Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-19-01862/USCOURTS-ca13-19-01862-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ansible Government Solutions, LLC
Not party
Eskridge & Associates
Appellant
United States
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

ESKRIDGE & ASSOCIATES,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

ANSIBLE GOVERNMENT SOLUTIONS, LLC,

Defendant

______________________

2019-1862

______________________

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims 

in No. 1:18-cv-02001-CFL, Senior Judge Charles F. Lettow.

______________________

Decided: April 15, 2020

______________________

TIMOTHY TURNER, Whitcomb, Selinsky, PC, Denver, 

CO, argued for plaintiff-appellant. 

 TANYA KOENIG, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil 

Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. Also represented 

by JOSEPH H. HUNT, ROBERT EDWARD KIRSCHMAN, JR.,

DOUGLAS K. MICKLE. 

 ______________________

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2 ESKRIDGE & ASSOCIATES v. UNITED STATES

Before PROST, Chief Judge, SCHALL and WALLACH, Circuit 

Judges.

WALLACH, Circuit Judge.

Appellant Eskridge & Associates (“Eskridge”) filed a 

bid protest in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, protesting

the award of a U.S. Department of the Army (“Army”) contract to a competitor. Following Eskridge’s motion for judgment on the administrative record, the Court of Federal 

Claims concluded that Eskridge lacked standing, as it was 

not an interested party pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1491, and 

dismissed the protest. See Eskridge & Assocs. v. United 

States, 142 Fed. Cl. 410, 425 (2019) (Opinion and Order);

Judgment, Eskridge & Assocs. v. United States, No. 18-

2001 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 19, 2019), ECF No. 26. 

Eskridge appeals. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3). We affirm.

BACKGROUND1

In 2016, the Army sought to procure the services of certified registered nurse anesthetists (“CRNAs”) for the 

Womack Army Medical Center, located in Fort Bragg, 

North Carolina, by issuing a solicitation (“the 2016 Solicitation”). See Eskridge, 142 Fed. Cl. at 412–13. Relevant 

here, the Army performed a price realism analysis of the 

proposals made in response to the 2016 Solicitation. Id.

at 412. Eskridge bid on the 2016 Solicitation, but the solicitation was cancelled in 2017 in connection with a corrective action (“the 2017 Protest”). Id. Later in 2017, the 

Army released a preview for a new solicitation for the 

CRNAs at Fort Bragg. Id. at 413. The preview outlined 

1 Unless otherwise noted, we will rely on the uncontested facts as presented by the Court of Federal Claims. 

See generally Appellant’s Br., Appellee’s Br. Where the 

parties disagree, we rely on the record.

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the award of a contract on a fixed-price basis for a base period of six months, with the addition of four option years to

follow, and estimated a cost of $21,034,111.20. Id. The 

preview also stated that performance was expected to commence on April 1, 2018 and to end by September 30, 2022. 

Id.

In early January 2018, the Army filed a solicitation 

with bids due three weeks later (“the 2018 Solicitation”). 

Id. In addition to listing various requirements and expectations, the 2018 Solicitation provided the method by 

which the Army intended to evaluate the bids—the “lowest 

price technically acceptable . . . approach.” Id. (capitalization altered). Specifically, the 2018 Solicitation stated that 

the Army would “initially list proposals from lowest to 

highest price,” and then “evaluate the technical acceptability of the five lowest-priced bids.” Id. (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). If any of those five bids were 

rated technically acceptable, the Army would “not evaluate 

any other proposals,” and instead “award the contract to 

the lowest-priced, technically acceptable bidder.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The price 

“would act as a filter,” allowing the Army to review only the 

five lowest-priced bids for the detailed technical evaluation. Id. The Army provided three categories to determine 

if a bid was technically acceptable: (1) “[g]eneral compliance with solicitation requirements”; (2) technical merit, 

scored on six subfactors; and (3) past performance. Id. (citation omitted). In the 2018 Solicitation, the Army set the 

minimum compensation rate for a CRNA at $113.89 per 

hour, inclusive of fringe benefits. Id. at 414. The addition

of the minimum compensation rate—which had not been 

included in the 2016 Solicitation—was provided in lieu of 

the 2016 Solicitation’s price realism analysis, as “the Army 

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believed the minimum acceptable wage rate acted as a 

price realism regulator[.]” Id.2

The Army received eighteen timely, complete proposals. Id. Before the Army could evaluate the proposals,

however, Eskridge filed a pre-award protest with the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”), alleging that the 

