Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00225/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00225-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Craig Apker
Respondent
David Evan Starr
Petitioner

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

David Evan Starr, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Craig Apker, 

Respondent.

No. CV-12-00225-TUC-RCC

ORDER 

Before the Court is the August 12, 2013, Report and Recommendation (R&R) 

from Magistrate Judge D. Thomas Ferraro (Doc. 45) recommending that this Court grant 

in part and deny in part Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1). The R&R further recommends this Court deny Respondent’s 

Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 29) and deny as moot Petitioner’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment (Doc. 42). 

Respondent filed his objections to the R&R (Doc. 49) on September 25, 2013, and 

Petitioner filed his response to Respondent’s objections on October 7, 2013 (Doc. 52). 

Respondent also filed a reply (Doc. 54) to Petitioner’s response; however, no replies are 

permitted and the Court will therefore strike Document 54. (See Doc. 45 at 6). 

 For the following reasons, this Court will adopt the R&R. 

I. BACKGROUND 

The factual and procedural background in this case is thoroughly detailed in 

Magistrate Judge Ferraro’s R&R (Doc. 45). This Court fully incorporates by reference 

the Summary section of the R&R into this Order. 

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II. LEGAL STANDARD 

The duties of the district court in connection with a R&R are set forth in Rule 72 

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U .S.C. § 636(b)(1). The district court 

may “accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or 

return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3); 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The Court will not disturb a Magistrate Judge’s Order unless his 

factual findings are clearly erroneous or his legal conclusions are contrary to law. 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). “[T]he magistrate judge’s decision ... is entitled to great deference 

by the district court.” United States v. Abonce-Barrera, 257 F.3d 959, 969 (9th Cir. 

2001). Where the parties object to a R&R, “[a] judge of the [district] court shall make a 

de novo determination of those portions of the [R&R] to which objection is made.” 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149-50 (1985). 

III. DISCUSSION 

a. § 2241 Petition 

Magistrate Judge Ferraro issued a R&R recommending that this Court enter an 

order granting in part and denying in part the § 2241 petition. Judge Ferraro 

recommended the petition be granted to the extent that the Petitioner should be placed on 

“IFRP Exempt” status until a proper restitution schedule has been set. Judge Ferraro 

further recommended that the petition be denied to the extent that Petitioner requests 

changes to the terms of his order of restitution; specifically, that Petitioner not be 

obligated to pay restitution until his release from custody, and that the restitution award 

be recalculated upon his release. 

Petitioner’s claims 1 and 2 argue that the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) cannot 

impose a restitution schedule on him because the sentencing court did not do so. Citing 

U.S. v. Gunning, 401 F.3d 1145, 1150 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Gunning II”), and Ward v. 

Chavez, 678 F.3d 1042, 1051-52 (9th Cir. 2012), Judge Ferraro found that claims 1 and 2 

should be granted because the statutory duty to set a restitution payment schedule belongs 

to the sentencing court, and cannot be delegated to the BOP or any other authority. Judge 

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Ferraro further noted that because in this case the sentencing court “failed to set a 

schedule for repayment ‘in consideration of’ Petitioner’s financial circumstances as 

required by 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(2),” the BOP has no authority to create its own schedule 

or to collect payments under Petitioner’s IFRP plan. (Doc. 45 at 5). Judge Ferraro 

therefore concluded Petitioner should be placed on “IFRP Exempt” status and that the 

BOP must stop collecting payments until the sentencing court amends its restitution order 

to include a payment schedule. 

Petitioner’s claim 3 argues that he should not be required to pay any restitution 

while he is incarcerated and has no income, and claim 4 argues the restitution obligation 

should be recalculated upon Petitioner’s release from custody. Judge Ferraro rejected 

these claims, noting that petitions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 are “only appropriate to 

challenge the ‘manner, location, or conditions of a sentence’s execution.’” (Doc. 45 at 5) 

(citation omitted). Judge Ferraro therefore concluded this Court lacks jurisdiction to 

consider the Petitioner’s claims regarding modifications as to the amount and terms of the 

restitution order entered by the sentencing court. 

In his objections to the R&R, Respondent states that the petition should be 

dismissed because Petitioner failed to directly appeal his restitution order and has 

therefore waived the arguments. Here, Petitioner is challenging the BOP’s execution of 

the sentencing order and judgment, i.e., its scheduling of payments through the IFRP, not 

the sentencing order itself. It is well established that a § 2241 petition is the proper 

vehicle through which a federal prisoner challenges the manner or the execution of a 

sentence. See Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 864 (9th Cir. 2000). This petition 

does just that. It challenges the BOP’s authority to schedule and withdraw restitution 

payments, not the legality of the sentence itself. This issue is properly raised by way of a 

§ 2241 petition. 

Respondent further argues that “[t]he Magistrate Judge’s finding that the 

restitution order is not a proper or valid order, is internally inconsistent with his finding 

that this court has no jurisdiction to modify the terms of the agreement, when the court 

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has done exactly that by invalidating another court’s restitution order.” (Doc. 49 at 4). 

