Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02056/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02056-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Guadalupe Montalvo-Murillo
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 

) 

GUADALUPE MONTALVO-MURILLO, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee. ) 

. FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

MAY 311989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

89-2056 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. CR-89-86) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

William L. Lutz, United States Attorney, and Robert J. Gorence, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for 

Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Bernard J. Panetta, II and Mary Stillinger of Caballero, Panetta & 

Ortega, El Paso, Texas, for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before MOORE, ANDERSON, and TACHA, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

Appellate Case: 89-2056 Document: 01019961474 Date Filed: 05/31/1989 Page: 1 
34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The cause is therefore ordered 

This appeal is taken from an order of the United States 

District Court for the District of New Mexico setting terms and 

conditions of defendant's release pending trial, notwithstanding 

the court's finding that no conditions or combination of 

conditions would reasonably assure his presence in court or the 

safety of the community, 18 u.s.c. § 3142(e). 1 The court directed 

1 (e) Detention. -- If, after a hearing pursuant to 

the provisions of subsection (f) of this section, the 

judicial officer finds that no condition or combination 

of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of 

the person as required and the safety of any other 

person and the community, such judicial officer shall 

order the detention of the person before trial~ In a 

case described in subsection (f)(l) of this section, a 

rebuttable presumption arises that no condition or 

combination of conditions will reasonably assure the 

safety of any other person and the community if such 

judicial officer finds that --

(1) the person has been convicted of a Federal 

offense that is described in subsection (f)(l) of 

this section, or of a State or local offense that 

would have been an offense described in subsection 

(f)(l) of this section if a circumstance giving 

rise to Federal jurisdiction had existed; 

(2) the offense described in paragraph (1) of this 

subsection was committed while the person was on 

release pending trial for a Federal, State, or 

local offense; and 

(3) a period of not more than five years has 

elapsed since the date of conviction, or the 

release of the person from imprisonment, for the 

offense described in paragraph (1) of this 

subsection, whichever is later. 

Subject to rebuttal by the person, it shall be presumed 

that no condition or combination of conditions will 

reasonably assure the appearance of the person as 

required and the safety of the community if the judicial 

officer finds that there is probable cause to believe 

(continued on next page) 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-2056 Document: 01019961474 Date Filed: 05/31/1989 Page: 2 
release after determining that release on conditions was the 

appropriate remedy for violations of the failure to hold a 

detention hearing within the time requirements of 18 u.s.c. 

§ 3142(f). 2 We affirm. 

(continued from previous page) 

that the person committed an offense for which a maximum 

term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed 

in the Controlled Substances Act (21 u.s.c. 861 et 

seq.), the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act 

(21 u.s.c. 951 et seq .. ), section 1 of the Act of 

September 15, 1980 (21 U.S.C. 955a), or an offense under 

section 924(c) of title 18 of the United States Code. 

2 (f) Detention hearing. -- The judicial officer 

shall hold a hearing to determine whether any condition 

or combination of conditions set forth in subsection (c) 

of this section will reasonably assure the appearance of 

the person as required and the safety of any other 

person and the community --

(1) upon motion of the attorney for the 

Government, in a case that involves 

(A) a crime of violence; 

(B) an offense for which the maximum sentence 

is life imprisonment or death; 

(C) an offense for which a maximum term of 

imprisonment of ten years or more is 

prescribed in the Controlled Substances Act 

(21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), the Controlled 

Substances Import and Export Act (21 u.s.c. 

951 et seq.), or section 1 of the Act of 

September 15, 1980 (21 u.s.c. 955a); ~r 

(D) any felony if the person has been 

convicted of two or more offenses described in 

subparagraphs (A) through (C) of this 

paragraph, or two or more State or local 

offenses that would have been offenses 

described in subparagraphs (A) through (C) of 

this paragraph if a circumstance giving rise 

to Federal jurisdiction had existed, or a 

combination of such offenses; or 

(2) upon 

Government or 

motion of 

upon the 

3 

the attorney for the 

judicial officer's own 

(continued on next page) 

Appellate Case: 89-2056 Document: 01019961474 Date Filed: 05/31/1989 Page: 3 
We recite the facts from the district court's memorandum 

opinion and order filed March 1, 1989. 

