Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-18-20274/USCOURTS-ca5-18-20274-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Spring Branch Independent School District
Appellant
Daniel W.
Appellee
Hannah W.
Appellee
O. W.
Appellee

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-20274

SPRING BRANCH INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

O.W., by next friend Hannah W., 

 Defendant - Appellee

*******************************************************

HANNAH W., as Parent/Guardians/Next Friends of O.W., an Individual with 

a Disability; DANIEL W., as Parents/Guardians/Next Friends of O.W., an 

Individual with a Disability; O.W.,

 Plaintiffs - Appellees

v.

SPRING BRANCH INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT,

 Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 12, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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Before HIGGINSON and WILLETT, Circuit Judges, and BROWN, District 

Judge.*

DEBRA M. BROWN, District Judge:

Upon panel rehearing, we withdraw our prior opinion, Spring Branch 

Indep. Sch. Dist. v. O.W., 938 F.3d 695 (5th Cir. 2019), and substitute the 

following:

After years of private schooling, O.W., a minor, enrolled in the fifth grade 

in the Spring Branch Independent School District for the 2014–2015 academic 

year. From his first day of school, O.W. struggled behaviorally and, despite 

having a history of mental illness, was not referred for a special education 

evaluation until January of 2015. Following transfers to two different 

programs, O.W.’s behavioral problems continued. Ultimately, O.W. was 

withdrawn from school with three days remaining in the academic year. An 

administrative hearing officer found the School District violated the 

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act and awarded O.W. two years of 

private school tuition. The district court affirmed the award and the School 

District appealed. We AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part, and REMAND.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The factual and procedural record in this case is extensive but largely 

undisputed.1

A. O.W.’s Early Education

During the summer of 2009, Hannah W. and Daniel W. registered O.W., 

* District Judge of the Northern District of Mississippi, sitting by designation.

1 The amicus brief of Disability Rights Texas cites evidence outside the appellate 

record to establish that “[s]chool districts throughout Texas have intentionally disregarded 

their Child Find duties.” This Court ordinarily does not consider evidence outside the record 

on appeal, McIntosh v. Partridge, 540 F.3d 315, 327 (5th Cir. 2008), and will not do so here. 

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their minor son, for kindergarten at Nottingham Elementary in the Spring 

Branch Independent School District. Although O.W. possessed a well-above 

average intelligence,2 he experienced various behavioral problems at 

Nottingham, including aggression towards other children. 

After O.W. completed his kindergarten year, his parents enrolled him at 

Rainard, a private school. O.W. attended Rainard as a first grader (the 2010–

2011 academic year) and a second grader (the 2011–2012 academic year). 

Following a self-harm attempt during his second grade year, O.W.’s parents 

moved him to The New School in the Heights, a private school for children with 

social-emotional challenges. O.W. attended The New School for third grade 

(the 2012–2013 academic year) and fourth grade (the 2013–2014 academic 

year). O.W. exhibited behavioral problems at The New School but finished the 

fourth grade with passing scores. 

B. Return to Nottingham

In the summer of 2014, O.W.’s parents registered O.W. for the fifth grade 

(the 2014–2015 academic year) at Nottingham. Before the start of the term, 

Ms. W. provided Nottingham officials with an August 7, 2014, letter from Dr. 

Robbi Wright, who had served as O.W.’s psychiatrist since the end of 2012. The 

letter stated that O.W. suffered from attention deficit hyperactivity disorder

and would thus benefit from § 5043 accommodations. Ms. W. also spoke with 

O.W.’s teacher “to provide a little background” about O.W.

On the first day of school, teachers discovered violent images of murder 

2 O.W.’s IQ was most recently measured in the “superior” range. 3 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), “broadly prohibit[s] 

discrimination against disabled persons in federally assisted programs or activities.” D.A. ex 

rel. Latasha A. v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 629 F.3d 450, 453 (5th Cir. 2010). The provision 

differs from the IDEA in that the “IDEA guarantees individually tailored educational services

for children with disabilities, while Title II [of the Americans with Disabilities Act] and § 504 

promise non-discriminatory access to public institutions.” Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 137 

S. Ct. 743, 756 (2017). 

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and death drawn by O.W, which also included anti-Semitic language and 

imagery, as well as obscenities. That day, Ms. W. conferenced with 

Nottingham’s principal regarding the images. 

The next day, O.W. held up his middle finger, used obscenities, and 

refused to follow directions. When administrators came to the classroom to 

assist the teacher, O.W., who was sitting on a bookshelf and refusing to come 

down, hurled insults laced with pejorative, vulgar, and racist terms. He then 

moved on from hurling words to hurling objects, throwing writing utensils at 

the assistant principal. 

Over the next few days, Ms. W. spoke often with Nottingham’s principal 

and assistant principal, during which she informed them that O.W. transferred 

from a therapeutic school, that he had difficulty with transitions, and that he 

suffered from Oppositional Defiant Disorder, Mood Disorder, Anxiety, and 

Depression. 

Ms. W. also provided the school with contact information for Dr. PowellWilliams, a counselor from The New School who had provided daily counseling 

to O.W. Dr. Powell-Williams spoke with school staff and offered strategies to 

manage O.W. Also, district officials collaborated with O.W.’s parents and

worked with O.W. “to find out what could be used as incentives to get him to 

complete his work.” Despite these efforts, O.W. continued to act out by 

regularly engaging in acts of verbal and physical aggression, including using 

extreme profanity and throwing objects at the teacher; refusing to follow 

directions; leaving assigned areas, including the classroom, without 

permission; disrupting lessons by pushing keys on the teacher’s laptop, playing 

with the ActivBoard, and yelling profanities from the back of the classroom;

sleeping excessively in class; insulting fellow students; and touching or taking 

others’ property. By early October of 2014, O.W. was interrupting classes daily. 

On September 16, 2014, Nottingham provided Ms. W. a § 504 “Notice of 

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Rights” and notice of a § 504 eligibility meeting to be held October 1, 2014. At 

approximately the same time, Ms. W. signed a “Notice and Consent for Initial 

Section 504 Evaluation,” consenting to an evaluation of O.W. to determine 

whether he qualified for § 504 accommodations. 

