Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-akd-3_20-cv-00301/USCOURTS-akd-3_20-cv-00301-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Steven E. Childers
Defendant
Kelsey Howell
Plaintiff
Municipality of Anchorage
Defendant
Luis Soto
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA 

KELSEY HOWELL, as Personal 

Representative for the Estate of Dan 

Demott, Jr., 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE, et 

al., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 3:20-cv-00301-SLG 

DECISION AND ORDER 

This matter came before the Court for a four-day bench trial from March 18 

to 21, 2024. The Court heard the testimony of nine witnesses, and the parties 

submitted exhibits. At the conclusion of trial, the Court requested supplemental 

briefing. Plaintiff Kelsey Howell filed Plaintiff’s Closing Argument Brief Regarding 

Qualified Immunity on April 4, 2024, at Docket 94; and Plaintiff’s Errata to Closing 

Argument Brief Re Qualified Immunity on April 5, 2024, at Docket 95. Defendants 

filed Municipal Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s Post-Trial Brief Re Qualified 

Immunity on April 11, 2024, at Docket 96. Based on the foregoing, and the record 

as a whole in this case, the Court now enters the following Findings of Fact and 

Conclusions of Law.1

1 See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(1) (“In an action tried on the facts without a jury . . . 

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FINDINGS OF FACT 

The Court finds the following facts by a preponderance of the evidence, 

unless otherwise specified: 

1. Plaintiff Kelsey Howell is the daughter of Dan Demott, Jr. and 

is the personal representative of the Estate of Dan Demott, Jr. 

2. On November 18, 2018, Plaintiff and her father got in an 

argument because Demott touched Howell’s baby’s face. 

Howell did not want Demott touching her baby’s face because 

his hands were dirty. 

3. Demott got “really angry,” and “cornered” Howell. Howell put 

her hand in front of her face for fear that Demott would hit her. 

4. At approximately 6:30 p.m., Howell called 911 and informed the 

dispatcher that Demott was “crazy,” barricading the front door, 

“ripping the curtains down,” and experiencing delusions that the 

police were watching him. She also told the dispatcher that 

Demott needed to go to Alaska Psychiatric Institute (“API”). 

Howell told the dispatcher that Demott had been diagnosed with 

bipolar disorder and manic depression, that he had been to API 

before, and that he was refusing to take his medication. She 

the court must find the facts specially and state its conclusions of law separately.”). . 

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also warned the dispatcher that Demott may not cooperate with 

the police because he had attacked the police on one prior 

occasion approximately four or five years prior.

5. When the police arrived, officers observed Demott through a 

window with a sword and what they initially thought was a rifle, 

although officers later stated that they were “confident it[] [was] 

a BB gun.” Howell was able to safely exit the residence with 

her children. Howell’s brother, Justin Charlie, was also outside 

the residence. A man named Michael Girardin, however, 

remained inside the residence with Demott. Girardin was 

homeless, and Demott had previously offered to let him stay at 

the residence in exchange for mechanical help. 

6. At approximately 7:30 p.m., Charlie informed the police that his 

father had a sword and a BB gun. In addition, Charlie informed 

officers that there was a .22 rifle and a .22 handgun locked in a 

safe inside the residence, but Charlie said that his father had 

lost the key to the safe and likely would not be able to find it 

because the residence was extremely messy. Charlie also told 

the officers that the residence did not have a landline or Wi-Fi 

and that Demott did not have a cell phone. At approximately 

7:40 p.m., the Computer Aided Dispatch (“CAD”) entry states 

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that the police began making several announcements to the 

residence. 

7. The police obtained a search warrant of the residence and an 

arrest warrant for Demott. The arrest warrant charged Demott 

with three violations of municipal law. First, Demott was 

charged with “Assault-Fear of Imminent Injury” because “by 

words or other conduct, [he] recklessly place[d] . . . [Howell] in 

fear of imminent physical injury” in violation of Anchorage 

Municipal Code 8.10.010(B)(3). Second, he was charged with

“Crim[inal] Mischief 5 – Property damage” because he 

”recklessly or intentionally injure[d] or destroy[ed] . . . real or 

personal property” in violation of Anchorage Municipal Code 

8.20.010(A)(6). Third, he was charged with delaying or 

obstructing his arrest by barricading himself inside his home in 

violation of Anchorage Municipal Code 8.30.010(A)(3). The 

warrant classified the event as a domestic violence incident.

8. At approximately 8:20 p.m., a Special Weapons and Tactics 

(SWAT) team began to arrive at the scene. Both of the 

individual Defendants in this case were part of this SWAT team 

and arrived at that time. Defendant Luis Soto was a sergeant 

at the time whose role was to “coordinate and supervise the 

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tactics implemented by SWAT.” However, Soto did not oversee 

SWAT’s implementation of any tactics until they were approved 

and directed by the SWAT commander. Soto remained at the 

command center, which was located a few blocks away from 

the Demott residence, throughout the entire incident and did not 

personally make any loudspeaker announcements, fire 

projectiles, or deploy chemical agents.

