Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-00103/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-00103-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jovencio Dela Calzada
Petitioner
Connie Gipson
Respondent

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JOVENCIO DELA CALZADA,

Petitioner,

v.

CONNIE GIPSON,

Respondent.

Case No. 14-cv-00103-WHO (PR) 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Dkt. No. 18

INTRODUCTION 

 Petitioner Jovencio Dela Calzada seeks federal habeas relief from his state 

convictions because (1) his sentence is unconstitutional and (2) defense counsel rendered 

ineffective assistance.1 Neither of these claims has merit. The petition for habeas relief is 

DENIED. 

BACKGROUND 

In 2011, a Contra Costa County Superior Court jury found Dela Calzada guilty of 

committing multiple sexual offenses against two of his stepdaughters, Jane Does I and II. 

(Ans., Ex. 6 at 1 (State Appellate Opinion, People v. Dela Calzada, No. A133098, 2012 

 

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In his traverse, Dela Calzada asserts the additional claim that the charges were timebarred. (Trav. at 7.) This claim is DENIED because it was raised in his traverse rather 

than in the petition. See Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994). 

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WL 5279770 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2012) (unpublished).) He received a sentence of 173 

years to life in state prison. (Id.) His attempts to overturn his convictions in state court 

were unsuccessful. This federal habeas petition followed.

The state appellate court summarized the facts as follows: 

The two victims are two of [Dela Calzada’s] three stepdaughters who were 

initially raised in the Philippines and moved to the United States in May 

1997 after their mother married [Dela Calzada]. At the time Jane Doe II 

was 13, Jane Doe I was four, and the third sister, Renzel, was 16.

In view of the limited nature of the issues raised on appeal, it is not 

necessary to set out the evidence at trial in any detail. In short, Jane Doe II 

described a course of conduct in which [Dela Calzada] at first offered her 

money to massage him, threatened to send her back to the Philippines if she 

told her mother, engaged in various sex acts with her including intercourse 

and oral copulation, and had sex with her ‘[p]robably more than 50 times’ 

although she was ‘sure it’s more than that.’ When Jane Doe II turned 17 

she told Renzel of this conduct, and at Renzel’s insistence told her mother. 

Her mother, however, insisted that this conduct not be reported to the 

authorities, and Jane Doe II and Renzel soon moved out of the family 

home. In December 2004, while in the Caribbean, Jane Doe II received a 

phone call from Jane Doe I, who ‘was crying, sobbing, sound[ing] scared.’ 

Concerned about her sister and over her mother’s objections and threats to 

kill herself, Jane Doe II contacted child protective services. Upon returning 

to California she reported her prior experiences with [Dela Calzada] to a 

police detective. 

Jane Doe I testified to having observed [Dela Calzada] on top of Jane II, 

who was not wearing pants, and then to numerous experiences of her own 

with [Dela Calzada] between the time she was in kindergarten until she was 

11 years old. On many of these occasions [Dela Calzada] groped and 

touched Jane Doe I’s vagina over her clothes. Jane Doe I reported some of 

these incidents to her mother, who discouraged her from mentioning the 

incidents to others at the risk of being placed in a foster home. [Dela 

Calzada] told Jane Doe I that he would deport her if she disclosed his 

actions. Her call to Jane Doe II in the Caribbean was prompted by a threat 

from [Dela Calzada] to kill her by cutting her throat and throwing her off a 

bridge. After she described to Renzel what had been occurring, she was 

interviewed by a police officer and a social worker, and then placed in a 

foster home. 

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(Ans., Ex. 6 at 2-3.) Dela Calzada testified at trial that he was innocent of the charges, and 

had never sexually molested his daughters. (Id. at 3.) 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 

this Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody 

in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(a). The petition may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated 

on the merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted 

in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state 

court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question 

of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of 

materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412–13 

(2000).

“Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the 

writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s 

decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 

413. “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes 

in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly 

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be 

unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application” 

inquiry should ask whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law 

was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. 

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When presented with a state court decision that is unaccompanied by a rationale for 

its conclusions, a federal court must conduct an independent review of the record to 

determine whether the state-court decision is objectively unreasonable. See Delgado v. 

Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). This review is not de novo. “[W]here a state 

court’s decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner’s burden still 

must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” 

Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 784 (2011). 

DISCUSSION 

I. Sentence 

Dela Calzada was sentenced to a total term of 173 years to life. For his crimes

against Jane Doe II, he received eight consecutive sentences of 15 years to life (with other 

sentences running concurrently), totaling 120 years. For his crimes against Jane Doe I, he 

received three consecutive sentences of 15 years to life, plus a sentence of 8 years (with 

other sentences running concurrently), totaling 53 years. (Ans., Ex. 2, Vol. 4 at 1093-94.) 

