Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-23-35136/USCOURTS-ca9-23-35136-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Steve Conway
Appellee
Robert Ferguson
Appellee
Tina Griffin
Appellee
Deb Haaland
Appellee
Jeff Holy
Appellee
Jay Inslee
Appellee
Shelley Kloba
Appellee
Sarah Lawson
Appellee
Alicia Levy
Appellee
Maverick Gaming LLC
Appellant
Bryan Newland
Appellee
Non-Party Compacting Tribes
Amicus Curiae
Julia Patterson
Appellee
Kristine Reeves
Appellee
Shoalwater Bay Tribe
Appellee
Bud Sizemore
Appellee
U.S. Department of the Interior
Appellee
United States of America
Appellee
Brandon Vick
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MAVERICK GAMING LLC, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE 

INTERIOR; DEB HAALAND, in her 

official capacity as Secretary of the 

Interior; BRYAN NEWLAND, in his 

official capacity as Assistant Secretary 

Indian Affairs; JAY INSLEE, in his 

official capacity as the Governor of 

Washington; ROBERT FERGUSON, 

in his official capacity as the Attorney 

General of Washington; ALICIA 

LEVY, in her official capacity as 

Chair of the Washington State 

Gambling Commission; JULIA 

PATTERSON, in her official capacity 

as Vice-Chair of the Washington State 

Gambling Commission; BUD 

SIZEMORE, in his official capacity as 

Commissioner of the Washington 

State Gambling Commission; 

KRISTINE REEVES, in her official 

No. 23-35136 

D.C. No. 3:22-cv05325-DGE 

OPINION

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2 MAVERICK GAMING LLC V. USA

capacity as Commissioner of the 

Washington State Gambling 

Commission; SARAH LAWSON, in 

her official capacity as Commissioner 

of the Washington State Gambling 

Commission; STEVE CONWAY, in 

his official capacity as ex officio 

member of the Washington State 

Gambling Commission; JEFF HOLY, 

in his official capacity as ex officio 

member of the Washington State 

Gambling Commission; SHELLEY 

KLOBA, in her official capacity as ex 

officio member of the Washington 

State Gambling Commission; 

BRANDON VICK, in his official

capacity as ex officio member of the 

Washington State Gambling 

Commission; TINA GRIFFIN, in her 

official capacity as Director of the 

Washington State Gambling 

Commission, 

Defendants-Appellees, 

 and 

SHOALWATER BAY TRIBE, 

Intervenor-DefendantAppellee.

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MAVERICK GAMING LLC V. USA 3

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

David G. Estudillo, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 27, 2024

Seattle, Washington

Filed December 13, 2024

Before: Kim McLane Wardlaw, William A. Fletcher, and 

Eric D. Miller, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Wardlaw;

Concurrence by Judge Miller

SUMMARY*

Indian Regulatory Gaming Act / Fed. R. Civ. P. 19

The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of 

Maverick Gaming LLC’s action—which alleged that the 

State of Washington’s tribal-state compacts allowing sports 

betting on tribal land violate the Indian Regulatory Gaming 

Act, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Tenth 

Amendment—because the Shoalwater Bay Indian Tribe is a 

required party that cannot be joined to the litigation. 

The panel held that the Tribe is a required party under 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a) because the Tribe has a legally 

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has 

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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4 MAVERICK GAMING LLC V. USA

protected interest in the lawsuit that may be impaired or 

impeded in the Tribe’s absence, and rejected Maverick’s 

argument that the federal government could adequately 

represent the Tribe’s interests. The panel held that the Tribe 

cannot feasibly be joined to the litigation where the Tribe 

enjoys sovereign immunity. Finally, the panel held that the 

litigation cannot proceed in equity and good conscience 

without the Tribe, and rejected Maverick’s argument that the 

litigation should continue in the Tribe’s absence under the 

public rights exception.

Concurring, Judge Miller agreed that Maverick’s action 

cannot proceed because the Tribe is a required party but 

sovereign immunity prevents the Tribe from being joined 

without its consent. He wrote separately to explain that 

(1) this Court’s precedent on Rule 19 has not adequately 

considered the distinctive character of litigation under the 

Administrative Procedure Act, and (2) a competitive injury, 

by itself, is not enough to make a tribe a required party.

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MAVERICK GAMING LLC V. USA 5

COUNSEL

Lochlan F. Shelfer (argued), Matthew D. McGill, and 

Theodore B. Olson, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP, 

Washington, D.C., for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Amber B. Blaha (argued) and Rebecca M. Ross, Attorneys; 

Todd S. Kim, Assistant Attorney General; Environment & 

Natural Resources Division, United States Department of 

Justice, Washington, D.C.; Tera M. Heintz (argued), Deputy 

Solicitor General; William D. McGinty, Assistant Attorney 

General, Complex Litigation Division; Robert Ferguson, 

Attorney General; Office of the Washington Attorney 

General, Olympia, Washington; Brian H. Rowe, Kristin 

Beneski, Assistant Attorneys General; Office of the 

Washington Attorney General, Seattle, Washington; Jody H. 

Schwarz, Senior Attorney, United States Department of the 

Interior, Washington, D.C.; for Defendants-Appellees.

Scott D. Crowell (argued), Crowell Law Offices Tribal 

Advocacy Group, LLP, Sedona, Arizona; Lael Echo-Hawk, 

MThirtySix PLLC, Washington, D.C.; for IntervenorDefendant-Appellee.

Keith M. Harper, Leonard R. Powell, and Allison M. 

Tjemsland, Jenner & Block LLP, Washington, D.C.; Cory J. 

Albright and Reed C. Bienvenu, Kanji & Katzen PLLC, 

Seattle, Washington, for Amicus Curiae Non-Party 

Compacting Tribes.

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6 MAVERICK GAMING LLC V. USA

OPINION

WARDLAW, Circuit Judge:

In 1988, Congress enacted the Indian Regulatory 

Gaming Act (“IGRA”) “to provide a statutory basis for the 

operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of 

promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, 

and strong tribal governments.” 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1). To 

this end, IGRA provides a regulatory scheme for the creation 

and administration of tribal-state gaming compacts. These 

gaming compacts allow tribes to conduct casino-style 

gambling, classified under IGRA as “class III” games. In 

the State of Washington, all twenty-nine federally 

recognized tribes have entered into IGRA gaming compacts

that allow them to offer class III gaming on their land. Class 

III gaming is otherwise illegal in Washington. 

Maverick Gaming LLC (“Maverick”) is a casino gaming 

company. Maverick owns several hotels and casinos in 

Nevada and Colorado, where it offers a variety of class III 

games, such as roulette and craps. In 2019, shortly after the 

Supreme Court struck down a federal statute that prohibited 

states from allowing sports gambling, see Murphy v. Nat’l

Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 584 U.S. 453 (2018), Maverick 

acquired nineteen cardrooms in the State of Washington. 

Maverick subsequently lobbied the Washington legislature 

to enact a law that would allow it to offer sports betting at 

these cardrooms, but without success. Consistent with its 

criminal prohibition of all other forms of class III gaming, 

the Washington legislature did not legalize sports betting for 

private entities. However, the legislature enacted a law that 

allows Indian tribes to amend their gaming compacts to 

authorize sports betting on their land.

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MAVERICK GAMING LLC V. USA 7

In response, Maverick filed this lawsuit. Maverick’s 

complaint alleges that Washington’s tribal-state compacts

and the sports betting compact amendments violate IGRA, 

the Equal Protection Clause, and the Tenth Amendment of 

the United States Constitution. The complaint names as 

defendants the United States and various federal officials 

responsible for the approval of the tribal-state gaming 

compacts, as well as the various Washington state officials 

involved in the execution and administration of those 

compacts. Although Maverick seeks relief that would 

invalidate the gaming compacts of all tribes in Washington, 

Maverick did not include any of these tribes as parties to the 

suit. 

The Shoalwater Bay Indian Tribe (“Tribe”) moved to 

intervene in the suit for the limited purpose of filing a motion 

to dismiss. The Tribe argues that it is a required party that 

cannot be joined in the action on account of its sovereign 

immunity. The district court granted the motion to intervene 

and the ensuing motion to dismiss. Because we agree with 

the district court that the Tribe is a required party that cannot 

be joined in the litigation, and because this suit cannot 

proceed in equity and good conscience in the Tribe’s

absence, we affirm. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Federal History

In 1987, the Supreme Court decided its landmark 

decision in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 

480 U.S. 202 (1987). Invoking the “traditional notions of 

Indian sovereignty and the congressional goal of Indian selfgovernment, including its ‘overriding goal’ of encouraging 

tribal self-sufficiency and economic development,” 

Cabazon held that a state cannot enforce its generally 

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8 MAVERICK GAMING LLC V. USA

applicable gaming regulations on tribal land without 

Congress’s express authorization. Id. at 217 (quoting New 

Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 335 

(1983)). 

In response, Congress enacted IGRA. See In re Indian 

Gaming Related Cases (Coyote Valley II), 331 F.3d 1094, 

1097 (9th Cir. 2003). While drafting the legislation, the 

Select Committee on Indian Affairs acknowledged the 

importance of gaming to tribal sovereignty, explaining that 

the income from gaming has enabled tribes “to provide a 

wider range of government services to tribal citizens and 

reservation residents than would otherwise have been 

possible” and often spells “the difference between an 

adequate governmental program and a skeletal program that 

is totally dependent on Federal funding.” S. Rep. No. 100-

446, at 2–3 (1988). But the Committee also recognized that 

some sort of regulatory scheme was necessary “to protect 

both the tribes and the gaming public from unscrupulous 

persons.” Id. at 2. Congress thus created IGRA “to balance 

the need for sound enforcement of gaming laws and 

regulations, with the strong federal interest in preserving the 

sovereign rights of tribal governments to regulate activities 

and enforce laws on Indian land.” Id. at 5.

