Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-05-01347/USCOURTS-caDC-05-01347-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Federal Communications Commission
Respondent
United States of America
Respondent
i2 Telecom International, Inc.
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 12, 2006 Decided December 15, 2006

No. 05-1248

NUVIO CORPORATION,

PETITIONER

v.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

RESPONDENTS

VERIZON TELEPHONE COMPANIES AND

AT&T CORPORATION,

INTERVENORS

Consolidated with

05-1345, 05-1346, 05-1347

On Petitions for Review of an Order of the

Federal Communications Commission

Russell M. Blau argued the cause for petitioners. With

him on the briefs were Richard M. Rindler and Joshua M.

Bobeck.

James M. Carr, Counsel, Federal Communications

Commission, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the

USCA Case #05-1347 Document #1011339 Filed: 12/15/2006 Page 1 of 21
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1

 Nuvio Corporation; Lightyear Network Solutions, LLC;

Primus Telecommunications, Inc.; Lingo, Inc.; and i2 Telecom

International, Inc. (collectively “petitioners”) have all petitioned

brief were Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, U.S.

Department of Justice, Douglas N. Letter, Appellant Litigation

Counsel, Scott R. McIntosh, Special Counsel, Samuel L. Feder,

General Counsel, Federal Communications Commission, and

Jacob M. Lewis and Daniel M. Armstrong, Associate General

Counsel. John E. Ingle, Deputy Associate General Counsel, and

Nandan M. Joshi, Counsel, entered appearances.

Michael E. Glover, Karen Zacharia, Leslie V. Owsley,

Joseph R. Guerra, David L. Lawson, and Gary L. Phillips were

on the brief for intervenors AT&T Corporation and Verizon

Telephone Companies. David W. Carpenter entered an

appearance.

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and GRIFFITH and

KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GRIFFITH in

which Chief Judge GINSBURG joins and Circuit Judge

KAVANAUGH joins with the exception of footnote five.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge KAVANAUGH.

GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge: Petitioners, providers of the

newly-emerging technology of Internet telephone service,

challenge an order of the Federal Communications Commission

(“Commission” or “FCC”) that gave them only 120 days to do

what is already required of providers of traditional telephone

service: transmit 911 calls to a local emergency authority. We

deny their consolidated petition for review1

 because we conclude

USCA Case #05-1347 Document #1011339 Filed: 12/15/2006 Page 2 of 21
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for review. 

that the Commission adequately considered not only the

technical and economic feasibility of the deadline, inquiries

made necessary by the bar against arbitrary and capricious

decision-making, but also the public safety objectives the

Commission is required to achieve.

I.

One of the many dramatic changes the Internet has

brought to telecommunications has been the development of

interconnected Voice over Internet Protocol (“VoIP”) service,

which allows a caller using a broadband Internet connection to

place calls to and receive calls from other callers using either

VoIP or traditional telephone service. E911 Requirements for

IP-Enabled Service Providers, First Report and Order and

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 10245, 10246 n.1

(2005) (“Order”). From a caller’s perspective, interconnected

VoIP service is, for the most part, similar to traditional

telephone service, and its users reasonably expect it to function

the same. But two additional capabilities of VoIP service

undermine those expectations when callers try to use 911

emergency services. VoIP service allows callers to choose what

are called “non-native” area codes. For example, a customer

living in the District of Columbia can use an area code from

anywhere in the country. Some interconnected VoIP providers

(“IVPs”) also offer “nomadic” service, which allows a VoIP

telephone call to be made and received from wherever the user

can establish a broadband connection. (By contrast, “fixed”

VoIP telephone service can only be used from a dedicated, fixed

connection—typically in a home or office.) As attractive as

these two features may be, each makes it difficult for IVPs to

provide the local callers the 911 emergency service they expect

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2

 E911 is a more advanced version of the traditional 911

system, which merely routes an emergency call to the local

PSAP, because it provides additional information about the

caller:

and upon which they rely. Routers designed to direct 911 calls

cannot recognize non-native area codes, and unlike traditional

and wireless telephone service, there are no means yet available

to easily determine the location of a caller using interconnected

VoIP service. IVPs, which were not required to do otherwise,

failed to use dedicated trunks (communications paths connecting

two switching systems, used to establish an end-to-end

connection) set aside for routing calls to a local emergency call

center (known as a public safety answering point or “PSAP”)

and instead routed 911 calls to administrative lines that had not

been designed and were not staffed to handle emergency calls.

