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Parties Involved:
Kirby Bruce Marshall
Appellee
TRW, Inc.
Appellant

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 16 1990 

ROBERT L. l!OECKER 

Clerk 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

No. 88-2832 

KIRBY BRUCE MARSHALL, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

TRW, INC., REDA PUMP DIVISION, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. 86-C-292-E) 

Stephen L. Andrew (D. Kevin 

Clark, P.C., with him on 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Ikenberry of 

the brief), 

McCormick, Andrew & 

Tulsa, Oklahoma, for 

Patrick J. Malloy, III (Leslie V. Williams of Malloy & Malloy, 

Inc., with him on the brief), Tulsa, Oklahoma, for PlaintiffAppellee. 

Before LOGAN, BRORBY, and MCWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges. 

McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 88-2832 Document: 01019583308 Date Filed: 04/16/1990 Page: 1 
Kirby Bruce Marshall, a citizen of Oklahoma, brought suit in 

the United States District Court for the Northern District of 

Oklahoma, against TRW, Inc., a foreign corporation doing business 

in the State of Oklahoma with its principal place of business in 

Cleveland, Ohio. Jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, 28 u.s.c. § 1332. 

The gist of the complaint was that Marshall, an employee of 

the defendant corporation in Bartlesville, Oklahoma, filed a workers' compensation claim arising out of injuries sustained by 

Marshall in the course of his employment with the defendant, in 

connection with which he retained a lawyer, and that the 

defendant, in retaliation therefor, discharged Marshall on 

November 8, 1985, in violation of 85 o.s. (1976 Supp.) §§ 5 and 

6. Marshall sought ~oney equal to his lost earnings from the time 

of the injury up until the time of trial, reinstatement, and punitive damages. 

Although we are unable to find defendant's answer in the 

record before us, it appears that the defendant denied retaliatory 

discharge and alleged that Marshall's discharge resulted from 

Marshall's violation of the collective bargaining agreement 

between defendant and its employees' union which forbade employees 

to be employed by any other company or person when on medical 

leave. 

A jury trial resulted in a verdict in favor of Marshall and 

against the defendant for $150,000 in actual damages and $125,000 

in punitive damages. In answer to a special interrogatory submitted by the court, the jury also found that because of hostility in 

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Appellate Case: 88-2832 Document: 01019583308 Date Filed: 04/16/1990 Page: 2 
the work place reinstatement was not an appropriate remedy and 

awarded Marshall an additional $250,000 as future damages. Judgments based on the jury's several verdicts were duly entered. 

Defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in 

the alternative, for a new trial, was denied. Pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1291, defendant appeals. 

As indicated, Marshall's action is based on Oklahoma 

statutes. Specifically, 85 o.s. § 5, which provides as follows: 

"No person, firm, partnership or corporation 

may discharge any employee because the 

employee has in good faith filed a claim, or 

has retained a lawyer to represent him in said 

claim, instituted or caused to be instituted, 

in good faith, any proceeding under the provisions of Title 85 of the Oklahoma Statutes, or 

has testified or is about to testify in such 

proceeding. Provided no employer shall be 

required to rehire or retain any employee who 

is determined physically unable to perform his 

assigned duties." 

Additionally, Marshall relies on 85 o.s. § 6, which provides 

as follows: 

"Except as provided in Section 29 of this act, 

a person, firm, partnership or corporation who 

violates any provision of Section 5 of this 

title shall be liable for reasonable damages, 

actual and punitive if applicable, suffered by 

an employee as a result of the violation. An 

employee discharged in violation of the Workers' Compensation Act shall be entitled to be 

reinstated to his former position. Exemplary 

or punitive damage awards made pursuant to 

this section shall not exceed One Hundred 

Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00). The burden of 

proof shall be upon the employee." 

As indicated, defendant alleges that it discharged Marshall 

because he obtained employment with another company while on 

medical leave in violation of the collective bargaining agreement 

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Appellate Case: 88-2832 Document: 01019583308 Date Filed: 04/16/1990 Page: 3 
between it and its employees' union. In this regard, the collective bargaining agreement between the defendant and its employees' 

union provides in Article 15 as follows: 

"Section 1. Employees with three (3) or more 

years of continuous service, upon written 

request, shall be eligible for a leave of 

absence at the discretion of the Company, not 

to exceed one (1) year and fifteen (15) days. 

