Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02512/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02512-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jo Anne B. Barnhart
Defendant
Trudi Kelsey
Plaintiff

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TRUDI KELSEY,

Plaintiff,

 v.

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner of

Social Security,

Defendant. /

No. C 05-02512 WHA

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT AND GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

In this social security appeal, the Court finds that the administrative law judge had a

substantial basis for determining that plaintiff was not disabled. The Court further finds that the

ALJ properly refused to reopen plaintiff’s prior applications for disability benefits. 

Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED and defendant’s cross-motion

for summary judgment is GRANTED.

STATEMENT

1. PROCEDURAL HISTORY.

On November 18, 2002, plaintiff Trudi Kelsey applied for disability insurance benefits

for the third time, alleging she had been disabled since July 27, 1998, due to allergies to metals

including palladium, muscle spasms and joint pain (AR 109B, 112, 115–17, 213). Plaintiff was

49 years old on the alleged onset date (AR 115). Plaintiff was insured through December 31,

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2003 (AR 17). Her application was denied both initially and upon reconsideration and she

requested a hearing before an ALJ (AR 87–92).

On December 17, 2003, plaintiff had a hearing before ALJ Richard P. Laverdure

(AR 16–25). The ALJ rendered a decision on November 10, 2004, finding that plaintiff’s prior

application would not be reopened and that she was not disabled (AR 16, 24). Plaintiff

requested administrative review (AR 12). The Appeals Council denied the request (AR 8). 

Plaintiff filed an action before this Court on June 21, 2005, seeking judicial review pursuant to

42 U.S.C. 405(g). The parties now make cross-motions for summary judgment.

2. THE ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING.

At the hearing before the ALJ, plaintiff testified that she had an undergraduate education

in film making and had taken classes towards a master’s degree but ended the program in

Spring 2001 (AR 45–46, 49–51). Prior to the alleged onset of her disability, plaintiff explained

that she worked as a teller and a manager in the banking industry (AR 46, 60). After July 1998,

plaintiff stated that she worked sporadically from her apartment, primarily doing freelance

research for friends and assembling multimedia presentations for her church (AR 36, 47–48,

51–53).

Plaintiff described that during her period of alleged disability she suffered from an

inability to adjust to environments outside of her apartment (AR 32). Plaintiff explained that

anytime she left her apartment, she subsequently became incapacitated for periods of up to one

week (AR 35, 39, 45). The aftermaths of her outings were apparently most difficult when she

had entered buildings with air-conditioning or mold or when she had to traverse the hills outside

her apartment (AR 33, 41–44). Plaintiff testified that during these stretches, she suffered from

muscle pain, muscle spasms, fatigue, sleeplessness and pain and swelling in her teeth and gums

(AR 33, 44). Plaintiff said she had difficulty sleeping through the night due to pain and muscle

spasms (AR 38). To combat her ailments, plaintiff stated that she spent time meditating and

took homeopathic medications (AR 33–34). She testified that although she had a prescription

for ibuprofen, she took it only sparingly to avoid chemical dependence (AR 33–34, 38). In

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addition to her hypersensitivity to environmental stimuli, plaintiff suggested that the bouts of

incapacity were brought on by her thyroid condition known as “Hashimoto’s thyroiditis”

(AR 39–41). 

Plaintiff testified that on days when she felt strong, she could perform basic household

chores such as cooking and vacuuming, but only by working slowly and for limited intervals

(AR 35–36). Plaintiff reported spending significant portions of her day researching her medical

conditions and handling her social-security matter (AR 53–54). As for her computer-related

work, plaintiff performed such activity only in limited stretches with frequent breaks (AR 36). 

As a result of her outbreaks, plaintiff explained that she had to avoid computer use altogether

for roughly fifteen days per month (AR 44).

Also at the hearing, plaintiff’s attorney explained plaintiff’s test results for metal

hypersensitivity (AR 28–31). The attorney told the ALJ that the primary metal for which

plaintiff tested positive for allergic reaction was palladium, a metal used in dental fillings

(AR 29–30). The attorney also informed the ALJ that as a result of the allergy, plaintiff had

dental work to remove all of her fillings (AR 30). Plaintiff explained to the ALJ that the

removal process took one year and failed to improve her condition (AR 61–62). The ALJ noted

that, in addition to her thyroid condition and palladium allergy, plaintiff’s records indicated that

she had “allergic rhinitis, chronic sinusitis, hepatitis A and B, pain and digestive disorder, tooth

infection, hypertension [and] dislipidemia” (AR 54).

