Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-02032/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-02032-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Charles K. Dible
Defendant
Pride of San Juan, Inc.
Plaintiff
Sunagra, Inc.
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PRIDE OF SAN JUAN, INC.

Plaintiff,

v.

SUNAGRA, INC. and CHARLES K.

DIBLE,

Defendants.

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No. C06-2032 SBA (BZ)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON

DAMAGES

By Order dated October 3, 2006, the Honorable Saundra

Brown Armstrong referred this case to a Magistrate Judge for a

report and recommendation on the proper amount of damages. 

Having been assigned the matter, I recommend that plaintiff

Pride of San Juan, Inc. be awarded legal fees in the amount of

$21,886.74 plus prejudgment interest on the $10,005.50

principal outstanding balance calculated at a rate of 1.5% per

month.

This case came before Judge Armstrong as an enforcement

action under the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act

(PACA). 7 U.S.C. § 499a, et seq. As described in Judge

Armstrong’s Order, plaintiff is a seller of wholesale produce,

Case 4:06-cv-02032-SBA Document 44 Filed 11/17/06 Page 1 of 7
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1 The total principal amount due derives from eleven

separate transactions ranging in amount from $600.00 to

$2,365.00. 

2 Default had, at the time of the Order, been entered

against SunAgra. Thus, Judge Armstrong denied summary judgment

as against SunAgra, noting that the proper procedure would be

for plaintiff to file a motion for default judgment.

2

SunAgra is a buyer or seller of wholesale produce, and Charles

Dible is the principal of SunAgra. See Order at 1. Between

October and December 2005, plaintiff sold defendants on credit

produce valued at $10,005.50.1

 The controlling credit

agreement signed by Dible provides that a 1.5% monthly service

charge would be assessed on unpaid balances. In addition, the

agreement provided for the assessment of reasonable legal fees

in the event that an enforcement action is brought to collect

payment. 

Plaintiff filed its March 16 Complaint seeking payment of

the principal, interest on the principal, and attorneys’ fees

and costs. See id. Plaintiff thereafter sought summary

judgment against defendants. Judge Armstrong granted

plaintiff summary judgment against Dible.2 Judge Armstrong

concluded that Dible is liable to plaintiff for the $10,005.50

principal, and for an amount of interest and attorneys’ fees

and costs to be determined.

Although PACA does not expressly provide for attorneys’

fees or interest, losses under the statute encompass related

expenses including contractual rights to attorneys’ fees and

interest. See Middle Mt. Land and Produce Inc. v. Sound

Commodities Inc., 307 F.3d 1220, 1225-26 (9th Cir. 2002)

(interpreting 7 U.S.C. § 499e©)(2)); Rey Rey Produce SFO, Inc.

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3

v. M&M Produce and Food Service Supplies, Inc., 2006 WL

1867633, at *3-*4 (N.D. Cal. July 5, 2006). As discussed in

Judge Armstrong’s Order, the credit agreement is binding and

provides a contractual basis for plaintiff’s requests for fees

and interest. 

By its terms, the credit agreement provides for the

assessment of reasonable legal fees. Plaintiff requests fees

and costs totaling $26,537.74 but does not explain how it

calculates this amount. Dible filed an Opposition pro per

arguing that the amount requested is excessive and exorbitant. 

The documentation provided, however, does justify a

substantial portion of the fees requested. 

Plaintiff is represented by two law firms: Borton,

Petrini & Conron, and Keaton & Associates. David Bremer, of

the Borton firm, served as plaintiff’s local counsel and

submitted a declaration in support of the request for fees. 

The declaration identifies Bremer’s hourly rate ($290.00 per

hour), time spent on the matter (16.20 hours), and related

costs incurred ($683.76), totaling $5,381.76. Bremer declares

that he has reviewed all billing statements but does not

provide them. His declaration in no way describes the tasks

or services performed on behalf of plaintiff. Bremer wholly

fails to explain the $683.76 in costs. His claims are

therefore difficult to assess. 

On the other hand, Bremer declares under penalty of

perjury that his rates are reasonable and competitive in the

field; that the bills submitted to plaintiff were accurate;

and that the work time he billed was reasonable and necessary. 

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4

In addition, billing records from plaintiff’s other firm,

Keaton, refer to work accomplished by “Local Counsel”. Thus,

although Bremer’s showing lacks detail, see Local Civil Rule

54-6, some amount of compensation is reasonable. I recommend

that the court invoke its discretion and 1) deny the request

for $683.76 in costs, and 2) reduce by 50% the $4698.00 fee

request, for a total of $2,349.00, to reflect Bremer’s

inadequate documentation. 

