Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02156/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02156-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
REMSA
Defendant
Brad Reger
Plaintiff
SEMSA
Defendant
Sierra Medical Services Alliance
Defendant
Patrick Smith
Defendant

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

This motion was determined to be suitable for decision *

without oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h). 

Since the Status Order filed January 12, 2006, states 1

“[n]o further joinder of parties or amendments to pleadings is

permitted[,]” the caption has been modified to reflect the

dismissal of Doe Defendants 1-50. (Status Report at 1.) 

“[D]efendants sued in federal courts can bring anti-SLAPP 2

motions to strike state law claims and are entitled to attorney

fees and costs when they prevail.” Verizon Delaware, Inc. v. Covad

Commc’ns Co., 377 F.3d 1081, 1091 (9th Cir. 2004). 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRAD REGER, ) 02:05-cv-2156-GEB-GGH

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) ORDER*

)

PATRICK SMITH; SIERRA MEDICAL )

SERVICES ALLIANCE d/b/a/ SEMSA; )

REMSA, )

)

)

Defendants. )

1

 )

Defendants move to strike Plaintiff’s libel claim under

California’s Anti-Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation

statute (“anti-SLAPP statute”) and move for an award of $34,902.67 in

attorney fees and costs incurred from bringing the motion. (Defs.’ 2

Mot. at 11; Defs.’ Reply at 10.) Plaintiff opposes the motion, and

Case 2:05-cv-02156-GEB-GGH Document 31 Filed 08/22/06 Page 1 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“REMSA is a non-profit company that was originally 3

organized by Washoe County, Nevada, and cities within Washoe

County, to oversee and provide ambulance services in Washoe County.

SEMSA is a separate non profit company set up to do medical

transportation business outside of the franchise requirements in

Washoe, Neveda.” (Smith Decl. ¶ 1.) 

2

requests an unspecified amount of attorney fees and costs “to be

determined at a later date.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 18.)

BACKGROUND

For approximately twenty years, Plaintiff Brad Reger

(“Plaintiff”) served as the principal of Lassen Ambulance, a ground

ambulance service provider in Lassen County, California. (Pl.’s

Compl. ¶¶ 9, 15.) However, in early December 2004, Plaintiff ceased

business operations and closed Lassen Ambulance, leaving only one

ground ambulance company to provide ambulance service to the residents

of Lassen County. (Id. ¶ 13.) 

In response to the closure, the Board of Supervisors of

Lassen County (“the Board of Supervisors”) declared a “state of

emergency” and hired Defendants Regional Emergency Medical Services

Association (“REMSA”) and Sierra Medical Services Alliance (“SEMSA”)

to provide ground ambulance service on a temporary basis. (Smith 3

Decl. ¶¶ 1-5.) The Board of Supervisors subsequently issued a

“Request for Proposal” (“RFP”), which sought bids from interested

ambulance companies to become the long-term exclusive provider of

ground ambulance service in Lassen County. (Pl.’s Compl. ¶¶ 12-13;

Smith Decl. ¶ 15.) The RFP required ambulance service providers to

submit a proposal that addressed, among other things, past problems

with the provision of ground ambulance service in Lassen County. 

(Smith Decl. ¶ 15.) However, the RFP did not specifically request

that ambulance service providers address the issue of non-emergency

Case 2:05-cv-02156-GEB-GGH Document 31 Filed 08/22/06 Page 2 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

ambulance transportation from Banner Lassen, the local hospital, to

nursing homes. (Smith Dep. Vol. II at 33:8-35:3.) 

In response to the RFP, the President and Chief Executive

Officer of SEMSA and REMSA, Defendant Patrick Smith, submitted a

proposal on behalf of the companies. (Smith Decl. ¶¶ 1, 15.) In a

cover letter attached to the proposal, Defendant Smith discussed what

he perceived to be past problems with the ambulance service in Lassen

County and what REMSA and SEMSA had done to address these problems

while providing temporary ambulance service for the county. (Id.

¶ 15; Defs.’ Ex. 8, at 1.) Specifically, the cover letter stated: 

We have transferred patients from Banner Lassen

back to the local nursing home or their

residences. Apparently, the previous provider

declined to do this because of low reimbursement

potential, but it’s still the right thing to do

for these patients and we consider it to be our

job as EMS professionals. We have had many people

thank us for responding to this need. No thanks

are necessary, it’s the right thing to do!

(Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 19; Defs.’ Ex. 8 at 1.) Based on this statement,

Plaintiff filed this action against Defendants, asserting a single

“libel per se” claim. (Pl.’s Compl. ¶¶ 17-25.) 

DISCUSSION

“The anti-SLAPP statute was enacted to allow early dismissal

of meritless first amendment cases aimed at chilling expression

through costly, time-consuming litigation.” Metabolife Intern., Inc.

v. Wornick, 264 F.3d 832, 839-40 (9th Cir. 2001). Under the statute,

a defendant may move to strike any claim that arises from an act in

furtherance of the right to petition or free speech under the United

States or California Constitution. Id.; Bosley Medical Institute,

Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 682 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Case 2:05-cv-02156-GEB-GGH Document 31 Filed 08/22/06 Page 3 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 Plaintiff argues seven exhibits Defendants submitted in 4

(continued...)

4

When a defendant files a motion to strike, the court engages

in “a two-step process” to determine whether the motion should be

granted. Equilon Enter. v. Consumer Cause, Inc., 29 Cal.4th 53, 67

(2002). First, the court determines whether the defendants have “made

a threshold showing that the challenged cause[] of action arise[s]

from protected activity, i.e. activity by defendants in furtherance of

their constitutional right of petition or free speech.” Mann v.

Quality Old Time Service, Inc., 120 Cal. App. 4th 90, 102 (2004); 

Equilon, 29 Cal.4th at 67. “To determine whether [the] defendant[s]

ha[ve] met . . . [this] burden, [the court] consider[s] the pleadings

and any supporting and opposing affidavits stating facts upon which

the liability is based.” Mann, 120 Cal. App. 4th at 102. 

“If the challenged cause[] of action arise[s] from protected

activity, the court must then determine whether the plaintiff has

demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim.” Id.; Equilon,

29 Cal.4th at 67. “To establish a probability of prevailing, the

plaintiff must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally

sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts

to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the

plaintiff is credited.” Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif,

__ Cal. 4th __, 2006 WL 2075700, *17 (July 27, 2006) (citations and

quotation marks omitted). For purposes of this inquiry, the court

considers the pleadings and evidentiary submissions of the plaintiff

and the defendants; however, the court cannot consider inadmissible

evidence or “weigh the credibility or comparative probative strength

of competing evidence . . . .” Id.; Mann, 120 Cal. App. 4th at 105. 4

Case 2:05-cv-02156-GEB-GGH Document 31 Filed 08/22/06 Page 4 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(...continued) 4

support of their motion have not been properly authenticated.

(Pl.’s Evidentiary Objections at 4-5.) Defendants have not

addressed this objection nor demonstrated their exhibits are

authentic. Consequently, the exhibits have not been considered. 

Plaintiff also argues the deposition transcripts

Defendants submitted with their motion are not admissible because

“they have not been filed with the reporter’s certification.”

(Pl.’s Evidentiary Objections at 7.) However, Plaintiff filed the

same deposition transcripts with the reporter’s certification and

Defendants re-filed the transcripts with the certification

attached. Therefore, the objection is overruled. 

All of Plaintiff’s remaining evidentiary objections need

not be reached because resolution of this motion does not require

examination of the contested evidence. 

5

The court may grant a motion to strike only if the plaintiff fails to

make a prima facie showing of facts that would support a favorable

judgment or if the evidence submitted by the defendants defeats the

plaintiff’s prima facie showing as a matter of law. Mann, 120 Cal.

App. 4th at 105-06; Soukup, __ Cal. 4th __, 2006 WL 2075700, at *17. 

A. Protected Activity

Defendants argue Plaintiff’s libel claim arises from

protected activity because the statement in their proposal “was made

in connection with an issue under consideration” by the Board of

Supervisors. (Defs.’ Mot. at 7.) Specifically, Defendants contend

the Board of Supervisors invited ambulance service companies to submit

proposals to become the exclusive provider of ground ambulance

service, and that Defendants submitted a proposal “in connection with

. . . the issue of which entity . . . [the Board should] select to

provide ambulance service in the future.” (Id.) Defendants argue

“[t]his issue naturally encompassed comment[s] on past problems . . .

[because] several requirements in the RFP focused on past problems

experienced in connection with the provision of ambulance services

. . . [in Lassen County].” (Id.) 

