Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-akd-3_22-cv-00265/USCOURTS-akd-3_22-cv-00265-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joshua D. Briggs
Plaintiff
Municipality of Anchorage
Defendant
Orean Yi
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA 

JOSHUA D. BRIGGS, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

OREAN YI, in his personal capacity; 

and MUNICIPALITY OF 

ANCHORAGE, 

Defendants. 

Case No. 3:22-cv-00265-SLG 

ORDER RE PENDING MOTIONS 

 This order addresses each of the four motions pending before the Court. 

The primary motion is Plaintiff Joshua Briggs’ Motion and Memorandum in Support 

for Preliminary Injunction at Docket 8. Defendants Orean Yi and the Municipality 

of Anchorage responded in opposition to the preliminary injunction motion at 

Docket 23, to which Mr. Briggs replied at Docket 26. 

Defendants have also filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 

Docket 24. Mr. Briggs responded to that motion at Docket 28, requesting that the 

Court defer consideration of the motion pursuant to Rule 56(d) of the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure until after close of discovery. Defendants filed a reply at Docket 

34. 

Mr. Briggs has filed two additional motions that are ripe for decision. First, 

he filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint at Docket 30, to which 

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Defendants responded in opposition at Docket 33, and Mr. Briggs replied at Docket 

35. Second, Mr. Briggs filed a Motion to Deem Confidentiality Waived or Require 

Defendants to Provide a Privilege Log at Docket 31, to which Defendants 

responded in opposition at Docket 36, and Mr. Briggs replied at Docket 37. 

Mr. Briggs requested oral argument with respect to his Motion and 

Memorandum in Support for Preliminary Injunction at Docket 8, but oral argument 

is not necessary to the Court’s determination. Oral argument was not requested 

with respect to any of the other pending motions and it is not necessary to the 

Court’s determination. 

BACKGROUND 

Mr. Briggs alleges violations of his constitutional rights arising under the 

First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.1 His 

claims arise from his arrest on July 12, 2022, for Disorderly Conduct pursuant to 

Anchorage Municipal Code (“AMC”) 08.30.120(A)(2) and Harassment pursuant to 

AMC 08.10.110(A)(1).2 

According to Mr. Briggs’ unverified complaint, on the day in question, he 

entered a Holiday Stationstore to purchase a few items and got in line to pay for 

them behind Officer Orean Yi, who was on duty and in uniform. Mr. Briggs said, 

“Hey look, it’s a pig.” Officer Yi turned and assumed a “defensive posture.” Mr. 

1 Docket 1 at 1. 

2 Docket 1 at 3, ¶ 7, 6, ¶ 20. 

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Briggs repeated, “What, you’re a pig.” Mr. Briggs claims that he “could smell 

alcohol on Yi’s breath” and asked whether Officer Yi was drunk, saying that “he 

would contact Yi’s superior to have him sobriety tested.” Officer Yi then arrested 

and handcuffed Mr. Briggs, searched the contents of his wallet without his consent, 

and put him in the back of a patrol car for more than an hour.3 The complaint 

alleges that Mr. Briggs was arrested in retaliation for criticizing a police officer, 

which he claims is constitutionally protected speech.4 In his motion for a 

preliminary injunction, Mr. Briggs explains that the Harassment charge was 

dismissed for lack of probable cause on September 13, 2022. He also states that 

he filed a motion contesting probable cause for his Disorderly Conduct charge and 

that charge was dismissed on December 5, 2022.5 

Based on these allegations, Mr. Briggs brings this action against Officer Yi 

in his personal capacity and the Municipality of Anchorage.6 The complaint 

contains the following counts: (1) First Amendment retaliation; (2) false arrest; (3) 

unreasonable search and seizure; (4) municipal liability for failure to train and 

supervise; (5) punitive damages; and (6) Anchorage Municipal Code 

3 Docket 1 at 3–5, ¶¶ 7–17. 

4 Docket 1 at 10–11, ¶¶ 41–47. 

5 Docket 8 at 4. 

6 Docket 1 at 1, 3 at ¶¶ 2–3. 

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08.30.120(A)(2) is unconstitutional.7 Mr. Briggs seeks damages from Officer Yi in 

his personal capacity and the Municipality of Anchorage, an injunction against 

enforcement of AMC 08.30.120(A)(2), attorneys fees and costs, and punitive 

damages.8

Defendants’ statement of facts differs in several respects from the recitation 

of facts in Mr. Briggs’ complaint and motion for a preliminary injunction. According 

to Defendants, “it was Mr. Briggs’ conduct, and not the content of his speech, that 

resulted in charges being brought.”9 Specifically, Mr. Briggs “raised his voice” and 

