Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_05-cv-00615/USCOURTS-almd-2_05-cv-00615-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Patricia A. Campbell
Plaintiff
Gannett Co., Inc.
Defendant
Montgomery Advertiser
Defendant

Document Text:

The Complaint names the Gannett Co. Inc., a corporation doing business as The 1

Montgomery Advertiser, as the sole defendant to this action. The Advertiser Company,

which does business as The Montgomery Advertiser, has defended this action, but contends

that it has not been properly named in the Complaint. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

PATRICIA A. CAMPBELL, )

 )

PLAINTIFF, )

 )

v. ) CASE NO.: 2:05-cv-615-MEF

 )

GANNETT CO., INC., d/b/a THE )(WO-Not Recommended for Publication)

MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, )

 )

DEFENDANT. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Patricia Campbell (“Campbell”) brings suit against her former employer, The

Montgomery Advertiser (“Defendant”) for alleged discrimination on the basis of race and 1

sex and for retaliation. Campbell’s claims are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.

(“Title VII”) and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. This cause is presently before the court on the

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 12).

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The court exercises subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1331 (federal question) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (civil rights). The parties do not contest

personal jurisdiction and venue, and the court finds adequate allegations in support of

personal jurisdiction and venue. 

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is

appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). “An issue of fact is ‘genuine’ if the record as a whole

could lead a reasonable trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. An issue is ‘material’

if it might affect the outcome of the case under the governing law.” Redwing Carriers, Inc.

v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1496 (11 Cir. 1996) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty th

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). 

The party asking for summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of

informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The movant can meet this burden by presenting evidence

showing there is no dispute of material fact, or by showing the non-moving party has failed

to present evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate

burden of proof. Id. at 322-23. 

Once the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56(e) “requires the nonmoving party

to go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to

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3

interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324. To avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party

“must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material

facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). On the

other hand, a court ruling on a motion for summary judgment must believe the evidence of

the non-movant and must draw all justifiable inferences from the evidence in the non-moving

party’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 255. After the nonmoving party

has responded to the motion for summary judgment, the court must grant summary judgment

if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

FACTS

The court has carefully considered all deposition excerpts and documents submitted

in support of and in opposition to the motion. The submissions of the parties, viewed in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party, establish the following relevant facts:

Campbell is an African-American female. From July of 1988 to September 27, 2004,

Defendant employed Campbell. When she was initially hired, Campbell worked as a

transient sales representative. Her duties included taking incoming telephone calls from

customers wishing to purchase advertising in Defendant’s newspaper. After approximately

one year, Defendant awarded Campbell a position as a Contract Sales Representative. As

a Contract Sales Representative, Campbell was responsible for servicing and developing

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 There was a period of time when Campbell was again working as a Transient Sales 2

Representative, but during the period of time relevant to the claims in this case, Campbell

was working as a Contract Sales Representative.

 Joe Howard worked with Campbell for a time, but it is undisputed that he left his 3

position with Defendant prior to the date on which Campbell’s employment was terminated.

4

classified advertising accounts and non-accounts. Specifically, she handled incoming

advertisement orders, performed customer service, called customers for advertisement

renewals, and sold advertising space for sale specials. Campbell had a group of assigned

customers. For most of the rest of her time as Defendant’s employee, Campbell was a

Contract Sales Representative.2

Jennifer Jensen (“Jensen”), a Caucasian female, was the Classified Department’s

Inside Sales Supervisor and Campbell’s immediate supervisor. Jensen reported to Kathryn

Mount (“Mount”), a Caucasian female, the Classified Manager. Campbell worked with a

number of other Contract Sales Representatives: Brenda Jackson, an African-American

female; Cornelius Jones, an African-American male; Thomas Taylor, an African-American

male; Margie Jean Robinson-Smith, an African-American female; Ed Smith, an AfricanAmerican male; and Joe Howard, an African-American male. 

3

Throughout her employment with Defendant, Campbell complained about a variety

of issues. On September 14, 2003, she made perhaps her most notable complaint when she

delivered a thick packet of information to Advertising Director Ron Davidson and Human

Resources Director Linda Browder. This packet included copies of several of her prior

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 This was not Campbell’s first complaint about morale. In January of 2002, 4

Campbell sent a written memorandum to Mount in which Campbell complained about morale

and accused Mount of being the “largest part of that discontent.” Campbell further stated to

Mount that Mount was not “greatly liked nor respected” and criticized Mount for taking her

job “too seriously.” She accused Mount of being “in the clouds” and told to “take a good

long look at things and try some different approaches lest we all become consumed by the

prevailing gloom and bitterness that colors our every day.”

