Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-15-01672/USCOURTS-ca8-15-01672-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
E.T.H.
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 15-1672

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

E.T.H., JUV

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of South Dakota - Pierre

____________

 Submitted: November 19, 2015

 Filed: August 18, 2016

____________

Before MURPHY, SMITH, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

1

____________

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

E.T.H., who was originally adjudicated a juvenile delinquent for assaulting a

federal officer, appeals from the district court's imposition of a combination of

The case was submitted for oral argument to Judges Smith, Bye, and Benton

1

on November 19, 2015. Following Judge Bye's retirement, Chief Judge Riley

designated Judge Murphy to sit in place of Judge Bye. See 8th Cir. R. 47E. 

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official detention and juvenile delinquent supervision ("supervision") following

revocation of E.T.H.'s prior supervision term. E.T.H. argues that the total combined

term of detention and supervision exceeds the maximum possible term under the

Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (FJDA), 18 U.S.C. § 5031 et seq. We reverse and

remand with instructions to enter a sentence not to exceed the statutory maximum set

forth infra.

I. Background

In 2013, E.T.H. was adjudicated a juvenile delinquent for assaulting a federal

officer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111. On September 17, 2013, the district court

sentenced then-16-year-old E.T.H.to probation until his 19th birthday: November 21,

2015. The day after his initial sentencing, E.T.H. was placed at McCrossan Boys

Ranch in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, but McCrossan Boys Ranch terminated E.T.H.'s

participation in its program on May 15, 2014, due to his poor attitude and behavior.

He was then transferred to the Juvenile Services Center in Rapid City, South Dakota,

where he spent the next two months before returning to his father'sresidence in Eagle

Butte, South Dakota, on July 7, 2014. 

Three days later, on July 10, 2014, E.T.H. was arrested for simple assault,

resisting arrest, disorderly conduct, and public nuisance. On July 11, 2014, E.T.H.'s

probation officer petitioned to revoke E.T.H.'s probation. On September 23, 2014, the

district court sentenced E.T.H. to detention until his 18th birthday, followed by two

years ofsupervision. As a result of thissentence, E.T.H.served 4 months and 11 days

in detention. His supervision term was scheduled to expire on November 21, 2016. 

On E.T.H.'s 18th birthday, he commenced supervision at GloryHouse in Sioux

Falls, South Dakota. On December 12, 2014, E.T.H. produced a urine sample that

tested positive for dextromethorphan. On December 19, 2014, the district court held

a status hearing on E.T.H. and then returned him to Glory House. 

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On January 19, 2015, another of E.T.H.'s urine samples tested positive for

synthetic cannabinoids. Later that day, E.T.H. removed his electronic ankle monitor,

left Glory House without permission, and failed to return. The police located E.T.H.

two days later, finding him highly intoxicated at the scene of a car accident. On

January21, 2015,E.T.H.'s probation officer petitioned to revoke E.T.H.'s supervision,

alleging that E.T.H. violated the conditions of his supervision by (1) possessing and

using a controlled substance, and (2) failing to reside and participate in the residential

re-entry center. E.T.H. was arrested on January 26, 2015, and he remained in custody

for the pendency of the revocation proceeding. 

On February 5, 2015, E.T.H. admitted to the second allegation in the petition.

Before the disposition hearing, the probation office prepared a supplemental

predisposition investigation report (PIR). Paragraph 14 of the supplemental PIR

provided that "[h]ad [E.T.H.] been convicted as an adult, the maximum of the

guideline range he could have been sentenced to was 18 months . . . . On a prior

revocation, [E.T.H.] served 4 months and 11 days; therefore, the maximum term of

official detention is 13 months and 19 days." The government moved for an upward

departure and objected to this portion of the PIR at the disposition hearing. The

government argued that Eighth Circuit precedent permits a district court to "upwardly

depart, following revocation of juvenile probation, based on the juveniles' continued

unlawful behavior while on supervision." (Citing United States v. K.R.A., 337 F.3d

970 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. A.J., 190 F.3d 873 (8th Cir. 1999).) At the

disposition hearing, the government maintained that while "a statutory cap" existed,

there was "no guideline cap." According to the government, the Guidelines range that

E.T.H. would have been subject to had he been convicted as an adult was not a "cap,"

meaning that the district court could upwardly depart just asit may do so for an adult. 

