Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-05489/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-05489-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
David Bayly
Defendant
Westar Marine Services, Inc.
Plaintiff

Document Text:

NO. C 09-05489 RS 

ORDER

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California 

*E-Filed 05/10/2010* 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION 

WESTAR MARINE SERVICES, INC., 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

DAVID BAYLY, 

 Defendant. 

____________________________________/

No. C 09-05489 RS 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS 

Plaintiff Westar Marine Services, Inc. (“Westar”) filed this declaratory relief action on 

November 19, 2009, seeking a judgment that defendant David Bayly is not entitled to maintenance 

and cure benefits. Bayly now moves to dismiss the federal action. The motion was heard in this 

Court on May 6, 2010. For the reasons set forth below, the motion to dismiss is granted. 

According to the allegations of the complaint, Bayly was working as a deck engineer for 

Westar, a tugboat operator, when he was injured by falling off a ladder onboard the tugboat Terilyn 

in the San Francisco Bay. It is undisputed that Bayly’s employment qualifies him as a seaman 

pursuant to the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 2101 et seq., and that he gave notice of his injury and began 

receiving maintenance and cure benefits from Westar in accordance with general maritime law. 

Westar filed this suit in federal court, and Bayly filed suit in San Francisco Superior Court one day 

Case 3:09-cv-05489-RS Document 18 Filed 05/10/10 Page 1 of 4
NO. C 09-05489 RS 

ORDER

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United States District Court

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later.1 Bayly contends that the instant action should be dismissed in deference to his action in state 

court and for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).2

 

The granting of declaratory relief in federal court is discretionary. Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. 

v. Dizol, 133 F.3d 1220, 1222-23 (9th Cir. 1998). In deciding whether to exercise this discretion, 

district courts consider the following factors: (1) federal courts should avoid needlessly deciding 

issues of state law; (2) litigants should be discouraged from filing declaratory relief actions as a 

means of forum shopping; and (3) duplicative litigation should be avoided. Id. at 1225 (citing the 

seminal case Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 316 U.S. 491, 495 (1942)). Generally, “[i]f there 

are parallel state proceedings involving the same issues and parties pending at the time the federal 

declaratory action is filed, there is a presumption that the entire suit should be heard in state court.” 

Id. There is, however, no per se rule against the district court exercising its jurisdiction to resolve 

[a] . . . dispute when the underlying liability suit is pending in state court.” Am. States Ins. Co. v. 

Kearns, 15 F.3d 142, 145 (9th Cir. 1994). 

The first Brillhart factor—avoiding needless adjudication of state law issues—is relatively 

neutral on these particular facts. All claims in both this case and the state law case arise under 

federal maritime law; and the Jones Act gives Bayly, as a seaman-plaintiff, the right to choose his 

forum. Skaw v. Lady Pacific, Inc., 577 F. Supp. 2, 4 (D.C. Alaska 1983) (explaining that “Congress 

 

1

 Westar asks the Court to take judicial notice of Bayly’s state court complaint and first amended 

complaint, and Bayly has not opposed this request. As the veracity of these documents is “capable 

of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 

questioned,” they are a proper subject of judicial notice and may be considered at the pleading stage. 

Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 

971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992) (explaining that Rule 201 allows courts to “take notice of 

proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings 

have a direct relation to matters at issue.”). 

2

 Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a claim may be dismissed because of 

a “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A dismissal 

under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or on the absence of 

sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., 534 

F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Case 3:09-cv-05489-RS Document 18 Filed 05/10/10 Page 2 of 4
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ORDER

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United States District Court

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intended to give seamen the choice of forum in Jones Act actions”). Thus, there is little likelihood 

that either this Court or the state court will “needlessly” decide anything. 

Likewise, with respect to the second factor, neither party can truly be accused of forum 

shopping. The two complaints, filed one day apart in two different courts, were in essence 

simultaneous. Westar strenuously argues that the fact its federal action was filed one day earlier 

proves that Bayly was forum shopping; but this is ultimately unsupported by any case law and is 

unconvincing by virtue of its technicality. 

As to the third Brillhart factor, Bayly’s first amended complaint in state court indeed poses 

many similar issues, and duplicative litigation is certainly a risk. The parties agree that the two 

lawsuits are based on the same facts surrounding the injuries Bayly allegedly sustained in the course 

of his work for Westar. The lawsuits will both involve a determination whether these facts give rise 

to a duty on the part of Westar to pay maintenance and cure for the injuries Bayly sustained. Any 

findings made by this Court in a declaratory judgment action would have an impact on the issues 

presented in the California state court action. Thus, this factor weighs strongly in favor of deferral 

to the state court. 

Westar argues, however, that this case is analogous to First Shipmor Associates v. Musa, in 

which the district court denied a motion to dismiss in circumstances where, like here, competing 

federal and state cases had been filed by the two parties. No. 92-4675 FMS, 1993 WL 181382 

(N.D. Cal. May 26, 1993). Musa, however, is distinguishable from the instant case for a number of 

reasons: the federal action was “confined to a single issue which [could] quickly be resolved 

through ADR”; the defendant had “already paid the entire disputed amount into the Court’s 

registry”; and the defendant had filed the federal action a full five months before the plaintiff filed 

the state court action. Id. at *2. The Musa Court acknowledged that in most cases, the Brillhart

factors suggest deferring to state court, but that “this case presents a somewhat unusual situation.” 

That unusual situation is not present here. As explained above, the Brillhart factors tilt in favor of 

deferring to the jurisdiction of the San Francisco Superior Court. 

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ORDER

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Furthermore, the Musa Court emphasized that First Shipmor had conceded that Musa injured 

his shoulder in service on the vessel, thus eliminating a principal factual dispute. In this case, by 

contrast, Westar’s counsel indicated at oral argument that all factual issues, including the nature and 

causation of Bayly’s injuries, are in dispute. Therefore, unlike in Musa, any factual determinations 

made here will have a broad preclusive effect in state court. This is a situation which must be 

avoided. Belle Pass Towing Corp. v. Cheramie, 763 F. Supp. 1348, 1354-55 (E.D. La. 1991) 

(explaining that the “possible preclusive effects [that] maintaining such an action [in federal court] 

would have on a suitor’s Jones Act case in another court” mandate dismissal). 

For these reasons, Bayly’s motion to dismiss is granted. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 05/10/2010 

RICHARD SEEBORG 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Case 3:09-cv-05489-RS Document 18 Filed 05/10/10 Page 4 of 4