Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01157/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01157-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lawrence Everatt Anderson
Appellant

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

IN RE: LAWRENCE EVERATT ANDERSON,

Appellant

______________________ 

2016-1156, 2016-1157

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in Nos. 

13/189,505 and 13/214,202.

______________________ 

Decided: October 13, 2016

______________________ 

LAWRENCE EVERATT ANDERSON, Falls Church, VA, pro 

se.

THOMAS W. KRAUSE, Office of the Solicitor, United 

States Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria, VA, for 

appellee Michelle K. Lee. Also represented by SARAH E.

CRAVEN, BENJAMIN T. HICKMAN.

______________________ 

Before NEWMAN, LOURIE, and DYK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

In these consolidated appeals, Lawrence E. Anderson 

(“Anderson”), a patent attorney proceeding pro se, appeals 

from two decisions of the United States Patent and 

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2 IN RE: ANDERSON

Trademark Office (“PTO”) Patent Trial and Appeal Board 

(“the Board”), in which the Board affirmed the Examiner’s 

rejections of all pending claims of U.S. Patent Applications 13/214,202 (“the ’202 application”) and 13/189,505 

(“the ’505 application”) as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. 

§ 102(b) or § 103(a) (2006).1 See Ex Parte Anderson, 

No. 2013-006406, Application No. 13/214,202, 2015 WL 

5469585 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 14, 2015) (“’202 Decision”) (relating to Appeal No. 2016-1156); Ex Parte Anderson, No. 

2013-003878, Application No. 13/189,505, 2015 WL 

4607919 (P.T.A.B. July 30, 2015) (“’505 Decision”) (relating to Appeal No. 2016-1157). Because the Board did not 

err in finding the claims of the ’202 and ’505 applications 

unpatentable over the cited prior art, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Anderson is the sole inventor and applicant of the ’202 

application, entitled “Solar or Wind Powered Traffic 

Monitoring Device and Method,” and the ’505 application, 

entitled “Traffic Monitoring Device and Method,” both 

directed to a system and method for monitoring the flow 

of vehicular traffic. The applications were filed in July 

and August of 2011. The ’202 application is a continuation-in-part of the ’505 application.

I. The ’202 Application

The ’202 application has twenty claims, with claims 1, 

10, and 19 being the independent claims. Claim 1 reads

as follows: 

1. A system for monitoring the flow of vehicular 

traffic comprising:

1 Because the ’202 and ’505 applications were filed 

before the enactment of the Leahy-Smith America Invents 

Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011), we 

apply the pre-AIA version of 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103.

 

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at least two photodetectors that detect the 

speed of a vehicle fixedly positioned along a 

predetermined roadway by measuring the time 

that the vehicle takes to pass between the at 

least two photodetectors; the at least two photodetectors being powered by one of solar or 

wind power;

at least one transmitter for transmitting the 

data relating to the passage of a vehicle at a 

predetermined point on a roadway; the transmitter being powered by solar or wind power; 

and 

a second receiver for receiving the transmitted 

data relating to the speed of a vehicle along a 

predetermined roadway; the second receiver 

being operatively connected to a display for 

displaying traffic speeds at points along a 

roadway located above the predetermined 

roadway, the speed being displayed on the display for use by a motorist in determining a 

route of travel[.]

Appellant’s Appendix (“App.”) 94 (emphases added). 

In a final Office Action, the Examiner rejected all

claims of the ’202 application under § 103(a) as obvious 

over U.S. Patent Application Publication 2007/0208506 

(“Macneille”) in view of U.S. Patent 6,750,787 

(“Hutchinson”). The Examiner found that Macneille 

discloses a system for detecting the passage of vehicles 

and displaying information on traffic flows at points along 

a roadway and teaches most of the limitations of independent claims 1, 10, and 19, but that it does not “disclose 

detecting the speed of the vehicle by measuring the time 

that the vehicle takes to pass between the at least two 

photodetectors, and displaying traffic speeds at points 

along a roadway located above/near the predetermined 

roadway.” Id. at 50–51. The Examiner found that 

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Hutchinson teaches those limitations that are missing 

from Macneille, namely, detecting and displaying the 

speed of individual vehicles. Id. at 51. She reasoned that 

it would have been obvious to modify Macneille in view of 

Hutchinson “in order to maximize route efficiency by 

providing precise traffic speed, with predictable results.” 

