Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-19-11807/USCOURTS-ca11-19-11807-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Bryan Felipe Bautista Ortiz
Appellant
Nixon Javier Bautista Ortiz
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 19-11807

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 8:17-cr-00178-MSS-AAS-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

NIXON JAVIER BAUTISTA ORTIZ, 

BRYAN FELIPE BAUTISTA ORTIZ,

 Defendants-Appellants.

________________________

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

________________________

(April 13, 2020)

Before LUCK, LAGOA and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Nixon Javier Bautista Ortiz (“Nixon”) and Bryan Felipe Bautista Ortiz 

(“Bryan”) (collectively “appellants”) jointly appeal their convictions for violations 

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of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (“MDLEA”). Appellants argue that the 

district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over their prosecution. After 

thorough review, we affirm.

We review a district court’s interpretation and application of a statute 

concerning its subject-matter jurisdiction de novo but review factual findings with 

respect to jurisdiction for clear error. United States v. Cruickshank, 837 F.3d 1182, 

1187 (11th Cir. 2016). Parties may not stipulate to federal jurisdiction. United States 

v. Iguaran, 821 F.3d 1335, 1337 (11th Cir. 2016). However, parties may stipulate 

to facts that bear on a jurisdictional inquiry, and it is the court’s task to determine 

whether the stipulated facts give rise to jurisdiction. Id. 

We review a district court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing for abuse of 

discretion. United States v. Barsoum, 763 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2014). A 

district court is not compelled to hold an evidentiary hearing if a defendant fails to 

allege facts that, if proven true, would require the grant of relief. United States v. 

Sneed, 732 F.2d 886, 888 (11th Cir. 1984). An appellant abandons an argument on 

appeal unless it is “plainly and prominently” raised in his briefing. United States v. 

Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1283 n.8 (11th Cir. 2003). 

The MDLEA criminalizes possession with intent to distribute a controlled 

substance on board a vessel subject to United States jurisdiction. 46 U.S.C. § 

70503(a)(1), (e)(1). Relevant here, the MDLEA defines a vessel subject to United 

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States jurisdiction as a vessel without nationality. Id. § 70502(c)(1)(A). A vessel 

without nationality is a vessel in which the master: (1) fails, on request of a United 

States officer, to make a claim of nationality for that vessel; or (2) makes a claim of 

registry that the claimed nation of registry does not affirmatively and unequivocally 

confirm. Id. § 70502(d)(1)(B), (C). A U.S. Coast Guard (“USCG”) petty officer is 

a United States officer who may make inquiries, searches, seizures, and arrests on 

vessels subject to United States jurisdiction. 14 U.S.C. § 89(a). The MDLEA 

provides three exclusive methods for the master to make a claim of nationality for 

the vessel: (1) possessing on board the vessel documents evidencing the vessel’s 

nationality; (2) flying its nation’s ensign or flag; or (3) verbally claiming nationality 

or registry. United States v. Obando, 891 F.3d 929, 933 (11th Cir. 2018); see 46 

U.S.C. § 70502(e). A painted flag does not constitute a claim of nationality. 

Obando, 891 F.3d at 934. 

If, after a claim of registry is made, a foreign nation responds that it can neither 

confirm nor deny the registry of that vessel, then that vessel is subject to United 

States jurisdiction as a vessel without nationality. United States v. Hernandez, 864 

F.3d 1292, 1302-03 (11th Cir. 2017). “MDLEA statelessness does not turn on actual 

statelessness, but rather on the response of the foreign government.” Id. at 1299. 

The response of a foreign nation to a claim of registry is proved conclusively by 

certification of the U.S. Secretary of State or the Secretary’s designee. 46 U.S.C. § 

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70502(d)(2); Hernandez, 864 F.3d at 1299. “The very concept of a conclusive proof 

entails not only that no detail or corroboration is needed, but also that any contrary 

evidence is futile.” Hernandez, 864 F.3d at 1300. 

In Hernandez, the defendant alleged that the government acted in bad faith 

when it requested a confirmation of registry from Guatemalan authorities. Id. at 

1299. Specifically, the defendant argued that, when USCG officials sought a claim 

of registry from Guatemalan officials, it intentionally withheld registration 

documents showing that the vessel was registered in Guatemala. Id. at 1297-98. We 

held that, assuming those bad faith actions to be true, the government had still 

conclusively proven jurisdiction by obtaining the State Department’s certification. 

Id. at 1302. “If the United States hid information from Guatemala, then the 

Guatemalan government may complain in some form to the U.S. government; but 

Congress has instructed that [MDLEA] defendants may not litigate those complaints 

in an MDLEA prosecution.” Id. (discussing 46 U.S.C. § 70505). A defendant 

charged with a MDLEA violation “does not have standing to raise a claim of failure 

to comply with international law as a basis for a defense.” 46 U.S.C. § 70505. 

