Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01390/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01390-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Eric Conroy
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Karen E. Schreier, United States District Judge for the District

of South Dakota. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-1390

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of South Dakota.

Eric Conroy, *

*

Appellant. *

__________

Submitted: September 13, 2005

Filed: September 29, 2005

___________

Before RILEY, FAGG, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges. 

___________

RILEY, Circuit Judge.

Eric Conroy (Conroy) was convicted of aggravated sexual abuse in violation

of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a)(1), 2246(2)(A), and 1153, and abusive sexual conduct in

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2244(a)(1), 2246(3), and 1153. Conroy challenges his

convictions, arguing the district court1

 erred in (1) finding statements made by

Conroy to one of his victims, Raelene Tail (Tail), not subject to disclosure under

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (2) not excluding or limiting the

government’s expert witness testimony following the government’s alleged improper

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expert witness notice; (3) admitting the expert witness’s testimony; (4) admitting

Tail’s prior consistent statements; and (5) denying his motion for mistrial based on

prosecutorial misconduct. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Conroy was indicted on five counts of sexually abusing three victims: Tail,

Sheila Slow Bear (Slow Bear), and Angela Sun Bear. The events giving rise to this

appeal took place on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation, where Conroy’s father is a

tribal police officer.

Following Conroy’s arrest, Tail provided a detailed written statement to police.

Tail’s disclosed statements included an explanation for her late reporting of the

assaults, saying she did not immediately report the rapes because Conroy’s father is

a tribal police officer. At a pretrial conference, the government asserted Tail would

testify at trial she did not immediately report her first rape by Conroy because Conroy

had told her the police had let him go in the past because of his father’s position.

Conroy objected and, pursuant to Brady, requested disclosure of the statement he

allegedly made to Tail. The district court held the statement was not exculpatory and

thus not subject to disclosure.

At trial, Tail testified Conroy had bragged to Tail that he and others once were

stopped by police, but when he told police who his father was, the police set him free

while detaining the others. On cross-examination, Conroy attempted to impeach Tail

with her written statement to police regarding several specific factual details. On

redirect, the government was permitted, over Conroy’s objection, to rehabilitate Tail

with prior consistent statements she made in her written statement that did not

specifically pertain to the topics on which she was impeached.

Also before trial, the government filed a notice to use expert witness Kandi

Smith (Smith) to testify as to laboratory results of a rug found outside Tail’s home on

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which Conroy allegedly wiped semen from his penis following one of the rapes of

Tail, including Smith’s opinions on why the laboratory results found no semen on the

rug. Conroy filed motions in limine arguing (1) the notice failed to provide adequate

notice of the substance of Smith’s opinions, and (2) the scope of Smith’s testimony

exceeded the scope of the laboratory results. The district court denied the motions.

Smith testified at trial as to why the laboratory results may not have found Conroy’s

semen on the rug. Conroy objected to the testimony as too speculative and not based

on facts or data, but the district court denied the objection and admitted the testimony.

During closing argument, the government told the jury Conroy failed to

produce medical evidence supporting his arguments the victims would have been

bruised by Conroy’s actions, Conroy had the ability to subpoena witnesses, and

Conroy presented no evidence regarding how easily the victims bruised. After each

statement, the district court sustained Conroy’s objection. Following closing

arguments, the district court addressed these specific objections and admonished the

jury as to the government’s burden of proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and

explained “the defendant does not have the burden or duty of calling any witnesses

or producing any evidence.”

Conroy was convicted on three of five counts. He moved for a mistrial based

on the prosecutor’s closing argument, but the district court held the statements, while

improper, were not prejudicial. Conroy was sentenced to 188 months’ imprisonment.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Failure to Disclose Conroy’s Statements to Tail Pursuant to Brady

We review for an abuse of discretion the government’s alleged violation of its

disclosure obligations under Brady. United States v. Deavault, 190 F.3d 926, 929

(8th Cir. 1999).

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Brady requires the government to disclose “evidence favorable to an accused

upon request . . . where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,

irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.

Impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence falls within the Brady rule.

United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). Impeachment evidence is

“evidence favorable to an accused, so that, if disclosed and used effectively, it may

make the difference between conviction and acquittal.” Id. (citations and quotations

omitted). Evidence is material “only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the

evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been

different. A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 682. 

