Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-08-04679/USCOURTS-ca4-08-04679-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Jeremy Sanquan Wright
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 08-4679

JEREMY SANQUAN WRIGHT,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of South Carolina, at Florence.

Terry L. Wooten, District Judge.

(4:07-cr-00897-TLW-1)

Argued: December 2, 2009

Decided: February 3, 2010

Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and DUNCAN,

Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the

opinion, in which Judge Duncan joined. Judge Gregory wrote

a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: David Bruce Betts, Columbia, South Carolina,

for Appellant. Carrie Ann Fisher, OFFICE OF THE UNITED

STATES ATTORNEY, Florence, South Carolina, for AppelAppeal: 08-4679 Doc: 42 Filed: 02/03/2010 Pg: 1 of 18
lee. ON BRIEF: W. Walter Wilkins, United States Attorney,

Columbia, South Carolina, Alfred W. Bethea, Jr., Assistant

United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES

ATTORNEY, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.

OPINION

WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:

Jeremy Wright sprayed twenty-two rounds from an AK-47

assault rifle into a crowded night club parking lot, killing a

man sleeping in a car with a single bullet to the head. Wright

fired his rifle until he ran out of ammunition even though

there were some two or three hundred people at the club,

many of whom were pouring outdoors as the result of a fight

that Wright had just instigated with rival gang members. In

addition to the man he killed, Wright also wounded a club

patron in the course of his rampage.

A jury convicted Wright of being a felon in possession of

a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). In light of his prior

offenses, the district court sentenced Wright to life imprisonment under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(e)(1). We affirm.

I.

On the night of June 17, 2007, appellant Jeremy Wright, his

brother, Brandon Wright, Atari Hayes and Geno (last name

unknown) were at the Grand Prix Night Club in Dillon

County, South Carolina. Wright was a member of the Crips

street gang, and his friends also were affiliated with the organization. After some time at the Grand Prix, the men decided

to go to the Blue Moon Night Club and set off in a convoy

of three cars with other associates.

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When they arrived in the parking lot outside the Blue

Moon, the owner of the club, Randy McCullum, informed

Wright that he and his friends were not welcome because

some of them had caused problems at the club a week earlier.

Wright demanded entry. During the ensuing altercation,

Wright told McCullum, "If we can’t go in and par[ty], nobody

can par[ty]." According to one bystander, Wright said that "if

he can’t come in the club, he didn’t want nobody in the club,

he would turn it out. He didn’t want nobody going in the

club." The argument grew heated. One witness said that

Wright three times ordered the driver of the car in which he

arrived to pop the trunk, which later events showed to contain

a firearm. The driver refused. One of the night club workers

testified that Wright told McCullum, "Your nephew killed our

home boy; we owe you all a body."

After issuing these threats, Wright, Hayes, and Geno

pushed past McCullum and entered the night club, with

Wright refusing to be searched by the bouncer at the door.

Almost immediately, Wright became involved in a fight with

an individual whose red bandana and red hat marked him as

a member of the rival Bloods gang. While the club’s bouncer

was attempting to end this brawl, two more fights broke out,

one of which involved Geno on one side and a Bloods member on the other. Hayes managed to leave the building and

told Brandon Wright that his brother was fighting inside.

Brandon Wright went to the back of the car the men drove

to the night club and removed an AK-47 assault rifle from the

trunk. The gun itself was never recovered, but several witnesses at trial identified pictures of the type of gun and noted

that it had a banana clip. While Brandon Wright was getting

the gun, Jeremy Wright and the patrons of the club were spilling out the front door, and the club employees were trying to

end the fighting. A man yelled at Brandon to put the gun

away. Brandon began to obey, but Jeremy Wright snatched

the AK-47 from his hands. He cocked the gun, walked to the

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door of the night club, and pointed the AK-47 inside. He then

turned and started shooting into the parking lot.

Wright fired repeatedly, continuing to shoot until he

expended all his ammunition and the gun clicked on an empty

chamber. One of his victims, Jameka Manning, testified that

she heard "real, real loud gun noises. And I could hear the

bullets flying by my face and could feel, like, the wind pass

by my face." After being narrowly missed by several rounds,

she was struck in the back by a bullet. Investigators later

recovered twenty-two 7.62 x 39 mm shell casings, the same

caliber ammunition fired by the AK-47.

