Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-16-01094/USCOURTS-caDC-16-01094-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
CalPortland Company, Inc.
Petitioner
Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission
Respondent
Secretary of Labor
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 6, 2016 Decided October 20, 2016

No. 16-1094

CALPORTLAND COMPANY, INC.,

PETITIONER

v.

FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION 

AND SECRETARY OF LABOR, ON BEHALF OF JEFFREY PAPPAS,

RESPONDENTS

On Petition for Review of an Order of 

the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission

Brian P. Lundgren argued the cause and filed the briefs 

for petitioner. John M. Payne and Selena C. Smith entered 

appearances.

Edward Waldman, Attorney, U.S. Department of Labor, 

argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was 

W. Christian Schumann, Counsel. John T. Sullivan, Attorney, 

Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, entered an 

appearance.

USCA Case #16-1094 Document #1641929 Filed: 10/20/2016 Page 1 of 19
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Before: HENDERSON and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges, and 

SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

SENTELLE.

SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge: CalPortland Company, 

Inc. (“CalPortland”) petitions for review of a decision by the 

Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission 

(“Commission”) ordering CalPortland to temporarily reinstate 

Jeffrey Pappas, pursuant to section 105(c)(2) of the Federal 

Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (“Mine Act”), 30 U.S.C. 

§ 815(c)(2), pending final order on Pappas’s underlying 

discrimination complaint currently pending before the 

Commission. We have jurisdiction over this petition pursuant 

to the collateral order doctrine and, because we conclude that 

Pappas was an “applicant for employment” who was not 

eligible for temporary reinstatement, we grant the petition for 

review and vacate the Commission’s decision and order.

I.

“Congress adopted the Mine Act ‘to protect the health 

and safety of the Nation’s . . . miners,’” Thunder Basin Coal 

Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 202 (1994) (quoting 30 U.S.C. 

§ 801(g)), by “strengthen[ing] and streamlin[ing] health and 

safety enforcement requirements” at the Nation’s mines, id. at 

211. To accomplish its goals, the Mine Act “charges two 

separate agencies with complementary policymaking and 

adjudicative functions.” Prairie State Generating Co. LLC v. 

Sec’y of Labor, 792 F.3d 82, 85 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The 

Secretary of Labor (“Secretary”), acting through the 

Department of Labor’s Mine Safety and Health 

Administration (“MSHA”), “sets regulatory standards of mine 

safety, conducts regular mine inspections, and issues citations 

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and orders in response to violations.” Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. 

§ 557a; 30 U.S.C. §§ 813, 814; Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 

202–04 & n.5). “The Commission, an adjudicatory body 

established as independent of the Secretary, reviews 

challenges to MSHA’s actions.” Id. at 85–86 (citing 30 

U.S.C. §§ 815(d), 823). 

 

Relevant to this case, the Mine Act also includes a 

whistleblower provision, 30 U.S.C. § 815(c), which prohibits 

a mine operator from discriminating against a miner or 

interfering with a miner’s statutory rights because the miner

engaged in protected activity. Leeco, Inc. v. Hays, 965 F.2d 

1081, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Council of S. Mountains, Inc. v. 

FMSHRC, 751 F.2d 1418, 1420–21 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Section 

105(c) establishes procedures for the filing and investigation 

of complaints made by “[a]ny miner or applicant for 

employment” and authorizes the Commission to adjudicate 

contested complaints. See 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(2)–(3); 

Simpson v. FMSHRC, 842 F.2d 453, 456 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 

At the center of this case is section 105(c)(2)’s temporary 

reinstatement provision. “Because a complaining . . . miner 

‘may not be in the financial position to suffer even a short 

period of unemployment or reduced income pending 

resolution of the discrimination complaint,’” Cobra Nat. Res., 

LLC v. FMSHRC, 742 F.3d 82, 84 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting S. 

