Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-15-02786/USCOURTS-ca8-15-02786-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Donald Clark Luger
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 15-2786

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Donald Clark Luger, also known as Jody Luger

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of North Dakota - Bismarck

____________

 Submitted: May 18, 2016

 Filed: September 14, 2016

____________

Before RILEY, Chief Judge, COLLOTON and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

____________

KELLY, Circuit Judge.

Jody Luger appeals from his conviction of one count of aggravated sexual

abuse of a child in Indian country. We have considered each of the three issues

presented on appeal, and affirm the judgment of the district court.1

The Honorable Ralph R. Erickson, Chief Judge, United States District Court

1

for the District of North Dakota.

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I. Background

The investigation in this case began in late 2011, when a letter alleging that

Luger sexually assaulted his girlfriend’s 16-year-old daughter was sent to the U.S.

Attorney’s Office (USAO) for the District of North Dakota. The letter wasforwarded

to the FBI for further investigation, which ultimately revealed multiple allegations of

sexual abuse going back decades. On May 14, 2013, Luger was indicted on three

counts. Count 1 charged him with aggravated sexual abuse of a child, T.L., in Indian

country, occurring in 1999. Counts 2 and 3 charged Luger with abusive sexual 2

contact and child abuse in Indian country, occurring in late 2011. The victim of the

latter two counts was E.C.G., the 16-year-old girl who had been the subject of the

original letter.

Before trial, the government indicated its intent to introduce propensity

evidence pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414. This evidence was to

consist of the testimony of five women, all of whom alleged that Luger had sexually

abused or assaulted them. The assaults had all occurred more than 25 years prior to

the indictment in this case. Three of the women had been adults at the time of the

assaults, and the other two had been young teenagers. Luger moved in limine to

exclude all five women’s testimony. The district court granted Luger’s motion as to

the three women who had been adults at the time of the assaults, and denied Luger’s

motion as to the two women—M.N. and S.C.—who had been teenagers at the time

of the assaults.

The case proceeded to trial on November 17, 2014. At trial, T.L. testified that

Luger had sexually assaulted her in 1997, when she was 13 years old. At the time,

T.L.’s mother was in a relationship with Luger. T.L. testified that early one morning

after her mother had left their apartment and gone to work, Luger came into her

The evidence later showed that this assault may have occurred in 1997.

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bedroom, held her down, and touched her breasts and genitals. T.L. said that Luger

smelled as though he had been drinking. E.C.G. also testified, but recanted her

allegation that Luger had assaulted her. Instead, E.C.G. testified that during her first 3

interview with the FBI, when she said that Luger had sexually abused her

(corroborating the accusation in the letter sent to the USAO), she had been using

methamphetamine and was hungover. E.C.G. testified thatshe later heard about what

she had told the FBI, but did not remember telling them that and did not believe that

Luger would have abused her. E.C.G. also testified about various traumatic events

and disruptions in her life, which Luger and the government respectively framed as

damaging and bolstering to the credibility of her original accusation. M.N.’s and

S.C.’s testimony about Luger’s assaults on them was presented as propensity

evidence. On November 21, at the close of the defense’s case and before closing

arguments, the district court granted Luger’s motion for a judgment of acquittal as to

Counts 2 and 3. The court determined that, in light of E.C.G.’s recantation, the

government had not presented evidence from which a reasonable jury could find

Luger guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Count 1 went to the jury, which returned a

verdict of guilty.

After trial and upon review of the presentence report, Luger’s counsel

discovered that the U.S. Attorney, Timothy Purdon, had a clear conflict of interest in

Luger’s case. Prior to his appointment as the U.S. Attorney for the District of North

Dakota, Purdon had worked in private practice as a criminal defense attorney and had

represented Luger on a charge of tampering with evidence in 2009. Based on this

fact, Luger moved to disqualify the USAO for the District of North Dakota on

February 17, 2015. The government filed a response on February 19, and attached

an affidavit by Purdon. The district court then set a hearing for March 27, 2015. 

E.C.G. initially told the FBI that Luger sexually assaulted her one night when

3

he came home from a bar and found her alone in the living room. She said that she

was lying down watching TV, and Luger came over and touched her genitals. At the

time, Luger was in a relationship with E.C.G.’s mother. 

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Before the hearing, the government was permitted to withdraw Purdon’s affidavit and

file an exhibit consisting of an email exchange between the USAO and officials at the

Department of Justice (DOJ) regarding the conflict. At the hearing, the government

presented no additional evidence. The district court granted the motion to disqualify.

