Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01068/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01068-9/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dave Davey
Respondent
Richard Louis Arnold Phillips
Petitioner

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD LOUIS ARNOLD PHILLIPS,

Petitioner,

v.

DAVE DAVEY, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:14-cv-01068-LJO-SAB-HC

ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATION, DENYING

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS 

CORPUS AND DISMISSING WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE THE CLAIM ABOUT PRO 

PER PRIVILEGES, DIRECTING CLERK OF 

COURT TO ENTER JUDGMENT AND 

CLOSE CASE, AND DENYING 

PETITIONER’S MOTIONS FOR STAY OF 

STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

On June 10, 2015, the Magistrate Judge issued a Findings and Recommendation that 

recommended that the petition be denied, that Petitioner’s claim that he is entitled to the same 

pro per privileges that he had during his 1991 penalty trial be dismissed without prejudice, and 

that Petitioner’s motions for a stay of the state court proceedings be denied. (ECF No. 39). On 

June 10, 2015, the Findings and Recommendation was served on all parties. On June 24, 2015, 

Petitioner filed a motion for a fifteen day extension of time to file his objections and Petitioner 

had indicated that he had not received the Findings and Recommendations. (ECF No. 42). On 

June 26, 2015, the Magistrate Judge granted Petitioner thirty days from the date of service of that 

order to file objections and directed the Clerk of Court to serve another copy of the Findings and 

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Recommendations on Petitioner. (ECF No. 43). Petitioner filed timely objections. (ECF No. 

46). Respondent filed a reply to Petitioner’s objections. (ECF No. 47). In accordance with the 

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), this Court has conducted a de novo review of the case. 

Petitioner argues that he is not in custody pursuant to a valid state court judgment and 

cites to Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147,156-57 (2007) and Section 1245 of the California Penal 

Code. Section 1245 of the California Penal Code states: 

If before the granting of the certificate, the execution of the 

judgment has commenced, the further execution thereof is 

suspended, and upon service of a copy of such certificate the 

defendant must be restored, by the officer in whose custody he is, 

to his original custody. 

This section pertains to stays pending appeal and restoration to original custody during that stay. 

It is inapplicable to the instant case because the instant case is not on appeal in the state courts 

pursuant to a certificate by the trial court stating that the trial court has stayed the execution of 

the judgment or order granting probation. See Cal. Pen. Code §§ 1243, 1244. 

In Burton, the petitioner was sentenced in 1994 to a total term of 562 months; the trial 

court imposed the sentence by running three terms consecutively and, in the alternative, by 

running the terms concurrently but finding the sentence for Burton's rape conviction to be 

otherwise too lenient under Washington law. After an unrelated prior conviction was reversed, 

Burton sought resentencing. In 1996, the trial court recalculated Burton's offender scores and 

again sentenced him to 562 months for the rape conviction, finding it exceptional. Burton sought 

direct review of his conviction and this sentence; the Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction, 

but remanded the case for resentencing. Accordingly, in March 1998, the trial court entered a 

second amended judgment and sentence and imposed a 562 month sentence by running Burton's 

three sentences consecutively. Burton, 549 U.S. at 150–51.

While his direct review of this sentence was pending, Burton filed a federal habeas 

petition. He noted that he was challenging his 1994 conviction and acknowledged that the 

sentence he had received on resentencing was then on appeal. Both the district court and the 

Ninth Circuit rejected his petition. Id. at 151. In 2002, Burton filed another federal habeas 

petition attacking his sentence only. Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit rejected the 

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state’s claim that the petition was successive, but denied it on the merits. Id. at 152.

The Supreme Court ultimately found that the lower courts lacked jurisdiction over the 

petition because it was indeed successive, and Burton had never received authorization to pursue 

it. It reasoned that Burton was in custody under the 1998 judgment when he filed the 1998 

petition and the 2002 petition and so he “twice brought claims contesting the same custody 

imposed by the same judgment of a state court.” Id. at 153.

Burton argued that had he waited for the conclusion of direct review of the 1998 

resentencing, his federal petition raising claims related to his underlying conviction would be 

time-barred. The Supreme Court said:

[T]he limitations period applicable to a person in custody pursuant 

to the judgment of a State court shall run from ... the date on which 

the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or 

the expiration of the time for seeking such review. Final judgment 

in a criminal case means sentence. The sentence is the judgment. 

Accordingly, Burton's limitations period did not begin until both 

his conviction and sentence became final by the conclusion of 

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such reviewwhich occurred well after Burton filed his 1998 petition.

Id. at 156–57 (emphases in original; internal quotations, citations omitted).

Here, Petitioner’s convictions for first degree murder, attempted murder, and robbery are 

final. Petitioner has not had his first degree murder conviction vacated. There will be no further 

review by the state courts of any of his claims in respect to his first degree murder, attempted 

murder, and robbery convictions. The only pending proceeding in state court is the retrial for the 

special circumstance, and if the special circumstance is found to be true by the jury, any appeals 

and post-conviction remedies available to Petitioner that pertain to the retrial for the special 

circumstance. 

