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Parties Involved:
Nicole English
Appellee
Marcus Deangelo Jones
Appellant

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

MARCUS DEANGELO JONES, a/k/a 

Marcus Deangelo Lee, 

 Petitioner - Appellant, 

v. 

NICOLE ENGLISH, Warden, USPLeavenworth, 

 Respondent - Appellee. 

No. 19-3188 

(D.C. No. 5:19-CV-03029-JWL) 

(D. Kan.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before MATHESON, BALDOCK, and KELLY, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Marcus Deangelo Jones, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the 

district court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2241. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.1

*

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

1

 A federal prisoner is not required to obtain a certificate of appealability to 

seek review of a district court’s denial of a habeas application under § 2241. 

Eldridge v. Berkebile, 791 F.3d 1239, 1241 (10th Cir. 2015). 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

June 9, 2020

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

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I. BACKGROUND 

Mr. Jones is currently serving an aggregate sentence of 327 months in prison 

for drug and firearm offenses. His projected release date based on good conduct time 

is January 17, 2024. In the interim, Mr. Jones wants to serve the remainder of his 

sentence in a Residential Reentry Center or Community Correction Center 

(“community confinement”). To that end, Mr. Jones made two requests to staff at the 

United States Penitentiary Leavenworth, Kansas (“Leavenworth”), to consider him 

for community confinement as a prerelease inmate under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c). 

Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) staff denied the requests as premature. 

Mr. Jones next filed a § 2241 habeas petition in the United States District 

Court for the District of Kansas. He alleged that “but for” Leavenworth staff’s 

reliance on “fabricated and false information” contained in a presentence 

investigative report (“PSR”), he would be eligible for “placement or consideration for 

the pre-parole/pre-release setting.” R. at 12. He asked the court to order 

Leavenworth staff to conduct an individualized review under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b). 

Mr. Jones further alleged that in 2018, while he was incarcerated in Missouri, 

BOP staff there relied on the “fabricated and inaccurate information” in the PSR to 

increase his security classification and transfer him to Leavenworth as retaliation for 

having filed numerous administrative complaints. R. at 10. According to Mr. Jones, 

the retaliation continued at Leavenworth when staff there also refused to change his 

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security classification.2

 Based on these allegations, Mr. Jones sought an order 

requiring Leavenworth staff to correct the alleged inaccurate information in the PSR. 

The district court found that Mr. Jones’s request for the court to order the BOP 

to consider him for community confinement as a prerelease inmate was not ripe due 

to the length of time remaining on his sentence. The court also found that, because 

Mr. Jones had not asked for consideration as a non-prerelease inmate, it would not 

order BOP staff to undertake such a review. Further, the court held that Mr. Jones 

could not properly bring claims in a § 2241 petition for retaliation or to correct his 

PSR and therefore dismissed them. Finally, the court denied Mr. Jones’s request for 

an evidentiary hearing and discovery. 

II. DISCUSSION 

A. Standard of Review

Because Mr. Jones is proceeding pro se, we liberally construe his filings. See 

Garza v. Davis, 596 F.3d 1198, 1201 n.2 (10th Cir. 2010). 

“When reviewing the denial of a habeas petition under § 2241, we review the 

district court’s legal conclusions de novo and accept its factual findings unless 

clearly erroneous.” al-Marri v. Davis, 714 F.3d 1183, 1186 (10th Cir. 2013). We are 

2

 While Mr. Jones’s petition was pending, his security classification was 

changed, and he was transferred from Leavenworth to a low-security facility in 

Arkansas. The district court determined that the transfer did not divest the court of 

jurisdiction. We agree. See Santillanes v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 754 F.2d 887, 888 

(10th Cir. 1985) (“It is well established that jurisdiction attaches on the initial filing 

for habeas corpus relief, and it is not destroyed by a transfer of the petitioner and the 

accompanying custodial change.”). 

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free to affirm the denial of habeas relief under § 2241 “on any ground for which there 

is a sufficient record to permit conclusions of law.” Grossman v. Bruce, 

447 F.3d 801, 805 n.2 (10th Cir. 2006). 

Our review of the decision to deny an evidentiary hearing or discovery is for 

an abuse of discretion. See Anderson v. Att’y Gen. of Kan., 425 F.3d 853, 858 

(10th Cir. 2005) (evidentiary hearing); Curtis v. Chester, 626 F.3d 540, 549 

(10th Cir. 2010) (discovery). 

B. Legal Background 

1. Habeas Relief 

A proper § 2241 petition challenges “the fact or duration of a prisoner’s 

confinement and seeks the remedy of immediate release or a shortened period of 

confinement.” McIntosh v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 115 F.3d 809, 812 (10th Cir. 1997) 

(quotations omitted). Although transfer to community confinement affects the 

conditions of confinement—not its duration—we have recognized that petitions 

seeking review of whether BOP staff followed the law in evaluating an inmate for 

community confinement may be brought in a § 2241 habeas petition. See Wedelstedt 

v. Wiley, 477 F.3d 1160, 1168-69 (10th Cir. 2007) (affirming grant of habeas relief 

under § 2241 requiring staff to consider factors in 18 U.S.C. 3621(b) to evaluate 

transfer to community confinement). Otherwise, “a prisoner who challenges the 

conditions of his confinement must do so through a civil rights action.” PalmaSalazar v. Davis, 677 F.3d 1031, 1035 (10th Cir. 2012). 

