Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01351/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01351-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Google, Inc.
Appellee
Oracle America, Inc.
Appellant

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

ORACLE AMERICA, INC.,

Appellant

v.

GOOGLE, INC.,

Appellee

______________________ 

2014-1351

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in Reexamination 

No. 95/001,548.

______________________ 

Decided: March 20, 2015

______________________ 

MARC A. HEARRON, Morrison & Foerster LLP, Washington, DC, argued for appellant. Also represented by 

MEHRAN ARJOMAND, Los Angeles, CA; DEANNE MAYNARD,

Washington, DC; CHRISTOPHER B. EIDE, Palo Alto, CA. 

DARYL JOSEFFER, King & Spalding LLP, Washington, 

DC, argued for appellee. Also represented by ROBERT T.

NEUFELD, Atlanta, GA; ADAM CONRAD, Charlotte, NC; 

SCOTT THOMAS WEINGAERTNER, New York, NY; BRIAN C.

BANNER, Austin, TX . 

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2 ORACLE AMERICA, INC. v. GOOGLE, INC. 

______________________ 

Before DYK, O’MALLEY, and TARANTO, Circuit Judges.

O’MALLEY, Circuit Judge. 

Google, Inc. (“Google”) filed a request for an inter 

partes reexamination of U.S. Patent No. 6,910,205 (“the 

’205 patent”), arguing, inter alia, that the ’205 patent is

invalid under § 102 as anticipated by Partial Translation, 

Swedish Institute of Computer Science Technical Report 

(T93.5), October 1993 (“Magnusson”). The Patent Trial 

and Appeal Board (“the Board”) affirmed the examiner’s 

rejection of the ’205 patent as anticipated by Magnusson. 

Oracle America, Inc. (“Oracle”), the owner of the ’205 

patent, appeals the Board’s rejection. For the reasons 

explained below, we affirm-in-part, reverse-in-part, vacate-in-part, and remand. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. The ’205 Patent

The Java computer language allows software developers to create programs that are capable of running on any 

device that has a Java virtual machine (“JVM”) installed. 

This ensures that, once the program is created, it can run 

on a multitude of different devices—e.g., Windows computers, Apple computers, tablets, smartphones. When a 

program is written in Java, it is compiled into a series of 

virtual machine instructions, also referred to in the 

patent as “bytecodes.” Those virtual machine instructions 

can be distributed to any device that has a JVM installed. 

The JVM installed on each device interprets those virtual 

machine instructions to achieve the desired output. 

Although this is an advantage for interoperability, the 

JVM must interpret the virtual machine instructions 

while the program is running. This typically causes the 

execution to be slower than a program that is compiled 

directly into native machine instructions. 

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To help increase the execution speed of Java-like programs—programs that use a virtual machine to interpret 

virtual machine instructions—the ’205 patent discloses a 

method of replacing some virtual machine instructions 

with native machine instructions. This allows the JVM to 

skip the interpretation step for those instructions and 

purports to speed up the execution of the program. Figure 

5 is exemplary:

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4 ORACLE AMERICA, INC. v. GOOGLE, INC. 

’205 patent Fig. 5. 

The virtual machine instructions 301 are modified 

such that native instructions replace some virtual machine instructions in the hybrid instructions 309. In this 

example, the virtual machine instruction BYTECODE 2 is 

replaced by the virtual machine instruction “GO_NATIVE 

#N” in the modified virtual machine instructions 303. 

When the JVM reaches the new instruction, rather than 

interpret BYTECODE 2, it will execute the new 

GO_NATIVE instruction. This will cause the execution of 

the corresponding native code in the snippet zone 305. In 

this example, the snippet executes native machine instructions that perform the same function as

BYTECODES 2–5 (as if the JVM had interpreted those 

virtual machine instructions). As a result, once the 

snippet is executed, the program will continue by interpreting BYTECODE 6. 

Claims 1 and 2 are indicative of the issues on appeal:

1. In a computer system, a method for increasing 

the execution of virtual machine instructions at 

runtime, the method comprising:

receiving a first virtual machine instruction; 

generating, at runtime, a new virtual machine instruction that represents or references one or 

more native instructions that can be executed instead of said first virtual machine instruction; and

executing said new virtual machine instruction 

instead of said first virtual machine instruction.

2. The method of claim 1, further comprising 

overwriting a selected virtual machine instruction 

with a new virtual machine instruction, the new 

virtual machine instruction specifying execution 

of the at least one native machine instructions.

’205 patent col. 13 ll. 44–58 (emphasis added). 

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B. The Reexamination Proceedings

On February 17, 2011, Google requested this inter 

partes reexamination, arguing, inter alia, that Magnusson 

anticipated the claims of the ’205 patent. The examiner 

decided that Magnusson presented a substantial new 

question of patentability and granted the reexamination. 

After amendment and briefing, the examiner rejected all 

of the challenged claims as anticipated by Magnusson. 

