Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_11-cv-00158/USCOURTS-almd-2_11-cv-00158-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
The City of Montgomery
Defendant
Roosevelt Watkins
Plaintiff

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

ROOSEVELT WATKINS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. ) CASE NO. 2:11-cv-0158-MEF

) (WO – Do not publish)

THE CITY OF MONTGOMERY, )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER ON PRETRIAL HEARING

A pretrial conference was held in the above case on January 24, 2013, at which time

the following proceedings were held and actions taken:

1. PARTIES AND TRIAL COUNSEL: The parties and their designated trial

counsel are correctly named as set out below: 

PARTIES TRIAL COUNSEL

Plaintiff, Roosevelt Watkins

Opt-in Plaintiff, 1Richard Brackin

W. Lee Gresham, III.

HENINGER GARRISON DAVIS 

2224 1st Avenue North

Birmingham, Alabama 35203

(205) 326-3336

(205) 326-3332 (Fax) 

lee@hgdlawfirm.com

William R. Davis

DAVIS & HERRINGTON

Park Place Center

8650 Minnie Brown Road, Suite 150

Montgomery, Alabama 36117

(334) 215-4449

(334) 215-4459 (Fax)

wrd@davisherrington.com

Case 2:11-cv-00158-MEF-WC Document 95 Filed 02/05/13 Page 1 of 14
Opt-in Plaintiff, Quentin Burke

Opt-in Plaintiff, Richard Carr

Opt-in Plaintiff, Carlos Carlisle 

Opt-in Plaintiff, Brian Clements

Opt-in Plaintiff, Larry Coleman

Opt-in Plaintiff, Russ Collier

Opt-in Plaintiff, Dustin Davenport

Opt-in Plaintiff, Ed Daniel

Opt-in Plaintiff, Darren Keith Davis

Opt-in Plaintiff, Michael Shane Davis

Opt-in Plaintiff, Herman Dudley

Opt-in Plaintiff, Bart Estes 

Opt-in Plaintiff, Brent Farthing

Opt-in Plaintiff, Charles Ford, Jr.

Opt-in Plaintiff, William Fulton, III

Opt-in Plaintiff, Rickey Garmon

Opt-in Plaintiff, Anthony Glasgow 

Opt-in Plaintiff, Richard Glaze

Opt-in Plaintiff, Tony Garner 

Opt-in Plaintiff, Kenneth Gray 

(Same as above) 

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Opt-in Plaintiff, Michael Hamil

Opt-in Plaintiff, S.M. Harris, Jr.

Opt-in Plaintiff, James Hart

Opt-in Plaintiff, Marc Hayes

Opt-in Plaintiff, Timothy Heath

Opt-in Plaintiff, Randy Hill

Opt-in Plaintiff, W.L. House 

Opt-in Plaintiff, Myron James

Opt-in Plaintiff, Rickey Johnson

Opt-in Plaintiff, James Jordan 

Opt-in Plaintiff, Steven Kilpatrick

Opt-in Plaintiff, Stephen Lewis

Opt-in Plaintiff, Alan Madore 

Opt-in Plaintiff, Jacob Money

Opt-in Plaintiff, Jerry D. Moon

Opt-in Plaintiff, David Moore

Opt-in Plaintiff, Michael D. Murphy

Opt-in Plaintiff, Donald Pickens

Opt-in Plaintiff, William Savage

Opt-in Plaintiff, Robert Sides

Opt-in Plaintiff, James Smith

(Same as above)

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Opt-in Plaintiff, Eddie Stephens

Opt-in Plaintiff, Toney Stephens

Opt-in Plaintiff, John Swindle

Opt-in Plaintiff, Samuel Matthew Thames

Opt-in Plaintiff, M.D. Thomas, Sr.

Opt-in Plaintiff, Adrian Thrasher

Opt-in Plaintiff, Greg Treloar

Opt-in Plaintiff, Shane White

Opt-in Plaintiff, Kenneth Wilhoit

Opt-in Plaintiff, Jason Williams

Opt-in Plaintiff, James Witcher

Defendant, The City of Montgomery Wallace D. Mills

323 Adams Avenue

Montgomery, Alabama 36104

(334) 593-8053

wallace@wallacemills.com

COUNSEL APPEARING AT PRETRIAL HEARING: Counsel appearing at the PreTrial Conference is the same as those listed above. 

