Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01124/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01124-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Lisa Wilkins
Plaintiff

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 The Plaintiff and the Commissioner entitle their respective briefs as motions for summary judgment. (Docs.

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19, 23). Although briefs filed in Social Security cases in this district previously were deemed summary judgment

motions, for several years this Court has designated the documents as “opening briefs,” “responses” or “oppositions,” and

“reply briefs.” (See, e.g., Doc. 7, Scheduling Order, setting forth deadlines for filing the various briefs). These Findings

and Recommendations continue the trend of using the nomenclature set forth in the Scheduling Order.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LISA WILKINS, Case No. 1:07-cv-01124 OWW TAG

Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

ON APPEAL FROM A FINAL

vs. ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

 /

Plaintiff Lisa Wilkins (“Claimant”) seeks judicial review of an administrative decision

denying her claim for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Social Security

Act (the “Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq. (Doc. 2). Pending before the Court is Claimant’s appeal

from the administrative decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”). 

Claimant filed her complaint on August 2, 2007 (Doc. 2), and her opening brief on June 9, 2008. 

(Doc. 19). The Commissioner filed his opposing brief on July 9, 2008. (Doc. 23). Claimant did 1

not file a reply brief.

JURISDICTION

On June 23, 2004, Claimant protectively filed an application for SSI payments. 

(Administrative Record (“AR”) 77-85). Claimant’s application was denied initially and on

reconsideration. (AR 24, 30, 36-49). After timely requesting a hearing, Claimant and her counsel

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 Paperwork related to Claimant’s SSI application reported that she attended school through the ninth grade. 

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(AR 87, 94). 

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appeared before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Christopher Larsen on November 1, 2006. (AR

53, 338-360). On February 22, 2007, the ALJ issued a decision that was partially favorable to

Claimant. (AR 14-23). The Appeals Council denied Claimant’s request for review of the adverse

portion of the ALJ’s decision on June 5, 2007. (AR 5-8). The Appeals Council’s decision,

therefore, became the final decision of the Commissioner, which is appealable to the district court. 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The initiation of an appeal in the district court must be commenced within sixty

(60) days of the Appeals Council’s decision. Id. On August 2, 2005, Claimant timely filed this

action. (Doc. 2).

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The facts have been presented in the administrative hearing transcript, the ALJ’s decision,

and stipulated or set forth in the briefs filed by the parties, and, therefore, will only be summarized

here. In her SSI paperwork, Claimant alleged an inability to work due to lower back pain and, in

general, a bad back and problems with her right femur, all of which were traceable to a 1987 car

accident. (AR 90-95). She alleged an onset date of June 23, 2004. (AR 87, 91). In response to a

pain questionnaire, Claimant stated that she has suffered burning, cramping pain, numbness, and

headaches throughout her body continuously since May 11, 1986. (AR 97). Claimant further

indicated that, in addition to taking pain medication, which caused various side effects, she walks

with a cane. (AR 98). 

At the November 1, 2006, administrative hearing, Claimant testified that she was born on

March 13, 1960, making her 46 years’ old at the time of ALJ Larson’s decision, and had completed

the eighth grade of school. (AR 343-344). Claimant added that she had not worked for the previous 2

15 years. (AR 344). She lives in an apartment with her boyfriend, who does the things that she

cannot. (AR 349, 354). Claimant stated that she underwent surgery to prevent the further

compression of her C5 and C7 spinal discs and confinement to a wheelchair. (AR 344). Both before

and after the surgery, Claimant reported that she suffered from, inter alia, numb hands and finger

pain, which made it difficult to grasp objects without dropping them. (AR 344-347). 

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Claimant further testified that, before the surgery, she suffered from neck pain that rendered

her incapable of moving her neck except a little bit to the side. (AR 345). She added that, although

occasionally she could reach in front of her with her arms, she could not move her arms above her

head. (Id.). Claimant reported that, if she wrote more than 20 minutes, her index fingers would

become painful. (AR 346). In addition, Claimant noted that she could use her right hand to lift some

items, such as a one-half gallon of milk. (AR 347). Claimant further stated that, using her cane, she

could walk ten yards before the pain in her back, neck, knees, and feet necessitated that she stop. 

(AR 348). 

Claimant testified that, in general, the surgery worsened her problems. (AR 349). She

specified that her neck did not improve except to the extent that, despite the chronic pain, it was

slightly more mobile. (AR 348-349, 351-352). Claimant stated that her “walking got way worse,”

noting that her left leg “turned in more.” (AR 349). In addition, she reported that she no longer has

any strength in her arms and could not reach in front of her. (Id.). Claimant further testified that,

since June 2006, she has had daily bowel accidents. (AR 350). 

Regarding her activities of daily living, Claimant testified that she cannot comb her hair,

brush her teeth, dress herself, or otherwise care for her personal hygiene because the muscles in her

arms were weak. (AR 349-351). According to Claimant, she can hold utensils and drink out of a

cup using both hands, but is not able to hold a plate. (AR 351). She does no housework, laundry, or

cooking. (AR 354). Claimant stated that she drives only when she has a doctor’s appointment. (AR

354). She added that she has no social activities and spends her days laying down watching

television. (AR 355). 

With respect to her treatment and exertional abilities, Claimant testified that she cannot bend,

and was able to sit and stand a maximum of fifteen minutes. (AR 352-353). Claimant testified that

she lays down approximately 3/4 of the day, which relieves the pain. (AR 353). In addition, her

prescription medication – neurontin (Gabentin) and hydrocodone (Vicodin) – helps alleviate the

pain slightly and causes no side-effects other than sleepiness. (Id.). Claimant explained that during

the time that the medicine enables her to sleep, she is pain-free, but upon awakening the pain returns.

(Id.). Further, Claimant reported that, at least four times daily, she uses a TENS unit for a minimum

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of one hour each time. (AR 354). 

