Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02991/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02991-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mark A. Medearis
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-2991

___________

United States of America, *

 *

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States 

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Missouri.

Mark A. Medearis, *

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: April 19, 2006

Filed: June 27, 2006

___________

Before ARNOLD, LAY, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.

Mark Medearis pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by an unlawful user

of a controlled substance, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), possession of an unregistered

short-barreled shotgun, see 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841, 5845(a), 5861(d), and possession of

a stolen firearm, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(j). The district court sentenced Mr. Medearis to

five years of probation. The United States appeals, contending that the sentence is

unreasonable. We remand for re-sentencing.

Pursuant to a valid warrant, local and federal officials searched Mr. Medearis's

premises for stolen property. There they found, among other items, a short-barreled

shotgun that was not registered to Mr. Medearis in the National Firearms Registration

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and Transfer Record as required by § 5841 and § 5845(a)(1), a Savage 30-06 caliber

bolt-action rifle that had been reported stolen, and some marijuana and

methamphetamine. Mr. Medearis admitted to law-enforcement officials that he used

both drugs. After being indicted, he pleaded guilty to all counts. 

The probation office prepared a pre-sentence report that calculated

Mr. Medearis's sentencing range as forty-six to fifty-seven months' imprisonment.

The district court at sentencing first noted the applicable range, but then mentioned

that many of Mr. Medearis's friends and family members had written the court,

contending that Mr. Medearis had turned his life around and asking for some form of

community alternative to incarceration. The court stated that it believed these letters

and was convinced that Mr. Medearis had indeed reformed; it acknowledged the

seriousness of Mr. Medearis's offenses, but concluded that incarceration was not

necessary to keep Mr. Medearis from re-offending. The court therefore sentenced

Mr. Medearis to five years of probation for each count, to be served concurrently. 

The government argues on appeal that the district court abused its discretion in

sentencing Mr. Medearis to probation. When the district court has correctly calculated

the guidelines sentencing range, as it did here, the only remaining issue is whether the

ultimate sentence is reasonable. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261-62

(2005). Our review for reasonableness is akin to what we do under an abuse-ofdiscretion standard. United States v. Goody, 442 F.3d 1132, 1134 (8th Cir. 2006).

Thus a sentencing court may act unreasonably if it fails to consider a matter of relative

importance, gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant matter, or arrives at

a sentence outside of the range justified by the facts of the case. See United States v.

Haack, 403 F.3d 997, 1004 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 276 (2005).

A sentence within the applicable guideline range is presumptively reasonable.

United States v. Lincoln, 413 F.3d 716, 717-18 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.

840 (2005). When a district court wishes to impose a sentence outside that range, it

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must justify the variance on the basis of the matters listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). As

the size of the variance grows, so too must the reasons that warrant it. United States

v. Larrabee, 436 F.3d 890, 892 (8th Cir. 2006). And if a court imposes a sentence

dramatically lower or higher than what the guidelines recommend, it must show

exceptional facts that make the proposed sentence a reasonable one. See id.

Mr. Medearis contends that the government's position is that any sentence that

varies from the sentencing guidelines is unreasonable. We do not construe the

government's argument to be so broad as that. Instead, the government merely argues

that the district court should give the sentencing guidelines considerable weight when

deciding the ultimate sentence that should be imposed. Indeed, this argument seems

entirely correct, since § 3553(a)(4) requires courts to consider the guidelines range

when sentencing a defendant. But to consider the guidelines is not to be ruled by

them. As we indicated in Lincoln, 413 F.3d at 718, a defendant may rebut the

presumption that a guideline sentence is reasonable. In fact, district courts must vary

from the guidelines range in those "highly unusual circumstances" where other

§ 3553(a) matters would render a sentence within them unreasonable. United States

v. Lazenby, 439 F.3d 928, 933 (8th Cir. 2006).