9. Defendant Steven Childers was a sergeant at the time of the 

events described in this lawsuit. He was the designated arrest 

team/entry team leader, meaning that he was to guide and 

control the actual arrest of the suspect as safely as possible if 

they exited. However, he did not make the decisions as to 

which SWAT tactics to use or when to use them. Like Soto, 

Childers did not personally make any of the announcements or 

deploy projectiles; however, Childres did introduce chemical 

agents into the residence.

10. Both of the individual Defendants in this case acted under color 

of state law at all relevant times. 

11. When the SWAT team arrived, the patrol officers told the 

SWAT team about the potential rifle in the home and told the 

SWAT team that Demott was not threatening them with the 

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weapon. 

12. Over the next several hours, the SWAT team made dozens of 

announcements via a loudspeaker, repeatedly identifying 

themselves as the Anchorage Police Department (“APD”). The 

announcements also repeatedly informed Demott that there 

was a warrant for his arrest and a search warrant for his 

residence; commanded both Demott and Girardin to leave the 

residence; and warned that the SWAT team would use force 

against Demott, including tasers, direct impact munitions, gas, 

and K9s. In addition to the announcements, a high pitched 

siren was used. 

13. At no time was the loudspeaker used to try to negotiate with 

Demott or Girardin, or to try to address Demott’s mental health 

needs, or to serve as a means for family or friends of Demott 

to communicate with him. The Crisis Intervention team 

members that were at the incident did not make any 

announcements over the loudspeaker at any time. 

14. Just before 11:00 p.m., the SWAT team deployed baton 

rounds and “knock-knocks.” Knock-knocks are foam 

projectiles that are deployed against the structure in order to 

gain the attention of the suspect. The baton rounds were used 

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to break a large window by the front door. The SWAT team 

then made more announcements and, after receiving no 

response, deployed additional projectiles at the main entrance 

door and garage man door as agitation. According to the CAD

report, an officer saw Demott at a window just after the second 

deployment at approximately 11:00 p.m.; this was the last time 

that Demott was reportedly seen alive. There is no indication 

that Demott had a firearm at that time; he was noted to have 

moved away from the window at that time. Shortly after 11:30 

p.m., there was a report of loud banging coming from inside 

the residence.

15. Minutes later, at 11:36 p.m., the SWAT team deployed its first 

round of chemical agents into the residence. These were 

projected inside the residence and into the attached garage, 

with the intent being to create an irritant strong enough to 

cause the barricaded suspect to exit the structure. Childers 

successfully deployed a baffled Carbon Monosulfide (CS) 

grenade through the window near the main entrance door. 

16. Minutes after the first round of chemical agents was deployed, 

Girardin exited the residence. He had not been harmed by 

Demott.

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17. Shortly after Girardin left the residence, Childers deployed 

another Tri-chamber CS grenade into the garage because his

first attempt had deflected off a window. This additional CS 

grenade was deployed less than 20 minutes after Girardin had 

left the home. It appears from the CAD report that at least one 

other SWAT team member deployed additional CS gas into the 

home at that time.2 

18. Girardin spoke to at least two officers after he left the home 

about what had happened inside the residence. His reports 

had some inconsistencies. For example, Girardin informed the 

officers that he did not hear the officers calling his name 

because he had taken a couple of Dayquil pills. However, he 

also said that he did not leave the residence because Demott 

threatened to shoot him if he left. But he also told the police 

that he did not see any weapons in the home, except that he 

knew that Demott had BB guns and that when the police broke 

the windows, Demott had two swords but then dropped them. 

Girardin further told police that Demott was experiencing a 

Vietnam flashback. Additionally, Girardin informed the police 

2 See Ex. P-1 at 23:55. The CAD also reflects that some of the SWAT team had stopped shooting 

the gas into the house because “someone came out” of the residence. Ex. P-1 at 23:52:26. 

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that he believed that Demott was going into the crawl space. 

Girardin also told the officers that Demott had encouraged 

Girardin to get in to the crawl space, which Demott referred to 

as a “bunker,” but Girardin had declined to do so because it 

was too cold in the crawl space. 

19. Six more rounds of CS gas were deployed into the garage and 

the house, but not into the crawl space, at 12:43 a.m., 

approximately one hour after Girardin had left the residence. 

A robot sent into the house soon after did not detect any 

movement, although the robot’s mobility was impeded by stuff 

on the floor. 

20. At 1:28 a.m., the SWAT team initiated another six rounds of 

CS gas into the residence; this gas was deployed into the 

crawl space. 

21. At some point after 2:00 a.m., the SWAT team decided to enter 

the residence. Childers was one of the SWAT team officers 

who entered the residence. The SWAT team looked for 

Demott using a robot, a K-9 police dog, and a pole-cam. 