Vocational Expert Thomas Dachelet (“VE” or “VE Dachelet”) then testified regarding

whether there were jobs in the national and regional economy that a hypothetical individual with

differing limitations and exertional capacities could perform. (AR 356-359). The ALJ’s first

hypothetical question presented a 46-year-old person with an 8th grade education; no past relevant

work experience; and the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to: lift and/or carry 10 pounds

frequently and 20 pounds occasionally; stand, walk, and/or sit six hours in an eight hour day;

frequently balance and kneel; occasionally stoop, crouch, crawl and climb ramps or stairs but never

climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; occasionally reach overhead; and occasionally look overhead with

no restrictions on looking downward. (AR 356-357). The VE testified that, because of the

restriction on the ability to look upward, there would be an exception to the Dictionary of

Occupational Titles (“DOT”), but that the individual still could perform two-thirds of the 80,933

sedentary, unskilled jobs available in California. (AR 357). The second hypothetical involved the

same person, but with an RFC that limited her to standing and walking one hour, and sitting no more

than two hours, in an eight-hour day. (Id.). In addition, the individual could only occasionally

handle, finger, and feel. (AR 358). The VE testified that the there were no jobs in the national or

regional economy that this hypothetical person could perform. (Id.). Claimant’s attorney questioned

whether a person with the following RFC could work: lifting and carrying 10 pounds frequently and

occasionally; standing and walking with an assistive device; and limited to occasional climbing,

stooping, kneeling, balancing, reaching, crouching, crawling, pushing, pulling, reaching, and gross

handling with both hands. (Id.). The VE responded that, because of the hand restrictions, this

person could not perform sedentary, unskilled work. (Id.). Finally, VE Dachelet stated that, other

than the exception to the DOT with respect to the hypothetical individual’s ability to perform a full

range of sedentary, unskilled work due to the neck limitation, his testimony was consistent with the

characteristics of the jobs set forth in the DOT. (Id.). 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of a Commissioner’s decision.

42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A court must uphold the Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits, made

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through an ALJ, when the decision is based on the proper legal standards and is supported by

substantial evidence. Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005). Substantial evidence is

more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance. McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 601-

602 (9th Cir. 1989) (quotations omitted). It is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Webb, 433 F.3d at 686, citing Richardson v. Perales,

402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420 (1971). Moreover, such “inferences and conclusions as the

[Commissioner] may reasonably draw from the evidence” are accorded the same consideration as is

substantial evidence as defined above. Mark v. Celebrezze, 348 F.2d 289, 293 (9th Cir. 1965). On

review, the Court must consider the record as a whole, not just the evidence supporting the decision

of the Commissioner. Weetman v. Sullivan, 877 F.2d 20, 22 (9th Cir. 1989) (quotation and citation

omitted).

It is the role of the trier of fact, not this Court, to resolve conflicts in evidence. Richardson,

402 U.S. at 400. If the evidence supports more than one rational interpretation, the Court must

uphold the decision of the ALJ. Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984). If there is

substantial evidence to support the administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence that

would support a finding of either disability or non-disability, the Commissioner’s decision is

conclusive. Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-1230 (9th Cir. 1987). Nevertheless, a decision

supported by substantial evidence will be set aside if the proper legal standards were not applied in

weighing the evidence and making the decision. Brawner v. Secretary of Health and Human

Services, 839 F.2d 432, 433 (9th Cir. 1988).

RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The Social Security Act defines “disability” as the “inability to engage in any substantial

gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be

expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of

not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act also provides

that a claimant shall be determined to be under a disability only if her impairments are of such

severity that claimant is not only unable to do her previous work but cannot, considering claimant’s

age, education and work experiences, engage in any other substantial gainful work which exists in

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the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B).

SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS

Initial Disability Evaluation

The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining

whether a person is disabled under Title XVI of the Act. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. At Step One, the ALJ

determines if the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activities. If he is, benefits are denied. 

20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(I), (b). If he is not, the ALJ proceeds to Step Two, at which point he

determines whether the claimant has a medically severe impairment or combination of impairments

that meet the duration requirements set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 416.909; i.e. the impairment(s) are

expected to result in death or continuously lasted or are expected to last at least twelve months.

20 C.F.R. § 416.920a(4)(ii), (c). If the claimant does not have a severe impairment, a combination of

impairments, or meet the duration requirement, the disability claim is denied. Id. 

If the impairment is severe, the evaluation proceeds to Step Three, which compares the

claimant’s impairment with a number of listed impairments acknowledged by the Commissioner to

be so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii), (d); 20 C.F.R.

Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. If the impairment meets or equals one of the listed impairments and

satisfies the duration requirement, the claimant is conclusively presumed to be disabled. 

20 C.F.R. §§ 416.909, 416.920(a)(4)(iii), (d). If the impairment is not one conclusively presumed to

be disabling, the evaluation proceeds to Step Four, requiring the ALJ to determine whether the

impairment prevents the claimant from doing work performed in the past. If the claimant is able to

perform his previous work, he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(iv), (e); 416.960(b). If

the claimant cannot perform this work, at Step Five, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is able

to perform other work in the national economy in view of his age, education and work experience. 

20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(v), (f) and (g); 416.960(b) and (c). See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137,

107 S. Ct. 2287 (1987).

The initial burden of proof rests upon a claimant to establish that he “is entitled to the 

benefits claimed under the Act.” Rhinehart v. Finch, 438 F.2d 920, 921 (9th Cir. 1971) (citations

omitted). In terms of the five-step sequential evaluation process, the Ninth Circuit has held that

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 SSI continuing disability determinations delete the first step, i.e., whether claimant is engaged in substantial 3

gainful activity. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.994(b)(5). The remaining seven steps are followed. Hence, the subparagraph

numbering of section 416.994(b)(5) corresponds to that of section 404.1594(f), but offset by the missing first step in SSI

analysis. 

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“[t]he burden of proof is on the claimant as to steps one to four,” while at the same time noting that

an ALJ’s “affirmative duty to assist a claimant to develop the record . . . complicates the allocation of

burdens” such that “the ALJ shares the burden at each step.” Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098

& n.3 (9th Cir. 1999) (italics in original). The initial burden is met once a claimant establishes that a

physical or mental impairment prevents him from engaging in his previous occupation. The burden

then shifts to the Commissioner to show (1) that the claimant can perform other substantial gainful

activity and (2) that a “significant number of jobs exist in the national economy” which claimant can

perform. Kail v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1496, 1498 (9th Cir. 1984).

Cessation of Disability Evaluation 

In order to determine whether a claimant’s disability is continuing or has ceased, and,

therefore, whether the claimant no longer is entitled to disability benefits, an eight-step process is

followed. Griego v. Sullivan, 940 F.2d 942, 944 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1991)(eight-step process for analyzing

whether disability benefits should terminate); Aikens v. Shalala, 956 F. Supp. 14, 16 & n.2 (D.D.C.