Rep. No. 95-181, at 37 (1977)), if the Secretary finds that a 

discrimination complaint was “not frivolously brought,” the 

Commission “shall order the immediate reinstatement of the 

miner pending final order on the complaint,” 30 U.S.C. 

§ 815(c)(2). Although section 105(c) protects the rights of 

both miners and applicants for employment, the temporary 

reinstatement remedy is limited to miners. See id. 

§ 815(c)(1)–(3); Piper v. KenAmerican Res., Inc., 35 

FMSHRC 1969, 1972 & n.2 (July 3, 2013). Accordingly, 

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whether a complainant is a “miner” or an “applicant for 

employment” is a threshold issue that must be addressed 

before determining a complainant’s entitlement to temporary 

reinstatement. See Young v. Lone Mountain Processing, Inc., 

20 FMSHRC 927, 932 n.5 (Sept. 4, 1998).

 

II.

Beginning in or around 1999, Jeffrey Pappas worked as a 

miner at the Oro Grande cement plant in San Bernardino 

County, California. Martin Marietta Materials, Inc., which 

owned the plant through a subsidiary named Riverside 

Cement Company, was Pappas’s employer. In 2014, while 

working for Martin Marietta at the Oro Grande plant, Pappas 

notified management about a supervisor’s potentially unsafe 

directions. When management failed to fully address his 

concerns, Pappas notified a MSHA inspector, who 

investigated and issued several citations to Martin Marietta 

for safety violations. After MSHA issued these citations to 

Martin Marietta, Pappas’s relationship with his managers and 

colleagues at the Oro Grande plant deteriorated, culminating 

in his discharge in March 2014. Pappas filed a section 105(c) 

discrimination complaint against Martin Marietta in April 

2014 that resulted in a Commission-approved settlement 

reinstating Pappas to his former position at Oro Grande. 

Upon his return to work, his colleagues and direct supervisor 

harassed Pappas about his discrimination complaint and his 

prior safety concerns. He asked the plant’s upper 

management, including Martin Marietta’s Human Resources 

manager Jamie Ambrose, to intervene and stop the 

harassment, but Martin Marietta’s management took no 

action.

On or around June 30, 2015, CalPortland executed a 

limited asset purchase agreement with Martin Marietta to 

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acquire the Oro Grande plant where Pappas worked and three 

related facilities, effective October 1, 2015. It is undisputed 

that Pappas was never employed by CalPortland, as 

CalPortland’s purchase agreement with Martin Marietta did 

not include Martin Marietta’s existing labor force and 

CalPortland did not agree to hire any of Martin Marietta’s 

hourly employees in the purchase agreement.

To ensure that it could take control of the Oro Grande 

plant in October 2015 without shutting down the kiln, 

CalPortland began the staffing process early. In mid-August 

2015, prior to CalPortland’s effective acquisition of the Oro 

Grande plant, CalPortland contacted Jamie Ambrose, Martin 

Marietta’s Human Resources manager, for advice on hiring 

decisions. Soon thereafter, Ambrose was offered and 

accepted the Human Resources manager position at 

CalPortland. Because of her prior employment with Martin 

Marietta, Ambrose knew about Pappas’s previous section 

105(c) complaint.

In mid-September 2015, CalPortland invited all of the 

employees from the four facilities covered by the asset 

purchase agreement, including the employees at the Oro 

Grande plant, to apply for employment with CalPortland. 

CalPortland did not advertise these positions to the general 

public and nearly all of the existing Martin Marietta 

employees applied. CalPortland made its hiring decisions on 

September 26, 2015, and extended employment offers to 

approximately 115 out of 130 applicants, with approximately 

100 to 105 of those offered employment accepting positions

with CalPortland. Pappas was one of the applicants from the 

Oro Grande plant who was not offered employment by 

CalPortland. On September 28, 2015, two days before 

CalPortland’s acquisition of the Oro Grande plant, Martin 

Marietta told those miners who were not offered employment 

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by CalPortland to leave the plant immediately and not to 

return for their shifts on the following two days. These 

individuals, including Pappas, were paid by Martin Marietta 

through September 30, 2015, and given severance packages 

from Martin Marietta. Then, on October 1, 2015, CalPortland 

acquired the Oro Grande plant.

