Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-01901/USCOURTS-ca7-14-01901-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jackie H. Richardson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14-1901

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JACKIE H. RICHARDSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:13-cr-00070-TWP-DKL-1 — Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED JANUARY 27, 2015 — DECIDED MARCH 12, 2015

____________________

Before POSNER, SYKES, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

POSNER, Circuit Judge. The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution provides that “in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy ... trial.” The brevity 

of the provision is striking. There is no quantification of 

“speedy” and no specification of when in the course of a 

criminal investigation or prosecution the speedy-trial clock 

begins to tick. But the Supreme Court has held that it does 

not begin to tick “before a defendant is indicted, arrested, or 

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otherwise officially accused.” United States v. MacDonald, 456 

U.S. 1, 6 (1982). To the same effect see United States v. Marion, 

404 U.S. 307, 313 (1971), and United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 

U.S. 302, 310 (1986). The question presented by this appeal is 

whether or in what circumstances the clock begins to tick 

when a federal complaint and detainer are served on a person who is being prosecuted by a state.

In United States v. Zukowski, 851 F.2d 174, 178 (7th Cir. 

1988), we interpreted MacDonald to hold that the “official accusation” to which the Supreme Court referred in that case 

must be a formal charging document, such as an indictment 

or information. We’ll see that a complaint, affidavit of probable cause, and detainer (the documents at issue in this case), 

even in combination, are not the equivalent of an indictment 

or information.

“Someone who is only the target of a criminal investigation has no right to have the government wrap up its investigation quickly and bring charges, even if the target is 

aware of the investigation.” United States v. Clark, 754 F.3d 

401, 405 (7th Cir. 2014); see also, e.g., Pharm v. Hatcher, 984 

F.2d 783, 785 (7th Cir. 1993). “[E]ven an arrest by the federal 

authorities is insufficient if the person is immediately released without any federal charges being filed.” United States 

v. Clark, supra, 754 F.3d at 405. (Clark was a Speedy Trial Act 

case, but we noted in it that “the Sixth Amendment speedy 

trial right, from which the Speedy Trial Act draws its substance, applies only to persons who are formally accused of 

a crime.” Id.) Only if an arrested person is detained pending 

indictment does the speedy-trial clock begin to tick upon arrest. See, e.g., United States v. Loud Hawk, supra, 474 U.S. at

310 (“when no indictment is outstanding, only the ‘actual reCase: 14-1901 Document: 49 Filed: 03/12/2015 Pages: 25
No. 14-1901 3

straints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal 

charge ... engage the particular protections of the speedy trial provision of the Sixth Amendment,’” quoting United States 

v. Marion, supra, 404 U.S. at 320); Dillingham v. United States, 

423 U.S. 64, 65 (1975) (per curiam).

Richardson was arrested by Indiana police on December 

17, 2011, for committing a vicious domestic battery and intimidation with a deadly weapon, in violation of Indiana 

law. A search of his home, conducted the same day, revealed 

a remarkable collection of guns and ammunition—

apparently he manufactured guns (from the gun parts) and 

also ammunition. Because he previously had been convicted 

in federal court of illegal possession of a firearm by a felon, 

his gun-related activities violated federal as well as state 

law. So just four days after his arrest the U.S. Attorney filed 

a criminal complaint and affidavit of probable cause in a 

federal court in Indiana, and a federal detainer in the jail in 

which Richardson was being held on the state charges.

Such a complaint must not be confused with a civil complaint. A civil complaint initiates a civil suit. Fed. R. Civ. P. 3. 

A criminal complaint can initiate only a misdemeanor prosecution. Fed. R. Crim. P. 58(b). A complaint that charges a felony can establish a basis for an arrest warrant, justify an arrest made without a warrant, initiate, continue, or expand an 

investigation, and notify other law enforcement agencies of 

its concern with the person arrested or investigated. Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 3, 4(a), 5(b); United States v. Alvarado, 440 F.3d 191, 

200 (4th Cir. 2006). But unlike an indictment or information,

it cannot initiate a felony prosecution. An indictment or information must be signed by a government lawyer; a complaint, because it cannot initiate a felony prosecution, need 

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not be, Fed. R. Crim. P. 3, 7(c)(1), and was not in this case. 

And even a complaint plus a detainer imposes no deprivation of liberty on the defendant.

All that the complaint in this case said is that the agent of 

the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives who signed it was swearing that “to the best of [her] 

knowledge and belief,” on a specified date the “defendant 

did unlawfully possess a firearm as a convicted felon” and

was thus “in violation of” of the federal criminal code. See 18 

U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). This signals an investigation rather than a 

prosecution.

