Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-04227/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-04227-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Hung Q. Ho
Petitioner
Mike Knowles
Respondent
K. Prosper
Respondent

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HUNG Q. HO, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

 v. )

)

MIKE KNOWLES, Warden, )

)

Respondent. ) )

No. C 07-04227 CW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Hung Q. Ho, a prisoner of the State of California

who is incarcerated at the California Medical Facility in Vacaville

(docket #4), filed this pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Court ordered Respondent to show

cause why the petition should not be granted. Respondent has filed

an answer to the petition and a memorandum of points and

authorities and exhibits in support thereof. Petitioner has filed

a traverse to the answer. 

For the reasons outlined below, the Court DENIES the petition

for a writ of habeas corpus on all claims.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 2, 2005, a jury found Petitioner guilty of first degree

burglary and the court found true allegations that Petitioner had

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1The probation report stated that Petitioner had three prior

felony and nine misdemeanor convictions. Resp’t Ex. 1 at 194-95.

2

two prior “serious” felony convictions that also qualified as

“strikes” under California Penal Code Sections 667(a)-(i) and

1170.12. Resp’t Ex. 1 (Clerk's Transcript) at 128-29.1 On July

22, 2005, the court sentenced Petitioner to a term of twenty-five

years to life consecutive to ten years in state prison, and ordered

him to pay a restitution fine of $10,000. Id. 

Petitioner filed a direct appeal to the California Court of

Appeal. On May 1, 2006, the Court of Appeal affirmed the jury

verdict in an unpublished, written opinion. On July 12, 2006,

Petitioner’s petition for review to the Supreme Court of California

was denied, and on May 9, 2007, his state petition for a writ of

habeas corpus was also denied.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

In its written opinion, the California Court of Appeal

summarized the factual background as follows:

Hung Thi Ho has lived in the same house in San Jose

for 21 years. There is a gate between her front and back

yards. To open the gate, you have to reach over the top

of it and undo a latch. In the back of the house is a

sliding glass door with a window next to it. The window

has a lock. 

On February 18, 2004, Ms. Ho bought a desk from

Best Buy. Two Vietnamese men delivered the desk on

either February 21 or 27, 2004. Ms. Ho took time off

work and was there to meet the delivery men. One of

them knocked on the front door. She opened the door for

them and told them to put the desk in her daughter’s

room. They brought the desk in through the front door

and took it to her daughter’s room. They went back to

the truck to get the boards needed to make the shelves,

then came back and assembled the desk. Afterwards, they

left through the front door. Ms. Ho watched the two men

the entire time they were in her house, except while

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they assembled the desk. At no time did the men go into

her kitchen, into the room with the sliding-glass door,

or into her backyard. 

Anthony Nguyen, as assistant manager at Best Buy,

testified that defendant and Minh Tran delivered Ms.

Ho’s desk. At the time, defendant was a part time

employee of Best Buy. Mr. Tran testified that he and

defendant went to Ms. Ho’s front door with the desk. 

When Ms. Ho answered the door they took the desk inside. 

It took them two trips to bring the desk in, and then

they assembled it with a screwdriver and ratchet. They

left through the front door. They never went into the

kitchen or the backyard. 

On April 27, 2004, Ms. Ho left her house for work

around 9:00 a.m. The back window was locked when she

left. Sometime in the afternoon her daughter called to

tell her that a window on the back of her house was

broken. She told her daughter to leave the house and

then she called the police. She went home and found

that the window on the back of her house was broken, its

screen was off, and a screwdriver was near the door. 

She also found that a VCR and a DVD player were missing

from the room next to the kitchen, and a VCR and a DVD

player were missing from her daughter’s room. An

officer came to her home that same day. 

Detective Robert Fischer was dispatched to Ms. Ho’s

house at approximately 4:00 p.m. on April 27, 2004. He

spoke with Ms. Ho and went inside the house. He saw a

window at the back of the house had broken glass on the

inside windowsill. Two panes at the lower center of the

window, near the middle latch and lock, were broken. 

