Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01117/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01117-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
James D. Maciel
Petitioner
James A. Yates
Respondent

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U.S . District Court

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES D. MACIEL, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

JAMES A. YATES, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:05-CV-1117 REC LJO HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING RESPONDENT’S MOTION

TO DISMISS 

[Doc. #16]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections at the

Substance Abuse Treatment Facility located in Corcoran, California. With this petition, Petitioner

does not challenge the underlying conviction; rather, he challenges a decision of prison officials

which removed him from Total Medical Disability (“TMD”) status. Petitioner claims he was unable

to attend an assigned education program because of his medical problems. As a result, he was found

guilty of a rules violation and is now precluded from earning credits towards his sentence. 

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Petitioner sought relief through administrative appeals within the prison system. On

October 31, 2001, the final administrative appeal was denied. See Exhibit A, Respondent’s Motion

to Dismiss (hereinafter “Motion”). On March 14, 2002, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas

corpus in the Lassen County Superior Court. See Exhibit B, Motion. He was denied relief and

continued through the state courts until he filed a petition in the California Supreme Court on

April 1, 2003. See Exhibit C, Motion. On October 15, 2003, the petition was summarily denied. Id. 

On September 1, 2005, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court. On

October 4, 2005, the undersigned issued a Findings and Recommendation that recommended

Grounds One and Four be dismissed from the petition. On December 28, 2005, the District Court

adopted the recommendation in part and dismissed Ground Four. Respondent was then directed to

file a response to the petition. On April 12, 2006, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition

as being filed outside the one-year limitations period prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

Petitioner filed an opposition to Respondent’s motion to dismiss on May 11, 2006. 

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not

entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

The Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have allowed respondents to file a motion to

dismiss in lieu of an answer if the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies

or being in violation of the state’s procedural rules. See Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 325

(1996); O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990) (using Rule 4 to evaluate motion to

dismiss petition for failure to exhaust state remedies); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir.

1989) (using Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review motion to dismiss for state procedural default). 

Thus, a respondent can file a motion to dismiss after the court orders a response, and the Court

should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. 

In this case, Respondent's motion to dismiss is based on a violation of 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)'s

one-year limitations period. Because Respondent's motion to dismiss is similar in procedural

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standing to a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust state remedies or for state procedural default

and Respondent has not yet filed a formal answer, the Court will review Respondent’s motion to

dismiss pursuant to its authority under Rule 4. 

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (hereinafter “AEDPA”). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of

habeas corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059,

2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct.

586 (1997). 

In this case, the petition was filed on September 1, 2005, and therefore, it is subject to the

provisions of the AEDPA. The AEDPA imposes a one-year period of limitation on petitioners

seeking to file a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended,

§ 2244, subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In most cases, the limitations period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. In this case, Petitioner’s administrative appeals became final when the

Director’s Level Appeal Response was issued on October 31, 2001. See Exhibit A, Motion. The oneCase 1:05-cv-01117-OWW -LJO Document 21 Filed 05/22/06 Page 3 of 8
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year statute of limitations commenced the next day, on November 1, 2001. Redd v. McGrath, 343

F.3d 1077, 1082 (9th Cir.2003) (Statute of limitations begins the day after the administrative appeals

are concluded). Therefore, Petitioner had one year until November 1, 2002, absent applicable tolling,

in which to file his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. However, Petitioner delayed filing the

instant petition until September 1, 2005, nearly 3 years beyond the due date. Absent any applicable

tolling, the instant petition is barred by the statute of limitations.

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In

Carey v. Saffold, the Supreme Court held the statute of limitations is tolled where a petitioner is

properly pursuing post-conviction relief, and the period is tolled during the intervals between one

state court's disposition of a habeas petition and the filing of a habeas petition at the next level of the

state court system. 536 U.S. 214, 215 (2002); see also Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir.

1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1846 (2000). Nevertheless, state petitions will only toll the one-year

statute of limitations under § 2244(d)(2) if the state court explicitly states that the post-conviction

petition was timely or was filed within a reasonable time under state law. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544

U.S. 408 (2005); Chavis v. Evans, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 846 (2006). Claims denied as untimely or

determined by the federal courts to have been untimely in state court will not satisfy the requirements

for statutory tolling. Id.

As stated above, the statute of limitations began to run on November 1, 2001. On March 14,

2002, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the Lassen County Superior Court. See Exhibit B, Motion.

At that point, 133 days of the limitations period had expired. Respondent concedes the limitations

period was tolled for the time the first state habeas petition was filed in superior court until the

California Supreme Court denied the petition on October 15, 2003. See Cal. R. Ct. § 29.4(b)(2).

Therefore, statute of limitations recommenced on October 16, 2003. With 232 days remaining, the

statute of limitations expired on June 4, 2004. As previously stated, the instant federal petition was

not filed until September 1, 2005, which was 454 days beyond the statute’s expiration. The instant

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1As requested by Petitioner, the Court hereby takes judicial notice of the following cases: Maciel v. Sanchez, et al.,

case no. 2:02-CV-00144-DFL-JFM; and Maciel v. Prebula, et al., case no. 2:02-CV-02675-MCE-PAN.

