Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-87-01392/USCOURTS-ca10-87-01392-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
William Antone Hirni
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

FILED 

United St.ates Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

FEB O 11988 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. No. 87-1392 

WILLIAM ANTONE HIRNI, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

(D.C. No. CR-86-370) 

(District of New Mexico) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT 

Before McKAY, BARRETT, and TACHA, Circuit Judges. 

William Hirni was convicted by a jury for possession of a 

firearm by a convicted felon. 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a)(l) (1982 & 

Supp. III 1985). On appeal, he claims that the trial court abused 

its discretion by: (1) reading the entire grand jury indictment 

to the prospective jury panel during voir dire proceedings and (2) 

allowing admission of defendant's post-arrest statement that he 

had previously been caught with a gun while on parole. 

I. 

While investigating another matter, a police officer 

approached a stopped vehicle which the defendant had been driving. 

According to testimony, the driver's door was open; and, as the 

police officer looked inside, he observed a gun protruding from a 

leather glove underneath the driver's armrest. Record, vol. 3, at 

Appellate Case: 87-1392 Document: 010110025175 Date Filed: 02/01/1988 Page: 1 
69-71. Defendant was arrested; subsequently, a federal grand jury 

returned the following indictment: 

On or about the 14th day of October, 1986, in Bernalillo 

County, in the State and District of New Mexico, the 

defendant ... a person who had previously been convicted of felonies in 1980 in the State of New Mexico, 

to-wit: armed robbery and escape, did knowingly possess 

a firearm ... [i]n violation of 18 U.S.C. Appn. 

1202(a)(l). 

Id., vol. 1, doc. 1. 

During voir dire proceedings, the trial court began to read 

the indictment. Defendant's counsel interrupted the reading, 

objecting to the nature of the prior felonies being revealed to 

the prospective jurors. Defendant's counsel then informed the 

court that he had planned to offer a stipulation that defendant 

was a convicted felon. The court advised defendant's counsel that 

he "should have called that to my attention a long time ago'' and 

denied the objection. Id., vol. supp. 2, at 5. The court then 

read the entire indictment, revealing the prior convictions. Subsequent to the voir dire proceedings, but before presentation of 

the evidence, defendant submitted a motion in limine. Based on 

the materials and arguments then presented to the court, the court 

granted the motion, requiring the government to stipulate to 

defendant's status as a convicted felon and disallowing the introduction of any evidence concerning the nature of defendant's prior 

felonies. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1392 Document: 010110025175 Date Filed: 02/01/1988 Page: 2 
Defendant claims that the vo ir dire disclosure of his prior 

convictions was prejudicial and t hat the trial court abused its 

discretion by making the disclosure. 

The trial court is vested with broad discretion in the conduct of a jury's voir dire. United States v. Black, 685 F.2d 132, 

1 34 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1021 (1982). "[A]bsent an 

abuse of discretion and a showing that the rights of the accused 

have been prejudiced thereby, the scope and content of voir dire 

will not be disturbed upon appeal." Id.; see also United States 

v . Poore, 594 F.2d 39, 41 (4th Cir. 1979) (refusal to strike c ertain language from indictment gauged by abuse of discretion standa r d). To determine whether the trial court abused its discretion 

in this case by reading the indictment to the prospective jurors 

and whether defendant was unfairly prejudiced by the disclosure, 

we must review the trial court's actions and the circumstances of 

the alleged error. 

In framing an indictment f or possession of a firearm by a 

convicted felon, "the better practice dictates that the . 

[indictment] not set forth the details of defendant's actual convictions, but merely allege that the defendant is a convicted 

felon." United States v. Busic, 587 F.2d 577, 585 ( 3d Cir. 1978), 

rev'd on other grounds, 446 U.S. 398 (1980). As defendant points 

o ut, status as a convicted felon is sufficient to establish an 

element of the offense without revealing the nature of the prior 

conviction. See Poore, 594 F.2d at 41 (a specific type of prior 

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Appellate Case: 87-1392 Document: 010110025175 Date Filed: 02/01/1988 Page: 3 
felony conviction not required for this firearm offense; "any 

felony conviction suffices"). 

Although the indictment in the present case revealed the 

nature of defendant's previous felonies, immediately after the 

indictment was read the jurors were issued a limiting instruction 

stating that 

[t]he indictment returned by the grand jury is a writing 

which the United States uses to serve as his accusation 

against the Defendant, and upon which it brings its case 

into court. It serves no other trial purpose. It is 

meant solely to inform the Defendant of the crime with 

which the Defendant is charged. It is not evidence 

against the Defendant and does not infer guilt. 