On September 23, 2014, Ms. W. provided a Family History Form to the 

School District which included a history of O.W.’s behavioral problems and a 

list of his medications. Ms. W. also provided the School District with a May 

2012 evaluation of O.W. performed by Dr. Susan Rosin. Dr. Powell-Williams 

called the principal and discussed the possibility of a special education 

evaluation of O.W. Ultimately, the School District postponed the October 1 

meeting until October 8, 2014, apparently to allow the School District’s 

Licensed Specialist in School Psychology (LSSP) to review Dr. Rosin’s

evaluation. 

At the October 8 meeting, the School District determined that O.W., who 

was removed from class on a daily basis due to his disruptive behavior,

qualified for § 504 accommodations. To this end, O.W.’s parents and 

administration officials agreed to a behavior intervention plan (BIP), which 

appears to have been put in place.4 The plan utilized “Success Charts” which

tracked O.W.’s problematic behaviors at thirty-minute intervals and provided 

rewards for good behavior. Notes from the meeting reflect O.W. was “at Level 

2 intervention [methods but] may need to go to Tier 3.”

The BIP’s implementation had a minimal impact on O.W.’s behavior. The 

frequency of his misconduct “diminish[ed]” for a short time—O.W. was only 

disciplined once from October 8 until November 4 after being disciplined eight 

4 Ms. W. testified at the administrative hearing that during the meeting, she 

requested a special education evaluation for O.W. but the LSSP in attendance stated the 

evaluation was unnecessary. An administration official at the meeting testified she did not 

recall the request. Notes from the meeting do not include the request. However, both the 

hearing officer and the district court determined the request was made. 

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times from August 26 through October 6. However, O.W. was disciplined three 

times in November, including for a “major disru[ption]” related to him climbing 

the walls of the gym. In addition to these documented incidents of discipline, 

O.W. twice fell asleep in class during the month of November. Furthermore, by 

the end of the semester, his grades had dropped. 

On January 9, 2015, O.W. hit a staff member in the back with a jacket. 

Shortly after, O.W. assaulted his fifth-grade teacher, “kicking her and hitting 

her with a closed fist.” The second of these incidents resulted in the teacher 

bringing charges against O.W. 

On January 15, 2015, the School District convened a second § 504 

meeting. At the meeting, the School District informed O.W.’s parents that O.W. 

would be referred for a special education evaluation and that during the 

evaluation O.W. could either remain a student at Nottingham with a new 

teacher and a personal aide, or enroll at the School District’s Turnaround 

Opportunities through Active Learning (TOTAL) program. O.W.’s parents 

agreed to enroll O.W. in TOTAL. 

C. Development of IEP 

While enrolled in TOTAL, O.W. was assigned a multidisciplinary team 

which included an LSSP, an educational diagnostician, and a speech-language 

pathologist. Following a brief delay to consider a February 2015 private report 

provided by O.W.’s parents, the team completed a Full Individual Evaluation 

(FIE) on February 24, 2015. Although a private report provided by O.W.’s 

parents diagnosed O.W. with autism,5 the evaluation team rejected the 

diagnosis. The team determined O.W. was a “student with poor emotional and 

5 Following the October 8, 2014, meeting, O.W.’s parents paid for a private 

Independent Educational Evaluation which was performed in December 2014. The resulting 

report, which was produced in February 2015, diagnosed O.W. with Autism Spectrum 

Disorder. 

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behavioral regulation” who suffers from an Emotional Disturbance.

On March 11, 2015, an Admission, Review and Dismissal Committee 

(ARDC)6 convened to consider the FIE and develop an IEP for O.W. Based on 

a Functional Behavior Assessment and consultation with O.W.’s parents, the 

ARDC developed a BIP. As explained by the district court, the BIP: 

focused on using positive behavioral approaches. For physical 

aggression (e.g., throwing objects, hitting, kicking, destroying 

school property), staff were to help O.W. learn replacement 

behaviors (e.g., removing himself to a cooling-off area, 

implementing deep breathing, calming sequences, stop and think).

Additionally, staff were to avoid power struggles and arguments, 

and instead offer choices, frequent/movement breaks, and access 

to preferred activities. For verbal aggression (e.g., threats, 

profanity, obscene gestures, name calling), staff were to teach O.W. 

alterative phrases, avoid power struggles, allow 

frequent/movement breaks, provide access to preferred activities 

and a cooling-off area, and provide direct instruction on ways to 

verbalize discontent. Again, staff were to use calm interaction 

styles and minimize verbal interactions. For the behavioral 

problem of leaving the classroom, staff were to offer a visual 

schedule, clear rules, offer choices, frequent/movement breaks, 

provide access to preferred activities or a cooling-off area, and 

reinforce desired behaviors. Again, staff were to use a calm 

interaction style and redirect O.W. back to assigned areas, and 

remind him of his ability to access the cooling-off area. The IEP 

does not state that time-outs or restraints would be used as a tactic 

to address any of the above conduct.

The ARDC and O.W.’s parents also agreed to enroll O.W. in an “adaptive 

behavior program” located at Ridgecrest Elementary School. O.W. enrolled at 

Ridgecrest on March 23, 2015. While at Ridgecrest, O.W. maintained passing 

grades in all his classes and passed all portions of the State of Texas 

6 Under Texas law, each district must establish an ARDC “for each eligible student 

with a disability and for each student for whom a full individual and initial evaluation is 

conducted . . . .” 19 Tex. Admin. Code § 89.1050. “The ARD committee is the individualized 

education program (IEP) team defined in federal law and regulations . . . .” Id.

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Assessments of Academic Readiness. 

D. Implementation of IEP

At Ridgecrest, when O.W. engaged in inappropriate conduct (known as 

“target behavior”), he was provided a “redirection,” then a warning, then two 

warnings, and then directed to a desk (take-desk) in the classroom for a five 

minute period (Take 5) or a ten minute period (Take 10). During these periods, 

O.W. was given the opportunity to pursue replacement behavior, such as 

drawing. Disciplinary records show O.W. was placed in a Take 5 or Take 10 on 

sixteen of his forty days at Ridgecrest. 

In addition to the take-discipline, O.W. was physically restrained on 

eight occasions. Each instance of restraint was preceded by physical aggression 

by O.W. and attempts at de-escalation by Ridgecrest staff. On at least four 

occasions, Ridgecrest summoned police as a result of O.W.’s behavior. 

