Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-15-03084/USCOURTS-caDC-15-03084-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Devon Cleveland Hunt
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 10, 2016 Decided December 20, 2016

No. 15–3084

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

DEVON CLEVELAND HUNT, ALSO KNOWN AS MAN,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:13-cr-00306-1)

Edward C. Sussman, appointed by the court, argued the 

cause and filed the briefs for the appellant.

Jason B. Feldman, Assistant United States Attorney, 

argued the cause for the appellee. Elizabeth Trosman and 

George P. Eliopoulos, Assistant United States Attorneys, were 

with him on the brief.

Before: HENDERSON and PILLARD, Circuit Judges, and 

GINSBURG, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

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KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Devon 

Hunt has a long history of drug dealing. Over the years he has 

done much of his business at Potomac Gardens, a housing 

project in southeast Washington, D.C. In this case, he 

conspired to distribute heroin from there. He pleaded guilty 

pursuant to a plea agreement in which he anticipatorily waived 

his right to appeal certain aspects of his sentence. The district 

court sentenced him to 62 months of imprisonment, to be 

followed by five years of supervised release. Without saying 

why, the court conditioned Hunt’s supervised release on his 

staying away from Potomac Gardens. Hunt objected to the 

condition but not to the lack of explanation.

Hunt now appeals, challenging both the stay-away 

condition and the district court’s failure to explain it. The 

government argues that Hunt’s appeal waiver bars his claims. 

We disagree. The waiver contains ambiguities that the court 

compounded during the plea colloquy. We construe the 

ambiguities against the government, which drafted the plea 

agreement and provided no clarification during the colloquy. 

We nevertheless uphold the stay-away condition because 

Hunt’s claims fail on the merits. First, because he did not 

object to the court’s failure to explain the condition, we review 

his procedural claim for plain error only. To the extent there 

was a procedural error, it was not plain and did not affect his 

substantial rights. Second, as a substantive matter, the 

condition is well within the court’s wide discretion. It will

sensibly keep Hunt away from a neighborhood in which he has 

conducted numerous drug deals. And because he neither lives 

in the neighborhood nor alleges that he has family there, the 

condition does not unduly restrict his liberty.

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I. BACKGROUND

A. HUNT’S OFFENSES, PAST AND PRESENT

Hunt has ties with Potomac Gardens but they are not to his 

credit. In 1987, he conducted at least three heroin deals there. 

In 1990, he assaulted police officers there. In 1994, he again 

participated in a series of heroin sales there. In the process, he 

threatened security guards and told a young child to keep an 

eye out for police. After he pleaded guilty to conspiracy 

based on the 1994 conduct, a long jail term kept him away from 

Potomac Gardens until at least 2006. In June 2009, the D.C. 

Housing Authority barred him from the complex. He was not 

deterred: narcotics officers found him at Potomac Gardens just 

a few months later.

From late 2012 to early 2013, while residing elsewhere, 

Hunt once again used Potomac Gardens as a base of operations 

for drug dealing. He repeatedly sold heroin from there 

through a middleman to a confidential source. The deals 

involved a total of more than 100 grams of heroin. Based on 

those deals, the government charged him here with conspiring 

to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute 100 grams 

or more of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. It also 

charged him with six related drug offenses.

B. THE GUILTY PLEA

Hunt was arrested and agreed to plead guilty to the 

conspiracy count in exchange for the government’s dismissal 

of the other counts. The parties stipulated to an imprisonment 

range of 60 to 65 months and a five-year term of supervised 

release. Pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of 

Criminal Procedure, the parties further agreed that the 

sentencing range and five-year term of supervised release 

would bind the district court if it accepted the plea agreement. 