Id. at 10246 ¶ 1 n.2 (documenting various instances in which

consumers were unable to contact emergency help after dialing

911 using an interconnected VoIP service). The resulting

tragedies gave rise to the Order at issue.

The Commission, which had previously been reluctant

to regulate this nascent industry for fear of hindering its

development, see, e.g., IP-Enabled Services, Notice of

Proposed Rulemaking, 19 F.C.C.R. 4863, 4864 ¶ 1 (2004)

(“Notice of Proposed Rulemaking” or “NPRM”) (noting that IPenabled services had developed “in an environment that is free

of many of the regulatory obligations applied to traditional

telecommunication services”), decided that an immediate

solution was required to “discharge[] the Commission’s

statutory obligation to promote an effective nationwide

911/E911 emergency access system,” Order, 20 F.C.C.R. at

10266 ¶ 36.2

 The Commission thus ordered that

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E911 systems route 911 calls through the use of

a Selective Router to a geographically

appropriate PSAP based on the caller’s location.

E911 also provides the call taker with the caller’s

call back number, referred to as Automatic

Numbering Information (ANI), and, in many

cases, location information—a capability

referred to as Automatic Location Identification

(ALI).

Order, 20 F.C.C.R. at 10251 ¶ 13 (citations omitted).

3

 This Order became effective on July 29, 2005, see 70

Fed. Reg. 43,323, 43,323 (July 27, 2005) (to be codified at 47

C.F.R. § 9.5), thereby requiring compliance by November 28,

2005, id.

within 120 days of the effective date of this

Order,[3] an interconnected VoIP provider must

transmit all 911 calls, as well as a call back

number and the caller’s “Registered Location”

for each call, to the PSAP, designated statewide

default answering point, or appropriate local

emergency authority that serves the caller’s

Registered Location.

Id. ¶ 37 (citations omitted).

In effect, the Order requires that all IVPs, including

those that offer nomadic service using non-native area codes,

ensure that their users are able to reach local emergency services

when making 911 calls. To do so, IVPs must route all 911 calls

using the technology known as Automatic Number Identification

(“ANI”) or pseudo-ANI, if necessary. ANI “identifies the

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4

 “The core of the existing wireline E911 network is a

dedicated, redundant, highly reliable wireline network (Wireline

E911 Network), which is interconnected with but largely

separate from the PSTN [public switched telephone network].”

Order, 20 F.C.C.R. at 10251 ¶ 14. This network is generally

implemented and operated by incumbent local exchange carriers

(“ILECs”). Id.

calling party and may be used as a call back number.” 47 C.F.R.

§ 20.3. A pseudo-ANI is “[a] number, consisting of the same

number of digits as ANI, that is not a North American

Numbering Plan telephone directory number and may be used

in place of an ANI to convey special meaning.” Id. Because

local selective routers are not capable of delivering non-native

numbers to a local PSAP, pseudo-ANIs are used to temporarily

mask the true number with a local number to facilitate

processing by the local selective router for delivery to the PSAP.

See id. The Commission was less stringent in requiring the use

of Automatic Location Information (ALI), which provides an

emergency dispatcher with the geographic location of the caller,

because it is not yet technologically feasible to detect

automatically the location of nomadic VoIP callers. The Order

only requires, therefore, that IVPs ensure that 911 calls are

routed to the registered and not the actual location of each 911

caller. See Order, 20 F.C.C.R. at 10271 ¶ 46. IVPs, however,

must provide a way for consumers to update their registered

locations in a timely fashion. See id. These interconnected IVP

911 calls must also be routed through the Wireline E911

network.4

 See id. at 10269 ¶ 40. 

