Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-03246/USCOURTS-ca10-89-03246-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lario Enterprises, Inc.
Appellant
Mid-America Pipeline Company
Appellee
The City of Topeka, Kansas
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FILED 

Unit.eel States C.ourt of Appeals Tent.'1 Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 3 0 1991 

TENTH CIRCUIT ROBERT L. HOECKER 

MID-AMERICA PIPELINE COMPANY, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

LARIO ENTERPRISES, INC., and THE CITY OF ) 

TOPEKA, KANSAS , ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants. ) 

) 

Clerk 

Nos. 89-3231 

and 89-3246 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D.C. No. 88-4205-R) 

Leonard J. Johnson (David C. Stout with him on the briefs) of 

Morrison, Hecker, Curtis, Kuder & Parrish, Kansas City, Missouri, 

and James L. Grimes of Cosgrove, Webb & Oman, Topeka, Kansas for 

Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee. 

Gerald L. Goodell (Leslie E. Diehl of Goodell, Stratton, Edmonds & 

Palmer, Topeka, Kansas; and Stephen P. Weir and Edwin P. Carpenter 

of Carpenter, Weir & Myers, Topeka, Kansas, with him on the 

briefs) of Goodell, Stratton, Edmonds & Palmer, Topeka, Kansas, 

for Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants. 

Before BALDOCK and BRORBY, Circuit Judges, and ANDERSON,* District 

Judge. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

Mid-America Pipeline Company ("MAPCO" or Appellant) seeks 

equitable relief from the construction of Heartland Park Topeka 

(HPT), a newly-built automobile raceway that partially overlies 

* The Honorable Aldon J. Anderson, Senior United States 

District Judge for the District of Utah, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 89-3246 Document: 01019762423 Date Filed: 08/30/1991 Page: 1 
MAPCO's pre-existing high-pressure liquid gas pipeline easements. 

MAPCO appeals the United States District Court for the District of 

Kansas's denial of an injunction mandating the removal of the 

offending parts of the racetrack. HPT's owners, Lario Enterprises 

and the City of Topeka, Kansas (collectively, "Lario") crossappeal certain rulings of the district court. The Memorandum and 

Order denying injunctive relief is published as Mid-America 

Pipeline Co. v. Lario Enters., 716 F. Supp. 511 (D. Kan. 1989). 

Jurisdiction in the district court was based on diversity of 

citizenship pursuant to 28 u.s.c. § 1332. Our jurisdiction arises 

under 28 u.s.c. § 1292(a)(l). 

Facts 

MAPCO purchased certain easements across undeveloped farmland 

in 1960, and duly recorded the easements. MAPCO selected the path 

of the easements so as to avoid developed property. Mid-America, 

716 F. Supp. at 514. The easements define a sixty-foot wide right 

of way and provide substantial rights, which are reprinted at 

length in Mid-America, id. at 513-14. The relevant easement 

provision states: 

Granter shall have the right to fully use and enjoy the 

above described premises subject to the rights herein 

granted. Grantee shall have the right to clear and keep 

clear all trees, undergrowth and other obstructions from 

the herein granted right of way, and Granter agrees not 

to build, construct or create, nor permit others to 

build, construct or create any buildings or other 

structures on the herein granted right of way that will 

interfere with the normal operation and maintenance of 

the said line or lines. 

MAPCO drew the easement language. Id. at 514. MAPCO 

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subsequently installed two high-pressure liquid gas pipelines 

through the easements. Id. at 513. The pipelines were buried at 

a depth of thirty to forty-eight inches. Id. 

MAPCO's officers learned of Lario's plans to build HPT in the 

summer of 1988, and promptly informed Lario of its easement rights 

and objections to the planned construction. Id. at 514. Lario 

had both actual and constructive notice of MAPCO's easements and 

the existence of its gas pipelines prior to its construction of 

HPT. MAPCO filed this lawsuit on August 30, 1988. Lario 

subsequently deeded certain areas of HPT, including parts of the 

pipeline easements, to the City of Topeka, with agreement that the 

land and project would be reconveyed to Lario after a term of 

twenty-three years. MAPCO then joined the City as a defendant. 

