Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-99001/USCOURTS-ca9-14-99001-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kevin Chappell
Appellee
William Kirkpatrick Jr.
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WILLIAM KIRKPATRICK, JR., 

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

KEVIN CHAPPELL, Warden, 

California State Prison at San 

Quentin, 

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 14-99001

D.C. No.

2:96-cv-00351-WDK

ORDER AND 

AMENDED

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

William D. Keller, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted February 17, 2017

Pasadena, California

Original Opinion Filed October 10, 2017

Panel Rehearing Granted July 18, 2018

Re-argued and Submitted December 10, 2018

San Francisco, California

Original Opinion Withdrawn June 13, 2019

Filed June 13, 2019

Amended February 13, 2020

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2 KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL

Before: Kim McLane Wardlaw, Carlos T. Bea,

and Morgan Christen, Circuit Judges.*

Order;

Opinion by Judge Bea

SUMMARY**

Habeas Corpus / Death Penalty

The panel filed an order (1) amending its June 13, 2019, 

opinion affirming the district court’s denial of William 

Kirkpatrick’s habeas corpus petition challenging his capital 

sentence for two first-degree murders; (2) denying 

Kirkpatrick’s petition for panel rehearing; and (3) denying 

on behalf of the court Kirkpatrick’s petition for rehearing en 

banc.

The panel amended the opinion to write that, in light of 

the substantial aggravating evidence presented in 

* This case was originally decided by a panel comprised of Judge 

Stephen Reinhardt, Judge Kim McLane Wardlaw, and Judge Alex 

Kozinski. Appellee’s petition for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc 

was pending when Judge Kozinski retired. Following Judge Kozinski’s 

retirement, Judge Christen was drawn by lot to replace him. Following 

the death of Judge Reinhardt, Judge Bea was drawn by lot to replace him. 

Ninth Circuit General Order 3.2.h. The newly constituted panel granted 

Appellee’s petition for rehearing before a three-judge panel on July 18, 

2018. The newly constituted panel re-heard argument on December 10, 

2018. The filing of this opinion serves to withdraw the original opinion.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL 3

comparison to the minimal mitigation evidence, absent 

improperly-considered facts, the jury still would have found 

the bad evidence is so substantial in comparison with the 

good that it warrants death instead of life without parole.

COUNSEL

Patricia Ann Young (argued) and Mark R. Drozdowski, 

Deputy Federal Public Defenders; Amy M. Karlin, Interim 

Federal Public Defender; Office of the Federal Public 

Defender, Los Angeles, California; for Petitioner-Appellant.

A. Scott Hayward (argued), Deputy Attorney General; 

James William Bilderback II, Supervising Deputy Attorney 

General; Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney 

General; Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General; Xavier Becerra, Attorney General; Office of the 

Attorney General, Los Angeles, California; for RespondentAppellee.

ORDER

The opinion, filed on June 13, 2019, reported at 926 F.3d 

1157, is amended as follows:

On page 21 of the slip opinion, delete <This means that 

after excluding the aggravating facts that were considered in 

error, if the other aggravating circumstances outweigh the 

mitigating circumstances, the jury would still be required to 

sentence Kirkpatrick to death.>

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4 KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL

On page 22 of the slip opinion, replace <In light of the 

substantial aggravating evidence presented in comparison to 

the minimal mitigation evidence, absent the improperlyconsidered facts, the jury still would have found that the 

aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating 

circumstances and therefore would have been required to 

impose the death penalty.> with <In light of the substantial 

aggravating evidence presented in comparison to the 

minimal mitigation evidence, absent the improperlyconsidered facts, the jury still would have found “the ‘bad’ 

evidence is so substantial in comparison with the ‘good’ that 

it warrants death instead of life without parole.” People v. 

Brown, 40 Cal. 3d 512, 542 n.13 (1985), rev’d on other 

grounds, 479 U.S. 538 (1987).>

With these amendments, Appellant’s petition for panel 

rehearing is DENIED. Judge Wardlaw and Judge Christen 

vote to deny Appellant’s petition for rehearing en banc, and 

Judge Bea so recommends. The full court has been advised 

of the petition for rehearing en banc, and no judge has 

requested a vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc. 

Fed. R. App. P. 35. The petition for rehearing en banc is 

DENIED. No further petitions for panel rehearing or 

rehearing en banc will be entertained.

OPINION

BEA, Circuit Judge:

I. BACKGROUND

In September 1983, William Kirkpatrick was arrested 

and subsequently tried and convicted for robbing a Taco Bell 

restaurant in Burbank, California and for murdering two 

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KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL 5

Taco Bell employees in the course of his robbery. He was 

23 years old. The two victims, one of whom was 16 years 

old, were later found stuffed in a closet; both had been shot 

in the head, “execution style.” Because the California 

Supreme Court’s opinion in People v. Kirkpatrick, 874 P.2d 

248 (Cal. 1994) (in bank), disapproved of on other grounds 

by People v. Doolin, 198 P.3d 11, 36 n.22 (Cal. 2009), 

explains the details of Kirkpatrick’s brutal double murder, 

we do not restate them here.

A. Kirkpatrick’s Trial

More relevant to Kirkpatrick’s appeal is the procedural 

history of his case. After the guilt phase of Kirkpatrick’s 

trial, the jury deliberated for five days. The jury found 

Kirkpatrick guilty on two counts of first-degree murder, 

burglary, and robbery. The jury also found that because 

Kirkpatrick was convicted of two murders and the murders 

were committed during the commission of a robbery and 

burglary, special circumstances existed under California 

Penal Code § 190.2 that rendered Kirkpatrick eligible for the 

death penalty.

During the penalty phase of Kirkpatrick’s trial, the jury 

was tasked with deciding whether Kirkpatrick should 

receive the death penalty or a sentence of life imprisonment 

without parole. Cal. Penal Code § 190.3. The prosecution 

and defense had the opportunity to present aggravating and 

mitigating evidence to the jury to support their arguments 

regarding which sentence Kirkpatrick should receive. The 

prosecution presented aggravating evidence of Kirkpatrick’s 

character and his other troubling actions. First, Stephen 

Thomas told the jury that when he was 16, Kirkpatrick 

became angry with him while they were drinking at a park 

after he refused to assist Kirkpatrick in a violent robbery. 

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6 KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL

Thomas stated that Kirkpatrick dragged him to the park 

restroom, choked him, and tried to stick his head in a toilet.

Another witness, Jacob De Binion, testified that when he 

was 17, he met Kirkpatrick in a Der Wienerschnitzel 

restaurant parking lot and accepted Kirkpatrick’s invitation 

to drink beer in the back of a van. After having a few drinks 

together, De Binion testified that Kirkpatrick physically 

forced him to perform oral sex and kiss him and threatened 

to kill him if he refused.

Finally, Shirley Johnson testified that Kirkpatrick left his 

calculator, bicycle, and projector at her house in late May 

1983. Kirkpatrick attempted to retrieve his belongings from 

her house, but his calculator was nowhere to be found. 

Kirkpatrick subsequently made numerous phone calls to 

Johnson and threatened to “do damage” to her dogs, 

daughter, house, and herself if his calculator was not 

returned.

In late June 1983, Johnson came home and found that her 

two dogs had been poisoned and temporarily paralyzed. 

Later, Kirkpatrick called Johnson to tell her that he had 

“taken care” of the dogs. Kirkpatrick’s defense counsel 

objected to Johnson’s testimony about Kirkpatrick’s dog 

poisoning and property threats, and argued that making 

threats to property and poisoning dogs were not facts that 

may be considered as aggravating evidence under California 

Penal Code § 190.3, which permits the jury to consider only 

violent acts and threats of violence to people. The court 

overruled defense counsel’s objection without explanation.

The defense’s mitigation presentation consisted solely of 

Kirkpatrick’s testimony, in which he reasserted his 

innocence and said he aspired to be a writer. Kirkpatrick’s 

lawyers spoke to his mother in preparation for the mitigation 

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KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL 7

presentation and told the court that she would be “very, very 

helpful to the defense,” but Kirkpatrick ordered his lawyers 

not to contact or present any family members as witnesses.

After both sides rested, the court instructed the jury. 

