Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-06260/USCOURTS-ca10-92-06260-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kevin Lovell Higgs
Appellant
Jerry Lecentburg
Appellee
Streets Service Center, Inc.
Appellee

Document Text:

F I L ~..- .u 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALsJnited Stat.es Court of Appeal! Tenth Cireuit 

KEVIN LOVELL HIGGS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

STREETS SERVICE CENTER, INC., and 

JERRY LECENTBURG, Owner, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

DECO 9 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 92-6260 

(D.C. No. CIV-92-807-A) 

(W. Dist. of Okla.) 

Before LOGAN, BARRETT and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this 

panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not 

materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. 

App. P. 34(a); Tenth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. 

Kevin Lovell Higgs (Higgs), appearing prose and proceeding 

in forma pauperis, appeals from the district court's Orders of 

June 1, 1992, and June 22, 1992, dismissing his employment 

termination complaint filed against his former employer, Streets 

Service Center and Jerry Lecentburg, owner, of Oklahoma City, 

* This Order and Judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 92-6260 Document: 010110151519 Date Filed: 12/09/1992 Page: 1 
Oklahoma, as frivolous, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915d. Higgs' 

complaint alleged that he was unlawfully terminated in his 

employment because of his race (black) and that defendants used as 

a pretext his purported failure to pass a polygraph test given 

certain employees relative to stolen merchandise. 

Following entry of the dismissal Order of June 1, 1992, Higgs 

filed a response contending that the EEOC office in Milwaukee, 

Wisconsin, which had been processing his claim against defendants 

at the request of the Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, office of the EEOC, 

did not communicate with him at his new address in Oklahoma City, 

although he had informed one Patricia Stewart of the Oklahoma City 

EEOC office of his new address on August 10, 1987. The district 

court found that Higgs was partly at fault for the address errors 

because he apparently at no time completed a change of address 

card with the postal department. However, and more importantly, 

the court found that on September 25, 1990, Higgs received a 

Letter of Determination from the Wisconsin EEOC office informing 

him that his claim was denied and that he had two weeks to pursue 

an administrative review and ninety (90) days within which to file 

a Title VII suit in federal district court, but Higgs did not file 

the present suit until May 5, 1992, well beyond the January, 1991, 

time limit, i.e., ninety days after September 25, 1990. 

On appeal, Higgs argues that (1) the mishandling and 

destruction of his EEOC charge by the Milwaukee EEOC office was a 

deliberate attempt by that office to cover-up its wrongdoing in 

failing to investigate and in failing to submit a Notice of Right 

to Sue letter, (2) he was denied his constitutional rights to a 

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Appellate Case: 92-6260 Document: 010110151519 Date Filed: 12/09/1992 Page: 2 
fair trial and due process when the Milwaukee EEOC office refused 

to accept his collect long-distant telephone privileges following 

his first two calls, and (3) he has proof that he sent a letter to 

the Milwaukee EEOC office notifying them of his change of address 

and new information concerning his charge. 

We affirm the district court's dismissal substantially for 

the reasons set forth in the district court's Orders of June 1, 

1992, and June 22, 1992, copies of which are attached hereto and 

made a part hereof. 

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Entered for the Court: 

James E. Barrett, 

Senior United States 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 92-6260 Document: 010110151519 Date Filed: 12/09/1992 Page: 3 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT F0~1 ~

, . 

WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

KEVIN LOVELL HIGGS, 

v. 

STREETS SERVICE CENTER, 

JERRY LECENTBURG, owner, 

Plaintiff, 

Defendants. 

0 R D E R 

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No. CIV-92-807-A 

Plaintiff Kevin Lovell Higgs ("plaintiff"), who is proceeding 

prose and in forma pauperis, filed the Complaint in this case 

against his former employer Streets Service Center and its owner 

Jerry Lecentburg ("defendants"). Upon a review of the Complaint 

and of the law that could be applied to it, the Court dismisses 

plaintiff's case as frivolous, pursuant to 28 u.s.c. § 1915d. 

The facts of the case as set forth in the Complaint are as 

follows. On or about 14 May, 1987, plaintiff was required to take 

a polygraph test at the defendant Center. Plaintiff was told that 

the test was necessary to discover if any of the employees were 

stealing merchandise that was allegedly disappearing and being sold 

on the streets. When plaintiff returned to work on or about 18 May 

1987, he was told that he and two other black employees had failed 

the test and were being terminated therefor. 

