Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-99000/USCOURTS-ca9-13-99000-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kevin Chappell
Appellant
Brett Patrick Pensinger
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRETT PATRICK PENSINGER,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

KEVIN CHAPPELL, Warden,

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 12-99006

D.C. No.

2:92-cv-01928-DSF

BRETT PATRICK PENSINGER,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v.

KEVIN CHAPPELL, Warden,

Respondent-Appellant.

No. 13-99000

D.C. No.

2:92-cv-01928-DSF

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Dale S. Fischer, District Judge, Presiding

Argued October 9, 2014

Submitted June 2, 2015

Pasadena, California

Filed June 2, 2015

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2 PENSINGER V. CHAPPELL

Before: Richard C. Tallman, Carlos T. Bea,

and John B. Owens, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Tallman

SUMMARY*

Habeas Corpus/Death Penalty

The panel affirmed the district court’s partial grant and

partial denial of California state prisoner Brett Pensinger’s

pre-AEDPAhabeas corpus petition, upholding his kidnapping

and first-degree murder conviction but overturning his

sentence of death.

The panel rejected the State’s request to invoke the

panel’s discretion to sua sponte apply the non-retroactivity

bar under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), which

ordinarily prevents a federal court from granting habeas relief

to a state prisoner based on a rule announced after his

conviction and sentence became final, to bar Pensinger’s

instructional error claim.

The panel rejected the State’s challenge to the district

court’s holding that the trial court violated Pensinger’s

constitutional rights by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte

in accordance with People v. Green, 27 Cal. 3d 1 (1980),

which held that a kidnap-murder special circumstance

requires proof that the kidnapping was committed for an

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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PENSINGER V. CHAPPELL 3

independent felonious purpose (i.e., not merely incidental to

the murder). The panel held that instructional error occurred,

and that the error was not harmless.

The panel also rejected Pensinger’s ineffective assistance

of counsel claim based on his trial counsel’s failure to request

a Green instruction, where counsel’s failure to request the

instruction comported with the theory of his defense.

COUNSEL

Jan B. Norman (argued), Los Angeles, California, for

Petitioner-Appellant.

Lise S. Jacobson (argued) and Robin Urbanski, Deputy

Attorneys General; Julie L. Garland, Senior Assistant

Attorney General; Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General of

California, San Diego, California, for Respondent-Appellee.

OPINION

TALLMAN, Circuit Judge:

Brett Patrick Pensinger was convicted of kidnapping and

first-degree murder and sentenced to death in 1982. After his

California state appeals, Pensinger filed a writ of habeas

corpus in federal court prior to the enactment of the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. The

district court granted in part and denied in part Pensinger’s

federal habeas petition, ultimately vacating the kidnapmurder special circumstance and the death sentence. Both

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4 PENSINGER V. CHAPPELL

parties appealed. “[B]ecause in most matters it is more

important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that

it be settled right,” we agree with the district court and uphold

Pensinger’s conviction for the kidnappings and murder but

overturn his sentence of death. Burnet v. Coronado Oil &

Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

We reject the State’s request that we invoke our discretion

to sua sponte apply the non-retroactivity bar under Teague v.

Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), which ordinarily prevents a

federal court from granting habeas relief to a state prisoner

based on a rule announced after his conviction and sentence

became final, to bar Pensinger’s instructional error claim. 

We reject the State’s challenge to the district court’s holding

that the trial court violated Pensinger’s constitutional rights

by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte in accordance with

People v. Green, 27 Cal. 3d 1 (1980). Green held that a

kidnap-murder special circumstance requires proof that the

kidnapping was committed for an independent felonious

purpose (i.e., not merely incidental to the murder). We also

reject Pensinger’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim

based on his trial counsel’s failure to request a Green

instruction. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291

and 2253, and we affirm the grant of partial habeas relief.

I

A

On August 4, 1981, 19-year-old Brett Pensinger met

Vickie and Michael Melander, Sr., at the Silver Saddle Bar in

Parker, Arizona, near the Colorado River separating Arizona

from California. Pensinger drank and played pool with the

Melanders, who had been drinking there since noon. At

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PENSINGER V. CHAPPELL 5

about 7 p.m., Pensinger drove Vickie to a friend’s home

where she picked up her two children, five-year-old Michael,

Jr., and five-month-old Michele. The four drove off in

Pensinger’s pickup truck around 7:40 p.m. toward the Turtle

Barn Bar in Parker. Vickie and Pensinger went in for another

drink, leaving the children unattended in the truck. While

they were inside, Michael, Jr., found Pensinger’s rifle inside

his truck and pointed it at a passerby in the Turtle Barn

parking lot, who confiscated it. When Vickie came out to

check on the children, Michael, Jr., told her that a man had

stolen Pensinger’s gun.

Vickie testified that when she told Pensinger about the

missing rifle he became so angry that she ran off down the

street. Nonetheless, the four subsequently drove to the Silver

Saddle, where Vickie again left the children unattended in the

truck. She reported to her husband that she and Pensinger

were going to the Yuma County Sheriff’s substation to report

the theft of the rifle. Vickie and Pensinger, still with the

children in the truck, arrived at the sheriff’s substation about

8:20 p.m. Vickie went into the station, expecting Pensinger

to follow. While Vickie reported the theft, she looked out

and noticed that the truck was gone, but assumed that

Pensinger was either looking for his gun or was back at the

Silver Saddle. Around 9 p.m., a Parker City police officer

drove Vickie back to the Silver Saddle. Ten minutes after

arriving Vickie realized that her children were still

unaccounted for and called the police.

