Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-08-04603/USCOURTS-ca4-08-04603-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Marcellus Thomas
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-4603

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

MARCELLUS THOMAS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Durham. William L. Osteen, Jr., 

District Judge. (1:08-cr-00003-WO-1)

Argued: May 12, 2010 Decided: August 6, 2010

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, MOTZ, Circuit Judge, and Arthur L. 

ALARCÓN, Senior Circuit Judge of the United States Court of 

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.

Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Senior Judge Alarcón wrote the 

opinion, in which Chief Judge Traxler and Judge Motz joined.

ARGUED: Eugene Ernest Lester, III, SHARPLESS & STAVOLA, PA, 

Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Harry L. Hobgood, 

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North 

Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Anna Mills Wagoner, United 

States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

Appeal: 08-4603 Doc: 124 Filed: 08/06/2010 Pg: 1 of 21
2

ALARCÓN, Senior Circuit Judge:

Marcellus Thomas appeals from the judgment entered 

following his conviction by a jury of twelve counts of violating 

26 U.S.C. § 7206(2) by aiding and assisting in the preparation 

of false federal income tax returns. He seeks reversal on the 

ground that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment 

right to represent himself at his trial despite his timely, 

voluntary, knowing, intelligent, and unequivocal request to do 

so. We affirm because we conclude that the district court did 

not err in denying Thomas’s motion to represent himself on the 

grounds that it was manipulative, and not clear and unequivocal. 

We also determine that his request was made to delay, obstruct, 

and hinder the timely disposition of this case.

I

Thomas was indicted on January 28, 2008. When he appeared 

for arraignment on February 2, 2008, attorney David Smith made a 

limited appearance on behalf of Thomas. Arraignment was set for 

February 7, 2008.

On February 5, 2008, William S. Trinette of the Federal 

Defender’s Office, was appointed to represent Thomas. On 

February 7, 2008, Thomas entered a not guilty plea to all the 

charges in the indictment. The district court ordered that a 

trial by jury be set for March 10, 2008.

Appeal: 08-4603 Doc: 124 Filed: 08/06/2010 Pg: 2 of 21
3

On March 3, 2008, Assistant Public Defender Trinette filed 

a motion to withdraw as counsel. He explained that withdrawal 

was required because of a conflict of interest arising from the 

fact that an investigator for the Federal Defender’s Office was 

related to one of the persons listed in the indictment.

Attorney Brian Gates was appointed to represent Thomas on 

March 13, 2008. On April 10, 2008, Thomas filed a pro se motion 

for the substitution of counsel. He complained that Mr. Gates 

urged him to plead guilty, had only met him once, did not 

request that the court appoint an investigator, and had no 

experience in trying an income tax case. On April 16, 2008, 

Thomas filed a pro se motion to continue the trial date. On 

April 17, 2008, the district court scheduled the trial date for 

April 23, 2008. During the status hearing on April 17, 2008,

Thomas stated: “If I’m not satisfied with [Mr. Gates’] 

services, can I just after the discussion come back and move the 

Court that I represent myself.” The district court responded: 

“You clearly have the right to represent yourself.” The 

district court denied the motion to substitute counsel.

On April 21, 2008, Thomas filed another pro se motion for 

the appointment of substitute counsel. On that date, the 

district court granted this request. On April 24, 2008, 

attorney Robert A. Broadie was appointed to represent Thomas.

Appeal: 08-4603 Doc: 124 Filed: 08/06/2010 Pg: 3 of 21
4

Thomas filed numerous pro se motions after Mr. Broadie was 

appointed to represent him. At a May 8, 2008, status hearing, 

the district court stated to Thomas:

Now if you continue to persist in making your own

motions to the Court outside or separate from the 

advice of counsel that Mr. Broadie has rendered, or if 

you want to proceed pro se, then we’ll have a separate 

hearing to determine whether or not you want to 

proceed with counsel or you want to represent 

yourself.

Thomas replied: “I understand that. I would respect the Court 

and Your Honor not to assume that I appreciate the services of 

my attorney”.

The Court then inquired: “Are you satisfied with the 

services of Mr. Broadie?”

Thomas responded: “At this time I am, Your Honor.”

On May 28, 2008, Thomas filed a pro se motion to continue 

the trial date. The district court denied all outstanding pro 

se motions at a status conference held on May 30, 2008, 

including Thomas’s pro se motion to continue the trial date. 

The date for jury selection and trial was again ordered to 

commence on June 2, 2008.