1997)(same). At Step One, the issue is whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful 3

activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1594(f)(1). If so, claimant’s disability is deemed terminated. Id.

At Step Two, the issue is whether claimant’s impairment meets or equals the impairments set

out in the Listing of Impairments. If so, benefits continue. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1594(f)(2),

416.994(b)(5)(i). At Step Three, reached if a claimant’s impairments do not meet the Listing of

Impairments, the issue is whether there has been any medical improvement since the original

determination of disability. If there has been medical improvement, as shown by a decrease in

medical severity, the ALJ proceeds to Step Four. Otherwise, and absent medical improvement, the

ALJ proceeds to Step Five. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1594(f)(3), 416.994(b)(5)(ii). 

At Step Four, the ALJ must determine whether a medical improvement is related to the

claimant’s ability to do work, i.e., whether there has been an increase in his RFC. If so, the ALJ

proceeds to Step Six. Otherwise, and absent an ability to perform work (as with an absence of

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 This is commonly referred to as a case involving a closed period of disability. See Jones v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 4

522, 524 (7th Cir. 1993); Mendoza v. Apfel, 88 F.Supp.2d 1108, 1113 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (after determining claimant was

disabled, stating that, in assessing whether the disabling impairment ceases, the “medical improvement standard applies

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medical improvement), the ALJ proceeds to Step Five. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1594(f)(4),

416.994(b)(5)(iii). Step Five applies in either of the following situations: if there has been no

medical improvement or if the improvement is unrelated to the claimant’s ability to do work.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1594(f)(3) and (4), 416.994(b)(5)(ii) and (iii). At Step Five, the ALJ determines

whether any of the two groups of exceptions to the medical improvement standard of review apply. 

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1594(f)(5), 416.994(b)(5)(iv). If no exceptions apply, the claimant’s disability

continues; if the first group of exceptions apply, then the ALJ proceeds to Step Six; and if the second

group of exceptions apply, the claimant’s disability is terminated. Id.

Alternatively, if the claimant’s medical improvement is related to his ability to do work (or if

one of the Step Five group of exceptions applies), the ALJ proceeds to Step Six. At Step Six, the

ALJ determines whether the claimant’s impairments are sufficiently severe so as to limit his physical

or mental abilities to do basic work activities. If they are not sufficiently severe, disability is

terminated. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1594(f)(6), 416.994(b)(5)(v). If the claimant’s impairments are

sufficiently severe then, at Step Seven, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s current RFC to determine

whether he can perform work that he previously did. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1594(f)(7), 416.994(b)(5)(vi). 

Once again, if he can perform past work, disability terminates. Otherwise, the ALJ proceeds to Step

Eight. Id.

Finally, at Step Eight, reached if the claimant cannot perform past work, the ALJ considers

whether, given the claimant’s age, education, past work experience, and RFC, the claimant can

perform other work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1594(f)(8), 416.994(b)(5)(vii). If so, disability terminates. 

Otherwise, benefits continue. Id. 

ADMINISTRATIVE FINDINGS

ALJ Larsen initially noted that he had to ascertain whether Claimant was entitled to SSI

benefits due to medical impairments and, if so, whether her medical condition improved such that

she no longer was disabled. (AR 15). He therefore provided two separate sequential evaluations –

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28 to cases, such as here, involving a closed period of disability”)

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one addressing Claimant’s alleged disabling impairments and the second discussing whether, and to

what extent, her medical condition improved. 

First Period: Onset Date to October 31, 2005

At Step One, the ALJ found that, because Claimant had never worked, she had not engaged

in substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date of June 23, 2004. (AR 15, 21-22). At Step

Two, he noted that Claimant had no severe impairments from June 23, 2004 through October 1,

2004. (AR 16, 22). The ALJ determined that, as of October 1, 2004, Claimant suffered from the

following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease, disease of the cervical spine at C5-6 and

C6-7, cervical myelopathy with radiculopathy, and status post-cervical discectomy and spinal cord

compression. (Id.). At Step Three, the ALJ found that Claimant did not have an impairment or

combination of impairments that were among those acknowledged by the Commissioner to be so

severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity, and, therefore, she did not meet or equal a listing

under 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. (Id.). 

Before addressing Step Four and Five findings, ALJ Larsen determined Claimant’s RFC. 

(AR 16). In doing so, the ALJ discussed the results of Claimant’s October 2004 x-ray (AR 137) and

February 1, 2005 magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) results, and noted her consistent subjective

complaints from October 2004 and April 2005, all of which indicated that she suffered upper

extremity and neck pain in addition to the impairments he previously mentioned. (AR 16). The ALJ 

also reported that Claimant underwent back surgery in June 2005 (AR 317-320). (AR 16). The ALJ

concluded that, given that Claimant suffered severe pain, required several months to recuperate from

the back surgery, and in light of the record evidence, she lacked the ability to “maintain the

concentration, persistence, and pace required for full-time work,” and other limitations precluded her

from working during the relevant time period. (AR 17). Based on the foregoing, the ALJ felt it

unnecessary to address Steps Four and Five, and instead found Claimant disabled by pain, secondary

to back surgery, and thus eligible for SSI benefits from October 1, 2004 through October 31, 2005. 

(Id., AR 22-23). ALJ Larsen, however, noted that there was evidence that Claimant’s impairments

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 This period extends to the date that the Appeals Council denied Claimant’s request for review on June 5, 5

2007. (AR 5-7). 

 Because Claimant was disabled under Title XVI (SSI), not Title II (DIB), the applicable regulation for

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cessation of disability is 20 C.F.R. § 416.994(b)(5), not 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(f). As noted in fn. 3, the two regulations

are virtually identical such that ALJ’s application of § 404.1594(f) in and of itself does not constitute legal error.

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improved, requiring that he determine whether she remained disabled. (AR 17). 

