Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-05111/USCOURTS-ca10-89-05111-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Children's Developmental Center
Appellee
Independent School District No. 4 of Bixby, Tulsa County, Oklahoma
Appellee
Natalie Johnson
Appellant
Oklahoma State Department of Education
Appellee

Document Text:

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PUBLISH FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 11 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

NATALIE JOHNSON, a minor who sues by ) 

and through FRED and JENNIFER JOHNSON, ) 

her father and mother, as next friends, ) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 4 

OF BIXBY, TULSA COUNTY, OKLAHOMA; 

OKLAHOMA STATE DEPARTMENT OF 

EDUCATION; CHILDREN'S DEVELOPMENTAL 

CENTER, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 89-5111 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. 88-C-340-C) 

Lowell Thomas Price, Jr., of Protection & Advocacy Agency, )TUlsa, 

Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Andrea K. Allbritton, of Rosenstein, Fist & Ringold, Tulsa, 

Oklahoma (John G. Moyer, Jr. with her on the briefs), for 

Defendant-Appellee Independent School District No. 4 of Bixby, 

Tulsa County, Oklahoma and Defendant-Appellee Children's 

Developmental Center. 

Kay Mildren, with her on the briefs, Oklahoma State Department of 

Education, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellee 

Oklahoma State Department of Education. 

Before HOLLOWAY, MOORE, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

Appellate Case: 89-5111 Document: 01019625216 Date Filed: 12/11/1990 Page: 1 
PER CURIAM. 

This case involves an action brought under the Education of 

All Handicapped Children's Act, 20 u.s.c. §§ 1400-1485 (1989), as 

implemented by 34 C.P.R. §§ 300.1-300.754 (1989) (collectively 

referred to as "the Act"). Natalie Johnson is a severely and 

multiply handicapped child who was eight years old at the time her 

local school district rejected her parents' request for a 

structured summer educational program. Natalie's parents invoked 

the due process provisions of the Act, and the schools' decision 

was administratively and judicially affirmed. There are two 

issues on appeal: (1) What information should be considered as a 

basis for entitlement under the Act to a free extended year school 

program in addition to the traditional September through May 

nine-month school program? (2) In Oklahoma, is the cooperative 

special education service provider a necessary party to the due 

process procedure mandated by the Act? As to the first issue, we 

reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of 

the schools because insufficient information was utilized in both 

the administrative proceedings and the district court to satisfy 

the Act 's procedural requirement for individualized review of 

Natalie's program plan. As to the second issue, we conclude that 

the special education cooperative unit is a not necessary party to 

this action. 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-5111 Document: 01019625216 Date Filed: 12/11/1990 Page: 2 
I . 

It is undisputed that Natalie has profound autistic defenses 

with at least moderate mental retardation and seizures. She has 

received educational services since the age of eighteen months 

from the Children's Development Center (CDC) , a cooperative 

special education program serving severely and multiply 

handicapped children from several local county school districts, 

administered by the Superintendent of the Tulsa County Public 

Schools. 1 Natalie and her family are legal residents within the 

Independent School District No. 4 of Bixby, Tulsa County, Oklahoma 

(the Bixby school district), which is, in turn, a member of the 

CDC cooperative program. CDC operates for nine months of the 

1 The cooperative provision of services is statutorily approved 

by Okla. Stat. tit. 70, § 13-101 (1989 & Supp. 1990), which 

provides in pertinent part: 

Two or more school districts may establish cooperative 

programs of special education for exceptional children 

when such arrangement is approved by the State Board of 

Education. The county superintendent of schools of any 

county may establish and maintain a special education 

program, with the approval of the State Board of 

Education, and county funds may be expended for such 

purpose. Any school district or districts located 

wholly or in part in a county may participate in any 

such program so established by the county superintendent 

of schoo l s and shall have authority to contribute school 

district funds, either directly or by reimbursement to 

the county participating in such program. . . . 

It shall be the duty of each school district to 

provide special education for all exceptional children 

as herein defined who reside in that school district. 

This duty may be satisfied by: 

2. The district joining in a cooperative 

with another district or districts to provide 

education for such children . . . . 

3 

program 

special 

Appellate Case: 89-5111 Document: 01019625216 Date Filed: 12/11/1990 Page: 3 
year, September through May. The Bixby school district does not 

provide a structured summer program for its severely and multiply 

handicapped children. 

