Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-05797/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-05797-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Megan Brennan
Defendant
Misty Danielle Brown
Plaintiff

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MISTY DANIELLE BROWN,

Plaintiff,

v.

MEGAN BRENNAN,

Defendant.

Case No. 19-cv-05797-JSC 

ORDER RE: DEFENDANT’S MOTION 

TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 20

Misty Danielle Brown, representing herself, sues her employer the Postmaster General of 

the United States Postal Service (“Defendant”) alleging employment discrimination under Title 

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; specifically, retaliation arising from a disability 

discrimination complaint Plaintiff filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

(“EEOC”).1 (Dkt. No. 1.)2 Now before the Court is Defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Dkt. No. 20.) After careful 

consideration of the parties’ briefing and having had the benefit of oral argument on February 6, 

2020, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion because Plaintiff fails to state a claim for 

retaliation under Title VII. 

BACKGROUND

I. Complaint Allegations

Plaintiff has been employed by Defendant since 1998. She suffered “an industrial jobrelated injury” in May of 2004. (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 6.) In 2010, “Plaintiff was assigned to a full-time 

modified limited duty job as a Carrier Technician” at the USPS Bayview Station in San Francisco, 

1 Both parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(c). (Dkt. Nos. 6 & 25.) 

2 Record citations are to material in the Electronic Case File (“ECF”); pinpoint citations are to the 

ECF-generated page numbers at the top of the documents. 

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California. (Id.) Plaintiff was demoted in January 2013; following her demotion she contacted the 

regional Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) office through her representative. (Id.) 

Plaintiff subsequently filed a formal complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission (“EEOC”) and was allegedly subjected to retaliatory treatment that is the subject of 

another action in this District; that action is currently on appeal. See Brown v. Brennan, No. 3:16-

cv-06972-EDL (“Brown I”). 

The gravamen of Plaintiff’s complaint is that Defendant subjected her to the following 

retaliatory treatment for filing an appeal in August 2014 with the EEOC’s Office of Federal 

Operations in connection with the above-referenced EEOC complaint: (1) on August 28, 2014, 

Defendant altered eight hours of Plaintiff’s previously-approved sick leave to “leave without pay”

and subsequently did not pay her for that time; and (2) between September 27, 2014 and October 

9, 2014, Defendant failed to provide Plaintiff with timely notice of her work assignments. (Id. at 

¶¶ 7, 11; see also id. at 13.) On October 20, 2014, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the regional 

EEO office regarding this alleged discrimination. (Id. at ¶ 13.) She then filed a formal EEOC 

complaint “on or about November 20, 2014.” (Id.) The EEOC issued its decision in June 2019, 

and Plaintiff received a notice-of-right-to-sue letter on June 18, 2019. (Id. at ¶ 14; see also id. at 

9.) 

Due to Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff has “suffer[ed] serious economic and emotional 

damage” and been “on unpaid leave since late 2014.” (Id. at ¶ 11.) 

II. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed her complaint in September 2019, alleging two Title VII claims for 

retaliation for “engaging in prior EEO activity.” (Id. at ¶¶ 4-5, 15-19.) The Court granted 

Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis, reviewed the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2), and directed the Clerk of Court to issue the summons. (Dkt. No. 7.) Defendant 

moved to dismiss thereafter. (Dkt. No. 20.) The motion is fully briefed, (see Dkt. Nos. 31 & 33), 

and the Court heard oral argument on February 6, 2020. 

PRELIMINARY ISSUES

Generally, “district courts may not consider material outside the pleadings when assessing 

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the sufficiency of a complaint” on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Khoja v. Orexigen 

Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 998 (9th Cir. 2018). There are, however, “two exceptions to this 

rule: the incorporation-by-reference doctrine, and judicial notice under Federal Rule of Evidence 

201.” Id. In support of its motion, Defendant asks the Court to take judicial notice of several 

exhibits and asserts that the incorporation-by-reference doctrine applies to another. 

I. Judicial Notice 

Pursuant to Rule 201(b), a judicially noticed adjudicative fact must be one “that is not 

subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court’s territorial 

jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot 

reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). 

Defendant requests judicial notice of the following: (1) records maintained by the National 

EEO Investigative Services Office of the United States Postal Service (“USPS”) regarding the 

EEO claims filed by Plaintiff; (2) documents filed in Brown I; and (3) that “September 27, 2014

was a Saturday. October 9, 2014 was a Thursday. Two Sundays fell between September 27, 2014 

and October 9, 2014.” (Dkt. No. 22 at ¶¶ 1, 2, 4.) Plaintiff does not oppose judicial notice of the 

proffered facts, (see generally Dkt. No. 31), and the Court concludes that they are proper subjects 

of judicial notice as undisputed matters of public record. See Harris v. Cty. of Orange, 682 F.3d 

1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that judicial notice is appropriate for “undisputed matters of 

public record, including documents on file in federal or state courts”) (internal citation omitted); 

see also Lacayo v. Donahoe, No. 14-cv-04077-JSC, 2015 WL 993448, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 

2015) (“In the context of employment discrimination cases in particular, it is well established that 

courts may consider the administrative record of a plaintiff’s claims before the EEOC as judicially 

noticeable matters of public record.”) (collecting cases). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS 

Defendant’s request for judicial notice of exhibits A-J to the declaration of Leslie Cedola, EEO 

Manager for the National EEO Investigative Services Office of the USPS, (Dkt. No. 21 – 21-10, 

Exs. A-J), and the court’s order granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in Brown v. 

