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Parties Involved:
Chaka Toure Hutchinson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 4, 2001 Decided November 6, 2001

No. 01-3036

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Chaka Toure Hutchinson,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 00cr00255-01)

A. J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender, argued the cause

and filed the briefs for appellant. Gregory L. Poe, Assistant

Federal Public Defender, entered an appearance.

Patricia A. Heffernan, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Kenneth L.

Wainstein, U.S. Attorney, and John R. Fisher, Roy W.

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McLeese III and Roderick L. Thomas, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: Edwards, Rogers and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Rogers.

Rogers, Circuit Judge: Chaka T. Hutchinson appeals his

conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon on the ground that the district court

erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. He contends that the retention of his identification during a Terry

stop extended his nonconsensual detention longer than was

necessary to effect the purpose of the Terry stop, and therefore was unlawful, requiring suppression of the gun, the

ammunition, and certain statements that he made. Because

the district court did not address Hutchinson's argument that

the scope and duration of the Terry stop was excessive in

light of police retention of his identification, and hence there

are no findings of fact essential to decide this legal issue, we

remand the case to the district court.

I.

The police stopped Hutchinson at 13th and Monroe Streets,

N.W., at about 12:40 a.m. on July 28, 2000. In following up a

robbery, the police were investigating a stabbing incident that

arose from the robbery and occurred at around 11:30-11:45

p.m. on July 27, 2000, at 13th and Kenyon Streets, N.W.,

which is approximately two to three blocks from Monroe

Street. Around midnight, an eyewitness to the stabbing told

Detective Hilliard that the person who had done the stabbing

was a black male, 5'6" to 5'9" tall, wearing dark clothing, with

a bush hair style pulled back and tied; the eyewitness

observed the stabbing from about fifty yards away and from

an elevated position. In response to the eyewitness's report,

a lookout was broadcast, describing a black male in his

twenties, about 5'8" tall wearing a dark shirt over dark pants

and having a bush hair style tied back with a rubber band.

The lookout stated that the subject was last seen walking

eastbound in the 1200 block of Kenyon Street, N.W.

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Hilliard first saw Hutchinson walking east on Monroe

toward 13th Street. Hutchinson wore dark blue pants and a

white shirt, and was carrying a shoulder bag. He was 28 or

29 years of age. His hair was in a bush hairstyle, pulled back

and tied. Although Hutchinson is 6'3" tall, Hilliard, who is

5'10", thought at the time that Hutchinson was around 5'11"

or 6' tall. Accompanied by one other officer, Hilliard stopped

Hutchinson because he believed that he fit the description of

the individual described in the lookout and no one else in the

area matched the lookout. One of the officers told Hutchinson to put his hands on a fence, which he did. Hutchinson

then asked "what was going on," and the officer responded

that he matched a lookout. The officer patted down Hutchinson and found nothing. A third officer arrived at the scene

shortly after Hutchinson was frisked. Hilliard then asked

Hutchinson from where he was coming and to where he was

going. Hutchinson said that he had just finished work at

WPFW, a jazz radio station, and that he was on his way to a

friend's house on Monroe Street. Hilliard was satisfied with

Hutchinson's responses, and was "comfortable that this

wasn't our suspect."

Hilliard, however, had obtained Hutchinson's identification,

jotted it down in his notebook, and decided to run it through

the "WALES" system. After determining that Hutchinson

"wasn't our suspect," Hilliard started walking toward his

cruiser to do the "WALES" check, when he said to Hutchinson, "You don't have a problem with the officer looking into

your bag?" Hilliard asked about the bag because Hutchinson

fit the lookout, having had time to take off a dark colored

shirt, and the bag would have been a good place to hide the

shirt and the knife. Hilliard testified that he was comfortable

that Hutchinson did not appear to be the person for whom

they were looking, but he could not say for certain that

Hutchinson was not the stabbing suspect without seeing if he

had a dark shirt or a knife. Thus, he "just arbitrarily" asked

Hutchinson about the bag to be sure he did not have "these

articles" before he was released. When Hutchinson did not

respond, it "sent back up the red flag" and Hilliard continued

to his cruiser.

