Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00153/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00153-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joseph Callanan, Jr.
Defendant
Gail Carson
Defendant
Peter A. Orner
Defendant
Jose Trinidad Lara Urbina
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE TRINIDAD LARA URBINA,

Plaintiff,

v.

GAIL CARSON, RN; PETER A.

ORNER; JOSEPH CALLANAN, JR.;

and DOES 1 through 50,

Defendants.

1:07-CV-00153 OWW NEW (TAG)

MEMORANDUM DECISION GRANTING

IN PART AND DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANT’S CARSON MOTION TO

DISMISS AND MOTION TO STRIKE

(DOC. 17); DEFENDANT’S

CALLANAN MOTION TO DISMISS

(DOC. 19) AND MOTION TO STRIKE

(DOC. 20); AND DEFENDANT’S

ORNER MOTION TO STRIKE (DOC.

21) AND MOTION TO DISMISS

(DOC. 22)

1. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff brings this suit against Defendants alleging 

1. violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 56.10(a), 

2. violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 56.36(b), 

3. Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 

4. violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) and § 1985(3). 

Plaintiffs claims arise from the alleged wrongful disclosure

of private medical information in a pending federal civil rights

action, Lara-Urbina v. County of Kern, et. al., Case No. 05-cv1056 OWW WMW (“Urbina I”). 

In Urbina I Plaintiff brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim

alleging a violation of his constitutional rights resulting from

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alleged excessive use of force during his arrest. Plaintiff

alleges that Defendants in this case engaged in ex parte

communications about and accepted his medical information without

his consent in violation of his right to medical privacy. 

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s suit for failure to state

a claim and move to strike Plaintiff’s first and second causes of

action. 

2. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 19, 2007, Plaintiff filed his first amended

complaint (“FAC”). (Doc. 8, FAC.) 

On March 7, 2007 Defendant Callanan filed his motion to

dismiss Plaintiff’s FAC. (Doc. 19, Motion to Dismiss First

Amended Complaint.) On March 7, 2007 Callanan filed a special

motion to strike Plaintiff’s FAC. (Doc. 20, Motion to Strike.) 

On February 28, 2007 Defendant Carson also moved to dismiss

Plaintiff’s FAC and, in the alternative, filed a special motion

to strike. (Doc. 17, Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint

and Special Motion to Strike.) 

On March 12, 2007, Defendant Orner filed both a motion to

strike and a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s FAC. (Doc. 21, Motion

to Strike; Doc. 22, Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a

Claim.) 

On April 9, 2007 Plaintiff filed an Opposition to all

motions. (Doc. 28, Opposition.)

On April 10, 2007, Defendant Carson filed his reply. (Doc.

29, Reply by Carson.) On April 11, 2007 Defendant Callanan filed

his reply. (Doc. 30, Reply by Callanan.) On April 12, 2007

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Defendant Orner filed his reply to Plaintiff’s opposition. (Doc.

31, Reply by Orner.) 

3. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Defendant Gail Carson, RN (“Carson”) is a registered nurse

licensed under the laws of the state of California. (Doc. 8,

FAC, ¶ 4.) 

Defendant Peter A. Orner, MD (“Orner”) is a medical doctor

licensed under the laws of the state of California. (Id. at ¶

5.)

Defendant Joseph Callanan, Jr. (“Callanan”) is a resident of

the state of California. (Id. at ¶ 6.) He was retained as a

police procedures and use of force expert by the County of Kern

in the underlying lawsuit Urbina I. 

Plaintiff alleges that on August 15, 2003 “a police

officer... Detective Chris Jackson (“Officer Jackson”), struck

[him] repeatedly in his ribs” during Plaintiff’s arrest. (Doc.

8, FAC, ¶ 10.) Plaintiff claims Officer Jackson hit Plaintiff

with the butt of his gun, fracturing Plaintiff’s rib and a

collapsing his lung. (Id.) Plaintiff has filed a separate

lawsuit for redress of these injuries that is currently pending

before this court. 

Defendant Carson, a registered nurse at the Kern County

Jail, treated and evaluated at the jail Plaintiff’s medical

condition and injuries sustained during his arrest. (Id. at ¶

11.) Plaintiff claims that Carson created a medical report

(“Medical Screening Form”) on August 15, 2003 reflecting her

evaluation of Plaintiff’s condition. (Id. at ¶ 11.) This report

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included facts pertaining to Plaintiff’s medical condition,

including his complaints of pain and difficulty breathing. (Id.

at ¶ 11.) Plaintiff argues that Nurse Carson is a material

witness to the events that give rise to the lawsuit in Urbina I.

However, Plaintiff admits that he subpoenaed her Medical

Screening Form and provided it to the Defense during the

discovery stage of Urbina I. Defendant also admits his claims of

personal injury put in issue Plaintiff’s physical and medical

condition. 

According to Plaintiff, Defendant Orner and Defendant

Callanan consented to be retained as experts to testify on behalf

of the defendants in Urbina I. (Id. at ¶ 13.) However,

Plaintiff alleges that Orner and Callanan realized that Carson’s

August 15, 2003 medical record was damaging to defendants

position in Urbina I. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that Orner and

Callanan entered into a conspiracy to induce Carson to change or

alter her findings in the Medical Screening Form so as to

exonerate, rather than incriminate, the defendant police officers

in Urbina I. (Id.) 

In support of these allegations, Plaintiff claims that on

July 21, 2006 Callanan interviewed Carson and obtained from her, 

information regarding Plaintiff’s medical condition at the time

he was arrested. (Id.) This interview occurred without notice

to Plaintiff and without his consent or authorization. (Id.) 

Plaintiff also claims that on July 26, 2006 Dr. Orner

conducted a telephone interview with Carson in which he also

obtained information and details about Plaintiff’s medical

condition at the time of his arrest. (Id.) 

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According to Plaintiff, the disclosure of his medical

information without his consent violates Cal. Civ. Code § 56.10

(a) and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act

of 1996 (“HIPPA”). (Id.)

Based on these allegations Plaintiff brings the following

causes of action: 

1. Conspiracy to Violate Cal. Civ. Code § 56.10(a). 

(Id., ¶ 15.) 

2. Wrongful Disclosure Cal Civ. Code § 56.36(b). 

(Id., ¶ 16.) 

3. Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendment. 

4. Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) & (3). Plaintiff

alleges that Defendants conspired for the purposes

of impending, hindering, obstructing or defeating

the due course of justice in Plaintiff’s civil

lawsuit, Urbina I, with the intent to injure

plaintiff in his property for attempting to

enforce his right to equal protection of the laws.

4. MOTION TO DISMISS

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) provides that a motion to dismiss

may be made if the plaintiff fails “to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted.” However, motions to dismiss under Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) are disfavored and rarely granted. The

question before the court is not whether the plaintiff will

ultimately prevail; rather, it is whether the plaintiff could

prove any set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle

him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73

(1984). “A complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears

beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support

of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Van Buskirk v.

CNN, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).

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In deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss, the court

“accept[s] all factual allegations of the complaint as true and

draw[s] all reasonable inferences” in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th

Cir. 1999); see also Rodriguez v. Panayiotou, 314 F.3d 979, 983

(9th Cir. 2002). A court is not “required to accept as true

allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of

fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State

Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).

A. Plaintiff has Failed to State a Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 

1983. 