However, because O.W. often calmed down before the police arrived, it appears 

the police spoke with O.W. only once. 

On May 5, 2015, police were summoned to O.W.’s classroom after

teachers attempted de-escalation (providing choices of alternative activities, 

verbal redirection, calming techniques, and reduced verbal interaction); O.W. 

repeatedly struck his teacher with a closed fist and then charged at her; and

the teachers restrained O.W. Upon entering the classroom, the officer “stated 

to [O.W.] who was in charge, and [then] asked if he wanted to go to jail.” The 

officer also asked if O.W. “remembered why he was in a cop car last time.” 

After the interaction with police, O.W. “picked his ears until they were bloody 

and oozing,” “chewed his shirt,” and was unable to sleep or shower by himself. 

The day after the police intervention occurred, Ridgecrest faculty and 

Ms. W., without consultation with O.W.’s ARDC, agreed in writing that O.W.’s 

school day should begin at 9 a.m. instead of the normal 7:30 a.m. On May 18, 

2015, school officials and Ms. W. agreed that O.W.’s school day should be 

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shortened to three hours, from 9 a.m. until noon. The e-mail memorializing 

this agreement states, “this means a brief ARD [but] that he will begin the 

schedule tomorrow.” Ultimately, at the suggestion of Dr. Powell-Williams, 

O.W. left Ridgecrest with three days left in the school year. 

E. Fusion Academy and Administrative Proceedings

The following summer, O.W.’s parents enrolled him for tutoring at 

Fusion Academy, a private institution. Because O.W.’s parents and teachers 

noticed an improvement in O.W.’s behavior and performance, O.W.’s parents 

elected to enroll O.W. at Fusion for the 2015–2016 academic year. On August 

14, 2015, less than ten days before the beginning of the School District’s school 

year, O.W.’s parents informed the School District that O.W. would not be reenrolling. 

O.W. attended Fusion for the 2015–2016 academic year. However, on 

February 16, 2017, O.W. set fire to a school trash can. Due to this incident O.W. 

was removed from school and O.W.’s parents were informed he would not be 

allowed to return until he received “intervention.” Following his removal, the 

W.’s enrolled O.W. at Little Keswick, a residential school in Virginia. 

O.W.’s parents filed an administrative complaint against the School 

District on October 28, 2015. The complaint sought reimbursement for private 

school tuition, private placement, and other equitable relief. On February 23, 

2016, O.W.’s parents filed an amended administrative complaint.7 The parties 

appeared for an administrative hearing on May 24, 2016.

On August 5, 2016, the hearing officer issued a decision in O.W.’s favor 

on four issues, finding that (1) the School District violated its child find 

obligation because it did not timely refer O.W. for a special education 

7 The amendment added three allegations not contained in the original complaint 

related to alleged failures to convene ARDC meetings, and a failure to provide a FAPE for 

the 2014–2015 academic year and beyond. 

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evaluation; (2) the School District failed to provide O.W. a free appropriate 

public education (FAPE) for the 2014–2015 academic year because it did not 

timely fulfill its child find duties, because it violated his IEP by placing him in 

school for only three hours a day, and because O.W., who was gifted and 

talented, was failing math; (3) the reduction of hours in May 2015 deprived 

O.W. of a commensurate school day; and (4) the School District failed to 

implement O.W.’s IEP because it used restraints, time-outs, and police 

intervention, and reduced O.W.’s school hours. 

Based on these findings, the hearing officer determined that O.W. was 

entitled to reimbursement from the School District for $50,250 in tuition and 

tutoring for O.W.’s enrollment at Fusion for the 2015–2016 academic year, and 

that O.W. was entitled to a compensatory education award of tuition for Fusion 

for the 2016–2017 school year. 

F. District Court Proceedings

On August 30, 2016, the School District appealed the administrative 

decision to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. 

The administrative appeal was consolidated with a separate fee petition filed 

by O.W.’s parents which seeks attorney’s fees for the underlying 

administrative action. 

The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment on the hearing 

officer’s decision. Additionally, the W.’s sought an order that the School District 

pay $125,000 for O.W.’s tuition at Little Keswick as a “stay put”8 remedy. The 

district court denied the request for “stay put” relief, finding that a “newly 

articulated program proposed by” the School District which would provide 

8 The IDEA’s “stay put” provision provides that “during the pendency of any 

proceedings conducted pursuant to this section, unless the State or local educational agency 

and the parents otherwise agree, the child shall remain in the then-current educational 

placement of the child . . . .” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j).

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O.W. one-on-one instruction “is the appropriate stay-put placement during the 

pendency of this appeal given O.W.[’s] inability to continue attending Fusion 

Academy.” 

On March 29, 2018, the district court granted the W.’s summary 

judgment motion, affirmed the hearing officer’s decision, and denied the School 

District’s motion for summary judgment. This appeal followed. During the 

pendency of the appeal, two amicus briefs were filed—one by the Council of 

Parent Attorneys and one by Disability Rights Texas. Both briefs support the 

district court’s decision.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“[F]or appeals in IDEA actions, [the] standard of review for . . . summary 

judgments is obviously more expansive than the usual de novo review for 

summary judgments . . . prescribed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a).” 

E.R. ex rel. E.R. v. Spring Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., 909 F.3d 754, 762 (5th Cir. 

2018). We “review[] legal questions de novo and factual questions for clear 

error.” Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Woody, 865 F.3d 303, 309 (5th Cir. 2017). 

“Mixed questions should be reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard if 

factual questions predominate, and de novo if the legal questions 

predominate.” Seth B. ex rel. Donald B. v. Orleans Par. Sch. Bd., 810 F.3d 961, 

967 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Beech v. Hercules Drilling Co., 691 F.3d 566, 569 

(5th Cir. 2012)). 

Of relevance here, determinations of whether a school district failed to 

provide a FAPE or failed to comply with its child find duty in a timely manner 

are mixed questions which we review de novo. Krawietz ex rel. Parker v. 

Galveston Indep. Sch. Dist., 900 F.3d 673, 676 (5th Cir. 2018) (child find 

decision reviewed de novo); Woody, 865 F.3d at 309 (FAPE decision reviewed 

de novo). The underlying factual determinations are reviewed for clear error. 

