Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01512/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01512-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael R. Burns
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-1512

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Western

* District of Missouri.

Michael R. Burns, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: October 29, 2004

Filed: December 28, 2005 (Corrected 3/28/06)

___________

Before WOLLMAN, ARNOLD, SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.

Michael Burns was convicted by a jury of one count of conspiracy to distribute

500 grams or more of methamphetamine, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846,

and two counts of distribution of 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), and sentenced by the district court to 360 months in prison. On

appeal, he contends that prejudicial error occurred during his trial and that his

sentence is excessive. We affirm Mr. Burns's conviction, but we remand to the district

court for resentencing.

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I.

Mr. Burns first argues that the district court should have granted his request for

a mistrial after Officer Scott Britton was allowed to testify to a post-arrest hearsay

statement of co-defendant Alonzo Ellerman that inculpated Mr. Burns. We conclude

that the district court's refusal to grant a mistrial was not reversible error.

In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135-36 (1967), the Court held that

"the admission of a non-testifying defendant's statement that inculpated a codefendant,

violated the latter's Confrontation Clause rights, despite a curative instruction

otherwise." United States v. Coleman, 349 F.3d 1077, 1085 (8th Cir. 2003), cert.

denied, 541 U.S. 1055 & 1080 (2004). Prior to trial, the district court granted the

government's motion to sever the trials of Mr. Burns and Mr. Ellerman in order to

avoid a potential confrontation-clause problem based on the admission of Mr.

Ellerman's post-arrest statement. Cf. United States v. Ellerman, 411 F.3d 941 (8th Cir.

2005). Mr. Ellerman was not present at Mr. Burns's trial.

In its case in chief against Mr. Burns, the government presented the testimony

of Officer Britton, the investigating officer and a member of a regional drug task force

(the Combined Ozarks Multijurisdictional Enforcement Team (COMET)), but it did

not ask him about Mr. Ellerman's statement. By questioning the officer, the

government established that after methamphetamine was found at Mr. Ellerman's

residence, Mr. Ellerman agreed to cooperate and to set up a drug transaction with

another co-defendant, Howard Neustel. Mr. Neustel later agreed to assist the

government and testified against Mr. Burns at his trial.

Mr. Burns's counsel sought to challenge Mr. Neustel's credibility through his

cross-examination of Officer Britton. Counsel began by asking the officer about a

report of Mr. Ellerman's interview with COMET (during which the statements

inculpating Mr. Burns occurred). The attorney then inquired whether "as a result of

conversations" with Mr. Ellerman, COMET had "focus[ed] on this Mr. Neustel."

After establishing that Mr. Ellerman had assisted COMET in making controlled

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purchases from Mr. Neustel, counsel inquired whether "anybody had tossed around

Mr. Burns's name" by the time of Mr. Neustel's second purchase; the officer (after

being sure that he had heard the question correctly) responded that COMET learned

of Mr. Burns during its interview with Mr. Ellerman. Counsel asked Officer Britton

whether based on the "conversations with Mr. Ellerman, [Officer Britton] suspect[ed]

that Mr. Neustel was a major dealer of some kind." At another point in crossexamination, Mr. Burns's attorney asked Officer Britton to identify the report of

Mr. Ellerman's interview, although it was not introduced into evidence. Finally, after

questioning the officer about Mr. Neustel's arrest and subsequent statement to law

enforcement, Mr. Burns's counsel asked whether COMET had any "independent

corroboration of anything [Mr. Neustel] told you at that point." 

Mr. Burns argues that he was entitled to a mistrial because on redirect

examination, the government elicited from Officer Britton post-arrest statements of

Mr. Ellerman that incriminated Mr. Burns. Over counsel's objection, the government

asked about whom, in addition to Mr. Neustel, Mr. Ellerman had identified as a

methamphetamine supplier. Officer Britton responded that Mr. Ellerman had named

Mr. Burns and had said that he (Mr. Ellerman) hoped that by Officer Britton meeting

Mr. Neustel first, the officer would "build ... credibility," which would then lead to a

purchase from Mr. Burns. At that point, Mr. Burns's counsel asked for a mistrial,

which was denied. The government also elicited testimony that, according to

Mr. Ellerman, Mr. Burns had been making trips to California and "purchasing 1 pound

to 11⁄2 pounds of methamphetamine" at a time.

No doubt Mr. Ellerman's incriminating hearsay statements normally would be

inadmissible because of his right to confront the witnesses against him. See Bruton,

391 U.S. at 135-36. But we have said that "there can be no reversible error" "where

the defendant 'opened the door,' " and that the court may admit "otherwise

inadmissible evidence to clarify or rebut an issue opened up by defense counsel on

cross-examination," United States v. Beason, 220 F.3d 964, 968 (8th Cir. 2000)

(internal quotations omitted).

