Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-1_14-cv-02208/USCOURTS-alnd-1_14-cv-02208-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Farrah Lynn
Plaintiff
John Lynn
Plaintiff
Shenitha Wilson
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

JOHN LYNN, FARRAH LYNN,

Plaintiffs,

v.

SHENITHA WILSON, individually,

Defendant.

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Case No.: 1:14-CV-2208-VEH

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This is a civil action filed by the plaintiffs, John and Farrah Lynn, against

defendant Shenitha Wilson, a social worker employed with the Calhoun County

Department of Human Resources (“DHR”). (Doc. 22). Wilson is sued in her

individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for allegedly violating the plaintiffs’ due

process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 

(Doc. 22 at 16, 18, 20) (Counts One, Two, and Three). The plaintiffs also sue the

defendant for negligence (Count Four) and wantonness(Count Five). (Doc. 22 at 24,

26). All counts arise out of Wilson’s actions as a social worker which ultimately led

to the removal of the plaintiffs’ child from their home.

This case comes before the court on the defendant’s “Second Motion to

FILED

 2015 Sep-01 PM 04:00

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 1:14-cv-02208-VEH Document 25 Filed 09/01/15 Page 1 of 33
Dismiss” the Amended Complaint. (Doc. 23).1 The motion claims that this court

lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action and, therefore, pursuant to Rule

12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this case should be dismissed. The

motion also claims that this case should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. For the reasons stated

herein, the motion will be GRANTED.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Rule 12(b)(1)

Unlike state courts, federal tribunals are bodies of limited jurisdiction,meaning

that the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction over the claims asserted by the plaintiff

must be present at the time the complaint is filed and must be obvious on the face of

the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); 28 U.S.C. § 1330, et seq. The law is clear that

Plaintiffs, the parties seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction in this case, have the

burden to demonstrate that the court has subject matter jurisdiction. See McNutt v.

General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189, 56 S. Ct. 780, 785, 80 L. Ed.

1135 (1936) (“They are conditions which must be met by the party who seeks the

exercise of jurisdiction in his favor . . . . [and a]s he is seeking relief subject to this

1

 The defendant’s first motion to dismiss was denied without prejudice when this court

determined that the original complaint (doc. 1) was “a quintessential shotgun pleading” (doc. 20

at 3) (internal quotations and citations omitted) and ordered the plaintiffs to replead.

2

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supervision, it follows that he must carry throughout the litigation the burden of

showing that he is properly in court.”); see also McCormick v. Aderholt, 293 F.3d

1254, 1257 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (“[T]he party invoking the court’s

jurisdiction bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, facts

supporting the existence of federal jurisdiction.”). 

Further, lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived or expanded by

judicial interpretation, and a jurisdictional deficiency can be raised at any time by

either the parties or the court. See, e.g., Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6,

17-18, 71 S. Ct. 534, 542, 95 L. Ed. 702 (1951) (“The jurisdiction of the federal

courts is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation or by prior

action or consent of the parties.”); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 398, 95 S. Ct. 553,

557, 42 L. Ed. 2d 532 (1975) (“While the parties may be permitted to waive

nonjurisdictional defects, theymay not by stipulation invoke the judicial power of the

United Statesin litigation which does not present an actual ‘case or controversy,’ and

. . . we feel obliged to address the question of mootness before reaching the merits of

appellant’s claim.”) (citation omitted).

B. Rule 12(b)(6)

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion attacksthe legalsufficiency of the complaint. See Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (“[A] party may assert the following defenses by motion: (6)

3

Case 1:14-cv-02208-VEH Document 25 Filed 09/01/15 Page 3 of 33
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]”). The Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure require only that the complaint provide “‘a short and plain statement

of the claim’ that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is

and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S. Ct. 99,

103, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957) (footnote omitted) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)),

abrogated by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955,

1965, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (setting forth general

pleading requirements for a complaint including providing “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”). 

While a plaintiff must provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief, Rule 8

does not mandate the inclusion of “detailed factual allegations” within a complaint.

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. at 1964 (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47, 78 S.

Ct. at 103). However, at the same time, “it demands more than an unadorned,

the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). “[O]nce a claim has been

stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the

allegations in the complaint.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563, 127 S. Ct. at 1969. 

“[A] court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying

pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the

4

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assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. “While legal

conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by

factual allegations.” Id. “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court

should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to

an entitlement to relief.” Id. (emphasis added). “Under Twombly’s construction of

Rule 8 . . . [a plaintiff’s] complaint [must] ‘nudge[] [any] claims’ . . . ‘across the line

from conceivable to plausible.’ Ibid.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680, 129 S. Ct. at 1950-51. 

A claim is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. “The plausibility

standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at

556, 127 S. Ct. at 1965).

II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

The following factual allegations appear in the Amended Complaint:

6. On or about July 25, 2014 the Plaintiffs’ newborn son, Oliver

Lynn, was admitted to Children’s Hospital due to birth complications.

While at Children’s Hospital, Oliver Lynn received medical treatment

including surgery to address an imperforate anus. The Plaintiffs were

guided and provided instruction on the care-giving requirements for

Oliver Lynn.

5

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7. During the Children’s Hospital admission, the Calhoun County

Department of Human Resources was contacted by an employee of

Children’s Hospital expressing a potential concern regarding Plaintiffs’

capacity to manage the needs of their son. DHR received the contact and

directed Defendant Shenitha Wilson to make contact with the hospital

and Plaintiffs.

8. Based on the information obtained from the Plaintiffs and

Children’s Hospitalstaff, DHR requested recordsfromthe State of Ohio

regarding the Plaintiffs’ history. Ohio officials provided records on or

about August 7, 2014.

9. On or about August 7, 2014 Defendant ShenithaWilson contacted

Garrett Counseling and requested services to be provided to the

Plaintiffs upon their son’s discharge from Children’s Hospital. On this

day, Defendant Shenitha Wilson also contacted psychologist Dennis

Sizelove regarding conducting psychological evaluation or assessments

of the Plaintiffs.

10. On or about August 11, 2014 Oliver was discharged to the care of

Plaintiffs. Defendant Shenitha Wilson approved Oliver’s discharge

home to the Plaintiffs.

. . . 

12. Defendant Shenitha Wilson was contacted by the Plaintiffs upon

Oliver’s discharge and on or about August 12, 2014 Defendant Wilson

made a home visit to the Plaintiffs. During the home visit Defendant

Wilson requested Plaintiffs cooperate in submitting to a psychological

assessment. During this visit, Defendant Wilson toured the home and

observed the circumstances and care being provided to Oliver by his

parents.

