Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca6-14-06492/USCOURTS-ca6-14-06492-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Amber Nicole Flowers
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

File Name: 16a0069n.06

Case Nos. 14-6492, 15-5213

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

AMBER NICOLE FLOWERS; TIMOTHY JOE 

SWALLOWS,

Defendants-Appellants.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT FOR THE EASTERN 

DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

O P I N I O N

BEFORE: COLE, Chief Judge; SUHRHEINRICH and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

COLE, Chief Judge. Amber Nicole Flowers and Timothy Joe Swallows pleaded guilty to 

aiding and abetting the possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Flowers received 

77 months’ imprisonment, after providing substantial assistance to the government, and 

Swallows received 262 months’ imprisonment, after accounting for his career-offender status. 

Both defendants now appeal their sentences. We affirm.

I.

In June 2012, a local sheriff’s deputy pulled Swallows over for speeding in Bradley 

County, Tennessee. Flowers was in the passenger seat. As the officer approached the driver’sside door, he noticed a “strong odor of alcohol emanating from the vehicle.” The officer asked 

Swallows to exit the vehicle for a field sobriety test. A background check revealed that

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Swallows’s license was revoked for driving under the influence and Flowers had an outstanding 

warrant on a drug charge. Both were arrested.

Flowers was advised of her Miranda rights at the scene and confessed that she had two 

bags of methamphetamine on her person—84.7 grams, 93.4% pure. But she claimed that the 

drugs belonged to Swallows. According to Flowers, Swallows threw the bags at her when they 

saw the “blue lights” and told her to “get rid of [them].” Swallows, meanwhile, was taken to the 

Bradley County jail. He was also advised of his Miranda rights and agreed to speak with two 

detectives after signing a waiver. During the interrogation, Swallows admitted that he was 

“aware of the methamphetamine” and had “used some” that day.

In December 2012, a grand jury indicted Flowers and Swallows on two counts of 

trafficking in methamphetamine. Swallows filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the traffic 

stop and subsequent custodial interrogation violated his constitutional rights. The district court 

denied his motion. Eventually, Flowers and Swallows both pleaded guilty to one count of aiding 

and abetting the possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a), (b)(1)(A) and 18 U.S.C. § 2.

We review the district court’s sentencing decisions and consider Flowers’s and 

Swallows’s arguments in turn.

II.

Flowers’s offense level was set at 27. See USSG §§ 2D1.1, 3E1.1. This designation, 

combined with a criminal history category of IV, see USSG §§ 4A1.1, 1.2, resulted in a 

guidelines range of 100 to 125 months’ imprisonment. See USSG Ch. 5, Pt. A. Flowers

qualified for a 120-month mandatory minimum under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), however, which 

became the low end of her guidelines range. See USSG § 5G1.1.

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At Flowers’s sentencing hearing, the government moved for, and the court granted, a 

three-level substantial assistance departure. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e); USSG § 5K1.1. This 

reduced Flowers’s guidelines range to 77 to 96 months’ imprisonment. Still, Flowers’s counsel 

objected to the extent of the departure. She argued that the district court should have considered 

the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, along with Flowers’s substantial assistance, and varied further 

below the mandatory minimum. She hoped for a non-custodial sentence, given Flowers’s newfound sobriety, work-ethic, and sense of parental responsibility.

The district court considered this argument and rejected it. The court recalled “actually 

[getting] reversed by the Sixth Circuit [for] considering the [§] 3553(a) factors in a substantial 

assistance departure, and [being] chastised by the circuit for doing so.” Flowers’s counsel 

conceded that “Sixth Circuit case law . . . states that the [c]ourt cannot, under [§] 3553(e), 

sentence a defendant below a mandatory minimum based on anything aside from the defendant’s 

cooperation.” The court then went on to acknowledge Flowers’s efforts at self-rehabilitation, but 

also pointed to countervailing concerns of recidivism. After weighing these factors, among 

others, the court decided that the “low end of th[e] guideline[s] range is appropriate” and

sentenced her to 77 months’ imprisonment.

On appeal, Flowers’s primary challenge is to the district court’s decision not to depart 

further below the mandatory minimum. In the ordinary course, we have no jurisdiction to review 

a defendant’s challenge to the extent of a substantial assistance departure. See United States v. 

Curry, 536 F.3d 571, 573 (6th Cir. 2008).

As such, Flowers takes us on a methodological detour. She asks us to remand her case 

for resentencing because, in her view, the district court should have considered the “§ 3553(a) 

factors . . . along with the extent of [her] substantial assistance” to depart further below the 

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mandatory minimum. We review the district court’s legal interpretation of the guidelines de 

novo. United States v. Battaglia, 624 F.3d 348, 351 (6th Cir. 2010).

Flowers’s argument is meritless. We have held, many times over, that “only factors 

relating to a defendant’s cooperation may influence the extent of a departure pursuant to 

§ 3553(e).” United States v. Williams, 687 F.3d 283, 286 (6th Cir. 2012) (emphasis omitted) 

(quoting United States v. Bullard, 390 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 2004)). Every other circuit agrees. 