 

After CalPortland did not hire him, Pappas filed a section 

105(c) complaint against CalPortland,1 and on December 8, 

2015, the Secretary, on behalf of Pappas, filed an application 

for temporary reinstatement. Notably, the Secretary sought an 

order directing CalPortland “to hire” Pappas. In support of 

the application, the Secretary relied on a declaration from a

MSHA investigator stating that after Martin Marietta’s 

employees were “terminated” and “CalPortland invited the 

existing Oro Grande employees to apply for new positions

with CalPortland,” “CalPortland decided not to hire Mr. 

Pappas” because of his April 2014 discrimination complaint

against Martin Marietta. (emphasis added).

Focusing on Pappas’s employment at the Oro Grande 

plant and Martin Marietta’s active role in CalPortland’s hiring 

decisions, the Administrative Law Judge concluded that 

Pappas was a “miner” for purposes of section 105(c) and 

approved the Secretary’s application on January 12, 2016. 

See Pappas v. CalPortland Co., 38 FMSHRC 53, 58–61, 66

(Jan. 12, 2016); see also 29 C.F.R. § 2700.45(c) (allowing 

operator to request hearing before an ALJ following receipt of 

Secretary’s application for temporary reinstatement). The 

Commission, in a 4-1 decision, affirmed the ALJ’s decision

 1 In his discrimination complaint filed with the MSHA, Pappas 

named “Riverside Cement” and “Martin Marietta” as the 

respondents, alleging a discriminatory “layoff/refusal of 

employment”; however, the Secretary ultimately sought an 

application for temporary reinstatement against CalPortland.

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on February 8, 2016. See Pappas v. CalPortland Co., 38 

FMSHRC 137 (Feb. 8, 2016); see also 29 C.F.R. § 2700.45(f) 

(describing procedure for review by the Commission of an 

ALJ’s temporary reinstatement order). 

In affirming the ALJ’s decision, the Commission found

that CalPortland’s hiring process, which the Commission 

characterized as “miner retention decisions” or “rehiring” 

decisions, occurred while Pappas was “[u]nquestionably” a 

“miner” at the Oro Grande plant. See Pappas, 38 FMSHRC

at 141–42. Based on the fact that Jamie Ambrose, who was 

aware of Pappas’s prior section 105(c) complaint, was 

involved in CalPortland’s hiring process, see id., the 

Commission held that CalPortland’s “decision-making 

process . . . was done in conjunction with Martin Marietta,” 

id. at 142; see also id. at 144 (“Pappas has alleged that he was 

the victim of a joint decision-making process involving 

Martin Marietta and CalPortland.”). The Commission 

concluded that because “[t]emporary reinstatement was 

designed to maintain the status quo while miners proceed with 

their discrimination claims[,] [p]ermitting Pappas, who had 

worked at the Oro Grande cement plant for 16 years, to 

continue working at that plant pending the resolution of this 

matter, is consistent with this underlying Congressional 

intent.” Id. at 144. 

 

On February 22, 2016, the Commission denied 

CalPortland’s petition for reconsideration. CalPortland filed 

its petition for review with this Court on March 8, 2016. On 

appeal, CalPortland does not challenge the Commission’s 

determination that Pappas’s complaint was not frivolously 

brought, see id. at 144–47, but argues that the Commission 

erred in holding that Pappas was a “miner” rather than an 

“applicant for employment” for purposes of section 

105(c)(2)’s temporary reinstatement provision.

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III.

While neither party disputes that we have jurisdiction 

over a section 105(c)(2) temporary reinstatement order, we 

have “a special obligation” to satisfy ourselves of our own 

jurisdiction. Micei Int’l v. Dep’t of Commerce, 613 F.3d 

1147, 1151 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting Bender v. Williamsport 

Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986)). 

