Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00740/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00740-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Thomas Cumpston
Defendant
Ane Deister
Defendant
El Dorado Irrigation District
Defendant
George Osborne
Defendant
David Powell
Defendant
Scott Shewbridge
Plaintiff
George Wheeldon
Defendant

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 1 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-230(h).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

SCOTT SHEWBRIDGE,

NO. CIV. S-05-0740 FCD EFB

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

EL DORADO IRRIGATION DISTRICT,

a municipal corporation; ANE

DEISTER, DAVID POWELL, THOMAS

CUMPSTON, GEORGE WHEELDON, and

GEORGE OSBORNE,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on a motion for summary

judgment, or alternatively, partial summary judgment brought by

defendants El Dorado Irrigation District (“EID”), Ane Deister

(“Deister”), David Powell (“Powell”), Thomas Cumpston

(“Cumpston”), George Wheeldon (“Wheeldon”) and George Osborne

(“Osborne”) (sometimes collectively, “defendants”).1 By the

Case 2:05-cv-00740-FCD-EFB Document 42 Filed 12/19/06 Page 1 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 In his complaint, filed April 15, 2005, plaintiff also

alleged a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public

policy under state law. Said claim, however, was dismissed on

defendants’ motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6). (Mem. & Order, filed Sept. 22, 2005 [dismissing claim

as untimely under the California Tort Claims Act].)

2

motion, defendants seek adjudication in their favor on plaintiff

Scott Shewbridge’s (“plaintiff”) complaint, alleging claims for

(1) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the grounds defendants

retaliated against plaintiff for exercising his First Amendment

rights and terminated him without sufficient due process and 

(2) conspiracy to violate plaintiff’s civil rights.2

 Plaintiff

opposes the motion, arguing that triable issues of fact exist as

to each of his claims. 

For the reasons set forth below, the court GRANTS in part

and DENIES in part defendants’ motion. 

BACKGROUND

In November 2001, EID hired plaintiff as a Senior Engineer

for the Water Division. (Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Stmt. of

Undisputed Facts [“UF”], filed Nov. 17, 2006 [Docket #36-3], 

¶s 1, 2.) At the time, and during all times relevant to this

action, plaintiff resided in El Dorado County, within EID’s

district. (Pl.’s Stmt. of Add’l Material Facts [“AF”], filed

Nov. 17, 2006 [Docket #36-3], ¶ 1.) Subsequently, plaintiff

became the co-head of the Hydro Division. (UF ¶ 3.) Throughout

his employment with EID, plaintiff’s primary task was to lead the

re-licensing of Project 184, which involved large scale water

diversions, conveyances, and hydroelectric facilities. 

Plaintiff’s job duties connected with this project included

review of documentation from past interactions, including

Case 2:05-cv-00740-FCD-EFB Document 42 Filed 12/19/06 Page 2 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

litigation, notices of violation, interactions with regulatory

agencies, and studies done in support of the re-licensing

efforts. (UF ¶ 5.) Plaintiff’s duties also involved meeting

with the re-licensing group members, including state, federal and

local resource agencies, regulators, and nongovernmental

organizations, managing the hydrologic data and reviewing the

results from hydrologic modeling for EID’s raw water supply. (UF

¶s 6-7.) Throughout his employment, plaintiff believed he had a

personal and ethical obligation as a professional engineer to

report wrongdoing by the district and any potential danger to the

public. (UF ¶ 8.)

Defendant Powell supervised plaintiff during his employment

with EID. (UF ¶ 9.) Powell’s duties as plaintiff’s supervisor

included preparing written performance evaluations and discussing

those evaluations with plaintiff. (UF ¶ 10.) On July 21, 2002,

Powell prepared a performance evaluation for plaintiff,

indicating: “You can and do come on too strong at times however,

and this intimidates your employees and peers. You should tone

this down a bit when appropriate.” (UF ¶ 11-12.) Powell

discussed the contents of the evaluation with plaintiff. (UF 

¶ 13.) On August 14, 2002, plaintiff signed the evaluation and

indicated he understood Powell wanted him to change his style of

communication. (UF ¶ 14.)

Thereafter, in September 2002, defendants assert plaintiff

again began behaving inappropriately. (UF ¶ 60.) On September

26, 2002, plaintiff walked out of a staff meeting in frustration

over comments made by defendant Deister, General Manager of EID. 

(UF ¶s 61, 75.) On September 30, 2002, defendants claim

Case 2:05-cv-00740-FCD-EFB Document 42 Filed 12/19/06 Page 3 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 Section 6 of EID’s Personnel Policy Statement

distinguishes between regular (permanent) employees and

probationary employees. (UF ¶ 15.) A regular employee is an

employee who was hired, has received a satisfactory evaluation of

performance and has 12 months, or more, continuous employment

with the district in an established position. (UF ¶ 16.) Upon

completion of 12 months of continuous service with the district

and upon receiving a satisfactory evaluation of performance, a

probationary employee will be granted regular status. (UF ¶ 17.) 

Permanent employees have the right to appeal demotions and

dismissals, but probationary employees do not. (UF ¶s 18, 19.) 