 2. JURISDICTION AND VENUE: 

(a) Plaintiffs’ claims arise under the Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended,

29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (hereinafter “FLSA”). 

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(b) Subject matter jurisdiction exists on the basis of federal question

jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 

(c) Venue in the Middle District of Alabama is proper under 28 U.S.C. §

1391(b) and 1391(c) in that Defendant does business in this district and

a substantial part of the conduct giving rise to the claims occurred in

this district.

(d) All jurisdictional and procedural requirements prerequisite to

maintaining this action have been met.

3. PLEADINGS: The following pleadings and amendments were allowed:

(a) Plaintiffs Complaint (Doc. #1).

(b) Defendant’s Answer to Plaintiffs’ Complaint (Doc. #7).

(c) Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (Doc. #31). 

(d) Defendant’s Answer to First Amended Complaint (Doc. #35). 

4. CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES:

(a) Plaintiffs: 

(1) “The Fair Labor Standards Act was designed to extend the frontiers

of social progress by insuring to all able-bodied working men and

women a fair day’s pay for a fair day’s work.” Gregory v. First Title

of Am., Inc., 555 F.3d 1300, 1307 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting A.H.

Phillips, Inc., 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945)). 

(2) “There can be no doubt that the purpose of the FLSA was and is to

protect interstate employees by denying their employers the tool of

toying with workers’ wages when battling in the competitive

market.” Martinez v. Behring’s Bearings Serv., Inc., 501 F.2d 104,

107 (5th Cir. 1974). 

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(3) “The [Fair Labor Standards Act] should be interpreted liberally in

the [Plaintiffs’] favor.” Birdwell v. City of Gadsden, 970 F.2d 802,

805 (11th Cir. 1992); Mitchell v. Lubin, McGaughy & Assocs., 358

U.S. 207, 211 (1959).

(4) To accomplish this, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a) “requires [that] [the City]

pay their employees at the enhanced rate of time-and-a-half when

their work week exceeds 40 hours.” Cremeens v. City of

Montgomery, 602 F.3d 1224 (11th Cir. 2010). 

(5) The FLSA also creates a number of exemptions for specific workers

for whom a different maximum hour threshold applies before

overtime pay is required. One such partial exemption exists for

certain public safety employees who engage in “fire protection

activities”. 29 U.S.C. § 207(k). Pursuant to § 207(k), Defendant

need not provide overtime compensation to “fire protection

employees” until more than 212 hours are worked during a twentyeight day period. Id. Under the United States Department of

Labor’s (“DOL”) regulations, the maximum hours “law

enforcement” employees may be required to work, during a fourteen

(14) day work cycle, without overtime pay is one-hundred-six

(106). 29 C.F.R. § 553.230. 

(6) The City classifies Plaintiffs under the FLSA’s definition of “fire

protection employees” meaning they (1) are trained in fire

suppression; (2) have the legal authority and responsibility to

engage in fire suppression; (3) are employed by a municipal fire

department; (4) engage in the prevention, control, and

extinguishment of fires; and/or (5) respond to emergency situations

where life, property, or the environment is at risk. 29 U.S.C. §

203(y).

(7) Plaintiffs therefore claim that because they meet the statutory

definition of a “fire protection” employee and the regulatory

definition of a “first responder,” the City of Montgomery should

have paid them overtime compensation at a rate of time and onehalf for all hours worked in excess of one-hundred six (106). 

(8) The Department of Labor updated and revised its regulations

implementing the FLSA in August of 2004. The intent behind the

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revisions was to “restore” the “severely eroded” overtime

protections intended by the FLSA and to “ensure that employees

could understand their rights, employers could understand their

legal obligations and the DOL could vigorously enforce the law.”

69 Fed.Reg 22122. 

(9) As part of its 2004 revisions, the DOL promulgated, for the first

time, what is commonly referred to as the “First Responder”

regulation. 29 C.F.R. § 541.3. 

(10) The purpose behind the addition of the “First Responder” regulation

was to explicitly address the application of overtime exemptions to

first responders and to “make clear” that employees, regardless of

rank or pay level, who engage in the prevention, control; or

extinguishment of fires and the rescue of fire victims....” “are

entitled to overtime pay.” 69 Fed. Reg 22129 (emphasis added).

(11) Plaintiffs meet the regulatory definition of a “First Responder” in

that they prevent, control and/or extinguish fires and rescue fire

victims. See 29 C.F.R § 541.

