Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-15-02147/USCOURTS-ca3-15-02147-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Ocean City
Appellant
Ocean City Police Department
Not Party
Monica Raab
Appellee
Jessie Ruch
Not Party

Document Text:

PRECEDENTIAL 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

_____________ 

No. 15-2127 

_____________ 

MONICA RAAB, 

 Appellant 

v. 

CITY OF OCEAN CITY, NEW JERSEY, 

a municipal corporation of the State of New Jersey; 

OCEAN CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT; 

OFFICER JESSIE RUCH, in his official and individual 

capacity; 

JOHN DOES (#1-25), Fictitious Designation 

ABC CORPS. (#1-25), Fictitious Designation 

_____________ 

No. 15-2147 

_____________ 

MONICA RAAB 

v. 

CITY OF OCEAN CITY, NEW JERSEY, 

a municipal corporation of the State of New Jersey; 

OCEAN CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT; 

OFFICER JESSIE SCOTT RUCH, in his official and 

individual capacity 

JOHN DOES (1-25), Fictitious Designation 

ABC Corps, (#1-25), Fictitious Designation 

 City of Ocean City, 

 Appellant 

____________ 

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

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2 

for the District of New Jersey 

(No. 1-11-cv-06818) 

District Judge: Hon. Robert B. Kugler 

Argued: March 17, 2016 

____________ 

Before: CHAGARES, RESTREPO and VAN 

ANTWERPEN,*

 Circuit Judges. 

(Filed: August 15, 2016) 

Paul R. Rizzo, Esq. [ARGUED] 

Nicholas F. Pompelio, Esq. 

DiFrancesco, Bateman, Coley, Yospin, Kunzman, Davis, 

Lehrer & Flaum, P.C. 

15 Mountain Boulevard 

Warren, NJ 07059 

 Attorneys for Appellant/Cross-Appellee Monica Raab 

A. Michael Barker, Esq. [ARGUED] 

Vanessa E. James, Esq. 

Barker, Gelfand & James, P.C. 

210 New Road 

Linwood Greene, Suite 12 

Linwood, NJ 08221 

 Attorneys for Appellees/Cross-Appellants City of 

Ocean City and Ocean City Police Department 

Thomas B. Reynolds, Esq. [ARGUED] 

John J. Bannan, Esq. 

Reynolds & Horn, P.C. 

750 Route 73 South, Suite 202A 

Marlton, NJ 08053 

 Attorneys for Appellee Jessie Ruch 

 

* The Honorable Franklin Van Antwerpen participated in the 

decision in this case, but died before the opinion was filed. 

 This opinion is filed by a quorum of the court. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 46; Third Circuit I.O.P. 12.1(b).

Case: 15-2147 Document: 003112380633 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/15/2016
3 

____________ 

OPINION 

____________ 

CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 

 Plaintiff Monica Raab and defendant City of Ocean 

City, New Jersey (“Ocean City”) both appeal the District 

Court’s denial of their motions for attorney’s fees. Raab 

argues that she is a “prevailing plaintiff,” for purposes of 

attorney’s fee eligibility under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, in her civil 

suit against defendant Ocean City police officer Jessie Ruch. 

At issue in Raab’s appeal is whether a settling plaintiff in a 

civil rights action can be a “prevailing party” where the 

district court sua sponte entered a dismissal order 

incorporating and retaining jurisdiction over the settlement 

agreement. For the reasons that follow, we hold that a 

plaintiff can be a “prevailing party” in such circumstances. 

Accordingly, we will reverse in part the District Court’s order 

and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

 At issue in Ocean City’s cross-appeal is whether the 

District Court abused its discretion in denying attorney’s fees 

to a prevailing defendant, when the District Court had 

previously granted summary judgment in the defendant’s 

favor. For the reasons that follow, we hold that the District 

Court did not abuse its discretion, and we will affirm the 

District Court’s denial of Ocean City’s motion for attorney’s 

fees. 

I. 

 In November 2011, Raab filed a civil complaint 

against police officer Ruch and his employer, Ocean City. 

