Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-21-03221/USCOURTS-ca7-21-03221-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Royel Page
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 21-3221 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

ROYEL PAGE, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Wisconsin. 

No. 2:17-cr-00175-MYS-9 — Michael Y. Scudder, Circuit Judge.

*

____________________

ARGUED MAY 22, 2024 — DECIDED DECEMBER 18, 2024 

____________________ 

Before SYKES, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK, ROVNER,

BRENNAN, ST. EVE, KIRSCH, JACKSON-AKIWUMI, LEE, PRYOR, 

and KOLAR, Circuit Judges.**

* Of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, sitting 

by designation.

** Circuit Judges Scudder and Maldonado did not participate in the 

consideration or decision of this appeal.

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2 No. 21-3221 

KIRSCH, Circuit Judge. Royel Page was charged with twelve 

counts of attempted heroin distribution and one count of drug 

conspiracy. At trial, the government proved that Page repeatedly purchased distribution quantities of heroin from Terrance Hamlin for over a year. Further, the government presented evidence of Hamlin and Page’s relationship that substantially showed a heightened level of trust between them. 

For his part, Page denied involvement in the drug trade altogether, painting Hamlin as a biased witness who wholly lied 

about their drug transactions. The jury convicted Page on all 

counts. 

Page appealed his conspiracy conviction on two grounds. 

First, he argued that the government failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain his conspiracy conviction. Second, 

he urged us to find that the district court plainly erred by not 

sua sponte giving a buyer-seller jury instruction, even though 

he affirmatively approved the district court’s final instructions and never argued that he and Hamlin had a mere buyerseller relationship. A panel of our court agreed with Page’s 

second argument and remanded his case for a new trial. We 

vacated the panel’s opinion and voted to rehear the case en 

banc. 

Our conspiracy and buyer-seller jurisprudence has 

strayed far from the Supreme Court’s decision in Direct Sales 

Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703 (1943). Today, we fix that deviation by holding that repeated, distribution-quantity drug

transactions alone can sustain a conspiracy conviction. Further, we apply the plain error standard as established in 

United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993), something we have 

not always done in our recent case law. In short, because the 

evidence more than sufficiently supports Page’s conspiracy 

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No. 21-3221 3

conviction, and because the district court did not err, let alone 

plainly err, in not sua sponte providing a buyer-seller jury instruction, we affirm. 

I 

A grand jury charged Royel Page, Terrance Hamlin, and 

others with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 100 

or more grams of heroin, fentanyl, and cocaine. 21 U.S.C. 

§§ 841(a)(1), 846. Page was also charged with twelve counts of 

attempt to distribute and possess with intent to distribute heroin. Unlike Hamlin and the other defendants, who all pleaded 

guilty, Page proceeded to trial. 

At trial, the government presented substantial evidence of 

Page’s guilt. For over a year and a half, Page purchased heroin 

from Hamlin multiple times a week. The quantity of heroin 

varied with each transaction, but Hamlin testified that Page 

typically purchased between 5 and 56 grams, with the quantities steadily increasing over time. Hamlin also testified that 

he eventually sold heroin to Page at a lower price per gram 

because Page distributed his supply quickly. 

Though not related by blood, Page and Hamlin maintained a close relationship that they likened to one between 

an uncle and a nephew. The pair met in person or over the 

phone hundreds of times to arrange drug deals and exchange 

heroin. The government introduced wiretaps of approximately 133 calls between the two. Hamlin walked the jury 

through these calls and explained the coded language he and 

Page used to discuss the details of their heroin transactions. 

Hamlin explained that they often did not need to discuss 

price, however, because he had an established price per gram 

rate for Page’s purchases. 

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Surveillance corroborated Hamlin’s testimony. On one occasion, for example, Detective Nathan Pennes observed Hamlin park his vehicle outside Page’s house shortly after the pair 

had a phone call discussing the sale of 45 grams of heroin. Det. 

Pennes watched Page exit his home, walk to Hamlin’s car, 

and enter the passenger side. A few minutes later, Page returned home, and Hamlin drove away. Based on his experience and training, Det. Pennes testified that this interaction 

likely involved the 45-gram transaction that Page and Hamlin 

previously discussed. 

In addition to Page’s repeated, large-scale drug transactions with Hamlin, the government introduced evidence

shedding further light on the nature of the pair’s burgeoning 

business relationship. For example, Hamlin expressed skepticism at having anyone other than Page involved, testifying 

that he warned Page to keep his cousin out of the “business.” 

And in line with this view, a recorded phone call showed that 

Hamlin was particularly protective of Page, with Hamlin noting that he could not have the same business relationship with 

others because Page “earned what [he was] doing.” Moreover, Hamlin allowed Page to purchase heroin partially on 

credit, further evidencing the heightened trust between the 

pair. 

Hamlin testified that, from the beginning, he saw a potential for growth in his drug-dealing venture with Page. And at 

one point, Page was agreeable to helping Hamlin expand his 

heroin dealing “up north,” emphasizing to Hamlin in a call 

that “we can do this” and that he could provide Hamlin with 

his expertise in cutting heroin. 

Additionally, the government introduced evidence showing that Page and Hamlin jointly sought to ensure the 

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No. 21-3221 5

delivery of high-quality heroin to Page’s customers. For example, on one occasion, Page told Hamlin that the delivered

supply of heroin was “no good” and asked to switch it out. 

Page informed Hamlin that this requested recall was for a customer that “spends good money” and whose business he

could not afford to lose. Hamlin agreed to replace the heroin. 

The government introduced significant expert testimony

on drug conspiracies and transactions. Wisconsin Department of Justice Agent Jay Novak described the general inner 

workings of drug conspiracies and explained how drug traffickers typically further each other’s efforts to distribute 

drugs. Moreover, Agent Novak compared personal-use quantities of heroin with distribution quantities. While Agent Novak testified that heroin quantities of a gram or less typically 

reflect purchases made for personal use, quantities above two 

grams—like those purchased by Page—are exemplary of distribution levels. 

Throughout trial, Page proceeded under the theory that he 

was not involved in the drug trade at all, broadly challenging 

the evidence that connected him to Hamlin and the intercepted phone calls. For example, through cross examination 

and closing argument, Page’s counsel spent considerable time 

painting Hamlin as a liar who had a lot to gain in falsely testifying for the government. In doing so, Page’s counsel asked 

the jury to consider “who was on that telephone line.” Additionally, Page’s counsel tried to cast doubt on the criminality 

of Page’s meetings with Hamlin. Page’s counsel highlighted 

that law enforcement never physically observed Page and 

Hamlin exchange drugs and suggested instead that their 

meetings were innocent encounters between family friends 

that involved the exchange of innocuous items. 

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At the close of evidence, the district court and the parties 

proceeded with a jury instruction conference. Neither party 

asked for a buyer-seller instruction. At the close of the conference, the district court asked Page’s counsel, “[F]or the record 

the defense is good with the jury instructions, what’s in and 

what’s not in?” Page’s counsel responded, “Yes.” 

Ultimately, the jury convicted Page on all counts. Page 

proceeded to sentencing, where he faced a Sentencing Guidelines range of 97–121 months. The district court sentenced 

Page to 90 months on each count to be served concurrently, 

and Page appealed, raising two challenges. First, he argues 

that there was insufficient evidence to support his conspiracy 

conviction. Second, he argues that the district court plainly 

erred by not giving a buyer-seller jury instruction sua sponte. 

II

We turn first to Page’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge. For such a challenge, we view the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the prosecution. United States v. Garcia, 919 

F.3d 489, 496 (7th Cir. 2019). To prevail, Page must show that 

no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

We have time and again described a defendant’s burden under this standard as “nearly insurmountable.” United States v. 

Dessart, 823 F.3d 395, 403 (7th Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted). 

We begin by explaining how our conspiracy and buyerseller jurisprudence has drifted far from the Supreme Court’s 

guidance. See United States v. Brown, 726 F.3d 993, 1000–01 

(7th Cir. 2013) (describing the tension and inconsistency in 

our buyer-seller case law). After correcting course, we stress 

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No. 21-3221 7

that Page’s conviction would stand even under our nowoverruled precedent. 

A 

To sustain a conspiracy conviction, the government must 

prove that two or more people agreed to commit an unlawful 

act and that the defendant knowingly and intentionally joined 

in that agreement. See United States v. Wright, 85 F.4th 851, 861 

(7th Cir. 2023). For a drug-distribution conspiracy, there must 

be sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to conclude 

beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly 

agreed, at least implicitly, to distribute drugs with another. 

United States v. Hidalgo-Sanchez, 29 F.4th 915, 924–25 (7th Cir. 

2022); see also United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 15 (1994) 

(government need not prove an overt act). This inquiry often 

leads us to distinguish between conspiracies and mere buyerseller relationships because “[e]vidence showing only that 

two people are in a buyer-seller relationship is insufficient to 

prove a drug-distribution conspiracy.” Hidalgo-Sanchez, 29

F.4th at 925. However, how we have articulated this distinction has often been confusing and flawed. 

The leading authority on the buyer-seller doctrine is Direct 

Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703 (1943). In that case,

Dr. John Tate purchased from Direct Sales Co. large quantities 

of morphine sulphate, which he then illegally distributed to 

others. Id. at 704. Specifically, for several years, Direct Sales 

sold Tate thousands of morphine sulphate tablets annually, 

even though “the average physician in the United States [did]

not require more than 400 one-quarter grain tablets annually 

for legitimate use.” Id. at 706. Based on these repeated, 

distribution-quantity transactions, Direct Sales was convicted 

of conspiracy to distribute narcotics. Id. at 704. Direct Sales 

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8 No. 21-3221 

appealed, relying on the Court’s then-recent decision in 

United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205 (1940), for the premise 

that mere sales to a buyer combined with knowledge that the 

buyer would use the sold items illegally is not enough to 

sustain a conspiracy conviction. See Direct Sales, 319 U.S. at 

708. The Court rejected that comparison, noting that Falcone

“[came] down merely to this, that one does not become a 

party to a conspiracy by aiding and abetting it, through sales 

of supplies or otherwise, unless he knows of the conspiracy; 

and the inference of such knowledge cannot be drawn merely 

from knowledge the buyer will use the goods illegally.” Id. at 

709; see also id. at 710 (noting that the Court in Falcone was not 

asked to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to 

sustain a conspiracy between the buyer and seller). 

Instead, the Court distinguished the nature of the goods in

Falcone (there, the defendant sold sugar and yeast to secondary illegal distillers), which “were articles of free commerce” 

that “left the seller’s stock and passed to the purchaser’s 

hands” as unrestricted commodities capable of “further legal 

use.” Id. at 710. The illegality of morphine, as compared to the 

legality of sugar and yeast, proved critical to sustaining Direct 

Sales’s conspiracy conviction for two reasons: “One is for 

making certain that the seller knows the buyer’s intended illegal use. The other is to show that by the sale he intends to 

further, promote and cooperate in it. This intent ... is the gist 

of conspiracy.” Id. at 711; see also id. (opining that the “difference between sugar, cans, and other articles of normal 

trade ... and narcotic drugs, machine guns and such restricted commodities” arises from “the latters’ inherent capacity for harm and from the very fact they are restricted” and 

thereby “makes a difference in the quantity of proof required 

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to show knowledge that the buyer will utilize the article unlawfully”). 

The Court’s reliance on this distinction makes sense. There 

is an inherent and necessary trust between parties to an illegal 

transaction—at the least, that the other will not reveal the 

transaction to law enforcement—that is not shared by buyers 

and sellers of innocuous items. For this reason, facts such as 

“quantity sales” or “abnormal increases in the size of the 

buyer’s purchases, ... which would be wholly innocuous or 

not more than ground for suspicion in relation to unrestricted 

goods, may furnish conclusive evidence, in respect to 

restricted articles, that the seller knows the buyer has an 

illegal object and enterprise.” Id. Intent “is not unrelated to” 

knowledge. Id. When the evidence establishes repeated, 

distribution-quantity transactions in an illicit market, “[t]he 

step from knowledge to intent and agreement may be taken. 

There is more than suspicion, more than knowledge .... There 

is informed and interested cooperation, stimulation, 

instigation.” Id. at 713. 

A contextual breakdown of the relationship between a 

buyer and seller is instructive. Consider the relationship as it 

proceeds in the drug distribution setting. First, a seller sells 

distribution quantities of a drug to a buyer. (Keep in mind the 

government must still prove that the quantity of drugs sold 

was indicative of further distribution. This is crucial as it provides the circumstantial evidence of the seller’s knowledge—

namely, that the buyer will sell the drugs to others rather than 

simply consume them himself.) At this point, the seller knows 

that the buyer has purchased drugs from him for further illegal distribution. Yet, despite this known illegality, the seller

continues to sell distribution quantities of drugs to the buyer, 

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and the buyer willingly continues to purchase said quantities. 

In this way, the buyer and seller develop, in part, a codependent business relationship wherein they have a shared stake in 

each other’s success. As the buyer’s distribution to downstream clients thrives, so too does the seller, now a willing 

participant in the dealing through his provision of stock for 

the buyer’s enterprise. And if the buyer’s own customer base 

grows, he might need to purchase even more drugs (in frequency or quantity) from the seller to satisfy increased demand. This too enhances the stake in the pair’s relationship. 

Thus, far from a mere, arms-length buyer-seller relationship, 

such evidence of repeated, distribution-quantity transactions, 

given the mutually known benefits that flow from such transactions, shows that the buyer and seller knowingly and intentionally entered into an implicit agreement to distribute 

drugs. 

Of course, a single sale of a restricted good in a low quantity does not, by itself, support a charge of conspiracy, even if 

the seller knows that the good will be used for further illegal 

activity. Id. at 712. But this does not mean that a seller can sell 

contraband “in unlimited quantities.” Direct Sales, 319 U.S. at 

712. Rather, as plain from the hypothetical above, when the 

evidence shows that a buyer and seller worked in “prolonged 

cooperation” for a plainly unlawful purpose—the seller supplying the buyer with stock for his illicit enterprise—“there is 

no legal obstacle to finding that the supplier not only knows 

and acquiesces, but joins both mind and hand with him to 

make its accomplishment possible.” Id. at 713. This is so even 

if the agreement between the buyer and seller “was a tacit understanding, created by a long course of conduct and executed in the same way.” Id. at 714. After all, a conspiracy conviction by its very nature requires proof based largely (and 

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often, solely) on circumstantial evidence. Thus, when the 

charged conspiracy involves the distribution of illicit goods, 

the amount of proof needed to support the conspiracy conviction lessens because the illicit nature of the goods itself serves 

as a factor supporting an agreement between a buyer and 

seller. For these reasons, the Supreme Court had no trouble 

affirming Direct Sales’s conspiracy conviction based solely on 

evidence of repeated, distribution-quantity sales of morphine. 

All told, Direct Sales provides three principles for determining which types of buyer-seller relationships are indicative of a conspiracy. First, repeated, distribution-quantity

sales of innocuous goods between a buyer and seller do not, 

on their own, show a conspiratorial agreement, even when 

the seller knows that the buyer plans to use those innocuous 

goods for illicit activities. Second, a buyer and seller involved

in a low-quantity exchange of illicit goods merely for the 

buyer’s personal use are likewise not, without more, engaged 

in a conspiracy. Third, a drug conspiracy conviction can be 

sustained if the government proves that a buyer and seller engaged in repeated, distribution-quantity drug transactions. 

See id. at 714–15 (noting that a conspiracy conviction can 

stand “notwithstanding the overt acts consist solely of sales, 

which but for their volume, frequency and prolonged repetition, coupled with the seller’s unlawful intent to further the 

buyer’s project, would be wholly lawful transactions”). 

Our holding today departs from a long line of cases that 

have stretched the buyer-seller doctrine too far and deviated 

from the standard set in Direct Sales. These cases originate

from our decision in United States v. Colon, 549 F.3d 565 (7th 

Cir. 2008). In Colon, we concluded that repeated, distributionquantity transactions alone could not support a conspiracy 

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conviction and instead required the presence of additional evidence, such as sales on credit or an agreement between the 

buyer and seller to warn of future threats to each other’s business. Id. at 568–70. But that conclusion rested on the same arguments made by the defendant in Direct Sales that the Supreme Court squarely rejected. For instance, we analogized

sales of cocaine to innocent purchases made at one’s local 

Wal-Mart: “If you buy from Wal-Mart your transactions will 

be highly regular and utterly standardized, but there will be 

no mutual trust suggestive of a relationship other than that of 

buyer and seller.” Id. at 568. That analogy flies in the face of

Direct Sales and the critical difference discussed above between innocent purchases at one’s local store compared to repeat, distribution-quantity transactions of illicit substances: 

the “mutual trust” not present in a transaction with Wal-Mart 

is undoubtedly found between the parties to an illicit transaction. Colon thus erred at the outset, resulting in a holding that 

has tainted our conspiracy and buyer-seller law.

Colon also stressed the practical reasons for not conflating 

a mere sale with a conspiracy. See id. at 569 (emphasizing that

there needs to be evidence of an agreement to commit a crime 

other than evidence of the illegal transaction itself). No doubt, 

a mere buyer of drugs does not, without more, engage in a 

drug distribution conspiracy with a seller. Our holding does 

not change that basic principle. But today, we refine what 

“more” can transform a mere buyer-seller relationship into 

such a conspiracy. Repeated, distribution-quantity transactions of illegal drugs do not reflect a mere buyer-seller relationship between the parties. The buyer-seller defense was 

never meant for such a wholesale-level relationship. Cf. 

