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Parties Involved:
Benny Earl Farrell
Appellant
Klein Tools, Inc.
Appellee

Document Text:

( 

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

BENNY EARL FARRELL, an 

Oklahoma citizen, 

TENTH CIRCU!.'.IP 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

FIL E.D/. 

United· St.at.ea Court of Appeals · Tenth Ci:~1it 

v. 

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No. 8.7-1083 

KLEIN TOOLS, INC., a 

Delaware corporation, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTR:'ICT-COUR'l' 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHO~\ 

(D.C. NO. CIV-86-1005 W) 

Bob Behlen (Robert Mansell on the briefs), Lampkin,c~9C~tfr~y & 

Tawwater, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff/Appellant. 

Michael R. Chaffin (Robert L. Huckaby on the brief)~ Huckaby, 

Fleming, Frailey, Chaffin & Darrah, Chickasha, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellee~ 

Before MOORE, ANDERSON and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 87-1083 Document: 01019739955 Date Filed: 02/01/1989 Page: 1 
( Benny Earl Farrell, an iron worker, sustained injuries in a 

fall at a construction site whe~e he was working. He sued Kiein 

Tools, Inc. ("Klein") alleging tl).at the safety belt and lanyard he 

was using for fall protection were manufactured by Klein arld ~ere 

defective in that the hook on the lanyard was too large in relation to the "D" ring on the safety belt, allowing the hook to 

"roll-out" of the ring. 1 He contended that his fall was caused by 

such an occurrence. Klein defended largely on the ground that the 

safety belt and lanyard, and specifically the hook, in question 

were not manufactured by it. ·In its answer to Farrell's complaint 

Klein also raised the two defenses of abnormal use of the product, 

and assumption of the risk. Jurisdiction was based on diversity 

of citizenship. Oklahoma's substantive law governs. 

The case was tried to a jury. Over Farrell's objections the 

district court submitted to the jury Klein's requested instructions on abnormal use of the product, Instruction 17, and assumption of the risk, Instruction 18. The jury returned a verdict in 

favor of Klein. The district court subsequently denied Farrell's 

motion for a new trial based on alleged error in giving Instructions 17 and 18. Farrell appeals from the denial of that motion. 

The only issues on appeal are whether there was sufficient 

evidence to support the submission of Instructions 17 and 18 on 

1 A lanyard is a rope with metal hooks on each end. The 

lanyard allegedly used by Farrell when he fell had one small hook 

and one large hook.. A safety belt is a large nylon woven waist 

belt with metal rings, sometimes referred to as "D'' rings, on each 

end. A worker uses the safety equipment by hooking one of the 

lanyard hooks to a "D'' ring and one of the hooks to some other 

fixture or by wrapping the lanyard around a stable fixture and 

attaching both of the hooks to the "D" rings on the safety belt. 

The procedure is referred to as tying off. R. Vol. III at 117. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1083 Document: 01019739955 Date Filed: 02/01/1989 Page: 2 
the defenses of abnormal use and assumption of the risk, whether 

the instruction on abnormal use misstated the applicable law, and 

whether any error in those respects is sufficiently prejudicial to 

require a reversal. For the reasons stated below we conclude that 

it was reversible error to submit to the jury the instruction on 

the defense of abnormal use of the product. As a result we remand 

for a new trial. Because of our disposition with regard to 

Instruction 17 it is unnecessary to address the o~her issues 

raised by Farrell. 

I. 

Although the determination of the substance of a jury 

instruction in a diversity case is a matter of state law, the 

grant or denial thereof is a matter of procedure controlled by 

federal law. Brownlow v. Aman, 740 F.2d 1476, 1490 (10th Cir. 

1984); Wright v. Albuquerque Auto-Truck Stop Plaza, Inc., 591 F.2d 

585, 587 (10th Cir. 1979). 

The parties are in agreement in their briefs that the applicable Oklahoma law on the defense of misuse or abnormal use of 

a product is defined by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Fields v. 

Volkswagen of America, Inc., 555 P.2d 48 (Okla. 1976). See Brief 

of the Appellant at 4; Answer Brief of Appellee at 2-3. In Fields 

the Court stated: 

"Generally when.we speak of the defense of 

misuse or abnormal use of a product we are 

referring to cases where the method of using a 

product is not that which the maker intended 

or is a use that could not reasonably be 

anticipated by a manufacturer. A distinction 

must be made between use for an abnormal 

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Appellate Case: 87-1083 Document: 01019739955 Date Filed: 02/01/1989 Page: 3 
purpose and use for a proper purpose but in a 

careless manner (contributory negligence). 