Relevant here, the court told the jury:

Evidence has been introduced for the purpose 

of showing that Defendant Kirkpatrick has 

committed the following acts:

1. Oral copulation by means of force upon 

Jacob De Binion, age 17;

2. An assault upon Stephen Eugene 

Thomas;

3. Making threatening telephone calls to 

Ms. Shirley Johnson;

4. Administering poison to animals;

Which involved the express or implied use of 

force or violence or the threat of force or 

violence. Before you may consider any such 

criminal acts as an aggravating circumstance 

in this case, you must first be satisfied beyond 

a reasonable doubt that the Defendant 

Kirkpatrick did commit such criminal acts. 

You may not consider any evidence of any 

other criminal acts as an aggravating 

circumstance.

In closing argument, the prosecutor noted the absence of 

mitigating factors from Kirkpatrick’s presentation. He urged 

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the jury to impose the death penalty because the aggravating 

evidence outweighed the mitigating evidence. He also relied 

heavily on the dog poisoning incident to highlight 

Kirkpatrick’s character:

We brought in Shirley Johnson. Shirley 

Johnson committed the crime of having the 

defendant’s calculator and he wanted the 

calculator back.

So what did the defendant do? The defendant 

made a series of threatening phone calls. “I 

will get you; I’ll get your dogs and I’ll get 

your children. Your daughter.”

The next day or a few days later, Mrs. 

Johnson came home and her dogs were 

paralyzed. A few days later she gets a phone 

call from Mr. Kirkpatrick.

“I have taken care of your dogs. You and 

your daughter are next. Give me back my 

calculator.”

. . .

What does it show you about Mr. 

Kirkpatrick? It shows you he is a man who 

has callousness, a callous disregard for the 

feelings of other people. This person who is 

absolutely amoral and will stop at nothing to 

get what he wants. He will go so far as to 

poison Mrs. Johnson’s dogs to get his 

calculator.

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KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL 9

The prosecutor continued: “With the Johnsons, he had a 

choice. He had a choice to leave [them] alone and get his 

calculator back some other way: but he chose to poison the 

dogs and to make threats. . . . Mr. Kirkpatrick is here right 

now because of choices he made. . . . I would ask you to 

think about that when you think about pity, when you think 

about sympathy.”

At closing argument, Kirkpatrick told the jury that he had 

not received a fair trial.1 He argued that his attorneys failed 

to call certain witnesses and ask specific questions. He said 

he was “frightened” and “mad” that prosecutors were 

sending an innocent person to jail. He also told jurors that 

he did not blame them for finding him guilty and that he 

would have done the same thing if he had been in their 

position.

Prosecutors rebutted Kirkpatrick’s closing argument by 

suggesting that Kirkpatrick was “an anarchist” and that his 

only contribution to society was “to inflict havoc, pain and 

suffering on innocent people.” The prosecution reminded 

the jury that Kirkpatrick made deliberate choices to kill two 

Taco Bell employees; to force Jacob De Binion to perform 

oral sex and kiss him; to assault Stephen Thomas after he 

refused to help him with a violent burglary; and to threaten 

Shirley Johnson, her daughter, and her dogs to retrieve his 

calculator. The prosecution concluded by stating that 

1 Throughout his criminal trial, appeals, and habeas proceedings, 

Kirkpatrick has repeatedly tried to represent himself or to interfere with 

his defense counsel. After the trial court denied his request to serve as 

co-counsel during the guilt phase of his trial, Kirkpatrick threatened not 

to attend the penalty phase unless he could proceed pro se. The trial 

court denied his request to proceed pro se, but the court granted him cocounsel status for the penalty phase of his trial. Accordingly, Kirkpatrick 

and his counsel each addressed the jury directly during the penalty phase.

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10 KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL

because the aggravating factors “so far outweigh anything in 

mitigation,” the jury “shall impose the penalty of death.”

The jury began its penalty deliberations on June 19, 

1984. Several hours into deliberating on June 20, 1984, the 

jury sent a note to the court asking: “[W]hat [are] the legal 

definitions for aggravating and mitigating circumstances as 

they apply to the instructions in making the determination of 

this sentence?” The court responded that the jury members 

“have been given all the legal definitions [they] need [and 

that] [a]ll other words have their common definitions.” On 

June 21, 1984, the jury returned a death verdict for both 

murders.

At Kirkpatrick’s sentencing hearing on August 14, 1984, 

Kirkpatrick moved to modify the verdict imposing the death 

penalty. The court reviewed the aggravating circumstances 

and stated that the only mitigating factors were Kirkpatrick’s 

lack of prior felony convictions and his young age of 23. 

Because the court found that the aggravating circumstances 

outweighed those in mitigation, it denied Kirkpatrick’s 

motion to modify the verdict and imposed a sentence of 

death.

B. Kirkpatrick’s Direct Appeal and State Habeas Petition

In 1988, Kirkpatrick filed an automatic direct appeal 

with the California Supreme Court as provided by the 

California Constitution. Cal. Const. art. VI, § 11, subsec. a. 

Kirkpatrick argued, in relevant part, that the trial court 

violated state law and his Eighth Amendment rights when it 

instructed the jury that it may consider evidence of 

Kirkpatrick’s dog poisoning and property threats as 

aggravating circumstances in deciding whether to impose 

the death penalty. Specifically as to his Eighth Amendment 

argument, Kirkpatrick argued that allowing the jury to 

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KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL 11

consider those facts violated the Supreme Court’s 

“narrowing” requirement that a capital sentencing scheme 

must provide a “meaningful basis for distinguishing the few 

cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many 

cases in which it is not.” He further argued that these 

statements “were highly prejudicial” and had “minimal, if 

any, legal relevance to the important issue of whether the 

death penalty should be imposed.”

The California Supreme Court affirmed Kirkpatrick’s 

conviction and sentence in a lengthy published opinion. 

Kirkpatrick, 874 P.2d at 269. The court held that evidence 

of Kirkpatrick’s dog poisoning and property threats was 

admissible as a matter of state law because it showed the 

surrounding circumstances of Kirkpatrick’s threats to harm 

Johnson’s daughter. Id. at 263. The court did, however, hold 

that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that it could 

consider evidence that Kirkpatrick threatened Johnson’s 

property and poisoned her dogs as aggravating 

circumstances in determining whether to impose the death 

penalty because California Penal Code § 190.3 allows the 

jury to consider “only those threats of violent injury that are 

directed against a person or persons.” Id. at 264. It 

nevertheless found that the error was harmless. Id. at 264–

65.

As to Kirkpatrick’s Eighth Amendment argument, the 

court explained that California law performs its required 

narrowing at the eligibility phase, not the penalty selection 

phase of the trial. Id. at 264. As a result, it held that the 

aggravating factors considered at the penalty selection phase 

are not relevant to whether the State’s scheme adequately 

narrows the class of persons who receive the death penalty. 

Id. Because the court found that Kirkpatrick’s Eighth 

Amendment argument was “founded upon a mistaken 

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12 KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL

understanding of the purpose of aggravating and mitigating 

circumstances in [California’s] death penalty scheme,” it 

denied him relief on his Eighth Amendment claim. Id.

C. Kirkpatrick’s Federal Habeas and State Habeas 

Exhaustion Proceedings

On January 18, 1996, nine days before his scheduled 

execution, Kirkpatrick initiated habeas proceedings in the 

United States District Court for the Central District of 

California. On June 24, 1998, Kirkpatrick filed his federal 

habeas petition. The district court dismissed more than 20 

of Kirkpatrick’s claims as unexhausted but found good cause 

to stay his petition pending exhaustion of his claims in state 

court. Kirkpatrick subsequently filed a habeas petition to 

exhaust his claims in the California Supreme Court on 

December 30, 1998.

While his state habeas exhaustion petition was pending, 

on July 23, 2000, Kirkpatrick sent a handwritten letter to the 

California Supreme Court, with an attached handwritten 

form titled, “Waiver Form.” His handwritten “Waiver 

Form” stated: “I do not wish to proceed with my petition for 

writ of habeas corpus review in this matter. I wish the 

sentence and the judgement [sic] of execution in People v. 

William Kirkpatrick Jr., 14-590144 to be carried out at this 

time.”

In response, the California Supreme Court appointed 

Marin County Superior Court Judge Stephen Graham as a 

referee to determine whether Kirkpatrick was competent to 

waive his petition and whether his waiver was voluntary, 

knowing, and intelligent. At first, Kirkpatrick cooperated. 