Conroy argues the government violated its duties under Brady by failing to

disclose Conroy’s statement to Tail about receiving favorable treatment by police

following a traffic stop. He claims this was impeachment evidence because, had he

known about it, he could have used facts surrounding the alleged stop to impeach

Tail’s credibility. The government implies the evidence was not impeachment

evidence, and argues it was not material.

We disagree with the government as to impeachment, but agree the evidence

was not material. While a statement by a witness supporting her own testimony does

not fit what one normally thinks as impeachment evidence (such as bias or interest),

under the broad definition in Bagley, Tail’s testimony probably fits within an

expanded impeachment definition because, if used effectively, it may have been

useful in attacking Tail’s credibility. On the other hand, even if the statement was

impeachment evidence, it was not material. The issue at trial was not whether the

traffic stop occurred as Tail testified, but what Tail believed regarding Conroy’s

special treatment by the police. Tail’s belief or fear about Conroy and the police, i.e.,

her state of mind for not reporting the rapes, was material. The true facts surrounding

the alleged stop were not material. Further, had the statement been disclosed, it might

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have affected the trial’s outcome only indirectly if (1) the traffic stop did not occur

as Tail testified, (2) if Conroy somehow presented evidence contradicting Tail’s

account of the traffic stop, (3) if the jury believed Conroy’s evidence regarding the

stop over Tail’s testimony, (4) if this inconsistency affected the jury’s credibility

determination of Tail on the sexual abuse charge, and (5) if the jury based a not guilty

verdict on Tail’s diminished credibility. These many “if’s” do not create a reasonable

probability of a different outcome.

B. Insufficient Expert Witness Notice

We review for an abuse of discretion alleged violations of Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(G). See United States v. Tibesar, 894 F.2d 317, 319 (8th

Cir. 1990).

Rule 16(a)(1)(G) requires the government to provide a summary of an expert

witness’s expected testimony, including “the witness’s opinions, the bases and

reasons for those opinions, and the witness’s qualifications.” The government’s

notice of Smith’s expected testimony contained the following statement: “Ms. Smith

is expected to testify that no semen was detected on the rug and the reasons why no

semen or vaginal fluids were detected, including but not limited to environmental

impacts, non-secreter issues, and the lack of established vaginal fluid testing

availability.”

Conroy argues the government’s notice of intent to use Smith was insufficient

because the notice failed to explain the bases for Smith’s opinions as to why

laboratory results did not find semen on the rug located outside Tail’s home. The

government responds claiming the notice was sufficient, and the level of detail argued

by Conroy is not required by the law.

While the government’s notice did not explain in detail the bases for Smith’s

opinions, and its use of a non-exclusive list is questionable, the district court’s

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The district court’s advice to the government “in the future . . . [to] be more

enlightening to the defendant” in Rule 16(a)(1)(G) expert disclosures is good advice.

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holding that the notice was sufficient was not an abuse of discretion. First, Conroy

cites no case law supporting his argument. Second, upon receiving the government’s

notice, Conroy had the opportunity for over five months before trial to move to

compel a more detailed notice, but he chose not to do so. Conroy also could have

sought the advice of his own expert. Third, a detailed notice would not have helped

Conroy. His defense was he never committed the rapes; thus, no semen could have

been found on the rug. Smith testified no semen was found on the rug, thereby

supporting Conroy’s defense. A more detailed notice, which arguably could have

helped Conroy cross-examine Smith as to her opinion regarding the different

scenarios for semen being on the rug and then disappearing, would have offered little

help to his defense claim that no semen was ever on the rug.2

C. Inadmissible Expert Witness Opinion

Conroy argues the district court erred in admitting Smith’s testimony because

her testimony was too speculative in opining about the reasons for a lack of physical

evidence. As an initial matter, the government argues plain error review applies

because Conroy originally challenged the scientific basis of Smith’s testimony under

Daubert, but later withdrew that challenge. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,

509 U.S. 579 (1993). Conroy responds an abuse of discretion standard applies

because he never actually raised a Daubert challenge and therefore never waived it,

but he did object to the testimony’s general admissibility under Federal Rule of

Evidence 702 both before and during trial. Because Conroy challenged the admission

of Smith’s testimony under Rule 702, we review for an abuse of discretion. See

Craftsmen Limousine, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 363 F.3d 761, 776 (8th Cir. 2004).

