Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-07-72614/USCOURTS-ca9-07-72614-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Eric H. Holder Jr.
Respondent
Jaspal Singh Uppal
Petitioner

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JASPAL SINGH UPPAL, 

No. 07-72614 Petitioner,

Agency No.

v.  A076-841-745

ERIC H. HOLDER Jr., Attorney ORDER AND General, OPINION Respondent. 

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted

February 10, 2009—San Francisco, California

Filed May 21, 2010

Before: David R. Thompson, Marsha S. Berzon and

N. Randy Smith, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Berzon

7303

Case: 07-72614 05/21/2010 ID: 7345738 DktEntry: 60-1 Page: 1 of 15
COUNSEL

Martin Avila Robles, Immigration Practice Group, P.C., San

Francisco, California, for the petitioner.

Tiffany Walters Kleinert, Office of Immigration Litigation,

Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.,

for the respondent.

ORDER

The Opinion and Concurrence in Part/Dissent in Part filed

August 11, 2009, Slip Op. 10849, and appearing at 576 F.3d

1014 (9th Cir. 2009), are withdrawn. They may not be cited

UPPAL v. HOLDER 7305

Case: 07-72614 05/21/2010 ID: 7345738 DktEntry: 60-1 Page: 2 of 15
as precedent by or to this court or any district court of the

Ninth Circuit. 

The superseding opinion will be filed concurrently with this

order. The parties may file an additional petition for rehearing

or rehearing en banc.

OPINION

BERZON, Circuit Judge:

Jaspal Singh Uppal, a native and citizen of India, petitions

for review of the Board of Immigration Appeal’s (BIA) order

dismissing his appeal. Uppal contends the BIA erred in concluding that he had committed a crime which categorically

involved moral turpitude, thus rendering him inadmissible at

the time of his adjustment of status, and subject to removal.

We agree and grant the petition.

BACKGROUND

Jaspal Singh Uppal entered the United States illegally

around February 1, 1997, near Blaine, Washington. He was

granted asylum in 1998 and accorded status as a permanent

resident in 2004. 

On April 11, 2006, the Department of Homeland Security

(“DHS”) issued Uppal a Notice to Appear. The Notice

charged Uppal as removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A),

alleging that Uppal was inadmissible at the time of his entry

and/or adjustment of status on two grounds: 1) he had been

convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, and 2) he

attempted to obtain immigration benefits through fraud or

misrepresentation of a material fact. 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I); (a)(6)(C)(i).

7306 UPPAL v. HOLDER

Case: 07-72614 05/21/2010 ID: 7345738 DktEntry: 60-1 Page: 3 of 15
Specifically, the Notice alleged that on February 21, 1995,

Uppal was convicted of aggravated assault in violation of § 2681

of the Canada Criminal Code and deported from Canada to

India as a result. The Notice further alleged that Uppal’s

application for asylum made no mention of this conviction or

his status as a Canadian permanent resident.

On receiving the Notice, Uppal filed a formal motion to terminate the removal proceedings. Without holding an evidentiary hearing the IJ issued a final order denying the motion.

Uppal’s conviction under § 268 of the Criminal Code of Canada (on occasion hereafter “§ 268”), the IJ held, constituted a

categorical crime involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”). The IJ

also concluded that Uppal had committed immigration fraud

by concealing both the conviction and his status as a Canadian

permanent resident from U.S. immigration officials.

Uppal timely appealed the IJ’s order to the BIA. In a onepanel-member, unpublished decision, the BIA affirmed the

IJ’s order. Undertaking a de novo review of the moral turpitude issue, the BIA concluded that the IJ was correct in determining that a § 268 offense constituted a categorical CIMT,

rendering Uppal inadmissible at the time of his adjustment of

status. The BIA reasoned that Uppal “was convicted of having

committed aggravated assault by, in the process of committing an assault, wounding, maiming, disfiguring or endangering the life of the victim.” Basing its conclusion on its

interpretation of the statutory language of § 268, the BIA

determined that “the crime cannot be committed negligently

or carelessly; rather, [the crime] requires willfulness of the

action which inflicts significant injury.” As the BIA found

Uppal removable on that basis alone, it did not reach the

immigration fraud issue.

