Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01442/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01442-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Thomas L. Carey
Respondent
Terry Wayne Trainer
Petitioner

Document Text:

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TERRY WAYNE TRAINER,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-05-1442 DFL GGH P

vs.

THOMAS L. CAREY, 

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Introduction

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254. Pending before the court is respondent’s September 15, 2005, motion to dismiss, to which

petitioner filed an opposition on October 17, 2005. 

Petitioner, convicted of first degree murder, robbery, and grand theft, was

sentenced on August 23, 1978, to a term of 7 years to life with the possibility of parole. Form

Petition, p. 3; attachment, p. 2. Petitioner challenges the denial of parole, for the twelfth time, at

his February, 2002, subsequent parole consideration hearing. Petition attachment, p. 4. The

grounds for his challenge include: 1) state superior court denial of petitioner’s cruel and unusual

punishment claim mischaracterized petitioner as sentenced to a term of 25 to life as a first degree

murderer; 2) continued denial of parole based on the commitment offense and pre-imprisonment

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conduct violates petitioner’s due process rights; 3) Board of Prison Terms and Parole (BPT)

violated petitioner’s equal protection rights by failing to set a parole date when others sentenced

under the same law are granted parole, which failure also constitutes cruel and unusual

punishment; 4) petitioner meets seven of the nine suitability criteria in the parole regulatory

scheme and cannot comply to any greater degree after 26 years of incarceration. Id., at 3-6.

Motion to Dismiss 

Respondent’s motion is based solely on the ground that this court lacks subject

matter jurisdiction because the California parole statutes do not give rise to a federally protected

liberty interest. 

Respondent cites Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska, 442 U.S. 1, 7, 99 S. Ct.

2100 (1979), for the principle that a convicted person does not have a constitutional or inherent

right to be released prior to the expiration of a valid sentence. Motion, p. 4. Respondent does

observe that in Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U. S. 369, 371, 377-78, 107 S. Ct. 2415 (1987),

the Supreme Court has recognized an exception to the general rule of no protected liberty interest

in parole, wherein a state can create an enforceable liberty interest in the “unique structure and

language” of its parole statutes, that “mandatory language” in a parole statute may create an

expectancy of release giving rise to a protected liberty interest, and that Greenholtz, 422 U.S. at

12, 99 S. Ct. at 2106, recognized the mandatory language standard. Id. 

Respondents argue, however, that Cal. Penal Code § 3041, the parole statute, does

not contain the requisite mandatory language. Motion, p. 5.

Respondents cite the relevant portions of § 3041:

(a) One year prior to the inmate’s minimum eligible parole release

date a panel...shall again meet with the inmate and shall normally

set a release date as provided...

(b) The panel...shall set a release date unless it determines

that...consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy

period of incarceration.

Cal. Penal Code §3041 (emphasis added by respondents and in Sass v. California Board of

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Prison Terms, 376 F. Supp.2d 975 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (Honorable Morrison England)). Relying on

In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 417 (2005), a California Supreme Court

case finding that, inter alia, the language of § 3041 is not mandatory under the test of Greenholtz

and Allen, and that there is no right to parole in California, and on Sass, a post-Dannenberg

district court decision in this district, finding that “shall” in § 3041 is not used in a mandatory

sense, respondents contend that the court should defer to the interpretation of the state supreme

court of this state’s parole law. Motion, pp. 5-7. 

Respondent also argues that the California parole scheme does not give rise to a

federal liberty interest under Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-85, 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995). 

Motion, pp. 7-8. Sandin requires a determination of whether there is a state-created liberty

interest giving rise to federal due process protections by evaluating whether an action imposes a

“significant and atypical hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison

life.” Sandin, at 484, 115 S. Ct. 2293. Respondent notes that the Ninth Circuit has not applied

Sandin in the parole decision context but argues, somewhat irrelevantly, that other circuits have,

contending that a denial of early release cannot impose a significant and atypical hardship since

every California prisoner under an indeterminate sentence is subject to the statutory maximum

unless the Board of Prison Terms fixes a shorter term. Id. (The undersigned notes that in Sass, a

case on which respondents rely, the court explicitly found that Sandin was not applicable in the

context of considering a liberty interest in parole. See Sass, supra, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 980).

Opposition

In opposition, petitioner pro se argues that In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1084,

1087-88, is not “unassailable,” and that the Ninth Circuit in McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d

895, 901 (2002), in finding a liberty interest in California’s statutory parole scheme relied on the

clearly established framework found in Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct.

2100, and Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U. S. 369, 107 S. Ct. 2415. Opposition (Opp.), pp. 1-

2. With regard to respondent’s contention that the state’s parole scheme does not give rise to a

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federal liberty interest under Sandin, supra, petitioner notes that the McQillion court rejected the

application of the Sandin holding to the question of the creation of a liberty interest in the parole

context, determining “that Sandin’s holding was limited to internal prison disciplinary

regulations.” Opp., p. 2, quoting McQuillion, 306 F. 3d at 903.

Discussion

In the first place, respondent confuses the question of the court’s subject matter

jurisdiction with the failure to state a cognizable claim. Clearly, the court has subject matter

jurisdiction over petitioner’s habeas corpus claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Federal

question jurisdiction exists if the complaint (or petition) purports to state a claim under federal

law regardless of the validity of the claim. Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 83 S. Ct. 1441,

1444 (1963). Only if the stated federal claim is so wholly insubstantial that even a preliminary

review of the merits is not required does the federal court not have jurisdiction. Bell v. Hood,

327 U.S. 678, 66 S. Ct. 773 (1946). It is not every arguably failed claim that deprives the district

court of jurisdiction. Here, petitioner properly invoked § 2254 for the basis of his habeas claim. 

