Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-15486/USCOURTS-ca9-13-15486-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Diane C.
Appellee
George K.
Appellee
Sam K.
Appellee
State of Hawaii Department of Education
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SAM K., by and through his parents;

DIANE C.; GEORGE K.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

STATE OF HAWAII DEPARTMENT OF

EDUCATION,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-15486

D.C. No.

1:12-cv-00355-

ACK-BMK

SAM K., by and through his parents;

DIANE C.; GEORGE K.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

STATE OF HAWAII DEPARTMENT OF

EDUCATION,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 13-16452

D.C. No.

1:12-cv-00355-

ACK-BMK

OPINION

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Hawaii

Alan C. Kay, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

October 9, 2014—Honolulu, Hawaii

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2 SAM K. V. STATE OF HAWAII DEP’T OF EDUC.

Filed June 5, 2015

Before: A. Wallace Tashima, Johnnie B. Rawlinson,

and Richard R. Clifton, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Clifton;

Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge

Rawlinson

SUMMARY*

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act

The panel affirmed the district court’s judgment in an

action brought by a disabled student under the Individuals

with Disabilities Education Act.

The panel affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the

student’s parents were entitled to reimbursement for the costs

of a private school program because this placement was

bilateral, not unilateral, and so the parents’ request for

reimbursement was timely under the two-year statute of

limitations set forth in Haw. Rev. Stat. § 302A-443(a). 

Distinguishing K.D. v. Dep’t of Educ., 665 F.3d 1110 (9th

Cir. 2011), the panel held that the placement was bilateral

because the State of Hawaii Department of Education tacitly

consented to the student’s placement by failing to propose an

alternative.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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SAM K. V. STATE OF HAWAII DEP’T OF EDUC. 3

Affirming the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees to

the student and his parents, the panel held that the district

court did not abuse its discretion in reducing the hourly rate

requested by counsel.

Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge

Rawlinson agreed with the majority that the district court

acted within its discretion in determining a reasonable hourly

rate for the calculation of attorneys’ fees. She disagreed with

the majority’s holding that the private school placement

became bilateral due to implied consent on the part of the

Department of Education.

COUNSEL

Jocelyn H. Chong, Michelle Puu (argued), and Holly T.

Shikada, Deputy Attorneys General, Honolulu, Hawaii, for

Defendant-Appellant/Defendant-Appellee.

Carl M. Varady, Honolulu, Hawaii, for PlaintiffsAppellees/Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

CLIFTON, Circuit Judge:

Sam K. is a disabled student. An administrative hearings

officer for the State of Hawaii concluded that the State

Department of Education (“DOE”) failed to propose a school

placement for Sam for the 2010–11 school year that was

appropriate and satisfied the requirements of the Individuals

with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400

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4 SAM K. V. STATE OF HAWAII DEP’T OF EDUC.

et seq. The hearings officer further found that the private

school program in which Sam was enrolled by his parents

was appropriate.

In other circumstances, this would have entitled the

parents to reimbursement by the DOE for the costs of

attending the private program, but the hearings officer also

concluded that the parents’ request for reimbursement was

untimely under Haw. Rev. Stat. § 302A–443(a). That statute

sets two different limitations periods. Parents ordinarily have

two years to initiate the process by requesting a hearing, but

the statute requires a filing “within one hundred and eighty

calendar days of a unilateral special education placement” if

the request includes “reimbursement of the costs of the

placement.” Id. The hearings officer found that the private

placement by the parents was “unilateral” and that their

request was not filed within 180 days. Reimbursement was

denied on that ground. The district court disagreed. It held

that the placement was “bilateral,” not “unilateral,” so that the

parents’ request was not untimely, and concluded that the

parents were entitled to reimbursement. We affirm the

judgment of the district court.

The district court also awarded attorney’s fees to Sam and

his parents. Contending that the hourly rate used in

calculating the award was too low, Sam cross-appeals the

amount of the attorney’s fees. We affirm that order as well.

