Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca6-14-06395/USCOURTS-ca6-14-06395-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Steve A. Braden
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1 

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION 

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) 

File Name: 16a0080p.06 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

_________________ 

STEVE A. BRADEN, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

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No. 14-6395 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville. 

Nos. 3:08-cr-00148-1; 3:11-cv-01006—William J. Haynes, Jr., Chief District Judge. 

Decided and Filed: March 10, 2016*

Before: KEITH, McKEAGUE, and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges. 

_________________ 

COUNSEL 

ON BRIEF: Kevin M. Schad, FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Cincinnati, Ohio, for 

Appellant. Clay T. Lee, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Nashville, Tennessee, for 

Appellee. 

_________________ 

OPINION 

_________________ 

DAMON J. KEITH, Circuit Judge. Following a jury trial in 2009, Petitioner-Appellant 

Steve Allen Braden (“Mr. Braden”) was convicted of and sentenced for three drug- and firearmsrelated offenses. At sentencing, Mr. Braden was determined to be an Armed Career Criminal 

 *

This decision was originally issued as an “unpublished decision” filed on March 10, 2016. The court has 

now designated the opinion as one recommended for full-text publication. 

>

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No. 14-6395 Braden v. United States Page 2 

under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). In 2011, Mr. Braden filed a pro se petition to 

vacate his convictions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The district court appointed counsel to 

represent Mr. Braden as to his petition. The counsel thereafter filed another petition seeking to 

raise more claims than those identified in Mr. Braden’s pro se petition. The district court denied 

relief. Mr. Braden timely appealed. On appeal, Mr. Braden argues that the district court erred in 

dismissing his pro se petition, and he argues, for the first time on appeal, that he is not an Armed 

Career Criminal. For the following reasons, we REMAND with instructions for the district 

court to consider Mr. Braden’s pro se petition, but we AFFIRM Mr. Braden’s classification as 

an Armed Career Criminal under the ACCA. 

I. BACKGROUND

In 2009, Mr. Braden was convicted of one count of possession with intent to distribute 

cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841; one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of 

drug trafficking activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); and one count of being a felon in 

possession of firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Based on his prior convictions, he was 

classified as an Armed Career Criminal pursuant to the ACCA and as a Career Offender under 

the United States Sentencing Guidelines (the “Guidelines”). He was sentenced to concurrent 

terms of forty years of imprisonment on counts one and two, and a consecutive term of five years 

of imprisonment on count three. He appealed his convictions and sentence to this court, and we 

affirmed. United States v. Braden, No. 09-5854 (6th Cir. Oct. 28, 2010). 

In 2011, Mr. Braden, acting pro se, filed a petition to vacate his convictions pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2255 (“§ 2255”). In his petition, he asserted multiple claims: ineffective assistance 

of trial counsel; flawed jury instructions that resulted in a constructive amendment; illegal search 

and seizure; insufficient arrest warrant; racial discrimination in the selection of the jury; and 

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. See Braden v. United States, No. 14-6395 (6th Cir. 

April 16, 2015). The Government opposed the petition, and then the district court appointed 

counsel to represent Mr. Braden and instructed newly appointed counsel to “file an amended 

motion to vacate if necessary.” 

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Newly appointed counsel filed an amended motion raising additional claims regarding 

the § 922(g) gun charge. In that motion, defense counsel purported to supplement the prior pro 

se filing, rather than supersede it, stating: “This amended motion does not abrogate any of the 

claims Mr. Braden raises in his pro se filings. Rather, it supplements claims A through J of Mr. 

Braden’s pro se motion by adding the claims set forth below.” 

In denying relief as to the § 2255 petition, the district court stated that it “deem[ed] the 

amended petition to supersede the pro se petition and the claims therein.” The district court 

further stated that “[u]nless adopted and supported by legal memorandum, the [c]ourt deems the 

claims in the pro se and first amended petition to be waived.” The court then denied the claims 

raised by appointed counsel in the amended motion as meritless. Mr. Braden appealed. 

