Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02568/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02568-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ronald Duane Beaulieu
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 171990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

RONALD DUANE BEAULIEU, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

88-2568 

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On Appeal From The 

United States District Court 

For The Western District 

Of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. CR-88-129-P) 

Edward Y. Crandall, Midwest City, Oklahoma, for DefendantAppellant. 

Robert G. Mccampbell, Assistant United States Attorney (William S. 

Price, United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Oklahoma 

City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before TACHA and SETH, Circuit Judges, and BROWN, District Judge*. 

SETH, Circuit Judge. 

*Honorable Wesley E. Brown, United States District Judge for the 

District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 88-2568 Document: 01019583516 Date Filed: 04/17/1990 Page: 1 
Ronald -Duane Beaulieu, defendant-appellant, was convicted by 

a jury for conspiracy to manufacture· amphetamines, 21 u.s.c. 

§ 846, and for the unlawful possession of amphetamine oil with an 

intent to manufacture one (1) ounce of amphetamine in violation of 

21 u.s.c. § 84l(a)(l). The sentencing judge increased defendant's 

offense level under the United States Sentencing Commission 

Guidelines ("Guidelines") on the basis of a finding that defendant 

obstructed justice by testifying untruthfully. On appeal, 

defendant challenges both the sufficiency of evidence to support 

his conviction and the trial court's upward adjustment under 

§ 3Cl.l of the Guidelines. 

Defendant's indictment stems from a Drug Enforcement 

Administration ("DEA") investigation which began after several 

individuals purchased ch~micals used to process amphetamines from 

Mid-America Chemical Company in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. As a 

result of this investigation, police officers executed a $earch 

warrant of defendant's residence. In the defendant's presence, 

officers searched his bedroom and found a single burner heating 

device, two bottles of brown liquid and glassware. Furthermore, 

the record reveals that the search produced defendant's telephone 

bill indicating two long distance calls made to Mid-America 

Chemical Company (Exhibit 115) and an empty Mid-America Chemical 

box (Exhibit 116). Record, Vol. 3, at 246-48. Subsequently, a 

superseding indictment was returned against defendant charging him 

in Counts I and IV with violating 21 U.S.C. § 846 and 21 U.S.C. 

§ 84l(a)(l), respectively. The indictment also charged 

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Appellate Case: 88-2568 Document: 01019583516 Date Filed: 04/17/1990 Page: 2 
.defendant's brothers John and Darrell, and five others with 

conspiracy to manufacture-amphetamine and other drug related 

crimes. 

Defendant was tried jointly with his brother John Beaulieu. 

See United States v. John Beaulieu, F.2d , No. 88-2580, 

slip op. (10th Cir.); United States v. Darrell Beaulieu, 893 F.2d 

1177 (10th Cir.). At trial, a chemist testified that one bottle 

seized from defendant's bedroom contained a solution of 

amphetamine dissolved in ether and that sufficient amphetamine 

existed to extract it from the ether. Record, Vol. 3, at 232-34. 

There was also testimony from several government witnesses which 

conflicted as to whether the defendant purchased chemicals or 

participated in the "cooks." 

Mr. Schickedanz, a DEA special agent, provided the most 

damaging testimony to defendant. In. his opinion, the ·physical 

evidence seized from defendant's bedroom was all that was 

necessary to manufacture amphetamine by the "powdering out" 

process. Record, Vol. 3, at 244-45. To "powder out" amphetamine, 

defendant could place a clear dish on the heating device along 

with a small amount of the amphetamine-ether solution. After the 

heating device evaporated the ether, the resulting white powdery 

substance would be unlawful amphetamine sulfate. Id. at 245. 

Moreover, manufacturers of amphetamines save only small amounts of 

amphetamine in order to extract as much amphetamine from the 

liquid as possible. Id. at 244. Finally, the record shows that 

Mr. Schickedanz identified Exhibit 50 as a receipt from 

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Appellate Case: 88-2568 Document: 01019583516 Date Filed: 04/17/1990 Page: 3 
Mid-America Chemical Company -attributable to defendant for the 

purchase of known precursor chemicals to manufacture amphetamine. 

Id. at 241-43. 

The defendant denied all involvement in the production of 

amphetamine. He testified that the heating device was in his room 

to heat coffee or hot chocolate and that the brown liquid was 

starter fluid. Record, Vol. 3, at 308-311. Defendant testified 

that the ether was used to work on his carburetors and he was 

unaware that it was contaminated. Id. at 316. Further, he 

explained that the woman he bought the precursor chemicals from at 

Mid-America "misled" him about the type of chemicals he bought 

because he thought he was buying chemicals for his gold and silver 

business. Id. at 312-313. 

Defendant admits the evidence shows he possessed amphetamine, 

but argues the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction 

for intent to manufacture amphetamine under 21 U.S.C. § 84l(l)(a). 

