Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01388/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01388-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alexei Pena
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Nanette K. Laughrey, United States District Judge for the

Western District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-1388

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Missouri.

Alexei Pena, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: October 3, 2006

Filed: October 4, 2006

___________

Before RILEY, COLLOTON, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

A jury found Alexei Pena guilty of conspiring to distribute and distributing

cocaine, and he was sentenced to 41 months in prison and 3 years of supervised

release. After Pena began serving his supervised release, the probation office

petitioned for revocation, alleging that Pena had violated his release conditions. At

the revocation hearing, the district court1

 revoked supervised release and imposed a

new sentence of 18 months in prison. Pena appeals, arguing that the district court

abused its discretion by sentencing him without considering the factors in 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a), as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), including the Guidelines Chapter 7

Appellate Case: 06-1388 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/04/2006 Entry ID: 2096097
2

As to the arguments raised in Pena’s supplemental brief, “it is Eighth Circuit

policy to refuse to consider pro se filings when a party is represented by counsel.”

United States v. Martin, 59 F.3d 767, 768 n.2 (8th Cir. 1995).

-2-

policy statements and the 3-9 month revocation range recommended under Chapter

7. For the reasons discussed below, we reject this argument and conclude that the

sentence was not unreasonable. See United States v. Nelson, 453 F.3d 1004, 1006

(8th Cir. 2006) (reasonableness standard of review for revocation sentences). 

Although the recommended sentencing range and the violation worksheet

which included the recommended range were not explicitly mentioned at the

sentencing hearing, we cannot say that the court failed to consider the appropriate

factors and policy statements: the violation worksheet was available to the court; the

court conferred with the probation officers immediately prior to imposing sentence;

the court discussed Pena’s violations as well as his inability to tell the truth, accept

personal responsibility, and respond to supervision; the same judge presided over

Pena’s original and revocation sentencing hearings, and the judge’s remarks indicated

a recognition of Pena’s history and characteristics; and the court repeatedly declined

at sentencing to give Pena another chance to continue on supervision because of his

refusal to admit the truth. See United States v. Larison, 432 F.3d 921, 923 (8th Cir.

2006) (district court need not mechanically list every § 3553(a) consideration when

sentencing defendant upon revocation of supervised release); United States v.

Franklin, 397 F.3d 604, 607 (8th Cir. 2005) (fact that same judge presided over

original sentencing hearing and revocation hearing implied familiarity with

defendant’s history and characteristics, and district court’s awareness of defendant’s

numerous and repeated violations of release conditions supported inference that court

was aware of relevant § 3553(a) factors); United States v. Otto, 176 F.3d 416, 418

(8th Cir. 1999) (district court is presumed to know and apply the law). 

Accordingly, we affirm the sentence.2

Appellate Case: 06-1388 Page: 2 Date Filed: 10/04/2006 Entry ID: 2096097