Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-01302/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-01302-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jeffery Beard
Respondent
Bobby Lee Hughes
Petitioner

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BOBBY LEE HUGHES,

Petitioner,

v.

JEFFERY BEARD,

Respondent.

Case No. 14-cv-01302-EMC 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

I. INTRODUCTION

Bobby Lee Hughes filed this pro se action for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 to challenge part of the sentence he received pursuant to a plea agreement. 

Respondent has filed an answer to the petition and Mr. Hughes has filed a traverse. For the 

reasons discussed below, the Court dismisses one claim as untimely filed and denies the other 

claim on the merits.

II. BACKGROUND 

A. California‟s Sentence Enhancement For Committing A New Crime While Out On Bail

California Penal Code section 12022.1 provides for a two-year sentence enhancement 

when a defendant commits a crime while out on bail for another crime. This provision is 

sometimes called the “on-bail enhancement.” Section 12022.1 sets out the methods by which 

courts can account for the sometimes contingent nature of the underlying (or “primary”) offense

(e.g., staying the enhancement on the sentence for the current (or “secondary”) offense until a 

conviction occurs for the underlying offense), and the steps to be taken after the underlying 

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offense is resolved.

1

 

Mr. Hughes‟ federal habeas petition challenges the two-year sentence enhancement he 

received under California Penal Code section 12202.1 as part of his plea deal. Mr. Hughes 

challenges the sentence originally imposed as well as the state court‟s later refusal to vacate the 

on-bail sentence enhancement when the underlying offense was dismissed. 

B. The No-Contest Plea And Sentencing

On November 1, 2010, Mr. Hughes was charged in Alameda County Superior Court with 

second degree robbery. The criminal complaint also contained numerous sentence enhancement 

allegations, including allegations that Mr. Hughes: (a) was on bail in Solano County Case No. 

 

1 At the time Mr. Hughes entered his no-contest plea, California Penal Code § 12022.1 

provided, in relevant part:

(a) For the purposes of this section only:

(1) “Primary offense” means a felony offense for which a person 

has been released from custody on bail or on his or her own 

recognizance prior to the judgment becoming final. . . .

(2) “Secondary offense” means a felony offense alleged to have 

been committed while the person is released from custody for a 

primary offense.

(b) Any person arrested for a secondary offense which was alleged to 

have been committed while that person was released from custody 

on a primary offense shall be subject to a penalty enhancement of an 

additional two years in state prison which shall be served 

consecutive to any other term imposed by the court. 

* * *

(d) Whenever there is a conviction for the secondary offense and the 

enhancement is proved, and the person is sentenced on the 

secondary offense prior to the conviction of the primary offense, the 

imposition of the enhancement shall be stayed pending imposition of 

the sentence for the primary offense. The stay shall be lifted by the 

court hearing the primary offense at the time of sentencing for that 

offense and shall be recorded in the abstract of judgment. If the 

person is acquitted of the primary offense the stay shall be 

permanent.

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FCR263076 when he committed the robbery; (b) had suffered five prior convictions for receiving 

stolen property, first degree burglary, assault with a deadly weapon, and battery on a non-confined 

person by a prisoner; and (c) had suffered four prior prison terms. See Docket No. 14-3 at 2, 9-11. 

The parties entered into a plea agreement. On February 2, 2012, pursuant to that plea 

agreement, Mr. Hughes pleaded no contest to the robbery offense and admitted the sentence 

enhancement allegations that he had suffered one prior serious felony and was on bail at the time 

of the current offense.2 The prosecutor described the agreed-upon sentence: “The defendant is 

going to receive the low term of two years times two, plus the two-year enhancement under 

12022.1, for a total of six years state prison, which he will be serving at 85 percent. In lieu (sic) of 

that plea, the other priors will be stricken for purposes of sentencing.” Docket No. 14-3 at 15. 

The court reviewed the rights that Mr. Hughes would be waiving by entering his plea, and he 

waived them. The prosecutor then stated the factual basis for the plea, and defense counsel 

accepted it.3 The court then returned to the sentence:

THE COURT: The understanding is that you will receive a total of six years in the 

state prison at 85 percent. You will not be considered for probation. Do you 

understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: And you‟re prepared to do that, correct?

