Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_16-cv-00485/USCOURTS-azd-4_16-cv-00485-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dewey Lee McBride
Petitioner
Charles L Ryan
Respondent

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Dewey Lee McBride, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L Ryan, 

Respondent. 

No. CV-16-00485-TUC-CKJ

 ORDER 

 On December 2, 2016, Magistrate Judge Leslie A. Bowman issued a Report and 

Recommendation (Doc. 19) in which she recommended the Petition Under 28 U.S.C. 

§2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (Doc. 1) filed by Dewey 

McBride be denied. McBride objected to the Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 20). 

Respondents have not filed a response. 

 This Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Further, under 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), if a party makes a timely objection to a magistrate judge's 

recommendation, then this Court is required to “make a de novo determination of those 

portions of the [report and recommendation] to which objection is made.” The statute 

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does not “require [] some lesser review by [this Court] when no objections are filed.” 

Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149-50, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985). Rather, this 

Court is not required to conduct “any review at all . . . of any issue that is not the subject 

of an objection.” Id. at 149. 

 No objections having been made to the magistrate judge’s rendering of the 

procedural and factual history, the Court adopts those recitations. The Court now 

evaluates McBride’s objections to statutory time computation, and finds McBride’s 

petition is time-barred. 

Procedural History 

 The Court will briefly reiterate facts mentioned in the Report and 

Recommendation and supplement them with additional facts in the record that 

specifically address the objections by McBride. 

 McBride was sentenced August 17, 2009, and filed his first petition for postconviction relief on February 22, 2011. (Doc. 19, p. 2). The first petition requested an 

evidentiary hearing and resentencing on the issues of ineffective assistance of counsel 

and mental incompetency. (Doc. 12, p. 10; Doc. 19, p. 2). Specifically, McBride argued 

his mental health issues were not properly addressed by the court, and counsel failed to 

represent him in the presentence interview as well as failed to present mitigating evidence 

at sentencing. Id. The trial court denied the petition on November 30, 2011. (Doc. 13, pp. 

36-38). 

 After the denial, McBride filed a petition for review in the Arizona Court of 

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Appeals on January 4, 2012. (Doc. 19, p. 2). The appeals court granted a limited remand 

to determine which exhibits the judge considered for sentencing. Id. The inquiry revealed 

a disparaging letter the trial judge had reviewed. Id. The letter was sealed and had not 

been disclosed to the parties. Id. Without directly addressing the letter, the Arizona Court 

of Appeals granted review but denied relief on May 25, 2012. (Doc. 14, p. 29). In its 

memorandum decision, the appeals court explained “McBride has failed to demonstrate 

the trial court abused its discretion, either in finding insufficient evidence that he was 

incompetent, or in concluding that counsel was not ineffective by failing to challenge 

McBride’s incompetency at the change-of-plea and sentencing hearings.” (Doc. 19, p. 2). 

McBride moved for a rehearing based on the letter but it was summarily denied. Id. 

 On October 13, 2012, McBride filed a petition for review in the Arizona Supreme 

Court. (Doc. 19, p. 2). This petition again argued incompetency and ineffective 

assistance, but also included a request to remand for resentencing before a different judge 

due to the sealed letter. (Doc. 14, p. 52; Doc. 19, p. 2). The Arizona Supreme Court 

denied the petition February 15, 2013. (Doc. 19, p. 2). 

 On April 12, 2013, McBride filed a second Notice of Post-Conviction Relief in the 

trial court. (Doc. 19, p. 3). The trial court dismissed the notice because the Arizona Court 

of Appeals had not yet issued its mandate, and the court did not have jurisdiction. Id. 

 McBride then filed another Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (“Notice”) in the trial 

court on June 10, 2013, as well as a sealed motion for change of judge for cause. Id.

When this petition was filed on August 12, 2013, McBride argued that the merits of the 

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issues raised in the First Petition (McBride’s incompetency and counsel’s ineffective 

assistance) needed to be re-reviewed because the disclosed letter constituted newly 

discovered evidence which could have had an impact not only on the sentencing, but in 

the trial court’s initial Rule 32 proceedings. (Doc. 15, p. 47; Doc. 19, p. 3). The court 

reassigned the case to a different judge, finding “[the judge] has not, in any way, acted 

improperly, that she acted in good faith in these matters, and that she reasonably believed 

that no party would gain an advantage as a result of the ex-parte communication and that 

the communication did not have an effect at the time of sentencing. However, this Court 

does not wish there to be any issue of any nature surrounding these procedures.” (Doc. 

