Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-09-01789/USCOURTS-ca8-09-01789-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael E. Craddock
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 09-1789

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Western

* District of Missouri.

Michael E. Craddock, *

* [PUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: January 11, 2010

Filed: February 1, 2010

___________

Before GRUENDER and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges, and JARVEY,1

 District Judge.

___________

PER CURIAM.

In October 2008, Michael Craddock pled guilty to possession with intent to

distribute over 50 grams of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and

(b)(1)(A). Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851, the government sought to enhance

Craddock’s sentence based upon a prior conviction for sale of a controlled substance

1

The Honorable John A. Jarvey, United States District Judge for the Southern

District of Iowa, sitting by designation.

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that resulted in a suspended imposition of sentence. The district court2

 accepted this

enhancement and sentenced Craddock to 240 months imprisonment, the mandatory

minimum sentence pursuant to § 841(b)(1)(A). Craddock appeals this sentence, and

we affirm.

I.

Following Craddock’s arrest in March 2008, a federal grand jury returned a

nine-count indictment against Craddock for drug and weapons charges. Pursuant to

21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1), the government filed a notice seeking to enhance Craddock’s

sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), based upon his prior Jackson County,

Missouri, conviction for sale of a controlled substance, which resulted in a suspended

imposition of sentence and three years probation. On October 2, 2008, Craddock pled

guilty to count six of the indictment, possession with the intent to distribute over 50

grams of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A). In the plea

agreement, Craddock reserved the right to appeal the issue of whether his suspended

imposition of sentence in Missouri state court was a “prior conviction” such that §

841(b)(1)(A) increased his mandatory minimum prison sentence from 10 years to 20

years. Following a sentencing hearing, the district court sentenced Craddock to a 240-

month mandatory minimum sentence.3

 Craddock appeals the imposition of this

sentence. 

2

The Honorable Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr., Chief Judge, United States District

Court for the Western District of Missouri.

3

But for the 240-month mandatory minimum sentence under § 841(b)(1)(A),

Craddock’s advisory Guidelines sentencing range would have been 120 to 135 months

imprisonment.

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II.

Section 841(b)(1)(A) of Title 21 provides that any person who commits certain

drug crimes, including possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of

cocaine base, shall be sentenced to at least ten years imprisonment. However, “[i]f

any person commits such a violation after a prior conviction for a felony drug offense

has become final, such person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which

may not be less than 20 years . . . .” 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). Craddock argues that

because Missouri courts do not consider a suspended imposition of sentence to be a

final judgment, see Yale v. City of Independence, 846 S.W.2d 193, 194 (Mo. 1993)

(en banc), he has no “prior conviction for a felony drug offense [that] has become

final” that would subject him to § 841(b)(1)(A)’s enhanced 20-year minimum

sentence. 

The great weight of authority, however, is against Craddock’s position. We

have previously held that the question of what constitutes a “prior conviction” for

purposes of § 841(b)(1)(A) is a matter of federal, not state, law, and that a suspended

imposition of sentence qualifies as such a prior conviction.4

 See, e.g., United States

v. Davis, 417 F.3d 909, 912-13 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied 546 U.S. 1144 (2006);

4

Although some of the cases discuss them interchangeably, under Missouri law

a “suspended sentence” or “suspended execution of sentence” and a “suspended

imposition of sentence” are separate sentencing options available to the trial court. 

See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 557.011.2 (allowing a court to “(3) Suspend the imposition of

sentence, with or without placing the person on probation; [or] (4) Pronounce sentence

and suspend its execution, placing the person on probation . . . .”). Suspended

executions of sentence are considered to be final judgments by Missouri courts, while

suspended impositions of sentence are not. See Yale v. City of Independence, 846

S.W.2d 193, 194-95 (Mo. 1993). We have previously held both suspended

impositions of sentence and suspended executions of sentence qualify as prior

convictions for purposes of § 841(b)(1)(A). See United States v. Slicer, 361 F.3d

1085, 1086-87 (8th Cir. 2004) (suspended execution of sentence); United States v.

Ortega, 150 F.3d 937, 948 (8th Cir. 1998) (suspended imposition of sentence). 

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United States v. Slicer, 361 F.3d 1085, 1086-87 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 543 U.S. 914

(2004); United States v. Franklin, 250 F.3d 653, 665 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 534 U.S.

1009 (2001); United States v. Ortega, 150 F.3d 937, 948 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied

525 U.S. 1087 (1999). This holding is in line with “[s]everal of our sister circuits

[that] have held that deferred adjudications or probated sentences constitute

convictions in the context of § 841.” Ortega, 150 F.3d at 948 (citing United States v.

Cisneros, 112 F.3d 1272, 1281 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Mejias, 47 F.3d 401,

403-04 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); United States v. Meraz, 998 F.2d 182, 184-85

(3d Cir. 1993); United States v. Campbell, 980 F.2d 245, 250-51 (4th Cir. 1992);

United States v. McAllister, 29 F.3d 1180, 1184-85 (7th Cir. 1994)). 

Craddock acknowledges this line of cases but urges us to follow United States

v. Stallings and hold that his suspended imposition of sentence is not a prior drug

conviction for purposes of § 841(b)(1)(A). 301 F.3d 919, 921-22 (8th Cir. 2002)

(relying on California law to find that a suspended imposition of sentence for felony

possession of cocaine base could not be the basis for an enhanced sentence under §

841(b)). We decline to do so. First, while Craddock argues, in part, that his prior

conviction was not final, we have previously held that Stallings did not discuss finality

and, thus, is not controlling on the issue. See United States v. Maxon, 339 F.3d 656,

659 (8th Cir. 2003) (“We do not believe that Stallings controls the result in this case

because the issue of finality was not decided there.”). Additionally, to the extent that

Stallings evinces a conflict in our precedent, “we are free to choose which line of

cases to follow.” Meyer v. Schnucks Mkts., Inc., 163 F.3d 1048, 1051 (8th Cir.

1998). We think the older Ortega line of cases holding that a suspended imposition

of sentence is a prior conviction for purposes of § 841(b)(1)(A) is more persuasive and

is in line with the decisions of our sister circuits. See Maxon, 339 F.3d at 659

(recognizing the split in this court’s authority and “conclud[ing] that Ortega offers the

proper approach”). 

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Craddock also argues that the reasoning employed by the Ortega line of cases

has been undermined and that we should therefore overrule them. Even if we found

this argument persuasive, we are without the authority to overrule the decisions of a

prior panel of this circuit. See United States v. Betcher, 534 F.3d 820, 823-24 (8th

Cir. 2008) (“[I]t is a cardinal rule in our circuit that one panel is bound by the decision

of a prior panel.” (quotation omitted)).

III.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. 

______________________________

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