Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01581/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01581-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ford Motor Company
Appellant
United States
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

FORD MOTOR COMPANY,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2014-1581

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of International 

Trade in No. 1:03-cv-00115-JMB, Senior Judge Judith M. 

Barzilay.

______________________ 

Decided: January 6, 2016

______________________ 

 STEPHANIE A. DOUGLAS, Bush Seyferth & Paige, 

PLLC, Troy, MI, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also 

represented by NED H. MARSHAK, JOSEPH MARTIN

SPRARAGEN, ROBERT B. SILVERMAN, Grunfeld, Desiderio, 

Lebowitz, Silverman & Klestadt LLP, New York, NY. 

 EDWARD FRANCIS KENNY, International Trade Field 

Office, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, 

United States Department of Justice, New York, NY,

argued for defendant-appellee. Also represented by JOYCE 

R. BRANDA, JEANNE E. DAVIDSON, AMY M. RUBIN. 

______________________ 

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2 FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. US

Before PROST, Chief Judge, LOURIE and REYNA, Circuit 

Judges. 

Opinion for the court filed by Chief Judge PROST. 

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge REYNA. 

PROST, Chief Judge. 

This appeal concerns Customs and Border Protection’s (“Customs”) decision to treat Ford Motor Company’s 

(“Ford”) duty refund claims under the North American 

Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) differently depending 

on whether those claims were filed traditionally or 

through an electronic process known as “reconciliation.” 

We previously remanded this long-running dispute to the 

Trade Court for a narrow inquiry: whether there is a 

reasonable explanation for Customs’ decision to treat the 

claims differently. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 715 

F.3d 906, 917 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“Ford IV”). On remand, 

Customs first explained that traditional refund claims 

and reconciliation claims are governed by different implementing statutes; thus, Customs was not inconsistent 

in its treatment of identical claims. Second, Customs 

noted that even if both types of claims were governed by 

the same statute, procedural differences among traditional and reconciliation claims justify treating the claims 

differently. The Court of International Trade (“Trade 

Court”) found Customs’ explanation reasonable. For the 

reasons stated below, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

We provided a detailed explanation of the background 

of this case in Ford IV. 715 F.3d at 908–12. Thus, we 

only briefly recite the pertinent facts here. Ford imported 

automotive goods into the United States and paid the 

duties on them. Ford later claimed NAFTA preference on 

those imports and filed for refund of the duties it paid 

under 19 U.S.C. § 1520(d). The parties agreed to rely on 

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FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. US 3

one entry as the test case: a June 27, 1997 entry via 

Detroit. Under § 1520(d)’s default procedures implemented by 19 C.F.R. § 181.22, Ford was required to file the 

certificates of origin within one year of importation. But 

Ford did not file the certificate of origin until November 5, 

1998, beyond the one-year filing deadline. Ford was also 

unable to secure the port director’s written waiver for the 

certificates under 19 C.F.R. § 181.22(d)(1)(i). Customs 

denied Ford’s claim, stating that the “Certificate of Origin 

was not furnished within one year of the date of importation.” J.A. 224. Ford filed a protest to contest the denial, 

and Customs denied the protest on the same grounds. 

In Ford IV, Ford contended that Customs had an affirmative obligation under its own regulation to accept 

Ford’s untimely filing of the certificates. We rejected that 

argument. Ford IV, 715 F.3d at 915. Ford’s only remaining contention was that Customs’ refusal to grant Ford a 

waiver for the certificates was arbitrary and capricious 

based on Customs’ waiver of the filing requirement in a 

separate reconciliation program. Ford argued that its 

traditional refund claims, although not processed through 

the reconciliation program, should nevertheless enjoy the 

same waiver benefit available through that program. Id. 

Previously, the Trade Court did not explore Customs’ 

authority and reasoning for waiving the certificate filing 

requirement under the reconciliation program because 

Ford’s claims at issue were not processed through that 

program. Id. We remanded to the Trade Court to conduct 

this limited inquiry. Id. at 917.

On remand, Customs explained that the reconciliation 

program, authorized by 19 U.S.C. § 1484(b), is a procedural means for processing import entries. Ford Motor 

Co. v. United States, 978 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1353–54 (Ct. 

Int’l Trade 2014) (“Ford V”). Among the features of the 

reconciliation program is an ability to claim the substantive duty refund benefit under § 1520(d). Id. Customs 

explained that the reconciliation program has “a set of 

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4 FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. US

statutory safeguards that permit Customs to remedy 

mistakes and misconduct in awarding duty free treatment 

under NAFTA.” Id. at 1356–57. Many of the reconciliation program’s statutory safeguards are not available in 

the traditional post-entry duty refund process. Id. at 

1356. The Trade Court noted that the reconciliation 

program provides Customs an added level of confidence in 

the legitimacy of the importer’s claims. See id. at 1358 

(“The record keeping requirements and auditing procedures give Customs well-defined procedures for ensuring 

the correctness of entries made through the fully automated Reconciliation Program.”). Under Chevron U.S.A. 

Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 

837 (1984), the Trade Court concluded that Customs’ 

interpretation of the statutory scheme entrusted to its 

administration was reasonable. Ford V, 978 F. Supp. 2d 

at 1352, 1359.

DISCUSSION

We review legal conclusions from Customs and the 

Trade Court de novo, Universal Electronics Inc. v. United 

States, 112 F.3d 488, 493 (Fed. Cir. 1997), subject to any 

deference owed to Customs’ statutory interpretations, 

Princess Cruises, Inc. v. United States, 201 F.3d 1352, 

1357 (Fed. Cir. 2000). We similarly review law of the case 

de novo. See Laitram Corp. v NEC Corp., 115 F.3d 947, 

950 (Fed. Cir. 1997).