United States v. Grant, 636 F.3d 803, 814 n.8 (6th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (collecting cases). Here, 

as the district court dutifully recognized, it would have been error to consider the § 3553(a) 

factors to further reduce Flowers’s sentence.1 See Williams, 687 F.3d at 286.

Flowers concedes as much. So, in a last-ditch effort, she urges this court to “abandon its 

prohibition on the consideration of factors other than the defendant’s substantial assistance” and 

allow district courts to engage in plenary sentencing under § 3553(e). In support of this view, 

she directs our attention to provisions that deal with post-incarceration sentence modifications: 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b), which allows for substantial assistance reductions 

 

1

This conclusion “does not mean that context has no role to play in the § 3553(e) analysis.” See Williams, 

687 F.3d at 286. As we have made clear in a recent en banc decision, “district courts have traditionally determined 

the value of a defendant’s substantial assistance” under § 3553(e) and USSG § 5K1.1 by “tak[ing] into account the 

practicalities of the context.” Grant, 636 F.3d. at 816. This qualification remains good law.

To be sure, determining the value of a defendant’s cooperation begins, “as a matter of course,” with 

“consideration of the defendant’s activities on behalf of the government and how much his assistance helped in the 

investigation or prosecution of another.” Id. at 817. But a district court might “wish to consider” other contextual 

factors affecting the valuation:

For example, a district court might recognize that a defendant’s assistance is of extremely high

value but also recognize that fully valuing the cooperation would give the defendant a sentence 

much lower than co-defendants who were far less culpable. Giving a lesser reduction under these 

circumstances might well be warranted. Similarly, if the defendant was among the least culpable 

in a multi-defendant case, his extremely valuable assistance could be fully rewarded. Another 

typical situation involves consideration of a defendant’s capacity for abiding by the law. A 

defendant whose prior criminal activity is non-existent or not too serious could be fully rewarded 

for his valuable assistance, while the valuable cooperation of a defendant who is a threat to society 

might not be rewarded quite so highly. And, finally, a district judge might properly consider a 

sentence below a certain point inappropriate for a defendant convicted of a heinous crime, and 

thus value his cooperation less, while the equivalent cooperation of a defendant who is not a threat 

to society could be fully valued.

Id. Of course, “substantial assistance is the governing principle in this exercise of discretion.” Id. at 816.

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after sentencing, and 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (and its guidelines-counterpart, USSG § 1B1.10), 

which allows for sentence modifications based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been 

lowered by the Sentencing Commission. Flowers asserts that, when reducing a sentence after 

incarceration, these provisions allow a district court to consider the § 3553(a) factors along with 

the defendant’s substantial assistance. It follows, she says, that “[t]here is not a logical reason to 

allow for the consideration of the [§] 3553(a) factors during a defendant’s . . . resentencing, but 

exclude their consideration during her initial sentencing.”

Even if these provisions were relevant to the task at hand, however, Flowers’s argument 

is misguided. We have recently held that the plenary “§ 3553(a) factors have no role in Rule 

35(b) proceedings,” just as they have no role in § 3553(e) motions. Grant, 636 F.3d at 816. 

Our “longstanding practice” has been to interpret Rule 35(b) “in lockstep” with § 3553(e). Id. at 

815. And we have also recognized that sentence modifications under § 3582(c)(2) are “closely 

analogous to Rule 35(b) reductions.” Id. (citing Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 827–28

(2010)). Indeed, as the Supreme Court has said, “[l]ike § 3582(c)(2), Rule 35 delineates a 

limited set of circumstances in which a sentence may be corrected or reduced.” Dillon, 560 U.S. 

at 828. These provisions are “congressional act[s] of lenity” that allow for “limited 

adjustment[s] to an otherwise final sentence and not a plenary resentencing.” See id. at 826, 828.

The 2014 amendments to USSG § 1B1.10 do not change our conclusion. Flowers’s 

applicable guidelines range has not “subsequently been lowered” as a result of a retroactive 

amendment to the guidelines. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2); Dillon, 560 U.S. at 826; USSG 

§ 1B.1.10(a)(1). As such, she is not currently eligible for a sentence modification under this 

provision. See USSG 1B1.10, comment. (n.1). Whatever the effect of the Sentencing 

Commission’s amendments to § 1B1.10, see USSG Supp. App. C, Amdts. 780, 782, 788 

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(effective Nov. 1, 2014), we have no occasion to revisit the longstanding rule that courts may not 

consider non-assistance factors in departing below a mandatory minimum under § 3553(e).

Next, Flowers challenges the substantive reasonableness of her sentence on grounds that 

it is “greater than necessary to comply with the purposes of § 3553(a).” We review for abuse of 

discretion. United States v. Taylor, 800 F.3d 701, 712 (6th Cir. 2015). Substantive 

reasonableness asks whether the length of a particular sentence is appropriate, “tak[ing] into 

account the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the 

Guidelines range.” See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).

