Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-06-03035/USCOURTS-caDC-06-03035-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
William L. Lawson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 2, 2007 Decided July 20, 2007

No. 06-3035

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

WILLIAM L. LAWSON,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 04cr00273-01)

Nikki U. Lotze argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant.

John P. Gidez, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for

appellee. With him on the brief were Kenneth L. Wainstein,

U.S. Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and Roy W.

McLeese, III, David B. Goodhand, and Kenneth F. Whitted,

Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and GRIFFITH, Circuit

Judge, and WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GRIFFITH.

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GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge: Appellant William L. Lawson

challenges his criminal conviction and resulting sentence on

multiple grounds. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm his

conviction but remand the case to the district court for resentencing. 

I.

Looking for illegal drug transactions, Officer Darrick

Wallace of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police

Department parked his unmarked police car at a strip mall on the

5000 block of New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., on the evening of

May 14, 2004. From this observation post, Wallace saw

appellant Lawson drive his car with a passenger into the mall’s

parking lot and park in a spot only a few feet away from

Wallace’s post. With a clear view of the driver’s side of

Lawson’s car, Wallace saw Aubrey Canarte approach the car on

a bicycle and, after a brief conversation, hand Lawson some

money. Lawson reached up towards the sun visor in his car and

retrieved a “small object” that he handed to Canarte, who then

pedaled away. Lawson and his passenger soon drove away as

well, followed by Wallace and two other officers Wallace had

called for assistance. The three officers stopped Lawson’s car

at a traffic circle a short distance away. As he approached the

stopped car, Officer Clayton Smith noticed that Lawson and his

passenger were holding clear plastic cups. Believing them to

contain alcohol, Smith asked Lawson to step out of the car, at

which point Lawson handed Smith the cup. Because the liquid

smelled like alcohol, the officers arrested Lawson and his

passenger for illegal possession of an open container of alcohol.

Smith also saw an open bottle of champagne inside the

vehicle in plain view. While retrieving the bottle, Smith smelled

what he suspected was marijuana coming from the center

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1

 The last two of these are lesser included offenses of

possession-with-intent-to-distribute charges.

console. He opened the console and found inside a .40 caliber

semi-automatic handgun loaded with seven rounds, a large clear

bag holding eight smaller bags containing a total of 11.7 g of

crack cocaine, four clear bags containing 8 ecstasy pills (1.3 g

in total), and three clear bags of marijuana (8.8 g in total).

Smith also found $1,400 in cash on Lawson and another small

clear bag of 1.4 g of crack cocaine in the area near the driver’s

side sun visor. Lawson was charged with unlawful possession

with intent to distribute 5 g or more of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C.

§§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B)(iii); unlawful possession with intent

to distribute marijuana, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(D);

unlawful possession with intent to distribute ecstasy, 21 U.S.C.

§§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C); using, carrying, and possessing a

firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(c)(1); and because Lawson had a prior felony conviction

for unlawful possession of drugs and guns, unlawful possession

of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 

At trial, Lawson requested a jury instruction that would

allow the jury to find that possession of the 1.4 g of crack

cocaine found behind the sun visor could be for his personal use

alone while possession of the 11.7 g found in the console was

for distribution. The district court agreed to the instruction but

explained to the jury that it could still convict Lawson of

possession with intent to distribute the smaller amount and could

only convict Lawson of simple possession of this amount if the

government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

Lawson possessed the larger amount. [See 9/13/05 Tr. at 84,

116-17]. The jury convicted Lawson of (1) possession by a

felon of a firearm, (2) simple possession of the 1.4 g of crack

cocaine, and (3) simple possession of marijuana.1

 The jury

acquitted Lawson of using, carrying, and possessing a firearm

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during a drug trafficking offense and of possession with intent

to distribute marijuana or the smaller amount of crack cocaine.

The jury deadlocked on the charges of possession with intent to

distribute the larger amount of crack cocaine and the ecstasy

found in the console. The government dropped these two

charges.

