Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-08-03016/USCOURTS-caDC-08-03016-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Nelson Brockenborrugh
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 9, 2009 Decided August 7, 2009 

No. 08-3016 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

APPELLEE

v. 

NELSON BROCKENBORRUGH, 

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 07cr00078-02) 

Richard K. Gilbert argued the cause and filed the briefs 

for appellant. 

Florence Y. Pan, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. On the brief were Jeffrey A. Taylor, U.S. 

Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese, III, Elizabeth Trosman, and 

Patricia A. Heffernan, Assistant U.S. Attorneys. 

Before: SENTELLE, Chief Judge, and ROGERS and 

GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges. 

 Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GRIFFITH. 

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 Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part filed by 

Circuit Judge ROGERS. 

 GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge: A jury found Nelson 

Brockenborrugh guilty of wire fraud and conspiracy to 

commit wire fraud, and the district court sentenced him to 46 

months in prison. On appeal, Brockenborrugh contends that 

the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to support his 

convictions and that a number of the district court’s rulings 

were erroneous and sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new 

trial. He also argues that the district court made three errors in 

calculating his sentence. For the reasons set forth below, we 

reject these arguments and affirm Brockenborrugh’s 

convictions and sentence. 

I.

A.

Because Brockenborrugh’s appeal relies in large measure 

on an argument regarding the sufficiency of the evidence 

presented at trial, we must recount that evidence in some 

detail. When James Roy died on October 13, 2004, he left to 

his heirs a multiunit residential property located at 1133 6th 

Street N.W., Washington, D.C. Although the condition of the 

property deteriorated after Roy’s death, its location a block 

from the city’s new convention center attracted the interest of 

a number of developers. Named as the executor of her father’s 

estate, Katrina Robinson had to decide what to do with the 

rundown property. Robinson first met Brockenborrugh while 

visiting the property in April 2005. According to Robinson, 

Brockenborrugh, a retired police officer who worked as a 

Court Security Officer (CSO) at the D.C. Superior Court, and 

his realtor, Denise McLeod, were at the site and asked her 

about buying the property. During this conversation, McLeod 

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told Robinson she was an employee of the D.C. government, 

introduced Brockenborrugh as a U.S. Marshal, and said, 

“[W]e have been watching your property, because we have 

been getting several complaints . . . about the things . . . going 

on there.” Trial Tr. 189–90 (Oct. 23, 2007). Brockenborrugh 

told Robinson that he was “working with” the U.S. Marshals, 

Trial Tr. 44 (Oct. 24, 2007), showed her a gold-plated badge, 

and stated that he was a retired police officer. Robinson told 

them that once she was officially appointed executor, she 

would consult with her family and then decide whether to sell. 

The three exchanged phone numbers, and Robinson told 

Brockenborrugh and McLeod to contact her lawyer, David 

Scull, if they remained interested in buying the property. On 

June 21, 2005, McLeod called Scull. She told him that “U.S. 

Marshal Brockenborrugh wanted to buy the property” and 

could assist in solving the problem created by squatters who 

had moved into its abandoned units. Trial Tr. 131 (Oct. 18, 

2007). McLeod also advised Scull that she was “monitoring 

every aspect” of the property. Id. at 132. 

 On September 8, 2005, McLeod filed with the District of 

Columbia Recorder of Deeds a fraudulent deed that purported 

to convey the property from James Roy to her for $10,000. 

Because the deed reflected a nominal sale price, the District 

required an additional payment of $7610, which included a 

transfer tax and recording fee based on the assessed value of 

the property. Two other people helped McLeod file the deed. 

Cynthia Russell “witnessed” James Roy’s signature (though, 

of course, Roy did not posthumously sign the deed). LaShawn 

Lewis notarized the deed in return for $250. (Both pleaded 

guilty to charges related to these actions.) A week later, 

Brockenborrugh wrote McLeod a check for $8804, 

approximately one half of the total purchase price, and noted 

on the memo line, “For my half of 1133 6th St NW.” App. at 

49. At trial, Brockenborrugh testified he wrote the check 

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because he “just wanted to make sure that [he] was included 

in to what [he] thought was a legal transaction.” Trial Tr. 88–

89 (Oct. 25, 2007). He had asked McLeod, “[H]ow much do I 

owe you?,” id. at 155, and she responded, “[R]ight now I 

don’t know what the total price is going to be, but for now I 

have had to pay the water and tax bill . . . [s]o this is what the 

price is,” id. at 155–56. McLeod subsequently agreed to sell 

the property to developer Kenneth Silbert for $300,000. When 

Silbert’s lawyer conducted a title search, he uncovered the 

fraudulent deed. Silbert instructed him not to tell Robinson. 

 On October 6, 2005, Metropolitan Police Department 

Officer Israel James was called to the property, where he 

found Brockenborrugh and McLeod. Brockenborrugh was 

wearing his CSO uniform and may also have been wearing his 

CSO security badge. According to Officer James, the two 

claimed they had “authority” over the property and 

complained that squatters needed to be removed. Trial Tr. 33–

34 (Oct. 22, 2007). Brockenborrugh does not deny he was at 

the property but claims that only McLeod talked to the police. 

Two investigators from the fire department also responded at 

the scene. Because the squatters had been poaching electricity 

and creating a fire hazard, they declared the property 

uninhabitable and ordered the squatters to leave. Later that 

day, a bystander called Robinson to report that McLeod was 

hanging around the property saying she was the new owner. 

The caller then passed the phone to McLeod, who told 

Robinson she “was getting [the squatters] out” and would 

“contact her later.” Trial Tr. 202 (Oct. 23, 2007). Wondering 

why McLeod was at the property, Robinson called her lawyer, 

Scull. Scull ran his own title search, discovered the fraudulent 

deed assigning the property to McLeod, and, with the 

encouragement of Robinson, called the FBI. 

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 On October 19, 2005, Robinson, wearing an FBI wire, 

met with Brockenborrugh, McLeod, Silbert, and Nathan 

Carter, who is alleged to be the person that would finance any 

purchase of the property. During their conversation with 

Robinson, members of the group made representations that 

implied the property was worthless, and Brockenborrugh 

claimed responsibility for the removal of the squatters. As a 

retired police officer, he said that he had asked a few current 

officers whom he knew to keep an eye on the property. This 

increased protection, he boasted, had prevented the squatters 

from reentering and ended the neighbors’ complaints about 

the property’s condition. Brockenborrugh added that one of 

the squatters had seen him at the courthouse and said, “[O]h 

you’re a real marshal.” App. at 105. Robinson interjected, 

“Oh he didn’t think you were?” Id. at 106. “He didn’t believe 

it,” confirmed Brockenborrugh. Id. Brockenborrugh testified 

that he did not correct the occupant because the comment 

“didn’t really phase [sic] [him].” Trial Tr. 174 (Oct. 25, 2007). 

 Brockenborrugh, McLeod, and Carter also told Robinson 

that she faced a number of risks by retaining the property. For 

example, they warned her that the squatters might burn down 

the building. Brockenborrugh said the situation was “really, 

really serious” and that each passing day was like “spinning 

the roulette wheel.” App. at 117. McLeod told Robinson that 

the squatters could sue her because the building contained 

asbestos that was making them ill. She also warned Robinson 

that the city could file a “wrongful housing” suit and assess a 

fine on the property but had not yet done so because of 

Brockenborrugh’s influence. Id. at 118–19. 

 Robinson said that her family wanted $825,000 for the 

property. McLeod rejected that price out of hand. She argued 

that the building itself was worth nothing and that the land 

was worth only $99,000 to $130,000. The group offered 

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Robinson $130,000 and presented her with a contract. 

Robinson asked for more information about all the buyers 

except for Brockenborrugh. She stated that she “[knew] about 

Mr. US Marshall [sic].” Id. at 137. Brockenborrugh urged 

Robinson to act quickly, adding that the police would check 

on the property so long as he was “still in the mix.” Id. at 143. 

If he did not “do his part,” they would stop. Id. at 144. 

 Two days later, McLeod faxed to Robinson a document 

that purported to be an official District of Columbia “Property 

Detail,” which contained fictitious assessments of the 

property. The document was fraudulent in several respects, 

and the value of the property’s improvements was listed as 

“$0.00 (inhabitable) [sic],” id. at 50–51. McLeod later faxed a 

revised contract along with a letter assuring the Roy heirs that 

the only issues revealed by a title search were outstanding 

property taxes and water bills. Obviously, the letter did not 

mention the fraudulent deed. 

