Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-7_04-cv-02527/USCOURTS-alnd-7_04-cv-02527-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Eddie Davis
Plaintiff
Olivia Davis
Plaintiff
NPC Pizza Hut
Defendant
Tammy Taylor
Plaintiff

Document Text:

Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, filed on January 19, 2005, references both Title VII and § 1

1981 as the statutory bases for their race discrimination claim. While the language of the Amended

Complaint generally refers to racial discrimination by Defendant "by compelling them [i.e.,

Plaintiffs] to work in a hostile work environment as well as engaging in discriminatory employment

practices" (Doc. #21 ¶ 1), the attached EEOC administrative documents specifically reference the

August 2003 promotion decision. Similarly, the parties' briefs and evidence focus on the August

2003 employment decision. Accordingly, it appears to the court that Plaintiffs are only challenging

Defendant's failure to promote them. In any event, to the extent that the Amended Complaint could

be read to include any claims beyond the August 2003 promotion decision, Plaintiffs have abandoned

them. See, e.g., Wilkerson v. Grinnell Corp., 270 F.3d 1314, 1322 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding claim

abandoned when argument not presented in initial response to motion for summary judgment); Bute

v. Schuller International, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 1473, 1477 (N.D. Ga. 1998) (finding unaddressed claim

abandoned); see also Coalition for the Abolition of Marijuana Prohibition v. City of Atlanta, 219

F.3d 1301, 1326 (11th Cir. 2000) (failure to brief and argue issue at the district court is sufficient to

find the issue has been abandoned); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th

Cir. 1995); Hudson v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 209 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1324 (N.D. Ga. 2001). Cf.

McMaster v. United States, 177 F.3d 936, 940-41 (11th Cir. 1999) (claim may be considered

abandoned when district court is presented with no argument concerning a claim included in the

plaintiff's complaint); Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No. 669 v. Independent Sprinkler Corp.,

10 F.3d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir. 1994) (concluding that a district court "could properly treat as

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

WESTERN DIVISION

OLIVIA DAVIS, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

NPC PIZZA HUT,

Defendant.

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Case No.: 7:04-CV-2527-RDP

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

This race discrimination case filed by Plaintiffs Olivia Davis, Eddie Davis, and Tammy

Taylor ("Taylor") arises out of a promotion decision made by Defendant NPC International, Inc.

("NPC") in August 2003. (Doc. #21). Pending before the court is NPC's Motion for Summary 1

FILED

 2006 Aug-22 PM 04:27

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 7:04-cv-02527-RDP Document 44 Filed 08/22/06 Page 1 of 18
abandoned a claim alleged in the complaint but not even raised as a ground for summary judgment").

In addition, as Plaintiffs have not disputed the fact that the only promotion claim properly before the

court was filed under Title VII only, (Compare Def's. Memo. in Support of Mot. Summ. J. at n. 7,

SOF ¶ 18, p.10 with Pl's. Resp. at Statement of Facts ¶¶ § 14-16) Plaintiffs have also abandoned any

claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 

The court notes that Plaintiffs have offered their own statement of facts without 2

chronologically responding to those outlined by NPC. However, some of the facts identified by

Plaintiffs in their opposition as admitted mirror those offered by NPC. Therefore, the following

statement of facts is based upon a review and comparison of the facts included in Doc. #40, Doc.

#41, and Doc. #43 as well as the evidentiary record on summary judgment. Whenever Plaintiffs

have adequately disputed a fact offered by NPC, the court has accepted Plaintiffs' version. The

court's numbering of admitted facts (e.g., AF No. 1) corresponds to the numbering of NPC's

Statement of Facts as set forth in Doc. #40 and responded to by Plaintiff in Doc. #41. Similarly, the

designation "AAF" stands for additional admitted fact and corresponds to Plaintiffs' Statement of

Facts contained in Doc. #41 and responded to by NPC in Doc. #43. Any other facts referenced by

the parties that require further clarification are dealt with later in the court's opinion. 

2

Judgment (Doc. #39) filed on April 17, 2006. Plaintiffs filed their opposition (Doc. #41) on May

8, 2006. After obtaining an extension of time, NPC filed its reply (Doc. #43) on May 26, 2006. As

discussed in detail below, the court concludes that there are no material factual disputes and that

NPC is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, NPC's Motion for Summary is due to

be granted.