A.

Section 106(a) of the Mine Act provides that any person 

adversely affected by “an order” of the Commission may 

obtain judicial review of “such order.” 30 U.S.C. § 816(a)(1). 

Although the Mine Act refers to an “order” rather than to a 

“final order,” we have held that “the Mine Act limits appellate 

review to final agency action.” Meredith v. FMSHRC, 177 

F.3d 1042, 1047–48 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Two conditions must 

be satisfied for an action to be considered “final”: 

First, the action must mark the consummation of 

the agency’s decisionmaking process—it must 

not be of a merely tentative or interlocutory 

nature. And second, the action must be one by 

which rights or obligations have been 

determined, or from which legal consequences 

will flow. 

U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 1807, 

1813 (2016) (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 

(1997)). In light of the fact that “[a] final order need not 

necessarily be the very last order,” NetCoalition v. SEC, 715 

F.3d 342, 351 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted), “there is a close issue of whether [a section 

105(c)(2) temporary reinstatement] order is a final one for 

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purposes of appellate review.” Jim Walter Res., Inc. v. 

FMSHRC, 920 F.2d 738, 744 (11th Cir. 1990); see also 

Cobra, 742 F.3d at 93–96 (Agee, J., dissenting) (concluding 

that a temporary reinstatement order is “a final order for 

purposes of appeal”); N. Fork Coal Corp. v. FMSHRC, 691 

F.3d 735, 738–39 (6th Cir. 2012) (considering appeal from 

temporary reinstatement order without analyzing jurisdiction 

and noting that parties may seek judicial review of the 

Commission’s “final order” (citing 30 U.S.C. § 816(a))). But 

given the “pragmatic and flexible nature” of the finality 

inquiry, Rhea Lana, Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor, 824 F.3d 1023, 

1027 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citations and internal quotation marks 

omitted), we need not directly resolve this issue because, as 

explained below, we conclude that the Commission’s order 

directing CalPortland to hire Pappas is immediately 

appealable pursuant to the collateral order doctrine. 

B.

Courts of appeals “have jurisdiction of appeals from all 

final decisions of the district courts of the United States, . . . 

except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme 

Court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (emphasis added). But the 

Supreme Court has given 28 U.S.C. § 1291 “a ‘practical 

rather than a technical construction,’” meaning that “the 

statute encompasses not only judgments that ‘terminate an 

action,’ but also a ‘small class’ of collateral rulings that, 

although they do not end the litigation, are appropriately 

deemed ‘final.’” Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 

100, 106 (2009) (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan 

Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545–46 (1949)). We have also

explained that “[t]he collateral order doctrine extends beyond 

the confines of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to encompass the principle 

of administrative finality contained in section 106(a) of the 

Mine Act.” Meredith, 177 F.3d at 1050. We are mindful, 

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however, that the collateral order doctrine is “a limited 

exception to the final judgment rule,” United States v. Fokker 

Servs. B.V., 818 F.3d 733, 747 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citing Cohen, 

337 U.S. 541), that “must ‘never be allowed to swallow the 

general rule that a party is entitled to a single appeal, to be 

deferred until final judgment has been entered,’” Mohawk 

Indus., 558 U.S. at 106 (quoting Digital Equip. Corp. v. 

Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 868 (1994)).

To come within the scope of the collateral order doctrine, 

an order must: “(i) conclusively determine[] a disputed 

question; (ii) resolve[] an important issue completely separate 

from the merits of the action; and (iii) [be] effectively 

unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Meredith, 

177 F.3d at 1048 (citing Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 

U.S. 463, 468 (1978)). Each of these conditions must be 

satisfied for an order “to qualify as an immediately-appealable 

collateral order.” Fokker Servs., 818 F.3d at 748; see also 

Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 107–08.

