Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-18-99001/USCOURTS-ca9-18-99001-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ronald Davis
Appellant
Tauno Waidla
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TAUNO WAIDLA, 

Petitioner-Appellee / 

Cross-Appellant, 

 v. 

RONALD DAVIS, Warden, 

Respondent-Appellant / 

Cross-Appellee.

Nos. 18-99001 

18-99002

D.C. No. 2:01-cv00650-AG 

OPINION

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Andrew J. Guilford, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 1, 2023

Reargued and Submitted January 25, 2024

Pasadena, California

Filed December 23, 2024

Before: Kim McLane Wardlaw, Morgan B. Christen, and 

Eric D. Miller, Circuit Judges. *

* The Honorable Paul J. Watford retired from the Ninth Circuit Court of 

Appeals on May 31, 2023. Judge Morgan B. Christen was drawn to 

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2 WAIDLA V. DAVIS

Per Curiam Opinion; 

Concurrence by Judge Christen; 

Partial Dissent by Judge Wardlaw

SUMMARY**

Habeas Corpus / Death Penalty 

In the State of California’s appeal and Tauno Waidla’s 

cross-appeal from the district court’s judgment on Waidla’s 

habeas corpus petition challenging his California conviction 

and death sentence for a 1988 murder, the panel affirmed the 

district court’s denial of guilt-phase relief and reversed the 

district court’s grant of penalty-phase relief.

Waidla cross-appealed the district court denial of relief 

on his two claims of guilt-phase error. Reviewing under 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d), the panel agreed with the district court’s 

assessment that Waidla’s claims lack merit. 

Waidla contended that his Fifth Amendment rights were 

violated when the State introduced his confession at 

trial. The trial court ruled that Waidla’s confession and pretrial statements to the police were admissible because it 

found that, although Waidla had invoked his right to counsel, 

he later initiated dialogue with a detective. The California 

Supreme Court relied on Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 

replace him on July 17, 2023 (Dkt. 94) while the Petition for Rehearing 

was pending. Judge Christen asked for oral argument and this appeal 

was reargued on January 25, 2024.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has 

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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WAIDLA V. DAVIS 3

(1981), to conclude that, as a matter of law, Waidla’s 

question to a detective amounted to initiation of 

interrogation that constituted waiver of Miranda. The panel 

held that the California Supreme Court did not unreasonably 

apply Edwards and its progeny when it upheld the admission 

of Waidla’s pre-trial statements and confession, as 

fairminded jurists could conclude that law enforcement did 

not recommence interrogation in the sense relevant to the 

Edwards analysis.

Waidla contended that counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance in four areas at the guilt phase: (1) investigating 

and litigating the motion to suppress Waidla’s confession; 

(2) counseling Waidla to recant his confession and testify to 

an alibi; (3) failing to investigate alternative defenses; and 

(4) failing to rebut the State’s expert testimony regarding the 

lifespan of fingerprints. The panel concluded that, as to the 

first and second alleged deficiencies, the California Supreme 

Court reasonably could have concluded that counsel met the 

performance standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. 668 (1984); and that the remaining alleged 

deficiencies did not prejudice Waidla.

The State appealed the district court’s order granting 

penalty-phase relief on Waidla’s claim that his counsel 

rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and 

present mitigation evidence that competent counsel would 

have discovered. Not reaching Strickland’s performance 

prong, the panel concluded, under the Antiterrorism and 

Effective Death Penalty Act, that the California Supreme 

Court’s conclusion that Waidla was not prejudiced by his 

counsel’s alleged errors was not unreasonable.

As alternative grounds for affirming the district court’s 

order granting penalty-phase relief, Waidla argued (1) that 

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4 WAIDLA V. DAVIS

the prosecutor violated his Eighth Amendment right to 

heightened reliability in capital sentencing by presenting 

inconsistent factual theories at the seriatim trials of Waidla 

and his codefendant, and (2) that prosecutorial misconduct 

denied him his right to due process and a fair trial in violation 

of the Fourteenth Amendment. The panel concluded (1) the 

district court correctly observed that there is no clearly 

established Supreme Court precedent prohibiting a 

prosecutor from presenting inconsistent theories to convict 

codefendants in separate trials, and (2) whether the alleged 

prosecutorial misconduct is considered under the Eighth 

Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment, the claim fails 

because the California Supreme Court’s factual findings 

were not unreasonable.

Judge Christen concurred. She concluded that the 

California Supreme Court’s prejudice analysis was not 

unreasonable, but also concluded that some aspects of 

Waidla’s counsel’s performance fell below an objectively 

reasonable standard. She wrote separately to avoid 

minimizing the requirement that counsel investigate a capital 

defendant’s available options before deciding not to pursue 

them.

Judge Wardlaw dissented in part. She concurred in the 

portion of the judgment denying habeas relief from Waidla’s 

conviction, but would affirm the district court’s grant of 

habeas relief to Waidla on his penalty phase ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim because she believes counsel 

performed deficiently during the penalty phase and that this 

deficient performance prejudiced Waidla.

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WAIDLA V. DAVIS 5 

COUNSEL

Marta VanLandingham (argued), Tracy Casadio, Craig A. 

Harbaugh, and Katherine Farkas, Deputy Federal Public 

Defenders; Cuauhtemoc Ortega, Federal Public Defender; 

Federal Public Defender's Office, Los Angeles, California; 

for Petitioner-Appellee.

Seth P. McCutcheon (argued), Scott Hayward, and Michael 

C. Keller, Deputy Attorneys General; Dana M. Ali, 

Supervising Deputy Attorney General; James W. Bilderback 

II, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Lance E. Winters, 

Chief Assistant Attorney General; Xavier Becerra, Former 

Attorney General; Rob Bonta, Attorney General; Office of 

the California Attorney General, Los Angeles, California; 

for Respondent-Appellant.

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

A California jury sentenced Tauno Waidla to death for 

the 1988 murder of Viivi Piirisild. Among other findings, 

the jury convicted Waidla of first-degree murder with two 

special circumstances: murder during the commission of a 

robbery and murder during the commission of a burglary. 

Viivi was murdered in her home, having sustained multiple 

blows to her head with a hatchet. The blows crushed her 

skull and fractured her jaw, larynx and hyoid bone. She was 

also stabbed multiple times. The State argued that Waidla 

acted with an accomplice, but the two men were tried 

separately. The jury in Waidla’s trial found that he 

personally used a hatchet. 

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6 WAIDLA V. DAVIS

The California Supreme Court affirmed Waidla’s 

convictions on direct appeal, People v. Waidla, 996 P.2d 46 

(Cal. 2000), and the United States Supreme Court denied his 

petition for a writ of certiorari, Waidla v. California, 531 

U.S. 1018 (2000). This appeal arises from the district court’s 

decision granting penalty-phase relief on Waidla’s petition 

for a writ of habeas corpus. The State has appealed that 

decision and Waidla cross-appealed the denial of guilt-phase 

relief.

1 We affirm in part and reverse in part.2

I. Background

A

Tauno Waidla was born and raised in Estonia during its 

occupation by the Soviet Union. In 1986, when Waidla was 

18 years old, he was conscripted into the Soviet Army, an 

institution known for mistreating Estonian soldiers. Id. at 

54. While stationed in East Germany, Waidla escaped into 

West Germany with a fellow Estonian, Peter Sakarias. From 

there, Waidla and Sakarias sought and received asylum in 

the United States in 1987. Id.

Upon arriving in New York, Waidla and Sakarias were 

received warmly by the Estonian émigré community. Id. In 

April 1987, Waidla moved to Los Angeles, where he met

Avo and Viivi Piirisild. The Piirisilds had relocated to the 

1 The opinion filed on May 23, 2023, (Dkt. 85) is hereby ordered 

VACATED. The Warden’s Petition for Panel Rehearing (Dkt. 92) is 

DENIED as moot. The parties may seek panel rehearing or rehearing 

en banc from this opinion. 

2 Judge Christen and Judge Miller join the per curiam opinion in full. 

Judge Wardlaw concurs in the portion of the judgment denying the guilt 

phase claims and dissents from the judgment as to the penalty phase 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

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WAIDLA V. DAVIS 7

United States from Estonia decades earlier and were active

members of the Baltic American Freedom League, an 

organization devoted to fighting for the Baltic States’ 

independence from the Soviet Union. Id. The Piirisilds 

invited Waidla to live with them shortly after meeting him. 

He moved in and lived with the Piirisilds for just over a year,

and they paid for his food, cigarettes, clothes, and medical 

care. Id. at 54. They also offered to help him find 

employment. Id. Waidla applied for a radio broadcasting 

job and accepted occasional short-term jobs, but he was 

otherwise uninterested in finding work or returning to 

school. Id. 

The Piirisilds asked Waidla to help them renovate their 

home in exchange for his room and board. Id. at 54–55. 

Waidla agreed and completed several significant projects. 

Id. at 55. At some point, Viivi indicated that Waidla could 

have the Piirisilds’ non-functioning car if he started to attend 

school or obtained a job. Id. Later, she promised him the 

car for finishing certain home improvement projects.

Waidla sought to collect on Viivi’s promise in May 

1988, claiming that he was owed for the work he had done 

on the house. Id. Viivi refused, in part because Waidla

showed little initiative to work or attend school. Id. Waidla 

became angry and threatened to report the Piirisilds for 

building without a permit. Id. He also threatened to kill Avo 

and to break his arm. Id. at 56. Viivi told him to pack and 

leave. Id. Rita Hughes, the Piirisilds’ daughter, was able to 

calm Waidla down and help him pack, after which he left 

peacefully. Id.

Waidla began traveling with Sakarias across the country 

by car. While in Arizona, they sent Viivi a postcard 

featuring a recipe for skinning, cutting up, and cooking 

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8 WAIDLA V. DAVIS

rattlesnake, on which they wrote: “You are as wise as the 

rattlesnake.” Waidla also called the Piirisilds from the road 

several times to ask for the car or the proceeds from its sale. 

Id. During this period, Viivi expressed fear of Waidla and 

Sakarias to several people, including her acquaintance 

George Charon, a Federal Bureau of Investigation agent. Id.

Waidla and Sakarias eventually made their way to 

Boston, where Sakarias accepted a job to deliver a pickup 

truck to San Francisco. Id. The two drove to Los Angeles 

on their way to San Francisco. Id. On July 4, 1988, they 

went to the Piirisilds’ home to ask again for the car. Id. Avo 

told them that he was unable to get the car’s title from the 

bank due to the holiday and that he would be leaving town 

the next day. Avo said that he would be gone for two weeks. 

Waidla and Sakarias went on their way after Avo bought gas 

for the pickup. Id. At some point, the two drove to the 

Piirisilds’ cabin in Crestline, California, which Waidla had 

previously visited as the Piirisilds’ guest. Id. at 54, 56. They 

stayed there without permission for over a week, eating the 

Piirisilds’ food and making calls. When they left, they took 

a hatchet and various other possessions. Id. at 56.

On July 12, the Piirisilds’ neighbor saw two men that he 

later identified as Waidla and Sakarias walking toward the 

Piirisilds’ home wearing jackets and carrying no bags. Id. at 

56–57. When he saw them leave later, they carried bags and 

no longer wore jackets. Id. at 57. On July 14, a friend 

checked on the Piirisilds’ house at Avo’s request because 

Avo had not been able to reach Viivi. The friend found that 

the kitchen door had been broken to allow entry. Viivi was 

dead inside a bedroom. Id. at 57.

The crime scene showed that Viivi was attacked as she 

walked through the front door of the house and that her body

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WAIDLA V. DAVIS 9

was later moved from the entryway to a bedroom, where it

was covered with a bedsheet. Id. at 57. Viivi sustained 

multiple wounds to the head consistent with blows from the

blunt side of a hatchet. Id. As a result, all of the bones on 

one side of her face were broken. Viivi also had been 

stabbed four times in the chest and suffered three head 

wounds caused by the sharp edge of a hatchet. Id. One of 

the sharp-edged hatchet blows, which was inflicted premortem, was so forceful that it cut through the top of her 

skull and left a flap of bone attached only by scalp tissue. 

The others, which had been inflicted post-mortem, left 

incisions on her forehead. Id. While she was alive, she also 

suffered a broken voice box that may have been caused by 

strangulation. The medical examiner, Dr. James Ribe, also 

testified that post-mortem abrasions he observed on Viivi’s

back could have been caused by dragging her body from the 

entryway to the bedroom. The official cause of death was 

the combined effect of the bludgeoning, stabbing, chopping 

wounds and strangulation. Id. Dr. Ribe found no evidence 

of defensive wounds. 

Police found only seven fingerprints at the residence. 

One, on the deadbolt cover of the kitchen door—the door 

that had been broken to allow entry—was a match for 

Waidla. Id. Police also obtained saliva samples from two 

cigarette butts found in the trash that matched Waidla’s, but 

not Sakarias’s, blood type. Id. 

On July 12, Waidla and Sakarias pawned two pieces of 

Viivi’s jewelry and purchased two plane ticketsto New York 

using Viivi’s credit card. Id. While in New York, they 

stayed with an Estonian acquaintance, Andres Juriado. 

Juriado raised the news of Viivi’s murder, but Waidla and 

Sakarias changed the subject rather than engage on the topic.

Id. 

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10 WAIDLA V. DAVIS

On August 28, Waidla was arrested by United States 

Border Patrol in New York near the United States-Canada 

border on suspicion of illegal entry. Id. He carried a loaded 

gun in a backpack as well as an unsent letter to Sakarias. The 

letter suggested that Waidla had considered suicide. He also 

wrote: “When you hear that I am dead, then you should know 

that I’ve [croaked] with a weapon in hand. If you hear that 

I have been taken alive . . . (almost impossible) . . . then you 

should know that I did my best.” Id. at 58.

While in custody in New York, Waidla initially invoked 

his right to counsel during interrogation by a Border Patrol 

agent. Id. at 69. However, he made incriminating statements 

to Los Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”) Detective

Victor Pietrantoni the next day at a jail facility in Rouses 

Point, New York. Id. at 69–70. When he talked to Detective 

Pietrantoni, Waidla initially denied any role in Viivi’s 

murder, telling Pietrantoni that he had parted ways with 

Sakarias after leaving the Piirisilds’ cabin in Crestline and 

that he returned to Los Angeles on July 9, and then 

hitchhiked alone to New York where he met up with 

Sakarias. Waidla also stated that he last saw Viivi on May 

21 and Avo on July 5. After Detective Pietrantoni 

confronted Waidla with information that an eyewitness 

identified him and Sakarias leaving the Piirisilds’ house on 

July 12, Waidla admitted to being in the house that morning. 

He stated that he and Sakarias had entered through the rear 

door by breaking the glass and unscrewing the dead bolt. He 

recounted that he ran outside when he saw Viivi pull up and 

that he heard a struggle during which Viivi said, “don’t hit.” 