Krawietz, 900 F.3d at 676; Woody, 865 F.3d at 309. 

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III. DISCUSSION

On appeal, the School District challenges the district court’s conclusions 

that (1) the School District breached its child find duty with regard to O.W.; (2) 

the School District failed to fully implement O.W.’s IEP; and (3) two years of 

private placement tuition was an appropriate remedy for O.W.

A. Child Find

Pursuant to the IDEA’s child find requirement, a state receiving federal 

funds must maintain policies and procedures to ensure, among other things, 

that “[a]ll children with disabilities . . . who are in need of special education 

and related services, are identified, located, and evaluated . . . .” 20 U.S.C. § 

1412(a)(3). While the statute’s implementing regulations define “how quickly 

a school district must act after consent for an evaluation is received, . . . neither 

the statute nor regulations seek to set a time between notice of a qualifying 

disability and referring the student for an evaluation . . . .” Woody, 865 F.3d at

319. This Court, however, has inferred a “reasonable-time standard” into the 

provision. Id. at 320. Thus, a school district must “identify, locate, and evaluate 

students with suspected disabilities within a reasonable time after the school 

district is on notice of facts or behavior likely to indicate a disability.” Krawietz, 

900 F.3d at 676 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Here, the hearing officer found the School District violated its child find 

duty when it “waited until January 2015 to refer [O.W.] to special education” 

despite the fact that it should have suspected O.W. suffered from a disability 

“[b]y the October 28, 2014 accrual date for this proceeding . . . .” The district 

court upheld the hearing officer’s decision based on a finding that the School 

District’s time to evaluate began to run on October 8, 2014. Citing 34 C.F.R. § 

300.534, the district court further held that “given O.W.’s constant violation of 

the student code of conduct due to his special needs, SBISD was charged with 

expediting the evaluation process.” Ultimately, the district court determined 

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the delay between October 8, 2014 (the date of the alleged notice) and January 

15, 2015 (the date of the referral for evaluation) was unreasonable. 

The School District argues the district court improperly relied on § 

300.534 to find the need for an expedited review process and, in the absence of 

such a need, there was no child find violation. 

1. Was an expedited evaluation required?

20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(5) provides protections for “[a] child who has not been 

determined to be eligible for special education and related services . . . and who 

has engaged in behavior that violate[s] a code of student conduct . . . .” 

Generally, these protections apply if the educational institution “had 

knowledge . . . that the child was a child with a disability before the behavior 

that precipitated the disciplinary action occurred.” Id. However, in the absence 

of knowledge, the statute provides:

If a request is made for an evaluation of a child during the time 

period in which the child is subjected to disciplinary measures 

under this subsection, the evaluation shall be conducted in an 

expedited manner. If the child is determined to be a child with a 

disability, taking into consideration information from the 

evaluation conducted by the agency and information provided by 

the parents, the agency shall provide special education and related 

services in accordance with this subchapter, except that, pending 

the results of the evaluation, the child shall remain in the 

educational placement determined by school authorities.

20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(5)(D)(ii).

34 C.F.R. § 300.534, the implementing regulation for § 1415(k)(5), 

contains virtually identical language but clarifies that an expedited evaluation 

is required when “a request is made for an evaluation of a child during the time 

period in which the child is subjected to disciplinary measures under § 300.530 

. . . .” 34 C.F.R. § 300.534(d)(2)(i). Section 300.530, in turn, governs removal of 

a student from his or her current placement for more than ten days in a school 

year.

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Neither the child find provisions nor the expedited evaluation provisions 

refer to the other. Thus, in the absence of plain language connecting the 

provisions, we “employ can[]ons of statutory construction to discern the 

legislature’s intent.” Vielma v. Eureka Co., 218 F.3d 458, 464 (5th Cir. 2000). 

At least four aspects of the statutes suggest Congress intended that the 

requirements exist independently. 

First, the absence of any cross reference between the two provisions 

suggests independence. Chamber of Commerce of U.S.A. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 

885 F.3d 360, 381 (5th Cir 2018) (“Congress’s use and withholding of terms 

within a statute is taken to be intentional.”). 

Second, beyond sharing general references to evaluations, the statutes 

and regulations are drastically different—the child find requirement details 

procedures for identifying disabled students while the expedited evaluation 

requirement is in a provision addressing procedures for discipline. Charvat v. 

NMP, LLC, 656 F.3d 440, 449 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he two private-right-of-action 

provisions contain significant textual differences, indicating that they are 

distinct provisions to be treated independently.”). 

Third, the expedited evaluation requirement is in a subparagraph titled 

“Limitations,” which is located in a subsection titled “Conditions that apply if 

no basis of knowledge [of disability].” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(5)(D)(ii). Thus, in 

context, the expedited evaluation requirement stands as a “Limitation” on a 

school district’s ability to discipline a student in the absence of knowledge of a 

disability, not as an element of the separate child find requirement. See House 

v. C.I.R., 453 F.2d 982, 987 (5th Cir. 1972) (“[I]t is proper to consult both the 

section heading and the section’s content to come up with the statute’s clear 

and total meaning.”). 

Fourth, the expedited evaluation requirement only triggers when the 

child is subjected to disciplinary proceedings, a request for an evaluation has 

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been made, and the institution lacked knowledge that the child was a child 

with a disability before the behavior that precipitated the discipline.9 34 C.F.R. 

§ 300.534(d). To hold that the expedited evaluation requirement is 

incorporated into the child find reasonableness requirement would be to hold 

that a school district with previous knowledge of a suspended student’s 

disability does not violate the child find requirement by failing to conduct an 

expedited evaluation, while a school district without previous knowledge of the 

disability would violate the child find requirement by failing to conduct an 

expedited evaluation. This absurd result suggests a finding that the provisions 

are separate. Dunn-McCampbell Royalty Interest, Inc. v. Nat’l Park Serv., 630 

F.3d 431, 439 (5th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e should avoid any interpretation that would 

lead to absurd or unreasonable outcome[s] . . . .”) (quotation marks omitted). 

