Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00034/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00034-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Flavio Camero
Petitioner
Mike Knowles
Respondent

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FLAVIO CAMERO,

Petitioner,

v.

MIKE KNOWLES,

Respondent.

 /

CV F 05-0034 OWW WMW HC

ORDER RE MOTION TO DISMISS,

GRANTING PETITIONER OPPORTUNITY TO

WITHDRAW UNEXHAUSTED CLAIMS

[Doc. 10]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72-302. Pending before the court is Respondent’s

motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that it contains both exhausted and unexhausted claims

in violation of 28 U.S.C. Section 2254(b)(1).

Petitioner filed a previous petition for writ of habeas corpus in this court: Camero v.

Knowles, 1:03 cv 06904 REC TAG HC. In that case, the Magistrate Judge entered findings and

recommendations on March 15, 2004, that the case be dismissed for lack of exhaustion. On June 1,

2004, the District Judge adopted the findings and recommendations, dismissing the petition without

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28 Contrary to Petitioner’s statement in his present traverse, he did not withdraw the petition in case number 1:03 cv 1

06904 REC TAG HC. . 

prejudice because it contained unexhausted claims. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for writ 1

of habeas corpus with the California Supreme Court, which the court denied on December 15, 2004.

Petitioner filed the present petition on January 10, 2005. Respondent now moves to dismiss

portions of the petition on the ground that the claims are not exhausted. Petitioner has filed a

response to the motion to dismiss, in which he merely recites the procedural history of his prior court

proceedings. He does not dispute Respondent’s contention that some of his claims are unexhausted.

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by a

petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The

exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial

opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 731, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518, 102 S.Ct. 1198,

1203 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9 Cir. 1988). th

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with

a full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. Picard v.

Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9 Cir. th

1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full and fair opportunity to

hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the claim's factual and legal

basis. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S.Ct. 887, 888 (1995) (legal basis); Kenney v.

Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis). Additionally, the petitioner

must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a federal constitutional claim. Duncan,

513 U.S. at 365-66, 115 S.Ct. at 888; Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9 Cir.1998). For th

example, if a petitioner wishes to claim that the trial court violated his due process rights “he must

say so, not only in federal court but in state court.” Duncan, 513 U.S. at 366, 115 S.Ct. at 888. A

general appeal to a constitutional guarantee is insufficient to present the "substance" of such a

federal claim to a state court. See, Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7, 103 S.Ct. 276 (1982)

(Exhaustion requirement not satisfied circumstance that the "due process ramifications" of an

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argument might be "self-evident."); Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63, 116 S.Ct. 1074

(1996) (“a claim for relief in habeas corpus must include reference to a specific federal

constitutional guarantee, as well as a statement of the facts which entitle the petitioner to relief.”).

In 1996, Congress enacted the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. Pub.L. No

104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. Under the AEDPA, exhaustion can be waived by respondent. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(b)(C). The court can also excuse exhaustion if “(I) there is an absence of available State

corrective process; or (ii) circumstances exist that render such a process ineffective to protect the

rights of the application.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B). In this case, Respondent has not waived

exhaustion. In addition, California provides avenues for Petitioner to pursue state claims. For

example, these claims may be presented in a petition for writ of habeas corpus. See Cal. Penal Code

§§ 1473 - 14758. 

Finally, there are not sufficient circumstances in this case for the court to ignore the United

States Supreme Court’s admonishment that comity demands exhaustion and find that California’s

corrective processes are ineffective to protect Petitioner’s rights. 

In this case, the court finds that Respondent is correct in arguing that some of Petitioner’s

claims are unexhausted. Specifically, the claims that are unexhausted are as follows: 1) within

ground two, the claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to call particular witnesses and that

counsel’s actions denied him a speedy trial; 2) ground four; 3) ground five; and 4) ground six. 

 The court must dismiss a petition that contains unexhausted claims, even if it also contains

exhausted claims. Rose, 455 U.S. at 521-22, 102 S.Ct. at 1205; Calderon v. United States Dist.

Court (Gordon), 107 F.3d 756, 760 (9 Cir. 1997) (en banc) cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 265 (1997); th

Guizar v. Estelle, 843 F.2d 371, 372 (9 Cir.1988). th

Pursuant to Ninth Circuit holdings, a petitioner should be given the option of withdrawing

his unexhausted claims and proceeding in federal court with those claims that are exhausted. Guizar

v. Estelle, 843 F.2d 371, 372 (9 Cir. 1988), citing, Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 510, 520 (1982). th

However, should Petitioner abandon his unexhausted claims, any later attempt to amend the petition

to include newly exhausted claims may be subject to an abuse of the writ challenge. See McCleskey

v. Zant, 111 S.Ct. 1454 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 455 U.S. 510, 520-521 (1982); see also,

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Rule 9(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases; 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (failure to allege all available

grounds for relief in a single petition may be abuse of the writ). Should Petitioner fail to withdraw

the unexhausted claims or withdraw the petition, the petition will be dismissed. Rose, 455 U.S. at

519; Guizar, 843 F.2d at 372. This dismissal will not bar Petitioner from returning to federal court

after exhausting available state remedies. See, Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 586 (9th

Cir.1995). However, Petitioner should bear in mind that 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) sets out a critical

one-year limitations period within which a federal habeas petition may be filed. In most cases, the

one year period starts to run on the date the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s direct

review. See, id. Although the limitations period tolls while a properly filed request for collateral

review is pending in state court, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), is does not toll for the time an application is

pending in federal court. Duncan v. Walker, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 531 U.S. 991 (2001). 

The Court HEREBY ORDERS:

1. Petitioner is GRANTED thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order to inform

the court whether he seeks to withdraw the unexhausted claims and proceed with those

that are exhausted or withdraw the entire petition and return to state court to exhaust

those claims that are unexhausted. The court will delay ruling on the pending motion to

withdraw the petition in order to allow Petitioner to consider his alternatives. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 30, 2007 /s/ William M. Wunderlich 

mmkd34 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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