Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-50369/USCOURTS-ca9-13-50369-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gustavo Garcia-Gonzalez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

GUSTAVO GARCIA-GONZALEZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-50369

D.C . No.

3:12-cr-04471-

BTM-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Barry T. Moskowitz, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted

March 3, 2015*—Pasadena, California

Filed July 1, 2015

Before: Michael R. Murphy,

**

 Ronald M. Gould,

and Richard C. Tallman, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Murphy

* The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without

oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

** The Honorable Michael R. Murphy, Senior Circuit Judge for the U.S.

Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.

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2 UNITED STATES V. GARCIA-GONZALEZ

SUMMARY***

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed a conviction for being a previously

removed alien illegally found in the United States in violation

of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a).

The panel held that the district court correctly denied the

defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment, where even

assuming the existence of a due process violation in the

underlying expedited removal proceeding, the defendant

failed to demonstrate that relief in the form of withdrawal of

application for admission was plausible and thus failed to

carry his burden of demonstrating prejudice.

The panel held that the district court did not err in

denying the defendant’s motion to compel the government to

produce statistics about the numbers of individuals with a

background similar to his who were granted withdrawal of

application of admission, where the statistics the defendant

sought are not presently available and cannot be accurately

compiled even with the expenditure of significant resources. 

 

*** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. GARCIA-GONZALEZ 3

COUNSEL

Kara Hartzler, Federal Public Defender of San Diego, Inc.,

San Diego, California, for Defendant-Appellant.

Laura E. Duffy, United States Attorney; Bruce R. Castetter,

Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate Section,

Criminal Division; and Anne Kristina Perry, Assistant United

StatesAttorney, San Diego, California, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

MURPHY, Circuit Judge:

I. INTRODUCTION

A grand jury indicted Gustavo Garcia-Gonzalez1on one

count of being a previously removed alien illegally found in

the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). Garcia

moved the district court to dismiss the indictment, arguing the

prior removal upon which it was based was fundamentally

unfair. See id. § 1326(d). The district court denied the

motion; Garcia entered a conditional guilty plea preserving

his right to challenge that decision on appeal. See Fed. R.

Crim. P. 11(a)(2). Garcia asserts the district court erred in

two particulars: (1) in concluding he failed to demonstrate his

1

In their district court filings and briefs on appeal, the parties refer to

Garcia-Gonzalez as Garcia. This opinion uses the same nomenclature.

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4 UNITED STATES V. GARCIA-GONZALEZ

expedited removal in 20122 was fundamentally unfair; and

(2) in refusing to order the government to produce statistics

about the numbers of individuals with a background similar

to his who were granted a form of discretionary relief

available in expedited removal proceedings, i.e., withdrawal

of application for admission. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(4) (“An

alien applying for admission may, in the discretion of the

Attorney General . . . , be permitted to withdraw the

application for admission and depart immediately from the

United States.”); 8 C.F.R. § 1235.4 (providing Attorney

General with discretion to allow an “alien applicant for

admission to withdraw his or her application for admission in

lieu of . . . expedited removal”).

Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this

court affirms the district court’s judgment of conviction. 

Garcia failed to demonstrate his 2012 expedited removal was

fundamentally unfair. Furthermore, the statistics Garcia

sought are not presently available and can not be accurately

compiled even with the expenditure of significant resources.

II. BACKGROUND

A. General Legal Background

It is a crime for an alien who has been removed from the

United States to “enter[], attempt[] to enter, or . . . at any time

2 Garcia was removed from the United States in 2003 and 2012. The

district court found reason to doubt the fundamental fairness of the 2003

removal, but declined to resolve the issue because it concluded the 2012

expedited removal was valid. On appeal, the government disclaims any

reliance on the 2003 removal as a basis to support Garcia’s § 1326

conviction. Thus, the only issue before the court is the validity of the

2012 expedited removal.

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UNITED STATES V. GARCIA-GONZALEZ 5

[be] found in” the United States without the express consent

of the Attorney General. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). A prior

removal “must be valid, legal, and comport with due process

requirements to sustain a conviction under Section 1326.” 

United States v. Lopez, 762 F.3d 852, 858 (9th Cir. 2014). 

