Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01507/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01507-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Sasheen Pena
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SASHEEN PENA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. )

)

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, )

Commissioner of Social )

Security, )

)

Defendant. )

)

 )

1:06-cv-01507-LJO-SMS

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION RE:

PLAINTIFF’S SOCIAL SECURITY

COMPLAINT (DOC. 2)

Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis and with counsel

against the Commissioner of Social Security. Pursuant to 42

U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3), Plaintiff seeks judicial review

of a final decision of the Commissioner denying an application

for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits under Title XVI

of the Social Security Act (the Act). The matter has been

referred to the Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 636(b)

and Local Rule 72-302(c)(15); the matter is before the Court on

the parties’ briefs, which have been submitted without oral

argument.

I. Procedural History

On September 23, 2004, Plaintiff, who was born on June 29,

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1985, applied for Supplemental Security Income (SSI), alleging

disability due to a learning disability since March 15, 2004.

(A.R. 62-64, 42.) After Plaintiff’s claim was denied initially

and on reconsideration, Plaintiff appeared with counsel and

testified at a hearing held before the Honorable Stephen W.

Webster, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) of the Social Security

Administration (SSA), on May 24, 2006. (A.R. 42-46, 48-53, 13,

160-74.) On July 5, 2006, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s application

for benefits. (Id. at 13-19.) After the Appeals Council denied

Plaintiff’s request for review on August 25, 2006, Plaintiff

filed the complaint in this action on October 19, 2006. (Id. at

4-6.) Briefing commenced on September 25, 2007, and was completed

on October 25, 2007, with the filing of Defendant’s opposition.

II. Standard and Scope of Review 

Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of

the Commissioner's decision to deny benefits under the Act. In

reviewing findings of fact with respect to such determinations,

the Court must determine whether the decision of the Commissioner

is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Substantial evidence means "more than a mere scintilla,"

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971), but less than a

preponderance, Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119, n. 10

(9th Cir. 1975). It is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."

Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401. The Court must consider the record

as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the

evidence that detracts from the Commissioner's conclusion; it may

not simply isolate a portion of evidence that supports the

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decision. Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9 Cir. th

2006); Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). It

is immaterial that the evidence would support a finding contrary

to that reached by the Commissioner; the determination of the

Commissioner as to a factual matter will stand if supported by

substantial evidence because it is the Commissioner’s job, and

not the Court’s, to resolve conflicts in the evidence. Sorenson

v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 (9 Cir. 1975). th

In weighing the evidence and making findings, the

Commissioner must apply the proper legal standards. Burkhart v.

Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988). This Court must

review the whole record and uphold the Commissioner's

determination that the claimant is not disabled if the

Commissioner applied the proper legal standards, and if the

Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence.

See, Sanchez v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 812 F.2d

509, 510 (9th Cir. 1987); Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d at 995. If

the Court concludes that the ALJ did not use the proper legal

standard, the matter will be remanded to permit application of

the appropriate standard. Cooper v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 557, 561 (9th

Cir. 1987).

III. Disability

In order to qualify for benefits, a claimant must establish

that she is unable to engage in substantial gainful activity due

to a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of

not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). A

claimant must demonstrate a physical or mental impairment of such

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severity that the claimant is not only unable to do the

claimant’s previous work, but cannot, considering age, education,

and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial

gainful work which exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C.

1382c(a)(3)(B); Quang Van Han v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 1453, 1456 (9th

Cir. 1989). The burden of establishing a disability is initially

on the claimant, who must prove that the claimant is unable to

return to his or her former type of work; the burden then shifts

to the Commissioner to identify other jobs that the claimant is

capable of performing considering the claimant's residual

functional capacity, as well as her age, education and last

fifteen years of work experience. Terry v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d