 The FBI convened a second meeting with the group, 

during which an undercover agent posed as “James Roy, Jr.” 

Also present were Robinson, another undercover agent, 

McLeod, Carter, and Silbert. McLeod explained that 

Brockenborrugh could not make the meeting because, as “a 

U.S. Marshall [sic],” he was “assigned to a judge” that day. R. 

Material Tab 3, 3. The agent posing as James Roy, Jr., stated 

that he wanted $200,000 for the property. The parties 

eventually agreed to a purchase price of $165,000. At that 

point, Brockenborrugh joined the meeting via speakerphone. 

McLeod told him that “James Roy” wanted $165,000 and 

asked, “[C]an we go forward with that?” Id. at 32. 

Brockenborrugh replied, “I’ll go with that.” Id. at 33. 

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B.

By an indictment filed March 22, 2007, the grand jury 

charged Brockenborrugh and McLeod with five crimes: (1) 

wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343; (2) conspiracy to 

commit wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349; (3) firstdegree fraud in violation of D.C. CODE §§ 22-3221(a), -1805; 

(4) forgery in violation of D.C. CODE §§ 22-3241, -1805; and 

(5) uttering a forged instrument in violation of D.C. CODE

§§ 22-3241, -1805. McLeod pleaded guilty to each count 

shortly before trial and did not take the stand. The jury found 

Brockenborrugh guilty of wire fraud and conspiracy to 

commit wire fraud, but acquitted him of the other charges. 

At trial, the district court made three rulings relevant to 

this appeal. The first concerned whether Robinson’s attorney, 

Scull, could testify about statements McLeod made to him 

during their June 21, 2005, telephone conversation. The 

district court admitted the testimony under Federal Rule of 

Evidence 801(d), which provides an exemption to the rule 

against hearsay for statements of a co-conspirator made in 

furtherance of the conspiracy. Second, the district court ruled 

that the government could question Brockenborrugh about his 

sexual relationship with McLeod, finding that the prejudicial 

value of the testimony would not outweigh its probative 

worth. And third, the district court refused Brockenborrugh’s 

request for a jury instruction on multiple conspiracies, finding 

it was not supported by the evidence. 

At sentencing, the parties agreed that section 2B1.1 of the 

Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which governs offenses 

involving fraud, applied and that Brockenborrugh’s base 

offense level was 7. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 

MANUAL § 2B1.1 (2007) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.]. The parties 

disagreed, however, over how much the court should increase 

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Brockenborrugh’s sentence under that section, which ties a 

defendant’s total offense level to the amount of loss for which 

he is responsible, see id. § 2B1.1(b). The district court 

concluded that Brockenborrugh’s conduct involved an 

intended loss between $200,000 and $400,000, and thus 

warranted a twelve-level increase. Over Brockenborrugh’s 

objection, the district court also applied two enhancements: 

(1) a two-level enhancement for abuse of trust because 

Brockenborrugh falsely represented that he was a U.S. 

Marshal to significantly facilitate his offense; and (2) another 

two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice because 

Brockenborrugh lied on the stand. The resulting offense level 

was 23, which translated into a sentencing range of 46 to 57 

months under the Sentencing Guidelines because 

Brockenborrugh had no prior criminal history. The district 

court sentenced Brockenborrugh to 46 months’ imprisonment 

followed by two years of supervised release. 

II.

 On appeal, Brockenborrugh renews his challenges to the 

district court’s trial and sentencing rulings and also argues 

that there was insufficient evidence for a jury to conclude he 

engaged in any fraudulent conduct. We have jurisdiction to 

consider these arguments under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 

U.S.C. § 3742. 

We begin with the argument that there was insufficient 

evidence to support Brockenborrugh’s convictions. Our 

review of such challenges is narrow. We must view the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the government and 

“accept the jury’s guilty verdict if we conclude that ‘any 

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements 

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” United States v. 

Branham, 515 F.3d 1268, 1273 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting 

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United States v. Arrington, 309 F.3d 40, 48 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). 

Brockenborrugh does not dispute that the evidence 

established two attempts to fraudulently obtain the property 

located at 1133 6th Street N.W.: the filing of the forged deed 

and the effort to cause the Roy heirs to sell the property for an 

unreasonably low price. Nor does he dispute there was a 

conspiracy to get the property unlawfully. Rather, 

Brockenborrugh argues that the evidence did not prove that he 

knowingly sought to defraud the Roy heirs or participated in a 

conspiracy to do the same. To commit wire fraud, he must 

have knowingly and willingly entered into a scheme to 

defraud. To be convicted of conspiracy, he must have entered 

into an agreement with another with the intent to commit wire 

fraud. See United States v. Alston-Graves, 435 F.3d 331, 337 

(D.C. Cir. 2006). In Brockenborrugh’s view, the evidence 

showed only that he thought “the attempted purchase of 1133 

Sixth Street from the heirs was progressing in the same 

manner as a lawful real estate transaction.” Br. of Appellant at 

27. 

 We disagree. There is ample evidence in the record from 

which the jury could reasonably infer that Brockenborrugh 

was a knowing participant in the unlawful scheme to obtain 

the property. To begin with, the jury could conclude from 

Brockenborrugh’s connection to the forged deed that he 

knowingly entered a scheme with McLeod to defraud the Roy 

heirs. This inference finds support in the check 

Brockenborrugh wrote McLeod after learning she had 

“purchased” the property. See App. at 49. Although the 

defense argued that Brockenborrugh did not think this was his 

final payment, the jury could have reasonably found that 

Brockenborrugh thought that it was and that he knew the 

property was being obtained by fraud. 

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 Brockenborrugh argues that the jury’s verdict on the D.C. 

counts of fraud, forgery, and uttering a forged instrument 

shows that he was “acquitted of all counts directly relating to 

the forged deed.” Br. of Appellant at 9. Not so. As we just 

explained, the federal counts also implicate the forged deed. 

The jury’s verdict on the D.C. counts in no way undermines 

this conclusion. Under D.C. law, a person commits the 

offense of forgery or uttering “if that person makes . . . or 

utters a forged written instrument with the intent to defraud 

. . . another.” D.C. CODE § 22-3241(b). Anyone who advises, 

incites, aids, or abets forgery or uttering is liable as a 

principal. Id. § 22-1805. Brockenborrugh’s conduct does not 

fall within either provision. He did not make or utter the 

forged deed, and there is no evidence that he advised or aided 

its creation. Likewise, a person commits first-degree fraud 

under D.C. law if he actually defrauds another thereby 

causing that person to lose his property. Id. § 22-3221(a). The 

scheme to get the property was ultimately unsuccessful. That 

there was insufficient evidence to convict Brockenborrugh of 

these crimes under D.C. law does not absolve him of his 

involvement with the forged deed under the federal counts. 

 Brockenborrugh’s knowing participation in the fraud can 

also reasonably be inferred from his role in the second attempt 

to secure the property from the Roy heirs. The evidence 

shows that Brockenborrugh falsely represented to Robinson 

that he was a U.S. Marshal, and Robinson testified that 

Brockenborrugh led her to believe that he had influence over 

police officers who were protecting the property on his behalf. 

Brockenborrugh also suggested to Robinson that if the 

property was not sold to his group, police protection would 

cease, the property would be ruined, and the estate would be 

liable. These actions were vital to the plot to convince 

Robinson to sell the property at a deflated price, and a jury 

could reasonably infer from them that Brockenborrugh 

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knowingly entered into a scheme with his co-conspirators to 

defraud the Roy heirs. 

III.

 Brockenborrugh challenges three trial rulings: (1) the 

decision to allow attorney Scull to testify about statements 

McLeod made to him in June 2005; (2) the decision to allow 

the government to cross-examine him about his sexual 

relationship with McLeod; and (3) the refusal to give a jury 

instruction regarding the existence of multiple conspiracies. 

We consider each in turn. 

A.