22. The SWAT team found Demott’s body submerged in water 

inside the crawl space at approximately 4:15 a.m. According 

to the autopsy report, Demott died from either hypothermia or 

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drowning. The ambient air temperature at that time was 15 

degrees Fahrenheit. Demott had “abrasions and contusions of 

flexor surfaces of extremities and on trunk,” but the report 

concluded that the “trauma [was] insignificant to cause death.” 

His death was classified as an accident.3

23. On November 4, 2020, Howell, in her capacity as personal 

representative of Dan Demott, initiated this action in Alaska 

state court. With respect to Soto and Childers, Howell brings 

a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that these 

Defendants used excessive force when attempting to arrest 

Demott, in violation of Demott’s Fourth Amendment right under 

the United States Constitution to be free from unreasonable 

seizure.4 Howell’s Complaint also pleads a state law 

negligence claim for failure to exercise reasonable care and 

failure to use reasonable de-escalation techniques when 

executing the arrest warrant, which is in essence an excessive 

force claim.5 

24. With respect to the Municipality, the Court previously granted 

3 Exhibit P-40. 

4 Docket 4 at 12, ¶¶ 67–68.

5 Docket 4 at 11, ¶¶ 57, 59–62. 

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summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim that the Municipality is 

vicariously liable for the violation of Demott’s Fourth 

Amendment right under the United States Constitution. The 

Court previously granted summary judgment to the 

Municipality on Plaintiff’s Section 1983 failure to train and 

supervise claim.6

25. The Court also granted summary judgment to all Defendants 

for any claims arising under the Alaska Constitution.7 Howell’s 

Complaint also contends that the Municipality is vicariously 

liable for the negligence of its employees and directly liable for 

inadequately training or supervising its employees.8 

26. Soto and Childers participated in the planning and execution 

of the use of force. Soto coordinated and supervised the 

SWAT team’s tactics so they were done in accordance with 

APD policies and procedures after they were approved and 

directed by the SWAT commander. And Childers deployed 

chemical agents and did not object to their use by others. The 

Court therefore concludes that both Soto and Childers can be 

6 Docket 46 at 61.

7 Docket 46 at 61. 

8 Docket 4 at 11, ¶ 55; 13, ¶ 76.

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held liable under the integral-participant doctrine. 

27. In this case, APD was responding to Howell’s report that she 

feared an imminent assault by her father—a form of domestic 

violence. The Ninth Circuit has recognized that “[w]hen 

officers respond to a domestic abuse call, they understand that 

violence may be lurking and explode with little warning. 

Indeed, more officers are killed or injured on domestic violence 

calls than on any other type of call.”9 Additionally, Alaska law 

provides that “[a] peace officer, with or without a warrant, shall 

arrest a person if the officer has probable cause to believe the 

person has, either in or outside the presence of the officer, 

within the previous 12 hours . . . committed domestic violence 

. . . whether the crime is a felony or a misdemeanor.”10 

Because there was probable cause to believe that Demott had 

committed a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, 

Childers and Soto were attempting to effectuate a mandatory 

arrest under Alaska law. 

28. The Ninth Circuit has also observed, however, that “the 

9 Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 450 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Martinez, 406 

F.3d 1160, 1164 (9th Cir. 2005)).

10 Alaska Stat. § 18.65.530(a)(1) (emphasis added). 

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legitimate escalation of an officer’s ‘concern[] about his or her 

safety’ is less salient ‘when the domestic dispute is seemingly 

over by the time the officers begin their investigation.’”11 Here, 

Howell and her children had already left the house by the time 

the SWAT team arrived and the incident that led to the 

warrants’ issuance had ended several hours before the SWAT 

team used the chemical agents, less lethal rounds, and knockknocks at the residence. Accordingly, the severity of the crime 

had substantially abated when that force was applied. 

29. When police officers first arrived at the scene, they were 

concerned that Demott had a rifle; but by 7:34 p.m., they were 

“confident” it was “a BB gun.” One police officer reported 

hearing Demott say he “would shoot us through [the] window,” 

but the officer confirmed that “no gun [was] seen.” Police 

officers were also aware that Demott had access to a sword. 

30. Early on in the incident, Charlie informed the police officers that 

that there was a .22 rifle and a .22 handgun locked in a safe in 

the home, but he also said that Demott likely would not be able 

to access these weapons because Demott had lost the key and

11 George v. Morris, 736 F.3d 829, 839 (9th Cir. 2013) (alterations in original) (quoting Mattos, 661 

F.3d at 450).

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his home was extremely messy. Indeed, at 7:34 p.m., the CAD 

reported that “real rifles in [the] res[idence] should be in [the] 

safe” and that “he does not have [the] key.”12 And while the 

passage of time may have increased the risk that Demott 

would locate the key to the safe,13 when Girardin left the 

residence at 11:30 p.m., he informed the officers that he had 

not seen any firearms in the residence that evening.

31. Police officers were also aware that Demott had some history 

of violence. For example, Howell informed the police officers 

that Demott had attacked police officers once four or five years 

prior, although she did not provide any details about that 

incident. Howell also informed police officers that Demott had 

hit Howell one time in the past but indicated it was gently and 

with a toy sword. 