Record, supp. vol. 2, at 6. The trial court also asked the prospective jurors the following questions: 

Evidence will be presented that will show that 

Tony Hirni has been convicted in the past of a felony. 

Does anyone here feel that it would be difficult to 

judge this case on its own merits, knowing that in the 

past Tony Hirni has been convicted of a felony? 

Does anyone feel that because Tony Hirni has been 

convicted of a felony in the past that he gives up his 

right to be presumed innocent in this case? 

Does anyone feel that he has forfeited his right 

to a fair trial because of his prior felony conviction? 

Id. at 17-18. None of the jurors indicated an affirmative 

response to the questions. 

We believe that the impact of the voir dire disclosure was 

minimized by the court's limiting instruction and the subsequent 

questioning of the prospective jurors. Also, five days elapsed 

between the voir dire proceedings and the presentation of evidence; and consistent with the limiting instruction and the 

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subsequent stipulation, no evidence concerning the nature of 

defendant~s prior convictions was ever introduced at trial. 

Additionally, defendant's counsel did not object to disclosure of the prior felonies until the trial court actually began 

reading the indictment to the prospective jurors. At that time, 

defendant was not pr epa red to make a showing of proof as to why 

disclosure would be prejudicial. The government was prepared to 

enter the judgment and commitment order for the prior convictions 

to establish them as evidence of its case. Although defendant may 

have offered during voir dire to stipulate to the fact that he was 

a convicted felon, it was clearly wit hin the trial court's broad 

discretion to accept or reject defendant's attempted stipulation 

or to require the government to accept the offer at that time. 

United States v. Brinklow, 560 F.2d 1003, 1006 (10th Cir. 1977), 

cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1047 (1978). 

Viewing the circumstances of the voir dire disclosure, we 

cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by reading 

the indictment to the prospective jurors. We further conclude, 

viewing the record as a whole, that defendant was not prejudiced 

by the disclosure and that the government presented sufficient 

evidence to support the resulting jury verdict. 

II. 

During trial, the court allowed admission of defendant's 

post-arrest statement that he had previously been caught with a 

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Appellate Case: 87-1392 Document: 010110025175 Date Filed: 02/01/1988 Page: 5 
gun while on parole and that nothing ever happened to him. 

Record, vol. 3, at 90-91. - Defendant requested that the statement 

be rephrased to eliminate any reference to a prior incident and 

then entered an objection to the statement's admission. Defendant 

now claims that admission o f the full statement created an unfair 

prejudice and that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the statement. See United States v. Cooper, 733 F.2d 1360, 

1366 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1255 (1984) (evidentiary 

rulings not reversible error absent an abuse of discretion). 

Defendant's post-arrest statement was introduced by the government to prove that defendant had constructive possession o f the 

gun. According to the jury instruction given on this issue, "[a] 

person who, although not in actual possession, knowingly has both 

the power and the intention, at a given time, to exercise dominion 

or control over a thing, either directly or through another person 

or persons, is then in constructive possession of it." Record, 

vol. 1, doc. 38, at 9 (emphasis added). Thus, to show constructive possession, the government was required to present evidence 

establishing defendant's knowledge and intent; and defendant's 

defense was that the government failed to establish that he knowingly possessed the .gun. 

Although evidence of a wrong or act cannot be introduced ''to 

prove a defendant's criminal disposition," the evidence may be 

admitted to show knowledge or intent under Rule 404(b) of the 

Federal Rules of Evidence. United States v. Naranjo, 710 F.2d 

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Appellate Case: 87-1392 Document: 010110025175 Date Filed: 02/01/1988 Page: 6 
1465, 1467 (10th Cir. 1983). Defendant's statement, occurring 

close in time to his arrest, . tended to show that defendant knew he 

had possession of the gun this time, since the statement seemed to 

indicate that defendant had also been caught with possession a gun 

before. The statement was therefore relevant to an essential 

element of the government's case and possessed real probative 

value, not just possible worth. See Fed. R. Evid. 401; United 

States v. Nolan, 551 F.2d 266, 271 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 

U.S. 904 (1977). The trial court properly exercised its discretion in further determining that the relevance of defendant's 

statement was not outweighed by its prejudicial effect. See 

United States v. Guerrero, 667 F .2d 862, 867 (10th Cir. 1981), 

cert. denied, 456 U.S. 964 (1982) ("Federal Rules and Practices 

favor the admission of evidence, rather than its exclusion if the 

proffered evidence" is relevant). 

The decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED. 

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Entered for the Court 

Monroe G. McKay 

Circuit Judge 

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