Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-14-03160/USCOURTS-ca8-14-03160-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Shawn Olson
Appellant
Push, Inc.
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of fAppeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-3160

___________________________

Shawn Olson

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Push, Inc.

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis

____________

 Submitted: July 1, 2015

Filed: February 22, 2016

[Unpublished]

____________

Before SHEPHERD, BYE, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

____________

PER CURIAM.

In this action that was removed based on diversity jurisdiction, Minnesota

resident Shawn Olson appeals the dismissal of his complaint under Minnesota law

against Push, Inc. (Push), a Wisconsin corporation. Upon careful review, and for the

reasons set forth below, we reverse the dismissal, and we remand the case to the

district court for further proceedings. 

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In February 2014, a Push representative called Olson and offered him a job

with Push in West Virginia, which he accepted. Olson underwent a pre-employment

drug test at a clinic in Minnesota, and started working for Push in West Virginia three

days later. When the drug test came back as “diluted” five days later, Push treated it

as a positive result, and terminated Olson’s employment. 

Olson initially brought this action in Minnesota state court, alleging that Push

had violated a provision of the Minnesota Drug and Alcohol Testing in the

Workplace Act (DATWA), Minn. Stat. § 181.950 et seq. As relevant, DATWA

prohibits an employer from terminating an employee based on a first positive result

of an employer-requested drug or alcohol test, unless the employer has first verified

the result by a confirmatory test, and given the employee an opportunity to participate

in a counseling or rehabilitation program. See id. § 181.953 subdiv. 10. DATWA

defines “employer” as “a person or entity located or doing business in [Minnesota]

and having one or more employees.” See id. § 181.950 subdiv. 7. “Employee” is

defined as “a person . . . who performs services for compensation, in whatever form,

for an employer.” See id. § 181.950 subdiv. 6.

After Push removed the action based on diversity jurisdiction, the district court

dismissed Olson’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be

granted. More specifically, although Push conceded that it did businessin Minnesota,

the district court interpreted “doing business,” as used in DATWA, to include only

“relevant business--namely, the employment for which [the entity]is conducting drug

testing,” and concluded that “doing business” should not be construed as a “broad,

stand-alone qualification that applies to any employer who conducts any amount of

business in Minnesota, regardless of where the employment is taking place.” The

district court also found that construing DATWA to apply to Olson’s out-of-state

employment would invite absurd or unjust results in light of other requirements

DATWA imposes on employers. The district court thus concluded that DATWA did

not apply to Push as an employer, under the facts of this case.

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We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim, as well as its interpretation and application of state law. See Levy v.

Ohl, 477 F.3d 988, 991 (8th Cir. 2007); see also Nolles v. State Comm. for

Reorganization of Sch. Dists., 524 F.3d 892, 901 (8th Cir. 2008). We look to

Minnesota law to decide the merits of this diversity case, see Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,

304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938), and because this case presents a matter of first impression,

we must predict, to the best of our ability, how the Supreme Court of Minnesota

would decide the case, see Sloan v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 368 F.3d 853, 856 (8th

Cir. 2004). In so doing, we consider relevant state precedent, analogous decisions,

considered dicta, and any other reliable data; and we are bound by Minnesota’s rules

of statutory construction. See HOK Sport, Inc. v. FC Des Moines, L.C., 495 F.3d

927, 935 (8th Cir. 2007); Gershman v. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, PA, 251 F.3d 1159,

1162 (8th Cir. 2001). In Minnesota, the goal of statutory interpretation is “to

ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” See Minn. Stat. § 645.16.

 

“[W]hen the legislature’s intent is clear from plain and unambiguous statutory

language, [the Supreme Court of Minnesota] ‘does not engage in any further

construction and instead looks to the plain meaning of the statutory language.’” State

v. Bluhm, 676 N.W.2d 649, 651 (Minn. 2004) (quoting State v. Wukawitz, 662

N.W.2d 517, 525 (Minn. 2003)); see also Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (“[W]hen the words

of a law in their application to an existing situation are clear and free from all

ambiguity, the letter of the law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing

the spirit.”). A Minnesota statute is ambiguous only when “the language therein is

subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.” Amaral v. Saint Cloud Hosp.,

598 N.W.2d 379, 384 (Minn. 1999). We conclude that DATWA’s broad definition

of “employer” clearly and unambiguously includes all entities “doing business in”

Minnesota, and that Push, which conceded that it does business in Minnesota, falls

within that definition. See Minn. Stat. § 645.08(1) (statutory definitions are to be

given controlling effect, unless their observance would involve construction

inconsistent with manifest intent of legislature, or repugnant to context of statute). 

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DATWA contains no language limiting its application only to drug testing of those

employees whose employment is directlyrelated to an employer’s Minnesota business

activities;rather, the legislature drafted DATWA broadly to encompass all employers

that are located in Minnesota, and all employers that conduct business in Minnesota. 