Dela Calzada claims that the trial court violated (i) California Penal Code section 

654, and thereby his right to due process, when it imposed multiple sentences for the same 

criminal conduct, and (ii) his Sixth Amendment jury trial rights when it imposed 

consecutive sentences after erroneously finding that the offenses occurred on separate 

occasions. (Pet. at 2-3.) 

These claims were presented only by way of a habeas petition to the state supreme 

court, which summarily denied them. This Court will therefore conduct an independent 

review of the record to determine whether the state-court decision is objectively 

unreasonable. See Delgado, 223 F.3d at 982. 

A. Due Process

Dela Calzada’s claim that the trial court violated his federal rights by imposing

consecutive sentences contrary to state law does not warrant habeas relief. First, whether 

the offenses qualified as separate crimes under California Penal Code § 654 (or any other 

California statute) is a matter of state, not federal, law. The state supreme court’s implicit 

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ruling that the evidence in this case supported a finding of separate crimes under state law 

binds this federal habeas court, Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, even if state law were 

erroneously applied or interpreted, Cooke, 131 S. Ct. at 863. Dela Calzada may not 

“transform a state-law issue into a federal one merely by asserting a violation of due 

process.” Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996). This claim is not 

cognizable on federal habeas review. Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S. Ct. 859, 861-62 (2011). 

The state and federal cases on which Dela Calzada relies are inapplicable. (Pet., Ex. 

A at 2-3.) Because state law violations cannot support a claim for federal habeas relief, the 

federal cases from the First, Second, and Fifth Circuits and are either not relevant or not 

binding on this Court. 

Furthermore, Dela Calzada’s claim is insufficiently detailed. He asserts in 

conclusory fashion that the convictions should not have been grouped together because his 

acts “are part of a continuous course of criminal activity despite [the fact that the acts were 

committed on] different[s] victims.” (Pet., Ex. A at 3.) He points to no specific details 

showing that the crimes are separable. Because his claim is conclusory and undetailed, it 

fails to meet the specificity requirements of Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 655 (2005). 

Importantly, if this were a cognizable federal claim, it would lack merit. Jane Doe 

II testified to over 70 incidents of sexual abuse from the age of 13 to 16. (Ans., Ex. 2, Vol. 

1 at 164-68.) When asked whether that number was an estimate, she said, “Yeah, I’m sure 

it’s more than that.” (Id. at 164.) She then stated that an act of sexual abuse occurred 

“[p]robably at least once a week.” (Id.) Intercourse would occur twice a month when she 

was 14 and 15. (Id. at 166.) Jane Doe I testified to many separate sexual offenses 

occurring from when she was in kindergarten to when she turned 11 years old, occurring in 

different places in the house. (Id. at 257-71.) There is no question that the acts were 

sufficiently separate to justify the imposition of consecutive sentences. 

Upon an independent review of the record, the Court concludes that the state court’s 

denial of the claim was not objectively unreasonable and therefore is entitled to AEDPA 

deference. Dela Calzada has not shown that there was no reasonable basis for the state 

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court to deny relief. Accordingly, this sentencing claim is DENIED. 

B. Sixth Amendment 

Dela Calzada claims that the imposition of consecutive sentences violated his Sixth 

Amendment right to have a jury determine whether the crimes occurred on separate 

occasions. (Pet. at 6, 6A.) This claim is foreclosed by Ninth Circuit precedent. “The 

decision whether to impose sentences concurrently or consecutively is a matter of state 

criminal procedure and is not within the purview of federal habeas corpus.” Cacoperdo v. 

Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994). Sixth Amendment jury trial protections 

do not apply to a trial court’s decision to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences. See 

Oregon v. Ice, 129 S. Ct. 711, 714-15 (2009). Also, as noted above, there was sufficient 

evidence in the record to support a finding that the incidents were separate, rather than part 

of a continuous course of conduct. 

Upon an independent review of the record, the Court concludes that the state court’s 

denial of the claim was not objectively unreasonable and therefore is entitled to AEDPA 

deference. Also, Dela Calzada has not shown that there was no reasonable basis for the 

state court to deny relief. Accordingly, this sentencing claim is DENIED.

II. Assistance of Counsel

Dela Calzada asserts that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to: 

(i) object to the prosecutor’s statement that the victims were credible; (ii) impeach the 

victims on grounds that there was no physical evidence to support their testimony; 

(iii) object to his sentence on grounds that it violated section 654; (iv) disclose that the 

victims were motivated by the lure of money and possessions, and were coerced; 

(v) request disclosure of the victims’ medical and school records and by failing to object 

when the trial court disallowed admission of the records; and (vi) request that the jury be 

instructed with CALJIC No. 2.72.