After firing all his ammunition, Wright ran back to the car,

and he and his friends left. As they were leaving, Hayes heard

a girl screaming, "He’s shot, he’s shot, he’s dead." Wright

told his friends not to "snitch" because he would get back at

them. The men went back to the Grand Prix Night Club. Several minutes after Wright left, witnesses reported that other

individuals began firing guns. However, all agreed that the

AK-47 had a distinctive sound and that the later shots were

from different types of weapons.

Police responding to a 911 call from the Blue Moon found

Kelvin Small dead in the back seat of his car with a gunshot

wound to the back of his head. Small had been sleeping in his

car when he was killed. Bullet fragments recovered from

Small’s body were examined by a forensic scientist and determined to be most consistent with a 7.62 x 39 mm bullet.

A jury found Jeremy Wright guilty of possessing a firearm

after being previously convicted of a felony. 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(i). After the jury was excused but while the trial

judge remained on the bench, Wright jumped from his chair

and headed for the prosecutor’s table with clenched fists. He

was subdued by U.S. Marshals before any injury occurred.

Wright’s presentence report listed numerous prior incidents, including an aggravated assault and battery conviction

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arising from a gang fight between Crips and Bloods. In addition to that conviction and other criminal acts not relevant

here, Wright had three juvenile adjudications stemming from

three separate burglaries in the year 2000, in which Wright

stole a 9mm handgun, an FKS rifle, and a .32 New England

Firearms Model R73 Revolver. Based on these prior offenses,

the district court sentenced Wright under the Armed Career

Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), to life imprisonment.

On appeal, Wright raises three challenges to his sentence.

He first argues that the use of his juvenile adjudications as

predicate crimes under the ACCA violates the Supreme

Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,

490 (2000), because South Carolina family courts do not

employ juries.1 Second, Wright claims that the burglaries he

committed as a juvenile do not qualify as violent felonies

under the ACCA because he did not "carry" firearms merely

by stealing them. Finally, Wright asserts that the district court

improperly referenced the sentencing guideline for first

degree murder when it sentenced him. We consider each of

these arguments in turn.

II.

A.

We review de novo Wright’s claim that the Armed Career

Criminal Act (ACCA) enhancement he received on the basis

of his juvenile adjudications was improper. Wright was convicted by a jury of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), which prohibits any person "who has been convicted in any court of, a

crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one

year" from "possess[ing] . . . any firearm or ammunition." As

1South Carolina does not have separate juvenile courts but instead gives

its family courts exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate most juvenile

offenses. See S.C. Code § 63-3-510. 

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a result of this conviction, Wright was subject to a statutory

maximum sentence of not more than ten years. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(a)(2). However, in recognition of the fact that certain

repeat offenders pose a greater risk than other criminals, Congress has chosen through the ACCA to increase the punishment for any "person who violates section 922(g) of this title

and has three previous convictions . . . for a violent felony or

a serious drug offense, or both." 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). Offenders who meet § 924(e)(1)’s criteria are subject to a statutory

minimum of fifteen years’ imprisonment. Id.

Wright’s adult conviction for aggravated assault and battery plainly counts as one of the required three predicate violent felony convictions. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)

("violent felony" includes any adult conviction punishable by

more than one year that "has as an element the use, attempted

use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of

another"). Similarly, the three burglaries for which Wright

was adjudged delinquent as a juvenile fall within § 924(e)’s

violent felony definition. The relevant statutory provisions

state that any burglary that is an "act of juvenile delinquency

involving the use or carrying of a firearm . . . that would be

punishable by imprisonment for [a term exceeding one year]

if committed by an adult" constitutes a violent felony. 18

U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). 

Wright argues that, notwithstanding this language, his juvenile adjudications cannot be counted under the ACCA

because South Carolina family courts do not employ juries.

