Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01858/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01858-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jaime Beltran
Petitioner
Warren L. Montgomery
Respondent

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAIME BELTRAN,

Petitioner,

v.

WARREN L. MONTGOMERY, Warden,

Calipatria State Prison,

Respondent.

No. 1:15-cv-01858-DAD-SKO HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

THAT THE COURT DENY PETITION 

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, claims that insufficient evidence supported his conviction for first 

degree murder. Specifically, he contends that (1) the witness never identified him in court; (2) no 

fingerprints were found on the murder weapon; (3) no gun residue was identified on Petitioner; 

and (4) no fingerprints were found on the shells. The state court found that these claims lacked 

merit. The undersigned agrees and recommends that the Court deny habeas relief.

I. Factual Background 1

On the day of the murder, the victim, Eduardo Diaz Reynoso, was drinking beer with 

Santana Santos Garcia under a tree near a market. A man approached with a gun, said “God, 

forgive me,” and shot Reynoso multiple times. 

 

1 The statement of facts reflects the factual summary set forth by the California Court of Appeal in People v. Beltran, 

2015 WL 7735648 (Cal.App. Dec. 1, 2015) (No. F069219) (reproduced at Lodged Doc. 1).

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At trial, Garcia would not identify Petitioner. A difficult and emotional witness, he 

testified that he focused on the end of the gun, not on the shooter’s face. He added that his 

memory was poor because he was intoxicated at the time of the shooting.

Following the shooting, Garcia told Deputy Sheriff Thomas Edgar Grillione that the 

shooter said “God, forgive me,” before he shot Reynoso. He also stated that the shooter knew a 

woman named Kathy, who worked in the discount store in Kerman.

In an interview on the afternoon of the shooting, Garcia told Deputy Sheriff Hector Palma, 

the lead investigator, that he was under the tree near the market when the shooter approached, 

carrying a shotgun. The man asked Reynoso what he had been saying,2then shot him three times 

before walking away. The shooter drove away in a gold-colored car with a dent in the side. 

Garcia later identified the car as a PT Cruiser.

Garcia had seen the shooter before. Once, he saw the shooter driving a woman named 

Katia in the gold PT cruiser. On another occasion, the shooter and Katia arrived in the same car at 

a yard sale conducted by Reynoso and Garcia. Garcia told Palma the name of the discount store 

where Katia worked.

Garcia also told Palma that he thought the shooter was Alejandra Canzales’ grandson. 

Palma confirmed that Ms. Canzales is Petitioner’s grandmother.

Palma testified that when Petitioner wore his long hair in a ponytail, he appeared to have 

short hair. Palma obtained two photographs of Petitioner. Garcia was unable to identify 

Petitioner in the first photo, in which his long hair hung free. When Garcia saw the second photo, 

in which Petitioner’s hair was cut shorter, he began weeping and identified Petitioner as the man 

who shot Reynoso.

///

 

2 Reynoso had apparently spoken openly about his disapproval of those who cultivated marijuana.

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Palma interviewed Katia, who stated that she was Petitioner’s sister. When Palma asked 

where Petitioner was, Katia pointed to a gold PT cruiser that was then passing the discount store. 

Law enforcement personnel arrested Petitioner when he returned; Petitioner was the only person 

in the vehicle. Deputies recovered a shotgun and Petitioner’s shoes.

Autopsy results established that Reynoso was killed by two shotgun wounds, one in his 

head and one in his neck. Shoe tracks at the scene were consistent with the shoes confiscated 

from Petitioner when he was arrested. Shotgun shells recovered at the scene were shot from the 

shotgun recovered from Petitioner’s vehicle.

II. Procedural Background

Petitioner was charged with one count of first degree murder (Cal. Penal Code § 187(a)) 

with a sentence enhancement for personal discharge of a firearm in the victim’s death (Cal. Penal 

Code § 12022.53(d)), and tried in Fresno County Superior Court in January 2014. Petitioner 

executed a Faretta3 waiver and represented himself. In the course of the trial, he asked only a 

single question in cross-examination.

