Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00320/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00320-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Terrence Brownlee
Petitioner
M. Kramer
Respondent

Document Text:

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TERRENCE BROWNLEE, )

)

)

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Petitioner, )

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vs. )

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M. KRAMER, )

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Respondent. )

)

)

No. CV-F-06-320 OWW/SMS HC

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER'S

MOTION TO SET ASIDE RULING

PURSUANT TO RULE 60(b),

FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL

PROCEDURE (Doc. 30)

By Order filed on May 25, 2006, Petitioner's petition for

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 was dismissed

for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the petition is a

second or successive petition.

On January 10, 2006, Petitioner filed a motion to set aside

this ruling pursuant to Rule 60(b)(3), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, asserting that the state court fraudulently increased

Petitioner's sentence from 15 years in prison to 15 years to

life.

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The threshold issue is whether this Court has jurisdiction

to hear the claim asserted in Petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion. 

In Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005), the Supreme

Court discussed the interaction between Rule 60(b), Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure, and the AEDPA. After noting that the AEDPA

and its decisions make clear that a “claim” “is an asserted

federal basis for relief from a ... judgment of conviction”, id.

at 530, the Supreme Court stated:

In some instances, a Rule 60(b) motion will

contain one or more ‘claims.’ For example,

it might straightforwardly assert that owing

to ‘excusable neglect.’ Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.

60(b)(1), the movant’s habeas petition had

omitted a claim of constitutional error, and

seek leave to present that claim ...

Similarly, a motion might seek leave to

present ‘newly discovered evidence,’ Fed.

Rule Civ. Proc. 60(b)(2), in support of a

claim previously denied ... Or a motion might

contend that a subsequent change in

substantive law is a ‘reason justifying

relief,’ Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 60(b)(6), from

the previous denial of a claim ... Virtually

every Court of Appeals to consider the

question has held that such a pleading,

although labeled a Rule 60(b) motion, is in

substance a successive habeas petition and

should be treated accordingly ....

We think those holdings are correct. A

habeas petitioner’s filing that seeks

vindication of such a claim is, if not in

substance a ‘habeas corpus application,’ at

least similar enough that failing to subject

it to the same requirements would be

‘inconsistent with’ the statute. 28 U.S.C. §

2254 Rule 11. Using Rule 60(b) to present

new claims for relief from a state court’s

judgment of conviction - even claims couched

in the language of a true Rule 60(b) motion -

circumvents AEDPA’s requirement that a new

claim be dismissed unless it relies on either

a new rule of constitutional law or newly

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discovered facts. § 2244(b)(2). The same is

true of a Rule 60(b)(2) motion presenting new

evidence in support of a claim already

litigated: even assuming that reliance on a

new factual predicate causes that motion to

escape § 2244(b)(1)’s prohibition of claims

‘presented in a prior application,’ §

2244(b)(2)(B) requires a more convincing

factual showing than does Rule 60(b). 

Likewise, a Rule 60(b) motion based on a

purported change in the substantive law

governing the claim could be used to

circumvent § 2244(b)(2)(A)’s dictate that the

only new law on which a successive petition

may rely is ‘a new rule of constitutional

law, made retroactive to cases on collateral

review by the Supreme Court, that was

previously unavailable.’ In addition to the

substantive conflict with AEDPA standards, in

each of these three examples use of Rule

60(b) would impermissibly circumvent the

requirement that a successive habeas petition

be precertified by the court of appeals as

falling within an exception to the

successive-petition bar. § 2244(b)(3).

In most cases, determining whether a Rule

60(b) motion advances one or more ‘claims’

will be relatively simple. A motion that

seeks to add a new ground for relief ... will

of course qualify. A motion can also be said

to bring a ‘claim’ if it attacks the federal

court’s previous resolution of a claim on the

merits, since alleging that the court erred

by denying habeas relief on the merits is

effectively indistinguishable from alleging

that the movant is, under the substantive

provisions of the statutes, entitled to

habeas relief.

Id. at 531-532. However, the Supreme Court ruled:

That is not the case ... when a Rule 60(b)

motion attacks, not the substance of the

federal court’s resolution of a claim on the

merits, but some defect in the integrity of

the federal habeas proceedings.

Id. at 532. The Supreme Court noted:

Fraud on the federal habeas court is one

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example of such a defect. See generally

Rodriguez v. Mitchell, 252 F.3d 191, 199 (CA2

2001)(a witness’s allegedly fraudulent basis

for refusing to appear at a federal habeas

hearing ‘relate[d] to the integrity of the

federal habeas proceeding, not to the

integrity of the state criminal trial’). We

note than an attack based on the movant’s own

conduct, or his habeas counsel’s omissions,

see, e.g., supra, at 530-531, ordinarily does

not go to the integrity of the proceedings,

but in effect asks for a second chance to

have the merits determined favorably.

Here, Petitioner’s claim of fraud pursuant to Rule 60(b)(3)

is not based on any defect in the prior habeas corpus

proceedings. Rather, the claim is based on alleged fraud in the

underlying state criminal proceeding, a claim which Petitioner

could have raised in the prior habeas corpus proceedings. 

Therefore, the exception for fraud noted by the Supreme Court

does not apply. 

Petitioner’s motion to vacate must be construed as a second

or successive motions pursuant to Section 2254 governed by 28

U.S.C. § 2244. Thompson v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 918, 921 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 965 (1998). Consequently, this

court lacks jurisdiction to consider the merits of these motions

absent authorization from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 

United States v. Allen, 157 F.3d 661, 664 (9 Cir. 1998). th

ACCORDINGLY, as set forth above,

Petitioner’s Motion to Set Aside Ruling Pursuant to Rule

60(b)(3), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is DENIED for lack of

jurisdiction.

///IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: February 12, 2007 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

emm0d6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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