Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-15-01285/USCOURTS-ca8-15-01285-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Loretta E. Lynch
Respondent
Amardeep Singh
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 15-1285

___________________________

Amardeep Singh, also known as Amardeep Simngh

lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioner

v.

Loretta E. Lynch, Attorney General of the United States

lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent

____________

Petition for Review of an Order of the

 Board of Immigration Appeals

____________

 Submitted: September 10, 2015

Filed: October 14, 2015

____________

Before RILEY, Chief Judge, BENTON and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

____________

RILEY, Chief Judge.

Amardeep Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of an order

of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) affirming an immigration judge’s (IJ)

denial of his application for asylum, withholding ofremoval, and protection under the

Convention Against Torture (CAT). Singh also challenges the Board’s rejection of

his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. We deny the petition for review. 

Appellate Case: 15-1285 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/14/2015 Entry ID: 4325894 
I. BACKGROUND

In August 2011, Singh entered the United States near Hidalgo, Texas, without

a valid visa or other entry document. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I)

(documentation requirements). Singh is a Sikh and a member of the Shirmoani Akali

Dal Amritsar party led by Sardar Simranjit Singh Mann (Mann Party). When

detained by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Singh asserted he

feared persecution by the rival India Congress Party (Congress Party) if returned to

India. Singh told a DHS asylumofficer that members of the Congress Party had twice

beaten him for refusing to switch parties. The officer found Singh had “a credible

fear of persecution” for his political opinion and referred Singh’s application for

further consideration. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii), (B)(ii). 

 

On September 9, 2011, DHS initiated removal proceedings. Conceding

removability, Singh applied for asylum, withholding ofremoval, and CAT protection. 

See id. §§ 1158(b)(1)(A), 1231(b)(3)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c). On March 21, 2012,

the IJ continued Singh’s removal hearing to permit Singh to obtain new counsel. 

Singh’s retained counsel did not attend the rescheduled removal hearing on

November 13, 2012, despite a promise to do so, instead sending an unprepared

associate to appear for Singh. The IJ chastised counsel for not being ready to

proceed, but granted another continuance—though shorter than counsel sought. 

At the rescheduled hearing on December 5, 2012, Singh testified through an

interpreter that he was a farmer in India and a low-level member of the Mann Party. 

Singh reported he fled India for the United States because he feared persecution for

his political views. Singh again described two instances where he had been attacked

and beaten by members of the Congress Party who told him to disavow the Mann

Party and join the Congress Party. Singh provided several documents to support his

request for asylum. 

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On August 8, 2013, the IJ denied Singh’s application and ordered him

removed. Thoroughly examining the record, the IJ decided Singh was “not credible

because his testimony contradicted information he gave at his [credible fearinterview

with the asylumofficer] and because he was nonresponsive and evasive during crossexamination.” The IJ found “[s]ome testimony was unbelievable” and some was

“directly contradicted” by “the corroborating evidence,” but all lacked sufficient

record support. 

The IJ alternatively found that, even if credible, Singh’s accounts of minor

beatings and short detentions did “not rise to the level of persecution.” The IJ also

found Singh failed to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. Because

Singh was not eligible for asylum and did not present evidence he would face torture

for other reasons, the IJ concluded he could not establish an entitlement to

withholding of removal or relief under the CAT.

With new counsel, Singh timely appealed to the Board, which denied relief.

The Board agreed with the IJ that Singh was not credible and alternatively “that,

assuming credibility, [Singh] did not demonstrate that he suffered past persecution

or that he has a well-founded fear of future persecution based on the record evidence

and country conditions in Punjab, India.” In addition to upholding the IJ’s decision

on the merits, the Board rejected Singh’s assertion he was prejudiced by his prior

counsel’s ineffective assistance. Singh petitions for review of the Board’s order. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standards of Review

We review the Board’s “decision as the final agency action, but to the extent

the [Board] adopts the findings of the IJ, this court reviews those findings as part of

the final agency action.” R.K.N. v. Holder, 701 F.3d 535, 537 (8th Cir. 2012). In

evaluating Singh’s petition, we review de novo his due process claim, see Zheng v.

