Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-30134/USCOURTS-ca9-13-30134-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jason Charles Shouse
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JASON CHARLES SHOUSE,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-30134

D.C. No.

4:12-cr-00071-DLC-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Montana

Dana L. Christensen, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 3, 2014*

Seattle, Washington

Filed June 24, 2014

Before: Alfred T. Goodwin, M. Margaret McKeown,

and Paul J. Watford, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge McKeown

* The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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2 UNITED STATES V. SHOUSE

SUMMARY**

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed a sentence imposed following the

defendant’s guilty plea to one count of production of child

pornography and one count of penalties for registered sex

offenders.

Applying case law interpreting identical language in

United States Sentencing Guideline § 2G2.2(b)(4), the panel

held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in

applying an enhancement under § 2G2.1(b)(4) for sexual

exploitation of a minor by production of sexually explicit

visual or printed material that portrayed sadistic or

masochistic conduct or other depictions of violence.

The panel held that the district court did not abuse its

discretion by ordering the sentence to run consecutivelyto the

defendant’s undischarged state sentence.

The panel rejected the defendant’s plea for

reconsideration of the Ninth Circuit’s sentencing review

standard and his argument that the district court imposed an

unreasonable sentence by ignoring his arguments in favor of

leniency and downward sentencing adjustments.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. SHOUSE 3

COUNSEL

Anthony R. Gallagher, Federal Defender, District of

Montana, Great Falls, Montana, for Defendant-Appellant.

Michael W. Cotter, United States Attorney; Cyndee L.

Peterson, Assistant United States Attorney, District of

Montana, Missoula, Montana, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge:

Jason Charles Shouse appeals a sentence imposed by the

district court following his guilty plea to one count of

production of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 2251(a) and one count of penalties for registered sex

offenders in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2260A. Shouse’s

advisory sentencing guideline range was 360 to 720 months

for both counts. The district court sentenced Shouse within

this guideline range—480 months’ imprisonment for the

production of child pornography offense, a mandatory

consecutive term of 120 months’ imprisonment for the

penalties for registered sex offenders count, and a small

assessment, for a total of 50 years’ imprisonment followed by

a lifetime term of supervised release. We affirm the sentence

imposed by the district court.

I. Sentence Enhancement Challenge

At issue is United States Sentencing Guideline

§ 2G2.1(b)(4), which falls under sentencing enhancements for

“sexually exploiting a minor by production of sexually

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4 UNITED STATES V. SHOUSE

explicit visual or printed material.” U.S. Sentencing

Guidelines Manual § 2G2.1 (2012). Section 2G2.1(b)(4)

provides a four-level sentence enhancement “[i]f the offense

involved material that portrays sadistic or masochistic

conduct or other depictions of violence.” Shouse argues that

the images and videos obtained by law enforcement, “while

distasteful and deviant, are not possessed of the kind of pain,

coercion, abuse and denigration that implicate[]

§ 2G2.1(b)(4).” We disagree.

Because the terms “sadistic,” “masochistic,” and

“depictions of violence” are not defined in the guidelines, we

employ their plain meaning. See United States v. Flores,

729 F.3d 910, 914 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[U]nless defined, words

in a statute will be interpreted as taking their ordinary,

contemporary, common meaning.” (internal quotation marks

omitted)); see also United States v. Maurer, 639 F.3d 72,

77–78 (3d Cir. 2011) (relying on plain meaning to interpret

“sadistic or masochistic conduct” and “depictions of

violence” under § 2G2.2(b)(4)). “Sadistic” content involves

“infliction of pain upon a love object as a means of obtaining

sexual release,” “delight in physical or mental cruelty,” or

“excessive cruelty.” Webster’s Third New International

Dictionary 1997–98 (1993). “Masochism” is “sexual

gratification through the acceptance of physical abuse or

humiliation,” while “violence,” as applied in this narrow

context, is the “exertion of any physical force so as to injure

or abuse.” Id. at 1388, 2554.

Although we have not considered the application of these

terms with respect to the production of child pornography

under § 2G2.1(b)(4), we see no reason to deviate from our

precedent with respect to identical language in § 2G2.2(b)(4)

for the receipt and possession of child pornography, both of

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UNITED STATES V. SHOUSE 5

which stem from the same chapter on “sexual exploitation of

a minor.” See, e.g., United States v. Rearden, 349 F.3d 608,

615–16 (9th Cir. 2003) (interpreting and applying

enhancement pursuant to current § 2G2.2(b)(4)

1

). 

