Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-05303/USCOURTS-caDC-96-05303-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Margaret Dong
Appellee
Smithsonian Institution
Appellant

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 5, 1997 Decided October 17, 1997 

No. 96-5303

MARGARET DONG,

APPELLEE

v.

SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION, HIRSHHORN 

MUSEUM & SCULPTURE GARDEN,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 94cv00628)

Nancy R. Page, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause 

for appellant. With her on the brief was Eric H. Holder, Jr.,

U.S. Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and R. Craig 

Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

Joseph Kaplan argued the cause for appellee. With him on 

the brief was John P. Mahoney.

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Before: WILLIAMS, GINSBURG and HENDERSON, Circuit 

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WILLIAMS.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge: Margaret Dong brought this 

action against her employer, the Smithsonian Institution, for 

damages under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a. The district court found the Smithsonian liable and awarded plaintiff 

$2,500 in compensatory damages. Dong v. Smithsonian Institution, 943 F. Supp. 69 (D.D.C. 1996). The Smithsonian 

appeals from the district court's determination that it is an 

"agency" subject to the Privacy Act. Dong v. Smithsonian 

Institution, 878 F. Supp. 244 (D.D.C. 1995). Alternatively, it 

argues that even if it is covered by the Act, its conduct 

toward plaintiff was not "intentional or willful" as required for 

imposition of damages under the Act. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4). 

We reverse.

* * *

Plaintiff began working at the Hirshhorn Museum and 

Sculpture Garden in 1985. She currently holds the position 

of Museum Registration Specialist, which means that her 

duties include serving as a courier for works of art the 

Hirshhorn lends to other museums. Museum procedures 

require employees to obtain permission from the director of 

the Hirshhorn before acting as a courier. In September 

1993, without seeking permission, plaintiff took annual leave 

and accompanied the painting Circus Horse by Joan Miro 

from Barcelona to the Museum of Modern Art ("MOMA") in 

New York City. At trial she testified that she deliberately 

failed to request approval for her trip, even though she had 

never had such a request denied in the past. Apparently her 

purpose was to avoid friction with a co-worker, who in her 

view made trouble when plaintiff was away on courier duty, 

but not when she simply took annual leave.

Rumors of plaintiff's unauthorized journey soon reached 

the administrator of the Hirshhorn, Beverly Pierce, and 

plaintiff's immediate supervisor, Douglas Robinson. Through 

conversations with the registrar at MOMA and an employee 

of New York's Metropolitan Museum of Art who had worked 

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at MOMA at the time of plaintiff's trip, Pierce and Robinson 

eventually substantiated the story. Both supervisors testified 

that they telephoned New York (rather than directly confront 

plaintiff) because they were aware of tensions in the Hirshhorn office where plaintiff worked, and wanted to put the 

rumors to rest without creating any additional workplace 

difficulties. When the rumors proved true, Pierce and Robinson approached plaintiff, who admitted taking the trip. She 

was suspended for five days.

In March 1994 plaintiff instituted this action against the 

Smithsonian under the Privacy Act, which requires federal 

agencies, when gathering information that may lead to an 

adverse determination about an individual, to obtain that 

information directly from the individual "to the greatest 

extent practicable." 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(2); see Waters v. 

Thornburgh, 888 F.2d 870 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Damages are 

available under the Privacy Act for "intentional or willful" 

violations. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4). The Smithsonian defended 

on the theory that it is not an "agency" subject to the Act. 

In the alternative, it contended that its conduct could not be 

described as intentional or willful given its reasonable belief 

that the Act did not apply to it. Finally, the Smithsonian 

argues that even if the Privacy Act applied and even if its 

understanding to the contrary were not exculpatory, Pierce 

and Robinson's decision not to obtain information from the 

plaintiff in the first instance stemmed from a good faith belief 

that intra-office tensions rendered such a direct confrontation 

impracticable.

The district court rejected all of the Smithsonian's arguments. It found that the Smithsonian "has sufficient federal 

ties and control, as well as independent authority, to compel a 

finding of agency status under the Act." Dong, 878 F. Supp. 

at 248. The district court also held that the Smithsonian had 

intentionally or willfully violated the Act, saying that the 

institution was put on notice of its subjection to the Privacy 

Act by a 1992 district court opinion, Cotton v. Adams, 798 

F. Supp. 22, 24 (D.D.C. 1992), which found it to be an agency 

for the purposes of the Freedom of Information Act 

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("FOIA"), a statute whose definition of "agency" also governs 

the Privacy Act.