1The Notice to Appear alleged that Uppal was convicted of violating

§ 268(2) of the Canada Criminal Code. As that subsection refers only to

the maximum punishment applicable to aggravated assault, we construe

the allegation as one of prior conviction under subsection 268(1), which

sets forth the elements of the crime. 

UPPAL v. HOLDER 7307

Case: 07-72614 05/21/2010 ID: 7345738 DktEntry: 60-1 Page: 4 of 15
Uppal timely filed this petition for review.

JURISDICTION

We have jurisdiction to review this final order of removal

under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). Although our jurisdiction to

review orders of removal against “criminal aliens” is limited

by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), we retain jurisdiction to review

constitutional challenges and questions of law. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D). Whether a crime involves moral

turpitude is a question of law not subject to the jurisdictionstripping provision of § 1252(a)(2)(C). Tall v. Mukasey, 517

F.3d 1115, 1118-19 (9th Cir. 2008).

DISCUSSION

The determination whether a conviction under a criminal

statute is categorically a CIMT involves two steps, to which

different standards of review apply. See Marmolejo-Campos

v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). First,

the BIA must identify the elements of the statute necessary to

secure a conviction. Because “[t]he BIA has no special expertise by virtue of its statutory responsibilities in construing

state or federal criminal statutes,” we review its conclusion in

that regard de novo. Id. at 907. Second, once it identifies the

elements of the statute, the BIA must compare those elements

to the generic definition of a crime involving moral turpitude

and decide whether they meet the definition. Id. at 908; see

also Morales-Garcia v. Holder, 567 F.3d 1058, 1064 (9th Cir.

2009). Because the BIA does have expertise in making this

determination, we defer to its conclusion if warranted, following the Chevron framework if the decision is a published decision (or an unpublished decision directly controlled by a

published decision interpreting the same statute), and following the Skidmore framework if the decision is unpublished

(and not directly controlled by any published decision interpreting the same statute). Marmolejo-Campos, 558 F.3d at

909-11; see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.

7308 UPPAL v. HOLDER

Case: 07-72614 05/21/2010 ID: 7345738 DktEntry: 60-1 Page: 5 of 15
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984); Skidmore v. Swift &

Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). As the decision here is of the

latter variety, our deference analysis on the second prong of

the CIMT inquiry must proceed under Skidmore. 

1. The Elements of § 268

[1] We turn to the first step of the inquiry: identifying the

elements of Canada Criminal Code § 268 (aggravated

assault). A person commits “aggravated assault” under § 268

of the Canada Criminal Code if he “wounds, maims, disfigures, or endangers the life of” another. Can. Crim. Code,

R.S.C., ch. C-46 § 268(1) (1985). As the statute thus requires

either injury or the “endanger[ment] of the life of” the victim,

it can be satisfied even if no actual injury occurs. 

Canadian case law interpreting § 268 leaves no doubt that

there need be no actual harm. As the Canadian Supreme Court

explained: “There is no prerequisite that any harm must actually have resulted. This first requirement of § 268(1) is satisfied by the significant risk to the li[fe] of the [victim]

occasioned by the [application of force].” R. v. Cuerrier,

[1998] 2 S.C.R. 371, ¶ 95 (Can.). 

[2] Although it is difficult to tell for sure from the BIA’s

terse analysis whether the BIA correctly identified the elements of § 268, most likely it did not. The BIA’s decision

quotes the statute’s actus reus language—“wound[ing], maim-

[ing], disfigur[ing], or endanger[ing] the life of the

complainant”—correctly, but it then goes on to paraphrase the

statute as requiring “willfulness of the action which inflicts

significant injury“ (emphasis added), suggesting that it has

overlooked the endangerment alternative. We therefore conclude that the BIA misapprehended the actus reus elements

required for a conviction under § 268. Because the BIA failed

to identify the elements of § 268 correctly, its CIMT analysis,

in which it compares the elements it has identified to the

generic definition of moral turpitude, is misdirected and so

UPPAL v. HOLDER 7309

Case: 07-72614 05/21/2010 ID: 7345738 DktEntry: 60-1 Page: 6 of 15
merits no deference from this Court. See Morales-Garcia, 567

F.3d at 1066 n.4.

