Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-03825/USCOURTS-ca7-15-03825-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jared L. Seats
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted May 6, 2016

Decided May 6, 2016

Before

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

No. 15-3825

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JARED L. SEATS,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 3:15-CR-30080-DRH-1

David R. Herndon,

Judge.

O R D E R

After an argument with his half-brother, Jared Seats twice fired a rifle from inside 

his house, at his half-brother and the half-brother’s girlfriend, who were outside. Seats 

was arrested and eventually pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, 

see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He was sentenced to 92 months’ imprisonment and 3 years’ 

supervised release. He filed a notice of appeal, but his appointed lawyer asserts that the 

appeal is frivolous and seeks to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). 

We invited Seats to comment on counsel’s motion, but he has not responded. See CIR.

R. 51(b). Counsel’s brief in support of his motion explains the nature of the case and 

addresses potential issues that an appeal of this kind might be expected to involve. 

Because the analysis in the brief appears to be thorough, we limit our review to the 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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subjects that counsel discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014); 

United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996). 

Counsel first tells us that Seats does not wish to challenge his guilty plea, and thus 

the lawyer appropriately does not discuss the voluntariness of the plea or the adequacy 

of Seats’s plea colloquy. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11; United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 

(7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 670–71 (7th Cir. 2002). 

Counsel then considers a single argument: that Seats’s prison sentence is 

substantively unreasonable. Counsel correctly rejects this potential argument as 

frivolous. At sentencing the district court calculated a total offense level of 23 and a 

criminal-history category of VI, resulting in a guidelines imprisonment range of 92 to 

115 months—a determination that defense counsel did not dispute. Seats’s 92-month 

sentence is at the low end of the guidelines range and thus presumptively reasonable.

See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007); United States v. Williams-Ogletree,

752 F.3d 658, 664 (7th Cir. 2014). Counsel has not identified any reason to question the 

presumption of reasonableness, nor can we.

To begin, the district court fully addressed Seats’s primary argument in 

mitigation. Seats had contended that his criminal-history category is overstated because

none of his many convictions resulted in significant prison time and several were 

committed before he turned 18. Seats wanted the court to sentence him as if he was in 

criminal-history category III rather than VI, but the court rejected this argument, noting 

that many of Seats’s convictions did not receive any criminal-history points and opining 

that category VI accurately reflects Seats’s “total disregard” for the law. The court added 

that, even if Seats was in criminal-history category III, the court still would impose a 

sentence “more consistent” with the calculated range. The court further addressed 

Seats’s contention that leniency was appropriate because, Seats said, he is not a violent 

person and, as a teenager, had suffered the tragic death of his father. The court then 

received explicit assurance from defense counsel that all of Seats’s arguments in 

mitigation had been discussed. Thus, any challenge to the court’s consideration of those 

arguments would be considered waived. See United States v. Donelli, 747 F.3d 936, 940–41 

(7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Garcia-Segura, 717 F.3d 566, 569 (7th Cir. 2013).

The district court also adequately explained its sentence with regard to the factors 

in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The court highlighted Seats’s pattern of recidivism and the 

seriousness of his gun crime, emphasizing the “stunning” recklessness of firing a gun 

into a neighborhood and risking the lives of, not only his targets, but innocent 

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bystanders. The court further noted that Seats’s offense was especially serious compared 

to most other § 922(g) cases, which, the judge said, ordinarily do not involve brandishing 

and shooting the firearm. Any challenge to the reasonableness of Seats’s sentence would 

thus be frivolous.

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and the appeal is DISMISSED.

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