The window screen was on the ground in the backyard to

the left of the window. He dusted the window for

fingerprints. He found several smudges and one clear

print on the outside of the window, to the left of the

broken panes. A screwdriver found inside the home was

given to him by Ms. Ho’s daughter as evidence. 

Michael Valverde testified as an expert in

fingerprint collection, documentation, comparison, and

analysis. He was one of two examiners who compared the

latent print Detective Fischer found with the

fingerprints in his database. He determined that the

latent print matched the left thumb on defendant’s 1987

10-print fingerprint card. The match was verified by

another fingerprint examiner. Valverde testified on

cross-examination that a fingerprint can remain on a

glass surface under optimum conditions for years, so he

has no idea how long the latent print was on the surface

from where it was collected. 

Ms. Ho testified that she does not know defendant,

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nor does she recognize him from the desk delivery or

otherwise. He is not related to her and has never lived

with her or her family. She never gave him permission

to go into her backyard or her house, and she did not

give him permission to take the VCRs or DVD players from

her house. 

People v. Ho, 2006 WL 1150834 at *1-2 (Cal. App. 6th Dist.

2006) (Resp't Ex. 6).

LEGAL STANDARD 

A federal court may entertain a habeas petition from a state

prisoner "only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of

the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act (AEDPA), a district court may not grant a petition

challenging a state conviction or sentence on the basis of a claim

that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state

court’s adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that

was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court

of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d). A decision is contrary to clearly established federal

law if it fails to apply the correct controlling authority, or if

it applies the controlling authority to a case involving facts

materially indistinguishable from those in a controlling case, but

nonetheless reaches a different result. Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d

1062, 1067 (9th. Cir. 2003). 

Even if the state court's ruling is contrary to or an

unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, that error

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CALJIC No. 2.01 reads: 

However, a finding of guilt as to any crime may not

be based on circumstantial evidence unless the proved

circumstances are not only (1) consistent with the theory

that the defendant is guilty of the crime, but (2) cannot

be reconciled with any other rational conclusion. [¶]

Further, each fact which is essential to complete a set

(continued...)

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justifies habeas relief only if the error resulted in "actual

prejudice." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993).

The only definitive source of clearly established federal law

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is the holdings of the Supreme Court as

of the time of the relevant state court decision. Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000).

To determine whether the state court’s decision is contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

law, a federal court looks to the decision of the highest state

court that addressed the merits of a petitioner’s claim in a

reasoned decision. LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th

Cir. 2000). If the state court only considered state law, the

federal court must ask whether state law, as explained by the state

court, is "contrary to" clearly established governing federal law. 

Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2001). 

DISCUSSION

I. FAILURE TO GIVE CALJIC NO. 2.01

A. Petitioner’s Claim

Petitioner claims that the trial court violated his federal

right to due process by using the wrong jury instruction on

circumstantial evidence. Specifically, he claims that the trial

court should have instructed the jury pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.01

rather than CALJIC No. 2.02.2

 Petitioner argues that CALJIC No. 

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2(...continued)

of circumstances must be proved beyond a reasonable

doubt. In other words, before an inference essential to

establish guilt may be found to have been proved beyond a

reasonable doubt, each fact or circumstance on which the

inference necessarily rests must be proved beyond a

reasonable doubt. [¶] Also, if the circumstantial

evidence [as to any particular count] permits two

reasonable interpretations, one of which points to the

defendant's guilt and the other to [his][her] innocence,

you must adopt that interpretation that points to the

defendant's innocence, and reject that interpretation

that points to [his][her] guilt. [¶] If, on the other

hand, one interpretation of this evidence appears to you

to be reasonable and the other interpretation to be

unreasonable, you must accept the reasonable

interpretation and reject the unreasonable.

CALJIC No. 2.02 reads: 

The specific intent with which an act is done may be

shown by the circumstances surrounding the commission of

the act. However, you may not find the defendant guilty

of the crime charged unless the proved circumstances

[are] not only, one, consistent with the theory that the

defendant had the required specific intent but, two,

can't be reconciled with any other rational conclusion.