I. Background

Sam K. suffers from anxiety, depression, language issues,

speech issues, social issues, and central auditory processing

disorder. In 2003, his parents (“Parents”) removed Sam from

public school and placed him in Loveland Academy, a private

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SAM K. V. STATE OF HAWAII DEP’T OF EDUC. 5

institution in Honolulu, where he was enrolled every year

thereafter. The current litigation concerns Sam’s placement

for the 2010–11 school year.

Previous litigation between the Parents and DOE

regarding the three years immediately preceding the 2010–11

school year was resolved by a settlement in May 2010 under

which (1) DOE agreed to pay for Sam’s tuition at Loveland

for school years 2007–08 through 2009–10, (2) current

information from Loveland about Sam would be provided to

DOE, and (3) the Parents would participate in an “IEP

Reevaluation meeting” by the end of June 2010.1 The Parents

and DOE representatives met to discuss Sam’s Individual

Education Plan (“IEP”) for the following year several times

during the summer and into the fall of 2010. In the

meantime, the 2010–11 school year began, and Sam remained

at Loveland.

The meetings extended into January 2011. No different

placement was ever agreed upon. DOE did not present a

specific public school placement until January 14, 2011,

when DOE produced a signed IEP that provided that Sam

would be placed in a public school program at the Windward

Intensive LearningCenter (“ILC”). DOE followed up on that

proposal by sending to the Parents a document entitled Prior

Written Notice of Department Action, giving formal notice of

the ILC placement, dated January 27, 2011. Sam never joined

the ILC program, remaining at Loveland instead.

1 Prior to the settlement, the litigation resulted in several district court

orders, one of which was published. See D.C. v. Dept. of Educ., 550 F.

Supp. 2d 1238 (D. Haw. 2008).

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6 SAM K. V. STATE OF HAWAII DEP’T OF EDUC.

The Parents disputed the effectiveness of the IEP and the

finality of the ILC placement. The DOE stated in letters

dated March 9, 2011, and April 20, 2011, that the IEP issued

on January 14, 2011, was the final IEP. The Parents filed a

request for a due process hearing on October 27, 2011.

Following an extensive due process hearing, the

administrative hearings officer issued a 34-page Findings of

Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decision. The decision

included at least five determinations that are important for the

current appeal.

1. The DOE “predetermine[d] placement to be appropriate

at DOE Proposed Placement [the ILC program] in advance

and without any significant parental input.” The hearings

officer further concluded that “[t]he IDEA is violated when

the DOE predetermines placement for [Sam] before the IEP

is developed. In addition to being contrary to the procedural

requirement that the placement be based on the IEP,

pre-determination also deprived [the] Parents of meaningful

participation in the IEP process.”

2. The placement proposed by the DOE was “ill advised,

inappropriate, and potentially disastrous to [Sam] and his

education.” The decision detailed reasons for that stronglyworded conclusion, but as the DOE is no longer contesting

the conclusion, it is not necessary to go into them here. The

important determination, also no longer disputed by DOE,

was that the placement proposed by the DOE was not

reasonably calculated to confer educational benefits on Sam

and denied him the free appropriate public education to which

he was entitled under the IDEA.

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SAM K. V. STATE OF HAWAII DEP’T OF EDUC. 7

3. The Parents established that Loveland was an

appropriate placement for purposes of reimbursement. The

hearings officer specifically concluded that it “has provided

and can provide educational instruction specially designed to

meet the unique needs of [Sam], supported by such services

as are necessary to permit [Sam] to benefit from instruction.”

(citations omitted).

4. The placement of Sam at Loveland for the 2010–11

school year was a “unilateral placement” by the Parents,

without the agreement of DOE. The DOE made its position

clear that the IEP process was over and the ILC placement

was what it made available. The hearings officer found that

DOE stated this view no later than in its letter dated March 9,

2011. This letter was received by the Parents around March

12, 2011, and so the 180-day period began running, at the

latest, on March 12, 2011. The Parents’ request for a due

process hearing and reimbursement was filed on October 21,

2011. That was untimely as it was more than 180 days later,

so the hearings officer concluded that reimbursement was

precluded under Haw. Rev. Stat. § 302A–443(a). In reaching

that conclusion, the hearings officer’s decision discussed both

the previous decision of the district court in D.C. v.

