Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-05094/USCOURTS-ca10-90-05094-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dorothy Mae Dowler
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

' 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

PI 7 ,ED 

Uni 1,.xi Sta.t;.i }o•·sc •;·{ :':.[.\ als 

Terrth vi.:.:,· 1t 

AUG 14 1991 

ROBERT L. HOEC :i.!.iR 

Clerk UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 90-5094 

v. 

DOROTHY MAE DOWLER, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

(D.C. No. 89-CR-39-02-E) 

( N. D. Okla. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before McKAY, SETH and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

Appellant Dorothy Mae Dowler was charged and convicted of one 

count of conspiracy to defraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 

seven counts of causing interstate travel in furtherance of fraud 

in violation of 18 u.s.c. § 2314. She seeks reversal of her 

conviction asserting that the trial court erroneously denied her 

motion to suppress evidence obtained in violation of her Fourth 

Amendment rights. 

On October 29, 1986, appellant rented an apartment at the 

Oakwood Garden Apartments on a month to month basis. She planned 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppal. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-5094 Document: 010110132056 Date Filed: 08/14/1991 Page: 1 
to utilize the space as living accommodations and as office space. 

On November 1, 1986, she moved her personal belongings and 

business records into the apartment. The business records were 

contained in eight boxes, a file cabinet and two leather 

briefcases. She stayed in the apartment during the entire month 

of November. In early December 1986, she went to Switzerland. 

Before leaving, she made arrangements with her employee, Bob 

Lucas, and the Barclay Bank in Costa Mesa to pay her rent and 

utilities. Appellant returned on December 11, 1986, and spent the 

night in her apartment. This was the only evening that she stayed 

in her apartment during the month of December. The following 

morning she left the apartment, and eventually went to San 

Francisco. She had no contact with the apartment manager until 

February 26, 1987. 

Meanwhile, the apartment manager had not received payment on 

the December rent. He contacted Mr. Lucas whose name appeared on 

her rent application. Mr. Lucas was uncertain when appellant 

would return and suggested that the apartment manager place her 

property in storage. On December 30, 1986, while he was removing 

appellant's property from her apartment, he noticed that some of 

the material appeared to be valuable because it looked like stocks 

and bonds. He then placed her property in the locked apartment 

building storage area until appellant could collect it. 

In early January 1987, Detective Pace, of the Costa Mesa 

Police Department (not the local department), contacted the 

apartment manager and asked him if he knew the whereabouts of 

-2-

Appellate Case: 90-5094 Document: 010110132056 Date Filed: 08/14/1991 Page: 2 
appellant because she was the subject of an investigation by the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation in Oklahoma. The apartment 

manager informed him that she had lived there; that the rent had 

not been paid; and that he had been instructed to put her property 

in storage. 

Although the apartment manager made no search of the boxes 

and files, he testified that the documents and other personal 

property, the obvious ones, did not appear to be related to 

criminal activity, but he was concerned about the safety of the 

storage area. Therefore, he called his friend, Detective 

Parmentier of the Newport Beach Police Department (the local 

department), to pick up the property on February 26, 1987. During 

this telephone conversation, he also informed Detective Parmentier 

that Detective Pace had tried to contact appellant. After his 

conversation with the apartment manager, Detective Parmentier 

called Detective Pace. Detective Pace stated that appellant was 

the subject of a fraud investigation and the documents might have 

some evidentiary value. That same morning Detective Parmentier 

and another officer arrived at the Oakwood Garden Apartments and 

picked up appellant's property. Detective Parmentier testified 

that he did not perform a search of the property when it was in 

the storage area or at the police station. He merely took some 

photographs of the property in the storage area and put covers on 

a few of the boxes which were uncovered. He then seized the 

property which consisted of one file cabinet, eight boxes of 

miscellaneous papers and files and two leather briefcases, and 

-3-

Appellate Case: 90-5094 Document: 010110132056 Date Filed: 08/14/1991 Page: 3 
took it to the local police station. Thus, he took possession 

apparently on the suggestion of the apartment manager, and after 

the conversation with Detective Pace, but with no actual knowledge 

of the contents. 

