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Parties Involved:
Judel Jean-Charles
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 19-12885

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 0:15-cr-60309-JIC-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JUDEL JEAN-CHARLES, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

________________________

(March 12, 2020)

Before JORDAN, NEWSOM and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

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Judel Jean-Charles appeals his 24-month sentence, imposed following the 

revocation of his supervised release. Jean-Charles raises two arguments on appeal. 

He first argues his sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the district 

court failed to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, as well as pertinent policy 

statements in Chapter 7 of the Sentencing Guidelines. Second, he argues his 

sentence was substantively unreasonable because it was above the guideline range 

and was greater than necessary to provide for just punishment. After review,1 we 

affirm.

Reviewing reasonableness is a two-part process which requires us to ensure, 

first, that the district court did not commit a significant procedural error, and 

second, that the sentence is substantively reasonable. United States v. Irey, 612 

F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). First, as to the procedural 

reasonableness of Jean-Charles’s sentence, we will conclude a significant 

procedural error has been made if the district court calculated the guideline range 

incorrectly, failed to consider the § 3553(a) factors, based the sentence on clearly 

1 We ordinarily review the sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release for 

reasonableness, applying a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. 

Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2014); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). 

However, the government argues here that we should review Jean-Charles’s procedural 

reasonableness claims only for plain error, as he failed to preserve them. See Vandergrift, 754 

F.3d at 1307 (“Because [the defendant] did not object to the procedural reasonableness at the 

time of his sentencing, we review for plain error.”). We need not resolve the parties’ dispute 

regarding the standard of review, as we would affirm the district court’s sentencing decision 

even under the more favorable abuse-of-discretion standard Jean-Charles suggests we should 

apply.

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erroneous facts, neglected to explain the sentence, or treated the Guidelines as 

mandatory rather than advisory. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.

It is generally true that upon revocation of supervised release, a court must 

impose a sentence “sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the 

purposes” listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e). Among 

the factors courts should consider under § 3553(a) is “any pertinent policy 

statement . . . issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(5). 

Chapter 7 of the Sentencing Guidelines lays out several such “pertinent policy 

statement[s]” concerning sentences imposed upon revocation of supervised release. 

U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1–7B1.5. Among those policy statements is a table with suggested 

terms of imprisonment based on the seriousness of the supervised-release violation 

and the defendant’s criminal history category. Id. § 7B1.4. A district court 

generally must consider these sentencing ranges, along with the other policy 

statements in Chapter 7, though it is not bound by them. See United States v. 

Hofierka, 83 F.3d 357, 360–61 (11th Cir. 1996), modified by, 92 F.3d 1008 (11th 

Cir. 1996). 

We have held, however, that the district court is not required to consider the 

§ 3553(a) factors when revocation is mandatory under § 3583(g). United States v. 

Brown, 224 F.3d 1237, 1241 (11th Cir. 2000), abrogated on other grounds by 

Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319 (2011). Revocation is mandatory where, as 

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here, the defendant possessed a firearm in violation of federal law. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3583(g)(2). Jean-Charles’s argument that the district court procedurally erred in 

failing to explicitly consider those factors—including any pertinent Chapter 7 

policy statements—is therefore without merit. 

In any case, the record reveals that the district court did, in fact, consider 

both the § 3553(a) factors and the Chapter 7 policy statements in imposing JeanCharles’s sentence. Specifically, the district court stated its sentencing decision 

was based on “the seriousness of the offense, that is, discharging a firearm in a 

crowded parking lot at 4:30 in the morning, [and] striking an individual,” and 

further noted the maximum 24-month sentence was necessary to “promote respect 

for the law, to provide just punishment, and to afford adequate deterrence and to 

protect the public.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). As for the Chapter 7 policy 

statements, the district court noted that Jean-Charles’s violations constituted

“Grade A” violations under the table in § 7B1.4. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4. Thus, 

even assuming the district court was required to consider the factors Jean-Charles 

identifies, it did so. In sum, we can perceive no procedural error, plain or 

otherwise, in the district court’s sentencing decision.

Having considered procedural reasonableness, we now turn to the 

substantive reasonableness of Jean-Charles’s sentence. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1189. In 

that respect, we will reverse only if “left with the definite and firm conviction that 

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the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) 

factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences 

dictated by the facts of the case.” Id. at 1190. “The fact that we might reasonably 

have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify 

reversal of the district court.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. 

The party challenging the sentence bears the burden of proving that it is 

unreasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances and the § 3553(a) 

factors. United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010). JeanCharles cannot meet that burden. The district court did not fail to consider any 

factor due significant weight, give an improper factor significant weight, or 

improperly rely on any factors, and it sentenced Jean-Charles within the statutory 

limits after explaining the seriousness of his violations and the need for deterrence, 

to protect the public, and to promote respect for the law. We must defer to the

weight the district court afforded these factors in the absence of “a clear error of 

judgment,” and we find no such error here. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1189; see also United 

States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008).

Accordingly, we affirm Jean-Charles’s 24-month sentence as procedurally 

and substantively reasonable.

AFFIRMED.

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