Department of Education, 550 F. Supp. 2d 1238 (D. Haw.

2008), and our decision in K.D. v. Department of Education,

665 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2011).

5. The Parents did not establish that DOE was

responsible for the failure to have the 2010–11 IEP in place

by the conclusion of the August 6, 2010, IEP meeting, which

would have been only about one week after the start of the

school year. In reaching that conclusion, the hearings officer

observed that the IEP process was “very lengthy and very

disputatious. . . . As stated by Petitioners’ counsel: ‘We’ll

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8 SAM K. V. STATE OF HAWAII DEP’T OF EDUC.

stipulate that it [the relationship between the parties] was

bad.’” (alteration in original).

On appeal from the administrative decision, the district

court reversed the hearings officer’s finding as to the statute

of limitations, but affirmed in all other respects. The district

court followed its own prior decision in D.C., where it held

that a subsequent determination by a hearings officer in favor

of a student that a private placement was appropriate, while

the DOE’s proposed placement was not, constituted an

agreement between the DOE and the family rendering the

private placement “bilateral” rather than unilateral. See D.C.,

550 F. Supp. 2d at 584. The district court also observed that

Sam had been placed at Loveland for many years, and that the

DOE had agreed in the settlement agreement to pay for the

Loveland program for the preceding three years. The court

noted that the DOE had not offered an IEP for Sam for those

preceding years, that the settlement agreement did not

provide for a change in placement, and that no IEP had been

offered by the DOE by the beginning of the 2010–11 school

year. Under those circumstances, the district court concluded

that the “Parents’ decision to continue to enroll Sam in

Loveland effectively was a continuation of a bilateral

placement rather than a unilateral placement.” The court’s

order discussed our decision in K.D., which held that a

settlement agreement did not necessarily constitute an

agreement by the DOE that continued into following years,

concluding that our K.D. decision was distinguishable based

on the facts that the district court identified.

On appeal to this court, the DOE does not challenge the

first three conclusions by the hearings officer identified

above, all of which were affirmed by the district court. It is,

therefore, no longer in dispute regarding the 2010–11 school

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SAM K. V. STATE OF HAWAII DEP’T OF EDUC. 9

year that (1) DOE breached a procedural requirement of the

IDEA by predetermining Sam’s placement and failing to

allow for significant parental input in the IEP process, (2) the

ILC placement proposed by DOE was inappropriate for Sam,

and (3) the Loveland program in which Sam was enrolled by

his Parents was appropriate. DOE appeals only the decision

by the district court that the Parents are entitled to

reimbursement because the Loveland placement for school

year 2010–11 was not “unilateral” and thus that the Parents’

request was not untimely.

After the district court rendered its decision on the merits,

including the Parents’ entitlement to reimbursement, Sam,

through his Parents, brought a motion in the district court for

an award of attorney’s fees and costs. Adopting a calculation

made in findings and recommendation by a magistrate judge,

the district court awarded fees in the amount of $77,226.93. 

The calculation was primarily based on 255.05 billable hours

compensated at a rate of $285 per hour, with small amounts

added for work done by a paralegal and for Hawaii general

excise tax. Sam’s attorney sought a higher hourly rate of

$375 per hour and supported that request with declarations by

five Hawaii attorneys stating their opinions that such a rate

was reasonable for the attorney in question. The district court

noted those declarations but concluded, based on the court’s

familiarity with the prevailing rates in the community, that

the requested hourly rate was excessive and that an hourly

rate of $285 was reasonable. The court awarded fees based

on that reduced hourly rate.

Sam appeals the amount of fees awarded, raising only the

issue of the reduced hourly rate.

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10 SAM K. V. STATE OF HAWAII DEP’T OF EDUC.

II. Reimbursement Claim

In a case under IDEA, this court reviews a district court’s

findings of fact for clear error. L.M. v. Capistrano Unified

Sch. Dist., 556 F.3d 900, 908 (9th Cir. 2009). We review

questions of law and mixed questions of fact and law de

novo, unless the mixed question is primarily factual. Amanda

J. ex. rel. Annette J. v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 267 F.3d 877,

887 (9th Cir. 2001).