To this end, IGRA’s stated purpose is “to provide a 

statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes 

as a means of promoting tribal economic development, selfsufficiency, and strong tribal governments,” while 

simultaneously seeking “to provide a statutory basis for the 

regulation of gaming by an Indian tribe.” 25 U.S.C. 

§ 2702(1)–(2). To further these goals, IGRA requires that 

tribes maintain the “sole proprietary interest” for any gaming 

activity. Id. § 2710(b)(2)(A). The statutory scheme further 

specifies that the net revenues from tribal gaming may be 

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MAVERICK GAMING LLC V. USA 9

used solely “(i) to fund tribal government operations or 

programs; (ii) to provide for the general welfare of the Indian 

tribe and its members; (iii) to promote tribal economic 

development; (iv) to donate to charitable organizations; or 

(v) to help fund operations of local government agencies.” 

Id. § 2710(b)(2)(B), (d)(1)(A)(ii). 

IGRA creates three classes of gaming, each of which is 

subject to a different level of regulation. Class I games 

include social games for prizes of minimal value and 

traditional forms of Indian gaming. Id. § 2703(6). Class II 

games include bingo and certain card games. Id.

§ 2703(7)(A). At issue in this case are class III games, the 

most heavily regulated form of gaming under IGRA. This 

class is comprised of “all forms of gaming that are not class 

I gaming or class II gaming,” id. § 2703(8), including 

blackjack, roulette, and craps, as well as slot machines and 

sports betting, see id. § 2703(7)(B). “Class III gaming is not 

only ‘a source of substantial revenue’ for tribes, but the 

lifeblood on ‘which many tribes ha[ve] come to rely.’” 

Chicken Ranch Rancheria of Me-Wuk Indians v. California, 

42 F.4th 1024, 1032 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Coyote Valley 

II, 331 F.3d at 1097, 1099–1100) (alteration in original). 

IGRA permits class III gaming on tribal land if three 

conditions are met: (1) the tribe has authorized the class III 

gaming by a tribal ordinance or resolution; (2) the state in 

which the tribe is located permits such gaming for any 

purpose by any person, organization, or entity; and (3) the 

class III gaming is conducted in conformity with a tribalstate compact that is in effect. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1). The 

last requirement necessitates the existence of a tribal-state 

gaming compact, which “prescribes rules for operating 

gaming, allocates law enforcement authority between the 

tribe and State, and provides remedies for breach of the 

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10 MAVERICK GAMING LLC V. USA

agreement’s terms.” Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 

572 U.S. 782, 785 (2014). “The compacting process gives 

to states civil regulatory authority that they otherwise would 

lack under Cabazon, while granting to tribes the ability to 

offer legal class III gaming.” Artichoke Joe’s Cal. Grand 

Casino v. Norton, 353 F.3d 712, 716 (9th Cir. 2003). The 

creation of a tribal-state compact begins with a tribe 

“request[ing] the State in which [its] lands are located to 

enter into negotiations for the purpose of entering into a 

Tribal-State compact governing the conduct of gaming 

activities.” 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A). IGRA imposes a 

duty upon the states to “negotiate with the Indian tribe in 

good faith to enter into such a compact,” and provides the 

tribe with statutory remedies if no compact results from 

these negotiations. Id. § 2710(d)(3)(A), (d)(7). 

Once the state and tribe have entered into a compact, the 

compact is sent to the Secretary of the Interior (the 

“Secretary”) for approval. Id. § 2710(d)(3)(B), (d)(8). The 

Secretary may disapprove a compact only if it violates 

(1) any provision of IGRA; (2) any other provision of federal 

law that does not relate to jurisdiction over gaming on Indian 

lands; or (3) the trust obligations of the United States to 

Indians. Id. § 2710(d)(8)(B). If the Secretary does not 

approve or disapprove a compact within 45 days of 

submission to the Secretary for approval, the compact “shall 

be considered to have been approved” by operation of law, 

“but only to the extent the compact is consistent with” 

IGRA. Id. § 2710(d)(8)(C). Approved compacts become 

effective after the Secretary publishes notice in the Federal 

Register. Id. § 2710(d)(3)(B), (d)(8)(D). 

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MAVERICK GAMING LLC V. USA 11

B. Washington State History

For the first 83 years of Washington’s existence, the 

state’s constitution prohibited all forms of gambling. See

Wash. Const. art. II, § 24 (amended 1972). A 1972

constitutional amendment authorized specific types of 

gambling, but only if approved by a supermajority of the 

state legislature or electorate. See id. Shortly thereafter, the 

state legislature created the Washington State Gambling 

Commission and passed a law authorizing certain limited 

forms of gambling, such as charitable activities, raffles, and 

amusement games. See Wash. Rev. Code § 9.46.0311. But 

because it is otherwise “the policy of the legislature, 

recognizing the close relationship between professional 

gambling and organized crime, to restrain all persons from 

seeking profit from professional gambling activities in this

state,” id. § 9.46.010, most forms of casino-style gaming, 

including those classified as class III games under IGRA, are 

illegal on non-tribal lands in Washington, see generally id.

§ 9.46. 

A few years after IGRA went into effect, the legislature 

enacted Washington Revised Code § 9.46.360, which directs 

the Gambling Commission to negotiate “compacts for class 

III gaming on behalf of the state with federally recognized 

Indian tribes in the state of Washington” in accordance with 

IGRA. Wash. Rev. Code § 9.46.360(2). Ultimately, after 

negotiations and possible public hearings, the proposed 

compact is sent to the governor for review and final 

execution. Id. § 9.46.360(6). Washington has since 

negotiated and entered into gaming compacts with all 

twenty-nine federally recognized tribes within its borders, 

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allowing the tribes to conduct class III gaming on their land.1 

Class III gaming has been a source of great economic value

to the tribes. In 2020, Washington’s tribal casinos provided 

more than 14,000 jobs.2 And in 2021, Washington’s tribal 

gaming industry netted over $2 billion.3 

In March 2020, the Governor of Washington signed into 

law House Bill 2638 (“H.B. 2638”). H.B. 2638 created 

Washington Revised Code § 9.46.0364, which allows a tribe 

to amend its class III gaming compact “to authorize the tribe 

to conduct and operate sports wagering on its Indian lands” 

pursuant to IGRA and Washington Revised Code 

§ 9.46.360. Before enacting H.B. 2638, the legislature 

considered legislation that would have allowed private 

cardrooms, such as those owned by Maverick, to conduct 

sports wagering.4 Maverick also testified in opposition to 

H.B. 2638, advocating instead for a law that would authorize 

sports betting at licensed cardrooms in addition to tribal 

1 See Wash. State Gambling Comm’n, Tribal gaming compacts and 

amendments (last visited July 28, 2024), 

https://www.wsgc.wa.gov/tribal-gaming/gaming-compacts. 

2 Wash. Indian Gaming Ass’n, The Economic & Community Benefits of 

Tribes in Washington, 12 (May 2022) (last visited July 27, 2024), 

https://tinyurl.com/4dauyxkv. 

3 Wash. State Gambling Comm’n, Gambling Industry Overview 2022, 2 

(2022) (last visited July 27, 2024), https://tinyurl.com/mr2rzrst. 

4 Senators King and Rivers proposed a bill that would have authorized 

sports wagering at cardrooms and racetracks. See S.B. 6277, 66th Leg., 

2020 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2020). Senator Rivers also proposed an 

amendment to H.B. 2638 that would have allowed licensed cardrooms to 

conduct sports wagering. See 2638-S.E AMS RIVE JOSU 302, 66th 

Leg., 2020 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2020). These proposals were not adopted. 

Id. 

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MAVERICK GAMING LLC V. USA 13

casinos.5 The legislature ultimately decided against

allowing private entities to offer sports betting, explaining: 

It has long been the policy of this state to 

prohibit all forms and means of gambling 

except where carefully and specifically 

authorized and regulated. The legislature 

intends to further this policy by authorizing 

sports wagering on a very limited basis by

restricting it to tribal casinos in the state of 

Washington. Tribes have more than twenty 

years’ experience with, and a proven track 

record of, successfully operating and 

regulating gaming facilities in accordance 

with tribal gaming compacts. Tribal casinos 

can operate sports wagering pursuant to these 

tribal gaming compacts, offering the benefits 

of the same highly regulated environment to 

sports wagering. 

2020 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 127, § 1. In 2021 and 2022, the 

legislature again rejected bills that would have made it legal 

to offer sports betting at cardrooms and racetracks.6 Since 

5 Maverick’s Chief Executive Officer, Eric Persson, and several other 

representatives of the company testified before the House Committee on 

Gaming & Commerce in opposition to H.B. 2638. See H.B. Rep. 2638, 

66th Leg., 2020 Reg. Sess., at 6–7, 8–9 (Wash. 2020). Summarizing this 

testimony, the House Bill Report explains that those who opposed the 

bill argued that private cardrooms should be allowed to offer sports 

betting because “[l]icensed card rooms are heavily regulated, just as 

tribal gaming is,” id. at 6, and allowing only tribal casinos to offer sports 

betting “creates an unfair playing field,” id. at 8. 

6 See S.B. 5212, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2021); H.B. 1674, 67th 

Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2022).

