Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00841/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00841-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
David Levine
Defendant
Jeffrey Wichmann
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JEFFREY WICHMANN, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

DAVID LEVINE, 

Defendant. 

No. 2:16-cv-00841-KJM-EFB 

ORDER 

This matter is before the court on the motion to dismiss the complaint for improper 

venue or, in the alternative, to transfer venue, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3), and 

the special motion to strike the complaint under California Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16 by 

defendant David Levine. Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 12-1; Mot. Strike, ECF No. 14-2. Plaintiff 

Jeffrey Wichmann opposed each motion. Opp’n Dismiss, ECF No. 16; Opp’n Strike, ECF 

No. 15. 

As explained below, the court denies both motions. 

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I. BACKGROUND 

A. Allegations 

Plaintiff is the owner of American Bottle Auctions, which appraisers, brokers, 

consigns, and auctions antique bottles and glass. Compl. ¶ 6, ECF No. 1. Plaintiff himself 

collects antique bottles, and is an active member of the Federation of Historical Bottle Collectors 

(FOHBC). Id. ¶¶ 6, 11. The FOHBC is a non-profit organization, founded in 1959 and 

previously known as the Antique Bottle Collectors Association; it supports collectors of historical 

bottles, flasks, jars and related items. Id. ¶ 11. The FOHBC conducts events in the Eastern 

District of California, including the National Antique Bottle Convention & Expo (the Sacramento 

Convention), which at the time the complaint was scheduled to be held on August 4, 2016, in 

Sacramento, California. Id. ¶ 12. The FOHBC invited plaintiff to the Sacramento Convention. 

Id. 

Defendant is a collector of bottles from Owl Drug Stores, known as “Owl Drug” 

bottles, and other related paraphernalia produced by or for the Stores. Id. ¶ 13. He is a resident 

of the State of Virginia. Id. ¶ 2. Defendant publishes an online blog titled “Owl Drug Collectors 

Blog” and a Facebook page.1

 Id. ¶ 14. Defendant’s online business, the “Owl Drug Collectors 

Store,” conducted from his blog, sells various clothing and accessories related to Owl Drug 

bottles. Id. ¶ 15. Defendant has publicly stated that he “does business in Sacramento.” Id. 

Defendant is a resident of the State of Virginia. Id. ¶ 2. 

On December 16, 2015, defendant posted the following statement on his blog, 

referencing himself and the Sacramento Convention: “Let us share a few things about Sacramento 

since we do business there, and the blog director was stationed in the military and attended 

college there. The selection of Sacramento for the show is questionable . . . .” Id. ¶ 16. 

Defendant also posted statements concerning the auction services related to conventions and 

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 The blog can be found at https://owldrugcollectors.wordpress.com. Compl. ¶ 14. The 

Facebook page is located at https://www.facebook.com/Owl-Drug-Collectors-271644637608/. 

Id.

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shows hosted by the FOHBC that he alleges made the Sacramento Convention site questionable. 

Id. 

On January 7, 2016, defendant posted an entry on the blog regarding a bottle 

identical to another one involved in an investigation conducted by the state of Nevada into 

plaintiff’s activities, among others. Id. ¶ 17. Through a series of blog entries over the next three 

months, defendant reported that certain bottles were stolen from Piper’s Opera House in Virginia 

City, Nevada, and plaintiff, “the owner of an auction house in the Sacramento area, bought some 

of the stolen bottles, knowing they were stolen, then brokered a deal to sell the bottles . . . . Was 

that the first time or the only time Jeff Wichmann has been involved in this type of activity?” Id.

¶¶ 18–19. Defendant also said on his blog that plaintiff was one of the “three principal figures” 

mentioned in an investigative report from the state of Nevada, which defendant obtained through 

the Freedom of Information Act, and on which he based his postings. Id. ¶¶ 20–23. 

Throughout his posts from February 11, 2016 to April 21, 2016, defendant 

continued his narrative of the theft in Virginia City and repeatedly linked plaintiff to the theft 

through numerous statements. Defendant’s reporting culminated in a post that named the theft at 

the Piper’s Opera House as the “Jeff Wichman[n] affair.” Id. ¶¶ 27–38, 40–44, 47, 49, 54, 56. 

B. Procedural History 

Plaintiff filed the complaint on April 22, 2016, alleging against defendant two 

claims: (1) defamation per se, and (2) false light invasion of privacy. See generally Compl. 