13. On or about August 13, 2014 Dennis Sizelove, pursuant to the

Wilson request, purportedly conducted, in the Calhoun County

Department of Human Resources offices located in Anniston, Calhoun

County, Alabama, a pre-evaluation interview with the Plaintiffs and

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purportedly administered the Mental Status Exam (MSE) and the

Kaufman Brief Intelligence Test, Second Edition (KBIT-2) 

14. On or about August 15, 2014 Leah Simmons, an employee of

Garrett Counseling began in-home sessions with the Plaintiffs. Ms.

Simmons did not note or communicate to DHR any concerns regarding

the care of Oliver.

15. Dennis Sizelove prepared Psychological Evaluation Reports

purportedly relating to the Plaintiffs, and on or about August 26, 2014

submitted the reports to DHR.

16. According to the report prepared on Plaintiff John Lynn,

“... DHR isrequesting testing to assess his parenting skills

as well as his cognitive level of functioning. The stated

reason for the referral is to assess the client for the

presence of psychopathology, to assess his IQ, and to

evaluate whether he is capable of providing appropriate

parenting for this child.”

17. According to the report prepared on Plaintiff Farrah Mason Lynn:

“Testing is requested to assess the client’s level of

functioning and her current ability to parent her infant

child. The stated reason for the referral is to assess the

client for the presence of psychopathology, to assess her

IQ, and to evaluate whether she is able to provide

appropriate parenting for her children.”

18. Dennis Sizelove stated in his report on John Lynn:

“Intellectually he may be capable of engaging in activities

of daily living required to provide appropriate parenting for

his child with some assistance due to his self-reported

inability to read. This assessment of his parenting abilities

is considered accurate during times when the client is not

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engaged in seeking substances, actively abusing

substances, or recovering from the effects of said

substances.”

Sizelove further opines and recommends:

“In regard to the placement of his children, it is the clinical

opinion of this evaluator that the client is currently unable

to appropriately care for his child both physically and

emotionally without supervision. . . . His deficits in

occupational, social, and emotional functioning put the

client and his children at risk of harm. It is this examiners

clinical opinion that until the client can demonstrate that he

is abstinent fromsubstance abuse, is financially stable, and

is able to provide a stable, safe, and appropriate home

environment for his child he is to remain out of the client’s

custody or as an alternative supervision should be provided

along with parenting education to ensure that the client

understands, and can provide appropriate parenting. Only

at such time as he can demonstrate that he is able to

provide for his child in the above manner should he be

considered as an appropriate parent for this child.”

19. Dennis Sizelove stated in his report on Plaintiff Farrah Mason

Lynn:

“Given that there was a significant difference between her

verbal and nonverbal scores, the client may be less

competent at tasks that require her to utilize skills that are

verbal than she is at tasks that require nonverbal fluency

(such as solving puzzles, doing piece work). She may be

capable of providing appropriate care for her child with

supervision and may be intellectually capable of engaging

in treatment for substance abuse and any other mental

disorders by which she may be impacted as long as any

materials are presented orally as the client reported she is

unable to read or write anything other than her name. This

8

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assessment of her parenting abilitiesis considered accurate

during times when the client is not engaged in seeking

substances, actively abusing substances, or recovering from

the effects of said substances.”

Sizelove further opines and recommends:

“In regard to the placement of her children it is the clinical

opinion of this evaluator that the client is currently unable

to appropriately care for her children without supervision

both physically and emotionally. . . . Her deficits in

occupational, social, and emotional functioning put the

client and her children at risk of harm. It is this examiners

opinion that until the client can demonstrate that she is

abstinentfromsubstance abuse, hassecured stable housing

independently of her spouse’s family, and is able to

provide a stable, safe and appropriate home environment

for her children they are to remain out of the client’s

custody. Only at such time as she can demonstrate that she

is able to provide for her children in the above manner

should she be considered as an appropriate parent for

them.” 

20. Plaintiffs are literate and are absent of any issues regarding

substances or substance abuse. Plaintiffs were financially stable and had

stable housing. Dennis Sizelove engaged in no diagnostic protocol to

identify or assess deficits in the occupational, social, or emotional

functioning of either Plaintiff. Sizelove failed to base his opinions on

information and techniques sufficient to substantiate his findings and

failed to conduct an examination of the Plaintiffs adequate to support his

statements and conclusions. Much of the information and assessment

provided by Sizelove to DHR in general, and therefore to Defendant

Wilson in particular, was known to the Defendant to be incorrect.

21. On August 28, 2014 Leah Simmons conducted another in-home

session with the Plaintiffs. Ms. Simmons did not note nor communicate

to DHR any concerns regarding the care of Oliver.

9

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22. Garrett Counseling submitted to DHR billing and notes. Nothing

in the notes reported or indicated any concerns regarding the care of

Oliver Lynn.

23. Plaintiffs provided care to their infant son, Oliver Lynn, with

Defendant Shenitha Wilson’s knowledge and approval until September

10, 2014.

24. Between August 15, 2014 and September 10, 2014 Defendant

Wilson again visited the home of Plaintiffs and observed the care being

provided to Oliver. At the time of the visit there existed no imminent

danger to the life or health of Oliver Lynn and Wilson did not remove

Oliver from the Plaintiffs.

25. On September 10, 2014 at approximately 5:30 p.m. Defendant

Shenitha Wilson contacted the Anniston Police Department and

requested officers accompany her to the home of the Plaintiffs. Upon

arrival at Plaintiffs’ home Defendant Wilson physically removed Oliver

Lynn from the residence and from the care and custody of Plaintiffs.

Defendant Wilson had not requested nor possessed a “pick-up order”

and Defendant Wilson had no information, reports, evidence or any

personal observation indicating the residence or the care and custody of

the parents presented an imminent danger to Oliver’s life or health.

26. . . . Neither the residence nor the caregivers to Oliver Lynn

presented imminent danger to his life or health. Upon taking Oliver

Lynn into protective custodyShenitha Wilson willfully and intentionally

failed to immediately notify the Calhoun County Juvenile Court [as she

was required by law to do]. Ms. Wilson, willfully and intentionally,

failed to give the Plaintiffs or the Juvenile Court Intake Officer written

notice of the action or the reasons for such action[, which she was

required by law to do].

27. On September 11, 2014, Defendant Shenitha Wilson filed a

complaint alleging the dependency of Oliver Lynn in the Calhoun

County Juvenile Court citing the Sizelove reports and specifically

stating, inter alia, 

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“The psychologist clinical opinion is that the clients are

currently unable to appropriately care for their children

without supervision both physically and emotionally. The

psychologist reports that both parents’ deficit in

occupational, social and emotional functioning put the

client and their children at risk of harm.”

28. At the time of Oliver’s summary removal and at the time of the

Complaint’s filing with the Juvenile Court Intake Officer, Defendant

Shenitha Wilson was fully aware there existed no imminent danger to

the life or health of Oliver Lynn. Wilson was also fully knowledgeable

that Oliver had been in the sole care of Plaintiffs and that Oliver was not

only being appropriately cared for but that he was thriving.