The jury found Petitioner guilty of the murder and found the sentencing enhancement to 

be true. On February 14, 2014, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to an indeterminate term of 

fifty years to life in custody.

Petitioner’s counsel filed a direct appeal pursuant to People v. Wende, 25 Cal.3d 436 

(1979), in which she asserted that she was unable to identify any arguable issues for direct appeal. 

In a supplemental statement, Petitioner contended that insufficient evidence of his guilt had been

presented to the trial court. In an opinion dated December 4, 2015, the California Court of 

Appeal rejected Petitioner’s argument as meritless. 

///

 

3 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S 806 (1975).

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On December 11, 2015, Petitioner filed a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

On January 11, 2016, Petitioner filed a petition for review by the California Supreme 

Court, which denied review on February 19, 2016.

III. Standard of Review

A person in custody as a result of the judgment of a state court may secure relief through a 

petition for habeas corpus if the custody violates the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 (2000). On April 24, 1996, 

Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), which 

applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed thereafter. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 

322-23 (1997). Under the statutory terms, the petition in this case is governed by AEDPA's 

provisions because Petitioner filed it after April 24, 1996.

Habeas corpus is neither a substitute for a direct appeal nor a device for federal review of 

the merits of a guilty verdict rendered in state court. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n. 5 

(1979) (Stevens, J., concurring). Habeas corpus relief is intended to address only "extreme 

malfunctions" in state criminal justice proceedings. Id. Under AEDPA, a petitioner can prevail 

only if he can show that the state court's adjudication of his claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of 

the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-71 (2003); Williams, 

529 U.S. at 413.

///

///

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"By its terms, § 2254(d) bars relitigation of any claim 'adjudicated on the merits' in state 

court, subject only to the exceptions set forth in §§ 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2)." Harrington v. 

Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011). 

As a threshold matter, a federal court must first determine what constitutes "clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Lockyer, 

538 U.S. at 71. To do so, the Court must look to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of the 

Supreme Court's decisions at the time of the relevant state-court decision. Id. The court must 

then consider whether the state court's decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law." Id. at 72. The state court need not have cited 

clearly established Supreme Court precedent; it is sufficient that neither the reasoning nor the 

result of the state court contradicts it. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). The federal court 

must apply the presumption that state courts know and follow the law. Woodford v. Visciotti, 

537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002). The petitioner has the burden of establishing that the decision of the 

state court is contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, United States Supreme 

Court precedent. Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996). 

"A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its 

independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal 

law erroneously or incorrectly." Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75-76. "A state court's determination that 

a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' 

on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101 (quoting 

Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). Thus, the AEDPA standard is difficult to 

satisfy since even a strong case for relief does not demonstrate that the state court's 

determination was unreasonable. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102. 

///

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IV. Due Process: Sufficiency of the Evidence

Petitioner alleges a due process violation because the evidence adduced at trial was 

insufficient to convict him. He contends that (1) the witness never identified him in court; (2) no 

fingerprints were found on the murder weapon; (3) no gun residue was identified on Petitioner; 

and (4) no fingerprints were found on the shells. 

A. State Court Opinion

The California Court of Appeals found Petitioner’s claim lacked merit.4 Noting that 

Petitioner, who represented himself, failed to elicit the evidence that he claimed cast doubt on his 

guilt, the court wrote:

The record conclusively establishes that Garcia was a reluctant and 

difficult witness who was saying anything in an attempt to avoid 

testifying at trial. The trial court even noted that it was apparent 

Garcia was feigning lack of memory to avoid identifying 

[Petitioner] as the individual who shot Reynoso. Garcia’s feigned 

lack of memory permitted the prosecution to introduce his prior 

statements which positively identified [Petitioner] as the person 

who shot Reynoso, as well as Garcia’s statements linking 

[Petitioner] to the vehicle, to his grandmother, and to his sister. 

Video surveillance from the market did not show the shooting, but 

did show [Petitioner’s] vehicle leaving the scene shortly after the 

shooting. The shoe print impression evidence linked [Petitioner] to 

the scene, and the firearms examiner established conclusively that 

the shotgun used to kill Reynoso was the same shotgun found in 

[Petitioner’s] vehicle hours after the murder. This is overwhelming 

evidence of [Petitioner’s] guilt.

