Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02550/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02550-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rodman Wolfe Jordan
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

. FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

RODMAN WOLFE JORDAN, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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FI LED · United States Court of Appeals 

·renth Circuit 

NOV 2 2 1989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 88-2550 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

. FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(CR-88-49-P) 

John E. Green (Williams. Price, United States Attorney, with him 

on the briefs), Assistant United States Attorney for the Western 

District of Oklahoma, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for PlaintiffAppellee. 

Mike Brown of Brown, Harding, Brown, Fargason & Rice, Lubbock, 

Texas, and Daniel H. Benson, Texas Tech University (Ray Fargason 

of Brown, Harding, Brown, Fargason & Rice, Lubbock, Texas, with 

them on the briefs) for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before MCKAY, MCWILLIAMS, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

Mr. Jordan (Defendant) appeals his jury conviction on four 

Appellate Case: 88-2550 Document: 010110135922 Date Filed: 11/22/1989 Page: 1 
counts of knowingly making a false statement to an insured savings 

and loan for the purpose of obtaining a loan, in violation of 18 

U.S.Co § 1014 (1982). 

Defendant asserts six errors: (1) the prosecution is barred 

by the statute of limitations; (2) the trial court erroneously 

instructed the jury concerning the limitations and republication 

of a false statement; (3) the indictment is multiplicitous; (4) 

there exists a fatal variance between the indictment and the 

evidence; (5) the trial court abused its discretion in ordering 

payment of restitution as a condition of probation; and (6) the 

trial court abused its discretion in ordering, as a condition of 

probation, that Defendant incur no new debts. 

An overview of the facts is required to understand the 

assertions of error. The specific facts will be d~veloped as 

necessary. Defendant gave to an FSLIC insured savings and loan a 

document that was represented to be a true copy of his 1981 

federal· income tax return (Form 1040). The savings and loan 

officer, in making the decision to make four separate_loans to 

Defendant on four separate occasions, placed great reliance upon 

this document as it showed the Defendant's 1981 taxable income to 

be in excess of $120,000, thereby evidencing Defendant's capacity 

to repay the loans. Relying upon- this information the savings and 

loan made four loans to the Defendant from ~arch 23 through May 

·1983. Defendant's problems arose when he was unable to repay the 

loan. I·t was then ··lear·ned that the· document presented was not a 

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true copy of Defendant's 1981 Federal tax return. The For-m 1040 

actually filed by the Defendant with the IRS showed a taxable 

income of approximately $16,000. The prosecution and convictions 

followed. 

I. 

The Statute of Limitations 

Defendant contends that, because he delivered the fictitious 

copy of his tax return to the savings and loan in February of 1983 

and the indictment was not forthcoming until March 8, 1988, the 

prosecution is barred by the five-year statute of limitations 

enunciated by 18 u.s.c. § 3282 (1982). 

To properly resolve Defendant's contention it becomes 

necessary to review the evidence relating to the date of 

submission of the fictitious tax return. In reviewing the 

evidence supporting a conviction, it is axiomatic that we must 

view the evidence and all reasonable inferences to be drawn 

therefrom in the light most favorable to the Government. The loan 

officer for the savings and loan testified that Defendant first 

delivered a "loan package" to the savings and loan in February of 

1983 and this package included the fictitious Form 1040. He 

furthe~ testified that the package did not contain a suitable 

appraisal ..... and the Defendant thereupon. brought in a new package 

containing both a suitable appraisal and the fictitious Form 1040 

on or after March 17, 1983. He further testified that this first 

· ·•loan was made-on March 23·, 1983, and' the loan documents introduced 

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into evidence support this date. This evidence clearly 

establishes that the fictitious Form 1040 was delivered to the 

savings and loan by the Defendant after March 8, 1983. Thus, that 

a trier of fact could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 

Defendant delivered the fictitious Form 1040 to the savings and 

loan within the five-year period prior to March 8, 1988, which was 

the date the indictment was issued. This second delivery of the 

fictitious income tax return, made to induce the lender to make 

the first loan, constituted the "false statement" required for 

completion of a crime under 28 u.s.c. § 1014. 

Defendant's argument that the prosecution is time barred is 

based upon a factual theory of the case that Defendant delivered 

the fictitious tax return in February 1983 and Defendant never 

again had anything to do with or say about this fictitious 

document. Defendant's factual theory is not supported by the 

record. It therefore follows that Defendant's legal theory has no 

merit. The prosecution was not barred by the applicable statute 

of limitations. 

II. 

Jury Instructions Concerning Republication 

Defendant complains of error in the district court's charge 

to the jury concerning the atatute of limitation and the doctrine 

of republication as related to limitations. Appellant's Bri.ef at 

21. 