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14 MAVERICK GAMING LLC V. USA

then, twenty of Washington’s federally recognized tribes 

have received the Secretary’s approval for compact 

amendments allowing sports wagering on their land.7 

C. Shoalwater Bay Indian Tribe’s History

The Shoalwater Bay Indian Tribe is a federally 

recognized Indian tribe located on the Shoalwater Bay 

Indian Reservation (“Reservation”) in rural western

Washington.8 Like the other twenty-eight federally 

recognized tribes in Washington today, the Tribe has 

reached agreement with the State on a gaming compact that 

allows it to offer class III gaming on its land.9 

Despite ultimately reaching agreement on a gaming 

compact with the State, the Tribe’s relationship with the 

State is best characterized as adversarial. In 1998, after 

several years of the Tribe’s efforts to negotiate a gaming 

compact, and the State’s refusal to do so, the Tribe began

operating 108 gambling machines at the Reservation’s 

casino over the objection of the State and without a compact. 

See United States v. Shoalwater Bay Indian Tribe, 205 F.3d 

1353, 1999 WL 1269343, at *1 (9th Cir. 1999). In response, 

the United States filed an in rem forfeiture action and seized 

the Tribe’s gambling machines. Id. Undeterred, the Tribe 

installed a different type of gaming machine on tribal 

property the following year. Further enforcement action 

followed. The National Indian Gaming Commission issued 

a Notice of Violation and Order of Closure, which accused 

7 Wash. State Gambling Comm’n, supra note 1. 

8 See Indian Entities Recognized by and Eligible to Receive Services 

from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 88 Fed. Reg. 2112, 2114 

(Jan. 12, 2023).

9 See Indian Gaming, 67 Fed. Reg. 68152-02 (Nov. 8, 2002).

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MAVERICK GAMING LLC V. USA 15

the Tribe of violating IGRA by conducting class III gaming 

activities on its land without a tribal-state compact. The 

conflict persisted until the United States Department of the 

Interior’s Office of Hearings and Appeals enjoined the 

National Indian Gaming Commission from taking further 

enforcement action against the Tribe in 2002, at which point 

the Tribe and the State were able to reach an agreement, 

negotiating and entering into a gaming compact that became 

effective with the Secretary’s approval in November 2002.10

The Tribe has since negotiated and received the 

Secretary’s approval for three amendments to its compact.11 

The most recent amendment, effective September 15, 2021, 

authorizes the Tribe to offer sports gambling.12 

Today, the Reservation’s casino and restaurant are 

operated by Willapa Bay Enterprises, and help to sustain the 

Tribe’s economic well-being. Incorporated by the Tribe in 

2007, Willapa Bay Enterprises employs 120 individuals, 

approximately thirty percent of whom are tribal members, 

tribal spouses, or the immediate family members of tribal 

members. The casino serves as a gathering place for the 

Tribe and its surrounding community and is a source of pride 

for the Tribe’s members. 

10 See Indian Gaming, 67 Fed. Reg. 68152, 68152-02 (Nov. 8, 2002). 

11 See Indian Gaming, 72 Fed. Reg. 30392-01, 30392 (May 31, 2007); 

Indian Gaming, 80 Fed. Reg. 31918-02, 31918 (June 4, 2015); Indian 

Gaming, Approval of Tribal-State Class III Gaming Compact in the State 

of Washington, 86 Fed. Reg. 51373-01, 51373 (Sept. 15, 2021). 

12 See Indian Gaming; Approval of Tribal-State Class III Gaming 

Compact in the State of Washington, 86 Fed. Reg. 51373-01, 51373

(Sept. 15, 2021). 

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II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

After failing to persuade Washington officials to enact 

legislation that would allow sports betting at its cardrooms, 

Maverick decided to try a new strategy. On January 11, 

2022, Maverick sued the various federal officials 

(collectively, “Federal Defendants”) and Washington state 

officials (collectively, “State Defendants”) responsible for 

the creation, approval, and administration of the Washington 

tribes’ gaming compacts and sports betting compact 

amendments in the United States District Court for the 

District of Columbia. The complaint did not name any of 

Washington’s twenty-nine federally recognized tribes as 

defendants. 

Maverick’s complaint alleged three claims. The first 

claim, against the Federal Defendants under the 

Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), alleged that the 

Secretary’s approval of the Washington tribes’ sports betting 

compact amendments violated IGRA, the Equal Protection 

Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and the anticommandeering 

principle of the Tenth Amendment (“APA claim”). 

Maverick sought declaratory relief to that effect, as well as a 

declaration that the Tribes’ sports gaming violated IGRA 

and sought vacatur of the Secretary’s approval of the sports 

betting amendments. 

Maverick’s second claim against the State Defendants, 

brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, equitable principles, and 

the Declaratory Judgment Act, alleged that the state 

officials’ execution and administration of the tribal-state 

compacts and the sports betting amendments violated IGRA 

and related federal statutes, the Equal Protection Clause, and 

the anticommandeering principle of the Tenth Amendment

(“Equal Protection claim”). Maverick again sought 

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MAVERICK GAMING LLC V. USA 17

declaratory relief to that effect. Maverick also sought an 

injunction prohibiting members of the Washington State 

Gambling Commission from continuing to administer the 

compacts and sports betting amendments and the governor 

of Washington from entering into any new compacts. 

In its third claim, also against the State Defendants under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983, equitable principles, and the Declaratory 

Judgment Act, Maverick alleged that the state’s exemption 

of the tribes from its criminal prohibition on most forms of 

class III gaming violated the Constitution’s guarantee of 

equal protection (“Criminal Prohibition claim”). Again,

Maverick sought declaratory relief to that effect, and an 

injunction prohibiting the State Defendants from enforcing 

those criminal laws against Maverick.13

On February 24, 2022, the State Defendants moved to 

transfer venue to the Western District of Washington based 

on the D.C. District Court’s lack of personal jurisdiction 

over them and in the interests of justice and convenience. In 

response, Maverick moved for leave to amend its complaint 

to drop the State Defendants as defendants, even though it 

maintained its challenge to the Washington laws. In 

opposition, the State Defendants argued that they were 

required parties under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a).

Without ruling on the motion for leave to file the amended 

complaint, the D.C. District Court granted the State 

Defendants’ motion to transfer the case to the Western 

District of Washington on April 28, 2022. Maverick then 

filed its First Amended Complaint, which retained the State 

Defendants and stated identical claims as its first complaint.

13 On each claim, Maverick also sought an award of nominal damages

and reasonable costs (including attorney’s fees). 

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Shortly thereafter, the Tribe moved to intervene for the 

limited purpose of filing a motion to dismiss under Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(7) contending that it is a 

required party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19. 

The district court granted the Tribe’s motion to intervene on 

September 29, 2022, and four days later the Tribe moved to 

dismiss the First Amended Complaint. Both the Federal 

Defendants and the State Defendants supported the Tribe’s 

motion. 

The district court granted the Tribe’s motion to dismiss, 

ruling that the Tribe is a required party under Rule 19(a). 

Because of “the long history of tribal gaming and associated 

employment benefits for the tribes and the surrounding 

community” the district court found that Maverick’s suit 

may impair the Tribe’s legally protected interest in “the 

economic and sovereign rights” conferred by its gaming 

compact. The district court rejected Maverick’s argument 

that existing parties to the suit could adequately represent 

these interests in the Tribe’s absence, explaining that, under 

Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our Environment v. Bureau 

of Indian Affairs, 932 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 2019) and its 

progeny, the Federal Defendants’ interests in defending their 

approval of the sports betting compact amendments “clearly 

diverge” from the Tribe’s sovereign interest in the continued 

operation of class III gaming. 

Next, because the Tribe had not waived its sovereign 

immunity by intervening for the limited purpose of asserting 

that it was a required party under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 19(a), the district court concluded that the Tribe 

could not feasibly be joined in the litigation. The district 

court weighed the equitable factors to be considered when 

determining whether “in equity and good conscience,” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 19(b), the action should proceed or be dismissed, 

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and concluded that dismissal was required. The district court 

noted the “‘wall of circuit authority’ requiring dismissal 

when a Native American tribe cannot be joined due to its 

assertion of tribal sovereign immunity.” Klamath Irrigation 

Dist. v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 48 F.4th 934, 947 (9th 

Cir. 2022) (quoting Deschutes River All. v. Portland Gen. 

Elec. Co., 1 F.4th 1153, 1163 (9th Cir. 2021)). 

Finally, the district court concluded that the threat posed 

by Maverick’s suit to the Tribe’s “legal entitlements is 

sufficient such that the public rights exception,” which 

applies in cases filed to vindicate a public right, did not relax 

the joinder rules here. The court noted its doubt that this case 

was brought in the public interest given Maverick’s detailed 

statements in the complaint explaining how “invalidation of 

the tribal compacts would increase Maverick’s commercial 

revenue.” 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“We review a district court’s decision to dismiss a case 

for failure to join a required party under Rule 19 for abuse of 

discretion, and we review any legal questions underlying 

that decision de novo.” Klamath Irrigation, 48 F.4th at 943. 

We review de novo issues of tribal sovereign immunity. 

Jamul Action Comm. v. Simermeyer, 974 F.3d 984, 991 (9th 

Cir. 2020). 

IV. DISCUSSION

A party may move for dismissal of a complaint under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(7) for “failure to join 

a party under Rule 19.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(7). Rule 19 

sets forth a three-step inquiry. First, we determine whether 

the absent party is “required” under Rule 19(a). Klamath 

Irrigation, 48 F.4th at 943. If the absent party is required, 

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we then “determine whether joinder of that party is feasible.” 

Id. If joinder is infeasible, we must then “determine 

whether, in equity and good conscience, the action should 

proceed among the existing parties or should be dismissed.” 

Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b)). 

A. The Shoalwater Bay Indian Tribe is a required party.

We must first determine whether the Tribe is a “required 

party” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a). A party 

is required if: 

(A)in that person’s absence, the court cannot 

accord complete relief among existing 

parties; or 

(B) that person claims an interest relating to 

the subject of the action and is so situated 

that disposing of the action in the 

person’s absence may:

(i) as a practical matter impair or impede 

the person’s ability to protect the 

interest; or 

(ii) leave an existing party subject to a 

substantial risk of incurring double, 

multiple, or otherwise inconsistent 

obligations because of the interest.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1). The district court concluded that

the Tribe is a required party under Rule 19(a)(1)(B)(i) 

because the Tribe has a legally protected interest in the 

lawsuit that may be impaired or impeded in the Tribe’s

absence. We agree. 

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1.

“To come within the bounds of Rule 19(a)(1)(B)(i), the 

interest of the absent party must be a legally protected 

interest and not merely some stake in the outcome of the 

litigation.” Jamul Action Comm., 974 F.3d at 996. This 

interest “must be ‘more than a financial stake.’” Diné 

Citizens, 932 F.3d at 852 (quoting Makah Indian Tribe v. 

Verity, 910 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir. 1990)). For example, “an 

interest that arises from terms in bargained contracts may be 

protected, but such an interest must be substantial.” Id.

(quoting Cachil Dehe Band of Mintun Indians of the Colusa 

Indian Cmty. v. California (Colusa), 547 F.3d 962, 970 (9th 

Cir. 2008)) (quotation marks and alterations omitted). 

However, “[t]here is no precise formula for determining 

whether a particular nonparty should be joined under Rule 

19(a),” Bakia v. Los Angeles Cnty., 687 F.2d 299, 301 (9th 

Cir. 1982) (per curiam), and “we have emphasized the 

‘practical’ and ‘fact-specific’ nature of the inquiry,” Colusa, 

547 F.3d at 970 (quoting Makah, 910 F.2d at 558). 

The district court correctly concluded that, because of 

the importance of tribal gaming compacts and the revenue 

that these compacts provide to Washington’s federally 

recognized tribes, as well as the long history of tribal gaming 

and its associated benefits for the tribes and their 

surrounding communities, Maverick’s suit implicates the 

Tribe’s legally protected economic and sovereign interests. 

Maverick does not contest this conclusion. In fact, Maverick 

concedes that the Tribe has a legitimate interest in the 

legality of its gaming compact and sports betting 

amendment. Therefore, because Maverick’s APA and equal 

protection claims seek relief that would result in the 

invalidation of the Tribe’s gaming compact and sports 

betting amendment, Maverick does not dispute that the Tribe 

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has a legally protected interest in the first and second claims 

in the First Amended Complaint challenging the Secretary’s 

approval and the State Defendants’ administration of the 

compact and amendment. 

Straying from the text of the complaint and its argument 

below, which focuses on the Tribe’s exemption from 

Washington’s criminal laws prohibiting class III gaming, 

Maverick now contends that the Tribe has no legally 

protected interest in the Criminal Prohibition claim. This 

issue is not preserved for appellate review because it was not 

“raised sufficiently for the trial court to rule on it.” 

Cornhusker Cas. Ins. Co. v. Kachman, 553 F.3d 1187, 1192 

(9th Cir. 2009) (quoting In re E.R. Fegert, 887 F.2d 955, 957 

(9th Cir. 1989)). Maverick states “in passing,” Brownfield 

v. City of Yakima, 612 F.3d 1140, 1149 n.4 (9th Cir. 2010),

that the district court “could redress Maverick’s injuries by 

simply enjoining the State defendants from enforcing 

[Washington’s criminal laws prohibiting class III gaming] 

against Maverick.” This statement is far removed from a 

specific and distinct argument that the Criminal Prohibition 

claim “does not threaten the Tribe’s compact or its gaming 

activities at all.” See id. Our court generally “will not hear 

an issue raised for the first time on appeal,” Whittaker Corp. 

v. Execuair Corp., 953 F.2d 510, 515 (9th Cir. 1992), and we 

decline to do so here.

2.

Maverick also argues that the Tribe’s interest will not be 

impaired or impeded because the Federal Defendants can 

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adequately represent the Tribe’s interests in this litigation.14

“As a practical matter, an absent party’s ability to protect its 

interest will not be impaired by its absence from the suit 

where its interest will be adequately represented by existing 

parties to the suit.” Alto v. Black, 738 F.3d 1111, 1127 (9th 

Cir. 2013) (quoting Washington v. Daley, 173 F.3d 1158, 

1167 (9th Cir. 1999)). We have held that 

whether an existing party may adequately 

represent an absent required party’s interests 

depends on three factors: (1) whether the 

interests of a present party to the suit are such 

that it will undoubtedly make all of the absent 

party’s arguments; (2) whether the party is 

capable of and willing to make such 

arguments; and (3) whether the absent party 

would offer any necessary element to the 

proceedings that the present parties would 

neglect. 

Klamath Irrigation, 48 F.4th at 944 (quoting Diné Citizens, 

932 F.3d at 852) (internal quotation marks omitted). The 

complaint states only the APA claim against the Federal 

Defendants; only the State Defendants are named in the 

second and third claims. The district court did not abuse its 

discretion in finding that, under Diné Citizens and Klamath 

14 Maverick concedes that State Defendants cannot adequately represent 

the Tribe’s interests in this case. See Am. Greyhound Racing, 305 F.3d 

at 1023 n.5. 

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Irrigation, the Federal Defendants will not be able to

adequately represent the Tribe’s interest here.15

In Diné Citizens, a coalition of tribal, regional, and 

national conservation organizations sued the U.S. 

Department of the Interior challenging its reauthorization of 

coal mining activities on land reserved to the Navajo Nation. 

932 F.3d at 847. The plaintiffs challenged the agency’s 

approval of renewals to leases and mining permits possessed 

by the Navajo Transitional Energy Company (“NTEC”), a 

corporation wholly owned by the Navajo Nation, on the 

grounds that the agency’s action violated the requirements 

of the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) and National 

Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”). Id. at 847, 849–50. 

There, like here, NTEC intervened for the limited purpose of 

filing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(7) for failure to 

a join a party required under Rule 19 based on NTCE’s and 

the Navajo Nation’s sovereign immunity. Id. at 850.

Affirming the district court’s dismissal, we rejected the 

plaintiffs’ argument that the federal government could 

adequately represent the tribe’s interests. We reasoned that, 

“[a]lthough Federal Defendants have an interest in 

defending their decisions, their overriding interest . . . must 

be in complying with environmental laws.” Id. at 855. We 

determined that “[t]his interest differs in a meaningful sense 

from NTEC’s and the Navajo Nation’s sovereign interest in 

ensuring that the Mine and Power Plant continue to operate 

and provide profits to the Navajo Nation.” Id. We 

15 Both parties parse the complaint to argue that the Federal Defendants 

can or cannot adequately defend the Tribe’s interest in this action. But 

this analysis is besides the point because Maverick’s concessions below 

require us to assume that if Maverick prevails on any one of its claims 

for relief the Tribe’s economic and sovereign interests may be impaired. 

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explained that a judicial holding that “these statutes required 

something other than what Federal Defendants have 

interpreted them to require could similarly change Federal 

Defendants’ planned actions, affecting the lease, rights-ofway, and permits at stake,” and therefore the “Federal 

Defendants’ interest might diverge from that of NTEC.” Id. 

Three years later in Klamath Irrigation, plaintiffs sued 

the federal Bureau of Reclamation (“Reclamation”) to 

challenge the agency’s operating procedures for the 

distribution of water in the Klamath Water Basin. 48 F.4th 

at 938. In adopting these procedures, Reclamation had “the 

‘nearly impossible’ task of balancing multiple competing 

interests,” including the interests of the irrigation district 

members, the requirements of the ESA, and the federal 

reserved water and fishing rights of the non-party tribes. Id.

at 940–41. Again, as here, the absent tribes moved to 

intervene, and then immediately “moved to dismiss. . . under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(7) for failure to join a 

required party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19, 

arguing that tribal sovereign immunity barred their joinder.” 

Id. at 942. 

We held that Reclamation could not adequately represent 

the absent tribes’ water and fishing rights. Id. at 944–45. 

Applying Diné Citizens, we explained that although the 

federal agency and the absent tribes “share an interest in the 

ultimate outcome of this case, our precedent underscores that 

such alignment on the ultimate outcome is insufficient for us 

to hold that the government is an adequate representative of

the tribes.” Id. at 945. Rather, because “[t]he Tribes’

primary interest is in ensuring the continued fulfillment of 

their reserved water and fishing rights, while Reclamation’s

primary interest is in defending its [action] taken pursuant to 

the ESA and APA,” their interests were “not so aligned as to 

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make Reclamation an adequate representative of the Tribes.” 

Id. at 944–45.

We agree with the district court that under Diné Citizens

and Klamath Irrigation, the Federal Defendants cannot 

adequately represent the Tribe’s interests here. The federal 

government and the Tribe undoubtedly “share an interest in 

the ultimate outcome of this case”—they both seek to defend 

the Secretary’s approval of the compacts and sports betting 

compact amendments. Id. at 945. But they “share an interest 

in the ultimate outcome of this case for very different 

reasons.” Id. As the district court explained, “though the 

federal government maintains an interest in defending its 

own analysis that formed the basis of its decision to approve 

the sports-betting compact amendments, it does not share an 

interest in the outcome of the continued approval of the 

sports-betting compact amendments—the continued 

operation of sports-betting at tribal casinos.” In contrast, the 

Tribe is interested in defending the approval of the compacts

and compact amendments to ensure the continued operation 

of sports betting and other class III gaming on its land. 