Consequently, the operative phrase in these two guidelines

carries precisely the same meaning, and our key cases

pertaining to § 2G2.2(b)(4)—United States v. Rearden and

United States v. Holt—apply with equal force to the

§ 2G2.1(b)(4) enhancement at issue here. See, e.g., United

States v. Granbois, 376 F.3d 993, 996 (9th Cir. 2004)

(holding that the term “crime of violence” is identical in

meaning regardless of its exact location in the guidelines).

In Rearden, we joined multiple circuits in holding that

images involving an adult male penetrating prepubescent

children are sadistic or masochistic because the conduct

depicted “necessarily hurt the child.” 349 F.3d at 614–16

(noting accord with the Second, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits). 

The sadistic nature of the material arose from the “adult

male’s pleasure at the expense of the child’s pain,” due to acts

that were “necessarily painful” to the child. Id. at 615. We

reiterated this conclusion in Holt,stating that “a district court

can apply the sadistic conduct enhancement any time images

portray the penetration of prepubescent children by adult

males because such images are necessarily pleasurable for the

participant and painful for the child.” 510 F.3d 1007, 1011

(9th Cir. 2007).

Here, the undisputed evidence is that Shouse produced

child pornography that portrayed sadistic, masochistic, or

1 At the time of Rearden’s sentencing, the corresponding and

substantively identical guideline provision was § 2G2.2(b)(3). U.S.

Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2G2.2(b)(3) (2001).

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6 UNITED STATES V. SHOUSE

other violent content warranting an enhancement under

§ 2G2.1(b)(4). Shouse was found to have an expansive cache

of child pornographic material, including 82 child

pornography images on an iPhone, and an old cellular phone

SD card containing 264 child pornography images as well as

18 child pornography videos, nearly all of which Shouse

produced himself as he committed sexual acts on a female

infant. The videos reveal Shouse penetrating and ejaculating

on the infant while she cries for her “mom or mommy” and

the images show pre-pubescent children being penetrated and

children that Shouse admits are in “bondage.” Rearden and

Holt leave no doubt that this material qualifies as sadistic or

masochistic content. Rearden, 349 F.3d at 615–16; Holt,

510 F.3d at 1011–12. The meaning of sadistic or masochistic

with respect to Shouse’s conduct is not ambiguous, as he

contends; the photographic material that he possessed

indisputably fits the bill.

Shouse relies on an Eighth Circuit case, United States v.

Parker, to assert that there is a distinction between deviant

depictions that do not warrant the application of an

enhancement for sadistic or masochistic content or material

depicting violence from those that do. 267 F.3d 839 (8th Cir.

2001). Yet Parker does not stand for this proposition. 

Rather, the court in Parker held that the district court erred in

deciding that the conduct portrayed in the photographs at

issue, including an adult male ejaculating onto a crying baby,

“was merely deviant and not violent or sadistic.” Id. at 847. 

We acknowledge Shouse’s point that child pornography,

albeit abhorrent and deviant, may not necessarily qualify as

sadistic in all instances. Our case law, however, demands

more than mere possession or production of child

pornography to fall under the rubric of sadistic or masochistic

content; it also requires the taking of delight in inflicting pain

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UNITED STATES V. SHOUSE 7

or in acting cruelly or violently. See Rearden, 349 F.3d at

615–16; Holt, 510 F.3d at 1011–12.

Shouse further argues that, for the § 2G2.1(b)(4)

enhancement to apply, the government must demonstrate that

he specifically intended to produce the sadistic materials. 

Nothing in the text of § 2G2.1(b)(4) requires a finding of

intent, and we see no reason to read one in. To the extent that

the SentencingCommission has provided anyguidance on the

matter, the application notes appended to § 2G2.2(b)(4) and

§ 2G3.1(b)(4), which prescribe the sadism enhancements for

related offenses, clarify that the other enhancements apply

“regardless of whether the defendant specifically intended to

possess, access with intent to view, receive, or distribute such

materials.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2G2.2 cmt.

n.2 (2012); see U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2G3.1

cmt. n.3 (2012). Shouse’s argument, which relies on out-ofcircuit precedent that predates the application notes to

§ 2G2.2 and § 2G3.1, is unpersuasive.

Finally, because § 2G2.1(b)(4) is not ambiguous, the rule

of lenity is inapplicable to Shouse’s claim. See United States

v. LeCoe, 936 F.2d 398, 402 (9th Cir. 1991). The district

court did not abuse its discretion in applying an enhancement

under § 2G2.1(b)(4).2

2 An intra-circuit split remains as to whether we review the district

court’s application of the guidelines to the facts de novo or for abuse of

discretion. See United States v. Tanke, 743 F.3d 1296, 1306 (9th Cir.

2014). Either way, the standard of review does not affect the outcome of

this case. Id.