Because we hold that the district court erred in finding the 

Smithsonian to be an "agency" under the Privacy Act, we 

reverse without reaching its "intentional or willful" defenses.

* * *

The Privacy Act requires "[e]ach agency that maintains a 

system of records" to gather information about a person 

directly from that person, to the greatest extent practicable. 

5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(2). The other requirements of the Act 

similarly apply to "agencies." See §§ 552a(b), (c), (d), (f).

Through § 552a(a)(1), the Act borrows the definition of 

"agency" found in FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(f).1 That definition 

in turn reads as follows:

For purposes of this section, the term "agency" as defined in section 551(1) of this title includes any executive 

department, military department, Government corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other establishment in the executive branch of the Government 

(including the Executive Office of the President), or any 

independent regulatory agency.

5 U.S.C. § 552(f). Section 552a(a)(1) cross-references 5 

U.S.C. § 551(1), the definition of "agency" in the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), but does not explicitly incorporate it. Still, as the parties recognize, the Privacy Act 

encompasses not only all entities covered by § 552(f) but also 

all those described by § 551(1), which embraces any "authority of the Government of the United States, whether or not it 

is within or subject to review by another agency." Indeed, 

the additional language of § 552(f) was added to FOIA in 

1974 "to encompass entities that might have eluded the APA's 

definition in § 551(1)." Energy Research Foundation v. Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 917 F.2d 581, 583 

(D.C. Cir. 1990).

__________

1 Actually, § 552a(a)(1) refers to "agency as defined in section 

552(e) of this title," but § 552(e) has since been redesignated 

§ 552(f).

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Hence, to be an agency under the Privacy Act, an entity 

must fit into one of the categories set forth either in § 552(f) 

or § 551(1). Because we cannot see how the Smithsonian fits 

into any of them, we hold that it is not an agency for Privacy 

Act purposes.

Of the categories listed in § 552(f), the only ones that 

might be thought to cover the Smithsonian are "establishment in the executive branch" and "Government controlled 

corporation." It is plain that the Smithsonian is not an 

establishment in the executive branch. To begin with, nine of 

the seventeen members of its governing Board of Regents are 

appointed by joint resolution of Congress, 20 U.S.C. § 43, and 

six of the remaining eight are members of Congress, 20 

U.S.C. § 42. (The other two are the Vice President and the 

Chief Justice of the United States, id.) Moreover, there is no 

evidence that the Secretary of the Smithsonian answers to 

the President, or that the institution administers federal 

statutes, prosecutes offenses, promulgates rules and regulations (other than with respect to its own buildings and 

grounds), or engages in any other typically executive activity. 

Indeed, if the Smithsonian were to wield executive powers, 

the method by which its Regents are appointed would appear 

to violate the Constitution's separation of powers principles. 

See U.S. Const., art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 

1, 138-39 (1976) (officeholders appointed by Congress may act 

only "in an area sufficiently removed from the administration 

and enforcement of the public law to permit their being 

performed by persons not 'Officers of the United States' "); 

Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for 

the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 501 U.S. 252, 275-76 (1991).

Nor is the Smithsonian a "Government controlled corporation" within the meaning of the Privacy Act. There is much 

force to the Smithsonian's argument that the plain terms of 

the phrase itself simply do not encompass it. In particular, 

the Smithsonian contends that it is not "governmentcontrolled" in the day-to-day sense required by our cases, see 

Rocap v. Indiek, 539 F.2d 174, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1976), and that 

it is not a "corporation," but rather a testamentary trust res

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denominated an "establishment" by Congress in 1846, 20 

U.S.C. § 41. We find it unnecessary to address these arguments, however. Section 552(f) first identifies four specific 

categories"any executive department, military department, 

Government corporation, Government controlled corporation"and then uses a catch-all phrase to encompass similar 

entities not precisely fitting any of the four specific molds: 

"or other establishment in the executive branch" (emphasis 

added). Thus Congress evidently viewed the four specified 

classes as examples of "establishments in the executive 

branch," so that an entity clearly outside the executive branch 

would not qualify even if it could otherwise be shoehorned 

into the concept of a "Government controlled corporation." 2

This is the most logical reading of the statute; for those who 

collect canons of construction it might be termed an application of "reverse ejusdem generis (where the general term 

reflects back on the more specific rather than the other way 

around), [so] that the phrase 'A, B, or any other C' indicates 

that A is a subset of C." United States v. Williams-Davis,

90 F.3d 490, 508-09 (D.C. Cir. 1996).3In short, then, because 

__________

2 A 1993 report of the House Committee on Government Operations takes the same view of the first four entities listed in § 552(f). 