He asserts that these adjudications are infirm on their face. He

further argues that the district court violated the Supreme

Court’s statement in Apprendi v. New Jersey that "[o]ther than

the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum

must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable

doubt." 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). Under Wright’s view, the

district court violated Apprendi by considering his juvenile

adjudications in applying § 924(e).

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B.

The Supreme Court’s decision in McKiever v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (plurality opinion), squarely forecloses Wright’s challenge to the use of his juvenile

adjudications at sentencing. While the decision was a plurality, five justices rejected Sixth Amendment challenges to several juvenile delinquency proceedings, holding that "trial by

jury in the juvenile court’s adjudicative stage is not a constitutional requirement." Id. at 545 (plurality opinion); id. at 557

(Harlan, J., concurring in the judgments). Part of the plurality’s concern was that a jury requirement would undermine the

unique rehabilitative, if imperfectly realized, goals of the

juvenile justice system. See, e.g., id. at 543-45, 47. "If the jury

trial were to be injected into the juvenile court system as a

matter of right, it would bring with it into that system the traditional delay, the formality, and the clamor of the adversary

system and, possibly, the public trial." Id. at 550. As a jury is

not required in a juvenile adjudication on the merits, we see

no reason to impose such a requirement through the back door

by allowing former juveniles who have subsequently reached

adulthood to overturn their adjudications in subsequent sentencing hearings.

This is not to say that a juvenile is without protection.

Rather, juveniles are accorded many other procedural safeguards, for instance "the rights to appropriate notice, to counsel, to confrontation and to cross-examination, and the

privilege against self-incrimination [in addition to] proof

beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 533. However, there is no

reason to hold that an adjudication that is constitutionally sufficient to commit a juvenile to confinement, in some instances

until age twenty-one, is somehow off limits for sentencing

consideration if the same juvenile later violates § 924(e)’s

armed career criminal prohibition. The Supreme Court has

decided that juries are not required in juvenile proceedings,

and it is not for us to set aside that ruling.

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In light of this guidance, it is not surprising that the clear

majority of circuits to consider this issue agree that juvenile

offenses may be considered by the court as predicate convictions at ACCA sentencings. Four circuits have held that juvenile convictions fall within Apprendi’s exemption for prior

convictions and need not be submitted to a jury. See U.S. v.

Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, 1033 (8th Cir. 2002) ("We therefore

conclude that juvenile adjudications can rightly be characterized as ‘prior convictions’ for Apprendi purposes, and that the

district court did not err in increasing [the defendant’s] sentence based on his prior juvenile adjudications."); U.S. v. Crowell, 493 F.3d 744, 749-51 (6th Cir. 2007) (same); U.S. v.

Burge, 407 F.3d 1183, 1187-91 (11th Cir. 2005) (same); U.S.

v. Jones, 332 F.3d 688, 696 (3d Cir. 2003) (same). But see

U.S. v. Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187, 1191-95 (9th Cir. 2001). Several state courts have taken the same route. See State v. Hitt,

42 P.3d 732, 739-40 (Kan. 2002); Ryle v. State, 842 N.E.2d

320, 321-23 (Ind. 2005); People v. Bowden, 102 Cal. App. 4th

387, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 513 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). But see State

v. Brown, 879 So. 2d 1276, 1290 (La. 2004).

These courts have recognized that the issue of whether

juvenile adjudications can be used to enhance sentences under

Apprendi’s exception for prior convictions hinges in part on

whether non-jury adjudications "are so reliable that due process of law is not offended by such an exemption." Smalley,

294 F.3d at 1033. Thus, many courts have held that prior convictions are allowed to enhance punishment under the ACCA

without being "submitted for jury consideration because ‘the

defendant has received the totality of constitutional protections due in the prior proceeding on the predicate offense.’"

Burge, 407 F.3d at 1191 (quoting U.S. v. McGatha, 891 F.2d

1520, 1526 (11th Cir. 1990)). As the Eighth Circuit explained,

"[W]hile we recognize that a jury does not have a role in trials

for juvenile offenses, we do not think that this fact undermines the reliability of such adjudications in any significant

way." Smalley, 294 F.3d at 1033.

