Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-01846/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-01846-7/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City and County of San Francisco
Defendant
Estate of Amilcar Perez Lopez
Plaintiff
Margarita Lopez Perez
Plaintiff
Juan Perez
Plaintiff
Eric Reboli
Defendant
San Francisco Police Department
Defendant
Greg Suhr
Defendant
Craig Tiffe
Defendant

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ESTATE OF AMILCAR PEREZ LOPEZ, et 

al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

GREG SUHR, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-01846-HSG 

ORDER PARTIALLY STAYING 

DISCOVERY AND BIFURCATING

DERIVATIVE LIABILITY CLAIMS

Re: Dkt. Nos. 20 & 21

Before the Court are the motion to stay discovery and disclosures and motion to bifurcate

trial and discovery filed by Defendants Police Chief Greg Suhr (“Chief Suhr”), City and County of 

San Francisco (“San Francisco”), San Francisco Police Department (“SFPD”), Police Officer

Craig Tiffe, and Police Officer Eric Reboli (together, “Defendants”). Dkt. Nos. 20 (“MTS”) & 21 

(“MTB”). Plaintiffs Estate of Amilcar Perez Lopez, Margarita Lopez Perez, and Juan Perez 

(together, “Plaintiffs”) have filed an opposition to both motions, Dkt. Nos. 25 (“MTS Opp.”) & 26 

(“MTB Opp.”), and Defendants have replied, Dkt. Nos. 27 (“MTS Reply”) & 28 (“MTB Reply”).

Previously, the Court entered two temporary stays of all discovery and disclosures pending 

criminal charging decisions by the San Francisco District Attorney’s Office (“District Attorney”) 

as to Defendants Tiffe and Riboli (together, “Officers”). Given that no charging decisions have

yet been made, the Court must decide whether any further stay of discovery and disclosures is

warranted. For that reason, the Court also will decide Defendants’ motion to bifurcate Plaintiffs’ 

claims against the Officers from their Monell and supervisory liability claims.

The Court has carefully considered the arguments of the parties, both in their briefs and in 

at oral argument. For the reasons set forth below, the Court STAYS all direct discovery to the 

Officers, including written discovery and depositions, until June 1, 2016. At that time, the Court 

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will consider whether any additional stay is appropriate. Additionally, and in light of that Order, 

the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to bifurcate Plaintiffs’ Monell and supervisory liability 

claims from their claims involving the Officers given their largely derivative nature. On that 

basis, the Court also STAYS all discovery and disclosures relating to those claims until after 

Plaintiffs’ claims against the Officers are resolved, whether by settlement or trial. To the extent 

that discovery pertains to the individual claims, it may proceed under the limitations set out above, 

subject to the exercise of privilege claims or other objections.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Allegations

On February 26, 2015, at approximately 9:54pm, Amilcar Perez Lopez (“Perez Lopez”) 

was walking to his apartment when he was confronted by a man, who began following him and 

taunting him. Dkt. No. 22 (“Am. Compl.”) ¶ 20. An altercation ensued between the two men. Id. 

The altercation ended, and Perez Lopez began walking away. Id. While he continued to walk 

home, the Officers “surreptitiously rushed” at him from behind. Id. One of the Officers grabbed 

Perez Lopez and secured him in a “bear-hug hold” around his upper body. Id. The Officers were 

wearing civilian clothes at the time and did not identify themselves as police officers. Id. Perez 

Lopez was unable to determine that the Officers were police and broke free by wriggling away. 

Id. He then fled toward the street between two vehicles parked at the curb. As Perez Lopez ran

away from them, the Officers pointed their firearms at him. Id. ¶ 21. One of the Officers shot 

Perez Lopez in the back five times, while the other Officer shot him once in the back of the head, 

killing him. Id. Perez Lopez had run only a couple of feet away when he was shot. Id. 