[¶] Also, if the evidence as to any specific intent

permits two reasonable interpretations, one of which

points to the existence of the specific intent and the

other to its absence, you must adopt that interpretation

which points to its absence. If on the other hand one

interpretation of the evidence as to the specific intent

appears to you to be reasonable and the other

interpretation to be unreasonable, you must accept the

reasonable interpretation and reject the unreasonable.

6

2.02 should only be given in lieu of CALJIC No. 2.01 when specific

intent is the only element of the case that rests on circumstantial

evidence, whereas here all of the elements, not just specific

intent, rested on circumstantial evidence. Petitioner claims that

by using No 2.01 instead of No. 2.02, the trial court lowered the

prosecution’s burden of proof in violation of due process. 

B. State Court Analysis

The Court of Appeal’s summary of the relevant facts and

analysis on this issue are as follows:

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In instructing the jury, the court gave CALJIC No. 2.00 

[direct and circumstantial evidence-inferences], and

CALJIC No. 2.02 [sufficiency of circumstantial evidence

to prove specific intent or mental state]. The court did

not give, and the record does not indicate that defense

counsel requested, CALJIC No. 2.01 [sufficiency of

circumstantial evidence-generally].

The People concede that the court erred in failing to

give CALJIC No. 2.01 rather than CALJIC No. 2.02. We

agree with the concession. The trial court has a sua

sponte duty to instruct the jury with CALJIC No. 2.01 on

the effect to be given circumstantial evidence when

circumstantial evidence is substantially relied on for

proof of guilt. CALJIC Nos. 2.01 and 2.02 are alternative

instructions. CALJIC No. 2.01, “[t]he general instruction

on sufficiency of circumstantial evidence[,] is a more

inclusive instruction on sufficiency of circumstantial

evidence than [CALJIC No. 2.02,] the instruction on

sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to prove specific

intent or mental state, and the former is the proper

instruction to give unless the only element of the

offense that rests substantially or entirely on

circumstantial evidence is that of specific intent or

mental state.” (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal. 4th 1158,

1222; see also Use Notes to CALJIC Nos. 2.01 and 2.02

(Oct. 2005 ed.).)

The question remains whether the error was prejudicial.

Defendant first contends that failure to give CALJIC No.

2.01 was federal constitutional error. He argues that,

because the principles enunciated in CALJIC No. 2.01 flow

from the reasonable doubt standard, and error in

instructing on reasonable doubt constitutes federal

constitutional error (see Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993)

508 U.S. 275, 278-282), failure to give CALJIC No. 2.01

constitutes federal constitutional error. We disagree.

The error here was instructing on the sufficiency of

circumstantial evidence, not in instructing on reasonable

doubt. The court instructed the jury with CALJIC No.

2.90, which correctly defines reasonable doubt. (See

People v. Hearon (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1285, 1286-1287.)

Therefore, federal constitutional error has not been

shown.

Defendant correctly contends that, under California law,

the error in giving CALJIC No. 2.02 rather than CALJIC

No. 2.01 was prejudicial if there was a reasonable

probability that he would have been acquitted had CALJIC

No. 2.01 been given instead. (See People v. Watson (1956)

46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) Defendant argues that the “key

principle found in both [CALJIC] Nos. 2.01 and 2.02 is

that the defendant is entitled to an acquittal if the

inferences to be drawn from circumstantial evidence are

equally consistent with both guilt and innocence. Here,

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the jury was misled into believing that this principle

applied only to the issue of specific intent and not to

the issue of whether the presence of [defendant's]

fingerprint adequately proved that he was the

perpetrator.” “Since [CALJIC] No. 2.02 was given as to

the specific intent element of burglary, the jury

naturally believed that the principle stated in the

instruction did not apply to the proof of any other

factual matter.” Defendant cites People v. Salas (1976)

58 Cal.App.3d 460 (Salas), disapproved on another point

in People v. Wolcott (1983) 34 Cal.3d 92, 109, in support

of his argument.