Approximately six (6) months earlier, Ricky Banks ("Banks"), 

one of the employees who was discharged at the time of plaintiff's 

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Appellate Case: 92-6260 Document: 010110151519 Date Filed: 12/09/1992 Page: 4 
termination, allegedly admitted stealing some of the merchandise. 

Plaintiff contends that Banks apologized for the theft at the time 

and the owner allowed him to stay, despite a written company 

regulation providing that theft of company property would result 

in automatic discharge. 

Toward the end of the two page Complaint, plaintiff asks the 

Court to force defendants to comply with their own rules and 

regulations that require them to give an employee three (3) written 

and/or verbal warnings of misconduct before discharging him. 

Plaintiff claims that he was never warned of any problems before 

he was discharged, and was allegedly told on a number of occasions 

that he was doing a good job. 

In his prayer for relief, plaintiff asks for an award of back 

wages and punitive damages for the allegedly malicious treatment 

by defendants. Although plaintiff fails to cite any law allegedly 

violated by defendants, it is clear that he believes that 

defendants discriminated against him on the basis of his race. In 

fact, on the Civil Cover Sheet in his case file, plaintiff lists 

the cause of action as race discrimination under Title VII of the 

Civil Rights Act of 1964. 

Because plaintiff is proceeding pro se, this Court made a 

diligent attempt to analyze his Complaint under every potentially 

applicable statute. This thorough analysis revealed that 

plaintiff's claim was time-barred under all of the applicable 

statutes. Plaintiff's Complaint must therefore be dismissed. 

2 

Appellate Case: 92-6260 Document: 010110151519 Date Filed: 12/09/1992 Page: 5 
I. 42 u.s.c. §§ 2000e et seq. 

If one views the Complaint as alleging a cause of action under 

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, codified at 42 U.S.C. 

§ § 2000e et .§.filL.., one immediately sees that plaintiff did not 

follow proper procedure. According to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e - 5(e) (1), 

a claimant under Title VII must file a charge with the Equal 

Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") within 180 days of the 

alleged discrimination. In his Complaint, plaintiff states that 

his termination, the alleged discriminatory act, occurred on 18 May 

1987; however, plaintiff never mentions the filing of an EEOC 

charge at any time. Accordingly, his claim is unequivocally timebarred under Title VII. See also, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 

Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 s.ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). 

II. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 & 1983 

Plaintiff's claim is likewise time-barred under 42 u.s.c. 

§§ 1981 & 1983. When Congress enacted these statutes, it did not 

provide a limitations period within which to bring a cause of 

action for violations thereunder. Accordingly, courts must adopt 

the most analogous limitations period of the state in which they 

sit. Johnson v. Railway Express. Inc., 421 u.s. 454, 462, 95 s.ct. 

1716, 1721, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975). 

In 1984, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided the case 

of Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640 (10th Cir.), aff'd, 471 U.S. 261, 

105 s.ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). Garcia held as a matter of 

federal law that for statute of limitations purposes all section 

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Appellate Case: 92-6260 Document: 010110151519 Date Filed: 12/09/1992 Page: 6 
I ' 

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1983 actions should be characterized as actions for injury to 

personal rights. Id. at 650-51. See also, Meade v. Grubbs, 841 

F.2d 1512, 1522-24 {10th Cir. 1988) (same holding as Garcia); EEOC 

v. Gaddis, 733 F.2d 1373, 1377 {10th Cir. 1984) (same for a section 

1981 action). Accord, Jackson v. Grider, 691 P.2d 468, 472 {Okl. 

App. 1984). 

The most analogous Oklahoma statute of limitations to an 

action for injury to personal rights is 12 o.s. § 95 {Third). This 

statute provides that an action for injury to the rights of 

another, not arising on contract, and not hereinafter enumerated, 

can only be brought within two (2) years. As plaintiff's action 

was not brought until almost five (5) years after it accrued, it 

must be deemed untimely under 12 o.s. § 95 {Third). 

III. 29 u.s.c. §§ 2001, et seq. 

Finally, this court reviewed the possible applicability of the 

Employee Polygraph Protection Act, 29 _u.s.c. §§ 2001 et §.filh, to 

plaintiff's Complaint. While plaintiff might have been able to 

invoke the protection of this act had he filed his claim within 

three (3) years of the alleged use of the polygraph exam, his cause 

of action is now time-barred under this act as well. 

u.s.c. § 2005{c) (2). 