The Commission did not dictate a specific manner for

IVPs to provide E911 access. Instead, the Commission noted

that IVPs could satisfy these requirements by interconnecting

directly with the E911 network through incumbent local

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exchange carriers (“ILECs”), see id. at 10268 ¶ 39, by

interconnecting indirectly through a third party, see id. at 10267

¶ 38, or by any other solution that results in E911 access, see id.

Finally, the Order requires that interconnected VoIP providers

notify every customer, new and existing, about “the

circumstances under which E911 service may not be available

through the interconnected VoIP service or may be in some way

limited by comparison to traditional E911 service.” Id. at 10272

¶ 48.

II.

Under the Administrative Procedure Act, which governs

our review of this challenge, petitioners’ burden is to show that

the Order is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or

otherwise not in accordance with law,” see 5 U.S.C.

§ 706(2)(A). They rely upon three arguments to meet that

burden. First, petitioners assert that the Order’s 120-day

deadline for IVPs to provide E911 service to their users of

nomadic, non-native VoIP service is an unexplained departure

from the Commission’s precedent made without adequate regard

to economic and technological obstacles. Petitioners also fault

the Order for requiring that IVPs connect to the Wireline E911

network but failing to impose a corresponding duty on ILECs to

permit this connection. Finally, petitioners contend that the

Commission did not give adequate notice of the substance of the

Order. We consider these arguments in turn and find each

wanting.

A. The FCC decision to require all IVPs—including

providers of nomadic, non-native VoIP

service—to provide E911 access within 120

days.

Petitioners assert that the Commission disregarded

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5

 Our concurring colleague reads the Order to suggest

that “the 911 requirement would be justified even if VoIP

providers could not feasibly meet the 120-day deadline.”

Concurring Op. at [1-2]. But he quotes no language in the

Order stating that, and we find none suggesting that. The Order

makes reference to the Commission’s statutory duty to consider

safety, a factor that is an important element in our analysis, but

we do not think these references can support the suggestion that

the Commission has ever justified the 120-day deadline on the

basis of any authority to ban VoIP service outright. We note

that if such authority exists, the Commission has not clearly

relied on it in its briefs or at oral argument. In fact, when asked

to clarify whether the deadline was appropriate even if it was not

feasible, counsel for the Commission replied, “No. No, Your

Honor. The Commission believed that the deadline was

aggressive, but that it was something that could be met, and it

recognized the need to try to force these parties to get going, to

get moving.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 19, Nuvio Corp.

v. FCC, No. 05-1248 (D.C. Cir. Sep. 12, 2006). Because we

“cannot sustain [the Commission’s] action on some other basis

the [Commission] did not mention,” Point Park Univ. v. NLRB,

457 F.3d 42, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp.,

332 U.S. 194, 196-97 (1946)), we need not consider whether

safety concerns alone would justify the deadline.

record evidence that the 120-day deadline was not feasible

because there was no demonstrated way to overcome the

technical and practical obstacles to implement E911 for

providers of nomadic, non-native VoIP service. But this

argument fails in the face of substantial contrary record evidence

that the nation’s largest interconnected VoIP provider had

already procured a technical solution to meet the deadline.5

 The

Commission noted that Intrado, a third-party competitive local

exchange carrier, was already prepared to offer a technological

USCA Case #05-1347 Document #1011339 Filed: 12/15/2006 Page 8 of 21
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solution that met the Order’s requirements, even for providers

of nomadic, non-native service. Order, 20 F.C.C.R. at 10267

¶ 38. At the time the Order was promulgated and in advance of

the 120-day deadline, Intrado was already offering a service that

“enables the delivery of a VoIP subscribers [sic] address and call

back number to the most geographically relevant [PSAP] . . . ,

thereby accommodating the nomadic capability inherent in their

VoIP service.” Ex Parte Letter from M. Boyd, Intrado, to M.H.