The district court responded by observing that the FJDA "is largely

incomprehensible" and "needs to be rewritten" and that the rules concerning juvenile

delinquent dispositions are "a bit on the mushy side." The court commented that it is

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vested with "a great deal of discretion" in juvenile cases and that "the best interests

of the juvenile is a factor for the Court to consider" in determining the appropriate

disposition. The court found the government's argument "an interesting point" but

declined "to test the outer limits of its authority to sentence this juvenile to prison."

The court characterized the question presented as "academic" and refused "to wade

in and attempt to . . . resolve that issue." 

Thereafter, the court heard argument from the parties on what the proper

disposition should be and also engaged in a lengthy discussion with E.T.H. The court

gave a thorough recitation of E.T.H.'s history and the case history before announcing

its disposition. The court placed E.T.H. in the Reintegrating Youthful Offenders

program in Galen, Montana, a place where E.T.H.'s "addiction issues might be

addressed and where he can do more for himself than just sitting in a prison setting."

"[M]indful of all of the factors in a juvenile delinquent case," the court imposed a

disposition of "time served, plus whatever time it takes for placement at the

Reintegrating Youthful Offenders program in Galen, Montana, followed by juvenile

delinquent supervision for a term of two years on the same terms and conditions,

adding the term about the [Reintegrating Youthful Offenders] placement and

residential reentry center placement." The court acknowledged that the disposition

was "a little bit on the indefinite side because . . . it could take as long as 30 days

for . . . him to be actually placed" in the program. As a result, the court "ha[d] to

fashion the sentence as time served, plus whatever time it takes for the U.S. Marshal

to transport him to Galen, Montana, when they are ready for him there."

E.T.H.'s counsel objected to the disposition, arguing that "the maximum

amount that he can be subject to custody and . . . further supervision is . . . 13 months

and 19 days, without a finding by the Court of a different number." The court replied

that it was "mak[ing] a finding that thisjuvenile'srehabilitation needs are so vast that

additionalsupervision of two years beyond the point where we are today isrequired."

The court entered a judgment ordering that E.T.H. "be detained for a total term of:

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Time served plus any additional time, up to 30 days, that it takes to make

arrangements for him to be placed at Reintegrating Youthful Offender's Program in

Galen, MT and for the U.S. Marshal to transport him there." The judgment also

provided that upon E.T.H.'s release from official detention, he "shall be on juvenile

delinquent supervision for a term of: 2 years." This supervision term is the subject of

the present appeal. 

II. Discussion

On appeal, E.T.H. argues that the total term of detention and supervision that

the district court imposed exceeded the maximum possible penalty permitted under

18 U.S.C. § 5037. According to E.T.H., the maximum combined term of official

detention and supervision that the district court could impose is 18 months—the top

of the advisory Guidelines range applicable to a similarly situated adult

defendant—minusthe 4 months and 11 days that E.T.H. previously served on official

detention.

"We have jurisdiction to review a sentence pronounced under the FJDA to

determine whether it was 'imposed in violation of law' or is 'plainly unreasonable.'" 

United States v. M.R.M., 513 F.3d 866, 868 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting 18 U.S.C.

§ 3742(a)(1), (4); K.R.A., 337 F.3d at 978). We have recognized that a "district court

enjoys 'broad discretion' when sentencing juvenile offenders under the

FJDA—indeed, broader discretion than when sentencing an adult." Id. (citation

omitted). But we review de novo "the district court's interpretation of the relevant

statutes." K.R.A., 337 F.3d at 974 (citation omitted). 

The focus of our review is 18 U.S.C. § 5037(d), which governs juvenile

dispositions. Subsection (d)(2) sets out the maximum term of supervision that a

district court may order as part of its original disposition of a juvenile delinquent. It

provides:

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(2) The term of juvenile delinquent supervision that may be ordered for

a juvenile found to be a juvenile delinquent may not extend—

(A) in the case of a juvenile who is less than 18 years old,

a term that extends beyond the date when the juvenile

becomes 21 years old; or

(B) in the case of a juvenile who is between 18 and 21

years old, a termthat extends beyond the maximumtermof

official detention set forth in section 5037(c)(2) (A) and

(B), less the term of official detention ordered.