The district court sentenced Lawson to 192 months in

prison: 120 months for possession of the firearm, 12 months for

possession of the marijuana, and 60 months for possession of the

crack cocaine. The court justified the 60-month sentence, which

is well beyond the statutory maximum for possession of 1.4 g of

crack cocaine, by reasoning that even though the jury did not

convict Lawson of possession with intent to distribute the 11.7 g

of crack cocaine, his conviction for possession of the gun and

the marijuana found in the console was a clear indication “that

the jury was concluding that [Lawson] possessed all of the

[crack cocaine found in the car.]” 1/12/06 Tr. at 15. Only a

week later, the district court, sua sponte, announced that it was

reconsidering Lawson’s 60-month sentence because of its

uncertainty as to whether it could impose a sentence that

exceeded the statutory maximum for his possession of the 1.4 g

based upon its determination that he had also possessed the

11.7 g. Later, the court reduced Lawson’s sentence for

possession of the 1.4 g to the statutory maximum of 12 months,

but reiterated its conclusion that, given the way these drugs were

packaged, “the evidence clearly indicated that these drugs

[including the 11.7 g of crack cocaine and the ecstasy] were

possessed with the intent to distribute them.” 2/3/06 Tr. at 4

(emphasis added); see also id. at 6 (“I do believe that the

evidence, by a preponderance, did in fact indicate his

involvement in this offense beyond mere possession.” (emphasis

added)).

On appeal, Lawson challenges his convictions, arguing that

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the district court abused its discretion when it excluded allegedly

relevant evidence, erred in instructing the jury to disregard a

portion of his counsel’s closing argument, and demonstrated

unlawful bias against his counsel throughout the trial. Lawson

also argues that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment

right to trial by jury by imposing a sentence based on facts not

found by the jury and that his sentence was unreasonable

because the district court failed to provide a sufficient

justification for imposing a sentence higher than the maximum

recommended by the Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”). We

first address Lawson’s arguments relating to his trial and then

turn to those challenging his sentence. 

II.

A. Faulty Photographs of the Re-Created Crime Scene

At trial, Lawson argued that no sale of drugs to Aubrey

Canarte took place. In an effort to show that Officer Wallace

could not have observed the transaction from where he sat in his

car, Lawson attempted to submit into evidence two photographs

that depicted his attempt to re-create the scene. The

photographs showed a car placed in the same spot that Lawson

had occupied and a man on a bicycle in two different positions

relative to the car. The car in the photographs was not

Lawson’s. 

The district court refused to admit the photographs into

evidence because, according to Wallace, they did not accurately

represent what he had seen: the bicycle did not appear in the

exact position he had recalled seeing it. The court explained

that the proper way to use a photographic re-creation for trial

would have been to ask the court to “order the officer to go out

and position the bike and the person in a manner consistent with

what he saw.” 9/8/05 Tr. at 104. Lawson’s counsel then asked

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Wallace on the stand to draw a picture on the photographs

depicting the car and the bicycle. When Wallace protested that

he was no “artist” and thus felt uncomfortable trying to draw the

scene, the court stopped this line of inquiry. Lawson’s counsel

next attempted to present evidence that Lawson’s car was

unavailable for the photographs because it had been seized in

civil forfeiture, but the court rejected this argument, holding that

once the photographs were excluded, any evidence that the car

had been seized was irrelevant. The court reminded Lawson’s

counsel that the photographs were excluded because they could

not be authenticated by Wallace. The fact that the car was not

Lawson’s was, according to the court, irrelevant. On appeal,

Lawson argues that the court abused its discretion by (i)

excluding the photographs, (ii) prohibiting Lawson’s counsel

from seeking Wallace’s drawn corrections to the photographs,

and (iii) not allowing counsel to present evidence that Lawson’s

car had been taken into police custody. 

“This Court reviews a district court’s evidentiary rulings for

abuse of discretion.” United States v. Watson, 409 F.3d 458,

462 (D.C. Cir. 2005). To be admissible, evidence must be

relevant, and its probative value must not be substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or misleading the

jury. See FED. R. EVID. 402, 403. “As a general rule, tangible

evidence such as photographs must be properly identified or

authenticated before being admitted into evidence at trial.”

United States v. Blackwell, 694 F.2d 1325, 1329-30 (D.C. Cir.

1982) (citing FED. R. EVID. 901(a)). A photograph may be

authenticated if a witness with knowledge of the scene testifies

that it accurately depicts the scene it purports to represent. See,

e.g., Am. Wrecking Corp. v. Sec’y of Labor, 351 F.3d 1254,

1262 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(1)).