Raab asserted numerous federal claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983, as well as similar state law causes of action, which all 

stemmed from an incident in which Ruch detained Raab on 

May 10, 2010.1

 On that day, Ruch stopped his patrol car 

 

1

 The causes of action alleged in Raab’s initial complaint 

included federal and state claims of false arrest, excessive 

force, unlawful search, unreasonable seizure, supervisory 

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outside of Raab’s residence to investigate a trailer that had 

been parked on the street for about a month and had no 

license plate. Ruch believed that the trailer was abandoned 

and contacted police dispatch to request that it be towed. 

Shortly thereafter, Raab went outside, spoke with Ruch, and 

informed him that the trailer belonged to her brother-in-law 

and that she would move the trailer into her driveway. Ruch 

told her not to move the trailer, but she still tried. After Raab 

was unsuccessful in her attempt to move the trailer, she went 

inside her house to call her husband. She then returned to the 

driveway and handed the phone to Ruch, who indicated that 

the trailer would not be towed if it was moved before a tow 

truck arrived. At that point, another man drove by the house 

and offered to help move the trailer. With his help, the trailer 

was moved into the driveway. 

 Ruch then asked Raab for her name. The parties 

dispute whether Raab provided her name, and they dispute 

the resulting physical interaction. Raab alleges that she 

responded “we are the Raabs,” but that Ruch then grabbed her 

arm, handcuffed her, and threw her to the ground. Appendix 

(“App.”) 51-52. She alleges that, while she was on the 

ground, Ruch repeatedly pulled and twisted the handcuffs, 

causing her arm to be pulled in different directions and her 

head to hit the ground several times. Ruch disputes Raab’s 

version of events. He claims that Raab refused to tell him her 

name, cursed at him, and then pushed him with her forearm. 

Ruch alleges that he then grabbed Raab by the arm, at which 

point she started slapping his hand and subsequently fell to 

the ground on her back. See App. 52. Ruch alleges that 

Raab, while on the ground, started flailing her legs. Id. Ruch 

indicated that he believed Raab was having a “psychological 

episode,” so he decided to detain her and call for his 

supervisor. Id. When the supervisor arrived, the supervisor 

called an ambulance for Raab and told Ruch to remove the 

handcuffs. Later that day, Raab went to her primary care 

doctor, where she was diagnosed with various injuries. 

 

liability, failure to train, negligent supervision, assault and 

battery, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. 

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 Notably, approximately one month prior to the May 10 

incident, Ruch had received a negative performance notice for 

failing to detain a suspect in an unrelated incident. The 

performance notice served as a “training tool” for Ruch, who 

indicated that this performance notice was “in the back of 

[his] mind” during the altercation with Raab. App. 7. 

 Both Ruch and Ocean City filed motions for summary 

judgment. The District Court granted in part and denied in 

part Ruch’s motion for summary judgment. The surviving 

claims against Ruch included federal and state claims for 

excessive force, a state claim for assault and battery, and a 

request for punitive damages. The District Court also granted 

summary judgment in favor of Ocean City on all counts, 

having found that Raab could not establish “‘both (1) 

contemporaneous knowledge of the offending incident or 

knowledge of a prior pattern of similar incidents; and (2) 

circumstances under which the supervisor’s inaction could be 

found to have communicated a message of approval to the 

offending subordinate are present’” required to succeed on a 

municipal liability claim. App. 68 (quoting Bonenberger v. 

Plymouth Twp., 132 F.3d 20, 25 (3d Cir. 1997)). 

Specifically, “[n]o reasonable jury could find that because 

Officer Ruch was previously told that he should have arrested 

a domestic violence suspect when probable cause existed to 

do so, his supervisors communicated a ‘message of approval’ 

to tackle citizens to the ground every time any suspect is 

arrested.” App. 70. 

 Raab and Ruch requested a settlement conference with 

the Magistrate Judge to whom the case was referred for 

certain pre-trial proceedings. At a November 25, 2014 

settlement conference held by the Magistrate Judge, Raab and 

Ruch agreed to resolve all outstanding claims for the total 

sum of $150,000, exclusive of attorney’s fees and costs. The 

parties agreed that the issue of attorney’s fees would be 

determined later by the District Court. Shortly thereafter, 

Raab filed her motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1988. Ocean City also filed a fee application with 

the District Court. 