United States v. Delgado, 672 F.3d 320, 333 (5th Cir. 2012) (en 

banc) (“The buyer-seller exception prevents a single buy-sell 

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agreement, which is necessarily reached in every commercial 

drug transaction, from automatically becoming a conspiracy 

to distribute drugs. The rule shields mere acquirers and 

street-level users, who would otherwise be guilty of conspiracy to distribute, from the more severe penalties reserved for 

distributers.”). 

Colon and its progeny are now overruled to the extent that 

they are inconsistent with this opinion. See, e.g., United States 

v. Pulgar, 789 F.3d 807, 813 (7th Cir. 2015); United States v. 

Brown, 726 F.3d 993, 999 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v. Johnson, 592 F.3d 749, 755–56 (7th Cir. 2010). This brings us in harmony with our sister circuits. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 596 F.3d 18, 25 (1st Cir. 2010) (rejecting the argument that 

a buyer-seller instruction was required because “the evidence 

at trial showed that Mitchell was involved in multiple transactions, for large, kilogram-quantities of cocaine, for large 

sums of money”); United States v. Siegler, 990 F.3d 331, 338 (4th 

Cir. 2021) (“We have repeatedly recognized that evidence of 

a single buy-sell transaction involving a ‘substantial quantity 

of drugs’ can support a ‘reasonable inference’ of knowing participation in a distribution conspiracy.”) (quotation omitted); 

Delgado, 672 F.3d at 333 (Fifth Circuit concluding that the 

buyer-seller exception prevents a “single buy-sell agreement,” not transactions in wholesale quantities); United States 

v. Mosley, 53 F.4th 947, 957 (6th Cir. 2022) (“[K]nowing entry 

into a drug conspiracy may reasonably be inferred when a 

buyer repeatedly purchases large quantities of drugs from a 

single seller.”) (cleaned up); United States v. Davis, 867 F.3d 

1021, 1034 (8th Cir. 2017) (“Eighth Circuit law is clear: ‘[E]vidence of multiple sales of resale quantities of drugs is sufficient in and of itself to make a submissible case of a conspiracy 

to distribute.’”) (quotation omitted) (alteration in original); 

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United States v. Ivy, 83 F.3d 1266, 1285–86 (10th Cir. 1996) 

(“[T]he purpose of the buyer-seller rule is to separate consumers, who do not plan to redistribute drugs for profit, from 

street-level, mid-level, and other distributors, who do intend 

to redistribute drugs for profit, thereby furthering the objective of the conspiracy.”); United States v. Brown, 587 F.3d 1082, 

1090 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[D]ue to the repeated nature of the 

transactions and the large quantities involved, a rational trier 

of fact could infer a corresponding conspiracy to distribute 

the cocaine.”); United States v. McGill, 815 F.3d 846, 929 (D.C. 

Cir. 2016) (“Evidence that Simmons facilitated multiple transactions of wholesale drug quantities ‘permits an inference 

that [he] had knowledge of the conspiracy and intended to 

join.’”) (quotation omitted) (alteration in original).

In sum, evidence of repeated, distribution-quantity transactions of illegal drugs between two parties, on its own, can 

sufficiently sustain a drug conspiracy conviction, consistent 

with the holding in Direct Sales. Though additional evidence

is no longer required to defeat a sufficiency-of-the-evidence 

challenge in this context, see Johnson, 592 F.3d at 755–56 (citing 

Colon and listing examples of additional evidentiary factors 

needed to sustain a conspiracy conviction despite the presence of repeated, distribution-quantity drug transactions), 

our holding does not affect the government’s ability to offer 

such additional evidence (which, as discussed below, it did 

here) to prove a conspiracy. Further, this additional evidence 

may be required in other conspiracy cases where evidence of 

repeated, distribution-quantity drug transactions is lacking.

In this case, the government proved that Page met with 

Hamlin hundreds of times over the course of a year (at a clip 

of approximately three times a week) to purchase distribution 

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No. 21-3221 15

quantities of heroin. That evidence alone supports a rational 

jury’s finding that Page and Hamlin entered into an agreement, at least implicitly, to distribute drugs. Therefore, Page’s 

conspiracy conviction must stand. 

B 

Though Page’s challenge to his conviction fails under the 

proper conspiracy standard outlined above, we would 

sustain his conviction even under our now-overruled cases 

where we improperly held that repeated, distributionquantity drug sales could not alone support a conspiracy. In 

those cases, we often turned to our list of additional, 

nonexhaustive evidentiary factors referenced above to help 

distinguish buyer-seller relationships from conspiracies: 

“sales on credit or consignment, an agreement to look for 

other customers, a payment of commission on sales, an 

indication that one party advised the other on the conduct of 

the other’s business, or an agreement to warn of future threats 

to each other’s business stemming from competitors or lawenforcement authorities.” Johnson, 592 F.3d at 755–56. And 

evidence showing a level of heightened trust likewise favors 

a conspiracy finding. United States v. Vizcarra-Millan, 15 F.4th 

473, 507 (7th Cir. 2021). While these additional factors are 

instructive, our ultimate inquiry was always a holistic 

assessment of whether the jury reached a reasonable verdict. 

Hidalgo-Sanchez, 29 F.4th at 925. Stated differently, we ask 

whether a conspiracy existed under the totality of the 

circumstances. Id.

The evidence of conspiracy in this case consisted of much 

more than just repeated, distribution-quantity drug transactions. First, Page and Hamlin maintained a relationship akin 

to that of an uncle and a nephew, and they had a general trust 

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16 No. 21-3221 

in one another. Second, as evidenced by several phone calls, 

Hamlin advised Page on his drug distribution, in part by recommending that Page not work with specific individuals, and 

acknowledged an especially cooperative business relationship with Page. In particular, because Page distributed heroin 

at such a fast pace, Hamlin gave him the benefit of a lower 

price per gram. Such a benefit reflects Hamlin and Page’s understanding that Hamlin’s short-term revenue losses would 

ultimately be usurped by larger profits stemming from Page’s 

stable, high-volume drug distribution. Third, Page and Hamlin consistently notified each other about the status of their 

drug supply and their clientele. Fourth, Page and Hamlin contemplated expanding their business relationship “up north,” 

and Page, at least at first, enthusiastically supported the idea. 

Though they ultimately did not agree to expand the business, 

a rational jury could certainly rely on this evidence to infer 

that Page and Hamlin had an underlying, implicit agreement 

to distribute drugs together—otherwise, there would be no 

business relationship to expand “up north.” Fifth, Page and 

Hamlin exhibited a shared interest in delivering high-quality 

heroin to Page’s customers, with Hamlin allowing Page to 

swap out a bad batch of heroin intended for a valuable, highpaying customer. And finally, on at least one occasion, Page 

purchased heroin partially on credit, which coupled with the 

other evidence above, is strong evidence of a conspiracy. 

This evidence is overwhelming and indicative of an 

implied agreement between Page and Hamlin to distribute 

heroin together. A rational trier of fact could have easily

convicted Page of conspiracy based on this record, which 

included much more than just evidence of repeated, 

distribution-quantity drug sales. 

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III

Page also argues that the district court erred by not sua 

sponte giving a buyer-seller instruction to the jury. Page did 

not request a buyer-seller instruction at trial, and when the 

district court asked Page’s counsel if the proposed final jury 

instructions were sufficient, counsel responded affirmatively. 

While Page possibly waived all challenges to the jury instructions, thus precluding our appellate review, we assume without deciding that Page merely forfeited his request for the 

buyer-seller instruction. United States v. Leal, 72 F.4th 262, 266 

(7th Cir. 2023) (noting that a response of “no objection” during a jury instruction conference results in forfeiture but describing tension in our case law on the issue). We review 

Page’s forfeited jury instruction request for plain error under 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b). See Greer v. United 

States, 593 U.S. 503, 507–08 (2021). As discussed above, Page’s 

case did not warrant a buyer-seller instruction. Nevertheless, 

we take this opportunity to clarify what is required for us to 

find plain error.

The Supreme Court laid out the test for plain error in 

United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993), which it has reaffirmed time and again, most recently in Greer. “To establish 

eligibility for plain-error relief, a defendant must satisfy three 

threshold requirements”: (1) “there must be an error”; (2) “the 

error must be plain”; and (3) “the error must affect ‘substantial rights,’ which generally means that there must be ‘a reasonable probability that, but for the error, the outcome of the 

proceeding would have been different.’” Greer, 593 U.S. at 

507–08 (quotation omitted). If those three elements are met, 

an appellate court must consider a fourth discretionary element: the court may grant plain errorrelief only if it concludes 

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that “the error had a serious effect on ‘the fairness, integrity 

or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Id. at 508 (quotation omitted). The defendant faces a “difficult” burden in 

seeking to establish all four elements needed for plain error. 

Id. Under this test, Page’s claim of error fails. 

A 

For plain error to lie, there must first be an error. A deviation from a legal rule is error unless the rule has been affirmatively waived. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 732–33. Page faces several obstacles in trying to meet this element.

First, for the reasons outlined in the previous section, the 

evidence in this case, even under our now-overruled precedent, supported a conspiracy rather than a buyer-seller relationship. Therefore, a buyer-seller instruction was not appropriate. 

Second, a buyer-seller instruction would have contravened Page’s theory of defense. Throughout the trial, Page 

painted Hamlin, the government’s chief witness, as a liar to 

undermine any testimony that identified him as the individual on the other side of Hamlin’s wiretapped phone calls. 

Page also suggested that his meetings with Hamlin were innocent encounters between family friends. In doing so, Page 

wisely tried to show that he was not involved in the drug 

trade at all so that the jury would acquit him of all charges 

(and not just the conspiracy charge). A buyer-seller defense 

would have done Page no good on 12 of his 13 counts (the 

attempt to distribute counts) and would have contradicted his 

position on those counts. Moreover, Page conceded at oral argument that he did not present a buyer-seller defense at trial. 

Oral Argument at 3:13 (“He did not present a buyer-seller 

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No. 21-3221 19

theory. That—I fully admit to that. We concede that.”). Thus, 

because “we have repeatedly held that a buyer-seller instruction is unnecessary where the instruction would contradict 

the defendant’s theory of the case,” United States v. Love, 706 

F.3d 832, 839 (7th Cir. 2013), Page’s claim of error fails for this 

reason too. 

Third, Page’s case presents an odd procedural question: 

whether there is ever error when a district court does not sua 

sponte give an instruction on a defense theory that a defendant did not request. We conclude there is not. “In our adversarial system of adjudication, we follow the principle of party 

presentation,” and “in both civil and criminal cases, ... we 

rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision and assign 

to courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present.” United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371, 375 (2020)

(quotation omitted); see also id. at 375–76 (“[A]s a general 

rule, our system is designed around the premise that parties 

represented by competent counsel know what is best for 

them, and are responsible for advancing the facts and argument entitling them to relief.”) (cleaned up). Courts therefore 

“do not, or should not, sally forth each day looking for 

wrongs to right. They wait for cases to come to them, and 

when cases arise, courts normally decide only questions presented by the parties.” Id. at 376 (cleaned up). In the criminal 

context, departures from the party presentation principle are 

more common, albeit marginally, most often to protect a pro 

se litigant’s rights. See id. at 375. 

A district court does not err, let alone plainly err, by not 

sua sponte instructing the jury on a potential defense, particularly when the defendant is represented by counsel. The 

onus is not on the district court to devise and proffer such 

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20 No. 21-3221 

defense theories. And as was the case with Page, there are often strategic reasons for defense counsel’s decision to avoid 

presenting a particular theory. A theory of defense, like the 

buyer-seller defense, see, e.g., United States v. Douglas, 818 

F.2d 1317, 1322–23 (7th Cir. 1987) (discussing defendant’s proposed instruction on the “buyer-seller theory of defense”), is 

only injected into a criminal proceeding through the defendant’s case presentation, unlike, for instance, the elements of 

an offense, which are injected via an indictment. Thus, it is the 

defendant’s obligation to seek an instruction on said defense, 

and a district court does not err by not giving such an instruction on its own initiative. 

Our sister circuits agree with this view. See, e.g., United 

States v. Sago, 74 F.4th 1152, 1160 n.6 (10th Cir. 2023) (“We are 

not alone in requiring this of defendants. Of the circuits to 

have considered a claim regarding an unrequested 

affirmative-defense instruction, most hold there is no error.”) 

(collecting cases); United States v. Tyson, 653 F.3d 192, 212 (3d 

Cir. 2011) (finding no error in failing to give instruction on 

defense to firearms charge when defendant did not request it, 

even though “evidence arguably would have supported a[n] 

... instruction [on the defense],” because this may have been 

part of the defendant’s strategy, and “[i]t is not for the district 

court to sua sponte determine which defenses are appropriate 

under the circumstances”); see also 1 Paul H. Robinson & 

Catherine Palo, Criminal Law Defenses § 68.50 (1984 ed. & 

Supp. 2023) (“[T]rial courts should not interfere with a 

defendant’s chosen defense theory by giving an instruction 

which neither party requested and which may undermine 

defendant’s chosen theory. Moreover, trial courts are not 

required to provide instructions for every possible theory of 

defense just because some supporting evidence may be 

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No. 21-3221 21

produced at trial, if the defendant has not relied on the 

particular defense theory.”).

Because Page conceded that he did not seek a buyer-seller 

instruction at conference, the district court did not err by not

inserting that instruction. And even if Page had requested the 

instruction at conference, the district court would not have 

erred in declining to give it. Page conceded that he did not 

present a buyer-seller defense during trial, and no evidence 

supported the instruction. To the extent Page suggests that he 

injected the buyer-seller defense into the case when he alluded to it during his closing argument, we are not convinced 

in light of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 30. Under Rule 

30, a party seeking an instruction “must” make its request “at 

the close of evidence or at any earlier time,” and the court 

“must inform the parties before closing arguments how it intends to rule on the requested instructions.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 

30(a)–(b). Thus, a party does not properly inject a defense into 

a criminal proceeding solely by introducing it during closing 

argument. For all these reasons, the district court committed 

no error. 

B 

Even assuming error, the second element of the plain error 

inquiry requires that the error be “plain.” The Supreme Court 

has described this prong as “synonymous with ‘clear’ or, 

equivalently, ‘obvious.’” Olano, 507 U.S. at 734 (quotation 

omitted); see also United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 

(1982) (noting that relief under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52 requires “error so ‘plain’ the trial judge and prosecutor were derelict in countenancing it, even absent the defendant’s timely assistance in detecting it”). An error that is 

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22 No. 21-3221 

“subject to reasonable dispute” is not “plain.” Puckett v. 

United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). 

An error (had it existed) in not sua sponte instructing the 

jury on the buyer-seller defense would not have been plain. 

Page did not present this defense theory, and the evidence of 

conspiracy was very strong. Nothing about this record would 

have made it obvious to the district court that such an instruction was needed. We need not belabor these points again here. 

Instead, we take this opportunity to emphasize the need to 

ensure that an error is indeed plain before reversing a district 

court’s judgment. In doing so, we clarify that some of our 

opinions have not placed sufficient emphasis on the rigorousness of the plain error standard of review. 

Consider our recent opinion in United States v. Anderson, 

99 F.4th 1106 (7th Cir. 2024). That case turned on whether the 

defendant’s 2001 conviction for assault in Florida qualified as 

a predicate offense under the Armed Career Criminal Act

(ACCA). Id. at 1110. Specifically, the issue was whether assault under Florida law criminalized reckless conduct—if it 

did, it would not qualify as an ACCA predicate. The Eleventh 

Circuit was presented with this identical question. It certified 

the question to the Florida Supreme Court, and we likewise 

held our appeal in abeyance pending that decision. See Somers 

v. United States, 355 So. 3d 887, 888 (Fla. 2022). The Florida Supreme Court concluded that assault under Florida law did not 

criminalize reckless conduct, see id. at 892–93, and the Eleventh Circuit, upon receiving answers to its certified questions, 

held that an assault conviction in Florida qualifies as an 

ACCA predicate, Somers v. United States, 66 F.4th 890, 892 

(11th Cir. 2023). 

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No. 21-3221 23

In Anderson, we endeavored to review the district court’s 

ACCA enhancement based on a Florida assault conviction for 

plain error because “Anderson did not contest his ACCA designation in the district court.” 99 F.4th at 1110. Yet, our review 

effectively addressed the issue de novo in reversing the district court. We pointed to intermediate appellate decisions 

from Florida, concluded that the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Somers did not apply retroactively, and applied the 

reasonable probability test to hold that Anderson’s assault 

conviction did not qualify as an ACCA predicate. We found 

that the district court erred in applying ACCA’s 15 year minimum floor to Anderson’s sentence, id. at 1114, but we did not

explain how this error was clear or obvious. Anderson instead 

acknowledged that “[t]he breadth of the Florida aggravated 

assault statute at the time of Anderson’s conviction is not easily discerned” and that the case was a “close” one. Id. at 1111–

12. Any error was “subject to reasonable dispute,” Puckett, 556 

U.S. at 135, as our majority opinion needed to distinguish a 

Florida Supreme Court decision on point and created a split 

with the Eleventh Circuit on an identical question. Therefore,

any error in Anderson was not plain.

A standard of review is not to be invoked in name only

and then disregarded. It is a limiting principle on our scope 

of review that properly gives deference to a district court and 

the arguments the parties made before it. Simply, it keeps an 

appeal from turning into a full retrial. For there to be plain 

error, a court must give due weight to all four prongs set out 

in Olano. Anderson, and opinions like it, would turn out differently under a proper application of this standard. 

