Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_13-cv-00605/USCOURTS-alsd-1_13-cv-00605-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Carlos Butler
Plaintiff
Daphne Utilities
Defendant
Cedric Goodloe
Plaintiff
Voneka Q. Nettles
Plaintiff

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

VONEKA Q. NETTLES, et al., )

 )

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 13-0605-WS-C

 )

DAPHNE UTILITIES, )

 )

Defendant. )

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 

74) with respect to the claims of plaintiff Carlos Butler. The Motion has been briefed and is now 

ripe for disposition.

I. Relevant Background.

Carlos Butler is one of three plaintiffs who brought this action alleging race-based 

employment discrimination by defendant, Daphne Utilities.1 As pleaded in the Amended 

Complaint, Butler, who is African-American, has asserted a single claim of discriminatory 

evaluation / denial of a raise. Specifically, in Count V, Butler alleges that Daphne Utilities 

violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the Due Process Clause and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “by failing to properly 

evaluate Plaintiff Carlos Butler’s job performance, and thereby, denying him an annual raise.” 

(Doc. 6, ¶ 53.) Daphne Utilities now seeks entry of summary judgment in its favor as to Count 

V on the grounds that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.

 1 The other two plaintiffs, Cedric Goodloe and Voneka Nettles, assert claims that 

are factually (and in some instances, legally) distinct from Butler’s. In light of the individualspecific nature of each plaintiff’s claims, the Court has ordered separate trials for each plaintiff. 

(See doc. 18.) Defendant filed three plaintiff-specific Motions for Summary Judgment, each of 

which has been briefed independently. This Order is confined to the claims of plaintiff Butler, 

and neither considers nor adjudicates the claims of plaintiffs Goodloe or Nettles.

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The pertinent record facts are as follows:2 Daphne Utilities hired Butler as a Wastewater 

Field Service Worker on or about October 5, 2006. (Butler Dep. (doc. 76, Exh. 2), at 11, 51-52.) 

In this capacity, Butler reported directly to Woodrow Maye, an African-American whose title 

was Wastewater Field Services Supervisor. (Lyndall Aff. (doc. 76, Exh. 1), ¶ 3; Butler Dep., at 

11.) Some time in 2012, Maye’s supervisor, Larry Jackson, was reassigned elsewhere in the 

company, after which Maye reported directly to Danny Lyndall, the Operations Manager at 

Daphne Utilities, for a period of time. (Lyndall Aff., ¶¶ 2-4.)3 In October 2012, Daphne Utilities 

performed a reorganization, pursuant to which a white employee named Jim Caudle (who had 

previously overseen the Water Reclamation Department for several years) became the supervisor 

of the entire Wastewater Department, including both the Water Reclamation and the Wastewater 

Collection sections. (Id., ¶ 5.) As a result of this change (which Daphne Utilities has justified 

via legitimate business reasons and to which Butler has ascribed no discriminatory motive), 

Maye reported directly to Caudle, who in turn reported to Lyndall. (Id., ¶ 5 & Exh. A.)

Prior to this reorganization, Maye had already prepared annual performance evaluations 

for the employees under his supervision, including Butler. (Jackson Decl. (doc. 102, Exh. A), at 

1.) Maye’s evaluation of Butler’s performance rated him a “4” (meaning “exceeds 

expectations”) in five listed categories. (Doc. 76, Exh. 3 at Exh. 2.)4 Jackson’s practice had 

 2 The Court is mindful of its obligation under Rule 56 to construe the record, 

including all evidence and factual inferences, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 

See Skop v. City of Atlanta, GA, 485 F.3d 1130, 1136 (11th Cir. 2007). Thus, Butler’s evidence is 

taken as true and all justifiable inferences are drawn in his favor. Also, federal courts cannot 

weigh credibility at the summary judgment stage. See Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707 

F.3d 1244, 1252 (11th Cir. 2013) (“Even if a district court believes that the evidence presented by 

one side is of doubtful veracity, it is not proper to grant summary judgment on the basis of 

credibility choices.”). Therefore, the Court will “make no credibility determinations or choose 

between conflicting testimony, but instead accept[s] [Butler’s] version of the facts drawing all 

justifiable inferences in [his] favor.” Burnette v. Taylor, 533 F.3d 1325, 1330 (11th Cir. 2008).

3 In his summary judgment brief, Butler denies that any such temporal gap occurred 

following Jackson’s departure or that Jackson was ever reassigned to a different position prior to 

his December 2012 retirement. (Doc. 102, at 3.) Such discrepancies need not be explored here, 

as they are not material to the issues presented on summary judgment.