 

2 At the change-of-plea hearing, it was agreed that Mr. Hughes would admit to having 

suffered a prior serious felony conviction. At sentencing, however, that provision was modified 

and Mr. Hughes admitted to suffering a prior prison term rather than a prior conviction. Compare

2/1/12 RT 2 with 3/6/12 RT 2.

3

The prosecutor stated the following factual basis for the plea:

On October 22nd, 2010, the defendant walked into the U.S. Bank 

inside the Safeway in Dublin, wearing designer sunglasses and a hat, 

carrying a manila envelope. Defendant approached the teller, 

handled (sic) the teller a note that said, “No bait, no dye packs.” 

The defendant told her to hand over all the large bills, and the 

teller‟s next to her. The teller was frightened, so complied. There 

was no weapon and the defendant fled. [¶] After an investigation, 

the defendant was determined and identified by the teller. The 

defendant was subsequently arrested.

Docket No. 14-3 at 21. 

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THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

Docket No. 14-3 at 17. Mr. Hughes then entered his plea of no contest to the robbery charge and 

admitted the two sentence enhancement allegations. Id. at 22-23. The prosecutor dismissed the 

remaining sentence enhancement allegations of prior convictions for purposes of sentencing. Id.

at 24. 

Less than three weeks later, Mr. Hughes sent a letter to his lawyer dated February 19, 

2012, musing about whether a better deal could have been obtained had Mr. Hughes waited and 

whether Mr. Hughes should try to withdraw his plea. See Docket No. 18 at 22-27. His letter 

plainly shows that he and his attorney had discussed the on-bail enhancement and that Mr. Hughes 

planned to use the statute to his advantage at the appropriate time, even planning to conceal

information from the sentencing judge if advantageous. Mr. Hughes wrote to his attorney:

I am sending you what I have on P.C. 120122.1. Please review it as 

well as any other secondary source info you have at your disposal. 

As I told you, my understanding of the bail enhancement is if I am 

convicted of the charges in Solano, I cannot be given the 2 extra 

years. The case in Solano is my “primary offense” and the case at 

bar is my secondary offense. As long as I am not convicted of a 

felony in Solano, my offense here will only be 4 years. And that 

reasoning is why I am taking this deal.

I believe the sentencing Judge is required to stay the two years 

pending adjudication of my primary offense, but if he does not, [I] 

won’t say anything as you advised. But when I get to Solano and 

resolve that case favorably, what should I do -- file an appeal or a 

habe[a]s corpus?

Docket No. 18 at 26 (emphasis added). In that same letter, Mr. Hughes acknowledged that 

counsel had informed him that he likely would receive a much lengthier sentence if he went to 

trial. Id. at 25 (“My time isn‟t bad when you look at the cap -- and you did your duty to relay your 

honest opinion that I‟d end up with close to the 20 years I was facing.”) 

On March 6, 2012, Mr. Hughes was sentenced to a total of six years in prison. As 

indicated in footnote 2, supra, the court and counsel had discussed the sentencing in chambers and 

determined to make a change to Mr. Hughes‟ advantage: instead of Mr. Hughes admitting to 

having suffered a prior serious felony conviction, he would admit to having served a prior prison 

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term for the same conviction; the result of the change was that it would not be a second strike 

sentence and instead would be a sentence of the same length but calculated differently to impose a 

one-year enhancement for the prior prison term. Docket No. 14-3 at 29. Mr. Hughes agreed, and 

admitted that he had served a prior prison term. Id. at 29. The six-year term was then imposed, 

comprised of consecutive sentences of the mid-term of three years for the robbery, one year for the 

prior prison term sentence enhancement, and two years for the enhancement for committing the 

robbery while on bail. Id.at 29-30.

Mr. Hughes did not appeal. 