Although we have applied the collateral order doctrine to 

issues arising under section 105(c) of the Mine Act, see 

Meredith, 177 F.3d at 1048–52, we have not determined 

whether a section 105(c)(2) temporary reinstatement order is 

subject to the collateral order doctrine. The Seventh and 

Eleventh Circuits have determined that such orders are 

reviewable under the collateral order doctrine, Vulcan Constr. 

Materials, L.P. v. FMSHRC, 700 F.3d 297, 300 (7th Cir. 

2012); Jim Walter, 920 F.2d at 744–45 (determining in the 

11th Circuit), but the Fourth Circuit has reached the opposite 

conclusion, Cobra, 742 F.3d at 88–92. For the following 

reasons, we conclude that all three requirements are satisfied 

in this case and, therefore, the Commission’s temporary 

reinstatement order is an immediately appealable order under 

the collateral order doctrine. 

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First, the Commission’s order directing CalPortland to 

hire Pappas conclusively determined the temporary 

reinstatement issue. To satisfy the conclusiveness condition, 

an order must be “a fully consummated decision,” Meredith, 

177 F.3d at 1052 (quoting Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 

651, 659 (1977)), that “conclusively and finally determined” 

the issue, In re Sealed Case (Med. Records), 381 F.3d 1205, 

1209 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). The Commission’s temporary reinstatement order 

“is a ‘fully consummated’ decision, and there are literally ‘no 

further steps’ that [CalPortland] can take in order to avoid the 

Commission’s order at the agency level.” Jim Walter, 920 

F.2d at 744 (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 527 

(1985)). Even if the temporary reinstatement order was 

“technically subject to modification, . . . [‘]there is no basis to 

suppose that the [Commission] contemplated any 

reconsideration of [the] decision.’” Obaydullah v. Obama, 

609 F.3d 444, 447 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting Moses H. Cone 

Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 12–13 

(1983)). In fact, the Commission denied CalPortland’s 

petition for reconsideration on February 22, 2016, which 

suggests that its decision was not merely “tentative or subject 

to revision.” Sealed Case, 381 F.3d at 1209 (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). 

Second, the Commission’s order satisfies the separability

condition. A temporary reinstatement order has “no bearing” 

on the ultimate resolution of a complaint, as the complainant’s 

discrimination case proceeds regardless of the Commission’s 

holding on the temporary reinstatement application and the 

temporary reinstatement order does not affect the merits 

decision. Cobra, 742 F.3d at 98 (Agee, J., dissenting). This 

case also concerns a threshold issue—whether Pappas was a 

“miner” or an “applicant for employment” for purposes of his 

complaint—that is “completely independent from the merits 

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of whether [CalPortland] committed the acts charged in the 

complaint.” See Meredith, 177 F.3d at 1051–52. Because 

both miners and applicants for employment are protected by 

the Act but only miners are eligible for temporary 

reinstatement, whether Pappas was a miner or an applicant is 

relevant only to the temporary reinstatement issue and need

not be addressed in the merits decision. 

Third, temporary reinstatement orders involve important 

interests that will be effectively unreviewable on appeal from 

a final order on the complaint. The “crucial question” in 

analyzing this condition is “whether deferring review until 

final judgment so imperils the interest as to justify the cost of 

allowing immediate appeal of the entire class of relevant 

orders.” Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 108. During the period 

between the issuance of the temporary reinstatement order 

and the final order on the complaint—in this case, the ALJ’s 

decision issued on January 12, 2016, and the underlying 

merits hearing on Pappas’s complaint is scheduled for 

December 6-9, 2016—an operator may be unnecessarily 

forced to pay wages and employ a worker who has no 

meritorious claim with no procedure available to recoup these 

expenses. See Cobra, 742 F.3d at 95, 99 (Agee, J. 

dissenting). Miners have even more significant interests at 

stake. A miner, who “may not be in the financial position to 

suffer even a short period of unemployment or reduced 

income pending resolution of the discrimination complaint,” 

id. at 96 (quoting S. Rep. No. 95-181, at 37 (1977)), may 

suffer irreparable financial harm if his right to appeal from an 

adverse decision is foreclosed. Denying immediate review of 

an order on temporary reinstatement may also have a chilling 

effect on a miner’s willingness to report safety complaints. 

