Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-10087/USCOURTS-ca9-13-10087-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Juan Quintero-Junco
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JUAN QUINTERO-JUNCO,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-10087

D.C. No.

4:12-cr-02145-

DCB-LAB-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

David C. Bury, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

May 14, 2014—San Francisco, California

Filed June 12, 2014

Before: M. Margaret McKeown and Milan D. Smith, Jr.,

Circuit Judges, and James L. Robart, District Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.

* The Honorable James L. Robart, District Judge for the U.S. District

Court for the Western District of Washington, sitting by designation.

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2 UNITED STATES V. QUINTERO-JUNCO

SUMMARY**

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed a sentence for illegal reentry after

deportation in a case in which the district court applied an

enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) on the

ground that the defendant’s prior conviction for attempted

sexual abuse under Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-1404 was

a forcible sex offense and thus a crime of violence. 

The panel held that because the district court adequately

considered the Sentencing Guidelines in fashioning the

defendant’s sentence,its sentencingmethodologywas proper.

The panel held that the district court properly analyzed

the defendant’s prior conviction under the modified

categorical approach because § 13-1404 is divisible. The

panel held that the district court, which did not have the

benefit of Descamps v. United States, misapplied the

modified categorical approach by looking behind the

defendant’s conviction in search of record evidence that he

actually committed the generic offense, but that the error was

inconsequential because the elements of the statutory prong

under which the defendant was convicted categoricallymatch

the elements of the generic definition of forcible sex offense.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. QUINTERO-JUNCO 3

COUNSEL

Myrna R. Beards (argued), Tucson, Arizona, for DefendantAppellant.

Erica L. Seger (argued), Assistant United States Attorney,

Tucson, Arizona, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

M. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

In this appeal, we consider whether the district court gave

adequate weight to the United States Sentencing Guidelines

(USSG or Guidelines) when sentencingDefendant-Appellant

Juan Gregorio Quintero-Junco. We also consider whether

Quintero-Junco’s prior conviction for attempted sexual abuse,

in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes (ARS) § 13-1404,

constitutes a “forcible sex offense,” and therefore a “crime of

violence,” under the Guidelines. See USSG § 2L1.2 cmt.

n.1(B)(iii). Because the district court adequately considered

the Guidelines in fashioning Quintero-Junco’s sentence, we

conclude that the court’s sentencingmethodologywas proper. 

Applying the modified categorical approach, we further

conclude that the portion of ARS § 13-1404 under which

Quintero-Junco was previously convicted is categorically a

forcible sex offense. We therefore affirm the judgment of the

district court.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Quintero-Junco, a citizen of Mexico, was arrested in

Arizona on September 27, 2012. Because he had previously

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4 UNITED STATES V. QUINTERO-JUNCO

been deported on June 10, 2008, he was charged with illegal

reentry after deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326.

On December 6, 2012, Quintero-Junco pleaded guilty to

the indictment without a plea agreement. On January 11,

2013, the Probation Office produced its Presentence

Investigation Report (PSR), which noted that Quintero-Junco

had previously been convicted of attempted sexual abuse, in

violation of ARS § 13-1404. The PSR classified QuinteroJunco’s prior conviction as a “forcible sex offense,” and

therefore a “crime of violence,” which would subject him to

a sentencing enhancement under USSG § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). 

Quintero-Junco objected to the enhancement.

The district court sentenced Quintero-Junco on February

14, 2013. At the sentencing hearing, the court first calculated

the applicable Guidelines range. In so doing, the court

explained that Quintero-Junco’s prior Arizona convictionwas

“potentially . . . categorically a crime of violence.” The court

then determined, however, that “the plea transcript that has

been filed, and the factual basis for the plea in the case, and

. . . judicially noticeable documents” showed that the prior

conviction constituted a crime of violence under the modified

categorical approach. The court therefore concluded that

Quintero-Junco was subject to a twelve-level enhancement

and calculated his total offense level under the Guidelines to

be seventeen. The district court then calculated QuinteroJunco’s Guidelines range to be between twenty-seven months

and thirty-three months of incarceration.

Nevertheless, the district court explained that the

Guidelines calculation “doesn’t really matter” in QuinteroJunco’s case. Instead of imposing a sentence within the

Guidelines range, the district court sentenced Quintero-Junco

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UNITED STATES V. QUINTERO-JUNCO 5

principally to a term of fifty-two months of incarceration. 

