Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cv-00114/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cv-00114-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kapresha Cooper
Defendant
Wasatch Pool Holdings, LLC
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WASATCH POOL HOLDINGS, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

KAPRESHA COOPER,

 Defendant.

Case No. 2:20-cv-00114-TLN-DB

SUA SPONTE REMAND ORDER

This matter is before the Court pursuant to Defendant Kapresha Cooper’s (“Defendant”)

Notice of Removal and Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1–2.) For the reasons 

set forth below, Defendant’s Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 2) is DENIED as 

moot, and the Court hereby REMANDS the action to the Superior Court of California, County of 

Sacramento, due to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 23, 2019, Plaintiff Wasatch Pool Holdings, LLC (“Plaintiff”) brought an 

action for unlawful detainer against Defendant for possession of the real property known as 4350 

Galbrath Drive, #163, Sacramento, California, 95842 (“the Property”). (ECF No. 1 at 10.) On 

January 15, 2020, Defendant filed a Notice of Removal removing this unlawful detainer action 

from the Sacramento County Superior Court. (ECF No. 1.) 

///

Case 2:20-cv-00114-TLN-DB Document 3 Filed 01/21/20 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

II. STANDARD OF LAW

28 U.S.C. § 1441 permits the removal to federal court of any civil action over which “the 

district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “Removal is 

proper only if the court could have exercised jurisdiction over the action had it originally been 

filed in federal court.” Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). 

Courts “strictly construe the removal statute against removal jurisdiction,” and “the 

defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 

F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). Furthermore, “[i]f the district court at any time 

determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the removed action, it must remedy the 

improvident grant of removal by remanding the action to state court.” California ex rel. Lockyer 

v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 838, as amended, 387 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied 544 

U.S. 974 (2005).

Federal question jurisdiction is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The 

“presence or absence of federal question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint 

rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on 

the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 386. Federal 

question jurisdiction therefore cannot be based on a defense, counterclaim, cross-claim, or thirdparty claim raising a federal question. See Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49 (2009); Hunter 

v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042–43 (9th Cir. 2009).

Alternatively, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 governs diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 

Section 1332 states that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions 

where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and 

costs, and is between — (1) citizens of different States.” Id. The burden of proving the amount 

in controversy depends on the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint. Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank 

Nat’l Ass’n, 479 F.3d 994, 998–1000 (9th Cir. 2007). When the complaint alleges damages less 

than the jurisdictional requirement, the party seeking removal must prove the amount in 

controversy with legal certainty. Id.; Rynearson v. Motricity, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1240 

(W.D. Wash. 2009).

Case 2:20-cv-00114-TLN-DB Document 3 Filed 01/21/20 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

III. ANALYSIS

Defendant removed this action on the basis of federal question and diversity jurisdiction. 

(ECF No. 1 at 18.) The Court will address both grounds for federal jurisdiction in turn. 

As to federal question jurisdiction, Defendant argues that the Complaint alleges violations 

of the First Amendment. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) However, it is clear that the Complaint itself contains

only a single claim for unlawful detainer. (ECF No. 1 at 10–12.) The instant Complaint therefore 

relies solely on California state law and does not state any claims under federal law. Based on the 

well-pleaded complaint rule as articulated above, removal cannot be based on a defense, 

counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim raising a federal question. Caterpillar Inc., 482 

U.S. at 392; see also Vaden, 556 U.S. at 49; Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d at 1042–43. 

Thus, while Defendant seems to contend in the notice of removal that Plaintiff has violated the 

First Amendment, this assertion relates only to an affirmative defense or potential counterclaim, 

which cannot be considered in evaluating whether a federal question appears on the face of 

Plaintiff’s Complaint. See Vaden, 556 U.S. at 60-62. 

As to diversity jurisdiction, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff is a limited liability 

corporation formed in another state. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) But even assuming there is complete 

diversity of citizenship, the Complaint makes clear that the amount in controversy does not 

exceed $75,000 because Plaintiff demands “less than $10,000.” (ECF No. 1 at 10.) Moreover, 

Defendant fails to prove, with legal certainty, that the amount in controversy is in fact higher than 

$75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332; see also Lowdermilk, 479 F.3d at 998–1000. 

In sum, because the Complaint indicates that the only cause of action is one for unlawful 

detainer, which arises solely under state law, this action does not arise under federal law. Further, 

Defendant’s alternate argument as to diversity jurisdiction also fails because the amount in 

controversy does not meet the statutory requirement. There being no apparent grounds for federal 

jurisdiction, it is appropriate to remand this case, sua sponte, for lack of federal subject matter 

jurisdiction. See United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 967 (9th 

Cir. 2004) (“the district court ha[s] a duty to establish subject matter jurisdiction over the 

removed action sua sponte, whether the parties raised the issue or not.”).

Case 2:20-cv-00114-TLN-DB Document 3 Filed 01/21/20 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 

2) is DENIED as moot, and the Court hereby REMANDS this action to the Superior Court of 

California, County of Sacramento.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 16, 2020

Case 2:20-cv-00114-TLN-DB Document 3 Filed 01/21/20 Page 4 of 4