On June 1, 2008, Mr. Broadie filed a motion to withdraw as 

Thomas’ trial counsel. On June 2, 2008, Thomas filed a pro se 

motion for the appointment of substitute counsel.

Appeal: 08-4603 Doc: 124 Filed: 08/06/2010 Pg: 4 of 21
5

On June 2, 2008, the district court conducted a hearing,

before the scheduled commencement of jury selection, to consider 

Thomas’s motion to stay the trial of this matter until Thomas’s 

appeal to the Fourth Circuit, filed on May 30, 2008, was 

determined by this Court. In his interlocutory appeal, Thomas 

sought review of the May 30, 2008 denial of (1) his motion to 

dismiss the indictment, (2) the denial of his motion to continue 

the trial date, (3) the denial of his motion to suppress 

evidence, and (4) his motion that Judge William L. Osteen, Jr.,

recuse himself from presiding over the trial.

After hearing Thomas’s argument in support of his motion 

for a stay, the district court denied the motion. It concluded 

that it was not divested of jurisdiction because it had not 

entered a final judgment in this matter.

Thomas then requested a three-day stay “to discuss with my 

new counsel on the matter.” The district court denied the 

motion.

The district court then noted that Mr. Broadie filed a 

motion to withdraw as Thomas’s counsel on Sunday, June 1, 2008 

at approximately 10:00 p.m. Mr. Broadie informed the district 

court that he filed the motion after Thomas told him he had 

“concerns with me representing him further in this trial.” 

In his pro se substitution of counsel motion, Thomas 

asserted that Mr. Broadie’s representation was inadequate. He 

Appeal: 08-4603 Doc: 124 Filed: 08/06/2010 Pg: 5 of 21
6

informed the district court “me and my attorney have not met, 

which is in the record, to even discuss any theories of trial.” 

He also asserted that Mr. Broadie had failed to request funds 

for the appointment of a tax expert. Thomas further complained 

that Mr. Broadie had never tried a tax case. Thomas stated: “I 

ask the court on the record in the right of trial fairness and 

my rights under the constitution to (sic) the Sixth Amendment to 

have an effective and adequate counsel.” 

At the request of the district court for a response, 

Mr. Broadie stated that he had had numerous phone calls with his 

client. He had also set aside the preceding Wednesday, 

Thursday, and Friday, as well as the whole weekend, to meet with 

Thomas in preparation for trial. Thomas did not meet with 

Mr. Broadie, however, until Sunday. On that day, instead of 

discussing defense theories, Thomas focused on their difference 

of opinion as to “the matters of law that he wanted to proceed 

upon and the various motions he wanted to file.” The district 

court denied the motion for a substitution of counsel.

Thomas was then permitted to make a further statement of 

his position. He stated that “At this moment, Your Honor, we’re 

not ready for trial... I don’t – at this time, Your Honor, I 

don’t have adequate representation. That’s why I moved to get 

new counsel, Your Honor. Or in the interests of justice, 

possibly a Motion to Continue, that I could have a right to 

Appeal: 08-4603 Doc: 124 Filed: 08/06/2010 Pg: 6 of 21
7

discuss the factual elements with my attorney so I can have a 

fair trial.” The district court treated Thomas’s request as a 

motion for reconsideration of its earlier ruling denying the 

motion for a substitution of counsel. In response, Thomas 

stated that he felt that Judge Osteen’s decision was biased. 

Thomas then stated: “And let the record show that the defendant 

does not choose to proceed with Mr. Broadie as his attorney.” 

The district court advised the parties it was going to take 

a ten minute recess “to allow Mr. Broadie and Mr. Thomas an 

opportunity to have whatever further discussions they want to 

have, in view of the court’s denial of the Motion to Appoint 

Substitute Counsel in this matter.” 

During the recess, Thomas served two documents on the 

district court in which he requested a stay of further 

proceedings, and a notice of appeal based on the denial of his 

motion to substitute counsel. The district court denied the 

motion for a stay.

The district court then inquired of Mr. Broadie whether 

“Mr. Thomas wants to proceed with counsel, or does Mr. Thomas 

want to be heard on which he alluded to, that is, proceeding pro 

se in this matter?” Mr. Broadie replied: “I can assert to the 

court that I’ve been advised that that will be his position, to 

proceed pro se, but I will tender Mr. Thomas to make sure that 

Appeal: 08-4603 Doc: 124 Filed: 08/06/2010 Pg: 7 of 21
8

the court had adequate understanding of his position, because 

that is the very reason I filed this motion.” 