“Section 1983 provides for liability against any person

acting under color of law who deprives another ‘of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’

of the United States.” S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336

F.3d 885, 887 (9th Cir. 2003)(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). “The

rights guaranteed by section 1983 are ‘liberally and beneficently

construed.’” Id. (quoting Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 443

(1991). Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff may bring a

civil action for deprivation of rights under the following

circumstances: 

Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State

or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects,

or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United

States or other person within the jurisdiction

thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,

or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,

shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for

redress, except that in any action brought against a

judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such

officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall

not be granted unless a declaratory decree was

violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For

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 Plaintiff also argues that Defendants are in violation of 1

Federal law because their conduct violates the “privacy rule”

under the HIPPA 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.103, 164.502. He states that

Carson’s telephone disclosures to Orner and Callanan were not

authorized by HIPPA because Carson did not have Plaintiff’s

consent. However, Plaintiff also recognizes in his opposition

that there is no private right of action for damages under HIPAA

but discusses the statute to “demonstrate that Plaintiff’s claims

are not barred by California’s litigation privilege and that

Plaintiff has stated a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” 

(Doc. 28, Opposition, n. 3.) Plaintiff offers no support for the

proposition that a violation of HIPAA’s medical privacy rule

implicates a recognized constitutional right for purposes of 42

U.S.C. § 1983. 

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the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress

applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia

shall be considered to be a statute of the District

of Columbia. 

Therefore, to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §

1983, a plaintiff must establish that (1) they were deprived of a

right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States,

and (2) the alleged deprivation was committed under color of

state law. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S.

40, 49-50 (1999). 

The first issue is whether Plaintiff sufficiently alleges a

constitutional deprivation. Plaintiff argues that he was

deprived of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.1

i. 4th Amendment Illegal Search and Seizure 

Plaintiff in alleging a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, states

in his complaint “Defendants... acting under color of state law

[violated] Plaintiff’s rights as protected by the Fourth

Amendment.” It is unclear from the complaint what specific acts

by Defendants were made under the color of law or how Defendants

were in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 

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Under the Fourth Amendment the right of the people to be

secure in their persons, houses, and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. U.S.

Const. amend. IV.; Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F. 3d 1113,

1152 (9th Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court has held that “in the

ordinary case, seizures of personal property are unreasonable

within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, without more, unless

accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant issued by a neutral

and detached magistrate after finding probable cause.” Id. 

However, when faced with special law enforcement needs, the

Supreme Court has found that certain general, or individual,

circumstances may render a warrantless search or seizure

reasonable. Id. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants used the color of authority

of the City of Shafter and the County of Kern, two local

government entities, in causing the wrongful disclosure and

dissemination of Plaintiff’s confidential medical information. 

Plaintiff claims that Defendant Carson provided Defendants

Callanan and Orner with Plaintiff’s medical information without

Plaintiff’s consent. Orner and Callanan, private citizens, who

were retained as expert witnesses for the defense in Urbina I,

“knew that Carson’s report on Plaintiff’s medical condition was

damaging to defendants.” According to Plaintiff Callanan and

Orner induced Carson to alter her findings of Plaintiff’s post

arrest medical examination. 

Plaintiff does not allege any facts suggesting there has been

an unreasonable search or seizure by Defendants. To the

contrary, Plaintiff admits that Plaintiff himself subpoenaed the

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Medical Screening Form and provided it to Defendants as part of

Plaintiff’s discovery obligations. Plaintiff cannot credibly

suggest that he did not know that his medical records would be

subject to scrutiny and discovery. He impliedly consented to the

use of his medical records in this case. These records are

highly relevant to the nature and extent of his injuries and

damage claims. Plaintiff offers no law or argument that he had a

legitimate expectation of privacy in the medical information that

he voluntarily provided to the defense in this lawsuit; that he 

was legally required to provide; and that he put his medical

conditions and the extent of his injuries in issue by the

allegations of his complaint. Plaintiff also does not address

this issue in his opposition. Plaintiff only alleges that Carson

spoke to Callanan and Orner during the course of the Urbina I

litigation about Plaintiff’s medical screening and medical

condition. This is insufficient to show a Fourth Amendment

violation. Neither does Plaintiff allege that either private

defendants acted under the color of state law. 

Plaintiff contests the nature of the information shared

during the Defendants’ ex parte conversations. The Ninth Circuit

has long applied Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600, 97 S. Ct.

869 (1977) and its progeny in holding that individuals have a

constitutionally protected interest in avoiding disclosure of

personal matters including medical information. Tucson Woman’s

Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 551 (9th Cir. 2004); see also,

Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, 135 F.3d 1260,

1269 (9th Cir. 1998)(the constitutionally protected privacy

interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters clearly

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encompasses medical information and its confidentiality.); Yin v.

California, 95 F.3d 864, 870 (9th Cir. 1996)(noting that

individuals have a right protected under the Due Process Clause

of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments in the privacy of personal

medical information and records.) 

Plaintiff’s complaint does not specifically describe any of

the information that was shared. For example, Plaintiff argues

in his papers that he “did give permission to share ‘certain

types of medical information’ but not ‘the kind that was actually

shared.’” Plaintiff does not identify what medical information

was allegedly shared without his permission. Defendants rejoin

that Plaintiff voluntarily disseminated his medical information

to Defense counsel. Without further detail it cannot be

determined whether Plaintiff actually has an expectation of

privacy in the “medical information” or whether any of the Whalen

line of cases apply to Plaintiff. Plaintiff refers to no legal

authority that constrains a party’s expert from communicating

with an adverse party’s percipient witnesses. Plaintiff has

failed to allege an unlawful search and seizure in violation of

his Fourth Amendment rights.

The motion to dismiss the Fourth Amendment claim is GRANTED

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

ii. 14th Amendment Denial of Due Process

Plaintiff claims a denial of Due Process in his § 1983 claim. 

The complaint is unclear whether Plaintiff alleges a denial of

substantive due process rights, procedural due process rights, or

both. 

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The procedural due process component of the Fourteenth

Amendment protects individuals against the deprivation of liberty

or property by the government without due process. Portman v.

County of Santa Clara 995 F.2d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 1993 ). “A §

1983 claim based upon procedural due process has three elements:

(1) a liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution;

(2) a deprivation of the interest by the government; (3) lack of

process. The Due Process Clause does not create substantive

rights in property the property rights are defined by reference

to state law.” Id.

“Substantive due process protects individuals from arbitrary

deprivation of their liberty by government.” Brittain v. Hansen,

451 F.3d 982, 991 (9th Cir. 2006). “The United States Supreme

Court has repeatedly spoken of the cognizable level of executive

abuse of power as that which shocks the conscience.” Id. “Only

the most egregious official conduct can be said to be arbitrary

in a constitutional sense.” Id. “Such conduct can be shown by

‘conduct intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any

government interest.’” Id. “In order to establish a

constitutional violation based on substantive due process, a

plaintiff must show both a deprivation of liberty and conscience

shocking behavior by the government.” Id. 

The dispute here involves the scope of the medical 

information that was shared among Defendants’ experts in

discovery and investigation by the experts to prepare for trial. 

Plaintiff claims that the information shared went beyond the

scope of the Medical Screening Form and was, therefore,

confidential. Defendants argue that Plaintiff had already

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voluntarily disclosed and disseminated his medical information to

defense attorneys in Urbina I, after Plaintiff subpoenaed it from

the medical custodian of records. According to Defendants, any

ex parte conversation concerned only the information on the

Medical Screening Form. Defendants further argue that Plaintiff

offers no law to show that he is entitled to relief when a

percipient witness shares Plaintiff’s medical information with

defense experts during ongoing litigation. Plaintiff does not

address this issue in his opposition and provides no law that

supports his position. 

Plaintiff has not alleged a protected property interest in

the medical records that he voluntarily and necessarily disclosed

to the defense. Plaintiff does not allege a deprivation of a

protected interest by the government, or denial of due process. 

Plaintiff also does not allege that Defendants’ conduct shocks

the conscience. It is entirely expectable that all Plaintiff’s

medical information about his physical and mental condition,

treatment, diagnosis, prognosis and recovery has as a matter of

law to be fully disclosed to Defendants for the litigation. 

