Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-24-10027/USCOURTS-ca11-24-10027-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dwayne Eric Thompson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-10027

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

DWAYNE ERIC THOMPSON, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 3:10-cr-00015-TJC-LLL-1

____________________

USCA11 Case: 24-10027 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2024 Page: 1 of 12
2 Opinion of the Court 24-10027

____________________

No. 24-10031

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

DWAYNE ERIC THOMPSON, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 3:09-cr-00117-TJC-MCR-1

____________________

____________________

No. 24-10030

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

USCA11 Case: 24-10027 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2024 Page: 2 of 12
24-10027 Opinion of the Court 3

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

DWAYNE ERIC THOMPSON, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 3:23-cr-00067-TJC-JBT-1

____________________

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and JILL PRYOR and BRASHER, 

Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Dwayne Eric Thompson appeals his conviction and sentence for possession of a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), 

and his sentence for violating supervised release. Thompson challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the denial of his motion for 

a mistrial and new trial, and the upward variance from his Sentencing Guidelines range without prior notice. We affirm.

USCA11 Case: 24-10027 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2024 Page: 3 of 12
4 Opinion of the Court 24-10027

I. BACKGROUND

A grand jury indicted Thompson with one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). At trial, 

Officer Walter Umland testified that he was on patrol when he saw 

a car driving with dark window tint, and records showed the registered owner and driver, Thompson, had a pending investigation. 

Detective Thomas Sweat pulled Thompson over. Thompson and 

two female passengers got out of the car. During a search, officers 

found a firearm in the center console on top of other items. The 

women denied having a firearm in the car and denied seeing 

Thompson with a firearm. Further investigation revealed that 

Thompson was a convicted felon. Thompson was combative when 

Officer Umland obtained a DNA sample. On cross-examination, 

Officer Umland testified that he never saw Thompson with the firearm. 

Detective Sweat testified that he pulled Thompson over and 

located the firearm. He wore a fresh pair of gloves, did not touch 

anything before touching the firearm, and placed the firearm and 

ammunition in a brown bag to avoid contamination. He never saw 

Thompson physically possess the firearm.

Quenita Mustafa, one of the passengers, testified that she did 

not know the firearm was in the car. Special Agent Lisa Gaul testified that the firearm crossed international and state lines. Shernelle 

Smith testified that she examined the firearm and magazine and did 

not find any latent fingerprints. 

USCA11 Case: 24-10027 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2024 Page: 4 of 12
24-10027 Opinion of the Court 5

Brooke Hoover testified that there was a mixture of four donors from both the firearm and magazine swabs, and Thompson 

was a possible contributor. She explained that the mixed DNA profile for the firearm swab was more than 700 billion times more 

likely to occur if the sample was from Thompson and 3 other individuals as opposed to 4 unrelated individuals. She explained that 

the mixed DNA profile for the magazine swab was about 14,000 

times more likely to occur if the sample was from Thompson and 

3 other individuals as opposed to 4 unrelated individuals. On 

cross-examination, Hoover testified that DNA could reach a surface from direct contact or indirect transfer through an intermediary. She stated that it was possible for DNA to transfer from an intermediary but was not likely through dry touch. On redirect, Hoover testified that it was more likely for DNA to end up on an item 

because it was directly handled than because it was transferred.

The parties stipulated that Thompson knew he had been 

previously convicted of a felony. The government rested, and 

Thompson moved for a judgment of acquittal. He argued that the 

government did not prove he knowingly possessed the firearm because no witness stated he possessed the firearm. The district court 

denied the motion. 

The defense called Charlesana Thomas, Thompson’s girlfriend and the second passenger. She testified that she did not see 

Thompson with a firearm the day of the stop and had never seen 

him with a firearm before. The defense also called Tearron Byrd, 

Thompson’s friend, who testified that a couple of days before the 

USCA11 Case: 24-10027 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2024 Page: 5 of 12
6 Opinion of the Court 24-10027

traffic stop, he put the firearm in the console of Thompson’s car

and forgot about it. He did not tell Thompson about the firearm. 

Byrd did not remember a lot as he had been drinking heavily. 

Thompson did not testify, and the defense rested. Thompson renewed his motion for a judgment of acquittal on the same 

grounds as his initial motion and because one of the defense’s witnesses stated it was his firearm. The district court denied the motion. 