Dortch, FCC, WC Docket No. 04-36 (Apr. 25, 2005); see also

Ex Parte Letter from M. Boyd, Intrado, to M.H. Dortch, FCC,

WC Docket No. 04-36 (Apr. 19, 2005). Vonage, the nation’s

largest VoIP provider, agreed with Verizon, the ILEC

controlling the Wireline E911 network in its territory, that it

would use Intrado’s service “to deliver both caller’s location and

call back number to emergency services personnel for 911 calls

placed throughout Verizon’s [28-state] territory,” and would do

so by November 4, before the November 28, 2005 deadline. Ex

Parte Letter from W.B. Wilhelm, Vonage, to K.J. Martin, FCC,

WC Docket No. 04-36 (May 9, 2005). 

The Commission also relied on IVP trials that

demonstrated E911 access was possible for providers of

nomadic, non-native VoIP service. For example, Qwest and

Vonage conducted a test of VoIP E911 access in King County,

Washington. This test included both an experimental means of

PSTN access and a messaging component used to deliver the

calling party’s location automatically. Petitioners’ focus on the

failed experimental access component ignores the successful

messaging component of the trial that demonstrated VoIP E911

access was in fact possible. In recounting the results of this trial,

Qwest noted that, rather than using this failed experimental

access, an IVP could provide E911 service using a combination

of Qwest’s tarriffed access to the Wireline E911 network and

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6 To provide E911 connectivity for its “nomadic”

VoIP users, the VoIP provider can purchase the

dedicated access component in the form of

Qwest’s tarriffed E911 service and, in addition,

they can purchase the E2 interface (the

messaging component) from a VoIP Positioning

Center provider. This is consistent with the

NENA I2 standard.

Ex Parte Letter from C. O’Connell, Qwest, to M.H. Dortch,

FCC, WC Docket No. 04-36 (Apr. 12, 2005).

third party support services.6

 Ex Parte Letter from C.

O’Connell, Qwest, to M.H. Dortch, FCC, WC Docket No. 04-36

(Apr. 12, 2005). Vonage had also successfully tested E911

access for nomadic VoIP in Newport, Rhode Island. See Ex

Parte Letter from W.B. Wilhelm, Vonage, to M.H. Dortch, FCC,

WC Docket No. 04-36 (May 9, 2005). Petitioners seize upon

two elements of this Newport test to argue that it is an unreliable

basis for the Order. First, there is only one PSAP in small

Rhode Island and so this test could not address the critical issue

of routing calls to the wrong PSAP. Second, the state and not an

ILEC owns the selective router and so there is no issue of

providing access to the E911 Wireline network. Petitioners have

no doubt identified elements in this test that provide some

grounds to distinguish them from what the Order demands, but

the general success of the Rhode Island test, combined with the

substantial deference we owe the FCC’s predictive judgments,

overcomes the petitioners’ objections. See, e.g., Int’l Ladies’

Garment Workers’ Union v. Donovan, 722 F.2d 795, 821 (D.C.

Cir. 1983) (“Predictive judgments about areas that are within the

agency’s field of discretion and expertise” are entitled to

“particularly deferential” treatment.); see also Charter

Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 460 F.3d 31, 44 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“That

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is a predictive judgment that the FCC is entitled to make and to

which we defer.”). 

Petitioners’ argument that the submission of the National

Emergency Number Association (“NENA”) undermines the

Commission’s conclusion that the 120-day deadline was

reasonable also fails to account for the deference we give to an

agency’s predictive judgments. NENA opined that “the bulk of

national access to [E911]” could be reached within 120 days, but

noted that “[f]ull national access” could take “another 4-6

months.” Ex Parte Letter from J.R. Hobson, NENA, to M.

Dortch, FCC, WC Docket No. 04-36 (May 11, 2005) (emphasis

added). The Commission was acting well within its authority to

use its expertise to make predictive judgments when it

concluded that if the “bulk of national access” could be achieved

within 120 days, it was reasonable to use that time period.