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2. Community Confinement

a. Statutory framework 

Two statutes govern BOP’s authority to place a prisoner in community 

confinement, namely 18 U.S.C. §§ 3624(c) and 3621(b). 

Before 2007, a prisoner’s assignment to community confinement could not 

exceed the last six months of his sentence. But in the Second Chance Act (“SCA”), 

enacted in 2007, Congress granted BOP the discretion to place soon-to-be released 

inmates into community confinement for up to twelve months: “The [staff] shall, to 

the extent practicable, ensure that a prisoner . . . spends a portion of the final months 

of that term (not to exceed 12 months), under conditions that will afford that prisoner 

a reasonable opportunity to adjust to and prepare for . . . reentry. . . into the 

community.” § 3624(c)(1). Those “conditions . . . include a community correction 

facility.” Id.3

 

To effectuate its additional discretion to place an inmate in community 

confinement for up to twelve months prior to his release, the BOP issued two 

memoranda. The first, issued in April 2008, addressed prerelease inmates and 

instructed staff “to review inmates for pre-release placements at an earlier time., e.g., 

seventeen to nineteen months before their projected release dates, and to consider 

3 See also 28 C.F.R. § 570.21(a) (2009) (“Inmates may be designated to 

community confinement as a condition of pre-release custody and programming 

during the final months of the inmate’s term of imprisonment, not to exceed twelve 

months.”). 

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pre-release inmates on an individual basis using the five factors from . . . § 3621(b).”

4

 Garza, 596 F.3d at 1198, 1202-03. 

The second memorandum, issued in November 2008, “addressed inmate 

requests for [immediate] transfer to [community confinement] when more than 

twelve months remained from their projected release date (that is, non-pre-release 

inmates).” Id. at 1203 (emphasis added). “[T[he memorandum instructed staff that 

they could not automatically deny a non-pre-release inmate’s request for pre-release 

transfer, but must give each request individualized consideration.” Id. “However, if 

an inmate were to request transfer prior to the pre-release time frame of twelve 

months, although staff must individually consider the request [using the five factors 

in § 3621(b)], they were instructed that there was no need to perform immediately the 

statutorily prescribed individualized review,” id. (quotations and citation omitted). 

Rather, staff were instructed to inform the inmate “that the request would be fully 

reviewed in conjunction with the next scheduled Program Review,” id. 

C. Analysis 

1. Prerelease Consideration under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c) 

Under the BOP’s first memorandum, staff are not obligated to review requests 

for prerelease community confinement under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c) until seventeen to 

4

 The five factors are: (1) the resources of the facility; (2) the nature and 

surrounding circumstances of the prisoner’s criminal offense; (3) the prisoner’s 

history and characteristics; (4) any relevant statements by the sentencing court 

concerning the sentence and type of facility, and (5) any relevant policy of the 

Sentencing Commission. See 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b). 

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nineteen months before an inmate’s projected release date. Because Mr. Jones’s 

projected release date is January 17, 2024, Leavenworth staff were not required to 

review his request. We agree with the district court’s dismissal of Mr. Jones’s claim 

as not ripe. 

“We review the issue of ripeness de novo.” United States v. Cabral, 926 F.3d 

687, 693 (10th Cir. 2019) (quotations omitted). “The purpose of the ripeness 

doctrine is to prevent the premature adjudication of abstract claims.” Id. (quotations 

omitted). Particularly applicable here, “[t]he doctrine of ripeness prevents courts 

from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, 

while also protecting the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative 

decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging 

parties.” S. Utah Wilderness All. v. Palma, 707 F.3d 1143, 1158 (10th Cir. 2013) 

(brackets and quotations omitted). “In evaluating ripeness the central focus is on 

whether the case involves uncertain or contingent future events that may not occur as 

anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” Id. (quotations omitted). 

Mr. Jones makes no argument that he was a prerelease inmate when he made 

his requests, nor could he, because his projected release date is not until January 

2024. His claim was not ripe for adjudication. See id. 

2. Non-Prerelease Consideration under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) 

The district court also refused to order Leavenworth staff to undertake an 

individualized assessment of whether Mr. Jones should be considered for a transfer to 

community confinement as a non-prerelease inmate “[b]ecause it is not clear from the 

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record that [Mr. Jones] has made [such] a request.” R. at 317. If Mr. Jones “intends 

to [do so], he should specify that he is seeking an immediate transfer as opposed to 

pre-release consideration.” Id. And, “[i]f [he] makes such a request, he would be 

entitled to receive individualized consideration under § 3621(b) at his next scheduled 

review Program Review.” Id. 