Army “acted in bad faith” regarding the 2018 Solicitation—

by failing to include language allegedly agreed upon following the 2016 Solicitation’s cancellation—and that the 2018

Solicitation was ambiguous. Id. at 414–15 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Army responded, requesting that the GAO dismiss the protest, contending that 

Eskridge failed “to allege facts upon which a legally sufficient assertion of bad faith could be based.” Id. at 415 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Army 

explained that its reference in the 2018 Solicitation to 48 

C.F.R. § 52.222-46, which requires compensation realism

evaluations, “fulfilled the Army’s obligation arising from 

its informal agreement” after the 2016 Solicitation was 

cancelled. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see 48 C.F.R. § 52.222-46.3 Eskridge withdrew its 

2 The 2018 Solicitation was amended multiple times 

and included, inter alia, an increase to the minimum compensation rate to $121.22 per hour. Id. 3 Section 52.222-46 provides for the evaluation of 

compensation for professional employees. The regulation 

requires that professional employees in the service of the 

federal government “be properly and fairly compensated,” 

as it is “in the [federal government’s] best interest.” 48 

C.F.R. § 52.222-46(a). Accordingly, the regulation provides 

requirements that proposals for the solicitations of professional employees undergo various evaluations to ensure 

that the employees are compensated at rates that will ensure “uninterrupted[,] high-quality work.” Id. “Failure to 

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protest two days after the Army responded. Eskridge, 142 

Fed. Cl. at 415. 

After Eskridge withdrew its protest, the Army commenced its evaluation process. Id. The Army sorted the 

bids according to price; Eskridge’s bid was not ranked 

among the five lowest proposals. Id. The Army conducted 

its technical evaluations of the lowest proposals and, finding three of the five to be technically acceptable, sent notifications to the thirteen unsuccessful bidders, including 

Eskridge. Id. The Army awarded the contract (“Contract”) 

to Ansible Government Solutions, LLC (“Ansible”), after 

determining that Ansible provided the lowest-priced, technically acceptable proposal. Id. at 417.

In March 2018, Eskridge filed another protest with the 

GAO. Id. Eskridge alleged that the Army’s determination 

was “unreasonable, capricious, and contrary to law” and 

that its “evaluation was ambiguous and contrary to the 

terms of the [2018] [S]olicitation.” Id. (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). The Army requested that the 

GAO dismiss Eskridge’s protest, arguing that Eskridge 

was not an interested party “because there were [multiple] 

proposals that were evaluated as [t]echnically [a]cceptable 

with . . . lower prices than [Eskridge’s] proposal.” Id. (citation omitted) (all alterations except ellipsis in original). On 

April 1, 2018, while proceedings were ongoing before the 

GAO, the Army signed the Contract with Ansible. Id. 

Eskridge filed a response to the Army’s request for dismissal on April 6 and, on April 13, the Army issued a stop work 

order to Ansible. Id. at 417–18. On April 18, the Army 

took corrective action by issuing a memorandum that indicated it would “‘revise the source selection documents in 

order to better document the selection and award process’

and to ‘review the evaluations of the proposals [to 

comply . . . may constitute sufficient cause to justify rejection of a proposal.” Id. § 52.222-46(d). 

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6 ESKRIDGE & ASSOCIATES v. UNITED STATES

determine] if [Ansible] fully compl[ied] with’” the requirements of the 2018 Solicitation. Id. at 418 (citation omitted) 

(alterations in original). 

In April 2018, the Army reevaluated the proposals as 

set forth in its corrective action memorandum. Id. The 

Army reviewed the ten lowest-priced bidders on both technical and past performances bases. Id. Five of the ten bidders were deemed technically unacceptable. Id. at 419. Of 

the five technically acceptable bidders, Eskridge bid the 

highest total price at $18,124,729.20. Id. Ansible’s proposal bore the total price of $16,565,078.40. Id. The Army 

compared each line of the itemized proposed price against 

the independent government estimate (“IGE”) to determine 

if each itemized price was fair and reasonable. Id.4 Ansible’s proposed prices were 14 to 25 percent less than the 

IGE, while Eskridge’s proposed prices were between 13 

to 14 percent below the IGE. Id. The Army awarded the 

Contract to Ansible and notified the nine unsuccessful bidders. Id. at 419–20. 

