Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-16340/USCOURTS-ca9-14-16340-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John Clint Draper
Appellant
E. Rogers
Appellee
D. Rosario
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOHN CLINT DRAPER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

D. ROSARIO, Officer; E.

ROGERS, Lieutenant,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 14-16340

D.C. No.

2:10-cv-00032-KJM-EFB

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Kimberly J. Mueller, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted May 11, 2016

San Francisco, California

Filed September 7, 2016

Before: Kim McLane Wardlaw, Richard A. Paez,

and Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Paez;

Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Bea

 Case: 14-16340, 09/07/2016, ID: 10114166, DktEntry: 74-1, Page 1 of 37
2 DRAPER V. ROSARIO

SUMMARY*

Civil Rights

In an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by a

California state prisoner, the panel affirmed the district

court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s procedural due process claim,

affirmed the district court’s evidentiary rulings, and vacated

the district court’s award of costs in favor of defendants and

remanded.

Plaintiff alleged a violation of his Eighth Amendment

right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment stemming

from a physical altercation with a prison officer. Plaintiff

also alleged that in the administrative disciplinary proceeding

that followed the altercation, the presiding officer deprived

plaintiff of a fair hearing in violation of his Fourteenth

Amendment procedural due process rights.

The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of

plaintiff’s procedural due process claim for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform

Act. The panel held that even though defendants filed an

unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion rather than a motion for

summary judgment on the exhaustion issue, remand was not

necessary because the district court applied the correct

summary judgment standard. The panel further held that

because plaintiff failed to rebut defendants’ evidence of

non-exhaustion, the district court properly dismissed the

claim.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

 Case: 14-16340, 09/07/2016, ID: 10114166, DktEntry: 74-1, Page 2 of 37
DRAPER V. ROSARIO 3

Affirming the district court’s evidentiary rulings, the

panel held that the district court did not err by excluding

testimony from an inmate witness. The panel further held that

counsel in a civil trial may not rely on evidence outside the

record to vouch for the credibility of witnesses. In this case,

defense counsel improperly vouched for the credibility of

correctional officer witnesses during closing argument. On

plain error review, however, the district court’s failure to

correct the error sua sponte did not warrant reversal.

Finally, the panel held that because several factors

weighed heavily against a large cost award in this case, and

severe injustice would result from such an award, the district

court abused its discretion in taxing costs of $3,018.35

against plaintiff. Accordingly, the panel vacated the cost

award and remanded for the district court to reconsider

whether a cost award was warranted, and, if so, an

appropriate amount, in light of the panel’s opinion.

Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge Bea

agreed with the majority that the judgment in favor of the

defendants should be affirmed. He dissented in part, stating

that the district court did not abuse its discretion in taxing

costs against the plaintiff because the district court justifiably

followed the presumption of taxing costs against the losing

party.

 Case: 14-16340, 09/07/2016, ID: 10114166, DktEntry: 74-1, Page 3 of 37
4 DRAPER V. ROSARIO

COUNSEL

Matthew Guarnieri (argued) and Paul R.Q. Wolfson, Wilmer

Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Washington, D.C., for

Plaintiff-Appellant.

Suzanne Antley (argued), Deputy Attorney General; Thomas

S. Patterson, Supervising DeputyAttorney General; Jonathan

L. Wolff, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Kamala D.

Harris, AttorneyGeneral; Office of the AttorneyGeneral, San

Diego, California, for Defendant-Appellee D. Rosario.

OPINION

PAEZ, Circuit Judge:

In this prisoner civil rights action, plaintiff John Clint

Draper (“Draper”) alleged a violation of his Eighth

Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual

punishment stemming from a physical altercation with

defendant Officer David Rosario (“Rosario”). Draper also

alleged that in the administrative disciplinary proceeding that

followed the altercation, the presiding officer, defendant

Lieutenant E. Rogers (“Rogers”), deprived him of a fair

hearing in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment procedural

due process rights. The district court dismissed the due

process claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies

as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995

(“PLRA”). 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The Eighth Amendment

claim was tried before a jury, which returned a verdict in

favor of Rosario. On appeal, Draper argues that the district

court erred in dismissing his procedural due process claim

and in excluding the testimony of a certain prisoner who

 Case: 14-16340, 09/07/2016, ID: 10114166, DktEntry: 74-1, Page 4 of 37
DRAPER V. ROSARIO 5

allegedly witnessed the altercation. He also argues that the

district court erred in allowing opposing counsel to make

improper statements during closing argument. Finally,

Draper appeals the district court’s order taxing costs totaling

$3,018.35.

We affirm the district court’s dismissal of Draper’s

procedural due process claim and the court’s evidentiary

rulings. We conclude that defense counsel improperly

vouched for the credibility of correctional officer witnesses

during closing argument, but on plain error review, the

district court’s failure to correct the error sua sponte does not

warrant reversal. Finally, we hold that the district court

abused its discretion in awarding $3,018.35 in costs. We

therefore affirm in part, vacate the award of costs, and

remand.

I.

At the time of the altercation, Draper was a 61-year-old

prisoner housed at the California State Prison in Solano

(“C.S.P.-Solano”). He was considered mobility impaired and

used a cane to walk. He was assigned to work as a porter in

the prison, where his job was to clean tables in Building Four. 

On September 9, 2009, Rosario accused Draper of not

cleaning the tables and ordered him to report to the

correctional officers’ office. Draper complied, and while he

stood outside the office, the two had a conversation about

whether Draper had performed his porter duties. Draper

became upset, swore at Rosario, and accused him of lying. 

Rosario claimed that Draper then stepped into the office

across a red line delineating an area that prisoners could not

enter without permission, and that he told Draper to step

back, which Draper did. Draper disputes that he ever stepped

 Case: 14-16340, 09/07/2016, ID: 10114166, DktEntry: 74-1, Page 5 of 37
6 DRAPER V. ROSARIO

over the red line. Rosario then ordered Draper to drop his

cane and to put his hands behind his back. Draper complied,

and Rosario placed him in handcuffs.

What happened next is disputed.1 Draper testified that

Rosario suddenly slammed him against the sally port gate that

leads out of Building Four. Draper explained that he put a

foot out to try to stop himself from “hitting the grill gate with

full force” but that he still “hit the grill gate hard.” Draper

testified that the force of Rosario slamming him against the

gate caused him to bounce off and fall to the ground, and that

Rosario “jumped down in the middle of [Draper’s] back”

with his knee, pushing his full body weight into Draper. He

explained that Rosario then twisted Draper’s arm behind his

back, and he “heard the bone pop.” Draper testified that

Rosario then slammed his head against the concrete and that

Draper eventually heard someone say, “Get off of him.”

Rosario’s version of events is quite different. He testified

that as he reached for his radio to notify the yard staff that he

would be leading an inmate out of the building, Draper

unexpectedly “placed his foot on the grill gate, and lunged his

body back towards” Rosario. Rosario explained that, while

keeping his hands on Draper, he moved out of the way as

Draper fell to the ground. He then held Draper down until

1 We take the factual background relating to the altercation between

Draper and Rosario from the evidence presented at trial. In doing so, we

construe the facts in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict. Pavao

v. Pagay, 307 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). Nonetheless, we describe

both parties’ version of events because an appropriate cost award,

discussed in Part II.D, depends in part on “the closeness and difficulty of

the issues in the case.” Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms, Inc., 743 F.3d

1236, 1248 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Ass’n of Mex.-Am. Educators v.

