Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-04-03165/USCOURTS-caDC-04-03165-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Richard A. Smith
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 15, 2006 Decided November 7, 2006 

No. 04-3165 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

V. 

RICHARD A. SMITH, 

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 89cr00036-03) 

Jonathan Zucker, appointed by the court, argued the 

cause and filed the briefs for appellant. 

Patricia A. Heffernan, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued 

the cause for appellee. With her on the briefs were Kenneth L. 

Wainstein, U.S. Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese III, Assistant 

U.S. Attorney 

Before: RANDOLPH and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges, and 

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge. 

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Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

WILLIAMS. 

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge: Rule 48(a) of the 

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that “[t]he 

government may, with leave of court, dismiss an indictment, 

information, or complaint.” In 2004, the government made a 

Rule 48(a) motion to vacate appellant Richard A. Smith’s 

fifteen year-old conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Smith 

did not oppose the motion, which the district court in due 

course granted. Letting no good deed go unpunished, Smith 

now claims that the district court lacked jurisdiction to grant 

the motion—and asks that his conviction be reinstated—on 

the theory that Rule 48(a) is inapplicable once a sentence is 

final. (We explain below the reasoning that has evidently led 

Smith to make this counter-intuitive claim.) Without ruling 

on the ultimate scope of Rule 48(a), we hold that the district 

court had jurisdiction to entertain the government’s motion 

and that Smith’s contemporaneous failure to object to that 

motion forfeited his right to do so now. 

* * * 

In 1989 the district court sentenced Smith to serve several 

concurrent life (and shorter) sentences for various drug 

distribution offenses, as well as a consecutive thirty-year term 

of imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for the possession 

and use of firearms “during and in relation” to those drug 

offenses. This court affirmed Smith’s convictions on direct 

appeal, accepting the government’s contention that Smith’s 

conduct—trading drugs for guns—constituted a violation of 

§ 924(c). United States v. Harris, 959 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir. 

1992). 

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Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Bailey v. 

United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995) (concluding that § 924(c) 

requires “active employment” of a gun), Smith filed a motion 

to vacate his § 924(c) conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2255. The district court denied the motion and, in 1999, this 

court denied Smith’s request for a certificate of appealability. 

See In re Smith, 285 F.3d 6, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Despite 

Bailey, we treated our Harris decision as controlling in the 

§ 2255 context. 

In 2001 Smith asked for authorization to file a successive 

§ 2255 motion in order to take advantage of this court’s 

decision in United States v. Stewart, 246 F.3d 728 (D.C. Cir. 

2001), where we overturned Harris and held that, in light of 

Bailey, receipt of a gun during a drug transaction was indeed 

not an offense under § 924(c). We denied the requested 

authorization. In re Smith, 285 F.3d at 7-9. Although it was 

by then clear under circuit law that Smith’s § 924(c) 

conviction rested on an erroneous interpretation of the statute, 

that error did not meet § 2255’s conditions for filing a second 

or successive motion under § 2255, which must invoke 

“newly discovered evidence . . . [or] a new rule of 

constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral 

review by the Supreme Court, that was previously 

unavailable.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Smith’s motion met neither 

criterion. 

Smith was not without recourse, however. Under the 

savings clause of § 2255, we noted, Smith could use 28 

U.S.C. § 2241 to collaterally attack his § 924(c) conviction in 

the district in which he was confined, which was then the 

Southern District of Indiana. Although the Seventh Circuit 

had not yet clarified how it would view cases where a 

defendant requested guns in payment for drugs, the 

government believed that, in light of United States v. 

Westmoreland, 122 F.3d 431 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that 

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passively receiving a gun for drugs does not constitute “use” 

of a gun in a drug offense), Smith would prevail on his habeas 

claim and indeed offered to argue “in support of relief for 

[him] in the Seventh Circuit.” In re Smith, 285 F.3d at 9. 

Through no fault of either party, however, Smith was 

transferred to the Middle District of Florida (in the Eleventh 

Circuit), before he could request relief in the Seventh Circuit. 

Under the relevant Eleventh Circuit law as it stood in 2002, it 

was far less certain that Smith’s habeas claim would be 

successful because that circuit had no precedent similar to the 

Seventh Circuit’s Westmoreland decision. Smith filed for a 

writ of habeas corpus, but the government opposed the 

motion. 

Presumably seeking a practical means of achieving a 

result agreeable to both parties, the government returned to 

the District of Columbia district court and on October 19, 

2004 filed a motion to vacate the § 924(c) conviction pursuant 

to Rule 48. Smith did not oppose the motion; three days after 

the government filing he requested re-sentencing on his 

remaining counts. The district court granted the government’s 

motion to vacate, but denied Smith’s motion for resentencing. Smith filed a timely notice of appeal. 

* * * 

On appeal, Smith presents two arguments. First, he 

claims that the district court lacked the power under Rule 

48(a) to vacate the § 924(c) conviction. If there were indeed 

such a jurisdictional defect, we would have to vacate the 

court’s order despite Smith’s failure to oppose the 

government’s Rule 48 motion. 