The Keaton firm, in contrast, provided a detailed

declaration and copies of all billing statements through

September 2006. Michael Keaton, the attorney primarily

responsible for handling the litigation, sets forth in his

declaration the various hourly rates billed by his firm and

explains how the firm charges clients for associated costs. 

Both Keaton’s declaration and the billing records provide

detailed descriptions of the legal tasks performed. The

records account for the hours spent on each task and state the

applicable billing rates. Keaton states that his firm’s

billing rates are competitive in the field of PACA

enforcement, and that all work was reasonable and necessary. 

Moreover, Keaton declares that plaintiff made repeated

attempts to settle the matter and that defendants’ opposition

necessitated filing of the summary judgment motion.

Defendant Dible attacks the Keaton request on numerous

grounds. Defendant claims to be familiar with litigation in

the PACA field, and states that the Keaton fees are excessive. 

As proof, defendant proffers documents relating to two

separate actions against SunAgra and Dible in which the

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3 In his declaration, Keaton estimates that an

additional $6,500 were incurred in fees and costs in the month

of October. As Keaton states, however, his estimate is

“subject to submission of actual figures once they become

available.” I therefore recommend that the court deny this

request until counsel provides documentation. 

5

prevailing parties requested $1,540.00 and $2,764.00

respectively in attorneys’ fees and costs. Both actions,

however, were decided by way of default judgment. As

explained by Mr. Keaton, and as documented by the billing

records, moving for summary judgment entailed further expense.

Additionally, defendant Dible asserts that he retained an

attorney to settle the matter and that plaintiff frivolously

refused to accept settlement. Dible, however, offered just

over half of the amount for which Judge Armstrong found

defendants liable, claiming that plaintiff owed money to

SunAgra. Simply put, Dible’s averments suggest that he knew

he owed plaintiff money and confirm Keaton’s explanation of

the need for a summary judgment motion. 

Finally, Dible claims to have previously hired Keaton &

Associates to represent him and SunAgra in unrelated PACA

litigation. Dible does not explain why he did not raise this

issue earlier or how the firm’s previous work could effect the

reasonableness of the legal fees requested in this matter. 

The tasks and costs documented appear reasonable and

necessary to the litigation. I therefore recommend that the

court grant plaintiff the $19,537.74 in legal fees documented

by Keaton in his declaration and billing records.3

 Adding the

$2,349.00 and $19,537.74 figures, I recommend that the court

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4 In his Opposition, defendant Dible argues that the

legal costs plaintiff requests are out of proportion to the

principal owed. While it is true that the $21,886.74 award I

recommend is more than double the principal amount at issue,

the evidence demonstrates the reasonableness of plaintiff’s

handling of the case.

5 In its Motion for Summary Judgment, plaintiff

submitted a version of the table calculating accrued interest

through July 26, 2006. See Pl. Mot. for Summ. J., Exh. A. 

According to a declaration by Peter Trenz in support of the

motion, “[t]he rate is set forth at the statutory rate of

.00075% per month.” It is not at all clear what statute Trenz

refers to, or to what extent the rate is used to calculate the

interest. Indeed, the table itself explicitly references the

1.5% contractual rate. What is clear is that the rate of

interest here is dictated by the contractual terms binding the

parties. See Rey Rey Produce SFO, Inc., 2006 WL 1867633, at

*4. There is no mention of a .00075% rate in the credit

agreement. Thus, I recommend that the court limit plaintiff’s

interest calculations to the 1.5% contractual rate. 

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award plaintiff a total of $21,886.74 in legal fees.4

Plaintiff also seeks pre-judgment interest on the

principal balance at a rate of 1.5% per month. As noted,

Judge Armstrong determined that plaintiff possesses a

contractual right to this interest. The only question is the

amount owed. 

Plaintiff submitted a calculation table demonstrating the

interest accrued through November 1. The table calculates the

monthly interest on each of the eleven separate transactions,

beginning from the date each was due. The interest is then

added, for a total of $1,693.69. The calculation appears to

conform to the terms of the credit application.5 The

interest, however, continues to accrue. Therefore, I

recommend that the court award plaintiff the $10,005.50

principal balance plus prejudgment interest at the rate of

1.5% per month, to be calculated from the dates on which each

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of the eleven transaction balances first came due. I further

recommend that the plaintiffs update their calculations as the

court may direct.

For the reasons discussed, I recommend that the court

award plaintiff 1) $21,886.74 in legal fees, and 2) the

$10,005.50 principal balance plus prejudgment interest at the

rate of 1.5% per month to be calculated from the dates the

balances were first due.

Dated: November 16, 2006

Bernard Zimmerman 

 United States Magistrate Judge

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