California, 231 F.3d 572, 592–93 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)).

 Case: 14-16340, 09/07/2016, ID: 10114166, DktEntry: 74-1, Page 6 of 37
DRAPER V. ROSARIO 7

other officers arrived a few minutes later. Aside from

holding Draper down, Rosario denied using any force.

Later that day, Rosario wrote a rules violation report

charging Draper with assault on a peace officer. Another

staff member, Rogers, ultimately conducted a hearing on the

rules violation charge and found Draper guilty. Draper filed

several grievances related to these events, including one that

accused Rogers of having determined his guilt before the

hearing. Draper did not, however, complete the three levels

of the administrative appeal process for the grievance against

Rogers.2

Draper filed a pro se complaint in district court pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights by Rosario, Rogers, and

several other defendants (“Defendants”).3 The district court

granted Draper in forma pauperis status. After the district

court screened the complaint and found that it stated

cognizable claims, the court ordered Defendants to respond. 

 

2

 In California’s prison system, a prisoner may administratively appeal

“any policy, decision, action, condition, or omission by the department or

its staff that the inmate . . . can demonstrate as having a material adverse

effect upon his or her health, safety, or welfare.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15,

§ 3084.1. There is one informal level and three formal levels of review,

although lower levels of review may be bypassed by administrators. To

satisfy the exhaustion requirement of the PLRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), a

prisoner is generally required to appeal the grievance and receive a

decision at the third level of review. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(b).

3 Draper’s complaint included allegations that a third correctional officer

had violated his due process rights by altering a videotape documenting

Draper’s injuries and that prison medical staff had improperly denied him

medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Draper does not

challenge the dismissal of these claims.

 Case: 14-16340, 09/07/2016, ID: 10114166, DktEntry: 74-1, Page 7 of 37
8 DRAPER V. ROSARIO

Defendants moved to dismiss all claims. Relevant to this

appeal, Defendants argued that Draper had failed to exhaust

his claim against Rogers through the prison grievance

process. The district court dismissed Draper’s due process

claim for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies but

declined to dismiss the Eighth Amendment claim against

Rosario. Rosario moved for summary judgment, which the

district court denied, finding that there were triable issues of

fact. The court also appointed pro bono counsel to represent

Draper at trial.

Draper proceeded to trial on his claim that Rosario had

violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from

excessive force. See, e.g., Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1,

6–7 (1992). Prior to trial, Draper requested that three

prisoner eyewitnesses be allowed to testify. The district court

issued writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum for two

witnesses, Mario Thompson and John Doe.4 The court denied

Draper’s request with respect to the third witness, Richard

Shepard, because Shepard had been transferred to a different

prison and would be more difficult to transport to trial. All

three witnesses had observed the altercation between Draper

and Rosario and were prepared to testify that Rosario had

slammed Draper against the sally port gate and onto the

prison floor while Draper was handcuffed. Shortly before

trial was scheduled to begin, Doe contacted Draper’s counsel

to inform him “that he had received an explicit threat to his

life from other inmates if he were to testify at trial.” The

4 We do not use this witness’s name because he was threatened in prison

in connection with this lawsuit. Accordingly, the district court allowed

documents with the witness’s name to be filed under seal and redacted

portions of the transcript that included his name. For ease of discussion,

we refer to the witness as “John Doe” or “Doe.”

 Case: 14-16340, 09/07/2016, ID: 10114166, DktEntry: 74-1, Page 8 of 37
DRAPER V. ROSARIO 9

inmates had told him that it was against the rules to “snitch,”

and counsel believed the threats to be raciallymotivated. The

district court vacated the writ of habeas corpus ad

testificandum for Doe and issued a writ for Shepard to testify

in Doe’s place.

At trial, Draper testified to his version of events, which

was supported by the testimony of the two prisoner

eyewitnesses (Thompson and Shepard). A third prisoner

testified about his own similar prior altercation with Rosario. 

In addition, a medical expert witness and Draper’s

investigator both testified. For the defense, Rosario testified,

as did Officers Eddie Colter and Pyong Lee, who generally

corroborated Rosario’s account. The Chief Medical Officer

of the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) also testified for the defense

regarding Draper’s injuries as documented in his prison

medical records.

The parties’ closing arguments focused on convincing the

jury of which version of events was most credible. Rosario’s

attorney argued that the correctional officer witnesses had

“everything to lose” by committing perjury, “in contrast to

the inmate witnesses you heard.” He explained that “Draper

and his inmate witnesses have little, if anything, to lose by

committing perjury because they are already in prison,”

whereas “Colter and Lee, both honorably discharged from

military service before their long service with the CDCR,

have much to lose. A conviction for perjury would end Lee’s

career [and] . . . could possibly result in a prison term for both

of them.” Draper’s attorney did not object to these

statements, nor did he request a curative instruction.

 Case: 14-16340, 09/07/2016, ID: 10114166, DktEntry: 74-1, Page 9 of 37
10 DRAPER V. ROSARIO

The jury returned a verdict in favor of Rosario, and the

district court entered judgment. Rosario filed an application

to tax costs, which Draper opposed. The district court

ultimately awarded $3,018.35 in costs against Draper. Draper

timely appealed.

II.

A.

The PLRA requires prisoners to exhaust available

administrative remedies prior to filing a § 1983 lawsuit

challenging prison conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Porter

v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 520 (2002). We review de novo a

district court’s dismissal for failure to exhaust. Williams v.

Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2015).

Prisoners need only exhaust “available” administrative

remedies; remedies are not considered “available” if, for

example, prison officials do not provide the required forms to

the prisoner or if officials threaten retaliation for filing a

grievance. See McBride v. Lopez, 807 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir.

2015); Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1177 (9th Cir. 2014)

(en banc). Draper does not dispute that he failed to exhaust

administrative remedies with respect to his procedural due

process claim against Rogers. He alleged, however, that

prison officials obstructed his efforts to file grievances and

administrative appeals. He also argues that the district court

applied the wrong standard of review in light of our recent en

banc opinion in Albino v. Baca.

In Albino, we held that because non-exhaustion is an

affirmative defense, the defendant bears the burden of

proving that an administrative remedy was available to the

 Case: 14-16340, 09/07/2016, ID: 10114166, DktEntry: 74-1, Page 10 of 37
DRAPER V. ROSARIO 11

prisoner and that he failed to exhaust such remedy. 747 F.3d

at 1172. “Once the defendant has carried that burden, the

prisoner has the burden of production. That is, the burden

shifts to the prisoner to come forward with evidence showing

that there is something in his particular case that made the

existing and generally available administrative remedies

effectively unavailable to him.” Id. We also clarified in

Albino that the proper procedure for raising non-exhaustion

is by moving for summary judgment rather than by filing an

unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12; Albino,

747 F.3d at 1169–71. Remand is the usual remedy when the

district court fails to follow this procedure. See, e.g.,

Bejarano v. Allison, 622 F. App’x 612 (9th Cir. 2015); Fratus

v. Peterson, 584 F. App’x 606 (9th Cir. 2014).

