Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-15-03156/USCOURTS-ca8-15-03156-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jeffrey R. Lockhart
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 15-3156

___________________________

Jeffrey R. Lockhart

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Joplin

____________

 Submitted: June 16, 2016

 Filed: August 25, 2016

____________

Before SMITH, GRUENDER, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

____________

BENTON, Circuit Judge.

A federal employee injured Jeffrey R. Lockhart in a car accident. Lockhart

later required shoulder surgery. He sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). 

The district court, in a bench trial, found the government 100% at fault for the

1

The Honorable Brian C. Wimes, United States District Judge for the Western 1

District of Missouri.

Appellate Case: 15-3156 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/25/2016 Entry ID: 4441243 
collision, but only 20% liable for Lockhart’s injury. He appeals the damages award. 

Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms. 

In March 2011, Lockhart was driving his truck south on a rural Missouri road. 

A park ranger for the United States Army Corps of Engineers was driving north. The

ranger took his eyes off the road to adjust his radio. His side mirror collided with

Lockhart’s mirror. Lockhart sustained minor glass cuts and felt some left-shoulder

pain. Both drivers drove away from the collision. Because the ranger was within the

scope and course of his employment, the United States stipulated to liability for his

acts under the FTCA. 

After the collision, Lockhart saw his primary care physician, Dr. Leonard W.

Bridges. Imaging of Lockhart’s left shoulder showed both degenerative conditions

and traumatic injury. Before the collision, Lockhart had not complained to Dr.

Bridges about, or been treated for, left-shoulder pain. Dr. Bridges referred Lockhart

to a specialist. 

An orthopedic surgeon, Dr. William T. Wester, examined Lockhart’s shoulder

and reviewed the images. Dr. Wester noted that the images showed the left shoulder

had signs of degenerative arthritis, specifically glenohumeral arthritis, AC joint

arthritis, and some degenerative arthritis in the rotator cuff. According to the district

court, “Dr. Wester testified that imaging of the shoulder indicated advanced

degeneration that would have had to develop over time . . . such that the degenerative

condition is not attributable to the Collision itself. . . . He further opined that but for

the Collision, the arthritis may not have advanced to the point that shoulder

replacement would be necessary.” After non-surgical treatment failed, Dr. Wester

performed total left-shoulder replacement surgery. Lockhart then completed physical

therapy. He returned to Dr. Bridges for treatment and pain management, and Dr.

Bridges assisted him in applying for Social Security disability benefits. The Social

Security Administration found Lockhart disabled as of the day after the collision. 

-2-

Appellate Case: 15-3156 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/25/2016 Entry ID: 4441243 
Lockhart sued under the FTCA. Before trial, the United States retained Dr.

Thomas B. Corsolini as a medical expert. He examined Lockhart and prepared an

expert report, admitted at trial. Dr. Corsolini testified that the collision was—at

most—responsible for 20% of Lockhart’s “need for the later left shoulder surgery”

“citing the advanced arthritic changes that were found.” He stated “there is no way

it [the collision] would cause all of the abnormalities that were found on diagnostic

testing” and “pointed out that those findings would have required years to develop.”

Dr. Corsolini further testified that “the need for the left shoulder joint replacement

would have arisen and been necessary due to degenerative changes at the left

shoulder whether or not Mr. Lockhart had been in the accident.” However, Dr.

Corsolini did say that the collision “could have contributed a portion toward the need

for the surgery.” 

The district court found the United States 100% at fault for the collision. It

also found that the medical opinions supported Lockhart’s claim that the collision

contributed to his left-shoulder issues and that Lockhart’s injury was a reasonably

foreseeable consequence ofthe collision. Although finding the United States at fault,

the court concluded that the collision resulted in, at most, 20% of “Lockhart’s need

for the shoulder replacement.” Multiplying Lockhart’s total medical expenses of

$53,968.42 by20%,the court awarded $10,793.68 in compensatorymedical damages. 

The court also awarded $10,000 for pain and suffering, and $22,000 for lost income. 

Lockhart appeals, seeking all his medical expenses and an increased award for pain

and suffering. 