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As the ACCA expressly provides for qualifying juvenile

adjudications to be used as predicate offenses and the Constitution in no way forbids it, the district court was correct not

to discount the fact that Wright burgled firearms on three separate occasions during his delinquent youth. The fact that

juries are not constitutionally required in juvenile adjudications does nothing to impeach this fact. As a result, we agree

with the Sixth Circuit that the "defendant received all process

that was due when convicted – for adults that includes the

right to a jury trial; for juveniles, it does not." Crowell, 493

F.3d at 750 (citing Jones, 332 F.3d at 695)). The district court

properly relied on Wright’s prior juvenile convictions to

enhance his sentence under the ACCA.2

III.

We next move to Wright’s contention that his juvenile burglaries do not constitute prior offenses under the ACCA

2Only two days before oral arguments in this case, Wright’s counsel

filed a supplemental brief addressing our decision in United States v. Walters, 359 F.3d 340 (4th Cir. 2004), to argue that the fact that juvenile adjudications are not considered criminal convictions under South Carolina

law renders consideration of such convictions inappropriate for ACCA

purposes. Because this argument is distinct from Wright’s Apprendi/Sixth

Amendment claim and was not raised until literally hours before oral argument on appeal, we hold that it was waived. Even if we were to entertain

this new argument, however, we would have to reject it. Walters decided

that an individual previously adjudicated a delinquent who possessed a

firearm could not be convicted as a felon in possession under § 922(g)(1)

because Virginia state law distinguishes juvenile adjudications from criminal convictions. Walters, 359 F.3d at 344-47. South Carolina law contains

a similar provision. See S.C. Code § 63-19-1410(C). However, unlike

§ 922(g)(1), which by its terms only applies to convicted adult felons, the

ACCA specifically indicates that not only prior felonies but also prior

juvenile adjudications involving the use or carrying of firearms may be

considered. See § 924(e)(2)(B). Indeed, Walters itself discussed this distinction. See Walters, 359 F.3d at 343. Thus the statutory treatment of

juvenile adjudications under the ACCA is distinct from juvenile offenders’

treatment under § 922(g)(1)’s felon in possession prohibition, and the

Walters opinion does not aid appellant here. 

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because he did not "carry" a firearm while committing a crime

of violence. This claim is also a legal one and thus is

reviewed de novo. U.S. v. Williams, 508 F.3d 724, 726 (4th

Cir. 2007). As noted, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) enhances the sentences of repeat violent felons who possess firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). In the case of juveniles, a burglary

"involving the use or carrying of a firearm" qualifies as a

prior violent offense. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). The practical

effect of counting Wright’s burglaries as predicate ACCA

convictions is to increase his statutory sentencing range from

a maximum sentence of ten years to a mandatory minimum of

fifteen years with no statutory ceiling. Compare 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(a)(2) with 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).

Wright argues that the act of burglary is complete at the

moment a dwelling is entered without consent. He thus claims

that his burglaries did not involve carrying firearms because

it is possible to commit burglary simply by entering a dwelling with the requisite intent to commit a crime, regardless of

whether anything is actually stolen. See S.C. Code § 16-11-

312(A). Additionally, he points out that with each of his three

burglary convictions he was also convicted of a corresponding

count of larceny under South Carolina Code § 16-13-30.

Because Wright contends that these convictions punish the

actual carrying of the firearms he stole, he argues that the burglary convictions do not meet the ACCA’s requirement that

a firearm be carried in the commission of a burglary.

We cannot accept this argument. To begin, we note that

Wright does not dispute that he committed three burglaries as

a juvenile and that in each instance he stole a firearm. He does

not raise any argument that the convictions were somehow

unreliable under Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13

(2005). Rather, the only question is whether as a definitional

matter Wright "carried" firearms when he admittedly stole

them from homes on three separate occasions.

We explained only recently in United States v. Thompson

that burglary is a crime of violence under the ACCA, pro10 UNITED STATES v. WRIGHT

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vided that it meets the general requirements set out in Taylor

v. United States:

the Supreme Court has construed ‘burglary’ in the

statute to include ‘any crime, regardless of its exact

definition or label, having the basic elements of

unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in,

a building or structure, with intent to commit a

crime.’

