Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-03094/USCOURTS-caDC-98-03094-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Henry G. Cisneros
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 4, 1999 Decided March 9, 1999

No. 98-3094

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Henry G. Cisneros,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(97cr00485-01)

Barry S. Simon argued the cause for appellant. With him

on the briefs were Brendan V. Sullivan, Jr. and Marcie R.

Ziegler.

Mathew S. Rosengart, Senior Associate Independent Counsel, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief

were David M. Barrett, Independent Counsel, James P.

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Fleissner and Mark V. Jackowski, Senior Associate Independent Counsel.

Before: Henderson, Randolph, and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Randolph.

Randolph, Circuit Judge: Henry G. Cisneros, former Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, brings this appeal

from an order of the district court denying his motion to

dismiss Counts 1 through 18 of a 21-count indictment returned against him, two of his former employees (Sylvia

Arce-Garcia and John D. Rosales) and Linda D. Medlar, his

one-time girlfriend. Independent Counsel David M. Barrett

prosecuted the case. Cisneros sought a dismissal on the

ground that any adjudication of the charges against him

would run afoul of the separation of powers doctrine. The

first and, as it turns out, the only question we must decide is

whether we have jurisdiction to hear the appeal despite its

interlocutory nature.

I

The Presidential Transition Act of 1963 declared the purpose of Congress to promote "the orderly transfer of the

executive power in connection with the expiration of the term

of office of a President and the inauguration of a new

President." Presidential Transition Act of 1963, Pub. L. No.

88-277, 78 Stat. 153 (1964) (codified at 3 U.S.C. s 102

(notes)). One of the immediate tasks facing any newlyelected President is to begin forming a Cabinet. For a

smooth transition, the selection of potential nominees, the

investigations of their backgrounds, and the adjudications of

their security clearances must begin well before the President

takes the oath on January 20th. U.S. Const. amend. XX, s 1.

To these ends, President-elect Clinton and Warren Christopher, the head of his transition team, signed a Memorandum

of Understanding with Attorney General Barr of the outgoing

Bush Administration a few days after the November 1992

election. Indictment, Background, at p. 6, pp 5-6. The Memorandum stated that upon written requests of President-elect

Clinton, the FBI would conduct background investigations of

his prospective nominees. Memorandum of Understanding at

1. According to the Memorandum, the FBI would have two

principal objectives in conducting its investigations. First, it

should "ascertain facts and information relevant to the candidate's suitability for Federal government employment ... in

accordance with Executive Order 10450," id. Second, it

should compile information to "permit adjudication of the

candidate for clearance for access to Sensitive Compartmented Information, when necessary, in accordance with the standards set forth in Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)

Directive 1/14." Id.

Executive Order No. 10450, relied upon in the Memorandum of Understanding, has been in effect since President

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Eisenhower issued it in 1953. In order to ensure that all

officers and employees would be "reliable, trustworthy, of

good conduct and character, and of complete and unswerving

loyalty to the United States," Executive Order No. 10450

directed investigators to develop information regarding the

candidate's "deliberate misrepresentations, falsifications, or

omissions of material facts," any "criminal" or "dishonest"

conduct on the individual's part, facts concerning the candidate's susceptibility to "coercion, influence, or pressure which

may cause him to act contrary to the best interests of the

national security," and other behavior by the candidate indicating that he is "not reliable or trustworthy." Executive

Order No. 10450, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (1953). The information developed by the FBI would be used, not only by the

President-elect, but also by the Personnel Security Office of

the Department of Justice in determining whether to grant

the candidate a national security clearance.

After President-elect Clinton identified Cisneros as a potential nominee for HUD Secretary, Cisneros completed a

"Questionnaire for Sensitive Positions (For National Security)," commonly known as an "SF-86." Indictment, Background, at pp. 13-14, p 19. Pursuant to the Memorandum of

Understanding, Cisneros's SF-86 and a written request from

President-elect Clinton triggered the FBI's full-field investigation. Although the conspiracy count (Count 1) of the

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Indictment stretches from the summer of 1992 through September 1994, the focus of this count and the other counts

naming Cisneros (Counts 1 through 18) is the period between

the election of President Clinton in November 1992 and the

appointment of Cisneros as HUD Secretary in late January

1993.

