Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01188/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01188-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Bridgestone Americas Tire Operations, LLC
Not party
Bridgestone Americas, Inc.
Not party
GPX International Tire Corporation
Appellant
Hebei Starbright Tire Co., Ltd.
Appellant
Ministry of Commerce, People's Republic of China
Not party
Tianjin United Tire & Rubber International Co., Ltd.
Appellant
Titan Tire Corporation
Appellee
United States
Appellee
United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union, AFL-CIO-CLC
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

GPX INTERNATIONAL TIRE CORPORATION, 

HEBEI STARBRIGHT TIRE CO., LTD., 

TIANJIN UNITED TIRE & RUBBER 

INTERNATIONAL CO., LTD.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants

MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC 

OF CHINA,

Plaintiff

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

BRIDGESTONE AMERICAS, INC., 

BRIDGESTONE AMERICAS TIRE OPERATIONS, 

LLC,

Defendants

TITAN TIRE CORPORATION, UNITED STEEL, 

PAPER AND FORESTRY, RUBBER, 

MANUFACTURING, ENERGY, ALLIED 

INDUSTRIAL AND SERVICE WORKERS 

INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL-CIO-CLC,

Defendants-Appellees

______________________ 

2014-1188, 2014-1248

______________________ 

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2 GPX INTERNATIONAL TIRE CORP. v. US

Appeals from the United States Court of International 

Trade in No. 1:08-cv-00285-JAR, 1:08-cv-00286-JAR, 1:08-

cv-00351-JAR, 1:08-cv-00352-JAR, 1:08-cv-00358-JAR, 

1:08-cv-00360-JAR, 1:08-cv-00361-JAR, Judge Jane A. 

Restani.

______________________ 

Decided: March 13, 2015 

______________________ 

JAMES P. DURLING, Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & 

Mosle LLP, Washington, DC, argued for plaintiffsappellants GPX International Tire Corporation, Hebei 

Starbright Tire Co., Ltd. Also represented by DANIEL L.

PORTER, CHRISTOPHER DUNN, MATTHEW PAUL 

MCCULLOUGH, ROSS BIDLINGMAIER, WILLIAM H.

BARRINGER. 

MARK B. LEHNARDT, Lehnardt & Lehnardt, LLC, Liberty, MO, for plaintiff-appellant Tianjin United Tire & 

Rubber International Co., Ltd.

ALEXANDER V. SVERDLOV, Commercial Litigation 

Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of 

Justice, Washington DC, argued for defendant-appellee 

United States. Also represented by STUART F. DELERY,

JEANNE E. DAVIDSON, FRANKLIN E. WHITE, JR.; JOHN D.

MCINERNEY, DANIEL JOSEPH CALHOUN, DEVIN S. SIKES,

Office of the Chief Counsel for Trade Enforcement & 

Compliance, United States Department of Commerce, 

Washington, DC.

ELIZABETH DRAKE, Stewart and Stewart, Washington, 

DC, argued for defendants-appellees Titan Tire Corporation, United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers 

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GPX INTERNATIONAL TIRE CORP. v. US 3

International Union, AFL-CIO-CLC. Also represented by 

TERENCE PATRICK STEWART, PATRICK JOHN MCDONOUGH. 

______________________ 

Before DYK, O’MALLEY, and TARANTO, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge DYK. 

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge O’MALLEY. 

DYK, Circuit Judge. 

GPX International Tire Corp. and Hebei Starbright 

Tire Co., Ltd. (collectively, “GPX”) appeal a Court of 

International Trade (“Trade Court”) decision upholding 

the Department of Commerce’s (“Commerce”) imposition 

of both antidumping and countervailing duties. Commerce acted pursuant to a 2012 law that overruled this 

court’s decision in GPX International Tire Corp. v. United 

States, 666 F.3d 732 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“GPX I”), reh’g 

granted, 678 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“GPX II”), and 

permitted Commerce to impose countervailing duties with 

respect to non-market economy (“NME”) countries retroactively to proceedings initiated on or after November 20, 

2006. Because the new law does not violate the Ex Post 

Facto Clause of Article I, Section 9 of the U.S. Constitution or the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to 

the U.S. Constitution, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Much of the background relevant to this case is recounted in this court’s prior decisions in GPX I and 

Guangdong Wireking Housewares & Hardware Co. v. 

United States, 745 F.3d 1194 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Wireking”). 

