Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-03498/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-03498-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
J. D. Hollinger
Defendant
Jose Luis Morales
Plaintiff
C. Noll
Defendant
P. E. Tingey
Defendant
C. Van Hoose
Defendant
A. Williams
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

NOT FOR CITATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE LUIS MORALES,

Plaintiff,

 vs.

P. E. TINGEY, A. WILLIAMS, J. D.

HOLLINGER, C. NOLL, and C. VAN

HOOSE, 

Defendants. /

No. C 05-3498 PJH (PR)

RULINGS; ORDER FOR

PLAINTIFF TO SHOW CAUSE

This is a civil rights case filed pro se by a prisoner. It was dismissed with leave to

amend in the initial review order. Plaintiff has filed several motions and has amended.

DISCUSSION

1. Motion for appointment of counsel

There is no constitutional right to counsel in a civil case. Lassiter v. Dep't of Social

Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981). 28 U.S.C. § 1915 confers on a district court only the

power to "request" that counsel represent a litigant who is proceeding in forma pauperis. 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). This does not give the courts the power to make "coercive

appointments of counsel." Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 310 (1989).

The court may ask counsel to represent an indigent litigant under § 1915 only in

"exceptional circumstances," the determination of which requires an evaluation of both (1)

the likelihood of success on the merits and (2) the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his

claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved. Terrell v. Brewer, 935

F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir.

1986).

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United States District Court

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Plaintiff has done an excellent job pleading his case, and the issues are simple. The

motion for appointment of counsel will be denied.

2. Other motions

Plaintiff has filed two motions for leave to amend, and has amended once as of right. 

Because the complaint has not yet been served, no prejudice will arise from allowing the

most recent amendment, the third amended complaint. The motion for leave to file it will be

granted and the amendment filed. It is reviewed below.

The earlier motion to amend is mooted by the grant of the motion for leave to file the

third amended complaint, and plaintiff has withdrawn his motion for a stay.

3. Review of third amended complaint

A. Standard of Review

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners

seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 

28 U.S.C § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and

dismiss any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at

1915A(b)(1),(2).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was

violated, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the

color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

B. Legal Claims 

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Tingey reviewed his conviction of a rule violation and

ordered that the Rules Violation Report ("RVR") be reissued and reheard because of

procedural errors. Plaintiff contends that Tingey deliberately falsified her order requiring

that the report be reissued and reheard so that the new RVR could be written for a more

serious rule violation. He alleges that this violated his due process, Eighth Amendment,

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and First Amendment rights, and was in retaliation for his "beat[ing]" attempted murder

charges from the same incident. 

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Hollinger, the hearing officer on the reissued report,

violated various of his due process rights in the course of finding him guilty. Among other

sanctions imposed for the rules violation was the loss of 360 days of good time credit. The

other defendants are alleged to have failed to consider his attempted administrative appeal

and to have been members of the classification committee which imposed a Security

Housing Unit (SHU) term as a consequence of his having been found guilty of the rules

violation. 

Plaintiff requests relief of an injunction voiding the RVR decision and compensatory

and punitive damages. Because it would directly impact the length of his sentence, the

request that the disciplinary decision be voided is relief that can be sought only by way of

habeas corpus. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). The request for

injunctive relief will be dismissed.

 As to the damages claims, the United States Supreme Court has held that to

recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other

harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid,

a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct

appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to

make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of

habeas corpus. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-487 (1994). A claim for

damages arising from a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not

cognizable under § 1983. Id.

Heck makes it clear that a § 1983 "cause of action for damages attributable to an

unconstitutional conviction or sentence does not accrue until the conviction or sentence has

been invalidated." Id. at 489-90 (footnote omitted). Any such claim is not cognizable and

therefore must be dismissed. Edwards, 520 U.S. at 649; Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49

F.3d 583, 585 (9th Cir. 1995) (claim barred by Heck may be dismissed sua sponte without

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prejudice under 28 U.S.C. §1915).

Heck has been applied beyond cases which involve a challenge to the fact of

conviction or to the sentence as imposed by a court, including attacks on disciplinary

decisions that involve a loss of good time credits, as here. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520

U.S. 641, 645 (1997); Sheldon v. Hundley, 83 F.3d 231, 233 (8th Cir. 1996). If plaintiff is

successful here, it appears that would implicate the validity of the present calculation of the

length of his sentence. In short, if Heck applies, plaintiff cannot pursue Section 1983

claims going to the validity of his RVR conviction until he gets it set aside by way of other

proceedings, probably in a state or federal habeas case. 

Plaintiff will be ordered to show cause why the case should not be dismissed under

Heck.

CONCLUSION

1. Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a third amended complaint (document number

14 on the docket) is GRANTED. The amendment shall be filed. His earlier motion for

leave to amend (document number 11) is DENIED as moot. Plaintiff has withdrawn his

motion for a stay (document 13); the clerk shall terminate it. His motion for appointment of

counsel (document 10) is DENIED for the reasons set out above.

2. On review of the third amended complaint, plaintiff's injunctive relief claim is

DISMISSED. 

3. Plaintiff shall show cause within thirty days of the date this order is entered why

the case should not be dismissed pursuant to Heck, as discussed above. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 1, 2007. 

 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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