"In order to determine whether the use of 

a product by a plaintiff is abnormal, we must 

ask whether it was reasonably foreseeable by 

the manufactur~r. A manufacturer is not liable for injuries resulting from such use if 

it is not foreseeable." 

Id. at 56-57 (footnotes omitted). See McMurray v. Deere and Co. 

Inc., 858 F.2d 1436, 1442 (10th Cir. 1988); Smith v. United States 

Gypsum Co., 612 P.2d 251, 254-55 (Okla. 1980); Stewart v. ScottKitz Miller Co., 626 P.2d 329, 331 (Okla. Ct. App. 1981); Spencer 

v. Nelson Sales Co., Inc., 620 P.2d 477, 482-83 (Okla. Ct. App. 

1980). 

Farrell first contends that Instruction 17 did not correctly 

reflect Oklahoma law. Instruction 17 reads as follows: 

"In this regard, you are instructed that 

the defendant has raised the affirmative 

defense of abnormal use and has claimed that 

the plaintiff's use of the equipment was abnormal because such use was not foreseeable by 

the defendant. You are instructed that a 

distinction must be made between use for an 

abnormal purpose and use for a proper purpose 

but in a careless manner. The first, use for 

an abnormal purpose, is a defense to the 

plaintiff's claim and a bar to his recovery. 

The second, use for a proper purpose but in a 

careless manner, is not a defense to the 

plaintiff's claim. In this regard, you are 

instructed that if the use of the equipment 

was a use that the defendant could reasonably 

foresee, then such use does not constitute 

abnormal use. 

"If you find that the defendant has 

proven by a preponderance of the evidence that 

the plaintiff was using the equipment in an 

abnormal manner and that such use was the sole 

cause of the accident involved herein and thus 

has proven this affirmative defense, then you 

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Appellate Case: 87-1083 Document: 01019739955 Date Filed: 02/01/1989 Page: 4 
must find in favor of the defendant and 

against the plaintiff." 

R. Vol. I at Tab 36. 

Specifically, Farrell acknowledges that the first paragraph 

of Instruction 17 correctly states the legal principle "that if 

the use of the equipment was a use that the defendant could 

reasonably foresee, then such use does not constitute abnormal 

use." Id. However, he contends that it was error not to repeat 

that phrase, or some similar reference to foreseeability, in the 

final paragraph of the instruction. He cites virtually no authority, and none directly on point, in support of that position, and 

we find that it is without merit. It is an established principle 

that jury instructions are to be read as a whole. See United 

States v. Grissom, 814 F.2d 577, 580 (10th Cir. 1987). See also ~~~~~~~~~~-

United States v. Troutman, 814 F.2d 1428, 1451 (10th Cir. 1987) 

(it is enough that the jury instructions, viewed as a whole rather 

than in isolation, give an ac.curate statement of the law). The 

instruction in question may not be ideal since the last paragraph 

in isolation could conceivably cause some confusion, but read as a 

whole it sufficiently reflects Oklahoma law regarding the abnormal 

use defense as applied to the circumstances of this case. 2 

Whether or not there was evidence sufficient to support the 

submission of Instruction 17 to the jury is a different matter. 

2 Although not an error and not discussed by either party in 

their briefs we note that there is some further potential for 

confusion in Instruction 17. The first paragraph of the 

instruction dis.tingui.shes "use for an abnormal purpose" from "use 

for a proper purpose but in a careless manner." The second 

paragraph refers to use in an "abnormal manner," and thus somewhat 

blurs the distinction referred to in the first paragraph. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1083 Document: 01019739955 Date Filed: 02/01/1989 Page: 5 
Under federal law it is error to give an instruction when there is 

no evidence to support it. McMurray v. Deere and Co., Inc., 858 

F.2d 1436, 1440-41 (10th Cir. 1988); Rolfes v. Int'l Harvester 

Co., 817 F.2d 471, 474 (8th Cir. 1987); Smith v. FMC Corp., 754 

F.2d 873, 877 (10th Cir. 1985); Brownlow v. Aman, 740 F.2d at 

1490; Smith v. Mill Creek Court, Inc., 457 F.2d 589, 592 (10th 

Cir. 1972). There must be more than a mere scintilla of evidence 

to support an instruction. Sufficient competent evidence is 

required. See Smith v. FMC, 754 F.2d at 877; Brownlow v. Aman, 

740 F.2d at 1490; Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 

727 F.2d 917, 927-28 (10th Cir. 1984); Chavez v. Sears, Roebuck & 

Co., 525 F.2d 827, 830 (10th Cir. 1975); Hartman v. Miller Hydro 

Co., 499 F.2d 191, 193 (10th Cir. 1974); Smith v. Mill Creek 

Court, Inc., 457 F.2d at 592; General Motors Corp. v. Walden, 406 

F.2d 606, 609 (10th Cir. 1969); 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal 

Practice and Procedure 2524 (1971). 