29. The Juvenile Court Intake Officer, pursuant to the practices

established byCalhoun County Department of Human Resources and at

the insistence of Defendant Shenitha Wilson and while ignoring

statutory prescriptions, presented the Wilson Complaint and Petition

alleging dependency directly to the Juvenile Court, by-passing the

Calhoun County Circuit Clerk. A shelter care hearing was set for

approximately four to five hours from the filing of the Complaint.

. . . 

31. At the shelter care or 72 hour hearing, although not a hearing on

the merits of the Petition, Plaintiffs were to be afforded an opportunity

to admit or deny the allegations of the Petition. §12-15-308(c), Code of

Alabama. The Plaintiffs were not given that opportunity by the Calhoun

County Juvenile Court. Instead, at the beginning of the hearing Wilson

through counsel, informed the Court that an agreement had been

reached. The agreement did not include an acknowledgment by the

Plaintiffs as to the merits of the Petition, or the propriety of summary

removal of their son by Wilson. The agreement provided for the State to

maintain temporary custody of Oliver, to have discretion in planning and

placement and to work reunification with the parents. The Court did not

give Plaintiffs an opportunity to admit or deny the allegations of the

Petition nor did the court provide Plaintiffs an opportunity to present or

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address any claims regarding violation of their constitutional rights by

Wilson. The Court did inquire of Plaintiffs’ appointed counsel whether

this was the agreement and received an affirmative response. The Court

took no evidence in support of the Petition nor did the Court hear or

have before it clear and convincing evidence that Oliver had [“]no

parent, legal guardian, legal custodian, or other suitable person able to

provide supervision and care for the child ... or [t]he release of Oliver

would present serious threat of substantial harm to him[”] as mandated

by §12-15-128 (a)1) and (a)(3) and §12-15-128(b), Code of Alabama.

32. In discussion prior to formal commencement of the hearing

Wilson, directly and through counsel, repeatedly represented to

Plaintiffs’ appointed counsel that Sizelove determined Plaintiffs could

notsafely care for their child. Prior to and at the hearing, counsel for the

Plaintiffs and the guardian ad litem requested from Defendant Shenitha

Wilson the Sizelove psychological reports utilized as the basis and

premise of the filing of the dependency complaint and petition and as

the basis of Wilson’s statement that Sizelove determined Plaintiffs could

not safely care for their child. Defendant Wilson refused to provide a

copy or to allow inspection of the reports. Without access to the reports

and having to rely on the Wilson representations Plaintiffs were without

recourse to challenge the reports or the representations and succumbed

to the agreement for DHR to maintain custody pending further hearing.

33. Notwithstanding Wilson’s knowledge that the Sizelove reports

had been known to her for two weeks; that the reports contained obvious

material inaccuracies; that Oliver was thriving in his parents care; that

Garrett Counseling reported no issues; that Wilson had allowed Oliver

to remain in the Plaintiffs care since receiving the reports, Wilson

willfully, intentionally and fraudulently withheld from the Plaintiffs,

their appointed counsel and the Court this dispositive evidence which

was contrary to the allegations set forth in the Complaint.

34. Based on Wilson’s willful and intentional concealment of the true

facts and the forced agreement the Court directed Oliver to remain in the

custody of DHR and made other findings contrary to what Wilson knew

to be true. The Court set the merits of the Petition to be heard on

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October 15, 2014. The Court did not enter a final ruling or conclusive

judgment on the merits of Wilson’s Petition.

35. Subsequent to the shelter care hearing Defendant Wilson refused

contact between Plaintiffs and their infant son Oliver except for one

hour of supervised visits per week at the Calhoun County DHR offices.

36. Oliver Lynn was placed in a foster home and died while in the

custody of the Calhoun County Department of Human Resources on

October 14, 2014.

(Doc. 22 at 2-13).

The complete allegation of dependency, asstated in Wilson’s Petition, attached

as Exhibit A to the Motion to Dismiss (doc. 23-1), is as follows:

2

2

 It has been noted that

[a] court evaluating a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted must focus its analysis on the face of the complaint, but it

may also consider any attachments to the complaint, matters of public record,

orders, and items appearing in the record. See Watson v. Bally Mfg. Corp., 844

F.Supp. 1533, 1535 n. 1 (S.D.Fla.1993), aff'd mem., 84 F.3d 438 (11th Cir.1996).

Additionally, any documents referenced in the complaint that are central to the

plaintiff's case may be considered. See In re Sunbeam Sec. Litig., 89 F.Supp.2d

1326, 1335 (S.D.Fla.1999).

Clark v. Bibb Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 174 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1370-71 (M.D. Ga. 2001). The same

standards apply in a Rule 12(b)(1) facial challenge to this court’s jurisdiction. U.S. ex rel.

Schaengold v. Mem'l Health, Inc., No. 4:11-CV-58, 2014 WL 7272598, at *24 (S.D. Ga. Dec.

18, 2014) (BuBose, J.); see also, SunSouth Bank v. First NBC Bank, No. 1:13-CV-379-WKW,

2014 WL 3767548, at *1 (M.D. Ala. July 31, 2014) (Watkins, J.) (“This is a facial attack because

Defendants rely entirely on the substance of the complaint, documents referenced in the

complaint, and inferences from the allegations in the complaint.”). The petition and order are

referenced in, and are certainly central to, the plaintiffs’ claims in this case. They are properly

considered. In addition, “factual attacks” to this court’s jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1)

challenge “the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings, and

matters outside the pleadings . . . are considered.” Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1529

(11th Cir. 1990).

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The child’s dependency has been evidenced by the following facts: O.L.

was born on 7/25/14 to J. and F. L. O.L. was born with an imperforate

anus. Through surgical procedure an anorectal pull was completed on

O.L. on 7/30/2014. Due to his medical condition, O.L. needs follow up

care to ensure full recovery. The mother, F.M.L. has extensive CPS

history in Cincinnati, Ohio and previously lost custody of five children

in the State of Ohio due to neglect, abuse and poor parenting skills. J.L.

reportsthat one of the five children was his child. These children remain

in the custody of relatives and friends in Ohio. The CPS cases in Ohio

were closed in 2012. F.L. and J.L. were married in Jefferson County

Alabama just prior to O.L. being born. The L,’s have resided in Alabama

for approximately 11 months. It was also noted that Ms. L. appeared to

be low functioning. A Psychological Evaluation referral was made by

Calhoun CountyDHR and the results are asfollows:The psychologist’s

clinical opinion is that the clients are currently unable to

appropriately care for their children without supervision both

physically and emotionally. Mrs. L. is diagnosed with an AXIS I

Diagnosis of Borderline Intellectual Functioning. Mr. L. has a basic

misunderstanding of the serious nature of his son’s birth defect. The

Psychologist reports that both the parents’ deficit in occupational,

social and emotional functioning put the client and their children at

risk of harm. The parents are allegedly residing with Ms. L.’ssister and

her husband. However, when the DHR social worker went to the home

today, Mrs. L was found to be alone with the baby. All these factors

combined place O.L. at great risk with the parents.