During the nine 

attended the CDC. For 

recreational day camp 

months of the regular school year, Natalie 

four years, 1982-1986, she attended a 

for handicapped children run by the Tulsa 

Association for the Retarded (TAR) during six weeks in the summer. 

The parties dispute whether this day camp experience had a 

positive educational effect on Natalie or whether it was 

tantamount to no structured educational program. 

In January 1987, at the regular annual meeting he.ld to plan 

Natalie's educational program, the Johnsons requested that Natalie 

be provided with a structured summer educational program. This 

request was denied after a separate meeting was held in April 1987 

to discuss the issue. The Johnsons then invoked the due process 

procedures defined by the Act, beginning with a hearing before an 

administrative hearing officer appointed by the Oklahoma State 

Department of Education. 

At the hearing, the Johnsons presented evidence in the form 

of testimony from Natalie's mother and from the social worker for 

Natalie's family, R. Vol. II, tr. at 9-33, 58-85, as well as 

written opinions from her pediatrician, her neurologist, and a 

psychologist who evaluated Natalie. R. Vol. II. All agreed that 

she needed to continue her experience in a structured educational 

setting during the summer months to prevent regression. 

The school district presented testimony from Natalie's 

classroom teacher and her speech therapist for the 1985-86 and 

4 

Appellate Case: 89-5111 Document: 01019625216 Date Filed: 12/11/1990 Page: 4 
1986-87 school years. Both teachers testified that, in fact, 

Natalie had not regressed during the summer of 1986 even though 

she had not participated in an extended school year program during 

that period. R. Vol. II, tr. at 89-90, 99-101. 

The hearing officer found that Natalie's educational record 

did not provide objective documentation of improvement or lack of 

regression, despite her teachers' optimistic testimony. R. 

Vol. II, Hearing decision, findings of fact, '11~1 7, 8. The hearing 

officer concluded that an extended school year program was not 

warranted for Natalie. The hearing officer's decision was based, 

first, on the legal premise that predictions of future regression 

are insufficient to compel the schools to provide an extended 

school year to a handicapped child, and, second, on the factual 

finding that Natalie's parents failed to demonstrate that Natalie 

had in fact regressed during the summer of 1986. 

Natalie's parents appealed the decision, and the appeals 

officer affirmed the hearing officer's decision, stating that 

"[a]ll parents are encouraged to supplement their children's 

required education in an effort to maximize the individual child's 

potential; but, this additional effort is not the School's 

responsibility." R. Vol. II, Appeal Review Decision at 3. 

Natalie's parents then filed this action against the Bixby 

school district, the CDC and the Oklahoma State Department of 

Education (collectively referred to as "the schools") in the 

district court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, seeking 

judicial review of the decision. No additional evidence was 

offered by either party and the matter was referred to a 

5 

Appellate Case: 89-5111 Document: 01019625216 Date Filed: 12/11/1990 Page: 5 
magistrate following cross motions for summary judgment. The 

magistrate issued a report and recommendation stating that the 

preponderance of the evidence indicated that Natalie could b e 

predicted to regress during the summer months without a structured 

summer program, and concluding that, pursuant to the Act, the 

schools must provide Natalie with a structured summer educational 

program as a continuation of her program during the regular school 

year. R. Vol. I, tab 27. 

However, the district court, basing its decision on the same 

regression evaluation standard used by the administrative hearing 

officer, found the evidence that Natalie had not regressed during 

the previous summer, presented by two teachers who had worked with 

Natalie on a daily basis for many months, to be more compelling 

than the predictions of outside experts, who had less continuous 

contact with the child, that such a summer program would prevent 

regression in the future. The district court therefore granted 

the schools' motion for summary judgment, holding that, as a 

matter of law under the Act and the Oklahoma statute, the Bixby 

school district was not required to provide an extended school 

year program to Natalie. Johnson v. Independent School District 

No. 4, No. 88-C-340-C (N.D. Okla. June 5, 1989). Natalie's 

parents appealed. 

II. 

