Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-02-01192/USCOURTS-caDC-02-01192-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kitty Hawk Air Cargo, Inc.
Petitioner
United States Department of Transportation
Respondent

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

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the Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made

before the bound volumes go to press.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 17, 2003 Decided July 2, 2004

No. 02-1190

FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION,

PETITIONER

v.

NORMAN Y. MINETA, SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION, AND

THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,

RESPONDENTS

KITTY HAWK AIR CARGO, INC. AND

EMERY AIR FREIGHT CORPORATION,

INTERVENORS

Consolidated with

02-1192, 02-1284, 02-1313

On Petitions for Review of Orders of the

United States Department of Transportation

–————

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #02-1192 Document #833663 Filed: 07/02/2004 Page 1 of 14
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Warren L. Dean, Jr. argued the cause for petitioners.

With him on the briefs were Patricia N. Snyder, Cynthia J.

Collins, Robert P. Silverberg, and Neil J. King. Dwayne S.

Byrd entered an appearance.

Christine N. Kohl, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for respondents. With her on the brief

were William G. Kanter, Deputy Director, Michael J. Singer,

Attorney, Kirk Van Tine, General Counsel, U.S. Department

of Transportation, Paul M. Geier, Assistant General Counsel,

Peter J. Plocki, Senior Litigation Counsel, and Thomas L.

Ray, Attorney.

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, EDWARDS, Circuit Judge,

and WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge GINSBURG.

GINSBURG, Chief Judge: Five air cargo carriers, Federal

Express, Emery Air Freight, Kitty Hawk Aircargo, Polar Air

Cargo, and United Parcel Service, petition for review of four

rules promulgated by the Department of Transportation to

govern the award of compensation to air carriers under the

Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act,

§§ 101 et seq., 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note. The Carriers argue

the four rules — the offset rule, two rebuttable accounting

presumptions, and a procedure for the recoupment of excess

payments — are inconsistent with the terms of the Stabilization Act and were promulgated without an opportunity for

comment, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.

For the reasons set forth below, we deny the petition for

review with respect to the APA claims and the offset rule,

and dismiss the petition as unripe with respect to statutory

challenges to the two accounting rules and the recoupment

procedure.

I. Background

On September 11, 2001, as terrorists hijacked four commercial passenger aircraft, the Federal Aviation Administration

issued a ‘‘ground stop order’’ halting all civilian air traffic

within the United States’ airspace. That order was lifted in

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large part on September 14, 2001, but remained in effect at

certain airports, such as Ronald Reagan National Airport,

until the late fall of 2001 (a detail we may ignore for the

purpose of analysis).

On September 22, 2001 the Congress enacted and the

President signed into law the Air Transportation Safety and

System Stabilization Act in order to compensate air carriers

for the losses they incurred from the ground stop order while

it was in effect, and for the losses they would incur through

December 31, 2001 as a direct result of the attacks. To that

end, § 101(a)(2) of the Act authorizes the President to ‘‘[c]ompensate air carriers in an aggregate amount’’ of $5 billion for:

(A) direct losses incurred beginning on September 11,

2001 TTT as a result of any Federal ground stop order

issued by the Secretary of Transportation or any subsequent order which continues or renews such a stoppage;

and

(B) the incremental losses, incurred beginning September 11, 2001, and ending December 31, 2001 TTT as a

direct result of such attacks.

In the case of a cargo carrier, however, the amount of

compensation is capped at the lesser of ‘‘the amount of such

air carrier’s direct and incremental losses described in section

101(a)(2),’’ § 103(b)(1), or a percentage of $500 million equal

to that carrier’s percentage of the ‘‘total revenue ton miles’’ of

all cargo carriers for the last quarter for which data are

available, § 103(b)(2)(B). Section 103(a) authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to ‘‘audit’’ the documents the air

carrier submits in order to determine the carrier’s entitlement to compensation.

By the end of September 2001 the DOT had compensated

air carriers to the extent of approximately $2.3 billion. The

petitioning Carriers, each of which received some compensation, are now pursuing before the Department administrative

appeals regarding the exact amounts to which they are

entitled.