According to the district court, Quintero-Junco’s criminal

history, including his previous incarceration for illegal

reentry, militated in favor of a custodial sentence of longer

than seventy-seven months. However, the court ultimately

sentenced Quintero-Junco to fifty-two months of

imprisonment on account of the age of Quintero-Junco’s

criminal record, as well as his “age and infirmity.” QuinteroJunco timely appealed.

JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review

unpreserved claims of procedural error at sentencing for plain

error. See United States v. Valencia-Barragan, 608 F.3d

1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010). We review de novo a district

court’s determination that a prior conviction constitutes a

crime of violence under the Guidelines. United States v.

Gonzalez-Monterroso, 745 F.3d 1237, 1243 (9th Cir. 2014)

(citing United States v. Gomez-Hernandez, 680 F.3d 1171,

1174 (9th Cir. 2012)).

DISCUSSION

Quintero-Junco asserts that the district court committed

two reversible errors in connection with his sentencing. First,

although he did not raise this argument in the district court,

Quintero-Junco contends on appeal that the court gave

inadequate weight to the Guidelines. Second, he argues that

the district court erroneously classified his prior Arizona

conviction for attempted sexual abuse as a forcible sex

offense, and therefore a crime of violence. We reject both of

these arguments.

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6 UNITED STATES V. QUINTERO-JUNCO

I. Sentencing Methodology

Quintero-Junco argues, for the first time on appeal, that

the district court gave inadequate weight to the applicable

Guidelines range when imposing his sentence. Even though

the Guidelines are advisory, “the district court must correctly

calculate the recommended Guidelines sentence and use that

recommendation as the ‘starting point and the initial

benchmark.’” United States v. Munoz-Camarena, 631 F.3d

1028, 1030 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (quoting Kimbrough

v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 108 (2007)). Thus, we have

explained that “[a] district court must start with the

recommended Guidelines sentence, adjust upward or

downward from that point, and justify the extent of the

departure from the Guidelines sentence.” Munoz-Camarena,

631 F.3d at 1030. According to Quintero-Junco, the district

court contravened this procedure by stating at the beginning

of the sentencing hearing that it did not intend to impose a

Guidelines sentence.

At the outset of the sentencing hearing, the district court

stated that it believed that the Guidelines would provide

“poor advice” in this case given Quintero-Junco’s record of

recidivism. The district court further explained that defense

counsel’s arguments against the sentencing enhancement

would not “help Mr. Quintero-Junco” because the Guidelines

were “not going to guide” the court in imposing a sentence. 

Based on these comments, Quintero-Junco contends that the

district court failed to treat the Guidelines as its starting point.

Quintero-Junco misreads the record. To be sure, the

district court acknowledged early in the hearing that it

intended to vary from the Guidelines in imposing a sentence. 

But the court followed the required procedure in doing so. 

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UNITED STATES V. QUINTERO-JUNCO 7

While Quintero-Junco contends that the district court gave the

Guidelines short shrift, the court expressly recognized that it

was “obligat[ed] to find the [G]uidelines . . . because it’s a

starting point for a number of things.” The district court then

explained that it would vary from the recommended

Guidelines range because Quintero-Junco had re-offended in

spite of having previously received a “very, very long

sentence” for the same offense. Indeed, the district court

specifically noted that, in light of Quintero-Junco’s criminal

history, an above-Guidelines sentence was required “to

promote respect for the law” and to deter Quintero-Junco

from offending yet again. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (directing

courts to consider “deterrence” and the need “to promote

respect for the law” in imposing a sentence).

Accordingly, the district court did not commit any

methodological error, much less plain error. The court

acknowledged that it was required to start with a Guidelines

calculation, and then it relied on the § 3553(a) factors to

impose a non-Guidelines sentence. The court therefore

properly treated the Guidelines as its starting point, see

Munoz-Camarena, 631 F.3d at 1030, and it adequately

“explain[ed] the sentence selected, including any deviation

from the Guidelines range.” United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d

984, 993 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc); see also United States v.

Ali, 620 F.3d 1062, 1074 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming a

sentence where the district court “considered the guidelines

and imposed what it felt was the appropriate sentence”). For

these reasons, Quintero-Junco’s argument that the district

court failed adequately to consider the Guidelines is without

merit.

