Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_17-cv-02474/USCOURTS-caed-2_17-cv-02474-8/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Scott Johnson
Plaintiff
Sweet Spark, Inc.
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

SCOTT N. JOHNSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

SWEET SPARK, INC.,

Defendant.

No. 2:17-cv-02474 WBS DB 

ORDER RE: MOTION FOR 

ATTORNEY’S FEES

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Scott Johnson moves for $35,359.20 in 

attorney’s fees pursuant to the court’s authority under the 

Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12205, and 

California Civil Code § 52(a) following the parties’ settlement. 

(Docket No. 43.) 

I. Facts & Procedural Background 

Plaintiff is a quadriplegic who uses a wheelchair for 

mobility and has a specially equipped van. (Decl. of Scott 

Johnson (“Johnson Decl.”) ¶¶ 2-3 (Docket No. 24-5).) Plaintiff 

claims that on at least five different occasions between March 

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2017 and September 2017, he encountered access barriers at Fix 

Auto Sacramento (“Fix Auto”) that denied him full and equal 

access to Fix Auto and caused him difficulty and frustration. 

(Id. ¶¶ 6-12.) At all relevant times, defendant Sweet Spark, 

Inc. (“Sweet Spark”) owned, and presently owns, Fix Auto. (Def’s 

Resp. to Pl.’s Req. for Admis. 2-5 (Docket No. 24-12).) 

Plaintiff filed this action on November 24, 2017 seeking an 

injunction under the ADA and Unruh Act compelling Sweet Spark to 

bring its facilities into full compliance with the ADA. He also 

sought damages under the Unruh Act. (Compl. at 11 (Docket No. 

1).) 

After this court denied plaintiff’s motion for summary 

judgment (Docket No. 28), the parties reached a settlement 

agreement following their final pretrial conference. (Docket No. 

39.) The settlement agreement disposed of all causes of action 

described in the complaint and any causes of action that may have 

been brought in the complaint, known or unknown.1 (Settlement 

Agreement (Docket No. 51).) Presently before the court is 

plaintiff’s opposed motion for attorney’s fees. (Docket No. 43.)

II. Discussion 

A. Attorney’s Fees

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12205, a prevailing party is 

entitled to “reasonable attorney’s fees, including litigation 

expenses and costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 12205. Similarly, prevailing 

parties can recover attorney’s fees in suits brought under 

1 The parties’ confidential settlement agreement was 

submitted to the court under seal. 

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California civil rights statutes, including the Unruh Civil 

Rights Act. Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a). Defendant does not dispute 

that plaintiff was the prevailing party here, but contends that 

the attorney’s fees were miscalculated and a portion of the fee 

award is unsupported by evidence. (Opp. to Mot. (“Opp.”) (Docket 

No. 47).) 

An award of reasonable attorney’s fees is determined by 

the lodestar approach. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 

433 (1983). The lodestar is the “number of hours reasonably 

expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly 

rate.” Id. The court will exclude from the calculation any 

hours that were not reasonably expended because they were

“excessive, redundant or unnecessary.” Id. at 434. The court 

may then adjust the lodestar figure “pursuant to a variety of 

factors.” Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1209 (9th 

Cir. 2013) (citation and internal punctuation omitted). There is 

a strong presumption that the lodestar amount is reasonable.

Fischer v. SJB-P.D. Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1119 n.4 (9th Cir. 

2000). In determining the size of an appropriate fee award, the 

court need not “achieve auditing perfection.” Fox v. Vice, 563 

U.S. 826, 838 (2011). The court may use estimates and “take into 

account [its] overall sense of a suit” to determine a reasonable 

attorney’s fee. Id. 

1. Lodestar Computation

The burden is on the party requesting attorney’s fees 

to produce evidence to support his request. Blum v. Stenson, 465 

U.S. 886, 905 (1984). This includes submitting billing records 

to establish that the number of hours requested is reasonable. 