On April 15, 2015, the government filed a motion for reconsideration on the

disqualification issue, attaching four exhibits ostensibly showing that the USAO had

properly screened Purdon fromparticipation in Luger’s case. The government did not

explain its initial failure to provide this evidence. Nevertheless, the district court

granted the government’s motion for reconsideration, vacated its previous order, and

denied Luger’s motion to disqualify. On July 16, 2015, Luger filed a motion for a

new trial, arguing that the undisclosed conflict of interest and associated appearance

of impropriety had deprived him of his constitutional right to a fair trial. The district

court denied Luger’s motion, finding that any newly discovered evidence would not

have resulted in an acquittal.

On July 30, 2015, the district court sentenced Luger to 138 months’

imprisonment. Luger timely appealed, arguing that the district court erred in partially

denying his motion in limine, in granting the government’s motion for

reconsideration, and in denying his motion for a new trial. We address each issue in

turn.

II. Motion in Limine

Luger first challenges the district court’s partial denial of his motion in limine

as to the propensity testimony of M.N. and S.C. He asserts that the sexual assaults

about which the two women testified were insufficiently similar to the charged

conduct in this case to justify their admission as propensity evidence, and that

because of the dissimilarity the prejudicial effect of the testimony substantially

outweighed its probative value. We review the district court’s decision to admit this

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evidence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Gabe, 237 F.3d 954, 959 (8th Cir.

2001); United States v. Mound, 149 F.3d 799, 800–01 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that

Rules 413 and 414 are constitutional subject to the limitations of Rule 403, and

reviewing the district court’s evidentiary decisions under these rules for abuse of

discretion).

As a general rule, evidence of a defendant’s prior bad acts is not admissible to

prove his propensity to commit the charged crime. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). 

However, Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414 create an exception to that general

rule in cases where the charged crime is sexual assault or child molestation. Fed. R.

Evid. 413, 414. In such cases, evidence of any prior sexual assault or child

molestation offense is admissible for any relevant purpose, including to prove the

defendant’s propensity to commit the charged offense. Id. These rules are checked

by Rule 403, under which otherwise admissible propensity evidence may be excluded

if its probative value issubstantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice. Fed.

R. Evid. 403. Though Rules 413 and 414 reflect a “strong legislative judgment that

evidence of prior sexual offenses should ordinarily be admissible,” United States v.

LeCompte, 131 F.3d 767, 769 (8th Cir. 1997), the prior offenses must be similar

enough to the charged offense to be probative of the defendant’s propensity to

commit that specific offense. See United States v. Crow Eagle, 705 F.3d 325, 327

(8th Cir. 2013) (per curiam); United States v. Gabe, 237 F.3d 954, 959 (8th Cir.

2001). Thus, even where prior offenses are offered solely to prove the defendant’s

propensity to commit the charged offense, the district court is required to conduct a

careful analysis of the prior offenses to determine that they are in fact probative of

propensity and are not overly prejudicial.

Here, the district court conducted a commendably thorough analysis of the

admissibility ofthe propensity testimony. The court reviewed the history and purpose

of Rules 413 and 414, observing that they deviate from the general rule that evidence

may not be admitted to prove propensity. The district court also noted that after the

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enactment ofRules 413 and 414, courts continued to apply the balancing testrequired

by Rule 403 and excluded evidence otherwise admissible under the rules if it created

“substantially unfair prejudice” relative to its probative value. In this case, the district

court readily concluded that the three sexual assaults against adult victims “ha[d] little

relevance on the question of propensity to engage in inappropriate sexual contact with

a minor,” and that the probative value of this evidence was substantially outweighed

by the danger of unfair prejudice. However, the court found that M.N.’s and S.C.’s

testimony about Luger’s assaults on them was probative of his propensity to commit

the charged offenses, because there was “greater similarity” between the charged

conduct and the propensity conduct. The court observed that while there was some

prejudice to Luger, that prejudice was not substantial enough to justify excluding the

evidence.

Though we consider this a close question, the district court acted within its

discretion in admitting M.N.’s and S.C.’s testimony. The assaults against M.N. and

S.C. had occurred more than 25 years prior to the trial in this case, diminishing the

probative value of their testimony and potentially increasing its prejudicial effect. 