The IDEA aims to provide “all children with disabilities

. . . a free appropriate public education that emphasizes

special education and related services designed to meet their

unique needs and prepare them for further education,

employment, and independent living[.]” 20 U.S.C.

§ 1400(d)(1)(A). If parents believe their child is not

receiving a free appropriate public education (commonly

referred to as a “FAPE”), they may be able to place the child

in a private program and then seek reimbursement from the

public school district. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii);

34 C.F.R. § 300.148(c). The federal statute provides that the

parent must seek a hearing within two years of an alleged

denial of a FAPE, but permits states to set a different

limitations period. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(B), (f)(3)(C).

Under Haw. Rev. Stat. § 302A–443(a), parents in Hawaii

have two years to initiate the process by requesting a due

process hearing, but a filing is required “within one hundred

and eighty days of a unilateral special education placement,

where the request is for reimbursement of the costs of the

placement.” The statute does not define “unilateral special

education placement.” There are no reported Hawaii state

court decisions interpreting this provision.

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SAM K. V. STATE OF HAWAII DEP’T OF EDUC. 11

Our court considered the meaning of “unilateral special

education placement” as used in Section 302A–443 in K.D.,

665 F.3d at 1110. We adopted a definition previously set

forth in a District of Hawaii decision and held that “a

unilateral special education placement occurs when one party

unilaterally (i.e., without consent or agreement of the other

party) enrolls the student in a special education program.” Id.

at 1122 (quoting Makiko D. v. Hawaii, No. 06-cv-00189,

2007 WL 1153811, at *7 (D. Haw. Apr. 17, 2007)) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

In K.D., a student’s family reached a settlement

agreement in March 2007 with the Hawaii DOE under which

the DOE agreed to pay for the student’s private tuition, by

coincidence also at Loveland Academy, for the then-current

2006–07 school year. The agreement provided that the

student was to participate in planning for transition to a

public school for the following school year, if deemed

appropriate. Before that next school year began, the DOE

presented a IEP providing for placement in a public school. 

The family did not respond and re-enrolled the student in the

Loveland program. After a due process hearing, the

administrative hearings officer concluded that the public

school placement proposed by the DOE would have provided

a FAPE. The hearings officer also dismissed the family’s

claims for private program tuition reimbursement for the

2007–08 year. Although the family argued that it was

entitled to maintain the placement at Loveland as a “stay put”

placement during the pendency of litigation, the request was

rejected as untimely because the placement at Loveland for

the 2007–08 year was found to have been “unilateral” and the

request for reimbursement was made over a year later.

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12 SAM K. V. STATE OF HAWAII DEP’T OF EDUC.

Our court affirmed that decision. In particular, we agreed

that the placement for 2007–08 was properly described as

“unilateral.” We noted that the March 2007 settlement

agreement never called for “placement” at Loveland and only

required tuition reimbursement for the prior year. Id. at 1119. 

The agreement also referenced at least the possibility that the

student would transition to a public school for the next year. 

Id. We observed that the “settlement agreement specified in

several places that it applied only to the 2006–07 school

year[.]” Id. at 1120. The decision to enroll the student at

Loveland the following year was, therefore, a “unilateral”

decision by the family. “The enrollment thus occurred

without consent or agreement of the other party.” Id. at 1122

(internal quotation marks omitted).

The DOE points to K.D. and argues that this case is the

same. We disagree, however, and conclude that this case is

different in at least one important respect.

In K.D. the settlement agreement explicitly contemplated

a public school placement for the following year, and the

DOE proposed such a placement before the next school year

began. In the current case, the DOE did not present an IEP

providing for a public school placement for the 2010–11

school year until January 2011, at least halfway through that

year. The DOE did not make clear that its position was final

until it sent a letter to that effect in March 2011, after most of

the 2010–11 school year had already gone by. Prior to that

time, Sam was still attending the Loveland program, as the

DOE necessarily knew. The DOE had not proposed anything

else, and it presumably did not intend that Sam would receive

no educational services in the meantime. In those

circumstances, it does not appear to us that the placement at

Loveland for the 2010–11 school year was “without consent

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SAM K. V. STATE OF HAWAII DEP’T OF EDUC. 13

or agreement” of DOE, as the term “unilateral” was defined

in K.D.

