Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03396/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03396-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Walter Piwowar
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable John F. Nangle, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri, sitting by designation.

2

 The Honorable Michael J. Davis, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-3396

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff–Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the District of

* Minnesota.

Walter Piwowar, also known as *

Walter Piwowar, Jr., *

*

Defendant–Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: May 15, 2007

Filed: July 5, 2007

___________

Before BYE and SMITH, Circuit Judges, and NANGLE,1

 District Judge.

___________

BYE, Circuit Judge.

A jury convicted Walter Piwowar of three counts of being a felon in possession

of firearms and ammunition under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), after law enforcement

officers seized fifteen firearms and a large amount of ammunition from his home and

business properties. The district court2

 sentenced him to 37 months imprisonment.

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He appeals only his conviction for the firearms and ammunition seized from his

business property, arguing he was no longer in possession of them when they were

seized, and thus the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. We affirm.

I

On November 17, 2004, law enforcement officers executed a search warrant at

a business property owned by Piwowar, resulting in the seizure of fourteen firearms

and several containers of ammunition from a building located there. The first floor

of the building, at one time a truck stop and garage, is divided into two discrete areas.

The firearms and ammunition were located in one area, on the north side of the

building, which he leased to Christina Lenczuk, a childhood friend and sometime

girlfriend. Lenczuk leased the area for storage, with the goal of eventually opening

an antique shop on the property. The second half of the floor was used exclusively

by Piwowar for storage and vehicle repairs.

The firearms and ammunition were seized from a padlocked walk-in

refrigerator located in the portion of the building leased by Lenczuk. While Piwowar

claimed not to have a key to Lenczuk’s area, he did have a key to the walk-in

refrigerator and Lenczuk did not. In addition, officers testified they were able to enter

Lenczuk’s area without a key via access from the rear during the course of their

search. They were also able to access the walk-in refrigerator without utilizing a key

by taking the door off its hinges. A key to the refrigerator was later found on a key

ring in Piwowar’s briefcase, located in his van.

When police called Lenczuk the day of the search, she denied any knowledge

of the firearms, but later said she did so because she was frightened. At trial, she

testified she had written Piwowar a check for $4,000 in exchange for the firearms

located in the walk-in refrigerator and stated she never moved the firearms after taking

possession of them, instead leaving them in the walk-in refrigerator. She also testified

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as to a plan to sell them at an auction with Piwowar’s guidance. In addition, she

testified about a key she possessed to the leased area of the property and

acknowledged not having a key to the walk-in refrigerator.

On December 2, 2005, the jury found Piwowar guilty of possessing the firearms

and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He appeals, contending the

evidence was insufficient to support the conviction, as he had sold the firearms and

ammunition previously and thus was no longer in possession of them on the date of

the seizure by law enforcement officers.

II

“We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, viewing evidence in the

light most favorable to the government, resolving conflicts in the government’s favor,

and accepting all reasonable inferences that support the verdict.” United States v.

Guenther, 470 F.3d 745, 747 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Washington,

318 F.3d 845, 852 (8th Cir. 2003)). This is a strict standard of review, as “[w]e may

reverse only if no reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Id.

To convict Piwowar of being a felon in possession of firearms and ammunition,

the government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the following: (1)

He previously had been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment

exceeding one year, (2) had knowingly possessed a firearm and ammunition, and (3)

the firearm and ammunition had been in or had affected interstate commerce. United

States v. Johnson, 474 F.3d 1044, 1048 (8th Cir. 2007). Knowing possession can be

actual or constructive, as well as sole or joint. Guenther, 470 F.3d at 747.

Constructive possession of a firearm is established if the possessor had control over

the place where the firearm was located, or control, ownership, or dominion over the

firearm itself. Id. Constructive possession “requires knowledge of an object, the

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ability to control it, and the intent to do so.” United States v. Cuevas-Arrendondo,

469 F.3d 712, 715 (8th Cir. 2006).

It is Piwowar's contention the evidence was insufficient to prove his intent to

control the firearms and ammunition found in the refrigerator. We disagree. While

he contends the evidence shows his having sold these items to Lenczuk and there is

no evidence he touched or even looked at them after becoming a felon, he overlooks

the evidence he owned the building where the refrigerator was located and possessed

the sole key to the refrigerator. Lenczuk, whom he contends owned the firearms and

ammunition, did not possess such a key. Such evidence supports the jury’s finding

that he intended to control the firearms and ammunition at issue. See Guenther, 470

F.3d at 747 (finding possession of a key to a vehicle’s trunk supported a finding the

defendant exercised control over the contents of the trunk); United States v. Brett, 872

F.2d 1365, 1369 n.3 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding, in a drug possession case, sufficient

evidence of constructive possession as “every other circuit to address this issue agrees

that the holder of the key, be it to the dwelling, vehicle or motel room in question, has

constructive possession of the contents therein”).

It is true Lenczuk testified, contrary to her initial statement to police, that

Piwowar sold her the firearms and ammunition and that she took sole ownership and

control of them. A jury might have accepted this testimony and concluded he no

longer possessed the firearms and ammunition. We have held, however, “the presence

of one possible ‘innocent’ explanation for the government’s evidence does not

preclude a reasonable jury from rejecting the exculpatory hypothesis in favor of guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Maloney, 466 F.3d 663, 667 (8th Cir.

2006). In addition, because the record contains inconsistent statements from Lenczuk

as well as her curious admission she did not possess a key for the refrigerator, which

contained the firearms and ammunition she supposedly purchased, the jury could have

easily rejected her story. We have often held “[w]e enjoy no greater vantage point on

appeal than did the jury at trial, and we have no right to usurp the jury’s role to judge

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the facts and make credibility findings.” United States v. Porter, 409 F.3d 910, 915

(8th Cir. 2005).

Piwowar further argues the government did not meet its burden of constructive

possession based on the key because he was a “packrat” and there was no evidence on

the record he was aware he still possessed the key. He cites no case law, however, and

we have found none, suggesting the government was required to show he knew he

possessed the key. In Brett, we concluded mere “proof of possession of the key to the

front door of the house” is sufficient to prove the “knowing possession” of the house’s

contents. Brett, 872 F.2d at 1369. So too here, we find his possession of the sole key

to the refrigerator as being sufficient to prove knowing possession of the firearms and

ammunition inside.

In sum, we hold a reasonable jury could find Piwowar constructively possessed

the firearms and ammunition seized from his business property.

III

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

______________________________

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