588 F.3d 197, 200 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Taylor v. U.S., 495

U.S. 575, 599 (1990)).

In this case, the law Wright violated as a juvenile states that

"[a] person is guilty of burglary in the second degree if the

person enters a dwelling without consent and with intent to

commit a crime in the dwelling." S.C. Code § 16-11-312(A).3

This language tracks the generic definition of burglary set

forth by the Supreme Court in Taylor, and as such we have

no difficulty determining that South Carolina’s burglary statute falls within the ACCA’s list of prior offenses.

Wright’s further arguments serve only to confirm our view.

His claim that he did not "carry" firearms falls short. Section

924(e) merely requires that a prior offense be one "involving

the use or carrying of a firearm." 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)

(emphasis added). The language "involving the use or carrying of a firearm" is broader than language such as breaking

and/or entering with firearms—a formulation Congress could

have used but did not. The statute does not define "involving,"

but that term in no way narrows its "use or carrying" language. Indeed, in defining the same word in another prong of

3

It appears that Wright was initially charged with two counts of first

degree burglary, S.C. Code § 16-11-311, and one count of second degree

burglary, S.C. Code § 16-11-312, but that he was allowed to plead guilty

to three counts of second degree burglary. See J.A. 189, 211-18. See also

Br. of Appellant 11 n.1. 

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§ 924(e), we have already acknowledged that "involving"

means "[t]o have as a necessary feature or consequence" and

that "the word ‘involving’ itself suggests that the subsection

should be read expansively." U.S. v. Brandon, 247 F.3d 186,

190 (4th Cir. 2001) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii))

(emphasis omitted in first quotation). A burglary that results

in the theft of firearms necessarily involves carrying them,

else the burglar would be forced to leave his spoils at the

scene of the crime.

This notion is consistent with our interpretation of other

sections of 18 U.S.C. § 924 as well. For instance, in United

States v. Mitchell, we noted that the "plain meaning of the

term ‘carry’ as used in § 924(c)(1) requires knowing possession and bearing, movement, conveyance, or transportation of

the firearm in some manner." 104 F.3d 649, 653 (4th Cir.

1997). Relying on this language, the district court in the present case correctly held that "taking the gun during the burglary . . . does involve a carrying of the gun, and that does

involve a possession and bearing, movement, conveyance or

transportation of the firearm." Wright knowingly possessed

and transported a firearm contemporaneously with and as a

consequence of each of his three burglaries. As a result, he

cannot now be heard to argue that his crimes did not involve

the carrying of firearms. Additionally, by stealing firearms

Wright armed himself with a deadly weapon that furthered his

escape. Whether he intended to do so is irrelevant; the firearms were available to aid his flight from justice as soon as

he took possession of them.

Indeed, South Carolina courts have taken a similar view in

interpreting an element of the state’s first degree burglary

statute that requires a suspect to be "armed with a deadly

weapon." S.C. Code § 16-11-311(A)(1)(a). In affirming a burglary conviction in which a loaded .22 caliber rifle was stolen,

the South Carolina Court of Appeals explained that a defendant or his accomplice "need only have physical control over

a deadly weapon . . . such that the weapon is readily available

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for the person to use. It matters not how the person acquired

the deadly weapon or for what purpose the person took possession of the deadly weapon." State v. McCaskill, 468 S.E.2d

81, 82 (S.C. Ct. App. 1996). It is simply inaccurate to say that

Wright did not use or carry firearms when he carried them

from the homes he burgled. At the moment he stole them,

they became "just as available . . . for offensive or defensive

use as if the burglar had himself brought the weapon to the

burglary for the purpose of committing the crime." Id. at 83.

The district court properly rejected Wright’s argument to the

contrary.

IV.

Wright’s final claim on appeal is that the district court erroneously cross-referenced the sentencing guideline for first

degree murder instead of the second degree guideline. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Gall v. United States,

we must "ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error," when it calculated the guidelines

range. 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). If the guidelines range is properly calculated, we review the substantive reasonableness of

the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard. Id. When,

as here, the sentence is within the calculated guidelines range,

an "appellate court may, but is not required to, apply a presumption of reasonableness" to the sentence imposed. Id.

