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Parties Involved:
Sidney Bishopp
Appellee
John Breen
Appellee
District of Columbia
Appellant
William Q. Stickley
Appellee
Floyd E. Yocum
Appellee
Joseph E. Zeis
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 18, 1995 Decided June 16, 1995

No. 94-7018

SIDNEY BISHOPP, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION,

APPELLANT

Consolidated with No. 94-7165

-

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 83cv00417)

Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the

briefs was Garland Pinkston, Acting CorporationCounsel. Donna M. Murasky and John A. Payton,

Assistant Corporation Counsels, entered appearances.

Douglas B. Huron argued the cause and filed the brief for appellee. James H. Heller entered an

appearance.

Before: SILBERMAN, SENTELLE and RANDOLPH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.

SENTELLE, Circuit Judge: The District of Columbia appeals the district court's award of

damages under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1988), to

District ofColumbia firefighter Floyd Yocumfor employment discrimination in a promotiondecision.

Five white firefightersfiled this discrimination suit against the District of Columbia, claiming that the

fire department discriminated against them in filling a vacancy for Assistant Fire ChiefOperations

("AFCO"). After remand by this court to determine which of the five plaintiffs would have received

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the promotion,see Bishopp v. District of Columbia, 788 F.2d 781 (D.C. Cir. 1986), the district court

determined that John Breen, who held the position of Deputy Fire ChiefFire Marshal ("fire

marshal"), would have received the promotion to AFCO. The district court further held that appellee

Yocum would have been promoted to the fire marshal position then held by Breen had there been no

discrimination in the selection of the AFCO. Consequently, the district court awarded damages to

both Breen and Yocum. The District of Columbia challenges the award of damages to Yocum.

Because we hold that Yocum was not an actual victim of discrimination, we reverse.

I.

This case has a protracted history, reaching this court for the second time on appeal after our

remand in Bishopp v. District of Columbia, 788 F.2d 781 (D.C. Cir. 1986). While an extended recital

of the facts can be found in our earlier opinion, see 788 F.2d at 782-84, we will briefly summarize the

background before discussing those facts more pertinent to this appeal.

InAugust 1974, incumbent Assistant Fire ChiefOperations("AFCO") Doyle Harpster, one

oftwo Assistant Fire Chiefsreporting directly to the Fire Chief, retired from the District of Columbia

Fire Department. The AFCO directly supervised five Deputy Fire Chiefs ("DFC's"), three of whom

worked in the Firefighting Division and in turn supervised a number of subordinate Battalion Fire

Chiefs ("BFC's"). The fourth DFC served as fire marshal and the fifth ran the department's training

center. 788 F.2d at 782. Department policy provided that promotions to positions above the rank

of BFC were within the discretion of the mayor, but could only be filled with candidates from the

BFC rank or higher. D.C. Code Ann. § 4-302 (1981). The AFCO position was eventually filled by

a black Battalion Fire Chief, Jefferson Lewis.

In 1982, after pursuing charges with the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission, five

white firefighters, Sidney Bishopp, John Breen, William Q. Stickley, Floyd E. Yocum and Joseph E.

Zeis alleged in a complaint filed in district court that they were denied promotion to AFCO because

of their race. At the time of Lewis' selection for AFCO, Bishopp, Stickley, Zeis and Breen were

serving at the Deputy Fire Chief rank, and Yocum was serving at the lower BFC rank. Because

Yocum had served in the position longer than Lewis, allfive plaintiff-appellees were senior to Lewis.

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After hearing the evidence, the district court held that appellees had presented a prima facie

case under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), but it concluded that the

District ofColumbia had demonstrated sufficient non-discriminatoryjustification for hiring Lewis and

thus held for the District of Columbia on all counts. Bishopp v. District of Columbia, 602 F. Supp.

1401 (D.D.C. 1985). We reversed, rejecting the District of Columbia's justification for hiring Lewis

and failing to hire any of the plaintiffs as "incredible" and "farfetched," id. at 788, and remanded the

case to the district court "for further consideration, including the fashioning of an appropriate

remedy." Id. at 789.

Since that remand, we have decided Dougherty v. Barry, 869 F.2d 605 (D.C. Cir. 1989), a

similar case involving a challenge by eight Battalion Fire Chiefs to the filling of two DFC slots in

1979-80. The district court there had found liability and granted relief to each of the eight plaintiffs

asthough each had been promoted to DFC. We vacated and remanded the district court's judgment,

holding that "the extent of [the] relief granted by the district court was overly generous." Id. at 614.

