Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-02657/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-02657-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Paul Belbin
Plaintiff
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

PAUL BELBIN, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant. 

No. 2:13-cv-02657-AC 

ORDER 

 Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”) denying applications for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and 

Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act 

(“Act”), respectively. For the reasons discussed below, the court will deny plaintiff’s motion for 

summary judgment and grant the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment. 

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiff, born December 13, 1983, applied on September 2, 2010 for DIB and SSI, 

alleging disability beginning March 19, 2003. Administrative Record (“AR”) 144, 147. Plaintiff 

alleged he was unable to work due to his bipolar disorder, manic depression, stomach, back and 

neck pain, bowel problems, insomnia, fatigue, intense anger, vertigo, sleep apnea, and 

posttraumatic stress disorder. AR 187. In a decision dated August 30, 2012, the ALJ determined 

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that plaintiff was not disabled. AR 32. The ALJ made the following findings (citations to 20 

C.F.R. omitted): 

1. Born on December 13, 1983, the claimant had not attained age 

22 as of March 19, 2003, the alleged onset date. 

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

since March 19, 2003, the alleged onset date. 

3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: learning 

disorder, borderline intellectual functioning, bipolar disorder, and 

posttraumatic stress disorder.

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed 

impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned 

finds that the claimant had the residual functional capacity to 

perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the 

following nonexertional limitations: the claimant can perform 

simple, repetitive tasks. He can interact with supervisors, but can 

occasionally work with coworkers and the public. He may initially 

require additional instructions to learn tasks but is able to learn 

simple, repetitive tasks. The claimant is able to maintain regular 

attendance. He cannot work in a competitive environment with 

quotas or pacing. 

6. The claimant has no past relevant work. 

7. The claimant was born on December 13, 1983 and was 19 years 

old, which is defined as a younger individual age 18-49, on the 

alleged disability onset date. 

8. The claimant has limited education and is able to communicate 

in English. 

9. Transferability of job skills is not an issue because the claimant 

does not have past relevant work. 

10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, 

and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in 

significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can 

perform. 

11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the 

Social Security Act, from March 19, 2003, through the date of this 

decision. 

AR 16–32. 

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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

 Born on December 13, 1983, plaintiff was 19 years old on the alleged onset date of 

disability and 28 at the hearing before the ALJ. AR 39, 144. Plaintiff has some high school 

education. AR 47. He has no past relevant work. AR 31. 

III. ISSUES PRESENTED 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed the following errors in finding plaintiff not 

disabled: (1) the ALJ failed to consider all of plaintiff’s impairments in assessing plaintiff’s RFC 

and, as a result, posed an incomplete hypothetical to the vocational expert; (2) the ALJ 

improperly evaluated the opinions of plaintiff’s treating physicians; and (3) the ALJ failed to 

develop the record with regard to the time period between December 2010 and January 2011. 

IV. LEGAL STANDARDS 

The court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether (1) it is based on 

proper legal standards pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and (2) substantial evidence in the record 

as a whole supports it. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial 

evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Connett v. Barnhart, 340 

F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2003). It means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007), 

quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). “The ALJ is responsible for 

determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving ambiguities.” 

Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). “The court will 

uphold the ALJ’s conclusion when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008). 

The record as a whole must be considered, Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th 

Cir. 1986), and both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the ALJ’s 

conclusion weighed. See Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). The court may not 

affirm the ALJ’s decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. Id.; see 

also Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). If substantial evidence supports the 

administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence supporting a finding of either disability 

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or nondisability, the finding of the ALJ is conclusive, see Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 

1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987), and may be set aside only if an improper legal standard was applied in 

weighing the evidence. See Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988). 

V. ANALYSIS 

A. RFC Assessment 

Plaintiff contends the ALJ failed to include all of plaintiff’s impairments in determining 

his residual functional capacity. In particular, plaintiff asserts the ALJ failed to account for 

limitations suggested by Drs. Terrini and Daigle. In determining a claimant’s RFC, an ALJ must 

assess all the evidence to determine what capacity the claimant has for work despite her 

impairments. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a). The court will affirm the ALJ’s 

determination of plaintiff’s RFC if the ALJ applied the proper legal standard and her decision is 

supported by substantial evidence. See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005). 