(Doc. 23-1 at 2-3) (bold indicates portion of the petition quoted, without noting

missing portions with an ellipsis, in the Amended Complaint (see doc. 22 at 9, ¶27)).

The shelter care order issued by the state court provides, in pertinent part:

The Court, having considered the agreement [of the parties] . . .

finds in accordance with the requirements of Public Laws § 96-272 &

105-89 and Alabama Code 1975, Title 12-15-312 as follows:

That placement of the child in his/her home would be contrary to

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the best interests and welfare of the child and that placement out of the

home was in the best interest of the health and safety of the child at the

time of removal.

That an emergency situation exists which requires the immediate

temporary removal of the child from his/her home and that it is

reasonable not to make efforts to prevent removal of the child form

his/her home due to the emergency situation or pursuant to Public Law

105-89.

That reasonable efforts will be made to reunite the child and

his/her parent(s).

Custody of the child is transferred to the Department of Human

Resources, pendente lite, with the Department having discretion in

planning and placement. The Department shall notify the GAL of any

change in the placement of a child by the end of the next business day. 

A hearing will be scheduled on said change of placement upon the

motion of any party. The Department shall have authority to allow for

out of state travel and consent for the child to receive medical care to

maintain and foster the good health and welfare of the child.

(Doc. 23-1 at 6). The order also reflects on itsface that the plaintiffsin this case were

represented at the shelter care hearing by retained counsel and also each by their own

separate, court appointed, guardians ad litem. (Doc. 23-1 at 6). The minor child also

had his own guardian ad litem. (Doc. 23-1 at 6). 

III. ANALYSIS

This court must consider first whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over

this case. See Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir.2001) (stating

that where “a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with other Rule 12

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motions, the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before

addressing any attack on the merits.”) (citing Hitt v. City of Pasadena, 561 F.2d 606,

608 (5th Cir.1977)).3

 The instant case is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.4

A. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

In its most recent discussion of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Eleventh

Circuit stated:

Application of Rooker–Feldman is a threshold jurisdictional

matter. Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 611 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th

Cir.2010). . . . The party invoking subject matter jurisdiction bears the

burden of proving its existence. See Sweet Pea Marine, Ltd. v. APJ

Marine, Inc., 411 F.3d 1242, 1247 (11th Cir.2005). . . . Alone among the

federal courts, only the Supreme Court may exercise appellate authority

to reverse or modify a state-court judgment. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi

Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284–85 (2005). Accordingly, under

the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, federal district courts and courts of

appeals lack jurisdiction to review the final judgment of a state court.

Lozman, 713 F.3d at 1072. However, in delineating the boundaries of

Rooker–Feldman, the Supreme Court has clarified that the doctrine is

narrow in scope, and only applies to cases that are “brought by

state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court

judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced

and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”

Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284;see also Lozman, 713 F.3d at 1072.

3

 See Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc)

(holding that decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on

September 30, 1981, are binding in the Eleventh Circuit).

4

 “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine derives from Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S.

413, 44 S. Ct. 149, 68 L. Ed. 362 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,

460 U.S. 462, 103 S. Ct. 1303, 75 L. Ed. 2d 206 (1983).” Alvarez v. Attorney General for Fla.,

679 F.3d 1257, 1262 (11th Cir. 2012).

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Rooker–Feldman applies “both to federal claims raised in the state court

and to those ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court's judgment.”

Casale v. Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir.2009). It does not

apply if a party lacked a reasonable opportunity to raise his federal claim

in state court. Id. A claim filed in federal court is inextricably

intertwined with a state court judgment if it would “effectively nullify”

the state court judgment or if it “succeeds only to the extent that the state

court wrongly decided the issues.” Id. (quotation omitted). The

pendency of an action in state court precludes application of

Rooker–Feldman. Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 292. Thus,

Rooker–Feldman does not apply if the federal action was commenced

before the end of state proceedings. Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266,

1274 (11th Cir.2009). State proceedings end for Rooker–Feldman

purposes in three scenarios:(1) when the highest state court in which

review is available has affirmed the judgment below and nothing is left

to be resolved, (2) if the state action has reached a point where neither

party seeks further action, and (3) if the state court proceedings have

finally resolved all the federal questions in the litigation, but state law

or purely factual questions (whether great or small) remain to be

litigated. Id. at 1275 (quotation omitted).

Cavero v. One W. Bank FSB, No. 14-14369, 2015 WL 3540388, at *1-2 (11th Cir.

June 8, 2015).5

In the instant case all of the federal claims fall squarely within the

5

 In their brief, the plaintiffs refer to the “four-factor test” that at one time was used by

the Eleventh Circuit in applying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (Doc. 24 at 14). In Nicholson v.

Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266, 1272 (11th Cir. 2009), the Eleventh Circuit noted the factors as: 

(1) the party in federal court is the same as the party in state court, (2) the prior

state court ruling was a final or conclusive judgment on the merits, (3) the party

seeking relief in federal court had a reasonable opportunity to raise its federal

claims in the state court proceeding, and (4) the issue before the federal court was

either adjudicated by the state court or was inextricably intertwined with the state

court's judgment[.]

Nicholson, 558 F.3d at 1272 (quoting Amos v. Glynn County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 347 F.3d

1249, 1266 n. 11 (11th Cir.2003)). However, in that same opinion, the court noted the Supreme

Court’s decision in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct.

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Case 1:14-cv-02208-VEH Document 25 Filed 09/01/15 Page 17 of 33
parameters of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 

1. The Plaintiffs Are State-Court Losers Complaining of Injuries

Caused by State-Court Judgments Rendered before the District

Court Proceedings Commenced

It is clear that the dependency proceedings had “reached a point where neither

party [sought] further action.” The Shelter Care hearing ended, by agreement of all

parties, all of whom were represented by counsel, when the state court judge entered

1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005), and wrote: 

Exxon Mobil clarified the scope of the Rooker–Feldman doctrine by returning it to

its roots, the facts of the Rooker and Feldman cases. In doing so, Exxon Mobil

casts doubt on the continued viability of the Amos test. See United States v.

Mendez, 528 F.3d 811, 817 n. 3 (11th Cir.2008) (“When a prior panel decision

conflicts with a subsequent Supreme Court decision, we must depart from the

prior panel precedent and follow the Supreme Court decision.”). Rather than apply

Amos, we adhere to the language in Exxon Mobil, delineating the boundaries of

the Rooker–Feldman doctrine: “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of

injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court

proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those

judgments.” Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517. 

Id. at 1274; see also, Arthur v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA, 569 F. App'x 669, 675 (11th Cir.