Waidla said that he saw Sakarias hit Viivi with a hammer 

that they had taken from the Crestline cabin. He described

the hammer as blunt on one end and with a blade on the 

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WAIDLA V. DAVIS 11

other. Waidla stated that when he re-entered the house, he 

saw blood and left. 

Detective Pietrantoni then told Waidla that police had 

recovered his fingerprints from Viivi’s body, and Waidla 

told a third version of events. This time, he admitted helping 

Sakarias drag Viivi’s body to the bedroom but denied being 

involved in the attack. He also admitted that Sakarias took 

Viivi’s purse, that they pawned several of her items, and that 

they used her credit cards to fly to New York on July 12. 

On August 30, in a tape-recorded statement made after 

he waived his Miranda rights, Waidla admitted that he had 

been angry with Viivi because she had “promised [him] 

everything and was laughing at [him]” and that he and 

Sakarias had no opportunities because she was telling 

everybody that they were on drugs. Waidla said that after he 

saw Avo on July 4, he and Sakarias went to the Crestline 

cabin and stayed there until July 11. From the cabin, they 

took a “hammer” and a screwdriver and then broke into the 

Piirisilds’ house to get food. Waidla confessed that he was 

the first to strike Viivi and said that he struck with the blunt 

end of the “hammer” as she came through the front door. He 

also said that the hammer hit her hand and glanced off her 

head. Sakarias then stabbed Viivi with the knife, they 

dragged her body into a bedroom, and eventually left. 

The police later found the Crestline cabin in a state of 

disarray. The rear window of the cabin had been broken, and 

the cabin was strewn with dirty dishes, cigarette butts, 

tobacco debris, and empty liquor containers. Id. Laying out 

in the open on a table, the police found a receipt for a DMV 

identification application with Waidla’s name on it. 

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12 WAIDLA V. DAVIS

B

Waidla and Sakarias were jointly charged with Viivi’s 

murder, but their cases were severed before trial when 

Sakarias was found incompetent. At Waidla’s trial, his 

counsel sought to suppress the pre-trial statements Waidla

had made to the police because they were obtained after 

Waidla had invoked his right to counsel. The motion to 

suppress argued that “[t]he People have not indicated 

through any information provided during discovery that 

counsel was made available to the defendant, or that the 

defendant initiated the conversation with Detectives Crews 

and Pietrantoni, and defendant does not believe the People 

will contend at this time that either was the case.” 

At a pretrial status hearing, counsel reminded the court 

of the pending motion to suppress. The State remarked that 

it needed to conduct more research and was not sure whether 

it would seek to introduce Waidla’s pretrial statements, but 

it agreed to produce live witnesses to litigate the issue if it 

decided to introduce the statements. The case proceeded to 

trial. Near the end of the State’s case on November 15, 1990, 

the State indicated that it would seek to introduce Waidla’s 

pretrial statements. In the suppression hearing that followed,

Detective Pietrantoni testified that Waidla had initiated the 

conversation on August 29 in which he gave incriminating 

statements admitting to being present at the time of the 

murder. Finding Detective Pietrantoni credible, the trial 

court held that Waidla’s Miranda waiver was valid and 

admitted the August 29 pretrial statements and August 30 

confession. Waidla, 996 P.2d at 68–70.

Detective Pietrantoni’s testimony that Waidla had 

initiated the conversation with him at Rouses Point was a 

surprise to the prosecutor and to the defense counsel. 

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WAIDLA V. DAVIS 13

Waidla’s counsel sought and obtained a short continuance at 

the close of the State’s case to reformulate his strategy

because he had not expected the court to admit Waidla’s 

confession. Defense counsel had access to the prosecutor’s 

file during the pre-trial phase, and he knew the State doubted 

the confession was admissible. Waidla’s counsel had not 

pursued a mental state defense because two pretrial mental 

health evaluations had concluded that Waidla had no 

psychiatric condition that could have prevented him from 

forming the intent to kill. After the court denied Waidla’s 

motion to suppress, counsel “advised Mr. Waidla that he 

needed to testify to any bases for repudiating the validity of 

the confession and any alibi.” Waidla confirmed that he 

could truthfully recant his confession.

When the trial resumed, Waidla testified that he was 

coerced by LAPD detectives, who he said had threatened to 

hang him if he did not parrot a confession they “fed” to him. 

Id. at 58. Personally familiar with the violent interrogation 

style of the KGB, Waidla said that he believed the threat and 

did not feel free to deny his guilt. Id. Before the jury, he 

testified to the first version of events he had relayed to 

Detective Pietrantoni: that he was not present when Viivi 

was killed because he had begun hitchhiking to New York 

before the murder occurred. Id.

During closing argument, the prosecutor argued that the 

jury should find that Waidla used the hatchet throughout the 

attack, “choosing . . . the more devastating of the 

instruments,” while Sakarias “accept[ed]” the knife, “the 

lesser implement.” The prosecutor argued that “Waidla first 

inflicted the blunt force injuries, then, turn[ed] the hatchet 

blade so it was more effective . . . [and he] was now able to 

chop through the top of her skull.” The prosecutor called Dr. 

Ribe to testify that the abrasion on Viivi’s lower back 

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14 WAIDLA V. DAVIS

occurred post-mortem, suggesting that she was already dead 

when she was dragged to the bedroom. After four days of 

deliberation, the jury found Waidla guilty of first-degree 

murder during the course of a burglary and robbery with 

personal use of a deadly and dangerous weapon, a capital 

crime. The jury also found that Waidla used the hatchet. 

Sakarias’s trial began approximately ten months after 

Waidla’s trial concluded. At that trial, the same prosecutor 

argued that it was Sakarias who inflicted the fatal blows and 

that Sakarias struck all three hatchet chopping blows in the 

bedroom before Viivi died. The prosecutor introduced 

Sakarias’s statements to the police in which he said that 

during the attack on Viivi in the living room, he used the 

knife while Waidla used the hatchet, and that Waidla 

directed him to the bedroom where Sakarias struck Viivi’s 

head with the hatchet two more times. The prosecutor called 

Dr. Ribe to testify but did not ask him about the abrasion on 

Viivi’s lower back. Accordingly, the jury at Sakarias’s trial 

did not hear testimony opining that Viivi was most likely 

dead by the time Sakarias went back to the bedroom and 

struck her with the hatchet.

C

Neither side presented additional evidence at the penalty 

phase of Waidla’s trial. Defense counsel agreed with the 

trial court’s statement that the defense had “sound tactical 

reasons” for resting on the mitigation evidence it had elicited

during the guilt phase. The trial court stated that counsel had 

put forth “a tremendous amount of evidence about the 

defendant’s background.” The court specifically referred to

an article that Waidla authored. It was published in a 

Canadian newspaper, and it gave a first-hand account of his 

time in the Soviet Army. The article, entitled Escaping 

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WAIDLA V. DAVIS 15

Through the Fog, detailed the harsh conditions Waidla 

experienced during his service in the military. It described 

that he spent long periods in the bitter cold, was given illfitting and dirty clothes, slept in crowded spaces, and 

received abysmal medical care for a respiratory infection. In 

the article, Waidla wrote that while in the military hospital, 

“[a]ll wishes to exist disappear[ed].” The article was 

introduced as an exhibit at trial. 

Waidla’s counsel later acknowledged that he had not 

investigated any mitigating evidence aside from that 

presented during the guilt phase. He did not seek out any 

evidence related to Waidla’s positive adjustment to 

incarceration, although he was aware that Waidla had not 

been subject to any disciplinary proceedings while awaiting 

trial. He also made no attempts to contact Waidla’s family, 

friends, or acquaintances from Estonia to obtain background 

or good character mitigation evidence. According to defense 

counsel, Waidla “expressed considerable reluctance” when 

it came to a social history investigation because he did not 

want his family to know about his situation and because he 

feared that Soviet authorities would retaliate against any 

Estonian who aided in his defense. When counsel revisited 

the question, Waidla acknowledged that his loved ones 

likely knew about his criminal case, but he remained 

concerned about their safety. Ultimately, counsel “did not 

definitively resolve the issue” with Waidla.

The defense counsel’s penalty phase argument at 

Waidla’s trial principally pleaded for the jury’s mercy. 

Counsel’s explanation of Waidla’s struggles in the Soviet 

Army was limited to his observation that “after three weeks 

in a Russian Army hospital Mr. Waidla was so consumed by 

a desire for freedom . . . that he risked everything to run.” 

Counsel also referred to the limited information available 

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16 WAIDLA V. DAVIS

about Waidla’s background and character. He drew the 

jury’s attention to Waidla’s young age and lack of criminal 

history. He reminded the jury of testimony from Avo and 

Rita that Waidla had been friendly, nonaggressive, and 

helpful around the house, and argued that Waidla had been 

cooperative with law enforcement. Finally, counsel asked 

the jury to show Waidla mercy because he had no one who 

could testify to his character, from which the jury could infer 

that he was “essentially alone in this world.”

The State largely argued that the horrific nature of the 

crime warranted the death penalty. The prosecutor detailed 

the brutality of the attack on Viivi. He described Viivi’s 

wounds in detail and argued that Waidla had struck the 

“death blow” to her head with the sharp edge of the hatchet.3

The prosecutor characterized the crime as planned, 

calculated, and especially callous given the kindness Viivi 

had shown Waidla, during the year he lived with the 

Piirisilds. The State also attacked Waidla’s character by 

portraying him as a deserter from the Soviet Army and as a 

lazy “parasite” who believed that “he deserved to be taken 

care of,” citing his refusal to look for work or attend school. 

The State suggested that Waidla had a propensity for 

violence because he had been willing to harm others during 

his escape from the Soviet Army and because he carried a 

loaded gun when Border Patrol agents arrested him, which 

3 The California Supreme Court found that the “great weight of evidence 

indicates that Viivi Piirisild was dead or near death when dragged into 

the bedroom and thus that Waidla, rather than Sakarias, struck the 

antemortem, hemorrhagic hatch-blade blow.” In re Sakarias, 106 P.3d 

931, 948 (Cal. 2005). The court also found that the impact of the 

prosecutor’s arguments derived from the hemorrhagic chop “through the 

top of her skull” or “death blow,” rather than from the fact that “further 

blows were struck after she was dead.” Id. at 950.

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WAIDLA V. DAVIS 17

his unsent letter to Sakarias suggested he might use to harm 

any officer who tried to arrest him. According to the State, 

these incidents “revealed his violent nature” and showed that 

“killing doesn’t mean anything to Mr. Waidla.”

After hearing no new evidence from either party and less 

than a day’s worth of argument at the penalty phase, the jury 

went on to deliberate for just over eight days. On day three, 

the jury sent a note asking what would happen if it could not 

reach unanimity. Waidla, 996 P.2d at 80. On day five, the 

jury sent a note stating that it was deadlocked. Id. A poll of 

the jurors revealed that ten of twelve believed they could not 

come to a unanimous verdict. The court asked the jury to 

continue deliberating. Id. On the morning of day nine, the 

jury returned a death verdict. Id.

D

The California Supreme Court rejected Waidla’s Fifth 

Amendment claim on direct appeal, Waidla, 996 P.2d at 71, 

and summarily denied his ineffective assistance of counsel 

claims on the merits. Waidla filed state petitions for 

postconviction relief. In them, he asserted, among other 

claims, ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilt and 

penalty phases, prosecutorial misconduct, and failure to 

suppress his confession as required by the Fifth 

Amendment.4

4 The California Supreme Court denied Waidla’s first habeas petition, 

which included guilt-phase ineffective assistance of counsel claims for 

failure to seek an earlier adjudication of Waidla’s motion to suppress his 

pretrial statements and failure to investigate and rebut the State’s 

fingerprint evidence. The state court summarily denied these claims on 

the merits. In his second state petition, Waidla reasserted the same guiltphase claims and added penalty-phase ineffective assistance of counsel

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18 WAIDLA V. DAVIS

In support of his claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel at the penalty phase, Waidla offered three categories

of mitigation evidence that could have been presented had 

counsel conducted a more complete investigation: 

(1) evidence of his psychosocial history and character; 

(2) evidence of the abuse faced by Estonians serving in the 

Soviet Army; and (3) evidence that he had behaved well in 

custody before trial.

Mare Pork, a professor of clinical psychology in Estonia, 

interviewed Waidla’s family members, friends, and teachers

in support of Waidla’s postconviction claim. Dr. Hillevi 

Ruumet, an Estonian-American clinical psychologist,

conducted interviews that corroborated the information 

gleaned from Pork’s interviews. We recount their relevant 

combined findings.

Waidla’s parents asked Waidla’s great-uncle Gunnar and 

Waidla’s grandmother Linda to raise him when he was just 

one month old. Waidla saw his mother only occasionally 

after that and essentially never saw his father. When Waidla 

was 11 years old, Linda developed a debilitating brain 

tumor. From that time until she passed several years later, 

she became “uncontrollably abusive” to those around her. 

Waidla became very attached to Gunnar, who “in many ways 

took the place of both mother and father” for Waidla. As a 

teen, Waidla’s favorite cousin and an aunt who had taken on 

the role of his primary female caregiver died in a house fire, 

which devastated him. In all, three maternal figures—his 

mother, grandmother, and aunt—abandoned him or passed 

away before Waidla turned 15.

claims. The state supreme court denied these claims as untimely, 

repetitive, and on the merits. 

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WAIDLA V. DAVIS 19

Waidla displayed “a strong will to succeed” and a “desire 

for excellence” in his athletic pursuits. He attended a 

prestigious sports school for marksmanship, where his coach 

recalled that Waidla “was the best shooter in his [grade] and 

the only one who spent more hours training than was 

required by the overall training schedule.” A headmistress 

from his school recalled that he was a quick learner but did 

“just enough homework to get by.” In all, Waidla seemed to 

focus more on sports, but maintained adequate grades. 

Waidla developed a “reputation among his teachers and 

coaches [for] having a lot of willpower and a desire to fight 

for justice.” According to a family friend who was a wellknown photographer, Waidla also showed a facility for 

photography. He published several photographs in 

magazines and newspapers.

Gunnar recalled that Waidla “never showed a violent or 

aggressive nature” in social environments and was not one 

to get into fights with peers. Waidla’s primary 

marksmanship coach similarly recalled that Waidla “was a 

consistently peaceable and non-violent youth, who was 

never aggressive or bullying toward his classmates or other 

competitors.” Other coaches and students at the school 

concurred in that assessment.

In support of his efforts to seek post-conviction relief, 

psychologist Dr. Myla Young evaluated Waidla to 

determine whether he posed a risk of violence in a carceral 

setting. Personality testing showed that Waidla had a “prosocial orientation” and was a “fundamentally non-violent, 

non-confrontational individual.” Dr. Young reported that, 

over the ten years she had spent evaluating individuals in 

criminal proceedings, Waidla exhibited “fewer risk factors 

to violence than any individual [she had] ever examined.”