(Emphases added.) In turn, § 5037(c)(2) providesthat a juvenile delinquent's officialdetention term

may not extend—

***

(2) in the case of a juvenile who is between eighteen and

twenty-one years old—

(A) who if convicted as an adult would be

convicted of a Class A, B, or C felony,

beyond the lesser of—

(i) five years; or

(ii) the maximum of the

guideline range, pursuant to

section 994 of title 28,

applicable to an otherwise

similarly situated adult

defendant unless the court finds

an aggravating factor to warrant

an upward departure from the

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otherwise applicable guideline

range; or

(B) in any other case beyond the lesser of—

(i) three years;

(ii) the maximum of the

guideline range, pursuant to

section 994 of title 28,

applicable to an otherwise

similarly situated adult

defendant unless the court finds

an aggravating factor to

warrant an upward departure

from the otherwise applicable

guideline range; or

(iii) the maximum term of

imprisonment that would be

authorized if the juvenile had

been tried and convicted as an

adult.

(Emphases added.)

In contrast to § 5037(d)(2), subsections(d)(5) and (6) concern the dispositions

available to a district court following revocation of a juvenile delinquent's

supervision. These subsections provide that a district court may revoke a juvenile's

supervision and order a term of official detention, which may be followed by another

term of supervision. 18 U.S.C. § 5037(d)(5)–(6); see also Joe Gergits, Looking at the

Law, Fed. Probation, December 2005, at 35, 38–39 ("New subsection 5037(d)(6)

permits the court to order a term of juvenile delinquent supervision to follow a term

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of detention that wasimposed as a result of a violation ofsupervision."). Subsections

(d)(5) and (6) of 18 U.S.C. 5037 provide as follows:

(5) If the juvenile violates a condition ofjuvenile delinquentsupervision

at any time prior to the expiration or termination of the term of

supervision, the court may, after a dispositional hearing and after

considering any pertinent policy statements promulgated by the

Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994 of title 18, revoke the

term of supervision and order a term of official detention. The term of

official detention which is authorized upon revocation of juvenile

delinquent supervision shall not exceed the term authorized in section

5037(c)(2)(A) and (B), less any term of official detention previously

ordered. The application of sections 5037(c)(2)(A) and (B) shall be

determined based upon the age of the juvenile at the time of the

disposition of the revocation proceeding. If a juvenile is over the age of

21 years old at the time of the revocation proceeding, the mandatory

revocation provisions of section 3565(b) are applicable. A disposition

of a juvenile who is over the age of 21 years old shall be in accordance

with the provisions of section 5037(c)(2), except that in the case of a

juvenile who if convicted as an adult would be convicted of a Class A,

B, or C felony, no term of official detention may continue beyond the

juvenile's 26th birthday, and in any other case, no term of official

detention may continue beyond the juvenile's 24th birthday.

(6) When a term of juvenile delinquent supervision is revoked and the

juvenile is committed to official detention, the court may include a

requirement that the juvenile be placed on a term of juvenile delinquent

supervision. Any term of juvenile delinquent supervision ordered

following revocation for a juvenile who is over the age of 21 years old

at the time of the revocation proceeding shall be in accordance with the

provisions of section 5037(d)(1), except that in the case of a juvenile

who if convicted as an adult would be convicted of a Class A, B, or C

felony, no termof juvenile delinquentsupervision may continue beyond

the juvenile's 26th birthday, and in any other case, no term of juvenile

delinquent supervision may continue beyond the juvenile's 24th

birthday.

(Emphases added.) (Footnote omitted.) 

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"To avoid an inordinate term of juvenile supervision and detention, any

combination ofsupervision and detention, including sanctions following revocation,

may not extend beyond the periods available in § 5037." Gergits, supra, at 39. Here,

both parties agree that § 5037(d)(6) permits a district court to impose an additional

term of supervision following revocation. They also agree that the subsection

"explicitly sets out the maximum period of supervision for a juvenile who is over 21

years old at the time of the revocation proceeding." The source of contention 2

between the parties is what the maximum term of additional supervision is for

someone who, like E.T.H., is under age 21 at the time of revocation. E.T.H. argues

that § 5037(d)(6) "is silent on the maximum period of supervision for a juvenile who

is under 21 years old" at the time of revocation. He contends that because of this

silence, a court must look to other subsections in § 5037—specifically,

§ 5037(d)(2)—to determine the maximum possible term of supervision. He argues

that looking to § 5037(d)(2) is consistent with the way that § 5037(d)(5)—the section

authorizing detention following revocation of supervision—explicitly incorporates

§ 5037(c)(2)—the section authorizing detention after an original adjudication—to

establish the maximum possible term of detention following revocation. 

