Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01303/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01303-12/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Jason Travis Uhl
Plaintiff

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JASON TRAVIS UHL,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant.

Case No. 1:13-cv-01303-SMS

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 

ATTORNEY’S FEES UNDER THE EQUAL 

ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT 

(Doc. 37) 

This is a Social Security appeal. Before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees, 

costs, and expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. Doc. 37. 

No hearing was held as the Court found the matter suitable for submission on the papers. Local 

Rule 230(g). 

I. LEGAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

On August 16, 2013, Plaintiff filed a complaint, by his attorney, Denise Bourgeois Haley 

(“DBH”), challenging the denial of his disability insurance benefits and supplemental security 

income by the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”). Doc. 1. The Court issued an 

order on March 19, 2015, affirming the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). Doc. 

 

1

 The Court will not recount in detail all of the facts of this case; instead, it incorporates by reference 

the “Factual Summary of Administrative Record” section from its March 19, 2015, order. Doc. 30.

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30. Shortly after, Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal from the Court’s judgment and new counsel, 

Lawrence D. Rohlfing (“LDR”), was added. Docs. 32-33. On January 27, 2016, the Ninth Circuit 

issued an order granting the parties’ joint motion for a full remand under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. 

§ 405(g), vacated the Court’s March 19, 2015 order, and directed the Court to remand this case to 

the Commissioner for a de novo hearing and enter judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

58. Doc. 36. 

On March 2, 2016, Plaintiff filed this motion under EAJA seeking $11,814.08 in attorney’s 

fees for 65.95 hours expended on this case. In support of the motion are: (1) the declaration of Mr. 

Rohlfing, (2) an itemized statement of the hours expended by the attorneys and two paralegals in 

this case, (3) an excerpt from the “United States Consumer Law Attorney Fee Survey Report 2013-

2014” by Ronald L. Burdge, Esq., and (4) the contingency agreement between Plaintiff and the 

Law Offices of LDR. Plaintiff avers attorney’s fees are warranted because the Commissioner’s 

position was not substantially justified in light of her stipulation to remand for the ALJ to 

reevaluate the medical opinion evidence. Plaintiff further requests that the award of attorney’s fees 

be payable to the Law Offices of LDR because Plaintiff has assigned the right to receive EAJA 

fees, costs, and expenses thereto. Doc. 37. The Commissioner filed an opposition on April 13, 

2016, disputing only part of Plaintiff’s motion, namely the amount requested and the proper payee. 

She does not dispute the hourly rates claimed by Plaintiff, but instead disputes the reasonableness 

of the hours expended. Doc. 41. Two days later, Plaintiff filed a reply brief addressing the 

Commissioner’s opposition and reiterated his position concerning the reasonableness of the amount 

requested and that the Court may order payment to the Law Offices of Lawrence D. Rohlfing under 

its assignment agreement with Plaintiff. Additionally, Plaintiff requests additional fees for time 

expended reviewing the Commissioner’s opposition and preparing the reply brief, thereby bringing 

the total request to $12,575.20. Doc. 42. The Commissioner did not request to file a sur-reply

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brief.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Reasonableness of Fees Requested

1. Legal Standard

Attorney fees granted under EAJA must be reasonable. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d); see Sullivan v. 

Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 883 (1989) (“The EAJA was designed to . . . [provide] for an award of a 

reasonable attorney’s fee to a prevailing party in a civil action or adversary adjudication unless the 

position taken by the United States . . . was substantially justified or special circumstances make an 

award unjust.”) (internal quotations omitted). The burden lies with the applicant to demonstrate the 

reasonableness of his request. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 897 (1984). And though a “district 

court has discretion in determining the amount of a fee award,” it must “provide a concise but clear 

explanation of its reasons for the fee award.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983). 

“The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the 

number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” 

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. This has come to be known as the “lodestar” approach. Costa v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 690 F.3d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 2012). Importantly, the Supreme Court 

urged that “[c]ounsel for the prevailing party should make a good faith effort to exclude from a fee 

request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary, just as a lawyer in private 

practice ethically is obligated to exclude such hours from his fee submission.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 

434. 