“continued to yell and create loud noise disturbing other customers by acting 

disorderly.”10 And according to Defendants, while Mr. Briggs did move the state 

court to dismiss the Disorderly Conduct charge for failure to show probable cause, 

that court ruled from the bench that there was probable cause. Defendants 

maintain that the state court later dismissed the Disorderly Conduct charge for the 

convenience of the prosecutor and not for lack of probable cause.11

Mr. Briggs’s motion for a preliminary injunction seeks an order that would 

enjoin Defendants “from taking action to prevent him from exercising his first 

7 Docket 1 at 10–18, ¶¶ 41–83. 

8 Docket 1 at 19. 

9 Docket 23 at 2 (quoting Docket 23-1 at 2, ¶ 5). 

10 Docket 23 at 2 (quoting Docket 8 at 8 and Docket 8-1 at 5–6). 

11 Docket 23 at 3–4, 4 n.1. 

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amendment rights or retaliating against him for doing so.” He also requests that 

Defendants “be preliminarily enjoined from enforcing AMC 08.30.120(A)(2) in any 

manner.”12 

JURISDICTION 

Mr. Briggs brought this suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 seeking 

redress for alleged violations of his federal constitutional rights guaranteed by the 

First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court has jurisdiction over this 

matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.13 

LEGAL STANDARD 

In Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the United States 

Supreme Court held that plaintiffs seeking preliminary injunctive relief must 

establish that (1) they are likely to succeed on the merits; (2) they are likely to 

suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of 

equities tips in their favor; and (4) a preliminary injunction is in the public interest.14 

 The Supreme Court in Winter characterized “injunctive relief as an 

extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the 

12 Docket 8 at 1. 

13 According to the complaint, this action is also brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which 

provides for attorney’s fees in proceedings to enforce sections 1983 and 1985. Section 1988, 

however, does not provide a cause of action. 

14 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 

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plaintiff is entitled to such relief.”15 Thus, a plaintiff “must demonstrate that in the 

absence of a preliminary injunction, ‘the [plaintiff] is likely to suffer irreparable harm 

before a decision on the merits can be rendered.’”16 “Speculative injury does not 

constitute irreparable injury . . . . [A] plaintiff must demonstrate immediate 

threatened injury as a prerequisite to preliminary injunctive relief.”17 Moreover, 

“[t]here must be a ‘sufficient causal connection’ between the alleged irreparable 

harm and the activity to be enjoined,” such as a “showing that ‘the requested 

injunction would forestall’ the irreparable harm.”18 

Following Winter, the Ninth Circuit addressed the first element—the 

likelihood of success on the merits—and held that its “serious questions” approach 

to preliminary injunctions was still valid “when applied as a part of the four-element 

Winter test.”19 Accordingly, if a plaintiff shows “that there are ‘serious questions 

going to the merits’—a lesser showing than likelihood of success on the merits—

then a preliminary injunction may still issue if the ‘balance of hardships tips sharply

15 Id. (citing Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam)). 

16 Id. (quoting 11A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 

2948.1 (2d ed. 1995)). 

17 Caribbean Marine Servs. Co. v. Baldridge, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988) (emphasis 

omitted) (first citing Goldie’s Bookstore, Inc. v. Superior Ct. of State of Cal., 739 F.2d 466, 472 

(9th Cir. 1984); and then citing L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 634 F.2d 

1197, 1201 (9th Cir. 1980)). 

18 Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 886 F.3d 803, 819 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting 

Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 653 F.3d 976, 981–82 (9th Cir. 2011)). 

