Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-15-02219/USCOURTS-ca10-15-02219-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Board of Valencia County Commissioners
Appellee
Jeffrey Burke
Not Party
Haley Cage
Not Party
County of Valencia
Appellee
Rolando Flores
Appellee
Randy Gutierrez
Appellee
James Thor Kirk
Appellant
Paul Lopez
Not Party
New Mexico State Police
Not Party
State of New Mexico
Not Party
University Hospital Doctors
Not Party
University of New Mexico Hospital
Not Party
Unnamed Administrators
Not Party
Valencia County Detention Center
Appellee
Valencia County Medical Care
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

JAMES THOR KIRK, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

DOCTOR ROLANDO FLORES; 

VALENCIA COUNTY DETENTION 

CENTER; VALENCIA COUNTY 

MEDICAL CARE; COUNTY OF 

VALENCIA; BOARD OF VALENCIA 

COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; RANDY 

GUTIERREZ, Valencia County Detention 

Center Officer, 

 Defendants - Appellees, 

and 

OFFICER JEFFREY BURKE; 

UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO 

HOSPITAL; NEW MEXICO STATE 

POLICE; UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL 

DOCTORS; STATE OF NEW MEXICO; 

UNNAMED ADMINISTRATORS; PAUL 

LOPEZ; HALEY CAGE, Officer, 

 Defendants. 

No. 15-2219 

(D.C. No. 1:12-CV-01157-JAP-WPL) 

(D. N.M.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

 *

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

(continued) 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

August 17, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

Appellate Case: 15-2219 Document: 01019673208 Date Filed: 08/17/2016 Page: 1 
2 

_________________________________ 

Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, BACHARACH and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

 James Thor Kirk crashed his automobile while fleeing at high speeds from police 

in Los Lunas, New Mexico. Afterward, he was taken to the hospital, treated for hand and 

knee injuries, and released to the Valencia County Detention Center. He later filed this 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against individuals and entities involved in his apprehension and 

subsequent medical care.1

 The district court dismissed several of Kirk’s claims 

sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), entered summary 

judgment on qualified-immunity grounds on another claim, and later certified the 

resulting judgment as final. Acting pro se, Kirk appeals. Exercising jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. 

Preliminarily, we note that Kirk fails to assert any specific argument as to how the 

district court erred. Instead, he appears to repeat the allegations of his complaint. 

Although we liberally construe a pro se appellant’s filings, arguments not made in the 

opening brief are waived. See Toevs v. Reid, 685 F.3d 903, 911 (10th Cir. 2012); Adler v. 

Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 679 (10th Cir. 1998). While we could affirm on 

that basis alone, proceeding to the merits, we conclude the district court did not err. 

 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

1

 Kirk filed four complaints before the district court directed that no further 

complaints be filed without prior approval. 

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I. Section 1915(e)(2) & Rule 12(b)(6) Dismissals 

 We review de novo the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of a claim, whether it 

was dismissed pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) or Rule 12(b)(6). See Vasquez Arroyo v. 

Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1094 (10th Cir. 2009). In conducting our review, “we accept as 

true the well-pleaded factual allegations” and consider whether Kirk has provided 

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Hogan v. Winder, 

762 F.3d 1096, 1104 (10th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).2

 First, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed Kirk’s claims of 

inadequate medical care against the Valencia County defendants (Valencia County, 

Valencia County Detention Center, Board of Valencia County Commissioners, and 

Valencia County Medical Care) because Kirk didn’t allege an injury resulting from an 

unconstitutional policy or custom. See Jenkins v. Wood, 81 F.3d 988, 993 (10th Cir. 

1996) (“To establish municipal liability, a plaintiff must show (1) the existence of a 

municipal custom or policy and (2) a direct causal link between the custom or policy and 

the violation alleged.”). At most, Kirk based the County defendants’ § 1983 liability on 

the actions of a nurse practitioner, Rolando Flores, who worked at the detention center as 

an independent contractor. But a respondeat superior theory of liability is insufficient to 

state a claim for relief against the county defendants. See Mocek v. City of Albuquerque, 

 2

 “Although dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6) typically follow a motion to 

dismiss, giving plaintiff notice and opportunity to amend his complaint, a court may 

dismiss sua sponte when it is patently obvious that the plaintiff could not prevail on 

the facts alleged, and allowing him an opportunity to amend his complaint would be 

futile.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1109-10 (10th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

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813 F.3d 912, 933 (10th Cir. 2015) (stating that “[a] municipality is not liable solely 

because its employees caused injury,” but rather, because the municipality, “[t]hrough its 

[own] deliberate conduct, . . . [was] the moving force behind the injury” (emphasis and 

internal quotation marks omitted)). 