1273, 1275 (9 Cir. 1990). th

The regulations provide that the ALJ must make specific

sequential determinations in the process of evaluating a

disability: 1) whether the applicant engaged in substantial

gainful activity since the alleged date of the onset of the

impairment, 2) whether solely on the basis of the medical

evidence the claimed impairment is severe, that is, of a

magnitude sufficient to limit significantly the individual’s

physical or mental ability to do basic work activities; 3)

whether solely on the basis of medical evidence the impairment

equals or exceeds in severity certain impairments described in

Appendix I of the regulations; 4) whether the applicant has

sufficient residual functional capacity, defined as what an

individual can still do despite limitations, to perform the

applicant’s past work; and 5) whether on the basis of the

applicant’s age, education, work experience, and residual

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28 All references to the Code of Federal Regulations is to the 2006 version unless otherwise stated. 1

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functional capacity, the applicant can perform any other gainful

and substantial work within the economy. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920.1

Here, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had a severe

impairment of a learning disorder that alone or in combination

with any other impairments did not meet or medically equal a

listed impairment; Plaintiff retained the residual functional

capacity (RFC) to perform simple, repetitive tasks; Plaintiff had

no past relevant work, but as one with a limited education who

was eighteen years old on the alleged onset date of disability,

she was able to perform jobs that existed in significant numbers

in the economy. (A.R. 15-18.)

IV. Summary of Evidence regarding Plaintiff’s Impairment

The medical evidence included the report of Richard Engeln,

Ph.D., a clinical psychologist, who examined Plaintiff to

evaluate her disability for the Department of Social Services on

December 7, 2004. (A.R. 116-25.) Dr. Engeln interviewed

Plaintiff, obtained a diagnostic history, and administered the

Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale III, Wechsler Memory Scale III,

Bender-Gestalt Test II, and a Mental Status Exam. (A.R. 116.)

The doctor’s report reflected that Plaintiff could not read

and did not understand her schoolwork; she had attended special

education classes and had attendance problems beginning in ninth

grade and continuing throughout high school. Plaintiff was alert

and oriented without evidence of delusions or confusion; verbal

expression was easily understood, appropriate in form and

association; there was low interest in developing a knowledge

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. Plaintiff’s WAIS-III IQ estimates were verbal, 70, performance, 60, 2

full scale, 63; the more accurate measurement of her actual cognitive ability

was the obtained verbal IQ estimate of 70. (A.R. 118.)

Working memory was 79, high borderline; her immediate auditory memory 3

was 56, moderate range of mental retardation; delayed auditory memory, 61, low

in the mild range of mental retardation; auditory recognition delayed, 55,

moderate range of mental retardation; immediate visual memory was 75, mid

borderline; and delayed visual memory 56, moderate range of mental

retardation. (A.R. 118-19.) 

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base and low interest and concentration on tasks presented. She

presented with no evidence of any mental or emotional illness or

attention deficit issues. (A.R. 118-19.)

Plaintiff’s verbal intelligence was measured low borderline.

Her visual intelligence measured low in the mild range of mental

retardation, which appeared to reflect concentration and effort

issues. The more accurate measurement of Plaintiff’s cognitive

ability was the verbal IQ, low borderline, which was consistent

with her interview presentation and educational history, which

suggested at least mid borderline intellectual skills. (A.R.

119.) Dr. Engeln wrote, “The obtained standard scores appear to 2

be an underestimate reflecting patient’s tendency to withdraw

very quickly from tasks requiring processing of multiple units of

information at one time. (A.R. 117-18.)

Academic skills pursuant to the Side Range Achievement Test

R, with grade equivalent scores, were reading and spelling,

beginning third grade; arithmetic, mid second grade. (A.R. 118.)

Plaintiff’s working memory was measured high borderline;

obtained memory scores appeared to reflect low task acceptance

issues and concentration dimensions, and they appeared to be

underestimates of abilities. (A.R. 119.)3

Dr. Engeln diagnosed V code adjustment, phase of life

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transition from adolescence to young adulthood, a non-clinical

diagnosis reflecting phase of life transition and phase of life

task assignment; with mixed personality disturbance with

inadequate and avoidant features, with academic delay, moderate

to severe, influenced strongly by school attendance issues. (A.R.

