Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-01328/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-01328-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jaime Arias-Maldonado
Petitioner
Superior Court, County of Santa Clara
Respondent

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAIME ARIAS-MALDONADO,

Plaintiff,

v.

SUPERIOR COURT, COUNTY OF 

SANTA CLARA,

Defendant.

Case No. 19-cv-01328-EMC 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH 

FURTHER LEAVE TO AMEND

Docket No. 17-1

Jaime Arias-Maldonado, formerly an inmate at the Santa Clara County Jail, commenced 

this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by filing a “motion to safeguard civil rights 

of pretrial detainee,” Docket No. 1, and other miscellaneous documents. 

The Court conducted an initial screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and dismissed the 

pleading with leave to amend. Docket No. 16. The Court explained that Mr. Arias-Maldonado’s 

several filings were difficult to understand but focused on criminal charges pending against Mr. 

Arias-Maldonado and appeared to seek federal court authorization to represent himself in state 

court criminal proceedings and for pro per privileges at the jail. Id. at 2-3. The Court determined 

that the Younger abstention doctrine required the dismissal of Mr. Arias-Maldonado’s claims 

seeking interference in the state court criminal proceedings against him. Id. at 4-5 (citing Younger 

v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)). The Court permitted Mr. Arias-Maldonado to file an amended 

complaint to attempt to allege a claim for a denial of the constitutional right of access to the 

courts. Id. at 5. 

Mr. Arias-Maldonado filed an amended complaint that again pertains mostly to his efforts 

to obtain pro per status and his representation in his state court criminal cases. Although those 

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general subject matters can be understood from the amended complaint, the allegations are too 

confused for this Court to determine that a claim is stated against any defendant for a violation of 

Mr. Arias-Maldonado’s federal constitutional rights. Leave to amend will be granted so that Mr. 

Arias-Maldonado may file a second amended complaint to attempt to allege his claims in a more 

coherent manner. 

As the Court explained in the order of dismissal with leave to amend:

Inmates have a constitutional right of access to the courts. See 

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996). The Ninth Circuit has 

“traditionally differentiated between two types of access to court 

claims: those involving prisoners’ right[s] to affirmative assistance

and those involving prisoners’ rights to litigate without active 

interference.” Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th 

Cir.2011) (emphasis in source), overruled on other grounds as 

stated by Richey v. Dahne, 807 F.3d 1202, 1209 n.6 (9th Cir. 2015). 

To allege a claim for denial of access to the courts of the first sort 

(i.e., denial of affirmative assistance), a plaintiff must allege facts 

showing that there was an inadequacy in the prison’s legal access 

program that caused him an actual injury. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 

U.S. at 350-51. To prove an actual injury, the prisoner must show 

that the inadequacy hindered him in presenting a non-frivolous 

claim concerning his conviction or conditions of confinement. See 

id. at 355. Examples of impermissible hindrances include: a 

prisoner whose complaint was dismissed for failure to satisfy some 

technical requirement of which, because of deficiencies in the 

prison's legal assistance facilities, he could not have known; and a 

prisoner who had “suffered arguably actionable harm” that he 

wished to bring to the attention of the court, but was so stymied by 

the inadequacies of the prison’s services that he was unable even to 

file a complaint. See id. at 351. 

To allege a claim for a violation of the right to litigate without active 

interference, the plaintiff must identify the interference and allege 

that he has suffered an actual injury, such as the dismissal of his 

pending action. See Silva, 658 F.3d at 1103–04. Additionally, the 

“underlying cause of action, whether anticipated or lost, is an 

element that must be described in the complaint, just as much as 

allegations must describe the official acts frustrating the litigation.” 

Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002). The underlying 

cause of action must be described by allegations in the complaint 

sufficient to give fair notice to a defendant, id. at 416, and to the 

court in a prisoner action that must be screened under 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A. 

Docket No. 16 at 5-6.

A § 1983 claim for a denial of, or interference with, the right to self-representation 

recognized in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), may exist. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 

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1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 1989). In Taylor, the Ninth Circuit stated that the Faretta right included a 

“right of access to law books, witnesses, and other tools necessary to prepare a defense,” id., but 

the Supreme Court later cast doubt on the existence of a claim of interference with one’s selfrepresentation right when it held that “Faretta says nothing about any specific legal aid that the 

State owes a pro se criminal defendant,” and does not clearly establish a right of access to a law 

library, Kane v. Garcia Espitia, 546 U.S. 9, 10 (2005). Assuming arguendo that a § 1983 claim 

may exist based on an interference with a criminal defendant’s Faretta right, a plaintiff must

allege how he was harmed by any interference with the Faretta right. See generally Taylor, 880 

F.2d at 1049; see, e.g., id. (only damages would be available for the denial of the right to 

meaningful self-representation if claim was proven because the harm resulting from the asserted 

denial of the right to meaningful self-representation “has been substantially remedied” by the 

reversal of the conviction).