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24 No. 21-3221 

C 

If a defendant establishes the existence of a plain error, he 

must still show that the error affected his substantial rights—

that a reasonable probability exists that, but for the error, the 

outcome of the proceedings would have been different. Under this prong, “[i]t is the defendant rather than the Government who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 734. In other words, a defendant 

claiming that a plain error affected his substantial rights must 

“make such an argument or representation on appeal.” Greer, 

593 U.S. at 509. 

Page did not and could not have met this burden. Even if

the district court’s failure to sua sponte instruct the jury on 

the buyer-seller relationship constituted plain error, nothing 

in this record suggests that the outcome of the trial would 

have differed. As discussed above, this was not a close case; 

the evidence did not support a buyer-seller relationship. 

Moreover, the district court did more than simply instruct the 

jury on the elements of conspiracy. It also provided other 

instructions on when a defendant qualifies—and does not 

qualify—as a member of a conspiracy. In short, a jury would 

have convicted Page even with a buyer-seller instruction in 

hand.

D 

“Rule 52(b) is permissive, not mandatory.” Olano, 507 U.S. 

at 735. Thus, even if a defendant meets the first three threshold elements of plain error, we may grant relief, in our discretion, only if the error had a serious effect on the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. This requirement is distinct from the substantial rights prong: “a 

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No. 21-3221 25

plain error affecting substantial rights does not, without 

more,” satisfy the fourth prong of plain error, “for otherwise 

the discretion afforded by Rule 52(b) would be illusory.” Id.

at 737. The fourth prong of Olano “inherently requires ‘a casespecific and fact-intensive’ inquiry.” Rosales-Mireles v. United 

States, 585 U.S. 129, 142 (2018) (quotation omitted). In cases 

where a finding of plain error would result in additional jury 

proceedings on remand, the Supreme Court has suggested 

that an appellate court’s discretion under the fourth prong of 

Olano should be exercised “sparingly” and “reserved for ‘exceptional circumstances.’” See id. at 142–43 (quotations omitted). 

We would decline to exercise our discretion under the 

fourth Olano prong. A finding of plain error here would require a wholly new jury trial based on an omitted jury instruction, cf. Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 389–94 (1999) (finding no plain error for purportedly erroneous jury instructions), even though Page never asked for the instruction, did 

not present a defense consistent with the instruction, and affirmatively approved the final jury instructions as written. 

Such an error would not affect the fairness, integrity, or reputation of our judicial system.

AFFIRMED

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26 No. 21-3221 

EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge, concurring. I join the majority’s opinion and add a few words about the relation between 

the party-presentation principle, see United States v. SinenengSmith, 590 U.S. 371 (2020), and plain-error review under Fed. 

R. Crim. P. 52(b). 

Sineneng-Smith tells us that courts generally should not, 

and often must not, inject issues into litigation. Judges should 

instead respect the choices made by litigants and their lawyers about which issues to pursue and which to avoid. If lawyers for criminal defendants handle this task poorly, and prejudice ensues, a court might find that the defendant suffered 

from ineffective assistance of counsel. But that possibility is 

for collateral review rather than direct appeal. Massaro v. 

United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003). 

Subjects within the discretion of counsel in criminal cases 

include selection of a theory of defense and the decision 

whether to assert an affirmative defense, such as duress, selfdefense, entrapment, or advice of counsel. Many defenses 

open the accused to some kind of risk, and counsel must evaluate whether the potential reward justifies that risk. Consider 

entrapment. “[I]f the defendant seeks acquittal by reason of 

entrapment he cannot complain of an appropriate and searching inquiry into his own conduct and predisposition as bearing upon that issue. If in consequence he suffers a disadvantage, he has brought it upon himself by reason of the nature of the defense.” Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451–

52 (1932). Many lawyers view “I didn’t do it” and “I was entrapped into doing it” as so incompatible that making both 

contentions amounts to a confession of culpability. A defendant is free to take that risk, see Mathews v. United States, 485 

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No. 21-3221 27 

U.S. 58 (1988), but it is not one that a judge may thrust upon 

him.

The same is true when the tactic is in the nature of avoidance or mitigation. See Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 

212–13 (1973) (observing that a lesser-included-offense instruction can reduce the chance of acquittal). A buyer-seller 

argument poses risks to any defendant charged with both 

conspiracy and substantive crimes. Arguing that “I didn’t do 

it” yet “I was just a buyer of illegal drugs” makes the defense 

position inconsistent and creates a risk that jurors may become skeptical about both halves of the either/or proposition. 

That sort of risk is apparent in Page’s case, as he denied that 

he had anything to do with heroin and depicted Hamlin as a 

liar. Arguing that he just bought heroin in spot transactions 

with Hamlin could have helped Page against the conspiracy 

charge but would have increased the chance of conviction on 

the substantive charges. Because the Sentencing Guidelines 

link their recommendations to the quantity of drugs included 

as relevant conduct under U.S.S.G. §1B1.3, without adding

levels for a conspiracy conviction, see U.S.S.G. §2D1.1 and Application Note 5; §2X1.1(a), trying to avert a conspiracy conviction while increasing the chance of substantive convictions 

would have incurred a substantial risk for little if any reward. 

An accused is free to take that risk, see United States v. Cruse, 

805 F.3d 795, 815 (7th Cir. 2015), but the choice is one for the 

defense rather than the judge.

As far as I can tell, the Supreme Court has never held that 

a district judge must, should, or even may raise a contention 

such as a buyer-seller argument (or any other matter in defense, avoidance, or mitigation) when the accused does not 

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28 No. 21-3221 

presentation principle in action. Applied to this case, it means 

that the district judge did not err in omitting a buyer-seller 

instruction—indeed, that the judge would have erred by including one.

What, then, is the role of plain-error review under Rule 

52(b)? It is to permit appellate review of errors affecting subjects that the parties did present, even if no one called a blunder to the court’s attention. When a party proffers evidence, 

the judge must decide whether it is admissible; a plain error 

can be reviewed under Fed. R. Evid. 103(e). And the indictment in a criminal case necessarily requires the judge to craft 

an accurate charge on the elements of the offense. A bad elements instruction may be called plain error, consistent with 

the party-presentation principle, because the prosecutor 

made the elements of the crime an issue.

But Page does not contend that the judge misinstructed the 

jury on the elements of conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. §846. All a 

prosecutor need prove is agreement to engage in unlawful 

drug transactions, with intent to advance the agreement’s object. See United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10 (1994). The judge 

told the jury exactly that, following Instruction 5.08(B) of the 

William J. Bauer Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions of the Seventh 

Circuit (2023 ed.). A buyer-seller instruction just restates the 

elements instruction from the defense’s perspective. See Instruction 5.10(A). (This is why it is a theory of defense rather 

than an affirmative defense.) Page did not request any alteration of the elements instruction and, to the contrary, told the 

judge that all of the instructions were correct. That left no 

work for Rule 52(b) to do on the subjects that the prosecutor 

brought to the case, and no work at all to do on other subjects 

that the defense did not bring to the case.

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No. 21-3221 29 

Once convicted on the substantive counts, a defendant’s 

risk/reward calculus for a buyer-seller instruction looks favorable, but the decision whether to request such an instruction 

must be made at trial rather than with the benefit of hindsight. 

Raising a buyer-seller issue for the first time after conviction 

is too late, because there is no error to address.

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30 No. 21-3221 

JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge, joined by ROVNER and 

LEE, Circuit Judges, dissenting. Today we revisit two wellworn questions under our conspiracy law. First, what evidence is sufficient to distinguish between a buyer-seller relationship and a conspiracy to distribute drugs? Second, can a 

district court plainly err by failing to give a buyer-seller instruction when a defendant doesn’t request one? 

On the first question, my colleagues in the majority conclude that evidence of repeat, distribution-sized drug transactions alone can prove conspiracy. They claim to restore our 

law to the rule articulated by the Supreme Court in Direct 

Sales Co. v. United States1 because, they contend, a shift in interpretation ushered in by United States v. Colon2 threw our 

circuit offtrack. I do not see restoration but reinvention.

Direct Sales—and every decision on the matter our circuit 

has issued since then—holds that repeat drug deals, even in 

significant quantities, may establish knowledge of a 

conspiracy, but they aren’t enough by themselves to sustain a 

conspiracy conviction. The law has always required more—

specifically, proof of intent to join the conspiracy. The 

majority’s approach erases the critical element of intent, 

effectively collapsing the lines between drug distribution, 

aiding and abetting a drug distribution conspiracy, and 

conspiracy to distribute drugs. 

Worse still are the silences today’s decision offers. There is 

silence about the complete consistency of our pre- and postColon precedent, including our 30-year-old en banc decision 

1 319 U.S. 703 (1943).

2 549 F.3d 565 (7th Cir. 2008).

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No. 21-3221 31 

squarely addressing today’s issue, United States v. Lechuga.3

These prior decisions all hold that large, repeat drug transactions are not enough to sustain a conspiracy conviction. The 

majority does not cite—nor have I found—a single decision 

by a panel of this circuit holding that repeat, distributionquantity drug transactions alone can sustain a conspiracy 

conviction. There is silence on any justification (much less a 

compelling one) for not only explicitly overturning Colon and 

its progeny, but also implicitly overturning Lechuga. And 

there is silence on the significant due process concerns today’s 

decision introduces.

On the second question before our court, I cannot agree 

with the majority. The law is clear: a district court can plainly 

err by failing to give a buyer-seller instruction, even when a 

defendant doesn’t request one. 

Below, I address these two questions in Parts I and II, respectively. In Part III, compelled by the majority’s unusual detour, I pause to address an unrelated case. I conclude in Part 

IV. In short, because this new order of the day upends our 

circuit’s conspiracy jurisprudence, I dissent.

I 

Page’s Sufficiency-of-the-Evidence Challenge

A jury convicted Royel Page of twelve counts of attempting to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute heroin, plus one count of conspiracy to distribute heroin. On appeal, Page seeks to overturn only the conspiracy conviction. 

My colleagues in the majority affirm the conspiracy conviction, concluding that evidence of repeat, distribution-sized 

3 994 F.2d 346 (7th Cir. 1993) (en banc), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 982 (1993). 

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32 No. 21-3221 

drug transactions are a sufficient basis for that conviction. I 

see things differently.

In Part A, I walk through our circuit’s jurisprudence on 

drug distribution conspiracies—at least as it stood before today’s ruling. In this section, I first outline the actus reus and 

mens rea elements of a drug distribution conspiracy crime. I 

then discuss the mens rea element’s distinct knowledge and 

intent requirements—the latter of which transforms a buyerseller relationship into a conspiratorial one. From there, I address how our circuit law has always conformed with the 

holding of Direct Sales that the illicit nature of goods, paired 

with repeat and large-quantity transactions, may suffice to establish knowledge of a drug distribution conspiracy. And our 

circuit law has always conformed with the instruction in Direct Sales that “informed and interested cooperation, stimulation, [or] instigation” must exist to establish intent to join the 

conspiracy. 319 U.S. at 713. Even in Colon, I explain, our adherence to Direct Sales remained beyond question.

In Part B, I detail how the majority veers off course with 

its holding today. In this section, I begin by addressing the 

majority’s alarmist portrayal of our circuit’s drug distribution 

conspiracy jurisprudence. Yes, we have sometimes struggled 

in articulating the precise factors that demonstrate the 

informed and interested cooperation, stimulation, or 

instigation needed to elevate a defendant’s mens rea from 

mere knowledge to intent; but we have never—not once—

abandoned Direct Sales’ clear rule that the sale of illicit goods, 

even in repeat and large quantities, cannot by itself establish 

intent. I then turn to the majority’s misreading of Direct Sales

and Colon, showing how its analysis diverges from those 

precedents and, in doing so, effectively erases the intent 

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No. 21-3221 33 

requirement and converts one crime—drug distribution 

and/or aiding and abetting a drug distribution conspiracy—

into another: conspiracy to distribute drugs. Finally, I discuss

important considerations the majority does not, including our 

strong presumption against overturning precedent without 

compelling justification; the majority’s effective overturning 

of Lechuga, our 30-year-old en banc decision addressing the 

issue we opine on today; and the due process concerns that 

today’s decision raises.

In Part C, I apply the law to the facts of this case, demonstrating that under the correct legal framework as it stood before today, Page is entitled to a buyer-seller instruction. The 

majority’s claim otherwise does not hold together.

A 

Our Drug Distribution Conspiracy Law—Before Today

To understand why the majority’s decision charts a concerning new course, we must first understand our circuit’s 

drug distribution conspiracy law before today.

The crime of engaging in a drug distribution conspiracy 

sits at the intersection of two distinct crimes: conspiracy and 

drug distribution. To prove conspiracy, the government must 

establish three elements: (1) that two or more individuals 

agreed to commit an unlawful act; (2) that the defendant was 

aware of the agreement; and (3) that the defendant intended 

to join that agreement.4 See 21 U.S.C. § 846. To prove drug 

4 See United States v. Townsend, 924 F.2d 1385, 1390 (7th Cir. 1991) (“To 

join a conspiracy, then, is to join an agreement, rather than a group. It follows that to be a conspirator you must know of the agreement, and must 

intend to join it.” (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted)).

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34 No. 21-3221 

distribution, the government must establish two elements: (1) 

that the defendant knowingly or intentionally distributed a 

controlled substance; and (2) that the substance distributed 

was, in fact, a controlled substance. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). 

These two crimes—conspiracy and drug distribution—

address distinct wrongs, but when combined, they form the 

crime of drug distribution conspiracy.

Importantly, as I explain in Section A.1 below, both crimes 

involve agreements. Drug distribution typically involves

buyer-seller agreements—agreements to exchange drugs for 

money (or something else of value). Conspiracy, by contrast, 

hinges on conspiratorial agreements—agreements to further 

distribute drugs. With agreements at issue in both crimes, and 

the crimes combining to form a third crime (drug distribution 

conspiracy), the line between the offenses can grow thin. The

challenge lies in ensuring that buyer-seller relationships are 

not miscast as conspiracies. 

Direct Sales, which I examine in depth in Section A.2 below, draws the necessary line. It ensures conspiracy charges 

remain distinct from other criminal charges by identifying intent as the defining feature of conspiracy. Direct Sales requires 

the government to prove that the defendant intended to join 

the conspiracy, not merely that he engaged in conduct consistent with the conspiracy’s goals—like buying and selling 

drugs (drug distribution) or otherwise helping the drug distribution conspiracy succeed (aiding and abetting a drug distribution conspiracy). By demanding proof of intent to join, 

Direct Sales prevents individuals from being swept into conspiracy charges without the collective agreement that the 

crime of conspiracy requires.

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No. 21-3221 35 

Our circuit’s drug distribution conspiracy jurisprudence, 

shaped by Direct Sales, reflects these distinctions. It requires 

proof of three elements: actus reus (two or more people agree 

to commit an unlawful act, namely further distributing 

drugs), knowledge of the conspiracy (often inferred from repeat purchases of drugs in large quantities), and intent to join 

the conspiracy (demonstrated by informed and interested cooperation). The latter two elements form the mens rea for drug 

distribution conspiracy. I explain this in detail in Section A.2 

below.

With this foundation laid, I turn to a closer examination of 

actus reus and mens rea in drug distribution conspiracy cases. 

My goal, again, is to provide the framework for understanding precisely how the majority’s change to our circuit law is 

unwarranted, inconsistent with Direct Sales, and much more. 

1 

Actus Reus

When the government charges a drug seller or buyer with 

conspiracy to distribute drugs (instead of or in addition to a 

charge of drug distribution), we need to ask: what agreement 

does the government contend forms the basis of the conspiracy’s actus reus? Remember: a drug sale is already an agreement to commit an unlawful act—specifically, drug distribution. The buyer and seller come together, negotiate terms, and 

exchange money or goods for drugs. United States v. Rock, 370 

F.3d 712, 714 (7th Cir. 2004). This is drug distribution—a 

straightforward buyer-seller transaction. But while this kind 

of transaction involves an agreement to distribute drugs, it 

cannot by itself also serve as the conspiratorial agreement necessary to support a drug distribution conspiracy conviction. 

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36 No. 21-3221 

Id. (“[T]he government must prove that the defendant conspired to commit some crime beyond that agreement.”). To 

say otherwise would conflate a simple buyer-seller transaction with a broader drug distribution conspiracy. See Lechuga, 

994 F.2d at 349 (requiring “proof of an agreement to commit 

a crime other than the crime that consists of the sale itself”).5

For this reason, we have consistently held that a conspiracy to 

distribute drugs demands something more at the actus reus 

stage—specifically, an agreement to further distribute drugs

beyond the initial sale. United States v. Smallwood, 188 F.3d 905, 

912 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Lechuga, 994 F.2d at 349); see also

United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 16 (1994) (explaining that 

“the criminal agreement itself is the actus reus” in a conspiracy 

case). Although conspiratorial agreements can be inferred 

from circumstantial evidence, reliance on such evidence 

should not “obscure the basic fact that the agreement is the 

essential evil at which the crime of conspiracy is directed.” See

Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 n.10 (1975) (citing Direct Sales, 319 U.S. at 711–13). 

2 

Mens Rea

As with actus reus, the government almost always turns to 

circumstantial evidence to establish the two separate mens rea 

5 While Lechuga generated six separate opinions, seven of the eleven 

judges agreed with Judge Posner’s formulation of the distinction between 

a conspiratorial relationship and a buyer-seller relationship. See United

States v. Torres-Ramirez, 213 F.3d 978, 982 (7th Cir. 2000) (“The lead opinion, which was joined by three judges, Judge Rovner’s concurring opinion, 

id. at 357, and the dissenting opinion, id. at 357–64, also joined by three 

judges, agreed on this point. The lead opinion therefore establishes the 

holding of the case.”).