While his appeal of the denial of the § 2255 motion was pending, Mr. Braden filed a pro 

se motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 59(e) alleging more ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims. The district court denied this motion as well. In denying the 

motion, the district court referred to its prior ruling on the § 2255 petition, noting that it had 

“considered the record as a whole and all of the claims raised in both the original and amended 

motion, but addressed only those which had some substance. The [c]ourt concluded that [Mr. 

Braden] was not entitled to relief.” 

Because a certificate of appealability had not been issued by the district court, we 

construed Mr. Braden’s notice of appeal as an application for a certificate of appealability. 

Initially, this court granted a limited certificate of appealability solely to address the question of 

whether the district court erred in failing to consider Mr. Braden’s pro se petition. However, this 

court later expanded the certificate of appealability to encompass the issue of whether Mr. 

Braden remains an Armed Career Offender under the ACCA in light of the United States 

Supreme Court’s holding in Johnson v. United States, -- U.S. --, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). 

Johnson was decided after the district court had already ruled on Mr. Braden’s petition, and after 

Mr. Braden had initiated the instant appeal. See 135 S. Ct. 2551. 

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II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review 

“In reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion under Section 2255, we apply a clearly 

erroneous standard to its factual findings and review its conclusions of law de novo.” Hyatt v. 

United States, 207 F.3d 831, 832 (6th Cir. 2000). “Section 2255 provides federal prisoners with 

a means to secure a second look at the legality of their conviction or sentence, beyond the direct 

appeal of right.” Ajan v. United States, 731 F.3d 629, 631 (6th Cir. 2013). “A federal prisoner 

may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence.” 

Id. (citation omitted). The district court “initially considers whether or not the petitioner is 

entitled to any § 2255 relief.” Id. 

“This court reviews de novo a district court’s determination regarding whether a prior 

conviction constitutes a ‘violent felony’ under the ACCA.” United States v. Kemmerling, 612 F. 

App’x 373, 375 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing United States v. Hockenberry, 730 F.3d 645, 663 (6th Cir. 

2013)). 

B. Analysis 

1. Original Petition & Amended Petition 

“Generally, amended pleadings supersede original pleadings.” Hayward v. Cleveland 

Clinic Found., 759 F.3d 601, 617 (6th Cir. 2014). This rule applies to habeas petitions. See

Calhoun v. Bergh, 769 F.3d 409, 410 (6th Cir. 2014) cert. denied sub nom. Calhoun v. Booker, 

135 S. Ct. 1403 (2015). However, we have recognized exceptions to this rule where a party 

evinces an intent for the amended pleading to supplement rather than supersede the original 

pleading, see Clark v. Johnston, 413 F. App’x 804, 811-12 (6th Cir. 2011), and where a party is 

forced to amend a pleading by court order. See Hayward, 759 F.3d at 617-18; but cf. Grubbs v. 

Smith, 86 F.2d 275, 275 (6th Cir. 1936) (concluding that regardless of the party’s intentions, an 

“amended and substituted petition” superseded, as a matter of law, the first petition and the first 

amended petition where the district court had directed the party to combine its first petition and 

first amended petition into one document). An amended pleading supersedes a former pleading 

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if the amended pleading “is complete in itself and does not refer to or adopt a former pleading[.]” 

Shreve v. Franklin Cty., Ohio, 743 F.3d 126, 131 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting 61B Am. Jur. 2d 

Pleading § 789).1

 

Additionally, while “[a] habeas petitioner has neither a constitutional right nor a statutory 

right” to represent himself and also be represented by counsel at the same time, “a court may 

consider a pro se petition even when a habeas petitioner is represented by counsel.” Miller v. 