Brennan, No. 3:16-cv-06972-EDL, (Dkt. No. 22-2, Ex. B). The Court also takes judicial notice of 

the requested days of the week in September and October 2014. 

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II. Incorporation by Reference

Courts may consider documents under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine if: (1) “the 

complaint necessarily relies upon a document or the contents of the document are alleged in a

complaint,” and (2) the document’s authenticity is not in question and there are no disputed issues 

as to the document’s relevance.” Coto Settlement v. Eisenberg, 593 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 

2010). Defendant asserts that the December 2014 USPS “Step B Decision” regarding the 

grievance Plaintiff’s union filed related to the alleged retaliatory conduct at issue is incorporated 

by reference because the complaint “alleges the contents of the grievance decision.” (Dkt. No. 22 

at ¶ 3.) The Court agrees. The complaint directly references the contents of the USPS grievance 

decision as it relates to Plaintiff’s second cause of action for retaliation: 

Plaintiff’s grievance with the USPS regarding her assignments was 

resolved by recognizing that, 1) Plaintiff must be allowed to opt on 

[sic] any assignment that she can perform with her medical 

restrictions, 2) that she must be provided with a limited duty job offer, 

including all letter carrier duties she is capable of performing, and 3) 

that the management violated the applicable collective bargaining 

agreement (“National Agreement”) by failing to provide, or post [the] 

assignment schedule in the Bayview Station. 

(Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 19.) The complaint also attaches as an exhibit a document related to the grievance 

proceedings. (See id. at 15.) Further, Plaintiff does not dispute the document’s authenticity or its 

relevance. Accordingly, the grievance decision is incorporated by reference and may be 

considered in adjudicating Defendant’s motion. 

DISCUSSION

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Alternatively, Defendant moves to dismiss the 

complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. However, Defendant’s reply briefing 

demonstrates that Defendant’s only substantive argument is that the complaint fails to state a Title 

VII claim for retaliation. (See Dkt. No. 34 at 2.) The Court thus addresses Defendant’s motion 

under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard only. 

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of a complaint as 

failing to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. 

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Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A facial plausibility standard is not a “probability 

requirement” but mandates “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, 

a complaint “that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 

of action” is insufficient, as is a complaint that “tenders naked assertion[s] devoid of further 

factual enhancement.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). When a plaintiff files a 

complaint without an attorney, as Plaintiff does here, the Court must “construe the pleadings 

liberally . . . to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 

(9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

I. The Complaint Fails to State a Claim for Retaliation 

To state a claim for retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) “she 

engaged in a protected activity”; (2) her employer “subjected her to an adverse employment 

action”; and (3) there is a causal link “between the protected activity and the adverse action.” 

Manatt v. Bank of Am., NA, 339 F.3d 792, 800 (9th Cir. 2003). The complaint brings two claims 

for retaliation based on two instances of alleged retaliatory treatment: (1) Defendant altered and 

deleted eight hours of Plaintiff’s dependent sick leave in August 2014; and (2) between September 

27, 2014 and October 9, 2014, Defendant failed to provide Plaintiff with timely notice of her work 

schedule and assignments. (Id. at ¶¶ 7, 11.) As discussed below, the complaint fails to adequately 

plead a Title VII retaliation claim as to both instances of alleged retaliation. 

A. Protected Activity

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s claims fail for the threshold reason “that she has not

alleged a Title VII protected activity that could support her claim of retaliation under that statute.” 

(Dkt. No. 34 at 2.) The Court agrees. Plaintiff’s form complaint states that her claims are 

“brought pursuant to Title VII” for “[r]etaliation for engaging in prior EEO activity.” (Dkt. No. 1 

at ¶¶ 3-4.) The complaint further alleges that the “conduct is discriminatory with respect to the 

following: Retaliation for engaging in prior EEO activity.” The complaint specifies that the 

retaliation took place after Plaintiff filed an appeal in August 2014 with the EEOC’s Office of 

Federal Operations in connection with the previous EEOC complaint at issue in Brown I. Those 

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allegations are insufficient to allege protected activity under Title VII. 