In sum, the IDEA’s text and structure, including its implementing 

regulations, compel a conclusion that the child find and expedited evaluation 

requirements are separate and independent such that a violation of the latter 

does not mean a violation of the former. To the extent the district court held 

otherwise, this was error.10

2. Did a child find violation occur?

A finding of a child find violation turns on three inquiries: (1) the date 

the child find requirement triggered due to notice of a likely disability; (2) the 

date the child find duty was ultimately satisfied; and (3) the reasonableness of 

the delay between these two dates. See Krawietz, 900 F.3d at 676.

9 See also Letter to Nathan, OSEP (available at https://sites.ed.gov/idea/files/osepletter-to-nathan-01-29-2019.pdf) (“While an LEA may choose or find it necessary to expedite 

evaluations in these circumstances, under IDEA expedited evaluations are only required in 

situations where the LEA is not deemed to have knowledge that the child may have a 

disability . . . .”). 10 Because O.W. did not assert an independent claim arising from a failure to perform 

an expedited evaluation, we need not reach the School District’s alternate argument that an 

expedited evaluation was not required under the IDEA. 

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The School District does not challenge the district court’s finding that 

October 8, 2014, represents the appropriate notice date and we see no error in 

that conclusion. See Krawietz, 900 F.3d at 677 (finding sufficient notice based 

on “academic decline, hospitalization, and incidents of theft”). We also agree 

with the parties that the January 15, 2015, referral for evaluation represents 

the appropriate end date for the reasonableness inquiry. See Woody, 865 F.3d 

at 320 (considering time period between notice and referral for evaluation). 

The only dispute then is whether the delay between October 8, 2014, and 

January 15, 2015 (99 days, or three months and seven days), was reasonable.11

This Court has twice considered the reasonableness of delay in the child 

find context. In Woody, this Court considered an 89-day delay between notice 

and referral to be reasonable where the local education agency spent the period 

“requesting and gathering information on [the student] in an effort to classify 

her and determine its obligations,” and where more than a month of the period

was spent waiting for the parents of the student to provide specific information. 

865 F.3d at 320. In the end, this Court concluded that the “facts suggest[ed] 

reasonableness, with neither the District nor the parent reacting with urgency 

or with unreasonable delay.” Id. 

In contrast, in Krawietz, this Court found a four-month delay 

unreasonable where the school district “failed to take any appreciable steps 

toward complying with its Child Find obligation” during the relevant time 

period. 900 F.3d at 677. In reaching this conclusion, this Court rejected the 

school district’s reliance on the student’s parents’ failure to act with urgency 

11 Citing Texas’ one-year statute of limitations for IDEA claims, the School District 

urges us to look at its actions after October 28, 2014. Because “events preceding [the statute 

of limitations bar] may provide evidence of a child-find violation,” we decline to limit the 

inquiry in this way. See Mr. P. v. W. Hartford Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d 735, 750 (2d Cir. 2018) 

(considering the time frame from the relevant trigger date, even though it predated the 

limitations bar). 

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because “the IDEA imposes the Child Find obligation upon school districts, not 

the parents of disabled students.” Id. This Court thus distinguished the case 

from the facts of Woody, noting that Woody involved a delay which “was not 

solely attributable to the district and [a] district . . . [which] took proactive 

steps throughout [the] period to comply with its Child Find obligation.” Id. 

Taken together, Krawietz and Woody stand for the proposition that the 

reasonableness of a delay is not defined by its length but by the steps taken by 

the district during the relevant period. A delay is reasonable when, throughout 

the period between notice and referral, a district takes proactive steps to 

comply with its child find duty to identify, locate, and evaluate students with 

disabilities. Conversely, a time period is unreasonable when the district fails 

to take proactive steps throughout the period or ceases to take such steps.

The School District argues this case is closer to Woody than Krawietz

because it was entitled to attempt regular behavioral interventions—a process 

known as response to intervention (RTI)—and § 504 accommodations prior to 

referral, and such steps were consistent with its child find obligations. We 

disagree. In light of the acts and behaviors observed by the School District in 

this case, its failure to pursue evaluation, even while concurrently 

implementing intermediate accommodations, can be described as nothing less 

than a delay or denial.

We in no way suggest that a school district necessarily commits a childfind violation if it pursues RTI or § 504 accommodations before pursuing a 

special education evaluation. We instead recognize that determining whether 

a child find violation occurred is a fact-intensive inquiry and highlight that 

§ 504 accommodations are not a substitute for an evaluation once a school 

district is “on notice of acts or behavior likely to indicate a disability.” Krawietz, 

900 F.3d at 676. The Child Find obligation is for a “child with a disability” who, 

by reason of that disability, “needs special education and related services.” 20 

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U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A).

Though compliance with § 504 does not absolve a school district of its 

duty to comply with the IDEA, we do recognize that there may be cases where 

intermediate measures are reasonably implemented before resorting to

evaluation. For instance, in D.K. v. Abington School District, the Third Circuit 

noted that “the measures the School District did take to assist D.K. in the 

classroom militate against finding a Child Find violation.” 696 F.3d 233, 252 

(3d Cir. 2012). There, the behavior demonstrated by D.K.—hyperactivity, 

difficulty following instructions, and tantrums—“was typical of boys his age.” 

Id. at 251. Accordingly, it was reasonable for the School District to try 

intermediate measures before “jump[ing] to the conclusion that D.K.’s 

misbehavior denoted a disability or disorder.” Id. D.K. stands for the 

proposition that “schools need not rush to judgment or immediately evaluate 

every student exhibiting below-average capabilities, especially at a time when 

young children are developing at different speeds and acclimating to the school 

environment.” Id. at 252.