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Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are examined under Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In order to prevail on a claim of ineffectiveness of 

counsel, the petitioner must establish two factors. First, he must establish that counsel’s 

performance was deficient, i.e., that it fell below an “objective standard of reasonableness” 

under prevailing professional norms, id. at 687-68, “not whether it deviated from best 

practices or most common custom,” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 778 (2011) 

(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). “A court considering a claim of ineffective assistance 

must apply a ‘strong presumption’ that counsel’s representation was within the ‘wide 

range’ of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 787 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

689). 

Second, he must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient 

performance, i.e., that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 694. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 

confidence in the outcome. Id. Where the defendant is challenging his conviction, the 

appropriate question is “whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, 

the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.” Id. at 695. “The 

likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.” Richter, 131 S. 

Ct. at 792 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693). 

The standards of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and Strickland are “highly deferential . . . and 

when the two apply in tandem, review is doubly so.” Id. at 788 (quotation and citations 

omitted). “The question [under § 2254(d)] is not whether counsel’s actions were 

reasonable. The question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel 

satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Id. 

A. Failure to Object to Prosecutor’s Statement

Dela Calzada claims without elaboration that defense counsel should have objected

to the prosecutor’s affirmation that the victims were credible witnesses. (Pet. at 6-A.) He 

cites no specific example nor indicates when the prosecutor allegedly made these 

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statements. This claim was presented to the state courts only by way of a habeas petition 

to the state supreme court, which summarily denied the petition. 

As a general rule, “a prosecutor may not express his opinion of the defendant’s guilt 

or his belief in the credibility of [government] witnesses.” United States v. McKoy, 771 

F.2d 1207, 1211 (9th Cir.1985). Improper vouching for the credibility of a witness occurs 

when the prosecutor places the prestige of the government behind the witness or suggests 

that information not presented to the jury supports the witness’s testimony. United States 

v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 7 n.3, 11-12 (1985). 

Habeas relief is not warranted here. All Dela Calzada alleges is: “Not objecting to 

the prosecutor’s arguments about the credibility of the statements made by the victims.” 

(Pet. at 6-A.) He points to no specific statements by prosecutor and he gives no indication 

when the prosecutor allegedly made these statements, either by citing a page number to the 

record or naming a stage of the trial. Because his claim is conclusory and undetailed, it 

fails to meet the specificity requirements of Felix, 545 U.S. at 655. By failing to provide 

any specific information to support his claim, he fails to show whether the prosecutor 

placed the prestige of the government behind the witness or suggested that information not 

presented to the jury supports the witness’s testimony. Young, 470 U.S. at n.3. 

Upon an independent review of the record, the Court concludes that the state court’s 

denial of the claim was not objectively unreasonable and therefore is entitled to AEDPA 

deference. Dela Calzada has not shown that there was no reasonable basis for the state 

court to deny relief. This claim is DENIED. 

B. Failure to Impeach

Dela Calzada claims that defense counsel should have tried to impeach the victims 

by showing that their assertions were not supported by physical evidence. (Pet. at 6-A.) 

Habeas relief is not warranted on this claim. Dela Calzada has not shown that there 

is no reasonable argument that counsel failed to satisfy Strickland’s highly deferential 

standard. If counsel had done as Dela Calzada suggests, the prosecutor likely would have 

countered with evidence that many of the crimes happened many years ago, and that Dela 

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Calzada threatened the victims with violence or deportation if they reported the abuse. It 

was reasonable and not prejudicial for counsel to forgo cross-examining the victims on this 

topic. 

Upon an independent review of the record, the Court concludes that the state court’s 

denial of the claim was not objectively unreasonable and therefore is entitled to AEDPA 

deference. Dela Calzada has not shown that there was no reasonable basis for the state 

court to deny relief. This claim is DENIED. 

 C. Failure to Object to the Sentence under Section 654

Habeas relief is not warranted here. The state courts rejected Dela Calzada’s freestanding section 654 claim for lack of merit. As stated in Section I, above, I agree. 

Because the claim lacks merit, Dela Calzada cannot show that counsel’s failure to object 

on the same grounds constituted a deficient performance or resulted in prejudice. Any 

objection would almost certainly have been overruled. Upon an independent review of the 

record, the Court concludes that the state court’s denial of the claim was not objectively 

unreasonable and therefore is entitled to AEDPA deference. Dela Calzada has not shown 

that there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief. Accordingly, this 

claim is DENIED. 