II. FACTS2

NPC is a franchisee of Pizza Hut restaurants. AF No. 1. Each NPC restaurant employs one

Restaurant General Manager ("RGM") (also known as a store manager) who is responsible for the

daily operations of the restaurant he/she manages. AF No. 2. RGMs report to an Area General

Manager ("AGM"), who is responsible for overseeing the operations of all NPC restaurants within

that AGM's assigned area. AF No. 3. Each AGM supervises between seven and ten restaurants.

AF No. 3. Plaintiffs are all RGMs at NPC restaurants in the "area" NPC designates as the

Case 7:04-cv-02527-RDP Document 44 Filed 08/22/06 Page 2 of 18
3

Tuscaloosa area and are related to each other; Olivia Davis is Eddie Davis' mother and Tammy

Taylor is the live-in girlfriend of Eddie Davis. AF No. 5. 

Plaintiff Olivia Davis commenced her employment with NPC on April 15, 1982, and was

promoted to RGM on May 1, 1996. AF No. 6. That was Olivia Davis' fifth promotion since starting

her employment. AF No. 6. Plaintiff Eddie Davis commenced his employment with NPC on

December 13, 1998, and was promoted to RGM in October 2002. AF No. 7. That was Eddie Davis'

second promotion since starting his employment. AF No. 7. Plaintiff Taylor commenced her

employment with NPC in September 1998, and was promoted to RGM on June 21, 2005. AF No.

8. That was Taylor's fourth promotion since starting her employment. AF No. 8. All of the

Plaintiffs are African-American and therefore belong to the same protected class. AF No. 18. They

all claim NPC discriminated against them based upon their race when it failed to promote them to

an AGM position in August 2003. That position was awarded to Paula Stanford ("Stanford"), a

white employee who also worked for NPC.

An AGM's responsibilities include (1) ensuring the overall profitability of all the restaurants

they manage; (2) maintaining proper staffing; and (3) ensuring that all employees meet company

standards. (Doc. #40 at Ex. 2 ¶ 15). The primary job function of an AGM is to manage multiple

restaurants. (Doc. #40 at Ex. 2 ¶ 16). The selection criteria for internal candidates to be promoted

from RGM to AGM is outlined on NPC's Area General Manager Selection Criteria document, which

explains that to be promoted to AGM an RGM should have: (1) over two years of experience as an

RGM; (2) pass a background check; (3) earned at least a meets expectations ("ME") on the last two

Case 7:04-cv-02527-RDP Document 44 Filed 08/22/06 Page 3 of 18
The NPC Admin Module was not available in 2003 and still is not available. Thus, this

3

requirement is waived by NPC for all candidates.

4

performance evaluations; (4) completed Expert, LAS, BMT, HIC and NPC Admin Modules; (5) 3

completed Leading Multiple Restaurants Training; (6) earned at least twenty-four points on NPC's

Leadership Competencies Evaluation; and (7) demonstrated the ability to perform at least twenty of

the tasks listed on NPC's Readiness Checklist for RGM to AGM. (See NPC's Area General Manager

Selection Criteria document, Doc. #40 at Ex. 8; Ex. 2 ¶ 17).

NPC maintains a "bench planning process," which is the process by which AGMs, Regional

Managers, and Human Resource Leaders communicate with one another and identify the personnel

needs, such as employee training, hiring, and promotion, of each NPC restaurant. AF No. 10. NPC

relies on the bench planning process and the regular contact of AGMs and Human Resources Leaders

with RGMs (and other members of a restaurant's staff) to determine who is "bench ready" for

promotion and who desires to be promoted. (Doc. #40 at Ex. 2 ¶ 14; Ex. 7 p. 62 at 16-21). NPC has

no written procedure in place to ensure that any interested employees may know what position(s) are

available and when they have become available for job interviews. AAF No. 46. 

Before Stanford was promoted, the AGM was Ken Dunnington ("Dunnington"). On June

4, 2003, Eddie Davis and Olivia Davis attended a meeting conducted by Fred Schlimm ("Schlimm"),

NPC's Regional Manager, where they were informed that Dunnington, their AGM, had been

terminated, and they did not have an AGM. (Doc. #40 at Ex. 3 p. 145; Ex. 4 p. 42; Aff. of Fred

Schlimm at ¶ 4). Taylor learned of Dunnington's termination one week after his termination. (Doc.