On that same day appellant learned that her rent was 

delinquent. She went to the Oakwood Garden Apartments to pay the 

December rent and to collect her property. After learning that 

the items had been turned over to the police, she went to the 

police station and requested Detective Parmentier to release the 

items to her. He refused to do so because he believed that the 

property was evidence in a case that the FBI was investigating. 

On January 26, 1988, the files were transported to the FBI in Los 

Angeles. Thereafter, the property was searched and the documents 

were examined without a warrant and without the consent of 

appellant. 

Prior to trial, appellant moved to suppress all the evidence 

obtained from the search of the boxes and files. The trial court 

denied this motion finding that appellant had abandoned her 

apartment; therefore, she did not have a reasonable expectation of 

privacy in the items seized. Apparently, the trial court only 

considered appellant's relationship to the apartment, and did not 

consider her expectation of privacy as to the property in the 

location where it was seized and searched nor the fact that it was 

in containers. 

On February 26, 1990, the case proceeded to trial. The jury 

found appellant guilty on all eight counts. Appellant appeals the 

-4-

Appellate Case: 90-5094 Document: 010110132056 Date Filed: 08/14/1991 Page: 4 
denial of her motion to suppress alleging that the warrantless and 

non-consensual search and seizure violated her rights under the 

Fourth Amendment. 

It is apparent that a person does not have standing to 

complain of a Fourth Amendment violation where he or she has 

voluntarily abandoned property. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 

217, 240-241. In United States v. Jones, 707 F.2d 1169, 1172 

(10th Cir.), we held: 

"The test for abandonment is whether an 

individual has retained any reasonable 

expectation of privacy in the object, 

[United States v.] Diggs, 649 F.2d [731] at 

735 [9th Cir. (1981)]. This determination is 

to be made by objective standards. 

United States v. Kendall, 655 F.2d 199, 201 

(9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941, 

102 S. Ct. 1434, 71 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982). An 

expectation of privacy is a question of 

intent, which 'may be inferred from words 

spoken, acts done, and other objective facts.' 

Kendall, 655 F.2d at 202 (quoting 

[United States v.] Williams, 569 F.2d [823] at 

826 [5th Cir. (1978)]). 'A finding of 

abandonment is reviewed under the clearly 

erroneous standard.' Diggs, 649 F.2d at 735." 

The trial court, as mentioned, concluded that appellant had 

abandoned the apartment. However, the abandonment of the 

apartment was not an issue in the Fourth Amendment consideration. 

There was no search of appellant's apartment nor seizure of any 

property from it. The determination of admissibility and the 

motion to suppress on that basis was clearly erroneous. 

Upon the request of Mr. Lucas, as mentioned, the apartment 

manager agreed to store appellant's property until she could 

return to collect it and so removed the property from the 

-5-

Appellate Case: 90-5094 Document: 010110132056 Date Filed: 08/14/1991 Page: 5 
apartment for that purpose. Although appellant did not directly 

deliver possession of her property to the apartment manager, the 

bailment was created through Mr. Lucas, her agent. As such, the 

apartment manager was obligated to care for her property in the 

regular storage area and a new relationship was created. The 

property was not abandoned. There was nothing to indicate that 

appellant could not pick up her property when she wished to do so, 

or have access to it when she wished. No lien was asserted. In 

fact, the apartment manager testified that upon demand he would 

have returned the property to her even if she did not pay the past 

due rent. She did return to collect her property. 

In addition to the doctrines arising from the bailment 

created by her agent, and the privacy expectations created 

thereby, the property seized was in closed containers. 

An individual does not have standing to challenge a search 

and seizure unless that "individual's subjective expectation of 

privacy is 'one that society is prepared to recognize as 

"reasonable."'" Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (quoting 

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361). By placing personal 

property inside a closed container, one "manifest[s] an 

expectation that the contents would remain free from public 

examination." United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11. In 

United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 120, n.17, the Supreme 

Court held that "[a] container which can support a reasonable 

expectation of privacy may not be searched, even on probable cause 

without a warrant." See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753. As 

-6-

Appellate Case: 90-5094 Document: 010110132056 Date Filed: 08/14/1991 Page: 6 
long as a package is "closed against inspection," the Fourth 

Amendment protects its contents "wherever they may be" and the 

police must obtain a search warrant. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 

727, 733. "[U]nless the container is such that its contents may 

be said to be in plain view, those contents are fully protected by 

the Fourth Amendment." Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 427. 