We must also address the petitioners’ claim that the

Commission erred by failing to distinguish between the

technological obstacles faced by nomadic or non-native VoIP

providers and those faced by fixed, native providers. They

allege the Commission based the Order on the technological

capabilities associated with fixed VoIP service and overlooked

the unique challenges posed by nomadic, non-native VoIP

service. But the Commission in fact considered the unique

technological challenges of nomadic VoIP, see Order, 20

F.C.C.R. at 10259 ¶ 25 (noting that “certain [nomadic or

portable] VoIP services pose significant E911 implementation

challenges”), and taking stock of those challenges, did not

require that IVPs determine the actual location of nomadic VoIP

users because it “is not always technologically feasible for

providers of interconnected VoIP service to automatically

determine the location of their end users without end users’

active cooperation,” id. at 10271 ¶ 46. Instead, the Commission

determined that IVPs must provide only the registered location

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of the nomadic VoIP user making a 911 call, see id., and called

for comment on the feasibility of automatically determining the

geographic location of nomadic VoIP users, see id. at 10276-77

¶¶ 56-57. 

Petitioners’ argument that the Commission overlooked

the economic cost of implementing the Order’s 120-day

deadline highlights that our task under the arbitrary or capricious

standard is to determine only whether an agency’s decision

“‘was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and

whether there has been a clear error of judgment,’” Motor

Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.

Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quoting Bowman Transp., Ind. v.

Ark.-Best Freight System, Inc., 491 U.S. 281, 285 (1974)).

Petitioners overlook a countervailing interest that the

Commission must consider and we must respect—the threat to

public safety. When, as is the case with the FCC, Congress has

given an agency the responsibility to regulate a market such as

the telecommunications industry that it has repeatedly deemed

important to protecting public safety, the agency’s judgments

about the economic cost of its regulations must take into account

its duty to protect the public. The Commission is required to

consider public safety by both its enabling act, see

Communications Act of 1934 § 1, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (“so as to

make available, so far as possible . . . [a] world-wide wire and

radio communication service with adequate facilities at

reasonable charges . . . for the purpose of promoting safety of

life and property through the use of wire and radio

communications”) (emphasis added), and the Wireless

Communication and Public Safety Act of 1999 § 3, 47 U.S.C.

§ 615 (“shall encourage and support efforts by States to deploy

comprehensive end-to-end emergency communications

infrastructure and programs, based on coordinated statewide

plans, including seamless, ubiquitous, reliable wireless

telecommunications networks and enhanced wireless 9-1-1

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service”). The Commission here weighed public safety against

the economic cost of compliance with the Order and found that,

“[w]hile 120 days is an aggressively short amount of time in

which to comply with these requirements, the threat to public

safety if we delay further is too great and demands near

immediate action.” Order, 20 F.C.C.R. at 10266-67 ¶ 37

(emphasis added). 

Because the Commission has reasonably determined that

nomadic, non-native VoIP E911 access is technologically

feasible, any argument about the time period required for

implementation is nothing more than a quarrel over relative

costs and benefits. In this case, the Commission has weighed

the cost of an “aggressive” implementation scheme—a 120-day

deadline—against the cost in human lives, and found in favor of

public safety. See id. at 10266 ¶ 36 (“We find that this

requirement most appropriately discharges the Commission’s

statutory obligation to promote an effective nationwide

911/E911 emergency access system by recognizing the needs of

the public safety community to get call back and location

information and balancing those needs against existing

technological limitations of interconnected VoIP providers.”);

cf. Public Citizen v. Auchter, 702 F.2d 1150, 1157 (D.C. Cir.

1983) (“Delays that might be altogether reasonable in the sphere

of economic regulations are less tolerable when human lives are

at stake.”). We may not disturb its determination where, as here,

the Commission has considered relevant factors and has

articulated a reasoned basis for its conclusion. See State Farm,

463 U.S. at 42-43. When viewed in this light, we cannot agree

that the 120-day deadline is arbitrary or capricious.