Holder, 698 F.3d 710, 714 (8th Cir. 2012), and any issues of law, see Ademo v.

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Lynch, 795 F.3d 823, 828 (8th Cir. 2015). “We review the IJ’s findings of fact,

including adverse credibility findings, under the deferential substantial evidence

standard, and must treat those findings as ‘conclusive unless any reasonable

adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.’” Sandoval-Loffredo v.

Gonzales, 414 F.3d 892, 895 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). 

B. Credibility

“To qualify for asylum, [Singh] must show that he is unable or unwilling to

return to his country of origin because of persecution or a well-founded fear of

persecution on account ofrace, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social

group, or political opinion.” Nanic v. Lynch, 793 F.3d 945, 947 (8th Cir. 2015)

(citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(A), 1101(a)(42)(A)). Proof of past persecution gives

rise to a rebuttable presumption of “a well founded fear of future persecution.” Uli

v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 950, 955 (8th Cir. 2008). 

Persecution “is an ‘extreme concept’ that involves the infliction or threat of

death, torture, or injury to one’s person or freedom, on account of a protected

characteristic.” Malonga v. Holder, 621 F.3d 757, 764 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting

Sholla v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 946, 951 (8th Cir. 2007)). It “does not include

low-level intimidation and harassment.” Zakirov v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 541, 546 (8th

Cir. 2004). “In addition, persecution is a harm that is inflicted either by the

government of a country or by persons or an organization that the government was

unable or unwilling to control.” Shaghil v. Holder, 638 F.3d 828, 834 (8th Cir. 2011)

(quoting Menjivar v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 2005)) (internal marks

omitted). 

An applicant can prove persecution “without corroboration, but only if the

applicant satisfies the trier of fact that the applicant’s testimony is credible, is

persuasive, and refers to specific facts sufficient to demonstrate that the applicant is

a refugee.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). “An IJ may properly request evidence to

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corroborate an alien’s claims if his credibility is in question.” Prokopenko v.

Ashcroft, 372 F.3d 941, 945 (8th Cir. 2004). “[E]vidence of persecution that is

‘insufficiently specific or imminent’ does not establish persecution for an asylum

claim.” Litvinov v. Holder, 605 F.3d 548, 554 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ladyha v.

Holder, 588 F.3d 574, 577 (8th Cir. 2009)). 

Singh claims he was and will be persecuted in India because he will not change

political parties. After hearing Singh’s testimony and reviewing the other evidence

in the record, the IJ found Singh was not credible because of inconsistencies in his

testimony and a lack of evidentiary support. Singh claims the IJ’s “adverse credibility

finding should be reversed” because, in Singh’s view, “it is based almost exclusively

on collateral matters that are not relevant to the key facts of [Singh’s] claim” and the

IJ failed to give adequate notice of the need for corroborating evidence. Singh’s

claims are without merit.1

Singh complains the IJ’s credibility determination was based on the IJ’s

“improper consideration of” “evidence that is not relevant or probative or

For the first time in his brief on appeal, Singh alleges judicial interference and

1

bias created “an atmosphere of hostility, aggression and lack of cooperation on the

part of the Immigration Court [toward Singh, his counsel, and the interpreter] that

leavesserious doubts asto whether thisrecord can even be trusted” and deprived him

of a fair hearing. Although Singh’s assertions of judicial misconduct and debilitating

record deficiencies appear unlikely to withstand even the slightest scrutiny, we do not

consider these issues here because Singh did not present them to the Board. See

Martinez Carcamo v. Holder, 713 F.3d 916, 925 (8th Cir. 2013) (“A petitioner has not

exhausted administrative remedies with respect to a particular issue [as required by

8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1)] if he fails to raise it when he appeals to the Board.” (quoting

Ateka v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 954, 957 (8th Cir. 2004) (internal marks omitted)));

Mambwe v. Holder, 572 F.3d 540, 551 (8th Cir. 2009) (“[T]o the extent [the

petitioner]’s due process claim relates to the proceedings before the IJ, we may not

consider it because [the petitioner] failed to raise the issue in her appeal to the

[Board].”). 

