (“CAR”) contains the following evidence,

summarized chronologically below. Because plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment only

raises issues with respect to the ALJ’s consideration of the various medical conclusions

concerning plaintiff’s mental health issues, the court need not summarize records relating to any

other impairments. 

November 2, 1999 – An “Assessment/Client Plan” form from Sacramento County

Mental Health indicates that plaintiff had “off & on suicidal ideation.” The assessor indicated

that one of plaintiff’s strengths was that she “likes to help others, friendly.” 

March 29, 2001 – Stewart Teal, M.D., a child staff psychologist, completed an

initial psychiatric evaluation. Dr. Teal provided the following assessment:

On psychiatric interview Kuwana appeared as an attractive, slender

fifteen-year-old African-American girl looking rather grim and with set

facial expression. She was able to relax as the interview proceeded and

she was able to smile and engage with the interviewer in the assessment. 

Kuwana’s logical associations of thought were intact and there was no

indication of disorganization of logical thinking processes. Her affect was

appropriate to the content of her thought and her mood seemed mildly to

moderately depressed through much of the interview. Kuwana described a

great deal of difficulty sleeping at night. She has nightmares, which are

repetitious of the shooting incident. She also has associated nightmares in

which other members of her family are shot who were not involved in that

at all. According to Kuwana she felt the problems with the anxiety

particularly at night were getting better, but in the last month or two

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months have again worsened and she continues to have difficulty. 

Kuwana described anxiety symptoms of long standing when she is in

crowds. She denied other kinds of anxiety except for fear of noises at

night in the dark, which have gotten much worse since the shooting. 

* * *

Cognitively Kuwana seemed of average to low average intelligence. She

was able to read at about sixth or seventh grade level, but had more

difficulty with understanding abstractions. Some of her cognitive

difficulties may be secondary to her preoccupation with the shooting. It

was hard for her to focus on things like memory test very well. Her recent

memory was fairly good, remembering eight out of nine items after several

minutes. Her interpretation of proverbs was clear and very concrete, but

there was no indication of any distortion of intrusive thoughts. Kuwana

does some magical thinking believing in ghosts. She also reports

occasionally hearing voices, which frighten her. This is only rarely and

usually happens at night when she is trying to fall asleep. Kuwana seems

to have a reasonably good conscience development with concerns for her

friends and for her family. 

Dr. Teal offered the following conclusion and recommendation:

I see Kuwana as an anxious traumatized youngster struggling to deal with

her life following a major trauma. She seems to have had difficulties both

with anxiety and behavior problems. I would speculate that the shooting

exacerbated these problems and probably have resulted in the more severe

Post Traumatic Stress Disorder than otherwise would have occurred. 

Kuwana was open and able to make a relationship with the interviewer. I

would speculate that she could profit from individual psychotherapy as

well as family therapy. In addition I feel her anxiety is such that a trial on

psychotropic medication is indicated. She has been prescribed Paxil 20

mgs daily and Clonidine 0.1 mg at bedtime to help with agitation and

sleep. 

April 2, 2001 – Barry N. Finkel, Ph.D., submitted a disability evaluation. Dr.

Finkel reported the following on mental status observation:

Kuwana was seen individually for interview and testing. She is alert and

is able to identify the year, month, and day of the week. Speech is normal

in rate and flow. She evidenced no difficulty understanding interview

questions or test instructions. Thinking is logical and goal oriented. She

denied delusions, hallucinations, or ideas of reference. There is no

indication of psychotic symptoms. Mood is dysphoric with appropriate

range of affect. She looks sad but smiles often and seems to have

reasonable energy. 

* * *

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She is able to recall five digits forward. Social judgment is fair. Asked

about smoke and fire, she said “run out.” If she saw an envelope in the

street that was sealed, addressed, and stamped? “Put it in a mailbox.” 

She put forth careful, deliberate effort on all test tasks and results are

considered to be a valid measure of present functioning. She was able to

persist on all items without difficulty. 

Dr. Finkel diagnosed post-traumatic stress disorder traits and borderline intellectual functioning. 

He provided the following summary:

This is a 15-year-old, African-American female who presents with a

reported learning disability and depression. Overall intellectual

functioning is in the borderline range with no significant difference

between verbal and performance scores. On the WRAT-3, reading,

spelling, and arithmetic skills are commensurate with IQ scores. Specific

learning disabilities are not indicated. Results of the Vineland indicate

daily living skills in the adequate range with communication and

socialization in the moderately low range. 

