Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-05084/USCOURTS-ca13-14-05084-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
American Packing Corporation
Not party
Dorothy L. Biery
Not party
Thad J. Colling
Appellant
Collins Industries, Inc.
Not party
Gordon Holloway
Appellant
Julia R. Chalfant Etvir Trust
Not party
K.A.K. Farms, Inc.
Not party
Thick Gon Mar
Appellant
Becky Myers
Appellant
Floyd E. Myers
Appellant
Erin Pankratz
Appellant
Jerramy Pankratz
Appellant
Stacy E. Judy Trust
Appellant
United States
Appellee
Donald E. Weddell
Appellant
Evangeline Weddell
Appellant
Marcia J. Woods
Appellant
Michael A. Woods
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

DOROTHY L. BIERY, FOR HERSELF AND AS 

REPRESENTATIVE OF A CLASS OF SIMILARLY 

SITUATED PERSONS,

Plaintiff

GORDON HOLLOWAY, AS SUCCESSOR AND 

REPRESENTATIVE OF DECEDENT GEORGE A. 

HOLLOWAY, STACY E. JUDY TRUST, DATED 

MARCH 7, 1994,

Plaintiffs-Appellants

JULIA R. CHALFANT ETVIR TRUST, K.A.K. 

FARMS, INC., AMERICAN PACKING 

CORPORATION, COLLINS INDUSTRIES, INC.,

Plaintiffs

JERRAMY PANKRATZ AND ERIN PANKRATZ, 

HUSBAND AND WIFE, DONALD E. WEDDELL AND

EVANGELINE WEDDELL, HUSBAND AND WIFE, 

THAD J. COLLING, THICK GON MAR, TRUSTEE 

OF THE THICK GON MAR REVOCABLE TRUST, 

DATED NOVEMBER 7, 1995, MICHAEL A. WOODS

AND MARCIA J. WOODS, HUSBAND AND WIFE, 

FLOYD E. MYERS AND BECKY MYERS, HUSBAND

AND WIFE, FOR THEMSELVES AND AS 

REPRESENTATIVES OF A CLASS OF SIMILARLY 

SITUATED PERSONS,

Plaintiffs-Appellants

v.

UNITED STATES,

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2 BIERY v. US

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2014-5084

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in Nos. 1:07-cv-00675-NBF, 1:07-cv-00693-NBF, 

Senior Judge Nancy B. Firestone.

______________________ 

Decided: March 23, 2016

______________________ 

MARK F. HEARNE II, Arent Fox, LLP, Clayton, MO, 

argued for plaintiffs-appellants. Also represented by 

LINDSAY S.C. BRINTON, STEPHEN SHARP DAVIS, MEGHAN 

SUE LARGENT; DEBRA J. ALBIN-RILEY, Los Angeles, CA.

 

TAMARA N. ROUNTREE, Environment and Natural Resources Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. Also 

represented by JOHN C. CRUDEN. 

______________________ 

Before PROST, Chief Judge, NEWMAN and STOLL, Circuit 

Judges.

PROST, Chief Judge. 

Plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Court of Federal 

Claims awarding them attorney fees under the fee shifting provisions of the Uniform Relocation Assistance and 

Real Property Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 4654(c). Plaintiffs’ 

counsel asserts that the Court of Federal Claims erred 

when it made a number of reductions to its requested fee 

award. Also pending before this court are plaintiffs’ 

motion to supplement the record and plaintiffs’ motion to 

order payment of the uncontested attorney fee amount. 

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BIERY v. US 3

For reasons discussed below, plaintiffs’ motion to supplement the record is denied, and the judgment of the Court 

of Federal Claims is affirmed. Because we affirm the 

judgment below, plaintiffs’ motion for payment of uncontested attorney fees is denied as moot.

BACKGROUND

In 2007, thirteen Kansas landowners brought suit in 

the Court of Federal Claims against the United States. 

Plaintiffs alleged that the government had taken their 

land without just compensation in violation of the Fifth 

Amendment after the conversion of a rail corridor to a 

trail under the National Trail Systems Act, 16 U.S.C. 