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Gonzalez, 729 F.3d at 1202. The court may reduce the hours 

“where documentation of the hours is inadequate; if the case was 

overstaffed and hours are duplicated; [or] if the hours expended 

are deemed excessive or otherwise unnecessary.” Chalmers v. City 

of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Plaintiff submitted a billing statement itemizing the 

time spent by twelve attorneys on this matter: Russell Handy, 

Phyl Grace, Dennis Price, Amanda Seabock, Isabel Masanque, Chris 

Seabock, Sara Gunderson, Elliot Montgomery, Khushpreet Mehton, 

Robert Doyle, Bradley Smith, and Mark Potter. (Mot. Ex. 2

(“Billing Statement”) (Docket No. 43-3).) Defendant claims that 

counsel billed for items that were clerical, unnecessary, or 

unreasonable. (Opp. at 7-16.) The hours claimed by plaintiff’s 

counsel, the defendant’s requested deduction to hours, and the 

hours that would remain after the requested deduction are as 

follows: 

Attorney Name Hours Claimed

by Plaintiff 

Requested 

Deduction 

Hours Remaining

After Deduction 

Mark Potter .3 0 .3

Russell Handy 4.4 1.8 2.6 

Phyl Grace 2.6 1.7 .9

Dennis Price 18.3 15.4 2.9

Amanda Seabock 2.4 1.9 .5

Chris Seabock 1.6 0 1.6

Isabel Masanque 12.3 2.2 10.1

Elliot Montgomery 1.3 0 1.3

Sara Gunderson 2.3 1.4 .9

Khushpreet Mehton .4 .4 0

Robert Doyle .1 .1 0

Bradley Smith 31.0 6.7 24.3

Totals 77 hours 

claimed

32.6 hours 

requested 

reduction 

55.7 lodestar 

hours 

i. Billings by Handy

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Mr. Handy claims 4.4 total hours. (See generally

Billing Statement.) Defendant first objects to an hour spent by 

Mr. Handy reviewing defendant’s answer and updating case notes. 

(Opp. at 7.) Defendant claims an hour spent on this task is 

“excessive” and there is “inadequate documentation regarding what 

analysis was conducted, and what notes were updated.” (Id.) The 

court finds it is reasonable to spend an hour reviewing an answer 

and updating case notes, and will not reduce that portion of Mr. 

Handy’s claimed hours. 

Next, defendant objects to Mr. Handy’s review of 

particular orders in light of their brevity, including: reviewing 

the stay order and VDRP order, reviewing the order extending 

VDRP, reviewing the notice of appointment of a VDRP neutral, 

reviewing an order extending time to complete VDRP, reviewing the

notice of completion of VDRP, reviewing the text of the order for 

the settlement conference, reviewing the order vacating the trial 

date and deadline for dismissal, and reviewing the minutes of the 

settlement conference. (Opp. at 7-8.) These reviews totaled 1 

hour. (Id.; Billing Statement 3-5, 7-8.) While some of the 

orders were as short as a sentence, exacting review of a court’s 

orders is a reasonable activity. Therefore, the billings for 

reviewing orders are not unreasonable or excessive. 

Conversely, Handy billed .8 hours for conveying

instructions to his assistant. (Opp. at 7-8; Billing Statement 

3-5, 8.) Defendant objects, claiming these instructions are a 

clerical task that cannot be billed as attorney’s fees. (Opp. at 

7-9.) The Ninth Circuit has recognized that work that is 

“clerical in nature . . . should [be] subsumed in firm overhead 

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rather than billed.” Nadarajah v. Holder, 569 F.3d 906, 921 (9th 

Cir. 2009). This can include organizational tasks like filings,

calendaring dealings, and certain email correspondence. See

Miller v. Schmitz, 1:12-cv-00317-LJO-SAB, 2017 WL 633892, at *6-7 

(E.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2017). While careful instructions are 

important, instructions to “notify plaintiff of mediation date” 

or “send reminder email to plaintiff” are clerical tasks that 

cannot be billed at an attorney’s rate. (Billing Statement at 

4.) Accordingly, the court will reduce Mr. Handy’s claimed hours 

by .8, bringing his total hours to 3.6. 