2

The Supreme Court noted that it has never squarely addressed the question whether equitable tolling is available

under AEDPA’s statute of limitations. In Pace, the Supreme Court again declined to do so and only assumed for the sake of

argument that it did, because Respondent assumed as much and Petitioner was not entitled to tolling under any standard. 125

S.Ct. at 1814 n. 8.

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 5

petition is therefore untimely.

Petitioner contends the statute should be tolled for the time his civil rights complaints were

pending in federal court.

1 However, Petitioner is not entitled to tolling for the time his complaints

were pending in federal court. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181 (2001). 

D. Equitable Tolling

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if the petitioner demonstrates: “(1) that

he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his

way.”2 Pace, 125 S.Ct. at 1814; see also Irwin v. Department of Veteran Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96

(1990); Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9th Cir. 1998), citing Alvarez-Machain

v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1996), cert denied, 522 U.S. 814 (1997). Petitioner bears

the burden of alleging facts that would give rise to tolling. Pace, 125 S.Ct. at 1814; Smith v. Duncan,

297 F.3d 809 (9th Cir.2002); Hinton v. Pac. Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 395 (9th Cir.1993). 

Assuming it is available, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling because he fails to

demonstrate any extraordinary circumstance which would have prevented him from timely

complying with the statute of limitations. While it appears that Petitioner has been diligently

pursuing his remedies with respect to his civil rights actions, he presents no extraordinary

circumstance which stood in his way or otherwise prevented him from timely filing the instant

petition for writ of habeas corpus. Indeed, Petitioner concedes having filed over fourteen (14) cases

in the federal courts with respect to the underlying claims. See p. 4, Petitioner’s Opposition. 

Petitioner appears to claim he was ignorant of the law; nevertheless, this is not sufficient to

justify equitable tolling. See, e.g., Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283,

1288-89 (9th Cir.1997), overruled on other grounds by Calderon v. United States Dist. Court

(Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir.1998) (en banc); Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 800 F.2d

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905, 909 (9th Cir.1986) (pro se prisoner's illiteracy and lack of knowledge of law unfortunate but

insufficient to establish cause); Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir.2000) (“it is well

established that ignorance of the law, even for an incarcerated pro se prisoner, generally does not

excuse prompt filing.”); Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710 (5th Cir. 1999); Warren v. Lewis, 365 F.3d

529, 532 (6th Cir.2004), quoting Rose v. Dole, 945 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir.1991) (“[i]t is wellsettled that ignorance of the law alone is not sufficient to warrant equitable tolling.”).

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling and the petition remains untimely.

E. Exhaustion

Respondent also contends that Petitioner failed to present any federal issue to the California

courts.

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by a

petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The

exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial

opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158,

1163 (9th Cir. 1988). 

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with a

full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. Duncan v.

Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88

F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full

and fair opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the

claim's factual and legal basis. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365 (legal basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504

U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis). 

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a

federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669

(9th Cir.2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (2001); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir.1999);

Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir.1998). In Duncan, the United States Supreme Court

reiterated the rule as follows: 

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In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 . . . (1971), we said that exhaustion 

of state remedies requires that petitioners "fairly presen[t]" federal claims to the 

state courts in order to give the State the "'opportunity to pass upon and correct 

alleged violations of the prisoners' federal rights" (some internal quotation marks

omitted). If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations 

of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners 

are asserting claims under the United States Constitution. If a habeas petitioner 

wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due 

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only 

in federal court, but in state court. 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule further, stating:

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not "fairly presented" (and thus 

exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to 

that court that those claims were based on federal law. See Shumway v. Payne, 

223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2000). Since the Supreme Court's decision in 

Duncan, this court has held that the petitioner must make the federal basis of the 

claim explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even

if the federal basis is “self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 889 

(9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 . . . (1982), or the 

underlying claim would be decided under state law on the same considerations 

that would control resolution of the claim on federal grounds. Hiivala v. Wood, 

195 F3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830-31 

(9th Cir. 1996); . . . .

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert the state court to 

the fact that the relevant claim is a federal one without regard to how similar the 

state and federal standards for reviewing the claim may be or how obvious the 

violation of federal law is. 

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2000) (italics added). 

In the instant petition before the Court, Petitioner raises three grounds for relief which may

be cognizable on federal habeas review. However, Respondent correctly asserts that Petitioner never

made the federal basis of his claims known to the California Supreme Court. A review of the petition

reveals Petitioner never cited, analyzed or even mentioned federal law to the court. The petition was

entirely based on state law and regulations. Therefore, any federal claim raised before this Court is

unexhausted. The petition must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). Because Petitioner has also

violated the statute of limitations, the dismissal should be with prejudice. 

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the motion to dismiss be

GRANTED and the habeas corpus petition be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for Petitioner’s

failure to comply with 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)’s one year limitation period and for failure to exhaust

state remedies.

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This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Robert E. Coyle, United

States District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule

72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of

California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections

with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and

filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the objections. 

The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 19, 2006 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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