Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-06055/USCOURTS-ca8-04-06055-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gail Osborne
Appellee
Cynthia Marie Stage
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

__________

No. 04-6055EM

__________

In re: Cynthia Marie Stage, *

 *

Debtor. *

 *

Gail Osborne, *

 * Appeal from the United States

Plaintiff - Appellee, * Bankruptcy Court for the 

 * Eastern District of Missouri

v. *

 *

Cynthia Marie Stage, *

 *

Defendant - Appellant. *

__________

Submitted: February 8, 2005

Filed: March 10, 2005

__________

Before KRESSEL, Chief Judge, DREHER and MAHONEY, Bankruptcy Judges.

__________

KRESSEL, Chief Judge.

This case has its origins in alienation of affections litigation in Missouri state

court in which a jury awarded Appellee Gail Osborne a $50,000.00 judgment against

Appellant Cynthia Marie Stage. Stage appeals from the order of the bankruptcy court

granting summary judgment to Osborne based on collateral estoppel. The principal

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 This was labeled as instruction #6. The record does not indicate

whether the court gave the jury any other instructions.

2

issue in this appeal is whether the state court judgment for alienation of affections

established that Stage willfully and maliciously injured Osborne for purposes of 11

U.S.C § 523(a)(6). We conclude that it did not, and reverse.

BACKGROUND

Osborne filed suit against Stage in state court based on the tort of alienation of

affections. On July 28, 1999, after a two day trial, the case was submitted to a jury

with the following instruction:

 

Your verdict must be for Plaintiff, Gail Ann Osborne, if

you believe: First, Plaintiff was married to Daniel

Osborne, and Second, Defendant, Cynthia Stage caused

Plaintiff to lose the society, comfort, affection and

assistance of Daniel Osborne, and Third, Defendant did so

intentionally and Fourth Plaintiff was thereby damaged.1

The court declined to give the following punitive damages instruction submitted by

the plaintiff: 

If you find the issues in favor of the plaintiff, Gail Ann

Osborne, and if you believe the conduct of Defendant,

Cynthia Stage, as submitted in instruction number_____

was outrageous because of Defendant, Cynthia Stage’s,

evil motive or reckless indifference to the rights of others,

then, in addition to any damages to which you find

plaintiff, Gail Ann Osborne, entitled under instruction

number ____, you may award Plaintiff, Gail Ann Osborne,

an additional amount as punitive damages in such sum as

you believe will serve to punish Defendant, Cynthia Stage,

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 Made applicable in this adversary proceeding by Fed. R. Bankr. P.

7012(b).

3

and to deter Defendant, Cynthia Stage, and others from like

conduct. 

The Jury found Cynthia Marie Stage liable for alienating the affections of Daniel

Osborne from his wife, Gail Osborne, and awarded her $50,000.00 in damages.

Judgment on the jury’s verdict was entered by the court on July 28, 1999.

On March 25, 2004, Stage filed a Chapter 7 petition in the Eastern District of

Missouri. On June 22, 2004 Osborne filed a complaint to determine the

dischargeability of her debt, claiming that the judgment she received in state court is

excepted from Stage’s discharge under § 523(a)(6). 

In her complaint, Osborne claimed that Stage is collaterally estopped from

contesting the issue of willful and malicious injury because the issues have already

been litigated and determined in the state court action. On August 10, 2004, Stage

made a motion to dismiss the complaint based on two different theories. Firstly, she

claimed the issue of whether Stage’s actions were willful and malicious for the

purposes of § 523(a)(6) had not been adjudicated in state court and therefore

collateral estoppel did not apply. Secondly, she argued that the case should be

dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under Fed

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)2

 because the cause of action for alienation of affections no longer

existed in Missouri.

On August 24, 2004, the bankruptcy court denied Stage’s motion to dismiss.

The bankruptcy court held that her argument regarding collateral estoppel was

premature because Osborne had not filed a motion for summary judgment. It also

held that Stage had presented no legal authority to support the proposition that the

abolishment of a tort action voids a prior final judgment based on that tort.

