Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_22-cv-00813/USCOURTS-caed-1_22-cv-00813-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Chain
Defendant
Cisneros
Defendant
Korkor
Defendant
Ibrahima Wane
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IBRAHIMA WANE,

Plaintiff,

v.

KORKOR, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:22-cv-00813-BAM (PC)

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO 

RANDOMLY ASSIGN DISTRICT JUDGE

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO 

DISMISS ACTION FOR FAILURE TO 

STATE A CLAIM

(ECF No. 15)

FOURTEEN (14) DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff Ibrahima Wane (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court screened Plaintiff’s 

complaint and granted leave to amend. Plaintiff’s first amended complaint is currently before the 

Court for screening. (ECF No. 15.)

I. Screening Requirement and Standard

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous 

or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary 

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

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pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as 

true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,

572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires 

sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret 

Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully 

is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility 

standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

II. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff is currently housed at High Desert State Prison. Plaintiff alleges the events in the 

complaint occurred at California Substance Abuse and Treatment Facility (“SATF”). Plaintiff 

names as defendants: (1) Dr. W. Korkor, (2) Dr. Chain, psychiatrist, and (3) Warden Cisneros.1

In claims 1 and 2, Plaintiff alleges denial in right to medical care, Due Process and 

freedom from cruel and unusual punishment.

1 Plaintiff alleges this case is the same case as a state court case that was dismissed from 

Kings County Superior Court, Case number 19c-0410. The current case may be subject to claim 

preclusion or issue preclusion. Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, a final judgment 

forecloses successive litigation of the very same claim, whether or not relitigation of the claim 

raises the same issues as the earlier suit. Issue preclusion, in contrast, bars successive litigation of 

an issue of fact or law actually litigated and resolved in a valid court determination essential to 

the prior judgment, even if the issue recurs in the context of a different claim. Taylor v. Sturgell, 

553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008). “[A] duplicative action arising from the same series of events and 

alleging many of the same facts as an earlier suit” may be dismissed as frivolous or malicious 

under section 1915(e). See Bailey v. Johnson, 846 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1988). A prisoner 

complaint that merely repeats pending or previously litigated claims may be considered abusive 

and dismissed under the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. However, while the Court could take 

judicial notice of the records from Kings County Superior Court, the records are not clear as to 

the claims and events at issue which were dismissed. Therefore, at this point in the current case,

the Court cannot ascertain whether the claims should be precluded.

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On June 9, 2017 at about 10:30 a.m. on Facility E-yard, Plaintiff was seen by his health

care provider about his swollen, painful, lumps discharging fluid out of his breast. His primary 

care physician, Dr. W. Korkor, examined his breast enlargement and he said that Plaintiff needed 

medical treatment. But in 2017, Plaintiff did not receive any treatment. Dr. Korkor asked Plaintiff 

“who gave you this medication,” and Plaintiff said that Plaintiff’s mental health provider, Dr. Y. 

Chain prescribed the medication which caused his injury. Dr. Korkor referred Plaintiff back to the 

mental health provider. Plaintiff explained to Dr. Y. Chain about his condition and showed his 

condition to Dr. Chain. Dr. Chain told Plaintiff that the medication may cause the problem and so 

Dr. Chain discontinued his medication. Dr. Korkor told Plaintiff that there is nothing that she 

could do for Plaintiff, and Dr. Chain referred Plaintiff back to Plaintiff’s health care provider Dr. 

Korkor.

Plaintiff alleges that he now has female breasts that leak due to his psychotropic 

medication, Celexa. On 7/4/18, Plaintiff told his mental health provider, Dr. Chain, that Celexa 

may cause the injury. On 7/17/18, Dr. Korkor told Plaintiff that there is nothing that could be 

done.

In the year 2019, Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Korkor and his health care provider and they 

talked about Plaintiff’s discharging breasts. Both Dr. Korkor and Dr. Chain told Plaintiff that

there is nothing that can be done.

Plaintiff suffers significant and recurrent pain from his swollen, painful lumps, leaking 

and discharging breast fluid. The prison doctor Dr. Chain prescribed medication that caused the

harm. After Dr. Chain found out about the injury, she discontinued the medication, Celexa, 

Depakote and Vistaril. Dr. Chain initially prescribed these medications knowing the side effect on 

Plaintiff and that is deliberate indifference.

