Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-14-04773/USCOURTS-ca3-14-04773-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Raymond Edward Chestnut
Appellant
Warden Lewisburg USP
Appellee

Document Text:

ALD-245 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 14-4773

___________

RAYMOND EDWARD CHESTNUT,

Appellant

v.

WARDEN LEWISBURG USP

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civ. No. 3:13-cv-02951)

District Judge: Honorable William J. Nealon, Jr.

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to 

Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

June 25, 2015

Before: RENDELL, CHAGARES and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: July 2, 2015)

_________

OPINION*

_________

PER CURIAM

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.

Case: 14-4773 Document: 003112007596 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/02/2015
2

Pro se appellant Raymond Chestnut seeks this Court’s review of the District 

Court’s dismissal of his petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Because his appeal 

presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order. See

3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.

I.

In 2007, Chestnut was sentenced to an aggregate term of 300 months’ 

imprisonment by the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina after 

pleading guilty to conspiracy to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine base in violation 

of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A), and the possession, use, or carrying of a firearm 

in connection with a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). 

Chestnut withdrew his direct appeal to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. And in July 

2010, upon the Government’s motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 

35(b), the District of South Carolina reduced Chestnut’s sentence to an aggregate term of 

180 months’ imprisonment. 

Since then, Chestnut has repeatedly attacked his conviction, including filing 

several motions to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255,1and several 

applications to the Fourth Circuit to file a second or successive § 2255 motion, all of 

which were denied. 

 

1 Most recently, on June 15, 2015, Chestnut filed a § 2255 motion in the District of South 

Carolina. (D.S.C. Crim No. 4:05-cr-01044, dkt. no. 528.) That motion is based on the 

same claim that he raised in the § 2241 petition currently at issue. 

Case: 14-4773 Document: 003112007596 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/02/2015
3

Chestnut filed the current 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition in the United States District 

Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, the jurisdiction in which he is confined. 

He claimed that his sentence is invalid and that he is actually innocent of being a career 

offender because certain of his state convictions were vacated after the statute of 

limitations for filing a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion had expired. The District Court 

dismissed the petition.

Chestnut now appeals.

II.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We exercise plenary review 

over the district court’s legal conclusions and apply a clearly erroneous standard to its 

factual findings.” Cradle v. U.S. ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir. 2002) (per 

curiam). 

Chestnut’s petition is not viable under § 2241. A motion filed under 28 U.S.C. § 

2255 is the presumptive means for a federal prisoner to challenge the validity of a 

conviction or sentence. See Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002). 

By contrast, § 2241 “confers habeas jurisdiction to hear the petition of a federal prisoner 

who is challenging not the validity but the execution of his sentence.” Coady v. Vaughn, 

251 F.3d 480, 485 (3d Cir. 2001). Here, the claim in Chestnut’s § 2241 petition 

challenges the validity of his sentence and must be brought under § 2255. 

Case: 14-4773 Document: 003112007596 Page: 3 Date Filed: 07/02/2015
4

In limited circumstances, a federal prisoner can seek relief under § 2241 if the 

remedy provided by § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective” to test the legality of his or her 

detention. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 249-51 (3d Cir. 1997). 

This occurs “only where the petitioner demonstrates that some limitation of scope of 

procedure would prevent” the petitioner from receiving adequate adjudication of his or 

her claims. Cradle, 290 F.3d at 538. We have thus far applied this “safety valve” only in 

the rare situation where a prisoner has had no prior opportunity to challenge his 

conviction because an intervening change of the law decriminalized the conduct 

underlying the conviction. Okereke, 307 F.3d at 120 (citing In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 

251). 

As noted above, Chestnut asserts that he is actually innocent of being a career 

offender and that his sentence is invalid because prior state court convictions on which 

that sentence was based have been vacated. The District Court concluded that the “safety 

valve” does not apply to such claims. Even if there were a basis to conclude otherwise, 

Chestnut’s claim is too conclusory to suggest any potential basis for relief. In his § 2241 

petition, Chestnut asserts that his prior convictions for possessing crack cocaine, “purse

snatching,” and assault have been vacated. But Chestnut, who is an experienced litigant, 

has not provided any evidence or detail showing that these alleged events may call the 

basis for his present sentence into question. Chestnut, for example, has not specified the 

dates of these convictions, the court or courts that rendered them, or when or why the 

Case: 14-4773 Document: 003112007596 Page: 4 Date Filed: 07/02/2015
5

convictions allegedly were vacated. Nor has Chestnut specified how these convictions 

resulted in his original 300-month sentence, let alone how they may have influenced the 

180-month sentence that he has been serving since his sentencing court reduced his 

sentence in 2010.

Additionally, Chestnut’s argument that § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective” 

because his state court convictions were vacated after the time expired to file a § 2255 

motion misunderstands § 2255’s statute of limitations in this context. If Chestnut’s state 

court convictions on which his federal sentence were based were vacated, then (assuming 

he exercised sufficient diligence) they are “facts” triggering the commencement of a 

renewed one-year limitations period. See Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295, 308 

(2005). Chestnut has recently filed a § 2255 motion in the sentencing court. We express 

no opinion on the merits of his motion, but until the sentencing court has ruled, and 

Chestnut has sought relief on appeal if necessary, we have no basis to conclude that § 

2255 is an inadequate or ineffective method by which he can challenge his sentence. 

Accordingly, the District Court did not err in dismissing Chestnut’s § 2241 

petition, and we will affirm its judgment. 

Case: 14-4773 Document: 003112007596 Page: 5 Date Filed: 07/02/2015