When Congress has “explicitly left a gap for an agency 

to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the 

agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by 

regulation, and any ensuing regulation is binding in the 

courts unless procedurally defective, arbitrary or capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” 

United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001) 

(citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44). “If a statute is 

ambiguous, and if the implementing agency’s construction 

is reasonable, Chevron requires a federal court to accept 

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FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. US 5

the agency’s construction of the statute, even if the agency’s reading differs from what the court believes is the 

best statutory interpretation.” Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. 

Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005)

(citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44). 

On appeal, Ford contends that Customs’ remand explanation violates the law of the case and that it is not 

reasonable. We address each contention in turn.

A. Law of the Case

Ford argues that this court held in the prior appeals 

of this case that a single statute, 19 U.S.C. § 1520(d), 

codifies NAFTA’s post-entry duty refund claims process. 

Ford therefore insists that Customs’ remand explanation 

implicating a different statute violates the law of the case. 

We disagree.

In our prior decisions, we merely explained that 

§ 1520(d) implements the post-entry duty refund allowed 

by a particular NAFTA article. See Ford Motor Co. v. 

United States, 635 F.3d 550, 552 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Ford 

II”). We did not, however, state that it was the only 

statutory provision that implements the duty refund 

process. “The law of the case doctrine is limited to issues 

that were actually decided, either explicitly or by necessary implication, in the earlier litigation.” See Toro Co. v. 

White Consol. Indus., Inc., 383 F.3d 1326, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 

2004). Because our prior decisions did not decide that 

NAFTA’s post-entry duty refund claims process is exclusively governed by § 1520(d), Ford’s contention based on 

the law of the case is incorrect. 

B. Reasonableness of Customs’ Remand Explanation 

Ford argues that the Trade Court erred in both affording Chevron deference to Customs’ remand explanation 

and in finding the explanation reasonable. We disagree 

on both counts. 

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6 FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. US

1. Trade Court Correctly Applied Chevron Deference 

Ford argues that Customs’ remand explanation “conflict[s] with the law of the case, Customs’ published 

interpretation of the Reconciliation Program, the relevant 

statutes, and the NAFTA treaty itself.” Appellant’s Br. 

16. Ford relies on Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital, 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988), for the proposition that 

there is no deference “to agency litigating positions that 

are wholly unsupported by regulations, rulings, or administrative practice.” Appellant’s Br. 17. Ford therefore 

concludes that “no deference is owed to Customs’ incorrect 

interpretation of the NAFTA, § 1520(d), and the Reconciliation Program.” Id. at 17.

The premise for all of Ford’s alleged “conflicts” is that 

§ 1520(d) is the exclusive authority for NAFTA’s postentry duty refund claims process and that a variety of 

legal and regulatory authorities have repeatedly said so. 

See id. at 29–30 (“NAFTA post-entry refund claims submitted through the Reconciliation Program are subject to 

all requirements of § 1520(d)—including its one-year 

filing deadline. . . . In sum, in nearly every published 

reference to NAFTA reconciliation, Customs includes a 

citation to § 1520(d).”). But Ford’s contentions are based 

on a misreading of those legal and regulatory authorities. 

It is true that those authorities mention § 1520(d) in 

discussing the reconciliation program’s feature for claiming post-entry duty refunds. But those authorities do not 

state that § 1520(d) exclusively governs the procedure for 

claiming refunds through the reconciliation program, 

including the ability to obtain a waiver of certificates of 

origin. Rather, § 1520(d) explicitly delegates authority to 

Customs to prescribe regulations to govern the refund 

claims process. 19 U.S.C. § 1520(d). Customs exercised 

that authority by promulgating 19 C.F.R. § 181.22 to 

govern the traditionally filed duty refund claims process. 

Similarly, Customs was duly authorized by 19 U.S.C. 

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FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. US 7

§ 1484(b) to implement the reconciliation program, a 

procedural means for processing import entries. Customs 

has interpreted the various statutes as creating two 

separate frameworks: one governs Customs’ waiver 

authority with respect to traditionally filed claims, and 

the other prescribes the particular process of waiver with 

respect to reconciliation-based claims. That interpretation is not inconsistent with relevant statutes, regulations, or administrative practices.

The dissent disagrees and concludes that “Chevron 

deference does not apply to Customs’ remand explanation.” Dissent at 11. It argues that Customs’ present 

reliance on § 1484(b) during judicial review is contrary to 

its focus on § 1520(d) during the administrative process. 

Id. (emphasizing Customs’ notice in the Federal Register 

that reconciliation is a “vehicle by which refunds and 

certificate of origin waivers are granted under § 1520(d)”); 

id. at 13 (“‘Congress has delegated to the administrative 

official and not to appellate counsel the responsibility for 

elaborating and enforcing statutory commands.’” (quoting 

Bowen, 488 U.S. at 213)). Accordingly, the dissent dismisses Customs’ explanation as merely a “convenient 

litigation position” not entitled to Chevron deference. Id. 

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

The dissent’s fault-finding is misplaced. In Bowen, 

the agency’s litigation position was contrary to the agency’s past implementation of the particular statutory 

provision governing the disputed claims. 488 U.S. at 212–

13; see also id. at 209, 211. The context here is far different. First, Ford’s import entries at issue were not processed through the reconciliation program. See Ford IV, 

715 F.3d at 915 (“It is undisputed that Ford’s request for 

a refund of duties paid on the Entry was not made 

through the reconciliation program.”). Indeed, the controversy over the reconciliation program was initially determined by the Trade Court to be irrelevant. Id. at 912 

(noting that the Trade Court dismissed Ford’s reconciliaCase: 14-1581 Document: 42-2 Page: 7 Filed: 01/06/2016
8 FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. US

tion program argument in a footnote, stating that Ford’s 

“entries were not subject to the program and the court’s 

inquiry must focus on the statutory and regulatory 

scheme which governed [Ford’s] entries” (alteration in 

original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Customs 

thus had no reason to address the argument that it was 

treating traditionally filed claims differently from those 

made under the reconciliation program until we specifically remanded to the Trade Court to make that determination in Ford IV. Id. at 916 (noting that, given the 

procedural history of the case, “it is not surprising that 

the record provides no explanation for Customs’ divergent 

approaches to exercising its § 1520(d) waiver power” and 

remanding to the Trade Court to consider whether “there 

is a reasonable explanation for treating traditional 

§ 1520(d) claims differently than § 1520(d) claims made 

under the reconciliation program”). Because the reconciliation program was not previously material to the administrative adjudication of Ford’s claims, Customs’ remand 

explanation regarding § 1484(b) is not merely a “litigation 

position.” 

