Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_20-cv-01822/USCOURTS-caed-1_20-cv-01822-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Charles A. Edwards
Plaintiff
D. Smith
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES A. EDWARDS,

 Plaintiff,

 vs.

D. SMITH, 

 Defendants.

1:20-cv-01822-GSA-PC

ORDER FOR CLERK TO RANDOMLY 

ASSIGN A UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

JUDGE TO THIS CASE

 AND

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 

RECOMMENDING THAT THIS CASE 

PROCEED ONLY AGAINST 

DEFENDANT DON SMITH WITH 

PLAINTIFF’S EXCESSIVE FORCE 

CLAIM, AND THAT ALL OTHER 

CLAIMS BE DISMISSED FOR FAILURE 

TO STATE A CLAIM

OBJECTIONS DUE ON OR BEFORE 

APRIL 25, 2023

I. BACKGROUND

Charles A. Edwards (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis with this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On December 28, 2020, 

Plaintiff filed the Complaint commencing this action. (ECF No. 1.) On March 25, 2022, the 

Court dismissed the Complaint for failure to state a claim, with leave to amend. (ECF No. 9.) 

On April 11, 2022, Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 10.) On April 13, 

2022, Plaintiff lodged a First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 11), which was stricken by the Court

on June 8, 2022, for attempting to add information piecemeal to the complaint in violation of 

Local Rule 220, with leave to file a Second Amended Complaint complete in itself. (ECF No. 

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13.) On June 17, 2022, Plaintiff filed the Second Amended Complaint, (ECF No. 14), which was 

stricken by the Court for lack of Plaintiff’s signature, (ECF No. 15). On July 1, 2022, Plaintiff 

filed the Second Amended Complaint, bearing his signature, which is now before the Court for 

screening. 28 U.S.C. § 1915. (ECF No. 16.)

II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall 

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the action or appeal fails to state a claim 

upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint is required to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken 

as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, 

Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To state 

a viable claim, Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim 

to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 

572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal 

conclusions are not. Id. The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this 

plausibility standard. Id. 

III. ALLEGATIONS IN SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at California State Prison-Sacramento in Represa, 

California. The events at issue in the Second Amended Complaint allegedly occurred at Kern 

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Valley State Prison in Delano, California, when Plaintiff was incarcerated there in the custody of 

the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Plaintiff names as the sole 

defendant Correctional Officer Don Smith.

Plaintiff’s allegations follow:

Plaintiff alleges in the Second Amended Complaint that he came out for an injection at 

8:00 p.m., (date of incident not stated), and as he walked into the day room he was pepper-sprayed

and slammed to the ground. In Plaintiff’s original complaint he states that this incident occurred 

on May 31, 2020, and also states in the same complaint that it occurred on May 30, 2020 (ECF 

No. 1 at 3 & 8.) He was then handcuffed and placed in a rotunda cage. Plaintiff was not 

decontaminated by staff. He was told not to make a statement then escorted to his cell for 45 

minutes. He was told at 9:00 p.m. that he needed to go up front. Plaintiff alleges that he stated 

all of the facts, and everything is in the report. 

As relief, Plaintiff requests settlement of this case.

IV. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS

A. Section 42 U.S.C. § 1983

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 

usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to 

be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the 

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 

action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

“[Section] 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a 

method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 

393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)); see also Chapman v. 

Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979); Hall v. City of Los Angeles, 697 F.3d 

1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012); Crowley v. Nevada, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 2012); Anderson v. 

Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006). “To the extent that the violation of a state law

///

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amounts to the deprivation of a state-created interest that reaches beyond that guaranteed by the 

federal Constitution, Section 1983 offers no redress.” Id.

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted under 

color of state law and (2) the defendant deprived him or her of rights secured by the Constitution 

or other federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); see

also Marsh v. Cnty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing “under color 

of state law”). A person deprives another of a constitutional right, “within the meaning of § 1983, 

‘if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative act, or omits to perform an act 

which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.’” 

Preschooler II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting

Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). “The requisite causal connection may be 

established when an official sets in motion a ‘series of acts by others which the actor knows or 

reasonably should know would cause others to inflict’ constitutional harms.” Id. (quoting 

Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743). This standard of causation “closely resembles the standard 

‘foreseeability’ formulation of proximate cause.” Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 637 F.2d 

1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th 

Cir. 2008).