4

plaintiff engaged in “attack style interactions” in a meeting

with Board members and other staff. (UF ¶ 62.) Then, on October

10, 2002, defendants assert plaintiff became agitated in a

meeting with Deister and was accusatory and disrepectful towards

her. (UF ¶ 63.) Plaintiff disputes defendants’

characterizations of these incidents and asserts he acted

appropriately under the circumstances of each incident. (UF 

¶s 60, 62, 63.) 

On November 15, 2002, Powell prepared another performance

evaluation for plaintiff, which he discussed with plaintiff. (UF

¶s 20, 21.) At the time of this evaluation, plaintiff was still

on an initial 12-month probationary period. (UF ¶ 22.) Based on

the recent incidents, plaintiff’s performance was deemed

unacceptable in this evaluation, and defendants assert

plaintiff’s probationary period was extended.3 (UF ¶ 23.) 

Plaintiff contends his probationary period was not extended. (UF

¶ 23; AF ¶ 19.) 

Also on November 15, 2002, Powell prepared and issued a

Performance Improvement Plan (“PIP”) to plaintiff. (UF ¶ 24.) 

Defendants assert the plan was intended to help plaintiff improve

his behavior and give him an opportunity to change his manner of

Case 2:05-cv-00740-FCD-EFB Document 42 Filed 12/19/06 Page 4 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

dealing with EID personnel, including his supervisors. (UF ¶

25.) Plaintiff disputes that the PIP was warranted, in the first

instance, and asserts it was never formally initiated. (UF ¶s 25,

26.) According to plaintiff, on November 22, 2002, Deister told

him the PIP “would not be issued, that there were mistakes in it,

that it contained materials in it that had come from Mary Egan

that were wrong and it was not going to be issued.” (UF ¶ 26; AF

¶ 20.) 

On February 27, 2003, plaintiff met with Deister about

changes that were made to the EID Organizational Chart. (UF ¶

27.) Defendants assert that during this meeting, plaintiff

closed the door to Deister’s office and argued with her in a loud

voice, yelling and exhibiting aggressive behavior. (UF ¶ 28.) 

Three people overheard the incident. (UF ¶ 29.) Plaintiff

disputes that he yelled or exhibited aggressive behavior towards

Deister and maintains that he acted appropriately under the

circumstances of two people having a disagreement. (UF ¶ 28.)

The following week, on March 3 or 4, 2003, plaintiff

received a “Notice of Two Day Suspension for Insubordination,”

authored and delivered by Powell. The Notice cited several

incidents of alleged misconduct and insubordination by plaintiff,

from September 2002 to February 2003, and notified plaintiff that

any further acts of insubordination would result in termination. 

(UF ¶s 31, 32.)

/////

/////

/////

/////

Case 2:05-cv-00740-FCD-EFB Document 42 Filed 12/19/06 Page 5 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4 Plaintiff’s foundational objection to this evidence is

overruled. Defendant Powell filed a declaration attesting to

this fact, and moreover, plaintiff alleged this fact in his

complaint and testified that he based the allegation on a draft

version of the Notice of Intent to Terminate found in the

Department of Labor files.

5 Defendant Cumpston is EID’s General Counsel. (UF 

¶ 77.)

6 Defendants Wheeldon and Osborne are members of EID’s

Board of Directors. (UF ¶ 78.)

7 Skelly v. State Personnel Bd., 15 Cal.3d 194 (1975)

(finding that state statutory scheme regulating civil service

employment confers on a permanent civil service employee a

property interest in continuation of his employment and that this

interest is protected by due process)

6

In April 2003, Powell decided to terminate plaintiff and

began preparing a “Notice of Intent to Terminate.” (UF ¶ 40.)4

Also in April 2003, then Boardmember, Al Vargas, overheard a

meeting between Deister, Cumpston,5 Powell, Wheeldon and

Osborne,6 at which they discussed terminating plaintiff, and

Vargas told plaintiff defendants intended to terminate him. (UF

¶ 56.) 

In July 2003, plaintiff was given a “Skelly”7 hearing to

contest his 2-day suspension and was allowed to have counsel

present. (UF ¶s 33.) At the hearing, plaintiff raised questions

about Deister’s behavior. (UF ¶ 34.) The Skelly officer upheld

the suspension, and plaintiff appealed the decision to the Board

of Directors, who also upheld the suspension. (UF ¶s 35, 36.) 

During this appeal, plaintiff again raised questions about the

management style, ethics and legality of certain decisions taken

by Deister. (UF ¶ 38.)

///

Case 2:05-cv-00740-FCD-EFB Document 42 Filed 12/19/06 Page 6 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

Thereafter, on August 8, 2003, plaintiff was given a Notice

of Intent to Terminate prepared by Powell. (UF ¶ 39.) Said

Notice set forth the factual basis for the termination noting

multiple instances whereby defendants claimed plaintiff was

insubordinate to his supervisor, Powell, and the General Manager,

Deister, and was verbally abusive to others within EID. (UF 

¶ 64.) Plaintiff was given an opportunity to respond via another

Skelly hearing, and he again had counsel present. (UF ¶ 41, 43.) 

Steve Cascioppo, Executive Officer of El Dorado County courts,

served as hearing officer. (UF ¶ 42.) Mr. Cascioppo affirmed

the termination, and plaintiff appealed to the Board of Directors

on March 19, 2004. (UF ¶ 44.) The Board also affirmed

plaintiff’s termination. (UF ¶ 45.)