Id. at 52. She also found that Macneille in view of 

Hutchinson teaches the additional limitations of the 

dependent claims. Id. at 52–54. In particular, she found 

that Macneille teaches detecting traffic flow to provide 

motorists with optimal travel routes. Id. at 52–53, 54 

(citing Macneille at ¶¶ 17–19, 23–30).

Anderson appealed to the Board, the Examiner responded with an answer, and Anderson filed a reply. In 

September 2015, the Board affirmed the Examiner’s 

obviousness rejection of all claims over Macneille in view 

of Hutchinson. ’202 Decision, 2015 WL 5469585, at *2–6. 

In so doing, the Board “agree[d] with and adopt[ed] the 

. . . findings and rationale as set forth in the [Examiner’s] 

Answer.” Id. at *2. The Board then addressed Anderson’s 

arguments as to each claim, id. at *2–6, and specifically 

rejected his argument that “[t]he display of Hutchinson is 

not for use by a motorist in determining a route of travel,” 

id. at *3 (alteration in original). The Board agreed with 

the Examiner that the “for use by a motorist in determining a route of travel” claim language is “a statement of 

intended use” and thus does not limit the scope of the 

claims. Id. 

II. The ’505 Application

The ’505 application also has twenty claims, with 

claims 1, 10, and 19 being the independent claims. 

Claim 1 reads as follows: 

1. A system for monitoring the flow of vehicular 

traffic comprising:

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at least one first transmitter receiver that detects the passage of a vehicle along a roadway 

fixedly positioned at a predetermined point adjacent the roadway; and

at least one fixedly positioned second transmitter for transmitting the data relating to the 

passage of a vehicle at a predetermined point 

on a roadway for use by motorists in determining a route of travel. 

App. 258 (emphases added).

In a final Office Action, the Examiner rejected all 

claims of the ’505 application under § 103(a) as obvious 

over Macneille in view of U.S. Patent Application Publication 2011/0095908 (“Nadeem”). The Examiner found that 

“Macneille does not explicitly determine traffic speed,” 

instead that it teaches determining “traffic flow type 

which corresponds to traffic speed.” Id. at 226. She then

found that “Nadeem discloses a system for monitoring the 

flow of vehicular traffic, including determining traffic 

speed.” Id. (internal citations omitted). She reasoned 

that it would have been obvious to modify “Macneille to 

determine traffic speed, as suggested by Macneille and 

taught by Nadeem, in order to maximize route efficiency 

by providing precise traffic speed, with predictable results,” and thus concluded that independent claims 1, 10, 

and 19 would have been obvious over Macneille in view of 

Nadeem. Id. at 225–26. The Examiner next found that 

Macneille in view of Nadeem renders the dependent 

claims obvious. Id. at 226–30.

Anderson appealed to the Board. The Examiner responded with an answer, in which she replaced the obviousness rejection of claims 1 and 19 with an anticipation

rejection under § 102(b) in view of Macneille only, because 

those claims do not require the detection of traffic speed

as taught by Nadeem. Id. at 264–65. The Examiner 

maintained that changing the statutory basis of the 

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rejection did not constitute a new ground of rejection, 

because she merely omitted the unnecessary reliance on 

Nadeem, and the § 102 rejection was based on the same 

teachings of Macneille used to support the § 103 rejection. 

Anderson filed a petition to the Director under 37 

C.F.R. § 1.181, requesting that the Examiner’s anticipation rejection be designated as new. Before the Director 

issued a decision, Anderson filed a reply brief at the 

Board. The Director then dismissed Anderson’s petition

pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.40(d), which provides that a 

reply brief filed after the filing of a petition under § 1.181, 

but before a decision on that petition, “will be treated as a 

request to withdraw the petition and to maintain the 

appeal.” App. 360–61 (quoting § 41.40(d)). On Anderson’s 

petition for reconsideration, the Director maintained the 

dismissal, id. at 366–67; and in September 2013, the 

Director denied Anderson’s request for suspension of the 

rules, id. at 371–75.

In July 2015, the Board affirmed the Examiner’s anticipation rejection of claims 1 and 19 on the merits,2 as 

well as the obviousness rejection of claims 2–18 and 20 

over Macneille in view of Nadeem. ’505 Decision, 2015 

WL 4607919, at *1–3. As in the ’202 Decision, the Board 

“agree[d] with and adopt[ed] the . . . findings and rationale as set forth in the [Examiner’s] Answer,” id. at *1, 

and then specifically addressed Anderson’s arguments as 

to each claim, id. at *1–3.

