Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01404/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01404-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Bank of America, N.A.
Defendant
Carthel Dennis Boring
Plaintiff
Nationstar Mortgage, LLC
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CARTHEL DENNIS BORING, an 

individual,

Plaintiff,

v.

NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE,LLC, a 

limited liability company; 

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., a 

national business 

association; and DOES 1-50, 

inclusive,

Defendants.

No. 2:13-cv-01404-GEB-CMK

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART NATIONSTAR’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS; GRANTING IN 

PART AND DENYING IN PART BANK OF 

AMERICA’S MOTION TO DISMISS 

Defendants Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (“Nationstar”) and 

Bank of America, N.A., (“BANA”) move separately under Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) for dismissal of claims 

in Plaintiff‟s Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). The SAC consists 

of state claims alleged against Nationstar under: California 

Civil Code sections 2924(a), 2923.7, and 2923.6; and claims 

against all Defendants for violations of the implied covenant of 

good faith and fair dealing and California Unfair Competition Law 

(“UCL”). 

I. JUDICIAL NOTICE

Nationstar submits a request for judicial notice in 

support of its dismissal motion. (Request for Judicial Notice

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(“RJN”), ECF No. 58.) Nationstar seeks judicial notice of the 

following documents recorded in the Butte County Recorder‟s 

Office: (1) the Deed of Trust recorded on October 30, 2007; (2) 

the Corporate Assignment of Deed of Trust recorded on December 

19, 2012; (3) the Substitution of Trustee recorded on January 15, 

2013; (4) the Notice of Default and Election to Sell Under Deed 

of Trust recorded on March 5, 2013; and (5) the Notice of 

Trustee‟s Sale recorded on May 31, 2013. (RJN 1:23-2:9.)

Courts “may. . . take judicial notice of „matters of 

public record.” United States v. Corinthian Colls., 655 F.3d 984, 

998-99 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); see also Fed. R. 

Evid. 201(b)(2). Since the referenced documents are matters of 

public record, the judicial notice request is granted. 

II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND JUDICIALLY NOTICED MATTERS

Each dismissal motion concerns the following 

allegations in the SAC and judicially noticed information.1

“Plaintiff refinanced [a] loan agreement for his property with 

Countrywide Bank FSB” in October 2007 and “BANK OF AMERICA . . . 

acquired Plaintiff‟s loan[] in late 2008.” (SAC ¶ 11; RJN Ex. A, 

ECF No. 58-1.) 

“[B]eginning in 2010,” Plaintiff “began to apply for a 

loan modification because his Bank of America representative told 

him that he was eligible.” (Id. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff “submit[ted] a 

 

1 BANA argues some allegations in Plaintiff‟s First Amended 

Complaint “remain[] controlling” to the extent that they are inconsistent with

allegations in the SAC. (BANA Mot. 5:5-7, ECF No. 59.) However, “[t]here is 

nothing in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to prevent a party from filing 

successive pleadings that make inconsistent or even contradictory allegations” 

“[u]nless there is a showing that the party acted in bad faith,” a showing 

BANA has not made. PAE Gov't Servs., Inc. v. MPRI, Inc., 514 F.3d 856, 858 

(9th Cir. 2007). 

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complete application,” but “Defendant BANK OF AMERICA interfered 

with Plaintiff‟s ability to submit a complete application, as it 

constantly demanded updated information or duplicate 

information.” (Id.) “[I]n April 2011, Defendant BANK OF AMERICA 

informed Plaintiff . . . the reason [his loan] was not being 

modified was because he was not delinquent in his mortgage 

payments.” (Id.) “Plaintiff was told that in order to obtain a 

modification it was absolutely necessary for [him] to stop making 

payments on his loan” and that “he would not face foreclosure or 

other negative consequences for missing payments in pursuit of a 

loan modification.” (Id.) “[I]n reliance on these 

representations, Plaintiff began missing payments” “pursuant to 

Defendant BANK OF AMERICA‟s instructions” and “submitted yet 

another loan modification application.” (Id. ¶¶ 12-13.) 