In August 2018, Eskridge filed a post-award protest 

with the GAO, claiming the Army’s determination process 

was “‘ambiguous and contrary’ to the solicitation, ‘unreasonable, arbitrary, and contrary to law,’” and conducted in 

bad faith, alleging the Army did not adhere to the terms 

agreed upon following the 2016 Solicitation. Id. at 420

4 The IGE was an estimate “based upon [the Army’s] 

assessment of base salaries paid in the local area as well as 

salaries paid on current contracts.” J.A. 170. In the 2018 

Solicitation, the Army determined it would review compensation as part of its technical evaluation of the proposals, 

and “[a] low, or no [c]ompensation [p]lan, may be viewed as 

evidence of failure to comprehend the complexity of the 

contract requirements or appropriate compensation levels 

for [the] geographic area where performance will take 

place.” J.A. 170. 

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(internal citations omitted). Eskridge also argued that Ansible’s bid and the other bids lower than its own were too 

close to the proposal’s “minimum bid” of $15,186,441.60. 

Id. In November 2018, the “GAO dismissed Eskridge’s protest, finding Eskridge was not an interested party.” Id.

at 421. Specifically, the GAO determined that Eskridge’s 

arguments were “unpersuasive,” as the other three unsuccessful bidders that had provided proposals with total 

prices lower than Eskridge’s had “a more direct economic 

interest in this procurement.” Id. (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). Additionally, the GAO found 

unpersuasive Eskridge’s argument that the three other 

bidders with “proposed prices that were in the neighborhood of Ansible’s also should [be] assessed as nonresponsive,” as there was less than a $200,000 difference between 

Eskridge’s bid and the next lowest bid. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

In December 2018, Eskridge filed a complaint in the 

Court of Federal Claims, alleging that the “Army’s decision 

to award the [C]ontract to Ansible [is] arbitrary, capricious, 

or contrary to law” and requesting the Court of Federal 

Claims to “issue a declaratory judgment that the Army’s 

award was in violation of its own solicitation and of procurement laws” and to “order the Army to award the . . . 

[C]ontract to Eskridge.” Id. at 412, 421. The Court of Federal Claims dismissed all of Eskridge’s claims. Id. at 425. 

In doing so, the Court of Federal Claims first addressed 

whether Eskridge had a substantial chance of winning the 

Contract and concluded that it did not. Id. at 422–23. The 

Court of Federal Claims reasoned that all five technically 

acceptable bidders exceeded the minimum compensation 

rate required by the Army. Id. at 422. Second, the Court 

of Federal Claims determined that, because Eskridge’s bid 

was valued within $200,000 of the next lowest bid, 

Eskridge’s bid would fail alongside the other four lower 

bids under Eskridge’s own argument that all bids “‘in the 

neighborhood’ of Ansible’s were so low as to represent a 

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facially unreasonable bid.” Id. at 422–23. Third, the Court 

of Federal Claims determined that “the claims of error 

Eskridge makes in this protest focus primarily on the 

Army’s alleged failure to conduct a compensation realism 

analysis, which as a practical matter would affect each of 

the five lowest-priced, technically acceptable proposals 

equally.” Id. at 423.

The Court of Federal Claims also addressed Eskridge’s 

claim that the Army failed to incorporate terms it pledged 

to include following the 2017 Protest. Id. at 424. It concluded that Eskridge waived the issue, as a timely complaint would have come in a pre-award protest. Id. The 

Court of Federal Claims concluded that, in any event, the

Army fulfilled its obligations following the 2017 Protest, as 

it “incorporated by reference [48 C.F.R.] § 52.222-46, which 

put all [bidders] on notice that the Army intended to conduct an analysis of compensation realism as part of the 

technical evaluation.” Id. at 424–25. The Court of Federal 

Claims dismissed the Complaint, concluding that “because 

Eskridge offered the fifth highest technically acceptable 

bid and its protest does not make a credible challenge to 

the technical acceptability of four lower bids,” “Eskridge 

cannot show a direct economic interest in the protest and 

consequently is not an interested party and lacks standing.” Id. at 425.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review and Legal Standard

“Whether a party has standing to sue is a question that 

[we] review de novo.” Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. United 

States, 258 F.3d 1294, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Section 1491 provides 

that the Court of Federal Claims 

shall have jurisdiction to render judgment on an 

action by an interested party objecting to a solicitation by a Federal agency for bids or proposals for a 

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proposed contract or to a proposed award or the 

award of a contract or any alleged violation of statute or regulation in connection with a procurement 

or a proposed procurement.

28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1) (emphasis added). The statute provides that the Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction over an objection brought by “an interested party,” but 

does not define the term. See id. § 1491.