Second Period: November 1, 2005 to February 22, 20075

Applying 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(f) to ascertain if Claimant’s disability continued, at Step 6

One, ALJ Larsen found that Claimant was not engaging in substantial gainful activity. (AR 17). At

Step Two, he concluded that, post-surgically, Claimant did not have a severe impairment or

combination of impairments that met or equaled a listing under 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1,

including Listing 1.02 (the inability to use the upper extremities). (AR 18, 22). At Step Three, the

ALJ found that the evidence indicated that there was a decrease in the medical severity of Claimant’s

impairments that were present at her most recent favorable medical decision, which constituted a

medical improvement. (Id.). Specifically, the ALJ noted that a September 2005 cervical spine x-ray

(AR 297), demonstrated an improvement over Claimant’s October 2004 and February 2005

radiological test results, and, subjectively, Claimant reported that she felt better. (AR 18, 285). 

 At Step Four, the ALJ found that “[t]here is no question [Claimant] has experienced an

increase in her residual functional capacity after October, 2005” due to her medical improvement,

based on her impairments at the time he previously found her disabled. (AR 18, 22). The ALJ 

concluded that the June 2005 surgery “resolved both the anatomic abnormality that was the cause of

Claimant’s pain and much of her pain as well,” which had prevented her from working. (AR 18). 

At Step Five, the ALJ found that Claimant presently suffered many of the same severe impairments

as previously, including degenerative disc disease and cervical myelopathy, and he also found that

she suffered from mild disc dessication with broad-based disc bulges along the lumbar spine and

mild bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. (AR 19, 22-23). 

ALJ Larsen determined Claimant’s present RFC before rendering his Step Six finding as to

whether she is capable of performing her past work. (AR 19). The ALJ discounted Claimant’s

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 The ALJ misstated the number of the last step, which should be Step Eight of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(f), 7

although, had he applied the SSI regulation, the final step would be Step Seven, 20 C.F.R. § 416.994(b)(5)(vii).

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record and testimonial complaints of pain due to her drug-seeking behavior and testimonial

statements that called her credibility into doubt. (AR 18-20). The ALJ reasoned that “[a]lthough

the evidence continues to support her complaints of pain, and, consequently, some continuing

functional limitations, it is not so compelling to overcome the credibility problems I have already

discussed.” (AR 20). The ALJ relied on the state agency physician’s July 2005 RFC assessment, 

which he adjusted to incorporate evidence of Claimant’s subsequent medical diagnoses, over the two

treating physicians’ assessments. (AR 20, 175-186). The ALJ concluded that the treating

physicians’ opinions failed to provide supporting evidence and appeared to be based solely on

Claimant’s subjective complaints. (AR 20-21). He found that Claimant’s increased RFC enabled

her to lift and carry 10 pounds frequently and 20 pounds occasionally; sit for six hours; stand and

walk for two hours; frequently balance or kneel; occasionally stoop, crouch, crawl, and climb ramps

or stairs; occasionally reach and look overhead; but cannot climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. (AR

21, 23). 

Because Claimant had no past relevant work, the ALJ continued to Step Seven and found 7

that, given Claimant’s RFC, and based on the testimony of VE Dachelet, Claimant could perform

unskilled, sedentary jobs, of which there were significant numbers in both California and the national

economy. (AR 21, 23). Accordingly, the ALJ found that, as of November 1, 2005, Claimant could

perform available work and, therefore, Claimant’s disability ended, and she has not been entitled to

benefits, since January 1, 2006. (Id.); see 20 C.F.R. § 416.1331(a).

ISSUES

Claimant’s opening brief asserts that the ALJ erroneously found that her medical condition

had improved as of November 1, 2005. Claimant raises the following arguments. 

(A) Claimant’s medical condition did not improve

(1) There was insufficient evidence to support a finding of medical improvement; and 

(2) The ALJ improperly found that Claimant’s medical improvement increased her RFC.

///

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 The medical evidence that Claimant cites includes records submitted to the Appeals Council that were not 8

available when the ALJ issued his decision. Gomez v. Charter, 74 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 1996); Ramirez v. Shalala, 

8 F.3d 1449, 1452 (9th Cir. 1993); 20 C.F.R. 416.1470. 

12

 (B) The ALJ improperly accorded controlling weight to the opinions of state agency

physicians

This Court must uphold the Commissioner’s determination that Claimant is not disabled if

the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards and there is substantial evidence in the record

as a whole to support the decision.

DISCUSSION

The arguments Claimant raises to support her claims are addressed below.

(A) Claimant’s medical condition did not improve

Claimant’s general argument is that, contrary to the ALJ’s findings, she remains incapable of

engaging in substantial gainful activity because she is “status post cervical discectomy and spinal

cord compression, cervical myelopathy, failed cervical surgery, and continuing cervical disc

disease.” (Doc. 19, p. 2). Claimant contends that the ALJ erroneously concluded that her medical

condition improved since he first found her disabled and, even had her condition improved, it was

not related to an increase in her RFC.

(1) There was insufficient evidence of medical improvement

Claimant argues that the ALJ’s finding of medical improvement hinges on isolated evidence

that her back problems improved after the June 2005 surgery. (Doc. 19, pp. 5-7). Specifically,

Claimant contends that the ALJ found that her medical condition had improved as of November 1,

2005, based on a comparison of the results of October 2004 and September 2005 radiological

examinations of her back, and a statement made by Claimant in October 2005 indicating that she felt

better. (Id. at 5). Claimant avers that, although the ALJ acknowledged that she suffered from the 8

same impairments both before and after her surgery, he found a decrease in the medical severity her

impairments. (Id. at 4-5). In addition, Claimant argues that, because the ALJ did not specify why he

found Claimant disabled through October 31, 2005, there was nothing against which the ALJ could

base his determination of medical improvement after that date. (Id. at 5). 

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 Claimant sought most of her health care treatment from the University Medical Center Emergency Room or 9

Clinic, regardless of the nature of the illness. This resulted in an array of physicians treating her, frequently for

subjective complaints, which prevented a consistent, longitudinal portrait of her impairments and treatment by a specific

doctor. (See generally AR). 

 A condition in which the vertebral joints become fixed or stiff, causing pain and decreased mobility. Mikel 10

A. Rothenberg, M.D. et al., Dictionary of Medical Terms (Fifth Ed. 2006).

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(a) Medical improvement

Once a claimant is eligible for disability benefits, the benefits can be terminated if the

claimant’s impairments have medically improved and the improvement enables the claimant to

engage in substantial activity. 42 U.S.C. § 423(f); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1594(a), 416.994(b)(5); Reefer

v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376, 378, n.1 (3rd Cir. 2003); Halasz v. Apfel, 2001 WL 253225, *2 (N.D.Cal.