Without more, Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a Fourteenth

Amendment Due Process violation by any Defendant.

iii. State Action 

Even if Plaintiff had sufficiently alleged a constitutional

deprivation under the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments, Plaintiff

would still have to show that Defendants acted under the color of

state law. 

To act under color of state law requires that the defendant

in a § 1983 action has exercised power “possessed by virtue of

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state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed

with the authority of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,

49 (1988) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326

(1941)). If defendants’ conduct satisfies the state action

requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, “that conduct [is] also

action under color of state law and will support a suit under §

1983.” Id. In such circumstances, defendant’s alleged

infringement of plaintiff’s federal rights is “fairly

attributable to the State.” Id. 

To constitute state action, the deprivation must be caused by

the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or

by a person for whom the State is responsible, and the party

charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be

said to be a state actor. Id.; See also, Sullivan, 526 U.S. at

50 (1999). It is firmly established that a defendant in a § 1983

suit acts under color of state law when he abuses the position

given to him by the State. Atkins, 487 U.S. at 49. Generally, a

public employee acts under color of state law while acting in his

official capacity or while exercising his responsibilities

pursuant to state law. Id.

Neither defendant is a public employee. Plaintiff identifies

no conduct by Defendants that constitutes state action. The

private Defendants were retained as testifying experts who were

to analyze Plaintiff’s conduct, medical condition and treatment

to determine the effects of interaction between Plaintiff and law

enforcement and to analyze the credibility of his damage claims

as measured by his injuries. Plaintiff does not expressly argue

that Defendants are state actors. Defendant Carson is a

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registered nurse who was employed by a hospital. Defendant Orner

is a private medical doctor. Defendant Callanan is a private law

enforcement consultant. Plaintiff does not allege facts to show

that any of the Defendants were public actors or acted for a

public purpose under the color of state law.

a. There Is No State Action By Defendants as Private 

Individuals

The United States Supreme Court recognizes that an

individual’s conduct is equivalent to government action if there

is a nexus between the State and the action such that “seemingly

private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State

itself.” Single Moms, Inc. v. Mont. Power Co., 331 F.3d 742, 747

(9th Cir. 2003)(citing Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch.

Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001).) The Supreme Court has

identified four factors that influence a finding of state action

by a private individual:

(1) The government compelled the action 

using its coercive power, or 

significant overt or covert 

encouragement. Single Moms, Inc. 

331 F.3d at 747. (citing Blum v. 

Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 

(1982));

(2) The government and the private actor

wilfully participated in joint

activity. Id. (citing Lugar v.

Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936

(1982));

(3) The government controlled a

nominally private actor. Id.

(citing Pennsylvania v. Bd. of Dir.

of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230, 231

(1957)); or

(4) The government delegated a public

function to the private actor. Id.

(citing Atkins, 487 U.S. at 56).

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See also Kirtley v. Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088, 1094-95 (9th Cir.

2003) (replacing the nominally private actor factor with the

Brentwood nexus factor: seemingly private behavior that may be

fairly considered state action).

It is unclear from the complaint and the facts alleged do not

demonstrate what factor Plaintiff claims applies. Plaintiff’s

“state action” argument relies entirely on the case of Gonzalez

v. Spencer, 336 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2003). In Gonzalez,

defendant, an attorney was hired to defend Los Angeles County in

an underlying civil rights suit brought by plaintiff. Id. at

834. Defendant accessed plaintiff’s juvenile court file without

notifying him and without obtaining authorization from the

juvenile court. Id. Defendant then used the confidential

records from the file to cross-examine plaintiff during his

deposition in the underlying action. Id. Plaintiff brought suit

against defendant, her law firm, and the county for accessing and

using his juvenile court file without authorization, alleging a

violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. 

The court found that defendant acted under color of state law. 

Id. She was retained to represent state entities and their

employees in litigation. Id. She inspected plaintiff’s file in

the course of that representation, and used her status to gain

access to the file. Id. Her role was analogous to that of a

state prosecutor rather than a public defender, because she acted

on behalf of the state rather than as its adversary. Id. The

court further reasoned that defendant was not entitled to

qualified immunity. Id. at 835. She did not point to a special

reason significantly favoring an extension of government immunity

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 Plaintiff cites Peng v. Penghu, 335 F.3d 970, 980 (9th 2

Cir. 2003) for the proposition that if “the police condone

activities by private parties that they know to be illegal, there

exists sufficient evidence of conspiracy between the private

parties and the officer.” Plaintiff fails to show how Peng

applies in this case. No facts are alleged that Thomson had

control or authority over Carson’s actions.

16

to private parties in her position. 

Plaintiff argues that just as a person must first invoke

California’s statutory procedure for accessing someone’s juvenile

records, so too must a person comply with state and federal law

before accessing or distributing a person’s confidential health

information. In the abstract, this assertion has some coherence,

but not in the context of ongoing litigation in which such

privileges are waived by the nature of the claims Plaintiff

asserts. Plaintiff claims that Kern Deputy County Counsel Andrew

Thomson (“Thomson”), in his role as the Kern County’s counsel,

solicited Carson to make her disclosures and arranged the

telephone conversations involving the three defendants. 

According to Plaintiff, Thomson knew that such disclosure was in

violation of federal and state law. Plaintiff argues that since

Thomson was acting under state law when he arranged for Carson’s

wrongful disclosures to Orner and Callanan, defendants have also

acted under color of state law. 

2

Contrary to Gonzalez, there is no allegation in this case

that the named Defendants used their position to gain access to

Plaintiff’s file. Nor does Thompson or any other public official

direct their activities. While Plaintiff alleges that Thomson as

Kern County counsel solicited Carson to make the disclosures,

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 An allegation that a private person conspired with a 3

state official satisfied the requirement that a defendant acted

under color of state authority. Franklin, 201 F.3d at 1100. 

However, Plaintiff does not make any allegations of Thomson’s

involvement in the alleged conspiracy in the complaint.

17

Plaintiff has not sued Thomson. Further, to prove a conspiracy,

Plaintiff must show “an agreement or ‘meeting of the minds’ to

violate constitutional rights.” Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423,

441 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). Each individual does

not need to know the plan; sharing the common purpose of the

conspiracy is sufficient. Id. A private individual may be

liable if he conspired with a state actor. Id. Here, all three

named defendants are private individuals. Plaintiff has not

alleged a conspiracy between the Defendants and Thomson and

Plaintiff raises these allegations for the first time in his

opposition brief. In the Ninth Circuit, Plaintiff must present 3

more than conclusory allegations of conspiracy to survive a

motion to dismiss. Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227, 229 (9th Cir.

1980). The alleged conspiracy between Defendants and Thomson, a

state actor, is defeated by the necessary element of 42 U.S.C. §

1983 that state action occur. The alleged purpose of the

conspiracy, to use disclosed medical data, cannot be wrongful, in

the context of civil litigation. The conspiracy claim is not

alleged with sufficient specificity. 

Defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983

claim are GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 

iv. Defendants Affirmative Defense of Absolute Witness 

Immunity

In the alternative, Defendant Callanan and Defendant Orner

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raise the defense of absolute witness immunity available in §

1983 suits. Absolute witness immunity is based on the policy of

protecting the judicial process and is “necessary to assure that

judges, advocates, and witnesses can perform their respective

functions without harassment or intimidation.” Franklin v. Terr,

201 F.3d 1098, 1100 (9th Cir. 2000). “[A] witness’s apprehension

of subsequent damages liability might induce two forms of self

censorship. First, witnesses might be reluctant to come forward

to testify. And once a witness is on the stand, his testimony

might be distorted by the fear of subsequent liability.” Id. 

“Any other holding would eviscerate absolute immunity since a

witness rarely prepares her testimony on her own.” Id. at 1101-

1102. 