In their arguments to the jury, the prosecutor and

defense counsel discussed and applied the circumstantial

evidence rule. In his opening argument, the prosecutor

told the jury: “Now, the thing with circumstantial

evidence, and there's an instruction which if there are

two interpretations of that evidence, just like baseball,

tie goes to the runner. If there are two reasonable

interpretations of the evidence, the benefit goes to the

defendant. That's the way the system is set up. All this

is designed to not make the defendant look guilty. From

the get go, this system is designed to give him a lot of

breaks. And one of the breaks is if circumstantial

evidence has two reasonable interpretations and one of

them benefits the defendant, that's the one you have to

adopt. The key word is reasonable and rational. If

there's two interpretations and only one of them is

reasonable, only one of them is rational, then even if

the unreasonable one benefits the defendant, you adopt

the reasonable interpretation. If more than one

reasonable interpretation, then you choose the one that

benefits the defendant. If you only have one reasonable

interpretation though as in this case, you adopt that

interpretation regardless whether or not it benefits the

defendant.” Defense counsel argued that the

circumstantial evidence presented was insufficient to

prove that defendant committed the charged burglary. In

closing, the prosecutor argued that, under the

circumstantial evidence rule, his view of the evidence

was the only reasonable explanation for the evidence.

In this case, it appears that defendant did not object to

the court's proposal of giving CALJIC No. 2.02 rather

than CALJIC No. 2.01. Moreover, it appears that the

parties and the court discussed the issue and that

defendant stipulated to the instructions as given. While

it appears counsel for defendant made a reasoned decision

to request the more limited instruction, we need not

decide whether defendant invited the error because we

find the error harmless.

In determining whether instructional error is

prejudicial, the California Supreme Court has declared

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that the reviewing court may reverse a conviction “‘only

if, “after an examination of the entire cause, including

the evidence” [citation], it appears “reasonably

probable” the defendant would have obtained a more

favorable outcome had the error not occurred.’” (People

v. Lasko (2000) 23 Cal.4th 101, 111.) In this case, the

court gave CALJIC No. 2.00, the general instruction on

direct and circumstantial evidence and making possible

inferences, as well as CALJIC No. 2.02. Both CALJIC Nos.

2.01 and 2.02 tell jurors that in order to convict a

defendant key circumstantial evidence of the prosecution

must be irreconcilable with any conclusion other than

guilt and that if two reasonable interpretations of this

evidence exist, the interpretation favorable to the

defendant must be adopted. The court also gave

instructions on witness credibility (CALJIC Nos. 2.20 and

2.21.1) and the presumption of innocence and the burden

of proof (CALJIC No. 2.90).

...

Based on the instructions and arguments of counsel, the

jury was fairly advised how to evaluate circumstantial

evidence and was instructed to draw reasonable inferences

and weigh the competing inferences from the evidence.

Here, although the more inclusive language of CALJIC No.

2.01 might have been more suitable, there was no

possibility that the jury would be misled by CALJIC No.

2.02 into believing that the requirements embodied in

that instruction could not be applied to the question of

whether defendant entered Ms. Ho's residence with the

required specific intent, as was required for the

conviction of first degree burglary. Defendant does not

contest the sufficiency of the evidence to support his

conviction. Accordingly, we conclude that it is not

reasonably probable that defendant would have achieved a

better result had CALJIC No. 2.01 been given rather than

CALJIC No. 2.02. (People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at

p. 836; People v. Lasko, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 111.)

Ho, 2006 WL 1150834 at *8-10.

C. Applicable Federal Law 

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects

the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a

reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime

charged. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 

To obtain federal collateral relief based on an error in the

jury charge, a petitioner must show that the ailing instruction by

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itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction

violated due process. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72

(1991). The fact that the jury instruction was incorrect under

state law is not a basis for habeas relief. Id. The instruction

may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be considered

in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial

record. Id. 

D. Analysis

Although the trial court used CALJIC No. 2.02 instead of No.