See id. at 99. And, because an appeal from the final order on 

the complaint need not reach issues concerning temporary 

reinstatement, the parties would “effectively lose any 

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opportunity for a judicial hearing of [their] claims.” Jim 

Walter, 920 F.2d at 745; see also Cobra, 742 F.3d at 98 

(Agee, J., dissenting) (explaining that “any issues related to 

the temporary order [are] effectively moot” when the 

Commission issues the final order on the complaint). This

lack of appealability is particularly concerning when, as here, 

there is a dispute over the threshold issue of whether a 

complainant is eligible for temporary reinstatement. See 

Meredith, 177 F.3d at 1052 (“Once administrative 

proceedings have run their course, the interest in avoiding 

them has been vitiated and cannot be vindicated.”) (citation 

omitted). 

 

Because the Commission’s temporary reinstatement order 

satisfies the requirements of the collateral order doctrine, we 

have jurisdiction to hear this petition for review. 

 

IV.

As noted, CalPortland timely petitioned for review, 

arguing that the Commission erred when it affirmed the ALJ’s 

decision ordering CalPortland to “reinstate” Pappas even 

though Pappas had never been employed by CalPortland. We 

review the Commission’s legal conclusions de novo and its 

findings of fact for substantial evidence. Am. Coal Co. v. 

FMSHRC, 796 F.3d 18, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 

A.

The Secretary’s reasonable interpretation of the Mine Act 

is accorded deference by both the Commission and this Court

under the familiar two-step Chevron standard. Am. Coal, 796 

F.3d at 23-24 (citations omitted); see also Chevron, U.S.A., 

Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–45 

(1984). The Secretary’s litigating position before the 

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Commission, which “is as much an exercise of delegated 

lawmaking powers as is the Secretary’s promulgation of a . . . 

health and safety standard,” is also entitled to Chevron

deference. Am. Coal, 796 F.3d at 24 (citations and internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

“Under the first step of Chevron we consider whether 

Congress has unambiguously addressed the question.” Id. at 

23–24. As the Supreme Court has made clear, “[a]gencies 

exercise discretion only in the interstices created by statutory 

silence or ambiguity; they must always give effect to the 

unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Util. Air 

Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2445 (2014) 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, “[a]n 

agency has no power to ‘tailor’ legislation to bureaucratic 

policy goals by rewriting unambiguous statutory terms.” Id. 

If, however, the Mine Act is “silent or ambiguous with respect 

to the specific issue,” Sec’y of Labor v. Excel Mining, LLC, 

334 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted), “we ask whether the Secretary’s 

interpretation is reasonable,” Am. Coal, 796 F.3d at 24. 

 

B.

In relevant part, section 105(c)(2) of the Mine Act 

provides:

Any miner or applicant for employment or 

representative of miners who believes that he 

has been discharged, interfered with, or 

otherwise discriminated against by any person 

in violation of this subsection may . . . file a 

complaint with the Secretary alleging such 

discrimination. . . . [I]f the Secretary finds that 

such complaint was not frivolously brought, the 

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Commission, on an expedited basis upon 

application of the Secretary, shall order the 

immediate reinstatement of the miner pending 

final order on the complaint.

30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(2) (emphasis added). The parties do not 

dispute that section 105(c)(2)’s temporary reinstatement 

remedy is limited to “miners.” See Piper, 35 FMSHRC at 

1972 & n.2. The question, therefore, is whether Pappas was a 

“miner” eligible for temporary reinstatement.

The Secretary argues that the term “miner” in section 

105(c)(2) is ambiguous as it relates to Pappas. Specifically, 

the Secretary asserts that Pappas “was both a ‘miner’ and an 

‘applicant for employment’ at the Oro Grande cement plant,” 

and contends that section 105(c)(2) does not address the 

question of whether a miner who applies for employment with 

the future operator of the mine at which the miner is working 

qualifies as a “miner” eligible for temporary reinstatement. 