Substantial construction of HPT has occurred since the filing 

of the lawsuit, and has continued in light of the district court's 

denial of MAPCO's request for a preliminary injunction. The court 

described the existing and planned parts of HPT that are located 

above the gas pipelines in the following terms: 

Currently, four racetrack surfaces approximately 36 

feet in width cross over the pipelines. A drag strip 

approximately 60 feet in width also crosses the 

pipelines. These surfaces are composed of 7! inches of 

asphalt over a 12 inch fly ash/clay base. The base is a 

mixture of materials designed to set up like concrete. 

The depth of the cover has been increased over the 

pipelines in some areas by as much as 12 to 20 feet. It 

is anticipated that moveable concrete barriers weighing 

approximately 8,000 pounds apiece shall border the 

racetrack. Two chain link fences will cross the 

pipelines in four locations. Additionally, two tram 

roadways that will also cross the pipelines are 

contemplated in the future. 

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716 F. Supp. at 514. 

The court found the asphalt covering, the fly ash/clay base, 

and the fill dirt would render the task of excavating the 

pipelines "more difficult, time-consuming and expensive." Id. 

However, given the history of the pipelines, the court concluded 

the probability that excavation would be necessary "appears 

remote." Id. at 515. Nevertheless, addressing the language of 

the easements, the court held: 

The asphalt 

interfere with 

the [pipe]lines' 

easement rights. 

tracks of HPT are 'structures which 

the normal operation and maintenance of 

and, therefore, violate plaintiff's 

Id. The court also noted, "[o)f course, not all structures are 

barred by the easements. Only structures which 'interfere with 

the normal operation and maintenance' of the pipelines are 

prohibited." Id. at 516. 

Reasoning from the terms of the easement, the court concluded 

II [ i] f trees and undergrowth, which the easements expressly 

designate for removal, can be considered interference, it is 

logical to believe the parties would consider the racetracks as 

interference." Id. at 517. The court found otherwise with 

respect to the fences, concrete barriers, and tramways, concluding 

they do not unreasonably or materially interfere with the normal 

operations and maintenance of the pipelines. Id. 

The court also considered the much-disputed safety 

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implications of operating the racetrack over the liquid gas 

pipelines. The propane and ethane gases transported in the 

pipelines are heavier than air and, in leak situations, pose a 

danger of accumulation at ground level and explosion. MAPCO 

claims HPT interferes with its ability to detect pipeline leaks by 

obscuring the easement from the by-weekly overflights MAPCO uses 

to look for the dead vegetation or ice plugs that indicate a gas 

leak. MAPCO further claims HPT will increase the cost and 

decrease the accuracy of its close-interval cathodic surveys -- a 

means of electrically testing the corrosion resistance of the 

pipes. MAPCO is also concerned about the increased danger and 

delay involved in the task of digging down to the pipelines 

through the asphalt racetracks and increased overburden -- perhaps 

in the presence of explosive gases and under emergency 

circumstances. Lario argues that because MAPCO never had to dig 

up the pipes before, and because the pipes have now been 

inspected, repaired, and certified safe, there is no safety 

problem. 

The court in essence agreed with Lario, citing the lack of 

prior leaks or problems at the HPT site, the present safe 

condition of the pipelines, and the comprehensive pipelinemonitoring system used by MAPCO to detect leaks. 716 F. Supp. at 

514. The court concluded the probability that pipeline excavation 

will be necessary "appears remote," and "absent a safety risk from 

the operation of HPT over the pipelines, the court has no reason 

to believe that the substantial cost of relocating the pipelines 

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should be suffered by any party in this case." Id. at 515, 520. 

The district court refused to grant an injunction mandating 

the removal of the racetracks or any other aspect of HPT from the 

easements. The court offered three grounds in explaining its 

denial of the injunction: "plaintiff has an adequate remedy in 

condemnation or damages; an injunction would place an unfair 

hardship upon defendants; and, an injunction would not be in the 

interests of the public." Id. at 513. 

Issues Raised 

MAPCO appeals the court's denial of injunctive relief. Lario 

argues on cross-appeal that although the district court correctly 

denied injunctive relief, it erred in finding the asphalt tracks 

are "structures" under the easements and in finding the tracks 

"interfere with the normal operation and maintenance" of the 

pipelines. 