The claimant is polite and cooperative, neatly dressed and groomed. She

presents well and her responses would suggest somewhat higher

functioning that IQ scores alone would indicate. She looks sad but smiles

appropriately and describes the shooting in a matter-of-fact manner. She

indicates she is depressed and angry and verbalized what sounded like

realistic concerns about additional violence. She shows some PTSD traits. 

The claimant is able to groom and dress herself appropriately. She should

be able to follow simple instructions. She would likely have difficulty

attending to and following through on tasks without direct supervision due

to cognitive limitations. She is able to interact appropriately with others. 

Attention, concentration, and pace are mildly to moderately impaired. Her

ability to manage an eight-hour day is likely moderately impaired. If

granted benefits, recommend re-evaluation in one year. As a minor, she is

not competent to manage funds. 

April 4, 2005 – Agency examining psychologist David C. Richwerger prepared a

report following a comprehensive psychiatric evaluation. Plaintiff reported that “she sometimes

hears dead loved ones such as her uncle and friend, and she has trouble sleeping.” She also

stated she felt she could not trust others. As to current level of functioning, Dr. Richwerger

reported:

The claimant lives in an apartment with her family. The claimant states

she does not sleep very well because the babies are crying often, and she

only sleeps from about 3 a.m. to 6:30 a.m., and she has to take care of

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infants. The claimant states her appetite is reduced. The claimant states

she eats about twice a day because she breast feeds, and she states she

usually does not eat that much. The claimant states she does household

chores and takes care of her children. The claimant states she does not go

anywhere because she does not feel safe. The claimant states she has no

outside activities or hobbies other than taking care of her kids. The

claimant states she handles her own financial affairs. The claimant states

she usually gets around by getting a ride. The claimant is able to move

about alone. The claimant got a ride to this evaluation. The claimant

states she does not get along that well with her family. The claimant

states, “I feel my family does not like me.” The claimant states she has

one friend that she interacts with. The claimant states that on a daily basis

she just takes care of her children. 

Dr. Richwerger diagnosed borderline intellectual functioning and assigned a GAF score of 60. 

The doctor opined that plaintiff had no impairment in her ability to perform simple and repetitive

tasks, her ability to perform work activities without special supervision, and her ability to

maintain regular work attendance. He felt plaintiff was slightly impaired in her ability to perform

detailed and complex tasks, her ability to perform work activities on a consistent basis, and her

ability to understand and accept instructions from supervisors. Dr. Richwerger stated that

plaintiff was moderately impaired in her ability to complete a normal workday without

interruption from a psychiatric condition, her ability to interact with co-workers and the public,

and her ability to deal with the usual stresses encountered in competitive work. The doctor stated

that plaintiff was able to handle her own funds. 

June 21, 2005 – Agency consultative psychiatrist Joseph Schnitzler, M.D.,

prepared mental residual functional capacity assessment. The doctor opined that plaintiff was

moderately limited in her ability to understand, remember, and carry out detailed instructions. 

He did not find that plaintiff was significantly limited in any other area of mental functioning. 

June 7, 2006 – Plaintiff reported to Dr. Curiale “no sleep at all.” 

July 14, 2006 – Dr. Curiale appears to have prescribed medication at this visit. 

January 16, 2007 – Plaintiff reported to Dr. Curiale that she had just stopped

smoking marijuana and cigarettes. 

/ / /

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February 2, 2007 – Treatment notes by Dr. Curiale indicate that plaintiff reported

feeling overwhelmed. 

February 5, 2007 – Dr. Curiale prepared a letter addressed “To Whom it May

Concern” in which the doctor stated:

Kuwana Partee is suffering from Post Traumatic Stress due to

being shot by random bullets shot by feuding neighbors. She was an

innocent bystander.

She is presently drug and alcohol free and is involved in outpatient

therapy. 

Kuwana is an excellent candidate for therapy and her prognosis is

excellent for success. 

February 22, 2007 – Plaintiff reported to Dr. Curiale that she “continues to feel

depressed.” Plaintiff also reported that she was “feeling somewhat hopeless intermittently –

struggles to reduce anxiety constantly.” 

March 1, 2007 – Plaintiff reported to Dr. Curiale that she was sleeping “somewhat

better.” She told the doctor that she was happy and that her husband was clean and sober. 