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On September 7, 2004, Osborne filed a motion for summary judgment based

on collateral estoppel. She claimed that the judgment in state court for alienation of

affections had already determined that Stage’s actions caused her malicious and

willful injury thereby making the judgment non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(6).

Stage did not deny the existence of the judgment, but argued that the litigation in state

court did not establish that she acted willfully or maliciously.

On September 27, 2004, the bankruptcy court granted Osborne summary

judgment, concluding that collateral estoppel applied. The court held that the

judgment for alienation of affections in state court established that Stage willfully and

maliciously injured Osborne. The court also held that Missouri’s abolishment of the

intentional tort of alienation of affections did not affect Osborne’s judgment.

Stage appeals the bankruptcy court’s September 27, 2004 order and judgment.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo the bankruptcy court’s conclusions of law, including the

application of collateral estoppel. Fisher v. Scarborough (In re Scarborough), 171

F.3d 638, 641 (8th Cir. 1999). Summary judgment was properly granted if, assuming

all reasonable inferences favorable to the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue

as to material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), made applicable to bankruptcy proceedings under Fed. R.

Bankr. P. 7056; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323 (1986). 

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DISCUSSION

VALIDITY OF THE JUDGMENT FOR ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS

We begin first with the threshold issue. Stage argues that the bankruptcy court

erred when it concluded that the abolishment of the tort of alienation of affections did

not affect the validity of a prior final judgment based on that tort.

The tort of alienation of affections has, in fact, been abolished in the State of

Missouri. Helsel v. Noellsch, 107 S.W.3d 231, 233 (Mo. 2003). While the Missouri

Supreme Court has not addressed the issue, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western

District has ruled that the abolishment of the cause of action is to be given

retrospective application. Scott v. LeClercq, 136 S.W.3d 183, 190 (Mo. Ct. App.

2004). In Scott, the trial court awarded a judgment to the plaintiff for defamation and

alienation of affections. The defendant appealed and the appeal was pending when

the Missouri Supreme Court abolished the tort in Helsel. The court in Scott found

that Helsel applied in that case and therefore ruled that the abolishment of the cause

of action applied retrospectively. Scott, 136 S.W.3d at 190.

In this case, Osborne does not have and is not asserting a cause of action for

alienation of affections. She has a judgment. A case is not pending because the

judgment is final and unappealable. State ex rel. Faith Hosp. v. Enright, 706 S.W.2d

852, 854 (Mo. 1986). Stage is not asserting an alienation of affections claim, she is

asserting an exception to discharge claim based on her judgment. We agree with the

bankruptcy court’s conclusion that the abolishment of the tort of alienation of

affections neither affects the validity of a prior final judgment based upon that tort

nor bars her from seeking a determination of its dischargeability. 

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COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 

 Collateral estoppel is a legal doctrine that “bars relitigation of factual or legal

issues that were determined in a prior...court action”. Johnson v. Miera (In re Miera),

926 F.2d 741, 743 (8th Cir. 1991). Collateral estoppel applies to relitigation in

federal court of state court decisions. Fisher v. Scarborough (In re Scarborough),

171 F.3d 638, 640 (8th Cir. 1999). Federal courts are required by statute to give full

faith and credit to state court judgments. State court judicial proceedings “shall have

the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its

Territories and Possessions as they have by law for usage of such State, Territory, or

Possession from which they are taken” 28 U.S.C. § 1738.

The purposes of collateral estoppel are to (1) relieve the parties of the expense

and vexation of attending multiple lawsuits, (2) conserve judicial resources, (3) foster

reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions.

Montana v. U.S., 440 U.S. 147, 162 (1979).

The substantive law of the forum state is used when applying the doctrine of

collateral estoppel. Guarantee Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945); Baker

Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Chaske, 28 F.3d 1466, 1475 (8th Cir. 1994). Thus, we look to the

law of Missouri to determine whether collateral estoppel applies.

