Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02450/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02450-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
American Civil Liberties Union of Colorado
Amicus Curiae
Joan Brown
Appellee
Colonel Eugene T.M. Cullinane, Commander, Headquarters, 3rd Space Support Wing (AFSPACECOM) Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado
Appellant
Colonel James O. Palmer, Base Commander of Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado
Appellant
Donna R. Johnson
Appellee
Susan Matarrese
Appellee
Geoffrey Parker
Appellee
Mary Lynn Sheetz
Appellee
Peter Sprunger-Froese
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

JOAN BROWN; DONNA R. JOHNSON; 

SUSAN MATARRESE; GEOFFREY 

PARKER; MARY LYNN SHEETZ; 

PETER SPRUNGER-FROESE, 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

v. 

COLONEL JAMES O. PALMER, 

BASE COMMANDER OF PETERSON 

AIR FORCE BASE, COLORADO, AND 

COLONEL EUGENE T.M. CULLINANE, 

COMMANDER, HEADQUARTERS, 3RD 

SPACE SUPPORT WING (AFSPACECOM) 

PETERSON AIR FORCE BASE, 

COLORADO, as officers and agents 

of the UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, 

an agency of the UNITED STATES 

OF AMERICA, 

Defendants-Appellants. 

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SEP 10 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 88-2450 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Colorado 

(D.C. No. 87-M-1131) 

ON REHEARING EN BANC 

Patricia M. Bryan (Stewart M. Gerson, Assistant Attorney General, 

Washington, D.C., Michael J. Norton, United States Attorney, 

Denver, Colorado, and Anthony J. Steinmeyer and Alfred Mellin, 

Attorneys, Appellate Staff, Civil Division, United States 

Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., on the briefs), for 

Defendants-Appellants. 

Appellate Case: 88-2450 Document: 01019294816 Date Filed: 09/10/1991 Page: 1 
Newman E. McAllister, (L. Douglas Beatty with him on the brief), 

Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellees. 

Hilary Holland, Westminster, Colorado, and David Miller, Denver, 

Colorado, filed a brief for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties 

Union of Colorado. 

Before HOLLOWAY, MCKAY, LOGAN, SEYMOUR, MOORE, ANDERSON, TACHA, 

BALDOCK, BRORBY, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

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On October 3, 1990, a panel of this court by majority vote 

held that Peterson Air Force Base was not a public forum during 

the open house days that it held in 1985 and 1986 to celebrate 

Armed Forces Day. Accordingly, we upheld bar letters that had 

been issued by Peterson AFB against plaintiffs-appellees as a 

result of their activity in distributing anti-war leaflets during 

those open houses. Brown v. Palmer, 915 F.2d 1435 (lOth Cir. 

1990). Our decision reversed the judgment of the district court 

which had concluded, upon cross-motions for summary judgment and a 

largely undisputed and stipulated record, that Peterson AFB should 

be characterized as a "public forum" during its 1985 and 1986 

Armed Forces Day celebrations. 

Following our panel decision, appellees petitioned this court 

for rehearing en bane, and we granted that petition. The thrust 

of the appellees' argument on rehearing was that the "objective" 

evidence of what actually occurred at the open houses was 

sufficient to establish that Peterson AFB was a public forum 

during the open house events, notwithstanding the subjective 

testimony of Air Force personnel that they never intended to open 

up the base to public discussion of political or ideological 

topics. Appellees also challenged what they perceived to be the 

panel's determination that military bases should be accorded 

special status for purposes of analyzing whether they are public 

fora. Finally, appellees claim that the panel improperly 

substituted its judgment for that of the district court and that 

it erred in holding that the Air Force's restrictions on political 

and ideological speech were viewpoint neutral. 

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We reaffirm our previous panel opinion and do not here repeat 

either the facts or the legal analysis contained in that opinion. 

This en bane opinion shall only respond to the specific arguments 

raised by appellees in their petition for rehearing. 1 

Appellees do not challenge the panel's ruling that the 

ultimate determination of whether Peterson AFB was converted into 

a public forum during its open houses depends upon the intent of 

the Air Force. Appellees' Supplemental Brief at p. 2-3, 8. 

Indeed, the appellees could not argue otherwise in light of 

rulings both from the United States Supreme Court and from our 

court. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 

u.s. 788, 802 (1985) ("The government does not create a public 

forum by inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but only by 

intentionally opening a non-traditional forum for public 

discourse.") (emphasis added); United States v. Albertini, 472 

U.S. 675, 686 (1985); Barnard v. Chamberlain, 897 F.2d 1059, 1064 

(lOth Cir. 1990). 