Remand is not necessary, however, if the district court’s

dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim can be construed as a grant

of summary judgment. In Williams, we concluded that

“[b]ecause it is clear that the district court considered

evidence submitted by the parties in reaching its decision, we

construe the district court’s [dismissal of the complaint] as a

grant of summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion.” 

775 F.3d at 1191.

Here, Defendants filed an unenumerated Rule 12(b)

motion rather than a motion for summary judgment. The

magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations, however,

explained that “[b]ecause care must be taken not to resolve

credibility on paper as it pertains to disputed issues of

material fact, the undersigned applies the Rule 56 [summary

judgment] standards to exhaustion motions that require

consideration of materials extrinsic to the complaint.” The

magistrate judge also correctly recognized that “Defendants

bear the burden of proving plaintiff’s failure to exhaust.” He

 Case: 14-16340, 09/07/2016, ID: 10114166, DktEntry: 74-1, Page 11 of 37
12 DRAPER V. ROSARIO

ultimately concluded that Draper had failed to rebut

Defendants’ evidence of non-exhaustion by producing

evidence that put material facts into dispute, and the district

judge adopted his findings and recommendations. Because

the district court applied the correct (summary judgment)

standard, remand is not necessary.

In the alternative, Draper argues that even if the district

court applied the correct standard, dismissal was improper

because Draper provided evidence that put material issues of

fact in dispute. In Defendants’ motion to dismiss, they

identified five grievances that Draper filed regarding the

incidents at issue in this lawsuit. Three of these grievances

did not pertain to Draper’s claim against Rogers, and the

other two, which arguably did, were unexhausted: one

grievance was cancelled because Draper failed to participate

in the grievance interview, and another was rejected as

incomplete at the third level of review and was never

resubmitted. Defendants attached supporting declarations

from prison officials with documentation of these grievances

and the rejected appeal. In his pro se opposition to the

motion to dismiss, Draper did not contest that his due process

claim was unexhausted, but he claimed that there were

“Department of Corrections staff, and employees that

engaged in impeding and unethical conduct of obstructing

Plaintiffs CDC-602’s [grievance forms] frombeing exhausted

in a timely manner” (capitalization altered). Draper’s

complaint also alleged that he had made a “substantial effort

to obtain administrat[ive]remedies atC.S.P.-Solano” and that

“prison administrat[ors] and employees [had] prohibited and

impeded” his efforts to “exhaust[] [his] CDC-602[]

administrative remedies” (capitalization altered).

 Case: 14-16340, 09/07/2016, ID: 10114166, DktEntry: 74-1, Page 12 of 37
DRAPER V. ROSARIO 13

The district court properly concluded that Draper’s

unsupported allegations were insufficient to create a triable

issue of material fact. To meet his burden of production,

Draper’s verified complaint or pro se opposition needed to

include evidence that there was “something in his particular

case that made the existing and generally available

administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him.” 

Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172. Although pro se pleadings must be

construed liberally, Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895

(9th Cir. 2002), the district court did not err in concluding

that Draper needed to provide some explanation of the kinds

of “impeding and unethical conduct” that prison officials had

allegedly undertaken, once Defendants had provided

documentation of non-exhaustion and facially legitimate

reasons for rejecting Draper’s administrative appeals.5

Draper did not identify any actions that prison staff took that

impeded his ability to exhaust his administrative remedies,

nor did he otherwise explain why he failed to comply with the

administrative process. Because Draper failed to rebut

Defendants’ evidence of non-exhaustion, the district court

properly dismissed his procedural due process claim against

Rogers.

B.

Draper challenges a series of the district court’s

evidentiary rulings that resulted in the exclusion of witness

5 District courts must advise pro se prisoner litigants of the requirements

for opposing a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 and,

under pre-Albino law, for opposing a motion to dismiss for failure to

exhaust available administrative remedies. See Klingele v. Eikenberry,

849 F.2d 409, 411–12 (9th Cir. 1988). Here, the magistrate judge

informed Draper of these requirements.

 Case: 14-16340, 09/07/2016, ID: 10114166, DktEntry: 74-1, Page 13 of 37
14 DRAPER V. ROSARIO

Doe’s testimony. We review the district court’s evidentiary

rulings for abuse of discretion. Valdivia v. Schwarzenegger,

599 F.3d 984, 988 (9th Cir. 2010).

A few days before trial was scheduled to begin, Doe

called Draper’s counsel to tell him “that he had received an

explicit threat to his life from other inmates if he were to

testify at trial.” Three inmates had approached him in the

yard and threatened to stab him if he testified because it was

“against the rules” to “snitch.” Counsel’s understanding was

that the threat was racially motivated: Draper was black,

while Rosario and Doe were white, and the prisoners who

threatened Doe were members of a white prison gang. Doe

indicated that he was afraid to testify in court but would be

willing to participate in a deposition.

Draper’s counsel requested permission to take a video

deposition of Doe for presentation at trial. The district court

denied Draper’s request to present deposition testimony but

granted his alternative request that Shepard—the third

eyewitness, who was housed farther away—be permitted to

testify in Doe’s stead. On the first day of trial, Draper’s

counsel requested that Doe be allowed to testify via video

transmission from prison, which Doe had recently informed

counsel he would be willing to do. The court denied that

request.

At the close of Draper’s case-in-chief, counsel requested

that Doe’s prior sworn statement, taken several months before

any threat was made, be admitted into evidence. The district

court also denied this request, and Doe’s testimony was not

presented to the jury. Draper argues that the district court

erred in denying his application to present Doe’s testimony

by video deposition, in denying his motion to allow Doe to

 Case: 14-16340, 09/07/2016, ID: 10114166, DktEntry: 74-1, Page 14 of 37
DRAPER V. ROSARIO 15

testify by simultaneous video transmission, and in excluding

Doe’s written sworn statement. We conclude that the district

court did not abuse its discretion.

1.

Draper argues that the district court erred in denying his

motion to take Doe’s deposition and present the deposition

testimony at trial. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

32(a)(4)(E) provides that deposition testimony of an

“unavailable witness” may be admitted at trial if the court

finds “that exceptional circumstances make it desirable . . . to

permit the deposition to be used.” Federal Rule of Evidence

804(a)(2) specifies that for hearsay purposes, a witness is

“unavailable” if he refuses to testify despite a court order to

do so. Here, the district court had issued a writ of habeas

corpus ad testificandum, which is the normal substitute for a

subpoena when the witness is incarcerated. Cf. Demarest v.

Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 189–91 (1991) (holding that

prisoners who testify in federal court are entitled to witness

fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1821, even though “prisoners are

technically ‘produced’ under a writ of habeas corpus ad

testificandum, rather than summoned by a subpoena”). A

writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum thus qualifies as a

court order for purposes of Rule 804(a)(2).

Although it would have been within the district court’s

discretion to authorize Draper to take Doe’s deposition, the

court was not required to do so. Significantly, Draper’s

request to take an additional deposition was on the eve of

trial, for the purpose of offering the deposition testimony at

trial. Rule 804(a)(2) would have allowed preexisting

deposition testimony to be admitted, but it did not compel the

district court to allow Draper to take an additional deposition

 Case: 14-16340, 09/07/2016, ID: 10114166, DktEntry: 74-1, Page 15 of 37
16 DRAPER V. ROSARIO

when it reasonably concluded that the circumstances did not

warrant it. Moreover, the “exceptional circumstances” prong

of Rule 32(a)(4) applies only “if the court finds . . . that

exceptional circumstances make it desirable—in the interest

of justice and with due regard to the importance of live

testimony in open court—to permit the deposition to be

used.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(4) (emphasis added).

