Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-03-01322/USCOURTS-ca7-03-01322-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sedgwick Johnson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

 June 1, 2007

Before

Hon. RICHARD D. CUDAHY, Circuit Judge

Hon. ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

Hon. ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

Nos. 03-1322, 03-1323 & 03-1477

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff- Appellee,

v.

SEDGWICK JOHNSON, KALONJI

MCMILLIAN, and RAYMOND

COOPER,

 Defendants-Appellants.

Appeals from the United States

District Court for the Northern District

of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 01 CR 543

James F. Holderman, 

Chief Judge.

O R D E R

After concluding that the convictions of Sedgwick Johnson, Kalonji McMillian,

and Raymond Cooper should be affirmed, we ordered a limited remand so that the

district court could determine whether the sentence remained appropriate after United

States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), relegated the United States Sentencing

Guidelines to advisory status. See United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471 (7th Cir.

2005).

The district court judge has replied that it would impose the same sentence,

even knowing that the Guidelines are not mandatory. Therefore, “we will affirm the

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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Nos. 03-1322, 03-1323, & 03-1477 Page 2

original sentence against [the] plain error challenge provided the sentence is

reasonable, the standard of review prescribed by Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 765.” Paladino,

401 F.3d at 484. 

Although the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Rita v. United States, No. 05-

4674, 2006 WL 1144508 (May 4, 2006), cert granted 127 S. Ct. 551 (2006), to determine

whether it is consistent with Booker to accord a presumption of reasonableness to

within-Guidelines sentences, the presumption of reasonableness accorded to such

sentences reflects the current state of the law in our circuit. See United States v.

Gama-Gonzales, 469 F.3d 1109, 1110-11 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Mykytiuk, 415

F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005). Here, each appellant received a sentence within the

now-advisory Guidelines range. As a career offender, Johnson’s range was 360 months

to life, and the district court sentenced him to 360 months. The range applicable to

McMillian was 188 to 235 months, and the district court sentenced him to 204 months.

For Cooper, the sentencing range was 324 to 405 months, and he received a sentence

of 360 months. 

The appellants raise several arguments in response to the district court’s

statement that it would reimpose the same sentences. First, the appellants contend

that the government failed to prove that the cocaine base in this case was actually

crack. It is true that “not all cocaine base is crack.” United States v. Edwards, 397

F.3d 570, 571 (7th Cir. 2005). In our circuit, for purposes of the mandatory minimum

sentence in 28 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), the term “cocaine base” refers to cocaine base

that constitutes crack. Id. at 577. The appellants, however, did not raise this argument

at the time of the initial sentencing or on direct appeal. By failing to raise this

challenge at the time of their initial sentencing or on direct appeal, the appellants lost

the opportunity to bring it now, and they cannot use our limited remand as a vehicle

to do so. See United States v. Morris, 249 F.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[P]arties

cannot use the accident of a remand to reopen waived issues.”); see also United States

v. Duncan, 427 F.3d 464, 465 (7th Cir. 2005) (only question on a Paladino limited

remand is whether district court would have imposed the same sentence knowing the

Guidelines are advisory). Similarly, Johnson’s argument that the district court should

not have examined the Presentence Investigation Report when it determined that he

was a career offender does not entitle him to relief. Johnson did not raise this

argument at the initial sentencing or on direct appeal, and he is precluded from

bringing it now. See Morris, 249 F.3d at 898.

Next, Johnson and McMillian maintain that their sentences are unreasonable

because the Guidelines punish offenses involving crack cocaine more severely than

those involving powder cocaine. We have previously rejected this argument, and it

does not succeed under our circuit’s case law. United States v. Miller, 450 F.3d 270,

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Nos. 03-1322, 03-1323, & 03-1477 Page 3

275 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Gipson, 425 F.3d 335, 337 (7th Cir. 2005).

McMillian also takes issue with the drug quantities attributable to him. In a special

verdict, the jury found that McMillian was responsible for more than 500 grams of

powder cocaine and more than 50 grams of crack cocaine. McMillian maintains that

the district court impermissibly found at sentencing that McMillian was responsible

for more than one kilogram of powder cocaine and one kilogram of crack cocaine, as he

contends that conclusion is at odds with the jury’s determination. But the jury’s

special verdict form indicated that it found McMillian responsible for “more than” 500

grams of powder cocaine and “more than” 50 grams of crack cocaine, so the district

court’s conclusion that McMillian was responsible for a higher quantity is not

inconsistent with the jury’s determination. Moreover, we have repeatedly rejected

arguments that Booker precludes a judge from making factual findings at sentencing

that have the effect of increasing a Guidelines range. See, e.g., United States v.

Harrison, 431 F.3d 1007, 1014 (7th Cir. 2005). McMillian also maintains that the

district court should have undertaken on remand a comparative analysis of the

sentence it initially imposed and the sentence it would have imposed under an advisory

Guidelines scheme. We find, however, that the district court met its obligation with

respect to each of the defendants. The district court evaluated each defendant’s

sentence in light of the factors listed in 28 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and ultimately concluded

that it would reimpose the same sentence if called to resentence. No more was

required. See United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725, 728-29 (7th Cir. 2005).

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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