Defendants Callanan and Orner argue that Plaintiff’s

allegations are all related to conduct they undertook as retained

testifying experts in Urbina I. According to Defendants,

absolute litigation immunity exists to ensure that expert

witnesses can render testimony without harassment or intimidation

and that they are absolutely immune from liability as to

Plaintiff’s claims. 

In support of their argument, Defendants rely on Franklin,

which confronted whether a witness had absolute immunity from

liability for civil damages under § 1983 for conspiring to

present her own and another witness’ perjured testimony at trial. 

Franklin, 201 F.3d at 1100. Franklin held that when a witness’

alleged conspiratorial behavior is inextricably tied to her

testimony, the witness was immune from damages under § 1983. Id.

at 1102. Franklin addressed allegations by Plaintiff that Terr,

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a psychiatrist and expert witness in an underlying case,

“conspired with others, including the prosecutor, to testify

falsely at trial.” Id. at 1100. Plaintiff was convicted of

first degree murder in the underlying case. Id. Plaintiff

alleged that Terr conspired with a key witness in the underlying

case by interviewing her before plaintiff’s trial and by then

incorporating information obtained from those interviews into

Terr’s own testimony. Id. at 1102. The Plaintiff also alleged

that Terr provided the key witness with a description of the sort

of details that would make the testimony more persuasive, the

details of which the witness incorporated into her own testimony. 

Id. Plaintiff argued that the ostensible purpose of the

conspiracy was to ensure that one person’s testimony did not

contradict the other’s testimony. Id. The court reasoned that

Terr’s alleged conspiratorial behavior was inextricably tied to

her testimony and that she was therefore immune from damages. 

Id. The court stopped short of deciding whether § 1983 provides

a cause of action against a defendant who conspired to present

the perjured testimony of another witness but who did not testify

as a witness herself. Id. Allowing Plaintiff to circumvent the

witness immunity rule by alleging a conspiracy to present false

testimony would undermine the purposes served by granting

witnesses absolute immunity from damages liability under § 1983. 

Id. at 1101. 

Plaintiff in this case argues that Defendants are not

entitled to witness immunity because the federal witness immunity

doctrine applies to testimony. Here, Plaintiff is suing

Defendants because they allegedly engaged in wrongful

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dissemination of Plaintiff’s confidential medical information,

rather than for testimony that they gave during trial. Plaintiff

argues that the doctrine, therefore, does not apply. In support

of his argument, Plaintiff cites Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d

1189 (9th Cir. 1997). Harris involves the issue of qualified

immunity for government officials. Harris is inapplicable since

qualified immunity is different from the defense of absolute

witness immunity in a § 1983 case. 

The two experts’ conduct was to obtain information to prepare

for giving testimony. The fact gathering function of an expert

should not be deterred and is subject to absolute witness

immunity. The role and conduct of testifying experts in

preparing for and giving testimony is testimonial in nature. 

Any medical information that was allegedly shared among

Defendants pertains to Plaintiff’s physical condition that he has

placed at issue. Without qualified immunity for witness

testimony the undesirable effect of chilling experts’ willingness

to testify would result.

The expert witness defendants are entitled to absolute

witness immunity. The motion to dismiss on this ground is

GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

B. Plaintiff’s Failure to State a Claim under 42 

U.S.C. § 1985. 

Plaintiff’s second and third causes of action allege

violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) and (3) of the and Civil Rights

Act of 1871. A court may dismiss a complaint for (a) lack of a

cognizable legal theory; or (b) the pleading of insufficient

facts under a cognizable legal theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter

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Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9 Cir. 1984). Plaintiffs’ th

claims under § 1985 fail in both respects. 

Section 1985 provides in pertinent part: 

(2) Obstructing justice; intimidating party, witness, 

or juror

If two or more persons in any State or Territory

conspire to deter, by force, intimidation, or threat,

any party or witness in any court of the United States

from attending such court, or from testifying to any

matter pending therein, freely, fully, and

truthfully...

or if two or more persons conspire for the purpose

of impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating, in

any manner, the due course of justice in any State or

Territory, with intent to deny to any citizen the equal

protection of the laws....

(3) Depriving persons of rights or privileges

If two or more persons in any State or Territory

conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the

premises of another, for the purpose of depriving... 

a person or class of persons of the equal protection of

the laws... 

or if two or more persons conspire to prevent by

force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen...from

giving his support or advocacy...in favor of the

election of any lawfully qualified person as an elector

for President or Vice President, or as a Member of

Congress of the United States....

42 U.S.C. § 1985. 

The first part of § 1985(2) prohibits conspiracies to

obstruct justice in the federal system, while the second part

prohibits conspiracies to obstruct the due course of justice in

any state proceeding. The first part of § 1985(3) prohibits

persons from conspiring to deprive any person of his or her

constitutional rights, while the second part of § 1985(3)

prohibits conspiracies to interfere with the federal voting

process. Section 1985(3) also provides for a private right of

action for damages caused by any conspiracy prohibited by § 1985. 

To state a claim under the first clause of 42 U.S.C.

§1985(2), plaintiff must allege 1) a conspiracy to 2) deter a

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witness by force, intimidation or threat from attending court or

testifying freely in any pending matter 3) which has resulted in

injury to plaintiff. David v. United States 820 F.2d 1038, 1040

(9th Cir.1987) Stated another way, plaintiff must allege a

conspiracy by defendants to injure a party or witness in his or

her person or property because he or she attended federal court

or testified in any matter pending in federal court resulting in

injury or damages to plaintiff. Portman, 995 F.2d at 909. 

Plaintiff alleges that defendants Orner and Callanan entered

into a conspiracy to “induce or encourage Carson to change or

alter her findings so as to exonerate, rather than incriminate,

the defendant police officers in Urbina I”. (Doc. 8, FAC, ¶ 13)

The alleged acts in furtherance of the conspiracy are that 

1. Carson shared information “regarding her August 

15, 2003 evaluation of Plaintiff’s medical 

condition

2. That Defendants shared this information without 

notice to Plaintiff

3. As a result, Defendants violated Cal. Civ. Code § 

56.10(a) and HIPPA

Plaintiff then alleges that as a result of those acts

“plaintiff is informed and believes and based thereon alleges

that defendants induced Carson to alter and/or modify her August

15, 2003 findings so as to support the Urbina I defendants’

litigation position.” (FAC, ¶14) The fourth cause of action

contends that such acts violate 42 U.S.C. §1985(2) and (3).

Plaintiff has not alleged the existence of a conspiracy to

deter a witness by force, intimidation or threat. He has not

alleged a conspiracy to injure a witness in his or her person or

property. He has not alleged any overt acts in furtherance of

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any such conspiracy. He has not alleged any injury by virtue of

the alleged conspiracy to “induce” nurse Carson to modify her

medical findings. Nurse Carson is not alleged to have even

testified in Urbina I or to have testified adversely to

Plaintiff. Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under § 1985(2)

Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s § 1985 claims cannot

stand because Plaintiff is not a member of a protected class. An

essential requirement for a 1985(3) claim is that there must be

some racial or otherwise class-based “invidious discriminatory

animus” for the conspiracy. Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health

Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 268-69 (1993)(citing Griffin v.

Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971)). Section 1985(3) was not

meant to apply to all tortious conspiracies to deprive the rights

of another. Id. Section 1985(3) does not extend beyond race

unless that class can show that the government has determined

that class members “require and warrant special federal

assistance in protecting their civil rights.” Orin v. Barclay,

272 F.3d 1207, 1217 n.4 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Plaintiff argues that the complaint adequately alleges a §

1985 conspiracy among Defendants “to induce or encourage Carson

to change or alter her findings so as to exonerate, rather than

incriminate, the defendant police officers in Urbina I.” 