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8 UNITED STATES V. QUINTERO-JUNCO

II. Crime of Violence Enhancement

Quintero-Junco next contends that the district court

erroneously classified his prior Arizona conviction for

attempted sexual abuse as a forcible sex offense, and thus a

crime of violence. As a result of this classification, the

district court found Quintero-Junco eligible for a twelve-level

sentencing enhancement. Quintero-Junco contends that the

district court erred in this respect, and therefore miscalculated

the applicable Guidelines range. But Quintero-Junco’s

argument is unavailing, because (1) the modified categorical

approach applies; and (2) Quintero-Junco’s prior conviction

for attempted sexual abuse constitutes a forcible sex offense

under that analysis.1

A. Legal Framework

Under the Guidelines, the base offense level for a

violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326—the crime for which QuinteroJunco was sentenced here—is eight. See USSG § 2L1.2(a). 

However, “[i]f the defendant was previously deported after

being convicted of a felony that constitutes a ‘crime of

violence,’” the offense level increases. United States v.

Caceres-Olla, 738 F.3d 1051, 1053 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting

USSG § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii)). As relevant here, a “crime of

violence” is defined to include “forcible sex offenses

(including where consent to the conduct is not given or is not

legally valid, such as where consent to the conduct is

involuntary, incompetent, or coerced).” USSG § 2L1.2 cmt.

n.1(B)(iii). Further, “an attempt to commit a crime of

1 We have previously held that Arizona’s definition of attempt is

coextensive with the federal definition. See United States v. Taylor,

529 F.3d 1232, 1238 (9th Cir. 2008).

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UNITED STATES V. QUINTERO-JUNCO 9

violence is itself a crime of violence.” United States v.

Wenner, 351 F.3d 969, 976 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing USSG

§ 4B1.2 cmt. n.1).

To determine whether a prior conviction constitutes a

crime of violence, courts generally apply the “formal

categorical approach” established in Taylor v. United States,

495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990). Under the categorical approach,

“sentencing courts compare the elements of the statute of

conviction with a federal definition of the crime to determine

whether conduct proscribed by the statute is broader than the

generic federal definition.” Caceres-Olla, 738 F.3d at 1054

(quoting Valencia-Barragan, 608 F.3d at 1107) (internal

quotation marks omitted). “If the statute of conviction

‘sweeps more broadly than the generic crime, a conviction

under that law cannot count as [a qualifying] predicate, even

if the defendant actually committed the offense in its generic

form.’” Caceres-Olla, 738 F.3d at 1054 (quoting Descamps

v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2283 (2013)).

The categorical approach precludes sentencing courts

from considering information other than the respective

elements of the crime of conviction and the generic federal

crime. Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2283. In a “narrow range of

cases,” however, sentencing courts may instead apply the

“modified categorical approach,” and “may look beyond the

statutory elements to the charging paper and jury instructions

to determine whether the defendant’s conviction necessarily

involved facts corresponding to the generic federal offense.” 

Caceres-Olla, 738 F.3d at 1054 n.2 (quoting Descamps,

133 S. Ct. at 2283–84) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

As the Supreme Court recently clarified in Descamps, courts

may employ the modified categorical approach onlywhen the

statute of conviction is “divisible,” in that it “lists multiple,

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10 UNITED STATES V. QUINTERO-JUNCO

alternative elements, and so effectively creates ‘several

different . . . crimes.’” Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2285 (quoting

Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 41 (2009)).

Where a statute of conviction is divisible, a sentencing

court employing the modified categorical approach may

“consult a limited class of documents, such as indictments

and jury instructions, to determine which alternative formed

the basis of the defendant’s prior conviction.” Descamps,

133 S. Ct. at 2281. “The court can then do what the

categorical approach demands: compare the elements of the

crime of conviction (including the alternative element used in

the case) with the elements of the generic crime.” Id. If the

elements of the statutory alternative under which the

defendant was convicted are broader than the generic crime,

the prior conviction “cannot count as [a qualifying]

predicate.” Id. at 2283.

B. Modified Categorical Approach

The district court properly analyzed Quintero-Junco’s

prior conviction under the modified categorical approach

because the Arizona statute under which he was convicted is

divisible. Under ARS § 13-1404, “[a] person commits sexual

abuse by intentionally or knowingly engaging in sexual

contact with any person who is fifteen or more years of age

without consent of that person or with any person who is

under fifteen years of age if the sexual contact involves only

the female breast.” As this language demonstrates, a

defendant can violate the statute in two distinct ways. First,

a defendant violates the statute if he “intentionally or

knowingly engag[es] in sexual contact with any person who

is fifteen or more years of age without consent of that

person.” Id. Alternatively, a defendant also violates the

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UNITED STATES V. QUINTERO-JUNCO 11

statute if he “intentionally or knowingly engag[es] in sexual

contact . . . with any person who is under fifteen years of age

if the sexual contact involves only the female breast.” Id.