Thomas requested that the district court rule on 

Mr. Broadie’s motion to withdraw as his attorney. The district 

court replied: “All right. Mr. Broadie’s Motion to Withdraw is 

denied. Now, how do you want to proceed? Mr. Thomas, do you 

want to be heard on the Motion to Proceed in Pro Se?” (Thomas 

replied, “Not at this time, Your Honor. I will hold my right, 

that’s my right under the constitution to represent myself. If 

I want to go pro se anytime in this proceeding, and right now –-

and I would right now hold my right to that.” 

In response, the district court summarized its findings as 

follows:

1. Thomas’s pro se motion to substitute counsel was 

not timely filed. It was filed on 8:30 a.m. on 

the date that jury selection was scheduled to 

begin.

2. The untimeliness of the motion “casts some doubt 

of the defendant’s motives in filing the Motion to 

Substitute Counsel; that is with respect to 

attempts to obstruct, hinder and delay the trial 

that is scheduled in this matter.” 

3. “The court does not find that conflict is so great 

between attorney and [client] that it has resulted 

Appeal: 08-4603 Doc: 124 Filed: 08/06/2010 Pg: 8 of 21
9

in a total lack of communication, preventing an 

adequate defense based on what’s been described in 

this court during the course of these proceedings.

4. Any failure to communicate arises from Thomas’s 

“desire to proceed ahead on legal arguments that 

the defendant desires to make.” 

Based on these findings, the district court denied 

Mr. Broadie’s motion to withdraw as counsel. Thomas then 

stated: 

I would like to be –- have –- a motion be heard at a 

further time with respect to proceeding pro se and 

would respectfully request the court to grant me I 

would say a week to review my options and either 

proceed pro se or even try to hire a new attorney in 

light of my appeal.” 

The district court denied the motion. It noted that the 

indictment had been pending in this case since January 28, 2008.

The district court then proceeded to discuss Thomas’s 

suppression motion and the proposed instructions to the jury

with counsel. Thomas then made an oral motion to proceed in pro 

se. The district court stated:

[Y]our motion is denied at this point. Having 

just told me 30 or 40 minutes ago that you wanted to 

keep Mr. Broadie as your counsel, to now turn around 

after what’s transpired in this courtroom since I’ve 

returned and make a Motion to Proceed Pro Se, just is 

nothing more than to delay these proceedings. 

Appeal: 08-4603 Doc: 124 Filed: 08/06/2010 Pg: 9 of 21
10

The district court advised Thomas that it would hear from 

him again on his motion to proceed pro se after concluding the 

hearing with counsel on the suppression motion and the proposed 

jury instructions.

After the district court had concluded its conference with 

counsel, it inquired of Thomas whether he wanted to continue 

being represented by Mr. Broadie. Thomas responded that because 

Mr. Broadie did not have experience regarding tax law and the 

Internal Revenue Code, and had not conferred with him about the 

trial exhibits, or discussed his defense, he wished to represent 

himself at trial. He requested that he be granted “a 

considerable amount of time to, on my own, hire or get tax 

experts and any witnesses or experts that would help me avail 

myself of a proper and good defense in this matter.” (R.T. at 

100.) The district court denied the motion to continue the 

trial. It then inquired of Thomas whether he wished to proceed 

pro se in view of the fact that his motion for a continuance had 

been denied. Thomas responded that he wished to proceed pro se. 

Thomas also stated, however, that if the Court of Appeals 

granted his appeal from the denial of his motion for 

substitution of counsel, he wanted to be represented by counsel 

at trial. Thereupon, the district court conducted an 

evidentiary hearing to determine whether Thomas’s motion to 

represent himself should be granted.

Appeal: 08-4603 Doc: 124 Filed: 08/06/2010 Pg: 10 of 21
11

Thomas was placed under oath and was questioned by the 

district court. Thomas testified that he had not been treated 

recently for mental illness, or addiction to narcotics. 