119.) He concluded that Plaintiff was mentally competent to

manage funds, but because of her passive-dependent role in her

family, she had not developed the judgment required for selfmanagement of funds. There were no psychological restrictions to

job adjustment; verbally, cognitively, and socially, she was

capable of job adjustment in a context where instructions were

unidimensional, and normal supervision was provided;

concentration and social skills were adequate for work

adjustment; and skills were adequate for entry level job

adjustment in a setting consonant with educational history and

age level. Plaintiff was able to perform one-to-two-step, simple

job instructions, but not able to receive complex or technical

job instructions. Her long pattern of school avoidance and

responsibility avoidance issues were the dimensions that were the

most restrictive. (A.R. 119-20.)

Jennifer Bryan-Sanchez, a teacher at the W. E. B. DuBois

Public Charter School, completed a teacher’s questionnaire on

November 8, 2004. (A.R. 97-104.) Bryan-Sanchez had known

Plaintiff for some weeks since Plaintiff’s enrollment, and she

would see Plaintiff twice a week for mathematics-algebra I

classes. Plaintiff would sometimes arrive late or come during a

tutoring session instead of her regularly scheduled class.

Plaintiff was artistically apt and could perform well on easy

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tasks, but she could not perform basic math functions (adding,

subtracting, multiplying, and dividing), and she shut down when

forced to come up with her own ideas. (A.R. 97-104.) 

With respect to acquiring and using information, Plaintiff

had very serious problems with comprehending oral instructions,

school and content vocabulary, reading and written material, math

problems, class discussions, and new material; she had serious

problems reading, doing math problems, participating in class

discussions, providing oral explanations and adequate

descriptions, recalling and applying previously learned material,

and applying problem-solving skills in class discussions. She had

serious problems expressing ideas in written form. (A.R. 98.)

With respect to attending and completing tasks, BryanSanchez stated that Plaintiff could not finish a task in one

class; a five-a-day warm-up would take her about thirty-five

minutes to complete, and it usually was not accurate. Plaintiff

had an obvious problem working at a reasonable pace or finishing

on time, and paying attention when spoken to directly. She had a

slight problem focusing long enough to finish assigned work and

completing work accurately without careless mistakes. She had

serious problems with refocusing to task when necessary and

completing assignments. She had very serious problems carrying

out single-step and multi-step instructions. (A.R. 99.) 

Plaintiff had no social problems, except she had an obvious

problem with using adequate vocabulary and grammar to express

thoughts and ideas in general, everyday conversation; further,

she retreated to not speaking if she did not know the topic. (Id.

at 99-100.) Plaintiff took medication, and she frequently missed

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school due to illness. (A.R. 103.)

On December 31, 2004, Archimedes Garcia, M.D., a state

agency psychiatrist, reviewed Dr. Engeln’s report and BryanSanchez’s questionnaire. Dr. Garcia opined that Plaintiff would

have moderate difficulties understanding, remembering, and

carrying out detailed instructions; there were no problems with

interaction or adaptation; Plaintiff had the RFC to perform

simple, repetitive tasks for two-hour intervals, finishing a

normal workday, and maintaining attendance, and she would not

need special supervision. She was capable of interacting with

coworkers or the general public and would not have difficulty

adapting to usual work. (A.R. 126-30.)

On February 2, 2005, Dr. Allen Middleton reviewed all the

evidence in the file and Dr. Garcia’s assessment, and he affirmed

the assessment of Plaintiff’s adjustment phase disorder as

written. (A.R. 131-44.) He concluded that Plaintiff was only

mildly limited in activities of daily living, maintaining social

functioning, and maintaining concentration, persistence, and

pace. (A.R. 141.)

V. Failure to Evaluate the Teacher’s Statements

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s failure to evaluate the

evidence concerning Plaintiff’s abilities provided for by

Plaintiff’s teacher, Jennifer Bryan-Sanchez, constitutes

reversible error. 

Lay witnesses, such as friends or family members in a

position to observe a claimant’s symptoms and daily activities,

are competent to testify to a claimant’s condition; the

Commissioner will consider observations by non-medical sources as

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to how an impairment affects a claimant’s ability to work.

Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918-19 (9 Cir. 1993). An ALJ th

cannot discount testimony from lay witnesses without articulating

specific reasons for doing so. Id. at 919.

Here, the ALJ noted the report of Bryan-Sanchez concerning

Plaintiff’s difficulties with comprehending instructions, paying

attention, working at a reasonable task and completing tasks, and

daily carrying out single-step or multi-step instructions. (A.R.

17.) However, the ALJ did not state any reasons for his apparent

rejection of the limitations assessed by the teacher. 

Where an ALJ’s error lies in a failure properly to discuss

competent lay testimony favorable to the claimant, a reviewing

court cannot consider the error harmless unless it can

confidently conclude that no reasonable ALJ, when fully crediting

the testimony, could have reached a different disability

determination. Stout v. Commissioner, 454 F.3d 1050, 1056 (9th

Cir. 2006).

Here, the statements from Plaintiff’s teacher cannot be said

to be inconsequential to the disability determination because

Bryan-Sanchez reported limitations inconsistent with the medical

evidence upon which the ALJ relied; Bryan-Sanchez reported an

inability to understand, remember, and perform even single-step

instructions or simple, repetitive tasks. (A.R. 17-18.) Further,

the ALJ relied on testimony of a vocational expert (VE) to the

effect that jobs existed on the assumption that Plaintiff could

perform simple, repetitive tasks; and the VE testified that if a

person had the RFC attributed by the ALJ but also had occasional

problems with maintaining attention, concentration, and pace,

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there would be no jobs for such a person. (A.R. 171-73.)

The ALJ gave reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s mother’s

reports of Plaintiff’s limitations, stating that her reported

limitations were not quantified in any way, and no examples were

given. (A.R. 17.) However, he gave no reasons whatsoever for his

treatment of Bryan-Sanchez’s report. It is not reasonable to

interpret the ALJ’s reasoning concerning Plaintiff’s mother’s

reports as pertaining to the limitations expressed by BryanSanchez because Bryan-Sanchez did quantify her data somewhat (she

stated that problems occurred daily), and she reported specific

examples (cut/copy and paste as well as designation of specific

mathematical functions which Plaintiff could not perform). The

Court concludes that reasonably interpreted, the ALJ’s decision

was lacking in any statement of reasons germane to BryanSanchez’s report. 

This Court cannot confidently conclude that no reasonable

ALJ, when fully crediting the report of Bryan-Sanchez, could have

reached a different disability determination. See, Stout v.

Commissioner, 454 F.3d 1050, 1056 (9 Cir. 2006). This is because th

fully crediting her report would lead to a critical inconsistency

in the evidence concerning Plaintiff’s functional limitations,

including but not limited to those based on her comprehension,

ability to understand and carry out instructions, and her

concentration, persistence, and pace.

Therefore, this case must be remanded for further

proceedings to permit the consideration and evaluation of BryanSanchez’s report and for the ALJ to state reasons germane to his

treatment of this evidence as required at each pertinent stage of

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the sequential analysis.

Plaintiff raises issues at various steps of the analysis. At

step three, Plaintiff appears to argue that the ALJ’s finding

that Plaintiff’s impairment did not meet a listing was erroneous

because it was not supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff

argues that the evidence of Dr. Engeln and Ms. Bryan-Sanchez,

Plaintiff’s teacher, indicated that her impairment met listing

12.05(C) and/or (D)(3) and/or (4), concerning mental retardation.

It is Plaintiff’s burden to establish that his impairment

met a listing. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987).

Mere diagnosis of a listed impairment is not sufficient to

sustain a finding of disability; there must also be the findings

required in the listing. Young v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 180, 183 (9th

Cir. 1990); 20 C.F.R. § 416.925(d). Generally, specific medical

findings are needed to support the diagnosis and the required

level of severity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1525(c)-(d), 416.925(c). The

Commissioner is not required to state why a claimant failed to

satisfy every different section of the listing of impairments;

rather, it is sufficient to evaluate the evidence upon which the

ultimate factual conclusions are based. Otherwise, an undue

burden would be put on the social security disability process.

