Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03736/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03736-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
M, A, Yah
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-3736

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

v. * District of Nebraska. 

*

M, A, Yah, also known as *

Allen Cotton, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: June 15, 2007

 Filed: September 11, 2007

___________

Before MELLOY, SMITH, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges. 

___________

MELLOY, Circuit Judge.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, M, A, Yah pled guilty to one count of conspiracy

to commit bank fraud, a violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1344, and one count of

aggravated identity theft, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A. The district court

sentenced Yah to a total of 54 months of imprisonment. Yah appeals his sentence,

alleging (1) the district court erred in imposing a four-level leadership enhancement

pursuant to United States Sentencing Guidelines § 3B1.1(a), (2) the government

breached the plea agreement by not recommending the low end of the applicable

Guidelines range, and (3) his sentence is unreasonable. We affirm in part, reverse in

part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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I. Background

Yah was indicted in six counts of an eleven-count indictment for various

offenses related to bank fraud and use of false identification. All of the charges

stemmed from a scheme through which the co-conspirators would open bank accounts

using false identification based upon false birth certificates Yah created. Checks

would be written on those accounts for amounts exceeding the funds held in the

account. The co-conspirators would then cash the checks, again using false

identification based upon false birth certificates Yah made. 

Yah entered into a plea agreement with the government, agreeing to plead guilty

to conspiracy to commit bank fraud (Count I) and aggravated identity theft (Count

VIII), in return for the government’s dismissal of the remaining charges against him.

The plea agreement also included stipulations regarding the application of the United

States Sentencing Guidelines and the government’s position as to Yah’s sentence.

First, as to the government’s sentencing recommendation, the plea agreement stated:

Provided that you demonstrate acceptance of responsibility to the

Probation Office and to the Court, the undersigned Assistant United

States Attorney stipulates that you notified authorities in a timely manner

of your intention to enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting the

government to avoid preparing for trial and permitting the Court to

allocate its resources efficiently. The undersigned Assistant United

States Attorney for the District of Nebraska further agrees to recommend

a sentence at the low end of the applicable sentencing guideline. The

United States Attorney for the District Of Nebraska also agrees that the

defendant will not be prosecuted for any additional criminal conduct in

the District Of Nebraska emanating from the federal investigation [of]

the defendant for Bank Fraud and Identity Theft. 

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(Emphasis added). Second, the government agreed to $7,876.75 as the amount of loss

for relevant conduct and restitution purposes. Third, the parties agreed that loss

amount was the only specific offense characteristic adjustment under § 2B1.1 that

applied to Yah’s conduct. Fourth, the parties agreed to litigate “the applicability of

any enhancement for role in the offense.” Finally, the parties agreed to a total offense

level of 8, before application of either a reduction for acceptance of responsibility or

an increase due to role in the offense. The district court accepted Yah’s pleas of guilty

to Counts I and VIII and deferred acceptance of the plea agreement pending review

of a Presentence Investigation Report (PSR).

The PSR presented a summary of the defendant’s relevant conduct and a

proposed sentencing calculation under the Guidelines. The PSR’s recommendations

differed from those contemplated in the plea agreement. First, the PSR recommended

that Yah be held responsible for $24,992.12 in loss, far greater than the plea

agreement loss amount of $7,876.75. Second, the PSR applied specific offense

characteristic adjustments from § 2B1.1 other than amount of loss. Third, the PSR did

not recommend Yah receive a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Also, the

PSR resolved the dispute over the application of a role enhancement in favor of the

government, recommending a four-level increase pursuant to § 3B1.1(a). The

defendant timely objected to the PSR.

After reviewing the PSR and considering the defendant’s objections, the district

court entered tentative findings on a number of contested issues. The court concluded

“the plea agreement should be upheld” as to the loss amount, the application of

additional § 2B1.1 specific offense characteristic adjustments, and acceptance of

responsibility. The court reserved ruling on the question of a role enhancement.