Klein's only evidence on the subject of abnormal use consisted of brief statements by two defense witnesses, Paul Steigler 

and Donald Beck. Mr. Steigler, a representative of Klein, testified on cross-examination that "[t]he big [metal snap hook on the 

lanyard] has never been advocated for use in a 'D' ring." R. Vol. 

III at 201. Mr. Beck, an employee of a safety equipment 

manufacturing company, testified that the type of large hook 

allegedly utilized by Farrell was "intended to be used on a 2-by-4 

or a bar or a rod or a form, or something where it's not a ring." 

R. Vol. II at 28. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1083 Document: 01019739955 Date Filed: 02/01/1989 Page: 6 
Not only does such testimony appear to fall into the "mere 

scintilla" category, more importantly it does not contain the 

slightest reference to or support for the proposition that the 

manufacturer could not reasonably foresee that a worker would use 

the lanyard in question to tie-off by inserting the hook into - the 

"D" ring on his safety belt. To the contrary, the evidence shows 

that it was indeed foreseeable to a manufacturer that the safety 

equipment would be used in such a way. R. Vol. III at 37-38. The 

evidence also affirmatively shows that the lanyard and hook in 

question were specifically manufactured for the purpose of tyingoff and were issued by the employer to Farrell for the purpose. 

Under the circumstances, we hold that there was insufficient 

evidence to support an instruction to the jury on the defense of 

abnormal use of the product. 

II. 

The final issue is whether the erroneous submission of the 

abnormal use defense to the jury was prejudicial so as to require 

reversal. McMurray v. Deere and Co., 858 F.2d at 1443; Joyce v. 

Atlantic Richfield Co., 651 F.2d 676, 682-83 (10th Cir. 1981). 

The issue centers on the fact that the jury returned a general 

verdict and it cannot be determined with absolute certainty 

whether the jury relied on the improperly submitted ground. 

Klein contends ~hat even if the instructions were not supported by the evidence reversal is not required. It advances two 

arguments in support of that position. First, it submits that for 

purposes of describing the limits of a products liability action, 

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Appellate Case: 87-1083 Document: 01019739955 Date Filed: 02/01/1989 Page: 7 
it is not reversible error to give an instruction which correctly 

states the law even though the instruction is inapplicable to the 

evidence in the case. Murphy v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 779 F.2d 

340, 345 (6th Cir. 1985); Answer Brief of Appellee at 6-7. We 

disagree that such a rule applies in circumstances similar to 

those presented here. 

Klein next argues that an appellate court can examine the 

entire record to determine if the error was likely to have 

influenced the verdict. In other words, Klein urges that the 

harmless error principle applies. It asserts that a bare possibility that the verdict was influenced is not enough to warrant 

reversal arguing that a likelihood of prejudice must be shown by 

the appealing party. Id. at 7-8. For that proposition Klein 

cites Lusby v. T.G. & Y. Stores, Inc., 749 F.2d 1423, 1436-37 

(10th Cir. 1984), cert. granted and vacated on other grounds sub 

nom., City of Lawton v. Lusby, 474 U.S. 805, 106 s.ct. 40, 88 

L.Ed.2d 33, cert. denied, 479 u.s. 818, 106 s.ct. 65, 88 L.Ed.2d 

53, reh'g denied, 474 U.S. 1014, 106 S.Ct. 548 (1985); Sanderson 

v. Chapman, 487 F.2d 264, 267 (9th Cir. 1973); and Employers 

Liability Assurance Corp. v. Freeman, 229 F.2d 547, 551 (10th Cir. 

1955). 

In support of its position Klein makes a convincing case that 

the trial focused on whether Klein manufactured the product in 

question, and upon Farrell's credibility. There.was overwhelming 

evidence that Klein did not manufacture the product, and Farrell 

had given seriously conflicting versions of the accident. The 

abnormal use defense was not referred to in either the opening 

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Appellate Case: 87-1083 Document: 01019739955 Date Filed: 02/01/1989 Page: 8 
statements or the closing arguments. 3 Therefore, it appears 

highly unlikely that the jury's verdict was affected by the 

abnormal use instruction. 

The law on this subject is not characterized by any great 

clarity. The general rule, usually stated without qualification, 

is that when one of two or more issues submitted to the jury was 

submitted erroneously, a general verdict cannot stand because it 

cannot be determined whether the jury relied on the improper 

ground. See Sunkist Growers Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus 

Products Co., 370 U.S. 19, 29-30 (1962); United New York and New 

Jersey Sandy Hook Pilots Association v. Halecki, 358 U.S. 613, 619 

(1959); McMurray v. Deere and Co., Inc., 858 F.2d at 1444; Bone v. 