5

written complaints such as a July 2000 complaint expressing Campbell’s disagreement with

how sales goals were derived, about the commission structure, about vacation time, about the

filing of vacant positions and about the way that free ads were distributed. Another

document in the packet was a June 2002 document in which Campbell expressed various

complaints about vacation, holiday, and seniority issues and an April 2003 complaint about

morale. 

4

Campbell believes this complaint in 2003 resulted in the termination of her

employment in September of 2004. Defendant disputes this and contends that it terminated

Campbell’s employment in September of 2004 due to what they contend are her repeated

violations of company policies, including company policies regarding billing. 

Defendant’s policies required that classified ads placed in its paper must run on both

Sundays and Mondays and cannot run on Sundays alone. Because billing periods ended on

Sundays, Defendant required their sales representatives to split the revenue from classified

ads placed in both a Sunday and a Monday paper between billing periods. For example, if

an ad placed to run on Sunday and Monday cost $500, the sales employee placing the ad

would allocate $250 to the billing period which ended on Sunday and $250 to the next billing

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period which began on Monday. This process is referred to in the factual record as splitting

ads across billing periods, but it perhaps more accurately should have been described as

splitting ad revenue across billing periods. 

On November 5, 2003, Jensen had individual discussions with Campbell and with all

other Contract Sales Representatives in which she explained that splitting ads across billing

periods was not an option and that further failures in that area would result in disciplinary

action. On November 11, 2003, Jensen documented these conversations with email messages

to each employee summarizing the individual discussions she had with each of them. On that

same date, Campbell sent Jensen a response seeking confirmation that everyone was getting

this same email message and that the message was going in everyone’s file.

In January of 2004, Campbell failed to split thirteen crossover ads. This meant that

nearly 12% of her total ads taken were improperly billed. None of her co-workers had more

than three improperly billed ads (for that employee the rate of improper billing was a mere

1.91%). Defendant gave Campbell a verbal warning. In February of 2004, Campbell had

nine crossover ads improperly billed -- 10.98% of her total ads taken. During this same

period, none of her co-workers had more than three improperly billed ads (for that employee

the percentage of improperly billed ads was only 1.58%). On March 2, 2004, Defendant

issued Campbell a written warning regarding problems with failing to split ads that cross

billing periods. At this same time two other employees with highest volume of improperly

allocated cross over ads also were issued warnings. In March of 2004, Campbell had only

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one improperly billed crossover ad. She did not receive any verbal or written warning.

During this same period, a co-worker with six crossover ads (3.39% if the total ads that

employee took) received a verbal warning. In April of 2004, Campbell had three crossover

ads, but was not counseled. In May of 2004, Campbell had five crossover ads (3.45% of her

total ads taken). Defendant gave her a “final written warning” which she received on June

4, 2004. Two of her co-workers who had problems with crossover ads, albeit at a lower

percentage than Campbell, also received warnings. During the month of June of 2004,

Campbell had only one crossover ad and did not receive any form of counseling for it. 

By July of 2004, Campbell had a total of thirty-two ads that she had failed to split for

the year and she had repeatedly been cautioned that failure to split such ads was improper.

On July 13, 2004, Campbell received her annual performance appraisal. Not surprisingly it

noted that Campbell had repeated violated the cross-billing policy. For the same period, her

co-workers had failed to spilt twenty, eleven, nine, eight, and eight times respectively. It is

undisputed that during this period all employees with high percentages of violating this

policy received warnings - either written or verbal. There is no evidence that Campbell alone

was being disciplined on this issue. Moreover, there is not evidence that only females were

disciplined. Objectively speaking, Campbell’s rate of improperly billing crossover ads was

much higher than her co-workers. For this reason, Defendant elected to put Campbell on a

performance improvement plan in July 26, 2004. The performance improvement plan clearly

stated that Campbell was not to have more than two ads that cross the billing period in the

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next sixty days. Nevertheless, in August of 2004, Campbell had five crossover ads

improperly billed. Defendant terminated Campbell’s employment on September 27, 2004.