Plaintiff stated that, while her relationship is “somewhat stressful,” she “is coping” and wants a

better life for her children. 

April 10, 2007 – Dr. Curiale submitted a letter to plaintiff’s attorney outlining her

opinions concerning plaintiff’s mental functioning. Dr. Curiale stated that she began treating

plaintiff in June 2006. In her letter, Dr. Curiale outlined the results of psychological testing

administered in March 2007. The doctor concluded:

. . . [Plaintiff] is unable to work in the general labor force at this

time since she is unable to concentrate for any length of time. She has

difficulty accepting authority and although attempts to be quite

conforming would not be able to employ the judgment and thinking

necessary to be gainfully employed. 

Dr. Curiale diagnosed post-traumatic stress disorder with generalized anxiety and assigned a

GAF score of 60. 

/ / /

/ / /

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July 19, 2007 – Dr. Curiale completed a “Medical Source Statement – Mental.” 

The form indicates that the last time plaintiff was treated by Dr. Curiale was on July 13, 2007.

The doctor opined that plaintiff’s ability to understand and remember detailed or complex

instructions was poor and her ability to understand and remember very short and simple

instructions was somewhere between fair and poor. Dr. Curiale stated that these limitations are

attributable to plaintiff’s “confusion and inability to communicate for a sustained period of time.”

Dr. Curiale also stated that plaintiff’s ability to carry out instructions and work without

supervision were both poor as evidenced by “MMPI-2, Beck Depression Inventory, PTSD

Inventory.” The doctor opined that plaintiff’s ability to interact with the public, co-workers, and

supervisors were all poor, but did not cite any objective medical findings to support this

conclusion. Dr. Curiale stated that plaintiff’s ability to adapt to changes in the workplace, ability

to be aware of hazards, and ability to use public transportation were also all poor, citing

“psychotherapeutic sessions.” Dr. Curiale’s prognosis was “fair” and the doctor concluded that,

with time and therapy, plaintiff would “be able to re-enter a quasi-normal life.” Dr. Curiale

provided the following narrative with her source statement:

Ms. Partee has recurring images of being shot – she is in pain from

the bullets still being lodged in her body and that pain forces her to relive

her trauma and terror. She is hypervigilent bordering often on paranoia

during our last session on 7-13-07. She reported believing “someone was

in her room” and she “armed herself with a butcher knife to defend

herself.” She is highly irritable and “fights” with everybody. She is often

teary and sad although she is taking Paxil and Depakote. During the 4th of

July she hid in her room as the sounds of the fireworks sounded like

gunshots to her. She was hospitalized after the shooting at Sierra Vista

Mental Hospital. She was 15 yrs. old. She attended outpatient services for

3 mos. and has asked for assistance intermittently over the years. 

She appears to be genuinely interested in “getting better” however

presently she is disabled.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The court reviews the Commissioner’s final decision to determine whether it is: 

(1) based on proper legal standards; and (2) supported by substantial evidence in the record as a

whole. See Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). “Substantial evidence” is

more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. See Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521

(9th Cir. 1996). It is “. . . such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971). The record as a whole,

including both the evidence that supports and detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion, must

be considered and weighed. See Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th Cir. 1986); Jones

v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). The court may not affirm the Commissioner’s

decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. See Hammock v.

Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). If substantial evidence supports the administrative

findings, or if there is conflicting evidence supporting a particular finding, the finding of the

Commissioner is conclusive. See Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Therefore, where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of

which supports the Commissioner’s decision, the decision must be affirmed, see Thomas v.

Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002), and may be set aside only if an improper legal

standard was applied in weighing the evidence, see Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th

Cir. 1988). 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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IV. DISCUSSION

In her motion for summary judgment, plaintiff argues: (1) the ALJ failed to

properly credit the opinion of her treating mental health professional, Angela Curiale, Ph.D.; and

(2) the ALJ failed to fulfill his duty to develop the record by obtaining additional clinical findings

from Dr. Curiale.

A. Evaluation of Medical Opinions

The weight given to medical opinions depends in part on whether they are

proffered by treating, examining, or non-examining professionals. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d

821, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1995). Ordinarily, more weight is given to the opinion of a treating

professional, who has a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual,

than the opinion of a non-treating professional. See id.; Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1285

(9th Cir. 1996); Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 1987). The least weight is given

to the opinion of a non-examining professional. See Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 502, 506 & n.4

(9th Cir. 1990).