The elements of collateral estoppel in Missouri are (1) The issues in the prior

and present litigation are identical, (2) there is a prior judgment on the merits, (3) the

party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted is the same as, or in privity with,

the party in the prior suit, (4) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted

must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior suit. State

v. Nunley, 923 S.W.2d 911, 922 (Mo. 1996); see also Nichols v. City of St. Louis, 837

F.2d 833, 835 (8th Cir. 1988) (applying Mo. law). The doctrine applies only to those

issues which were necessarily and unambiguously decided. American Polled

Hereford Assoc. v. City of Kansas City, 626 S.W.2d 237, 241 (Mo. 1982). 

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 The Eighth Circuit ruled that a debt cannot be excepted from discharge

under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), unless it is based on an intentional tort.

7

Stage concedes that the second, third and fourth elements are satisfied. The

parties are identical, there was a prior judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction

and Stage had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in state court. The

dispute is over the first element. The parties do not agree on whether the issues are

identical and specifically whether the elements of alienation of affections establish

willful and malicious injury for the purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). 

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) reads in pertinent part “A discharge...does not discharge

an individual debtor from any debt...for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to

another entity or the property of another entity.” In the Eighth Circuit, the terms

“willful” and “malicious” are two distinct elements, each of which must be shown to

establish an exception to discharge. Fisher, 171 F.3d at 641. 

Willfulness

The Supreme Court addressed the term “willful” for purposes of § 523(a)(6)

and concluded that the word “willful” modifies the word “injury. This indicates that

the exception to discharge requires a deliberate or intentional injury, not merely a

deliberate or intentional act that leads to injury. Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57,

61 (1998). 

The category of injury that the Supreme Court envisioned was that of an

intentional tort. “[T]he (a)(6) formulation triggers...the category of intentional torts,

as distinguished from negligent or reckless torts.” Geiger, 523 at 62; affirming the

Eighth Circuit in Geiger v. Kawaauhau (In re Geiger), 113 F.3d 848, 852 (8th Cir.

1997) (en banc).3

 Intentional torts generally require that the actor intend the

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“consequences of an act, and not just the act itself.” Restatement (Second) of Torts

§ 8A cmt. a. 

The Restatement (Second) of Torts makes a distinction between injury and

harm. Injury, as used in the Restatement, denotes an invasion of any legally protected

interest of another. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 7(1). Comment a to this section

clarifies this by stating “...there has been an invasion of a legally protected interest

which, if it were the legal consequence of a tortious act, would entitle the person

suffering the invasion to maintain an action of tort. Thus willfulness means that the

defendant intended the injury. 

Maliciousness

The Supreme Court did not address the meaning of malicious in Geiger.

Allstate Insurance v. Dziuk (In re Dziuk), 218 B.R. 485 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1998). 

In the Eighth Circuit, an injury is malicious when the debtor intended to harm

the creditor at least in the sense that the debtor’s tortious conduct was certain or

almost certain to cause harm. Waugh v. Eldridge (In re Waugh), 95 F.3d 706, 711

(8th Cir. 1996); Johnson v. Miera (In re Miera), 926 F.2d 741, 743 (8th Cir. 1991).

Intentional harm is difficult to establish, but the likelihood of harm in an objective

sense may be considered in evaluating intent. Barclays American Bus. Credit, Inc.

v. Long (In re Long), 774 F.2d 875, 881 (8th Cir. 1985). The mere violation of legal

rights is not enough to show malice “absent some additional aggravated

circumstances”. Id.

In the Restatement, harm (as distinguished from injury) “denote[s] the

existence of loss or detriment in fact of any kind to a person resulting from any

cause.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 7(2). Comment c clarifies this by stating

that the existence of loss or detriment need not necessarily be the invasion of a legally

protected interest. The Eighth Circuit’s definition of malicious focuses on the

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resultant harm done to the creditor. Waugh, 95 F.3d at 711. It is the intent to cause

harm which must exist for an injury to be malicious. 