A vocational expert, Robert Raschke, was also present at the hearing (AR 57). The ALJ

focused his questions to the vocational expert on potential limitations imposed by a palladium

allergy (AR 57–60). The vocational expert testified that hypersensitivity to palladium was rare

and that people employed in dental offices were most likely to be aversely effected by such a

condition (AR 59). The expert stated that he arrived at this conclusion after “I talked to my

own dentist about this a number of different times” (ibid.).

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1

 According to the United States Department of Health and Human Services, Hashimoto’s Thyroiditis is an

autoimmune disease in which the immune system attacks the thyroid gland. See

http://www.4woman.gov/faq/hashimoto.htm.

4

3. MEDICAL EVIDENCE.

The medical evidence was summarized in the ALJ’s decision (AR 17–24). This order

briefly reviews the most significant findings of the physicians and clinics that examined

plaintiff.

The San Francisco State Student Health Center saw plaintiff from June 1998 to March

2002 (AR 314–362). The Center found that plaintiff had a history of Hashimoto’s Thyroiditis1

and prescribed her medication for this condition (AR 314, 362). In 2000, the Center responded

to plaintiff’s reports of lower-leg pain when dancing, performing tai chi or walking up hills, by

recommending that plaintiff reduce activity levels and wear shock-absorbing footwear

(AR 329).

Dr. Eugene McMillan, M.D., performed a consultative evaluation of plaintiff on April

17, 2001 (AR 288–92). After conducting physical and psychological testing, Dr. McMillan

concluded that plaintiff had no physical, postural or environmental limitations or limitations on

walking, lifting or sitting (AR 290). He found plaintiff capable of performing activities

commensurate with any person of plaintiff’s age and build (ibid.).

Dr. Victor Rosenor, M.D., performed consultative examinations in November 2001 and

January 2003 at the request of the Social Security Administration (AR 367–71). Dr. Rosenor

initially found plaintiff fit for sedentary occupations requiring plaintiff to carry no more than

forty pounds at a time (AR 371). In his second evaluation, Dr. Rosenor concluded that plaintiff

was only fit for a sedentary occupation that did not involve lifting more than twenty pounds

(AR 368).

Plaintiff visited Marin Community Clinic, in particular Dr. Georgeanna Farren, M.D.,

from October 1998 to March 2003 (AR 372–410, 476, 524–27). In a letter dated April 24,

2004, Dr. Farren encapsulated her findings (AR 476):

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2

 Palladium is “a rare metallic element of the platinum group . . . used chiefly as a catalyst and in dental and

other alloys.” THE RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY (Revised 1st ed.).

5

Ms. Kelsey suffers from multiple medical problems that prevent

her from working with regularity. She is hypothyroid and suffers

from sensitivity to chemicals within closed buildings or buses. 

She also has a history of chronic sinusitis, and has been diagnosed

with palladium toxicity. She also has high cholesterol, elevated

blood pressure and is easily fatigued. Due to the additive nature

of the symptoms of those chronic problems Ms. Kelsey is unable

to work regularly. She is very attentive to her health and is

currently strictly following a dietary and treatment regimen. It is

my opinion that she is unable to work, and will continue to be

disabled for the foreseeable future.

The University of California, San Francisco Medical Center, and in particular allergist

Dr. Pedro Avila, M.D., saw plaintiff between August 1999 and April 2003 (AR 411–474). 

Plaintiff was found to have a sensitivity to palladium2 (AR 422). Dr. Avila readily admitted in

his assessment that limited information and testing was available for palladium hypersensitivity

but conjectured that such an allergy could cause plaintiff’s symptoms (AR 423). Dr. Avila

proposed to plaintiff that she seek psychiatric counseling to determine if any of her symptoms

were psychosomatic, an idea plaintiff apparently rejected (AR 425). Dr. Avila also indicated

that plaintiff suffered from vasomotor rhinitis that could be treated with Nasonex and Allegra

(AR 423). Dr. Avila further determined that plaintiff demonstrated sensitivity to aluminum and

suggested that plaintiff cease wearing costume jewelry (AR 439–40). UCSF referred plaintiff

to dermatologist Dr. Howard Maibach, M.D. who corroborated that plaintiff had a “delayed

hypersensitivity to palladium” (AR 422).

Dr. Yuly Vilderman, DDS, removed porcelain crowns and amalgam fillings in plaintiff’s

mouth, in response to her reports that she suffered from metal allergies and was being sickened

by the metal in the fillings (AR 365).

