Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-07-70640/USCOURTS-ca9-07-70640-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ernesto Esquivel-Garcia
Petitioner
Eric H. Holder Jr.
Respondent

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ERNESTO ESQUIVEL-GARCIA, 

Petitioner, No. 07-70640

v. Agency No.  A029-283-455 ERIC H. HOLDER JR., Attorney

General, OPINION

Respondent. 

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted

December 9, 2009—Pasadena, California

Filed January 28, 2010

Before: David R. Thompson and Barry G. Silverman,

Circuit Judges, and Susan R. Bolton,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Thompson

*The Honorable Susan R. Bolton, United States District Judge for the

District of Arizona, sitting by designation. 

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COUNSEL

Sylvia Rivera, Los Angeles, California, for the petitioner.

David Schor, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for

the respondent.

OPINION

THOMPSON: Senior Circuit Judge:

The petitioner seeks review of the Board of Immigration

Appeals’ (“BIA”) denial of his requests for cancellation of

removal, adjustment of status and voluntary departure. We

grant the petition for review of the denial of the request for

cancellation of removal, and remand that request to the BIA

for further consideration. We deny the petition for review of

the denial of the requests for adjustment of status and for voluntary departure. In addition, we deny the petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, as the petitioner can raise this

issue in a motion to reopen.

BACKGROUND

The petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, was removable for having entered the United States without inspection

on or about October 1, 1992. He conceded removability and

applied for adjustment of status, cancellation of removal, and,

in the alternative, voluntary departure.

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At a 2004 hearing, an immigration judge (“IJ”) questioned

the petitioner about a 1989 conviction. The record before the

IJ indicated the petitioner had been convicted of possession of

a controlled substance under California Health & Safety Code

§ 11350, but did not identify the substance. Under oath before

the IJ, the petitioner testified:

IJ: . . . [W]hat were you convicted of?

. . .

Petitioner: Possession of drugs.

IJ: Possession of drugs. What kind of

drugs?

Petitioner: In the house, the house where I

was (indiscernible).

IJ: What kind of drugs?

Petitioner: I think it was heroin.

Thereafter, the IJ pretermitted petitioner’s applications for

cancellation of removal and adjustment of status. According

to the IJ, the petitioner was statutorily ineligible for these

forms of relief because the record and testimony established

that the petitioner had been “convicted of violating a state law

relating to a controlled substance,” a disqualifying offense

under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) of the Immigration and

Nationality Act (“INA”). The petitioner was discretionarily

denied voluntary departure. The BIA affirmed in a threeparagraph order.

The petitioner timely filed, pro se, a petition for review by

this court. We granted a stay of removal and appointed pro

bono counsel, who filed a replacement opening brief.

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DISCUSSION

I. Cancellation of Removal

The petitioner can only be eligible for cancellation of

removal if he “has not been convicted of an offense under

[§ 1182(a)(2)].” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C). Section

1182(a)(2) includes, as a disqualifying offense, a violation of

“any [State] law . . . relating to a controlled substance (as

defined [by the federal Controlled Substances Act]). 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). Here, the IJ and BIA determined that

the petitioner’s 1989 conviction under California Health &

Safety Code § 11350 constituted a disqualifying controlled

substance conviction. The petitioner concedes he suffered a

controlled substance conviction, but he challenges the disqualifying nature of that offense. 

We review de novo the question whether a conviction

involves a controlled substance offense affecting removability. Cazarez-Gutierrez v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 905, 909 (9th

Cir. 2004). 

[1] To determine if the petitioner’s California Health &

Safety Code § 11350 conviction constitutes a controlled substance offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), we apply

the two-step analysis of Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575,

110 (1990). The Taylor analysis requires us to determine

whether the state statute of conviction is “categorically” a disqualifying controlled substance offense under the INA. Suazo

Perez v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 2008). To

make this determination, we ask whether the “full range of

conduct” criminalized by the state statute falls within the disqualifying offense. Id.

[2] The petitioner asserts that California Health & Safety

Code § 11350 proscribes more substances than the disqualifying offense. Respondent does not disagree. Thus, we presume

the statute is categorically overbroad and we proceed to the

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second step of Taylor—the modified categorical approach.

See Suazo Perez v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d at 1226. 

[3] Under the modified categorical approach, we look

beyond the statute of conviction to consider “a narrow, specified set of documents that are part of the record of conviction”

to determine whether petitioner was convicted of the disqualifying offense. Tokatly v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 613, 620 (9th Cir.

2004). In conducting this analysis, we are “generally limited

to examining the statutory definition, charging document,

written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any

explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented.” Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16

(2005). 

Here, both parties submitted a “Criminal History Transcript” describing petitioner’s 1989 conviction as: “11350

HS-POSSESS NARCOTIC CONTROL SUBSTANCE; -

CONVICTED -PROB/JAIL; FELONY; SEN: 036 MONTHS

PROBATION, 131 DAYS JAIL.” Even if this document is

judicially noticeable under Shepard v. United States, the document fails to identify the controlled substance involved in

the petitioner’s conviction. Thus, the record is inconclusive as

to whether the petitioner’s conviction involved a relevant controlled substance. 

[4] Under our intervening decision in Sandoval-Lua v.