2001). A medical improvement is “any decrease in the medical severity of your impairment(s) which

was present at the time of the most recent favorable medical decision that you were disabled.” 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1594(b)(1) and (f)(4), 416.994(b)(1)(i) and (b)(5)(iii); Griego v. Sullivan, 940 F.2d at 

944. Any finding that the claimant’s medical severity has decreased “must be based on changes

(improvement) in the symptoms, signs, and/or laboratory findings associated with” the claimant’s

impairments. Id.. In the instant case, because the ALJ first decided that Claimant was disabled on

October 1, 2004, that is the “most recent favorable medical decision.” 

(b) Evidence of medical improvement

In his decision, the ALJ summarized the majority of Claimant’s impairments, treatments,

and RFC from soon after her alleged onset date through his February 22, 2007 decision and

concluded that, from a diagnostic standpoint, there was a medical improvement, or decrease in the

medical severity of Claimant’s impairments. (AR 16-23). 

During a visit to the emergency room on December 24, 2004, a doctor noted that the results 9

of an October 26, 2004 x-ray of Claimant’s cervical spine showed that she had degenerative disc 

disease with spondylosis at C5-C6 and C6-C7, narrowing with post spurs resulting in moderate-to- 10

severe encroachment on neural foramen (openings). (AR 137). On June 15, 2005, Claimant

underwent surgical procedures to correct her back problems, including a C5-C7 cervical discectomy,

a microdiscectomy, and a bilateral decompression of the spinal canal and foraminotomy at C5-C7. 

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 The administrative record contains other medical records showing an improvement in Claimant’s medical 11

conditions. On December 9, 2005, Claimant’s treating physician reported that her x-rays showed “excellent” fusion and

alignment. (AR 274). On December 21, 2005, Claimant underwent a physical examination which showed no abnormal

clinical findings. (AR 269). The medical progress notes report that by May 2006, Claimant’s treating physician reported

her cervical symptoms were stable. (AR 243). Claimant’s medical improvement is also reflected in the results of

additional diagnostic tests taken in 2006 and 2007. Claimant’s May 18, 2006 MRI showed only mild to moderate

stenosis and was an improvement over the results of her February 2005 MRI. (AR 246). Claimant’s March 1, 2007

computerized axial tomography (CT) cervical myologram showed no spinal stenosis or disc bulging other than at C5 to

C7 and only moderate spinal canal narrowing, which was also an improvement over the results of Claimant’s February

2005 MRI. (AR 334).

14

(AR 317). 

The x-rays taken during the surgery and through November 1, 2005, confirmed that the

surgery succeeded in anatomically aligning Claimant’s cervical spine and that she had only mild

degenerative changes. (AR 18, 286, 297, 300, 308-309). In evaluating whether there was a medical

improvement, the ALJ compared the results of Claimant’s pre-surgery x-ray and MRI with her

post-surgery x-ray. The pre-surgery x-ray showed cervical spine narrowing and radiculopathy, and

the pre-surgery MRI showed possible cord edema and moderate to severe stenosis. The postsurgery x-ray showed anatomical alignment, unremarkable vertebral bodies, and mild stenosis. 

These medical records reflect a medical improvement since October 1, 2004. (AR 18). 11

The ALJ properly considered Claimant’s post-surgery statements to her physician, in

determining whether there had been a decrease in the severity of Claimant’s symptoms. At an

October 21, 2005 medical examination, Plaintiff told her treating physician that she felt “better” and

her pain was “better.” (AR 18, 285). The ALJ noted these statements in his assessment, along with

Claimant’s comments that she felt numbness in her joints, arms, and knees. (AR 18). 

The post-surgery changes noted by the ALJ constituted an improvement in symptoms, signs,

or laboratory findings associated with Claimant’s impairments. After the surgery, Claimant’s spine

had anatomically aligned, she no longer had moderate to severe stenosis, and she felt better and

experienced less pain. Although the ALJ did not dispute that Claimant had multiple impairments,

there is sufficient evidence that Claimant’s medical condition improved so as to warrant a finding

that she no longer was disabled after October 2005. 

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(2) The ALJ improperly found that Claimant’s medical improvement increased her RFC

According to Claimant, the ALJ did not demonstrate that there was an increase in her ability

to work, or RFC, as a result of the improvement in her medical condition since October 1, 2004. 

(Doc. 19, pp. 7-10). Claimant contends that the ALJ erred in relying on the non-examining state

agency physicians’ 2005 RFC assessments because he implicitly rejected them when he found her

disabled in October 2004, and because they did not contain medical evidence relevant to the postdisability period. (Id. at 9-10). 

(a) Standards for determining RFC 

Determination of a claimant’s RFC falls between the sequential steps and is for the ALJ to

determine. See Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1151 n.2 (9th Cir. 2007) (discussing

determination of RFC in the initial five-step evaluation). Under Social Security Ruling 98-6p and

pertinent regulations

RFC is the individual’s maximum remaining ability to do sustained work activities in

an ordinary work setting on a regular and continuing basis, and the RFC assessment

must include a discussion of the individual’s abilities on that basis. A “regular and

continuing basis” means 8 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work

schedule. RFC does not represent the least an individual can do despite his or her

limitations or restrictions, but the most. RFC is assessed by adjudicators at each level

of the administrative review process based on all of the relevant evidence in the case

record, including information about the individual’s symptoms and any “medical

source statements” – i.e., opinions about what the individual can still do despite his or

her impairment(s) – submitted by an individual’s treating source or other acceptable

medical sources.

SR 98-6p; see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 404.1546, 416.945, 416.946.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that, when an ALJ

determines a claimant’s RFC, he must consider all of the relevant evidence, including, but not

limited to, medical records, consultative reports ordered by the Commissioner, physicians’ reports,

and subjective statements concerning symptoms and pain, to the extent that the ALJ finds the latter

credible. Id.; Robbins v. Social Security Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 2006). Acceptable

physicians’ reports include those from licensed physicians and licensed or certified psychologists,

including state agency physicians. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.04.1513, 416.913, 416.927(f)(2)(1). The ALJ 

need not accept a conclusory opinion from an acceptable medical source, even if rendered by a

treating physician, if the opinion is unsupported by clinical findings. Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d

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1144, 1149 (9th Cir.2001); Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989). 