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The district court gave to the jury the following 

instruction: 

The Government is required by law to bring a 

criminal charge against an: individual within five years 

of the commission of an unlawful act •••• 

. . . . 

You are instructed that the five year period in a 

case such as this begins to run on any of the following 

dates, whichever is later: 

1. The date an alleged false statement was 

submitted to a financial institution. 

2. The date an alleged false statement, 

previously submitted, was affirmatively relied upon 

by the defendant in subsequent dealings with the 

financial institution. This is known as 

"republication" of a previously submitted false 

document or statement, and .does not require an 

actual delivery or physical resubmission of t~e 

alleged false document on each subsequent occasion. 

Instruction No. 14. Counsel for the Defendant ~ffered no 

objection to the instruction-before or after it was given in the 

trial court. Appellant's Brief at 21. 

This court has often stated the general rule that if an 

appellant fails to alert the trial court to claimed error, the 

issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal unless plain 

error is held to apply. ~, United States v. Phillips, 869 F.2d 

1361, 1365 (10th Cir. 1988}, cert. denied, 109 s.ct. 2074 (1989}; 

United States v. Freeman, 813 F.2d 303, 305 (10th Cir. 1987}. See 

also Fed. R. Crim. P. 30, 52(b}. We therefore must analyze this 

·assertion of error under the ''plain error" standard. 

Defendant -argues· that- the instruction is- an "erroneous 

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misstatement" of the law regarding republication of a false 

statement, Appellant's Brief at 22, and cites to us as his only 

authority the case of United States v. Brown, 674 F.2d 436, 438 

(5th Cir. 1982). In Brown, the court found that, in the absence 

6f a record revealing any direct reference to an earlier executed 

financial statement, or even an indirect or implicit reference to 

it, one may not be held liable for the making of a false 

statement. Defendant, in advancing this argument, assumes the 

facts in the instant case are the same as or closely related to 

Brown. This is simply not so. 

Defendant has cited no authority even suggesting the 

instruction itself may be erroneous. We find the instruction 

accurately reflects the law in this circuit regarding 

republication, as expressed in United States v. Warnick, 815 F.2d 

1341, 1342-43 (10th Cir. 1987). 

In deciding the propriety of this instruction, again we must 

~eview the evidence contained in the record. Instructions may not 

ordinarily be reviewed in a vacuum where no facts are present. 

Revlewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the 

Government, as we must, 

evidence. The savings and 

we are persuaded by the 

loan officer testified it 

following 

was the 

... bank's "normal procedure" to ask a loan applicant if he or she had 

a more recent tax return than the one on file with the 

institution. He stated he told the Defendant that the Defendant 

''"would ·not have to br·ing in a ·-new --Form 1640 for- his subsequent loan 

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applications, as the bank could.use the financial statement that 

Defendant already submitted. Another bank officer testified that 

copies of the financial statement and Form 1040 were maintained in 

Defendant's consumer loan file and also in the separate file 

containing his application for .a construction loan for the South 

Classen project. As these officers' testimony reveals, the 

Defendant submitted or adopted by reference the fictitious Form 

1040 in each of his loan applications. 

It cannot be disputed that Defendant was implicitly 

"resubmitting" his financial information initially provided to the 

savings and loans each time he applied for a subsequent loan. The 

Defendant could not reasonably expect the institution to make a 

loan without information on his financial situati6n, and the loan 

officer told Defendant that it could use the initial financial 

statement and tax return for the later loans. The Defendant thus 

"republished" the fictitious income tax return each time he 

applied for another loan. There was evidence that on each of the 

four occasions defendant applied for loans, the fictitious IRS 

Form 1040 was ''submitted" or relied on by Defendant as part of the 

loan application package. While Warnick did not even require that 

the defendant kno~ the bank was incorporating his prior security 

agreements in his loan extension application, see 815 F.2d at 

1342, here Defendant was aware that his financial statement was 

being so used. 

It . there.foi::e -becomes appa·rent that· Defendant is asking us to 

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judge the instruction on the basis of his factual theory, which is 

unsupported by the evidence. Defendant assumes the record shows 

the only time the Defendant represented the financial statement to 

be genuine was when he first brought the fictitious tax return 

into the bank in February of 1983. The evidence clearly 

establishes that the tax return was physically submitted on two 

occasions, in February and March of 1983. Moreover, Defendant was 

either asked by the lending officer prior to the making of each 

loan if the fictitious tax return was still his most current 

federal tax return or was informed that the bank would use it as 

his current financial statement. The instructions to the jury 

informed the jury that the Defendant had to affirmatively rely 

upon the false statement. The evidence supports this instruction, 

and the instruction was correct as .a matter of law. Clearly, 

there was no "plain error" "'undermin[ing] the fundamental 

fairness of the trial and contribut[ing] to a miscarriage of 

justice.'" United States v. Swafford, 766 F.2d 426, 428 (10th 

Cir. 1985) (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 16 

(1985)). 