Plaintiff claims that the negative performance reviews,

suspension and eventual termination were all a pretext to silence

him in retaliation for reporting wrongdoing by EID management. 

(UF ¶ 46.) Plaintiff also claims he did not receive fair Skelly

hearings in that the judges were not impartial, and he was not

allowed to present his side of the story. (AF ¶ 22, 24.) 

Both as an EID employee and as a resident of El Dorado

County, plaintiff asserts he had a direct interest in issues of

water quality, water availability, water delivery and the effect

of EID’s management of water resources on the environment in

which he lived. (AF ¶ 1.) Once employed by EID, plaintiff

states he began to question EID management on these issues, often

in the face of severe rebukes. (AF ¶ 2; UF ¶ 70.) Yet,

plaintiff continued to advocate his position that EID was

mismanaging El Dorado County’s water resources in ways which

Case 2:05-cv-00740-FCD-EFB Document 42 Filed 12/19/06 Page 7 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

could lead to environmental damage, water shortages, and the

complete unavailability of water for consumption and fire

suppression in El Dorado Hills. (AF ¶ 3.)

Specifically, either prior to his actual termination in

August 2003 and/or prior to his receiving notice, in

approximately April 2003, of defendants’ intent to terminate him,

plaintiff:

(1) complained to Deister and Powell about Deister’s

hostile treatment of other employees (AF ¶ 6); 

(2) expressed concern about improper participation, in

violation of the Brown Act, by three Board members,

including Wheeldon and Osborne, in a participation

meeting regarding access to the Crawford Ditch (UF 

¶ 50); 

(3) complained about Powell’s misrepresentation at a preBoard meeting and Board meeting regarding the amount of

losses of water flowing through Crawford Ditch (AF 

¶ 4); 

(4) complained to Deister about her withholding of

information from the Board in November 2002 through

January 2003 (AF ¶s 6, 18; UF ¶ 52); 

(5) in May 2003, made complaints to the Department of Fish

and Game, the State Water Board, the Department of

Health Services and the California Attorney General’s

office about EID’s misrepresentations and misreporting

of water supply by EID and about insufficient supply to

meet demand in El Dorado Hills (AF ¶s 12, 13; UF 

¶ 47 ); 

(6) In May 2003, participated in a public water conference,

as a private citizen, over the objections of Cumpston,

who threatened plaintiff with loss of his job if he

participated, and Deister (AF ¶ 10, 11); 

(7) participated in a presentation regarding water supply,

demand and diversion issues to citizens of El Dorado

County through the Maidu Group of the Sierra Club (AF 

¶ 14); 

(8) participated at Board meetings following his being

placed on administrative leave, to voice concerns

regarding issues of water supply and demand (AF ¶ 15);

Case 2:05-cv-00740-FCD-EFB Document 42 Filed 12/19/06 Page 8 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

(9) wrote letters to the editor and had discussions with

reporters regarding his concerns about water supply and

demand issues (AF ¶ 16); and 

(10) participated in the EID Citizen’s Water Advisory Group

(AF ¶ 17). STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary

judgment where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see California v.

Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 1998). The evidence must

be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 

See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en

banc).

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating

the absence of a genuine issue of fact. See Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). If the moving party fails to

meet this burden, "the nonmoving party has no obligation to

produce anything, even if the nonmoving party would have the

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial." Nissan Fire & Marine

Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2000). 

However, if the nonmoving party has the burden of proof at trial,

the moving party only needs to show "that there is an absence of

evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp.,

477 U.S. at 325.

Once the moving party has met its burden of proof, the

nonmoving party must produce evidence on which a reasonable trier

of fact could find in its favor viewing the record as a whole in

Case 2:05-cv-00740-FCD-EFB Document 42 Filed 12/19/06 Page 9 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8 Section 1983 does not create any substantive rights but

rather provides a vehicle whereby a plaintiff can challenge

actions by governmental officials. To establish a violation of 

§ 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the action occurred

under color of state law and (2) the action resulted in the

deprivation of a constitutional right or federal statutory right. 

Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal

quotations and citations omitted). Here, it is undisputed that

defendants acted under “color of state law.” The only issue then

is whether defendants violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights,

namely, his First Amendment and/or due process rights. 

10

light of the evidentiary burden the law places on that party. 

See Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th

Cir. 1995). The nonmoving party cannot simply rest on its

allegations without any significant probative evidence tending to

support the complaint. See Nissan Fire & Marine, 210 F.3d at

1107. Instead, through admissible evidence the nonmoving party

"must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine

issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). 

ANALYSIS

1. § 1983 Claim8 – Retaliation in Violation of First

Amendment Free Speech Rights

Defendants move for summary judgment as to plaintiff’s

retaliation claim arguing plaintiff cannot demonstrate he engaged

in speech protected by the First Amendment and even if he could,

plaintiff cannot demonstrate that his speech was a substantial or

motivating factor in defendants’ decision to terminate him. To

establish a claim for retaliation in violation of free speech

rights, a public employee plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) he

engaged in constitutionally protected speech; (2) the employer

took adverse employment action against the employee; and (3) the

employee’s speech was a “substantial or motivating” factor in the

adverse action. Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 543 (9th Cir.