“[I]n November 2011 . . . Plaintiff learned that 

Defendant NATIONSTAR had obtained his mortgage” and when 

“NATIONSTAR informed Plaintiff that he was delinquent . . . , 

which resulted from Plaintiff‟s compliance with Defendant BANK OF 

AMERICA‟S instructions. . . . Plaintiff submitted a payment. . . 

which left [him] approximately a month late in his mortgage 

payments.” (SAC ¶ 14; RJN Ex. B, ECF No. 58-2.) “Plaintiff began 

submitting his regular monthly mortgage payment to Defendant 

NATIONSTAR. . . and continued pursuing a loan modification with 

NATIONSTAR, through his customer service manager Amber Orebaugh.” 

(SAC ¶ 14.) 

“In May 2012, Ms. Orebaugh confirmed receipt of all 

documents necessary for the [loan modification] application,” 

“but [Plaintiff] never received a written determination of his 

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eligibility for the modification.” (Id. ¶¶ 29-30.)

“[I]n August 2012, Plaintiff. . . learn[ed] that his 

account had been frozen.” (SAC ¶ 15.) Plaintiff contacted 

Nationstar, “but. . . was unable to reach anyone to remedy the 

issue.” (Id.) “On or about March 5, 2013, Defendant NATIONSTAR 

caused to be recorded a Notice of Default for Plaintiff‟s loan 

account.” (Id. ¶ 17; RJN Ex. D, ECF No. 58-4.) “Defendant 

NATIONSTAR [then] caused to be recorded a Notice of Trustee‟s 

Sale for Plaintiff‟s property, . . . indicat[ing] that 

Plaintiff‟s property would be sold at auction . . . on June 26, 

2013.” (SAC ¶ 20; RJN Ex. E, ECF No. 58-5.)

After Nationstar obtained his mortgage, “Plaintiff 

received a letter from NATIONSTAR which indicated his Single 

Point of Contact had changed to Chance Davis” “[o]n or about May 

8, 2013,” another letter “indicated his Single Point of Contact 

had changed to Ryan Revalski” “[o]n or about May 10, 2013,” and a 

third letter “indicated that Plaintiff‟s Single Point of Contact 

had . . . [changed] to Christopher Anderson” “[o]n or about June 

10, 2013.” (SAC ¶¶ 18-19, 21.) “[A]ll of Plaintiff‟s single 

points of contact failed to communicate” with Plaintiff” and “as 

a result of Defendant‟s” actions, “Plaintiff has suffered . . . 

irreparable harm. . . from the imminent loss of his property.”

(Id. ¶¶ 29, 31.)

III. LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint 

must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face. A claim has 

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 

factual content that allows the court to draw 

the reasonable inference that the defendant 

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is liable for the misconduct alleged. The 

plausibility standard is not akin to a 

“probability requirement, but it asks for 

more than a sheer possibility that a 

defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a 

complaint pleads facts that are “merely 

consistent with a defendant's liability, it 

stops short of the line between possibility 

and plausibility of entitlement to relief.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal citation 

and quotation omitted).

The Supreme Court states “[t]wo working principles 

underlie” its motion to dismiss standard. Id.

First, the tenet that a court must accept as 

true all of the allegations contained in a 

complaint is inapplicable to legal 

conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by 

mere conclusory statements, do not 

suffice....Second, only a complaint that 

states a plausible claim for relief survives 

a motion to dismiss. Determining whether a 

complaint states a plausible claim for relief 

will . . . be a context-specific task that 

requires the reviewing court to draw on its 

judicial experience and common sense. But 

where the well-pleaded facts do not permit 

the court to infer more than the mere 

possibility of misconduct, the complaint has 

alleged—but it has not shown that the pleader 

is entitled to relief.

Id. at 679.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Claim 1: Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.6 and § 2923.7

Nationstar argues Plaintiff‟s claim for damages under 

Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.6 and §2923.7 should be dismissed since 

“Plaintiff fails to allege a trustee‟s deed has recorded” and “a 

borrower cannot recover damages” without a recorded trustee‟s 

deed. (Nationstar Mot. 4:5-6; 4:23-24, ECF No. 57.) However, 

Nationstar has not shown that Plaintiff seeks damages in these 

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claims. Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that he seeks “an 

injunction of the foreclosure sale, as well as attorney‟s fees,” 

resulting from Nationstar‟s alleged violation of Cal. Civ. Code §

2923.6 and § 2923.7. (SAC ¶ 31.)