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We believe that here the cross-examination of Officer Britton was likely to give

the jury the false impression that Mr. Ellerman had named Mr. Neustel as the primary

actor in the drug conspiracy because COMET "focus[ed]" on Mr. Neustel based on

its conversations with Mr. Ellerman. And we think that this impression may have

been bolstered when counsel asked whether Mr. Ellerman's statement created

suspicions that "Mr. Neustel was a major drug dealer of some kind," even though

Officer Britton denied that he had such a suspicion "[a]t that time." In addition, it

seems to us that Mr. Burns's counsel sought through his questions to create an

inference that Mr. Neustel's statements inculpating Mr. Burns had no "independent

corroboration," although, in fact, they were supported by Mr. Ellerman.

Mr. Burns correctly states on appeal that he did not ask Officer Britton to repeat

what Mr. Ellerman had said, but we do not believe that resolves the issue. Counsel

repeatedly referred to the statement and created confusion about its content. When,

as here, "defense counsel leaves a false impression after cross-examining a witness,

the court may allow the use of otherwise inadmissible evidence on redirect to clarify

the issue." United States v. Womochil, 778 F.2d 1311, 1317 (8th Cir. 1985). We

therefore conclude that here the government properly questioned Officer Britton to

clear up the false impressions created during cross-examination.

In addition, we believe that even assuming that the government's questions

should have been prohibited, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See

Coleman, 349 F.3d at 1086. The government introduced testimony from Mr. Neustel

and Kimberly Tally, a friend of Mr. Burns, that Mr. Burns had been purchasing

methamphetamine from California in large quantities. We are not persuaded by Mr.

Burns's contention that Mr. Ellerman's statements to the same effect were "compelling

and forceful" because "a government agent" testified to them. The jury was well

aware that Officer Britton was merely repeating the words of a co-conspirator, who

had decided to cooperate with the police. The evidence of Mr. Ellerman's hearsay

statement was cumulative, and the other evidence of Mr. Burns's guilt was

overwhelming. Cf. id. at 1086-87.

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II.

Mr. Burns maintains that he was entitled to a mistrial because the government

improperly shifted the burden of proof by commenting during closing argument on

his failure "to negate key government evidence." We review the denial of a mistrial

based on prosecutorial misconduct for an abuse of discretion. United States v.

Conroy, 424 F.3d 833, 840 (8th Cir. 2005). For reversible error to exist, the

government must have engaged in improper conduct that prejudicially affected Mr.

Burns's substantial rights so as to deprive him of a fair trial. Id.

During trial, the government introduced evidence showing that in 1999 an

officer from the sheriff's department of San Bernardino County, California, arrested

Mr. Burns after stopping him for a traffic violation and seized over 340 grams of

methamphetamine from his car. A "criminalist" in the sheriff's department testified

that the substance, which she determined through testing to be methamphetamine,

would have been destroyed a year later in accordance with standard department

procedures. According to a government witness, the procedure was necessary because

of the large amount of drugs seized in San Bernardino County. When questioning

witnesses from the sheriff's department, defense counsel emphasized that he could not

have independent testing conducted to counter the state's findings because the

evidence had been destroyed.

According to Mr. Burns, the government improperly shifted the burden of proof

in closing argument when it addressed the substance seized in California, as well as

when it spoke of an automobile bottle jack that Mr. Burns allegedly used to hide

methamphetamine. The government argued to the jury that there was a "good reason"

that the sheriff's department did not keep evidence in drug cases. It then added that

Mr. Burns, while facing related drug-crime charges in California, had a year to have

had the substance tested if he was "so inclined," but "there [was] no evidence" that he

did so. Defense counsel did not object at this point.

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Shortly afterward, the government's attorney referred to a letter that Mr. Burns

wrote to Ms. Tally after his arrest. Mr. Burns said in the letter that the police were

interested in the bottle jack and asked that Ms. Tally save it for him because it might

be an important piece of evidence, but Ms. Tally gave it to the police. The

government asked the jury whether it really thought that Mr. Burns "would have taken

the jack and said [to the police], 'Here's my tire jack. This is going to prove my

innocence'?" Mr. Burns's counsel asked for a mistrial, contending that the government

had twice shifted the burden to the defendant by referring to his failure "to produce

evidence to prove his innocence." The court admonished the government to be

"careful" about what it said "in regard to what the defendant should do" and denied

a mistrial. The court then asked Mr. Burns's attorney whether he wanted any other

relief such as an instruction to the jury, but counsel declined.

