Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-72181/USCOURTS-ca9-14-72181-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Marcilin Anne Benvin

United States District Court for the District of Nevada, Reno
Respondent
United States of America
Real Party in Interest

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

IN RE MARCILIN ANNE BENVIN,

MARCILIN ANNE BENVIN,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEVADA,

RENO,

Respondent,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Real Party in Interest.

No. 14-72181

D.C. No.

3:11-cr-00099-

RCJ-WGC-1

OPINION

Petition for Writ of Mandamus

to the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Argued and Submitted

March 17, 2015—San Francisco, California

Filed June 29, 2015

Before: Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Marsha S. Berzon,

and Jay S. Bybee, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam Opinion

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2 IN RE BENVIN

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law/Mandamus

The panel granted a criminal defendant’s petition for a

writ of mandamus, and instructed the district court to reassign

the case to another district judge, in a case in which the

defendant asserted that the district court improperly

interjected itself into plea negotiations.

The panel held that the district court’s suggestion that the

parties add a particular term to the plea agreement – i.e., that

the parties stipulate to a restitution amount of $3 million to

resolve the district court’s concerns that the alleged victims

of dismissed counts would not otherwise be entitled to

receive restitution – constituted impermissible involvement

in plea discussions. The panel held that the district court also

inappropriately involved itself in plea negotiations, in

violation of Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1), when it imposed

conditions on its approval of the government’s proposal to

dismiss counts.

The panel concluded that the factors set forth in Bauman

v. United States District Court weigh in favor of granting

mandamus relief, and that the appearance of justice will best

be served by reassignment to a different judge. 

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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IN RE BENVIN 3

COUNSEL

Michael J. Kennedy, Chief Assistant Federal Public

Defender, Federal Public Defender,Reno, Nevada, argued the

cause on behalf of the petitioner Marcilin Anne Benvin.

Elizabeth O. White, Appellate Chief and Assistant United

States Attorney, District of Nevada, Reno, Nevada, argued

the cause on behalf of the real party in interest the United

States. With her on the brief was Daniel G. Bogden, United

States Attorney, District of Nevada, Reno, Nevada.

No appearance for Respondent.

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

We must decide whether a district court improperly

interjected itself into plea negotiations and, if it did so,

whether mandamus is the appropriate remedy in this case.

I

On August 10, 2011, Marcilin Benvin was charged in a

fifty-count indictment alleging wire fraud, mail fraud,

aggravated identity theft, money laundering, embezzlement,

theft from an employee benefit plan, and false statements and

concealment of facts in employee benefit plan records. These

charges arose from the government’s investigation into

Benvin’s actions as president of Cetus Mortgage, a financial

services companywhich filed for bankruptcyprotection while

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4 IN RE BENVIN

Benvin was president.1 Benvin entered a plea of not guilty to

the indictment.

In due course, Benvin and the United States negotiated a

plea agreement under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(A)–(B).

Under its terms, Benvin agreed to enter an unconditional

guilty plea to one count of embezzlement and theft from an

employee benefit plan (“Count 45”). Benvin further agreed

that the court could consider all relevant conduct in

determining the applicable guidelines sentencing range and

stipulated to restitution of $260,000 for the offense of

conviction. For its part, the government agreed to move to

dismiss the other forty-nine counts at sentencing and agreed

not to bring additional charges arising from the investigation.

The parties also stipulated to an eighteen-level enhancement

to Benvin’s advisory sentencing guidelines offense level.

A

On August 13, 2013, the parties appeared before the

district court for a change-of-plea hearing. During the

hearing, the district court questioned Benvin to ensure that

her unconditional guilty plea to Count 45 was knowing and

voluntary. After reviewing the terms of the plea agreement

with the prosecutor, the district court engaged in a lengthy

colloquy with counsel regarding the restitution provision in

the plea agreement, and whether it was “binding” upon the

court. Both defense counsel and the prosecutor explained that

the plea agreement itself did not bind the court regarding the

1 The bankruptcy proceeding resulted in entry of a $3 million nondischargeable judgment against Benvin and in favor of the estate, on the

ground that Benvin was personally responsible for the conduct of Cetus

Mortgage that resulted in damage to its creditors.

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IN RE BENVIN 5

amount of restitution, but that the restitution statute limited

the court’s ability to order restitution to the offense of

conviction. During the hearing, counsel also explained the

parties’ decision to reference the bankruptcy court’s $3

million judgment against Benvin in connection with the

criminal counts to be dismissed, and the difficulty of

determining restitution for those counts.