The district court reasonably concluded that it would not

be “desirable . . . to permit the deposition to be used.” Id.

The court instead granted Draper’s alternative request that

Shepard be allowed to testify in place of Doe. The grant of

alternative relief was reasonable. Draper’s attorney’s initial

declaration, attached to his motion to obtain attendance of

prisoner witnesses, contained identical descriptions of Doe’s

and Shepard’s anticipated testimony. A later declaration

submitted by Draper’s investigator contained more detailed

descriptions of each witness’s expected testimony, and the

descriptions were still very similar. Given the cumulative

nature of the testimony of these two witnesses and the fact

that both witnesses generally corroborated Draper’s account,

it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to

conclude that exceptional circumstances did not require

taking Doe’s deposition for presentation at trial.

2.

We also conclude that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in denying Draper’s motion to allow Doe to testify

by video transmission. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43(a)

provides that “[f]or good cause in compelling circumstances

and with appropriate safeguards, the court may permit

testimony in open court by contemporaneous transmission

from a different location.” See also Beltran-Tirado v. INS,

 Case: 14-16340, 09/07/2016, ID: 10114166, DktEntry: 74-1, Page 16 of 37
DRAPER V. ROSARIO 17

213 F.3d 1179, 1185–86 (9th Cir. 2000) (rejecting a due

process objection to telephonic testimony); Alderman v. SEC,

104 F.3d 285, 288 n.4 (9th Cir. 1997) (affirming an agency’s

credibility findings based on telephonic testimony). The

advisory committee notes, however, state that “[t]he

importance of presenting live testimony in court cannot be

forgotten” and that contemporaneous transmission “is

permitted only on showing good cause in compelling

circumstances.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 43 advisory committee’s

note.

Here, the district court expressed reasonable concern over

Doe’s ability to testify safely, even by contemporaneous

video transmission. Draper’s initial motion to take Doe’s

deposition stated that “the witness is willing to testify under

oath and be cross examined at a time not directly linked to

trial” (emphasis added). Presumably, Doe was concerned

about testifying during the trial because the prisoners who

had threatened him might be suspicious of his absence. 

Although counsel later clarified that Doe “would be willing

to testify live, but by video conference, if basic safety

precautions were taken,” the district court could reasonably

have been concerned that testifying by video might still

endanger the witness. Moreover, Doe’s testimony was

largely cumulative of Shepard’s and Thompson’s testimony. 

The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in

denying Draper’s motion to allow Doe to testify by video

transmission.6

6 Draper also argues that the district court abused its discretion by

treating the request for live video testimony as a request for

reconsideration of her prior ruling regarding the deposition testimony. 

Even if the district court erred in treating the request as a motion for

reconsideration, the decision not to allow the video testimony still would

 Case: 14-16340, 09/07/2016, ID: 10114166, DktEntry: 74-1, Page 17 of 37
18 DRAPER V. ROSARIO

3.

The district court also properly excluded Doe’s sworn

written statement. Draper argues that the statement was

admissible under the “catchall” hearsay exception, Federal

Rule of Evidence 807. To be admissible under Rule 807, a

hearsay statement must, among other factors, be “more

probative on the point for which it is offered than any other

evidence that the proponent can obtain through reasonable

efforts.” Fed. R. Evid. 807(a)(3). During the proffer in

support of the request for live video testimony, Draper’s

counsel argued that Doe’s testimony was unique because he

“saw Mr. Draper put his foot against the bars to try to prevent

his head and body from hitting the bars, [and] the witness was

distinct that the foot move was defensive.” While the other

prisoner witnesses (Shepard and Thompson) did not provide

this exact account, they both testified that Draper was at no

time resisting Rosario and that Rosario was the aggressor. 

On this record, the district court reasonably concluded that

Doe’s statement about Draper’s defensive foot move was not

significantly more probative than the testimony already

presented.

C.

1.

We turn to whether defense counsel’s statements during

closing argument rendered Draper’s trial fundamentally

unfair. Draper argues that defense counsel improperly

vouched for the credibility of correctional officers Colter and

have been well within the court’s discretion. Thus, any error in applying

the wrong legal standard was harmless. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 61.

 Case: 14-16340, 09/07/2016, ID: 10114166, DktEntry: 74-1, Page 18 of 37
DRAPER V. ROSARIO 19

Lee when he argued that they could lose their jobs or face

imprisonment if they lied on the stand, whereas the prisoner

witnesses had little to lose by perjuring themselves. Draper

did not object to these statements. We conclude that these

statements were improper, but it was not plain error for the

district court to fail to take sua sponte corrective action.

In the criminal context, we have recognized two types of

improper vouching. The first type “consists of placing the

prestige of the government behind a witness through personal

assurances of the witness’s veracity.” United States v.

Necoechea, 986 F.2d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1993), as amended

on denial of reh’g (Apr. 15, 1993). The second type consists

of “suggesting that information not presented to the jury

supports the witness’s testimony.” Id.

Statements about the consequences of lying on the stand

for a law enforcement officer’s career generally fall into the

second category because those statements rely on evidence

outside the record. In United States v. Weatherspoon,

410 F.3d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 2005), we characterized the

following statement, made by a prosecutor during closing

argument, as “clearly improper”:

[The police officer witnesses] had no reason

to come in here and not tell you the truth. 

And they took the stand and they told you the

truth. I guess, if you believe [defense

counsel], they must have lied at the scene

there; they came into this court and they lied

to you; they lied to this judge; they lied to me;

they lied to my agent, Agent Baltazar. I guess

they lied to the dispatcher when they called it

in. These are officers that risk losin’ their

 Case: 14-16340, 09/07/2016, ID: 10114166, DktEntry: 74-1, Page 19 of 37
20 DRAPER V. ROSARIO

jobs, risk losin’ their pension, risk losin’ their

livelihood. And, on top of that if they come in

here and lie, I guess they’re riskin’ bein’

prosecuted for perjury. Doesn’t make sense

because they came in here and told you the

truth, ladies and gentlemen.

The prosecutor’s argument that “the existence of legal and

professional repercussions served to ensure the credibility of

the officers’ testimony” was sufficient “for the statement to

be considered improper as vouching based upon matters

outside the record.” Id. Similarly, in United States v. Combs,

379 F.3d 564, 574–75 (9th Cir. 2004), we held that a

prosecutor engaged in “improper rebuttal based upon matters

outside the record” when she argued that “in order to acquit

[the defendant], the jury had to believe that agent Bailey

[would] risk[] losing his job by lying on the stand.” See also

United States v. Boyd, 54 F.3d 868, 871–72 (D.C. Cir. 1995)

(holding that a prosecutor improperly “relied on evidence not

in the record” when she argued that police witnesses would

not “jeopardize their careers and risk criminal prosecution”

for perjury, and collecting cases).

While the first type of vouching—placing the “prestige of

the government behind a witness”7—is particularly

7 Draper argues that because the jury knew that defense counsel was a

government lawyer, the vouching statements carried an improper

implication of governmental support, similar to that of a prosecutor. 