15, p. 36). 

 At first, the trial court held that the letter was not “newly discovered evidence” 

and denied both resentencing and re-evaluation of his first petition in front of a new 

judge. (Doc. 19, p. 3). But, after McBride filed a motion for rehearing, the trial court 

found the letter was “newly discovered evidence” and granted McBride a resentencing. 

(Doc. 17, pp. 6-7). It did not, however, re-examine its order denying a re-evaluation of 

the Rule 32 of-right petition in front of a different judge. (Doc. 19, p. 3).

 McBride then filed a petition for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals on March 

31, 2014. (Doc. 17, p. 11). The appeals court granted review but denied relief on 

September 22, 2014. (Doc. 18, pp. 3-6). 

 McBride filed for review in the Arizona Supreme Court but was this was denied 

on April 21, 2015. (Doc. 18, p. 20). The Arizona Court of Appeals’ mandate issued on 

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May 7, 2015. (Doc. 8-4, p. 2). 

 Finally, McBride filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court 

on July 20, 2015 (Doc. 18, p. 36) which was denied on December 7, 2015. (Doc. 18-6, p. 

2). 

 The pending petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this Court was filed July 21, 

2016. (Doc. 1). 

Statutory Limitations for Filing a Writ of Habeas Corpus

 Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, a petitioner may 

file a writ of habeas corpus in federal court requesting relief from a state judgment, 

however, the time for the appeal is not unlimited. Petitioners have one year to file from 

“the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the 

expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 8 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). “The time during 

which a properly filed application for State post-conviction . . . is pending shall not be 

counted toward any period of limitation.” 8 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

 McBride’s objections raise three issues: (1) whether the time between the 

conclusion of review of the first Rule 32 of-right proceedings and the Notice was tolled 

when calculating the one-year statute of limitations, (2) whether the sealed letter viewed 

by the judge but not counsel constituted structural error, negating the first round of 

appeals, and (3) whether the review was “pending” until the U.S. Supreme Court issued 

its denial of certiorari. The Court addresses these issues separately. 

1. Tolling of Time Between Petitions 

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 The magistrate judge found the end of direct review occurred on May 16, 2013; 

ninety (90) days after the Arizona Supreme Court denied McBride’s first petition. The 

Report and Recommendation subtracts the twenty-four (24) day period between that date 

and the date of the properly filed Notice of Post-Conviction Relief from the one year 

filing deadline. See Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007) (When 

notice is filed properly “it is sufficient to toll the AEDPA statute of limitations.”). 

 McBride argues that the time between conclusion of the first round of Rule 32 

proceedings and the filing of the Notice in the second petition on June 10, 2013 was 

tolled because his second petition met the two-pronged test laid out in King v. Roe, 340 

F.3d 821, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (abrogated on other grounds); accord. Stancle 

v. Clay, 692 F.3d 948, 953 (9th Cir. 2012). 

 The King test determines whether a petitioner is entitled to tolling of “the period 

between petitions filed in the same court.” Stancle v. Clay, 692 F.3d at 953 (quoting

Banjo v. Ayers, 614 F.3d 964, 968 (9th Cir. 2010)). First, the Court must decide “whether 

the petitions are limited to an elaboration of the facts relating to the claims in the first 

petition.” King, 340 F.3d at 823. If the Court considers the second petition an elaboration, 

“[the court] construe[s] the new petitions as part of the first ‘full round’ of collateral 

review” and allows tolling. Id. If the petitioner simply tried to correct deficiencies in the 

first petition the time would toll, but if the petitioner raises new claims, he brings a new 

round of collateral attack and the statute of limitations would run. Stancle, 692 F.3d at 

954. Second, the Court must decide whether the state court denied the second claim based 

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on the merits or deemed the second petition untimely. Id. 