Case 2:05-cv-00740-FCD-EFB Document 42 Filed 12/19/06 Page 10 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

2006). The first and third elements are at issue on this motion

as the parties do not dispute that defendants’ took adverse

employment action against plaintiff when they terminated him.

As to the first issue, whether plaintiff engaged in

protected speech, the court must engage in a three-step analysis: 

First, the court must determine whether plaintiff spoke as a

citizen or an employee. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S.Ct. 1951

(2006). Second, the court must determine whether, in light of

the content, form and context of the speech, it touched on

matters of public concern. Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 146

(1983). Third, the court must determine whether the value of the

employee’s speech outweighs “the government’s interest in the

effective and efficient fulfillment of its responsibilities to

the public.” Id. at 150. Ordinarily, these are questions of law

for the court to decide. Id. at 148 n. 7. However, as set forth

below, there are certain factual issues in this case that must be

addressed by a jury first which preclude this court from making a

conclusive determination herein. Accord Kodrea v. City of

Kokomo, 2006 WL 1750071 (S.D. Ind. June 22, 2006). 

Defendants contend that plaintiff’s speech was not made in

his capacity as a citizen but in the context of his employment. 

The Supreme Court, in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S.Ct. 1951

(2006), recently addressed the issue of whether the First

Amendment protects a government employee from discipline based on

speech made pursuant to the employee's official duties. The

plaintiff, Ceballos, was a deputy district attorney employed as a

calendar deputy with supervisory responsibilities. Id. at 1955. 

Pursuant to his duties, he investigated a complaint from a

Case 2:05-cv-00740-FCD-EFB Document 42 Filed 12/19/06 Page 11 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

defense attorney regarding inaccuracies in an affidavit used to

obtain a search warrant. Id. at 1955-56. Following his

investigation, Ceballos prepared a memo outlining his concerns

with the affidavit and recommending that the case be dismissed. 

Id. Ceballos' memo prompted a meeting with his supervisors and

members of the sheriff's department that allegedly became very

heated. Id. at 1956. In spite of Ceballos' concerns, the

district attorney's office decided to proceed with the

prosecution. Id. Thereafter, during a hearing on a motion

challenging the warrant, Ceballos was called by the defense to

testify about his observations, but the trial court upheld the

warrant. Id. Ceballos claimed that he was subsequently subjected

to retaliation, including a transfer and denial of a promotion. 

Id.

The Court found that the controlling factor in determining

whether Ceballos' speech was protected was that his expressions

were made pursuant to his official duties as a calendar deputy. 

Id. at 1960. Part of Ceballos' responsibilities were to

investigate concerns and advise his supervisors regarding pending

cases, a fact that was not disputed by the parties. Id. Under

these circumstances, the Supreme Court concluded “when public

employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the

employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment

purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their

communications from employer discipline.” Id.

In reaching this decision, the Court made several

observations applicable to this case. First, because the parties

did not dispute that Ceballos wrote the memo pursuant to his

Case 2:05-cv-00740-FCD-EFB Document 42 Filed 12/19/06 Page 12 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9 The Court stated: “The proper inquiry is a practical

one. Formal job descriptions often bear little resemblance to

the duties an employee actually is expected to perform and the

listing of a given task in an employee’s written job description

is neither necessary nor sufficient to demonstrate that

conducting the task is within the scope of the employee’s

professional duties for First Amendment purposes.” Id. at 1961-

62.

13

employment duties, the Court observed that it did not have

occasion to articulate a framework for defining the scope of an

employee's duties in cases where there is room for serious

debate. Id. at 1961. It did reject, however, the suggestion

that an employer can restrict an employee's rights simply by

creating broad job descriptions. Id.9 In addition, the Court

was not persuaded that Ceballos' speech was unprotected merely

because he had expressed his views in the office and they

concerned the subject matter of his employment, explicitly noting

that in some cases employees may still receive First Amendment

protection for expressions made at work or related to the

employee's job. Id. at 1959.

Ceballos thus reveals that the “critical inquiry” in

addressing whether plaintiff's speech in this case was protected

is plaintiff’s job responsibilities (i.e., was his speech made

“pursuant to [his] official duties”). Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d

528, 545 (9th Cir. 2006). However, here, unlike the situation in

Ceballos, there is a factual dispute concerning whether

plaintiff’s speech was made pursuant to his ordinary job duties. 

See accord Kodrea v. City of Kokomo, 2006 WL 1750071 (S.D. Ind.

June 22, 2006). Defendants proffer no evidence that it was

plaintiff’s job as a engineer for EID to report wrongdoing by the

district, either internally (within the district) or externally

Case 2:05-cv-00740-FCD-EFB Document 42 Filed 12/19/06 Page 13 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

(to outside agencies). Instead, defendants rely on plaintiff’s

testimony at his deposition that he believed, as a professional

engineer, he had an obligation to report wrongdoing by the

district and to respond to what he perceived as potential dangers

to the public; defendants maintain plaintiff’s “obligation as a

professional engineer is inseparable from his obligation as an

employee of EID because he was hired by EID to work as an

engineer.” (Mem. of P&A, filed Aug. 29, 2006, 10:17-19)

(emphasis in original.) Defendants’ argument is not persuasive. 