III. 

Double Jeopardy 

D'efendant next argues that his multiple convictions violate 

the Fifth. Amendment protection against double jeopardy, citing to 

us Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. · 299 (1932). As 

explained in Blockburger, when the same act or transaction is 

al-leged ·-as a -violation .:in multiple ..counts,· "the ·test ·to be applied 

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to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is 

whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other 

does not." 284 U.S. at 304. 

The illogic of Defendant's argument is his assumption that 

the only time the Defendant affirmatively held out the fictitious 

Form 1040 was when he first presented it to the financial 

institution in February 1983. The facts show that the tax return 

was also submitted on or about March 17, 1983, and that on each 

occasion Defendant secured a new loan he represented, directly or 

implicitly, the fictitious tax return as his most current. See 

discussion in part II., supra. 

In the instant case the evidence and the reasonable 

inferences to be drawn therefrom, viewed in a light most favorable 

to the government, show the Defendant on four separate occasions 

either presented the ,fictitious income tax return or indicated 

that it was still his most current return. The Defendant 

republished the fictitious tax return on each separate occasion; 

he did not publish it but once as urged by Defendant. Again, 

Defendant in making this argument relies upon the facts as he 

wishes they were, rather than as they in fact are. 

IV. 

Variance 

Defendant next asserts there is a fatal variance between the 

... -allegations of· the ·indictment, as limited by the bill ·of 

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particularsj and the evidence adduced at trial. Specifically the 

Defendant asserts that the "allegations of the Bill of Particulars 

limited the Government's permissible case to proof of specific 

falsehoods in specific line items of the allegedly false IRS 

1040." Appellan.t 's Brief at 28-29. 

The indictment charged Defendant "willfully submitted a false 

1981 tax return stating his total income on line 21 as •.• 

($120,305.77), after knowingly submitting his official 1981 tax 

return to the Internal Revenue Service stating his total income on 

line 21 as ••• ($16,481.88)." 

Upon the motion of Defendant and by order of the district 

court, the Government filed a three-page bill of particulars 

setting forth that the fictitious income tax return submitted by 

the Defendant was false with reference to the business income 

reported on line: 11, the rent and royal ties income reported on 

line 17, the total income figure on line 21, the total amount of 

taxes, the estimated tax payments, and various other specified 

line items. 

The proof by the Government at trial was the introduction 

into evidence of the true Form 1040 as actually filed by the 

Defendant with the IRS and the fictitious Form 1040 as presented 

by Defendant to the financial institution. These documents were 

coupled. with the testimony of Defendant's secretary who testified 

that she .signed Defendant.'-s -wife's signature - on the fictitious 

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return at the direction of the Defendant, and testimony by the 

defendant's accountant that neither he nor his firm had prepared 

the fictitious return, even though the fictitious return so 

indicated. 

We have reviewed the return actually filed by the Defendant 

and the return submitted by the Defendant to the financial 

institution. It is sufficient to say that none of the line items 

specified by the Government on the fictitious return as being 

false is in agreement with the corresponding line item amount set 

forth in the Defendant's return filed with the IRS. The 

Government was not required to prove the true amount on each line, 

only the falsity of the entries in the form submitted to the 

savings and loan. All of the line item amounts on the fictitious 

return varied from the respective line item amounts reported to 

the IRS. It is therefore apparent that the income tax return 

submitted to the savings and loan was false with respect to each 

line item. The gravamen of Defendant's representation was that 

the fictitious return was a true copy of his tax return filed with 

the IRS. It then becomes clear that none of the line item amounts 

specified in the bill of particulars was true in the sense that 

these were the line amounts reported to the IRS. There was no 

variance between the indictment, the bill of particulars, and the 

proof adduced at trial. 

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v. 

Restitution 

The trial court sentenced the Defendant to concurrent terms 

of two years on each of the first three counts. Concerning count 

four, the trial court suspended the imposition of .• I 

sentence and 

I 

placed Defendant on probation for a period of five years, which is 

to be consecutive to the sentences imposed on the first three 

counts. 1 The trial court imposed special conditions of probation 

as follows: 

No. 1, the defendant will provide a yearly audited 

financial statement to the probation office; No. 2, no 

new debt will be incurred by the defendant; No. 3, he 

will provide any requested financial information to the 

probation office. 