§ 1247(d). The cases were consolidated the following year.

Five years later, the parties cross-moved for summary 

judgment on the issue of liability. The Court of Federal 

Claims granted summary judgment in favor of the United 

States concerning the claims of five plaintiffs and dismissed those claims.1 The Court of Federal Claims then 

certified questions to the Kansas Supreme Court concerning the scope of railroad easements in Kansas. On September 23, 2010, after briefing and holding oral argument 

on the certified questions, the Kansas Supreme Court 

determined that it lacked jurisdiction to accept certified 

questions from the Court of Federal Claims and dismissed 

the case. 

 

1 On June 4, 2014, we reversed the Court of Federal 

Claims’ summary judgment order regarding three of the 

five plaintiffs. Biery v. United States, 753 F.3d 1279 (Fed. 

Cir. 2014). Those claims are still pending. For purposes 

of this appeal and for consistency with the opinion below, 

we will refer to these plaintiffs as “the unsuccessful 

plaintiffs” as any potential fee award for work done on 

their behalf is not at issue here.

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The remaining plaintiffs subsequently refiled their 

motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability 

with the Court of Federal Claims. On June 9, 2011, the 

Court of Federal Claims granted plaintiffs’ motion. After 

the Court of Federal Claims issued its opinion, plaintiffs’ 

counsel (“counsel”) requested attorney fees under the 

Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Act of 

1970, 42 U.S.C. § 4654(c). In response, the Court of 

Federal Claims instructed counsel to file a motion for 

partial summary judgment to determine the method by 

which the attorney fee award would be calculated.

In its submission, counsel requested that the Court of 

Federal Claims apply the “national” rate charged by its 

firm for all work completed at the prevailing market rate. 

According to counsel, the use of current, rather than 

historical, rates was based on the contingent nature of the 

representation, where payment does not take place until 

successful completion of the case. In its contingent fee 

agreement with clients, counsel explained that fees were 

ordinarily paid when they are accrued, usually on a 

monthly basis. However, the use of rates in effect at the 

end of the case, rather than the rates in effect when the 

work took place, would be used based on “the risk that 

there will be no recovery and that, if a recovery is awarded, the Firm may not be reimbursed for the expenses until 

some time in the future.” J.A. 944.

On November 27, 2012, the Court of Federal Claims 

issued an opinion on the requested summary judgment 

motion. In its opinion, the Court of Federal Claims determined that it would calculate attorney fees using the 

lodestar method, where a reasonable number of hours 

expended is multiplied by the prevailing rate in the 

relevant community. The Court of Federal Claims then 

determined that, for purposes of the case, the hourly rate 

for work primarily done in St. Louis would be based on 

the prevailing market rate in St. Louis, Missouri. The 

Court of Federal Claims noted that, at that time, it could 

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BIERY v. US 5

not, “without further evidence, rule on specific reasonable 

rates for St. Louis.” J.A. 17. The Court of Federal Claims

also determined that, due to the “no-interest rule,” historical rates, rather than rates in force at the end of litigation, would be used to compute a final award. See Library 

of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 311 (1986). 

Counsel subsequently moved for summary judgment 

requesting $2,017,987 in attorney fees and $201,924 in 

costs. Counsel based its fee request, in part, on rates in 

effect in the Washington D.C. metropolitan area at the 

time of its request based on the Kavanaugh Matrix, an 

alternative to the Adjusted Laffey Matrix maintained by 

the United States Attorney’s Office.2 Counsel did not 

submit any evidence regarding the computation of rates 

for the St. Louis area. The government cross-moved for 

summary judgment on the issue of the appropriate hourly 

rate. 