They mischaracterize plaintiff’s testimony. Plaintiff did not

testify that such reporting was within his job duties for EID;

rather, he testified that by law, under the California Code of

Regulations governing engineers, he believed he had a

professional and ethical obligation to report wrongdoing by the

district and to respond to any perceived danger to the public. 

(UF ¶ 8 [Pl.’s Dep. at 32:11-33:24].) As set forth in his

opposition to the motion, plaintiff clearly disputes that his

speech in this case fell within any specific job duties he had

for EID. (Id.; AF ¶ 1.)

What his job duties included is the “critical inquiry.” 

Freitag, 468 F.3d at 545 (emphasizing the distinction between

speech attendant to a public employee’s official duties and

speech about the subject of a public employee’s employment and

holding that only the former is not protected speech under

Ceballos); see also accord Wilcoxon v. Red Clay Consolidated Sch.

Dist. Bd. of Educ., 437 F. Supp. 2d 235 (D. Del. 2006); Kodrea v.

City of Kokomo, 2006 WL 1750071 (S.D. Ind. June 22, 2006). 

Accordingly, because there are factual issues about whether

Case 2:05-cv-00740-FCD-EFB Document 42 Filed 12/19/06 Page 14 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

plaintiff’s job responsibilities included the obligation to

report wrongdoing by the district either internally to his

supervisors or externally to other agencies, the court is unable

to conclude that plaintiff’s complaints were made simply as an

employee in performance of his duties rather than a concerned

citizen. The court, therefore, must resolve any doubt in favor

of plaintiff for purposes of summary judgment and conclude, at

this stage of the proceedings, that plaintiff may have acted as a

concerned citizen. Defendants thus are not entitled to summary

judgment on this issue.

As to the next inquiry, whether plaintiff’s speech addressed

a matter of public concern, the court finds that it is able to

make, on the record presented, this legal determination. 

A public employee addresses a matter of public concern when

his speech relates to an issue of “political, social, or other

concern to the community.” Connick, 461 U.S. at 146. “Speech

that concerns issues about which information is needed or

appropriate to enable the members of society to make informed

decisions about the operation of their government merits the

highest degree of first amendment protection.” Coszalter v. City

of Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2003). In contrast,

“speech that deals with individual personnel disputes and

grievances and that would be of no relevance to the public's

evaluation of the performance of governmental agencies, is

generally not of public concern.” Id.

In defining the scope of First Amendment protection afforded

to public employees’ speech, the Supreme Court has distinguished

between speech “as a citizen upon matters of public concern” at

Case 2:05-cv-00740-FCD-EFB Document 42 Filed 12/19/06 Page 15 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

one end and speech “as an employee upon matters only of personal

interest” on the other. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147. Thus, the

relevant inquiry under Connick is the point of the speech in

question--was it the employee’s point to bring wrongdoing to

light or was the point to further some purely private interest? 

Roth v. Veteran's Admin. of United States, 856 F.2d 1401, 1406

(9th Cir. 1988). It is only when it is clear that the

information would be of no relevance to the public’s evaluation

of the performance of governmental agencies, that the public

employee’s speech receives no protection. Ulrich v. City &

County of San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 978 (9th Cir. 2002).

The vast majority of plaintiff’s speech in this case falls

squarely within the confines of speech addressing matters of

public concern. (AF ¶s 4, 10-18; UF ¶s 47, 50, 52.) With the

exception of his internal complaints about his supervisors’

treatment of employees (AF ¶ 6), his speech addressed issues

concerning EID’s alleged misrepresentations to the public

concerning water supply and demand within the district and EID’s

mismanagement of the district. As such, his speech sought to

bring alleged wrongdoing to light, and it addressed topics which

would be important to the public in evaluating the performance of

EID. Coszalter, 320 F.3d at 973; Roth, 856 F.2d at 1406. The

court, therefore, finds that said speech was of a matter of

public concern.

However, even if speech relates to a matter of public

concern, it is not constitutionally protected unless the

speaker's First Amendment interests outweigh the public

employer's interests “in promoting workplace efficiency and

Case 2:05-cv-00740-FCD-EFB Document 42 Filed 12/19/06 Page 16 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17

avoiding workplace disruption.” Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d

1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2004), overruled on other grounds, 126 S.Ct.

1951 (2006). “The employer bears the burden of proving that the

balance of interests weighs in its favor.” Id. Defendants have

not met this burden. They have not presented any evidence with

regard to the Connick-Pickering balance test. (Mem. of P&A at

11:4-12 [Attorney argument that plaintiff’s speech impacted EID’s

ability to complete the re-licensing project is not evidence the

court can consider.].) There is nothing in the record to suggest

that plaintiff's speech was sufficiently disruptive so that the

government's interest in promoting efficiency outweighed

plaintiff's First Amendment rights. Moreover, the Supreme Court

has recognized that speech which “seek[s] to bring to light

actual or potential wrongdoing or breach of the public trust” is

entitled to heightened protection, even in the face of alleged

disruption to the employer. Connick, 461 U.S. at 148.

Accordingly, and assuming without deciding that plaintiff spoke

as a citizen, the court must conclude at this stage, that

plaintiff's speech is protected. Defendants are therefore not

entitled to summary judgment on this issue.

