Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01112/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01112-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH FILED 

Uaicod Srares Court of Appeals 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT JUL -9 1991 

llOBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

CHEROKEE NATION OF OKLAHOMA, ) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. No. 88-1112 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

ON APPEAL PROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. 83-306-C) 

James G. Wilcoxen, Wilcoxen & Cate, Muskogee, Oklahoma (Paul M. 

Niebell, Washington, D.C., was also on the brief) for PlaintiffAppellant. 

Maria A. Iizuka, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (Roger J. 

Marzulla, Assistant Attorney General, Washington, D.C.; Roger 

Hilfiger, United States Attorney and Ralph Keen, Assistant United 

States Attorney, Muskogee, Oklahoma; Pauline H. Milius and Edward 

J. Shawaker, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; and Whit 

Field, Office of the Solicitor, Department of the Interior, 

Washington, D.C., were also on the brief) for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before HOLLONAY Chief Judge, SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge, and BRONN, 

District Judge·' 

HOLLONAY, Chief Judge 

* 

The Honorable Wesley E. Brown, United States District Judge 

for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 88-1112 Document: 01019293714 Date Filed: 07/09/1991 Page: 1 
I 

This action was brought by the Cherokee Nation pursuant to a 

special jurisdictional grant to the Court of Claims or the United 

States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma. Pub. 

L. No. 97-385, 96 Stat. 1944-45 (1982). 1 The complaint was filed 

in the Eastern District of Oklahoma stating two theories of 

recovery sought for damages to assets of the Cherokee Nation 

resulting from actions of the United States Army Corps of 

Engineers in constructing the Arkansas River Navigation System. 

The damages were alleged to have occurred on lands of the 

Cherokee Nation, consisting of a portion of the riverbed of the 

Arkansas River in Oklahoma. The first claim was for a taking 

without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 

The second claim was for violation of the principles of fair and 

1 

The pertinent portion of the Act, which was approved December 

23, 1982, reads as follows: 

That (a) notwithstanding sections 2401 and 2501 of title 

28, United States Code, and section 12 of the Act of 

August 13, 1946, as amended (the Indian Claims Commission Act, 60 Stat. 1049, 1052; 25 U.S.C. 70k), 

jurisdiction is hereby conferred upon the United States 

Court of Claims, or upon the United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma, to hear, 

determine, and render judgment, under the jurisdictional 

provisions of section 2 of the Indian Claims Commission 

Act of August 13, 1946, as amended (60 Stat. 1049, 1050; 

25 u.s.c. 70a), on any claim which the Cherokee Nation 

of Oklahoma may have against the United States for any 

and all damages to Cherokee tribal assets related to and 

arising from construction of the Arkansas River Navigation System, including, but not limited to, the value of 

sand, gravel, coal, and other resources taken, the value 

of damsites and powerheads of dams constructed on that 

part of the Arkansas riverbed within Cherokee domain in 

Oklahoma, without the authority or consent of said 

Cherokee Nation; . . . . 

2 

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honorable dealings between the United States and the Cherokee Nation, grounded on the "fair and honorable dealings" clause of the 

Indian Claims Commission Act, 60 Stat. 1050, 25 u.s.c. § 70a(5) 

(1976). 2 More specifically, the Cherokee Nation claims that the 

Corps of Engineers altered the natural channel of the riverbed, 

destroyed sand and gravel assets, rendered oil, gas and coal 

deposits inaccessible, and constructed dams in the riverbed, two 

of which are generating electricity for profit, although not inuring to the benefit of the Cherokee Nation. 3 Brief of Appellant at 

2 

The pertinent portion of the statute provided: 

The Commission shall hear and determine the following claims against the United States on behalf of any 

Indian tribe, band, or other identifiable group of 

American Indians residing within the territorial limits 

of the United States or Alaska: (1) claims in law or 

equity arising under the Constitution, laws, treaties of 

the United States, and Executive orders of the 

President; (2) all other claims in law or equity, 

including those sounding in tort, with respect to which 

the claimant would have been entitled to sue in a court 

of the United States if the United States was subject to 

suit; (3) claims which would result if the treaties, 

contracts, and agreements between the claimant and the 

United States were revised on the ground of fraud, 

duress, unconscionable consideration, mutual or 

unilateral mistake, whether of law or fact, or any other 

ground cognizable by a court of equity; (4) claims 

arising from the taking by the United States, whether as 

the result of a treaty of cession or otherwise, of lands 

owned or occupied by the claimant without the payment 

for such lands of compensation agreed to by the claimant; and (5) claims based upon fair and honorable dealings that are not recognized by any existing rule of law 

or equity. . . . 