2. Comparison of § 268 to the CIMT definition

[3] Even if we misread the BIA’s opinion as premised on

the erroneous understanding that § 268 requires actual injury,

we still could not defer to the BIA’s conclusion that § 268 is

categorically a CIMT. Under Skidmore, the measure of deference afforded to the agency “depends upon the thoroughness

evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its

consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all

those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking

power to control.” 323 U.S. at 140. When this standard is

applied, the second step of the BIA’s CIMT analysis does not

warrant deference. That analysis is neither thoroughly reasoned nor consistent with prior BIA and Ninth Circuit case

law. In addition, there is a head-on conflict between the BIA’s

analysis and this Court’s recent decision in Morales-Garcia v.

Holder, 567 F.3d 1058, as well as a general conflict with the

BIA’s own case law. 

To see why the BIA’s CIMT analysis cannot stand, we

begin by eludicating § 268’s mens rea requirement. To do so,

we must read § 268 together with § 265, which establishes a

base-level mens rea requirement for all assault offenses under

the Criminal Code of Canada:

A person commits an assault when

(a) without the consent of another person,

he applies force intentionally to that other

person, directly or indirectly; 

(b) he attempts or threatens, by an act or a

gesture, to apply force to another person, if

he has, or causes that other person to

7310 UPPAL v. HOLDER

Case: 07-72614 05/21/2010 ID: 7345738 DktEntry: 60-1 Page: 7 of 15
believe on reasonable grounds that he has,

present ability to effect his purpose; or 

(c) while openly wearing or carrying a

weapon or an imitation thereof, he accosts

or impedes another person or begs.

Can. Crim. Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46 § 265(1) (1985); Cuerrier,

2 S.C.R. 371, ¶¶ 94-95. 

[4] The mens rea required for a conviction under § 268

thus includes the base-level mens rea required for simple

assault: (1) the force must be intentionally applied; and (2) the

force must be applied without the victim’s consent, with the

perpetrator “intentionally or recklessly [disregarding the lack

of consent] or being wil[l]fully blind to the fact that the victim

does not consent.” R. v. Williams, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 134, ¶ 22

(Can.). In addition to the base-level mens rea requirement, a

conviction for aggravated assault requires that the “risk of

bodily harm” resulting from the application of force be “objective[ly] fores[eeable.]” Id. As this summary indicates, a

conviction for aggravated assault under § 268 does not require

that the perpetrator specifically intend to inflict serious physical injury, or any injury at all. Indeed, under § 268, a perpetrator need not even recklessly disregard the risk of bodily harm

or endangerment resulting from the assault. Instead, § 268

requires only that a reasonable person would know that the

assault carries a risk of bodily injury or endangerment, which

is a negligence standard. See Marmolejo-Campos, 558 F.3d at

912.

Once again, this understanding is confirmed by case law.

As the Canadian Supreme Court noted in R. v. Godin, “[i]t is

not necessary that there be an intent to wound or maim or disfigure [under § 268]. The section pertains to an assault that

has the consequences of wounding, maiming or disfiguring.”

[1994] 2 S.C.R. 484, ¶ 2 (emphasis added); see also R. v. L.,

[1992] 59 O.A.C. 130, ¶¶ 8-10 (Ont. Ct. App.) (“[T]he essenUPPAL v. HOLDER 7311

Case: 07-72614 05/21/2010 ID: 7345738 DktEntry: 60-1 Page: 8 of 15
tial intent required for an assault . . . remains the same for all

forms of assault, including aggravated assault. Parliament . . .

never intended that, on an indictment charging ‘aggravated

assault,’ the prosecution would be required to prove that the

accused intended to wound, maim or disfigure the complainant or endanger his life. . . . Aggravated assault is . . . a crime

of general intent.” (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted)) (interpreting the former § 245.2, which is identical

to the current § 268). Likewise, in R. v. Brodie, the British

Columbia Court of Appeal affirmed an aggravated assault

conviction in which the defendant had forcefully pushed the

victim in a driveway, causing the victim to fall and resulting

in life-long brain damage. See [1995] 60 B.C.A.C. 153, ¶¶ 5,

12. The court noted that “a reasonable person who contemplated pushing another over . . . would be bound to foresee

that such conduct would expose the victim to risk of bodily

harm.” Id. ¶ 10 (emphasis added). 

