Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-03037/USCOURTS-ca10-89-03037-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mitchell King
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

\ 

PUBLISH 

DEC 1 8 1989 

N.OB.ERT L. HORCK ·-- .. ER 

UNITED Clerk STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

v. 

MITCHELL 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

) No. 89-3037 

) 

KING, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

District of Kansas 

D.C. Criminal No. 88-30013-01 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Charles D. Anderson, Federal Public Defender, and David J. 

Phillips, Asst. Federal Public Defender, District of Kansas, 

Kansas City, KS, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Benjamin L. Burgess, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and Richard L. Hathaway, 

Asst. U.S. Attorney, District of Kansas, Topeka, KS, for 

Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before £OGAN, TACHA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

TACHA, Circuit Judge. 

Mitchell King pleaded guilty to assault with a dangerous 

weapon with intent to do bodily harm, 18 u.s.c. § 113(c). 

Pursuant to 18. U.S.C. section 3013, the district court ordered 

King to pay a ''special assessment" of$ 50. Section 3013 requires 

Appellate Case: 89-3037 Document: 010110220408 Date Filed: 12/12/1989 Page: 1 
the district court to assess$ 50 against any individual convicted 

of a felony, 18 u.s.c. § 3013(a)(2)(A), or a lesser amount if the 

individual is convicted of a misdemeanor or infraction, id. § 

3013(a)(l). In the latter case, the amount of the assessment 

varies with the class of the misdemeanor or infraction. Id. All 

assessments "shall be collected in the manner that fines are 

collected in criminal cases." Id. § 3013(b). King objected to 

the imposition of the special assessm.ent, contending that section 

3013 was passed in violation of the origination clause of the 

federal Constitution, U.S. Const. art. I, §7, cl. 1. The district 

court rejected his contention, and this appeal followed. 1 We 

affirm. 

I • 

The origination clause provides that "All Bills for raising 

Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the 

Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills." 

U.S. Const. art I, § 7, cl. 1. The reach of the origination 

clause, however, is restricted. In Twin City National Bank~ 

Nebecker, 167 U.S. 196, 203 (1897), the United States Supreme 

Court held that "revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the 

strict sense of.the word, and are not bills for other purposes 

which may incidentally create revenue." The Court determined that 

the test for whether a particular bill is a revenue bill rests 

upon the bill's "main purpose." Id. Thus, where the purpose of 

1 After exam1n1ng the briefs and appellate recoid, this 

panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not 

materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. 

App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-3037 Document: 010110220408 Date Filed: 12/12/1989 Page: 2 
an act is "to raise revenue to be applied in meeting the expenses 

or obligations of the government," id., the act is a revenue 

measure subject to the origination clause. Where the main purpose 

of the act is other than raising revenue, it is not subject to 

challenge under the origination clause. In Nebecker, the Court 

thus determined that a bill creating a national currency that also 

laid a tax upon United States bonds was not a revenue bill. Id.; 

see also Millard~ Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906) (upholding act 

setting tax in District of Columbia for new railway terminal 

against origination clause challenge);' United States ~ Norton, 91 

U.S. 566 (1875) (upholding Postal Money Order Act although 

imposing fee on purchasers). We thus analyze the main purpose of 

section 3013 to determine the applicability of the origination 

clause. We review this question of law de novo, In re RutiSweetwater, Inc., 83.6 F.2d 1263, 1266 (10th Cir. 1988), 

remembering that "federal statutes are to be construed so as to 

avoid serious doubts as to their constitutionality," Communication 

Workers of Am.~ Beck, --- U.S. ---, 108 s. Ct. 2641, 2657 

(1988), and that "the burden of showing a statute to be 

unconstitutional is on the challenging party, not on the party 

defending the statute," New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New 

York, 487 U.S. 1, ---, 108 S. Ct. 2225, 2236 (1988) (emphasis in 

original). 