Petitioners’ final challenge to the 120-day deadline is

that it represents an unexplained departure from long-standing

precedent. The precedent, so the argument goes, was

established when the FCC gave more time for wireless and

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satellite phones and other new technologies to implement 911

capabilities than the aggressive deadline it has imposed on the

new VoIP telephone service market. Petitioners are right that an

agency departing from precedent “must provide a principled

explanation for its change of direction.” Nat’l Black Media

Coalition v. FCC, 775 F.2d 342, 355 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see also

Airmark Corp. v. FAA, 785 F.2d 685, 692 (D.C. Cir. 1985). But

surely different technologies may reasonably bear different

regulatory burdens. It is not apparent to us that the regulation of

satellite or wireless phones is clear precedent for the regulation

of information technology service providers. No doubt each

involves telephone communications, but the differences between

satellite and wireless phone service on the one hand and VoIP

service on the other are such that the Commission has previously

refused to classify IP-enabled services as telecommunications

carriers. We give deference to agency expertise used to

distinguish its prior cases from present controversies. See PPL

Montana, LLC v. Surface Transp. Bd., 437 F.3d 1240, 1247

(D.C. Cir. 2006) (“[T]he [agency’s] attempt to distinguish its

prior cases, while terse, is entitled to deference.” (quoting Inland

Lakes Mgmt., Inc. v. NLRB, 987 F.2d 799, 805 (D.C. Cir.

1993))). Even if the Commission’s regulatory approach to these

other telecommunications services provided a precedent for

VoIP service, the Commission provided a reasoned explanation

for adopting a different approach by expressly noting that “the

record indicates that the network components that have been

developed to make wireless E911 possible can also be used for

VoIP E911, which should make the implementation process

simpler and far less expensive than the initial upgrades

necessary for wireless E911.” Order, 20 F.C.C.R. at 10274

¶ 53; see also Ex Parte Letter from W.B. Wilhelm, Vonage, to

K.J. Martin, FCC, WC Docket No. 04-36 (May 9, 2005) (stating

that Vonage “does not anticipate that it will face the same issues

that have made [wireless] E-9-1-1 such a daunting challenge”).

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Because petitioners acknowledge that some type of E911

regulation is necessary, see Petitioners’ Br. at 19, this petition

for review is, in essence, a challenge only to where the FCC has

drawn the regulatory “line,” and we have previously and

repeatedly given the Commission “wide discretion to determine

where to draw administrative lines.” AT&T Corp. v. FCC, 220

F.3d 607, 627 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Based on the record evidence,

the demonstrated safety concerns, and our deference to the

Commission’s predictive judgments, we conclude that the

Order’s 120-day deadline was neither arbitrary nor capricious.

B. The FCC requirement for IVP connectivity to the

Wireline E911 network without a corresponding

obligation on ILECs.

The Order requires IVPs to utilize the Wireline E911

network generally owned by the ILECs, but it failed to impose a

duty on ILECs to provide that access. Petitioners argue that this

different treatment of the ILECS was error. We find no error for

the simple reason that the record contained evidence that major

ILECs were cooperating with nomadic IVPs and “increasingly

offering E911 solutions that allow VoIP providers to interconnect

directly to the Wireline E911 network through tariff, contract, or

a combination thereof.” Order, 20 F.C.C.R. at 10268 ¶ 39. There

is record evidence, for example, that Qwest, Bellsouth, and

Verizon were cooperating with IVPs to provide access to the

Wireline E911 network. See, e.g., Ex Parte Letter from C.

O’Connell, Qwest, to M.H. Dortch, FCC, WC Docket No. 04-36

(Apr. 12, 2005); Ex Parte Letter from B.L. Ross, Bellsouth, to

M.H. Dortch, FCC, WC Docket No. 04-36 (May 12, 2005); Ex

Parte Letter from K. Grillo, Verizon, to M.H. Dortch, FCC, WC

Docket No. 04-36 (May 11, 2005). Although there is some

evidence to suggest that a few ILECs were not always

cooperative, see Petitioners’ Reply Br. at 10 n.15, there was

ample evidence of significant and increasing ILEC cooperation

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with IVPs and, in the Commission’s view, that cooperation

removed any need to impose a duty upon ILECs to permit

connectivity. That is a judgment we wisely leave alone as

“predictions regarding the actions of regulated entities are

precisely the type of policy judgments that courts routinely and

quite correctly leave to administrative agencies,” Public Util.

