Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01552/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01552-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Raymond Bruce Belton
Petitioner
Bernie Ellis
Respondent

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This information was derived from the petition for writ of habeas corpus and the memorandum in support of the

petition.

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAYMOND BRUCE BELTON, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

BERNIE ELLIS, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:05-CV-1552 REC LJO HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS PURSUANT TO 28

U.S.C. § 2241

Petitioner, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed an application for a petition for writ

of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 

BACKGROUND1

Petitioner is currently in custody of the Bureau of Prisons at the Taft Correctional Institution

located in Taft, California, pursuant to a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Wisconsin entered on March 15, 1989, following his conviction for conspiracy with intent

to distribute in excess of five kilograms of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846 and 18

U.S.C. § 2. Petitioner was sentenced to a determinate term of 360 months in federal prison. 

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U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 2

Petitioner appealed the conviction to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. He claimed that

he was improperly sentenced as a career offender. On November 20, 1989, the Seventh Circuit

affirmed the judgment. See U.S. v. Belton, 890 F.2d 9 (7th Cir.1989). 

On August 1, 1990, Petitioner filed a motion to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the sentencing court. On August 13, 1990, the motion was denied.

See Exhibit B, Petitioner’s Declaration in Support of Petition (hereinafter “Declaration”). Petitioner

appealed the denial to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. On March 25, 1992, the Seventh Circuit

affirmed the District Court’s denial. Id. On June 1, 1992, the Seventh Circuit denied Petitioner’s

request for rehearing en banc. See Exhibit C, Declaration.

Petitioner then filed a second § 2255 motion in the sentencing court, and supplemented said

motion on January 3, 1994, and May 31, 1994. See Exhibit D, Declaration. On June 7, 1994, the

motion was denied. See Exhibit E, Declaration.

On May 15, 1998, Petitioner filed a third motion pursuant to § 2255 in the sentencing court.

See Exhibit F, Declaration. On June 30, 1998, the motion was denied as successive. See Exhibit G,

Declaration. Petitioner’s motion for certificate of appealability was denied on November 13, 1998.

See Exhibits H and I, Declaration.

On December 29, 1998, Petitioner filed a motion for leave to file a successive motion under

§ 2255. See Exhibit I, Declaration. The motion was denied by the Seventh Circuit because the

§ 2255 motion Petitioner sought to file was untimely and successive. See Exhibit I, Declaration.

On February 17, 1999, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2241 in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. See Exhibit J,

Declaration. The Central District recast the petition as a motion pursuant to § 2255 and transferred

the action to the sentencing court on March 2, 1999. See Exhibit L, Declaration. On July 30, 1999,

the sentencing court dismissed the motion as successive and for failure to obtain prior authorization

from the Seventh Circuit. See Exhibit M, Declaration. Petitioner then filed a motion for certificate of

appealability which was denied by the sentencing court. On December 17, 1999, however, Petitioner

received an order from the Seventh Circuit requiring Petitioner to file a memorandum explaining

why his appeal should not be summarily affirmed. See Exhibit O, Declaration. On December 20,

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U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 3

1999, Petitioner submitted his memorandum through private counsel. See Exhibit O, Declaration. On

October 2, 2000, the Seventh Circuit reversed the judgment of the sentencing court finding the

district court did not have jurisdiction to dismiss the § 2255 motion, because the § 2241 petition was

improperly recast as a § 2255 motion by the Central District of California. See Exhibit P,

Declaration. The Seventh Circuit also found Petitioner’s claims to be frivolous and recommended

the District Court consider sanctioning Petitioner. Id.

Petitioner then sought relief in the sentencing court by filing a motion for modification of

sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). See Exhibit S, Declaration. The sentencing court

denied the motion on November 22, 2002. See Exhibit T, Declaration. Petitioner appealed, and on

July 23, 2003, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment. See Exhibit U, Declaration.

On December 5, 2005, Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his sentence. Petitioner argues that his sentence was improperly

enhanced when he was wrongly found to be a career offender.

