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Parties Involved:
Howard Electrical & Mechanical, Inc.
Respondent
National Labor Relations Board
Petitioner

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, 

Petitioner, 

FILED 

United Statez Co·m; of Appeals ~ .... . .. ,.~ .. r t: ••. ~,.,~4-

APR 2 6 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

vs. 

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) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 89-9532 

(NLRB 27CA-8889-2) 

HOWARD ELECTRICAL & MECHANICAL, 

INC., 

Respondent. 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before BALDOCK, McWILLIAMS, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

The National Labor Relations Board (Board) seeks enforcement 

of its order finding appellant Howard Electrical & Mechanical, 

Inc. (Howard) liable for unfair labor practices in its dealings 

with Plumbers Local Union No. 3 (plumbers) and Pipefitters Local 

Union No. 208 (pipefitters). Howard challenges the Board's order 

on three grounds. Our jurisdiction arises under 29 u.s.c. 

SS 160(e) & (f). We find Howard's arguments without merit and 

enforce the Board's order. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of law of the 

case, res judicata, or collateral estoppal. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-9532 Document: 010110105184 Date Filed: 04/26/1991 Page: 1 
I. 

Howard is an electrical and mechanical contractor engaged in 

the building and construction trade in the Denver, Colorado 

vicinity. The plumbers and pipefitters comprise separate 

bargaining units representing plumbers, gas fitters, pipefitters 

and various foremen employed by Howard. Howard was signatory to a 

multi-employer collective bargaining agreement with the plumbers 

and pipefitters. This agreement recognized the two unions as the 

exclusive bargaining representatives for journeyman and apprentice 

plumbers, gas fitters and pipefitters. The agreement, which 

expired on May 31, 1983, set hourly wage rates and governed 

employer contributions to health and pension funds. 

In September 1982, Howard withdrew from the multi-employer 

organization and commenced individual parallel negotiations with 

the plumbers and pipefitters. In March 1983, Howard proposed that 

the bargaining units described in the recognition clause of the 

agreements be modified to exclude "pre-apprentices" who lacked the 

skills of journeymen, but would be assigned to perform work under 

the direction of a journeyman. Howard sought to exclude this new 

class of pre-apprentice employees from union security and hiring 

hall provisions, compensate them at a rate lower than unit 

employees and exclude them from certain fringe benefits. Howard 

and the unions met in several negotiating sessions in 1983, but 

were unable to agree on this proposal. In December 1983, Howard 

resubmitted its pre-apprentice proposal to the two unions 

characterizing the proposal as its "final" or "last" offer and 

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Appellate Case: 89-9532 Document: 010110105184 Date Filed: 04/26/1991 Page: 2 
•' informing the unions that it intended to implement this offer 

effective January 1, 1984. Howard and the pipefitters continued 

to negotiate throughout January 1984, but were unable to reach 

agreement. Howard then asserted that negotiations were in a state 

of impasse and expressed its intention to implement unilaterally 

its latest offer. In April 1984, Howard hired its first preapprentice pipefitter without utilizing the union hiring hall; the 

first pre-apprentice plumber was hired the following month in the 

same manner. Negotiations continued in June 1984, whereupon 

Howard presented an additional proposal which it implemented 

unilaterally after the parties failed to reach agreement. 

The pipefitters and plumbers filed unfair labor practice 

charges against Howard between July 24 and August 28, 1984, 

alleging, inter alia, that Howard committed an unfair labor 

practice by arguing to impasse on its pre-apprentice proposal and 

implementing unilaterally the proposal without union consent. The 

administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that the six-month 

limitations period was triggered by Howard's announcement in 

December 1983, that it intended to implement its pre-apprentice 

proposal, not when it actually hired the first pre-apprentices in 

April-May 1984. The ALJ also determined that, if Howard committed 

an unfair labor practice when it hired the pre-apprentice 

employees, then Howard necessarily committed an unfair labor 

practice the previous December, a time frame outside the six-month 

limitations period. Consequently, the ALJ determined that the 

action was time-barred. On appeal, the Board reversed the ALJ, 

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. I 

t 

concluding that Howard violated§ 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National 

Labor Relations Act (Act), 29 u.s.c. §§ 158(a)(5) & (1), by 

changing unilaterally the scope of the bargaining unit without the 

unions' consent. Howard Elec. & Mech., 293 N.L.R.B. No. 51 at 11-

12 (1989). Rejecting the analysis of the ALJ, the Board 

determined that Howard's actual implementation of the preapprentice proposal in April-May 1984, not its expression of 

intent to implement its proposal in December 1983, formed the 

triggering date for the six-month statute of limitations; thus the 

action was not time-barred. Id. at 9-10. The Board also 

concluded that Howard violated§ 8(a)(5) when it implemented its 

June 1984 contract proposals without bargaining in good faith and 

without obtaining the unions' consent. Id. at 12-13. 