[D]efendant will pay restitution in the amount of 

$83,465.76 to the [savings and loan involved]. 

Following conviction, the trial court entered its written order 

setting a hearing to determine the.amount of loss to the victim 

financial institution pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 32. 2 Pursuant 

to this order, an evidentiary hearing was subsequently held at 

which time the Defendant presented numerous exhibits, presented 

evidence and cross-examined the government's witnesses. 

Defendant's counsel, while making his closing argument to the 

court, urged the court to "punish" .the Defendant "by ordering that 

he make restitution in the amount whatever the Court feels is 

1 It should be noted the offenses were committed between March 

and-- May 1983. Probation was . therefore imposed pursuant to·:18 

u.s.c. § 3651 (1982}. 

2 Neither party de~ignated this order as a part o~ the record. 

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proper, the 85 thousand some odd dollar amount or something in 

excess of that." Of course, counsel in making this statement was 

arguing for probation. The district court ordered restitution in 

the amount of $83,465.76, which was less than the amount urged by 

Defendant. 

Defendant now asserts that, because the indictment failed to 

allege any specific amount of damages or loss, the district court 

could not properly order restitution. We review a trial court's 

order concerning conditions of probation for abuse of discretion. 

United States v. Tolla, 781 F.2d 29, 34 (2d Cir. 1986): United 

States v. Lawson, 670 F.2d 923, 929 (10th Cir. 1982). We observe 

initially that Defendant has failed to comply with this court's 

Rule 28.2(d), which requires, as to ~ach issue raised, a statement 

in the brief showing where the issue was raised and the trial 

court's ruling thereupon. 3 This court has reviewed the transcript 

of the hearing and has been unable to find where or, for that 

matter, if this issue was raised before the district court. We 

will, for the purpose of this opinion, assume this issue was 

raised before the district court in some portion of the record 

that counsel failed to designate as a part of the record. 

We find Defendant's argument to be without merit. Actual 

. .damages flowing from a specific crime char-ged in the indict-ment of 

which the defendant was convicted may be properly ordered as · 

3 It should be noted the Government has inexplicably failed , respond to any of·-Defendant 's ·arguments ·concerning res ti tut ion. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2550 Document: 010110135922 Date Filed: 11/22/1989 Page: 13 
restitution when the amount has been judicially determined 

pursuant to notice and hearing. A judicial hearing was held upon 

the issue of restitution. ·The hearing was held pursuant to 

written notice, and. Defendant had a full and fair opportunity to 

present evidence, exhibits, and argument. Defendant, after 

specifically urging the district court to impose restitution in an 

amount higher than actually imposed, cannot now be heard to argue 

that restitution was improper. 

Defendant cites to us United States v. Whitney, 785 F.2d 824, 

(9th Cir. 1986), amended at 838 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1988), as 

standing for the proposition that restitution may not be ordered 

unless the amount is set forth in the indictment or is contained 

in a signed plea agreement. On the contrary, according to the 

court in Whitney, the Ninth Circuit has suggested that alternative 

methods of fixing the amount of restitution might prove as 

reliable and fair. 838 F.2d at 404-05 (citing United States v. 

Black, 767 F.2d 1334, 1343 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1022 

(1985)). To read Whitney as urged by Defendant would be to hold 

that restitution can never be ordered unless the amount is charged 

in the indictment and proved beyond a reasonable doubt at trial or 

agreed to by Defendant in a signed plea agreement. We are not 

prepared to so hold and we can find no authority requiring such a 

holding. In the instant case Defendant was ~iven notice--~nd a 

hearing concerning restitution. The issues were resolved 

judicially. Defendant made no complaint coricerning restitution or 

the -procedures - involved· in,.resolving these issues until he came 

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before this court. Nor has he cited any authority to us showing 

the trial court's procedures to be error. 

Defendant next urges that "[t]he restitution ordered by the 

District Court is attributable to, and payable for, a debt 

discharged in bankruptcy." Appellant's Brief at 37. Again, 

Defendant has failed to set forth in his brief where or if this 

contention was brought to the attention of the district court. 