Comm’n of State of Cal. v. FERC, 24 F.3d 275, 281 (D.C. Cir.

1994). 

C. The FCC’s notice and comment procedures.

Petitioners’ final argument faults the Commission because

the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that led to the Order lacked

proposed rules or even tentative conclusions. The APA requires

notice of “either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a

description of the subjects and issues involved.” 5 U.S.C.

§ 553(b)(3). “Since the public is generally entitled to submit their

views and relevant data on any proposals, the notice must be

sufficient to fairly apprise interested parties of the issues involved,

but it need not specify every precise proposal which [the agency]

may ultimately adopt as a rule.” Action for Children’s Television

v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). The Commission fairly apprised the

parties and the public of the issues covered by the Order. In our

view, the Commission notified the parties of the purpose, see

NPRM, 19 F.C.C.R. at 4900 ¶ 56 (“how best to achieve our policy

objectives for ensuring the availability of 911 and E911

capability”), the extent, see id. (“the effectiveness of alternatives

to direct regulation”), the form, see id. at 4901 ¶ 56

(“technological flexibility so that our rules allow for the

development of new and innovative technologies”), and the time

frame, see id. ¶ 57 (“time frame in which we should consider 911

and E911 regulatory issues in the IP context”) of any potential

regulation. The NPRM gave “interested parties a reasonable

opportunity . . . to present relevant information” on the central

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issues. WJG Tel. Co. v. FCC, 675 F.2d 386, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1982)

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Indeed, many of

the parties submitted comments on all aspects of VoIP access.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

denied.

So ordered.

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KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge, concurring: In 2005, the

Federal Communications Commission required voice-overInternet-protocol (VoIP) providers to ensure adequate 911

connections – a requirement already imposed on wireline and

wireless telephone providers. The FCC set a 120-day deadline

for the VoIP providers to meet the requirement. See Order, 20

F.C.C.R. 10,245 (2005). The Court upholds the Order because

the Commission reasonably predicted that VoIP providers

(including nomadic VoIP providers) could meet the 120-day

deadline and the Order was otherwise justified and explained.

I agree with the Court’s analysis and join its opinion. 

The FCC also candidly recognized, however, the potential

difficulties that nomadic VoIP providers would face in meeting

a 120-day deadline – and acknowledged that the deadline was

“aggressively short.” Id. at 10,266-10,267 ¶ 37; see also id. ¶ 25

(“[W]e recognize that certain VoIP services pose significant

E911 implementation challenges.”). The FCC nonetheless said

that “the threat to public safety if we delay further is too great

and demands near immediate action.” Id.; see also FCC Brief at

31 (“[T]he FCC made a reasonable judgment that any possible

risk that expedited 911 implementation posed to [VoIP

providers’] commercial viability was outweighed by the

growing threat to public safety if [VoIP providers] continued to

route 911 calls in a systematically unsatisfactory manner.”); id.

at 26 (“Given the tragedies that have already resulted from

inadequate VoIP 911 service, and given the projected tenfold

increase in the number of VoIP 911 calls in the near future, the

Commission reasonably concluded that the public could not

tolerate any further delay in the implementation of VoIP E911

service.”); id. (“[G]iven the profound public safety concerns

weighing in favor of rapid 911 deployment here, petitioners

have not come close to showing that the balance struck by the

Commission was unreasonable.”). 

