Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-08082/USCOURTS-ca10-89-08082-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Carol Ann Culver
Appellant
Officer Gary Webster
Appellee
The Town of Torrington, Wyoming
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

CAROL ANN CULVER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

J4.,IL~D United Stare~. w H't: o!. L .. p~ls T,.. ..... t}i r·)···~1}it. 

APR 1 6 1991 

ROBER1' L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 89-8082 

THE TOWN OF TORRINGTON, WYOMING 

and, OFFICER GARY WEBSTER, 

Defendant-Appellees. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR DISTRICT WYOMING 

(D.C. No. CIV-89-0008-B) 

George Santini of Graves, Santini & Villemez, P.C., Cheyenne, 

Wyoming, attorneys for plaintiff-appellant. 

William Mather McKellar and Lloyd E. Smith of Lathrop, Rutledge & 

Boley, P.c., Cheyenne, Wyoming, attorneys for plaintiff-appellee 

Gary Webster. 

Alan B. Minier, of Hirst & Applegate, P.C. Cheyenne, Wyoming, 

attorneys for defendant-appellee The Town of Torrington. 

Before Logan and Moore, Circuit Judges, and Greene, District 

Judge.* 

Greene, District Judge. 

* The Honorable J. Thomas Greene, Judge, United States District 

Court for the District of Utah, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 89-8082 Document: 01019299021 Date Filed: 04/16/1991 Page: 1 
Appellant carol Ann Culver appeals from the district 

court's order granting appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment 

dismissing her Section 1983 claim of use of excessive force while 

she was in a jail cell in a post-arrest pre-trial detention 

setting. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

On July 9, 1987, following reports that appellant Carol 

Ann Culver was drunk and threatening to harm herself, officers 

including appellee Gary Webster went to appellant's home, 

determined that she was a threat to herself and the community and 

pursuant to Wyoming's involuntary mental health hold statute, 1 

took her into police custody and transported her to the Goshen 

County Jail. Appellant originally alleged that Webster used 

excessive force when placing her in custody, while in the booking 

area of the jail, and during a search of her person at her jail 

cell. This appeal involves only appellant's claim of the use of 

excessive force at the jail cell. 2 

§ 25-10-109, Wyo. Cr. Code, provides: 

(a) When a law enforcement officer or examiner has reasonable 

cause to believe a person is mentally ill pursuant to W.S. 25-10-

101, the person may be detained. 

2 Originally this matter was brought before the Magistrate on cross Motions for 

Summary Judgment. The Magistrate denied plaintiffs motion and granted defendants' motion 

in all respects except as to the claim of use of excessive force in the booking area. The 

Magistrate's ruling was affirmed by the district court. The parties then stipulated to dismissal of 

all claims with prejudice on the agreement that appeal could be taken on plaintiffs claim of 

alleged use of excessive force in the search of her person at the jail cell. 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-8082 Document: 01019299021 Date Filed: 04/16/1991 Page: 2 
After placing appellant in a jail cell following her 

arrest, police officers were contacted by her mental health 

counselor who notified them that she may have prescription drugs 

in her possession which she might ingest in an attempt to harm 

herself. Based on this information, Webster and two other jail 

personnel searched the appellant while she was in the jail cell. 

The search was conducted by having appellant stand against the 

bars of the cell while a deputy and Webster pulled appellant's 

arms straight forward through the cell bars so that a matron 

could perform a pat down search to ascertain whether she had any 

contraband or prescription drugs. Appellant alleges that Webster 

used excessive force during the course of this search, causing 

severe bruises. It is uncontroverted that the next morning 

appellant had bruises on her arms and legs, and jail personnel 

photographed the bruises. 

ANALYSIS 

Standards for Summary Judgment 

Summary judgment is appropriate when the record shows 

that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 

the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 

Rule 56(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The moving party 

has the initial burden to show "that there is an absence of 

evidence to support the non-moving party's case." Celotex Corp. 

v. Catrett, 477 u.s. 317, 325 (1986). If the moving party meets 

its burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to show 

3 

Appellate Case: 89-8082 Document: 01019299021 Date Filed: 04/16/1991 Page: 3 
that there is a genuine issue of material fact. The non-moving 

party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his 

pleadings." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 u.s. 242, 249. 

On review of the record all facts must be considered in the light 

most favorable to the non-moving party Celotex, 477 u.s. at 322, 

but summary judgment is mandated if after adequate time for 

discovery a party "fails to make a showing sufficient to 

establish the existence of an element essential to the party's 

case and on which the party will bear the burden of proof at 

trial." Id. at 322. 

Failure to Conduct Adequate Discovery 

Appellant asserts that summary judgment was 

inappropriate because she lacked adequate opportunity for 

discovery prior to the hearing on the Motion for Summary 

Judgment. In this regard, appellant's attorney filed an 

affidavit pursuant to Rule 56(f) Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, 3 but it was insufficient to justify a continuance 

under Meyer v. Dans un Jardin. S.A., 816 F.2d 533 (lOth Cir. 

