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Parties Involved:
Jerry Lee Grist
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

United States Court of-Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

JERRY LEE GRIST, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT 

r:EB o 11 ea 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 86-2880 

(D.C. No. 86-91-CR) 

(Eastern District of 

Oklahoma) 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, BARRETT, Circuit Judge, and CONWAY, 

District Judge* 

Defendant Jerry Lee Grist was indicted on twenty-seven counts 

arising out of his purported participation in -- and masterminding 

of a ring of car thieves. After a jury trial, Grist was 

convicted on three counts of transporting stolen vehicles in 

interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§2312 and 2 

(1982); three counts of receiving or concealing stolen vehicles, 

in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§2313 and 2 (1982); and one count of 

conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. §371 (1982). 

On appeal, Grist argues that his convictions should be 

reversed because the prosecution was fatally tainted by the 

improper introduction of evidence of other crimes committed by 

* The Honorable John E. Conway, United States District Judge 

for the District of New Mexico, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 86-2880 Document: 010110025181 Date Filed: 02/01/1988 Page: 1 
Grist that were unrelated to the offenses charged. In addition, 

Grist contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the 

convictions for the three counts of transporting stolen vehicles 

in interstate commerce and the three counts of receiving or 

concealing stolen vehicles. Finally, Grist asserts that the 

convictions under both 18 u.s.c. §2312 (1982) and 18 u.s.c. §2313 

(1982) cannot stand because they are duplicative. We affirm. 

I. Facts 

Considered in the light most favorable to the government, as 

we must at this juncture, the evidence tends to show the 

following. On April 1, 1986, Ronnie Sullivan, a manager at 

Southwestern Electric Cooperative ("Southwestern") notified B.J. 

Moore, a District Attorney Investigator in Durant, Oklahoma, that 

two Southwestern employees, while inspecting telephone poles, "had 

run across a kind of a shop or barn type building back down off 

the road 

pickups 

. and had seen some fairly late model cars and 

and so forth in the building. " IV R. 126. In 

response to Sullivan's information, Moore ran the tag number of 

one of the vehicles seen by the Southwestern employees -- a 1985 

Ford Mustang -- through the National Crime Information Center 

("NCIC''). The NCIC reported that the vehicle had been stolen. 

Based on the information supplied by Sullivan and the NCIC 

report, Moore obtained a search warrant for the property. The 

same day, Moore, an officer with the Oklahoma State Bureau of 

Investigation, and two officers from the Atoka County Sheriff's 

Office executed the warrant. The search of the property uncovered 

the following vehicles: 

(1) A 1986 Blue Chevrolet Pickup; 

(2) a 1983 Tan Ford Pickup; 

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(3) a 1981 Blue Lincoln; 

(4) a 1986 Chevrolet Crew Cab; and 

(5) a 1985 Red Ford Mustang. 

In addition, the search also disclosed twenty-five automobile 

engines; several motor vehicle frames; a wide variety of interior 

and exterior motor vehicle parts; and equipment for cutting up 

automobile bodies. 

Following the search and subsequent investigation an 

indictment was returned against Grist. It charged Grist with 

twenty-seven counts, including four counts of transporting a 

stolen motor vehicle in interstate commerce, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. §2312 (1982); four counts of possessing a stolen motor 

vehicle, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §2313 (1982); eighteen counts 

of altering a motor vehicle identification number, in violation of 

18 U.S.C. §511 (1982); and one count of conspiracy in violation of 

18 u.s.c. §371 (1982). Two alleged coconspirators C.J. 

Anderson and Loyd Callicoat -- were indicted for conspiracy; and 

three others Charles Edward Brigman, Ralph William Crowe, and 

Stephen Charles Seabourn were named as unindicted 

coconspirators. 

At trial, evidence of a wide-ranging auto theft ring was 

presented. Testimony by Anderson, Brigman, and Crowe linked Grist 

to the theft of twenty vehicles. V R. 181; V R. 281. In 

addition, evidence was introduced that at least three of the 

vehicles seized in the April 1, 1986 search were stolen, IV R. 

146-54; V. R. 360; see also Ex. 89-90, and that the vehicle 

identification numbers on many of the engines and frames seized in 

- the raid had been removed. Finally, the prosecution presented 

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testimony that Grist was the lessee of the property searched on 

April 1, 1986. IV R. 99-101; V R. 273-74. 