(12) The “First Responder” regulation specifically states that firefighters

do not qualify as exempt executives “because their primary duty is

not management of the enterprise in which [Plaintiffs are] employed

or a customarily recognized department or subdivision thereof.” 29

C.F.R. § 541.3(b)(2) (emphasis added).

(13) The “First Responder” regulation also states that firefighters do not

qualify as exempt administrators “because their primary duty is not

the performance of work directly related to the management or

general business operations of the [the City] or the [City’s]

customers.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.3(b)(3) (emphasis added).

(14) The “First Responder” regulation explains that “a. . . fire fighter

whose primary duty is to. . . . fight fires is not exempt . . merely

because the. . . fire fighter also directs the work of other employees

in the conduct of . . . fighting a fire.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.3(b)(2); see

also, Amicus Brief of the Department of Labor in Mullins v. City of

New York, 523 F. Supp. 2d 339 (S.D. N.Y. 2007); Amicus Brief of

the Department of Labor to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in

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Mullins v. City of New York, 53 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2011); and

Mullins v. City of New York, 53 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2011) (the fact

Plaintiffs give direction while performing fire prevention work does

not transform their duty of suppressing fire into one of

management.) 

(15) Plaintiffs seek the payment of back overtime wages for all hours

worked over one-hundred six (106), liquidated damages, and such

other relief as previously requested in this case. 

(16) Defendant’s conduct of failing to properly classify and compensate

Plaintiffs’ with overtime as is required by the “First Responders”

was willful. Defendant knew, or showed reckless disregard for, the

fact that its conduct was forbidden by the FLSA and the “First

Responder” regulation. Ojeda-Sanchez v. Bland Farms, LLC, 2012

U.S. App. LEXIS 24586 (11th Cir. 2012); Morgan v. Family Dollar

Stores, 551 F.3d 1233, 1283 (11th Cir. Ala. 2008).

(17) Defendant did not act in “good-faith” with respect to the

classification and pay practices due to there being no evidence that

its failure to compensate Plaintiffs as “First Responders” were taken

in good faith and was in conformity with and in reliance on a

written administrative interpretation from the Department of Labor.

29 U.S.C. § 259; Cole v. Farm Fresh Poultry, Inc., 824 F.2d 923,

926 (11th Cir. 1987). 

(18) The City cannot prove both that it acted with a good faith belief that

its policy and practice of not paying Plaintiffs’ overtime

compensation as “First Responders” was in compliance with the

FLSA and the Department of Labors’ regulations and that it had

reasonable grounds for its belief. Ojeda-Sanchez v. Bland Farms,

LLC, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 24586 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing

Rodriguez v. Farm Stores Grocery, Inc., 518 F.3d 1259, 1272 (11th

Cir. 2008).

(19) The City intentionally misled Plaintiffs by stating the Department

of Labor had been contacted and that said consultation revealed that

Fire Suppression Lieutenants and Captains were not due to be paid

overtime wages as “First Responders.”

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(20) Defendant concealed the fact it had never contacted the Department

of Labor and despite Plaintiffs’ exercise in due diligence they did

not discover the falsity of the City’s representations. As a result, the

applicable statute of limitations should be tolled.

(21) “Both the diligent and the non-diligent plaintiff are protected from

the expiration of claims the factual basis for which was shrouded by

the veil of fraudulent concealment.” Morton’s Mkt., Inc. v.

Gustafson’s Dairy, Inc., 198 F.3d 823, 832 (11th Cir. 1999). 

(22) The issue of when Plaintiffs were on notice of their FLSA claims is

a question of fact for the jury to decide. Morton’s Mkt., 198 F.3d at

828 (11th Cir. 1999).

(23) In order to defeat Plaintiffs' tolling argument the City must

conclusively “show that [P]laintiffs knew of their claims or had

notice sufficient to prompt them to investigate and that, had they

done so diligently, they would have discovered the basis of their

claims.” Morton’s Market, 198 F.3d at 832. 

(24) Defendant has the burden of proving by "clear and affirmative

evidence" any exemption to the FLSA’s overtime requirements by

showing Plaintiffs satisfy each element of the exemptions it asserts. 

Huff v. Dekalb Cnty., 516 F.3d 1273, 1278 (11th Cir. 2008).

(25) Exemptions are only to be applied to those clearly and unmistakably

within the terms and spirit of the exemption.” Brock v. Norman’s

Country Mkt., Inc., 835 F.2d 823, 826 (11th Cir. 1988) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). 