The FTCA gives district courts jurisdiction over claims against the United

States for money damages “for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death

caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the

Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under

circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the

claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” 

-3-

Appellate Case: 15-3156 Page: 3 Date Filed: 08/25/2016 Entry ID: 4441243 
Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. 392, 398 (1988), quoting 28 U.S.C. §

1346(b)(1). Because the collision occurred in Missouri, Missouri substantive law

applies. See id. Under the FTCA, “Damages are determined according to the relevant

state law.” Wilkinson v. United States, 564 F.3d 927, 934 (8th Cir. 2009). See also

Limone v. United States, 579 F.3d 79, 103 (1st Cir. 2009) (“We approach the awards

at issue here mindful that, in an FTCA case, both the nature of allowable damages and

the measure of those damages are drawn from state law. . . . Under Massachusetts

law, the proper measure of damages is, within wide limits, committed to the sound

discretion of the trier of fact.”). 

This court reviews the district court’s findings of fact for clear error, and its

conclusions of law de novo. Washington v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 183 F.3d

868, 872 (8th Cir. 1999). “This court has recognized that while ‘the amount of

damages entered in a non-jury case is a finding of fact and therefore subject to the

‘clearly erroneous’ standard of review set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a), any

application of that general standard must take account of the special circumstances

in which that kind of factual finding is rendered.’” Gonzalez v. United States, 681

F.3d 949, 952 (8th Cir. 2012), quoting Overton v. United States, 619 F.2d 1299, 1304

(8th Cir. 1980). 

According to Lockhart, the district court improperly applied Missouri law by

concluding that Lockhart’s shoulder injury was only 20% attributable to the collision

(thus awarding only 20% of the medical expenses), after finding the government

100% at fault for the collision. Lockhart asserts Missouri precedent does not allow

this reduction. He believes that the district court incorrectly used a “direct result”

standard instead of the correct “directly caused or directly contributed to cause”

standard. See Missouri Approved Jury Instructions (Civil) 4.01, 19.01 (7th ed.)

(“MAI”). 

-4-

Appellate Case: 15-3156 Page: 4 Date Filed: 08/25/2016 Entry ID: 4441243 
In Missouri, for multiple causes of damages, the “direct result” jury instruction

must be changed to “directly caused or directly contributed to cause” in both the

liability and damages instructions. See Carlson v. K-Mart Corp., 979 S.W.2d 145,

148 (Mo. banc 1998) (“If the ‘direct result’ language is confusing in the verdict

director when there are multiple causes of injury, it is equally so in the damages

instruction.”), cited in MAI 4.01 n.3, 19.01 n.2. The jury instruction reads: “If you

find in favor of plaintiff, then you must award plaintiff such sum as you believe will

fairly and justly compensate plaintiff for any damages you believe plaintiff sustained

that [the collision] directly caused or directly contributed to cause.” MAI 4.01 n.3.

See also MAI 19.01 n.2. True, in the bench trial required by the FTCA, the district

court—not a jury—determines the damages. See 28 U.S.C. § 2402. However, the

Missouri Approved Jury Instructions, as created and interpreted by the Missouri

Supreme Court, are the substantive law of the state. See Eubank v. Kansas City

Power & Light Co., 626 F.3d 424, 427 (8th Cir. 2010) (“When determining the scope

of Missouri law, we are bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court of Missouri.”).

Distinguishing “direct result” from “directly caused or directly contributed to

cause,” Lockhart emphasizes Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hosp., 863 S.W.2d 852

(Mo. banc 1993). Discussing foreseeability in proximate causation, the Callahan

court quoted the Prosser treatise: “It is as if a magic circle were drawn about the

person, and one who breaks it, even by so much as a cut on the finger, becomes liable

for all resulting harm to the person, although it may be death.” Id. at 865-66, quoting

Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 43, at 291 (5th ed. 1984). Illustrating the concept,

the Missouri Supreme Court discusses a case where a “blow to [the plaintiff’s] back

. . . . activated a dormant cancer in his adrenal gland which caused the cancer to

spread throughout his body.” Id. at 866, discussing Heppner v. Atchison, Topeka

and Santa Fe Railway Co., 297 S.W.2d 497 (Mo. 1956). That case “held that the jury

could find that the railroad’s negligence activated a latent disease and that the

railroad was liable for all of the resulting harm that flowed from its negligence.” Id.