4 There appears to be a missing page from the mostly-illegible copy of Maye’s draft 

evaluation of Butler contained in the court file. (Id.)

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been to review those evaluations and then forward them to Human Resources along with his 

recommendations for raises. (Jackson Decl., at 1.) Following the October 2012 reorganization 

of the department, the evaluation for Butler prepared by Maye never took effect because 

performance evaluations for Wastewater Collection employees became subject to a new 

procedure.

After Caudle assumed managerial responsibilities for the Wastewater Collection 

Department, he personally prepared performance evaluations for all Collection Systems workers, 

with input from Maye, in December 2012. (Caudle Aff. (doc. 76, Exh. 5), ¶¶ 4-5.)5 The 

resulting final evaluation for Butler, dated December 27, 2012, was both more comprehensive 

and less favorable than the Maye draft had been. For example, Caudle rated Butler a “2” 

(“below expectations”) for quality of work, indicating, “Carlos needs to communicate more 

effectively with supervision and management.” (Caudle Aff., ¶ 6 & Exh. A, at 1.) Likewise, 

Caudle rated Butler a “2” for initiative/enthusiasm, writing, “Carlos appears to be reserved in the 

morning staff meetings ...[and] needs to demonstrate his knowledge in helping the department 

grow.” (Id. at 2.) In the category of safety and housekeeping, Caudle awarded Butler a score of 

“1,” writing, “The maintenance, appearance, and cleanliness of all vehicles in this department 

fall well below acceptable standards.” (Id. at 3.) Overall, Caudle gave Butler a performance 

rating of 2.6 (slightly below “meets expectations”).6

 5 Plaintiff objects that “Maye had no input into Caudle’s evaluations.” (Doc. 102, 

at 4.) This assertion is not credited because plaintiff provides no evidentiary support for it other 

than the Declaration of Carlos Butler (doc. 103, at 2), which lacks any discernible foundation 

establishing Butler’s personal knowledge. Without some indication that Butler actually had 

firsthand knowledge about whether Caudle obtained input from Maye, such a conclusory remark 

in his Declaration does not pass muster under Rule 56(c)(4), Fed.R.Civ.P., and is not properly 

considered. Besides, plaintiff’s assertion that Maye lacked input into Caudle’s evaluations is 

contradicted elsewhere in plaintiff’s own brief, wherein he acknowledges that “Maye gave 

Caudle the evaluations of all the employees he supervised.” (Doc. 102, at 26.)

6 In subsequent documentation, Caudle identified additional specifics in support of 

the Butler evaluation. According to Caudle, “Butler exhibited a negative attitude when changes 

and improvements were suggested,” even telling Caudle that he (Butler) could learn nothing 

from Caudle as to field services work. (Caudle Aff., ¶ 6.) Caudle further maintained that Butler 

“was unresponsive and uninvolved during staff meetings,” “was sleeping during morning 

meetings,” “was taking longer than allowed lunch breaks,” and was failing to complete daily 

schedules, clean tools, secure trucks, and follow safety protocols. (Id.) For his part, Butler 

(Continued)

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Performance evaluations at Daphne Utilities matter because they are tied to 

compensation. Defendant has no precise numerical formula for translating evaluations into 

raises. (Butler Decl., at 2.) Nonetheless, Daphne Utilities utilizes a merit raise system, pursuant 

to which employees are awarded pay increases solely on the basis of performance, as opposed to 

step increases or raises linked to years of service. (Caudle Aff., ¶ 6.) In Caudle’s view, “Carlos 

Butler’s unacceptable performance in 2012 did not merit a raise.” (Id.) Butler was called into a 

meeting with Caudle and Maye, at which time he was shown both the final evaluation that 

Caudle had prepared and the earlier Maye version. (Butler Dep., at 20-21.)7 At that time, Butler 

expressed disagreement with the numerical scores on the Caudle evaluation, and declined to sign 

the document. (Id. at 21-22, 26.) Caudle notified Butler that, based on the unfavorable 

evaluation, Butler was ineligible for a merit raise. (Id. at 24.)

Multiple other Wastewater Collection employees fared better in the December 2012 

evaluation process, receiving positive performance evaluations from Caudle, along with pay 

raises. At the time the evaluations were done, there were five employees in that department: 

Butler, James McPherson, Jay Bivins, Sybil Williams and supervisor Woodrow Maye. (Caudle 

Aff., ¶ 5.) With one exception, Caudle prepared evaluations for these individuals in late 2012, 

following which McPherson and Bivins were awarded raises based on those evaluations. (Id., ¶ 

7.) The exception was Maye, who did not receive a performance evaluation in 2012. (Lyndall 

Aff. II (doc. 117, Exh. 4), ¶ 2.) Maye’s evaluation was delayed until the middle of 2013 pending 

an accident investigation and related litigation, following which he too was awarded a raise

 

maintains that these alleged deficiencies lack any factual basis and amount to complete 

fabrications. (Butler Decl. (doc. 103), at 3.)

