Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cr-00029/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cr-00029-8/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Christopher Pan
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff
Christina Vanbeek
Defendant
Mitchell Vanbeek
Defendant

Document Text:

1 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME 

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MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

AMY SCHULLER HITCHCOCK

Assistant United States Attorney

501 I Street, Suite 10-100

Sacramento, CA 95814

Telephone: (916) 554-2700

Facsimile: (916) 554-2900

Attorneys for Plaintiff

United States of America

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

MITCHELL VANBEEK,

CHRISTINA VANBEEK,

CHRISTOPHER PAN,

 Defendants.

CASE NO. 2:19-CR-00029-JAM

STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE 

TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; 

FINDINGS AND ORDER

DATE: April 7, 2020

TIME: 9:15 a.m.

COURT: Hon. John A. Mendez

By previous Order, this case was set for a status hearing on April 7, 2020. On March 16, 2020, 

this Court issued General Order 611, which suspends all jury trials in the Eastern District of California

scheduled to commence before May 1, 2020. This General Order was entered to address public health 

concerns related to COVID-19.

Although the General Order addresses the district-wide health concern, the Supreme Court has 

emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act’s end-of-justice provision “counteract[s] substantive 

openendedness with procedural strictness,” “demand[ing] on-the-record findings” in a particular case. 

Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no 

exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). Id. at 507. And moreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. Id.

at 509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a 

judge ordering and ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record “either 

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orally or in writing”).

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which Zedner emphasizes as both mandatory 

and inexcusable—the General Order requires specific supplementation. Ends-of-justice continuances 

are excludable only if “the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of 

justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a 

speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable unless “the court sets 

forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that the ends of justice 

served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in 

a speedy trial.” Id.

The General Order excludes delay in the “ends of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code 

T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address continuances stemming from pandemics, 

natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has discretion to order a continuance in such 

circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-week ends-of-justice continuance 

following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. Furlow v. United States, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court 

recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. Id. at 767-68; see also United 

States v. Correa, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Furlow to exclude time following the 

September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). The coronavirus is posing a 

similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated by the statutory rules. 

In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following 

case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-ofjustice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). If continued, this Court should designate a new date 

for the status. United States v. Lewis, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any pretrial 

continuance must be “specifically limited in time”).

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and 

through defendant’s counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on April 7, 2020. ECF 45. By minute 

order, the Court reset the status hearing to June 16, 2020, in light of General Order 611 and 612. ECF 

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46. 

2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to superseded the minute order and continue 

the status conference until June 16, 2020, and to exclude time between April 7, 2020, and June 16, 2020, 

under Local Code T4. 

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: 

a) The government has to date produced discovery including over 100,000 pages of 

materials, as well as several video files. The government and defense counsel continue to meet 

and confer regarding the charges.

b) Counsel for defendants each desire additional time to review and analyze this 

voluminous discovery, research legal and factual aspects of the charges, and confer with their 

clients. Additionally, communications with the government have raised additional items to 

research and analyze, and about which to confer with their respective clients.

c) Counsel for defendants believes that failure to grant the above-requested 

continuance would deny him/her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking 

into account the exercise of due diligence.

d) The government does not object to the continuance.

e) In addition to the public health concerns cited by General Order 611 and 

presented by the evolving COVID-19 pandemic, an ends-of-justice delay is particularly apt in 

this case because counsel or other relevant individuals have been encouraged to telework and 

minimize personal contact to the greatest extent possible. It will be difficult to avoid personal 

contact should the hearing proceed. Additionally, defense counsel will need additional time to 

confer with their clients given public health constraints on such contacts.

f) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the 

case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the 

original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. 

g) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, 

et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of April 7, 2020 to June 16, 2020, 

inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] 

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because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant’s request on the basis of 

the Court’s finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest 

of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the 

Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial 

must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

Dated: March 20, 2020 MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

/s/ Amy Schuller Hitchcock

Amy Schuller Hitchcock

Assistant United States Attorney

Dated: March 20, 2020

By: /s/ Mia Crager

Mia Crager

Counsel for Defendant

CHRISTINA VANBEEK

Dated: March 20, 2020

By: /s/ Kyle Knapp

Kyle Knapp

Counsel for Defendant

MITCHELL VANBEEK

Dated: March 20, 2020

By: /s/ Alex R. Kessel

Alex R. Kessel

Counsel for Defendant

CHRISTOPHER PAN

//

//

//

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FINDINGS AND ORDER

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED this 20th day of March, 2020.

 /s/ John A. Mendez

THE HONORABLE JOHN A. MENDEZ

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

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