Thomas testified that he was aware that he was charged with 

thirteen counts of violating 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2), and the 

maximum possible penalties that could be imposed if he were to 

be convicted of these crimes. Thomas also admitted that he had 

not met with Mr. Broadie on Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, 

Saturday, and Sunday, the days his appointed counsel had made 

available to concur with his client because he had car trouble, 

and was involved in filing pro se legal motions. Thomas also 

conceded that he filed pro se motions to continue the trial and 

filed motions in the Court of Appeal to stay the trial pending 

the determination of these appeals. He stated that he had filed 

a notice of appeal that date and had requested a stay of the 

district court’s proceedings. Thomas also admitted that he had 

informed the district court, during earlier proceedings on that 

date, that he wished to proceed represented by Mr. Broadie 

roughly an hour and one-half earlier on June 2, 2008. (R.T. at 

108.) Thomas further conceded he had changed his mind again 

about requesting self-representation. 

In addition, he admitted that he had made a motion to 

continue the trial fifteen minutes earlier. In response to the 

district court’s inquiry, Thomas also stated he understood that 

Appeal: 08-4603 Doc: 124 Filed: 08/06/2010 Pg: 11 of 21
12

if he proceeded to represent himself, he would have to conduct 

voir dire, make the opening statement, and conduct his 

examination of witnesses in accordance with the rules of 

evidence. Thomas also acknowledged that he was not familiar 

with the tax laws.

The district court denied Thomas’s motion to represent 

himself because it was not clear and unequivocal. It also found 

that it was untimely. 

The district court explained that whether Thomas’s motion 

to represent himself was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary was 

of “significant” concern because of Thomas’s vacillation in 

asserting his right to self-representation. The Court opined 

that Thomas’s conduct exhibited manipulation and efforts to 

delay, obstruct and hinder the orderly disposition of this case. 

The district court denied Thomas’s motion to proceed pro se 

because it concluded that his motion to proceed pro se was being 

“used as a tactic to delay and disrupt the trial and distort the 

system and manipulate the trial process.” 

Thomas was found guilty of Counts 2 through 13 of the 

indictment. Thomas was sentenced to serve fifty-six months of 

imprisonment and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of 

$19,812. On October 22, 2008, Thomas filed a timely Notice of 

Appeal. This Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291.

Appeal: 08-4603 Doc: 124 Filed: 08/06/2010 Pg: 12 of 21
13

II

Thomas has presented the following issue for review in this 

appeal: “Did the trial court violate Mr. Thomas’s Sixth 

Amendment right to proceed at trial without the assistance of 

counsel when it forced appointed counsel upon him despite his 

timely, voluntary, knowing, and intelligent requests to 

represent himself?” (Appellant’s Opening Br. at 1.) “We review 

a district court’s denial of a defendant’s right to selfrepresentation de novo.” United States v. Bush, 404 F.3d 263, 

270 (4th Cir. 2005)(citing United States v. Singleton, 107 F.3d 

1091, 1996 (4th cir. 1997). “We review the district court’s 

findings of historical fact for clear error.” Id. (citing

United States v. Flackovich, 209 F.3d 1227, 1236 (10th Cir. 

2000).

Citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) and 

28 U.S.C. § 1654, Thomas argues that “[a] defendant in a 

criminal case has both a statutory and constitutional right to 

proceed without the assistance of counsel.”*

 * Section 1645 reads as follows:

 (Appellant’s 

Opening Br. at 8.) He contends that the trial court’s denial of 

In all courts of the United States the parties 

may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by 

counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively 

are permitted to manage and conduct cases therein.” 

Appeal: 08-4603 Doc: 124 Filed: 08/06/2010 Pg: 13 of 21
14

his motion to dismiss appointed counsel to represent himself” 

defeat[ed] the absolute right of a mentally competent defendant 

to dismiss appointed counsel and conduct his own defense.” 

(Appellant’s Opening Br. at 13.) We disagree. Faretta did not 

create an “absolute right” to self-representation to mentally 

competent defendants who knowingly and intelligently waive their 

right to counsel. In fact, in Bush, this Court expressly held 

that the Faretta right to self-representation is not absolute. 

Id.

In Bush, this Court set forth the circumstances that 

justify the denial of a mentally competent defendant’s motion 

for self-representation: 

In determining whether a defendant properly has 

exercised his right to self-representation and waiving 

his right to counsel, we ascertain whether the 

assertion of the right to self-representation is 

(1) clear and unequivocal, (2) knowing, intelligent 

and voluntary; and (3) timely. The requirement that 

the assertion be clear and unequivocal is necessary to 

protect against an inadvertent waiver of the right to 

counsel by a defendant’s occasional musings, and it 

also prevents a defendant from taking advantage of and 

manipulating the mutual exclusivity of the rights to 

counsel and self-representation. Addi-tionally, in 

ambiguous situations created by a defendant’s 

vacillation or manipulation, we must ascribe a 

constitutional primacy to the right to counsel. At 

bottom, the Faretta right to self-representation is 

not absolute and the government’s interest in ensuring 

the integrity and efficiency of the trial outweighs 

the defendant’s interest in acting as his own instant 

lawyer. (emphasis added).