No more does an affidavit (filed with the complaint in 

this case) in support of a search warrant kick off a prosecution. United States v. Alvarado, supra, 440 F.3d at 200. As for a

detainer, it merely informs the jail that a person held there is 

wanted on other criminal charges and the jail should therefore notify the agency that issued the detainer of the prisoner’s imminent release, so that the agency can arrest him. The 

federal court issued a warrant for Richardson’s arrest, but of 

course the warrant wasn’t executed, because he was already 

in jail. The state court set his bail at $500,000. He couldn’t 

make bail, and so remained in jail throughout the state proceedings against him.

On March 21, 2013, approximately fifteen months after 

his arrest, Richardson pleaded guilty in state court to felony 

intimidation and was sentenced to time served. He would

thus have been a free man had it not been for the federal detainer. The day after he was sentenced the federal warrant 

for his arrest that had been issued immediately after his state 

arrest was executed, and he was jailed. The following month 

he was indicted on federal charges of being a felon in posCase: 14-1901 Document: 49 Filed: 03/12/2015 Pages: 25
No. 14-1901 5

session of firearms and also for illegal possession of a submachine gun (35 of the items found on his property were either submachine guns or parts of such guns).

Initially he was disposed to plead guilty to the federal 

charges, but he changed his mind and on January 28, 2014, 

filed a motion to dismiss the federal case on the ground that 

the government had violated his Sixth Amendment right to a 

speedy trial. He argued that the speedy-trial clock had started to tick when the federal complaint and detainer had been 

filed four days after his arrest on state charges. Between then 

and the issuance of his federal indictment 16 months had 

elapsed, which would indeed have been a considerable delay, raising a colorable speedy-trial issue, had the federal 

prosecution begun back in December 2011 when the gun 

cache was discovered. The government argues that the clock 

did not begin to tick until the federal warrant for Richardson’s arrest was executed in March 2013 upon the completion of his state sentence.

His federal trial was scheduled for June 2013 and would 

thus have been “speedy” relative to the federal indictment

had the trial not been delayed—but the delay was at the behest of Richardson, who that month said he would plead 

guilty and therefore asked for a continuance of the trial. Not

until January of the following year did he repudiate his 

agreement to plead guilty, and move to dismiss the indictment on speedy-trial grounds. The district judge denied the 

motion. Richardson then pleaded guilty and was sentenced 

to 120 months in prison. His appeal is from the denial of his 

motion to dismiss the indictment. If it should have been 

granted, his conviction and sentence must be reversed.

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He argues that he was “officially accused” of a federal 

crime when the federal government filed its complaint and 

detainer the day after his arrest by state officers. Now the

Supreme Court in MacDonald did not actually say that the 

speedy-trial clock begins to tick when there is an official accusation of a federal crime—rather that it doesn’t begin to 

tick before then; the official accusation is the earliest time at 

which it begins to tick. But subsequent cases, while continuing to cite MacDonald approvingly, regard “arrest [provided 

the person arrested isn’t immediately released], indictment, 

or other official accusation” as a trigger rather than merely 

as an analytical starting point. See, e.g., Doggett v. United 

States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992); United States v. Loera, 565 F.3d 406, 

412 (7th Cir. 2009); Pharm v. Hatcher, supra, 984 F.2d at 785. 

That evolution of the law can’t help Richardson, however. 

The relevant arrest (that is, one followed by detention) must 

be for a suspected federal crime, and there was no federal 

arrest when he was arrested on state charges, even though 

the feds were in the vicinity, so to speak, having accompanied state officers on the search of his premises. See United 

States v. Clark, supra, 754 F.3d at 405.

The distinction is important. To hold that the clock began

to run upon the commencement of the state proceeding

against Richardson, on the theory that he was in effect officially accused of a federal as well as a state crime, would 

produce a messy clash of governments (Indiana’s state government and the federal government) with no likely benefit 

to the defendant. The state had arrested him primarily for 

domestic battery, a state not federal offense. The purpose of 

filing the federal complaint and detainer was just to make 

sure that he wasn’t released before the feds were able to arCase: 14-1901 Document: 49 Filed: 03/12/2015 Pages: 25
No. 14-1901 7

rest him and book him for violation of federal gun laws, if

they decided to prosecute him.

