Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01351/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01351-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Brenda G. Swain
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRENDA G. SWAIN,

Plaintiff,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY,

Defendant.

No. 2:14-cv-1351-KJN

ORDER

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision by the Commissioner of Social Security

(“Commissioner”) denying plaintiff’s application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under 

Title II of the Social Security Act (“Act”).1 In her motion for summary judgment, plaintiff 

principally contends that the Commissioner erred by finding that plaintiff was not disabled from

June 7, 2004, plaintiff’s alleged disability onset date, through December 31, 2009, plaintiff’s date 

last insured. (ECF No. 14.) The Commissioner filed an opposition to plaintiff’s motion and a 

cross-motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 18.) No optional reply brief was filed by 

plaintiff. 

 

1

This action was initially referred to the undersigned pursuant to E.D. Cal. L.R. 302(c)(15), and 

both parties voluntarily consented to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge for all 

purposes. (ECF Nos. 7, 9.) 

Case 2:14-cv-01351-KJN Document 19 Filed 07/20/15 Page 1 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

For the reasons discussed below, the court DENIES plaintiff’s motion for summary 

judgment, GRANTS the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and enters 

judgment for the Commissioner. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was born on June 29, 1964, has a high school education with special education 

classes, is able to communicate in English, and previously worked primarily as a lumber 

grader/laborer at a lumber mill.

2

 (Administrative Transcript (“AT”) 40, 55-56, 85, 112, 346.) On 

May 6, 2008, plaintiff applied for DIB, alleging that her disability began on June 7, 2004, and that 

she was disabled primarily due to a right elbow impairment, a learning disability, attention deficit 

hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”), and diabetes. (AT 132, 290, 347.) After plaintiff’s 

applications were denied initially and on reconsideration, plaintiff requested a hearing before an 

administrative law judge (“ALJ”), which took place on June 9, 2010, and at which plaintiff, 

represented by an attorney, and a vocational expert (“VE”) testified. (AT 50-94, 177, 183.) In a 

decision dated August 18, 2010, the ALJ determined that plaintiff was not disabled during the 

relevant period. (AT 154-65.) Subsequently, plaintiff requested review of the ALJ’s decision by 

the Appeals Council, which remanded the case for a new hearing and additional proceedings on 

January 20, 2012. (AT 173-75.) An additional hearing was conducted on September 17, 2012, at 

which plaintiff, represented by an attorney, and a VE testified. (AT 95-131.) 

In a subsequent decision dated October 10, 2012, the ALJ again determined that plaintiff 

had not been under a disability, as defined in the Act, at any time from June 7, 2004, plaintiff’s 

alleged disability onset date, through December 31, 2009, plaintiff’s date last insured. (AT 29-

42.) The ALJ’s October 10, 2012 decision became the final decision of the Commissioner when 

the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for review on February 27, 2014. (AT 12-14.) 

Thereafter, upon receiving an extension of time to file a civil action from the Appeals Council 

(AT 1), plaintiff filed this action in federal district court on June 3, 2014, to obtain judicial review 

 

2 Because the parties are familiar with the factual background of this case, including plaintiff’s

medical and mental health history, the court does not exhaustively relate those facts in this order. 

The facts related to plaintiff’s impairments and treatment will be addressed insofar as they are 

relevant to the issues presented by the parties’ respective motions.

Case 2:14-cv-01351-KJN Document 19 Filed 07/20/15 Page 2 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

of the Commissioner’s final decision. (ECF No. 1.) 

II. ISSUES PRESENTED

On appeal, plaintiff has raised the sole issue of whether the ALJ improperly rejected 

plaintiff’s testimony concerning her own symptoms and functional limitations. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

The court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether (1) it is based on 

proper legal standards pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and (2) substantial evidence in the record 

as a whole supports it. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial 

evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Connett v. Barnhart, 340 

F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). It means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable 

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th 

Cir. 2007), quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). “The ALJ is 

responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving 

ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). “The 

court will uphold the ALJ’s conclusion when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Summary of the ALJ’s Findings

The ALJ evaluated plaintiff’s entitlement to DIB pursuant to the Commissioner’s standard 

five-step analytical framework.3 As an initial matter, the ALJ noted that plaintiff met the insured 

 

3 Disability Insurance Benefits are paid to disabled persons who have contributed to the Social 

Security program. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. Supplemental Security Income is paid to disabled 

persons with low income. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382 et seq. Both provisions define disability, in part, as 

an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” due to “a medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment. . . .” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(a) & 1382c(a)(3)(A). A parallel 

five-step sequential evaluation governs eligibility for benefits under both programs. See 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 404.1571-76, 416.920 & 416.971-76; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-

42 (1987). The following summarizes the sequential evaluation:

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful activity? If so, the 

claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed to step two.