 Over the objection of defense counsel, the district court 

allowed Scull to testify about statements McLeod made 

during their June 2005 phone conversation. According to 

Scull, McLeod said that “U.S. Marshal Brockenborrugh” 

wanted to buy the property and could assist with the squatter 

problem. Trial Tr. 131 (Oct. 18, 2007). The district court 

provisionally admitted this testimony subject to proof of a 

conspiracy under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E), 

which provides that a statement is not hearsay if it is offered 

against a party and is made “by a coconspirator of [that] party 

during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” 

The question on appeal is whether the district court 

correctly found that Brockenborrugh and McLeod were 

engaged in a conspiracy at the time McLeod made the 

statements to Scull. At the close of the government’s case, the 

prosecutor argued that a conspiracy, as that term is used in 

Rule 801(d)(2)(E), could be inferred as early as April 2005 or 

at the latest by September 2005, when Brockenborrugh wrote 

the check to McLeod. The district court found that there was 

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“overwhelming evidence of a business relationship between 

Ms. McLeod and Mr. Brockenborrugh” in April 2005, Trial 

Tr. 48 (Oct. 25, 2007), and “overwhelming evidence that 

there was a conspiracy to commit wire fraud” in September 

2005, id. at 49. Brockenborrugh argues that although the 

district court may have ruled on the existence of a conspiracy 

in April and September, it failed to find a conspiracy in June. 

We typically review the admission of evidence under 

Rule 801(d)(2)(E) for clear error. See United States v. 

Gatling, 96 F.3d 1511, 1521 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The 

government, however, argues that the plain error standard of 

review applies because defense counsel did not renew the 

objection or move to strike Scull’s testimony after the district 

court ruled on the scope of the conspiracy.1

 Because we find 

that the district court committed no error—clear, plain, or 

otherwise—in admitting the testimony we need not decide 

which standard best fits these facts. 

 We have previously explained that when admitting 

testimony under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), “the district court must 

find by a preponderance of the evidence that a conspiracy 

existed and that the defendant and declarant were members of 

that conspiracy.” United States v. Gewin, 471 F.3d 197, 201 

(D.C. Cir. 2006). Admission, however, is not contingent upon 

the finding of an unlawful combination. Rather we have held 

that, despite its use of the word “conspiracy,” Rule 

801(d)(2)(E) allows for admission of statements by 

individuals acting in furtherance of a lawful joint enterprise. 

 

1

 When a party forfeits a challenge by failing to raise it below, the 

general rule is that plain error review applies. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 

52(b). The plain error standard of review imposes a more 

substantial burden on criminal defendants than does clear error 

review, and is intended to ensure that forfeited-but-obvious errors 

do not effect a miscarriage of justice. 

USCA Case #08-3016 Document #1200181 Filed: 08/07/2009 Page 12 of 42
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See Gewin, 471 F.3d at 201–02; United States v. Weisz, 718 

F.2d 413, 433 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (stating that the rule, which 

derives from agency and partnership law, “embodies the longstanding doctrine that when two or more individuals are 

acting in concert toward a common goal, the out-of-court 

statements of one are . . . admissible against the others, if 

made in furtherance of the common goal”). Citing Gewin, the 

district court found “overwhelming evidence” that 

Brockenborrugh and McLeod were engaged in a “business 

relationship” as early as April 2005. Trial Tr. 48 (Oct. 25, 

2007). Our review of the record supports this conclusion and 

reveals ample evidence that this relationship continued such 

that in June 2005, the pair was engaged in a lawful joint 

enterprise to acquire the property. For example, 

Brockenborrugh testified that McLeod, at the time of her 

conversation with Scull, was acting as his real estate agent for 

his attempted purchase of the property. Id. at 78–81. 

McLeod’s statements to Scull that “U.S. Marshal 

Brockenborrugh” was interested in buying the property were 

made in furtherance of this enterprise and properly admitted. 

B. 

 

Brockenborrugh also argues that the district court erred in 

allowing the government to cross-examine him about his 

sexual relationship with McLeod. We review this ruling for 

abuse of discretion. See United States v. Fonseca, 435 F.3d 

369, 373 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 

After hearing arguments from both sides, the district 

court determined that cross-examination was needed to show 

the “closeness” of Brockenborrugh’s relationship with 

McLeod and “for . . . impeachment purposes to cast doubt [on 

Brockenborrugh’s] credibility.” Trial Tr. 57 (Oct. 25, 2007). 

The court concluded that any prejudice that might result from 

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questions asked about the sexual relationship would be 

outweighed by the probative value of the testimony given. 

When Brockenborrugh took the witness stand, defense 

counsel asked him to tell the court and the jury “basically” his 

relationship with McLeod. Id. at 68. Brockenborrugh 

answered that McLeod “did taxes” for half of the CSOs in the 

courthouse, “did real estate,” and was his property manager. 

Id. at 68–69. He did not mention the sexual component of the 

relationship. On cross-examination, the prosecutor first asked 

Brockenborrugh if he had a chance to finish his answer about 

the relationship, and Brockenborrugh responded that he had. 

The prosecutor pressed further and questioned him about his 

sexual relationship with McLeod. Only then did 

Brockenborrugh acknowledge its existence between 2002 and 

late 2004 or early 2005. He also admitted to concealing the 

relationship when first interviewed by the FBI. See id. at 133–

39. At the close of trial, the court instructed the jury not to 

consider the sexual relationship as proof of Brockenborrugh’s 

bad character but only as evidence of the true nature of his 

relationship with McLeod and of Brockenborrugh’s 

credibility based on his failure to describe the full extent of 

that relationship during his direct testimony. 

 The district court acted well within its discretion in 

permitting the cross-examination. Cross-examination of a 

criminal defendant is permissible on the subject matter of the 

defendant’s direct examination and matters affecting 

credibility. See FED. R. EVID. 611(b); see also United States v. 

Raper, 676 F.2d 841, 846 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Brockenborrugh’s 

testimony on direct examination suggested that he and 

McLeod had nothing more than a business relationship. The 

government was therefore entitled to elicit further testimony 

to show the true nature of the relationship. Brockenborrugh 

argues that cross-examination on this subject should have 

been prohibited under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which 

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allows for the exclusion of evidence if its “probative value is 

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 

confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 

considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 

presentation of cumulative evidence.” The district court, 

however, “‘is in the best position to perform [the] subjective 

balancing’ required under Rule 403.” United States v. 

Johnson, 519 F.3d 478, 483 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting United 

States v. Cassell, 292 F.3d 788, 795–96 (D.C. Cir. 2002)) 

(alteration in original). Upon review, we see no abuse of 

discretion in the balance struck by the district court. The 

probative value of the evidence was substantial as it spoke to 

the central issue in the case: whether Brockenborrugh was a 

knowing participant in the fraudulent scheme or an innocent 

real estate investor caught up in McLeod’s thievery. The only 

prejudicial effect identified by Brockenborrugh is the possible 

inference “that a person who ‘cheats’ on his wife cannot be 

trusted,” Br. of Appellant at 33. Any such effect was 

mitigated by the district court’s instruction to the jury to 

disregard the relationship as evidence of bad character. Cf. 

Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n.8 (1987) (“We normally 

presume that a jury will follow an instruction to disregard 

inadmissible evidence inadvertently presented to it . . . .”). 

C.

 Brockenborrugh’s final contention regarding his trial is 

that the district court erred in refusing to instruct the jury to 

consider whether the evidence supported the existence of 

multiple conspiracies. The district court determined that such 

an instruction was not warranted. We review this decision de 

novo. United States v. Dickerson, 163 F.3d 639, 641 n.3 (D.C. 

Cir. 1999). If the record supports the existence of multiple 

conspiracies, the jury must be instructed to consider them. 

United States v. Hemphill, 514 F.3d 1350, 1363 (D.C. Cir. 

USCA Case #08-3016 Document #1200181 Filed: 08/07/2009 Page 15 of 42
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2008). Brockenborrugh argues that a jury could have found 

several conspiracies to obtain the property and that he was 

involved in only some of them. This instruction, according to 

Brockenborrugh, would have allowed the jury to distinguish 

his legitimate activities from the fraudulent ones of McLeod 

and others. For example, Brockenborrugh argues that the 

creation of the forged deed and its concealment from 

Robinson were two separate conspiracies, and that he was not 

involved in either. But a single conspiracy can “pursue 

multiple schemes with different modi operandi without 

dividing into multiple conspiracies, as long as there is a single 

objective.” Id. at 1364. Whether a course of conduct should 

be classified as a single conspiracy or divided into multiple 

conspiracies depends on whether the participants shared a 

common goal, were dependent upon one another, and were 

involved together in carrying out at least some parts of the 

plan. See United States v. Mathis, 216 F.3d 18, 23–24 (D.C. 

Cir. 2000); cf. Hemphill, 514 F.3d at 1364 (“The mere fact 

that the conspirators found different ways to [carry out their 

crime] does not break the conspiracy into parts.”). 