Appeal: 08-4603 Doc: 124 Filed: 08/06/2010 Pg: 14 of 21
15

Bush, 404 F.3d at 271. (internal citations and quotation marks 

omitted).

A

Thomas’s pro se motion for a substitution of counsel and a 

stay of further proceedings was filed on the morning set for 

trial. In United States v. Reevey, 364 F.3d 151 (4th Cir. 

2004), this Court held that “a continuance request for the 

substitution of counsel made on the first day of trial is 

clearly ‘untimely under all but the most exigent 

circumstances’.” Id. at 157. (quoting United States v. 

Corporan-Cuevas, 35 F.3d 953, 956 (4th Cir. 1994)). Thomas has 

failed to identify any exigent circumstances that demonstrate 

that his request for a substitution of counsel and a continuance 

of his trial was timely. He had asserted the same reasons for 

his dissatisfaction with Mr. Broadie several times previously. 

Thomas’s assertion that Mr. Broadie was not prepared for trial 

because he had not conferred with Thomas was contrary to the 

undisputed fact that he failed to meet with his counsel on the 

days Mr. Broadie made himself available to discuss Thomas’s 

defense.

“We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s 

rulings on a motion to substitute counsel and on a request for a

continuance.” Reevey, 364 F.3d at 156. The district court did 

Appeal: 08-4603 Doc: 124 Filed: 08/06/2010 Pg: 15 of 21
16

not abuse its discretion in denying Thomas’s motion for a 

substitution of counsel and a continuance.

B

Thomas’s motion to proceed in pro se was asserted for the 

first time on the date set for trial. The district court

advised him on April 17, 2008, that he had a right to represent 

himself. On May 8, 2008, Thomas informed the district court

that he was satisfied with Mr. Broadie’s representation. At the 

May 30, 2008, status conference, Thomas did not indicate that he 

desired to represent himself.

In United States v. Lawrence, 605 F.2d 1321 (4th Cir. 

1979), this Court held that the right of self-representation 

must be asserted at some time “before meaningful trial 

proceedings have commenced, and that thereafter its exercise 

rests with the sound discretion of the trial court.” Id. at 

1325. Thomas’s motion to represent himself was not made before 

meaningful trial proceedings had commenced. It was asserted on 

the day of trial after the district court considered in limine

motions and had conferred with counsel about the instructions 

that should be addressed to the prospective jurors. 

Thomas contends that “[d]efendants are allowed to assert 

their right to self-representation anytime before trial or 

before the jury is empanelled.” (Appellant’s Opening Br. at 

17.) Thomas cites McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984) in 

Appeal: 08-4603 Doc: 124 Filed: 08/06/2010 Pg: 16 of 21
17

support of this proposition. No issue was raised in McKaskle

regarding whether the assertion of a motion for selfrepresentation can be asserted anytime before trial or the jury 

is empanelled. The sole issue raised in McKaskle was “what role 

standby counsel who is present at trial over the defendant’s 

objection may play consistent with the protection of defendant’s 

Faretta rights.” McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 170.

Our research has not disclosed an opinion of this Court 

that has expressly considered whether the denial of a motion for 

self-representation as untimely that was filed on the date set 

for trial, but prior to jury selection, is erroneous. In 

Lawrence, this Court stated that “[w]hen ‘meaningful trial

proceedings have commenced’ will of course vary from case to 

case.’” Lawrence, 605 F.2d at 1325. In that matter, this Court 

held that the defendant’s motion was untimely when the jury had 

been selected but had not yet been sworn. Id. We need not 

decide in this case whether the filing of a motion for selfrepresentation on the date set for trial, but before jury 

selection has commenced is timely because we are persuaded that 

the district court did not clearly err in finding that Thomas’s 

request to represent himself was manipulative to delay and 

obstruct the orderly disposition of this case, and therefore, 

was not clear and unequivocal.

Appeal: 08-4603 Doc: 124 Filed: 08/06/2010 Pg: 17 of 21
18

C

Thomas argues that the district court clearly erred in 

finding that his purported waiver of counsel was not knowing, 

intelligent, voluntary, and clear and unequivocal. The district 

court found that Thomas “vacillated back and forth at least a 

couple of times over the past two hours.” 