He appeared before the referee with his lawyers from the 

Federal Public Defender’s (FPD) office for status 

conferences on four occasions in late 2000. Kirkpatrick was 

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KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL 13

also evaluated by a court-appointed psychiatrist, Dr. 

McEwen, for two and a half hours. Following Dr. 

McEwen’s examination, however, Kirkpatrick declined to 

take part in the process any further. He refused to be 

interviewed by three experts retained by the FPD, doctors 

Robert Weinstock, Xavier Amador, and Roderick Pettis.

He also refused to attend the referee’s evidentiary 

hearing in March 2001. There, Dr. McEwen testified that 

Kirkpatrick was competent to waive his habeas petition and 

he had no “mental disease, disorder or defect.” She also 

opined that if Kirkpatrick decided to waive his state habeas 

exhaustion petition, his decision to proceed on his own and 

represent himself would be voluntary, knowing, and 

intelligent. Although the FPD-supplied experts did not have 

the opportunity to meet with Kirkpatrick in person, they 

reviewed Dr. McEwen’s report and each testified that her 

conclusions were not adequately supported. However, each 

FPD expert also testified that he was not in a position to 

express a diagnostic conclusion as to Kirkpatrick’s 

competence because he did not interview Kirkpatrick 

personally.

Referee Judge Graham credited Dr. McEwen’s opinions 

over the FPD experts’ opinions because he thought they 

were “based upon extraordinary qualifications of training 

and experience, careful review of the available history, and 

perhaps the only substantial mental health interview Mr. 

Kirkpatrick has ever allowed.” Based on Dr. McEwen’s 

opinions and his interactions with Kirkpatrick, the referee 

concluded that Kirkpatrick had voluntarily requested to 

withdraw his state habeas exhaustion petition and was 

competent to do so. But because Kirkpatrick “refused to 

engage in sufficient discussion” with the referee to permit 

him to make a more specific determination, the referee fell 

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14 KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL

short of concluding that Kirkpatrick’s waiver was 

“knowing” or “intelligent.” The referee submitted his 

findings in a report to the California Supreme Court, along 

with the hearing transcripts, Dr. McEwen’s written report, 

and copies of relevant exhibits, letters, and briefs. The 

California Supreme Court adopted the referee’s conclusion

that Kirkpatrick was competent to withdraw his state habeas 

exhaustion petition, but—differing from the referee’s 

conclusion—also found that he “made a knowing, 

intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to proceed.” As 

a result, the California Supreme Court summarily granted 

Kirkpatrick’s request and dismissed his state habeas 

exhaustion petition as waived.

Back in federal court in December 2001, Kirkpatrick’s 

lawyers filed an amended federal habeas petition, including 

the claims from his state habeas exhaustion petition that the 

California Supreme Court had deemed waived. Kirkpatrick 

then filed a pro se request to waive his amended federal 

petition. The district court, however, denied the request after 

Kirkpatrick again refused to participate in a competency 

evaluation.

After the state moved to dismiss the claims Kirkpatrick 

had waived in state court on grounds that such claims were 

unexhausted, Kirkpatrick argued that his waiver in the 

California Supreme Court was invalid because it was not 

voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. The district court 

upheld the California Supreme Court’s conclusion that the 

waiver in state court was valid, and it dismissed as 

unexhausted all the state claims in Kirkpatrick’s amended 

federal habeas petition that had been part of his waived state 

habeas exhaustion petition.

In making this determination, the district court applied 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) deference to the California Supreme 

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KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL 15

Court’s finding that Kirkpatrick’s waiver had been 

voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. It stated, “Under [the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 

(AEDPA)], the decision of the California Supreme Court 

must be given deference, and cannot . . . be reviewed de novo

by this court.” Rather, the district court noted that its “power 

to review the decision of the California Supreme Court is 

extremely limited.” Applying this highly deferential 

standard, the district court concluded that because “there is 

evidence to support the conclusory findings of the California 

Supreme Court,” its conclusion must be upheld. To be sure 

of its decision, the district court also conducted its own 

analysis and concluded there was evidence to support the 

California Supreme Court’s finding of waiver. See 

Appendix 1. The court then concluded that “[t]here has been 

no unreasonable determination of the facts or a decision 

contrary to, or involving an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established federal law.” As a result, the district 

court dismissed as unexhausted all the claims Kirkpatrick 

had presented in his state habeas exhaustion petition.

On June 9, 2011, Kirkpatrick filed a revised amended 

federal habeas petition asserting the exhausted claims that 

had been presented to the California Supreme Court on 

direct appeal. In Claim 17(C) of his revised amended federal 

habeas petition, Kirkpatrick argued that allowing the jury to 

consider the facts that he poisoned Shirley Johnson’s dogs 

and threatened her property during the penalty phase of his 

trial violated his Eighth Amendment right against arbitrary 

and capricious sentencing. Following the logic of the 

California Supreme Court, the district court interpreted 

Kirkpatrick’s claim as directed to the narrowing requirement 

under California Penal Code § 190.2, and not to the choice 

of punishment under California Penal Code § 190.3. Like 

the California Supreme Court, the district court denied 

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16 KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL

Kirkpatrick’s Eighth Amendment claim on the theory that 

the special circumstances of California Penal Code 

§ 190.2—not the factors for penalty selection set out in 

§ 190.3—perform the constitutionally required narrowing 

function. The district court further agreed with the 

California Supreme Court that any error of state law was 

“harmless because the magnitude and circumstances of the 

underlying crimes were such that the result would not have 

been any different even if the objectionable evidence had not 

been admitted.” The district court granted Kirkpatrick a 

certificate of appealability on Claim 17(C), and this appeal 

followed.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Kirkpatrick’s Eighth Amendment Claim

The district court certified only one issue for appellate 

review: Claim 17(C) of Kirkpatrick’s revised amended 

federal habeas petition, regarding whether the jury’s 

consideration of the facts that he threatened Shirley 

Johnson’s property and poisoned her dogs at the penalty 

selection phase of his trial violated Kirkpatrick’s Eighth 

Amendment right against arbitrary and capricious 

sentencing. To obtain relief on this claim, Kirkpatrick must 

show that the jury’s consideration of these facts amounts to 

prejudicial constitutional error. Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 

2187, 2197 (2015).

As a threshold issue, there is some doubt whether 

Kirkpatrick properly raised this issue on appeal.2

 

2 The Supreme Court has long drawn a distinction between the 

“narrowing” and “selection” phases of capital sentencing as it applies to 

cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. The 

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“narrowing” phase requires that states define the circumstances that 

place a defendant in the class of people eligible for the death penalty. 

Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878 (1983). States must limit judges’ 

and juries’ discretion to impose the death penalty on a defendant because 

giving them unfettered discretion to decide who receives the death 

penalty is “cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and 

Fourteenth Amendments.” Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 

(1972) (per curiam); see also Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980);

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).

By contrast, the “selection” phase occurs after a jury has found that 

a defendant is eligible for the death penalty and must decide whether to 

sentence the defendant to death or life imprisonment without parole. In 

contrast to the requirement during the narrowing phase that states must 

limit judges’ and juries’ discretion in determining who is eligible for the 

death penalty, the Court has stated that the selection stage requires only 

“an individualized determination on the basis of the character of the 

individual and the circumstances of the crime.” Zant, 462 U.S. at 879 

(emphasis in original).

To the California Supreme Court and the federal district court, 

Kirkpatrick appears to have raised his Eighth Amendment argument only 

in context of the narrowing phase and not the penalty selection phase. 

Accordingly, the California Supreme Court and federal district court 

addressed Kirkpatrick’s Eighth Amendment argument as one that 

alleged his rights were violated at the narrowing phase of his trial, not 

the penalty selection phase of his trial. But on appeal to this court, 

Kirkpatrick argues that independent of any narrowing that took place 

during the guilt phase of his trial to determine whether he was eligible 

for the death penalty, the jury’s consideration of the facts that he 

threatened Johnson’s property and poisoned her dogs at the penalty 

selection phase resulted in the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the 

death penalty in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Kirkpatrick also 

argues that his Eighth Amendment claim is exhausted because he fairly 

presented it to the California Supreme Court and federal district court, 

and they merely improperly construed his argument as only a narrowing 

argument.

We have doubts as to whether Kirkpatrick’s Eighth Amendment 

argument concerning the penalty selection phase of his trial was fairly 

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18 KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL

Nonetheless, we assume without deciding that Kirkpatrick’s 

certified claim is exhausted because it makes no difference 

to the result. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2).

