Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_04-cv-00323/USCOURTS-alsd-1_04-cv-00323-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ralph Hooks
Respondent
Derrick Michael Standberry
Petitioner

Document Text:

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

DERRICK MICHAEL STANDBERRY, :

Petitioner, :

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 04-0323-BH-B

RALPH HOOKS, :

Respondent. :

ORDER

Derrick Standberry, a state prisoner currently in the

custody of Respondent, has petitioned this Court for federal

habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1).

Respondent has filed an answer in response to the petition (Doc.

10), along with exhibits 1 through 11 (Doc. 11). In its Answer,

Respondent argues that Petitioner's habeas corpus petition

should be dismissed, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), because

it is barred by the one-year statute of limitations.

On November 4, 1999, Petitioner was found guilty, after a

trial by jury, of trafficking in cocaine (Doc. 11, Exhibit A-1).

On January 27 2000, Petitioner was sentenced to life

imprisonment without parole, and on the same date, he gave his

notice of appeal (Doc. 17, pg. 6). On March 9, 2000, Petitioner

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was re-sentenced to life imprisonment. Id. 

Petitioner timely appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals,

which remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to

assess applicable fines (Doc. 11, exh. 1; Doc. 17, pg. 7).

Once monetary penalties were imposed by the trial court,

Petitioner’s appeal was returned to the Court of Criminal

Appeals, which affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence on

March 31, 2001 (Doc. 11, exh. 2). Petitioner’s application for

rehearing was overruled by the appeals court on April 30, 2001

(Doc. 17, pg. 8). Petitioner filed with the Supreme Court of

Alabama a petition for writ of certiorari. On August 31, 2001,

the writ was denied and the Certificate Of Judgment was issued.

(Doc. 11, exh. 3). 

Petitioner filed a petition for federal habeas corpus relief

with this Court on July 9, 2002 (Doc. 11, exh. 5; CV-02-0509-CGM, Doc. 1). Thereafter, Petitioner filed a motion for voluntary

dismissal, and the case was dismissed without prejudice on

October 3, 2002 by order of the Court (Doc. 11, exh. 6; CV-02-

0509-CG-M, Docs. 7, 10 & 11). 

Petitioner filed a Rule 32 petition in the Circuit Court of

Mobile County on August 5, 2002 (Doc. 11, exh. 9). The Rule 32

petition was summarily dismissed by the trial court (Id.).

After an appeal of the dismissal, the Alabama Court of Criminal

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Appeals affirmed the lower court’s ruling (Doc. 11, exh. 8).

Petitioner’s application for rehearing was overruled on July 18,

2003 and the certificate of judgment was issued by the criminal

appeals court on August 5, 2003 (Doc. 10; Doc. 11, exh. 11).

On May 17, 2004, Petitioner filed the instant petition for

habeas corpus relief (Doc. 1.) Based upon the procedural history

referenced above, it appears that Petitioner's habeas corpus

petition is time-barred. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(1), as

amended by the April 24, 1996 enactment of The Anti-Terrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, § 101 (Supp. II 1997)

(“AEDPA”), a state prisoner seeking a federal habeas corpus

remedy must file his federal petition within one year of the

"conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review". The Act provides that 

(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an

application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody

pursuant to the judgement of a State court. The limitations

period shall run from the latest of–

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an

application created by State action in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the

applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

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(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise

of diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgement or claim is pending shall not be counted

toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d).

In this case, Petitioner's sentence for drug trafficking

became final on August 31, 2001, the day on which the Supreme

Court of Alabama issued the certificate of judgment, thereby

triggering the commencement of the AEDPA's statute of

limitations. The filing of Petitioner's first Rule 32 petition,

on August 5, 2002, tolled the limitations period as it was timely

filed and twenty-six days remained in the AEDPA's limitations

period when the petition was filed. As noted supra, the

limitations period may be tolled if Petitioner timely files an

application for state post-conviction or other collateral

review. Thus, the AEDPA's limitations period was tolled from

August 5, 2002 until the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeal's

certificate of judgment dismissing his Rule 32 petition was

entered on August 5, 2003. With this dismissal, the clock

started again, and Petitioner had twenty-six days remaining to

file his federal habeas petition absent some other tolling event.

Notwithstanding the September 1, 2003 deadline, Petitioner did

not file the current habeas petition until April 16, 2004, over

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eight months after the limitations deadline. The fact that

Petitioner previously filed a federal habeas petition on July 9,

2002 is of no consequence because the AEDPA's limitations period

is not tolled by the filing of a federal habeas petition. (“By

tolling the limitations period for the pursuit of state remedies

and not during the pendency of applications for federal review,

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) provides a powerful incentive for

litigants to exhaust all available state remedies before

proceeding in the lower federal courts.... [W]e are convinced §

2244(d)(2) does not toll the limitations period during the

pendency of a federal habeas petition.” Duncan v. Walker, 553

U.S. 167, 180-81, 121 S.Ct 2120, 150 L.Ed. 2d 251 (2001)). 

 Petitioner did not file the instant petition until May 17,

2004, more than eight months after the federal statute of

limitations had expired. Thus, it appears that Petitioner’s

federal habeas petition (Doc. 1) is barred by the federal statute

of limitations (See Docs. 10, 11, 17 and Exhibits). However, the

Eleventh Circuit has stated that: 

Section 2244 is a statute of limitations, not a

jurisdictional bar. Therefore, it permits equitable

tolling “when a movant untimely files because of

extraordinary circumstances that are both beyond his

control and unavoidable even with diligence.” Sandvik

v. United States, 177 F.3d 1269[, 1271 (11th Cir.

1999)]. Equitable tolling is an extraordinary remedy

which is typically applied sparingly. See Irwin v.

Dept. Of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96, 111 S.Ct.

453, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990).

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Steed v. Head, 219 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir. 2000). See also

Miller v. New Jersey State Dept. of Corrections, 145 F.3d 616,

618-19 (3rd Cir. 1998)(“equitable tolling is proper only when the

‘principles of equity would make [the] rigid application [of a

limitation period] unfair.’... [g]enerally, this will occur when

the petitioner has ‘in some extraordinary way...been prevented

from asserting his or her rights.’...[t]he petitioner must show

that he or she ‘exercised reasonable diligence in investigating

and bringing [the] claims.’... [m]ere excusable neglect is not

sufficient.”). Moreover, in the Eleventh Circuit, as a general

rule, “the ‘extraordinary circumstances’ standard applied in

this circuit focuses on the circumstances surrounding the late

filing of the federal habeas petition, rather than the

circumstances surrounding the underlying conviction.” Helton v.

Secretary of Dept. of Corrections, 259 F.3d 1310, 1314 (11th

Cir.), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1080, 122 S.Ct. 1965 (2002); Drew

v. Department of Corrections, 297 F.3d 1278, 1286-87 (11th Cir.

2002).

Therefore, upon consideration of the foregoing, Petitioner

is ORDERED to respond on or before July 11, 2005 to Respondent’s

answer and to show cause, (i.e., extraordinary circumstances),

why this case should not be dismissed for failure to comply with

the statute of limitations requirement as set forth in 28 U.S.C.

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§ 2244(d)(1).

DONE this the 20th day of June, 2005. 

S/ SONJA F. BIVINS 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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