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? If so, proceed to step 

Case 2:14-cv-01351-KJN Document 19 Filed 07/20/15 Page 3 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

status requirements of the Act for purposes of DIB through December 31, 2009. (AT 31.) At the 

first step, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity between 

June 7, 2004, plaintiff’s alleged disability onset date, and December 31, 2009, plaintiff’s date last 

insured. (Id.) At step two, the ALJ found that plaintiff had the following severe impairments 

through the date last insured: right elbow pain, learning disability, ADHD, anxiety, and diabetes. 

(Id.) However, at step three, the ALJ determined that plaintiff did not have an impairment or 

combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of an impairment listed in 

20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 through the date last insured. (Id.) 

Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ assessed plaintiff’s residual functional capacity 

(“RFC”) as follows:

After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned 

finds that, through the date last insured, the claimant had the 

residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 

CFR 404.1567(b) except she could stand/walk six hours in an eight 

hour workday and sit six hours in an eight hour workday, she could 

lift 25 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, and no 

repetitive pushing/pulling with right upper extremity, and no 

strenuous activities requiring the use of her right upper extremity. 

She has no limits with left upper extremity. She could perform 

simple repetitive tasks and adapt to minimal changes in work 

environment. She could interact with supervisor, coworkers, and 

the public. She could concentrate on her regular simple type tasks, 

and perform simple one-two simple tasks. [sic]

 

three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is appropriate.

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments meet or 

equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1? If so, the 

claimant is automatically determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four.

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past relevant work? If so, the 

claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step five.

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional capacity to perform any 

other work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled. 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995).

The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 

process. Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5. The Commissioner bears the burden if the sequential 

evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id. 

Case 2:14-cv-01351-KJN Document 19 Filed 07/20/15 Page 4 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

(AT 32.) 

At step four, the ALJ found that plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work

through the date last insured. (AT 40.) However, at step five, the ALJ determined, based on the 

VE’s testimony, that, considering plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, there 

were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that plaintiff could have

performed through the date last insured. (AT 41.) 

Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined 

in the Act, at any time from June 7, 2004, plaintiff’s alleged disability onset date, through 

December 31, 2009, plaintiff’s date last insured. (AT 41.)

B. Plaintiff’s Substantive Challenges to the Commissioner’s Determinations

As noted above, plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly rejected plaintiff’s testimony 

concerning her own symptoms and functional limitations. 

In Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2007), the Ninth Circuit Court of 

Appeals summarized the ALJ’s task with respect to assessing a claimant’s credibility:

To determine whether a claimant’s testimony regarding subjective 

pain or symptoms is credible, an ALJ must engage in a two-step 

analysis. First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has 

presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment 

which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other 

symptoms alleged. The claimant, however, need not show that her 

impairment could reasonably be expected to cause the severity of 

the symptom she has alleged; she need only show that it could 

reasonably have caused some degree of the symptom. Thus, the 

ALJ may not reject subjective symptom testimony . . . simply 

because there is no showing that the impairment can reasonably 

produce the degree of symptom alleged. 

Second, if the claimant meets this first test, and there is no evidence 

of malingering, the ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony about 

the severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and 

convincing reasons for doing so. . . .

Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1035-36 (citations and quotation marks omitted). “At the same time, the 

ALJ is not required to believe every allegation of disabling pain, or else disability benefits would 

be available for the asking....” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). 

“The ALJ must specifically identify what testimony is credible and what testimony 

undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 

Case 2:14-cv-01351-KJN Document 19 Filed 07/20/15 Page 5 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

693 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 

1999)). In weighing a claimant’s credibility, an ALJ may consider, among other things, the 

“‘[claimant’s] reputation for truthfulness, inconsistencies either in [claimant’s] testimony or 

between [her] testimony and [her] conduct, [claimant’s] daily activities, [her] work record, and 

testimony from physicians and third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect of the 

symptoms of which [claimant] complains.’” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th Cir. 

2002) (modification in original) (quoting Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 

1997)). If the ALJ’s credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record, the 

court “may not engage in second-guessing.” Id. at 959.

In this case, the ALJ provided several specific, clear, and convincing reasons for 

discounting plaintiff’s testimony concerning the severity of her symptoms and functional 

limitations. 