The district court instructed the jury, and the jury began to 

deliberate at 1:35 p.m. At 3:35 p.m., the court explained that it received two requests from the jury, including one for another verdict form. Before it was able to accommodate that request, the jury 

submitted a note stating, “There are 11 [g]uilty and 1 not [g]uilty[.] 

What do we do they are ready to [g]o [h]ome[?]” As the district 

court was preparing to discuss the communication with the parties, 

the jury submitted a verdict form, which read “NOT GUILTY 0 

GUILTY 12 SO SAY WE ALL, NO” with the wrong date. The 0 

looked like it had been written over a 1 and the 12 looked like it 

had been written over an 11.

Thompson requested a mistrial on the ground that there 

was some coercion based on the changed vote of a holdout on the 

jury and the note showing that the jury wanted to go home. The 

district court determined that it could not accept the verdict form 

based on itsinconsistencies. It declined to declare a mistrial because 

it could provide a charge under Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 

(1896). 

USCA11 Case: 24-10027 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2024 Page: 6 of 12
24-10027 Opinion of the Court 7

The district court concluded that an Allen charge would not 

be coercive because the jury had deliberated for only two hours; 

the jury had not yet reported being deadlocked and instructed to 

continue; the modified charge would not imply that the jurors violated their oaths or acted improperly by failing to reach a verdict; 

and the time between the supplemental instruction and verdict was 

unknown. The district court stated that it would instruct the jurors 

that they were not expected to give up their honest beliefs about 

the evidence. It denied Thompson’s motion for a mistrial over

Thompson’s objection. 

The jury returned and the district court explained the communications it received and the issues with the verdict form. The 

district court then gave the jury the modified Allen charge. The jury 

exited at 4:13 p.m. and returned at 4:19 p.m. The jury found 

Thompson guilty.

Thompson renewed his motion for a mistrial and filed a renewed motion for judgment of acquittal or motion for new trial. 

He argued that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he 

knowingly possessed the firearm and that the verdict was the result 

of coercion or failure to follow the jury instructions. 

The district court denied Thompson’s motions. It ruled that 

there was sufficient evidence of constructive possession because officers found the firearm in the center console of the vehicle Thompson owned and was driving and his DNA was on the firearm. It 

found that indirect transfer of DNA, though possible, was not probable and that Thompson was combative when Officer Umland

USCA11 Case: 24-10027 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2024 Page: 7 of 12
8 Opinion of the Court 24-10027

obtained his DNA sample. It further found that the jury could have 

disbelieved Byrd’s testimony as not credible. It also ruled that its 

Allen charge was not coercive because the sequence of events suggested that the first verdict form reflected the jury’s unanimous 

verdict and the Allen charge’s language was not coercive. 

Thompson’s presentence investigation report recorded a total offense level of 18 and a criminal history category III, which resulted in a guideline range of 33 to 41 months of imprisonment. At 

sentencing, the district court stated it considered all the statutory 

sentencing factors, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including the nature and 

circumstances of the offense, Thompson’s history and characteristics, the need to promote respect for law, afford adequate deterrence, and protect the public from further crimes. It then imposed 

an “upward variance” of 60 months of imprisonment and a consecutive sentence of 24 months of imprisonment for two supervised 

release violations. 

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Three standards of review govern this appeal. We review a 

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, and we view 

the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in the government’s favor. United States v. Beach, 80 F.4th 1245, 1255, 1258 (11th 

Cir. 2023). We will uphold a conviction “if a reasonable trier of fact 

could conclude that the evidence establishes the defendant’s guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 1255 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We review the denial of motions for a mistrial and a new trial for abuse of discretion. United States v. Capers, 

USCA11 Case: 24-10027 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2024 Page: 8 of 12
24-10027 Opinion of the Court 9

708 F.3d 1286, 1298 (11th Cir. 2013). We review for plain error an 

objection to the failure to provide notice of an upward variance 

when raised for the first time on appeal. United States v. Hall, 965 

F.3d 1281, 1296 (11th Cir. 2020).

III. DISCUSSION

We divide our discussion in three parts. First, we explain 

that sufficient evidence supports Thompson’s conviction. Second, 

we explain that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying his motions for a mistrial and new trial. Third, we explain 

that the district court did not plainly err in imposing an upward 

variance without providing notice.