Under the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, Commerce 

may impose two types of duties on imports that injure 

domestic industries: (1) antidumping duties on goods “sold 

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4 GPX INTERNATIONAL TIRE CORP. v. US

in the United States at less than . . . fair value,” 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1673; and (2) countervailing duties on goods that receive 

a “countervailable subsidy” from a foreign government, id.

§ 1671(a).

For goods imported from market economy countries, 

Commerce may impose both antidumping and countervailing duties. Until recently, Commerce maintained that 

it could not impose countervailing duties on imports from 

NME countries—focusing on Soviet bloc countries—

because of the difficulty in calculating countervailing 

subsidies in those countries. See GPX I, 666 F.3d at 735. 

This longstanding Commerce position was upheld by this 

court in Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 

1308, 1314–18 (Fed. Cir. 1986), as not being contrary to 

the statute. Thereafter, Congress ratified Commerce’s 

prior position by amending and reenacting the countervailing duty statute in 1988 and 1994. See GPX I, 666 

F.3d at 738–39.

Beginning on November 20, 2006, however, Commerce indicated that it was considering taking a new

position by applying countervailing duties to imports from 

China, a NME country. See Notice of Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigations: Coated Free Sheet Paper 

from the People’s Republic of China, Indonesia, and the 

Republic of Korea, 71 Fed. Reg. 68,546, 68,549 (Dep’t of 

Commerce Nov. 27, 2006) (“Given the complex legal and 

policy issues involved, and on the basis of the Department’s discretion as affirmed in Georgetown Steel, the 

Department intends during the course of this investigation to determine whether the countervailing duty law 

should now be applied to imports from [China].”). And on 

March 29, 2007, Commerce issued a memorandum stating 

that “the Department’s policy that gave rise to the 

Georgetown Steel litigation does not prevent us from 

concluding that the [Chinese] Government has bestowed a 

countervailable subsidy upon a Chinese producer.” CounCase: 14-1188 Document: 65-2 Page: 4 Filed: 03/13/2015
GPX INTERNATIONAL TIRE CORP. v. US 5

tervailing Duty Investigation of Coated Free Sheet Paper 

from the People’s Republic of China—Whether the Analytical Elements of the Georgetown Steel Opinion Are 

Applicable to China’s Present-Day Economy (Mar. 29, 

2007), available at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/nme-seprates/prc-cfsp/china-cfs-georgetown-applicability.pdf 

(“Georgetown Steel Memo”).

In this case, on June 18, 2007, following the 

Georgetown Steel Memo, several domestic tire manufacturers petitioned Commerce to impose both antidumping 

and countervailing duties on certain Chinese tires. See

Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires from the 

People’s Republic of China: Initiation of Countervailing 

Duty Investigation, 72 Fed. Reg. 44,122 (Dep’t of Commerce Aug. 7, 2007). On July 15, 2008, Commerce issued 

its final countervailing duty determination. Certain New 

Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires from the People’s Republic 

of China: Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Final Negative Determination of Critical 

Circumstances, 73 Fed. Reg. 40,480 (Dep’t of Commerce 

July 15, 2008).

On September 9, 2008, GPX challenged Commerce’s 

countervailing duty determination at the Trade Court, 

which ultimately remanded to Commerce with instructions to forgo imposition of countervailing duties because 

“it is too difficult for Commerce to determine . . . whether 

and to what degree double counting is occurring.” GPX 

Int’l Tire Corp. v. United States, 715 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 

1346 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2010).

On appeal, we affirmed the Trade Court’s holding that 

countervailing duties could not be applied to imports from 

NME countries, concluding that Congress had ratified 

Commerce’s prior position. See GPX I, 666 F.3d at 745. 

Specifically, we found that “when amending and reenacting countervailing duty law in 1988 and 1994, Congress 

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6 GPX INTERNATIONAL TIRE CORP. v. US

legislatively ratified earlier consistent administrative and 

judicial interpretations that government payments cannot 

be characterized as ‘subsidies’ in a non-market economy 

context, and thus that countervailing duty law does not 

apply to NME countries.” Id. at 734.

On March 13, 2012, less than three months after the 

release of our decision in GPX I, Congress enacted new 

legislation overruling that decision. See An Act to Apply 

the Countervailing Duty Provisions of the Tariff Act of 

1930 to Nonmarket Economy Countries, and for other 

Purposes, Pub. L. No. 112-99, 126 Stat. 265 (2012) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671, 1677f-1) (the “new law”). The 

new law authorizes the imposition of countervailing 

duties on NME countries both prospectively and retrospectively, applying to “all proceedings initiated . . . on or 

after November 20, 2006.” 126 Stat. at 265 § 1(a); see also 

Wireking, 745 F.3d at 1197 & n.1. When antidumping 

and countervailing duties imposed on the same goods 

double count for the same unfair trade advantage, the 

new law adjusts for double counting prospectively to 

proceedings initiated after March 13, 2012, but not retrospectively. Wireking, 745 F.3d at 1197–98. 