7 Butler asserts that he “was the only employee to receive two evaluations,” one 

from Maye and one from Caudle. (Butler Decl., at 3.) This statement is not credited because it 

flunks Rule 56(c)(4)’s personal knowledge prerequisite for summary judgment declarations (i.e., 

how would Butler have personal knowledge whether his co-workers received two evaluations in 

their meetings with Caudle?). Besides, plaintiff contradicts this remark in his own brief by 

acknowledging that “Mr. Maye had prepared 2012 evaluations for his workers prior to Mr. 

Caudle’s re-evaluations.” (Doc. 102, at 4.) By plaintiff’s own admission, then, he was treated 

no differently than his colleagues in this regard. At any rate, competent record evidence 

confirms that all Wastewater Collection employees were given both the Maye draft and the 

Caudle evaluation during their performance reviews. (Maye Statement (doc. 117, Exh. 2), at 27.)

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retroactive to 2012. (Caudle Aff., ¶ 7; Lyndall Aff. II, ¶ 2.) Williams did not receive a raise in 

December 2012; however, she was awarded a raise retroactive to 2012 after demonstrating

improvement on her mid-year evaluation in 2013. (Id.)

8

 After accounting for mid-year 2013 

evaluations, Butler was the only Wastewater Collection Department employee to whom Caudle 

did not award a merit raise, effective December 2012. The Wastewater Collection employees 

who did receive raises (Maye, McPherson, Bivins and Williams) are all African-American. 

(Doc. 102, at 11.)

In the wake of this disappointment, Butler exercised his rights under Daphne Utilities 

policies to contest Caudle’s December 2012 evaluation of his performance. At his request, 

Daphne Utilities convened multiple meetings involving Butler and various company officials 

(including Caudle, Lyndall, HR Manager Deloris Brown, and others). (Butler Decl., at 3-5; 

Butler Dep., at 28-33, 35-37, 40-42.) At some point during this series of meetings and 

conferences, Butler filed a formal grievance, invoking the specific mechanism recognized by

Daphne Utilities policy. (Butler Dep., at 39-40.) In a written grievance dated April 8, 2013, 

Butler explained, “It is my position that Mr. Maye should have been the one rating my job 

performance, and not Mr. Caudle.” (Doc. 76, Exh. 3, at 3.) Butler further balked that Caudle 

“has never during the rating period in question, supervised or witnessed any job tasks” 

performed by Butler, and “hade [sic] no knowledge of [Butler’s] work performance, which made 

him unqualified” to issue the December 2012 evaluation. (Id.) Butler concluded, “I personally 

believe that the denial of the pay raise ... is discriminatory in nature and creates a hostile 

working environment.” (Id. at 4.)

After a lengthy, multifaceted investigation, Daphne Utilities General Manager Rob 

McElroy issued a written memo to Butler on June 6, 2013, summarizing his findings. In that

document, McElroy chided Butler that “[n]o employee of Daphne Utilities chooses who 

ultimately oversees the department and conducts their performance evaluations; instead, 

management makes these decisions.” (Doc. 76, Exh. 8, at 1.) McElroy elaborated that Caudle 

was selected for the task “with the knowledge and understanding that [he] had only been the 

manager for two months prior to the evaluation,” and opined that, in McElroy’s view, “two 

 8 By contrast, at a meeting with Caudle and Maye after his mid-year evaluation, 

Caudle notified Butler that he still would not receive a raise. (Butler Dep., at 39.)

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months is a sufficient time” for a manager to observe and evaluate employee performance. (Id.

at 2.) Ultimately, McElroy found that Caudle “was competent to oversee [Butler’s] performance 

evaluation, and, that there are no facts which suggest that his supervision was tainted by some 

improper discriminatory motive.” (Id.)

9

This lawsuit followed, with Butler alleging that his poor evaluation and accompanying 

denial of merit raise were the product of unlawful race discrimination by Daphne Utilities. In 

opposing defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Butler states, “My only issue was that I 

should not have been evaluated by someone who had not supervised or otherwise observed my 

daily performance.” (Butler Decl., at 6.)10

II. Summary Judgment Standard.

Summary judgment should be granted only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 

56(a), Fed.R.Civ.P. The party seeking summary judgment bears “the initial burden to show the 

district court, by reference to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact 

that should be decided at trial.” Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). 