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While still retaining Hutchinson's identification, Hilliard

was in his cruiser for two to five minutes attempting to run

the "WALES" check. Hilliard was unable to run the

"WALES" check, however, and returned to where Hutchinson was standing with the two other officers and asked, "Do

you have a problem with the officer looking in your bag?"

Hutchinson began taking his bag off his shoulder. Hilliard

asked, "What's wrong?" Hutchinson replied, "Well, you['re]

going to lock me up anyway." Hilliard asked, "Well, what's

wrong? You got a weapon or something in there?" Hutchinson replied, "Yeah, I have a gun." The police immediately

arrested Hutchinson and took the bag. The bag contained a

sawed-off shotgun. The transport officers observed Hutchinson attempting to conceal two shell casings in the transport

vehicle. Another officer corroborated much of Hilliard's testimony.

Hutchinson, who was implicated in neither the stabbing nor

the robbery that preceded it, filed a motion to suppress the

gun, the ammunition, and his statements. He argued that

the facts did not justify a Terry stop, because he did not fit

the lookout description and was walking in the opposite

direction at a time much later than the stabbing. He also

argued that the Terry stop had exceeded the scope of the

purpose of the stop, maintaining that the Terry stop constituted a custodial situation because Hilliard kept Hutchinson's

identification, there were three officers present, and Hutchinson was commanded to let the police look in his bag. Further, Hutchinson argued, because Hilliard was satisfied with

Hutchinson's responses, there was no need for further investigation. Finally, Hutchinson argued that the police officers'

questioning constituted custodial interrogation in violation of

his Fifth Amendment rights. The government responded

that the lookout was reliable, Hutchinson's location, age, race,

dark pants and hair style justified the stop, there was only

investigatory questioning that led to asking for consent to

search the bag, which Hutchinson effectively gave, and, in any

event, upon admitting he had a gun, there was probable cause

to arrest him.

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The district court denied the suppression motion. The

court concluded that the description was sufficient for a stop

two or three blocks away from the incident, and that because

the stabbing involved a knife, a pat down and preliminary

inquiry regarding the weapon were proper. The court found

that no weapons were drawn, the police did not use loud

voices, Hutchinson was not surrounded, and the stop was for

a short duration on a public street. As to the identification,

the court relied on United States v. Jordan, 958 F.2d 1085

(D.C. Cir. 1992), for the standard, "[whether] there [is] a

reasonable opportunity to review it," and concluded that the

officers retained Hutchinson's identification for a reasonable

period of time. Given the circumstances, the court concluded

that it was a fair inference that Hilliard intended to return

the identification to Hutchinson but for his admission to

having a gun. Finally, the court concluded that Hutchinson

was not in custody--that the encounter was a legitimate

Terry stop--and that the questioning was reasonably related

to the purpose of the stop.

Hutchinson thereafter pleaded guilty to unlawful possession

on July 28, 2000, of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted

felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. s 922(g)(1).

II.

On appeal, Hutchinson does not contend that his initial stop

was based on less than reasonable suspicion. Instead, he

explicitly declined to challenge the stop's propriety at its

inception in light of United States v. Davis, 235 F.3d 584

(D.C. Cir. 2000). Because Hutchinson does not challenge the

lawfulness of his initial stop, the court has no occasion to

decide whether the facts in the instant case rise to the level of

reasonable suspicion present in Davis and required by the

Supreme Court's Terry jurisprudence.

Hence, the only question on appeal is whether the scope

and duration of the Terry stop were impermissible. Hutchinson contends that the retention of his identification for two to

five minutes to run a "WALES" check, and the questioning

that took place during and after that period, resulted in a

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detention that was both longer than necessary to carry out

the purpose of the stop and beyond the scope of the purpose

of the stop. Therefore, Hutchinson contends, his statements

and the physical evidence seized from him during and after

this time period must be suppressed.

In Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983), the Supreme

Court instructed that:

an investigative detention must be temporary and last no

longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the

stop. Similarly, the investigative methods employed

should be the least intrusive means reasonably available

to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period

of time. It is the State's burden to demonstrate that the

seizure it seeks to justify on the basis of reasonable

suspicion was sufficiently limited in scope and duration to

satisfy the conditions of an investigative seizure.