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A. Role Enhancement

At the sentencing hearing the court considered whether Yah qualified for an

increase in offense level based upon his role in the offense. The government

presented testimony from Yah’s co-conspirators and co-defendants, Robert McFarland

and Clinton Brooks, regarding the nature of the conspiracy to commit bank fraud and

Yah’s role within the conspiracy. McFarland testified that the members of the

conspiracy used false identifications Yah provided to cash checks written on fake

bank accounts. After the co-conspirators cashed checks, they were required to turn

over a portion of the proceeds to Yah. McFarland stated he watched Yah and other

conspiracy members fraudulently cash checks before he did. McFarland identified

Annette Clark and Mark Rex as other members of the conspiracy to commit bank

fraud. 

Brooks testified that Yah brought him into the conspiracy and that Yah taught

him how to “scam.” Brooks provided Yah with his children’s social security cards

and Yah created false birth certificates using the children’s information. Brooks

testified that Yah supplied the checks that Yah, McFarland, Annette Clark, and he

cashed. The checks were in the name “Dairyonius Stewart,” which is a false name

that Yah has used. Brooks further testified that Yah instructed the conspiracy

members on how to utilize false checks most efficiently. Brooks also identified

Nathan Johns, Courtney Baker, and Tammy Bonnema as members of the conspiracy.

The district court found McFarland and Brooks credible and relied upon their

testimony in determining that Yah was an organizer or leader of criminal activity

involving eight participants. Thus, the district court applied a four-level increase to

Yah’s offense level. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a).

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B. Government Recommendation 

After pleading guilty, but before sentencing, Yah was charged with a number

of state criminal offenses. The government argued at sentencing that Yah breached

the plea agreement by engaging in criminal conduct while on release pending

sentencing. Therefore, the government argued Yah should not be granted an

acceptance of responsibility reduction. The government further argued it was not

bound to make a recommendation at the low end of the applicable Guidelines range

because Yah failed to accept responsibility for his criminal conduct.

 

The district court declined “to have a miniature trial on what may be a fairly

complex case against the defendant” on the new state charges and decided to grant a

two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility despite the allegations. The court

responded to the government’s argument:

[I]f the government contends that the defendant has in some way

breached the plea agreement by engaging in additional criminal conduct

while on pretrial release, and the government does not consider itself

bound to recommend the low end, that’s fine. 

As far as I’m concerned, you can recommend what you want to

recommend because it’s just a recommendation anyway. And I

recognize that the guidelines are advisory, and I recognize that I can

sentence anywhere in the statutory range. 

The government presented argument to the court in support of a sentence at the

high end of the Guidelines range, stating, in part:

I do not feel constrained by the plea agreement to recommend a

low end of the sentencing guideline range, your Honor, in part because

paragraph 2 starts out saying, “Provided that you demonstrate acceptance

of responsibility.” And then it goes on further, and then it says, “The

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undersigned United States Attorney agrees to further recommend a

sentence at the low end of the applicable guideline range.”

I realize that the Court has given this particular defendant the

benefit of some acceptance of responsibility. But I view my obligation

to make a recommendation for the low end consistent with the plea

agreement conditioned upon his acceptance of responsibility. And I

think I’ve made a record of the fact that I don’t think that’s happened.

So I am not asking the Court to sentence him at the low end of the

guideline range.

The defendant objected to the government’s statements, arguing that the government

breached the plea agreement. The court did not specifically rule on the objection, but

responded:

And for the record, regardless of what the government would have

recommended in this case, it would not have affected what I am going to

do in this case as far as the sentencing is concerned.

Yah’s criminal history placed him in category VI, and, based on the

determinations discussed above, Yah’s total offense level was 10, resulting in an

advisory Guidelines range of 24–30 months for Count I. Count VIII carried a

statutory mandatory minimum of not less than two years of imprisonment, to be

served consecutively to any other term of incarceration. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028A. The

court sentenced Yah to 30 months in prison on Count I and 24 months in prison on

Count VIII, to be served consecutively. 