Defendant first moved to dismiss, or, in the alternative, to transfer venue on May 16, 2016. On 

June 6, 2016, the court denied this first motion to dismiss without prejudice, because defendant 

did not meet the meet-and-confer requirement in the court’s standing order, ECF No. 3-1. Minute 

Order, ECF No. 11. Defendant refiled the motion to dismiss the complaint on the same day. See 

generally Mot. Dismiss. Subsequently, on June 24, 2016, defendant filed the motion to strike the 

complaint. See generally Mot. Strike. 

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II. MEET AND CONFER 

As noted, on June 6, 2016, defendant refiled its motion to dismiss the complaint 

after the court denied it without prejudice, stating he had been unaware of the standing order’s 

requirement and noting his pro hac vice status. Mot. Dismiss Not., ECF No. 12. Once he became 

aware of the requirement, he contacted plaintiff’s attorneys to meet and confer. Id.; Erlich Decl. 

¶¶ 13–17, ECF No. 12-3. On June 8, 2016, counsel filed a supplemental declaration, which stated 

he was not able to complete the meet and confer efforts until June 7, 2016. Supp. Decl., ECF 

No. 13. Defendant’s special motion to strike was filed with a certification that the counsel had 

met and conferred as required. Mot. Strike Not., ECF No. 14. 

Counsel’s argument that he was not aware of the court’s standing order is 

unpersuasive. This court’s standing order is not only on the docket, but also posted on this 

district’s website.2

 Counsel’s carelessness is generally not a reason to deviate from this court’s 

requirements. However, given that meet and confer efforts have now been made with respect to 

the motion to dismiss, albeit tardily, and for the special motion to strike as well, the court will 

proceed to resolve the motions in the interest of adjudicating the matters on their merits. The 

court reminds the parties that any future motions filed without certification of meet and confer 

efforts will again be denied. 

III. MOTION TO DISMISS: RULE 12(b)(3) 

A. Improper Venue 

A district court may dismiss or transfer a case “to any district or division in which 

it could have been brought” if venue is “wrong.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). Once venue is challenged, 

plaintiff has the burden of showing that the venue is proper in this district. Piedmont Label Co. v. 

Sun Garden Packing Co., 598 F.2d 491, 496 (1979). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391, venue is 

appropriate in a civil action where jurisdiction is grounded on diversity of citizenship in (1) the 

judicial district where any of the defendants reside, if all defendants reside in the same state, 

(2) the judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the 

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 This court’s standing order can be found on the docket, ECF No. 3-1, and on 

http://www.caed.uscourts.gov/caednew/index.cfm/judges/all-judges/5020/standing-orders/. 

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claim occurred or a substantial part of the property that is subject to the action is situated, or (3) a 

judicial district in which any defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is 

commenced, if there is no district in which the action might otherwise be brought. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1391(a); see MCSI, Inc. v. Woods, No. 02-2865, 2002 WL 32059741, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 

2002) (defamation); cf. Cal. Brewing Company v. 3 Daughters Brewing LLC, No. 15-2278, 2016 

WL 1573399, at *6–7 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2016) (trademark). 

 “[T]he question of a federal court’s competence to exercise personal jurisdiction 

over a defendant is distinct from the question of whether venue is proper.” Action Embroidery 

Corp. v. Atlantic Embroidery, Inc., 368 F.3d 1174, 1179 (9th Cir. 2004). “Jurisdiction is the 

power to adjudicate, while venue, which relates to the place where judicial authority may be 

exercised, is intended for the convenience of the litigants.” Id. (citations, internal quotations, and 

emphasis omitted). Despite the jurisdictional references in both parties’ briefing, see, e.g., Mot. 

at 2; Opp’n at 8, the parties have not raised any argument suggesting the court lacks personal 

jurisdiction over defendant. Instead, the dispute is whether venue is proper. 

Here, the first and third provisions of the venue statute, § 1391(a), are not 

applicable in this case because defendant does not reside in California, and because there is at 

least one other district––the Eastern District of Virginia––in which this action could be brought. 

Similarly, because property is not at issue in this case, the second prong of the second provision 

does not apply. Nevertheless, under § 1391(a)(2), venue is proper in California because a 

substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in California. 

Plaintiff alleges that the brunt of his harm was suffered here in California, and the Ninth Circuit 

has held that in a tort action, the “locus of the injury” constitutes a substantial part of the events 

giving rise to a plaintiff’s claim. Myers v. Bennett Law Offices, 238 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 

2001) (venue proper in Nevada because at least one of the harms suffered by plaintiffs was felt in 

Nevada); cf. Diesel Power Source, L.L.C. v. Crazy Carl’s Turbos Inc., No. 14-00826, 2015 WL 

1034231, at *10 (D. Utah Mar. 10, 2015) (“[A]cts that are physically performed on the Internet 

can ‘occur’ in the forum state in order to establish proper venue.”). Therefore, venue is proper in 

the Eastern District of California. 