Had the speedy-trial clock begun to run upon the filing 

of the complaint and detainer, the U.S. Attorney would have 

been under pressure to indict Richardson forthwith and proceed with all deliberate speed to trial—with the result that

Richardson would have been fighting prosecution by two 

sovereign entities, the State of Indiana and the United States 

of America, at the same time. If the state decided to take a 

pass, it would be throwing away its domestic-battery charge,

which had no counterpart in the federal case. If the feds took 

a pass, they would be throwing away gun charges more extensive than those involved in the state prosecution. And 

had the state and federal prosecutions proceeded simultaneously, Richardson might squawk at having to defend himself 

in two trials at the same time, while if one trial were delayed

he would complain of a speedy-trial violation.

We can’t think of a good reason for the Justice Department to have barged into the state’s proceeding by instituting an overlapping federal prosecution. When a person is 

credibly accused of violating both federal and state law, he 

exposes himself to prosecution by both federal and state authorities—and thus to two separate proceedings, which rarely can efficiently be conducted simultaneously. As noted in

United States v. Schreane, 331 F.3d 548, 554–55 (6th Cir. 2003)

(for clarity, we omit citations and internal quotation marks 

and rearrange some sentences), when state and federal 

charges are lodged against a defendant “at least one sovereign ... will have to wait its turn at the prosecutorial turnstile. [For delay that is] due to the obvious need to allow the 

defendant to be prosecuted by the State without interference 

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by the federal government” is unavoidable. “Customarily—

although certainly not always—the jurisdiction with custody 

of the accused ... is afforded the first opportunity to prosecute the defendant. This longstanding practice is rooted in 

the respect accorded to a custodial sovereign to resolve its 

criminal proceedings before relinquishing custody to another jurisdiction. This practice also can be understood in terms 

of the orderly and efficient prosecution of cases in our dual 

system of criminal justice. ... [S]imply waiting for another 

sovereign to finish prosecuting a defendant is without question a valid reason for delay that weighs in favor of the government.”

The custodial sovereign in this case was the State of Indiana. It had “first dibs” (the right to go first), therefore, on 

prosecuting Richardson. It would be unrealistic to think that 

if the accused is in custody, only minimal paperwork is 

needed to shift custody as needed between the two governments from time to time. That would turn the criminal process into a game of shuttlecock. See United States v. Watford, 

468 F.3d 891, 900–03 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Grimmond, 137 F.3d 823, 827–29 (4th Cir. 1998). The sequencing of 

prosecutions and the resulting delay, often long, of one of 

them, are the inevitable consequence of a governmental

structure that gives separate governments overlapping jurisdictions.

Richardson points out that there was “cooperation” between state and federal officers from the outset. When his

girlfriend complained to the police about his beating her up, 

she mentioned his collection of guns, and so the police informed the ATF, whose agents joined the police in searching 

Richardson’s property and seizing the guns, gun parts, and 

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No. 14-1901 9

ammo found there. But the feds had no interest in or for that 

matter jurisdiction over the domestic battery and so let the 

state proceed first. Had the state been the feds’ cat’s paw, 

charging Richardson with the battery offense solely in order 

to detain him pending an eventual federal indictment, the 

state prosecution would have been a de facto federal prosecution and the speedy-trial clock would have started to run 

when Richardson was charged by the state. See, e.g., United 

States v. Dyer, 325 F.3d 464, 468 (3d Cir. 2003). But that isn’t

what happened. See United States v. Clark, supra, 754 F.3d at 

405–06.

Even if, contrary to what we’ve said, the speedy-trial 

clock began to tick with respect to the federal prosecution 

when the federal complaint, affidavit of probable cause, and 

detainer were filed, there would still be no violation of the 

Sixth Amendment. Like most constitutional rights, the right 

to a speedy trial is not absolute; it yields in the face of compelling circumstances. The most obvious such case is where 

the defendant prevents a speedy trial from being held because he has fled, or refused to enter, the jurisdiction in 

which the trial would be held, as in In re Kashamu, 769 F.3d 

490, 493–94 (7th Cir. 2014). One step down, but deemed important in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972), is a defendant’s “failure to assert the right [to a speedy trial],”

which the Court said “will make it difficult for a defendant 

to prove that he was denied a speedy trial.” There were reasons for delay in this case, and none for attempting to try the 

defendant in federal court while he was defending himself 

in state court, or insisting that he be tried first in federal 

court and only after a judgment was entered by that court

tried in state court.