ii. Billings by Grace

Defendant first claims Ms. Grace billed for clerical 

tasks when listing .5 hours for correspondence and instructions 

between her and her assistant to “contact defense counsel” and 

“confirm with defense counsel,” among other things. (Opp. at 9-

10.) For the reasons discussed above, the court agrees and will 

reduce her claimed hours by .5. 

Defendant also objects to .6 hours’ worth of emails 

exchanged between Ms. Grace and defense counsel. (Id.) While 

the descriptions on the mast majority of the entries are confined 

to “email with defense counsel,” the court recognizes that these 

emails could be substantive and the time spent will not be 

excluded. See Miller, 2017 WL 633892, at *8. 

Finally, defendant objects to Ms. Grace’s billings for 

reviewing draft stipulations, deadline extensions, and additional 

revisions of drafted stipulation, totaling .7 hours. (Opp. to 

Mot. at 9.) The court does not find this excessive or 

duplicative, and will not reduce the hours on those grounds. 

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Accordingly, the court will reduce Ms. Grace’s claimed 2.6 hours 

by .5, leaving her with 2.1 hours. 

iii. Billings by Price

Defendant next argues that Price’s instructions to his 

assistant for the joint status report and his review of billing 

for errors or duplications are unbillable, because they are 

clerical or overhead. (Opp. at 10.) Time spent on tasks like 

preparing billing statements falls within the scope of 

administrative tasks previously mentioned. See Miller, 2017 WL 

633892, at *9 (citing Valley Bank & Trust Co., 678 F. Supp. 714, 

725 (N.D. Ill. 1988)). Accordingly, Mr. Price’s rate will be 

reduced .4 hours. 

Similarly, defendant argues plaintiff’s claimed 

research on prevailing hourly rates in Sacramento are unbillable 

because the information can easily be found, or is already known

to the attorneys given their expertise. (Opp. at 10.) 

Ironically, plaintiff provides an abundance of research on 

prevailing rates in the Central District of California, but 

provides no guidance on the prevailing rates in the Eastern 

District. (See Docket No. 43-5 & 6.) Accordingly, the court 

will not allow that request. 

Finally, Price billed 6.0 hours to draft the fees 

motion and initially billed an additional 8.0 hours to prepare 

the reply brief in support of the pending motion and to prepare

for and attend the oral argument. (Billing Statement at 9.) The 

court finds taking 6 hours to draft the fees motion is 

reasonable. In a declaration submitted with plaintiff’s reply, 

Mr. Price claims reviewing the defendant’s opposition to the 

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current motion took 2.1 hours and drafting the reply took 3.1 

hours. (Decl. of Dennis Price (“Price Decl.”) ¶¶ 3-4 (Docket No. 

53-1).) In light of the submission of the motion on the papers, 

Mr. Price withdrew his request for additional time associated 

with a court appearance. (Id. ¶ 5.) The court finds the total 

time associated with reviewing defendant’s opposition and 

drafting the reply -- 5.2 hours -- is not unreasonable. The 

court will subtract the remaining 2.8 hours from Mr. Price’s 

initial 8 hour time estimate per the plaintiff’s withdrawal. 

Accordingly, Mr. Price’s claimed 18.3 hours will be reduced by 

5.2, bringing his total to 13.1. 

iv. Billings by Masanque

Defendant objects to billing .8 hours for a public 

record search, claiming it is a clerical task. (Opp. at 11; 

Billing Statement at 2.) Indeed, this court has previously 

addressed this precise task by plaintiff’s counsel in three of 

its prior decisions, and reduced the hours claimed in each. See

Johnson v. Xinliang Bai, No. 2:16-1698 WBS GGH, 2017 WL 3334006, 

at *2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2017) (reducing 2.2 hour search by 1.1 

hours); Johnson v. Wayside Prop., Inc., No. 2:13-1610 WBS AC, 

2014 WL 6634324, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2014) (2.1 hours for 

public records research reduced to 1.1 hours); Johnson v. Allied 

Trailer Supply, No. 2:13-1544 WBS EFB, 2014 WL 1334006, at *2 

(E.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2014) (same). But here, with under an hour’s 

worth of work claimed, the court finds it is reasonable. 