32. Although the SWAT team made at least 50 announcements 

over the loudspeaker commanding the men to exit the home 

and warning them that lethal and nonlethal force could be used 

12 Exhibit P-1 at 2. 

13 Cf. Alford v. Humboldt Cnty., 785 F. Supp. 2d 867, 877 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (“The passage of time 

increased [the decedent’s] opportunity to find the rifle ammunition, which was not in a safe, and 

to locate the other high-powered weapons and ammunition, and figure out a way to unlock the 

safe they were in.”).

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against them, the SWAT team did not try to negotiate with 

Demott or take any action that took into account Demott’s 

mental health issues. 

33. When the SWAT team deployed the less lethal rounds and the 

first round of tear gas, Girardin was still in the house with 

Demott, increasing the nature of the threat at that time because 

of the potential hostage situation.14 At this point in time, this 

Graham factor suggests that the use of force was reasonable. 

But after Girardin had exited the residence safely, the nature 

of the threat that Demott posed to others substantially 

decreased, as the SWAT team was no longer responding to a 

potential hostage situation.15 And Girardin informed the SWAT 

team that Demott was experiencing Vietnam flashbacks, did 

not have weapons, and was retreating to the crawl space.16 

Accordingly, the SWAT team was then made aware that 

Demott was an unarmed man experiencing a mental health 

14 Compare Lock v. Jenkins, 641 F.2d 488, 496 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding that the use of tear gas 

was not unjustified following the taking hostage of a prison warden and several others), with Est. 

of Escobedo v. Bender, 600 F.3d 770, 782–84 (7th Cir. 2010) (Escobedo I) (holding that the law 

was clearly established that the use of tear gas against an armed suicidal man barricaded in his 

apartment violated the Fourth Amendment because, among other reasons, the man was not 

holding hostages).

15 See Escobedo I, 600 F.3d at 780–81.

16 Docket 25-1 at 21; Docket 36 at 9; Docket 36-12 at 8. 

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crisis who was refusing to leave his house. This Graham

factor, therefore, tips strongly against the reasonableness of 

the use of force after Girardin’s exit. 

34. The Court next considers the fact that Demott was resisting 

arrest insofar as he was refusing to leave his home despite 

repeated orders to do so.17 Throughout the entire incident, 

Demott remained in his residence, a location that prevented 

immediate law enforcement access, and refused to follow 

numerous commands to exit. 

35. When Howell first called 911, she informed the dispatcher that 

her father had barricaded the front door with plywood, although 

she also said that she thought she could take it down. In any 

event, Howell was able to promptly leave the residence by 7:15 

p.m. That being said, when Girardin exited the residence, he 

informed the SWAT team that Demott had the front entryway 

barricaded well with anything and everything that he could use. 

36. The SWAT team had time on its side because it had up to 12 

17 See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8–

9 (1985)); Lombardo v. City of St. Louis, 594 U.S. 464, 467 (quoting Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 

U.S. 389, 397 (2015)) (holding that courts should consider “whether the plaintiff was actively 

resisting”).

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hours to effectuate a mandatory arrest.18 This was not a case 

in which the police officers were “forced to make split-second 

judgments” in a circumstance that was “tense, uncertain, and 

rapidly evolving.”19 Police officers arrived on the scene at 

approximately 6:45 p.m, and Girardin left the residence shortly 

after the first round of chemical agents were deployed, at 11:36 

p.m. 

37. Although the officers waited several hours before using 

intermediate non-lethal force against Demott, they did not 

appear to have taken advantage of this time to pursue any 

strategies to address Demott’s mental health crisis but simply 

continued to make the same announcements over the 

loudspeaker system that went unheeded. Hence, the Court 

finds that while Demott was resisting arrest, he was not

physically struggling with or threatening the officers; rather, he 

was trying to disengage from them. In sum, the Court 

concludes that Demott was passively, rather than actively, 

resisting arrest, such that this Graham factor is neutral. 

38. “The gravity of the particular intrusion that a given use of force 

18 Alaska Stat. § 18.65.530(a)(1).

19 Tekle v. United States, 511 F.3d 839, 847 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). 

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imposes upon an individual’s liberty interest is measured with 

reference to ‘the type and amount of force inflicted.’”20 When 

the SWAT team deployed less lethal rounds and tear gas while 

Girardin remained in the residence, the SWAT team could 

reasonably have been of the view that Girardin’s life was at 

risk. But once Girardin exited the house unharmed by Demott, 

there did not appear to be any innocent members of the public 

who were then at risk of harm. Nor were the officers, who were 

heavily fortified outside the residence, at serious risk of harm 

at that time. 

39. After Girardin left the residence, it was unconstitutionally 

excessive force for the SWAT team to continue to fire multiple 

rounds of chemical agents into the home, because Demott was 

suspected of only minor crimes, posed no apparent threat to 

the officers or others, and was engaged in only passive 

resistance. 