Next, the parties dispute what standard of review applies 

to Kirkpatrick’s Eighth Amendment claim. The warden 

argues that AEDPA applies because Kirkpatrick’s habeas 

petition was filed in 1998, after AEDPA was enacted. 

Kirkpatrick does not dispute that his habeas petition is 

generally subject to AEDPA’s standards, but argues that we 

should apply de novo review to his Eighth Amendment claim 

because the California Supreme Court did not adjudicate the 

claim on the merits. See Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289 

(2013). Again, we need not decide this issue because we 

deny Kirkpatrick relief even under the more favorable 

standard of de novo review. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 

560 U.S. 370, 390 (2010) (“Courts can . . . deny writs of 

habeas corpus under § 2254 by engaging in de novo review 

when it is unclear whether AEDPA deference applies, 

because a habeas petitioner will not be entitled to a writ of 

habeas corpus if his or her claim is rejected on de novo

review.” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)). Additionally, 

regardless of what standard of review applies, to obtain 

relief, Kirkpatrick must prove the claimed error was not 

harmless—that a trial error of federal law “had substantial 

and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s 

verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) 

(citation omitted). Indeed, “a prisoner who seeks federal 

habeas corpus relief must satisfy [the harmless error standard 

presented to the California Supreme Court and federal district court. 

However, because we may deny Kirkpatrick’s habeas petition on the 

merits notwithstanding his failure to exhaust his Eighth Amendment 

claim in state court, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2), we analyze the merits of his 

Eighth Amendment claim.

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KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL 19

established in Brecht], and if the state court adjudicated his 

claim on the merits, the Brecht test subsumes the limitations 

imposed by AEDPA.” Davis, 135 S. Ct. at 2199 (citing Fry 

v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 119–20 (2007)). Thus, we proceed 

to analyze the merits of Kirkpatrick’s Eighth Amendment 

claim.

Kirkpatrick contends that his Eighth Amendment rights 

were violated when the trial court allowed the jury to 

consider evidence that Kirkpatrick poisoned Shirley 

Johnson’s dogs and threatened damage to her property 

because those acts are not enumerated under California 

Penal Code § 190.3, which explains the type of evidence the 

jury may consider when determining whether to impose a 

sentence of death or life imprisonment without parole. The 

parties do not dispute that the jury should not have 

considered those acts as aggravating evidence. Indeed, the 

California Supreme Court held that although the evidence 

was admissible to provide context to Kirkpatrick’s threats 

against Johnson’s daughter, “the court should have modified 

the [jury] instructions to delete references to poisoning 

animals and threatening injury to property.” Kirkpatrick, 

874 P.2d at 263–64. The court explained that California 

Penal Code § 190.3 permits the jury to consider “only those 

threats of violent injury that are directed against a person or 

persons,” not animals or property. Id. at 264 (citing People 

v. Boyd, 700 P.2d 782, 792–93 (Cal. 1985) (in bank)).

While we recognize that the jury’s consideration of 

Kirkpatrick’s dog poisoning and property threats was error 

under California state law, Kirkpatrick, 874 P.2d at 263–64, 

we assume without deciding and solely for the sake of 

argument that this error amounts to constitutional error under 

the Eighth Amendment, because “that does not necessarily 

mean that [Kirkpatrick] is entitled to habeas relief,” Davis, 

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135 S. Ct. at 2197. On collateral review, “[f]or reasons of 

finality, comity, and federalism,” habeas petitioners must 

also show the trial error “resulted in ‘actual prejudice.’” Id.

(quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637). Under this test, relief is 

proper only when a federal court “is in grave doubt about 

whether a trial error of federal law had substantial and 

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s 

verdict.” O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436 (1995) 

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Kirkpatrick has not shown he was prejudiced by the 

jury’s consideration of Shirley Johnson’s testimony that 

Kirkpatrick threatened her property and poisoned her dogs. 

In California, once the jury has determined that a special 

circumstance exists under California Penal Code § 190.2 

that renders the defendant eligible for the death penalty, it 

must then determine whether to impose on the defendant a 

sentence of death or life imprisonment without parole under 

California Penal Code § 190.3. Section 190.3 instructs, in 

relevant part:

After having heard and received all of the 

evidence, and after having heard and 

considered the arguments of counsel, the trier 

of fact shall consider, take into account and 

be guided by the aggravating and mitigating 

circumstances referred to in this section, and 

shall impose a sentence of death if the trier of 

fact concludes that the aggravating 

circumstances outweigh the mitigating 

circumstances.

Cal. Penal Code § 190.3 (emphasis added).

Besides the evidence that Kirkpatrick poisoned 

Johnson’s dogs and threatened to damage her property, the 

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KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL 21

prosecution presented substantial aggravating evidence of 

Kirkpatrick’s immoral and callous character, which 

Kirkpatrick does not challenge. First, the jury could 

consider the circumstances of the crime of conviction—his 

“execution style” double-murder of two Taco Bell 

employees. Cal. Penal Code § 190.3, factor (a). Second, the 

jury could consider the presence of criminal activity by the 

defendant that involved the use or threat of force or violence 

against a person. Id. factor (b); Kirkpatrick, 874 P.2d at 264. 

Under this factor, the jury could consider Stephen Thomas’s 

testimony that when he was sixteen, Kirkpatrick dragged 

him to a park bathroom, choked him, and tried to stick his 

head in a toilet. Another witness, Jacob De Binion, testified 

that he once accepted Kirkpatrick’s invitation to drink beer 

in the back of a van, and Kirkpatrick physically forced him 

to perform oral sex and kiss him and threatened to kill 

De Binion if he refused. Further, even if the jury improperly 

considered the portions of Shirley Johnson’s testimony 

referring to property threats and dog poisoning, Kirkpatrick 

does not challenge that the jury could consider that 

Kirkpatrick threatened to “do damage” to Johnson and her 

daughter if she did not find and return Kirkpatrick’s 

calculator.

By contrast, the only mitigating evidence presented to 

the jury comprised Kirkpatrick’s testimony explaining that 

he did not want to involve his family in his trial, reasserting 

his innocence, and noting that he aspired to be a writer and 

would write in prison if given the chance. In light of the 

substantial aggravating evidence presented in comparison to 

the minimal mitigation evidence, absent the improperlyconsidered facts, the jury still would have found “the ‘bad’ 

evidence is so substantial in comparison with the ‘good’ that 

it warrants death instead of life without parole.” People v. 

Brown, 40 Cal. 3d 512, 542 n.13 (1985), rev’d on other 

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grounds, 479 U.S. 538 (1987). Thus, we are not left with 

grave doubt that the jury’s consideration of Kirkpatrick’s 

property threats and dog poisoning had a substantial and 

injurious effect on the jury’s decision. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 

637. We hold, therefore, that any constitutional error arising 

from the jury’s consideration of these facts was harmless. 

Davis, 135 S. Ct. at 2197.

B. Kirkpatrick’s Uncertified Claims

Although the district court certified only one issue for 

appeal, Kirkpatrick has briefed two additional uncertified 

issues. Pursuant to Ninth Circuit Rule 22-1(e), if a petitioner 

elects to brief any uncertified issues alongside the certified 

issues, it will be “construed as a motion to expand the 

[certificate of appealability (COA)] and will be addressed by 

the merits panel to such extent as it deems appropriate.”

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), a COA may issue only 

when the petitioner “has made a substantial showing of the 

denial of a constitutional right.” This showing can be 

established by demonstrating that “reasonable jurists could 

debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition 

should have been resolved in a different manner or that the 

issues were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed 

further.’” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) 

(quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 (1983)).

In his first uncertified claim (his “waiver claim”), 

Kirkpatrick argues that the district court erred in dismissing 

as unexhausted the claims from Kirkpatrick’s state habeas 

exhaustion petition that the California Supreme Court 

deemed waived. Kirkpatrick argues that the California 

Supreme Court erred in finding that he validly waived his 

state habeas exhaustion petition because he was not 

competent to withdraw his petition, and his waiver was not 

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KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL 23

voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. In his second 

uncertified claim, Kirkpatrick alleges that the district court 

erred in dismissing his original penalty-phase ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim as unexhausted. There, he 

argues that his trial counsel failed to investigate “to uncover 

any and all available mitigating evidence to present at the 

penalty phase of a capital trial.” We think Kirkpatrick’s 

waiver claim merits further discussion, but we agree with the 

district court that his original ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim is unexhausted. We decline to address it 

because it fails to meet the standard warranting certification.