Agreement may be tacit. The inclusion of “consent” as an

alternative to “agreement” in K.D.’s definition of “unilateral”

further suggests that the manifestation of agreement need not

be explicit. See generally Sierra Club v. Castle & Cooke

Homes Hawaii, Inc., 320 P.3d 849, 861 (Haw. 2013)

(recognizing “implied consent” as “[c]onsent inferred from

one’s conduct rather than from one’s direct expression”)

(quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 346 (9th ed. 2009)). 

Consent may be indicated by silence or inaction where such

silence or inaction manifests a willingness for the conduct in

question to happen. See generally Restatement (Second) of

Torts § 892(1) (1965) (“(1) Consent is willingness in fact for

conduct to occur. It may be manifested by action or inaction

and need not be communicated to the actor. (2) If words or

conduct are reasonably understood by another to be intended

as consent, they constitute apparent consent and are as

effective as consent in fact.”); Restatement (First) of Property

§ 516 cmt. c (1944) (“Manifestation of consent. The consent

from which a license arises may be manifested by conduct of

any kind. The manifestation may consist in the use of

language, or in conduct other than the use of language. Such

conduct may consist of acts indicative of a consent by the

actor to the use of his land by another, or it may consist in

failure to take reasonable action when inaction may

reasonably lead to an inference of consent.”).

Here, the DOE knew that Sam was enrolled at Loveland

for the 2010–11 school year. By waiting so long into that

school year to propose a different placement, the DOE tacitly

consented to his enrollment at Loveland Academy. It is true

that the hearings officer found that the Parents did not prove

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14 SAM K. V. STATE OF HAWAII DEP’T OF EDUC.

that the DOE was responsible for the failure to have an IEP

for a public school program in place by the time that the

2010–11 school year began. But that does not change the fact

that the DOE knew that Sam was going to be enrolled in

Loveland in the meantime and necessarily consented to that

enrollment for that school year because it had not offered

another alternative.

That did not mean that the DOE was precluded from

proposing something different thereafter. Had it proposed an

appropriate public school placement, it might have been able

to maintain the position that Sam’s family should not be

entitled to reimbursement for the time following the proposal

of a proper public placement. But the hearings officer and the

district court both concluded that the DOE’s proposed

placement was not appropriate and that the Loveland program

was, findings that the DOE no longer disputes. For now, the

only question is whether the placement at Loveland for the

2010–11 school year was “unilateral.” We agree with the

district court that it was not, and as a result, the 180-day

limitations period did not apply. Reimbursement cannot be

denied on that basis.2

Sam’s family is entitled to reimbursement for the

2010–11 school year. We affirm the decision of the district

court to that effect.

 

2 The district court identified other reasons for reaching the conclusion

that the placement was not unilateral, but we do not need to consider those

other reasons.

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SAM K. V. STATE OF HAWAII DEP’T OF EDUC. 15

III. Attorney’s Fees

Sam appeals the amount of attorney’s fees awarded by the

district court, contending that the fees should have be

calculated at a rate of $375 per hour rather than at the $285

rate used by the district court.

We review a district court’s determination of whether to

grant attorney’s fees in an IDEA case for an abuse of

discretion. Oscar v. Alaska Dept. Of Educ. & Early Dev.,

541 F.3d 978, 980–81 (9th Cir. 2008). We review the district

court’s factual determinations for clear error and the legal

analysis related to the fee determination de novo. Id.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in using an

hourly rate of $285. In support of his position, Sam’s

attorneypresented to the district court declarations from other

Hawaii attorneys who undertake IDEA or other civil rights

cases on behalf of plaintiffs, stating their opinions that the

requested rate of $375 per hour, in light of the attorney’s

training and experience, was reasonable. It was telling,

however, that none of the declarations stated that any of the

attorneys had actually been paid fees at that $375 rate for

work of this type, or that any attorney of similar training and

experience had.