On November 27, 2013, the Board affirmed the examiner’s rejection. Although the examiner did not construe 

any claims, the Board construed “overwriting” as “the act 

of replacing some information in a computer file with new 

information, rather than literally writing over an existing 

information.” Google, Inc. v. Oracle Am., Inc., No. 2013-

010321, 2013 WL 6217845, at *3 (Patent Tr. & App. Bd. 

Nov. 27, 2013) (“Board Decision”). Based on that construction, the Board concluded that Magnusson anticipated the claims that contained the “overwriting” 

limitation—claims 2–4, 15, 16, and 18–21. The Board 

also affirmed the examiner’s determination that Magnusson was an enabling prior art references for all claims, 

including the claims that do not have the “overwriting” 

limitation—claims 1 and 8. 

Oracle timely appealed. Because this is an appeal 

from a final decision of the Board, we have jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A) (2012). 

II. DISCUSSION

We review the Board’s legal conclusions, e.g., claim 

construction, de novo.1 In re NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d 1268, 

1 After oral argument in this case, the Supreme 

Court decided Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 

135 S.Ct. 831 (Jan. 20, 2015), which changed our standard of review of a district court’s factual determinations in 

construing a claim. Because the Board did not base its 

 

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1273 (Fed. Cir. 2011). We review the Board’s factual 

findings for “substantial evidence.” In re Morsa, 713 F.3d 

104, 109 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Substantial evidence is “less 

than the weight of the evidence but more than a mere 

scintilla of evidence.” Id. “‘[W]here two different, inconsistent conclusions may reasonably be drawn from the 

evidence in [the] record, an agency’s decision to favor one 

conclusion over the other is the epitome of a decision that 

must be sustained upon review for substantial evidence.’” 

Id. (quoting In re Jolley, 308 F.3d 1317, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 

2002)). 

Whether or not a piece of prior art is enabled is a 

question of law based on underlying factual findings. Id.

(citing In re Antor Media Corp., 689 F.3d 1282, 1287, 1292 

(Fed. Cir. 2012)).

A. Claim Construction

On reexamination, claims are to be “given their 

broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the 

specification.” In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. 

Cir. 1984). Claims must be read in light of the specification as it would be interpreted to a person having skill in 

the art. In re Am. Academy of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 

1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (collecting cases).

Although the examiner did not construe any terms, 

the Board construed “overwriting” to mean “the act of 

replacing some information in a computer file with new 

information, rather than literally writing over an existing 

information.” Board Decision, 2013 WL 6217845, at *3. 

The Board explained that its construction is warranted 

because “only bytecode 2 has been ‘overwritten’ within the 

construction in this case on any findings of fact, and 

instead only considered intrinsic evidence, we need not 

consider whether Teva also changes our standard of 

review on appeals from the Board.

 

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modified [JVM] instructions 303, despite the fact that 

bytecodes 3–5 are also being replaced by one or more 

native machine instructions.” Id. 

We conclude that the Board’s construction is erroneous. Although claims are given their “broadest reasonable 

construction” on reexamination, that construction must be 

“consistent with the specification.” Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 

at 1571. Based on the clear language in the claims and 

the specification, “overwriting” means “replacing information in a particular memory location with new information in that location.”

In the example from Figure 5—which the Board relies 

upon for its construction—although the native machine 

instructions execute instead of BYTECODES 2–5, only 

BYTECODE 2 is overwritten or replaced by a new virtual 

machine instruction—GO_NATIVE #N. The specification 

explains that only “the initial virtual machine instruction”—in this example, BYTECODE 2—is overwritten. 

The new virtual machine instruction—GO_NATIVE #N—

replaces the old virtual machine instruction in the same 

memory location as the old virtual machine instruction. 

’205 patent col. 8 ll. 2–5. This ensures that the virtual 

machine will interpret GO_NATIVE #N instead of 

BYTECODE 2 when it reaches that instruction. Id. col. 8 

ll. 27–30 (“When the interpreter executes the go_native 

bytecode, the interpreter will look up the snippet in the 

snippet zone specified by the go_native bytecode and then 

activate the native machine instructions in the snippet.”). 

BYTECODES 3–5, on the other hand, remain in memory, 

and are, therefore, not overwritten with new information—i.e., a new virtual machine instruction. Indeed, 

the specification refers to only BYTECODE 2 as being 

overwritten, not BYTECODES 3–5. Id. col. 8 ll. 2–5 (“The 

interpreter generates modified Java virtual machine 

instructions 303 by overwriting bytecode 2 with a 

go_native virtual machine instructions.” (emphasis added)).