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Over the next year the DOT issued four cumulative and

superceding ‘‘Final Rules’’ to govern the award of compensation to air carriers. See Procedures for Compensation of Air

Carriers, 66 Fed. Reg. 54,616 (October 29, 2001) (First Final

Rule), 67 Fed. Reg. 250 (January 2, 2002) (Second Final

Rule), 67 Fed. Reg. 18,468 (April 16, 2002) (Third Final Rule),

and 67 Fed. Reg. 54,058 (August 20, 2002) (Fourth Final

Rule). The First Final Rule was promulgated, pursuant to

the good cause exception of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B),

without prior notice or opportunity for comment, which the

Department deemed ‘‘impractical, unnecessary, and contrary

to the public interest’’ in view of ‘‘the need to move quickly to

provide compensation to air carriers.’’ 66 Fed. Reg. at

54,620/1-2. The DOT nonetheless invited public comments

after the fact, see id. at 54,616/1, and it responded to them

when it issued the Second Final Rule. See 67 Fed. Reg. at

250/1-2. Although the Second Final Rule was also made

‘‘immediately effective,’’ the DOT again sought post hoc comments from the public. See id. at 255/1.

The Third Final Rule introduced the four provisions as to

which the Carriers now petition for review. The ‘‘offset rule’’

provides

[If] a carrier experienced better-than-forecasted total

results for [the period September 11 through December

31, 2001, then] the actual results for the period after the

Federal ground stop order was lifted TTT must be offset

against direct losses incurred during the period of the

Federal ground stop order.

67 Fed. Reg. at 18,474/1. Unlike passenger carriers, which

suffered significant continuing losses after September 11,

some cargo carriers enjoyed higher profits after the attacks

because shipments of military cargo increased and the reduced number of commercial passenger flights shifted some

air freight from passenger to cargo carriers. See 67 Fed.

Reg. at 54,063/1. Therefore, the DOT concluded an offset ‘‘is

necessary to implement the requirement of the Act that air

carriers only receive compensation for losses actually incurred.’’ 67 Fed. Reg. at 18,474/1.

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The Third Final Rule also established rebuttable presumptions regarding the timing of losses and the treatment of

savings. Under the timing presumption the Department

‘‘generally does not allow air carriers to include in their

calculations TTT losses that are not actually and fully realized

in the period between September 11, 2001 and December 31,

2001.’’ 14 C.F.R. § 330.39(a)(1). If, however, an air carrier

can show that ‘‘the actual costs of a loss were the direct result

of the terrorist attacks of September 11 TTT, were fully borne

within the September 11 to December 31 time period and are

permanent, and that compensation for those costs would not

be duplicative, [then] the Department will consider such

claims.’’ 67 Fed. Reg. at 18,472/1.

Under the savings presumption the Department ‘‘generally

does not accept claims by air carriers that cost savings should

be excluded from the calculation of incurred losses.’’ 14

C.F.R. § 330.39(b). An air carrier can rebut this presumption only if it ‘‘can provide pre-existing documentary support’’

demonstrating ‘‘specific instances of cost savings that [it]

believes are unrelated to the events of September 11 and

believes should be excluded with the effect of increasing

compensation.’’ 67 Fed. Reg. at 18,473/2-3.

In addition, the DOT adopted the following procedural

requirement for the recoupment of any excess compensation

paid to an air carrier: ‘‘If at any time [the DOT] determine[s]

that a past payment is greater than the amount justified by

the provisions of this part and the documentation you submit,

[the air carrier] must repay immediately the excess amount to

the Department.’’ Id. at 18,476/2.

Again the DOT invited comment after rather than before

promulgating the rule, see id. at 18,475/3, and Federal Express, Emery Air Freight, and Kitty Hawk, among others,

submitted comments to which the DOT responded when it

issued the Fourth Final Rule. See 67 Fed. Reg. at 54,062–65.

That Rule did not alter the substance of either the offset rule

or the two accounting presumptions, but the DOT did agree

with Federal Express that the recoupment procedure should

be revised to ‘‘comply with [the Federal Claims] Collection

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Act[, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3701 et seq.,] in pursuing recovery of

overpayments made under the Stabilization Act.’’ Id. at

54,063l; see 14 C.F.R. § 330.9(b). The Carriers now petition

for review of all four rules.