(emphasis added). 

3 

The Supreme Court had earlier determined that treaties 

between the Cherokee, Chickasaw and Choctaw Tribes and the United 

States granted to the tribes fee simple title to the riverbed 

underlying specified portions of the Arkansas River in Oklahoma. 

Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620 (1970). The Court held 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

3 

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5-6. 

The district court granted partial summary judgment for the 

Cherokee Nation on the taking claim and an interlocutory appeal 

was granted by this court, resulting in an affirmance by this 

court of the ruling favorable to the Cherokee Nation on the taking 

claim, one judge dissenting. Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma v. 

United States, 782 F.2d 871 (lOth Cir. 1986), rev'd, 480 U.S. 700 

(1987). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the tribal 

interests at issue did not include the right to be free from the 

navigational servitude of the United States and that exercise of 

the servitude was not an invasion of any private property rights 

in the stream or the lands underlying it. United States v. 

Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, 480 U.S. 700, 707-08 (1987). As the 

Court noted in its opinion, the district court had addressed only 

the taking claim, and had not ruled on the fair and honorable 

dealings claim; the court of appeals accordingly did not consider 

that claim and it was not before the Supreme Court. Id. at 702 

n.l. 

(Footnote continued): 

that in grants it made to the Cherokee, Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, the United States conveyed title to the bed of the Arkansas 

River below its junction with the Grand River in Oklahoma within 

the present State of Oklahoma. Id. at 635-36. It was later 

determined with respect to the portion of said riverbed from the 

confluence of the Canadian River and the Arkansas River to the 

Oklahoma-Arkansas boundary line that the Cherokee Nation owned the 

north half of the riverbed, and that the south half of the 

riverbed was owned by the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations; that 

with respect to said south half of the riverbed from the Canadian 

fork to the Arkansas-Oklahoma boundary, the Choctaw Nation had an 

undivided 3/4 interest and the Chickasaw Nation had an undivided 

1/4 interest. Choctaw Nation v. Cherokee Nation, 393 F.Supp. 224, 

226, 246 (E.D. Okla. 1975). 

4 

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On remand, cross motions were made for summary judgment and 

the district court decided the remaining fair and honorable dealings claim, with the issues of liability and damages respecting 

that claim being bifurcated. The parties agreed, and the district 

court found, that there were no disputed issues of fact and the 

claim was resolved on the submitted cross motions for summary 

judgment and supporting briefs. The district judge held that the 

Cherokee Nation had failed to establish that any special obligation or undertaking to the Cherokee Nation had been assumed by the 

United States by treaty, statute, agreement or representations. 

Since the Cherokee Nation could not establish that first required 

element of a fair and honorable dealings claim, summary judgment 

was granted for the United States in an unpublished order granting 

defendant's motion for summary judgment and denying plaintiff's 

motion for summary judgment. I R. Doc. 14 at 3-5. This appeal by 

the Cherokee Nation followed. 

II 

A. 

First, we address the proposition of the Cherokee Nation that 

the district court erred in failing to find that a special 

fiduciary relationship did exist between the Cherokee Nation and 

the United States which gave rise to a moral obligation to 

compensate the Tribe. Brief of Appellant at 16. 