An examining physician’s opinion alone constitutes substantial evidence if it rests on that 

physician’s own independent examination. See Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th 

Cir. 2001). Hypothetical questions posed to a vocational expert must set out all the substantial, 

supported limitations and restrictions of the particular claimant. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 

at 747, 756 (9th Cir. 1989). However, the ALJ need only include the limitations that he or she 

finds to exist. Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001). 

The ALJ assessed plaintiff’s RFC as follows: 

[T]he claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform a full 

range of work at all exertional levels but with the following 

nonexertional limitations: the claimant can perform simple, 

repetitive tasks. He can interact with supervisors, but can 

occasionally work with coworkers and the public. He may initially 

require additional instructions to learn tasks but is able to learn 

simple, repetitive tasks. The claimant is able to maintain regular 

attendance. He cannot work in a competitive work environment 

with quotas or pacing. 

AT 20. In making this determination, the ALJ took into account those limitations for which there 

was support in the record, including, to varying degrees, the medical opinions of Drs. Regazzi, 

Daigle, Richwerger, Bible, and Terrini. AR 22–31. 

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Dr. Michelina Regazzi performed a psychological evaluation on January 22, 2002, when 

plaintiff was 18 years old. AR 477. In the course of the evaluation, plaintiff’s performance on 

the Vineland Adaptive Behavior test revealed that he communicated at an age-equivalency of 8 

years old, had the daily living skills of a 12 year old, and the social skills of a 13 year old. AR 

479–80. His adaptive behavior composite was that of an 11 year old. AR 480. Dr. Regazzi 

diagnosed plaintiff with a learning disorder, borderline intellectual functioning, and a Global 

Assessment Functioning (“GAF”) of 68.1 AR 481. She opined that plaintiff would have the 

following capabilities and limitations: 

Paul is capable of understanding and carrying out simple and twopart instructions. He is capable of communicating appropriately 

with others. He is capable of interacting appropriately with others 

at least in a one-on-one setting. He has a relative strength in 

vocabulary, practical knowledge, and factual knowledge. He seems 

motivated to do well and would benefit from a job training 

program. 

Paul cannot be expected to learn at the rate of his peers. He would 

have difficulty performing tasks at length without supervision. He 

would have difficulty understanding and carrying out complex 

tasks. 

AR 481–82. The ALJ concluded that Dr. Regazzi’s opinion was supported by the medical 

evidence and consistent with her own objective findings. AR 24. 

Dr. Bradley Daigle performed a psychiatric evaluation of plaintiff on June 27, 2003. AR 

266. Dr. Daigle noted that plaintiff has had lifelong learning and performance problems. AR 

266. He stated that plaintiff is “essentially functionally illiterate and has been said to function in 

the borderline intellectual range” (AT 266) and that “in general, he may be able to make some 

progress in a sheltered situation” (AT 270). Dr. Daigle diagnosed plaintiff with learning disorder, 

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 GAF is a scale reflecting the “psychological, social, and occupational functioning on a 

hypothetical continuum of mental health-illness.” Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental 

Disorders at 34 (4th ed. 2000) (“DSM IV-TR”). A 61-70 GAF indicates “[s]ome mild symptoms 

(e.g., depressed mood and mild insomnia) OR some difficulty in social, occupational, or school 

functioning (e.g., occasional truancy, or theft within the household), but generally functioning 

pretty well, has some meaningful interpersonal relationships.” Id. 