Later that evening, Police Chief Suhr arrived at the scene of the shooting along with other 

officers and began their investigation. Id. ¶ 22. Police Chief Suhr told a local news station that 

Perez Lopez had “lunged at the officer with a knife overhead.” Id. But an autopsy conducted by 

the San Francisco Office of the Medical Examiner indicated that Perez Lopez had been shot in the 

back, as corroborated by two eyewitnesses. Id. ¶ 24. Despite that evidence, Police Chief Suhr 

declared at a town hall meeting on March 2, 2015, that the Officers “were approximately 5 to 6 

feet away when [Perez Lopez] charged at one of the officers with the knife raised over head.” Id. 

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He also presented a diagram indicating this official version of the shooting. Id. Plaintiffs allege 

that Police Chief Suhr knowingly misinterpreted the facts to cover up Perez Lopez’s murder. Id.

Plaintiff further alleges that the City and County of San Francisco (“San Francisco”) and 

Police Chief Suhr had long known of the propensity of the San Francisco Police Department 

(“SFPD”), including the Officers, to callously and recklessly use excessive force against members 

of the public, targeting minority groups in particular, and to engage in deceitful misconduct. Id. ¶

26 (setting forth earlier incidents of excessive force and racism by the SFPD and the Officers).

B. Procedural History

Plaintiffs filed this action on April 24, 2015. Dkt. No. 1. The operative complaint asserts

§ 1983 claims against the Officers for excessive force and unreasonable seizure under the Fourth 

Amendment, a municipal liability claim under § 1983 against San Francisco and the SFPD for 

unconstitutional customs and practices, a supervisory liability claim under § 1983 against Chief 

Suhr for ratification of the Officers’ shooting and for the failure to train, supervise and discipline 

the Officers, and a § 1983 claim against all Defendants for interference with familial integrity in 

violation of substantive due process, assault and battery, and survivorship. Defendants filed the 

instant motions to stay discovery and disclosures and to bifurcate on September 22, 2015. 

1. San Francisco’s Motion to Stay Disclosures and Discovery

In its motion to stay, San Francisco represented that both the SFPD and the San Francisco 

District Attorney’s Office (“SFDAO”) were conducting criminal investigations into the shooting. 

MTS at 3. San Francisco moved to stay disclosures and discovery pending a charging decision 

from the SFDAO based primarily on its concern that permitting Plaintiffs to acquire certain 

materials, especially the SFPD’s confidential investigative file, would compromise the integrity of 

the investigations. Specifically, San Francisco argued that this discovery could affect witnesses’

willingness to give statements and otherwise participate in the investigations. Id. at 3-7. San 

Francisco also asserted that discovery would impose an unfair burden on the Officers, who likely 

would have to assert their Fifth Amendment right to avoid self-incrimination in response to 

Plaintiff’s requests, resulting in adverse inferences against them as well as the derivative liability 

defendants. Id. at 7-9. And San Francisco contended that the requested stay would promote 

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judicial efficiency and would not prejudice Plaintiffs. Id. at 9-12.

At that time, San Francisco anticipated that the SFPD would finish their investigation by 

September 30, 2015, but that the investigation would remain open until the District Attorney’s 

Office made a charging decision. Id. at 3. The SFDAO investigation, which is independent of the 

SFPD investigation, was “expected to continue for a number of months,” but San Francisco 

predicted that it would last until early 2016, based on the timing of charging decisions in similar 

past cases. Id. at 5, 11.

In their opposition, Plaintiffs argued that there is nothing inherently objectionable about 

concurrent civil and criminal actions, the burden is on the Defendants to show an exception, and 

Defendants cannot do so given that there are no pending criminal charges against the Officers and 

no reason to suspect there will be. MTS Opp. at 5-6. To that effect, Plaintiffs pointed out that 

when the motions were filed, more than seven months had already passed since the shooting 

occurred and there was still no charging decision, making the risk of any adverse inference from 

pleading the Fifth Amendment increasingly hypothetical. Id. at 7-8. In addition, Plaintiffs 

disputed that there is any evidence that discovery would hamper the investigations, challenging 

the notion that their counsel acted improperly in interviewing witnesses through informal means. 