2014) (district court erred in applying Amos test as that test has been abandoned in favor of strict

reliance on the language found in Exxon Mobil); Velazquez v. S. Florida Fed. Credit Union, 546

F. App'x 854, 856 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding that, since Exxon, the Amos factors are not applied);

Cormier v. Horkan, 397 F. App'x 550, 552 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that, since Exxon, the Amos

factors are not applied); Lomax v. Ruvin, 387 F. App'x 930, 931 (11th Cir. 2010)

Rooker–Feldman doctrine should be applied only within the limits set by Exxon). The plaintiffs

correctly state that this court’s order of February 20, 2015 (doc. 20 at 4) also, albeit erroneously,

sets forth the four part test in a footnote, while at the same time setting out the standard from

Exxon Mobil. Importantly, the court’s February 20, 2015, order had nothing to do with the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Rather, that order discussed the shotgun nature of the plaintiffs’

complaint. The purpose of the note at issue was to explain why the plaintiffs needed to provide

more specificity, not to establish the law of the case. The plaintiffs had no basis to rely on the

court’s footnote in that order. Their reliance is especially misplaced in light of the fact that the

defendant quotes Exxon Mobile at length in her brief.

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Case 1:14-cv-02208-VEH Document 25 Filed 09/01/15 Page 18 of 33
the order of shelter care. (Doc. 23-1). There is no indication in the record, or indeed

even any allegation, that any party was seeking any further action. The plaintiffs,

having lost custody of the child, were the state court losers.

6 This case was filed only

after the state court judgment was entered.

7

6

 As noted previously, the plaintiffs’ arguments are all directed towards the wrong

standard. Still, they assert that the hearing “[was] not a review of the removal’s merits, nor a

determination of the propriety of the removal. Rather it [was] for the sole purpose of

determining whether continued shelter care [was] required . . . pending a hearing on the merits of

Wilson’s Dependency Petition.” (Doc. 24 at 16). “Shelter Care” is “[t]he temporary care of

children in group homes, foster care, relative placement, or other nonpenal facilities.” Ala. Code

§ 12-15-102(25). The procedures for the hearing are set out in Ala. Code 12-15-308, and include

provisions requiring that the hearing be held “within 72 hours from the time of removal . . . to

determine whether continued shelter care is required.” Ala. Code 12-15-308(a). In this case,

however, the order entered by the state court clearly states that the court finds “[t]hat placement

of the child in his/her home would be contrary to the best interests and welfare of the child and

that placement out of the home was in the best interest of the health and safety of the child at the

time of removal,” and “[t]hat an emergency situation exists which requires the immediate

temporary removal of the child from his/her home and that it is reasonable not to make efforts to

prevent removal of the child form his/her home due to the emergency situation.” (Doc. 23-1 at 6)

(emphasis added). Further, the instant order clearly transferred custody of the child to DHR. 

(Doc. 23-1 at 6 (“[c]ustody of the child is transferred to . . . [DHR]”)). Because there were no

further proceedings, for all intents and purposes this was also a final custody termination. The

plaintiffs were on the losing end of that decree. If, for some reason, the juvenile court was

without authority to enter that custody order, the plaintiffs should have made that argument on

appeal, not to this court.

7

 The plaintiffs argue, without citing any authority, that “none of [their] claims in any

form were before the Calhoun County Juvenile Court[,] therefore there has never been a final or

conclusive judgment on their merits.” (Doc. 24 at 15). The plaintiffs’ argument confuses the

issue of whether the state court’s judgment was a final judgment on the merits, with whether the

issues therein were “inetrixably intertwined,” with those in the instant case. No future court

dates were set, but the court provided that “[a] hearing will be scheduled on [any] change of

placement upon the motion of any party.” (Doc. 23-1 at 6). For Rooker-Feldman purposes, the

state court order was a final judgment on the merits. The plaintiffs cite no authority to the

contrary.

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2. The Claims in the Instant Case Are “Inextricably Intertwined”

with the State Court's Judgment8

The most instructive case on this issue is Goodman ex rel. Goodman v. Sipos,

259 F.3d 1327, 1328-30 (11th Cir. 2001).9

 That case

8

 The plaintiffs make no real argument on this issue. Instead the focus only on the

“summary removal,” writing:

Wilson pins her hopes on the notion that the shelter care hearing Order, attached

to her Motion to Dismiss as Exhibit “B” ratifies her acts and conduct. It does not. 

However, at this stage of the litigation the shelter care Order it irrelevant and is

due to be excluded. (Rule 12(d) and 12(f) Fed. R. Civ. P.)

(Doc. 24 at 17). As discussed previously (see supra note 2), the plaintiffs are incorrect. The

plaintiffs also state:

Although due to be excluded and not considered, for sake of clarity, the

shelter care Order, attached to Wilson's Motion as Exhibit “B” does not state or

render as a finding that Wilson acted in compliance with the due process rights of

the Plaintiffs or that the summary removal of Oliver Lynn was effectuated

pursuant to a determination that the residence of the child or the caregiver

presented imminent danger to Oliver Lynn's life, as required by state

law.(§26-14-6 Code of Alabama)[.] Furthermore, Wilson is factually inaccurate

when she represents to this Court that the Plaintiffs agreed to the findings of fact.

(Wilson Motion pg. 25 ¶1)[.] The Plaintiffs did not agree that Wilson properly

removed Oliver. Nor did Plaintiffs agree that an emergency situation existed

requiring immediate temporary removal as asserted in Wilson's Motion. (Wilson

Motion pg. 30).

(Doc. 24 at 17-18). First, as noted above, the state court order need not explicitly state, or even

decide anything with regard to the plaintiffs’ due process rights for them to be "inextricably

intertwined" with the state court's judgment. The remainder of the allegations in this paragraph

stretch credulity when one considers the clear language of the order, and the fact that the order,

on its face, states that it is based on the agreement of the parties, each of whom were represented

by an attorney, and their own, separate guardians ad litem. Regardless, even if somehow this

order was entered contrary to Alabama law, or was entered contrary to the plaintiffs’ agreement,

the proper place to make that argument is on appeal to an Alabama appellate court, not here.

9

 Although this case is pre-Exxon Mobil the court cites it only for its interpretation of 

"inextricably intertwined" in the context of child custody proceedings. See, Velazquez v. S.

20

Case 1:14-cv-02208-VEH Document 25 Filed 09/01/15 Page 20 of 33
[arose] out of an investigation of child neglect conducted by [the

Georgia Department of Family andChildren Services (“DFCS”)] against

Goodman. Defendant D'Anna Liber was the Supervisor of the Child

ServicesInvestigation Section of the CobbCountyDFCS Office in 1995

when thisinvestigation took place. On October 27, 1995, Liber received

a call from school personnel informing her of a report from one of

Goodman's neighbors that Goodman left Michael, age 13 at the time, at

home alone all day from 7 a.m. until 10 or 11 p.m., and that Michael

asked neighborsfor food.The school officialfurther informed Liber that

Goodman had previously withdrawn Michael from school, indicating

that she would home-school him.