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No. 21-3221 37 

requirements of knowledge and intent. See id. at 714. Two key 

Supreme Court cases—United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205 

(1940), and Direct Sales, 319 U.S. at 712–13—have long made 

clear that, even when the government relies on circumstantial 

evidence, knowledge of the conspiracy and intent to join the 

conspiracy remain essential elements of the drug distribution 

conspiracy crime. 

In Falcone, the Supreme Court held that mere knowledge 

by the seller that the buyer intended to use the commodity 

unlawfully, without more, is not enough to support a conspiracy conviction. 311 U.S. at 210–11. In that case, wholesalers 

that regularly sold large quantities of sugar and yeast to bootleggers were not considered conspirators, despite knowing 

the illegal uses to which the products would be put. Id. at 210. 

The Court explained that knowledge of the unlawful end-use 

was insufficient; proof of intent to join the conspiracy was still 

required. Id. In short, Falcone insisted that the government go 

further—showing not only that the defendants knew about 

the illegal activity, but that they intentionally joined the agreement to further the illegal activity.6 Id. 

Three years later, in Direct Sales, the Supreme Court clarified what more is needed to transform knowledge into intent. 

Direct Sales was a drug manufacturer and wholesaler. Direct 

Sales, 319 U.S. at 704. The company sold morphine sulphate to 

a doctor in such large quantities, so frequently, and over such 

6 Of course, knowledge of the conspiracy, combined with the fact that a 

seller provides a buyer with the means to commit a further illegal act, 

might turn the seller into an aider and abettor of the buyer’s future crime.

See Lechuga, 994 F.2d at 349. But that knowledge is not enough to turn the 

seller into a co-conspirator. Id. More on aiding and abetting liability in a 

bit.

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38 No. 21-3221 

a long period that it must have known the doctor could not 

lawfully dispense the amounts received and was thus distributing the drug illegally. Id. at 705. The company also “actively 

stimulated” these purchases by employing a cost-saving mail 

order system that allowed it to offer lower prices than its competitors. Id. The Court reaffirmed Falcone’s principle that mere 

knowledge of illegal use, without more, cannot establish conspiracy. Id. at 709. It then examined whether, considering the 

facts, the seller had both knowledge of the conspiracy and intent to join it. Id. at 711–14.

The first factor the Direct Sales Court considered was the 

nature of the merchandise. In Falcone, the commodities sold—

sugar and yeast—were innocent in themselves, while in Direct 

Sales, the commodity was the restricted drug morphine. Direct 

Sales, 319 U.S. at 711–12. The Court considered the difference 

in the types of goods “important for two purposes.” Id. at 711

“One is for making certain that the seller knows the buyer’s 

intended illegal use. The other is to show that by the sale he 

intends to further, promote and cooperate in it.” Id. (emphasis 

added).

How does the nature of the merchandise inform the 

knowledge requirement, according to Direct Sales? The restricted nature of a commodity “makes a difference in the 

quantity of proof required to show knowledge that the buyer will 

utilize the article unlawfully,” Direct Sales explained. Id. at 712 

(emphasis added). The Court added that “additional facts, 

such as quantity sales, high-pressure sales methods, abnormal increases in the size of the buyer’s purchases, etc., which 

would be wholly innocuous or merely suspicious in relation 

to unrestricted goods, may furnish conclusive evidence, in 

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No. 21-3221 39 

respect to restricted articles, that the seller knowsthe buyer has 

an illegal object and enterprise.” Id. (emphasis added).

And how does the character of the merchandise inform the

separate intent requirement? According to Direct Sales, the restricted nature of a commodity “has a further bearing upon the 

existence and the proof of intent.” Id. (emphasis added). As 

Direct Sales explained, “[k]nowledge, equivocal and uncertain 

as to [unrestricted goods], becomes sure as to the other,” and 

“[s]o far as knowledge is the foundation of intent, the latter 

thereby also becomes the more secure.” Id. at 711–12 (emphasis 

added). “More secure,” though, does not mean fully secure; 

so the mens rea analysis in Direct Sales did not end. As the 

Court acknowledged, “[n]ot every instance of sale of restricted goods, harmful as are opiates, in which the seller 

knows the buyer intends to use them unlawfully, will support 

a charge of conspiracy.” Id. at 712. This means sometimes, 

even where the evidence clearly establishes knowledge, it still 

falls short of proving intent. Id. 

Direct Sales took pains to distinguish the analysis of 

knowledge from that of intent. Id. at 711 (“While [intent] is not 

identical with mere knowledge that another purposes unlawful action, it is not unrelated to such knowledge.”). First, no 

evidence of knowledge means no intent, the Court said. Id. at 

711–12 (stating that “knowledge is the foundation of intent” 

and “without the knowledge, the intent cannot exist” (citing 

Falcone, 311 U.S. 205)). Second, equivocal evidence of 

knowledge also means no intent. This is because “charges of 

conspiracy are not to be made out by piling inference upon 

inference, thus fashioning what, in [Falcone], was called a 

dragnet to draw in all substantive crimes.” Id. (internal citations omitted). And third, definite evidence of knowledge can 

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40 No. 21-3221 

still mean no intent. “There may be circumstances in which 

the evidence of knowledge [of unlawful activity] is clear,” Direct Sales concluded, “yet the further step of finding the required intent [to join the unlawful activity] cannot be taken.” 

Id. at 712.

So, Direct Sales moved past the character of the merchandise to examine a second factor: quantity and regularity. The 

Court concluded that sales of restricted goods occurring in 

significant “volume, frequency, and prolonged repetition,” 

may suffice to establish knowledge, but that knowledge must 

still be “coupled” with the distinct and separate requirement 

of intent. Direct Sales, 319 U.S. at 714–15 (explaining the sales 

“would be wholly lawful transactions” “but for their volume, 

frequency and prolonged repetition, coupled with the seller’s 

unlawful intent to further the buyer’s project”) (emphasis 

added); see also id. at 712 n.8, 712–13. 

That brings me to the third factor Direct Sales considered: 

whether the evidence shows “informed and interested cooperation, stimulation, instigation.” Id. at 713. The Court held 

that a conspiracy conviction may not lie even against a defendant engaged in “a more continuous course of sales, made 

either with strong suspicion of the buyer’s wrongful use or 

with knowledge, but without stimulation or active incitement 

to purchase.” Id. at 712 n.8. Unlike in Falcone, where the evidence fell short, the evidence in Direct Sales revealed the necessary stimulation or active incitement to purchase: there was 

evidence that the wholesaler tried to “stimulate” sales 

through quantity discounts, “high-pressure” mail solicitations, and changes to its order forms that encouraged more 

frequent purchases. Id. at 705–07, 712. With this evidence, the 

jury could conclude that the wholesaler intended by its efforts 

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No. 21-3221 41 

to informedly and interestedly cooperate, stimulate, and instigate the drug distribution conspiracy. See id. at 712. Absent 

such actions, the evidence could not show intent—just “suspicion, knowledge, acquiescence, carelessness, indifference, 

[or] lack of concern.”7 Id.; see also United States v. Gabriel, 810 

F.2d 627, 634 (7th Cir. 1987) (“The intent necessary to support 

a conviction for conspiracy ... is ‘more than knowledge, acquiescence, carelessness, indifference, lack of concern,’ but rather is ‘informed and interested cooperation, stimulation, instigation.’” (quoting Direct Sales, 319 U.S. at 713 (1943))).

Boiled down, Direct Sales and Falconetell us that a jury may 

conclude that a defendant knowingly and intentionally joined 

a drug distribution conspiracy when three elements are present: the defendant (1) dealt in restricted goods, (2) in “high 

volume, frequency, and over a prolonged period,” and (3) exhibited “informed and interested cooperation, stimulation, instigation.” Direct Sales, 319 U.S. at 712–13. If the evidence 

shows only the first two things, knowledge may exist, but not 

necessarily intent. And without intent, there can be no conspiracy conviction. Our ruling in United States v. Menting

sums up well how this circuit applies Direct Sales:

7 See also Direct Sales, 319 U.S. at 712–13 (“But this is not to say that a 

seller of harmful restricted goods has license to sell in unlimited quantities, to stimulate such sales by all the high-pressure methods .... When the 

evidence discloses such a system, working in prolonged cooperation with 

a physician’s unlawful purpose to supply him with his stock in trade for 

his illicit enterprise, there is no legal obstacle to finding that the supplier 

not only knows and acquiesces, but joins both mind and hand with him to 

make its accomplishment possible. The step from knowledge to intent and 

agreement may be taken. There is more than suspicion, more than 

knowledge, acquiescence, carelessness, indifference, lack of concern.

There is informed and interested cooperation, stimulation, instigation.”).

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42 No. 21-3221 

More than 55 years ago, the Supreme Court upheld a conspiracy conviction in which the overt 

acts consisted solely of “sales, which but for 

their volume, frequency and prolonged repetition, coupled with the seller’s unlawful intent to 

further the buyer’s project, would be wholly 

lawful transactions.” Direct Sales Co. v. United 

States, 319 U.S. 703, 714–15, 63 S. Ct. 1265, 87 

L.Ed. 1674 (1943). Following that guidance, this 

court has looked for evidence of “a prolonged and 

actively pursued course of sales coupled with the 

seller’s knowledge of and a shared stake in the 

buyer’s illegal venture” in order to distinguish 

a conspiracy from a simple buyer-seller relationship. United States v. Pearson, 113 F.3d 758, 

761 (7th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). Other important indicia of conspiracy include “the length of 

affiliation, the established method of payment[,] ... 

the extent to which the transactions are standardized, and the demonstrated level of mutual trust.” 

Id.8

8 Another useful summary comes from our decision in United States 

v. Clay, in which we reasoned:

 

Although the nub of a conspiracy is an agreement, a simple agreement between a buyer and seller to exchange 

something of value for cocaine cannot alone constitute a 

conspiracy because such an agreement is itself the substantive crime. See United States v. Lechuga, 994 F.2d 346, 

349 (7th Cir. 1993) (en banc); see also United States v. 

Kozinski, 16 F.3d 795, 808 (7th Cir. 1994). The ‘something 

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No. 21-3221 43 

more’ that is necessary for the existence of a true drug distribution conspiracy is a further understanding between 

the buyer and seller, often implicit, that usually relates to 

the subsequent distribution of the narcotics .... Just how 

implicit that understanding can be to sustain a conspiracy, and how circumstantial the proof of it will typically 

be, was demonstrated in Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 

319 U.S. 703 (1943).... 

The Court noted that the knowledge alone that one is supplying inputs to another’s illicit business cannot support 

a finding of conspiracy. But knowledge is sometimes accompanied by an intent to further or cooperate in the secondary endeavor .... 

What sort of evidence will allow ... a trier of fact to make 

the inference that buyer and seller are dealing not just 

with disinterested eyes narrowly focused on the purchase 

at hand but with a mutual understanding about subsequent distribution? Direct Sales indicates that a prolonged 

and actively pursued course of sales coupled with the 

seller’s knowledge of and a shared stake in the buyer’s 

illegal venture is sufficient to sustain a finding of conspiracy.... Many things will inform this question of degree; 

for example the length of the affiliation, the established 

method of payment, the available supplying or marketing 

alternatives, the extent to which the transactions are 

standardized, and the demonstrated level of mutual 

trust..... No one of these, or other, circumstantial factors 

will typically be dispositive because each is only an imperfect indicant of whether a true conspiracy existed. If 

enough point in the direction of a concrete, interlocked 

interest beyond the consummation of the individual buysell deals themselves, we will not disturb the conclusion 

reached by the finder of fact that at some point the association blossomed into a cooperative venture.”

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44 No. 21-3221 

166 F.3d 923, 928 (7th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added).

In the 90 years since Direct Sales, our caselaw has built a 

framework for determining when a buyer-seller relationship 

crosses the line into a conspiracy. That framework focuses on 

whether the relationship involves “a prolonged and actively 

pursued course of sales,” Pearson, 113 F.3d at 761—or, as Direct Sales put it, “informed and interested cooperation, stimulation, instigation,” 319 U.S. at 712—which can be “coupled 

with the seller’s knowledge of and shared stake in the buyer’s 

illegal venture,” Pearson, 113 F.3d at 761, to establish a drug 

distribution conspiracy. The “[f]actors that bear on that assessment,” United States v. Contreras, 249 F.3d 595, 599 (7th Cir. 

2001), have repeatedly surfaced in our decisions:

• United States v. Sergio, 934 F.2d 875, 877, 879 (7th Cir. 

1991) (affirming drug conspiracy conviction based on “large 

quantities,” “regular shipments,” and “fronting,” among 

other things);

• United States v. Thompson, 944 F.2d 1331, 1342–43 (7th 

Cir. 1991) (affirming based on “large quantities,” “number of 

transactions,” and fact that buyers “picked up [] cash from [] 

couriers and in turn arranged to have other couriers drive cocaine to Milwaukee where [the seller] would receive it”);

• United States v. Severson, 3 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 

1993) (affirming based on “several” purchases of “marijuana 

packaged in Ziploc bags” and “fronting”);

• United States v. Dortch, 5 F.3d 1056, 1065 (7th Cir. 1993) 

(affirming based on “three sales” of “distributable amounts,” 

37 F.3d 338, 341–42 (7th Cir. 1994).

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No. 21-3221 45 

“one of which included ‘fronted’ cocaine,” and discussing factors);

• United States v. Cabello, 16 F.3d 179, 182 (7th Cir. 1994) 

(affirming based on “prolonged cooperation” and “fronting” 

on a “highly regular basis”); 

• United States v. Zarnes, 33 F.3d 1454, 1465–68 (7th Cir. 

1994) (affirming based on transaction frequency, standardized dealings, and “fronting,” among other things, and discussing factors);

• United States v. Ferguson, 35 F.3d 327, 331 (7th Cir. 1994) 

(affirming based on transaction frequency, transaction size, 

and “fronting”);

• United States v. Clay, 37 F.3d 338, 342–43 (7th Cir. 1994) 

(affirming based on “regular purchases,” transaction size, and 

“fronting,” among other things);

• United States v. Penny, 60 F.3d 1257, 1259, 1263 (7th Cir. 

1995) (affirming based on “numerous transactions,” “large 

quantities,” and “fronting”);

• United States v. Larkins, 83 F.3d 162, 166 (7th Cir. 1996) 

(affirming based on “kilogram quantities” and credit sales);

• United States v. Pearson, 113 F.3d 758, 761 (7th Cir. 

1997) (discussing the Seventh Circuit “refin[ing] [its] calculus” “[o]ver the years” on “identify[ing] a few factors more 

relevant than others in determining whether a conspiracy existed” and affirming conspiracy conviction based on large, 

monthly, and standardized drug transactions, and the fact 

that “[the buyers] paid many thousands of dollars for the 

drugs and then went shopping before actually receiving the 

cocaine”);

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• United States v. Berry, 133 F.3d 1020, 1023 (7th Cir. 1998) 

(affirming because “buying and selling of crack occurred between Berry and Vinson” and “Vinson provided security services, made runs, and packaged Berry’s crack,” as well as discussing factors);

• United States v. Meyer, 157 F.3d 1067, 1074–75 (7th Cir. 

1998) (affirming based on “numerous drug transactions over 

a span of more than four years,” “large quantities,” and “consult[ing] his father [the co-conspirator] regarding drug 

buys”);

• United States v. Hach, 162 F.3d 937, 943–44 (7th Cir. 

1998) (affirming based on “frequent and repeated transactions,” “amounts fit for more than personal consumption,” 

standardized transactions, and credit sales, among other 

things, and discussing factors);

• United States v. Smallwood, 188 F.3d 905, 913 (7th Cir. 

1999) (affirming based on frequent transactions, credit sales, 

discounted sales, and advice, among other things, and discussing factors);

• United States v. Sanchez, 251 F.3d 598, 602 (7th Cir. 2001) 

(affirming “[b]ased on th[e] evidence of repeat sales, the 

promise of future sales, standardized dealings, [] the level of 

trust between the parties,” and “the quantity of drugs,” and 

discussing factors);

• United States v. Adkins, 274 F.3d 444, 450–51 (7th Cir. 

2001) (affirming based on “large quantities,” standardized 

transactions, and credit sales, and discussing factors);

• United States v. Haywood, 324 F.3d 514, 517 (7th Cir. 

2003) (affirming based on “larger quantities,” transaction 

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No. 21-3221 47 

frequency, and standardized transactions, and discussing factors);

• United States v. Hicks, 368 F.3d 801, 805–06 (7th Cir. 

2004) (affirming based on “quantity of drugs,” transaction frequency, standardized transactions, paying of “consult” fee, 

and “fronting,” and discussing factors);

• United States v. Suggs, 374 F.3d 508, 518–19 (7th Cir. 

2004) (affirming based on “large quantities,” “long-term pattern of distribution,” and “monitor[ing] the presence of police,” and discussing factors);

• United States v. Askew, 403 F.3d 496, 502, 504 (7th Cir. 

2005) (affirming based on “weekly sales of large quantities of 

PCP” and “fronting,” and discussing factors);

• United States v. Carrillo, 435 F.3d 767, 776 (7th Cir. 2006) 

(affirming based on large quantities; repeat transactions; 

“fronting”; the buyer took cash from seller to pay rent on 

home where drugs were stored; the seller was listed on the 

lease; and, after a car stuffed with heroin had been seized by 

the DEA, the seller, through an attorney, attempted to claim 

the car, among other things, and discussing factors);

• United States v. Eberhart, 467 F.3d 659, 669 (7th Cir. 