In Aleut Community of St. Paul Island v. United States, 480 

F.2d 831, 838-39 (Ct.Cl. 1973), in upholding the sufficiency of 

allegations stating a claim for breach of fair and honorable dealings, the court thus stated the test for establishing a fair and 

honorable dealings claim: 

5 

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The cases of Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community, supra; Lipan Apache Tribe v. United States, 180 

Ct.Cl. 487 (1967), and Oneida Tribe of Indians of 

Wisconsin v. United States, 165 Ct.Cl. 487, cert. 

denied, 379 U.S. 946, 85 S.Ct. 411, 13 L.Ed.2d 544 

(1964), set out in holdings or dicta criteria for a 

claim of breach of fair and honorable dealings. There 

must be a showing that the United States undertook an 

obligation, a 'special relationship', the obligation was 

to the Tribe, that the United States failed to meet its 

obligation, and that as a result the Tribe suffered damages. 

Id. at 838-39 (emphasis added). 

The Cherokee Nation vigorously argues that the entire history 

of its treatment by the government is relevant in connection with 

the fair and honorable dealings claim. Building on this argument, 

it is contended that due to the removal of the Cherokee to the 

Indian Territory in Oklahoma and the granting of title to the 

riverbed to the Cherokee, the whole of the circumstances 

establishes a special relationship within the test laid down in 

Aleut Community. 

More specifically, the Cherokee Nation argues that its claim 

of violation of the fair and honorable dealings clause is shown by 

a series of treaties and subsequent violations of the government's 

obligations thereunder. It says that by treaties of 1828, 1833 

and 1835 and the patent of 1838, the United States repeatedly assured the Cherokee Nation that their new home in the west would be 

theirs "forever." Brief of Appellant at 17. They rely on the 

Treaty with the Cherokees of 1828, 7 Stat. 311, under which 

Cherokee lands in Arkansas were to be exchanged for over 7 million 

acres of land in the Indian Territory, now the State of Oklahoma, 

and an outlet to the west, under which the United States "agree to 

possess the Cherokees, and that guarantee is solemnly pledged." 

Id. at 7. The 1833 treaty relied on settled a boundary dispute 

6 

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between the Cherokees and Creeks relating to their western domains 

and did again "agree to possess the Cherokees, and that guarantee 

is hereby pledged." Treaty with the Western Cherokee, Art. 1, 7 

Stat. 414. The 1835 Treaty referred to imposed the Treaty of New 

Echota, 7 Stat. 478, on the Cherokee Nation, forcing the Cherokees 

to cede to the United States their remaining lands in the east and 

their removal to and uniting with the Western Cherokees on lands 

described in the treaty. The government agreed with the Cherokee 

Nation that it would have the right of self-government in its 

domain which would "in no future time without their consent, be 

included within the territorial limits or jurisdiction of any 

state or territory." Art. 5. The series of treaties culminated 

in a patent from President Van Buren conveying to the Cherokee 

Nation over 14 million acres of land in the northeast quadrant of 

the present State of Oklahoma, providing that the Cherokee Nation 

should "HAVE AND HOLD THE SAME . . . FOREVER." Brief of Appellant 

at 8-10. 

The Cherokee Nation maintains that there was a fundamental 

change in contravention of the promises of the treaties effected 

by the Curtis Act of 1898, 30 Stat. 495, forcing the Indians to be 

placed on tribal rolls and providing for the division of tribal 

lands and assets among the members thereof, with abolition of 

tribal courts and the extension of federal jurisdiction over all 

disputes among members of the tribes. Brief of Appellant at 17-

18. 

On the basis of these historic wrongs, the Cherokee Nation 

maintains that it has demonstrated a special relationship. In 

particular, the Cherokee Nation argues that when the United States 

7 

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"so completely took over the management of the affairs and 

property of the Five Civilized Tribes, it established a special 

relationship with the tribes giving rise to an obligation to manage their remaining limited property interests for their benefit." 

Brief of Appellant at 22. 

We agree that we should consider the background of statutes, 

treaties and any representations made to the Cherokee Nation to 

determine whether the requisite showing is made of a "special 

relationship" as an element of the fair and honorable dealings 

claim. This special relationship must, however, be one with a 

nexus to the actions complained of relating to the Arkansas River 

Navigation System. 4 This is because the jurisdictional grant 

under which this suit has proceeded defines the claim to be 

considered as one "for any and all damages to the Cherokee Tribal 

assets related to and arising from construction of the Arkansas 

River Navigation System II See Pub. L. No. 97-385, 96 

Stat. 1944-45 (1982) (emphasis added), quoted in n.1. Thus, the 

purpose of the jurisdictional grant is clearly to afford relief 

for violations of the rights of the Cherokee Nation, including 

their rights under the fair and honorable dealings clause, arising 

from the government's actions in the construction and operation of 

the Arkansas River Navigation System. 