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Finally, Hunt agreed to waive some of his appellate rights with 

respect to his sentence. In pertinent part, the appeal waiver 

stated:

[Hunt] understands that federal law, 

specifically 18 U.S.C. § 3742, affords 

defendants the right to appeal their sentences in 

certain circumstances. [Hunt] agrees to waive 

the right to appeal the sentence in this case, 

including any term of imprisonment, fine, 

forfeiture, award of restitution, term of 

supervised release, authority of the Court to set 

conditions of release, and the manner in which 

the sentence was determined, except to the 

extent the Court sentences [Hunt] above the 

statutory maximum or guidelines range 

determined by the Court or [Hunt] claims that 

[he] received ineffective assistance of counsel, 

in which case [he] would have the right to 

appeal the illegal sentence or above-guidelines 

sentence or raise on appeal a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel, but not to 

raise on appeal other issues regarding the 

sentencing.

Plea Agreement, Dkt. No. 121 at 8.

The district court held a plea hearing on the same day that 

Hunt signed the plea agreement. Midway through the 

hearing, the court told him that “you [are] generally giving up 

your rights to appeal,” with certain “exceptions.” Plea Tr. 31 

(Aug. 13, 2015). As relevant here, the court said Hunt could 

appeal if he “think[s] the sentence is illegal or it exceeds the 

applicable Sentencing Guidelines range or resulted from 

ineffective assistance of counsel . . . .” Id. Later in the 

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hearing, the court again discussed the appeal waiver but did not 

suggest, as before, that the waiver permits appeal from an 

“illegal” sentence. Id. at 51. The government did not object 

to the court’s inconsistent characterizations of the waiver or 

otherwise offer clarification. The court accepted Hunt’s 

guilty plea.

C. SENTENCING

In a presentencing memorandum, the government 

emphasized Hunt’s “long term connection” to criminal activity 

at Potomac Gardens and asked the district court to “order as a 

condition of [his] supervised release that [he] stay away from” 

the complex. Government’s Mem. in Aid of Sentencing, Dkt. 

No. 136 at 7, 9.

At the sentencing hearing, the government renewed its 

request for a stay-away condition. In support, it listed the 

crimes that Hunt committed at Potomac Gardens. The 

government added that “[h]e hasn’t lived there.” Sent. Tr. 16 

(Nov. 20, 2015). Without disputing the government’s 

recitation—except to say that Hunt lived at Potomac Gardens 

“at one point”—defense counsel responded that a “stay[-]away 

order from a particular large area of town is inappropriate,” 

especially because Hunt “knows many people there . . . who 

have nothing to do with drugs or illegal activity.” Id. at 24. 

Defense counsel also suggested that a stay-away condition was 

unnecessary because Hunt was forbidden “to engage in illegal 

activities” in any event. Id.

Consistent with the plea agreement, the district court 

sentenced Hunt to 62 months of imprisonment and five years of 

supervised release. As a condition of that release, the court 

ordered Hunt to stay away from Potomac Gardens. 

Specifically, the court stated:

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[W]ithout the prior approval of the U.S. 

Probation Office, you shall not enter the 

grounds of the Potomac Gardens housing 

complex area in Southeast Washington, D.C., 

or any structure in it, as bounded by the areas of 

Pennsylvania Avenue, Southeast, to the north; 

14th Street, Southeast, to the east; K Street, 

Southeast, to the south; and 11th Street, 

Southeast, to the west.

Sent. Tr. 31. The court did not further explain the condition. 

After imposing sentence, it asked: “Are there any other matters 

we need to take up, Counsel?” Id. at 32-33. Defense counsel 

responded: “I don’t believe so, sir.” Id. at 33.

II. ANALYSIS

As noted, Hunt challenges the stay-away condition and the 

district court’s failure to explain it. Before addressing the 

merits, we consider whether the appeal waiver bars his claims 

ab initio.

1

 1

 Waiver of appellate rights is a threshold issue but not a 

jurisdictional one. United States v. Shemirani, 802 F.3d 1, 3 & n.1 

(D.C. Cir. 2015). We usually address it as an essential gateway to 

the merits, see, e.g., United States v. Adams, 780 F.3d 1182, 1183-84 

(D.C. Cir. 2015) (enforcing waiver without considering merits); 

United States v. Guillen, 561 F.3d 527, 529, 532 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 

(same), but not always, see, e.g., Shemirani, 802 F.3d at 3 (rejecting 

sentencing claims on merits where alleged waiver implicated 

“difficult” and “unsettled” issues better left for another day); United 

States v. Ransom, 756 F.3d 770, 773 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (taking similar 

approach). We decide the waiver issue here in the interest of sound 

judicial administration: the provision in Hunt’s plea agreement is 

one the government uses as a matter of standard practice in this 

Circuit, Oral Arg. Recording 18:54-19:18, but it is ambiguous for 

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A. HUNT’S APPEAL WAIVER DOES NOT UNAMBIGUOUSLY

BAR HIS CHALLENGES TO THE STAY-AWAY CONDITION.