The court stated that it would neither “accept the plea nor

the plea agreement” until it had reviewed the presentence

report. Defense counsel responded that, while the court could

defer a decision on the plea agreement under Rule 11(c), it

should accept the guilty plea once the requirements of Rule

11(b) were met. The court then explained that it would

“terminate the hearing and . . . not accept the plea today if

you take that position.” The court rejected defense counsel’s

contention that Benvin was seeking to enter an unconditional

guilty plea to Count 45, stating instead that Benvin’s plea was

conditional and that the plea agreement was binding on the

court as to restitution. The court then terminated the hearing.

The next day, on August 14, 2013, the district court held

a status conference, which it opened by stating:

The record should reflect that counsel from

both sides appeared in chambers yesterday,

and we discussed the potential of changing the

plea agreement slightly so that it could go

forward, and that is my understanding of what

you intend to do.

The Court required two additional steps. Since

I did not believe that the plea to one count was

a straightup, unconditional plea, I required

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6 IN RE BENVIN

counsel, number one, to change the plea

agreement to make it clear that it was binding

on the Court at least with respect to one aspect

of the sentencing.

And, number two, with respect to all the other

counts with different victims who thereby

would be foreclosed from making statements

at ultimate sentencing, I did require that

before I took the plea, or concurrent with the

plea hearing, that you noticed all potential

victims of those other counts, actual counts, of

the entry of a plea to one count only and the

fact that therefore their restitution amounts

could not, would not be included in any

judgment of the district court. As we all know,

that some of them are included, of course, in

a nondischargeability judgment of the

bankruptcy court.

And that the Court then would be willing to

proceed with a guilty plea colloquy, and

based, of course, upon any appearance or

presentation of victims of other charged

counts.

I’m not taking at that time their authorized

witness statements because those statements

are only authorized on behalf of people for

counts to which she actually pleads guilty, but

rather what I’m doing is I’m sampling the

victims, if there are objections. If there are no

objections, then I have no objection, of

course. But if there are objections, I certainly

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IN RE BENVIN 7

will hear that, by other victims on other

counts.

This is not to impair the U.S. Attorney’s

prosecutorial discretion, but the Court just

does not believe I can accept a binding plea

agreement until I know that there’s no bigger

dispute in the community over whether she

should be pleading to additional counts.

So those are the two steps I’ve asked counsel

to comply with, in which case I’d be willing

to go forward on a binding plea agreement.

The status conference concluded without further action.

B

As the court required, the parties subsequently entered

into a revised plea agreement under Rule 11(c)(1)(A), (B),

and (C), which contained identical terms to the original

agreement, except for making the $260,000 restitution

amount binding on the court under Rule 11(c)(1)(C). The

government also notified the alleged victims of all counts in

the indictment to advise them of the upcoming change-of-plea

hearing.

C

The district court held the next change-of-plea hearing on

November 4, 2013, which it began by stating: “This plea

agreement has a couple of problems, in my opinion, that I

need you to comment or help to resolve. The first and biggest

one is the binding nature of it with respect to restitution.” The

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8 IN RE BENVIN

court then heard from counsel for the bankruptcy trustee

regarding the scope of the $3 million bankruptcy judgment

against Benvin. The trustee’s counsel confirmed that any

person with a claim against the Cetus Mortgage estate would

be able to participate in any recovery against Benvin in the

bankruptcy proceedings.

The court then suggested a revision to the terms of the

parties’ plea agreement:

So that raises the biggest problem that I have.

Why should I—why not stipulate to the

restitution for the nondischargeable—the

amount of the nondischargeable judgment?

Here basically what we’re doing is we’re

selecting one count of the indictment, to be

sure, it’s your right to do that, but also we’re

selecting one victim of that count as the

recipient of restitution.

The only amount that I can order restitution

for is to that one pension fund, and so, in

essence, I make the government the credit

collector for that one victim. Any restitution,

of course, would go to that one victim,

nobody else. Under law, that’s all it could go

to, and I don't see that that’s fair.

* * *

So that’s the biggest problem. I see that as

unfair.

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IN RE BENVIN 9

And number two is, under the federal criminal

statutes victims have a right to have input at

the sentencing phase. They have a right to file

a statement, make a statement, and basically

what I think we’re doing here is that we’re

deleting the rights of all other victims to make

such a statement and limiting it to the pension,

the one pension fund to which we’re

admitting the claim.

So I think we’ve got a major problem with

that process, and therefore I’ll let you

persuade me that there’s not a problem first,

please, before we go forward with the plea

agreement, and, of course, we’ll hear anybody

who wants to have input.

The prosecutor subsequently confirmed that the

government had notified all alleged victims in the case, and

that the parties had revised the plea agreement to make the

restitution amount binding on the court. In addition, the

prosecutor advised the court that the parties reached their

agreement in part to avoid difficult issues of proof of loss,

and noted that the agreement provided that the court could

take all relevant conduct into account in determining the

applicable guidelines sentencing range.