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20 WAIDLA V. DAVIS

Dr. Young reviewed information about Waidla’s 

background that supported her clinical findings. She opined 

that Waidla had “a very difficult and stressful early life.” 

She found it notable that despite the “traumatic separation” 

from his parents, Waidla “was able to achieve strong 

psychological and emotional bonding with his Great-Uncle 

Gunnar and other members of the family.” In Dr. Young’s 

opinion, these connections “permitted Mr. Waidla to 

develop [an] intact personality structure.” Waidla’s wellformed personality structure was consistent with “the 

positive efforts he made within the family and in his 

academic and athletic efforts,” as well as his “impeccable 

record of peaceableness [sic]” outside of Viivi’s murder. Dr. 

Young concluded that Waidla’s was “a very unusual case in 

which an otherwise pro-social, law-abiding, and highachieving individual lapsed into a momentary assaultive 

outburst . . . and [that he] has led an entirely non-violent life 

both before and afterward.”

Dr. Ruumet also conducted clinical interviews of 

Waidla. Based on those interviews and her assessment of 

Waidla’s background, she confirmed the psychological 

conclusions reached by Dr. Young. Her clinical evaluation 

showed that Waidla was “passive, intelligent, socially 

appropriate and invested in giving a good impression, 

respectful of authority, diffident, and avoidant of any 

confrontation or physical violence.” In fact, she found that 

Waidla displayed a “characterological aversion to 

confrontation and violence.”

Waidla also offered postconviction evidence of the 

cruelty endured by Estonian conscripts in the Soviet Army. 

Dr. Ruumet declared that serving in the Soviet Army in the 

1980s as an Estonian was “a guarantee of extended physical 

beatings and brutality” and carried a serious risk of death. 

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WAIDLA V. DAVIS 21

Hazing was rampant and “any superior could, with total 

impunity, inflict any kind of physical or mental suffering on 

any inferior at any time and for any (or no) reason.” Dr. 

Ruumet conveyed the story of an Estonian soldier who died 

of kidney failure because he was denied water as a form of 

punishment. According to Dr. Ruumet, such stories were 

not “isolated incident[s].” These conditions were the 

product of Russians’ longstanding prejudice against 

Estonians, with whom Russians had ethnic and linguistic 

differences. Waidla sent a letter to family during his service

asking for their help. In it, he expressed suicidal thoughts

and fear for his life.

Finally, at the post-conviction stage, Waidla provided 

evidence that he had adjusted to incarceration without 

disciplinary incident. The State produced an internal

memorandum from the District Attorney’s office evaluating 

whether the death penalty was appropriate for Waidla and 

Sakarias in January 1989, several months after Waidla’s 

arrest (the “DA memo”). The DA memo reported that while 

incarcerated, Sakarias had been found in possession of 

weapons several times. Whereas Sakarias had been 

designated an escape risk and the DA memo concluded that 

he was “a danger to others even while in custody,” the memo 

was silent as to Waidla’s disciplinary history and observed

that Waidla did not “evidence the same degree of danger to 

society.”

Waidla submitted a declaration detailing his positive 

experience in Wayside Maximum Security, where he was 

incarcerated for three months before trial. He applied for 

and obtained jobs in the kitchen and maintenance units. He 

received a uniform reserved for inmates with a clean 

behavioral record as well as a pass that allowed him to work 

outside of the dormitories. He swept, passed out toilet paper, 

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22 WAIDLA V. DAVIS

and buffed floors. Waidla spent his free time in the library 

reading the newspaper and improving his English. Unlike 

most inmates, he was allowed to read in the library rather 

than taking his reading materials to his cell.

When Waidla was transferred to San Quentin State 

Prison after trial, California Department of Corrections 

officials conducted Waidla’s orientation review to assign 

him housing (the “CDC document”). The officials at San 

Quentin verified Waidla’s statement that he had “no 

problems programming in the county jail” by contacting the 

jail. An unidentified official at the jail “stated that Waidla 

was not a disciplinary problem and programmed well with 

other inmates.”

E

Sakarias and Waidla both argued in their petitions for 

postconviction relief that the prosecutor had presented 

factually inconsistent theories at their respective trials. For 

this reason, the California Supreme Court consolidated their 

petitions for consideration of the prosecutorial misconduct 

claim. The Court appointed a referee to conduct a hearing 

on the claim and, in a reasoned opinion, subsequently 

concluded that the prosecutor had violated Sakarias’s due 

process rights by “intentionally and without good faith 

justification arguing inconsistent and irreconcilable factual 

theories in the two trials, attributing to each petitioner in turn 

culpable acts that could have been committed by only one 

person.” In re Sakarias, 106 P.3d at 934. The court could 

not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

prosecutorial argument that Sakarias struck all the hatchetblade blows played no role in Sakarias’s penalty-phase 

verdict. Id. at 949. The court therefore set aside Sakarias’s 

death sentence. Id. at 949–50, 952. As to Waidla, the 

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WAIDLA V. DAVIS 23

California Supreme Court did not decide whether the 

prosecutor’s inconsistent theories had constituted a due 

process violation because it deemed any misattribution 

harmless. Id. at 950–51.

The court explained that the jury in Waidla’s case had 

heard that when Viivi entered through the front door, Waidla 

hit her in the head with the blunt part of the hatchet with such 

force that it fractured several bones and knocked out her 

teeth, and then likely “turned the hatchet around and struck 

Viivi with the sharp blade with such force as to penetrate her 

skull and cut a flap of skull and scalp from the top of her 

head.” Id. at 950. Although the prosecutor likely 

misattributed to Waidla two post-mortem hatchet blows, the 

court concluded that in light of the strong evidence that 

Waidla struck the initial pre-mortem hatchet blow—and 

likely delivered the other hatchet blows inflicted in the 

entryway where Viivi died—the false attribution was 

harmless.5 Id. The court denied Waidla’s Eighth 

Amendment claim in a footnote that concluded the 

“attribution of blows [did not] make Waidla’s penalty 

determination unreliable.” Id. at 951 n.11.

Waidla filed the operative petition in federal district 

court for the Central District of California pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 on March 17, 2006. He asserted eleven 

claims for relief related to: (1) the trial court’s denial of his 

motion to exclude his confession in violation of the Fifth 

5 The court noted that the crime scene evidence showed a large pool of 

blood in the living room, a minimum blood spatter on the bedroom walls 

and ceiling, and the lack of blood on the bedroom floor and observed that 

this constituted strong physical evidence that Viivi’s hemorrhagic 

wounds were inflicted during the initial attack on her in the living room, 

where she died. See In re Sakarias, 106 P.3d at 948.

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24 WAIDLA V. DAVIS

Amendment; (2) law enforcement officers’ failure to advise 

him of his rights under the Vienna Convention on Consular 

Relations; (3) ineffective assistance of trial counsel at the 

guilt phase of trial; (4) prosecutorial misconduct; (5) judicial 

misconduct; (6) the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s 

decision to seek the death penalty; (7) judicial bias in favor 

of the death penalty; (8) ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel at the penalty phase; (9) the trial court’s refusal to 

answer the jury’s penalty phase questions; (10) the jury’s 

reliance upon his non-testimonial demeanor; and (11) the 

jury’s reliance on “extraneous and inaccurate” information. 

The district court held a four-day evidentiary hearing

beginning on March 17, 2009. The Supreme Court 

subsequently issued a decision in Cullen v Pinholster, 563 

U.S. 170, 181 (2011) holding that the threshold 

determination in adjudicating a § 2254(d) petition is limited 

to the state‒court record. At that point, the district court 

recognized that the initial review of Waidla’s petition could 

not include consideration of new evidence offered for the 

first time in federal court. 

Ultimately, the district court granted relief on Waidla’s 

claim of ineffective assistance at the penalty phase and

rejected Waidla’s remaining claims. The State now appeals

the decision granting penalty phase relief and Waidla crossappeals the denial of relief on his Fifth Amendment and 

guilt-phase ineffective assistance claims. Waidla also 

reasserts his prosecutorial misconduct claim as an alternative 

basis for affirming the district court’s grant of penalty-phase 

relief.

We review de novo the district court’s denial of Waidla’s 

habeas petition. See Gulbrandson v. Ryan, 738 F.3d 976, 

986 (9th Cir. 2013). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective 

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WAIDLA V. DAVIS 25

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 

110 Stat. 1214, we review the last reasoned state court 

opinion. See Tamplin v. Muniz, 894 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th 

Cir. 2018). Here, because of the unusual consolidation of 

the postconviction petitions on the prosecutorial misconduct 

claim, we consider two reasoned state-court decisions: 

(1) the California Supreme Court’s decision on Waidla’s 

direct appeal, People v. Waidla, 996 P.2d 46 (Cal. 2000); and 

(2) the California Supreme Court’s decision on Waidla’s 

second state habeas petition, which was consolidated with 

Sakarias’s, In re Sakarias, 106 P.3d 931 (Cal. 2005).

A court may not grant habeas relief with respect to any 

claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state 

court’s decision was “contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, 

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or “based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented 

in the State court proceeding,” id. § 2254(d)(2).

II. Waidla’s Cross-Appeal

The district court denied relief on Waidla’s two claims 

of guilt-phase error, which Waidla raises on cross-appeal. 

We consider these claims before we turn to the State’s 

penalty-phase appeal. Waidla first contends that his Fifth 

Amendment rights were violated when the State introduced 

his confession at trial. Second, Waidla asserts that he 

received ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt 

phase. Reviewing under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), we agree with 

the district court’s assessment that Waidla’s claims lack 

merit.

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26 WAIDLA V. DAVIS

A

Waidla argues that his confession was improperly 

admitted in violation of the Fifth Amendment. We provide 

factual background before turning to the claim.

Six weeks after the murder, Border Patrol agents 

apprehended Waidla in New York near the Canadian border 

and arrested him on suspicion of illegal entry into the 

country. Waidla, 996 P.2d at 69. During the interrogation 

at a Border Patrol station in Rouses Point, New York, Waidla 

invoked his right to counsel and was then moved to another 

facility where he was detained. Id. The next day, a Border 

Patrol agent transported Waidla back to Rouses Point, where 

he encountered Detective Pietrantoni. Id. At a suppression 

hearing held outside the jury’s presence during Waidla’s 

trial, Detective Pietrantoni and Waidla gave differing 

testimony regarding what transpired at Rouses Point. 

Because the trial court found Detective Pietrantoni more 

credible, we recount his version of events. Waidla, 996 P.2d 

at 71.

On August 29, 1988, officers moved Waidla from a 

holding cell at Rouses Point and took him into an 

administrative area where he saw Detective Pietrantoni 

dressed in civilian clothes. Detective Pietrantoni and 

another officer had flown to New York to interrogate Waidla 

and to take him back to Los Angeles following an extradition 

hearing. Detective Pietrantoni was unaware that Waidla 

would enter the administrative area at that moment. 

Speaking first, Waidla asked: “You’re the detective from 

Los Angeles?” When Detective Pietrantoni confirmed that 

he was, Waidla asked either, “What do you want from me?” 

or “What can I do for you?” Id. A conversation ensued in 

which Waidla first provided an alibi and then admitted 

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WAIDLA V. DAVIS 27

minimal involvement in Viivi’s murder. The following day, 

August 30, Detective Pietrantoni met with Waidla again and 

administered Miranda warnings that Waidla waived. In a 

recorded statement, Waidla confessed that he was present 

when Viivi was murdered and that he was the first to strike 

her with the hatchet. 

The trial court ruled that Waidla’s confession and pretrial statements to the police were admissible because it 

found that, although Waidla had invoked his right to counsel, 

he later initiated the dialogue with Detective Pietrantoni at 

Rouses Point. Id. at 70. On direct appeal, the California 

Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s factual finding that 

Waidla had started the conversation although he had been 

given Miranda warnings and requested counsel. The 

California Supreme Court relied on Edwards v. Arizona, 451 

U.S. 477 (1981), to conclude that, as a matter of law, 

Waidla’s question to Detective Pietrantoni amounted to 

initiation of interrogation that constituted waiver of 

Miranda. Id. at 71.

The California Supreme Court did not unreasonably 

apply Edwards and its progeny when it upheld the admission 

of Waidla’s pre-trial statements and confession. Edwards 

holds that a suspect who has invoked the right to counsel 

may not be “subject[ed] to further interrogation by the 

authorities until counsel has been made available[]to him, 

unless the accused himself initiates further communication, 

exchanges, or conversations with the police.” 451 U.S. at 

484–85. Initiating statements are those that “represent a 

desire on the part of an accused to open up a more 

generalized discussion relating directly or indirectly to the 

investigation.” Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045 

(1983) (plurality opinion).

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28 WAIDLA V. DAVIS

Fairminded jurists could conclude that law enforcement 

did not recommence interrogation in the sense relevant to the 

Edwards analysis. Cases finding Edwards violations 

involve police-initiated meetings that a suspect understands

are interrogation attempts. See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 487 

(recounting that police officers “told Edwards that they 

wanted to talk to him”); Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 

146, 149 (1990) (explaining that jailers told Minnick he 

would “have to talk” to an officer who arrived to interview 

him and “could not refuse”). Unlike the suspects in those 

cases, Waidla had little reason to expect that he would be 

questioned when he encountered Detective Pietrantoni. 

Waidla testified at the suppression hearing that he did not 

recognize Pietrantoni, and testified at trial that he had no idea 

why he had been transported to Rouses Point, and he

maintained that position before the district court.6

Moreover, Detective Pietrantoni was not in uniform at the 

time, the encounter did not begin in an interrogation room, 

and Waidla does not argue that other contextual cues 

suggested to him that interrogation was requested or 

planned. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that Waidla did 

not experience his encounter with Detective Pietrantoni as a 

coercive attempt at further interrogation.

6 Detective Pietrantoni’s explanation for Waidla’s behavior, credited by 

the trial court, was that Waidla may have seen Detective Pietrantoni 

when he went to an Estonian cultural center in New York looking for 

Waidla and therefore recognized Pietrantoni at Rouses Point. Waidla, 

996 P.2d at 69. A fairminded jurist could still conclude, however, that 

even if Waidla recognized Detective Pietrantoni in New York, he may 

have been unaware that the detective was present for purposes of 

interrogating him. Thus, this court and the trial court can validly rely on 

Waidla’s testimony that he lacked awareness of the reason for his 

transport. 

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WAIDLA V. DAVIS 29

Considering that Waidla did not know the purpose for 

his transport, it is insufficient for him to observe that law 

enforcement brought about his encounter with Detective 

Pietrantoni. As the California Supreme Court recognized, 

no Supreme Court case has found an Edwards violation 

solely because the police initiated the meeting at which the 

suspect made incriminating statements. Waidla, 996 P.2d at 

71. Edwards created a prophylactic rule to protect suspects 

from the coercive effect of persistent interrogation attempts. 

See Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 104–05 (2010). But 

not all police-initiated meetings following an invocation of 

rights carry coercive potential. A reasonable jurist could 

conclude that, absent a suspect’s belief that he will be 

questioned during an encounter, the coercive effect of a 

police-initiated interaction is minimal. Thus, even if law 

enforcement manufactured Waidla’s contact with 

Pietrantoni, that would not, on its own, render his statements 

and confession inadmissible.

We reach the same conclusion when considering the 

question, as Waidla urges us to, under Rhode Island v. Innis, 

446 U.S. 291 (1980). Innis holds that law enforcement 

engages in the “functional equivalent” of interrogation when 

it takes action that is “reasonably likely to elicit an 

incriminating response.” Id. at 301. The Innis analysis 

“focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, 

rather than the intent of the police.” Id. Here, fairminded 

jurists could conclude that because Waidla did not know he 

was transported to facilitate further interrogation, simply 

encountering Detective Pietrantoni was not reasonably 

likely to draw any admissions from him. There is no 

evidence to suggest that any involved officer could have 

predicted that Waidla would recognize Pietrantoni as a 

detective when he was wearing civilian clothes. Waidla’s 

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30 WAIDLA V. DAVIS

response was therefore an “unforeseeable result[]” of 

delivering him into Pietrantoni’s presence. Id.

Finally, Waidla suggests that his question to Detective 

Pietrantoni was vague and possibly hostile, rather than a

clear attempt to initiate further interrogation. But even the 

more ambiguous formulation of Waidla’s question—“What 

do you want from me?”—was no less ambiguous than the 

phrase that initiated further interrogation in Bradshaw: 

“Well, what is going to happen to me now?” 462 U.S. at 

1045 (plurality opinion). The California Supreme Court 

reasonably concluded that Waidla’s question “represent[ed] 

a desire . . . to open up a more generalized discussion,” 

particularly considering Pietrantoni’s testimony that before 

he began his questioning, Waidla interrupted him several 

times with offers to discuss the investigation. Waidla, 996 

P.2d at 69 (quoting People v. Mickey, 818 P.2d 84, 98 (Cal.

1991)).

B

Waidla also raises a claim of ineffective assistance at the 

guilt phase. He contends that counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance in four areas: (1) investigating and litigating the 

motion to suppress Waidla’s confession; (2) counseling 

Waidla to recant his confession and testify to an alibi; 

(3) failing to investigate alternative defenses; and (4) failing 

to rebut the State’s expert testimony regarding the lifespan 

of fingerprints.

To prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim,

Waidla must show that counsel’s performance “fell below 

an objective standard of reasonableness,” Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984), and that “there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 

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WAIDLA V. DAVIS 31

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different,” id. at 694. 

Because 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) applies, we defer to a state 

court’s decision unless it “was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, 

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” 

or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts 

in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding.” We may grant Waidla habeas relief only if 

“there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that 

the state court’s decision conflicts with [the Supreme] 

Court’s precedents.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 

103 (2011). Our review is doubly deferential when we apply 

the Strickland and § 2254(d) standards in tandem. See id. at 

101. Here, we do not hesitate to conclude that the California 

Supreme Court reasonably could have concluded that 

counsel met Strickland’s performance standard as to two of 

the alleged deficiencies and that the remaining alleged 

deficiencies did not prejudice Waidla.

Motion to Suppress. Waidla identifies two shortcomings

in counsel’s litigation of the motion to suppress his 

confession: (1) the failure to press for an earlier decision on 

the motion; and (2) the failure to investigate more 

thoroughly. The first argument fails because it incorrectly 

presumes that counsel had control over the timing of the 

trial-court ruling on his motion to suppress. The second fails 

because it impermissibly relies on facts knowable only in

hindsight.

Defense counsel filed a motion to suppress in advance of 

trial. At that point, it appeared possible that the State would 

not seek to introduce Waidla’s confession. The trial court 

had discretion to hear the motion at a time of its choosing,

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32 WAIDLA V. DAVIS

and it acceded to the State’s request to defer the issue. 

Waidla does not point to any feature of state law that would 

have allowed defense counsel to compel the court to hold a 

hearing sooner. Thus, counsel reasonably refrained from 

making a likely futile request for an earlier hearing. 

Based on what he knew at the time, counsel reasonably 

could have determined that further investigation of the 

motion to suppress was unnecessary because it was 

reasonable to anticipate that Detective Pietrantoni would not 

testify. The prosecutor had given counsel full access to his 

files, and the files showed that the State had preliminarily 

concluded that Waidla’s statement was likely obtained in 

violation of Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988), a 

case applying the rule set out in Edwards. Defense counsel 

was surprised by Detective Pietrantoni’s testimony at the 

suppression hearing, but that cannot be equated with 

deficient performance. Even the prosecutor was surprised 

by Detective Pietrantoni’s testimony that Waidla initiated 

the conversation at Rouses Point. Nor was there any 

mention of this in police records. Thus, counsel had little 

reason to think that interviewing the officers involved or 

conducting additional investigation would inform his 

strategy for arguing the suppression motion. That is 

especially true because Waidla maintained that he had not 

initiated the interrogation. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691

(“[W]hen the facts that support a certain potential line of 

defense are generally known to counsel because of what the 

defendant has said, the need for further investigation may be 

considerably diminished or eliminated altogether.”). 

Strickland cautions that we must not fall prey to the 

“distorting effects of hindsight” in assessing counsel’s 

performance. 466 U.S. at 689. For these reasons, we cannot 

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WAIDLA V. DAVIS 33

say that the California Supreme Court unreasonably 

concluded that counsel’s performance was not deficient.

Waidla’s Testimony. Faced with the trial court’s 

decision to admit Waidla’s extremely damaging taperecorded confession, counsel made a strategic decision to 

advise Waidla to testify. Waidla argues that counsel’s 

choice fell short of objectively reasonable standards of 

representation. But reviewing under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), 

we cannot conclude that the California Supreme Court

unreasonably applied Strickland’s performance prong.

Counsel made the reasonable tactical judgment that 

letting the confession stand uncontested would have proved

fatal to Waidla’s defense. Waidla confessed not only to his 

presence during the crime, but to waiting for Viivi to enter 

her home and being the first one to strike her in the head with 

the murder weapon. Failing to dispute the validity of this 

confession would have left the jury with little room to form 

a reasonable doubt as to Waidla’s guilt. Thus, defense 

counsel’s advice that Waidla should testify did not fall below 

an objectively reasonable standard. Indeed, presenting 

Waidla’s testimony “was the only way to potentially rebut” 

the State’s overwhelming evidence of guilt. Allen v. 

Woodford, 395 F.3d 979, 1000 (9th Cir. 2005).

Failure to Investigate Alternative Defenses. Waidla 

argues that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing 

to investigate any alternative defense strategy. Counsel 

admitted in a postconviction declaration that he prepared just 

one approach—seeking suppression of Waidla’s confession 

and casting doubt on the State’s evidence of Waidla’s 

involvement. Counsel was forced to abandon his original

strategy when the trial court denied the motion to suppress. 

Waidla suggests that one viable alternative defense theory 

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34 WAIDLA V. DAVIS

was that he was at the scene of the crime because he intended

to negotiate Viivi’s debt to him. Another posited that he was 

at the house on the day of the crime but did not participate in 

Viivi’s murder. Id. Waidla also argues that counsel should 

have investigated a mental state defense based on diminished 

capacity because the two pretrial psychological evaluations 

found only that Waidla was generally capable of forming an

intent to kill, not that he in fact formed that intent. 

Fairminded jurists could conclude that even if counsel 

had offered evidence that Waidla was at the Piirisilds’ home 

but uninvolved in the murder, there was no reasonable 

probability the jury would have reached a different verdict. 

Waidla’s argument that he could have offered testimony 

showing that his intent was to confront Viivi and obtain 

payment for his household work is contradicted by the 

evidence. The evidence strongly suggested that Viivi was 

hit in the head immediately after she entered the house, the 

coroner testified that she did not have defensive wounds, and 

there was no evidence that Waidla attempted to talk to her 

on the day of the murder about collecting the debt he claimed 

she owed him or anything else. This theory would have 

failed for the same reason Waidla’s alibi at trial failed: it was 

swamped by his confession. The claim that he was there 

when Viivi was killed but uninvolved in her murder would 

have been undermined by objective evidence of Waidla’s 

consciousness of guilt: Waidla fled after the crime, reacted 

strangely when an acquaintance told him about Viivi’s 

death, and gave a series of changing and conflicting stories 

to the police about his presence during the crime. Waidla, 

996 P.2d at 57, 69. Especially because we view this claim 

under the deferential standard demanded by AEDPA, 

Waidla does not show that fairminded jurists could not 

disagree that counsel’s performance was deficient for failing 

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WAIDLA V. DAVIS 35

to advance an alternative defense based on Waidla’s noninvolvement.

As for a mental state defense, the evaluations available 

to defense counsel at the time of trial did not support such a 

theory, so counsel was not deficient for not pursuing it. Even 

at the post-conviction stage, Waidla offered minimal 

evidence of diminished capacity or severe emotional 

disturbance in support of his petition. Only one 

postconviction psychologist’s evaluation assessed Waidla as 

suffering from dissociative disorder, and even that 

evaluation did not go so far as to suggest that Waidla’s 

dissociative disorder prevented him from forming the 

requisite intent to kill Viivi.

Moreover, the evidence showed that the crime was 

planned and deliberate, making it less likely that a mental 

state defense would have been persuasive, and Waidla was 

not prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to pursue it. Waidla 

waited until Avo was out of town to confront Viivi; he took

the hatchet from the Piirisilds’ cabin for the confrontation;

he parked some distance from Viivi’s house, presumably to 

avoid alerting her to their presence; and he stood inside the 

Piirisilds’ home with the hatchet, waiting for Viivi to return.

Id. at 56–57. These considered actions tend to show that 

Waidla acted with foresight and deliberation throughout the 

crime. Thus, fairminded jurists could conclude that a mental 

state defense would not have been persuasive. See 

Crittenden v. Ayers, 624 F.3d 943, 960–63 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(finding no prejudice when counsel presented an alibi 

defense over a mental state defense because the evidence 

overwhelmingly established deliberation and 

premeditation).

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36 WAIDLA V. DAVIS

Fingerprint Lifespan. Waidla’s counsel did not present 

expert testimony to rebut testimony from a State witness that 

fingerprints have a “lifespan” of only ten days to three

weeks. Waidla, 996 P.2d at 57. But at the post-conviction 

stage, counsel presented the declaration of a latent 

fingerprint examiner and fingerprint consultant who opined 

that there is no known lifespan for fingerprints, and “a latent 

impression can last indefinitely in a latent state.” Waidla 

argued that the State’s evidence on this point was false and 

that he could have left his fingerprint on the Piirisilds’ 

deadbolt when he was last in the Piirisilds’ home, more than

six weeks before the crime. Even assuming counsel 

performed deficiently by failing to offer robust rebuttal 

testimony to counter the State’s fingerprint expert, the 

California Supreme Court reasonably could have concluded

that Waidla was not prejudiced by counsel’s performance.

Without the fingerprint evidence, the State’s evidence 

still overwhelmingly showed that Waidla was present at the 

Piirisilds’ home during the crime. Most notably, Waidla

confessed that he had been there. Waidla, 996 P.2d at 58. A 

neighbor also identified Waidla as one of two men he had 

seen walking to and from the Piirisilds’ home around the 

time of the crime. Id. at 56–57. The State presented 

evidence of cigarette butts found inside the house that 

matched Waidla’s (but not Sakarias’s) blood type, which 

was significant because Viivi did not allow smoking inside 

the house and therefore it was reasonable to infer an invited 

guest would not have left the cigarettes. See id. at 57. 

Waidla and Sakarias pawned green jade earrings and a black 

star sapphire pendant that they had taken from the Piirisilds’ 

home. Id. at 57. Finally, the evidence showed that Waidla 

had fled to the East Coast after the crime, id. at 57–58, 

showing consciousness of guilt. See People v. Bradford, 929 

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WAIDLA V. DAVIS 37

P.2d 544, 575 (Cal. 1997) (explaining relevance of flight to 

jury’s determination of guilt).

From the outset, the defense theory that Waidla left a 

fingerprint over six weeks before the crime strained 

credulity. Witnesses testified that Viivi was a thorough and 

frequent cleaner. In line with that testimony, police 

investigators found only seven fingerprints in the entire 

home, suggesting that it had been recently cleaned. Yet 

Waidla argues that a jury would have concluded that a 

fingerprint on the deadbolt lock, a high-touch surface, 

somehow survived for over a month and that this would have 

added weight to his contention that he was not inside the 

house on the day of the murder. Considering the weakness 

of this theory and the overwhelming evidence of Waidla’s 

presence at the scene of the crime, the California Supreme 

Court did not unreasonably conclude that there was no 

reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a 

different outcome had defense counsel offered evidence to 

refute the State’s fingerprint lifespan testimony.

Cumulative Error. Finally, Waidla raises a claim of 

cumulative error, arguing that the aggregate effect of 

counsel’s performance at the guilt phase prejudiced him. In 

assessing a cumulative error claim, we do not consider the 

prejudicial effect of nonexistent errors. See United States v. 

Jeremiah, 493 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2007). Even 

assuming counsel performed deficiently by failing to 

investigate additional defenses and failing to present rebuttal 

testimony on the lifespan of fingerprints, Waidla cannot 

prevail on his claim of cumulative error. Waidla’s

fingerprint claim posits that he was robbed of an opportunity 

to convince the jury that he was not present during the crime, 

while his failure-to-investigate claim proceeds on the 

assumption that he was present. Thus, counsel’s alleged 

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38 WAIDLA V. DAVIS

missteps lack the “symmetry” that would cause them to

“amplify each other in relation to a key contested issue in the 

case,” resulting in cumulative prejudice. Ybarra v. 

McDaniel, 656 F.3d 984, 1001 (9th Cir. 2011). 

III. The State’s Appeal

The State appeals the district court’s order granting

penalty-phase relief on Waidla’s claim that his counsel 

rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and 

present mitigation evidence that competent counsel would 

have discovered. We do not reach Strickland’s performance 

prong. We conclude, under AEDPA, that the California 

Supreme Court’s conclusion that Waidla was not prejudiced 

by his counsel’s alleged errors was not unreasonable, and we 

reverse. 

