Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01250/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01250-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Isaac Bellinger
Petitioner
On Habeas Corpus
Respondent

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

 Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), Petitioner has 

consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge 

to conduct all further proceedings in the case, including the entry 

of final judgment, by manifesting Petitioner’s consent in writing 

signed by Petitioner and filed by Petitioner on September 3, 2013. 

Pending before the Court is the petition, which was filed on August 

12, 2013.

I. Screening the Petition

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing ' 2254 Cases in the United States 

District Courts (Habeas Rules) requires the Court to make a 

ISAAC BELLINGER,

 Petitioner,

v.

ON HABEAS CORPUS,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:13-cv-01250-BAM-HC

ORDER DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE FOR FAILURE TO EXHAUST 

STATE COURT REMEDIES (DOC. 1)

ORDER DECLINING TO ISSUE A 

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY AND 

DIRECTING THE CLERK TO CLOSE THE 

CASE

Case 1:13-cv-01250-SKO Document 7 Filed 11/25/13 Page 1 of 9
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preliminary review of each petition for writ of habeas corpus. The 

Court must summarily dismiss a petition "[i]f it plainly appears 

from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is 

not entitled to relief in the district court....@ Habeas Rule 4; 

O=Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990); see also

Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1990). Habeas Rule 

2(c) requires that a petition 1) specify all grounds of relief 

available to the Petitioner; 2) state the facts supporting each 

ground; and 3) state the relief requested. Notice pleading is not 

sufficient; rather, the petition must state facts that point to a 

real possibility of constitutional error. Rule 4, Advisory 

Committee Notes, 1976 Adoption; O=Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d at 420 

(quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75 n.7 (1977)). 

Allegations in a petition that are vague, conclusory, or palpably 

incredible are subject to summary dismissal. Hendricks v. Vasquez, 

908 F.2d at 491.

Further, the Court may dismiss a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus either on its own motion under Habeas Rule 4, pursuant to the 

respondent's motion to dismiss, or after an answer to the petition 

has been filed. Advisory Committee Notes to Habeas Rule 8, 1976 

Adoption; see, Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 

2001).

 A petition for habeas corpus should not be dismissed without 

leave to amend unless it appears that no tenable claim for relief 

can be pleaded were such leave granted. Jarvis v. Nelson, 440 F.2d 

13, 14 (9th Cir. 1971).

II. Exhaustion of State Court Remedies

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to challenge 

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collaterally a conviction by a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. ' 2254(b)(1). The 

exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives 

the state court the initial opportunity to correct the state's 

alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 

722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982); Buffalo v. 

Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 1988). 

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by 

providing the highest state court with the necessary jurisdiction a 

full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting 

it to the federal court, and demonstrating that no state remedy 

remains available. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-76 (1971); 

Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996). A federal court 

will find that the highest state court was given a full and fair 

opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the 

highest state court with the claim's factual and legal basis. 

Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (legal basis); Kenney v. 

Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1992), superceded by statute as

stated in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (factual basis).

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the 

state court that he was raising a federal constitutional claim. 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669 

(9th Cir. 2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001); Hiivala v. 

Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999); Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 

1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 1998). In Duncan, the United States Supreme 

Court reiterated the rule as follows:

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275...(1971),

we said that exhaustion of state remedies requires that

petitioners "fairly presen[t]" federal claims to the

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state courts in order to give the State the

"'opportunity to pass upon and correct= alleged

violations of the prisoners' federal rights" (some

internal quotation marks omitted). If state courts are

to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations

of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be

alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting

claims under the United States Constitution. If a

habeas petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary

ruling at a state court trial denied him the due

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment,

he must say so, not only in federal court, but in state

court. 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule 

further in Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-69 (9th Cir. 2000), 

as amended by Lyons v. Crawford, 247 F.3d 904, 904-05 (9th Cir. 

2001), stating: 

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not "fairly

presented" (and thus exhausted) his federal claims

in state court unless he specifically indicated to

that court that those claims were based on federal law.

See, Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir.

2000). Since the Supreme Court's decision in Duncan,

this court has held that the petitioner must make the

federal basis of the claim explicit either by citing

federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even

if the federal basis is "self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding,

189 F.3d 882, 889 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v.

Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7... (1982), or the underlying

claim would be decided under state law on the same

considerations that would control resolution of the claim

on federal grounds, see, e.g., Hiivala v. Wood, 195 

F.3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Zenon,

88 F.3d 828, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1996); Crotts, 73 F.3d 

at 865.

...

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert

the state court to the fact that the relevant claim is a

federal one without regard to how similar the state and

federal standards for reviewing the claim may be or how

obvious the violation of federal law is.

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Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-69 (9th Cir. 2000), as amended 

by Lyons v. Crawford, 247 F.3d 904, 904-05 (9th Cir. 2001).

Where none of a petitioner=s claims has been presented to the 

highest state court as required by the exhaustion doctrine, the 

Court must dismiss the petition. Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 

1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 481 (9th 

Cir. 2001). The authority of a court to hold a mixed petition in 

abeyance pending exhaustion of the unexhausted claims has not been 

extended to petitions that contain no exhausted claims. Raspberry, 

448 F.3d at 1154.

III. Petitioner’s Failure to Exhaust State Court Remedies

Petitioner alleges that he is an inmate of the California 

Substance Abuse Treatment Facility serving a sentence of fifteen 

years to life imposed by the Superior Court of the State of 

California, County of Madera on July 3, 1980, for Petitioner’s

conviction of second degree murder. (Pet., doc. 1, 1-2.) 

