Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-93-03047/USCOURTS-ca10-93-03047-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Willie Lee Randel
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

"'[.'\ l .· -·~ 'l) r ... .LJ ~ Unit•d Dtn:::: ~. Crnrt of Appeals ,_ . .:::::h C~rcuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 0 8 1993 

TENTH CIRCUIT ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk · 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-appellee, 

v. No. 93-3047 

WILLIE LEE RANDEL, 

Defendant-appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D.C. No. 91-40056-03) 

Gregory G. Hough (Jackie N. Williams, United States Attorney with 

him on the briefs), Assistant United States Attorney, Topeka, 

Kansas, for plaintiff-appellee. 

Michael M. Jackson, Topeka, Kansas, for defendant-appellant. 

Before SEYMOUR, BARRETT and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. 

BARRETT, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 93-3047 Document: 01019284234 Date Filed: 11/08/1993 Page: 1 
Willie Lee Randel appeals from the judgment entered on his 

plea of guilty to a two-count indictment, charging Randel and codefendants Milton Gene Lee, W.C. Thompson, and Ivy Simmons 

Gillespie with knowingly, willfully and unlawfully conspiring with 

intent to distribute cocaine and knowingly and intentionally possessing with the intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 

U.S.C. § 846 and 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1). 

On June 25, 1992, Randel entered into an oral plea agreement 

under which he agreed to plead guilty in exchange for the 

government's agreement not to file a 21 U.S.C. § 851 prior conviction information against him. Notwithstanding the agreement, the 

government subsequently filed a § 851 information setting forth 

Randel's prior conviction which the government relied upon to 

seek an enhanced sentence. 

On the day of the trial, Randel responded to the government's 

§ 851 information and moved for enforcement of the oral plea 

agreement. In answer, the government disputed that a binding offer of plea was ever made. The government argued that any action 

taken on June 25, 1992, was simply part of ongoing negotiations, 

that it had withdrawn the plea agreement offer well before Randel 

tried to accept it, and that the acceptance or rejection of any 

plea agreement rests within the sound discretion of the United 

States Attorney. Believing that the government was not legally 

permitted to withdraw its plea agreement, the district court 

rejected the government's arguments and entered an order granting 

Randel's motion for enforcement of the plea agreement. The court 

also denied the government's motion to reconsider. The government 

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served notice on defendant and the court that it intended to 

appeal the court's refusal to let it withdraw the plea agreement. 

Randel then formally accepted the plea agreement and entered a 

plea of guilty on August 24, 1992. 

On August 27, 1992, the district court entered an order 

stating that it was reconsidering its decision to enforce the plea 

agreement. The court's "order indicated that on the basis of 

MabkY v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504 (1984) and United States v. 

Papaleo, 853 F.2d 16 (1st Cir. 1988), it appeared that the 

government was entitled to withdraw the plea bargaining proposal 

prior to defendant pleading guilty or taking other significant 

action in reliance on the offer." (R., Vol. One, Tab 183 at 3). 

On September 11, 1992, the district court entered an order 

vacating its order enforcing the plea agreement. Thereafter, 

Randel filed a motion to withdraw plea. On October 26, 1992, the 

district court entered an order denying Randel's motion, finding 

that he had "failed to show a fair and just reason for withdrawing" his plea of guilty. (R., Vol. One, Tab 193 at 15). During 

Randel's sentencing hearing, the district court overruled his objection to a § 851 enhancement predicated on his prior Texas conviction. 

On appeal, Randel contends that the district court erred in: 

vacating its order to enforce the plea agreement; finding his 

prior Texas conviction valid under state law; and finding that 

his prior Texas conviction was not obtained in violation of the 

United States Constitution. 

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Appellate Case: 93-3047 Document: 01019284234 Date Filed: 11/08/1993 Page: 3 
I. 

Randel contends that the district court erred after accepting 

his unconditional plea, in vacating its order enforcing the plea 

agreement. We review de novo a district court's compliance with 

the requirements of Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 designed to ensure that a 

plea is made knowingly and voluntarily. United States v. Elias, 

937 F.2d 1514, 1517 (lOth Cir. 1991). 

Randel argues that the district court, after entering an order enforcing the plea agreement and unconditionally accepting his 

guilty plea, was not authorized under Rule 11, Fed. R. Crim. P. 32 

or the common law to subsequently enter an order vacating its 

order enforcing the plea agreement. During the sentencing 

hearing, Randel volunteered to the court that he was aware that 

the government intended to appeal the order enforcing the plea 

agreement and he assured the court that should the government 

prevail on appeal, he would not move to withdraw his guilty plea. 