According to Plaintiff, Defendants illegally accessed or

disseminated Plaintiff’s confidential medical information with 

effect of undermining the conclusions stated in Carson’s August

15, 2003 report. However, Plaintiff does not claim that the

dissemination of the medical information was motivated by some

racial or class-based invidiously discriminatory animus. Also,

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in the Ninth Circuit, conspiracy claims are subject to a

heightened pleading standard. Harris, 126 F.3d at 1195. “In

order to survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs alleging a

conspiracy to deprive them of their constitutional rights must

include in their complaint non-conclusory allegations containing

evidence of unlawful intent or face dismissal...” Id. The plaintiff

must plead with particularity as to “which defendants conspired,

how they conspired and how the conspiracy led to a deprivation of

his constitutional rights.” (Id. at 1196.) In the present

action, this heightened pleading standard is not satisfied. 

Plaintiff does not allege a conspiracy to intimidate Plaintiff

among the Defendants, that was motivated by racial animus, or

that he was deprived of a constitutional right as a result. 

Defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1985

claims are GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE. 

C. Plaintiff’s Claim for Relief Under Cal. Civ. Code § 56.10, 

§ 56.35, and § 56.36

Cal. Civ. Code § 56.10, subdivision (a), provides: “No

provider of health care shall disclose medical information

regarding a patient of the provider without first obtaining an

authorization, except as provided in subdivision (b) or (c).” 

Heller v. Norcal Mutual Ins. Co., 8 Cal. 4th 30, 38 (Cal. 1994). 

Cal. Civ. Code § 56.35 provides:

“In addition to any other remedies available at law, a

patient whose medical information has been used or

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 Cal. Civ. Code § 56.10 applies to health care providers, 4

health care service plans, or healthcare contractors. 

 Cal. Civ. Code § 56.104 applies to the release of 5

information on outpatient psychotherapy treatment. 

 Cal. Civ. Code § 56.20 applies to the disclosure of 6

private medical information by employers or their agents. 

 Cal. Civ. Code § 56.26 applies to persons or entities 7

engaged in the business of furnishing administrative services to

programs that provide payment for health care services. 

 Cal. Civ. Code § 56 et seq. codifies the Confidentiality 8

of Medical Information Act. Francies v. Kapla, 127 Cal. App. 4th

1381, 1383 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005.) 

25

disclosed in violation of Section 56.10 or 56.104 or 4 5

56.20 or subdivision (a) of Section 56.26 and who has 6 7

sustained economic loss or personal injury therefrom

may recover compensatory damages, punitive damages not

to exceed three thousand dollars ($3,000), attorneys’

fees not to exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000), and

the costs of litigation.” 

Cal. Civ. Code § 56.36(b) provides: 

“In addition to any other remedies available at law,

any individual may bring an action against any person

or entity who had negligently released confidential

information or records concerning him or her in

violation of this part, for either or both of the

following: 

1. Nominal damages of one thousand dollars 

($1,000). In order to recover under this 

paragraph, it shall not be necessary that the 

plaintiff suffered or was threatened with 

actual damages.

2. The amount of actual damages, if any, sustained by

the patient. 

Cal. Civ. Code §§ 56.35 and 56.36 provide remedies for

violations of Cal. Civ. Code § 56 et seq., including 8

compensatory damages, punitive damages not to exceed § 3,000,

attorney fees not to exceed $1,000, and costs of suit. Heller, 8

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Cal. 4th at 38 (Cal. 1994). Section 56.36 makes a violation a

misdemeanor if the patient suffers economic loss or personal

injury. Id. To violate Cal. Civ. Code § 56 et seq., a provider

of health care must make an unauthorized, unexcused disclosure of

privileged medical information. Id.

i. Defendant Callanan

Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Callanan is a

health care provider or healthcare contractor. Plaintiff does

not allege that Callanan released any of Plaintiff’s medical

information in any way or that Callanan serves the capacity of

Plaintiff’s employer or as furnishing administrative services to

programs that provide payment for health care services. 

Plaintiff fails to allege facts to show that Callanan is in any

way liable for damages under Cal. Civ. Code § 56.35. 

Defendant’s motion to dismiss the first cause of action

against Defendant Callanan under Cal. Civ. Code § 56.10(a) is

GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE. 

ii. Defendants Carson and Orner

Defendant Carson is a nurse who treated Plaintiff for

injuries he alleges in Urbina I to have been inflicted by police

during his arrest. Defendant Orner is a medical doctor licensed

under the laws of the state of California. Both Defendants

qualify as health care providers for purposes of Cal. Civ. Code §

56.10(a). 

Plaintiff argues that he did not give Carson the

authorization to make her disclosures to Orner or Callanan, such

disclosures were not authorized under any statutory exemption. 

Defendants Carson, on the other hand, argues that the disclosures

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of Plaintiff’s medical information were allowed under Cal. Civ.

Code § 56.16. Under § 56.16, “unless there is a specific written

request by the patient to the contrary, nothing... shall be

construed to prevent a provider upon an inquiry concerning a

specific patient, from releasing at its discretion, any of the

following information: the patient’s name, address, age, and

sex, a general description of the reason for the treatment...” 

Cal. Civ. Code § 56.16. 

Defendant Carson argues that absent a written request by

Plaintiff, she was authorized by the statute to release general

information about Plaintiff’s medical condition. Carson argues

that Callanan and Orner already had the medical screening form in

their possession because it was provided to them by Plaintiff

through discovery. Plaintiff argues § 56.16 does not apply. 

According to Plaintiff the information Carson disclosed “was far

more and of a different quality than one would expect a provider

to disclose.” However, this conclusion is unilluminating and

Plaintiff does not specify what “medical details” were disclosed

or how such disclosure exceeded the scope of his actual consent

and implied consent to provide in civil discovery all information

about his physical, mental and medical conditions before and

after the accident which he placed in issue. Plaintiff further

argues that Orner is also liable under the theory of conspiracy

to violate Cal. Civ. Code § 56.10. According to Plaintiff, it is

irrelevant that Orner did not disclose, but only received the

confidential information. 

The case of Garrett v. Young 109 Cal. App. 4th 1393, 1406

(Cal. Ct. App. 2003) is instructive in determining the

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sufficiency of allegations in the complaint for violation of Cal.

Civ. Code § 56.10. In Garrett, the complaint alleged that

respondent disclosed “personal and confidential medical

information about appellant, including but not limited to

appellant’s current health, symptomology, examinations performed,

and her planned visits with respondent and other health care

providers.” Garrett, 109 Cal. App. 4th at 1398. Here the

complaint alleges only that the disclosure involved “information

and details regarding Plaintiff’s medical condition at the time

he was arrested.” Plaintiff concedes that he authorized the

disclosure of medical information resulting from his arrest, but

argues that Carson disclosed medical information beyond the scope

of his consent. The complaint does not state in general terms

the type of medical information that was disclosed or whether

that information extends beyond that contemplated by Cal. Civ.

Code § 56.16.

None of their state activity claims survives the absolute

witness immunity defense for Callanan and Orner.

Defendants’ motions to dismiss the first and second causes

of action against Defendants Carson and Orner under Cal. Civ.

Code § 56.10(a) and § 56.36(b) are GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE by

reason of absolute witness immunity.

D. Defendant’s Affirmative Defenses

i. Waiver

Defendant Orner raises the affirmative defense of waiver in

response to Plaintiff’s first and second causes of action. Orner

argues that even if Plaintiff made sufficient allegations to

sustain his first and second causes of action, Plaintiff waived

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his expectation of privacy regarding his medical condition by

placing his physical, mental and medical condition at issue in

litigation. Defendants claim that Plaintiff placed his medical

condition at issue by filing the Urbina I lawsuit. Plaintiff

then subpoenaed the Medical Screening Form prepared by Defendant

Carson and voluntarily provided the form to the Urbina I

defendants. In doing so, Defendant claims that Plaintiff waived

any right to confidentiality of the information contained in that

document for the purposes of a Section 56.10(a) lawsuit. 