Gonzales, 499 F.3d 1121, 1129-30 (9th Cir. 2007), an alien

who seeks to prove eligibility for cancellation of removal can

meet his or her initial burden by pointing to an inconclusive

record of conviction. The petitioner did that in this case. The

record of conviction is inconclusive because it does not disclose the nature of the controlled substance, and the petitioner’s testimony that he thought the substance was heroin does

not alter the record of conviction. Under our decision in

Sandoval-Lua, the result of this is that the government has the

burden of going forward to prove that the controlled substance the petitioner possessed was heroin or some other conESQUIVEL-GARCIA v. HOLDER 1745

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trolled substance under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). The

government did not do this, because neither it, the IJ nor the

BIA had the benefit of our decision in Sandoval-Lua, which

we now have.

[5] We thus remand to the BIA for further proceedings consistent with Sandoval-Lua to permit the government to put

forth reliable evidence to show that the petitioner was convicted of a disqualifying controlled substance offense. See

Cheuk Fung S-Yong v. Holder, 578 F.3d 1169, 1174, 1176

(9th Cir. 2009) (“The government bears the burden of proving

by ‘clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the facts

alleged as grounds for [removability] are true.’ ” (quoting

Gameros-Hernandez v. INS, 883 F.2d 839, 841 (9th Cir.

1989))).

II. Adjustment of Status

An alien who is “physically present in the United States,”

but who “entered the United States without inspection,” may

be eligible to apply to the Attorney General for an adjustment

of status. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i)(1).1 If this relief is granted, the

alien need not leave the country, but rather his or her status

is adjusted to that of a lawful permanent resident. LandinMolina, 580 F.3d at 915.

[6] Adjustment of status is a discretionary form of relief.

See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i)(2) (“[T]he Attorney General may

adjust the status of [an otherwise eligible] alien.” (emphasis

added)). However, an alien can only be eligible for adjustment of status if the alien is “admissible to the United States

1We note that “[8 U.S.C. § 1255(i)] expired on April 30, 2001, and, at

present, its benefits are available only to those aliens who qualify as having been ‘grandfathered’ into the provision.” Landin-Molina v. Holder,

580 F.3d 913, 915 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 245.10(b)). The petitioner is grandfathered in because he is the beneficiary of an I-130 petition

filed before April 30, 2001. 

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for permanent residence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i)(2)(A) (emphasis

added); but see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (authorizing the Attorney

General to waive certain bases of inadmissibility).

[7] The INA renders inadmissible any alien (1) “convicted

of,” or (2) “who admits having committed,” or (3) “who

admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of” a violation of state law relating to a controlled substance offense under the federal Controlled Substances Act. 8

U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (emphasis added). Compare

Romero v. Holder, 568 F.3d 1054, 1057 (9th Cir. 2009)

(requiring a controlled substance conviction to establish ineligibility for cancellation of removal, although related admissions were relevant to moral character). 

Thus, under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), admissions

made by an alien to the IJ, enforcement officials, and third

parties, apart from any conviction, may be considered to

determine an alien’s admissibility when considering the question of adjustment of status. See, e.g., Pazcoguin v. Radcliffe,

292 F.3d 1209, 1218 (9th Cir. 2002) (considering alien’s

admissions to a doctor and immigration officers). 

In this case, the petitioner established prima facie eligibility

for an adjustment of status because he is the beneficiary of an

I-130 petition that was filed on or before April 30, 2001. See

8 U.S.C. § 1255(i)(1)(B)(i); Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 871,

879 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The approved I-130 provides prima

facie evidence that the alien is eligible for adjustment as an

immediate relative of a United States citizen.”). That caused

the burden of production to be shifted to the government. See

Pazcoguin v. Radcliffe, 292 F.3d at 1213. The government

relies on proof of the petitioner’s 1989 guilty plea, his conviction, and his statement to the IJ as to the nature of the substance he pleaded guilty to possessing.

[8] It is undisputed that the petitioner pleaded guilty to possession of a narcotic controlled substance under California

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law. The petitioner also told the IJ “I think [the possessed substance] was heroin.” The IJ found that this statement established that the controlled substance which the petitioner

pleaded guilty to possessing was in fact heroin. The petitioner

left this factual determination unchallenged. There was thus

sufficient evidence to support the IJ’s finding that the petitioner had possessed a disqualifying controlled substance, and

that precluded adjustment of status. We, therefore, deny the

petition for review of the denial of such relief. 

III. Voluntary Departure and Ineffective Assistance of

Counsel

[9] We also deny the petition for review of the denial of the

request for voluntary departure. We lack jurisdiction to

review this discretionary determination. 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(f);

Galeana-Mendoza v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 1054, 1056 n.5 (9th

Cir. 2006). We also deny the petition as to any ineffective

assistance of counsel claim, as the petitioner does not dispute

that he can raise this issue before the agency in a motion to

reopen. See Liu v. Waters, 55 F.3d 421, 426 (9th Cir. 1995).

CONCLUSION

We GRANT the petition for review as to the denial of petitioner’s request for cancellation of removal and REMAND

that question to the BIA for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion. We DENY the petition for review as to the

denial of the requests for adjustment of status and for voluntary departure. We also DENY, for lack of jurisdiction, the

petition to review at this time the ineffective assistance of

counsel claim.

GRANTED in part and REMANDED for further proceedings; DENIED in part. 

The parties shall bear their own costs for this petition for

review.

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