On appeal, Mr. Burns relies on cases that forbid the government from

commenting to the jury upon the defendant's failure to testify. See, e.g., Griffin v.

California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965); United States v. Triplett, 195 F.3d 990, 995 (8th

Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1094 (2000). He maintains that "the jury may have

drawn the next logical inference" from the government's argument and wondered

"why [Mr. Burns] did ... not simply take the stand and explain that and tell them when

the conspiracy began?" We agree with Mr. Burns that the prosecution "may not

improperly suggest that the defendant has the burden to produce evidence." United

States v. Balter, 91 F.3d 427, 441 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1011 (1996);

see also United States v. Drake, 885 F.2d 323, 323 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493

U.S. 1033 & 1049 (1990). When the defendant's attorney offers a theory of defense,

however, the government may respond by noting the absence of evidence to support

that defense. Balter, 91 F.3d at 441.

We do not believe that the government was suggesting that the defendant had

any burden to present evidence of his innocence of the offense charged here. Even if

we assume that the government should not have made the two comments, before

granting Mr. Burns any relief we would have to view the comments in the context of

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the entire trial and consider their probable effect "on the jury's ability to judge the

evidence fairly." See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 12 (1985). From the start

of trial, the jury instructions explained that Mr. Burns was presumed innocent until

proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and that he did not have to present evidence,

testify, or call other witnesses. We note, moreover, that the instructions notified the

jury that the argument of counsel was not evidence. The government's two remarks

were made in response to particular situations: Mr. Burns's counsel lamenting the

destruction of evidence, and Mr. Burns asking in his letter to have a piece of evidence

saved. Once an objection was raised, the court cautioned the government's attorney,

and the government said nothing else that elicited an objection from Mr. Burns's

lawyer. In his argument, Mr. Burns's attorney emphasized that the government had

to prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt before the jury could

return a guilty verdict. We conclude that even if the government's comments were

improper, Mr. Burns has not shown that they deprived him of a fair trial, see Conroy,

424 F.3d at 840.

III.

Mr. Burns contends that the conspiracy did not begin until 2000, and that

therefore the district court should have excluded from evidence items seized from his

residence by Missouri law enforcement officers in April 1998, as well as a certified

copy of his related state conviction for possession of methamphetamine. We disagree.

To prove the conspiracy charge, the government was required to show that an

agreement to engage in distributing methamphetamine existed between Mr. Burns and

at least one other person. United States v. Rodgers, 18 F.3d 1425, 1428-29 (8th Cir.

1994). Individuals become members of a conspiracy when they knowingly contribute

their efforts to the conspiracy's objectives, see United States v. Galvan, 961 F.2d 738,

741 (8th Cir. 1992), and they may be co-conspirators without knowing all of the

members or all of the details of the conspiracy, see United States v. Adipietro, 983

F.2d 1468, 1475 (8th Cir. 1993). We note, moreover, that one conspiracy can

continue to exist even if the participants or their roles change. See id. Keeping these

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principles in mind, we believe that the evidence challenged by Mr. Burns combined

with other evidence admitted at trial to support the existence of the charged conspiracy

which, according to the indictment, began at least as early as April 1998 and

continued until Mr. Burns was arrested in 2002.

The government offered evidence that during a search of Mr. Burns's combined

business and residence in April 1998 officers seized the following items: 1.3 grams

of methamphetamine, a hollowed-out Bible, an empty package with a note from

Manuel Baez, address books containing Mr. Ellerman's name and Mr. Baez's name

with a California phone number, numerous baggies, scales, a police scanner, a

surveillance system, and eight firearms. An officer who was at the scene also testified

that Mr. Burns admitted that the substance found was methamphetamine that came

from his friend in California. The government also entered into evidence Mr. Burns's

state methamphetamine-possession conviction, which arose out of the search. 

The testimony of Ms. Tally showed that a Manny or Manuel Baez from

California, who was mentioned in the seized address book, was supplying Mr. Burns

with large quantities of methamphetamine from the time that she met Mr. Burns in

2001. Mr. Ellerman, whose name was also in an address book, was identified at trial

as an individual who agreed with Mr. Burns and Mr. Neustel to distribute

methamphetamine obtained from California in the Branson, Missouri, area, and he

was doing so at the time COMET conducted its investigation in 2002.

