Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00390/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00390-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Melody McGuiness
Plaintiff
Richard McGuiness
Plaintiff
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., successor by merger with Wells Fargo Bank Southwest, N.A., 

f/k/a Wachovia Mortgage, FSB, f/k/a World Savings Bank, FSB (“Defendants”) removed this case 

from the Superior Court of Stanislaus County on March 11, 2015. See Doc. 1. Defendants 

asserted that the basis for removal was the presence of diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 

1332. See id. On April 10, 2015, Richard McGuiness and Melody McGuiness (“Plaintiffs”) filed 

a Motion for Remand to Superior Court and Request for Payment of Attorney‟s Fees by Defense 

Counsel in the Amount of $2,500.00. See Doc. 8. On April 17, Defendants filed a joint 

stipulation requesting the remand of the federal action to the state court. See Doc. 10. 

 Federal courts are of limited jurisdiction, having subject matter jurisdiction only over 

matters authorized by the Constitution and Congress. See, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins., 

511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). A “strong presumption” against removal jurisdiction exists. Gaus v. 

Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 567 (9th Cir. 1992). In seeking removal, the defendant bears the burden 

of proving that jurisdiction exists. Scott v. Breeland, 792 F.2d 925, 927 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, this Court has original jurisdiction over civil actions “arising 

under” federal law. Removal based on § 1331 is governed by the “well-pleaded complaint” rule. 

RICHARD MCGUINESS, an individual, 

and MELODY MCGUINESS,

Plaintiff

v.

WELLS FARGO BANK, NA, a business 

entity and DOES 1 to 10, inclusive,

Defendants

CASE NO. 1:15-CV-00390- AWI-GSA

ORDER GRANTING JOINT 

STIPULATION REQUESTING THE 

REMAND OF THE FEDERAL ACTION 

TO THE STATE COURT

(Doc. 10)

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Caterpiller, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Under the rule, “federal jurisdiction exists 

only when a federal question is presented on the face of plaintiff‟s properly pleaded complaint.” 

Id. at 392. If the complaint does not specify whether a claim is based on federal or state law, it is a 

claim “arising under” federal law only if it is “clear” that it raises a federal question. Duncan v. 

Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir. 1996). Thus, plaintiff is generally the “master of the 

claim.” Caterpiller, 482 U.S. at 392. There is no federal question jurisdiction simply because 

there is a federal defense to the claim. Id. at 392. The only exception to this rule is where the 

plaintiff‟s federal claim has been disguised by “artful pleading,” such as where the only claim is a 

federal one or is a state claim preempted by federal law. Sullivan v. First Affiliated Sec., Inc., 

813 F.2d 1368, 1372 (9th Cir. 1987). 

 The complaint here contains state law claims for unfair business practices (Cal. Bus. & 

Prof. Code § 17200 et seq.), negligence, and violations of the Rosenthal Act (Cal. Civ. Code 

§ 1788). No federal claim is alleged. As such, this court does not have jurisdiction over this 

matter on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. This court will now consider whether it has 

diversity jurisdiction over the matter. 

 Subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship requires all plaintiffs to have a 

different citizenship from all defendants and that the amount in controversy exceed $75,000. See 

28 U.S.C. § 1332; Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 (1978). In 

attempting to invoke federal diversity jurisdiction, defendants must prove that there is complete 

diversity of citizenship between the parties and that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 

28 U.S.C. § 1332. When an action has been removed and the amount in controversy is in doubt, 

there is a “strong presumption” that the plaintiff has not claimed an amount sufficient to confer 

jurisdiction. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing St. Paul Mercury 

Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-90 (1938). “When not facially evident from the 

complaint that more than $75,000 is in controversy, the removing party must prove, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy meets the jurisdictional threshold.” 

Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003). “Conclusory 

allegations must provide evidence establishing that it is „more likely than not‟ that the amount in 

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controversy exceeds [$75,000].” Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 404 (9th 

Cir. 1996). Indeed, “when a state-court complaint affirmatively alleges that the amount in 

controversy is less than the jurisdictional threshold, the „party seeking removal must prove with 

legal certainty that [the] jurisdictional amount is met.‟” Guglielmino v. McKee Foods Corp., 

506 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 2007). 

 Plaintiffs originally filed this litigation in Stanislaus County Superior Court by filing their 

complaint in Limited Civil Jurisdiction, which limits damages recoverable to $24,999.00. In their 

motion to remand, Plaintiffs state that they “are seeking an order requiring Defendants to act 

appropriately under California State law and to uphold their duty of care required once they accept 

a loan modification application.” See Complaint, 5:4-6. Further, “[u]nder no circumstances have 

Plaintiffs sought to „invalidate a loan secured by a deed of trust‟ . . . Nor have Plaintiffs sough[t] 

to cancel a deed of trust or enjoin the bank from selling or transferring the property.” See id. at 

5:1-4. Accordingly, the jurisdictional amount has not been met in this case. See also Alex v. JP 

Morgan Chase & Co., 2:14-cv-01402-CAS-VBK; Doherty v. Ocwen Financial Corp., 2:14-cv7118-PA-E.

After consideration of the Stipulation of Plaintiffs and Defendants and good cause 

appearing the Court ORDERS as follows: 

1. The parties‟ Stipulation to remand the instant action back to the State Court is 

GRANTED; 

2. All pending hearing dates for this matter are VACATED; 

3. The case will be remanded to the Superior Court of California, County of 

Stanislaus, Case No. 2012731, forthwith; and 

4. The request for payment of attorney‟s fees is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: April 20, 2015 

 SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE 

Case 1:15-cv-00390-AWI-GSA Document 11 Filed 04/21/15 Page 3 of 3