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It’s not as if delay always favors the prosecutor, and so 

always supports a speedy-trial claim. Many defendants are 

content or even prefer to sit around and wait for witnesses to 

die or vanish or forget. For if the defendant is guilty there 

are likely to be more witnesses helpful to the government’s 

case than to the defendant’s. And the government will usually need more witnesses than the defendant because the 

government must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, 

and the defendant has no burden of proof whatsoever. And 

so on average the death, disappearance, forgetfulness, or recantation of a witness will favor the defendant and thus put 

him on the slow side of the case.

Richardson relies heavily on Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 

(1969), which preceded the MacDonald and Marion decisions. 

The defendant was in federal prison on federal charges. A 

state had filed formal charges against him and he wanted a 

trial on those charges. The state refused. It said he’d have to 

wait till the completion of his federal prison sentence. The 

state gave no reason for not complying with his request for a 

speedy trial other than that it was its policy not to try someone who was in prison on other charges. The Supreme 

Court, which had already held that the Sixth Amendment’s 

speedy-trial right would be deemed to have been made applicable to state prosecutions by the Fourteenth Amendment, Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223–26 (1967),

didn’t think the state’s reason adequate.

But not only did Richardson not ask for a federal trial 

during his state confinement; he had not yet been convicted 

and sentenced by the state court. He was still awaiting trial, 

so that had he been placed on trial for his federal offenses 

the proceedings would have overlapped, a result likely to 

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No. 14-1901 11

sow confusion. See United States v. Watford, supra, 468 F.3d at

902–03; United States v. Grimmond, supra, 137 F.3d at 828–29.

All this said, we acknowledge that the extreme vagueness of the speedy-trial clause of the Sixth Amendment, and 

the limited clarification of it that has been attempted by the 

Supreme Court, open up a potential for prejudice to a defendant caught between two sovereigns. Suppose Indiana

had dawdled in prosecuting Richardson and as a result not 

16 months but 3 years had elapsed between the filing of the 

federal complaint, affidavit, and detainer and the federal indictment. A delay of such length might have seriously prejudiced Richardson’s defense. The best solution in such a 

case might be, as suggested in Pharm v. Hatcher, supra, 984 

F.2d at 786–87, to inquire whether the prejudice was so 

great, and not excused by any legitimate need of the government to complete a thorough investigation before indicting, that the delay had denied the defendant due process of 

law. See also United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 796–97 

(1977); United States v. Zukowski, supra, 851 F.2d at 178; United 

States v. Samples, 713 F.2d 298, 302 (7th Cir. 1983); United 

States v. Sanders, 452 F.3d 572, 581–83 (6th Cir. 2006). Richardson argues that he was hurt by the 16-month delay—that 

had it not been for the federal detainer the state court would 

have fixed his bail at an amount he could have paid. But had 

he made bail the feds would have arrested him and, given

the magnitude of his illegal firearm business, the federal 

court would either have denied bail or set it at a level, comparable to that set by the state court for its narrower set of 

charges, that he could not afford. And finally there is no indication that the government’s delay in indicting him was 

intended to impede his defense.

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The district judge was right to deny the motion to dismiss the federal prosecution.

AFFIRMED.

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No. 14-1901 13

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment. I 

agree with my colleagues that defendant Jackie Richardson’s 

speedy trial right under the Sixth Amendment was not violated here. I would follow a much narrower path to that conclusion, however, to stay more consistent with Supreme 

Court precedent and to preserve the ability to deter or prevent unduly prejudicial delay in future cases.

The majority affirms the district court’s judgment on two 

grounds: (1) the combination of a federal complaint, arrest 

warrant, and detainer does not trigger speedy trial concerns 

because it does not add up to an “official accusation” within 

the meaning of United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 6 

(1982), and in the alternative, (2) Richardson has not shown a 

violation of his right to a speedy trial. I agree with my colleagues on the second ground but not the first.

Start with our agreement. Richardson has preserved his 

Sixth Amendment objection only as to the sixteen months 

between the filing of the federal complaint and detainer on 

December 20, 2011 and his federal indictment on April 10, 

2013. (He has not invoked the more detailed statutory protections of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq.,

which would not help him here.) To weigh whether Richardson’s Sixth Amendment right was violated by that sixteenmonth delay, we should apply the factors set forth in Barker

v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). See Doggett v. United States, 

505 U.S. 647, 655–56 (1992) (applying Barker factors). The factors are the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, 

whether the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, 

and any prejudice the defendant suffered by the delay.

These factors show that Richardson’s Sixth Amendment 

right to a speedy trial was not violated. The first factor, the 

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sixteen-month delay, is sufficient to justify concern and further analysis, as the majority recognizes. United States v. 