(continued from previous page) 

motion, in a case that involves --

(A) a serious risk that the person will flee; 

or 

(B) a serious risk that the person will 

obstruct or attempt to obstruct justice, or 

threaten, injure, or intimidate, or attempt to 

threaten, injure, or intimidate, a prospective 

witness or. juror. 

The hearing shall be held immediately upon the person's 

first appearance before the judicial officer unless that 

person, or the attorney for the Government, seeks a 

continuance. Except for good cause, a continuance on 

motion of the person may not exceed five days, and a 

continuance on motion of the attorney for the Government 

may not exceed three days. During a continuance, the 

person shall be detained, and the judicial officer, on 

motion of the attorney for the Government 6r sua sponte, 

may order that, while in custody, a person who appears 

to be a narcotics addict receive a medical examination 

to determine whether such person is an addict. At the 

hearing, such person has the right to be represented by 

counsel, and, if financially unable to obtain adequate 

representation, to have counsel appointed. The person 

shall be afforded an opportunity to testify, to present 

witnesses, to cross-examine witnesses who appear at the 

hearing, and to present information by proffer or 

otherwise. The rules concerning admissibility of 

evidence in criminal trials do not apply to the 

presentation and consideration of information at the 

hearing. The facts the judicial officer uses to support 

a finding pursuant to subsection (e) that no condition 

or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the 

safety of any other person and the community shall be 

supported by clear and convincing evidence. The person 

may be detained pending completion of the hearing. The 

hearing may be reopened before or after a determination 

by the judicial officer, at any time before trial if the 

judicial officer finds that information exists that was 

not known to the movant at the time of the hearing and 

that has a material bearing on the issue whether there 

are conditions of release that will reasonably assure 

the appearance of the person as required and the safety 

of any other person and the community. 

4 

Appellate Case: 89-2056 Document: 01019961474 Date Filed: 05/31/1989 Page: 4 
On February 8, 1989 defendant, a Mexican citizen 

and legal residint alien of the United States, was 

arrested by United States Customs agents at a checkpoint 

in· Orogrande, New Mexico in connection with the 

discovery of a substantial quantity of cocaine in an 

auxiliary gasoline tank mounted in the rear of 

defendant's pickup truck. According to the customs 

agents, defendant advised that his destination was 

Chicago, Illinois where he intended to make delivery of 

the cocaine, and at the agents' request defendant agreed 

to participate in a "controlled delivery" to the 

anticipated purchasers. The customs agents then met 

with personnel of the Drug Enforcement Administration 

who made arrangements for the Chicago venture. 

Consequently, defendant flew to Chicago, Illinois in the 

company of a DEA agent and another DEA agent drove 

defendant's vehicle to Chicago where the controlled 

delivery was attempted. However, nobody showed up to 

receive the shipment in Chicago. 

On February 10, 1989 a complaint was filed in New 

Mexico and the United states Magistrate for the District 

of New Mexico issued a warrant for defendant's arrest; 

and defendant, who at the time was in Chicago, was taken 

before a United States Magistrate in Illinois for a 

hearing in accordance with Rule 40 of the Federal Rules 

of Criminal Procedure. This was defendant's initial 

appearance before a judicial officer. 

During the February 10 hearing Ms. Garza, the 

Assistant United States Attorney who was handling the 

case, advised the Magistrate that the Government "was 

going to move for detention" but an agreement had been 

reached with Ms. Green, defendant's court appointed 

counsel. Ms. Garza represented it had been agreed that 

defendant would consent to removal of the proceedings to 

New Mexico, where he was charged, if he would be 

returned to New Mexico immediately. Ms. Garza stated 

that they had also agreed tha~ defendant would waive a 

detention hearing in Illinois, but he would not waive 

his rights to a preliminary hearing or a detention 

hearing in New Mexico. 

The United States Magistrate in Illinois did not 

ask defendant any questions to determine his ability to 

understand his rights and the nature of the proceeding. 