Defendant then claims that .7 hours to draft the 

complaint and .1 hours to review the court’s summons are 

“excessive.” (Opp. at 11-12.) These are substantive tasks, and 

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the amount of time claimed does not appear to be unreasonable. 

However, Ms. Masanque’s claimed .6 hours spent providing 

instructions to her assistant, emailing the court clerk, and 

emailing a word version of the statement of undisputed facts to 

opposing counsel are clerical and will be discounted. (Opp. at 

12; Billing Statement 2, 7.) Accordingly, Ms. Masanque’s claimed 

12.3 hours will be reduced by .6, leaving her with 11.7 hours. 

v. Billings by Amanda Seabock

Defendant argues spending 1.2 hours drafting a notice 

of settlement, settlement agreement, and stipulation to extend 

deadline for dismissal is an unbillable clerical task. (Opp. at 

12; Billing Statement at 8-9.) While drafting a notice of 

settlement is arguably a clerical task, see Xinliang Bai, 2017 WL 

3334006, at *2, the court finds that .3 hours to draft the notice 

of settlement, .6 hours to draft the settlement, and .3 hours to 

draft the stipulation to extend deadline for dismissal is not 

unreasonable and therefore it will not be discounted. 

Similarly, the .6 hours spent reviewing correspondence 

from defense counsel is also not unreasonable and will not be 

reduced. (Opp. at 12-13.) However, for the reasons set forth 

above, the court finds Ms. Seabock’s correspondence with her 

assistant cannot be billed because it is clerical. (Opp. at 12.)

Accordingly, the court will reduce Ms. Seabock’s claimed 2.4 

hours by .1 hours. 

vi. Billings by Gunderson

Much as with the other attorneys, defendant objects to 

the .5 hours Ms. Gunderson spent providing instructions to her 

assistant, and for the reasons the court has already provided, 

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this time will be discounted. (Opp. at 13-14; Billing Statement 

5-6.) The .4 hours spent corresponding with defense counsel, or 

reviewing correspondence from the city clerk or court, is not 

inherently clerical, and will not be discounted. (Id.) Finally, 

the .4 hours spent reviewing the investigator’s report and the .1 

hours spent drafting notices of deposition will not be reduced as 

clerical or excessive in light of their substantive nature. 

Accordingly, Ms. Gunderson’s 2.3 hours will be reduced by .5, 

leaving her with 1.8 hours for the lodestar calculation. 

vii. Billings by Mehton

Defendant argues the .2 hours Mr. Mehton spent drafting 

a notice of appearance and .2 hours spent drafting a notice of 

withdrawal are clerical tasks. (Opp. at 14; Billing Statement at 

3.) Some tasks, like drafting notices, do not require an 

attorney to perform. See Compass Bank v. Morris Cerullo World 

Evangelism, No. 13:CV-0654-BAS (WVG), 2015 WL 3442030, at *8 

(S.D. Cal. May 28, 2015) (finding “certain tasks were ministerial 

and did not require an attorney to perform[,]” including drafting 

a subpoena). These notices fall within that scope, and will be 

excluded. 

viii. Billings by Doyle

Mr. Doyle billed .1 hours to review the court’s order 

to continue the scheduling conference. (Billing Statement at 2.) 