2.01, this did not impinge on Petitioner's due process right not

to be found guilty except upon proof of every element of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt. To begin with, the instructions

addressed circumstantial evidence and did not discuss the

reasonable doubt standard at all. The jury was properly informed

of the correct reasonable doubt standard in another instruction

pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.90. See Lisenbee v. Henry, 166 F.3d 997,

999-1000 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding CALJIC No. 2.90 constitutionally

fit). Furthermore, CALJIC No. 2.02, like CALJIC No. 2.01,

properly explained to the jury that if two reasonable

interpretations of circumstantial evidence exist, the

interpretation favorable to the defendant must be used. As noted

by the Court of Appeal, counsel also explained this point in their

argument to the jury. Ho, 2006 WL 1150834 at *10. 

Based on the instructions and trial record as a whole, there

is no indication that the use of CALJIC No. 2.02 instead of No.

2.01 would have caused the jury to believe that it did not have to

find all the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Accordingly, the California Court of Appeal's conclusion that the

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state law error in the jury instruction did not rise to the level

of federal constitutional error was neither contrary to nor an

unreasonable application of federal law. 

II. RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE

A. Petitioner’s Claim

Petitioner claims that an evidentiary ruling by the trial

court precluded him from presenting the defense that he placed the

finger print on the window, not when the house was burglarized in

April, 2004, but when he delivered the desk in February, 2004.

B. State Court Analysis 

The Court of Appeal summarized the evidentiary rulings at

trial as follows:

Defendant moved in limine to exclude any reference to his

prior convictions. The prosecutor sought to introduce,

for purposes of impeachment, four of defendant's prior

convictions: a 1987 conviction for first degree burglary,

a 1987 conviction for second degree burglary, a 1989

conviction for first degree burglary, and a 1994

conviction for auto burglary. The court ruled, pursuant

to Evidence Code section 352, that it would not admit the

priors for impeachment.

The prosecutor separately moved in limine to admit the

1987 and 1989 first degree burglary convictions under

Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), as evidence

of defendant's intent to steal as well as to show the

absence of an innocent mistake. The court ruled as

follows: “I have ruled tentatively and I will rule at

this time as a final ruling that the People's

case-in-chief should not include these [Evidence Code

section] 1101(b) items unless the defendant puts on

evidence for or puts on cross-examination or insinuates

there is a mistake or an innocent way the fingerprint got

on the window where the home was broken into. We had a

discussion about where the line would be drawn. [Defense

counsel] understood that beyond a reasonable doubt he

could argue and he could do his job and he could

vigorously defend his client, but if he says things such

as quote, well, we all know what happens when delivery

guys go to a home and check if people are there, that

that would open the door because it is indicating that

the fingerprint got on there by a mistake or innocent way

and puts the specific intent at issue. So that there is

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no problem in this area before any evidence of any prior

criminality of the defendant is mentioned in any way in

front of the jury I am ordering that both attorneys need

to get a ruling from the judge by way of approaching or

taking a recess so that it's not done on the fly, but

that the court is allowed critical analysis and

reconsideration. And it's not clear whether the defendant

is testifying yet or not, that would also be a factor in

the court's decision depending on what the testimony is.”

...

My prior ruling regarding if the defendant puts on a

defense that the defendant put the fingerprint on the

backyard window when he was looking for the occupants in

the house or it implies that, then the intent is squarely

at issue and the priors would come in under [Evidence

Code section 1101, subdivision (b) ]. The People argued

previously that intent is an issue whenever the declarant

pleads not guilty. I indicated that is true, however, the

court has taken a conservative view to protect the

defendant's rights.”

Defense counsel then argued: “Because of the court's

ruling under [Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision

(b)] and based on the age of the priors, and I know that

they are similar in nature, I think it's limiting the

defense to what I can argue. And I can basically argue

the science of the fingerprints is what the court has

ruled, and the other area I'm going to argue is-or at

least cross-examine witnesses on is their memory as to

what happened during that delivery. Did they-are they

sure that they remember everywhere that delivery people

went? And I don't know if I can argue that either. And so

I'd like a ruling on that if I can probe their memories

as to the day of the delivery and where everybody went or

am I opening up the door there? And I think-and that's

all I can-that's all the defense has in this case. I

think the ruling based on the age of the priors somewhat

violates my client's due process both under the 14th, 5th

and 6th amendments because we're kind of hamstrung as to

what we can argue in this case.”