It is undisputed that Thomas was mentally competent to make 

a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to 

counsel. The district court placed Thomas under oath and 

inquired whether he was addicted to drugs or suffered from 

mental illness. Thomas also testified that he was aware of the 

charges against him, the maximum penalties and the fact that he 

had to conduct his voir dire of the jury, present an opening 

statement, and examine witnesses in accordance with the rules of 

evidence. 

After the district court denied his motion to represent 

himself, Thomas filed another interlocutory appeal before this 

Circuit. After the jury selection proceedings had commenced, 

Thomas stated: “I would like to have a motion to get time to 

get a new attorney at my own expense. Will Your Honor entertain 

me doing that.” In denying this motion, the district court

stated: “You’ve had since January to find your own counsel and 

you, for whatever reason, have not done that.” Thomas 

responded: “But for the record, I would like to have a motion 

Appeal: 08-4603 Doc: 124 Filed: 08/06/2010 Pg: 18 of 21
19

to dismiss my attorney and have time to get another lawyer.” 

This motion again cast doubt on whether his earlier request that 

he be granted the right to represent himself was unequivocal. 

It was yet another belated attempt to delay his trial.

CONCLUSION

The record supports the district court’s determination that 

Thomas’s request to represent himself was not clear and 

unequivocal. On the eve of the original April 10, 2008, trial 

date, Thomas asked to have Mr. Gates removed and replaced with 

new counsel because he disagreed with Thomas as to how to 

prepare for trial. At a hearing on April 16, 2008, Mr. Gates 

informed the court that he would not “engage in tactics that I 

think are unwise or ill-conceived.” After the district court

granted the request and appointed Mr. Broadie, Thomas continued 

filing pro se motions even though he was represented by counsel. 

On the eve of trial, Thomas again sought to substitute counsel, 

or in the alternative, to represent himself, raising the same 

arguments he made when he sought substitute counsel for 

Mr. Gates, i.e., that Mr. Broadie had not met with him 

sufficiently to discuss the evidence in the case; that 

Mr. Broadie lacked sufficient experience in tax trials; and, 

that Mr. Broadie had failed to engage a tax expert. When 

questioned by the district court at the hearing on the morning 

Appeal: 08-4603 Doc: 124 Filed: 08/06/2010 Pg: 19 of 21
20

jury selection was to begin, Thomas admitted he was not ready 

for trial and asked for a continuance to “to review [his] 

options.” The record clearly demonstrates that Thomas’s request 

to represent himself was a manipulative effort to present 

particular arguments rather than a sincere desire to dispense 

with Mr. Broadie’s services. See United States v. Frazier-El, 

204 F.3d 553, 560 (4th Cir. 2000)(“A trial court must be 

permitted to distinguish between a manipulative effort to 

present particular arguments and a sincere desire to dispense 

with the benefits of counsel.”)

Thomas argues that his request was “conditional,” not 

“equivocal,” because he wanted to represent himself only if he 

could not get substitute counsel appointed. (Appellant’s 

Opening Br. at 14-15.) Thomas’s argument misses the mark. The 

district court did not conclude that his request was unequivocal 

merely because he made it “in the alternative” to getting new 

counsel. As the district court noted, within the span of a few 

hours at the hearing on the morning of June 2, 2008, Thomas 

changed his mind several times as to whether he wanted to keep 

his counsel or proceed pro se and represent himself, subject to 

the granting of an order granting him a continuance. It was 

this vacillation that constituted the lack of clarity and 

equivocation, not the framing of the request “in the 

Appeal: 08-4603 Doc: 124 Filed: 08/06/2010 Pg: 20 of 21
21

alternative,” which led the district court to conclude that the 

request was not unequivocal.

“In ambiguous situations created by a defendant’s 

vacillation or manipulation, we must ascribe a ‘constitutional 

primacy’ to the right to counsel because this right serves both 

the individual and collective good, as opposed to only 

individual interests served by protecting the right of selfrepresentation.” Frazier-El, 204 F.3d at 559 (quoting 

Singleton, 107 F.3d at 1102.) The district court did not err in 

denying Thomas’s request to represent himself on the ground that 

his request was not clear and unequivocal.

Accordingly, we affirm.

AFFIRMED 

Appeal: 08-4603 Doc: 124 Filed: 08/06/2010 Pg: 21 of 21