Plaintiff argues that he does not sue Defendants based on

the information he consented to releasing in the Medical

Screening Form. Plaintiff alleges that he is suing over the

disclosure between the Defendants of medical information

exceeding the scope of the Medical Screening Form. According to

Plaintiff, the Medical Screening Form corroborated Plaintiff’s

claim that he was repeatedly struck in his ribs. However,

Plaintiff claims that Defendants Orner and Callanan talked to

Carson and obtained from her additional information which

Defendants then used “to rule out the claim that an officer

struck [Plaintiff], fracturing his ribs.”

The extent of a privacy interest is dependent on the

circumstances. Heller, 8 Cal. 4th at 43. By placing his

physical condition in issue, Plaintiff’s expectation of privacy

regarding that condition and his related medical records is nonexistent. see, Id. The plaintiff in an invasion of privacy case

must have conducted himself or herself in a manner consistent

with an actual expectation of privacy, i.e., he must not have

manifested by his conduct a voluntary consent. Hill v. Nat’l

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Collegiate Ath. Ass’n., 7 Cal. 4th 1, 26 (Cal. 1994). If

voluntary consent is present, a defendant’s conduct will rarely

be deemed “highly offensive to a reasonable person” so as to

justify tort liability. Id. The party intruded upon, of course,

may consent to the conduct of the intruding party. Id. at 102,

n.15. In such a case, the former may be said to have “waived”

his right of privacy or the latter may have said to have effected

no intrusion. Id. 

Here Plaintiff has put his medical condition and medical

treatment directly at issue in Urbina I, by claiming that he was

subjected to and injured by law enforcement use of excessive

force. He has waived his expectation to privacy as to the 

specific medical records arising out of the alleged injuries. 

The entirety of his medical history related to any injuries

claimed to be caused by the officers is a fair subject for

discovery and Plaintiff has no expectation of privacy in these

medical records and information.

In Urbina I, Plaintiff claims the police used excessive

force by striking him repeatedly in the ribs during his arrest

causing him to suffer severe and life threatening injuries,

including fractured ribs and a collapsed lung. The claim in

Urbina I, is based on Plaintiff’s medical condition which Carson

evaluated after the incident. It is Plaintiff who voluntarily

put his medical condition in issue. By doing so, Plaintiff has

relinquished his expectation of privacy and has waived his right

to confidentiality as to all his medical records, including those

specifically at issue. 

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Defendant also cites Heller for the proposition that the

medical information here would have inevitably been discovered

and, there was no invasion of privacy. Heller concerned the

alleged disclosure of Plaintiff’s medical information in an

underlying medical malpractice action against her treating

physician, Dr. Geis. Heller, 8 Cal. 4th at 36. Dr. Yamaguchi,

an expert witness in the underlying medical malpractice

litigation, had several private interviews with Defendant’s

malpractice insurer, Norcal, about Plaintiff’s medical condition. 

Id. Yamaguchi also disclosed Plaintiff’s medical records to

Norcal. Id. The court held that there was no invasion of

Plaintiff’s medical privacy rights because: 1) she put her

medical condition at issue and thus waived any privacy right to

the medical information related to the medical malpractice case;

and 2) the medical information would have been inevitably

discovered since Dr. Yamaguchi was an expert witness in the

medical malpractice action. see Id. at 1005-1006. As the

defense medical expert Defendant Orner would inevitably have been

provided Plaintiff’s medical information. Defendants Orner and

Callanan would have inevitably been provided and discovered

Plaintiff’s medical information. Defendants assert that Orner

and Callanan were hired by the defense as expert witnesses and

were scheduled to testify in Urbina I. Defendants also note that

Carson’s deposition about Plaintiff’s medical evaluation had

already been taken and all her information about Plaintiff’s

medical records and condition was in the public domain. Further,

Plaintiff concedes that the information disclosed by Carson would

have inevitably been discovered by stating in his opposition that

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 The case of Susan S. v. Philip D. Israels, 55 Cal. App. 9

4th 1290 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997), is instructive in determining when

a waiver of certain medical information is inapplicable. The

court found there was no waiver of Susan S.’s mental health

records because her mental health was not at issue in the

underlying sexual battery case. Id. at 1297. Susan S. brought an

action against Kevin Keables for sexual battery. Id. at 1293. 

In the course of defending Keables, his attorney, Philip Israels,

served a subpoena duces tecum on Harbour, a mental health

facility, for Susan S.’s mental health records. Id. Instead of

sending the documents to the court, they were mistakenly sent to

attorney Israels. Id. Knowing that the records were private and

confidential, Israels read them, transmitted them to the defense

psychiatrist and used them in his cross-examination of Susan S.

Id. The court held that there was no waiver by Susan S. of her

mental health records because, where her mental conditions was

not at issue, her expectation of privacy in her medical records

was not substantially lowered. Id. at 1297. Unlike the Heller

case, Susan S. did not place her mental health at issue by

charging Keables with sexual battery. Id. That court held that

the discovery of Susan S.’s mental health records was not

inevitable. Id. There is nothing inevitable about the discovery

of a rape victim’s mental health records. Id. Such discovery

requires a careful balancing of the defendant’s rights and the

plaintiff’s rights; this balance does not invariably tip in the

favor of the defendant. Id. The defendant must show good cause

for discovery of such mental health records. Id. at 1294. Susan

S. gave no waiver of her mental health records by filing a sexual

battery case. 

32

the defendants “should have gotten a deposition subpoena” to

obtain access to the information. 

Even if Plaintiff’s claims under Cal. Civ. Code § 56.10 et.

seq. were pled sufficiently, Plaintiff has waived his privacy

rights to the medical information discussed by Defendants. 

9

Defendant’s motion to dismiss on the ground of waiver is GRANTED

WITH PREJUDICE.

ii. Cal. Civ. Code § 47(b) Witness Immunity

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As an alternative defense, Defendants argue that the

communications at issue were privileged publications under

California Civil Code § 47(b). California Civil Code § 47(b)

provides in pertinent part. 

A privileged publication or broadcast is one made:

(a) In the proper discharge of an official duty.

(b) In any... judicial proceeding, in any other official

proceeding authorized by law, or in the initiation or

course of any other proceeding authorized by law and

reviewable pursuant to Chapter 2 (commencing with

Section 1084) of Title 1 of Part 3 of the Code of Civil

Procedure, except as follows:

(1) An allegation or averment contained in any

pleading or affidavit filed in an action for

marital dissolution or legal separation made of or

concerning a person by or against whom no

affirmative relief is prayed in the action shall

not be a privileged publication or broadcast as to

the person making the allegation or averment

within the meaning of this section unless the

pleading is verified or affidavit sworn to, and is

made without malice, by one having reasonable and

probable cause for believing the truth of the

allegation or averment and unless the allegation

or averment is material and relevant to the issues

in the action.

***

(c) In a communication, without malice, to a person

interested therein, (1) by one who is also interested,

or (2) by one who stands in such a relation to the

person interested as to afford a reasonable ground for

supposing the motive for the communication to be

innocent, or (3) who is requested by the person

interested to give the information....

The most relevant portion of section 47 is subsection b,

which provides absolute privilege for any “publication or

broadcast” made in any judicial proceeding. California courts

have given this privilege an “expansive reach.” Rubin v. Green,

4 Cal. 4th 1187, 1193-94 (1993). It extends to any communication

that bears “some relation to any ongoing or anticipated lawsuit.” 