Ordinarily, “[t]he essence of a substantive-reasonableness claim is whether the length of 

the sentence is ‘greater than necessary’ to achieve the sentencing goals set forth in 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a).” United States v. Tristan-Madrigal, 601 F.3d 629, 632–33 (6th Cir. 2010). But when 

a mandatory minimum sentence has been challenged as too high, it is “by definition 

substantively reasonable.” United States v. Marshall, 736 F.3d 492, 501 (6th Cir. 2013).

No basis exists for Flowers to argue that her sentence was substantively unreasonable. 

As explained above, after granting the government’s substantial assistance motion, the district 

court lacked discretion to consider the § 3553(a) factors when departing below the mandatory 

minimum. See Grant, 636 F.3d at 816. “The whole point of mandatory minimums is to remove 

from judges the discretion to impose low sentences on sympathetic defendants.” Marshall, 736 

F.3d at 501. Whether Flowers’s sentence is commensurate to the § 3553(a) sentencing factors is 

“immaterial,” as she received the “lowest possible legal sentence.” See Grant, 636 F.3d at 816.

Finally, Flowers argues that her sentence “violates the Eight[h] Amendment prohibition 

against cruel and unusual punishment.” Because she did not raise this argument in the district 

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court, we review it for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Dedman,

527 F.3d 577, 591 (6th Cir. 2008).

The Eighth Amendment “encompasses a narrow proportionality principle” and “forbids 

only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime.” Harmelin v. Michigan, 

501 U.S. 957, 997, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 

Moreover, we “grant substantial deference” to Congress in “determining the types and limits of 

punishments for crimes.” Id. at 999 (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983)). 

Accordingly, a sentence “within the maximum set by statute generally does not constitute cruel 

and unusual punishment.” United States v. Layne, 324 F.3d 464, 474 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting 

Austin v. Jackson, 213 F.3d 298, 302 (6th Cir. 2000)). Here, Flowers’s 77-month sentence—far 

below the 120-month mandatory minimum—was not “grossly disproportionate” to her offense. 

See id. (holding that 87-month sentence for methamphetamine manufacturing, which was “well 

below the twenty-year statutory minimum,” could not “be said to be either ‘extreme’ or ‘grossly 

disproportionate’ to the crime”). Finding no error, plain or otherwise, our review is at an end.

III.

Swallows’s base offense level was set at 34, after an enhancement for his career offender 

status. See USSG §§ 2D1.1, 3E1.1, 4B1.1. His criminal history category was set at VI: 13 

criminal history points for his prior sentences—including three convictions for sale of 

methamphetamine—and an additional two because he committed the instant offense while on 

parole. See USSG §§ 4A1.1, 4A1.2. All of this produced an advisory guidelines range of 262 to 

327 months’ imprisonment. See USSG Ch. 5, Pt. A.

At Swallows’s sentencing hearing, defense counsel made no relevant objections. Instead, 

he “asked for mercy, either [in the form of] a downward variance or a motion [for a sentence] 

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outside of the guidelines.” The court stated, however, that “the facts are pretty clear that 

[Swallows’s] prior felony record justifies classif[ying] him as a career offender.” Ultimately, 

after considering the § 3553(a) factors, the court imposed a bottom-of-the-guidelines sentence:

262 months.

On appeal, Swallows attempts to challenge the district court’s suppression ruling. 

He asserts that the officers “conducted a drug investigation without probable cause” and he did 

not “voluntarily waive his Miranda rights” during the subsequent interrogation. But a defendant 

“may not appeal an adverse ruling on a pre-plea motion to suppress evidence unless he has 

preserved the right to do so by entering a conditional plea of guilty in compliance with [Federal 

Rule of Criminal Procedure] 11(a)(2).” United States v. Bell, 350 F.3d 534, 535 (6th Cir. 2003). 

Here, Swallows entered an unconditional plea without preserving the right to appeal the ruling 

on his suppression motion. He may not raise this issue on appeal.

Next, Swallows challenges the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. He argues that

the “career criminal enhancement over-represented the seriousness of [his] offense.” 

We presume on appeal that a within-guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable. Gall, 552 

U.S. at 51.

Swallows has not rebutted that presumption. See United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 

389–90 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc). Here, the district court took note of the “major problem in our 

communities with methamphetamine” and explained the need “to protect the public 

from [Swallows’s] future crimes.” In the district court’s view, this was “a very 

important consideration” given Swallows’s “marked number of criminal convictions” for 

methamphetamine trafficking. Indeed, as the district court aptly noted, Swallows possessed the 

“type of background that the Sentencing Commission had in mind when it enacted the career 

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offender guideline.” See USSG § 4B1.1 comment. (backg’d) (noting that “substantial prison 

terms should be imposed on . . . repeat drug traffickers”). In any case, the district court imposed

a sentence “at the very bottom” of Swallows’s guidelines range. See United States v. Michael, 

576 F.3d 323, 329 (6th Cir. 2009). This was not an abuse of discretion. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 

51.

IV.

The district court’s sentencing decisions are affirmed.

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