This is the only task for which Mr. Doyle recorded time. The 

court finds it unreasonable to seek attorney’s fees for one 

discrete task. Accordingly, Mr. Doyle’s hours will be reduced to 

zero. 

ix. Billings by Smith

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Defendant objects to the .2 hours Mr. Smith used to 

draft the appearance of counsel, and for the reasons set forth 

above, it will be discounted as clerical. (Opp. at 15.) 

Defendant next objects to the 2 hours Mr. Smith used to prepare 

for the mediation conference. (See id.) However, the court 

finds two hours to prepare for a mediation conference is not 

unreasonable. Next, Mr. Smith’s review of emails from defense 

counsel are not necessarily clerical, and therefore the 1 hour 

spent doing so will not be discounted. (See id. at 15-16.) 

However, the .8 hours Mr. Smith spent conveying instructions to

his assistant or reviewing emails from a judicial assistant are 

administrative and will be discounted. (See id.) 

Additionally, the .3 hours Mr. Smith took to fill out 

the subpoena form and the .2 hours he used to draft the notice of 

submission of confidential settlement agreement is considered 

clerical and will be discounted. See Compass Bank, 2015 WL 

3442030, at *8 (finding “certain tasks were ministerial and did 

not require an attorney to perform[,]” including drafting a 

subpoena). 

Finally, 2 hours to prepare for the settlement 

conference is not ordinarily unreasonable. However, here the 

court has already awarded Mr. Smith compensation for 2 hours to 

prepare for the mediation conference. Considering the 

similarities between a mediation conference and a settlement 

conference, the court finds it duplicative and unreasonable to 

compensate Mr. Smith for both 2 hours in preparation for the 

mediation conference and another 2 hours in preparation for the 

settlement conference. No explanation is provided for how the 

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tasks were any different. Accordingly, the court will discount 

the 2 hours claimed by Mr. Smith for preparing for the settlement 

conference. Mr. Smith’s claimed 31 hours will be reduced by 3.5, 

for a total of 27.5. 

x. Summary 

All told, the attorney’s claimed hours, the defendant’s

requested reduction, the court’s actual reduction, and the hours 

remaining for the lodestar calculation are listed below: 

Attorney 

Name

Hours 

Claimed

Requested 

Reduction 

Hours 

Reduced (if 

any)

Hours 

for 

Lodestar 

Mark Potter .3 0 0 .3

Russell 

Handy

4.4 1.8 .8 3.6

Phyl Grace 2.6 1.7 .5 2.1

Dennis Price 18.3 15.4 5.2 13.1

Amanda 

Seabock 

2.4 1.9 .1 2.3

Chris 

Seabock 

1.6 0 0 1.6

Isabel 

Masanque 

12.3 2.2 .6 11.7

Elliot 

Montgomery 

1.3 0 0 1.3

Sara 

Gunderson 

2.3 1.4 .5 1.8

Khushpreet 

Mehton

.4 .4 .4 0

Robert Doyle .1 .1 .1 0 

Bradley 

Smith 

31.0 6.7 3.5 27.5

Totals 77 hours 

claimed

32.6 hours 

requested 

reduction 

11.7 hours 

actually 

reduced 

65.3 

lodestar 

hours

2. Hourly Rates

After the hours are calculated, the court must look to 

the prevailing rates for the “relevant community” to determine 

how much to award. Camacho v. Bridgeport Financial, Inc., 523 

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F.3d 973, 979 (9th Cir. 2008). The relevant community is the 

form in which the district sits. Id. In this case, the relevant 

community is the Sacramento Division of the Eastern District of 

California. The prevailing party has the burden of producing 

sufficient evidence that its “requested rates are in line with 

those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers 

of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.”

Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n.11; accord Gonzalez, 729 F.3d at 1206. 

Unless the requesting party provides evidence of the prevailing 

rate in the relevant community, the court is permitted to 

consider the rates awarded in prior fee awards in the district. 

See Johnson v. Patel, No. 2:14-2078 WBS AC, 2016 WL 72711, at *3 

(E.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2016). 