19 All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131–32 (9th Cir. 2011). 

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in the plaintiff’s favor.’”20 “Serious questions are ‘substantial, difficult, and doubtful, 

as to make them a fair ground for litigation and thus for more deliberative 

investigation.’”21 They “need not promise a certainty of success, nor even present 

a probability of success, but must involve a ‘fair chance on the merits.’”22 All four 

Winter elements must still be satisfied under this approach,23 but analyses of the 

last two elements—balance of the equities and consideration of the public 

interest—merge when the government is the opposing party.24 

Injunctive relief is an equitable remedy, and “[t]he essence of equity 

jurisdiction is the power of the court to fashion a remedy depending upon the 

necessities of the particular case.”25 

“Courts asked to issue preliminary injunctions based on First Amendment 

grounds face an inherent tension: the moving party bears the burden of showing 

20 Friends of the Wild Swan v. Weber, 767 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2014) (emphasis in original) 

(quoting Shell Offshore, Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc., 709 F.3d 1281, 1291 (9th Cir. 2013)). 

21 Gilder v. PGA Tour, Inc., 936 F.2d 417, 422 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Republic of the Philippines 

v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1362 (9th Cir. 1988)); see also Fyock v. City of Sunnyvale, 25 F. 

Supp. 3d 1267, 1273 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (“‘Serious questions’ refers to questions ‘which cannot be 

resolved one way or the other at the hearing on the injunction and as to which the court 

perceives a need to preserve the status quo . . . .’” (quoting Gilder, 936 F.2d at 422)). 

22 Gilder, 936 F.2d at 422 (quoting Marcos, 862 F.2d at 1362). 

23 All. for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1135 (“Of course, plaintiffs must also satisfy the other 

Winter factors.”); see also, e.g., Ass’n des Eleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Quebec v. Harris, 

729 F.3d 937, 944 (9th Cir. 2013) (describing standard for preliminary injunction). 

24 Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). 

25 Sierra Forest Legacy v. Rey, 577 F.3d 1015, 1022 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. 

Odessa Union Warehouse Co-op, 833 F.2d 172, 175 (9th Cir. 1987)). 

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likely success on the merits . . . and yet within that merits determination the 

government bears the burden of justifying its speech-restrictive law.”26 

Accordingly, “in the First Amendment context, the moving party bears the initial 

burden of making a colorable claim that its First Amendment rights have been 

infringed, or are threatened with infringement, at which point the burden shifts to 

the government to justify the restriction.”27

DISCUSSION 

I. Standing to Seek a Preliminary Injunction 

Under Article III of the Constitution, “[t]he jurisdiction of the federal courts is 

limited to ‘cases’ and ‘controversies.’”28 Federal courts enforce this jurisdictional 

limitation through the doctrine of standing.29 A plaintiff bears the burden of 

demonstrating the “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing,” which consists 

of three elements.30 A plaintiff must show (1) an injury in fact, meaning an “invasion 

of a legally protected interest that is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual 

or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”; (2) causation; and (3) redressability, 

26 Cal. Chamber of Com. v. Council for Educ. & Rsch. on Toxics, 29 F.4th 468, 477 (9th Cir. 

2022) (alteration in original) (quoting Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 645 F.3d 1109, 1115 (9th 

Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds by Bd. of Trs. of Glazing Health & Welfare Tr. v. 

Chambers, 941 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 2019)). 

27 Thalheimer, 645 F.3d at 1116. 

28 Wash. Env’t Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting U.S. Const. art. III, 

§ 2). 

29 See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 340–42 (2006). 

30 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 

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meaning that “the injury will likely be redressed by a favorable decision.”31 The 

plaintiff “must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought.”32

“First Amendment challenges ‘present unique standing considerations’ 

because of the ‘chilling effect of sweeping restrictions’ on speech.”33 These 

considerations “tilt[] dramatically toward a finding of standing.”34 “‘[T]he Supreme 

Court has dispensed with rigid standing requirements’ for First Amendment 

protected speech claims and has instead endorsed a ‘hold your tongue and 

challenge now’ approach.”35

Yet even in the First Amendment context, a plaintiff seeking prospective 

injunctive relief must demonstrate a credible threat of adverse state action.36 

Courts within the Ninth Circuit examine three factors to determine whether a 

credible threat of enforcement exists: “We consider (1) whether the plaintiff has a 

‘concrete plan’ to violate the law, (2) whether the enforcement authorities have 

31 Townley v. Miller, 722 F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61). 

32 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000). 

33 Italian Colors Restaurant v. Becerra, 878 F.3d 1165, 1171 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Ariz. Right 

to Life Pol. Action Comm. v. Bayless, 320 F.3d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 2003)). 