Instead, appellees' principal argument on rehearing is that 

the panel opinion gave undue weight to the affidavits of the Base 

1 We will not repeat our analysis of the proper standard of 

appellate review, nor we will repeat our analysis of the 

viewpoint-neutral nature of the Air Force's restrictions on the 

speech permitted during its open houses. These matters are 

discussed at length in our panel decision at pages 1441 and 1444-

45, respectively. We would, however, add to our analysis of the 

proper standard of appellate review only the observation that this 

matter comes before us upon the district court's ruling on crossmotions for summary judgment upon a record of largely stipulated 

and undisputed facts. Thus, in addition to the fact that we are 

reviewing a legal issue with First Amendment implications, see 

Brown v. Palmer, 915 F.2d at 1441, the procedural context of the 

case also warrants our de novo review. Gonzales v. Miller Cas. 

Ins. Co., 923 F.2d 1417, 1419 (lOth Cir. 1991). 

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·.• 

Commander at Peterson AFB and the Air Force Chief of Staff as to 

their intent without adequately considering objective evidence of 

intent based upon the activities that were actually permitted 

during the open houses. In this regard, appellees misperceive our 

panel opinion. While it is true that we did look to the 

affidavits as some evidence of the Air Force's intent, we also 

looked to the objective evidence of what, in fact, was permitted 

to occur at the open houses. After reviewing all of the evidence, 

we concluded that there was a "lack of any evidence" establishing 

that the Air Force intended to open Peterson AFB to political or 

ideological debate. Brown v. Palmer, 915 F.2d at 1443. Intent 

can be discerned both by direct testimony and by indirect evidence 

of conduct. Cornelius, 473 u.s. at 802 ("the Court has looked to 

the policy and practice of the government to ascertain whether it 

intended to designate a place not traditionally open to assembly 

and debate as a public forum"). We looked at, and considered, all 

of the evidence in the record in reaching our conclusion that 

there was no evidence that the Air Force intended to open Peterson 

AFB to public political and ideological debate during its open 

houses. 

Appellees wrongly assume that just because the Air Force 

opened up Peterson AFB to some topics of speech and activity and 

invited the public onto the base that the Air Force should be 

deemed to have opened the base to all topics of speech and 

conduct. That is simply not the law. The Supreme Court has made 

it abundantly clear that the government may selectively preclude 

discussion of certain general topics while nevertheless inviting 

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the public onto its premises to participate in speech on a variety 

of other topics. 

In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 u.s. 298 (1974), a 

municipal mass transit authority permitted advertising within its 

cars on all subjects except for political advertising. It 

accepted advertising from retail and service establishments, 

churches, and civic and public service groups. In addition, of 

course, the mass transit authority solicited the entire public to 

enter upon, and to use, its mass transit facilities. 

Notwithstanding these facts, the Supreme Court concluded that the 

mass transit authority could, consistent with the First and 

Fourteenth Amendments, exclude political advertisements. 

In Perry Education Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n., 

460 u.s. 37 (1983), the Court held that a public school district's 

internal mail system had not become a designated public forum even 

though the mail system was made available to the union that 

represented the school employees, the YMCA, Cub Scouts, and other 

civic and church organizations. The Court upheld the right of the 

school district to exclude from the mail system a second union 

which wanted to use that facility for organizing efforts. The 

Court stated that "selective access did not transform government 

property into a public forum." Id. at p.47. Because the school 

district continued to exercise the right to exclude certain 

entities from use of its internal mail system, that facility could 

not be deemed to be a public forum. The school district's policy 

of excluding an unauthorized union from use of its mail system 

while allowing its exclusive bargaining agent to use the mail 

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system was held to be reasonable and rationally related to a 

legitimate school district purpose. Accordingly, the school 

district's power to exclude the unauthorized union was upheld. 

In Cornelius, 473 u.s. 788, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and 

other political lobbying groups sought access to government 

employees through the Combined Federal Campaign (CFC) in order to 

solicit contributions and to explain their mission. The NAACP 

Legal Defense Fund argued that the CFC was a public forum because 

it allowed numerous charities to participate in its campaign. The 

Supreme Court disagreed, noting that the CFC had chosen to exclude 

all political advocacy groups, and thus, CFC remained a nonpublic 

forum. The Court held that it was reasonable for the CFC to 

exclude political advocacy groups in order to eliminate 

controversy and in order to avoid the reality or appearance of 

government entanglement with particular political viewpoints. 