Reasonable attorney’s fees are to be calculated according

to “the prevailing market rates in the relevant community.” 

Van Skike v. Dir., Office of Workers Compensation

Programs, 557 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting

Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984)). The burden is

on the fee applicant “to produce satisfactory evidence” of the

prevailing market rates. Id. (quoting Blum, 465 U.S. at 896

n. 11). District courts may consider the fees awarded by

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16 SAM K. V. STATE OF HAWAII DEP’T OF EDUC.

others in the same locality for similar cases. Moreno v. City

of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1115 (9th Cir. 2008); see also

Nat’l Ass’n of Concerned Veterans v. Sec’y of Def., 675 F.2d

1319, 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“Recent fees awarded by the

courts or through settlement to attorneys of comparable

reputation and experience performing similar work are also

useful guides in setting an appropriate rate.”). District courts

may also use their “own knowledge of customary rates and

their experience concerning reasonable and proper fees.” 

Ingram v. Oroudjian, 647 F.3d 925, 928 (9th Cir. 2011).

That other attorneys may think that a given rate is

“reasonable” does not necessarily say what the prevailing

market rates actually are. That is especially true when the

opinion are expressed by attorneys whose own professional

interests might motivate them to favor higher rates. The D.C.

Circuit has expressed skepticism about the value of

declarations from attorneys that provide only conclusory

statements as to the prevailing rates or whether a given hourly

rate is reasonable. See Nat’l Ass’n of Concerned Veterans,

675 F.2d at 1325–26 (“The District Court’s . . . inquiry is

aided little by an affidavit which just offers one attorney’s

conclusory and general opinion on what [the relevant market]

rate is. Nor is it helpful if the affiant simply states that he is

familiar with the attorney and the litigation and that he thinks

the fee request is reasonable.”). In concluding that the

requested hourly rate was excessive and that an hourly rate of

$285 was reasonable, the magistrate judge noted the court’s

familiarity with the prevailing rates in the community and

cited specific fee awards in other cases in the district. The

district court accepted that recommendation. Nothing in the

record gives us reason to doubt the court’s assessment.

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SAM K. V. STATE OF HAWAII DEP’T OF EDUC. 17

Sam’s attorney also argues that the district court

improperly followed a policy to “hold the line” by adopting

a policy to limit fee awards to a certain rate for similar cases,

citing our decision in Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1115. The district

court rejected a similar attack on the recommendation of the

magistrate judge, noting that nothing in the recommendation

indicated an effort to “hold the line.” We agree. Indeed, we

note that the $285 hourly rate awarded by the district court

was, as the magistrate judge’s report described, higher than

the $275 rate previously awarded by the court to Sam’s

attorney in a different case. In addition, the magistrate

judge’s report discussed an even higher hourly rate, $300 per

hour, that had been awarded to another attorney in IDEA

cases, noting that the attorney awarded that higher rate had

many years more experience than Sam’s attorney. That

discussion contradicts the claim that the court applied a

policy to “hold the line.”

We affirm the fee award entered by the district court.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, we affirm both the award of

reimbursement in No. 13-15486 and the award of attorney’s

fees in No. 13-15452.

Each side to bear its own costs.

AFFIRMED.

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18 SAM K. V. STATE OF HAWAII DEP’T OF EDUC.

RAWLINSON, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and

dissenting in part:

I agree with the majority that the district court acted

within its discretion in determining a reasonable hourly rate

for the calculation of attorney’s fees in this case. However,

I respectfully disagree that the hotly disputed placement at

Loveland Academy somehow morphed from a unilateral

placement to a bilateral placement due to implied consent on

the part of the State Department of Education.

Initially, it is important to note that the State Hearings

Officer determined that the private placement for the

2010–2011 school year was a unilateral placement. Thus, the

adjudicator in the case with the closest nexus to the case did

not give “implied consent” to the placement. Relying on

K.D. v. Department of Education, 665 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir.