A

When assessing prejudice, “we reweigh the evidence in 

aggravation against the totality of available mitigating 

evidence.” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534; see Mickey v. Ayers, 

606 F.3d 1223, 1245 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that the 

Supreme Court has “reaffirmed that the facts of the crime 

play an important role in the prejudice inquiry”). Prejudice 

is satisfied if, considering all the evidence adduced at trial 

and in the state habeas proceedings, “there is a reasonable 

probability that at least one juror would have struck a 

different balance.” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 537. Considering 

the arguments or theories that “could have supported” the 

California Supreme Court’s summary denial of this claim, 

fairminded jurists could conclude that Waidla was not 

prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to present mitigating 

evidence. Richter, 562 U.S. at 102.

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WAIDLA V. DAVIS 39

Background and Character Evidence. As an initial 

matter, it is unclear the extent to which the jury would have

viewed the unpresented evidence of Waidla’s psychosocial 

history and character as mitigating. The evidence of 

Waidla’s background in Estonia suggests that he had a 

difficult childhood and that all three important women in his 

life died. See Andrews, 944 F.3d at 1117 (“[A] background 

of severe abuse, neglect, and disadvantage . . . is important 

to a sentencer’s accurate determination of the defendant’s 

moral culpability.”). On the other hand, he was taken in 

and raised by a caring great-uncle and did well at school, 

even gaining admission to a special sports school where he 

excelled in marksmanship. That Waidla was able to 

“achieve strong psychological and emotional bonding with 

his Great-Uncle Gunnar and other members of the family”

suggests that he was capable of developing normal 

relationships with those who cared for him. See Bell v. Cone, 

535 U.S. 685, 701–02 (2002) (observing that evidence of an 

unremarkable youth might “cut the other way”). In this light, 

reasonable jurors could have decided that Waidla’s 

premeditated murder of the woman who took him in and 

treated him like family after he escaped from the Soviet 

Army and was granted asylum in this country made him 

more morally culpable, not less. Further, emphasizing 

Waidla’s close relationships would have precluded one of 

the primary themes in counsel’s argument: that Waidla was 

“essentially alone in this world, and maybe because of that 

is to be a bit pitied rather than despised.”7

7 The more contemporaneous declarations of Estonian-Americans who 

met Waidla after he arrived in the United States are also not necessarily 

mitigating. One declarant stated that it appeared Waidla and Sakarias 

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40 WAIDLA V. DAVIS

Presenting evidence of Waidla’s mental health would 

have been extraordinarily risky and likely 

counterproductive. Had Drs. Young and Ruumet testified at 

trial, the prosecutor could have cross-examined them about 

the very different versions of the crime that Waidla had 

relayed to them. See Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15, 24–

25 (2009) (per curiam) (considering potential rebuttal 

evidence that could counter potential mitigating evidence). 

In his interviews with Drs. Young and Ruumet, Waidla 

admitted only that he broke into the Piirisilds’ house to 

collect a debt he believed he was owed, and he expressed 

remorse for his crimes. He also minimized his role and 

blamed Sakarias for instigating the crimes. When he talked 

with Dr. Ruumet, Waidla did not mention that he used the

hatchet. When he talked to Dr. Young, Waidla said that he

grabbed a hatchet he found outside the house and when Viivi 

came home, saw them and went “ballistic,” this caused him 

to strike her once with it. Waidla told Dr. Young that after 

he and Viivi both fell, she grabbed the hatchet and Sakarias 

started stabbing her. All of these versions differed 

dramatically from Waidla’s confession that he struck the 

first blow, and they certainly conflicted with his trial 

testimony that he was not in town at the time Viivi was 

murdered. Presenting the testimony of Drs. Young or 

Ruumet at trial would have opened the door to blistering

cross-examination regarding the conflicting ways Waidla 

lacked the maturity to handle being in the United States and that they 

were incapable of grasping available opportunities. Another declared 

that when Waidla and Sakarias arrived in the United States, they seemed 

to have some fantasy about what it was like to live in “the decadent 

West.” These declarations could further support the prosecutor’s 

description of Waidla as someone who had no desire to work or better 

himself and who believed he deserved to be cared for by others. 

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WAIDLA V. DAVIS 41

had described the crime and his statements deflecting blame 

to Sakarias. It also risked losing all credibility with the jury. 

See ABA Guidelines, 11.7.1(B) (1989) (“If inconsistencies 

between guilt/innocence and penalty phase defenses arise, 

counsel should seek to minimize them by procedural or 

substantive tactics.”).8 Reasonable jurists could decide that 

competent counsel would have chosen not to present the 

defense’s mental health expert opinions.

Given this backdrop, even if the additional evidence of 

Waidla’s background and character did have a net mitigating 

value, it is unclear how much weight jurors would have 

given to Waidla’s past life experiences. By the time the case 

got to the penalty phase, the jury had heard his recorded 

confession, see Waidla, 996 P.2d at 53, and Waidla had 

taken the witness stand and testified to the first version of 

events he relayed to Detective Pietrantoni, in which he 

claimed to be on the East Coast at the time of the murder, id. 

at 58. After extensive deliberation, the jury found Waidla 

guilty of first-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. In 

doing so, the jurors necessarily found that he had lied to them 

under oath. See Bemore v. Chappell, 788 F.3d 1151, 1172 

(9th Cir. 2015) (“[A] good character defense was unlikely to 

8 Introducing Dr. Ruumet’s testimony would have provided the 

prosecution with additional fertile ground for cross-examination because 

Dr. Ruumet was born in Estonia, and her declaration included the 

statement that in Estonian culture, it was typical for individuals to engage 

in “frontier justice.” For example, if someone refused to pay a debt even 

when confronted, “there would follow stages of physical retribution 

ranging from damage to the person’s property to, in extreme cases, 

physical injury which escalated until the debt was paid.” A jury could 

interpret this explanation of Estonian culture to support the prosecutor’s 

argument that because Waidla felt Viivi owed him more than she had 

given him, Waidla resorted to “frontier justice,” intending to beat her 

until she paid or died.

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42 WAIDLA V. DAVIS

be persuasive to a jury that had just decided that Bemore had 

carried out a grizzly murder . . . and had lied on the stand to 

boot.”). 

Experience in the Soviet Army. Waidla argues that had 

the jury heard more evidence about the difficulties and 

hardships he encountered while serving in the Soviet 

military, it might have made a difference to the outcome of 

the penalty phase. This argument fails because the jury had 

Waidla’s first-hand account of the inhumane conditions, 

bullying, and constant fear of death he experienced as a 

conscript through his article, “Escaping the Fog.” The jury 

also heard guilt-phase testimony that Estonia was under

Soviet occupation and that Waidla received political asylum 

in the United States after escaping from the Soviet Army. 

Avo testified that draftees from the Baltic states were not 

treated well in the Soviet Army. Although additional 

corroborating evidence might have been helpful to this 

claim, fairminded jurists could disagree about whether the 

failure to offer it was prejudicial because additional evidence

could be viewed as cumulative or as carrying insufficient

mitigating weight, even when considered alongside 

Waidla’s other evidence. See Cox v. Ayers, 613 F.3d 883, 

899–900 (9th Cir. 2010) (cumulative penalty evidence

“adding to what was already there would have made little 

difference” (quoting Belmontes, 558 U.S. at 22)).

Positive adjustment to incarceration. Waidla argued 

that his counsel was ineffective for failing to offer 

admissible evidence showing that he had a good disciplinary 

record in pre-trial detention and that he had adjusted well to 

prison life. At the post-conviction stage, Waidla submitted 

a California Department of Corrections document dated 

March 15, 1991. It was initialed by two correctional officers 

at San Quentin prison and it memorialized Waidla’s security 

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WAIDLA V. DAVIS 43

classification when he was transferred to that facility. The 

document reflects that Waidla informed the correctional 

officers that he had no problems programming in the county 

jail while he awaited trial, knew of no enemies at San 

Quentin, and did not have a gang affiliation. The document 

also reflects that officers at San Quentin verified this

information by contacting the county jail. An unidentified 

source there stated that Waidla was not a disciplinary 

problem and programmed well with other inmates. 

Waidla raised his penalty-phase argument that defense 

counsel was ineffective for failing to offer evidence of his 

adjustment to incarceration in his first and second postconviction petitions. The California Supreme Court denied 

Waidla’s first petition on the merits and denied the second 

petition, which addressed penalty-phase claims, as untimely, 

repetitive, successive and on the merits. In our view, 

fairminded jurists could reasonably conclude that the 

omission did not prejudice Waidla. 

Post-Pinholster, the district court recognized that its 

threshold ruling on Waidla’s § 2254(d) petition could not 

consider evidence offered for the first time in federal court. 

In response to the court’s request for filings on the impact of 

Pinholster, the State considered the arguments or theories 

that could have supported the state court’s summary denial 

of this claim, Richter, 562 U.S. at 103, and argued that the 

California Supreme Court would have rejected the 

Department of Corrections document because it “consisted 

entirely of hearsay.” The State’s brief on appeal repeated the 

argument that the document could have been rejected by the 

California Supreme Court as hearsay. We agree that the 

California Supreme Court reasonably could have deemed 

this document inadmissible.

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44 WAIDLA V. DAVIS

The remaining evidence offered in support of this clam 

was Waidla’s own declaration describing his time as a 

pretrial detainee from June through August 1990. It 

described recognition Waidla received for his alleged good 

behavior in jail. Fairminded jurists could decide that the jury 

might have rejected his declaration because, in rejecting his 

alibi and finding him guilty, it had already determined that 

he was not a credible witness. Alternatively, the state court 

could have determined that this period of Waidla’s pre-trial 

detention was too short to carry significant weight, even 

when considered with his other evidence, given the 

exceptionally violent nature of the murder.

That Waidla was not prejudiced by the failure to present 

this mitigating evidence becomes especially clear when

comparing the mitigating evidence with the substantial 

aggravating evidence. On direct appeal, the California 

Supreme Court summarized the circumstances of the 

murder, “On Viivi’s return, as she passed through the front 

door toward the living room, before she could even attempt 

to resist, Waidla and Sakarias set upon her, dispatched her 

toward death, and then dragged her to a bedroom where her 

body would subsequently be found.” The court described 

in gruesome detail the multiple wounds Viivi suffered, the 

means and force used to inflict them, and concluded: “They 

caused her death through the combination of the throttling, 

bludgeoning, chopping and stabbing, and may have done so 

through any one of such means, because each was potentially 

fatal in and of itself.” Id. at 57. When the California 

Supreme court resolved the procedural misconduct claims 

that Waidla and Sakarias presented in post-conviction 

petitions, the court emphasized the evidence that Viivi died 

in the living room entryway, that Waidla admitted to striking 

the first devastating blow, and the absence of evidence that 

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WAIDLA V. DAVIS 45

Waidla and Sakarias exchanged weapons. In Re Sakarias, 

106 P.3d at 948. Though we do not think it necessary to 

repeat verbatim the state court’s unchallenged findings 

regarding the injuries that resulted in Viivi’s death or the 

force used to inflict them, we are mindful that the jury heard 

and saw the State’s evidence in grim detail. The horrific 

nature of this crime largely drives our prejudice analysis. 

Even viewed cumulatively, the jury was left with no 

evidence that could explain the shocking and unexpected 

nature of the attack against Viivi. There was no indication 

of alcohol or drug use, and no evidence of any mental health 

diagnosis that sometimes explains a sudden outburst and act 

of violence. Given the strong evidence that Waidla was 

angry with Viivi, planned the attack, and waited with a 

hatchet for Viivi to enter her home, it is hard to see how a 

jury could view Viivi’s murder as a “momentary assaultive 

outburst.” 

Our task is limited to determining whether fairminded

jurists could disagree that Waidla was prejudiced by his 

counsel’s failure to present any of this mitigating evidence. 

See Richter, 562 U.S. at 102 (recognizing that “even a strong 

case for relief does not mean the state court’s contrary 

conclusion was unreasonable”); see also Pinholster, 563 

U.S. at 202 (observing that the unpresented mitigating 

evidence was “not so significant” that “it was necessarily 

unreasonable for the California Supreme Court to conclude 

that Pinholster had failed to show a ‘substantial’ likelihood 

of a different sentence” (citation omitted)). Because the 

California Supreme Court’s denial of this claim was not 

objectively unreasonable, we reverse the district court’s 

order granting relief on this claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

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46 WAIDLA V. DAVIS

B

As an alternative ground for affirming the district court’s 

order granting penalty-phase relief, Waidla argues that the 

prosecutor violated his Eighth Amendment right to 

heightened reliability in capital sentencing by presenting

inconsistent factual theories at the seriatim trials of Waidla 

and Sakarias.

Under the Eighth Amendment, a capital sentencing 

determination requires a greater degree of scrutiny than other 

punishments. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 329 

(1985); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 884‒85 (1983) 

(“[B]ecause there is a qualitative difference between death 

and any other permissible form of punishment, ‘there is a 

corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the 

determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a 

specific case.’”) (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 

U.S. 280, 305 (1976)). To prevail on his Eighth Amendment 

claim, Waidla must show that the Supreme Court has 

previously decided the constitutional question at issue and 

established the “precise contours” of the rule he invokes. 

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73 (2003); see Knowles v. 

Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 122 (2009) (“[I]t is not an 

unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law 

for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that 

has not been squarely established by this Court.” (internal 

quotation marks omitted)). When the Supreme Court has not 

provided a clear answer to the question presented, “it cannot 

be said that the state court ‘unreasonabl[y] appli[ed] clearly 

established Federal law.’” Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 

120, 126 (2008) (per curiam) (quoting Carey v. Musladin, 

549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006)).

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WAIDLA V. DAVIS 47

In support of his Eighth Amendment claim, Waidla cites 

to Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), and 

Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980). Neither case clearly 

established that it is unconstitutional for a prosecutor to 

present inconsistent theories under the Eighth Amendment. 

Woodson held that a mandatory death penalty scheme 

violated the Eighth Amendment. 428 U.S. at 304. Beck held 

that a death sentence could not be imposed when the 

evidence could support a lesser-included offense and the jury 

was not instructed on the lesser-included offense. 447 U.S. 

at 638. Waidla has not shown that the California Supreme 

Court’s denial of his Eighth Amendment claim was contrary 

to or an unreasonable application of clearly established 

Supreme Court precedent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

Waidla also argued, in the district court and on appeal,

that prosecutorial misconduct denied him his right to due 

process and a fair trial in violation of the Fourteenth 

Amendment.9 The district court correctly observed that 

there is no clearly established Supreme Court precedent 

prohibiting a prosecutor from presenting inconsistent 

theories to convict codefendants in separate trials. See

Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 190 (2005) (Thomas, J., 

concurring) (noting that the Supreme Court “has never 

hinted, much less held, that the Due Process Clause prevents 

a State from prosecuting defendants based on inconsistent 

theories”). 

