Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-10-01356/USCOURTS-ca8-10-01356-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Larry Levin
Appellee
Lisa Ritchie
Appellant
St. Louis Jewish Light
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

________________

No. 10-1356

________________

Lisa Ritchie,

Appellant,

v.

St. Louis Jewish Light; Larry

Levin,

Appellees.

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

Appeal from the United States

District Court for the

Eastern District of Missouri.

[PUBLISHED]

________________

Submitted: September 22, 2010

 Filed: January 4, 2011

________________

Before LOKEN, HANSEN, and BENTON, Circuit Judges. 

________________

HANSEN, Circuit Judge.

Lisa Ritchie, a former employee of St. Louis Jewish Light, filed a federal court

complaint against Larry Levin, Ritchie's supervisor, and St. Louis Jewish Light

(collectively, appellees), pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C.

§ 215, claiming that her employment was terminated in retaliation for insisting on

recording her overtime work. Appellees filed a motion to dismiss, which the district

Appellate Case: 10-1356 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/04/2011 Entry ID: 3740702
1

The Honorable Charles A. Shaw, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri.

-2-

court1

 granted, finding that informal FLSA complaints to one's employer are not

protected. Ritchie appeals. Because we find that Ritchie's federal court complaint

failed to state a claim, we affirm.

I.

Ritchie was employed at St. Louis Jewish Light in various capacities between

February 2002 and September 2009. According to Ritchie, around May or June of

2009, Levin, the chief executive officer of St. Louis Jewish Light, asked her to

perform work that previously had been performed by two employees. Ritchie stated

that Levin asked her to perform the work without recording overtime. According to

Ritchie's complaint, the work required that Ritchie perform overtime, which she

recorded. Levin again instructed her to perform the work without recording overtime.

When Ritchie continued to record the overtime, her employment was terminated.

Ritchie asserts that this termination was in violation of the FLSA. She claims that her

employment "was terminated in retaliation for her insistence of recording overtime."

(Appellant's App. at 1.) She did not allege that she was not paid for the overtime she

worked, and her counsel conceded at oral argument that she was in fact paid for all

overtime work she performed.

Ritchie filed a complaint in the United States District Court, asserting a claim

under the FLSA. The appellees filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that her complaint

failed to state a claim. The district court granted the appellees' motion, finding that

Ritchie did not state a claim of retaliation under the FLSA because she did not allege

that she engaged in statutorily protected activity. Ritchie appeals, arguing that

informal complaints to an employer trigger the anti-retaliation protection of the FLSA

and that she was retaliated against for exercising her rights under the FLSA.

Appellate Case: 10-1356 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/04/2011 Entry ID: 3740702
-3-

II.

We review a district court's grant of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) de novo. Carton v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp.,

611 F.3d 451, 454 (8th Cir. 2010). In reviewing an appeal from a grant of a motion

to dismiss, "we construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party." Id. "To survive a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations in a complaint,

assumed true, must suffice 'to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'"

Northstar Indus., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 576 F.3d 827, 832 (8th Cir. 2009)

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).

The anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA makes it unlawful for any person 

to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee

because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused

to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter, or has

testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding, or has served or is

about to serve on an industry committee.

 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3).

In granting the appellees' motion to dismiss, the district court analyzed the issue

of whether "informal complaints" are covered by the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision.

The district court acknowledged that the Eighth Circuit had not addressed the issue

directly but held that Ritchie's "oral complaint to her employer concerning the failure

to pay overtime is not protected activity under § 215(a)(3) of the FLSA." (Appellant's

App. at 14.) On appeal, Ritchie argues that she made informal complaints to the

Appellate Case: 10-1356 Page: 3 Date Filed: 01/04/2011 Entry ID: 3740702
-4-

appellees about their requirement that she not record overtime hours and that she was

fired for recording her overtime hours.

We need not decide today whether informal complaints are protected activity

under the FLSA because there is nothing in Ritchie's verified federal court complaint

that alleged that Ritchie made any sort of complaint to either Levin or St. Louis

Jewish Light. The verified complaint alleged that:

7. Starting on or about May or June 2009, Levin asked Ritchie to

perform work ("Work") [formerly] performed by two employees by

herself which Ritchie commenced to do.

8. Levin asked Ritchie to perform the Work without recording overtime.

9. The Work required that Ritchie perform overtime hours (more than

40 hours in a week) ("Overtime") which Ritchie recorded.

10. Levin complained to Ritchie about her recording the Overtime and

again requested that she perform the Work without recording overtime.

11. When Ritchie continued to record the Overtime, she was terminated

by Levin and [St. Louis Jewish Light].

(Appellant's App. at 1-2.)

Even assuming that informal complaints are sufficient to trigger the antiretaliation provision of the FLSA, a legal conclusion we do not make, Ritchie failed

to allege sufficient facts to indicate that she made even an informal complaint to either

Levin or St. Louis Jewish Light. The only complaining asserted in her pleading goes

the other way—Levin complaining to Ritchie. Ritchie asserts that she complained

pursuant to the FLSA when she gave "Levin notice that she believed Levin's

instructions were a violation of the law because she, in fact, recorded the overtime

hours in writing despite his orders not to record them." (Appellant's Reply Br. at 4.)

In fact, rather than constituting an affirmative complaint that would trigger the antiretaliation provision of the FLSA, her recording of her overtime could be nothing

more than mere insubordination, she having been instructed to the contrary.

Appellate Case: 10-1356 Page: 4 Date Filed: 01/04/2011 Entry ID: 3740702
2

In fact, we note that the complaint alleged only that Levin instructed her to stop

recording overtime. Levin could merely have been instructing Ritchie to complete the

work required by the job within a 40-hour workweek and to stop working overtime

altogether.

-5-

Insubordination is not protected under the FLSA, and insubordination is not sufficient

to trigger the anti-retaliation provision in 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). As appellees' counsel

noted at oral argument, if merely recording one's overtime is a "complaint" that

triggers the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA, an employer would not be able to

discipline an employee for working unauthorized overtime so long as the employee

recorded the overtime.

As the Supreme Court has recently said, the plausibility standard, which

requires a federal court complaint "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,

. . . asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully."

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (internal quotation marks omitted). "[W]here the wellpleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of

misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not 'show[n]—'that the pleader is

entitled to relief.'" Id. at 1950 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). 

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the FLSA, Ritchie would

have to show that she participated in statutorily protected activity, that the appellees

took an adverse employment action against her, and that there was a causal connection

between Ritchie's statutorily protected activity and the adverse employment action.

See Grey v. City of Oak Grove, 396 F.3d 1031, 1034-35 (8th Cir. 2005). The facts

pleaded in Ritchie's complaint do not permit us to infer more than the mere possibility

of misconduct. Thus, Ritchie's complaint merely alleged, but did not show, that

Ritchie is entitled to relief.2

Thus, the district court did not err in granting the appellees' motion to dismiss

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Carton, 611 F.3d at 454.

Appellate Case: 10-1356 Page: 5 Date Filed: 01/04/2011 Entry ID: 3740702
-6-

III.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 10-1356 Page: 6 Date Filed: 01/04/2011 Entry ID: 3740702