In this case, by contrast, O.W. was not exhibiting behaviors “typical of 

boys his age.” And, unlike D.K., who was a “young child[]” in the early years of 

elementary school, O.W. was a fifth grader who had already been moved 

between schools in an attempt to respond to his unique educational needs. By 

the time the § 504 meeting occurred on October 8, 2014, O.W. had repeatedly: 

drawn violent pictures depicting murder, death, and anti-Semitic images; used 

incredibly vulgar language and made lewd gestures in the middle of the 

classrooms; disrupted class by yelling obscenities; hurled racial slurs and other 

derogatory insults at the principal, teacher, and fellow students; refused to 

follow directions or even remain in the classroom; thrown crayons at the 

teacher; and engaged in other forms of misconduct that resulted in him being 

removed from the classroom on a daily basis. And during this time, the School 

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District had attempted to provide both positive and negative reinforcements, 

frequent redirections, and consequences for O.W.’s behavior. Yet they had no 

effect. Based on the severity of O.W.’s behavior, it was not reasonable to try 

intermediate measures to determine whether special education testing was 

appropriate for O.W., as was the case for D.K. The School District was more 

than reasonably “on notice of acts or behavior likely to indicate a disability”

before implementing § 504 accommodations, and it was, therefore, required to 

evaluate O.W.12

In sum, the record in this case reflects that as of the October 8 notice 

date, the School District had attempted to engage with O.W. and his parents 

for the purpose of offering positive incentives and that such attempts had 

utterly failed to improve O.W.’s behavior. This failure led the hearing officer to 

conclude that “[b]y the October 8, 2014 Section 504 meeting, it was apparent 

that general education behavioral interventions were not working . . . .” We 

agree with the hearing officer that by October 8, 2014, the School District 

should have known that general behavior interventions were not working and 

that relying exclusively on § 504 accommodations, in lieu of evaluation, would 

only delay providing O.W. the assistance he needed. Accordingly, we conclude 

the continued use of behavioral interventions was not a proactive step toward 

compliance with the School District’s child find duties and that, therefore, a 

child find violation occurred.13

12 We, of course, do not suggest that the School District’s § 504 plan was unreasonable. 

It is only to say that, under the circumstances, it was not reasonable for the § 504 plan to be 

a preliminary rather than concurrent step in pursuing an evaluation. 13 The School District has suggested that some of the delay may be attributable to 

O.W.’s parents’ delay in providing information. While a proactive step may include waiting 

for a reasonable time for a parent to respond to a request for information or approval, see 

Woody, 465 F.3d at 320, “the IDEA imposes the Child Find obligation upon school districts, 

not the parents of disabled students.” Krawietz, 900 F.3d at 677.

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B. FAPE and IEP

“The IDEA requires states and local educational agencies receiving 

federal IDEA funds to make a FAPE available to children with certain 

disabilities.” Renee J., as Next Friend of C.J. v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 913 

F.3d 523, 528–29 (5th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks and alterations omitted). 

“Schools provide students a FAPE based on IEPs unique to each child.” Id. at

529. An IEP is a “written statement prepared at a meeting attended by a 

qualified representative of the school district, a teacher, the child’s parents or 

guardians, and when appropriate, the child himself.” Id. (quoting Lance v. 

Lewisville Indep. Sch. Dist., 743 F.3d 982, 989 (5th Cir. 2014)). An IEP must 

be both adequate in design and properly implemented. See id. (IEP must be 

adequate); Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Bobby R., 200 F.3d 341, 349 (5th Cir. 

2000) (failure to implement IEP may result in violation of IDEA).

The parties do not dispute the IEP developed by the School District was

adequate in design.14 However, the hearing officer found, and the district court 

agreed, the School District failed to implement O.W.’s IEP because it used 

time-outs, physical restraints, and police involvement as forms of discipline, 

and because it improperly shortened O.W.’s school day. The School District 

challenges each of these conclusions. 

1. Use of discipline

Ordinarily, adequacy of an IEP is determined by consideration of the four 

“indicators of whether an IEP is reasonably calculated to provide a meaningful 

educational benefit under the IDEA,” which were set forth in CypressFairbanks Independent School District v. Michael F. ex rel. Barry F., 118 F.3d 

14 The district court, in a footnote, noted that the escalating discipline at Ridgecrest 

was a result of either a failure to implement the IEP or an “inappropriate” IEP. However, the 

district court’s opinion also noted that neither party was challenging the adequacy of the IEP 

itself. Because the opinion includes no analysis of the relevant factors, it does not appear the 

district court intended to hold the IEP was inadequate. 

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245, 253 (5th Cir. 1997). However, when a plaintiff brings a claim based on a 

failure to implement an IEP, the first factor (whether the program is 

individualized) and second factor (whether the program is administered in the 

least restrictive environment) are generally “not at issue.” Bobby R., 200 F.3d 

at 348. Rather, a court must decide whether a FAPE was denied by 

considering, under the third factor, whether there was a “substantial or 

significant” failure to implement an IEP;15 and under the fourth factor, 

whether “there have been demonstrable academic and non-academic benefits 

from the IEP.” Id. at 349. 

a. Take 5 and Take 10

The district court found the use of Take 5 and Take 10 violated the IEP 

because under Texas law, “[t]he use of time-outs must be limited on a student’s 

IEP if they are to be used,” and because the procedures were time-outs as they 

“were mandatory isolations for O.W. away from his regular setting and other 

students.” The district court also found the use of the take-discipline 

inconsistent with the IEP’s general requirement that staff use a calm 

interaction area, redirect O.W., and remind him of his ability to access a cooling 

off area. 

Texas law provides a “[t]ime-out may only be used in conjunction with 

an array of positive behavior intervention strategies and techniques and must 

be included in the student’s IEP and/or BIP if it is utilized on a recurrent basis 

to increase or decrease a targeted behavior.” 19 Tex. Admin. Code § 89.1053(g). 

Thus, an IEP or BIP which does not authorize the recurrent use of time-outs 

effectively prohibits such use. The parties do not dispute that O.W.’s IEP did 

15 Bobby R. defined the inquiry as whether a district “failed to implement substantial 

or significant provisions of the IEP.” 200 F.3d at 349. However, the panel focused the 

substance of its inquiry on whether the violation of the IEP (rather than the provision) was 

de minimis. Id. at 348. 

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not authorize the use of time-outs,16 or that the take-discipline was utilized on 

a recurrent basis to increase or decrease a targeted behavior. However, the 

School District contends the Take 5 and Take 10 disciplines were not time-outs 

under Texas law because the desk was in O.W.’s classroom and was not 

separated from other students and because O.W. was given an opportunity to 

pursue preferred activities during the discipline. 