Second, there is no allegation that Customs had extended the reconciliation program’s certificate filing 

waiver to other traditional tariff refund claims but refused to do the same for Ford’s traditional refund claims 

at issue. The dissent’s and Ford’s reliance on Bowen is 

therefore misplaced and the Trade Court was correct to 

apply Chevron deference in reviewing Customs’ remand 

explanation.

2. Customs’ Remand Explanation is Reasonable

Customs justifies the reconciliation program’s certificate filing waiver based on numerous procedural safeguards not available in the traditional claims process. 

Ford V, 978 F. Supp. 2d at 1356–57. Indeed, it is undisputed that the reconciliation program has additional 

safeguards, such as the requirement for importers to post 

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FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. US 9

a continuous bond. That alone is a reasonable explanation for the difference in treatment between traditional 

claims and reconciliation-based claims. 

The dissent dismisses that explanation by citing the 

availability of other enforcement tools common to both 

processes. The fact that both processes have some of the 

same safeguards does not, however, negate the added 

protection that the additional safeguards provide under 

the reconciliation program. And, as stated above, there is 

no dispute that the reconciliation program’s requirement 

of a continuous bond provides an additional protection for 

Customs against improper tariff refund claims. 

We are satisfied with Customs’ explanation that the 

differences between the reconciliation program and the 

traditional post-entry duty refund process warrant different filing requirements. We therefore agree with the 

Trade Court that Customs’ remand explanation is reasonable. Having satisfied our mandate in Ford IV, our

inquiry goes no further.

CONCLUSION

Customs’ remand explanation provides a reasonable 

explanation for the different filing requirements in the 

traditional post-entry duty refund process and in claiming 

duty refund through the reconciliation program.

AFFIRMED

Case: 14-1581 Document: 42-2 Page: 9 Filed: 01/06/2016
United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

FORD MOTOR COMPANY,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2014-1581

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of International 

Trade in No. 1:03-cv-00115-JMB, Senior Judge Judith M. 

Barzilay.

______________________ 

REYNA, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 

I find no principled explanation for Customs’ decision 

in this case to treat duty refund claims under NAFTA 

differently depending on whether those claims were filed 

traditionally or through an electronic process known as 

“reconciliation.” I dissent. 

BACKGROUND

The fundamental purpose of NAFTA is to provide 

preferential trade treatment to goods and services that 

originate within the NAFTA region. Central to NAFTA’s 

purpose is the “certificate of origin.” The certificate of 

origin is a document certifying that goods originate in the 

NAFTA region and hence qualify for preferential tariff 

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2 FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. US

treatment. North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-

Mex.-U.S., art. 501(1), Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289, 358

(1993). An importer may claim preferential tariff treatment at importation or may later claim a refund under 19 

U.S.C. § 1520(d) for excess duties paid at entry. Id. arts. 

502(1), 502(3), 32 I.L.M. at 358 (implemented by 

§ 1520(d)). Either claim requires a valid certificate of 

origin, unless the importation does not exceed a certain 

value, id. art. 503(a), (b), 35 I.L.M. at 358–59, or the 

importing country has “waived the requirement for a 

Certificate of Origin,” id. art. 503(c), 35 I.L.M. at 359. 

Customs waives the certificate of origin for § 1520(d) 

refund claims in two contexts. 

First, for “traditional” refund claims, Customs follows 

19 C.F.R. § 181.22. Section 181.22(d) reflects the NAFTA 

certificate of origin exceptions set out in NAFTA Article 

503 with some variation. The regulation provides that a

certificate of origin is not required for non-commercial 

importation of goods, id. § 181.22(d)(1)(ii), commercial 

importation of goods whose value does not exceed $2,500 

(provided an interested party certifies the goods as originating goods or Customs waives this requirement), id.

§ 181.22(d)(iii), and importation of goods for which Customs has waived the certificate of origin requirement, id.

§ 181.22(d)(1)(i). Customs waives “possession” of the 

certificate of origin under § 181.22(d)(1)(i) on a case-bycase basis.

Second, for refund claims filed electronically through 

the Automated Commercial System (ACS) Reconciliation 

Prototype, Customs published a notice in the Federal 

Register indicating that Customs would waive “presentation” of the certificate of origin for any importer who 

participates in the reconciliation program, “but the filer 

must retain [the certificate], which shall be provided to 

Customs upon request.” Revised National Customs 

Automation Program Test Regarding Reconciliation, 63 

Fed. Reg. 6257, 6259 (Feb. 6, 1998) (replacing notice 

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FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. US 3

published Feb. 6, 1997). This dispute arises from Customs’ decision to waive the requirement for Ford to present certificates of origin for refund claims filed through 

reconciliation but not to waive the requirement for similar

claims filed traditionally.

A. Factual History

Upon NAFTA’s entry into effect, certificates of origin

created difficulty for the respective Customs authorities of 

the contracting Parties, particularly in the automotive 

sector. Ford struggled to generate certificates in time to 

claim preferential tariff treatment at entry. In brief, the 

large number of suppliers and significantly large number 

of parts and components sourced around the world made 

it difficult for importers to acquire certificates, especially

within NAFTA’s timeframes. As a result, Ford paid

duties on originating goods at entry and filed traditional 

§ 1520(d) refund claims when the certificates of origin for 

those entries became available. Due to increased NAFTA 

trade, Customs had difficulty processing the high volume 

of claims, and the lack of a paperless process for submitting certificates compounded the problem. 