Section 5037(d)(2)(B) provides that the maximum supervision period that a

district court may order for a juvenile delinquent is "in the case of a juvenile who is

between 18 and 21 years old, . . . the maximum term of official detention set forth in

section 5037(c)(2)(A) and (B), lessthe termof official detention ordered." (Emphasis

added.) According to E.T.H., § 5037(d)(2)(B) directs that for a juvenile like E.T.H.

who is between the ages of 18 and 21 years old, the maximum total period of

detention and supervision that the district court may impose upon revocation of a

previously imposed term of supervision is one of three options, pursuant to

E.T.H. makes this statement in his opening brief, and the government's brief

2

characterizes E.T.H.'s statement as a concession. 

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§ 5037(c)(2)(B). Those options are (i) three years; (ii) the top of the Guidelines range

that would have applied to a similarly situated adult defendant unless the court finds

an aggravating factor to warrant an upward departure; or (iii) the maximum term of

imprisonment that would be authorized if the juvenile had been tried and convicted

as an adult, whichever is least, less any period of official detention previously

ordered. Applying this formula, E.T.H. asserts that the top of the Guidelines range

that would have applied to a similarly situated adult defendant is 18 months, and the

maximum penalty for an adult convicted of assault on a federal officer is eight years;

therefore, the lowest of these terms (3 years, 18 months, or 8 years) is 18 months.

Taking into account the 4 months and 11 days of official detention previously

ordered, E.T.H. concludes that the maximum period of detention and supervision

permitted under § 5037(d)(6) via § 5037(d)(2) and § 5037(c)(2)(B) is 13 months and

19 days. 

By contrast, the government contends that § 5037(d)(6) alone governs

supervision upon revocation, noting that the subsection "does not mention or cross

reference § 5037(d)(2)." The government argues that we should "presume that

Congress acted intentionally by not including the same maximum boundaries on a

revocation supervision term in § 5037(d)(6) as it included in § 5037(d)(2)."

According to the government, "[o]ne reasonable reading of the subsection . . . is that

§ 5037(d)(6) does, in fact, specify a maximum supervision termfor someone revoked

before age 21" by "mandat[ing] that 'in any other case,' the additional supervision

term may not stretch past a juvenile's 24th birthday." 

We are now tasked with determining the maximum term of supervision upon

revocation for a person under age 21 in the face of an indisputably ambiguous statute.

A statute is ambiguous if it is "'capable of being understood in two or more possible

senses or ways.'"See Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 90 (2001)

(quoting Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 77 (1985)). At oral argument,

the government characterized the statute asfalling within the category of "admittedly

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ambiguous statutes" that a court must construe sensibly. It also admitted that § 5037

is "[n]ot a very artfully drafted statute." Likewise, the district court characterized the

statute as "largely incomprehensible" and "a bit on the mushy side" that "needs to be

rewritten." 

When a statute is ambiguous, a court "seek[s] guidance in the statutory

structure, relevant legislative history, congressional purposes expressed [in the statute

at issue], and general principles [of law relevant to the statute at issue]." Fla. Power

& Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 737 (1985). Our review of the structure and

purpose of § 5037 leads us to conclude that we must look to subsection (d)(2) to

determine the length of "juvenile delinquent supervision" that a court may order

under subsection (d)(6). First, as E.T.H. points out, Congress addressed individuals

over 21 years of age only in § 5037(d)(5) and (6)—revocation of probation and

supervision—because "juveniles over 21 can only come before the court on

revocation of probation or supervision. Individuals over 21 cannot receive initial

sentences of probation, official detention, or juvenile delinquentsupervision because

the Juvenile Delinquency Act does not cover individuals charged after the age of

21." This explains why Congress had to set the maximum supervision term out in 3

subsections (d)(5) and (6) for individuals over 21—because they are not discussed

(and could not have been included) in any of the other subsections. By contrast, the

omission ofjuveniles between 18 and 21 years old fromsubsection (d)(6)'s discussion

of "juvenile delinquent supervision" is understandable, given that subsection (d)(2)

sets the maximum length for any term of "juvenile delinquent supervision" for that

age group. 

The FJDA defines "juvenile" as "a person who has not attained his eighteenth 3

birthday, or for the purpose of proceedings and disposition under this chapter for an

alleged act of juvenile delinquency, a person who has not attained his twenty-first

birthday." 18 U.S.C. § 5031.