We have reviewed the record de novo and agree that Mr. Jones did not request 

consideration as a non-prerelease inmate. According to Mr. Jones, following his 

March 2018 transfer to Leavenworth, he “filed an administrative remedy request[] 

[c]oncerning the inaccuracy of the information relied on” to make the transfer 

decision. Aplt. Opening Br. at 2f. In response, Warden Nicole English scheduled a 

review of the transfer decision. While the transfer review was pending, Mr. Jones 

“submitted a [separate] request to [Leavenworth] Unit Manager John Johnson, that he 

make the appropriate corrections [to his file] and [then] consider [his] circumstances 

for [community confinement] or other appropriate placement in Re-Entry pursuant to 

18 U.S.C. § 3624(c).” Id. As grounds for the review, Mr. Jones noted that he was 

“fastly [sic] approaching the [end of his] total sentence.” R. at 26. His request was 

denied. 

Next, in February 2019, Mr. Jones made another request to staff to be 

considered for community confinement, and “was again informed that nothing would 

be changed [in his file] and [he] would be considered for [community confinement] 

19 to 17 months from [his] release.” Id. at 125. Leavenworth staff plainly 

understood Mr. Jones to be making a prerelease-inmate request because the request 

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invoked the seventeen-to-nineteen-month review period. Moreover, nothing in the 

record shows that Mr. Jones informed staff that they had misinterpreted the request. 

Because the record does not show that Mr. Jones made a request for 

consideration as a non-prerelease inmate, the district court properly dismissed the 

claim. See Palma, 707 F.3d at 1158. 

3. Retaliation

Mr. Jones’s retaliation claim was based on events that began in February 2018, 

while he was an inmate in Missouri. In his petition, he alleged he was told during his 

team review that “because of [his] repeated filing of administrative remedies against 

staff, [he] will not be considered for Pre-Release/Community Correction although 

[he] is within 19 months” of his projected release date,5

 and Missouri staff then 

proceeded to increase his “Offense Severity [to] Greatest Severity,” which changed 

his custody level and resulted in his transfer to Leavenworth. R. at 124. Mr. Jones 

further alleged that the retaliation continued at Leavenworth through the actions of 

Unit Manager Johnson, who told him “that he [had] spoke[n] with staff [in Missouri] 

and [he] . . . was not going to change anything [even if Mr. Jones was] right.” Aplt. 

Opening Br. at 2g (quotations omitted). 

The district court dismissed Mr. Jones’s retaliation claim as not properly raised 

in a § 2241 petition because it concerned the conditions of his confinement—where 

he should serve his sentence. See Palma-Salazar, 677 F.3d at 1035. We will not 

5

 Mr. Jones was not within seventeen to nineteen months of his projected 

release date. 

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consider the issue because Mr. Jones has failed to adequately brief it on appeal. See 

Holmes v. Colo. Coal. for Homeless Long Term Disability Plan, 762 F.3d 1195, 1199 

(10th Cir. 2014) (declining to consider arguments on appeal that were inadequately 

briefed); Murrell v. Shalala, 43 F.3d 1388, 1389 n.2 (10th Cir. 1994) (declining to 

consider “a few scattered statements” and “perfunctory” arguments that failed to 

develop an issue). 

4. Correction to the Central File 

The United States Probation Office (“USPO”) prepared two PSRs in 

connection with Mr. Jones’s sentencing. These PSRs are part of Mr. Jones’s central 

file at BOP and used by the staff to review information about his offenses and to 

assist with his programming needs. According to Mr. Jones, one of his PSRs 

contains inaccuracies. He asked the district court to order staff to correct the 

“inaccurate” information. 

 The district court found that only the USPO can correct inaccuracies in an 

inmate’s PSR—not BOP staff—and in any event, the claim was not properly raised in 

a § 2241 petition because it did not seek the remedy of immediate release or a 

shortened period of confinement. See McIntosh, 115 F.3d at 812. Again, Mr. Jones 

has failed to adequately brief the issue. We thus will not consider it on appeal. See 

Holmes, 762 F.3d at 1199; Murrell, 43 F.3d at 1389 n.2. 

D. Evidentiary Hearing and Discovery 

“District courts are not required to hold evidentiary hearings in collateral 

attacks without a firm idea of what the testimony will encompass and how it will 

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support a movant’s claim.” United States v. Cervini, 379 F.3d 987, 994, (10th Cir. 

2004). Nor is “[a] habeas petitioner . . . entitled to discovery as a matter of ordinary 

course,” Curtis, 626 F.3d at 549 (quotations omitted). Instead, discovery is 

appropriate only when a petitioner “set[s] forth good reason to believe he may be 

able to demonstrate he is entitled to relief,” id. (quotations omitted). 

 Because Mr. Jones was not entitled to relief, and because he has not otherwise 

shown that the district court abused its decision, we affirm the denial of both 

requests. 

III. CONCLUSION 

 We affirm the district court’s judgment. We deny Mr. Jones’s motion to 

expedite his appeal as moot. 

Entered for the Court 

Scott M. Matheson, Jr. 

Circuit Judge 

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