According to the charges, Cisneros set out to deceive the

FBI and the Department of Justice, all to the end of ensuring

his nomination, confirmation, appointment and continuation in

office. What Cisneros wrote in his SF-86 and what he said to

FBI special agents in two background interviews are at the

heart of the case. It would serve no useful purpose to recite

each of the counts in detail. Suffice it to say that if the

charges are proved, Cisneros repeatedly lied about and concealed the fact that he had paid large amounts of money to

Medlar ($44,500 in 1990; $73,000 in 1991; $67,500 in 1992);

that even during the FBI's investigation of him from December 1992 through early January 1993, he continued to pay

Medlar while denying that he was doing so; that although

Cisneros stated on a supplemental SF-86 that he was not

subject to blackmail and although he told the FBI that

Medlar had not threatened or coerced him, he continued

making payments because Medlar was still threatening to

expose him; that Cisneros illegally structured some of these

payments to avoid having a Currency Transaction Report

filed, itself a felony (see 31 U.S.C. ss 5324, 5322(a); Ratzlaf v.

United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994)); and that he failed to file

gift tax returns with the Internal Revenue Service reporting

his payments to Medlar. (After the magnitude of the payments became known in the summer of 1994, the IRS opened

an investigation of Cisneros.)

Count 1 charges conspiracy among Cisneros, Medlar, ArceGarcia, and Rosales, in violation of 18 U.S.C. s 371. Counts 2

through 17 charge Cisneros with violating 18 U.S.C. s 1001.

Count 18 charges him with obstruction of justice, in violation

of 18 U.S.C. s 1505, by influencing and impeding the Justice

Department's inquiry into whether to grant him a security

clearance.

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II

A.

As to Counts 2 through 17, Cisneros's argument on appeal,

like his motion to dismiss, proceeds as follows. To prove the

violation of 18 U.S.C. s 1001,1 as alleged in each of these

counts, the government would have to show that the facts

Cisneros concealed or the false statements he made on his

SF-86 and to the FBI were "material." See United States v.

Hansen, 772 F.2d 940, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1985). "The 'central

object' of any materiality inquiry is 'whether the misrepresentation or concealment was predictably capable of affecting,

i.e., had a natural tendency to affect, the official decision.' " In

re Sealed Case (Lewinsky), 162 F.3d 670, 673-74 (D.C. Cir.

1998) (quoting Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 771

(1988)). Cisneros argues that "courts may not adjudicate"

materiality in this case. As he sees it, the separation of

powers doctrine precludes the Judicial Branch from considering what information would be capable of influencing the

President or the Senate in evaluating prospective cabinet

officers. Hence, materiality cannot be established and Cisneros cannot be convicted of violating s 1001. Brief for Appellant at 11-12.2

__________

1 During the period covered by the Indictment, 18 U.S.C.

s 1001 read as follows:

Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully

falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a

material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or

document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or

fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined under this title or

imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

The False Statements Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.

104-292, s 2, 110 Stat. 3459, revised this section.

2 Cisneros also claims that the background investigation was

not a "matter within the jurisdiction" of the FBI for purposes of

s 1001 because, in conducting the investigation, the FBI acted

pursuant to orders of President-elect Clinton, and the PresidentCisneros stakes out a bold position indeed, and he admits

as much. As to his specific situation, he maintains that the

information he allegedly falsified and the facts he allegedly

concealed did not influence President-elect Clinton's decision

to nominate him. He backs this up with an off-the-record

assertion. According to Cisneros, he made the Presidentelect and the Transition Team "fully aware" of the "information about which he allegedly deceived the FBI" and the

President-elect nevertheless decided not to withdraw his nomination. Brief for Appellant at 25 n.13.3 Apart from the

particulars of his nomination, Cisneros believes that no potential Presidential appointee undergoing a background investigation has a judicially enforceable obligation to tell the truth

in filling out forms or in talking with FBI agents. In other

words, if such an individual falsified information about himself

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or covered up his misconduct, no legal consequences could

follow. Judge Sporkin thought that Cisneros's "position

would allow unqualified candidates for high public office to lie

their way into extremely sensitive and important positions of

government." Memorandum Opinion and Order, Sept. 17,

1998, at 5 (denying appellant's motion for reconsideration).