In response to this report, a caseworker visited Goodman's home

and reported that Michael was barefoot, and that he admitted he was at

home alone four days a week until after 10:30 p.m. while his mother

worked and went to school. He indicated that they had more food now

that his mother was working. Goodman later called Liber and stated that

she was complying with home-schooling regulations, butshe refused to

meet with any DFCS officials.

On November 9, 1995, Liber received an anonymous call from a

neighbor of Goodman. The neighbor again stated that Michael was at

home alone, both during the day and at night. About two weeks later,

DFCS received a third report from another neighbor stating similar

concerns. The person making the third reportstated that Michael begged

for food, was not clean, walked barefoot in a yard with 20 chickens, and

lived in a house with about 50 birds. That person also said he and other

neighbors were concerned about Michael and that Goodman was “a little

crazy.” Liber assigned Defendant Patty Sipos, a DFCS caseworker, to

investigate the reports.

Florida Fed. Credit Union, 546 F. App'x 854, 857 (11th Cir. 2013) (in determining whether

Exxon Mobil standard is satisfied, “this court has continued to apply the fourth factor of the Amos

test, evaluating whether the plaintiff's claims are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court

judgment.”).

21

Case 1:14-cv-02208-VEH Document 25 Filed 09/01/15 Page 21 of 33
After being assigned to the case, Sipos went to Goodman's house

and knocked on the door, but no one answered. Sipos called Liber and

informed her of this, and Liber decided that police involvement was

necessary. Liber called the child abuse unit of the Cobb County Police

Department and informed them of the situation, and two uniformed

officers were sent to the house to meet Sipos. Officers Forrester and

Crook came to the house, discussed the situation with Sipos, and then

knocked on the door. The subsequent events are in dispute.

According to Michael, Officer Forrester opened the unlocked door

and stood at the threshold with Sipos behind him. According to the

defendants, the officers explained to Michael why they were there, and

asked him to call his mother so that they could meet with her. After

several minutes of discussion and unsuccessful attempts to reach

Goodman, the defendants state that Michael opened the door wide and

gestured for the officers and Sipos to enter. Goodman and Michael deny

that he consented (or had authority to consent) for the officers or Sipos

to enter.

Siposstatesthat her purpose in entering wasto determine whether

the house posed a health hazard to Michael (because of the report of

birds) and to determine whether there was food for him. According to

the defendants, Sipos and the officers quicklywalked through the house,

while Michael laughed and joked with the officers. Sipos and the

officers departed after Sipos concluded that the house was not a health

risk and that there was food.

Sipos returned later in the day in an attempt to speak with

Goodman, but no one was home. She then returned the next day and

spoke with a neighbor who expressed concerns about Michael's being

at home alone all day and his begging for food. Sipos later called

Goodman at work after getting no answer at home, but Goodman hung

up on her.

On December 5, 1995, a confidential source claiming to be a

long-time friend of Goodman reported to Sipos that Goodman had

threatened to shoot herself and Michael. The caller said that Goodman

22

Case 1:14-cv-02208-VEH Document 25 Filed 09/01/15 Page 22 of 33
was acting bizarre, and had said that she had a gun. The caller seemed

to Siposto be reliable. Thereafter, Sipos spoke with Robert Grayson, an

attorney for DFCS, about the situation. Grayson spoke with the

confidential source and concluded based on that conversation that there

was sufficient evidence to seek an ex parte order taking custody of

Michael away from Goodman.

The next day, DFCS filed an ex parte petition, supported by an

affidavit from Sipos, seeking to obtain custody of Michael. The petition

and supporting affidavit stated that Michael was deprived because his

mother had withdrawn him from school without complying with home

school requirements. They indicated that DFCS had received several

reports of Michael being home alone all day, and a report that Goodman

had threatened to shoot herself and Michael. Finally, the petition and

affidavit stated that Goodman had been uncooperative with DFCS

during its investigation, and that Michael should be removed from his

mother's custody for his own safety. Goodman alleges that Sipos'

affidavit filed in support of the petition for custody was intentionally or

recklessly false.

After reviewing DFCS' ex parte petition, the Cobb County

juvenile court issued an order taking custody away from Goodman and

setting a hearing for the following day. Michael was then picked up by

the sheriff's department.

The following day, the juvenile court held a hearing which

Goodman attended. The court found probable cause to grant DFCS

custody of Michael, and DFCS and Goodman agreed that Michael

would be placed with a family friend, Curtis Scott. A few days later,

DFCS took Michael away from Scott, however, because Sipos claimed

that Scott had deprived her of access to Michael. According to

Goodman, Sipos threatened to have Scott arrested if he did not return

Michael. At that time Michael was placed in a shelter. Goodman filed

a motion with the juvenile court to have Michael returned to Scott's

custody, but after a hearing the court denied her motion. The parties

eventually agreed that Robert Goodman, Michael's father, would be

granted temporary custody of him. On April 12, 1996, the juvenile court

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Case 1:14-cv-02208-VEH Document 25 Filed 09/01/15 Page 23 of 33
entered an order requiring that Michaelremain in his father's custody for

up to two years.

Goodman, 259 F.3d at 1328-30. 

In their complaint to the federal district court, the plaintiffs raised

three § 1983 claims that are based on allegations of separate

constitutional violations. First, they allege[d] that Liber, Sipos and

Officer Forrester violated their Fourth Amendment rights by unlawfully

entering and searching Goodman's house without a warrant or consent.

Second, the plaintiffs challenge the veracity of the affidavit submitted

by Sipos to the juvenile court in support of the ex parte petition for

custody of Michael, and argue that it and the ensuing ex parte

proceeding violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment. Finally, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants committed

an additional due process violation by threatening Scott with arrest if he

did not return Michael to DFCS

Id. at 1330. The Eleventh Circuit applied Rooker-Feldman in part, writing:

The plaintiffs did not, strictly speaking, present any of the three

federal claims asserted in their complaint in this case to the state court

which considered the issues involving Michael's custody. We must

decide whether the plaintiffs' federal claims nonetheless were

“inextricably intertwined” with the state court judgment in the sense that

“the federal claim[s] succeed[ ] only to the extent that the state court

wrongly decided the issues before it,” Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1172, and, if

so, whether the plaintiffs had a reasonable opportunity to present their

federal claimsin the state court proceedings, see Powell, 80 F.3d at 467.

