Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-01243/USCOURTS-ca7-14-01243-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jose Miguel Medina-Mora
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

Nos. 14-1243 & 14-1420 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

JOSE MIGUEL MEDINA-MORA, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 08 CR 1021 — Ronald A. Guzmán, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED AUGUST 4, 2015 — DECIDED AUGUST 5, 2015 

___________________ 

Before POSNER, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges. 

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. When the district court sentenced defendant Jose Miguel Medina-Mora in 2009 for unlawful reentry by an alien, see 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) & (b)(2), he 

was serving undischarged terms in an Illinois state prison on 

a drug charge and a weapons charge. When the district court 

pronounced sentence orally in open court, the judge said 

that Medina-Mora was “committed to the custody of the BuCase: 14-1243 Document: 51 Filed: 08/05/2015 Pages: 4
2 Nos. 14-1243 & 14-1420 

reau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a concurrent term of 77 

months on Count One.” When the court issued its written 

judgment, however, the court said nothing about a “concurrent” sentence. The Bureau of Prisons has used the written 

judgment to measure Medina-Mora’s imprisonment. Based 

on the silence in the written judgment, the Bureau has treated his 77-month federal sentence as consecutive to the two 

state sentences, so he did not begin earning credit toward his 

federal sentence until he finished his state sentences. 

When Medina-Mora learned about the difference between what the judge said and what the judge wrote, he 

filed a motion in the district court under Federal Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 36 to correct a clerical error in the written judgment. The district judge denied the motion, concluding that his “use of the word ‘concurrent’ when imposing the 

sentence was in error” and that he “did not intend for the 

defendant’s sentence in the instant case to run concurrent 

with the sentences on the state convictions he was then serving.” 

Medina-Mora has appealed, and we must reverse. When 

a court pronounces sentence orally, that is the defendant’s 

sentence, at least if the oral pronouncement is unambiguous. 

E.g., United States v. Alburay, 415 F.3d 782, 788 (7th Cir. 2005); 

United States v. Bonanno, 146 F.3d 502, 511 (7th Cir. 1998); 

United States v. Becker, 36 F.3d 708, 711 (7th Cir. 1994); accord, 

e.g., United States v. Love, 593 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2010); United 

States v. Villano, 816 F.2d 1448, 1450–51 (10th Cir. 1987) (en 

banc). In such a case, a conflicting written judgment is “a 

nullity, not requiring further discussion.” Alburay, 415 F.3d at 

788; see also United States v. Johnson, 765 F.3d 702, 710–711 

Case: 14-1243 Document: 51 Filed: 08/05/2015 Pages: 4
Nos. 14-1243 & 14-1420 3

(7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Weathers, 631 F.3d 560, 561 

(D.C. Cir. 2011). 

It is true that if the oral pronouncement is ambiguous, 

the court may consider the entire record, including the written judgment, to resolve the ambiguity. E.g., United States v. 

Cephus, 684 F.3d 703, 709–10 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. 

Khoury, 901 F.2d 975, 977–78 (7th Cir. 1990). We see no ambiguity in this oral pronouncement, however. Medina-Mora 

was convicted on only one federal charge. The only sentences with which the federal sentence could be “concurrent” 

were the state sentences. 

Because the written judgment failed to capture accurately 

the unambiguous oral pronouncement, Rule 36 allows for 

correction of such a clerical error at any time. Medina-Mora 

is entitled to that correction. 

In considering defendant’s motion to correct the clerical 

error in the written judgment, the district court erred by 

considering its original intentions and concluding that its 

use of the word “concurrent” was an “error.” Under Federal 

Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a), the district court lost any 

power it may have had to correct an “arithmetical, technical, 

or other clear error” in the sentence fourteen days after pronouncing sentence. At least after that time, the judge’s subjective intentions no longer mattered and could not justify 

the refusal to correct the clerical error. See Becker, 36 F.3d 708, 

711 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Werber, 51 F.3d 342, 347 

(2d Cir. 1995); Villano, 816 F.2d at 1451. 

The denial of Medina-Mora’s Rule 36 motion is hereby 

REVERSED. With the correction of the clerical error, Medina-Mora may be entitled to release from Bureau of Prisons 

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4 Nos. 14-1243 & 14-1420 

custody either immediately or in the very near future 

(though he is subject to a detainer from immigration authorities). To avoid further delay, we therefore ourselves direct 

the clerk of the district court to correct the clerical error. See 

United States v. Pulley, 601 F.3d 660, 668 n.4 (7th Cir. 2010). 

The clerk shall amend the judgment in this case to reflect 

that Medina-Mora’s federal sentence was to run concurrently 

with the undischarged state sentences he was subject to at 

the time of his federal sentencing. The mandate shall issue 

immediately and the clerk of the district court shall immediately notify the Bureau of Prisons of the correction so that 

Medina-Mora’s correct release date may be determined as 

soon as possible. 

So ordered. 

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