Defendant told Campbell that her employment was being terminated because of her repeated

violations of policies and procedures regarding the allocation of revenue from crossover ads.

It is undisputed that no one ever told Campbell that there was any other reason for the

termination of her employment. 

Believing that the termination of her employment was improperly motivated,

Campbell filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (“EEOC”) on December 14, 2004. In this Charge of Discrimination, Campbell

alleged that she had been subjected to discrimination on the basis of her race and sex and to

retaliation for having opposed unlawful practices. On March 31, 2005, the EEOC made a

no cause finding and issued Campbell a notice of her right to sue. Campbell filed this lawsuit

on June 29, 2005.

DISCUSSION

A. Race

In her Complaint, Campbell alleges that Defendant discriminated against her on the

basis of her race. She brings this claim pursuant to Title VII (Count One) and 42 U.S.C. §

1981 (Count Four). Defendant moved for summary judgment on these claims. In her

submissions in opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Campbell’s

counsel concedes that “the evidence supporting her claim of race discrimination under Title

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9

VII and Section 1981, as developed through discovery, is not compelling” and indicated that

Campbell does not argue for the continuation of these claims in this matter. In light of this

concession and upon independent review of the record before this court which is devoid of

evidence of disparate treatment on the basis of race, the court finds that the Motion for

Summary Judgment is due to be GRANTED to the extent that it seeks judgment in

Defendant’s favor on the claims of race discrimination contained in the Complaint (Counts

One and Four). 

B. Sex

In her Complaint, Campbell alleges that Defendant discriminated against her on the

basis of her sex; she brings this claim pursuant to Title VII (Count Two). Title VII prohibits

employers from discriminating against employees with respect to decisions relating to the

termination of their employment. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). “A Title VII disparate

treatment plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted with discriminatory purpose.” Nix v.

WLCY Radio/Rahall Communications, 738 F.2d 1181, 1184 (11th Cir. 1984). A plaintiff

may attempt to do so by offering either statistical, direct, or circumstantial evidence. In this

case, Campbell argues that she has established a prima facie case of discriminatory

termination by circumstantial evidence. 

In evaluating disparate treatment claims supported by circumstantial evidence, courts

within this Circuit and elsewhere rely on the framework established by the United States

Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) and Texas Dep’t

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of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). See, e.g., Wilson v. B/E Aerospace,

Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1087 (11th Cir. 2004). 

Under this framework, the plaintiff first has the burden of

establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, which creates

a rebuttable presumption that the employer acted illegally. A

plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of disparate treatment by

showing that she was a qualified member of a protected class

and was subjected to an adverse employment action in contrast

with similarly situated employees outside the protected class.

The methods of presenting a prima facie case are not fixed; they

are flexible and depend to a large degree upon the employment

situation.

Id. (internal citations omitted). Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the employer

must articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions. Id. The employer has

a burden of production, not a burden of persuasion, and it need not persuade the court that

it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons. Id. 

If an employer satisfies its burden by articulating a non-discriminatory reason, it

rebuts the presumption of discrimination created by the prima facie case. Id. The burden of

production then shifts to the plaintiff to offer evidence that the alleged reason of the

employer is a pretext for illegal discrimination. Id. The plaintiff may satisfy this burden of

showing pretext by persuading the court either directly that a discriminatory reason more than

likely motivated the employer or indirectly that the proffered reason for the employment

decision is not worthy of belief. See, e.g., Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. The plaintiff may

accomplish this in a number of ways. Recognized ways of establishing pretext in cases

involving the termination of an employee for alleged violation of a work rule include a

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showing by the plaintiff either that she did not violate the work rule or that, if she did, other

employees not within the protected class who engaged in similar acts were not similarly

treated. See, e.g., Anderson v. Savage Labs., Inc., 675 F.2d 1221, 1224 (11th Cir. 1982). 

In this case, Campbell claims that the termination of her employment was

discriminatory. 

A plaintiff’s prima facie case for a discharge-discrimination

claim must show the following elements: (1) the plaintiff is a

member of a protected class; (2) the plaintiff was qualified for

the position at issue; (3) the plaintiff was discharged despite his

qualification; and (4) the plaintiff was subject to differential

treatment, that is, he was either (a) replaced by someone who

was not a member of the plaintiff’s protected class or (b) a

similarly situated employee who was not a member of the

protected class engaged in nearly identical conduct and was not

discharged.