 We think the record is best interpreted as showing a 

single conspiracy to acquire the property. Although the 

conspirators may have tried to achieve their goal in different 

ways, their actions demonstrate pursuit of a sole objective: the 

fraudulent acquisition of the Roy property. McLeod filed a 

forged deed in an attempt to secure title, and Brockenborrugh 

reimbursed half of the claimed cost to buy the property. When 

that failed, McLeod, Brockenborrugh, and others sought to 

fraudulently obtain the property from Robinson and the other 

Roy heirs. The participants all worked toward a common 

goal, and although Brockenborrugh may not have participated 

in every step of the conspiracy, it is clear that he was 

significantly involved from start to finish. Accordingly, we 

hold that the evidence establishes a single conspiracy. The 

USCA Case #08-3016 Document #1200181 Filed: 08/07/2009 Page 16 of 42
17 

district court did not err in refusing to give the jury 

Brockenborrugh’s requested instruction. 

IV.

 Brockenborrugh also appeals from his sentence, arguing 

the district court made three clearly erroneous factual findings 

in calculating his sentencing range. When applying the clear 

error standard of review, we are mindful that the trial judge 

has a unique opportunity “to evaluate the credibility of 

witnesses and to weigh the evidence.” Inwood Labs., Inc. v. 

Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 855 (1982); see also HARRY T.

EDWARDS & LINDA A. ELLIOT, FEDERAL COURTS STANDARDS 

OF REVIEW: APPELLATE COURT REVIEW OF DISTRICT COURT 

DECISIONS AND AGENCY ACTIONS 21 (2007) (explaining 

clearly erroneous standard). Accordingly, we affirm unless we 

are “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake 

has been committed.” United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 

U.S. 364, 395 (1948). 

We begin with Brockenborrugh’s argument that the 

district court did not properly calculate the monetary loss 

associated with his offense. Under section 2B1.1 of the 

Guidelines, a defendant’s offense level depends in part on the 

loss—actual or intended—for which he is responsible. See

U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1) & cmt. n.3(A). Of course, 

Brockenborrugh caused no actual loss because the scheme 

was ultimately unsuccessful. But the district court found that 

the conspirators planned to sell the property to Silbert for 

$300,000. Under section 2B1.1, that amount of intended loss 

required a twelve-level increase to Brockenborrugh’s base 

offense level. Brockenborrugh does not object to the $300,000 

figure as a “starting point,” see Reply Br. of Appellant at 7, 

but argues it should have been discounted by the $165,000 he 

and his co-conspirators agreed to pay the Roy heirs in their 

USCA Case #08-3016 Document #1200181 Filed: 08/07/2009 Page 17 of 42
18 

second attempt to obtain the property. According to 

Brockenborrugh, the amount of loss is at most $135,000, 

which calls for a ten- rather than a twelve-level increase. 

The district court’s loss calculation is a factual finding 

that we review for clear error. United States v. Leonzo, 50 

F.3d 1086, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1995).2

 Brockenborrugh’s 

argument is flawed because it overlooks the effort to obtain 

the property using the fraudulent deed. Had Brockenborrugh 

and McLeod succeeded, the conspirators would have sold the 

property for $300,000 without any involvement by its rightful 

owners. It was only after this first attempt failed that 

Brockenborrugh and McLeod agreed to pay any money to the 

Roy heirs. Brockenborrugh fails to account for this first 

attempt because he argues there is no evidence “linking him 

to McLeod’s fraudulent deed scheme,” Reply Br. of Appellant 

at 8. But as we have explained, this is simply not true. 

Accordingly, there is no reason for deducting any amount 

from the $300,000 of intended loss. 

 

2

 The government argues, and Brockenborrugh seems to agree, that 

Brockenborrugh’s challenges to the district court’s factual findings 

are subject to plain error review under United States v. Olano, 507 

U.S. 725, 732 (1993), because they were not raised before the 

district court. See Br. of Appellee at 51. Our case law on this issue 

is not settled, and two members of this court have recently 

expressed the view in a concurring statement that we must apply a 

clear error standard of review to factual findings made at the time 

of sentencing regardless of whether the defendant objected to those 

findings below. See In re Sealed Case, 552 F.3d 841, 848–52 (D.C. 

Cir. 2009) (Edwards, J., concurring, joined by Silberman, J.). 

Because we find no clear error—much less plain error—in the 

district court’s factual findings, we affirm without taking up this 

question. 

USCA Case #08-3016 Document #1200181 Filed: 08/07/2009 Page 18 of 42
19 

 Brockenborrugh next argues that the district court erred 

by enhancing his sentence for abuse of a position of trust. 

Section 3B1.3 of the Guidelines provides that if a defendant 

holds himself out to his victim as occupying a position of 

public trust in a way that significantly facilitates the 

commission of the offense, his sentence may be increased by 

two levels. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 & cmt. n.3. The district court 

determined that there was “absolutely no question . . . that 

[Brockenborrugh] acted so as to create the impression in the 

minds of a number of individuals that he was a United States 

Marshal.” Trial Tr. 23 (Feb. 14, 2008). Brockenborrugh 

disputes this finding, arguing that he never held himself out as 

a U.S. Marshal and that, even if he did, he did not use his 

representations to facilitate an offense. 

Because this challenge calls into question findings of 

fact, we again review for clear error. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) 

(2006); see also United States v. Henry, 557 F.3d 642, 644–45 

(D.C. Cir. 2009). There is evidence that Brockenborrugh held 

himself out as a U.S. Marshal. For example, Brockenborrugh 

told Robinson that one of the property’s squatters, seeing him 

at the courthouse, said, “[O]h you’re a real marshal.” App. at 

105. Brockenborrugh did not correct him, but instead adopted 

the characterization and stated that the squatter had not 

previously believed that he held such a position. See id. at 

106. During that same conversation, when the conspirators 

presented Robinson with a contract to buy the property, she 

requested additional information about the buyers but told 

Brockenborrugh that she already knew about “Mr. US 

Marshall [sic].” Id. at 136–37. Again, Brockenborrugh made 

no effort to correct her mistaken impression. 

There is also evidence that Brockenborrugh used these 

misrepresentations to facilitate the offense. The scheme 

required convincing Robinson that the property was worth 

USCA Case #08-3016 Document #1200181 Filed: 08/07/2009 Page 19 of 42
20 

little or nothing and that her only realistic option was to sell it 

to the conspirators for a price she would not realize was well 

below its true value. Brockenborrugh used his fictitious status 

as a U.S. Marshal toward this end. For example, after telling 

Robinson that the squatter recognized him as a “real marshal,” 

Brockenborrugh claimed that the only reason the squatters 

had not reentered the property was his continuing 

involvement in its purchase. And, as noted, Robinson did not 

press for additional information about Brockenborrugh 

because she believed him to be a U.S. Marshal. Thus the 

district court did not clearly err in concluding that 

Brockenborrugh presented himself as a U.S. Marshal and used 

that representation to facilitate his offense. 

 Finally, Brockenborrugh argues that the district court 

erred in increasing his offense level for obstruction of justice. 

Section 3C1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides: 

If (A) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or 

attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of 

justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or 

sentencing of the instant offense of conviction, and (B) 

the obstructive conduct related to . . . the defendant’s 

offense of conviction and any relevant conduct[,] 

increase the offense level by 2 levels. 

The commentary to this guideline provides a nonexhaustive 

list of conduct that may constitute obstruction of justice, 

including perjury, destroying or concealing material evidence, 

and providing a materially false statement to law enforcement 

to significantly obstruct an official investigation. See id.

§ 3C1.1, cmt. n.4. The commentary makes clear, moreover, 

that “the conduct to which th[e] adjustment applies is not 

subject to precise definition.” Id. § 3C1.1, cmt. n.3. 

USCA Case #08-3016 Document #1200181 Filed: 08/07/2009 Page 20 of 42
21 

 The district court applied this adjustment because 

Brockenborrugh lied on the stand, finding that “[h]e very 

obviously denied his extremely close, not to say intimate 

relationship with, Ms. McLeod,” “falsely denied that he 

evicted the tenants,” and “denied that he threatened Ms. 

Robinson . . . that he could influence the police to withdraw 

their extra attention and protection for the property.” Trial Tr. 

24–25 (Feb. 14, 2008). Brockenborrugh does not dispute that 

lying on the stand is grounds for applying this adjustment. 

Instead he claims that his testimony was truthful, which is 

another challenge to the district court’s factual findings that 

we review for clear error, 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e). 