Like a guilty plea more generally, see United States v. 

Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 631-32 (2002), an appeal waiver serves the 

important function of resolving a criminal case swiftly and 

finally, see United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1318, 1325 

(10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (per curiam). It also gives the 

defendant “an additional bargaining chip” during plea 

negotiations and thereby “increases the probability he will 

reach a satisfactory plea agreement with the Government” in 

the first place. United States v. Guillen, 561 F.3d 527, 530 

(D.C. Cir. 2009). We have held that a “knowing, intelligent, 

and voluntary” appeal waiver, even though “anticipatory,” 

“generally may be enforced.” Id. at 529. And we ordinarily 

dismiss an appeal falling within the scope of such a waiver. 

See, e.g., United States v. Adams, 780 F.3d 1182, 1184 (D.C. 

Cir. 2015); Guillen, 561 F.3d at 532; see also, e.g., United 

States v. Ortega-Hernandez, 804 F.3d 447, 452 (D.C. Cir. 

2015) (partially dismissing appeal based on waiver); In re 

Sealed Case, 283 F.3d 349, 355 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (same). But 

cf. United States v. West, 392 F.3d 450, 460-61 (D.C. Cir. 

2004) (enforcing waiver but affirming district court’s 

judgment rather than dismissing appeal).

But we will not bar the door to a criminal defendant’s 

appeal if his waiver only arguably or ambiguously forecloses 

his claims. A plea agreement is a contract and so we advert to 

principles of contract law in interpreting it. United States v. 

 

reasons we explain below. We strongly recommend that the 

government revise the provision. Although we do not purport to 

dictate particulars, one appropriate revision would be to change the 

phrase “term of supervised release” to “term or condition of 

supervised release.”

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Henry, 758 F.3d 427, 431 (D.C. Cir. 2014); United States v. 

Jones, 58 F.3d 688, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Ambiguity in a plea 

agreement, as in any other type of contract, is construed against 

the drafter. Henry, 758 F.3d at 431; In re Sealed Case, 702 

F.3d 59, 63 n.2, 65 (D.C. Cir. 2012); see RESTATEMENT 

(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1981) (“In choosing among 

the reasonable meanings of a promise or agreement or a term 

thereof, that meaning is generally preferred which operates 

against the party who supplies the words or from whom a 

writing otherwise proceeds.”). The government drafted 

Hunt’s plea agreement. If the agreement does not 

unambiguously preclude Hunt from appealing the issues he 

presents to us, he has not knowingly, intelligently and 

voluntarily waived them. In re Sealed Case, 702 F.3d at 65 

(where appeal waiver was “at the very least . . . ambiguous,” 

defendant “did not knowingly waive his right to appeal”); 

accord United States v. Binkholder, 832 F.3d 923, 926 (8th Cir. 

2016) (court enforces appeal waiver only if, inter alia, “a given 

appeal is clearly and unambiguously within [its] scope”) 

(internal quotation omitted); Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325 (holding 

similarly).

Reviewing Hunt’s appeal waiver de novo, see Henry, 758 

F.3d at 431; Guillen, 561 F.3d at 531, we conclude that it does 

not unambiguously foreclose his challenges to the stay-away 

condition. Like statutory construction, see, e.g., Jimenez v. 

Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 118 (2009), interpretation of a plea 

agreement begins with plain language, see, e.g., Ramsey v. U.S. 