Once the moving party has satisfied its responsibility, the burden shifts to the non-movant to 

show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. “If the nonmoving party fails to make 

 9 Sometime later, Daphne Utilities requested that Edward McDermott, Esq., 

conduct an investigation into the processing of Butler’s grievance. (McElroy Aff. (doc. 76, Exh. 

6), ¶ 7.) McDermott’s report questioned whether, under company policies and procedures, 

Butler’s grievance should have been decided by Deloris Brown (the HR Manager) rather than 

McElroy (the General Manager); however, he also concluded, “There are no factual bases for 

Butler’s allegations that Caudle’s ratings and denial of a pay raise were racially discriminatory 

and created a hostile working environment.” (Id., ¶ 7 & Exh. F, at 11.)

10 Clearly, then, the issue of whether Caudle (as opposed to someone else) should 

have completed Butler’s performance evaluation is central to plaintiff’s discrimination claim. In 

its reply brief, Daphne Utilities decries this argument as “a bait and switch,” objecting that 

“Butler’s complaint is he did not receive a raise” (doc. 116, at 2) and that he somehow changed 

gears on summary judgment by focusing on the evaluation and evaluator. Such criticism is 

unfounded. The Amended Complaint leaves no doubt that Butler is complaining about both the 

alleged failure “to properly evaluate Plaintiff Carlos Butler’s job performance” and the denial of 

an annual raise. (Doc. 6, ¶ 53; see also id., at ¶¶ 21, 24, 29.) The manner in which his 

performance evaluation was conducted is and has always been part and parcel of this lawsuit; 

therefore, defendant could not have been unfairly surprised by the nature of plaintiff’s summary 

judgment arguments.

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'a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden 

of proof,' the moving party is entitled to summary judgment.” Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)) (footnote omitted). “In reviewing whether the nonmoving party 

has met its burden, the court must stop short of weighing the evidence and making credibility 

determinations of the truth of the matter. Instead, the evidence of the non-movant is to be 

believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBHSiegen, 965 F.2d 994, 999 (11th Cir. 1992) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 

“Summary judgment is justified only for those cases devoid of any need for factual 

determinations.” Offshore Aviation v. Transcon Lines, Inc., 831 F.2d 1013, 1016 (11th Cir. 1987) 

(citation omitted).

The Eleventh Circuit has expressly rejected the notion that summary judgment should 

seldom be used in employment discrimination cases because they involve issues of motivation 

and intent. See Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079 (11th Cir. 2004). Rather, “the 

summary judgment rule applies in job discrimination cases just as in other cases. No thumb is to 

be placed on either side of the scale.” Id. at 1086 (citation omitted); see also Williamson v. 

Clarke County Dep’t of Human Resources, 834 F. Supp.2d 1310, 1318 (S.D. Ala. 2011) 

(recognizing and applying rule that summary judgment standard is applied equally in 

employment discrimination cases as in other kinds of federal actions).

III. Analysis.

A. The McDonnell Douglas Standard.

Absent direct evidence of discrimination,11 Butler must make a showing of circumstantial 

evidence that satisfies the test set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 

S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).12 Under this familiar burden-shifting analysis, plaintiff is 

 11 Plaintiff’s deposition testimony confirms that he has no such direct evidence. 

Indeed, Butler repeatedly testified that neither Caudle nor any other Daphne Utilities manager 

had ever used language that he viewed as racially motivated in connection with this incident. 

(Butler Dep., at 22, 33, 41, 62-63.)

12 Although plaintiff’s claims are nominally brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 42 

U.S.C. § 1983, both sides properly recognize that the applicable legal standard is identical (doc. 

75, at 9-10, 16; doc. 102, at 20-23). See, e.g., Brown v. Alabama Dep’t of Transportation, 597 

F.3d 1160, 1174 n.6 (11th Cir. 2010) (“The analysis under [§ 1981] claims mirrors that under 

Title VII.”); Rice-Lamar v. City of Fort Lauderdale, Fla., 232 F.3d 836, 843 n.11 (11th Cir. 