Section 1326 sets out three requirements a defendant must

satisfy to challenge the validity of a prior removal order. 

8 U.S.C. § 1326(d). The only requirement at issue in this

case is the requirement that a defendant demonstrate the entry

of a prior removal order was “fundamentally unfair.” Id.

§ 1326(d)(3).

“[A] predicate removal order satisfies the condition of

being fundamentally unfair for purposes of § 1326(d)(3)

when the deportation proceeding violated the alien’s due

process rights and the alien suffered prejudice as a result.” 

United States v. Barajas-Alvarado, 655 F.3d 1077, 1085 (9th

Cir. 2011) (quotations omitted). Garcia’s predicate removal

was an expedited removal at the border. The Constitution

does not entitle “non-admitted aliens” to “any procedure visà-vis their admission or exclusion.” Id. at 1084. “Whatever

the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as

far as an alien denied entry is concerned.” United States ex

rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950). Thus,

the regularity of Garcia’s expedited removal proceeding is

judged solely by the procedures set out in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)

and 8 C.F.R. § 1235.3(b).

To demonstrate prejudice from a due process violation,

Garcia must show that, absent the violation, it was plausible

he would have obtained discretionary relief from removal. 

United States v. Raya-Vaca, 771 F.3d 1195, 1206 (9th Cir.

2014). The only form of discretionary relief available in

expedited removal proceedings is withdrawal of application

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6 UNITED STATES V. GARCIA-GONZALEZ

for admission. 8 C.F.R. § 1235.4. In analyzing the

plausibility of that form of discretionary relief, this court

looks “for guidance to the Inspector’s Field Manual, an

internal agency document that counsels immigration officers

as to when to grant withdrawal of application for admission.” 

Raya-Vaca, 771 F.3d at 1206–07.3

B. Factual Background

Garcia was born in Mexico. In 1989, at the age of eight,

he was brought to the United States by his parents. He

sporadically attended school in the United States, but never

graduated from high school. Garcia has two children with

Margarita Flores: Isabel Garcia and Anne Garcia. Anne

Garcia has Down Syndrome. He has three children with his

current partner Elva Rodriguez. The ages of his children do

not appear in the record.

 

3

 As this court has noted,

[t]he Inspector’s Field Manual provides for a highly

individualized determination and instructs officers to

consider all facts and circumstances related to the case

to determine whether permitting withdrawal would be

in the best interest of justice. The Manual also

enumerates six factors relevant to the question of relief:

(1) the seriousness of the immigration violation;

(2) previous findings of inadmissibility against the

alien; (3) intent on the part of the alien to violate the

law; (4) ability to easily overcome the ground of

inadmissibility; (5) age or poor health of the alien; and

(6) other humanitarian or public interest considerations.

United States v. Raya-Vaca, 771 F.3d 1195, 1207 (9th Cir. 2014)

(quotations and citations omitted).

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UNITED STATES V. GARCIA-GONZALEZ 7

Sometime prior to 2002,Garcia’s father, then a permanent

legal resident of the United States, filed an I-130 petition to

adjust Garcia’s status. In 2006, after Garcia’s father had

become a United States citizen, the I-130 was approved. 

Garcia’s priority date was reached in June 2007.4

In 2002, Garcia was convicted of, inter alia, possession

of cocaine, in violation of Cal. Health & Safety Code

§ 11350(a). Since 2006, Garcia has had several additional

criminal convictions. Although all these convictions were

misdemeanors, they include serious offenses (i.e., driving

under the influence of alcohol/drugs, possession of narcotics

paraphernalia, and using or being under the influence of a

controlled substance).

In 2003, Garcia was removed from the United States

following proceedings before an Immigration Judge. See

supra n.2 (noting the government has conceded this removal

proceeding was not fundamentally fair). On September 11,

2012, Garcia attempted to enter the United States through the

San Ysidro Port of Entry. He presented a Washington state

birth certificate that belonged to someone else. That same

day, he was ordered removed from the United States via

expedited removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). The validity of

Garcia’s instant § 1326 conviction turns on whether he has

carried his burden of demonstrating this expedited removal

was fundamentally unfair.

4 The reaching of Garcia’s priority date did not grant him a visa; it

merely allowed him to file a visa application. The ultimate success of his

visa application was contingent on him demonstrating admissibility. See

generally Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191, 2198 (2014).