2006) (affirming based on “ample evidence that Eberhart dealt 

in large quantities of drugs, bought and sold drugs on credit, 

and cooperated with Bolden over a significant period of 

time,” and discussing factors);

• United States v. Fuller, 532 F.3d 656, 662–63 (7th Cir. 

2008) (affirming based on transactions “on a steady basis,” 

“distribution amounts,” standardized transactions, and 

“fronting,” among other things, and discussing factors); and

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48 No. 21-3221 

• United States v. Zaragoza, 543 F.3d 943, 947–48 (7th Cir. 

2008) (affirming based on “regular[]” purchases, standardized transactions, and “fronting,” among other things, and 

discussing factors).

We decided United States v. Colon in due course, tweaking 

our existing list of factors. An earlier Seventh Circuit pattern 

jury instruction on buyer-seller relationships had outlined a 

set of factors drawn from our cases up to that point. 549 F.3d

at 570–71. Those factors included: (1) whether the parties developed a standardized way of doing business over time; (2) 

the level of mutual trust between the buyer and seller; (3) 

whether the parties had a continuing relationship; (4) whether 

the seller had a financial stake in the buyer’s resale; (5) 

whether there was an understanding that the goods would be 

resold; and (6) whether sales were made on credit or consignment. Id. at 570. Colon flagged a critical issue, however: only 

the last factor really distinguished conspiracies from buyerseller relationships while the others were in fact consistent 

with both scenarios. Id.

To address that problem, Colon set aside the previous list 

in favor of a new one designed to more accurately distinguish 

between a conspiracy and a simple buyer-seller relationship. 

This updated, non-exhaustive list included: (1) sales made on 

credit or consignment; (2) an agreement to help find other 

customers; (3) payment of commissions on sales; (4) evidence 

that one party advised the other on how to conduct their business; and (5) an agreement to warn each other about threats 

to the business, whether from competitors or law enforcement. Id. at 570–71. As it turns out, all of these “new” factors 

had already made appearances in our pre-Colon caselaw. 

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No. 21-3221 49 

And, since then, we have applied the factors as listed in Colon.9 

Until today, our precedent—while perhaps not always 

polished at the edges when it comes to the “factors”—has 

nonetheless maintained a clear and consistent standard: 

repeat drug transactions, even those involving large 

quantities, do not establish the necessary intent to conspire. 

The government must do more than point to repeat, 

distribution-quantity sales; it must show “informed and 

interested cooperation, stimulation, instigation” in or of the 

broader drug distribution conspiracy. Direct Sales, 319 U.S. at 

712. Without this showing of intent, there is no conspiracy.

B 

Our Drug Distribution Conspiracy Law—After Today

The majority tells us that our long-held rule—requiring 

more than repeat, distribution-quantity drug transactions to 

sustain a drug conspiracy conviction—is yesterday’s news.

9 See, e.g., United States v. Kincannon, 567 F.3d 893, 897 (7th Cir. 2009); 

United States v. Avila, 557 F.3d 809, 816 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Johnson, 592 F.3d 749, 756 n.5 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Rea, 621 F.3d 595, 

608 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Villasenor, 664 F.3d 673, 680 (7th Cir. 

2011); United States v. Vallar, 635 F.3d 271, 286–87 (7th Cir. 2011); United 

States v. Nunez, 673 F.3d 661 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Pulgar, 789 F.3d 

807, 812–13 (7th Cir. 2015); United States v. Musgraves, 831 F.3d 454, 462–63 

(7th Cir. 2016); United States v. Moreland, 703 F.3d 976, 985 (7th Cir. 2012), 

holding modified by United States v. Jett, 908 F.3d 252 (7th Cir. 2018); United 

States v. Maldonado, 893 F.3d 480, 485 (7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Neal, 

907 F.3d 511, 516 (7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Brown, 726 F.3d 993,1000

(7th Cir. 2013); United States v. Vizcarra-Millan, 15 F.4th 473, 510–11 (7th 

Cir. 2021).

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50 No. 21-3221 

In so declaring, the majority opinion begins by catastrophizing the state of our drug distribution conspiracy law, 

painting a picture that distorts reality. It then misquotes and 

misinterprets Direct Sales and Colon, effectively sidestepping

the specific intent requirement and transforming drug distribution and/or liability for aiding and abetting a drug distribution conspiracy into conspiring to distribute drugs. After 

that, it falls silent, offering no salve for the serious due process

issues its holding creates; no comment on the lack of a compelling reason to abandon our strong presumption against 

overturning precedent; and no explanation for implicitly 

overturning Lechuga, a longstanding en banc decision addressing the very same issue.

1 

The Majority Opinion Invents Inconsistency 

Where None Exists 

The majority opinion opens with what might seem like a 

small misstep. But that misstep, in truth, sets a foundation for 

the great error to come—that is, eliminating the longstanding 

intent requirement in drug distribution conspiracy cases.

The majority opinion begins with a sweeping critique of 

our existing law, asserting that “[o]ur conspiracy and buyerseller jurisprudence has strayed far from the Supreme Court’s 

decision in Direct Sales ....” Ante, at 2. To support this claim, 

the majority cites United States v. Brown, 726 F.3d 993, 1000–01 

(7th Cir. 2013), with a parenthetical stating that Brown “describe[d] the tension and inconsistency in our buyer-seller 

case law.” Ante, at 6. 

But Brown doesn’t do what the majority suggests. In fact, 

Brown mentions Direct Sales three times, and none of those 

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No. 21-3221 51 

mentions critique our precedent or suggest that we’ve deviated from the Supreme Court’s guidance. Brown, 726 F.3d at 

998–99. Rather than fault our jurisprudence for straying from 

Direct Sales, Brown acknowledges that our precedent has been 

internally inconsistent—but only in a narrow respect: in articulating the precise factors needed to establish informed and 

interested cooperation, stimulation, or instigation. Id. at 1001 

(“Admittedly, much of the confusion stems from our own imprecision.”).

Put differently, in Brown, our court recognized the need to 

provide a clearer statement about the factors we consider 

when deciding whether knowledge has become intent. 726 

F.3d at 1001. Agreements come in infinite shapes and sizes, 

Brown observes, and our list-of-factors approach to conspiracies must—and does—account for this variety. Id. at 1001–02. 

The previous version of our pattern instruction on buyerseller relationships provided a list of factors, which Colon

simply updated, Brown explains. Id. at 998–99. Even though 

“many of our cases do not state the legal standard in precisely 

the same way,” Brown notes that “most of them would have 

reached the same outcome under each other’s jurisprudence.” 

Id. at 1001–02. The key insight in Brown was that the consistency of results across our cases, despite occasional differences in wording, suggested that we had been employing a 

“totality of the circumstances” approach all along. Id. Thus, 

the majority is wrong to frame Brown as a sweeping critique 

of our drug distribution conspiracy precedent rather than a 

case clarifying how the factors articulated in Colon were to be 

applied. 

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52 No. 21-3221 

The majority’s framing lays the groundwork for the major 

shift its decision occasions: the quiet excision of the intent requirement from our drug distribution conspiracy law.

2 

The Majority Opinion Reinterprets Direct Sales and Colon

The majority next turns its attention to Direct Sales and Colon, distorting the reasoning in the two cases, and—in the 

end—effectively eliminating the intent requirement from our 

drug distribution conspiracy framework. 

i.

I start with Direct Sales. The majority’s treatment suffers 

from three flaws.

First, the majority misrepresents Direct Sales by suggesting 

that—where there’s repeat, distribution-quantity transactions 

of goods—the illicit nature of the goods ends the analysis. According to the majority, “[t]he illegality of morphine [in Direct 

Sales], as compared to the legality of sugar and yeast [in Falcone], proved critical to sustaining Direct Sales’s conspiracy 

conviction for two reasons:” ensuring “the seller knows” and 

showing “[the seller] intends.” Ante, at 8. 

But Direct Sales never elevated the illegality of goods to a 

decisive factor in determining whether a defendant took part 

in a drug distribution conspiracy—even where there’s large, 

repeat transactions. Direct Sales, in fact, explicitly rejected that 

rule. The Direct Sales Court described the restricted nature of 

morphine as “important for two purposes”: providing some 

proof of knowledge and, separately, providing some proof of

intent. 319 U.S. at 711. Specifically, Direct Sales explains that 

the legality of a good makes “a difference in the quantity of 

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No. 21-3221 53 

proof required to show knowledge that the buyer will use the 

article unlawfully” and “[t]he difference in the commodities 

has a further bearing upon the existence and the proof of intent.” Id. (emphasis added). Direct Sales goes on to explain 

that, though the illicit nature of goods can amount to conclusive proof of knowledge when sold in large quantities,10 it 

does not constitute conclusive proof of intent. Id. at 712–13. 

Far from making the illicit character of the goods dispositive, the Supreme Court treated it as just one consideration in 

assessing whether repeat, large-scale transactions can demonstrate the separate and distinct elements of knowledge and intent to conspire. By allowing the illicit nature of goods to 

shoulder more weight than Direct Sales permits, the majority 

opinion downplays, if not outright erases, Direct Sales’s clear 

line between knowledge and intent.

***

Second, the majority errs in its treatment of the second 

consideration in Direct Sales: quantity and frequency of transactions.

To start, the majority correctly observes that “facts such as 

‘quantity sales’ or ‘abnormal increases in the size of the 

buyer’s purchases, ... which would be wholly innocuous or 

not more than ground for suspicion in relation to unrestricted 

goods, may furnish conclusive evidence, in respect to 

10 See Direct Sales, 319 U.S. at 712 (holding that “additional facts, such 

as quantity sales, high-pressure sales methods, abnormal increases in the 

size of the buyer’s purchases, etc., which would be wholly innocuous or 

merely suspicious in relation to unrestricted goods, may furnish conclusive evidence, in respect to restricted articles, that the seller knows the 

buyer has an illegal object and enterprise” (emphasis added)).

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54 No. 21-3221 

restricted articles, that the seller knows the buyer has an illegal 

object and enterprise.’” Ante, at 9 (emphasis added). But what 

comes next is perplexing. The majority doubles back and asserts that repeat, distribution-sized transactions prove intent. 

This conclusion flatly contradicts its observation above. Id. 

Worse, it squarely conflicts with Direct Sales, which makes 

clear that even conclusive evidence of knowledge—like that 

inferred from sales in large quantities—does not, on its own, 

establish intent. See Direct Sales, 319 U.S. at 711–12. 

Two, in an attempt to support its conclusion that drugs, 

repeat transactions, and large quantities suffice, the majority 

offers what it calls an “instructive” breakdown of the buyerseller relationship in cases involving repeat, distribution-level 

drug sales. In doing so, however, the majority collapses two 

distinct legal concepts—conspiracy and aiding and abetting 

liability—into one.

The majority asserts that when a seller repeatedly supplies 

distribution-quantities of drugs, the seller inevitably realizes 

the buyer is reselling the drugs illegally. Ante, at 9. As the 

buyer’s illegal distribution network expands, so does the 

seller’s stake, creating what the majority calls a “codependent 

business relationship” where both parties have “shared stake 

in each other’s success.” Id. at 10. The more the buyer’s customer base grows, the more the seller profits, which according 

to the majority solidifies the implicit agreement between the 

two to further distribute drugs. Id. at 9–10. 

Not only does the conclusion that intent can be inferred 

from a combination of drugs, repeat transactions, and large 

quantities run headlong into Direct Sales, this very 

argument—conjuring a “codependent business relationship” 

and “shared stake in each other’s success” based on repeat, 

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No. 21-3221 55 

distribution-quantity drug transactions alone—was squarely 

rejected by this court in Townsend, more than a decade before 

Colon. In Townsend, the government contended that a seller 

who repeatedly engages in distribution-quantity drug deals 

with a known dealer must be aware that the buyer is 

connected to a broader drug distribution conspiracy. 924 F.2d 

at 1391–92. The government’s logic in that case was that 

because both the buyer and seller benefited from these 

transactions, they each knowingly and intentionally joined 

the larger conspiracy. Id. 

We rejected that reasoning, explaining: “Taken to its extreme, the government’s logic suggests that anyone selling or 

buying drugs from any [] of these defendants could also have 

been convicted as a coconspirator.” Id. at 1390. Here was our 

rejection in full:

We think the government’s argument stretches 

the boundaries of conspiracy law to the breaking point. We recognize that, by their very nature, drug conspiracies are loosely-knit ensembles.... [But] mere knowledge of the hub’s activities, or those of the other spokes, is not enough 

to tie the conspiracy together.... Neither of these 

paradigms suffices ... to show mutual support 

or interest among the component parts of the organizational construct. They don’t eliminate the 

need to inquire directly into whether the defendants had a mutual interest in achieving the 

goal of the conspiracy .... “[I]t is ... hard[] to tell 

just what agreement can reasonably be inferred 

from the purchase, even the repeated purchase, 

of contraband ....” Borelli, 336 F.2d at 384. By 

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56 No. 21-3221 

definition, market transactions—whether in legal or illegal markets—benefit both parties, but 

we do not assume, ab initio, that they carry with 

them the excess baggage of conspiracy....11

Id. at 1391–92. 

Indeed, as we further explained in Townsend, “we cannot 

say that every act of distribution taken by [the buyer], once 

[the seller] became involved with [the buyer], was in the furtherance of their conspiracy.” Id. (quoting United States v. 

North, 900 F.2d 131, 134 (8th Cir. 1990)). Even if a seller admits 

that he knew the buyer resold drugs to others, one possibility 

is that those additional sales formed part of the buyer’s own

distribution operation—not the conspiracy’s. Id. at 1393. Another possibility is that the buyer and seller may face liability 

11 Of course, “[w]e cannot [] reasonably assume that everyone with 

whom a drug dealer does business benefits, directly or indirectly, from his 

other drug deals. In fact, any inference should probably run in the other 

direction. There is—hard though it may be to believe—a finite supply of 

drugs. Those in the market to sell or buy large quantities (for distribution) 

are just as likely, if not more, to be competitors as collaborators.” Townsend, 924 F.2d at 1393; see also United States v. Thornton, 972 F.2d 764, 769–

70 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[A] conspiracy is essentially a business enterprise with 

illegal purposes that like a legal business enterprise is characterized by 

cooperative relationships between its members. And, ... just like other 

commodities, there is a limited supply of drugs, meaning that if the government could pool all levels of a distribution chain into one conspiracy 

without providing some evidence that the members intended to join in a 

cooperative association with a common goal, it would be just as likely, if 

not more likely, that the persons pooled together would be competitors 

rather than persons working in concert to achieve a common objective.” 

(internal citations omitted)).

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for aiding and abetting a drug distribution conspiracy. Id. at 

1393–94. 

Conspiracy and aiding and abetting liability—though 

close cousins—are distinct legal concepts: in the drug context, 

conspiring to distribute drugs involves knowing of and intentionally joining the conspiracy, see Direct Sales, 319 U.S. at 712; 

aiding and abetting a drug distribution conspiracy involves 

knowingly helping the conspiracy succeed, see Nye & Nissen 

v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619–20 (1949) (citing United States 

v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938) (Hand, J.)). “[W]e do 

not subject [buyers and sellers] to additional liability as conspirators simply because they aided the conspiracy and derived a benefit from doing so.” Townsend, 924 F.2d at 1393 (citing Nye, 336 U.S. at 620; Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 11 

(1954)). This is because we cannot infer intent to join the conspiracy based on aid to the conspiracy. Id. (“[W]e cannot infer 

that both parties agreed to work together to achieve that result from the fact that they engaged together in some other 

crime.”) (citing Falcone, 311 U.S. 205)). For these reasons, 

though a buyer-seller relationship involving repeat, largescale drug transactions may be enough to sustain a conviction 

for aiding and abetting a drug distribution conspiracy, it is 

not enough to establish intent to join the conspiracy and, 

therefore, cannot sustain a drug distribution conspiracy conviction.

Three, in addressing cases involving a single sale of a restricted good in a small quantity, the majority opinion again 

misquotes—and in doing so, misstates—the Supreme Court’s

reasoning in Direct Sales. The majority states: “Of course, a 

single sale of a restricted good in a low quantity does not, by 

itself, support a charge of conspiracy, even if the seller knows 

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that the good will be used for further illegal activity. [Direct 

Sales, 319 U.S.] at 712. But this does not mean that a seller can 

sell contraband ‘in unlimited quantities.’” Ante, at 10. 

While the majority’s citation may seem at first blush to 

support its position, it decidedly does not. The Direct Sales

Court indeed observed that a seller cannot sell restricted 

goods “in unlimited quantities.” Id. at 712–13. But the 

majority opinion leaves out critical context: the Supreme 

Court did not make this “unlimited quantities” observation to 

suggest that any sale beyond a small, single transaction 

satisfies the elements of a drug distribution conspiracy 

charge. Id. Quite the opposite. The Direct Sales Court made 

that reference to underscore that, even where “unlimited 

quantities” of drugs are at issue, the analysis is not done. 

Rather, the defendant’s intent—not his knowledge—remains 

central to the drug distribution conspiracy inquiry:

The difference in the commodities has a further bearing upon the existence and the proof of intent. There 

may be circumstances in which the evidence of 

knowledge is clear, yet the further step of finding the required intent cannot be taken. Concededly, not every instance of sale of restricted 

goods, harmful as are opiates, in which the 

seller knows the buyer intends to use them unlawfully, will support a charge of conspiracy. 