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8 UNITED STATES V. SHOUSE

II. Consecutive Sentence Challenge

Shouse’s argument that the district court erred byordering

the sentence to run consecutive to Shouse’s undischarged

state sentence rather than concurrently or partially

concurrently is also unavailing. Under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3, the

district court has broad discretion to determine how the

sentence imposed should run: in cases “involving an

undischarged term of imprisonment, the sentence for the

instant offense may be imposed to run concurrently, partially

concurrently, or consecutively to the prior undischarged term

of imprisonment to achieve a reasonable punishment for the

instant offense.” Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) (“[I]f a term of

imprisonment is imposed on a defendant who is already

subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment, the terms

may run concurrently or consecutively. . . .”). The district

court need not “always specifically justify its choice between

concurrent and consecutive sentences” but may support its

consecutive sentence by clearly explaining “its choice of the

sentence as a whole with reference to the factors listed in

§ 3553(a).” United States v. Fifield, 432 F.3d 1056, 1066

(9th Cir. 2005); see United States v. Chea, 231 F.3d 531, 538

(9th Cir. 2000) (requiring that the district court “give careful

consideration to each of the factors specifically enumerated

in the guideline and determine, based on those factors,

whether a concurrent, partially concurrent, or consecutive

sentence will achieve a reasonable punishment and avoid

unwarranted disparity” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

The district court did just that. It acknowledged its

discretion to impose a concurrent, partially concurrent, or

consecutive sentence. It examined the § 3553(a) factors,

considering the very serious, “horrific,” “dangerous,” and

“predatory” nature of Shouse’s offenses, the number of

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UNITED STATES V. SHOUSE 9

images, and the disturbing nature of the videos found. It

discussed Shouse’s personal history and characteristics,

including ineffective prior treatment, which actually helped

Shouse to determine how he “might further offend young

girls,” and his subsequent re-offense within 14 months of

release from custody. It weighed what sentence would

constitute just punishment and evaluated “the need to protect

the public from further criminal behavior” by Shouse. It

deliberated “what [would be] a sufficient but not greater than

necessary sentence” under § 3553(a), and ultimately chose a

sentence in accordance with an application note to § 5G1.3

recommending a consecutive sentence when a defendant is on

probation or parole at the time of the offense. U.S.

Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5G1.3, cmt. n.3(C) (2012). 

Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in

selecting a consecutive sentence. See United States v. Carty,

520 F.3d 984, 993 (9th Cir. 2008).

III. Reasonableness Challenge

Finally, Shouse relies on United States v. Bookerto argue

that the district court imposed an unreasonable sentence by

ignoring his arguments in favor of leniency and downward

sentencing adjustments. 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005) (plurality

opinion). Rather than pointing to specific arguments or

claims that the district court failed to consider, Shouse makes

a general plea for reconsideration of our court’s sentencing

review standard. We have no basis, or authority, to conduct

such a review here. See Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672,

677 (9th Cir. 2011) (“A three-judge panel cannot reconsider

or overrule circuit precedent unless an intervening Supreme

Court decision undermines an existing precedent of the Ninth

Circuit, and both cases are closely on point.” (internal

quotation marks omitted)).

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10 UNITED STATES V. SHOUSE

Upon review, if “[t]he record makes clear that the

sentencing judge listened to each argument” and “considered

the supporting evidence,” the reasons the district court

provides for a within-guideline sentence are “legally

sufficient.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 358 (2007).

The district court need only explain the sentence as a whole,

while considering the § 3553(a) factors and whether the

sentence is “sufficient, but not greater than necessary.”

Carty, 520 F.3d at 991–92 (internal quotation marks omitted).

In imposing a sentence within the guideline range, the

district court’s explanation was neither brief nor cursory. The

court discussed the specific nature of the offense involving

“an extremely young female of approximately 3 years of age”

and “horrific predatory and dangerous behavior.” The record

is clear that the court considered the § 3553(a) factors,

including Shouse’s criminal history and probation violations

for similar offenses, the need for just punishment that was

“sufficient but not greater than necessary,” public safety, and

deterrence, as discussed above. The court weighed all of the

evidence provided, including the comprehensive presentence

investigation report and Shouse’s objections to the report,

Shouse’s sentencing memorandum, and extensive arguments

by counsel, plus a statement by Shouse. The court explained

that it had conducted a thorough review of Shouse’s claims

and the § 3553(a) factors and it demonstrated sufficient

consideration of all of the supporting evidence provided to

the court. Nothing more was required. See Rita, 551 U.S. at

358–59; Carty, 520 F.3d at 991.

AFFIRMED.

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