After reviewing the facts of this case, we conclude that the district court abused

its discretion by sentencing Mr. Medearis to only five years of probation. At the

sentencing hearing, the district court considered some § 3553(a) matters, such as the

need to keep Mr. Medearis from committing further crimes. But the court paid little

notice to other relevant matters, such as the requirement in § 3553(a)(2)(B) that a

sentence should deter others from committing similar crimes. Indeed, the district

court explicitly noted that a sentence of probation "would do little to deter others," but

thought probation would be sufficient to keep Mr. Medearis from re-offending.

General deterrence, however, is one of the key purposes of sentencing, and the district

court abused its discretion when it failed to give that matter its proper weight. 

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In addition, we believe that the district court abused its discretion in not giving

proper weight to the seriousness of Mr. Medearis's offenses. Law-enforcement

officers found stolen property throughout Mr. Medearis's residence, including a highpowered rifle; and federal law strictly regulates the possession of short-barreled

shotguns because such weapons are easily concealed and extraordinarily lethal. The

risk that the rifle and the shotgun posed, moreover, was considerably increased by

Mr. Medearis's use of illegal drugs such as methamphetamine. In all, the offenses to

which Mr. Medearis pleaded guilty to were of a very serious nature. The district court

stated that had this been the only matter, it would have sentenced Mr. Medearis to the

guidelines range. But to impose a sentence of only probation indicates that the district

court paid too little attention to the seriousness of Mr. Medearis's crimes and what a

just punishment for those offenses should be.

Finally, the district court's sentence of probation fails to meet the requirement

that sentences are to be crafted so as to "avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among

defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct."

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). Other defendants who plead guilty to the conduct that

Mr. Medearis admitted will almost certainly receive sentences that include some term

of incarceration.

While Mr. Medearis's rehabilitation may well be entitled to some weight, it

cannot be allowed to trump all the other considerations listed in § 3553(a). We

therefore conclude that the district court imposed an unreasonable sentence in this

case, and we vacate the judgment of the district court and remand for re-sentencing

consistent with this opinion.

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LAY, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. In this case, the district court applied the post-Booker

sentencing approach our court prescribed in United States v. Haack, 403 F.3d 997 (8th

Cir. 2005), and reached the reasonable conclusion that Medearis should be sentenced

to five years' probation.

Section 3553(a) requires a district court to "impose a sentence no greater than

necessary to account for the nature and seriousness of the offense and the defendant's

history and characteristics, as well as to provide just punishment, to protect the public,

and to avoid unwanted sentencing disparities." United States v. Tabor, 439 F.3d 826,

831 (8th Cir. 2006). "Sentences varying from the guidelines range ... are reasonable

so long as the judge offers appropriate justification under the factors specified in 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a)." United States v. Lazenby, 439 F.3d 928, 932 (8th Cir. 2006)

(citation and quotations omitted). 

At the sentencing hearing, Medearis presented evidence that he tested

negatively for drug use since his arraignment, maintained a job, joined a church, and

grew closer to his family. He also provided the court with a number of letters from

friends and family members corroborating the turnaround of his life. The district

court noted that Medearis' crimes were "serious" and observed that if this was the only

factor to consider, Medearis should be sentenced in the guidelines range. However,

in considering the other § 3553(a) factors, the district court concluded incarceration

was not required to deter Medearis from committing subsequent crimes or to protect

the public. In the written "Statement of Reasons," the district court observed the

decision to depart from the guidelines was based on the "lack of a need to deter

defendant from re-offending, his personal characteristics, his strong community and

family support, and the lack of a need to protect the public."

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The district court followed precisely the procedure required by our court. After

calculating Medearis' advisory guideline range to be 46 to 57 months' imprisonment,

the court then considered "all other factors set forth in § 3553(a) to determine whether

to impose the sentence under the guidelines or a non-guidelines sentence." Haack,

403 F.3d at 1003. A district court bears the obligation to depart from the guidelines

range when a review of the § 3553(a) factors compels a different sentence. Our

court's obligation is to give the district court's determination the same amount of

deference whether the resulting sentence is greater than, or less than, the guidelines

range. 

Sentencing courts have the unique ability to appraise the evidence and

personally assess a defendant. A reversal of the district court's reasonable sentence

in this case encroaches upon the district court's discretion to do so. 

I would affirm Medearis' sentence.

______________________________

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