“[A] prevailing party that satisfies EAJA’s other requirements may recover its paralegal fees 

from the Government at prevailing market rates.” Richlin Sec. Serv. Co. v. Chertoff, 553 U.S. 571, 

590 (2008). What is not recoverable, however, are:

purely clerical tasks such as filing documents and preparing and 

serving summons. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 288 n. 10, 

(1989) (holding that an attorney may not seek reimbursement for purely 

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clerical tasks at an attorney rate); Nadarajah v. Holder, 569 F.3d 906, 

921 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that clerical tasks such as filing and 

organization “should have been subsumed in firm overhead rather than 

billed at paralegal rates”); Brandt, 2009 WL 1727472, at *4 (finding 

that attorney time spent drafting and serving summons was noncompensable clerical work).

Neil v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 495 F. App’x 845, 847 (9th Cir. 2012).

2

 

2. Hourly Rates

Under EAJA, “attorney fees shall not be awarded in excess of $125 per hour unless the 

court determines that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor . . . justifies a higher fee.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A); see Atkins v. Apfel, 154 F.3d 986, 987 (9th Cir. 1998). Considering the 

cost of living increases then, the Ninth Circuit has provided, on an yearly basis, the maximum

hourly rate. Relevant to this case are the following rates: 

2013: $187.02

2014: $190.06

2015: $190.28

2016: $190.28

No rate has been provided for 2016; however, the Ninth Circuit advises that where “no rate is 

posted for the period . . . use the rate that is posted for the previous period.” UNITED STATES 

COURTS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov (last visited June 7, 2016); see 

Thangaraja v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 870, 876-77 (9th Cir. 2005). 

For attorney time, Plaintiff requests an hourly rate of $186.55 for 2013, $190.06 for 2014, 

and $190.28 for 2015 and 2016. Doc. 37-1, p. 3. And for paralegal time, he requests an hourly rate 

of $125.00, the statutory cap under EAJA. Doc. 37, p. 8. The Commissioner does not dispute the 

hourly rates. Finding a cost of living adjustment appropriate, and mindful of the Commissioner’s 

implicit agreement, the Court will therefore adopt the hourly rates as requested by Plaintiff. 

 

2

 This unpublished decision is citable under Rule 32.1 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

See also 9th Cir. R. 36–3(b).

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3. Hours Expended

Plaintiff requests attorney’s fees for 54.8 hours of attorney time from 2013 to 2016 and 

11.15 hours of paralegal time from 2013 to 2015. Applying the appropriate hourly rates, this totals 

$11,814.08. The Commissioner opposes the total hours claimed. The Court addresses her 

oppositions in turn. 

a. 2014 Hours

The Commissioner avers the attorney time spent by DBH on the opening brief in 2014—16 

hours— was excessive given that Plaintiff raised only one procedural issue. She therefore urges the 

Court to reduce the time here by 6 hours. Plaintiff counters the hours requested are reasonable 

because they include review of the AR for settlement purposes and for brief writing, two distinct 

processes. Specifically, the hours expended were as follows:

Doc. 73-1, p. 2. 

Under the circumstances, the Court agrees with the Commissioner that 16 hours is 

excessive, but declines to reduce the time by 6 hours. Indeed, the administrative record (“AR”) in 

this case spans approximately 450 pages, which is not voluminous. Doc. 9. The opening brief 

itself is only 13 pages in length (excluding the certificate of service), with 2 of those pages 

containing boilerplate language. Contra Murphy v. Colvin, 2016 WL 1410279, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 

Apr. 11, 2016) (No. 4:14-CV-03784-YGR) (“This case was highly fact intensive and contained 

over 700 pages in the administrative record. It is not unreasonable for Plaintiff’s counsel to have 

spent 4.0 hours reviewing the 700-page administrative record and an additional 21.25 hours 

31-Jan-14 3.9 DBH review of transcript, conduct research and preparation 

of settlement proposal

17-Jul-14 2.1 DBH review of transcript and research for preparation of 

Opening Brief

3-Aug-14 3.1 DBH continued review of transcript, research and preparation 

of Opening Brief

4-Aug-14 6.9 DBH review of transcript and preparation of Opening Brief

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drafting and editing a 25-page motion.”) (citation omitted). And the fact that Plaintiff raised 

essentially one issue is notable. See, e.g., Hamby v. Peake, 2008 WL 3318715, at *2 (Vet. App. 