IV. Conclusion 

See, 29 

Despite this Court's best efforts to discover a statute within 

which to place plaintiff's cause of action, none is available at 

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Appellate Case: 92-6260 Document: 010110151519 Date Filed: 12/09/1992 Page: 7 
this late date. Accordingly, plaintiff's case is deemed frivolous 

and is dismissed pursuant to 28 u.s.c. § 1915d. 

It is so ordered this / ..\ r day of June, 1992. 

5 

United states District Judge 

ENTERED ON JUDGMENT DOCKET 06-01-92 

Appellate Case: 92-6260 Document: 010110151519 Date Filed: 12/09/1992 Page: 8 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR T4E , L 1 -~ 

WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA JI I'• 2 '1 92 

KEVIN LOVELL HIGGS, 

v. 

STREETS SERVICE CENTER, 

JERRY LECENTBURG, owner, 

Plaintiff, 

Defendants. 

0 R D E R 

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8Y CF.:-iJTY -L,.&t' ____ .. __ 

No. CIV-92-807-A 

On 1 June 1992, this Court entered an Order dismissing 

plaintiff's case pursuant to 28 u.s.c. § 1915d, because plaintiff 

had not made a timely claim for race discrimination against his 

former employer. That Order remains in full force and effect, but 

the Court now modifies its reasoning with respect to plaintiff's 

Title VII claim in view of the plaintiff's Motion to Show Cause, 

filed on 5 June 1992. 

In the Brief in Support of plaintiff's Motion to Show Cause, 

he stated that he had in fact instituted a timely charge with the 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") after his 

termination with the defendant. Plaintiff further stated that 

after his case was transferred to the Milwaukee, Wisconsin EEOC 

office to reduce the caseload of the Oklahoma City office, a number 

of letters from the EEOC concerning his charge were sent to the 

wrong address. As a consequence of the address confusion, 

Appellate Case: 92-6260 Document: 010110151519 Date Filed: 12/09/1992 Page: 9 
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plaintiff contends, the court should extend the Title VII 

limitations period for filing suit in United States district court. 

The Court recognizes that plaintiff's discrimination charge 

was timely made with the EEOC. But the Court believes that 

plaintiff bears at least part of the blame for the address errors, 

because he apparently never completed a change of address card with 

the United states Postal Service. 

Even if plaintiff was not at fault for the address mistake, 

however, his Title VII claim is still time-barred based upon the 

exhibits attached to plaintiff's show cause brief. Exhibit 4, 

which plaintiff claims he received in a timely fashion, is a 

letter, dated 25 September 1990, from the EEOC Enforcement Unit 

Supervisor in Milwaukee, apparently in response to a telephone 

inquiry that plaintiff made about his case the previous day. At 

the bottom of the letter, it states that the EEOC' s Letter of 

Determination, dated 21 September 1989, is enclosed. 

The cover letter to the Letter of Determination specifically 

directs plaintiff's attention to pages 3 and 4 of the Determination 

Letter, which inform plaintiff that he may pursue a review of the 

EEOC's denial of his claim within two (2) weeks. Pages 3 and 4 

further state that plaintiff has ninety (90) days from the 

expiration of his appeal period, whether or not he elects to pursue 

an appeal, to file a suit in federal district court. This ninety 

(90) day period is codified at 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-5(f) (1), the 

limitations section of Title VII. 

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Appellate Case: 92-6260 Document: 010110151519 Date Filed: 12/09/1992 Page: 10 
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Thus, even if one assumes that plaintiff did not know about 

the EEOC' s denial of his claim until late September of 1990, 

plaintiff still would have had only until early January of 1991 to 

file suit in United States district court. Because plaintiff did 

not file the present suit until May of 1992, his Title VII claim is 

clearly time-barred by the limitations period in 42 u.s.c. § 2000e5(f) (1). 

In summary, this Court's Order of 1 June 1992 remains in full 

force and effect, subject only to the change in reasoning regarding 

plaintiff's Title VII claim in this Order. Plaintiff's case is 

therefore deemed dismissed as of 1 June 1992. 

It is so ordered this Z.~ day of June, 1992. 

~ WAYNE E _'1ALLEY ~ ., 

C 

United States District Judge 

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Appellate Case: 92-6260 Document: 010110151519 Date Filed: 12/09/1992 Page: 11