 Here, the magistrate judge’s determination of the date that terminated direct 

review was made prior to McBride’s objections. Assumedly, the decision was predicated 

on the assumption that each petition was separate; the first petition raised issues of 

ineffective assistance of counsel and mental competency, the second raised the claim of 

newly-discovered evidence. 

 Under this logic, McBride’s first petition was first denied by the trial court, then 

the Arizona Court of Appeals, and finally the Arizona Supreme Court on February 15, 

2013. The Report and Recommendation states the final judgment would commence 

ninety (90) days after the denial, giving McBride a three month period to petition the U.S. 

Supreme Court for certiorari. Since McBride did not petition to the U.S. Supreme Court, 

the time expired to seek such review. 

 Based on McBride’s arguments before the magistrate judge, her conclusions were 

reasonable. The “newly discovered evidence” argument was not raised until after the 

magistrate judge made her Report and Recommendation. However, when analyzed under 

King, the newly discovered evidence issue was inextricably tied to the first proceeding 

and functioned as an expansion of the record in the first petition. 

 The District Court of Arizona’s decision in Corrales v. Ryan is instructive. 2015 

WL 4882632 (D. Ariz., Jun. 24, 2015). In that case, the defendant filed his first notice of 

post-conviction relief alleging his attorney was ineffective because he did not ask that 

counts be severed, and did not object to impeachment testimony or to the admission of 

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evidence. Id. at *2. The trial court denied the petition. Id. He then filed a petition for 

review to the Arizona Court of Appeals using the same arguments and was summarily 

denied. Id. Defendant did not file a petition to the Arizona Supreme Court, instead filing 

a second Rule 32 Notice in the trial court. Id. This time, defendant alleged ineffective 

assistance of counsel and newly-discovered evidence, but failed to include any argument 

or facts in support of either claim. Id. at 3. The court found that the second petition was 

not an elaboration of the first, instead it asserted new claims of ineffective assistance and 

newly discovered evidence and denied tolling of the time between petitions. Id. at 5. 

Addressing the second prong, the court also found the filings were untimely. Id. at 4. 

 McBride’s situation is distinguishable from Corrales. In that case, the defendant 

had neither discovered new evidence during the pendency of the first proceedings, nor 

attempted to have the newly discovered evidence addressed during the pendency of the 

first round of review. When the defendant raised ineffective assistance and newly 

discovered evidence claims in the second round of proceedings, he failed to amend his 

second petition with any additional facts that were unknown to the trial court in the first. 

McBride, on the other hand, attempted at the earliest possible opportunity to obtain a 

rehearing at the Arizona Court of Appeals on the issue of the sealed letter during the first 

round of proceedings. He then petitioned for review of the issue to the Arizona Supreme 

Court. When McBride filed his second petition at the trial court, it included the letter, a 

newly discovered fact which was presented in the first round of review, but had not been 

properly addressed by the trial court in the first petition because the fact was unknown at 

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the time of filing. In McBride’s case, the trial court granted him resentencing and found 

there was newly discovered evidence which could have altered the sentence. (Doc. 17, p. 

6). McBride was attempting to fix the discrepancies and errors in the first petition based 

on facts that were only revealed in the process of his first Rule 32 post-conviction 

proceedings. Unlike Corrales, McBride reasserted his original claims, but then asked that 

these claims be re-examined based on the newly-discovered letter. The “newly 

discovered evidence” should not be considered another claim, but the avenue in which 

McBride was able to elaborate on the facts included in the first Rule 32 petition. 

 The second prong of the two-part analysis is satisfied as well. The trial court did 

not find McBride’s second petition untimely, and denied the petition on the merits. 

 The Court finds the later petition, filed June 10, 2013, was not a subsequent round 

of collateral review, but elaborated on the facts of the first petition. Therefore, the time 

between the conclusion of direct review in the Arizona Supreme Court and the Notice in 

the second round of post-conviction proceedings was tolled.

2. Structural Error 

 In the alternative, McBride argues that if the Court rejects the argument that the 

time between proceedings is tolled, then the second Notice should be treated as the Rule 

32 of-right petition for the purposes of beginning the one-year statute of limitations. He 

reasons the first petition and all of its appeals proceedings were void because the sealed 

letter constituted structural error by the trial court, and cannot be used to calculate the 

time. 