40. The SWAT team knew that Demott was acting “crazy” and had 

been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and manic depression 

but was refusing to take his medication. The SWAT team also 

20 Young v. Cnty. of L.A., 655 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 

F.3d 1272, 1279 (9th Cir. 2001)).

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was later informed by Girardin that Demott was experiencing 

Vietnam flashbacks. Moreover, Demott had not physically 

harmed anyone through the lengthy incident. Despite these 

facts, which show that Demott’s mental health condition 

diminished the government’s interest in using force against 

him, the SWAT team did not take any action to address 

Demott’s mental health.

41. Although 11 APD officers at the scene had participated in a 40-

hour critical intervention training, and members of the Crisis 

Negotiation Team were at the scene, neither Childers nor Soto

consulted on mental health strategies. Although some officers 

testified that they had taken Demott’s mental health into 

consideration, there is no indication that they changed any of 

their tactics or approach due to Demott’s mental health. To the 

contrary, Childers testified that the SWAT team’s response on 

the night in question was “almost textbook of a SWAT callout,” 

and acknowledged that the SWAT team made no 

accommodations for Demott’s mental health or deviation from 

its standard progression in using force throughout this incident.

Indeed, at the time of the incident, both Childers and Soto 

erroneously believed that APD’s Crisis intervention Team

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policy did not apply when an individual in crisis is suspected of 

committing a crime. 

42. Demott posed a threat to Girardin’s safety while Girardin 

remained in the house. But after Girardin had left the house 

unharmed, Demott was a lone individual experiencing a mental 

health crisis in his home who was retreating to the crawl space. 

He was no longer an immediate threat to the safety of the 

officers or others. Therefore, Childers and Soto were 

constitutionally required to have considered a mental health 

intervention or other less invasive alternatives before 

deploying additional CS gas into the residence after Girardin

left the home. 

43. After Girardin left the home, Childers’ successful “deployment 

of the Tri-chamber CS grenade into the garage in order to 

make up for the baffled grenade that bounced off the window” 

less than 20 minutes after the initial deployment at 

approximately 11:36 p.m., constituted an excessive use of 

force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.21 

44. It is more likely than not that Demott was alive at the time of 

21 Ex. P-2 at 5; Ex. P-1 at 7. 

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that deployment, and it is more likely than not that the 

deployment caused him significant pain and suffering—

indeed, it was intended to cause him pain and suffering. 

45. By 12:19 a.m., the SWAT team was aware that Demott was 

likely in the home’s crawl space. Despite that knowledge, the 

SWAT team deployed six more rounds of CS gas into the 

garage and house at 12:43 a.m., but not into the crawl space. 

If Demott was still alive at that point, the likely result of that 

deployment would have been to keep him in the crawl space, 

not to have him exit out of the crawl space through the gasinfused residence. 

46. The deployment of the six CS gas canisters at 12:43 a.m. into 

the home was an unconstitutionally excessive use of force. 

47. The Court cannot find it more likely than not that Demott was 

alive at the time of the 12:43 a.m. deployment. 

48. Demott’s estate is entitled to damages for the pain and 

suffering he endured when the additional gas canisters, at 

around 11:55 p.m., were fired into the house approximately 20 

minutes after Girardin had exited the home unharmed by 

Demott and had described Demott as alive at that time. 

49. The Court awards $50,000 to Kelsey Howell, as personal 

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representative of the Estate of Dan Demott, from Defendants 

Steven E. Childers and Luis Soto, for the pain and suffering he 

endured as a result of the excessive force used against him 

prior to his death. 

50. The excessive force deployed by Childers and Soto was a 

substantial factor in causing the death of Demott. And it is 

more likely than not that the SWAT team’s use of 

unconstitutionally excessive force against Demott was an 

actual cause of his death; that is, that Demott’s death would 

not have occurred but for the continuing use of force deployed 

by the SWAT team after Girardin’s departure from the 

residence. 

51. There were reasonable alternatives available to the SWAT 

team after Girardin had left the residence, including using the 

PA system to try to communicate in a more positive manner 

with Demott, throwing a phone into the residence and using 

the PA system to tell Demott how he could use the phone, 

further communicating with Demott’s family and Girardin for 

suggestions on how to de-escalate the situation so Demott 

would voluntarily exit the residence, playing a prerecorded 

statement from Charlie to Demott, among other options. And 

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the SWAT team could have consulted with mental health 

professionals, such as APD officers who were Crisis 

Intervention trained. Using these alternatives, and/or 

informing Demott that the police were going to stay outside the 

home, urging him to leave the crawl space, informing Demott 

that they were stopping their announcements and intermediate 

force deployments for the next hour, and waiting for Demott to 

voluntarily exit could well have kept Demott alive that night, at 

least on a more likely than not basis. 

52. Kelsey Howell and Justin Charlie are adult children of Dan 

Demott. Each was dependent on Demott for their housing at 

the time of his death, although that dependency was unlikely 

to continue due to the imminent foreclosure sale of Demott’s 

home. 