II. Analysis

The Carriers argue the offset rule, the two accounting

presumptions, and the recoupment procedure are contrary to

the Act. They also argue the DOT’s failure to afford interested persons an opportunity to comment before promulgating those rules violated the APA.

A. Offset Rule

The Carriers first argue the offset rule is based upon an

erroneous interpretation of the Stabilization Act. We review

the DOT’s interpretation of the Act under the familiar twostep analysis of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources

Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). First we must

determine ‘‘whether Congress has directly spoken to the

precise question at issue,’’ id. at 842, which is whether an air

carrier’s ‘‘better-than-forecasted total results’’ for the last

quarter of 2001 offset the air carrier’s compensation for the

direct losses it incurred as a result of the ground stop order.

If the Congress has answered that question, then ‘‘the court,

as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously

expressed intent of Congress.’’ Id. at 842-43. If, however,

‘‘the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific

issue,’’ then we must go on to determine ‘‘whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the

statute.’’ Id. at 843.

The Carriers argue the Act unambiguously precludes the

offset rule. According to the Carriers, the offset rule ‘‘improperly collapse[s]’’ into one what the Act treats as two

distinct categories of losses: (A) ‘‘direct losses incurred TTT

as a result of any Federal ground-stop order,’’ § 101(a)(2)(A),

and (B) ‘‘incremental losses incurred [from] September 11

[through] December 31, 2001 TTT as a direct result of [the]

attacks,’’ § 101(a)(2)(B). Thus, the Carriers maintain, the

offset rule ‘‘perverts’’ the intention of the Congress to comUSCA Case #02-1192 Document #833663 Filed: 07/02/2004 Page 6 of 14
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pensate air carriers for both categories of losses and ‘‘renders

section 101(a)(2)(A) superfluous.’’

The Department correctly points to an ambiguity in

§ 101(a)(2) demonstrating that the Act does not ‘‘address the

situation in which a carrier experience[d] short-term losses

during the ground stop order, but later realize[d] better-thanexpected revenues for the remainder of the calendar year.’’

Specifically, the statute is ambiguous regarding how and

when air carriers ‘‘incurred direct losses’’ as a result of the

September 11-14 ground stop order. The Congress neither

defined, nor provided any guidance regarding the meaning of,

the word ‘‘incurred.’’ Did an air carrier incur a loss as a

result of the ground stop order when it was unable to deliver

cargo from September 11-14, 2001? Or did it incur a loss

only if it did not recover by December the business it lost in

September? Quite understandably, nothing in the Act suggests the Congress resolved these questions.

Indeed, the only metric the Act provides to determine

whether an air carrier has incurred a loss under either

§§ 101(a)(2)(A) or (B) is ‘‘the satisfaction of the President.’’

§ 103(a) (‘‘the amount of compensation payable to an air

carrier under section 101(a)(2) may not exceed the amount of

losses described in section 101(a)(2) that the air carrier

demonstrates to the satisfaction of the President TTT the air

carrier incurred’’). This delegation vests the Executive ‘‘with

broad discretion to determine appropriate criteria’’ for the

award of compensation to an air carrier with better-thanexpected results for the period September 11-December 31,

2001. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 22 F.3d 1125,

1148-49 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (statute requiring demonstration of

equal effectiveness of alternative testing program ‘‘to the

satisfaction of the Administrator’’ grants EPA broad discretion to determine equivalency).

The Department, exercising that discretion, interpreted

‘‘losses’’ to mean that which ‘‘is gone and cannot be recovered,’’ and ‘‘incurred’’ to mean ‘‘liable or subject to, as in to

incur debt.’’ 67 Fed. Reg. at 54,062/2-3. Thus, according to

the DOT, a loss has been incurred ‘‘only if that loss has not

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been fully offset by better-than-forecasted results’’ as of

December 31, 2001. 67 Fed. Reg. at 18,474/1. The Department maintains the offset rule does not render § 101(a)(2)

superfluous because it compensates air carriers ‘‘for both

their direct and incremental losses, provided that such losses

have been incurred.’’ (Emphasis in original).

The Department’s interpretation does avoid the otherwise

absurd result of providing a windfall to cargo carriers that

actually benefitted as a result of the attacks of September 11.