A customer and an employee of the P.D.Q. Market in

Parker testified that a tall young man wearing a cowboy hat

came into the store sometime between 8:45 and 9 p.m. on

August 4th. Both witnesses said he was looking for someone

who had stolen a rifle out of his truck while his wife and

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6 PENSINGER V. CHAPPELL

five-year-old child were in it. He was reported to be beside

himself with rage, and said that if the person who stole the

gun came in and tried to use it in a robbery of the store, the

store clerk had permission to use the gun to “blow their heads

off.” The store employee saw the man get into a light-colored

pickup and drive off. The witness did not see anyone else in

the truck.

Michael, Jr., confirmed his mother’s testimony at trial. 

He further testified that he did not recall stopping at the

P.D.Q. Market, but that after leaving the sheriff’s substation

and driving on a road outside of town Pensinger told him a

cop was following him and that Michael, Jr., should get out

and wait until Pensinger came back. Pensinger never

returned. Later that night at about 9:30 p.m., a couple picked

up Michael, Jr., as he hitchhiked on the roadside near the

Parker Dam on the California side of the river. They called

the Yuma County Sheriff, and waited to meet the deputy in a

restaurant.

Michele’s body was discovered six days later on August

10, 1981, in the Black Meadows Landing Dump in San

Bernardino County, California, some nine miles from where

Michael, Jr., was picked up. The baby girl victim had many

disfiguring injuries, including a crushing blow to the skull

that occurred before death. Michele’s body was partially

decomposed. She had a long diagonal incision from below

the rib cage to above her pubic region, and an egg-shaped cut

between the legs encompassing the location of the vagina,

anus, and surrounding supportive tissue. The uterus was also

missing, likely removed with another long incision below the

rib cage. The pathologist who conducted the autopsy was

unable to determine whether the incisions were made before

or after death, or whether Michele had been sexually

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PENSINGER V. CHAPPELL 7

assaulted because of the missing vagina. Forensic

examination revealed no evidence of semen on the remaining

parts of the body.

B

Pensinger was arrested in Midland, Texas, in mid-August

1981 and charged with kidnapping Michele and Michael, Jr.,

and murdering Michele. Although investigators found a box

of blades for a utility knife in the truck, all tests for blood,

hair, and fibers were negative. It could not be determined

whether a stain on the left front fender of the pickup was

human or animal blood. When the police arrested Pensinger,

he had bloodstains on his pants, shirt, belt, and boots, but the

stains were not compared to the victim’s blood in time for the

trial.

During Pensinger’s pre-trial confinement, more evidence

of Michele’s murder came to light. When Pensinger was

extradited from Texas to Oregon to face unrelated charges

there, he was housed in the Washington County Jail with

Tony Krossman. Krossman testified that Pensinger told him

that he was trying to make bail because he was afraid that

warrants would arrive from Arizona and California charging

him with kidnapping and murder. Pensinger told Krossman

that he had killed someone. The only details Krossman could

remember were that Pensinger said the crime happened in

Parker or Flagstaff, Arizona, and that he was afraid a blonde

woman had seen him in the course of the crime.

After Pensinger was transferred to the San Bernardino

County Jail in September 1981, he was housed in an isolation

unit next to inmate Gary Howard. Howard provided a much

more detailed statement attributed to Pensinger. Howard

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testified that Pensinger told him he had picked up a baby in

Arizona and killed her. He drove out of town, and when the

little girl started crying, he slapped her hard enough to break

her ribs, but she did not stop crying. In one conversation

Pensinger said that when he stopped to relieve himself,

Michael, Jr., ran off. In another conversation Pensinger said

that Michael, Jr., was still in the car when he stopped and

tried to force the baby to orally copulate him. Howard also

stated Pensinger told him that he attempted to have sex with

Michele. When he could not do this, he cut her belly and

private parts out. He then drove to a dump, put her in a

plastic bag, and threw her out. He said he cut the baby with

a hunting knife and left her body near Parker Dam. In

another conversation Pensinger said that he had removed the

sex organs to hide the sexual assault and to make it difficult

to identify the baby’s sex.

David Hicks, another jailhouse informant, testified that in

October 1981, Pensinger asked Hicks if he would kill Howard

for $500 because Howard was testifying against Pensinger. 

Hicks further recounted that Pensinger told him he had been

drinking with the Melanders on the day of the crime. After

Vickie went into the sheriff’s station to report a stolen rifle,

Pensinger said he drove off because he was frightened about

being in the truck, which Pensinger had stolen from an uncle,

and he feared he had outstanding warrants for his arrest from

Oregon. He stopped in the desert to urinate and the boy ran

off. He drove to a junkyard and “did in” the baby girl. He

tried to have sex with her but she was too small so he cut her. 

He put her in a plastic bag and threw her body in the

junkyard. Pensinger told Hicks that he went to the dam and

buried the knife. He told Hicks he had not thrown the knife

into the water, as he had told Howard. Hicks told officers

about the location where Pensinger said he had put the knife. 

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PENSINGER V. CHAPPELL 9

Officers later recovered a utility knife handle from that

location in plain sight on a pile of rocks. It was too

weathered to yield any forensic clues.

At trial, all three jailhouse informants denied receiving

any benefit for their testimony, but Howard and Hicks were

substantially discredited during cross-examination. The

investigating officers in the case confirmed that they had

offered Krossman, Howard, and Hicks no benefits for their

testimony.

Pensinger attempted to show at trial that someone else

murdered Michele. The defense case consisted of attacks on

the jailhouse informants and Vickie Melander. Pensinger

took the stand and testified that after driving Vickie to pick

up her children, and stopping at the Turtle Barn Bar, Michael,

Jr., informed them of the stolen rifle. He denied becoming

enraged or that Vickie ever ran from him. Pensinger stated

that he then drove back to the Silver Saddle to see if Vickie’s

husband would help look for the missing weapon. Vickie

asked Pensinger to take her to another bar, the name of which

he did not recall, so she could arrange a place to stay for the

night.