Thus, the Court upheld the right of CFC to exclude the NAACP Legal 

Defense Fund. 

In United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115 (1990), the 

United States allowed various groups to distribute leaflets, 

speak, and picket on the premises of a post office. The 

government even allowed political statements to be posted on a 

bulletin board at the post office. However, it did not allow 

solicitations for money. A group wished to solicit money for 

political purposes on a sidewalk which was constructed on postal 

property and which was the means of public access to the post 

office from the adjacent parking lot. That group claimed, in 

part, that the sidewalk had become a public forum by virtue of the 

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fact that the public had been invited to use the sidewalk and nonsolicitation activities were allowed on those premises. The 

Supreme Court disagreed. It held: "Even conceding that the forum 

had been dedicated to some First Amendment uses, and thus is not a 

purely non-public forum, regulation of the reserved non-public 

uses would still require application of the reasonableness test." 

Id. at 3121 (emphasis added). The Court concluded that it was 

reasonable to exclude solicitations for funds because of the 

disruptive nature of that expressive activity. Thus, the Court 

upheld that exclusionary regulation by the Postal Service. 

If anything, the Supreme Court has been even more accepting 

of selective restrictions on military bases. In Greer v. Spack, 

424 U.S. 828 (1976), the Court addressed a situation where Ft. Dix 

had precluded "speeches and demonstrations of a partisan, 

political nature." The base did, however, welcome visitors, and 

it routinely invited civilian speakers to give talks ranging from 

business management to drug abuse as well as to invite civilian 

clergy to preach religious sermons on base. The base further 

permitted access to public groups to present theatrical 

exhibitions and musical programs. Political campaigning, however, 

was precluded. Notwithstanding that Ft. Dix allowed access to so 

many other groups for expressive activity, the Supreme Court 

concluded that Ft. Dix had not "abandoned any claim of special 

interest in regulating the distribution of unauthorized leaflets 

or the delivery of campaign speeches for political candidates 

within the confines of the military reservation." Id. at 837. 

The Court noted that this selective restriction against political 

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t 

campaigning was reasonable because it was "wholly consistent with 

the American constitutional tradition of a politically-neutral 

military establishment under civilian control." Id. at 839. 

Accordingly, it held that the regulations on their face did not 

violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights. 

Finally, in Albertini, 472 u.s. 675, the Supreme Court was 

confronted with a situation where a defendant had been prosecuted 

for attending a military open house at Hickam Air Force Base and 

participating in a peaceful demonstration against the arms race in 

violation of a bar letter that previously had been issued against 

him. Although the holding of the case was that Albertini could be 

excluded from Hickam AFB even if it were a public forum because of 

his prior criminal conduct, the Court went on to criticize the 

suggestion that Hickam had become a public forum during the open 

house. The Court stated "there is 'no generalized constitutional 

right to make political speeches or distribute leaflets,' .... 

on military bases, even if they are generally open to the public." 

Id. at 685 (quoting Greer, 424 U.S. at 838). The Court went on to 

state even more specifically, "[n]or did Hickam become a public 

forum merely because the base was used to communicate ideas or 

information during the open house." Id. at 686 (emphasis added). 

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals similarly concluded that 

Offutt Air Force Base did not become a public forum during its 

open house. Persons for Free Speech at SAC v. United States Air 

Force, 675 F.2d 1010 (8th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 

1092 (1982). Offutt AFB held an annual open house at which time 

the public was invited to come on the base. The open house had 

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been attended by as many as two-hundred fifty thousand people, and 

it included displays of military equipment, military bands, and 

many non-military organizations (including defense contractors, 

local public service organizations, and public safety 

organizations) who were assigned display booths. The petitioners 

sought permission for a booth to advocate anti-war beliefs, and 

their request was denied because the Air Force precluded political 

or ideological speech on base. The Eighth Circuit upheld this 

restriction, holding that the open house activities did not 

convert Offutt Air Force Base into a public forum and that the 

restrictions against political speech on an air force base were 

reasonable. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit rejected the 

petitioners' claim that the First Amendment entitled them to the 

right to present their view at the open house. 