On January 24, 2014, the Court of Federal Claims issued its opinion on attorney fees and costs. In determining the appropriate number of hours, the Court of Federal 

Claims made a number of adjustments. Specifically, the 

 

2 The parties and cited cases use various terms for 

these two matrices. See, e.g., Bywaters v. United States, 

670 F.3d 1221, 1226 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (referring to the 

Kavanaugh matrix as the “Updated Laffey Matrix”); 

Rodriguez v. Sec. of Health & Human Servs., 632 F.3d 

1381, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (using the terms “Laffey 

Matrix” and “Adjusted Laffey Matrix” interchangeably); 

Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 426 F.3d

694, 709–10 (3d Cir. 2005) (referring to “the U.S. Attorney’s Matrix” as “ICO’s updated Laffey Matrix”). For 

clarity, we refer to the matrix maintained by the United 

States Attorney’s office as the “Adjusted Laffey Matrix” 

and the matrix developed by Dr. Michael Kavanaugh as 

the “Kavanaugh Matrix.”

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6 BIERY v. US

Court of Federal Claims found that some the of hours 

spent on the argument before the Kansas Supreme Court 

were duplicative, and that the number of hours spent on 

calculating the attorney fees and costs were excessive. 

Consequently, the Court of Federal Claims reduced the 

number of hours spent on those tasks by approximately 

75% and 80%, respectively. 

In addition, in order to avoid compensating counsel 

for work done on claims which had been dismissed, the 

Court of Federal Claims reduced the number of hours 

expended on the litigation leading up to the first summary judgment motion by 30%. The Court of Federal 

Claims noted that it made this reduction “[r]ecognizing 

the validity of plaintiffs’ contention that there were overlapping issues between the successful and unsuccessful 

plaintiffs.” J.A. 35. Viewing the number of hours expended on the remainder of the litigation to be excessive, 

the Court of Federal Claims further reduced those hours 

by 10%. 

To determine the appropriate billing rate, the Court of 

Federal Claims held that two distinct rates should apply. 

For hours expended from the commencement of litigation 

until 2010, when plaintiffs’ lead counsel was affiliated 

with a St. Louis law firm, local St. Louis rates should 

apply. For the period after 2010, when plaintiffs’ lead 

counsel moved to a law firm based in Washington D.C., 

local Washington D.C. rates would apply. The Court of 

Federal Claims determined that, at that time, there was 

“ample evidence” to determine a St. Louis rate and used a 

rate based on four attorney fee awards by district courts 

in the Eastern District of Missouri. J.A. 36–39. For work 

taking place in Washington D.C., the Court of Federal 

Claims used the Adjusted Laffey Matrix rate, noting that 

this rate had been used in awarding attorney fees to 

counsel’s firm in two other district court litigations. 

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BIERY v. US 7

In addition to making reductions to the requested billing rate and the number of hours, the Court of Federal 

Claims made a 30% reduction to costs incurred before the 

summary judgment motion to account for expenses incurred on the unsuccessful claims. 

On January 30, 2014, six days after the Court of Federal Claims issued its attorney fee order, counsel submitted a request under the Freedom of Information Act 

(“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552, to obtain the government’s time 

entry records and costs regarding 101 distinct cases, 

including the instant cases. Counsel also filed a motion 

for reconsideration with the Court of Federal Claims on 

February 5, 2014. The motion made no reference to the 

then-pending FOIA request. The Court of Federal Claims

denied the motion on April 1, 2014. 

Counsel timely brought this appeal challenging a 

number of cuts made by the Court of Federal Claims. On 

September 15, 2015, after the appeal was filed, the government responded to counsels’ FOIA request and provided its time summaries for the instant cases. Shortly 

thereafter, counsel moved to supplement the record with 

this new information. 

We have jurisdiction of this appeal under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(3).

DISCUSSION

I 

We review the Court of Federal Claims’ attorney fee 

determination for an abuse of discretion. Haggart v. 

Woodley, 809 F.3d 1336, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016). We review 

its underlying legal conclusions de novo. Id. “An abuse of 

discretion exists when the trial court’s decision is clearly 

unreasonable, arbitrary or fanciful, or is based on clearly 

erroneous findings of fact or erroneous conclusions of 

law.” Lazare Kaplan Int’l, Inc. v. Photoscribe Techs., Inc., 

714 F.3d 1289, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (internal quotation 

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8 BIERY v. US

marks and citations omitted).