Id. at 8-9. Plaintiffs also contended that any further delay would prejudice them, citing the 

inevitably fading memories of witnesses, and argued that they and the public have a substantial 

right in the speedy prosecution of their civil action in light of the seriousness of the claims. Id. at 

9-10. 

2. San Francisco’s Motion to Bifurcate

Separately, San Francisco moves to bifurcate discovery and trial on Plaintiffs’ Monell and 

supervisory liability claims from the claims against the Officers. Because liability under Monell

and the supervisory claims generally requires a finding of underlying individual liability, San 

Francisco contends that bifurcation will avoid the unnecessary use of Court and party resources on 

the derivative claims if the individual claims ultimately fall short. MTB at 4-6. Additionally, San 

Francisco contends that bifurcation allows the Officers to avoid the undue prejudice that would 

flow from evidence of other alleged police misconduct. Id. at 7-9.

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Plaintiffs respond that bifurcation is inappropriate because the individual and derivative 

claims are intertwined and would result in duplicative trials, undermining judicial economy. MTB 

Opp. at 5. Plaintiffs also argue that even if bifurcation of trial is appropriate, there is no basis to 

stay discovery on the derivative claims until after trial because the evidence that they are seeking 

is identical for both sets of claims. Id. at 4-5. Plaintiffs are not seeking, they assert, discovery into 

unrelated misconduct, but whether there is a pattern of bias in the SFPD that caused this shooting 

to occur. Id. at 7-9. Plaintiffs also argue that supervisory liability is not dependent on a finding of 

individual liability. Id. at 6-7. Plaintiffs allege that Chief Suhr conducted an improper and 

insufficient investigation of the shooting, which they claim suffices to show supervisory liability. 

Id. 

3. Previous Stay Order and Stipulated Extensions

On November 9, 2015, the Court stayed all disclosures and discovery in this matter for 60 

days. Dkt. No. 34. On December 9, 2015, the Court extended that stay of discovery until January 

12, 2016, when the parties were scheduled to appear for a status conference. Dkt. No. 39. During 

that conference, the parties stipulated to extend the discovery stay until March 22, 2016, when the 

parties again were scheduled to appear for a status conference. Dkt. No. 44. On March 22, 2016, 

the Court directed the parties to file a discovery plan by April 19, 2016, produce non-Monell

initial disclosures by April 26, 2016, and appear on the latter date for a status hearing. Dkt. No. 

47.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion to Stay Discovery

A district court’s “power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every 

court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for 

itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). Using this 

power, one case may be stayed in favor of another. Leyva v. Certified Grocers of Cal., Ltd., 593 

F.2d 857, 863-64 (9th Cir. 1997) (“A trial court may, with propriety, find it is efficient for its own 

docket and the fairest course for the parties to enter a stay of an action before it, pending 

resolution of independent proceedings which bear upon the case. This rule applies whether the 

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separate proceedings are judicial, administrative, or arbitral in character, and does not require that 

the issues in such proceedings are necessarily controlling of the action before the court.”).

“The Constitution does not ordinarily require a stay of civil proceedings pending the 

outcome of criminal proceedings.” Keating v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 45 F.3d 322, 324 (9th 

Cir. 1995) (citing Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Molinaro, 889 F.2d 899, 902 (9th Cir. 1989)). 

“In the absence of substantial prejudice to the rights of the parties involved, [simultaneous] 

parallel [civil and criminal] proceedings are unobjectionable under our jurisprudence.” Id. 

(brackets original). “Nevertheless, a court may decide in its discretion to stay civil proceedings

. . . when the interests of justice seem [] to require such action.” Id. (brackets in original). “The 

decision whether to stay civil proceedings in the face of a parallel criminal proceeding should be 

made in light of the particular circumstances and competing interests involved in the case. This 

means the decisionmaker should consider the extent to which the defendant’s fifth amendment 

rights are implicated.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “In addition, the decisionmaker 

should generally consider the following factors: (1) the interest of the plaintiffs in proceeding 

expeditiously with this litigation or any particular aspect of it, and the potential prejudice to 

plaintiffs of a delay; (2) the burden which any particular aspect of the proceedings may impose on 

defendants; (3) the convenience of the court in the management of its cases, and the efficient use 

of judicial resources; (4) the interests of persons not parties to the civil litigation; and (5) the 

interest of the public in the pending civil and criminal litigation.” Id. at 324-25 (internal citations 

and quotation marks omitted).

