Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-5_05-cv-00156/USCOURTS-ared-5_05-cv-00156-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Terese Marie Meadows
Plaintiff
Larry Norris
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

 EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

 PINE BLUFF DIVISION

TERESE MARIE MEADOWS PETITIONER

v. Case No. 5:05CV00156 JMM

LARRY NORRIS, Director,

Arkansas Department of 

Correction RESPONDENT

 ORDER DENYING 

 CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Petitioner has filed an application for a certificate of appealability (DE # 30). For

the reasons that follow, the Court denies the application.

On May 11, 2005, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. She raised the following grounds for relief:

1. The trial court erred by denying Petitioner’s motion for mistrial and

convicting her of capital murder after the jury returned inconsistent

verdicts finding her guilty of both capital murder and seconddegree murder while simultaneously acquitting her of first-degree

murder;

2. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advance a proper and

timely objection on the issue of inconsistent verdicts;

3. Petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated by the State’s failure

to submit a capital murder verdict form which clearly defined which

capital murder statute she was convicted of violating;

Case 5:05-cv-00156-JMM Document 33 Filed 11/09/07 Page 1 of 11
 1 In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the United States Supreme

Court held: “Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty

for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and

proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.

 2 371 U.S. 471 (1963).

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4. Apprendi v. New Jersey1 was violated because:

a. The State failed to prove each and every element of

capital-felony murder and arson;

b. Petitioner’s arson conviction was constitutionally deficient

because no arson instruction was provided to the jury;

c. Petitioner’s arson conviction was constitutionally deficient

because no non-hearsay evidence was presented to prove

that she committed arson;

d. Petitioner’s capital-felony murder conviction was

constitutionally deficient because the State failed to provide

an arson instruction to the jury; and

e. Petitioner’s capital-felony murder conviction was

constitutionally deficient because the State failed to prove

the underlying felony of arson; 

5. Counsel was ineffective for failing to timely raise and object to the

issues raised in Claim 4 at trial and for failing to raise the issues

on appeal; and

6. The trial court violated Wong Sun v. United States2

 by erroneously

admitting inadmissible hearsay statements made by co-defendant

Dale Meadows, which were “not made during and in furtherance

of the conspiracy.” 

By an order and judgment entered on September 20, 2007, this Court adopted

the findings and recommendations of Magistrate Judge Forster and dismissed

Petitioner’s petition with prejudice. The Court dismissed Claims 2, 3, 4 (other than

Petitioner’s due process challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support her

Case 5:05-cv-00156-JMM Document 33 Filed 11/09/07 Page 2 of 11
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convictions for arson and capital-felony murder), 5, and 6 as procedurally barred. The

Court rejected, on the merits, Claim 1, Petitioner’s claim that the trial court erred by

denying her motion for mistrial and convicting her of capital murder after the jury

returned inconsistent verdicts finding her guilty of both capital murder and seconddegree murder while simultaneously acquitting her of first-degree murder. The Court

also rejected, on the merits, Petitioner’s due process challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence to support her convictions for arson and capital-felony murder. Relying on the

United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390

(1932), Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339 (1981), and United States v. Powell, 469 U.S.

57 (1984), the Court found that Claim 1 “does not implicate the Constitution.” These

decisions establish that there is no violation of a defendant’s constitutional rights even

if a jury’s verdicts are inconsistent so long as the evidence before the jury was

constitutionally sufficient to convict her. This Court found that the evidence was

constitutionally sufficient to convict Petitioner of arson, capital-felony murder with arson

as the underlying felony, and premeditated capital murder. The Court, applying the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) mandating deference to state court adjudications,

found that Petitioner failed to show that the Arkansas Supreme Court’s adjudication of

her claim that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion for mistrial

because the jury returned inconsistent verdicts is contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States. The Court also found that Petitioner failed to show

that the Arkansas Supreme Court’s adjudication of her sufficiency of the evidence claim

is contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal

Case 5:05-cv-00156-JMM Document 33 Filed 11/09/07 Page 3 of 11
 3

 The Court notes that Petitioner refers to Claims 4(d) and 4(e) as “Claim Two”

even though the Court numbered them Claims 4(d) and 4(e).

