Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02653/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02653-6/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Karen Alexandrou
Plaintiff
County of Sacramento
Defendant
Richard Maddox
Plaintiff

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD MADDOX, a natural person; ) 

KAREN ALEXANDROU, a natural )

person; ) 2:06-cv-2653-GEB-EFB

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) ORDER

)

COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, a local )

government agency; JAN SCULLY, a )

natural person and the District )

Attorney for Sacramento County; )

CYNTHIA BESEMER, a natural person )

and Chief Deputy District Attorney )

for Sacramento County; KAREN )

MAXWELL, a natural person and )

Deputy District Attorney for )

Sacramento County; NATALIA LUNA, )

a natural person and Deputy )

District Attorney for Sacramento )

County; WILLIAM MOTMANS, a natural )

person and an investigator )

employed by the District Attorney )

for Sacramento County; and JAMES )

COOPER, a natural person and a )

captain of the Sacramento County )

Sheriff’s Department, )

)

Defendants. )

)

Plaintiffs Richard Maddox and Karen Alexandrou (collectively

“Plaintiffs”) move under Rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure for relief from an Order filed on November 6, 2006, and for

Case 2:06-cv-02653-GEB-EFB Document 36 Filed 01/09/07 Page 1 of 6
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28 1 Defendant filed its opposition in the related action, case

number 2:06-cv-0072-GEB-EFB.

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leave to amend their Complaint under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. Defendant filed an opposition on December 22, 2006.1

The motion was heard on January 8, 2007.

BACKGROUND

On January 11, 2006, Plaintiffs, along with four other

individuals (“Homeowner Litigants”), filed their Complaint against

Defendant and individual employees of Defendant (“Action 1"). The

Status (Pretrial Scheduling) Conference (“Status Conference”),

originally scheduled in Action 1 for April 17, 2006, was continued to

September 25, 2006. In their Joint Status Report (“JSR”) filed

September 8, 2006, the parties indicated that they needed more time to

propose how severance of two separate lawsuits identified in their JSR

should be accomplished. The parties explained the separate lawsuits

as follows:

[T]here are two separate law suits with separate

claims alleged in [the Action 1] complaint. The

Plaintiffs in [Action 1] include individuals who

owned or operated group homes for low income

and/or disabled persons . . . . These [Homeowner

Litigants] claim that their federal civil rights

have been violated by the conduct of Sacramento

County and its employees in the enforcement and

prosecution of building, housing, and nuisance

abatement codes. 

 At this time, [Homeowner Litigants] are

Defendants in a criminal action in the Superior

Court for the County of Sacramento . . . for code

violations at the same property alleged in this

federal case.

 Plaintiffs, Richard Maddox and Karen

Alexandrou, on the other hand, are employees of

Sacramento County . . . with knowledge of code

enforcement activities of Sacramento County as it

pertains to the [Homeowner Litigants]. Maddox and

Alexandrou have alleged employement [sic]

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discrimination and retaliation claims under state

law, and federal constitutional claims under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that they have been

discriminated and retaliated against as a result

of opposing alleged wrongful conduct of employees

of Sacramento County District Attorney’s Office

and Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department.

 [The Homeowner Litigants] and all Defendants

have agreed that . . . the employment

discrimination claims of Alexandrou and Maddox

[should] be severed from the claims of the

[Homeowner Litigants] and tried separately. The

parties will file a written stipulation staying

the action and for severance.

(September 8 JSR at 4-5.) Based on this JSR, the status conference

was continued to December 18, 2006.

On October 23, 2006, the parties in Action 1 filed a

“Stipulation and Order” (“Stipulation”) in which they stipulated that

all claims in the Complaint asserted by the Homeowner Litigants be

stayed and that the claims made by “[Plaintiffs] be allowed to proceed

immediately but only against defendant County of Sacramento and that

an order permitting discovery issue forthwith . . . .” (Stipulation

at 2-3.) On November 6, 2006, an Order issued (“November 6 Order”) in

which the Court sua sponte severed Plaintiffs’ claims from the

Homeowner Litigants’ Complaint, “‘creat[ing] two discrete, independent

actions . . . .’” (November 6 Order at 6 (quoting Gaffney v.