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borderline intellectual functioning, and assessed his global functioning at 60.2 AR 270. He 

opined that plaintiff is slightly limited in his ability to: understand, remember, and carry out 

simple 1-or 2-step job instructions; relate and interact with supervisors, co-workers and the 

public; and adapt to the stresses common to a normal work environment. AR 271. Dr. Daigle 

also opined that plaintiff is moderately limited in his ability to: follow detailed and complex 

instructions; maintain concentration, attention, persistence and pace; and associate with day-today work activity, including attendance and safety. AR 271. Plaintiff contends the ALJ’s RFC 

assessment failed to account for Dr. Daigle’s opinion that plaintiff may be able to make some 

progress in a sheltered situation with limited expectations. However, the ALJ’s limitation that 

plaintiff not work in a competitive work environment with quotas or pacing reasonably accounts 

for this portion of Dr. Daigle’s opinion. 

Dr. David Richwerger performed a psychological evaluation of plaintiff on December 29, 

2004. AR 277. Dr. Richwerger also noted plaintiff’s learning problems. AR 277. He performed 

several tests, including the Bender-Gestalt, II, Trails A and Trail B, the Wechsler Adult 

Intelligence Scale, III (WAIS-III) and the Wechsler Memory Scale, III. AR 277. Plaintiff 

received a score of 66 on the Bender-Gestalt-II and a percentile rank of 1. AR 280. With respect 

to Trails A and Trails B, plaintiff scored within normal limits and borderline range, respectively. 

AR 280. As to the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, III, plaintiff had a verbal IQ of 86, a 

performance IQ of 77 and full scale IQ score of 80. AR 280. These placed plaintiff in the 18th, 

6th and 9th percentiles, respectively. AR 280. Dr. Richwerger noted that plaintiff scored at the 

higher end of the borderline range with his verbal skills somewhat better than his nonverbal skills. 

AR 280. With regard to the Wechsler Memory Scale, III, plaintiff scored in the borderline range 

on tasks of concentration and memory. AR 281. Dr. Richwerger diagnosed plaintiff with 

adjustment disorder with mixed disturbance of emotions and conduct, borderline intellectual 

functioning, and antisocial personality traits. AR 281. He further noted that there were 

 

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 51 to 60 GAF indicates “[moderate] symptoms (e.g., flat affect and circumstantial speech, 

occasional panic attacks) OR moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning 

(e.g., few friends, conflicts with peers or co-workers).” DSM IV-TR at 34. 

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employment-related concerns and assessed plaintiff’s GAF was 653 at the time of the exam. AR 

281. As to plaintiff’s functional assessment, Dr. Richwerger opined as follows: 

The claimant appears to have a moderate impairment in his ability 

to perform detailed and complex tasks. 

The claimant appears to have no impairment in his ability to 

perform simple and repetitive tasks. 

The claimant appears to have slight impairment in his ability to 

perform work activities on a consistent basis. 

The claimant appears to have no impairment in his ability to 

perform work activities without special supervision. 

The claimant appears to have slight impairment in his ability to 

complete a normal workday or workweek without interruption from 

a psychiatric condition. 

The claimant appears to have slight impairment in his ability to 

understand and accept instructions from supervisors. 

The claimant appears to have slight impairment in his ability to 

interact with coworkers and the public. 

The claimant appears to have no impairment in his ability to 

maintain regular attendance in the workplace. 

The claimant appears to have slight impairment in his ability to deal 

with the usual stresses encountered in competitive work. 

The claimant appears to be capable of managing his own funds. 

AR 281–82. 

 Dr. Charlotte Bible performed a psychiatric review on January 18, 2005. AR 283. Dr. 

Bible diagnosed plaintiff with adjustment disorder and borderline intellectual functioning. AR 

283. She opined that plaintiff was moderately restricted in his daily activities; experienced 

moderate difficulties in maintaining social functioning; had moderate difficulties in maintaining, 

concentration, persistence, or pace; and would not experience any episodes of decompensation of 

an extended duration. AR 290. On that same day, Dr. Bible completed a mental residual 

functional capacity assessment. AR 293. She opined that plaintiff was moderately limited in his 

ability to: understand and remember detailed instructions, carry out detailed instructions, maintain 

 

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 See supra footnote 1. 