She asked no questions about his understanding of his 

rights under 18 u.s.c. § 3142(f). She did not make 

findings that defendant had knowingly and voluntarily 

waived his right to an immediate detention hearing or 

that defendant had consented to a continuance. The 

Magistrate advised the defendant, through an 

interpreter, that before being sent back to New Mexico 

5 

Appellate Case: 89-2056 Document: 01019961474 Date Filed: 05/31/1989 Page: 5 
he had the right to a determination that there was 

probable cause to believe he committed an offense and 

that he was the person named in the complaint and 

further advised him that he was entitled to a hearing on 

detentlon or bail. The Magistrate then asked "Is that 

agreeable to you?" Defendant's counsel responded, 

obliquely, that "we are not wa1v1ng the preliminary 

hearing." The Magistrate then rephrased the question to 

defendant by asking "Is that acceptable?" Defendant's 

response, through the interpreter; was "Yes ••. if 

they want me to, I'm with them." Next, the Magistrate 

asked defendant if he had talked to his counsel, Ms. 

Green, "about it'' and defendant's interpreted reply was 

"Yes, well she is Ms. Green, right?" The Magistrate 

said "yes" and "alright, then we will enter an order of 

removal specifically reserving the issues on detention 

and probable cause for determination by the District 

Court in New Mexico •• " Defendant made no statements 

during the hearing in Illinois other than the two 

responses, set forth in full above, and a reply of "yes'' 

to a question about whether he understood he was present 

for a removal hearing. The United States Magistrate in 

Illinois ordered that the defendant be returned to New 

Mexico; he was returned late on the evening of Friday, 

February 10, 1989 and was jailed in Las Cruces, New 

Mexico. 

On the morning of Monday, February 13, 1989, a 

representative of the Drug Enforcement Administration 

conferred with the secretary in the office of the United 

States Magistrate in Las Cruces, New Mexico about a date 

and time for a detention hearing and arraignment. The 

Office of the United States Magistrate for the District 

of New Mexico scheduled a hearing on Thursday, February 

16, 1989. On Wednesday, February 15, 1989 the United 

States Magistrate appointed counsel to represent the 

defendant, but retained counsel appeared on defendant's 

behalf at the hearing the following day, February 16, 

1989. 

It appears that the Assistant United States 

Attorney and defendant were prepared to proceed with the 

detention hearing on February 16, 1989; neither the 

government nor the defendant moved for a continuance. 

However, at the beginning of the February 16 hearing the 

Magistrate· stated that "in the interest of justice'' the 

detention hearing should be rescheduled on February 21, 

1989,· apparently because a Pre-Trial Services Report had 

not yet been prepared. Again, at the February 16, 1989 

hearing, which was defendant's first appearance before a 

judicial officer in New Mexico, no inquiry was made of 

defendant's understanding of his right to an immediate 

detention hearing under 18 u.s.c. § 3142(f) and there 

6 

Appellate Case: 89-2056 Document: 01019961474 Date Filed: 05/31/1989 Page: 6 
was no finding that defendant had knowingly and 

voluntarily waived his right to an immediate hearing. 

In fact, the Magistrate did not advise defendant of any 

rights and asked him no questions. Moreover, the United 

States Magistrate made no finding, as required by 18 

u.s.c. § 3142(f), that there was "good cause" to 

continue the hearing to February 21, 1989. 

In regard to postponing the hearing to February 21, 

1989, the Magistrate stated that the hearing would be 

held that date if the Government moved to detain the 

defendant and in~icated that if it did not, on 

February 21, 1989 the Magistrate would set conditions of 

release. The Government filed a Motion for Detention on 

February 17, 1989. This was the first detention motion 

that was actually made; the Government had intended to 

move for detention on February 10, 1989 before the 

Magistrate in Illinois, but had not done sq by reason of 

the agreement reached with defendant's court appointed 

counsel in Illinois. Since the Government filed a 

written motion for detention on February 17, 1989, the 

United States Magistrate in Las Cruces, New Mexico 

proceeded with a detention hearing on February 21, 1989 

at the conclusion of which the Magistrate said he would 

set conditions of release but would allow the Government 

an opportunity to appeal to United States District Court 

before entry of the order setting conditions of release. 