Therefore, we do consider the historical events outlined for 

the purpose of determining whether a "special relationship" was 

4 

To determine whether the rema1n1ng elements of the claim are 

established -- a failure of the government to meet its obligation 

and damages -- one must focus on the conduct of the United States 

in connection with the construction and operation of the Navigation System. 

8 

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created with a nexus to the construction and operation of the 

Navigation System complained of. However, this suit may not be 

entertained for the purpose of affording general relief for wrongs 

to the Cherokee Nation through the long and tragic history relied 

on. "The [Indian Claims Commission] Act was not designed to grant 

compensation for all the detriment accruing to the Indians by our 

ongoing policy toward them but, rather, had the more limited goal 

of paying for specific deprivations of land or property or rights 

protected by treaty, statute, or then-existing law." Gila River 

Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v. United States, 427 F.2d 1194, 

1200-01 (Ct.Cl.) (Davis, J., concurring), cert. denied, 400 u.s. 

819 ( 1970) . 

With these parameters in mind, we are not persuaded that the 

requisite special relationship has been shown. We agree with the 

district judge who concluded that the Cherokee Nation "has failed 

to show, and in fact cannot show, that the United States has assumed a special obligation to compensate plaintiff for the 

exercise of its navigational servitude." Order at 5. While the 

Supreme Court did not consider or decide the merits of the fair 

and honorable dealings claim in United States v. Cherokee Nation 

of Oklahoma, supra, its opinion there makes unmistakably clear the 

recognition of the constitutional right of the government to 

exercise its navigational servitude arising from the Commerce 

Clause with respect to the Arkansas riverbed, despite the ownership of a portion of that riverbed by the Cherokee Nation. 480 

u.s. at 706-08. The Court concluded: 

[W]e have repeatedly held 

servitude applies to all 

riverbed interests .... 

9 

that 

holders 

the 

of 

navigational 

riparian and 

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• • • As we have explained, the tribal interests at 

issue here simply do not include the right to be free 

from the navigational servitude, for exercise of the 

servitude is 'not an invasion of any private property 

rights in the stream or the lands underlying it . • • . United States v. Rands, 389 U.S., at 123. 

Id. at 707-08. (Emphasis in original).5 

5 

We note in this connection the op1n1on of the Claims Court in 

Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation v. United States, 20 

Cl.Ct. 31 (1990). There the Indian Tribes sought compensation for 

water power values of tribal lands taken and used by the 

government in construction of the Grand Coulee Dam and the 

Franklin D. Roosevelt Reservoir. Claims were asserted of the same 

nature as those of the Cherokee Nation here. The court rejected 

them on the ground that the dominant navigational servitude of the 

government had been exercised so that no liability on any of the 

theories asserted existed. The court concluded that: 

[W]e must decide whether, notwithstanding the proper 

exercise of navigational servitude, any of the theories 

upon which the Tribes have premised their claims for 

compensation will subordinate the defendant's 

navigational servitude defense. We hold that they do 

not. Why? Simply because the constitutional power to 

assert the navigational servitude is dominant over any 

and all interests when it is properly exercised through 

an appropriate manifestation of congressional intent, as 

here in the Rivers and Harbors Act of August 30, 

1935. . . • Therefore, we hold that the navigational 

servitude, having been fully and properly exercised by 

Congress, exonerates the defendant from any obligation 

to pay additional compensation to the Tribes under any 

and all of the theories presented here. 

Id. at 47. More specifically, with respect to the fair and 

honorable dealings claim the court observed: 

[I]t is obvious that Congress did not surrender any 

right to assert its sovereign powers under the Commerce 

Clause, much less the power to exercise the navigational 

servitude over Indian lands, in either explicit or 

implicit terms when it enacted the fair and honorable 

dealings clause of the ICCA. 