June 30, 2008) (No. 04-2206(E) (addressing the “vague and ambiguous nature” of a billing entry, 

the court explained, “[g]iven that the brief contained only one issue and four pages of actual 

argument . . . the 2 hours for research of ‘issues’ is vague and excessive, and will reduce the time 

by one hour.”) (citations omitted). Further, the time spent reviewing the transcript and conducting 

research for the opening brief should have been less given that counsel performed those activities in 

preparation for settlement purposes. See, e.g., Boss v. Astrue, 2008 WL 1847184, at *4-*5 (E.D. 

Cal. Apr. 23, 2008) report and recommendation adopted, 2008 WL 2074466 (E.D. Cal. May 15, 

2008) (No. 104CV06424OWWTAG) (explaining that where “much of the preparatory work that 

[counsel] performed for her letter brief-review administrative record, identify and research issues-is 

identical to the work she engaged in when drafting her opening brief” a reduction of “hours that 

seemingly involved redundant or overlapping work” is recommended). The Court will therefore 

reduce the 2014 hours of attorney time spent on the opening brief by 3 hours. This equates to a 

reduction of $570.18 (3 x $190.06).

b. 2015 hours

The Commissioner takes further issue with the paralegal spending 6 hours in 2015 preparing 

excerpts of the record for appeal, contending the activity was clerical in nature and therefore 

unrecoverable. She claims the activity consisted of pulling from an electronically filed AR, which 

was already sequentially paginated, and that any creation of cover pages did not require attorney 

expertise, and therefore requests a reduction of 5 hours. Plaintiff counters that preparation of the 

excerpts were not clerical, given the need for strict compliance with the Federal Rules of Appellate 

Procedure (“FRAP”). Again, the Court agrees with the Commissioner. 

As stated in the itemized statement, 6 hours were spent on preparation of excerpts for 

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appeal:

7-Jul-15 4 KAH preparation of excerpts of record for appeal

9-Jul-15 2 KAH preparation of excerpts of record for appeal

Doc. 37-1, p. 1. In support of the claimed hours, Plaintiff cites to Davis v. City & Cty. of San 

Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536 (9th Cir. 1992), opinion vacated in part on denial of reh’g, 984 F.2d 345 

(9th Cir. 1993). That case, however, did not involve claimed paralegal hours spent on preparing the 

excerpts of record or document preparation. There, the Ninth Circuit reiterated the position that 

“purely clerical or secretarial tasks should not be billed at a paralegal [or lawyer’s] rate, regardless 

of who performs them” and agreed with the defendant that they include “tasks such as the filing of 

pleadings and the travel time associated therewith.” Id. at 1543 (quotations omitted). Davis is 

therefore unavailing. To the extent that the “preparation of excerpts” here involves more than pure 

clerical work, which the Court cannot determine based on the brief and general description, 

Plaintiff has not shown otherwise. See, e.g., Baldridge v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 227, 235 (2005) 

(“Large blocks of time associated with either many tasks or a single task with only generalized 

descriptions such as ‘research’ or ‘conference’ are not specific enough to permit the Court an 

adequate basis for review and are subject to reduction.”) (citations omitted). He has not therefore 

met his burden of demonstrating the reasonableness of his request. The Court will reduce the 2015 

paralegal time by 4 hours. This equates to a reduction of $500 (4 x $125.00). 

Finally, the Commissioner opposes the claim of 29 hours that attorney LDR spent in 2015 

preparing and drafting the opening brief for the Ninth Circuit. She contends that amount is 

unreasonable where LDR is from the same law firm as DBH, who had expended 16 hours preparing 

the opening brief to this Court, and where the two briefs raised the same argument stemming from 

the same AR. Insisting the time claimed is excessive and redundant, she urges the Court to reduce

the time by 11 hours. In response, Plaintiff argues the Ninth Circuit brief required more time and 

effort in explaining the issue, and that some duplication of work was necessary. He asserts that 

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involvement of a second counsel should not be cause for a reduction of fees. Further, that the 

Commissioner agreed to remand, according to Plaintiff, justified the effort and time expended on 

Ninth Circuit brief. 