Summary

In sum, the debtor must have intended the injury to the creditor (willful) and

intended the harm to the creditor (malicious). In re Dziuk, 218 B.R. at 487. The

willful element is satisfied if the injury is the result of an intentional tort. The

malicious element is satisfied if, in committing the intentional tort, the perpetrator

intended the resulting harm, or the harm was substantially certain or nearly certain to

result. See Waugh, 95 F.3d at 711; Long, 774 F.2d at 881.

ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS

Alienation of affections is an intentional tort. In Missouri, the elements of this

cause of action are, (a) the defendant’s wrongful conduct, (b) the plaintiff’s loss of

the affections or consortium of his or her spouse, and (c) the causal connection

between such conduct of the defendant and the loss by the plaintiff. Gibson v.

Frowein, 400 S.W.2d 418, 421 (Mo. 1966). “[A]n action for alienation of affections

is based on inherently wrongful acts of the defendant intentionally done which have

the natural and probable consequences of alienating the affections of the spouse of

the plaintiff, and which in the particular case had that result.” Gibson, 400 S.W.2d

at 421. 

In other words, the acts which constitute the wrongful conduct must be

intentional, but proof that the defendant had an actual intent to alienate the affections

of the plaintiff’s spouse is not necessary. The acts by the defendant that have the

effect of alienating the affections of the plaintiff’s spouse are considered inherently

wrong and seductive. Krause v. Krause, 693 S.W.2d 869, 873 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).

Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts “ One who purposely alienate’s one

spouse’s affections from the other spouse is subject to liability for the harm thus

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 The elements are of alienation of affection in S.D. are (a) wrongful

conduct of the defendant, (b) loss of affection or consortium, and (c) a causal

connection between the wrongful conduct and the loss of affection and

consortium. Hunt v. Hunt, 309 N.W.2d 818, 820 (S.D. 1981). 

5

 The affirmed jury instruction required “wrongful conduct” and not

“intentional and malicious” conduct.

10

caused to any of the other spouse’s legally protected marital interests.” Restatement

(Second) of Torts § 683 (1977). According to the Restatement, protected marital

interests include “affections, society and companionship of the other spouse, sexual

relations, the exclusive enjoyment of them, services in the home, and support. Id.

cmt. c. In addition, it is not necessary that the actor be motivated by ill will toward

the other spouse. In fact, one may be subject to liability even in an absence of a

desire to divert the spouse’s affections to the actor or any other person. Id. cmt. j.

The Eighth Circuit indicated that the key component of an alienation of

affections action is enticement. “It is based on an intentional tort and not on

negligence.” Jones v. Swanson, 341 F.3d 723, 732 (8th Cir. 2003) (interpreting S.D.

law which is nearly identical to Mo. law) citing Pankratz v. Miller, 401 N.W.2d 543,

548-549 (S.D. 1987). It is a general rule for the tort that an actual intent to alienate

the affections of the spouse of another need not be shown, “if the defendant’s

conduct is inherently wrong and tends to, and does, have that effect.” Id.4

In Jones, the defendant claimed that the district court erred in rejecting his jury

instruction which would have required the jury to find that the defendant’s actions

against the plaintiff were “intentional and malicious”. The Eighth Circuit affirmed

indicating that the instruction used in the district court case was nearly identical to

that used in the state court. Jones, 341 F.3d at 735 citing Veeder v. Kennedy, 589

N.W.2d 610 at 618 (S.D. 1999).5

 Clearly maliciousness is not an element of the tort

of alienation of affections

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APPLICATION OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

In this case, the issue is whether the bankruptcy court properly applied

collateral estoppel. The bankruptcy court held that Osborne need not prove

willfulness or maliciousness because both had already been established by the state

court judgment. We agree as to willfulness, but disagree as to maliciousness.

The Supreme Court clearly indicated that willfulness for purposes of §

523(a)(6) was intended to encompass intentional torts. Osborne proved in state court

that Stage alienated the affections of her spouse and therefore caused her injury.