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attention and concentration for extended periods, perform activities within a schedule, maintain 

regular attendance, be punctual within customary tolerances, work in coordination with or 

proximity to others without being distracted by them, complete a normal workday and workweek 

without interruptions from psychologically-based symptoms and perform at a consistent pace 

without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods, interact with the general public, get 

along with coworkers or peers without distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes, and 

respond appropriately to changes in the work setting. AR 293–94. 

 On December 3, 2010, Dr. Steven J. Terrini performed a comprehensive psychiatric 

evaluation of plaintiff. AR 345. Dr. Terrini diagnosed plaintiff with bipolar disorder, chronic 

posttraumatic stress disorder, panic disorder, and had features of antisocial personality disorder. 

Dr. Terrini assessed plaintiff’s global functioning was 544 at the time. AR 348. Dr. Terrini 

assessed plaintiff’s functional limitations as follows: 

The claimant may be capable of managing his funds, although it is 

likely his arithmetic skills are somewhat below average. 

The claimant should be able to perform simple and repetitive tasks. 

He may have some trouble with detailed and complex tasks due to 

his psychiatric symptoms. 

The claimant should be able to accept instructions from supervisors. 

He may have trouble working with coworkers and the public, as he 

claimed he does not trust other people. 

The claimant may have trouble performing work activities on a 

consistent basis without special or additional instruction due to his 

psychiatric symptoms. 

The claimant may be able to maintain regular attendance in a 

workplace, although he has a minimal work history. He is likely 

mildly to moderately impaired in his ability to complete a normal 

workday and workweek without interruptions from a psychiatric 

condition. 

The claimant is likely moderately impaired in his ability to deal 

with the stress encountered in a competitive workplace. 

AT 349. Plaintiff asserts the ALJ failed to account for Dr. Terrini’s opinion with regard to 

plaintiff’s ability to perform work activities without special or additional instruction. However, 

 

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 See supra footnote 2. 

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the ALJ stated that plaintiff might initially require additional instructions to learn simple, 

repetitive tasks. AR 20. This finding reasonably accounts for Dr. Terrini’s opinion regarding 

plaintiff’s need for additional instruction. Plaintiff also contends the ALJ failed to account for Dr. 

Terrini’s opinion regarding plaintiff’s work-attendance limitations. However, plaintiff does not 

present a full picture of Dr. Terrini’s opinion with respect to these limitations. As stated above, 

Dr. Terrini opined that plaintiff may be able to maintain regular attendance in a workplace, which 

seems to contradict the opinion that plaintiff would miss work because of his psychiatric 

condition. See AR 20. 

As demonstrated above, the ALJ reasonably accounted for the limitations expressed in the 

opinions of Drs. Regazzi, Daigle, Richwerger, Bible, and Terrini. For the reasons stated, the 

ALJ’s RFC assessment was supported by substantial evidence. 

B. Medical Opinions 

Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred in evaluating the opinions of his treating physicians. 

There are three types of physicians relevant to disability determinations: treating physicians, 

examining physicians, and nonexamining physicians. “If a treating doctor’s opinion is not 

contradicted by another doctor (i.e., there are no other opinions from examining or nonexamining 

sources), it may be rejected only for ‘clear and convincing’ reasons supported by substantial 

evidence in the record.” See Ryan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th 

Cir.2008); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir.1996). “If the ALJ rejects a treating or 

examining physician’s opinion that is contradicted by another doctor, he must provide specific, 

legitimate reasons based on substantial evidence in the record.” Valentine v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 692 (9th Cir.2009); Ryan, 528 F.3d at 1198. 

“[T]he medical opinions of a claimant's treating physicians are entitled to special weight.” 

Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421 (9th Cir.1988). If the ALJ disregards a treating physician's 

opinion, the ALJ must “set[ ] out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting 

clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Id. (quoting Cotton v. 

Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1408 (9th Cir.1986)). Moreover, “[t]he ALJ need not accept the opinion 

of any physician, including a treating physician, if that opinion is brief, conclusory, and 

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inadequately supported by clinical findings.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 

2002). “To evaluate whether an ALJ properly rejected a medical opinion, in addition to 

considering its source, the court considers whether (1) contradictory opinions are in the record; 

and (2) clinical findings support the opinions.” Esposito v. Astrue, 2012 WL 1027601, CIV S10-2862-EFB at *3 (E.D.Cal. Mar. 26, 2012). 

A nonexamining physician’s function is to read medical evidence in a claimant’s case 

records, decide whether or not the claimant’s impairments meet or equal the Listings, and 

determine the claimant’s Residual Functional Capacities. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(e)(1)(i). Because 

nonexamining physicians do not have the benefit of hearing the claimant's complaints of pain, 

their opinions as to claimant’s pain are of “very limited value.” Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 

957 (9th Cir. 1993). 

Shirley Rigg, a family nurse practitioner, treated plaintiff with respect to several physical 

illnesses from July 2011 to June 2012. AR 524–535. Rigg wrote a note, dated March 23, 2012, 

stating that plaintiff “suffers from significant mental health issues which prevent him from being 

gainfully employed.” AR 484. Rigg also stated that plaintiff suffered from bipolar disorder and 

borderline personality disorder, and that he would be unemployable from March 23, 2012 to 

March 23, 2013. AR 484. The ALJ did not recognize the signature on the note but addressed the 

opinion nonetheless, giving it little weight because it “conflicts with every acceptable medical 

source opinion in the medical evidence of record and with objective findings including the results 

of two separate batteries of psychometric tests.” AR 30. 

Plaintiff contends that Rigg’s note, suggesting plaintiff was “unemployable” due to 

bipolar disorder, does not conflict with all the medical source opinions. Plaintiff cites his 

treatment at El Hogar Community Services, El Hogar’s Guesthouse Services Program, Guest 

House Homeless Services program, and at the Primary Care Clinic. Plaintiff asserts that these 

medical sources, including the opinion of consultative examiner Dr. Terrini, all diagnosed 

plaintiff with bipolar disorder and thus Dr. Rigg’s note is consistent with medical source 

opinions. This argument misses the mark. The ALJ rejected Rigg’s note with regard to the 

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opinion that plaintiff was “unemployable,” not with respect to the diagnoses given in the note. 

AR 30. 

Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ failed to articulate clear and convincing reasons for 

rejecting Rigg’s opinion, or, in the alternative, failed to articulate specific and legitimate reasons 

for doing so. As an initial matter, Rigg’s opinion regarding plaintiff’s employability is 

contradicted by Drs. Regazzi, Daigle, Richwerger, and Terrini. All opined that plaintiff could 

perform simple jobs albeit with limitation, and could with some difficulty carry out simple 

instructions from his supervisors. See e.g., AR 481–82 (Dr. Regazzi’s opinion that plaintiff could 

perform simple tasks); 271 (Dr. Daigle describing plaintiff’s work limitations as slight or 

moderate); 281–82 (Dr. Richwerger describing plaintiff’s mental impairments as nonexistent, 

slight or moderate); 349 (Dr. Terrini opining that plaintiff could perform simple and repetitive 

tasks and could accept instructions from supervisors). In light of the conflict, the ALJ was 

required to provide specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting Rigg’s opinion. 

As noted by the Commissioner, Rigg was a family nurse practitioner who treated plaintiff 

for his physical ailments. She did not conduct psychological testing or a psychiatric evaluation, 

nor did she provide treatment for plaintiff’s mental health concerns. The several mental health 

professionals who evaluated plaintiff with regard to his mental impairments opined that plaintiff 

had the capacity to perform simple work. Relying on the opinions of those mental health 

professionals and their objective findings, the ALJ gave Rigg’s opinion little weight because it 

contradicted the opinions and objective findings of the appropriate specialists. AR 22–31. These 

are specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting Rigg’s opinion, and are supported by substantial 

evidence. There was no error in the ALJ’s evaluation of the medical opinions. 