As to Kirkpatrick’s waiver claim, we consider whether 

the California Supreme Court erred in granting Kirkpatrick’s 

request to waive his state habeas exhaustion petition based 

on its conclusion that he was competent to waive his petition 

and his waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.

1. Standard of Review

First, Kirkpatrick argues that de novo review should 

apply to the question whether he validly waived his state 

habeas exhaustion petition in the California Supreme Court. 

When Kirkpatrick presented this argument to the district 

court, it disagreed and held that it owed deference to the 

California Supreme Court’s finding of waiver under 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). We agree with the district court that 

we owe deference to the California Supreme Court’s finding 

of waiver, but not under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), a habeas petition seeking 

relief from a state court’s judgment “shall not be granted 

with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the 

merits,” unless it (1) “resulted in a decision that was contrary 

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

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Court of the United States;” or (2) “resulted in a decision that 

was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 

light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding.” The Supreme Court has defined “claim” as 

used in 28 U.S.C. § 2254 as “an asserted federal basis for 

relief from a state court’s judgment of conviction.” 

Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 530 (2005). And an 

adjudication on the merits is “a decision finally resolving the 

parties’ claims . . . that is based on the substance of the claim 

advanced, rather than on a procedural, or other, ground.” 

Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 969 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(citation omitted).

Kirkpatrick’s handwritten “Waiver Form” to the 

California Supreme Court requesting to withdraw his state 

habeas exhaustion petition is not “an asserted federal basis 

for relief from a state court’s judgment of conviction.” 

Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 530. If we were to conclude that his 

waiver was invalid, Kirkpatrick would not be entitled to 

relief from his state court conviction; rather, he could merely 

continue litigating the merits of the claims contained within 

his state habeas exhaustion petition. Additionally, because 

his withdrawal is a waiver of his right to pursue habeas relief, 

it is not a decision resolving his claims based on the 

substance of his habeas petition. Thus, under § 2254(d) 

alone, we would not be subject to AEDPA’s deferential 

framework.

However, under § 2254(e)(1), in proceedings evaluating 

a prisoner’s habeas petition, “[f]actual determinations by 

state courts are presumed correct absent clear and 

convincing evidence to the contrary.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 

537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). 

Unlike § 2254(d), § 2254(e)(1)’s application is not limited 

to claims adjudicated on the merits. Rather, it appears to 

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KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL 25

apply to all factual determinations made by state courts. See 

Sophanthavong v. Palmateer, 378 F.3d 859, 866–67 (9th 

Cir. 2004); Gonzalez v. Pliler, 341 F.3d 897, 903 (9th Cir. 

2003). Thus, we defer to the California Supreme Court’s 

factual determinations unless Kirkpatrick provides clear and 

convincing evidence that its factual findings were wrong.

Whether a petitioner is competent to withdraw his habeas 

petition is a question of fact, Massie ex rel. Kroll v. 

Woodford, 244 F.3d 1192, 1194 (9th Cir. 2001), and the 

parties agree this inquiry is generally subject to deference 

under § 2254(e)(1). Likewise, whether a waiver is knowing 

and intelligent is a question of fact, United States v. Doe, 

155 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), and thus this 

inquiry is also subject to deference under § 2254(e)(1).3

3 Kirkpatrick argues that the panel need not defer to the California 

Supreme Court’s factual findings under § 2254(e)(1) because its factual 

findings resulted from a deficient fact-finding process. But “before we 

can determine that the state-court [fact-finding] process is defective in 

some material way, or perhaps non-existent, we must more than merely 

doubt whether the process operated properly.” Taylor v. Maddox, 

366 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004), overruled on other grounds by 

Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 999–1000 (9th Cir. 2014). “Rather, 

we must be satisfied that any appellate court to whom the defect is 

pointed out would be unreasonable in holding that the state court’s factfinding process was adequate.” Id. If not, we must presume the state 

court’s factual findings are correct. Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

We recognize that there was no in-depth questioning as to whether 

Kirkpatrick “appreciate[d] the consequences of his decision, that he 

underst[ood] the possible grounds for appeal but d[id] not wish to pursue 

them, and that he ha[d] a reason for not delaying execution.” Dennis ex 

rel. Butko v. Budge, 378 F.3d 880, 889 (9th Cir. 2004); Whitmore v. 

Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 165–66 (1990). But that is only because 

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However, whether a waiver is voluntary is a mixed 

question of law and fact. Id.; Collazo v. Estelle, 940 F.2d 

411, 415–16 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (reviewing de novo

the voluntariness of a confession and reviewing for clear 

error whether a waiver was knowing and intelligent). PreAEDPA, we reviewed de novo mixed questions of law and 

fact; but after AEDPA was enacted, our court, sitting en 

banc, found that AEDPA “restricts the scope of federal 

review of mixed questions of fact and law.” Jeffries v. 

Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1498 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (citing 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)), overruled on other grounds by 

Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 

Specifically, we held that “[d]e novo review is no longer 

appropriate; deference to the state court factual findings is.” 

Id.4 To review the California Supreme Court’s conclusion 

Kirkpatrick chose not to attend several evidentiary hearings the referee 

scheduled, not because of any failing on the state court’s part.

Additionally, though it is unusual that the California Supreme Court 

made its own factual determinations after reviewing the evidence and the 

referee’s findings, that is simply a function of that court’s de novo factfinding power in habeas cases. See In re Thomas, 129 P.3d 49, 53 (Cal. 

2006). The California Supreme Court was not bound by the referee’s 

findings and was free to make its own factual determinations. Id.

To the extent we harbor any doubts about the peculiarities in the 

process here, mere doubts are not enough to discount the California 

Supreme Court’s factual findings, and Kirkpatrick has presented no other 

evidence that its fact-finding process was otherwise deficient. Thus, we 

defer to the California Supreme Court’s factual findings regarding 

Kirkpatrick’s waiver of his state habeas exhaustion petition under 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

4 Our original published opinion, now withdrawn, was premised on 

the conclusion that mixed questions of fact and law are reviewed de 

novo. See Kirkpatrick v. Chappell, 872 F.3d 1047, 1057 n.6 (9th Cir. 

2017) (withdrawn). However, we now recognize that Jeffries requires a 

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KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL 27

on the mixed issue of voluntariness, we “must first separate 

the legal conclusions from the factual determinations that 

underlie it.” Lambert, 393 F.3d at 977–78. “Fact-finding 

underlying the state court’s decision is accorded the full 

deference of [§ 2254(e)(1)].” Id. at 978. Because 

Kirkpatrick challenges only the factual findings underlying 

the California Supreme Court’s conclusion that his waiver 

was voluntary, we defer to those factual findings under 

§ 2254(e)(1).5

Kirkpatrick cites to Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662 (9th 

Cir. 1994) (en banc) and Moran v. Godinez, 57 F.3d 690 (9th 

Cir. 1994), to support his assertion that we should apply de 

novo review to the finding of a voluntary waiver because it 

is a mixed question of law and fact. Of course, these cases 

pre-date AEDPA and our holdings in Lambert and Jeffries. 

393 F.3d at 977–78; 114 F.3d at 1498. Moreover, even preAEDPA cases held that the factual issues underlying the 

voluntariness inquiry were entitled to a “presumption of 

correctness,” while the legal question of voluntariness was 

not. See Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 431–32 

(1983); Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1444 (9th Cir. 1996); 

Collazo, 940 F.2d at 415; Iaea v. Sunn, 800 F.2d 861, 864 

(9th Cir. 1986). Thus, we presume the California Supreme 

Court’s findings that Kirkpatrick was competent to withdraw 

his habeas petition and that his withdrawal was voluntary, 

different standard. 114 F.3d at 1498. That analytical change drives the 

different outcome reached in the opinion issued today.

5 We need not address what standard of review would apply to the 

California Supreme Court’s legal conclusion as to voluntariness because 

Kirkpatrick’s claims of error are directed to the court’s factual 

determinations.

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knowing, and intelligent are correct unless Kirkpatrick 

rebuts them by clear and convincing evidence.

2. Whether Kirkpatrick can rebut the California 

Supreme Court’s finding of waiver

To waive a petitioner’s right to further habeas 

proceedings, the petitioner must be competent and his 

waiver must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Rees v. 