Inasmuch as the undisputed purpose of the Act was to

‘‘stabilize an industry that [was] desperately in need of urgent

relief,’’ 147 CONG. REC. H5884 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001)

(statement of Rep. Reynolds), it is simply implausible that the

Congress intended to compensate cargo carriers for the direct losses they incurred as a result of the September 11-14

ground stop order even if they enjoyed better financial results overall for the period September 11-December 31, 2001.

See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 274

(1995) (rejecting interpretation that, ‘‘when viewed in terms of

the statute’s basic purpose, seems anomalous’’). The Congress intended the compensation to ‘‘make up for the revenue

[carriers] lost TTT as a result of [the September 11] terrorist

attack and the government’s order grounding their planes,’’

147 CONG. REC. H5885 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001) (statement of

Rep. Frost); see id. at S9595 (statement of Sen. Levin)

(Stabilization Act provides ‘‘a $5 billion cash infusion to stop

the immediate hemorrhaging of the airline industry and to

cover their losses for the month of September’’); it surely

intended also that the DOT ‘‘pay out no more in subsidy than

is currently needed to accomplish the purposes of the [Act].’’

Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 385 F.2d

648, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1967).

Although the offset rule effectuates the primary purpose of

the Act, the DOT’s parsing of § 101(a)(2), which focuses upon

whether losses have been ‘‘incurred,’’ does nothing to parry

the thrust of the Carriers’ point that the offset rule renders

subsection (A) superfluous. See Asiana Airlines v. FAA, 134

F.3d 393, 398 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (it is ‘‘a cardinal principle of

interpretation [that one should] construe a statute so that no

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provision is rendered inoperative or superfluous, void or

insignificant’’) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). For regardless of what ‘‘incurred’’ means, the interpretation of § 101(a)(2) advanced by the DOT does not account

for the Congress having distinguished between ‘‘direct losses

incurred TTT as a result of any Federal ground stop order’’

and ‘‘incremental losses incurred TTT as a direct result of [the

September 11] attacks’’; rather the Department’s argument

proceeds as if the Act simply made compensable ‘‘all losses

incurred’’ as a result of the September 11 attacks.

The lacuna in DOT’s argument is not fatal to the offset

rule, however, because it is self-evident that § 101(a)(2)(A)

does admit of a straightforward and reasonable interpretation — that is, one in which no provision is rendered superfluous — with which the offset rule is consistent. In subsections

(A) and (B) the Congress sought to compensate air carriers

for losses caused by two different types of events: (A) ‘‘any

Federal ground stop order,’’ and (B) the terrorist attacks of

September 11, respectively. (Emphasis added). The losses

made compensable by § 101(a)(2)(A) are not only those resulting from the ground stop order in effect from September

11 through 14, 2001; they include direct losses from ‘‘any

subsequent order which continues or renews such a stoppage’’

without any limitation in time. By contrast, § 101(a)(2)(B)

provides compensation for the incremental losses incurred by

air carriers only for the period ‘‘beginning September 11,

2001 and ending December 31, 2001.’’ Offsetting the Carriers’ direct losses incurred as a result of the September 11-14

ground stop order by the amount of their better-thanexpected results for the last quarter of 2001 may mean that a

Carrier does not collect anything under § 101(a)(2)(A) for

2001, but it does not render § 101(a)(2)(A) superfluous; a

Carrier may yet receive compensation for its direct losses

from ‘‘any subsequent [ground stop] order which continues or

renews such a stoppage’’ after December 31, 2001. Therefore, we conclude the offset rule reflects a permissible interpretation of § 101(a)(2).

Although the Department’s response to the Carriers’ objection was incomplete, we need not remand the offset rule to

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the DOT, pursuant to SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194,

196 (1947), merely for the agency to republish our interpretation of § 101(a)(2) in the pages of the Federal Register. ‘‘No

principle of administrative law or common sense requires us

to remand a case in quest of a perfect opinion unless there is

reason to believe that the remand might lead to a different

result.’’ Fisher v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 1055, 1057 (7th Cir. 1989).