Keel v. U.S. Dep’t of Air Force, 256 F. Supp. 2d 1269, 1285 (M.D. Ala. 2003), aff’d without

opinion, 99 Fed. Appx. 880 (11th Cir. Mar 02, 2004); Davis v. Qualico Miscellaneous Inc.,

161 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1319 (M.D. Ala. 2001). Accord, Williams v. Motorola, 303 F.3d

1284, 1293 (11 Cir. 2002). It is not disputed that as a female Campbell is a member of a th

protected class, nor is it disputed that the termination of her employment constitutes an

adverse employment action. The parties disagree as to whether Campbell was qualified for

the position she held. For purposes of this motion, the court is satisfied that the evidence,

when viewed in the light most favorable to Campbell, establishes that she was minimally

qualified for the job. Thus, the true element of the prima facie case at issue in this action is

whether Campbell was subjected to differential treatment. 

Case 2:05-cv-00615-MEF-CSC Document 32 Filed 07/19/06 Page 11 of 20
In addition to comparator evidence relating to work rule violations, Campbell 5

attempts to also rely on evidence relating to awards for Salesperson of the Month and

Salesperson of the Year in 2003. According to Campbell these awards were given to male

employees when they should have been given to her. Campbell cannot bring claims relating

to these awards in this lawsuit because she did not timely file a Charge of Discrimination

with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission relating to these awards. To the extent

that she offers the evidence as some sort of additional circumstantial evidence of sexist

motive, the court finds that they are of little utility as they relate to compensation and

performance awards rather than discipline which is the employment action at issue in this

suit. 

12

In support of her contention that she was subjected to differential treatment, Campbell

points to male employees who she contends were similarly situated to her and who engaged

in nearly identical conduct and were not discharged. In evaluating this claim, the court must 5

be mindful of the binding precedent from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals which

requires Campbell to be similarly situated in all relevant respects to those comparators she

identifies. See, e.g., Morris v. Emory Clinic, Inc., 402 F.3d 1076, 1082 (11th Cir. 2005)

(doctor discharged from clinic due to patient complaints about his conduct who couldn’t

show that he was replaced by someone outside his protected class and who couldn’t show

that a comparable person outside the his protected class received “nearly identical”

complaints, but was not fired failed to establish a prima facie case); Silvera v. Orange County

Sch. Bd., 244 F.3d 1253, 1259 (11th Cir. 2001) (reversing judgment in favor of plaintiff

because employer entitled to judgment as a matter of law where plaintiff’s comparator

engaged in fewer instances of misconduct than plaintiff); Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364,

1368-69 (11th Cir. 1999) (affirming summary judgment in employer’s favor where alleged

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13

misconduct of comparators was not sufficiently similar to support disparate treatment claim);

Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1563 (11th Cir. 1997) (affirming summary judgment where

plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence that non-minority employees with which he

compares his treatment were similarly situated in all aspects, or that their conduct was of

comparable seriousness to the conduct for which he was discharged); Jones v. Gerwens, 874

F.2d 1534, 1540-42 (11th Cir. 1989); Nix, 738 F.2d at 1185-87 (African-American plaintiff

who was replaced by another African-American after termination for violation of work rule

failed to make out a prima facie case of race discrimination because he did not meet his

burden of showing that a white employee in similar circumstances was retained while he was

fired). In evaluating the similarity of the comparators identified by a plaintiff, the most

important variables in a discriminatory discipline case are the nature of the offenses

committed and the nature of the punishments imposed. See, Jones v. Gerwens, 874 F.2d at

1539. Both the “quantity and the quality of the comparator’s misconduct must be nearly

identical to prevent courts from second-guessing employers’ reasonable decisions and

confusing apples and oranges.” Maniccia, 171 F.3d at 1368. In making this analysis a court

must keep in mind that “Title VII does not take away an employer’s right to interpret its rules

as it chooses, and to make determinations as it sees fit under those rules[.]” Id. at 1369.

Moreover, the actions of the employer toward the proffered comparators are only relevant

if the decisionmaker knew of the rule violations by the comparators and took no action

against them. Jones v. Gerwens, 874 F.2d at 1542. 