#40 at Ex. 6 pp. 53, 54). None of Plaintiffs were identified as promotable to the AGM position on

any bench planning worksheet or during any of the monthly bench planning meetings that Fred

Case 7:04-cv-02527-RDP Document 44 Filed 08/22/06 Page 4 of 18
Plaintiffs have argued that "Dunnington expressed to Fred Schlimm, by bench plan, his 4

promotable employees, which would include the Plaintiffs." See Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's

Motion for Summary Judgment at 7, ¶ 31. However, a close examination of the exhibits to

Dunnington's deposition makes clear that the bench plans introduced at the deposition do not indicate

Plaintiffs were promotable at the time those plans were written. Olivia Davis was never identified

on any of the bench plans as promotable at all, and Eddie Davis and Tammy Taylor were not

identified as promotable to AGM. (Doc. #41 at Ex. 7, Pl's. Ex. 2, which contains the bench plans).

Although Plaintiffs have asserted Stanford did not receive LMR training, they have failed 5

to put forward substantial evidence that is so. The only evidence they have placed into the Rule 56

record is Eddie Davis' affidavit testimony that Stanford and he were in the same "BMT class." (Doc.

#41 at Ex. 2 ¶ 8). That testimony is simply not substantial evidence that creates an issue of fact for

a jury to decide.

5

Schlimm, Regional Manager, held with Sherry Davis, the Human Resources Leader, and Ken

Dunnington, the former AGM. (Doc. #40 at Ex. 9 ¶ 9). In addition, Schlimm had no idea any of the

Plaintiffs desired the position, and none of them told Schlimm they wanted to be promoted to AGM.4

(Ex. 9 at ¶ 10; Ex. 4 p. 44-45; Ex. 6 p. 38, p. 40; Ex. 3 p. 146). In fact, neither Eddie Davis nor

Olivia Davis had told anyone they desired to be promoted. (Ex. 4 p. 44-45; Ex. 3 p. 147 at 7-17).

Schlimm chose Stanford to be the new AGM for the Tuscaloosa area in late July 2003, and

she was formally promoted in August 2003. (Doc. #40 at Ex. 9 at ¶ 5). Stanford had been an RGM

in the Birmingham Area since 2002, had performed well in that capacity, and had expressed an

interest in the AGM position from the time she was hired. (Doc. #40 at Ex. 9 at ¶¶ 6, 8). During her

tenure as an RGM for NPC, Stanford completed all of the tasks NPC requires of internal candidates

desiring promotion to AGM, including completing Leading Multiple Restaurants ("LMR") training.5

(Doc. #40 at Ex. 9 at ¶ 7). Even before she began working for NPC, Stanford was already qualified

to be an AGM because she had been an RGM for Lee's Famous Recipe for three years, had managed

multiple restaurants for Lee's Famous Recipe for nearly ten years, and had also owned and managed

several restaurants herself. (Doc. #40 at Ex. 9 at ¶6).

Case 7:04-cv-02527-RDP Document 44 Filed 08/22/06 Page 5 of 18
6

Schlimm chose Stanford to be the AGM because of her performance record, her past

experience managing multiple restaurants, and because she had completed all of the tasks internal

candidates are asked to complete before being promoted to AGM. (Doc. #40 at Ex. 9 at ¶ 7).

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R .Civ. P. 56(c). All reasonable doubts

about the facts and all justifiable inferences are resolved in favor of the nonmovant. See Fitzpatrick

v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993). A dispute is genuine "if the evidence is such

that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). To warrant the entry of summary judgment, the moving party must

demonstrate that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact." HCA Health Servs. of Ga., Inc.

v. Employers Health Ins. Co., 240 F.3d 982, 991 (11th Cir. 2001). "A mere 'scintilla' of evidence

supporting the opposing party's position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the

jury could reasonably find for that party." Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990).

A plaintiff in an employment discrimination case maintains the ultimate burden of proving

that the adverse employment decision was made because of intentional discrimination. See Reeves

v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509

U.S. 502, 509-12 (1993); Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Communications, 738 F.2d 1181, 1184 (11th

Cir. 1984). Although the Supreme Court previously established the basic allocation of burdens and

order of proof in a disparate treatment case, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), as modified by Desert

Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003), that allocation scheme applies only in cases where there is no

Case 7:04-cv-02527-RDP Document 44 Filed 08/22/06 Page 6 of 18
Direct evidence is "[s]uch evidence [which], if believed, proves the existence of a fact in 6

issue without inference or presumption." Burns v. Gadsden State Community College, 908 F.2d

1512 (11th Cir. 1990); see Wright v. Southland Corp., 187 F.3d 1287, 1293-94 (11th Cir. 1999)

(Tjoflat, J.) (defining direct evidence as "evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find,

more probably than not, a causal link between an adverse employment action and a protected

personal characteristic" and finding the outcomes reflected in prior case law consistent with that

definition).