Case 2:05-cv-02156-GEB-GGH Document 31 Filed 08/22/06 Page 5 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

Under the anti-SLAPP statute, protected activity includes

“‘any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an

issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or

judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law,’”

regardless of whether the statement concerned an issue of public

interest. Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity, 19 Cal.4th

1106, 1112, 1123 (1999) (quoting Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 425.16(e)(2));

Mann, 120 Cal. App. 4th at 103. Official proceedings authorized by

law include, but are not limited to, proceedings before governmental

entities. See Kibler v. Northern Inyo County Local Hosp. Dist.,

__ Cal. 4th __, 2006 WL 2022176, *7 (July 20, 2006).

Defendants have demonstrated the statement in their proposal

was submitted to a governmental entity, the Board of Supervisors, in

connection with an issue under their consideration, namely, which

ambulance service company they should select to become the permanent,

exclusive provider of ground ambulance service in Lassen County. (See

Smith Decl. ¶¶ 15-16.) Although the statement concerned

transportation from the local hospital to nursing homes, an issue

Defendants were not specifically required to address in their

proposal, the statement had a sufficient connection to the issue under

consideration since the Board of Supervisors required proposals to

address “past problems” with ground ambulance service in Lassen

County. (See id. ¶ 15.) Therefore, Defendants have made a threshold

showing that Plaintiff’s libel claim arises from protected activity;

consequently, Plaintiff must demonstrate a probability of prevailing

on his libel claim.

Case 2:05-cv-02156-GEB-GGH Document 31 Filed 08/22/06 Page 6 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

B. Probability of Prevailing

Defendants argue Plaintiff should be considered “a limited

purpose public figure” who must prove actual malice in order to

prevail on his libel claim. (Defs.’ Mot. at 9-10.) When determining

if a plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on a libel

claim, “courts must take into account whether the plaintiff is a

[limited purpose] public figure who must prove actual malice by clear

and convincing evidence.” Annette F. v. Sharon S., 119 Cal. App. 4th

1146, 1164, 1170 (2004). “To characterize a plaintiff as a limited

purpose public figure . . . there [must have been] a public

controversy” and the plaintiff “must ordinarily ‘have undertaken some

voluntary act though which he seeks to influence the resolution of the

public issues involved.” Id. at 1163 (citations and quotation marks

omitted). Furthermore, to accord the plaintiff limited purpose public

figure status, “the allegedly defamatory communication [must have]

relate[d] to his role in [the] public controversy.” Id. at 1163. 

Defendants argue “there was a public controversy over the

provision of ambulance service in Lassen County” and “Plaintiff . . .

created this public controversy by broadcasting the financial concerns

he had over operating Lassen Ambulance and by abruptly withdrawing the

service of Lassen Ambulance, creating a crisis in the county.” 

(Defs.’ Mot. at 9.) Defendants also contend the allegedly defamatory 

statement in the proposal “relates directly to the provision of

[ambulance] services, and to issues that had arisen and were of

concern to the community.” (Id.) Plaintiff rejoins that the

allegedly defamatory statement does not concern “the much broader

issue of providing [ambulance] services in Lassen County in general,”

but rather “relates to providing non-emergency taxi rides to private

Case 2:05-cv-02156-GEB-GGH Document 31 Filed 08/22/06 Page 7 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

citizens from a private hospital to a private nursing home.” (Pl.’s

Opp’n at 16.) 

The closure of Lassen Ambulance attracted public attention

apparently due to concerns that only one ground ambulance company

would continue to provide emergency ambulance service in Lassen

County. (Reger Dep. at 84:13-95:15; Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 13.) Since the

potential lack of sufficient emergency ambulance service created

public debate and had foreseeable consequences for the community, a

public controversy existed on this issue. See Annette F., 119 Cal.