Because the Arizona statute “list[s] potential offense

elements in the alternative,” it is divisible, and the modified

categorical approach may be applied to discern the prong

under which Quintero-Junco was convicted. See Descamps,

133 S. Ct. at 2283.

C. Forcible Sex Offense

Although the district correctly recognized that the

modified categorical approach applies here, the court—which

did not have the benefit of Descamps— misapplied the

modified categorical approach by “look[ing] behind

[Quintero-Junco’s] conviction in search of record evidence

that he actually committed the generic offense.” See id. at

2293. Specifically, the district court reviewed the transcript

of Quintero-Junco’s plea colloquy, which showed that

Quintero-Junco was accused of attempting forciblyto remove

a woman’s clothing in order to touch her breasts. The court

found by “clear and convincing evidence” that such conduct

constituted a forcible sex offense, and therefore a crime of

violence. Under Descamps, this approach was erroneous. 

Rather than determining whether Quintero-Junco “actually”

committed the generic crime, the district court should have

instead analyzed whether the elements of the statutory prong

under which Quintero-Junco was convicted correspond to

those of the generic federal offense.

Nonetheless, the district court’s error was

inconsequential. As discussed above, the modified

categorical approach applies here because the Arizona statute

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12 UNITED STATES V. QUINTERO-JUNCO

under which Quintero-Junco was convicted is divisible. And,

as discussed below, the elements of the statutory prong under

which Quintero-Junco was convicted categoricallymatch the

elements of the generic definition of forcible sex offense. 

Thus, even though the district court’s application of the

modified categorical approach was flawed, the court’s

ultimate conclusion was correct.

A proper application of the modified categorical

approach reveals that Quintero-Junco was convicted under

the first prong of the Arizona statute, which criminalizes

“intentionally or knowingly engaging in sexual contact with

any person who is fifteen or more years of age without

consent of that person.” ARS § 13-1404. Under Descamps,

courts applying the modified categorical approach are

permitted to look to the indictment to ascertain the statutory

alternative under which a defendant was convicted. See

Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2284. And here, the Arizona

indictment to which Quintero-Junco pleaded guilty shows

that the victim of the crime was fifteen or more years of age

and that she did not consent to any sexual contact.

The elements of the statutory prong under which

Quintero-Junco was convicted categorically match the

elements of the generic definition of forcible sex offense. In

2008, the United States SentencingCommission modified the

definition of “forcible sex offense” to include those offenses

“where consent to the conduct is not given or is not legally

valid, such as where consent to the conduct is involuntary,

incompetent, or coerced.” USSG § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iii); see

also United States v. Gallegos-Galindo, 704 F.3d 1269, 1272

(9th Cir. 2013). After the 2008 amendment, “indicia of

additional force or violence [are] no longer required for the

[forcible sex offense] enhancement so long as consent to the

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UNITED STATES V. QUINTERO-JUNCO 13

sex offense [is] shown to be lacking.” Gallegos-Galindo,

704 F.3d at 1272. Thus, under the amended Guidelines, a

forcible sex offense simply “requires a sexual act where

‘consent to the conduct’: (1) ‘is not given’; or (2) ‘is not

legally valid, such as where consent to the conduct is

involuntary, incompetent, or coerced.’” Caceres-Olla,

738 F.3d at 1054–55 (quoting USSG § 2L1.2 cmt.

n.1(B)(iii)).

Because the applicable prong of the Arizona statute

criminalizes non-consensual sexual contact with a person

over fifteen years of age, it fits comfortably within the broad

definition of forcible sex offense. Accordingly, the district

court properly determined that Quintero-Junco’s prior

conviction for attempted sexual abuse constitutes a forcible

sex offense, and the court did not err in applying an

enhancement under the Guidelines.

In arguing against this conclusion, Quintero-Junco

counters that his prior conviction does not constitute a

forcible sex offense because the Arizona statute under which

he was convicted does not have penetration as an element. 

As Quintero-Junco observes, Arizona law defines “sexual

contact” to include not only penetration, but also “any direct

or indirect touching, fondling or manipulating of any part of

the genitals, anus or female breast.” ARS § 13-1401(2). 

Thus, Quintero-Junco contends that the Arizona statute under

which he was convicted is not categorically a forcible sex

offense, as it also criminalizes what he characterizes as “nonviolent non-consensual indirect touching of an intimate area.” 