Pensinger insisted that he dropped Vickie and the children

off at the bar, subsequently purchased gas, and stopped and

inquired about his rifle at the P.D.Q. Market. He admitted to

having been upset and telling store employees that if they had

trouble with whoever took the gun, to blow their head off. He

then went into a restaurant and talked to a deputy sheriff he

saw there, who advised Pensinger to report the loss to the

local police. After an unsuccessful search for his rifle,

Pensinger drove to Texas. He denied making any confessions

to the three jailhouse informants.

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10 PENSINGER V. CHAPPELL

At closing, the State argued that when Pensinger left the

sheriff’s substation, he did not have in mind kidnapping the

children or murdering Michele. The prosecutor contended

that Pensinger’s sole intention at that point was to look for the

rifle. It was only after talking to the store clerk that Pensinger

“finally decided he’s going to take matters into his own hands

and strike back. And that’s the point where he kidnaps

Michael and Michele.” The prosecutor did not specify how

Pensinger intended to strike back. However, as to the sexual

offense charges, the prosecutor argued that he:

would rather believe that this sex stuff didn’t

happen. And I really never have strongly

argued that it did. [¶] But . . . [h]ow can I say

there’s no evidence of sexual misconduct

when the baby is missing her sexual organs?

. . . So then you start asking yourself why did

he do it. And you get into these sexual

implications. And we always considered that

but could never put it together until Howard

and Hicks came forward and he’s telling them

about the sexual angle. That’s why those

charges are there.

Neither the defense nor the prosecution’s theory of the

case turned on whether Michele’s murder advanced the

independent felonious intent of kidnapping.

On August 3, 1982, a California jury convicted Pensinger

of two counts of kidnapping and one count of first-degree

murder. The jury also found true two special circumstances

making Pensinger death-eligible: (1) murder committed in the

course of a kidnapping, and (2) murder with the intent to

torture the victim. The jury, however, rejected two other

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PENSINGER V. CHAPPELL 11

special circumstances: (1) murder in the commission of a

lewd act on a child under the age of 14, and (2) murder

committed in the course of oral copulation in violation of

California Penal Code § 288a.

At issue here are the kidnap-murder special circumstance

jury instructions. The trial court instructed the jury using

California Criminal Jury Instruction (CALJIC) No. 8.81.171:

If you find the defendant in this case guilty of

murder of the first degree, you must then

determine if the murder was committed under

one or more of the following special

circumstances: One, while said defendant,

Brett Patrick Pensinger, also known as

Panama Red, was engaged in kidnap[p]ing in

violation of California Penal Code Section

207.

The trial court did not include, nor did Pensinger’s trial

counsel request, paragraph 2 of section 8.81.17 of the

CALJIC, which codifies the California Supreme Court’s

ruling in People v. Green,

2

requiring an independent

felonious purpose. The second paragraph of the jury

instruction reads as follows:

The murder was committed in order to carry

out or advance the commission of the crime of

[kidnapping] or to facilitate the escape

1 At the time of Pensinger’s trial in 1982, the trial court used CALJIC

No. 8.81.17, Fourth Edition 1980 Rev.

 

2

 27 Cal. 3d 1 (1980).

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12 PENSINGER V. CHAPPELL

therefrom or to avoid detection. In other

words, the special circumstance referred to in

these instructions is not established if the

[kidnapping] was merely incidental to the

commission of the murder.

CALJIC No. 8.81.17(2). Without the benefit of paragraph 2,

the jury found true the kidnap-murder special circumstance

and subsequently sentenced Pensinger to death.

C

Pensinger filed his opening brief on direct appeal on April

8, 1985. He filed his first state habeas petition on June 3,

1985. Five years later, in an opinion deciding the direct

appeal and habeas petition, the California Supreme Court

affirmed Pensinger’s convictions, the kidnap-murder special

circumstance finding, and the penalty determination. People

v. Pensinger, 52 Cal. 3d 1210, 1229, 1257 (1991). However,

it reversed Pensinger’s torture-murder special circumstance

because the jury was not instructed that the special

circumstance required proof of intent to inflict torture. Id. at

1254–55. The court otherwise denied relief on the habeas

petition. Id. at 1282. On October 21, 1991, the U.S. Supreme

Court denied Pensinger’s petition for a writ of certiorari. 

Pensinger v. California, 502 U.S. 930 (1991).

D

Pensinger initiated his federal habeas proceedings on July

13, 1994. The district court stayed the proceedings pending

Pensinger’s filing of his state habeas corpus petition to

exhaust certain claims. On July 26, 2000, the California

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PENSINGER V. CHAPPELL 13

Supreme Court denied Pensinger’s state habeas petitions on

the unexhausted claims.

The district court then lifted the stay of the federal

proceedings, and Pensinger filed an amended petition on

October 2, 2000. Ultimately, the district court issued an order

granting in part and denying in part Pensinger’s habeas

petition. Pensinger v. Chappell, No. CV-92-1928-DSF (C.D.

Cal. Nov. 30, 2012). The district court denied twenty-four

claims, dismissed as moot an additional thirty-five, but

granted relief on one claim. On that claim (Claim 24), it held

that the superior court violated Pensinger’s constitutional

rights by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte in compliance

with People v. Green, that a kidnap-murder special

circumstance requires proof that the kidnapping was

committed for an independent felonious purpose (i.e., not

merely incidental to the murder). As a result, the district

court vacated the kidnap-murder special circumstance and the

death sentence. The district court granted a limited certificate

of appealability with respect to one subclaim (Claim 12(BB))

on whether Pensinger’s trial counsel was ineffective in failing

to request a jury instruction in accordance with People v.