A. Sufficient Evidence Supports Thompson’s Conviction.

Thompson argues that the government failed to present sufficient evidence that he knowingly possessed the firearm. A defendant’s mere presence near a firearm is insufficient to establish constructive possession. United States v. Perez, 661 F.3d 568, 576 (11th 

Cir. 2011). The government must prove through direct or circumstantial evidence that the defendant was aware of the firearm’s 

presence and had the ability and intent to exercise dominion and 

control over the firearm. Id. The government may establish constructive possession when the defendant exercised ownership or 

control over the car concealing the firearm. United States v. Gunn, 

369 F.3d 1229, 1234 (11th Cir. 2004). 

There was sufficient evidence that Thompson constructively possessed the firearm. Officers found the firearm in the center console of the car Thompson owned and was driving. See id.

USCA11 Case: 24-10027 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2024 Page: 9 of 12
10 Opinion of the Court 24-10027

Hoover testified that it was highly likely that Thompson’s DNA 

was on the firearm. Although she stated it was possible for Thompson’s DNA to transfer to the firearm from other objects, it was not 

likely, and the jury was allowed to accept this reasonable interpretation of the evidence. See Beach, 80 F.4th at 1256 (“The jury is free 

to choose among alternative, reasonable interpretations of the evidence.”). And officers testified that Thompson was combative 

when they took a DNA sample, which could suggest he knew 

about the firearm’s presence in the car. Cf. United States v. Wright, 

392 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that resisting arrest 

could show that the defendant realized officers would discover the 

firearm in a post-arrest search). The jury was free to discredit Byrd’s 

testimony that the firearm was his and Thomas’s testimony that 

she never saw Thompson with a firearm. See United States v. Estepa, 

998 F.3d 898, 908 (11th Cir. 2021) (This Court must “assume that 

the jury made all credibility choices in support of the verdict.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Sufficient evidence 

supports Thompson’s conviction. 

B. The District Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Denying 

Thompson’s Motions for a Mistrial and a New Trial.

Thompson argues that he was entitled to a mistrial or new 

trial because either the jury did not follow the Allen instruction or 

the instruction coerced the jury into reaching a decision. District 

courts have broad discretion in issuing Allen charges but must take 

care not to “coerce any juror to give up an honest belief.” United 

States v. Anderson, 1 F.4th 1244, 1269 (11th Cir. 2021) (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). We have identified five 

USCA11 Case: 24-10027 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2024 Page: 10 of 12
24-10027 Opinion of the Court 11

non-exhaustive factors we consider when reviewing the effect of 

an Allen instruction, including: the total length of deliberations, the 

number of times the court instructed the jury to resume deliberations, whether the court knew of the jury’s split, whether the instructions imply jurors violate their oaths by failing to reach a verdict, and the time between the final instruction and the verdict. 

Brewster v. Hetzel, 913 F.3d 1042, 1053 (11th Cir. 2019). “[W]e consider the language of the charge and the totality of the circumstances under which it was delivered.” Anderson, 1 F.4th at 1269 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

Thompson’s motions for a mistrial and new trial. We presume the 

jury followed the Allen instruction. See United States v. Valdiviez-Garza, 669 F.3d 1199, 1201 (11th Cir. 2012). And the totality 

of the circumstances does not establish that the instruction was coercive. The first verdict form suggested the jury reached a unanimous verdict before the Allen charge, which explains the short duration of deliberations after the charge. If a juror changed his position based on input from other members of the jury, that change 

does not constitute impermissible coercion. See Brewster, 913 F.3d 

at 1053 (“[S]uch pressure is a natural function of sending twelve 

persons into a jury room to deliberate.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). The jury had been deliberating for only

two hours before the charge, and the district court instructed the 

jury to continue deliberating once, omitted language about violating their oaths, and included language about not giving up their 

USCA11 Case: 24-10027 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2024 Page: 11 of 12
12 Opinion of the Court 24-10027

honest beliefs. See id.; Anderson, 1 F.4th at 1269. The Allen charge 

was not coercive. 

C. The District Court Did Not Plainly Err by Failing to Provide 

Notice Before Imposing an Upward Variance.

Thompson argues that the district court plainly erred by failing to provide notice before imposing an upward variance. We disagree. A district court must provide notice before imposing a departure, not a variance. Hall, 965 F.3d at 1295–96. The district court 

explained that it was imposing an upward variance and relied on 

the statutory sentencing factors, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), not a specific 

guideline departure provision, so it was not required to provide 

prior notice. See Hall, 965 F.3d at 1296. 

IV. CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM Thompson’s conviction and sentences.

USCA11 Case: 24-10027 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2024 Page: 12 of 12