Whereas the Federal Defendants’ “interests in this litigation 

begin and end with” defending the compacts, “for the Tribe, 

the stakes of this litigation extend beyond the fate of the 

[compact] and implicate sovereign interests in selfgovernance.” Deschutes River All., 1 F.4th at 1163. 

Because the federal government’s interest in this litigation is 

meaningfully distinct from the Tribe’s, the Federal 

Defendants cannot serve as an adequate representative of the 

Tribe. 

Maverick attempts to distinguish Diné Citizens and 

Klamath Irrigation by arguing that they were challenges to 

the federal agency enforcement of statutes and regulations 

other than IGRA, which were not intended to benefit tribal 

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interests. So in Diné Citizens we found that “[a]lthough 

Federal Defendants have an interest in defending their 

decisions, their overriding interest . . . must be in complying 

with environmental laws.” Diné Citizens, 932 F.3d at 855. 

And similarly, in Klamath Irrigation we concluded that 

“Reclamation has the ‘nearly impossible’ task of balancing 

multiple competing interests in the Klamath Basin,” only 

one of which was the tribes’ federal reserved water and 

fishing rights. Klamath Irrigation, 48 F.4th at 940. By 

contrast, Maverick argues, IGRA was created “to provide a 

statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes 

as a means of promoting tribal economic development, selfsufficiency, and strong tribal governments,” 25 U.S.C.

§ 2702(1), and requires the Secretary to disapprove any 

compact that violates “the trust obligations of the United 

States to Indians,” 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(8)(B)(iii). Maverick 

contends that by defending the Tribe’s compact with 

Washington, the Federal Defendants express their belief that 

the compact benefits the Tribe, and thus the Tribe’s and 

federal government’s interests are aligned. But we do not 

think the analysis so simple. The Secretary of the Interior 

does not consider the tribes’ interests exclusively when 

tasked with approving or disapproving a compact that has 

been reached between a state and a tribe. IGRA requires the 

Secretary to disapprove any compact that violates “any other 

provision of Federal law that does not relate to jurisdiction 

over gaming on Indian lands.” 25 U.S.C. 

§ 2710(d)(8)(B)(ii). Thus, in the event of a conflict between 

the Tribe’s interest in class III gaming and any other 

provision of federal law, IGRA requires the federal 

government to consider, and possibly prioritize, the federal 

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law over the Tribe’s interest, just as in Diné Citizens and 

Klamath Irrigation.

16 

Maverick also relies upon Alto and Southwest Center for 

Biological Diversity v. Babbitt, 150 F.3d 1152 (9th Cir. 

1998) (per curiam) to argue that the Federal Defendants can 

serve as an adequate representative of the Tribe. But these 

cases are inapposite. In Alto, we held that the Bureau of 

Indian Affairs could adequately represent the absent tribe’s 

interest in limiting tribal enrollment to qualified individuals

where “the tribe’s own governing documents vest[ed] the 

United States Department of Interior, Bureau of Indian 

Affairs (“BIA”), with ultimate authority over membership 

decisions.” 738 F.3d at 1115. We also distinguished Alto in

Diné Citizens on this basis, explaining that “the tribe had 

specifically granted BIA final decisionmaking authority 

over tribal membership issues, making it more plausible that 

the government would represent the tribe’s interest—or that 

the government’s interest and the tribe’s interest had become 

one and the same.” Diné Citizens, 932 F.3d at 855. 

Similarly, in Southwest Center, environmental 

organizations brought an action under the ESA and NEPA to 

16 Maverick also asserts that Diné Citizens is distinguishable because 

some of the plaintiffs were tribal conservationist organizations, and thus 

there were tribal interests on both sides of the issue. We have indeed 

often found that the federal government cannot adequately represent an 

absent tribe’s interests when there are other tribes acting as plaintiffs in 

the same suit. See Makah, 910 F.2d at 559; Confederated Tribes of 

Chehalis Indian Rsrv. v. Lujan, 928 F.2d 1496, 1500 (9th Cir. 1991) 

(“[T]he United States cannot adequately represent the [absent tribe’s] 

interest without compromising the trust obligations owed to the plaintiff 

tribes.”). But that the plaintiff coalition in Diné Citizens included tribal 

organizations did not factor into the adequate representation analysis

there. See Diné Citizens, 932 F.3d at 853–56.

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enjoin the federal government’s use of a newly built water 

storage facility until a further environmental study was 

performed. 150 F.3d at 1153. We found that a non-party 

tribe had “an interest in the [facility] becoming available for 

use as soon as possible,” and that “an injunction would 

impair” that interest. Id. However, we concluded that the 

federal government was an adequate representative of the 

tribe because the federal government and the tribe “share[d]

a strong interest in defeating [the plaintiff’s] suit on the 

merits and ensuring that the [water storage facility] is 

available for use as soon as possible.” Id. at 1154 (emphasis 

added). The government and the absent tribe did not just 

share the same interest in the outcome of the litigation, but

they also shared the same reason for that desired outcome—

imminent use of the water storage facility. 

Here, in contrast, although the Federal Defendants and 

Tribe share an interest in defending the Secretary’s approval 

of the gaming compacts and sports betting amendments, the 

Federal Defendants do not share the Tribe’s sovereign and 

economic interests in protecting and furthering its class III 

gaming operations. Maverick contends that this is an 

improper formulation of the adequate representation inquiry. 

According to Maverick, so long as there is no conflict of 

interest between the government and the Tribe, the federal 

government can adequately represent an absent tribe’s 

interests. Maverick relies upon Washington v. Daley for this 

proposition. However, neither Daley, nor any other 

precedent cited by Maverick, stands for the proposition that 

whether the government can adequality represent a tribe’s 

interests turns solely on whether there is a present conflict of 

interest between the government and the tribe. Rather, we 

have consistently examined (1) “whether the interests of a 

present party to the suit are such that it will undoubtedly

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make all of the absent party’s arguments; [(2)] whether the 

party is capable of and willing to make such arguments; and 

[(3)] whether the absent party would offer any necessary 

element to the proceedings that the present parties would 

neglect.” Shermoen v. United States, 982 F.2d 1312, 1318 

(9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Cnty. of Fresno v. Andrus, 622 F.2d 

463, 439 (9th Cir. 1980)) (internal quotations omitted); 

Southwest Center, 150 F.3d at 1153–54 (quoting Shermoen, 

982 F.2d at 1318); Daley, 173 F.3d at 1167 (same); Alto, 738 

F.3d 1127–28 (same). In the process of this examination 

some of our older Rule 19 cases have made the statement

that “[t]he United States can adequately represent an Indian 

tribe unless there exists a conflict of interest between the 

United States and the tribe.” Southwest Center, 150 F.3d at 

1154; see also Daley, 173 F.3d at 1167. But it is evident 

from reading the entire content, the statements form just a 

piece of the analysis, and do not represent a standalone rule. 

Southwest Center, 150 F.3d at 1154 (“The federal 

government and [the tribe] share a strong interest in 

defeating [the] suit on the merits”); see also Daley, 173 F.3d 

at 1167–68 (“[T]he Secretary and the Tribes have virtually 

identical interests in this regard.”); Makah, 910 F.2d at 558 

(“The inquiry is a practical one[,] fact specific, and is 

designed to avoid the harsh results of rigid application.”) 

(internal citation omitted).

The Tribe contends that the federal government cannot 

be expected to assert an important legal argument that the 

Tribe would raise: That under our precedent, the Tribe can 

lawfully offer class III gaming even without a compact.17 In 

17 We offer no view as to the merits of this claim, but simply recognize 

that the Tribe has identified at least one argument that it would make that 

the Federal Defendants could not make on its behalf, as this argument is 

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response, Maverick contends that it is irrelevant whether the 

Federal Defendants would be willing to make this argument, 

because the question of whether the Tribe can offer class III 

gaming without a compact would become pertinent, if ever, 

only after Maverick succeeded in invalidating those 

compacts in this current litigation. But Maverick’s view 

cannot be reconciled with Diné Citizens, which explained 

that the federal government could not adequately represent 

the tribe’s interest because the “Federal Defendants’ interest 

might diverge from that of” the Tribe if the district court 

decided that “the federal agencies’ analyses underlying the 

approval was flawed.” Diné Citizens, 932 F.3d at 855 

(emphasis added). 

And, contrary to Maverick’s statements otherwise, a 

conflict between the Tribe’s and the federal government’s 

interests exists in this case. Although today the Tribe and 

the State of Washington have a valid gaming compact 

pursuant to which the Tribe successfully operates its casino, 

that was not always the case. When Washington refused to 

negotiate a compact with the Tribe in the late 1990s, the 

federal government filed an in rem action against the Tribe, 

seized the Tribe’s gambling machines, and issued a Notice 

of Violation and Order of Closure against the Tribe. At that 

time, the federal government relied on IGRA’s requirement 

that the Tribe have a valid gaming compact in effect to 

prevent the Tribe from offering class III gaming. In light of 

the federal government’s documented history of adverse 

action toward the Tribe in litigation over the Tribe’s gaming 

contrary to federal law. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C) (“Class III 

gaming activities shall be lawful on Indian lands only if such activities 

are . . . conducted in conformance with a Tribal-State compact . . . that 

is in effect.”). 