Parole Comm’n, 840 F.3d 853, 860 (D.C. Cir. 2016). The key 

language of the appeal waiver provides that Hunt “agrees to 

waive the right to appeal the sentence in this case, including 

any term of imprisonment, fine, forfeiture, award of restitution, 

term of supervised release, authority of the Court to set 

conditions of release, and the manner in which the sentence 

was determined . . . .” Plea Agreement, Dkt. No. 121 at 8.

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One reasonable interpretation of the provision is that Hunt 

waived the right to appeal any aspect of his sentence, including 

the conditions of supervised release and the manner in which 

they were imposed. After all, the word “including” is 

ordinarily illustrative rather than limiting. See, e.g., Bloate v. 

United States, 559 U.S. 196, 206-07 (2010). Also, supervised 

release and the conditions thereof are part of “the sentence” by 

statutory default. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(a), 3742(a)(3); see 

United States v. Higgins, 739 F.3d 733, 738 & nn.11-12 (5th 

Cir. 2014).

We are not convinced, however, that the only permissible 

interpretation of the provision is the one set out above or that 

Hunt read it that way when he signed the plea agreement. He 

might reasonably have believed that the clauses about his 

“term of supervised release” and the “authority of the Court to 

set conditions of release” occupy the field as to supervised 

release, displacing the more general waiver in that context. 

See Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 407 (1991) 

(ordinarily, “[a] specific provision controls over one of more 

general application”). And neither clause about supervised 

release unambiguously bars the claims Hunt advances in this 

Court.

By waiving his right to appeal any “term of supervised 

release,” Hunt did not necessarily give up the right to appeal a 

condition of such release. True, “term” can mean “condition.” 

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1698 (10th ed. 2014). But in the 

context of Hunt’s appeal waiver, it more likely connotes 

“duration.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 

DICTIONARY, UNABRIDGED 2358 (1993). The provision 

covers “any term of imprisonment . . . [and] term of supervised 

release.” Plea Agreement, Dkt. No. 121 at 8. As the 

government does not dispute, “term of imprisonment” refers to 

the duration of Hunt’s imprisonment. It likely follows that 

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“term of supervised release,” appearing in the same sentence as 

“term of imprisonment,” refers to the duration of Hunt’s 

supervised release. See Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 

153, 164-65 (1985) (“It is logical to assume that the same word 

has the same meaning when it is . . . used earlier in the same 

sentence.”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 

§ 202(2) (contract “is interpreted as a whole”).

Likewise, by waiving his right to challenge the “authority 

of the Court to set conditions of release,” Plea Agreement, Dkt. 

No. 121 at 8 (emphasis added), Hunt did not unambiguously 

give up the right to appeal the stay-away condition itself. He 

does not claim that the condition is ultra vires. Cf. United 

States v. Malenya, 736 F.3d 554, 557 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 

Instead, the gravamen of his appeal is that the condition “was 

imposed in violation of law,” 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1), because 

the court did not adequately explain it under 18 U.S.C. § 

3553(c) and because it is substantively unreasonable under 18 

U.S.C. §§ 3553(a) and 3583(d). 

Finally, instead of clarifying the plea agreement’s 

ambiguities, the plea colloquy exacerbated them. The district 

court indicated—without correction or qualification from the 

government—that one of the “exceptions” to Hunt’s 

“general[]” waiver permits him to appeal if he “think[s] the 

sentence is illegal . . . .” Plea Tr. 31. Consistent with our 

analysis above, Hunt might reasonably have understood the 

court to mean he could appeal a supervised release condition 

that, in his view, “was imposed in violation of law” because 

procedurally or substantively erroneous. 18 U.S.C. § 

3742(a)(1); see United States v. Godoy, 706 F.3d 493, 495 

(D.C. Cir. 2013) (in everyday usage, “illegal sentence” means 

one that is erroneous for legal reasons). A criminal defendant 

may take a district court’s “oral pronouncement” about a 

written waiver at face value even if it “mischaracterizes” the 

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waiver, Godoy, 706 F.3d at 495-96, and even if the waiver is 

otherwise unambiguous, see United States v. Kaufman, 791 

F.3d 86, 88 (D.C. Cir. 2015); United States v. Wilken, 498 F.3d 

1160, 1167-69 (10th Cir. 2007). A fortiori, and especially 

because the government made no objection and offered no 

clarification, see Kaufman, 791 F.3d at 88; Godoy, 706 F.3d at 

495, Hunt was entitled to rely on the court’s characterization of 

the ambiguous waiver as permitting him to appeal a supervised 

release condition resting on (in his view) procedural and 

substantive legal error.