If an employee enters into employment with any 

other company or person during such leave of 

absence, the employment shall be terminated as 

of the date of the leave of absence, unless 

otherwise agreed upon by the Company and the 

Union. The employee's seniority, as defined 

in Article 17, shall not accumulate after 

fourteen (14) days of continuous absence for 

personal reasons. The granting of such leave 

of absence shall be at the sole discretion of 

the Company. 

"Section 6. Employees, who are under a doctor's care, shall be considered on medical 

leave after thirty (30) days of continuous 

absence. Bargaining unit seniority of an 

individual shall continue while on medical 

leave for one (1) year and fifteen (15) days. 

A leave may be continued with the mutual 

agreement of the Company and Union ...• The 

duration of a medical leave and conditions 

thereof shall be the same as defined in Section 1 of this Article." 

Before addressing the issues raised on appeal, a brief 

recital of the background facts will put things in focus. 

Marshall, who had been employed by the defendant for some 16 

years, suffered severe work-related burns on April 11, 1985. He 

filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits under state law 

and was being paid benefits when he was placed on so-called 

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Appellate Case: 88-2832 Document: 01019583308 Date Filed: 04/16/1990 Page: 4 
"medical leave" by the defendant. 1 Marshall also retained an attorney to represent him in connection with his possible claims 

against the defendant. On November 8, 1985, Marshall was 

discharged by the defendant. It was Marshall's theory of the case 

that defendant discharged him in retaliation for his filing of a 

workers' compensation claim and retaining an attorney to represent 

him in pursuing his various remedies. 

It was defendant's theory of the case that Marshall's 

discharge had nothing to do with his filing of a workers' 

compensation claim or retaining an attorney, and that in reality 

he was fired because he was employed, or self-employed, in a 

bicycle shop while on medical leave, and that such violated the 

collective bargaining agreement between defendant and its 

employees' union. 2 

In response, Marshall contended that the reason given him by 

defendant for his discharge was pretextual. In this regard, 

Marshall testified that he had run the bicycle shop for a period 

of time before being placed on medical leave as a result of his 

work-related injuries, and that he regarded such as a legitimate 

form of "moonlighting." There was evidence that Marshall's 

operation of the bicycle shop did not interfere with his duties at 

1 The defendant was apparently self-insured, and Marshall received 

all benefits and other payments directly from the defendant. 

2 Pursuant to the grievance procedure provided in the collective 

bargaining agreement, Marshall filed a grievance over his 

discharge, insisting that he had not violated Article 15 of the 

collective bargaining agreement. We are advised that the grievance has not yet been arbitrated. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2832 Document: 01019583308 Date Filed: 04/16/1990 Page: 5 
defendant's plant, that it was both known by defendant and permitted by defendant. Marshall testified that while he rehabilitated 

from his burn injuries he had little or nothing to do with the 

day-to-day operation of the shop. Defense witnesses agreed that 

before they terminated Marshall's employment, they made no contact 

with Marshall or otherwise inquired about any so-called "outside 

employment." Other witnesses testified that Marshall was the only 

employee ever discharged for accepting employment while on medical 

leave. 

I. Pre-emption 

Defendant's principal argument in this court, as it ~as in 

the district court, is that under Article VI, clause 2, of the 

United States Constitution, Marshall's state tort claim of 

retaliatory discharge for filing a workers' compensation claim is 

pre-empted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. 29 

U.S.C. § 185(a); Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962); 

and Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985). 

We believe the pre-emption issue is controlled by Lingle v. 

Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988). 

Defendant claims that Lingle supports its claim of pre-emption, 

whereas Marshall asserts that Lingle, "if anything;" supports his 

position of "no pre-emption." 

The State of Illinois has a statute similar to the one we are 

presently concerned with which provides that an employee who is 

discharged for filing a wor~ers' compensation claim may recover 

compensatory and punitive damages from his or her employer. Ms. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2832 Document: 01019583308 Date Filed: 04/16/1990 Page: 6 
Lingle was employed in the defendant's plant in Herrin, Illinois. 

She notified the defendant that she had been injured in the course 

of her employment and requested compensation pursuant to the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act. A week later her employment was 

terminated by the defendant and the reason given !or her discharge 

was for filing a "false workers' compensation claim.'' The union 

representing Ms. Lingle filed a grievance pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement which precluded discharge except for 

"proper" or "just cause." Ultimately, an arbitrator ruled for Ms. 