After the prosecutor stated that he would “find that

objectionable if those questions were asked,” the court

stated: “Okay. So I guess the question would really go to

what are you attempting to do when you're examining them?

Are you attempting to lay out your defense that he went

around the backyard and looked in the window and put his

finger on the window? Are you simply trying to test their

memories about whether this person really came to the

door or not or was it the other fellow, et cetera? And

I'll just have to see when I see.”

The prosecutor argued: “While I agree that the defense is

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limited, I think we can't forget the fact that the

defense is limited by its own choice to try and avoid

creating a situation where rebuttal evidence as to a

defense theory becomes viable. Defense is not limited in

any way. The problem is they just don't like the evidence

that's going to become relevant if they go down that line

of defense. It's the defendant's choice. If he wants to

argue that the print was left there in February, he's

entitled to. I want the record to be clear. He's not

being prohibited from doing that. The problem is then it

becomes relevant this past situation, actually two

situations, where the same type of victim, the same type

of day, same type of crime, same type of item stolen,

becomes very probative as to whether or not he's telling

the truth when he says or when he argues that he left the

print there two months before the burglary happened.”

After all witnesses had testified, but before the parties

rested, in a hearing outside the presence of the jury,

the prosecutor contended that defense counsel's

cross-examination of Ms. Ho and Mr. Tran was intended to

create an inference that defendant could have left his

print somewhere else in the house without either of them

being able to see. He contended that defendant's

cross-examination of these witnesses was designed to

undermine the witnesses' credibility, and that his

cross-examination of Mr. Valverde was meant to bolster

his claim that defendant's print could have been left in

February and survived through April. The court responded:

“I find that the questions to this point would not rise

to the level of me overruling my in limine ruling on the

[Evidence Code section] 1101(b) so that ruling will

stand. We still have the closing arguments. We'll see how

that plays out, how [defense counsel] uses the

information or doesn't use the information, and then

we'll look at it again.”

Defendant did not testify. After the prosecutor rested,

defense counsel rested without calling any witnesses.

Ho, 2006 WL 1150834 at *2-6. 

The Court of Appeal held that the trial court did not deny

Petitioner the right to present his defense. Ho, 2006 WL 1150834

at *7. The ruling on the motions in limine did not preclude

Petitioner from putting forth his defense. He could have crossexamined the prosecution’s witnesses about the fingerprints being

placed in February. Defense counsel’s decision not to do so was a

matter of trial strategy. Id. 

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The appellate court further found that Petitioner’s reliance

on Conde v. Henry, 198 F.3d 734 (9th Cir. 1999), was misplaced. 

In Conde, the defense had two inconsistent theories of the case

and the trial court’s ruling erroneously precluded defense counsel

from presenting evidence on and arguing one of his alternative

theories. Id. at 739. In Petitioner’s case, the trial court’s

ruling did not prohibit defense counsel from presenting evidence

on or arguing Petitioner’s theory of the case. Ho, 2006 WL

115083, at *7. The trial court simply ruled that if Petitioner

intended to argue that his finger print was placed at Ms. Ho’s

house in February, then the prosecution would be permitted to

introduce rebuttal evidence of Petitioner’s prior burglaries. Id.

The Court of Appeal noted that the trial court’s ruling placed

Petitioner in a situation similar to the dilemma often faced by

defendants who must decide whether or not to testify after the

trial court rules that their priors are admissible for

impeachment. Id. In that situation, the United States Supreme

Court has held that a defendant must testify and be impeached in

order to preserve the point for appeal. See Luce v. United

States, 469 U.S. 38, 41-43 (1984); see also People

v. Collins, 42 Cal.3d 378, 383-88 (1986) (adopting rule in Luce). 

