Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-23-12711/USCOURTS-ca11-23-12711-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Attorney General, State of Florida
Appellee
Michael Anthony LoRusso
Appellant
Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-12711

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

MICHAEL ANTHONY LORUSSO, 

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 

ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA, 

Respondents-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 8:22-cv-02258-MSS-TGW

____________________

USCA11 Case: 23-12711 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 01/21/2025 Page: 1 of 4
2 Opinion of the Court 23-12711

Before BRANCH, BRASHER, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Michael LoRusso, proceeding pro se, appeals the district 

court’s order appointing counsel to represent him in his habeas corpus petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He argues that the appointment of counsel violated his constitutional right to self-representation. We disagree and affirm the district court’s order. 

We have appellate jurisdiction under the collateral order 

doctrine to review an order appointing counsel despite a party’s 

request to proceed pro se. See Devine v. Indian River Cnty. Sch. Bd., 

121 F.3d 576, 578–81 (11th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other 

grounds by Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 

U.S. 516 (2007).

The Sixth Amendment “necessarily implies the right of selfrepresentation” at a criminal trial. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 

832 (1975); see United States v. Hakim, 30 F.4th 1310, 1321 (11th Cir. 

2022). But no such right exists in an appeal, where the convicted 

defendant, no longer presumed innocent, prosecutes the case. See 

Martinez v. Ct. of App. of Cal., Fourth App. Dist., 528 U.S. 152, 154, 

162–63 (2000). In an appeal, a court has the “discretion to allow” a 

defendant to “proceed pro se.” See id. at 163 (emphasis added). A 

section 2254 petition, a collateral appeal, is a type of appeal. So we 

review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s decision not to 

permit a section 2254 petitioner to proceed pro se. See id. 

USCA11 Case: 23-12711 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 01/21/2025 Page: 2 of 4
23-12711 Opinion of the Court 3

No such abuse occurred here. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c)(2) requires courts to appoint a guardian ad litem or issue 

“another appropriate order” to “protect a[n] . . . incompetent person who is unrepresented in an action.” Section 3006A of Title 18 

of the United States Code provides that “[w]henever the . . . [district] court determines that the interests of justice so require, representation may be provided for any financially eligible person 

who . . . is seeking relief under . . . section . . . 2254 . . . of title 28.” 

18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B).

Here, the district court ordered that LoRusso be appointed 

counsel—and more specifically, denied his construed motions for 

reconsideration of its order appointing him counsel—on the basis

that he suffered from mental illness and lacked the capacity to represent himself. The record supports the district court’s reasoning. 

Documents indicated that LoRusso was diagnosed with delusional 

disorder and housed for several months in an inpatient mental 

health unit. After the district court directed LoRusso to file a single 

supplemental memorandum not exceeding twenty pages to help

the court rule on his construed motions for reconsideration, he 

filed dozens of documents containing a host of conspiracy allegations involving high-ranking officials from Governor Ron DeSantis 

to President Donald Trump. The record also reflects that LoRusso 

has been barred from further pro se filings at all three levels of Florida’s court system due to his frivolous or meritless filings. In light 

of the record, we cannot say the district court abused its discretion 

when it appointed counsel to represent LoRusso instead of permitting him to proceed pro se. 

USCA11 Case: 23-12711 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 01/21/2025 Page: 3 of 4
4 Opinion of the Court 23-12711

Lastly, to the extent that LoRusso’s appellate briefing makes 

claims on the merits of his section 2254 petition, or that his First 

Amendment rights were violated by his prosecution, incarceration, 

or the district court’s appointment of counsel, we decline to address those challenges: they are either (or both) outside the scope 

of the appeal before us or abandoned because they are not supported by arguments and authority. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian 

Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014) (“We have long held that 

an appellant abandons a claim when he either makes only passing 

references to it or raises it in a perfunctory manner without supporting arguments and authority”).

The district court is AFFIRMED.

USCA11 Case: 23-12711 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 01/21/2025 Page: 4 of 4