According to Quintero-Junco, the term “forcible” would be

superfluous if such non-violent offenses constituted forcible

sex offenses. See United States v. Bolanos-Hernandez,

492 F.3d 1140, 1145 (9th Cir. 2007) (rejecting an

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14 UNITED STATES V. QUINTERO-JUNCO

interpretation of the Guidelines that would “render any of its

provisions mere surplusage”). Quintero-Junco thus urges that

only offenses involving penetration constitute forcible sex

offenses.

Quintero-Junco’s argument is foreclosed by the plain

language of the 2008 amendment to the Guidelines and our

case law construing it. As discussed above, the 2008

amendment expanded the definition of forcible sex offense to

include offenses “where consent to the conduct is not given

or is not legally valid, such as where consent to the conduct

is involuntary, incompetent, or coerced.” USSG § 2L1.2 cmt.

n.1(B)(iii). Applying this language, we have explained that

the Guidelines now “include as a forcible sex offense any sex

offense involving the absence of the victim’s consent.” 

Gallegos-Galindo, 704 F.3d at 1270 (emphasis added); see

also Caceres-Olla, 738 F.3d at 1054–55.

ContrarytoQuintero-Junco’s assertion,Gallegos-Galindo

does not support his narrow interpretation of forcible sex

offense. In that case, we held that, following the 2008

amendment, “force beyond penetration” is not required for a

prior conviction to constitute a forcible sex offense. Id. at

1273. Relying on this language, Quintero-Junco argues that

Gallegos-Galindo implicitly suggests that all forcible sex

offenses must include penetration as an element. But we

explained in clear terms in Gallegos-Galindo that any sex

offense committed without the consent of the victim

constitutes a forcible sex offense. Id. at 1274. Thus,

Gallegos-Galindo provides no support for Quintero-Junco’s

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UNITED STATES V. QUINTERO-JUNCO 15

contention that forcible sex offenses must have penetration as

an element.2

Our decision in Gallegos-Galindo is not an aberration. 

To the contrary, several of our sister circuits have likewise

held that any sex offense involving a lack of consent is a

forcible sex offense. For example, the Eleventh Circuit

recently explained that “any nonconsensual sexual contact

will satisfy the guidelines definition of ‘forcible sex

offense.’” United States v. Contreras, 739 F.3d 592, 597

(11th Cir. 2014). While the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged

that “[i]t may seem odd that the term ‘forcible sexual

offenses’ is defined to include crimes that do not have

physical force as an element,” the court concluded that the

post-2008 definition “could hardly be any clearer” that lack

of consent is sufficient. Id. at 596. The Tenth Circuit has

similarly explained that “[w]hen an offense involves sexual

contact with another person, it is necessarily forcible when

that person does not consent.” United States v. ReyesAlfonso, 653 F.3d 1137, 1142 (10th Cir. 2011) (internal

quotation marks omitted). And the Fifth Circuit has held that

a conviction under a state statute prohibiting non-consensual

“touch[ing] of the victim’s intimate parts” constitutes a

forcible sex offense. United States v. Diaz-Corado, 648 F.3d

290, 293 (5th Cir. 2011). In urging us to read a penetration

2 Quintero-Junco cites no authority suggesting that only crimes

involving penetration constitute “sex offenses.” And the ordinary

meaning of “sex offense” is not so limited. For instance, we have

previously citedBlack’sLawDictionary for the proposition that “a ‘sexual

offense’ ‘involv[es] unlawful sexual conduct.’” Bolanos-Hernandez,

492 F.3d at 1144 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1112 (8th ed. 2004)). 

Similarly, 42 U.S.C. § 16911(5)(A)(i) defines “sex offense” as “a criminal

offense that has an element involving a sexual act or sexual contact with

another.”

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16 UNITED STATES V. QUINTERO-JUNCO

requirement into the expanded definition of forcible sex

offense, Quintero-Junco not only asks us to depart from our

decision in Gallegos-Galindo, but also to part company with

our sister circuits. We decline to do so.

For these reasons, Quintero-Junco’s prior conviction

constitutes a forcible sex offense. The district court thus

correctly applied the “crime of violence” enhancement when

calculating Quintero-Junco’s Guidelines range.

CONCLUSION

The district court properly treated the Guidelines as its

starting point, and the court correctly concluded that

Quintero-Junco’s prior Arizona conviction for attempted

sexual abuse constitutes a forcible sex offense. Accordingly,

we affirm the judgment of the district court.

AFFIRMED.

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