34 Lopez v. Candaele, 630 F.3d 775, 781 (9th Cir. 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting LSO, Ltd. 

v. Stroh, 205 F.3d 1146, 1155 (9th Cir. 2000)). 

35 Tingley v. Ferguson, 47 F.4th 1055, 1067 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Cal. Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. 

Getman, 328 F.3d 1088, 1094 (9th Cir. 2003)). 

36 Italian Colors Restaurant, 878 F.3d at 1171 (first citing Lopez, 630 F.3d at 786; and then citing 

LSO, 205 F.3d at 1155). 

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‘communicated a specific warning or threat to initiate proceedings,’ and (3) whether 

there is a ‘history of past prosecution or enforcement.’”37 

A party seeking injunctive relief “must proffer evidence sufficient to establish 

a likelihood of irreparable harm.”38 This evidence must “go[] beyond the unverified 

allegations of the pleadings and motion papers.”39 For example, the Ninth Circuit 

held—in a case much like this one—that a plaintiff who had been charged with a 

violation of state law had standing to seek injunctive relief on First Amendment 

grounds, even though her charges were eventually dropped, because she 

provided testimony that she would continue to engage in expressive activity if not 

for her fear of adverse state action.40 An unverified complaint, however, is not 

evidence that can support a motion for a preliminary injunction.41

37 Tingley, 47 F.4th at 1067 (quoting Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 220 F.3d 

1134, 1139 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)). 

38 Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla. Ent. Mgmt., Inc., 736 F.3d 1239, 1251 (9th Cir. 2013); see also

Perlot v. Green, 609 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 1116 (D. Idaho 2022) (“A preliminary injunction may only 

be awarded ‘upon a clear showing’ of evidence that supports each relevant preliminary 

injunction factor. ‘This “clear showing” requires factual support beyond the allegations of the 

complaint . . . .’” (citations omitted)). 

39 11A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2949 (3d ed. 

2020). C.f. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b) (allowing issuance of temporary restraining order without notice 

only where “specific facts in the affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and 

irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be 

heard in opposition”). 

40 Porter v. Martinez, No. 21-55149, __F.4th__, 2023 WL 2820332, at *4 (9th Cir. Apr. 7, 2023). 

41 See Perez v. Ryan, No. CV 19-05602-PHX-MTL (JFM), 2020 WL 995569, at *6 (D. Ariz. Mar. 

2, 2020) (“As an initial matter, Plaintiff has failed to present any evidence to support his claim for 

preliminary injunctive relief. Plaintiff’s unverified Complaint is not evidence.” (internal citations 

omitted)); Vardanyan v. Moroyan, No. C12-05645 HRL, 2013 WL 12091111, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 

1, 2013) (“[Plaintiff] has not supported his motion for TRO with any declarations. He relies 

almost exclusively upon the allegations of his unverified complaint . . . . None of the other 

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Here, Mr. Briggs has not filed a verified complaint or any supporting affidavit 

to demonstrate that he has a credible threat of adverse state action. The unverified 

complaint does not even appear to allege that Mr. Briggs intends to continue to 

call a police officer whom he encounters in a public setting a “pig.”42 The sole 

declaration filed with the motion contains counsel’s transcription of a witness 

interview.43 In his brief on the motion, counsel for Mr. Briggs asserts that 

“Defendants’ conduct in this case has only strengthened Briggs’s belief that police 

officers are pigs, and he should not [be] dissuaded by the threat of arrest and 

prosecution from exercising his rights and expressing this belief.”44 But there is no 

evidence in the record to support this claim.45 The Court concludes that Mr. Briggs 

documents appended to his motion have been properly authenticated. . . . On the record 

presented, the court finds that [plaintiff] has not made a sufficient showing on any of the Winter 

elements.”); Shaterian v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. C-11-920 SC, 2011 WL 2314151, at *4 (N.D. 

Cal. June 10, 2011) (“[A] plaintiff may not support a motion for a preliminary injunction by merely 

pointing to his complaint and the facts alleged therein.”); U.S.A. Express Cab, LLC v. City of San 

Jose, No. C-07-06171 RMW, 2007 WL 4612926, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2007) (“Arguments in 

briefing and allegations in unverified complaints cannot serve as the basis for injunctive relief.”). 