Reconciliation was designed to alleviate growing complexities in processing international trade, including 

problems associated with traditional § 1520(d) refund 

claims. Reconciliation allows importers to file entry 

summaries using the best available information and 

electronically “flag” indeterminable information, with the 

understanding that the importer will provide Customs the 

information at a later date. J.A. 45 (ACS Reconciliation 

Prototype: A Guide to Compliance (Sept. 2004)). When 

information becomes available, the importer files a new 

entry providing Customs with the information necessary 

to correct the original entry summary and adjust duties 

owed by the importer. Ford and other importers worked 

with Customs to develop Reconciliation in the years 

following NAFTA’s effective date. Reconciliation took 

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4 FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. US

effect on October 1, 1998, and Customs extended the 

program indefinitely beginning October 1, 2000. 

Before reconciliation was fully operational, Ford 

worked with local ports of entry to develop interim reconciliation for processing electronically submitted § 1520(d) 

refund claims. As Customs acknowledged during development of reconciliation, these “local, informal versions of 

‘reconciliation’ were problematic because they varied a

great deal from place to place.” J.A. 43. Ford nevertheless found success with interim reconciliation at several 

ports of entry. Some ports of entry allowed Ford to electronically file § 1520(d) refund claims without certificates 

of origin, given that Customs could not yet accommodate 

electronically filed certificates, even for claims that were 

otherwise filed electronically. 

While Ford succeeded with interim reconciliation at 

some ports of entry, Ford met resistance at the Detroit

port of entry. Anticipating difficulty with electronically 

filing certificates of origin, Ford wrote a letter dated July 

16, 1996, to the (Customs) Detroit Port Director requesting permission to submit CD-ROM disks including certificate of origin data associated with electronically filed 

§ 1520(d) refund claims. The Detroit Port Director took 

Ford’s request under advisement but did not formally 

respond until April 10, 1998. 

In the interim, Ford imported automobile parts from 

Canada into the United States through the Port of Detroit 

as usual. Because Ford did not yet have certificates of 

origin, Ford did not claim preferential tariff treatment at 

the time of importation and instead paid non-preferential 

duties as prescribed by the applicable provisions of the 

Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States. Ford 

later submitted more than 600 refund claims under 

§ 1520(d) through the Electronic Protest Module of Customs’ Automated Commercial System (“ACS”). Because 

the Customs protest module could not accept paper docuCase: 14-1581 Document: 42-2 Page: 13 Filed: 01/06/2016
FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. US 5

ments such as copies of certificates of origin, Ford submitted refund claims without certificates, in accordance with 

interim reconciliation processes Ford had developed at 

other ports. 

After Ford had submitted hundreds of § 1520(d) 

claims without certificates, the Detroit Port Director 

responded to Ford’s request to provide certificates of 

origin on CD-ROM disks, which by now was close to two 

years old, through two letters dated April 10, 1998. In 

one letter, the Port Director permitted Ford to file 

§ 1520(d) claims on a CD-ROM disk, yet required Ford to 

“supply the paper documentation required by the regulations.” J.A. 162. In another letter, the Port Director 

acknowledged “some confusion” surrounding Ford’s 

§ 1520(d) claims filed without certificates of origin and 

requested the missing certificates within 60 days. Id. at 

163.

In response to the Port Director’s request, Ford attempted to work with the Port of Detroit to find an efficient process for submitting the certificates of origin. 

Ford proposed electronically filing the certificates, but the 

Port of Detroit rejected the proposal, stating that “no 

electronic format for receiving [certificates of origin] has 

been approved.” J.A. 172. On June 12, 1998, Customs 

Headquarters informed Ford that its request to electronically file the missing certificates had been officially denied. 

Negotiations having failed, Ford complied with the 

Port Director’s request by submitting hard copies of the 

certificates during the period of August 11, 1998, to

December 4, 1998. Despite Ford’s submissions, on June 4, 

1999, the Port of Detroit informed Ford that its § 1520(d) 

refund claims were being denied because, while the 

§ 1520(d) claims were timely filed within one year of 

importation, the certificates of origin were not, and thus 

the claims were untimely.

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6 FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. US

Though hundreds of Ford’s § 1520(d) claims were affected, the parties agree to use a single representative 

entry.1 The representative automobile parts entered the 

United States from Canada on June 27, 1997. As with 

other entries, Ford did not claim preferential treatment at 

importation but instead filed a § 1520(d) refund claim 

(without certificates of origin) on May 13, 1998, less than 

one year after the date of importation. Ford submitted 

the certificates on November 5, 1998, over a year after 

importation. Customs denied Ford’s claim, stating that 

the “Certificate of Origin was not furnished within one 

year of the date of importation.” J.A. 224. Ford filed a 

protest to contest the denial, and Customs denied the 

protest on the same grounds. 

At around the time Ford sought review by Customs of 

the representative entry, Ford had pending protests of 

denied § 1520(d) claims filed through reconciliation. 

Customs ruled in Ford’s favor on each of these protests, 

reasoning that “there is no apparent dispute that the 

importations at issue met the substantive criteria for 

eligibility for NAFTA preference.” J.A. 226. Customs 

acknowledged “the fact that Customs liquidated certain 

claims with preference under these same facts creates the 

risk that Ford’s claim of treatment [in this case] might be 

accepted by a court.” Id. For the representative entry, 

however, Customs did not waive the one-year certificate of 

origin requirement, as it had done for contemporaneous 

reconciliation claims.