This court has jurisdiction on appeal pursuant to § 141S(e) 

of the Act, and 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1989). See also Hendrick Hudson 

District Board of Education v . Rowley, 458 u.s. 176, 186 n.9 

6 

Appellate Case: 89-5111 Document: 01019625216 Date Filed: 12/11/1990 Page: 6 
(1982)(the court has jurisdiction over an issue which evades 

review yet is capable of repetition). 

The final district court order in this case was grant of the 

schools' motion for summary judgment. 

We review the summary judgment orders de nQYQ, 

applying the same legal standard used by the district 

court under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. Summary judgment should be granted only if 

"there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 

• • • the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). When applying 

this standard, we are to examine the factual record and 

reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most 

favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. 

'However, the nonmoving party may not rest on his 

pleadings; the party must set forth specific facts 

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. 

Abercrombie v. City of Catoosa, 896 F.2d 1228, 1230 (lOth Cir. 

1990)(citations omitted). 

In Hendrick Hudson District Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 

u.s. 176 (1982), the Supreme Court established a twofold inquiry 

for district courts to use in determining whether the Act's 

requirements have been met: (1) Has the State complied with the 

procedures set forth in the Act? (2) Is the individualized 

educational program developed through the Act's procedures 

reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational 

benefits? Id. at 206-07. 

The legal standard to be used by the district court in 

considering each of these issues is set forth in the Act: "In any 

action brought under this paragraph the court shall receive the 

records of the administrative proceedings, shall hear additional 

evidence at the request of a party, and, basing its decision on 

the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the 

7 

Appellate Case: 89-5111 Document: 01019625216 Date Filed: 12/11/1990 Page: 7 
court determines is appropriate." 20 u.s.c. § 1415(e)(2); see 

Polk v. Central Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 

173 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 838 (1989). 2 This 

case was submitted to the district court on the administrative 

record, including a transcript of the administrative hearing. 

Thus, our review includes de novo factual analysis based on that 

administrative record, as well as de novo legal analysis of the 

issues presented. 

The parties should note that the burden of proof in these 

matters rests with the party attacking the child's individual 

education plan. In Alamo Heights Independent School District v. 

State Board of Education, 790 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1986), the Fifth 

Circuit reiterated that the Act 

"placed primary responsibility for formulating 

handicapped children's education in the hands of state 

and local school agencies in cooperation with each 

child's parents." In deference to this statutory scheme 

and the reliance it places on the expertise of local 

2 The court in Campbell v. Talladega County Board of Education, 

518 F. Supp. 47 (N.D. Ala. 1981), explained that: 

The preponderance of the evidence standard codified 

at 20 u.s.c. § 1415(e)(2) reflects a decision to accord 

a greater role in the enforcement scheme to the federal 

courts. The original House version which provided that 

the determination of the state agency would be 

"conclusive in any court of the United States if 

supported by substantial evidence" was rejected by the 

conference committee and the present language was 

substituted. 

Id. at 53 n.9 (citation omitted); see also David D. v. Dartmouth 

School Comm., 775 F.2d 411, 420 (1st Cir. 1985)(federal courts do 

not have to assume deference to the administrative hearing 

officers' decisions under the Act, for to do so would be 

tantamount to elevating the decisions of the administrative 

hearing officer to that of the highest state court, clearly an 

inappropriate outcome), cert. denied sub~ Massachusetts Dept. 

of Educ. v. David 0., 475 U.S. 1140 (1986). 

8 

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education authorities, • . • the Act creates a 

"presumption in favor of the education placement 

established by [a child's individualized education 

plan]," and "the party attacking its terms should bear 

the burden of showing why the educational setting 

established by the [individualized education plan] is 

not appropriate." 

Id. at 1158 (quoting Tatro v. Texas, 703 P.2d 823, 830 (5th Cir. 

1983), aff'd, 468 U.S. 883 (1984))(footnotes omitted). 

III. 

States which elect to receive federal funds under the Act 

must provide all handicapped children with the right to a "free 

appropriate public education." 20 u.s.c. § 1412(1). Under the 

Act, each child's substantive educational program must be defined 

by an annual individual educational plan (IEP) developed by the 

local school district in consultation with the child's parents. 

34 C.P.R. §§ 300.340-.345. The IEP must include the specific 

goals, teaching methods, and evaluation procedures appropriate to 

that child's educational needs. Id. § 300.346. Each child's IEP 

must be revised at an annual meeting of the teachers and 

therapists who work with the child, his or her parents, and local 

school district special education administrators (IEP meeting). 