The United States Attorney therefore requested an 

immediate hearing before the District Court and that 

hearing was held on February 23, 1989. 

The district court temporarily stayed its release order to 

enable the United States to file a notice of appeal; thereafter, 

we stayed defendant's release pending further order of the court. 

The government argues that the February 21 hearing on the 

detention motion was timely, that defendant's waiver of an 

immediate detention hearing (in Illinois) was a request for an 

indefinite continuance of the hearing for good cause, and that 

even if a violation of§ 3142(f) occurred, the remedy is a prompt 

detention hearing, not release. Defendant contends that the time 

constraints of§ 3142(f) were violated and that the remedy chosen 

by the district court was correct. 

7 

Appellate Case: 89-2056 Document: 01019961474 Date Filed: 05/31/1989 Page: 7 
First, we must determine the appropriate standard by which to 

review the district court's factual findings and legal 

conclusions. Next we must consider whether the time requirements 

of§ 3142(f) were violated under the facts of this case. Finally, 

if violations of § 3142(f) occurred, we must review the 

correctness of the district court's choice of remedy. 

Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 u.s.c. § 3141, et seq., 

pretrial detention is presumptively appropriate for certain 

offenders upon a finding that "no condition or combination of 

conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as 

required and the safety of any other person and the community." 

§ 3142(e). Further, certain offenses carry a presumption that no 

such con9itions or combination thereof will assure appearance and 

safety, including violations of the Controlled Substance Act, 21 

u.s.c. § 801, et seq., where there is probable cause to believe 

that the person committed an offense for which the maximum term of 

imprisonment is more than ten years. Id. 

Under§ 3142(a), upon the charged person's appearance before 

a judicial officer, the officer shall issue an order releasing the 

person on recognizance or on conditions, temporarily detaining the 

person under § 3142(d), or detaining the person under§ 3142(e). 

This case involves only§ 3142(e). 

Detention under§ 3142(e) requires a hearing under § 3142(f) 

on motion of the government (f)(l), or on motion of either the 

government or the judicial officer (f)(2), depending on certain 

factors, the hearing "is to be held "immediately upon the person's 

first appearance before the judicial officer," unless a 

8 

Appellate Case: 89-2056 Document: 01019961474 Date Filed: 05/31/1989 Page: 8 
continuance is sought. Except for good cause, the government may 

have three days and the accused five. An accused may be detained 

pending completion of the hearing, at which time the person is 

afforded counsel and may testify by himself or by witnesses. The 

ultimate finding for purposes of§ 3142(e) "shall be supported by 

clear and convincing evidence." A detention order issued pursuant 

to (e) is required to include "written findings of fact and a 

written statement of the reasons for the detention." § 3142(i). 

In upholding the constitutionality of the Act, the Supreme Court 

noted that under§ 3142 (f), the arrestee is entitled to a prompt 

hearing. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987). 

Nothing in § 3142(e} provides for a ''waiver" of the time 

requirements for the hearing, United States v. Hurtado, 779 F.2d 

1467, 1474 n.7 (11th Cir. 1985}; United States v. Al-Azzawy, 768 

F.2d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir. 1985), although a short postponement 

from the initial appearance in the arresting district (here 

Illinois) to the first appearance in the charging district (here 

New Mexico} has been upheld. See United States v. MelendezCarrion, 790 F.2d 984, 990 {2d Cir. 1986}(removal hearing may 

pre~ede detention hearing, leaving latter to occur in prosecuting 

district after removal}. See also United States v. Dominguez, 783 

F.2d 702, 704-05 (7th Cir. 1986). 

Among the issues necessary to resolving the question of 

whether the detention hearing was timely are (1) when, under these 

facts, defendant had his first appearance, (2) whether an 

immediate detention hearing is waivable (and, if so, for how 

long), and (3) whether defendant in fact waived his right to an 

9 

Appellate Case: 89-2056 Document: 01019961474 Date Filed: 05/31/1989 Page: 9 
immediate hearing. We are confronted by the same difficulties as 

the district court because the facts are far from crystal crear. 