Lawson’s proffered photographs were properly excluded from

evidence because they could not be authenticated. According to

the testimony of Wallace—the only witness at trial with

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2

 Lawson seizes upon some of our language in Henderson v.

George Washington University, 449 F.3d 127 (D.C. Cir. 2006), to

argue that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to permit

his use of the inaccurate photographs. In Henderson, a medical

malpractice case, we held that an official post-surgery medical report

should have been admitted into evidence because it “[went] to the

heart of [the] party’s case and appear[ed] crucial to the outcome of the

case” while “the prejudice to the party opposing admission of the

evidence appear[ed] minimal.” 449 F.3d at 141. But in Henderson,

the improperly excluded official report had been authenticated.

Lawson’s photographs were unauthenticated and therefore

inadmissible.

knowledge of the scene—the photographs did not accurately

reflect what he saw. The district court also did not abuse its

discretion in preventing Lawson’s counsel from forcing Wallace

to draw the scene on the photographs. Given Wallace’s own

professed lack of artistic ability, there was a danger that the

potential prejudicial effect of any compelled depiction might

substantially outweigh its probative value. Lawson lacked

relevant, reliable photographs to submit as evidence. He cannot

fault the district court for failing to force Wallace to salvage the

faulty photographs.2 Once the faulty photographs were

excluded, the district court did not abuse its discretion in

preventing Lawson’s counsel from explaining the unavailability

of Lawson’s car to re-create the scene. The civil forfeiture of

Lawson’s car was irrelevant as the obstacle to admissibility

“ha[d] nothing to do with the car.” 9/12/05 Tr. at 78. Any

similar vehicle would have sufficed to stage the re-creation.

Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion by the district court in

its evidentiary rulings. 

B. The Missing-Witness Argument to the Jury

In his closing statement to the jury, Lawson’s counsel

argued: 

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And when you retire, ladies and gentlemen, to

think about what evidence the government has

and hasn’t presented, I submit to you that you

will find yourself asking a whole bunch of

questions that are completely unanswered by the

government’s evidence. The government hasn’t

presented to you the testimony of Aubrey

Canarte. The government hasn’t presented to

you a single photograph, or a single video, or

anything to suggest that this transaction occurred.

And how do you know, ladies and gentlemen,

that this supposed transaction didn’t occur? 

9/13/05 Tr. at 129. A moment later and over objection, the

court, sua sponte, instructed the jury to disregard counsel’s

reference to the government’s failure to call Canarte because it

was, in the court’s view, a “partial missing-witness argument”

that was inappropriate and could not be made without prior

permission from the court. On appeal, Lawson argues that this

instruction was error because his counsel was not making a

missing-witness argument. 

A jury may infer that a witness who “potentially ha[s] so

much to offer that one would expect [him] to take the stand” but

is not called would have given testimony harmful to a party that

had “special ability to produce him” at trial. United States v.

Pitts, 918 F.2d 197, 199 (D.C. Cir. 1990). And counsel may

make that argument upon a showing that the opposing party had

such power and failed to use it. See, e.g., United States v.

Young, 463 F.2d 934, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“Surely it should

not be put to the jury, as either instruction or argument, that an

inference should be drawn from a party’s failure to produce

witnesses if the judge concludes that the party was powerless to

do so.”). Lawson’s counsel could have properly asked the jury

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to infer that Canarte would have testified that Lawson sold him

no drugs if she could have shown that the government had a

special ability to produce Canarte to testify at trial. But Lawson

does not dispute that a missing-witness argument would have

been inappropriate. The government had no special ability to

produce Canarte. Lawson could just as easily have called him.

Lawson argues instead that his counsel was not making such an

argument, and we agree.

Lawson was charged with multiple counts of possessionwith-intent-to-distribute illegal drugs. Defending against these

counts, Lawson’s counsel was simply calling into question the

sufficiency of the government’s evidence, a typical and

expected argument for a case like this. It was entirely

reasonable for counsel to point out to the jury the kinds of

evidence that they might have expected to see but did not in a

case to prove that illegal drugs were sold. Emphasizing the lack

of one form of evidence—in this instance, testimony by

Canarte—is not always or necessarily an argument that a

witness not called would have provided testimony harmful to

the prosecution’s case. See, e.g., Burgess v. United States, 440

F.2d 226, 235 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (“[T]he significance of the

absence of a witness is not confined to an inference that if

produced his testimony would be unfavorable to the party who

has the power to produce him.”). Lawson’s counsel did not

even ask the jury to infer, either directly or in a meaningful

indirect manner, that Canarte would have testified against the

government’s case. See United States v. Henson, 486 F.2d

1292, 1298 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that a party did not

make a missing-witness argument because “[t]he remarks did

not directly, or in a meaningful indirect manner, ask the jury to

draw an impermissible inference from [a witness’s] absence”).