Instead, in order to "more closely approximate[ ] the goal of "recreat[ing] the conditions and

relationships that would have been had there been no' unlawful discrimination," id. at 615 (quoting

Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 372 (1977)), we concluded that the district

court had two optionsin remedying the discrimination: (1) if it were able to determine with certainty

which two of the appellees would have received the promotions, it should award those two appellees

full relief and the others none; or (2) if it were unable to do so, it should divide the monetary value

of the two promotions among all qualified appellees pro rata. Id. at 615.

In aftermath ofthe Dougherty decision, the plaintiffsrevised their prayer for relief on remand,

asking the district court to provide full damages to John Breen, who plaintiffs determined was most

qualified for the AFCO position. However, plaintiffs also added a new wrinkle to their claim at this

stage. They argued that if Breen, the DFC-fire marshal, had been properly promoted to AFCO, a

vacancy would have arisen in his position of fire marshal. Plaintiffs contended that the fire marshal

vacancy would have been filled by Floyd Yocum, the most senior BFC. Thus, as a result of the initial

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1All five plaintiffs had agreed to divide the monetary value of the total award among them. 

discrimination, the District ofColumbia had in fact injured bothBreen and Yocum, plaintiffs argued.1

Plaintiffs presented expert testimony regarding the amount of damages due both Breen and Yocum.

Although the District of Columbia vehemently objected to any separate relief for Yocum, it did not

attempt to obtain further discovery or present any evidence regarding the likelihood of Yocum's

promotion to DFC.

In November 1993, the district court concluded that both Breen and Yocum were entitled to

damages. It found that because the evidence demonstrated that he was best qualified for the AFCO

position, "Unquestionably, Breen should have received the position of AFC-O in the fall of 1974."

With respect to the claim that Yocum would have been promoted to fire marshal, the district court

found that the District of Columbia "simply has not carried its burden of proofthat Yocumwould not

have been promoted to fill the vacant DFC slot. Substantially, the evidence indicates that Yocum

would have been so promoted." The court awarded Breen $244,703 and Yocum $366,134.

The District of Columbia appeals the award of damages to Yocum for the fire marshal

position. Because we conclude that Yocum was not an actual victim of discrimination by the District

of Columbia, we reverse the district court's award of damages to him.

II.

As a threshold matter, we hold that the issue of Yocum's entitlement to damagesfor the DFC

position was properly reached by the district court and is properly before us. Under Title VII, the

"trial court has authority to award appropriate relief dictated by the evidence, even though it may not

have been sought in the pleadings." Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168, 1172 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1981)

(citation omitted). We thus reject appellant's suggestion that appellees have waived this claim by not

initially raising it in the pleadings below, but instead waiting until after remand.

In determining whether a late-raised claim for relief is warranted, the court must ask whether

the party requesting relief has "improperly and substantially prejudiced the other party" by failing to

raise the claim earlier. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 424 (1975). Here, it is

apparent that the District of Columbia was not "substantially prejudiced" by plaintiffs' raising of

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Yocum'sseparate claimfor damages on remand. First, the amended claim for relief became necessary

only when Dougherty v. Barry made clear that plaintiffs' original theory of full recovery by all five

plaintiffs was no longer valid. Second, the District of Columbia could have avoided any perceived

prejudice simply by requesting further discovery or an evidentiary hearing regarding Yocum's

recovery upon remand. See Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 920 F.2d 967, 969 (D.C. Cir. 1990)

(noting district court's willingness to allow post-remand evidence concerning nondiscriminatory

rationale for employment decision). Since it never asked for either accommodation, the District of

Columbia should not now get the benefit of hindsight.

III.

Section 706(g) ofTitle VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988), providesfor "make-whole" relief

to victims of illegal employment discrimination, mandating that where a court finds that an employer

has engaged in unlawful employment practices, it may "order such affirmative action as may be

appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or

without back pay ... or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate." Make-whole

remedies, like other equitable remedies, "repair the denial of a constitutional right." Swann v.

Charlotte-Mechlenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971). Specifically, in the Title VII context,

the purpose of "make-whole" remedies is to redress "injuries suffered on account of unlawful

employment discrimination." Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 418.

Section 706(g) does not provide relief to every plaintiff who did not receive a promotion

where another person is unlawfully selected on the basis of race. Instead, section 706(g) limits

make-whole relief "only to those who have been actual victims of discrimination ...." Firefighters,

Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 580 (1984) (emphasis added); see also Lander v.

Lujan, 888 F.2d 153, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("[C]ourts must make the victim "whole' by "plac[ing

him], as near as may be, in the situation he would have occupied if the wrong had not been

committed.' ") (emphasis added). Individual members of a class of victims, like the five firefighters

here, must "demonstrate that theyhave been actualvictims ofthe discriminatory practice" before they

may recover. Stotts, 467 U.S. at 578-79. Thus, "mere membership in the disadvantaged class is

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2This case arose before adoption of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, PUB. L. 102-166, 105 Stat.