At the outset, we join those circuits which have held that 

appellate review of detention or release orders is plenary, at 

least as to mixed questions of law and fact, and independent, with 

due deference accorded to the trial court's purely factual 

findings. See United States v. Hurtado, 779 F.2d at 1471-72, 

collecting and analyzing cases from the First, Third, Sixth, 

Eighth, and Ninth Circuits: United States v. Bayko 774 F.2d 516, 

519-20 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Delker, 757 F.2d 1390, 

1399-1400 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. Hazime, 762 F.2d 34, 

36-37 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Maull, 773 F.2d 1479, 1487 

(8th Cir. 1985); United States v. Motamedi, 767 F.2d 1403, 1406 

(9th Cir. 1985). 

762 (7th Cir. 

See also United States v. Portes, 786 F.2d 758, 

1985)(joining majority of circuits adopting 

independent review standard). 

At the hearing before the magistrate in Illinois, the 

government did not specifically move for pretrial detention 

because counsel for both sides and the defendant had agreed that 

the preliminary and detention hearings should take place in New 

Mexico. The government's intention to move for pretrial 

detention, however, is clear enough, and defendant was thus 

provided with ample notice of the government's proposed course of 

action. Additionally, § 3142(f)(l) does not expressly require the 

government to 

Uni tea· States 

make a written motion for pretrial detention. 

v. Volksen, 766 F.2d 190, 192 (5th Cir. 1985). On --------------

10 

Appellate Case: 89-2056 Document: 01019961474 Date Filed: 05/31/1989 Page: 10 
this record, we believe the government adequately moved for 

pretrial detention at the Illinois hearing. 

However, by the time of the first hearing before the 

magistrate in New Mexico on February 16, six days had elapsed 

since defendant's arrival there. The government had not yet filed 

a formal motion for pretrial detention, nor had a motion for 

continuance been sought. Even if we assume that on February 10 

defendant could be deemed to have waived his right to an immediate 

detention hearing (a question we need not answer), and even if we 

construe counsel's agreement to postpone the detention hearing as 

an implicit request for a continuance under§ 3142(f)(2), the 

permissible time period had expired by February 16. See, ~, 

United States v. Malekzadeh, 789 F.2d 850, 851 (11th Cir. 

1986)(defendant can implicitly· agree to continuance of detention 

hearing); United States v. Valenzuela-Verdigo, 815 F.2d 1011, 

1015-16 (5th Cir. 1987)(inferring from record that five-day 

continuance from initial appearance to hearing was ''in substance'' 

requested by defendant). 

Most troubling, however, is the magistrate's decision, sua 

sponte, to further continue the matter to February 21. The 

statute does not authorize a continuance by the judicial officer. 

See United States v. Alatishe, 768 F.2d 364, 369 (D.C. Cir. 

1985)(judicial officer should not sua sponte delay detention 

hearing except in most compelling situations); United States v. 

Hurtado, 779 F.2d at 1475 (judicial officer lacks authority to sua 

sponte extend time for hearing). 

11 

Appellate Case: 89-2056 Document: 01019961474 Date Filed: 05/31/1989 Page: 11 
The magistrate couched his continuance of the hearing in the 

following language: 

All right. I think, therefore, 

judgment (sic), that I should 

hearing for a maximum of three 

United States wishes to request. 

in the interest of 

continue the detention 

working days, as the 

(Emphasis added.) 

Vol. II, p. 5. 

However, neither the government nor the defendant requested a 

continuance. Further, it is fair to conclude from reading the 

transcript of the February 16 hearing that the magistrate did not 

intend to conduct the detention hearing until the pretrial 

services report had been prepared. (Vol. II, pp. 5-6.) There is 

no indication why this report was not prepared between February 13 

when the magistrate's office was first contacted regarding 

defendant and February 16 when the initial hearing was held in the 

charging district. There was no finding of good cause for the 

continuance under§ 3142(f), nor would the lack of a pretrial 

services report, without more, necessarily constitute good cause. 