B. HUNT’S CHALLENGES TO THE STAY-AWAY CONDITION 

ARE MERITLESS.

Although Hunt has not waived his claims about the 

stay-away condition, they lack merit.

1. The district court did not commit

plain procedural error.

Hunt did not object at the sentencing hearing to the district 

court’s failure to substantiate the stay-away condition. Sent. 

Tr. 32-33 (Q: “Are there any other matters we need to take up, 

Counsel?” A: “I don’t believe so, sir.”). Accordingly, we 

review his procedural challenge for plain error only. United 

States v. Sullivan, 451 F.3d 884, 896 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 

(reviewing for plain error where defendant and his lawyer “sat 

in court while the judge pronounced the sentence, but they 

never voiced an objection on the ground that the District Court 

had failed to substantiate the conditions of release”); see 

United States v. Bigley, 786 F.3d 11, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (per 

curiam) (“When a defendant fails to timely raise a procedural 

reasonableness objection at sentencing, this Court reviews for 

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plain error.”). 2

 Under the plain-error standard, Hunt must 

demonstrate that the district court (1) “committed error”; (2) 

“that is plain” or obvious; (3) “that affects [his] substantial 

rights”; and (4) that “‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, 

or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” United States 

v. Locke, 664 F.3d 353, 357 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Johnson 

v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997)) (second alteration 

in Johnson). Assuming without deciding that Hunt meets the 

first requirement, we conclude that he cannot satisfy the other 

three.

Neither the United States Supreme Court nor our Court 

has squarely decided whether a district court must make 

express findings to substantiate a special condition of 

supervised release.3

 That alone dooms Hunt’s claim of plain 

 2 Hunt notes that he objected to the condition itself. 

Appellant’s Br. 15. That objection did not preserve his claim about 

the lack of explanation. United States v. Deatherage, 682 F.3d 755, 

763 (8th Cir. 2012) (“A general objection at sentencing to the 

substantive restriction imposed by a special condition is not enough 

to preserve an allegation that the court did not adequately explain its 

specific reasons for imposing the special condition.”); United States 

v. Watson, 582 F.3d 974, 981 (9th Cir. 2009) (similar holding).

3

 Our sister circuits are divided on the issue. Compare United 

States v. Falor, 800 F.3d 407, 411 (7th Cir. 2015) (express findings 

required); United States v. Martinez-Torres, 795 F.3d 1233, 1238 

(10th Cir. 2015) (same); United States v. Salazar, 743 F.3d 445, 451 

(5th Cir. 2014) (same); United States v. Poitra, 648 F.3d 884, 889 

(8th Cir. 2011) (same); United States v. Miller, 594 F.3d 172, 184 

(3d Cir. 2010) (same); United States v. Armel, 585 F.3d 182, 186 (4th 

Cir. 2009) (same); United States v. Brogdon, 503 F.3d 555, 563 (6th 

Cir. 2007) (same); and United States v. Brown, 653 F. App’x 50, 51 

(2d Cir. 2016) (unpublished summary order) (same), with United 

States v. Garrasteguy, 559 F.3d 34, 42 (1st Cir. 2009) (express 

findings not required where reasons can be inferred from record); 

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procedural error. United States v. Terrell, 696 F.3d 1257, 

1260 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (error ordinarily cannot be “plain” 

unless “a clear precedent in the Supreme Court or this circuit 

establishe[s] its erroneous character”). To cinch matters, we 

have held in an analogous case that a lack of findings, even if 

error, was not plain error. Sullivan, 451 F.3d at 896 (affirming 

sentence where defendant did not contemporaneously object to 

district court’s “fail[ure] to substantiate the conditions of 

release” and did not advance any “viable basis for ascribing 

plain error to” sentencing judge). We see no basis for a 

different conclusion here.