 Prior to deciding Raab’s and Ocean City’s motions for 

attorney’s fees, the District Court entered an Order of 

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Dismissal on January 21, 2015. The order dismissed the 

action without costs and provided: “The terms of the 

settlement agreement are incorporated herein by reference 

and the Court shall retain jurisdiction over such agreement.” 

App. 230. None of the parties objected to or appealed the 

District Court’s dismissal order. The order did not include 

the actual terms of the settlement, and the District Court later 

indicated that it had not seen the settlement terms when it 

issued the dismissal order. See App. 8. A few days later, the 

parties filed a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice, which 

simply stated that the parties have “stipulated and agreed that 

the same be and it is hereby dismissed, with prejudice, 

exclusive of the pending motions for attorney fees.” App. 

231.2

 

 On April 6, 2015, the District Court denied both 

Raab’s and Ocean City’s motions for attorney’s fees. The 

District Court held that Raab was not a “prevailing party,” as 

required by 42 U.S.C. § 1988. As to Ocean City, the District 

Court held that, although Ocean City was a prevailing 

defendant, the city had not demonstrated that Raab’s action 

was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation to justify 

the awarding of fees. Both Raab and Ocean City timely 

appealed the denials of their fee applications. 

II.3

 We review a district court’s denial of attorney’s fees 

for abuse of discretion. P.N. v. Clementon Bd. of Educ., 442 

F.3d 848, 852 (3d Cir. 2006). “An abuse of discretion occurs 

when a district court’s decision rests upon a clearly erroneous 

finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper 

 

2

 Raab’s counsel signed and dated the stipulation as of 

January 20, 2015. Ruch’s counsel signed and dated the 

stipulation as of January 23, 2015. The stipulation was filed 

and entered with the District Court on February 2, 2015. 

3

 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 

1331 and 1343(a)(3), and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1291 to review the final decision of the District 

Court. 

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application of law to fact.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). 

However, if the fee application was denied based on the 

district court’s conclusions on questions of law, our review is 

plenary. Id. 

III. 

 The first question before us is whether Raab is a 

“prevailing party” in her action against Ruch. Under 42 

U.S.C. § 1988(b), courts may, in their discretion, grant a 

“reasonable attorney’s fee” to a “prevailing party” in certain 

federal actions, including those proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 

1983. 

 The District Court held that Raab was not a “prevailing 

party,” and accordingly did not award attorney’s fees. In 

reaching this holding, the District Court indicated that “a 

party may only ‘prevail’ by obtaining either a judgment or a 

court-ordered consent decree.” App. 5. The District Court 

then determined that Raab had obtained neither: 

Plaintiff has not obtained a judgment on the 

merits; rather, Plaintiff and Officer Ruch 

entered into a private settlement agreement. 

Only “enforceable judgments on the merits and 

court-ordered consent decrees create the 

material alteration of the legal relationship of 

the parties necessary to permit an award of 

attorney’s fees.” Buckhannon [Bd. and Care 

Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human 

Res.], 532 U.S. [598, 604 (2001)] (internal 

citations omitted). While “settlement 

agreements enforced through a consent decree 

may serve as the basis for an award of 

attorney’s fees,” id., that is not the situation that 

presents itself here, as no consent decree was 

entered to enforce the settlement agreement. 

App. 7-8. We disagree. 

 The Supreme Court has set forth some useful 

guideposts for determining whether a plaintiff is a “prevailing 

party” for purposes of fee-shifting statutes. In Buckhannon, 

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the Court distilled the following threshold inquiries under 

section 1988: (1) whether there is a “‘material alteration of 

the legal relationship of the parties,’” and (2) whether that 

material alteration is “judicially sanctioned.” 532 U.S. at 

604-05 (quoting Tex. State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. 

Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792-93 (1989)). We have observed 

generally that “[t]he Supreme Court has given a ‘generous 

formulation’ to the term ‘prevailing party.’” Truesdell v. 