Riverboat Services of Indiana, 451 F.3d 424, 441 (7th Cir. 2006).) 

The Court declined at that time to give Plaintiffs’ severed action its

own action number, however, because “evaluation of [their] severed

claims reveals they are all premised on state law, and thus do not

present a federal question.” (Id.) Although the Homeowner Litigants

alleged class action claims, “[Plaintiffs] [did] not allege sufficient

facts [to show] they have standing to bring these claims.” (Id.) 

Since only state claims remained, the Court determined that

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Plaintiffs’ severed state claims should be “dismissed under the

rationale of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2) and (3).” (Id. at 8.) The

November 6 Order also stayed the Homeowner Litigants’ claims. (Id.)

On November 16, 2006, Plaintiffs filed their motion for

relief from the November 6 Order and motion to amend their Complaint. 

Since Plaintiffs’ “motion [was] noticed in a stayed action[,]” and

their claims were severed from those of the Homeowner Litigants, “and

they seek relief only from the dismissal portion of the Order,” it was

decided that their “pending motion will be decided in a separate

action.” (Order, Nov. 21, 2006, at 2.) The Clerk of Court created a

separate action for Plaintiffs’ severed claims. (“Action 2.”)

DISCUSSION

Under Rule 60(b)(6), a court may, “upon such terms as are

just, . . . relieve a party or a party’s legal representative from a

final judgment, order, or proceeding for . . . any . . . reason

justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” 

Following the January 8 hearing on the Plaintiffs’ motion,

Plaintiffs’ counsel explained that the stay in the Homeowner

Litigants’ action should be lifted because the reason for the stay no

longer existed. Defendants’ counsel agreed, and the Court lifted the

stay. The Court then inquired whether the November 6 severance Order

should be rescinded since the basis for the severance was to permit

the Plaintiffs’ action to proceed while the Homeowner Litigants’

action was stayed. Plaintiffs’ counsel responded yes, and Defendants’

counsel responded no. 

Because of the remedial nature of Rule 60(b), and since Rule

60(b) is designed to permit cases to be decided on their merits, the

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following rulings issue. See generally Patapoff v. Vollstedt’s Inc.,

267 F.2d 863, 865 (9th Cir. 1959). 

The severance and dismissal rulings in the November 6 Order

are withdrawn, since the stated reason for severing the Plaintiffs’

and the Homeowner Litigants’ respective claims no longer exists and

counsel were not in a position at the January 8 hearing to

meaningfully address the dismissal at issue. 

The Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) sua sponte

dismissal was against the parties’ stipulations that “[t]he court has

. . . jurisdiction . . . pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sections 1331, 1343,

and 1367.” (June 1, 2006 JSR at 1; September 8 JSR at 2.) “When

jurisdiction may not exist, however, the court must raise the issue

even if the parties are willing to stipulate to federal jurisdiction.”

Wash. Local Lodge No. 104 v. Int’l Bhd. of Boilermakers, 621 F.2d

1032, 1033 (9th Cir. 1980). 

At the January 8 hearing, no party was in a position to

pointedly address whether jurisdiction existed over Plaintiffs’

severed claims since neither counsel brought a copy of the original

complaint to the hearing. Rather than consider whether the dismissal

was appropriate under the circumstances here, where the court is

determining the issue without helpful input from the parties, the

severance ruling is withdrawn in light of the parties’ representation

that the reason for that ruling no longer exists. This decision is

reached sua sponte under Rule 60(b)(6). Kingvision Pay-Per-View Ltd.

v. Lake Alice Bar, 168 F.3d 347, 351-52 (9th Cir. 1999) (indicating a

judge may vacate a ruling sua sponte when sufficient reason exists for

changing the ruling).

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28 2 This dismissal makes it unnecessary to rule on Plaintiff’s

motion to amend the Complaint, which was filed in the dismissed action.

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Therefore, the Plaintiffs’ and the Homeowner Litigants’

claims are the claims they stated in the Complaint filed in Action 1

(civil action 2:06-cv-0072-GEB-EFB) on January 11, 2006. Action 2

(civil action 2:06-cv-2653-GEB-EFB) is dismissed.2

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: January 9, 2007

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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