Further, in Hernandez, the defendant argued that the government must have 

jurisdiction over the vessel prior to the commission of the underlying offense. 864 

F.3d at 1303. We held that MDLEA jurisdiction “is not an element of the crime that 

the [g]overnment must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. We explained that 

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relying on the State Department’s certification eliminated any timing argument 

because, to obtain jurisdiction over a MDLEA prosecution, the government need 

only show “that the statutory requirements for MDLEA prosecution in U.S. courts 

have been met.” Id. at 1304. 

Finally, in Hernandez, the Guatemalan government responded to the claim of 

registry “before the search of the ship.” Id. at 1296. However, we noted that the 

State Department’s certification was obtained based on Guatemala’s “post‐crime 

non-assertion of registry.” Id. at 1304. Indeed, the MDLEA does not contain an 

explicit timing requirement related to jurisdiction. See 46 U.S.C. § 70504 (providing 

that jurisdiction “is not an element of an offense” and should be determined solely 

by the trial judge); id. § 70502(d)(2) (providing that the response by a foreign nation 

“may be made by radio, telephone, or similar oral or electronic means, and is proved 

conclusively by certification of the Secretary of State or the Secretary’s designee”). 

A defendant who is a “non-U.S. citizen and non-U.S. resident, and who has 

no significant connection to the United States,” cannot raise a Fourth Amendment 

challenge in the MDLEA context. United States v. Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567, 

594 (11th Cir. 2020) (applying United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 

274-75 (1990) and holding that a MDLEA defendant could not raise a Fourth 

Amendment challenge to the USCG’s delay in bringing him before a magistrate 

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judge). In Verdugo-Urquidez, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment 

protects only “the people” of the United States. 494 U.S. at 269 (quotations omitted). 

Here, the district court did not err in determining that it had jurisdiction over 

appellants under the MDLEA. The main dispute between the parties centers on 

whether the appellants told the USCG officers who boarded their vessel, through 

USCG Interpreter Rivera, where the vessel was registered. While appellants claim 

the vessel’s master, appellant Nixon, reported to the USCG officers that the boat, 

called the Nino Divino, was registered in Ecuador, the government says that 

appellants told the officers that they did not know where the vessel was registered 

and made references to both Ecuador and Colombia. Some months after this 

encounter, however, the U.S. State Department certified the United States’ 

jurisdiction over the vessel, based on Nixon’s statement that the last port of call was 

Colombia and that the vessel’s painted flag was Colombian, Colombia’s response 

that it could neither confirm nor deny the vessel’s nationality, the government’s later 

understanding that Nixon had made a claim of Ecuadorian nationality for the vessel, 

and Ecuador’s response that it could neither confirm nor deny the vessel’s 

nationality. On this record, the State Department certified that the boat was without 

nationality under 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C) and, thus, subject to the jurisdiction of 

the United States.

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On this record, jurisdiction was conclusively proven in this case when the 

State Department issued its certification. See 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(2); Hernandez, 

864 F.3d at 1299. As for the appellants’ claim that the USCG officers acted in bad 

faith by misrepresenting Nixon’s statements during the radio report of the vessel’s 

nationality, we’ve held that claims of bad faith may only be lodged by the country 

that is contacted -- here, Ecuador -- and not the defendants in a MDLEA prosecution. 

Hernandez, 864 F.3d at 1302 (finding that the government’s concealment of 

information from a foreign nation would not invalidate a State Department 

certification because such claims of bad faith are issues of international law to be 

resolved between the United States and foreign nations). 

Further, the MDLEA contains no timing requirement for obtaining that 

certification and, thus, it was not error for the government to obtain that certification 

three months after appellants’ arrest. See, e.g., United States v. Greer, 285 F.3d 158, 

175 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that a nation’s consent, obtained five years after the 

original indictment, related back to the activity that occurred prior to consent)

(persuasive authority); United States v. Bustos-Useche, 273 F.3d 622, 627 (5th Cir. 

2001) (providing that the “exact timing of a flag nation’s permission is not a 

condition to consent under” the MDLEA) (persuasive authority). So even if we were 

to assume that the appellants’ claims about Nixon’s claim of registry and the 

government’s bad faith actions are true, the district court did not abuse its discretion 

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in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing because those facts cannot overcome the 

State Department’s conclusive proof of jurisdiction. See Hernandez, 864 F.3d at 

1300 (noting that it is futile to submit evidence that attempts to disprove conclusive 

evidence).1

 

Finally, the appellants’ probable cause arguments are merely recast 

jurisdiction arguments. In any event, we’ve held that the Fourth Amendment does 

not apply to non-U.S. citizens and non-U.S. residents subject to the MDLEA. 

Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d at 589-90. Thus, the appellants lack Fourth 

Amendment standing to raise probable cause arguments on appeal. Accordingly, we

affirm the appellants’ convictions.

AFFIRMED.

1 We add that by not raising any arguments on appeal about any documents found on board the 

Nino Divino or of any flying flag, appellants have abandoned any arguments that a claim of 

nationality was made for those reasons. See Jernigan, 341 F.3d at 1283 n.8. Regardless, the 

Colombian flag painted on the vessel was not flying and, therefore, would not satisfy a claim of 

nationality. See Obando, 891 F.3d at 933. Further, appellants have presented no evidence that 

registration documents were recovered from the Nino Divino.

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