Arceo, 535 F.3d 679, 684 (7th Cir. 2008) (a delay approaching 

one year is presumptively prejudicial); United States v. 

Oriedo, 498 F.3d 593, 597 (7th Cir. 2007) (same).

The second and third Barker factors, which are closely related here, weigh heavily against Richardson. The reasons 

for the delay are best seen as shared between the government and the defendant. The federal government chose to 

defer to the state prosecution. That was certainly a reasonable decision. It was also a decision that Richardson did 

nothing to challenge until after the state prosecution was 

complete, after the federal prosecution was well under way, 

and after the challenged delay had already passed. In such a

situation, where the defendant faces both federal and state 

prosecutions in sequence, if the defendant indicates no desire to force the deferred prosecution forward, there should 

be no Sixth Amendment violation.

In other cases, however, a defendant in this situation—

target of a federal complaint and detainer while in state custody—should be entitled to require the federal prosecutors 

to “put up or shut up.” Given the fruits of the search of 

Richardson’s property, the federal prosecutors no doubt 

could have “put up” quite readily, but that will not always 

be the case. 

The fourth Barker factor is whether the delay prejudiced 

the defendant. Richardson has not shown prejudice from the 

delay in this case. For purposes of the Sixth Amendment 

speedy trial right, prejudice can take many forms, of course,

including loss of liberty, disruption of employment and association with other people, financial drains, and continuing 

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No. 14-1901 15

harm to reputation. Oriedo, 498 F.3d at 600–01, citing United 

States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971), and Barker, 407 U.S. 

at 532–33. But Richardson’s claim falls short on this score.

During the relevant time, he was in state pretrial custody 

and was busy defending the state criminal charges. He has 

not identified loss of exculpatory evidence or other obvious 

forms of prejudice.

He argues on appeal that the federal detainer caused the 

state court to set his bail so high ($500,000) that he could not 

afford to post bond, so that the federal detainer caused him 

to be stuck in jail pending the resolution of his state charges.

That is possible, but on this record, we would have to speculate about the role the federal detainer played, if any, in the 

state court’s initial bail decision. Richardson was accused in 

state court of a violent attack on his girlfriend. He also had 

in his home an extraordinary arsenal of illegal firearms and 

ammunition, as well as equipment to manufacture firearms. 

Perhaps the state court viewed him as dangerous enough to 

set an impossible bail amount regardless of the federal accusation. Perhaps the federal detainer tipped the balance in the 

state court’s bail decision. Richardson does not seem to have 

challenged the state court’s bail decision, and we cannot set 

aside his federal conviction based on speculation about the 

role the federal detainer might have played.1

1 The majority speculates at page 11 that if Richardson had made bail 

in the state court, a federal court would either have denied bail or set bail 

deliberately at a level he could not afford. In fact, in the Southern District 

of Indiana, pretrial release and detention decisions under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3142 are based on estimates of the defendant’s risk of flight and danger 

to the community. Pretrial release in that district is almost never conditioned on the defendant’s ability to post any bail amount at all.

 

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Richardson also argues that the delay in the federal prosecution caused him prejudice by making the prior state conviction part of his criminal history, raising the sentencing 

guideline range for his federal convictions. That should not 

count as a relevant form of prejudice. If the federal prosecution had gone forward first, then his federal convictions 

would have been relevant criminal history for the state 

courts. The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial does not 

give a defendant a constitutional right to the more advantageous sequence in those sentencing decisions.

Under this reasoning, then, Richardson’s Sixth Amendment speedy trial right was not violated, and on this basis, I 

agree we should affirm his conviction. I disagree, however, 

with the majority’s more sweeping pronouncement—which 

is not necessary to resolve this case—that the combination of 

a federal complaint, arrest warrant, and detainer can never

trigger speedy trial concerns.

That pronouncement is based on too narrow a reading of 

Supreme Court decisions in this area. The majority’s reasoning also fails to appreciate the risk of prejudice, especially to 

an innocent defendant, and exaggerates the speedy trial doctrinal problems and logistical difficulties of managing parallel state and federal prosecutions.

First, the Supreme Court decisions. The majority’s reasoning conflicts with Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969). 

Smith was in federal prison but faced criminal charges in 

state court. He wanted to be brought to trial on the state 

charges and sought for six years to get a prompt trial. The 

state refused because he was already in prison serving another sentence. After the state court refused to dismiss the 

charges, the Supreme Court reversed and held that the state

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No. 14-1901 17

was required at least to make a good faith effort to try Smith 

by asking the federal government to transfer his custody for 

a state trial.