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This example is consistent with the remainder of the 

specification, which consistently discloses that only the 

first bytecode in the sequence is actually overwritten or 

replaced. Id. col. 7 ll. 27–28; see id. col. 7 ll. 36–40 (“At 

step 209, the virtual machine instruction at the beginning 

of the selected portion of the function is overwritten with a 

new virtual machine instruction that specifies the execution of one or more native machine instructions of the 

snippet.” (emphasis added)). The new go_native instruction replaces the old bytecode at the same location in 

memory so that the virtual machine will interpret the 

go_native instruction instead of the old bytecode. See id.

col. 8 ll. 27–30. While this replacement could occur either 

by actually writing over the existing information with the 

new information or by deleting the existing information 

and inserting the new information, the existing and new 

information must both appear in the same memory location. Id. 

Based on the language in the claims and specification, 

accordingly, we reject the Board’s construction and construe “overwriting” to mean “replacing information in a 

particular memory location with new information in that 

location.”2 Because the Board’s finding of anticipation 

was based on an erroneous claim construction, we vacate

the Board’s finding that Magnusson anticipates the 

overwriting claims of the ’205 patent—claims 2–4, 15, 16, 

2 Although we use the term “information” in our 

construction, we note that the claims at issue discuss 

“overwriting a selected virtual machine instruction with a 

new virtual machine instruction.” ’205 patent col. 13 ll. 

54–56. Because neither party addresses the additional 

limitations in the claims at issue, we do not address them 

here. The Board, however, will need to address these 

limitations on remand.

 

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and 18–21—and remand for proceedings consistent with 

this opinion.

B. Enablement of Magnusson

Because the Board considered enablement based on 

an erroneous construction of overwriting, we vacate the 

Board’s enablement determination with respect to the 

overwriting claims—claims 2–4, 15, 16, and 18–21—and 

remand for the Board to make the first determination of 

enablement with respect to those claims. Oracle, however, also argues that Magnusson is not enabled for claims 1 

and 8, which do not include the overwriting limitation. In 

determining whether a prior art reference is enabled, we 

ask “whether a person of ordinary skill in the art could 

make or use the claimed invention without undue experimentation based on the disclosure of that particular 

document.” Morsa, 713 F.3d at 110 (emphasis in original) 

(citing 35 U.S.C. § 112).

 Oracle argues that, because Magnusson does not 

explain how the “TRANSLATED” instruction is introduced, it is not enabled with respect to the “generating” 

and “representing” steps in claims 1 and 8, respectively. 

See ’205 patent col. 13, ll. 48–51 (“[G]enerating, at 

runtime, a new virtual machine instruction that represents or references one or more native instructions that 

can be executed instead of said first virtual machine 

instruction . . . .”); id. col. 14 ll. 23–25 (“[R]epresenting 

said at least one native machine instruction with a new 

virtual machine instruction that is executed after the 

compiling of the function . . . .”). The examiner,3 however, 

3 The Board did not provide any analysis of this issue in its opinion; it merely credited the examiner’s 

analysis. Board Decision, 2013 WL 6217845, at *5 (“We 

have similarly considered the record and we find that the 

arguments and evidence submitted by [Oracle] are not 

 

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extensively reviewed the record and found person of 

ordinary skill would have known how to introduce 

the “TRANSLATED” instruction to meet the generating 

and representing steps. J.A. 31–32. Oracle fails to provide any explanation as to how these findings are not 

supported by substantial evidence.

Oracle’s remaining arguments are also unpersuasive. 

Contrary to Oracle’s assertions, the examiner did not base 

his finding of enablement on a comparison between the 

disclosure in Magnusson and the disclosure in the ’205 

patent. Instead, the examiner merely noted that the 

specification of the ’205 patent did not even have the level 

of detail that Oracle was arguing was necessary in Magnusson. See In re Epstein, 32 F.3d 1559, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 

1994) (“Rather the Board’s observation that appellant did 

not provide the type of detail in his specification that he 

now argues is necessary in prior art references supports 

the Board’s finding that one skilled in the art would have 

known how to implement the features of the references 

and would have concluded that the reference disclosures 

would have been enabling.”). Furthermore, the mere fact 

that the expert witnesses for both sides were persons of 

extraordinary skill, does not preclude the examiner’s 

finding that a person of ordinary skill would recognize the 

errors in Magnusson. Even though Oracle’s expert may 

have disagreed, we cannot say that the examiner’s determination of the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill is 

not supported by substantial evidence. 

We therefore conclude that Magnusson is an enabling 

reference with respect to claims 1 and 8 and affirm the 

Board’s holding that these claims are anticipated.

sufficient to overcome the presumption of enablement 

relied upon by the Examiner.”). 

 

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III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the Board’s 

construction of “overwriting” and vacate its anticipation 

and prior art enablement conclusions based on its incorrect construction—for claims 2–4, 15, 16, and 18–21. We

remand this case for proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. With respect to claims 1 and 8, which do not 

have the “overwriting” limitation, we agree with the 

Board that Magnusson is an enabling prior art reference. 

We therefore affirm the Board’s holding that these two 

claims are anticipated.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, 

VACATED IN PART, REMANDED

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