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II. Discussion

A. Role in the Offense

Yah argues the district court erred in concluding he was a leader or organizer

of criminal activity involving five or more people. Thus, Yah contends the court erred

in imposing a four-level enhancement pursuant to § 3B1.1(a). “We review for clear

error the district court’s factual findings underlying the imposition of a sentencing

enhancement based on the defendant’s role in the offense,” United States v. Rosas,

486 F.3d 374, 376 (8th Cir. 2007), and examine de novo the application of the

Guidelines. United States v. Mickle, 464 F.3d 804, 807 (8th Cir. 2006). 

Under § 3B1.1, an upward adjustment of four levels applies if “the defendant

was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more

participants.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). We interpret the terms “organizer” and “leader”

broadly. See United States v. Manuel, 912 F.2d 204, 207 (8th Cir. 1990) (“We have

recognized a broad definition of what constitutes a leadership and organizational

role.”) (internal quotation omitted). The factors considered in determining whether

a defendant is a leader or organizer include:

the exercise of decision making authority, the nature of participation in

the commission of the offense, the recruitment of accomplices, the

claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the crime, the degree of

participation in planning or organizing the offense, the nature and scope

of the illegal activity, and the degree of control and authority exercised

over others. 

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, cmt. n.4.

Considering these factors, the district court did not clearly err in finding Yah

was a leader or organizer of a scheme involving five or more people. First, the

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evidence supports the district court’s conclusion that the criminal activity involved

eight people. McFarland and Brooks specifically identified five people, in addition

to themselves and the defendant, who were involved in the conspiracy. Second, the

testimony of McFarland and Brooks also supports the district court’s conclusion that

Yah was a leader or organizer of the scheme. Yah created and distributed the

identification documents and the checks necessary to accomplish the fraud. He

instructed and advised the others on how to use the fraudulent checks most efficiently.

And, Yah received a portion of the proceeds from the other participants when they

successfully cashed the fraudulent checks. This testimony, which the district court

specifically found to be credible, provides sufficient grounds to conclude Yah was a

leader or organizer. Thus, the four-level enhancement under § 3B1.1(a) was properly

applied. 

B. Government Recommendation

Yah alleges the government breached the plea agreement by failing to

recommend a sentence at the low end of the applicable Guidelines range. The

government contends its obligation to recommend the low end of the Guidelines range

was conditioned upon Yah demonstrating acceptance of responsibility and Yah failed

to fulfill that condition by engaging in criminal conduct after his plea. 

“Issues concerning the interpretation and enforcement of a plea agreement are

reviewed de novo.” United States v. Borer, 412 F.3d 987, 994 (8th Cir. 2005). We

apply general contract principles in interpreting plea agreements. United States v.

Gomez, 271 F.3d 779, 781 (8th Cir. 2001). 

In considering whether the government’s recommendation agreement was

conditional, we turn to the text of the plea agreement. The portion of the plea

agreement addressing the government’s recommendation reads:

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Provided that you demonstrate acceptance of responsibility to the

Probation Office and to the Court, the undersigned Assistant United

States Attorney stipulates that you notified authorities in a timely manner

of your intention to enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting the

government to avoid preparing for trial and permitting the Court to

allocate its resources efficiently. The undersigned Assistant United

States Attorney for the District of Nebraska further agrees to recommend

a sentence at the low end of the applicable sentencing guideline. The

United States Attorney for the District Of Nebraska also agrees that the

defendant will not be prosecuted for any additional criminal conduct in

the District Of Nebraska emanating from the federal investigation [of]

the defendant for Bank Fraud and Identity Theft. 

The use of the term “[p]rovided” makes it is clear that the government conditionally

agreed that Yah met the standards outlined in § 3E1.1(b). See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b)

(outlining the information the government must provide to the court in a motion for

an additional one-level reduction if the defendant has an offense level 16 or greater).