The California Supreme Court concluded that any false 

attribution to Waidla of hatchet blows inflicted by Sakarias

was harmless. In re Sakarias, 106 P.3d at 950–51. And the 

district court concluded that Waidla’s prosecutorial 

9 The district court considered Waidla’s prosecutorial misconduct claim 

as a guilt-phase claim. 

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48 WAIDLA V. DAVIS

misconduct argument did not satisfy § 2254(d)(2) because 

the California Supreme Court’s factual findings that Waidla: 

(1) inflicted the first hatchet blow when Viivi entered her 

home; (2) likely delivered the other chopping blows in the 

entryway; and (3) that Viivi died in the living room, were 

supported by the evidence presented in state court and were 

therefore reasonable. Whether we consider the alleged 

prosecutorial misconduct under the Eighth Amendment or 

the Fourteenth Amendment, we agree that the claim fails 

because the California Supreme Court’s factual findings 

were not unreasonable.

Waidla argues that the California Supreme Court 

unreasonably determined that he was the actual killer and 

struck the “fatal blow.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). He 

argues that the court ignored the following facts to reach this 

conclusion: (1) Waidla’s confession was that “he only struck 

one blow, with the blunt part of the hatchet”; (2) Sakarias 

confessed to moving Viivi to the bedroom and “kill[ing] her 

with the sharp edge of the hatchet”; (3) the blood spatters in 

the bedroom showed that Viivi was alive when she was 

moved to the bedroom and Sakarias was the only attacker in 

the bedroom; and (4) Sakarias stabbed Viivi four times in the 

chest and two of those stabbings were potentially fatal. 

To grant habeas relief on a claim of trial error, we assess 

the error for “actual prejudice” under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 

which requires the error to have “had [a] substantial and 

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s 

verdict.” 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. 

United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)).

Waidla cannot meet this burden. To begin, the first two 

of Waidla’s contentions misinterpret the record: the 

California Supreme Court recounted that Waidla admitted 

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WAIDLA V. DAVIS 49

striking Viivi once but denied “any memory of how the rest 

of the attack proceeded,” and the court observed that, after 

the initial attack, the evidence showed that “at Waidla’s 

direction, [Sakarias] went to the bedroom and chopped 

Viivi’s head twice with the hatchet.” In re Sakarias, 106 

P.3d at 936; People v. Sakarias, 995 P.2d 152, 161‒62 (Cal. 

2000) (summarizing Sakarias’s confession). 

The court expressly considered Waidla’s latter two 

contentions, acknowledged that both men participated in the 

“fatal attack” against Viivi, and that Dr. Ribe found the cause 

of death to be from a combination of wounds. In re Sakarias, 

106 P.3d at 934–36. In reviewing the evidence from both 

trials as well as the evidentiary hearing held at the 

postconviction stage, the California Supreme Court 

reasonably concluded that “the great weight of the evidence 

available—the statements of both petitioners, the physical 

crime scene evidence, and the medical examiner’s expert 

testimony—tended to show that Waidla wielded the hatchet 

in the initial attack, that the first chopping wound was 

inflicted before Viivi’s death, and that Viivi died in her 

living room from the initial attack before being dragged to 

the back bedroom.” Id. at 950. Given the impact of the 

evidence showing that Waidla waited for Viivi to enter 

through the front door, the large pool of blood in the living 

room, Waidla’s confession that he was the first to strike her 

in the head with the blunt end of the hatchet, and the absence 

of evidence that Waidla and Sakarias exchanged weapons in 

the initial attack, see id. at 948, we cannot say that the 

California Supreme Court unreasonably concluded that the 

prosecutor’s false attribution of all three chopping wounds 

to Waidla was not prejudicial. The prosecutor’s attribution 

to Waidla of all three hatchet blows inflicted in the entryway 

does not leave us with “grave doubt” about whether any false 

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50 WAIDLA V. DAVIS

attribution had a “‘substantial and injurious effect or 

influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Davis v. Ayala, 

576 U.S. 257, 268 (2015) (quoting O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 

U.S. 432, 436 (1995)). 

Whether considered as a penalty-phase Eighth 

Amendment claim or a guilt-phase due process claim, 

Waidla has not shown he is entitled to relief based on 

prosecutorial misconduct. 

AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part.

CHRISTEN, Circuit Judge, concurring: 

Though I conclude that the California Supreme Court’s 

prejudice analysis was not unreasonable, I also conclude that 

some aspects of Waidla’s counsel’s performance fell below 

an objectively reasonable standard. I write separately to 

avoid minimizing the requirement that counsel investigate a 

capital defendant’s available options before deciding not to 

pursue them. In doing so, I acknowledge that the burden of 

defending a capital case is extraordinary. 

The applicable ABA practice guidelines stated that 

counsel’s investigation relating to the penalty phase of a 

capital trial “should begin immediately upon counsel’s entry 

into the case and should be pursued expeditiously.” ABA 

Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel 

in Death Penalty Cases 11.4.1(A) (1989) (hereinafter ABA 

Guidelines). Strickland requires that we view counsel’s 

performance with latitude that accounts for “the wide range 

of reasonable professional assistance,” see Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689–90 (1984) (noting that 

strategic decisions are “virtually unchallengeable” if made 

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WAIDLA V. DAVIS 51

“after thorough investigation of law and facts[.]”). 

Hindsight makes it easy for others to second-guess difficult 

decisions that lawyers must make under circumstances that 

are far from ideal. And for the reasons explained in the 

majority opinion, my view is that Waidla did not suffer 

prejudice as a result of his lawyer’s performance. But the 

need to prepare sentencing-phase mitigation evidence was 

apparent from the outset of this case because the defense 

knew that Waidla had confessed to committing an 

exceptionally gruesome murder of a woman who had taken 

him in as a refugee and supported him for over a year. 

The evidence and circumstances in many murder cases 

permit counsel to argue that a sudden, violent attack was the 

product of mental illness, drugs, or alcohol. The facts in this 

case were terribly difficult to defend because they included 

strong evidence that the crime was both premediated1 and 

brutal.2 Counsel could not control when the trial court ruled 

on the motion to suppress Waidla’s pretrial statements, but 

counsel knew the risk that the pretrial statements and 

Waidla’s confession could be admitted, and the State’s case 

against Waidla was strong even without the pretrial 

statements. As such, it was critical that the defense muster 

reasonably available mitigation evidence to be prepared to 

1 In addition to the evidence that Waidla waited for Viivi inside her home 

on the day of the murder, the State offered a letter Waidla wrote to 

Sakarias in May of 1988 in which he stated that they had to “get rid of 

those dammed Estonians for once finally.” 

2 The California Supreme Court described in detail how Waidla and 

Sakarias “throttled [Viivi],” “bludgeoned her . . . delivering some blows 

with such force as to crush her skull,” “chopped her three times around 

the top of her head[,]” and “stabbed her four times[.]” People v. Waidla, 

996 P.2d 46, 57 (Cal. 2000) (emphasis in original).

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52 WAIDLA V. DAVIS

offer the most robust possible response to the prosecution’s 

strong aggravating evidence. ABA Guidelines 11.4.1(C). 

The district court did not fault the decision to forgo a 

mental state defense, and neither do I. The pretrial 

psychological assessments did not suggest that Waida’s 

actions could be explained in whole or in part by a mental 

health diagnosis. More favorable assessments were offered 

at the postconviction stage, but as the district court 

recognized, they were offered by witnesses who were far 

from well-versed about the circumstances in which this 

murder occurred. 

That said, I agree with our dissenting colleague that more 

should have been done to explore available mitigation 

evidence regarding Waidla’s background and upbringing in 

Estonia. Waidla’s concern for the safety of Estonian 

witnesses appears to have been both legitimate and 

genuinely held, but the record establishes that counsel “did 

not definitively resolve the issue” with Waidla, and 

counsel’s decisions can only be deemed “strategic” if they 

were made after an adequate investigation. Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 690–91; Correll v. Ryan, 539 F.3d 938, 948 (9th Cir. 

2008).

The evidence that could have been uncovered does not 

show the type of extreme child abuse or neglect that has been 

found to be sufficiently mitigating in other cases, see 

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395 (2000); and it was not 

entirely one-sided. But I see no reasonable dispute that it 

would have humanized Waidla to explain his difficult 

upbringing in greater detail. More to the point, Strickland’s 

deficient performance prong required counsel to explore this 

possibility and explain the consequences of not doing so. 

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WAIDLA V. DAVIS 53

The State relies on Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987) 

and Strickland, but those cases are easily distinguished. In 

Burger, counsel interviewed all potential witnesses who had 

been called to his attention and reasonably decided against a 

mitigation strategy that required testimony from the 

defendant. Burger, 483 U.S. at 794–95. That decision was 

strategic because a psychologist had warned that the 

defendant might brag about the crime on the witness stand. 

Id. at 791–92. In Strickland, the defendant’s character and 

psychological evidence would have held little weight in light 

of the overwhelming aggravating circumstances, and the 

court found that counsel acted strategically to ensure 

evidence of his client’s character, criminal history, and 

psychology would not be admitted. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

699. 

Here, counsel did not interview any potential witnesses 

from Estonia or conduct an investigation to discover what 

evidence might be available. Unlike counsel in Burger,

there was no reasonable basis for counsel to conclude that 

additional evidence concerning Waidla’s personal history 

would be counterproductive. Waidla had no criminal history 

and the record does not show that there were other episodes 

in his past that counsel purposefully side-stepped. To the 

contrary, the evidence shows that despite initial hardships in 

his childhood, Waidla was well-liked by his peers in Estonia, 

performed reasonably well in school and in sports, and did 

not exhibit anti-social or violent behavior. 

Separately, the defense was aware that there had been no 

disciplinary proceedings against Waidla while he awaited 

trial, but counsel did not pursue Waidla’s good behavior as 

potential mitigation evidence. In addition to having an 

infraction-free record during that initial period of 

incarceration, Waidla’s declaration stated that he obtained a 

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54 WAIDLA V. DAVIS

job working in the prison’s kitchen and that he was given a 

different-colored uniform and a pass that allowed him to 

leave his cell and go to work. He was also one of few 

inmates allowed to read in the library. A memo to the district 

attorney corroborates Waidla’s declaration, noting that 

unlike Sakarias, Waidla did not face disciplinary action 

during the first several months of his confinement. The 

record does not suggest a strategic reason for failing to 

investigate and present this admissible, mitigating evidence 

of Waidla’s adjustment to incarceration. 

Finally, I agree that counsel’s failure to present evidence 

of Waidla’s mistreatment in the Soviet Army was 

unreasonable. The State admitted Waidla’s article, but 

defense counsel failed to present evidence explaining the 

hostility between Estonian and Russian soldiers and the 

specific conditions that Waidla experienced. Avo provided 

some testimony regarding the mistreatment that Estonian 

soldiers faced, but he did not testify about the practices in 

effect during Waidla’s service. According to Dr. Ruumet, it 

was widely recognized that Estonian conscripts were abused, 

and units with more Russian soldiers, like the one Waidla 

ended up in, were especially dangerous. Evidence offered at 

the state post-conviction stage included Dr. Ruumet’s 

explanation that Waidla feared he would die in the military, 

and that in one letter he sent to his family, “he pleaded with 

them to try to save him.” Without this context, the jury could 

have failed to appreciate the extent of the hardships 

described in Waidla’s article. I am unpersuaded by the 

State’s argument that elaborating upon the article would 

have been entirely cumulative. 

Mustering a successful counterweight to Waidla’s 

violent crime would have been an uphill battle under any 

circumstances, but in my view, despite the deference we 

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WAIDLA V. DAVIS 55

afford to counsel’s strategic choices, the failure to 

investigate these avenues and present this mitigation 

evidence fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 

WARDLAW, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part: 

Consistent with our opinion issued May 23, 2023, I 

concur in that portion of the judgment denying habeas relief 

from Waidla’s conviction, although I do not join the 

majority’s opinion. However, I continue to believe that 

counsel performed deficiently during the penalty phase and 

that this deficient performance prejudiced Waidla. 

Therefore, I would affirm the district court’s grant of habeas 

relief to Waidla on his penalty phase ineffective assistance 

of counsel claim. 

To be clear, Waidla committed a heinous and gruesome 

crime that deserves punishment. Under our system, 

however, “[c]apital defendants have a constitutional right to 

the effective assistance of counsel at the guilt and penalty 

phases of trial.” Avena v. Chappell, 932 F.3d 1237, 1247 

(9th Cir. 2019); see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 

(1984). This need for effective counsel is especially acute 

where, as here, the deficient performance is the difference 

between life and death. Cf. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 

U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (“Death, in its finality, differs more 

from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs 

from one of only a year or two. Because of that qualitative 

difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for 

reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate 

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56 WAIDLA V. DAVIS

punishment in a specific case.”). Therefore, with respect, I 

dissent from the majority’s opinion.1 

A.

Legal Standard

Waidla’s sole claim of error at the penalty phase is that 

his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to 

investigate and present mitigation evidence that competent 

counsel would have discovered. Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. 668 (1984), sets out the standard for ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims. Under Strickland, Waidla must 

first show that his counsel’s performance “fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness” under prevailing 

professional norms. Id. at 688. Strickland creates a strong 

presumption that counsel’s performance “falls within the 

wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 

689. Counsel’s strategic decisions, if “made after thorough 

investigation of law and facts,” are “virtually 

unchallengeable.” Id. at 690. Our court assesses a particular 

decision not to investigate or to limit the scope of 

investigation for reasonableness. Id. at 691.

If Waidla can show that counsel’s performance was 

deficient, he must then establish prejudice. Id. at 694. To 

assess prejudice at the penalty phase, we reweigh all of the 

evidence in aggravation and mitigation and ask whether, had 

counsel provided competent representation, “there is a 

reasonable probability that at least one juror would have 

struck a different balance.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 

537 (2003); see also id. at 534, 536. 

1 The following discussion is drawn largely from the original per curiam 

opinion. 

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When 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) applies, we defer to a state 

court’s decision unless it “was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, 

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” 

or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts 

in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding.” When reviewing a state court decision for 

which there is no reasoned opinion, as here, we must 

consider any arguments that could have supported the state 

court’s decision. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 

102 (2011). We may grant Waidla habeas relief only if 

“there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that 

the state court’s decision conflicts with [the Supreme] 

Court’s precedents.” Id.

I would hold that the California Supreme Court 

unreasonably applied Strickland’s standard in evaluating 

Waidla’s claim of ineffective assistance at the penalty phase. 

Had the three categories of evidence that counsel should 

have discovered been presented to the jury, there is a 

reasonable probability that at least one juror would have

voted against the death penalty. 

B.