C. Post-Sentencing State Court Proceedings

The on-bail enhancement imposed in the Alameda County case discussed above was based 

on a Solano County case in which Mr. Hughes was charged with burglary and grand theft, People 

v. Bobby Hughes, Solano County Superior Court Case No. FCR263076. Docket No. 14-5 at 21

(“the “Solano County case”). The Solano County case was dismissed on October 2, 2012, in the 

interest of justice in view of a finding that Mr. Hughes had been “prosecuted in Alameda County 

for the same offense.” Docket No. 14-5 at 21. (That Alameda County prosecution is separate 

from the Alameda County robbery case at issue here.) Mr. Hughes allegedly received a copy of 

the Solano County Superior Court‟s order dismissing the Solano County case “[s]ometime in 

March or early April 2013.” Docket No. 1-1 at 3.

On June 3, 2013, Mr. Hughes filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Alameda 

County Superior Court, contending that the on-bail enhancement portion of his sentence was 

infirm because the offense for which he was on bail had been dismissed. The Alameda County 

Superior Court denied the petition on July 17, 2013 as untimely and on the merits. Docket No. 14-

5 at 8. As to the latter, the court wrote:

Even if timely, the Petition fails to state prima facie claims for relief. 

A defendant may be estopped from complaining about a sentence, 

even if it is unauthorized, if the defendant agreed to it as part of plea 

agreement. (People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal. 4th 290, 295.) 

Petitioner negotiated a plea providing for a 6-year sentence and was 

sentenced pursuant to that plea bargain. “[D]efendants who have 

received the benefit of their bargain should not be allowed to trifle 

with the courts by attempting to better the bargain through the 

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appellate process. [Citations.]” (Hester, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 

295.)

Docket No. 14-5 at 8 (alterations in original).

Mr. Hughes then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of 

Appeal on August 14, 2013. The court ordered and received an informal brief from respondent, 

and received a reply from Mr. Hughes. On October 4, 2013, the petition was denied without 

discussion. Docket No. 14-5 at 9. 

Mr. Hughes then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court 

on November 20, 2013. The petition was denied without discussion on February 11, 2014. See

Docket No. 14-6 at 2. 

This action was filed on March 20, 2014. The petition is dated March 14, 2014, and the 

envelope in which it arrived has no readable postmark. Applying the prison mailbox rule, the 

Court assumes for present purposes that Mr. Hughes gave his petition to prison officials to mail on 

the date he signed it, and deems the petition to have been filed as of March 14, 2014. See Stillman 

v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 2003) (mailbox rule provides that pro se prisoner's 

filing of a document is deemed to have occurred when he gives it to prison officials to mail to the 

court).

III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action for a writ of habeas corpus under 

28 U.S.C. § 2254. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This action is in the proper venue because the petition 

concerns the conviction and sentence of a person convicted in Alameda County, California, which 

is within this judicial district. 28 U.S.C. §§ 84, 2241(d).

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in 

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The Antiterrorism And Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) amended § 2254 

to impose new restrictions on federal habeas review. A petition may not be granted with respect to 

any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court‟s adjudication of 

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the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application 

of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of 

the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

“Under the „contrary to‟ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court 

arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if 

the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially 

indistinguishable facts.” Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000).

“Under the „unreasonable application‟ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if 

the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court‟s 

decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner‟s case.” Id. at 413. 

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its 

independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law 

erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. “A 

federal habeas court making the 'unreasonable application' inquiry should ask whether the state 

court‟s application of clearly established federal law was 'objectively unreasonable.'“ Id. at 409.

V. DISCUSSION

A. The Claim(s) Asserted

In his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus, Mr. Hughes alleges that his right to due 

process was violated when the “state courts refused to adhere to state statutory law, as well as law 

of the California Supreme Court, requiring petitioner‟s bail violation enhancement conviction and 

sentence be vacated where petitioner had not suffered a requisite felony conviction as to the 

„primary offense‟ within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.1” Docket No. 1-1 at 5. He 

argues that, “for the bail violation enhancement, Penal Code § 12022.1, to be sustained, [he had] 

to be convicted of a felony,” and the October 2, 2012 dismissal of the Solano County case meant 

that “no felony conviction came to fruition as to the „primary offense,‟ and thus, petitioner‟s bail 

violation enhancement conviction and sentence must be ordered vacated.” Docket No. 1-1 at 6. 