See also Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 89 (1974) (holding that allegations in unverified 

complaint did not afford basis for finding of irreparable injury for purpose of preliminary 

injunctive relief). 

42 See generally Docket 1. 

43 See generally Docket 8-1. 

44 Docket 26 at 10. 

45 As Mr. Briggs’s counsel noted in his reply when characterizing Defendants’ briefing as 

“worthless,” “attorney statements are not evidence of any sort [and] a party cannot manufacture 

a genuine issue of material fact merely by making assertions in its legal memoranda.” Docket 

26 at 4 (citing S.A. Empressa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines) v. Walter Kidde & 

Co., 690 F.2d 1235, 1238 (9th Cir. 1982). 

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has not demonstrated that he has standing for purposes of seeking a preliminary 

injunction to enjoin enforcement of AMC 08.30.120(A)(2).46

II. Summary Judgment 

Defendants seek partial summary judgment on Count VI of the Complaint, 

which asserts that AMC 8.30.120(A)(2) is unconstitutional.47 In response, Mr. 

Briggs asks that the Court defer consideration pursuant to Rule 56(d) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure until after the close of discovery.48 

The party requesting a Rule 56(d) continuance must show: “(1) it has set 

forth in affidavit form the specific facts it hopes to elicit from further discovery; (2) 

the facts sought exist; and (3) the sought-after facts are essential to oppose 

summary judgment.”49 The Ninth Circuit has held that “[f]ailure to comply with 

46 To be clear, the fact that Mr. Briggs does not have standing to seek a preliminary injunction 

does not mean that he does not have standing to seek damages. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles 

v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983) (“That Lyons may have been illegally choked by the police . . . 

while presumably affording Lyons standing to claim damages against the individual officers and 

perhaps against the City, does nothing to establish a real and immediate threat [for purposes of 

seeking injunctive relief.]”). Defendants contend that Mr. Briggs has not shown that he has 

suffered an injury in fact because the criminal charges underlying his claim were dismissed. 

Docket 23 at 6. But the fact that the criminal charges were dropped is insufficient to vitiate 

standing. See, e.g., Ward v. Utah, 321 F.3d 1263 (10th Cir. 2003); McCormack v. Hiedeman, 

694 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2012). 

47 Docket 24 at 1. 

48 Docket 28 at 1–2. 

49 Fam. Home & Fin. Ctr., Inc. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 525 F.3d 822, 827 (9th Cir. 

2008) (citing State of California ex rel. Cal. Dep’t of Toxic Substances Control v. Campbell, 138 

F.3d 772, 779 (9th Cir. 1998)). Note that at the time that Family Home & Finance Center was 

decided, Rule 56(d) was enumerated as 56(f) in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

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these requirements ‘is a proper ground for denying discovery and proceeding to 

summary judgment.’”50 

Counsel for Mr. Briggs filed an affidavit with his Response to Motion for 

Partial Summary Judgment in which he asserts that he has “been diligent in 

pursuing this matter” and explaining that Defendants filed the motion for partial 

summary judgment before discovery had begun.51 Counsel has not identified, 

however, any specific facts that he hopes to elicit from discovery that are essential 

to oppose the partial summary judgment motion. To the contrary, counsel stated 

in a previous filing that a “First Amendment facial challenge to a statute . . . is not 

a fact dependent inquiry,” emphasizing that “[t]here is no factual inquiry that needs 

to be undertaken” for purposes of Mr. Briggs’ facial challenge.52 Indeed, Mr. 

Briggs’ facial challenge to the constitutionality of AMC 8.30.120(A)(2) is a pure 

question of law and Mr. Briggs has not identified any discoverable facts that would 

be relevant to resolving this question.53 For this reason, several district courts have 

denied similar discovery requests, explaining that “a facial challenge to the text of 

50 Id. (quoting Cal. Dep’t of Toxic Substances Control, 138 F.3d at 779). 

51 Docket 28-1 at 1. 

52 Docket 12 at 4. 

53 See Doherty v. Wireless Broad. Sys. of Sacramento, Inc., 151 F.3d 1129, 1131 (9th Cir. 1998) 

(recognizing that “[t]he district court concluded that Pacific did not need to undertake discovery 

because the issue in this case involved a purely legal question”).