(emphasis added). Lockhart contends that under the “directly caused or directly

-5-

Appellate Case: 15-3156 Page: 5 Date Filed: 08/25/2016 Entry ID: 4441243 
contributed to cause” standard—and the “magic circle” standard—Missouri law

required the district court to fully compensate him for his injury, since the district

court found the collision contributed to the injury. 

“It istrue that a defendant is generally liable for the aggravation of pre-existing

conditions caused by his negligence or a statutory violation.” Miller v. Gulf, Mobile

& Ohio Railroad Co., 386 S.W. 2d 97, 102 (Mo. 1964). “Under Missouri law, the

plaintiff in a personal injury action ‘is not entitled to recover damages for conditions

that are due entirely and wholly to previous disease or injuries,’ but ‘may recover for

the aggravation of existing ailments caused by the negligent acts of [the] defendant.’”

Kingman v. Dillard’s, Inc., 643 F.3d 607, 612 (8th Cir. 2011), quoting Schide v.

Gottschick, 43 S.W.2d 777, 782 (Mo. 1931) (emphasis added). 

The controlling Missouri Supreme Court case is Carlson v. K-Mart Corp., 979

S.W.2d 145 (Mo. banc 1998). While at K-Mart, Georgia Carlson “bent down to

examine some merchandise on a lower shelf” when “boxes containing crockpots fell

on her from an upper shelf, striking her on the face and head and causing her to fall

to the floor.” Id. After that incident, an MRI showed she had degenerative disk

disease. Id. at 146. Later that year, she was involved in a car accident. Id. “At trial,

the primary dispute was what part each of these three factors, possible pre-existing

degenerative disk disease, the K-Mart incident, and the automobile accident, played

in Ms. Carlson’s present back injury.” Id. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed the

damage award due to a jury instruction error. Id. at 148. The trial court had

instructed the jury that the defendant “is liable if he ‘directly caused or contributed

to cause damage’ to the plaintiff, but that the measure of such damage is only that

which ‘directly resulted’ from such conduct.” Id. Due to the multiple potential

causes of injury, the Missouri Supreme Court explained that a “direct result” damage

instruction—like a “direct result” liability instruction—would confuse the jury. Id. 

-6-

Appellate Case: 15-3156 Page: 6 Date Filed: 08/25/2016 Entry ID: 4441243 
K-Mart argued that the “directly caused or contributed to cause” damage

instruction would make “it liable for all injuries ever suffered by the plaintiff to her

back, whether or not they were caused by K-Mart’s negligence.” Id. The Missouri

Supreme Court ruled:

As noted above, the proposed damage instruction is properly modified

to allow recovery only for that damage directly caused or contributed to

by defendant’s negligence. On the basis of this instruction, K-Mart

remains perfectly free to argue, as it did here, that the current condition

of plaintiff’s back was not directly caused or contributed to by its

negligence, and that the automobile accident or natural degenerative

disk disease caused plaintiff to suffer damage that was neither caused

nor contributed to by the K-Mart incident.

Id. The court emphasized the purpose of modifying the jury instruction: to help the

jury “identify which causes of injury the plaintiff is entitled to be compensated for.” 

Id. at 147. 

Under Carlson, the Missouri standard of an award for “directly caused or

directly contributed to cause” means that the jury can determine that damages

suffered solely due to a pre-existing condition were “neither caused nor contributed

to by” a collision. See id. at 148. Based on the evidence here, the district court found

the collision contributed to only 20% of Lockhart’s need for shoulder surgery.

Lockhart’s own orthopedic surgeon opined that imaging indicated advanced

degeneration that developed over time and did not result from the traumatic

injury—even if the collision triggered symptoms in the left shoulder. The

government’s expert testified that “the need for the left shoulder joint replacement

would have arisen and been necessary due to degenerative changes at the left

shoulder whether or not Mr. Lockhart had been in the accident.” As in Carlson, the

district court was “perfectly free” to find “that the . . . natural [arthritic condition]

caused plaintiff to suffer damage that was neither caused nor contributed to by” the