Standard of Review 

We apply the law of the forum state in determining whether to 

grant mandatory injunctive relief in diversity cases. Erie R.R. 

Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); Genovese Drug Stores, 

Inc. v. Bercrose Assocs., 563 F. Supp. 1299, 1304 (D. Conn. 1983) 

("Where injunctive relief is sought, a federal court must look to 

state law to determine whether a party is entitled to equitable 

remedial rights."). See also United States v. O'Block, 788 F.2d 

1433, 1435 (10th Cir. 1986) (absent controlling federal law, 

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questions involving real property rights are resolved under state 

law); 2 J. Moore, w. Taggart & J. Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice 

,I 2. 09 ( 1990) ("Assuming a case is in the federal court solely 

because of diversity and that the right to be adjudicated concerns 

only local law then the parties are entitled to the same 

substantial treatment they would get in the same (state] court."). 

We review the state law determinations of the district court 

de novo, according no deference. Salve Regina College v. Russell, 

U.S.~-'~-' 111 S. Ct. 1217, 1221-25 (1991). Although Erie 

dictates we apply Kansas law to the merits of this case, as a 

matter of independent federal procedure we utilize the normal 

federal standards of appellate review to examine the district 

court's decision process. Cf. Manchester Pipeline Corp. v. 

Peoples Natural Gas Co., 862 F.2d 1439, 1444 (10th Cir. 1988) 

(federal standards applied in review of sufficiency of evidence 

and motion for new trial in diversity case). Therefore, in this 

appeal, legal conclusions reached by the federal district court 

are reviewed de novo, while findings of fact are examined for 

clear error. Fox v. Mazda Corp. of America, 868 F.2d 1190, 1194 

(10th Cir. 1989) (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 

(1988)). 

Analysis 

Applying de novo review, we are convinced the district 

court's decision does not properly reflect Kansas law. The 

district court largely derived its legal conclusions by applying 

the seven-part test of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 936 

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(1979). 1 See Mid-America, 716 F. Supp. at 518-20. Under § 936, 

the court focused on the adequacy of legal remedies, the relative 

hardship to the parties, and the interests of the public. Id. at 

519-20. As we have found no Kansas case adopting, using, or even 

citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 936, our de novo review 

must consider whether the district court's analysis comports with 

Kansas authority. We note the district court did not have the 

benefit of the Kansas Supreme Court's recent decision in MidAmerica Pipeline Co. v. Wietharn, 246 Kan. 238, 787 P.2d 716 

(1990). 

"As a court sitting in diversity, we must apply a state 

1 Section 936, "Factors in Determining Appropriateness 

Injunction" reads in part: 

(1) The appropriateness of the remedy of injunction 

against a tort depends upon a comparative appraisal of 

all of the factors in the case, including the following 

primary factors: 

(a) the nature of the interest to be protected, 

(b) the relative adequacy to the plaintiff of 

injunction and of other remedies, 

(c) any unreasonable delay by the plaintiff in 

bringing suit, 

(d) any related misconduct on the part of the 

plaintiff, 

(e) the relative hardship likely to 

defendant if an injunction is granted and to 

if it is denied, 

result to 

plaintiff 

(f) the interests of third persons and of the 

public, and 

(g) the practicability of framing and enforcing 

the order or judgment. 

-8-

of 

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supreme court's most recent statement of state law." Southwest 

Forest Indus., Inc. v. Sutton, 868 F.2d 352, 354 (10th Cir. 1989) 

(citing Robinson v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 803 F.2d 572, 574 

(10th Cir. 1986)), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1320 (1990). 

Wietharn, the Kansas Supreme Court's most recent statement 

concerning that state's law on mandatory injunctions, is 

especially significant because it involved the same plaintiff, 

MAPCO, asserting rights under easement language identical to that 

before this court. 787 P.2d at 718. Wietharn reversed the trial 

court's denial of an injunction mandating the removal of several 

buildings from MAPCO's pipeline easement, and in so doing resolved 

certain issues that are raised in the present case. Id. at 719-

25. 