Respondent misstates the findings of the R&R. The R&R does not recommend that the 

restitution order is invalid; rather, the R&R recommends that because the restitution order 

does not set a payment schedule, the BOP has no authority to set its own schedule and 

collect payments from Petitioner. It is up to the sentencing court whether it wishes to 

amend the restitution order to establish a payment schedule. Respondent also seems 

confused in his misstatement of the issues before the Court—Petitioner is not 

challenging, and the Court does not presume to address, the validity of the sentencing 

court’s judgment or restitution order. The issue at bar is the BOP’s enforcement of the 

restitution order— an issue which falls squarely within § 2241’s as the proper vehicle 

through which a federal prisoner challenges the manner or execution of his sentence. 

Petitioner also suggests that the sentencing court did not impermissibly delegate 

its authority to the BOP to establish a repayment schedule. Pursuant to the Mandatory 

Victims Restitution Act (“MVRA”), “[u]pon determination of the amount of restitution 

owed to each victim, the court shall, pursuant to section 3572, specify in the restitution 

order the manner in which, and the schedule according to which, the restitution is to be 

paid.” 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(2). The MVRA charges the District Court with setting the 

terms of the restitution payments and that duty cannot be delegated. Gunning II, 401 F.3d 

at 1149-50 (citing U.S. v. Gunning, 339 F.3d 948, 949 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Gunning I”)). 

The Gunning II court explicitly stated that “the district court must determine the 

restitution payment schedule.” 401 F.3d at 1150. In this case, the sentencing court 

ordered Petitioner’s restitution due “in full immediately.” This Court has previously 

found that an order making restitution due immediately, without providing a specific time 

frame for payment, does not comply with Gunning II. (See 11-CV-130-TUC-RCC Doc. 

33). Allowing the BOP to determine the restitution schedule pursuant to such an order is 

an impermissible delegation of the sentencing court’s authority. 

To the extent Petitioner suggests Eighth Circuit case law should apply here 

(because Petitioner’s underlying conviction is from the District of Iowa), the Court 

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rejects that argument. Petitioner is challenging the manner in which his sentence is being 

executed in the District of Arizona. Thus, Ninth Circuit law properly applies to the § 

2241 petition. 

b. Motion to Dismiss 

Magistrate Judge Ferraro also recommended this Court deny Respondent’s Motion 

to Dismiss (Doc. 29). In the R&R, Judge Ferraro notes that the Court expressly ordered 

Respondent to file an answer to the petition, and that Respondent was prohibited from 

filing a dispositive motion without first showing cause as to why an answer would be 

inadequate. (See Doc. 5 at 4). However, Respondent did not file an answer and did not 

seek the Court’s leave before filing his first Motion to Dismiss on July 5, 2012 (Doc. 18). 

The Court later granted Petitioner’s Motion to Strike (Doc. 23) the Respondent’s Motion 

to Dismiss. 

Respondent subsequently filed a second Motion to Dismiss on October 29, 2012 

(Doc. 29), which was fully briefed by the parties. In the R&R, Judge Ferraro notes that 

“The Court determines that additional briefing is unwarranted in the circumstances and 

rules on the documents it has before it.” (Doc. 45 at 1 n.1). 

In his objections to the R&R, Respondent does not directly challenge Judge 

Ferraro’s recommendation to deny the Motion to Dismiss. 

c. Motion for Summary Judgment 

Because Magistrate Judge Ferraro concluded Petitioner is entitled to relief on the 

merits of Claim 1 and Claim 2 of the 28 U.S.C. §2241 petition, Judge Ferraro did not 

address the merits of Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Judge Ferraro therefore 

recommends the Court deny Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment as moot. 

In his objections to the R&R, Respondent does not directly challenge Judge 

Ferraro’s recommendation to deny the Motion for Summary Judgment. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

Petitioner’s § 2241 claim asserts and proves a deficiency in the execution of his 

sentence. Accordingly, the Court must remedy the execution of the sentence, rather than 

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ordering the amendment of the judgment. As there is no schedule by which the BOP can 

collect payments from Petitioner’s account, the BOP must stop collecting such payments. 

Moreover, Petitioner should be placed on “IFRP Exempt” status in light of the BOP’s 

lack of authority to implement a payment schedule through that program. 

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Ferraro’s Report and Recommendation 

(Doc. 45) is hereby ACCEPTED and ADOPTED as the findings of fact and 

conclusions of law by this Court. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

(Doc. 1) is granted in part to the extent Petitioner be put on “IFRP Exempt” status until 

a proper restitution schedule has been set by the sentencing court, and denied in part to 

the extent that Petitioner requests changes to the terms of his order of restitution. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the BOP shall stop collecting restitution payments 

from Petitioner, and shall place Petitioner on “IFRP Exempt” status. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 29) is 

denied. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 

42) is denied as moot. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED striking Document 54 from the record as an 

unpermitted reply. 

The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly and shall close its file on this 

matter. 

Dated this 3rd day of March, 2014. 

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