In addition, Mr. Neustel's testimony supported a finding that he began

participating in Mr. Burns's ongoing methamphetamine distribution activities in 1998:

Mr. Burns came to Mr. Neustel's radiator shop in early 1998 to pick up a bag of

money and drugs that had come from A.G. Abbott, a drug dealer, who was in jail. Mr.

Abbott, from whom Mr. Neustel had been purchasing methamphetamine for use and

resale, had telephoned Mr. Neustel and asked him to retrieve the bag for Mr. Burns.

After meeting Mr. Neustel, Mr. Burns suggested to him that he "tak[e] [Mr. Abbott's]

spot," and soon Mr. Neustel began selling drugs "for and with" Mr. Burns. For "quite

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a while," Mr. Neustel would purchase four grams of methamphetamine from Mr.

Burns, sell three, and keep one. Mr. Neustel initially bought from Mr. Burns once a

week; after a month that increased to "maybe twice a week." Mr. Burns left town in

late 1999 for about six months; when he returned, he continued selling

methamphetamine to Mr. Neustel, but the quantities increased. The government also

offered evidence that in August 1999, Mr. Burns was arrested in California with about

one pound of methamphetamine and a gun in his vehicle.

Mr. Burns contends that Mr. Neustel testified on cross-examination that the

conspiracy began in 2000. Initially, we note that Mr. Neustel's understanding of when

the conspiracy began would not resolve the issue. And although Mr. Neustel

answered affirmatively when asked whether "this big conspiracy between [him] and

Mr. Burns commenced" in 2000 (emphasis added), he testified that he began selling

methamphetamine "for and with" Mr. Burns on a regular basis long before that. In

fact, we believe that the essence of Mr. Neustel's testimony is that in 2000 he became

a bigger "player" in the operation: The agreement between Mr. Neustel and Mr. Burns

to distribute methamphetamine did not begin then; Mr. Burns just began providing

Mr. Neustel with more drugs to sell. Mr. Neustel testified that in 2000 he began using

a ledger for transactions with Mr. Burns because they were "dealing in a lot more

weight and worth a lot more money" than they had been.

We believe that the government showed a sufficient connection between

evidence of Mr. Burns's criminal conduct in 1998 and his later participation in

methamphetamine distribution to support a finding of an ongoing conspiracy. We

therefore reject Mr. Burns's challenge to the admission of evidence seized from his

residence in 1998. In addition, as with the seized evidence, we conclude that the

record of Mr. Burns's conviction for possessing methamphetamine in 1998 was

admissible to prove that he was conspiring to distribute methamphetamine at that time.

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IV.

In another, closely related argument, Mr. Burns contends that the district court

should have given a jury instruction that he requested on the issue of multiple

conspiracies. The instruction that he offered proposed the existence of two separate

conspiracies: One between Mr. Burns, Mr. Neustel, and others to distribute lesser

amounts of methamphetamine from April 1998 until December 1999, and another

between the same individuals to distribute greater amounts from January 2000 until

July 2002. Cf. Ellerman, 411 F.3d at 945. He was entitled to an instruction on this

theory of defense if the instruction that he offered was supported by the evidence and

correctly stated the law. See id. We generally review de novo whether the evidence

is sufficient to support a multiple conspiracy instruction. United States v. Hall,

171 F.3d 1133, 1149 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1027 (2000).

Several considerations affect whether one or two conspiracies exist, including

the nature of the activities, the location where the alleged events of the conspiracy

occurred, the identity of the co-conspirators, and the time frame. United States v.

McCarthy, 97 F.3d 1562, 1571 (8th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1139, 520 U.S.

1133 (1997). Here, the evidence showed an agreement to distribute methamphetamine

involving the same individuals in the same locations (California and the Branson,

Missouri, area) throughout the time period. None of the listed considerations supports

Mr. Burns's contention that there were two conspiracies.

We note, moreover, that the government agreed to an instruction that required

the jury to find that the conspiracy began "at least as early as April 1998" before

returning a guilty verdict (although we need not resolve whether this finding was

required by law). And, over the objection of the government, Mr. Burns's counsel was

allowed to argue to the jury that Mr. Burns was entitled to an acquittal unless the

jurors believed beyond a reasonable doubt that the conspiracy began no later than

April 1998. The jury then found Mr. Burns guilty. Having carefully reviewed the

record, we believe neither that Mr. Burns was entitled to a multiple-conspiracy

instruction, nor that the district court's refusal to give one prejudiced him.

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V.