II. 

Howard challenges the Board's order on three grounds: 1) the 

action was commenced outside the six-month limitation period, 2) 

insufficient evidence supports the Board's finding that Howard 

committed an unfair labor practice, and 3) the Board contravened 

its own precedent in bringing an unfair labor practices action 

against Howard in the absence of certification of the unions' 

majority status. We review orders of the National Labor Relations 

Board to determine whether "the Board correctly applied the law 

and if its findings are supported by substantial evidence in the 

record as a whole." Glazers Local Union No. 558 v. NLRB, 787 F.2d 

1406, 1411 (10th Cir. 1986). 

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• 

A. 

Section lO(b) of the Act provides that "no complaint shall 

issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six 

months prior to the filing of the charge with the Board. II 

29 u.s.c. § 160(b). In Local Lodge No. 1424, Int'l Ass'n of Mach. 

v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411 (1960), the Supreme Court held that, 

although the Board may consider conduct occurring more than six 

months prior to the alleged unfair labor practice, it may not rely 

upon the time-barred conduct in establishing the elements of a 

violation. Id. at 415. Rather, the unfair labor practice must be 

established by conduct which, "standing alone," falls within the 

statutory period. Id. The Court explained: 

[I]n applying rules of evidence as to the admissibility 

of past events, due regard for the purposes of§ lO(b) 

requires that two different kinds of situations be 

distinguished. The first is one where occurrences 

within the six-month limitations period in and of 

themselves may constitute, as a substantive matter, 

unfair labor practices. There, earlier events may be 

utilized to shed light on the true character of matters 

occurring within the limitations period; and for that 

purpose§ lO(b) ordinarily does not bar such evidentiary 

use of anterior events. The second situation is that 

where conduct occurring within the limitations period 

can be charged to be an unfair labor practice only 

through reliance on an earlier unfair labor practice. 

There the use of the earlier unfair labor practice is 

not merely "evidentiary," since it does not simply lay 

bare a putative current unfair labor practice. Rather 

it serves to cloak with illegality that which was 

otherwise lawful. And where a complaint based upon that 

earlier event is time-barred, to permit the event itself 

to be so used in effect results in reviving a legally 

defunct unfair labor practice. 

Id. at 416-17 (footnote omitted). The six-month limitations 

period under§ lO(b) is not triggered by a party's notice that it 

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• 

intends to commit an unfair labor practice; the clock does not 

commence to run until the alleged unfair labor practice actually 

is committed. American Distrib. Co. v. NLRB, 715 F.2d 446, 452 

(9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 958 (1984). 

In the instant case, Howard contends that the Board should 

have concluded that, for purposes of§ lO(b), Howard's alleged 

unfair labor practice was committed in December 1983, when Howard 

announced its intention to implement its pre-apprentice proposal 

after bargaining to impasse. The date on which Howard gave notice 

of its intention to commit an unfair labor practice, however, is 

irrelevant because the Board found that Howard violated§ 8(a)(5) 

when it implemented its pre-apprentice proposal in April-May 1984. 

Although Howard also may have violated the Act in December 1983, 

when it pressed its pre-apprentice proposal to impasse, its 

unilateral implementation of this proposal during spring 1984, 

"standing alone," was sufficient independently to establish a 

violation of§ 8(a)(5). See Local Lodge No. 1424, 362 U.S. at 

415. 

B. 

Collective bargaining under the Act is divided into two 

primary subject areas: mandatory and permissive. Facet Enter. v. 

