Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-00731/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-00731-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Tuanja Edward Anderson
Plaintiff
Munioz
Defendant
E. Sanchez
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TUANJA EDWARD ANDERSON,

Plaintiff,

 v.

E. SANCHEZ, et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 15-0731 MEJ (PR)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND

INTRODUCTION

Tuanja Edward Anderson, a California state prisoner currently incarcerated at Salinas

Valley State Prison (“SVSP”) and proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights action pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983. He has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis in a separate

order. Based upon a review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, it is dismissed

with leave to amend.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners

seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss

any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v.

Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “Specific facts are not necessary; the

statement need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim is and the grounds

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upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (citations omitted). 

Although in order to state a claim a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, . . .

a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action

will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations

omitted). A complaint must proffer “enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible

on its face.” Id. at 570. 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was

violated, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the

color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 

B. Legal Claims 

The complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In the portion

of the form complaint where a plaintiff is instructed to provide a statement of his claim,

Anderson writes the following:

On 2/3/15 there was an argument between inmate Mitchell and C/O

[Correctional Officer] Sanchez on D2 EOP yard in Administrative Segregation. 

Mr. Mitchell was upset and he started cussing at staff. C/O Sanchez told him

to watch his language and Mr. Mitchell started teasing C/O Sanchez calling her

“Clown Face.” I was laughing (inmate Anderson) real hard. Then I heard C/O

Sanchez make a comment about having someone sodomize Mr. Mitchell. Then

Mr. Mitchell started using racial slurs. Mitchell asked for the warden and she

stated “he is on my side, not yours.” I kept laughing. When C/O J. Meskus

came to my cage, he told me I shouldn’t be fishing on the yard. Then when I

got to the cell, I was told by other inmates that the staff searched my cell for

about 30 minutes while on the yard. When dinner came, my cake had a

fingerprint on the icing and spit. I threw the cake in the toilet. Then my

noodles had a loogie in them. With all that data, C/O Sanchez told the staff

that I, inmate Anderson, was also making racial slurs. I said not one word to

Mr. Mitchell nor C/O Sanchez. All I was doing was laughing.

Compl. at 3-5.

The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but neither does it permit

inhumane ones. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The treatment a prisoner

receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under

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the Eighth Amendment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). In its prohibition

of “cruel and unusual punishment,” the Eighth Amendment places restraints on prison

officials, who may not, for example, use excessive force against prisoners. See Hudson v.

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992). 

The Amendment also imposes duties on these officials, who must provide all prisoners

with the basic necessities of life such as food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and

personal safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832; DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of

Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989). A prison official violates the Eighth

Amendment when two requirements are met: (1) the deprivation alleged must be, objectively,

sufficiently serious, see Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298

(1991)), and (2) the prison official possesses a sufficiently culpable state of mind, see id.

(citing Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297). In determining whether a deprivation of a basic necessity is

sufficiently serious to satisfy the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim, a

court must consider the circumstances, nature, and duration of the deprivation; the more basic

the need, the shorter the time it can be withheld. See Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731

(9th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff’s contentions that prison staff tampered with his food on one

occasion and searched his cell for 30 minutes on one occasion, though unfortunate, are

insufficient to allege a deprivation of the basic necessities of life. See, e.g., Anderson v.

County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1314-15 (9th Cir. 1995) (temporary placement in safety cell

that was dirty and smelled bad did not constitute infliction of pain); DeMallory v. Cullen,

855 F.2d 442, 445 (7th Cir. 1988) (correctional officer spitting upon prisoner does not rise to

level of constitutional violation); Holloway v. Gunnell, 685 F.2d 150, 156 (5th Cir. 1985) (no

claim stated where prisoner forced to spend two days in hot dirty cell with no water); Miles

v. Konvalenka, 791 F. Supp. 212, 214 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (single instance of finding mouse in

food not actionable). Federal courts should avoid enmeshing themselves in the minutiae of

prison operations in the name of the Eighth Amendment. Wright v. Rushen, 642 F.2d 1129,

1132 (9th Cir. 1981).