He further argues that, at the time the plea agreement was reached, the parties anticipated that he 

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would be convicted in the Solano County case, and that California Penal Code § 12022.1 “permits 

the court presiding over the adjudication of the „secondary offense,‟ to accept a bail violation plea, 

and impose a two year term. However, the two year term is to be „stayed,‟ pending conviction as 

to the „primary offense.‟” Docket No. 1-1 at 7. 

As this Court understands it, Mr. Hughes‟ petition urges two analytically distinct claims. 

First, the petition appears to assert that the sentence was improper from the outset because the onbail sentence enhancement should have been stayed until the Solano County case was resolved. 

See id. Second, the petition appears to assert that, once the Solano County case was dismissed, 

due process required the state courts to dismiss the two-year on-bail sentence enhancement. See 

id.at 5-6. As will be explained below, the first claim is untimely and the second claim does not 

support federal habeas relief.

B. The Habeas Statute of Limitations Bars Claim One

Petitions filed by prisoners challenging noncapital state convictions or sentences must be 

filed within one year of the latest of the date on which: (1) the judgment became final after the 

conclusion of direct review or the time has passed for seeking direct review; (2) an impediment to 

filing an application created by unconstitutional state action was removed, if such action prevented 

petitioner from filing; (3) the constitutional right asserted was recognized by the Supreme Court, if 

the right was newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactive to cases on collateral 

review; or (4) the factual predicate of the claim could have been discovered through the exercise 

of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

The one-year statute of limitations period in § 2244(d)(1) applies to each claim in a habeas 

petition on an individual basis. See Mardesich v. Cate, 668 F.3d 1164, 1169-71 (9th Cir. 2012). 

In the usual case, all the claims in a petition are for alleged errors at trial or sentencing and all the 

claims receive the same starting date for the limitations period based on the date the conviction 

becomes final. However, when, as here, one or more claims arise after the conviction becomes 

final, the rule from Mardesich becomes critical. Mardesich rejected the view that all claims in a 

petition “may proceed so long as at least one of them is timely.” Id. at 1169, 1171. In other 

words, if a claim arises long after a conviction is final -- due to a newly recognized constitutional 

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right or due to the belated discovery of the factual predicate of a claim -- that claim might have a 

later starting date and be timely, but its timeliness does not open the door for the presentation of 

other claims that are otherwise time-barred. This court therefore must consider whether each of 

the two claims in Mr. Hughes‟ habeas petition is timely. The timeliness of one claim will not 

necessarily mean the other claim is timely. See id. at 1170-71.

1. Claim One Is Untimely

The limitations period for the claim that the sentence originally imposed violated due 

process began when the judgment became final upon “the expiration of the time for seeking 

[direct] review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). In California, a criminal defendant must file an 

appeal within 60 days “after the rendition of the judgment or the making of the order being 

appealed.” Cal. R. Ct. 8.308(a). The rendition of judgment is the oral pronouncement, i.e., the 

sentencing date. See Cal. Penal Code § 1202; People v. Thomas, 52 Cal. 2d 521, 529 n.3 (Cal. 

1959). Mr. Hughes was sentenced on March 6, 2012. See Docket No. 14-3 at 33. Mr. Hughes 

had until May 5, 2012 to file an appeal. Mr. Hughes did not appeal, so his judgment became final 

on May 5, 2012, when the time for seeking direct review expired. The one-year limitations period 

began the next day, and the presumptive deadline for Mr. Hughes to file his federal petition 

therefore was May 5, 2013.

The Court does not use the alternative starting date for the limitations period of “the date 

on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered 

through the exercise of due diligence,” § 2244(d)(1)(D), for the claim that the original sentence 

violated due process because that date is earlier than the “date on which the judgment became final 

by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review,” §

2244(d)(1)(A). When § 2244(d)(1)(D) applies, the limitations period begins “when the prisoner 

knows (or through diligence could discover) the important facts, not when the prisoner recognizes 

their legal significance.” Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1154 n.3 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting 

Owens v. Boyd, 235 F.3d 356, 359 (7th Cir. 2000)). Here, Mr. Hughes knew as of February 19, 

2012 that the sentence for the on-bail enhancement would not but (according to his claim) should 

be stayed pending a resolution of the Solano County case. On that date, he wrote to his attorney 

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that he “believe[d] the sentencing Judge is required to stay the two years pending adjudication” of 

the Solano County case. Docket No. 18 at 26. When he was sentenced on March 6, 2012, Mr. 