The Admitted Inadequacy of Counsel’s Investigation

Counsel admitted that he conducted no investigation into 

mitigation evidence beyond any incidental investigation he 

made of evidence relevant to the guilt phase. Competent 

counsel would have sought out and introduced evidence 

concerning Waidla’s background and character, the hardship 

Estonians faced in the Soviet Army, and Waidla’s good 

behavior while in custody awaiting trial. Counsel’s 

disregard for all three possible mitigation strategies makes 

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58 WAIDLA V. DAVIS

clear that his incompetence is “beyond any possibility for 

fairminded disagreement.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103.

Background and Character Evidence. The record shows 

that counsel “abandoned [his] investigation of petitioner’s 

background after having acquired only rudimentary 

knowledge of his history from a narrow set of sources,” 

thereby violating basic professional standards. Wiggins, 539 

U.S. at 524; see also Apelt v. Ryan, 878 F.3d 800, 831 (9th 

Cir. 2017) (“There can be no doubt that counsel was required 

to review a defendant’s background in preparation for 

sentencing.”). The duty to investigate a defendant’s social 

history was as foundational at the time of trial as it is now. 

Practice guidelines in effect in 1990, which guide our 

analysis of what qualifies as reasonable professional 

conduct, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, stated that “[c]ounsel 

in a capital case is obligated to conduct a thorough 

investigation of the defendant’s life history and 

background.” ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and 

Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases 8.1, 

commentary (1989). Abdicating this duty, counsel 

interviewed Waidla alone and did not procure any 

psychological or psychosocial evaluations.

Waidla’s resistance to having counsel perform a social 

history investigation did not eliminate counsel’s duty to 

investigate his background. To be sure, “[c]ounsel’s actions 

are usually based, quite properly, on informed strategic 

choices made by the defendant.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

691. But counsel “never made a serious attempt to educate 

[Waidla] about the consequences of his decision.” Silva v. 

Woodford, 279 F.3d 825, 841 (9th Cir. 2002). Although 

Waidla’s concern for the safety of Estonian witnesses was 

legitimate and genuinely held, that concern was only part of 

the calculus. Counsel himself admitted that, far from fully 

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WAIDLA V. DAVIS 59

advising Waidla on the benefits and drawbacks of an 

investigation, he “did not definitively resolve the issue” with 

Waidla. In fact, Waidla realized that one basis for his 

reluctance to have counsel contact witnesses in Estonia was 

unreasonable, showing that he continued to actively consider 

the issue. Failing to advise Waidla of the importance of 

mitigation evidence was especially detrimental because, as 

Waidla stated in his declaration, he “did not have an 

understanding of the American legal system [and] did not 

know what would constitute a presentation of ‘mitigation’ 

evidence.”

The State’s comparisons to the investigations held 

competent in Strickland and Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 

(1987), are unconvincing. Counsel in both cases made an 

informed strategic decision to limit their social history 

investigations because they knew that presenting social 

history evidence would prove harmful. In Strickland, 

counsel sought to avoid opening the door to evidence of the 

defendant’s criminal history, bad character, and intact 

psyche. See 466 U.S. at 672–74, 699. In Burger, counsel 

sought to keep the defendant’s criminal history from the 

jury, as well as testimony from family and acquaintances 

about his drug use and violent tendencies. 483 U.S. at 791–

95. Counsel also reasonably decided against a mitigation 

strategy that required testimony from the defendant, who 

showed a lack of remorse and, according to a psychologist, 

might have bragged about the crime on the witness stand. Id. 

No such concerns are evident in this case. Waidla had 

no criminal history and his social history would not have 

revealed any significant prior bad acts. Further, no 

psychological expert identified him as a liability on the stand 

and he expressed deep remorse for Viivi’s murder. Thus, 

Strickland and Burger are not instructive on this point.

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Finally, although counsel would have faced logistical 

hurdles to investigating abroad, those challenges did not 

eliminate counsel’s duty to investigate. In Apelt, a case 

governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), we considered whether 

counsel had performed deficiently in representing a capital 

defendant who had lived in Germany until six months before 

the crime. 878 F.3d at 805, 830–31. Since counsel was 

aware that a social history investigation could have revealed 

useful mitigation evidence, we held that he had rendered 

ineffective assistance because his co-counsel made only one 

trip to Germany and was unable to communicate with the 

defendant’s German-speaking family while there. Id. As in 

Apelt, Waidla’s counsel was on notice of the need for a social 

history investigation. He knew that Waidla’s upbringing 

was not traditional in that Waidla had not been raised by his 

parents. That counsel broached the question of investigating 

in Estonia with Waidla multiple times shows that he was 

aware of the significance of a social history investigation. 

Yet, as in Apelt, counsel fell short of professional standards 

by abandoning his efforts to investigate through travel to 

Estonia or other means. Id. 

Moreover, the record shows that investigating in Estonia, 

while more challenging than a domestic investigation, would 

not have been the “daunting task” the State claims. In 1989 

and 1990, communication between the United States and 

Estonia was possible via fax, phone, and mail. Dr. Ruumet 

reports that by June 1990, “the Soviet regime had loosened 

enough to allow relatively unfettered travel in and out of the 

country.” And although a personal visit by counsel to 

Estonia may have been possible, counsel need not have 

personally traveled to Estonia, as Professor Pork would have 

interviewed Waidla’s family and acquaintances on counsel’s 

behalf. Because California provides indigent defendants 

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with funding for efforts “reasonably necessary for the 

preparation or presentation of the defense” upon an 

application by counsel, Cal. Penal Code § 987.9(a), the costs 

of international investigation were not insurmountable. 

Notably, counsel in co-defendant Sakarias’s trial, which 

occurred within a year of Waidla’s trial, was able to obtain 

social history interviews from Sakarias’s family and friends 

in Estonia. In re Sakarias, 106 P.3d at 936, 949. Thus, 

counsel’s violation of minimum professional standards was 

not excused by logistical barriers.

Mistreatment in the Soviet Army. Counsel’s duty to 

investigate a defendant’s social history no doubt includes an 

obligation to seek out evidence of childhood hardship 

because “[e]vidence of abuse inflicted as a child is especially 

mitigating.” Andrews v. Davis, 944 F.3d 1092, 1117 (9th 

Cir. 2019) (en banc). 

Waidla was still a teenager when he was conscripted into 

the Soviet Army. People v. Waidla, 996 P.2d 46, 54 (Cal. 

2000). Counsel was aware of this chapter in Waidla’s life 

because Waidla’s article, Escaping Through the Fog,

detailed the experience to an extent. Yet counsel did not 

argue that Waidla’s hardships were relevant to the jury’s 

decision, nor did he attempt to obtain additional contextual 

evidence about the indignities visited on Estonian conscripts 

in the Soviet Army. 

Had counsel investigated, he would have found that in 

addition to the crowded lodging, repeated exposure to bitter 

cold, and inadequate medical care described in Waidla’s 

article, Estonian soldiers often encountered serious physical 

abuse and even death at the hands of Russian soldiers and 

officers. Counsel would have learned of the psychological 

impact that looming danger had on Waidla, whose letter to 

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62 WAIDLA V. DAVIS

his family begging for help spoke to his despondency and 

fear. Armed with this evidence, competent counsel would 

have argued that Waidla’s time in an abusive institutional 

setting detracted from his culpability. 

The State makes much of the fact that the jury had access 

to some evidence about Waidla’s time in the Soviet Army. 

The article, Escaping Through the Fog, was introduced 

during the guilt phase and in his testimony, and Avo 

indicated he agreed with the statement that “traditionally 

draftees from the Baltic States were not treated very well in 

the Soviet Army.” According to the State, the jury’s 

awareness of this evidence eliminated any need for counsel 

to investigate cumulative evidence concerning the abuse

endured by Estonian soldiers. I disagree. The State 

improperly emphasizes the mere existence of evidence in the 

record while disregarding counsel’s obligation to explain 

how that evidence should be factored into a decision of 

whether to impose the death penalty. The State also 

overstates the cumulative nature of the postconviction 

evidence.

First, counsel’s obligations do not end at ensuring that 

mitigation evidence is accessible to the jury. That is all that 

counsel did with respect to Waidla’s time in the Soviet 

Army. Avo’s testimony did not make an appearance in 

counsel’s guilt or penalty phase arguments. Counsel also 

never argued at the penalty phase that Waidla’s article 

evidenced hardship that ought to inform the jury’s 

sentencing decision. Nor did this evidence feature in the 

State’s case in a way that would alert the jury to its 

mitigating force. The State referenced the article for its 

discussion of Waidla’s escape from the Soviet Army, not its 

description of his experiences prior to escape. It was 

incumbent on counsel not just to make sure that this 

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WAIDLA V. DAVIS 63

mitigation evidence made it to the jury, but to identify its 

existence and to argue its relevance. See Rogers v. 

Dzurenda, 25 F.4th 1171, 1189 (9th Cir. 2022) (finding 

deficient performance when counsel’s opening statement 

gave the jury “inadequate context for how the evidence 

would relate to the insanity defense”). Counsel failed to 

fulfill that aspect of his professional duty.

Perhaps the glaring omission of the argument that 

Waidla’s mistreatment in the Soviet Army reduced his 

culpability could be excused as a strategic decision. Such 

strategic decisions, when reasonably well-informed, are 

entitled to deference. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. But even 

if there was a hypothetical strategic purpose for leaving this 

mitigation evidence unmentioned, counsel did not make a 

decision with the benefit of all of the evidence at his 

disposal. After proper investigation, counsel could have 

made a significantly more forceful version of the argument 

that Waidla was mistreated in the Soviet Army, as discussed 

below. Thus, any strategic decision was fatally 

underinformed.

Nor could a fairminded jurist conclude that it was 

reasonable to eschew further investigation on the theory that 

only cumulative evidence could be obtained. Waidla’s 

article only vaguely references the hostility between 

Estonian and Russian soldiers and does not adequately 

convey the extent of the power disparity favoring the 

Russians. Avo attested to the power imbalance to some 

extent, but provided no detail about the nature of the abuse, 

nor did he testify about the practices in effect during 

Waidla’s service. This evidence left a significant gap in 

explaining the severity of the likely abuse as well as its 

systemic nature. 

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Bobby v. Van Hook, 558 U.S. 4 (2009), on which the 

State relies, is inapposite. There, because counsel had 

gathered significant evidence of the defendant’s abusive 

family life, he was reasonable to forego obtaining additional, 

likely cumulative, testimony on that topic from more distant 

relatives. Id. at 10–12. In contrast, it should have been clear 

to Waidla’s counsel that he could have sought out evidence 

not just corroborating Waidla’s article but providing muchneeded context for it. 

The State’s contention that “cumulative evidence that 

other soldiers were also mistreated lacked any real 

significance, especially if Waidla was not aware of the 

circumstances” is unpersuasive. First, according to Dr. 

Ruumet, the risks to Estonian conscripts were so widely 

known that Estonians frequently took measures to avoid 

placement in units with more Russian soldiers, like the one 

Waidla ended up in, which were especially dangerous. Thus, 

Waidla surely understood the scope of the danger that 

awaited him. 

Second, it is highly relevant that Estonian soldiers were 

subjected to widespread, state-sanctioned abuse rooted in 

prejudice. Without that context, the jury could have 

misinterpreted Waidla’s account of harsh training tactics and 

fights between Estonian soldiers and their Russian 

counterparts as commonplace drills and roughhousing rather 

than sanctioned institutional abuse. The information 

provided by Dr. Ruumet would have also supported an 

argument that Waidla did not just endure run-of-the-mill 

discomforts while serving, but also suffered significant fear 

and emotional distress, as shown by Waidla’s desperate 

letter to family requesting that, as Dr. Ruumet paraphrased, 

they “try to save him.” Because context was so crucial to 

understanding Waidla’s experience, counsel could not have 

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WAIDLA V. DAVIS 65

reasonably forgone investigation into this mitigation 

strategy simply because the jury had access to Waidla’s 

account.

Good Behavior in Custody Awaiting Trial. It is well 

established that “evidence that the defendant would not pose 

a danger if spared (but incarcerated) must be considered 

potentially mitigating.” Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 

1, 5 (1986); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 

(2000) (failure to present, inter alia, prison guard testimony 

that defendant was not dangerous or violent as well as prison 

records demonstrating good behavior contributed to finding 

of deficient performance). The import of such mitigating 

evidence is particularly clear when the State argues for the 

death penalty on the ground that a defendant “could not be 

trusted to behave if he were simply returned to prison.” 

Skipper, 476 U.S. at 5 n.1. Here, the State made a similar 

argument by telling the jury that Waidla had a “violent 

nature” and that killing meant nothing to him.

Counsel was on notice that, contrasting with the State’s 

narrative that Waidla posed a risk of future violence, Waidla 

had not encountered any disciplinary issues while 

incarcerated pending trial. Yet counsel ignored this 

“tantalizing indication[] in the record,” Stankewitz v. 

Woodford, 365 F.3d 706, 720 (9th Cir. 2004), of a possible 

mitigation strategy based at least in part on Waidla’s good 

behavior. Counsel’s failure to pursue this viable strategy 

was unreasonable. Each of the State’s arguments to the 

contrary is unpersuasive.

First, the California Supreme Court could not reasonably 

have found counsel’s performance adequate by disregarding 

Waidla’s evidence as inadmissible or conclusory. To make 

out a prima facie case in a California habeas petition, a 

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66 WAIDLA V. DAVIS

petitioner must attach “reasonably available” documentation 

supporting his allegations. People v. Duvall, 886 P.2d 1252, 

1258 (Cal. 1995). A petitioner may not rely on hearsay 

evidence to make out a prima facie case, People v. Madaris, 

122 Cal. App. 3d 234, 241–42 (1981), overruled on other 

grounds by People v. Barrick, 654 P.2d 1243, 1250 (Cal. 

1982), nor on “subjective, self-serving” statements, In re 

Alvernaz, 830 P.2d 747, 756–57 (Cal. 1992). Looking to this 

procedure, the State argues that the California Supreme 

Court could have declined to consider the CDC document 

noting that Waidla behaved well in county jail as hearsay and 

could have found Waidla’s remaining evidence conclusory.

Fairminded jurists would agree that Waidla offered 

enough admissible evidence to show that counsel rendered 

ineffective assistance. That is true even assuming the CDC 

document is inadmissible hearsay. Waidla’s declaration 

explaining the privileges he accrued in county jail for good 

behavior may be self-serving, but it is hardly conclusory. 

The declaration explains, based on Waidla’s personal 

knowledge, that he enjoyed freedoms reserved for wellbehaved prisoners like the ability to read in the library and 

the ability to leave the dormitories for his job. That evidence 

is more than a bare allegation of good behavior. See SEC v. 

Phan, 500 F.3d 895, 909 (9th Cir. 2007) (differentiating selfserving declarations from conclusory ones that offer no 

admissible facts). 