Wietharn states the law of injunctive relief in Kansas in 

these terms: 

Mandatory injunctions require performance of an act, 

while preventive, or prohibitory, injunctions require a 

party to refrain from doing an act. To obtain 

injunctive relief from prospective injury, a party must 

show that a reasonable probability of injury exists and 

that an action at law will not provide adequate remedy. 

Mere apprehension or possibility of wrong or injury 

ordinarily does not warrant the granting of an 

injunction. 

A mandatory injunction is an extraordinary 

remedy used to effectuate full and complete justice by 

commanding the performance of a positive act. Although 

the granting of a mandatory injunction is governed by 

the same rules as the granting of preventive 

injunctions, courts are more reluctant to grant a 

mandatory injunction. Therefore, usually only 

prohibitory injunctions are entered. A party seeking a 

mandatory injunction must clearly be entitled to that 

form of relief. 

Id. at 719-20 (citations omitted). Thus, Wietharn sets out three 

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requirements for the issuance of a mandatory injunction under 

Kansas law: (1) the party seeking injunctive relief must show 

that a reasonable probability of injury exists; (2) the party must 

show that there is no adequate remedy at law; and (3) the party 

must clearly be entitled to a mandatory injunction. Id.; Prophet 

v. Builders, Inc., 204 Kan. 268, 462 P.2d 122, 126 (1969). 

We note initially that the Wietharn requirements do not 

include two of the three bases for the district court's holding in 

this case specifically, the balancing of equities and the 

weighing of the public interest. Indeed, Wietharn expressly 

rejected the balancing of equities where the respondent acts with 

knowledge of the easement or pipeline and is therefore not 

"innocent." Wietharn, 787 P.2d at 725. In rejecting the 

balancing of equities, the Kansas Supreme Court adopted "MidAmerica['s] argu[ment] that the trial court should not have 

balanced equities after finding that the easement rights were 

violated because the Wietharns could not claim to be innocent 

respondents. 11 Id. at 722. After surveying cases, the court 

concluded: 

The respondents were not innocent parties acting without 

knowledge of the easement or the pipeline. It is 

difficult, if not impossible, to imagine how the 

construction of buildings or structures could interfere 

more with the normal operation and maintenance of the 

pipeline than the buildings constructed by the 

respondents in the present case. To find otherwise 

would render the previously quoted language in the 

easement meaningless and Mid-America's rights thereunder 

illusory. 

the 

the 

Since Mid-America has clearly defined rights under 

easement that are recognized and protected by law, 

district court should not have balanced the 

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equities. 

Id. at 725. 

In this case, despite its professed belief that HPT would not 

interfere with MAPCO's easement rights, Lario did not proceed in 

the construction of HPT "without knowledge or warning" of MAPCO's 

property rights. See id. at 722 (quoting Papanikolas Bros. 

Enters. v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center Assocs., 535 P.2d 1256, 1259 

(Utah 1975)). Lario is therefore not "innocent" and not entitled 

to a balancing of equities under controlling Kansas law. After 

examining Wietharn, we are constrained to hold the district court 

erred in balancing the equities in this case. 787 P.2d at 725. 

It is clear the district court's utilization of the 

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 936 analysis is not in accord with 

Kansas authority. We now address whether the requirements for the 

issuance of a mandatory injunction, as set out in Wietharn, have 

been met in this case. 

1. Injury 

We first review the district court's construction of the 

easement language and its holding that HPT interferes with MAPCO's 

easement rights. See 716 F. Supp. at 517. Material interference 

with MAPCO's reasonable enjoyment of the easement would constitute 

injury potentially entitling MAPCO to a mandatory injunction. See 

Aladdin Petroleum Corp. v. Gold Crown Properties, Inc., 221 Kan. 

579, 561 P.2d 818, 825 (1977). 

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Under Kansas law, the character and extent of rights created 

by a grant of easement is determined by construction of the 

language of the grant. Potter v. Northern Natural Gas Co., 201 

Kan. 528, 441 P.2d 802, 805 (1968). "'A cardinal rule in the 

interpretation of contracts is to ascertain the intention of the 

parties and to give effect to that intention if it can be done 

consistent with legal principles.'" Garvey Center, Inc. v. Food 

Specialties, Inc., 214 Kan. 224, 519 P.2d 646, 650 (1974) (quoting 

Hamann v. Crouch, 211 Kan. 852, 508 P.2d 968, 973-74 (1973)). 