Though a trial court has discretion in determining a 

fee award, it must “provide a concise but clear explanation of its reasons for the fee award.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983). A fee award that is 

determined through the use of a lodestar calculation 

carries a “strong presumption” that it represents a “reasonable” attorney fee. Bywaters v. United States, 670 

F.3d 1221, 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing City of Burlington 

v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562 (1992)). Departures from the 

lodestar figure, once calculated, must be supported by 

“specific evidence” justifying the award. Perdue v. Kenny 

A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 553 (2010). Ultimately, a 

fee award must “be adequate to attract competent counsel,” but must not “produce windfalls to attorneys.” 

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 444 (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted). 

II 

As a threshold issue, we must decide whether to grant 

counsel’s motion to supplement the record. In general, an 

appellate court’s review is limited to the record presented 

at the court below. See Del. Valley Floral Grp. v. Shaw 

Rose Nets, LLC, 597 F.3d 1374, 1380 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 

However, we do have authority to supplement the record

in rare instances, should the circumstances of the case 

require it. See id. (citing Dickerson v. Alabama, 667 F.2d 

1364, 1367 (11th Cir. 1982)).

Counsel argues that supplementing the record would 

be in the interests of justice because the government’s 

time-keeping records for the instant cases are relevant to 

the reasonableness of the fees requested. Counsel also 

asserts that the records were not available earlier because 

the government did not respond to the FOIA request until 

the appeal was pending, and twenty months after counsel 

made its first request. Consequently, counsel was unable 

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BIERY v. US 9

to provide this information to the Court of Federal 

Claims. 

Under FOIA, a government agency must provide an 

initial response to a request within twenty days of receipt. 

5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i). There is no dispute that the 

government’s response to the initial request was not 

timely. However, the initial request was made after the 

Court of Federal Claims issued its initial attorney fee 

determination. 

Though counsel is correct that it filed the FOIA request before the Court of Federal Claims’ opinion on 

attorney fees was made final, the timing of the request 

indicates that the Court of Federal Claims would not have 

been in a position to consider the documents in deciding 

the attorney fee request, even if the government had 

immediately responded. 

Had the government responded immediately, counsel’s request to the Court of Federal Claims to consider 

the government’s records would necessarily have been 

part of its motion for reconsideration. Such motions are 

governed by Rule 59(a)(1), R.C.F.C. Under Rule 59(a)(1), 

a court, in its discretion, “may grant a motion for reconsideration when there has been an intervening change in 

the controlling law, newly discovered evidence, or a need 

to correct clear factual or legal error or prevent manifest 

injustice.” Young v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 671, 674 

(Fed. Cl. 2011). A motion for reconsideration must also be 

supported “by a showing of extraordinary circumstances 

which justify relief.” Caldwell v. United States, 391 F.3d 

1226, 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted).

Counsel has presented arguments as to why this information was unavailable between January 30, 2014, 

when it initially filed its FOIA request, and September 

15, 2015, when it received the relevant documents from 

the government. However, counsel has not adequately 

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10 BIERY v. US

explained why it did not seek this information sooner. 

Notably, counsel’s motion for reconsideration before the 

Court of Federal Claims did not even make reference to 

its then-pending FOIA request.

If, as counsel argues, this information was relevant to 

the determination of a reasonable number of hours, the 

FOIA request should have been filed before the initial 

attorney fee motion, not after the motion had been decided. Under these circumstances, even if counsel had been

able to present this new evidence to the Court of Federal 

Claims when it filed its motion for reconsideration, the 

Court of Federal Claims would have been within its 

discretion to deny the motion. 

In sum, the information could have been requested in 

a timely manner in order to influence the underlying 

decision. Because counsel’s submission is based on a 

request that took place after the Court of Federal Claims’ 

fee order, there is no basis to grant counsel’s motion to 

supplement the record. 

III 

With regards to the merits of the fee award, counsel 

challenges the cuts made based on work done on behalf of 

the unsuccessful plaintiffs, the Court of Federal Claims’ 

use of the Adjusted Laffey Matrix, the use of historical 

rates, its determination of the standard St. Louis hourly 

rate, and reductions to the work done for the Kansas 

Supreme Court argument and fee motions. 

