Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-02984/USCOURTS-ca7-14-02984-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Milwaukee
Appellee
Martin Gonzalez
Appellant

Document Text:

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 14-2984 

MARTIN GONZALEZ, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

CITY OF MILWAUKEE, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Wisconsin. 

No. 11-C-1070 — Lynn Adelman, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED APRIL 1, 2015 — DECIDED JUNE 26, 2015 

____________________ 

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and FLAUM, Circuit Judge, and 

KENNELLY, District Judge.

FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Martin Gonzalez was a police officer for the City of Milwaukee from 1995 until 2011. He was 

discharged from his employment with the City following an 

 Hon. Matthew F. Kennelly of the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by 

designation.

 

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2 No. 14-2984 

incident in January 2011 in which he failed to report for 

work. Gonzalez is Caucasian and worked in a predominately African-American police district in Milwaukee, District 4. 

Gonzalez alleges that he was discharged because of his race 

in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of 

the City of Milwaukee after denying Gonzalez’s motion to 

compel discovery, in which he specifically requested that the 

City turn over a District 4 “climate survey.” Gonzalez now 

appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to compel. 

We affirm. 

I. Background 

Martin Gonzalez was hired by the City of Milwaukee as a 

police officer in 1995. At some point prior to January 2011 (it 

is unclear precisely when), Gonzalez was transferred to District 4.1 Between March 2009 and March 2011, Gonzalez was 

disciplined on seven different occasions for various misbehaviors, including: “failure ... to abide by the ordinances in 

another jurisdiction,” “idling and loafing,” “causing damage 

to department property and ... fail[ing] to report to [a] supervisor,” “fail[ing] to be courteous toward the public ... 

and ... officiously interfering in the private business of another,” “failing to fully investigate a crime,” and “fail[ing] to 

promptly and thoroughly investigate and report a crime.” 

Aff. of Franklin Gayle in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. 1–

1 Gonzalez states that he was hired in 1995, and “began experiencing 

workplace problems roughly fourteen years later, after having been 

transferred to District 4.” Br. of Pl. Appellant Martin Gonzalez 1.

 

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No. 14-2984 3

2. Gonzalez received discipline ranging from an official reprimand to a ten-day suspension for these infractions. 

On January 28, 2011, Gonzalez requested to be off from 

work on January 30, but his request was denied. Gonzalez 

then submitted a request to switch shifts with another officer, and he informally arranged for another officer to take 

his shift. Gonzalez’s formal request, however, was neither 

approved nor denied. Gonzalez did not report to work on 

the 30th, but neither did his replacement. Gonzalez’s supervising sergeant, Sergeant Flowers, called Gonzalez several 

times on the morning of the 30th, but could not reach him. 

Sergeant Flowers also could not locate an approved replacement form on file. When Gonzalez eventually returned 

Sergeant Flowers’s phone call, Sergeant Flowers ordered 

Gonzalez to report to work. Gonzalez told Sergeant Flowers 

that he was at an event with his daughter and that he did not 

have transportation. Gonzalez did not report to work on 

January 30, thereby disobeying Sergeant Flowers’s direct order to do so. 

Following this incident, Captain O’Leary, Sergeant Flowers’s supervisor, referred the matter to the Professional Performance Division (PPD) (i.e., internal affairs) for investigation. Following the PPD investigation, Chief of Police Edward Flynn discharged Gonzalez on April 6, 2011. Gonzalez 

subsequently requested a due process hearing under Wis. 

Stat. § 62.50(17), which was held on September 28 before the 

Fire and Police Commission (FPC). At this hearing, Gonzalez 

had the opportunity to present and cross-examine witnesses. 

The FPC then issued a decision sustaining Gonzalez’s discharge, finding that there was substantial evidence to support the termination. 

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Gonzalez states that the environment of District 4 

“turned hostile toward non-African Americans” after Chief 

Flynn promoted Captain O’Leary—who is AfricanAmerican—and assigned O’Leary to District 4. Gonzalez argues that he overheard Captain O’Leary refer to District 4 as 

his “chocolate city,” and mention that he wanted District 4 to 

be a “chocolate island.” Gonzalez alleges that Sergeant 

Flowers—who is also African-American—made similar 

comments. Gonzalez contends that Captain O’Leary transferred a number of Caucasian officers out of District 4, but 

transferred almost no African-American officers out of the 

District. The City of Milwaukee contends that Gonzalez’s 

claims about transfers are factually inaccurate. 

Gonzalez further alleges that in District 4, Captain 

O’Leary and Sergeant Flowers treated Caucasian officers differently than African-American officers. Specifically, Gonzalez alleges that Caucasian officers were scrutinized more 

closely than African-American officers, and that Sergeant 

Flowers would “talk down” to Caucasian officers by saying 

things like, “what are you doing here at the station?”, “why 

aren’t you working?”, and “get out of my station.” Gonzalez 

further claims that Caucasian officers were frequently singled out for not completing their reports faster, whereas African-American officers were not. Gonzalez also claims that 

Caucasian officers were frequently told to finish their reports 

at a later time and to get back on the street, while AfricanAmerican officers were permitted to work on their reports 

without comment. 