7

direct evidence of discrimination. Grigsby v. Reynolds Metals Co., 821 F.2d 590, 595 (11th Cir.

1987). 

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Background

The analysis of Plaintiffs' failure to promote claim relates not only to the nature of the

allegations but also the type of evidence offered in support of those claims. Standard v. A.B.E.L.

Services, Inc., 161 F.3d 1318,1330 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting that "[t]he analytical framework and

burden of production var[y] depending on the method of proof chosen"). In general, a plaintiff may

attempt to establish a claim of employment discrimination through the use of direct evidence,6

circumstantial evidence, or statistics. Id.;see also Schoenfeld v. Babbitt, 168 F.3d 1257, 1266 (11th

Cir. 1999) (recognizing the availability of either direct or circumstantial evidence). Providing a

plaintiff with the opportunity to establish discrimination through the use of circumstantial evidence

of discrimination is important because direct proof of discrimination is uncommon. Combs v.

Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1537 (11th Cir. 1997); Grigsby v. Reynolds Metals Co., 821

F.2d 590, 595 (11th Cir. 1987). 

Here, Plaintiffs assert there is circumstantial evidence of racial discrimination. "In evaluating

[discrimination] claims supported by circumstantial evidence, [the courts of this circuit] use the nowfamiliar framework established by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp.

Case 7:04-cv-02527-RDP Document 44 Filed 08/22/06 Page 7 of 18
See also McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n.13 ("The facts necessary will vary in Title

7

VII cases, and the specification above of the prima facie proof required from respondent is not

applicable in every respect in different factual situations.").

8

v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.

248 (1981)." Combs, 106 F.3d at 1527 (parallel citations omitted). Under the McDonnell Douglas

and Burdine framework, the plaintiff first has the burden of establishing a prima facie case of

discrimination, which creates a rebuttable presumption that the employer acted illegally. See id. at

1527-28. The methods of presenting a prima facie case, as well as the exact elements required for

such a showing, are not fixed; rather, they are flexible and depend to a large degree upon the facts

of the particular decisions at issue. See, e.g., Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Communications, 738 F.2d

1181, 1185 (11th Cir. 1984); Lincoln v. Board of Regents of Univ. Sys., 697 F.2d 928, 937 (11th Cir.

1983). One of the methods a plaintiff may use to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment

employment discrimination is to show that she was a qualified member of a protected class and was

subjected to an adverse employment action but that otherwise similarly situated employees outside

the plaintiff's class were treated dissimilarly. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 (hiring); 7

Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1997) (discipline); see also Nix, 738 F.2d at 1185

(discipline).

Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case and, thereby, raises the presumption of

discrimination, the burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Combs, 106 F.3d at 1528. The employer "need not

persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons." Burdine, 450 U.S. at

254-55; see Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1024 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Indeed, "the

defendant's burden of rebuttal is exceedingly light. . . . At this stage of the inquiry, the defendant

Case 7:04-cv-02527-RDP Document 44 Filed 08/22/06 Page 8 of 18
9

need not persuade the court that its proffered reasons are legitimate; the defendant's burden is merely

one of production, not proof." Cooper v. Southern Co., 390 F.3d 695, 725 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation

and internal quotation omitted). "If such a reason is produced, a plaintiff then has the ultimate

burden of proving the reason to be a pretext for unlawful discrimination." Denney v. City of Albany,

247 F.3d 1172, 1183 (11th Cir. 2001). In addition, when the defendant articulates multiple,

reasonable, legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons, the plaintiff must rebut each of defendant's

proffered reasons. Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1024-25. Although the fact that a plaintiff established a

prima facie case becomes irrelevant once the employer has offered a legitimate reason for its actions,

the evidence of pretext may include the same evidence offered to establish the prima facie case.

Combs, 106 F.3d at 1528.