Plaintiff’s allegations that Correctional Officer Sanchez said plaintiff was making

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racial slurs also fail to state claim. Verbal harassment alone is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. See Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 738 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other

grounds by Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884-85 (9th Cir. 2008); Rutledge v. Arizona Bd.

of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1353 (9th Cir. 1981); see, e.g., Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083,

1092 (9th Cir. 1996), amended 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998) (disrespectful and assaultive

comments by prison guard not enough to implicate 8th Amendment); Burton v. Livingston,

791 F.2d 97, 99 (8th Cir. 1986) (“mere words, without more, do not invade a federally

protected right”). Plaintiff does not allege that there was any consequence of Officer

Sanchez’s words. An Eighth Amendment claim has not been stated on the facts alleged as

plaintiff has not identified a serious risk to his safety or that Officer Sanchez acted with

deliberate indifference to a known risk. 

As for defendant SVSP Warden Munioz, plaintiff adds no facts whatsoever linking

Mr. Munioz to his allegations of wrongdoing. If plaintiff files an amended complaint and

keeps Mr. Munioz as a defendant, he must set forth specific facts showing how Mr. Munioz

actually and proximately caused the deprivation of his federal rights of which he complains. 

See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff is cautioned that there is no

respondeat superior liability under § 1983, i.e. no liability under the theory that one is

responsible for the actions or omissions of an employee. Liability under § 1983 arises only

upon a showing of personal participation by the defendant. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040,

1045 (9th Cir. 1989). A supervisor may be liable under § 1983 upon a showing of (1)

personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection

between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. See Starr v.

Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Plaintiff is further cautioned that he must have exhausted his administrative remedies

before filing suit in federal court. The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 amended 42

U.S.C. § 1997e to provide that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions

under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison,

or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are

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exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion is mandatory and no longer left to the

discretion of the district court. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006) (citing Booth v.

Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739 (2001)). An action must be dismissed unless the prisoner

exhausted his available administrative remedies before he or she filed suit, even if the

prisoner fully exhausts while the suit is pending. McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199

(9th Cir. 2002). From the face of plaintiff’s complaint, it does not appear that plaintiff has

exhausted his administrative remedies.

Finally, it appears that plaintiff is attempting to pursue this action on behalf of both

himself and inmate Mitchell. Mitchell has not signed the complaint or submitted an in forma

pauperis application. Nor does plaintiff identify the constitutional violations purportedly

committed against Mitchell. In any event, plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in that status he

cannot represent anyone other than himself. See Russell v. United States, 308 F.2d 78, 79

(9th Cir. 1962) (“[A] litigant appearing in propria persona has no authority to represent

anyone other than himself”). Accordingly, Mitchell is hereby DISMISSED from this action. 

Mitchell must file a separate civil rights action if he wishes to pursue judicial relief.

Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed because his allegations, even when liberally

construed, do not state a cognizable claim for relief under Section 1983 that defendants have

violated his constitutional rights. Plaintiff will be granted leave to amend his complaint to

state a cognizable claim, provided he can do so in good faith.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby orders as follows:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend.

2. Within twenty-eight (28) days from the date of this Order, plaintiff may, but is

not required to, file an amended complaint to cure the deficiencies noted above, if he

truthfully can do so. Plaintiff shall use the court’s civil rights complaint form, a copy of

which is provided herewith, and include in the caption both the case number of this action,

No. C 15-0731 MEJ (PR), and the heading “AMENDED COMPLAINT.” Failure to file the

amended complaint by the deadline will result in the dismissal of the action. 

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3. Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the original

complaint. “[A] plaintiff waives all causes of action alleged in the original complaint which

are not alleged in the amended complaint.” London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811,

814 (9th Cir. 1981). Plaintiff may not incorporate material from the prior complaint by

reference. Defendants not named in an amended complaint are no longer defendants. See

Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). 

4. It is plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the

Court informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the Clerk headed

“Notice of Change of Address,” and must comply with the Court’s orders in a timely fashion. 

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). 

5. The Clerk shall send plaintiff a blank civil rights form along with his copy of

this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 

Maria-Elena James

United States Magistrate Judge

May 12, 2015

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