Applying the preceding precedents to the undisputed facts in 

this case lead to a clear conclusion that Peterson AFB was not 

opened as a public forum to political and ideological speech 

during its open houses. As noted in the panel decision, the Air 

Force Chief of Staff, General Larry Welch, stated that "an 'open 

house' event was never intended to function as an open political 

forum for the discussion and debate of the important and sometimes 

divisive political questions of the day . " R. Vol. I, Doc. 9, 

Tab 3, ~ 8 (Affidavit of Larry D. Welch). See also Affidavit of 

Base Commander Colonel James 0. Palmer, R. Vol. I, Doc. 9, Tab 1 

at 3 (in creating open houses, the Air Force did not create a 

forum for debating political or ideological topics). Colonel 

Palmer went on to state in his affidavit that Peterson AFB had 

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consistently denied all requests to discuss political and 

ideological subjects on base. Among the petitions that have been 

denied at Peterson AFB are the following: "Petitions aimed at 

advocating a no smoking law; putting political pressure on the 

Soviet Union to leave Afghanistan; creating an Olympic Hall of 

Fame in Colorado Springs; opposing an atheists' petition before 

the Federal Communications Commission to stop religious 

broadcasting; requiring tax increases to be approved only by a 

vote of the people; and declaring English the official language of 

2 Colorado." Id. at 2. Appellees introduced no contrary testimony 

disputing the Air Force policy of precluding political or 

ideological speech. 

Appellees would have us turn, instead, to an objective 

analysis of the actual activities and conduct that were permitted 

at Peterson AFB during its open houses in order to infer whether 

the Air Force intended to open the base to political and 

ideological speech. 3 We did include such an analysis in our 

previous panel decision, and we do so again now. The parties 

stipulated as to the activities that occurred during the open 

2 Colonel Palmer further stated in his affidavit that his policy 

is to require prior approval before any written material is 

distributed on base, and that also applies to material distributed 

during the open house. 

3 Appellees seem not to have a clear idea of what they are trying 

to prove from such "objective" evidence. At one point they argue 

that allowing distribution of a Bible showed that "the Air Force 

certainly intended, though unwittingly, to open the base up to a 

wide exchange of ideas on the day in question." Appellees' brief 

at 15 (emphasis added). However, Cornelius, 473 u.s. at 802, 

makes it clear that a nonpublic forum cannot be transformed into a 

public forum unwittingly or by inaction. Rather, it can only be 

accomplished "intentionally." 

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houses, so there is absolutely no dispute of fact on that matter. 

The following is a complete summary of the stipulated activities 

that occurred during the open house events: (1) Air Force 

recruiting; (2) discussion by defense contractors concerning their 

weapon systems currently in use by the Air Force; (3) distribution 

of circulars advertising the Cheyenne, Wyoming Year-Round Walk and 

advertising the Historic MacGregor Ranch Walk in Estes Park, 

Colorado; (4) distribution of one edition of a newspaper entitled 

the "Space Observer"; and (5) a brochure about the International 

Plastic Modelers' Society. There were also various aerial shows, 

bands, a NORAD ceremony, and military reviews, all performed by 

military personnel. In addition, one of the plaintiffs attending 

the Guest Day received the following from military representatives 

of the base Chaplain: (1) an invitation to the Peterson AFB Chapel 

to attend a luncheon and religious lecture; (2) a book entitled, 

"About Being Catholic"; (3) a newspaper entitled "The Catholic 

Herald"; (4) a copy of The Good News Testament Bible that 

contained the inscription "presented by the Air Force". None of 

these activities were political or ideological in nature, and the 

absence of any political or ideological speech strongly 

corroborates the direct testimonial evidence from Colonel Palmer 

and General Welch. 

Appellees specifically focus upon the religious literature 

that was distributed to one of them during the 1987 open house and 

they argue that it should be considered to be political and 

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ideological in nature. 4 However, most of these materials consist 

of little more than information about religious services offered 

by Peterson AFB to its own Air Force members. That material fits 

well within the objective of the open house of being informational 

in nature and describing activities and equipment that are 

available on base. Appellees refer to the single copy of the 

Bible which was distributed to one of them and they refer to 

Matthew 5:38, which counsels not to seek revenge against a 

wrongdoer, and Romans 13:1, which addresses the godliness of 

obeying authority. However, the qualitative difference between 

these general religious statements and a political discussion 

about current United States policy on the use of military force is 

obvious. Although one could fashion a connection between any two 

subjects, no matter how dissimilar they may be, our job is not to 

fashion abstract connections, but rather to attempt to discern the 

intent of the Air Force by applying a pragmatic, common sense 

analysis of the conduct and activities that were allowed (as well 

as the conduct and activities that were disallowed) during the 

sponsored open house. This record is absolutely devoid of any 

evidence, direct or indirect, subjective or objective, testimonial 

or by conduct, that the Air Force intended to abandon its 

4 The record on appeal does not demonstrate that the distribution 

of religious material during the 1987 open house was ever linked 

to the activities of the 1985 and 1986 open houses, which are the 

open houses under scrutiny in this case. We nevertheless discuss 

the distribution of religious materials because both parties 

address the issue on appeal without challenge to the assumption 

that similar material was disseminated during the 1985 and 1986 

open houses, and the district judge similarly made reference to 

this material in his opinion. However, insofar as the appellate 

record is concerned there is nothing to establish that religious 

materials were distributed during the 1985 or 1986 open houses. 