Smith pointed out that the purposes of the speedy trial 

guarantee can apply even to a person being held in custody 

by another sovereign. Undue delay may cause the person to 

lose forever the possibility of at least partially concurrent 

sentences; the conditions of his current custody may be 

harsher than otherwise; the threat of another pending charge 

may be as oppressive as for a person who remains free; and 

long delays can impair a person’s ability to defend against 

the pending charge. Smith, 393 U.S. at 378–79. The Smith

Court did not suggest that its reasoning depended on 

whether the defendant was in federal custody or state custody, or whether the second, pending case was in federal or 

state court. Its reasoning should apply here, where the federal and state roles are reversed.

The majority points out correctly that Smith pushed for a 

speedy state trial, while Richardson made no such effort

here. In my view, that’s the decisive difference between the 

cases, and it’s why I concur in the judgment here. The 

speedy trial issue, however, is better addressed under the 

Barker framework. The majority’s rigid conclusion that the 

speedy trial right does not apply at all here conflicts with the 

reasoning of Smith.

In fact, in the wake of Smith v. Hooey, the Supreme Court 

has applied a standard that is more pragmatic and flexible 

than the majority’s approach. The constitutional right attaches when a defendant is “indicted, arrested, or otherwise officially accused.” United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 6 (1982) 

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(emphasis added), citing United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 

313 (1971); see also Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655.

My colleagues contend that a complaint does not “officially accuse” a person of a crime within the meaning of 

MacDonald, Marion, and Doggett. The complaint itself shows 

that is about as official an accusation as can be imagined that 

is not an indictment or information. (The Supreme Court 

opinions refer to other official accusations as a category distinct from an indictment or federal arrest that were also 

mentioned.) A complaint asserts, under oath, that there is 

probable cause to believe a particular person committed a 

particular crime. It is “a written statement of the essential 

facts constituting the offense charged.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 3. 

The majority points out that a complaint need not be signed 

by a prosecutor, but how is such a specific accusation signed 

under oath by a federal law enforcement officer any less an 

“official accusation” within the meaning of Doggett, MacDonald, or Marion? It is not an indictment or information, but 

it is surely an “official accusation.” A complaint, especially 

when followed by an arrest warrant and detainer, is not 

merely a sign of a pending investigation, as my colleagues 

contend. It makes a quite specific, quite official accusation of 

a federal crime.

At least three other circuits agree with the approach I 

would adopt. In a case indistinguishable from this one, United States v. Thomas, 55 F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 1995), the Fourth Circuit held that the “combination of the criminal complaint, 

the arrest warrant, and the federal detainer were sufficient to 

implicate the speedy trial provision of the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 149, citing Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30 (1970), 

and Smith, 393 U.S. at 377–83. Having determined that the 

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speedy trial right attached, the Thomas court then applied the 

Barker factors and found no violation, largely for the same

reasons Richardson’s claim fails here: the defendant did not 

push for a speedy federal trial, and federal prosecutors reasonably delayed the federal prosecution so that the state 

prosecution could run its course without interference. Id. at 

149–51. That’s the better approach here.

Taking an even broader approach, the Ninth Circuit held 

in United States v. Terrack, 515 F.2d 558, 559 (9th Cir. 1975), 

that a complaint was a sufficiently official “accusation” to 

trigger the defendant’s Sixth Amendment speedy trial right

under the reasoning of Marion. The Ninth Circuit then applied the Barker factors to find no violation where the postcomplaint, pre-indictment delays had been caused first by 

the defendant’s evasion of capture and then by mutual consent during negotiations between the defendant and the 

government. Id. The Ninth Circuit has applied similar reasoning in Northern v. United States, 455 F.2d 427, 429 (9th Cir. 

1972) (filing of federal complaint against defendant in state 

custody triggered Sixth Amendment speedy trial right, but 

defendant’s own efforts to block removal from state custody 

defeated his claim).2

In another similar case, the First Circuit, in United States 

v. Henson, 945 F.2d 430, 437 (1st Cir. 1991), assumed without 

explanation that the issuance of a federal complaint, arrest 

warrant, and detainer for a person in state custody was suf2 There are, however, other Ninth Circuit cases taking a narrower 

approach. See Arnold v. McCarthy, 566 F.2d 1377, 1382 (9th Cir. 1978) 

(speedy trial right engaged by arrest and arraignment, not by earlier 

complaint); Favors v. Eyman, 466 F.2d 1325, 1327–28 (9th Cir. 1972) (same, 

even though defendant was in state custody on unrelated charge).