[5] Comparing the requisite mens rea under § 268 with the

case law concerning assaults as CIMTs, it becomes clear that

a § 268 conviction cannot categorically be a CIMT. Under

well-established law, simple assault and battery convictions

are not categorically CIMT convictions because the required

mens rea for simple assault or battery is usually the intent to

touch another offensively, not the “evil” intent typically

required for a CIMT.2

2

See Matter of Solon, 24 I. & N. Dec. 239, 241 (BIA 2007) (“Offenses

characterized as ‘simple assaults’ are generally not considered to be

crimes involving moral turpitude. This is so because they require general

intent only and may be committed without the evil intent, depraved or

vicious motive, or corrupt mind associated with moral turpitude.” (internal

citation omitted)); Matter of Fualaau, 21 I. & N. Dec. 475, 477 (BIA

1996) (defining a CIMT as “ ‘an act which is per se morally reprehensible

and intrinsically wrong, or malum in se, so it is the nature of the act itself

and not the statutory prohibition of it which renders a crime one of moral

turpitude.’ ” (quoting Matter of Franklin, 20 I. & N. Dec. 867, 868 (BIA

1994))); Matter of B-, 5 I. & N. Dec. 538, 540-41 (BIA 1953) (holding a

simple assault committed “knowingly” upon a prison guard involved no

evil intent and so was not a CIMT). 

7312 UPPAL v. HOLDER

Case: 07-72614 05/21/2010 ID: 7345738 DktEntry: 60-1 Page: 9 of 15
Some assault statutes, though, have been held to be CIMTs.

Those statutes include as an element “some aggravating

dimension” sufficient to increase the culpability of an assault

or battery and so to transform the offense into one categorically a CIMT. The “aggravating dimensions” recognized as

sufficiently increasing the culpability of an assault to turn an

assault into a CIMT have been the use of a deadly weapon,

Matter of Medina, 15 I. & N. Dec. 611 (BIA 1976), and a victim who has a special status or trust relationship vis à vis the

perpetrator, such as a domestic partner or spouse, In re Tran,

21 I. & N. Dec. at 291, a child, Guerrero de Nodahl v. I.N.S.,

407 F.2d 1405 (9th Cir. 1969), or a peace officer, Matter of

Danesh, 19 I. & N. Dec. 669 (BIA 1988). As these categories

of cases illustrate, to rise to the level of moral turpitude, an

assault crime must involve a particular type of aggravating

factor, one that says something about the turpitude or blameworthiness inherent in the action. See generally Nunez v.

Holder, 594 F.3d 1124, 1131 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2010). 

The only precedential BIA case of which we are aware in

which an assault offense was held categorically a CIMT

despite the absence of a special protected status or trust relationship or the use of a deadly weapon is Matter of Franklin,

See also, generally, Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1063, 1068

(9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (defining non-fraud CIMTs as involving conduct

that is “inherently base, vile, or depraved” and “contrary to the [accepted]

private and social duties man owes to his fellow men or to society in general” (emphasis added)); Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 1159,

1165-66 (9th Cir. 2006) (discussing the requirement that a crime involve

a showing of “ ‘willfulness’ or ‘evil intent’ ” to be classified as a CIMT,

as opposed to “general intent” or “reckless[ness]”); Notash v. Gonzales,

427 F.3d 693, 698 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that an act done deliberately

and with knowledge does not necessarily involve the “evil intent” required

for CIMT purposes); Goldeshtein v. I.N.S., 8 F.3d 645, 648 (9th Cir. 1993)

(rejecting the argument that “evil intent exists if a conviction requires

proof that a defendant did a forbidden act ‘willfully,’ ” where “willfully”

was defined to mean “deliberately and with knowledge”). 

UPPAL v. HOLDER 7313

Case: 07-72614 05/21/2010 ID: 7345738 DktEntry: 60-1 Page: 10 of 15
20 I. & N. Dec. 867 (BIA 1994). In Franklin, the BIA held

that an involuntary manslaughter statute was categorically a

CIMT because the statute had as elements both extreme recklessness and the death of another person, a result serious

enough to raise the offense to a CIMT even without a showing of specific evil intent. Franklin, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 870.3

Consistently with these general trends in the BIA’s case

law, this Court recently reversed the BIA and held that California Penal Code section 273.5, which penalizes the “willful[ ] inflict[ion] upon a person who is his or her spouse,

former spouse, cohabitant, former cohabitant, or the mother or

father of his or her child, corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition,” is not categorically a CIMT. See MoralesGarcia, 567 F.3d at 1060, 1063. The Court so held because

the statute did not require any special trust relationship — the

victim could be merely a “former cohabitant”; it also

observed that the resulting harm, a “traumatic condition,”

could encompass “a wound or external or internal injury

[even] . . . of a minor . . . nature.” Id. at 1063. 