Clearly, no matter whether the fair and honorable 

dealings clause of the ICCA is construed liberally or 

strictly, the tribes have no right to recover for water 

power values upon the defendant's proper assertion of 

the navigational servitude. There is clearly no author-

(Footnote continued on next page) 

10 

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In Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation v. United 

States, 20 Cl.Ct. 31 (1990), the Claims Court found the Supreme 

Court's decision in Cherokee Nation to be "extremely persuasive, 

if not dispositive, on the issues asserted by the Tribes here," 

which included issues relating to a fair and honorable dealings 

claim. Id. at 46; see note 5, supra. We must agree. In 

Cherokee Nation, 480 u.s. at 708, the Court relied on its earlier 

decision in United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 123 (1967), 

which had held that "the proper exercise of this power [to 

regulate navigation] is not an invasion of any private property 

rights in the stream or the lands underlying it." The Cherokee 

Nation here demonstrates no reason why the exercise of the 

government's power to regulate navigation was not proper in the 

construction and operation of the Arkansas River Navigation 

System, other than by its general assertion of a violation of the 

fair and honorable dealings clause. We feel that this is not 

enough. More fundamentally, the Cherokee Nation has failed to 

demonstrate that in some way the government undertook a special 

relationship such that it would forego or restrict its historic 

rights under the Commerce Clause so that the government was 

inhibited in the exercise of the navigational servitude, or bound 

to make compensation for the results of its exercise. 

The Cherokee Nation relies upon Heckman v. United States, 224 

u.s. 413, 437 (1912), to support its position that a special 

(Footnote continued): 

ity to suggest that Congress intended such a result when 

it enacted the ICCA, nor have the plaintiffs cited to 

any legislative history which produced the Act tending 

to support such an intent. 

Id. at 50. 

11 

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relationship exists in the instant circumstances. Reliance is 

placed on the Court's statements concerning the guardianship of 

the United States with respect to the Five Civilized Tribes. In 

Heckman the Court held that the United States had a distinct 

interest in the maintenance of suits to cancel conveyances by 

members of the Tribes in violation of restrictions on alienation 

imposed for the protection of the Indians with respect to their 

allotments; that statutory provisions authorizing suits to be 

brought on recommendation of the Secretary of the Interior did 

confer authority to bring such suits so that the United States had 

the capacity to prosecute them. Id. at 437, 443-44. The Court's 

opinion noted that out of the government's "peculiar relation to 

these dependent peoples sprang obligations to the fulfillment of 

which the national honor has been committed. 'From their very 

weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing 

of the Federal Government with them and the treaties in which it 

has been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with 

it the power. This has always been recognized by the Executive 

and by Congress, and by this court, whenever the question has 

arisen.' United States v. Kagama, 118 u.s. 375, 384." Id. at 

437. 

We are not persuaded that Heckman supports the argument that 

a "special relationship" exists here for purposes of enforcing a 

claim under the fair and honorable dealings clause. In Heckman, 

there were specific statutory provisions made for the imposition 

of restrictions on alienation for the benefit of the allottees, 

and there were clear statutory provisions for the maintenance of 

suits to enforce the restrictions on alienation. Both from the 

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statutory restrictions on alienation, and from the statutory 

recognition of the right to bring cancellation suits, a basis for 

the obligations of the government was evident. Here, on the 

contrary, there is no basis identified for the recognition of a 

"special relationship" under which the government obligated itself 

to forego or restrict the exercise of its historic and dominant 

navigational servitude which Congress decided to exercise in 

authorizing the construction of the Arkansas River Navigation 

System. Nor is there a showing that in the governmental actions 

in connection with that System, the government undertook an 

obligation to make compensation to the Cherokee Nation. 

Further we note the argument of the Cherokee Nation that the 

government continued to hold in trust lands belonging to the Five 

Civilized Tribes pursuant to the statutory provisions in the Act 

of 1906, 34 Stat. 137, 148; that the Act provided thus that 

remaining Cherokee lands, which included the riverbed property, 

were to continue to be held in trust by the government for the use 

and benefit of the Cherokee Nation as a part of their tribal 

property; and that the government has thus taken over full 

administrative control under the Curtis Act, the 1902 Cherokee 

Agreement and other Acts. These circumstances are particularly 

relied on as demonstrating a "special relationship" as a basis for 

the fair and honorable dealings claim. 