While acknowledging that it could not participate in the

parties’ plea negotiations, the court stated:

And how do you respond to the Court’s

suggestion—I mean, I can’t get involved, the

Circuit has just recently reminded us, in your

guilty pleas, but as far as fairness in accepting

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10 IN RE BENVIN

this guilty plea agreement, I do have the right

to ask the question I think.

Why don’t you just simply stipulate, and

make it binding upon me, a restitution amount

of $3 million so that basically they all share—

all the victims share in the restitution

payments received by the government?

* * *

But, but, if you were willing to stipulate to the

$3 million amount, whatever the amount of

the bankruptcy court judgment is, that means

that whatever you collect byway of restitution

payments we could spread equally amongst

those victims, not just to the one pension fund.

Do you see what I’m saying?

* * *

Yeah, and I don’t want to get into a

negotiating situation, the three of us. I don’t

want to be in that position.

I’m just saying that the problem with the

present agreement is the restitution payments

that go to the government who always stands

first in line, as we all know, including our

taxes, will only be the collector for one victim

unless we modify the language of this

stipulation.

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IN RE BENVIN 11

After hearing from defense counsel, the court reiterated

its concerns with the parties’ proposed plea agreement, and

invited comment from any alleged victims:

But I do want to take any input from victims

who are alleged in any of the counts of the

indictment, and primarily on the two

questions, the two concerns I have about the

plea agreement.

One is the limitation of the restitution amount

to just the one pension fund victim which

means that the government, who will be

involved in collection activities during

supervised release time, for example, can

collect on behalf of only that one victim, and

the restitution payments would go only to that

one victim.

The other concern is the capping at 60 months

by allowing her to plead to one count on

which Congress has set an absolute maximum

of five years, 60 months, limit in sentencing,

even though the guidelines for some of the

overall fraud counts would contemplate a 57-

to 74-month guideline.

After one alleged victim not named in the indictment

spoke, the court announced that it was rejecting the plea

agreement, saying:

I can’t stop her from going forward with a

plea of guilty to that one count, but I do

caution you and her that I will not permit the

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12 IN RE BENVIN

government to dismiss the other counts, even

upon conviction, without a showing of one of

two things, one, either consent by that victim

listed in the indictment, or, if they’re not

willing to consent, a showing by the

government satisfactory to me that theywould

have difficulty proving that count of the

indictment.

And so I think that’s the caution that I would

give her. She can plead guilty to one count, of

course, but I am not going to let the

government dismiss the other counts without

one of those two showings.

Defense counsel objected, arguing that “authority to dismiss

counts is with the executive branch,” and that the court’s

“conditioning of their authority is contrary to law.” The court

rejected this argument and asked again whether Benvin

wanted to proceed with the guilty plea, given that the court

was rejecting the plea agreement. When defense counsel

suggested hearing from the government, the court reiterated:

I am not going to let them enter into a plea

agreement with the defendant on these terms.

That’s all. That’s all we need to hear. I’m not

going to let them say we’ll agree to part of the

agreement. I’m not going to let them do that.

* * *

Okay. I do need an answer to my question.

Without a plea agreement, do you want to

proceed on a guilty plea to one count?

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IN RE BENVIN 13

After defense counsel expressed the need to discuss the

matter with his client, the court terminated the hearing and

ordered the case set for trial.

D

In due course, Benvin brought this petition for a writ of

mandamus. She seeks an order directing the district court not

to condition its acceptance of the parties’ plea agreement on

the government’s obtaining consent from alleged victims

before dismissing the remaining counts. She also seeks an

order that would prevent the district court from conditioning

the United States Attorney’s dismissal of the remaining

counts in the indictment on a showing that the government

would struggle to prove Benvin’s guilt on those counts.

Finally, Benvin seeks reassignment to a different district

judge to preserve the appearance of justice. The United States

agrees that mandamus relief is appropriate under the

circumstances, and suggests that reassignment may be

necessary in light of the district court’s statements regarding

plea negotiations.

We have jurisdiction to hear mandamus petitions pursuant

to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

II

Under Fed R. Crim. P. 11, a district court may accept or

reject the parties’ plea agreement, but Rule 11(c)(1) instructs

that “[t]he court must not participate in the[] [plea agreement]

discussions.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1). This rule is designed

“to keep the judge from shaping the plea bargain or

persuading the defendant to accept particular terms, and to

preserve judicial impartiality.” United States v. Frank,

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14 IN RE BENVIN

36 F.3d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1994). Moreover, we have recently

“emphasize[d] that Rule 11(c)(1) is intended to eliminate all

judicial pressure from plea discussions.” United States v.