Osborne needed only to prove that Stage intended the inherently wrongful acts which

resulted in Osborne’s loss of consortium. The judgment for liability for alienation of

affections established that Stage intended the injury; therefore willfulness has been

established by the state court judgment. 

Osborne argues that for the purposes of the state court action, the intent to harm

is presumed as the natural and probable consequence of the inherently wrongful act.

See Gibson, 400 S.W.2d at 421. While we are not sure this is a strictly accurate

characterization of the law, even if it is, a presumption of harm is not the same as

proving an intent to harm. 

The jury did not find that Stage acted with an intent to harm Osborne, that was

presumed. By stating the intent to harm is presumed, the Missouri Supreme Court is

saying that it is not an element of the offense that must be proved. In fact, the court

indicates that “actual intent to alienate the affections of plaintiff’s spouse is not

necessary.” Id. As the U.S. Supreme Court has stated “A conclusive presumption

which testimony could not overthrow would effectively eliminate intent as an

ingredient of the offense.” Morissette v. U.S., 342 U.S. 246, 275 (1952). 

Osborne’s judgment did not establish that Stage acted maliciously when she

alienated the affections of Osborne’s husband. The judgment established that Stage’s

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actions resulted in an injury to Osborne and the judgment reflected that violation of

a legally protected right. The judgment did not establish that she intended to harm

Osborne. 

Osborne relies heavily on the verdict director. The director instructed the jury

to find for Osborne if it found “First, Plaintiff was married to Daniel Osborne, and

Second, Defendant, Cynthia Stage caused Plaintiff to lose the society, comfort,

affection and assistance of Daniel Osborne, and Third, Defendant did so intentionally

and Fourth Plaintiff was thereby damaged.” The verdict director cites two cases:

Miller v. Neill, 867 S.W.2d 523 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); Krause v. Krause, 693 S.W.2d

869 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). In both cases, the juries received similar directives, but the

directives were based on the intent required for alienation of affections. 

 In Miller, the defendant appealed a verdict director claiming it was in error

because it allowed the jury to award damages for “the doing of acts which were not

intended to cause an alienation of [plaintiff’s] affections.” Miller, 867 S.W.2d at 526.

The court ruled that the defendant need not have intended to cause an alienation of

affections, he need only to have intended to do the acts which resulted in the loss of

consortium. Id.

In Krause, the court concluded that while the acts constituting the wrongful

conduct must have been intentional, “proof that the defendant had an actual intent to

alienate the affections of the plaintiff’s spouse is not necessary if the acts and the

conduct of the defendant are inherently wrong.” Krause, 693 S.W.2d at 873. In

addition, in Krause the court concluded that a plaintiff established a prima facie case

when she had proved “the wrongful acts of the defendant intentionally done have

caused the plaintiff to suffer a loss of consortium of her spouse.” Id. In bankruptcy

terms, proof of intent to harm is not a requirement of alienation of affections. The

verdict director on intent must be read in light of the cases interpreting it. “Did so

intentionally,” refers to the injury, not the harm.

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CONCLUSION

The intent in an alienation of affections cause of action need only be to engage

in acts that are inherently wrongful, not ones that are intended to cause harm to the

plaintiff. Gibson, 400 S.W.2d at 421. Therefore, the jury need only have found that

the plaintiff acted with the intent required to meet the elements of alienation of

affections. By finding Stage liable for alienation of affections, the jury did not

necessarily find that she acted maliciously by intending to harm Osborne, only that

she acted willfully to cause the injury. If the jury did not determine whether Stage

intended to harm Osborne, it did not establish that Stage’s actions were malicious for

purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

We hold that the judgment for alienation of affections in Missouri state court

established that Cynthia Stage acted willfully, but not maliciously. Therefore we

reverse the bankruptcy court grant of summary judgment. To prevail, Osborne must

prove that Stage’s actions were targeted at her, i.e. that Stage intended to harm her.

 

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