For both a denial-of-access-to-the-courts and any Faretta claim, a plaintiff must allege the 

particular ways in which the defendants interfered with the right and how the plaintiff was 

harmed. Mr. Arias-Maldonado’s amended complaint does not contain that information. Part of 

the problem is that Mr. Arias-Maldonado heavily emphasizes the failure to follow local jail rules

and state court protocols for pro per litigants. But the failure to follow jail and state court rules

are largely irrelevant to the federal constitutional analysis, as the federal right does not depend on 

what the state court requires or the county jail provides for a pro per litigant. For example, Mr. 

Maldonado mentions some sort of requirement for a 28-day period prior to termination of pro per 

status and a right to a hearing upon request regarding that termination, see Docket No. 17-1 at 9, 

but those are not federal constitutional requirements. In his second amended complaint, Mr. 

Arias-Maldonado must specifically describe what each defendant did to violate his federal 

constitutional rights and the resulting harm.1 

1 The status of his criminal cases also may present obstacles to a § 1983 action. 

Mr. Arias-Maldonado reports that he was found not guilty in one of his cases, see Docket 

No. 18, so it is not clear what the actual harm would have been with respect to that criminal case. 

He does not allege the status of his other criminal case, but must do so in his second 

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The amended complaint also has numerous conclusory and confusing allegations that 

further impede the Court’s ability to determine that a claim is stated. For example, Mr. AriasMaldonado alleges that a San Jose police officer and detective “nearly unchallenged, impartially 

testified and knowingly withheld material evidence to Arias-Maldonado’ prejudice.” Docket No. 

17-1 at 23. The allegation that the police “withheld material evidence” is a conclusory allegation

that alone is insufficient; Mr. Arias-Maldonado needs to allege facts to explain what that evidence 

consisted of so that it can be determined whether it was actually material. The quoted allegation 

appears to be self-contradictory as it alleges the police testified impartially and did something 

wrong (i.e., withheld material evidence). Mr. Arias-Maldonado must strive in his next pleading to 

be much clearer in meaning.

Leave to amend is granted so that Mr. Arias-Maldonado may file a second amended 

complaint to attempt to allege facts, if he has them, that plausibly show that defendants violated 

his right of access to the courts and his Faretta right. For each claim of denial of access to the 

courts or interference with the Faretta right to self-representation, he must allege enough facts to 

state a claim that is plausible on its face. If he contends that there have been several violations of 

his federal constitutional rights, Mr. Arias-Maldonado must allege each one separately. Mr. AriasMaldonado also must link one or more defendants to any access to the courts claim, as explained 

in the order of dismissal with leave to amend. See Docket No. 16 at 6-7.

amended complaint. If that case is still pending or resulted in a conviction that has not been 

overturned, Mr. Arias-Maldonado’s claims might be precluded by the Heck rule. In Heck v. 

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff cannot bring a 

civil rights action for damages for a wrongful conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm 

caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, unless that 

conviction or sentence or other decision already has been determined to be wrongful. See Heck v. 

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). A conviction or sentence may be determined to be 

wrongful by, for example, being reversed on appeal or being set aside when a state or federal court 

issues a writ of habeas corpus. See id. The Heck rule also prevents a person from bringing an 

action that--even if it does not directly challenge the conviction or other decision--would imply 

that the conviction or other decision was invalid. The practical importance of the Heck rule is that 

plaintiffs cannot attack their convictions or sentences in a civil rights action for damages and 

instead must have successfully attacked the decision before filing the civil rights action for 

damages. The Heck rule requires dismissal of a case where the conviction has occurred. When 

the action is brought by a pretrial detainee and the criminal proceedings are still pending, the 

action will be stayed rather than dismissed if it would, if successful, “impugn an anticipated future 

conviction.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393-94 (2007). 

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For the foregoing reasons, the amended complaint is dismissed because it does not state a 

claim upon which relief may be granted. Further leave to amend is granted so that Mr. AriasMaldonado may file a second amended complaint. The second amended complaint must be filed 

no later than March 13, 2020, and must include the caption and civil case number used in this 

order. Failure to file the second amended complaint by the deadline will result in the dismissal of 

the action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 10, 2020

______________________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

United States District Judge

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