-7-

Appellate Case: 15-3156 Page: 7 Date Filed: 08/25/2016 Entry ID: 4441243 
collision. See Carlson, 979 S.W.2d at 148. The district court identified “which

causes of injury the plaintiff is entitled to be compensated for” in determining the

damage award. See id. at 147. See also Kingman, 643 F.3d at 613 (applying

Missouri law and stating that a plaintiff “is not entitled to recover damages for

conditions that are due entirely and wholly to previous disease or injuries”); Sanders

v. Ahmed, 364 S.W.3d 195, 212 (Mo. banc 2012) (describing a situation “in which

an injury occurs and the negligence of a third party aggravates the initial injury. In

such a situation, the third party would be liable only for the damage attributable to the

aggravation and not for the initial injury.”). The district court did not err in

concluding that, under Missouri law, it could find 80% of the damages attributable

to an unrelated pre-existing condition and 20% of the damages attributable to the

aggravation caused by the collision. 

Lockhart also argues that the district court erred in reducing by 80% both the

medical expense and pain and suffering awards. 

First, Lockhart contendsthat the 80% reduction should apply only to the actual

cost of the shoulder replacement surgery ($36,528.42), not the “unrelated” expenses

(over $17,000), because Dr. Corsolini used the 20% figure only in relation to the

actual surgery. “After a bench trial, this court reviews the district court’s findings of

fact for clear error.” Kingman, 643 F.3d at 611. “A finding [of fact] is clearly

erroneous when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the

entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been

committed.” Id. “The reviewing court must give due regard to the trial court’s

opportunity to judge the witness’s credibility. . . . A district court’s choice between

two permissible views of evidence cannot be clearly erroneous.” Id. at 612. At trial,

Dr. Corsolini testified that the 20% applied to the “need for the later left shoulder

surgery.” This need encompasses the medical expenses before and after the

surgery—such as the post-surgery physical therapy noted by the district court. The

district court did not clearly err in concluding that “Lockhart’s total for medical

-8-

Appellate Case: 15-3156 Page: 8 Date Filed: 08/25/2016 Entry ID: 4441243 
expenses incurred in connection with his left shoulder injury totals $53,968.42” and

applying the 20% to that amount. 

Second, Lockhart argues the district court improperly reduced the pain-andsuffering award by 80%. The district court awarded $10,000 for pain and suffering. 

In Missouri, an award of medical expenses should be accompanied by an award of

pain-and-suffering damages “commensurate with the nature and extent of the

injuries.” Davidson v. Schneider, 349 S.W.2d 908, 913 (Mo. 1961). 

This court generally reviews a district court’s award of “non-economic

damages under the FTCA for abuse of discretion.” Wilkinson, 564 F.3d at 934, citing

St. John v. United States, 240 F.3d 671, 678-79 (8th Cir. 2001) (relying on Gasperini

v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 419 (1996), which held that “appellate control

of the trial court’s ruling [on excessiveness or inadequacy of a jury award is] limited

to review for ‘abuse of discretion.’”). This court “must defer to the district court’s

assessment of damages unless there is plain injustice or a monstrous or shocking

result.” Id. See also Gonzalez, 681 F.3d at 952. See generally Limone, 579 F.3d at

102 (describing how a review of non-economic damagesin an FTCA claimhas “three

facets”: “Raw findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. . . . Claimed errors of law

engender de novo review. . . . The third facet of the standard of review relates to

matters of judgment, which are reviewed for abuse of discretion.”).

In determining the pain-and-suffering amount, the district court reasoned that

“credible record evidence indicates that at the time he was discharged from his

physical therapy after his shoulder surgery, Lockhart reported no shoulder pain. 

Further, Lockhart’s shoulder is no longer being treated by a specialist related to the

shoulder injury.” The district court found that the award of “past medical expenses

is proper,” and thus concluded $10,000 was “commensurate with the nature and

extent of Lockhart’s injuries attributable to the Government.” Because this court

finds the medical expense damage award was not in error, the district court did not

-9-

Appellate Case: 15-3156 Page: 9 Date Filed: 08/25/2016 Entry ID: 4441243 
abuse its discretion in awarding $10,000 for pain and suffering. The award is not “a

plain injustice or a monstrous or shocking result.”

* * * * * * *

The judgment is affirmed.

______________________________

-10-

Appellate Case: 15-3156 Page: 10 Date Filed: 08/25/2016 Entry ID: 4441243