When a party moves to stay only discovery and not the entire proceeding, the “good cause” 

standard of the protective order provision of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) controls. Gray 

v. First Winthrop Corp., 133 F.R.D. 39, 40 (N.D. Cal. 1990); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) (“The 

court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party . . . forbidding inquiry into certain 

matters, or limiting the scope of disclosure or discovery to certain matters[.]”). “A party seeking a 

stay of discovery carries the heavy burden of making a ‘strong showing’ why discovery should be 

denied.” Id. (quoting Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 1975)). When a 

discovery stay is sought in light of an actual or potential parallel criminal proceeding, the Court

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frames its analysis of whether Defendants have met their “heavy burden” under Rule 26(c) using 

the framework set forth in Keating. See, e.g., Square 1 Bank v. Lo, No. 12-cv-05595, 2014 WL 

7206874, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2014) (applying Keating analysis to find that a discovery stay 

was appropriate pending resolution of a parallel and ongoing criminal proceeding).

B. Motion to Bifurcate

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) provides that: “For convenience, to avoid prejudice, 

or to expedite and economize, the court may order a separate trial of one or more separate issues, 

[or] claims[.]” Rule 42(b) confers “broad authority,” Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 

961 (9th Cir. 2001), and “giv[es] the district court virtually unlimited freedom to try the issues in 

whatever way trial convenience requires.” Charles A. Wright, et al., 9A Fed. Prac. & Proc.

(Trials) § 2387 (3d ed. rev. 2015). The Ninth Circuit has held that implicit in the power of courts 

to bifurcate trial under Rule 42(b) is the “power to limit discovery to the segregated issues”

because “[o]ne of the purposes of Rule 42(b) is to permit deferral of costly and possibly 

unnecessary discovery pending resolution of potentially dispositive preliminary issues.” Ellingson 

Timber Co. v. Great N. Ry. Co., 424 F.2d 497, 499 (9th Cir. 1970) (per curiam); accord Craigslist 

Inc. v. 3Taps, Inc., 942 F. Supp. 2d 962, 982 (N.D. Cal. 2013).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Stay

Applying the factors set forth in Keating v. Office of Thrift Supervision, the Court finds 

that there is good cause under Rule 26(c) to again temporarily stay discovery in this case, but only 

with respect to discovery directed at the Officers, including written discovery and depositions, 

because that discovery might require them to invoke their Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination. The Court discusses its findings on each element of the Keating analysis in turn.

Under the first Keating factor, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have a non-negligible interest 

in proceeding expeditiously with the civil litigation. See F.3d at 324. While there may not have 

been any “genuine prejudice from delay” in September 2015, when San Francisco first filed its 

motion, it is now April 2016. See MTS at 10. San Francisco’s prediction that the Court could 

reasonably expect a charging decision by early 2016 has not come to pass. See id. at 11. Nearly 

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14 months have passed since the shooting of Perez Lopez, and the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that 

the memories of witnesses, especially those who may not be cooperating with the SFPD, may fade 

with time. See McCormick v. Rexroth, No. C 09-4188, 2010 WL 934242, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 

15, 2010) (recognizing the “danger that any testimony will be lost as a result of the stay” in a civil 

proceeding pending criminal trial). Accordingly, this factor weighs against any further stay.

The second factor, however, which considers the burden on the party seeking the stay if no 

stay is entered, weighs heavily in favor of a further stay on all discovery directed at the Officers. 

San Francisco’s concern is that prudence will require the Officers to invoke the Fifth Amendment 

in response to discovery requests, which would burden them by triggering adverse inferences

against them at trial. Plaintiffs respond that the Officers have no absolute right to avoid adverse 

inferences in their civil action if they invoke the Fifth Amendment. And, Plaintiffs argue, the need 

to assert the Fifth Amendment is speculative given that no charges have been filed.