3 Rule 56 (f) provides: 

When Affidavits are Unavailable. Should it appear from the 

affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for 

reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the 

party's opposition, the court may order a continuance to permit 

affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to 

be had or may make such other order as is just. 

See Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of America. Inc .. 850 F.2d 1373 (lOth Cir. 1988). 

4 

Appellate Case: 89-8082 Document: 01019299021 Date Filed: 04/16/1991 Page: 4 
1987). In that case we held that "[t]he non-moving party has the 

burden of showing by affidavit how additional time will enable 

him to rebut the movant's allegations." 816 F.2d at 537. 

Appellant has failed to make a showing that additional time would 

have enabled her to rebut movant's allegations of no genuine 

issue of material fact concerning use of excessive force at the 

jail cell. 4 See also Bryant v. O'Connor, 848 F.2d 1064 (lOth 

Cir. 1988). 

Appellant failed to conduct any discovery after the 

motion for summary judgment was filed on January 10, 1989, even 

though appellant had not otherwise completed her discovery and 

was not required to respond until May 5, 1989. The trial court 

ruled that this was sufficient time to complete discovery. We 

agree. 

4 

Claim of Negligent Hiring by the Town of Torrington 

Appellant alleged that the Town of Torrington had a 

The affidavit of appellant's counsel dated May 19, 1989 stated: 

3. Discovery in this case has been hampered by the inability to 

obtain copies of Defendant Webster's personnel file and other 

pertinent discovery materials. 

4. I believe that additional discovery in this case, including the 

testimony of John O'Leary, attorney at law and expert in police 

procedures, would disclose that the amount of force used in taking 

Plaintiff into detention was, in his opinion, excessive. It would 

further disclose that the manner in which Plaintiff was searched 

was improper and that the officers failed to follow proper police 

procedures in their treatment of Plaintiff. 

5 

Appellate Case: 89-8082 Document: 01019299021 Date Filed: 04/16/1991 Page: 5 
policy of encouraging excessive force, or that it was negligent 

in hiring, retaining and failing to discipline officer Webster 

even though he had a history of use of excessive force. These 

allegations are wholly unsupported by affidavits or_evidence in 

the record. Appellant argues that allegations were sufficient 

without supporting evidence, because the Town of Torrington had 

failed to present evidence or affidavits to negate the 

allegations of negligent hiring, relying upon Nichols v. u.s .. 

796 F.2d 361, 365 (lOth Cir. 1986): 

• • . if the movant fails to carry its burden 

under Rule 56 and its documents do not 

establish the absence of a genuine issue of 

fact, summary judgment must be denied, even 

if no opposing evidentiary matter is 

presented (citations omitted). 

Appellant's reliance on Nichols is misplaced because of the 

complete absence of any evidence supporting her allegations as to 

use of excessive force - a matter on which appellant bears the 

burden of proof. The Magistrate reviewed the record and found no 

evidence to support appellant's allegations, but did find 

sufficient evidence that the Town of Torrington had denied the 

existence of any policy condoning excessive force or that Officer 

Webster had a history of the use of excessive force. The trial 

court also found insufficient facts in the record to allow a jury 

to conclude in plaintiff's favor on that issue. In these 

circumstances the Supreme Court has stated: 

"a complete failure of proof concerning an 

essential element of the nonmoving party's 

6 

Appellate Case: 89-8082 Document: 01019299021 Date Filed: 04/16/1991 Page: 6 
case necessarily renders all other facts 

immaterial. The moving party is entitled to 

a judgment as a matter of law because the 

nonmoving party has failed to make a 

sufficient showing on an essential element of 

her case with respect to which she has the 

burden of proof." 

Celotex v. Catrett, 477 u.s. 317, 322-23, See also, Lake Hefner 

Open Space Alliance v. Dole, 871 F.2d 943 (lOth Cir. 1989). In 

the case at bar appellant has failed to make even a minimal 

factual showing on the essential issue on which she bears the 

burden of proof and which appellee Town of Torrington has denied, 

i.e., that there was a policy or practice of the City condoning 

the use of excessive force by a police officer, or that there was 

a history or background of use of excessive force by Officer 

Webster. 

Claim of excessive force by Officer Webster 

Unquestionably, individuals have the right to be free 

from the use of excessive force by governmental officers when 

being detained. Graham v. Connor, 490 u.s. 386 (1989). However, 

not all force used by governmental officers rises to the level of 

a constitutional violation since the use of excessive force must 

be established. Martinez v. California, 444 u.s. 277, 285 

(1980). See also, Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512 (lOth Cir. 

1988) . 

In determining whether a § 1983 claim involving 

excessive force by law enforcement officers has been stated the 

7 

Appellate Case: 89-8082 Document: 01019299021 Date Filed: 04/16/1991 Page: 7 
court must apply a constitutional standard. Three alternative 

constitutional standards have been utilized: 1) the Eighth 

Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment; 5 2) the Fourth 

Amendment standard of "objective reasonableness"; 6 and 3) the 

Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process standard which 

protects against use of excessive force that amounts to 

punishment. 7 

The Supreme court has stated that the practice of 

applying the Fourteenth Amendment standard to all § 1983 

5 Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 318-326 (1986). The Eighth Amendment standard 

does not apply in this case because the alleged use of force did not "follow a determination of 

guilt after a trial or plea ... " Benv v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1493, citing Bell v. 

Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 n. 17, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1872 n. 17, 51 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). 

6 The "reasonableness" of a particular use of force must be judged 

from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather 

than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. 

. . . The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for 

the fact that police officers are often forced to make splitjudgments - in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly 

evolving - about the amount of force that is necessary in a 

particular situation. 

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, _ , 101 S.Ct. 1865, 1872 (1989). See also, Zuchel v. 

Spinhamey, 890 F.2d 273 (lOth Cir. 1989). 

7 "It is clear, however, that the Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee from the 

use of excessive force that amounts to punishment." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,_, 109 

S.Ct. 1865, 1871 (1989). 

8 

Appellate Case: 89-8082 Document: 01019299021 Date Filed: 04/16/1991 Page: 8 
excessive force claims is inappropriate, 8 holding that a "free 

citizen's claim that law enforcement officials used excessive 

force in the course of making an arrest, investigatory stop, or 

other 'seizure' of his person is subject to the Fourth 

Amendment's 'objective reasonableness' standard." Graham v. 

Connor 490 u.s. at ___ , 101 s.ct. at 1870. See also Ross v. 

Neff, 905 F.2d. 1349 (lOth Cir. 1990). 

The trial court did not state which standard it was 

applying, but this court need not determine whether to apply the 

Fourteenth or Fourth Amendment standard since there is no 

practical difference in the application of the two standards in 

this case. 9 Appellant argues that a question of fact is 

8 The court said: 

In the years following Johnson v. Glick, (481 F.2d 1028 (2nd 

Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973)) the vast majority of 

lower federal courts have applied its four-part "substantive due 

process" test indiscriminately to all excessive force claims lodged 

against law enforcement and prison officials under § 1983, without 

considering whether the particular application of force might 

implicate a more specific constitutional right governed by a 

different standard ... 

We reject this notion that all excessive force claims 

brought under § 1983 are governed by a single generic standard. 

. . . § 1983" is not itself a source of substantive rights," but merely 

provides " a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere 

conferred." Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144, n. 3 (1979). 

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. at_, 101 S.Ct. at 1870. 

9 There is no dispute between the parties as to which constitutional standard applies. 

9 

Appellate Case: 89-8082 Document: 01019299021 Date Filed: 04/16/1991 Page: 9 
presented as to whether the search was "objectively reasonable" 

under the Fourth Amendment or intended as a form of punishment 

under the Fourteenth Amendment. Appellees on the other hand 

argue that summary judgment should be granted because appellant 

has failed to make a sufficient factual showing under either 

standard. Appellees made a sufficient showing to establish that 

the search in appellant's jail cell was not intended as excessive 

force to punish appellant within the meaning of the Fourteenth 

Amendment, but rather was intended to meet the legitimate 

governmental interest of ensuring that appellant was not in 

possession of contraband or any means by which to hurt herself. 

Appellant failed to present evidence in rebuttal. Similarly, the 

unrebutted showing by appellees was sufficient to establish that 

officer Webster's actions, though unorthodox, did meet the 

"objective reasonableness" standard of the Fourth Amendment. We 

agree with the trial court that appellant had failed to carry her 

burden as to an essential element of her case. 

Appellant next argues that demonstration of the 

severity of the injury constituted sufficient evidence to 

preclude summary judgment. Byrd v. Clark, 783 F.2d 1002, 1006 

(11th Cir. 1986). It is not disputed that appellant had injuries 

and that those injuries may have resulted from excessive force. 

However, the only evidence appellant presented was that the 

appellant had bruises. There was no evidence as to where or how 

the bruises occurred or more specifically, that the bruises were 

10 

Appellate Case: 89-8082 Document: 01019299021 Date Filed: 04/16/1991 Page: 10 
a result of the search of the appellant in the jail cell. It is 

difficult to surmise how the bruises on her legs could have 

resulted from her arms being pulled through the bars at the jail. 

Further, the evidence was insufficient to show that the force 

used was not reasonable under the circumstances. Thus, we affirm 

the trial court's ruling that there was insufficient evidence to 

create a genuine issue of material fact, and hold that entry of 

summary judgment was appropriate. 

Motion to file a Second Amended Complaint 

Two weeks before trial appellant filed a motion for 

leave to file an amended complaint naming Goshen County. The 

trial court denied the motion. Appellant has not argued this 

issue in her brief on appeal, so it may be considered to be 

waived. Bledsoe v. Garcia, 742 F.2d 1237 (lOth Cir. 1984). It 

was clear from the outset that Goshen County as operator of the 

jail could have been a named defendant. Denial of a motion to 

amend is in the sound discretion of the trial court. Federal 

Insurance Company v. Gater Learjet Corporation, 823 F.2d 383 

(lOth Cir. 1987). 

Based upon the foregoing, the judgment of the trial 

court is AFFIRMED. 

11 

Appellate Case: 89-8082 Document: 01019299021 Date Filed: 04/16/1991 Page: 11