53. Both Howell and Charlie have suffered a loss of the 

companionship due to the death of Dan Demott. 

54. Pursuant to Alaska law, the Court awards Howell, as personal 

representative of the Estate of Dan Demott, Jr., $50,000 for 

Howell’s loss of the companionship of her father, and $50,000 

for Charlie’s loss of companionship of his father. 

55. Plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence to support an award 

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of pecuniary damages and stated during closing argument that 

the Estate was not seeking pecuniary damages. 

56. Plaintiff has not established that the conduct of Childers or 

Soto was motivated by an evil motive or intent, or that it 

involved reckless or callous indifference to the federally 

protected rights of others. 

57. Plaintiff has not established by clear and convincing evidence 

that the conduct of Childers or Soto was outrageous, such as 

done with malice, bad motive, or reckless indifference to the 

interest of another.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 

1. The Court has jurisdiction over Howell’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Court exercises its 

supplemental jurisdiction over Howell’s state law claims 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

2. The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government actors 

from civil liability under § 1983 if “their conduct does not violate 

clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 

reasonable person would have known.”22 

22 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (citations omitted).

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3. “[A]ll claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive 

force—deadly or not—in the course of an arrest, investigatory 

stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be analyzed 

under the Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’ 

standard.”23 “In Fourth Amendment excessive force cases, we 

examine whether police officers’ actions are objectively 

reasonable given the totality of the circumstances.”24 

4. To determine the reasonableness of the force used, a court 

must consider “the facts and circumstances of each particular 

case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the 

suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers 

or others, and whether [the suspect] is actively resisting arrest 

or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”25 The Ninth Circuit has 

repeatedly emphasized that the second factor—the immediate 

threat to the safety of the police officers and to others—is the 

most important.26 Other circumstances to consider include 

23 Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 (emphasis omitted).

24 Nehad v. Browder, 929 F.3d 1125, 1132 (9th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted).

25 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (citing Garner, 471 U.S. at 8–9).

26 See, e.g., S.B. v. Cnty. of San Diego, 864 F.3d 1010, 1013-14 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Of all of these 

factors, the ‘most important’ one is ‘whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety 

of the officers or others.’” (quoting George, 736 F.3d at 838)).

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“the relationship between the need for the use of force and the 

amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff’s injury; any 

effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of 

force; the severity of the security problem at issue; [and] the 

threat reasonably perceived by the officer.”27 Additional 

relevant factors may “include the availability of less intrusive 

alternatives to the force employed, whether proper warnings 

were given and whether it should have been apparent to 

officers that the person they used force against was 

emotionally disturbed.”28

5. “The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be 

judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the 

scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”29 “Only 

information known to the officer at the time the conduct 

occurred is relevant.”30 And while the availability of alternative 

measures to take a suspect into custody may be a relevant 

consideration in some cases, officers “need not avail 

27 Lombardo, 594 U.S. at 467 (quoting Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397).

28 Glenn v. Wash. Cnty., 673 F.3d 864, 872 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). 

29 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–22 (1968)).

30 Nehad, 929 F.3d at 1132 (citations omitted). 

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themselves of the least intrusive means of responding to an 

exigent situation; they need only act within that range of 

conduct we identify as reasonable.”31 Additionally, “[t]he 

gravity of the particular intrusion that a given use of force 

imposes upon an individual’s liberty interest is measured with 

reference to ‘the type and amount of force inflicted.’”32 

6. The Ninth Circuit has explained that “[u]nder our cases, an 

official whose ‘individual actions’ do ‘not themselves rise to the 

level of a constitutional violation’ may be held liable under 

section 1983 only if the official is an ‘integral participant’ in the 

unlawful act.”33 The minimum level of involvement for liability 

under the integral-participant doctrine occurs in two situations: 

those in which (1) the defendant knows about and acquiesces 

in the constitutionally defective conduct as part of a common 

plan with those whose conduct constitutes the violation or (2) 

the defendant “set[s] in motion a series of acts by others which 

[the defendant] knows or reasonably should know would cause 

others to inflict the constitutional injury.”34 

7. With respect to the first category, the Ninth Circuit has held that 

31 Hughes v. Kisela, 841 F.3d 1081, 1087 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 

915 (9th Cir. 1994), rev’d on other grounds, Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100 (2018) (per curiam). 

32 Young, 655 F.3d at 1161 (quoting Deorle, 272 F.3d at 1279).

33 Peck v. Montoya, 51 F.4th 877, 889 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Reynaga Hernandez v. Skinner, 

969 F.3d 930, 941 (9th Cir. 2020)).

34 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743–44 (9th Cir. 1978)).