Phila. Housing Auth., 290 F.3d 159, 163 (3d Cir. 2002) 

(quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)); see 

also Cnty. of Morris v. Nationalist Movement, 273 F.3d 527, 

535 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that normally, a “prevailing 

plaintiff should recover an award of attorney’s fees absent 

special circumstances”). 

A. 

Regarding the first inquiry, a plaintiff must “receive at 

least some relief on the merits of his claim before he can be 

said to prevail.” Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760 (1987). 

This “inquiry does not turn on the magnitude of the relief 

obtained.” Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114 (1992). 

Indeed, the Court has held that even an award of nominal 

damages will satisfy this test. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604 

(citing Farrar, 506 U.S. 103). As we have noted, “when . . . a 

material alteration in the legal relationship of the parties has 

occurred, ‘the degree of the plaintiff’s overall success goes to 

the reasonableness of the award . . . not to the availability of a 

fee award vel non.’” Truesdell, 290 F.3d at 166 (quoting Tex. 

State Teachers Ass’n, 489 U.S. at 793). 

Although an award of relief may be issued by a court 

following consideration of the merits, “[t]he fact that [a 

plaintiff] prevailed through a settlement rather than through 

litigation does not weaken her claim to fees. Nothing in the 

language of § 1988 conditions the District Court’s power to 

award fees on full litigation of the issues or on a judicial 

determination that the plaintiff’s rights have been violated.” 

Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129 (1980). We have 

recognized, however, that “interim” relief — such a obtaining 

a preliminary injunction to maintain the status quo — that is 

not in some way merit-based will not confer prevailing party 

status. See, e.g., John T. ex rel. Paul T. v. Del. Cnty. 

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Intermediate Unit, 318 F.3d 545, 558 (3d Cir. 2003); J.O. v. 

Orange Twp. Bd. of Ed., 287 F.3d 267, 272-74 (3d Cir. 

2002). 

This case involves the payment of $150,000 from 

Ruch to Raab pursuant to a settlement agreement that effected 

a final resolution of Raab’s case. This indisputably 

constituted a material alteration of the legal relationship 

between Ruch and Raab. 

B. 

Regarding the second inquiry, the material alteration 

of the legal relationship between the parties requires a 

“judicial imprimatur on the change.” Buckhannon, 532 U.S. 

at 605; see also CRST Van Expedited v. E.E.O.C., 136 S. Ct. 

1642, 1646 (2016) (“This change must be marked by judicial 

imprimatur.” (quotation marks omitted)). Key to this 

determination is whether the change is enforceable or 

“judicially sanctioned” by the court. See Buckhannon, 532 

U.S. at 604-05; Farrar, 506 U.S. at 111; John T., 318 F.3d at 

560; see also Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 622 (acknowledging 

that a party cannot be considered prevailing “unless there has 

been an enforceable alteration of the legal relationship of the 

parties” (quotation marks omitted) (Scalia, J., concurring)). 

The Court in Buckhannon offered two “examples” meeting 

this standard: “enforceable judgments on the merits” and 

“settlement agreements enforced through a consent decree.” 

Id. at 604-05. However, the Court in Buckhannon determined 

that “[a] defendant’s voluntary change in conduct, although 

perhaps accomplishing what the plaintiff sought to achieve by 

the lawsuit, lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur on the 

change” between the legal relationship of the parties. Id. at 

605. 

The District Court held that only a judgment or 

consent decree — not the “private settlement agreement” the 

parties entered into — could constitute the basis to permit 

Raab to be a prevailing party. App. 7-8. While settlement 

agreements reached “through negotiations out of court” alone 

may lack the necessary judicial imprimatur, John T., 318 F.3d 

at 560, the facts of this case differ. 

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A settling plaintiff may be entitled to attorney’s fees if 

the district court has ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the terms 

of a settlement agreement. The Supreme Court has 

recognized that generally, a federal district court does not 

have jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement, even 

though the original dispute may have been before the court. 