There is no such reason here. This is not a situation in which

the agency believed its interpretation was ‘‘compelled by a

statute that is actually ambiguous.’’ American Petroleum

Inst. v. EPA, 906 F.2d 729, 740 (D.C. Cir. 1990). In that

situation ‘‘it is not for the court ‘to choose between competing

meanings,’ ’’ and so we remand to the agency that it may

make a policy choice. PDK Labs. Inc. v. DEA, 362 F.3d 786,

798 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting Alarm Indus. Communications

Comm. v. FCC, 131 F.3d 1066, 1072 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). Here,

the DOT has already chosen between competing meanings

and made its policy choice; it merely failed to respond

adequately to the Carriers’ objection that its choice rendered

§ 101(a)(2) (A) superfluous.

B. Accounting Presumptions

The Carriers next argue the two rebuttable accounting

presumptions improperly ‘‘deprive air carriers of the compensation to which they are entitled under the Stabilization Act.’’

The DOT, before arguing the merits of the Carriers’ position,

maintains their objections are not ripe for resolution. The

Carriers respond that their petition is indeed ripe because it

addresses only the ‘‘validity of the [accounting] Rules themselves, not the Rules as applied.’’

Whether the petitioners’ challenge to the accounting rules

is ripe depends upon ‘‘the fitness of the issues for judicial

decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court

consideration.’’ Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149

(1967). In applying the ripeness doctrine to agency action we

‘‘balance the interests of the court and the agency in delaying

review against ‘the petitioner’s interest in prompt consideration of allegedly unlawful agency action.’ ’’ Cronin v. FAA,

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73 F.3d 1126, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Eagle-Picher

Indus. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 905, 915 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).

We conclude that the question whether the accounting

presumptions improperly ‘‘deprive air carriers of compensation to which they are entitled’’ is not ripe for resolution.

First, because the accounting presumptions are rebuttable it

is uncertain whether they will ever have the effect of depriving any of the Carriers of any compensation. See id. at 1132-

33 (‘‘It makes no sense for us to anticipate a wrong when

none may ever arise’’). Moreover, if and when that does

come to pass, judicial review of the issue ‘‘is likely to stand on

a much surer footing in the context of a specific application of

this regulation than could be the case in the framework of the

generalized challenge made here.’’ Toilet Goods Ass’n, Inc.

v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 164 (1967). Therefore, it is in the

interest of the court (and presumably that of the agency) to

postpone review until the DOT resolves the Carriers’ administrative appeals.

Furthermore, postponing review of the accounting presumptions will not be a hardship to the Carriers, let alone a

hardship that is ‘‘immediate, direct, and significant.’’ State

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Dole, 802 F.2d 474, 480 (D.C.

Cir. 1986). The Carriers are concerned that they will be

precluded ‘‘from contesting the validity of the Rules themselves’’ in any appeal of the administrative proceedings now

pending before the DOT, but they need not worry: We have

long held that ‘‘[a] time limitation on petitions for judicial

review TTT can run only against challenges ripe for review.’’

Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. ICC, 672 F.2d 146, 149 (D.C.

Cir. 1982); see Eagle-Picher Indus., 759 F.2d at 911-12

(otherwise untimely petition may be heard ‘‘where the petitioner lacked a meaningful opportunity to challenge the agency action during the review period due to TTT lack of ripeness’’).

In sum, ‘‘[b]ecause the ‘institutional interests’ of the agency

and the court favor postponing review, and because petitioners have pointed to no ‘hardship’ ’’ that would result from

postponing review until the rules have been applied to their

detriment, we dismiss the present challenge to the accounting

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presumptions as unripe. Southern Co. Servs., Inc. v. FCC,

313 F.3d 574, 582 (D.C. Cir. 2002).*

C. Recoupment Procedures

The Carriers next argue the recoupment procedure is

unlawful because the Act does not authorize ‘‘any means

other than an audit for analyzing the propriety of any distribution authorized by the Act.’’ The DOT again argues the

Carriers’ challenge is unripe because their claims for compensation ‘‘are still in the administrative review process’’ and,

therefore, ‘‘it is premature to suggest that they will be subject

to a ‘procedurally unfair’ process.’’ The Carriers reply that

their challenge to the recoupment procedure presents a ripe

issue, namely, whether the DOT may make ‘‘final determinations of claims TTT without following the audit procedures set

forth in the Act.’’