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8 UNITED STATES V. GARCIA-GONZALEZ

C. Procedural Background

Nine days after his expedited removal, officers found

Garcia in the United States near the Calexico Port of Entry. 

A grand jury indicted Garcia on one count of illegal reentry. 

Garcia filed a motion to dismiss, asserting his 2012 expedited

removal failed to comply with statutory and regulatory

requirements in three ways: (1) the examining officer failed

to comply with 8 C.F.R. § 1235.3(b)(2)(i) by not presenting

for his review and signature Forms I-860 and I-867AB; (2) he

was never informed withdrawal of application for admission

was available in lieu of expedited removal; and (3) the

examining officer mistakenly thought his 2003 removal was

based on an aggravated felony. Garcia asserted these alleged

due process violations prejudiced him because, absent the

violations, he stood a good chance of being permitted to

withdraw his application for admission. According to Garcia:

(1) his attempt to enter the United States using false

documents is not a serious immigration violation; (2) the

pending visa request by his father, which achieved a priority

date by the time of his expedited removal, overcame any

ground of inadmissibility; (3) humanitarian factors—

including his father’s advanced age and his care for his

daughter with Down Syndrome—further supported the

plausibility of a grant of discretionary relief; and (4) as of

2004, almost 70% of aliens determined to be inadmissible

were allowed to withdraw their applications for admission

and that another individual who attempted to enter with false

citizenship documents, to which he was similarly situated,

had been allowed to withdraw his application. The district

court denied Garcia’s motion to dismiss in a comprehensive

written order.

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UNITED STATES V. GARCIA-GONZALEZ 9

III. ANALYSIS

A. Validity of 2012 Expedited Removal

1. Standard of Review

This court reviews de novo a “denial of a motion to

dismiss an indictment under 8 U.S.C. § 1326 when the

motion is based on an alleged deprivation of due process in

the underlying removal proceedings. The district court’s

factual findings are reviewed for clear error.” United States

v. Valdavinos-Torres, 704 F.3d 679, 685 (9th Cir. 2012)

(citations and quotation omitted).

2. Discussion

a. Due Process Violation

The government does not contest the assertion that

Garcia’s 2012 expedited removal proceeding failed to comply

with the applicable regulation. See 8 C.F.R.

§ 1235.3(b)(2)(i). Thus, like the district court, we assume

Garcia has established a due process violation and move on

to consider the question of prejudice.

b. Prejudice

Garcia failed to demonstrate that, absent the assumed due

process violation, it was plausible he would have been

granted withdrawal of his application for admission in lieu of

his 2012 expedited removal. This case is factually and

legally indistinguishable from Barajas-Alvarado, 655 F.3d at

1079. As was the case in Barajas-Alvarado, Garcia

attempted to enter the United States with false documents of

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10 UNITED STATES V. GARCIA-GONZALEZ

citizenship. Barajas-Alvarado concluded such conduct had

a “disqualifying effect” given the Field Manual’s focus on

“obvious, deliberate fraud on the part of the applicant.” 

655 F.3d at 1091 (quoting Inspector’s Field Manual § 17.2). 

Thus, the first and third factors from the Field Manual weigh

strongly against discretionary relief. Id. at 1090–91; see also

Raya-Vaca 771 F.3d at 1210 (collecting cases for proposition

that deliberate fraud during an attempted entry “renders relief

implausible”).

The remaining factors also weigh against granting relief. 

Without regard to whether it would support a § 1326

conviction, Garcia’s removal in 2003 means the second factor

from the Field Manual weighs against the availability of

discretionary relief. Barajas-Alvarado, 655 F.3d at 1090

(noting prior findings of inadmissibility weigh against

granting withdrawal of application for admission). The

fourth factor—ability to overcome grounds for

inadmissability—also weighs against the grant of

discretionary relief. Garcia’s California state conviction for

possession of cocaine rendered him inadmissible and

rendered his father’s petition for adjustment of status

irrelevant. Garcia, quite correctly, does not contest this

conclusion. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (providing

that a conviction for violating any state or federal law or

regulation “relating to a controlled substance” renders an

alien inadmissible); id. § 1255(a)(2) (providing that an alien

must be admissible at the time he seeks adjustment of status). 

