Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03154/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03154-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Does
Appellee
T. Mark Kraft
Appellant
Arlen L. Meyer
Appellee
St. John Lutheran Church
Appellee
The Estate of David Mannigel
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 04-3154

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T. Mark Kraft,

Appellant,

v.

St. John Lutheran Church of

Seward, Nebraska, doing business

as St. John Lutheran School, Arlen

L. Meyer, The Estate of David

Mannigel, and Does 1-1000.

Appellees.

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Appeal from the United States

District Court for the

District of Nebraska.

 [PUBLISHED]

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Submitted: March 16, 2005

 Filed: July 18, 2005

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Before WOLLMAN, HANSEN, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges. 

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HANSEN, Circuit Judge.

T. Mark Kraft alleges that he was repeatedly sexually abused by his teacher,

Arlen L. Meyer, while Kraft was a junior-high student at St. John Lutheran School

in Seward, Nebraska, in the late 1970s. Kraft filed this lawsuit in 2002, seeking

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The Honorable Laurie Smith Camp, United States District Judge for the

District of Nebraska. 

2

Mannigel committed suicide in July 2001. His estate is a named defendant,

and the record, when viewed in the light most favorable to Kraft, supports an

inference that Mannigel, too, was sexually abusing children. 

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damages in tort for the injuries caused by the abuse. The district court1 granted the

defendants' motions for summary judgment, concluding that Kraft's lawsuit was

barred by Nebraska's statute of limitation. We affirm. 

I. 

In this summary judgment context, we view the facts and the inferences to be

drawn from them in the light most favorable to Kraft, the nonmoving party.

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The

district court found the following facts to be undisputed for purposes of summary

judgment. Arlen Meyer, a teacher at the St. John Lutheran School, sexually abused

Mark Kraft on numerous occasions from 1976 through 1978, when Kraft was

between the ages of 12 and 15 years old. The last act of abuse may have occurred as

late as 1980. As a result of the abuse, Kraft suffers from emotional and psychological

injury including posttraumatic distress disorder, dysthymic reaction, somataform

disorder, complex trauma reaction, and dissociative disorder NOS, all resulting in

symptoms of depression as well as problems with interpersonal relationships and

maintaining monogamous relationships. 

In 1990, Kraft disclosed the abuse to his wife and parents, after grappling with

marital problems stemming largely from his homosexual behavior. In 1991, Kraft

made an anonymous report of Meyer's wrongful conduct to the St. John Lutheran

School principal, David Mannigel,2

 warning that any special young friends of Meyer

might be suffering sexual abuse. Also in 1991, Kraft told two family friends of his

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abuse at the hands of Meyer out of concern for their grandchildren who then attended

the school. 

In 1995, Kraft discussed the abuse with a licensed professional counselor,

Donna Stains. Her treatment notes indicate that Kraft told her he had sought

counseling about the sexual abuse in 1991. Stains advised Kraft that there was a

strong possibility that the sexual abuse he had suffered as a child was contributing to

his current problems.

Kraft hired an attorney who wrote a letter to the school on October 29, 2001,

in an attempt to have Meyer removed from his position at the school. The letter states

that Kraft "is emotionally now able to publicly reveal the nature and circumstances

of these acts and to pursue the appropriate redress for the conduct, if necessary." (R.

at 52.) In January 2002, Kraft's attorney wrote to the principal again, stating in part

that "Kraft is seeking compensation for injuries suffered by him as a result of acts

committed by [Meyer]." (R. at 57.) 

On May 16, 2002, Kraft's attorney referred Kraft for an evaluation with Dr.

Fisch, a clinical psychologist. Dr. Fisch diagnosed Kraft with moderate to severe

posttraumatic distress disorder, moderate to severe dysthymic reaction, moderate to

severe fulminating somataform disorder, complex trauma reaction, and chronic

fulminating dissociative disorder. Dr. Fisch's affidavit states that Kraft did not make

a connection between the abuse and his mental disorders until after he had started his

treatment with Dr. Fisch. Kraft's primary care physician, Dr. Cohen, also stated in a

letter that Kraft did not understand the causal relationship between the abuse and his

problems until he began his treatment with Dr. Fisch. 