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fundamentally fair when related to the actual incidents of persecution.” As Singh

sees it, he is entitled to a new hearing because the agency should have focused not on

his understanding of “broad political” issues and what he calls “minorinconsistencies

orinaccuracies on tangential issues” and “innocuousfailures in [Singh’s] knowledge”

but on his consistent account of “two particular physical attacks, post attack threats,

and his flight from” India. Singh misconstruesthe IJ’s task and the scope of appellate

review. 

Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a

trier of fact may base a credibility determination on the demeanor,

candor, or responsiveness of the applicant or witness, the inherent

plausibility of the applicant’s or witness’s account, the consistency

between the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements

(whenever made and whether or not under oath, and considering the

circumstances under which the statements were made), the internal

consistency of each such statement, the consistency of such statements

with other evidence of record (including the reports of the Department

of State on country conditions), and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in

such statements, without regard to whether an inconsistency,

inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or

any other relevant factor.

8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (emphasis added). And “we defer to an IJ’s credibility

determination where, as here, it is supported by ‘specific, cogent reasons for

disbelief.’” Fesehaye v. Holder, 607 F.3d 523, 527 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Onsongo

v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 849, 852 (8th Cir. 2006)).

Notwithstanding Singh’s contention to the contrary, Singh received sufficient

notice and a fair opportunity to obtain and present evidence to corroborate his claims. 

The IJ and Board then duly considered Singh’s testimony in relation to the other

relevant factors. The IJ and Board merely found Singh’s inconsistent reports of

persecution insufficiently supported by record evidence and outweighed by the

balance of the totality of the circumstances.

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Closely examining Singh’s understanding of the goals of his party and the

political atmosphere in Punjab, the IJ found Singh’s description incredible,

implausible, and contradicted by his prior testimony and other evidence, including

evidence describing country conditions in India. The IJ found Singh became

“nonresponsive” and “generally evasive” when confronted with such material

inconsistencies and contradictions. Singh’s admission that the agent who brought

him to the United States had coached him about what to say and not to say to obtain

asylum reasonably heightened the IJ’s concerns about Singh’s credibility. The

Board—in concluding the IJ’s “adverse credibility finding [wa]s not clearly

erroneous”—agreed Singh “gave inconsistent, evasive, and generally incoherent

testimony describing the various political parties in Punjab, India and the general

conditions there.” 

Singh concedes he became nonresponsive and made inconsistent and

inaccurate statements but maintains they were minor, irrelevant, and the result of

nerves and fear. But Singh’s attempts to minimize the flaws in his live testimony and

to rationalize his evasive demeanor do not persuade us the IJ was compelled to find

his testimony credible under the circumstances of this case. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(b)(4)(B); Mayemba v. Holder, 776 F.3d 542, 545 (8th Cir. 2015) (“‘It is well

settled that an immigration judge is in the best position to make credibility findings

because he or she sees the witness as the testimony is given.’” (quoting Ismail v.

Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 970, 974 (8th Cir. 2005))).

Upon careful review, we are satisfied the IJ’s adverse credibility finding was

based on substantial record evidence and supported by specific, cogent reasons. See

Fesehaye, 607 F.3d at 527. Because Singh’s “asylum, withholding of removal, and

CAT claims were based upon the same discredited testimony,” that “adverse

credibility finding is fatal to all three” of Singh’s claims for relief from removal. 

Fofanah v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 1037, 1040 (8th Cir. 2006).