More importantly, Defendant fails to cite to this court any 

factual basis for this argument. The record designated to this 

court is totally devoid of any reference to whether the "debt'' was 

discharged in bankruptcy. 4 Counsel for Defendant, in urging this 

factual contention, neglects to inform us as to when, where,· or 

before what court this bankruptcy proceeding transpired or even 

the nature of the asserted bankruptcy proceedings. We do not know 

whether Defendant filed Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 proceedings. This 

court cannot and will not act solely upon the basis of general 

factual contentions raised for the first time on appeal. This 

court has carefully reviewed the transcript of the sentencing 

hearing, and we are unable to find any mention in this transcript 

that would justify our concluding that appellant filed bankruptcy 

or was discharged from the payment of any debts. We therefore 

decline to reach this question as there exists no factual basis in 

4 We note for th, record that the Supreme Court has apparently 

granted certiorari in In re Johnson-Allen, 871 F.2d 421 (3d Cir.), 

cert. granted sub. nom., Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. 

Davenport, 110 s.ct. 49 (1989), where the question is: Are 

criminal restitution obligation debts subject to discharge under 

Chapter 13 of~the Ban~ruptcy Code? 

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the record before us upon which to base an opinion. 

VI. 

Debt Incurrence 

As a condition of probation, the district court ordered that 

Defendant incur "no new debts." Defendant asserts the trial court 

abused its discretion in imposing this condition. Def.endant 

argues this condition is unnecessarily harsh and excessive and "is 

global, vague and not fine-tuned to reasonably relate to 

rehabilitation and public safety." Appellant's Brief at 45. 

Prior to discussing the legal principles involved in 

resolving this contention, the factual setting must be complete. 

At least one witness during the course of the trial testified that 

Defendant had suggested to him that he fill out a false financial 

statement and use this fictitious financial statement as a basis 

to obtain a bank loan. The witness further testified that he 

asked Defendant what he thought ~ould happen if he (Defendant) got 

caught and 

hand because 

the Defendant answered "[i]t would be a slap on the 

it's my first offense." The witness further 

testified that he asked Defendant what would happen if the note 

was called and Defendant replied that he would file bankruptcy. 

At the sentencing hearing the district judge remarked that he was 

troubled by several agg.ravating factors, including.-the fact that 

•"there was more than minimal planningo 

carried out over a substantial period of 

It was a fraud that was 

time." The court was 

also .concerned :that .the, 11 defiendant involv,ed other people" and that 

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Defendant's "testimony at trial was that he had done nothing 

wrong, that he had not violated the law, and that he had engaged 

in a course of conduct that was either lawful in his eyes or was 

done at the suggestion of others." 

18 u.s~c. § 3651 provides in part that a court: 

[W]hen satisfied that the ends of justice and the best 

interest of the public as well as the defendant will be 

served thereby, may suspend the imposition or execution 

of sentence and place the defendant on probation for 

such period and upon such terms and conditions as the 

court deems best. 

Federal trial courts are consequently accorded broad discretiori. 

Their discretionary authority is bounded only by the Federal 

Probation Act and the requirement that conditions of probation be 

reasonably related to the simultaneous goals of rehabilitating the 

defendant and protecting the public. United States v. Tolla, 781 

F.2d 29, 34 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Hussong, 778 F.2d 

567, 569-70 (10th Cir. 1985); United States v. Lawson, 670 F.2d 

923, 929 (10th Cir. 1982). A defendant who seeks to overturn a 

particular condition of probation must establish that the court 

acted outside its discretionary authority in imposing it. Tolla, 

781 F.2d at 32. It is axiomatic that particular conditions of 

probation should be tailored to meet the special problems of a 

particular defendant and that conditions of probation must be 

viewed in light of all the circumstances properly before the 

.. 

court. 

It is obvious that Defendant's problems stemmed, in 

significant part, from improper use and creation of personal and 

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commercial debt. The mere fact that a condition of probation 

restricts the Defendant's freedom to perform otherwise lawful 

activities is not dispositive of the reasonableness of the 

condition. United States v. Terrigno, 838 F.2d 371, 374 (9th Cir. 

1988). It cannot be an abuse of discretion to require a person to 

conduct his life without debt. Such a condttion of probation is 

obviously designed to rehabilitate Defendant as well as to protect 

those persons who would be willing to extend Defendant credit. 

Members of our society exist who are unable to create debt. 

Likewise, many citizens are unwilling to create debt. 

. Restrictions prohibiting debt will plainly create a hardship upon 

a person who is used to borrowing and creating debt. However, a 

condition designed to protect would-be creditors and to teach 

Defendant how to handle his finances in a conservative fashion 'is j 

reasonably related to the rehabilitation of Defendant and the 

protection of the public. It does not constitute an abuse of the 

trial court's broad discretion. Furthermore, it is not vague. 

The condition clearly prohibits Defendant from incurring any 

(i.e., personal or commercial) new debt during his probationary 

period. The language of the court could not be more plain. 

Defendant is forbidden from receiving credit or borrowing money 

during his probation • 

. • The judgment is therefore AFFIRMED. 

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