Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-00570/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-00570-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Stephen Chew
Defendant
Peggy Lopez
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PEGGY LOPEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

STEPHEN CHEW MD,

Defendant.

No. 2:24-cv-0570-DAD-CKD (PS)

ORDER GRANTING IFP REQUEST AND 

GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND

(ECF No. 2.)

Plaintiff Peggy Lopez (“Plaintiff”), who proceeds without counsel in this action, requests 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”).1 (ECF No. 2.) See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (authorizing the 

commencement of an action “without prepayment of fees or security” by a person who is unable 

to pay such fees). Plaintiff’s affidavit makes the required financial showing, so Plaintiff’s request 

is granted.

However, the determination that a plaintiff may proceed without payment of fees does not 

complete the inquiry. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the Court must screen every in forma 

pauperis proceeding and must dismiss the case if it is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a 

claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is 

immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 

1 Actions where a party proceeds without counsel are referred to a magistrate judge pursuant to 

E.D. Cal. L.R. 302(c)(21). See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

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(2000). In performing this screening, the Court liberally construes a pro se plaintiff's pleadings. 

See Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 

364, 365 (1982) (per curiam). Further, the federal court has an independent duty to ensure it has 

subject matter jurisdiction in the case. See United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed Inc., 

360 F.3d 960, 967 (9th Cir. 2004).

I. Allegations in the Complaint

Plaintiff alleges that on February 25, 2022, Defendant Dr. Chew, an anesthesiologist, 

attempted to intubate Plaintiff during her surgery at the Oroville Hospital despite being informed 

that Plaintiff could not be intubated. (ECF No. 1 at 2-3, 4.) Defendant was informed prior to 

surgery that Plaintiff had “extreme sensitivity to aesthetics and [that Plaintiff] suffers with sleep 

apnea.” (Id. at 3, 4.) Defendant was also reminded during the surgery by Plaintiff’s surgeon, Dr. 

Lionel Foster, that Plaintiff could not be intubated. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges she was left with “a 

bruised and swollen mouth.” (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that “another Anesthesiologist and 

Knee Surgeon” told Plaintiff that “she should have never suffered a damaged mouth from the 

surgery.” (Id. at 3-4.) 

Plaintiff alleges the Court has diversity jurisdiction in this action. Plaintiff is a citizen of 

California and Defendant is a citizen of Hawaii. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff seeks monetary relief in the 

total amount of $920,000. (Id. at 5.) 

II. Pleading Standards

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice[.]” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While factual allegations are accepted as 

true, legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Courts “are not required to indulge 

unwarranted inferences[.]” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Pro se litigants are entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any 

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doubt resolved in their favor, Eldridge, 832 F.2d at 1137, but a plaintiff's claims must be facially 

plausible to survive screening. Facial plausibility for a claim requires sufficient factual detail to 

allow the court to reasonably infer that a named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient to 

state a claim, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. 

See Id.; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

Prior to dismissal, the court is to tell the plaintiff of deficiencies in the complaint and 

provide an opportunity to cure––if it appears at all possible the defects can be corrected. See 

Lopez, supra, 203 F.3d at 1130-31. However, if amendment would be futile, no leave to amend 

need be given. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996).

III. Discussion

Plaintiff asserts diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and alleges four state law 

claims in her complaint. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) As detailed below, the Court finds jurisdiction is 

proper but will provide Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint due to a failure to state her 

state law claims.

A. Diversity Jurisdiction

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. 

Of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). In general, federal courts hear cases that arise in diversity 

or present a federal question. See U.S. CONST. art. III §§ 1–2; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-32.

Federal district courts have “have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter 

in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, ... and is between ... citizens of different 

States....” 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The presumption is against jurisdiction and “the burden of 

establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Vacek v. U.S. Postal Serv., 

447 F.3d 1248, 1250 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377). “If the court determines 

at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 12(h)(3); see Franklin v. State of Or., State Welfare Div., 662 F.2d 1337, 1342 (9th Cir. 

1981) (court may dismiss an action sua sponte for lack of jurisdiction).

Here, Plaintiff alleges diversity in citizenship between the parties and pleads an amount in 

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controversy that exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Accordingly, the Court finds jurisdiction is 

appropriate at this juncture.

B. The Complaint is Conclusory and Lacks Specificity 

The complaint does not contain sufficient factual allegations to state a valid state law

claim. In order to state a claim for relief, a plaintiff must link the defendant to the harm suffered 

by setting forth the specific actions or omissions of the defendant that plausibly shows defendant 

is liable for the alleged violations. Plaintiff's legal conclusions about the defendant’s conduct does

not suffice to state a claim because legal conclusions are not taken as true in the same way that 

well-pleaded factual allegations are taken as true.

Although the complaint must be dismissed, Plaintiff will be granted leave to file an 

amended complaint with additional factual allegations. See Lucas v. Dep't of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 

248 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Unless it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defect... a pro 

se litigant is entitled to notice of the complaint's deficiencies and an opportunity to amend prior to 

dismissal of the action.”). Accordingly, the Court provides the following legal standards and 

explanation.