Id. §§ 300.341-.345. If the child's special education placement 

or program as defined by the IEP is disputed by the child's 

parents, the Act sets forth a procedure by which the IEP is to be 

reviewed by an impartial hearing officer through the 

administration of the state education agency. 

20 u.s.c. §§ 1415(a),(b),(d); 34 C.P.R. §§ 300.500-.508. The 

decision of the hearing officer may be appealed to an appeals 

hearing officer, also appointed by the state educational agency. 

9 

Appellate Case: 89-5111 Document: 01019625216 Date Filed: 12/11/1990 Page: 9 
20 U.S.C. § 1415(c); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.509- .510. That decision 

may be reviewed in 

local federal district 

§ 300.511. 

an action brought in state court or in the 

court. 34 U.S.C. § 1415(e}; 34 C.F.R. 

We are bound by the Act, which rests on the cornerstone of 

granting handicapped children entitlement to a "free appropriate 

public education," 20 u.s.c. § 1412(1), based on an individually 

designed education plan revised at least annually. Id. at 

§ 1414(a)(5)~ Rowley, 458 U.S. at 203. The individualization 

requirement is of paramount importance in the Act. 20 

u.s.c. §§ 1401(a)(19), 1412(2)(B)~ Rowley, 458 u.s. at 188-89, 

198, 202~ Polk, 853 F.2d at 172; Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 

269, 280 (3d Cir.), on remand, 513 F. Supp. 425 (E.D. Pa~ 1980), 

cert. denied sub~ Scanlon v. Battle, 452 U.S. 968 (1981). 

While it would be easier for those involved in administrative 

review under the Act to have one and only one criterion for 

evaluating the appropriateness of a handicapped child1 S IEP, the 

handicapping impediments which force individualization of the 

child's education program in the first place also mandate an 

_individualized approach to review of the child's IEP. 

The amount of regression suffered by a child during the 

summer months, considered together with the amount of time 

required to recoup those lost skills when school resumes in the 

fall, is an important consideration in assessing an individual 

child's need for continuation of his or her structured educational 

program in the summer months. In Alamo Heights, the Fifth Circuit 

10 

Appellate Case: 89-5111 Document: 01019625216 Date Filed: 12/11/1990 Page: 10 
explained this "regression-recoupment" analysis, which plays an 

integral part in the case before us today: 

As we stated in Crawford v. Pittman [708 F.2d 1028 (5th 

Cir. 1983)], "The basic substantive standard under the 

Act, then, is that each IEP must be formulated to 

provide some educational benefit to the child," in 

accordance with "the unique needs" of that child. The 

some-educational-benefit standard does not mean that the 

requirements of the Act are satisfied so long as a 

handicapped child's progress, absent summer services, is 

not brought "to a virtual standstill." Rather, if a 

child will experience severe or substantial regression 

during the summer months in the absence of a summer 

program, the handicapped child may be entitled to 

year-round services. The issue is whether the benefits 

accrued to the child during the regular school year will 

be significantly jeopardized if he is not provided an 

educational program during the summer months. 

790 F.2d at 1158 (citations omitted). 

However, the regression-recoupment analysis is not the only 

measure used to determine the necessity of structured summer 

program. In addition to degree of regression and the time 

necessary for recoupment, courts have considered many factors 

important in their discussions of what constitutes an 

"appropriate" educational program under the Act. These include 

the degree of impairment and the ability of the child's parents to 

provide the educational structure at home, Battle, 629 F.2d at 

280; the child's rate of progress, his or her behavioral and 

physical problems, the availability of alternative resources, the 

ability of the child to interact with non-handicapped children, 

the areas of the child's curriculum which need continuous 

attention, and the child's vocational needs, Yaris v. Special 

School Dist., 558 F. Supp. 545, 551 (E.D. Mo. 1983), aff'd, 728 

F.2d 1055 {8th Cir. 1984); and whether the requested service is 

11 

Appellate Case: 89-5111 Document: 01019625216 Date Filed: 12/11/1990 Page: 11 
"extraordinary" to the child's condition, as opposed to an 

integral part of a program for those with the child's condition. 