Randel argues that the district court's reliance on his waiver of 

the right to withdraw his plea in the event that the district 

court's ruling enforcing his plea agreement should be reversed on 

appeal "ignores the fact that the district court had no authority 

to vacate its order [of August 24, 1992] concerning the plea 

agreement." (Brief for Appellant at 18). Randel cites to United 

States v. Olesen, 920 F.2d 538 (8th Cir. 1990) for the proposition 

that once a district court unconditionally accepts a Rule 

ll(e) (1) (C) plea containing a specific sentence, it cannot 

subsequently, absent fraud, modify the sentence portion of the 

agreement. 

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Appellate Case: 93-3047 Document: 01019284234 Date Filed: 11/08/1993 Page: 4 
The government responds that the district court properly 

relied upon Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504 (1984), in ruling that 

the government was entitled to withdraw the plea agreement prior 

to its acceptance. We agree. 

In Mabry, the Court considered "whether a defendant's 

acceptance of a prosecutor's proposed plea bargain creates a 

constitutional right to have the plea bargain specifically 

enforced." Id. at 505. In holding that it did not, the Court 

opined that: 

[a] plea bargain standing alone is without constitutional significance; in itself it is a mere executory 

agreement which, until embodied in the judgment of a 

court, does not deprive an accused of liberty or any 

other constitutionally protected interest. It is the 

ensuing guilty plea that implicates the Constitution. 

Id. at 507-08 (footnote omitted). In Mabry, the district court 

had permitted the government to withdraw its plea agreement and 

only accepted the guilty plea thereafter. Here, although the 

district court initially refused to permit the government to 

withdraw the plea, it did so on a misunderstanding of the law and 

over the objection of the government, which preserved the legal 

issue for appeal. The district court was thereafter permitted to 

correct its legal error, just as we would have been obliged to do 

had the district court declined to do so and the government 

appealed. 

Within its order vacating its prior order enforcing the plea 

agreement, the district court found: 

During the hearing .... [i]t was not suggested, 

nor has it ever been suggested, that the government 

failed to withdraw the plea bargaining proposal before 

defendants accepted it. Instead, defendants objected to 

the fact of reconsideration itself, suggesting that the 

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court had gone past a point of no return and that 

defendants' double jeopardy rights or other unlabeled 

rights might be violated if the court attempted to 

correct any legal mistake concerning the enforcement of 

the plea "agreement." 

We disagree with the defendants' position. The 

plea "agreement" enforced by the court did not alter the 

crimes charged against defendants. Defendants agreed to 

plead guilty to the crimes as originally charged, and 

the court accepted defendants' pleas. The court 

ordered, however, that defendants were not subject to 

the enhanced sentencing provisions of § 851. This is a 

decision which the government is entitled to appeal 

under the statute .... 

By reconsidering our action to enforce the plea 

"agreement," the court is not ordering a second 

prosecution of defendants, nor is the court ordering 

multiple punishments for the same offense. As in the 

Hicks case [Hicks v. Duckworth, 922 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 

1991] , the prosecutor in this case made it clear that 

the government would appeal the court's decision in this 

case. Therefore, the defendants had no legitimate 

expectation of finality and repose. They knew if the 

government prevailed on appeal they would be subject to 

a mandatory minimum sentence of 20 years instead of a 

minimum mandatory sentence of 10 years .... 

In conclusion, on the basis of the Mabry case 

and other case law, the court finds that a legal error 

was committed when the court granted defendants' motion 

to enforce the plea agreement. Upon reconsideration, 

the court hereby vacates that decision. 

(R., Vol. One, Tab 183 at 4-6). 