State Law Claim for Medical Malpractice

Plaintiff alleges Defendant committed medical malpractice by attempting to intubate her 

during her surgery despite being informed that Plaintiff could not be intubated resulting in 

Plaintiff’s mouth to be damaged. (ECF No. 1 at 2-3.) Pursuant to California law, “[t]he elements 

of a cause of action for medical malpractice are: (1) a duty to use such skill, prudence, and 

diligence as other members of the profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of the 

duty; (3) a proximate causal connection between the negligent conduct and the injury; and (4) 

resulting loss or damage.” Chakalis v. Elevator Solutions, Inc., 205 Cal. App. 4th 1557, 1571 

(2012); Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 392 (9th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff’s allegations of 

Defendant’s conduct is conclusory and fails to demonstrate sufficient facts to state a cognizable 

claim. Even under a liberal construction of the complaint, however, the Court may not supply 

essential elements of a claim not pleaded by the plaintiff. Bruns v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin., 122 

F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997). As a result, this claim will be dismissed with leave to amend. 

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State Law Claim for Medical Battery

Plaintiff realleges the same allegations as her prior claim as basis to assert a claim for 

medical battery. (ECF No. 1 at 4-5.) “A typical medical battery case is where a patient has 

consented to a particular treatment, but the doctor performs a treatment that goes beyond the 

consent.” Conte v. Girard Orthopaedic Surgeons Med. Grp., Inc., 107 Cal. App. 4th 1260, 1267

(2003). The California Supreme Court “has made it clear that battery and lack of informed 

consent are separate causes of action. A claim based on lack of informed consent—which sounds 

in negligence—arises when the doctor performs a procedure without first adequately disclosing 

the risks and alternatives. In contrast, a battery is an intentional tort that occurs when a doctor 

performs a procedure without obtaining any consent.” Saxena v. Goffney, 159 Cal. App. 4th 316, 

324 (2008). Here, Plaintiff does not allege that she consented to a certain procedure by Defendant 

in which thereafter Defendant performed another type of procedure without her consent. Given 

the allegations are identical to her claim for medical malpractice, this claim appears to be 

duplicative of her claim for medical malpractice. This claim will be dismissed with leave to 

amend but Plaintiff is cautioned that failure to allege specific facts that relate to this claim may 

warrant dismissing this claim as duplicative. 

State Law Claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 

Plaintiff alleges a claim for emotional distress which the Court will construe as a claim for 

intentional infliction of emotional distress. (ECF No. 1 at 4.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant’s attempt 

to intubate her during her surgery has led her to be “fearful of any further medical procedures.” 

(Id.) Pursuant to California law, “[a] cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress 

exists when there is ‘(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of 

causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s 

suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the 

emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.’ A defendant’s conduct is ‘outrageous’ 

when it is so ‘extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.’ 

And the defendant’s conduct must be ‘intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization 

that injury will result.’ ” Hughes v. Pair, 46 Cal.4th 1035,1050-1051 (2009). Here, Plaintiff has 

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not alleged elements for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff fails to allege 

Defendant’s conduct had the intent to cause or was with reckless disregard of the probability of 

causing emotional distress. Therefore, this claim will be dismissed with leave to amend. 

State Law Claim for Elder Abuse

Plaintiff alleges “Elder Abuse” as a cause of action but does not identify a governing legal 

authority. (Id. at 4.) Pursuant to the California Elder Abuse Act found in sections 15600 et seq. 

“[the] Act makes certain enhanced remedies available to a plaintiff who proves abuse of an elder, 

i.e., a ‘person residing in this state, 65 years of age or older.’ (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 15610.27.) In 

particular, a plaintiff who proves ‘by clear and convincing evidence’ both that a defendant is 

liable for physical abuse, neglect or financial abuse (as these terms are defined in the Act) and 

that the defendant is guilty of ‘recklessness, oppression, fraud, or malice’ in the commission of 

such abuse may recover attorney fees and costs. (Id., § 15657, subd. (a).) Worsham v. O'Connor 

Hosp., 226 Cal. App. 4th 331, 336 (2014). Although Plaintiff alleges she is 78 years old, she fails 

to allege facts sufficient to show Defendant acted with “recklessness, oppression, fraud, or 

malice” when he attempted to intubate Plaintiff during her surgery. (ECF No 1 at 4.) As a result, 

this claim will be dismissed with leave to amend.

C. Guidelines for an Amended Complaint

The complaint must be dismissed because it does not state a valid claim for relief. 

Because it is not absolutely clear that no amendment could cure the defect, Plaintiff is granted 

leave to file an amended complaint. See Lucas, 66 F.3d at 248. If Plaintiff elects to file an 

amended complaint, it shall be captioned “First Amended Complaint” and shall contain a “short 

and plain statement” of the claim[s] showing the basis on which Plaintiff is entitled to relief. Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 8(a). In order to state a claim, Plaintiff must allege with some degree of particularity 

the specific acts each defendant engaged in that support Plaintiff's claims. See Jones v. 

Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984).

Finally, Plaintiff is informed that Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint be 

complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. Therefore, in any amended complaint, 

as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be 

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sufficiently alleged.

IV. Conclusion

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is granted;

2. Plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 1) is dismissed with leave to amend; and 

3. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file an amended 

complaint that complies with the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

and the Local Rules of Practice; the amended complaint must bear the docket number 

assigned this case and must be labeled “First Amended Complaint”; failure to file an 

amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a recommendation that 

this action be dismissed.

Dated: June 7, 2024

4, lope0570.24

_____________________________________

CAROLYN K. DELANEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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