We are not convinced that the showing made by the Cherokee 

Nation establishes a "special relationship" that will sustain a 

fair and honorable dealings claim. We find no indication in the 

materials relied on that the government undertook to restrict the 

exercise of its navigational servitude in the Arkansas riverbed in 

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question, or to compensate the Cherokee Nation for any of the effects of the navigation projects of the Arkansas River Navigation 

System. 

This case is unlike Aleut Community of St. Paul Island, 

supra, relied on by the Cherokee Nation. There the court held the 

averments sufficient to state a fair and honorable dealings claim. 

The Aleut complaint, however, alleged assurances to the Indians by 

government agents of their rights to bargain freely in selling 

their labor and products; that statutory provisions guaranteed 

them the privilege of killing seals necessary for food and clothing; that control over hunting was placed in the hands of the 

Secretary of Commerce and the statutes recognized the Indians' 

dependence on killing of seals for their survival; that the 

statutes assured fair compensation for their labor; and that the 

Secretary was given authority to furnish food, shelter and the 

like. Further the complaint alleged that the Indians were denied 

their right to trade in furs with anyone but the monopolies on the 

Islands; that in practice they were denied the ability to survive 

from the hunt; they were threatened with banishment if they left 

St. Paul Island, while historically they would travel from island 

to island because no one island was able to support the native 

population. The court concluded that a special relationship and 

failure of the government in its obligations to the tribe were 

stated. 

Obviously, there is a sharp difference between the affirmative obligations undertaken to the Aleut Indians and the general 

claims of a "special relationship" being relied on by the Cherokee 

Nation here. If particular activities or interests of the 

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Cherokee Nation had been specifically protected by statutes and 

representations of the government, like those of the Aleut 

Indians, and then the Navigation System had disrupted the Cherokee 

Nation's protected activities, a violation of a special relationship might be shown. But that is not the case here where, 

instead, general allegations are made as to the breach of a 

special relationship based on the government's exercise of its 

navigational servitude. 

Nor is the fair and honorable dealings claim upheld in 

Seminole Nation of Oklahoma v. United States, 492 F.2d 811 (Ct. 

Cl. 1974), supportive of the Cherokee Nation's position here. In 

Seminole Nation the court held that the Indian Claims Commission 

erred in rejecting one part of the Indians' fair and honorable 

dealings claim. There Congress had transferred to the municipality of Seminole, Oklahoma, abandoned station reservation property 

that belonged to the Seminole Nation which held a residual fee 

title. An earlier decision of the Supreme Court denied liability 

under existing treaties and legislation, but this was held not to 

preclude the fair and honorable dealings claim for transfer of the 

Seminole Nation's property without fair compensation. Here there 

is no such transfer of property from the Cherokee Nation to others, only the exercise of the government's dominant right to 

exercise its navigational servitude against holders of riparian 

and riverbed interests. See United States v. Cherokee Nation of 

Oklahoma, 480 u.s. at 706-08. 

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B. 

Second, we turn to the argument of the Cherokee Nation that 

the district court erred in applying the navigational servitude, a 

legal power, to defeat a claim based on a moral duty. Brief of 

Appellant at 29. We agree that the servitude is not in all 

instances a bar to a fair and honorable dealings claim, but we are 

convinced that the government's right to proper exercise of its 

navigational servitude should be given consideration as an 

important factor in this case. 

A fair and honorable dealings claim will not necessarily be 

barred in every instance by Congress' constitutional power with 

respect to navigational servitudes. We simply hold that in this 

case the requisite "special relationship" between the government 

and the Cherokee Nation has not been sufficiently established to 

demonstrate that the government's exercise of the servitude here 

was a violation of any special obligations to the Tribe. We are 

persuaded that a claim like that presented here for compensation 

under the fair and honorable dealings clause cannot be determined 

without a judicial inquiry into the facts and circumstances of 

each case. See H.R. Rep. No. 453, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 

3 (1982) (noting the Department of the Interior's reliance on the 

navigational servitude as a blanket bar to relief and remarking 

that "the issue of compensation • • • is appropriate for 

adjudication by the courts"). 

