Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_08-cv-00350/USCOURTS-cand-3_08-cv-00350-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
BNC Mortgage, Inc.
Defendant
Kevin Caylor
Defendant
Chase Bank
Defendant
Jim E. Moore
Plaintiff
Ndex West LLC
Defendant
Stirling Funding Corporation
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JIM E. MOORE,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CHASE BANK; BNC MORTGAGE, INC.;

NDEx West LLC; STIRLING FUNDING

CORPORATION; KEVIN CAYLOR; and DOES

1-20,

Defendants. 

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Case No. 08-0350 SC

ORDER DENYING

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO

REMAND

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court on the Ex Parte Motion to

Remand ("Motion") filed by Plaintiff Jim Moore. See Docket No. 4. 

The defendant BNC Mortgage ("BNC") filed an Opposition and

Plaintiff submitted a Reply. See Docket Nos. 7, 8. For the

following reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to Remand. 

II. BACKGROUND

The present action arises out of Plaintiff's September 2004

refinancing of his home loan with Defendants. On January 4, 2007,

Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the Superior Court of the State of

California for Contra Costa County, alleging six causes of action:

(1) declaratory judgment for violations of California Civil Code §

2924 et. seq, which establishes protections and procedures for

valid foreclosure sales; (2) unfair business practices under

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United States District Court

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California Business and Professions Code § 17200; (3) fraud,

pursuant to California Civil Code § 1572; (4) unconscionability;

(5) breach of contract; and (6) accounting. In addition,

Plaintiff obtained a temporary restraining order from the state

superior court prohibiting the foreclosure sale of his home. Mot.

at 2. Defendants subsequently filed a timely notice for removal,

see Docket No. 1, and Plaintiff filed the present Motion to

Remand.

III. DISCUSSION

"The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction is upon the

party seeking removal . . . and the removal statute is strictly

construed against removal jurisdiction." Emrich v. Touche Ross &

Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1194-95 (9th Cir. 1988) (internal citations

omitted). "Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any

doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance." Gaus v.

Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992).

Ordinarily, "federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal

question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly

pleaded complaint." Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386,

392 (1987). Thus, "the plaintiff [is] the master of the claim; he

or she may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on

state law." Id. 

In the present case, Plaintiff asserts that because the

causes of action in his Complaint are all California statutory and

common law claims, there is no federal jurisdiction and the case

must be remanded to state court. Plaintiff's repeated invocation

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of federal law in his Complaint, however, belies the fact that

resolution of questions of federal law underpin Plaintiff's

claims. "Congress has given the lower federal courts jurisdiction

to hear, originally or by removal from state court, only those

cases in which a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that

federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's

right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial

question of federal law." Franchise Tax Bd. of the State of Cal.

v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 27-28

(1983). 

In his Complaint, Plaintiff states that Defendants "are

subject to and must comply with the Federal Truth in Lending Act

(15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1666j) and with the Act's corresponding

Regulation Z (24 C.F.R. §§ 3500.1-3500.17)." Compl. ¶ 6. 

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants "are debt collectors . . .

as defined by 15 USCA § 1692a(6), the Federal Fair Debt Collection

Practices Act," and that Defendants "were at all times alleged in

this complaint required to comply with and [sic] the federal Real

Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. § 2601-2617." 

Id. §§ 7, 8. Plaintiff re-alleges these claims with greater

specificity in other sections of the Complaint. See Compl. §§ 33-

36. In light of Plaintiff's facial invocation of these federalstatute allegations, Plaintiff's argument that he did not "raise

any federal issues," Mot. at 3, is plainly contradicted by his own

Complaint. 

In addition, several of Plaintiff's causes of action contain

predicate federal statutory violations. For example, in

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Plaintiff's second cause of action for unfair business practices,

Plaintiff alleges the following: 

Defendants . . . made the following

untrue and misleading statements, and

engaged in the following unfair business

practices. . . . They failed to comply

with the disclosure provisions of the

Federal Truth in Lending Act. They

failed to comply with the disclosure

provisions of the Homeowner Equity

Protection Act, a part of the Truth in

Lending Act.

Compl. ¶ 60. Under this same cause of action, Plaintiff also

alleges that various fees demanded by Defendants "are erroneous

and fraudulent, and are based on fraudulent representations,

violations of the Federal Truth in Lending Act, violations of

HOEPA [Home Owners Equity Protection Act], and concealed excessive

charges and fees." Id. § 64.

In Plaintiff's third cause of action for fraud, Plaintiff

alleges the following: "Defendants . . . committed fraud in the

following ways. . . . They failed [to] comply with the disclosure

provisions of the Homeowner Equity Protection Act, a part of the

Truth in Lending Act." Id. § 69. Thus, although Plaintiff has

pleaded California state-law causes of action, Plaintiff's

decision to include numerous allegations relating to underlying

federal statutory violations brings his action within this Court's

jurisdiction. Thus, Plaintiff's "right to relief necessarily

depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law." 

Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. at 27-28. 

The Court need not reach the issue of whether any of

Plaintiff's claims are preempted by federal law as federal

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subject-matter jurisdiction plainly exists by way of Plaintiff's

invocation of federal statutory violations. The Court also need

not reach the issue of which of Plaintiff's causes of action may

be characterized as arising under only state law; it suffices to

say that Plaintiff's claims for unfair business practices and

fraud both explicitly incorporate federal statutory violations and

therefore create federal jurisdiction. At the very least, the

remaining claims may remain in federal court based on supplemental

jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 

In addition, Plaintiff argues that the statutes of

limitations for all of the federal statutes relied on in the

Complaint have expired. Even assuming, arguendo, this were so, "a

plaintiff should not be permitted to effectuate remand by pointing

out the flaws in her own complaint, in effect arguing for

dismissal of that claim." Barraclough v. ADP Auto. Claims Servs.,

818 F. Supp. 1310, 1312 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (internal quotation marks

omitted). 

IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to

Remand. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 31, 2008 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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