We have held that the “interested party” term under

§ 1491 must be interpreted in accordance with the standing 

requirements provided by the Competition in Contracting 

Act (“CICA”), 31 U.S.C. §§ 3551–56. See Am. Fed’n, 258 

F.3d at 1300–02; see also Myers Investigative & Sec. Servs., 

Inc. v. United States, 275 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2002)

(“[I]n our recent decision in American Federation, we held 

that [§] 1491(b)(1) did not adopt the [Administrative Procedure Act’s] liberal standing standards, and that the narrower standards—consistent with the [CICA]—continued 

to apply.” (internal citation omitted)). “In bid protests under [§ 1491], we . . . construe the term ‘interested party’ in 

[§] 1491(b)(1) in accordance with the [standing requirements of the] CICA and hold that standing under 

§ 1491(b)(1) is limited to actual or prospective bidders or 

offerors whose direct economic interest would be affected by 

the award of the contract or by failure to award the contract.” Myers Investigative, 275 F.3d at 1370 (third bracketed addition and ellipsis in original) (emphasis added) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We have 

stated that “[t]o prove a direct economic interest as a putative prospective bidder, [the protestor] is required to establish that it had a ‘substantial chance’ of receiving the 

contract.” Rex Serv. Corp. v. United States, 448 F.3d 1305, 

1308 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see Info. Tech. & Applications Corp. 

v. United States, 316 F.3d 1312, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“To 

establish prejudice, [the protestor] must show that there 

was a ‘substantial chance’ it would have received the contract award but for the alleged error in the procurement 

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process.” (citation omitted)); Statistica, Inc. v. Christopher,

102 F.3d 1577, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (similar). 

II. Eskridge Lacks Standing to Bring a Protest

The Court of Federal Claims determined that Eskridge 

lacked standing to bring a post-award protest because it 

did not have a direct economic interest since it did not have

a substantial chance of receiving the Contract. See 

Eskridge, 142 Fed. Cl. at 422–23. Eskridge contends that 

the Court of Federal Claims erred in concluding that it did 

not have a direct economic interest as it would have had a 

substantial chance of winning the Contract “but for the 

Army’s errors in evaluating technical acceptability.” Appellant’s Br. 18. We disagree with Eskridge.

Eskridge bid on the 2018 Solicitation, so we focus our 

inquiry on whether Eskridge possesses the requisite direct 

economic interest. To be an interested party, a bidder must 

have a “direct economic interest [that] would be affected by 

the award of the contract.” Myers, 275 F.3d at 1370. We 

conclude that Eskridge does not possess such a direct economic interest. In a post-award bid protest, the relevant 

inquiry is whether the bidder had a “substantial chance” of 

winning the award—specifically, whether a protestor “establish[ed] not only some significant error in the procurement process, but also that there was a substantial chance 

it would have received the contract award but for that error.” Statistica, 102 F.3d at 1582; see United States v. Int’l 

Bus. Machs. Corp., 892 F.2d 1006, 1010–11 (Fed. Cir. 1989) 

(concluding that a bid protestor had “at best, a trivial interest in the award” and therefore no economic interest 

where, if the protest were successful, the award would go 

to another party); see also Impresa Construzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi v. United States, 238 F.3d 1324, 1334 (Fed. 

Cir. 2001) (summarizing cases). Eskridge failed to demonstrate that it would be in line for the Contract. First, even 

if Ansible was removed from the running for some reason, 

the award would go to one of the other three lower-priced, 

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ESKRIDGE & ASSOCIATES v. UNITED STATES 11

technically acceptable bids that ranked before Eskridge,

and Eskridge still would not have a substantial chance of 

winning the award. See Eskridge, 142 Fed. Cl. at 424 (explaining that there were three lower-priced, technically acceptable bids between Ansible’s and Eskridge’s bids); see

also Int’l Bus. Machs., 892 F.2d at 1010–11 (finding no direct economic interest where there is a lower-priced, technically acceptable bid). 5 

Second, Eskridge fails to allege prejudice sufficient to

require the Contract to be rebid, which would have allowed 

Eskridge to compete again. A bidder has an economic interest and therefore standing to challenge a contract award 

where, “if the [bidder’s] bid protest were allowed because of 

an arbitrary and capricious responsibility determination 

by the contracting officer, the government would be obligated to rebid the contract, and [the bidder] could compete 

for the contract once again.” Impresa, 238 F.3d at 1334. 

Outside of its contention that the Army failed to conduct a

compensation realism analysis, Eskridge does not allege alternate grounds which, if true, would require rebidding. 