We note that no evidence was introduced to establish that, 

presumably, the gunshot revenue tests did not show any gunshot 

residue on [Petitioner] when he was arrested, or that, presumably, 

Garcia’s description of the shotgun given to police differed from 

the shotgun found in [Petitioner’s] possession. This is evidence 

that would have been admissible and possibly helpful to 

[Petitioner], but he failed to elicit such testimony from the 

witnesses that testified.

[Petitioner’s] correspondence suggest that he believes a conviction 

was possible only if a witness, in this case Garcia, positively 

identified him at the perpetrator at trial. This is incorrect. The jury 

 

4 Because the California Supreme Court summarily denied review, the Court must "look through" the summary 

denial to the last reasoned decision, which is, in this case, the opinion of the California Court of Appeal, Fifth 

Appellate District. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-06 (1991).

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is instructed to review all of the evidence presented in deciding if 

the prosecution has proven a defendant’s guilty [sic] beyond a 

reasonable doubt. (CALCRIM Nos. 101, 103, 3550.) We review 

the entire record, not just the testimony of a single witness, to 

determine if substantial evidence supports the verdict. (People v. 

Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal. 4th 469, 496.) The entire record provided 

overwhelming evidence of Beltran’s guilt.

People v. Beltran, 2015 WL 7735648 at *2-*3 (Cal.App. Dec. 1, 

2015) (No. F069219) (reproduced at Lodged Doc. 1).

B. Standard of Review

To determine whether the evidence supporting a conviction is so insufficient that it 

violates the constitutional guarantee of due process of law, a court evaluating a habeas petition 

must carefully review the record to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found 

the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; 

Windham v. Merkle, 163 F.3d 1092, 1101 (9th Cir. 1998). It must consider the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the prosecution, assuming that the trier of fact weighed the evidence, 

resolved conflicting evidence, and drew reasonable inferences from the facts in the manner that 

most supports the verdict. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Jones v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th

Cir. 1997). 

C. Valid Faretta Waiver

The California Court of Appeal determined that Petitioner, who represented himself at 

trial, validly waived his right to counsel under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S 806 (1975). 

Petitioner does not challenge the state court’s conclusion.

D. Garcia’s Failure to Identify Petitioner as Shooter 

Petitioner’s first contention of insufficient evidence is Garcia’s failure to identify him at 

trial. Garcia, a reluctant witness, testified, “I don’t want to be here today. I don’t want to have 

any problems with anybody. I don’t have any type of problems.” 5RT755. Garcia accused the 

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prosecutor of not caring about Garcia’s feelings5and wanting to force him to relive Reynoso’s 

death. He also testified that he was drunk at the time of the shooting and that he did not recall 

the events. On cross-examination, Petitioner asked Garcia if he had identified Petitioner as the 

shooter. Garcia denied that he had identified Petitioner or anyone else. 

The prosecution recalled Detective Hector Palma to testify about Garcia’s statement 

following the shooting. Petitioner did not object at any point during Palma’s testimony. After 

the jury had left the courtroom, the trial court set forth its conclusion that Garcia had had falsely 

professed a lack of recollection, allowing the prosecution to introduce Garcia’s prior inconsistent 

statements under California Evidence Code §§ 1235 and 770. Petitioner declined the trial court’s 

invitation to add anything to the record.

Petitioner does not challenge the trial court’s admission of Palma’s testimony regarding 

Garcia’s prior inconsistent statements, but simply assumes that Garcia’s refusal to identify 

Petitioner in court was sufficient to conclude that Garcia had not identified Petitioner. 

Petitioner’s assumption is incorrect. 

In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, the reviewing court must consider all 

evidence adduced at trial. McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120, 131 (2010). Evidence of Garcia’s 

statements to investigators following the shooting fully supported the conclusion that Garcia had 

identified Petitioner as the shooter, even if he was unwilling to identify Petitioner at trial.