B. Procedural History

Ford sought review of Customs’ decision to deny its 

refund claim for the representative entry in the Trade 

Court. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 32 I.T.R.D. 1103 

(Ct. Int’l Trade 2010), available at 2010 WL 98699. The 

1 Entry No. 231-2787386-9. 

 

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FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. US 7

Trade Court dismissed Ford’s complaint for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction, reasoning that a certificate of origin is 

an element of a § 1520(d) refund claim that must be filed 

within one year of importation. Id. at *2 (citation omitted). The Trade Court explained that by not filing the 

certificate of origin within one year of importation, Ford 

had not met § 1520(d)’s requirements. Id. Customs in 

turn had not reached a “decision” on Ford’s protest sufficient for Trade Court jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1581(a), because a “decision” under § 1581(a) requires “a 

claim filed in accordance with law.” Id.

This court reversed. Ford II, 635 F.3d at 558. The 

court explained that § 1520(d) is not a jurisdictiongranting provision because Congress “has not clearly 

labeled § 1520(d)’s timely certificate filing requirement as 

‘jurisdictional.’” Id. at 557. “[S]o long as notice of a 

party’s § 1520(d) claim is timely filed within one year of 

importation, failure to adhere to § 1520(d)’s formalities . . . will not deprive the Trade Court of jurisdiction to 

hear the case.” Id. The court predicated its holding on 

Customs’ authority under § 1520(d) to waive the certificate of origin, noting that while § 1520(d) does not expressly mention certificate of origin waiver, “it is obvious 

that § 1520(d) was designed in part to permit the implementation of [NAFTA] Article 503(c)’s waiver authority.” 

Id. at 555.

On remand, the Trade Court upheld the merits of 

Customs’ decision, reasoning that § 1520(d) and implementing regulations “require importers to file within one 

year of importation copies of applicable certificates of 

origin.” Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 800 F. Supp. 2d 

1349, 1352 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2011). Ford argued that 

Customs improperly treated traditional claims filed under 

§ 1520(d) differently than claims filed through reconciliation, waiving the one-year certificate of origin requirement for reconciliation claims but refusing to do so for 

traditional § 1520(d) claims. The Trade Court dismissed 

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8 FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. US

the argument, stating that Ford’s “entries were not subject to the [reconciliation] program and the court’s inquiry 

must focus on the statutory and regulatory scheme which 

governed [Ford’s] entries.” Id. at 1352–53 n.5. 

This court vacated the Trade Court’s decision. Ford

IV, 715 F.3d at 917. The court held that Customs may 

deny a § 1520(d) claim if certificates of origin have not 

been filed within one year of importation, “and the requirement to file them has not been waived.” Id. at 913. 

In contrast to the Trade Court’s reasoning, however, the 

court found reconciliation relevant to Customs’ denial of 

Ford’s claims because “the record reflects that Customs 

has approved Ford’s post-entry requests for refunds made 

through the reconciliation program when Ford did not 

submit the related [certificates of origin] within one year.” 

Id. at 915. Accordingly, the Ford IV court remanded this

case to the Trade Court to determine “whether there is a 

reasonable explanation for treating traditional § 1520(d) 

claims differently than § 1520(d) claims made under the 

reconciliation program.” Id. at 917. On remand, the 

Trade Court ordered Customs to explain why it treated 

Ford’s § 1520(d) claims differently depending on the 

manner in which Ford filed the claim. Customs explained 

that this court’s inquiry “appears to be based upon the 

incorrect assumption that Customs’ authority to waive 

presentation of the [certificate of origin] . . . stems solely 

from the NAFTA and 19 U.S.C. § 1520(d).” J.A. 302 

(Remand Report). Customs argued that it had authority 

to waive the certificate of origin under a “wholly different 

set of statutes, namely, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1401(s), 1484, 1508, 

and 1509, which govern the reconciliation process.” Id. 

Customs thus contended that its inconsistent treatment of 

Ford’s refund claims “is not the result of two different 

interpretations of § 1520(d).” Id. Customs explained 

further that it was justified in granting blanket certificate 

of origin waivers for reconciliation claims and not doing 

the same for traditional refund claims because the reconCase: 14-1581 Document: 42-2 Page: 17 Filed: 01/06/2016
FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. US 9

ciliation statutes, unlike § 1520(d) and associated regulations, “provide strong remedies to Customs should it later 

discover that the claimed goods are not entitled to NAFTA

[preference].” Id. at 307–08. 

After reviewing Customs’ explanation, the Trade 

Court again upheld Customs’ decision to deny Ford’s 

refund claim. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 978 F.

Supp. 2d 1350 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2011). According to the 

Trade Court, Customs’ statutory interpretation warrants 

deference because Customs’ explanation involved the 

“interpretation of the statutory scheme [Customs] is 

entrusted to administer.” Id. at 1352 (citing Chevron 

U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 

(1984)). The Trade Court found that Customs reasonably 

concluded that waiver for reconciliation claims is governed by statutory safeguards that are inapplicable to 

waiver for traditional § 1520(d) claims. Id. at 1357–59. 

Ford timely appealed, challenging both the Trade Court’s 

authority to accept Customs’ remand explanation under 

law of the case and this court’s prior mandates, in addition to the merits of Customs’ explanation. 

DISCUSSION

This court reviews legal conclusions from Customs 

and the Trade Court de novo, Universal Elecs. Inc. v.

United States, 112 F.3d 488, 493 (Fed. Cir. 1997), subject 

to any deference owed to Customs’ statutory interpretations, Princess Cruises, Inc. v. United States, 201 F.3d 

1352, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2000). For the reasons explained 

below, I would find that no deference is due and therefore 

review the statutes de novo. See id. (“Statutory interpretation by the Court of International Trade . . . is . . . 

reviewed de novo.”). 