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 

380-81 (1994). However, a district court will have ancillary 

jurisdiction over a settlement agreement, permitting the court 

to enforce the agreement, when “the terms of the settlement 

agreement had been made part of the order of dismissal — 

either by separate provision (such as a provision ‘retaining 

jurisdiction’ over the settlement agreement) or by 

incorporating the terms of the settlement agreement in the 

order.” Id. at 381. The Court in Buckhannon acknowledged, 

as a result, that “federal jurisdiction to enforce a private 

contractual settlement will often be lacking unless the terms 

of the agreement are incorporated into the order of dismissal.” 

532 U.S. at 604 n.7. Accordingly, a district court’s retaining 

ancillary jurisdiction over the settlement agreement or 

incorporating the terms of the settlement agreement in the 

order of dismissal confers the judicial imprimatur that is 

required for a plaintiff to become a prevailing party under 

section 1988. See Truesdell, 290 F.3d at 163-65 (holding that 

a settling plaintiff was a prevailing party when the court order 

contained “mandatory language,” was entitled “Order,” 

“b[ore] the signature of the District Court judge,” and gave 

the plaintiff “the right to request judicial enforcement of the 

settlement”). 

 Turning to the case before us, we note that the District 

Court’s dismissal order both explicitly incorporated the terms 

of the settlement agreement and retained jurisdiction to 

enforce the agreement. The order provided: “The terms of 

the settlement agreement are incorporated herein by reference 

and the Court shall retain jurisdiction over such agreement.” 

App. 230. We therefore hold that the settlement agreement 

had the necessary judicial imprimatur to confer prevailing 

party status. 

 Ruch urges us to disregard the explicit language 

incorporating the settlement terms because the District Court 

did not actually see the settlement agreement prior to issuing 

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11 

its dismissal order. This argument is unavailing. Although it 

may be a good practice for a district court to examine a 

settlement agreement prior to incorporating its terms, Ruch 

points to no case law requiring a district court to do so in 

order to effectively retain jurisdiction over a settlement. In a 

similar case, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held 

that a district court’s retention of jurisdiction over the 

enforcement of a settlement provided “sufficient judicial 

sanction to convey prevailing party status on plaintiffs,” even 

though the district court had not “scrutinize[d] the 

settlement’s fairness or conduct[ed] any review of the terms 

of the Agreement before endorsing the stipulation dismissing 

the suit.” Roberson v. Giuliani, 346 F.3d 75, 80, 84 (2d Cir. 

2003). The circumstances here are also vastly different from 

those we considered in John T. There, we held that the 

plaintiff’s relief was not “judicially sanctioned” when the 

parties developed a mutual resolution “through negotiations 

out of court,” and where there was no other form of judicial 

sanction over the parties’ mutually agreed upon resolution. 

318 F.3d at 560. But here, the operative order dismissing the 

case contains explicit language incorporating the settlement 

terms and retaining jurisdiction in the District Court — 

providing the requisite “judicial sanction” over the settlement 

agreement.4

 Ruch also urges us to ignore the plain language in the 

District Court’s dismissal order stating that the settlement 

terms were incorporated. Instead, Ruch argues that we should 

defer to the District Court’s later interpretation of its 

dismissal order. See Ruch Br. 16-17. In its order denying 

attorney’s fees, the District Court noted that “the terms of the 

settlement were not actually included” and that the court “did 

not facilitate the settlement, has never seen the settlement 

agreement, nor was it aware of any terms contained within the 

agreement when the Order was issued.” App. 8. However, 

the case relied on by Ruch — United States v. Spallone, 399 

 

4

 We also note that, unlike in John T., the settlement occurred 

with the help of an active magistrate judge in the federal 

district courthouse in Camden, New Jersey. This likely gave 

the District Court some assurance that the terms of the 

agreement were appropriate to become part of a court order. 

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12 

F.3d 415, 423 (2d Cir. 2005) — concerns a district court’s 

construction of an “ambiguity in his own words.” Here, the 

dismissal order was unambiguous: by its own terms it 

incorporated the settlement terms and retained jurisdiction. 

 Ruch next argues that the retention of jurisdiction 

clause is invalid because the parties did not consent to 

ancillary jurisdiction over later enforcement of the settlement. 

Ruch Br. 23-25 (citing Am. Disability Ass’n, Inc. v. 