 Brockenborrugh’s testimony about his ability to influence 

the police to protect the property provides ample support for 

the district court’s decision that he lied. During the first group 

meeting, Brockenborrugh threatened to have the police stop 

paying extra attention to the property, which meant, in effect, 

that the police would leave the property without protection 

from squatters. He told Robinson his group’s involvement in 

the sale was “the only reason why the police [we]re doing 

anything” to keep the squatters out of the building. App. at 

143 (wire transcript). Although acknowledging that the police 

had a general duty to protect all property, Brockenborrugh 

cynically added, “[Y]ou know how police are,” implying that 

without his participation the police would do nothing at all to 

protect this property. Id.; see also id. at 143–44. At trial, 

Brockenborrugh admitted he threatened that extra police 

attention would cease were Robinson to stop dealing with his 

group. He denied, however, threatening that police protection 

would cease altogether. He stated that he merely meant the 

police “wouldn’t be going by there on [his] behalf. [It] is their 

job to go by there and check on that property, or any 

property.” Trial Tr. 187 (Oct. 25, 2007); see also id. at 187–

88 (“Q: [Y]ou meant to suggest to Ms. Robinson that if you 

USCA Case #08-3016 Document #1200181 Filed: 08/07/2009 Page 21 of 42
22 

pulled out of the deal, . . . the police . . . will go away, right? 

A: I didn’t mean that they would go away just because I was 

out of the deal.”). 

The district court concluded that Brockenborrugh lied at 

trial about what he said to Robinson regarding the level of 

protection the police would give the property. In a spare 

explanation, the district court said only that Brockenborrugh 

lied about his threat to withdraw the police’s “extra attention 

and protection for the property.” Trial Tr. 25 (Feb. 14, 2008). 

We read this explanation as referring not only to 

Brockenborrugh’s threat to remove extra attention but also to 

his threat to remove all protection from the property. Because 

Brockenborrugh’s testimony about this latter threat was 

untruthful, we conclude that the district court did not clearly 

err in deciding that Brockenborrugh’s trial testimony 

contradicted what he had told Robinson and warranted an 

enhancement for obstruction of justice. 

Our dissenting colleague argues that the district court did 

not base its finding of obstruction of justice on 

Brockenborrugh’s lie at trial about his threat to withdraw all 

police protection from the property. Rather, according to her 

reading, the district court mistakenly relied on a nonexistent 

contradiction in what Brockenborrugh said about withdrawal 

of extra police attention for the property. Were we to read the 

district court’s explanation as referencing only the withdrawal 

of extra police attention, we would agree with the dissent. 

Brockenborrugh admitted at trial that he threatened to 

withdraw the extra police attention. But given the evidence 

presented at trial and the “crystal clear” discrepancy between 

Brockenborrugh’s testimony and his recorded statements, 

Trial Tr. 25 (Feb. 14, 2008), it is apparent that the district 

court based its conclusion on a finding that Brockenborrugh 

lied at trial when he denied having made a threat to withdraw 

USCA Case #08-3016 Document #1200181 Filed: 08/07/2009 Page 22 of 42
23 

even minimal police protection for Robinson’s property. This 

reading of the district court’s explanation is bolstered by the 

fact that the government argued in its sentencing 

memorandum for an enhancement not because 

Brockenborrugh lied about the extra police attention, but 

because he lied about “threaten[ing] Ms. Robinson that he 

could cause the withdrawal of police attention to her 

property” altogether. Government’s Mem. in Aid of 

Sentencing at 7. The district court enhanced 

Brockenborrugh’s sentence at the government’s request, 

which strongly suggests that it relied on the lie the 

government identified about the threatened withdrawal of all 

police protection. 

We reject the dissent’s suggestion that we reach this 

conclusion through impermissible appellate factfinding. See

Dissenting Op. at 7 (“[F]actfinding is the basic responsibility 

of district courts, rather than appellate courts, and . . . the 

Court of Appeals should not . . . resolve[] in the first instance 

[a] factual dispute which had not been considered by the 

District Court.” (quoting In re Sealed Case, 552 F.3d 841, 845 

(D.C. Cir. 2009) (alterations in original))). To the contrary, 

we have explained why the district court’s factfinding and 

conclusion are not clearly erroneous. We have found no facts 

and have in no way usurped the district court’s factfinding 

function. We have, instead, respected it, and merely described 

the relevant context to show the district court’s decision is 

best understood as increasing Brockenborrugh’s sentence 

because he lied at trial about his threat to withdraw police 

protection from the property. The dissent, reading the district 

court’s explanation in a parsed manner that overlooks its 

meaning in context, simply disagrees that this conclusion 

correctly conveys what the district court had in mind. 

USCA Case #08-3016 Document #1200181 Filed: 08/07/2009 Page 23 of 42
24 

The district court’s decision is independently supported 

by Brockenborrugh’s lie in his testimony about his 

relationship with McLeod. Viewing the testimony on this 

subject in the light most favorable to Brockenborrugh, the 

district court could have concluded that Brockenborrugh 

testified truthfully about the relationship; he did not deny its 

existence and the first time he was asked about the sexual 

nature of the relationship on cross-examination, he answered 

honestly. But it is also reasonable to conclude that he lied 

about the relationship. Brockenborrugh was on notice that his 

relationship with McLeod was relevant because he put the 

relationship at issue. His central defense, after all, was that he 

was an innocent investor deceived by McLeod, his realtor, to 

join unwittingly in an unlawful business transaction. And 

before Brockenborrugh took the stand, the district court heard 

argument between counsel in Brockenborrugh’s presence on 

whether he could be cross-examined about his sexual 

relationship with McLeod. It is fair to infer that 

Brockenborrugh was intentionally concealing the true nature 

of his relationship when he testified that his prior description, 

which made no mention of the romance, was complete.3

“Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the 

factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly 

erroneous.” Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 

(1985). 

 

3

 The dissent makes much of the fact that Brockenborrugh was 

merely asked to describe “basically” his relationship with McLeod. 

See Trial Tr. 68–69 (Oct. 25, 2007); see also Dissenting Op. at 11–

15. But Brockenborrugh and McLeod’s two-and-a-half-year affair 

was a “basic” element of their relationship, and it seems reasonable 

that he would have mentioned it as such despite his view that he 

was not McLeod’s “boyfriend or anything,” Trial Tr. 134 (Oct. 25, 

2007). 

USCA Case #08-3016 Document #1200181 Filed: 08/07/2009 Page 24 of 42
25 

Our dissenting colleague states that a more searching 

form of clear error review applies because this case does not 

require us to “review[] factual findings based on assessments 

of the credibility of a witness.” Dissenting Op. at 2. Yet that is 

exactly what we are called upon to do. Cf. Bose Corp. v. 

Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499–501 (1984) 

(“The same ‘clearly erroneous’ standard applies to findings 

based on documentary evidence as to those based entirely on 

oral testimony, but the presumption has lesser force in the 

former situation than in the latter.” (citations omitted)). Upon 

viewing Brockenborrugh’s demeanor on the witness stand and 

hearing all of the evidence presented at trial, the district court 

determined that Brockenborrugh lied about his sexual 

relationship with McLeod. On clear error review, appellate 

judges should not comb through the record seeking to identify 

the best factual inferences to draw from the transcript of a 

witness’s testimony. “The trial judge’s major role is the 

determination of fact, and with experience in fulfilling that 

role comes expertise.” Bessemer City, 470 U.S. at 574. We 

must defer to the considered judgment of the trial judge. 

Doing so, we hold that the district court did not clearly err in 

finding Brockenborrugh lied on the stand. 

V.

 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district 

court is 

 

Affirmed.

USCA Case #08-3016 Document #1200181 Filed: 08/07/2009 Page 25 of 42
ROGERS, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in

part: A sentencing enhancement for perjury under section 3C1.1

of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”) “can be

imposed only if the district court finds that the defendant gave

‘false testimony concerning a material matter with the willful

intent to provide false testimony, rather than as a result of

confusion, mistake, or faulty memory.’” United States v. Smith,

374 F.3d 1240, 1245 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v.

Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94 (1993)). The district court concluded

that Brockenborrugh’s sentence should be increased for

obstruction of justice upon finding he had committed perjury at

trial by denying: (1) he had evicted the squatters occupying the

real property that was the object of the conspiracy, (2) he had

threatened the executor that he would withdraw the extra

attention and protection that his connections with local police

had obtained for the property, and (3) he had an intimate

relationship with his co-defendant, Denise McLeod. These were

the only findings made by the district court in determining an

obstruction of justice enhancement was appropriate. 