Customs’ remand explanation includes two distinct 

arguments. First, Customs argues that its authority to 

waive certificates of origin stems from two separate 

statutory schemes. As a result, Customs stresses that it 

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10 FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. US

is not interpreting the same statute differently and thus 

need not offer a reasonable explanation for treating Ford’s 

claims differently. Second, Customs argues that the 

process governing refund claims differs depending on 

whether a refund claim is filed traditionally or through 

reconciliation. Customs’ second argument is consistent 

with the notion that even if waiver authority stems solely 

from § 1520(d), the difference between the regulatory 

process governing the two different types of refund claims 

provides a reasonable explanation for Customs’ different 

treatment of waiver authority granted by the same statute, § 1520(d). See Ford, 978 F. Supp. 2d at 1358–59 

(“Although § 1520(d) may establish Customs’ waiver 

authority in general, it does not control the actual process 

of waiver with respect to reconciliation-based claims.”). 

Neither argument is persuasive. 

A. Statutory Authority to Waive Certificates of 

Origin 

i. Deference 

The majority opinion states that “the Trade Court was 

correct to apply Chevron deference in reviewing Customs’ 

remand explanations.” Maj. Op. at 8. A court reviewing 

an agency’s interpretation of a statute it is entrusted to 

administer applies Chevron deference if the “agency 

interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the 

exercise of [Congressionally delegated] authority.” United 

States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001). An agency may exercise Congressionally delegated authority 

through adjudication, notice-and-comment rulemaking, or 

through some other “legislative type of activity” indicative 

of “comparable congressional intent.” Id. at 227, 232.

Ford argues that no deference is due because Customs’ remand explanation is “far removed not only from 

[the] notice-and-comment process, but from any other 

circumstances reasonably suggesting that Congress ever 

thought of . . . deserving [ ] deference.” Appellant’s Br. at 

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FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. US 11

16 (quoting Mead, 533 U.S. at 231). Customs repeats the 

Trade Court’s rationale that Customs’ interpretation is 

reasonable under Chevron. Yet Customs fails to explain

why its remand explanation should be afforded Chevron

deference at all. 

I would find that Chevron deference does not apply to 

Customs’ remand explanation. Customs does not identify 

any instance in which it officially interpreted its authority 

to waive certificates of origin for refund claims as stemming from reconciliation statutes. To the contrary, Customs’ publications suggest that reconciliation is a vehicle 

by which refunds and certificate of origin waivers are 

granted under § 1520(d). See, e.g., Modification of National Customs Automation Program Test Regarding 

Reconciliation, 62 Fed. Reg. 51,181, 51,182 (Sept. 30, 

1997) (characterizing reconciliation as a “vehicle to file

post-importation refunds claims under 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1520(d)”) (emphases added). See also, e.g., Modification 

and Clarification of Procedures of the National Customs 

Automation Program Test Regarding Reconciliation, 67 

Fed. Reg. 61,200, 61,201 (Sept. 27, 2002) (“There are two 

ways to make a 1520(d) NAFTA claim: One way is to file 

[a traditional 1520(d) claim] and the other is to make a 

1520(d) claim in accordance with the Reconciliation 

process.”). 

The Trade Court agreed that Customs’ sources consistently cite § 1520(d) as authority for issuing refunds 

through reconciliation. Ford, 978 F. Supp. 2d at 1358 

(“The court notes that Customs has not always provided

importers the clearest guidance on this issue and has 

referenced § 1520(d) when discussing the Reconciliation 

Program, which implies that ‘waiver’ is the same whether 

the claim was made through reconciliation or not.”). 

Customs points to no regulations, letters, or documents 

supporting its current interpretation. Customs’ remand 

explanation thus finds no basis in any source that would 

ordinarily demand Chevron deference.

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12 FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. US

Customs argued in its brief to this court prior to this 

court’s most recent remand that the reconciliation program was consistent with waiver authority under 

§ 1520(d). In its brief, Customs explained that “Customs 

expressly waived the timely submission of the Certificate 

of Origin requirement of § 1520(d) with regard to all 

claims submitted pursuant to Customs’ Reconciliation 

Program.” Appellee’s Br. at 10. Customs explained that

reconciliation program certificate waiver arose under

§ 181.22(d)(1)(i), because “Customs satisfies itself that 

imported goods will qualify for NAFTA treatment when it 

accepts participants into the reconciliation program.” 

Ford IV, 715 F.3d at 916. 

At oral argument, Customs still indicated that its 

ability to waive the certificate of origin filing requirement 

under reconciliation was pursuant to NAFTA section 503, 

therefore arising under § 181.22(d)(1)(i). Oral Argument 

at 17:49, available at http://oralarguments.cafc. uscourts.

gov/default.aspx?fl=2012-1186.mp3. Customs argued that 

the application process governing reconciliation justified 

treating the two types of refund claims differently. Ford 

IV, 715 F.3d at 916. 

Customs’ interpretation morphed on remand. In its 

brief in the current appeal, Customs argues that its 

remand report “justifies the different treatment given to 

certificate of origin waivers under traditional section 

1520(d) claims and to section 1520(d) claims made 

through the Reconciliation Program.” Appellee’s Br. at 

29. 

The majority opinion finds that Customs exercised its 

authority to prescribe regulations to govern traditional 19 

U.S.C. § 1520(d) claims by promulgating 19 C.F.R. 

§ 181.22, and that “Customs was duly authorized by 19 

U.S.C. § 1484(b) to implement the reconciliation program.” Maj. Op. at 6–7. It explains that “Customs has 

interpreted the various statutes as creating two separate 

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FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. US 13

frameworks: one governs Customs’ waiver authority with 

respect to traditionally-filed claims, and the other prescribes the particular process of waiver with respect to 

reconciliation-based claims.” While this may be Custom’s 

current interpretation, I would not accord this interpretation deference, as there is no indication that Customs 

interpreted the statutes this way in the past. 