We granted rehearing of GPX I and in a supplemental 

opinion we recognized that “Congress clearly sought to 

overrule our decision in GPX [I].” GPX II, 678 F.3d at 

1311. We remanded the case to the Trade Court “for a 

determination of the constitutionality of the new legislation . . . .” Id. at 1313. On remand, the Trade Court 

rejected challenges to the new law under, inter alia, the 

Ex Post Facto Clause and the Due Process Clause of the 

U.S. Constitution. GPX Int’l Tire Corp. v. United States, 

893 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1334 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2013). GPX

appeals the Trade Court’s determinations under the Ex 

Post Facto Clause and Due Process Clause.

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GPX INTERNATIONAL TIRE CORP. v. US 7

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(5). We review questions of constitutional or 

statutory interpretation de novo. Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc. v. United States, 734 F.3d 1306, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 

2013) (citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

I 

While this appeal was pending, we decided Wireking, 

holding that the new law, while retroactive, was not 

punitive and did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. 

745 F.3d at 1207. In Wireking, we examined the new law 

under the Supreme Court’s framework for determining 

whether a civil law is punitive as articulated in Smith v. 

Doe I, 583 U.S. 84 (2003). See Wireking, 745 F.3d at 

1202–03 (citing Smith, 538 U.S. at 92). We found that the 

new law was remedial, rather than punitive, and therefore did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. See id. at 

1204–07. GPX acknowledges that “Wireking found the 

[new law] to be non-punitive, and not subject to the Ex 

Post Facto Clause,” Reply Br. 23, but continues to argue 

that “[p]articularly with regard to these Appellants, the 

long period of retroactivity makes the retroactive duties 

especially punitive and thus unconstitutional” under the 

Ex Post Facto Clause. Reply Br. 29.

Contrary to GPX’s contentions, the holding in Wireking was not fact-specific, and any alleged factual distinctions are irrelevant to the ex post facto analysis. We held

that “[t]he predominant effect of the new law is remedial,” 

and that the outcome did not depend on the facts of a 

particular case, referring to the new law’s “remedial effect 

generally.” 745 F.3d at 1207 (emphasis added). Thus, 

whether “this particular case involves an excessive period 

of retroactivity,” Reply Br. 24, does not alter the ex post 

facto analysis, and GPX’s ex post facto challenge is foreclosed by Wireking. 

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8 GPX INTERNATIONAL TIRE CORP. v. US

II

GPX also argues that the new law violates the Due 

Process Clause because it operates retroactively. The 

government responds that “legislation cannot implicate 

the due process clause unless it disturbs a vested right,” 

Appellee’s Br. 15 (citations omitted), and that GPX’s due 

process challenge is therefore foreclosed at the outset by 

its failure to establish a vested right in this case. According to the government, GPX has no vested right to the 

countervailing duty deposits here because they could not 

have a vested right in a particular rate of duty.

Contrary to the government, we do not think that the 

outcome of the due process analysis depends upon a 

determination that a vested right exists. None of the 

Supreme Court cases that the government relies on for 

this proposition, nor any decision of this court, establishes 

such a threshold test. While a vested right analysis

(looking to “whether the new provision attaches new legal 

consequences to events completed before its enactment,” 

Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 270 (1994)) 

may be relevant to the due process analysis, it is not a 

threshold test. See United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 

33 (1994); Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 273–74; see also Weaver 

v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29–30 (1981) (“Evaluating 

whether a right has vested is important for claims under 

the Contracts or Due Process Clauses, which solely protect pre-existing entitlements.” (citations omitted)).1 

1 GPX argues that it has a vested right to its countervailing duty cash deposits in this case, which would 

have automatically liquidated in September 2009 but for 

GPX’s challenge to the government’s authority to collect 

countervailing duties in the first place. We see no signifi-

 

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In determining whether the Due Process Clause has 

been violated, “the strong deference accorded legislation 

in the field of national economic policy is no less applicable when that legislation is applied retroactively.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 

729 (1984). Thus, due process is satisfied “simply by 

showing that the retroactive application of the legislation 

is itself justified by a rational legislative purpose.” Id. at 

730. Under this deferential standard, “it will be a rare 

circumstance where federal legislation that is retroactive 

will be held unconstitutional under the Due Process 

Clause.” Commonwealth Edison Co. v. United States, 271 

F.3d 1327, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (en banc). And the 

burden is on GPX to establish that Congress lacked a 

rational basis for the retroactive application of the new 

law. See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 

15 (1976) (“It is by now well established that legislative 

Acts adjusting the burdens and benefits of economic life 

come to the Court with a presumption of constitutionality, 

and that the burden is on one complaining of a due process violation to establish that the legislature has acted in 

an arbitrary and irrational way.” (citations omitted)).

