Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-03176/USCOURTS-ca13-14-03176-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of the Interior
Respondent
Merit Systems Protection Board
Respondent
Denise L. Robinson
Petitioner

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

DENISE L. ROBINSON,

Petitioner,

v.

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,

Respondent.

______________________ 

2014-3176

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. DC-0752-0580-I-1.

______________________ 

Decided: January 13, 2015

______________________ 

DENISE L. ROBINSON, of Fredericksburg, Virginia, pro 

se. 

KATHERINE M. SMITH, Attorney, Office of the General 

Counsel, Merit Systems Protection Board, of Washington, 

DC, for respondent. With her on the brief was BRYAN G.

POLISUK, General Counsel. 

______________________ 

Before WALLACH, TARANTO, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.

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2 ROBINSON v. MSPB

PER CURIAM. 

Denise Robinson petitions for review of the final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board) adopting the initial decision of the administrative judge (AJ) as 

the Board’s final decision. The AJ dismissed Ms. Robinson’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction because Ms. Robinson 

failed to make non-frivolous allegations that her resignation, made pursuant to a voluntary settlement agreement, 

was the product of coercion, duress, or misrepresentation. 

Because we agree that the Board lacks jurisdiction, we 

affirm.

BACKGROUND

Ms. Robinson worked for the Department of the Interior in the National Park Service (Agency) as a Human 

Resources Assistant. On March 7, 2007, she and the 

Agency entered into an equal employment opportunity (EEO) resolution agreement resolving a discrimination 

complaint she had filed against the Agency. The Agency 

agreed to reassign Ms. Robinson from her position in 

Washington, District of Columbia, to the Mather Training 

Center in Harpers Ferry, West Virginia. Ms. Robinson in 

turn agreed to withdraw her complaint and to resign from 

her position at the Agency no later than March 13, 2009. 

On May 10, 2013, Ms. Robinson filed an appeal with 

the Board contending that the Agency wrongly forced her 

to resign from service. In doing so, she registered as an efiler with the Board’s e-Appeal system. She contended 

that the Agency failed to honor its obligations under the 

settlement agreement and refused to accept her multiple 

attempts to rescind her agreement to resign.

On May 15, 2013, the AJ electronically issued an 

acknowledgement order advising Ms. Robinson that 

resignation actions are presumed to be voluntary and 

thus, not within the Board’s jurisdiction. The AJ advised 

Ms. Robinson that her appeal would be dismissed unless 

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ROBINSON v. MSPB 3

she amended her petition to allege that the resignation 

was in effect involuntary due to duress, coercion, or 

misrepresentation by the Agency. The AJ ordered Ms. 

Robinson to file such evidence and argument by May 30, 

2013, 15 calendar days from the date of the order. 

On May 24, 2013, Ms. Robinson submitted two documents to the Board: a SF-50 Notification of Personnel 

Action which states that she voluntarily resigned; and a 

final agency decision dated August 6, 2008, which stated

that the Agency had complied with the terms of the 

settlement agreement. The Agency filed a motion to 

dismiss and provided a copy of the resolution agreement. 

On June 14, 2013, the AJ issued its Initial Decision 

granting the Agency’s motion. The AJ held that the 

Board lacked jurisdiction over Ms. Robinson’s action in 

part because Ms. Robinson failed to raise a non-frivolous 

allegation that her resignation was involuntary. The AJ

noted that the evidence of record stated her resignation 

was voluntary, and found that Ms. Robinson did not 

assert that her resignation was the product of coercion, 

duress or misrepresentation on the part of the Agency.

Ms. Robinson filed a petition for review with the 

Board on June 25, 2013, arguing for the first time that 

Agency representatives obtained her assent to the resolution agreement through misrepresentation and coercion. 

She submitted argument and evidence contending that 

the Agency fraudulently obtained her resignation by 

claiming it would otherwise refuse to reassign her and 

that the agreement was void because the agency breached 

its terms, thus voiding her obligation to resign.

Ms. Robinson contended that these arguments had 

not been submitted before the record closed because she 

was unaware of the AJ’s order and deadline to submit 

evidence and argument. She alleged that when she 

attempted to access the May 15, 2013, acknowledgement 

order on the e-Appeal system, she was met with a mesCase: 14-3176 Document: 21-2 Page: 3 Filed: 01/13/2015
4 ROBINSON v. MSPB

sage that it was “temporarily unavailable.” Accordingly, 

she contended that her May 24, 2013, submission of 

documents was made to complete her appeal, and not in 

response to the acknowledgement order. She also contended that on June 11, 2013, she called the Northeastern 

Regional office (where she filed her appeal) to inquire 

about the status of her case and was informed for the first 

time that her case had been transferred. She then called 

the Washington Regional Office (where her appeal was 

docketed after transfer) to confirm her case had been 

transferred. 

The Board denied Ms. Robinson’s petition for review. 

In affirming the AJ’s decision, the Board declined to 

consider Ms. Robinson’s new arguments regarding the 

involuntariness of her resignation. Because the arguments were not previously presented to the AJ, the Board 

stated it would not consider them absent a showing that 

they were based on new and material evidence not previously available despite the party’s due diligence, citing 

Banks v. Department of the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 268, 271 

(1980), Avansino v. U.S. Postal Serv., 3 M.S.P.R. 211, 214 

(1980), and 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(d). The Board found that 

Ms. Robinson’s new evidence significantly predated her 

appeal. The Board also found unavailing Ms. Robinson’s 

explanation for the untimeliness of her new arguments. 