Finally, in April 2004, Dr. Michael Dietrick, M.D. performed a psychiatric evaluation of

plaintiff (AR 528–31). Dr. Dietrick found that plaintiff suffered from an adjustment disorder

with some anxiety and depression, but that plaintiff did not have any significant psychiatric

disorder (AR 530).

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ANALYSIS

1. LEGAL STANDARD.

A decision denying disability benefits must be upheld if it is supported by substantial

evidence and free of legal error. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Substantial evidence is “more than a scintilla,” but “less than a preponderance.” Smolen v.

Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). It means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Ibid. A court must “review the

administrative record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and that which

detracts from the ALJ’s conclusion.” Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039. “The ALJ is responsible for

determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and for resolving

ambiguities;” thus, where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation,

the decision of the ALJ must be upheld. Ibid.

A claimant has the burden of proving disability. Id. at 1040. Disability claims are

evaluated using a five-step inquiry. 20 C.F.R. 404.1520. In the first four steps, the ALJ must

determine: (1) whether the claimant is working, (2) the medical severity and duration of the

claimant’s impairment, (3) whether the disability meets any of those listed in Appendix 1,

Subpart P, Regulations No. 4, (4) whether the claimant is capable of performing his or her

previous job and (5) whether the claimant is capable of making an adjustment to other work. 20

C.F.R. 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(v). In step five, “the burden shifts to the Secretary to show that the

claimant can engage in other types of substantial gainful work that exists in the national

economy.” Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1040. The use of the Medical-Vocation Guidelines, or “grids”,

at step five is proper “where they completely and accurately represent a claimant’s limitations”

and the claimant can “perform the full range of jobs in a given category.” Tackett v. Apfel,

180 F.3d 1094, 1101 (9th Cir. 1999)(emphasis in original). Although “the fact that a

non-exertional limitation is alleged does not automatically preclude application of the grids,”

the ALJ must first determine whether the “claimant’s non-exertional limitations significantly

limit the range of work permitted by his exertional limitations.” Id. at 1102.

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2. THE ALJ’S FIVE-STEP ANALYSIS.

At step one of his decision, the ALJ found that plaintiff had engaged in some work after

the alleged onset of her disability (AR 17). Nevertheless, the ALJ concluded that claimant’s

post-onset work did not rise to the level of substantial (ibid.).

Next, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff had numerous impairments which qualified as

“severe” (ibid.). The ALJ found that plaintiff had the impairments of hepatitis A and B, rhinitis,

chemical allergies, sensitivity to palladium, Hashimoto’s thyroiditis and hypertension. The ALJ

viewed plaintiff’s high cholesterol and adjustment disorder in combination with plaintiff’s other

impairments, without regard to the separate severity of these two conditions (ibid.). For

purposes of step three, however, the ALJ found that none of plaintiff’s impairments considered

separately or cumulatively equaled any of the impairments listed in the Social Security

regulations (ibid).

On step four, the ALJ found that plaintiff had “the residual functional capacity for

medium exertional work” (AR 22). The ALJ thereby concluded that plaintiff was still capable

of performing her past relevant work and, therefore, was not disabled (AR 24). The ALJ

indicated that plaintiff’s past work as “an office manager and as a consultant was performed at

less than the medium exertional level” (ibid.). 

As an alternative ground for finding plaintiff was not disabled, the ALJ conducted the

fifth step of the analysis (AR 24–25). The ALJ applied the grids and determined that plaintiff’s

“residual functional capacity” set her within one of the grid categories (ibid.). The ALJ did not

specify within which job category plaintiff fell (ibid.).

First, plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly weighed the medical evidence, in

particular by discounting the opinion of treating physician Dr. Farren (Br. 10–16). Second,

plaintiff argues that the ALJ errantly determined plaintiff could perform past relevant work at

step four (Br. 16). Third, plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly applied the grids in

alternatively denying plaintiff’s claim at step five (Br. 18–20). Fourth, plaintiff argues that her

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due process rights were violated by the ALJ’s failure to reopen plaintiff’s prior disability

applications (Br. 7–9).

3. TREATING PHYSICIAN’S OPINION.

Our circuit distinguishes among the opinions of three types of physicians:

(1) those who treat the claimant (treating physicians); (2) those

who examine but do not treat the claimant (examining

physicians); and (3) those who neither examine nor treat the

claimant (nonexamining physicians).

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1996). Generally, more weight is given to a

treating physician’s opinion than to the opinion of a non-treating physician because the former

“is employed to cure and has a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as an

individual.” Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir. 1987). Even if another

physician’s opinion contradicts the treating physician’s opinion, the ALJ “may not reject this

opinion without providing specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in

the record for so doing.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 830 (internal citation omitted). 