It is not an abuse of discretion to allow an expert witness to testify as to a lack

of physical evidence as long as the expert’s opinion does not usurp the jury’s role of

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assessing whether the event occasioning the evidence actually occurred. United

States v. Kirkie, 261 F.3d 761, 766 (8th Cir. 2001). Such testimony assists the jury

in understanding the evidence or lack of it. See Fed. R. Evid. 702. We see little

difference between a forensic expert testifying as to the reasons for not finding bodily

fluid evidence on a rug, and the common situation of a fingerprint expert testifying

as to the reasons for not finding a defendant’s fingerprints on an object in question.

See, e.g., United States v. Solorio-Tafolla, 324 F.3d 964, 965 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting

a law enforcement expert’s testimony on the lack of fingerprint evidence on certain

drug packaging). Further, an expert’s testimony generally is admissible when it

“substantially track[s] the summary report.” United States v. Beltran-Arce, 415 F.3d

949, 953 (8th Cir. 2005). Smith’s testimony did so, and her speculation as to the

ways time and environmental factors might eliminate the presence of semen is

allowed and may even be encouraged: “A certain amount of speculation is necessary,

an even greater amount is permissible (and goes to the weight of the testimony), but

too much is fatal to admission.” Group Health Plan, Inc. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.,

344 F.3d 753, 760 (8th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he district court is the ‘gatekeeper,’ and we

owe significant deference to its determination that expert testimony is excessively

speculative.”). We hold the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting

Smith’s testimony. 

D. Inadmissible Prior Consistent Statements of Tail

We review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s decision to admit a prior

extrajudicial statement under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B). United States

v. Blankinship, 784 F.2d 317, 320 (8th Cir. 1986).

Conroy argues the district court abused its discretion in admitting prior

statements made by Tail to a police officer, because the prior consistent statements

did not relate to the specific subject matter of the prior inconsistent statements

Conroy had used to impeach Tail during cross-examination. Conroy attempted to

impeach Tail as to her testimony about whether the porch light was on, the number

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of adults at home, her missing clothes, and an encounter with Conroy at Slow Bear’s

home. Following cross-examination, the government attempted to rehabilitate Tail

with prior consistent statements regarding her desire to end her relationship with

Conroy.

We hold the district court did not abuse its discretion. While the statements

admitted to rehabilitate Tail did not specifically relate to the subject matter of the

statements impeached by Conroy, it is not an abuse of discretion for a district court

to admit prior consistent statements “relevant to any other portion made the subject

of cross-examination,” Coltrane v. United States, 418 F.2d 1131, 1140 (D.C. Cir.

1969), cited in Blankinship, 784 F.2d at 320, when doing so is “necessary to show the

seriousness of the claimed inconsistencies,” as a result of “serious efforts ha[ving]

been made to show recent fabrication or improper motive.” Blankinship, 784 F.2d

at 320. Rule 801(d)(1)(B) permits prior statements consistent with the witness’s trial

testimony “to rebut . . . [a] charge . . . of recent fabrication or improper influence or

motive,” and does not expressly limit the prior consistent statements’ admissibility

to the subject matter of the statements challenged on cross-examination. We

generally leave decisions under Rule 801 to the “sound discretion of the trial court,”

and we do the same here. Blankinship, 784 F.2d at 320.

E. Prosecutorial Misconduct During Closing Argument

We review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s ruling on a motion for

mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct. United States v. Hernandez, 779 F.2d

456, 458 (8th Cir. 1985). “The test for reversible prosecutorial misconduct has two

parts: (1) the prosecutor’s remarks or conduct must in fact have been improper, and

(2) such remarks or conduct must have prejudicially affected the defendant’s

substantial rights so as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.” Id.

Conroy argues the prosecutor’s repeated attempts to shift the burden of proof

to Conroy during closing arguments constituted reversible misconduct. The

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government argues the comments were not improper, then contends even if they were,

they were not prejudicial, given the district court’s admonishment of the jury

following closing arguments as to the government’s burden of proof.

Even if the prosecutor’s comments were improper, they were not prejudicial.

The comments were brief, over a matter of seconds in the context of the four-day trial

(three successive statements, with objections to each sustained); the government’s

case was strong (consisting of corroborating testimony of witnesses and three

victims); and the comments promptly were cured by the district court’s admonition.

Cf. United States v. Johnson, 968 F.2d 768, 771 (8th Cir. 1992).

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm Conroy’s convictions for aggravated sexual abuse and abusive

sexual conduct.

______________________________

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