United States, 561 F. App’x 485, 489 (6th Cir. 2014). It is not uncommon for newly appointed 

counsel in habeas cases to supplement the original pro se pleading by adding claims. See 

Peguero v. United States, 526 U.S. 23, 25 (1999) (analyzing a case where the district court had 

“appointed new counsel, who filed an amended motion adding a claim” to a prisoner’s pro se 

2255 motion). 

Here, Mr. Braden initially filed his habeas petition pro se. The district court then 

appointed counsel to represent him, noting that the newly appointed counsel could file an 

“amended” petition if necessary. The newly appointed counsel then filed an amended petition 

asserting additional claims, and noting that the amended petition “does not abrogate any of the 

claims Mr. Braden raises in his pro se filings. Rather, it supplements claims A through J of Mr. 

Braden’s pro se motion by adding the claims set forth below.” The district court nevertheless 

ruled that the amended petition superseded the original petition, citing a decision of the United 

States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Clark v. Tarrant County, 798 F.2d 736, 740-41 (5th 

Cir. 1986). 

Because the amended petition was not “complete in itself” and because it referred to and 

adopted the prior petition, the amended petition did not supersede the original petition. See

Shreve, 743 F.3d at 131. Mr. Braden unequivocally evinced an intent to supplement his original 

 1

Some courts employ local rules that prohibit a party from incorporating a prior pleading by reference in an 

amended pleading, and those rules are given force on appeal. See Hill v. Fort Loudoun Elec. Co-op., 493 F. App’x 

638, 644 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to address a motion 

“in light of a local rule” in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee which prohibited a 

party from incorporating “any prior pleading by reference” in an amended pleading). Neither party in this case 

asserts that the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee has such a local rule, and this court 

is aware of none. 

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petition. See Clark, 413 F. App’x at 812. Therefore, the district court erred in treating the 

original petition as superseded. See id.; see also Shreve, 743 F.3d at 131. 

The government’s sole argument on appeal is that the district court in fact considered the 

merits of the claims raised in the original pro se petition. In support, the Government points to 

the district court’s order denying Mr. Braden’s subsequent Rule 59(e) motion; the district court 

stated that it had “considered the record as a whole and all of the claims raised in both the 

original and amended motion, but addressed only those which had some substance. The [c]ourt 

concluded that [Mr. Braden] was not entitled to relief.” The government’s reliance on this afterthe-fact statement by the district court is unavailing. This statement from the district court came 

only after the district court had the benefit of hindsight to “clarify” its actions. Assuming that it 

is proper to consider this after-the-fact clarification, the clarification is belied by the record. 

While the district court is not required to provide a lengthy analysis of every claim, a review of 

the § 2255 order reveals that the district court only addressed the claims presented in the petition 

filed by counsel and did not address any of the claims presented by Mr. Braden in his initial pro 

se petition. The conclusion that the district court did not review the pro se claims is further 

buttressed by its own unequivocal statement that it treated the pro se petition as superseded. 

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the district court erred in treating Mr. Braden’s 

pro se petition as “superseded” by his amended petition. 

2. Armed Career Criminal Status 

Next, we address Mr. Braden’s argument that he no longer qualifies as an Armed Career 

Criminal under the ACCA. Specifically, Mr. Braden argues that his prior two convictions for 

aggravated assault under Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-13-102 were not proper qualifying 

offenses under the ACCA.2

 Mr. Braden argues that remand is necessary to determine whether he 

was convicted under the residual clause of the ACCA. Recently, the Supreme Court of the 

United States held in Johnson v. United States, -- U.S. --, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), that the 

 2

Mr. Braden does not challenge any of his other prior convictions, and it is undisputed that Mr. Braden has 

at least one other qualifying ACCA conviction. 

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residual clause is unconstitutionally vague.3 For the following reasons, Mr. Braden’s argument 

is meritless.4

 

A defendant is considered an Armed Career Offender under the ACCA if he or she 

violates 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and has at least three qualifying felonies under the Act. Kemmerling, 

612 F. App’x at 375. “The ACCA increases the sentences of certain federal defendants who 

have three prior convictions for a ‘serious drug offense’ or a ‘violent felony.’” United States v. 