Overwhelmingly, the recent cases from this district 

have concluded that hourly rates of $300 for Mr. Potter and Mr. 

Handy, $250 for Ms. Grace, and $150 for Mr. Price and other 

junior attorneys2 are reasonable. See, e.g., Johnson v. Hey Now 

Properties, LLC, No. 2:16-CV-02931 WBS KJN, 2019 WL 586753, at *3 

(E.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2019) (finding hourly rate of $300 for Potter 

and Handy, $250 for senior attorneys, and $150 for junior 

attorneys were reasonable); Johnson v. Wen Zhi Deng, No. 2:15-CV02698 KJM EFB, 2019 WL 1098994, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2019) 

(holding that “the rates outlined in Hey Now Properties are the 

appropriate, prevailing rates in this district....”); Johnson v. 

2 The court finds Amanda Seabock, Chris Seabock, Isabel 

Masanque, Elliott Montgomery, Sara Gunderson, Khushpreet Mehton, 

Robert Doyle, and Bradley Smith have approximately equal or less 

experience than Dennis Price. Accordingly, their hourly rate 

will also be set at $150. 

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Pizano, No. 2:17-cv-1655 TLN DB, 2019 WL 2499188, at *7 (E.D. 

Cal. June 17, 2019) (recommending “a reasonable hourly rate of

$300 per hour for attorneys Potter and Handy, $250 for attorney 

Grace, and $150 for the less experienced associate, attorney 

Price.”); Johnson v. Powers, No. 2:15-cv-245 WBS AC (PS), 2019 WL 

2386063, at *1 (E.D. Cal. June 5, 2019). According, the lodestar 

in this case is $10,590, calculated as follows: 

Potter: .3 x $300 = $90

Handy: 3.6 x $300 = $1,080

Grace: 2.1 x $250 = $525

Price: 13.1 x $150 = $1,965 

A. Seabock: 2.3 x $150 = $345 

C. Seabock: 1.6 x $150 = $240 

Masanque: 11.7 x $150 = $1,755

Montgomery: 1.3 x $150 = $195

Gunderson: 1.8 x $150 = $270

Mehton: 0 x $150 = $0 

Doyle: 0 x $150 = $0

Smith: 27.5 x $150 = $4,125

2. Adjustments to the Lodestar 

Defendants argue the court should reduce the lodestar 

by 50 percent to reflect the plaintiff’s limited success. (Opp. 

at 17.) Alternatively, defendant requests the court subtract the 

hours plaintiff’s counsel spent preparing its unsuccessful motion 

for summary judgment. (Id.) 

To determine whether the amount of fees awarded should 

be adjusted based on limited success, the court must first ask 

whether “the plaintiff fail[ed] to prevail on claims that were 

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unrelated to the claims on which he succeeded,” and then whether 

“the plaintiff achieve[d] a level of success that makes the hours 

reasonably expended a satisfactory basis for making a fee award.” 

Ibrahim v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 912 F.3d 1147, 1172 (9th 

Cir. 2019) (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434). “[C]laims are 

unrelated if the successful and unsuccessful claims are 

distinctly different both legally and factually; claims are 

related, however, if they involve a common core of facts or are 

based on related legal theories.” Dang v. Cross, 422 F.3d 800, 

813 (9th Cir.2005) (citations and internal quotation marks 

omitted) (alterations in original). If the successful claims are 

unrelated to the unsuccessful claims, “the hours expended on the 

unsuccessful claims should not be included in the fee award.” 

Id. Because plaintiff’s claims arise out of a “common core of 

facts,” the court must focus on the significance of the overall 

relief plaintiff obtained. 