This court does not address the first finding and there is no

support for it in the record. This court’s efforts to find support

for the other two findings are valiant, but those findings are

directly contradicted by trial testimony that shows

Brockenborrugh admitted making the threat and having the

intimate relationship. The court acknowledges that the district

court clearly erred by finding that Brockenborrugh threatened to

withdraw the extra police attention but discovers an additional,

non-erroneous finding that was neither argued by the parties nor

articulated by the district court. As regards the relationship, the

court finds that Brockenborrugh’s testimony could be construed

as insufficiently forthright. Op. at 24-25. Perhaps so. But that

is not what the district court found, nor what the Sentencing

Guidelines require. See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 & cmt. nn. 2, 4(a).

Because de novo factfinding is incompatible with the role of an

USCA Case #08-3016 Document #1200181 Filed: 08/07/2009 Page 26 of 42
2

appellate court, see, e.g., United States v. Burke, 888 F.2d 862,

869 (D.C. Cir. 1989), I would remand the case for resentencing.

I.

In Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597

(2007), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that review of a

sentencing court’s factual findings is for clear error. See also

United States v. Day, 524 F.3d 1361, 1367 (D.C. Cir. 2008);

United States v. Edwards, 496 F.3d. 677, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2007).

Accordingly, this court’s role is limited to determining whether

“the district court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light

of the record viewed in its entirety.” Anderson v. Bessemer City,

470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985). Under clear-error review, the

court may not disturb the district court’s factual findings unless

it is “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has

been committed.” Id. at 573. But this deference to the

sentencing court’s choice between “two permissible views of the

evidence,” id. at 574, does not mean that this court may uphold

an erroneous factual finding simply because the record contains

some “evidence to support it,” id. at 573. Nor, as a practical

matter, does it require this court to approach all factual findings

in the same way. See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 243

(2001); Bessemer City, 470 U.S. at 575; Bose Corp. v.

Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499-501(1984).

In the instant case, this court is not reviewing factual findings

based on assessments of the credibility of a witness or the

culpability of a defendant’s mental state but the district court’s

straightforward findings that while on the witness stand

Brockenborrugh falsely denied three things. See Op. at 21. 

The court is to be cognizant, in determining whether the

sentence should be remanded in light of clearly erroneous

factual findings, of the lesser costs to the systemic interests in

finality where resentencing, as opposed to retrial, is the

USCA Case #08-3016 Document #1200181 Filed: 08/07/2009 Page 27 of 42
3

1

 In urging that Brockenborrugh has failed to show “error, let

alone plain error,” Appellee’s Br. 58, the government overlooks

defense counsel’s timely, on-point objection. See United States v.

Rashad, 396 F.3d 398, 401 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (citing FED. R. CRIM. P.

51(a)); United States v. Edmond, 52 F.3d 1080, 1103-04 (D.C. Cir.

1995).) 

appropriate remedy. See United States v. Saro, 24 F.3d 283,

287-88 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 

 The background to the district court’s imposition of the

obstruction of justice enhancement is as follows. Without any

citations to the record, the government’s sentencing

memorandum asserted that Brockenborrugh had committed

perjury at trial by falsely denying that he: “evicted the tenants,”

“displayed a U.S. Marshals badge,” “asserted the authority of a

federal marshal,” “represented himself to the heirs as a federal

marshal,” “threatened [the executor] Ms. Robinson that he could

cause the withdrawal of police attention to her property,” and

“had an ongoing relationship with his co-defendant.” Gov’t’s

Sent. Mem. 7. The government therefore asked the district court

to increase the sentence based on his obstruction of justice. Id.

citing U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, & cmt. n. 2. The presentence report did

not make a recommendation regarding obstruction of justice

under § 3C1.1. In written objections to the presentence report,

defense counsel stated: “There is no evidence of obstructing

justice in this case and the allegations of the government are

without merit. The transcript of the proceedings will sustain the

defendant[’]s position.” Opp’n Mem. 2. Counsel repeated his

objection at the sentencing hearing.1

 

The district court concluded that a two-level upward

adjustment in the offense level for obstruction of justice was

warranted. In the district court’s view, the trial testimony had

been “crystal clear” as to Brockenborrugh’s obstruction of

USCA Case #08-3016 Document #1200181 Filed: 08/07/2009 Page 28 of 42
4

justice. Trial Tr. 24 (Feb. 14, 2008). The district court found

that Brockenborrugh committed perjury by falsely denying on

the witness stand that he: (1) “evicted the tenants when, in fact,

that is precisely what he did on that day in question, and he did

it while asserting his authority as an alleged Federal Marshal”;

(2) “threatened Ms. Robinson [the executor of the property] . . .

that he could influence the police to withdraw their extra

attention and protection for the property”; and (3) had an

“extremely close, not to say intimate relationship with, Ms.

McLeod.” Id. at 24-25. As regards the third finding, the district

court noted that prior to cross-examination Brockenborrugh

“pretended that he barely knew her”; “tried to pretend that he

did not know where she lived”; and “tried to pretend that they

did not have a personal relationship.” Id. at 24.

II.

An examination of Brockenborrugh’s trial testimony

demonstrates a remand for resentencing is required:

A. The Eviction. As this court apparently acknowledges

by its silence, the district court’s finding that Brockenborrugh

perjured himself by denying that he evicted the tenants at the

Robinson property is clearly erroneous. The government does

not maintain on appeal that Brockenborrugh evicted the tenants,

and points to no evidence in the record to support such a finding

or to rebut the contrary evidence identified by Brockenborrugh

that two of the government’s own witnesses testified at trial that

the D.C. Fire Department conducted the eviction. 

B. The Threat. The district court found that Brockenborrugh

“denied that he threatened Ms. Robinson . . . that he could

influence the police to withdraw their extra attention and

protection for the property.” Id. at 25 (emphasis added). On

appeal, the government maintains that the evidence supported

USCA Case #08-3016 Document #1200181 Filed: 08/07/2009 Page 29 of 42
5

2

 Working with the FBI, Ms. Robinson recorded her meeting

with Brockenborrugh and Ms. McLeod on October 19, 2005.

Brockenborrugh was recorded telling Ms. Robinson: 

I mean if we, if we . . . were out of this situation they [the

squatters] will go back up in there. . . . They’ll take those

signs up[.] [T]he only, the only reason why the police are

doing anything, I know that’s their job [. . .] [b]ut you know

how police are.

They, you know, they come out and say, hey, I Broch man, I

been checking on that house up there and I wanna catch

somebody in there, and they said, you know, you still, you

still in the mix on this right? I said yeah, please I appreciate

it[.] [I]ts okay, now we’re going to do this for you. [. . . ]

You know, but . . . [t]hey’ll help[.] [I]f, if, I can’t, if I don’t

do my part and get this thing sewed up . . . [t]hey’re not

gonna[.] [T]hey’re gonna stop. [. . .] They’re gonna say well,

hey, it’s like anything else.

Appx. 143-44 (alterations and omissions to improve readability).

the finding that Brockenborrugh “threatened to influence the

police to withdraw their extra attention and protection of the

property and that his denial of having done so was false.”

Appellee’s Br. 60. And, indeed Brockenborrugh was recorded

making just such a threat during a pre-trial meeting with Ms.

Robinson, and the recording was played in open court for the

jury before Brockenborrugh testified. On the recording,

Brockenborrugh threatened Ms. Robinson that if he could not

buy the property, then the police would no longer provide extra

attention and protection to the property on his behalf.2 But,

contrary to the district court’s finding, Brockenborrugh did not

perjure himself at trial by denying making the threat. Rather, at

trial he admitted making the threat, testifying that he told Ms.

USCA Case #08-3016 Document #1200181 Filed: 08/07/2009 Page 30 of 42
6

3 Brockenborrugh’s trial testimony was: 

Q: But as a personal favor to you they were looking after that

property? 

A: A police officers [sic] said that, that as a personal favor to

me they would go by and keep an eye on it during the

midnight tour, on the evening tour and the day tour.

Q: And do you remember saying to Ms. Robinson, hey you

know how the police are though. If I’m not in this anymore,

hey you know, they will not go by there anymore?

A: If she had sold it to somebody else, why — I mean they

wouldn’t be going there on my behalf. That is their job to go

by there and check on that property, or any property. It is not

— it is not — they are no longer doing — I asked him to do

me a favor and check on the property. I had never any

intention of having them or using that to swindle somebody

into selling me their property. I asked them to do it for me as

a favorite [sic] to take — I have a lot of friends, elderly

friends that say, can you have the police come by? And I say,

can you go by and check on somebody’s property for me?