Chmielarz, 289 F.3d 1315, 1318 (11th Cir. 2002) (noting that 

district court retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement at 

the request of the parties), and Roberson, 346 F.3d at 83 

(noting that its holding that a settlement agreement was 

judicially sanctioned was “strengthened” by clause in 

settlement providing that it would not become effective if 

order of discontinuance did not include a provision retaining 

jurisdiction over enforcement)). However, neither of the 

cases cited by Ruch hold that a district court can only retain 

jurisdiction of the enforcement of a settlement if the parties 

include a provision stating as such in their settlement 

agreement or otherwise consent to the court’s jurisdiction. 

We reject Ruch’s argument and hold that a district court may 

sua sponte retain ancillary jurisdiction in the circumstances of 

this case.5

 

5

 As discussed infra, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) 

authorized the District Court to enter the dismissal order with 

the provisions incorporating the settlement agreement and 

retaining ancillary jurisdiction. Ruch, however, claims that 

the District Court was “wholly without legal authority,” Ruch 

Br. 32, to include these provisions because District of New 

Jersey Local Civil Rule 41.1(b) “does not contain language 

which would allow a trial judge to add conditions or terms to 

the Order of Dismissal, such as the retention of jurisdiction 

over the settlement language.” Id. Local Civil Rule 41.1(b) 

provides: 

When a case has been settled, 

counsel shall promptly notify the 

Clerk and the Court, thereafter 

confirming the same in writing. 

Within 21 days of such 

notification, counsel shall file all 

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13 

 

papers necessary to terminate the 

case. Upon failure of counsel to 

do so, the Clerk shall prepare an 

order for submission to the Court 

dismissing the action, without 

costs, and without prejudice to the 

right to reopen the action within 

60 days upon good cause shown if 

the settlement is not 

consummated. 

L. Civ. R. 41.1(b) (D.N.J.). 

 We reject Ruch’s argument for at least four reasons. 

First, Ruch provides no case law to support his argument. 

The District Court of New Jersey has instead confirmed that 

the decision whether “to retain ancillary jurisdiction over the 

settlement agreement is discretionary” in these circumstances. 

Brass Smith, LLC v. RPI Indus., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 377, 

381 (D.N.J. 2011); see also id. (“[A] court is under no 

obligation to retain jurisdiction over a settlement agreement, 

but may do so if it chooses.”); Wright v. Prudential Ins. Co. 

of Am., 285 F. Supp. 2d 515, 522 n.17 (D.N.J. 2003) (“The 

exercise of [ancillary] jurisdiction to enforce its own order is 

discretionary; the court [is] under no obligation to reserve 

[jurisdiction] in the first place.”). Second, Local Rule 41.1(b) 

does not, by its terms, restrict or modify the court’s authority 

in any way. The rule merely supplements Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 41(a), inter alia, to create a procedure for 

attorneys to notify the court when a case settles “as soon as 

possible so that the Court will not waste further effort on the 

case and so that it can readjust its calendar.” Allyn Z. Lite, 

N.J. Federal Practice Rules, Rule 41.1(b), cmt. 3 (2015). 

Third, Ruch’s argument presumes that a local rule may 

override the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure — which is not 

possible. See Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641, 645-46 (1987); 

see also 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a); N.J. L. Civ. R. 1.1 (noting that 

the New Jersey Local Civil Rules “supplement the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure . . . and are applicable in all 

proceedings when not inconsistent therewith”). Fourth, we 

note that Ruch did not object to the District Court’s dismissal 

order, which was entered on January 21, 2015. Nor did he 

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14 

 When case law does mention parties’ consent to 

ancillary jurisdiction, it is often in the context of Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) voluntary dismissals. 

Under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii), a plaintiff can dismiss an action 

without a court order by filing “a stipulation of dismissal 

signed by all parties who have appeared.” See State Nat’l Ins. 

Co. v. Cnty. of Camden, -- F.3d --, --, 2016 WL 2990975, at 

*5 (3d Cir. 2016). “‘[A]ny action by the district court after 

the filing of [the Stipulation of Dismissal] can have no force 

or effect because the matter has already been dismissed.’” Id. 