See Gabe, 237 F.3d at 960. Furthermore, both M.N. and S.C. testified that Luger

raped them, a more serious—and thus more prejudicial—offense than the touchings

charged in this case. However, the assaults against T.L., E.C.G., M.N., and S.C. all

4

occurred when the victims were between 13 and 16 years old. Luger wasin a relative

position of power or authority over his victims: T.L., E.C.G., and M.N. were all part

We note that Luger was ultimately acquitted of the chargesrelating to E.C.G., 4

and we have some concerns about the prejudicial nature of her testimony in this

context. However, at the time that the district court ruled on the motion in limine, the

counts as to E.C.G. were still extant, and the district court was not required to predict

that it would enter a judgment of acquittal on those counts when analyzing the

admissibility of M.N. and S.C.’s testimony under Rules 413 and 414. We also note

that Luger did not object to the admission of E.C.G.’s testimony at trial, and that after

the judgment of acquittal the district court determined that her testimony could not

be considered as propensity evidence.

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of Luger’s extended family group, and Luger was S.C.’s teacher. T.L. and M.N. were

both assaulted while sleeping in a home to which Luger had access. Luger restrained

T.L., M.N., and S.C. while he assaulted them, either by holding them down or, in

S.C.’s case, tying her to his bed.

Given these similarities, M.N.’s and S.C.’s testimonywas probative of Luger’s

propensity to commit the charged offenses in this case. While their testimony was

prejudicial, the district court concluded that this prejudice was not substantiallyunfair

and did not outweigh the testimony’s probative value. Crow Eagle, 705 F.3d at 328

(“The district court’s balance of the prejudicial and probative impacts of evidence is

accorded ‘great deference.’” (citation omitted)); United States v. Hollow Horn, 523

F.3d 882, 888 (8th Cir. 2008). Rules 413 and 414 contemplate the admission of

prejudicial evidence to prove propensity, and we believe the district court applied

those rules correctly here. See LeCompte, 131 F.3d at 769 (“Rule 403 must be

applied to allow Rule 414 its intended effect.”). We defer to the district court’s

careful exercise of its discretion in this case, and conclude that the propensity

testimony of M.N. and S.C. was properly admitted.

III. Motion for Reconsideration

Luger next argues that the district court abused its discretion in granting the

government’s motion for reconsideration. See Julianello v. K-V Pharm. Co., 791

5

F.3d 915, 922 (8th Cir. 2015) (reviewing the district court’s denial of a motion for

reconsideration for abuse of discretion). 

In the civil context, our court has been clear that a motion for reconsideration

“serve[s] the limited function of correcting manifest errors of law or fact or . . .

Luger does not challenge the district court’s ultimate denial of his motion to 5

disqualify the North Dakota USAO.

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present[ing] newly discovered evidence.” Bradley Timberland Res. v. Bradley

Lumber Co., 712 F.3d 401, 407 (8th Cir. 2013) (alterations in original) (quoting

United States v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 440 F.3d 930, 933 (8th Cir. 2006)). A

motion for reconsideration should not be used as a vehicle to present evidence that

was available when the matter was initially adjudicated. See Julianello, 791 F.3d at

922; Anthony v. Runyon, 76 F.3d 210, 215 (8th Cir. 1996) (evidence presented on a

motion for reconsideration “must be truly new, in the sense that it was previously

unavailable”); Hagerman v. Yukon Energy Corp., 839 F.2d 407, 414 (8th Cir. 1988)

(quoting Rothwell Cotton Co. v. Rosenthal & Co., 827 F.2d 246, 251 (7th Cir. 1987)

(motion for reconsideration “cannot in any case be employed as a vehicle to introduce

new evidence that could have been adduced during pendency of the [previous]

motion”). Although this court has never had occasion to do so, courts in other

Circuits have held that this civil standard applies tomotionsfor reconsideration raised

in criminal cases outside of the suppression context. See United States v. Rollins,

607 F.3d 500, 502 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Healy, 376 U.S. 75 (1964))

(“The Justices have concluded that motionsto reconsider in criminal prosecutions are

proper and will be treated just like motions in civil suits.”)); see, e.g., United States

v. Gomez-Gomez, 643 F.3d 463, 471–72 (6th Cir. 2011) (reconsideration was

improper where the movant “failed to inform the district court why his additional

witness testimony in support of his claim that he was a juvenile was not previously

available to him”). 