2 In a footnote, the Board acknowledged the Director’s September 2013 decision denying Anderson’s request 

to suspend the rules and to designate the § 102 rejection 

as a new ground of rejection. ’505 Decision, 2015 WL 

4607919, at *1 n.1. The Board did not otherwise comment 

on the Director’s decisions.

 

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Anderson timely appealed from both decisions of the 

Board to this court. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(4)(A).

DISCUSSION

We review the Board’s legal determinations de novo, 

In re Elsner, 381 F.3d 1125, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 2004), and the 

Board’s factual findings for substantial evidence, In re 

Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2000). A finding 

is supported by substantial evidence if a reasonable mind 

might accept the evidence to support the finding. Consol. 

Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). “Where 

two different conclusions may be warranted based on the 

evidence of record, the Board’s decision to favor one 

conclusion over the other is the type of decision that must 

be sustained by this court as supported by substantial 

evidence.” In re Bayer Aktiengesellschaft, 488 F.3d 960, 

970 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

Obviousness is a question of law based on underlying 

factual findings, In re Baxter, 678 F.3d 1357, 1361 (Fed.

Cir. 2012), including what a reference teaches, In re 

Beattie, 974 F.2d 1309, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 1992), and the 

existence of a reason to combine references, In re Hyon, 

679 F.3d 1363, 1365–66 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Whether the 

Board relied on a new ground of rejection is a question of 

law. In re Stepan Co., 660 F.3d 1341, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 

2011).

I. The ’202 Application

Anderson argues that the Board erred in affirming 

the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–20 of the ’202 application as obvious over Macneille in view of Hutchinson. 

Anderson challenges the Board’s construction of the “for 

use” claim language in independent claims 1, 10, and 19 

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8 IN RE: ANDERSON

as a non-limiting statement of intended use.3 Appellant’s 

Br. 8–12, 15. Anderson also contends that the Board 

failed to show how one of ordinary skill would have combined Macneille and Hutchinson, that combining those 

references would defeat the purpose of Macneille, that 

Hutchinson does not teach or suggest displaying the 

detected vehicular speed for use by a motorist in selecting

a route of travel, and that Hutchinson’s speed detector 

does not work across multiple lanes. Id. at 9, 15, 17; 

Appellant’s Reply Br. 5, 15.

Additionally, Anderson makes numerous assertions, 

most of which are conclusory, that the cited prior art does 

not teach or suggest various claim limitations, including: 

(1) “photodetectors . . . operatively associated with a light 

source that emits light in the solar blind region” and 

“light from outside of the solar blind region does not 

activate the . . . photodetectors” in claims 2, 16, and 20; 

(2) “photodetectors . . . operatively associated with a light 

source that emits a modulated light” and “light from the 

environment does not activate [the] photodetectors” in

claim 6; (3) “the display is located . . . at a location before 

the . . . photodetectors” in claim 2; (4) “determine an 

average speed” in claim 7; (5) “sets of at least two photodetectors . . . spaced apart at predetermined intervals” so 

that a motorist may select a route of travel in claim 3; 

(6) “sets of at least two photodetectors . . . spaced apart at 

3 Claim 10 recites “the speed being displayed on the 

at least one display for use by motorists in determining

whether or not to select passage along the roadway containing the at least one point as a way to navigate through 

the region.” App. 97 (emphasis added). Claim 19 recites 

“at least one solar powered transmitter for transmitting 

the data relating to the speed of a vehicle at a predetermined point on a roadway for use by motorists in determining a route of travel.” Id. at 99 (emphasis added).

 

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intervals exceeding five hundred feet” so that a motorist 

may select a route of travel in claim 12; and 

(7) “transmitter receivers spaced at intervals along a 

roadway for detecting the speed of a vehicle[] passing in 

the vicinity” in claim 11. Appellant’s Br. 12–18; see also

App. 94–99 (claims of the ’202 application). With respect 

to claim 3, Anderson also argues that the Board erred in 

construing “so that motorists may exit the limited access 

highway based upon the information relayed” as a statement of intended use. Appellant’s Br. 16. Lastly, with 

respect to claims 4 and 13, Anderson disputes the Examiner’s finding that traffic congestion, as disclosed in 

Macneille, corresponds to average traffic speed; Anderson 

contends that Macneille fails to disclose the claim limitations of “determine average traffic speed” and “the GPS 

receiver determines the suggested route for navigation 

based upon the average traffic speeds at recorded points 

on a roadway.” Id. at 18–20.