In a number of cases, the Supreme Court has rejected 

due process challenges to retroactive statutes with features similar to the new law here. See Carlton, 512 U.S. 

at 31–35 (upholding a retroactive tax against a due process challenge because the amendment at issue “was 

adopted as a curative measure,” when “Congress acted to 

correct what it reasonably viewed as a mistake in the 

original . . . provision”); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 

U.S. 181, 184–86, 191 (1992) (upholding against a due 

process challenge a 1987 statute, which overturned a 

cance for the due process analysis in the delay in liquidation of the cash deposits. 

 

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1985 decision of the Michigan Supreme Court, that applied retroactively to require payment of employment 

benefits back to 1981; it was “a rational means of meeting 

th[e] legitimate objective” of “correct[ing] the unexpected 

results of the Michigan Supreme Court’s . . . opinion”); see

also Commonwealth Edison, 271 F.3d at 1344–45 (listing 

“more than ten occasions” in which the Supreme Court 

rejected due process challenges to retroactive statutes). 

The Supreme Court has articulated five considerations that are relevant to the rational basis analysis here

under the Due Process Clause: (1) whether the retroactive 

provision is “wholly new,” United States v. Hemme, 476 

U.S. 558, 568 (1986); (2) whether the retroactive action 

resolves uncertainty in the law, see Romein, 503 U.S. at 

184–85, 191–92; (3) the length of the period of retroactivity, see Carlton, 512 U.S. at 32–33; (4) whether the affected 

party had notice of the potential change prior to the 

conduct that was retroactively regulated, see Pension 

Benefit, 467 U.S. at 731–32; and (5) whether the retroactive provisions are remedial in nature, see Romein, 503 

U.S. at 191. In this case, at least four of these considerations (excluding the length of the retroactive effect) weigh 

heavily against finding a due process violation. 

First, contrary to GPX’s assertion, the new law here is 

not “wholly new.” Hemme, 476 U.S. at 568. Hemme

distinguished a “wholly new tax” from “amendments that 

bring about certain changes in operation of the tax laws.” 

See id.; see also Carlton, 512 U.S. at 27, 34 (noting that 

“[t]he amendment at issue here [retroactively limiting the 

availability of a recently added deduction] certainly is not 

properly characterized as a ‘wholly new tax’”). As we 

explained in Wireking, “this law simply extends Commerce’s ability to impose countervailing duties to a new 

group of importers.” 745 F.3d at 1206 (emphasis added). 

Thus, this is not a “wholly new” law, but rather one “that 

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GPX INTERNATIONAL TIRE CORP. v. US 11

bring[s] about certain changes in operation” of preexisting countervailing duties. Hemme, 476 U.S. at 568. 

Second, the new law resolved uncertainty in the law 

with respect to whether countervailing duties applied to 

NME countries. Congress did not retroactively change 

the language of an otherwise clear statute, see Hemme, 

476 U.S. at 572, nor did it overrule a final interpretation 

of a federal statute by the United States Supreme Court. 

When Commerce initiated this countervailing duty investigation in late 2007, the state of the law with respect to 

countervailing duties was unclear. As we explained in 

GPX I, Georgetown Steel itself was unclear. See GPX I, 

666 F.3d at 738–39 (explaining that “we do not find the 

statute to be clear on its face” and that “Georgetown Steel

could perhaps be interpreted as resting on Chevron”). 

And even if we look to our opinion in GPX I as a clear 

statement of the law at the time, it was only clear for a

matter of days before Congress overturned it, and there is 

no suggestion that any action here was taken in reliance 

on GPX I. 