In evaluating the defendant's sufficiency of evidence challenge, 

we note that he bears a heavy burden. We must review whether 

"[t]he evidence - both direct and circumstantial, together with 

the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom - is sufficient 

if, when taken in the light most favorable to the government, a 

reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt." United States v. McKinnell, 888 F.2d 669, 673 

(10th Cir.) (citing United States v. Brandon, 847 F.2d 625, 630 

(10th Cir.)). The evidence supporting a conviction must be 

substantial, raising more than a mere suspicion of guilt. Id. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2568 Document: 01019583516 Date Filed: 04/17/1990 Page: 4 
-(citing United States v. Troutman, 814 F.2d 1428, 1455 (10th 

Cir.)). After viewing the evidence in this light, we find ample 

evidence to support the jury's conviction. 

21 u.s.c. § 84l(a)(l} makes it a crime to knowingly or 

intentionally possess a controlled substance with the intent to 

manufacture. Amphetamine in liquid and powder form is a Schedule 

II controlled substance. See 21 C.F.R. § 1301.02(b)(7) (1988). 

Defendant urges that "[c]ornrnon sense dictates that larger 

quantities of amphetamine would be necessary to evince an 

intention to manufacture." Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 14. 

Defendant argues that the small amount of physical evidence seized 

combined with the absence of other physical evidence (precursor 

chemicals, chemical apparatus, drug paraphernalia and any natural 

chemical by-products) weighs in favor of mere personal possession. 

Defendant's contention that larger quantities of amphetamine 

are "necessary to evince an intention to manufacture" is without 

merit. As support, defendant urges us to consider case law 

concerning possession with intent to distribute. It is well 

settled, however, that possession with intent to distribute and 

manufacture are distinct charges that require proof of different 

elements. See United States v. Zamora, 784 F.2d 1025, 1029 (10th 

Cir.). Although quantity is an important factor wfth respect to 

the charge of possession with intent to distribute, it simply is 

not essential to prove intent to manufacture. See United States 

v. Washington, 858 F.2d 590, 594 (10th Cir.) (defendant's 

possession of one pint of piperdine was a sufficient amount to 

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Appellate Case: 88-2568 Document: 01019583516 Date Filed: 04/17/1990 Page: 5 
.. support the charge of intent to manufacture PCP): United States v. 

Young, 862 F.2d 815, 818 (10th Cir.) (trace amounts of liquid 

methamphetamine was a sufficient amount, along with other 

evidence, to support the inference that the defendant intended to 

convert it to powder methamphetamine). 

Moreover, the government is not required to prove the 

existence of all the physical evidence associated with the 

production process to sustain a conviction for intent to 

manufacture under 21 u.s.c. § 84l(a)(l). In Young this court 

found that evidence showing defendant's possession of liquid 

methamphetamine with the intent to convert it to finished powder 

methamphetamine was sufficient to support an intent to manufacture 

conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 84l(c)(l). In rejecting the argument 

that to sustain an intent to manufacture conviction the government 

must present physical evidence showing the capability.of further 

manufacture and evidence of a precursor element we stated: 

"The government is not required to present 

evidence from a currently operating laboratory 

in order to sustain a possession with intent 

to manufacture charge. Under these 

circumstances, the evidence of the residue and 

the byproducts of the manufacturing process 

was sufficient to prove the charge in the 

indictment." 

Young, 862 F.2d at 819. 

Similarly, in this case a reasonable jury could infer that 

the defendant manufactured amphetamine by using the "powdering 

out" process to extract amphetamine from ether to produce unlawful 

white powder amphetamine. Defendant's possession of the 

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Appellate Case: 88-2568 Document: 01019583516 Date Filed: 04/17/1990 Page: 6 
-amphetamine-ether solution and heating device supports the 

-inference that he intended to use the heating device to convert 

the solution to powder amphetamine. This is a reasonable 

inference given the testimony of Mr. Schickedanz that the 

defendant had all the necessary equipment to manufacture 

amphetamine, by converting the solution through the powdering out 

process to unlawful powder amphetamine. The jury considered 

evidence that if the defendant heated the solution, the ether 

would evaporate and the remaining substance would be powder 

amphetamine. The jury was free to reject defendant's hypothesis 

that the heating device was used to heat hot chocolate or coffee. 