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With these principles in mind, the court will examine Campbell’s contention that her

employment was terminated for the violation of company policy and male employees who

violated the same company policy were retained. Campbell correctly notes that like her,

some of her male counterparts, namely Howard, Taylor and Jones, violated Defendant’s

policy regarding the proper billing of crossover ads. However, the court cannot say that the

quantity of the misconduct was sufficiently similar to Campbell’s to establish a prima facie

case of disparate treatment on the basis of sex. The chart below summarizes the number of

crossover ads each had during the first eight billing periods in 2004:

Campbell Howard Taylor Jones

Period 1 13 3 0 1

Period 2 9 2 1 3

Period 3 1 1 1 2

Period 4 3 0 0 1

Period 5 5 0 2 2

Period 6 1 2 4 0

Period 7 2 1 1 1

Period 8 5 1 0 5

Total for 1-8 39 10 9 15

Clearly, Campbell had far more instances of violating policy than Howard, Taylor, and Jones.

Indeed, she had more violations than Howard, Taylor, and Jones combined. Moreover, it is

undisputed that during this period, while Defendant did not terminate the employment of

Howard, Taylor or Jones, it did subject each of them to either verbal or written disciplinary

Case 2:05-cv-00615-MEF-CSC Document 32 Filed 07/19/06 Page 14 of 20
 In the alternative, the court finds that Defendant is entitled to summary judgment 6

on Campbell’s sex discrimination claims because the court is satisfied that Campbell has not

shown that the legitimate, non-discriminatory reason Defendant has proffered for the

termination of Campbell’s employment was a pretext for intentional discrimination. For this

additional reason, the motion for summary judgment as to Count Two is due to be

GRANTED. 

15

action for their violations of this policy. Consistent with the previously cited binding

precedent from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, this court finds that Campbell has

failed to establish a prima facie case by pointing to a similarly situated employee who was

not a member of the protected class engaged in nearly identical conduct and was not

discharged. Thus, the court finds that the undisputed evidence, when viewed in the light most

favorable to Campbell fails to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination. For this

reason, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Count Two is due to be GRANTED.6

C. Retaliation

In her Complaint, Campbell alleges that Defendant retaliated against her for opposing

unlawful employment practices and raising concerns about race-based discrimination. She

brings this claim pursuant to Title VII (Count Three) and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count Five). 

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, [an employee]

must show: (1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) her

employer was aware of that activity; (3) she suffered adverse

employment action; and (4) there was a causal link between her

protected activity and the adverse employment action.

 Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11 Cir. 1999) (citing Little v. United Tech., 103 th

F.3d 956, 959 (11 Cir. 1997)). 

th

Case 2:05-cv-00615-MEF-CSC Document 32 Filed 07/19/06 Page 15 of 20
 Of course in this case, Campbell does not exactly argue that temporal proximity 7

between her protected conduct and the termination of her employment constitutes sufficient

circumstantial evidence that some causal relationship exists between the protected activity

and the termination of her employment. Instead, Campbell argues that Defendant has an

established pattern of taking action against her after she makes a complaint and that this

pattern is sufficient evidence of that her termination and her September 2003 complaint are

not wholly unrelated. In making this argument, Campbell also attempts to show that the

progression of disciplinary actions against her which preceded the actual termination of her

employment are sufficient evidence to satisfy her evidentiary burden. Campbell cites no

cases in which a court found a plaintiff’s burden of establishing the causal link element of

the prima facie case was satisfied based on the temporal link between protected acts by a

plaintiff and allegedly retaliatory actions other than the actual adverse employment action at

issue in the suit. In fact, the cases on which Campbell relies involve close temporal

proximity between a plaintiff’s protected conduct and the adverse employment action at issue

in the suit.

16

Defendant contends that Campbell has not established the fourth element of the prima

facie case – the causal link between the protected activity and the adverse employment

action. Thus, this court need not address whether Campbell’s complaints to her employer

constitute protected activity; whether her employer knew of her protected activity; or whether

she suffered an adverse employment action. Instead the court will focus its inquiry on the

causal link element. 