(Continued)

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required to make out a prima facie case of race discrimination. If he does so, that showing 

“creates a rebuttable presumption that the employer acted illegally.” Underwood v. Perry 

County Com’n, 431 F.3d 788, 794 (11th Cir. 2005). At that point, “the burden shifts to the 

employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment 

action. ... If the employer does this, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the 

employer’s stated reason was a pretext for discrimination.” Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 

976 (11th Cir. 2008) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Holifield v. Reno, 

115 F.3d 1555, 1566 (11th Cir. 1997) (outlining similar procedure for Title VII retaliation 

claims). A plaintiff may establish pretext “either directly by persuading the court that a 

discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the 

employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Brooks v. County Com'n of 

Jefferson County, Ala., 446 F.3d 1160, 1163 (11th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted). “The ultimate 

burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the 

plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.” Springer v. Convergys Customer Management 

Group Inc., 509 F.3d 1344, 1347 (11th Cir. 2007).

B. Plaintiff’s Claim of Discriminatory Evaluation / Denial of Raise.

In Count V of the Amended Complaint, Butler asserts a claim that Daphne Utilities failed 

properly to evaluate his job performance and denied him an annual raise, all in violation of 42 

U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. Although both the evaluation and the denial of raise are recited in the 

 

2000) (“The elements of a section 1983 claim of race or gender discrimination are the same as 

the elements of a Title VII disparate treatment action. ... The elements of a claim of race 

discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 are also the same as a Title VII disparate treatment claim 

in the employment context.”); Whiting v. Jackson State University, 616 F.2d 116, 121 (5th Cir. 

1980) (“Section 1983 serves as a basis for relief for violations of federal law under color of state 

law. Insofar as it is used as a parallel remedy for transgression of section 1981 and section 706 

of Title VII rights, the elements of the causes of action do not differ ....”); Brown v. School Bd. 

of Orange County, Florida, 459 Fed.Appx. 817, 819 (11th Cir. Feb. 28, 2012) (“Title VII and § 

1981 have the same requirements of proof and utilize the same analytical framework.”). The 

parties have not argued that the analysis differs for any of the various species of claims that 

Butler is asserting, save for the Due Process claim (nominally recited in the Amended 

Complaint) which he now disclaims any intent to pursue. (See doc. 76, Exh. 10, at #13; doc. 

100; doc. 102, at 15.) Nor does plaintiff contend that the analytical framework or legal standard 

would differ if he were proceeding under an Equal Protection theory, as he seeks to do by 

separate motion.

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pleadings, Butler’s claim hinges on the evaluation. That is to say, Butler does not suggest that, 

even if his performance evaluation was not racially discriminatory, Daphne Utilities’ failure to 

award him a merit raise in 2012 would remain actionable in Count V. To the contrary, Butler’s 

position is that the performance evaluation was the product of race discrimination, and that the

decision to deny him a raise flowed directly from the biased evaluation. A corollary to this 

formulation is that, if Butler cannot show genuine issues of material fact as to whether his 

performance evaluation evinces race-based disparate treatment, then Count V must fail.

Defendant now moves for summary judgment, reasoning that Butler cannot make out a 

prima facie case because he has failed to identify an appropriate comparator. (Doc. 75, at 19-

20.)13 To establish a prima facie case of race discrimination in the context of an unfavorable 

evaluation / denial of a raise, Butler must show that: (i) he belongs to a protected class; (ii) he 

was qualified to do the job; (iii) he was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (iv) the 

employer treated similarly situated employees outside his class more favorably. See, e.g., 

Crawford, 529 F.3d at 970; McCann v. Tillman, 526 F.3d 1370, 1373 (11th Cir. 2008).14 Daphne 

Utilities seizes on the “similarly situated comparator” prong of the test, reasoning that Butler has 

not shown that his adverse treatment by defendant is “in contrast with similarly situated 

employees outside the protected class.” (Doc. 75, at 19.) Such an argument is properly 

cognizable on summary judgment. See Felder v. Bradford Health Services, 493 Fed.Appx. 17, 

20-21 (11th Cir. Oct. 18, 2012) (concluding that plaintiff failed to establish prima facie case of 

racially discriminatory denial of pay raise because she “failed to identify a comparator whose 

experience was substantially similar to her own” or “to present any other evidence of 

discrimination”).

 13 This argument is the sole ground for dismissal of Count V identified in Daphne 

Utilities’ principal brief; therefore, the Motion for Summary Judgment as to Carlos Butler’s 

claims stands or falls on whether he has made a sufficient showing of comparators or has 

otherwise met his prima facie burden.

14 In his brief, plaintiff correctly observes that there are other possible means of 

establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment. (Doc. 102, at 24.) However, he identifies 

no alternative formulation that he contends is more appropriate or better suited to the facts and 

circumstances presented here. Nor does plaintiff argue that the iteration of the prima facie test 

advanced by Daphne Utilities is inappropriate or undesirable.

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The only white comparator identified by Butler is James “Eddie” Ferguson, a Wastewater 

Treatment Plant Operator in the Water Reclamation Department. (Butler Dep., at 42-43; doc. 