Cal. Civ. Code § 2924.12 (a)(1) prescribes: “If a 

trustee‟s deed upon sale has not been recorded, a borrower may 

bring an action for injunctive relief to enjoin a violation of 

Section . . . 2923.6 [or] 2923.7.” Section 2924(i) permits the 

court to “award a prevailing borrower reasonable attorney‟s fees 

and costs in an action brought pursuant to this section,” and 

provides “a borrower shall be deemed to have prevailed. . . if 

the borrower obtained injunctive relief or was awarded damages 

pursuant to this section.” 

Therefore, the motion is denied.

B. Claim 2: Good Faith and Fair Dealing

1. Nationstar: Failure to Accept Partial Payment

Nationstar argues Plaintiff‟s implied covenant claim 

fails since he “does not allege he attempted to cure his default 

or tender his obligations in full,” (Nationstar Reply 3:18-19, 

ECF No. 64,) and a lender “may . . . reject[]” partial payments.

(Nationstar Mot. 5:13-15.) 

Plaintiff alleges he “had been attempting to make his 

mortgage payments . . . but had been frustrated in [] doing 

[this] because his account was frozen.” (SAC ¶ 16.) Plaintiff‟s 

allegations are sufficient to withstand the dismissal motion. 

Therefore, the motion is denied. 

///

///

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2. BANA

a. Allegations of Breach

BANA seeks dismissal of Plaintiff‟s claim for breach of 

the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing arguing 

Plaintiff fails to identify any way in which BANA unfairly 

interfered with his right to receive the benefits of the contract

because “the provision which Plaintiff [] references [as being 

the term relevant to the implied covenant claim] is an [express] 

obligation upon Plaintiff to „pay [] the principal of, and 

interest on, the debt evidenced by the Note.‟” (BANA Mot. 6:3-6) 

(emphasis added). 

Plaintiff responds he has stated a claim since “[i]t 

naturally flows from Plaintiff‟s obligation to make monthly 

payments that Defendant must not unfairly interfere with the 

ability of Plaintiff to make such payments.” (Opp‟n to BANA Mot.

5:9-11; 6:23-25, ECF No. 60.) 

“It has long been recognized in California that . . . 

[under the implied covenant of good faith] neither party will do 

anything which will injure the right of the other to receive the 

benefits of the agreement.” Kransco v. Am. Empire Surplus Lines 

Ins. Co., 23 Cal. 4th 390, 400 (2000) (quoting Comunale v. 

Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal.2d 654, 658 (1958)). “A „breach 

of a specific provision of the contract is not a necessary 

prerequisite‟ to a breach of an implied covenant of good faith 

and fair dealing.” Marsu, B.V., v. Walt Disney Co., 185 F.3d 932, 

937 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Carma Dev. Inc. v. Marathon Dev. 

Cal., Inc., 2 Cal. 4th 342, 376 (1992)). 

Here, Plaintiff alleges in the FAC that BANA “induced 

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Plaintiff to stop making payments on his mortgage loan, and then 

unreasonably strung out the loan modification process while late 

fees accrued.” (SAC ¶ 36.) BANA‟s inducement of Plaintiff‟s 

breach is what Plaintiff alleges violated the covenant. 

Plaintiff‟s allegations are sufficient to defeat the motion; 

therefore, this portion of BANA‟s motion is denied. 

BANA also argues for the first time in its reply that 

Plaintiff fails to state a claim because BANA “merely respond[ed] 

to Plaintiff‟s request for information” and did not provide “an 

instruction to Plaintiff to stop making payments on his loan,” 

(BANA Reply 3:18-21, ECF No. 62.) This untimely argument is not 

addressed here because it was not “rais[ed] in [BANA‟s] main 

brief”. United States v. Cox, 7 F.3d 1458, 1463 (9th Cir. 1993). 

b. Statute of Frauds

BANA also argues Plaintiff‟s implied covenant claim is 

insufficient since “Plaintiff cannot rely on purported oral 

representations to support any modification of a contract 

required to be in writing by the statute of frauds” and Plaintiff 

does not plead the contract modification was in writing. (BANA 

Mot. 6:9-11.) 