Relying on our holding on the merits in United States v.

Durenberger, 48 F.3d 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1995), Judge Sporkin

denied Cisneros's motion to dismiss, rejecting his argument

that the prosecution impermissibly intruded upon the prerogatives of the executive and legislative branches to nominate

and confirm prospective Cabinet members. Memorandum

Opinion, July 30, 1998, at 12-14.

Whether Judge Sporkin ruled correctly is not our immediate concern, however. Without a judgment ending the case

on the merits and leaving "nothing for the court to do but

execute the judgment," Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229,

__________

elect is not a "department or agency of the United States." See

Brief for Appellant at 34-35. We agree with a concession Cisneros

makes elsewhere in his brief: "these issues are not directly before

the Court." Id. at 10 n.6.

3 Given our disposition of this appeal on jurisdictional grounds,

we reach no judgment about the relevance of any of this.

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233 (1945), the courts of appeals generally do not have

appellate jurisdiction. Here the trial has not even begun.

Proceedings in the district court remain on hold pending the

completion of this appeal. Already more than two years have

passed since the indictment came down. Avoiding delay is

one of the reasons behind the final judgment rule. See 28

U.S.C. s 1291. Avoiding piecemeal review is another.

Still, Cisneros insists that we have jurisdiction to review

Judge Sporkin's order refusing to dismiss Counts 2 through

17 because this was a "collateral order" of the sort mentioned

in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541

(1949).4 While the collateral order doctrine of Cohen is

sometimes described as an exception to the final judgment

rule, it is more accurately treated as an interpretation of

"final decisions" as used in 28 U.S.C. s 1291. See Digital

Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867 (1994).

To come within the Cohen doctrine, "the order must conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important

issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and

be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment."

Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978).

In criminal cases, "the compelling interest in prompt trials"

demands that courts apply the Cohen doctrine "with utmost

strictness" and confine its scope. Flanagan v. United States,

465 U.S. 259, 265 (1984); see also United States v. Hollywood

Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263, 270 (1982). In the years since

Cohen, the Supreme Court has rarely permitted criminal

defendants to appeal pretrial orders. The Court has identified only three types of motions in criminal proceedings

whose denial falls within the collateral order category: "motions to reduce bail, Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951), motions

to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds, Abney v. United

States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977), and motions to dismiss under the

Speech or Debate Clause, Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500

(1979)." Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S.

794, 799 (1989). Orders denying such motions, the Court has

__________

4 The government initially believed the same, but in postargument supplemental briefing it altered its view.

determined, would be "effectively unreviewable on appeal

from a final judgment," for obvious reasons with respect to

denials of bail, and in the cases of double jeopardy and speech

and debate, because the defendant is asserting a right not to

be tried.

The order Cisneros seeks to appeal, insofar as it refused to

dismiss Counts 2 through 17, does not come within the

collateral order doctrine for several distinct reasons. Each of

these sixteen counts alleges that Cisneros's false statements

or his concealment of material facts--all of which occurred

before he took office--related to "a matter within the jurisdiction of departments and agencies of the United States, that is,

the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the United States

Department of Justice...." See, e.g., Indictment, Count 2,

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p 5. With this in mind, the government suggests that the

separation-of-powers issue Cisneros is raising here might

never arise at trial. Brief for Appellee at 26 n.12. The point

is well-taken. In s 1001 prosecutions, it is up to the jury to

decide whether the materiality element has been proven.

United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 523 (1995). In

instructing the jury, Judge Sporkin could define "materiality"

with reference, not to the President's nomination decision or

the Senate's confirmation decision, but to the FBI's investigative role under the Memorandum of Understanding and Executive Order No. 10450, and to the decision of the Department

of Justice on Cisneros's security clearance. Much will depend

on the trial evidence and on the government's (and the

defendant's) proposed instructions. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 30.

The district judge has not yet made a final decision on jury

instructions, nor could he at this stage. Jury instructions

"must be specifically tailored to the pleadings and evidence of

the particular case.... Conduct alleged in the indictment,

but not supported by evidence at trial, for example, should

not be included in any instruction to the jury." Edward J.