Five circuits have considered section 3013's purpose in light 

of origination clause challenges. Only the Ninth Circuit, in 

United States ~ Munoz-Flores, 863 F. 2d 654 ( 9th Cir. 1988), cer-t. 

granted, -~- U.S. ---, 110 S. Ct. 48 (1989), has determined that 

3 

Appellate Case: 89-3037 Document: 010110220408 Date Filed: 12/12/1989 Page: 3 
!' 

section 3013's purpose is to raise revenue, thus violating the 

origination clause. The Third, Fifth~ and Sixth Circuits have 

determined that section 3013's main purpose is to fund a victim's 

compensation program. See United States v. Newman, No. 88-3499 

(6th Cir. Nov. 9, 1989) (Westlaw 1989 WL 134203); United States v. 

Herrada, 887 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1989); United States~ Simpson, 

885 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1989). The Second Circuit has determined 

that the section's main purpose is to punish offenders. See 

United States v. Griffin, 884 F.2d 655 (2d Cir. 1989). The Sixth 

Circuit has also held that section 3013's twin purposes are 

punishment and victim's compensation. See United States v. 

Ashburn, 884 F.2d 901 (6th Cir. 1989). Thus every circuit except 

the Ninth that has considered this issue has held that section 

3013 survives origination clause challenge. In United States v. 

Mayberry, 774 F.2d 1018 (10th Cir. 1985), we reviewed section 

3013's purpose relative to the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 u.s.c. 

§ 13, and determined that the section's purpose was punitive. We 

adhere to our earlier position and agree with the Second, Third, 

Fifth and Sixth Circuits that section 3013 is not a revenue 

measure subject to the origination clause. 

In Mayberry, we examined the relationship of section 3013 to 

the Assimilative Crimes Act, which fills gaps in federal criminal 

law by adopting state criminal law for federal enclaves. When the 

Assimilative Crimes Act is triggered, it permits punishment only 

in the manner that the same offense would have been punishable 

under applicable state law. We concluded that section 3013 could 

not be applied under the Assimilative Crimes Act because section 

4 

Appellate Case: 89-3037 Document: 010110220408 Date Filed: 12/12/1989 Page: 4 
3013 was punitive, placing an additional burden on convicted 

persons not present under state law. In finding this punitive 

intent, we noted that the section on its face imposes higher 

penalties on felons than misdemeanants, a factor suggesting 

punitive, rather than revenue, intentions. We also noted that the 

statute required the assessments to be collected like criminal 

fines. Turning to the legislative history, we noted that the 

Senate Report stated that revenue gained through the assessments 

would be insubstantial, id. at 1021 (quoting S. Rep. No. 497, 98th 

. Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 ·[ hereinafter Senate Report], reprinted in 

1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin News 3607, 3619-20, and referred to 

the special assessments as "penalty assessment fines," "penalty 

assessment fees," penalty fee[s]," and "penalties," id. (quoting 

Senate Report at 13, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. 

News 3619). We thus held that Congress intended to treat the 

special assessments ~s punishment. 

The Ninth Circuit rejected this reasoning in Munoz-Flores, 

863 F.2d 654. The court refused to draw any inferences of 

punishment from the statutory language, describing the language as 

"ambiguous", id. at 658, and finding that the reference to 

collecting special assessments·like criminal fines "may be 

interpreted as a purely procedural requirement," id. The court 

also found the lack of an explicit limitation on disposition of 

special assessment funds important. The court then seized upon 

the following statement in the section-by-section analysis: 

The purpose of imposing nominal assessment _fees 1s to 

generate needed income to offset the cost of the 

[victim's assistance fund] authorized under S. 2423. 

Although substantial amounts will not result, these 

5 

Appellate Case: 89-3037 Document: 010110220408 Date Filed: 12/12/1989 Page: 5 
additional amounts will be helpful in financing the 

program and will constitute new income for the Federal 

government':-"" -- --

Id. (emphasis in Munoz-Flores) (quoting Senate Report at 13-14, 

reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3619-20). The 

court found that the emphasized language showed that "Congress 

contemplated that the revenue might be used as general federal 

revenue." Id. at 659 (footnote omitted). The court thus 

concluded "that for purposes of the origination clause the 

primary purpose of the special assessment was to raise revenue, 

not to finance state victlm assistance programs or to punish 

offenders." Id. at 660. 