Peyton, 384 U.S. 312, 313–14 (1966); Dennis ex rel. Butko 

v. Budge, 378 F.3d 880, 889 (9th Cir. 2004). A petitioner is 

competent to waive further habeas proceedings so long as he 

lacks a mental disease, disorder, or defect that substantially 

affects “the prisoner’s capacity to appreciate his options and 

make a rational choice among them.” Dennis, 378 F.3d at 

889 (emphasis omitted) (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 

495 U.S. 149, 166 (1990)). Whether a waiver is voluntary, 

knowing, and intelligent involves two distinct inquiries. 

Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986). “First, the 

relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the 

sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice 

rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.” Id. And 

second, “the waiver must have been made with a full 

awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned 

and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” Id. A 

petitioner’s waiver of his right to proceed is voluntary, 

knowing, and intelligent where his “statements to the court 

demonstrate that he appreciates the consequences of his 

decision, that he understands the possible grounds for appeal 

but does not wish to pursue them, and that he has a reason 

for not delaying execution.” Dennis, 378 F.3d at 889.

Important here, we are not tasked with determining 

whether Kirkpatrick was competent to waive his state habeas 

exhaustion petition and whether his waiver was voluntary, 

knowing, and intelligent. We are tasked only with deciding 

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KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL 29

whether Kirkpatrick has presented clear and convincing 

evidence to rebut the California Supreme Court’s finding 

that Kirkpatrick validly waived his state habeas exhaustion 

petition. Kirkpatrick offers several arguments why his 

waiver of his state habeas exhaustion petition was invalid, 

but none of his arguments provide clear and convincing 

evidence that the California Supreme Court’s waiver 

determination was wrong.

Kirkpatrick first argues that his handwritten letter to the 

California Supreme Court stating that he wished to withdraw 

his state habeas exhaustion petition is insufficient to 

constitute waiver because it does not demonstrate that his 

waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Along that 

same line, Kirkpatrick argues that his waiver was invalid 

because he was never questioned on the record about his 

decision, and without such a colloquy a factfinder could not 

determine whether his waiver was knowing and intelligent.

While Kirkpatrick’s handwritten “Waiver Form” on its 

own is likely not enough to establish that he was competent 

to waive his state habeas exhaustion petition and that his 

waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, the 

California Supreme Court had other evidence before it when 

it determined Kirkpatrick’s waiver was valid. After the 

referee concluded the evidentiary hearings, he submitted a 

written report to the California Supreme Court (along with 

the hearing transcripts, Dr. McEwen’s report, and copies of 

other relevant records) containing substantial evidence that 

Kirkpatrick desired to waive his state habeas exhaustion 

petition. For example, in a colloquy with the referee when 

Kirkpatrick first participated in the proceedings, he was 

asked what he “would like to accomplish at the bottom line 

in this process,” to which Kirkpatrick responded, 

“Competency and vacating of the appeal.” During the same 

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hearing, Kirkpatrick demonstrated that he understood the 

potential consequences of waiving his petition:

[Warden]: If he is raising an issue in the State 

Court that’s not previously been exhausted, 

and you go to Federal Court and try to raise 

it, we can make a claim and the Federal Court 

buys that and says, “You can’t litigate that 

issue as good as you may think it is.” It might 

limit your possibilities of what you can raise 

in Federal Court.

[Kirkpatrick]: I understand that my writ for 

exhaustion is already filed by the PD’s office.

[Warden]: If you withdraw that, then it won’t 

have the impact of doing the exhaustion 

because it will be withdrawn. There is a 

potential that when we go back to Judge 

Keller’s courtroom and you withdraw it, you 

can’t raise it there again. There is a possibility 

he might do that.

[Kirkpatrick]: I can appreciate that.

[Warden]: So that means if you say, “Gee, I 

changed my mind,” he may say, “Mr. 

Kirkpatrick, sorry, you can’t raise it.”

[Kirkpatrick]: You are looking out there, 

Robert. Thanks.

At the end of the first hearing, Referee Judge Graham told 

Kirkpatrick that although it was “only a preliminary 

observation . . . I can tell you right now based upon what I 

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KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL 31

have seen here today, I don’t see that you have any mental 

or emotional limitations that would get in the way of your 

being a perfectly rational and intelligent participant in the 

litigation process.”

Additionally, Dr. McEwen, the only psychologist to 

interview Kirkpatrick personally, testified that she 

“believe[d] he ha[d] the capacity” to “appreciate his position 

and make a rational choice with respect to continuing or 

abandoning further litigation.” And she did not think 

Kirkpatrick was suffering “from a mental disease, disorder 

or defect which may substantially affect his capacity” to 

forgo rationally further litigation.

Rather, Dr. McEwen thought Kirkpatrick’s actions were 

part of a “conscious, deliberate set of responses that provide 

him with a certain degree of pleasure. The reward being 

attention, slowing down of the process.” She observed that 

Kirkpatrick’s hope was to gain “more and more control over 

his case” through hiring different lawyers or representing 

himself. The referee asked Dr. McEwen, “[A]ssuming that 

he has made the decision to proceed on his own and represent 

himself, was that a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary 

decision of his?” Dr. McEwen opined, “yes.”

Dr. McEwen’s written report reiterated her “medical 

opinion that [Kirkpatrick] shows no evidence of mental 

impairment which would diminish his capacity to make a 

knowing, intelligent and voluntary decision pertaining to his 

legal choices.” Rather, “[t]he clinical evidence suggests that 

he indeed made his decision to withdraw his petition in a 

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conscious, goal-directed manner, free of any intervening 

mental illness.”6

Kirkpatrick also argues that some of his statements to the 

referee and Dr. McEwen show that he did not want to 

withdraw his petition to expedite his execution. Rather, he 

argues that he wanted to exercise more control over his case, 

which he planned to do through firing his current counsel 

and then representing himself or hiring black lawyers, with 

6 Kirkpatrick argues that the referee erred in determining he was 

competent to waive his state habeas exhaustion petition because he failed 

to order Kirkpatrick to submit to competency determinations by the 

FPD’s experts, failed to order Kirkpatrick to be examined in an inpatient 

psychiatric facility, failed to require Kirkpatrick to be examined by a 

second mental health expert, and failed to videotape Kirkpatrick’s 

interview with Dr. McEwen. Kirkpatrick argues that Dr. McEwen’s 

testimony alone “provided no reliable or reasonable basis for the state 

court to conclude that Kirkpatrick was competent to waive his [state 

habeas] exhaustion petition,” particularly because the FPD’s experts 

reviewed Dr. McEwen’s testimony and found it to be flawed. 

Kirkpatrick admits, however, that the FPD’s experts could not give 

definitive opinions because they did not interview Kirkpatrick in person.

This argument is flawed. First, the referee could not force 

Kirkpatrick to attend the evidentiary hearings to determine his 

competency after Kirkpatrick refused to attend and answer questions. It 

follows logically that it would have been futile for the referee to order 

Kirkpatrick to submit to further examinations. And Kirkpatrick cites no 

authority to support the proposition that the referee was required to take 

any of these measures. Second, the referee acted reasonably in basing 

his competency determination on Dr. McEwen’s testimony because he 

found that her opinions were “based upon extraordinary qualifications of 

training and experience, careful review of the available history, and 

perhaps the only substantial mental health interview Mr. Kirkpatrick has 

ever allowed.” Finally, even if the district court prematurely determined 

that Kirkpatrick was competent to waive his state habeas exhaustion 

petition, that certainly does not amount to clear and convincing evidence 

that the California Supreme Court’s competency finding was wrong.

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KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL 33

the hope of obtaining a new trial to establish his innocence. 

On de novo review, that argument could provide a basis for 

considering whether Kirkpatrick’s waiver was really 

knowing or intelligent. But under § 2254(e)(1), it does not 

amount to the clear and convincing evidence necessary to set 

aside the California Supreme Court’s well supported factual 

findings. Kirkpatrick clearly desired more control over the 

proceedings, but that is not evidence that he did not 

understand or appreciate the consequences of his decision. 