A 

Counsel argues that the Court of Federal Claims

erred when it reduced the number of hours and costs 

awarded by 30% to take into account work done on behalf 

of the unsuccessful plaintiffs. Counsel characterizes this 

reduction as an overall adjustment to the lodestar figure 

that must be supported by specific evidence under Perdue.

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BIERY v. US 11

Counsel’s characterization of the reduction is incorrect. The Court of Federal Claims did not make an overall reduction of the final award, but, rather, an overall 

reduction in the number of hours. Though the end result 

may be mathematically identical, the factors a court takes 

into account are different, depending on which aspect of 

the award is under consideration. “[T]he lodestar figure 

includes most, if not all, of the relevant factors constituting a ‘reasonable’ attorney’s fee . . . .” Pennsylvania v. 

Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 

566 (1986). These factors include the measure of success 

achieved by a party. See id. at 562 n.7.

There is no dispute that work done on behalf of the 

unsuccessful plaintiffs is not recoverable. “Hours that are 

not properly billed to one’s client are also not properly 

billed to one’s adversary pursuant to statutory authority.” 

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted). When multiple claims are brought in a 

single litigation and involve common questions of law, it 

may be difficult, if not impossible, to separate out the 

hours expended on each claim. However, contrary to 

counsel’s assertion, this does not compel the conclusion

that all work involved is always compensable. A fee 

award is subject to a court’s discretion and a court “may 

attempt to identify specific hours that should be eliminated, or it may simply reduce the award to account for the 

limited success.” Id. at 436–37.

Though a court may reduce an award, it should not do 

so in a rigid, mechanical way. Hubbard v. United States, 

480 F.3d 1327, 1333–34 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Here, the Court 

of Federal Claims did not simply reduce the number of 

hours based on the number of successful claims but

instead came to a 30% reduction after “[r]ecognizing the 

validity of plaintiffs’ contention that there were overlapping issues between the successful and unsuccessful 

plaintiffs.” J.A. 35. This reduction, based on the degree 

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12 BIERY v. US

of success obtained, was within the Court of Federal 

Claims’ discretion.

Therefore, the Court of Federal Claims did not abuse 

its discretion when it reduced the hours and costs by 30% 

in order to take into account work done on behalf of the 

unsuccessful plaintiffs.

B 

Counsel argues that the Court of Federal Claims

abused its discretion by not applying the Kavanaugh 

Matrix and instead applying the lower Adjusted Laffey

Matrix. 

In Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., the District 

Court for the District of Columbia set out a matrix of 

reasonable rates for attorneys in the Washington, D.C. 

metropolitan area who were engaged in complex federal 

litigation at that time. See 572 F. Supp. 354, 371–72 

(D.D.C.), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 746 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 

1984), overruled by Save Our Cumberland Mountains, 

Inc. v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1516 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc). 

This matrix of fees has become known as the “Laffey

Matrix” and its use has been expressly endorsed by the 

Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a “useful starting 

point” for computing attorney fees. See Covington v. 

District of Columbia, 57 F.3d 1101, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 

We have not had occasion to determine whether the 

Laffey Matrix is an appropriate starting point for fee 

awards, but have acknowledged its use by the Court of 

Federal Claims. See Bywaters, 670 F.3d at 1226 & n.4 

(Fed. Cir. 2012); see also Rodriguez v. Sec’y of Health &

Human Servs., 632 F.3d 1381, 1384–85 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 

(distinguishing Vaccine Act cases from “complex litigation” described in Laffey). 

Because the matrix proposed by Laffey was based on 

prevailing market rates for a single point in time, courts 

have found it necessary to determine similar matrices for 

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BIERY v. US 13

other years using the Laffey rates as a starting point. See

Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc., 857 F.2d at 1525. 

To this end, two competing approaches have been applied 

by district courts and the Court of Federal Claims. 

