Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-09-03068/USCOURTS-caDC-09-03068-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Franklin H. Pettiford
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 12, 2010 Decided December 28, 2010

No. 09-3068

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

FRANKLIN H. PETTIFORD,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:06-cr-00162)

Mary E. Davis argued the cause for the appellant.

Jonathan P. Hooks, Assistant United States Attorney,

argued the cause for the appellee. Ronald C. Machen Jr., United

States Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese III, Mary B. McCord and

Mary Ann Snow, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on

brief.

Before: GINSBURG, HENDERSON and KAVANAUGH, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: In November

2006, a jury convicted Franklin Pettiford (Pettiford) of

possessing with intent to distribute cocaine base in violation of

USCA Case #09-3068 Document #1285091 Filed: 12/28/2010 Page 1 of 11
2

21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B)(iii). Pettiford,

contending the Government had failed to disclose exculpatory

evidence in its possession in violation of Brady v. Maryland,

373 U.S. 83 (1963), moved for a new trial. The district court

denied his motion, concluding the undisclosed evidence was not

material. For the following reasons, we affirm.

I.

On May 11, 2006, Officer David Augustine of the District

of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) stopped a

2003 Ford Expedition because of a burned-out headlight.1

Pettiford was the driver and sole occupant of the vehicle and

Augustine determined that its registration had expired.

Augustine let Pettiford go with a warning notice regarding the

headlight.

Four days later, on May 15, 2006,2

 MPD officers James

Chastanet and Theodore Brosey stopped the same Ford

Expedition. Pettiford was again the driver and sole occupant.

This time, the officers arrested Pettiford for driving an

unregistered vehicle and searched the passenger compartment

incident to Pettiford’s arrest. In the center console, located

between the driver’s and passenger’s seats, Chastanet found a

clear plastic bag. The bag contained clusters of white, rock-like

substances, some of which were in ziploc bags. The police also

found in the console a digital scale, plastic gloves and

envelopes. The white, rock-like substances field-tested positive

for cocaine base.

1

 Our decision in United States v. Pettiford, 517 F.3d 584 (D.C.

Cir. 2008), sets out much of the relevant factual and procedural

background of this case. We draw, at times verbatim, from that

decision in summarizing the background here.

2

 All events occurred in 2006 unless otherwise noted.

USCA Case #09-3068 Document #1285091 Filed: 12/28/2010 Page 2 of 11
3

On June 13, a federal grand jury indicted Pettiford on one

count of possessing with intent to distribute five grams or more

of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and

841(b)(1)(B)(iii). Pettiford’s first trial began on September 26

but mistried when the jury was unable to reach a unanimous

verdict. The case was reassigned to another judge and a second

trial commenced on November 27.

At trial, Officer Augustine first testified as to his stop of

Pettiford in the Ford Expedition on May 11, when Pettiford was

let go with a warning notice about the burned-out headlight.

Officer Chastanet then recounted the events leading up to and

following Pettiford’s arrest on May 15, including the discovery

of the plastic bag of drugs and the other paraphernalia in the

vehicle’s center console. Chastanet testified that, based on his

experience, he recognized the white, rock-like substances as

cocaine base. The parties stipulated to the analysis conducted

by a Drug Enforcement Administration chemist, which analysis

concluded the seized substances were 71% cocaine base and

weighed a total of 18.8 grams. MPD Detective Anthony

Washington, who qualified as an expert witness on the

distribution and use of narcotics, identified the substances seized

from Pettiford’s vehicle as cocaine base. Washington further

opined that the packaging of the cocaine base and the presence

of the digital scale and gloves were consistent with the

wholesale distribution thereof. The ziploc bags, he said,

contained “what we call eight balls, 3.5 grams which is an

eighth of an ounce” of cocaine base. Pettiford, 517 F.3d at 587

(citation omitted).