Nor does the lack of explanation or findings affect Hunt’s 

substantial rights or call into question the fairness, integrity or 

public reputation of judicial proceedings. The district court 

imposed the stay-away condition moments after the parties 

argued about its merits. The sequence and timing strongly 

suggest the court endorsed the government’s arguments that 

(1) Hunt’s many crimes at Potomac Gardens warranted the 

condition; and (2) the condition did not unduly restrict his 

liberty because “[h]e hasn’t lived” at the complex. Sent. Tr. 

15-16. We discern no prejudice from the court’s failure to say 

out loud that it agreed with the government. See United States 

v. Balon, 384 F.3d 38, 41 n.1 (2d Cir. 2004) (defendant 

suffered no prejudice from any error in court’s failure 

“expressly [to] articulate on the record why it was imposing 

[certain] conditions of supervised release” because reason was 

“self-evident in the record”); cf. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 

338, 359 (2007) (“Where a matter is . . . conceptually simple 

. . . and the record makes clear that the sentencing judge 

 

United States v. Betts, 511 F.3d 872, 876 & n.8 (9th Cir. 2007) 

(same); United States v. Ridgeway, 319 F.3d 1313, 1317 (11th Cir. 

2003) (similar). 

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considered the evidence and arguments, we do not believe the 

law requires the judge to write more extensively.”).

2. The district court did not abuse its discretion

under section 3583(d).

The government concedes, and we agree, that Hunt 

preserved his substantive challenge to the stay-away condition 

by objecting to it at the sentencing hearing. Nonetheless, as 

with most sentencing matters, the standard of review is 

deferential. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), a district court may 

impose “any condition . . . it considers to be 

appropriate”—including “a discretionary condition” typically 

associated with probation under section 3563(b)—so long as 

the condition:

(1) is reasonably related to the [sentencing] 

factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), 

(a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D);

(2) involves no greater deprivation of liberty 

than is reasonably necessary for the purposes 

set forth in section 3553(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), 

and (a)(2)(D); and 

(3) is consistent with any pertinent policy 

statements issued by the Sentencing 

Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(a) . . . .

The district judge has “wide discretion when imposing 

terms and conditions of supervised release” under section 

3583(d) because he is in the best position to “measure[] the 

conditions imposed against the statutorily enumerated 

sentencing goals.” Sullivan, 451 F.3d at 895 (internal 

quotation omitted); see Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 

(2007) (“The judge sees and hears the evidence, makes 

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credibility determinations, has full knowledge of the facts and 

gains insights not conveyed by the record.”) (internal quotation 

omitted). We therefore review the substantive validity of the 

stay-away condition under an abuse-of-discretion standard. 

United States v. Burroughs, 613 F.3d 233, 240 (D.C. Cir. 

2010); Sullivan, 451 F.3d at 895. 

The district court did not abuse its discretion in 

concluding, albeit implicitly, that the stay-away condition is 

tailored to Hunt’s criminal history, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), will 

deter him from criminal conduct, id. § 3553(a)(2)(B), and will 

protect the public from further crimes at his hands, id. § 

3553(a)(2)(C). Hunt’s primary contention to the contrary is 

that the condition does not prevent him from dealing drugs 

anywhere outside Potomac Gardens. Appellant’s Br. 20-21 

(“[D]rug dealing is hardly a crime that knows geographical 

boundaries. . . . If a defendant is inclined to continue his 

criminal behavior while on supervised release, he certainly will 

find a suitable locale for his activities.”). We do not agree that 

Hunt’s potential recidivism renders the condition 

unreasonable. As defense counsel noted at sentencing, 

another condition of Hunt’s supervised release prohibits him 

from “commit[ting] another federal, state, or local crime.” 