Elliott, 757 F.3d 492, 293 (6th Cir. 2014). The term “violent felony” is defined as follows: 

Any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, . . . that (i) 

has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force 

against the person of another; or (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves the 

use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential 

risk of physical injury to another[.] 

18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). 

 Section (i) is usually referred to as the “force” prong of the statute. Elliott, 757 F.3d at 

494. The first part of section (ii) listing specific offenses is usually referred to as the 

“enumerated felonies” prong. Id. And the second part of section (ii) referring to conduct that 

“otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” is 

referred to as the “residual clause.” Id. 

 Mr. Braden’s reliance on Johnson is unavailing because Johnson has no bearing on Mr. 

Braden’s conviction or sentence. We must first determine whether Mr. Braden’s convictions 

qualify as “violent felon[ies]” under the ACCA. Elliott, 757 F.3d at 494. In making this 

determination, courts employ what is known as the “modified categorical approach” when the 

 3

We held that Johnson announced a new substantive rule that is retroactive on collateral review. See In re 

Watkins, 810 F.3d 375, 382 (6th Cir. 2015). This means that petitioners who were sentenced pre-Johnson can apply 

Johnson’s holding to attack the constitutionality of their sentences in a habeas petition. See id.

4

As a preliminary matter, Mr. Braden did not assert that Johnson changed his status as an Armed Career 

Offender before the district court because the Supreme Court rendered its opinion in Johnson after the district court 

issued its ruling. Ordinarily, a failure to raise a constitutional challenge in the district court would “preclude our 

consideration of the issue on appeal.” United States v. Chesney, 86 F.3d 564, 567 (6th Cir. 1996). However, this 

court can exercise discretion to “review an issue not raised below” where an applicable Supreme Court decision was 

rendered after the district court issued its ruling. See id. at 568. This is especially appropriate where the question 

presents “a purely legal issue” that was fully briefed by both parties. Id. Here, we conclude that Johnson is an 

applicable Supreme Court decision that was not available to Mr. Braden below, the question of whether Mr. Braden 

is an Armed Career Offender is purely legal, and both parties have fully briefed the matter. 

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criminal statute underlying the prior conviction in question is “divisible.” Id. A statute is 

“divisible” when it “includes ‘multiple, alternative elements, and so effectively creates several 

different crimes.’” United States v. Denson, 728 F.3d 603, 612 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting 

Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2285 (2013)). Therefore, in some circumstances, 

the statute “could be violated in a way that would constitute a [violent felony] and in a way that 

would not.” Id. at 608 (citation omitted). 

Under the modified categorical approach, the court may look at a “limited class of 

documents . . . to determine which alternative [element] formed the basis of the defendant’s prior 

conviction[.]”5

 Id. (citation omitted) (first alteration in original). When the defendant pled 

guilty to the prior offense, those documents “may include the charging document, written plea 

agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which 

the defendant assented.” Id. (citation omitted). These documents are called Shepard documents. 

See id. (citing Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005)). While Mr. Braden did not raise 

the ACCA argument below, this court can consult Shepard documents on appeal. See id. at 613 

(consulting Shepard documents on appeal).6 If the Shepard documents reveal that the defendant 

was convicted of an offense that qualifies as a “violent felony” under the ACCA’s “force 

clause,” then Johnson does not affect the defendant’s designation as an Armed Career Criminal. 

See United States v. Bernardini, 616 F. App’x 212, 213 (6th Cir. 2015) (noting that “Johnson left 

the ACCA’s use-of-force clause undisturbed”). 

We have previously held that the Tennessee aggravated assault statue under which Mr. 