Moreover, "reasonable rather than unreasonable interpretations are 

favored by the law. Results which vitiate the purpose or reduce 

the terms of the contract to an absurdity should be avoided." 

Garvey Center, 519 P.2d at 649 (quoting Weiner v. Wilshire Oil Co. 

of Texas, 192 Kan. 490, 389 P.2d 803 (1964)). The construction of 

the written instrument and the existence of ambiguity are 

questions of law. Kennedy & Mitchell, Inc. v. Anadarko Prod. Co., 

243 Kan. 130, 754 P.2d 803, 805-06 (1988). 

As noted, the easement contracts at issue prohibit the 

creation of "any buildings or other structures on the herein 

granted right of way that will interfere with the normal operation 

and maintenance" of the pipelines. MAPCO argues "the trial court 

erred in holding that fences, concrete barriers, additional dirt 

fill, perimeter roads and other racetrack appurtenances do not 

violate and interfere with" 

those aspects of HPT are not 

its easement rights. 

prohibited "structures" 

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Lario argues 

under the 

Appellate Case: 89-3246 Document: 01019762423 Date Filed: 08/30/1991 Page: 12 
easement, asserts the easement contract is ambiguous, and claims 

the district court erred in adopting a definition of "structures" 

that favors MAPCO. 

Ambiguity is found "only when words used to express the 

meaning and intention of the parties are insufficient in that the 

contract may be understood to reach two or more possible 

meanings." Anadarko, 754 P.2d at 806. We agree with Lario's 

contention that the word "structure" is ambiguous, as it may be 

understood to reach two or more meanings -- hence the disagreement 

among various courts as to the word's proper definition. See MidAmerica, 716 F. Supp. at 515-16. However, we reject Lario's 

implication that, like an insurance policy, the easement at issue 

is an adhesion contract requiring narrow construction of its terms 

against the drafter. 

Finding ambiguity, we apply the "cardinal rule" of 

construction by ascertaining the intention of the parties to the 

easement contract and giving effect to their intention. See In re 

Estate of Murphy, 226 Kan. 424, 601 P.2d 1096, 1099 (1979); Garvey 

Center, 519 P.2d at 650; Crouch, 508 P.2d at 973-74. We agree 

with the district court's conclusion that: 

[I)t is reasonable to assume that the grantee intended 

to bar asphalt surfaces from crossing the easements 

because plaintiff plotted the pipelines to avoid 

developed property. It is also reasonable to assume 

that the grantors did not have a contrary intent, since 

the property was used for pasture and agriculture for 

decades before and after the easements were executed. 

This construction conforms with the dictionary 

definition of "structure." 

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716 F. Supp. at 515. Despite the facial ambiguity of the contract 

term, consideration of the parties' intent establishes that the 

racetracks are "structures" in the meaning of the contract. 

The district court rejected Lario's 

with "buildings." 

argument that 

"structures" is synonymous Id. at 516. We 

concur. Otherwise, apart 

authority, Lario does 

from citing nonbinding, contrary 

not suggest what the parties might 

reasonably have meant by the term "structures." Looking to the 

intent of the parties, we are unable to perceive why barns, stockwatering tanks, or windmills, for instance, would be considered 

interfering "structures" if four 36 feet wide asphalt racetracks 

and a 60 feet wide asphalt drag strip are not. As the same logic 

applies to the fences, concrete barriers, and additional cover, we 

hold they are also "structures" under these facts. The proposed 

perimeter tracks, which are simple gravel roads, are not 

"structures". This resolution respects the rule that "[t]he 

circumstances under which the contract was made, will be 

considered to show the intent of the parties." United States v. 

Kansas Gas & Elec. Co., 215 F. Supp. 532, 542 (D. Kan. 1963). 

The next disputed issue is whether these structures 

"interfere with the normal operation and maintenance" of MAPCO's 

pipelines. This is a mixed question of law and fact involving 

contract construction and factual determinations concerning the 

actual impacts of the structures. We ask whether the impacts 

found by the district court constitute "interference" in the 

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meaning of the easement contract. De novo review is appropriate 

in the case of such mixed questions. Pittsburg & Midway Coal Min. 