3

In Matter of Fualaau, a case involving reckless assault, the BIA hinted

that something short of death—perhaps “serious bodily injury”—might be

sufficient. See 21 I. & N. Dec. at 477 (indicating that reckless assault was

not categorically a CIMT because it did not require “serious bodily injury”). Moreover, some of our sister circuits consider serious bodily injury

resulting from assault an aggravating factor where the mens rea standard

requires recklessness. See Godinez-Arroyo v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 848, 849,

851 (8th Cir. 2008) (affirming an unpublished BIA opinion that held a

conviction for “second-degree assault . . . for recklessly causing serious

physical injury to another person” was a CIMT (internal quotation marks

and alterations omitted)); Pichardo v. I.N.S., 104 F.3d 756, 760 (5th Cir.

1997) (determining that an aggravated assault statute requiring “serious

bodily injury” to any person or “bodily injury” to a police officer or

inflicted with a deadly weapon constituted a CIMT because it contained

the elements of “bodily injury together with a minimum mens rea of recklessness”). Because the criminal provision at issue here requires neither

recklessness with respect to harm nor serious bodily injury, these decisions are not useful guides. 

7314 UPPAL v. HOLDER

Case: 07-72614 05/21/2010 ID: 7345738 DktEntry: 60-1 Page: 11 of 15
There is no way to square the BIA’s opinion in this case

with Morales-Garcia. As in Morales-Garcia, the statute at

issue in Uppal’s case requires no special trust relationship

between the victim and the perpetrator. And it does not

require that serious physical injury, much less death, result.

Under § 268, it is sufficient to “endanger the life of” the victim, even if the victim sustains no bodily injury at all. See

Cuerrier, 2 S.C.R. 371, ¶ 95. 

Nor can the BIA’s conclusion with respect to § 268 find

support in the context of non-assault cases in which the BIA

and courts of appeal have held that certain endangerment

crimes constitute a CIMT even without resulting injury. This

line of cases requires actual knowledge of a factor indicating

risk of harm and conscious disregard of it, whereas § 268

requires only negligence. In Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder,

for example, we held, after applying the modified categorical

approach, that a conviction for driving or physically controlling a car while under the influence and with a suspended or

restricted license constituted a CIMT. 558 F.3d at 917. However, we emphasized that the petitioner had “actual knowledge” that his license was invalid at the time of his crimes,

and so demonstrated a subjectively culpable mental state. Id.

at 913 n.12; see also Keungne v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 561 F.3d

1281, 1286-87 (11th Cir. 2009); Knapik v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d

84, 90 n.5 (3d Cir. 2004); Matter of Lopez-Meza, 22 I. & N.

Dec. 1188, 1194, 1196 (BIA 1999), rejected on other grounds

by Hernandez-Martinez v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 1117, 1118-19

(9th Cir. 2003). In contrast, § 268 requires only that the risk

of harm resulting from the assault be “objective[ly] fores[eeable],” [1994] R. v. Godin, 2 S.C.R. 484, ¶ 2, not that the perpetrator actually have subjective knowledge of a factor

indicating risk to another. 

[6] Given these considerations, this case does not fall

within the scope of Franklin, in which the unintended result

was death; the special factor assault cases; or the endangerment cases requiring actual knowledge and conscious disreUPPAL v. HOLDER 7315

Case: 07-72614 05/21/2010 ID: 7345738 DktEntry: 60-1 Page: 12 of 15
gard of the risk of harm. And outside of these exceptions, the

BIA’s case law uniformly indicates that an assault statute

requiring only general intent cannot be categorically a CIMT.

For example, in Matter of Muceros, A42-998-610 (BIA May

11, 2000) (index decision),4 the BIA held that a conviction

under California Penal Code section 243(d) for “battery . . .