Green. The district court denied a certificate of appealability

for twenty-six other claims.

Pensinger appeals the district court’s ruling on Claim

12(BB) and requests that the panel expand the certificate of

appealability to include a multitude of other claims.

3 The

3 We decline to expand the certificate of appealability to include

Pensinger’s uncertified claims because Petitioner has not made “a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(2) (2012); see Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483 (2000).

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14 PENSINGER V. CHAPPELL

State filed a cross-appeal challenging the grant of relief under

Claim 24.

II

We review denials of habeas petitions de novo. Rhoades

v. Henry, 598 F.3d 495, 500 (9th Cir. 2010). AEDPA does

not apply here because Pensinger’s original federal petition,

filed in 1994, preceded AEDPA’s enactment. See Woodford

v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 210 (2003) (holding that AEDPA’s

application depends on whether the petitioner filed an

application for habeas relief seeking an adjudication on the

merits after AEDPA’s effective date); see also Lindh v.

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 322–23 (1997).

Under the pre-AEDPA standards of review, we review de

novo questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact. 

See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 402 (2000) (“Under the

federal habeas statute as it stood in 1992, then, our precedents

dictated that a federal court should grant a state prisoner’s

petition for habeas relief if that court were to conclude in its

independent judgment that the relevant state court had erred

on a question of constitutional law or on a mixed

constitutional question.”); Robinson v. Schriro, 595 F.3d

1086, 1099 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining that under

pre-AEDPA law, federal courts owe no deference to a state

court’s resolution of law or mixed questions of law and fact). 

However, “we presume that state court determinations of

historical fact are correct.” Payton v. Woodford, 299 F.3d

815, 822 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), vacated on other grounds

by 538 U.S. 975 (2003); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994);

Woratzeck v. Stewart, 97 F.3d 329, 332 (9th Cir. 1996);

McKenna v. McDaniel, 65 F.3d 1483, 1490 (9th Cir. 1995).

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PENSINGER V. CHAPPELL 15

Here, the California Supreme Court’s ruling on whether

or not the Green instruction applies is a question of law

reviewed de novo.

III

Before addressing the merits of the habeas petition, we

consider the State’s request that we exercise our discretion to

invoke sua sponte the non-retroactivity bar of Teague v.

Lane. Teague bars a federal court from retroactively applying

“new constitutional rules of criminal procedure” on collateral

review. 489 U.S. at 310. If we were to invoke our discretion,

we would need to determine whether Green’s “independent

felonious purpose” element for a kidnap-murder special

circumstance, see Williams v. Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465, 1476

(9th Cir. 1995), would constitute a new constitutional rule of

criminal procedure under Teague. Following oral argument,

we requested supplemental briefing to address (1) what

factors should inform our consideration whether to exercise

our discretion to invoke Teague if we found waiver by the

State; and (2) if we decided nonetheless to exercise our

discretion, whether a Teague exception applied in light of

Webster v. Woodford, 369 F.3d 1062, 1067–69 & n.2 (9th

Cir. 2004), Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 339–45 (1993),

Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 539–40 (1997), and

Clark v. Brown, 450 F.3d 898, 904–09 (9th Cir. 2006).

“[C]ourts of appeals have [the] discretion, but are not

required, to address a Teague defense raised for the first time

on appeal (or, perhaps, even in a petition for rehearing).” 

Boardman v. Estelle, 957 F.2d 1523, 1536–37 (9th Cir.

1992); see Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41 (1990)

(“Although the Teague rule is grounded in important

considerations of federal-state relations, we think it is not

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16 PENSINGER V. CHAPPELL

‘jurisdictional’ in the sense that this Court, despite a limited

grant of certiorari, must raise and decide the issue sua

sponte.”). Here, despite numerous opportunities to do so, the

state repeatedly failed to raise the Teague defense as to the

Green error. First, the state did not mention the defense as to

Claim 24 in its answer to Pensinger’s first amended habeas

petition before the district court, even though it argued

Teague as to several other claims in its answer. See Schiro v.

Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 228–29 (1994); Duckett v. Godinez,

67 F.3d 734, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 1995) (a state waives the

Teague defense by not raising it in district court). Then, a full

year prior to ruling on Pensinger’s petition, the district court

requested supplemental briefing “on the merits of Petitioner’s

Claim 24 and on any procedural bar(s) to the claim.” 

(Emphasis added). The State’s supplemental

briefing—again—failed to raise Teague as a procedural bar. 

Finally, following the district court’s grant of Pensinger’s

petition on the basis of Claim 24, the State raised Teague in

its motion to alter the judgment.

On this appeal, the State once again failed to properly

allege its Teague defense. The State’s appellate brief raises

Teague “only in passing” in a single paragraph towards the

end of the brief without identifying “the new rule of

constitutional law[,] . . . why such a rule would not have been

compelled by existing precedent . . . , [and] why the rule

contended for is not within one of Teague’s exceptions.” 

Arredondo v. Ortiz, 365 F.3d 778, 781–82 (9th Cir. 2004) (“If

a state seriously wishes to press Teague upon us, at a

minimum Teague should be identified as an issue (indeed, the

first issue) on appeal.”). In response to our request for

supplemental briefing, the State admitted that it did not

comply with the strictures of Arredondo in asserting the

Teague defense on appeal.

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PENSINGER V. CHAPPELL 17

In fairness, and despite Pensinger’s valid conviction for

Michele’s murder and the kidnapping charges, on this record

we cannot save the State from its repeated mistakes. Thrice

the State “inadvertently” failed to properly assert Teague. 

The State offers no excuse for failing to raise Teague below. 