Polk, 853 F.2d at 182. In fact, the Third Circuit recently 

explicitly rejected using solely a regression analysis 

determine the necessity of a summer program under the Act: 

[AJ serious problem ••. lies in defendants' implicit 

suggestion that a child must first show regression 

before his parents may challenge the appropriateness of 

his education. . • • [W]e do not believe that Congress 

intended that courts present parents with the Hobson's 

choice of allowing regression (hence proving their 

claim) or providing on their own what their child needs 

to make meaningful progress. 

Polk, 853 F.2d at 184. 

In Rowley, the Supreme Court explicitly held 

to 

that 

administrative and court review may not limit analysis of the 

appropriateness of the IEP to any single criterion. "We do not 

attempt today to establish any one test for determining the 

adequacy of educational benefits conferred upon all children 

covered by the Act." 458 u.s. at 202; see also Yaris, 

558 F. Supp. at 558. This restraint is as applicable to a 

specific educational program element, such as whether a child 

should be provided a structured summer educational experience, as 

it is to a generalized issue such as the "adequacy of educational 

benefits conferred upon all children covered by the Act." Rowley, 

458 U.S. at 202; see also Crawford, 708 F.2d at 1034 n.28 

(declining to state whether the "regression-recoupment syndrome" 

should be used as a test to narrow the class of children to whom a 

summer program must be offered). 

12 

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We prefer to adopt the Fifth Circuit's broad premise, as 

articulated in Alamo Heights: 

The issue is whether the benefits accrued to the child 

during the regular school year will be significantly 

jeopardized if he is not provided an educational program 

during the summer months. This is, of course, a general 

standard, but it must be applied to the individual by 

[those drafting and approving the IEP] in the same way 

that juries apply other general legal standards such as 

negligence and reasonableness. 

790 F.2d at 1158.3 The analysis of whether the child's level of 

achievement would be jeopardized by a summer break in his or her 

structured educational programming should proceed by applying not 

only retrospective data, such as past regression and rate of 

recoupment, but also should include predictive data, based on the 

opinion of professionals in consultation with the child's parents 

as well as circumstantial considerations of the child's ~ndividual 

situation at home and in his or her neighborhood and community. 4 

3 The Alamo Heights case, in which the court found that the 

child in question should receive a structured summer educational 

program, resembles the case before the court today in that the 

testimony concerning the child's regression-recoupment tendencies 

was directly conflicting: "[T]he School District's employees and 

consultants were unanimous that they observed no significant 

regression, while the doctors, therapists, and former teachers who 

testified on behalf of [the childJ all agreed that [the child] 

required a continuous structured program in order to prevent 

significant regression." Id. at 1159. 

4 We are aware that at least one district court has limited the 

provision of summer educational programs to those children who can 

prove irreparable regression. In Bales v. Clarke, 523 

F. Supp. 1366 (E.D. Va. 1981), the court held that "[p]laintiff is 

••. not entitled to year-round schooling without showing an 

irreparable loss of progress during summer months." Id. at 1371. 

The Bales court relied on Anderson v. Thompson, 495 F. Supp. 1256, 

1266 (E.D. Wis. 1980), aff'd, 658 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 

1981)(affirming district court denial of compensatory damages and 

attorney's fees). 

We disagree with the Bales court, not only in its holding 

{continued on next page) 

13 

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In so holding, we are mindful of the Supreme Court's caution 

in Rowley that the "appropriate" education required by the Act is 

not one which is guaranteed to maximize the child's potential. 

458 u.s. at 197 n.21; accord Polk, 853 F.2d at 178-79; Muth v. 

Central Bucks School Dist., 839 F.2d 113, 119 (3d Cir.), cert. 

denied, 109 s. Ct. 103 (1988)(as to local school district 

defendant and grounds pertinent hereto), and rev'd, 109 s. Ct. 

2397 (1989)(only as to state as defendant on 11th Amendment 

immunity grounds). 5 The Act insures, first, that some services 

(continued from previous page) 

under the Act, but also with its implication that Anderson 

supports its conclusion. In Anderson, a case involving a child 

whose diagnosis and proposed educational program were disputed, 

the district court, without citing any legal authority, declined 

to order the local school district to provide a summer program 

because the student's academic regression was not predicted to be 

more severe than that of a nonhandicapped student. Id. at 1266. 