 

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ficient to trigger the Sixth Amendment speedy trial inquiry, 

though again the Barker factors were applied to find no violation in that case. Id. at 437–39.

As explained above, I think the Supreme Court’s cases 

amply support the approach I have described. But I 

acknowledge that after Smith, in cases presenting Speedy 

Trial Clause issues different from the issue here, some of the 

Supreme Court’s language, including “official accusation,” 

leaves room for debate about its application to this case. See, 

e.g., the majority and dissenting opinions in United States v. 

Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302 (1986) (holding that period after 

dismissal of indictment, during which defendant was not 

under indictment, incarcerated, or subject to substantial restrictions on liberty, did not count toward Speedy Trial 

Clause claim).3

Given this room for argument about the Supreme Court’s 

guidance, we should consider the problem more broadly to 

serve the purposes of the Speedy Trial Clause and to adopt a 

workable rule. The majority offers a pragmatic rationale for 

its broad rule. It is concerned that recognizing a speedy trial 

right under these circumstances would produce “a messy 

3 At page 6, the majority relies on United States v. Clark, 754 F.3d 401, 

405 (7th Cir. 2014), to say that a federal indictment, federal information, 

or federal arrest is necessary to trigger speedy trial concerns. That is correct under the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act, see 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) 

& (c), but that is all that Clark decided. See 754 F.3d at 405–07. Clark did 

not address the Sixth Amendment at all, so its analysis cannot help the 

majority on this point. Despite their common purposes, the constitutional and statutory standards differ as to important details, and we have 

recognized that either provision may be violated without violating the 

other. E.g., United States v. Loera, 565 F.3d 406, 412 (7th Cir. 2009).

 

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clash” between the state and federal governments “with no 

likely benefit to the defendant.” These concerns are real but 

do not justify the sweeping rule adopted by the majority.

They are better managed under the framework of the Barker

factors.

Consider the possible benefit to the defendant. Surely an 

innocent defendant faces the greatest risk of prejudice by delay. Evidence of his innocence may disappear or erode as 

memories fade, records are lost, or witnesses move away.

The majority recognizes the inverse proposition: “For if the 

defendant is guilty there are likely to be more witnesses helpful to the government’s case than to the defendant’s. ... And 

so on average the death, disappearance, forgetfulness, or recantation of a witness will favor the defendant and thus put 

him on the slow side of the case.” Slip op. at 10 (emphasis 

added). That’s probably right, but if the accused is innocent, 

the effects of delay are likely to be exactly the opposite, undermining the ability of the accused to defend himself. Protecting innocent defendants from such unfairness is a core 

purpose of the Sixth Amendment speedy trial right. E.g., 

United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966).

The majority’s concern about a “messy clash” of governments is legitimate but exaggerated. It does not justify the 

majority’s broad rule. Concerns about bureaucratic friction 

certainly should not trump the right of the accused (who is 

presumed innocent) to push for prompt resolution of the 

charge or other official accusation against him. Where a defendant faces both state and federal charges, state and federal prosecutors already must confer and agree on how to proceed. That happens all the time; they typically know each 

other well.

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If a defendant insists, as I think he should be able to after 

official accusations by each government, on speedy trials in 

both cases, the coordination of scheduling is no more difficult a task than state and federal courts accomplish routinely. 

That happens when there are cases involving the same party, 

the same witness, or even the same lawyer. And if the accused is in custody, only minimal paperwork is needed to 

shift custody as needed between the two governments from 

time to time.

To support its concerns about the “messy clash” between 

state and federal prosecutions, the majority draws heavily 

from the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Schreane, 

331 F.3d 548, 554–56 (6th Cir. 2003), but Schreane actually 

supports the approach I would adopt. In Schreane the Sixth 

Amendment speedy trial right had been triggered by the defendant’s federal indictment. His federal prosecution was 

put on hold while a state prosecution went forward to conviction and sentencing. The Sixth Circuit discussed the reasons for the delay, which were obviously legitimate, but it did 

so in the context of applying the Barker factors that I argue should 

be applied here. The same is true of the majority’s other cases, 

United States v. Watford, 468 F.3d 891, 900–03 (6th Cir. 2006), 

and United States v. Grimmond, 137 F.3d 823, 827–29 (4th Cir. 

1998).

