Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01144/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01144-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
C.E. Ducart
Respondent
Abel Valencia
Petitioner

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ABEL VALENCIA,

Petitioner,

v.

C.E. DUCART, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:14-cv-01144 MJS (HC)

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS 

[Doc. 9]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent is represented in this action by Brian 

G. Smiley of the Office of the Attorney General for the State of California. Both parties 

have consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (ECF Nos. 7, 

8.)

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections 

pursuant to a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Kings, upon being 

convicted by a jury on July 7, 2010 of possession of heroin while confined in prison. (See

Lodged Doc. 1.) On the same date, Petitioner was sentenced to a determinate state 

prison term of six years to run consecutive to his prior term of eleven years. (Id.) 

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Petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the California Court of Appeal, Fifth 

Appellate District. (Lodged Doc. 2.) However, as Petitioner did not file an opening brief, 

the matter was dismissed on December 16, 2010. (Id.)

Petitioner sought collateral review of his conviction by way of filing eight petitions

for relief with the California courts starting in October 2012. (Lodged Docs 3-17.) All of 

the petitions were denied.

Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas petition on July 20, 2014.

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(Pet.) On 

September 23, 2014, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition as having been

filed outside the one-year limitations period prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). (Mot. to 

Dismiss, ECF No. 9.) Petitioner did not file a response to the motion to dismiss.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to 

dismiss a petition if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the 

petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing 

Section 2254 Cases.

The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an 

answer if the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being 

in violation of the state’s procedural rules. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 

420 (9th Cir. 1990) (using Rule 4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to 

exhaust state remedies); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989) (using 

Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review motion to dismiss for state procedural default); 

Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n. 12 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). Thus, a 

respondent can file a motion to dismiss after the court orders a response, and the Court 

should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533 F. Supp. at 1194 & 

n. 12.

 

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Although the petition was filed with the court on July 23, 2014, Petitioner signed the petition on 

July 20, 2014. Accordingly, the Court considers the petition to be filed on July 20, 2014.

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In this case, Respondent's motion to dismiss is based on a violation of the oneyear limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Because Respondent's motion to dismiss 

is similar in procedural standing to a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust state 

remedies or for state procedural default and Respondent has not yet filed a formal 

answer, the Court will review Respondent’s motion to dismiss pursuant to its authority 

under Rule 4.

B. Commencement of Limitations Period Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996 (hereinafter “AEDPA”). AEDPA imposes various requirements on all 

petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 

521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th 

Cir. 1997). 

In this case, the petition was filed on November 27, 2013, and is subject to the 

provisions of AEDPA. AEDPA imposes a one-year period of limitation on petitioners 

seeking to file a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As 

amended, § 2244, subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of 

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State 

court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion 

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such 

review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application 

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the 

United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing 

by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly 

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively 

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postCase 1:14-cv-01144-MJS Document 13 Filed 11/04/14 Page 3 of 6
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conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment 

or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation 

under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

Under § 2244(d)(1)(A), the limitations period begins running on the date that the 

petitioner’s direct review became final or the date of the expiration of the time for seeking 

such review. In this case, Petitioner filed an appeal with the California Court of Appeal, 

Fifth Appellate District. The court dismissed the petition on December 16, 2010. The 

Court of Appeal's decision became final the same day. See Cal. Rules of Court 

8.264(b)(2)(B); 8.387(b)(2). Petitioner did not seek review in the California Supreme 

Court. Accordingly, for purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A), Petitioner's judgment of conviction 

became final on December 26, 2010, upon expiration of the ten-day period within which 

to file and serve a petition for review with the California Supreme Court. 8.500(e)(1). The 

AEDPA statute of limitations began to run the following day, on December 27, 2010. 

Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001).

Absent applicable tolling, Petitioner had one year from December 27, 2010, in 

which to file his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. However, Petitioner delayed in 

filing the instant petition until July 20, 2014, nearly two and a half years after the statute

of limitations period expired. Accordingly, the instant petition is barred by the statute of 

limitations unless the statute was tolled or its commencement was delayed. Petitioner 

has made no showing that the statute of limitations should commence at a later date 

under § 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D). Accordingly, Petitioner may only rely on tolling to attempt to 

show that the petition is not barred by the statute of limitations. 

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the 

pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward” the one year 

limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In Carey v. Saffold, the Supreme Court held 

the statute of limitations is tolled where a petitioner is properly pursuing post-conviction 

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relief, and the period is tolled during the intervals between one state court's disposition of 

a habeas petition and the filing of a habeas petition at the next level of the state court 

system. 536 U.S. 214, 216 (2002); see also Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th 

Cir. 1999). Nevertheless, state petitions will only toll the one-year statute of limitations 

under § 2244(d)(2) if the state court explicitly states that the post-conviction petition was 

timely or was filed within a reasonable time under state law. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 

U.S. 408 (2005); Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 (2006). Claims denied as untimely or 

determined by the federal courts to have been untimely in state court will not satisfy the 

requirements for statutory tolling. Id.

As stated above, the statute of limitations period began on December 27, 2010. 

According to the state court records provided by Respondent, Petitioner filed his first 

petition for collateral relief, in the form of a petition for writ of habeas corpus, on October 

29, 2012 nearly ten months after the statute of limitations period had expired. (Lodged 

Doc. 3.) State petitions filed after the expiration of the statute of limitations period have 

no tolling effect. Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820 (9th Cir. 2003) ("section 2244(d) 

does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the state 

petition was filed.")

Accordingly, the limitations period expired one year after its commencement on 

December 27, 2010. Petitioner filed the instant petition on July 20, 2014, two and a half 

years after the limitations period expired. Accordingly, the petition is untimely. 

D. Equitable Tolling

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if the petitioner demonstrates: 

“(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary 

circumstance stood in his way.” Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560-62 (2010); 

quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo. Petitioner bears the burden of alleging facts that would 

give rise to tolling. Pace, 544 U.S. at 418; Hinton v. Pac. Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 395 (9th 

Cir.1993). 

 Petitioner has not presented any evidence regarding equitable tolling.

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Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to the benefit of equitable tolling and his petition 

remains untimely.

III. CONCLUSION

As explained, Petitioner failed to file the instant petition for Habeas Corpus within 

the one year limitation period required by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Petitioner is neither 

entitled to the benefit of statutory or equitable tolling. Based on the foregoing, this Court 

recommends that Respondent’s motion to dismiss be GRANTED.

IV. ORDER

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Respondent's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 9) is GRANTED; 

2. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DISMISSED with prejudice as 

untimely; and 

3. The Court DECLINES to issue a Certificate of Appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 

2253(c); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (in order to obtain a 

COA, petitioner must show: (1) that jurists of reason would find it debatable 

whether the petition stated a valid claim of a denial of a constitutional right; 

and (2) that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district 

court was correct in its procedural ruling. Slack, 529 U.S. 484. In the 

present case, jurists of reason would not find debatable whether the 

petition was properly dismissed with prejudice as time-barred under 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Petitioner has not made the required substantial 

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 4, 2014 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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