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traditional and long-standing policy of precluding public 

5 political and ideological debate during its open house events. 

There is another response as well to the appellees' argument 

that the dissemination of religious literature converted the 

Peterson AFB open house into a public forum. All of the religious 

materials, including the Bible, were distributed by military 

personnel--the Peterson AFB Chaplain--and not by civilian members 

of the public. If the government's own speech could be used to 

support a claim that it had thereby caused its facilities to 

become a public forum, then "display cases in public hospitals, 

libraries, office buildings, military compounds, and other public 

facilities immediately would become Hyde Parks open to every 

would-be pamphleteer and politician. This the Constitution does 

not require." United States Postal Service v. Council of 

Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 u.s. 114, 130 n.6 (1981) (quoting 

Lehman, 418 u.s. at 304). See also Persons For Free Speech, 675 

F.2d at 1017-18. The Air Force is free to discuss the religious 

activities that are available to its base personnel and to allow 

the base Chaplain to hand out Bibles as an expression of the 

religious atmosphere available on base without causing the base to 

become a public forum. 6 

5 Ironically, even the very limited distribution of religious 

material by the base chaplain that did occur during the open house 

appears to have been inadvertent and unauthorized. Palmer 

affidavit. R. Vol. I, Doc. 9, Tab 1, p.3. 

6 Opening up an air force base to the distribution of literature 

of one religion to the exclusion of other religions might raise 

other constitutional questions but no such issue is before us in 

this case. 

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Appellees next challenge what they perceived to be the 

panel's determination that military bases are in a special 

category for public forum analysis. Appellees suggest that under 

our panel decision a military base could never be a designated 

public forum. That is an incorrect reading of our panel decision. 

It is undeniable that the Supreme Court has stated that 

military bases are, by their very nature, traditionally nonpublic 

and that, in determining whether the military has intended to open 

up a military base to become a public forum, consideration should 

be given to the resulting loss of control and entanglement in 

political controversy that would occur if the military base were 

held to be a public forum. In Greer v. Spock, 424 u.s. 828 

(1976), the Supreme Court affirmed the nonpublic status of Ft. Dix 

with the following observations: "this Court over the years has 

on countless occasions recognized the special constitutional 

function of the military in our national life .... " Id. at 

837. "A necessary concomitant of the basic function of a military 

installation has been the 'historically unquestioned power of 

[its] commanding officer summarily to exclude civilians from the 

area of his command'." Id. at 838. In Albertini, the Supreme 

Court was disinclined to extend public forum status to Hickam Air 

Force Base, notwithstanding the public activities allowed during 

its open house events. The Court said: "A military base .•. is 

ordinarily not a public forum . . . even if it is open to the 

public," 472 U.S. at 684, " ... [n]or did Hickam become a public 

forum merely because the base was used to communicate ideas or 

information during the open house." Id. at 686. In Kokinda, the 

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Court similarly advised that "[c)onsideration of a forum's special 

attributes is relevant to the constitutionality of a regulation 

since the significance of the government's interest must be 

assessed in light of the characteristic nature and function of the 

particular forum involved." 110 s. Ct. at 3122 (quoting Heffron 

v. Int'l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 u.s. 640, 650-

51 (1981)). And, in Cornelius, the Court said: 

In cases where the principal function of the property 

would be disrupted by expressive activity, the Court is 

particularly reluctant to hold that the government 

intended to designate a public forum. Accordingly, we 

have held that military reservations, Greer v. Speck, 

and jailhouse grounds, Adderly v. Florida, do not 

constitute public fora. 

473 u.s. at 804. 

The United States Courts of Appeals have also frequently 

commented on the special need of the military to retain control 

over the content of public speech permitted on military bases. 

Frequently, Courts of Appeal have rejected claims that military 

bases have become public fora because selected public activities 

and speech have been permitted to occur on base. See Shopco 

Distribution Co., Inc. v. Commanding General, 885 F.2d 167, 172-73 

(4th Cir. 1989); United States v. McCoy, 866 F.2d 826, 832-34 (6th 

Cir. 1989); M.N.C. of Hinesville, Inc. v. United States Dept. of 

Defense, 791 F.2d 1466, 1472-74 (11th Cir. 1986); Persons For Free 

Speech, 675 F.2d at 1015-18. 