Further, there can be no distinction between "the relative 

'privacy interests' in a closed suitcase, briefcase, portfolio, 

duffelbag, or box." Id. 

At the time of the seizure from the storage area and the much 

later search by the FBI, the documents were contained in covered 

boxes, briefcases, and a file cabinet. The contents were "closed 

against inspection" and were not in "plain view." The contents 

were unknown to those handling the containers. By placing the 

documents in the boxes, file cabinet and briefcases, appellant 

manifested an expectation that the documents would remain private 

and free from inspection. Appellant's expectation of privacy and 

protection from a wrongful search and seizure continued into the 

creation of the bailment by the apartment manager and her agent, 

Mr. Lucas. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 109 (where package is 

entrusted to a private carrier, a search warrant is required to 

examine its contents). See also United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 

U.S. 249 (search warrant required to examine the contents of two 

packages entrusted with the postal service). Possession of 

property by the police does not authorize a warrantless search 

absent a recognized exception. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109. No such 

-7-

Appellate Case: 90-5094 Document: 010110132056 Date Filed: 08/14/1991 Page: 7 
exception is articulated here. The mere fact that Detective 

Parmentier put covers on some of the boxes before he seized them 

does not warrant a different conclusion as addressed below. 

The government cannot argue that the search was based upon a 

good faith belief that the property was abandoned or upon the 

consent of the apartment manager. As indicated above, the 

apartment manager was entrusted to safekeep appellant's property. 

He could not consent to the search of its contents. Any 

suggestion was nullified when appellant tried to reclaim her 

property at the police station on the same day that it had been 

seized. As noted, upon learning that the property had been 

seized, appellant requested that Detective Parmentier return her 

property. The officer obviously knew at this time appellant's 

claim and that the apartment manager was storing the property for 

her. Her claim negated any suggestion of abandonment. The 

officer knew the chain of events and the property was so burdened 

when it passed to the FBI. At the time of the search by the FBI, 

the authorities were thus aware of appellant's intent to retain a 

reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of those boxes 

and a search warrant was required for the examination of the 

contents. 

The government urges that the FBI's search was lawful because 

its search did not exceed the scope of the private search 

performed by the apartment manager. A private search or seizure 

does not invoke the protections of the Fourth Amendment. 

Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109. A private person's discovery of 

-8-

Appellate Case: 90-5094 Document: 010110132056 Date Filed: 08/14/1991 Page: 8 
contraband and his subsequent notification of the authorities as 

to the existence of such contraband does not violate the Fourth 

Amendment. Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765. In Jacobsen, 466 

U.S. 109, defendant's privacy expectations were lost where Federal 

Express employees, upon noticing a white powder exuding from a 

damaged package, opened it up and notified the DEA. See also 

United States v. Walsh, 791 F.2d 811 (10th Cir.) (privacy interest 

in a briefcase was lost where airline employee opened it up to 

determine its owner, discovered a firearm, and then contacted the 

authorities). 

Here, the action by the apartment manager did not constitute 

a private search. It was no search at all. The apartment manager 

did not search the contents of the boxes, briefcases, or file 

cabinet. Although he thought that some of the documents were 

stocks and bonds, this viewing did not frustrate appellant's 

expectation of privacy. Any illegal nature of the contents, if 

this was the case, was of course not apparent. When the apartment 

manager finally contacted the authorities almost two months later, 

he indicated that he was concerned about the security of the 

storage area. He did not notify the authorities because he had 

reviewed the documents and believed that they were associated with 

criminal activity. The apartment manager's actions did not 

constitute a private search; therefore, the FBI's search was a 

significant departure from the apartment manager's actions and not 

based thereon. 