D. Failing to Disclose Victims’ Motivations

Dela Calzada claims that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing 

to disclose that the victims lied to increase their chances of obtaining his assets and were 

coached by their mother and her boyfriend. (Pet. at 6A.) His theory appears to be that the 

victims lied to incriminate him, which would please their mother, Maria, who would 

reward them financially, especially when she received the proceeds she obtained from her 

divorce from Dela Calzada. 

Habeas relief is not warranted here. Dela Calzada’s theory is wholly without 

support. He has not provided any evidence of a conspiracy or inclination to lie, such as 

proof that the victims received his money or possessions, or made inculpatory admissions. 

He does provide evidence in his traverse that he must pay restitution to the victims, and 

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that there were money and possessions to be had from the marriage. (Trav., Ex. A.) But 

there is no evidence that the victims fabricated their testimony to obtain restitution or his 

assets. It is purely speculative to contend that the victims were coached, coerced, or in any 

way encouraged to lie. Because there was no supporting evidence, it was reasonable and 

not prejudicial for counsel to decline to impeach the victims on the grounds Dela Calzada 

suggests. Upon an independent review of the record, the Court concludes that the state 

court’s denial of the claim was not objectively unreasonable and therefore is entitled to 

AEDPA deference. Dela Calzada has not shown that there was no reasonable basis for the 

state court to deny relief. This claim is DENIED. 

E. Disclosure of Medical and School Records 

Dela Calzada claims that counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he failed to 

obtain and disclose the victims’ medical and school records, and when he failed to object 

when the trial court disallowed the admission of the records. (Pet. at 6-A.) But contrary to 

Dela Calzada’s assertion, defense counsel sought to obtain and then moved to admit the 

records. (Ans., Ex. 1, Vol. 1 at 93E; Ex. 2, Vol. 1 at 8-9, 19.) After much legal wrangling, 

the trial court reviewed them in camera and declined to admit them, saying, “There was 

absolutely nothing of any value to either side.” (Id., Ex. 2, Vol. 1 at 82-83.) 

Habeas relief is not warranted. Dela Calzada’s claim that counsel should have 

obtained the records fails because counsel did try to obtain the records. It was reasonable 

and not prejudicial for counsel to forgo objecting to the court’s ruling since any objection 

would almost certainly have been rejected, given that the trial court itself inspected the 

records. Upon an independent review of the record, the Court concludes that the state 

court’s denial of the claim was not objectively unreasonable and therefore is entitled to 

AEDPA deference. Dela Calzada has not shown that there was no reasonable basis for the 

state court to deny relief. Accordingly, this claim is DENIED. 

 

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F. Request for CALJIC No. 2.72

Dela Calzada claims that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to 

request that the jury be instructed on CALJIC No. 2.72 (“Corpus Delicti Must Be Proved 

Independent of Admission or Confession”), which reads: 

No person may be convicted of a criminal offense unless there is some 

proof of each element of the crime independent of any [confession] [or] 

[admission] made by [him] [her] outside of this trial. 

The identity of the person who is alleged to have committed a crime is not 

an element of the crime [nor is the degree of the crime]. The identity [or 

degree of the crime] may be established by [a] [an] [confession] [or] 

[admission]. 

This claim is nonsensical. Dela Calzada points to no admissions or confessions he 

made regarding the charges. Without a basis for using the instruction, CALJIC No. 2.72 

would have been irrelevant. It was reasonable and not prejudicial for counsel to not 

request this instruction.2 Upon an independent review of the record, the Court concludes 

that the state court’s denial of the claim was not objectively unreasonable and therefore is 

entitled to AEDPA deference. Also, Dela Calzada has not shown that there was no 

reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief. This claim is DENIED. 

CONCLUSION

The state court’s adjudication of Dela Calzada’s claims did not result in decisions 

that were contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

federal law, nor did they result in decisions that were based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. 

Accordingly, the petition is DENIED. 

A certificate of appealability will not issue. Reasonable jurists would not “find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Dela Calzada may seek a certificate of appealability 

 

2 Dela Calzada’s claim that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by failing to 

give the instruction (Pet., Ex. A at 1) is DENIED because the instruction was unnecessary. 

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from the Ninth Circuit. 

Dela Calzada’s motion to file a traverse with excess pages (Docket No. 18) is 

GRANTED. 

The Clerk shall terminate Docket No. 18, enter judgment in favor of respondent and 

close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: May 5, 2015

_________________________ 

WILLIAM H. ORRICK 

United States District Judge

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