Trial Tr. 187 (Oct. 25, 2007) (emphasis added); see also id. at 188 (“I

said that, you know, eventually, when the property is sold or whatever,

they are not going to just go by and check on that one location on a

daily basis.”). 

Robinson that if she sold the property to someone else, “[the

police] wouldn’t be going by [the property] on [his] behalf.”3 

 

The court acknowledges that the district court clearly erred

in finding that Brockenborrugh denied threatening to withdraw

the extra police attention. Op. at 22. To save the district court’s

factual finding from being clearly erroneous, the court discovers

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7

a second component to the district court’s actual finding,

effectively making its own findings of fact and concluding that

the district court implicitly must have made those findings as

well. The court finds that at his pre-trial meeting with Ms.

Robinson “Brockenborrugh threatened to have the police stop

paying extra attention to the property, which meant, in effect,

that the police would leave the property without protection from

squatters,” Op. at 21, but that he falsely denied making this

threat during his trial testimony, id. As support for this

unarticulated finding by the district court, the court finds that

“[a]lthough acknowledging that the police had a general duty to

protect all property, Brockenborrugh cynically added, ‘[Y]ou

know how police are,’ implying that without his participation

the police would do nothing at all to protect this property.” Id.

(quoting Appx. 143). The court proceeds to find that when

testifying at trial Brockenborrugh “denied, however, threatening

that police protection would cease altogether,” id., as a result of

the withdrawal of the extra protection, id.

“[F]actfinding is the basic responsibility of district courts,

rather than appellate courts, and . . . the Court of Appeals should

not . . . resolve[ ] in the first instance [a] factual dispute which

had not been considered by the District Court.” In re Sealed

Case, 552 F.3d 841, 845 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting PullmanStandard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 291-92 (1982) (alterations in

original). Thus, where the record evidence is susceptible of

more than one reasonable interpretation and the district court

fails to make findings on a material issue or where its findings

are unclear or incomplete, remand, not affirmance based on de

novo factfinding by this court, is the proper course. See id. at

848; United States v. Henry, 557 F.3d 642, 649-50 (D.C. Cir.

2009). Notwithstanding what the district court could have

found, this court must be able to “conclude with confidence”

from the record that the district court actually made and relied

on findings which would support the imposition of the increased

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8

sentence. United States v. McCoy, 242 F.3d 399, 411 (D.C. Cir.

2001); see also Sealed Case, 552 F.3d at 848. This restraint

makes sense: the court owes deference to the district court’s

findings, not to the findings it could have made. See United

States v. Askew, 529 F.3d 1119, 1142 n. 4 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 

Instead, the court concludes that although the district court

actually found that Brockenborrugh falsely denied threatening

to withdraw the “extra attention and protection,” the district

court implicitly found that Brockenborrugh falsely denied that

the result of the withdrawal of extra attention would mean, in

reality, the withdrawal of all police protection for the property.

The effect is to convert the actual finding that Brockenborrugh

denied withdrawing “extra attention and protection” into a

finding that he denied withdrawing “extra attention and

[therefore all] protection.” No amount of “context,” Op. at 23,

can disguise that the district court did not make that finding.

Notwithstanding the court’s protest that it is not engaging in de

novo factfinding, see id., the court’s holding that the district

court did not clearly err in finding Brockenborrugh perjured

himself on the witness stand with respect to the threat he made

to Ms. Robinson relies only on its own de novo factfinding.

The court claims to derive the requisite confidence in its

reading of the district court’s actual finding from two sources.

First, the court states that its interpretation of the district court’s

finding is “crystal clear,” borrowing the phrase that the district

court used in describing its confidence in findings that were, as

the court acknowledges, see supra at 4; Op. at 22, riddled with

clear error. Critically the court cannot and does not hold that its

reading of the evidence, much less of Brockenborrugh’s trial

testimony, is the only one that the district court could reasonably

have adopted. In both his recorded statement and in his trial

testimony Brockenborrugh drew a distinction between the

“extra” police attention and protection he asked the police to

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9

provide for the Robinson property and the general attention and

protection the police would otherwise provide. Supra notes 2 &

3. As a result, it is hardly obvious that in his recorded statement

Brockenborrugh implied that without the extra protection the

Robinson property would be without any protection at all, but

that he denied implying this “threat” in his trial testimony.

Second, the court finds support in the government’s assertion in

its sentencing memorandum that Brockenborrugh falsely denied

threatening that he could “‘cause the withdrawal of police

attention to her property’ altogether.” Op. at 23 (quoting Gov’t’s

Sent. Mem. 7) (emphasis added). But the government’s presentencing view of the evidence is not the one that the court now

ascribes to the district court. Rather, the court concludes that the

district court implicitly found that Brockenborrugh falsely

denied that withdrawing the extra attention would result in the

loss of all police protection. The government’s pre-sentencing

claim that Brockenborrugh threatened to withdraw “police

attention” from the property does not support the conclusion that

the district court’s finding of a threat to withdraw “extra

attention and protection” clearly implied a finding of a threat to

withdraw extra attention that would result in the loss of all

protection. 

How far afield the court has strayed by discovering an

implicit component of the district court’s factual finding is

evident given that it is neither what the district court stated it

found nor what the parties argued. Rewriting the district court’s

findings to match the appellate court’s view of a finding that the

evidence would support runs contrary to this court’s repeated

recognition that such de novo factfinding is inconsistent with its

proper role. See Henry, 557 F.3d at 649-50; Burke, 888 F.2d at

869; Askew, 529 F.3d at 1142 n. 4. Given the district court’s

“spare explanation,” Op. at 22, of its perjury finding, this court

must accept the straight forward finding as meaning what the

district court stated, reflecting the distinction Brockenborrugh

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10

drew in his testimony between “extra” and general police

protection, without recourse to additional words or to an obscure

tension between Brockenborrugh’s trial testimony and his

recorded statement first discovered by this court on appeal. 

Because the district court’s factual finding about the threat

was clearly erroneous, a remand is required unless the district

court’s third factual finding in support of the increased sentence

for obstruction of justice is not clearly erroneous. 

C. Intimate Relationship. The district court found that in

his trial testimony Brockenborrugh “very obviously denied his

extremely close, not to say intimate relationship with, Ms.

McLeod.” Trial Tr. 24 (Feb. 14, 2008). As noted, this finding

rested on the grounds, identified by the district court, that

Brockenborrugh pretended “that he barely knew her”; “that he

did not know where she lived”; and “that they did not have a

personal relationship.” Id. at 24. This court appears to accept

that the first two subsidiary findings were clearly erroneous.

Op. at 24-25. First, as the government concedes,

Brockenborrugh pretended that he did not know where Ms.

McLeod lived during a pretrial interview with the FBI, not

during his testimony at trial. Second, the court rightly declines

to adopt the government’s suggestion that in describing his

business relationship with Ms. McLeod on direct examination

Brockenborrugh “pretended that he barely knew her.” This

suggestion also appears to have been based on

Brockenborrugh’s pretrial interview with the FBI, rather than his

trial testimony. Such statements to investigators, whether false

or not, cannot support the obstruction of justice enhancement

because the district court made no finding that

Brockenborrugh’s denial to the FBI “significantly obstructed or

impeded the official investigation or prosecution of the [case],”

U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. n. 4(g), and the government points to no

record evidence to support such a finding. 

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4

 Defense counsel asked Brockenborrugh whether he knew

the co-defendant Denise McLeod and after he responded “Yes, I do,”

defense counsel asked him to “tell the court, and the jury, and the

prosecutor basically your relationship with Ms. Denise McLeod.”

Brockenborrugh answered: 

Well, basically my relationship with Ms. McLeod started in

1999 basically. I was introduced to her by her husband at

Superior Court, because she did taxes. Ms. McLeod did

probably about, I would say, 50 percent of the CSOs and

people around the courthouse’s taxes. Upon, you know, being

introduced to her as far as taxes went, she told she did real

Still, while accepting that two of the district court’s

subsidiary findings were clearly erroneous, the court concludes

that the district court did not clearly err in finding that

Brockenborrugh falsely denied his intimate relationship with

Ms. McLeod in the absence of an actual denial by him. It

reasons that the district court could properly conclude that by

trying to pretend that he did not have an intimate relationship

with McLeod, Brockenborrugh constructively denied the

relationship. Op. at 24-25. The record demonstrates otherwise.

On direct examination, Brockenborrugh did not suggest one way

or the other the nature or extent of any personal relationship

with Ms. McLeod after he first met her in 1999, and on cross

examination he readily admitted that he had an intimate

relationship with her beginning in mid or late 2002 and ending

in December 2004 or January 2005.