Focusing on Pappas’s previous employment for Martin 

Marietta, the Secretary argues that Pappas can be “reinstated” 

to a position at the Oro Grande plant. The Commission 

similarly concluded that Pappas was eligible for temporary 

reinstatement because he was “[u]nquestionably” a miner “at 

the Oro Grande plant” when CalPortland made its hiring 

decisions, Pappas, 38 FMSHRC at 141, and that permitting 

Pappas “to continue working at that plant” was consistent 

with the “underlying Congressional intent” in the Mine Act, 

id. at 144. 

 

“To determine whether the meaning of a statutory 

provision is plain, the court’s analysis begins with the most 

traditional tool of statutory construction, reading the text 

itself.” Wolf Run Mining Co. v. FMSHRC, 659 F.3d 1197, 

1200 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citation, internal quotation marks, and 

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brackets omitted). In making this determination, we consider 

“the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the 

language and design of the statute as a whole.” Id. (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted). “Ambiguity is a 

creature not of definitional possibilities but of statutory 

context,” Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994) (citing 

King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991)), and 

“the presence of a difficult question of statutory construction 

does not necessarily render that provision ambiguous,” 

Meredith, 177 F.3d at 1053. In short, we defer to an agency’s 

interpretation of a statute “only when the devices of judicial 

construction have been tried and found to yield no clear sense 

of congressional intent.” Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. 

Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600 (2004) (citing INS v. 

Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446–48 (1987)).

The Mine Act broadly defines a “miner” as “any 

individual working in a coal or other mine,” 30 U.S.C. 

§ 802(g), and Pappas was undeniably a “miner” for Martin 

Marietta at the Oro Grande plant during the relevant period. 

But this case concerns the use of the term “miner” in the 

specific context of section 105(c)(2)’s temporary 

reinstatement provision. Thus, the question at issue in this 

case is whether Pappas is a “miner” who is eligible for 

reinstatement. We conclude that Congress’s use of the word 

“reinstatement” in section 105(c)(2) provides a “clear sense of 

congressional intent” on this issue. See Gen. Dynamics, 540 

U.S. at 600.

 

To “reinstate” means to “restore []someone . . . to their

[sic] former position,” THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN 

DICTIONARY 1428 (2d ed. 2005) (emphasis added); see also 

WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1915

(1993) (“[T]o instate again[;] place again[] as in . . . a former 

position[.]” (emphasis added)); Reinstate, BLACK’S LAW 

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DICTIONARY 1477 (10th ed. 2014) (“To place again in a 

former state or position; to restore . . . .” (emphasis added)), 

and section 105(c)(2) explicitly ties “reinstatement” with the

miner’s “former position.” See 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(2) (stating

that the Commission may require an offender to take 

affirmative action to abate a violation, “including . . . the 

rehiring or reinstatement of the miner to his former position”

(emphasis added)). We agree with the Commission that, “[a]s 

a purely logical and semantic matter, one cannot be 

‘reinstated’ to a position he has never held,” Piper, 35 

FMSHRC at 1972 n.2, and the Secretary acknowledges that 

the definition of reinstatement “may preclude an individual 

from being reinstated ‘to a position he never held.’”

In this case, it is undisputed that Pappas has never been 

employed by or worked for CalPortland; during the relevant 

time period, he was a miner employed by Martin Marietta.

See, e.g., Pappas, 38 FMSHRC at 141–42 (finding that 

Pappas was a “miner” eligible for temporary reinstatement 

because he was “a ‘miner’ employed by Martin Marietta” 

when CalPortland decided not to hire him and he 

“experienced the effect of CalPortland’s decision not to hire 

him while he was still a miner working for Martin Marietta”

(emphases added)). In a final decision, CalPortland, as the 

successor operator of the Oro Grande plant, could perhaps be 

ordered to instate Pappas if it was found to have violated the 

Mine Act when it failed to hire him, see 30 U.S.C. 