Counsel was making a permissible argument based on absence

of evidence that the government had failed to prove that Lawson

sold illegal drugs. The district court should not have instructed

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the jury to disregard this argument.

But not every error during a trial requires reversal of a

conviction. In fact, “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance

which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.”

FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a); see United States v. Olano, 507 U.S.

725, 731 (1993). An error affecting “substantial rights” must

have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the . . . verdict.” United States v. Dominguez

Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 81 (2004) (quoting Kotteakos v. United

States, 328 U.S. 750, 766 (1946)). The district court’s error did

not have such an effect or influence. The jury failed to convict

Lawson of selling drugs. Each of his drug convictions was for

possession alone. The argument his counsel was forbidden to

make went only to the distribution charges. Had counsel been

allowed to make her full argument about Canarte’s failure to

testify, the jury could have at most inferred that Lawson had not

sold him drugs, which would have left virtually untouched the

government’s substantial case against Lawson for unlawful

possession of illegal drugs. It is highly unlikely that the jury

would have struggled over Lawson’s possession charges

because of the government’s failure to call Canarte to the stand.

C. The District Court’s Alleged Bias Against Lawson

Lawson also makes an overarching claim that the district

court “demonstrated bias against counsel that deprived [Lawson]

of his constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial.”

Appellant’s Br. at 37. He points to instances of allegedly unfair

evidentiary rulings, see id. at 39, unfair jury instructions, see id.

at 39-40, unfair sua sponte questioning of witnesses, see id. at

41, “result-oriented reasoning” in imposing an unreasonable

sentence, id., and critical remarks by the judge against his

counsel and her techniques, see id. at 43. 

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Lawson’s argument of bias is similar to the one made in

United States v. Donato, 99 F.3d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1996), where

we explained:

[A] district judge has wide discretion in

monitoring the flow of a criminal trial. It is well

within her discretion to rebuke an attorney,

sometimes harshly, when that attorney asks

inappropriate questions, ignores the court’s

instructions, or otherwise engages in improper or

delaying behavior. Sharp words spoken by a

trial court to counsel do not by themselves

establish impermissible bias. There is a modicum

of quick temper that must be allowed even

judges.

Id. at 434 (citations and quotation marks omitted).

Notwithstanding this deference, in Donato we reversed the

appellant’s criminal conviction because “the negative

comments . . . were more concentrated, frequent, and critical

than [in other cases]” and “the relative brevity of [the] trial

ma[de] it more likely that the judge’s negative comments

colored the entire trial.” Id. at 435.

We have reviewed the record with Donato in mind, and

have some cause for concern. The interactions between the

court and Lawson’s counsel in this three-day trial were

frequently on less-than-friendly terms. Yet, we do not believe

that the court’s conduct warrants either reversal or a retrial.

Lawson fails to demonstrate any harm from the exchanges

between the court and his counsel. The court took care to

instruct the jury not to take its comments or remarks to counsel

as any indication of its opinion of the merits or its view of the

facts. See 9/8/05 Tr. at 128. It is also significant that the court’s

comments were directed at Lawson’s counsel and not at him or

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his witnesses. See United States v. Clark, 184 F.3d 858, 869

(D.C. Cir. 1999) (considering a mistrial claim and giving weight

to the fact that “the court’s comments were directed at the

attorneys, not at defendant or his witnesses” (citing Donato, 99

F.3d at 437-38; United States v. Edmond, 52 F.3d 1080, 1101-02

(D.C. Cir.1995))). And many of the comments Lawson cites

were made at the bench (inaudible to the jurors) or while the

jury was not in the courtroom. See, e.g., 9/8/05 Tr. at 51-54,

103-04; 9/13/05 Tr. at 121-23. 