Moreover, even if there were action taken in reliance 

during the interim three months, GPX I was not the final 

word given the possibility of Supreme Court review, so the 

parties could not reasonably rely on GPX I as the final 

resolution of the subject. Thus, by passing the new law, 

Congress acted promptly to adopt a “curative measure,” 

“to correct what it reasonably viewed as a mistake in the 

original . . . provision . . . .” Carlton, 512 U.S. at 26, 31–

32. The retroactive effect serves the legitimate government purpose of “correct[ing] the unexpected results” of 

our decision in GPX I. Romein, 503 U.S. at 191; see also 

Graham v. Goodcell, 282 U.S. 409, 427 (1931) (“[D]efects 

in the administration of the law may be cured by subsequent legislation without encroaching upon constitutional 

right . . . .”).

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12 GPX INTERNATIONAL TIRE CORP. v. US

Third, while the period of retroactivity in this case is

substantial, it is shorter than that in other cases where 

the Supreme Court has rejected due process challenges. 

In this case, the new law applies retroactively for a period 

of a little over five years, from March 13, 2012, the date of 

enactment, to November 20, 2006, the earliest date to 

which the new law applies. Even longer periods have 

been held not to violate due process. See Romein, 503 

U.S. at 184–86 (approximately six years of retroactive 

effect); United States v. Heinszen & Co., 206 U.S. 371, 

378, 382, 386 (1907) (approximately seven years of retroactive effect). 

Fourth, GPX clearly had notice that Commerce would 

apply countervailing duties to NMEs prior to the imports 

in this case. The imports that are subject to the retroactive countervailing duties here all occurred after GPX had 

notice of the change in government policy. GPX had 

notice of the possible change as early as November 20, 

2006, when Commerce first indicated that it was considering applying countervailing duties to imports from China. 

See 71 Fed. Reg. at 68,549. The new law is retroactive 

only to proceedings initiated after that date. Commerce 

thereafter continued to reiterate its view on March 29, 

2007, when Commerce announced the change of policy in 

the Georgetown Steel Memo. And GPX most certainly had 

notice that Commerce would apply countervailing duties 

to its imports no later than August 7, 2007, when Commerce first initiated this countervailing duty investigation. All of these dates are prior to December 17, 2007, 

the earliest date of the imports here. Thus, GPX had 

notice of a possible change in government policy before it 

imported the goods at issue, and before any adverse 

government action was taken.

Even if GPX had lacked notice of the new law and 

detrimentally relied on the prior state of the law, these 

factors are not dispositive of the due process analysis. 

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The retroactive tax in Carlton did not violate due process 

even though the challenger “specifically and detrimentally 

relied” on the prior state of the law, and even though the 

challenger did not have prior notice of the change in the 

law. See Carlton, 512 U.S. at 33–34; see also Usery, 428 

U.S. at 16, 18 (upholding a retroactive law even though “it 

may be that the liability imposed by the Act for disabilities suffered by former employees was not anticipated at 

the time of actual employment”). 

Finally, the new law is directed to the remedial administration of trade duties, as opposed to raising government revenue. Trade statutes, such as the new law, 

are designed to be remedial and to preserve American 

industry. See Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United 

States, 288 U.S. 294, 318 (1933) (“No one has a legal right 

to the maintenance of an existing rate or duty.”); see also 

Wireking, 745 F.3d at 1205 (“It is well established that 

antidumping and countervailing duty laws are remedial 

in nature.”). Although trade duties are forward-looking in 

part, the government also has a clear interest in fashioning a remedy for damaging past acts, “level[ing] the 

playing field for particular American manufacturers,” and

“remedy[ing] the harm American manufacturers and their 

workers experience as a result of unfair trade practices.” 

Wireking, 745 F.3d at 1206. The remedial aspect of the 

new law is not merely forward-looking, but the imposition 

of duties is remedial in eliminating past advantages 

enjoyed by the importers.

Companies, such as GPX, that operate in the highly 

regulated field of international trade can expect some 

retroactive liability, even if the remedial legislation were 

“severely retroactive” (which the new law is not). Commonwealth Edison, 271 F.3d at 1346, 1348 

(“[P]articipants in [a] highly regulated field can expect 

liability for remediation costs.”). Moreover, with respect 

to trade duties, imports always occur with uncertainty as 

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14 GPX INTERNATIONAL TIRE CORP. v. US

to the extent of final duties. See Parkdale Int’l v. United 

States, 475 F.3d 1375, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“While 

liability to pay dumping duties accrues upon entry of 

subject merchandise, the actual duty is not formally 

determined until after entry, and not paid until the goods 

are liquidated by [Customs].” (citations omitted)); see also 

N. Am. Foreign Trading Corp. v. United States, 783 F.2d 

1031, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“No vested right to a particular classification or rate of duty or preference is acquired 

at the time of importation.” (citations omitted)). 