See generally Appellant’s Br. Cf. Info. Tech., 316 F.3d 

at 1319 (determining that a disappointed bidder established the requisite prejudice for standing, as the party was 

a qualified bidder whose proposal met minimum contract 

requirements and “its chances of securing the contract increased if the problem [alleged] . . . was cured”). 

Eskridge’s counterarguments are unavailing. 

Eskridge contends that it would have a chance of being 

awarded the Contract, because its challenge encompasses 

5 To the extent that Eskridge is protesting the terms 

of the 2018 Solicitation, such a challenge is untimely. See 

Blue & Gold Fleet, L.P. v. United States, 492 F.3d 1308, 

1313 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that a party waives the ability to object to the terms of a solicitation if it fails to do so 

before the close of the bidding process). 

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all four lower-priced bidders due to the Army’s improper

determination that they were technically acceptable when 

they were in fact deficient. See Appellant’s Br. 18 (“[T]he 

Army committed substantial errors by failing to adhere to 

evaluation criteria pertaining to retention and recruiting 

of CRNAs,” “which allowed four bidders to submit wage 

rates and pricing wholly inadequate to retain and recruit 

CRNAs in the latter option years of the contract[.]”). Specifically, Eskridge asserts—notably without providing record support—that the 2018 Solicitation required that 

“wage rates must increase proportionally per option year 

at a percentage necessary to maintain and sustain the 

workforce throughout the life of the contract.” Id. at 19. 

This argument fails, hinging on a faulty premise: For 

Eskridge’s argument to prevail, the 2016 Solicitation’s 

price realism analysis requirement—which Eskridge suggests would engender the need for proportional and annual 

wage increases—must have been imputed into the 2018 Solicitation. It was not incorporated. The Army specified 

that in the 2018 Solicitation, it had removed the 2016 Solicitation’s price realism analysis requirement and, in its 

place, added the minimum compensation rate requirement. 

See Eskridge, 142 Fed. Cl. at 414 (“[T]he Army made th[e] 

[minimum compensation rate] addition because the prior 

iteration of this procurement—unlike the current one—incorporated price realism in a best value trade-off analysis.”); see J.A. 171 (2018 Solicitation) (setting the initial

“minimum acceptable provider wage rate” at $113.84 (capitalization altered)), 159–72 (2018 Solicitation) (providing 

for no annual wage increase in option years). All four of 

the lower-priced bids met the compensation rate requirement, see Eskridge, 142 Fed. Cl. at 414–15; see also 

J.A. 861–65, and so the Court of Federal Claims did not err 

in determining the bids were technically acceptable on that 

basis, see Int’l Bus. Machs., 892 F.2d at 1011 (explaining 

that, where every bidder “offers essentially the same 

[bid,] . . . materially differ[ing] only as to price, the 

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solicitation itself is not challenged, and there is no reason 

to believe that the second-lowest bid is not responsive, only 

the second-lowest bidder has a direct economic interest”). 

Similarly, Eskridge’s claim that the Army erred by rating the four lower bidders as technically acceptable—despite their offering of wage rates that “fall[] below the 

median rate established by the IGE” for two option years—

is flawed. Appellant’s Br. 21. The compensation realism 

analysis specified in the 2018 Solicitation requires the 

Army to measure each bid’s price against the minimum 

hourly rate provided for, which the Army did. See 

Eskridge, 142 Fed. Cl. at 422. In contrast, the IGE analysis 

is used to determine whether each bidder’s pricing was 

“[f]air and reasonable.” Id. at 419 (citation omitted); see 

J.A. 859 (2018 Solicitation Source Selection Decision Document) (“Fair and reasonable pricing can be determined by 

comparison to the [IGE].”). Compensation realism analysis 

evaluates whether a proposed compensation is too low, 

Eskridge, 142 Fed. Cl. at 423, while the fair and reasonable 

analysis determines if it is too high. See Triad Int’l Maint. 

Corp., B-408374, 2013 WL 4854436, at *7 (Comp. Gen. 

Sept. 5, 2013) (citing Milani Constr., LLC, B-401942, 2010 

CPD ¶ 87 at 4 (Comp. Gen. Dec. 22, 2009)). For the reasons 

stated above, the Army did not err in its compensation realism analysis. Accordingly, because Eskridge failed to 

demonstrate a direct interest, it does not have standing to 

protest.

CONCLUSION

We have considered Eskridge’s remaining arguments 

and find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, the Judgment of 

the U.S. Court of Federal Claims is

AFFIRMED

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