Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02004/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02004-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Frank Gomez
Appellant
State of New Mexico
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

FRANK GOMEZ, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

FI LED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuir 

JUL 15 1991 

ltOBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

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) 

) 

) 

) 

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) 

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No. 89-2004 

STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

(Dist. N.M. No. CV 88-152-J) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before ANDERSON and EBEL, Circuit Judges, and BROWN, District 

Judge.** 

This matter comes before the court on appellee's petition for 

rehearing and motion to recall and stay the mandate. 

In our earlier order, Gomez v. State of New Mexico, No.89-

2004 (April 12, 1991), we vacated the district court's dismissal 

of Gomez' federal habeas corpus petition and remanded for an 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

** Honorable Wesley E. Brown, Senior United States District Judge 

for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 89-2004 Document: 010110128873 Date Filed: 07/15/1991 Page: 1 
,. 

application of the "deliberate bypass" test set forth in Fay v. 

Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438-39 (1963). We held that such a result was 

mandated by our opinion in Osborn v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612, 624 

(10th Cir. 1988). 

Appellee now requests that we recall and stay the mandate of 

that order and reconsider our holding in light of the Supreme 

Court's recent opinion in Coleman v. Thompson, 500 U.S._, 1991 

WL 107399 (June 24, 1991). In that opinion, the Supreme Court 

emphatically rejected the deliberate bypass test set forth in Fay 

and directed courts instead to apply the "cause and prejudice" 

test enunciated in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977). 

The Court stated that "[b]y applying the cause and prejudice 

standard uniformly to all independent and adequate state 

procedural defaults, we eliminate the irrational distinction 

between Fay and the rule of cases like Francis, Sykes, Engle, and 

Carrier." Coleman, 500 U.S. at_, 1991 WL 107399 at 18. Since 

the Supreme Court has made it clear that Coleman should be applied 

retroactively, see Singletary v. Francis,_ U.S._, 1991 US 

LEXIS 3801, 1 (June 24, 1991), appellee maintains that it would be 

futile to require the district court to follow our order and apply 

a standard that has been discarded by the Supreme Court. We 

agree. 

Although we rarely exercise such authority, this court does 

have the inherent power to recall the mandate after it has issued. 

Abel v. West, 932 F.2d 898, 899 (10th Cir. 1991); Hannnons v. Int'l 

Playtex. Inc., 872 F.2d 963, 963 (10th Cir. 1989). In this case, 

our initial order was filed on April 12, 1991. Appellee filed a 

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Appellate Case: 89-2004 Document: 010110128873 Date Filed: 07/15/1991 Page: 2 
petition for rehearing on April 30, 1991, which was denied on June 

19, 1991. The mandate issued on June 27, 1991. However, on June 

24 -- five days after the petition for rehearing was denied -- the 

Supreme Court handed down its Coleman opinion. Appellee's motion 

to recall the mandate followed several days later on July 3, 1991. 

We think the circumstances here justify the recall of the mandate, 

and we grant appellees' petition for rehearing. To hold otherwise 

would be to engage in an exercise in futility, requiring the 

district court to apply a legal analysis which has now been 

repudiated by the Supreme Court. 

In light of Coleman, we affirm the district court's 

application of the "cause and prejudice" standard and its 

dismissal of Gomez' habeas petition. We agree with the district 

court that, under the terms of that standard, Gomez failed to 

demonstrate cause sufficient to overcome the state procedural bar. 

Although Gomez maintains that his procedural default was caused by 

his attorney's failure to file a petition for certiorari with the 

New Mexico Supreme Court, Coleman makes it quite clear that the 

right to effective assistance of counsel does not extend beyond 

the first appeal as of right. See also Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 

600, 619 (1974) (no right to counsel for discretionary appeals 

where defendant already had one appeal as of right). Given that a 

criminal defendant has no right to counsel beyond his first 

appeal, "any attorney error that led to the default of 

[petitioner's] claims in state court cannot constitute cause to 

excuse the default in federal habeas." Coleman, 500 U.S. at_, 

1991 Wl 107399 at 22. Accordingly, Gomez' allegations of 

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Appellate Case: 89-2004 Document: 010110128873 Date Filed: 07/15/1991 Page: 3 
ineffective appellate counsel do not constitute "cause," and he 

must "bear the risk of attorney error." Id. at 20. 

We therefore RECALL the mandate, VACATE our earlier order and 

judgment, and AFFIRM the district court. 

Entered for the court 

David M. Ebel 

Circuit Judge 

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