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Parties Involved:
Anoka Hennepin Public Schools, ISD No. 11
Appellee
B.S.
Appellant
Brenda Cassellius
Appellee
Tom Heidemann
Appellee
Minnesota Department of Education
Appellee
Office of Administrative Hearings
Appellee
Tammy Pust
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-2564

___________________________

B.S., by and through his Parents and Natural Guardians, K.S. and M.S.

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Anoka Hennepin Public Schools, ISD No. 11; Tom Heidemann, Chair of Anoka

Hennepin Board of Education; Minnesota Department of Education; Brenda

Cassellius, Commissioner, in her individual and representative capacity; Office of

Administrative Hearings; Tammy Pust, Chief Administrative Law Judge in her

individual and representative capacity

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis

____________

 Submitted: March 10, 2015

 Filed: September 2, 2015

____________

Before WOLLMAN, BEAM, and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.

____________

BEAM, Circuit Judge.

Appellate Case: 14-2564 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/02/2015 Entry ID: 4312597 
K.S. and M.S., parents of B.S., appeal the district court's denial of their

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petition for review in an Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) case

against the Anoka Hennepin Public Schools, Independent School District Number 11

(the district), Minnesota Department of Education (MDE), and various employees of

the MDE. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

B.S. was, at the time of the hearing, a sixteen-year-old identified with attention

deficit hyperactivity disorder and has had an individualized education program (IEP)

with the district. A dispute arose between the parents and the school district over the

IEP, and the parents requested a due process hearing pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415 in

May 2013. During a pretrial conference, B.S.'s counsel indicated that she usually

needed a day and a half to present evidence, and counsel for the school district

indicated one day would be sufficient. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

accordingly allotted nine hours of hearing time (eighteen hours total, divided evenly)

for each party to present the testimony and cross-examination of its witnesses, and

counsel were directed to plan their hearing presentations accordingly.

The due process hearing was held August 6, 7, and 8, 2013. Immediately prior

to the start of the hearing the parties disclosed that they had settled several issues,

including a claimfor prospective relief, asthe parties had already agreed to a new IEP

for B.S. for the upcoming school year. Thus, the only claim remaining at that point

was whether B.S. was entitled to compensatory education servicesfor the alleged past

denial of a free appropriate public education (FAPE) by the school. On the first day

ofthe hearing, counsel for B.S. spent approximately five hours examining the specialeducation administrator. At one point during this first day of testimony, counsel for

The Honorable Ann D. Montgomery, United States District Judge for the

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District of Minnesota.

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the district objected, noting that B.S.'s counsel had already used almost half of the

allotted nine hours of time. B.S.'s nine hours of time expired on the next day, while

examining a second witness, B.S.'sspecial-education case manager. In the middle of

B.S.'s examination of this second witness, the ALJ reminded B.S.'s counsel that the

nine-hour time limit set at the pretrial conference would be enforced, and offered

counsel the opportunity to reorder the presentation of evidence accordingly. Counsel

for B.S. objected to the enforcement of the time limits and continued on with the

lengthy examination of the special-education case manager. B.S'stime expired while

examining the special-education case manager, and B.S. was not allowed to question

witnesses further or cross-examine the district's witnesses. The ALJ offered to let

B.S. make an offer of proof by calling additional witnesses, including B.S.'s parents,

but B.S. instead chose to make an informal offer of proof of the additional evidence

that B.S. had intended to present. In its final order, the ALJ surmised that based upon

the offer of proof, B.S. would have needed three more days of hearing to present this

additional evidence.

