Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01101/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01101-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Jeffrey Martinez
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JEFFREY MARTINEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY,

Defendant.

Case No. 1:12-cv-01101-SAB

ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER’S MOTION 

FOR ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT TO 42 

U.S.C. § 406(b)

Petitioner Young Cho (“Counsel”), attorney for Plaintiff Jeffrey Martinez (“Plaintiff”), 

filed the instant motion for attorney fees on March 26, 2015. Counsel requests fees in the amount 

of $6,800.00 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Plaintiff has not objected to the request. 

I.

BACKGROUND

On July 6, 2012, Plaintiff filed this action challenging the denial of Social Security 

benefits. On July 29, 2013, the Court granted in part and remanded the action for further 

proceedings. On October 29, 2013, the Court granted the parties’ stipulation and ordered 

payment of $4.500.00 in attorney fees and $60.00 in costs pursuant to the EAJA.

On October 21, 2014, the Commissioner issued a decision granting Plaintiff’s application 

for benefits. Plaintiff received $48,518.00 in retroactive benefits. (Declaration of Young Cho, ¶ 

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4, attached to Motion, ECF No. 24.) The Commissioner withheld $12,129.50 from the past-due 

benefit for attorney fees. This amount equals 25 percent of the retroactive benefit award. (Notice 

of Award, attached to Motion, ECF No. 24-3.)

In the instant motion, Petitioner seeks $11,300.001for 21.5 hours of attorney time and 4.3

hours of paralegal time. After crediting $4,500.00 received previously pursuant to the EAJA, 

Counsel requests a net fee of $6,800.00 from the past-due award. 

II.

LEGAL STANDARD

In relevant part, 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A) provides that when a federal court “renders a 

judgment favorable to a claimant . . . who was represented before the court by an attorney,” the 

court may allow reasonable attorney fees “not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due 

benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment.” The payment of such 

award comes directly from the claimant’s benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A).

The Supreme Court has explained that a district court reviews a petition for section 406(b) 

fees “as an independent check” to assure that the contingency fee agreements between the 

claimant and the attorney will “yield reasonable results in particular cases.” Gisbrecht v. 

Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002). The district court must respect “the primacy of lawful 

attorney-client fee agreements,” and is to look first at the contingent-fee agreement, and then test 

it for reasonableness.” Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1148 (9th Cir. 2009). Agreements 

seeking fees in excess of twenty-five percent of the past-due benefits awarded are not 

enforceable. Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1148. The attorney has the burden of demonstrating that the 

fees requested are reasonable. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808; Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1148.

In determining the reasonableness of an award, the district court should consider the 

character of the representation and the results achieved. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 800. Ultimately, 

an award of section 406(b) fees is offset by an award of attorney fees granted under the EAJA. 

 

1 Although Petitioner states that he is seeking $6,800.00 in fees, this is the net amount that he is 

seeking. Therefore, the Court analyzes the reasonableness of the fee based upon the gross amount 

of $11,300.00.

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28 U.S.C. § 2412. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796.

The Ninth Circuit has identified several factors that a district court can examine under 

Gisbrecht in determining whether the fee was reasonable. In determining whether counsel met 

his burden to demonstrate that the requested fees are reasonable, the court may consider (1) the 

standard of performance of the attorney in representing the claimant; (2) whether the attorney 

exhibited dilatory conduct or caused excessive delay which resulted in an undue accumulation of 

past-due benefits; and (3) whether the requested fees are excessively large in relation to the 

benefits achieved when taking into consideration the risk assumed in these cases. Crawford, 586 

F.3d at 1151. 

III.

DISCUSSION

The Court has conducted an independent check to insure the reasonableness of the 

requested fees in relation to this action. Gisbrecht, 122 S.Ct. at 1828. Here, the fee agreement 

between Plaintiff and Petitioner provides for a fee consisting of “25 % of the backpay awarded 

upon reversal of any unfavorable ALJ decision for work before the Social Security 

Administration.” (Fee Agreement, attached to Motion, ECF No. 24-1.) In this action, Plaintiff 

was awarded substantial disability benefits as the benefits covered the period from October 2009 

through March 2015. In determining the reasonableness of the fees requested, the Court is to 

apply the test mandated by Gisbrecht.

There is no indication that a reduction of fees is warranted for substandard performance. 

Counsel is an experienced, competent attorney who secured a successful result for Plaintiff. 

There is no indication that Counsel was responsible for any substantial delay in the court 

proceedings. Counsel is requesting slightly less than the 25 percent contingent-fee. Plaintiff 

agreed to a 25 percent fee at the outset of the representation and Petitioner is seeking $11,300.00 

which is which is 23.29 percent of the backpay award. The $11,300.00 fee ($6,800.00 net fee 

after subtracting the previously awarded EAJA fee) is not excessively large in relation to the pastdue award of $48,518.00. In making this determination, the Court recognizes the contingent 

nature of this case and Counsel’s assumption of the risk of going uncompensated. Hearn v. 

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Barnhart, 262 F.Supp.2d 1033, 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2003).

Finally, the Court finds that the requested fees are reasonable when compared to the 

amount of work Counsel performed in representing Plaintiff in court. As a result of Petitioner’s 

representation in this action, claimant’s appeal was granted and remanded for further proceedings. 

The representation resulted in the action being remanded for an award of benefits. Counsel has

also submitted a detailed billing statement which supports his request. (ECF No. 24-4.) 

VI.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that the fees sought by Petitioner pursuant to 

Section 406(b) are reasonable. Accordingly, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Petitioner’s motion for an award of attorney fees pursuant to Section 406(b) in the 

amount of $11,300.00 is GRANTED; and

2. Petitioner’s award shall be offset by $4,500.00 for the EAJA fees previously 

awarded pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 11, 2015 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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