In a "Citizen's Guide" to FOIA, under the heading "The Scope of 

the Freedom of Information Act," it says:

The Federal Freedom of Information Act applies to documents 

held by agencies in the executive branch of the Federal Government. The executive branch includes cabinet departments, 

military departments, government corporations, government 

controlled corporations, independent regulatory agencies, and 

other establishments in the executive branch.

"A Citizen's Guide on Using the Freedom of Information Act and 

the Privacy Act of 1974 to Request Government Records," H.R. 

Rep. No. 103-104, at 5 (1993).

3 Congress's decision to place the so-called independent regulatory agencies after the catch-all phrase confirms this interpretation, in 

view of the uncertain constitutional status of such agencies vis-à-vis 

the executive branch. Compare Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 

349, 353 (1958) (President may freely remove officials who are "part 

of the Executive establishment," as opposed to "those whose tasks 

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the Smithsonian is not an establishment in the executive 

branch, it cannot fall into any of the conceivably applicable 

§ 552(f) categories.

Plaintiff proposes that we read the word "includes" in 

§ 552(f) as an invitation to extend agency status to entities 

that do not belong among the types enumerated but have 

something in common with them. In support of this idea, she 

points to legislative history indicating that § 552(f) was intended to broaden FOIA's scope so that it would embrace 

entities "which perform governmental functions and control 

information of interest to the public." H.R. Rep. No. 876, 93d 

Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1974). But Congress did not back this 

observation with any statutory text remotely matching its 

scope, such as "governmental entity," and accordingly we 

stick to the text as enacted.

We recognize, of course, that the word "includes" normally 

does not introduce an exhaustive list but merely sets out 

examples of some "general principle." Federal Land Bank of 

St. Paul v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 100 (1941). 

But behind § 552(f)'s enumeration there appears to be no 

general principle in sight other than the one set out in 

§ 551(1); indeed, plaintiff points to no alternative general 

principle. Moreover, as we have just said, § 552(f)'s structure indicates that Congress did perceive a unifying theme in 

the four specific kinds of entity mentioned before the catch-all 

clausea theme (belonging to the executive branch) not 

manifest in the Smithsonian. Accordingly, we now turn to 

§ 551(1).

Plaintiff asserts that the Smithsonian fits § 551(1)'s core 

phrase, "authority of the Government of the United States." 

In support of this proposition she marshals an impressive 

array of links between the Smithsonian and the federal 

government. To list the main ones: the Smithsonian operates under a federal charter granted by Congress in 1846; 

__________

require absolute freedom from Executive interference") with Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 687-92 (1988) (Congress may place some 

limits on President's discretion to remove officials exercising executive functions).

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most of its employeessome 70% according to plaintiff, Brief 

for Appellee at 16 n.3are considered federal civil service 

employees; its Regents, as mentioned, are federal officials or 

are selected by federal officials; it receives extensive federal 

funding and must submit a detailed annual statement of its 

expenditures to Congress, 20 U.S.C. § 49; it is subject to the 

audit and reporting requirements of the Government Accounting Office; "[a]ll moneys recovered by or accruing to 

[the Smithsonian are] paid into the Treasury of the United 

States, to the credit of the Smithsonian bequest, and separately accounted for," 20 U.S.C. § 53; it enjoys federal 

immunity from taxes and libel actions; it receives representation (as in this case) from the Department of Justice; and it 

publishes rules and notices in the Code of Federal Regulations and the Federal Register. See Dong, 878 F. Supp. at 

248-49; Cotton v. Adams, 798 F. Supp. at 24.

We have already held that factors like these justify classifying the Smithsonian as an "independent establishment of the 

United States" for purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act. 

See Expeditions Unlimited Aquatic Enterprises, Inc. v. 

Smithsonian Institution, 566 F.2d 289, 296 (D.C. Cir. 1977) 

(en banc). But the statute in question here uses narrower 

language; an entity may be deeply entwined with the federal 

government without being an "authority of the Government of 

the United States." Ultimately, then, as we said in rejecting 

a similar claim, plaintiff's litany of links between the Smithsonian and the federal government is "like Homer's catalogue of 

shipsexhaustive but quite beside the point." Meyer v. 