Id. at 1194. The privilege also applies to a wide range of

causes of action. The California Supreme Court recognized “the

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only exception to [the application of section 47(b) to tort suits

has been for malicious prosecution.]” Id. The California courts

have applied the privilege to claims of abuse of process, Pollock

v. Univ. of So. Cal., 112 Cal. App. 4th 1416 (2003), fraud,

Carden v. Getzoff, 190 Cal App. 3d 907 (1987), invasion of

privacy, Ribas v. Clark, 38 Cal. 3d 355, 364 (1985), and

interference with contract, Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Bear

Stearns & Co., 50 Cal. 3d 1118 (1990).

The privilege is not limited to statements made in the

courtroom, but extends to “any publication required or permitted

by law in the course of a judicial proceeding to achieve the

objects of the litigation, even though the publication is made

outside the courtroom [when] no function of the court or its

officers is involved.” Hagberg v. California Federal Bank 32

Cal.4th 350, 361 (2004) (citing Silberg v. Anderson, 50 Cal. 3d

205, 212). The privilege also applies to “communications with"

'some relation to a proceeding that is ... under serious

consideration;' " to " 'potential court actions;' " and to "

'preliminary conversations and interviews related to contemplated

action,' " and. . . to communications made, prior to the filing

of a complaint, by a person "meeting and discussing" with

potential parties the "merits of the proposed ... lawsuit." Id. 

The statutory privilege extends to attorneys, judges,

witnesses, experts, jurors and court personnel. Mattco Forge,

Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co., 5 Cal. App. 4th 392, 402 (Cal. Ct.

App. 1992). The privilege is broadly applied to protect most

publications within lawsuits provided there is some connection

between the lawsuit and the publication. Any doubt as to whether

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 Heller is instructive. There, the dispute was whether 10

the unauthorized ex parte discussions that occurred during the

discovery phase of a medical malpractice action between a

nonparty treating physician and the defendant physician’s

malpractice insurer, regarding the litigant patient’s medical

condition, violated Cal. Civ. Code § 56, et seq. The court ruled

that Plaintiff did not sufficiently allege an invasion of a

protectable privacy interest and that Cal. Civ. Code § 47(b)

applied to the common law tort ex parte communications,

preventing recovery for the causes of action. Heller, 8 Cal. 4th

at 45. 

35

the privilege applies is resolved in favor of applying the

privilege. Adams v. Superior Court 2 Cal.App.4th 521, 529 (1992)

The privilege is absolute and bars all species of tort theories,

including invasion of privacy. Silberg, 50 Cal.3d at 215-216

(1990). 

10

Plaintiff’s only reply is that Cal. Civ. Code §47(b) does

not apply to criminal publication of information and that such

disclosures are not immune from tort liability. This is

nonsense. Conclusory hyperbole is not a substitute for law.

Defendants’ conversation or the review of relevant medical

information in litigation concerning that very subject by a

County hospital employee to experts for the County on subject

matters that Plaintiff put in issue and already partially

disclosed cannot be criminal and is well within the expansive

scope of the privilege. Plaintiff argues that the alleged ex

parte disclosures were criminal under Cal. Civ. Code § 56.36. 

Section 56.36 makes a violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 56.10 a

misdemeanor if the patient suffers economic loss or personal

injury as a result of the disclosure. These laws have already

been disposed of by the prior analysis. Plaintiff has alleged no

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facts to show that Defendants have violated Cal. Civ. Code §

56.10 and has not alleged he suffered economic loss or personal

injury as a result. 

One of the seminal issues in Urbina I is Plaintiff’s medical

condition at the time of his arrest and any treatment

administered. Here, it is undisputed that Defendant Carson

treated Plaintiff for injuries he alleges were inflicted by

arresting officers. It is also undisputed that Plaintiff

subpoenaed the Medical Screening Form prepared by Defendant

Carson and provided the document to the defense as part of

discovery. Plaintiff well knows that he has placed the entirety

of his present and pre-existing physical and mental condition in

issue. If he chooses to invoke privilege to block medical 

discovery, he will not be permitted to offer at trial any

withheld information and invites a potential negative inference

by invocation of the privilege if comment to the jury on exercise

of the privilege is permitted. Defendants admit that Callanan

and Orner, who are retained as expert witnesses in Urbina I, had

an ex parte conversation with Defendant Carson about Plaintiff’s

medical condition, existing at the time of his arrest. Since

Plaintiff’s injuries, physical, mental, and medical conditions

are all at issue in Urbina I, the conversation between Defendants

are directly related to the litigation and the experts’

preparation for giving testimony at trial. There was no other 

conceivable reason for the experts to communicate with Carson

about Plaintiff.

The privilege itself is broad and applies to “any

communication... that bears some relation to a proceeding,”

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including “preliminary conversations and interviews related to

contemplated action.” Hagberg v. California Federal Bank 32

Cal.4th 350, 361 (2004). Based on this law, if the communication

between Defendants had some connection to the lawsuit, the

privilege applies.

Defendants’ motions to dismiss on the ground of litigation

privilege are GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE.

iii. Judicial Estoppel

Defendant Orner also argues that Plaintiff’s Cal. Civ. Code

§ 56.10 claims are barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel. 

Judicial estoppel precludes a party from taking inconsistent

positions under certain circumstances.

As explained in Wagner v. Professional Eng’rs in Cal. Gov’t,

354 F.3d 1036, 1044 (9 Cir.2004): th

‘Judicial estoppel, sometimes known as the

doctrine of preclusion of inconsistent

positions, precludes a party from gaining an

advantage by taking one position, and then

seeking a second advantage by taking an

incompatible position.’ ... Judicial estoppel

is an equitable doctrine that is intended to

protect the integrity of the judicial process

by preventing a litigant from ‘playing fast

and loose with the courts.’ ... Judicial

estoppel applies to a party’s stated position

whether it is an expression of intention, a

statement of fact, or a legal assertion.

In determining whether to apply judicial estoppel, a court may

consider (1) whether the party’s later position was inconsistent

with its initial position; (2) whether the party successfully

persuaded the court to accept its earlier position; and (3)

whether the party would derive an unfair advantage or impose an

unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped from

asserting the inconsistent position. New Hampshire v. Maine, 532

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U.S. 742, 750-751 (2001). The Ninth Circuit restricts the

application of judicial estoppel “to cases where the court relied

on, or ‘accepted,’ the party’s previous inconsistent position.” 

Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 270 F.3d 778, 783 (9th

Cir.2001).

Defendant Orner argues that Plaintiff used the discovery

process available in Urbina I to set a “litigation trap” for the

Defendants. According to Orner, Plaintiff “baited” the

Defendants and their witnesses by voluntarily providing the

document to defense counsel so that he could later claim that the

information on the Medical Screening Form was confidential. 

However, Defendant Orner misunderstands Plaintiff’s position. 

Plaintiff does not take a clearly inconsistent position in this

case from Urbina I. Plaintiff argues that Defendants’

disclosures went beyond the scope of the Medical Screening Form. 

There are no facts to show that an inconsistent position was

adopted in some manner by the court in the underlying litigation. 

There is no evidence that Plaintiff, in filing this litigation,

is “playing fast and loose” with the court. There is no

indication that Plaintiff, in filing this litigation, was seeking

to derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on

the opposing party. 

Plaintiff does not address this affirmative defense in his

moving papers. Further Defendants, in their discussion, apply

the four factor test as applied by California State Courts,

rather than the Ninth Circuit Guidelines: 

“The Doctrine is most appropriate when 1. a party has

taken two totally inconsistent positions, 2. the

positions were taken in a judicial or qusi-judicial

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proceedings, 3. the first position was adopted or

accepted as true and 4. the first position was not

taken as a result, ignorance, fraud, or mistake. MW

Erectors, Inc. v. Niederhauser Ornamental & Metal Works

Co., Inc., 36 Cal. 4th 412, 422 (2005).

The California factors are not materially different from the

Ninth Circuit guidelines. Regardless of what law is used,

judicial estoppel does not apply in this case. However, since

the causes of action were dismissed, the judicial estoppel

doctrine issue is moot.