In this case, in response to Luger’s motion to disqualify, the government

initially submitted an affidavit by Purdon as evidence that disqualification was

unnecessary. Before the hearing on the issue, the government asked to withdraw that

affidavit, and instead provided an email exchange between the USAO and the DOJ

regarding Purdon’s recusal from Luger’s case. The government provided no

additional evidence at the hearing on this motion. After the district court resolved the

matter against the government and in Luger’s favor, the government sought

reconsideration and provided four exhibits—includingPurdon’s affidavit—in support

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of its position that Purdon had been properly screened from Luger’s case. The

government offered no reason for its failure to provide that evidence before the

motion was adjudicated, and does not dispute that all the evidence was available

before the hearing on the motion to disqualify. According to Luger, the government

used its motion for reconsideration for the sole purpose of introducing evidence that

could have been raised during the initial motion to disqualify but was offered only

after the government received an adverse ruling. Thus, Luger asks us to import the

civil standard for motions for reconsideration—including the bar on using such

motions to “rais[e] evidence [the movant] could have previously raised”—into the

criminal context and find that the district court improperly granted reconsideration

without requiring the government to justify its failure to present available evidence

to the district court during the pendency of the original motion. See Julianello, 791

F.3d at 923 (motionsto reconsider should not be used for the “impermissible purpose

of raising evidence they could have previously raised”). 

We need not decide whether to import the civil motion for reconsideration

standard into the criminal context, however, because any possible error in granting

the motion to reconsider was harmless. Luger moved to disqualify the USAO after

trial, when only sentencing remained to be completed. Reversal of the district court’s

grant of the motion for reconsideration and reinstatement of the court’s order

disqualifying the USAO would therefore require only resentencing, without the

involvement of the North Dakota USAO. Luger suffered no prejudice from the North

Dakota USAO’s participation in sentencing—in fact, Luger received a

below-Guidelines sentence —and he does not request resentencing. As a result, we 6

decline to remand on this issue. See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 509

(1983). 

Luger was sentenced to 138 months’ imprisonment, and the advisory

6

Guidelines sentencing range was 168–210 months’ imprisonment.

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IV. Motion for New Trial

Third and finally, Luger argues that the district court erroneously denied his

motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. We review the district

court’s denial of a new trial for abuse of discretion, and conclude that there was no

such abuse here. United States v. Dodd, 391 F.3d 930, 934 (8th Cir. 2004).

In support of his motion for a new trial, Luger introduced into evidence the

four exhibits the government had introduced in support of its motion for

reconsideration, as well as several filings that included Purdon’s name in the

7

signature block. The district court considered this evidence, and determined that the

USAO had followed appropriate recusal procedures, that Purdon had been adequately

screened from Luger’s case, and that Purdon had no improper substantive

involvement with the case. The court therefore concluded that there was no conflict

of interest tainting Luger’s trial, and that the newly discovered evidence of Purdon’s 8

conflict of interest would have no effect on a new trial.

Given the finding that Purdon had been adequately screened from Luger’s

prosecution and trial, the district court’s decision to deny Luger a new trial was not

an abuse of discretion. In support of his argument that a new trial was necessary

because Purdon’s conflict of interest rendered his trial actually or apparently unfair,

Luger points to two facts: first, that several filings included Purdon’s name in the

Even if the district court’s consideration of these exhibits in the context of the

7

government’s motion for reconsideration was improper, Luger himself reintroduced

them in support of his motion for a new trial. 

The district court also found that the evidence of Purdon’s conflict was not

8

newly discovered, because it was “indisputable” that Luger knew that Purdon had

previously represented him. We are less inclined to so conclude, but because we

affirm the district court’s ruling on its alternative grounds we need not resolve this

question.

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signature block, and second, that Purdon asked the Assistant U.S. Attorney

9

responsible for Luger’s case not to file his affidavit regarding recusal unless it was

necessary. Both of these facts were available to the district court at the time of

Luger’s motion, and both seem to indicate that Purdon was in some way involved in

Luger’s prosecution and that there were troubling cracks in the screening measures

undertaken to “wall off” Purdon from this case. But neither fact renders clearly

erroneous the district court’s ultimate finding that Purdon was adequately screened

from Luger’s case. Luger does not allege any specific unfairness associated with

these instances of Purdon’s purported involvement in his case, instead asserting that

the appearance of Purdon’s name in the signature block on filings and Purdon’s

stance on the use of his affidavit affected the “core” of his trial. On the record before

us, we do not see how. There is no evidence that the appearance of Purdon’s name

in the filings was actually prejudicial, and the district court determined that Purdon’s

request regarding his affidavit was not substantive in nature. And Luger does not

allege any specific unfairness associated with Purdon’s conflict of interest generally. 

