Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-03478/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-03478-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Doug Mann
Defendant
Mann Bracken, LLC
Defendant
Zenaida E. Quicho
Plaintiff
Edward Reilly
Defendant

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1 All parties have consented to my jurisdiction,

including entry of final judgment, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636(c) for all proceedings. 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ZENAIDA E. QUICHO,

Plaintiff(s),

v.

MANN BRACKEN, LLC; DOUG

MANN; EDWARD REILLY,

Defendant(s). 

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No. C07-3478 BZ

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s

complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).1 For the

reasons discussed, defendants’ motion is GRANTED IN PART AND

DENIED IN PART. 

The plaintiff’s first cause of action alleges several

violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practice Act (“FDCPA”). 

One claim is that defendants violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(3) by

falsely representing in a collection letter received by

plaintiff that attorneys were directly or personally involved

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2 A copy of the collection letter was attached to the

complaint and is attached to this order.

3 A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) should be

granted only if plaintiff’s complaint fails to set forth facts

sufficient to establish a plausible right of recovery. See

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007). 

For purposes of such a motion, the complaint is construed in a

light most favorable to the plaintiff and all properly pleaded

factual allegations are taken as true. Everest & Jennings,

Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 226, 228 (9th Cir.

1994); see also Mitan v. Feeney, 2007 WL 2068106, at *9 (C.D.

Cal.) (discussing the post-Twombly standard). In resolving a

12(b)(6) motion, a court may consider materials attached by

plaintiff to his pleadings. See Canlas v. Eskanos & Adler,

P.C., 2005 WL 1630014 at *2 (N.D. Cal.) (citing Durning v.

First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1997)).

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in reviewing plaintiff’s file.2 In moving to dismiss,

defendants argue that because an attorney did not sign the

letter and because the letter states that it is from a debt

collector, the “least sophisticated consumer” would not

misperceive the level of attorney involvement.3

To determine if the FDCPA has been violated, the language

of the letter is judged by the “least sophisticated debtor”

standard. Swanson v. Southern Oregon Credit Service, Inc.,

869 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1988). I cannot say as a matter of

law that the letter here, printed on defendants’ letterhead

identifying defendants as “ATTORNEYS AT LAW,” and signed by

“MANN BRACKEN, LLC”, could not be perceived as constituting

the work of an attorney, especially when there is no

disclaimer indicating otherwise. See Greco v. Trauner, Cohen

& Thomas, L.L.P., 412 F.3d 360, 364 (2d Cir. 2005); see also

Dupuy v. Waltman, Wienberg & Reis Co., 442 F. Supp. 2d 822,

825 (N.D. Cal. 2006). The second paragraph of the letter

lists the numerous jurisdictions where “this firm” practices

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4 Plaintiff’s second cause of action is brought under

the Robbins-Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“RR

FDCPA”), Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.13(c), which prohibits the

misrepresentation of attorney involvement in debt collection

letters. At hearing, the parties agreed that a violation of

the FDCPA would amount to a violation of the RR FDCPA. See

Dupuy, 442 F. Supp. 2d at 824. Thus, the state claim survives

to the extent the federal claim survives.

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law, and states that the sender “intend[s] to pursue legal

remedies”. Although the letter states that it is from a “debt

collector,” that statement does not rule out the possibility

that the letter is from an attorney, as attorneys can be debt

collectors. See, e.g., Greco, 412 F.3d at 364; Dupuy, 442 F.

Supp. at 825. For these reasons, defendants’ motion is DENIED

as to this claim.4

Plaintiff also asserts that the letter does not clearly

state the creditor’s name, violating 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e,

1692e(10) and 1692g, because the statement that the “original

contract you entered into with Chase Bank USA N.A. or with the

predecessor or assignor of Chase Bank USA N.A.” would confuse

the least sophisticated debtor as to whether the debt is held

by Chase Bank USA, N.A., or some other creditor. Defendants

argue that the name of the creditor is clearly identified in

the caption of the letter and is not overshadowed or

contradicted by the second paragraph because the “original

contract” is only relevant to the legal rights included in the

contract, not to the identification of the creditor. 