The Carriers’ challenge to § 330.9(b) is unripe for the same

reason their challenge to the accounting presumptions is

unripe. Whether the result of the recoupment procedure will

be any different in substance from that of the ‘‘audit’’ authorized in § 103(a) is necessarily uncertain until the recoupment

procedure has been applied. Therefore, consideration of this

issue, like consideration of the rebuttable accounting presumptions, ‘‘would benefit from a more concrete setting.’’

Clean Air Implementation Project v. EPA, 150 F.3d 1200,

* We go only so far toward review as to caution the DOT against

limiting the evidence used to rebut the savings presumption to ‘‘preexisting documentary support,’’ 67 Fed. Reg. 18,473/2-3, as contemplated in one part of the Rule about which the petitioners specifically complain. There is no rational basis for imposing such a

limitation. See Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Dep’t of Transp., 105 F.3d 702,

706 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Although it may be reasonable initially to

presume that post-September 11 cost-reduction plans were attributable solely ‘‘to changed expectations regarding revenues after the

attacks,’’ 67 Fed. Reg. at 18,473/2, and that pre-September 11 cost

reduction plans ‘‘would have been reflected in an applicant’s preSeptember 11 forecasted financials,’’ id., the DOT offers no reason

to prohibit a carrier from presenting an otherwise valid document

created on or after September 11 showing post-September 11 costreductions that were not linked to the attacks.

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1204 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Furthermore, the Carriers do not

argue they would suffer any hardship from postponing judicial review of this issue. Therefore, we dismiss the present

challenge to the recoupment procedure as unripe.

D. Opportunity to Comment

Finally, the Carriers argue the Third and the Fourth Final

Rules were promulgated in violation of the APA because the

DOT failed to provide an opportunity for public comment

before the Rules became ‘‘final’’; wherefore they ask us to

‘‘direct the Department to publish notice of a proposed rule in

the Federal Register allowing sufficient time for public comments.’’ The DOT argues it has complied with the notice and

comment requirements of the APA because it provided an

opportunity to comment upon the Third Final Rule prior to

the promulgation of the Fourth Final Rule, which is the Rule

pursuant to which the agency will make ‘‘the ultimate determinations of the amount of compensation for which air carriers are eligible.’’ 67 Fed. Reg. at 54,058/2.

The APA requires that the agency ‘‘give interested persons

an opportunity to participate in the rule making through

submission of written data, views, or arguments.’’ 5 U.S.C.

§ 553(c). Although perhaps DOT should not have labeled the

First through Third rules as ‘‘final,’’ the agency has made a

‘‘compelling showing,’’ Advocates for Highway & Auto Safety

v. Fed. Highway Admin., 28 F.3d 1288, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1994),

that it provided ‘‘a meaningful opportunity to comment’’

before the Fourth Final Rule became effective, Gerber v.

Norton, 294 F.3d 173, 179 (D.C. Cir. 2002). In fact, interested persons, including the Carriers, had three opportunities

‘‘to comment on the [Fourth Final R]ule while it [wa]s still in

the formative’’ stage, Advocates for Highway & Auto Safety,

28 F.3d at 1291. And Federal Express and Kitty Hawk each

commented upon the offset rule, the accounting presumptions, and the recoupment procedure. DOT’s responses to,

and in some instances adoption of, the points made by the

Carriers show the agency had a ‘‘flexible and open-minded

attitude towards its own rules,’’ notwithstanding the ‘‘final’’

label it had attached to them. Nat’l Tour Brokers’ Ass’n v.

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United States, 591 F.2d 896, 902 (D.C. Cir. 1978); see Advocates for Highway & Auto Safety, 28 F.3d at 1292 (‘‘changes

and revision are indicative of an open mind’’); McLouth Steel

Prods. Corp. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1317, 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1988)

(‘‘participat[ion] in the rulemaking’’ meaningful because

‘‘agency’s mind remain[ed] open’’ to comments). Having

provided an opportunity to comment before it ‘‘chiseled [the

Fourth Final Rule] into bureaucratic stone,’’ American Fed’n

of Gov’t Employees v. Block, 655 F.2d 1153, 1157 (D.C. Cir.

1981), the DOT satisfied the notice and comment requirements of the APA. Remanding this matter for the agency to

take further comments would serve no useful purpose whatsoever.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is denied

in part and dismissed in part.

So ordered.

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