Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-14-03779/USCOURTS-ca3-14-03779-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Attorney General United States of America
Respondent
Alba Qemal Dinaj
Petitioner

Document Text:

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

________________

Nos. 14-3779 & 14-3780

________________

ALBA QEMAL DINAJ,

Petitioner

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

________________

On Petition for Review of a Final Order 

of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Immigration Judge: Honorable Andrew Arthur

(No. A047-189-009)

________________

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

June 18, 2015

Before: AMBRO, FUENTES, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: August 24, 2015)

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OPINION*

________________

AMBRO, Circuit Judge

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.

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The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) seeks the removal from the 

United States of Petitioner Alba Qemal Dinaj, a native and citizen of Albania. DHS 

alleged that Dinaj was removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) as an alien 

convicted of an aggravated felony and 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(ii) as “a drug abuser or 

addict.” A few months later the agency added that she was also removable under 8 

U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) as an alien “who is convicted of two or more crimes involving 

moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct.” The 

Immigration Judge (“IJ”) agreed in part, concluding that Dinaj was removable because 

she committed two crimes of moral turpitude: theft and armed robbery. In response, she 

applied for cancellation of removal, arguing that her husband and two children would 

suffer severe hardship were she deported. Dinaj also maintained that she committed the 

above-mentioned crimes out of desperation. 

During the hearing on her request, DHS informed the IJ that Dinaj had been less 

than forthright about her prior drug use. It took several exchanges for Dinaj ultimately to 

admit that she suffered from a heroin addiction and was receiving treatment. In light of 

her admission, the IJ ordered that, in addition to being removable for having committed 

multiple crimes of moral turpitude, Dinaj was removable as “a drug abuser or addict,” 8 

U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(ii). It also concluded that, notwithstanding her statutory 

eligibility for cancellation relief, she didn’t merit a favorable exercise of discretion. Her 

criminal history and lack of truthfulness, the IJ said, outweighed the factors favoring 

cancellation—namely, Dinaj’s familial ties to the United States and her personal growth. 

J.A. 95. Regarding the lies she told, the IJ noted that Dinaj on two occasions had denied 

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her drug use in the United States and fabricated a story to explain her prescribed use of 

Suboxone (a pain medication). 

Three days after receiving the IJ’s decision, Dinaj filed a motion to reopen (to 

introduce previously unavailable evidence) and a motion to reconsider. The IJ denied the 

former because all of the purported new evidence was available at the time of her 

previous hearing. It denied the motion to reconsider because Dinaj failed to persuade that 

the IJ’s adverse credibility determination was flawed. She appealed to the Board of 

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) the IJ’s denial of the (1) request for cancellation of 

removal, (2) motion to reopen, and (3) motion to reconsider. As to the cancellation of 

removal request, the BIA held that the IJ appropriately exercised its discretion in denying 

the request. It also agreed with the IJ that Dinaj’s motion to reopen was without merit 

because the evidence she introduced was previously available and, in any event, wasn’t 

material. The BIA came to the same conclusion regarding the motion to reconsider, 

holding that Dinaj failed to identify any legal or factual error in the IJ’s reasoning. She 

petitions us for review, challenging the BIA’s affirmance of the IJ’s ruling that she was 

removable as a drug addict or drug abuser, its denial of her request for cancellation of 

removal, and its denial of her motion to reopen and motion to reconsider. We deny the 

consolidated petitions in all respects.

First, we find no fault with the BIA’s failure to reach whether Dinaj was 

removable for her drug issues, as she was also removable for having been twice 

convicted of a crime of moral turpitude, and Dinaj makes no argument to the contrary. 

Second, we discern no factual or legal error in the IJ’s decision to deny Dinaj’s 

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cancellation application (nor the BIA’s in upholding it). Dinaj’s argument that the IJ 

failed to consider certain favorable factors under In re Sotelo, 23 I & N Dec. 201 (BIA 

2001), is wide of the mark, as the IJ and Board identified all relevant circumstances that 

weighed in favor of cancelling removal, though both decided that the bad outweighed the 

good. That we may have judged those factors differently is irrelevant. See Jarbough v. 

Att’y Gen., 483 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 2007). Finally, we reject Dinaj’s quarrel with the 

IJ’s denial of her motion to reopen because she has failed to identify a legal or 

constitutional error regarding that decision. 

For all of these reasons, we deny the petitions for review.

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