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operations, we agree with the district court that this case 

presents “actual, not hypothetical or unknown conflicts” 

between the federal government and Tribe. Cf. Klamath 

Irrigation, 48 F.4th at 945 (The fact that “the Tribes are in 

active litigation over the degree to which [the federal 

government] is willing to protect the Tribes’ interests in 

several species of fish . . . increases the likelihood that [the 

government] would not ‘undoubtedly’ make all of the same 

arguments that the Tribes would make in this case.”). 

Therefore, even though IGRA was created to promote 

tribal interests and codifies the federal government’s trust 

obligation to the tribes, the federal government’s interest 

will not always align with the interests of the tribes. That is 

because, just like in Diné Citizens and Klamath Irrigation,

the federal government’s “overriding interest . . . must be in

complying with [federal] laws,” which “differs in a 

meaningful sense from [the Tribe’s] sovereign interest in 

ensuring that [sports betting and other class III gaming] 

continue to operate and provide profits to the [Tribe].” See

Diné Citizens, 932 F.3d at 855. In light of these divergent 

interests, the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

finding that the Federal Defendants cannot adequately 

represent the Tribe in this case. 

B. The Shoalwater Bay Indian Tribe cannot feasibly be

joined to this litigation.

Next, we determine whether the Tribe can feasibly be 

joined to the litigation. See Diné Citizens, 932 F.3d at 856. 

Because the Tribe enjoys sovereign immunity, we hold that 

it cannot. 

“Indian tribes are ‘domestic dependent nations’ that 

exercise inherent sovereign authority over their members 

and territories.” Jamul Action Comm., 974 F.3d at 991

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(quoting Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi 

Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991)). “Among 

the core aspects of sovereignty that tribes possess is the 

common law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by 

sovereign powers.” Bodi v. Shingle Springs Band of Miwok 

Indians, 832 F.3d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal 

quotation marks and alterations omitted). Although a tribe 

may waive this immunity, such waiver “cannot be implied 

but must be unequivocally expressed.” Id. (quoting Santa 

Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978)). 

Here, the Tribe has unequivocally expressed its intent to 

not waive its immunity. When the Tribe filed its motion for 

limited intervention in the district court, it included the 

following language: 

For avoidance of doubt, by intervening in this 

action for the limited purpose of moving to 

dismiss under Rules 12(b)(7) and 19, the 

Tribe does not waive, and reserves in full, its 

sovereign immunity. Nothing herein shall be 

construed as waiver, in whole or in part, of 

the Tribe’s immunity, or as the Tribe’s 

consent to be sued, and the legal counsel for 

the Tribe, undersigned, lack authority to 

waive the Tribe’s immunity or consent to the 

jurisdiction of this Court. 

The Tribe’s Chairwoman, Charlene Nelson, also submitted 

a declaration with the motion for limited intervention that 

explained that the Tribal Council had not waived its 

sovereign immunity in this matter nor authorized any of the 

Tribe’s representatives, including its legal counsel, to do so. 

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The Tribe reiterated this same position in its motion to 

dismiss. 

Maverick nevertheless argues that the Tribe waived its 

sovereign immunity by voluntarily intervening in this suit. 

We disagree. It is well-established that a tribe’s voluntary 

participation in litigation for a limited purpose does not 

constitute a blanket waiver of immunity from suit in general. 

Rather, “[t]he scope of the waiver depends on the particular 

circumstances, including the tribe’s actions and statements 

as well as the nature and bounds of the dispute that the tribe 

put before the court.” Quinault Indian Nation v. Pearson for 

Est. of Comenout, 868 F.3d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 2017). That 

is why a “tribe’s participation in litigation does not constitute 

consent to counterclaims asserted by the defendants in those 

actions,” McClendon v. United States, 885 F.2d 627, 630 

(9th Cir. 1989); Potawatomi, 498 U.S. at 509–10 (holding 

that a tribe does not waive its immunity to compulsory 

counterclaims by voluntarily filing suit), and why “a tribe’s 

voluntary participation in administrative proceedings does 

not waive its immunity in a subsequent court action filed by 

another party seeking review of the agency proceedings,” 

Bodi, 832 F.3d at 1017; Quileute Indian Tribe v. Babbitt, 18 

F.3d 1456, 1460 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that the tribe’s 

“voluntary participation [in an administrative action] is not 

the express and unequivocal waiver of tribal immunity that 

we require in this circuit”); Kescoli v. Babbitt, 101 F.3d 

1304, 1310 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that tribes “did not 

waive their immunity by intervening in [an] administrative 

proceeding[]”). 

Accordingly, where, as here, a tribe intervenes for the 

limited purpose of a motion to dismiss the action because it 

is a required party that cannot be joined due to its sovereign 

immunity, the court’s jurisdiction is “limited to the issues 

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MAVERICK GAMING LLC V. USA 35

necessary to decide” that controversy, only. McClendon, 

885 F.2d at 630. “[I]t would defy logic” to conclude that 

“the Tribe clearly manifested its intent to waive the very 

immunity defense that it asserts.” Bodi, 832 F.3d at 1018. 

Maverick takes out of context a statement in our decision 

in United States v. Oregon, 657 F.2d 1009 (9th Cir. 1981) to 

the effect that the tribe’s “intervention” in that particular 

case waived its sovereign immunity. In that case, a tribe 

intervened in an action to establish and protect its treaty 

fishing rights and entered into a consent decree that 

“expressly retained [the court’s] continuing jurisdiction in 

order to expedite enforcement of its decree.” Id. at 1011. 

Over the years, the court exercised its jurisdiction to modify 

the consent decree at the behest of the parties. Id. The 

district court adopted an agreement by the parties and later 

intervenors in an additional court order, which included a 

provision stating: “[I]n the event that significant 

management problems arise from this agreement that cannot 

be resolved by mutual agreement, the parties agree to submit 

the issues to federal court for determination. In any event, 

the Court shall retain jurisdiction over the case.” Id. at 1011, 

1016. 

Over a decade later, an action was brought to enforce the 

consent decree, and we determined that the tribe waived its 

sovereign immunity because it had expressly consented to 

suit. Id. at 1014–16. We reasoned that, “[b]y intervening [in 

the initial action], the Tribe assumed the risk that its position 

would not be accepted, and that the Tribe itself would be 

bound by an order it deemed adverse.” Id. at 1015. Indeed, 

we found that the tribe had “expressly consented to th[e] 

suit” by entering into the conservation agreement, in which 

the tribe “agree[d] to submit the issues to federal court for 

determination.” Id. at 1016. Thus, the tribe submitted to 

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36 MAVERICK GAMING LLC V. USA

jurisdiction and engaged in the litigation for eleven years,

and only attempted to assert sovereign immunity when the 

outcome appeared likely to favor conservation at the expense 

of its fishing rights. 

Here, far from the “express[] consent” at issue in 

Oregon, the Tribe entered this litigation fully asserting its 

rights as a sovereign not subject to the court’s jurisdiction. 

See id.

Maverick’s reliance on Lapides v. Board of Regents of 

University System of Georgia, 535 U.S. 613 (2002), in which 

the Supreme Court found that the State of Georgia’s removal 

of a state court lawsuit against it to federal court amounted 

to a waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immunity, is also 

unavailing. In Bodi, we rejected a plaintiff’s similar 

“attempt to extend Lapides from the Eleventh Amendment 

context to the tribal immunity context.” 832 F.3d at 1018. 

We explained that “States can waive their Eleventh 

Amendment immunity through litigation conduct that would 

not effect a waiver of tribal sovereign immunity,” and thus 

“parallels between the two are of limited utility.” Id. at 1020. 

Accordingly, although a State’s removal of a state court case 

to federal court may waive its Eleventh Amendment 

immunity, a tribe’s removal of a state court action filed 

against it to federal court does not waive its sovereign 

immunity where the tribe “asserted its immunity defense 

promptly upon removal to federal court and neither it, nor 

any Defendant, ever voiced an intent to litigate on the 

merits.” Id. at 1017. Thus, while there may be 

circumstances where a State’s voluntary participation in 

litigation waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity, see, 

e.g., In re Lazar, 237 F.3d 967, 978 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding 

that when a state “files a proof of claim in a bankruptcy 

proceeding, the state waives its Eleventh Amendment 

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MAVERICK GAMING LLC V. USA 37

immunity with regard to the bankruptcy estate’s claims that 

arise from the same transaction or occurrence as the state’s 

claim”), a tribe does not waive its sovereign immunity 

where, as here, it asserted its immunity defense promptly 

upon intervention in the suit and only ever voiced an intent 

to do precisely that.

The Tribe’s limited intervention for the purpose of filing 

a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(7) does not constitute 

the “clear and unequivocal waiver that is required for a tribe 

to relinquish its immunity from suit.” Bodi, 832 F.3d at 

1014. Because the Tribe has not waived its sovereign 

immunity, it cannot be feasibly joined in this action.

C. This litigation cannot proceed in equity and good 

conscience without the Shoalwater Bay Indian Tribe.

Turning to the final step of the Rule 19 analysis, we must 

determine “whether, in equity and good conscience, the 

action should proceed among the existing parties or should 

be dismissed” under Rule 19(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b); see 

also Diné Citizens, 932 F.3d at 857. 

1.

“To determine whether a suit should proceed among the 

existing parties where a required party cannot be joined, 

courts consider (i) potential prejudice, (ii) possibility to 

reduce prejudice, (iii) adequacy of a judgment without the 

required party, and (iv) adequacy of a remedy with 

dismissal.” Klamath Irrigation, 48 F.4th at 947 (citing Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 19(b)). However, “[t]he balancing of equitable 

factors under Rule 19(b) almost always favors dismissal 

when a tribe cannot be joined due to tribal sovereign 

immunity.” Deschutes River All., 1 F.4th at 1163 (quoting 

Jamul Action Comm., 974 F.3d at 998). The district court 

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did not abuse its discretion in concluding that a balancing of 

these factors requires that it dismiss this action.