Nor does the State offer an excuse for failing to comply with

Arredondo on appeal to us.

Its arguments to support our exercise of discretion are

likewise unavailing. The State argues that failure to consider

Teague would be “pointless” because Pensinger would not be

entitled to a Green instruction on retrial based on the

California Supreme Court’s current interpretation of when the

Eighth Amendment triggers the independent felonious intent

requirement in the kidnap-murder special circumstance

statute. While it is true that “the views of the federal courts

of appeals do not bind the California Supreme Court when it

decides a federal constitutional question,” Johnson v.

Williams, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1098, reh’g denied,

133 S. Ct. 1858 (2013), “[t]he granting of a new trial places

the parties in the same position as if no trial had been had,”

Cal. Penal Code § 1180 (West 2015). In other words,

Pensinger could present new evidence and arguments that

would warrant a Green instruction under California’s

interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. Furthermore, the

State’s argument that a retrial of the special circumstance and

penalty phase in a 33-year-old case would be costly is

disingenuous—while we are sympathetic to the dilemma, the

problem is one of its own making.

Given the extent of the State’s persistent waiver, its lack

of adequate explanation, and unconvincing arguments in

supplemental briefing, we decline to reach the Teague bar sua

sponte. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 397 n.8 (1993)

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(declining to reach Teague defense “because petitioner [State

warden] did not raise a Teague defense in the lower courts or

in his petition for certiorari”); see also Schiro, 510 U.S. at

229 (same); Arredondo, 365 F.3d at 781 (declining to address

Teague defense because it was “simply mentioned but not

argued” (citation omitted)); Garceau v. Woodford, 281 F.3d

919, 920 (9th Cir. 2002). As a result, our decision in

Williams v. Calderon controls our review of Pensinger’s preAEDPA federal habeas petition. 52 F.3d 1465.

IV

On the merits, the State challenges the district court’s

holding that the trial court violated Pensinger’s constitutional

rights by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte that—in order

to find the kidnap-murder special circumstance true—there

must be proof that the kidnapping was committed for an

independent felonious purpose. Alternatively, even if a

Green instruction was constitutionally required, the State

contends the error was harmless. We agree with the district

court that an instructional error occurred which was

prejudicial, and affirm its grant of relief on the basis of Claim

24.

A

California’s death penalty statute requires the jury to find

the existence of special circumstances to distinguish between

defendants who are eligible for the death penalty and those

who are not. See Cal. Penal Code § 190.2 (1978); Williams,

52 F.3d at 1475–76; Green, 27 Cal. 3d at 61. The felonymurder special circumstance applies to those murders

“committed while the defendant was engaged in . . . the

commission of . . . or the immediate flight after committing”

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one of certain enumerated felonies, including kidnapping. 

Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(17)(B). At the time of

Pensinger’s offense (1981) and trial (1982), the

felony-murder special circumstance already required that the

defendant have “an independent felonious purpose.” Green,

27 Cal. 3d at 61; see Clark, 450 F.3d at 915 (holding that

Clark was constitutionally entitled to a Green instruction

because Clark committed his crime in January 1982 and “the

CALJIC instruction in place at the time of trial . . . had

specifically incorporated Green’s holding”).

The CaliforniaSupremeCourt developed this independent

felonious purpose requirement to comply with the U.S.

Supreme Court’s rulings in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238

(1972), and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). There,

the Supreme Court found unconstitutional under the Eighth

and Fourteenth Amendments death sentences imposed under

statutes that left juries with untrammeled discretion to impose

or withhold the death penalty. Furman, 408 U.S. at 313

(White, J., concurring); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189, 199. Furman

and Gregg held that imposition of the death penalty should

compel the jury to “focus on the particularized circumstances

of the crime and the defendant” in order to reduce “the risk of

wholly arbitrary and capricious” death sentences. Gregg,

428 U.S. at 189, 199.

Guided by Furman and Gregg, Green explained that

California’s felony-murder special circumstance statute

“expressed a legislative belief that it was not

unconstitutionally arbitrary to expose to the death penalty

those defendants who killed in cold blood in order to advance

an independent felonious purpose, e.g., who carried out an

execution-style slaying of the victim of or witness to a

holdup, a kidnap[p]ing, or a rape.” Green, 27 Cal. 3d at 61. 

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In other words, “Green held that a felony whose ‘sole object

is to facilitate or conceal the primary crime’ of murder is

‘incidental,’ and therefore does not qualify a defendant for the

death penalty under the special circumstance statute.” Clark,

450 F.3d at 905–06 (emphasis added) (citing Green, 27 Cal.

3d at 61). Thus, “under Green, a felony qualifie[s] under the

special circumstance statute only if two requirements [a]re

satisfied: (1) the felony, such as robbery or arson, must have

been committed for a purpose ‘independent’ of the murder,

and (2) the murder must have been committed in order to

advance that ‘independent felonious purpose.’” Id. at 910;

see also Phillips v. Ornoski, 673 F.3d 1168, 1193 (9th Cir.

2012).

For instance, in Clark under the defendant’s theory of the

case, “he set the fires [to the home] only for the purpose of

driving David Gawronski out of the house so that he could

shoot him.” Clark, 450 F.3d at 908. Clark argued that he did

not have an “an independent felonious purpose in committing

arson.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We held

“Clark was entitled to an instruction that told the jury he was

not guilty of the special circumstance if the arson was a

felony whose ‘sole object [was] to facilitate . . . the primary

crime’ of murder.” Id. (citing Green, 27 Cal.3d at 61).

