Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-13-02491/USCOURTS-ca8-13-02491-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Douglas E. Boultinghouse
Not Party
T. Dobbs
Appellee
Sammy D. Johnson
Appellee
Justine M. Minor
Not Party
James Edward Smith
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 13-2491

___________________________

James Edward Smith,

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

Sammy D. Johnson, CO-I, Pine Bluff Unit, ADC; T. Dobbs, Varner Unit, ADC,

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees,

Douglas E. Boultinghouse, Lt., Varner Unit, ADC; Justine M. Minor, Disciplinary

Hearing Officer, Arkansas Department of Correction,

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants.

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Pine Bluff

____________

 Submitted: September 10, 2014

 Filed: March 10, 2015

____________

Before BYE, COLLOTON, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

____________

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.

Appellate Case: 13-2491 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/10/2015 Entry ID: 4252307 
James Edward Smith, an inmate of the Arkansas Department of Correction, 

filed suit against Sammy D. Johnson, a correctional officer, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

alleging a violation of Smith’s Eighth Amendment rights. Smith assertsthatJohnson

and another officer acted with deliberate indifference to Smith’s safety by placing him

where another inmate could attack him and then intentionally punishing him for the

altercation. The district court dismissed Smith’s suit on the grounds that it was barred

by either the doctrine of claim preclusion or issue preclusion in light of a prior

decision by the Arkansas State Claims Commission on a claim by Smith. Because we

conclude that neither doctrine precludes Smith’s current suit, we reverse and remand

for further proceedings. 

I.

On December 20, 2009, Smith was labeled a “snitch” and attacked by three

other inmates in the Varner Unit of the Arkansas Department of Correction. He was

consequently removed from the Varner Unit and placed in protective custody. Smith

alleges that Johnson returned him to the general prison population in the Varner Unit

on January 28, 2010, without Smith’s consent and in violation of departmental

policies. According to Smith, another inmate attacked him the following day and

severely beat him with his fist and a lock, causing scarring, a lost tooth, migraines,

blurred vision, sensory losses, dizzy spells, and various psychological symptoms. 

After the attack, Smith claims that Johnson and other correctional officers punished

himfor a thirty-day period using “major disciplinary policies.” Smith unsuccessfully

pursued grievances regarding the altercation with the Department of Correction.

Smith then sought to redress his injuries by filing a pro se claim against the

Department of Correction with the Arkansas State Claims Commission. Smith

alleged that various correctional officers, including Johnson, “deliberately allowed”

the other inmate to attack Smith, did nothing to protect Smith during the attack, and

then punished Smith for the altercation to conceal their acts exposing him to the

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attack. Smith claimed the officers’ actions amounted to “deliberate indifference” and

“cruel and unusual punishment.” Smith also argued that an officer’s confiscation of

personal property from his cell amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. Smith

sought damages for physical and psychological injuries, compensation for the

“deliberate cruel and unusual punishment,” and reimbursement for his personal

property.

The Department of Correction moved to dismiss Smith’s claims for failure to

state a claim and for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that “[h]is claim is a federal

constitutional violation, not a negligence claim,” and that the Claims Commission

lacked jurisdiction over violations of federal law. The Claims Commission denied

the motion to dismiss. After a hearing, the Claims Commission dismissed Smith’s

claim based on his “failure to prove by a preponderance of the evidence any

negligence on the part of the Respondent,” i.e., the Department of Correction.

Smith next filed suit in the district court under § 1983 against Johnson in his

individual capacity. In his pro se complaint, Smith alleged thatJohnson returned him

to the Varner Unit with “deliberate indifference for [his] safety” fromthe other inmate

who attacked Smith, and then “cruelly and unusually punished” Smith for the

altercation, all in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Smith sought compensatory

and punitive damages.

Johnson moved to dismiss Smith’s claimon the grounds that the doctrine ofres

judicata barred him from relitigating the issues decided by the Claims Commission

and from pursuing any claims arising out of the same facts. The district court granted

the motion, ruling if the Claims Commission had jurisdiction to decide Smith’s

constitutional claim, then the § 1983 action was barred by claim preclusion. The

district court concluded alternatively that if the Commission did not have jurisdiction

over the constitutional claim, then issue preclusion barred Smith’s claimbecause “his

§ 1983 claim is based on the same facts as his unsuccessful claim before the

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Appellate Case: 13-2491 Page: 3 Date Filed: 03/10/2015 Entry ID: 4252307 
Commission.” We review de novo the district court’s dismissal of a claim based on

res judicata, accepting the plaintiff’s factual allegations as true. Laase v. Cnty. of

Isanti, 638 F.3d 853, 856 (8th Cir. 2011).

II.

Smith argues that the district court erred by dismissing his claims as barred by

either claim or issue preclusion. We conclude first that claim preclusion does not

apply: The Arkansas Claims Commission was the only forum in which Smith could

bring his claim against the State, but the Commission did not have jurisdiction to

address a constitutional claim against Johnson individually. 