But this is not to say that a seller of harmful restricted goods has license to sell in unlimited 

quantities, to stimulate such sales by all the highpressure methods, legal if not always appropriate, in the sale of free commodities .... 

Id. (emphasis added).

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Four, the majority further muddles the “quantity and frequency” consideration by conflating two distinct factors: 

number of sales (that is, frequency), and “prolonged cooperation.” The majority says:

Of course, a single sale of a restricted good in a 

low quantity does not, by itself, support a 

charge of conspiracy, even if the seller knows 

that the good will be used for further illegal 

activity. Id. at 712. But this does not mean that a 

seller can sell contraband “in unlimited 

quantities.” [Id.] Rather, as plain from the 

hypothetical above, when the evidence shows 

that a buyer and seller worked in “prolonged 

cooperation” for a plainly unlawful purpose—

the seller supplying the buyer with stock for his 

illicit enterprise—“there is no legal obstacle to 

finding that the supplier not only knows and 

acquiesces, but joins both mind and hand with 

him to make its accomplishment possible.” Id. at 

713. 

Ante, at 10 (citing Direct Sales, 319 U.S. at 712–13). 

To the extent the majority believes that repeat transactions 

necessarily imply “prolonged cooperation,” I must disagree. 

Repeat transactions may serve as evidence of the prolonged 

cooperation, but the two factors remain distinct. The number 

of sales is “significant only insofar as it cast[s] light on the existence of a continuing relation”—that is, “prolonged cooperation”—which could imply an agreement beyond a simple 

purchase and sale. Lechuga, 994 F.2d at 349–50. Direct Sales 

says so:

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What made “prolonged cooperation” a factor in 

inferring conspiracy in Direct Sales Co. v. United 

States, 319 U.S. 703, 713 (1943), was that it 

showed that the defendant not only knew that 

it was selling drugs to someone for use in an illicit enterprise but had “join [ed] both mind and 

hand with him to make its accomplishment possible.” See also id. at 712 n. 8. Prolonged cooperation is neither the meaning of conspiracy nor 

an essential element, but it is one type of evidence of an agreement that goes beyond what is 

implicit in any consensual undertaking, such as 

a spot sale.

Lechuga, 994 F.2d at 350; see also United States v. Brack, 188 F.3d 

748, 761 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Lechuga, 994 F.2d at 349–50; 

United States v. Thomas, 150 F.3d 743, 745 (7th Cir. 1998) (per 

curiam)); see also United States v. Mims, 92 F.3d 461, 463 (7th 

Cir.), on reh'g, 101 F.3d 494 (7th Cir. 1996). 

***

Third, the majority’s reading of Direct Sales misquotes the 

Supreme Court regarding the “informed and interested cooperation, stimulation, instigation” necessary to establish intent. 

See 319 U.S. at 713. The majority opinion misconstrues the central holding in Direct Sales not once, ante, at 11 (“For these reasons, the Supreme Court had no trouble affirming Direct 

Sales’s conspiracy conviction based solely on evidence of repeated, distribution-quantity sales of morphine.”); not twice, 

ante, at 11 (“All told, Direct Sales provides three principles for 

determining which types of buyer-seller relationships are indicative of a conspiracy.... [and the] [t]hird, [is] a drug conspiracy conviction can be sustained if the government proves 

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that a buyer and seller engaged in repeated, distributionquantity drug transactions.”); but three times, ante, at 7 

(“Based on these repeated, distribution-quantity transactions, 

Direct Sales was convicted of conspiracy to distribute narcotics.”). No portion of the majority opinion accurately acknowledges, much less grapples with, the Supreme Court’s careful 

consideration of the “informed and interested cooperation, 

stimulation, instigation” necessary to prove intent. The only 

sentence in the majority opinion that cites this language once 

again misquotes Direct Sales. The majority would have the 

reader believe that repeat, distribution-quantity transactions 

involving illicit goods bridge the gap between knowledge and 

intent—that these types of transactions by themselves show 

“informed and interested cooperation, stimulation, [and] instigation.” See ante, at 9. But, as I explained above, Direct Sales

says the opposite: Alone, such transactions do not establish 

the stimulation or active incitement necessary to transform 

knowledge into intent. See ante, at 38–42, 53–62. 

ii.

I turn now to the majority’s Colon analysis. This analysis

suffers from two flaws. 

First, the majority opinion claims that Colon is the 

“origin[]” of “a long line of cases that have stretched the 

buyer-seller doctrine too far and deviated from the standard 

set in Direct Sales.” Ante, at 11. According to the majority, Colon introduced a requirement for “additional evidence,” like 

sales on credit or warnings about future threats, to support 

conspiracy convictions. See ante, at 12. But the majority’s attempt to pin these factors on Colon doesn’t hold up. As shown 

above, the additional evidence discussed in Colon wasn’t an 

invention of the Colon panel; it was a straightforward 

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62 No. 21-3221 

application of the rule set forth in Direct Sales—a rule our circuit has faithfully adhered to ever since, at least until today. 

See ante, at 49–50. 

Second, in discussing Colon, the majority states that 

“[r]epeated, distribution-quantity transactions of illegal 

drugs do not reflect a mere buyer-seller relationship between 

the parties.” Ante, at 12. Again, this assertion directly contradicts Direct Sales. As discussed, Direct Sales establishes that 

quantity and frequency at best create certainty as to 

knowledge, leaving intent outstanding. 319 U.S. at 714–15. 

And where there is no intent, there is no conspiracy—instead, 

a mere buyer-seller relationship exists. Id. at 712.

3 

The Majority Opinion’s Other Omissions

The majority opinion reaches its conclusion but says nothing about three critical considerations and consequences: the 

absence of any compelling reason for overturning Colon and 

its progeny; the silent undoing of Lechuga, our decades-old en 

banc decision on the same issue; and the serious due process 

concerns today’s ruling introduces.

i.

We’ve long held that panel decisions should be overturned by the en banc court only when compelling reasons 

demand it. See United States v. Carpenter, 104 F.4th 655, 658 (7th 

Cir. 2024); see also Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984) 

(explaining that the doctrine of stare decisis “carries such persuasive force” that departing from it has “always required” 

“special justification”). What reason does the majority give? 

None. 

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No. 21-3221 63 

Colon and its progeny correctly interpret and apply Direct 

Sales. Ante, 49–50. To the extent that the majority thinks otherwise, I note our rule that “[m]ere disagreement with the law 

or a desire to see the law change is not enough.” Carpenter, 104 

F.4th at 658 (citing Tate v. Showboat Marina Casino P’ship, 431 

F.3d 580, 582 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[I]f the fact that a court considers one of its previous decisions to be incorrect is a sufficient 

ground for overruling it, then stare decisis is out the window, 

because no doctrine of deference to precedent is needed to induce a court to follow the precedents that it agrees with.”)). 

No intervening Supreme Court decision compels us to reconsider our settled view. 

Nor is there a circuit split of the kind that would justify 

breaking with our prior rulings. Rather, today’s decision 

shifts us from one side of an inter-circuit divide to the other. 

See United States v. Lamon, 893 F.3d 369, 371 (7th Cir. 2018) (explaining that “the mere existence of a circuit split does not justify overturning precedent”); Buchmeier v. United States, 581 

F.3d 561, 566 (7th Cir. 2009) (counseling against “one circuit’s 

restless movement from one side of a conflict to another”). 

No intra-circuit conflict exists either. See Buchmeier, 581 

F.3d at 566. We’ve done nothing new in this circuit since Direct Sales. Since then, we have held clearly and consistently 

that quantity and frequency of drug transactions alone are insufficient to sustain a drug distribution conspiracy conviction.

We said “no”—repeat, distribution-quantity drug sales 

are not enough—in Townsend, a 1991 case decided almost two 

decades before Colon. It’s hard to tell “just what agreement 

can reasonably be inferred from the purchase, even the repeated purchase, of contraband,” we explained. Townsend, 

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924 F.2d at 1392 (quoting United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376, 

383 (2d Cir.) (Friendly, J.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 960 (1964)). 

And “[t]he mere purchase or sale of drugs (even in large 

quantities) does not demonstrate an agreement to join a drug 

distribution conspiracy ....” Id. at 1394. 

We said “no”—repeat, distribution-quantity drug sales 

are not enough—in Contreras, a 2001 case decided well before 

Colon. There, we held that “[t]he multiple purchases [of ‘onekilogram quantities’] by themselves,” “without any additional evidence of the kind we have mentioned”—such as 

“fronting” or “favorable pric[ing] on the cocaine on the expectation of future purchase”—“do not permit the inference that 

the [] supplier conspired with [the buyer].” Contreras, 249 F.3d 

at 599. 

We again said “no”—repeat, distribution-quantity drug 

sales are not enough—in Rivera, another pre-Colon case from 

2001. There, we held that the buyer’s repeated large quantity 

purchases and seller’s “knowledge of the buyer’s illegal activities or resale objectives,” did not transform a “mere buyerseller arrangement” into a conspiracy. 273 F.3d at 755–56 (internal citations omitted). We concluded that the evidence 

“show[ed] none of the plus factors necessary to infer ... a conspiracy.” Id. at 755–56. 

We said “no” once again—repeat, distribution-quantity 

drug sales are not enough—in Thomas, a pre-Colon case from 

2002. There, we concluded, “[p]roof that Thomas sold a distribution quantity of crack cocaine to Jones on one or more 

occasions does not by itself establish that Thomas conspired 

with Jones and her associates.” 284 F.3d at 751. “That Thomas 

was aware of the conspiracy to distribute narcotics does not 

establish his membership in the conspiracy” as “[k]nowing of 

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a conspiracy differs from joining a conspiracy.” Id. at 752 (first 

emphasis added) (quoting Torres-Ramirez, 213 F.3d at 982). 

“One who deals in larger quantities of narcotics will invariably realize that his buyer intends to resell,” we said, “and that 

in all likelihood he will have help from others in doing so. 

That knowledge alone does not render the seller liable as a coconspirator.” Id. (citing Torres-Ramirez, 213 F.3d at 982). 

And we said “no” once again in Askew—yet another preColon case decided in 2005. “[I]n the case of a drug conspiracy, 

evidence of repeated sales alone is not enough to support a 

conviction. Rather ... in conspiracy cases the jury must assess 

a host of factors—including repeated sales—to determine 

whether an agreement beyond the simple purchase of drugs 

exists.” Askew, 403 F.3d at 503 (citing Mims, 92 F.3d at 466); see 

also Mims, 92 F.3d at 463 (explaining that, “while purchase of 

narcotics for resale is evidence of a conspiratorial agreement 

(especially when the purchases are repeated as they were 

here), a buyer-seller relationship alone is insufficient to prove 

a conspiracy”). 

Most critically, we said “no” in Lechuga—our en banc decision from 1991 addressing the very issue the full court decides today. The lead opinion concluded that “large quantities 

of controlled substances, without more, cannot sustain a conspiracy conviction.” Lechuga, 994 F.2d at 347. “What is necessary and sufficient is proof of an agreement to commit a crime 

other than the crime that consists of the sale itself.” Id.; see also 

United States v. Baker, 1 F.3d 596, 597 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 

U.S. 956 (1993) (“[T]here must be facts in evidence in addition 

to a sale for resale from which proof of a conspiracy to distribute can be inferred.”). Lechuga treated frequency no different: 

“the number of sales” was “significant only insofar as it cast 

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light on the existence of a continuing relation, implying an 

agreement with an objective beyond a simple purchase and 

sale—the latter being an agreement, all right, but not a conspiracy.” Id. at 349–50. 

The fact that we decided Lechuga en banc cannot be swept 

aside. The case demands our attention—far more than the silence the majority affords it. In my review of our circuit law, 

I found no instance where our en banc court overturned a 

prior en banc decision absent an intervening change in the 

law by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Minn-Chem, Inc. v. 

Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 852 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (overturning a prior en banc decision based on the “recent string of 

decisions” issued by the Supreme Court “undermin[ing] the 

holding” in the prior en banc decision). That makes sense. If

we require a compelling reason to overturn a three-judge 

panel decision, how much more when considering whether to 

overturn an en banc decision—a ruling that is supposed to 

represent the collective wisdom of the full court?12

But today, for the first time in our court’s history, the 

majority says “yes”: quantity and frequency alone can sustain

a drug distribution conspiracy conviction. In saying “yes,” the 

12 We consider several other factors in deciding whether to overturn 

precedent, including (1) whether the rule is supported by a single, isolated 

case or a series of cases (as this dissent has noted, the rule that repeat, distribution-quantity drug transactions cannot sustain a drug conspiracy was 

approved and followed in more than three dozen panel decisions and one 

en banc decision), see Tate, 431 F.3d at 583; and (2) whether reliance interests have built up around the decision (here, the reliance interests at stake 

are obvious, where a rule that repeat, distribution-quantity drug transactions cannot sustain a drug conspiracy conviction has stood unchallenged 

in this circuit for over 80 years), see id. at 583; see, e.g., United States v. Title 

Ins. & Trust Co., 265 U.S. 472, 486 (1924).

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majority opinion does not cite—nor have I found—a single 

decision by a panel of this circuit holding that repeat, 

distribution-quantity drug transactions alone can sustain a 

drug distribution conspiracy conviction. That is not 

surprising. The rule the majority announces today has never 

been the law of this circuit.

What we are gaining from this jurisprudential disruption 

is unclear, but what we risk losing—respect as a court committed to making decisions grounded in the rule of law no 

matter the case—is all too evident.13 

ii.

The majority’s decision to effectively eliminate the intent 

requirement from our drug distribution conspiracy law raises 

serious due process concerns.

The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Due 

13 The consequences of today’s decision will be felt beyond sufficiency 

of the evidence challenges. Take plea bargains for example. We have 

based our drug conspiracy plea bargaining jurisprudence on the bedrock 

principle that repeat, distribution-quantity transactions, by themselves, 

are insufficient to support a conspiracy conviction. United States v. Goliday, 

41 F.4th 778, 783 (7th Cir. 2022) (“Time and again we have underscored 

that proof of an ordinary buyer-seller relationship alone is insufficient to 

support a conviction under § 846.” (citing United States v. Neal, 907 F.3d 

511, 515 (7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Long, 748 F.3d 322, 325 (7th Cir. 

2014))); Long, 748 F.3d at 326 (“The government may ... not rely solely on 

purchases and sales, which after all are present in both buyer-seller and 

conspiracy arrangements.... Standing alone, []large-quantity sales ... 

can[not] sufficiently distinguish a conspiracy from an ordinary buyerseller relationship.”). What now? 

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process requires that the government prove each element of a 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 

358, 364 (1970). Criminal conspiracy, in particular, has always 

required that the government prove the defendant knowingly 

and intentionally entered into an agreement to commit a 

crime. See Direct Sales, 319 U.S. at 712. By effectively excising 

the intent requirement from the drug distribution conspiracy 

law of our circuit, my colleagues relieve the government of its 

burden to prove all elements of a conspiracy, striking at the 

heart of due process.14

The Due Process Clause also protects against vague laws 

that fail to provide adequate notice of prohibited conduct or 

encourage arbitrary enforcement. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 

U.S. 352, 357 (1983). Without the requirement of intent, the 

line between a buyer-seller relationship and a conspiracy is 

blurred, expanding prosecutorial discretion and inviting arbitrary enforcement.

Plainly, our rules for overturning precedent and our duty 

to uphold the Constitution both counsel against the majority’s 

decision.

14 To illustrate the due process stakes involved in eliminating the intent requirement, consider the line between conspiracy and aiding and 

abetting liability—theories that we keep distinct for good reason. “True, 

aiding and abetting presupposes the existence of more than one actor, but 

aiders and abettors are already punished as principals.” Townsend, 924 F.2d 

at 1393 (emphasis added); see also Nye, 336 U.S. at 620. “To justify imposing additional criminal liability, there must be some additional evidence 

that their actions are intended to bring about the object of the conspiracy.” 

Id. (citing Iannelli, 420 U.S. at 777–78). Notably in this case, the conspiracy 

charge carried a mandatory minimum five years’ imprisonment that an 

aiding and abetting charge would not have.

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C 

Under Our Old Law, a Buyer-Seller Instruction 

Is Appropriate 

Now, I turn to the facts of this case, applying the correct 

legal framework as it existed before today’s decision. Under 

that framework, Page is entitled to a buyer-seller instruction. 

The majority’s claim otherwise falls flat. 

As evidence that Page joined a conspiracy with drug supplier Terrance Hamlin, the majority first points to the personal 

relationship between the men. See ante, at 3. The majority considers that relationship, described at trial as akin to that of an 

uncle (Hamlin) and nephew (Page), as evidence of mutual 

trust. Yet, trust between a buyer and seller, even if rooted in a 

longstanding personal relationship, does not necessarily 

transform routine drug transactions into a conspiracy. When 

that trust arises from a familial connection, as it did here, it is 

also likely that any warnings exchanged between the two men 

were the product of genuine solicitude as opposed to a shared 

criminal enterprise. Cf. United States v. de Soto, 885 F.2d 354, 

367 (7th Cir. 1989) (explaining that “[c]ourts must be especially watchful to uphold this principle”—that “[t]he government must prove that the defendant took some step beyond 

‘mere association with, knowledge of, approval of, or presence at a conspiracy’”—“when a conspiracy is alleged to be 

composed of family members”). 