In Schreane the Sixth Circuit did not suggest, much less 

hold, that the speedy trial right should never attach because 

of concerns about possible federal-state interference. In

Schreane the defendant made no effort to push for an earlier 

federal trial while his state case was pending, 331 F.3d at 557, 

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so under the approach I advocate, a defendant like Schreane 

would also lose.4

If, on the other hand, a defendant insists on speedy trials 

in both state and federal cases, and if there is actually a good 

reason for one prosecution to wait for the other to finish in 

the particular case, the Barker framework will accommodate 

this concern, as in Schreane and Thomas. See United States v. 

Thomas, 55 F.3d at 150–51 (federal prosecutors reasonably 

delayed the federal prosecution to decrease safety risks and 

administrative costs, which favored finding no violation of 

defendant’s constitutional speedy trial right under Barker

reason-for-delay factor).

The majority virtually concedes the risk posed by its approach, acknowledging the “potential for prejudice to a defendant caught between two sovereigns,” and describing a 

scenario where three years lapse between the filing of a federal complaint, affidavit of probable cause, and detainer and 

the federal indictment. The majority also recognizes that this 

situation might seriously prejudice the defense. Under its 

approach, though, the speedy trial guarantee would not offer any protection at all to a defendant caught in this snare. 

The majority suggests a potential solution: the defendant 

could bring a due process challenge instead.

4 One odd feature of Schreane was that the defendant apparently did 

not learn of his federal indictment until after he had been sentenced in 

state court and moved to a state prison. 331 F.3d at 557. If he had known 

earlier and had still failed to seek a speedy federal trial, the Sixth Circuit 

said that the third Barker factor would “weigh heavily against him.” Id. 

That is Richardson’s situation, as I view this case.

 

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But why force a square peg into a round hole? After an 

“official accusation,” the speedy trial right should apply. The 

speedy trial cases and the Barker factors offer a framework 

that is tailor-made to address the issues that can arise. The 

due process approach does not. In fact, it’s telling that none 

of the cases cited by the majority have actually found a due 

process violation on such facts. See United States v. Lovasco, 

431 U.S. 783, 796 (1977) (“We therefore hold that to prosecute 

a defendant following investigative delay does not deprive 

him of due process, even if his defense might have been somewhat prejudiced by the lapse of time.”) (emphasis added); United 

States v. Zukowski, 851 F.2d 174, 178 (7th Cir. 1988) (suggesting that due process is more appropriate challenge but finding no due process violation because pre-indictment delay 

did not prejudice defendant); United States v. Samples, 713 

F.2d 298, 302 (7th Cir. 1983) (no due process violation where 

defendant challenged twenty-month delay between dismissal of first indictment and re-indictment). The majority emphasizes Pharm v. Hatcher, 984 F.2d 783 (7th Cir. 1993), as 

support for this potential solution, but Pharm stated flatly: 

“The Due Process Clause ... plays only a limited role in protecting against oppressive prosecutorial delay. In fact, we 

have never found pre-accusation delay rising to the level of a 

constitutional violation.” Id. at 786 (citation omitted). On 

closer inspection, the due process cases do not offer much of 

a solution to these concerns.5

5 The strongest support for the majority’s approach seems to come 

from United States v. Zukowski, 851 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1988), where the 

defendant was in federal prison on tax charges. He escaped but was arrested a few weeks later and transferred back to federal prison. He was 

indicted about twenty months later on an escape charge. Zukowski argued that his Sixth Amendment speedy trial right was violated by the 

 

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The better solution is to recognize that a federal complaint and arrest warrant filed under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 3 and 4 add up to an “official accusation” of a 

crime that starts the Sixth Amendment speedy trial clock, at 

least where the suspect is in state custody and subject to a 

federal detainer. Richardson has not established a violation 

of his speedy trial right, but we should not foreclose the possibility that another defendant could.

delay between his arrest after the escape and his indictment for the escape. We rejected that argument, holding that Zukowski’s Sixth 

Amendment right to a speedy trial “did not attach until he was indicted 

for the escape charge.” Id. at 178.

Zukowski is factually distinguishable. There, neither a criminal complaint nor an arrest warrant had been filed in connection with the escape. 

Id. at 176. In fact, the only document that had been issued was a “Notice 

of Escaped Prisoner,” which had “no legal effect.” Id. at 177. We noted 

that this document was “informational only” and did not “purport to 

order or authorize an arrest of the subject.” Id. Unlike here, there had 

been no official accusation. And if we were to ignore this important factual difference, it would be difficult to reconcile Zukowski with the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Smith, 393 U.S. at 378–80, and the “official 

accusation” language in MacDonald, Marion, and Doggett.

 

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