Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-03106/USCOURTS-ca7-15-03106-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Marek Stanislawczyk
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Nos. 15-2511 and 15-3106

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

PAWEL W. WROBEL and MAREK

STANISLAWCZYK,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 12 CR 650 — Rebecca R. Pallmeyer, Judge.

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 — DECIDED OCTOBER 28, 2016

Before BAUER, POSNER, and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge. On August 14, 2012, Slawomir

Wieckowicz, a confidential informant, alerted FBI agents of a

phone call he had with Zbigniew Oziemski, in which Oziemski

solicited Wieckowicz’s help in planned robberies that were

to occur in New York. Wieckowicz told the FBI agents of

Oziemski’s plan to travel from Poland to New York, and then

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2 Nos. 15-2511 and 15-3106

to Chicago. In Chicago, Oziemski would meet with Marek

Stanislawczyk, and then they would travel to New York to

commit the robberies.

On August 15, 2012, Wieckowicz told agents that Stanislawczyk was in New York, but he would return to Chicago and

then travel from Chicago to New York with Oziemski and a

third person (later identified as Pawel Wladyslaw Wrobel) to

commit the robberies. Stanislawczyk detailed Oziemski’s travel

plans to Wieckowicz, and explained that they would travel all

together from Chicago to New York. Stanislawczyk asked

Wieckowicz to rent a van under a false name.

On August 16, 2012, Wieckowicz, Wrobel, and Stanislawczyk met at Stanislawczyk’s apartment in Elk Grove

Village, Illinois. Oziemski participated via Skype. Wieckowicz

recorded the conversations. During this meeting, Wrobel and

Stanislawczyk told Wieckowicz that they would travel to New

York with Oziemski to rob a particular individual, Jacob

Reichman, a diamond merchant, at his residence in Brooklyn,

New York. Wrobel said that Reichman would be so frightened

that he would “turn [the diamonds] over just like that. Those

people are fucking scared ... you won’t fucking have to do

anything to him. He’ll just turn it over by himself and that’s it.”

Stanislawczyk described how a van would be most preferable

and efficient for conducting the robbery: “We drive up, the

doors are open; we throw the Jew [i.e., the diamond merchant]

inside ... we take the diamonds, the easiest job. He has the

diamonds on him ... . [H]e has it on him, and we fucking

taking it.” 

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Nos. 15-2511 and 15-3106 3

Assuming a successful robbery, Wrobel and Stanislawczyk

expected to sell the stolen diamonds to an individual Wrobel

knew as “Alex,” purportedly a former business partner of

Reichman. They predicted that the robbery would net between

one to three million dollars.

On August 18, 2012, Oziemski, Stanislawczyk, Wrobel, and

Wieckowicz met at Stanislawczyk’s apartment again. Wieckowicz again recorded the conversations. Wrobel informed the

others that Reichman was an Orthodox Jew in his late sixties

who supplied diamonds to retail outlets. Stanislawczyk

expressed confidence that Reichman was certain to be carrying

gems of substantial value: “He has a minimum of two [million

dollars’ worth of diamonds] on his person ... . He’s the kind of

Jew that receives a phone call that there’s a need for a fucking

so-and-so carat diamond in a color like this ... and he fucking

has it.” Wrobel and Stanislawczyk had a specific address and

displayed the location of Reichman’s home on an iPad using

Google Maps. They also described the area based on their

observations from having visited the location the previous

week. The group agreed to rent a van equipped with New

York license plates to avoid unwanted attention from law

enforcement.

Under the supervision of the FBI, Wieckowicz rented a van

equipped with both New York license plates and a sliding

door. The FBI also equipped the rental van with a recording

device.

On August 20, 2012, Wrobel, Stanislawczyk, Oziemski, and

Wieckowicz began their travel from Elk Grove Village to New

York. Wrobel forgot “the bag with the tools ... and gloves”

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4 Nos. 15-2511 and 15-3106

inside Stanislawczyk’s apartment, so the group went back to

the apartment. Stanislawczyk retrieved the bag containing a

pry bar and three pairs of gloves. 