(alterations in original) (quoting SmallBizPros, Inc. v. 

MacDonald, 618 F.3d 458, 463 (5th Cir. 2010)). But here, as 

the dismissal order was filed before the stipulated dismissal, 

Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) does not govern. Instead, as the Supreme 

Court has indicated, district courts may retain jurisdiction 

without the parties’ consent in Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal orders: 

When the dismissal is pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

41(a)(2), which specifies that the 

action “shall not be dismissed at 

the plaintiff’s instance save upon 

order of the court and upon such 

terms and conditions as the court 

deems proper,” the parties’ 

compliance with the terms of the 

settlement contract (or the court’s 

“retention of jurisdiction” over the 

settlement contract) may, in the 

court’s discretion, be one of the 

terms set forth in the order. Even 

when, as occurred here, the 

dismissal is pursuant to Rule 

41(a)(1)(ii) (which does not by its 

terms empower a district court to 

attach conditions to the parties’ 

stipulation of dismissal) we think 

the court is authorized to embody 

the settlement contract in its 

 

file a motion to reconsider or appeal that order. See Raab 

Reply Br. 13. Thus, no challenge to the dismissal order itself 

is properly before us. 

Case: 15-2147 Document: 003112380633 Page: 14 Date Filed: 08/15/2016
15 

dismissal order (or, what has the 

same effect, retain jurisdiction 

over the settlement contract) if the 

parties agree. 

Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 381-82. The Supreme Court in 

Kokkonen made clear that, for court dismissals made 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2), a 

district court may, in its discretion, “attach conditions to the 

parties’ stipulation of dismissal” — including the retention of 

jurisdiction over the settlement agreement. Id. Thus, the 

absence of a settlement term providing the parties’ consent 

does not render unenforceable the District Court’s retention 

of jurisdiction in a dismissal order under Rule 41(a)(2). 

* * * * * 

 We conclude that Raab was a prevailing party under 

section 1988. Therefore, we will reverse the District Court’s 

order denying Raab attorney’s fees, and remand so that the 

District Court can determine, within its discretion, the 

appropriate amount of fees to which Raab’s counsel is 

entitled. 

IV. 

 We turn to defendant Ocean City’s cross-appeal 

challenging the District Court’s denial of its motion for 

attorney’s fees. It is beyond dispute that Ocean City was a 

“prevailing party,” as none of the claims asserted against the 

city survived the District Court’s order granting Ocean City’s 

motion for summary judgment. 

 Although a prevailing party can be either a plaintiff or 

a defendant, “the standard for awarding attorney’s fees to 

prevailing defendants is more stringent than that for awarding 

fees to prevailing plaintiffs.” Barnes Found. v. Twp. of 

Lower Merion, 242 F.3d 151, 157-58 (3d Cir. 2001). Even 

when a defendant is a prevailing party in a section 1983 

action, he may recover attorney’s fees “only if the District 

Court finds that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, 

unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought 

in subjective bad faith.” Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14 

Case: 15-2147 Document: 003112380633 Page: 15 Date Filed: 08/15/2016
16 

(1980) (quotation marks omitted); accord CRST Van 

Expedited, Inc. v. E.E.O.C., 136 S. Ct. 1642, 1646 (2016) 

(“When a defendant is the prevailing party on a civil rights 

claim, the Court has held, district courts may award attorney’s 

fees if the plaintiff’s ‘claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or 

groundless,’ or if ‘the plaintiff continued to litigate after it 

clearly became so.’” (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. 

E.E.O.C., 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978))). Attorney’s fees for 

prevailing defendants under this standard are “not routine, but 

are to be only sparingly awarded.” Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 

934 F.2d 497, 503 (3d Cir. 1991). “The fact that a plaintiff 

may ultimately lose his case is not in itself a sufficient 

justification for the assessment of fees.” Hughes, 449 U.S. at 

14. Even if a plaintiff’s allegations are ultimately “legally 

insufficient to require a trial,” that alone is not enough to 

render the plaintiff’s cause of action “groundless” or “without 

foundation.” Id. at 15-16.6

 

 On appeal, Ocean City contends that the District Court 

did not use the proper analysis for deciding its fee application 

and abused its discretion in denying its fee application. 