102, at 10-11 & 28.) The record reflects that Ferguson received a 2012 performance evaluation 

score of 3.2 (as compared to Butler’s 2.6) and a merit raise (which Butler did not). (Anderson 

Aff. (doc. 76, Exh. 9), ¶ 3 & Exh. B.) Butler objects that Ferguson received a score of “2” 

(“below expectations”) for his deficient attendance while Butler received only a score of “3” 

(“meets expectations”) despite having no attendance issues. (Doc. 102, at 10-11; Butler Decl., at 

5.) The problem with Butler’s reliance on Ferguson as a comparator is that the two of them are 

not similarly situated in relevant respects. Butler worked in the Wastewater Collection 

Department, while Ferguson worked in the Water Reclamation Department. Ferguson’s 

performance evaluation for 2012 was prepared by supervisor Arthur Anderson, as was the case 

for all Water Reclamation employees. (Id., ¶¶ 2-3; Caudle Statement (doc. 117, Exh. 1), at 7.) 

By contrast, Butler’s final performance evaluation for 2012 was prepared by Caudle, as was the 

case for all Wastewater Collection employees. Of course, different decisionmakers may 

reasonably be expected to rate the same levels of performance differently; therefore, the 

observed proximity between the attendance rating given to Ferguson and that given to Butler 

does not evince a race-based disparity because the two individuals were not similarly situated.

Butler’s rejoinder to the foregoing is to argue that the fact that Ferguson’s and Butler’s 

evaluations were prepared by different supervisors is itself proof of disparate treatment. (Doc. 

102, at 28.) In that regard, plaintiff’s evidence is that employees in the Water Reclamation 

Department were predominantly white, whereas employees in the Wastewater Collection 

Department were predominantly black. (Butler Decl., at 1.) As of December 2012, Caudle was 

the manager in charge of both departments. So, plaintiff observes, the mostly white Water 

Reclamation Department was evaluated by a low-level supervisor (Anderson), while the (at that 

time) all-black Wastewater Collection Department was evaluated by the department manager 

(Caudle) rather than the equivalent low-level supervisor (Maye). Unspoken is plaintiff’s 

apparent conclusion that it is racially discriminatory to have a strict manager (Caudle) prepare 

performance evaluations for a department staffed by African-American workers, while a more 

lenient frontline supervisor (Anderson) prepares evaluations for a department staffed by 

Caucasian workers.

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This argument and these facts fail to support a reasonable inference of race 

discrimination by Daphne Utilities for a number of reasons. First, the record is devoid of 

evidence to support the premise that Anderson was more generous than Caudle in the 

performance evaluation process. While plaintiff protests that all employees in the Water 

Reclamation Department received raises (Butler Decl., at 5), the undisputed evidence is that all 

employees in the Wastewater Collection Department save Butler himself ultimately received 

raises as well (doc. 102, at 11). Thus, the record does not support an inference that it was 

inherently adverse or harmful to employee raise prospects for Caudle (as opposed to a frontline 

supervisor) to prepare their evaluations.

Second, Daphne Utilities had a legitimate business reason for having Anderson prepare

evaluations on the Water Reclamation side, and having Caudle prepare evaluations on the 

Wastewater Collection side. Indeed, Caudle had been manager over the Water Reclamation 

Department for approximately five years as of December 2012, with Anderson being his direct 

report throughout that time period. (Caudle Statement, at 4-5.) For the first two years of that 

arrangement, Caudle (and not Anderson) prepared final evaluations for the Water Reclamation 

employees. (Id. at 7.) Eventually, however, Anderson became “very proficient with the 

evaluation process” in the manner sought by Caudle, such that Anderson was permitted to 

prepare evaluations for those employees himself. (Id.) By contrast, December 2012 marked the 

first round of performance evaluations for which Caudle had been manager of the Wastewater 

Collection Department; therefore, Caudle’s intent was to work with Maye just as he had done 

with Anderson at first, with Caudle writing and approving final evaluations of all employees. 

(Id. at 7, 15.) In short, the reason why Caudle handled evaluations differently in the Water 

Reclamation section versus the Wastewater Collection section was that he had managed the 

former section for years and had a frontline supervisor fully trained as to Caudle’s preferred 

methodology for evaluations, whereas Caudle was relatively new to managing the latter section

and had not previously worked with Maye on evaluations. Plaintiff has identified no facts or 

circumstances that might cast doubt on the veracity of this explanation or suggest that it was 

somehow a smokescreen for unlawful race discrimination.