In a “cessation of disability” case, the ALJ must ultimately determine whether there is

medical improvement that results in an increase in the claimant’s ability to work, or RFC, by

ascertaining whether the RFC has improved since the claimant’s most favorable determination, i.e.,

when she was found disabled, and that the claimant retains the ability to work despite the occurrence

of any additional impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 405.1594(f)(3)-(f)(8), 416.994(b)(5)(ii)-(5)(vii). 

(b) Claimant’s RFC

ALJ Larsen initially concluded that Claimant’s RFC increased after October 31, 2005,

because the surgery had sufficiently resolved the pain upon which he found her disabled on October

1, 2004. (AR 18). He further noted that Claimant’s allegations of severe pain lacked credibility, and

that alternative methods of pain relief had proved beneficial. (AR 18-19). The ALJ then noted that

Claimant continued to suffer from many of the same ailments as she did pre-surgically, and

diagnostic evidence revealed that she had developed additional spinal impairments, all of which were

severe impairments that did not meet or equal the listings. (AR 19, 22). The record shows that postsurgically, Claimant’s radiological tests revealed disc extrusions and bulges in the thoracic and

lumbar spine and central spinal stenosis (AR 245-246); cord edema, spastic ambulation, and

bilateral weakness and muscle atrophy in her arms (AR 263); and mild bilateral carpal tunnel

syndrome (AR 263-264). However, there is nothing in the record that prevented Claimant from

engaging in physical actions. (See generally AR).

In determining that Claimant could perform light work, the ALJ relied in part on the clinical 

findings of Claimant’s treating physicians, which indicate that Claimant’s condition improved after

her June 2005 back surgery. (AR 17-20, 230-286, 308-324, 333). Their medical progress reports

state that surgery resolved much of Claimant’s pain, and as discussed above, she reported that she

felt better and her pain had improved. (AR 274, 282-286). A December 2005 examination of

Claimant revealed no abnormal clinical findings, and by May 2006, her physicians concluded that

her cervical symptoms were stable. (AR 243, 263, 274, 282-286). A June 2006 EMG report showed

Claimant’s status as normal with no evidence of neuropathy. (AR 235-236). Two months later,

Claimant’s physician assessed her physical condition as normal. On October 16, 2006, the medical

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 The record contains two separate assessments prepared by state agency physicians. (See AR 175-186, 208- 12

221). The first RFC assessment is dated March 10 and 11, 2005. (AR 175-186). The second report was prepared April

12, 2005 and affirmed on July 20, 2005. (AR 208-186). The ALJ apparently relied on the April 12 assessment.

17

progress notes show that Plaintiff refused to be examined, but had returned to request disability and

pain medication. (AR 333). At that time, she was not assessed with any functional limitation. (Id.). 

In determining Claimant’s RFC and whether her medical improvement was related to an

increased RFC, ALJ Larsen also reviewed the state agency physician’s assessments, considered

12

Claimant’s subsequent impairments, and, after discounting her subjective pain complaints and the

degree to which she testified she could not perform her activities of daily living, found that Claimant

currently retained the RFC to

lift and carry 10 pounds frequently and 20 pounds occasionally, to sit for 6 hours in an

8-hour workday, and to stand or walk for a total of 2 hours. She can never climb

ladders, ropes or scaffolds, and she can occasionally stoop, crouch, crawl, and climb

ramps or stairs. She can “frequently” balance or kneel, and she can occasionally reach

and look overhead.

(AR 21, 23). 

(c) Claimant’s credibility

The ALJ also considered Claimant’s credibility. The hearing transcript and medical records

contain statements by Claimant that she suffered disabling post-surgery pain. The ALJ rejected these

complaints as not credible, finding that “[t]here are too many notations of [Claimant’s] drug-seeking

to enable me to accept wholesale her complaints of disabling pain. [Claimant’s] lack of any work

history also undercuts her claim that she would be working but for her impairments and the disabling

pain they cause. ” (AR 20). The ALJ also extended his “skepticism to [Claimant’s ] testimony at the

hearing,” with respect to Claimant’s functional capacity, noting that he found her testimony “not

credible.” (AR 20). 

Credibility determinations are within the province of the ALJ. A two-step analysis applies at

the administrative level when considering a claimant’s subjective credibility. Smolen v. Chater, 80

F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996). First, the claimant must produce objective medical evidence of an

impairment and show that the impairment could reasonably be expected to produce some degree of

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 Social Security Rulings are accorded deference because they constitute the Commissioner’s interpretation of 13

the agency’s regulations. They do not, however, have the full force and effect of the law. Ukolov v Barnhart, 420 F.3d

1002, 1005 n.2 (9th Cir. 2005).

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symptom. Id. at 1281-82. Pursuant to Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-7p, the ALJ may not 13

disregard the claimant’s pain testimony solely because there is a lack of medical records evidencing

an impairment that causes pain. SSR 96-7p; Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir.

1997). If there is no evidence that the claimant is malingering, the ALJ can reject the claimant’s

testimony about the severity of his or her symptoms “only by offering specific, clear and convincing

reasons for doing so.” Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281 (9th Cir. 1996). This level of specificity is crucial

because, in its absence, effective judicial review may not be possible. See Mersman v. Halter, 161 F.

Supp. 2d 1078, 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (“The lack of specific, clear, and convincing reasons why

Plaintiff’s testimony is not credible renders it impossible for [the] Court to determine whether the

ALJ’s conclusion is supported by substantial evidence”); SSR 96-7p (the ALJ’s decision “must be

sufficiently specific to make clear to the individual and to any subsequent reviewers the weight the

adjudicator gave to the individual’s statements and reasons for that weight”). 

Here, the dispute is whether the ALJ provided legally sufficient reasons for discounting

Claimant’s subjective complaints. The ALJ gave several reasons, including Claimant’s drug-seeking

behavior and the lack of medical evidence to support her complaints that her condition worsened

after surgery. (See generally AR 230-269). While an ALJ cannot disregard Claimant’s subjective

complaints regarding the severity of her symptoms based solely on a lack of objective medical

evidence to support it, the lack of objective medical evidence is a factor the ALJ may consider. 

Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F. 2d 342, 345 (9th Cir. 1991). 

In determining whether Claimant’s medical improvement was related to an increase in her

RFC, the ALJ discounted Claimant’s pain due to her constant requests for more medication and her

refusal to comply with the recommendations of the pain-management physician. (AR 20). In the

progress notes, Claimant complained of neck pain, for which she was prescribed pain medication,

including Vicodin, and some upper extremity weakness. (See AR 283-303). As ALJ Larsen found,

Claimant repeatedly appeared at the clinic complaining of pain and requesting refills of Vicodin. 

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(See, e.g. 230, 241, 248, 268, 269). She reported a history of narcotics abuse, including intravenous

drug use, for which she attended inpatient drug rehabilitation. (AR 239, 253). During a referral visit

at the pain management clinic, when the doctor offered to re-evaluate her pain medication if

Claimant stopped taking Vicodin for three weeks and attended four 12-Step meetings, the records

indicate that Claimant resisted the idea and walked out of the office rather than comply with these

conditions. (AR 251). Given Claimant’s continuous requests for opiate drugs, in conjunction with

the lack of evidence of severe medical problems, her testimony that the surgery increased her

physical problems, and her failure to seek treatment for additional ailments that she testified she had,

the ALJ found her not credible. (AR 20). 

In making his credibility assessment, the ALJ also considered conflicts between Claimant’s

subjective complaints and the medical evidence. Morgan v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin.,

169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999). As noted by the ALJ and discussed above, despite Claimant’s

assertions of widespread pain, the 2006 medical records reflect that her cervical symptoms were

stable by May, neuropathy was ruled out in June, and her physical examinations in August and

October were normal. (AR 231, 235, 243, 333). In assessing Claimant’s current RFC, the ALJ

rejected her claim that she suffered back pain from cartilage buildup after a rod was removed from

her right femur in 2000, because none of her physicians mentioned any causal connection between

the rod removal and back pain. (AR 20, 91, 230-286, 308-324, 333). The ALJ also discounted

Claimant’s testimony that she needed help to comb her hair, brush her teeth, tie her shoes, and pull

up her pants, and that she suffered from bowel incontinence and could not hold utensils or a coffee

cup without using two hands. (AR 20, 348-353). The AR found it:

“hard to believe she is as functionally impaired as this, particularly since her bilateral carpal

tunnel syndrome was found on testing to be “mild” only. I also question her complaints of

bowel incontinence, particularly since there is no neuropathy in her bilateral lower

extremities that might cause it. Her complaints are also not as consistent as she alleges, nor

have they been treated by her doctors, who mention them but provide no specific treatment

tailored for control.” (Internal citations omitted).

 

(AR 20, 264-266). 

ALJ Larsen found that 1) Plaintiff’s testimony regarding the severity of her pain and the

degree to which it incapacitated her were not fully credible, 2) there was no objective medical

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evidence to indicate that her condition worsened after her surgery and the objective medical evidence

indicated her condition had improved, 3) treatment notes indicated physical examinations within

normal limits, and 4) Plaintiff refused to comply with physician-recommended pain management

therapy. The ALJ’s reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s subjective testimony are clear and convincing,

and supported by substantial medical evidence referenced in his decision. 

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds no error in the ALJ’s credibility assessment. Given

that the ALJ assessed Claimant’s RFC based on the state agency’s assessment, which was based on

the record, the post-surgical evidence and progress reports, Claimant’s testimony, and the ALJ’s

credibility findings, the Court finds no error in the ALJ’s RFC findings, including the finding that

Claimant’s medical improvement was related to an increase in her RFC.

Claimant also makes additional miscellaneous arguments. For example, as to the ALJ’s

reference to Claimant’s drug-seeking behavior, she contends that the ALJ’s analysis is erroneous

because she changed her medication from Vicodin to hydrocodone. (Doc. 19, p.9). Hydrocodone is

the generic for Vicodin and, thus, she continued taking the same drug. Claimant also asserts that the

ALJ should have found a closed period of disability and explained the rationale for this period,

thereby rendering it easier to evaluate the disability and cessation-of- disability periods on appellate

review. (Doc. 19, p. 7). As discussed above, the ALJ stated his reasons for finding Claimant

disabled, and, although ALJ Larsen did not specify that the period during which Claimant was

disabled constituted a “closed period of disability,” given that the ALJ deemed Claimant disabled

and eligible for benefits from October 1, 2004 through October 31, 2005, and subsequently found

that there was medical improvement that rendered Claimant no longer disabled, this is, essentially, a

“closed case.” (See fn. 4). 

(B) The ALJ improperly accorded controlling weight to the opinions of state agency

physicians

Claimant contends that the ALJ failed to provide sufficient reasons for rejecting the opinions

of her treating physicians. (Doc. 19, pp. 6-7, 9-10). She asserts that the ALJ’s stated rationale for

failing to credit their opinions – that they were based on Claimant’s subjective complaints and were

not supported by “findings” – are insufficient and belied by the medical record. (Id. at 7). Claimant

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adds that the ALJ erroneously accepted the pre-surgical RFCs and opinions prepared by 

non-examining state agency physicians and do not constitute substantial evidence sufficient to reject

a treating physician’s opinion. (Id. at 7).

In Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625 (9th Cir. 2007), the Ninth Circuit reiterated the deference that

should be given to a treating physician. The opinions of treating doctors should be given more

weight than the opinions of doctors who do not treat the claimant. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715,

725 (9th Cir.1998); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d at 830. The weight accorded the reports prepared by

non-examining physicians depends “on the degree to which they provide supporting explanations for

their opinions.” Ryan v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1201 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 20

C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3)). 

If the treating physician’s opinion is not contradicted by another physician, it may be rejected

only for “clear and convincing” reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record. Reddick,

157 F.3d at 725; Lester, 81F.3d 821, 830 )9th Cir. 1995). Even if the treating physician’s opinion is

contradicted by another physician, the ALJ may not reject this opinion without providing “specific

and legitimate reasons” supported by substantial evidence in the record. Murray v. Heckler, 722

F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir.1983). This can be done by the ALJ setting out a detailed and thorough

summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making

findings. Magallenes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d at 751. The ALJ must do more than offer his conclusions. 