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Smith’s position is puzzling, as the remedy he seeks is the 

restoration of his 30-year § 924(c) conviction. At oral 

argument counsel explained the method in this apparent 

madness: He suggested that reinstatement would permit 

Smith to file a new habeas petition in the Eleventh Circuit. If 

the court there vacated the § 924(c) conviction, counsel 

believed that Smith would have to be resentenced, and on 

such resentencing he could obtain the benefit of the rules 

announced in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), 

and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 

In addressing Smith’s claims we must distinguish 

questions of jurisdiction—whether a case “fall[s] within a 

court’s adjudicatory authority,” Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 

443, 455 (2004)—from questions of the proper exercise of 

jurisdiction, here, whether Rule 48 can be used to vacate a 

sentence that has become final on appeal. Though objections 

to jurisdiction can be neither waived nor forfeited, even an 

absolutely inflexible rule on how jurisdiction should be 

exercised can “be forfeited if the party asserting the rule waits 

too long to raise the point.” Id. at 456. 

A district court’s jurisdiction to entertain Rule 48 motions 

lies under 18 U.S.C. § 3231’s general grant of jurisdiction 

over “all offenses against the laws of the United States.” This 

observation would be unremarkable in the typical situation 

where Rule 48 is used to dismiss an indictment, information, 

or complaint before or during trial. Cf. Hugi v. United States, 

164 F.3d 378, 380 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Subject-matter 

jurisdiction in every federal criminal prosecution comes from 

18 U.S.C. § 3231 . . . . That’s the beginning and the end of the 

‘jurisdictional’ inquiry.”). The question here is simply 

whether jurisdiction under § 3231 is available if a Rule 48 

motion is made after sentencing and appeal. Though perhaps 

not obvious, the answer appears to be yes. 

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The Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Eberhart v. 

United States, 126 S. Ct. 403 (2005), is instructive. There the 

government responded on the merits to a defendant’s untimely 

request for vacatur and a new trial under Rule 33; until appeal, 

it neglected the issue of untimeliness. The Supreme Court, 

rejecting the Seventh Circuit’s understanding that Rule 33’s 

time limits were jurisdictional, held instead that they merely 

constituted mandatory “claim-processing” rules, to be applied 

rigorously if invoked, but subject to forfeiture if ignored. Id. 

at 407. 

Eberhart appears to confirm, albeit without comment, 

that district courts retain some reservoir of jurisdiction—

distinct from the rules of criminal procedure themselves—to 

entertain motions after final judgment. Though Eberhart did 

not state the jurisdictional basis for entertaining untimely Rule 

33 motions, this court’s ruling in Bruno v. United States, 180 

F.2d 393, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1950), suggests that such motions are 

“a part of the original proceeding,” and thus presumably rest 

on 18 U.S.C. § 3231. As the Eberhart court invoked no 

specific grant of jurisdiction (such as 28 U.S.C. § 2255) to 

vacate sentences and retry defendants long after their 

sentences became final, we infer that jurisdiction for such 

remedies must rest on § 3231. 

If Eberhart confirms both that district courts retain 

jurisdiction to vacate final sentences and that “fail[ure] to 

raise a defense of untimeliness until after the District Court 

ha[s] reached the merits, . . . forfeit[s] that defense, ” 

Eberhart, 126 S. Ct. at 407, it remains only to address whether 

Eberhart’s understanding of the time limits under Rule 33 

should apply with equal force to any implicit time limits on 

vacatur under Rule 48 (e.g., precluding exercise of the power 

after conviction has become final). We note that Congress 

has, in language with a somewhat jurisdictional flavor, limited 

district court authority to modify sentences. See 18 U.S.C. 

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§ 3582 (stating that a court “may not modify a term of 

imprisonment once it has been imposed except” under three 

specified circumstances: “upon motion of the Director of the 

Bureau of Prisons,” § 3582(c)(1)(A); “to the extent otherwise 

expressly permitted by statute or by Rule 35 of the Federal 

Rules of Criminal Procedure,” § 3582(c)(1)(B); and, in cases 

where the applicable sentencing range “has subsequently been 

lowered by the Sentencing Commission,” § 3582(c)(2)). But 

Eberhart’s holding—that the time limit on Rules 29, 33, 34 

and 35 imposed by Rule 45(b)(2) (as it was then worded) is no 

more than a claim-processing rule—calls into question a 

jurisdictional reading of § 3582. See Eberhart, 126 S. Ct. at 

405, 407. Cf. United States v. Smith, 438 F.3d 796, 799 (7th 

Cir. 2006) (characterizing § 3582(c) as “a real ‘jurisdictional’ 

rule rather than a case-processing requirement”). 