On two occasions we have considered and applied the

Rooker–Feldman doctrine in cases involving claimsrelated to state child

custody proceedings. See Liedel v. Juvenile Court of Madison County,

Ala., 891 F.2d 1542 (11th Cir.1990); Staley v. Ledbetter, 837 F.2d 1016

(11th Cir.1988). In Staley, we held that the Rooker–Feldman doctrine

deprived the district court and this Court of jurisdiction over a plaintiff's

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Case 1:14-cv-02208-VEH Document 25 Filed 09/01/15 Page 24 of 33
§ 1983 claim in which “[s]he requested reinstatement of parental

custody and psychiatric care at state expense for her children and

herself” based on alleged violations of the Equal Protection and Due

Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 837 F.2d at 1017. We

stated that the plaintiff “in essence sought to reverse a state court's child

custody determination” and held that:

[N]o federalsubject matter jurisdiction existed in this case.

In effect, Staley seeks to challenge collaterally the state

agency and court proceedings that terminated her parental

rights. The federal courts are not a forum for appealing

state court decisions.

Id. at 1017–18.

Similarly, in Liedel parents who were displeased with a state

court's child custody action brought a § 1983 action seeking “a

temporary restraining order and a permanent injunction against the

Department [of Human Resources] and Juvenile Court, preventing them

from enforcing the Juvenile Court's prior orders and preventing them

from issuing further orders against the [plaintiffs].” 891 F.2d at 1544.

We reasoned that the requested relief “would effectively nullify those

state orders,” and therefore held that “[t]o the extent that the [plaintiffs']

federal court complaintseeksto challenge the finalstate court judgment,

it must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under the Rooker–Feldman

doctrine.” Id. at 1545–46.

Those two decisions demonstrate that the Rooker–Feldman

doctrine may deprive district courts and this Court of subject matter

jurisdiction over claims related to child custody actions in state court,

but their holdings alone do not tell us which of the three claims brought

by the plaintiffs in this case are barred. Both Staley and Liedel involved

far more direct attacks on the previous state court judgment than the

claims in this case do. In fact, the primary relief sought in each of those

two cases was an injunction preventing enforcement of the state court

judgment and returning custody to the aggrieved parent. That is an easy

case for application of the Rooker–Feldman doctrine.

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Case 1:14-cv-02208-VEH Document 25 Filed 09/01/15 Page 25 of 33
By contrast, in this case the plaintiffs are not seeking injunctive

relief that would prevent the enforcement of any child custody orders of

the state court. They seek only damages based on the constitutional

violations which they allegedly suffered. Because of that, the plaintiffs

argue that the lack of a direct attack on the state court judgment and the

fact that they seek damages, instead of injunctive relief, take their claims

beyond the reach of the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. They cite to cases

from other circuits in support of their argument, maintaining that we

should draw a distinction between casesin which a plaintiff seeks relief

that would directly prevent the enforcement of a state court order and

cases in which a plaintiff seeks damages under § 1983 based on the

issues related to the state case.

But our decisions focus on the federal claim's relationship to the

issues involved in the state court proceeding, instead of on the type of

relief sought by the plaintiff. See, e.g., Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1172. For

example, in Liedel, even though part of the relief sought by the plaintiffs

was damages from the Alabama Department of Human Resources, we

held that the plaintiffs' claims were barred because their complaint

essentially sought “to challenge the finalstate court judgment.” 891 F.2d

at 1544–46. And in Staley, 837 F.2d at 1017, we held that the

Rooker–Feldman doctrine barred claims even though those claims, in

part, sought damages to pay for psychiatric care. The Rooker–Feldman

doctrine is broad enough to bar all federal claims which were, or should

have been, central to the state court decision, even if those claims seek

a form of relief that might not have been available from the state court.

Applying these principles to the case before us, we readily

conclude that the first of the plaintiffs' three claims, the one involving

the search, is not “inextricably intertwined” with the state court custody

proceeding in the sense that it is premised on the state court having ruled

erroneously. While the allegedly illegal search of the plaintiffs' home

occurred several days before the state custody proceeding was initiated,

no evidence or other information derived from the search was

introduced in the state court proceedings or wasrelied upon by the court

when it decided to take away Goodman's custody of Michael. No issue

26

Case 1:14-cv-02208-VEH Document 25 Filed 09/01/15 Page 26 of 33
involving the search was or could have been raised in the custody

proceeding. This federal claim may succeed without in any way calling

into doubt the state court decision. So, it is not barred.

The other two claims are different matters. One of those claims

contends that the Sipos affidavit was false and that the state court's ex

parte proceeding violated the plaintiffs' due process rights. Those

contentions strike at the heart of the state court's proceedings and

judgment, because the state court decided to take away Goodman's

custody of Michael only after finding Sipos' affidavit to be credible and

finding that the ex parte order was justified. This claim “succeeds only

to the extent that the state court wrongly decided” the custody issue.

Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1172. So, the claim is barred if the plaintiffs had a

reasonable opportunity to present it in the state court proceeding, a

matter we will discuss shortly.

The plaintiffs' third claim is that Sipos violated Michael's due

process rights when she threatened Scott with arrest if he did not return

Michael to DFCS. That claim is inextricably intertwined with the state

court orders and judgment, because the factual and legal predicate for it

was the basis of a motion the plaintiffs filed to have Michael returned to

Scott's custody. The state court held a hearing on that motion and denied

it. For the plaintiffs to succeed on this claim a federal court would have

to conclude that the state court erred. So, this claim, too, is barred if the

plaintiffs had a reasonable opportunity to present it to the state court.

Id. at 1332-1335.

The constitutional claims in the instant case fall into three categories, none of

which seek to overturn or enjoin the state court decree, but instead seek damages. 

Count One focuses on the initial removal of the child from the plaintiffs’ home, and

claims that such “summary removal” forever denied and precluded the opportunity

for due process regarding the summary and unlawful removal thereby violating

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Case 1:14-cv-02208-VEH Document 25 Filed 09/01/15 Page 27 of 33
Plaintiffs’fundamental right to the care, custody and control of their son and denying

the protections afforded under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution. (Doc. 22 at 17). As to the so-called “summary removal” the state court

decided: “That placement of the child in his/her home would be contrary to the best

interests and welfare of the child and that placement out of the home was in the best

interest of the health and safety of the child at the time of removal.” (Doc. 23-1 at 6). 

Count One can only succeed to the extent that this decision was wrong.

10

Count Two claims that, after the summary removal, the defendant

willfully and intentionally failed to give written notice to the Calhoun

County Juvenile Court Intake Officer and to the Plaintiffs of the action

taken and the reasons for taking Oliver Lynn into custody, as mandated

by §12-15-127, Code of Alabama. Further she failed to immediately

notify the Juvenile Court of the removal as mandated by §26-14-7, Code

of Alabama.

10

 In arguing that she did not have a reasonable opportunity to raise this claim, the

plaintiffs argue that, even if the Constitutional claims could have been raised, “there is nothing

the Juvenile Court could have done to un-ring the bell of the summary removal. Once Wilson

acted summarily she forever precluded the opportunity to prevent the removal and thereby denied

[p]laintiffs the opportunity for their claim to be heard by the juvenile [c]ourt.” (Doc. 24 at 16). 