In the few cases where the Supreme Court has invalidated retroactive statutes under the Due Process Clause, 

the challenged laws were “most unusual,” Commonwealth 

Edison, 271 F.3d at 1342, and in many instances have 

been called into question by later Supreme Court decisions. See Carlton, 512 U.S. at 34 (Earlier “cases were 

decided during an era characterized by exacting review of 

economic legislation under an approach that has long 

since been discarded.” (citation and quotation omitted)); 

see also Pension Benefit, 467 U.S. at 733 (questioning 

whether Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad Co., 

295 U.S. 330 (1935), which invalidated a retroactive 

pension statute, “retains vitality” (citation omitted)). In 

any event, each of these cases involved the retroactive 

creation of a wholly new statute, a prolonged period of 

retroactivity, and a total lack of notice at the time of the 

conduct being regulated or taxed. See, e.g., E. Enters. v. 

Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 549 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 

(Justice Kennedy would have invalidated on due process 

grounds a statute that had retroactive effects based solely 

on a company’s roster of employees approximately thirtyfive years prior to the statute’s enactment); Blodgett v. 

Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 147 (1927) (retroactive imposition 

of a new gift tax without even “the slightest” notice to the 

taxpayer violated due process); Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 

U.S. 531, 542–43 (1927) (estate tax with retroactive effect 

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on property “transferred [so many] years ago” that it was 

“beyond recall” violated due process); Forbes Pioneer Boat 

Line v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Everglades Drainage Dist., 258 

U.S. 338, 338–40 (1922) (no indication of notice when a 

state legislature sought to retroactively validate the 

collection of tolls for a canal); see also Welch v. Henry, 305 

U.S. 134, 147 (1938) (“In the cases in which this Court has 

held invalid the taxation of gifts made and completely 

vested before the enactment of the taxing statute, decision 

was rested on the ground that the nature or amount of the 

tax could not reasonably have been anticipated by the 

taxpayer at the time of the particular voluntary act which 

the statute later made the taxable event.” (citations 

omitted)); Commonwealth Edison, 271 F.3d at 1342 

(collecting cases).

Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the 

new law does not rationally relate to the government’s 

interest in retroactively remedying the damage from 

unfair foreign trade practices. The new law violates 

neither the Ex Post Facto Clause nor the Due Process 

Clause. 

AFFIRMED 

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United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

GPX INTERNATIONAL TIRE CORPORATION, 

HEBEI STARBRIGHT TIRE CO., LTD., 

TIANJIN UNITED TIRE & RUBBER 

INTERNATIONAL CO., LTD.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants

MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC 

OF CHINA,

Plaintiff

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

BRIDGESTONE AMERICAS, INC., 

BRIDGESTONE AMERICAS TIRE OPERATIONS, 

LLC,

Defendants

TITAN TIRE CORPORATION, UNITED STEEL, 

PAPER AND FORESTRY, RUBBER, 

MANUFACTURING, ENERGY, ALLIED 

INDUSTRIAL AND SERVICE WORKERS 

INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL-CIO-CLC,

Defendants-Appellees

______________________ 

2014-1188, 2014-1248

______________________ 

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2 GPX INTERNATIONAL TIRE CORP. v. US

Appeals from the United States Court of International 

Trade in No. 1:08-cv-00285-JAR, 1:08-cv-00286-JAR, 1:08-

cv-00351-JAR, 1:08-cv-00352-JAR, 1:08-cv-00358-JAR, 

1:08-cv-00360-JAR, 1:08-cv-00361-JAR, Judge Jane A. 

Restani.

______________________ 

O’MALLEY, Circuit Judge, concurring. 

I continue to believe, as discussed in my concurrence 

in Guangdong Wireking Housewares v. United States, 745 

F.3d 1194, 1209–11 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (O’Malley, J., concurring in the result), that Pub. L. No. 112-99, 126 Stat. 265 

(2012) (“the Act”), did not effect a retroactive change in

the law. GPX challenges the retroactive application of the 

Act under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Because GPX does not challenge the prospective 

application of the Act, and because, in my view, the Act 

does not operate retroactively, I do not believe we need to 

consider whether the Act violates the Due Process Clause. 

Because we are bound by the determination in Guangdong that the Act does apply retroactively, I agree with 

the majority that we must proceed to consider the due 

process question. And I agree with the majority that 

Congress had a rational basis upon which to justify retroactive application of the Act. 

Case: 14-1188 Document: 65-2 Page: 17 Filed: 03/13/2015