Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02265/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02265-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
KCCP Trust
Appellant
The City of North Kansas City
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Ortrie D. Smith, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-2265

___________

KCCP Trust, a Delaware Statutory * 

Trust, doing business as * 

Time Warner Cable, * 

* 

Appellant, * Appeal from the United States 

* District Court for the 

v. * Western District of Missouri.

* 

The City of North Kansas City, * 

* 

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: September 15, 2005

Filed: December 29, 2005

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, BYE, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

KCCP Trust, doing business as Time Warner Cable, ("Time Warner") sued to

enjoin the City of North Kansas City, Missouri, ("the City") from building a fiberoptic network which it contended Missouri statutory and constitutional law prohibited

in the absence of a referendum. The district court1

 dismissed for lack of jurisdiction

without prejudice. We affirm. 

Appellate Case: 05-2265 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/29/2005 Entry ID: 1991066
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Thus, in order to provide cable television services, the City must either connect

to an existing head end facility or construct its own. Either option is likely to be quite

expensive. The report from Black & Veatch estimated the cost of a head end facility

to vary as follows: (1) if the City builds its own, estimated cost is $720,000; (2) if the

City connects to a head end in the sky, estimated cost is $50,000, plus monthly

reoccurring costs, and plus an estimated cost of $500,000 for equipment to provide

local channels; and (3) if the City connects to an existing head end facility (such as the

one belonging to Time Warner), the cost would depend on the result of negotiations

with that provider.

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I. Background

In June 2003, the City Council passed a resolution to commission a review of

the City's cable infrastructure. The City contracted with Black & Veatch Corporation,

a private engineering firm, to conduct this review. The ensuing report and analysis

proposed that the City construct and operate a fiber-optic network to provide

telephone, internet, and television services to every business and home in the City.

The report stated that providing cable-television services would be necessary in order

for the network to be self-supporting. 

In August 2004, the City Council contracted with Black & Veatch to design and

plan a fiber-optic network. The planned network would provide data, voice, and video

to customers in the City. However, as initially planned and constructed, the network

would not and indeed could not provide cable-television services without being

connected to a cable television head end facility. A head end facility contains the

satellite dishes and other equipment necessary to supply television programming to

a fiber-optic network.2

 The City Council has not yet decided and has never voted on

the issue of whether to provide cable-television services on the planned fiber-optic

network, and the contract with Black & Veatch does not call for the preparation of

plans for the construction of a head end facility or for the connection to an existing

head end facility. 

Appellate Case: 05-2265 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/29/2005 Entry ID: 1991066
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The following month, Time Warner, which currently provides cable television

and other related services to the greater Kansas City area, wrote a letter to the City

stating that it believed that the proposed fiber-optic network would violate Missouri

law and in particular Mo. Rev. Stat. § 71.970. Section 71.970(1) provides that "[n]o

municipality may own or operate cable television facilities and services unless

approved by a vote of the people." The City Council disagreed, advising Time Warner

that the City had not yet decided whether to offer cable-television services over its

fiber-optic network. The City acknowledged that a public vote would be required prior

to offering cable-televison services over the planned network.

Time Warner then filed suit to enjoin the City from taking further steps in the

development or construction of its fiber-optic network without a public vote. In the

alternative, Time Warner sought a ruling that would bar the City from using its

planned fiber-optic network to provide cable-television services without a public vote.

In addition to its claims under Missouri law, Time Warner made several claims under

the United States Constitution. The district court found that it lacked jurisdiction over

the complaint because the case was not ripe for judicial consideration. At that time,

the City had not violated state law nor stated an intention to do so. The district court

found that the City does not own a cable-television facility or offer cable-television

services, noting that the City may do so in the future but then again it might not.

II. Discussion

The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(1). Where, as here, the district court's decision is based upon the

complaint and on its own determination of disputed factual issues, we review those

findings under the "clearly erroneous" standard. Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d

724, 730 (8th Cir. 1990). The district court was not clearly erroneous.