The record also reveals Garcia has continued to engage in

criminal conduct, including drug-related conduct, while

residing illegally in the United States. There is no indication

in the record Garcia is old or in poor health and the district

court found that Garcia’s alleged provision of care to his

disabled daughter was not borne out by the record. Thus, the

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UNITED STATES V. GARCIA-GONZALEZ 11

fifth and sixth factors from the Field Manual also weigh

against discretionary relief. Barajas-Alvarado, 655 F.3d at

1090–91.

None of the factors set out in the Field Manual support

the grant of discretionary relief. Garcia nevertheless argues

he is entitled to relief because he has identified one similarly

situated individual, “Gonzalez,” who was allowed to

withdraw his application for admission. This assertion, too,

is foreclosed by Barajas-Alvarado, 655 F.3d at 1079. The

relevant immigration documents provide no information at all

as to why Gonzalez was allowed to withdraw his application

for admission. Barajas-Alvarado makes clear such

comparisons offer no help to an alien attempting to

demonstrate discretionary relief is plausible. 655 F.3d at

1091 n.17. The mere fact that a few other aliens in a position

arguably similar to Garcia’s position were allowed (for

reasons unknown) to withdraw their applications for

admission establishes nothing more than relief in that

situation is possible. “[E]stablishing plausibility[, however,]

requires more than establishing a mere possibility.” Id. at

1089 (quotations omitted).

c. Conclusion

Even assuming the existence of a due process violation,

Garcia has failed to carry his burden of demonstrating

prejudice flowing from such violation. In particular, he has

failed to demonstrate that absent such violation, relief in the

form of withdrawal of application of admission was plausible. 

Thus, the district court correctly denied Garcia’s motion to

dismiss.

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12 UNITED STATES V. GARCIA-GONZALEZ

B. Motion to Compel

1. Standard of Review

This court reviews de novo challenges to a conviction

based on Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). United

States v. Smith, 282 F.3d 758, 770 (9th Cir. 2002). This court

also conducts de novo review of a district court’s

interpretation of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 

United States v. Fort, 472 F.3d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 2007).

2. Discussion

Garcia served upon the United States a subpoena ordering

it to produce “[a]ny statistics as to whether persons

committing fraud are or are not receiving withdrawal of

application for admission.”5 When the government did not

comply with the subpoena, Garcia moved to compel. At the

hearing on the motion to compel, the government contended

no such statistics exist. In support of this assertion, the

government presented the testimony of Johnny Armijo, the

Assistant Director for Border Security at the San Diego Field

Office. Armijo testified as follows:

Q. And to the best of your knowledge, is

there a database existing that could be

accessed telling us how many people have

been allowed to withdraw their applications

for admission who had first come in with

fraudulent documents?

5 The parties’ Joint Motion to Supplement the Record on Appeal with

the subpoena is GRANTED.

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UNITED STATES V. GARCIA-GONZALEZ 13

A. No, we don’t have that capability.

Q. What would it require you to do?

A. We would have to manually search

every case, and review the fact patterns

surrounding each one of those cases to

determine that answer.

Q. So, to the best of your knowledge,

there are no actual statistics as to the number

of people in the Southern District of

California in a given time frame who came in,

had false docs, and then were allowed to

withdraw their application?

A. No, we don’t record that.

Based on this testimony, the district court found (1) the

Brady/discoverymaterial Garcia sought from the government

did not exist; and (2) the government could not produce

accurate statistics of the type sought by Garcia even through

the expenditure of significant resources.

THE COURT: Well, but the problem is

you want them to do research to try to

generate Brady material that doesn’t exist.

The Brady material doesn’t exist. If there

were statistics that could help your case, you

would be entitled to it.

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14 UNITED STATES V. GARCIA-GONZALEZ

But what you want them to do is to devise

a program, a research method, to try to figure

out how to get these statistics.

[Armijo]testified the statistics don’t exist. 

I find him to be credible. You’ve offered

nothing to the contrary.

So I think they—you have asked for any

statistics as to whether persons committing

fraud are or are not receiving withdrawal of

application for admission.

[Armijo] testified that the statistics don’t

exist, presently exist.