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B. Transfer of Venue 

Alternatively, defendant moves to transfer venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404. When 

the district court finds venue is proper, it may still exercise discretion, “[f]or the convenience of 

parties and witnesses, [and] in the interest of justice,” to transfer an action “to any other district 

where it might have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The Ninth Circuit has set out the 

following non-exclusive list of factors to consider in adjudicating a motion to transfer: 

(1) the location where the relevant agreements were negotiated and 

executed, (2) the state that is most familiar with the governing law, 

(3) the plaintiff’s choice of forum, (4) the respective parties’ 

contacts with the forum, (5) the contacts relating to the plaintiff’s 

cause of action in the chosen forum, (6) the differences in the costs 

of litigation in the two forums, (7) the availability of compulsory 

process to compel attendance of unwilling non-party witnesses, . . . 

(8) the ease of access to sources of proof, (9) the presence of a 

forum selection clause, if any, and (10) the relevant public policy of 

the forum state, if any. 

Cal. Brewing Company, 2016 WL 1573399, at *7 (citing Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 211 

F.3d 495, 498–99 (9th Cir. 2000)) (internal quotations omitted). 

“The Ninth Circuit requires the defendant to make a ‘strong showing’ of 

inconvenience to overcome the preference traditionally accorded a plaintiff’s choice of forum.” 

Cal. Brewing Company, 2016 WL 1573399, at *7 (citing Decker Coal Co. v. Commonwealth 

Edison Co., 805 F.2d 834, 843 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

Here, defendant discusses briefly that he resides in the Eastern District of Virginia, 

his forum of choice, and that the majority of his evidence and witnesses on the issue of liability is 

located in Virginia. Defendant’s motion does not otherwise address the other Jones factors to 

explain why transfer to the Eastern District of Virginia would be more convenient or in the 

interests of justice. Rather, defendant states summarily that “[t]his [c]ourt should . . . grant [his] 

motion in the interests of convenience and justice.” Mot. at 5. Accordingly, defendant has not 

met his burden of showing a transfer is appropriate. See Decker Coal, 805 F.2d at 843. 

Defendant’s motion to transfer venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) is DENIED. 

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IV. SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE: SECTION 425.16 

A. Statute and State Court Application 

The state of California enacted section 425.16 of the Code of Civil Procedure “to 

curtail the ‘disturbing increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the 

constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances.’” Bulletin 

Displays, LLC v. Regency Outdoor Adver., Inc., 448 F. Supp. 3d 1172, 1178–79 (C.D. Cal. 2006) 

(quoting Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(a)). Special motions to strike under this section are 

commonly referred to as anti-SLAPP motions. Santana v. Cty. of Yuba, No. 15-00794, 2016 WL 

1268107, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2016) (citations omitted). “It is meant as a procedural remedy 

for any person sued in a so-called ‘strategic lawsuit against public participation,’ or SLAPP . . . .” 

Id. Specifically, section 425.16 provides as follows, in relevant part, 

A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that 

person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech 

under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution 

in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special 

motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has 

established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail 

on the claim. 

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(1). 

The California Legislature intended section 425.16 to give defendants a “cheap, 

early opportunity to squelch meritless litigation.” Santana, 2016 WL 1268107, at *6 (citing 

Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif, 39 Cal. 4th 260, 278 (2006)). A state court considers 

anti-SLAPP motions under a “summary judgment-like procedure,” and proceeds in two separate 

stages. Varian Med. Sys., Inc. v. Delfino, 35 Cal. 4th 180, 192 (2005). First, the court decides 

“whether the defendant has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one 

arising from protected activity.” Soukup, 39 Cal. 4th at 278–79 (citations and internal quotation 

marks omitted). Second, if the defendant has made the threshold showing, the court “must then 

determine whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim.” Id. A 

defendant must satisfy both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute. Id. 

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B. Anti-SLAPP Motions in Federal Court 

When a federal district court sits in diversity, it applies federal procedure and state 

substantive law. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 398 

(2010). Though section 425.16 generally applies in federal courts, subsections (f) and (g)3 of the 

section impose procedural limitations at odds with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Santana, 2016 WL 1268107, at *7 (citations omitted). For example, “[s]ection 425.16 limits 

discovery and makes further discovery an exception, rather than the rule. Rule 56 does not limit 

discovery.” Id. (citations and quotations omitted). Rather, Rule 56 “ensures that adequate 

discovery will occur before summary judgment is considered.” Id. (citing Metabolife, 264 F.3d at 

846). “For this reason, sections 425.16(f) and (g) do not apply to litigation in federal court.” Id.