In addition to considering its source, to evaluate whether the Commissioner

properly rejected a medical opinion the court considers whether: (1) contradictory opinions are

in the record; and (2) clinical findings support the opinions. The Commissioner may reject an 

uncontradicted opinion of a treating or examining medical professional only for “clear and

convincing” reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 831. 

While a treating professional’s opinion generally is accorded superior weight, if it is contradicted

by an examining professional’s opinion which is supported by different independent clinical

findings, the Commissioner may resolve the conflict. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035,

1041 (9th Cir. 1995). A contradicted opinion of a treating or examining professional may be

rejected only for “specific and legitimate” reasons supported by substantial evidence. See Lester,

81 F.3d at 830. This test is met if the Commissioner sets out a detailed and thorough summary of

the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, states her interpretation of the evidence, and makes a

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finding. See Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751-55 (9th Cir. 1989). Absent specific and

legitimate reasons, the Commissioner must defer to the opinion of a treating or examining

professional. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. The opinion of a non-examining professional,

without other evidence, is insufficient to reject the opinion of a treating or examining

professional. See id. at 831. In any event, the Commissioner need not give weight to any

conclusory opinion supported by minimal clinical findings. See Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111,

1113 (9th Cir. 1999) (rejecting treating physician’s conclusory, minimally supported opinion);

see also Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751. 

Regarding plaintiff’s treating mental health professional – Dr. Curiale – the ALJ

stated as follows in the decision after rehearing:

. . .The claimant began psychotherapy with Dr. Curiale in June 2006. She

noted the claimant had a prior traumatic history. The subsequent chart

notes indicate the claimant was seen by the psychologist on two occasions

in 2006 and on four occasions in early 2007. However, the brief chart

notes record the claimant’s various complaint but contain no clinical

findings. (Ex 7F, 11F, 19F-21F). 

The claimant’s representative has submitted a new statement from Dr.

Curiale who again noted the claimant’s prior trauma history and stated that

in July 2007 the claimant has hypervigilent and bordering on paranoia. 

The claimant described being highly irritable and having “fights” with

everyone as well as feeling teary and sad. Dr. Curiale concluded the

claimant has a fair ability to understand, remember, and carry out short and

simple instructions. However, she found the claimant has a poor ability to

understand, remember, and carry out detailed or complex instructions;

work without supervision; interact with the public, coworkers, or

supervisors; adapt to changes in the workplace; be aware of normal

hazards; and ability to use public transportation to travel to unfamiliar

places. However, the undersigned does not credit this assessment as Dr.

Curiale noted in April 2007 that the claimant had a GAF of 60 consistent

with only moderate limitations in function and there is no evidence to

support a finding that her condition deteriorated between April and July

2007. 

In discrediting Dr. Curiale’s opinion, the ALJ necessarily rejected the doctor’s conclusion that

plaintiff could not perform work involving contact with supervisors. The ALJ instead accepted

the conclusions of Drs. Finkel and Richwerger, neither of whom opined as to any limitation with

respect to supervisors. 

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Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in rejecting Dr. Curiale’s opinion that plaintiff

was limited in her ability to work with supervisors. Specifically, she argues:

The reasoning of the ALJ is faulty for the following reasons: First,

the opinion of the treating doctor [Dr. Curiale] was based on clinical

testing and on repeated examinations of the plaintiff, not a short

examination; second, the opinion of the consultative examiner was

actually very similar and differed only in degree on a limitation outdated. 

Finally, the opinion of the treating doctor is not controverted by clear and

convincing evidence to the contrary. [¶] The opinion of the treating doctor

was based on regular examinations. By the time of Dr. Curiale’s

diagnosis, she had seen plaintiff on at least six occasions over 2006 and

2007. The opinion of the consultative examiner was based on a one-time

exam. 

* * *

The Administrative Law Judge’s conclusion that plaintiff had the

residual functional capacity for unskilled work limited only by restrictions

on public and co-worker contact is not supported by substantial evidence. 

The court does not find plaintiff’s argument to be persuasive. First, contrary to

plaintiff’s assertion, Dr. Curiale’s opinion as to contact with supervisors is contradicted in that no

other mental health professional expressed such an opinion. In particular, while Dr. Richwerger

opined that plaintiff would have difficulty with contact with the public and co-workers, he

expressed no opinion concerning limitations on contact with supervisors and Dr. Finkel

specifically said that plaintiff would have no problems interacting appropriately with others. 