Plaintiff’s primary attack on the ALJ’s consideration of the medical evidence is that the

ALJ improperly denied controlling weight to treating physician Dr. Farren’s opinion (Reply Br.

4–8). This order finds, however, that the ALJ provided a thorough and legitimate explanation

for why he did not afford the opinion controlling weight (AR 22–23). The ALJ’s reasons can

be distilled into three. One, the ALJ found that the opinions of other physicians contradicted

Dr. Farren’s ultimate conclusion that plaintiff was incapable of working (AR 18–19, 23). Two,

the ALJ rejected plaintiff’s self-assessment of the severity of her limitations, which in turn

diminished the value of Dr. Farren’s opinion since the doctor relied on that self-assessment

(AR 23). Three, the ALJ concluded that Dr. Farren did not provide sufficient data to

substantiate that one afflicted with palladium allergy could suffer as plaintiff allegedly did

(ibid.). The ALJ, therefore, determined that the opinions of plaintiff’s other physicians

deserved equal or greater consideration (ibid).

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This order finds that the ALJ offered substantial and legitimate reasons to reject Dr.

Farren’s conclusions. It is undeniable that the opinions of Dr. Rosenor and Dr. McMillan

clashed with Dr. Farren’s opinion (AR 290, 368–71, 476). Dr. Rosenor found on two separate

occasions that plaintiff could work with moderate weight-lifting limitations (AR 367–71). Dr.

McMillan found that plaintiff could work without any limitations (AR 290). While plaintiff

argues that the ALJ improperly balanced the remainder of the medical evidence as well, there is

no indication in the record that any other physician agreed with the suggestion that plaintiff

could not work (Br. 13–14). 

As noted above, however, the ALJ must go beyond simply identifying a conflict. Lester,

81 F.3d at 830. Here, the ALJ also found Dr. Farren’s reliance on plaintiff’s self-assessment

dubious (AR 23). The ALJ justifiably did not find plaintiff’s self-assessment trustworthy

(ibid.). “The record indicates that claimant was a dance major, lived on a hill, walked to and

from the hill to the bus and had a full range of motions and no postural limitations” (AR 22–23). 

This reasoning distinguishes the instant case from Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 593–594

(9th Cir. 2004). The Benecke opinion condemned the ALJ because he “relied largely on

Benecke’s ability to carry out certain routine tasks.” Id. 594. In contrast, ALJ Laverdure found

that across the period of review, plaintiff’s activity level was high, even if it was recently

diminished, and even still plaintiff could perform many basic activities (AR 23). 

Likewise, the ALJ reasonably concluded that Dr. Farren inadequately justified her

opinion with objective data. The ALJ emphasized Dr. Farren’s failure to cite “clinical findings,

x-ray results, or laboratory results that are consistent with the degree of limitation she and the

claimant allege” (AR 23). Our circuit has cautioned that an ALJ’s expectations of objective

corroboration must not be unreasoanble. Benecke, 379 F.3d at 594. “The ALJ erred by

effectively requiring objective evidence for a disease that eludes such measurement.” Ibid.

(internal citation omitted). Palladium hypersensitivity may be such a disease. Dr. Avila, a

physician the ALJ relied on heavily, noted that “there are no diagnostic tests or specific

treatments for this illness, since not much is known about it” (AR 23, 423). Yet Dr. Farren’s

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opinion was worse than unobjective. “Dr. Farren’s opinion to a great extent is more the

product of advocacy than objective medical assessment” (AR 23). Indeed, Dr. Farren primarily

stated conclusions in her findings letter, not medical facts (AR 476). “An ALJ may discredit

treating physicians’ opinions that are conclusory, brief, and unsupported by the record as a

whole, or by objective medical findings.” Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d

1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004)(internal citation omitted). 

This order finds that the ALJ properly and reasonably weighed the evidence before him. 

Given this, the ALJ had a substantial basis for his conclusion at step four that plaintiff was

capable of performing her past relevant work and thus not disabled. The ALJ determined that

plaintiff could handle positions akin to office manager or consultant, which require “less than

the medium exertional level” (AR 24). “When evidence reasonably supports either confirming

or reversing the ALJ’s decision, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ.”

Batson, 359 F.3d at 1196. The Court declines to do so here. Since the ALJ reasonably applied

step four, we do not reach the ALJ’s alternative finding that plaintiff was not disabled under

step five.