Plaintiffs are correct that “[a] defendant has no absolute right not to be forced to choose 

between testifying in a civil matter and asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege.” See Keating, 45 

F.3d at 326. To the same effect, “the strongest case for deferring civil proceedings until after 

completion of criminal proceedings is where a party under indictment for a serious offense is 

required to defend a civil or administrative action involving the same matter.” SEC v. Alexander, 

No. 10-cv-04535, 2010 WL 5388000, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2010) (quoting SEC v. Dresser 

Indus., Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1375-76 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). “In such cases, allowing the civil action to 

proceed may undermine the defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege, expand criminal discovery 

beyond the limits of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(b), expose the defense strategy to the 

prosecution before the criminal trial, or cause other prejudice.” Id. The Ninth Circuit has held

that a civil defendant’s interest under the Fifth Amendment is “a far weaker one where no 

indictment has been returned.” Molinaro, 889 F.2d at 902; see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Liang, No. 

CV 13-08670, 2014 WL 1089264, at **1-7 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2014) (denying motion to stay 

action because pending criminal investigation was not sufficient to show overriding prejudice); 

eBay Inc. v. Digital Point Sols., No. C 08-4052, 2010 WL 702463, at **2-4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 

2010) (denying motion to stay action because “[p]otentially criminal conduct should not serve as a 

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shield against a civil law suit and prevent plaintiff from expeditiously advancing its claim”).

But San Francisco is seeking only a stay of discovery and not a complete stay of the action. 

For that reason, it need only show “good cause” under the protective order provision of Rule 

26(c). To determine whether good cause is present, the Court must consider whether there is an 

actual risk that adverse inferences will be drawn against the Officers in this case. While it is true 

that “in civil proceedings adverse inferences can be drawn from a party’s invocation of th[e] Fifth 

Amendment right,” adverse inferences are appropriate only “when independent evidence exists of 

the fact to which the party refuses to answer.” Doe ex rel. Rudy-Glanzer v. Glanzer, 232 F.3d 

1258, 1264 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Baxter v. Palmigiano, 232 F.3d 1258, 1264 (1976)). In other 

words, “when there is no corroborating evidence to support the fact under inquiry, the proponent 

of the fact must come forward with evidence to support the allegation, otherwise no negative 

inference will be permitted.” Id. Additionally, “no negative inference can be drawn against a civil 

litigant’s assertion of his privilege against self-incrimination unless there is a substantial need for 

the information and there is not another less burdensome way of obtaining that information.” Id.

at 1265. Ultimately, “a case-by-case analysis with a balancing test which weighs the need for the 

information being sought (and consequently its admissibility at trial) against the afforded 

constitutional protections is exactly what the law requires from the district court.” Id. at 1267.

In this case, there is a substantial risk that if the Officers invoke the Fifth Amendment,

adverse inferences will be drawn against them. Plaintiffs will likely serve written discovery on the 

Officers and seek to depose them, inquiring as to a variety of factual issues regarding the shooting. 

If the Officers answer without invoking the Fifth Amendment, the District Attorney could review 

those answers as part of its criminal investigation. For that reason, caution would counsel the 

Officers to invoke the Fifth Amendment to avoid the risk of self-incrimination. And because there 

are apparently eyewitnesses to the shooting who may be able to corroborate Plaintiffs’ account, 

adverse inferences may be warranted by the Officers’ invocation of their rights. See Glanzer, 232 

F.3d at 1264-65. Accordingly, this factor provides good cause to stay discovery directed to the 

Officers.

San Francisco contends that a discovery stay is also warranted with respect to the SFPD’s 

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investigative file because it would create a substantial burden on the integrity of the investigation. 

