Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-15-01178/USCOURTS-caDC-15-01178-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
LifeSource
Petitioner
National Labor Relations Board
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 15-1178 September Term, 2016

 FILED ON: OCTOBER 21, 2016

LIFESOURCE,

PETITIONER

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

RESPONDENT

Consolidated with 15-1201 

On Petition for Review and Cross-Application

for Enforcement of an Order of 

the National Labor Relations Board

Before: GRIFFITH and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

J U D G M E N T

This case was considered on the record from the National Labor Relations Board and on the 

briefs of the parties. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2); D.C. CIR. R. 34(j). The court has afforded the 

issues full consideration and has determined that they do not warrant a published opinion. See 

D.C. CIR. R. 36(d). For the reasons stated below, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the petition for review be DENIED and the Board’s 

cross-application for enforcement be GRANTED.

LifeSource challenges the Board’s administration of a representation election. In March 

2012, certain employees at a LifeSource facility voted to be represented by Local 881, United 

Food and Commercial Workers. LifeSource filed objections to the election. A Board Regional 

Director then conducted an investigation and recommended overruling the objections without a 

hearing. After a review process interrupted by NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014), 

the Board eventually adopted the Regional Director’s findings and recommendations and 

certified the union. LifeSource refused to bargain, and the Board issued a Decision and Order in 

June 2015 finding that LifeSource violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor 

Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (1), and ordering LifeSource to recognize and bargain with 

the Union. We uphold the Board’s decision.

USCA Case #15-1178 Document #1642048 Filed: 10/21/2016 Page 1 of 3
This court reviews the Board’s Decision and Order for abuse of discretion. U-Haul Co. of 

Nev. v. NLRB, 490 F.3d 957, 961 (D.C. Cir. 2007). “On questions regarding representation, we 

accord the Board an especially wide degree of discretion.” Id. (quoting Canadian Am. Oil Co. v. 

NLRB, 82 F.3d 469, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).

According to LifeSource, the Board should have at least held an evidentiary hearing, or even 

better invalidated the election. To get a hearing, the objecting party must produce “specific 

evidence which prima facie would warrant setting aside the election.” Amalgamated Clothing 

Workers of Am. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 818, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (quoting U.S. Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 

373 F.2d 602, 606 (5th Cir. 1967)). To set aside an election, “the objecting party must produce 

‘specific evidence’ that the election was improperly conducted and that the acts complained of 

‘interfered with the employees’ exercise of free choice to such an extent that they materially 

affected the results of the election.’” Id. at 827 (quoting NLRB v. Golden Age Beverage Co., 415 

F.2d 26, 30 (5th Cir. 1969)). 

The Board did not abuse its discretion in concluding that LifeSource failed to make a prima 

facie showing of any material effect on election results. LifeSource presented an affidavit from 

one of its election observers showing three supposed flaws in the election procedure: the election 

observers briefly left the voting area twice; voters could see the official list tracking who had 

already voted; and the Board agent briefly left the voting area and later could not remember 

whether she brought the unmarked ballots with her. Those facts—which the Board accepted—do 

not indicate any effect on voters’ choices or the vote tally. LifeSource hypothesizes various forms 

of tampering that could have occurred as a result of the alleged flaws, but that speculation does 

not amount to the “specific evidence,” id. at 828, necessary to warrant a hearing. LifeSource also 

contends that the flaws destroyed the ideal “laboratory conditions” to which the Board aspires, 

but a party objecting to deviations from election procedures must still “show that such a 

deviation had a material effect on the election such as an impact on an individual vote.” Hard 

Rock Holdings, LLC v. NLRB, 672 F.3d 1117, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 2012). LifeSource failed to show 

that here. The Board was therefore within its discretion to conclude that LifeSource’s objections 

did not warrant a hearing, much less a new election.

LifeSource makes several additional arguments, none of which saves its case. First, closer 

scrutiny because of the three flaws’ cumulative effect and the election’s close result does not 

transform LifeSource’s hypothetical harms into specific evidence. Second, LifeSource argues that

the Board gave its claims only conclusory consideration. Nothing, however, about the Regional 

Director’s report or the Board’s review calls into question the “strong presumption of regularity” 

that the Board receives. Nat’l Small Shipments Traffic Conference, Inc. v. Interstate Commerce 

Comm’n, 725 F.2d 1442, 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Third, LifeSource requests access to compulsory 

process, but it made no proper application to the Board for a subpoena, and it identifies no legal 

entitlement to one here. Fourth, “post-election turnover [of employees] is an insufficient ground 

to set aside an election.” Pearson Educ., Inc. v. NLRB, 373 F.3d 127, 133 (D.C. Cir. 2004) 

(quoting Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 285 N.L.R.B. 1032, 1033 (1987), enforced, 849 F.2d 599 

(3d Cir. 1988)). Finally, no authority provides that elections become invalid merely because 

substantial time has passed during Board and judicial review.

USCA Case #15-1178 Document #1642048 Filed: 10/21/2016 Page 2 of 3
Accordingly, we deny LifeSource’s petition for review and grant the Board’s crossapplication for enforcement.

Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is 

directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of any 

timely petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc. See FED. R. APP. P. 41(b); D.C. CIR. R.

41(a)(1).

Per Curiam

FOR THE COURT:

Mark J. Langer, Clerk

BY: /s/

 Ken Meadows

 Deputy Clerk

USCA Case #15-1178 Document #1642048 Filed: 10/21/2016 Page 3 of 3