Co. v. Yazzie, 909 F.2d 1387, 1393-94 (10th Cir.) (de novo review 

applied where issue of statutory construction was a mixed question 

which turned on historical record, but primarily involved legal 

principles), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 581 (1990). 

The district court found the asphalt surface hampers MAPCO's 

biweekly aerial surveillance of the pipelines and impairs the 

close-interval surveys. 716 F. Supp. at 514. The court found the 

racetracks and additional fill render excavation of the pipelines 

more difficult, time-consuming, and expensive. The court 

also noted "[d]efendants do not dispute the added expense and 

difficulty in maintaining or repairing a pipeline under an asphalt 

surface and fill dirt." 716 F. Supp. at 516. Lario disputes the 

significance of these findings by asserting the interference 

presented by HPT is immaterial. 

In Aladdin, the Kansas Supreme Court stated: 

"An obstruction or disturbance of an easement is 

anything which wrongfully interferes with the privilege 

to which the owner of the easement is entitled by making 

its use less convenient and beneficial than before. To 

constitute an actionable wrong it must, however, be of a 

material character such as will interfere with the 

reasonable enjoyment of the easement .... " 

561 P.2d at 825 (quoting 28 C.J.S. Easements§ 96). See Wietharn, 

787 P.2d at 720-21. Under Aladdin, we have no difficulty 

concluding the asphalt racetrack and increased cover at HPT 

materially interfere with MAPCO's operation and maintenance of its 

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pipelines. The racetracks and overburden -- which was increased 

to a depth of twenty feet in some areas -- impair MAPCO's ability 

to detect leaks. 716 F. Supp. at 514. The racetracks and 

overburden will also increase the costs and difficulty of digging 

down to the pipelines, should doing so become necessary. Id. We 

hold this level of interference is material. To hold otherwise 

would defy common sense. 

Lario argues any interference caused by HPT is "normal" 

compared to the interference tolerated by MAPCO in other locations 

where roads and highways cross the same pipelines. The 

interference MAPCO must tolerate elsewhere is largely irrelevant. 

It is axiomatic that "[a] court may not make an agreement for the 

parties which they did not make themselves." Potter, 441 P.2d at 

806. To require MAPCO to tolerate new interference with the 

maintenance of its pipelines at HPT simply because it must bear 

similar interference elsewhere "would have the effect of inserting 

an additional provision in the original grant requiring the 

grantee to furnish additional consideration for the rights granted 

and received by it." Id. Lario does not and cannot plausibly 

argue that the normal operation and maintenance of MAPCO's 

pipelines at HPT including aerial surveillance, cathodic 

surveying, and excavation when necessary is 

substantially more difficult and costly than it was prior 

not 

to 

construction of HPT. Lario's argument is therefore rejected. 

now 

the 

We agree with the district court's holding that the 

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interference caused by the fences and concrete barriers is not 

material. 716 F. Supp. at 517. The record contains no evidence 

suggesting these aspects of HPT will substantially impede leak 

detection or cathodic surveillance of the pipelines. The fences 

and barriers are distinguishable from trees and shrubbery 

(obstructions MAPCO is entitled to remove) as they obscure no 

significant amount of ground from view. Finally, as the fences 

and barriers are readily movable, they need not interfere with 

pipeline excavation or cathodic surveys. 

We hold the asphalt racetracks and increased overburden at 

HPT materially interfere with MAPCO's easement rights. Such 

material interference constitutes injury that is actionable under 

Wietharn, 787 P.2d at 720, and Aladdin, 561 P.2d at 825. Having 

determined that MAPCO is injured, we next consider whether an 

action at law will adequately remedy MAPCO's injury. Wietharn, 

787 P.2d at 719. 

2. Adequacy of Remedies at Law 

MAPCO argues the district court erred in holding MAPCO has an 

adequate remedy at law. Appellees respond MAPCO has an adequate 

remedy in inverse condemnation. The parties agree the City owns 

the land under the racetracks and possesses eminent domain power. 