Hughes knew the important facts, i.e., that the sentence imposed was six years and the two-year 

portion of that sentence attributable to the on-bail sentence enhancement had not been stayed. 

Thus, using § 2244(d)(1)(D) would result in a March 6, 2012 starting date for the limitations 

period, whereas using § 2244(d)(1)(A) results in the later starting date of May 6, 2012. Section 

2244(d)(1) provides that the limitations period runs “from the latest of” the four possible starting 

dates which, for Mr. Hughes‟ first claim, was the date on which the conviction became final upon 

the expiration of the time for seeking direct review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (limitations 

period runs “from the latest of” the four possible starting dates).

The one-year limitations period is tolled for the “time during which a properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Here, Mr. Hughes‟ first state habeas 

petition was not filed until June 3, 2013, almost a month after the one-year limitations period 

expired on May 5, 2013. The state habeas petitions, all having been filed after the expiration of 

the one-year habeas statute of limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), had no tolling effect. 

See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[S]ection 2244(d) does not permit 

the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the state petition was filed,” even if 

the state petition was timely filed).

Even if Mr. Hughes could show that he sent his first state habeas petition to the Alameda 

County Superior Court before the expiration of the one-year statute of limitations period, his 

petition would be untimely because the Alameda County Superior Court rejected that petition as 

untimely (as well as on the merits), with a citation to In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770, 780 (1998), 

and other cases. See Docket No. 14-5 at 8. A Robbins citation is the shorthand used by California 

courts to signal that a petition has been rejected as untimely. See Thorson v. Palmer, 479 F.3d 643, 

645 (9th Cir. 2007) (denial of petition with citation to Robbins at the page on which opinion 

discusses timeliness determinations was clear denial on timeliness grounds). “When a 

postconviction petition is untimely under state law, „that [is] the end of the matter‟ for purposes of 

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§ 2244(d)(2).” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414 (2005) (citing Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S.

214, 226 (2002)). As in Pace, “[b]ecause the state court rejected petitioner's [postconviction] 

petition as untimely, it was not „properly filed,‟ and he is not entitled to statutory tolling under 

§2244(d)(2).” Id. at 417; see also Lakey v. Hickman, 633 F.3d 782, 786 (9th Cir. 2011) (no 

statutory tolling for petition rejected as untimely by California Supreme Court because petition 

was not “properly filed”; fact that California's timeliness rule frequently requires consideration of 

diligence does not matter); Thorson, 479 F.3d at 645 (denial of petition with citation to Robbins at 

the page on which opinion discusses timeliness determinations was clear denial on timeliness 

grounds and therefore petition was neither “properly filed” nor “pending”). The Alameda County 

Superior Court‟s denial of Mr. Hughes‟ habeas petition as untimely strips that petition of any 

tolling effect. He thus is not entitled to statutory tolling for the days during which that petition 

was awaiting decision in the Alameda County Superior Court. Mr. Hughes also is not entitled to 

any tolling for his later state habeas petitions in the California Court of Appeal and the California 

Supreme Court because their summary denials created a presumption, unrebutted by Mr. Hughes, 

that those courts agreed with the lower court‟s determination on the timeliness question. See 

Curiel v. Miller, 780 F.3d 1201, 1203-04 (9th Cir. 2015); id. at 1204 (when the California 

Supreme Court denies the petition summarily, it is presumed that court agreed with the lower 

court‟s determination on the timeliness question unless “strong evidence” rebuts this 

presumption). In short, Mr. Hughes receives no statutory tolling for his state court habeas efforts. 