Plaintiff had a serious medical need. Plaintiff filed three health care 602 appeals against 

medical staff. Plaintiff suffers and continues to suffer from the harm. Plaintiff was denied care 

for his serious medical need and this condition seriously effects his daily activities, he is unable to 

work, sleep, shower, and has physical pain, mental anguish, embarrassment, humiliation and 

psychological injury. Plaintiff alleges that the use of untrained personnel to make medical

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decisions is systemic deficiency in staffing. Permitting persons without medical training to 

decide whether prisoners receive medical attention is deliberate indifference.

Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages and punitive damages.

III. Discussion

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8

Pursuant to Rule 8, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). Plaintiff must 

set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on 

its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). While factual allegations 

are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–57; Moss, 

572 F.3d at 969.

Here, Plaintiff’s complaint is short, but it is not a plain statement of his claims showing 

that he is entitled to relief. Many of Plaintiff’s allegations are conclusory and do not state what 

happened, when it happened, or which defendant was involved. 

B. Supervisory Liability

To the extent Plaintiff seeks to hold any defendant liable based solely upon their 

supervisory role, he may not do so. Liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for 

the actions or omissions of their subordinates under the theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 676–77; Simmons v. Navajo Cty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020–21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. 

City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th 

Cir. 2002). “A supervisor may be liable only if (1) he or she is personally involved in the 

constitutional deprivation, or (2) there is a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s 

wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 977 (9th 

Cir. 2013) (citation and quotation marks omitted); accord Lemire v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrs. & 

Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2013); Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 915–16 

(9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). “Under the latter theory, supervisory liability exists even without overt 

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personal participation in the offensive act if supervisory officials implement a policy so deficient 

that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force of a 

constitutional violation.” Crowley, 734 F.3d at 977 (citing Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 

(9th Cir. 1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Warden cannot be held responsible because he did not personally participate or 

implement a deficient policy. Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to support that any supervisory 

Defendant participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to 

prevent them. Plaintiff also has failed to plead facts showing that any policy was a moving force 

behind the assault. See Willard v. Cal. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., No. 14-0760, 2014 WL 6901849, 

at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2014) (“To premise a supervisor's alleged liability on a policy 

promulgated by the supervisor, plaintiff must identify a specific policy and establish a ‘direct 

causal link’ between that policy and the alleged constitutional deprivation.”).

Plaintiff alleges that untrained staff were providing medical decisions and that was “a 

systemic deficiency in staffing.” However, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts about the training he 

alleges was failed to be provided. Plaintiff alleges that both Defendant Korkor and Chain were 

medical doctors. Plaintiff does not allege any factual support that their training was deficient.

Plaintiff has been unable to cure the deficiency in supervisory liability.

C. Eighth Amendment – Medical Care

A prisoner's claim of inadequate medical care constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in 

violation of the Eighth Amendment where the mistreatment rises to the level of “deliberate 

indifference to serious medical needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) 

(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). The two-part test for deliberate indifference 

requires Plaintiff to show (1) “a ‘serious medical need’ by demonstrating that failure to treat a 

prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton 

infliction of pain,’ ” and (2) “the defendant's response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” 

Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096.

Deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious illness or injury, or risks of serious injury or 

illness, gives rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,

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105 (1976); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). To succeed on a medical care 

claim, a plaintiff must establish he had a serious medical need and that the defendant's response to 

that need was deliberately indifferent. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. An injury or illness is sufficiently 

serious if the failure to treat a prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or the 

“... unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 

1992); see also Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994).

A defendant does not act in a deliberately indifferent manner unless the defendant “knows 

of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at

837. “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard,” Simmons v. Navajo Cty. Ariz., 609 F.3d 

1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 2010); Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004), and is shown 

where there was “a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner's pain or possible medical 

need” and the indifference caused harm. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. In applying this standard, the 

Ninth Circuit has held that before it can be said that a prisoner's civil rights have been abridged, 

“the indifference to his medical needs must be substantial. Mere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or 

‘medical malpractice’ will not support this cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 622 F.2d 

458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105–06). Even gross negligence is

insufficient to establish deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. See Wood v. 

Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990). In general, deliberate indifference may be 

shown when prison officials deny, delay, or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or may 

be shown by the way in which prison officials provide medical care. Hutchinson v. United States, 

838 F.2d 390, 393-94 (9th Cir. 1988). Negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition 

does not, however, give rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. 

Moreover, a difference of opinion between the prisoner and medical providers concerning the 

appropriate course of treatment does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim. See Jackson v. 

McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996). But deliberately ignoring a prisoner's prior physician 

orders for reasons unrelated to the medical needs of a prisoner may show deliberate indifference. 

Hamilton v. Endell, 981 F.2d 1062, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 1992) (overruled on other grounds).

Plaintiff states he had serious breast pain and breast leakage, and the Court will liberally 

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construe the allegations that Plaintiff states a serious medical need.

However, Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient factual support to satisfy the second prong, that 

any Defendant was deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need. Plaintiff fails to allege any 

factual support regarding the conduct of Dr. Korkor or Dr. Chain that each defendant violated his 

constitutional rights. Plaintiff appears to allege that each Defendant prescribed the medication 

knowing that Plaintiff would suffer from breast discharge. Plaintiff fails to factually support such 

allegation, and the allegation is conclusory. Even if discharge in breasts was a known side effect 

of the medication, Plaintiff fails to allege any defendant knew that Plaintiff would suffer such side 

effect and that they nonetheless prescribed the medication with that knowledge. Indeed, Plaintiff 

alleges that Dr. Chain discontinued the medication once Plaintiff informed Dr. Chain of the side 

effect from the medication. Dr. Korkor was not responsible for prescribing the medication. 

Plaintiff also alleges that Dr. Korkor and Dr. Chain told Plaintiff that nothing can be done 

for the condition. A difference of opinion between the prisoner and medical providers concerning 

the appropriate course of treatment does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim. Plaintiff

fails to allege facts that any defendant “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate 

health or safety.”

D. Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act (“ADA” and “RA”)

The ADA provides, “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such 

disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or 

activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 

12132. The ADA defines “qualified individual with a disability” as “an individual with a 

disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the 

removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary

aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the 

participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.” Id. § 12131(2).

While the RA has the additional requirement that the program or activity receive federal 

funds, 29 U.S.C. § 794, “[t]here is no significant difference in analysis of the rights and 

obligations created by the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. Thus, courts have applied the same 

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analysis to claims brought under both statutes.” Zukle v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 166 F.3d 

1041, 1045 n.11 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).

To the extent Plaintiff intends to sue the individually named defendants for violation of 

his rights under the ADA, he may not “bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a State 

official in her individual capacity to vindicate rights created by Title II of the ADA.” Vinson v. 

Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 2002). The proper defendant in ADA actions is the public 

entity responsible for the alleged discrimination. U.S. v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 153 (2006). State 

correctional facilities are “public entities” within the meaning of the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 

12131(1)(A) & (B); Pennsylvania Dep't. of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998); Armstrong 

v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir. 1997).

In order to state a claim under the ADA, the plaintiff must have been “improperly 

excluded from participation in, and denied the benefit of, a prison service, program, or activity on 

the basis of his physical handicap.” Armstrong, 124 F.3d at 1023. Plaintiff has alleged no facts 

demonstrating such exclusion or denial. Plaintiff does not allege that he has a disability. Plaintiff 

also does not allege that any of his illnesses led to an exclusion or denial of a prison service, 

program, or activity. Further, plaintiff's allegations of inadequate medical care do not state a 

claim under the ADA. Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246, 249 (7th Cir. 1996) (“The ADA does not 

create a remedy for medical malpractice.”); see also Simmons, 609 F.3d at 1022 (Inadequate or 

negligent medical treatment alone does not constitute an unlawful failure to accommodate under 

the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act.).

IV. Conclusion and Recommendation

For the reasons discussed, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable 

claim for relief. Despite being provided with the relevant legal standards, Plaintiff has been 

unable to cure the deficiencies in his complaint. Further leave to amend is not warranted. Lopez 

v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to randomly assign a 

district judge to this action.

Further, for the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that this action 

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be dismissed for failure to state a cognizable claim upon which relief may be granted.

These Findings and Recommendation will be submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen 

(14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendation, Plaintiff may file written 

objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 

Findings and Recommendation.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the 

specified time may result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the magistrate’s factual 

findings” on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. 

Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 27, 2022 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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