Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-03040/USCOURTS-ca10-92-03040-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Percy A. Jackson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

AUG 2 G 1992. 

T'l\_,2Pr:' L. HOEC~ "' 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

Clerk 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 92-3040 

) ( D. C. No. 91-10011-02) 

PERCY A. JACKSON, ) ( D. Kansas) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before LOGAN, BARRETT and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously to honor the parties' request for a 

decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

This appeal arises out of a district court order revoking 

defendant Percy A. Jackson's supervised release and sentencing him 

to reimprisonment for a term of eleven months. The district court 

Order Revoking Supervised Release and Imposing Sentence stated, 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 92-3040 Document: 010110307883 Date Filed: 08/26/1992 Page: 1
"It is further ordered that the defendant receive credit for the 

time served since his arrest on November 15, 1991." IR. tab 92 

at 2. November 15 is the date defendant was arrested on the 

charge of violating the terms of his supervised release. On 

appeal defendant asserts he is entitled to more credit than the 

court gave him. The government argues, relying upon United States 

v. Wilson, U.S. __ , 112 S. Ct. 1351 (1992), that the appeal 

should be dismissed pending exhaustion of administrative remedies 

within the Bureau of Prisons. 

Defendant was sentenced after his guilty plea to a charge of 

theft from a financial institution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2113(b). The sentence was imprisonment of 202 days, with credit 

for 202 days he had already served in pretrial detention, with 

immediate release to a three year term of supervised release. 

Thereafter, in November 1991, defendant was arrested for acts that 

violated provisions of his supervised release, apparently including a charge of battery and disorderly conduct in a domestic 

violence case pending in a state municipal court in Wichita, Kansas. The district court, in revoking defendant's supervised 

release, imposed a sentence of eleven months additional incarceration, and in doing so made the statement quoted above concerning 

credit for detention since November 15. Defendant argues on 

appeal that he is entitled to credit against the eleven month sentence for the whole time he has been in detention, including the 

202 days already credited to his sentence on the original underlying crime. This appeal is an attempt to get that issue before us. 

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Appellate Case: 92-3040 Document: 010110307883 Date Filed: 08/26/1992 Page: 2
The Wilson case, decided by the Supreme Court after the district court imposed the sentencing at issue before us, resolved an 

ambiguity in 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) by holding that it is not the 

province of the district court, rather it is that of the Attorney 

General acting through the Bureau of Prisons, to initially determine the amount of any credit to be granted against a sentence of 

imprisonment. 

Section 3585(b) declares that a defendant shall be given 

credit toward the service of a term of imprisonment for any time 

spent in official detention before the date the sentence commences 

"as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed" 

but only if "that has not been credited against another sentence." 

In Wilson there was the possibility that a state court would 

give credit for pretrial detention on state charges which apparently would negate credit given by the district court on the federal conviction if the calculation was to be done by the Attorney 

General. 

defendant 

That also appears to be a possibility here, because 

apparently was arrested on state charges involving 

domestic violence, and the record is devoid of sufficient information to ascertain whether there is any overlap of credit here 

against state and federal sentences. There is also the question 

whether the sentence for violation of the conditions of supervised 

release is independent of the sentence for the underlying or original crime. See Celestine v. United States, 905 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 

1990); see also u.s.s.G. § 7B1.3(e); id. comment. (n.4). 

We do not resolve these issues because we agree with the government that Wilson requires that the determination of the credit 

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Appellate Case: 92-3040 Document: 010110307883 Date Filed: 08/26/1992 Page: 3
be made initially by the Attorney General through the Bureau of 

Prisons. Federal regulations afford prisoners administrative 

review of the computation of their credits. See 28 C.F.R. 

§§ 542.10 to 542.16. A prisoner can seek judicial review only 

after exhausting his administrative remedies. United States v. 

Woods, 888 F.2d 653, 654 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 

1006 (1990). 

Nevertheless, the district court erred in addressing the 

credit issue in the sentence. The case is remanded to the 

district court with directions to eliminate the sentence 

referencing prior credit and to dismiss without prejudice to 

defendant's right to seek judicial review after exhausting 

administrative remedies through the Bureau of Prisons. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

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Entered for the Court 

James K. Logan 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 92-3040 Document: 010110307883 Date Filed: 08/26/1992 Page: 4