At the end of the day, the story here is simple, benign and unchallenged by contrary 

record facts. Caudle had no experience working with the low-level supervisor in Butler’s 

department, so he wished to prepare the evaluations himself. In Ferguson’s department, 

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however, Caudle had been working with the same low-level supervisor for years and had 

developed trust in that individual’s evaluation abilities, so Caudle did not prepare the evaluations 

there. Nothing about this collection of facts and reasoning gives rise to even a whiff of race 

discrimination. To be sure, Butler emphatically objects to Caudle’s qualifications to evaluate his 

performance. As he put it in his summary judgment declaration, “My only issue was that I 

should not have been evaluated by someone who had not supervised or otherwise observed my 

daily performance.” (Butler Decl., at 6.)15 Assuming Butler’s factual premise to be correct (i.e.,

that Caudle had never observed his performance and was unqualified to evaluate him), it may 

well have been unwise or imprudent for Daphne Utilities to allow Caudle to evaluate Wastewater 

Collection employees such as Butler in December 2012. But the test for a § 1981 or Equal 

Protection violation is not whether an employee’s human resources practices are well-conceived, 

fair or optimal.

On that point, it has been oft-observed that an employee cannot succeed on a 

discrimination case by “simply quarreling with the wisdom of” the employer’s decisions. 

Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 2000). After all, “[f]ederal courts do 

not sit as a super-personnel department that reexamines an entity’s business decisions.” Id.

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). They do not concern themselves with “how 

medieval a firm’s practices” or “how mistaken the firm’s managers” might be. Id.; see also 

Alvarez v. Royal Atlantic Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1266 (11th Cir. 2010) (“it is not our 

role to second-guess the wisdom of an employer’s business decisions – indeed the wisdom of 

them is irrelevant”); Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Florida, Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1361 (11th

Cir. 1999) (“We are not in the business of adjudging whether employment decisions are prudent 

or fair.”). At most, plaintiff’s evidence and argument supports an inference that it was a bad idea 

 15 This statement echoes Butler’s objection in his grievance that “Caudle has never 

during the rating period in question, supervised or witnessed any job tasks performed by me. He 

hade [sic] no knowledge of my work performance, which made him unqualified to give me a 

performance rating.” (Doc. 76, Exh. 3, at 3.) It finds further reinforcement in Butler’s summary 

judgment brief, which is rife with statements that “Mr. Caudle could not possibly be in a better 

position than Mr. Maye to assess his strengths and weaknesses,” that his evaluation was unfair 

because of the “subjectivity of the process,” and that “Butler contends that he should not have 

been evaluated by someone who had not supervised or otherwise observed his daily 

performance.” (Doc. 102, at 10, 26.) 

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(from an accuracy standpoint) for Caudle to evaluate Butler’s performance, not that it was 

racially biased for him to do so. There is simply no plausible basis for inferring discriminatory 

intent from the fact that Caudle performed performance evaluations for a department that he had 

supervised for less than two months, even if (as plaintiff alleges) he lacked sufficient facts, data 

and observation to prepare such evaluations with meaningful precision.

In addition to Butler’s inability to identify a similarly situated comparator or to present 

facts raising a reasonable inference that it was racially discriminatory (as opposed to just 

unenlightened human resources practice) for Caudle to prepare his performance evaluation, 

Count V fails as a matter of law for an additional reason. Undisputed facts reveal that Caudle 

evaluated the performance of four African-American employees in the Wastewater Collection 

Department in December 2012, to-wit: Carlos Butler, Sybil Williams, Jay Bivins and James 

McPherson. Caudle issued favorable evaluations to Bivins and McPherson, both of whom 

received merit raises in December 2012. Caudle did not evaluate Butler’s and Williams’ 

performance favorably, so both were denied raises; however, Caudle left open the possibility of 

retroactive raises for them following mid-year evaluations in 2013 if they showed improvement. 

In Caudle’s view, Williams displayed the requisite improvement, as a result of which Caudle 

awarded her a raise in mid-2013, retroactive to 2012. He did the same for the department’s 

supervisor, Woodrow Maye, upon reviewing his performance for the first time in July 2013. The 

point is that every African-American employee in the Wastewater Collection Department other 

than Butler received a merit raise either at the end of 2012 or in mid-2013, retroactive to the end 

of 2012. No colorable inference of invidious race discrimination can exist where Caudle’s 

evaluations and raise recommendations resulted in 4 out of 5 black employees in the department 

receiving merit raises effective December 2012, with the lone exception being our plaintiff, 

Butler.