Furthermore, it is likely that Lawson’s counsel bears some

responsibility for the court’s reactions. In most of the exchanges

cited by Lawson, the court correctly ruled that counsel had

failed to properly frame her questions. At times, counsel’s

manner of introducing evidence did not manifest its relevance,

either immediately or even after further questioning. See, e.g.,

9/8/05 Tr. at 43-54, 102-111. Counsel made arguments in front

of the jury that were at least confusing to the jury and the judge,

see, e.g., 9/13/05 Tr. at 121-23, and arguably inappropriate, see,

e.g., id. at 129-35. Counsel interrupted the judge on a number

of occasions, see, e.g., id. at 154. 

Finally, we again note that despite the packaging and the

amount of the drugs found in Lawson’s car, the jury did not

convict Lawson of any possession-with-intent-to-distribute

charges. Therefore, although the court’s remarks were

occasionally harsh and the exchanges with counsel less than

ideal, Lawson has not demonstrated that, under the

circumstances, these remarks had such a distorting influence on

the jury’s determinations as to warrant a reversal of Lawson’s

conviction or to require a retrial. 

Having affirmed Lawson’s conviction, we now review his

sentence.

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3

 Lawson argues in effect that the district court could not

lawfully extend his sentence beyond 37 months. However, as we

discuss in Section III.B, infra, Lawson’s counsel was actually

mistaken in believing that the properly calculated Guidelines range for

Lawson’s case was 30-37 months. It is 110-137 months. 

III. 

A. The Booker Argument

Lawson argues that the district court violated his Sixth

Amendment right to trial by jury under United States v. Booker,

543 U.S. 220 (2005), by imposing a sentence higher than the

maximum provided for by the Guidelines based on facts not

found by the jury. His argument is flawed in at least two ways.

 

First, Lawson argues that the district court could not

lawfully impose a sentence higher than the maximum

Guidelines sentence. This argument is plainly wrong. Under

Booker, the Guidelines are advisory, not mandatory, see id. at

245 (excising the statutes that make the Guidelines mandatory).

No Sixth Amendment issue is raised unless a sentence exceeds

its statutory maximum. See id. at 244 (“Any fact (other than a

prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence

exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by

a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the

defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”

(citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000))).

Second, Lawson argues that the district court could not

lawfully enhance his sentence beyond the recommended

maximum Guidelines sentence based on conduct for which he

was not convicted—in this case, possession of the larger amount

of crack cocaine found in the console.3

 However, as we have

discussed above, the district court determined that although the

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jury failed to convict Lawson of an intent to distribute the crack

cocaine found in the console, the government nonetheless

proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Lawson

possessed all of the drugs found in the car (including the larger

amount of crack cocaine and the ecstasy pills) with an intent to

distribute, and took this finding into account in calculating his

sentence. 

We have recently considered whether a sentence based on

unconvicted conduct violates the Sixth Amendment. In United

States v. Dorcely, 454 F.3d 366 (D.C. Cir. 2006), the appellant

was convicted of making a false statement to the Federal Bureau

of Investigation but was acquitted of two related conspiracy

charges. See id. at 369. Although the recommended Guidelines

range for the appellant’s conviction was only 0-6 months, the

district court, finding by a preponderance of evidence that the

appellant was in fact involved in the conspiracies, sentenced

him to 24 months. See id. Reading the Supreme Court’s

language in Booker as providing the sentencing court with

discretion “broad enough to allow consideration of acquitted

conduct so long as the court ‘deems [it] relevant,’” id. at 371

(alteration in original), we held that “a sentencing court may

base a sentence on acquitted conduct without offending the

defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.” Id. Thus,

we held that “consideration of acquitted conduct violated the

Sixth Amendment only if the judge imposes a sentence that

exceeds what the jury verdict authorizes.” Id. at 371 (citing

Booker, 542 U.S. at 244). In affirming the appellant’s sentence,

we joined five other circuits that had considered this question.

See id. If it is permissible for a sentencing court to build a

sentence, at least in part, on conduct for which a defendant is

charged but acquitted, we find no error in relying on conduct for

which Lawson was charged but on which the jury deadlocked,

provided, as here, the court determined by a preponderance of

the evidence that he engaged in the conduct.