Id. at 500 (citations omitted). In Adams v. Williams, 407

U.S. 143 (1972), the Court further stated that a "brief stop of

a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or

to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more

information," is permissible. Id. at 146.

Typically, this means that the officer may ask the detainee a moderate number of questions to determine his

identity and to try to obtain information confirming or

dispelling the officer's suspicions. But the detainee is

not obligated to respond. And, unless the detainee's

answers provide the officer with probable cause to arrest

him, he must then be released.

Berkemer v. McCarthy, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 (1984) (footnotes

omitted); see also United States v. Gale, 952 F.2d 1412, 1415

(D.C. Cir. 1992).

On appeal, Hutchinson contends that his detention exceeded its allowable limits because Detective Hilliard's suspicions

based on the lookout had been dispelled, according to Hilliard's testimony, by the time Hutchinson made the incriminating statements. Hilliard testified that prior to attempting a

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es to his questions and that Hutchinson was not the subject of

the lookout. Nonetheless, although the record is unclear

when and what identification was obtained from Hutchinson,

the police obtained Hutchinson's identification. There was no

indication that there was anything wrong with Hutchinson's

identification. Hutchinson maintains, moreover, that there

was no evidence that a "WALES" check could have provided

information that would have helped the police determine

whether he was the stabbing suspect. Insofar as the record

reveals, retention of his identification for a "WALES" check

bore no relation to the purpose of the stop, which was for a

suspect in a stabbing earlier that night. No evidence was

offered about what information can be obtained from the

"WALES" system, much less what the "WALES" system is

other than some sort of police database. Although running a

computer check on a driver's license and registration is a

lawful part of a traffic stop because of the public interest of

the States in ensuring that only those qualified to do so are

permitted to operate motor vehicles, see Delaware v. Prouse,

440 U.S. 648, 658 (1979), Hutchinson maintains that no such

interest exists with regard to pedestrians. Finally, because

Detective Hilliard testified that he had copied the information

in his notebook, there was no need for him to retain Hutchinson's identification during the "WALES" check. In Hutchinson's view, the fact that the retention of his identification had

nothing to do with the stop is shown by Hilliard's failure to

explain why he needed to retain the identification for any

purpose related to the stop.

The government's response is that Hutchinson has waived

the argument that retention of his identification to run the

"WALES" check exceeded the lawful scope of the Terry stop

by failing to make it in the district court. See Fed. R. Crim.

P. 12(f). We disagree. First, Hutchinson's motion to suppress challenged the scope of the investigative stop, citing

both Royer and Terry. Second, Hutchinson elucidated this

challenge at the suppression hearing, arguing that "[a]n

investigative detention has to be reasonably related in scope

to the circumstances which justified the interference in the

first place. That's Terry, 392 U.S. at 20." He also argued

that because his match to the lookout description was so

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weak, the permitted scope and duration of the stop "narrowed

considerably." As part of his challenge to the scope and

duration of the stop, he further argued: "A key fact is that

Hilliard asks for and keeps [Hutchinson's] identification" and

that this "alone is enough to turn this into a custodial

situation." Although Hutchinson's terminology was not technically exact because "custodial situation" generally pertains

to Miranda analyses whereas the issue here was the scope

and duration of a Terry seizure, Hutchinson, by arguing that

the officer's retention of his identification impermissibly

turned the Terry stop into a custodial situation, a higherlevel, more intrusive, Fourth Amendment event, was also

necessarily arguing that the officer exceeded the permissible

bounds of the Terry stop. See United States v. Sharpe, 470

U.S. 675, 685 (1985); United States v. Laing, 889 F.2d 281,

285 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Third, the district court addressed the

legal issue of whether the stop had exceeded its permissible

bounds, and, relying on the legal standard in United States v.