To aid his claim of racial discrimination, Gonzalez refers 

to a comparator officer—Officer Truman Dodd—to support 

his allegation that he was treated unfairly following the JanCase: 14-2984 Document: 24 Filed: 06/26/2015 Pages: 11
No. 14-2984 5

uary 30 incident. Officer Dodd is African-American, also 

works in District 4, and was also under the supervision of 

Captain O’Leary during the relevant time period. On March 

24, 2011, Officer Dodd notified the late shift lieutenant that 

he was boarding a plane because his daughter had been in a 

school bus accident in Atlanta, and he was going there to be 

with her. Officer Dodd informed the late shift lieutenant that 

he, therefore, would not be able to make his noon shift. 

When Officer Dodd did not report to work, his noon shift 

lieutenant called him to find out where he was (apparently 

the late shift lieutenant had not conveyed the information), 

and Officer Dodd explained the situation. The noon shift 

lieutenant advised Officer Dodd that he should have called 

again to update the department about his status, but he was 

not disciplined. Captain O’Leary determined that Officer 

Dodd would not be paid for the day of work that he missed, 

and that he would be granted three discretionary days off. 

Prior to March 24, Officer Dodd did not have any history of 

disciplinary actions. 

On November 8, 2011, Gonzalez filed a complaint against 

the City of Milwaukee, the Milwaukee Police Department, 

and the Milwaukee Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 

alleging claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 

1964, and the Equal Protection Clause, as well as claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. The district court dismissed 

both the Milwaukee Police Department and the Milwaukee 

Board of Fire & Police Commissioners from the suit in April 

2012. After several extensions of the discovery deadline, the 

district court set the final discovery deadline for May 30, 

2013, and the deadline for dispositive motions for June 15 

(written discovery closed earlier on October 15, 2012). On 

June 14, 2013, Gonzalez filed a motion to compel discovery 

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requesting, among other things, a document that the parties 

refer to as a “climate survey” of District 4 (as we will discuss 

in detail below, neither party fully explains what is contained in this survey or when it was conducted). In his motion to compel, Gonzalez claimed that he had, earlier in the 

discovery process, requested: 

Any and all documents that relate to or pertain 

to any complaints of discrimination from January 2, 2005 to the present, including Plaintiff’s 

complaint of discrimination, against Defendant, including those documents relating to investigations conducted by Defendant into 

complaints of discrimination against Defendant. 

Pl.’s Mot. to Compel Disc. and Supporting Mem. of Law 18. 

At some point after this original request, it seems, Gonzalez 

became aware of the District 4 climate survey (although it is 

unclear exactly how or when). Referencing this discovery 

and his request, Gonzalez stated in his motion to compel: 

Plaintiff asked for additional information about 

investigations into discrimination. Defendant 

acknowledges the existence of an investigation 

into discrimination at District 4. However, Defendant now refuses to provide any information about the investigation because “the 

request is untimely and does not tie back to 

any original discovery demand ... .” 

Id. at 19. The City responded to Gonzalez’s motion to compel, stating the following about the climate survey: 

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No. 14-2984 7

On May 8, 2013 (past the written discovery 

deadline), Plaintiff’s counsel asked for a copy 

of an open discrimination investigation at District 4. While this is the District that Gonzalez 

worked in, he incorrectly assumed that this investigation was about a “discrimination complaint.” The request was untimely and does 

not tie back to request number 26 because it is 

not a “discrimination” complaint, but a “climate survey investigation,” it post-dates Gonzalez’s termination, and he no longer works 

there or has participated in “the climate” for 

over two years. 

Resp. Br. in Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. to Compel 10. 

It is undisputed that Gonzalez first made a specific request for this survey on May 8, 2013,2 which was past the 

deadline for written discovery, but before the deadline for 

all other discovery and before the deadline for dispositive 

motions. It is also apparent that Gonzalez attempted to procure this survey through an open records request on May 22. 

The City of Milwaukee denied this request, citing the fact 

that the request involved an open investigation. On July 15, 

the City moved for summary judgment on all of Gonzalez’s 

claims. On July 30, the district court denied Gonzalez’s motion to compel production of the climate survey, but gave 

2 In his opening brief, Gonzalez states that he first became aware of the 

climate survey in March 2013. However, Gonzalez clarifies in his reply 

brief that this was an error, and that he did not request the survey until 

May 2013.