Mr. Burns contends that the district court should have excluded from evidence

multiple firearms that were seized from his residence in 1998, because they were not

relevant or probative of the issue of a drug conspiracy regardless of when that

conspiracy might have commenced. We conclude that this argument is wholly

without merit. Drugs and items related to drug distribution were found in Mr. Burns's

residence along with the guns. Firearms, which are often used "to safeguard and

facilitate drug transactions," are probative of an ongoing drug conspiracy, particularly

where, as here, they are found in close proximity to methamphetamine and other tools

of the drug trade. See United States v. Harris, 310 F.3d 1105, (8th Cir. 2002), cert.

denied, 538 U.S. 1052 (2003).

VI.

For his final challenge to his conviction, Mr. Burns argues that even if the

alleged errors that we have already discussed were harmless individually, their

cumulative effect deprived him of a fair trial. But because we have not found multiple

errors, harmless or otherwise, we must also reject this contention.

VII.

After this appeal was submitted to the court, Mr. Burns, relying on an

administrative order of our court, moved to file a supplemental brief addressing the

constitutionality of his sentence "at an appropriate time." In the order relied upon by

Mr. Burns, we cited Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), announced that

we generally would hold the mandates in criminal cases pending the Supreme Court's

decision in United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), and ruled that individual

panels of judges "may permit" supplemental briefing after the Supreme Court decided

Booker. In both Blakely and Booker, the defendants contended that their sentences

violated the sixth amendment because the sentencing court had increased their

punishment based on facts that had not been found by a jury beyond a reasonable

doubt. In his motion to file a supplemental brief, Mr. Burns quoted the objections that

he had filed in the district court before sentencing: He argued in these objections that

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his "excessive" sentencing range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines

violated the eighth amendment and the due process clause of the Constitution. We

have concluded that we do not need supplemental briefing to address Mr. Burns's

sentencing issues, and we therefore deny his motion.

The merits of Mr. Burns's eighth amendment and due process objections are not

before us because he did not challenge his sentence on those grounds (or any other)

in his opening or reply brief. See United States v. Simmons, 964 F.2d 763, 777 (8th

Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1011 (1992). But we may consider whether

Mr. Burns is entitled to any relief under Booker since that decision is applicable to all

cases pending on direct appeal. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 769. In Booker, the

Supreme Court held that "certain applications of the mandatory federal sentencing

guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment, and adopted a remedy that rendered the

guidelines essentially advisory." United States v. Chauncey, 420 F.3d 864, 877 (8th

Cir. 2005).

Mr. Burns did not raise a sixth amendment issue in the district court, and thus

we review for plain error only. See United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 549-50 (8th

Cir.2005) (en banc); see also United States v. Backer, 419 F.3d 882, 884 (8th Cir.

2005). In order to establish plain error, Mr. Burns must establish, inter alia, that there

was a reasonable probability that the district court would have given him a more

favorable sentence if it had not understandably erred by believing that it was bound

by the guidelines. See Pirani, 406 S. Ct. at 552. 

Although the court sentenced Mr. Burns to 360 months in prison, the low end

of the guideline range (360 months to life imprisonment), this fact alone is insufficient

for plain error relief. See id. at 553. At sentencing, Mr. Burns's attorney requested

that (if his constitutional arguments were rejected) the district court sentence his client

to the low end of the guideline range. In response, the court stated that although it was

"rare" that a defendant who went to trial got the "low end" of the guidelines, it noted

that Mr. Burns's two-point enhancement for possession of a weapon added 36 months

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under the guidelines, "creat[ing] even a more harsh sentence for this defendant." The

court concluded that "360 months is ... certainly a sufficient sentence for the

conviction here." 

We believe that the district court, by referring to the 30-year sentence as "even

... more harsh" and "certainly sufficient," raised an inference that a lower sentence for

Mr. Burns would have sufficed. As we have observed, "[a] reasonable probability

does not mean certainty. In fact, it does not even equate to proof by a preponderance

of the evidence." United States v. Jimenez-Gutierrez, 425 F.3d 1123, 1126 (8th Cir.

2005). But it must be a probability "sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome." United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83 (2004). After

reviewing "the appellate record as a whole," as we must, Pirani, 406 F.3d at 552, we

conclude that there is a reasonable probability that the district judge would have given

Mr. Burns a more favorable sentence had he not believed that the guidelines were

mandatory. We also think that Mr. Burns meets the final requirement for plain error

relief, since to keep him in prison for a longer period because of the court's error

would seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

proceedings. See United States v. Fleck, 413 F.3d 883, 897 (8th Cir. 2005).

VIII.

Accordingly, we affirm Mr. Burns's conviction, and we remand to the district

court for resentencing in light of the principles set forth in Booker.

______________________________

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