Braden was convicted (Tenn. Code Ann. 39-13-102) is a divisible statute, and therefore, the 

 5

In contrast, under the categorical approach, the court “focuses on the statutory definition of the offense, 

rather than the manner in which an offender may have violated the statute in a particular circumstance.” Denson, 

728 F.3d at 607. 

6

Mr. Braden elected to raise this argument for the first time on appeal, seeking an expansion of the limited 

certificate of appealability that this court issued. However, after the government submitted the Shepard documents 

into the record, Mr. Braden argued that a remand is proper to allow the district court to decide the matter in the first 

instance. While it may have been unconventional for the government to file the Shepard documents after the appeal 

had been taken, the documents did not become relevant until Mr. Braden sought to enlarge his certificate of 

appealability to cover an issue that had not been presented before the district court. Mr. Braden cannot have it both 

ways. In any event, because this court can consult Shepard documents on appeal, we reject Mr. Braden’s assertion 

that the case must be remanded for the district court to review the documents in the first instance, especially because 

remand would prove futile. See Karimijanaki v. Holder, 579 F.3d 710, 721 (6th Cir. 2009) (noting that a “remand is 

not required where such a gesture would be futile”). 

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modified categorical approach is applicable. United States v. Cooper, 739 F.3d 873, 880 (6th 

Cir. 2014). In this case, Mr. Braden pled guilty to two counts of aggravated assault under the 

statute. Both indictments demonstrate that Mr. Braden necessarily pled guilty to a violation of 

subsection (a)(1)(B) of Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-13-102, which, at the time of Mr. 

Braden’s conviction, criminalized “[i]ntentionally or knowingly commit[ting] an assault” while 

“us[ing] or display[ing] a deadly weapon.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-102(a)(1)(B). 

In the first indictment, the grand jury charged Mr. Braden with “intentionally or 

knowingly . . . caus[ing] Tonya Renee Clark to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury, and [Mr. 

Braden] did use or display a deadly weapon, to wit: gun,” for conduct he engaged in on April 10, 

2002. In the second indictment, the grand jury charged Mr. Braden with “intentionally or 

knowingly . . . caus[ing] Tonya Renee Clark to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury, and [Mr. 

Braden] did use or display a deadly weapon, to wit: scissors,” for conduct Mr. Braden engaged in 

on April 16, 2002. Because the grand jury charged that Mr. Braden “intentionally or knowingly” 

assaulted Ms. Clark with a deadly weapon, Mr. Braden must have been charged with and pleaded 

guilty to violating § 39-13-102(a)(1)(B). Cf. Cooper, 739 F.3d at 881 (holding that the defendant 

“must have been charged with violating and pleading guilty to” one of the provisions under § 39-

13-102(a) because the grand jury charged that he had displayed a deadly weapon). Mr. Braden’s 

aggravated assault convictions are considered violent felonies under the ACCA’s “force” clause. 

See United States v. Priddy, 808 F.3d 676, 685-86 (6th Cir. 2015) (noting that an offense 

qualifies under the “force” clause where it “has an element” of “the use, attempted use, or 

threatened use of physical force against the person of another”). 

Because Mr. Braden was not convicted under the residual clause of the ACCA, Johnson

does not affect his status as an Armed Career Criminal. See Kemmerling, 612 F. App’x at 375 

(noting that Johnson only called the “residual clause” into question and not any other provision 

of the ACCA); see also Bernardini, 616 F. App’x at 213. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the dismissal of the claims presented in the 

initial pro se § 2255 petition and REMAND the case to the district court with instructions to 

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consider the arguments presented in Mr. Braden’s initial pro se § 2255 petition, but we AFFIRM 

Mr. Braden’s classification as an Armed Career Criminal under the ACCA.7

 7

Notably, Mr. Braden has two other appeals pending in this court: 15-5294 and 15-5465. Those two 

appeals have been consolidated into a separate case. While those appeals also raise challenges to Mr. Braden’s 

sentence, the issues presented in those appeals are different, Mr. Braden is represented by separate counsel in those 

appeals, and nothing in the instant opinion affects the outcome of those appeals. 

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