Lingle and ordered her reinstatement with full back pay. 

Meanwhile, Ms. Lingle filed an action in Illinois state court 

under the Illinois statute which prohibited an employee's 

discharge for exercising her rights under the Illinois workers' 

compensation laws. It was removed to the federal district court 

on the grounds of ~iversity. The district court thereafter 

dismissed the complaint on the ground that federal law pre-empted 

the state tort claim, concluding that the "claim for retaliatory 

discharge is 'inextricably intertwined' with the collective 

bargaining provision prohibiting wrongful discharge or discharge 

without just cause" and that to allow the state tort claim to 

proceed to conclusion would undermine the collective bargaining 

agreement and the arbitration procedures contained therein. On 

appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en bane, 

agreed that the state tort claim was pre-empted by § 301 of the 

Labor Management Relations Act. 

On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed. In so doing, the 

Supreme Court spoke as follows: 

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Appellate Case: 88-2832 Document: 01019583308 Date Filed: 04/16/1990 Page: 7 
"Illinois courts have recognized the tort of retaliatory 

discharge for filing a workers' compensation claim, ..• 

and have held that it is applicable to employees covered 

by union contracts. '[T]o show retaliatory 

discharge, the plaintiff must set forth sufficient facts 

from which it can be inferred that (1) he was discharged 

or threatened with discharge and (2) the employer's motive in discharging or threatening to discharge him was 

to deter him from exercising his rights under the Act or 

to interfere with his exercise of those rights.' • 

Each of these purely factual questions pertains to the 

conduct of the employee and the conduct and motivation 

of the employer. Neither of the elements requires a 

court to interpret any term of a collective-bargaining 

agreement. To defend against a retaliatory discharge 

claim, an employer must show that it had a 

nonretaliatory reason for the discharge; ••• this 

purely factual inquiry likewise does not turn on the 

meaning of any provision of a collective-bargaining 

agreement. Thus, the state-law remedy in this case is 

'independent' of the collective-bargaining agreement in 

the sense of 'independent' that matters for § 301 preemption purposes: resolution of the state-law claim 

does not require construing the collective-bargaining 

agreement." (Citations and footnotes omitted.) 

The Supreme Court in Lingle also noted that the Court of Ap~ 

peals, as well as the district court, believed that from a factual 

standpoint the state tort claim was "inextricably intertwined'' 

with the collective bargaining agreement and, in connection 

therewith, commented as follows: 

"We agree with the Court's explanation that the statelaw analysis might well involve attention to the same 

factual considerations as the contractual determination 

of whether Lingle was fired for just cause. But we 

disagree with the court's conclusion that such parallelism renders the state-law analysis dependent upon the 

contractual analysis. For while there may be instances 

in which the National Labor Relations Act pre-empts 

state law on the basis of the subject matter of the law 

in question, § 301 pre-emption merely ensures that 

federal law will be the basis for interpreting 

collective-bargaining agreements, and says nothing about 

the substantive rights a State may provide to workers 

when adjudication of those rights does not depend upon 

the interpretation of such agreements. In other words, 

even if dispute resolution pursuant to a collectivebargaining agreement, on the one hand, and state law, on 

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Appellate Case: 88-2832 Document: 01019583308 Date Filed: 04/16/1990 Page: 8 
the other, would require addressing precisely the same 

set of facts, as long as the state-law claim can be 

resolved without interpreting the agreement itself, the 

claim is 'independent' of the agreement for § 301 preemption purposes.'' (Footnotes omitted.) 

Lingle, in our view, indicates that there is no federal preemption in the instant case. Marshall alleged, and had the burden 

of proving, retaliatory discharge, i.e., the defendant discharged 

him for filing a workers' compensation claim. The defendant 

articulated a non-retaliatory reason for the discharge. Marshall 

then sought to show that the reason given, whether the reason was 

good, bad or indifferent, was entirely pretextual. The basic issue in oui case, as in Lingle, is whether there was, or was not, a 

retaliatory discharge. As in Lingle, there is no necessity of 

interpreting the collective bargaining agreement. 