Sent. Tr. 30. And it is a federal offense to deal or conspire to 

deal illegal drugs. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a), 846. The 

stay-away condition dovetails with the general prohibition: the 

point is to make drug dealing more difficult for or less tempting 

to Hunt in case he decides to break the law again. The fact 

that he participated in so many deals at Potomac Gardens 

suggests he has established drug contacts there. If the 

stay-away condition does anything to dry up his sources of 

supply or his customer base, it can only help keep him out of 

trouble and thereby serve the purposes of sentencing. See 

United States v. Watson, 582 F.3d 974, 983 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(“Separating a convicted felon from negative influences in his 

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prior life is reasonably related to the permissible goals of 

deterrence and rehabilitation and is a common purpose of 

supervised release.”).

Nor does the stay-away condition unduly restrict Hunt’s 

liberty. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2). The Congress contemplated 

that a district court may require a defendant—as “a 

discretionary condition” of supervised release, id. § 

3583(d)—to “refrain from frequenting specified kinds of 

places” and “from residing in a specified place or area,” id. § 

3563(b)(6), (13). We reject Hunt’s contention that the district 

court went too far by “preclud[ing him] from entering a rather 

large section of the District of Columbia.” Appellant’s Reply 

Br. 6. For starters, “rather large” is a rather large 

overstatement. The condition keeps Hunt away from a single 

housing project, plus about an extra city block in each 

direction. Using a Google map to measure the metes and 

bounds the district court plotted, we take judicial notice that the 

restricted area covers about 50 acres. See United States v. 

Burroughs, 810 F.3d 833, 835 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (taking 

judicial notice of Google map whose “‘accuracy [could not] 

reasonably be questioned’” for relevant purpose) (quoting FED.

R. EVID. 201(b)(2)). There are 640 acres in a square mile, see 

Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 686 n.23 (1979), 

which means the restricted area covers about 0.078 square 

miles. The District of Columbia encompasses about 68 

square miles. See Jones v. D.C. Armory Bd., 438 F.2d 138, 

141 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (per curiam). In other words, the 

restricted area comprises just over one one-thousandth of the 

District. That is a minimal imposition, especially when 

compared to the city- and county-wide restrictions that our 

sister circuits have upheld in analogous cases. See, e.g., 

Watson, 582 F.3d at 977-78, 983-85 (gang member prohibited 

from entering San Francisco); United States v. Garrasteguy, 

559 F.3d 34, 40-44 (1st Cir. 2009) (drug dealers prohibited 

USCA Case #15-3084 Document #1651775 Filed: 12/20/2016 Page 16 of 17
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from entering Suffolk County, Massachusetts) (plain-error 

review); United States v. Sicher, 239 F.3d 289, 289-93 (3d Cir. 

2000) (drug dealer prohibited from entering two Pennsylvania 

counties) (plain-error review); United States v. Cothran, 855 

F.2d 749, 750-53 (11th Cir. 1988) (drug dealer prohibited from 

entering Fulton County, Georgia).

Furthermore, like the conditions in some of the cases cited 

above, the stay-away condition here is not absolute. It forbids 

Hunt to enter Potomac Gardens and the immediate vicinity 

“without the prior approval of the U.S. Probation Office.” 

Sent. Tr. 31. If he has any legitimate cause to enter the 

complex—e.g., to visit family—he can prevail upon his 

probation officer, who we presume will act reasonably under 

the circumstances. See United States v. Love, 593 F.3d 1, 12 

(D.C. Cir. 2010). Hunt does not even allege that he resides or 

has family at Potomac Gardens. The closest he comes is his 

assertion that he lived there “at one point,” Sent. Tr. 24, and 

“has been a member of the Potomac Gardens community for 

much of his adult life,” Appellant’s Br. 20. He claims no 

specific hardship, however, and it is hard to see how he could. 

His counsel acknowledged at oral argument that he did not live 

there at the time of the offense. Oral Arg. Recording 

8:18-10:00. And to the extent he has friends there who are not 

involved in the drug trade, Sent. Tr. 24, he can meet them 

anywhere he chooses outside the restricted boundaries, which 

are unmistakably defined.

The district court did not plainly err in failing to explain 

the stay-away condition and did not abuse its discretion in 

imposing it. Accordingly, we affirm the court’s judgment.

So ordered.

USCA Case #15-3084 Document #1651775 Filed: 12/20/2016 Page 17 of 17