Nonetheless, we need not rule today whether § 3582 

imposes jurisdictional restraints on the application of Rule 35, 

whether those restrictions would apply with equal force to 

motions made under different rules, or whether vacating a 

sentence even constitutes “modif[ying] a term of 

imprisonment” for the purposes of § 3582. Rule 33 explicitly 

addresses a court’s ability to “vacate any judgment” and 

therefore appears to be the rule most analogous to Rule 48’s 

provision for district court dismissal of an indictment. 

Smith’s arrival at the same destination would clearly have 

been free of jurisdictional error if the government had made 

an unopposed motion for retrial under Rule 33, and then

moved to dismiss the new indictment under Rule 48. 

It bears repeating that today we also do not reach the nonjurisdictional question of whether Rule 48 alone can properly 

be used to vacate a final conviction; Smith forfeited his 

opportunity to challenge the rule’s appropriate use by failing 

to object below. We do observe, however, that both the text 

of the rule and its roots in the common law doctrine of nolle 

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prosequi cast doubt on Rule 48’s applicability postconviction. Two courts have suggested as much. See 

Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591, 607 (9th Cir. 

1987) (“There is no precedent for applying Rule 48 to vacate a 

conviction after the trial and appellate proceedings have 

ended.”); Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 

1411 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (“The court finds no authority for the 

proposition that a Rule 48(a) motion may be made long after 

the prosecution has come to rest, the judgment is final, 

appeals have been exhausted, judgment imposed and the 

sentence served.”). Although the Supreme Court has twice 

permitted post-conviction use of the rule while direct appeal 

was pending, see Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22 (1977) 

(per curiam); Watts v. United States, 422 U.S. 1032 (1975), it 

has not explained the scope or implications of those decisions. 

* * * 

Smith offers an alternative, non-jurisdictional theory for 

upsetting the district court’s action. He argues that after 

vacating the § 924(c) conviction, the court should have 

applied the “sentencing package” doctrine and re-sentenced 

him on the remaining counts of his conviction. Evidently 

Smith’s belief that he might gain from this turns on the theory 

mentioned above—that in resentencing the court would be 

obliged to apply Apprendi and Booker. 

It is perfectly true that “in some instances, sentences on 

multiple counts may comprise a ‘sentencing package,’ so that 

attacking the sentence on some counts via § 2255 reopens the 

sentence on the other counts as well.” United States v. 

Townsend, 178 F.3d 558, 567 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (emphasis 

added). This result rests on the interdependence of the 

different segments of the sentence, such that removal of the 

sentence on one count draws into question the correctness of 

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the initial aggregate minus the severed element. We assume 

arguendo that the “sentencing package” doctrine can be 

implicated by vacatur or modification under any provision, 

not just under § 2255. But the necessary package is 

conspicuously absent here. 

The classic application of the “sentencing package” idea 

involves a sentence in which the sentencing court initially 

imposed a consecutive § 924(c) sentence, but withheld any 

sentencing enhancement for gun use under § 2D1.1(b)(1) of 

the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines because the two provisions are 

mutually exclusive. United States v. Morris, 116 F.3d 501, 

504 (D.C. Cir. 1997). When Bailey required vacatur of the 

§ 924(c) sentence under § 2255, and thus eradication of the 

basis for disregarding § 2D1.1(b)(1), we have approved a 

resentencing in which the court added time to the non-

§ 924(c) sentence under § 2D1.1(b)(1). Id. Obviously, 

mutual exclusivity is an exceptionally strong form of 

interdependence. Other circuits have extended the sentencing 

package doctrine to allow or require, on vacatur of a § 924(c) 

count under § 2255, consideration of the appropriate reduction 

for substantial assistance, United States v. Watkins, 147 F.3d 

1294 (11th Cir. 1998); of an incorrect calculation of the base 

offense level, United States v. Smith, 103 F.3d 531 (7th Cir. 

1996); the application of intervening amendments of the 

Guidelines, United States v. Easterling, 157 F.3d 1220 (10th 

Cir. 1998); and a possible downward departure based on postconviction rehabilitation, United States v. Core, 125 F.3d 74 

(2d Cir. 1997). The latter two cases involved partial 

recalculations favorable to the defendant, but only in a context 

where excision of the § 924(c) conviction allowed the 

government to call for recalculations adding to the non-§ 

924(c) elements of the sentence. 

Here the sentencing court calculated a guideline range of 

imprisonment on Smith’s six grouped guideline counts and, 

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exercising its discretion, sentenced Smith to several 

concurrent life terms—the highest sentence available. Only 

then, once the package was complete, did the court impose the 

consecutive 30-year term under § 924(c). The life sentence on 

the grouped counts and the 30-year term for the § 924(c) 

violation were in no way interdependent, so the former is not 

“unravel[ed]” by vacation of the latter. Townsend, 178 F.3d at 

562. The government has understandably not seized upon the 

§ 924(c) vacatur to seek additions to the several concurrent 

life sentences. Defendant has even more understandably not 

sought increases to offset the effect of the § 924(c) vacatur. 

The sentencing package doctrine thus affords no apparent 

basis for any resentencing on the other counts. 

The judgment of the district court is 

Affirmed. 

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