Kraft filed this lawsuit on October 30, 2002, seeking damages against the

church, the congregation, the school, the principal, and Meyer. The district court

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granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that Kraft's

complaint was not timely filed. Kraft appeals. 

II.

We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment, applying

the same standards as the district court. Mayard v. Hopwood, 105 F.3d 1226, 1227

(8th Cir. 1997). Summary judgment is appropriate if the record “show[s] that there

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). We review the district court's

determination of state law de novo. See Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225,

231 (1991). Nebraska law applies to this diversity suit. Nebraska's four-year statute

of limitations for tort actions, see Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-207(3), is tolled for minors

until they reach the age of 21, see Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-213; Brown v. Kindred, 608

N.W.2d 577, 580 (Neb. 2000). 

Kraft reached the age of 21 on August 13, 1985, but he did not file this lawsuit

until October 2002, some seventeen years later. The district court dismissed his suit

as untimely, finding no basis for tolling the limitations period. On appeal, Kraft

asserts that factual disputes preclude entry of summary judgment. Namely, he

contends that the limitations period should be equitably tolled on the ground that he

did not discover a connection between the abuse and his problems until sometime

within four years of the filing of the complaint, and that his mental disorders

prevented him from pursuing legal action. 

While an action in tort generally accrues as soon as the act occurs, Nebraska

applies an equitable tolling doctrine referred to as the discovery rule in certain

categories of cases where "the injury is not obvious and the individual is wholly

unaware that he or she has suffered an injury or damage." See Schlien v. Bd. of

Regents of the Univ. of Neb., 640 N.W.2d 643, 650 (Neb. 2002) (emphasis removed).

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This case does not involve the discovery of a repressed memory. Kraft has

always retained an awareness of the facts of the claimed abuse.

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When this discovery rule is applicable, "the statute of limitations does not begin to

run until the potential plaintiff discovers, or with reasonable diligence should have

discovered, the injury." Id.; Condon v. A.H. Robins, Co., 349 N.W.2d 622, 627 (Neb.

1984). The Nebraska Supreme Court has explained that "[i]n the context of statutes

of limitations, discovery refers to the fact that one knows of the existence of an injury

or damage, regardless of whether there is awareness of a legal right to seek redress

in court." Reinke Mfg. Co. v. Hayes, 590 N.W.2d 380, 390 (Neb. 1999) (internal

quotation marks omitted, alteration in the original). Stated yet another way,

"[d]iscovery of the act or omission occurs when the party knows of facts sufficient

to put a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence on inquiry which, if pursued,

would lead to the discovery of facts constituting the basis of the cause of action." Id.

Nebraska has not yet applied this discovery rule in the context of a child sexual abuse

case. 

The district court applied the Schlien analysis, concluding that "no later than

1990, Kraft himself drew a direct link between the alleged abuse and a variety of

behaviors and negative consequences in his life." (Appellant's Add. at 12-13.) Kraft

argues that there was disputed evidence concerning when he actually discovered that

the abuse caused his injuries.3

 The district court noted that the only evidence

supporting Kraft's assertion were the statements of Dr. Fisch and Dr. Cohen, who

both concluded that Kraft did not make the causal connection until his treatment with

Dr. Fisch in 2002. We agree with the district court's conclusion that any assertion

that Kraft was unaware of the connection between the abuse and his injuries until his

treatment with Dr. Fisch in 2002 is disingenuous, for the reasons that follow. 

Kraft only began treatment with Dr. Fisch after his settlement negotiations with

the church had failed. The undisputed evidence concerning the settlement

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negotiations indicated that beginning in 2001, Kraft had been negotiating with the

church for damages resulting from the sexual abuse. He cannot attempt to contradict

his own behavior in 2001, seeking damages for injuries resulting from the sexual

abuse, with expert testimony that he did not understand the same causal connection

until 2002. Kraft asserts that the district court abused its discretion by considering

these settlement negotiations because an offer to compromise "is not admissible to

prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount," and neither is "[e]vidence

of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations." Fed. R. Evid. 408. This

evidence is admissible for other purposes, however, "such as proving bias or

prejudice of a witness [or] negativing a contention of undue delay." Id. The district

court did not abuse its discretion by considering Kraft's settlement negotiations with

the church for the purpose of proving Kraft's knowledge of a causal connection

between his injuries and the abuse.