The code defines a time-out as “a behavior management technique in 

which . . . the student is separated from other students for a limited period in 

a setting: (A) that is not locked; and (B) from which the exit is not physically 

blocked by furniture, a closed door held shut from the outside, or another 

inanimate object.” Id. § 89.1053(b)(3). While the School District is correct the 

desk was in O.W.’s classroom and that O.W. was allowed to partake in 

preferred activities, nothing in the administrative definition of “time out” 

suggests the definition is limited to placement in a separate room or is 

inapplicable when the student is provided certain activities. Section 89.1053(b) 

only requires a “separat[ion] from other students for a limited period . . . .” 

Although the parties cite no specific evidence as to the location of the desk, 

references by school employees to the procedure as an “isolation” or “time-out,” 

while not dispositive, support the district court’s finding that the desk was 

separated from other students. Thus, we conclude the district court did not err 

in finding the take-disciplines to be timeouts. Because O.W.’s IEP prohibited 

time-outs, the recurrent use of the take-discipline amounted to a substantial 

or significant departure from the IEP.

Regarding the fourth factor, the district court found the failure to 

16 The School District does not argue the IEP’s authorization to “[d]irect [O.W.] to the 

cool-down area” amounted to an authorization to use time-outs under Texas law. We deem 

this argument forfeited. See United States v. Zuniga, 860 F.3d 276, 284 n.9 (5th Cir. 2017) 

(“[A]ny issue not raised in an . . . opening brief is forfeited.”). 

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implement the IEP “denied O.W. the educational benefits sought under the 

IEP, and that such failure denied O.W. a FAPE.” We agree. It is undisputed 

that after the IEP was implemented, O.W.’s grades dropped17 and his behavior 

deteriorated to the point where school officials determined his school day 

should be shortened to three hours. This regression shows neither an 

educational nor a behavioral benefit. See generally Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. 

V.P. ex rel. Juan P., 582 F.3d 576, 583 (5th Cir. 2009) (“[A]n IEP must be likely 

to produce progress, not regression . . . .”) (emphasis added). 

In sum, the use of the take-discipline was a significant or substantial 

departure from O.W.’s IEP. During the time period this departure occurred, 

O.W. regressed both educationally and behaviorally. Under these 

circumstances, we conclude the district court did not err in finding an 

actionable failure to implement O.W.’s IEP as to take discipline. 

b. Physical restraints 

The district court and the hearing officer found the use of physical 

restraints violated the IEP’s framework for behavioral interventions, which 

required that staff use a calm style, minimize verbal interactions, avoid power 

struggles, and provide access to a cooling off period. The School District argues 

it was entitled under Texas law to use physical restraints and it was not 

required to include such use in the IEP. 

There is no question the use of physical restraints is neither positive 

reinforcement nor consistent with avoiding confrontations or power struggles.

However, Texas law expressly authorizes a local education agency (LEA) to use 

17 In arguing O.W.’s grades improved under the IEP, the School District compares 

O.W.’s scores from the first term (when he started at Nottingham) to his fourth term (when 

he was mostly at Ridgecrest). When compared in this fashion, the School District is correct 

that all but one of O.W.’s grades improved. However, when compared to the third term, which 

ended approximately two weeks before O.W. began at Ridgecrest, the grades dropped in most 

subjects. 

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physical restraints in an “Emergency” situation, which is defined as a 

“situation in which a student’s behavior poses a threat of . . . imminent, serious 

physical harm to the student or others; or . . . imminent, serious property 

destruction.” 19 Tex. Admin. Code § 89.1053(b), (c). Unlike the use of time-outs, 

the law contains no provision requiring that the use of physical restraints be 

expressly authorized by a student’s IEP. 

O.W.’s IEP listed positive reinforcement and avoidance of power 

struggles as two of seven “Specific strategies/supports to prevent or decrease . 

. . problem behavior.” In addition, the IEP listed five “Strategies/interventions 

to use when [physical aggression] behavior is occurring:” (1) “Us[ing] a calm 

interaction style and minimize[ing] verbal interactions;” (2) “Remind[ing O.W.] 

to use taught coping strategies;” (3) “Direct[ing O.W.] to the cool-down area;” 

(4) “Provid[ing] more physical space;” and (5) “Remov[ing] extraneous objects 

so [O.W.] is not tempted to throw them.” Nothing in the IEP suggests the LEA 

was required to follow every strategy in every instance. More important, 

nothing in the listed strategies suggests the techniques were intended to apply 

in the specific situation governed by the emergency restraint provision—when 

there is an imminent threat of serious harm. Therefore, so long as the School 

District’s use of physical restraints complied with state law, the use of 

restraints did not violate the IEP. 

O.W.’s disciplinary records show that he was physically restrained eight 

times and that each instance of restraint was preceded by violent behavior by 

O.W. and attempts by district staff to utilize at least some of the strategies 

enumerated in the IEP. In each instance, the school determined the restraint 

was necessary to prevent serious physical harm to O.W. or to another. O.W. 

does not dispute the uses of restraints were necessary to prevent harm and 

were thus appropriate under Texas law. Accordingly, the district court erred 

in concluding these eight instances of physical restraints violated O.W.’s IEP.

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c. Police intervention

As with the physical restraints, the district court and the hearing officer 

determined the request for police intervention violated the IEP, and thus 

denied O.W. a FAPE, because calls to police were inconsistent with the IEP’s 

expressly authorized strategies of using a calm interaction style, minimizing 

verbal interactions, providing access to a cooling off period, and avoiding power 

struggles. We disagree. 

As mentioned above, the IEP listed specific strategies to be used to 

address O.W.’s aggressive behavior. These strategies are not necessarily 

violated by a mere request for police presence, particularly to deal with a 

violent and escalating situation such as a student repeatedly striking a teacher 

and charging at her, as was the case here. O.W. interacted with police officers 

on one occasion, and only after school officials provided him an opportunity to 

cool down, offered verbal redirections, provided praise, attempted to reduce 

verbal interactions, and applied calming techniques. Once the officers arrived, 

the interaction was limited to a handful of questions which may best be 

characterized as implicit threats of arrest if O.W. continued to assault his 

teachers. There is no indication Ridgecrest staff directed or encouraged the 

police officers to act in a manner inconsistent with the IEP. Because the School 

District took steps to avoid police interaction and O.W.’s behavior posed a 

substantial risk of serious injury to himself and others, we do not believe the 

calls to police were inconsistent with O.W.’s IEP. Accordingly, the single 

instance of police involvement did not rise to the level of an actionable 

violation.