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A. Statutory Claim

Section 71.970(1) expressly prohibits municipalities from owning or operating

cable-television facilities unless the municipality's populace votes to approve the

endeavor. The pertinent question then is whether the City owns or operates such a

facility or is threatening to do so in violation of § 71.970(1). In order to own cabletelevison facilities, the City would require the capacity to receive cable-television

signals for transmission over its fiber-optic network. It is factually undisputed that the

City's fiber-optic network is not connected to the required head end facility to receive

such signals nor is there any plan to acquire it. Thus, Time Warner's statutory claim

rests on a contingent future event: the ownership or operation of a cable-television

facility by the City; therefore, Time Warner's claim that a vote is required under

Missouri law is not ripe in that the City does not currently own or operate a cabletelevision facility because the planned fiber-optic network will not be capable of

transmitting cable-television signals and because the City recognizes that in order for

it to provide cable-television services a public vote would be required. 

"The ripeness doctrine is grounded in both the jurisdictional limits of Article

III of the Constitution and policy considerations of effective court administration."

Pub. Water Supply Dist. No. 8 v. City of Kearney, 401 F.3d 930, 932 (8th Cir. 2005).

Article III limits the federal courts to deciding "Cases" and "Controversies" and thus

prohibits us from issuing advisory opinions. Id. "One kind of advisory opinion is an

opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts." Id.

(internal quotations and citations omitted). "A claim is not ripe for adjudication if it

rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may

not occur at all." Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998) (unanimous

decision) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Ripeness requires a court to

evaluate "both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the

parties of withholding court consideration." Id. at 300–01 (quoting Abbott

Laboratories v. Gardener, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967)).

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Claiming that its case is ripe for adjudication, Time Warner hangs its hat on

South Dakota Mining Ass'n, Inc. v. Lawrence County, 155 F.3d 1005 (8th Cir. 1998).

In South Dakota Mining, we held that the plaintiffs' challenge to a local zoning

ordinance was ripe for review, notwithstanding the fact that the ordinance had not

been enforced against the plaintiffs. South Dakota Mining, 155 F.3d at 1008–09. Had

the plaintiffs applied for a permit, it would have been "an exercise in futility" because

the ordinance plainly prohibited the issuance of any new permits, without exception.

See id. at 1008. Because this would have been an exercise in futility, we did not

require the plaintiffs to apply for the permit and held their action ripe. Id. at 1008–09.

South Dakota Mining, however, is distinguishable. The offending ordinance existed

and threatened plaintiffs though unenforced. Id. at 1008. Here, no threat of state law

violation exists because the antecedent cable-television facility does not exist and its

future existence is uncertain.

If the City seeks to upgrade the network without a public vote, Time Warner

may again seek a preliminary injunction. See Texas, 523 U.S. at 302. The fiber-optic

network that the City plans to build is designed to provide Internet services to the area.

Although Time Warner claims that providing cable-television services is necessary

for the project to be self-supporting, the City has never stated that the network has to

be self-supporting. Many government programs are not, standing alone, selfsupporting. In any event, the facility, as currently planned, will not be capable of

providing cable-television services without upgrade. This upgrade likely will be

costly. The City is aware of § 71.970 and concedes that it would require a public vote

before the network could be upgraded to provide cable-television services. Time

Warner's statutory claim that a vote is required under Missouri law is not ripe. 

B. Constitutional Claims

Because the planned fiber-optic network will not provide cable-television

services without substantial upgrade, and because such an upgrade may never be

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sought, there is currently no ripe case or controversy under Missouri law. Time

Warner's Equal Protection and First Amendment claims under the United States

Constitution are dubious but need not be decided because they are wholly dependent

upon the existence of a valid Missouri statutory claim. We therefore decline to address

them. We affirm the district court's dismissal of this action as not ripe. 

______________________________

Appellate Case: 05-2265 Page: 6 Date Filed: 12/29/2005 Entry ID: 1991066