Furthermore, as in Young, the process of converting liquid 

amphetamine into a finished powder form is consistent with the 

term ''manufacture" which is defined in 21 U.S.C. § 802(15) a~: 

"the production, prepar~tion, propagation, 

compounding, or processing of a drug or other 

substance, either directly or indirectly or by 

extraction from substances of natural origin, 

or independently by means of chemical 

synthesis or by a combination of extraction 

and chemical synthesis, and includes any 

packaging or repackaging of such substance or 

labeling or relabeling of its container 

" 

In addition, the jury considered other evidence (the chemical 

box, the phone bill and receipt for the purchase of precursor 

chemicals) from which it could reasonably infer that defendant 

intended to manufacture amphetamine. Of further importance is the 

eyewitness testimony of Regina Chester who observed defendant 

carry some amphetamines from a place of processing and recalled 

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Appellate Case: 88-2568 Document: 01019583516 Date Filed: 04/17/1990 Page: 7 
- him talking about purchasing chemicals .. Record, Vol. 3, at 122, 

130-31. Clint Brown testified that he believed defendant took an 

active role in manufacturing amphetamine, purchased chemicals and 

was present during four to six cooks. Id. at 144-45. Although 

other co-defendants presented conflicting testimony, it is within 

the exclusive province of the jury to determine the credibility of 

witnesses at trial. See United States v. Gillock, 886 F.2d 220, 

222 (9th Cir.). Viewed in a light most favorable to the 

government, we are satisfied that a rational trier of fact could 

conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant possessed 

amphetamine oil with the intent to convert it to powder 

amphetamine, in violation of 21 u.s.c. § 84l(a)(l). 

At the sentencing hearing the trial judge found that the 

defendant obstructed justice by .testifying unt.ruthfully at his 

trial. Based on this finding, the court enhanced defendant's 

s~ntence by increasing his base offense level by two pursuant to 

Section 3Cl.l of the Guidelines. The sentences as imposed are 

within the Guidelines. Defendant appeals contending, among other 

things, that the trial judge's upward adjustment was an abuse of 

discretion because it was based on insufficient finding of facts. 

At sentencing the trial court stated as to the adjustment: 

"The evidence at trial concerning [defendant], 

was overwhelming in the Court's view. And the 

jury flatly rejected the testimony that he 

provided. 

"The Court does not criticize defense counsel 

for putting [defendant] on the stand .... 

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Appellate Case: 88-2568 Document: 01019583516 Date Filed: 04/17/1990 Page: 8 
But the [defendant's] testimony was flatly 

contradicted by the other evidence at tr~al. 

"And the Court believes that a defendant who 

testifies falsely at trial should be subject 

to an increased offense level. And I am more 

than adequately persuaded that the defendant 

perjured himself during his testimony at 

trial." 

Record, Vol. 5, at 72. 

In our review of the trial court's decision to adjust, within 

the Guidelines, defendant's base offense level under Section 3Cl.l 

of the Guidelines we must "give due regard to the opportunity of 

the district court to judge the credibility of the witnesses, and 

shall accept the findings of fact of the district court unless 

they are clearli erroneous and shall give due deference to the 

district court's application of the guidelines to the facts." 18 

u.s.c. § 3742(e). 

we have held,' in cases of departures, that the trial court 

must specify its reasons for departu.re from the Guidelines and we 

must vacate the sentence if the trial court fails to do so. See 

18 u.s.c. § 3553 (b) and (c)(2). This was clearly described in 

United States v. Smith, 888 F.2d 720 (10th Cir.), and followed in 

United States v. Emrick, 895 F.2d 1297 (10th Cir.), and 

United States v. White, 893 F.2d 276, 278 (10th Cir.). If the 

trial court does not explicitly set forth the considerations that 

motivate its decision to depart from the Guidelines, we will not 

speculate as to what those considerations may have been. 

In the case before us, however, we do not have a departure 

from the Guidelines, but instead an upward adjustment to a point 

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Appellate Case: 88-2568 Document: 01019583516 Date Filed: 04/17/1990 Page: 9 
still within the Guidelines. The strict and added requirements 

for departures do not apply. False testimony may arguably have 

some elements to place it in a separate category, but this is not 

enough and the consequences of its application are no more severe 

than several other factors not considered as crimes. It is the 

departure from the Guidelines which is the significant factor 

under the statute and in the Tenth Circuit cases cited above and 

calls for the specific explanation by the trial judge. The 

Guidelines do not require "findings" for adjustments more specific 

than were. the reasons here expressed by the trial judge at 

sentencing. 

The Fifth Circuit in United States v. Mejia-Orosco, 867 F.2d 

216, reh'g denied, 868 F.2d 807, recently.described the difference 

between the standard of review. applic~ble to "adjustments" and to 

"departures" under the Guidelines: 

"We will affirm sentences imposed by district 

judges who make factual findings that are not 

clearly erroneous, and who apply the 

guidelines to those findings. In such cases, 

the sentencing judge need not of fer further 

reasons justifying the sentence. When, 

however, the judge departs from the guideline 

range, an additional reasonableness 

requirement applies: the judge must offer 

reasons explaining why the departure is 

justified in terms of the policies underlying 

the sentencing guidelines." 