C. Duty to Develop the Record 

Plaintiff contends the ALJ failed to develop the record with respect to plaintiff’s mental 

health treatment records from December 2008 to January 2011. The ALJ has a duty “to fully and 

fairly develop the record and to assure the claimant's interests are considered.” Brown v. Heckler, 

713 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir. 1983). “The ALJ must be ‘especially diligent’ when the claimant is 

unrepresented . . . .” McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 885 (9th Cir. 2011). The duty to develop 

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the record is “triggered only when there is ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate 

to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence.” Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459–60 (9th 

Cir. 2001). “Ambiguous evidence, or the ALJ’s own finding that the record is inadequate to 

allow for proper evaluation of the evidence, triggers the ALJ’s duty to conduct an appropriate 

inquiry.” Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1150. “A specific finding of ambiguity or inadequacy of the 

record is not necessary to trigger this duty to inquire, where the record establishes ambiguity or 

inadequacy.” McLeod, 640 F.3d at 885. “The ALJ may discharge this duty in several ways, 

including: subpoeanaing the claimant’s physicians, submitting questions to the claimant’s 

physicians, continuing the hearing, or keeping the record open after the hearing to allow 

supplementation of the record.” Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1150 (citations omitted). Generally, 

there must be some objective evidence suggesting a condition that could have a material impact 

on the disability decision. See Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1288 (9th Cir. 1996); Wainwright 

v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 939 F.2d 680, 682 (9th Cir.1991). The ALJ's decision may 

be set aside due to his failure to develop the record if the claimant can demonstrate prejudice or 

unfairness as a result of said failure. Vidal v. Harris, 637 F.2d 710, 713 (9th Cir.1991). 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ had a duty to order mental health treatment records from the 

jail and from Genesis counseling, because there are references in plaintiff’s other treatment notes 

to treatment provided by those entities. Specifically, other records reflect that plaintiff’s best 

medication response to his borderline personality disorder occurred when he was in jail receiving 

Paxil and Trazadone (AT 359), and that he was referred to Genesis counseling (AT 435, 438). 

The ALJ’s duty to further develop the record with respect to these records was not 

triggered. The ALJ found that the medical evidence and opinions were consistent with each other 

over the years. AT 30 (“All recognized the claimant’s history of learning disability, borderline 

intellectual functioning, and limitations of concentration, persistence or pace and thus all limited 

the claimant to the performance of simple repetitive tasks.”). This consistency among the 

medical opinions demonstrates that the record was not ambiguous and that the ALJ could conduct 

an appropriate inquiry on the record before her. Cf. Smolen, 80 F.3d 1288 (the ALJ had a duty to 

augment the record when the basis of the opinion of plaintiff’s treating physician was unknown to 

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the ALJ); Armstrong v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 160 F.3d 587, 590 (9th Cir. 1998) 

(the ALJ had a duty to call a medical expert to help determine the onset date of disability); 

Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1150 (the ALJ was required to develop the record when opinion of nonexamining expert, upon which the ALJ heavily relied, was equivocal and suggested a more 

detailed report from plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist). Ultimately, the ALJ concluded that the 

medical records and medical opinions supported the RFC assessment. AT 30. 

Furthermore, plaintiff has not shown prejudice or unfairness resulting from the absence of 

these records. The record referencing plaintiff’s mental health treatment in jail state that plaintiff 

experienced stability from his symptoms when he was receiving Paxil and Trazadone. AT 359. 

These records support the ALJ’s conclusion that plaintiff’s “psychological symptoms were 

controlled with compliance with psychiatric medications.” AT 30. Plaintiff did not state what the 

records from Genesis counseling, if they even existed, would have stated or how those records 

would have materially impacted the disability decision. See Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1288. 

Accordingly, the ALJ did not fail to develop the record with respect to the time period between 

December 2008 and January 2011. 

VI. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 19) is denied; 

2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 22) is granted; 

and 

3. Judgment is entered for the Commissioner. 

DATED: March 2, 2015 

Case 2:13-cv-02657-AC Document 23 Filed 03/02/15 Page 13 of 13