We believe our holding in the instant case that there was "no 

pre-emption" is in accord with the result and rationale in Peabody 

Galion v. Dollar, 666 F.2d 1309 (10th Cir. 1981). In P~abody, 

numerous employees who had been discharged brought suit under 85 

O.S. (1976 Supp.) §§ 5 and 6 against their employer, alleging they 

had been discharged because they had filed workers' compensation 

claims. Some of the plaintiffs had already had their claims 

submitted to arbitration and had lost. The defendant employer 

moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff could 

only pursue arbitration under the bargaining agreement and could 

not maintain an action under 85 O.S. (1976 Supp.) §§ 5 and 6. The 

district court denied that motion and Peabody took an 

interlocutory appeal. In affirming the district court, we 

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Appellate Case: 88-2832 Document: 01019583308 Date Filed: 04/16/1990 Page: 9 
concluded "that the Oklahoma statute is not facially pre-empted by 

any of the federal labor laws. 113 

As supplemental authority, defendant cites Doran v. 

Thermotex, 132 L.R.R.M. 3041 (N.D. Oh. 1989). That case, in our 

view, is different than the instant case. In Doran, the 

plaintiff-employee was terminated by the defendant-employer 

because his leave of absence arising from an industrial accident 

exceeded one year. The plaintiff brought suit under an Ohio 

statute which provided that an employer could not discharge an 

employee for filing a workers' compensation claim. The collective 

bargaining agreement between defendant and plaintiff's union 

provided that an employee's "seniority" is terminated if he has 

one year or more seniority and "is out of service for any reason 

for more than one year." Plaintiff amended his complaint to 

include allegations that he was discharged pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement. In this regard, it was plaintiff's 

position that the provision in the agreement above referred to 

simply meant that after one year's absence he lost his "seniority, 11 but not his "employment." Defendant's position was that 

"loss of seniority'' equates with "loss of employment." It was in 

this setting that the court held that the state court claim was 

pre-empted by federal common law principles where the dispute 

turned on the interpretation of a clause in the collective 

3 The Seventh Circuit in Lingle specifically addressed our Peabody 

and did not "agree with the Tenth Circuit's analysis of the 

presumption issue." Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 

823. F.2d 1031, 1047 (7th Cir. 1987). In granting certiorari, the 

Supreme Court in Lingle noted the conflict in the circuits. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2832 Document: 01019583308 Date Filed: 04/16/1990 Page: 10 
bargaining contract, and dismissed the action. Such is not our 

case. 

II. Future Damages 

As stated above, the jury awarded Marshall $150,000 in actual 

damages sustained by him up until and through the trial of his 

case. In his complaint, Marshall also asked for reinstatement. 

By the time of trial, however, Marshall did not seek reinstatement 

claiming, through counsel, that because of work-place hostility 

reinstatement was inappropriate, and that he should, therefore, be 

compensated for future loss of income. Marshall, who was thirty-. 

eight years of age at trial, testified that he had been unable to 

find any employment since his discharge by the defendant, although 

he continued to operate his bicycle repair shop. 

The district court, without apparent objection, ruled that if 

there was such hostility between Marshall and tDe defendant as to 

render reinstatement inappropriate, then so-called "future damages" could be awarded in lieu of reinstatement. 4 The district 

court then asked the jury, by special interrogatory, to decide 

whether there was such hostility. If the answer was "no," then 

the district court would presumably have ordered reinstatement. 

The jury was further instructed, however, that if their answer to 

the interrogatory was "yes,'' then it could award future damages, 

which the jury did, and set the award therefor at $250,000. 

4 In Equal Employment Opportunity Conunission v. Prudential Federal 

Savings and Loan Association, 763 F.2d 1166, 1172-73 (10th Cir. 

1985), an age discrimination case, we held that reinstatement is 

the preferred remedy, but where reinstatement is inappropriate 

because of ''extreme hostility" in the work place future damages 

may be awarded. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2832 Document: 01019583308 Date Filed: 04/16/1990 Page: 11 
On appeal, the defendant argues that there was no evidence of 

such hostility that would render reinstatement inappropriate and 

that, in any event, the evidence does not support an award of 

$250,000 as future damages. We agree. 