Petitioner here did not make the triggering argument and thus did

not preserve the point. The Court of Appeal concluded that the

trial court’s ruling did not violate Petitioner’s constitutional

rights to present a defense. Ho, 2006 WL 115083, at *7. 

C. Applicable Federal Law 

A state court’s procedural or evidentiary ruling is not

subject to federal habeas review unless the ruling violates

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federal law. Walters v. Maas, 45 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1995). 

The Sixth Amendment affords an accused in a criminal trial the

right to present a defense. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S.

284, 294 (1973). 

D. Analysis

The Court of Appeal reasonably concluded that, under federal

law, Petitioner was not denied his right to present a defense. 

Unlike Conde, Petitioner was not affirmatively prevented from

presenting his defense. Cf. Conde, 198 F.3d at 740-41 (the trial

court affirmatively prevented the defendant from presenting one of

two theories of his defense). Here, the trial court simply ruled

that it would allow the prior convictions into evidence if

Petitioner argued that he innocently placed his fingerprint in Ms.

Ho’s house in February. The trial court did not prohibit

Petitioner from making that argument; the decision whether to do

so was in the hands of Petitioner and his counsel. That

Petitioner’s prior convictions would have been admitted if he did

so did not prevent him from presenting the defense any more than

it prevented him from testifying. Petitioner and defense counsel

made a strategic decision not to present a defense under the

circumstances, but that decision was not forced by the trial

court. Cf. Luce, 469 U.S. at 41-43 (holding defendant must

testify and be impeached in order to preserve for appeal challenge

to trial court’s ruling prior convictions are admissible for

impeachment).

Accordingly, the Court of Appeal's determination that

Petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to present a defense was not

violated by the trial court’s evidentiary ruling was neither

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contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law. 

In addition, the trial court’s ruling did not violate

Petitioner’s right to due process because the evidence of his

prior residential burglaries was relevant for at least some

permissible purpose. “Only if there are no permissible inferences

the jury may draw from the evidence can its admission violate due

process”. Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir.

1991). Here, the prior convictions had some permissible purpose,

namely as evidence that Petitioner had the intent to commit the

burglary in this case. Consequently, the state court’s denial of

this claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application

of federal due process law. 

III. RESTITUTION FINE

Petitioner claims that he was deprived of the effective

assistance of counsel when his trial attorney failed to object to

the $10,000 restitution fine. Because this claim does not affect

the validity or duration of Petitioner's confinement and a

favorable determination would not entitle Petitioner to be

released from custody at an earlier date, the claim is 

not a cognizable basis for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

See Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 859 (9th Cir. 2003) ("habeas

jurisdiction is absent where a successful challenge to a prison

condition will not necessarily shorten the prisoner's sentence");

cf. United States v. Thiele, 314 F.3d 399, 401 (9th Cir. 2002)

(holding that review of restitution orders is not properly brought

in a habeas petition). Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to

federal habeas relief on this claim.

//

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3 Petitioner refers to a 1998 felony conviction, but this

appears to be a typographical error because the record indicates

that his two prior felony convictions in California were in 1987

and 1989. Resp't. Ex. 1 at 193-94.

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IV. SELECTIVE APPLICATION OF PRIOR STRIKES

A. Petitioner’s Claim

Petitioner claims that the use of his prior strikes and

serious felony convictions for sentence enhancements in the

present case violated his rights to due process and equal

protection because the convictions had not been used against him

as priors previously. Petitioner believes that, because he did

not receive sentence enhancements based on prior felony

convictions when he was previously convicted in California, in

1987 and 1989,3 it was improper to use prior convictions to

enhance his sentence in 2005.

B. Analysis 

Petitioner did not raise this claim on direct appeal to the

California Court of Appeal, and therefore a reasoned state court

opinion is not available. The fact that sentence enhancements for

prior convictions had not been applied to Petitioner previously

did not preclude the trial court from applying such enhancements

to the 2005 conviction, as long as there is no evidence that the

prosecution was motivated by any improper reason. The conscious

exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a

federal constitutional violation. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448,

456 (1962). To violate the constitution, it must be “stated that

the selection was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable

standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary

classification.” Id. Petitioner has not alleged or attempted to

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4

 More general challenges to the use of priors to enhance

current sentences, based on contentions of equal protection, bill

of attainder and double jeopardy against recidivist statutes such

as California Penal Code section 667 and 667.5 generally have been

dismissed as meritless. See Jackson v. Nelson, 435 F.2d 553, 553

(9th Cir. 1971). 