Similarly, in Green, a husband killed his wife and

subsequently took her clothes, rings and purse in order to

conceal her identity. Green, 27 Cal. 3d at 55. “The

California Supreme Court held that this felonious robbery of

the wife’s belongings was insufficient to support a

felony-murder special circumstance conviction because

Green did not commit the robbery for a reason independent

of the murder, and then commit the murder to advance the

purpose of committing the robbery.” Clark, 450 F.3d at 906. 

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“Rather, Green committed the robbery in order to facilitate or

conceal the murder.” Id. “In other words, the robbery was

‘incidental’ to the murder.” Id.

However, since the Green decision, the California

Supreme Court has narrowed the application of the Green

instruction, while the Ninth Circuit has adopted Green’s

broad holding. Compare People v. Kimble, 44 Cal. 3d 480,

501 (1988), with Williams, 52 F.3d at 1476, and Clark,

450 F.3d at 910–11 (“[T]he California Supreme Court

significantly changed the first requirement and entirely

dispensed with the second . . . that the murder have the

purpose of advancing the ‘independent felonious purpose’ of

the arson.”).

Under California’s current interpretation of Furman,

Gregg, and the Eighth Amendment, a Green instruction is not

always required. The California Supreme Court has held that

the Green instruction “does not set out a separate element of

the special circumstance” but rather acts to clarify that the

murder must have taken place in furtherance of the

accompanying special-circumstance felony. People v.

Harris, 43 Cal. 4th 1269, 1299 (2008); see Kimble, 44 Cal. 3d

at 501 (“[W]e reject the dissent’s novel suggestion that

Green’s clarification of the scope of felony-murder special

circumstances has somehow become an ‘element’ of such

special circumstances, on which the jury must be instructed

in all cases . . . .”); People v. Monterroso, 34 Cal. 4th 743,

767 (2004). This is important because “[a] trial court has a

sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on the essential elements

of a special circumstance allegation.” People v. Mil, 53 Cal.

4th 400, 409 (2012) (internal citations omitted).

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The State heavily relies on California’s current

interpretation to support the contention that no Eighth

Amendment violation occurred in instructing the jury. 

Because the Green instruction (i.e., the second paragraph of

CALJIC No. 8.81.17) does not constitute an element of the

crime of special-circumstances murder, the State argues that

the instruction is necessary only in limited circumstances. In

support of its argument the State notes that the California

Supreme Court has previously held that “a trial court has no

duty to instruct on the second paragraph of CALJIC No.

8.81.17 unless the evidence supports an inference that the

defendant might have intended to murder the victim without

having had an independent intent to commit the specified

felony.” People v. D’Arcy, 48 Cal. 4th 257, 297 (2010).

However, the State fails to meaningfully distinguish the

case we must follow, Williams v. Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465. In

Williams, the petitioner challenged the kidnap-murder special

circumstance, arguing that the trial court erred by failing to

provide the jury a Green instruction and therefore “the jury’s

finding this circumstance true was [] invalid.” Id. at 1475. 

We agreed that an “instructional error occurred” and

interpreted the Green decision as requiring an instruction on

the independent felonious purpose. Id. at 1475–76. We

further characterized the Green instruction as a

“constitutional necessity, not mere state law nicety, for

without this narrowing construction, the special circumstance

would run afoul” of Furman and Gregg. Id. at 1476.

The State attempts to distinguish Williams by arguing that

we did not reach the issue of whether or not a Green

instruction was necessary in all special circumstance cases. 

A careful reading of the case, however, persuades us that

Williams did indeed reach such a conclusion. Similar to the

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trial court in Pensinger, the trial court in Williams gave a jury

instruction commensurate with the first paragraph of CALJIC

No. 8.81.17, but omitted the second paragraph of that

instruction.4 Williams v. Vasquez, 817 F. Supp. 1443, 1482

(E.D. Cal. 1993). Considering our view of the Green

instruction as a “constitutional necessity” in combination with

the holding that an “instructional error occurred” when the

trial court gave only the first half of CALJIC No. 8.81.17,

Williams implicitly held that both paragraphs of CALJIC No.

8.81.17 were necessary to fulfill the strictures of Furman and

Gregg.

5 Therefore, because Pensinger’s kidnap-murder

 

4

 The instruction given in Williams was:

[i]t is further charged that [defendant] was personally

present and physically aided or committed the acts

causing the death of Lourdes Meza and that the murder

of Lourdes Meza was willful, deliberate and

premeditated and was committed during the

commission or attempted commission of kidnapping in

violation of Section 207 of the California Penal Code.

Williams v. Vasquez, 817 F. Supp. at 1482. The instruction in Pensinger

was:

If you find the defendant in this case guilty of murder

of the first degree, you must then determine if the

murder was committed under one or more of the

following special circumstances: One, while said

defendant, Brett Patrick Pensinger, also known as

Panama Red, was engaged in kidnap[p]ing in violation

of California Penal Code Section 207.

5 We are not alone in interpreting Green as requiring an independent

felonious purpose instruction in all felony-murder cases to comply with

the Constitution. See Kimble, 44 Cal. 3d at 517 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (“In

Green, the court squarely held that the felony-murder special circumstance

must be construed to require a finding of independent felonious purpose.

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special circumstance jury instructions failed to comport with

Furman, Gregg, Green, and Williams, the district court

correctly concluded that an instructional error occurred.

“Where the error involves a failure to provide a narrowing

instruction on a death special circumstance, we begin by

asking whether it can be concluded, in light of the other

instructions, that the jury necessarily found the omitted

narrowing element.” Williams, 52 F.3d at 1476. Though not

clear from its brief, the State seems to argue that because the

jury was instructed on the elements of first-degree murder

and kidnapping separately from the requirement for a special

circumstance murder, the jury necessarily found the

independent felonious intent. We found a similar argument

insufficient in Williams and we are bound by that holding to

reach the same conclusion here. See Williams, 52 F.3d at

1476.