The first Rule 19(b) factor, which considers “the extent 

to which a judgment rendered in the person’s absence might 

prejudice that person or the existing parties,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

19(b)(1), “largely duplicates the consideration that made a 

party necessary under Rule 19(a),” Am. Greyhound Racing, 

Inc. v. Hull, 305 F.3d 1015, 1025 (9th Cir. 2002). As 

discussed, the Tribe has a legitimate and substantial interest 

in the legality of its tribal-state gaming compact and its 

amendments, an interest that implicates the Tribe’s 

sovereign rights and which the federal government cannot 

adequately represent on the Tribe’s behalf. See Diné 

Citizens, 932 F.3d at 857. Because Maverick’s suit seeks to 

invalidate that compact and the sports betting amendment, 

the potential prejudice to the Tribe if a judgment were 

rendered in its absence “would be enormous.” Am. 

Greyhound Racing, Inc., 305 F.3d at 1025. This factor 

clearly favors dismissal. 

The district court also correctly concluded that the 

second factor, “the extent to which any prejudice could be 

lessened or avoided by: (A) protective provisions in the 

judgment; (B) shaping the relief; or (C) other measures,” 

weighs in the Tribe’s favor. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b)(2). The 

district court found that the relief that Maverick seeks for its 

APA and federal equal protection claims cannot be tailored 

to lessen the prejudice faced by the Tribe because “Maverick 

seeks nothing less than a wholesale revocation of the tribes’

ability to operate casino gaming facilities” through the 

invalidation of its tribal-gaming compact. Maverick argues 

that, on its Criminal Prohibition claim, the district court 

could instead provide relief in the form of an injunction 

preventing the State Defendants from enforcing the state’s 

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MAVERICK GAMING LLC V. USA 39

criminal laws against Maverick, thereby shaping the relief to 

avoid invalidation of the tribal-gaming compacts. But even 

that relief would impair what Maverick has conceded are the 

Tribe’s sovereign and economic interests in gaming 

exclusivity. 

Maverick also asserts that we could lessen any prejudice 

to the Tribe by allowing it to participate instead as an amicus. 

But “[a]micus status is not sufficient” to lessen prejudice. 

Makah, 910 F.2d at 560 (citing Wichita & Affiliated Tribes 

of Okla. v. Hodel, 788 F.2d 765, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“If 

the opportunity to brief an issue as a non-party were enough 

to eliminate prejudice, non-joinder would never be a 

problem since the court could always allow the non-joinable 

party to file amicus briefs.”)). 

The third consideration, however, weighs in Maverick’s 

favor mitigating against dismissal. This factor evaluates 

“whether a judgment rendered in the person’s absence would 

be adequate.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b)(3). Despite the varied 

and extensive relief sought in the First Amended Complaint, 

Maverick now contends that it would be satisfied with 

limiting its complaint to its APA claim only and seeking 

relief solely in the form of a judgment declaring the 

Secretary’s approval of the sports betting compact 

amendments invalid. Thus, the question becomes whether a 

judgment that invalidates the Secretary’s approval of the 

sports betting compact amendments would be adequate as 

between Maverick and the Federal Defendants. Under 

similar circumstances in Diné Citizens, we found that “[a] 

judgment rendered in NTEC’s absence would be adequate 

and would not create conflicting obligations, because it is 

Federal Defendants’ duty, not NTEC’s, to comply with” the 

federal statutes at issue. Diné Citizens, 932 F.3d at 858. 

Here, because it is the duty of the Secretary, not the Tribe, to 

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40 MAVERICK GAMING LLC V. USA

approve the compact amendments under IGRA, a judgment 

invalidating that approval would provide adequate relief as 

between the Federal Defendants and Maverick. 

Finally, we must determine “whether the plaintiff would 

have an adequate remedy if the action were dismissed for 

nonjoinder.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b)(4). Because there is no 

alternative judicial forum in which Maverick could seek the 

relief it requests, the district court found that this factor 

weighs in favor of Maverick. However, “we have regularly 

held that the tribal interest in immunity overcomes the lack 

of an alternative remedy or forum for the plaintiffs.” Am. 

Greyhound Racing, Inc., 305 F.3d at 1025. Indeed, we have 

found “a wall of circuit authority in favor of dismissing 

actions in which a necessary party cannot be joined due to 

tribal sovereign immunity—virtually all of the cases to 

consider the question appear to dismiss under Rule 19, 

regardless of whether an alternative remedy is available, if 

the absent tribes are Indian tribes invested with sovereign 

immunity.” Deschutes River All., 1 F.4th at 1163 (quoting 

Diné Citizens, 932 F.3d at 857) (internal quotation marks 

and alterations omitted). Thus, even though both the third 

and fourth factors weigh in favor of allowing the litigation 

to proceed, the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

concluding that, in light of the Tribe’s sovereign immunity 

and the prejudice the Tribe would suffer if the suit proceeded 

in its absence, Maverick’s suit must be dismissed. 

2.

Alternatively, Maverick argues that the litigation should 

continue in the Tribe’s absence under the public rights 

exception. “The public rights exception is a limited 

‘exception to traditional joinder rules’ under which a party, 

although necessary, will not be deemed ‘indispensable,’ and 

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MAVERICK GAMING LLC V. USA 41

the litigation may continue in the absence of that party.” 

Diné Citizens, 932 F.3d at 858 (citing Conner v. Burford, 

848 F.2d 1441, 1459 (9th Cir. 1988)). This exception is 

reserved for those circumstances where the litigation both 

“transcend[s] the private interests of the litigants and seek[s] 

to vindicate a public right,” and does not “destroy the legal 

entitlements of the absent parties.” Kescoli, 101 F.3d at 

1311 (quoting Connor, 848 F.2d at 1459). Maverick’s 

argument that this action comes within the public rights 

exception fails on both counts.

First, although Maverick frames its suit as one merely 

“seeking to enforce governmental compliance with 

administrative and constitutional law,” we have already 

rejected this argument in American Greyhound Racing, Inc. 

v. Hull, where, as here, the plaintiffs challenged the validity 

of tribal-gaming compacts under IGRA. 305 F.3d at 1025–

27. Despite the plaintiffs’ contention “that their action seeks 

only to ensure that the Governor acts in accordance with the 

state constitution and laws,” we found that their real “interest 

[was] in freeing themselves from the competition of Indian 

gaming, not in establishing for all the principle of separation 

of powers.” Id. at 1026. 

The same holds true here. The First Amended Complaint 

contains numerous allegations of the competitive harm 

Maverick suffers, and hopes to eradicate, by means of this 

lawsuit. For example, Maverick alleges that “[b]ecause the 

Tribes can offer [class III] games . . . but Maverick cannot,

Maverick suffers competitive injury with tribal casinos,” and 

that because Washington’s criminal laws prohibit it from 

offering class III gaming, “Maverick cannot establish or 

acquire gaming operations in Washington that can 

effectively compete with the Tribes’ operations.” To 

diminish this competition, Maverick seeks nothing less than 

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the invalidation of the tribal-gaming compacts of all 

Washington’s tribes. Just as in American Greyhound

Racing, Maverick’s suit does not “incidentally affect the 

gaming tribes in the course of enforcing some public right,” 

but is instead “aimed at the tribes and their gaming.” Id. at 

1026. Any incidental affect that Maverick’s suit could have 

in ensuring “governmental compliance with administrative 

and constitutional law” does not transcend Maverick’s 

private interest in increasing its own revenue. 

Maverick also argues that the district court erred in 

finding that its suit seeks to invalidate the Tribe’s 

acknowledged legal entitlement, because tribal-state 

compacts do not confer private legal rights but rather set the 

balance of public regulatory authority among different 

sovereigns. Maverick is correct that IGRA, which Congress 

enacted in response to the Supreme Court’s ruling in 

Cabazon, seeks “to balance the competing sovereign 

interests of the federal government, state governments, and 

Indian tribes, by giving each a role in the regulatory 

scheme.” Chicken Ranch Rancheria, 42 F.4th at 1032 

(quoting Pauma Band of Luiseno Mission Indians of Pauma 

& Yuima Rsrv. v. California, 813 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 

2015)). But that is not the statute’s only, nor even primary, 

objective. IGRA’s stated purpose is to “promot[e] tribal 

economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal 

governments.” 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1). It facilitates these

goals by, for example, requiring that net revenue from tribal 

gaming be used for specific sovereign functions. Id.

§ 2710(b)(2)(B), (d)(1)(A)(ii). Although IGRA also seeks 

“to provide a statutory basis for the regulation of gaming by 

an Indian tribe,” 25 U.S.C. § 2702(2), even those regulatory 

objectives are “generally focused on the integrity of the 

gaming enterprise itself.” Chicken Ranch Rancheria, 42 

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MAVERICK GAMING LLC V. USA 43

F.4th at 1031. IGRA’s very purpose is to confer legal 

entitlements to the Tribe, and all other federally recognized 

Indian tribes, in the form of tribal-state gaming compacts. 

And these tribal-gaming compacts are what Maverick seeks 

to invalidate. 

Even if “some of the interests [Maverick] seek[s] to 

vindicate, like the interest in being governed by 

constitutional laws, are public rights,” that is not sufficient 

where, as here, the litigation poses a threat “to the absent 

tribes’ legal entitlements, and indeed to their sovereignty.” 