To be sure, the one-year limitations period may be equitably tolled because § 2244(d) is 

not jurisdictional. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010). „[A] litigant seeking equitable 

tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights 

diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Id. at 649 (quoting 

Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)); see also Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 

1153 (9th Cir. 2006). Mr. Hughes does not show any basis for equitable tolling of the limitations 

period. He does not show that any extraordinary circumstance stood in the way of him 

challenging the conviction and sentence originally imposed, and does not show that he was 

“pursuing his rights diligently” to challenge that conviction and sentence, as is required for 

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equitable tolling. Holland, 560 U.S. at 649. He fails to identify even a single step he took to 

pursue collateral relief after the sentence was imposed before he received the court order 

dismissing the Solano County case. In fact, his February 19, 2012 letter to his attorney suggests a 

purposeful strategy not to alert the state court at the time of the sentencing that the on-bail 

enhancement needed to be stayed. Mr. Hughes has not satisfied either requirement for equitable 

tolling. He therefore is not entitled to any equitable tolling of the limitations period. 

Mr. Hughes‟ claim that the sentence originally imposed violated due process was not filed 

until March 14, 2014, more than ten months after the expiration of the habeas statute of limitations 

period. The claim challenging the sentence originally imposed is dismissed as untimely.

2. Claim Two Is Not Untimely

Mr. Hughes‟ second claim has a different starting date for the limitations period. His 

second claim is that his right to due process was violated when the state courts refused to vacate

the on-bail sentence enhancement after the Solano County case was dismissed. He could not have 

known of the factual predicate for that claim before the dismissal occurred, and asserts that he did 

not learn of the dismissal until March or April 2013. The limitations period for the second claim 

began on “the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been 

discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). Under this 

subdivision, the limitations period begins “when the prisoner knows (or through diligence could 

discover) the important facts, not when the prisoner recognizes their legal significance.” Hasan, 

254 F.3d at 1154 n.3. Mr. Hughes learned the essential fact that the Solano County case had been 

dismissed in March or April 2013. There is no evidence that he learned the essential fact before 

March 14, 2013, and that appears to make his federal petition filed on March 14, 2014 timely, 

without the need for any statutory or equitable tolling. Even if he received notice of the dismissal 

of the Solano County case in the first two weeks of March 2013, he would be entitled to equitable 

tolling for the time he was seeking relief in the state courts because he was diligently pursuing his 

rights and exhaustion was a necessary precondition to the filing of the claim in federal court. See 

Holland, 560 U.S. at 655 (litigant seeking equitable tolling must establish “(1) that he has been 

pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.”) 

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The second claim in the petition is not barred by the statute of limitations. The Court therefore 

turns to the merits of that second claim.

C. Claim Two: State Court‟s Refusal To Vacate On-Bail Sentence Enhancement

In his second claim, Mr. Hughes contends that the state court violated his due process 

rights when it “refused to adhere to state statutory law, as well as the law of the California 

Supreme Court” that required his on-bail sentence enhancement to be vacated after the Solano 

County case was dismissed. Docket No. 1-1 at 5. As mentioned in the “Background” section 

above, the Alameda County Superior Court rejected Mr. Hughes‟ habeas petition because, “[e]ven 

if timely, the Petition fails to state prima facie claims for relief.” Docket No. 14-5 at 8. The 

superior court further explained that Mr. Hughes was estopped from trying to better his position 

through post-conviction complaints about the sentence for which he had bargained and obtained 

the benefit of his bargain. Id. The superior court decision is the last reasoned decision from a 

state court and therefore is the decision to which 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) is applied. See Ylst v. 

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991); Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 

2005).

The alleged state law error of not vacating the on-bail portion of his sentence once the 

Solano County case was dismissed cannot support federal habeas relief. The Supreme Court has 

repeatedly held that the federal habeas writ is unavailable for violations of state law or for alleged 

error in the interpretation or application of state law. See Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219

(2011); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). Notwithstanding the unavailability of 

federal habeas relief for a state law error, relief might be available if that same error amounted to a 

due process violation.

It is clearly established law that “the sentencing process . . . must satisfy the requirements 

of the Due Process Clause.” Gardner v. Jones, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977). For example, due 

process requires that a sentence not be predicated on materially untrue information, Townsend v. 

Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 740-41(1948) (due process was offended by court‟s careless 

misunderstanding of defendant‟s criminal history used for sentencing purposes), but due process 

does not impose the same evidentiary requirements at sentencing as demanded for trial. See

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Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 250-51 (1949) (judge‟s imposition of the death penalty after 

he considered information in a probation department report and other sources not presented at trial

did not offend due process). “We must recognize that most of the information now relied upon by 

judges to guide them in the intelligent imposition of sentences would be unavailable if information 

were restricted to that given in open court by witnesses subject to cross-examination.”

A misapplication of a state‟s sentencing law will violate due process only if the 

misapplication was arbitrary or fundamentally unfair. “Absent a showing of fundamental 

unfairness, a state court‟s misapplication of its own sentencing laws does not justify federal habeas 

relief.” Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 461, 469 (9th Cir. 1994). There is no fundamental unfairness 

here for several reasons.

First, in denying the petition seeking to vacate the on-bail enhancement, the superior court 

articulated a reasonable legal basis for the decision, i.e., having accepted the benefit of the plea 

bargain, Mr. Hughes was estopped from trying to undo part of that bargain. The superior court 

determined that, as a matter of state law, Mr. Hughes was estopped from challenging his sentence 

because he had received the benefit of the plea bargain. This court accepts that determination of 

state law. See Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 972 (9th Cir. 2000) (“federal court is bound by the 

state court‟s interpretation of state law”). Mr. Hughes accepted the benefits of the plea agreement 

and chose not to object to the calculation of the prison sentence at the time it was imposed. Mr. 

Hughes has not shown that the state court‟s use of an estoppel theory to reject his claim was 

contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law from the Supreme 

Court. In fact, such a theory is consistent with the general rule in federal courts that failure to 

object to an error when made can result in forfeiture of a claim of error. “If a litigant believes that 

an error has occurred (to his detriment) during a federal judicial proceeding, he must object in 

order to preserve the issue. If he fails to do so in a timely manner, his claim for relief from the 

error is forfeited. „No procedural principle is more familiar to this Court than that a . . . right may 

be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right 

before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it.‟” Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 134 

(2009) (quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 4141 (1944)) (defendant‟s failure to object to the 

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government‟s alleged breach of the plea agreement when the government failed to recommend a 

downward departure was forfeited and therefore subject to the stricter standards of Federal Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 52(d)‟s plain error rule). In any event, Mr. Hughes has not pointed to any 

U.S. Supreme Court precedent clearly establishing that a state court‟s use of an estoppel theory 

under these circumstances violates the federal constitution.

Second, while it is true that due process forbids a sentence in excess of that allowed by 

statute (see Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163, 176-78 (1874); Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 347 

(1980); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948)), the Supreme Court has suggested that plea 

agreements are contractual in nature, which would include a freedom to agree upon enforceable

terms of the contract. “Although the analogy may not hold in all respects, plea bargains are 

essentially contracts,” and are evaluated under contract principles. Puckett v. United States, 556 

U.S. 129, 137 (2009); see Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 12 (1987) (defendant‟s post-sentencing 

refusal to testify as required by plea agreement removed the double jeopardy bar to his prosecution 

for a greater offense; “[t]he parties could have struck a different bargain, but permitting the State 

to enforce the agreement the parties actually made does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause”);

Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971) (applying contractual principles to resolve 

breach of plea agreement claim); but see Ricketts, 483 U.S. at 16 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (law of 

commercial contracts may be useful as an analogy or point of departure for evaluating plea 

agreements, but one must keep in mind that plea agreements are constitutional contracts with 

different values).