Because Dr. Curiale’s opinion in this regard is contradicted, the ALJ need only give specific and

legitimate reasons supported by the record for rejecting her opinion. 

The ALJ gave the following reasons for discrediting Dr. Curiale’s opinion: 

(1) Dr. Curiale’s opinion is based on brief chart notes which outline only subjective complaints;

(2) the opinion is not supported by clinical findings; and (3) the opinion is inconsistent with Dr.

Curiale’s other findings. The court finds that these reasons are specific, legitimate, and

supported by the record as a whole. A review of Dr. Curiale’s record reflects that she saw

plaintiff on June 7, 2006, July 14, 2006, January 16, 2007, February 2, 2007, February 22, 2007,

March 1, 2007, and July 13, 2007 (there are no chart notes for this last visit, which is referenced

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in a medical source statement). As summarized above, and as the ALJ noted, the chart notes for

these visits indicates that plaintiff reported various subjective complaints. The notes, however,

do not outline any objective findings. The question is not, as plaintiff characterizes it, whether

Dr. Curiale treated plaintiff on a regular basis or for only a short period of time. The question is

whether Dr. Curiale’s findings are supported by objective clinical findings. Certainly the chart

notes of the six or seven times Dr. Curiale treated plaintiff do not reflect such findings. 

The only reference to any clinical testing by Dr. Curiale is in the doctor’s July 19,

2007, medical source statement. In this document, Dr. Curiale references the MMPI-2, Beck

Depression Inventory, and PTSD Inventory. The doctor did not, however, state which specific

results of these tests supported any particular limitation. Moreover, to the extent the Beck

Depression Inventory and PTSD Inventory merely asked the plaintiff to list subjective symptoms,

neither can be said to represent objective clinical findings. There are no references to particular

MMPI-2 data. Finally, when asked what clinical findings support the doctor’s conclusion that

plaintiff could not interact with supervisors, Dr. Curiale did not outline any findings whatsoever. 

And as to her opinion that plaintiff would have difficulty with changes in the workplace,

awareness of hazards, and use of public transportation, Dr. Curiale referenced “psychotherapeutic

sessions” but no specific clinical findings. 

Based on the foregoing, the court finds that the ALJ’s decision to reject Dr.

Curiale’s opinion concerning contact with supervisors is supported by proper legal analysis and

the record as a whole. 

B. Duty to Develop the Record

The ALJ has an independent duty to fully and fairly develop the record and assure

that the claimant’s interests are considered. See Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th

Cir. 2001). When the claimant is not represented by counsel, this duty requires the ALJ to be

especially diligent in seeking all relevant facts. See id. This requires the ALJ to “scrupulously

and conscientiously probe into, inquire of, and explore for all the relevant facts.” Cox v.

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Califano, 587 F.2d 988, 991 (9th Cir. 1978). Ambiguous evidence or the ALJ’s own finding that

the record is inadequate triggers this duty. See Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1150. The ALJ may

discharge the duty to develop the record by subpoenaing the claimant’s physicians, submitting

questions to the claimant’s physicians, continuing the hearing, or keeping the record open after

the hearing to allow for supplementation of the record. See id. (citing Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d

599, 602 (9th Cir. 1998)). 

Plaintiff argues:

As noted above, the Administrative Law Judge rejected the opinion

of the treating doctor Angela Curiale, Ph.D. The ALJ stated that Dr.

Curiale’s “brief chart notes record the claimant’s various complaints but

contain no clinical findings.” 

Dr. Curiale stated the results of the MMPI II and noted that her

opinions were based on the MMPI II, the Beck Depression Inventory, and

the PTSD Inventory. The ALJ was unclear about what he meant by

clinical findings, if it was not encompassed in Dr. Curiale’s report. The

ALJ could have requested such further clinical findings by asking the

plaintiff’s attorney or sending a subpoena for the records. 

This argument is also unpersuasive given that the ALJ’s duty to develop the record was never

triggered in this case. The evidence was not ambiguous or inadequate. Instead, as the ALJ

found, clinical objective evidence to support Dr. Curiale’s opinion simply did not exist. If it had

existed, it was the plaintiff’s duty to present the ALJ with such evidence. 

/ / /

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V. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that the Commissioner’s final

decision is based on substantial evidence and proper legal analysis. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY

ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 17) is denied;

2. Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment (Doc. 20) is granted; and

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment and close this file.

DATED: March 24, 2010

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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