As Wright’s counsel acknowledged at argument, our resolution of Wright’s ACCA claims undermines his objection to

the district court’s advisory guidelines calculation. Even the

second degree murder range Wright claims should have been

used would have dictated a range of 360 months to life. Br.

of Appellees 21 n.3.

However, the district court did not err by referring to the

first degree murder guideline. It began by applying U.S.S.G.

§ 2K2.1, which deals with sentencing for unlawful possession

of firearms. However, § 2K2.1(c)(1) instructs a court to apply

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a cross reference if a defendant who unlawfully possessed

firearms used them to commit any other crimes. The district

court thus applied the sentencing guideline for first degree

murder, U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1, which gives a base offense level of

43 and a recommended life sentence. 

The district court did not err in its determination that first

degree murder was the appropriate cross reference for

Wright’s firearm violation. Indeed, the court’s decision is

consistent with the substantive definition of first degree murder:

Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with

malice aforethought. Every murder perpetrated by

. . . any . . . kind of willful, deliberate, malicious, and

premeditated killing . . ., is murder in the first

degree. Any other murder is murder in the second

degree.

18 U.S.C. § 1111(a). It is not necessary that the defendant

intend to kill the specific individual who dies. Any killing

which was "perpetrated from a premeditated design unlawfully and maliciously to effect the death of any human being

other than him who is killed" is covered by the statute. Id.

Similarly, it is well settled that "[s]entencing judges may find

facts relevant to determining a Guidelines range by a preponderance of the evidence, so long as that Guidelines sentence

is treated as advisory and falls within the statutory maximum

authorized by the jury’s verdict." U.S. v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d

300, 312 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 950 (2009).

Here, many facts support the view that Wright behaved

willfully, deliberately, maliciously, and with premeditation.

Wright and his fellow Crips were denied entry to the Blue

Moon Night Club precisely because some of them had been

involved in prior fights with rival Bloods. After being told he

could not enter the club, Wright threatened mahem, vowing

to prevent anyone from patronizing the club if he and his

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friends were refused entrance. The intimidation took on a sinister character, one witness testifying that Wright threatened

club owner McCullum, saying, "Your nephew killed our

home boy; we owe you all a body."

Wright and two friends then pushed into the bar, where

Wright immediately put his threats into action, picking a fight

with a rival Bloods member. Other fights broke out, and the

patrons of the club streamed out into the parking lot. Wright’s

brother, hearing Wright was in a fight, pulled the AK-47 from

the car trunk but then began to put it back when a bystander

yelled at him. Before he could do so, Wright, fresh from his

fight with a rival street gang member, snatched the AK-47

and opened up on the chaotic scene. The district court recognized at sentencing that "Mr. Wright had been in some kind

of confrontation, he had a motive to fire the gun, and fired it,

and if someone was killed, so be it." Indeed, Wright stopped

firing only after he emptied his magazine, gunning down an

innocent man in the process. 

It was perfectly foreseeable that someone would be killed

when Wright sprayed the parking lot with gunfire. Cars do not

drive themselves. People ride in them, wait in them, and cross

parking lots to get to them. It was thus not at all unusual that

Kelvin Smalls was in a car that Wright fired into, nor, unfortunately, was it surprising that Wright’s shot resulted in

Small’s killing. As the trial court found, Wright engaged in "a

reckless firing of the firearm, a random firing with the intent

to hurt someone." (emphasis added). 

In addition, Jameka Manning’s testimony certainly does

nothing to dispel the district court’s determination. Manning

was shot in the back by Wright, and before being hit, she

heard several other bullets fly close by her body, so close that

she could feel the wind from their passing. Whether her

shooting was intentional or random is hardly the point, for the

district court’s determination did not depend on whether

Wright’s marksmanship wholly matched his malice. The disUNITED STATES v. WRIGHT 15

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trict court properly applied the first degree murder cross reference.