E. No Fingerprints on Shotgun or Shells, nor Gunshot Residue on 

 Petitioner

In his second and fourth claims, Petitioner argues that the evidence was insufficient 

because his fingerprints were not found on the shotgun confiscated from his car or the shotgun 

shells recovered at the scene of the shooting. In his third claim, Petitioner argues that the 

evidence was insufficient because testing revealed no gunshot residue on his person. 

 

5 Garcia and Reynoso had been close friends for 25 years.

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Petitioner assumes that to convict him, the prosecution needed to introduce evidence of 

gunshot residue on Petitioner or fingerprints on the shotgun and shells. This assumption is 

incorrect. 

The measure of the sufficiency of the evidence is whether a rational trier of fact could 

have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. 

at 319. The state can prove that a defendant is guilty of a crime using various types of evidence 

so long as the evidence adduced at trial established the statutory elements of the crime. To prove 

Petitioner guilty of murdering Reynoso, the prosecution was not required to show Petitioner’s 

fingerprints on any piece(s) of evidence or to show that testing found gunshot residue on 

Petitioner. It needed only to prove that Petitioner unlawfully killed Reynoso, a human being, 

with malice aforethought. See Cal. Penal Code § 186(a). The prosecution did so through 

evidence other than the fingerprints and gunshot residue.

Because the prosecution did not introduce fingerprint evidence or positive results of the 

gunshot residue test, Petitioner’s conclusion that these items weighed in his favor likely is 

correct. At trial, however, Petitioner did not raise the lack of fingerprints or gunshot residue in 

his own defense.

F. Sufficiency of the Evidence

The state court reasonably determined that, viewed as a whole, the evidence adduced at 

trial proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner murdered Reynoso. Garcia’s statements 

identified Petitioner as the shooter and identified the gold PT cruiser in which Petitioner arrived 

at and left the scene. Although the security camera at the store did not capture the shooting 

itself, it showed Petitioner’s car leaving the scene. Expert testing indicated that the shotgun 

recovered from Petitioner’s car fired the shells recovered from the scene. The pattern of the 

///

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soles of Petitioner’s shoes matched the shoeprints left at the scene. Petitioner, representing 

himself, provided no defense at trial. 

V. Certificate of Appealability

A petitioner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal a 

district court's denial of his petition, but may only appeal in certain circumstances. Miller-El v. 

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003). The controlling statute in determining whether to issue a 

certificate of appealability is 28 U.S.C. § 2253, which provides:

(a) In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under section 2255 

before a district judge, the final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by 

the court of appeals for the circuit in which the proceeding is held.

(b) There shall be no right of appeal from a final order in a proceeding 

to test the validity of a warrant to remove to another district or place for 

commitment or trial a person charged with a criminal offense against the 

United States, or to test the validity of such person's detention pending 

removal proceedings.

(c) (1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of 

appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from—

 (A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the 

detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court; or

 (B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.

 (2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) 

only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.

 (3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall 

indicate which specific issues or issues satisfy the showing required by 

paragraph (2).

If a court denies a habeas petition, the court may only issue a certificate of appealability 

"if jurists of reason could disagree with the district court's resolution of his constitutional claims 

or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to 

proceed further." Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327; Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

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Although the petitioner is not required to prove the merits of his case, he must demonstrate 

"something more than the absence of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith on his . . . 

part." Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 338.

Reasonable jurists would not find the Court's determination that Petitioner is not entitled 

to federal habeas corpus relief debatable, wrong, or deserving of encouragement to proceed 

further. Accordingly, the Court should decline to issue a certificate of appealability.

VI. Conclusion

The undersigned recommends that the Court deny with prejudice the petition for writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and decline to issue a certificate of appealability. 

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C ' 636(b)(1). Within thirty 

(30) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, either party may file 

written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned AObjections to Magistrate 

Judge=s Findings and Recommendations.@ Replies to the objections, if any, shall be served and 

filed within fourteen (14) days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure

to file objections within the specified time may constitute waiver of the right to appeal the District 

Court's order. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 ((9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. 

Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 6, 2016 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto .

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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