An “agreement by a purchaser of real property to pay an 

indebtedness secured by a mortgage or deed of trust” is invalid 

unless reduced to a writing, Cal. Civ. Code § 1624(a)(6), and 

agreements to “forbear from exercising the right of foreclosure 

under a deed of trust securing an interest in real property” 

generally fall within the statute of frauds. Secrest v. Sec. 

Nat‟l Mortg. Loan Trust 2002-2, 167 Cal. App. 4th 544, 547 

(2008). 

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However, the California Supreme Court has held that “if 

there exists sufficient consideration for an oral modification 

agreement, then full performance by the promisee alone would 

suffice to render the agreement „executed‟ within the meaning of 

section 1698.” Raedeke v. Gibralter Sav. & Loan Ass‟n, 10 Cal.3d 

665, 673 (1974); see also Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1698 (b)-(c) (“a 

contract in writing may be modified by an oral agreement to the 

extent that the oral agreement is executed” and “unless the 

contract expressly provides, a contract in writing may be 

modified by an oral agreement supported by new consideration.”). 

Consideration includes “any prejudice suffered, or agreed to be 

suffered, by such person, other than such as he is at the time of 

consent lawfully bound to suffer, as an inducement to the 

promisor.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1605. The plaintiffs in Raedeke

established consideration “through the expenditure of time and 

energy” performing a task that “was not originally part of the 

bargain between plaintiff” and the defendant. 10 Cal.3d at 673.

Here, Plaintiff alleges “[BANA] informed [him] . . . in 

order to obtain a [loan] modification it was absolutely necessary 

for [him] to stop making payments on his loan[,]” and “that he

would not face foreclosure or other negative consequences for 

missing payments in pursuit of a loan modification.” (SAC ¶ 12.)

After he “began missing payments” “in reliance on [BANA‟s] 

representations,” “Plaintiff submitted yet another loan 

modification application to [BANA] . . .” (Id. ¶¶ 12-13.) 

Submitting a subsequent loan modification application after 

ceasing to make payments required the expenditure of time and 

energy that was not originally part of the loan agreement between 

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Plaintiff and BANA, and has not been shown to be insufficient 

activity to establish new consideration. See Wilson v. Household 

Fin. Corp., CIV S-12-1413 KJM AC, 2013 WL 1310589, *2 (E.D. Cal. 

Mar. 28, 2013) (filling out and submitting loan modification 

paperwork constituted new consideration); Vissuet v. Indymac 

Mortg. Serv., No. 09-cv-2321-IEG (CAB), 2010 WL 1031013, at *4 

(S.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2010) (“adequate consideration can be found 

in the form of Plaintiff‟s completion and submission of the loan 

modification application”). Therefore, this portion of BANA‟s 

motion is denied. 

c. “Series of Misrepresentations”

BANA contends “Plaintiff‟s claims regarding a purported 

„series of misrepresentations‟ are insufficiently pled” since the 

claims are “conclusory . . . [and] fall woefully short of 

pleading the requisite specificity to state a viable claim.” 

(BANA Mot. 6:19-26.) BANA cites in support of this argument two 

California state court opinions. (BANA Mot. 6:19-26) (citing 

Lazar v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.4th 631 (1996); Tarmann v. State 

Farm Mut. Aut. Ins. Co., 2 Cal. App. 4th 153, 157 (1991)).

In an action pending in federal court, “[t]he Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure apply . . . irrespective of whether the 

substantive law at issue is state or federal.” Vess v. Ciba-Geigy 

Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 2003). BANA‟s reliance 

on state court cases does not satisfy its burden of showing that 

the SAC fails to comply with the federal pleading standard. 

Therefore, this portion of the motion is denied. 

d. Plaintiff’s Contractual Obligations

BANA further argues “Plaintiff fails to establish he 

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fulfilled his obligations under the contract,” which is an 

element of Plaintiff‟s implied covenant of good faith and fair 

dealing claim. (BANA Mot. 7:3.) 

To establish a claim for breach of the implied covenant 

of good faith and fair dealing, a plaintiff must show he “did 

all, or substantially all of the significant things that the 

contract required him to do or that he was excused from having to 

do those things.” Judicial Council of California Civil Jury 

Instructions § 325 (emphasis added). “The want of performance of 

an obligation. . . is excused . . . [w]hen the debtor is induced 

not to make it, by any act of the creditor intended or naturally 

tending to have that effect, done at or before the time at which 

such performance or offer may be made, and not rescinded before 

that time.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1511(3). 