Waidla’s declaration, which speaks to three months of 

his confinement, is corroborated by other evidence. The 

memorandum authored by the District Attorney’s office in 

1989 evaluated whether the death penalty was appropriate 

for Waidla and Sakarias. The memo recommends seeking 

the death penalty for Sakarias but not Waidla in part because 

Waidla, unlike Sakarias, did not face disciplinary action 

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during the first several months of his confinement, and he 

did not “evidence the same degree of danger to society” as 

Sakarias did. The State does not argue that the DA memo is 

inadmissible hearsay, and our court has previously 

considered the State’s decision to seek or not seek the death 

penalty against a co-defendant in this context. See Sanders 

v. Davis, 23 F.4th 966, 994 (9th Cir. 2022). The declaration 

is also corroborated by Waidla’s lack of criminal history and 

Dr. Young’s opinion concerning his nonviolent personality 

structure. Waidla’s evidence is, therefore, far from 

conclusory.2

Second, the State argues that the California Supreme 

Court properly denied this subclaim because counsel’s 

declaration “sheds no light on Waidla’s behavior while in 

custody or trial counsel’s decisions concerning such 

behavior.” Not so. Counsel was aware that “there were no 

disciplinary proceedings against Mr. Waidla.” True, he gave 

no explanation for his failure to investigate the matter, but 

he admitted that he conducted no investigation whatsoever. 

It is therefore clear that his decision not to pursue this 

strategy did not stem from strategic insight gained after 

2 Typically, upon finding that a state court decision violated 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d), the federal habeas court undertakes de novo review of the 

claim before granting relief. See Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 737 (9th 

Cir. 2008) (en banc). The district court did not explicitly conduct de 

novo review. On appeal, the State takes issue only with the district 

court’s § 2254(d) analysis. Accordingly, the State has forfeited any 

objection that the district court erred by granting relief based on the 

evidence submitted in support of Waidla’s petition rather than evidence 

adduced in a new evidentiary hearing. To the extent the State makes an 

argument limited to this subclaim that the district court should have 

required admissible evidence of Waidla’s good behavior before granting 

relief, that argument is unavailing because Waidla’s evidence apart from 

the CDC document could have been rendered in admissible form.

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68 WAIDLA V. DAVIS

additional investigation. The State cites no authority for the 

proposition that trial counsel must affirmatively state that he 

lacked a strategic purpose, nor should the court adopt that 

rule here. 

Moreover, the record does not reveal any discernable 

strategy that might have justified counsel’s inaction. Any 

suggestion that counsel could reasonably have decided 

against investigating on the theory that juries are usually 

unpersuaded by good behavior evidence is untenable. It 

would be difficult to reconcile that view with Skipper’s 

holding that good behavior evidence must be admitted as 

mitigation, see 476 U.S. at 5, let alone Williams’s holding

that counsel was deficient in part for not gathering such 

evidence, 529 U.S. at 396. See also Deck v. Missouri, 544 

U.S. 622, 633 (2005) (noting that whether the defendant is 

“a danger to the community” is “nearly always a relevant 

factor in jury decisionmaking, even where the State does not 

specifically argue the point”). 

Finally, the State contends that presenting good behavior 

evidence could have indicated to the jury that no better 

mitigation evidence was available. But had counsel 

conducted an adequate investigation, Waidla’s good 

behavior in custody while awaiting trial would not have 

stood alone in Waidla’s mitigation case. It would have stood 

alongside and complemented the other evidence counsel 

could have introduced as described above. Thus, counsel’s 

failure did not stem from a reasonable strategic judgment, 

but from an oversight that cannot be squared with even 

Strickland’s forgiving standard.

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C.

Prejudice

Because counsel performed deficiently by failing to 

introduce and argue several categories of mitigation 

evidence, it is necessary to address whether counsel’s 

incompetence prejudiced Waidla. To do so, courts reweigh 

the aggravation evidence against the mitigation evidence 

that ought to have been presented to the jury. Wiggins, 539 

U.S. at 534. 

One factor relevant to assessing whether a reasonable 

probability exists that one juror would have voted differently 

is the jury’s behavior at trial. Long deliberations relative to 

the complexity of the case and indications of close jury 

deliberations “weigh against a finding of harmless error 

because [they] suggest a difficult case.” United States v. 

Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d 1023, 1036 (9th Cir. 2001) (en 

banc) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); 

Noguera v. Davis, 5 F.4th 1020, 1045 (9th Cir. 2021).3 We 

also consider the strength of the aggravation evidence and 

the nature and quality of the mitigation evidence originally 

3 The State contends otherwise. In its view, lengthy jury deliberations 

do not necessarily signify jury indecision. But the jury notes indicating 

deadlock gave a clear picture about the reason for its long deliberations. 

The State also hypothesizes that the jury’s deadlock could have been 

unrelated to the balance of mitigation and aggravation evidence and 

instead caused by, for instance, a juror’s misunderstanding of an 

instruction. But jury questions indicating deadlock show that the death 

sentence “was not a foregone conclusion, especially given that the jurors’ 

only task at that point was to decide between a sentence of life without 

parole and death.” Silva, 279 F.3d at 849–50. Even if the jury had been 

preoccupied with a mitigation factor unrelated to Waidla’s background 

or character, evidence relevant to those factors could have moved an 

uncertain jury to weigh the totality of the circumstances differently.

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presented in comparison to the nature and quality of the new 

mitigation evidence. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 537–38.

With these factors in mind, the California Supreme Court 

could not reasonably have found that counsel’s failures were 

non-prejudicial. The jury delivered a death sentence 

knowing very little about Waidla’s background and positive 

qualities. Even so, it took the jury nine days of deliberation 

and two bouts of deadlock to reach a verdict. Indeed, a 

declaration of one of the jurors on Waidla’s jury explains 

that the jury was “looking for reasons to show mercy if 

possible,” and that the “penalty phase deliberations were 

very intense.” Yet, because Waidla’s counsel did not put on 

a case, the jury had nothing to seize upon in order to grant 

Waidla mercy. No fairminded jurist considering a jury so 

closely divided could discount the prejudicial effect of 

failing to present even modest evidence of Waidla’s 

background and good character. See Wharton v. Chappell, 

765 F.3d 953, 978 (9th Cir. 2014) (“The jury’s notes and the 

fact that it deliberated over the course of three days suggest 

that the verdict was not an easy one to reach”); Kipp v. Davis, 

971 F.3d 939, 959 (9th Cir. 2020) (three-day deliberation 

supported a finding of prejudice); Thomas v. Chappell, 678 

F.3d 1086, 1103 (9th Cir. 2012) (five-day deliberation with 

several readbacks supported a finding of prejudice) 

(collecting cases).

The difference between the mitigation evidence actually 

presented and the evidence that competent counsel would 

have presented is significant. As the background evidence 

the jury heard was scant, it can readily be recounted again 

here: Waidla was born in Estonia, a country then occupied 

by the Soviet Union, and was raised by family members 

other than his parents. He testified that he had two 

encounters with the KGB as a teen in which he was detained 

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and beaten for allegedly protesting against the Soviet Union. 

At age 18, he was conscripted into the Soviet Army, where 

Estonians were generally not treated well. If the jury in fact 

read Escaping Through the Fog, which is not clear from the 

record, it would have learned that Waidla experienced harsh 

living conditions and once fled from a brawl between 

Russian and Estonian soldiers, before falling ill and 

ultimately escaping. While living with the Piirisilds, Waidla 

was typically friendly and demonstrated his construction 

skills by completing several home improvement projects. 

He was just 20 at the time of the crime and had committed 

no prior felonies. Finally, Waidla cooperated with law 

enforcement after his arrest.

Waidla’s mitigation case at trial essentially amounted to 

an incomplete picture of the adversity he faced in the Soviet 

Army, his age, and his lack of criminal history. The 

sparseness of this evidence is akin to counsel’s presentation 

in Wiggins, where the “sentencing jury heard only one 

significant mitigating factor—that Wiggins had no prior 

convictions,” 539 U.S. at 537, as well as that in Porter v. 

McCollum, 558 U.S. 30 (2009) (per curiam), where the 

mitigation case consisted of “inconsistent testimony about 

Porter’s behavior when intoxicated and testimony that Porter 

had a good relationship with his son,” id. at 32.

If Waidla had been competently represented, the jury 

would have heard much more. To start, competent counsel 

would have made the jury aware of Waidla’s many positive 

character traits. One such trait was Waidla’s strong work 

ethic. Waidla worked hard at marksmanship as a teen, 

showing dedication and skill that surpassed his peers. He 

also excelled in photography, having worked under the 

tutelage of his great-uncle Gunnar to learn the proper 

techniques. In jail pending trial, Waidla worked 

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maintenance and kitchen duty jobs, which entailed physical 

labor like buffing floors. He spent free time in the library 

strengthening his English and reading newspapers.

Waidla’s consistent dedication to his pursuits could have 

undercut the State’s portrayal of Waidla as entitled and 

parasitic. Counsel would have also directly refuted the 

State’s contention that Waidla was lazy by referring to the 

testimony from Dr. Ruumet, who opined that Waidla’s 

perceived laziness was possibly attributable to depression 

brought on by “circumstances in which he had lost his whole 

support system and in which he felt helpless and 

overwhelmed.” Dr. Ruumet’s analysis was in line with Dr. 

Young’s assessment, based on psychological testing, that 

“depression is an underlying component of Waidla’s 

character.”

Another character trait of note was Waidla’s pro-social 

nature and his “characterological aversion to confrontation 

and violence.” Loved ones, acquaintances, and coaches all 

attested to Waidla’s distaste for conflict and his peaceable 

disposition. Dr. Young opined that Waidla was the least 

violence-prone prisoner she had ever evaluated in the 

context of criminal proceedings. This testimony would have 

complemented and added credibility to evidence counsel 

could have presented of Waidla’s compliant and nonviolent 

behavior while in jail awaiting trial. There, guards and a 

librarian afforded him special privileges that would not have 

been fitting for a dangerous prisoner. The State suggests that 

evidence of Waidla’s good behavior in jail would not 

influence jurors who knew that he carried a loaded gun and 

a threatening note at the time of his arrest. However, that 

assessment disregards the character evidence that likewise 

points to his peaceful nature. 

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Evidence of Waidla’s lack of future dangerousness 

would have undermined the State’s contention that Waidla 

had a “violent nature,” and that “killing doesn’t mean 

anything” to him. That much is clear from Skipper, in which 

the relevance of similar evidence was “underscored . . . by 

the prosecutor’s closing argument, which urged the jury to 

return a sentence of death in part because petitioner could 

not be trusted to behave if he were simply returned to 

prison.” 476 U.S. at 5 n.1. 

Competent counsel would have introduced the evidence 

that Waidla was conscripted into the Soviet Army, where it 

was common knowledge that Estonians were targeted for 

serious physical and emotional abuse. Even if the jury took 

the time to review Waidla’s article closely, which no one can 

be sure of, it would not have known the full extent of the 

possible danger to Waidla. Waidla’s depiction of his 

experiences in the Soviet Army takes on new meaning when 

viewed in proper context, namely, a context of 

institutionalized and prejudice-based abuse that could prove 

fatal. The postconviction evidence therefore revealed the 

true nature of the psychological toll that conscription took 

on Waidla.

Finally, competent counsel would have presented the 

humanizing evidence about Waidla’s strong bonds to family 

members, including his great-uncle Gunnar, whom Waidla 

idolized and, according to Gunnar, related to as “both mother 

and father.” The jury would have learned that Waidla’s 

connections to family enabled him to withstand the 

hardships of his early life. This evidence would have 

allowed the jury to view Waidla as a three-dimensional 

person with the ability to form meaningful connections, a 

stark contrast from the caricature of a callous murderer 

presented by the State. See Porter, 558 U.S. at 41 (“The 

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74 WAIDLA V. DAVIS

judge and jury . . . heard almost nothing that would humanize 

Porter or allow them to accurately gauge his moral 

culpability.”). 

In sum, competent counsel would have rounded out the 

jury’s understanding of Waidla’s humanity and positive 

qualities. At the same time, counsel would have marshalled 

the evidence to counter the State’s arguments that Waidla 

was lazy, dangerous, and cruel. Any confidence in the jury’s 

verdict is undermined because “the task [the jury] actually 

undertook differed so profoundly from the one it would have 

performed had [Waidla’s] counsel not been deficient.” 

Boyde v. Brown, 404 F.3d 1159, 1180 (9th Cir. 2005), as 

amended, 421 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2005).

Waidla’s mild resistance to having counsel contact his 

loved ones and acquaintances in Estonia does not eliminate 

the prejudice associated with counsel’s failure to do so, as in 

Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465 (2007). “[W]e have held 

that the Landrigan prejudice holding does not apply when 

the defendant ‘did not threaten to obstruct the presentation 

of any mitigating evidence.’” Sanders, 23 F.4th at 981 

(quoting Hamilton v. Ayers, 583 F.3d 1100, 1119 (9th Cir. 

2009)). Landrigan is not controlling in this case.

Waidla’s reluctance pales in comparison to the 

opposition at issue in Landrigan. There, Landrigan 

hamstrung any and all attempts by counsel to present a 

mitigation argument, including by interrupting during 

counsel’s proffer of evidence to the judge and by asking the 

judge to impose the death penalty. Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 

470, 476–80. By contrast, Waidla merely voiced concerns 

about conducting an investigation in Estonia in 

conversations with counsel. He never indicated that he 

would obstruct counsel. Additionally, counsel in Landrigan

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WAIDLA V. DAVIS 75

advised his client strongly against his preferred course of 

action and attempted to present mitigation evidence over his 

client’s objections. Id. at 479–80. Waidla received 

markedly less diligent representation, as counsel simply did 

not press the issue enough to reach resolution on it. In other 

words, Landrigan does not govern because the major gap in 

Waidla’s mitigation case is attributable to counsel’s actions 

rather than Waidla’s.

The mitigation strategy outlined above is a modest one. 

Waidla’s social history does not reveal facts that often 

support a finding of prejudice like abject abuse or serious 

mental incapacity. See, e.g., Williams, 529 U.S. at 395–98. 

And, to be sure, good character evidence sometimes lacks 

persuasive force in the face of a “gr[isly] murder.” Bemore 

v. Chappell, 788 F.3d 1151, 1172 (9th Cir. 2015). But 

crucially, the court must determine whether fairminded 

jurists could conclude that this mitigation evidence gives rise 

to a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have 

voted differently. Waidla meets that standard given the 

jury’s deadlocking twice, its empty search for a reason to 

grant mercy, the extremely minimal mitigation evidence 

presented in the guilt phase, and the missed opportunity to 

rebut various aspects of the State’s aggravation argument, 

which was itself modest. 4 

4 Waidla argues, as an alternative ground for affirmance, that he was 

deprived of due process by the State’s presentation of false evidence 

against him. Because penalty phase relief is warranted on Waidla’s 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim, I do not address whether the state 

court’s determination violated 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

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