The doctrine of claim preclusion in Arkansas applies to decisions of

administrative agencies like the Claims Commission, Craven v. Fulton Sanitation

Serv., Inc., 206 S.W.3d 842, 844 (Ark. 2005), and it “bars not only the relitigation of

claims that were actually litigated in the first suit, but also those that could have been

litigated.” Jayel Corp. v. Cochran, 234 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Ark. 2006). But the

doctrine does “not bar a subsequent action where . . . a party was actually prohibited

from asserting a claim in the earlier action.” Cater v. Cater, 846 S.W.2d 173, 176

(Ark. 1993). The Restatement of Judgments, which has been followed by the

Arkansas courts in other respects, e.g., Ruth R. Remmel Revocable Trust v. Regions

Fin. Corp., 255 S.W.3d 453, 461 (Ark. 2007); Smith v. Roane, 683 S.W.2d 935, 936

(Ark. 1985), likewise provides that claim preclusion is not applicable where “[t]he

plaintiff was unable to rely on a certain theory of the case or to seek a certain remedy

or form of relief in the first action because of the limitations on the subject matter

jurisdiction of the courts . . . and the plaintiff desires in the second action to rely on

that theory or to seek that remedy or form of relief.” Restatement (Second) of

Judgments § 26(1)(c). The Restatement reasons that “it is unfair to preclude [the

plaintiff] from a second action in which he can present those phases of the claim

which he was disabled from presenting in the first.” Id. cmt. c.

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The Arkansas Claims Commission has “jurisdiction only over those claims

which are barred by the doctrine ofsovereign immunity frombeing litigated in a court

of general jurisdiction.” Ark. Code § 19-10-204(b)(2)(A). Because the doctrine of

sovereign immunity does not bar Smith from litigating his § 1983 claim against

Johnson individually in state or federal courts of general jurisdiction, Kentucky v.

Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166-67 (1985); Early v. Crockett, 436 S.W.3d 141, 148 & n.5

(Ark. 2014), the Claims Commission has no jurisdiction over that constitutional

claim. Smith’s claim against Johnson in his individual capacity could not have been

brought in the first action before the Claims Commission, so the doctrine of claim

preclusion does not bar the second action. The district court evidently recognized this

limitation on claim preclusion, for the court did not rely on claim preclusion to bar

the second action if the Commission lacked jurisdiction to decide Smith’s § 1983

claim. See R. Doc. 26, at 1-2.

The district court thought the doctrine of issue preclusion nonetheless barred

Smith’s action against Johnson. Issue preclusion bars the relitigation of an issue that

was actually litigated in a prior action and was determined by, and essential to, a valid

and final judgment. Deer/Mt. Judea Sch. Dist. v. Kimbrell, 430 S.W.3d 29, 39 (Ark.

2013). Applying that doctrine, the district court ruled that Smith was precluded from

bringing a claim“based on the same facts that were litigated and decided against him”

in the Arkansas Claims Commission. 

To invoke issue preclusion, however, a defendant must establish not only that

a claim arises from the same facts, but that the same issue was decided in the prior

proceeding. Estate of Goston v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Estate of Goston), 898 S.W.2d

471, 473 (Ark. 1995). The Arkansas Supreme Court requires a party invoking issue

preclusion to establish that “the precise issue” was decided in the first proceeding,

Smith, 683 S.W.2d at 936, and interprets “very narrowly” whether an issue was

previously litigated. In re Estate of Goston, 898 S.W.2d at 473. 

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The Commission did not decide the same issue that Smith seeks to litigate in

the present action. The order of the Commission determined only that Smith failed

to prove “any negligence on the part of the [Department of Correction].” App. 89

(emphasis added). Smith’s present claims are that Johnson individually was

deliberately indifferent to his safety in the prison and intentionally cruelly and

unusually punished him for the altercation, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). One claim involves alleged

criminal recklessness, where the defendant must “both be aware of facts from which

the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and . . .

also draw the inference,” id.; the other involves alleged intentional wrongdoing.

The Commission’s determination that the Department of Correction was not

negligent thus did not resolve the same issues presented here, because negligence is

mutually exclusive of deliberate indifference and intent. “The theories of negligence

and intentional tort are contradictory and mutually exclusive.” Hockensmith v.

Brown, 929 S.W.2d 840, 845 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996). Accordingly, “there is generally

no claim of negligence that flows from intentionally tortious conduct.” BP Chems.

Ltd. v. Jiangsu Sopo Corp., 285 F.3d 677, 685 (8th Cir. 2002). The Restatement

(Second) of Torts likewise recognizes that negligence “excludes conduct which

creates liability because ofthe actor’s intention to invade a legally protected interest,”

§ 282 cmt. d, or because of the actor’s criminal recklessness (i.e., deliberate

indifference): “[T]he word ‘negligence’ excludes conduct which the actor does . . .

realize as involving a risk to others which is not merely in excess of its utility, but

which is out of all proportion thereto.” Id. cmt. e; see also id. (“As the disproportion

between risk and utility increases, there enters into the actor’s conduct a degree of

culpability which approaches and finally becomes indistinguishable from that which

is shown by conduct intended to invade similar interests.”). For these reasons, even

assuming that the Commission’s decision on Smith’s allegations against the

Department of Corrections should be read as a decision about Johnson’s individual

conduct, the Commission’s determination that the Department was not “negligent”

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did not resolve the precise issues about alleged deliberate indifference and intentional

wrongdoing by Johnson that Smith raises in his § 1983 action.

* * *

The judgment of the district court is reversed, and the case is remanded for

further proceedings.

______________________________

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