(citation omitted). “Incorrect application of the federal rules is reversible error.” Id. (citation 

omitted). 

This inconsistency has led this court, along with others, to adopt a tiered approach 

to anti-SLAPP motions. Id. at *8. On the first tier in resolving an anti-SLAPP motion, the court 

determines whether there are legal deficiencies in the complaint. The court first asks whether 

defendant has made a “threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one arising from 

protected activity.” Soukup, 39 Cal. 4th at 278 (citation and quotation marks omitted). If the 

claims pass this first test, the court then “addresses the complaint’s purported legal deficiencies to 

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 Those subsections provide as follows: 

(f) The special motion may be filed within 60 days of the service of the complaint 

or, in the court's discretion, at any later time upon terms it deems proper. The 

motion shall be scheduled by the clerk of the court for a hearing not more than 30 

days after the service of the motion unless the docket conditions of the court 

require a later hearing. 

(g) All discovery proceedings in the action shall be stayed upon the filing of a 

notice of motion made pursuant to this section. The stay of discovery shall remain 

in effect until notice of entry of the order ruling on the motion. The court, on 

noticed motion and for good cause shown, may order that specified discovery be 

conducted notwithstanding this subdivision. 

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(f), (g). 

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determine whether the plaintiffs have ‘demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the 

complaint.’” Santana, 2016 WL 1268107, at *8 (citing Soukup, 39 Cal. 4th at 278). As a federal 

court, the court “must determine the motion in a manner that complies with the standards set by 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 12.” Id. (citations and quotations omitted). 

On the second tier, the court assesses “the plaintiff’s failure to submit evidence to 

substantiate its claims, “and “the motion is treated as a motion for summary judgment, and 

discovery ‘must be developed sufficiently to permit summary judgment under Rule 56.’” Id. 

(citations omitted); see also Metabolife Int’l, Inc. v. Wornick, 264 F.3d 846–47 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(reversed to allow for further discovery); Shropshire v. Fred Rappoport Co., 294 F. Supp. 2d 

1085, 1099 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (“The Court is unable to resolve this issue at this stage of the 

proceeding, when no discovery has been permitted, because the applicability of the anti-SLAPP 

statute turns on disputed questions of fact.”). 

C. Discussion 

Given that no discovery has yet occurred, the court construes the motion to strike 

as based on legal deficiencies in the complaint, and considers the first tier question whether 

defendant has made a threshold showing that the challenged claim is based on a protected 

activity. To the extent defendant asks the court to consider evidence outside of the complaint, the 

court declines to do so at this time. Defendant may renew the motion after discovery. 

In conducting its analysis, the court bears in mid that the anti-SLAPP statute 

protects “any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public 

forum in connection with an issue of public interest.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(e)(3). 

1. Public Forum 

 “[A] public forum is not limited to a physical setting, but also includes other 

forms of public communication such as electronic communication media like the internet.” 

New.Net, Inc. v. Lavasoft, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1107 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (quoting 

ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson, 93 Cal. App. 4th 993, 1106 (2001)). Here, the allegedly 

defamatory statements giving rise to plaintiff’s action were published on defendant’s website, 

which is widely accessible by the public. As such, defendant’s website constitutes a public forum 

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under the anti-SLAPP statute. See New.Net, 356 F. Supp. 2d at 1107 (“[C]ourts have uniformly 

held, or deeming the proposition obvious, simply assumed that internet venues to which members 

of the public have relatively easy access constitute a ‘public forum’ or a place ‘open to the public’ 

within the meaning of section 425.16.”). 

2. Public Interest 

Under California law, speech is considered to be “in connection with an issue of 

public interest” if it concerns: (i) a person in the public eye, (ii) “conduct that could directly affect 

a large number of people beyond the direct participants,” or (iii) “a topic of widespread, public 

interest.” Rivero v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., and Mun. Employees, AFL–CIO, 105 Cal. App. 4th 

913, 924 (2003). “[T]he definition of “public interest” within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP 

statute has been broadly construed to include not only governmental matters, but also private 

conduct that impacts a broad segment of society and/or that affects a community in a manner 

similar to that of a governmental entity.” Id. at 920. This case does not fall within the common 

law definition. Here, while the court does not doubt the parties’ passion for bottle collecting, 

defendant’s speech regarding plaintiff, plaintiff’s collecting and selling practices, and the 

FOHBC’s convention location is not an issue of general public interest. These issues do not 

affect any broad segment of society or a community as a governmental entity’s action would. 