To buttress its proof that Pettiford knowingly possessed the

cocaine base in the console, and that he specifically intended to

distribute it, the Government moved in limine to introduce

USCA Case #09-3068 Document #1285091 Filed: 12/28/2010 Page 3 of 11
4

evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)3

 that Pettiford

had possessed cocaine base with intent to distribute it on April

27, just two and one-half weeks before his May 15 arrest. Over

Pettiford’s objection, the court admitted the evidence of

Pettiford’s guilty plea to the earlier offense but, instead of

calling witnesses to the events of April 27, the Government,

with Pettiford’s agreement, read to the jury a redacted transcript

of his guilty plea.4 According to the transcript, the prosecutor in

that case proffered and Pettiford agreed to the following facts:

On the evening of April 27, MPD officers observed Pettiford

briefly converse with a person who appeared to give Pettiford an

unknown sum of money and who then followed Pettiford to a

nearby parking lot, where Pettiford reached into the front of his

pants, withdrew an item and tossed it to the ground in front of

the second person. The latter picked up the item and left. The

officers then watched Pettiford walk to a blue Mercedes, open

the front passenger door, reach inside, bend over into the

vehicle, withdraw, close the door and place an “unknown grassy

substance” by a nearby bush. Trial Tr. 194-98, United States v.

Pettiford, No. CR 06-162 (D.D.C. Nov. 27, 2006). The officers

subsequently stopped Pettiford and searched the Mercedes,

which was registered in his name. In the center console, the

police found 48 ziploc bags containing white, rock-like

substances that field-tested positive for cocaine. The MPD

placed Pettiford under arrest. Id.

3

 Rule 404(b) permits evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts”

to be admitted for the purpose of establishing, inter alia, intent and

knowledge.

4

 In early November, between Pettiford’s first and second trials

in district court, he moved in superior court to withdraw his guilty

plea. His motion was pending at the time of his second trial in district

court.

USCA Case #09-3068 Document #1285091 Filed: 12/28/2010 Page 4 of 11
5

After the Government concluded its case-in-chief in this

prosecution, the defense introduced a certified “Vehicle Record”

for the 2003 Ford Expedition indicating that, as of April 30, the

vehicle was registered to Marisa Ardelia Beam of Annandale,

Virginia. Pettiford, 517 F.3d at 587. Pettiford presented no

further evidence. Following closing arguments, the case was

submitted to the jury. On November 29, the jury returned a

guilty verdict.

Two months after Pettiford’s conviction here, the superior

court vacated Pettiford’s guilty plea as involuntary. On

February 15, 2007, Pettiford moved for a new trial, alleging that

the vacatur of his guilty plea in superior court constituted newly

discovered evidence under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure

33(b)(1).5

 The district court denied the motion and we affirmed.

Pettiford, 517 F.3d at 591-92.

Following vacatur of Pettiford’s guilty plea, the superior

court set trial for June 18, 2007 and later continued the trial date

to August 27, 2007. On August 27, the superior court again

continued the trial to give Pettiford time to review new

discovery material produced by the Government. Included in

the new material were photographs of the items the MPD

officers had removed from Pettiford’s Mercedes when they

searched it incident to his arrest on April 27. One photograph

showed a District of Columbia driver’s license belonging to

Covye Cousins. In Pettiford’s superior court trial, MPD Officer

Marc Wilkins, who had assisted in Pettiford’s April 27 arrest

and had driven Pettiford’s Mercedes from the scene of his arrest

to the police station, was the only witness who testified that the

license was found in, and removed from, Pettiford’s vehicle. Tr.

5

 Rule 33 permits a court to “vacate any judgment and grant a

new trial if the interest of justice so requires.” Subsection (b) provides

that a new trial may be granted based on “newly discovered evidence.”

USCA Case #09-3068 Document #1285091 Filed: 12/28/2010 Page 5 of 11
6

of Hr’g on Mot. for New Trial 7, 32-34, June 30, 2009.6

 Neither

the Government nor Pettiford, however, asked Wilkins whether

the license was found in the center console with the drugs or

somewhere else in the vehicle.7

 Pettiford was ultimately

acquitted in superior court on March 26, 2008.

Pettiford then filed a second new trial motion in district

court on August 25, 2008, alleging the Government’s failure to

timely disclose to him the photograph of Cousins’s driver’s

license constituted a Brady violation. The district court denied

Pettiford’s motion in a bench ruling on June 30, 2009. Pettiford

filed a timely notice of appeal on the same day.

II.

In Brady v. Maryland, the United States Supreme Court

held that the Due Process Clause “requires the government to

disclose, upon request, material evidence favorable to a criminal

defendant, including evidence held by law enforcement

officials.” United States v. Oruche, 484 F.3d 590, 596 (D.C.

Cir. 2007) (citing Brady, 373 U.S. at 87). The Government’s

failure to so disclose violates the Brady directive if three factors

exist: “The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused,

either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching;

[the] evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either

willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.”

