Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-04075/USCOURTS-ca8-03-04075-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John A. Davies
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable David S. Doty, United States District Judge for the District of

Minnesota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-4075

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States 

v. * District Court for the District 

* of Minnesota.

John A. Davies, *

*

Defendant - Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: June 15, 2004

 Filed: August 16, 2004 

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, BYE and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________

MELLOY, Circuit Judge.

John A. Davies appeals the district court’s1

 modification of the conditions on

his term of supervised release. Less than one year into Davies’s three-year term of

supervised release, his probation officer sought, and the district court imposed, a new

condition: participation in an alcohol abuse program and periodic testing for alcohol

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use. Davies challenges the modification on two grounds. First, Davies argues that

the district court based the modified conditions on testimony from witnesses he was

not able to confront. Second, he argues that the periodic alcohol testing involves a

greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary. We find that the district

court based the modification on evidence that was available to Davies and not on the

hearsay testimony of an absent witness. Further, we find that the district court

narrowly tailored the modified conditions of Davies’s term of supervised release to

address a specific concern, namely, the impact of alcohol use on Davies’s mental

health and alcohol as a contributing factor in Davies’s two prior suicide attempts.

Accordingly, we affirm.

I.

Davies owned and operated a business from July 1998 to April 2000. In this

business, he served as a qualified intermediary to hold the proceeds of sales intended

for the purchase of like kind property in accordance with the like kind exchange

restrictions of the Internal Revenue Code. Davies represented to his clients that he

would invest their sales proceeds in low-yield, conservative investments and pay

them the investment proceeds in exchange for a fixed, per-transaction fee. Instead,

he invested his clients’ funds in risky, potentially high-yield investments with the

intention of collecting for himself the difference between the actual investment

returns and the low-yield returns promised to his clients. His risky investments

resulted in losses that totaled approximately $2 million, and, in April 2000, he

declared bankruptcy.

On May 1, 2000, Davies voluntarily committed himself to a hospital. He

exhibited many depressive symptoms, including tearfulness, sleep disturbance,

anxiety, hopelessness, and suicide ideation. He reported that he tried to commit

suicide twice in the two weeks prior to his commitment, both times while intoxicated,

by placing a bag over his head and by trying to hang himself. Testing indicated

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severe depression with some compromise in thought process. According to Davies’s

presentence report, he never used illicit drugs, and, “[w]hen he was hospitalized in

May, 2000, it was determined that his chemical intake should be closely monitored

but he was not specifically diagnosed as chemical dependent.” He was discharged

on May 12, 2000, with improved symptoms and a final diagnosis of Major

Depression and Personality Disorder. 

On January 26, 2001, the government indicted Davies on two counts of wire

fraud. Davies pleaded guilty, and, on April 19, 2001, received a sentence of thirtyfour months imprisonment and three years of supervised release. The conditions on

his term of supervised release included restrictions regarding employment in a

fiduciary capacity and requirements for the disclosure of financial information. In

addition, Davies was required to undergo psychiatric or psychological counseling.

He began his term of supervised release on August 13, 2003, and has thus far

complied with all the original conditions.

On November 5, 2003, Davies’s probation officer petitioned the court to add

the following condition:

The defendant shall participate in a program for drug and alcohol abuse

as approved by the probation officer. That program may include testing

and inpatient or outpatient treatment, counseling or a support group.

In the petition, the probation officer stated, “Mr. Davies[’s] presentence investigation

as well as information received from the Bureau of Prisons indicates that the

defendant has a significant alcohol problem which has in the past exacerbated his

problem with depression.” The probation officer indicated that Davies refused to

consent to treatment or testing and strenuously resisted the proposed modification.

The district court held a hearing on December 9, 2003. No witnesses testified.

At the outset of the hearing, the district court stated:

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Now the reason the probation officer has recommended this for Mr.

Davies, based on the presentence investigation and information from the

Bureau of Prisons personnel, which leads him to believe that Mr. Davies

does have or could have a problem with alcohol that exacerbates his

depression, and as the probation officer spoke to me, he indicated it[’]s

not that he knows that’s the case, but he wants to find out if that’s the

case, and that’s the reason for the request for the change.

Later in the hearing, counsel for Davies objected to any reliance on information

received from the Bureau of Prisons. The following exchange occurred between

Davies’s counsel and the district court:

Court: Well, let’s make it very clear on the record what the court

is relying on. The Court is relying on the recommendation

of the probation officer, who in turn I think is relying on

the PSI, and I’m relying on the PSI, and all that

information has been before . . . Mr. Davies . . . .

Counsel: Is it truly the presentence investigation report and the

information that is there and not any new information that

is occasioning this modification?