Despite this shifting of the burden of production between the plaintiff and the defendant

under the McDonnell Douglas and Burdine framework, "[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier

of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with

the plaintiff." Burdine, 450 U.S. at. 253. A plaintiff may defeat a summary judgment by producing

sufficient evidence to allow a rational trier of fact to disbelieve the employer's proffered legitimate

reasons, thus permitting but not compelling the trier of fact to make a finding of illegal

discrimination. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148-49 (pointing out the production of the necessary sufficient

evidence by plaintiff will not always prevent the employer from prevailing on a Rule 50 motion and

suggesting that the strength of plaintiff's prima facie case, the probative value of the proof that the

employer's explanation is false, and any other properly considered evidence that supports the

employer's case are among the factors the court should take into account in evaluating a Rule 50

motion); see also St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 524; Abel v. Dubberly, 210 F.3d 1334, 1339

Case 7:04-cv-02527-RDP Document 44 Filed 08/22/06 Page 9 of 18
Plaintiffs' affidavit testimony to the contrary–presented after they gave sworn statements in 8

their depositions–is wholly unavailing and cannot "impeach" their prior and inconsistent sworn

testimony. See Van T. Junkins &Assoc. Inc. v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 736 F.2d 656, 657 (11th Cir. 1984)

("[A] party cannot . . . create . . . an issue [of fact] with an affidavit that merely contradicts, without

explanation, previously given clear testimony.") Plaintiffs cannot rely on affidavit testimony that

is directly contradicted by their deposition testimony. McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333

F.3d 1234 n. 7 (11th Cir. 2003) ("Under the law of this Circuit, we may disregard an affidavit

submitted solely for the purpose of opposing a motion for summary judgment when that affidavit

is directly contradicted by deposition testimony.") (citing Van T. Junkins, 736 F.2d at 657). Here,

Plaintiffs have not proffered a sufficient explanation for their subsequent, contradictory affidavit

testimony.

10

(11th Cir. 2000); Alexander v. Fulton County, 207 F.3d 1303, 1336 (11th Cir. 2000); Combs, 106

F.3d at 1529-38 (interpreting Hicks and the post-Hicks case law); Hairston v. Gainesville Sun

Publishing Co., 9 F.3d 913, 920-21 (11th Cir. 1993).

In support of its summaryjudgment position, NPC asserts that Plaintiffs have not established

a prima facie case of failure to promote and that, in any event, Plaintiffs have not sufficiently

rebutted its legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for selecting the incumbent, Paula Stanford, for

the position of AGM. For the reasons discussed below, the court agrees that NPC is entitled to

summary judgment. 

B. Plaintiffs Cannot Establish a Prima Facie Case

NPC asserts that Plaintiffs are unable to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination

with respect to their promotion claims for two reasons. First, NPC argues that Plaintiffs did not

express an interest in the position at issue. Second, NPC notes that Plaintiffs were not eligible for

consideration for promotion to the position because they were not qualified for it.

1. Plaintiffs Did Not Express an Interest in the Position

Plaintiffs have all admitted in their depositions that they knew the AGM position was

available. (AF Nos. 19, 20). Nevertheless, Olivia and Eddie Davis testified in their depositions that 8

Case 7:04-cv-02527-RDP Document 44 Filed 08/22/06 Page 10 of 18
Moreover, a candidate who expresses an interest in a promotion must also be qualified for 9

the position. As explained in more detail infra, the bench plan records attached to Dunnington's

deposition transcript reflect that Olivia Davis was never identified as promotable and Eddie Davis

and Tammy Taylor were not identified as promotable to AGM. (Doc. #41 at Ex. 7 at Bench

Planning Worksheets). 

11

they never told anyone they desired the promotion to the 2003 AGM position (AF No. 23), and

Taylor testified that she told her former AGM, Dunnington, a couple of times that she would like to

have his job, and that she told Olivia Davis she would like to be an AGM. (Doc. #41 at Ex. 10 at

37, 38, 40). This proffered testimony, however, does not establish a material factual dispute about

Schlimm's knowledge of Taylor's interest in the open AGM position during the Summer of 2003.9

There is no evidence that Dunnington alerted Schlimm of Taylor's desire, and Taylor never testified

that she expressed any other interest in the position at issue. Finally, the Rule 56 record shows that

it is undisputed that none of the Plaintiffs ever expressed their desire to be promoted to the AGM

position to Schlimm, the hiring manager. (AF No. 22).

Plaintiffs respond to NPC's evidence that they never applied for the position by noting that

NPC did not have any formal application process or procedures in place. Plaintiffs are correct that

proof of a formal application is not always required to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.

However, because Plaintiffs did not apply for the position that Stanford received, they can only

establish a prima facie case by showing (1) a clear policy of exclusion made it futile for them to

apply, or (2) the company had a duty to consider them for the position. Cox v. American Cast Iron

Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1560 (11th Cir. 1986). Plaintiffs have not made either showing.