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a statute does not typically require discovery for resolution because the challenge 

focuses on the language of the statute itself.”54 

Because Mr. Briggs did not satisfy any of the three requirements necessary 

to obtain a continuance pursuant to Rule 56(d), the motion is DENIED. Mr. Briggs 

is directed to file a supplemental opposition to Defendants’ partial summary 

judgment motion within 21 days of the date of entry of this order. 

III. Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint

Mr. Briggs requests leave to amend his complaint pursuant to Rule 15 of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to assert an additional count alleging that “[t]he 

Municipality of Anchorage has a practice and custom of using AMC 

08.30.120(A)(2) to violate the civil rights of the people in Anchorage.”55 Mr. Briggs 

filed this motion to amend on March 1, 2023, in advance of the March 10, 2023, 

deadline set for amendments to pleadings.56 Rule 15 provides that leave to amend 

“shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Because Mr. Briggs’ motion is 

timely and the Court is directed to freely give leave to amend, the motion is 

GRANTED.57

54 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Johnson, 362 F. Supp. 2d 327, 337 (D.D.C. 2005); see also Shelby County 

v. Holder, 270 F.R.D. 16, 19 (D.D.C. 2010) (“Because Shelby County brings only a facial 

challenge to the [Voter Registration Act], discovery into that claim is unwarranted.”). Note that at 

the time that these two cases were decided, Rule 56(d) was enumerated as 56(f) in the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure. 

55 Docket 30 at 1; Docket 30-1 at 19, ¶ 85. 

56 Docket 25 at 7. 

57 Defendants’ principal argument in opposition to this motion is that “[t]he proposed amendment 

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IV. Motion to Deem Confidentiality Waived or Require Defendants to 

Provide a Privilege Log 

Mr. Briggs contends that the privilege log that Defendants produced as part 

of its Initial Disclosures does not meet the minimum requirements of Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5).58 Rule 26(b)(5) directs a party withholding information 

that would otherwise be discoverable based on a claim that it is privileged to 

“describe the nature of the documents, communications, or tangible things not 

produced or disclosed—and do so in a manner that, without revealing information 

itself privileged or protected, will enable other parties to assess the claim.” The 

Ninth Circuit has explained that “a proper assertion of privilege must be more 

specific than a generalized, boilerplate objection.”59

The privilege log provides that Defendants will not produce an unredacted 

version of Officer Yi’s arrest report because it contains an Alaska Public Safety 

Information Network (“APSIN”) number.60 Defendants’ contention that APSIN 

numbers are privileged and cannot be produced during discovery in a civil case is 

remediable by the plain text of Alaska Statute 12.62.180(d)(6), which provides that 

is futile where Briggs is without standing to assert his claim.” Docket 33 at 2. This argument 

may be raised in a motion to dismiss and the Court is not considering it for purposes of the 

motion for leave to amend. 

58 Docket 31 at 4. 

59 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for Dist. of Mont., 408 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th 

Cir. 2005). 

60 Docket 31-1 at 3. 

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“[i]nformation that is sealed under this section may be provided to another person 

or agency only . . . for a use authorized by . . . court order.”61 The Court will enter 

an order that requires that production here.62

 Defendants also maintain that they cannot produce unredacted versions of 

Officer Glor’s reports because they contain “APSIN numbers, Personal 

Identification Information, Social Security numbers, Alaska Driver’s License 

numbers etc.”63 As discussed above, Defendants’ concern regarding the APSIN 

numbers is solved with a Court order. The remaining personal identification 

information need not be provided at this time pending entry of a protective order. 

Defendants assert that they withheld the audio files of the taped interviews 

with witnesses because they contain confidential personal identification 

information, such as social security numbers and Alaska driver’s license 

numbers.64 But it appears that at least one such interview has been provided to 

Mr. Briggs.65 Defendants do not explain why it would be impracticable to redact 

61 Alaska Stat. § 12.62.180(d)(6) (1994). 

62 In this regard, the Court observes that in his reply, Plaintiff maintains that he “did not ask 

Defendants to provide any of the withheld documents or unredacted versions of the documents”’ 

rather, he stresses that he seeks only for the Court to order that a more detailed privilege log be 

provided. Docket 37 at 2 (emphasis in original). But the Court will not order Defendants to 

produce an additional privilege log that the Court finds unwarranted. Rather, the Court has 

strived to resolve the parties’ discovery dispute in a way that would accord to both parties “the 

just, speedy, and inexpensive determination” of this proceeding. See Rule 1, Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure. 