In People v. Buckhalter, 26 Cal.4th 20, 34 (2001), the California Supreme Court held that 

when there is an appellate remand solely for correction of a sentence already in progress, a 

“defendant’s temporary removal from state prison to county jail as a consequence of the remand 

did not transform him from a state prisoner to a local presentence detainee.” After being 

sentenced and committed to prison to serve a term of imprisonment, the felon’s status remains 

the same until lawfully released. Id. In Buckhalter, the defendant’s conviction was not vacated. 

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Id. at 22. 

Here, Petitioner, like the defendant in Buckhalter, is a convicted felon who is incarcerated 

pursuant to a state court judgment, and he has not served his entire sentence. Burton held that 

the limitations period for filing a federal habeas petition does not begin until both the conviction 

and sentence become final by the conclusion of direct review. Burton, 549 U.S. at 156–57. 

Therefore, Burton does not support Petitioner’s argument that he is illegally in state prison 

without a judgment while he awaits the retrial for the special circumstance. Petitioner’s claim 

that he is currently held in state prison without a valid judgment and he is incarcerated past his 

release date for his determinate sentences, which are his only sentences, must be denied. 

Petitioner’s challenge to transfer from San Quentin to Corcoran State Prison is a 

challenge to the particular location of his housing. A prisoner has no right to be housed in a 

particular institution. See Rizzo v. Dawson, 78 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir. 1985); Meachum v. Fano, 

427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976). As Petitioner does not have a right to be housed in a particular 

location, his claim is meritless. As the Court has determined that Petitioner’s rights were not 

violated by transferring Petitioner to Corcoran, the Court will not address Petitioner’s objections 

that relate to whether Petitioner received a hearing pursuant to the medical clause of Section 

4007 of the California Penal Code. 

Petitioner argues that he is entitled to the same pro per provisions that he had during the 

penalty retrial in 1991. This claim is not a challenge to the fact or duration of Petitioner’s 

confinement, but rather a challenge to the conditions of Petitioner’s confinement. In contrast, a 

civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the proper method for a prisoner to challenge 

the conditions of that confinement. McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 141-42 (1991). While 

the Court could construe this claim as a Section 1983 civil rights complaint, Petitioner may not 

wish to pursue this claim as a civil rights complaint due to the $400 fee for civil rights cases that 

is deducted from Petitioner’s income in his trust account and the fact that civil rights complaints 

may count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Therefore, the Court will dismiss this claim 

without prejudice. 

Having carefully reviewed the entire file, the Court concludes that the Magistrate Judge's 

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Findings and Recommendation is supported by the record and proper analysis, and there is no 

need to modify the Findings and Recommendation.

In Petitioner’s objections, he requests a certificate of appealability. Respondent objects 

to any certificate of appealability. A state prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no 

absolute entitlement to appeal a district court’s denial of his petition, and an appeal is only 

allowed in certain circumstances. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003). The 

controlling statute in determining whether to issue a certificate of appealability is 28 U.S.C. § 

2253, which provides as follows:

(a) In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under section 

2255 before a district judge, the final order shall be subject to 

review, on appeal, by the court of appeals for the circuit in which 

the proceeding is held.

(b) There shall be no right of appeal from a final order in a 

proceeding to test the validity of a warrant to remove to another 

district or place for commitment or trial a person charged with a 

criminal offense against the United States, or to test the validity of 

such person’s detention pending removal proceedings.

(c) (1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of 

appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of 

appeals from–

(A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which 

the detention complained of arises out of process issued by 

a State court; or

(B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.

(2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) 

only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the 

denial of a constitutional right.

(3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall 

indicate which specific issue or issues satisfy the showing 

required by paragraph (2).

If a court denies a petitioner’s petition, the court may only issue a certificate of 

appealability “if jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his 

constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve 

encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327; Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 

484 (2000). While the petitioner is not required to prove the merits of his case, he must 

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demonstrate “something more than the absence of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith on 

his . . . part.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 338.

In the present case, the Court finds that reasonable jurists would not find the Court’s 

determination that Petitioner’s federal habeas corpus petition should be denied debatable, wrong, 

or deserving of encouragement to proceed further. Petitioner has not made the required 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Therefore, the Court denies 

Petitioner’s request for a certificate of appealability.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The June 10, 2015 Findings and Recommendation (ECF No. 39) is ADOPTED IN 

FULL;

2. Petitioner’s claim that he is entitled to the same pro per privileges that he had during 

his 1991 penalty retrial, to the extent that it is a challenge to the conditions of 

confinement, is DISMISSED without prejudice;

3. The petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED;

4. Petitioner’s motions for a stay of the state court proceedings (ECF Nos. 12, 24) are 

DENIED; 

5. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment and close the case; and

6. Petitioner’s request for a certificate of appealability is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 24, 2015 /s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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