NLRB, 907 F.2d 963, 975 (10th Cir. 1990). Wages, hours and 

working conditions comprise mandatory subjects of bargaining; 

permissive subjects cover all other areas. Id. Thus, the scope 

of a bargaining unit constitutes a permissive subject of 

bargaining. Id. Either party to labor negotiations may bargain 

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• 

to impasse1 over a mandatory subject of bargaining and take 

reasonable unilateral action once impasse is reached, provided the 

previous contract has expired. Trustees of Colo. Pipe Indus. 

Pension Trust v. Howard Elec., 909 F.2d 1379, 1383-84 (10th Cir. 

1990), cert. denied, 111 s. Ct. 958 (1991). On the other hand, an 

employer who bargains to impasse and then takes unilateral action 

on the scope of the bargaining unit violates§ 8(a)(5), regardless 

of whether the unit previously has been certified by the Board. 

Facet, 907 F.2d at 975 (employer violated§ 8(a)(5) by insisting 

to impasse on permissive subject of bargaining and unilaterally 

implementing proposal once impasse was reached). 

In the instant case, the record contains substantial evidence 

that Howard sought to alter the bargaining unit by introducing a 

new class of non-union, pre-apprentice employees to perform work 

formally done by unit employees. There was nothing wrong with 

advancing this proposal initially; however, as a permissive 

subject of bargaining, the unions were not obligated to bargain 

over it. Thus, unlike a mandatory bargaining issue such as wages, 

hours or working conditions, Howard was not free to implement 

unilaterally its pre-apprentice proposal upon impasse. 

Accordingly, Howard violated§ 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act when it 

hired its pre-apprentice plumbers and pipefitters in April-May, 

1 An "impasse" in labor negotiations exists when the parties 

have exhausted all possibility of concluding an agreement and 

further negotiations would be futile. Trustees of Colo. Pipe 

Indus. Pension Trust v. Howard Elec. & Mech., 909 F.2d 1397, 1981 

n.2 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 s. Ct. 958 (1991). 

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• 

1984, without the unions' consent, as well as when it implemented 

its June proposals unilaterally. See id. 

c. 

Howard finally contends that the Board ignored its own 

precedent in John Dekleva & Sons, 282 NLRB 1375 (1987), enf'd sub 

nom. 843 F.2d 770 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 889 (1988), 

when it found that Howard committed unfair labor practices by 

unilaterally altering the bargaining unit after expiration of the 

collective bargaining agreement. Dekleva overturned the 

"conversion doctrine" under which building trade unions who were 

signatories to a 29 u.s.c. § 158(f) pre-hire agreement could 

evolve into 29 u.s.c. § 159(a) exclusive bargaining 

representatives without having their majority status established 

through election and Board certification. Prior to the Board's 

decision in Dekleva, Howard stipulated that both unions were 

exclusive bargaining representatives of their respective units 

under§ 159(a). After Dekleva, Howard argued before the Board 

that it was not obligated to recognize the plumbers and 

pipefitters as exclusive bargaining representatives in the 

post-contract period because neither union had its majority status 

certified through a Board-sponsored election. Noting that Howard 

never argued the effect of Dekleva before the ALJ, despite the 

fact that the decision was handed down a month before the ALJ's 

decision issued, the Board declined to consider Howard's argument 

because it was untimely. Howard Elec., slip op. at 5 n.5. 

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, 

I 

Even where a subsequent decision totally .reverses a prior 

practice, this court is reluctant to permit an untimely challenge 

to the Board's determination. Osteopathic Hosp. Founder Ass'n. v. 

NLRB, 618 F.2d 633, 641 (1980). In the instant case, we are 

reluctant to consider Howard's untimely reliance on Dekleva 

because Howard's unilateral implementation of its pre-apprentice 

proposal was totally unrelated to its present belief that the 

unions were not exclusive bargaining representatives. See id. at 

641 n.7. Moreover, Howard had a full month to argue the effect of 

Dekleva before the ALJ or move to reopen the proceeding to 

consider evidence on the unions' majority status. We must 

therefore conclude that the Board acted within its discretion in 

holding that Howard's failure timely to raise Dekleva before the 

ALJ precluded consideration of that issue for the first time on 

review. See Jason/Empire, Inc. v. NLRB, 518 F.2d 7, 8 (10th Cir. 

1975) (per curiam) (Board has discretion to refuse to consider 

issues not timely raised). 

ENFORCEMENT GRANTED. 

Entered for the Court 

Bobby R. Baldock 

Circuit Judge 

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