The Board noted that as an e-filer, Ms. Robinson was 

obligated to monitor her case through the Board’s electronic filing system to ensure she received all related 

documents. The Board acknowledged that while Ms. 

Robinson may have contacted two regional offices while 

her appeal was pending, she did not request assistance 

with the e-Appeal system or otherwise inform the regional

offices of her problem viewing the acknowledgement 

order. Ms. Robinson now appeals to this Court.

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ROBINSON v. MSPB 5

DISCUSSION

Our review of a decision of the Board is limited. A decision of the Board must be affirmed unless it is 

“(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without 

procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having 

been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c); Dickey v. Office of Personnel 

Mgmt., 419 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005). We review 

the question of whether the Board has jurisdiction over an 

appeal de novo. Yates v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 145 

F.3d 1480, 1483 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The employee bears the 

burden of proving jurisdiction by a preponderance of the 

evidence. Id. (citing 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(a)(2)).

An employee resignation is presumed to be voluntary, 

and an employee who voluntarily retires has no right of 

appeal to the Board. Staats v. U.S. Postal Serv., 99 F.3d 

1120, 1123-24 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The Board does have 

jurisdiction, however, if an employee shows that his 

resignation was involuntary and thus tantamount to a 

removal. See Cruz v. Dep't of Navy, 934 F.2d 1240, 1244 

(Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[A]n involuntary resignation [is] deemed 

a ‘constructive removal.’”). To be entitled to a hearing on 

whether the Board has jurisdiction in an involuntary 

resignation case, an employee first must make a “nonfrivolous allegation [as to involuntariness] that, if proved, 

would establish Board jurisdiction.” Staats, 99 F.3d at 

1125. 

As a preliminary matter, Ms. Robinson agreed to accept electronic service when she registered as an e-filer 

with the Board. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.14(e). Accordingly, 

she is deemed to have received the acknowledgement 

order the day it was issued, May 15, 2013. 5 C.F.R. 

§ 1201.14(m)(2); see Rivera v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 111 

M.S.P.R. 581, 584 (2009). When a statute or regulation 

“deems” something to be done or to have been done, the 

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6 ROBINSON v. MSPB

event is considered to have occurred whether or not it 

actually did. Maurer v. Office of Personnel Mgmt, 84 

M.S.P.R. 156, ¶ 12 (1999), aff’d, 236 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 

2001). Thus, as a matter of law, Ms. Robinson was served 

with the acknowledgement order on May 15, 2013. 

Ms. Robinson first contends the Board decision should 

be reversed because the Board failed to promptly notify 

her that her case had been transferred to a different 

regional office, which led to her having missed the deadline in the acknowledgement order. Specifically, Ms. 

Robinson contends that had she known about the transfer, she would have had the opportunity to contact the 

Washington Regional Office in time to ascertain the 

status of her case and timely submit her new arguments. 

We find this argument unpersuasive. Ms. Robinson

has not explained how any relationship exists between 

the transfer of her case and her ability to access the 

acknowledgement order on the e-Appeal system. Moreover, Ms. Robinson did not contact either regional office 

about her appeal until June 11, 2013, nearly one month 

after the acknowledgement order was issued and more 

than ten days after the AJ’s deadline.

Second, Ms. Robinson claims she acted diligently in 

attempting to access the acknowledgement order as 

evidenced by her phone calls to the two regional offices. 

But even assuming that Ms. Robinson informed the 

regional offices about her difficulty accessing the document in the phone calls on June 11, 2013, which she 

claims for the first time here, she has offered no explanation for her nearly month-long delay in contacting the 

Board about the order. Nor has Ms. Robinson explained 

why she did not make subsequent attempts to access the 

acknowledgement order online given the error message 

she received told her the system was merely “temporarily

unavailable.” We thus find the Board did not abuse its 

discretion by refusing to consider Ms. Robinson’s arguCase: 14-3176 Document: 21-2 Page: 6 Filed: 01/13/2015
ROBINSON v. MSPB 7

ments and evidence submitted for the first time with her 

petition for review. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(d); Banks, 4 

M.S.P.R. at 271; Avansino, 3 M.S.P.R. at 214. 

Finally, Ms. Robinson argues that the Board applied a 

disproportionate sanction by dismissing her appeal for 

failure to prosecute. She argues that dismissal is not 

warranted for a single failure to comply with a Board 

order—here, the May 15, 2013, acknowledgement order. 

This argument is misplaced, as the AJ did not dismiss her 

appeal for failure to prosecute but rather for a lack of 

jurisdiction. The Board then refused to consider her new 

arguments and evidence not as a sanction, but because 

Ms. Robinson did not show her new arguments and evidence could not have been submitted before the AJ despite her due diligence. 

CONCLUSION

We conclude that the Board was within its discretion 

to refuse to consider Ms. Robinson’s arguments and 

evidence that had not initially been presented to the AJ. 

We also agree with the Board that Ms. Robinson failed to 

carry her burden of establishing the Board’s jurisdiction 

and thus affirm.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

Each party shall bear its own costs.

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