The Cherokee Nation relies on Burkhardt v. United States, 84 

F. Supp. 553 (Ct. Cl. 1949), to overcome the effect of Congress' 

exercise of the navigational servitude here. We find this reliance to be misplaced. In Burkhardt, after the Supreme Court had 

16 

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rejected plaintiffs' traditional legal claims in reliance on 

Congress' navigational servitude, plaintiffs successfully advanced 

considerations of morality and honor before the Court of Claims as 

the basis for relief against the government for loss of 

hydroelectric power caused by the government's construction of a 

dam. There, however, Congress had expressly undertaken, following 

the Court's decision rejecting the traditional legal claims, to 

compensate plaintiffs and had appropriated funds for this purpose. 

84 F. Supp. at 556. In essence, Congress had limited the effect 

of its exercise of the navigational servitude to afford relief to 

plaintiffs that would not otherwise have been possible. See 

Colville, 20 Cl. Ct. at 51 (distinguishing Burkhardt on the ground 

that there Congress expressly granted authority to the court to 

"subordinate" its navigational rights under the Constitution). 

Plaintiffs' claims were expressly referred to the Court of Claims 

by Congress, principally for a recommendation as to the amount 

that would constitute fair and reasonable compensation. 

No such congressional undertaking or reference is evident 

here. Specifically, in enacting Pub. L. 97-385, Congress did not 

appropriate funds for the satisfaction of the Cherokee Nation's 

claims arising from the construction and operation of the Arkansas 

River Navigation System. That is, in enacting the statute, 

Congress did not expressly limit the effect of its exercise of the 

navigational servitude. Instead, it provided the Cherokee Nation 

with forums for the adjudication of their claims. See Cherokee 

Nation of Oklahoma: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on 

Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the Committee on 

the Judiciary, House of Representatives, H.R. 2329, 97th Cong., 

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1st Sess. 30 (1981) (statement of Congressman Mike Synar) (noting 

that "[w]e are wanting the right to ask the court [whether relief 

is available despite Congress' exercise of the navigational 

servitude]; not the outright payment of compensation"). The 

courts were charged under the statute with determining, not only 

what compensation (if any) was appropriate, but whether the claims 

could prevail at all. Accordingly, contrary to the situation in 

Burkhardt, the district court in adjudicating the Cherokee 

Nation's fair and honorable dealings claim was required to 

evaluate the facts and circumstances of the instant case in light 

of the prevailing standards, including standards related to 

Congress' exercise of its navigational servitude. Its ruling in 

favor of the government reflects a correct determination that 

these standards were not satisfied. 

What we have said above concerning the legislative provisions 

and their history responds to the third proposition urged by the 

Cherokee Nation -- that it was the intention of Congress that the 

Nation be accorded a special right to sue and that this right 

transcends the bounds of law and equity. Brief of Appellant at 

35. We agree that Congress intended the Nation to have the full 

panoply of remedies -- legal, equitable and moral -- laid out in 

the five clauses of the Indian Claims Commission Act (25 u.s.c. § 

70a). See note 2, supra. That does not mean, however, that 

recovery by the Nation was automatically intended. The Cherokee 

Nation still had the burden of establishing the elements of those 

claims and, for reasons we have expressed, we must agree with the 

district court's conclusion that the fair and honorable dealings 

claim has not been established here. 

18 

Appellate Case: 88-1112 Document: 01019293714 Date Filed: 07/09/1991 Page: 18 
III 

Having considered all the grounds urged by the Cherokee Nation, we hold that a violation of the fair and honorable dealings 

clause has not been made out with respect to the government's 

construction and operation of the Arkansas River Navigation 

System. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is 

AFFIRMED. 

19 

Appellate Case: 88-1112 Document: 01019293714 Date Filed: 07/09/1991 Page: 19