Under Williams, where there is more than one plausible

explanation for the defendant’s actions, we cannot conclude

that the jury necessarily made the required independent

felonious purpose finding. Id. at 1476–77. Here, the district

court found that under the kidnapping jury instruction, the

jury could have convicted Pensinger of Michele’s kidnapping

because it believed Pensinger kidnapped her “to inflict

death”—under these facts, to murder Michele, Pensinger

necessarily had to move her, making the kidnap “incidental”

. . . [T]he majority’s attempt to present advancement of an independent

felonious purpose as merely a kind of nonessential ‘clarifying’ or

‘amplifying’ gloss is unsuccessful.”).

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to the murder.6 The jury could also have convicted Pensinger

of Michael, Jr.’s, kidnapping because it believed Pensinger

kidnapped Michael, Jr., to “aid in the commission of [the]

felony” of murdering Michele. In both circumstances, the

jury would not have found a purpose for kidnapping

independent of Michele’s murder. On the other hand, the jury

could have concluded that Pensinger kidnapped Michele with

the independent purpose of molesting her, and that he formed

the intent to murder her after the kidnapping. Because

evidence of Pensinger’s intent is subject to more than one

interpretation, we cannot conclude the jury necessarily found

the omitted narrowing element. Id. The district court

6 The superior court provided the following kidnapping jury instruction:

If a person moved away is incapable of consenting

thereto by reason of immaturity or mental condition,

then the person moving him away is guilty of

kidnapping only if you are convinced beyond a

reasonable doubt that before the movement the person

formed a specific intent to do the moving for an illegal

purpose or with an illegal intent and only if you are

convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he

knowingly or having reason to know that he had no

legal right to do so took, enticed, or kept from the legal

custodian a child less than eighteen years of age

without the custodian’s consent and only if you’re

convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he

knowingly restrained another person with the intent to,

[1] hold the victim for ransom, as a shield or hostage;

or [2] for involuntary servitude; or [3] to inflict death,

physical injury, child endangering or sexual offenses on

the victim, to detain or conceal such child from a

parent, or to otherwise aid in the commission of a

felony; or [4] place the victim or a third person in the

reasonable apprehension ofimminent physical injury to

the victim or such third person. (Emphasis added).

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properly found the remaining jury instructions did not cure

the error.

Next, we consider whether the California Supreme Court

cured the invalid instruction, and, if not, whether that

omission was harmless under Brecht v. Abrahamson,

507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993).

B

The California Supreme Court can cure an invalid

instruction in two ways. Morales v. Woodford, 388 F.3d

1159, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004). First, it can affirm the trial court

if it finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the same result

would have been obtained “without relying on the

unconstitutional aggravating circumstance”—that is to say,

the error was harmless. Id. (citing to Valerio v. Crawford,

306 F.3d 742, 756–57 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc)). Second, the

California Supreme Court can invoke the method described

in Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 748 (1990), by reweighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances to test

whether the verdict could stand without the improperly

introduced factor. Id.

Here, because the California Supreme Court did not find

error in the kidnap-murder special circumstance finding, it

did not attempt to cure the invalid jury instruction. 

Pensinger, 52 Cal. 3d at 1255–56. Instead, it held that there

was “no substantial evidence that defendant’s sole purpose at

the inception of the kidnapping was to murder [the baby].” 

Id. at 1255.

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“In the absence of the requisite ‘close appellate scrutiny’

by the state courts” a federal appellate court must conduct its

own harmless error analysis. Morales, 388 F.3d at 1171.

C

An error in the instruction of a death penalty special

circumstance is subject to Brecht’s harmless error review. 

Williams, 52 F.3d at 1476; see also Morales, 388 F.3d at

1171–72. Under Brecht, an error is harmless unless it can be

found that it “had substantial and injurious effect or influence

in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637

(quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776

(1946)) (internal quotations marks omitted). A habeas

petitioner must establish that the error resulted in “actual

prejudice.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). However,

where a judge in a habeas proceeding is in “‘grave doubt as

to the harmlessness of the error,’ the habeas ‘petitioner must

win.’” California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2, 5–6 (1996) (citing

O’Neal v. McAnnich, 513 U.S. 432, 437 (1995)). We have

previously noted that an error is “not harmless as a matter of

law” when “our invalidation of the special circumstance

eliminated the only remaining special circumstance.” 

Morales, 388 F.3d at 1172 (citing to Wade v. Calderon,

29 F.3d 1312, 1322–23 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other

grounds by Rohan ex rel. Gates v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 803,

815 (9th Cir. 2003)).

Here, the jury found Pensinger eligible for the death

penalty without having to make any determination whether

there was an “independent felonious purpose” to the

kidnapping of Michele Melander. Although the prosecutor

presented evidence of at least two different independent

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purposes for Michele Melander’s kidnapping,

7

the instruction

given to the jury required the jury to find only that the murder

occurred while Pensinger was “engaged in kidnapping in

violation of California Penal Code Section 207.” Thus, it was

possible for the jury merely to find that the kidnapping was

incidental to the murder—that is, during the course of

committing murder, Pensinger “happen[ed] to engage in

ancillary conduct that technically constitutes [a kidnapping]

or one of the other listed felonies.” See Green, 27 Cal. 3d at

62. Finally, the only special circumstance which remains

upholding Pensinger’s death sentence is the deficient kidnapmurder special circumstance. Cf. Williams, 52 F.3d at

1479–80 (finding no prejudice on Green instructional error

because the jury found several other valid special

circumstances). “When a jury is the final sentencer, it is

essential that the jurors be properly instructed regarding all

facets of the sentencing process. It is not enough to instruct

the jury in the bare terms of an aggravating circumstance that

is unconstitutionally vague on its face.” Walton v. Arizona,

497 U.S. 639, 653 (1990), overruled on other grounds by

Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (citing Maynard v.