Court: To my knowledge there is no new information. The

probation officer did indicate that there was some comment

or indication by the Bureau of Prisons personnel, but that’s

not information. I don’t think we would have a hearing,

and we couldn’t get it out even if there were a hearing.

What I’m going to be relying on and what I think the

probation officer is relying on is that information contained

in the PSI, something that has been before you and Mr.

Davies all along, so it[’]s not going to be a hearing or a

need for one. I’m going to make some findings of fact in

this case, and the Court will find that the representations of

the probation officer that Mr. Davies may or is likely to

suffer from an addiction to alcohol and that this condition

may exacerbate his psychological problems.

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The district court imposed the requested modification, and Davies appealed.

II.

District courts enjoy broad discretion in the imposition or modification of

conditions for terms of supervised release, and we review only for abuse of discretion.

United States v. Behler, 187 F.3d 772, 778 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Cooper,

171 F.3d 582, 585 (8th Cir. 1999). Underlying questions regarding compliance with

the rules of criminal procedure and the provision of due process, however, are purely

legal questions that we review de novo. See United States v. Pardue, 363 F.3d 695,

697 (8th Cir. 2004); United States v. Reynolds, 49 F.3d 423, 426 (8th Cir. 1995)

(conducting a de novo review of the procedure a district court employed in the

application of Rule 32.1(a)(2)(D) without explicitly declaring a standard); United

States v. Zentgraf, 20 F.3d 906, 908-09 (8th Cir. 1994) (same). 

A district court may modify the conditions imposed on a term of supervised

release even when, as in the present case, the modification is based only on evidence

that was available at the original sentencing. This is because the statute that

authorizes district courts to modify the conditions of supervised release does not

require new evidence, nor even changed circumstances in the defendant’s life.

Rather, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2) provides that the district court:

may modify, reduce, or enlarge the conditions of supervised release, at

any time prior to the expiration or termination of the term of supervised

release, pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure relating to the modification of probation and the provisions

applicable to the initial setting of the terms and conditions of postrelease supervision[.]

The applicable Rules in the present case include Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure

32.1(c), which provides a right to a hearing and representation by counsel. The

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comments to Rule 32.1(c) provide, “Probation conditions should be subject to

modification, for the sentencing court must be able to respond to changes in the

probationer’s circumstances as well as new ideas and methods of rehabilitation.”

Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 32.1(b) Advisory Committee Notes (1979) (Rule 32.1(c) was

added in 1993) (emphasis added). Further, we previously stated that a “district court

is free to modify the terms of supervised release at any time after considering factors

such as the nature and circumstances of the offense or the history and characteristics

of the defendant.” Behler, 187 F.3d at 778 n.3. Accordingly, although it is inefficient

to omit important conditions and later, upon further reflection, petition the court to

incorporate such conditions, the relevant statutes and rules do not prohibit such

practice.

Davies argues on appeal, as he did below, that the modification of the

conditions upon his term of supervised release resulted from comments made by some

unknown person at the Bureau of Prisons and that reliance on these hearsay

comments violated both Rule 32.1(c) and the general protections of the Fifth

Amendment’s Due Process Clause. While it is true that the probation officer made

vague reference to such a person, the district court, as quoted above, made it

abundantly clear that the actual decision to impose an alcohol treatment and testing

provision was based solely on information contained in the original presentence

report. Our own review of the presentence report confirms this assertion. Davies

suffered from depression. Alcohol exacerbated his depression. On two occasions he

tried to commit suicide, and on both occasions, he was intoxicated. Davies received

notice of the proposed modification, was represented by counsel during the hearing

concerning the modification, and the information necessary to support the

modification was contained in the presentence report. The fact that the probation

officer might have been motivated by comments received from an unknown Bureau

of Prisons employee does not change the fact that the district court properly relied on

information contained in the presentence report to justify the modified conditions.

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Regarding Davies’s second argument, that the district court applied an

overbroad and unnecessary condition on his term of supervised release, we find no

abuse of discretion. The district court did not impose a total ban on the use of

alcohol, as we approved under the facts of Behler, 187 F.3d at 779. Rather, the

district court imposed a condition that empowers the probation officer to verify

Davies’s claims that he does not abuse alcohol. The district court did not “impose[]

limitations on the basis of pure speculation or assumptions unrelated to the

rehabilitative process.” Id. Rather, the district court narrowly tailored the condition

to address the specific concern regarding the fact that alcohol exacerbated Davies’s

mental health issues and led him, twice, to attempt suicide while intoxicated.

In short, there was no abuse of discretion as the added condition clearly relates

to rehabilitation goals, is based on facts contained in the presentence report (facts that

cannot be the basis of factual dispute since probation officers amended the report

before initial sentencing to address Davies’s earlier objections), and reflects a lesser

deprivation of liberty than a complete ban on alcohol use.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

______________________________

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