(26) An exemption “analysis specifically require[s] an examination

beyond [Plaintiffs’] job title to the specific duties performed by the

[Plaintiffs].” Barreto v. Davie Marketplace, LLC, 331 Fed. App’x

672 (11th Cir. 2009).

(27) “It is necessary to focus on [Plaintiffs’] day-to-day activities in

order to determine whether [they] are subject to the administrative

or executive exemptions.” Ale v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 269

F.3d 682 (6th Cir. 2001). Therefore, “[t]he key to a determination

of whether [Plaintiffs are] covered by an exemption to the FLSA

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overtime requirements does not depend on . . . an employer's

general characterization of a particular job. What is important is

what [Plaintiffs] actually do[] on a day-to-day basis.” Id.

(emphasis added). 

(28) To defeat Plaintiffs’ claims for overtime wages, the City must

demonstrate Plaintiffs’ primary duty is not the prevention, control,

or extinguishment of fires and/or the rescue of fire victims. The

City cannot however, meet this burden by labeling Plaintiffs “in

charge” as this type of "categorical approach" and slapping on of a

“talismanic phrase” has been rejected. Morgan v. Family Dollar

Stores, 551 F.3d 1233, 1272 (11th Cir. 2008).

(29) Plaintiffs perform the production activities of the Montgomery Fire

Department which are those duties directly related to the

prevention, control or extinguishment of fires and rescue of fire

victims. 

(30) “Production activities in the context of municipal service activities

are activities that appear to be related to the primary service goal of

the agency.” Smith v. City of Jackson, 954 F.2d 296, 299 (5th Cir.

1992). 

(31) “The production activities of a municipal fire department are those

related to the prevention and suppression of fires.” Monroe

Firefighters Association v. City of Monroe, 600 F. Supp.2d 790, 802

(W.D. La. 2009). 

(32) The time spent by Plaintiffs’ waiting to respond to calls, engaging

in physical training, eating, and sleeping assumes the character of

the work Plaintiffs perform once dispatched to an emergency scene

which in Plaintiffs’ case is the manual labor of preventing,

controlling and/or extinguishing fires and rescuing of fire victims.

Debrecht v. Osceola Cnty., 243 F.Supp.2d 1364, 1373 (M.D. Fla.

2003) (holding an employee’s nonexempt time assumes the

character of the work performed once dispatched to an emergency

scene) (citing Smith v. City of Jackson, 954 F.2d 296, 299 (5th Cir.

1992). 

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(33) Defendant is in violation of the FLSA’s recording keeping

requirements set out in 29 U.S.C. § 211(c) and 29 C.F.R. § 516.2. 

(34) The City has a duty and is required to make, keep, and preserve

records of Plaintiffs’ wages, hours, and other conditions and

practices of employment” since “[it] is in a superior position to

know and produce the most probative facts concerning the nature

and amount of work performed by Plaintiffs. Allen v. Bd. of Pub.

Educ. for Bibb Cnty., 495 F.3d 1306, 2007 WL 2332506, at *6

(11th Cir. Aug. 17, 2007) (citing Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery

Co., 328 U.S. 680, 687, 66 S. Ct. 1187, 90 L. Ed. 1515 (1946)). 

(35) To be in compliance with the Department of Labor’s record keeping

provision, the City must maintain and preserve records indicating

among other things, (1) the time of day and day of week on which

Plaintiffs' workweek begins; (2) Plaintiffs' regular hourly rate of

pay for any workweek in which overtime compensation is due; (3)

the hours worked each workday and total hours worked each

workweek by Plaintiffs; (3) the total daily or weekly straight-time

earnings or wages due for hours Plaintiffs worked during the

workday or workweek, exclusive of premium overtime

compensation; and (4) the total premium pay for overtime hours. 

29 C.F.R. § 516.2(a)(1)-(12). 

(36) Defendant has violated the Department of Labor’s record keeping

requirements due to the fact it has failed to maintain a record

indicating the hours Plaintiffs worked each workday, the total hours

worked each week and Plaintiffs’ regular rate of pay. Klinedinst v.

Swift Invs., Inc., 260 F.3d 1251, 1257 (11th Cir. 2001) (employer

obligated to maintain records of the “hours worked each workday

and total hours worked each workweek.”)