Defendant argues that consumer information, when it affects a large number of people, is 

information concerning the public interest even if the business practices at issue do not affect a 

large number of people. Mot. at 9 (citing Wilbanks v. Wolk, 121 Cal. App. 4th 883, 989 (2004)). 

In Wilbanks, at issue were statements that defendant made with respect to viatical4

brokers. Specifically, defendant identified brokers on her websites whom she believed had 

engaged in unethical or questionable practices, and provided information for choosing good 

brokers. Id. at 889–90, 899. The California Court of Appeals in Wilbanks held that while the 

information did not concern a person in the public eye, nor was it a topic of widespread, public 

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 “[V]iaticals are arrangements that allow dying persons with life insurance policies to sell 

their policies to investors for a percentage of the death benefits.” Wilbanks, 121 Cal. App. 4th at 

889. 

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interest, it did affect a large number of people. Id. at 898. In reaching that conclusion, the 

appellate court cited to DuPont Merck Pharm. Co. v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. App. 4th 562, 567 

(2000), where the statements at issue concerned the commercial marketing of “Coumadin, an 

anticoagulant that was used by more than 1.8 million Americans for the prevention and treatment 

of life-threatening conditions.” Id. at 899. Importantly, the court in Wilbanks found that like the 

pharmaceutical industry sales in DuPont Merck Pharm. Co., the viatical industry also touches a 

large number of persons, exemplified by the Wilbanks plaintiffs’ business that generated an 

average monthly income of $58,333 before the defendant’s statements about the brokers appeared 

on her website. Id. 

This case is distinguishable from both Wilbanks and DuPont Merck Pharm. Co. in 

that nothing before the court shows the business practice of plaintiff affects a large number of 

people, or that consumer information provided on defendant’s website does either. As the court 

in Wilbanks aptly pointed out, while the individual businesses of the plaintiff did not affect a large 

number of people, the overall viatical industry did. See Wilbanks, 121 Cal. App. 4th at 899. 

The other examples provided by defendant regarding a union election, Mot. at 9 

(citing Macias v. Hartwell, 55 Cal. App. 4th 669, 674–75 (1997)), and a homeowners’ association 

are similarly inapposite, id. (citing Damon Ocean Hills Journalism Club, 85 Cal. App. 4th 468, 

474–75 (2000)). As the court pointed out in Macias, speech with respect to the election of the 

president to a large and powerful organization may impact the lives of many individuals. 

55 Cal. App. 4th at 673–74. The sentiment was echoed in Damon, where the court found that 

speech concerning how a community of more than 3,000 individuals would be governed is an 

inherently political question that affects each individual and the community as a whole. 

85 Cal. App. 4th at 479. Here, defendant asks too much of the court to find that the FOHBC, a 

non-profit organization supporting collectors of historical bottles, flasks, jars and related items, 

Compl. ¶ 11, is a large and powerful organization that impacts the lives of many individuals.5

 

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 Defendant also points to the 2012 minutes for a FOHBC’s Board of Directors conference 

call meeting, Def.’s Ex. 1, ECF No. 14-4, and a screenshot of FOHBC’s Facebook page, Def.’s 

Ex. 2, ECF No. 14-5, as support for his motion. The court does not consider these exhibits at this 

time as they are beyond the parameters of the complaint and not judicially noticeable. See Fed. 

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Defendant has not shown the speech here was made in connection with a public 

interest. The court need not reach whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of 

prevailing on his claims, because defendant has not met the threshold requirement to show the 

challenged cause of action is based on a protected activity. 

Defendant’s special motion to strike is DENIED without prejudice. 

V. CONCLUSION 

Defendant’s motion to dismiss for improper venue or, in the alternative, to transfer 

venue and special motion to strike are DENIED. This order resolves ECF Nos. 12 and 14. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: August 15, 2016. 

 

R. Evid. 201(b). Even if the court considers the exhibits, minutes to a conference call by the 

FOHBC’s Board of Director to plan a membership drive to reach 2,000 members and a 

screenshot of the FOHBC’s Facebook page showing 2,419 “likes” are insufficient to demonstrate 

public interest. Defendant provides no other support to demonstrate that the FOHBC actually 

reached its intended target of 2,000 new members. In addition, the fact that 2,419 members of 

Facebook liked a page does not demonstrate interest by a broad enough segment of the 

community, given the more than one billion active daily Facebook users. See

https://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2016). 

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