While the Court appreciates San Francisco’s concern in this regard, those concerns are adequately 

addressed by the official information privilege, to the extent that it applies. See Soto v. City of 

Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 613 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 653, 661 

(N.D. Cal. 1987) (explaining that courts can protect ongoing criminal investigations effectively 

under the official-information privilege where necessary). For the same reason, the Court does not 

find that San Francisco’s concern that witnesses will be tainted requires a discovery stay, as there 

is now a stipulated protective order in place. See Dkt. No. 43. In sum, the Court identifies no 

significant burden that proceeding with the case would place on Defendants other than the 

substantial Fifth Amendment concerns of the Officers.

Under the third Keating factor, the Court finds that it would be most convenient for case 

management to temporarily stay discovery directed at the Officers. “[T]his factor typically weighs 

against the granting of a stay,” Liang, 2014 WL 1089264, at *6, because “the court has an interest 

in clearing its docket,” Molinaro, 889 F.2d at 903. But that is not the case here because the Court 

is not entertaining a complete stay of the action. And a temporary stay of discovery directed at the 

Officers avoids the prospect of potentially having to reopen any discovery prevented by the 

Officers’ assertion of their Fifth Amendment rights if they are not ultimately charged. There is no 

similar efficiency, however, with respect to other discovery. Accordingly, this factor also weighs 

in favor of staying discovery directed at the Officers.

The fourth Keating factor does not appear to apply in this case. There are no nonparties 

that appear to have a significant or unrepresented interest in the outcome of this litigation. 

Finally, under the fifth Keating factor, the Court finds that the public has a strong interest 

in resolving the civil litigation in light of the fact that no criminal litigation is pending. See 

Molinaro, 889 F.2d at 903 (finding no abuse of discretion by the district court in concluding that 

“the public would be frustrated by further delay” where there was no indictment pending). For 

that reason, this factor weighs against any stay.

Weighing all of these factors, the Court concludes that the Fifth Amendment interests of 

the Officers and the efficiencies generated by staying discovery directed at the Officers outweigh 

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Plaintiffs’ and the public’s interest in resolving this litigation as quickly as possible. The only real

risk of prejudice to Plaintiffs flows from the risk that witnesses’ memories will fade as more time 

passes. But the Court is allowing third-party discovery to proceed in full, as the parties appear to 

contemplate in their discovery plan. See Dkt. No. 49 at 1-2. Accordingly, the Court temporarily 

stays any and all discovery directed at the Officers until June 1, 2016.

B. Motion to Bifurcate

Exercising its discretion under Rule 42(b), the Court finds that it is appropriate to bifurcate 

trial of the individual claims and the Monell municipal and supervisory liability claims in this 

case. Bifurcation will preserve substantial judicial and party resources in the event the Officers 

are not found individually liable. For the same reason, under Rule 26(c), the Court also stays any 

and all discovery that pertains exclusively to those derivative liability claims. 

As other courts in this district have held under similar circumstances, “bifurcation is 

conducive to expedition and economy because a finding that the individual officers did not deprive 

[the plaintiff] of his constitutional or statutory rights or negligently cause his death is dispositive 

of plaintiffs’ claims against the City and Chief[.]” Boyd v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, No. 

C-0405459, 2006 WL 6800556, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2006). This is because “neither Monell

. . . nor any other of [the Supreme Court’s] cases authorizes the award of damages against a 

municipal corporation based on the actions of one of its officers when in fact the jury has 

concluded that the officer inflicted no constitutional harm.” City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 

U.S. 796, 799 (1986); see also Fairley v. Luman, 281 F.3d 913, 916 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Exoneration 

of [the individual officer] of the charge of excessive force precludes municipal liability for the 

alleged unconstitutional use of such force.”); Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 916 (9th Cir. 1994) 

(holding, where individual officers were entitled to judgment on ground they did not use excessive 

force, municipality was entitled to judgment on claim municipality failed to adequately train 

officers). The same is true with respect to Plaintiff’s supervisory liability claims against Chief 

Suhr. See Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 920-21 (9th Cir. 1996) (“We have found municipal 

liability on the basis of ratification when the officials involved adopted and expressly approved of 

the acts of others who caused the constitutional violation.”) (italics added). And there are no 

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countervailing efficiencies. If the Officers are found liable, collateral estoppel will establish that 

fact in the second trial.