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law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. Finally, the Court found

that Petitioner failed to demonstrate that the Arkansas Supreme Court’s adjudication

of her claims resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. 

 Petitioner seeks a certificate of appealability on Claim 1, her claim that the trial

court erred by denying her motion for mistrial and convicting her of capital murder after

the jury returned inconsistent verdicts finding her guilty of both capital murder and

second-degree murder while simultaneously acquitting her of first-degree murder. She

also seeks a certificate of appealability on Claims 4(d) and 4(e). In Claim 4(d), she

contended that Apprendi was violated because her capital-felony murder conviction

was constitutionally deficient because the State failed to provide an arson instruction

to the jury. In Claim 4(e), Petitioner contended that Apprendi was violated because her

capital-felony murder conviction was constitutionally deficient because the State failed

to prove the underlying felony of arson.3

 A certificate of appealability may issue “only if the applicant has made a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). A

substantial showing is a showing that “reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for

that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or

that the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed

further.’” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle,

463 U.S. 880, 894 (1983)). “Where a district court has rejected the constitutional claims

Case 5:05-cv-00156-JMM Document 33 Filed 11/09/07 Page 4 of 11
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on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is straightforward: The

petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s

assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack, 529 U.S. at 484;

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 338 (2003). In order to obtain a certificate of

appealability on a claim that the district court denied on procedural grounds without

reaching the underlying merits of the constitutional claim, a petitioner must demonstrate

both that “jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid

claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it

debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack, 529 U.S.

at 484 (emphasis added); Khairmov v. Crist, 297 F.3d 783, 785 (8th Cir. 2002). In

making this two part inquiry, a court may proceed first “to resolve the issue whose

answer is more apparent from the record and arguments. Slack, 529 U.S. at 485. 

In Claim 1, Petitioner contended that the trial court erred by denying her motion

for mistrial and convicting her of capital murder after the jury returned inconsistent

verdicts finding her guilty of both capital murder and second-degree murder while

simultaneously acquitting her of first-degree murder. Relying on the United States

Supreme Court’s decisions in Dunn, Harris, and Powell and giving deference to the

Arkansas Supreme Court’s adjudication of Claim 1 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d),

this Court rejected the claim on the merits. The Court finds that Petitioner has not

demonstrated that reasonable jurists would find this Court’s assessment of Claim 1

debatable or wrong. 

The Court also rejected, on the merits, Petitioner’s due process challenge in

Case 5:05-cv-00156-JMM Document 33 Filed 11/09/07 Page 5 of 11
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Claim 4(e) to the sufficiency of the evidence to support her conviction for capital-felony

murder. Utilizing the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), the

Court found that the evidence was constitutionally sufficient to convict Petitioner of

capital-felony murder with arson as the underlying felony. The Court also found that

Petitioner failed to show that the Arkansas Supreme Court’s adjudication of her

sufficiency of the evidence claim is contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States. The Court finds that Petitioner has not demonstrated that reasonable jurists

would find this Court’s assessment of her due process challenge to the sufficiency of

the evidence to support her conviction for capital-felony murder debatable or wrong. 

In Claim 4(d), Petitioner contended that Apprendi was violated because her

capital-felony murder conviction was constitutionally deficient in that the State failed to

provide an arson instruction to the jury. The Court dismissed this claim as procedurally

barred, finding that Petitioner did not “fairly present” the claim in state court. In Claim

4(e), Petitioner contended that Apprendi was violated because her capital-felony

murder conviction was constitutionally deficient because the State failed to prove the

underlying felony of arson. The Court found that any claim raised in Claim 4(e), other

than a due process challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support her

convictions for arson and capital-felony murder, was procedurally barred. 

Petitioner argues that her claims are not procedurally barred because under Ark.