 

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Gonzalez until September 13, 2013 to take any depositions, 

related to the survey or otherwise. The district court subsequently denied the City’s summary judgment motion without prejudice on August 9, 2013, and allowed it to refile its 

motion on October 1, 2013. On August 14, 2014, the district 

court granted summary judgment in favor of the City on all 

of Gonzalez’s claims. Gonzalez appealed the district court’s 

summary judgment ruling, as well as the district court’s denial of his motion to compel discovery. At oral argument, 

however, Gonzalez conceded that his appeal of the district 

court’s summary judgment ruling, on the current record, 

lacked merit and abandoned all arguments to the contrary. 

(Gonzalez implicitly argues that if we reverse the district 

court’s denial of his motion to compel and permit discovery 

of the climate survey, the survey will provide him with sufficient information to support his discrimination claims so 

as to survive summary judgment.) Thus, we will only address the district court’s denial of Gonzalez’s motion to 

compel. 

II. Discussion 

We review a district court’s decision to deny a motion to 

compel for abuse of discretion. James v. Hyatt Regency Chi., 

707 F.3d 775, 784 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Kalis v. ColgatePalmolive Co., 231 F.3d 1049, 1056 (7th Cir. 2000)). We will 

only reverse a district court’s ruling after a clear showing 

that the denial of discovery resulted in actual and substantial 

prejudice. Id. (citing Packman v. Chi. Tribune Co., 267 F.3d 628, 

646 (7th Cir. 2001)). 

Gonzalez argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to compel because “the relevancy 

of [the climate survey] is so obvious that there is little need 

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No. 14-2984 9

to further belabor the matter.” Br. of Pl. Appellant Martin 

Gonzalez 18. Gonzalez seems to rest his claim of discrimination on the theory that the environment of District 4 was 

“hostile” to non–African Americans, and that this led to a 

pattern of Caucasian police officers being scrutinized more 

closely and disciplined more severely than AfricanAmerican officers; this environment, Gonzalez claims, ultimately led to his termination. He bolsters this theory by 

pointing to statements made by other officers in District 4 

echoing similar concerns, as well as comparator evidence 

involving Officer Dodd. It would seem, then, that a survey 

about the climate or environment of District 4 might further 

support Gonzalez’s claim of widespread discriminatory discipline and treatment in District 4. 

However, Gonzalez’s request for the climate survey was 

made after the close of written discovery. He does not explain the lateness of his request, and the district court did 

not abuse its discretion in overruling his contention that the 

request was encompassed within his earlier request for documents relating to complaints of discrimination. (We have, 

in previous cases, considered the lateness of a discovery request in concluding that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying a motion to compel discovery material. 

See Packman, 267 F.3d at 647.) Additionally, very little is 

known about the discovery that Gonzalez seeks, making it 

difficult to analyze the extent to which he was prejudiced by 

its non-disclosure, if at all. We do not know, precisely, when 

or why this survey was conducted.3 We do not know wheth3 The only indication regarding the timing of the climate survey is the 

City of Milwaukee’s statement in its response to Gonzalez’s motion to 

 

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10 No. 14-2984 

er the survey is still ongoing, or whether it has concluded. 

And other than knowing that the survey involves the “climate” of District 4, we know very little about the survey’s 

substance.4 While one could argue that the reason we know 

so little about the survey is precisely because the district 

court denied Gonzalez’s motion to compel, it is also apparent that Gonzalez neglected to use all available avenues to 

find out more specific information about the climate survey, 

which may have aided him in his request, or at the very least 

his arguments on appeal. For example, Gonzalez could have 

taken advantage of the district court’s ruling allowing him to 

take any depositions through September 13, 2013 in order to 

find out more about the survey and whether it was relevant 

to his claims. He did not do so, nor does he explain this lack 

of diligence. As a result, we are left to only speculate about 

the contents of the climate survey and its potential impact on 

Gonzalez’s case. Thus, Gonzalez does not demonstrate how 

the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion 

to compel, nor does he satisfy the prejudice requirement. 

compel that the survey was conducted two years after Gonzalez’s discharge from the department. See Resp. Br. in Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. to Compel 10. 

4 Gonzalez represents that he learned through his open records request 

that the survey “was initiated by Sergeant Sebastian Raclaw of the Professional Performance Division [PPD] and pertained to the experiences 

of District 4 officers with the supervision and leadership of Captain Jerome O’Leary ... . It also reveals the survey pertained to an investigation 

of a possible criminal offense or misconduct by O’Leary.” Reply Br. of Pl. 

Appellant Martin Gonzalez 4–5.

 

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No. 14-2984 11

Given the lateness of Gonzalez’s request, his lack of diligence in obtaining information about the climate survey, as 

well as his inability to show how he was prejudiced by the 

district court’s ruling, we find that the district court did not 

abuse its discretion in denying Gonzalez’s motion to compel 

discovery. 

III. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s 

denial of Gonzalez’s motion to compel discovery. 

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