Finally, the court must address whether retaliation for

plaintiff’s exercise of his First Amendment rights was the

substantial or motivating factor in defendants’ decision to

terminate plaintiff. In “mixed motive” cases like this one,

where plaintiff alleges he was terminated for exercising his

First Amendment rights and defendants assert plaintiff was

terminated for insubordination and poor performance, the Ninth

Circuit has formulated a two-part burden shifting test. Gilbrook

Case 2:05-cv-00740-FCD-EFB Document 42 Filed 12/19/06 Page 17 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18

v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 854 (9th Cir. 1999). 

First, plaintiff must show that his constitutionally protected

conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in defendants’

employment decision. If plaintiff makes this showing, then the

burden shifts to defendants to show, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that they would have reached the same decision even in

the absence of plaintiff’s protected conduct. Id. Plaintiff can

sustain his burden by introducing evidence regarding the

proximity in time between his speech and the allegedly

retaliatory action. Coszalter, 320 F.3d at 977 (finding that

“depending on the circumstances, three to eight months is easily

within a time range that can support an inference of

retaliation”).

Here, defendants contend plaintiff was terminated for

insubordination and poor performance. However, plaintiff

presents sufficient evidence to place that rationale in dispute. 

Contrary to defendants’ characterization of the evidence,

plaintiff did not first begin to make complaints about EID

management only after he found out about defendants’ intent to

terminate him from Vargas (in April 2003). Plaintiff presents

evidence that from the inception of his employment with EID and

continuing throughout his employment up until his termination in

August 2003, he voiced complaints to EID management and outside

agencies that EID was mismanaging El Dorado County’s water

resources in ways which could lead to environmental damage, water

shortages, and/or the complete unavailability of water for

consumption or fire suppression in El Dorado Hills. (AF ¶s 2,

3.) All of his complaints were made prior to his actual

Case 2:05-cv-00740-FCD-EFB Document 42 Filed 12/19/06 Page 18 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10 Contrary to defendants’ argument, the court finds that

this is the critical date for purposes of analyzing plaintiff’s

retaliation claim. While plaintiff may have learned of

defendants’ intent to terminate him in April 2003, it is

undisputed that he was not actually terminated until August 8,

2003. 

19

termination in August 200310 (AF ¶s 4, 6, 10-18; UF ¶s 47, 50,

52), and they coincided with defendants’ poor performance

evaluations, suspension, and eventual termination of plaintiff. 

As the adverse action taken against plaintiff “took place on the

heels of [his] protected activity,” a jury may reasonably find

that plaintiff’s speech was a motivating factor in defendant’s

decision to terminate him. See e.g. Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev.

Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1458 (7th Cir. 1994).

The court likewise finds based on this same evidence that

plaintiff has raised a triable issue of fact that defendants’

stated reasons for his termination are a mere pretext. The court

cannot find as a matter of law, on the record presented, that

defendants would have reached the same decision even in the

absence of plaintiff’s speech about the district. The underlying

facts regarding plaintiff’s alleged insubordination and poor

performance are highly disputed. It is for the jury to determine

whether plaintiff acted appropriately in his dealings with EID

management; should they find that he did, defendants’ stated

reasons for plaintiff’s termination may well be unpersuasive in

light of plaintiff’s evidence concerning the temporal nexus

between his complaints and defendants’ adverse employment actions

against him.

Accordingly, for the above reasons, defendants’ motion for

summary judgment as to plaintiff’s retaliation claim for

Case 2:05-cv-00740-FCD-EFB Document 42 Filed 12/19/06 Page 19 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 11 (UF ¶s 15-22.)

20

violation of plaintiff’s First Amendment rights is denied.

2. § 1983 Claim – Violation of Procedural Due Process

Rights

Defendants move for summary judgment on plaintiff’s

procedural due process claim, arguing (1) as a probationary

employee, plaintiff did not have a constitutionally-protected

property interest in his employment, and thus, he was not

entitled to any due process prior to his termination and (2) even

if plaintiff were considered a permanent employee entitled to due

process, he was afforded constitutionally adequate due process

prior to his termination. The parties agree that pursuant to

EID’s personnel policies, only “regular” or permanent employees

are constitutionally entitled to procedural due process prior to

their termination.11 Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)

(property interests are not created by the Constitution but

rather are “created and their dimensions are defined by existing

rules or understandings that stem from an independent source”). 

The parties dispute, however, whether plaintiff was a

probationary or permanent employee at the time of his

termination. (AF ¶s 19, 20.) Nevertheless, said dispute does

not prevent a grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants

because even assuming plaintiff was a permanent employee, he

received adequate due process.

In this context of government employment, plaintiff was

entitled, at a minimum, to pre-termination notice and an

opportunity to respond in a hearing appropriate to the nature of

the case. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532,

Case 2:05-cv-00740-FCD-EFB Document 42 Filed 12/19/06 Page 20 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12 Plaintiff also, at times in his briefing, makes

reference to an alleged lack of due process relating to his 2-day

suspension. However, plaintiff has not cited any law

demonstrating he is constitutionally entitled to any process

relating to such disciplinary action. As such, the court

considers plaintiff’s due process claim only with respect to his

termination.