Case 7:04-cv-02527-RDP Document 44 Filed 08/22/06 Page 11 of 18
To the contrary, the evidence shows that NPC had no reason to consider them because (1) 10

they had not expressed any interest in the position to Schlimm, NPC's General Manager, and (2),

regardless (and as explained more fully below), they were not qualified for the position based upon

NPC's selection criteria for internal candidates to be promoted from RGM to AGM. (Doc. #40 at

Ex. 8).

Plaintiffs' affidavits do not create a material factual dispute as to whether they expressed 11

any interest in the position because the statements contradict prior deposition testimony without

adequately explaining the contradiction. Van T. Junkins, 736 F.2d at 657. 

12

Plaintiffs have neither pointed to a clear policy of exclusion nor offered any evidence tending

to show that NPC had a reason or duty to consider them for the opening. Schlimm testified that 10

he had no knowledge that any of Plaintiffs desired a promotion to AGM and that none of them had

ever been identified as promotable to the AGM position. (Doc. #40 at Ex. 9 ¶ 10). In addition, 11

consistent with Schlimm's testimony and the bench plan documents, Eddie Davis and Olivia Davis

both testified that they had not told anyone at NPC they desired to be promoted. (Doc. #40 at Ex.

4 at 44-45; id. at Ex. 3 at 7-17). Therefore, because they knew of the opening but neither applied for

the position nor expressed any interest in it, Plaintiffs cannot meet this prima facie case requirement.

2. Plaintiffs Were Not Qualified for the Position

The court finds Plaintiffs cannot establish a prima facie case for a second (and alternative)

reason: they have not presented substantial evidence that they were qualified for the position at

issue. More specifically, Plaintiffs have failed to show how they satisfy NPC's selection criteria for

internal candidates to be promoted from RGM to AGM as outlined on NPC's Area General Manager

Selection Criteria document. (Doc. #40 at Ex. 2 ¶ 17). The criteria are:

(1) over two years of experience as an RGM; (2) pass a background check; (3) earn

at least a meets expectations ("ME") on last two performance evaluations; (4)

complete Expert, LAS, BMT, HIC & NPC Admin Modules; (5) complete Leading

Multiple Restaurants ["LMR"] Training; (6) earn at least twenty-four points on NPC's

Case 7:04-cv-02527-RDP Document 44 Filed 08/22/06 Page 12 of 18
As noted by NPC in its brief, the NPC Admin. Module that is referenced in item (4) above 12

was not available in 2003, and still is unavailable; therefore, this particular requirement was waived

by NPC for all otherwise qualified candidates. (Doc. #40 at 6 n.6; see also id. at Ex. 2 ¶ 17).

The court recognizes that Silvera involved allegations of discriminatory discipline, but the 13

legal principles discussed in that opinion (and in other decisions of the Eleventh Circuit) regarding

comparators still provide useful insight into the nature of the similarly situated standard to be applied

in a promotion case. See, e.g., Alexander v. Fulton County, 207 F.3d 1303, 1347 (11th Cir. 2000)

("Similarly, with respect to the reassignment claim, Steele offered no evidence of a similarly situated

black comparator who received a reassignment similar to the one he was denied."). Cf. MacPherson

v. Univ. of Montevallo, 922 F.2d 766, 774 n.16 (11th Cir. 1991) ("In a comparator analysis, the

plaintiff is matched with a person or persons who have very similar job-related characteristics and

who are in a similar situation to determine if the plaintiff has been treated differently than others who

are similar to him.").

13

Leadership Competencies Evaluation; and (7) demonstrate the ability to perform at

least twenty of the tasks listed on NPC's Readiness Checklist for RGM to AGM. 

Id.12

Taylor did not satisfy the criteria because she did not have enough experience as an RGM

— she had worked as an assistant manager until June 2005, and at the time of the job filling, had no

RGM work experience. Similarly, Eddie Davis also did not have two years experience as an RGM.

At the time of Stanford's selection, neither Olivia Davis nor the other Plaintiffs had completed LMR

training or had experience managing more than one restaurant. 

Plaintiffs point to Della Lann (who was the AGM over the Fayette and Mississippi area) and

note that she was promoted to AGM despite the fact that she had not received prior LMR training.

However, Lann is not a suitable comparator. Unlike any of Plaintiffs, Lann was managing three

restaurants at the time she was promoted to AGM in 1995. (Doc. #41 at Ex. 5 at 22-24). Moreover,

the LMR training did not even exist at the time of her promotion. (Id.). 