1072 (1991), which expanded remedies for victims of intentional employment discrimination. See

42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1994). Section 1981a provides that an individual victim of intentional

employment discrimination "may recover compensatory and punitive damages" in a limited

manner as authorized by the statute. Id. at § 1981a(a)(1), (b). As this case arose before their

adoption, we express no opinion today on the effect of the 1991 amendments. 

insufficient," id. at 579, to warrant recovery; rather, "each individual must prove that the

discriminatory practice had an impact on him." Id. (citing Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 367-71).

For purposes of this case, Dougherty v. Barry defines which member of the plaintiffs' class

was an "actual victim" of discrimination. Dougherty implicitly provides that, where specific findings

are possible, the number of "actual victims" of discrimination is limited to the number of positions

filled as a result of discrimination. See Dougherty, 869 F.2d at 614- 15. In that case, where two

Deputy Fire Chief positions were filled in a discriminatorymanner, the court stated that the plaintiffs'

class could recover the monetary value of no more than two DFC positions. Id. at 615. Where the

district court is able to determine which member of a plaintiffs' class would have received a promotion

absent illegaldiscrimination, then that member is entitled to full compensation and the remaining class

members receive nothing. Id. In conjunction with Supreme Court precedent, then, Dougherty

suggests that an individual plaintiff, in order to fully recover, must demonstrate both membership in

a disadvantaged class and individual economic impact as a result of denial of a promotion to the

position which is the subject of unlawful discrimination.2See Dougherty, 869 F.2d at 615; Stotts,

467 U.S. at 579.

Against this backdrop, appellees argue that all five of them were originally adjudged "actual

victims" of discrimination by the district court, a conclusion they claim is supported by this court's

statement that "allof appellants were better qualified thanLewis" undertraditionalpromotioncriteria.

See Bishopp v. District of Columbia, 788 F.2d at 786. Thus, appellants maintain that each is entitled

to any and all damagesthat may flow fromthat discrimination. In Yocum's case, appellees argue that

because he was an actual victim of discrimination with respect to the filling of the AFCO position,

he is entitled to damagesfor the District of Columbia Fire Department'sfailure to promote him to the

lower position of fire marshal that would have resulted absent the discrimination. Only then could

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the court "recreat[e] the conditions and relationships that would have been had there been no

unlawful discrimination." Dougherty, 869 F.2d at 615 (citations and internal quotations omitted).

Appellees' argument misconceives the essence of our Title VII employment discrimination

caselaw. While Dougherty doesinstruct the district court to attempt to "recreat[e] the conditions and

relationships" that would have existed absent discrimination, id., again, that remedial authority is

limited to "actual victims" of discrimination. Nowhere is the district court given authority to

"remedy" an injury to one who has not been a victim of discrimination. In this case, where

discrimination affected the promotion decision for one position, there can be only one "actual victim"

who may fully recover. See id.

The plaintiffs' class here allegesillegal discrimination onlywith respect to the AFCO position.

Because the DFC-fire marshal position never opened, plaintiffs did not, and indeed could not, allege

illegal discrimination in the filling of that position. Even under the plaintiffs' theory of the case, then,

Yocum sought damages for the DFC position only as a collateral consequence of discrimination

arising in the AFCO promotion.

Yocum'stheoryofinjuryisimplausible because he neversuffered the impact ofdiscrimination;

i.e., he would not have received the promotion to AFCO absent the discrimination in filling that

position. When the district court concluded that John Breen would have filled the AFCO vacancy

had racial considerations not tainted the selection process, it effectively determined that only John

Breen was an "actual victim" of illegal discrimination. While the other four plaintiffs may have been

members of a "disadvantaged class," the district court's determination that Breen alone was entitled

to the promotion to AFCO foreclosed their claim of victimization with respect to that position. See

Dougherty, 869 F.2d at 615. Thus, Yocum was entitled to nothing for the discrimination against

Breen. Neither Yocum nor anyone else was entitled to damages for the hypothetical failure to fill

Breen's fire marshal position because the position never opened; thus, no discrimination could have

taken place in filling that position. It is not enough to argue that the District of Columbia would have

discriminated in filling the fire marshal position if it had opened. It did not open, and no such

discrimination occurred.

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IV.

We conclude that the district court erred in awarding damages to Yocum for the District of

Columbia's failure to promote him to fire marshal. Title VII relief is limited to "actual victims" of

discrimination. Stotts, 467 U.S. at 579. Here, where only one position was filled in a discriminatory

manner, and the district court was able to conclude that another member ofthe plaintiffs' class would

have received the promotion absent discrimination, Stotts and Dougherty dictate that the remaining

class members are entitled to nothing. Thus, the district court's "collateral consequences" award to

Yocum was improper. Accordingly, the decision of the district court is vacated with respect to the

award of damages to Yocum.

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