[in which] serious injury is inflicted” is not categorically a

CIMT, because

the level of intent involved only extends to touching

the victim. No evil intent is required. The victims

are not a specially protected class of persons or those

who have a special relationship to the perpetrator.

. . . We recognize the argument that the element of

“serious bodily injury” presents an aggravating factor which elevates the respondent’s crime to one

involving moral turpitude. [But] [w]e adopt the reasoning of the California Courts in this regard, which

have held that “[s]ince section 243 does not require

an intention to do any act which would be judged to

be evil by generally accepted community standards

of morality, battery is not a crime of moral turpitude

[for impeachment purposes] even though it may

unintentionally result in serious bodily injury.”

Id. at *5-*6 (internal citation omitted). Similarly, in Matter of

Solon, the BIA gave dispositive significance to the distinction

between general and specific intent in holding that a New

4All decisions designated to serve as precedent are published in bound

volumes of the reporter entitled Administrative Decisions Under the Immigration & Nationality Laws of the United States (or “I. & N. Dec.”). Separately, the Executive Office of Immigration Review periodically compiles

certain unpublished decisions as so-called “indexed decisions,” which are

meant to serve as useful but non-binding guidance for EOIR staff. See BIA

PRAC. MAN., Ch. 1.4(d) (rev. July 30, 2004), available at http://

www.usdoj.gov/eoir/vll/qapracmanual/pracmanual/chap1.pdf. Indexed

decisions are, nevertheless, non-precedential. 

7316 UPPAL v. HOLDER

Case: 07-72614 05/21/2010 ID: 7345738 DktEntry: 60-1 Page: 13 of 15
York conviction for assault in the third degree is categorically

a CIMT: 

[S]ection 120.00(1) of the revised New York Penal

Law . . . provides that a person is guilty of assault

in the third degree when, “[w]ith intent to cause

physical injury to another person, he causes such

injury to such person or to a third person.” . . . [The

statute] requires “intent to cause physical injury.” . . .

Thus, the statute under which the respondent was

convicted requires the specific intent to cause physical injury, as opposed to the general intent associated

with simple assault. Therefore, the inclusion of the

specific intent element distinguishes third-degree

assault under section 120.00(1) of the New York

Penal Law from the general-intent simple assaults,

which are not considered to involve moral turpitude.

24 I. & N. Dec. 239, 243-44 (BIA 2007) (internal citations

omitted). 

This Court, too, has taken note of the distinction between

general and specific intent in the assault and battery contexts.

See Galeana-Mendoza v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 1054, 1059-61

(9th Cir. 2006) (holding that a conviction under a domestic

battery statute that applied to a wide range of relationships

and required neither injury nor an intent to injure did not categorically qualify as a crime involving moral turpitude);

Grageda v. I.N.S., 12 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding

that “when a person willfully beats his or her spouse severely

enough to cause ‘a traumatic condition,’ he or she has committed an act of baseness or depravity contrary to accepted

moral standards [and has categorically committed a crime

involving moral turpitude]” and noting that this “conclusion

follows from Guerrero de Nodahl[, 407 F.2d at 1406,]

because the injurious act under section 273.5(a) must be willful, meaning that the person intended to cause the harm”); cf.

Morales-Garcia, 567 F.3d at 1066 n.5 (noting that “Grageda

UPPAL v. HOLDER 7317

Case: 07-72614 05/21/2010 ID: 7345738 DktEntry: 60-1 Page: 14 of 15
interpreted the statute to require that the defendant ‘intended

to cause the harm,’ although later California cases appear to

require only the general intent to commit the act that results

in injury[ ]” (internal citation omitted) and expressing no

opinion on whether general intent would be sufficient).

[7] As a result, under the BIA’s case law and our own, an

assault statute not involving a specific intent to injure or a

special trust relationship and not requiring that the assault

cause death or even serious bodily injury cannot qualify as a

categorical CIMT.

Conclusion

[8] The BIA may have misconstrued the statutory elements. Whether it did or not, it applied a CIMT analysis

inconsistent with our case law and its own. We therefore grant

the petition and remand for application of the modified categorical approach. Of course, the BIA may also reach on

remand the immigration fraud issue it has not yet addressed.

GRANTED and REMANDED.

7318 UPPAL v. HOLDER

Case: 07-72614 05/21/2010 ID: 7345738 DktEntry: 60-1 Page: 15 of 15