Ocean City argues that the District Court failed to address 

properly the argument that Raab’s claims lacked a factual 

 

6

 In the Title VII context — where an analogous “frivolous, 

unreasonable, or without foundation” standard is employed 

— we have indicated that when determining whether an 

award of counsel fees to a prevailing defendant is appropriate, 

“courts should consider several factors including (1) whether 

the plaintiff established a prima facie case; (2) whether the 

defendant offered to settle; and (3) whether the trial court 

dismissed the case prior to trial or held a full-blown trial on 

the merits.” E.E.O.C. v. L.B. Foster Co., 123 F.3d 746, 751 

(3d Cir. 1997) (quotation marks omitted). Other factors that a 

court may consider are “whether the question in issue was 

one of first impression requiring judicial resolution,” and 

whether “the controversy is based sufficiently upon a real 

threat of injury to the plaintiff.” Barnes Found., 242 F.3d at 

158. “These considerations, however, are merely guidelines, 

not strict rules; thus determinations regarding frivolity are to 

be made on a case-by-case basis.” Id. (quotation and 

alteration marks omitted). 

Case: 15-2147 Document: 003112380633 Page: 16 Date Filed: 08/15/2016
17 

foundation, and claims that the District Court only focused on 

“reasonableness” and whether the claims were “frivolous.” 

 In denying Ocean City’s fee application, the District 

Court explicitly held that Raab’s claims were not frivolous or 

without foundation, and were reasonable. App. 6-7. The 

District Court, accordingly, employed the correct legal 

standard to evaluate Ocean City’s fee application. Nor did 

the District Court abuse its discretion in holding that, at the 

time Raab filed her complaint, it was not unreasonable for 

Raab to allege inadequate training and supervision by Ocean 

City. Deficient training or supervision may form the basis for 

section 1983 liability against a municipality when “both (1) 

contemporaneous knowledge of the offending incident or 

knowledge of a prior pattern of similar incidents; and (2) 

circumstances under which the supervisor’s inaction could be 

found to have communicated a message of approval to the 

offending subordinate are present.” Bonenberger, 132 F.3d at 

25 (quotation marks omitted). In reaching its conclusion, the 

District Court determined that Raab had undisputed evidence 

that one month prior to Raab’s arrest, Ruch had been issued a 

“Performance Notice” wherein “he was counseled by his 

supervisors for his lack of assertiveness and inability to take 

command in handling an unrelated incident.” App. 7. The 

District Court noted that Ruch had admitted that this 

counseling was “in the back of [his] mind” during the 

altercation with Raab. Id. (quotation marks omitted). The 

court reasoned that such evidence made it “not unreasonable 

for [Raab] to argue [municipal liability claims] based upon 

these facts.” Id. Further, the District Court noted that Ocean 

City and Ruch made a joint settlement offer to Raab, which 

“further supports the reasonableness of the claims asserted 

against Ocean City.” App. 7 n.1; see E.E.O.C. v. L.B. Foster 

Co., 123 F.3d 746, 751 (3d Cir. 1997) (indicating that 

whether “the defendant offered to settle” is a factor for 

determining whether an award of attorney’s fees to a 

prevailing defendant is appropriate). 

 We hold that the District Court acted within its 

discretion in finding that Raab’s claims were not frivolous, 

unreasonable, or without foundation. The District Court’s 

decision did not rest “upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, 

an errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law 

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18 

to fact.” Clementon Bd. of Educ., 442 F.3d at 852 (quotation 

marks omitted). Therefore, we will affirm the District 

Court’s denial of Ocean City’s motion for attorney’s fees. 

V. 

 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District 

Court’s order denying Raab’s motion for attorney’s fees and 

will remand to the District Court for proceedings consistent 

with this opinion. We will affirm, however, the District 

Court’s order denying Ocean City’s motion for attorney’s 

fees. 

Case: 15-2147 Document: 003112380633 Page: 18 Date Filed: 08/15/2016