Bush, 981 F.2d 1288, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

The term "authority" is not self-defining. At the very 

least, however, it seems logical that for an entity to be an 

authority of the government it must exercise some governmental authority. Scholars of the APA appear to agree. As 

one commentator put it, an "agency" for APA purposes is

a part of government which is generally independent in 

the exercise of [its] functions and which by law has 

authority to take final and binding action affecting the 

rights and obligations of individuals, particularly by the 

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characteristic procedures of rule-making and adjudication.

James O. Freedman, "Administrative Procedure and the Control of Foreign Direct Investment," 119 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 9 

(1970) (internal quotations omitted) (cited in Irwin Memorial 

Blood Bank v. American National Red Cross, 640 F.2d 1051, 

1053 (9th Cir. 1981)). See also 1 Kenneth Culp Davis & 

Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise § 1.2, at 

4 (3d ed. 1994) (focusing on whether "the entity has, or lacks, 

authority to take binding action"); Washington Research 

Project, Inc. v. Dep't of Health, Education and Welfare, 504 

F.2d 238, 248 & n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (citing legislative history 

of APA in support of a requirement of "final and binding 

action"); J.H. Miles & Co., Inc. v. Brown, 910 F. Supp. 1138, 

1159 (E.D. Va. 1995) (holding that quasi-government fisheries 

council "is not an 'authority' of the U.S. Government because 

it has no 'authority' to do anything").

Our cases have followed the same approach, requiring that 

an entity exercise substantial independent authority before it 

can be considered an agency for § 551(1) purposes. It is 

quite true that, apart from its roots in the language of 

§ 551(1) and its legislative history, our "substantial independent authority" test both originated in a case involving an 

entity in the Executive Office of the President, Soucie v. 

David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Office of Science and 

Technology), and has most often been applied in the case of 

such entities, see Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 90 F.3d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (National Security Council); 

Meyer, 981 F.2d at 1291-98 (Task Force on Regulatory 

Reform); Rushforth v. Council of Economic Advisers, 762 

F.2d 1038, 1040-43 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Council of Economic 

Advisers); Pacific Legal Foundation v. Council on Environmental Quality, 636 F.2d 1259, 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Council 

on Environmental Quality); cf. Sweetland v. Walters, 60 F.3d 

852 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Executive Residence of the President, 

deemed "analogous" to a unit of the Executive Office of the 

President). In such cases, naturally, much of the focus was 

on the independence aspect of the formula, since obviously 

the President exercises authority, and those who have his ear 

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must at a minimum possess some degree of derivative authority. But the requirement of authority derives both from the 

statutory language itself and from legislative history characterizing the requisite type of authority ("final and binding," 

see H.R. Rep. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., at 19 (1946), 

cited in Washington Research Project, 504 F.2d at 248-49 

n.15), and we have applied the requirement in at least two 

cases not involving presidential power at all. In Energy 

Research Foundation we applied it to the Defense Nuclear 

Facilities Safety Board, 917 F.2d at 584-85 (finding it covered 

because of its investigative and evaluative powers), and in 

Washington Research Project we held that "initial research 

groups," scholars appointed by the National Institute of 

Mental Health primarily from outside NIMH to conduct peer 

review of grant applications, were not agencies under the 

FOIA definition precisely because of their lack of authority 

even to make government grants, 504 F.2d at 248.

Washington Research Project might be read to imply that 

the "initial research groups," had they in fact possessed the 

power to decide how federal grant money was spent, would 

have been considered agencies for FOIA purposes. But we 

have already warned against such a reading of that case. 

"We held [in Washington Research Project] that because the 

organization in question had no authority to make decisions it 

was not a government agency, but the converse of that 

proposition may not always be true; that an organization 

makes decisions does not always mean that it is a government 

agency." Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Dep't of 

Health, Education and Welfare, 668 F.2d 537, 543 (D.C. Cir. 

1981). In addition, in Washington Research Project we noted 

that the body that was empowered to determine the allocation 

of the grants in question, the National Advisory Mental 

Health Council ("NAMHC"), derived this power directly from 

a statute which "empower[ed] the Secretary [of Health, Education & Welfare] to make grant awards if (and only if) the 

NAMHC so recommends." Id. at 248. Plaintiff has identified no comparable delegation of authority to the Smithsonian 

to control the allocation of federal research dollars, and we 

know of none. To the extent that the Smithsonian devotes 

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part of its own budget to funding grants and fellowships, it 

appears to be no different from any private research university which receives federal funds and enjoys some control over 

their use.