13 In his deposition, plaintiff testified he believed the

due process procedures were inadequate because there was “no

segregation of management from judicial in the proceedings.” He

stated he believed the hearing officer was “behold(ed) to the

political powers in El Dorado County for his job” and that he

“underst[ood] from others that [Cascioppo] and [defendant]

Cumpston knew of each other when Mr. Cumpston worked at the – for

the El Dorado Water Agency and that they had a friendly

relationship.” This latter statement is clearly inadmissible

hearsay.

21

542 (1985). The pretermination hearing, though necessary, need

not be elaborate. Id. at 545. Rather, “‘[t]he formality and

procedural requisites for the hearing can vary, depending upon

the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the

subsequent proceedings.’” Id. (citations omitted.) “In general,

‘something less’ than a full evidentiary hearing is sufficient

prior to adverse administrative action.” Id. (citation omitted.)

Here, it is undisputed that plaintiff received both notice

and a hearing. He received prior notice of his termination in

the “Notice of Intent to Terminate,” and he was given an

opportunity to respond in a Skelly hearing and appeal before the

EID Board. (UF ¶s 39, 41-45.)12 

Plaintiff contends, nonetheless, that he has a viable due

process claim because the hearing officer was not impartial, and

he was not given the opportunity to present “his side of the

story.” (AF ¶s 22, 23.) Other than his conclusory

allegations,13 however, plaintiff has no evidence to support his

claims. First, he has no factual basis for his assertion that

Case 2:05-cv-00740-FCD-EFB Document 42 Filed 12/19/06 Page 21 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

22

hearing officer, Cascioppo, was biased against him. Indeed, the

undisputed evidence is to the contrary. Cascioppo was not

employed by EID; he was the Executive Officer of El Dorado County

courts. (UF ¶ 42.) Moreover, Cascioppo’s decision was reviewed

by the EID Board, and plaintiff likewise produces no evidence

that the EID Board members were biased against him in reviewing

his appeal. (AF ¶ 22.) Plaintiff cannot simply rest on his

allegations without any significant probative evidence tending to

support his complaint. Nissan Fire & Marine, 210 F.3d at 1107. 

As plaintiff has no such evidence here, his due process claim on

this basis must be dismissed. 

Second, while plaintiff concedes he was given a hearing and

appeal in order to respond to the notice of termination, he

complains that he was not afforded adequate due process because

at those proceedings he was not allowed to “present his side of

the story.” Notably, plaintiff had counsel at both proceedings,

and it is undisputed that he was permitted to speak and state his

objections to the termination. (UF ¶s 41-45.) This is all that

due process requires. That plaintiff may have preferred to

discuss his allegations of wrongdoing by EID instead of the

allegations against himself does not raise a due process

violation. Plaintiff was constitutionally entitled to an

opportunity to respond to the termination notice, and he received

it. Therefore, summary judgment in favor of defendants is also

granted as to this basis for plaintiff’s due process claim.

3. Conspiracy to Violate § 1983

Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s conspiracy claim,

arguing that said claim is not cognizable under § 1983. Citing

Case 2:05-cv-00740-FCD-EFB Document 42 Filed 12/19/06 Page 22 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

23

Cohen v. Norris, 300 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1962), defendants argue

the Ninth Circuit has only recognized such a claim in dicta.

Defendants are incorrect. Subsequent to Cohen, the Ninth Circuit

has expressly recognized a conspiracy claim under § 1983. 

Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 848-52 (9th Cir.

1999) (upholding jury verdict finding city mayor, city council

members, the assistant city manager, the fire chief and other

city officials liable under § 1983 for conspiracy to violate city

firefighters’ First Amendment rights); see also Mendocino

Environmental Center v. Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1301

(9th Cir. 1999).

To establish the defendants' liability for a conspiracy, a

plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of “an agreement or

meeting of the minds to violate constitutional rights.” 

Mendocino Enivornmental Center, 192 F.3d at 1301 (internal

quotations omitted). Here, for the reasons set forth above,

plaintiff has raised triable issues of fact with respect to his

First Amendment retaliation claim sufficient to withstand summary

judgment on that claim and, correspondingly, on this claim. As

to defendants’ alleged “agreement” to violate plaintiff’s First

Amendment rights, plaintiff proffers evidence that the individual

defendants met as part of an ad hoc committee to plan his

termination. (AF ¶s 8, 9.) Such evidence is sufficient to raise

a triable issue as to whether defendants engaged in “some

concerted action, intend[ing] to accomplish [the] unlawful

objective” of terminating plaintiff for exercising his First

Amendment rights. Mendocino Enivornmental Center, 192 F.3d at

1301. Indeed, whether defendants were involved in an unlawful

Case 2:05-cv-00740-FCD-EFB Document 42 Filed 12/19/06 Page 23 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14 It is not clear from defendants’ motion whether they

also seek summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity

with respect to plaintiff’s claims against them in their official

capacities. Such relief is clearly not available as qualified

immunity applies only to suits against government actors in their

individual capacities. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). 

Accordingly, the court construes defendants’ motion as seeking

relief on the ground of qualified immunity only as to plaintiff’s

claims against the individual defendants in their individual

capacities. 

24

conspiracy is generally a factual issue which should be resolved

by the jury, “so long as there is a possibility that the jury can

infer from the circumstances (that the alleged conspirators) had

a meeting of the minds and thus reached understanding to achieve

the conspiracy's objectives.” Id. at 1301-02 (internal

quotations omitted). Therefore, defendants’ motion for summary

judgment as to this claim is denied.