Here, Plaintiff alleges BANA “induced [him] into 

skipping payments” (SAC ¶ 2); that he made payments to BANA until 

BANA “informed Plaintiff that in order to obtain a modification 

it was absolutely necessary for Plaintiff to stop making payments 

on his loan” and “that he would not face foreclosure or other 

negative consequences for missing payments;” and “Plaintiff 

substantially performed under the loan agreements, paying his 

monthly payments on time and in full every month.” (SAC ¶¶ 37-

38.) Plaintiff‟s allegations are sufficient to allege excuse of

performance, which is an alternative to alleging substantial 

performance under the contract. Cal. Civ. Code §1511. Therefore, 

this portion of BANA‟s motion is denied. 

e. Insufficient Damages

BANA also argues Plaintiff fails to state a claim for 

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breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing because 

Plaintiff‟s damages allegations contradict what he alleged in a 

prior complaint. However, even assuming the correctness of 

BANA‟s argument, BANA has not shown that consistency is required.

Therefore, this portion of BANA‟s motion is denied. 

C. Claim 3: UCL

1. Nationstar

a. Standing

Nationstar seeks dismissal of Plaintiff‟s UCL claim 

against it arguing Plaintiff lacks standing to bring a UCL claim 

“based on Civil Code Section 2923.7” since “Plaintiff simply 

alleges harm to his credit,” which “is missing the second

required element for standing, a causal connection.” (Nationstar 

Mot. 6:10-12.)

To establish standing to prosecute a UCL claim, 

Plaintiff must show he “suffered injury in fact and has lost

money or property as a result of the unfair competition.” Cal. 

Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204; Birdsong v. Apple, Inc., 590 F.3d 955, 

959 (9th Cir. 2009). “[D]amage to credit is a „loss of money or 

property‟ within the meaning of the UCL.” Rubio v. Capital OneBank, 613 F.3d 1195, 1204 (9th Cir. 2010)

Here, Plaintiff alleges he suffered “the destruction of 

his credit” “as a result of Defendants‟ wrongful conduct,” and 

that he “has suffered, and will continue to suffer, substantial 

and irreparable injury from the imminent loss of his Property as 

a result of Defendant‟s violations of California Civil Code §

2923, et seq.” (SAC ¶¶ 31, 50.) However, the SAC does not contain 

allegations from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that

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these harms were the result of Nationstar‟s alleged violation of 

Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.7. As addressed in the Order issued June 

27, 2014, “[t]hese conclusory allegations do not plausibly show 

that Nationstar caused Plaintiff to suffer an economic injury, 

and therefore Plaintiff has not shown that he has standing to 

bring UCL claims against Nationstar predicated on violations of 

section[] 2923.” (Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part 

Nationstar‟s Motion to Dismiss FAC 11:15-20, ECF No. 53.)

Accordingly, Nationstar‟s motion is granted. 

b. “Unfair”

Nationstar also seeks dismissal of Plaintiff‟s UCL 

“unfairness” claims to the extent they are based on a violation 

of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 

(Nationstar Mot. 7:17-8:15.)

“The UCL does not define the term „unfair‟” and 

“the proper definition of „unfair‟ conduct against consumers is 

„currently in flux‟ among California courts.” Davis v. HSBC Bank 

Nevada, N.A., 691 F.3d 1152, 1169 (9th Cir. 2012); see also

Pernell v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, No. 2:09-cv-03561 FDC, 

2011 WL 318539, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2011) (discussing the 

opposing lines of cases). One approach referred to as the 

“balancing test” defines “unfair” by “examin[ing] the practice‟s 

impact on the alleged victim, balanced against the reasons, 

justifications and motives of the alleged wrongdoer.” Davis, 691 

F.3d at 1169. Another approach, which the California Supreme 

Court has only applied in the context of UCL claims brought by 

competitors requires a plaintiff to “tether[]” “any finding of 

unfairness” “to some legislative declared policy.” Id. at 1170 

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(citing Cel-Tech Commc‟n, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co., 

20 Cal.4th 163, 186 (1999).). 

In Davis, the Ninth Circuit discussed the two 

approaches when considering a dismissal motion, but did not 

decide which approach to apply since “[Plaintiff] fail[ed] to 

state a claim under either definition.” 691 F.3d at 1170. 