Case 5:05-cv-00156-JMM Document 33 Filed 11/09/07 Page 6 of 11
 4 Rule 4-3(h) provides:

When the sentence is death or life imprisonment, the Court must

review all errors prejudicial to the appellant in accordance with

Ark. Code Ann. § 16-91-113(a). To make that review possible, the

appellant must abstract, or include in the Addendum, as

appropriate, all rulings adverse to him or her made by the circuit

court on all objections, motions and requests made by either

party, together with such parts of the record as are needed for an

understanding of each adverse ruling. The Attorney General will

make certain and certify that all of those objections have been

abstracted, or included in the Addendum, and will brief all points

argued by the appellant and any other points that appear to

involve prejudicial error.

Ark. Code Ann. § 16-91-113(a) (Repl. 2006) provides:

The Supreme Court need only review those matters briefed and

argued by the appellant, except that where either a sentence for

life imprisonment or death has been imposed the Supreme Court

shall review all errors prejudicial to the rights of the appellant.

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Sup. Ct. R. 4-3(h),4 the claims are “deemed” to have been reviewed on the merits by

the Arkansas Supreme Court, based upon the Arkansas Supreme Court’s obligation

under Rule 4-3(h) to “review the entire record for prejudicial error.” In support of this

argument, Petitioner cites the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Collins v. Lockhart, 754 F.2d

258 (8th Cir. 1985). In Collins, the petitioner’s counsel raised a ”pecuniary-gain

argument” at trial, but the argument was not raised in the petitioner’s brief on direct

appeal, and the Arkansas Supreme Court’s opinion affirming the petitioner’s conviction

did not mention the argument expressly. The Eighth Circuit found that the argument

was not procedurally barred because the Arkansas Supreme Court followed its practice

Case 5:05-cv-00156-JMM Document 33 Filed 11/09/07 Page 7 of 11
 5 Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-2725, which is now codified in Ark. Code Ann. § 16-91-

113(a) (Repl. 2006), provided:

The Supreme Court need only review those matters briefed and

argued by the appellant provided that where either a sentence for

life imprisonment or death, the Supreme Court shall review all

errors prejudicial to the rights of the appellant.

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of reviewing, pursuant to Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-2725 (Supp. 1973),5 all points properly

raised at trial, whether or not argued in the brief on direct appeal. Collins, 754 F.2d at

262. Where an appellant has been sentenced to death or life imprisonment, it is the

Arkansas Supreme Court’s established practice of reviewing the record, pursuant to

Rule 4-3(h), “for all errors raised in the trial court that are prejudicial to the appellant

regardless of whether the errors are raised on appeal.” Greene v. State, 335 Ark. 1, 10,

977 S.W.2d 192, 195 (1998). The Arkansas Supreme Court has a “duty, pursuant to

Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-3(h), to examine the record for error on objections decided adversely

to the appellant, not to address arguments that might have been made.” Tillman v.

State, 364 Ark. 143, 147, 217 S.W.3d 773, 775-76 (2005) (holding that the appellant’s

argument, that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because there

was insufficient corroboration of accomplice testimony, was barred because he did not

specifically challenge the State’s evidence corroborating the accomplice testimony in

his directed-verdict motion); Woolbright v. State, 357 Ark. 63, 78 n. 2, 160 S.W.3d 315,

325 n. 2 (2004) (review under Rule 4-3(h) is limited to arguments and points of error

raised by the appellant at trial).

 The Arkansas Supreme Court’s review under Rule 4-3(h) is limited to issues

Case 5:05-cv-00156-JMM Document 33 Filed 11/09/07 Page 8 of 11
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actually raised in the trial court. Petitioner did not argue, in the trial court, that Apprendi

was violated because her capital-felony murder conviction was constitutionally deficient

in that the State failed to provide an arson instruction to the jury, that the State failed

to provide an arson instruction to the jury, that her constitutional rights were violated

because the jury was not given an arson instruction, or that Apprendi was violated

because her capital-felony murder conviction was constitutionally deficient in that the

State failed to prove the underlying felony of arson. Accordingly, the Arkansas Supreme