On August 21, 2012, the group checked into a Comfort Inn

near Linden, New Jersey, at approximately 6:30 a.m. Shortly

thereafter, Stanislawczyk, Wrobel, and the two others (including the confidential informant) were arrested by the FBI. The

FBI agents found hooded sweatshirts and a black hat in Wrobel

and Stanislawczyk’s luggage, brought for the purpose of

disguising and concealing their identities. The FBI searched the

rental van and found a shopping bag containing three pairs of

gloves and a pry bar. 

On November 6, 2012, Wrobel, Stanislawczyk, and Oziemski were charged in an indictment with conspiring to obstruct,

delay, and affect commerce by robbery of diamonds and other

valuables, in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)

(Count 1); and, attempting to obstruct, delay, and affect

commerce by robbery in violation of § 1951(a) (Count 2). On

October 8, 2013, a Superseding Indictment added a third count,

and extortion allegations to Counts 1 and 2. Prior to the case

going to the jury, the government dismissed the extortion

allegations from Counts 1 and 2, and Count 3 in its entirety. 

Prior to trial, on October 17, 2013, the government gave

notice of its intent to introduce expert testimony from Donald

Strzepek regarding the diamond business. Strzepek would

testify that all diamonds are mined outside the United States,

and that diamond dealers frequently carry diamonds from

place to place on their persons. The government sought to

introduce Strzepek’s testimony to establish a nexus between

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Nos. 15-2511 and 15-3106 5

the charged offense and interstate commerce, and also to rebut

arguments that Wrobel, Stanislawcyzk, and Oziemski’s

statements regarding robbing a diamond merchant were mere

fantasy. On October 22, 2013, Oziemski filed a motion in limine

to suppress this testimony as irrelevant and prejudicial. The

district court denied the motion, and subsequently overruled

a similar objection at trial. 

On November 8, 2013, the jury convicted Wrobel, Stanislawczyk, and Oziemski on two Hobbs Act counts. On July 15,

2015, the district court ruled on a “plethora” of motions for

post-trial relief, including motions for judgment of acquittal

pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c), and,

alternatively, motions for a new trial. All post-trial motions for

relief were denied.

On September 2, 2015, Stanislawczyk appeared pro se at

his sentencing hearing having dismissed three separate

appointed attorneys during the course of his case. At the

beginning of the hearing, the district court warned Stanislawczyk of the disadvantages of refusing counsel and choosing

to represent himself. After the government provided its

argument to the court, the district court spoke directly to

Stanislawczyk, stating: “Mr. Stanislawczyk, you are welcome

to make a statement as well before your sentence is imposed.”

Stanislawczyk covered a variety of topics while exercising his

right of allocution. 

On July 6, 2015, the district court sentenced Wrobel to

60 months’ imprisonment on each of his two convictions,

the sentences to run concurrently. On September 2, 2015,

the district court sentenced Stanislawczyk to 61 months’

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6 Nos. 15-2511 and 15-3106

imprisonment on the two counts, the sentences to run concurrently. Wrobel and Stanislawczyk timely appealed.

Wrobel and Stanislawczyk claim that there was insufficient

evidence to establish the required nexus between the crime

and interstate commerce under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C.

§ 1951(a); they also argued that the district court improperly

admitted testimony by the government’s expert witness. And

last, Stanislawczyk argues that the district court failed to

provide him an adequate opportunity for allocution.

A. The Sufficiency of the Evidence

We will overturn a jury’s verdict only if, “after viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the

record is devoid of evidence from which a reasonable jury

could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v.

Campbell, 770 F.3d 556, 571–72 (7th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).

Since Wrobel and Stanislawczyk failed to properly raise this

challenge before the district court, we review for plain error

only. United States v. Mitov, 460 F.3d 901, 907 (7th Cir. 2006). As

a result, Wrobel and Stanislawczyk can only obtain a reversal

if they demonstrate a “manifest miscarriage of justice.” Id.

Regardless, Wrobel and Stanislawczyk’s challenge fails under

either standard.