In Silvera v. Orange County School Bd., 244 F.3d 1253 (11thCir. 2001), the Eleventh Circuit

reiterated the standard for determining whether employees are similarly situated: 

13

Case 7:04-cv-02527-RDP Document 44 Filed 08/22/06 Page 13 of 18
14

In determining whether employees are similarly situated for purposes of establishing

a prima facie case, it is necessary to consider whether the employees are "involved

in or accused of the same or similar conduct and are disciplined in different ways."

Jones v. Bessemer Carraway Med. Ctr., 137 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir.) (quoting

Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir.1997)), opinion modified by, 151

F.3d 1321 (11th Cir.1998).

244 F.3d at 1259. In other words, to meet the comparability requirement, Plaintiffs must show that

they are "similarly situated in all relevant aspects to the non-[protected category] employee."

Silvera, 244 F.3d at 1259 (citing Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1562) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs are unable

to show Lann is an appropriate comparator for at least three reasons: (1) temporally, the promotion

decisions are eight (8) years apart and, therefore, are too distant from one another; (2) geographically,

there is no evidence that the same decisionmaker, i.e., Schlimm, was involved in both decisions; and

(3) factually, Lann testified to having significant experience managing multiple restaurants while

Plaintiffs had no equivalent job experience when the decision at issue in this case was made.

C. Plaintiffs Cannot Show Pretext 

Alternatively, the court concludes that even if Plaintiffs were able to establish a prima facie

case with respect to their promotion claim (which they cannot), their claims nevertheless fail because

they are unable to show pretext in NPC's decision to select Stanford for the AGM position. "[T]o

avoid summary judgment [the plaintiff] must introduce significantly probative evidence showing that

the asserted reason is merely a pretext for discrimination." Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 990 F.2d

1217, 1228 (11th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). A reason is not pretext for discrimination "unless

it is shown both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason." St. Mary's

Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993). In the context of challenging a promotion:

[A] plaintiff cannot prove pretext by simply arguing or even by showing that he was

better qualified than the officer who received the position he coveted. A plaintiff

Case 7:04-cv-02527-RDP Document 44 Filed 08/22/06 Page 14 of 18
See Doc. #40 at Ex. 9 ¶ 5. 14

15

must show not merely that the defendant's employment decisions were mistaken but

that they were in fact motivated by race. We have explained, a plaintiff may not

establish that an employer's proffered reason is pretextual merely by questioning the

wisdom of the employer's reasons, at least not where . . . the reason is one that might

motivate a reasonable employer.

Alexander v. Fulton County, 207 F.3d 1303, 1339 (11th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations omitted).

Here, the court readily concludes that NPC's proffered reasons–Stanford's superior

qualifications and experience–were legitimate and non-discriminatory in nature. Thus, the burden

shifted to Plaintiffs to "meet [the proffered] reason head on and rebut it, and the employee cannot

succeed by simply quarreling with the wisdom of that reason." Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d

at 1030 (discussing ADEA claim). A plaintiff must show that the disparities between the successful

applicant's and her own qualifications were "of such weight and significance that no reasonable

person, in the exercise of impartial judgment, could have chosen the candidate selected over the

plaintiff." Cooper v. Southern Company, 390 F.3d 695, 732 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, ___ U.S.

____, 126 S. Ct. 478 (2005) (citation omitted); see also Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., ___ U.S. ____, 126

S. Ct. 1195, 1197 (2006) (per curiam) (approving of this language from Cooper). According to

Schlimm, the undisputed final decisionmaker, Stanford had nearly three years prior experience as 14

an RGM for Lee's Famous Recipe ("Lee's"), had been an RGM for NPC in the Birmingham area

since 2002 (and had performed well in that capacity), and had expressed an interest in the AGM

position. (Doc. #40 at Ex. 9 ¶¶ 6, 8). Stanford satisfied all the internal candidate criteria, including

Case 7:04-cv-02527-RDP Document 44 Filed 08/22/06 Page 15 of 18
As already noted, Plaintiffs attempt unsuccessfully, through the affidavit of Eddie Davis,

15

to create a material factual dispute over whether Stanford had completed LMR Training. However,

Eddie Davis, unlike Schlimm, is without any personal knowledge as to this particular subject matter

area, and regardless, his testimony does not specifically state that Stanford lacked this training.

(Doc. #41 at Ex. 2). Furthermore, Plaintiffs' citations to Dunnington's deposition do not contain

testimony that he created a "bench plan for promotion" for Olivia Davis, and the bench plan

documents do not identify Olivia Davis as promotable. (Doc. #41 at Ex. 7 p. 64; 15-20, pp. 65-77;

Pl's Ex. 2).