Gonzales v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1197, 1200-01 (9 Cir. 1990). th

The ALJ expressly found that Plaintiff did not have any

impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically

equaled one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R., Part 404,

Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. 416.920(d), 416.925 and

416.926). He then stated:

The claimant’s Verbal, Performance, and Full Scale

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IQ’s were between 60 and 70, but she does not have

any physical or other mental impairment imposing

an additional or significant work-related limitation

of her functioning. Additionally she does not have

any marked difficulties in any of the “B” criteria.

regarding mental retardation.

(A.R. 16.) 

The Court notes that the listing for mental retardation

(12.05) requires significantly sub-average general intellectual

functioning of severity such that the requirements in subsections

A, B, C, or D are satisfied. Listing of Impairments, 20 C.F.R.

Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, § 12.05. One way of meeting the

listing involves mental incapacity demonstrated by a full scale

IQ of 60 through 70 and a physical or other mental impairment

imposing additional and significant work-related limitations of

function. § 12.05 (C). Another way is by having a valid verbal,

performance, of full scale IQ of 60 through 70 which results in

at least two of four sets of restrictions, including marked

restriction of activities of either daily living; maintaining

social functioning; maintaining concentration, persistence, or

pace; or repeated episodes of decompensation, each of extended

duration. § 12.05(D).

It may be that the ALJ’s conclusion concerning Plaintiff’s

not having any other impairment imposing additional and/or

significant work-related limitations of function, or his findings

concerning the “B” criteria, would be the same even if the ALJ

fully considered and expressly evaluated Bryan-Sanchez’s report.

However, it is not clear to this Court what findings the ALJ

would make, what reasons for those findings would be stated, and

what proceedings would follow based on those findings. 

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Further, at step four, Plaintiff challenges as without the

support of substantial evidence the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff

could perform simple, repetitive tasks, and his finding that

Plaintiff was without occasional problems with maintaining

concentration, persistence, or pace. 

Again, the data set forth by Plaintiff’s teacher are

pertinent to the ALJ’s findings at this step. The Court cannot

make findings for the ALJ. A reviewing court cannot affirm an

ALJ’s decision denying benefits on a ground not invoked by the

Commissioner. Stout v. Commissioner, 454 F.3d at 1054 (citing

Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 847 (9 Cir. 2001)). Applying th

the harmless error rule in such a situation would in effect

result in the Court’s affirming a decision on a ground not

invoked by the Commissioner in denying the benefits originally.

Therefore, the Court concludes that the matter should be

remanded to permit the ALJ to consider, evaluate, and state

reasons for the evaluation of, the evidence from Plaintiff’s

teacher, Jennifer Bryan-Sanchez at all pertinent stages of the

sequential analysis, including whether Plaintiff suffered an

impairment or impairments that met or medically equaled a

listing, a determination of Plaintiff’s residual functional

capacity, and a determination of whether Plaintiff could engage

in past relevant work or other work existing in the economy. 

VI. RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, it IS RECOMMENDED that

1) Plaintiff’s social security complaint BE GRANTED, and

2. The matter BE REMANDED pursuant to sentence four of 42

U.S.C. § 405(g) for further consideration, consistent with this

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decision, of Plaintiff’s status as disabled, including whether or 

not Plaintiff’s impairments met or equaled a listing, and, to the

extent appropriate, Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity,

whether Plaintiff could perform her past work, and whether on the

basis of the Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and

residual functional capacity, Plaintiff could perform any other

gainful and substantial work within the economy; and

3. Judgment BE ENTERED for Plaintiff Sasheen Pena and

against Defendant Michael J. Astrue.

This report and recommendation is submitted to the United

States District Court Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court,

Eastern District of California. Within thirty (30) days after

being served with a copy, any party may file written objections

with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document

should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings

and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served

and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served

by mail) after service of the objections. The Court will then

review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636

(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 29, 2008 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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