I write separately only to express my agreement with the

FCC Order’s suggestion that the 911 requirement would be

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justified even if VoIP providers could not feasibly meet the 120-

day deadline. In my judgment, the FCC possesses the statutory

authority, which the Commission may reasonably choose to

exercise, to address the public safety threat by banning providers

from selling voice service until the providers can ensure

adequate 911 connections. And the FCC’s greater authority to

ban sales of voice service without adequate 911 capability

necessarily includes the lesser power to ban such sales

beginning in 120 days. 

Congress established the FCC in part “for the purpose of

promoting safety of life and property through the use of wire

and radio communications.” 47 U.S.C. § 151. Through the

Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act of 1999,

Congress charged the FCC with ensuring that 911 service is

available throughout the country. Pub. L. No. 106-81, 113 Stat.

1286 (codified at scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). The Act

instructs that “[t]he Commission . . . shall designate 9-1-1 as the

universal emergency telephone number within the United States

for reporting an emergency to appropriate authorities and

requesting assistance.” 47 U.S.C. § 251(e)(3). Five years later,

Congress enacted the ENHANCE 911 Act. Pub L. No. 108-494,

118 Stat. 3986 (2004) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 942). In that Act,

Congress found that “for the sake of our Nation’s homeland

security and public safety, a universal emergency telephone

number (911) that is enhanced with the most modern and

state-of-the-art telecommunications capabilities possible should

be available to all citizens in all regions of the Nation.” Id.

§ 102. Congress made clear that “enhanced 911 is a high

national priority.” Id.

As these statutes indicate, as the FCC has recognized in

prior orders, and as the record before the Commission in this

proceeding demonstrates, 911 service saves lives and helps

prevent or reduce injuries that occur as a result of violent crime

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3

or accidents. See, e.g., Revision of the Commission’s Rules to

Ensure Compatibility with Enhanced 911 Emergency Calling

Systems, 11 F.C.C.R. 18,676, 18,679 ¶ 5 (1996) (911 service

“saves lives and property”); Order, 20 F.C.C.R. at 10,246 ¶ 1 n.2

(describing recent incidents involving home burglary and where

children needed immediate help); id. at 10,248 ¶ 4 n.11 (citing

comments that explain why 911 service is critical and that

describe various incidents involving 911 service); Revision of

the Commission’s Rules to Ensure Compatibility with Enhanced

911 Emergency Calling Systems, 17 F.C.C.R. 8481, 8482 ¶ 4

(2002) (considering 911 issues for victims of domestic

violence). 

Adequate 911 service is important, moreover, for our

Nation to quickly respond to terrorist attacks or natural disasters.

See Order, 20 F.C.C.R. at 10,247-10,248 ¶ 4 (“911 service is

critical to our nation’s ability to respond to a host of crises”); id.

at 10,249 ¶ 6 n.16 (citing DALE N. HATFIELD, A REPORT ON

TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL ISSUES IMPACTING THE

PROVISION OF WIRELESS ENHANCED 911 SERVICES (2002));

HATFIELD REPORT at ii (“the tragic events of September 11,

2001 and growing dependence on wireless networks[] serve to

further emphasize the importance of E911 in general, and

wireless E911 in particular, to the safety of life and property and

homeland security”); id. at 15 (timely response to call of

suspicious activity “could make the difference between a foiled

or successful attack”); Recommendations of the Independent

Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on

Communications Networks, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 21

F.C.C.R. 7320, 7326 ¶¶ 16-17 (2006) (summarizing proposed

ways to ensure adequate 911 service during natural disasters); cf.

FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST

ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 318 (2004) (discussing

importance of 911 in emergency responses to terrorist attacks);

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FINAL REPORT OF THE

USCA Case #05-1347 Document #1011339 Filed: 12/15/2006 Page 20 of 21
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SELECT BIPARTISAN COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE

PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA 163-

64 (2006) (inoperability of 911 can impede emergency services

in response to natural disasters). 

In sum, the evidence establishes that adequate 911 service

is vital to the personal security of American citizens and the

homeland security of our Nation. The broad public safety and

911 authority Congress has granted the FCC therefore includes

the authority to prevent providers from selling voice service that

lacks adequate 911 capability. 

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