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C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

We also deny Singh’s petition for review of the Board’s rejection of Singh’s

ineffective assistance claim. Singh argues he is entitled to remand for a new hearing

because his hearing counsel was ineffective in failing to (1) file documents timely;

(2) submit Singh’s statement in support of his application for asylum on time; and

(3) secure corroborating evidence of Singh’s hospital visit following the second

attack. Singh complains his counsel’s “overall appearance of incompetence . . . no

doubt irked the [IJ] and created a negative hearing atmosphere that prejudiced” him

and undermined his right to a fundamentally fair hearing.

Despite acknowledging before the Board that we have held “there is no

constitutional right under the Fifth Amendment to effective assistance of counsel in

a removal proceeding,” Rafiyev v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 853, 861 (8th Cir. 2008),

Singh asserts such a claim here. Ignoring Rafiyev and the scope of the claim he

presented to the Board, Singh suggests his is a “special case” and “contendsthat there

is a Fifth Amendment Constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in

removal proceedings when the utter stupidity and unpreparedness of counsel serves

as the genesis for a hostile environment on the part of the Immigration Court at the

hearing, which undermines the Petitioner’s right to a fundamentally fair hearing.” 

Again, we need not consider Singh’s dubious proposal, see Mader v. United States,

654 F.3d 794, 800 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (explaining we are bound by prior panel

opinions), because Singh did not present that proposal to the Board. See Martinez

Carcamo, 713 F.3d at 925.

But that does not end the matter. In addition to his groundless Fifth

Amendment claim, Singh reasserts the non-constitutional deficiency claim he made

before the Board. Singh asked the Board to exercise its discretion to remand for a

new merits hearing based primarily on his hearing counsel’s failure to submit

corroborating evidence on time. See Rafiyev, 536 F.3d at 861 (remanding to the

Board to consider whether the petitioner could pursue an ineffective assistance claim

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“based on the agency’s discretionary authority, withoutregard to a constitutional right

to due process”); In re Compean, 25 I. & N. Dec. 1, 3 (2009) (concluding the Board

has discretion to reopen removal proceedings to consider ineffective assistance claims

and restoring the framework set forth in In re Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 638 (BIA

1988), pending consideration of a new rule). To prevail on this claim, Singh must

show (1) his counsel was so ineffective it rendered “the proceeding . . . so

fundamentally unfair that the alien was prevented from reasonably presenting his

case,” and (2) “he was prejudiced by his [counsel’s] performance.” In re Lozada,

19 I. & N. Dec. at 638.

Assuming, without finding, deficient performance, we agree with the Board

that Singh failed to show the requisite prejudice because his “inconsistent testimony

and the [IJ’s] adverse demeanor finding based on” Singh’s nonresponsive answersto

questions about those inconsistencies “were not caused or affected by the alleged

failure to submit corroborative evidence of injuries[Singh] suffered in India.” Singh

also generally complains of his counsel’s failure to “file documents,” but the only

missing corroborating evidence he mentions specifically is a hospital record related

to the second beating. The IJ did mention the hospital record as an example of

corroborating evidence that Singh “testified that he had” yet failed to provide, but the

IJ’s analysis of Singh’s failure “to provide corroborating evidence regarding his

specific claims of persecution” was not limited to that particular record. And, given

2

the IJ’s detailed evaluation of the totality of the circumstances, we are not convinced

one missing hospital record “would have swayed the IJ.” Obleshchenko v. Ashcroft,

392 F.3d 970, 973 (8th Cir. 2004). Singh therefore has not shown the requisite

prejudice “resulting from [his] counsel’s performance.” Id.

In evaluating Singh’s ineffective assistance claim, we are careful not to 2

presume any lack of corroborating evidence is necessarily the fault of ineffective

counsel. Absent proof to the contrary, it is entirely possible that at least part of

Singh’s persecution claim simply cannot be corroborated. 

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III. CONCLUSION 

The petition for review is denied. 

______________________________

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