The ALJ properly relied on the medical opinions of the consultative examiners to find 

plaintiff not completely credible. (AT 33-35, 40.)4 

On October 17, 2006, consultative examiner and clinical psychologist Dr. Mark Pierce 

performed a complete psychological evaluation of plaintiff, as well as intelligence, memory, and 

achievement testing. (AT 480.) Dr. Pierce diagnosed plaintiff with a learning disorder, 

borderline intellectual functioning, and methamphetamine abuse in sustained full remission. (AT 

484.) He opined that plaintiff had adequate reasoning capacity, could complete simple and 

repetitive vocational skills, could remember and comply with simple one and two part 

instructions, could concentrate adequately for a regular work schedule for a full workweek, could 

adapt to minimal changes in a work environment, and could effectively work with others. (AT 

485.) 

 On November 16, 2006, plaintiff was also examined by consultative examiner and 

orthopedic surgeon Dr. Nathan Pliam. (AT 486, 490.) After performing a comprehensive 

 

4 On appeal, plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s assessment of the medical opinion evidence 

through any substantive briefing or argument. Thus, any such issue is waived. See Carmickle v. 

Comm’r, 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Case 2:14-cv-01351-KJN Document 19 Filed 07/20/15 Page 6 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

physical examination, including an examination of plaintiff’s spine and all extremities, Dr. Pliam 

diagnosed plaintiff with right laterohumeral epicondylitis, also known as tennis elbow. (AT 490.) 

Dr. Pliam opined that plaintiff could lift 25 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds repetitively, and 

was precluded from repetitive forceful pushing and pulling, as well as strenuous activities, 

requiring the use of her right upper extremity. (Id.)

Thereafter, on August 16, 2008, plaintiff was examined by consultative examiner and 

internist Dr. Scott Gabler. (AT 611, 614.) Dr. Gabler described plaintiff as “a very wellappearing obese female who ambulates with no difficulty. She is able to sit comfortably 

throughout the examination, easily able to get on the examination table.” (AT 612.) Her diabetes 

was well controlled with oral medication. (Id.) Plaintiff had a normal gait, no edema in the 

extremities, normal reflexes, normal sensation, normal motor strength and muscle bulk/tone in 

both elbows with no weakness or atrophy noted, preserved range of motion in the right elbow 

without crepitus, and no pain with palpation over the right elbow joint or forearm. (AT 613.) Dr. 

Gabler diagnosed plaintiff with right elbow pain, “currently without pain; however, it does 

become worse with increased use.” (Id.) He declined to assess plaintiff’s alleged ADHD. (AT 

614.) Dr. Gabler opined that plaintiff could stand and walk for at least 6 hours in an 8-hour 

workday, could sit without restriction, did not require an assistive device, and had no further 

limitations. (Id.)

These medical opinions by specialists who personally examined plaintiff during the 

relevant period are consistent with the ALJ’s RFC and also support the ALJ’s credibility 

determination. To be sure, “after a claimant produces objective medical evidence of an 

underlying impairment, an ALJ may not reject a claimant’s subjective complaints based solely on 

a lack of medical evidence to fully corroborate the alleged severity of pain.” Burch, 400 F.3d at 

680 (citing Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 345 (9th Cir. 1991)). However, while such lack of 

medical evidence cannot form the sole basis for discounting plaintiff’s subjective symptom 

testimony, it is nevertheless a relevant factor for the ALJ to consider. Id. at 681. Thus, the ALJ 

properly considered any inconsistencies between plaintiff’s testimony and the medical opinions

discussed above. 

Case 2:14-cv-01351-KJN Document 19 Filed 07/20/15 Page 7 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

The ALJ also rationally found that plaintiff’s contention that her learning disability would 

preclude her from working was inconsistent with her work history. (AT 38.) Even though 

plaintiff was in special education classes in school, she was able to complete her job duties as a 

lumber grader, a semi-skilled job which involves making judgments and attaining precise 

standards, from 1993-2004, i.e., for 12 consecutive years. (AT 38, 85-86, 112, 348.) The ALJ 

reasoned that plaintiff’s work history, as well as the fact that plaintiff’s learning disability was 

present at approximately the same level of severity prior to the alleged onset date, strongly 

suggest that plaintiff’s learning disability would not preclude her from working. (AT 38.)