Devitt et al., 1 Federal Jury Practice and Instructions at III

(4th ed. 1992); see, e.g., United States v. Harrington, 108

F.3d 1460, 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1997). While the judge firmly

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ly follow that he will instruct the jury in the terms Cisneros

opposes. If we allow this appeal, we risk deciding a constitutional question that might evaporate were the case allowed to

go to trial, free of appellate interruption. Refusing to adjudicate constitutional issues unless it is strictly necessary to do

so is a time-honored practice of judicial restraint. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 78-79

(1997); Youakim v. Miller, 425 U.S. 231, 236 (1976); Rescue

Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549, 570

n.34 (1947). The final judgment rule complements this practice. Piecemeal review causes an appellate court to decide

issues that might not have survived if the case had proceeded

directly to trial. See, e.g., Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 309

(1995); Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. at 265. Cohen

itself, as well as later Supreme Court decisions, thus indicate

that district court orders "subject to reconsideration from

time to time" during trial do not qualify as "final decisions"

subject to immediate appeal. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546-47;

Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 690 n.11 (1997); Coopers &

Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 469; United States v. MacDonald, 435

U.S. 850, 858-59 (1978); Ficken v. Alvarez, 146 F.3d 978, 980

(D.C. Cir. 1998). This last point is particularly telling here.

During the course of Cisneros's trial, there will doubtless be

opportunities for the district judge to revise and refine the

analysis contained in his order refusing to dismiss the

charges. In making evidentiary rulings and in formulating

jury instructions the court will necessarily be deciding to

what extent it will adhere to its initial judgment regarding

Cisneros's claim that materiality cannot be defined in terms

of the President's or the Senate's determinations of the

suitability of nominees for high office. The order before us is

therefore far from the sort of "fully consummated decision"

qualifying as a collateral order. Abney, 431 U.S. at 659. The

district judge may not revisit his denial of the motion to

dismiss, but his underlying rationale would remain subject to

revision and reconsideration in light of the evidence produced

at trial. At this point, there is no telling what the evidence

will be or what instructions the district judge will give on

materiality.

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There is still another reason why Cisneros cannot fit his

appeal into the collateral order doctrine. The "right" he

claims is not one "which would be destroyed if it were not

vindicated before trial." MacDonald, 435 U.S. at 860. He

therefore is unable to satisfy the third factor described in

Coopers & Lybrand. Pretrial denials of a defense based on

the Double Jeopardy Clause or the Speech or Debate Clause

fall within the collateral order doctrine because these clauses

confer immunity not merely from conviction, but from the

burdens of having to defend against criminal charges. See

Helstoski, 442 U.S. at 508. The right "which would be

destroyed if it were not vindicated before trial," MacDonald,

435 U.S. at 860, is the defendant's constitutional right to be

free of a trial altogether. The right Cisneros seeks to

vindicate is quite different. In his opening brief, he framed it

up this way: "any attempt to adjudicate the materiality

element of the false statement charges against Mr. Cisneros

would require a judicial inquiry into matters within the

constitutional province of coordinate branches." Brief for

Appellant at 17. This is nothing more than an argument that

s 1001 is unconstitutional as applied to him. To that extent,

Cisneros stands in no different position than any other criminal defendant who loses a pretrial motion attacking an indictment on the ground that the underlying criminal statute is

unconstitutional. The district court's order in such a case,

and in Cisneros's case, would be fully reviewable on appeal

should the defendant be convicted. There is nothing here

that would be "effectively unreviewable" if the case proceeded

to trial and final judgment. See United States v. MunozFlores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990). By Cisneros's lights, at least in

his initial brief, the judicial intrusion he identifies--the violation of separation of powers--would flow from an "adjudication," not from holding the trial. See Brief for Appellant at

15, 17. As we have said before, materiality in a s 1001

prosecution is for the jury to decide and so, even as Cisneros

sees it, there would be no deprivation of his right until the

jury returned a verdict, that is, until the trial ended in

conviction or acquittal.

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After we called for supplemental briefing on the question of

appellate jurisdiction, Cisneros reformulated his position.

