Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-01805/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-01805-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Eric Pineda
Petitioner
J. Robertson
Respondent

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERIC PINEDA,

Petitioner,

v.

J. ROBERTSON,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:19-cv-01805-SKO (HC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO

DISMISS SUCCESSIVE PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT 

TO ASSIGN DISTRICT JUDGE

[TWENTY-ONE DAY OBJECTION 

DEADLINE]

On December 30, 2019, Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus in 

this Court. Because the petition is successive, the Court will recommend it be DISMISSED.

DISCUSSION

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases requires the Court to make a preliminary 

review of each petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Court must dismiss a petition "[i]f it 

plainly appears from the petition . . . that the petitioner is not entitled to relief." Rule 4 of the 

Rules Governing § 2254 Cases; see also Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490, 491 (9th Cir. 1990). 

A petition for habeas corpus should not be dismissed without leave to amend unless it appears 

that no tenable claim for relief can be pleaded were such leave granted. Jarvis v. Nelson, 440 

F.2d 13, 14 (9th Cir. 1971).

A federal court must dismiss a second or successive petition that raises the same grounds 

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as a prior petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). The court must also dismiss a second or successive 

petition raising a new ground unless the petitioner can show that 1) the claim rests on a new, 

retroactive, constitutional right or 2) the factual basis of the claim was not previously 

discoverable through due diligence, and these new facts establish by clear and convincing 

evidence that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the 

applicant guilty of the underlying offense. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A)-(B). However, it is not the 

district court that decides whether a second or successive petition meets these requirements.

Section 2244 (b)(3)(A) provides: "Before a second or successive application permitted by 

this section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of 

appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application." In other words, 

Petitioner must obtain leave from the Ninth Circuit before he can file a second or successive 

petition in district court. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 656-657 (1996). This Court must 

dismiss any second or successive petition unless the Court of Appeals has given Petitioner leave 

to file the petition because a district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over a second or 

successive petition. Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 152 (2007); Cooper v. Calderon, 274 F.3d 

1270, 1274 (9th Cir. 2001).

In this case, Petitioner challenges his 2007 conviction in the Tulare County Superior 

Court for carjacking and related offenses. He claims that his sentence was illegally enhanced, 

and that the gang expert relied on hearsay in violation of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 

Amendment. Petitioner previously sought federal habeas relief in this Court with respect to the 

same conviction. See Pineda v. Harrington, Case No. 1:10-cv-00354-OWW-DLB. In that action, 

Petitioner claimed: 1) The identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive; 2) The 

carjacking prosecution violated the double jeopardy clause; 3) Petitioner received ineffective 

assistance of counsel; and 4) There was insufficient evidence to support the criminal street gang 

enhancement. Id. The petition was denied on the merits on October 19, 2010. Id.

The Court finds that the instant petition is “second or successive” under 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(b). Petitioner makes no showing that he has obtained prior leave from the Ninth Circuit to 

file his successive petition. Therefore, this Court has no jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s 

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renewed application for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and must dismiss the petition. See Burton, 

549 U.S. at 157.

ORDER

Accordingly, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to assign a District Judge to this case.

RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the petition be 

DISMISSED as successive. 

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the United States District Court Judge 

assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 

of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within twenty-one days after being served with a copy, Petitioner may file written objections 

with the Court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 

Findings and Recommendation.” The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). Petitioner is advised that failure to file objections within 

the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 

F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 2, 2020 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto .

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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