2. Modification of IEP

Under Texas law, “[s]tudents with disabilities must have available an 

instructional day commensurate with that of students without disabilities. The 

ARD committee must determine the appropriate instructional setting and 

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length of day for each student, and these must be specified in the student's 

IEP.” 19 Tex. Admin. Code § 89.1075(e). Both the district court and the hearing 

officer determined that the shortening of O.W.’s school day violated O.W.’s IEP 

(and thus the IDEA) because the shortened school day was not provided for in 

O.W.’s IEP. The School District submits the IEP was modified by Ms. W and 

school officials. 

“In making changes to a child's IEP after the annual IEP Team meeting 

for a school year, the parent of a child with a disability and the public agency 

may agree not to convene an IEP Team meeting for the purposes of making 

those changes, and instead may develop a written document to amend or 

modify the child’s current IEP.” 34 C.F.R. § 300.324(a)(4)(i). Unless the IEP is 

modified by agreement in accordance with paragraph (a)(4), it may be modified 

only “by the entire IEP Team at an IEP Team meeting.” Id. § 300.324(a)(6).

By its terms, § 300.324(a)(4) provides an agreement may be modified 

without a meeting when the parent and LEA (1) agree as to the modification; 

(2) agree not to convene an IEP meeting; and (3) develop a written document 

to amend or modify the IEP. While the district court and hearing officer focused 

on the general fact that the IEP was modified to shorten O.W.’s school day, 

there were two modifications—the initial modification from a 7:30 start time 

to a 9:00 start time, and the subsequent modification to a three-hour school 

day. 

The initial modification, which included a formal written document 

prepared by Ms. W. and the LEA that set forth the modification and did not 

contemplate further IEP team action, satisfies § 300.324(a)(4)’s three

requirements. However, the subsequent modification, which did not include a 

formal written document produced by the parent and the LEA, and which 

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internal documents reflect presupposed a subsequent ARD meeting,18 did not 

meet the regulation’s requirements. It follows, therefore, that only the initial 

modification was effective and that the subsequent shortening of O.W.’s school 

day violated the IEP. This modification, which approximately halved O.W.’s 

school day, was a substantial and significant deviation from the IEP which 

indisputably resulted in a loss of academic benefits. Thus, the district court 

erred in finding the May 6, 2015, modification represented an actionable 

failure to implement O.W.’s IEP. The district court, however, correctly 

concluded the May 18, 2015, modification rose to the level of an actionable 

violation.

IV. REMEDIES

The “IDEA authorizes reimbursement for the cost of private specialeducation services when a school district fails to provide a FAPE and the 

private-school placement is appropriate, regardless of whether the child 

previously received special education or related services through the public 

school.” Woody, 865 F.3d at 314–15. If these requirements are satisfied, the 

court “must consider all relevant factors, including the notice provided by the 

parents and the school district’s opportunities for evaluating the child, in 

determining whether reimbursement for some or all of the cost of the child’s 

private education is warranted.” Id. at 315. However, to the extent this form of 

reimbursement is dependent on the failure to provide a FAPE, it may not 

18 The only written document cited by the School District is an internal e-mail between 

staff members stating that Ms. W. had agreed to the reduction, which reads:

Kristin and I had a long conversation with the 5th grader’s mother. In order to 

“survive” the last 11 days of school, let’s shorten his day from 9 to noon. Ana, this

means a brief ARD; know that he will begin this schedule tomorrow. She said she 

could stay after she drops him off. We will hold an ARD at SFMS before school starts 

to get him back full day; just FYI. Let us know how you want to handle the brief ARD 

as in who needs to be there, etc. I will be out to speak to the teacher and para [sic] 

about some ideas. She said today went well . . . .

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extend to periods when no FAPE violation occurred. See generally id. at 318 

(“[N]o case shown to us has permitted reimbursement for the time period 

before a school district’s obligations under the Act arose.”). Put differently, “the 

right to private school reimbursement, once adjudicated, does not go on 

indefinitely, but only while the school district is noncompliant (or 

acknowledges its inability to comply) with its obligation to provide a ‘free 

appropriate public education.’” Casey K. ex rel. Norman K. v. St. Anne Cmty. 

High Sch. Dist. No. 302, 400 F.3d 508, 516 n.1 (7th Cir. 2005).

In contrast, compensatory awards, which may include tuition 

reimbursement, are designed to provide “services prospectively to compensate 

for a past deficient program.” Draper v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 518 F.3d 

1275, 1280 (11th Cir. 2008). Such awards “should place children in the position 

they would have been in but for the violation of the Act.” Id. at 1289 (citing 

Reid ex rel Reid v. District of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 518 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). 

The hearing officer awarded the cost of one year of compensatory 

education for the 2016–2017 school year at Fusion because “[i]n the 2014-2015 

school year, the School District did not timely fulfill its Child Find Obligation 

and did not fully implement Student’s IEP, denying Student a FAPE.” The 

officer also found the School District should reimburse O.W. for the 2015–2016 

school year at Fusion because placement in the School District was 

inappropriate and placement at Fusion was appropriate. The district court 

affirmed these decisions. 

To the extent the hearing officer and district court awarded tuition 

reimbursement for a time period for which there was no corresponding finding 

of an IDEA violation (the 2015–2016 school year), such an award appears to 

have been in error. Regardless, because we have determined some of the 

district court’s underlying conclusions were incorrect, we remand the remedy 

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question to the district court for reconsideration in light of this opinion.19 See 

M.M. v. Lafayette Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 842, 862 (9th Cir. 2014) (remanding for 

reconsideration of remedies following reversal of summary judgment finding).

For the reasons above, we AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part, and 

REMAND.

19 We note that “[a]n unreasonable delay in complying with [the Child Find] duty may 

constitute a procedural violation of the IDEA.” Krawietz, 900 F.3d at 676 (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). “In matters alleging a procedural violation, a hearing officer 

may find that a child did not receive a free public education only if the procedural 

inadequacies—(I) impeded the child’s right to a free appropriate public education; (II) 

significantly impeded the parents’ opportunity to participate in the decisionmaking process 

regarding the provision of a free public education to the parents’ child; or (III) caused a 

deprivation of education benefits.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii).

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