His contentions that he was denied due process in the parole setting process are not so

insubstantial so as to deprive the court of jurisdiction. 

Turning to the merits, the undersigned relies on the fact that the Honorable David

F. Levi has found a liberty interest in the California parole scheme, albeit a narrow one. Johnson

v. Finn, CIV-S-05-0385 (Order of March 31, 2006). That should end the matter.

Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has held that California’s parole scheme gives rise to

a cognizable liberty interest in release on parole. Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d at 914. As noted,

respondent argues that the California Supreme Court recently found that Cal. Penal Code § 3041

is not mandatory and does not create a presumption that parole will be granted. In re

Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1084, 1087-88. Respondent’s reliance in part on a decision by a

district judge of this court finding that the California parole scheme for indeterminate sentences

does not create a federal liberty interest has also been noted. Sass v. Cal. Board of Prison Terms,

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supra, 376 F. Supp. 2d 975. In Sass, Judge England found that no federal liberty interest was

created because the wording of the parole statute, Cal. Penal Code 3041(a) (“a panel shall

normally set a release date..) and § 3041(b) (“the panel...shall set a release date....”) was

insufficiently mandatory. Judge England relied heavily on In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1098,

23 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 443. However, assuming that the “old” Supreme Court paradigm regarding

creation of a liberty interest (mandatory act and underlying factual predicates) remains the

analytical framework in which to judge the creation of right-to-parole liberty interests, see e.g.,

Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. at 378, 107 S. Ct. at 2421 (mandatory language in a parole

statute creates a “presumption of release” and gives rise to a liberty interest), California law, both

before and after Dannenberg finds that the California parole scheme for indeterminate offenses

does create a liberty interest. 

In sum, the governing statute provides that the Board must grant

parole unless it determines that public safety requires a lengthier

period of incarceration for the individual because of the gravity of

the offense underlying the conviction. (Pen.Code, § 3041, subd.

(b).) And as set forth in the governing regulations, the Board must

set a parole date for a prisoner unless it finds, in the exercise of its

judgment after considering the circumstances enumerated in

section 2402 of the regulations, that the prisoner is unsuitable for

parole. (Cal.Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2401.) Accordingly, parole

applicants in this state have an expectation that they will be

granted parole unless the Board finds, in the exercise of its

discretion, that they are unsuitable for parole in light of the

circumstances specified by statute and by regulation.

In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th at 654, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 138 (emphasis added).

It is difficult to conceive of words which mirror the requirements of the Allen

mandatory-act-in light-of-satisfied-factual-predicates paradigm more than the emphasized words

of Rosenkrantz. Indeed, Allen and Rosenkrantz use the same terminology, i.e., “presumption” of

release and “expectation” of release. These are the words of liberty interest creation. It is not

material that great discretion is vested within the administrative agency granting parole. Allen

supra. See also the post-Dannenberg case of In re DeLuna,126 Cal. App. 4th 585, 591, 24 Cal.

Rptr. 3d 643, 647 (2005):

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 Dannenberg did find that California prisoners had no liberty interest in a uniform parole 1

date, 34 Cal. 4th at 1098 (n.18), 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 443 (citing Rosenkrantz); however, this is a

far cry from holding that the parole scheme as a whole does not create a conditional liberty

interest.

 Other district court cases continue to find a liberty interest in the California parole 2

statute after Sass. See Lewis v. Solis, 2005 WL 3454137 (N.D.Cal. 2005); Murilla v. Perez,

2005 WL 2592420 (C.D. Cal. 2005); Rodriguez v. Campbell, 2005 WL 1335711 (E.D. Cal. 2005

MCE JFM); but see Trevino v. Mendoza-Powers, 2005 WL 2436471 (E.D. Cal. 2005 (OWW

SMS).

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Penal Code section 3041, subdivision (b) requires the Board to “set

a release date unless it determines that the gravity of the current

convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current

or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration of

public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration for

this individual, and that a parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed at

this meeting.” This statute creates a conditional liberty interest for

a prospective parolee. (Cf. Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p.

661, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 104, 59 P.3d 174; McQuillion v. Duncan (9th

Cir.2002) 306 F.3d 895, 901-902.) (emphasis added)1

The undersigned can only find that California law is in disarray on the subject of

liberty interest created by the California parole statutes. Dannenberg did not overrule

Rosenkrantz, and implied overrulings are extremely disfavored. Scheiding v. Gen. Motors, 22

Cal. 4th 471, 478, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 342, 346 (2000). Indeed, California cases after Dannenberg

continue to find a liberty interest and cite Rosenkrantz. Therefore, Biggs should not, and cannot,

be cast aside based on the ambiguities in California law unless the Ninth Circuit so holds.

2

For the reasons discussed above, the court finds that petitioner has a liberty

interest in parole. The court must recommend denial of respondents’ motion to dismiss, brought 

on the sole ground that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because there is no statecreated liberty interest in parole. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that respondent’s September 15,

2005, motion to dismiss the petition on the sole ground that this court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction be denied and respondent be required to file an answer within 30 days of adoption of

these findings and recommendations, should that occur.

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These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 7/26/06

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

____________________________________

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:009

trai1442.mtd

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