Defendant’s motions to dismiss on ground of judicial

estoppel are DENIED AS MOOT.

5. MOTION TO STRIKE

In the alternative, Defendants move to strike the first

causes and second causes of action under California’s “AntiSLAPP” statute, California Code of Civil Procedure Section

425.16, which provides in relevant part:

A cause of action against a person arising from any act of

that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition

or free speech under the United States or California

Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be

subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court

determines that the plaintiff has established that there is

a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.

...

As used in this section, “act in furtherance of a

person’s right of petition or free speech under the

United States or California Constitution in connection

with a public issue” includes: 

(1) any written or oral statement or writing made

before a legislative, executive, or judicial

proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized

by law; 

(2) any written or oral statement or writing made in

connection with an issue under consideration or review

by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any

other official proceeding authorized by law; 

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(3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a

place open to the public or a public forum in

connection with an issue of public interest; 

(4) or any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise

of the constitutional right of petition or the

constitutional right of free speech in connection with

a public issue or an issue of public interest.

Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 425.16(b)(1) & (e)(emphasis added).

A court considering a motion to strike under the Anti-SLAPP

statute must engage in a two-part inquiry. First, a defendant

must make an initial prima facie showing that the plaintiff’s

suit “aris[es] from” activity protected by the Anti-SLAPP

statute. Brill Media Co. v. TCW Group, Inc., 132 Cal. App. 4th

324, 329 (2005); Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 425.16(b)(1). In

performing this analysis, the California Supreme Court has

stressed, “the critical point is whether the plaintiff’s cause of

action itself was based on an act in furtherance of the

defendant’s right of petition or free speech.” City of Cotati v.

Cashman, 29 Cal. 4th 69, 78 (2002) (emphasis in original). 

If the defendant is able to make this threshold showing, the

burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate a probability of

prevailing on the challenged claims. In practice, a plaintiff

must show that the claim is “both legally sufficient and

supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain

a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff

is credited.” Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche, 31 Cal. 4th

728, 744 (2003). Claims for which Plaintiff is able to satisfy

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Although the anti-SLAPP statute applies to state law 11

claims brought in federal court, it does not apply to federal

question claims because such application would frustrate

substantive federal rights. See Smith v. California Dept. of

Corrections, 2006 WL 3518257 (E.D.Cal.2006) and cases cited

therein.

41

this burden are “not subject to being stricken as a SLAPP.” 

Id.

11

A. Defendants Have Met Their Burden of Showing the Allegations 

Demonstrate that Defendants Engaged in the Type of Free

Speech Activity Contemplated by § 425.16

Defendants each bring a special motion to strike Plaintiff’s

claims brought under Cal. Civ. Code § 56.10, § 56.35, § 56.36. 

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges the following:

1. Defendant Orner consented to be retained

as an expert to testify on behalf of the

defendants in Urbina I

2. Defendant Orner entered into a conspiracy

with expert witness and co-defendant Callanan

to induce or encourage co-defendant Carson to

change or alter her medical findings in

connection with the issues contested in

Urbina I

3. In furtherance of this conspiracy, Orner

communicated with Carson via telephone,

interviewing and obtaining from Carson

information regarding her August 15, 2003

evaluation of Plaintiff’s medical condition

without Plaintiff’s consent 

4. Defendant Callanan induced Defendant

Carson to modify her August 15, 2003 findings

so as to support the position of the Urbina I

defendants. 

5. This alleged conduct constitutes a

conspiracy to violate Cal. Civ. Code § 56.10

and Plaintiff is entitled to recover damages

pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code § 56.35 and §

56.36.

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A cause of action does not “arise from” protected activity

simply because it is filed after protected activity took place. 

Cashman, 29 Cal. 4th at 76-77. Nor does the fact “[t]hat a cause

of action arguably may have been triggered by protected activity”

necessarily mean that it arises from such activity. Cashman, 29

Cal. 4th at 78. The trial court must instead focus on the

substance of the plaintiff’s lawsuit in analyzing the first prong

of a special motion to strike. Scott v. Metabolife Intern.,

Inc., 115 Cal. App. 4th 404, 413-414 (2004); see also Cashman, 29

Cal. 4th at 78. In performing this analysis, the California

Supreme Court has stressed, “the critical point is whether the

plaintiff’s cause of action itself was based on an act in

furtherance of the defendant’s right of petition or free speech.” 

Cashman, 29 Cal. 4th at 78 (emphasis in original). In other

words, “the defendant’s act underlying the plaintiff’s cause of

action must itself have been an act in furtherance of the right

of petition or free speech.” Id.

Plaintiff’s state law claims in this case seek to chill, if

not wholly exclude, the testimony of Defendant expert witnesses,

who have knowledge of Plaintiff’s medical information. 

Plaintiff’s medical condition on August 15, 2003 is an issue

“under consideration or review by a judicial body.” It is a 

primary issue in Urbina I. Cal. Civ. P. §425.16(e)(2). The

actions complained of by the Plaintiff are oral statements made

in connection with that issue because Orner and Callanan

contacted Carson in their capacities as expert witnesses seeking

information directly related to Urbina I litigation. Standing

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alone the allegations demonstrate that Defendants engaged in the

type of free speech activity contemplated by § 425.16. 

B. Plaintiff Has Failed to Meet His Burden of Showing a 

Probability of Success on the Merits for His State Law 

Claims

Plaintiff’s state law causes of action have been dismissed

for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff has failed to allege

facts to show that Defendants were in any way liable for damages

under Cal. Civ. Code § 56.10, § 56.35, and § 56.36. According to

Cal. Civ. Code § 56.16, absent a written request by Plaintiff,

Defendant Carson was authorized to release general information

about Plaintiff’s medical condition. Defendants Callanan and

Orner already had the medical screening form in their possession

because it was provided to them by Plaintiff through discovery. 

Plaintiff failed to provide any evidence or information that the

medical information shared between Defendants extended beyond the

type of information contemplated by Cal. Civ. Code § 56.16.

However, even if Plaintiff had sufficiently established that

Defendants violated Cal. Civ. Code § 56.10, § 56.35, and § 56.36,

by putting his medical condition at issue in Urbina I, either the

doctrine of waiver or under Cal. Civ. Code § 47(b) witness

immunity would prevent Plaintiff from succeeding on his state law

claims. 

Since Plaintiff’s state law claims are dismissed with

prejudice for failure to state a claim, Defendants’ motions to

strike claims brought under Cal Civ. Code § 56.10(a) and §

56.36(b) are DENIED AS MOOT. 

 CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above,

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(1) Defendants’ Callanan, Carson and Orner motions to

dismiss Plaintiff’s third cause of action for violation of the

Fourth Amendment and for denial of due process under 42 U.S.C. §

1983 are GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

(2) Defendants’ Callanan, Carson and Orner motions to

dismiss Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action for conspiracy to

obstruct justice under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 are GRANTED WITH

PREJUDICE.

(3) Defendant Callanan’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s first

cause of action for conspiracy to violate under Cal. Civ. Code §§

56.10(a), 56.35 and 56.36(b) is GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE.

(4) Defendants’ Carson and Orner motions to dismiss

Plaintiff’s first and second causes of action for conspiracy to

violate and wrongful disclosure under Cal. Civ. Code §§ 56.10(a),

56.35 and 56.36(b) are GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE.

(5) Defendants’ Carson, Callanan and Orner Motions to strike

claims brought under Cal Civ. Code §§ 56.10, 56.35, and 56.36 are

DENIED AS MOOT.

(6) Counsel for Defendants shall prepare and lodge a form of

order that reflects the specific rulings on each issue addressed

by this decision within five (5) days following the date of

service of this decision.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 25, 2007 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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