The hours opposed by the Commissioner are as follows: 

 

Doc. 37-1, p. 2. The Court agrees with Plaintiff that some duplication of work is necessary so that 

attorney LDR, whose law firm employs DBH, may become sufficiently familiar with the case for 

purposes of the appeal. It was thus reasonable for him to spend time reviewing the AR; however, 

the Court is hard pressed to find that LDR (whose Social Security law practice frequently puts him 

before this Court)3expended nearly 20 hours (5.5 + 6 + 5 + 3) to prepare and revise an appellate 

brief which sets forth a single issue and the same one raised in this Court. See, e.g., Coulter v. State 

of Tenn., 805 F.2d 146, 152 (6th Cir. 1986) (noting that with representation by multiple attorneys 

comes “the danger of duplication, a waste of resources which is difficult to measure”). Having 

reviewed the appellate brief, the Court finds the hours claimed to be excessive. Despite being 

longer in length,

4

over half of the appellate brief presents the same content, by way of rephrasing, 

as the opening brief submitted to this Court. Further, the duplication in language within the brief, 

redundancy, and extensive use of block quotes belie the claimed hours expended. The Court 

 

3

 A review of CM/ECF reveals LDR is/was an attorney in 500 cases, most of them Social Security, 

before the Court. 

4

 Plaintiff asserts attorney LDR drafted “a 33-page appellate brief,” but FRAP 30 limits a principal 

brief to 30 pages. Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(A). It is unclear whether Plaintiff obtained permission to 

file a brief which exceeded the page limit. 

1-Apr-15 1.5 LDR review of file and judgment and memorandum

16-Apr-15 2 LDR review of file and preparation of mediation 

questionnaire

6-Jul-15 6 LDR review of file and conduct legal research

7-Jul-15 5.5 LDR preparation of opening brief

8-Jul-15 6 LDR preparation of opening brief

10-Jul-15 5 LDR preparation of opening brief

13-Jul-15 3 LDR review, revise and edit opening brief

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therefore reduces the time here by 6 hours. This equates to a reduction of $1,141.68 (6 x $190.28).

B. Proper Payee

Finally, the Commissioner asserts that EAJA fees are payable to Plaintiff, subject to the 

United States’ Treasury Offset Program. She does not dispute the validity of Plaintiff’s assignment 

agreement with counsel or contend that counsel cannot be the payee under the assignment. The 

holding in Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586 (2010), which the parties’ cite, is clear: “[A] § 2412(d) 

fees award is payable to the litigant and is therefore subject to a Government offset to satisfy a preexisting debt that the litigant owes the United States.” Id. at 589. Ratliff does not, however, stand 

for the position that an attorney may not receive EAJA fees where the plaintiff “does not owe a 

federal debt and has assigned [his] right to fees to the attorney.” Id. at 588; see Mang v. Colvin, 

2015 WL 5470339, at *2-3 (Sept. 17, 2015) (No. 14-904) (“Like this Court, a number of other 

courts in this district have concluded that Ratliff does not preclude direct payment to plaintiff’s 

counsel where there has been a valid assignment, subject to such an offset.”) Consequently, the 

Court will order the payment of EAJA fees to Plaintiff’s counsel, subject to any offset to which the 

government is legally entitled.

C. Additional Fees Associated With Fees Litigation

In his reply brief, Plaintiff seeks additional fees stemming from 4 hours spent reviewing the 

Commissioner’s opposition and preparing a reply brief thereto. This amounts to $761.12 (4 x 

$190.28). As stated, the Commissioner did not request the opportunity to file a sur-reply brief.

Indeed, the Commissioner raised a number of concerns regarding the reasonableness of the 

fees requested, which prompted Plaintiff to file a reply brief addressing those concerns. Despite 

finding a reduction of the hours appropriate, the reply brief aided the Court in its consideration of 

Plaintiff’s motion. For counsel to expend 4 hours reviewing the Commissioner’s opposition and 

draft a 10-page reply brief (excluding the certificate of service) was therefore reasonable. No 

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reduction is warranted. See, e.g., Tate v. Colvin, 2013 WL 5773047, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2013) 

(No. 1:11-CV-01643-SKO) (concluding that 4.5 hours spent reviewing the Commissioner’s 

opposition brief and drafting the reply brief was reasonable). Plaintiff will receive an additional 

award of $761.12 (4 x 190.28).

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff's petition for attorney’s fees under EAJA is GRANTED in the amount of 

$10,363.34, subject to an offset for any federal debt owed by Plaintiff and 

2. The fee award shall be made payable to Plaintiff’s counsel.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 15, 2016 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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