Now he tells us that "he is immune from prosecution on

structural separation of powers grounds," and that "he should

not be forced to endure a criminal trial where the very

conduct of the trial itself will violate the separation of powers

by causing the courts to invade the exclusive constitutional

province of coordinate branches." Supplemental Brief for

Appellant at 1-2. In other words, no longer is it the "adjudication" of materiality that will "violate the separation of

powers"; it is the "very conduct of the trial." "One must be

careful," the Supreme Court has reminded us, "not to play

word games with the concept of a 'right not to be tried.' In

one sense, any legal rule can be said to give rise to a 'right

not to be tried' if failure to observe it requires the trial court

to dismiss the indictment or terminate the trial. But that is

assuredly not the sense relevant for purposes of the exception

to the final judgment rule." Midland Asphalt Corp., 489 U.S.

at 801. We do not doubt that Cisneros, like any criminal

defendant, may raise separation of powers as a defense. See

Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 394. But it scarcely follows that

whenever a defendant relies on the separation-of-powers doctrine, the defendant's right must be treated as if it rested on

an "explicit ... guarantee that trial will not occur." Midland

Asphalt Corp., 489 U.S. at 801. Most separation-of-powers

claims are clearly not in that category. See, e.g., Mistretta v.

United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989). A few may be. For

instance, a trial court's order denying a President's claim of

separation-of-powers immunity from civil actions during his

term of office falls within the collateral order doctrine: the

right asserted would be irretrievably lost if there could be no

immediate appeal. See Clinton, 520 U.S. at 690; Jones v.

Clinton, 72 F.3d 1354, 1357 n.4 (8th Cir. 1996).

Nothing Cisneros argues amounts to a right not to be tried.

He cannot point to anything guaranteeing him an immunity

from standing trial. What he alleges is a constitutional

affront flowing from an adjudication of materiality. This is

not an affront to Cisneros personally. His complaint is aimed

at a supposed infringement of the President's authority and of

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the Senate's. Yet trying him would not itself interfere with

the President's nomination judgments or with the Senate's

advise-and-consent function. During Cisneros's trial the

President could continue nominating whomever he pleased,

and the Senate could continue confirming, or refusing to

confirm, those nominees for whatever reasons it saw fit. The

short of the matter is that neither the President's nor the

Senate's constitutional powers would be forever lost if Cisneros could appeal only after the jury returned its verdict.

For these reasons and others, Cisneros cannot bring his

appeal within the jurisdictional holding of United States v.

Rose, 28 F.3d 181 (D.C. Cir. 1994), or the jurisdictional

rulings in our two decisions following Rose--United States v.

Durenberger, 48 F.3d 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1995), and United

States v. Rostenkowski, 59 F.3d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The

defendant in each of these cases was a member of the

legislative branch when he committed the alleged wrongful

act for which he was being tried.5 Rose, a member of the

House of Representatives, defended against a civil penalty

action for filing false financial reports with the Clerk of the

House, in violation of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978.

He appealed from the district court's orders denying his

pretrial motion to dismiss the case. Rose's motion contended

that forcing him to endure a trial would violate his Speech or

Debate Clause immunity because the government planned to

use his testimony before the House Committee on Standards

of Official Conduct, which had investigated the matter. To

the extent the district court order rejected this claim, it fell

within a category of collateral orders recognized as immediately appealable, and we so held. 28 F.3d at 185. Rose also

contended in the lower court that he had complete immunity

from trial, under the separation of powers doctrine, because

the Constitution gave each House the power to regulate the

conduct of its members and because the House Committee

had already investigated and sanctioned him. Id. at 184, 189-

__________

5 While Rose was a civil action, Durenberger and Rostenkowski

were criminal proceedings. The court in Rose drew no distinction

between the two types of proceedings. 28 F.3d at 186.

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90. Rose's alleged right--his right to be free from having his

conduct examined outside the House--was, we believed,

closely akin to a claim of Speech or Debate Clause immunity.

We therefore treated the order as immediately appealable.

Id. at 186.