The Hobbs Act makes it a crime for a person to "obstruct[],

delay[], or affect[] commerce or the movement of any article

or commodity in commerce, by robbery ... or attempt[] or

conspire[] so to do ... .” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). Because the Hobbs

Act also criminalizes attempts, the government does not

need to prove that the defendant’s actions actually affected

interstate commerce, but “only that there exists a ‘realistic

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Nos. 15-2511 and 15-3106 7

probability’ of an effect on commerce.” United States v. Bailey,

227 F.3d 792, 797 (7th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). To prove an

attempt, the government must have shown only that Wrobel

and Stanislawczyk acted with specific intent to commit the

underlying offense, and took a substantial step towards its

completion. See id.

The jury heard the following evidence: Wrobel and Stanislawczyk traveled across state lines for the purpose of robbing

diamonds from a diamond merchant whose diamonds were

invariably obtained via foreign commerce, i.e., “commerce

between any point in a State ... and any point outside thereof

... .” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(3). While Wrobel and Stanislawczyk

objected to testimony of the government’s expert witness,

they did not—and still do not—challenge the expert’s claim

that diamonds are not mined in the United States.1

 The market

for diamonds in the United States implicates foreign commerce. Thus, Wrobel and Stanislawczyk’s conspiracy and

attempted robbery of a diamond merchant had a “realistic

probability” of an effect on interstate commerce.

Moreover, the government was able to show an effect on

interstate commerce under the “depletion of assets” theory.

Under this theory, “commerce is affected when an enterprise,

which either is actively engaged in interstate commerce or

customarily purchases items in interstate commerce, has its

assets depleted through [robbery], thereby curtailing the

victim's potential as a purchaser of such goods.” United States

1

 At oral argument, defense counsel admitted that “zero” diamonds were

mined in the United States, and stated: “We are not disputing that a

diamond merchant is interstate commerce.”

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8 Nos. 15-2511 and 15-3106

v. Harty, 930 F.2d 1257, 1261 (7th Cir. 1991) (alteration in

original) (quoting United States v. Elders, 569 F.2d 1020, 1025

(7th Cir. 1978); accord United States v. Muratovic, 719 F.3d 809,

813 (7th Cir. 2013). 

Wrobel and Stanislawczyk planned and intended to rob

Reichman because they believed he was a diamond merchant

with an abundant supply of diamonds. Wrobel and Stanislawczyk’s belief that Reichman was actively engaged in the

business of buying and selling diamonds is evidenced, among

other things, by hours of recorded conversations. For example,

Stanislawczyk stated: “[Reichman] has a minimum of two

[million dollars’ worth of diamonds] on his person ... . He’s the

kind of Jew that receives a phone call that there’s a need for a

fucking so-and-so carat diamond in a color like this ... and he

fucking has it.” Wrobel and Stanislawczyk’s intent to sell the

stolen diamonds to Reichman’s former business partner also

evidences their belief that Reichman conducted himself in

some form of a business entity. Had the robbery occurred as

planned, Wrobel and Stanislawczyk would have not only

depleted the diamond merchant’s assets, but also curtailed the

diamond merchant’s potential as purchaser and seller of

diamonds having moved through interstate commerce.

Therefore, the government provided sufficient evidence for a

reasonable jury to find that the interstate commerce element

was satisfied under the “depletion of assets” theory.

In response, Wrobel and Stanislawczyk’s main argument

largely relies on this court’s decision in United States v. Mattson,

671 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1982). They argue that the attempted

robbery could not have affected interstate commerce because

the government failed to present evidence that Reichman was

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Nos. 15-2511 and 15-3106 9

actually engaged in conducting business as a diamond merchant at the time of the offense. They contend that had they

successfully robbed Reichman, they would have only robbed

an individual, which would not have affected interstate

commerce.

