Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-2_05-cv-00018/USCOURTS-ared-2_05-cv-00018-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Fredrick McNeal
Plaintiff
Linda Sanders
Defendant

Document Text:

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Although Petitioner has not informed the Court of any change of address, the Bureau of Prisons

website (www.bop.gov) shows that he is now at FCI-Greenville, P.O. Box 5000, Greenville, Illinois 62246. The

Clerk of the Court is directed to mail a copy of this decision to him at the FCI-Greenville address, in addition

to the FCI-Forrest City address reflected in the file. 

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The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the Magistrate Judge (docket entry #8).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

EASTERN DIVISION

FREDRICK McNEAL PETITIONER

REG. #28417-044

V. NO. 2:05CV00018 JWC

LINDA SANDERS, Warden, RESPONDENT

FCI, Forrest City, AR

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Fredrick McNeal, a federal inmate, brings this 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition for writ of

habeas corpus (docket entry #2) challenging a disciplinary conviction he received while

incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) in Forrest City, Arkansas.1

Respondent has responded (docket entries #6, #7). For the reasons that follow, the

petition must be DISMISSED.2 

While conducting an area search of Petitioner’s quarters on June 18, 2003, Senior

Officer M. Padgett discovered a rigid metallic item, about 9.5 inches long, beneath the

locker containing Petitioner’s personal effects. The item had been sharpened to a point

on one end. Petitioner was charged with possession, manufacture, or introduction of a

weapon, dangerous chemical, explosive or ammunition. In response to the disciplinary

charge, Petitioner said that he and three Mexicans had gotten into an argument and that

the next day (June 18), he went to clean trash cans, then came back and took a shower.

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He said, when he came back from the shower, he was told to go to the lieutenant’s office,

where he was advised of the charge. (6/18/03 Incident Report [docket entry #6, p.5].) 

A discipline hearing was held on July 10, 2003, at which Petitioner appeared with

a staff representative. At the hearing, Petitioner stated that the weapon was not his, that

he had an altercation with three Hispanic inmates earlier, and that he felt like one of them

had put the weapon under his locker. He said he had no reason to need a weapon and

only wanted to do his time without any problems. Petitioner presented statements from two

inmates who said they heard Petitioner arguing with some Hispanic inmates. (DHO Report

[docket entry #6, pp. 7, 10-12].)

The discipline hearing officer found that Petitioner had committed the charged

offense, stating that the decision was based on Officer Padgett’s written statement that he

found the weapon under Petitioner’s locker. The hearing officer also stated that he

considered Petitioner’s denial but said he gave greater weight to the other evidence

presented, which indicated that Petitioner had a motive to manufacture a weapon due to

his earlier altercation with three inmates. The sanction imposed was thirty days of

disciplinary segregation, with fifteen days suspended pending 180 days of clear conduct,

along with disallowance of fourteen days of good conduct time. (DHO Report [docket entry

#6, pp.11-12].)

Petitioner alleges that the BOP violated his constitutional due process rights and its

own policy statements because: 

(1) The discipline hearing officer relied upon confidential informant

information to support his finding and failed to advise Petitioner of this fact. 

(2) Petitioner is “actually innocent” of the charged offense, and the

allegations contained in the incident report, investigation, evidence, a June 22, 2003

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memorandum and all related documentation are insufficient to support the hearing

officer’s decision; he says one or more of the Hispanic inmates with whom he had

an earlier verbal altercation had planted the alleged weapon under his locker in

retaliation, then alerted staff members. 

(3) The hearing officer did not consider the testimony of Petitioner’s

witnesses that they were there during the earlier argument, and the disciplinary

officer failed to call the reporting officer to determine the veracity of the information

and the reliability of the informant. 

(4) On appeal, the BOP regional office incorrectly stated that the

discipline hearing officer did not rely upon a confidential informant to find guilt.

(5) Petitioner was unable to adequately to prepare against the charge

because he was not provided with all the evidence used against him (i.e.,

advisement that a confidential informant’s statement had been used).

 

As relief, Petitioner asks the Court to order the BOP to expunge the incident report

and reinstate his lost good conduct time. 

Most of Petitioner’s arguments attack the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his

disciplinary conviction and the alleged use and non-disclosure of information from a

confidential informant. Due process requires only that the record contain “some evidence”

to support a prison disciplinary decision. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-56

(1985). The relevant question “is whether there is any evidence in the record that could

support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Id. at 455 (emphasis added).

This “some evidence” rule allows the federal courts to defer to the judgment of prison

officials in maintaining discipline in their institutions while meeting constitutional

requirements. Id. at 456. This limited review by federal courts does not require

examination of the entire record, independent assessment of credibility of witnesses, or

weighing of the evidence. Id. at 455. A witnessing officer’s violation report is “some

evidence.” Id. at 456; Orebaugh v. Caspari, 910 F.2d 526, 528 (8th Cir. 1990); Rudd v.

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DHO Report (docket entry #6, p.11).

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Sargent, 866 F.2d 260, 262 (8th Cir. 1989). Prison officials thus can rely on conduct

violation reports to find inmates guilty of disciplinary infractions. Rudd, 866 F.2d at 262.

Here, the discipline hearing officer stated that he was relying on the witnessing

officer’s report that he found a weapon under Petitioner’s locker, as well as the testimony

that Petitioner had been involved in an earlier altercation with other inmates, providing a

motive for him to have a weapon. Under the lenient Hill standard, this constitutes “some

evidence” supporting the hearing officer’s finding that Petitioner committed the prohibited

act of possessing a weapon. 

There is no evidence in this Court’s record that the hearing officer was aware of,

much less that he relied upon, information from a confidential informant in reaching his

finding. Although paragraph III(D) of the DHO report says the hearing officer also

“considered” a “Memorandum, Dated 06-22-03,”3

 neither party has submitted this

memorandum or identified its contents. Even assuming that the memorandum contained

information from a confidential informant, the hearing officer does not cite the

memorandum as a basis for his finding of guilt. Paragraph III(E) of the DHO report,

addressing the use of confidential information by the hearing officer in support of his

findings, is marked “N/A.” In Section V of the report entitled, “Specific Evidence Relied on

to Support Findings,” the hearing officer refers only to the witnessing officer’s report and

the evidence of Petitioner’s earlier altercation, which came from Petitioner’s testimony and

the statements of his own inmate witnesses. This evidence, as stated, satisfies Hill’s

standard on its own. Because the disciplinary decision is supported by “some evidence”

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other than the alleged confidential informant information, Petitioner’s challenges to the

reliability or non-disclosure of any confidential information must fail. See Espinoza v.

Peterson, 283 F.3d 949, 952 (8th Cir. 2002) (where there is other evidence supporting a

prison disciplinary decision, due process is satisfied without determining the reliability of

a confidential informant’s statement or reasons for non-disclosure).

Petitioner’s argument that the hearing officer failed to consider his inmate witnesses

is refuted by the DHO report, which specifically mentions them and their testimony. (DHO

Report [docket entry #6, pp. 11-12].) Finally, the Court cannot resolve any issue regarding

Petitioner’s disciplinary appeal because none of the appeal records have been submitted

here. In any event, his only argument is that the regional office incorrectly stated that the

hearing officer did not rely upon a confidential informant. As stated above, the DHO report

does not show that any confidential information provided the basis for the hearing officer’s

decision. 

Accordingly, this 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition for writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED

in its entirety, with prejudice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED this 19th day of June, 2006. 

 _________________________________

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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