Petitioner is challenging on various due process grounds a decision 

of California’s Board of Parole Hearings (BPH) made after a hearing 

on April 30, 2013, in which the BPH found that Petitioner was 

unsuitable for parole and set his next parole suitability hearing 

for 2016. (Id. at 6, 18, 45-46.) 

Although Petitioner refers to exhaustion of state court 

remedies in various locations in the petition, all the state court 

proceedings referred to were initiated and closed by a final 

disposition before the decision of April 30, 2013, which constitutes 

the decision resulting in the detention of which Petitioner 

complains. Petitioner does not specifically describe or document 

the proceedings in the state courts in which he exhausted his claims

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concerning the decision in April 2013. Further, a review of the 

official website of the California courts for cases filed by 

Petitioner reflects no case initiated or pending after the decision 

of April 30, 2013.1 Thus, upon review of the instant petition for 

writ of habeas corpus, it appears that Petitioner has not presented 

his claims concerning the 2013 decision to the California Supreme 

Court. 

On October 7, 2013, the Court ordered Petitioner to show cause 

in thirty (30) days why the petition should not be dismissed for 

Petitioner’s failure to exhaust state court remedies. The order was 

served by mail on Petitioner on the same date. Although over thirty 

days have passed since service of the order, no response has been 

filed.

Although non-exhaustion of state court remedies has been viewed 

as an affirmative defense, it is established that it is the 

petitioner’s burden to prove that state judicial remedies were 

properly exhausted. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); Darr v. Burford, 

339 U.S. 200, 218-19 (1950), overruled in part on other grounds in

Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Cartwright v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103, 

1104 (9th Cir. 1981). If available state court remedies have not 

been exhausted as to all claims, a district court must dismiss a 

petition. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515-16 (1982).

 

1

Error! Main Document Only.The Court may take judicial notice of facts that are 

capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy 

cannot reasonably be questioned, including undisputed information posted on 

official websites. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); United States v. Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 

331, 333 (9th Cir. 1993); Daniels-Hall v. National Education Association, 629 F.3d 

992, 999 (9th Cir. 2010). It is appropriate to take judicial notice of the docket 

sheet of a California court. White v Martel, 601 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2010), 

cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 332 (2010). The address of the official website of the 

California state courts is www.courts.ca.gov. 

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Here, Petitioner’s petition is premature because Petitioner has 

not submitted his claim or claims to the California Supreme Court 

for a ruling. Therefore, it is concluded that Petitioner failed to 

meet his burden to establish exhaustion of state court remedies.

Accordingly, the appropriate remedy is to dismiss the petition 

without prejudice 2 for failure to exhaust state court remedies.

IV. Certificate of Appealability

Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of 

appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the Court of Appeals 

from the final order in a habeas proceeding in which the detention 

complained of arises out of process issued by a state court. 28 

U.S.C. ' 2253(c)(1)(A); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 

 

2

A dismissal for failure to exhaust is not a dismissal on the merits, and 

Petitioner will not be barred by the prohibition against filing second habeas 

petitions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) from returning to federal court after 

Petitioner exhausts available state remedies. See, In re Turner, 101 F.3d 1323 

(9th Cir. 1996). However, this does not mean that Petitioner will not be subject 

to the one-year statute of limitations imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Although 

the limitations period is tolled while a properly filed request for collateral 

review is pending in state court, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), it is not tolled for the 

time an application is pending in federal court, Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 

172 (2001). By dismissing this petition without prejudice, the Court is not 

making any determination of timeliness of this petition or any petition filed in 

the future.

Further, the Supreme Court has held as follows:

[I]n the habeas corpus context is would be appropriate for

 an order dismissing a mixed petition to instruct an applicant

 that upon his return to federal court he is to bring only 

 exhausted claims. See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 41(a) and (b). 

 Once the petitioner is made aware of the exhaustion 

 requirement, no reason exists for him not to exhaust all

 potential claims before returning to federal court. The

 failure to comply with an order of the court is grounds for

 dismissal with prejudice. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 41(b).

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 489 (2000).

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(2003). A certificate of appealability may issue only if the 

applicant makes a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right. ' 2253(c)(2). Under this standard, a 

petitioner must show that reasonable jurists could debate whether 

the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that 

the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to 

proceed further. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 336 (quoting 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). A certificate should 

issue if the Petitioner shows that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of 

a constitutional right or that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the district court was correct in any procedural 

ruling. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000). 

In determining this issue, a court conducts an overview of the 

claims in the habeas petition, generally assesses their merits, and 

determines whether the resolution was debatable among jurists of 

reason or wrong. Id. It is necessary for an applicant to show more 

than an absence of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith; 

however, it is not necessary for an applicant to show that the 

appeal will succeed. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 338. 

A district court must issue or deny a certificate of 

appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant. 

Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

Here, it does not appear that reasonable jurists could debate 

whether the petition should have been resolved in a different 

manner. Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial 

of a constitutional right. 

Accordingly, the Court will decline to issue a certificate of 

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appealability. 

V. Disposition

In accordance with the foregoing analysis, it is ORDERED that:

1) The petition is DISMISSED without prejudice for 

Petitioner’s failure to exhaust state court remedies; and

2) The Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability; 

and

4) The Clerk is DIRECTED to close the case because dismissal 

terminates the proceeding in its entirety.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 22, 2013 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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