The first approach is for courts to use the Adjusted 

Laffey Matrix which is maintained by the United States 

Attorney’s Office. See, e.g., Rooths v. District of Columbia, 

802 F. Supp. 2d 56, 62 (D.D.C. 2011); First Fed. Sav. &

Loan Assoc. of Rochester v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 572, 

586 (Fed. Cl. 2009). Adjustments to this version of the 

matrix are based on changes to the cost of living in the 

Washington D.C. metropolitan area as measured by the 

Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers 

(“CPI-U”). United States Attorney’s Office, District of 

Columbia, Laffey Matrix – 2014-2015, at 1, 

http://www.justice.gov/usao/dc/divisions/Laffey%20Matrix

_2014-2015.pdf. The CPI-U measures the average change 

in price of a market basket of goods and services including 

food, shelter, and medical and legal services. See Bureau 

of Labor and Statistics, CPI Detailed Report: Data for 

December 2015, at 14, 203, 

http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpid1512.pdf.

The second approach is to use the “Kavanaugh Matrix,” advanced by economist Dr. Michael Kavanaugh, 

which makes adjustments to the Laffey Matrix based on 

changes to the Legal Services Index (“LSI”) component of 

the Consumer Price Index (“CPI”). Bywaters, 670 F.3d at 

1226 & n.4; Eley v. District of Columbia, 999 F. Supp. 2d 

137, 150 (D.D.C. 2013), vacated and remanded by 793 

F.3d 97 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The motivation behind these 

adjustments is to provide adjustments that solely capture 

the market for legal services and do not take other consumer goods into account, such as food, housing, gas, and 

clothing. See Salazar v. District of Columbia, 750 F. 

Supp. 2d 70, 73 (D.D.C. 2011).

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Both approaches are subject to criticism and no circuit has expressly adopted one over the other. See Salazar ex rel. Salazar v. District of Columbia, 809 F.3d 58, 

64–65 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Bywaters, 670 F.3d at 1226 & n.4; 

Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 426 F.3d 

694, 709–10 (3d Cir. 2005). The Adjusted Laffey Matrix 

has been criticized because it takes a broad basket of 

goods and services into account, including food and fuel, 

and may thus yield results that are higher or lower than 

the average rates private consumers of legal services in 

the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area actually pay. See

Salazar v. District of Columbia, 123 F. Supp. 2d 8, 14–15 

(D.D.C. 2000). The Kavanaugh Matrix has been criticized 

for its use of the national CPI, and may thus not be an 

accurate measure of the relevant community, here the 

Washington D.C. metropolitan area. See Eley, 999 F. 

Supp. 2d at 152.

The criticisms levied against both the Adjusted Laffey

Matrix and the Kavanaugh Matrix are well-founded and 

reasonable. Conversely, the arguments for each are also 

compelling. Consequently, we decline to exclusively 

endorse either for use in a lodestar calculation. The 

decision to use either matrix as a starting point to determine a lodestar is within the discretion of a trial court. 

See Interfaith Cmty. Org., 426 F.3d at 709 (“[T]he original 

Laffey Matrix is an appropriate starting point . . . .”); 

Covington, 57 F.3d at 1109 (noting that the Adjusted 

Laffey Matrix provides a “useful starting point.”). However, it would be an abuse of discretion for a court to blindly 

use either matrix without considering all the relevant 

facts and circumstances. See Eley v. District of Columbia, 

793 F.3d 97, 104 (D.C. Cir. 2015). As previously noted, 

though a court has broad discretion in computing a lodestar, the court must “provide a concise but clear explanation of its reasons for the fee award.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 

437. This includes the decision to use either the Adjusted 

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BIERY v. US 15

Laffey Matrix or the Kavanaugh Matrix and any departure, or no departure, from the rates they suggest.

Here, the Court of Federal Claims compared the Adjusted Laffey Matrix rate with fees awarded to counsel’s 

law firm in two district court cases and found those rates

lower than, if not comparable to, the Adjusted Laffey

rates. In doing so, the Court of Federal Claims explained 

that the Adjusted Laffey rate was sufficient to adequately 

compensate counsel, but not so high as to be a “windfall”

to counsel. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 444. 

Counsel argues that it was an abuse of discretion for 

the Court of Federal Claims to rely on fee awards from 

other jurisdictions in determining the fee award in this 

case. However, because counsel had previously requested 

fees based on a “national” rate, the use of awards from 

other jurisdictions as a comparative base was reasonable. 