This is not to say that a military base, or a portion of such 

a base, can never become a public forum. To the contrary, if the 

evidence clearly supports a conclusion that the military intended 

"to abandon" control over public conduct or speech on the base or 

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on a portion of a base, then that portion of the base could be 

deemed to be a public forum. The only case where the Supreme 

Court has held that a portion of a military base was a public 

forum was the case of Flower v. United States, 407 u.s. 197 

(1972). There, the Court held that the military had "abandoned 

any claim that it has a special interest in who walks, talks, or 

distributes leaflets on [new Branfels Avenue]," which is a street 

that runs through Ft. Sam Houston. Id. at 198. The street 

essentially had been opened up to unrestricted and unsupervised 

public access, and the Court held, accordingly, that it had become 

a public forum. Lest Flower be interpreted too broadly as 

precedent for declaring military facilities as public fora, the 

Supreme Court later limited that case to its "unusual facts." See 

Albertini, 472 U.S. at 685, and Greer, 424 U.S. at 836. In Greer, 

the Court instructed that Flower should be read very narrowly, 

stating: 

The Court of Appeals was mistaken, therefore, in 

thinking that the Flower case is to be understood as 

announcing a new principle of constitutional law, and 

mistaken specifically in thinking that Flower stands for 

the principle that whenever members of the public are 

permitted freely to visit a place owned or operated by 

the Government, then that place becomes a 'public forum' 

for purposes of the First Amendment. Such a principle 

of constitutional law has never existed, and does not 

exist now. 

424 u.s. at 836. 

Thus, when we noted in our prior panel decision that courts 

have been reluctant to extend public forum status to military 

bases, we did not propose any special test for military bases. 

Rather, we simply recognized the reality of existing precedent. 

In all cases, whether military bases are involved or not, the test 

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is simply whether the government has intended to open up the 

facility to public debate on the particular subject matter sought 

to be addressed by the person seeking access to that government 

facility. When the government facility is a military base, the 

evidence cannot be considered in a vacuum. Rather, we must 

consider the evidence against the background of the traditional 

need of the military to retain control over the scope and extent 

of public activity and speech permitted on the military base. We 

must be sensitive to the need of the military to maintain security 

over the base. Finally, we must keep in mind the traditional role 

of the military to avoid becoming embroiled in politics and 

ideological debate. The appellees argue that our holding will 

restrict free speech, but, in reality, the greater restriction 

would occur if we were to adopt the appellees' position. Here, 

the appellees were still free to advocate their own views of 

pacifism on the public streets immediately leading into Peterson 

AFB and they had access to the many other public fora within the 

immediate vicinity of Peterson AFB to reach the public that 

visited there during the open houses. 

If appellees' position were adopted, the flow of information 

to the public from Peterson AFB would likely be restricted. The 

military, most likely, could not risk the possibility that 

Peterson AFB would be labeled as a public forum. Affidavit of 

Larry D. Welch, R. Vol. I, Doc. 9, Tab 3, ~ 11. Consequently, the 

Air Force would have to consider possibly abandoning altogether 

the practice of hosting open house events. Thus, it is possible 

that the public would lose the opportunity to come onto military 

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bases; to learn about the weapon systems, activities and 

facilities that are there; and then to take that information back 

out to the public fora that are available and there to debate, if 

they wish, the proper role of the military. 

For the reasons stated, we affirm our prior panel decision, 

which REVERSES the district court's July 20, 1988 Judgment. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2450 Document: 01019294816 Date Filed: 09/10/1991 Page: 19 
NO. 88-2450 BROWN v. PALMER 

MOORE, Circuit Judge, dissenting, with whom HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, 

McKAY and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges, join: 

Ignoring Emerson's caution that a "foolish consistency is the 

hobgoblin of little minds," 1 I adhere to my previous dissent. 

Brown v. Palmer, 915 F.2d 1435, 1445. (lOth Cir. 1990). Taking 

the lead of the majority, I will not reiterate what I have said 

before, but given the course of this matter, I must comment 

further. Nothing contained in the additional presentations by the 

parties nor the opinion of the majority dissuades me from my 

original conviction that the district court properly concluded the 

open houses conducted in 1985 and 1986 were public forums. 