Cartwright, 406 U.S. 356 (1988), and Godfrey v. Georgia,

446 U.S. 420 (1980)). Therefore, we cannot here uphold the

kidnap-murder special circumstance on a harmless error

theory. The district court properly granted Pensinger’s

petition on the basis of Claim 24.

7 The State’s two different theories were: (1) Pensinger wanted to and

did sexually molest Michele; and (2) Pensinger wanted to “strike back” at

Vickie Melander and her husband for the theft of his rifle.

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PENSINGER V. CHAPPELL 29

V

Finally, we consider Pensinger’s contention that his trial

counsel was ineffective in failing to request a jury instruction

in accordance with People v. Green, during the guilt phase.

A meritorious ineffective assistance of counsel claim

must demonstrate: (1) “that counsel’s representation fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness”; and (2) that

the deficient performance prejudiced the defense, which

requires a showing that “there is a reasonable probability that,

but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984).

Under the pre-AEDPA standard of review, a state court’s

conclusion as to whether counsel rendered ineffective

assistance is a mixed question of law and fact, id. at 698,

subject to de novo review, Williams, 529 U.S. at 400. 

However, the state court findings of fact made in the course

of deciding an ineffectiveness claim are questions of fact,

subject to “a presumption of correctness.” Thompson v.

Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 111 (1995); Lambert v. Blodgett,

393 F.3d 943, 976 (9th Cir. 2004). “Consequently, a federal

court reviewing a state court conclusion on a mixed issue

involving questions both of fact and law must first separate

the legal conclusions from the factual determinations that

underlie it.” Lambert, 393 F.3d at 977–78.

A

A counsel’s performance is deficient if his or her

representation was unreasonable “under prevailing

professional norms.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. “Judicial

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scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly

deferential. . . . A fair assessment of attorney performance

requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting

effects of hindsight.” Id. at 689. The court “must indulge a

strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the

wide range of professional assistance; that is, the defendant

must overcome the presumption that, under the

circumstances, the challenged action might be considered

sound trial strategy.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Where counsel pursues one theory of the defense over

another, counsel’s lack of request for a jury instruction on the

alternate theory does not constitute deficient performance. 

See Clabourne v. Lewis, 64 F.3d 1373, 1382–83 (9th Cir.

1995) (“Clabourne was pursuing an insanity defense, and that

defense might have been less credible if Clabourne had

disavowed his confession. . . . [Thus,] the failure to request a

voluntariness instruction [regarding his confession] . . . did

not amount to ineffective assistance.”); United States v.

Chambers, 918 F.2d 1455, 1461–62 (9th Cir. 1990)

(“Chambers’ trial counsel chose to pursue an identity defense

rather than challenge Chambers’ possession of the

cocaine. . . . [T]rial counsel did not render deficient

performance by failing to request a [possession]

instruction.”).

Here, the district court relied on Clabourne and

Chambers, holding that failure to request a Green instruction

would meet the prejudicial prong of the Strickland standard,

but not the deficient performance prong. We agree. Defense

counsel’s theory was that Pensinger did not kidnap or murder

Michele. Instead, he argued that Vickie, Michele’s mother,

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had both the motive and opportunity to have Michele killed.8

Thus, requesting a jury instruction requiring Pensinger to

have an independent felonious purpose in kidnapping

Michele did not comport with defense counsel’s theory of the

case that Pensinger did not murder Michele.

Pensinger contends that the facts in Clabourne and

Chambers are distinguishable because Pensinger’s Green

instruction was not an instruction that the defense had to

request. Rather, that since the trial court had a duty to

instruct the jury, by extension, trial counsel was ineffective

in not asking for the instructions on all basic elements of the

kidnapping special circumstance, including the Green

instruction. Pensinger inappropriately conflates the trial

court’s duty with counsel’s. Because Pensinger’s defense

theory was that he did not kidnap the children or murder

Michele, defense counsel did not have a duty to request a

Green instruction and, consequently, his failure to request one

did not render his performance deficient. Chambers,

918 F.2d at 1461–62; Clabourne, 64 F.3d at 1382–83. 

Therefore, the district court properly denied Pensinger’s

petition for relief on the basis of Claim 12(BB).

VI

The facts of five-month-old Michele’s murder are

horrific. While Pensinger’s convictions for the first-degree

8 At closing, defense counsel argued that at the time of the murder

Vickie felt desperate, had two children, was pregnant with a third, had no

place to stay, and was married to a man who would not work. Defense

counsel argued that Vickie’s children interfered with the way she wanted

to live, and that Vickie did not have the money for the special formula that

Michele’s medical condition required.

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murder of Michele Melander and the kidnapping of Michael,

Jr., and Michele are unaffected by our decision—under our

pre-AEDPA case law—the district court properly vacated the

kidnap-murder special circumstance finding, which alone

supported Pensinger’s death sentence. Under Williams v.

Calderon, an instructional error occurred when the trial court

omitted the Green instruction requiring the jury to find an

independent felonious purpose to kidnap Michele. Williams,

52 F.3d at 1476. Even in light of other instructions, the jury

did not necessarily find the independent felonious purpose. 

And, under Brecht, the omission of the Green instruction in

the kidnap-murder special circumstance was not harmless as

a matter of law because our invalidation would eliminate the

only remaining special circumstance supporting the capital

sentence imposed.

The district court properly denied Pensinger’s ineffective

assistance of counsel claim because trial counsel’s failure to

request a Green instruction comported with the theory of his

defense.

AFFIRMED.

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