 We further conclude that the district court properly dismissed Kirk’s claim against 

booking officer Randy Gutierrez, as Kirk alleged no wrongdoing by Gutierrez. See

Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1227 (10th Cir. 2006) (“In order for liability to arise 

under § 1983, a defendant’s direct personal responsibility for the claimed deprivation of a 

constitutional right must be established.”). Kirk alleged only that Gutierrez said Kirk was 

in a booking cell for several days or weeks without showering or eating properly. 

 Despite filing multiple complaints, Kirk failed to remedy these pleading 

deficiencies. Consequently, the district court properly dismissed the claims against the 

Valencia County defendants and Gutierrez without providing Kirk further opportunities 

to amend the complaint. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007) 

(“Dismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim is proper only where it is 

obvious that the plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts he has alleged and it would be futile 

to give him an opportunity to amend.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

II. Summary Judgment 

 Kirk also challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment to defendant 

Rolando Flores based on qualified immunity. The record reveals that Nurse Flores saw 

Kirk on ten occasions from October 2010 to June 2012, treating his right-hand pain and 

headaches with pain relievers, muscle relaxants, and a migraine medication. In his third 

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5 

amended complaint, Kirk alleged that Flores provided inadequate medical care, resulting 

in diminished hand and memory function. He elaborated in later filings that Flores failed 

to ensure he made it to an appointment at an orthopedic hand clinic and failed to order a 

CT scan of his head. The district court found no evidence showing that Kirk suffered a 

sufficiently serious deprivation of medical care. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 

834, 842 (1994) (stating that a plaintiff asserting a deliberate indifference claim must 

show that (1) the deprivation was objectively sufficiently serious and (2) the defendant 

disregarded a known or obvious risk to the plaintiff’s serious medical needs). 

Accordingly, the district court granted Flores summary judgement on the grounds of 

qualified immunity. 

 We review de novo to ascertain whether there is a genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and whether Flores is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Koessel v. Sublette Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 717 F.3d 736, 742 

(10th Cir. 2013). To avoid qualified immunity, Kirk had to show “(1) a violation of a 

constitutional right (2) that was clearly established.” Puller v. Baca, 781 F.3d 1190, 1196 

(10th Cir. 2015). Kirk’s deliberate-indifference claim fails the first prong. Specifically, 

the evidence in the record shows only Kirk’s disagreement with the course of medical 

care provided by Flores. But such a disagreement doesn’t state a constitutional violation. 

Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1192 (10th Cir. 2010) (indicating that a doctor’s failure 

to pursue the inmate’s preferred course of treatment doesn’t, by itself, constitute a 

sufficiently serious medical deprivation); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107 

(1976) (observing that “[a] medical decision not to order an X-ray, or like measures, does 

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not represent [a constitutional violation]”); Oxendine v. Kaplan, 241 F.3d 1272, 1276 

(10th Cir. 2001) (stating that a medical need is sufficiently serious if a “physician [h]as 

mandat[ed] treatment” or it is “obvious [to] even a lay person”). And even assuming that 

Flores was somehow responsible for Kirk missing his hand appointment, the record 

contains no evidence showing that Flores was anything more than negligent. Medical 

negligence doesn’t qualify as a constitutional violation. Perkins v. Kan. Dep’t of Corr., 

165 F.3d 803, 811 (10th Cir. 1999). The district court properly granted Flores summary 

judgment. 

CONCLUSION

 We affirm the judgment of the district court, deny Kirk’s request for relief 

resembling a default judgment, and grant Kirk’s motion for leave to proceed without 

prepayment of fees. But we remind him of his continuing obligation to make partial 

payments until the filing fee is paid in full. 

Entered for the Court 

Nancy L. Moritz 

Circuit Judge 

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