Second, the majority claims that Hamlin’s advice to Page 

about avoiding certain individuals—coupled with Hamlin’s 

description of a “cooperative” business relationship with 

Page—suggests a conspiracy. See ante, at 16. This is a leap. For 

one, it wasn’t “individuals” (plural) that Hamlin advised 

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Page to be circumspect around, but a single person: Page’s 

cousin. Furthermore, a jury could find that a seller who provides guidance to ensure the buyer’s continued satisfaction is 

acting in self-interest to protect future sales, not necessarily to 

advance a joint conspiracy. Even where the facts suggest that 

“[the seller] made some effort to please and keep [the buyer] 

as a customer,” or reflects “an ongoing effort to cultivate [the 

buyer] as a customer,” “what they do not reflect is a shared 

stake in the success of [the buyer’s] distribution enterprise.” 

Thomas, 284 F.3d at 754. The seller may have done “what any 

good haberdasher might do—[the seller] got to know his customer’s needs and aimed to meet them.” Id. (citing Rivera, 273 

F.3d at 756 (“The government showed only that [the defendant] wanted [his customer’s] business—that is indicative of a 

buyer-seller relationship, not a conspiracy.”)). 

Third, the majority highlights as evidence of a conspiracy 

Hamlin’s decision to give Page a lower price per gram because Page could move drugs quickly. See ante, at 16. But offering a discount to a high-volume customer is a standard 

business practice in both legitimate and illicit marketplaces. 

See Pulgar, 789 F.3d at 813 (holding evidence was insufficient 

to sustain conspiracy conviction, even though “Pulgar, no 

doubt, sold large quantities of cocaine to Schmidt at wholesale prices for a period of eleven years”); Vizcarra-Millan, 15 

F.4th at 510–11 (“We do not need to determine whether the 

$100 is better described as a front or a discount. Either way it 

was extremely weak evidence of conspiracy.”).

Fourth, the majority states that Page and Hamlin “consistently notified each other about the status of their drug supply 

and their clientele.” Ante, at 16. But the majority does not support this claim with facts from the record, nor does it explain 

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how “consistently notifying” each other on the “status” of 

drug supply—whatever these terms may mean—helps us distinguish between a buyer-seller and a conspirator. 

Fifth, the majority emphasizes a conversation between 

Page and Hamlin about expanding their separate businesses 

“up north” as evidence of a conspiracy. See ante, at 16. But this 

discussion didn’t lead to anything, perhaps because Page was 

pursuing his own, separate venture with buyers in that region. In short, a buyer’s rejection of a seller’s proposal to 

merge their businesses may not be evidence of an agreement 

to further distribute, but evidence militating against such an 

agreement. 

Lastly, the majority points to a single instance in which 

Hamlin allowed Page to return a tainted bag of heroin, calling 

this a “sale on credit” and evidence that Page and Hamlin 

shared an interest in delivering high-quality heroin to Page’s 

customers. See ante, at 4, 16. The facts tell a different story. A 

sale on credit in the context of drug transactions involves supplying drugs without immediate payment, with the expectation of future payment after resale. Askew, 403 F.3d at 502, 504.

That didn’t happen here. Page had already paid for the heroin 

and was merely exchanging a defective product. This was no 

more a “sale on credit” than a consumer returning an item for 

a refund that must be used at the same store. The store already 

has the buyer’s money; it is willing to take back the product, 

but instead of supplying a refund in cash, it gives the buyer 

the chance to purchase something else. 

Crucially, this kind of transaction doesn’t necessarily indicate mutual trust or a shared interest in each other’s success 

the way that sales on credit might. There is no trust on the 

part of the seller who holds the buyer’s money in hand and 

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there is only negligible trust on the part of the buyer who, unless the seller goes out of business, will hold the product in 

hand too. No mutual trust is necessary—everyone comes out 

even. Indeed here, neither party needed to trust the other at 

all: Page cashed in his refund immediately, exchanging the 

bad batch of heroin for a better batch. So Hamlin never risked 

lost profits, and Page did not risk Hamlin shutting down 

shop. That is unlike a seller who allows a customer to obtain 

drugs on the promise of payment at a later date. See TorresRamirez, 213 F.3d at 982 (“Payment before delivery differs from 

delivery before payment, the ‘fronting’ transaction from 

which an inference of agreement may be drawn.” (emphasis 

added) (internal citations omitted)).

Ultimately, the evidence the majority relies on falls short 

of what we have required to rule out a buyer-seller instruction. Until today. 

II

Page’s Buyer-Seller Instruction Challenge

I now turn to the issue of the missing buyer-seller instruction. Page contends that the district court should have instructed the jury on the difference between a drug distribution conspiracy and a conventional buyer-seller relationship. 

Page did not, however, object to this omission at trial. That 

leaves us to review the issue for plain error. See United States 

v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993). We reverse a conviction under the plain error standard when (1) an error occurred; (2) it 

was plain; (3) it affected the defendant’s substantial rights; 

and (4) it seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public 

reputation of the judicial proceedings. See id. at 732. The 

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No. 21-3221 73 

majority concludes that no plain error occurred. I disagree. In 

the sections that follow, I address each part of the plain error 

test.

A 

There Was Error 

First, there was error. A defendant is entitled to an instruction if: (1) “the instruction represents an accurate statement of 

the law;” (2) “the instruction reflects a theory that is supported by the evidence;” (3) “the instruction reflects a theory 

which is not already part of the charge;” and (4) “the failure 

to include the instruction would deny the defendant a fair 

trial.” United States v. Walker, 746 F.3d 300, 307 (7th Cir. 2014) 

(cleaned); see also United States v. Douglas, 818 F.2d 1317, 1320–

21 (7th Cir. 1987). The first and third criteria are not in dispute. 

Page’s proposed instruction is faithful to the law and was not 

already part of the charge. The remaining criteria—the second 

and fourth—are whether the evidence at trial supported such 

an instruction and whether its absence compromised the fairness of the trial.

The second question asks whether the proposed buyerseller instruction reflects a buyer-seller theory that is supported by the evidence or, as Grimes also puts it, has “some 

foundation in the evidence, however tenuous.” United States 

v. Grimes, 413 F.2d 1376, 1378 (7th Cir. 1969) (citing United 

States v. Phillips, 217 F.2d 435, 442–43 (7th Cir. 1954)); see also 

United States v. Buchmeier, 255 F.3d 415, 427 (7th Cir. 2001) 

(holding that “[a] defendant’s theory of defense need only 

have ‘some foundation in the evidence, however tenuous,’” 

to require an instruction). “[W]here there is proof,” “[i]t is not 

the province ... of the trial court[] to appraise the 

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74 No. 21-3221 

reasonableness or unreasonableness of the evidence.” Phillips, 

217 F.2d at 442. “That is unnecessary, for in criminal cases the 

defendant is entitled to have presented instructions relating 

to a theory of defense for which there is any foundation in the 

evidence, even though the evidence may be weak, insufficient, inconsistent, or of doubtful credibility.” Id. at 443. 

Having examined the trial transcripts, I agree with Page 

that the theory that his involvement with Hamlin constituted 

a mere buyer-seller relationship, rather than that of coconspirators in a drug distribution conspiracy, has “some 

foundation in the evidence.” As discussed above in 

addressing Page’s sufficiency of the evidence challenge, when 

we accurately assess what the government and the majority 

insist are indicia of conspiracy, we see that not much at trial 

suggested a conspiracy beyond evidence showing Page 

repeatedly purchased distribution-sized quantities of heroin. 

And, again, that’s not enough.

As for the fourth question—whether the failure to include 

the instruction would deny the defendant a fair trial—we 

have answered “yes” where the evidence of the conspiracy 

was “far from overwhelming” and “the evidence could have 

been interpreted by the jury as indicating that the defendants 

were merely purchasers from the conspiracy.” Douglas, 818 

F.2d at 1322. 

For these reasons, the district court’s failure to give a 

buyer-seller instruction was error. The majority’s contrary 

conclusion rests on a faulty foundation. I make three observations about this below, the first being the longest. See post, at 

50–60 (discussing Page’s theories of defense), 60–61 (reprising 

discussion of repeat, distribution-quantity transactions), 61–

62 (discussing sua sponte instructions).

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No. 21-3221 75 

One, the majority contends that Page was not entitled to a 

buyer-seller instruction because it would have contravened 

Page’s theory of defense. This is because, the majority says, 

Page painted Hamlin as a liar and suggested that his meetings 

with Hamlin were innocent encounters between family 

friends. Page’s goal, the majority thinks, was to show that he 

was not involved in the drug trade at all, so that the jury 

would acquit him of both the drug distribution charges and 

the conspiracy charge—not just the latter. And because “we 

have repeatedly held that a buyer-seller instruction is unnecessary where the instruction would contradict the defendant’s 

theory of the case,” ante, at 19 (quoting United States v. Love, 

706 F.3d 832, 839 (7th Cir. 2013)), the majority opinion explains, Page’s claim of error fails.

The majority opinion misreads the facts and the law in two

ways. One, Page did advance the theory that he engaged in a 

buyer-seller relationship; so, a buyer-seller instruction would 

not have conflicted with Page’s defense theory. Two, while 

our consideration of whether a defendant put forth a buyerseller theory is relevant, it is not dispositive. Our inquiry into 

whether a buyer-seller theory has some foundation in the evidence extends beyond the defendant’s arguments to a holistic review of the record. I take each of these in turn.

Page did assert at trial that he engaged in a buyer-seller 

relationship. Recall that Page did not testify, so his defense 

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76 No. 21-3221 

theories would come through his counsel’s opening statement, cross-examinations, and closing argument.15

15 The majority states that “a party does not properly inject a defense 

into a criminal proceeding solely by introducing it during closing argument.” Ante, at 21. This analysis falters for three reasons.

One, it is irrelevant. Page did not raise the buyer-seller theory for the 

first time in closing argument; he introduced and developed the theory 

during cross-examination. See, e.g., Trial Tr. at 734:5–14.

Two, even if Page had introduced the buyer-seller theory for the first 

time during closing argument, the Supreme Court has made it clear that 

closing argument is counsel’s opportunity to synthesize the evidence and 

articulate the defense theory. See Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 861–62 

(1975). “It is only after all the evidence is in that counsel for the parties are 

in a position to present their respective versions of the case as a whole. 

Only then can they argue the inferences to be drawn from all the testimony 

....” Id. at 862 (describing “the opportunity finally to marshal the evidence 

for each side before submission of the case to judgment”). Far from being 

a procedural afterthought, closing argument is the moment when counsel 

“make[s] a proper argument on the evidence and the applicable law in his 

favor, however simple, clear, unimpeached, and conclusive the evidence 

may seem.” Id. at 860. Surely, the majority can appreciate the importance 

of closing argument, given its emphasis on the fact that, “through cross 

examination and closing argument, Page’s counsel spent considerable 

time painting Hamlin as a liar.” Ante, at 5. 

Three, the majority’s invocation of Rule 30 fares no better. The majority asserts that defendants cannot raise a theory for the first time during 

closing argument because, “[u]nder Rule 30, a party seeking an instruction 

‘must’ make its request ‘at the close of evidence or at any earlier time,’ and 

the court ‘must inform the parties before closing arguments how it intends 

to rule on the requested instructions.’” Ante, at 21 (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 

30(a)–(b)). But the reliance on Rules 30(a) and (b) is misplaced. These rules 

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No. 21-3221 77 

During closing, defense counsel argued that Page purchased controlled substances for personal use, although the 

evidence was contradictory, arguing “a [distribution] amount 

is whatever ... the government ... wants a [distribution] 

amount to be”—whether it be a quarter gram, a half gram, 

one gram, two grams, three grams, or more. Trial Tr. at 815:4–

17. And if “some heroin user” has two baggies in his pocket, 

defense counsel argued, the government will say even that is 

a distribution amount. Trial Tr. at 815:17–19. And if the heroin 

user says it is not (“that is my personal use amount”) the government will say “there was a lot found.” Trial Tr. at 815:17–

22. 

Defense counsel did not stop there, stating: 

apply to “requested instructions” made pursuant to Rule 30(a) and neither 

party requested a buyer-seller instruction here.

Rule 30(d), however, governs objections to jury instructions, including 

objections to a court’s failure to give an instruction. Rule 30(d) expressly 

permits objections to be raised before the jury retires to deliberate: “A 

party who objects to any portion of the instructions or to a failure to give 

a requested instruction must inform the court of the specific objection and 

the grounds for the objection before the jury retires to deliberate.” Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 30(d). This rule makes clear that omissions can—and should—be 

addressed even late in the trial process.

Rule 30(c) reinforces this point. As the Advisory Committee notes explain, Rule 30(c) allows the court to “instruct both before and after arguments, which assures that the court retains power to remedy omissions in 

pre-argument instructions or to add instructions necessitated by the arguments.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 30, advisory committee notes to 1987 amendments 

(emphasis added). This flexibility exists precisely to address situations like 

this one, where an omitted instruction becomes necessary in light of the 

evidence and closing arguments.

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78 No. 21-3221 

And I would counter that with there [are] individuals, and maybe somebody in our families, 

who like[] to go to Costco or Sam’s Club. And 

why is that? Because you can buy a large bulk 

material allegedly at a lower price.... [Y]ou go 

and buy in larger bulk, one, because it means 

you’re not going back and forth. You have what 

you want. And you can use it over time for what 

you want.

And do you know what else it provides for personal use people? Safety. Because every time 

you have to go out and purchase a drug from 

somebody, you’re putting yourself at risk. No 

matter the level of trust that you may have, 

you’re putting yourself at risk. And some addicts and personal use people don’t want to put 

themselves in that kind of risk where they have 

to go out every day or every other day or once a 

week, because that is the big risk you’re taking.

Trial Tr. at 815:23–816:13. A jury can interpret these arguments only one way: Page purchased controlled substances in 

bulk for personal use—not to distribute. It is clear that Page 

did assert a buyer-seller defense theory, making the buyerseller instruction fully consistent with his defense—not at 

odds with it, as the majority concludes.16

16 The majority contends that appellate counsel conceded at oral argument that trial counsel did not present a buyer-seller theory. I disagree. 

See Oral Argument at 22:15. And even if reasonable jurists could read 

counsel’s various remarks differently, any seeming concession was far 

from deliberate, clear, and unambiguous. See Robinson v. McNeil Consumer 

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No. 21-3221 79 

Perhaps the majority’s real concern is not that the buyerseller instruction would have contradicted Page’s defense theory, but rather that Page presented two defense theories that 

seem, at first glance, to be at odds. On one hand, Page claimed 

innocence, arguing that he did not buy or sell drugs and was 

thus not guilty of drug distribution. On the other, he claimed 

to be a mere buyer-seller, arguing that if he did buy drugs, it 

was solely for personal use or to sustain his own separate operation, not as part of a larger conspiracy and he therefore was 

not guilty of drug distribution conspiracy. I have two responses. First, these two theories are not inconsistent. Second, 

even if they were inconsistent, that would not nullify the need 

for a buyer-seller instruction.

Here’s why Page’s two defense theories were not inconsistent. By charging both drug distribution and drug distribution conspiracy, the government itself invited the jury to consider multiple possibilities. The government’s case-in-chief, 

through its witnesses and arguments, suggested that Page 

distributed drugs. Those same witnesses and arguments also 

suggested that Page conspired to do the same. When a defendant, as here, declines to testify and otherwise remains silent regarding the charges, he neither admits nor denies any 

specific crime. At the close of such a case, the jury must assess 

guilt or innocence on each charge after considering the distinct 

defenses applicable to each. In this context, trial counsel can 

argue that (1) the government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Page committed drug distribution; and (2) 

Healthcare, 615 F.3d 861, 872 (7th Cir. 2010) (explaining that, “in order to 

qualify as judicial admissions, an attorney’s statements must be deliberate, clear and unambiguous”).

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80 No. 21-3221 

even if the government proved Page bought drugs that Hamlin sold, the government did not prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that Page joined a conspiracy to further distribute the 

drugs he purchased from Hamlin. It then would fall to the 

jury to determine whether Page bought drugs that Hamlin 

sold and, if so, whether Page’s actions amount to mere drug 

purchases within a buyer-seller relationship or the intentional 

joining of a broader conspiratorial agreement. So, Page’s two 

defense theories are not inconsistent; they are merely gardenvariety alternative contentions and framing these alternative 

defenses is one way a defendant can respond to the government’s multi-faceted charges.

Here’s why, even if Page’s two defense theories were inconsistent, that inconsistency would not preclude a buyerseller instruction. The law does not require a defendant to 

concede guilt on a drug distribution charge to receive a buyerseller instruction on a related drug distribution conspiracy 

charge. Criminal defendants are entitled to assert inconsistent 

defenses at trial. See Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 65–

66 (1988) (permitting the inconsistent defenses of denial and

entrapment). This principle reflects a core tenet of modern 

criminal jurisprudence: a defendant is entitled to the full 

measure of constitutional protections when mounting a defense against prosecution. It underscores a commitment to 

limiting governmental overreach in criminal trials, ensuring 

that the burden of proof remains firmly on the government as 

to all charges. Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that the 

Due Process Clause requires the government to prove every 

element of every crime beyond a reasonable doubt); Taylor v. 

Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978) (emphasizing the presumption 

of innocence as a bedrock principle of American criminal law, 

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No. 21-3221 81 

and requiring explicit instructions to the jury to prevent implicit shifting of the burden of proof).