Because we find the district court calculated the guideline

correctly, we next exercise our discretion under Gall to "apply

a presumption of reasonableness" to the within-guidelines

sentence imposed here. 552 U.S. at 51. Far from being an

abuse of discretion, the district court’s decision to impose a

life sentence is well-supported by the sad facts of this case.

In the final analysis, Wright made at least twenty-two

deliberate choices the evening he ended Kelvin Small’s life.

He decided to empty twenty-two 7.62 x 39 mm rifle rounds

from his AK-47 into a crowded parking lot. Tragically, one of

Wright’s decisions ended with a bullet embedded in Small’s

skull. The district court did not err in sentencing Wright to life

in prison. The sentence was reasonable in light of Wright’s

instant offense, his adult conviction for aggravated assault and

battery, and his three prior convictions for burglary of firearms from residences. This conduct is the sort at which the

Armed Career Criminal Act is aimed, and we affirm the judgment.

AFFIRMED

GREGORY, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting

in part:

While I concur with the majority’s opinion finding that

Wright was appropriately categorized as an armed career

offender under the Armed Career Criminal Act, I respectfully

dissent from Part IV, which denies Wright’s claim that the

district court erred when it applied the sentencing guideline

for first degree murder. Under Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.

38, 51 (2007), we "must first ensure that the district court

committed no significant procedural error." I find that the

court’s cross reference to first degree murder resulted in an

erroneous calculation of the guidelines.

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While reckless behavior, as cited by the district court and

the majority, may be sufficient to show malice aforethought,

there must be evidence that the killing was "willful, deliberate, . . . and premeditated" for murder to rise to the level of

first degree. See 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a). In this case, no evidence, and certainly not a preponderance of the evidence,

demonstrates that Wright held a premeditated design to effect

the death of any person. There is no evidence that Wright

knew that the cars he was firing toward were occupied or that

Wright consciously intended to bring about the death of any

person at the scene, thus causing Smalls’ death. Instead, as the

district court recognized, Smalls "happened . . . to be in the

vicinity" when Wright engaged in a "reckless" and "random

firing." J.A. 163-64. No one testified that Wright was shooting at any individual. To the contrary, the evidence shows that

Wright "didn’t open fire in the club" and was shooting "towards the cars" parked in the lot. J.A. 56, 106-07. One witness specifically stated that Wright was aiming at a green car

to shoot it up and agreed that Wright was not shooting at persons. J.A. 75, 83. Another witness testified that Wright was

shooting directly in front of a green truck, belonging to the

club owner McCullum. J.A. 58. McCullum was the individual

who told Wright he could not enter the club.

While the facts of this case are tragic and Wright’s conduct

was certainly reckless, whether the conduct constituted first

degree murder depends on whether Wright acted purposefully

and not simply whether Smalls’ death was foreseeable. Foreseeability, as cited by the majority, is relevant to second

degree murder, but it is not a component of first degree murder, which requires a specific, subjective state of mind. First

degree murder requires that Wright had the purposeful intent

to bring about a death. So while it may have been reasonable

for Wright to realize that people might be in the parking lot

that night, this alone is not evidence that Wright committed

a "willful, deliberate, . . . and premeditated" killing. If the evidence had shown that Wright was shooting at anyone with the

intent to kill, including the injured bystander, Jameka ManUNITED STATES v. WRIGHT 17

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ning, I would agree with the majority’s analysis. Such evidence, however, does not exist on this record.

Therefore, the district court’s finding in favor of its cross

reference of first degree murder is not supported by a preponderance of the evidence and is clearly erroneous. The resulting error was not harmless because the cross reference to first

degree murder, "absent any downward adjustments or departures, require[d] the district court to impose a life sentence."

United States v. Crump, 120 F.3d 462, 467 n.3 (4th Cir.

1997). The court should have cross-referenced second-degree

murder, which given Wright’s criminal history category of

VI, would have provided a guideline range of 360 months to

life. Thus, although Wright would have been eligible for a life

sentence, such sentence should not have been required. Consequently, I would vacate the district court’s sentence and

remand for resentencing.

18 UNITED STATES v. WRIGHT

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