I don’t believe under Brady that they are

obligated to do a statistical research to see if

they can come up with something that would

help your case, especially in the light of that

you can’t offer more than one random

situation [Gonzalez] where they allowed the

fellow to withdraw.

I mean, there is nothing more that runs

against the field manual. There is no pattern

shown. There is just one spurious example. 

That’s all we have.

And I’m not going to require the

government to drop whatever they’re doing

and spend time and effort to do research to see

if somehow they can figure out something that

may somewhere be relevant in this case.

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UNITED STATES V. GARCIA-GONZALEZ 15

The statistics don’t exist. They can’t

quickly get them. They would have to look at

every case. And plus the other problem here

is you don’t know the grounds.

As Mr. Armijo said, they may have just

put that he has no basis for entry. Even if

there was fraud, they may have not specified

fraud, so you don’t know.

We’re not going to really get really good

statistics because there is no specific control

over the situation. So we are just

going—we’re not getting anywhere with this.

So I think that’s it. Unless you have

something else to offer, I’m going to find that

the government has not failed to comply with

the subpoena because what is called for under

the subpoena doesn’t presently exist.

Despite these specific findings on the part of the district

court,6 Garcia asserts the district court erred when it

concluded that the government’s failure to turn over the

requested statistics did not violate Brady and Federal Rules

of Criminal Procedure 16 and 17. But see Sanchez v. United

States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir. 1995) (“The government

has no obligation to produce information which it does not

6 This court has not resolved how much deference must be afforded a

district court’s factual findings in the context of a Brady challenge. 

United States v. Price, 566 F.3d 900, 907 n.6 (9th Cir. 2009). Given that

Garcia failed to adduce any evidence as to the existence of the statistics

he seeks, it is unnecessary to resolve this issue. See id.

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16 UNITED STATES V. GARCIA-GONZALEZ

possess or of which it is unaware.”); Fed. R. Crim. P.

16(a)(1)(E) (obligating government to allow defendant to

inspect a certain subset of items “within the government’s

possession, custody, or control”). He asserts he satisfied his

“initial burden of producing some evidence to support an

inference that the government possessed or knew about

material favorable to the defense and failed to disclose it.” 

United States v. Price, 566 F.3d 900, 910 (9th Cir. 2009). 

The burden, he therefore asserts, shifted to the government to

prove no such material existed. See id. He further asserts the

government failed to satisfy this burden because it produced

the testimony of Armijo, rather than someone more familiar

with the capacities of the information technology databases

at the Department of Homeland Security.

Garcia’s arguments are not persuasive. Garcia never

presented any evidence in the district court. The only

testimony presented at the hearing on the motion to compel

was that of Armijo, the government’s witness. At that

hearing, Garcia never challenged Armijo’s qualifications to

testify. Garcia now asserts his cross-examination of Armijo

developed evidence sufficient to meet his initial burden to

create an inference the statistics exist, but that Armijo’s

remaining testimony was insufficient to satisfy the

government’s burden of proving they do not exist. Garcia

cannot have it both ways. Either Armijo was not a proper

witness to testify as to the existence of the requested

statistics, which means no evidence was presented at the

hearing to satisfy his initial burden, or he was a proper

witness, which means his categorical denial of the existence

of such statistics satisfies the government’s burden.

In any event, it is simply not reasonable to assert that any

component of Armijo’s testimony supports in any way the

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UNITED STATES V. GARCIA-GONZALEZ 17

existence of statistics (reliable or not) as to the number of

persons attempting to enter the country with false documents

that have been granted discretionary relief. Instead, as set out

above, Armijo categorically denied the existence of any such

relevant statistics and specifically testified that producing

accurate statistics of the type sought by Garcia was not

possible, even with the expenditure of significant resources. 

That was so because the information Garcia sought was not

routinely recorded on the relevant immigration forms. The

district court found Armijo’s testimony to be credible, and

there is absolutely nothing in the record that would cast doubt

on that credibility determination.

Because Garcia has not produced any evidence indicating

the statistics he seeks exist, or can be accurately and easily

created, his arguments based on Brady and Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure 16 and 17 fail.

IV. CONCLUSION

For those reasons set out above, the judgment of

conviction entered by the district court in this case is hereby

affirmed.

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