JURISDICTION

A federal prisoner who wishes to challenge the validity or constitutionality of his conviction

or sentence must do so by way of a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence under 28

U.S.C. § 2255. Tripati v. Henman, 843 F.2d 1160, 1162 (9th Cir.1988); Thompson v. Smith, 719

F.2d 938, 940 (8th Cir.1983); In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 249 (3rd 1997); Broussard v. Lippman,

643 F.2d 1131, 1134 (5th Cir.1981). In such cases, only the sentencing court has jurisdiction. 

Tripati, 843 F.2d at 1163. A prisoner may not collaterally attack a federal conviction or sentence by

way of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Grady v. United States,

929 F.2d 468, 470 (9th Cir.1991); Tripati, 843 F.2d at 1162; see also United States v. Flores, 616

F.2d 840, 842 (5th Cir.1980). 

In contrast, a federal prisoner challenging the manner, location, or conditions of that

sentence's execution must bring a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Brown

v. United States, 610 F.2d 672, 677 (9th Cir. 1990); Capaldi v. Pontesso, 135 F.3d 1122, 1123 (6th

Cir. 1998); United States v. Tubwell, 37 F.3d 175, 177 (5th Cir. 1994); Kingsley v. Bureau of

Prisons, 937 F.2d 26, 30 n.5 (2nd Cir. 1991); United States v. Jalili, 925 F.2d 889, 893-94 (6th Cir.

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U.S . District Court

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1991); Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 478-79 (3rd Cir. 1991); United States v. Hutchings, 835

F.2d 185, 186-87 (8th Cir. 1987). 

In this case, Petitioner is challenging the validity and constitutionality of his sentence rather

than an error in the administration of his sentence. Therefore, the appropriate procedure would be to

file a motion pursuant to § 2255 and not a habeas petition pursuant to § 2241. Petitioner concedes

this fact. Petitioner admits bringing this petition as a § 2241 petition instead of a § 2255, because he

has already sought relief by way of § 2255. However, a petition contending Petitioner's sentence is

invalid is still a § 2255 petition regardless of what Petitioner calls the petition. See Brown, 610 F.2d

at 677.

In rare situations, a federal prisoner authorized to seek relief under § 2255 may seek relief

under § 2241 if he can show the remedy available under § 2255 to be "inadequate or ineffective to

test the validity of his detention." United States v. Pirro, 104 F.3d 297, 299 (9th Cir.1997) (quoting §

2255). Although there is little guidance from any court on when § 2255 is an inadequate or

ineffective remedy, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that it is a very narrow exception. Ivy v.

Pontesso, 328 F.3d 1057, 1059 (9th Cir.2003); Pirro, 104 F.3d at 299; Aronson v. May, 85 S.Ct. 3, 5

(1964) (a court’s denial of a prior § 2255 motion is insufficient to render § 2255 inadequate.); 

Tripati, 843 F.2d at 1162-63 (9th Cir.1988) (a petitioner's fears of bias or unequal treatment do not

render a § 2255 petition inadequate); Williams v. Heritage, 250 F.2d 390 (9th Cir.1957); Hildebrandt

v. Swope, 229 F.2d 582 (9th Cir.1956). The Ninth Circuit has provided little guidance on what

constitutes “inadequate and ineffective” in relation to the savings clause. It has acknowledged that

“[other] circuits, however, have held that § 2255 provides an "inadequate or ineffective" remedy (and

thus that the petitioner may proceed under § 2241) when the petitioner claims to be: (1) factually

innocent of the crime for which he has been convicted; and, (2) has never had an "unobstructed

procedural shot" at presenting this claim.” Ivy, 328 F.3d at 1059-60, citing, Lorentsen v. Hood, 223

F.3d 950, 954 (9th Cir.2000) (internal citations omitted). The burden is on the petitioner to show that

the remedy is inadequate or ineffective. Redfield v. United States, 315 F.2d 76, 83 (9th Cir. 1963). 