2011), the same case cited by the majority, the State Hearings

Officer determined that under the settlement agreement

between the State Department of Education and Sam K.’s

parents, the State agreed to pay tuition at Loveland only

through the end of the 2009–2010 school year. That

determination is undisputed. As the hearings officer also

noted, the settlement agreement contained no provision

regarding placement for Sam K. As the hearings officer

pointed out, the settlement agreement was “not a conclusion

from a detailed evaluation that determined private placement

to be the appropriate educational institution for Student

under the [Act]. . . .” (emphasis added).

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SAM K. V. STATE OF HAWAII DEP’T OF EDUC. 19

The hearings officer’s reasoning is supported by our

analysis in K.D. In the context of a “stay put”1scenario, we

held that before a favorable administrative or judicial

decision can convert a unilateral placement into an agreedupon bilateral placement, the favorable decision “must

expressly find that the private placement was appropriate.” 

665 F.3d at 1118 (emphasis added). We expressly

distinguished between placement of a child in an educational

setting, and reimbursement of private school tuition. Quoting

Zvi D. v. Ambach, 694 F.2d 904, 908 (2d Cir. 1982), we

emphasized that “payment and placement are two different

matters.” Id. at 1119 (alteration omitted). We contrasted the

settlement agreement in Zvi D., where the child was “never

placed in the private school—the Board of Education merely

agreed to pay for his tuition . . .”, with Bayonne Board of

Education v. R.S., 954 F. Supp. 933 (D.N.J. 1997), where the

settlement agreement “actuallyplaced the student” rather than

merely agreeing to reimburse tuition. Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted). We likened the settlement agreement in K.D.

to that in Zvi D. as opposed to the one in Bayonne. We

observed that “K.D.’s settlement agreement never called for

‘placement,’ and only required tuition reimbursement.” Id. 

We clarified that the distinction between education placement

and tuition reimbursement “is not an insignificant semantic

difference.” Id. We explained that simply because the State

agrees to pay tuition at a private school for a discrete period

of time, “it does not follow that, by doing so, the [State] had

conducted the detailed evaluation required to determine

whether Loveland was the proper educational institution for

K.D. under the [Act].” Id. Indeed, we intimated that

1 The “stay put” provision of the Individuals with Disabilities Education

Act (Act) requires the continuation of a “then-current educational

placement.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j).

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20 SAM K. V. STATE OF HAWAII DEP’T OF EDUC.

Loveland was not an appropriate educational placement under

the Act. See id. at 1128 (“K.D.’s Loveland placement does

not square with one of the main purposes behind [the

Act]—to combat the apparently widespread practice of

relegating handicapped children to private institutions . . .”)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis

added).

Because the settlement agreement did not place K.D. at

Loveland and because the State only agreed to pay tuition for

a finite time period, we concluded that the State “never

affirmatively agreed to place K.D. at Loveland.” Id. at 1121. 

In turn, Loveland never became K.D.’s stay put placement

and “the settlement agreement did not operate to change the

placement from unilateral to bilateral.” Id. at 1122.

In a similar vein, we concluded in Clovis Unified School

District v. California Office of Administrative Hearings,

903 F.2d 635, 641 (9th Cir. 1990), “that once the State

educational agency decided that the parents’ placement was

the appropriate placement, it became the [stay put educational

location] . . .” (citation omitted) (emphasis added); see also

School Committee of the Town of Burlington, Mass. v.

Department of Education of Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 369–70

(1985) (concluding that “placement in private schools at

public expense” is appropriate under the Act “where a court

determines that a private placement . . . was proper . . . and

that an [individualized education program] calling for

placement in a public school was inappropriate”) (emphasis

added).

The flaw in the district court’s opinion that is repeated by

the majority is that despite the fact that the settlement

agreement did not mention placement as required by all the

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SAM K. V. STATE OF HAWAII DEP’T OF EDUC. 21

cases that have addressed this issue, the district court

conflated the reimbursement agreement into a bilateral

placement agreement. None of our precedent supports this

conflated analysis. I respectfully dissent.

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