Cf. Rettig v. Kent City School Dist., 539 F. Supp. 768, 778-79 

(N.D. Ohio 1981)(regression standard is appropriately applied; the 

child who·se program was the subject of this case had displayed 

periods of regression year-round; "[I]f on the basis of a 

multi-factored evaluation, a new IEP for [the child] called for 

summer school," the school must so provide with state 

funding){emphasis added), aff'd in pertinent part and partially 

vacated 2n other grounds, 720 F.2d 463 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. 

denied, 467 u.s. 1201 (1984). 

5 It is important to be careful when using the term 

"maximization" in the educational setting. For example, the 

district court in Bales v. Clarke wrote as if the phrase 11 'maximizing' the plaintiff's educational opportunities" were 

synonymous with the idealistic goal of "'maximum educational 

progress' through the 'best' education available, without regard 

to costs. 11 523 F. Supp. at 1371. However, these concepts are not 

synonymous. The former describes making the best use of the 

educational program which has been determined to be appropriate 

for the child, including balancing the needs of the local school 

district with the resources available to meet those needs. The 

latter describes the utopian ideal of providing unlimited services 

to every child, a goal which has been uniformly recognized as 

unreachable and inappropriate, given the press of needs in our 

communities. The former is mandated by the Act; the latter is 

not. Indeed, most professional educators would agree that it is a 

(continued on next page) 

14 

Appellate Case: 89-5111 Document: 01019625216 Date Filed: 12/11/1990 Page: 14 
are provided to children who previously had received no services 

at all. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(3); see,~' Rowley, 458 u.s. at 201 

{each child must be provided with a "basic floor of opportunity"); 

Polk, 853 F.2d at 179. Second, it insures that those services 

which are provided are individualized. 20 u.s.c. § 1412(2)(8). 

And third, it gives parents the right and obligation to act as the 

enforcement arm of the entitlement through the procedural 

safeguards outlined and mandated by the Act. 20 u.s.c. § 1412(5); 

Rowley, 458 u.s. at 205-06; Hall v. Vance County Bd. of Educ., 774 

F.2d 629, 634 (4th Cir. 1985). Congress was mindful of the 

6 financial burdens which such expanded services imposed, and was 

not utopian in its goals. 

The State of Oklahoma is a recipient of federal assistance 

though the Act, and its legislature has enacted a correlative 

enabling statute, Okla. Stat. tit. 70, § 13-101 (1989 & 

Supp. 1990)(the Oklahoma statute). The Oklahoma statute includes 

the provision that, if the child's IEP recommends continuing 

educational services during the summer, the local school district 

(continued from previous page) 

theoretical as well as a physical and financial impossibility to 

establish an educational program which "maximizes" each child's 

educational potential. 

6 These financial burdens have offsetting 

See Polk, in which the Third Circuit stated: 

financial benefits. 

A chief selling point of the Act was that although it is 

penny dear, it is pound wise the expensive 

individualized assistance early in life, geared toward 

teaching basic life skills and self-sufficiency, 

eventually redounds to the benefit of the public fisc as 

these children grow to become productive citizens. 

853 F.2d at 181-82; accord Rowley, 458 u.s. at 201 n.23. 

15 

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will be funded to provide a maximum of forty days educational 

programming during the summer to prevent loss of the educational 

gains achieved during the nine-month school year.

7 

I·f state legislation implementing the Act grants a broader 

entitlement than that found in the federal statute, the state 

statute defines the parameters of the program which must be 

extended to children living in that state. See Board of Educ. v. 

Diamond, 808 F.2d 987, 992 (3rd Cir. 1986); David D. v. Dartmouth 

School Comm., 775 F.2d 411, 417, 420 (1st Cir. 1985){the Act 

incorporates state substantive law implementing the Act), cert. 

denied sub~ Massachusetts Dept. of Educ. v. David D., 475 u.s. 

1140 ( 1986) • 

However, the Oklahoma statute is not broader than its federal 

counterpart in its provision for funding for forty days of summer 

programming under an IEP. The Third, Fifth, Eighth and Eleventh 

Circuits have all held that under the Act itself, states must 

provide a continuous educational experience through the summer 

under the child's IEP if that is the "appropriate" educational 

experience for the handicapped child's situation. Georgia Ass'n 

of Retarded Citizens v. McDaniel, 716 F.2d 1565, 1576 (11th Cir. 