Therefore, the Court of Federal Claims did not abuse 

its discretion in its determination that the Adjusted 

Laffey Matrix provided a reasonable rate for the lodestar 

calculation.

C 

Counsel asserts that it was legal error for the Court of 

Federal Claims to find that the “no-interest rule” applied 

to its fee request and to require that historical rates be 

used.

Under the no-interest rule, recovery of interest on an 

award of attorney fees is barred unless an award of interest is “expressly and unambiguously authorized by statute.” Chiu v. United States, 948 F.2d 711, 719 (Fed. Cir. 

1991). This rule has been broadly read to reach any 

attempt to provide additional compensation based on a 

delayed payment. Shaw, 478 U.S. at 322 (“Interest and a 

delay factor share an identical function. They are designed to compensate for the belated receipt of money.”). 

“Thus, whether the loss to be compensated by an increase 

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16 BIERY v. US

in a fee award stems from an opportunity cost or from the 

effects of inflation, the increase is prohibited by the nointerest rule.” Id.

Counsel argues that the fee award should reflect a fee 

that a private client would pay in the private market and 

that, in the private market, the appropriate rates to be 

used are those in effect when payment is made. This 

argument is undercut by counsel’s own fee agreement, 

which notes that fees are ordinarily paid when the work is 

performed, not at the end of the case. According to the 

agreement, the contingent nature of the representation 

required a departure from the normal rule because “the 

Firm may not be reimbursed for the expenses until some 

time in the future.” J.A. 944. By its own language, this

departure is an attempt to obtain delay compensation and 

is therefore barred by the no-interest rule. See Chiu, 948 

F.2d at 720.

Therefore, the Court of Federal Claims did not err 

when it applied historical rates under the no-interest rule.

D 

Counsel argues that there was not sufficient evidence 

for the Court of Federal Claims to determine a reasonable 

rate for the St. Louis legal market. This argument is 

primarily based on the Court of Federal Claims’ initial 

statement that it could not, “without further evidence, 

rule on specific reasonable rates for St. Louis.” J.A. 17. 

According to counsel, the Court of Federal Claims’ later 

statement that there was “ample evidence” available, J.A. 

36, is in contradiction with this initial statement. 

It was counsel’s burden to provide evidence tending to 

show an appropriate rate in the St. Louis area. Hensley, 

461 U.S. at 437. Counsel failed to provide any evidence 

on this issue. In the absence of contradictory evidence, 

the Court of Federal Claims applied rates based on four 

district court cases from the Eastern District of Missouri. 

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BIERY v. US 17

This was not an abuse of discretion. When a party has a 

burden of production, it must submit evidence in order to 

meet the burden. When the burden has not been met, it 

is not the responsibility of a court to delay proceedings 

and request additional evidence from counsel; it rules on 

the record before it. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 

317, 323–24 (1986).

This is especially true here. Counsel was on notice of 

the Court of Federal Claims’ intent to apply local St. 

Louis rates in 2012. It was counsel, not the government, 

that subsequently moved for a final fee award. Counsel 

cannot now credibly claim that it was surprised when the 

Court of Federal Claims did what it stated it would do 

and based its rate calculation on the relevant information 

available. It was counsel’s responsibility to produce 

evidence rebutting the rate evidence presented. It failed 

to do so.

Therefore, the Court of Federal Claims did not abuse 

its discretion in its determination of an appropriate 

hourly rate for the St. Louis legal market.

We have reviewed the remaining challenged fee reductions, including the reduction in hours for work performed in support of the Kansas Supreme Court 

arguments and the fee award, and find that the Court of 

Federal Claims has adequately supported them in its 

opinion. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, counsel’s motion to supplement the record is denied. Counsel’s motion to order 

payment of the uncontested legal fees and expenses is 

denied as moot. The judgment of the Court of Federal 

Claims is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

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18 BIERY v. US

COSTS

Each party shall bear their own costs.

Case: 14-5084 Document: 121-2 Page: 18 Filed: 03/23/2016