It appears that Customs’ current interpretation of the 

basis for waiver in reconciliation—as arising not under 

§ 1520(d) and 19 C.F.R. § 181.22(d)(1)(i) but instead under 

other statutes discussing reconciliation generally—was 

crafted for the purpose of this litigation. As a mere “convenient litigation position,” Customs’ interpretation is not 

entitled to Chevron deference. See Bowen v. Georgetown 

Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 213 (1988). “Congress has 

delegated to the administrative official and not to appellate counsel the responsibility for elaborating and enforcing statutory commands.” Id. (quoting Inv. Co. Inst. v. 

Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 628 (1971)). I therefore would 

review the statutes without Chevron deference to Customs’ interpretation.

Even if not entitled to Chevron deference, a statutory 

interpretation by Customs is ordinarily entitled to deference proportional to the “‘thoroughness evident in its 

consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency 

with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those 

factors which give it power to persuade.’” See Mead, 533 

U.S. at 228 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 

134, 140 (1944)); Deckers Corp. v. United States, 752 F.3d 

949, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2014). An interpretation that a court 

finds unpersuasive, however, as I find Customs’ interpretation, is not entitled to deference, particularly when the 

interpretation emerges during litigation with no opportunity for public comment. See Christopher v. SmithKline 

Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2169–70 (2012). Accordingly, I would employ traditional tools of statutory interpretation to determine whether Customs has independent 

Case: 14-1581 Document: 42-2 Page: 22 Filed: 01/06/2016
14 FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. US

authority under reconciliation statutes to waive certificates of origin.

ii. Source of Certificate of Origin Waiver Authority

NAFTA Article 501(1) requires NAFTA governments 

to establish “a Certificate of Origin for the purpose of 

certifying that a good being exported from the territory of 

a Party into the territory of another Party qualifies as an 

originating good.” NAFTA art. 501(1), 32 I.L.M. at 358. 

Article 502 defines certificate of origin requirements for 

claiming preferential tariff treatment at the time of 

importation or later through a refund claim. An importer 

claiming preferential tariff treatment at the time of 

importation must “make a written declaration, based on a 

valid Certificate of Origin, that the good qualifies as an 

originating good,” and “have the certificate in its possession at the time the declaration is made.” Id. art. 502(1), 

32 I.L.M. at 358. Similarly, an importer applying for a 

refund of excess duties paid must present both “a written 

declaration that the good qualified as an originating good 

at the time of importation” and “a copy of the Certificate 

of Origin.” Id. art. 502(3), 32 I.L.M. at 358. 

NAFTA Article 503 is a provision establishing specific 

exceptions to the certificate of origin requirement. See id.

art. 503, 32 I.L.M. at 358–59. Article 503 states that a 

“Certificate of Origin shall not be required” in three 

circumstances. Id. at 358. The first two exceptions apply 

to the importation of goods whose value does not exceed 

U.S. $1,000 or the equivalent. Id. art. 503(a), (b), 32 

I.L.M. at 358–359. The third exception applies to the 

importation of goods into the territory of a party that has 

waived the certificate of origin requirement. Id. art. 

503(c), 32 I.L.M at 359. Article 503’s exceptions apply to 

both preferential tariff claims at importation and refund 

claims because, as a specific provision, Article 503 is an 

exception to Article 502’s general requirements. See, e.g., 

Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550–51 (1974) (“Where 

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FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. US 15

there is no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute 

will not be controlled or nullified by a general one.”) 

(citations omitted); see also Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 

491, 506 (2008) (“The interpretation of a treaty, like the 

interpretation of a statute, begins with its text.”).

As this court explained in Ford II, by implementing 

NAFTA Article 502’s refund provision, § 1520(d) also 

implemented Article 503’s certificate of origin exceptions. 

Ford II, 635 F.3d at 555 (“While § 1520(d) does not specifically refer to the waiver provision of NAFTA Article 

503(c), it is obvious that § 1520(d) was designed in part to 

permit the implementation of Article 503(c)’s waiver 

authority via Customs’ regulations.”). Like Article 502(3), 

§ 1520(d) requires an importer to submit a copy of a 

certificate of origin. While no domestic statutory provision parallels NAFTA Article 503 precisely, NAFTA’s 

Statement of Administrative Action, 19 U.S.C. § 3311, 

injects Article 503’s exceptions into § 1520(d) for the 

purpose of refund claims. Id. at 555, n.2; Bestfoods v. 

United States, 165 F.3d 1371, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“With 

[the NAFTA Implementation Act], Congress approved 

NAFTA, as well as a ‘statement of administrative action’ 

that was submitted with the legislation.”); Medellin, 552 

U.S. at 504–05 (explaining that a treaty is domestic law 

either when self-executing or when implemented by 

Congress). In sum, § 1520(d) implements NAFTA’s 

certificate of origin waiver authority as negotiated by the 

NAFTA Parties. Absent § 1520(d)’s implementing provisions, the United States could not waive certificate of 

origin requirements for NAFTA-traded goods. 

In contrast to § 1520(d), the statutory provisions governing reconciliation were not subject to NAFTA negotiations and not part of NAFTA’s implementing legislation. 

The reconciliation provisions do not address NAFTA 

refund claims specifically. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1401(s), 

1484(b). Sections 1401(s) and 1484(b) define and regulate 

the electronic reconciliation process. That process did not 

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16 FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. US

exist at the time NAFTA entered into effect. It is true 

that the reconciliation statutes’ language relates to imports generally. Yet such general language cannot be 

construed to independently authorize § 1520(d) refund 

claims or certificate of origin waivers associated with 

those refund claims because those matters are “dealt with 

in another part of the same enactment,” § 1520(d). See

RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 

S. Ct. 2065, 2071 (2012) (quoting D. Ginsberg & Sons v. 

Popkin, 285 U.S. 204, 208 (1932)). I would hold that the 

reconciliation statutes do not independently implement 

Article 503’s certificate of origin exceptions for § 1520(d) 

refund claims. 