Implicit in Rose, and in our later jurisdictional holdings in

Durenberger and Rostenkowski, was our recognition that the

Speech or Debate Clause of Article I, s 6, manifested the

Constitution's separation of powers. Designed to "prevent

intimidation by the executive and accountability before a

possibly hostile judiciary," the Speech or Debate Clause

reinforces the separation of powers and protects legislative

independence and integrity. United States v. Johnson, 383

U.S. 169, 181 (1966); see also United States v. Brewster, 408

U.S. 501, 524-25 (1972); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S.

606, 616-17 (1972). It does so by conferring a personal

privilege on individual legislators. Brewster, 408 U.S. at 524.

The argument in Rose, although ultimately rejected, 28 F.3d

at 190, was that the separation-of-powers doctrine conferred

on Rose an analogous and comparable privilege from having

to defend his actions as a Congressman in a civil penalty suit.

Durenberger and Rostenkowski are to the same effect. Like

Rose, former Senator Durenberger claimed an immunity,

based on separation of powers, from having to answer criminal charges depending, so he claimed, on the judiciary's

usurpation of the Senate's exclusive rulemaking authority and

statutory authority to make payments on vouchers conclusive.

Quoting Rose, we found Durenberger's alleged right not to be

tried sufficiently close to Speech or Debate Clause immunity

and therefore allowed an immediate appeal of the district

court's order denying his contentions. 48 F.3d at 1242. In

Rostenkowski we first held that the former Congressman's

appeal from the denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment

was within the collateral order doctrine because he had

claimed immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause. 59

F.3d at 1297. After explaining why orders denying immunity

under the Clause were immediately appealable, we said that

for "similar reasons" we would hear Rostenkowski's additional argument that his dismissal motion should have been

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granted on the ground that the separation of powers doctrine

immunized him from being tried. Id.

Cisneros obviously cannot rely on the analogy to Speech or

Debate Clause immunity we found persuasive in Rose, Durenberger, and Rostenkowski. During the period covered by

Counts 2 to 17, Cisneros was a member of no branch of

government.6 His separation-of-powers contention rests on

the proposition that the President has the sole discretion to

decide what is important in making nomination decisions.

Try as he might, Cisneros cannot stretch that claim into an

immunity for prospective nominees from being tried for lying

to the FBI during their background investigations. The

immunity, if any, is the President's alone. And as we have

said before, if there is merit to Cisneros's claim about judicial

infringement on the President's (and the Senate's) prerogatives, and if the issue is finally determined at his trial, there

will be time enough in an appeal from the final judgment to

vindicate the separation of powers.

In short, the order refusing to dismiss Counts 2 through 17

is not a final decision under 28 U.S.C. s 1291 because it did

not "conclusively determine" how the jury will be instructed

on materiality and because Cisneros's separation-of-powers

claim would not "be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a

final judgment." Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468.

B.

The balance of the opinion discusses why the order, insofar

as it refused to dismiss Count 1 and Count 18, also fails to

come within the Cohen collateral order doctrine and thus may

not be appealed prior to trial.

Count 1 charges Cisneros and others with having engaged

in a conspiracy from the summer of 1992 through September

__________

6 There is some irony in the fact that the argument about

judicial interference with the powers of the executive branch is

offered as a defense to a prosecution brought by the executive

branch for crimes arising out of an investigation conducted by the

executive branch.

1994. The objects of the conspiracy were to defraud the

United States by impeding the advise-and-consent function of

the Senate, the function of the FBI in conducting background

investigations pursuant to Executive Order No. 10450, and

the function of the Department of Justice Personnel Security

Office in determining whether Cisneros warranted a top

secret national security clearance; and to violate s 1001, to

obstruct pending Senate and Justice Department inquiries in

violation of 18 U.S.C. s 1505, and to structure payments to

Medlar in order to evade the financial reporting requirements

contained in 31 U.S.C. s 5313(a). Among the overt acts

alleged were: Cisneros's payments to Medlar during the

conspiracy, including two separate cash payments of $8000

each on December 16 and 18, 1992 (breaking down cash

transactions totaling over $10,000 into smaller sums for the

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purpose of evading the reporting requirement constitutes

impermissible structuring, even if the transactions are conducted over the course of several days, see 31 C.F.R.

s 103.11(gg)); telephone calls between Cisneros and Medlar;

his liquidation of an annuity account he maintained; a meeting between President-elect Clinton and Cisneros; Cisneros's

completion of the SF-86 and a supplement thereto; his

meetings with the FBI; his testifying before the Senate

Banking Committee, which held his confirmation hearing;

and his issuance of a press release in July 1994 stating that

he had made no payments to Medlar since becoming HUD

Secretary in January 1993 (the Indictment alleged he had

paid her more than $70,000 during this period). All told, 64

separate overt acts are alleged.