For example, he did not assert that Purdon’s previous representation affected his

decision on whether to testify, he did not identify any evidence or examination at trial

that revealed Purdon’s involvement in his case, and he did not explain the nature of

any overlap between this case and the case where Purdon was his attorney. In the

face of the district court’s determination that Purdon was actually recused from

Luger’s case, Luger’s broad claimof unfairness isinsufficient to support a conclusion

that he should have received a new trial.

We agree with Luger that a defendant is entitled to a trial that both appears fair

and actually is fair. United States v. Singer, 710 F.2d 431, 437 (8th Cir. 1983) (en

banc). We also agree that the involvement of a conflicted prosecutor in a criminal

proceeding is a fundamental constitutional error. Young v. United States ex rel.

One of these filings was a stipulation the parties entered, which was read to 9

the jury, Purdon’s name included.

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Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 810 (1987). But here, the district court established

that Purdon—admittedly conflicted—did not participate in Luger’s prosecution or

trial. Because Purdon was adequately screened from Luger’s case, the fairness

concerns associated with the involvement of a conflicted prosecutor did not actually

arise.

Our conclusion that a new trial was not required in this case does not diminish

the importance of careful, conscientious management of conflicts of interest. A

conflict such as this one has the potential to affect both the fairness and the

appearance of fairness in a criminal prosecution. Full disclosure to all affected

parties—and to the district court—is also important in achieving these goals. But

based on the district court’s specific finding that Purdon had been adequately

screened from substantive involvement in Luger’s prosecution, and under the

particular circumstances of this case, we conclude that Luger has not shown that the

district court abused its discretion in denying him a new trial.

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment.

I agree with the decision to affirm, and I concur in the judgment.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony of

witnesses M.N. and S.C. under Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414. I do not join

the court’s expression of “concerns” about the “prejudicial nature” of the trial

testimony of witness E.C.G, ante, at 6 n.4, because Luger does not raise any claim of

error concerning thistestimony, and the district court properly admitted the testimony

of E.C.G. as an alleged victim in the case.

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On the motion for reconsideration concerning disqualification, I agree that

Luger suffered no prejudice from having an attorney from the United States

Attorney’s Office in North Dakota rather than another government attorney represent

the United States at sentencing. That is enough to resolve this point of the appeal. 

The court, ante, at 7-8, goesfurther in dicta to suggest that a district court considering

a motion for reconsideration in a civil case may not receive evidence that was

available earlier. The cited authorities, however, all involve orders denying a motion

for reconsideration; the court cites no case in which this court held that a district court

is categorically forbidden to receive additional evidence on reconsideration without

demanding a justification from the movant. The court, ante, at 8, also opines that the

Sixth and Seventh Circuits apply the asserted “civil standard” to motions for

reconsideration in criminal cases. Again, however, the cited authorities involve

orders denying a motion for reconsideration. When directly confronted with the

propriety of granting a motion in a criminal case, the Seventh Circuit rejected the rule

suggested by the court: “We . . . decline to impose a justification requirement to

reopen a suppression hearing. Instead, we hold that this decision lies within the

sound discretion of the district court.” United States v. Ozuna, 561 F.3d 728, 734-35

(7th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added). Given that Luger was not prejudiced by the

10

The weight of authority concerning motionsto reconsider suppression orders 10

in criminal cases aligns with the Seventh Circuit. Compare United States v. Huff, 782

F.3d 1221, 1224 (10th Cir. 2015) (“The district court may prefer, even require, the

government to explain why it failed to introduce an argument earlier, but that

decision should rest with the district court.”) (emphasis added), Ozuna, 561 F.3d at

734-35, In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in East Africa, 552 F.3d 177,

196-97 (2d Cir. 2008) (“While it may often be useful for the government to explain

its reasons for not introducing evidence earlier, a district court may consider the

evidence without first finding good cause for the government’s omission or delay.”)

(emphasis added), United States v. Raab, 752 F.2d 1320, 1323 (9th Cir. 1984) (“We

reject [a] ‘justification’ requirement . . . .”), and United States v. Scott, 524 F.2d 465,

467 (5th Cir. 1975), with McRae v. United States, 420 F.2d 1283, 1288-89 (D.C. Cir.

1969). 

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district court’s approach, it is unnecessary here to address whether a district court in

any context must demand a justification for the presentation of new evidence on

reconsideration.

I agree that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Luger’s

motion for a new trial, because United States Attorney Purdon was adequately

screened from involvement in Luger’s case. Unlike the court, ante, at 10 n.8, I

express no view on the district court’s alternate conclusion that evidence of Purdon’s

conflict of interest was not newly discovered.

_________________________

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