Furthermore, the ALJ reasonably pointed to plaintiff’s relatively routine and conservative 

treatment during the relevant period as a basis for discounting her testimony. (AT 39.) See Parra 

v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 751 (9th Cir. 2007) (“We have previously indicated that evidence of 

conservative treatment is sufficient to discount a claimant’s testimony regarding severity of an 

impairment”). As the ALJ explained by detailed reference to plaintiff’s treatment records,

plaintiff’s physical and mental impairments were generally effectively controlled through 

medication, and her treatment consisted largely of office visits for routine complaints, check-ups, 

and medication refills. (AT 34-36, 39.) A condition that can be controlled or corrected by 

medication is not disabling for purposes of determining eligibility for benefits under the Act. See

Warre v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Finally, the ALJ properly found that plaintiff’s activities were inconsistent with her

allegations of disabling symptoms and limitations. (AT 38.) “While a claimant need not vegetate 

in a dark room in order to be eligible for benefits, the ALJ may discredit a claimant’s testimony 

when the claimant reports participation in everyday activities indicating capacities that are 

transferable to a work setting ... Even where those activities suggest some difficulty functioning, 

they may be grounds for discrediting the claimant’s testimony to the extent that they contradict 

claims of a totally debilitating impairment.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1112-13 (citations and quotation 

marks omitted); see also Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 2005) (ALJ properly 

considered claimant’s ability to care for her own needs, cook, clean, shop, interact with her 

nephew and boyfriend, and manage her finances and those of her nephew in the credibility 

Case 2:14-cv-01351-KJN Document 19 Filed 07/20/15 Page 8 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

analysis); Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999) (ALJ’s 

determination regarding claimant’s ability to “fix meals, do laundry, work in the yard, and 

occasionally care for his friend’s child” was a specific finding sufficient to discredit the 

claimant’s credibility). 

Here, as the ALJ observed, plaintiff completed a function report on October 10, 2006, 

indicating that:

she gets her kids ready for school, takes the kids to school, does 

household chores, picks kids up from school, and takes them to 

after school activities. In addition, she prepares meals, does 

laundry, (she cannot lift heavy items), she drives and shops, she can 

pay bills, count change, and handle money. She needs no help or 

encouragement to do these things. She goes out several times a day 

by driving or being a passenger. She socializes on the phone daily. 

She attends school events. She is able to handle stress and changes 

in routine.

(AT 37, 334-41.) Plaintiff also informed Dr. Pierce on October 17, 2006, that she lived with her 

family in a house; was able to dress and bathe herself; performed household chores; went 

shopping; cooked; was able to drive and move about within the community alone; paid her own 

bills and handled her own money; and got along “excellent” with family/relatives, friends, 

neighbors, and others. (AT 481.) On May 29, 2008, plaintiff completed another function report, 

reporting that:

she had no problem taking care of her personal needs. She prepares 

complete meals daily, she does laundry, household cleaning once a 

week. She needs no help or encouragement to do these things. She 

shops every other day. Her hobbies include beading jewelry once a 

week, as well as “other stuff.” She socializes on the phone daily 

and she attends church and school events. She can follow spoken 

one or two instructions. [sic] She handles changes in a routine 

very well.

(AT 37, 354-61.) On August 16, 2008, plaintiff further told Dr. Gabler that she had three children 

at home that she cared for without difficulty; that she was able to do all of her yard work and 

housework without any problems; and that her hobby was fishing. (AT 612.) In light of the 

activities discussed above, the ALJ rationally concluded that plaintiff was capable of at least a 

reduced range of light work involving simple repetitive tasks. (AT 32.) 

////

Case 2:14-cv-01351-KJN Document 19 Filed 07/20/15 Page 9 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

To be sure, the record may contain some contrary evidence, suggesting that plaintiff’s 

activities were more limited. However, it is the function of the ALJ to resolve any ambiguities

and inconsistencies, and the court finds the ALJ’s assessment to be reasonable and supported by 

substantial evidence. See Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming 

ALJ’s credibility determination even where the claimant’s testimony was somewhat equivocal 

about how regularly she was able to keep up with all of the activities and noting that the ALJ’s 

interpretation “may not be the only reasonable one”). As the Ninth Circuit explained:

It may well be that a different judge, evaluating the same evidence, 

would have found [the claimant’s] allegations of disabling pain 

credible. But, as we reiterate in nearly every case where we are 

called upon to review a denial of benefits, we are not triers of fact. 

Credibility determinations are the province of the ALJ...Where, as 

here, the ALJ has made specific findings justifying a decision to 

disbelieve an allegation of excess pain, and those findings are 

supported by substantial evidence in the record, our role is not to 

second-guess that decision.

Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 604 (9th Cir. 1989).

In light of the above, the court concludes that the ALJ provided several specific, clear, and 

convincing reasons for discounting plaintiff’s testimony of disabling symptoms and functional 

limitations beyond the limitations assessed in the ALJ’s RFC. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 14) is denied. 

2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 18) is granted.

3. Judgment is entered for the Commissioner.

4. The Clerk of Court shall close this case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: July 20, 2015

Case 2:14-cv-01351-KJN Document 19 Filed 07/20/15 Page 10 of 10