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 Structural errors “infect the entire trial process and necessarily render a trial 

fundamentally unfair.” Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7–9, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 

L.Ed.2d 35 (1999); see State v. Ring (Ring III), 65 P.3d 915, 993 ¶ 45 (2003). Structural 

error “is limited to such circumstances as denial of counsel or a biased [trier or fact],” 

State v. Valverde, 208 P.3d 233, 235–36 (Ariz. 2009) (en banc) (citing State v. Garza,

163 P.3d 1006, 1013 n. 6 (2007). In such cases, prejudice is presumed, because errors 

were “so intrinsically harmful as to require automatic reversal.” Id. at ¶ 10. 

 A biased trial judge may constitute structural error, but bias means more than 

simply considering evidence that should not have been considered. McBride’s examples 

differ from the present situation. In those cases, the judges had a high degree of improper 

personal involvement. In Williams v. Pennsylvania, a judge on a panel did not recuse 

himself from post-conviction review, but should have because he had approved the death 

penalty against the defendant when he served as a district attorney. __ U.S. __, 136 S.Ct. 

1899, 1910, 195 L.Ed.2d 132 (2016). In another case, the judge had a pecuniary interest 

in the outcome of the case. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749 

(1927). In the last case, a judge denied a defendant the right to a jury verdict, and instead 

substituted his own. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 

L.Ed.2d 182 (1993). 

 The error committed here was not structural error. The sentencing judge sealed 

one letter and reviewed it for sentencing, however, she had no interest in the outcome and 

viewing the letter did not undermine the entire sentencing process. This situation is much 

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closer to that of a jury permitted to review evidence which had not been admitted. See 

e.g., Eslaminia v. White, 136 F.3d 1234, fn. 1 (9th Cir. 1998) (not structural error when 

jurors considered taped interview of individual who did not testify, tape was not in 

evidence, and counsel did not find out until after deliberations.); People v. Gamache, 227 

P.3d 342, 385-86 (Cal. 2010) (not structural error when jurors viewed tape of two 

witnesses not admitted into evidence); but see United States v. Noushfar, 78 F.3d 1442 

(9th Cir. 1996) (structural error found when judge allowed jury to view 14 incriminating 

tapes of defendants’ statements). Because there was no structural error, prejudice is not 

presumed. Valverde, 208 P.3d at 236. McBride has failed to show prejudice during his 

first round of post-conviction proceedings, and the Court finds the denials of review in 

McBride’s first round of post-conviction review proceedings are valid. 

 Therefore, the conclusion of direct review occurred after the Arizona Supreme 

Court denied review in the first round of proceedings on February 15, 2013. See section 

4, infra (discussing conclusion of review occurs on the date the state’s highest court 

denied review). 

 Nonetheless, even if this Court found the first round of post-conviction review 

void due to structural error, the Court would not agree with McBride’s conclusion. 

Because the Court finds tolling of all the time from the first petition to the conclusion of 

the second petition, McBride’s argument would not increase the tolled time. 

3. Final Judgment to U.S. Supreme Court 

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to the United States Supreme Court was denied on December 7, 2015. He cites no case 

law supporting this theory. If true, it would mean the entire time between final judgment 

of the Arizona Supreme Court on May 16, 2013, to the denial of his petition for certiorari 

by the U.S. Supreme Court on December 7, 2013 was excluded from statute of 

limitations calculations. Accordingly, the pending petition (Doc. 1) would have been filed 

within the statutory time, 227 days later on July 21, 2016. 

 McBride’s calculations for the end of tolling are incorrect. A petition to the U.S. 

Supreme Court for certiorari does not stop the statute of limitations clock from running. 

The U.S. Supreme Court explained: 

 “[T]he statute of limitations is tolled only while state courts review the 

application. . . . [A] state post-conviction application ‘remains pending’ ‘until the 

application has achieved final resolution though the State’s post-conviction 

procedures.’ [The U.S. Supreme Court] is not a part of a ‘State’s post-conviction 

procedures.’ And an application for state post-conviction review no longer exists. 

All that remains is a separate certiorari petition pending before a federal court. The 

application for state post-conviction review is therefore not ‘pending’ after the 

state court’s post-conviction review is complete, and § 2244(d)(2) does not toll the 

1-year limitations period during the pendency of a petition for certiorari.” 

Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 332 127 S.Ct. 1079, 166 L.Ed.2d 924 (2007) 

(emphasis in original). Applying this to the pending writ, the time between the Arizona 

Supreme Court denial on the second round of post-conviction review and the final denial 

of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court was not tolled. 

4. Denial from Arizona Supreme Court 

 Since the Court finds that McBride’s petition was not pending while seeking a 

petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court must now determine the 

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actual date the tolling of time concluded and the clock began to run. 

 Tolling concludes at the time in which “the State’s highest court has issued its 

mandate or denied review.” Lawrence, 549 U.S. at 332 (emphasis added). In Arizona, the 

denial of review by the State Supreme Court ends the pendency of appeals proceedings 

and allows the clock to begin again. Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1077 (9th Cir. 

2007), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 829 (2008); Flores v. Trujillo, 2013 WL 424725 (D. Ariz., 

Apr. 10, 2014) (“When the Arizona Supreme Court denied his petition for postconviction review, the limitation period began running again from where it left off.”). 

 The Court concludes the date the proceedings were no longer ‘pending’ was on 

April 21, 2015, when the Arizona Supreme Court denied relief. Therefore, the clock 

began on April 24, 2015, the day after the Arizona Supreme Court decision and expired 

366 days later on April 23, 2016. 1 McBride filed his federal habeas petition on July 21, 

2016, 457 days after the clock started. So, even granting tolling for the twenty-four (24) 

days between his first and second petition, the pending habeas is still eighty-nine (89) 

days overdue and is deemed untimely. The Court therefore finds: 

1. The entire time period between McBride’s filing of his first Rule 32 petition ofright on February 22, 2011, and his denial by the Arizona Supreme Court on April 

21, 2015 is tolled. 

 

1

 Like the magistrate judge, the Court uses the “anniversary method” and includes an additional day because 2016 was a leap year. (Doc. 19, p. 6) (citing United State v. 

Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 2000). Since the filing deadline was a Sunday, the court extends the deadline to Monday, April 24, 2016. Fed.R.Civ.P 6(a)(1)(C). 

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2. The clock for the one-year time limit to file a writ for habeas corpus in federal 

court began the day after the Arizona Supreme Court issued its denial of review, 

April 22, 2015. 

3. Petitioner’s deadline for filing within the one-year time limit expired April 24, 

2016. 

4. Petitioner filed his Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by 

a Person in State Custody on July 21, 2016, eighty-nine (88) days after the oneyear statute of limitations had expired. 

5. Petitioner’s writ is therefore time-barred. 

Certificate of Appealability (“COA”)

 Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires that in habeas cases the 

“district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order 

adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in cases concerning detention 

arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 

2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). Here, 

the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges detention pursuant to 

a State court judgment. This Court must determine, therefore, if a COA shall issue. 

 The standard for issuing a COA is whether the applicant has “made a substantial 

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district 

court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy 

§ 2253(c) is straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists 

would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or 

wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000). 

“When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching 

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the prisoner's underlying constitutional claim, a COA should issue when the prisoner 

shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a 

valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Id.; see also 

Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143,1146-47 (9th Cir. 2007) (failure to object to magistrate 

judge’s conclusions does not automatically waive appellate challenge) In the certificate, 

the Court must indicate which specific issues satisfy the showing. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2253(c)(3). 

 The Court finds that jurists of reason would not find it debatable whether the 

Petition was filed within the statutory time limitations and the Court finds that jurists of 

reason would not find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural 

ruling. A COA shall not issue as to McBride’s claims. 

 Any further request for a COA must be addressed to the Court of Appeals. See

Fed. R.App. P. 22(b); Ninth Circuit R. 22-1 

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED: 

1. The Report and Recommendation (Doc. 19) is ADOPTED IN PART; 

2. The Petition Under 28 U.S.C. §2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in 

State Custody (Doc. 1) is DENIED; 

. . . 

. . . 

. . . 

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3. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment and shall then close its file in this 

matter, and; 

4. A Certificate of Appealability shall not issue in this case. 

 Dated this 26th day of January, 2017. 

Honorable Cindy K. Jorgenson

United States District Judge 

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