“There is no doubt that filing grievances and pursuing constitutional and statutory 

remedies are protected activities.” McCarthy v. Brennan, No. 15-cv-03308-JSC, 2016 WL 

946099, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2016) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

However, as this Court has explained:

[A]lthough [p]laintiff has alleged that he engaged in prior protected 

activity in the form of EEO claims and union grievances, he fails to 

identify the statute(s) under which he brought those claims or the 

nature of those claims. This is problematic because a plaintiff may 

bring a retaliation claim only under the statute under which he alleged 

the protected activity—that is, a Title VII retaliation claim can only 

allege reprisal for engaging in prior protected activity reporting race, 

religion, gender, and national origin discrimination; an [Age 

Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967] retaliation claim can 

only allege reprisal for engaging in prior protected activity reporting 

age discrimination; and so on.

Id. (citing Passatino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 506 (9th Cir. 

2000) (noting that a plaintiff may establish the first element of a prima facie retaliation claim 

under Title VII by showing that she engaged in activity protected under Title VII)). Plaintiff’s 

opposition asserts that “she is not a lawyer but a Pro Se Plaintiff and simply used the Employment 

Discrimination Complaint she uploaded under the templates for Pro Se [plaintiffs].” (Dkt. No. 31 

at 4-5.) 

The Court recognizes that Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and that Brown I concerned an 

EEO proceeding for disability discrimination brought under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 

701. (See Dkt. No. 22-2, Ex. B at 12.) Although Plaintiff’s opposition does not clarify that this 

action also arises under the Rehabilitation Act, it does repeatedly reference the prior protected 

activity in Brown I, and it is thus likely that the instant action arises under the same statute. (See

Dkt. No. 22-2, Ex. B at 12.) Courts apply the same standard when analyzing retaliation claims 

under the Rehabilitation Act or Title VII. McCarthy, 2016 WL 946099, at *12 n.13 (citing Pardi 

v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 389 F.3d 840, 850 n.5 (9th Cir. 2004); Coons v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t 

of Treasury, 383 F.3d 879, 884 (9th Cir. 2004). Thus, Plaintiff’s failure to plead the underlying 

statutory basis for the protected activity at issue in her retaliation claim could be cured by 

amendment. 

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B. Adverse Employment Actions

To satisfy the second element of a Title VII retaliation claim, a plaintiff must ultimately 

show “that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, 

which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or 

supporting a charge of discrimination.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 

68 (2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 

229 F.3d 917, 928 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[W]e have held that only non-trivial employment actions that 

would deter reasonable employees complaining about Title VII violations will constitute 

actionable retaliation.”). Examples of adverse employment actions include: “actions materially 

affecting compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” and termination. 

McCarthy, 2016 WL 946099, at *13 (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted). 

The Court addresses each alleged adverse employment action in turn. 

1. Deletion of eight hours of approved sick leave

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant manually altered her approved sick leave and changed it to 

“leave without pay,” thereby “deleting” eight hours of paid sick leave. (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 7.) 

Plaintiff further alleges that upon discovering the discrepancy the following pay period and prior 

to filing her EEO complaint: “Plaintiff requested an employee emergency advanced payment 

from prior Bayview Station supervisor Kiwanni Warren for the eight hours dependent sick leave

pay that was deleted and changed to leave without pay in hopes of being paid in a timely manner.” 

(Id. at ¶ 8.) Defendant denied Plaintiff’s request for emergency advance pay and instead “offered

a pay adjustment.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that the pay adjustment would have caused her “further 

adversit[y]” by “delaying [her] pay for an additional two to four weeks” and placing her in a 

higher tax bracket. (Id.) In other words, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant offered to remedy the 

employment action when Plaintiff brought it to her supervisor’s attention, but Plaintiff refused that 

correction. 

The complaint does not plausibly allege a materially adverse employment action that “well 

might have dissuaded a reasonable [person] from making or supporting a charge of 

discrimination.” See White, 548 U.S. at 68. First, an employment action must be “sufficiently 

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final to constitute an adverse employment action.” Brooks, 229 F.3d at 929-930 (concluding that 

performance evaluation “was not an adverse employment action because it was subject to 

modification by the [defendant]”). Drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, Plaintiff

herself alleges that the action was not final; instead, Plaintiff brought it to her supervisor’s 

attention and Defendant attempted to correct the problem by offering “a pay adjustment.” See id.

(concluding that action was not final for Title VII retaliation purposes where defendant 

accommodated plaintiff’s preferences after plaintiff complained about the challenged conduct). 