The court in unclear as to what point the plaintiffs are trying to make here. The issue of whether

the summary removal was proper was before the state court. Alabama law provides that if

continued shelter care was not warranted the court “shall order the return of the child.” Ala. Code

§ 12-15-309(a). If the plaintiffs are somehow claiming that the summary removal issue is not

“inextricably intertwined” with the state court's judgment, their underdeveloped argument also

does not make that clear and “the party who invokes the jurisdiction of the court has the burden

of establishing jurisdiction.” Lowery v. Alabama Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1216 (11th Cir.

2007). Regardless, focusing on the federal claim's relationship to the issues involved, it is clear

the this claim is "inextricably intertwined" with the state court judgment regarding the summary

removal.

28

Case 1:14-cv-02208-VEH Document 25 Filed 09/01/15 Page 28 of 33
(Doc. 22 at 19). She claims that these failures denied

the opportunity for the Intake Officer to determine that continuation in

shelter care wassupported by clear and convincing evidence that Oliver

Lynn had no parent, legal guardian, legal custodian or other suitable

person able to provide supervision and care for Oliver or... [t]he release

of Oliver Lynn would present a seriousthreat of substantial harmto him,

§12-15-128 (a) 1; (a)(3); §12-15-128(b) Code of Alabama thereby

violating Plaintiffs due process protections afforded under the

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

(Doc. 22 at 20). Like Count One, this count is merely another way of saying that if

the defendant had not engaged in this conduct they would not have lost custody. 

Similarly, Count Three claims that despite being asked, “[p]rior to and at the

hearing [for] a copy of the psychological report from which Wilson based her

allegations of dependency and her representation that Sizelove determined Plaintiffs

could not safely care for their child . . . Wilson willfully and intentionally refused to

provide [p]laintiffs or their appointed counsel access to or a copy of the reports.” 

(Doc. 22 of 22).11“The refusal of Wilson to provide the Sizelove reports denied

Plaintiffsthe opportunity to know what was being asserted and to refute the same thus

denying Plaintiffs the due process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment to the

11

 The defendant claims that there is no provision in Alabama law requiring such

production. (Doc. 23 at 24). Regardless, the plaintiffs should have asked the state court to

require it, instead of agreeing to the entry of an order they now complain about.

29

Case 1:14-cv-02208-VEH Document 25 Filed 09/01/15 Page 29 of 33
Constitution of the United States.” (Doc. 22 at 24).12 Again, this claim, like Counts

One and Two, basically seeks a determination that, if this evidence had been turned

over, the plaintiffs would not have lost custody. 

Each of the these claimsshould have been made before the state court and each

would, if successful, “effectively nullify” the state court judgment or, “succeed[] only

to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues [therein].” They are all

“inextricably intertwined” with the state court judgment. 

3. The Plaintiffs Had an Opportunity To Raise These Claims in 

the State Court

The plaintiffs argue that they did not have an opportunity to raise their federal

claimsin state court, claiming that the juvenile court “[lacked]jurisdiction to hear any

of the claims before this Court.” (Doc. 24 at 16). In a footnote, the plaintiffs write:

“[Ala. Code] §§ 12-15-114 and 12-15-115 establish[es] the jurisdiction of the

Alabama Juvenile Courts. The Juvenile Court has no jurisdiction to hear federal

claims or state law claims of negligence or wantonness.” (Doc. 24 at 16, n. 14). 

This argument misses the point. The question is not whether the plaintiffs

12

 The count also states that when the defendant filed the petition alleging the child’s

dependency she “willfully and intentionally failed to state in her Complaint/Petition that she had

received the evaluations from the psychologist on or about August 26, 2014, some two weeks

before she summarily removed Oliver Lynn from the Plaintiffs. Nor did she disclose in her

Complaint/Petition that Garrett Counseling reported no issues regarding the caregiving to Oliver

Lynn.” (Doc. 22 at 21). The count only alleges a violation of the plaintiffs’ Fourteenth

Amendment Rights based on the defendant’s refusal to provide a copy of the reports.

30

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could have, or did, make her section 1983 claims in the state court. Instead, as the

Eleventh Circuit noted in Goodman, the issue is whether “[Alabama] law permits

constitutional challenges to a juvenile court's orders to be brought in the juvenile

court.” Goodman, 259 F.3d at 1334. The Alabama court have recognized that such

challenges can be made, if done in a timely manner. See, M.H. v. B.F., 78 So. 3d 411,

418 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011) (mother’s constitutional challenge waived for appellate

review where not first presented to the juvenile court during the dependency

proceedings); L.S. v. Shelby Cnty. Dep't of Human Res., 28 So. 3d 804, 807 (Ala.

Civ. App. 2009) (“Because the mother failed to show that the constitutional issuesshe

raises on appeal were ‘presented to and reviewed by’ the juvenile court, the order of

the juvenile court is due to be affirmed.”).

B. The Plaintiffs’ Request for Discovery

The plaintiffs argue that if the Shelter Care Order isto be relied on by this court

as the basis of a “factual” challenge to subject matter jurisdiction, they must be given

an opportunity for discovery. (Doc. 24 at 18) (citing Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d

404, 414 (5th Cir. 1981) (“the district court must give the plaintiff an opportunity for

discovery and for a hearing that is appropriate to the nature of the motion to

dismiss”). In this case, the plaintiffs merely, and vaguely, request discovery without

setting out its purpose or what they hope to find. 

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The Rule 12(b)(1) motion in this case is only a facial—not factual—challenge. 

Only the pleadings, and documentsreferenced in the pleadings have been considered. 

Regardless, as noted previously, this court can consider matters outside the pleadings

on factual challenge as well. Upon considering the plaintiffs’ request, and the nature

of the motion, and the materials in the file, the court determines that neither

discovery, nor a hearing, is necessary to resolve this attack on its subject matter

jurisdiction. Their request will therefore be denied.

C. The Negligence and Wantonness Claims

The parties treat these claims as if they are part of the plaintiffs’ “federal

claims” which the court has already held are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 

The parties have not cited, and the court hasfound, any authority on whether state law

claims are “federal claims” under Rooker-Feldman merely because they are filed in

federal court. 

Regardless, since the court has held that all of the Section 1983 claims are due

to be dismissed because this court lacks jurisdiction over them, and since these were

the only claims over which the court had original jurisdiction, this court will decline

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Negligence and Wantonness claims in

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Counts Four and Five. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(c)(3).13

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the plaintiffs’ motion for discovery will be DENIED,

and the defendant’s motion to dismiss will be is GRANTED. An appropriate order

will be entered. 

DONE and ORDERED this 1st day of September, 2015.

 

 VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS

United States District Judge

13

 Because of the holdings herein, the could will not address the defendant's other

arguments, including state agent immunity, qualified immunity, eleventh amendment immunity,

12(b)(6), and statutory immunity. 

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