In September 2013, the ALJ issued its decision, concluding that B.S. did not

meet his burden of proving he was denied a FAPE under the IDEA. B.S. petitioned

for review of this decision to the federal district court pursuant to 20 U.S.C. §

1415(i)(2). B.S. additionally joined the MDE, the Commissioner of Education, and

the Chief ALJ as parties, alleging that these state defendants established an

unpromulgated "best practices" rule restricting the length of testimony in specialeducation hearings in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment. The district court granted the state defendants' motion to dismiss,

finding that because B.S. was challenging only one ALJ's discretionary decision, the

state was not a proper party. The district court further concluded that B.S. did not

suffer a legally cognizable injury for which the state could be liable, as there was

nothing in the record indicating that the state set forth a mandate that due process

hearings could only last three days. The district court also granted the district's

motion for judgment on the administrative record, finding no abuse of discretion in

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the ALJ's enforcement of time limits, and further found that the district had not

denied B.S. a FAPE. On appeal, B.S. alleges the ALJ's time limits were a denial of

due process, and with regard to the state defendants, B.S. alleges that the state'srules

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illegally mandated such a limit.

II. DISCUSSION

The IDEA requires all local educational agencies receiving federal funds to

establish procedures "to ensure that children with disabilities and their parents are

guaranteed procedural safeguards with respect to the provision of a free appropriate

public education by such agencies." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a). A party challenging

whether a FAPE has been provided may file an administrative complaint, which

entitles him to receive an impartial due process hearing before a local or state

educational agency. Id. §§ 1415(b)(6), 1415(f). Federal regulations provide parents

with the rights to (l) have the child who is the subject of the hearing present; (2) open

the hearing to the public; and (3) have the record of the hearing and the findings of

fact and decisions provided at no cost to parents. 34 C.F.R. § 300.512(c). Beyond

these requirements, the IDEA relies on the states to develop their own hearing

procedures. Minnesota statutes provide proceduralsafeguards to ensure a fair hearing

before a qualified independent hearing officer (an ALJ). The Education

Commissioner chooses an ALJ from a list of qualified individuals. Minn. Stat. §

125A.091, subd. 13. Thereafter, the Commissioner's only role is to monitor and

enforce the ALJ's decisions. Id. subd. 25. Minnesota statutes expressly require an

ALJ to limit the due process hearing to the time sufficient for each party to present

its case, and must maintain control and manage the hearing. Id. subd. 18. Minnesota

regulationsstate only that the "amount of time parties will have to present their cases"

is determined "by balancing the due process rights of the parties with the need for

B.S. does not challenge the district court's substantive IDEA ruling that the

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district provided him a FAPE.

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administrative efficiency and limited public resources." Minn. Admin. R. pt.

3525.4110, subp. 2(A)(4).

After the ALJ renders a decision, the aggrieved party may seek review of that

decision by bringing an action in federal district court, which reviews the

administrative record and any additional evidence requested by the parties. 20 U.S.C.

§ 1415(i)(2). The district court must make its decision independently, based on a

preponderance of the evidence, whether the IDEA was violated. Pachl v. Seagren,

453 F.3d 1064, 1068 (8th Cir. 2006).

Although the district court considered the entirety of B.S.'s substantive claims

on appeal from the ALJ, the only thing being challenged here is the propriety of the

ALJ's time limits. The Minnesota statutes recounted above explicitly set forth the

ALJ's duties with regard to managing due process hearings. Within five days of

being appointed, the ALJ must have a prehearing conference, and at this conference

the ALJ must identify the pertinent questions and eliminate meritless ones; set a

scheduling order; determine whether a hearing is even necessary; and establish the

management, control, and location of the hearing to ensure its fair and efficient

disposition. Minn. Stat. § 125A.091, subd. 15. And, as noted above, the ALJ "must"

limit the hearing to the time sufficient for each party to present its case. Id. subd. 18. 

Given Minnesota's statutory mandate vesting hearing officers with broad authority

to manage the IDEA due process hearing, we agree with the district court that our

review of this issue is for an abuse of discretion. Cf. Johnson v. Ashby, 808 F.2d

676, 678 (8th Cir. 1987) (noting that federal district courts are vested with discretion

to exercise strict control over the length of trials).

In light of these statutory standards, and having fully reviewed the

administrative hearing transcript, we find that the ALJ did not abuse its considerable

discretion in fulfilling the statutory mandate to oversee the due process hearing with

the imposition and enforcement of reasonable time limits. B.S. was fully consulted,

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and in fact instrumental, in the development of the ALJ's pretrial scheduling order. 