B. Customs’ Procedural Explanation

Customs’ second argument in its remand explanation 

relates to procedural differences between traditional and 

reconciliation-based § 1520(d) claims. Customs argues 

that such procedural differences justify its inconsistent 

treatment of Ford’s claims, even if authority to waive 

certificates of origin stems exclusively from § 1520(d). 

Customs explains that, by virtue of being an “entry” 

under § 1401(s), reconciliation claims are safeguarded by 

statutory recordkeeping and bond requirements, whereas 

traditional § 1520(d) claims are not. Appellee’s Br. at 20–

23 (citing §§ 1401(a), 1484, 1508, and 1059). I disagree. 

NAFTA recordkeeping requirements apply regardless 

of the manner in which a § 1520(d) refund claim is filed. 

Section 1508(a) requires interested parties to “make, 

keep, and render for examination and inspection” all

documents pertaining to importation. Even a refund 

claim that is not classified as an “entry” is governed by 

§ 1508(a)’s recordkeeping requirements because all refund 

claims require “a written declaration that the good qualified [as an originating good] at the time of importation.” 

§ 1520(d)(1). Section 1508(a)(3) applies to “activities 

[that] require the filing of a declaration, or entry, or both.” 

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FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. US 17

(emphasis added). Section 1509’s inspection, examination, and audit procedures apply not only for the “purpose 

of ascertaining the correctness of any entry,” but also “for 

determining the liability of any person for . . . duties, fees 

and taxes which may be due.” See § 1509(a). Both traditional and reconciliation-based § 1520(d) claims require 

Customs to determine liability for duties. 

Customs further argues that a bond is required for an 

“entry,” whereas a bond is not required for a traditional 

§ 1520(d) refund claim. Whether a bond is required for an 

“entry,” however, while not being required for a traditional § 1520(d) claim, is of little consequence. Unlike claims 

arising from reconciliation, traditional § 1520(d) refund 

claims do not rely on indeterminable information flagged 

at the time of importation. Rather, the entry is liquidated 

at importation as if no preferential treatment claim is 

being made. See § 1509(d). The importer thus pays all 

applicable liquidated duties and fees due at the time of 

importation, see J.A. 34, giving Customs an effective bond 

to guard against incorrect § 1520(d) refund claims. If 

Customs determines a § 1520(d) claim to be incorrect, 

Customs simply denies all or part of the refund and 

retains the duties paid at entry. Customs contends that it 

also needs a bond to guard against mistakes discovered

after reliquidation, i.e., mistakes made after Customs has 

processed a § 1520(d) refund claim. If the importer is 

responsible for such mistakes, however, Customs has 

remedies available under § 1592. If Customs finds fraud 

or negligence, it has authority to administer severe penalties unless the NAFTA importer who discovers the incorrect claim “voluntarily and promptly makes a corrected 

declaration and pays any duties owing.” § 1592(c)(5). 

Customs can therefore guard against mistakes and abuse 

without a bond.

Customs also argues that the technical manner in 

which it has defined waiver justifies treating waiver 

differently depending on whether an importer files a 

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18 FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. US

refund claim traditionally or through reconciliation. For 

refund claims made through reconciliation, Customs 

waives “[p]resentation” of the certificate of origin “but the 

filer must retain this document and provide it [Customs] 

upon request.” J.A. 51. Under 19 C.F.R. § 181.22(d), on 

the other hand, Customs waives “possession” of the certificate of origin. Customs argues that because it grants 

“possession” waivers under § 181.22(d) but only “presentation” waivers through reconciliation, a waiver granted 

through reconciliation would not prevent Customs from 

later requesting an importer’s certificate of origin if 

dishonest behavior was suspected. Customs’ argument 

misses the point.

Under the circumstances of this case, Customs could 

have granted Ford a “presentation” waiver for its traditional § 1520(d) claims. By the time Customs Headquarters was reviewing Ford’s traditional § 1520(d) claims, it 

was also reviewing denials of Ford’s claims for preferential treatment filed through reconciliation. Customs thus 

had already acknowledged statutory authority to waive 

“presentment” of certificates of origin, i.e., authority to 

waive less than that authorized by NAFTA Article 503. 

On the basis of such waiver authority, Customs granted 

Ford’s claims filed through reconciliation, while denying 

Ford’s traditional claims. There was no principled reason 

for doing so because the same statutory safeguards applied to both sets of Ford’s claims, and Ford had submitted all requisite certificates of origin, thus laying to rest 

any concerns about the authenticity of Ford’s claims.

Customs mistakenly assumes that it could not have 

granted Ford a “presentation” waiver simply because 

Ford’s traditional claims were not formally filed through 

the reconciliation portal. Ford’s claims were filed electronically through the Electronic Protest Module of Customs’ Automated Commercial System (“ACS”). Because 

the Customs protest module could not accept paper documents such as copies of certificates of origin, Ford submitCase: 14-1581 Document: 42-2 Page: 27 Filed: 01/06/2016
FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. US 19

ted refund claims without certificates, in accordance with 

interim reconciliation processes Ford had developed at 

other ports, and Ford offered to submit certificates of 

origin on CD-ROM. Ford’s claims thus reflected a claim 

filed under reconciliation in all substantive respects. The 

fact that Customs issued an informal, across-the-board 

“presentation” waiver for refund claims filed through 

reconciliation through notice in the Federal Register 

illustrates that it could have waived presentment here, 

particularly when it had no reason not to do so. “A fundamental norm of administrative procedure requires an 

agency to treat like cases alike.” Wester Energy, Inc. v. 

Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 473 F.3d 1239, 1241 

(D.C. Cir. 2007); see also F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, 

Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 549 (2009) (“an agency must act consistently”).

CONCLUSION

Because Customs’ remand explanation fails to identify 

a reasonable basis for its inconsistency, I dissent and

would reverse and remand to the Trade Court with instructions to calculate and award Ford’s excess duties 

paid, with interest.

Case: 14-1581 Document: 42-2 Page: 28 Filed: 01/06/2016