The source of my disagreement, as noted in my previous 

dissent, is over the way the majority looks at the evidence. I 

place greater reliance upon what activities the Air Force 

permitted rather than what activities it prevented. I believe 

that when one looks at the actions of the Air Force on the days of 

the open houses one sees clear evidence of its intent to create a 

public forum. Although the facts in the record are spare, they 

are sufficient to determine, as did the trial court, the Air Force 

intended to allow private citizens to distribute literature 

advertising their private interests. The evidence is also 

sufficient to establish those private interests were totally 

foreign to the military mission of the open houses. To me, those 

facts indicate the Air Force intended to permit the base to be 

1

Ralph Waldo Emerson, Essays: First Series (1841) History. 

Appellate Case: 88-2450 Document: 01019294816 Date Filed: 09/10/1991 Page: 20 
open to public discourse on civilian activity. Furthermore, the 

only difference between those civilians who were permitted to 

advertize their private interests and plaintiffs was the Air Force 

did not believe the material the plaintiffs wanted to distribute 

was politically neutral. 

To me, it is not significant that some might consider the 

material circulated by those individuals to be bland or 

uncontroversial. What is significant is 

allowed to speak on subjects of their own 

entirely foreign to the military mission 

those persons were 

choice which were 

of the open house. 

Contrary to the majority, I do not believe the government can 

create a limited public forum. Once private discourse is 

encouraged or allowed in a governmental facility, that locus has 

become a forum for the free exchange of all ideas. 

Thus, the issue here is not whether the government can 

selectively regulate the speech of citizens on a military base, 

but whether, after creating a public forum on that base, it can 

exercise the power of censorship. In my view, the majority is 

trying to have the cart draw the horse. The majority concludes 

the Air Force did not intend to create a public forum at the open 

houses because the Air Force can and did lawfully regulate speech 

on the air base. That analysis decides the public forum issue 

upon a determination of what speech was disallowed at the open 

house rather than what speech was permitted. I think the proper 

method of analysis is to first determine the type of forum 

provided by the Air Force and then decide whether that forum will 

permit censorship of speech. 

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Additionally, the majority narrows the forum issue to whether 

the Air Force intended to create a forum for "political or 

ideological debate." I believe that blurs the focus of this case. 

If a public forum was created by the actions of the government, by 

definition it is open to political, ideological, or any other 

forms of discourse. That fact distinguishes the cases upon which 

the majority relies. 

In Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 

U.S. 37 (1983), the Supreme Court reminds us: 

In places which by long tradition or by government 

fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate, the 

rights of the State to limit expressive activity are 

sharply circumscribed. At one end of the spectrum are 

streets and parks which "have immemorially been held in 

trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, 

have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating 

thoughts between citizens, and discussing public 

questions." Haaue v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515, 59 S.Ct. 

954, 963, 83 L.Ed. 1423 (1939). In these quintessential 

public forums, the government may not prohibit all 

communicative activity .... 

A second category consists of public property which 

the State has opened for use by the public as a place 

for expressive activity. The Constitution forbids a 

State to enforce certain exclusions from a forum 

generally open to the public even if it was not required 

to create the forum in the first place. Although a 

State is not required to indefinitely retain the open 

character of the facility, as long as it does so it is 

bound by the same standards as apply in a traditional 

public forum. . . . 

Public property which is not by tradition or 

designation a forum for public communication is governed 

by different standards. We have recognized that the 

"First Amendment does not guarantee access to property 

simply because it is owned or controlled by the 

government." In addition to time, place, and manner 

regulations, the State may reserve the forum for its 

intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long 

as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an 

effort to suppress expression merely because public 

officials oppose the speaker's view. 

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460 u.s. at 45-46 (citations omitted). 

We may therefore conclude with assurance there are three 

types of public property within which the government has differing 

powers of censorship. The first are streets, parks, and other 

facilities which are intended for public assembly. The 

government's right to limit speech in these facilities is confined 

to narrowly drawn regulations necessary to serve a compelling 

state interest. Id. at 45; Flower v. United States, 407 u.s. 197, 

198 (1972) (military cannot prohibit distribution of literature on 

"completely open street"). 

The second are facilities which are not by their nature 

intended for public assembly but, through governmental action, are 

opened for that purpose. As the Court noted in Perry, to the 

extent the government allows those facilities to remain open "it 

is bound by the same standards as apply in a traditional public 

forum." 460 u.s. at 46. 

Finally, there are those facilities which are not opened for 

public assembly by either tradition or governmental action. In 

those facilities, the government can reasonably regulate speech. 