There is no evidence in the record showing B.S.'s case to be particularly complicated. 

In fact, the issues were substantially narrowed before the hearing when the parties

agreed on prospective relief for B.S. B.S.'s counsel made no objection to the time

allotment until the second day of the hearing, even though concerns about the

allocation of time were raised by opposing counsel on the first day of the hearing. 

There is no question that B.S. was afforded all statutory rights specifically

prescribed by the IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(h) (listing the right to be advised by

counsel; the right to present evidence and confront witnesses; the right to a written

or electronic transcript of the hearing; and the right to written or electronic findings

of fact and decisions). And while B.S. spends much time and energy arguing about

the due process rights of parents and children in an IDEA proceeding, we note that

even in the criminal context, where a party's liberty interest is at stake, the Supreme

Court has rejected the idea that the accused has an unfettered right to present all

relevant evidence. Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 42 (1996); see also Johnson,

808 F.2d at 678 (noting that federal district courts also must use their discretion to

maintain control of their dockets, including restricting the length of trials). B.S. cites

Johnson for its proposition that "it may be an abuse of the trial court's discretion to

exclude probative, non-cumulative evidence simply because its introduction will

cause delay, and any time limits formulated in advance of trial must be fashioned with

this in mind." 808 F.2d at 678. Again, though, having reviewed the transcript of the

proceedings in front of the ALJ, we find no such abuse of discretion occurred in this

matter.

Further, the ALJ's reference to the best-practices manual during portions of

exchanges with B.S.'s counsel does not demonstrate that the ALJ applied an

inflexible, unpromulgated rule in limiting B.S.'s testimony time. The ALJ stated on

the record that the reference to "best practices" was "not a dictate." The ALJ noted

that during pretrial meetings(whenmore issues were disputed by the parties), counsel

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had agreed that "three days was more than sufficient to present these issues." After

a lengthy exchange wherein B.S.'s counsel repeatedly attempted to link enforcement

of the agreed upon time limits to a perceived dictate from the best-practices manual,

the ALJ reiterated that it was not. 

Okay. So pursuant to that statutory directive [in Minnesota Statute]

129A.091, Subdivision 18, Paragraph B[,] I entered an order providing

for the allotment, the equal allotment, the fair and equal allotment of

three days worth of hearing time. As it happens, coincidentally,

fortuitously, helpfully, three days of hearing time is consistent with the

maximum that MDE says is the best practice. So Counsel said they

needed three days, we scheduled three particular days, I divided in half

those three days, and it seemed to be consonant with the larger world.

An examination of the record indicates that in enforcing the time limits, the

ALJ balanced the due process rights of the parties with the need for administrative

efficiency and limited public resources. Minn. Admin. R. 3525.4110, subp. 2(A)(4). 

It appears abundantly clear from the record that the ALJ enforced the previouslyagreed-upon time limits because he concluded that nine hours should have afforded

B.S. an ample amount of time to present his case, not because the ALJ felt so

constrained by a "best practices" directive from the MDE. We find that it was not an

abuse of the ALJ's discretion to so conclude.

In light of this ruling on the first issue, we further find that the state defendants

were correctly dismissed from this lawsuit. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The

administrative record, which is necessarily part of the pleadings in the appeal of an

IDEA administrative ruling, demonstrates that the ALJ exercised his discretion to

limit hearing testimony to a reasonable time of nine hours for each party. There is

nothing to suggest that the ALJ's time limits were based upon an illegally

promulgated de facto rule, and as previously noted, the Minnesota statutes and rules

required the ALJ to set time limits. The administrative record conclusively shows

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that the ALJ did not feel bound by any alleged "systemic" procedural irregularity in

the state's IDEA due process appeals, nor do any such alleged dictates exist in the

state's procedures. See Pachl, 453 F.3d at 1070 (indicating a state's department of

education may have liability in the case of a systemic violation of its duties under the

IDEA). As in Pachl, the only action attributable to the state in this case was its

appointment of an ALJ, and as such, no liability against the state arises. Id.

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm.

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