This multiple restaurant management experience included nearly three years working as an 16

RGM for Lee's, ten years managing multiple restaurants for Lee's, and some additional time owning

and managing several restaurants herself.

16

completion of the Leading Multiple Restaurants training. (Id. ¶ 7). As already explained, Plaintiffs 15

had not.

Schlimm selected Stanford to fill the open AGM position because of her past performance

record, her prior experience managing multiple restaurants, and her completion of all NPC internal 16

candidate requirements. (Id.) Therefore, the court is not faced with a situation in which Plaintiffs

are claiming (or are able to claim) that their qualifications are so superior to those of Stanford such

that the disparities in employment records establish pretext. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit

Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187-88 (1989) ("[A plaintiff] might seek to demonstrate that respondent's

claim to have promoted a better qualified applicant was pretextual by showing that she was in fact

better qualified than the person chosen for the position."), superseded on other grounds by 42 U.S.C.

§ 1981(b); Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 ("The fact that a court may think that the employer misjudged

the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this

may be probative of whether the employer's reasons are pretexts for discrimination.").

Moreover, Plaintiffs have not offered any evidence that would tend to show that Schlimm's

decision was somehow tainted by racial bias. For example, Plaintiff does not contend that Schlimm

Case 7:04-cv-02527-RDP Document 44 Filed 08/22/06 Page 16 of 18
17

made any derogatory comments or jokes that would otherwise potentially demonstrate a bias against

promoting African-American employees. See, e.g., Ash, 126 S. Ct. at 1197 ("First, there was

evidence that Tyson's plant manager, who made the disputed hiring decisions, had referred on some

occasions to each of the petitioners as 'boy.' Petitioners argued this was evidence of discriminatory

animus."). Instead, Plaintiffs' primary point in opposing summary judgment seems to be that their

tenure at NPC meant that they deserved a promotion to AGM. However, this is insufficient to show

pretext. As the Eleventh Circuit stated succinctly and unequivocally in Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck &

Co., 939 F.2d 1466 (11th Cir. 1991):

Federal courts "do notsit as a super-personnel department that reexamines an entity's

business decisions. No matter how medieval a firm's practices, no matter how

high-handed its decisional process, no matter how mistaken the firm's managers, the

ADEA [, Title VII, or § 1981] does not interfere. Rather, our inquiry is limited to

whether the employer gave an honest explanation of its behavior." Mechnig v. Sears,

Roebuck & Co., 864 F.2d 1359, 1365 (7th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). 

Id. at 1470; see also Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Florida, Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1361 (11th

Cir. 1999) ("We are not in the business of adjudging whether employment decisions are prudent or

fair. Instead, our sole concern is whether unlawful discriminatory animus motivates a challenged

decision.") (citation omitted), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1109 (2000). 

Quite simply, Plaintiffs have not met their burden under Cooper to show that the disparities

between their qualifications and Stanford's qualifications were so severe that no reasonable person

could have chosen Stanford over them. See Brooks v. County Commission of Jefferson County, 446

F.3d 1160, 1163 (11th Cir. 2006)(affirming summary judgment on promotion claim and also noting

that, in Ash, the Supreme Court approved the language in Cooper). Indeed, Plaintiffs have offered

no evidence to challenge NPC's evidence that Stanford was hired based on her past performance

Case 7:04-cv-02527-RDP Document 44 Filed 08/22/06 Page 17 of 18
18

record, her prior experience managing multiple restaurants, and her qualifying for the position based

upon her completion of all NPC requirements for the position. This "inquiry at the third stage of the

McDonnell Douglas analysis of a promotion discrimination claim is not concerned with [Plaintiffs']

belief that [they were] equally or more qualified or whether we could conclude that [Plaintiffs were]

better qualified than [Stanford]." Brooks, 446 F.3d at 1163-64; see Cooper, 390 F.3d at 744 (noting

plaintiff's reliance on her own belief that she was better qualified than promotee and observing that

"whether we could conclude [the plaintiff] was better qualified than [the promotee] is not the issue

here"). For these reasons, Plaintiffs are unable to meet their burden on summary judgment of

demonstrating pretext in NPC's selection of Stanford over them for the AGM position.

V. CONCLUSION 

As explained above, NPC has shown that no material factual disputes exist and that it is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of NPC is due to

be entered. The court will enter an order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.

DONE and ORDERED this 22nd day of August, 2006.

___________________________________

R. DAVID PROCTOR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Case 7:04-cv-02527-RDP Document 44 Filed 08/22/06 Page 18 of 18