Plaintiffs nonetheless suggest that bifurcation would be an abuse of discretion, citing De 

Anda v. City of Long Beach, 7 F.3d 1418, 1421 (9th Cir. 1993). In that case, a § 1983 plaintiff 

sued two police officers and their police chief, alleging that they conspired with one another to 

violate his civil rights when he was shot and arrested. Id. at 1420. The plaintiff also asserted 

municipal liability claims. Id. The district court bifurcated the plaintiff’s conspiracy claim against 

the two officers from the same claim against the police chief, the latter of which was tried with the 

municipal claims. Id. at 1421. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that “[b]ecause [the plaintiff] 

alleged that all of the defendants were individually liable for the same constitutional injury, there 

was no reason to try the issue of [the police chief’s] liability in a separate phase.” Id. The court 

found that bifurcation prejudiced the plaintiff because, after the jury found against him in the trial 

against the two officers, the municipal liability claims became moot and he was never allowed to 

put on any evidence of the alleged conspiracy with respect to the police chief. Id. 

De Anda is clearly distinguishable from the present case. Plaintiffs do not allege that Chief 

Suhr conspired with the Officers before the shooting to violate Perez Lopez’s civil rights. Instead, 

they allege supervisory liability on a theory of ratification and for the general failure to train, 

supervise and discipline the Officers. In short, Plaintiffs’ claims against Chief Suhr are 

conceptually distinct from their claims against the Officers: their ratification theory involves only

post-shooting facts, while their failure to train theory involves pre-shooting facts that do not 

directly relate to Perez Lopez’s case. Without prejudging the issue, the Court does not see how

any evidence of Chief Suhr’s alleged ratification of the Officers’ actions is likely to be admissible 

against them. The same appears true with respect to any evidence that Plaintiffs might introduce 

against the SFPD, and San Francisco generally, that tends to show unconstitutional policies or 

customs.

The De Anda court cited Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 640 (9th Cir. 1991), 

as an example of when trial bifurcation is appropriate in police civil rights actions. See De Anda, 

7 F.3d at 1421. In Larez, a family of § 1983 plaintiffs sued six police officers for excessive force 

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while executing a search warrant. Id. at 634-35. As here, Plaintiffs also sued the police chief

(alleging that he had signed a letter stating that none of their complaints would be sustained, 

ratifying the illegal search) and the municipality (alleging that it had perpetuated unconstitutional 

polices or customs of excessive force, illegal searches, and inadequate investigation of citizen 

complaints). Id. at 635. The district court bifurcated the trial of the six police officers from the 

trial of the police chief and the municipality, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Id. The approach 

affirmed in Larez applies equally in this case.

Finally, the same judicial efficiencies that warrant bifurcation also provide good cause for 

a stay of discovery under Rule 26(c) with respect to the supervisory and municipal liability claims 

until Plaintiffs’ claims against the Officers are adjudicated. “[I]n order to prove the unlawful 

municipal policies alleged, plaintiffs may require discovery with respect to, inter alia, incidents 

involving non-party officers. Because such discovery has no apparent relevance to the claims 

against the individual officer defendants herein, a stay will conserve the resources of the parties 

and the Court by deferring such discovery until such time as one or more of the individual officers 

has been found liable or entitled to qualified immunity.” Boyd, 2006 WL 680556, at *3. To the 

extent that Plaintiffs can show that discovery directly pertains to the individual claims, it may 

proceed.

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, under its Rule 26(c) authority, the Court hereby STAYS all

discovery directed at the Officers, including written discovery and depositions, until June 1, 2016, 

at which point the Court will decide whether to extend that stay any further. Under its Rule 42(b) 

authority, the Court also BIFURCATES the trial of the individual liability claims against the 

Officers (for excessive force, assault and battery, interference with familiar integrity, wrongful 

death, and survivorship) from the Monell and supervisory liability claims against San Francisco, 

Chief Suhr, and the SFPD. Because the Court finds that trial bifurcation is warranted, the Court 

also STAYS discovery on any issues that pertain exclusively to the Monell and supervisory 

liability claims.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

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