In so doing, the court should “give primary 

consideration to the amount of damages awarded as compared to the 

amount sought.” Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114 (1992). To do 

so, the court must consider the “excellence of the overall 

result” including the extent to which a plaintiff’s success 

“served the public interest by vindicating important 

constitutional rights” or provided the “public benefit of 

deterring unconstitutional conduct.” McCown v. City of Fontana, 

565 F.3d 1097, 1101-02 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Defendant argues plaintiff did not succeed in this 

action because the parties’ settlement agreement did not reflect 

the relief sought. (Opp. at 18-19.) Instead of an injunction 

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and the full amount of statutory damages available for the 

alleged Unruh Act violations, parties settled “to avoid 

litigation and buy peace,” settling for a “nuisance value.” 

(Opp. at 19.) Plaintiff contests defendant’s characterization of 

the relief, arguing the resulting modification of plaintiff’s

property “out of fear of future litigation” and the amount of 

damages amounts to more than a “nuisance” victory. (Reply at 2-3 

(Docket No. 53).) 

The court finds it appropriate to reduce the lodestar 

by the number of hours spent on the unsuccessful motion for 

summary judgment. Plaintiff’s argument that he was entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law based on alleged violations of the 

California Building Code was inconsistent with clearly 

established law and bordered on frivolous. Further, there were 

obviously disputed issues of fact on plaintiff’s claim of a 

parking lot violation based upon the measurement of the access 

aisle and his claim that the bathroom was open to the public. In 

short, the motion for summary judgment was clearly without merit 

and should never have been made. 

Three attorneys worked on plaintiff’s motion for 

summary judgment: Ms. Masanque spent 9.1 hours working on the 

motion, while Mr. Smith spent 2.5 hours and Mr. Handy spent .1 

hours reviewing the order denying the motion for summary 

judgment. (See Billing Statement at 7.) The reduction would be 

$1,770, calculated as follows:

Masanque: 9.1 x $150 = $1,365

Smith: 2.5 x $150 = $375

Handy: .1 x $300 = $30

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Accordingly, the court will reduce $1,770 from the 

lodestar amount of $10,590 to award $8,820. Additionally, in 

light of the confidentiality of the settlement agreement, the 

court will not discuss its terms in detail in this order. 

Suffice it to say it does not come close to reflecting the value 

of this case had it gone to trial and plaintiff succeeded on the 

merits. For that reason, the court will further reduce the 

attorney’s fee by 25 percent, bringing the total amount to 

$6,615. 

B. Litigation Expenses & Costs

Plaintiff claims litigation costs of $1,407.70. 

(Billing Statement at 1.) Defendant does not oppose $1,007.70 of 

these costs, but contests a $400 award for investigators because 

“[t]here is no accompanying invoice establishing what work was 

done, when, or why, or why two investigators were necessary in a 

routine disability access case.” (Opp. at 3-4.) 

The only evidence provided for the investigators’ costs 

was Mr. Potter’s declaration, in which he stated “[w]e bill our 

investigators at $200 per on-site investigation . . . [o]ur 

investigators did not present me a formal invoice.” (Decl. of 

Mark Potter (“Potter Decl.”) ¶ 4 (Docket No.43-3).) Other courts 

in this district have denied costs associated with investigators 

when parties have failed to provide specific evidence, including 

in cases involving this plaintiff. See Johnson v. Yates, No. 

2:14-cv-1189-TLN-EFB, 2017 WL 3438737, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 

2017) (finding that “billing $200 for an ambiguous 

‘investigation’ without providing supporting documents” was 

unreasonable); Johnson v. Saleh, 2:16-cv-00617-JAM-KJN, 2018 WL 

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1157494, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2018) (denying cost request for

investigator because “the Court ha[d] no basis upon which to 

judge whether these costs were reasonably incurred” due to 

plaintiff’s failure to include supporting documents). This court 

will follow suit and deny plaintiff the $400 fee because it has 

no way to judge whether the costs were reasonable. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that: 

(1) Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs 

(Docket No. 43) be, and the same thereby is, GRANTED in part; and 

(2) Defendant is directed to pay $6,615 in attorney’s 

fees and $1,007.70 in costs to plaintiff. 

Dated: March 19, 2020

 

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