5 Petitioner lists the Eighth Amendment, but he offer any

argument as to how an alleged breach of his prior plea agreements

might have violated his Eighth Amendment rights. He cites no

authority, and this Court is aware of none, that the breach of a

plea agreement may violate the Eighth Amendment. In any event, for

the reasons discussed below, the sentence enhancements did not

breach any previous plea agreements.

18

show that imposition of the enhancements here was based on his

race, religion, or any other protected class. Absent such a

showing, the exercise of selectivity in the application of the

enhancements is not a federal constitutional violation.4

V. EX POST FACTO AND CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CLAIMS

A. Petitioner’s Claim

Petitioner claims that the use of his prior convictions and

prison terms violated his prior plea agreements and, therefore,

violated his rights under the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Due

Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment.5

B. Analysis

Petitioner did not raise this claim on direct appeal to the

California Court of Appeal, and therefore a reasoned state court

opinion is not available. The application of an enhancement due

to a prior conviction is not a violation of the Ex Post Facto

Clause of the United States Constitution. See McDonald v.

Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311, 312-13 (1901); see also United States

v. Sorenson, 914 F.2d 173, 174 (9th Cir. 1990) (dismissing ex post

facto challenge as meritless), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1099 (1991). 

The enhancement is not a penalty for the prior offense. See

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6 Petitioner offers no separate argument about the Eighth

Amendment. He cites no authority, and this Court is aware of none,

that the breach of a plea agreement may violate a defendant's

Eighth Amendment rights. In any event, for the reasons discussed

below, the sentence enhancements did not breach any prior plea

agreements.

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McDonald, 180 U.S. at 312-13. It is the repetitive nature of the

present offense that the enhancement punishes. See id. Here, the

enhancements based on Petitioner’s prior offenses did not violate

the Ex Post Facto Clause because they were not a penalty for the

prior offenses, but rather for Petitioner's being a repeat

offender. 

Using the prior convictions to enhance Petitioner's current

sentence also did not breach any previous plea bargain, or violate

his constitutional rights to due process or under the Eighth

Amendment. The prosecution’s breach of a plea agreement may

constitute a violation of due process.6 See Santobello v. New

York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971). Petitioner has not alleged or

indicated that anything in any previous plea bargain precluded his

convictions from later being used to enhance a sentence on a

future conviction. 

Moreover, the sentence enhancements did not render

Petitioner's prior guilty pleas involuntary, in violation of due

process. A defendant must be advised of the range of allowable

punishment that will result from his plea; however, the court does

not need to advise him of all possible collateral consequences. 

See Torrey v. Estelle, 842 F.2d 234, 235 (9th Cir. 1988). Among

the "collateral" consequences of which a defendant need not be

advised is the possibility that the conviction pursuant to the

guilty plea will later be used to as a sentence enhancement. See

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United States v. Garrett, 680 F.2d 64, 65-66 (9th Cir. 1982). 

Even if Petitioner was not aware that his prior convictions

subject to plea agreements could be used for sentence

enhancements, his due process rights were not violated. 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim that the sentence

enhancements violated his constitutional rights fails. 

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The

clerk shall enter judgement and close the file. All pending

motions are terminated. Each party shall bear his own costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 2/8/10

 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HUNG Q HO,

Plaintiff,

 v.

K PROSPER et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV07-04227 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on February 8, 2010, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing

said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle

located in the Clerk's office.

Hung Q. Ho D-73820

CA Medical Facility

I-1-133-Low

P.O. Box 2000

Vacaville, CA 95696-2000

Dated: February 8, 2010

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Sheilah Cahill, Deputy Clerk

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