See Shermoen, 982 F.2d at 1319. Because Maverick’s suit 

could destroy these legal entitlements, the district court did 

not abuse its discretion in determining that the public rights 

exception does not apply. 

V. CONLUSION

Because the Tribe is a required party that cannot be 

joined to the litigation on account of its sovereign immunity, 

and because the suit cannot in equity and good conscience 

proceed in the Tribe’s absence, we AFFIRM the district 

court’s dismissal of Maverick’s First Amended Complaint. 

AFFIRMED. 

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44 MAVERICK GAMING LLC V. USA

MILLER, Circuit Judge, concurring:

Maverick Gaming LLC brought this action against the 

United States and various federal and state officials 

challenging their actions relating to the regulation of gaming 

in Washington State, and, in particular, to a gaming compact 

between the State and the Shoalwater Bay Indian Tribe. 

Under our precedent, the Tribe is a required party that must 

be joined as a defendant. Because the Tribe’s sovereign 

immunity prevents it from being joined without its consent, 

I agree with the court that Maverick’s action cannot proceed. 

Although I join the court’s opinion in full, I write separately 

to explain, first, that our precedent on Rule 19 has not 

adequately considered the distinctive character of litigation 

under the Administrative Procedure Act and, second, that a 

competitive injury, by itself, is not enough to make a tribe a 

required party.

I

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a)(1) makes a person 

a “required party” who “must be joined” when feasible if 

“that person claims an interest relating to the subject of the 

action and is so situated that disposing of the action in the 

person’s absence may . . . as a practical matter impair or 

impede the person’s ability to protect the interest.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 19(a)(1). Ordinarily, “an absent party’s ability to 

protect its interest will not be impaired by its absence from 

the suit where its interest will be adequately represented by 

existing parties to the suit.” Alto v. Black, 738 F.3d 1111, 

1127 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Washington v. Daley, 173 F.3d 

1158, 1167 (9th Cir. 1999)). 

Count one of Maverick’s complaint invokes the APA to 

challenge the Secretary of the Interior’s approval of the 

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Tribe’s gaming compact with the State. The Secretary is 

fully capable of defending her approval of the compact, and 

she has made clear that she is prepared to do so in this 

litigation. But under our precedent, that is not enough. In 

Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our Environment v. Bureau 

of Indian Affairs, we held that a tribe that had been issued a 

mining permit was a required party in an APA challenge to 

the issuance of the permit. 932 F.3d 843, 856 (9th Cir. 2019). 

Even though the Department of the Interior was prepared to 

defend its action, we rejected the view that it could 

adequately represent the absent tribe’s interest. Instead, we 

held that to be an adequate representative, the federal 

government must share an interest not only in seeing the 

challenged agency action upheld but also in the “outcome,” 

or consequences, of upholding that action. Id. at 855. We 

applied similar reasoning in Klamath Irrigation District v. 

United States Bureau of Reclamation, an APA case in which 

we acknowledged that the federal government and the tribes 

“share an interest in the ultimate outcome” but nevertheless 

concluded that “such alignment on the ultimate outcome is 

insufficient for us to hold that the government is an adequate 

representative of the tribes” when they shared the same 

interest for different reasons. 48 F.4th 934, 945 (9th Cir. 

2022).

When an Indian tribe is a required party, it cannot be 

joined without its consent because it enjoys sovereign 

immunity. See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 

782, 788 (2014). Under Rule 19, if a required party “cannot 

be joined, the court must determine whether, in equity and 

good conscience, the action should proceed among the 

existing parties or should be dismissed.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

19(b). In practice, when tribal sovereign immunity is 

involved, that means that the case must be dismissed: “[W]e

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have observed that there is a ‘wall of circuit authority’ in 

favor of dismissing actions in which a necessary party 

cannot be joined due to tribal sovereign immunity—

‘virtually all the cases to consider the question appear to 

dismiss under Rule 19, regardless of whether [an alternate] 

remedy is available, if the absent parties are Indian tribes 

invested with sovereign immunity.’” Diné Citizens, 932 F.3d 

at 857 (quoting White v. University of Cal., 765 F.3d 1010, 

1028 (9th Cir. 2014)).

Those principles compel affirmance of the dismissal 

here. Although Maverick attempts to distinguish our 

decisions in Diné Citizens and Klamath Irrigation District, I 

agree with the court that its efforts to do so are unpersuasive. 

I am not convinced, however, that our precedents on this 

issue are correct. In my view, our decisions have not given 

adequate weight to the distinctive character of APA 

litigation.

In an APA case, the only question to be decided is 

whether the agency’s action should be set aside. Because the 

agency’s action is judged on the rationale articulated by the 

agency itself, the agency is the best party to defend it. See 

SEC v. Chenery, 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947). And the APA 

does not authorize relief against any party other than the 

agency. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 706. (In this case, count one of 

the complaint was phrased overly broadly and purported to 

seek relief against the Tribe itself, but Maverick has since 

made clear that it does not seek such relief; instead, it seeks 

a judgment setting aside the Secretary’s approval of the 

compact, which is the only relief authorized by the APA.) 

Although a judgment setting aside the agency’s action might 

have collateral consequences for non-parties like the Tribe, 

it leaves those non-parties no worse off than they would be 

had the agency not taken the challenged action in the first 

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place. In other words, an APA lawsuit threatens no interests 

beyond the interest in seeing agency action upheld, which 

the agency itself can be expected to represent. That is true 

even when the non-parties are sovereigns: Whatever legally 

protected interest a non-federal sovereign might have in 

APA litigation is collateral to the federal government’s 

primary interest in seeing its own action upheld.

The required-parties approach of Diné Citizens threatens 

to “sound[] the death knell for any judicial review of 

executive decisionmaking” in the wide range of cases in 

which agency actions implicate the interests of Indian tribes. 

Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1460 (9th Cir. 1988). 

That is so because, as noted, we have also held that “equity 

and good conscience” virtually always require dismissal in 

this context, see Diné Citizens, 932 F.3d at 857–58, and 

because we have refused to apply the “public rights” 

exception to joinder rules when tribal interests are at stake, 

see id. at 858–61. The combined effect of those holdings 

“produce[s] an anomalous result”—namely, that “[n]o one, 

except [a] Tribe, could seek review of” agency actions 

affecting tribal interests. Manygoats v. Kleppe, 558 F.2d 

556, 559 (10th Cir. 1977). That result frustrates Congress’s 

directive that a person “adversely affected or aggrieved by 

agency action . . . is entitled to judicial review thereof.” 5 

U.S.C. § 702.

Our decisions in Diné Citizens and Klamath Irrigation 

District have created a circuit conflict. The Tenth Circuit has 

held that a tribe is not a required party in an APA action 

challenging a federal decision to acquire land in trust for the 

tribe because “the Secretary’s interest in defending his 

determinations is ‘virtually identical’” to the tribe’s interest, 

and that even if the tribe were a required party, the lack of 

“any alternative forum in which plaintiffs’ claims can be 

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heard” weighs against dismissal. Sac & Fox Nation of 

Missouri v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1250, 1259–60 (10th Cir. 

2001) (quoting Rishell v. Jane Phillips Episcopal Mem’l 

Med. Ctr., 94 F.3d 1407, 1412 (10th Cir. 1996)). Similarly, 

the District of Columbia Circuit has held that a tribe is not a 

required party to an APA challenge to the Secretary of the 

Interior’s plan for allocating funds to tribes. Ramah Navajo 

Sch. Bd., Inc. v. Babbitt, 87 F.3d 1338, 1350–52 (D.C. Cir. 

1996). In an appropriate case, we should revisit the 

application of Rule 19 to APA actions and consider aligning 

our decisions with those of other courts of appeals.

II

Required-party status under Rule 19 must be assessed on 

a claim-by-claim basis. See Lyon v. Gila River Indian Cmty., 

626 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2010); Makah Indian Tribe v. 

Verity, 910 F.2d 555, 559 (9th Cir. 1990). Our precedent 

compels the dismissal of counts one and two of Maverick’s 

complaint, but count three calls for a somewhat different 

analysis.

Count three seeks a declaration that the State’s 

“enforcement of Washington’s criminal laws prohibiting 

class III gaming . . . violates the Constitution’s guarantee of 

equal protection, and a declaration prohibiting the 

Defendants from enforcing those laws against Maverick.” In 

other words, Maverick seeks a declaration that it is allowed 

to conduct gaming. That claim implicates the Tribe’s 

economic interests because the Tribe would suffer 

competitive injury if non-tribal entities were allowed to 

conduct gaming. But it does not implicate any legally 

protected interest of the Tribe, which is what Rule 19 

requires. See Diné Citizens, 932 F.3d at 852 (“To satisfy 

Rule 19, an interest must be legally protected and must be 

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MAVERICK GAMING LLC V. USA 49

‘more than a financial stake.’” (quoting Makah Indian Tribe, 

910 F.2d at 558)). The Tribe is therefore not a required party 

to this count, any more than a tribe that enjoys an exemption 

from a state gas tax would be a required party to a suit 

challenging the application of the gas tax to others. Cf.

Washington State Dep’t of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc., 

586 U.S. 347, 350 (2019). 

As the court’s opinion explains, however, Maverick did 

not preserve this issue below. To the contrary, the district 

court correctly observed that Maverick did not dispute that 

the Tribe “has a legally protected interest that could be 

impaired by the instant litigation,” without distinguishing 

among the different counts of the complaint. I therefore 

agree that we must affirm the dismissal of count three along 

with the rest of the complaint.

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