Kyle, 734 F.3d 956, 963 (9th Cir. 2013). “[W]hen a court

goes beyond providing reasons for rejecting the agreement

presented and comments on the hypothetical agreements it

would or would not accept, it crosses over the line established

by Rule 11 and becomes involved in the negotiations.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted).

A

Here, the district court repeatedly suggested that the

parties stipulate to a restitution amount of $3 million to

resolve the court’s concerns that the alleged victims of the

dismissed counts would not otherwise be entitled to receive

restitution. As explained in Kyle, the court’s suggestion that

the parties add a particular term to the plea agreement

constitutes impermissible involvement in plea discussions. 

Id. at 963–64.

Further, the district court inappropriately involved itself

in negotiations when it imposed conditions on its approval of

the government’s proposal to dismiss forty-nine of the

indictment’s counts. Whether or not these conditions were

independently improper, they constituted judicial setting of

the terms in and processes for the plea agreement, and thus

violated Rule 11(c)(1)’s prohibition on judicial involvement

in plea discussions. See id. at 963.

B

Having concluded that the district court erred by inserting

itself into the parties’ plea discussions, we must decide

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IN RE BENVIN 15

whether mandamus is the appropriate remedy. In making

such determination, we are guided by the five factors

identified in Bauman v. United States District Court,

557 F.2d 650 (1977). We consider whether: (1) petitioner has

any other adequate means of relief; (2) petitioner will be

damaged or prejudiced in a way not correctable on appeal;

(3) the district court clearly erred as a matter of law; (4) the

district court’s error is oft-repeated or manifests a persistent

disregard of the federal rules; and (5) the district court’s order

raises new and important issues. Id. at 654–55. Not all of the

factors need be met in order to grant mandamus relief. Id. at

655.

Here, the Bauman factors weigh in favor of granting

mandamus relief. Given the district court’s refusal to accept

the parties’ plea agreement, Benvin is left with choosing

either to enter a guilty plea to Count 45 without a plea

agreement or to proceed to trial on all fifty counts. We have

repeatedly explained that these options do not provide

adequate relief and can cause prejudice not correctable on

appeal. See Vasquez-Ramirez v. U.S. Dist. Court, 443 F.3d

692, 701 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Ellis v. U.S. Dist. Court,

356 F.3d 1198, 1210–11 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc)) (internal

quotation marks omitted) (holding that “going to trial” or

“pleading guilty to . . . and then appealing [a] conviction” are

“inadequate” remedies for purposes of mandamus, as they

would result in “substantial prejudice” to the defendant, the

government, and the judicial system). Therefore, Bauman’s

first two factors are met.

Moreover, as we have already discussed, supra Part II.A,

the district court erred when it inserted itself into plea

negotiations. That error satisfies Bauman’s third factor.

Bauman, 557 F.2d at 654–55. Finally, the fourth Bauman

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16 IN RE BENVIN

factor is satisfied here. “Although the district judge’s error is

not oft repeated, it is contrary to the Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure.” Vasquez-Ramirez, 443 F.3d at 700–01.

Therefore, as in Vasquez-Ramirez, we conclude that “a writ

of mandamus is the appropriate remedy.” Id. at 701.

C

Benvin also seeks reassignment to a different district

judge. “We may remand to a different district judge if a party

can show personal biases or unusual circumstances, based on

an assessment of three factors: (1) whether on remand the

district judge can be expected to follow this court’s dictates;

(2) whether reassignment is advisable to maintain the

appearance of justice; and (3) whether reassignment risks

undue waste and duplication.” Kyle, 734 F.3d at 966–67

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v.

Sears, Roebuck & Co., Inc., 785 F.2d 777, 779–80 (9th Cir.

1986) (discussing circuit court’s authority to reassign on

remand). Either of the first two Kyle factors will support

remand to a different district court judge. Kyle, 734 F.3d at

967; see Sears, 785 F.2d at 780.

Here, the appearance of justice will best be served by

reassignment to a different judge. The current district judge

has already expressed explicit views on the appropriate terms

of the parties’ plea agreement, suggested the terms he would

and would not accept, and explained that he would not grant

any motion dismissing forty-nine counts of the indictment

unless the government complies with such terms. In such a

situation, “[w]hether or not [the district judge] would

reasonably be expected to put out of his mind the . . .

conclusions previously drawn, and without ourselves

reaching any determination as to his ability to proceed

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IN RE BENVIN 17

impartially, to preserve the appearance of justice, . . . we

conclude reassignment is appropriate.” Ellis, 356 F.3d at

1211.

III

The petition for a writ of mandamus is GRANTED.

Respondent shall order this case be reassigned to another

district judge in accordance with local court rules for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.2

2 Petitioner’s unopposed motion to take judicial notice of the district

court’s order setting the jury trial date for August 10, 2015 is GRANTED.

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