Draper is correct that defense counsel introduced himself to the jurors as

“an attorney with the Office of the Attorney General, for the State of

California” and introduced his colleague as the “Supervising Deputy

AttorneyGeneral.” Because we conclude that defense counsel improperly

relied on evidence outside the record in his closing argument, we do not

decide whether the statements were improper for this additional reason. 

 Case: 14-16340, 09/07/2016, ID: 10114166, DktEntry: 74-1, Page 20 of 37
DRAPER V. ROSARIO 21

problematic in criminal trials, see Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d at

1147–48, the second type of vouching—relying on evidence

outside the record—is problematic in both civil and criminal

trials. During closing argument in a civil case, counsel is

permitted to make inferences and advance “plausible

argument[s] in light of the record.” Settlegoode v. Portland

Pub. Sch., 371 F.3d 503, 518 (9th Cir. 2004). “By contrast,

inferences unsupported by the evidence are improper.” 

Robert E. Jones et al., Rutter Group Prac. Guide Fed. Civ.

Trials & Evid. Ch. 14-B (2016) (citing United States v. Ruiz,

710 F.3d 1077, 1086 & n.6 (9th Cir. 2013)). In Bird v.

Glacier Electric Cooperative, Inc., 255 F.3d 1136, 1148–52

(9th Cir. 2001), we found reversible error in a civil case when

counsel’s statements during closing argument appealed to the

racial biases of the jury. We explained that the “broad racial

statements” used by plaintiff’s counsel were “not specific to

the [defendant] or related to the [defendant]’s particular

conduct in [that] case,” and that there was “no evidence in the

record” to support counsel’s allegations of bias. Id. at 1151. 

Similarly, in Hemmings v. Tidyman’s Inc., 285 F.3d 1174,

1192–95 (9th Cir. 2002), we held that plaintiff’s counsel’s

statement during closing argument that she had previously

sued the defendant was plainly improper. Both cases, though

not addressing vouching specifically, stand for the

unremarkable proposition that counsel in a civil trial may not

rely on evidence outside the record during closing argument.

Other courts have recognized this principle more directly. 

In Spicer v. Rossetti, 150 F.3d 642, 644 (7th Cir. 1998), an

Even if the statements improperly placed the “prestige of the government

behind” the correctional officer witnesses, see Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d at

1148, they would not rise to the level of plain error for the reasons stated

in Part II.C.2 below.

 Case: 14-16340, 09/07/2016, ID: 10114166, DktEntry: 74-1, Page 21 of 37
22 DRAPER V. ROSARIO

excessive force case brought by a prisoner, the Seventh

Circuit ordered a new trial because “the case turned entirely

on [the plaintiff]’s credibility, versus that of the guards,” and

the guards’ attorney had made multiple statements that the

plaintiff’s attorney doubted his client’s honesty. Although

plaintiff’s attorney objected, the court overruled his

objections. Id. The Seventh Circuit noted that “counsel may

not express his beliefs regarding the honesty of the opposing

party’s witnesses” and that an attorney’s opinions regarding

witness credibility “have no place in a court of law.” Id.; see

also Lenard v. Argento, 699 F.2d 874, 897 (7th Cir. 1983).

The Supreme Court has also recognized that the

prohibition on counsel communicating personal beliefs to the

jury, including beliefs about witness credibility, extends

beyond government prosecutors. In United States v. Young,

470 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1985), the Supreme Court stated that

“[d]efense counsel, like the prosecutor, must refrain from

interjecting personal beliefs into the presentation of his case.” 

The Court quoted the then-current ABA Model Code of

Professional Responsibility, which stated:

In appearing in his professional capacity

before a tribunal, a lawyer shall not . . .

[a]ssert his personal opinion as to . . . the

credibility of a witness, as to the culpability of

a civil litigant, or as to the guilt or innocence

of an accused; but he may argue, on his

analysis of the evidence, for any position or

conclusion with respect to matters stated

herein.

Id. at 7 n.3 (quoting Model Code of Prof’l Responsibility DR

7-106(C) (Am. Bar Ass’n 1980)). The current version of the

 Case: 14-16340, 09/07/2016, ID: 10114166, DktEntry: 74-1, Page 22 of 37
DRAPER V. ROSARIO 23

Model Rules similarly states that, in both civil and criminal

trials, a lawyer shall not “state a personal opinion as to . . . the

credibility of a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant or the

guilt or innocence of an accused.” Model Rules of Prof’l

Conduct R. 3.4(e) (2015).

In sum, our prior case law indicates that attorneys may

not rely on evidence outside the record during closing

argument and that prosecutors may not vouch for witnesses’

credibility. We now make clear that the prohibition on

improper vouching based on evidence outside the record

extends to civil trials.

2.

Because Draper’s attorney failed to object to opposing

counsel’s improper statements, our review is for plain error. 

Bird, 255 F.3d at 1148. In the civil context, “[p]lain error

review requires: (1) an error, (2) the error is plain or obvious,

(3) the error was prejudicial or [a]ffects substantial rights, and

(4) review is necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice.” 

Hemmings, 285 F.3d at 1193. Reversal “is available only in

‘extraordinary cases.’” Id. (quoting Bird, 255 F.3d at 1148). 

We conclude that, although defense counsel’s statements

were improper, they did not rise to the level of plain error

requiring reversal.

During his closing argument, defense counsel argued that

the correctional officer witnesses were more credible because

they had “no reason to commit perjury” and that they had

more to lose by lying on the stand than the inmate witnesses. 

He explained that “Draper and his inmate witnesses have

little, if anything, to lose by committing perjury because they

are already in prison,” whereas

 Case: 14-16340, 09/07/2016, ID: 10114166, DktEntry: 74-1, Page 23 of 37
24 DRAPER V. ROSARIO

Colter and Lee, both honorably discharged

from military service before their long service

with the CDCR, have much to lose. A

conviction for perjurywould end Lee’s career. 

And a conviction for perjury would—could

possibly result in a prison term for both of

them if they committed perjury. The same is

true for Sergeant Fowler and Sergeant Peel. 

They have no reason to commit perjury in this

case, and they have everything to lose by

doing so . . . .

These statements are materially indistinguishable from those

found improper in Weatherspoon, where the prosecutor

stated, “[t]hese are officers that risk losin’ their jobs, risk

losin’ their pension, risk losin’ their livelihood. And, on top

of that if they come in here and lie, I guess they’re riskin’

bein’ prosecuted for perjury.” 410 F.3d at 1146. In fact,

defense counsel in Draper’s case expressed more certainty

about the consequences of lying on the stand than the

prosecutor did in Weatherspoon. In that case, the

prosecutor’s vouching was improper even though the

statements were “not quite as egregious” as a case in which

the prosecutor told the jury that they could be “darn sure [the

agent] would get fired for perjuring himself.” Id. (quoting

Combs, 379 F.3d at 568) (alteration in original). In Draper’s

case, defense counsel stated, without reservation: “A

conviction for perjury would end Lee’s career.”