Additionally, as noted by the district court, the undisputed evidence

demonstrates that Kraft drew a direct connection between the abuse and his negative

behaviors in 1990, when he disclosed the abuse to his wife and parents as an

explanation for his marital discord and homosexual activity. Even if this incident,

construed in the light most favorable to Kraft, does not disclose a true understanding

of the causal connection, as Kraft asserts, the remaining undisputed evidence

indicates that Kraft was aware of sufficient facts by 1995 at the latest, from which he

could have, with reasonable diligence, discovered the causal connection. By that

time, Kraft had told not only his family, but also friends, counselors, and the school

principal about the abuse he had suffered; he was aware of his emotional and

behavioral problems; and Stains had expressly suggested to him in counseling that

there was a strong possibility that the sexual abuse he had suffered contributed to his

current problems. These undisputed facts, all known to Kraft by 1995, were

sufficient to put a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence on an inquiry which,

if pursued, would have led to the discovery of the connection between the abuse and

the injuries. See Reinke Mfg. Co., 590 N.W.2d at 390. The fact that Kraft may not

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have actually drawn the connection at that point or may not have understood the

extent of his damages did not prevent the statute of limitations from running. See

Rosnick v. Marks, 357 N.W.2d 186, 189 (Neb. 1984) ("A cause of action accrues and

the statute of limitations begins to run when the aggrieved party has the right to

institute and maintain suit, although the nature and extent of the damages may not be

known."). Thus, the discovery rule of equitable tolling does not preserve Kraft's

cause of action. 

The four-year statute of limitation for tort actions is also subject to tolling

where a person is suffering from a mental disorder. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-213.

Dr. Fisch diagnosed Kraft with moderate to severe posttraumatic distress disorder,

moderate to severe dysthymic reaction, moderate to severe fulminating somataform

disorder, complex trauma reaction, and chronic fulminating dissociative disorder.

Kraft argues that Dr. Fisch's uncontradicted expert testimony that these mental

disorders prevented him from pursuing his legal rights creates a question of fact on

the issue of whether the statute of limitation was tolled by Kraft's mental disorders.

We respectfully disagree. 

The district court determined as a matter of law that Kraft's disorders were not

the type of mental disorders that are contemplated by the statute, because they do not

render him incapable of understanding his legal rights or instituting legal action. See

Vergara v. Lopez-Vasquez, 510 N.W.2d 550, 554 (Neb. Ct. App. 1993) ("[A] person

with a mental disorder is one who suffers from a condition of mental derangement

which actually prevents the sufferer from understanding his or her legal rights or from

instituting legal action.") (holding that the change in the statutory language from

"insanity" to "mental disorder" did not change the legal standard involved). Persons

with a mental disorder sufficient to justify the tolling provision are not able to

evaluate and communicate information necessary to protect their rights. Id. at 553.

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It is undisputed that Kraft was able to communicate the facts of his abuse and

evaluate at least some of its effects on his life since at least 1990, when he began

telling others of the abuse and seeking counseling. The record demonstrates that

Kraft is employed in banking as a manager of a staff of 13 or 14 mortgage loan

officers. He has never been unemployed or missed any work because of his mental

disorders. He handles his own business and financial affairs, makes his own health

care decisions, and has never had a guardian or conservator appointed for him.

Whether Kraft could adequately evaluate the entire extent of his psychological

injuries is not the relevant question. The district court correctly determined that the

mental disorders alleged by Kraft did not, in a legal sense, render him incapable of

understanding his legal rights and acting to protect them. 

III

Accordingly, we affirm the district's court's grant of summary judgment

dismissing Kraft's lawsuit as barred by the statute of limitations. 

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