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Second, a possibility exists that failure to recognize a maximum penalty for

juveniles between 18 and 21 years old could lead to absurd results. "A statute

can . . . be considered ambiguous when a particular interpretation from the face of a

statute could lead to an anomalous, unusual or absurd result." Breedlove v.

Earthgrains Baking Cos., 140 F.3d 797, 800 (8th Cir. 1998); see also Ashley, Drew

& N. Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 625 F.2d 1357, 1365 (8th Cir. 1980) ("[I]t is

impermissible to follow a literal reading that engenders absurd consequences where

there is an alternative interpretation that reasonably effects the statute's purpose."

(citation omitted)); Friedman v. United States, 374 F.2d 363, 367 (8th Cir. 1967) ("A

literal interpretation of a statute will not be resorted to when it brings about absurd

consequences or produces results not intended by Congress." (citation omitted)). As

explained supra, the goal of § 5037(d)(6) is "[t]o avoid an inordinate termof juvenile

supervision and detention." Gergits, supra, at 39 (emphasis added). As E.T.H.

demonstrates, not setting a maximum penalty for juveniles under age 21 would mean

that

a person who was 20 years and 364 days old on the day of the

revocation hearing would be subject to an unlimited term ofsupervision

while a person who was two days older (i.e., 21 years and 1 day), could

only be placed on supervision until his 24th or 26th birthday, depending

on the underlying offense.

Third, the government's argument that subsection (d)(6) specifies the maximum

term of post-revocation supervision for a juvenile under 21 years old as his 24th

birthday is not consistent with the canons of statutory construction. Under the last

antecedent rule, "[r]eferential and qualifying words and phrases, where no contrary

intention appears, refer solely to the last antecedent." 2A Norman J. Singer &

Shambie Singer, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction § 47:33 (7th ed.

2007) (footnote omitted). "The last antecedent is the last word, phrase, or clause that

can be made an antecedent without impairing the meaning of the sentence." Id.

(quotation and footnote omitted). As a result, "a proviso usually applies to the

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provision or clause immediately preceding it." Id. (footnote omitted). "While [the last

antecedent rule] is not an absolute and can assuredly be overcome by other indicia of

meaning . . . construing a statute in accord with the rule is quite sensible as a matter

of grammar." Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003) (quotation and citation

omitted).

Here, § 5037(d)(6) provides that

[a]ny term of juvenile delinquent supervision ordered following

revocation for a juvenile who is over the age of 21 years old at the time

of the revocation proceeding shall be in accordance with the provisions

of section 5037(d)(1),[ ] except that in the case of a juvenile who if 4

convicted as an adult would be convicted of a Class A, B, or C felony,

no term of juvenile delinquent supervision may continue beyond the

juvenile's 26th birthday, and in any other case, no term of juvenile

delinquent supervision may continue beyond the juvenile's 24th

birthday.

(Emphasis added.) Applying the last antecedent rule, the "except" clause of

§ 5037(d)(6) does hang on the sentence that begins "[a]ny termof juvenile delinquent

supervision ordered following revocation for a juvenile who is over the age of 21

years old at the time of the revocation proceeding." In other words, "juvenile who is

over the age of 21 years old at the time of the revocation proceeding" is the subject

of the sentence, and "except in any other cases" modifies that antecedent clause. As

a result, the subsection's statement that "no term of juvenile delinquent supervision

may continue beyond the juvenile's 24th birthday" refers to juveniles over 21 years

old at the time of revocation. 

Subsection (d)(1) is no aid in determining Congress's statutory intent in 4

subsection (d)(6). It merely provides that "[t]he court, in ordering a term of official

detention, may include the requirement that the juvenile be placed on a term of

juvenile delinquent supervision after official detention." 18 U.S.C. § 5037(d)(1). 

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Having determined that we must look to subsection (d)(2) to determine the

length of a "juvenile delinquent supervision" term that a court may order under

subsection (d)(6), we must now consider whether for the purposes of subsection

(d)(2), the court must use the juvenile's age at the date of the revocation hearing in

ordering supervision under subsection (d)(6), or instead his age at the date of the

initial disposition hearing. We conclude that a court must use the juvenile's age at the

date of the revocation hearing. First, both subparts of subsection (d)(2) refer to the

age of the juvenile using the present tense: "a juvenile who is less than 18 years old"

or "a juvenile who is between 18 and 21 years old." 18 U.S.C. § 5037(d)(2)(A)–(B)

(emphases added). Congress's use of the present tense suggests that a court must

apply the juvenile's age at the time of the hearing at which the court refers to

subsection (d)(2). See United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 333 (1992)

("Congress'[s] use of a verb tense is significant in construing statutes." (citations

omitted)). 