Jordan, 958 F.2d 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1992), concluded that the

retention of Hutchinson's identification was not temporally

significant for purposes of the court's Fourth Amendment

analysis. Although neither Hutchinson nor the district court

focused clearly on the distinction between Jordan, in which

the issue was whether retention of an identification would

turn an otherwise consensual encounter into a seizure, id. at

1088-89, and this case, in which Hutchinson's identification

was retained during a seizure, Hutchinson's citation to Jordan put the issue of whether retaining his identification had

Fourth Amendment significance before the court, and the

court seemingly understood that point because it addressed

the issue.

It is true that the argument at the suppression hearing

focused on whether Hutchinson was lawfully stopped initially,

and whether his statements thereafter were elicited in response to custodial interrogation. In his motion, Hutchinson

argued that by the time he "told the officers that he had a

gun, the statement was the product of an illegal seizure."

The government's opposition acknowledged Hutchinson's

claim that he was unlawfully seized, but did not address

Hutchinson's impermissible scope argument or his reliance on

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Royer. It is also true that Hutchinson's motion could have

stated more fulsomely the argument regarding the scope of

the seizure, as counsel has done in his brief on appeal. But

for the reasons noted, we conclude that Hutchinson adequately set forth both the legal ground and factual support for his

objection, and accordingly, did not waive the scope and duration claim. See United States v. Mitchell, 951 F.2d 1291, 1296

(D.C. Cir. 1991); United States v. Bailey, 675 F.2d 1292, 1294

(D.C. Cir. 1982).

We nevertheless conclude that remand is required. Hutchinson's motion to suppress raised two separate legal questions. The first question was whether, under Terry, the

police had articulable suspicion to stop Hutchinson for questioning. See Royer, 460 U.S. at 498. The district court

addressed this question, finding that the police had reasonable grounds to stop Hutchinson and, because the stabbing

involved a knife, to pat him down and ask him questions in

connection with the stabbing. The second question was

whether Hutchinson's seizure was sufficiently limited in scope

and duration to the circumstances that justified the interference with his liberty in the first place. See Royer, 460 U.S. at

500; Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20. In order to answer the second

question, the district court had to make factual findings

regarding not only the length of time that Hutchinson was

seized, i.e., held for investigative detention, but also whether

at some point the investigative detention exceeded the purpose of the initial stop, see Royer, 460 U.S. at 500; United

States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1229-30 (10th Cir. 2001), and

hence impermissibly extended the duration of the stop. In

concluding that the duration of the stop was reasonable,

however, the district court addressed the retention of Hutchinson's identification only in temporal terms. The district

court also should have considered whether the temporal

duration of the stop was unlawfully extended because the

police pursued a means of investigation that was beyond the

scope of the purpose of the stop. See Sharpe, 470 U.S. at

686; see also United States v. Machuca-Barrera, 261 F.3d

425, 432 (5th Cir. 2001). The district court did not, however,

address whether the retention of Hutchinson's identification

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exceeded the permissible scope of the stop to investigate the

stabbing, and thus unlawfully extended Hutchinson's seizure.

Hutchinson did not argue in the district court that he was not

required to surrender his identification, see Oliver v. Woods,

209 F.3d 1179, 1190 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing Kolender v.

Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 361 n.10 (1983)), and does not attempt

to raise that issue now. But to address the argument he

made regarding the scope and duration of his detention and

the retention of his identification, the district court had to

make findings regarding the purpose of retaining Hutchinson's identification, the purpose of the "WALES" check, and

whether the information available from the "WALES" system

could have assisted the police in determining whether Hutchinson was the stabbing suspect whom they were pursuing.

Absent such findings, the court was not in a position to

determine whether the government had met its burden to

show that Hutchinson's seizure "last[ed] no longer than [wa]s

necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." Royer, 460

U.S. at 500. Under such circumstances, remand is appropriate. See United States v. Williams, 951 F.2d 1287, 1291

(D.C. Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Hill, 131 F.3d

1056, 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

Accordingly, we remand the case to the district court for

a determination whether retention of Hutchinson's identification for the purpose of running the "WALES" check was

related to the purpose of the stop or caused the stop to go on

for too long, thereby tainting the evidence and statements

obtained by the police after the attempted "WALES" check.

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