We are bound by the California Supreme Court’s factual 

conclusion, especially in light of the specific evidence from 

Dr. McEwen and Kirkpatrick himself that supports it. As to 

Kirkpatrick’s claim that a colloquy on the record is required 

to validate a waiver, Kirkpatrick cites to no binding authority 

that a colloquy is required, particularly where the defendant 

refused to participate in court proceedings where a colloquy 

would have occurred.7 Indeed, in Dennis we noted that 

7 We note, however, that where courts have previously found such 

waivers to be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, they have done so after 

the court questions the petitioner on the record regarding his intentions 

and whether he understands the consequences of the waiver. See 

Demosthenes v. Baal, 495 U.S. 731, 732–35 (1990) (state postconviction 

court found a valid waiver after an evidentiary hearing at which the 

petitioner testified that he understood his waiver would result in his 

death); Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 165 (finding valid waiver based on 

colloquy between counsel and trial court with the petitioner, including a 

discussion of the “possible grounds for appeal” he was waiving); Comer 

v. Schriro, 480 F.3d 960, 965–66 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (per curiam); 

id. at 966 (Paez, J. concurring) (describing the district court’s “thorough 

findings, including its finding that Comer understood his legal claims” 

that he was waiving after hearing Comer’s testimony that he 

“underst[ood] that the merits of his habeas appeal are legally strong . . .

but that he wished to halt his legal challenges even so”); Dennis, 

378 F.3d at 891; Massie, 244 F.3d at 1196–97; see also Fahy v. Horn, 

516 F.3d 169, 183–85 (3d Cir. 2008); Sanchez-Velasco v. Sec’y of Dep’t 

of Corr., 287 F.3d 1015, 1032–33 (11th Cir. 2002); St. Pierre v. Cowan, 

217 F.3d 939, 947–48 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting the lack of “any kind of 

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34 KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL

courts “have a measure of discretion in affording a hearing 

that is suitable in the circumstances” when determining the 

validity of a petitioner’s waiver. 378 F.3d at 894.

Kirkpatrick urges us to follow the Third Circuit’s 

opinion in Fahy v. Horn, 516 F.3d 169 (3d Cir. 2008). 

There, Henry Fahy was convicted of capital murder and 

sentenced to death in Pennsylvania. Id. at 176. Fahy filed 

multiple petitions for post-conviction relief. Id. at 177. 

After his third petition for post-conviction relief was denied, 

Fahy appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Id. 

While his appeal was pending, “Fahy filed a handwritten pro 

se motion” asking the court “to allow him to withdraw his 

appeal and to waive all collateral proceedings so that his 

death sentence could be carried out.” Id. The Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court remanded his appeal to the post-conviction 

relief court to conduct a colloquy to determine whether he 

“fully underst[ood] the consequences of his request to 

withdraw his appeal and to waive all collateral proceedings.” 

Id. On remand, the judge granted Fahy a one-week 

extension to consider his waiver request. Id. at 178. During 

that week, Fahy changed his mind and signed a sworn 

affidavit stating that he “no longer wished to waive his 

appellate rights, that he wanted to proceed with his appeal, 

and that he desired continued representation by counsel.” Id. 

But when he appeared before the judge for a second time, he 

stated that he changed his mind yet again and that he did not 

want legal representation nor did he want to pursue further 

litigation. Id. The judge then asked Fahy several questions 

proceeding, formal or informal, at which any court was able to assure 

itself that [the] waiver . . . satisfied the requirements for a knowing and 

voluntary waiver and that [the petitioner] intended it to be a waiver”). 

The State has not identified any cases in which a court determined that 

there was a valid waiver in the absence of such a colloquy.

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KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL 35

before informing him that he would tell “the Supreme Court 

of Pennsylvania that [he was] knowingly waiving all [his] 

appellate rights and all [post-conviction relief] rights.” Id. 

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court subsequently affirmed the 

post-conviction court’s determination that Fahy validly 

waived his right to further appellate and collateral 

proceedings. Id.

Fahy then filed a motion to stay his execution and an 

amended federal habeas petition in federal district court. Id. 

The district court held that although Fahy was competent 

when he waived his right to further appellate and collateral 

proceedings in state court, he was “improperly induced to 

waive his rights.” Id. at 178–79. The government appealed 

to the Third Circuit. Id. As to waiver, the Third Circuit 

recognized that it must defer to the state court’s factual 

findings under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); however, the court 

refused to defer to the state court’s finding of waiver in 

Fahy’s case. Id. at 181–87. It held that “when a state court’s 

waiver colloquy fails to reveal whether the requirements of 

a valid waiver have been met due to procedural infirmities, 

substantive deficiencies, and an insufficient probing into a 

defendant’s knowledge of the rights he is waiving, the 

findings by that court concerning the waiver are too 

unreliable to be considered ‘factual determinations.’” Id. at 

183. Thus, the court held that the trial court’s finding of 

waiver was not “entitled to the presumption of correctness.” 

Id. In so holding, the court emphasized a few important 

points.

First, the court noted that Fahy’s waiver resulted from 

“procedurally infirm” proceedings because the postconviction relief court denied his counsel’s request to ask 

Fahy about his waiver, which Fahy had requested in a letter 

to the court, and the court “explicitly refused to consider any 

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36 KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL

evidence of coercion.” Id. at 184–85. Second, Fahy 

expressly stated in his colloquy with the judge that he had 

not discussed all the issues pertaining to his waiver with his 

lawyers. Id. The court stated that this “inadequate colloquy” 

did not “reveal that he had any knowledge whatsoever of the 

purpose of federal habeas corpus or its procedures.” Id. at 

186. Finally, the court emphasized that Fahy’s 

equivocation—that he first filed a handwritten waiver form, 

then filed a signed affidavit stating he did not want to waive 

his appellate rights, and then changed his mind again and 

decided to waive further appellate and collateral 

proceedings—compelled its conclusion that Fahy’s waiver 

was not knowing and voluntary. Id. The court concluded 

that this “record of equivocation . . . does not support an 

enforceable waiver,” and thus proceeded to review the 

merits of Fahy’s appeal. Id. at 187.

The Third Circuit’s decision in Fahy differs from this 

case in several significant respects. First, unlike in Fahy 

where the court refused to consider evidence of coercion and 

was unbothered by Fahy’s express statement that he had not 

discussed his case with his attorneys, Kirkpatrick makes no 

claim that the referee did not allow him or his counsel the 

opportunity to discuss whether his waiver was voluntary, 

knowing, and intelligent. In fact, the opposite occurred: the 

referee engaged with Kirkpatrick to the extent he could, 

noting that it was a “pleasure to talk to [him]” at the first 

hearing. The court ordered a professional evaluation of 

Kirkpatrick’s competency, and Dr. McEwen interviewed 

Kirkpatrick for two and a half hours. It was Kirkpatrick who 

refused to engage with the court and his lawyers after Dr. 

McEwen assessed his competency.8 Thus, any “procedural 

8 We do not suggest that Kirkpatrick’s refusal to participate in the 

referee’s evidentiary hearing altered the State’s burden to prove the 

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KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL 37

infirmity” that occurred in Kirkpatrick’s case was of his own 

making. Second, and most importantly, unlike the petitioner 

in Fahy, Kirkpatrick never made any affirmative indication 

that he no longer wanted to waive his state habeas exhaustion 

petition.9 In fact, he submitted a nearly identical waiver 

during his federal district court habeas proceedings. Even if 

Kirkpatrick’s conduct of refusing to participate in the 

referee’s evidentiary hearings supports a counter-finding 

that he did not want to waive his state habeas exhaustion 

petition, it does not amount to clear and convincing evidence 

that the California Supreme Court’s waiver determination 

was wrong. His refusal to participate after requesting the 

opportunity to withdraw his petition—a process he repeated 

in federal district court—is entirely consistent with Dr. 

McEwen’s testimony that “he has an agenda” and is simply 

trying to manipulate the process.

validity of his waiver. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977) 

(“[I]t was incumbent upon the State to prove ‘an intentional 

relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’” (citation 

omitted)). Nor did Kirkpatrick’s refusal “relieve [the] court of the duty 

to ensure that a definitive waiver ha[d] occurred before it deprive[d] the 

petitioner of remedies that are available under state law.” St. Pierre v. 

Cowan, 217 F.3d 939, 949 (7th Cir. 2000).