867 F.2d at 221. Based on this distinction, the Fifth Circuit 

held that the sentencing judge's simple statement that defendant 

was a "manager" or "leader" was a finding of fact which was 

sufficient to justify an upward adjustment under Section 3Bl.l of 

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Appellate Case: 88-2568 Document: 01019583516 Date Filed: 04/17/1990 Page: 10 
the Guidelines. The court further stated that "we 'decline to 

require the judge to write out' more specific findings about .the 

defendant . [S]o formal a requirement would interfere with 

the smooth operation of the sentencing hearing." Id. (citing 

Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 430); see also, United States v. 

Duque, 883 F.2d 43 (6th Cir.) (the sentencing judge is not 

required to state with particularity the reasons for setting a 

sentence which falls within the Guidelines); United States v. 

Reed, 882 F.2d 147 (5th Cir.). 

The statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c), as amended, captioned 

"Statement of reasons for imposing a sentence," as here 

applicable, directs that the court at sentencing "shall state in 

open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular 

sentence." The statute in subsection (c)(2) provides for a more 

specific statement under other circumstances not here applicable. 

This gene~al requirement as to "reasons'', in our view, was 

satisfied by the trial court in the case before us. No "finding" 

of facts is required in these circumstances. See United States v. 

Duque, 883 F.2d 43 (6th Cir.). 

The general jury verdict against the defendant who here 

testified would not have been alone enough to demonstrate false 

testimony. The trial judge here mentioned it as a factor in 

saying that the jury "flatly rejected the testimony that he [the 

defendant] provided," but, in our view, this would not have been 

enough alone, and really was a factor without any significance. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2568 Document: 01019583516 Date Filed: 04/17/1990 Page: 11 
The judge's finding as to the ''contradiction" of defendant's 

-testimony by "other evidence at trial" was enough on this record. 

We have considered the fact that much of the testimony in 

issue on this point went to the extent the defendant participated 

in the enterprise. We have described above some of this 

testimony. It was not bare opinion nor an expression of 

subjective views, but went.to specific acts. There was some 

conflicting testimony, and many if not all of the witnesses were 

co-conspirators. The presence of these factors, in our view, does 

not lead to a different conclusion than here reached. 

The false testimony determination should here be treated the 

same way as would have been one as to whether a defendant was a 

"manager" or "leader" in· another adjustment case. This result has 

an obvious imP,act on a defendant's decision whether or not to 

testify. However, this ~onsequence and the imposition of 

penalties for false testimonj has been considered by the Supreme 

Court in United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41. Grayson, of 

course, was not a Guidelines case, but involved the same 

considerations as are here. The Supreme Court in Grayson stated: 

"Soon after Williams [v. New York, 337 U.S. 

241,] was decided, the Tenth Circuit concluded 

that 'the attitude of a convicted defendant 

with respect to his willingness to commit a 

serious crime [perjury] ... is a proper 

matter to consider in determining what 

sentence shall be imposed within the 

limitations fixed by statute.' Humes v. 

United States, 186 F.2d 875, 878 (1951). The 

Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, 

and Ninth Circuits have since agreed." 

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Appellate Case: 88-2568 Document: 01019583516 Date Filed: 04/17/1990 Page: 12 
438 U.S. at 50-51. Further, the Court in Grayson referred to the 

defendant's argument as to the impact of these holdings on 

defendant's right to testify. The Court there said: 

"Grayson's argument that judicial consideration of his conduct at trial impermissibly 

'chills' a defendant's statutory right, 18 

u.s.c. § 3481 (1976 ed.), and perhaps a 

constitutional right to testify on his own 

behalf is without basis. The right guaranteed 

by law to a defendant is narrowly the right to 

testify truthfully in accordance with the 

oath--unless we are to say that the oath is 

mere ritual without meaning. This view of the 

right involved is confirmed by the 

unquestioned constitutionality of perjury 

statutes, which punish those who willfully 

give false testimony. • . . Further support 

for this is found in an important limitation 

on a defendant's right to the assistance of 

counsel: Counsel ethically cannot assist his 

client in presenting what the attorney has 

reason to believe is false testimony .•.• 

Assuming, arguendo, that the sentencing 

judge's consideration of defendants' 

untruthfulness in testifying has any chilling 

effect on a defendant's decision to testify 

falsely, that effect is entirely permissible. 

There is no protected right to commit 

perjury." 

438 U.S. at 54. The Guidelines' comment on the increase of 

offense levels for obstruction by false statements (and other 

ways) is at § 3Cl.l, n.3, and includes the following statement: 

"This provision is not intended to punish a 

defendant for the exercise of a constitutional 

right. A defendant's denial of guilt is not a 

basis for application of this provision." 

AFFIRMED. 

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