B. Excessive Force – Eighth Amendment Claim

“After conviction, the Eighth Amendment serves as the primary source of substantive 

protection. . . in cases. . . . where the deliberate use of force is challenged as excessive and 

unjustified.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.10 (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986)); 

Hawkins v. Comparet-Cassani, 251 F.3d 1230, 1238 (9th Cir. 2001); Dennis v. Thurman, 959 

F.Supp. 1253, 1257 n.1 (C.D. Cal. 1997).

What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual 

Punishments Clause [of the Eighth Amendment] depends upon the claim at issue . . . .” Hudson 

v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992). “The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim 

is . . . contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of decency.” Id. (internal quotation 

marks and citations omitted). The malicious and sadistic use of force to cause harm always 

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violates contemporary standards of decency, regardless of whether or not significant injury is 

evident. Id. at 9; see also Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 628 (9th Cir. 2002) (Eighth Amendment 

excessive force standard examines de minimis uses of force, not de minimis injuries)). However, 

not “every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action.” Id. at 9. 

“The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments necessarily excludes 

from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force

is not of a sort ‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Id. at 9-10 (internal quotations marks 

and citations omitted).

“[W]henever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation 

of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was 

applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to 

cause harm.” Id. at 7. “In determining whether the use of force was wanton and unnecessary, it 

may also be proper to evaluate the need for application of force, the relationship between that 

need and the amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, 

and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.” Id. (internal quotation marks 

and citations omitted). “The absence of serious injury is . . . relevant to the Eighth Amendment 

inquiry, but does not end it.” Id.

Although the Second Amended Complaint is very brief on the facts, the Court does find

that Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant C/O Don Smith for use of excessive force in the 

Second Amended Complaint are sufficient to state a claim. 

C. Failure to Decontaminate – Eighth Amendment Claim

The failure to decontaminate or otherwise assist a prisoner suffering from the painful 

effects of pepper spray may support a claim under the Eighth Amendment.

An Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim based on a medical need has two 

elements: “the seriousness of the prisoner’s medical need and the nature of the defendant’s 

response to that need.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on 

other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A medical need is sufficiently serious “if the failure to treat 

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the prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton 

infliction of pain.’” McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). “Deliberate 

indifference is a high legal standard.” Id. at 1019; Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th 

Cir. 2004). The prison official must be aware of facts from which he could make an inference

that “a substantial risk of serious harm exists” and must make the inference. Farmer v. Brennan, 

511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).

Deliberate indifference may be shown when prison officials deny, delay, or intentionally 

interfere with medical treatment, or may be shown by the way in which prison officials provide 

medical care. Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 393-94 (9th Cir. 1988). In order to be 

actionable, the indifference to a prisoner’s medical needs must be substantial; mere indifference, 

negligence, or medical malpractice will not support this cause of action. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 

105-06); Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319; Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057; McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059.

Plaintiff’s allegations in his claim for failure to decontaminate are insufficient to state a 

cognizable claim against defendant Smith. Plaintiff has not named an individual defendant who 

personally acted to deny him the opportunity to decontaminate, or prevented him from 

decontaminating. Instead, Plaintiff merely alleges that he “did not get decontaminated by 

‘staff.’” (ECF No. 16 at 4.) To state a § 1983 claim, Plaintiff must name an individual defendant 

and allege facts showing personal conduct by the named defendant who is claimed to have

violated Plaintiff’s constitutional or other federal rights. Plaintiff has not done so.

Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for failure to decontaminate.

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

For the reasons set forth above, the court finds that Plaintiff’s Second Amended 

Complaint states a cognizable claim against Defendant Don Smith for use of excessive force in 

violation of the Eighth Amendment, but no other cognizable claims.

In this action, the Court previously granted Plaintiff an opportunity to amend the 

complaint, with guidance by the Court. Plaintiff has now filed three complaint and has only 

alleged a claim against Defendant Don Smith for use of excessive force. The Court finds that 

the deficiencies outlined above are not capable of being cured by amendment, and therefore 

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further leave to amend should not be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); Lopez v. Smith, 

203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of Court randomly assign a 

United States District Judge to this case; 

AND

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), this case proceed only 

against Defendant C/O Don Smith for use of excessive force in violation of the 

Eighth Amendment;

2. All other claims be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may 

be granted under § 1983, without leave to amend; and

3. This case be referred back to the Magistrate Judge for further proceedings, 

including initiation of service of process.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). On or before 

April 25, 2023, Plaintiff may file written objections to the findings and recommendations with 

the court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 

Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified time 

may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th 

Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 3, 2023 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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