(37) The legal consequence of the City’s failure to create and maintain

legally required records is that an award of damages to Plaintiffs

can be rendered, even though the result might only be an

approximate. Donovan v. New Floridian Hotel, Inc., 676 F.2d 468,

471 (11th Cir. 1982); Lyles v. Burt’s Butcher Shoppe & Eatery, Inc.,

2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119286, *16-17 (M.D. Ga. Oct. 17, 2011).

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(38) Plaintiffs have proven that they performed therefore the City must

“come forward with evidence of the precise amount of work

performed or with evidence to negative the reasonableness of the

inference to be drawn from the Plaintiffs’ testimony. In the event

the City fails to do so, damages may be still be awarded Plaintiffs

even though said damages are only approximate.” Contreras v.

Lara's Trucks, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5516, *7-8 (N.D. Ga.

Jan. 11, 2013).

(39) Each Plaintiff contests any defense or position contained in the City

of Montgomery’s contentions in this Pretrial Order or in other parts

of this Order that were not timely or properly raised by the City in

its Answers and/or at the appropriate stage of this case prior to entry

of this Order. No Plaintiff consents to the enlargement of any

defense or contention by the Defendant that was not previously

raised or properly preserved.

(nn) Defendant:

(1) Defendant contends that at all times material to the case, Defendants

paid Plaintiffs as fire protection employees under the § 207(k) partial

exemption based upon an established two-week pay and work

period; that Plaintiffs were and are fire protection employees. 

(2) Defendants paid Plaintiffs as exempt employees under the § 213(a)

exemption for executive employees; that Plaintiffs are, in fact,

executive employees as defined by the Fair Labor Standards Act and

interpretive regulations and, therefore, Sections 206 and 207 of the

Fair Labor Standards Act do not apply to said plaintiffs.

(3) Defendant did not make any decision or take any act to pay Plaintiffs

under either the § 207(k) or § 213(a) exemptions in bad faith. 

Defendant made all decisions and took all actions material to the

case and to the § 207(k) and § 213(a) exemptions in good faith.

5. STIPULATIONS BY AND BETWEEN THE PARTIES:

(a) The term “Plaintiffs” references and includes Roosevelt Watkins and all

the opt-in Plaintiffs who have filed a Consent to Become a Party Plaintiff

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and are listed above. 

(b) The Division of Suppression operates the pumper and ladder trucks and

handles the day-to-day fire side of the Montgomery Fire Department.

(c) The Division of Suppression has one (1) Assistant Chief, Kenneth Bolling,

to whom twelve (12) subordinate District Chiefs report.

(d) The Division of Suppression is divided into four (4) geographical fire 

districts with each having three (3) District Chiefs assigned to it.

(e) Due to rotating shifts, Plaintiffs’ normal tour of duty requires them to

work 104, 112, and 120 hours in successive work periods. 

(f) The City classifies Plaintiffs as “fire protection employees” under 29

U.S.C. § 203(y).

(g) Plaintiffs are trained in fire suppression.

(h) All documents produced by the City of Montgomery are business records.

(i) Plaintiffs customarily and regularly direct the work of two or more other

employees.

(j) Plaintiffs are compensated by the City of Montgomery at a rate of not less

than $455.00 per week.

(k) Plaintiffs receive the same amount of pay for their regular tour of duty

every two weeks.

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

(1) The jury selection and trial of this cause, which is to last (4) days, are set for

February 25, 2013, at 10:00 a.m. at the United States Courthouse in Montgomery Alabama;

(2) A trial docket will be mailed to counsel for each party approximately three (3)

weeks prior to the start of the trial term;

(3) The parties are to file their pre-trial briefs, if any, by February 18, 2013;

(4) Each party shall have available at the time of trial, for use by the court (the

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Judge, the courtroom deputy clerk, and the law clerk), three (3) copies of the Exhibit List and

a sufficient number of copies of each photostatically reproducible exhibit for opposing

counsel, the courtroom deputy clerk, the law clerk, and the Judge to each have a set of the

exhibits;

(5) All deadlines not otherwise affected by this order will remain as set forth in the

Amended Uniform Scheduling Order (Doc. #41) entered by the court on September 30, 2011;

(6) All understandings, agreements, deadlines, and stipulations contained in this

Pretrial Order shall be binding on all parties unless this Order be hereafter modified by Order

of the Court.

(7) Trial in this case shall be bifurcated between the issues of liability and damages.

DONE this the 5

th day of February, 2013.

 /s/ Mark E. Fuller 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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