Although this case is distinguishable from Weatherspoon

because it is civil rather than criminal, the statements made

by defense counsel in Draper’s case were more egregious

than the improper statements in Weatherspoon. Cf. Ruiz,

710 F.3d at 1086 & n.6 (finding no improper vouching where

 Case: 14-16340, 09/07/2016, ID: 10114166, DktEntry: 74-1, Page 24 of 37
DRAPER V. ROSARIO 25

a prosecutor characterized law enforcement officers as “just

doing their jobs, just police officers responding to an

emergencycall”). Accordingly, defense counsel’s statements

about the correctional officer witnesses’ credibility were

improper, and it was error for the district court to allow those

statements during closing.

The second prong of the plain error analysis requires the

error to be “plain or obvious.” See Hemmings, 285 F.3d at

1193; cf. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993)

(explaining that in the criminal context, “[a]t a minimum, [a]

court of appeals cannot correct an error pursuant to [Federal

Rule of Criminal Procedure] 52(b) unless the error is clear

under current law”). The error here does not satisfy that test. 

At the time of Draper’s trial, our circuit precedent had not

squarely applied the prohibition on improper vouching in the

civil context.8 As outlined above, neither criminal nor civil

lawyers may rely on evidence outside the record when

arguing to a jury, and we previously have held that certain

types of improper statements during closing argument

warrant reversal in civil cases. Nonetheless, this precedent

was not sufficiently clear at the time of trial to put the district

court on notice that defense counsel’s statements were

impermissible. Because the court’s error was not “plain or

obvious” in this case, we need not address the remaining

prongs of the analysis.

Thus, because it was not plain error to permit the

improper statements, reversal is not required.

8

In Radwan v. County of Orange, 519 F. App’x 490, 491 (9th Cir.

2013), an unpublished disposition issued the year before Draper’strial, we

explicitly declined to decide “whether the rule against vouching applies

to civil trials” because any error in that case was harmless.

 Case: 14-16340, 09/07/2016, ID: 10114166, DktEntry: 74-1, Page 25 of 37
26 DRAPER V. ROSARIO

D.

1.

Finally, Draper challenges the district court’s cost award. 

We conclude that the court’s award of $3,018.35 in costs was

an abuse of discretion.

We first address our jurisdiction to review the cost award. 

A notice of appeal must “designate the judgment, order, or

part thereof being appealed.” Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(B). But

“an order fixing costs in the district court, while an appeal

was pending, should be considered an inseparable part of the

pending appeal” and need not be separately appealed. 

California Union Ins. Co. v. Am. Diversified Sav. Bank,

948 F.2d 556, 567 (9th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks

omitted); see Dawson v. City of Seattle, 435 F.3d 1054, 1070

(9th Cir. 2006) (“[O]ur case law allows a party to contest an

award of costs on appeal even if the notice of appeal did not

raise the issue expressly.”). Treating a cost award as part of

the judgment is consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 1920, which

provides that “[a] bill of costs shall be filed . . . and, upon

allowance, included in the judgment or decree.”9

9 Taxable costs, like those awarded against Draper, are limited to a

specific set of items delineated in 28 U.S.C. § 1920, which include “fees

of the clerk and marshal; certain fees for transcripts; certain fees for

printing and witnesses; the costs of copies needed for use in the case;

docketing fees; and compensation of court appointed experts and

interpreters.” Grove v. Wells Fargo Fin. California, Inc., 606 F.3d 577,

579 (9th Cir. 2010). Such costs may be taxed against the losing party by

“[a] judge or clerk,” 28 U.S.C. § 1920, and are treated as part of the final

judgment. See California Union, 948 F.2d at 567. On the other hand,

when a prevailing party moves to recover attorney fees, “the court must,

on a party’s request, give an opportunity for adversary submissions on the

 Case: 14-16340, 09/07/2016, ID: 10114166, DktEntry: 74-1, Page 26 of 37
DRAPER V. ROSARIO 27

In California Union, 948 F.2d at 567, we addressed a

situation precisely analogous to Draper’s: the losing party

filed a notice of appeal from the final judgment prior to the

district court’s order taxing costs, and it did not file a separate

appeal from the cost award or amend its original notice of

appeal. We held that “[a]lthough it would have been

impossible for [the losing party] to have filed a notice of

appeal from an order that did not exist as of the date of the

notice, we determine that the notice of appeal from the

judgment incorporates the appeal of the denial of the motion

to retax costs.” Id.; see also Dawson, 435 F.3d at 1070. 

Because Draper filed a timely notice of appeal from the final

judgment, and the judgment incorporates the district court’s

cost award, we have jurisdiction to review the order taxing

costs.

2.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) provides that

“[u]nless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order

provides otherwise, costs—other than attorney’sfees—should

be allowed to the prevailing party.” See also 28 U.S.C.

§ 1920. We review a district court’s award of costs for abuse

of discretion. Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d

932, 945 n.12 (9th Cir. 2003). We have interpreted Rule

54(d)(1) as creating “a presumption for awarding costs to

motion” and “[t]he court must find the facts and state its conclusions of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(C). Parties claiming entitlement to

attorney fees also may, in certain situations, recover non-taxable costs,

such as expert fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(c). When a district court

enters an award of attorney fees and costs, such award must therefore be

separately appealed. See Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1160 (9th

Cir. 1999); Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477, 1482–83 (9th Cir.

1996).

 Case: 14-16340, 09/07/2016, ID: 10114166, DktEntry: 74-1, Page 27 of 37
28 DRAPER V. ROSARIO

prevailing parties; the losing party must show why costs

should not be awarded.” Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at

944–45. In Association of Mexican-American Educators v.

California, 231 F.3d 572, 591 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc), we

explained that Rule 54(d)(1) also “vests in the district court

discretion to refuse to award costs.” When determining

whether to exercise that discretion, we have said that

[a]ppropriate reasons for denying costs

include: (1) the substantial public importance

of the case, (2) the closeness and difficulty of

the issues in the case, (3) the chilling effect on

future similar actions, (4) the plaintiff’s

limited financial resources, and (5) the

economic disparity between the parties. This

is not “an exhaustive list of ‘good reasons’ for

declining to award costs,” but rather a starting

point for analysis.

Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms, Inc., 743 F.3d 1236,

1247–48 (9th Cir. 2014) (citingAss’n of Mex.-Am. Educators,

231 F.3d at 592–93). Although the final two factors focus on

the financial resources of the parties, proceeding in forma

pauperis does not, by itself, exempt a prisoner from paying

costs. Indeed, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 provides that when costs are

awarded against an indigent prisoner, the prisoner will be

required to pay those costs on a monthly payment plan of

twenty percent of the prisoner’s income from the previous

month. See id. § 1915(b)(2), (f)(2)(B).

10 Thus, the final two

10 Section 1915(f)(2)(B) provides that “the prisoner shall be required to

make payments for costs under this subsection in the same manner as is

provided for filing fees under subsection (a)(2).” This cross-reference,

however, appears to contain a typographical error. “Section 1915(f)(2)(B)

 Case: 14-16340, 09/07/2016, ID: 10114166, DktEntry: 74-1, Page 28 of 37
DRAPER V. ROSARIO 29

factors must be considered in the context of the record as a

whole. In addition, a losing party need not demonstrate that

all five factors weigh against imposing costs; rather, the list

provides a “starting point for analysis.” Escriba, 743 F.3d at

1248.

We have affirmed the denial of costs when, for example,

a prevailing plaintiff in a contract action recovered

substantially less in damages than were initially claimed, and

the defendant prevailed on two affirmative defenses. 