Wrobel and Stanislawczyk’s reliance on Mattson is misplaced. They believe that Mattson precludes us from finding

that the government satisfied the interstate commerce element

because Reichman, like the victim in Mattson, is an individual

not engaged in interstate commerce. This argument overlooks

a crucial distinction based on well-established law. Unlike the

extortion conviction reversed in Mattson, Wrobel and Stanislawczyk’s convictions were for an attempted Hobbs Act

robbery. Factual impossibility and mistake of fact are not

defenses to an attempt crime. Mitov, 460 F.3d at 908 (citing

Bailey, 227 F.3d at 797); Muratovic, 719 F.3d at 814 (noting that

the “inability to complete the crime ‘does not diminish the

sincerity of any efforts to accomplish that end’” (quoting

United States v. Cotts, 14 F.3d 300, 307 (7th Cir. 1994))). It does

not matter whether or not Reichman was actually a diamond

merchant engaged in interstate commerce. What matters is

that the evidence demonstrated that Wrobel and Stanislawczyk

acted with the specific intent to rob a diamond merchant

and took a substantial step toward robbing diamonds from

someone whom they believed to be a diamond merchant. The

government presented sufficient evidence to establish the

required nexus between the offense and interstate commerce.

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10 Nos. 15-2511 and 15-3106

B. Improperly Admitted Evidence

Wrobel and Stanislawczyk do not object to Strzepek’s

qualifications as an expert, nor do they contend that the district

court improperly applied the Federal Rule of Evidence 702

and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579

(1993), analysis. Instead, Wrobel and Stanislawczyk argue

that the district court abused its discretion by admitting

Strzepek’s expert testimony because it was not relevant under

Federal Rule of Evidence 401; or, even if relevant, it was

unfairly prejudicial under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. 

Prior to trial, the government gave Wrobel and Stanislawczyk notice of its intent to introduce Strzepek’s testimony

regarding the diamond business. Strzepek, a certified gemologist with over thirty years of experience in the diamond

industry, would testify that all diamonds are mined outside of

the United States, and that diamond dealers frequently carry

diamonds from place to place on their persons as a means of

transportation. In response, the defendants argued that the

testimony would be irrelevant and prejudicial. The district

court disagreed and denied the motion. The district court

overruled a similar objection at trial, and stated:

First of all, that is the subject of expert testimony

makes sense to me because—I mean, let’s just

use sort of a rough-and-ready test. Is this something the average person knows? I’m an average

person. I don’t know how diamond dealers

carry diamonds. I have never seen anything like

this. It’s completely unfamiliar to me. 

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Nos. 15-2511 and 15-3106 11

So somebody that has experience and exposure

to the diamond-dealing practices would be

someone who I would characterize as having

specialized knowledge of this issue. And the

other concern, that he obviously didn’t see the

victim wearing this vest or doesn’t even know

the victim, is all material that’s subject to crossexamination. 

I think it does go to rebut the notion that it’s

fantastical to expect that a diamond dealer

would leave his house carrying diamonds on his

body. Again, this is something I am personally

completely unfamiliar with. And I do think

jurors may very well have no idea how this is

done or whether it is indeed fantastical or not

fantastical.

We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion

in admitting this evidence, nor do we find the evidence

unfairly prejudicial. We consider each argument in turn. 

1. Relevance

In determining the materiality and relevancy of evidence,

the district court has been accorded “wide discretion.” United

States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1117 (7th Cir. 1999). Wrobel and

Stanislawczyk contend that the district court abused its

discretion by admitting Strzepek’s testimony because it is not

relevant. To support this argument, Wrobel and Stanislawczyk

revert to similar claims that they made regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, and claims better fashioned as Rule 403

arguments. They argue that only an individual would have

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12 Nos. 15-2511 and 15-3106

been robbed, not a diamond merchant; and, that the government cannot establish the jurisdictional element “by using

Strzepek’s testimony because the defendants were not planning on robbing Strzepek.” But, these claims do not address

whether the evidence at issue is relevant or not. 

Strzepek’s testimony regarding his “specialized knowledge” of the diamond industry is relevant because it could

assist the jury in understanding the evidence or in determining

a fact at issue. Because diamonds are not mined in the United

States, Strzepek’s testimony is relevant to the interstate

commerce element of the Hobbs Act. 