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officers are integral participants if an “officer was aware of the 

decision to use the [force], did not object to it, and participated 

in the . . . operation knowing the [force] was to be deployed.”35 

Simply being present at the scene is not enough; the officer 

must have participated in either the planning or the execution 

of the unlawful use of force.36 

8. Chemical agents such as tear gas are identified as 

“intermediate force” because they are “capable of inflicting 

significant pain and causing serious injury” and “present a 

significant intrusion upon an individual’s liberty interests,” 

although they are “less severe than deadly force.”37 Recent 

research shows that tear gas and pepper spray cause “acute 

respiratory symptoms” and “can cause serious and longlasting lung problems, skin burns, eye injuries and even 

death.”38 The use of chemical agents in addition to less lethal 

projectiles are considered significant force.39 In cases such as 

35 Boyd v. Benton Cnty., 374 F.3d 773, 780 (9th Cir. 2004).

36 See Peck, 51 F.4th at 889 (citing Hopkins v. Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752, 770 (9th Cir. 2009)).

37 Young, 655 F.3d at 1161 (analyzing the quantum of force deployed by pepper spray and baton 

blows); see Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 196 (9th Cir. 1979) (“[U]se of potentially dangerous 

quantities [of tear gas] is justified only under narrowly defined circumstances.”).

38 Anti Police-Terror Project v. City of Oakland, 477 F. Supp. 3d 1066,1083 (N.D. Cal. 2020). 

39 Id. at 1086–87 (“[C]hemical agents [and] less lethal projectiles . . . constitute significant force.”

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this one, there was “sufficient notice of the need for caution 

when using . . . aggressive tactics to subdue a mentally 

unstable individual who is resisting arrest.”40 

9. At the time of this incident in November 2018, it was clearly 

established that police officers violate a suspect’s Fourth 

Amendment rights when they use chemical agents and 

projectiles against individuals who were “suspected of, at 

most, minor crimes, who posed no threat to the officers or 

others, and who engaged in only passive resistance.”41 

10. Childers and Soto were both integral participants in the use of 

the chemical agents and projectiles into the home after 

Girardin had exited the residence. 

11. “The problems posed by, and thus the tactics to be employed 

against, an unarmed, emotionally distraught individual who is 

creating a disturbance or resisting arrest are ordinarily different 

from those involved in law enforcement efforts to subdue an 

armed and dangerous criminal who has recently committed a 

(first citing Young, 655 F.3d at 1161; and then citing Deorle, 272 F.3d at 1285)).

40 Alford, 785 F. Supp. 2d at 876-79, 882 (concluding that there was a genuine issue of material 

fact on reasonableness when an officer deployed a pyrotechnic device into a home where a man 

experiencing a mental health crisis had barricaded himself).

41 Hyer v. City and Cnty. of Honolulu, 118 F.4th 1044, 1068 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting Nelson v. City 

of Davis, 685 F.3d 867, 886 (9th Cir. 2012)); Young, 655 F.3d at 1168. 

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serious offense.”42 When possible, “the use of officers and 

others trained in the art of counseling is ordinarily advisable.”43 

“This is because when dealing with a disturbed individual, 

‘increasing the use of force may . . . exacerbate the situation,’ 

unlike when dealing with a criminal, where increased force is 

more likely to ‘bring[] a dangerous situation to a swift end.’”44 

And “[e]ven when an emotionally disturbed individual is ‘acting 

out’ and inviting officers to use deadly force to subdue him, the 

governmental interest in using such force is diminished by the 

fact that the officers are confronted, not with a person who has 

committed a serious crime against others, but with a mentally 

ill individual.”45 

12. “Where there is no need for force, any force used in 

constitutionally unreasonable.”46

42 Deorle, 272 F.3d at 1282–83; see id. at 1283 (“[W]e emphasize that where it is or should be 

apparent to the officers that the individual involved is emotionally disturbed, this is a factor that 

must be considered in determining . . . the reasonableness of the force employed.”). 

43 Id. at 1283.

44 Glenn, 673 F.3d at 877 (alterations in original) (quoting Deorle, 272 F.3d at 1283).

45 Deorle, 272 F.3d at 1283.

46 Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 880 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and emphasis 

omitted). 

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13. The Supreme Court has held that ‘Fourth Amendment rights 

are personal rights which . . . may not be vicariously 

asserted.’”47 However, “[i]n § 1983 actions . . . the survivors of 

an individual killed as a result of an officer’s excessive use of 

force may assert a Fourth Amendment claim on that 

individual’s behalf if the relevant state’s law authorizes a 

survival action.”48 “The party seeking to bring a survival action 

bears the burden of demonstrating that a particular state’s law 

authorizes a survival action and that the plaintiff meets that 

state’s requirements for bringing a survival action.”49

14. Under Alaska law, “[a]ll causes of action by one person against 

another . . . survive to the personal representative[].”50 Further, 

Alaska Stat. § 09.55.580(a) provides that: 

[W]hen the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act or 

omission of another, the personal representatives of the former 

may maintain an action therefore against the latter, if the 

former might have maintained an action, had the person lived, 

against the latter for an injury done by the same act or 

omission. 

47 Ochoa v. City of Mesa, 26 F.4th 1050, 1057 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 

U.S. 765, 778 (2014) (omission in original)). 

48 Moreland v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't, 159 F.3d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1998), as amended

(Nov. 24, 1998) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a)).