1983), modified on other grounds, 740 F.2d 902 (1984), cert. 

7 Okla. Stat. tit. 70, § 13-101 provides in pertinent part: 

Funds may be expended for school services for an 

additional period not to exceed forty (40) days during 

the summer months for approved programs for qualified 

children, who are severely or profoundly 

multiple-handicapped, provided their individualized 

education program (I.E.P.) states the need for a 

continuing educational experience to prevent loss of 

educational achievement or basic life skills. 

16 

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denied, 469 u.s. 1228 (1985); Crawford, 708 F.2d at 1034; Yaris, 

558 F. Supp. at 559; Battle, 629 F.2d at 281. Thus, the federal 

statute's mandate of a "free appropriate public education," as 

judicially interpreted, includes the provision for a summer 

program if appropriate under a child's IEP. It follows that the 

Oklahoma statute, while assuring local school districts that state 

funding will cover a forty-day structured educational program 

during the summer for a child's individualized program, does not 

expand the federal statute. 

To the extent that the Oklahoma statute has been interpreted 

to require the party attacking the child's proposed IEP to prove 

that the child has already experienced significant regression with 

ineffective recoupment of· educational or basic life skills, or 

could be predicted to experience such regression during summer 

months, in isolation from any other elements which may be 

important to an individualized assessment of the child's 

situation, the Oklahoma statute is actually more restrictive than 

the federal entitlement, rather than more expansive. We cannot 

reconcile that interpretation with the individualized review 

demanded by the Act. As an example which is not uncommon, what of 

the child who has not shown regression in the past, but for whom 

other factors, such as acceleration of his or her deficiencies 

with increased physical maturity, outweigh the lack of past 

egregious regression? Under the Act, both documentation 

concerning past regression and predictions of future regression 

should be considered, an analysis which requires investigation 

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Appellate Case: 89-5111 Document: 01019625216 Date Filed: 12/11/1990 Page: 17 
into many aspects of the child's educational, home, and community 

life. 

Turning to the case before us, a thorough review of the 

entire administrative record reveals it to be focused exclusively 

on a limited regression-recoupment analysis, which itself is 

vigorously disputed with opposing competent testimony and 

.d B ev~ ence. Because of the conflict in evidence concerning 

Natalie's past regression, other factors, including some or all of 

those discussed above, 9 should have been considered as part of the 

evaluation of whether Natalie's IEP is "appropriate" for her 

individual circumstances. However, there was scant factual 

development in the record from the administrative proceedings 

concerning many aspects of ·Natalie's life. 10 Because the record 

B This dispute alone, concerning 

renders inappropriate the district 

judgment. 

material 

court's 

factual 

grant of 

matters, 

summary 

9 The list of possible factors includes the degree of 

impairment, the degree of regression suffered by the child, the 

recovery time from this regression, the ability of the child's 

parents to provide the educational structure at home, the child's 

rate of progress, the child's behavioral and physical problems, 

the availability of alternative resources, the ability of the 

child to interact with nonhandicapped children, the areas of the 

child's curriculum which need continuous attention,. the child's 

vocational needs, and whether the requested service is 

extraordinary for the child's condition, as opposed to an integral 

part of a program for those with the child's condition. This list 

is not intended to be exhaustive, nor is it intended that each 

element would impact planning for each child's IEP. 

10 ~' the record reveals that for at least two summers, 1985 

and 1986, Natalie's parents had applied for her participation in 

the "Laura Dester program," a program run by the Oklahoma 

Department of Human Services for handicapped children living at 

home. The program is apparently one of nonprofessionals working 

with parents in the home during the summer, using the child's IEP 

for guidance. The record is completely undeveloped as to whether 

there is any cost to the parents for this program, or why Natalie 

(continued on next page) 

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Appellate Case: 89-5111 Document: 01019625216 Date Filed: 12/11/1990 Page: 18 
focuses so completely on only one component of Natalie's 

education, we do not have sufficient facts to make an informed 

disposition on the merits of this case, and we therefore express 

no opinion as to whether the Natalie's IEP is "appropriate" under 

the Act's mandate. We do hold, however, that those who conducted 

the administrative review, the administrative appeal, and the 

federal district court review of that administrative process erred 

by converting what should have been a multifaceted inquiry into 

application of a single, inflexible criterion. 