Id. Thus, the dimensions of the government's rights to control 

the content of speech are measured by "the nature of the relevant 

forum." Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 

473 u.s. 788, 800 (1985). 

In the cases relied upon by the majority to support its 

conclusion that the Air Force could deny plaintiffs the right to 

speak, the Court held the public facility in which speech was 

governmentally regulated was of the third category: not a public 

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forum. In Perry, the Court concluded the school district 

mailboxes were not a public forum. 460 u.s. at 46. In Lehman v. 

City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 303 (1974), the Court held 

advertising placards on public conveyances were not a public 

forum. 2 In Greer v. Speck, 424 u.s. 828, 838 (1976), the Court 

held that merely because a military base was open to visitors it 

had not become a public forum to permit plaintiffs to make 

"political speeches or distribute leaflets." 

In United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675 (1985), the 

question was whether the First Amendment would prevent the 

conviction of a person subject to a bar letter for the crime of 

unlawfully entering a military base during an open house. The 

Court did not decide whether the open house was a public forum, 

but ruled: "Where a bar letter is issued on valid grounds, a 

person may not claim immunity from its prohibition on entry merely 

because the military has temporarily opened a military facility to 

the public." Id. at 687. 

In United States v. Kokinda, ___ u.s. ___ , 110 S. Ct. 3115 

(1990), the issue was whether the post office could prohibit the 

solicitation of contributions on a sidewalk between the parking 

lot and the post office building. Engaging in the forum analysis, 

the Court determined the sidewalk from the postal parking lot was 

2The Court also considered the commercial nature of the 

advertising enterprise as a further reason to allow the government 

to choose what speech it would permit. "In much the same way as a 

newspaper or periodical, or even a radio or television station, 

need not accept every proffer of advertising from the general 

public, a city transit system has discretion to develop and make 

reasonable choices concerning the type of advertising that may be 

displayed in its vehicles." Lehman, 418 u.s. at 303. 

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.... 

not the same type of public thoroughfare as a sidewalk which 

parallels a public street. Whereas the latter is a "public 

passageway," id. at 3120, the parking lot sidewalk leads only from 

the lot to the post office front door. Thus, the Court concluded, 

the post office could regulate the content of speech on that 

sidewalk, but only because it did not constitute a public forum. 

Finally, in a case similar to this, the Eighth Circuit 

concluded an Air Force open house did not constitute a public 

forum; therefore political speech could be banned. Persons for 

Free Speech at SAC v. United States Air Force, 675 F.2d 1010 (8th 

Cir. 1982). I do not find Persons antithetical to my analysis, 

however. First, if the facts of a case do not indicate an intent 

on the part of the government to create a public forum on the 

occasion of a military open house, the government has the right to 

reasonably regulate the content of the speech at that event. 

Second, the facts of Persons are immediately distinguishable from 

the facts of this case. 

The open house involved in Persons did not include 

advertising or pamphleteering by private persons advocating 

private interests. The only nonmilitary people engaged in any 

form of speech were defense contractors who were present, much the 

same as in this case, to explain the "aircraft and weapon system 

that they were currently supplying to the Air Force." Id. at 

1013-14. None of these contractors were permitted to promote 

their "consumer products or public relations material regarding 

their corporations." Id. at 1014. Here, however, during the 1985 

and 1986 open houses, private persons unaffiliated in any way with 

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the Air Force were permitted to distribute material relating to, 

and talk about, their own private interests. I regard that 

distinction as highly relevant in the forum analysis. 3 

Given the legal perspective of the Supreme Court's treatment 

of governmentally owned facilities and the government's power to 

regulate the content of speech within those facilities, there is 

only one conclusion that can be drawn. The government's right to 

reasonably regulate speech is entirely dependent upon whether the 

facility is open, by design or designation, to public discourse. 

Here, because on the occasions of the 1985 and 1986 open houses at 

Peterson Air Force Base the base was turned into a public forum, 

the bar letters issued to plaintiffs were prohibited by the First 

Amendment. 

As a final comment, I must state that I do not believe a 

holding in accordance with my view would imperil the future of 

military open houses. While the majority expresses this concern, 

it can be easily avoided if, in the future, the command at 

Peterson Air Force Base will refuse to permit any form of private 

speech at its open houses. 

3

contrary to the position taken by the plaintiffs, I do not regard 

the defense contractors any differently than the military 

personnel who were conducting recruiting activities. In the 

context of their function, those contractors were carrying out the 

military mission of the Air Force by providing the public 

information about the weaponry on exhibit. 

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