9 After Kirkpatrick attended the first evidentiary hearing, he refused 

to attend the following four evidentiary hearings. The referee sent 

Kirkpatrick two separate letters telling him that if he “actually wish[ed] 

to withdraw [his] habeas corpus petition, it seems critical that you 

attend” the evidentiary hearing. Kirkpatrick never responded and never 

attended the subsequent evidentiary hearings. Kirkpatrick argues that 

his silence and refusal to attend further evidentiary hearings shows he 

did not want to waive his state habeas exhaustion petition. But this is 

not necessarily evidence that Kirkpatrick no longer wanted to waive his 

state habeas exhaustion petition. It could equally be evidence of 

Kirkpatrick’s unwillingness to cooperate with the court as part of a 

strategy to delay his court proceedings and execution.

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38 KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL

Finally, Kirkpatrick argues that his waiver was 

involuntary because evidence exists to suggest he wrote his 

“Waiver Form” under duress. Kirkpatrick notes that he 

wrote multiple letters to the state court asserting that he 

believed prison guards were trying to kill him, retaliate 

against him by withholding showers and food, and that the 

prison denied him medical attention, medication, legal 

documents, access to the library, and access to the prison 

yards. Kirkpatrick does not explain how these events 

influenced his decision to waive his state habeas exhaustion 

petition. Nonetheless, even if Kirkpatrick’s letters to the 

state court exhibited evidence of duress, both Dr. McEwen 

and the referee, who talked to Kirkpatrick personally, 

determined that his waiver was voluntary. Kirkpatrick’s 

assertions do not amount to clear and convincing evidence 

that the California Supreme Court’s finding that 

Kirkpatrick’s waiver was voluntary was wrong.

While we agree that the California Supreme Court’s 

waiver finding was unconventional, ultimately the 

California Supreme Court was not bound to accept the 

referee’s findings. See In re Thomas, 129 P.3d 49, 53 (Cal. 

2006). Kirkpatrick has not presented clear and convincing 

evidence to rebut the California Supreme Court’s finding 

that he validly waived his state habeas exhaustion petition. 

Thus, we presume its findings were correct, and affirm the 

district court’s dismissal of Kirkpatrick’s waived claims.10

10 Nothing in this opinion should be construed to minimize or 

modify the constitutional requirements of a competency determination 

and a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver.

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KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL 39

III. CONCLUSION

Because Kirkpatrick cannot show the jury’s 

consideration of the facts that he poisoned Shirley Johnson’s 

dogs and threatened her property had a substantial and 

injurious effect on the jury’s decision to impose the death 

penalty, Kirkpatrick is not entitled to relief on his Eighth 

Amendment claim. Additionally, Kirkpatrick has not 

presented clear and convincing evidence to rebut the 

California Supreme Court’s finding that Kirkpatrick validly 

waived his state habeas exhaustion petition. Thus, we affirm 

the district court’s denial of federal habeas relief to 

Kirkpatrick.

AFFIRMED.

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40 KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL

Appendix 1

The district court’s independent analysis whether there was 

evidence to support the California Supreme Court’s finding 

of waiver:

The district court stated, “[t]he evidence supporting the

California Supreme Court’s findings would include, but is 

not limited to, the following statements made during status 

conferences and in the evidentiary hearing before Judge 

Graham”:

Court: “What is it you would like to 

accomplish at the bottom line in this 

process?”

Petitioner: “Competency and vacating of the 

appeal.”

* * *

Respondent: “If he is raising an issue in the 

state court that’s not previously been 

exhausted, and you go to federal court and try 

to raise it, we can make a claim and the 

federal court buys that and says, ‘You can’t 

litigate that issue as good as you may think it 

is.’ It might limit your possibilities of what 

you can raise in federal court.”

Petitioner: “I understand that my writ for 

exhaustion is already filed by the PD’s 

office.”

Respondent: “If you withdraw that, then it 

won’t have the impact of doing the 

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KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL 41

exhaustion because it will be withdrawn. 

There is a potential that when we go back to 

Judge Keller’s courtroom and you withdraw 

it, you can’t raise it there again. There is a 

possibility he might do that.”

Petitioner: “I can appreciate that.”

Respondent: “So that means if you say, ‘Gee, 

I changed my mind,’ he may say, Mr. 

Kirkpatrick, sorry, you can’t raise it.”

Petitioner: “You are looking out there, 

Robert. Thanks.”

Respondent: “I am here to do justice. . . . 

[D]o you understand what I am trying to 

communicate?”

Petitioner: “Yeah, you are covering your 

ass.”

* * *

Court: “Mr. Kirkpatrick, I know it is only a 

preliminary observation, but I can tell you 

right now based upon what I have seen here 

today, I don’t see that you have any mental or 

emotional limitations that would get in the 

way of your being a perfectly rational and 

intelligent participant in the litigation 

process, and but for the circumstances in 

which we find ourselves its been a pleasure 

to talk to you.”

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42 KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL

* * *

[Psychiatrist] Dr. McEwen: “He made it quite 

plain that he knew why I was there.”

Court: “What did he say to you?”

Dr. McEwen: “He recognized that I was 

coming to talk to him about all these things 

that you see. We talked about coming in to 

this courtroom and talking to this Judge, and 

he talked about you and he talked about the 

Attorney General. So it was quite plain to me 

that he knew this was in response to some of 

his—it was in direct response to some of his 

requests in his case . . . .”

Dr. McEwen: “There’s not a clear—it should 

be obvious that there’s not a clear step-bystep plan that is particularly realistic. In the 

back of my mind I thought this person may 

simply be trying to stymie everybody else’s 

efforts on his case. I had that impression from 

his written material and from seeing him in 

person.”

Dr. McEwen: “[T]his is apparently a 

conscious, deliberate set of responses that 

provide him with a certain degree of pleasure. 

The reward being attention, slowing down of 

the process. His hope being that he has more 

and more control over his case. I want to have 

you understand that this is someone who has 

responded to being on death row in a very 

particular way. It is a combination of the 

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KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL 43

environment he’s in and his particular 

personality. I think he’s conscious of what 

he’s doing. . . . He knew exactly what he was 

doing with me.”

Dr. McEwen: “He thinks that he is going to 

be found competent. He tells me—he says, 

“There’s nothing wrong with me.”

Dr. McEwen: “[H]e certainly has some trends 

that are like a personality disorder, but these 

would not be the sorts of things that would 

interfere with the aforesaid decision-making 

abilities.”

Dr. McEwen: “[B]ut I have to say I think that 

this man knows what he is doing, has an 

agenda, doesn’t have the slightest interest in 

being seen as mentally ill. . . . I think I feel 

pretty strongly that he has character trends, 

argumentative, contrary character trends and 

a lot of energetic intelligence to keep himself 

very much occupied in this pursuit that he is 

involved in. It is a goal-directed pursuit, and 

I think that he is trying not just to frustrate 

people and make people upset, but he’s also 

trying to feel a sense of being in control of his 

life.”

Respondent: “[W]hat is your answer to this 

question: Whether Mr. Kirkpatrick has the 

capacity to appreciate his position and make 

a rational choice with respect to continuing or 

abandoning further litigation?”

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44 KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL

Dr. McEwen: “I believe he has the capacity 

to do that.”

Respondent: “Secondly, whether Mr. 

Kirkpatrick is suffering from a mental 

disease, disorder or defect which may 

substantially affect his capacity to do those 

things?

Dr. McEwen: “I believe he does not suffer 

from that type of condition.”

. . . .

Respondent: “Assuming that he has made the 

decision to proceed on his own and represent 

himself, was that a knowing, intelligent, and 

voluntary decision of his?”

Dr. McEwen: “I would say yes.”

The district court also found excerpts of Dr. McEwen’s 

written findings persuasive, as the only psychiatrist to 

interview Kirkpatrick in person:

“Based upon my examination of Mr. 

Kirkpatrick and upon review of the 

documents noted above, it is my medical 

opinion that he shows no evidence of mental 

impairment which would diminish his 

capacity to make a knowing, intelligent and 

voluntary decision pertaining to his legal 

choices. He is not suffering from any mental 

condition or defect that could interfere with 

either his ability to comprehend his situation 

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KIRKPATRICK V. CHAPPELL 45

or his ability to make rational decisions 

regarding litigation.”

“The clinical evidence suggests that he 

indeed made his decision to withdraw the 

petition in a conscious, goal-directed manner, 

free of any intervening mental illness.”

“He is stimulated by and takes pleasure in 

confounding the ‘powers that be.’ Wanting 

control is a natural human reaction, and not 

necessarily maladaptive.”

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