The Smithsonian is a cultural and research institution, 

established in 1846 pursuant to a trust bequest of James 

Smithson, and dedicated to "the increase and diffusion of 

knowledge among men." 20 U.S.C. § 41. It does not make 

binding rules of general application or determine rights and 

duties through adjudication. It issues no orders and performs no regulatory functions. Plaintiff's efforts to demonstrate that the Smithsonian exercises authority focus mainly 

on Congress's delegation to the institution of limited police 

powers, including arrest powers, on its own grounds. See 40 

U.S.C. §§ 193n, 193v, 193t. She also notes that Congress has 

authorized the Smithsonian to promulgate regulations in support of its power to maintain safety and order on its premises. 

40 U.S.C. § 193r; see 36 CFR §§ 504-20. Yet these limited 

powers, which enable the Smithsonian to protect its own 

collections and facilities, fall far short of converting the 

Smithsonian into "an authority of the Government of the 

United States." As we said recently, "the Smithsonian's 

ability to hire its own police force carries little probative 

weight in that many private museums employ their own 

security personnel." Cotton v. Heyman, 63 F.3d 1115, 1122 

(D.C. Cir. 1995).

Our cases, as noted, speak of "substantial independent 

authority." They do not support the proposition that the 

exercise of any independent authority, however confined, 

converts an entity into an "authority of the Government of 

the United States." For example, we affirmed a district 

court decision that the National Academy of Sciences 

("NAS") was not an "agency" under § 551(1) despite the fact 

that it possessed the apparent authoritygreater than any 

possessed by the Smithsonianto veto the Environmental 

Protection Agency's suspension of auto emission standards. 

Lombardo v. Handler, 397 F. Supp. 792, 794 (D.D.C. 1975), 

aff'd, 546 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Like the NAS, the 

Smithsonian simply is not the kind of "center of gravity in the 

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exercise of administrative power" to which § 551(1) refers. 

Lombardo, 397 F. Supp. at 796 (citing Freedman, 119 U. Pa. 

L. Rev. at 9).

In the most literal sense, of course, the Smithsonian's 

broad, Congressionally-granted latitude over spending its federally allocated funds and over its own personnel and collections indicates that it possesses "authority in law to make 

decisions." Cotton v. Heyman, 63 F.3d at 1122 (citing Washington Research Project, 504 F.2d at 248). But every private 

organization possesses the power to order its own affairs and 

carry out transactions with others within the limits set by 

law. To the extent the Smithsonian exercises anything approaching public authority, that authority appears to be entirely ancillary to its cultural and educational mission.4 Authority must be governmental in nature to count for § 551(1) 

purposes.

Finally, plaintiff points out that the Smithsonian is treated 

as an agency under other federal statutes. Indeed, in acknowledging plaintiff's extensive enumeration of governmental ties we cited the finding of Expeditions Unlimited, 556 

F.2d at 296, that the Federal Tort Claims Act embraced the 

Smithsonian, but pointed out that the FTCA defined "Federal 

agency" broadly to include "independent establishments of 

the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2671. Unsurprisingly, the 

Smithsonian is subject to other statutes whose language also 

differs from that of the Privacy Act. Thus, Smithsonian 

employees are covered by the Federal Employment Compensation Act, which applies to employees of "instrumentalit[ies] 

wholly owned by the United States," 5 U.S.C. § 8101(1)(A), 

which the Smithsonian concedes it is, at least insofar as the 

United States, as trustee, holds legal title to the original 

Smithson trust property and later accretions. Similarly, it is 

subject to the Inspector General Act ("IGA") not by virtue of 

__________

4

In addition to the "on-campus" police powers mentioned above, 

Congress has delegated to the Smithsonian control over certain 

cultural and research facilities such as the National Zoo, see 20 

U.S.C. § 81, and the Canal Zone Biological Area, a 4000-acre 

tropical forest on Barro Colorado Island, see 20 U.S.C. § 79b.

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any agency status, but because Congress has declared it a 

"designated Federal entity" for IGA purposes, 5 U.S.C. App. 

3, § 8G(a)(2). The Smithsonian's status under these other 

statutes is therefore inapposite.

In sum, the Smithsonian lacks both the "authority" necessary for it to qualify as an "authority of the government of 

the United States" under § 551(1) and the executive department status necessary under § 552(f).

The judgment of the district court is therefore

Reversed.

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