We conclude that the Board did not err in affirming 

the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–20 as obvious over 

Macneille in view of Hutchinson. In the Examiner’s 

answer, she provided a detailed analysis as to each of the

rejected claims, as well as the prior art teachings and her 

rationale on obviousness, and the Board adopted those

findings and rationale as its own and also provided further analysis. ’202 Decision, 2015 WL 5469585, at *2–6. 

On a careful review of the record, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the Board’s findings that (1) 

Macneille teaches most of the limitations of claims 1–20

and discloses a traffic system for detecting and displaying 

traffic flow to provide optimal travel routes to motorists; 

(2) Hutchinson teaches those limitations that are missing 

from Macneille, namely, stationary devices that detect the 

speed of passing vehicles by measuring the time it takes a 

vehicle to pass between two photodetectors, and then

displaying the speed at points along the roadway; and 

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10 IN RE: ANDERSON

vated to modify Macneille’s system in view of Hutchinson 

to detect the precise traffic speed in order to provide more 

efficient travel routes to motorists. 

We also agree with the Board that the “for use” claim 

language is a statement of intended use. The “for use” 

language does not add a structural limitation to the 

claimed system or method. Moreover, as the Examiner

found, Macneille teaches the claimed use, namely, to 

provide motorists with optimal travel routes. App. 106–

07. Accordingly, even assuming that the “for use” language were to be construed as limiting, the prior art 

indisputably teaches that limitation.

We are unpersuaded by Anderson’s argument that the 

Board erred in adopting the Examiner’s “intended use” 

construction because, according to Anderson, the Examiner raised the issue of intended use for the first time in her 

answer, which constituted a new ground of rejection. 

Anderson did not petition the Director to address that 

issue, see 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.181, 41.40, but instead chose to 

file a reply brief at the Board. Anderson had a full and 

fair opportunity to respond to the Examiner’s analysis on 

the merits. Stepan, 660 F.3d at 1343–44. We therefore 

discern no reversible err in the Board’s decision.4

Moreover, we are unpersuaded by Anderson’s arguments that the cited prior art does not teach or suggest 

4 As indicated infra in the companion case, we lack 

jurisdiction to review the decision of the Director on an 

applicant’s petition under 37 C.F.R. § 1.181 to designate a 

new ground of rejection. Here, however, Anderson alleges 

that the Board erred in raising a new ground of rejection 

by agreeing with the Examiner on the “intended use”

construction. We have jurisdiction to review whether the 

Board raised a new ground of rejection in its decision. See

28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A); Stepan, 660 F.3d at 1343–44.

 

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IN RE: ANDERSON 11

various claim limitations, Appellant’s Br. 12–20. On a 

careful review of the record, we conclude that substantial 

evidence supports the Board’s findings that the prior art 

teaches or suggests the disputed limitations. Cf. Bayer, 

488 F.3d at 970.

We have considered Anderson’s remaining arguments 

but find them to be without merit. Accordingly, because 

substantial evidence supports the Board’s factual findings 

underlying its conclusion of obviousness, and because the 

Board did not otherwise err, we affirm its decision that 

claims 1–20 of the ’202 application are unpatentable as 

obvious over Macneille in view of Hutchinson.

II. The ’505 Application

Anderson argues that the Board erred in affirming 

the Examiner’s rejection of claims 2–18 and 20 of the ’505 

application as obvious over Macneille in view of Nadeem. 

Anderson contends that one of ordinary skill would not 

have combined Macneille and Nadeem. According to 

Anderson, Nadeem discloses determining the speed of its 

mobile traffic monitoring units, such as a fleet of cars, 

using a speedometer, and thus Nadeem does not teach or 

suggest determining the speed of passing vehicles as 

claimed. Appellant’s Br. 21–22. 