Court did not review these claims on the merits under Rule 4-3(h), and the claims are

procedurally barred. In so finding, it is important to note that habeas jurisprudence after

Collins v. Lockhart casts doubt on the viability of its holding that an argument not raised

on direct appeal nor expressly addressed by the state appellate court is preserved for

review if the petitioner raised the argument at trial and the state appellate court followed

its practice of reviewing all points properly raised at trial, whether or not argued in the

brief on direct appeal. The United States Supreme Court has since made it clear that

a habeas petitioner, in order to preserve a claim for federal habeas review, must “fairly

present” his federal claim to the appropriate state appellate court in his appellate brief,

“thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim.” Baldwin v. Reese, 541

U.S. 27, 32 (2004) (“ordinarily a state prisoner does not ‘fairly present’ a claim to a state

court if that court must read beyond a petition or brief (or a similar document) that does

not alert it to the presence of a federal claim in order to find material, such as a lower

opinion in the case, that does so“). See also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 366

(1995) ("If a habeas petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court

Case 5:05-cv-00156-JMM Document 33 Filed 11/09/07 Page 9 of 11
 6 Several federal Courts of Appeal have held that statutorily-mandated

independent review on direct appeal by a state appellate court for errors or defects is

not sufficient to preserve a claim for federal habeas view where the petitioner failed to

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trial denied him due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must

say so, not only in federal court, but in state court"). The Supreme Court also has held

that where the petitioner did not properly present his federal claim to the appropriate

state appellate court and that court did not “expressly address” the claim, the claim is

not preserved for review. Adams v. Robertson, 520 U.S. 83, 86 (1997). In Bell v. Cone,

543 U.S. 447 (2005), the United States Supreme Court emphasized, albeit in dicta, that

the burden is on the petitioner to present his federal claim to the appropriate state

appellate court in order to preserve it for review, notwithstanding the fact that the state

appellate court could have addressed the claim without its having been raised by the

petitioner. In Bell, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the petitioner’s argument, i.e., that

one of the aggravating circumstances was unconstitutionally vague under the Eighth

Amendment, was not procedurally defaulted because the Tennessee Supreme Court’s

“statutorily mandated review of each death sentence [citation omitted] necessarily

included the consideration of constitutional deficiencies in the aggravating

circumstances found by the jury and therefore that the issue was ‘fairly presented’ to

the state court, even if [petitioner] did not raise it himself.” Bell, 543 U.S. at 451. The

State argued to the United States Supreme Court that ”the Sixth Circuit’s conclusion

in this regard is in tension with the decisions of other Courts of Appeals, which have

held that a petitioner must raise his constitutional claim in state court in order to

preserve it, notwithstanding the existence of a mandatory-review statute.”6 Id. at 451

Case 5:05-cv-00156-JMM Document 33 Filed 11/09/07 Page 10 of 11
present the claim to the state appellate court. Moormann v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044,

1057-58 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2984 (2006); Kornahrens v. Evatt, 66

F.3d 1350, 1362 (4th Cir. 1995); Julius v. Johnson, 840 F.2d 1533, 1546 (11th Cir. 1988).

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n. 3. While the Supreme Court in Bell found it unnecessary to “express a view on this

point,” the Court emphasized that “as a general matter, the burden is on the petitioner

to raise his federal claim in the state courts at a time when state procedural law permits

its consideration on the merits, even if the state court could have identified and

addressed the federal question without its having been raised.” Id. (citing Baldwin v.

Reese, 541 U.S. at 30-32). 

In conclusion, the Court finds that Petitioner has not shown that jurists of reason

would find it debatable whether this Court was correct in its ruling that Claim 4(d) and

Claim 4(e) (other than a due process challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to

support her convictions for arson and capital-felony murder) are procedurally barred.

THEREFORE, the Court denies Petitioner’s application for a certificate of

appealability.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 9th day of November, 2007.

 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Case 5:05-cv-00156-JMM Document 33 Filed 11/09/07 Page 11 of 11