In the petition for writ of habeas corpus, Petitioner claims that § 2255 is inadequate and

ineffective. Petitioner claims he is innocent of being a career offender and that his sentence was

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U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 5

wrongly enhanced. He claims his prior 1987 drug conviction was for conduct that was part of the

drug conspiracy for which he was convicted and should not have been counted when evaluating

whether he was a career offender. In support of this claim, Petitioner cites to U.S. v. Garecht, 183

F.3d 671 (7th Cir.1999). In Garecht, the Seventh Circuit found that Amendment 268, which took

effect on November 1, 1989, clarified the sentencing guidelines so that a prior conviction, not

included in a defendant’s prior criminal history, could not be used as a prior conviction for career

offender purposes. Id. at 676. Here, Petitioner was arrested for simple possession on November 12,

1987. The conspiracy for which Petitioner was convicted of in 1989 lasted from November 1, 1987,

to September 13, 1988. Thus, Petitioner argues, due to the clarification by Amendment 268 to the

Sentencing Guidelines, the 1987 simple possession conviction could not be used for career offender

purposes. Therefore, he argues, he is innocent of the career offender enhancement.

Next, Petitioner argues he has never had an unobstructed procedural shot at presenting this

claim because Garecht was decided on July 7, 1999, and Petitioner’s first § 2255 motion had been

denied by the sentencing court nearly nine years earlier on August 13, 1990. However, the record

before the Court demonstrates that Petitioner did in fact have numerous unobstructed procedural

opportunities to present the instant claim. 

Although Garecht was not decided until after Petitioner’s § 2255 motions had been denied,

the basis for such a challenge was readily available during direct appeal to the Seventh Circuit and

well before the first § 2255 motion was filed. As previously stated, Amendment 268 took effect on

November 1, 1989. The Seventh Circuit did not affirm the conviction and sentence until November

20, 1989, and Petitioner did not file his first § 2255 motion until August 1, 1990. Despite Petitioner’s

failure to raise the claim until recently, it was available, as it was for the petitioner in Garecht, and

could have been raised on appeal and in his first § 2255 motion. Petitioner also could have raised the

claim in any of the subsequent § 2255 motions and briefs to the Seventh Circuit. Notably, the

Seventh Circuit requested briefing during one of Petitioner’s appeals after Garecht was decided and

several years after Amendment 268 had taken effect. Petitioner with the assistance of counsel filed a

brief entitled “Jurisdictional Memorandum” on December 19, 1999; however, Petitioner did not raise

his Garecht claim. Instead, he claimed actual innocence of the career offender enhancement based on

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U.S . District Court

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the allegation that a prior 1985 conviction could not be used to compute his career offender status.

Petitioner could have raised the Garecht claim to the appellate court in his brief, but he did not. In

any case, the Seventh Circuit found that Petitioner’s claims under § 2241 were “frivolous.” See

Exhibit P, Declaration. The Seventh Circuit also directed the district court to consider whether

sanctions against Petitioner were appropriate. Id.

Petitioner then filed a motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). In an unpublished order

rejecting Petitioner’s appeal from the district court’s denial of that motion, the Seventh Circuit noted

that the Sentencing Commission elected not to make Amendment 268 retroactive. See Exhibit U,

Declaration; U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10. The Seventh Circuit rejected Petitioner’s claims “because there is

no retroactive amendment applicable to [Petitioner’s] sentence with which to calculate a new

guideline range.” See Exhibit U, Declaration.

Therefore, it is clear Petitioner has not demonstrated that § 2255 provides an "inadequate or

ineffective" remedy. The basis for Petitioner’s claim was available prior to his first § 2255 motion,

and Petitioner had multiple unobstructed opportunities to present it to the district court and to the

Seventh Circuit. In addition, as Amendment 268 is not retroactive, Petitioner’s claim is without

merit.

Petitioner’s alternative claim that § 2255 is unconstitutional should also be denied. In support

of this claim, Petitioner cites to the Second Circuit’s conclusion in Triestman v. U.S., 124 F.3d 361,

363 (2d Cir.1997), that “serious constitutional questions would arise if a person who can prove his

actual innocence on the existing record-- and who could not have effectively raised his claim of

innocence at an earlier time--had no access to judicial review.” As discussed above, however, those

serious constitutional questions do not arise because Petitioner had several opportunities at earlier

times to effectively raise his claim of innocence. Therefore, Petitioner’s claim that § 2255 is

unconstitutional must be rejected.

For the above reasons, the petition should be dismissed.

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be

DISMISSED because the petition does not allege grounds that would entitle petitioner to relief under

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U.S . District Court

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28 U.S.C. § 2241. 

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the Honorable Robert E. Coyle,

United States District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule

72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of

California. Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall

be served and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the

objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636

(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive

the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 4, 2006 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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