Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-08099/USCOURTS-ca10-89-08099-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Floyd R. King
Appellee
Maurice E. Miles
Appellant
The Jackson State Bank
Not Party

Document Text:

PUBLISH · 

FILLO 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAIUn1tai8tatll~Appellt Tenth \JIR,l,U• 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

THE JACKSON STATE BANK, a Wyoming ) 

banking corporation, ) 

) 

Plaintiff, ) 

) 

and ) 

) 

MAURICE E. MILES, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

V. ) 

) 

FLOYD R. KING, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee. ) 

APR23 1993 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 89-8099 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING 

(D.C. No. C-86-238J) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Patrick M. Hunter, Casper, Wyoming, for Plaintiff-Appellant . 

Terry W. Mackey of Terry W. Mackey, P . C. , Cheyenne, Wyoming, for 

Defendant-Appellee. 

Before LOGAN and TACHA, Circuit Judges, and GREENE,** District 

Judge. 

**Honorable J. Thomas Greene, District Judge, United States 

District Court for the District of Utah, sitting by designation. 

TACHA, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 89-8099 Document: 010110212854 Date Filed: 04/23/1993 Page: 1 
Plaintiff Maurice E. Miles appeals from a judgment entered 

following a jury trial in this legal malpractice action. In 

Miles' complaint, the malpractice allegations were broken down 

into separate claims for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of 

contract, and negligence. All three claims went to the jury. The 

jury returned a verdict assessing fault at thirty-five percent for 

Miles and defendant King, respectively, and thirty percent to a 

third party. The district court then entered judgment for King 

based on its determination that Wyoming's comparative negligence 

statute, Wyo. Stat . § 1-1-109, barred recovery on all three 

claims. Miles appeals that ruling, as well as the district 

court's order granting summary judgment on his claim that King 

committed malpractice through his failure to assert a statute of 

frauds defense. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. 

Upon our initial review of this matter, we certified the 

following questions to the Wyoming Supreme Court pursuant to Wyo . 

R. App. P . 11 . 01: 

A. Does Wyoming's comparative negligence statute, Wyo . Stat. § 1-1-109(a) (1977), bar plaintiff's recovery in a 

legal malpractice action based on claims for breach of 

contract and breach of fiduciary duty when the jury 

apportions fault in the following manner: plaintiff, 

thirty-five percent; defendant , thirty-five percent; and 

a third party, thirty percent? 

B. If the comparative negligence statute does not bar 

recovery on these claims, does it or some other 

principle of Wyoming law require that plaintiff's 

recovery be reduced by his percentage of fault ? 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-8099 Document: 010110212854 Date Filed: 04/23/1993 Page: 2 
The Wyoming Supreme Court has now answered both questions in the 

negative. Jackson State Bank v. King, 844 P.2d 1093, 1094 (Wyo. 

1993). We address the issues presented in light of those answers. 

The district court determined the legal malpractice acti on 

was, in essence, an action alleging negligence on the part of an 

attorney. Consequently, all three claims, regardless of their 

literal form, were treated as tort claims. The jury was 

instructed that each claim required, as an essential element, a 

showing that a duty of care was breached. Based on these 

assumptions regarding the nature of the cause of action, the court 

applied the comparative fault statute to all the claims. 1 Because 

the jury found the plaintiff and defendant equally at fault, the 

district court barred recovery. See Board of County Comm'rs v . 

Ridenour, 623 P.2d 1174, 1181-84 (Wyo. 1981) (adopting "Wisconsin 

Rule"). 

The Wyoming Supreme Court has now made it clear that 

application of the comparative negligence statute, under these 

circumstances, was incorrect. See King. 844 P.2d at 1094. The 

decision states, "[w]e agree with Miles that the cause of action 

in a legal malpractice claim is contractual in nature and that 

§ 1-1-109 is not applicable based upon its clear and unambiguous 

1 The relevant portion of the statute then in effect stated: 

Contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery in an 

action by any person or his legal representative to 

recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in 

injury ... if the contributory negligence was not as 

great as the negligence of the person against whom 

recovery is sought . Any damages allowed shall be 

diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence 

attribute d to the person recovering. Wyo . Stat. 

§ 1-1-109 ( a ) (1977) . 

3 

Appellate Case: 89-8099 Document: 010110212854 Date Filed: 04/23/1993 Page: 3 
language." The court held that Wyoming's comparative negligence 

statute does not bar recovery in a legal malpractice case, "which 

necessarily is based on claims for breach of contract and breach 

of fiduciary duty." Id. at 1095. 

This pronouncement of law alters the legal theories 

applicable to Miles' causes of action. This case was tried and 

instructed under the assumption that the comparative negligence 

statute applied. The answers to the certified questions make 

clear that this assumption was incorrect. Therefore, the only 

question remaining is the proper resolution of this appeal in 

light of the Wyoming court's opinion. 

Miles asks us to remand the case for an immediate award of 

damages and assessment of prejudgment interest . We decline this 

invitation. Recently, this court examined the proper approach in 

cases where, as here, a state court announces a new rule of law on 

certification following a jury trial. 

Because of the timing of the certification in this case, 

a new trial is necessary because "[w)e can only 

speculate as to the effect [of an instruction correctly 

stating the law] on the answers to the [verdict] 

interrogatories." Here, ... "it is clear that the 

jury was not, as it should have been, fully and 

correctly instructed on the applicable law of the case." 

We hold that, in this particular case, it would be 

manifestly unjust to assume in any way what the jury 

would have done had it been correctly instructed and not 

misled regarding the effect on the judgment of its 

answers to the special interrogatories. We therefore 

decline to adjust the damages for which Defendant is 

liable in accordance with some speculative theory of 

apportionment on the various causes of action, and we 

remand this case for a new trial. 

Phillips v. Dura-Last Roofing, Inc., 973 F.2d 869, 871 (10th Cir. 

1992) (citations omitted). We agree with King that the same result 

4 

Appellate Case: 89-8099 Document: 010110212854 Date Filed: 04/23/1993 Page: 4 
is required here. There is no way to discern from the jury's 

answers to the special interrogatories whether the damages were 

calculated properly. In light of the fundamental nature and 

effect of the Wyoming Supreme Court's answers to the certified 

questions, a new trial is proper on these claims. We likewise 

remand the summary judgment issue, as it is inextricably entwined 

with the other matters presented . 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Wyoming is REVERSED and REMANDED for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

5 

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Appellate Case: 89-8099 Document: 010110212854 Date Filed: 04/23/1993 Page: 6