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B. The Reasonableness of the Sentence

Lawson also argues that his 144-month sentence is nearly

four times greater than the maximum Guidelines sentence for

the three crimes for which he was convicted and that the district

court failed to provide a reasonable basis that would support this

seemingly draconian upward deviation, relying instead on

factors already included within the Guidelines calculations. We

have reviewed the Presentence Investigation Report and the

transcripts from the two sentencing hearings the district court

convened. Because it is not clear from the record whether the

district court in fact considered the appropriate Guidelines range

for Lawson’s crimes and his misconduct—a necessary threshold

inquiry for our reasonableness review—we conclude that we

cannot determine whether the sentence is reasonable or not. In

the absence of a clear explanation of how the district court

arrived at his sentence, we cannot address Lawson’s arguments

that the sentence is unreasonable, and we therefore remand the

case to the district court for re-sentencing. 

Because “a sentence within a properly calculated

Guidelines range is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of

reasonableness,” Dorcely, 454 F.3d at 376 (citations omitted);

see also Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 168 L. Ed. 2d

203, 211 (2007) (holding that “a court of appeals may apply a

presumption of reasonableness to a sentence that reflects a

proper application of the [Guidelines]”), we begin our review by

considering whether the sentencing court started its analysis

from a properly calculated Guidelines range. See Dorcely, 454

F.3d at 375 (“In the post-Booker world, the [sentencing] court

must calculate and consider the applicable Guidelines range but

is not bound by it.”); 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f) (“If the court of

appeals determines that . . . the sentence was . . . imposed as a

result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines,

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4 Section 3553(a) lists, inter alia, the following factors

relevant to Lawson’s sentence: 

the nature and circumstances of the offense and the

history and characteristics of the defendant . . . , the

need for the sentence imposed . . . to reflect the

seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the

law, and to provide just punishment for the

offense . . . , to afford adequate deterrence to criminal

conduct . . . , to protect the public from further crimes

of the defendant . . . , and to provide the defendant

with needed educational or vocational training,

medical care, or other correctional treatment in the

most effective manner . . . , the kinds of sentences

available . . ., [and] the need to provide restitution to

any victims of the offense.

the court shall remand the case for further sentencing

proceedings with such instructions as the court considers

appropriate.”). If it did, we then review the sentence ultimately

imposed “to ensure that it is reasonable in light of the sentencing

factors that Congress specified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United

States v. Price, 409 F.3d 436, 442 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Booker, 543

U.S. at 261 (“Section 3553(a) remains in effect, and sets forth

numerous factors that guide sentencing. Those factors in turn

will guide appellate courts, as they have in the past, in

determining whether a sentence is unreasonable.”);4 see also

United States v. Olivares, 473 F.3d 1224, 1226 (D.C. Cir. 2006)

(explaining that the court must determine that the Guidelines

were correctly applied before it can review the reasonableness

of the sentence in light of § 3553(a) factors).

With respect to Lawson’s sentence, the Presentence

Investigation Report prepared by the Probation Officer for the

sentencing court initially recommended a Guidelines range of

110-137 months, based in part on the Report’s conclusion that

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the “jury found Mr. Lawson responsible for the [11.7 g of]

cocaine base recovered from within the console.” Joint

Appendix at 64. When Lawson challenged this calculation on

the ground that he was only convicted of possessing the 1.4 g of

crack cocaine and not the larger volume, the Probation Officer

prepared an addendum to the Report that included an alternative

calculation of Lawson’s sentence, which did not include the

11.7 g. Id. at 64-65. The recommended range for Lawson’s

sentence under this second calculation was only 30-37 months.

Id. at 65. At the final sentencing hearing, the district court

nonetheless concluded that a preponderance of the evidence

clearly established that Lawson possessed all the drugs found in

Lawson’s car with an intent to distribute. 

This conclusion affects the applicable Guidelines range.

The proper Guidelines calculations need not be limited to the

charges for which the defendant has been convicted. They

should include the relevant factors specified in the Guidelines

and may include conduct for which the defendant was charged

and but not convicted if it appears by a preponderance of the

evidence that he engaged in the conduct. See, e.g., United States

v. Long, 328 F.3d 655, 670 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that the

preponderance of the evidence standard applies to calculating

the proper Guidelines range (citing McMillan v. Pennsylvania,

477 U.S. 79, 91-92 (1986))); see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, cmt.

background (2006) (“Conduct that is not formally charged or is

not an element of the offense of conviction may enter into the

determination of the applicable guideline sentencing range . . . .