United States v. Brodie, 524 F.3d 259, 268 (D.C. Cir. 2008)

(quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999)), cert.

6

 The crime scene search officer who photographed the contents

of the vehicle testified that he did not remember the license being in

the car. Id. at 32-34.

7

 Wilkins died sometime after Pettiford’s superior court trial. Id.

at 7. Pettiford’s superior court counsel submitted an affidavit in this

case in which he stated “[t]he driver’s license was near the cocaine in

the center console of the car.” Ferguson Aff. ¶ 5.

USCA Case #09-3068 Document #1285091 Filed: 12/28/2010 Page 6 of 11
7

denied, 129 S. Ct. 1396 (2009). To satisfy the third

prong—prejudice—the withheld evidence must be material,

which means “there must be ‘a reasonable probability that, had

the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.’ ” United States v.

Johnson, 519 F.3d 478, 488 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Strickler,

527 U.S. at 280). “A ‘probability’ reaches the level of

‘reasonable’ when it is high enough to ‘undermine confidence

in the verdict.’ ” United States v. Johnson, 592 F.3d 164, 170

(D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435

(1995)). “The defendant bears the burden of showing a

reasonable probability of a different outcome.” Johnson, 519

F.3d at 488 (citing Strickler, 527 U.S. at 291).

The Government concedes that the photograph of the

driver’s license is favorable to Pettiford and was not timely

disclosed to him. Accordingly, the materiality of the photograph

is the sole issue before us. “[T]he assessment of the materiality

of . . . evidence under Brady is a question of law” reviewed de

novo. Brodie, 524 F.3d at 268 (quoting Oruche, 484 F.3d at

595). If we find a Brady violation, “a new trial follows as the

prescribed remedy, not as a matter of discretion.” Id. (quoting

Oruche, 484 F.3d at 595).

Pettiford first seizes upon a stray statement made by the

district court in the course of a lengthy bench ruling on

Pettiford’s Brady motion, claiming the court found the

undisclosed photograph of the license material. See Tr. of Hr’g

on Mot. for New Trial at 42 (court stated that it considered “the

evidence of the driver’s license in the Mercedes to be material

in this case”). The court’s very next statement, however,

clarified that it did not find the photograph material within the

meaning of Brady. See id. (“But saying that, however, I cannot

find the probability of a new trial would result in a different

outcome. The reasonable probability sufficient to undermine[]

confidence in the outcome . . . .”). The court confirmed its

USCA Case #09-3068 Document #1285091 Filed: 12/28/2010 Page 7 of 11
8

conclusion as it went on to explain its reasoning. See id. (“I do

not see that . . . finding another person’s license in the car would

be sufficient in the court’s mind to overcome the verdict in this

case, that it would be another verdict of acquittal if this evidence

had been available to him. I cannot find sufficient probability

that that would have occurred.”); id. at 43 (“So if the [404(b)

evidence] is minimized by—and the effect is reduced by the

evidence that there is a driver’s license of someone else found

in the car, I cannot find that that would mean that the result

would be probably different.”); id. at 44 (“But I cannot find that

the evidence [of Cousins’s driver’s license being found in the

Mercedes] is so drastic . . . [that it] would alter the outcome of

this case.”). When the ruling is read in its entirety, therefore, it

is plain that the district court did not find the photograph to be

material.

Next, Pettiford argues the district court failed to consider

certain relevant facts. First, he argues the court ignored the facts

that his first district court trial mistried and that he was acquitted

in superior court. Pettiford is mistaken. See id. at 35 (court

acknowledged first district court trial ended in hung jury); id. at

39 (court acknowledged Pettiford was acquitted in superior

court); id. at 43 (court considered “the acquittal in the Superior

Court and the affect [sic] that could have on a jury”); id. at 44

(“Another factor I considered was the first trial in this court was

a hung jury, but the same evidence was used at that time.”).