Moreover, as in the companion case, Anderson makes 

numerous assertions that Macneille and Nadeem do not 

teach or suggest various claim limitations, including: 

(1) “two first transmitter/receivers which detect the speed 

of a passing vehicle by measuring the time taken by the 

vehicle to pass between the two first transmitter/receivers, the vehicle being detected by the blockage of 

light beams transmitted by the two first transmitter/receivers” in claims 2 and 11; (2) “information . . . 

relayed to motorists navigating in the nearby region” in

claims 3 and 12; (3) “at an exit preceding the point” in

claim 3; (4) “determining traffic speed at . . . one point 

along a roadway using . . . one first transmitter receiver 

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fixedly positioned along a roadway” and “transmitting the 

traffic speed . . . for use by motorists in determining 

whether or not to select passage along the roadway containing the . . . one point as a way to navigate through the 

region” in claim 10; (5) “displaying traffic speeds” in 

claim 15; (6) “average speed” or “average traffic speed” in

claims 16–18; and (7) “photodetectors . . . which determines the speed of the vehicle by determining the time 

the vehicle takes to travel the predetermined distance” in

claim 20. Id. at 20–23, 25–29; see also App. 258–61 

(claims of the ’505 application). And with respect to 

claims 4 and 13, Anderson disputes the Examiner’s finding that traffic congestion corresponds to average traffic 

speed; he contends that Macneille does not disclose the 

claim limitations of “determine average traffic speed” and 

“the GPS receiver determines the suggested route for 

navigation based upon the average traffic speeds at 

recorded points on a roadway.” Appellant’s Br. 24–25. 

We conclude that the Board did not err in affirming 

the Examiner’s rejection of claims 2–18 and 20 as obvious 

over Macneille in view of Nadeem. As the Board found, 

Nadeem teaches a traffic monitoring system that detects 

vehicle speed. ’505 Decision, 2015 WL 4607919, at *2. As 

with the combination of Macneille and Hutchinson in the 

companion case, we conclude that substantial evidence 

supports the Board’s finding that one of ordinary skill in 

the art would have modified Macneille’s traffic system in 

view of Nadeem’s teaching of detecting vehicle speed in 

order to provide more efficient travel routes to motorists. 

While it is true that Nadeem does describe a mobile traffic 

monitoring system, the Board and the Examiner did not 

err in also finding that Macneille teaches a stationary 

detector/transmitter of traffic flow information, and that 

Nadeem teaches the detection of vehicle speed using a 

stationary infrared TrafficEye. Those findings are supported by substantial evidence. 

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Moreover, as in the companion case, we are unpersuaded by Anderson’s arguments that the cited prior art 

does not teach or suggest various claim limitations. 

Appellant’s Br. 23–29. On a careful review of the record, 

we conclude that substantial evidence supports the 

Board’s findings that the prior art teaches or suggests 

those disputed limitations, and thus that Anderson fails 

to demonstrate reversible error.

Lastly, although Anderson does not challenge the anticipation rejection of claims 1 and 19 on the merits, he

argues that the PTO erred in not reopening prosecution 

after the Examiner changed the statutory basis of the 

rejection of those claims, which, according to Anderson, 

constitutes a new ground of rejection. Id. at 30–31. 

Anderson asks us to reverse the Director’s September 

2013 decision denying his request to suspend the rules 

and to designate a new ground of rejection. Id. at 31.

We conclude, however, that we lack jurisdiction to review the decision of the Director on a Rule 181 petition 

such as in this case. In re Makari, 708 F.2d 709, 711 

(Fed. Cir. 1983) (“Our jurisdiction in relation to the Patent and Trademark Office is limited to review of decisions of boards established in that Office. We do not have 

jurisdiction to review decisions of the Commissioner on 

petitions.”); see also In re Conte, 36 F. App’x 446, 449–50 

(Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A) and 

holding that we lack jurisdiction to consider an appeal 

from the Director’s decision denying a Rule 181 petition); 

In re Hornback, 20 F. App’x 846, 846 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 

(stating that “[a]ny review of an adverse ruling of the 

Director would first lie, if anywhere, in a district court” 

under the Administrative Procedure Act). We therefore 

cannot consider Anderson’s challenge of the Director’s 

decision on his Rule 181 petition for lack of jurisdiction.

We have considered Anderson’s remaining arguments 

but find them to be without merit. Accordingly, because 

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substantial evidence supports the Board’s factual findings 

underlying its conclusion of obviousness of claims 2–18 

and 20 over Macneille in view of Nadeem, and because the 

Board did not otherwise err, we affirm its decision that 

claims 2–18 and 20 of the ’505 application are unpatentable over the cited prior art. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Board’s conclusion that claims 1–20 of the ’202 application and 

claims 2–18 and 20 of the ’505 application are unpatentable as obvious over the cited prior art.

AFFIRMED

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