While it is simple enough to understand why Cisneros

believes the s 1001 charges (Counts 2-17) violate the separation of powers, it is no small feat to figure out why he thinks

the same argument entitles him to an immediate appeal of the

order refusing to dismiss Count 1.7 It is true that one of the

__________

7 Count 1 is not separately discussed in Cisneros's supplemental brief. The caption heading in Cisneros's opening brief--

"COUNTS 1-17 ARE NONJUSTICIABLE BECAUSE THE

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several objects of the conspiracy was to violate s 1001. Perhaps Cisneros believes he could be convicted of conspiring

only if materiality were proven. If this is the basis for his

claim of a right not to be tried on Count 1, then what we have

already written disposes of the contention. Still, it is worth

adding that on the face of the Indictment it is far from clear

that even this single object of the conspiracy would necessarily require proof that Cisneros's false statements were material because they were capable of influencing the President and

the Senate. Counts 19, 20, and 21 allege separate s 1001

violations by Cisneros's co-conspirators Rosales and Medlar.

There is no contention that adjudicating the materiality of

their false statements would impinge upon the prerogatives of

the political branches. If the evidence showed that Cisneros

conspired with Rosales and Medlar so that these two coconspirators would lie to the FBI, Cisneros would have no

claim to separation-of-powers immunity, or at least no claim

that he has made thus far. Furthermore, violating s 1001 is

but one of many objects of the conspiracy alleged in the

Indictment. With respect to some of the other objects of the

conspiracy--to violate the anti-structuring law, for instance--

we cannot imagine any viable separation-of-powers objection.

For all these reasons, there is no basis whatever for treating

the court's order refusing to dismiss Count 1 as a final

decision. For all anyone knows, the evidence of conspiracy

introduced at trial will have nothing whatever to do with

anything Cisneros is attempting to have us decide in this

appeal. See supra pp. 8-9.

To the extent the order refused to dismiss Count 18, it too

is not appealable as a final decision. This count charges

Cisneros with corruptly influencing and obstructing "the due

and proper administration of the law under which any pending proceeding is being had before any department or agency

of the United States," 18 U.S.C. s 1505--the pending pro-

__________

CEDURES USED BY THE PRESIDENT AND SENATE TO

EVALUATE PROSPECTIVE CABINET OFFICERS"--is followed by page after page of text arguing that "counts 2-17" must

be dismissed for this reason. See, e.g., Brief for Appellant at 15, 24,

27, 32.

ceeding being the adjudication by the Justice Department of

his security clearance. Cisneros has presented no argument

focusing on Count 18 to explain why the denial of his motion

to dismiss this count comes within the collateral order doctrine. Given the nature of this charge, his materiality contentions regarding Counts 2 through 17 simply do not apply. His

argument for dismissing Count 18 was that the executive

branch has sole and unreviewable authority to decide whether

to issue security clearances; that the judiciary cannot determine the criteria used to award security clearances; and

hence, the court could not determine whether his alleged

deceits corruptly obstructed the Justice Department's determination. See Brief for Appellant at 42. The Executive

Branch also "has exclusive authority and absolute discretion

to decide whether to prosecute a case," United States v.

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Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974), but it would be absurd to

suppose that anyone who was the subject of an agency

investigation would, for that reason, have a right not to be

tried for obstructing justice. See United States v. Kelley, 36

F.3d 1118, 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Cisneros's defense does

not, in short, translate into an immunity from prosecution.

Put differently, the district court's order refusing to dismiss

Count 18 is not by any stretch "effectively unreviewable on

appeal from a final judgment." Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S.

at 468.

For the reasons given, the district court's order refusing to

dismiss Counts 1 through 18 is not a "final decision" under 28

U.S.C. s 1291.

Appeal dismissed.

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