The condition precedent, however, cannot be read to apply to the government’s

“further” agreement to make a specific sentencing recommendation. The relevant

paragraph contains three independent promises of the government in return for Yah’s

guilty plea: 

1) Provided that you demonstrate acceptance of responsibility to the

Probation Office and to the Court, the undersigned Assistant United

States Attorney stipulates that you notified authorities in a timely manner

of your intention to enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting the

government to avoid preparing for trial and permitting the Court to

allocate its resources efficiently. 

2) The undersigned Assistant United States Attorney for the District of

Nebraska further agrees to recommend a sentence at the low end of the

applicable sentencing guideline. 

3) The United States Attorney for the District Of Nebraska also agrees

that the defendant will not be prosecuted for any additional criminal

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conduct in the District Of Nebraska emanating from the federal

investigation [of] the defendant for Bank Fraud and Identity Theft. 

(Emphasis added). The use of the words “further” in the second sentence and “also”

in the third demonstrates the independence of the three separate promises. 

Our court’s decision in United States v. Jensen, 423 F.3d 851, 853–54 (8th Cir.

2005), presents a similar scenario. There, the court found the government breached

the plea agreement by failing to move for the third-level reduction after the court

determined the defendant accepted responsibility for his crimes. The government

argued that a caveat earlier in the plea agreement applied and gave the government the

right not to recommend the third level of acceptance of responsibility. The court

“note[d] that the government could no doubt have drafted the agreement in such a way

as to make express its argued-for meaning,” but concluded the plea agreement could

not be so construed. Id. at 854. 

The government’s interpretation of its obligation to recommend a low-end

sentence strains the plain language of the plea agreement. Cf. Borer, 412 F.3d at

994–95 (finding no breach when the government failed to recommend the low end of

the guideline range, when the “plain language of the plea agreement” made the

obligation to do so contingent). Even if we were to accept the government’s alternate

interpretation as plausible, that would indicate the language of the plea agreement is

ambiguous. Because ambiguities in plea agreements are construed against the

government, our analysis would be unchanged. See United States v. Jensen, 423 F.3d

851, 854 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Where a plea agreement is ambiguous, the ambiguities are

construed against the government.”) 

Based upon the terms of the plea agreement, we conclude the government was

unconditionally obligated to recommend a sentence at the low end of the applicable

Guidelines range. Failure to do so constituted a breach of the plea agreement.

 

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Having concluded that the government breached the plea agreement, we turn

now to the appropriate remedy. The district court specifically stated that the

government’s recommendation was irrelevant to the determination of Yah’s sentence,

so any error would seem to be harmless. However, the Supreme Court’s opinion in

Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), and subsequent cases in this court

make clear harmless error review is unavailable. Like the instant case, in Santobello,

the sentencing court stated it was not influenced by the prosecution’s

recommendation, which was contrary to the plea agreement. The Supreme Court

stated: 

Nevertheless, we conclude that the interests of justice and appropriate

recognition of the duties of the prosecution in relation to promises made

in the negotiation of pleas of guilty will be best served by remanding the

case . . . .

Id. at 262. As this court has since held, “[t]he fact that the district court stated that the

government’s remark did not influence its decision does not ameliorate the

government’s breach.” United States v. McCray, 849 F.2d 304, 305 (8th Cir. 1988).

Under Santobello, the defendant is entitled to specific performance and resentencing

by a different judge or the opportunity to withdraw his plea. 404 U.S. at 263. As such,

we must remand. Like the Supreme Court in Santobello, “[w]e emphasize that this

is in no sense to question the fairness of the sentencing judge; the fault here rests on

the prosecutor, not on the sentencing judge.” Id.

In light of our decision to remand this case for re-sentencing, we decline to

address Yah’s claim that his sentence was unreasonable. 

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III. Conclusion

The sentence is vacated, and the case is remanded for resentencing before a

different judge in accordance with the procedures of the District of Nebraska. 

______________________________

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