Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06204/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06204-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Marilyn Kay Kelley
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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FILE D UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS United Stat.es Court of Appeals 

Tenth circuit 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

MARILYN KAY KELLEY, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

ORDER AND * JUDGMENT 

SEP 1 1 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-6204 

(D.C. No. CR-89-233-P) 

(W. D. Okla.) 

Before SEYMOUR, MOORE, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App . P . 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The case is therefore ordered 

This appeal is taken from the district court's May 14, 1990, 

order denying defendant's motion for release pending appeal. 

Initially, the motion was denied solely for failure to present a 

substantial question for review on appeal as required by 18 U.S.C. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-6204 Document: 010110042153 Date Filed: 09/11/1990 Page: 1 
§ 3143(b)(2). At that time, the court found that it was 

undisputed by the government that defendant was neither a flight 

risk nor a danger to the community. The court also continued 

defendant's release to a reporting date three weeks away. 

On May 16, the government moved to revoke defendant's release 

on the grounds that she had violated the conditions of release and 

that she could no longer show she was not likely to flee or pose a 

danger to the community. In conjunction, the government secured 

an arrest warrant for defendant, which was executed immediately. 

The district court held a hearing and issued its order revoking 

release that same day. 

The May 16 order also amended the May 14 order to add the 

additional reason for denying bail pending appeal that defendant 

has failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that she 

was not likely to flee. 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(l). 

In United States v. Affleck, 765 F.2d 944, 953 (10th Cir. 

1985), we held that defendant bears the "burden of proving by 

clear and convincing evidence that he is not likely to flee or 

pose a danger to the safety of any other person or to the 

community if released under section 3143(b)(l)." In addition, 

defendant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that 

the appeal is not taken for purposes of delay and raises a 

substantial question of law or fact under section 3143(b)(2). 765 

F.2d at 953 and n.15. 

Clear and convincing evidence is something more than a 

preponderance of the evidence but less than proof beyond a 

reasonable doubt. See generally Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 

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Appellate Case: 90-6204 Document: 010110042153 Date Filed: 09/11/1990 Page: 2 
' 

(1979). In support of her claim that she is not a flight risk, 

defendant offers her record of proper appearances and reporting to 

her probation officer during the time she has been on release. 

She also testified that she had no intention of fleeing. 

In other testimony, however, defendant admitted associating 

with a particular witness (with whom defendant was not to have 

contact as a condition of her release to the self-reporting date). 

Defendant further admitted accompanying this witness to a wig 

store and purchasing two wigs. Other statements, primarily made 

by defendant herself, reflected she was facing eviction two days 

hence and that she had attempted to negotiate the purchase of a 

car and truck in exchange for certain real property. 

Defendant also admitted having "quite a discussion" with a 

friend or acquaintance as to the location of the prosecutor's 

home. Although the district court did not find specifically that 

defendant was a danger to the community, the judge did express 

some concern in this regard. 

We hold that defendant has failed to demonstrate that the 

district court's finding of flight risk is clearly erroneous. See 

United States v. Smegal, 772 F.2d 659, 661 (10th Cir. 1985). 

Without a plausible and satisfactory explanation of her actions 

while on release, the mere fact that defendant had made her 

required court appearances and reported to her probation officer, 

without more, does not amount to clear and convincing evidence of 

the lack of likelihood of flight. 

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Appellate Case: 90-6204 Document: 010110042153 Date Filed: 09/11/1990 Page: 3 
. ' 

Having determined that the district court's determination on 

risk of flight is not clearly erroneous, we need not review the 

matter of whether a substantial question was raised. See United 

States v. Smegal, 772 F.2d at 661 (where district court made 

findings defendant likely to flee and defendant unable to 

demonstrate finding clearly erroneous, trial court not obligated 

by clear language of section 3143(b)(l) to deal with remaining 

provisions in section 3143(b)(2)). 

Accordingly, the judgment of the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

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Appellate Case: 90-6204 Document: 010110042153 Date Filed: 09/11/1990 Page: 4