Second, where the action is corrected it cannot serve as the basis for a Title VII retaliation 

claim. Kortan v. California Youth Auth., 217 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2000). As alleged here,

Defendant attempted to correct the action and Plaintiff refused the pay adjustment because it 

would delay payment for another two to four weeks and put her in a higher tax bracket. Thus, the 

only substantive harm alleged by Defendant’s action is a two to four-week delay in payment of 

eight hours of wages. That delay does not plausibly rise to the level of an adverse employment 

action that would deter a reasonable employee from pursuing a charge of discrimination. In 

Kortan, for example, the defendant gave the plaintiff an undeserved negative performance 

evaluation; however, the evaluation, when challenged, was corrected. The Ninth Circuit held that 

the negative performance evaluation therefore did not rise to level of an adverse employment 

action as a matter of law: 

Kortan was not demoted, was not stripped of work responsibilities, 

was not handed different or more burdensome work responsibilities, 

was not fired or suspended, was not denied any raises, and was not 

reduced in salary or in any other benefit. Thus, Kortan has not shown 

that her evaluation was discriminatory or retaliatory, or was such an 

“intolerable” act that it would force an employee to quit.

Kortan, 217 F.3d at 1113. The same is true of Plaintiff’s allegations here. The alleged delay in 

paying her for eight hours of work does not plausibly rise to the level of an adverse employment 

action that would deter a reasonable employee from pursuing a charge of discrimination. 

Plaintiff’s opposition asserts that she was “greatly dependent upon her fixed income to 

provide for her dependent children,” and the “estimated amount of eight hours totaling three 

hundred plus dollars that she was not paid for that pay period . . . adversely affected [her].” (Dkt. 

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No. 31 at 6.) The Court recognizes that hardship. However, the action that produced that hardship 

was not final, and was instead correctable; indeed, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant offered a 

correction which Plaintiff refused. Thus, it does not constitute an adverse employment action for 

purposes of a Title VII or Rehabilitation Act retaliation claim. 

2. Failure to provide timely notice of work assignments

Plaintiff’s second claim for retaliation alleges that Defendant failed to provide Plaintiff 

with timely notice of her work schedule/assignments between September 27, 2014 and October 9, 

2014. (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 11.) Defendant asserts that this employment action fails for the same 

reasons discussed above; specifically, it was not a “final” action as alleged but was instead 

temporary and “apparently remedied . . . shortly after Plaintiff[ ] complained.” (Dkt. No. 20 at 

15.) The Court agrees. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that the issue was resolved by the USPS 

internal grievance process in December 2014. (See Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 11 (“Plaintiff was denied 

timely assignments from September 2014 leading up to October 9, 2014. Plaintiff’s grievance 

with the USPS regarding her assignments was resolved . . . .”); see also Dkt. No. 22-1, Ex. A 

(December 2014 USPS “Step B Decision” resolving Plaintiff’s grievance related to Defendant’s 

“fail[ure] to post a weekly schedule for [Plaintiff]” by requiring Defendant to “post a weekly 

schedule in the Bayview office”).) Thus, Defendant’s failure to timely notify Plaintiff of her 

assignments is not an adverse employment action because it was not final; indeed, according to 

Plaintiff, Defendant remedied the action through its grievance process. See Brooks, 229 F.3d at 

930 (affirming district court’s rejection of retaliation claim where plaintiff complained about the 

challenged action to defendant and defendant remedied the action). 

As Plaintiff credibly explained at oral argument, Defendant’s conduct did have an adverse 

impact on her personally and, indeed, caused her to never return to work. But the test of an 

adverse employment action is not whether the challenged conduct would dissuade the particular 

plaintiff from pursuing a charge of discrimination; instead, it is an objective test. See White, 548 

U.S. at 68-69 (noting that an objective standard for determining whether an employer’s conduct 

would deter a reasonable employee from engaging in protected activity “avoids the uncertainties 

and unfair discrepancies that can plague a judicial effort to determine a plaintiff’s unusual 

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subjective feelings”). Under binding Ninth Circuit law the facts, as alleged, do not satisfy that 

objective test.

***

Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Because Plaintiff is selfrepresented and proceeding in forma pauperis, she must be given leave to amend her “complaint 

unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by 

amendment.” See Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228 n.9 (9th Cir. 1984) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). It is not absolutely clear that she could not plead more facts that, 

drawing all inferences in her favor, could support a finding that the challenged conduct was an 

adverse employment decision.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss with 

leave to amend. Plaintiff is given permission to replead her retaliation claims; she is not given 

permission to add any other claims. In addition, the retaliation claims should specify whether they 

are brought under Title VII or the Rehabilitation Act and the nature of the underlying protected 

activity (for example, specify whether the underlying protected activity is a complaint about 

disability discrimination or some other protected activity). Finally, Plaintiff must allege facts 

sufficient to support a plausible inference that she suffered an adverse employment action in 

retaliation for her appeal. 

Any amended complaint must be filed within 21 days of this Order. Failure to file an 

amended complaint by that deadline will result in dismissal of the complaint with prejudice.

This Order disposes of Docket No. 20. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 7, 2020

JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY

United States Magistrate Judge

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