Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01882/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01882-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mendoza-Powers
Respondent
Jose Melendez Silva
Petitioner

Document Text:

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28 This information is derived from the petition for writ of habeas corpus and Respondent’s motion to 1

dismiss. 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE MELENDEZ SILVA,

Petitioner,

v.

MENDOZA-POWERS, Warden,

Respondent.

 /

CV F 06-1882 AWI SMS HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS

[Doc. 7]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

 BACKGROUND1

In the instant petition, Petitioner challenges the denial of parole which occurred on July 5,

2005. (Exhibit A, attached to Motion, Hearing Transcript.) Petitioner did not seek relief before

the state superior court. On January 13, 2006, Petitioner filed a state habeas petition in the

California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District. On January 19, 2006, the Court denied the

petition without prejudice because Petitioner has failed to file a prior application with the

superior court. (Exhibit B, attached to Motion, Documents in C051681.)

However, instead of filing with the superior court, on March 21, 2006, Petitioner filed a

habeas corpus petition in the California Supreme Court. (Exhibit C, attached to Motion,

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Documents in S142069.) On November 29, 2006, the California Supreme Court denied relief

with a citation to People v. Duvall, 9 Cal.4th 464, 474 (1995). (Id. at 1.) 

Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus on December 27, 2006. 

Respondent filed the instant motion to dismiss on April 20, 2007, and Petitioner filed an

opposition on May 2, 2007. (Court Docs. 7, 9.) 

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the

petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” The Advisory Committee Notes to

Rule 5 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases state that “an alleged failure to exhaust state

remedies may be raised by the attorney general, thus avoiding the necessity of a formal answer as

to that ground.” The Ninth Circuit has referred to a respondent’s motion to dismiss on the

ground that the petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies as a request for the Court to dismiss

under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. See e.g. O’Bremski v. Maass, 915

F.2d 418, 420 (1991); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989); Hillery v. Pulley,

533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982). Based on the Rules Governing Section 2254

Cases and case law, the Court will review Respondent’s motion for dismissal pursuant to its

authority under Rule 4.

B. Exhaustion of State Remedies

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by

a petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 

The exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial

opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 731, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518, 102 S.Ct.

1198, 1203 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9 Cir. 1988). th

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court

with a full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. 

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Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828,

829 (9 Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full and fair th

opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the claim's

factual and legal basis. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S.Ct. 887, 888 (1995) (legal

basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis). 

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a

federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66, 115 S.Ct. at 888; Keating v. Hood, 133

F.3d 1240, 1241 (9 Cir.1998). For example, if a petitioner wishes to claim that the trial court

th

violated his due process rights “he must say so, not only in federal court but in state court.”

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 366, 115 S.Ct. at 888. A general appeal to a constitutional guarantee is

insufficient to present the "substance" of such a federal claim to a state court. See Anderson v.

Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7, 103 S.Ct. 276 (1982) (Exhaustion requirement not satisfied circumstance

that the "due process ramifications" of an argument might be "self-evident."); Gray v.

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63, 116 S.Ct. 1074 (1996) (“a claim for relief in habeas corpus

must include reference to a specific federal constitutional guarantee, as well as a statement of the

facts which entitle the petitioner to relief.”).

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising

a federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666,

669 (9th Cir.2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (2001); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th

Cir.1999); Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9 Cir.1998). In Duncan, the United States th

Supreme Court reiterated the rule as follows: 

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 . . . (1971), we said that exhaustion 

of state remedies requires that petitioners "fairly presen[t]" federal claims to the 

state courts in order to give the State the "'opportunity to pass upon and correct 

alleged violations of the prisoners' federal rights" (some internal quotation marks

omitted). If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations

of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners

are asserting claims under the United States Constitution. If a habeas petitioner 

wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due 

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only 

in federal court, but in state court. 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule further, stating:

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Our rule is that a state prisoner has not "fairly presented" (and thus 

exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to 

that court that those claims were based on federal law. See Shumway v. Payne, 

223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2000). Since the Supreme Court's decision in 

Duncan, this court has held that the petitioner must make the federal basis of the 

claim explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even

if the federal basis is “self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 889 

(9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 . . . (1982), or the

underlying claim would be decided under state law on the same considerations

that would control resolution of the claim on federal grounds. Hiivala v. Wood, 

195 F3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830-31 

(9th Cir. 1996); . . . .

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert the state court to 

the fact that the relevant claim is a federal one without regard to how similar the 

state and federal standards for reviewing the claim may be or how obvious the 

violation of federal law is. 

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2000) (italics added). 

Respondent argues that because Petitioner failed to present the California Supreme Court

with a copy of the transcript necessary to determine whether he was wrongfully denied parole,

and he has therefore failed to exhaust the state court remedies. Respondent’s argument is

persuasive. 

The general rule is that a citation to People v. Duvall, 9 Cal.4th 464, 474 (1995), indicates

that in order to satisfy the initial burden of pleading adequate grounds for relief, the petition

should both (i) “state fully and with particularity the facts on which relief is sought, as well as (ii)

include copies of reasonably available documentary evidence supporting the claim, including

pertinent portions of trial transcripts and affidavits or declarations.” These defects are curable by

filing a renewed state petition. Cf. Kim v. Villalobos, 799 F.2d 1317, 1319 (9 Cir. 1986) th

(interpreting citation to Swain, which stands for the proposition that a petitioner has failed to

state his claim with sufficient particularity and has failed to explain the reasons for any delay in

filing, can be cured in a renewed petition). 

Here, as previously noted, Petitioner did not file a renewed petition in the California

Supreme after the first petition was denied with a citation to Duvall; rather, Petitioner filed the

instant petition in this Court. Petitioner has therefore failed to exhaust the state court remedies. 

Petitioner did not present the California Supreme Court with a copy of the entire transcript which

was necessary to determine whether he was wrongfully denied parole. Without a copy of the

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entire transcript, the California Supreme Court could not render a decision on the merits of the

petition. By specifically citing Duvall, the California Supreme Court indicted to Petitioner that

he had not supplied the necessary information. Therefore, because Petitioner neglected to

exhaust the state court remedies, Respondent’s motion to dismiss should be granted, and the

instant petition should be dismissed, without prejudice. 

 RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss be GRANTED; and

2. The instant petition for writ of habeas corpus be DISMISSED, without prejudice.

This Findings and Recommendations is submitted to the assigned United States District

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of

the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with

the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served

and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the

objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time

may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th

Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 4, 2007 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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