-9-

Appellate Case: 90-5094 Document: 010110132056 Date Filed: 08/14/1991 Page: 9 
Further, Detective Parmentier did not conduct a search of 

appellant's property. In fact, he took pains not to do so. He 

testified that he did not want to disturb the evidence before the 

FBI could review it; therefore, he took some photographs, covered 

some of the uncovered boxes, and seized the property from the 

storage area. He could not have known the significance of the 

documents had he looked at them because he was not involved in the 

investigation. The only reason that the apartment manager 

contacted Detective Parmentier was because they are friends. 

Although Detective Pace indicated to Detective Parmentier that the 

documents might have some evidentiary value, he was not involved 

in the actual investigation either. Appellant did not lose any 

expectation of privacy in her property because Detective 

Parmentier knew that the property contained documents. The nonconsensual and warrantless search approximately 15 months after 

the seizure does not fall within any of the recognized exceptions 

to the warrant requirement; therefore, the search was unlawful. 

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219. 

Appellant contends that the government's unlawful search of 

her business records resulted in her conviction because it was 

permitted to introduce documents at trial obtained through the 

unlawful search. But in addition, and perhaps more importantly, 

she urges that the foundation for the government's entire case was 

established through the search and use of her business records. 

The government contends that the few items from her records 

-10-

Appellate Case: 90-5094 Document: 010110132056 Date Filed: 08/14/1991 Page: 10 
admitted at trial was harmless error even if the search was a 

violation of the Fourth Amendment. 

United States v. Sor-Lokken, 557 F.2d 755 (10th Cir.), 

decided by this court was in part a "common authority" case, but 

is important for its reference to the indirect use of material 

obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. We there said, at 

758: 

"It is well established that neither 

evidence seized during an unlawful search nor, 

as a general rule, evidence indirectly 

obtained as a result of such illegality is 

admissible against the victim of the search. 

Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 

S. Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). The 

exclusionary rule determines not only that 

illegally obtained evidence may not be 

directly presented to the court, but further 

that it may not be employed or relied on at 

all. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. 

United States, 251 U.S. 385, 40 S. Ct. 182, 64 

L.Ed. 319 (1920). 'Of course this does not 

mean that the facts thus obtained become 

sacred and inaccessible.' Silverthorne, 

supra, at 392, 40 s. Ct. at 183. Knowledge of 

these same facts gained from an independent 

source may still be employed. Silverthorne, 

supra." 

In Sor-Lokken, we relied on and quoted from Wong Sun v. 

United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-488 (quoting Maguire, Evidence of 

Guilt 221 (1959)), as follows: 

"We need not hold that all evidence is 'fruit 

of the poisonous tree' simply because it would 

not have come to light but for the illegal 

actions of the police. Rather, the more apt 

question in such a case is 'whether, granting 

establishment of the primary illegality, the 

evidence to which instant objection is made 

has been come at by exploitation of that 

illegality or instead by means sufficiently 

distinguishable to be purged of the primary 

taint.'" 

-11-

Appellate Case: 90-5094 Document: 010110132056 Date Filed: 08/14/1991 Page: 11 
The use of the wrongfully obtained material in the 

prosecution is here a significant factor. In Silverthorne Lumber 

Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, the Court held that 

information derived from an unlawful search or seizure remains 

tainted. However, if independently discovered through an 

independent source the derivative evidence may be purged of an 

illegal source. 

The record shows that the government obtained the benefit of 

unlimited discovery when it conducted the wrongful search of the 

records seized in violation of appellant's Fourth Amendment 

rights. These records, among other information, contained names, 

addresses, and telephone numbers of individuals who testified at 

the trial against appellant. It is reasonable to assume that 

these records could have provided information which became the 

basis for the prosecution and trial of appellant. The government 

asserts harmless error and has the burden. It urges, as 

mentioned, that only a few documents from the search were actually 

admitted, but again this is only part of the problem. 

Thus if the harmless error doctrine is to be applied as the 

government urges, see United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, and 

United States v. Smith, 888 F.2d 720 (10th Cir.), the consequences 

of the admission of the several exhibits from appellant's records, 

plus the use by the government of the wrongfully obtained records 

for other purposes in the prosecution, if there was any, must be 

evaluated together. This cannot be done on the record before us. 