4. REOPENING OF PRIOR APPLICATIONS.

Plaintiff has also raised a constitutional challenge to the ALJ’s refusal to reopen

plaintiff’s prior applications for benefits (Br. 7–9; AR 16). The Social Security regulations

provide that a successful claimant may only receive retroactive benefits for the twelve months

preceding the filing of the application. 20 C.F.R. 404.621 (a)(1)(i). Had the ALJ authorized the

reopening of plaintiff’s previous petitions, plaintiff could have sought benefits from the onset

date of her disability, July 27, 1998, since plaintiff used this onset date in each of her previous

two applications (Reply Br. 3; AR 109B, 112, 115–17).

“A decision not to reopen a prior, final benefits decision is discretionary and ordinarily

does not constitute a final decision; therefore, it is not subject to judicial review.” Udd v.

Massanari, 245 F.3d 1096, 1098–1099 (9th Cir. 2001)(internal citation omitted). An exception

exists “where the Secretary’s denial of a petition to reopen is challenged on constitutional

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grounds.” Ibid. (internal citation omitted). This exception applies to “any colorable

constitutional claim of due process violation that implicates a due process right either to a

meaningful opportunity to be heard or to seek reconsideration of an adverse benefits

determination.” Ibid. (internal citation omitted). A challenge is a colorable constitutional claim

if it is not “wholly insubstantial, immaterial, or frivolous.” Ibid. (internal citation omitted).

Plaintiff argues that due process requires us to reconsider the Administration’s refusal to

reopen her prior applications (Br. 7–8). Plaintiff requested reopening in a letter to the

Administration dated October 28, 2002 (Tr. 78–79). In the letter, plaintiff indicated several

grounds justifying her failure to timely seek reopening: (1) her mother’s deteriorating health, (2)

her graduate-school coursework, (3) her own deteriorating health and (4) her “fragile” mental

and emotional state (ibid.). Plaintiff adds in her current motion that she was not assisted by

counsel at the time (Br. 8). Our circuit seemingly counsels us to err on the side of finding a

colorable claim so as to allow jurisdiction for review on the merits of the denial:

Where a claimant alleges that a prior determination should be

reopened because he suffered from a mental impairment and was

not represented by counsel at the time of the denial of benefits, he

has asserted a colorable constitutional claim.

Udd, 245 F.3d at 1099 (internal citation omitted). Having so found a colorable claim, we have

jurisdiction to consider the merits of plaintiff’s due process claim. Ibid.

“[D]ue process requires that a claimant receive meaningful notice and an opportunity to

be heard before his claim for disability benefits may be denied.” Ibid. (internal citation

omitted). By its own rules, the Administration must determine if good cause exists to grant a

claimant an extension, when that claimant: 

presents evidence that mental incapacity prevented him from

requesting timely review of an administrative action, and the

claimant had no one legally responsible for prosecuting the claim

on his behalf at the time of the prior adverse action.

Ibid. (citing Soc. Sec. Ruling 91-5p). The ruling provides four factors for good cause: (1)

inability to read or write, (2) lack of facility with the English language, (3) limited education,

and (4) any mental or physical condition which limits the claimant’s ability to do things for

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herself. Soc. Sec. Ruling 91-5p. Reasonable doubt is to be resolved in favor of the claimant. 

Ibid.

In Udd, our circuit found that the plaintiff’s schizophrenia and lack of legal

representative satisfied good cause such that not reopening his previous application amounted to

a violation of due process. 245 F.3d at 1100. In contrast, our circuit found that failure to

reopen applications from a claimant who suffered from depression, alcoholism and reduced

cognitive functionality was not a violation. Evans v. Chater, 110 F.3d 1480, 1483–84 (9th Cir.

1997).

Viewing these cases as points on a spectrum, this order holds that the ALJ’s decision not

to reopen plaintiff’s prior applications did not deny her due process rights. Plaintiff has

engaged in post-graduate study and has worked in a managerial capacity in a bank. Plaintiff, as

detailed above, suffered from some physical ailments. Even with plaintiff’s dire view of her

own condition, however, she admitted that she spent considerable time preparing for her social

security case (AR 53–54). Plaintiff presumably could have done timely that which she did

tardily. Lastly, plaintiff has not demonstrated that her psychological condition, at the time

when she became delinquent, prevented her from complying. At worst, plaintiff’s

psychological condition was described as an adjustment disorder with accompanying anxiety

and depression (AR 530). Plaintiff was not deemed to have any significant psychiatric disorder

(ibid.). Even if her mental state was exacerbated by the unfortunate illness of her mother,

plaintiff’s condition still better resembled Evans than Udd. This order thus denies plaintiff’s

request to reopen her prior applications.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED. 

Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Judgment will be entered

accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 23, 2005 

WILLIAM ALSUP 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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