Refco, 774 F.2d 235, 242 (8th Cir. 1985); Neubauer v. City of 

McAllen, Texas, 766 F.2d 1567, 1575 (5th Cir. 1985); Smith v. FMC 

Corp., 754 F.2d at 877; Collis v. Ashland Oil and Refining Co., 

722 F.2d 625, 627 (10th Cir. 1983); Avins v. White, 627 F.2d 637, 

646 (3rd Cir. 1980); Morrissey v. National Maritime Union of 

America, 544 F.2d 19, 26-27 (2nd Cir. 1976). 

3 In Joyce v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 651 F.2d at 682, cited in 

McMurray for the proposition that a court must examine the 

prejudicial effect of an error before reversing, we stated that we 

must make the determination as to whether to reverse "in the 

light, not only of the instructions as a whole, but of the 

allegations of the complaint, the opening statements, the 

evidence, and the closing arguments." (quoting Alloy International 

Co. v.· Hoover-NSK Bearing Co., 635 F.2d 1222, 1226 (7th Cir. 

1980). See also Smith v. Minster Machine Co., 669 F.2d 628, 631-

32 (lOt~Cir-:- 1982) (In considering whether allegedly erroneous 

wording (as opposed to erroneous submission) of the instruction on 

state-of-the-art-defense to product liability claim amounted to 

reversible error, the opinion refers to fact that the defendant 

did not even mention the defense in closing argument.). 

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Appellate Case: 87-1083 Document: 01019739955 Date Filed: 02/01/1989 Page: 9 
As usual, and as Klein has pointed out, there are exceptions. 

In appropriate ~ases this court has recognized a harmless error 

test, using a reasonable likelihood standard. Thus, in Asbill v. 

Housing Authority of Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma, 726 F.2d 1499 

(10th Cir. 1984), after acknowledging the general rule established 

in Sunkist Growers we stated: 

"As with all errors committed at trial, a 

litmus test for reversal is whether the appellant was thereby unjustly prejudiced. See 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 61; 28 u.s.c. §2111 (1976). A 

general verdict may be upheld if it appears 

that the errors committed were not 'vital,' or 

prejudicial to the 'substantial rights' of the 

objecting party. See Wilmington Mining. [sic] 

Star Mining Co. v. Fulton, 205 U.S. 60, 79, 27 

s.ct. 412, 419, 51 L.Ed. 708 (1906). 

"[If plaintiff's properly submitted 

claim] were strongly and clearly supported by 

the record, we could possibly affirm the 

verdict on a harmless error theory. As it 

stands, however, the [proper claim] could be 

supported only by the jury's finding in 

[plaintiff's] favor on two extremely 'close' 

factual questions. Under these circumstances, 

we cannot say that the erroneous submission of 

the due process claims to the jury constituted 

harmless error. It is clear that the jury may 

have based its verdict upon these claims; we 

cannot be 'reasonably certain that the jury 

was not significantly influenced by iss.ues 

erroneously submitted to it.' E.I. duPont de 

Nemours & Company v. Berkley and Company, 620 

F.2d 1247, 1258 (8th Cir. 1980)[citing Gardner 

v. General Motors Corporation, 507 F.2d 525; 

529 (10th Cir. 1974))." 

Id. at 1504 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). See also 

Brownlow v. Aman, 740 F.2d at 1490 ("It is prejudicial error for a 

trial court to give instructions which find no support in the 

evidence unless the record shows the error [to be] harmless.") 

(emphasis added) (quoting Kirschner v. Broadhead, 671 F.2d 1034, 

1040 (7th Cir. 1982)); Lusby v. T.G. & Y. Stores, Inc., 749 F.2d 

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Appellate Case: 87-1083 Document: 01019739955 Date Filed: 02/01/1989 Page: 10 
at 1436 (holding that an instruction on future damages when there 

was no evidence to support such an instruction was harmless error, 

the court reasoned that the jury did not hear any facts from which 

they could infer that plaintiffs would incur future costs and the 

size of the jury award indicated it was unlikely that the jury 

included future damages). 

Likewise, exceptions have also been recognized in other 

circuits. In Collum v. Butler, 421 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1970), the 

Seventh Circuit permitted a general verdict to stand even though 

one of multiple claims had been erroneously submitted to the jury. 