“The causal link element is construed broadly so that ‘a plaintiff merely has to prove

that the protected activity and the negative employment action are not completely

unrelated.’” Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2001) (citations

omitted). One common method of establishing the causal link element with circumstantial

evidence is close temporal proximity between the adverse employment action and the

protected activity. However, where there is significant delay between the protected conduct

7

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and the allegedly retaliatory acts, the timing of the events does not constitute circumstantial

evidence of causation. See, e.g., Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273-74

(2001) (citing with approval several court of appeals decisions for the proposition that a three

to four month gap is insufficient to establish the causal relation prong in a retaliation case);

Wascura v. City of South Miami, 257 F.3d 1238, 1244-45 (11th Cir. 2001) (While a close

temporal proximity between two events may support a finding of a causal connection

between those two events, the three and one-half month period between plaintiff’s protected

conduct and the adverse employment action challenged does not, standing alone, establish

a causal connection); Keel v. United States Dep’t of Air Force, 256 F. Supp. 2d 1269, 1291

(M.D. Ala. 2003) (more than seven month gap between protected conduct and allegedly

retaliatory conduct was insufficient as a matter of law to establish the causation element of

the prima facie case of retaliation); Gaddis v. Russell Corp., 242 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1146-47

(M.D. Ala.), aff’d without opinion, 88 Fed. App. 385 (11th Cir. 2003) (granting employer

summary judgment on three of plaintiff’s retaliation claims because plaintiff was unable to

establish the requisite causal connection between her protected conduct and her adverse

employment actions where lapses of time six months or longer existed between the protected

conduct and the adverse employment actions). 

Here more than a year elapsed between the protected conduct Campbell identifies,

namely her September 2003 complaints, and the termination of her employment in late

September of 2004. On such facts the court is not persuaded that Campbell has established

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18

a prima facie case of retaliation. Given that Plaintiff has failed to present evidence in support

of this element of her case on which she bears the ultimate burden of proof, summary

judgment is due to be GRANTED in favor of Defendant on Campbell’s retaliation claims

(Counts Three and Five). 

Even assuming arguendo that Campbell had established a prima facie case of

retaliation, the court finds that Defendant is still entitled to summary judgment on the

retaliation claims because Campbell has not established that Defendant’s reasons for her

termination are pretextual. If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, the

burden then shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption by articulating legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for its employment action. Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1564. “This

intermediate burden is ‘exceedingly light.’” Id. (citing Turnes v. AmSouth Bank, N.A., 36

F.3d 1057, 1061 (11th Cir. 1994)). The employer has the burden of production, not of

persuasion, and thus does not have to persuade a court that it was actually motivated by the

reason advanced. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-255.

Once the employer satisfies this burden of production, “the presumption of

discrimination [or retaliation] is eliminated and ‘the plaintiff has the opportunity to come

forward with evidence, including the previously produced evidence establishing the prima

facie case, sufficient to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the reasons given by

the employer were not the real reasons for the adverse employment decision.’” Chapman v.

AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1024 (11th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). The establishment

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of a prima facie case does not in itself entitle a plaintiff to survive a motion for summary

judgment. Grigsby v. Reynolds Metals Co., 821 F.2d 590, 595 (11th Cir. 1987); Pace v. S.

Ry. Sys., 701 F.3d 1383, 1389 (11th Cir. 1983). After an employer proffers nondiscriminatory or non-retaliatory reasons for its actions, “[i]n order to avoid summary

judgment, a plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to conclude

that each of the employer’s proffered . . . reasons is pretextual.” Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1037.

Campbell engaged in the conduct in violation of company policy for which Defendant

terminated her employment. It is undisputed that she repeated failed to properly split revenue

from ads across billing periods. It is undisputed that she was repeatedly warned to curtail this

conduct. It is also undisputed that her problem on this point was far worse than any other

salesperson in Defendant’s employ. If Defendant made a business decision to enforce its

policy, it is not for this court to question the wisdom of that decision because Campbell was

a long-term employee with a track record of meeting or exceeding sales goals. The record

before this court, viewed in the light most favorable to Campbell, is not sufficient to permit

a reasonable factfinder to conclude that Defendant’s proffered reasons for the termination

of Campbell’s employment are pretextual. For this additional reason, Defendant is entitled

to summary judgment on Campbell’s retaliation claims. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, it is hereby ORDERED that the Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment (Doc. # 12) is GRANTED.

Case 2:05-cv-00615-MEF-CSC Document 32 Filed 07/19/06 Page 19 of 20
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The Clerk of the Court is hereby DIRECTED to remove the above-styled case from

the August 21, 2006 trial docket.

A separate final judgment will be entered in accordance with this Memorandum

Opinion and Order.

DONE this 19th day of July, 2006.

 /s/ Mark E. Fuller 

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:05-cv-00615-MEF-CSC Document 32 Filed 07/19/06 Page 20 of 20