The court stated its conclusions of law with regard to the 

remedy of inverse condemnation in the following passage: 

The court has determined that the doctrine of 

inverse condemnation may be applied to these facts. The 

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law recognizes that a condemnor may take property rights 

already devoted to a public use if the two uses are 

compatible. Thus, the law dictates in this situation 

that compensation in damages is the only remedy 

available to plaintiff. Plaintiff has not rebutted the 

existence of this remedy. Therefore, injunctive relief 

should not be ordered. 

716 F. Supp. at 519. 

Under Kansas law, inverse condemnation is a "remedy available 

to one whose land has been taken for public use." See Ventures in 

Property I v. City of Wichita, 225 Kan. 698, 594 P.2d 671, 678 

(1979) (quoting Wittke v. Kusel, 215 Kan. 403, 524 P.2d 774, 776 

(1974)). Inverse condemnation is an action initiated by the 

property owner which is available where private property actually 

has been taken for public use without formal condemnation 

proceedings and there is no intention or willingness on the part 

of the taker to bring the action to acquire the property. 

Ventures, 594 P.2d at 678. Actions in inverse condemnation 

enforce an obligation on the part of public entities to pay 

property owners the reasonable value of property or rights taken 

without compensation. Id. 

An action in inverse condemnation is a means of seeking 

damages or compensation for the property interest taken. Hiji v. 

City of Garnett, 248 Kan. 1, 804 P.2d 950, 953 (1991). As such, 

inverse condemnation represents nothing more than a procedure by 

which MAPCO presumably could seek damages. We are thus presented 

with a single question: whether damages would adequately remedy 

HPT's material interference with MAPCO's easement rights. 

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The district court addressed the adequacy of damages, 

stating: 

[A] damages claim for the increased cost of excavation 

would provide an adequate remedy for the hindrance 

presented by the racetracks. Such a claim could be made 

after the excavation. There is no reason to believe 

that such claims would be so numerous that a damages 

claim would be impractical.2 

2. While interference with plaintiff's 

surveillance efforts may be continual, this court 

considers this inconsequential .... 

716 F. Supp. at 519. 

MAPCO argues the district court's conclusion contradicts the 

holding in Wietharn, 787 P.2d 716, and Aladdin, 561 P.2d 818. 

While Aladdin and Wietharn concerned the wrongful erection of 

buildings that materially interfered with right-of-way easements, 

we nevertheless find their analysis applicable here, where the 

racetracks and overburden likewise materially interfere with 

MAPCO's easement rights. We agree that the district court's 

conclusion on the adequacy of damages contradicts Wietharn. 

The Kansas Supreme Court granted a mandatory injunction 

ordering the removal of four buildings that were built over 

MAPCO's pipeline easement in Wietharn. 787 P.2d at 725. The 

court recognized that no mandatory injunction could issue if legal 

action was adequate to remedy the interference. Id. at 719-21, 

725. The court held "the Wietharns' construction of buildings on 

Mid-America's easement created a continuing violation that did not 

cease with the completion of the building .... The issuance of a 

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mandatory injunction was appropriate to protect Mid-America's 

rights under the easement .... " Id. at 720. The court expressly 

found the remedy at law to be inadequate and granted the mandatory 

injunction, concluding "[w]here, as in the present case, the 

remedy at law is inadequate, equity will fashion a remedy that 

enforces that legal right. However, in so doing, equity will 

follow the law and not ignore it." Id. at 725. The Kansas 

Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in failing to 

order the removal of the offending buildings. Id. 

This holding is by no means anomalous: courts in many 

jurisdictions recognize that legal remedies are inadequate to 

redress ongoing or continuing violations. See, ~' Berin v. 

Olson, 183 Conn. 337, 439 A.2d 357, 361 (1981) ("the circumstance 

that the injury or the potential for injury is of a continuing 

nature permits the intervention of equity"); Richard Paul, Inc. v. 

Union Improvement Co., 33 Del. Ch. 113, 91 A.2d 49, 54 (Del. 

Super. Ct. 1952) ("the obstruction of an easement of itself is 

sufficient to show the irreparable nature of the injury and the 

inadequacy of the remedy at law"); Lynch v. Keck, 147 Ind. App. 