Champion Produce, Inc. v. Ruby Robinson Co., Inc., 342 F.3d

1016, 1022–24 (9th Cir. 2003). We also have affirmed the

denial of costs where a plaintiff unsuccessfullychallenged her

termination under the Family and Medical Leave Act

(“FMLA”). In Escriba, we applied the Association of

Mexican-American Educators factors and concluded that

individual FMLA cases protect vital rights for workers; that

the case was close, turning on conflicting witness testimony

and complex FMLA analysis; that taxing costs could chill

future FMLA actions; and that the plaintiff had limited

financial resources. Escriba, 743 F.3d at 1248–49.

In limited circumstances, we have also found an award of

costs to be an abuse of discretion. See Save Our Valley,

335 F.3d at 945. In Stanley v. University of Southern

California, 178 F.3d 1069, 1080 (9th Cir. 1999), a former

head women’s basketball coach sued a university for gender

discrimination and breach of contract. After the university

prevailed, the district court ordered the plaintiff to pay

mistakenly refers to § 1915(a)(2) as the authoritative subsection for the

payment process. However, . . . § 1915(a)(2) does not contain a payment

procedure. The payment process is actually located in § 1915(b)(2).” 

Talley-Bey v. Knebl, 168 F.3d 884, 887 (6th Cir. 1999).

 Case: 14-16340, 09/07/2016, ID: 10114166, DktEntry: 74-1, Page 29 of 37
30 DRAPER V. ROSARIO

$46,710.97 in costs. We held that the court abused its

discretion in denying the plaintiff’s motion to re-tax costs,

both because the award could have left her indigent and

because it might chill future civil rights litigation. Id. at

1079–80; cf. Ass’n of Mex.-Am. Educators, 231 F.3d 572 (“In

keeping with our decision in Stanley, we note that divesting

district courts of discretion to limit or to refuse such

overwhelming costs in important, close, but ultimately

unsuccessful civil rights cases like this one might have the

regrettable effect of discouraging potential plaintiffs from

bringing such cases at all.”).

Each of the factors outlined in Association of MexicanAmerican Educators counsels against imposing a large cost

award in Draper’s case.11231 F.3d at 592–93. First, the case

has “substantial public importance.” Id. at 592. Individual

Eighth Amendment cases are important for safeguarding the

rights and safety of prisoners. See Escriba, 743 F.3d at 1248

(citing as evidence of the public importance of the case a

“California public official’s statement that a case brought on

behalf of a single plaintiff as opposed to a class can still be

important because these issues ‘protect[ ] vital civil rights for

women in the work place’” (alteration in original)).

11 The dissent argues that these factors should not govern our review of

a district court’s decision to award costs to the prevailing party, but

instead only to our review of a district court’s decision not to award costs. 

Although the district court is not ordinarily required to provide reasons for

awarding costs, cf. Association of Mexican-AmericanEducators, 231F.3d

at 591–93, the factors relevant to our review of the district court’s ruling

do not change depending on the outcome of that ruling. In other words,

in determining whether it is appropriate to deviate from the ordinary rule

of awarding costs to a prevailing party, the district court should consider

the same set of factors regardless of what the court ultimately decides.

 Case: 14-16340, 09/07/2016, ID: 10114166, DktEntry: 74-1, Page 30 of 37
DRAPER V. ROSARIO 31

In addition, the case was close. Draper’s evidence of an

Eighth Amendment violation was sufficient to survive

summary judgment. Ultimately, the case turned on which

competing account of events the jurors believed. After

closing arguments, the jury deliberated for the remaining

half-day and then for several more hours the next morning

before returning a verdict for Rosario. After the jury returned

its verdict, the district court noted that the case was “welltried” and “hard-fought.”

Moreover, such a large cost award could chill similar

lawsuits challenging Eighth Amendment violations in jails

and prisons. Many would-be litigants in Eighth Amendment

excessive force cases, like Draper, have virtually no

resources. Even those with meritorious cases may choose not

to risk an unsuccessful lawsuit that could add to the fees and

costs associated with conviction and imprisonment. This is

particularly true for those whose cases, like Draper’s,

ultimately turn on the jury’s determination of whose account

of the event is more credible. We further note that district

courts have routinely declined to award costs against

prisoners proceeding in forma pauperis under similar

circumstances, citing potential chilling effects. See, e.g.,

Baltimore v. Haggins, No. 1:10-CV-00931-LJO, 2014 WL

804463, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2014) (denying $1,462.61

in costs and noting that “while this Court is what some may

call ‘inundated’ with similar cases filed under section 1983

by indigent inmates, the potential chilling effect of being

taxed with costs upon defeat cannot be ignored in cases such

as these”);Meeks v.Parsons, No. 1:03-CV-6700 OWW, 2010

WL 2867847, at *2 (E.D. Cal. July 21, 2010) (denying the

defendants’ motion to recover costs, in part because “an

award has the potential to chill meritorious civil rights

actions”); Jimenez v. Sambrano, No. 04CV1833 L(PCL),

 Case: 14-16340, 09/07/2016, ID: 10114166, DktEntry: 74-1, Page 31 of 37
32 DRAPER V. ROSARIO

2009 WL 937042, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2009) (granting a

motion to re-tax costs because “[a]warding a large sum of

costs against Plaintiff may have a chilling effect on future

civil rights litigants”).

The final two factors outlined in Association of MexicanAmerican Educatorsfocus on “the plaintiff’s limited financial

resources” and “the economic disparity between the parties.” 

Escriba, 743 F.3d at 1248 (citing Ass’n of Mex.-Am.

Educators, 231 F.3d at 592–93). Draper has virtually no

resources. At the time he filed his complaint, he had a

balance of $0.00 in his prison account, no checking or savings

account, no income during the past twelve months, and no

assets. He owed $4,779.94 in restitution and $464.02 for

other expenses, primarily litigation costs and legal mail, and

he was proceeding in forma pauperis. He represented himself

in this litigation for several years, until the district court

appointed pro bono counsel. There is no comparison between

Draper’s limited resources and those of the state of

California, which bore the defense costs.

Each of the factors listed above is an “[a]ppropriate

reason[] for denying costs,” Escriba, 743 F.3d at 1247–48,

or for a reduction in the amount awarded to the prevailing

party. In addition, the amount of costs is relevant in

determining whether a district court’s cost award is an abuse

of discretion. In Save Our Valley, we explained that

in the rare occasion where severe injustice

will result from an award of costs (such as the

injustice that would result from an indigent

plaintiff’s being forced to pay tens of

thousands of dollars of her alleged oppressor’s

legal costs), a district court abuses its

 Case: 14-16340, 09/07/2016, ID: 10114166, DktEntry: 74-1, Page 32 of 37
DRAPER V. ROSARIO 33

discretion by failing to conclude that the

presumption [in favor of awarding costs] has

been rebutted.

335 F.3d at 945; see Ass’n of Mex.-Am. Educators, 231 F.3d

at 593 (pointing to the “extraordinarily high” cost amount as

an appropriate reason to deny costs). Because several factors

weigh heavily against a large cost award in this case, and

severe injustice would result from such an award, the district

court abused its discretion in taxing costs of $3,018.35

against Draper. See Stanley, 178 F.3d at 1079–80. 