4. Qualified Immunity

Plaintiff sues the individual defendants in this action in

both their official and individual capacities. (Compl., ¶s 3-7.) 

With respect to plaintiff’s claims against them in their

individual capacities, the individual defendants move for summary

judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.14 As the court 

dismisses plaintiff’s due process claim against all defendants,

it discusses herein only whether the individual defendants are

entitled to qualified immunity as to plaintiff’s First Amendment

retaliation claim.

Public officials are entitled to qualified immunity for acts

that do not violate “clearly established . . . constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Thus, when considering a

Case 2:05-cv-00740-FCD-EFB Document 42 Filed 12/19/06 Page 24 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

25

defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the ground of

qualified immunity, “[t]he threshold question . . . is whether,

taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting injury,

the facts alleged show that the officer’s conduct violated a

constitutional right.” Bingham v. City of Manhattan Beach, 329

F.3d 723, 729 (9th Cir. 2003), superceded by 341 F.3d 939 (citing

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). If a violation can

be made out, the next step is to determine whether the right

violated or the law governing the official’s conduct was clearly

established such that “it would be clear to a reasonable officer

that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” 

Id. (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202); Act Up!/Portland v.

Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 871 (9th Cir. 1993). 

Where a defendant’s conduct violates constitutional rights

and the law is clearly established, the defendant may not claim

qualified immunity. 

Here, the threshold inquiry is satisfied because the court

has determined above that a reasonable jury could find that the

individual defendants violated plaintiff’s First Amendment

rights. The next question is whether, at the time of plaintiff’s

termination, the law regarding First Amendment retaliation was

clearly established such that a reasonable officer would have

been on notice that such conduct was unlawful. Saucier, 533 U.S.

at 205. 

At the time, the law was clearly established that county

officers cannot retaliate against employees for the exercise of

First Amendment rights. Hyland v. Wonder, 117 F.3d 405, 410 (9th

Case 2:05-cv-00740-FCD-EFB Document 42 Filed 12/19/06 Page 25 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

26

Cir. 1997). 

We have held that as early as 1983 ‘[i]t could hardly

be disputed that . . . an individual had a clearly

established right to be free of intentional retaliation

by government officials based upon that individual's

constitutionally protected expression.’ [citation

omitted] When the individual is a government employee,

he or she has a right to speak on issues of public

importance without being fired from public employment.

[citation omitted] In Hyland I, we noted that the

well-established ‘right of public employees to speak on

matters of public concern . . . is an outgrowth of the

constitutional tenet that public officials may not deny

or deprive a person of a governmental benefit or

privilege on a basis that infringes her or his freedom

of speech.’ [citation omitted]

Id. Thus, given the established state of the law at the time in

question, the individual defendants had “fair warning” that

termination of plaintiff for exercising his First Amendment

rights was unconstitutional. Hope v. Pelzer, 535 U.S. 730, 741

(2002) (noting that the salient question is whether the law at

the time of the disputed conduct gave the defendant “fair warning

that their alleged treatment of [the plaintiff] was

unconstitutional”).

Accordingly, because there are triable issues of fact as to

whether the individual defendants terminated plaintiff for

exercising his First Amendment rights, and because the individual

defendants had fair notice that their alleged conduct was

unconstitutional, the court cannot find, on summary judgment,

that they are entitled to qualified immunity.

5. Punitive Damages against EID

Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s claim for punitive

damages against EID on the ground that as a municipal corporation

EID is absolutely immune from such damages claims. City of

Case 2:05-cv-00740-FCD-EFB Document 42 Filed 12/19/06 Page 26 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

27

Newport v. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247, 267 (1981) (finding

municipalities immune from punitive damages claims brought under

§ 1983 as it would be wrong that “retribution should be visited

upon the shoulders of blameless and unknowing taxpayers”). 

Plaintiff responds, not challenging the controlling law, but

arguing that defendants have failed to proffer evidence that EID

is a municipal corporation. However, it is plaintiff’s burden to

produce evidence that EID is not such a corporation, and

plaintiff has not done so. Moreover, plaintiff alleges in his

complaint that EID is a municipal corporation. (Compl., filed –

[caption names the El Dorado Irrigation District, “a municipal

corporation”].) Under federal law, a party is conclusively bound

by the factual allegations in his pleading. American Title Ins.

Co. v. Lancelaw Corp., 861 F.2d 224, 226 (9th Cir. 1988). As

such, plaintiff is bound by his allegations regarding EID’s

corporate status, and accordingly, either under City of Newport

or based on plaintiff’s lack of an evidentiary showing, the court

grants summary judgment in favor of defendants on this issue. 

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

Case 2:05-cv-00740-FCD-EFB Document 42 Filed 12/19/06 Page 27 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

28

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The motion is

granted with respect to plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages

against defendant EID. The motion is also granted with respect

to plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against all defendants for violation

of plaintiff’s due process rights. The motion, however, is

denied with respect to plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against all

defendants for violation of plaintiff’s First Amendment rights

and conspiracy to violate said rights. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 19, 2006

Case 2:05-cv-00740-FCD-EFB Document 42 Filed 12/19/06 Page 28 of 28