In addition, Strzepek’s testimony was also relevant as a

rebuttal to Wrobel and Stanislawczyk’s defense. Wrobel and

Stanislawczyk claimed that they only spoke in fantastical

terms, and therefore did not exhibit an actual intent to rob

Reichman; Strzepek testified that diamond merchants frequently carried diamonds on their persons from place to place

as a means of transporting diamonds. This testimony tended

to show that Wrobel and Stanislawczyk reasonably believed

Reichman would actually have millions of dollars’ worth of

diamonds on his person, and that this belief was reasonable. 

The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding

Strzepek’s testimony relevant. 

2. Prejudice Under Rule 403

Wrobel and Stanislawczyk contend that even if Strzepek’s

testimony was relevant, the district court should have excluded it because its probative value was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.

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Nos. 15-2511 and 15-3106 13

Wrobel and Stanislawczyk assert that Strzepek’s testimony

created an impermissible inference that Reichman was a

diamond merchant. But, Strzepek’s testimony did not imply

that Reichman was a diamond dealer, and the district court

made sure of this. Prior to Strzepek’s testimony, the district

court made sure the government was “not going to suggest

that [Strzepek] saw the victim wearing [a diamond merchant’s

vest or wallet] or anything of the kind.” At trial, the government did not ask Strzepek if Reichman was a diamond dealer.

In fact, Strzepek was asked this question and gave this answer

in front of the jury:

Q: It would be fair to say, wouldn’t it, that you

don’t know anything about the particular facts

of this particular case?

A: No, I don’t. 

Strzepek’s testimony was not intended to mislead the jury

into believing Reichman was a diamond merchant. Instead,

Strzepek’s testimony was intended to support the government’s position that Wrobel and Stanislawczyk actually

believed that, as a person in the business of buying and selling

diamonds, Reichman was likely to be in possession of diamonds, either on his person or at his home, and that their belief

was reasonable. 

Wrobel and Stanislawczyk argue that the district court did

not balance the evidence’s probative value against its prejudicial effect. However, the district court considered whether

Strzepek’s testimony had the potential to mislead the jury. To

prevent this danger, the district court instructed the governCase: 15-3106 Document: 44 Filed: 10/28/2016 Pages: 17
14 Nos. 15-2511 and 15-3106

ment to ask Strzepek questions regarding his specialized

knowledge only. 

The district court did not abuse its discretion when admitting Strzepek’s testimony. 

C. Right of Allocution

Stanislawczyk separately contends that the district court

did not adequately comply with Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 32 and denied him his right of a meaningful

allocution. Rule 32 provides that, "[b]efore imposing sentence,

the court must ... address the defendant personally in order to

permit the defendant to speak or present any information to

mitigate the sentence ... ." Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(A)(ii). We

recognize that the right of allocution is an important right that

the district courts must construe liberally. United States v.

Covington, 681 F.3d 908, 910 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing United States

v. Barnes, 948 F.2d 325, 328–30 (7th Cir. 1991)). But, the right of

allocution is not without limits. United States v. Alden, 527 F.3d

653, 663 (7th Cir. 2008) (collecting cases describing limits on the

right to allocute). Rule 32 “does not purport to set out a script

that the district courts must follow when advising defendants

of their right to allocution.” United States v. Williams, 258 F.3d

669, 674 (7th Cir. 2001). Instead, we look to the “substance of

what occurred.” Id.

In considering Stanislawczyk’s arguments, we will follow

the same analysis utilized by this Court in Williams. See id. at

674–75. First, the district court satisfied the first part of Rule 32

when it personally addressed Stanislawczyk—“Mr. Stanislawczyk, you are welcome to make a statement as well before

your sentence is imposed.” In Williams, we held that the district

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Nos. 15-2511 and 15-3106 15

court’s question to the defendant—“Mr. Williams, is there

anything you would like to say?”—satisfied Rule 32’s requirement that the district court address the defendant personally.