Relying on the entire range of conduct . . . appears to be the

most reasonable approach to writing workable guidelines for

these offenses.”). In other words, where the court finds by a

preponderance of evidence that the defendant was engaged in

the conduct for which he was charged, this finding becomes a

factor in determining the properly calculated Guidelines range.

See, e.g., United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624, 644-45 (D.C.

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5

 Our discussion focuses solely on Lawson’s possession with

intent to distribute crack cocaine. Although the district court also

concluded that he intended to distribute the other drugs in the car,

Lawson’s possession of those drugs would not affect a Guidelines

calculation that had already taken into account the amount of crack

cocaine found in his car. See Joint Appendix at 21; see also U.S.S.G.

§ 2D1.1, § 3D1.2(d), § 3D1.3, § 3D1.4.

Cir. 1992) (where defendant was convicted of distribution of

0.199 g of crack cocaine but was acquitted of possessing 12.72 g

of additional crack cocaine found underneath his pickup truck,

the district court, upon finding defendant guilty by a

preponderance of evidence, could properly include the 12.72 g

of crack cocaine charge in calculating the Guidelines range).

We have previously found this approach to be constitutionally

permissible. See id.; see also Long, 328 F.3d at 670. 

Based on our review of the record, we believe that the

district court should have figured Lawson’s possession of the

11.7 g of crack cocaine into its calculation of the appropriate

Guidelines range from which it could then determine a

reasonable sentence.5 In fact, the district court noted this

possibility at Lawson’s first sentencing hearing:

[Lawson’s other conduct] can be factored into

what the Guidelines calculation is because even

though he may not be found guilty, if I conclude

that there are circumstances that, nonetheless,

show that he did possess the other drugs, by a

preponderance standard, that still can be used in

the calculation.

1/12/06 Tr. at 6. We have not, however, been able to find

anywhere in the record where the sentencing court stated or even

implied that it used a Guidelines range that took into account

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Lawson’s possession of the 11.7 g. Had it done so, the

recommended Guidelines range for Lawson’s sentence would

increase from 30-37 months to 110-137 months, as the Probation

Officer had initially calculated. With that range as the starting

point for its analysis, the court should have then considered

whether the § 3553(a) factors warrant a sentence either within

or outside this range.

Unfortunately, the record is muddled as to whether the

district court considered this starting point for its analysis. If

pressed, we would be forced to determine on an inconclusive

record that the district court used the 30-37 month range of the

Report’s addendum as the stepping off point for its analysis. In

objecting to the sentence, Lawson’s counsel noted that the base

offense level should have been 14, which corresponds to a

sentence range of 30-37 months. See 2/3/06 Tr. at 3-4. The

court did not counter this argument by noting that his base

offense level should have been 28 based on his possession of the

additional 11.7 g of crack cocaine, which is consistent with a

Guidelines range of 110-137 months. Instead, the court merely

noted that “the Guidelines aren’t mandatory” and that “the

Guidelines, as calculated, don’t accurately reflect the

seriousness of the conduct [Lawson] was convicted of.” 2/3/06

Tr. at 4. But we will not determine the reasonableness of a

prison sentence on such speculation. Without knowing the point

at which the sentencing court began its calculation, we cannot

address Lawson’s argument that his was unreasonable. We

therefore remand this matter to the district court to explain from

which Guidelines range it began its calculation, and only then,

see, e.g., Dorcely, 454 F.3d at 375, can we determine whether

the § 3553(a) factors invoked by the court reasonably justify the

sentence ultimately imposed. See, e.g., United States v.

Simpson, 430 F.3d 1177, 1187 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“[T]he

farther the judge’s sentence departs from the guidelines

sentence . . . , the more compelling the justification based on

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factors in section 3553(a) that the judge must offer in order to

enable the court of appeals to assess the reasonableness of the

sentence imposed.” (quoting United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d

725, 729 (7th Cir. 2005))). 

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Lawson’s conviction

on all grounds, but vacate Lawson’s sentence and remand the

case to the district court to make explicit the applicable

Guidelines range and how its consideration of the required

factors under § 3553(a) affected its departure from or adherence

to that range. 

So ordered.

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