Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06404/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06404-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Earl Allen
Appellee
Attorney General
Appellee
Charles Curtis Harris
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

CHARLES CURTIS HARRIS, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

FILED 

United Statf\::. Co· m oi i;..ppoo.ls 

Tt'nth c\renit 

APR 0 11991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

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) 

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) 

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No. 89-6404 

EARL ALLEN; ATTORNEY GENERAL, State 

of Oklahoma, 

Respondents-Appellees. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. 89-1176-R) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Charles Curtis Harris, pro se. 

Robert H. Henry, Attorney General of Oklahoma, Sandra D. Howard, 

Assistant Attorney General, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for 

Respondents-Appellees. 

Before McKAY, SEYMOUR, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

Appellate Case: 89-6404 Document: 01019292963 Date Filed: 04/01/1991 Page: 1 
assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a): lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Petitioner Charles Curtis Harris appeals from the district 

court's judgment denying his petition for habeas corpus relief 

filed pursuant to 28 u.s.c. § 2254. Harris also applies to this 

court for a certificate of probable cause and for leave to proceed 

in forma pauperis. Determining Harris to be indigent and his 

issue capable of debate, we grant both applications. See Barefoot 

v. Estelle, 463 u.s. 880, 893 and n.4 (1983); Ragan v. Cox, 305 

F.2d 58, 59-60 (lOth Cir. 1962). The issue presented on appeal 

was first brought by Harris through a petition for habeas corpus 

in the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals which was denied, thus 

exhausting Harris' state remedies. 

On November 16, 1987, in the district court of Oklahoma 

County, Harris pled guilty to the felony offenses of concealing 

stolen property, possession of a firearm, and possession of a 

controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute, all 

after prior conviction of a felony. A fourth pending charge, 

possession of a controlled dangerous substance/cocaine, was 

dismissed as part of the plea agreement. Harris had four prior 

felony convictions and the state agreed to use only one of the 

prior convictions for enhancement purposes. In addition, the 

state agreed not to file charges resulting from Harris missing a 

court appearance or any other "dope related charges" arising from 

the incident to which he pled guilty. Harris was sentenced to 

three concurrent ten-year sentences. 

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On July 8, 1987, more than three months prior to Harris' 

entry of his guilty plea, the state entered judgment in civil 

forfeiture proceedings against $2,684.00 which was seized from 

Harris at the time of his arrest. (CJ 87-3308, District Court of 

Oklahoma County). The state court ordered these funds forfeited 

to the State of Oklahoma as "money illegally used in relation to 

trafficking of a controlled dangerous substance as defined in the 

laws of the State of Oklahoma." (Rec., Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus, Exh. F). Harris argues that this forfeiture 

proceeding constituted an additional "punishment" which was not 

included in his plea agreement. Harris claims that the state's 

failure to inform him of this proceeding or to include it in his 

agreement renders his guilty plea unknowing and involuntary and 

constitutes a breach of the agreement by the state. 

In considering Harris' request for habeas corpus relief, we 

must be concerned with whether Harris' confinement is proper and 

in accord with the plea agreement. It must first be determined 

whether Harris' plea was indeed knowing and voluntary and whether 

he fully understood the consequences of the plea. See Boykin v. 

Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44 (1969); McCarthy v. United States, 

394 u.s. 459, 464-65 (1969). The sentencing court engaged in a 

thorough examination of Harris regarding his understanding of the 

plea agreement and his acceptance of the consequences of his 

guilty plea. Harris replied in the affirmative when asked by the 

sentencing judge whether he understood the rights he was waiving 

by entry of a guilty plea. Tr. 11/16/89 at 6-7. He also stated 

he understood the agreement and had received competent advice of 

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counsel. Id. at 7. 

coerced him. Id. 

He stated that no one had threatened or 

at 8. He further waived his right to a 

presentence investigation and report. Id. at 8-9. Harris took no 

direct appeal of his subsequent conviction or sentence. We thus 

conclude that Harris entered the plea voluntarily and knowingly. 

"Where the government obtains a guilty plea which is 

predicated in any significant degree on a promise or agreement 

with the [prosecuting attorney], such promise or agreement must be 

fulfilled to maintain the integrity of the plea." United States 

v. Stemm, 847 F.2d 636, 637 (lOth Cir. 1988) (citing Santobello v. 

New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971)). The record in this case is 

void of any evidence that the state or the prosecutor in any way 

misrepresented the terms and conditions of the plea agreement. 

Harris fully understood the charges to which he entered a guilty 

plea and was fully informed of the consequences of his plea. 

Harris claims an ownership interest in the $2,684.00 seized 

from him at the time of his arrest. This court knows of no 

prohibition that would have prevented Harris from requesting 

inclusion of the disposition of this money in the plea agreement. 

However, there was no affirmative duty on behalf of the court or 

the state to include it in the plea agreement and the plea 

agreement was not involuntary solely because of the state's 

failure to address the forfeiture proceeding. 

The Second Circuit has had the opportunity to consider a 

similar question most recently in United States v. United States 

Currency in the Amount of $228,536.00, 895 F.2d 908 (2nd Cir.), 

cert. denied, 110 s. Ct. 2564 (1990). The court held that because 

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a forfeiture is not a "direct consequence" of a criminal 

conviction, a court has no duty to inform the defendant of the 

possibility of forfeiture prior to accepting a plea. Id. at 911. 

Like Harris, the defendant in that action also claimed a violation 

of his due process rights. He argued an affirmative duty on the 

part of the judge and the district attorney to inform him of the 

possibility of civil forfeiture. Id. at 914. The Second Circuit 

stated there are certain consequences of a guilty plea which are 

"'collateral' rather than direct and need not be explained to the 

defendant in order to ensure that the plea is voluntary." Id. at 

915. The possibility of civil forfeiture proceedings is one of 

the collateral consequences that need not be explained. We agree. 

Although Harris was entitled to be fully informed of all direct 

consequences of his plea, the court was under no affirmative 

obligation to advise him of the possible collateral consequence 

that his guilty plea could lead to a civil forfeiture. See United 

States v. King, 618 F.2d 550, 552 (9th Cir. 1980); Sanchez v. 

United States, 572 F.2d 210, 211 (9th Cir. 1977). 

Civil forfeiture is an in rem proceeding brought against an 

asset used in an illegal transaction or obtained by illegal means. 

Forfeiture statutes are primarily remedial, not criminal, in 

nature, and although it would have been permissible for Harris to 

request inclusion of the forfeiture in the plea agreement, its 

absence does not render Harris' plea less knowing or voluntary or 

constitute any breach of the agreement on the part of the state. 

Harris alleges that he received no notice of the forfeiture 

proceeding. The record indicates that a judgment was entered in 

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the forfeiture proceeding more than three months prior to Harris' 

conviction. However, we do not have before us the propriety of 

the civil forfeiture proceeding, and thus, we limit ourselves on 

this appeal to the question of whether Harris' confinement is 

proper and in accord with his understanding of the plea agreement. 

We cannot conclude that Harris was prejudiced by his alleged 

lack of knowledge of the forfeiture proceeding or that his plea 

would have been different had he known of the forfeiture 

proceeding. The state fully complied with its obligations under 

the terms of the plea agreement, and Harris is serving the 

sentence for which he bargained. 

Petitioner's claim is resolvable by a thorough examination of 

the law and facts contained in the record, and we agree with the 

district court that no further evidentiary hearing was required. 

We grant Harris' request for a certificate of probable cause and 

for permission to proceed in forma pauperis, but the judgment of 

the United States District Court for the Western District of 

Oklahoma denying habeas corpus relief is AFFIRMED. 

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