Here too, the appropriate approach to apply need 

not be determined since Plaintiff‟s allegations fail under 

either. Therefore, this portion of the motion is granted. 

c. “Unlawful”

Nationstar seeks dismissal of Plaintiff‟s UCL

“unlawful” claim predicated on “Nationstar[„s] alleged[] 

violat[ion of] Civil Code section 2923.7 and “Plaintiff‟s UCL 

claim predicated on his claim for purported breach of the implied 

covenant of good faith and fair dealing.” (Nationstar Mot. 7:4-

11.) Plaintiff contends his “UCL allegation under the unlawful 

prong is tethered to his claims alleged under Civil Code 2924(a) 

and 2923.6, and to his Civil Code 2923.7 or breach of [t]he 

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing” claims (Opp‟n to 

Nationstar Mot. 8:1-3); see also (SAC ¶ 49.) Therefore, this

portion of the motion is denied.

2. BANA

a. Standing

BANA argues Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue his UCL 

“unfairness” claim since he “alleges that he „suffered various 

injuries. . . including but not limited to destruction of his 

credit,” but “fails to allege any specific amount of economic 

damages sustained as a result of each Defendant‟s individual 

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conduct.” (BANA Mot. 8:7-9.) 

As discussed above, Plaintiff sufficiently alleged 

damages. Therefore, this portion of the motion is denied. 

b. “Unfair”

BANA contends Plaintiff‟s allegations “are insufficient 

to maintain a UCL [“unfairness”] claim as they fail to set forth 

conduct that „violates public policy or [are not] „tethered to 

specific constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provisions.‟” 

(BANA Mot. 9:9-11.) Plaintiff responds that his “UCL claim is 

tethered to Defendant‟s violations of California law as set forth 

in the [SAC].” (Opp‟n to BANA Mot. 8:11-12.)

However, the portions of the Complaint Plaintiff

references are claims alleged exclusively against Nationstar. 

(SAC ¶¶ 48-49.) Therefore, BANA‟s motion is granted. 

c. “Unlawful”

BANA argues Plaintiff‟s UCL “unlawful” claim is not 

supported by a factual allegation from which it could reasonably 

be inferred that BANA committed unlawful or fraudulent conduct.

(BANA Mot. 9:11-13.) 

Plaintiff has not alleged a factual allegation evincing 

that this is a plausible claim against BANA. Therefore, this 

portion of BANA‟s dismissal motion is granted. 

d. “Fraud”

BANA argues Plaintiff‟s UCL claim should be dismissed 

under a California pleading standard since “Plaintiff fails to 

plead any facts showing how any of the alleged conduct involving 

his private loan, or any of the alleged conduct would deceive the 

public at large” as required for “a UCL claim founded on fraud.” 

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(BANA Mot. 9:18-19 (citing In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th 

298, 312 (2009).)

The standard cited by BANA does not apply here because 

it relates to UCL claims “based on false advertising or 

promotional practices,” which are not alleged in the SAC. In re 

Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th at 312. BANA‟s claim is therefore 

denied. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the stated reasons, Nationstar‟s motion is granted 

in part and denied in part and Bank of America‟s motion is 

granted in part and denied in part. 

Both Nationstar and BANA move for dismissal with 

prejudice. (Nationstar Mot. 9:2-10; BANA Mot. 2:21-23.) When 

deciding whether dismissal should be with prejudice, “[t]he court 

should freely give leave [to amend a pleading] when justice so 

requires.” Rule 12(a)(2). “[T]his policy is to be applied with 

extreme liberality,” Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Rose, 893 

F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 1990), and considers “factors such as 

bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing party, and the 

futility of amendment.” Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 

336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996). Since neither movant has shown that any 

dismissal should be with prejudice, Plaintiff is granted ten (10) 

days from the date on which this order is filed to file a Third 

Amended Complaint addressing the deficiencies in any claim 

Plaintiff was previously granted leave to include in the SAC.

Dated: October 28, 2014

Case 2:13-cv-01404-GEB-CMK Document 67 Filed 10/28/14 Page 16 of 16