Pettiford also claims the district court failed to consider how

Pettiford could have used the photograph of the license if it had

been timely disclosed by, for example, requiring the MPD

officers to testify about his previous arrest rather than publishing

portions of his guilty plea transcript and cross-examining the

officers, including now-deceased Officer Wilkins, about where

USCA Case #09-3068 Document #1285091 Filed: 12/28/2010 Page 8 of 11
9

in the Mercedes the license was located.8

 Again, Pettiford is

mistaken. See id. at 43-44 (court explained that Pettiford’s

counsel, as trial strategy, agreed to the publishing of Pettiford’s

guilty plea alternative); id. at 44-45 (court noted that Officer

Wilkins “had testified previously” that the license was in the

Mercedes but had not specified where in the vehicle “so there is

the chance that there would be [] different testimony as to where

the license was. All we can say is there was testimony that it was

in the car according to one officer, and the other officers do not

recall it.”).

Finally, Pettiford argues the district court erroneously

weighed the strength of the overall evidence against him in

concluding the undisclosed license was not material under

Brady. The court, however, has a “responsibility to evaluate the

impact of the undisclosed evidence not in isolation, but in light

of the rest of the trial record.” United States v. Bowie, 198 F.3d

905, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing United States v. Agurs, 427

U.S. 97, 112 (1976)); see also, e.g., Oruche, 484 F.3d. at 597-

601 (strength of overall evidence against defendant relevant in

finding no Brady violation).

The undisclosed evidence does not undermine the strength

of the evidence establishing Pettiford’s guilt of the drug offense

sub judice. Even without the 404(b) evidence of the April 27

arrest, there was ample evidence establishing Pettiford’s

8

 Pettiford does not argue that the account of his April 27 arrest

would not have been admissible under Rule 404(b) had the photograph

been timely disclosed. Rather, he claims he would have required the

MPD officers to testify about that arrest. In any event, the district

court indicated that the evidence of Pettiford’s April 27 arrest would

have been admitted, whether via the guilty plea transcript or live

testimony. See Tr. of Hr’g on Mot. for New Trial at 44 (court

concluded undisclosed photograph did not “militate[] against”

admissibility of evidence of Pettiford’s April 27 arrest).

USCA Case #09-3068 Document #1285091 Filed: 12/28/2010 Page 9 of 11
10

knowledge of and intent to distribute the drugs found in the

vehicle he was driving on May 15. Pettiford had been stopped

four days earlier while driving the same vehicle. He was the

driver and sole occupant of the vehicle both times, manifesting

his repeated use of the vehicle and thus his knowledge of its

contents. Incident to Pettiford’s May 15 arrest, the MPD

officers discovered a substantial amount of cocaine base in the

console, some of it individually packaged in ziploc bags, as well

as equipment commonly used to distribute cocaine, including a

digital scale and plastic gloves. That Pettiford’s May 15 arrest

came less than three weeks after his April 27 arrest and that both

times the police found cocaine base in the center console of the

vehicle Pettiford was driving provides strong evidence of his

knowledge and intent to distribute the cocaine base on May 15.9

Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the photograph of

9

 As already noted, Pettiford does not challenge the admissibility

of the April 27 arrest evidence under Rule 404(b). Supra note 8. Nor

would timely disclosure of the license have significantly undermined

that evidence; although Pettiford contends the presence of Cousins’s

driver’s license in his Mercedes calls into question whether he knew

the cocaine base was there, the only thing he claims he would have

done differently had he known of the photograph was to insist that the

April 27 events be presented to the jury through live testimony instead

of by publishing the guilty plea transcript. In fact, the evidence of the

April 27 events might have had more impact if, instead of being read

to the jury in a brief, “matter-of-fact way,” Pettiford, 517 F.3d at 591,

it had been introduced through the testimony of the officers who

witnessed Pettiford engage in an apparent drug sale, walk to his

Mercedes, reach inside and place a grassy substance by a nearby bush

before arresting him and finding cocaine base in the console. There

was thus sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude

Pettiford knowingly possessed with intent to distribute the cocaine

base on April 27 even if the photograph of Cousins’s license had been

timely disclosed and Officer Wilkins had testified the license was

found in the center console with the drugs.

USCA Case #09-3068 Document #1285091 Filed: 12/28/2010 Page 10 of 11
11

Cousins’s driver’s license is material under Brady because there

is no “reasonable probability” the jury would have reached a

different result with knowledge of the photograph or that the

jury’s ignorance of the photograph “undermine[s] confidence in

the verdict.” Johnson, 592 F.3d at 170 (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S.

at 435). 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s

denial of Pettiford’s new trial motion.

So ordered.

USCA Case #09-3068 Document #1285091 Filed: 12/28/2010 Page 11 of 11