Second, using the juvenile's age at the time of the initial disposition hearing

would create an inconsistency. The court would first ask whether the juvenile "is over

[21] at the time of the revocation proceeding" under subsection (d)(6) and answer

using the juvenile's present age. If the juvenile is under 21, the court would then ask

whether the he "is lessthan 18" or "is between 18 and 21" under subsection (d)(2) and

would answer based on whether he was under 18 at the time of the initial disposition.

No command or other textual indication in § 5037(d) counsels that the court make

such an awkward switch.

For the aforementioned reasons, we hold that the maximumtermofsupervision

that a court may impose under § 5037(d)(6) is determined by the requirements in

§ 5037(d)(2), using the juvenile's age at the time of the revocation hearing. As a

result, the maximum total period of detention and supervision that may be imposed

upon revocation of a previously imposed term of supervision for a juvenile who is

under age 21 at the time of revocation is (i) 3 years, (ii) the top of the Guidelines

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range that would have applied to a similarly situated adult defendant unless the court

finds an aggravating factor to warrant an upward departure, or (iii) the maximum

term of imprisonment that would be authorized if the juvenile had been tried and

convicted as an adult, whichever is least, see 18 U.S.C. § 5037(c)(2)(B), "less the

term of official detention ordered." Id. § 5037(d)(2)(B).

Applying this formula to the present case, E.T.H. is correct that 18 months—

the top of the Guidelines range that would have applied to a similarly situated adult

and the lowest termunder § 5037(c)(2)(B)—isthe starting point fromwhich the court

must calculate the maximum total period of detention and supervision that it could

impose upon E.T.H. However, E.T.H. is incorrect that the court must subtract from

this number the 4 months and 11 days of official detention previously ordered. Under

§ 5037(d)(2), the maximum supervision term is reduced by "the term of official

detention ordered." That phrase refersto "the term . . . ordered" at the instant hearing,

not to a term of detention previously ordered. This is in contrast to the reduction in

the maximum term of detention under § 5037(d)(5), which is the maximum from

§ 5037(c)(2) "less any term of official detention previously ordered." 

Here, the district court ordered up to 1 month of detention, and, according to

the government, E.T.H. served 28 days. See Gov't Br. 6 n.3. The maximum

supervision term under § 5037(d)(6) and (d)(2)(B) is calculated by subtracting the

term of detention ordered, 1 month, from the 18-month maximum detention from

§ 5037(c)(2), yielding a maximum of 17 months.

The government argues that even if we adopt E.T.H.'s construction of

§ 5037(d)(6), any error on the part of the district court is harmless. It points to

E.T.H.'s concession that "had the district court found 'an aggravating factorto warrant

an upward departure,' there would be no basis for appeal here." The government

argues that any error is harmless because the district court made a finding, in response

to defense counsel's objection to the disposition, that E.T.H.'s "rehabilitation needs

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are so vast that additional supervision of two years beyond the point where we are

today is required." The government contends that any remand would "require the

district court to engage in a rote recitation of sentencing factors, guidelines

considerations, then state that there are aggravating factors warranting an upward

departure." 

Our holding specifies that the top of the Guidelines range that would have

applied to a similarly situated adult defendant is the maximum total period of

detention and supervision that may be imposed upon revocation of a previously

imposed term of supervision for a juvenile who is under age 21 at the time of

revocation unless the court finds an aggravating factor to warrant an upward

departure. At oral argument, the court inquired whether it was "undisputed that the

district court did not grant [the government's] motion for upward departure," and the

government responded, "That's right. Well, didn't grant our motion for an upward

departure for a lengthy detention sentence . . . ." Although the government would

have us construe the district court's response to defense counsel's objection as the

equivalent of an upward departure, we decline to do so. The record shows that the

district court denied the government's motion for an upward departure and never

again revisited the subject. 

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand with

instructions to enter a sentence not to exceed the statutory maximum set forth supra.

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Appellate Case: 15-1672 Page: 16 Date Filed: 08/18/2016 Entry ID: 4438653