He must set forth his own interpretations and explain why they, rather than the physician’s, are

correct. Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421-422 (9th Cir.1988). The opinion of a treating

physician, however, may be rejected if it is brief and conclusory, not supported by clinical findings,

or is based on subjective complaints. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 948, 957 (9th Cir. 2002); Fair v.

Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 605 (9th Cir. 1989); Magallenes, 881 F.2d at 751. 

Regardless of the weight given to a treating physician’s medical opinion, it is not binding on

the ALJ with respect to the ultimate determination of disability. See Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.

Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1194-1195 (9th Cir. 2004) (treating physician had opined that claimant “met

or equaled the criteria” for a listed impairment under 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 105C);

Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751(“treating physician’s opinion is not, however, necessarily conclusive as

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to . . . the ultimate issue of disability”); 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(e)(1) (physician’s statement that a

claimant is “disabled” or “unable to work” does not mean that the claimant is disabled as defined

under the Act). 

The record contains three documents that arguably constitute treating physician opinions. 

The first document is a general relief eligibility form dated August 28, 2006 and signed by Brian

Curtis, M.D. Dr. Curtis stated that Claimant suffered neck and arm pain, diagnosed her with cervical

disc disease, and opined that she had a generally poor prognosis and a “likely permanent condition.” 

(AR 224-225). The second document is entitled “ Verification of Physical/Mental Incapacity -

General Assistance.” This one-page form dated August 11, 2006 appears to have been completed by

 “Dr. Meddy.” Dr. Meddy stated that Claimant is “permanently disabled,” but provides no medical

explanation for his opinion. (AR 229). 

The third document is dated October 16, 2006, entitled “Medical Source Statement

Concerning the Nature and Severity of an Individual’s Physical Impairment (“Source Statement),”

and completed by physician’s assistant (“PA”) Armand Valenzuela. (AR 328-332). In this multipage, check-the-box questionnaire seeking information as to the patient’s exertional ability and RFC,

PA Valenzuela checked the box on the first page, which stated that Claimant “has not been capable

of performing sustained SEDENTARY work on a regular and continuing basis, i.e., 8 hours a day, 5

days a week, or an equivalent work schedule,” checked the box on the second page, which stated 

that Claimant “has not been capable of performing sustained LIGHT work on a regular and

continuing basis, i.e., 8 hours a day, 5 days a week, or an equivalent work schedule, and would not

be able to work if given the option to change positions frequently. (AR 328, 329). PA Valenzuela

did not respond to the questions regarding Claimant’s exertional abilities and limitations, and

provided no information explaining why he reached the foregoing conclusions. (AR 330-332). 

The ALJ declined to give controlling weight to the opinions of Dr. Curtis and PA Valenzuela 

and explained his reasons for doing so, to wit: “[s]ince neither of these opinions sets forth findings in

support, and both appear based on [Claimant’s] subjective complaints, which I do not believe, I do

not grant much credence to either of them.” (AR 20). The August 11, 2006 opinion also fails to

contain clinical findings or medical evidence to support the opinion of disability and lacks legal 

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significance in any event, because disability determinations are expressly reserved to the

Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(e)(1), 416.927(e)(3); SSR 96-5p. 

The ALJ considered an assessment provided by state agency neurosurgeon, Sadda V. Reddy,

M.D. dated March 10, 2005, concluding that Plaintiff could perform a light range of work with

postural limitations. (AR 186). Despite this assessment, the ALJ found Claimant disabled through

October 2005. (AR 20). The ALJ also considered an assessment of state agency physician Brian

Ginsburg, M.D. dated July 20, 2005, opining that Plaintiff could perform light work with some

postural and manipulative restrictions within twelve months after her back surgery. (AR 208-217). 

The ALJ considered the opinions of Drs. Reddy and Ginsburg in their temporal context, and also

evaluated the medical evidence after July 20, 2005. In discussing that evidence, he concluded that

the medical evidence, consisting of only “mild” bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and “some disc.

protrusions and overall moderate central spine stenosis” were “not so extreme as to justify the

limited lifting capacity the state agency found” or any impairment in Claimant’s ability to handle or

finger. (AR 20). Accordingly, the ALJ found no reason to reject the state agency’s opinion of

Claimant’s RFC, and thus found that Claimant could perform a light range of work by November 1,

2005, consistent with Dr. Ginsburg’s assessment. 

Claimant’s contention that the ALJ erred in rejecting the treating physicians’ opinions and

accepting the state agency RFCs necessitated that Claimant prevail or a remand be entered lacks

merit. (Doc. 19, p. 7). The state agency assessments, which relied on and cited Claimant’s medical

records, ascertained Claimant’s exertional capacity, as opposed to the treating physicians’

unsupported statements that she was disabled. The ALJ properly rejected the opinions of Claimant’s

treating physicians because they were brief, conclusory, not supported by clinical findings, and based

on subjective complaints. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d at 957; Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d at 605 (9th

Cir. 1989); Magallenes, 881 F.2d at 751. The ALJ provided specific, legitimate reasons for his

decision not to give controlling weight to the treating physicians’ opinions, and his reasons are based

on substantial evidence in the record. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725; Lester, 81F.3d at 830; Magallanes,

881 F.2d at 751; Murray, 722 F.2d at 502; 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(e)(1). The ALJ did not err in

rejecting the treating physicians’ opinions. 

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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

For the reasons discussed above, this Court finds no error in the ALJ’s analysis, and finds

that the ALJ properly concluded Claimant’s disability ceased after she recuperated from her surgery. 

This Court further finds the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a

whole and based on proper legal standards. 

Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that:

1. Claimant’s Social Security complaint be DENIED; and

2. Judgment be ENTERED for Defendant Michael J. Astrue and against Claimant 

Lisa K. Wilkins. 

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to this action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and this Court’s Local Rule 72-304. 

No later than eleven (11) days after service of these Findings and Recommendations, any party may

file written objections to these Findings and Recommendations with the Court and serve a copy on

all parties and the Magistrate Judge and otherwise in compliance with this Court’s Local Rule

72-304(b). Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and

Recommendations.” Responses to objections shall be filed and served no later than ten (10) court

days after service of the objections and otherwise in compliance with this Court’s Local Rule 72-

304(d). The District Judge will review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may

waive the right to appeal the District Judge’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 13, 2008 /s/ Theresa A. Goldner 

j6eb3d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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