The court stated: 

"The dominant issue, as the record shows, 

involved the injuries suffered by the 

plaintiff as a result of the alleged beating 

inflicted upon him by the defendants. To 

permit other issues which have occupied positions of such relative insignificance in the 

trial to be treated now as so important as to 

make their submission to the jury prejudicial 

would not serve the interest of justice. Error must be viewed with respect to its 

relative effect on the results of trial. In 

our considered opinion, the results of the 

present trial would not have been 

substantially affected if these issues had not 

been submitted to the jury." 

Id. at 1260 (emphasis added). See also Morrissey v. National 

Maritime Union of America, 544 F.2d at 27 (general rule must be 

followed unless there is sufficient basis for confidence that the 

same verdict would have been rendered even if the improper claim 

had not been submitted to the jury); Simko v. C & C Marine 

Maintenance Co., 594 F.2d 960, 967 (3rd Cir.)(stating general rule 

but citing Morrissey's exception), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833 

(1979); Mueller v. Hubbard Milling Co., 573 F.2d 1029, 1039 (8th 

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Cir.) (adopting Morrissey analysis; the essential question is 

whether the appellate court is "fairly convinced that the jury 

proceeded on a sound basis"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 865 (1978); 

Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 837-38 (2nd 

Cir. 1967). 

However, despite these exceptions we consider ourselves 

bound, at least in this context, by our two most recent cases, 

both of which strictly imposed the general rule. In Smith v. FMC 

Corp., a products liability case in which this court was applying 

the substantive law of Oklahoma, we stated: 

"The bulk of FMC's case was directed to the 

proposition that the [product] in question was 

not defective at the time it was manufactured 

or at the time of the accident. In this 

regard, FMC made a very strong presentation to 

the effect that its [product] was free of 

defects (as related to the accident). 

"Although FMC presented a substantial 

case in favor of its position that its 

[product] was free of defects, it made no 

showing whatsoever that, assuming there was a 

defect, appellants' decedents knew of such 

risk and knowingly assumed the risk •. 

[I]n the absence of direct or credible and 

sufficient circumstantial evidence that the 

decedents were aware of the danger and 

voluntarily assumed the risk, the Court improperly instructed the jury on the [defense 

of] assumption of the risk. 

"Having held that it was error to 

instruct on the defense of assumption of the 

risk, the general judgment entered in favor of 

FMC must be reversed and the case remanded for 

a new trial. A remand is necessary when, as 

here,. we cannot ascertain from the record 

whether the jury found that the [product] was 

defective and, if . so, whether the decedents 

'assumed the risk' of working under it." 

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Smith v. FMC Corp., 754 F.2d at 876-77 (emphasis added). In 

Smith, although the bulk of the evidence was directed at the 

properly submitted defense that ~he product was not defective and 

the deferidant made a "very strong presentation" to that effect, we 

held that the error required reversal. 

In McMurray v. Deere and Co., Inc., a case very similar to 

the one before us, we cited the language just quoted from Smith v. 

FMC Corp.~ and also referred to Spencer v. Nelson Sales Co., 620 

P.2d 477 (Okla. Ct. App. 1980), for the proposition that an "unwarranted misuse instruction required reversal." McMurray v. 

Deere and Co., Inc. 858 F.2d at 1444. We then stated: 

"The same problem arises here. The jury 

might have based its verdict on a finding that 

the [product] was not defective. On the other 

hand, the jury might have based its verdict on 

findings that decedent 'assumed the risk' of 

injury, or 'misused' the [product]; these latter findings would be legally impermissible 

here because there was no evidence to properly 

support either conclusion. The general 

verdict frustrates a determination of the 

basis of the jury's decision, and reversal and 

remand for a new trial are required." 

Id. (emphasis added). The quoted language from our opinion in 

McMurray leaves no room for harmless error analysis. 

Accordingly, because we consider ourselves bound by Smith and 

McMurray, we hold that the district court committed reversible 

error in giving a jury instruction on the defense of abnormal use 

which was not supported by the evidence. We do so reluctantly. 

As we have noted, it appears very unlikely that the submission of 

the instruction on the abnormal use defense "significantly 

influenced" the jury or prejudiced Farrell's "substantial rights.'' 

See Asbill v. Housing Authority of Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma, 726 

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F.2d at 1504. However, because we cannot say with absolute 

certainty, as required by McMurray and Smith, that the jury was 

not influenced by the submission of the abnormal use instruction, 

we must reverse and remand for a new trial. 

The advisability of submitting special verdict forms to a 

jury in cases involving multiple defenses is one of the lessons to 

be gleaned from this situation. Even if some evidence had been 

submitted on the defense in question appellate review on the point 

would have been hampered by the general verdict. 

REVERSED and REMANDED. 

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