We conclude, then, as did the district court, that although 

the delay between the defendant's appearance in Illinois on 

February 10 and his first appearance in New Mexico on February 16 

might be viewed as a minor violation of the maximum permissible 

period for a defense requested continuance, the further 

continuance of the hearing by the magistrate, sua sponte, 

constituted a material violation of the specific instructions 

Congress provided in crafting§ 3142(£). 

What Congress did not provide, however, is the remedy. 

Consequently, circuit courts are divided in their conclusions as 

12 

Appellate Case: 89-2056 Document: 01019961474 Date Filed: 05/31/1989 Page: 12 
to what the remedy should be (which again is compounded by the 

variety of factual situations in which the question arises). 

Compare United States v. Al-Azzawy, 768 F.2d at 1145 (if time 

constraints violated in material way, district court should not 

order unconditional pretrial detention); United States v. Payden, 

759 F.2d 202, 205 (2d Cir. 1985)(remedy for failure to provide 

hearing at first appearance was reconsideration under prior bail 

law); United States v. O'Shaughnessy, 764 F.2d 1035, 1038-39 (5th 

Cir. 1985)(noncompliance with first appearance requirement for 

hearing precludes detention) appeal dismissed on rehearing as moot 

772 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1985); with United States v. Clark, 865 

F.2d 1433, 1436 (4th Cir. 1989)(en banc)(automatic release not 

appropriate remedy where requirements of Bail Reform Act not 

properly met); United States v. Coonan, 826 F.2d 11ao, 1185 (2d 

Cir. 1987)(where defendant otherwise incarcerated and defense 

counsel's position is that· immediate hearing is unnecessary, 

government is not precluded from seeking detention even if hearing 

is more than five statutory days after initial appearance); United 

States v. King, 818 F.2d 112, 114-15 (1st Cir. 1987)(where 

defendant already serving state sentence, detention hearing not 

required until release from state custody imminent); United States 

v. Vargas, 804 F.2d 157, 162 (1st Cir. 1986)(assuming detention 

hearing inadequate and untimely, subsequent de novo hearing by 

district court cured defect); United States v. Hurtado, 779 F.2d 

at 1481-82 (where hearing untimely and inadequate, detention order 

would be reversed and matter remanded for de novo hearing at which 

merits of pretrial detention to be reconsidered). See also United 

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States v. Madruga, 810 F.2d 1010, 1014 (11th Cir. 1987)(where 

defendant fails to object to hearing date, he can be deemed to 

acquiesce in up to five-day continuance); United States v. 

Holloway, 781 F.2d 124, 128-29 (8th Cir. 1986)(where government's 

request for detention made at second appearance before same 

judicial officer, district court's original order setting bond 

would be reinstated); United States v. Fortna, 769 F.2d 243, 249 

(5th Cir. 1985)(no error in magistrate's scheduling of hearing 

five days after initial appearance where defendant needed to 

obtain counsel, no objection to continuance raised, and 

continuance not suggested by government). 

Whether we construe defendant's February 10 agreement to move 

the hearing to New Mexico as a request for a five-day continuance 

or a waiver of the right to an immediate hearing, the second 

continuance, from February 16 to February 21, cannot be justified. 

Nor do we agree with the premise that the waiver of an immediate 

hearing "can be viewed as a request for an indefinite continuance 

for good cause." United States v. Clark, 865 F.2d at 1437. 

If the mandatory restrictions on the length of time a hearing 

can be continued, delayed, or postponed are to have any import, we 

believe the consequences for violations, at least where material 

and not the fault of the defendant, must likewise be substantive. 

Under the circumstances of this case, the subsequent holding of a 

de novo hearing by the district court did not cure the fact that 

the New Mexico magistrate was without authority to extend the date 

of the hearing from February 16 to February 21 absent a finding of 

14 

Appellate Case: 89-2056 Document: 01019961474 Date Filed: 05/31/1989 Page: 14 
good cause. Thus, the district court was correct in selecting· the 

only meaningful remedy available -- release on conditions. 

Accordingly, the memorandum opinion and order filed March 1, 

1989, is AFFIRMED. 

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