Thus the case must be remanded. 

-12-

Appellate Case: 90-5094 Document: 010110132056 Date Filed: 08/14/1991 Page: 12 
The conviction and judgment is REVERSED, and IT IS ORDERED 

that the case be REMANDED for further proceedings. 

-13-

Entered for the Court 

Oliver Seth 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 90-5094 Document: 010110132056 Date Filed: 08/14/1991 Page: 13 
No. 90-5094, United States of America v. Dowler 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 

I respectfully dissent. 

The issue we must address is whether Defendant retained a 

reasonable expectation of privacy in her records prior to the time 

the police took custody of the records on February 26, 1987. 

The district court concluded as follows: 

Based upon the credible testimony and the 

reasonable inferences that can be given to the credible 

testimony in this case, the Court must find that there 

was an abandonment by Dowler of these records. I mean 

that's what the objective test tells this fact finder. 

This finding by the trial court must be accepted by an 

appellate court unless it is clearly erroneous. Unlike the 

majority, I cannot conclude the trial court's finding was clearly 

erroneous. 

In reviewing the trial court's decision, we must consider the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the government. 

Looking at the evidence, we find Defendant rented the 

apartment in her name and her daughter's on a month-to-month 

tenancy. Defendant paid but one month's (November 1986) rent and 

made no further effort or attempt to pay any additional rent until 

after the records were seized. By mid-December, it was clearly 

evident no one was utilizing the apartment. On December 20, the 

Appellate Case: 90-5094 Document: 010110132056 Date Filed: 08/14/1991 Page: 14 
owner placed a notice on the door telling Defendant to pay or get 

out. Defendant, on her rental agreement, left the name of her 

chauffeur as the person to contact in the event of an emergency. 

When contacted, he did not know Defendant's whereabouts and he 

"suggested" Defendant's property be put into storage. Defendant 

also left telephone numbers for her business and for a relative. 

These contacts yielded no results. In the meantime the newspapers 

were piling up on the doorstep. 

In late December, the apartment manager moved Defendant's 

contents to a storage area that belonged to the apartment owner. 

This storage area was not secured. 

Defendant had at least three separate opportunities to 

contact the apartment manager prior to February 26 as she was in 

town and available but intentionally failed to do so. She 

deliberately and wilfully chose not to tell the apartment manager 

of her whereabouts. 

On February 26, Defendant appeared at the apartment hours 

after the police had taken the records, paid her unpaid December 

rent and some collection charges, and received her remaining 

property. 

While the majority credits Defendant with making arrangements 

to pay the rent with her bank in December, this fact was not found 

by the trial court and is only one of several conflicting and 

-2-

Appellate Case: 90-5094 Document: 010110132056 Date Filed: 08/14/1991 Page: 15 
unbelievable stories related by Defendant as she had insufficient 

monies in the bank. Likewise, the majority characterized 

Defendant's chauffeur with being her agent. These statements 

should not be considered under the standard of review we must 

employ. 

Whether property has been abandoned is largely a question of 

intent, which may be inferred from all of the relevant facts and 

circumstances. The determination of abandonment must be judged by 

objective standards. The ultimate question is whether the 

Defendant has retained reasonable expectation of privacy in these 

particular records. Applying this test to the facts before us, I 

would affirm the decision of the district court. Defendant, who 

is fifty-seven years old and does business worldwide, is obviously 

sophisticated and knowledgeable. She neither paid nor attempted 

to pay her rent after October 29, 1986. When one fails to pay 

rent for nearly three months, one should expect the contents will 

be inspected, inventoried, and moved elsewhere. It therefore 

follows that the owner of property left in an apartment under 

these circumstances has no reasonable expectation of privacy in 

such property. The records therefore came under the landlord's 

dominion and control, a fact made possible by Defendant's willful 

acts. Clearly, the landlord could allow other persons to inspect 

the property. As I cannot say the district judge's decision was 

clearly erroneous, I would affirm. 

-3-

Appellate Case: 90-5094 Document: 010110132056 Date Filed: 08/14/1991 Page: 16