I find that the creditor’s name is clearly stated in the

letter next to the caption “Name of Creditor”. Although the

beginning of the second paragraph states that another party

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may have been the contracting party, this party is not

identified as the “creditor,” but only as a party who the

debtor may have contracted with initially. Thus, the second

paragraph is not relevant to the identification of the current

creditor and does not contradict the plain fact that Chase

Bank, USA, N.A. is identified as the creditor. Cf. Sparkman

v. Zwicker & Assocs., P.C., 374 F. Supp. 2d 293, 300-301

(E.D.N.Y. 2005) (identifying the creditor, but also indicating

that the creditor could be some other entity). The

identification is sufficiently clear and, as a matter of law,

does not violate §§ 1692e, 1692e(10) or 1692g. For these

reasons, defendants’ motion as to this claim is GRANTED.

Plaintiff further claims defendants violated 15 U.S.C. §

1692e(5) because they threatened arbitration when they could

not legally do so. To find a violation of § 1692e(5), I must

determine “(1) whether the debt collector threatened legal

action, and, if so, (2) whether such action could legally be

taken or whether the debt collector intended to take such

action.” Irwin v. Mascott, 112 F. Supp. 2d 937, 950 (N.D.

Cal 2000) (quoting Newman v. Checkrite, 912 F. Supp. 1354,

1379 (E.D. Cal. 1995)). Here, the letter states: “If we are

unable to reach satisfactory arrangements, the filing of an

arbitration claim will be evaluated.” The text goes on to

make clear that legal action may follow in order to enforce

any arbitration award. Defendants claim this language merely

informed the debtor of the “possibility” of filing for

arbitration and included no imminent threat of legal action. 

The Ninth Circuit, however, has explained that the

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5 Whether defendants could legally file an arbitration

claim or intended to do so is not ripe for adjudication, as

neither party has introduced evidence on the issue and because

such evidence would, in any event, require me to rely on facts

outside of the pleadings. It is sufficient to note that

plaintiff includes in the complaint an allegation that

defendants’ threatened actions are not legally permissible. 

See Compl. ¶¶ 13, 15, 20. Thus, plaintiff’s allegation that

defendants also violated § 1692e(2)(A) by falsely claiming the

ability to seek arbitration must also survive at this time. 

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language of a debt collection letter can constitute a threat

when it “create(s) the impression that legal action by

defendant is a real possibility.” Baker v. G. C. Services

Corp., 677 F.2d 775, 779 (9th Cir. 1982). Thus, “an explicit

statement or threat of legal action” is not required to

establish a violation of § 1692e(5). See Kreek v. Phycom

Corp., 2007 WL 1229315 at *4 (N.D. Cal.) (analyzing a letter

stating: “if you do not telephone, the Physician will

consider using a collection agency or civil action to pursue

the debt.”) (emphasis added); see also Palmer v. Stassinos,

348 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (analyzing a

letter stating: “Failure [to remit payment in full] ... may

necessitate using other remedies to collect.”) (emphasis

added). 

The defendants here have used prospective language

similar to that found threatening in Kreek and Palmer,

including a clear threat to enforce any arbitral award. For

the least sophisticated debtor, the letter could be viewed as

conveying a “real possibility” of legal action. I cannot say

as a matter of law that the text does not constitute a threat

under § 1692e(5).5 Therefore, defendants’ motion is DENIED as

to this claim. 

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It is therefore ORDERED that defendants’ motion is

GRANTED as to the claimed violations of §§ 1692e, 1692e(10),

and 1692g premised on the theory that the collection letter

did not clearly identify the creditor. Defendants’ motion is

DENIED as to the remainder of plaintiff’s claims. 

Dated: September 24, 2007

 

Bernard Zimmerman

 United States Magistrate Judge

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