§ 815(c)(2), but it cannot be ordered to “reinstate” Pappas to a 

position he never held at this preliminary stage in the 

proceedings. Id. (emphasis added). Furthermore, because 

Pappas was never employed by CalPortland, the involvement 

of Ambrose in CalPortland’s hiring process, and her 

subsequent employment with CalPortland, does not affect 

“the status of Mr. Pappas as an applicant for employment with 

CalPortland.” Pappas, 38 FMSHRC at 152 (Althen, 

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dissenting). While allegations concerning Ambrose’s 

involvement in CalPortland’s hiring decisions could be 

evidence of CalPortland’s discrimination, they do not affect 

Pappas’s status as an applicant for employment for purposes 

of section 105(c)(2). 

In an attempt to create an ambiguity in the statute, the 

Secretary relies on the fact that Pappas was a miner, not with 

CalPortland, but at the Oro Grande plant. The Secretary, 

however, fails to identify any language in the Mine Act 

suggesting that the temporary reinstatement provision applies 

to a physical location rather than to an employer. The 

Commission’s own precedent illustrates that this remedy 

applies to a specific employer, not to a mine. See Piper, 35 

FMSHRC at 1972–73 (concluding that complainant “was not 

a mere ‘applicant’ for a position with KenAmerican” because 

“[h]e had actively worked in KenAmerican’s mine” and the 

“genesis” of the complaint was the miner’s dismissal by 

KenAmerican (emphasis added)); Lone Mountain, 20 

FMSHRC at 930 (holding that the complainant, who was a 

miner for Arch of Kentucky, “was not a complaining ‘miner’ 

for purposes of the Mine Act” and his complaint against Lone 

Mountain, which arose out of his application for employment 

with Lone Mountain). The mere fact that Pappas may have 

been both a miner and an applicant for employment does not 

establish that he was a miner for purposes of his complaint 

against CalPortland. See, e.g., Sec’y of Labor v. Mullins, 888 

F.2d 1448, 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“The fact that [the 

operator] also violated § 105(c) at an earlier point in time by 

interfering with Keene’s statutorily protected rights while he 

was still a miner within the meaning of the Act does not 

insulate [the operator’s owner and president] from liability for 

subsequently interfering with Keene’s statutorily protected 

rights in his capacity as an applicant for employment.”

(emphasis added)).

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Applying section 105(c)(2) to the facts of this case, 

because he had “no prior work history” and “no prior 

relationship” with CalPortland, cf. Piper, 35 FMSHRC at 

1973, we conclude that Pappas was an applicant for 

employment for purposes of his discrimination complaint 

against CalPortland. Although Pappas was obviously a 

“miner” in that he was employed by Martin Marietta at the 

Oro Grande plant, both CalPortland and the Secretary agree 

that Pappas applied for a new position at CalPortland and the 

alleged discriminatory act was CalPortland’s failure to hire 

him. The literal fact that Pappas had been employed as a 

miner for a different employer at the Oro Grande plant does 

not distinguish him from any other “applicant for 

employment” with CalPortland for purposes of section 

105(c)(2). Therefore, Pappas was an “applicant for 

employment” and was not eligible for temporary 

reinstatement. 

 

* * *

For the reasons stated, “regular interpretive method 

leaves no serious question” as to congressional intent in this 

case. Gen. Dynamics, 540 U.S. at 600. The text and structure 

of section 105(c)(2) of the Mine Act preclude the 

Commission from directing an owner or operator to 

temporarily “reinstate” a complainant who has never been 

employed by that owner or operator. Because Pappas was an 

“applicant for employment” who was not eligible for 

temporary reinstatement pending final order on his complaint,

we grant CalPortland’s petition for review and vacate the 

Commission’s decision and order. 

 

So ordered.

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