Even when two defenses appear inconsistent as to each 

other, an instruction on both theories is required if, as here, 

the law supports both theories and some foundation in the 

evidence provides a basis for their application—even if that 

evidence is “weak, insufficient, inconsistent, or of doubtful 

credibility.” Phillips, 217 F.2d at 443.17 This principle is especially important in drug cases, as the government often 

charges defendants with drug distribution and drug distribution conspiracy. In these cases, the government’s own evidence blurs the line between distribution and conspiracy, often presenting the same facts as equally suggestive of both. 

Yet, under the majority’s rule, any defendant who dares to 

defend himself against the drug distribution charge by claiming innocence when he is also charged with drug distribution 

conspiracy, must—as a matter of law—forfeit the opportunity 

to instruct the jury on his alternative buyer-seller defense. 

17 See also Eberhart, 467 F.3d at 666 (“A jury instruction [] does not have 

to completely track the defense presented; it need only represent ‘a theory 

that is supported by the evidence.’” (quoting Buchmeier, 255 F.3d at 426)); 

Douglas, 818 F.2d at 1318, 1321 (concluding that the defendant’s buyerseller theory was supported by the record despite “confusing and contradictory” evidence about the relationship between the co-conspirators and 

defendants, and about whether the drug amounts were distribution quantities or personal use quantities); United States v. Cruse, 805 F.3d 795, 815 

(7th Cir. 2015) (explaining that “the government’s understanding of [Love, 

Johnson, Askew, and Fort]” as holding that defendants who deny buying 

and selling drugs are barred from receiving a buyer-seller instruction as a 

categorical matter “is in tension with Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 

63–64 (1988), which holds that inconsistent defense theories are permissible”).

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This imposes an untenable burden on defendants and risks 

significant constitutional harm.

To be sure, a defendant who denies distributing drugs 

while simultaneously asserting a buyer-seller defense takes 

on significant strategic risks. But strategic calculations are for 

the defendant and jury to navigate; our responsibility is to ensure the jury is properly instructed on the law.

And still, our analysis of whether the buyer-seller theory 

has some foundation in the evidence does not end there. We 

have explained that whether a defendant brings forth a buyerseller theory is only one consideration. We also conduct a holistic review of the evidence, including the facts and arguments presented by the government, to make this determination. See Phillips, 217 F.2d at 440–41 (rejecting as clearly erroneous the argument that the government’s evidence can 

never entitle the defendant to a jury instruction).18

18 In Phillips, this court considered whether a defendant could rely 

“upon favorable testimony given by government’s witnesses” in presenting this defense or if “there must be testimony coming from his side of the 

case” “as a prerequisite to his right to such an instruction.” On this, we 

said: 

We think this was clearly an erroneous idea, the effect of 

which was to shift the burden of proof....

We think the government’s contention, apparently embraced by the trial court, that a defendant is not entitled 

to an instruction embodying a theory merely because it is 

predicated upon proof adduced by the government, is not 

the law....

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No. 21-3221 83 

Here, the government layered protracted testimony distinguishing personal use quantities from distribution quantities upon weak conspiratorial evidence, thereby carving out 

space for the jury to confuse conspiracy with a buyer-seller 

relationship. The government opened its case by telling the 

jury that Page purchased “distribution quantities” of heroin, 

ranging from over twelve grams up to fifty-six grams at a 

time, juxtaposing this amount against “user quantit[ies]” of 

heroin, ranging from 0.1 grams for beginners up to 0.5 grams 

for heavy users. Trial Tr. at 153:13–24. One government witness testified that forty-five grams (one of the amounts Page 

received from Hamlin) is “a larger quantity” of heroin: “It 

[T]he vital question from the time a plea of not guilty is 

entered until the return of the verdict, is whether upon all 

the evidence, by whatever side adduced, guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt.... 

[The government] then cites United States v. Phelps, 8 Cir., 

160 F.2d 858, 874, and Meyer v. United States, 7 Cir., 258 F. 

212, 216, for the proposition that a court will not instruct 

on ‘a defense not made by the defendant.’ These cases furnish no support for the contention. They hold nothing 

more than that the court will not instruct upon a theory 

unsupported by evidence. Certainly they do not indicate, 

even by inference, that the evidence must come from the 

defendant’s side of the case. 

217 F.2d at 440–41 (citations omitted); see also Askew, 403 F.3d at 504 (“[W]e 

must still review the evidence presented by the government to determine 

whether it was such that a jury could confuse a buyer-seller relationship 

with a conspiratorial one.”); Douglas, 818 F.2d at 1321 (explaining that, 

when determining whether a defendant’s theory of defense is supported 

by the evidence, the court “must [] analyze[] [the conspiracy case] according to its specific facts” and “consider whether the defendant has put forth 

the defense during trial”).

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84 No. 21-3221 

would not be for personal use. I believe 45 grams of heroin 

would be an amount that someone would purchase to sell to 

other people.” Trial Tr. at 408:7–12. And a different government witness took care to explain that a distribution quantity 

of heroin is sold in larger chunks held in sandwich, quart, or 

gallon-sized bags, while user quantities are sold in small bag 

corners called bindles. Trial Tr. at 724:23–726:6. 

The government also pushed back against the suggestion 

that Page purchased controlled substances for personal use. 

The government elicited testimony about things personal users commonly possess (e.g., straws, spoons, bindles, needles 

and other things “like that indicating ingestion”) in contrast 

to items distributors commonly possess (e.g., larger packaging materials, smaller packaging materials, scales, grinders, 

blenders, and adulterants). Trial Tr. at 726:7–22. Another government witness answered “no” again and again when asked 

during direct examination if he saw any needles, syringes, 

straws, rolled-up dollar bills, or burned aluminum foil in 

Page’s home. Trial Tr. at 349:16–350:1. He also found significant that Page never showed signs of being sick or told authorities he was going to be sick when taken into custody because, in “[the witness’s] experience in dealing with both heroin users and heroin distributors, ... heroin users will ... at 

some time say [] they’re going to be sick because they’re going 

to start withdrawing ....” Trial Tr. at 350:2–14. 

In short, the government repeatedly emphasized the volume of drugs Page purchased from Hamlin and indicators

that Page did not personally use drugs. The government did 

this to counter trial counsel’s argument that, to the extent 

Page was buying drugs from Hamlin, it was merely as a buyer 

rather than a partner in a distribution conspiracy. 

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No. 21-3221 85 

For these reasons, I conclude that the buyer-seller theory 

did have some foundation in the evidence.

Two, the majority contends that Page was not entitled to a 

buyer-seller instruction because, under our new law as established by today’s decision, evidence of repeat, distributionquantity transactions is sufficient to sustain a conspiracy conviction. Ante, at 14–15. This conclusion cannot stand for the 

reasons I outlined earlier in this dissent. See ante, at 51. 

Further, we have repeatedly held the opposite: “Our finding [] that [a] jury had sufficient evidence to convict [a defendant] on the conspiracy count does not automatically negate 

his claim that the judge committed plain error in failing to 

provide the jury with a buyer-seller instruction.” Askew, 403 

F.3d at 503; see also United States v. Gee, 226 F.3d 885, 894–96 

(7th Cir. 2000) (finding that the jury had sufficient evidence to 

convict on the conspiracy charge, but reversing for failure to 

give a buyer-seller instruction); Mims, 92 F.3d at 466 (finding 

ample evidence to support the conspiracy conviction, but reversing because the judge gave a flawed buyer-seller instruction). “‘[B]ecause the line between a conspiracy and a mere 

buyer-seller relationship is difficult to discern, district judges 

should instruct juries in appropriate situations on the distinction’ and ‘inform juries that repeated transactions do not constitute a conspiracy.’” Askew, 403 F.3d at 503 (quoting Gee, 226 

F.3d at 895); id. (citing Thomas, 150 F.3d at 745 (“[T]he jury 

should be told that agreement—the crime of conspiracy—cannot be equated with repeated transactions. This is the office of 

the buyer-seller instruction. It reminds juries that distribution 

of drugs is not itself conspiracy, although a history of transactions may be evidence of conspiracy.”)). 

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Three, the majority posits that a district court can never err 

“by not sua sponte instructing the jury on a potential defense, 

particularly when the defendant is represented by counsel,” 

framing the question as an “odd procedural” one. Ante, at 19. 

But this cannot be: it turns the plain error standard on its 

head.

The plain error standard exists precisely to address triallevel errors—whether by the court or counsel—that undermine a defendant’s constitutional rights in a way that warrants correction, even absent preservation. See Olano, 507 U.S. 

at 732–34. While appellate courts generally defer to counsel’s 

strategic decisions, the plain error doctrine acknowledges the 

reality that representation by counsel does not guarantee perfect safeguarding of a defendant’s rights. Trial counsel may 

fail to request a necessary instruction for a variety of reasons—mistake, inexperience, or even misguided strategy. The 

plain error standard ensures that, when an obvious legal error 

affects a defendant’s fundamental rights, courts may act to 

preserve the fairness and integrity of the judicial process.19

The majority’s rule that a district court never errs in failing 

to provide a sua sponte instruction when the defendant is represented categorically absolves the district court of responsibility for ensuring the jury is properly instructed and effectively eliminates appellate review for all unpreserved 

19 The concurrence “add[s] a few words about the relation between 

the party-presentation principle ... and plain-error review.” Ante, at 26

(internal citation omitted). Yet it nowhere acknowledges that plain error 

review is “an exception to the norm of party presentation.” Barrados-Zarate 

v. Barr, 981 F.3d 603, 605 (7th Cir. 2020). 

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No. 21-3221 87 

instructional errors, no matter how apparent or prejudicial 

the omission.20 This cannot be the law.

For these reasons, the district court’s failure to provide the 

buyer-seller instruction in this case was error. I now turn to 

the remaining steps of the plain error analysis.

B 

The Remainder of the Plain Error Test is Met 

The error was plain. The majority opinion explains that 

“[a]n error (had it existed) in not sua sponte instructing the 

jury on the buyer-seller defense would not have been plain. 

Page did not present this defense theory, and the evidence of 

conspiracy was very strong. Nothing about this record would 

have made it obvious to the district court that such an instruction was needed.” Ante, at 22. On all three fronts, the majority 

is wrong.

20 See Douglas, 818 F.2d at 1321 (holding that the district court plainly 

erred by not giving a buyer-seller instruction sua sponte, where the theory 

had “some foundation in the evidence,” and that without the instruction, 

the jury might have mistakenly believed that mere drug sales alone sufficed to establish a conspiracy); Gee, 226 F.3d at 895 (holding that the district court plainly erred and “should have sua sponte included a buyerseller instruction because it knew that the conspiracy evidence was 

weak”); id. (“[B]ecause the line between a conspiracy and a mere buyerseller relationship is difficult to discern, district judges should instruct juries in appropriate situations on the distinction.... The proffered evidence 

of a conspiracy was circumstantial and not overwhelming. The evidence 

was as consistent with a buyer-seller relationship as it was with a conspiracy. The instructions allowed the jury to make a guilty finding without 

determining whether the government had proved the existence of a conspiracy....”).

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As I explained previously, a buyer-seller theory had some 

foundation in the evidence, and the evidence of conspiracy 

was weak. Moreover, it should have been obvious to the district court. The district court’s comments at Page’s sentencing 

hearing make this point. The court emphasized the reach of 

Page’s drug distribution and the harm it caused. But even the 

court remarked that it did not believe—based on “[its] impression from the trial evidence”—that Page had accepted 

Hamlin’s offer to expand their businesses individually or collectively. Sent. Tr. at 40–41. For these reasons, I conclude that 

the district court’s error in not providing the buyer-seller instruction was plain.

The error affected Page’s substantial rights because “the 

failure of the jury to be initially instructed on the defendant[’s] theory of defense, where the evidence tying [him] to 

the larger conspiracy was tenuous, denie[s] [him] a fair trial.”

Douglas, 818 F.2d at 1322. 

And the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or 

public reputation of the judicial proceedings. Indeed, failure 

to provide the buyer-seller instruction allowed the jury to 

convict Page of conspiracy to distribute drugs based on evidence that pointed no more to conspiracy than to mere drug 

distribution. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 736. 

III

On United States v. Anderson

Before I conclude, I address United States v. Anderson, 99 

F.4th 1106 (7th Cir. 2024). The majority has taken the unusual 

step of criticizing a duly issued recent opinion of our court, 

rather than following the normal course of seeking to rehear 

en banc a case it believes a panel of our court wrongly 

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No. 21-3221 89 

decided. See ante, 22–23. I do not know why the majority 

spends so much of its time in an opinion about Royel Page’s 

case discussing Denny Anderson’s case. In any event, contrary to the majority’s complaints, Anderson properly applied 

the plain error standard. I now detour—as the majority has 

done—to explain why.

The issue in Anderson was whether Anderson’s 2001 conviction for aggravated assault could have been based on reckless conduct. At the time of his conviction, Florida appellate 

courts were split on whether aggravated assault included 

reckless conduct. 

The majority here suggests that this split precludes plain 

error, see ante, at 22–23, but the opposite is true. The Supreme 

Court requires a defendant like Anderson to present only one 

case showing that the statute applied to reckless conduct. See 

Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007) (outlining 

the realistic-probability test). Anderson did so—indeed, he 

pointed to two such cases. See LaValley v. Florida, 633 So. 2d 

1126, 1127–28 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Kelly v. Florida, 552 So. 

2d 206, 208 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989). It was thus plain error 

to rule that the statute never criminalized reckless conduct at 

the time of Anderson’s conviction when courts twice upheld 

convictions for aggravated assault based on reckless conduct.

The majority also says that no plain error could have occurred in Anderson because, in its view, the Florida Supreme 

Court and Eleventh Circuit ruled differently on the question 

presented in Anderson. See ante, at 23. This is wrong for two 

reasons. First, courts have found plain error even in the face 

of a circuit split. See In re Sealed Case, 573 F.3d 844, 851–52 

(D.C. Cir. 2009) (finding plain error despite circuit split because statute was clear); United States v. Salas, 889 F.3d 681, 

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90 No. 21-3221 

687 (10th Cir. 2018) (finding plain error despite circuit split 

because law was settled within the circuit). Second, neither 

the Florida Supreme Court nor the Eleventh Circuit ruled on 

the narrow state-law question presented in Anderson. In 2022, 

the Florida Supreme Court held that aggravated assault could 

not be based on reckless conduct. Somers v. United States, 

355 So. 3d 887, 888 (Fla. 2022). But that ruling said nothing 

about what Florida’s law meant before 2022. Then, relying on 

federal rules of statutory construction, the Eleventh Circuit 

held that Somers applied retroactively. Somers v. United States, 

66 F.4th 890 (11th Cir. 2023). But we must use Florida’s state

law, not federal law, to interpret Florida’s statutes. See Erie R. 

Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); Lexington Ins. Co. v. 

Rugg & Knopp, Inc., 165 F.3d 1087, 1093 (7th Cir. 1999). And as 

Anderson explained, under Florida law, the Florida Supreme 

Court’s interpretation of its aggravated-assault law was 

plainly not retroactive. See Florida v. Barnum, 921 So. 2d 513, 

528 (Fla. 2005); see also Anderson, 99 F.4th at 1111–12 (discussing Florida statutory interpretation). 

Finally, the majority appears to suggest that, because Anderson’s analysis involved several steps, its finding of plain error was wrong. But this court has not shied away from finding 

plain error when an analysis is complex, including when, as 

in Anderson, the court must use the categorical approach. See, 

e.g., United States v. Turner, 55 F.4th 1135, 1142–43 (7th Cir. 

2022) (determining on plain-error review that Illinois cocaine 

conviction was not a felony drug offense); United States v. 

Ruth, 966 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2020) (same); United States v. Garcia, 948 F.3d 789, 792–94 (7th Cir. 2020) (determining on plainerror review that Indiana marijuana conviction was not a felony drug offense); United States v. De La Torre, 940 F.3d 938, 

950–52 (7th Cir. 2019) (determining, on what the defendants 

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No. 21-3221 91 

there acknowledged was plain-error review, that Indiana 

methamphetamine conviction was not a felony drug offense); 

see also United States v. Hagen, 911 F.3d 891, 895–97 (finding 

plain error after complex five-part analysis). For these reasons, I disagree with the majority’s criticism of Anderson. 

IV 

Conclusion

The majority’s decision—not Colon, as the majority tells 

it—directly contravenes the Supreme Court’s holding in Direct Sales. Direct Sales does not stand for the proposition that 

repeat, large-quantity drug transactions alone suffice to sustain a drug distribution conspiracy conviction. Before Colon, 

after Colon, and even in our en banc decision in Lechuga, our 

precedent has faithfully adhered to Direct Sales’s clear call for 

intent to join the conspiracy as evidenced by informed and 

interested cooperation, stimulation, or instigation, even 

where a buyer and seller repeatedly transact in distributionquantities of drugs. The majority, unable to point to a single 

case from this court endorsing its interpretation or any compelling justification for overturning our precedent, nevertheless forges ahead with a new rule.

Likewise, the district court plainly erred by failing to provide sua sponte the buyer-seller instruction. The majority’s 

holding, that a district court cannot plainly err by failing to 

sua sponte give a buyer-seller instruction when a defendant 

does not request one, as well as the various other justifications 

offered by the majority to excuse the district court’s error, 

compound the problem and raise significant constitutional 

concerns.

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92 No. 21-3221 

Today’s decision departs from decades of precedent, and 

I cannot join it. A better course of action would be to suggest 

(not require) that district judges, when they hear evidence in 

or near equipoise, simply ask the parties: “If any party thinks 

a buyer-seller instruction would be appropriate, would you 

please let me know?” If the parties ask for the instruction, appeals like this one are unnecessary. If the parties decline the 

instruction, appeals like this one are waived. 

I respectfully dissent.

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