We hold that the district court properly relied on Mabry in 

vacating its order enforcing the plea agreement. Consequently, 

the only issue left for us to decide is whether the district court 

abused its discretion in thereafter refusing to let Randel 

withdraw his guilty plea. We conclude that it did not. Randel's 

"inability to enforce the prosecutor's offer is without 

constitutional significance." Mabry at 510. Here it is 

uncontested that: the government withdrew the plea agreement offer 

prior to Randel's acceptance (R., Vol. One, Tab 183 at 4); Randel 

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was aware at the time he entered his plea that the government 

intended to appeal the court's ruling relative to the enforcement 

of the plea agreement; Randel represented to the court that his 

guilty plea was not contingent upon the government's success on 

appeal; Randel agreed that if the government prevailed on appeal 

he waived his right to withdraw his plea and to ask for a new 

trial and that he would accept resentencing. Under these circumstances, Randel's "plea was thus in no sense the product of 

governmental deception; it rested on no 'unfulfilled promise.'" 

MabkY at 510. Moreover, nothing in the record indicates that 

Randel's plea was other than knowingly and voluntarily made. 

We also observe that Olesen, upon which Randel relies, is 

distinguishable. In Olesen the court held that a district court 

could not, absent fraud, modify the sentence portion of a plea 

agreement which all parties had agreed to and which the district 

court accepted. Unlike Olesen, in our case the government 

specifically attempted to withdraw the plea agreement before the 

district court accepted it, thereby preserving its right to appeal 

the validity of the plea agreement. 

II. 

Randel contends that the trial court erred in finding that 

the prior Texas conviction used in his § 851 sentence enhancement 

was valid under state law. 

Randel agrees that this is a mixed question of fact and law. 

"On the mixed question of whether the facts satisfy the proper 

legal standard, we conduct a de novo review if the question 

primarily involves the consideration of legal principles and apply 

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the clearly erroneous standard if the question is primarily a 

factual inquiry." Uselton v. Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, 

Inc., 940 F.2d 564, 572 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, U.S. 

(1991). Inasmuch as the question before us is "primarily a 

factual inquiry," i.e., whether the Texas court apprised Randel of 

the range of punishment prior to accepting his guilty plea, the 

district court's findings will be reviewed under the clearly 

erroneous standard. 

Randel argues that Texas law mandates that a sentencing court 

admonish a defendant of the range of punishment attached to an 

offense prior to accepting a plea of guilty. Randel argues that 

since "the only records of the case are insufficient under Texas 

law to show that prior to the judge accepting the guilty plea he 

admonished Randel concerning the range of punishment," (Brief for 

Appellant at 19), and since he testified that the Texas court did 

not admonish him of the range of punishment prior to sentencing 

him, the district court erred in finding that the conviction was 

valid under Texas law. It is uncontested that "[t]here is no 

transcript of the [Texas sentencing] proceedings because [Randel] 

. waived the presence of a court reporter." (R., Vol. One, 

Tab 208 at 2). 

The government responds that the record supports the district 

court's findings that Randel's prior conviction was valid under 

Texas law. We agree. Following a hearing during which Randel and 

the government presented evidence, the district court entered a 

detailed order, finding: 

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The government has presented the court with an 

affidavit from the Texas judge who took defendant's 

guilty plea, Hon. Ted Poe. The judge states that "on 

each and every occasion" when he has taken a guilty 

plea, he has advised the defendant of the range of 

punishment attached to the offense regardless of whether 

the defendant has viewed the written admonishments form. 

He further states that he personally advised defendant 

of the range of punishment and that he would not have 

allowed the guilty plea unless he was fully satisfied of 

the defendant's understanding of the matter. . .. 

Defendant was sentenced in accordance with a plea 

agreement to six years. . .. Defendant served about 

eight months of the sentence before being paroled. 

Defendant has never attempted to appeal or overturn his 

conviction and sentence, although he stated that he has 

applied for a pardon. . . . We . . . believe the plea 

met the requirements of Texas law. We find it is more 

probable than not that Judge Poe verbally advised 

defendant of the maximum penalty for the offense, as he 

advised defendant of his other rights, and as he has 

done by habit and practice during his career as a 

district court judge. This is not only supported by the 

affidavit of the judge and the testimony of the 

prosecutor, but also by the records indicating that 

defendant was admonished of the consequences of his plea 

and the admissions of defendant that Judge Poe verbally 

advised him of his rights. 

(R., Vol. One, Tab 208 at 4-6). 

