Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cr-00215/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cr-00215-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alejandro Arias
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME 

PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

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MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

ROSS PEARSON

Assistant United States Attorney

501 I Street, Suite 10-100

Sacramento, CA 95814

Telephone: (916) 554-2700

Facsimile: (916) 554-2900

Attorneys for Plaintiff

United States of America

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

ALEJANDRO ARIAS,

 Defendant.

CASE NO. 1:19-CR-00215-DAD-BAM

JOINT STATUS REPORT AND STIPULATION 

REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS 

UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; AND ORDER

DATE: June 8, 2020

TIME: 1:00 p.m.

COURT: Hon. Barbara A. McAuliffe

This case is set for status conference on June 8, 2020. On May 13, 2020, this Court issued 

General Order 618, which suspends all jury trials in the Eastern District of California “until further 

notice.” Further, pursuant to General Order 611, this Court’s declaration of judicial emergency under 18 

U.S.C. § 3174, and the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council’s Order of April 16, 2020 continuing this Court’s 

judicial emergency, this Court has allowed district judges to continue all criminal matters to a date after 

May 2, 2021.1 This and previous General Orders, as well as the declarations of judicial emergency, 

were entered to address public health concerns related to COVID-19.

Although the General Orders and declarations of emergency address the district-wide health 

concern, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act’s end-of-justice provision 

“counteract[s] substantive openendedness with procedural strictness,” “demand[ing] on-the-record 

1 A judge “may order case-by-case exceptions” at the discretion of that judge “or upon the 

request of counsel, after consultation with counsel and the Clerk of the Court to the extent such an order 

will impact court staff and operations.” General Order 618, ¶ 7 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2020). 

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findings” in a particular case. Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-therecord findings, there can be no exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). Id. at 507. Moreover, any such 

failure cannot be harmless. Id. at 509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 

(9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a judge ordering an ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit 

findings on the record “either orally or in writing”).

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which Zedner emphasizes as both mandatory 

and inexcusable—General Orders 611, 612, 617, and 618 and the subsequent declaration of judicial 

emergency require specific supplementation. Ends-of-justice continuances are excludable only if “the 

judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such 

action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable unless “the court sets forth, in the record of 

the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of 

such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” Id.

The General Orders and declaration of judicial emergency exclude delay in the “ends of justice.” 

18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address 

continuances stemming from pandemics, natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has 

discretion to order a continuance in such circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a twoweek ends-of-justice continuance following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. Furlow v. United States, 644 F.2d 

764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. 

Id. at 767-68; see also United States v. Correa, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Furlow to 

exclude time following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). 

The coronavirus is posing a similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated 

by the statutory rules. 

In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following 

case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-ofjustice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). 2

 If continued, this Court should designate a new date 

2 The parties note that General Order 612 acknowledges that a district judge may make 

“additional findings to support the exclusion” at the judge’s discretion. General Order 612, ¶ 5 (E.D. 

Cal. March 18, 2020).

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for the status conference. United States v. Lewis, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any 

pretrial continuance must be “specifically limited in time”).

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and 

through defendant’s counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on June 8, 2020. 

2. By this stipulation, both parties now move to continue the status conference until 

November 23, 2020, and to exclude time between June 8, 2020, and November 23, 2020, under Local 

Code T4. 

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: 

a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case 

includes over 7,000 pages of police reports, FBI serials, wiretap documents, intercepted calls and 

text messages, photographs, and other media. This discovery has been either produced directly 

to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying in multiple batches, with the most 

recent production on December 20, 2019. In addition, since the last status conference, the 

United States provided supplemental discovery consisting of search warrant documents and 

reports.

b) The parties have also engaged in initial plea discussions and expect that they will 

be able to resolve the case with a plea.

c) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to consult with his client, review the 

charges and discovery, conduct investigation, and discuss a potential resolution with his client 

and the government. 

d) Both parties believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would 

deny him/her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the 

exercise of due diligence.

e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the 

case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the

original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. 

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f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, 

et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of June 8, 2020 to November 23, 

2020, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code 

T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant’s request on the basis 

of the Court’s finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best 

interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

g) In addition, based on the public health concerns cited by the General Orders and 

declarations of judicial emergency, and presented by the evolving COVID-19 pandemic, an 

ends-of-justice delay is also appropriate in this case.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the 

Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial 

must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

Dated: June 1, 2020 MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

/s/ ROSS PEARSON

ROSS PEARSON

Assistant United States Attorney

Dated: June 1, 2020 /s/ ANTHONY CAPOZZI

ANTHONY CAPOZZI

Counsel for Defendant 

ALEJANDRO ARIAS

(authorized by email on June 1, 

2020)

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ORDER

IT IS SO ORDERED that the Status Conference is continued from June 8, 2020, to November 23, 

2020, at 1:00 p.m. before Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe. Time is excluded pursuant to 18 

U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 1, 2020 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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