We disagree with the Ninth Circuit's analysis. The quoted 

fragment from the legislative history explicitly limits special 

assessments to "financing the program" of victims assistance and 

compensation. The "new income" language may be read more 

reasonably not as a general invitation to fill the government's 

coffers with "special assessment booty," Simpson, 885 F.2d at 42, 

but rather as a notation that Congress would not have to divert 

monies from other programs. Moreover, we agree with the Third 

Circuit that the proper scope for analyzing section 3013's 

legislative history is the statute as a whole, and not the section 

in isolation. See Simpson, 885 F.2d at 41 (analyzing whole of 

Victims of Crime Assistance Act). Section 3013 was passed as part 

of the Victims of Crime Assistance Act. Although the Act does not 

explicitly state a purpose, the Senate Report explained that 

The purpose of S. 2423, the Victims of Crime Assistance 

Act of 1984, ••• is to provide limited Federal funding 

to the States, with minimal bureaucratic "strings 

attached", for direct compensation and service programs 

6 

Appellate Case: 89-3037 Document: 010110220408 Date Filed: 12/12/1989 Page: 6 
to assist victims of crime, including victims of Federal 

crime. 

Senate Report at 1, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. 

News 3607. The Victims of Crime Assistance Act as a whole 

contains·numerous restrictions on how program funds can be spent. 

See 42 U.S.C. § 10603(d)(2) (listing restrictions). We reject the 

Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the emphasized language in the 

section-by-section analysis requires a finding of revenue purpose. 

When taken as a whole, we find that the Victims of Crime Act 

clearly shows a main purpose of assisting victims of locai, state, 

and federal crime, not raising revenue to meet the general 

obligations of the government. Section 3013 is merely a part of 

this larger statutory scheme. Viewed in this context, the Victims 

of Crime Act and the special assessments authorized in section 

3013 bear a substantial similarity to the statutes approved by the 

Supreme Court in Nebecker, 167 U.S. 196 (bill creating currency 

funded by taxing U.S. bonds), Millard, 202 U.S. 429 (taxing 

property in District of Columbia for new railway station), and 

Norton, 91 U.S. 566 (upholding Postal Money Order Act although 

imposing fees on purchasers). 

We also adhere to our determination in Mayberry, 774 F.2d 

1018, that the other major purpose of section 3013 is punitive, 

not revenue-raising, in nature. We find the Ninth Circuit's 

characterization of the section's provisions as a possible 

"exercise of Congress' power to tax under art. I, § 8 of the 

Constitution," Munoz-Flores, 863 F.2d at 659, strained and 

difficult to reconcile with the Supreme Court's admonition that 

statutes are to be construed to save their constitutionality when 

7 

Appellate Case: 89-3037 Document: 010110220408 Date Filed: 12/12/1989 Page: 7 
"fairly possible," Communications Workers of Am.~ Beck, --- U.S. 

at---, 108 S. Ct. at 2657. As the Second Circuit observed in 

Griffin, "if an exaction be clearly a penalty it cannot be 

converted into a tax by the simple expedient of calling it such." 

884 F.2d at 656 (quoting United States~ LaFranca, 282 U.S. 568, 

572 (1931)). Section 3013 assesses amounts in proportion to the 

seriousness of the offense and provides that the assessments shall 

be collected like criminal fines. ~, 18 u.s.c. § 3013.(a} & 

(b}. Congress, in the Senate Report, characterized the special 

assessments as "penalty assessment fines," "penalty assessment 

fees," and "penalties." Senate Report at 13, reprinted in 1984 

U.S. Code Cong~ & Admin. News 3619. We find these factors, as we 

did before in Mayberry, indicative of a punitive, not revenue-· 

raising, purpose. 

II. 

We find that section 3013's main purposes are to raise funds 

to support local, state, and federal victims assistance and 

compensation programs and to punish offenders. Because we 

determine that section 3013 thus does not qualify as a revenue 

bill under the test in Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, we hold that 

section 3013 is not subject to the provisions of the origination 

clause. 2 The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

2 Because we are satisfied that the section was not enacted 

the purpose of raising revenue, as that term is used in the 

origination clause, we do not address the question of section 

3013's origin. 

8 

for 

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