85 O.S. § 6 provides that an employer who violates 85 o.s. § 

5 "shall be liable for reasonable damages, actual and punitive if 

applicable, • [and] an employee shall be entitled to be 

reinstated to his former position." It would appear that under 

the statute "reinstatement" is the preferred remedy. We do not 

disagree with the district court that if hostility renders 

reinstatement inappropriate, future damages may be awarded in lieu 

thereof. Our problem is that we find no testimony from any source 

concerning hostility, or lack of hostility, between Marshall and 

defendant. There is nothing in the record to support any .finding 

of nostility. As far as we can tell, there was no testimony bearing on the issue, although there was closing argument to the jury 

on the matter. The fact that there was retaliatory discharge, as 

the jury has now determined there was, does not by itself necessarily establish hostility. The statute itself recognizes that 

where there has been a retaliatory discharge, reinstatement is an 

appropriate remedy. 

In our view, the finding of hostility in the work place is 

not supported by the record before us. Further, the evidence to 

support an award of $250,000 is thin. About all there is in this 

regard is testimony that Marshall was thirty-eight years of age at 

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Appellate Case: 88-2832 Document: 01019583308 Date Filed: 04/16/1990 Page: 12 
trial, was netting $22,000 in yearly salary, and had many years 

remaining until retirement age. 5 

In Jackson v. City of Albuquerque, 890 F.2d 225 (10th Cir. 

1989), a civil rights case, the plaintiff-employee was, inter 

alia, denied reinstatement and awarded "front pay" in the amount 

of $100,000. The employee appealed, seeking reinstatement instead 

of front pay. In reversing, we held that reinstatement was the 

"preferred remedy" and· that there was insufficient evidence of 

hostility to render reinstatement inappropriate. In Jackson, at 

232, we noted "most of those making complaint against the 

plaintiff are no longer employed" by the defendant-employer. And 

in the instant case, the two employees of the defendant company 

who made the decision to discharge Marshall are no longer employed 

by defendant. 

Accordingly, the judgment ~warding tuture damages must be 

reversed. 

III. Punitive Damages 

85 o.s. § 6 provides that an employer who discharges an 

employee who in good faith files a claim under the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation laws ''shall be liable for reasonable damages, 

actual and punitive, if applicable .. II That statute was 

5 In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Prudential Savings 

& Loan Association, 763 F.2d 1166, 1173 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. 

denied, Prudential Fed'l Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. E.E.O.C., 474 U.S. 

946 (1985), we recognized that "future" damages are inherently 

open to the charge of uncertainty and speculation, and we outlined 

how courts can minimize this uncertainty. 

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amended, effective November 1, 1986, so as to limit punitive damages to $100,000. Suit in the instant case was commenced on March 

27, 1986, and Marshall had been discharged in November 1985. In 

such circumstance, the district court declined to apply the newly 

enacted ''cap" on punitive damages in the instant case and, as 

above stated, the jury awarded punitive damages in the sum of 

$125,000. Marshall, incidentally, had requested punitive damages 

in the sum of $250,000 and, in line therewith, the jury was 

instructed that any award of punitive damages could not exceed 

$250,000. 

Defendant asserts on appeal that the punitive damage award 

should be reduced to $100,000. Counsel agree that the Oklahoma 

Supreme Court in Thomas v. Cumberland Operating Company, 569 P.2d 

974 (Okla. 1977) held that statutory increases in wrongful death 

limitations were changes in a substantive right and would not be 

applied retroactively. Defendant argues that a different rule 

should be applied in the case of punitive damages. We are not 

persuaded. This matter has not yet been addressed by the Oklahoma 

Supreme Court, and we are not inclined to disturb the district 

court's prediction of how the Oklahoma Supreme Court would rule on 

the matter. 

IV. Arbitration Remedy 

The defendant argues that the district court erred in excluding evidence concerning the availability of the arbitration remedy 

provided in the collective bargaining agreement. We do not agree. 

This particular argument is a facet of defendant's pre-emption 

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argument. In this 

instructed the jury 

interpretation of the 

that "you are not 

general connection, the district court 

that it was not to concern itself with any 

collective bargaining agreement, stating 

to decide whether the defendant correctly or 

incorrectly interpreted any provision" of the collective bargaining agreement and that the issue to be resolved by the jury was 

whether Marshall's filing of a workers' compensation claim was a 

"significant factor" in defendant's decision to terminate. In 

sum, the remedy provided by state law in 85 o.s. §§ 5 and 6 is 

independent of possible remedies provided in the collective 

bargaining agreement. The two are not ''inextricably intertwined." 

Availability of arbitration is immaterial. 

The judgmeQt is affirmed except the judgment for future damages! which is reversed. The case is remanded for further 

proceedings only on the issue of reinstatement vis-a-vis future 

damages. 

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