Accordingly, we vacate the cost award and remand for the

district court to reconsider whether a cost award is warranted,

and, if so, an appropriate amount, accounting for the factors

discussed above. See Stanley, 78 F.3d at 1080.

* * *

For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the district

court’s dismissal of Draper’s due process claim and the

exclusion of testimony from witness Doe. We hold that

counsel in a civil trial may not rely on evidence outside the

record to vouch for the credibility of witnesses. On plain

error review, however, we conclude that defense counsel’s

improper statements during closing argument do not warrant

reversal. Finally, we hold that the court abused its discretion

in taxing $3,018.35 in costs.

The judgment is AFFIRMED. The award of costs is

VACATED and REMANDED for further consideration

consistent with this opinion.

The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

 Case: 14-16340, 09/07/2016, ID: 10114166, DktEntry: 74-1, Page 33 of 37
34 DRAPER V. ROSARIO

BEA, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I agree with the majority that the judgment in favor of the

defendants should be affirmed and thus join Parts I, II.A, II.B,

and II.C of the majority opinion. I decline to join Part II.D.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in taxing costs

against plaintiff John Clint Draper because the district court

justifiably followed the presumption of taxing costs against

the losing party, here, Draper.

The district court entered judgment in favor of the

defendants on June 24, 2014, and entered the order taxing

costs against Draper on July 23, 2014. I would affirm the

district court’s order taxing costs against Draper. Draper sued

the defendants; his case went to trial, and he lost. The

defendants sought to recoup from Draper $3,018.35 of costs

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1). Draper does

not dispute the amount of costs but contends that the

defendants, who prevailed, should not be awarded costs at all.

“Rule 54(d) creates a presumption for awarding costs to

prevailing parties; the losing party must show why costs

should not be awarded.” Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit,

335 F.3d 932, 944–45 (9th Cir. 2003). The district court, in a

reasoned order, followed this presumption and taxed costs

against Draper, the losing party. It did not abuse its discretion

in doing so.

The majority examines the factors from Association of

Mexican-American Educators v. California, 231 F.3d 572,

592–93 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc),1and concludes that the

1

“Appropriate reasons for denying costs include: (1) the substantial

public importance of the case, (2) the closeness and difficulty of the issues

in the case, (3) the chilling effect on future similar actions, (4) the

 Case: 14-16340, 09/07/2016, ID: 10114166, DktEntry: 74-1, Page 34 of 37
DRAPER V. ROSARIO 35

district court abused its discretion when it taxed costs against

Draper. Maj. Op. 28–33. The majority makes two mistakes.

First, it wrongly applies these factors to review the district

court’s award of costs to the prevailing party, Maj. Op.

30–32, when the factors are “reasons for refusing to award

costs,” Ass’n of Mex.-Am. Educators, 231 F.3d at 592

(emphasis added). As we have explained, “A district court

deviates from normal practice when it refuses to tax costs to

the losing party,” and “[t]he [Rule 54(d)] presumption itself

provides all the reason a court needs for awarding costs.”

Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 945; accord In re Online DVDRental Antitrust Litig., 779 F.3d 914, 932 (9th Cir. 2015).

Second, the majority ignores the fact that the district court

already considered these factors—though it was not required

to do so, see Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 945—and analyzes

and reweighs the factors de novo, Maj. Op. 28–33, when our

role is to review the district court’s order taxing costs for

abuse of discretion, see Ass’n of Mex.-Am. Educators,

231 F.3d at 591. The district court’s decision to follow the

presumption of taxing costs against the losing party, Draper,

was not an abuse of discretion—the district court did not

commit legal error, and its decision was not “illogical,

implausible, or without support in inferences that may be

drawn from the record.” United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d

1247, 1263 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc); see Save Our Valley,

335 F.3d at 945.

plaintiff’s limited financial resources, and (5) the economic disparity

between the parties. This is not ‘an exhaustive list of “good reasons” for

declining to award costs,’ but rather a starting point for analysis.” Escriba

v. Foster Poultry Farms, Inc., 743 F.3d 1236, 1247–48 (9th Cir. 2014)

(quoting Ass’n of Mex.-Am. Educators, 231 F.3d at 593).

 Case: 14-16340, 09/07/2016, ID: 10114166, DktEntry: 74-1, Page 35 of 37
36 DRAPER V. ROSARIO

The majority can drum up only a single case in which we

held that the district court had abused its discretion when it

taxed costs against the losing party, Stanley v. University of

Southern California, 178 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 1999). Maj. Op.

29–30. But, in Stanley, we did not hold that costs could not be

taxed against the plaintiff, who lost on summary judgment,

“because the award could have left her indigent and because

it might chill future civil rights litigation.” Maj. Op. 30.

Rather, we remanded the case for the district court to

reconsider its decision on costs in light of the plaintiff’s

limited financial resources and the possible chilling effect an

award of costs could engender, factors the district court did

not consider initially. Stanley, 178 F.3d at 1079–80.2 Here,

the district court did consider those factors and found them

insufficient to overcome the presumption of taxing costs

against the losing party. And, in any event, we later clarified

that district courts are not required to “justify[] routine

awards of costs against losing parties in civil rights cases”

and recognized that Stanley instead stands for the narrow

proposition that, “in the rare occasion where severe injustice

will result from an award of costs (such as the injustice that

would result from an indigent plaintiff’s being forced to pay

tens of thousands of dollars of her alleged oppressor’s legal

costs), a district court abuses its discretion by failing to

conclude that the [Rule 54(d)] presumption has been

rebutted.” Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 945.

This case does not present “the rare occasion where

severe injustice will result from an award of costs.” Id. The

costs taxed against Draper total $3,018.35, a modest sum and

less than the amount awarded in Save Our Valley, where we

2

It is unclear from the district court docket in Stanley how the district

court ultimately allocated costs on remand.

 Case: 14-16340, 09/07/2016, ID: 10114166, DktEntry: 74-1, Page 36 of 37
DRAPER V. ROSARIO 37

concluded that “[n]o such injustice will result from the award

of $5,310.55 in this case.” Id. Draper may pay these costs in

installments over time, depending on the income credited to

his prison account. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2). This case

presented no legal questions of unusual public importance;

rather, as the majority admits, “the case turned on which

competing account of events the jurors believed.” Maj. Op.

31. The fact that this is a civil rights case is likewise

unimportant, because we have affirmed “routine awards of

costs against losing parties in civil rights cases,” even where

the case presented close legal questions of great public

importance. Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 946. That this case

was brought by a prisoner should counsel in favor of taxing

costs against Draper, because Congress enacted the Prison

Litigation Reform Act of 1995, of which 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(f)(2)’s provision on payment of costs is a part, to

reduce the quantity of prisoner suits. See Woodford v. Ngo,

548 U.S. 81, 83 (2006).

The majority essentially establishes a rule that the

presumption of taxing costs against a losing party is rebutted

if the losing party is an indigent prisoner whose claim is

arguably meritorious and proceeds to trial. There is no legal

basis for such a rule. I would affirm the district court’s

decision to follow the presumption and tax costs against

Draper, the losing party.

* * *

Because the majority wrongly finds that the district court

abused its discretion by taxing costs against the losing party,

Draper, I respectfully dissent from Part II.D of the majority

opinion.

 Case: 14-16340, 09/07/2016, ID: 10114166, DktEntry: 74-1, Page 37 of 37