49 Id.

50 Alaska Stat. § 09.55.570.

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An award to the personal representative of the Estate for 

Demott’s predeath pain and suffering is recoverable under this 

statute. 

15. A claim for loss of companionship may be brought under the 

Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause; to prevail, a 

plaintiff must establish that the defendant’s conduct “shocks 

the conscience.”51 

16. Plaintiff did not bring a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment

for the children of Demott’s loss of companionship of Demott. 

17. The standard for excessive force under Alaska law is “nearly 

identical” to the federal standard. “[T]he three considerations 

that frame the excessive force inquiry are the severity of the 

crime, whether the suspect immediately threatens the safety of 

the police or others, and whether the suspect is actively 

resisting or fleeing arrest.”52 

18. “Alaska ‘usually follows federal case law in the area of qualified 

51 Ochoa, 26 F.4th at 1054 (“The plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment [loss of companionship] claim 

requires them to show that the officers’ conduct “shocks the conscience”—a standard that 

requires more of the plaintiffs than the Fourth Amendment excessive-force standard . . . .”).

52 Russell v. Virg-In, 258 P.3d 795, 802 (Alaska 2011) (citing Samaniego v. City of Kodiak, 2 P.3d 

78, 86 (Alaska 2000), overruled in part by Sheldon v. City of Ambler, 178 P.3d 459 (Alaska 2008)). 

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immunity.’”53

19. Because the Court has found that the use of force violated the 

Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, the use of 

force also violated Alaska Statute § 12.25.070 because the 

restraint used (the additional CS gas) was “greater restraint 

than . . . necessary and proper” to effectuate an arrest. And 

the use of unconstitutionally excessive force also violated 

Alaska Statute § 11.81.370(a) because the officers could not 

have “reasonably believe[d]” that the force used was 

“necessary to make an arrest.” 

20. Alaska law provides that the personal representative of the 

estate of a decedent may seek damages for a decedent’s 

children “when the death of a person is caused by the wrongful 

act or omission of another.”54 Such damages may include 

recovery for loss of companionship. 

21. Alaska Statute § 09.55.570 allows the personal representative 

of the estate of a decedent to seek damages for the pain and 

suffering experienced by a decedent prior to his death; here, 

such damages would be duplicative of the damages this Court 

53 Id. at 803 (quoting Sheldon, 178 P.2d at 463). 

54 Alaska Stat. § 09.55.580(a). 

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has awarded under Section 1983 for the same loss. 

22. The Municipality of Anchorage is vicariously liable for the 

negligent conduct of its police officers under state law; it is not 

vicariously liable for the Fourth Amendment violations of its 

police officers under federal law.55 

23. “[P]unitive damages in an action under § 1983 [are permitted] 

when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil 

motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous 

indifference to the federally protected rights of others."56 

24. Because the Court has found that neither individual 

defendant’s conduct was shown to be motivated by evil motive 

or intent, or that it involved reckless or callous indifference to 

the federally protected rights of others, no punitive damages 

are awarded under federal law. 

25. Under Alaska law, “[t]o support a claim for punitive damages, 

the plaintiff must show ‘by clear and convincing evidence that 

the defendant’s conduct was outrageous, such as acts done 

55 Taranto v. N. Slope Borough, 909 P.2d 354, 358 (Alaska 1996) (“[A] municipality is vicariously 

liable for the actions of its employees, agents, and officers under the traditional tort principle 

of respondeat superior.”); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (“[A]

municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.”).

56 Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983).

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with malice, bad motive, or reckless indifference to the 

interests of another.’”57 

26. Because the Court has found that Plaintiff has not established 

by clear and convincing evidence that the conduct of Childers 

or Soto was outrageous, such as acts done with malice, bad 

motive, or reckless indifference to the interests of another, 

Plaintiff is not entitled to punitive damages under state law.

IT IS SO ORDERED. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment for Plaintiff as 

follows: 

1. The Court awards $50,000 to Kelsey Howell, as personal 

representative of the Estate of Dan Demott, Jr. for the pain and 

suffering he endured as a result of the excessive force used 

against him prior to his death; this amount is to be paid by Luis 

Soto and Steven Childers, jointly and severally. 

2. Pursuant to Alaska law, the Court awards $100,000 to Kelsey 

Howell, as personal representative of the Estate of Dan Demott, 

Jr., to compensate Howell in the amount of $50,000 for the loss of 

the companionship of her father, and to compensate Justin Charlie 

57 Brandner v. Hudson, 171 P.3d 83, 89 (Alaska 2007) (quoting Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196, 

210 (Alaska 1995)); see Alaska Stat. 09.17.020.

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$50,000 for the loss of companionship of his father; this amount is 

to be paid by Luis Soto, Steven Childers, and the Municipality of 

Anchorage, jointly and severally. 

The Clerk of Court shall enter a final judgment accordingly. 

DATED this 13th day of December 2024, at Anchorage, Alaska.

/s/ Sharon L. Gleason 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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