Mr. Hughes has not identified any Supreme Court holding that plea agreements which are 

contractual in nature may never stipulate to a sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum. While

the Ninth Circuit has held that a guilty plea does not permit the state to impose a sentence in 

excess of state law despite agreement of the defendant to the sentence, see Marzano v. Kincheloe, 

915 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir. 1990), Marzano does not help Mr. Hughes because it is circuit-level 

precedent. The AEDPA requires this court to evaluate the state court‟s decision with reference 

only to “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 

States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

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Specifically, there is no Supreme Court precedent holding there is a Due Process violation

where the total term imposed pursuant to the plea agreement is actually within the statutory 

maximum that could have been imposed had the sentence been calculated differently, based on the 

same crimes and enhancements to which the petitioner pled. Mr. Hughes received a total term of 

six years upon his no-contest plea. He does not dispute that the sentencing court could have 

imposed the same six-year term based on the same crime to which he pled no-contest and the same 

enhancements he admitted. Second degree robbery “is punishable by imprisonment in the state 

prison for two, three or five years.” Cal. Penal Code § 211(a)(2). If the sentencing court had 

selected the upper term of five years instead of the mid-term of three years, and had imposed the 

one-year sentence enhancement for the prior prison term, the sentencing court could have reached 

a six-year term without need for the two-year on-bail enhancement.4 In light of the absence of 

Supreme Court authority prohibiting a plea agreement that permits a sentence that exceeds the 

statutory maximum for one of its components but not the statutory maximum that could have been 

imposed based on a different calculation of the sentence based on the same plea, the Alameda 

County Superior Court‟s rejection of Mr. Hughes‟ claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable 

application of clearly established federal law as set forth by the Supreme Court. “If Supreme 

Court cases „give no clear answer to the question presented,‟ the state court‟s decision cannot be 

an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.” Ponce v. Felker, 606 F.3d 596, 

604 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 126 (2008)). 

Finally, the state court‟s rejection of Mr. Hughes‟ claim would have been consistent with 

the reasoning in Brady v. United States. 397 U.S. 742, 756 (1970), where the Supreme Court 

rejected the argument that a plea was involuntary due to the failure to inform the defendant of a 

change in the law that did not occur until several years after he entered his plea. As Brady

explained: 

 

4 Alternatively, based on Mr. Hughes‟ original admission to the prior conviction sentence 

enhancement allegation, see footnote 2, supra, the sentencing court could have imposed a six-year 

sentence by using the mid-term of three years for the robbery, doubled because it was a second 

strike due to Mr. Hughes‟ admission that he suffered the prior conviction.

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Often the decision to plead guilty is heavily influenced by the 

defendant's appraisal of the prosecution's case against him and by 

the apparent likelihood of securing leniency should a guilty plea be 

offered and accepted. Considerations like these frequently present 

imponderable questions for which there are no certain answers; 

judgments may be made that in the light of later events seem 

improvident, although they were perfectly sensible at the time. The 

rule that a plea must be intelligently made to be valid does not 

require that a plea be vulnerable to later attack if the defendant did 

not correctly assess every relevant factor entering into his decision. 

A defendant is not entitled to withdraw his plea merely because he 

discovers long after the plea has been accepted that his calculus 

misapprehended the quality of the State's case or the likely penalties 

attached to alternative courses of action. 

Brady, 397 U.S. at 756-57. Although Brady involved a change in the law instead of the change in 

facts that occurred in Mr. Hughes‟ case, the inability to predict the future with certainty does not 

necessarily undermine the validity of the plea. Although according to Mr. Hughes, the parties 

entered the plea “anticipat[ing] he would be convicted of a felony” in the Solano County case, 

Docket No. 1-1 at 7, his plea which was intelligently made was not “vulnerable to later attack”

simply because he “did not correctly assess every relevant factor entering into his decision.” 

Brady, 397 U.S. at 757.

The superior court‟s rejection of Mr. Hughes‟ claim was not an unreasonable application 

of, or contrary to, any clearly established federal law, as set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court. He 

is not entitled to federal habeas relief.

D. A Certificate Of Appealability Will Not Issue

A certificate of appealability will not issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). This is not a case in 

which “jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the 

denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the 

district court was correct in its procedural ruling” as to the first claim. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 

U.S. 473, 484 (2000). And, as to the second claim, this is not a case in which “reasonable jurists 

would find the district court‟s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Id. 

Accordingly, a certificate of appealability is DENIED. 

///

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///

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VI. CONCLUSION

The petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED on the merits. Mr. Hughes‟ request for 

an evidentiary hearing is DENIED as unnecessary. The Clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 12, 2016

______________________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

United States District Judge

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