Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-09-01481/USCOURTS-ca8-09-01481-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Donroy Ghost Bear
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 09-1481

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff – Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

Donroy Ghost Bear, *

*

Defendant – Appellant. *

___________

 Appeals from the United States

No. 09-1642 District Court for the

___________ District of South Dakota.

[UNPUBLISHED]

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff – Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

Shane Tyon, *

*

Defendant – Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: December 15, 2009

Filed: July 21, 2010

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The Honorable Richard H. Battey, United States District Judge for the District

of South Dakota.

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Before BYE, BEAM and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

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BYE, Circuit Judge.

Donroy Ghost Bear and Shane Tyon pleaded guilty pursuant to plea agreements

to one count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846,

841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(a). On appeal, Ghost Bear and Tyon argue the Fort Laramie

Treaty of 1868 divested the district court of jurisdiction to hear their case. In addition,

Ghost Bear challenges the district court’s1

 determination that he was not entitled to a

two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under the Sentencing Guidelines.

We affirm.

I

The plea agreements reveal the following facts. In 2001, Ghost Bear became

involved with a group in South Dakota transporting and selling cocaine. Tyon later

became a member of the same group. During the conspiracy, Ghost Bear and Tyon

imported more than five kilograms of cocaine into South Dakota.

Ghost Bear and Tyon are members of the Oglala Lakota Sioux Tribe and

resided on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation located near Rapid City, South Dakota.

In January 2007, federal agents executed a warrant to arrest Ghost Bear; he was

arrested on the reservation. The record does not indicate where Tyon was arrested.

After a grand jury indicted both men on various drug charges, Ghost Bear and

Tyon moved for dismissal of all charges on the grounds that the Treaty of Fort

Laramie of 1868 barred prosecution. The district court denied the motion. Ghost

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Bear and Tyon subsequently pleaded guilty pursuant to written plea agreements to one

count each of conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§§ 846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(a). Ghost Bear and Tyon’s plea agreements

contained provisions waiving their right to appeal. Both appeal waivers, however,

included exceptions for challenges to the district court’s jurisdiction as well as the

“right to appeal the sentence for a determination of ‘reasonableness’ should the Court

impose a sentence above the advisory guideline range established by the Court for the

offense.”

At sentencing, Ghost Bear sought a two-level reduction of his offense level for

acceptance of responsibility, see U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a). The district court declined to

apply the two-level reduction. Ultimately, the district court imposed a sentence of 151

months on Ghost Bear and 120 months on Tyon, both sentences within the Guidelines

range.

Ghost Bear and Tyon timely appeal.

II

We review the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction de novo. See Keene

Corp. v. Cass, 908 F.2d 293, 296 (8th Cir. 1990).

As a starting point, 18 U.S.C. § 3231 provides that “[t]he district courts of the

United States shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of

all offenses against the laws of the United States.”

Ghost Bear and Tyon cite the so-called “Bad Men” provision of the Fort

Laramie Treaty of 1868, which states:

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If bad men among the Indians shall commit a wrong or depredation upon

the persons or property of any one, white, black, or Indian, subject to the

authority of the United States, and at peace therewith, the Indians herein

named solemnly agree that they will, upon proof made to their agent and

notice by him, deliver up the wrong-doer to the United States, to be tried

and punished according to its laws.

Treaty with the Sioux, Apr. 29, 1868, U.S.-Sioux, art. I, 15 Stat. 635.

According to Ghost Bear and Tyon’s argument, the “Bad Men” provision

requires the United States to give notice before seizing persons in Indian country. As

a corollary, Ghost Bear and Tyon contend that failure to give notice as contemplated

by the treaty is a jurisdictional defect barring prosecution in federal court.

We rejected the same arguments in United States v. Drapeau, 414 F.3d 869, 878

(8th Cir. 2005). In Drapeau, we held that the plain language of the treaty: 

does not create the sort of ‘notice’ requirement that [the appellant]

envisions. The treaty does not say that the United States must give notice

to an Indian tribe before the government may arrest and prosecute a

tribal member who has violated the federal drug trafficking laws. Rather,

the treaty imposes an obligation on the tribe to ‘deliver up the

wrong-doer to the United States,’ upon proof and notice to the tribe.

Id. In addition, the Drapeau court held that to the extent the treaty could be construed

to impose a notice and request obligation on the United States, Congress’ grant of

citizenship to the Indians, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(2) (now § 1401(b), see Pub. L. No.

95-432, § 3, 92 Stat. 1046 (1978)), “makes them ‘subject to all restrictions to which

any other American citizen is subject, in any state,’ and that the ‘legislative history

and the language of the statute itself are sufficient expression of a clear Congressional

intent to abrogate or modify any treaty provisions to the contrary.’” Id. (citation

omitted).

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Drapeau controls this case. We hold the district court did not err when it

concluded subject matter jurisdiction existed in this case.

III

Next, Ghost Bear challenges the district court’s determination that he was not

entitled at sentencing to a two-level offense level reduction for acceptance of

responsibility, see U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a). The government contends Ghost Bear waived

his right to appeal this issue. We agree.

An appeal waiver is enforceable where the appeal falls within the scope of the

waiver, both the plea agreement and the waiver were entered into knowingly and

voluntarily, and no miscarriage of justice would result from enforcing waiver. United

States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 889-90 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

Here, the appeal of the denial of the two-level reduction is within the scope of

the waiver. The only relevant exception to the waiver was Ghost Bear’s “right to

appeal the sentence for a determination of ‘reasonableness’ should the Court impose

a sentence above the advisory guideline range established by the Court for the

offense.” Because Ghost Bear’s sentence fell within the Guidelines range, and

because Ghost Bear is not seeking review of the sentence’s reasonableness, the appeal

waiver applies. Further, there is no suggestion by Ghost Bear that he did not enter

into the plea agreement knowingly and voluntarily. Finally, we conclude no

miscarriage of justice would result from enforcing the waiver. See id. at 891-92 (the

miscarriage-of-justice exception to enforcing an otherwise valid appeal waiver is

extremely narrow and “an allegation that the sentencing judge misapplied the 

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Sentencing Guidelines or abused his or her discretion is not subject to appeal in the

face of a valid appeal waiver”).

IV

Affirmed.

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