63 Docket 31-1 at 3. 

64 Docket 31-1 at 3. 

65 See Docket 8-1 at 1–2 (explaining that Defendants provided to Mr. Briggs “an audio 

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this information from the audio files. If it has not yet done so, Defendants shall 

produce the requested audio files with appropriate redactions. 

With respect to Officer Yi’s personnel files and internal affairs files that 

Defendants withheld, the Court agrees with Mr. Briggs that he is entitled to some 

of these files. For example, Officer Yi’s records of training, conduct, discipline, and 

performance are relevant, with appropriate redaction of sensitive personal 

information, such as Officer Yi’s social security number, driver’s license number, 

beneficiary designations, and medical information.66 The Court will not, however, 

require the identification of Bates numbers in a privilege log. But the Court finds 

that Defendants are required to provide considerably greater detail in the privilege 

log to comply with Rule 26(b)(5). The provided reason for asserting privilege, 

“personnel information,” is too vague to provide the “basis” for the claim of 

privilege, as Rule 26(b)(5)(B) requires. Moreover, “personnel and internal affairs 

files” does not adequately “describe the nature of the documents . . . not produced,” 

as Rule 26(b)(5)(A)(ii) requires. 

recording, in digital format, of interview of Dana Teeter by Anchorage Police Officer John Glor on 

August 30, 2022”). 

66 See, e.g., United States v. Henthorn, 931 F.2d 29, 30–31 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that “the 

district court erred in denying plaintiff’s discovery request for impeachment material contained in 

the testifying officers’ personnel files” and remanding for in camera review of those files); Soto v. 

City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 614–18 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (compelling discovery of police 

officer’s personnel files, subject to a protective order, explaining that “district courts in the Ninth 

Circuit have found that the privacy interests police officers have in their personnel files do not 

outweigh the civil rights plaintiff’s need for the documents”); Dowell v. Griffin, 275 F.R.D. 613, 

617 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (“Current case law suggests the privacy interests police officers have in 

their personnel files do not outweigh plaintiff’s interests in civil rights cases.”). 

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The Court will not deem privilege waived at this time. 

In sum, within 14 days of the date of this order, Defendants shall: 

(1) to the extent not yet produced, produce a redacted version of Officer Yi’s 

arrest report, Officer Glor’s reports, and audio files, with redaction of sensitive 

personal information, but no redaction of APSIN numbers, which are ordered to be 

produced in this case; and 

(2) with respect to Officer Yi’s personnel and internal affairs files, the Court 

directs defendants to either: (a) provide considerably more detail in the privilege 

log to “describe the nature of the documents, communications, or tangible things 

not produced or disclosed—and [to] do so in a manner that, without revealing 

information itself privileged or protected, will enable other parties to assess the 

claim”67 and/or (b) file a motion for a protective order,68 which includes a proposed 

protective order.69

CONCLUSION 

In light of the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that: 

 Mr. Briggs’ Motion and Memorandum in Support for Preliminary 

Injunction at Docket 8 is DENIED for lack of standing. 

67 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(A)(ii). 

68 It is standard practice to file a protective order for discovery of a police officer’s personnel and 

internal affairs files and it is not clear to the Court why this has not been done in this case. 

69 Local Civil Rule 7.1(b). 

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 With respect to Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 

Docket 24, the Court declines to defer consideration of this motion until 

after the close of discovery and directs Mr. Briggs to file a supplemental 

opposition within 21 days of the date of entry of this order. 

 Mr. Briggs’ Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint at Docket 30 is 

GRANTED. Mr. Briggs shall file a clean copy of the amended complaint 

filed at Docket 30-1 within 7 days of the date of entry of this order. 

 Mr. Briggs’ Motion to Deem Confidentiality Waived or Require 

Defendants to Provide a Privilege Log at Docket 31 is GRANTED in part 

and DENIED in part as set forth above. 

DATED this 12th day of April, 2023, at Anchorage, Alaska. 

/s/ Sharon L. Gleason 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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