 Prior to Brockenborrugh’s taking the witness stand, the

district court had ruled that the prosecutor could impeach his

testimony by inquiring on cross examination about his intimate

relationship with Ms. McLeod. See Op. at 13. Following this

ruling, Brockenborrugh’s counsel called him as a witness and

asked him to describe “basically [his] relationship” with Ms.

McLeod.4

 Brockenborrugh answered, “[w]ell, basically my

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12

estate. So at that point, I was interested in buying — I told

her that I wanted to buy a four unit apartment building. 

Trial Tr. 68-69 (Oct. 25, 2007) (emphasis added). Brockenborrugh

then answered questions about the four-unit apartment building and

McLeod’s work as a property manager for him before counsel directed

his attention to his attempted purchase of the property at issue in this

case. 

5

 On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Brockenborrugh

about his personal relationship with McLeod:

Q. Now [defense counsel] asked you on direct

examination this morning what your relationship was

with Ms. McLeod. Did you get a chance to finish

that answer?

A. I think I finished it.

relationship with Ms. McLeod started in 1999 basically,” supra

note 4, before explaining how he had met and come to work

with her in 1999, six years before the charged conspiracy took

place and three years before they had an intimate relationship.

His answer neither referred to their intimate relationship in

2002-04 or early 2005 nor to relevant details about the extent of

their business interactions, such as how often he had purchased

property with Ms. McLeod, cf. Trial Tr. 156 (Oct. 25, 2007), and

how she had assisted his attempts to obtain the property from

Ms. Robinson. His counsel’s following questions did not imply

that by explaining how he had met Ms. McLeod in 1999, he had

failed to answer the question put to him. Rather defense counsel

proceeded to inquire about Ms. McLeod’s management of

Brockenborrugh’s rental properties before turning his attention

to the Robinson property. On cross-examination,

Brockenborrugh testified that he thought he had finished

answering his counsel’s question by describing “basically” how

his relationship with Ms. McLeod had begun.5

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13

Q. You said you met her in 1999?

A. Yes

Q. And you and she began a business relationship?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you, in fact, have a much more personal

relationship with Ms. McLeod?

A. That was later on. 

. . . 

Q. When did you begin a more personal relationship

with Ms. McLeod?

A. Well, it had to be after she was divorced.

Q. Well, approximately what year do you believe? If

you began a business relationship with her in 1999,

when did you begin a personal relationship with her?

A. Maybe the middle or end of 2002. There was — but

I was not involved in a — I was not her boyfriend or

anything. 

Q. But you were having sexual relations with her?

A. Yes, I did. 

. . . 

Q. Okay. And so when [defense counsel] asked you on

direct examination about your relationship with Ms.

McLeod and you said in ‘99 I met her and I began a

business relationship, you left out the other part? 

A. Left out the other part? In ‘99 — I wasn’t having a

relationship with her [in] ‘99. 

Q. Okay. So you did not understand Mr. Rosen’s

question on direct to mean what has been your

relationship with Ms. McLeod since 1999?

A. Right. I did not understand that.

. . . 

Q. You skipped over that part of your relationship with

Ms. McLeod?

A. It was not asked me, what was my relationship, my

personal relationship with her at that time. 

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14

Id. at 133-38 (emphasis added).

When the prosecutor then asked if he had actually had a “much

more personal relationship,” he admitted that he had, stating

“[t]hat was later on.” Supra note 5. He explained that he had

not mentioned the intimate relationship in answering his

counsel’s question because “[he] wasn’t having a[n intimate]

relationship with her [in] ‘99,” id., and that he had not

understood the question to address their relationship after that

time. He then proceeded to describe the intimate relationship in

response to further questions on cross-examination.

As a result, the district court’s finding that on the

witnesstand Brockenborrugh “very obviously denied his

extremely close, not to say intimate relationship, with Ms.

McLeod, ” Trial Tr. 24 (Feb. 14, 2008), is clearly erroneous. No

matter how diligently one searches his trial testimony, he never

denied having this relationship; instead he admitted it. Yet the

court finds no clear error, reasoning that because

Brockenborrugh was “on notice” that his intimate relationship

with Ms. McLeod was “relevant,” “[i]t is fair to infer that

Brockenborrugh was intentionally concealing the true nature of

his relationship when he testified that his prior description [on

direct examination], which made no mention of the romance,

was complete.” Op. at 24. The court’s approach is flawed.

First, Brockenborrugh’s answer on direct examination did

not suggest anything to the jury about the full extent of his

business or any personal relationship with Ms. McLeod after

1999. Nor could his statement on cross examination that he

thought he had finished answering defense counsel’s question.

The transcript of his trial testimony would not support a finding

that as a result of these answers the jury was led into thinking he

was denying having an intimate relationship with Ms. McLeod.

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15

The government’s brief unhelpfully characterizes defense

counsel’s question as an “opened-end” invitation to “tell the jury

about his relationship with McLeod,” omitting the word

“basically.” Appellee’s Br. 59; see supra note 5. The brief also

overlooks that Brockenborrugh’s response expressly limited his

description to the relationship’s starting point. Moreover, no

evidence pointed to by the government rebuts the express

limitation in defense counsel’s question and in

Brockenborrugh’s answer by showing that he considered his

intimate relations with Ms. McLeod in 2002-04 or early 2005 to

be a fundamental part of their relationship. Rather, while

admitting they had sex during that time, he testified he was “not

her boyfriend or anything,”supra note 5, and the district court

sustained the defense objection when the prosecutor referred to

their relationship as an “affair,” Trial Tr. 135 (Oct. 25, 2007). 

Second, far from demonstrating that the district court’s

finding was not clearly erroneous, the court’s reasoning explains

only why the district court could have found that

Brockenborrugh purposefully did not mention the intimate

relationship until he was asked a question that required him to

do so. Brockenborrugh was “on notice,” Op. at 24, that he could

be impeached on cross examination about his intimate

relationship with Ms. McLeod, see Op. at 13 (quoting the

district court, Trial Tr. 57 (Oct. 25, 2007)), not that he was

expected or somehow obligated to divulge it on direct

examination. Even assuming a better defense strategy would

have been to disclose the intimate relationship on direct

examination, and avoid the almost certain possibility the subject

would be raised during cross-examination and afford the

prosecutor an opportunity to question whether he had been less

than fully responsive to his counsel’s question, this is not the

same as Brockenborrugh denying he and Ms. McLeod had an

intimate relationship. And even assuming that the district court

concluded that Brockenborrugh intended to conceal the true

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16

6

 The Supreme Court instructed in United States v. Dunnigan,

507 U.S. 87, 96 (1993), that if the defendant objects to a sentence

enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. resulting from his trial

testimony, as occurred here, “a district court must review the evidence

and make independent findings necessary to establish a willful

nature of the relationship, the trial transcript shows that he did

not do what the district court found he did: he did not deny

during his trial testimony the existence of his intimate

relationship with Ms. McLeod. Because the district court’s

finding that he did is without basis in the record, it is clearly

erroneous.

* * * *

In our legal system different roles are assigned to trial and

appellate courts, and it behooves this court not to blur the lines.

The district court found Brockenborrugh’s sentence should be

increased because he perjured himself by falsely denying he

evicted the squatters, threatened to withdraw extra police

attention and protection, and had an intimate relationship with

Ms. McLeod. His denial of evicting the tenants was not false

and he admitted threatening to withdraw the extra police

attention and protection and having an intimate relationship with

Ms. McLeod. To overcome those admissions, the court infers

findings that the district court did not make. Our review is

narrowed by the deference owed to the district court’s factual

findings, but this court cannot affirm on the basis of a finding of

a false denial that the district court could, but did not, make.

Nor can it affirm on the basis of testimony that is not actually

false simply because the district court could permissibly have

found that Brockenborrugh harbored an intention to keep

information from the jury until he was asked directly about it.

Whether the district court would have so found is for the district

court to decide, not for this court to infer.6

 Accordingly,

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17

impediment to or obstruction of justice, or an attempt to do the same,

under the perjury definition we have set out. See U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3

(Nov. 1989); FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(3)(D). See also Burns v. United

States, 501 U.S. 129, 134 (1991). When doing so, it is preferable for

a district court to address each element of the alleged perjury in a

separate and clear finding.”

because none of the three factual findings supporting the twolevel upward enhancement of Brockenborrugh’s sentence for

obstruction of justice under U.S.S.C. § 3C1.1 survive clear error

review, I would remand the case for resentencing; otherwise I

concur.

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