As to the first issue, therefore, we reverse summary judgment 

in favor of the schools and remand the case for further 

proceedings, which should include presentation and consideration 

of evidence concerning other factors in addition to the 

regression-recoupment evaluation previously conducted, relevant to 

a decision as to whether a structured educational summer program 

should be included as part of Natalie's IEP. 

IV. 

As to the second issue, whether the CDC is a necessary party 

to the suit, the hearing officer did not render any finding or 

conclusion. The appeals officer found that the CDC was not a 

necessary party because Natalie's program is the legal 

responsibility of the local education agency, the Bixby school 

(continued from previous page) 

did not attend it. The record also contains an unexplained school 

memo to file indicating that a speech pathologist from the Laura 

Dester program who was assigned to work with Natalie during the 

summer of 1986 visited her classroom to observe the techniques 

Natalie's teacher was employing, although in fact Natalie did not 

attend the program in 1986. 

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district, "under state and federal law and regulation." Appeal 

review decision at 2, 3 (citing the Oklahoma statute and 34 C.F.R. 

§ 506). The magistrate held: "The Children's Developmental 

Center is not a proper party to this action, being a cooperative 

effort pursuant to 70 o.s. § 13-101(2)." Report and 

Recommendation at 19 n.15. The district court found that it did 

not need to address the issue a f ter it granted the schools' motion 

f or . d t 11 summary JU gmen . 

?ection 1415(b)(2) of the Act provides that: 

Whenever a complaint has been received under 

paragraph (1) of this subsection, the parents or 

guardian shall have an opportunity for an impartial due 

process hearing which shall be conducted by the State 

educational agency or by the local educational agency or 

intermediate educational unit, as determined by State 

law or by the State educational agency. 

The Oklahoma State Department of Education has designated the 

"local education agency" as the proper party to respond to a 

parental request for due process review of a child's placement or 

program. See Policies and Procedures Manual for Special Education 

in Oklahoma at 53 (1988). By letter to counsel for the Johnsons 

dated June 5, 1987, the Oklahoma State Department of Education 

clarified that their request for review of Natalie's program must 

be forwarded to the superintendent of the Bixby Public Schools. 

11 On appeal, the schools argue that this issue is not properly 

before us because Natalie's counsel did not address it in the 

complaint before the district court. The district court stated 

that, "The plaintiff has not specifically objected to this 

conclusion." Order at 4. However, the record reveals that the 

complaint specifically and repe atedly requested federal court 

review of this issue. See, ~' R. Vol. I, tab 1 at 4-7. This 

comment of the district court was plain error, but the error is 

harmless under our holding today. 

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In theory; the CDC could be considered a "local educational 

agency" under the definitions given in the Act and in the 

regulations implementing the Act, see 20 u.s.c. §§ 140l(a)(8), 

1401(a)(22); 34 C.F.R. § 300.8. However, the Act states clearly 

that the request for due process review is to be made to only one 

party, which may be designated by the state board of education. 

20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2)(The "due process hearing shall be 

conducted by the State educational agency or by the local 

educational agency ~ the intermediate educational unit, ~ 

determined by the State educational agency.")(emphasis 

added). The Oklahoma State Board of Education has designated the 

local school district as the responsible party, consistent with 

the Act. 12 Thus, the CDC is not a necessary party to this action. 

The order of the district court is REVERSED and the matter is 

REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

12 At the hearing, the hearing officer sustained the schools' 

objections to questions about whether any of the seven other 

children in Natalie's class at the CDC were attending summer 

programs. The schools' objections were based in part on the fact 

that the programs for other children were not relevant to 

Natalie's program, and in part that other students "are not even 

students this school district has any responsibility for." R. 

Vol. II, tr. at 103. 

Under our holding today, it is clear that the question of 

what services are regionally available to a child with a 

particular handicap can be relevant to the evaluation of the 

schools' responsibility to provide a structured summer educational 

program. We trust that our intent to encourage broad information 

gathering during the evaluation process is clear, and that on 

remand, all relevant information will be included, in an attempt 

to achieve the balance of individual need and public resources 

which Congress envisioned. 

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