570, 263 N.E.2d 176, 181 (1970) ("Where the obstructions are of a 

permanent and continuous nature and the damages for each day's 

obstruction are insignificant, the remedy of successive actions at 

law for such damages is inadequate, and equity will interpose by 

injunction"); Czarnick v. Loup River Pub. Power Dist., 190 Neb. 

521, 209 N.W.2d 595, 599 (1973). See also, 

Easements and Licenses § 120 (1966 & Supp. 

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25 Am. Jur. 2d 

1991); 28 C.J.S. 

Appellate Case: 89-3246 Document: 01019762423 Date Filed: 08/30/1991 Page: 20 
Easements§ 107 (1941). 

Lario has not suggested that damages are more adequate in 

this case than in Wietharn. Lario cites several cases supporting 

the adequacy of a remedy by way of inverse condemnation. The 

cited cases, however, involve physical or regulatory takings and 

find damages adequate to remedy the challenged takings. In this 

case, given Lario's argument that HPT does not even constitute an 

interference with the easement, it is not at all clear that the 

construction of HPT would be adjudged a "taking" entitling MAPCO 

to compensation. And again, damages were found to be inadequate 

to remedy similar interference in Wietharn. 787 P.2d at 725. 

Lario argues Wietharn is distinguishable because the parties 

therein "agreed" the buildings violated the easement, while this 

case presents "a close question as to whether HPT even violated 

the Plaintiff's easement rights under any interpretation. These 

differences clearly go to the Defendant's good faith herein." 

This argument fails because it ignores the rejection, by Wietharn 

and the cases cited with approval therein, of "good faith" 

analysis. See id. at 722-23. In refusing to balance the relative 

equities between the parties, Wietharn rejected the significance 

of alleged good faith. We likewise discount the relevance of 

Lario's proffered good faith. 

We are also not persuaded that safety concerns provide a 

basis for distinguishing Wietharn. The district court 

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acknowledged a recent "explosion caused by a leak from the 

pipelines near HPT." 716 F. Supp. at 514. Neither the 

district court nor the parties to this lawsuit can predict the 

future safety of the pipelines at HPT. Because the injury found 

above involves material interference with MAPCO's leak detection 

capabilities, we decline to endorse the notion that safety 

concerns play no part in this case. 

3. Clear Entitlement 

Wietharn reaffirmed that "[a] party seeking a mandatory 

injunction must clearly be entitled to that form of relief." 787 

P.2d at 720. In Wietharn, the Kansas Supreme Court directed the 

state district court to issue an injunction mandating the removal 

of buildings that interfered with an easement created by the same 

contract language as that at issue in this case. Id. at 718, 725. 

Wietharn does not explain why the Kansas Supreme Court considered 

the plaintiff to be "clearly entitled" to a mandatory 

injunction. Nevertheless, given the similarity of the two cases, 

we find Wietharn controlling on this issue. 

Initially, we note that construction of the racetracks on 

plaintiff's easement, like the wrongful erection of buildings over 

the easement in Wietharn, "created a continuing violation that did 

not cease with the completion" of construction. Id. at 720. As 

in Wietharn, the offending structures at issue here continue to 

interfere with MAPCO's enjoyment of its easement rights. Also, as 

in Wietharn, MAPCO diligently protested the racetrack construction 

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( 

and asserted its easement rights. See Mid-America, 716 F. Supp. 

at 514. As noted above, "[t]he respondents were not innocent 

parties acting without knowledge of the easement or the pipeline." 

Wietharn, 787 P.2d at 725. Finally, as in Wietharn, "Mid-America 

has clearly defined rights under the easement that are recognized 

and protected by law." Id. 

Having held that the asphalt racetracks and increased 

overburden at HPT are structures that materially interfere with 

the normal operation and maintenance of the pipelines, and that an 

award of damages would not adequately remedy that interference, we 

now hold MAPCO's entitlement to relief in the form of a mandatory 

injunction is clear. 

Conclusion 

Under Kansas law, the district court erred in balancing the 

equities between parties in this case. The racetracks and 

increased cover at HPT materially interfere with MAPCO's easement 

rights. Because there is no adequate remedy at law for this 

injury, MAPCO clearly is entitled to a mandatory injunction 

requiring the removal of materially interfering structures above 

its pipelines. The order of the district court is REVERSED and 

the case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. 

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