We hold that the district court's finding that Randel's 

prior Texas conviction was valid under state law was not clearly 

erroneous. Particularly so, when, as here, there was no 

transcript of the Texas sentencing proceeding because Randel 

waived the presence of a court reporter. Cf. United States v. 

Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1203 (lOth Cir. 1991) (under the invited 

error doctrine, a defendant who induces an erroneous ruling is 

prevented from being able to have it set aside on appeal) . 

III. 

Randel contends that the district court erred in finding that 

his prior Texas conviction was not obtained in violation of the 

United States Constitution. 

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Randel argues that under Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 

(1969), the record must affirmatively disclose that a defendant 

who pleads guilty does so understandably and voluntarily. Boykin 

involved a direct appellate review of a conviction allegedly based 

upon an uninformed guilty plea in which the Court held that the 

waiver of rights resulting from a guilty plea "cannot [be] 

presume [d] from a silent record." 395 u.s. at 243. Randel 

argues that inasmuch as "[t]he certified record of [his] Texas 

conviction does not affirmatively show that [he] was advised of 

the range of his punishment," (Brief for Appellant at 33), "his 

Texas guilty plea conviction cannot be reviewed by this court to 

determine if the plea was voluntary and intelligently made" Id. 

As set forth supra, it is uncontested that there is no transcript 

of the proceedings because Randel waived the presence of a court 

reporter, (R., Vol. One, Tab 205 at 8), and Randel "has never 

attempted to appeal or overturn his [Texas] conviction and 

sentence." Id. at 5. 

The Supreme Court recently considered and rejected similar 

arguments in Parke v. Raley, 113 S. Ct. 517 (1992). In Parke, 

the Court held that it defies logic to presume that a defendant 

was not advised of his rights based on the mere unavailability of 

a transcript and that Boykin does not prohibit a state court in a 

collateral proceeding from applying the presumption of regularity 

to a final judgment of conviction offered for the purpose of 

sentence enhancement: 

In 1986, respondent Raley was charged with robbery 

and with being a persistent felony offender under a 

Kentucky statute that enhances sentences for repeat 

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felons. He moved to suppress the 1979 and 1981 guilty 

pleas that formed the basis for the latter charge, 

claiming that they were invalid because the records 

contained no transcripts of the proceedings and hence 

did not affirmatively show, as required by Boykin ... that the pleas were knowing and voluntary. 

* * * 

Respondent, however, never appealed his earlier 

convictions. They became final years ago, and he now 

seeks to revisit the question of their validity in a 

separate recidivism proceeding. To import Boykin's 

presumption of invalidity into this very different 

context would, in our view, improperly ignore another 

presumption deeply rooted in our jurisprudence: the 

"presumption of regularity" that attaches to final 

judgments, even when the question is waiver of 

constitutional rights .... Respondent, by definition, 

collaterally attacked his previous convictions; he 

sought to deprive them of their normal force and effect 

in a proceeding that had an independent purpose other 

than to overturn the prior judgments .... 

There is no good reason to suspend the presumption 

of regularity here .... Evidently, no transcripts or 

other records of the earlier plea colloquies exist at 

all .... The circumstances of a missing or nonexistent 

record is, we suspect, not atypical, particularly when 

the prior conviction is several years old. . . On 

collateral review, we think it defies logic to presume 

from the mere unavailability of a transcript {assuming 

no allegation that the unavailability is due to 

governmental misconduct) that the defendant was not 

apprised of his rights. In this situation, Boykin does 

not prohibit a state court from presuming, at least 

initially, that a final judgment of conviction offered 

for purposes of sentence enhancement was validly 

obtained. 

113 S. Ct. at 518 and 523-24. 

Applying Parke to our case, we hold that the district court 

did not err in finding that Randel's prior state conviction was 

valid under the United States Constitution. Moreover, the record 

supports the district court's specific findings on this issue: 

We believe the government has demonstrated that the 

plea of guilty in this case was knowingly and 

voluntarily made. Judge Poe verbally explained 

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defendant's rights to him. Defendant admits this. 

Defendant was not surprised by the sentence he received. 

He received exactly the sentence he was told he would 

receive before he pleaded guilty. He does not contend 

that his plea was made out of ignorance or coercion. 

Accordingly, we find that the guilty plea meets federal 

constitutional standards. 

(R., Vol. One, Tab 208 at 6). 

AFFIRMED. 

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