16

 16 This conclusion is not undermined by Butler’s attempt on summary judgment to 

rely on evidence of procedural regularities in the ensuing internal grievance process. In 

particular, Butler cites a 2014 report by attorney Edward B. McDermott, suggesting that it might 

have violated Daphne Utilities policy for the company to remove HR Manager Deloris Brown 

from the investigation and replace her with General Manager Rob McElroy. (Doc. 102, at 29.) 

But this is a red herring. Butler has not presented a claim for discriminatory grievance handling, 

or for breach of contract in connection with Daphne Utilities’ disposition of his grievance. 

Nothing about McElroy’s empanelment as decision maker for Butler’s grievance appears to have 

(Continued)

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In sum, nothing about the record in this case suggests that race had anything to do with 

Butler’s performance evaluation or denial of a raise. Butler has not identified a similarly situated 

comparator outside the protected class who was rated more favorably than he. Butler’s protests 

that “Mr. Caudle could not possibly be in a better position than Mr. Maye to assess his strengths 

and weaknesses” and his objections to the “subjectivity of the process” (doc. 102, at 10) do not 

enable him to withstand summary judgment review. After all, federal civil rights law does not 

entitle an employee to an accurate performance evaluation by a knowledgeable supervisor of the 

employee’s choosing. 

More generally, plaintiff’s case fails because Butler has identified no record facts about 

Caudle’s involvement that might raise a reasonable inference of disparate treatment on the basis 

of race. To be sure, Caudle may not have been the most knowledgeable or qualified person to 

evaluate the performance of Wastewater Collection employees in December 2012, but there is no 

reason to believe that he took on this responsibility in furtherance of a racist agenda. Differences 

in the evaluation process for December 2012 in the predominantly black Wastewater Collection 

section versus the predominantly white Water Reclamation section are readily explained away by 

innocuous facts pertaining to the length of time that Caudle had managed each and his level of 

familiarity / trust in the line supervisor to complete evaluations in harmony with Caudle’s

preferences. And, of course, the net result of Caudle’s evaluations was that four of the five black 

Wastewater Collection employees received merit raises, either on the spot in December 2012 or 

retroactively in mid-2013. Against that undisputed factual backdrop, Butler’s insistence that

Caudle and/or Daphne Utilities rigged the process to deprive African-American Wastewater 

Collection employees of merit raises lacks plausibility, much less evidentiary support.

 

any bearing on the legitimacy vel non of Caudle’s decision to evaluate Wastewater Collection 

employees himself. The latter decision, not the former, is being challenged by Butler in the 

Amended Complaint. Besides, insofar as Butler urges the Court to adopt the McDermott report, 

he should be cognizant that the last sentence of that report reads as follows: “There are no factual 

bases for Butler’s allegations that Caudle’s ratings and denial of a pay raise were racially 

discriminatory and created a hostile working environment.” (McElroy Aff., ¶ 7 & Exh. F at 11.) 

Butler cannot simply cherry-pick the portions of the McDermott report he likes and discard the 

remainder.

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Accordingly, Daphne Utilities is entitled to entry of summary judgment in its favor on 

Count V based on Butler’s failure to establish a prima facie case of racially discriminatory 

performance evaluation / denial of merit raise, or to come forward with any evidence raising a 

reasonable inference of disparate treatment based on race.17

IV. Conclusion.

For all of the foregoing reasons, it is ordered that Defendant’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment (doc. 74) is granted. Plaintiff Carlos Butler’s claim of discriminatory performance 

evaluation / denial of raise (Count V) is dismissed because there are no genuine issues of 

material fact and defendant is entitled to judgment is a matter of law. Count V was the only 

claim asserted by Butler in the Amended Complaint; therefore, the Clerk of Court is directed to 

terminate Carlos Butler as a party plaintiff to these proceedings. A final judgment will be 

entered as to plaintiff Butler upon resolution of the remaining claims brought by plaintiffs Cedric 

Goodloe and Voneka Nettles.

DONE and ORDERED this 24th day of March, 2015.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE 

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 17 Also in its principal brief, Daphne Utilities contends that it is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law on “any claim for” punitive damages that Butler is asserting. (Doc. 75, at 20-

21.) The Amended Complaint is devoid of any reference to punitive damages; rather, the ad 

damnum clause requests that Butler be awarded a declaratory judgment; $300,000 in 

compensatory damages; all annual increases and benefits he has been wrongfully denied; and 

costs and fees. (Doc. 6, at 10-11.) As the Amended Complaint lacks any indication that punitive 

damages are being sought, Daphne Utilities’ Motion for Summary Judgment is unnecessary 

insofar as it seeks dismissal of a nonexistent element of damages.

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