App. 4th at 1163 (stating a public controversy “mean[s] a dispute that

in fact has received pubic attention . . . was being debated

publically and . . . had foreseeable and substantial ramifications

for nonparticipants”). Notwithstanding this public controversy,

Plaintiff never “undertook some voluntary act though which he [sought]

to influence the resolution of the public issue[] . . . .” Id.

at 1163. Although Plaintiff spoke publically about the financial

difficulties Lassen Ambulance had experienced and authored a press

release informing the community of the closure, Plaintiff never

attempted to resolve how Lassen County would provide adequate

emergency ambulance service after Lassen Ambulance ceased business

operations. (See Reger Dep. at 84:13-95:15)

In addition, the allegedly defamatory statement did not

relate to the public controversy surrounding the closure of Lassen

Ambulance or the potential lack of emergency ambulance service in

Lassen County. See Copp v. Paxton, 45 Cal. App. 4th 829, 846 (1996)

(stating “the alleged defamation must have been germane to the

plaintiff’s participation in the controversy”). Rather, the alleged

defamatory statement, which was published after Lassen County resolved

Case 2:05-cv-02156-GEB-GGH Document 31 Filed 08/22/06 Page 8 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

the public controversy by hiring Defendants to provide temporary

emergency ambulance service, concerned the provision of non-emergency

transportation from the local hospitals to nursing homes. (Pl.’s

Compl. ¶ 19; Smith Decl. ¶¶ 2-4.) Consequently, Plaintiff cannot be

considered a limited purpose public figure who must prove actual

malice to prevail. 

Therefore, for Plaintiff to demonstrate a probability of

prevailing on his libel per se claim, he need only make a prima facie

showing that Defendants published a false, defamatory statement of

fact concerning Plaintiff. See e.g. Smith v. Maldonado, 72 Cal. App.

4th 637, 645 (1999); 5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, Torts, § 529

at 782. Plaintiff asserts the statement was false because Lassen

Ambulance “transport[ed] nursing home patients from the Hospital to

the Nursing Home [during the day] regardless of whether the service

would be reimbursed,” and refused to do so at night only “because it

was potentially detrimental to the health of the patient and to

protect crew rest.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 5; Reger Dep. at 134:15-137:14.) 

Plaintiff alleges the statement was defamatory because it “impugned

him in his business by expressly stating that he did not do ‘the right

thing’ and was motivated to do so because of the prospect of minimal

financial gain.” (Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff further contends the

“audience that received the proposal clearly understood that . . .

Defendants’ reference to the ‘previous provider’ was of and concerning

. . . Plaintiff, Brad Reger, as he had been the principal ‘previous

provider,’ Lassen Ambulance, for more than twenty years in a small and

close knit community.” (Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 15; Pl.’s Opp’n at 4; Reger

Dep. 32:10 & 110:17-23.) Consequently, Plaintiff has satisfied his

Case 2:05-cv-02156-GEB-GGH Document 31 Filed 08/22/06 Page 9 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

In their Reply brief, Defendants assert in a conclusory 5

fashion that the statement in the proposal was “an opinion on the

part of the author” and that a “statement which is merely an

opinion is not libel.” (Defs.’ Reply at 3.) However, there is no

“wholesale defamation exemption for anything that might be labeled

‘opinion’” and “a false assertion of fact could be libelous even

though couched in terms of opinion.” Rodriguez v. Panayiotou, 314

F.3d 979, 985 (9th Cir. 2002). 

10

burden of demonstrating a probability of prevailing on his libel

claim; thus, the motion to strike is denied.5

C. Attorney Fees 

Plaintiff argues he is entitled to an unspecified sum of

attorney fees and “requests that the Court entered an order entitling

Plaintiff to reasonable attorney fees and costs to be determined at a

later date.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 18.) Plaintiff asserts he is entitled

to attorney fees under the anti-SLAPP statute because Defendants’

Motion to Strike was “supported by a fraudulent declaration” and

because “Defendants’ counsel obstructed the discovery process with

inappropriate speaking objections and instructions not to answer

questions.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 17.) Since neither of these reasons

justify an award of attorney fees under the anti-SLAPP statute,

Plaintiff’s request for attorney fees is denied. See Cal. Code Civ.

Pro. § 425.16(c) (stating that a prevailing plaintiff may recover

attorney fees only if “the motion to strike [was] frivolous” or

“solely intended to cause unnecessary delay”). 

/////

/////

/////

/////

/////

/////

Case 2:05-cv-02156-GEB-GGH Document 31 Filed 08/22/06 Page 10 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

CONCLUSION

For the stated reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Strike is

denied and Plaintiff’s request for attorney fees is denied. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: August 21, 2006

/s/ Garland E. Burrell, Jr.

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

Case 2:05-cv-02156-GEB-GGH Document 31 Filed 08/22/06 Page 11 of 11