We also note that the Supreme Court of Minnesota would not read into a statute a

requirement that the legislature has purposely orinadvertently omitted; thus, contrary

to the district court’s interpretation, we decline to read into DATWA’s statutory

definition of “employer” a requirement that there be a nexus between the drug testing

and “relevant business.” See Premier Bank v. Becker Dev., LLC, 785 N.W.2d 753,

760 (Minn. 2010) (Minnesota rules ofstatutory construction “forbid adding words or

meaning to a statute” that legislature purposely omitted or inadvertently overlooked,

unless legislature’s silence on topic causes ambiguity); cf. Hertz Corp. v. State Farm

Mut. Ins. Co., 573 N.W.2d 686, 689 (Minn. 1998) (rejecting proposed interpretation

that would have created practical exception to broad statutory mandate because, inter

alia, exception was nowhere evident in statutory language). We further note that

DATWA is remedial in nature, which warrants a liberal construction in favor of the

remedies the statute provides. Cf. Hansen v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc., 813 N.W.2d 906,

916 (Minn. 2012) (statutes which are remedial in nature are generally entitled to

liberal construction, in favor of remedy provided by law, or in favor of those entitled

to benefits of statute).

A comparative review of other Minnesota employee-protection statutes

supports our conclusion. See Minn. Stat. § 645.16(5) (intention of legislature may

be ascertained by considering, inter alia, “other laws upon the same or similar

subjects”); Harris v. Cnty. of Hennepin, 679 N.W.2d 728, 732 (Minn. 2004)

(Minnesota statutesshould be read as a whole with other statutes addressing the same

subject). As previously indicated, the legislature did not limit DATWA’s statutory

definition of “employer,” except to require that the employer be located in, or that it

conduct business in, the State of Minnesota. By contrast, in legislation providing

employees the right to review and dispute their personnel records, the Minnesota

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legislature defined “employee” as “a person who performs services for hire for an

employer, provided that the services have been performed predominately within

[Minnesota],” see Minn. Stat. § 181.960 subdiv. 2; in the Minnesota Genetic Testing

in Employment Act, the legislature defined “employer” as “any person having one or

more employees in Minnesota,” and “employee” as “a person who performs services

for hire in Minnesota for an employer,” see Minn. Stat. § 181.974 subdiv. 1; and in

the Minnesota Human Rights Act, the legislature defined “employee” as “an

individual who is employed by an employer and who resides or works in

[Minnesota],” see Minn. Stat. § 363A.03 subdiv. 15. The Minnesota legislature has

thus demonstrated that it knows how to use qualifying language to define terms such

as “employer” and “employee” narrowly. It has also shown that it knows how to

distinguish between classes of employers and employees based on an express,

statutorilydefined relationship, orlack thereof, between the relevant employment and

the employer’s Minnesota business activities. See City of Brainerd v. Brainerd Invs.

P’ship, 827 N.W.2d 752, 756 (Minn. 2013) (inclusion of language in one statute may

demonstrate opposite intent in other statutes wherein legislature could have, but did

not, include same language); cf. State v. Wenthe, No. A12-0263, 2015 WL 3875366,

at *9 (Minn. June 24, 2015) (it is inappropriate to assume that legislature intended

scope ofstatute to be coextensive with other statutesthat contain different language). 

In addition, contrary to the district court’s reasoning, we do not agree that

interpreting “employer” in the broad manner that the plain language suggests would

lead to absurd or unjust results. On the contrary, a broad construction of “employer”

is eminently compatible with DATWA’s purpose, which is to provide employees

additional protections in relation to employer-requested drug and alcohol testing. See

Minn. Stat. § 181.955 (DATWA sets forth minimum standards and requirements for

employee protection relating to employment-related drug testing); see alsoRohmiller

v. Hart, 811 N.W.2d 585, 591 (Minn. 2012) (indicating Minnesota Supreme Court’s

reluctance to look past clear and unambiguous plain language of statute to avoid

absurd result; court will do so “only when the plain meaning of a statute ‘utterly

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confounds a clear legislative purpose’” (quoting Toth v. Arason, 722 N.W.2d 437,

442 (Minn. 2006))).

Finally, we are mindful that DATWA’s broad definition of “employer” is

constrained by the bounds of due process. In order for a state’s substantive law to be

constitutionally applied in a particular case, the state must have a significant contact

or a significant aggregation of contacts with the parties or the underlying facts giving

rise to the litigation, creating a state interest, such that the application of its law is

neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S.

302, 307-314 (1981); cf. Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n of Cal.,

294 U.S. 532, 539-43 (1935). Nevertheless, where a state’s contacts with the parties

or the transaction satisfy the “significant contacts” test for personal jurisdiction, no

party may reasonably expect that the state’s law cannot control the case, and the

state’s power to apply its law is “unquestionable.” See McCluney v. Joseph Schlitz

Brewing Co., 649 F.2d 578, 580-82 (8th Cir. 1981). We conclude that DATWA can

be applied to the facts of this case consistently with due process concerns: Push did

business in Minnesota, hired a Minnesota resident, and permitted that Minnesota

resident’s pre-employment drug test to be conducted in Minnesota. Cf. Houle v.

Stearns-Rogers Mfg. Co., 157 N.W.2d 362, 366-67 (Minn. 1968) (endorsing case-bycase analysis for whether Minnesota had sufficient legitimate governmental interest

to apply Minnesota statute). We also conclude that Olson’s claim is not precluded

based upon the presumption against extra-territorial application of Minnesota statutes

or the dormant commerce clause. See Cotto Waxo Co. v. Williams, 46 F.3d 790, 793-

94 (8th Cir. 1995).

For these reasons, we reverse the dismissal of Olson’s DATWA claim, and we

remand this case to the district court for further proceedings.

______________________________

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