Id. at 675. The unambiguous manner in which the district court

personally addressed the defendant in Williams is sufficiently

similar to the way the district court addressed Stanislawczyk.

The district court satisfied the requirement that it personally

address Stanislawczyk.

Second, the district court permitted Stanislawczyk to speak

or present any information to mitigate the sentence. Although

we do not know the duration of Stanislawczyk’s allocution, it

extended for more than nine pages in the transcript. Stanislawczyk elected to use his allocution time to cover a vast array

of topics, including: (1) inadequacies in the government’s case;

(2) ineffectiveness of his trial counsel; (3) the United States

Constitution; and, (4) family problems in Europe. In concluding his allocution, Stanislawczyk stated that the “only thing

[he] ask[s]” for is that “your Honor to use your gavel as a

magic wand and kick me out of this county, make me return to

my country to Poland.” The record as a whole shows that the

district court satisfied its obligation under Rule 32 and that

Stanislawczyk’s right to allocution was not denied.

Stanislawczyk’s argument essentially requests us to adopt

an expansive and unprecedented interpretation of Rule 32.

Rule 32 provides the defendant two opportunities to persuade

the court as to the appropriate sentence: once by the defendant’s attorney, Rule 32(i)(4)(A)(i), and the other by the

defendant, Rule 32(i)(4)(A)(ii). Stanislawczyk contends that

when a defendant proceeds pro se, his inability to exercise his

right to have an attorney speak on his behalf “penalize[s] a

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16 Nos. 15-2511 and 15-3106

pro se defendant.” Stanislawczyk argues that the district court

therefore has a duty to “clarify[] the two separate procedural

rights” to a pro se defendant and explain to the pro se defendant

of “his right to speak in mitigation.”

This argument is flawed. Stanislawczyk erroneously

believes that Rule 32 requires the district court to treat a

defendant proceeding pro se as two separate entities: the

defendant as the defendant’s attorney, and the defendant as

the defendant. Unsurprisingly, Stanislawczyk does not cite to

any authority in support of this argument, and we do not

believe any reasonable reading of Rule 32 would support it.

Thus, when the district court personally addressed Stanislawczyk, it was only as a defendant. There was no error in this

procedure. 

Furthermore, Stanislawczyk cannot claim he was “penalize[d]” by not having an attorney at sentencing when he

insisted on proceeding without counsel. When asked by the

district court as to whether he would proceed without counsel,

Stanislawczyk stated: “Yes. I would like your Honor to be done

and over with, with this case today, yes.” 

Reviewing the sentencing transcript in its entirety, it reveals

that the district court advised Stanislawczyk of the concerns

and disadvantages in proceeding pro se pursuant to Faretta.

422 U.S. 806. The district court not only advised Stanislawczyk

just before sentencing began, but had conducted an extensive

colloquy in earlier proceedings. See March 9, 2015, Order.

Stanislawczyk does not contend otherwise.

In a last attempt, Stanislawczyk argues that the record,

consisting of over nine pages of transcript, shows that he did

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Nos. 15-2511 and 15-3106 17

not understand that his allocution time was meant to cover

topics such as remorse or present arguments in mitigation.

Stanislawczyk points out that this confusion is further highlighted by the fact that he set out two arguments in mitigation

—sentence disparity and criminal history—only after the

district court had already imposed his sentence. 

These claims are unpersuasive. First, the transcript shows

that Stanislawczyk talked about remorse. In fact, Stanislawczyk

claimed “[t]here is nobody [he] could apologize to,” except to

his family. Second, Stanislawczyk could not have offered an

argument based on sentence disparity—as compared to his codefendants’ sentences—prior to the district court’s imposition

of his sentence. Stanislawczyk was the last of the three codefendants to be sentenced, and he had the lowest sentencing

Guidelines range.

The transcript shows that the district court gave Stanislawczyk what seemed like free-range to talk about whatever

he pleased. The district court did not commit procedural error

when it permitted Stanislawczyk to speak or present any

information to mitigate his sentence.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Wrobel and Stanislawczyk’s convictions, and AFFIRM Stanislawczyk’s sentence.

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