In defense, Grist asserted that the testimony by Anderson, 

Brigman, and Crowe was motivated by personal animus, VI R. 516; VI 

R. 520-21, and that he had never rented the property on which the 

stolen vehicles were found. VI R. 522-24. His testimony was that 

he was forced to work since he was a young boy because of his 

father's disability; he explained his legitimate business was the 

buying, rebuilding and selling of cars, and he denied the charges 

completely. 

The trial court directed a verdict of acquittal on one count 

of transporting a stolen vehicle in interstate commerce, and on 

one count of receiving or concealing a stolen vehicle. VI R. 432. 

All other counts were submitted to the jury. The jury returned 

verdicts of guilty on three counts of transporting a stolen 

vehicle in interstate commerce, on three counts of receiving or 

concealing a stolen vehicle; and on the one count of conspiracy. 

However, the jury found Grist not guilty on all 18 counts of 

altering or removing a motor vehicle identification number. After 

judgment and sentence, 1 this timely appeal followed. 

II. Evidence of other crimes 

A. 

Grist first argues that the prosecution was fatally infected 

by the improper introduction of evidence of other crimes, 

1 

Grist was -sentenced -to consecutive five year terms for counts 

one and two, and for concurrent five year terms for counts three, 

four, five, eight and nine. He was also ordered to make 

restitution and to pay special assessments. 

4 

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purportedly committed by Grist, that were unrelated to the 

offenses charged. At trial, C.J. Anderson, an alleged 

coconspirator of Grist's, testified about an incident -- recounted 

to him by Grist -- in which Grist allegedly hired someone to kill 

Crowe: 

[Grist] was telling me that there had been a shooting or 

something and that this guy went to the hospital 

screaming that Jerry had paid a black guy to kill him. 

And Jerry acted pretty upset about it, you know, he had 

mentioned that the colored guy had been out to Jerry's 

home and they had went to Rocky Ridge. I never did get 

the whole story on this. It was like a comic book. I 

think they fired twenty shots at each other, and had a 

rock fight and wound up in a fist fight. That's all. 

IV R. 49-50. When the prosecution asked Anderson whether Grist 

had ever told him any more about the incident, however, Anderson 

responded: "No, sir, ... [b]ut he did tell me that one 

time they had been smoking whack, or something, and you know, that 

is when the black guy had went out there to Rocky Ridge. 

IV R. 50. 

II 

Grist immediately objected, and, at a bench conference moved 

for a mistrial on the ground that the prosecution had improperly 

elicited evidence of another offense. 2 Although the trial court 

sternly admonished the prosecutor, IV R. 54, it denied the motion 

2 

The incident in which Grist allegedly hired someone to kill 

Crowe formed the basis for one of the overt acts listed in the 

indictment for conspiracy. See I R. 10 (overt act no. 8). 

Consequently, although there was considerable testimony about the 

incident, see,~, V R. 289 (testimony by Crowe); V R. 349-51 

(testimony by Sherry Jannell Anderson); VI R. 588 (testimony by 

Derrick Kirby Wilson), its admission was proper. Grist's 

objection, therefore, relates only to the testimony by Anderson 

that Grist was "smoking whack" and not to the alleged conspiracy 

to kill Crowe. 

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for mistrial. 3 Instead, the court offered to instruct the jury to 

disregard Anderson's testimony about the use of drugs by Grist. 

However, Grist declined the court's offer to admonish the jury. 

B. 

A motion for mistrial should be granted only "where evidence 

is so prejudicial that the jury will unlikely be able to erase it 

from their minds. II United States v. Escamilla, 666 F.2d 

126, 128 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Alley, 661 F.2d 718, 

721 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Klein, 546 F.2d 1259, 1263 

(5th Cir. 1977). A mistrial "is most likely to become necessary 

when the evidence is admitted, [it] indicates on its face that 

3 

The trial judge was clearly disturbed by what he perceived to 

be a pervasive pattern of conduct by prosecutors in introducing 

inadmissible evidence of other crimes. At the bench conference, 

for instance, the judge stated: 

You know if this just happened occasionally, 

••• I wouldn't think so much about it. Here we 

have two cases in a row where you have these guys 

doing this. I don't know whether ... you're not 

preparing them or just because -- when you start 

dealing with thugs ..• you end up with this kind 

of problem. Here we have two cases in a row [and] 

my recollect[ion] is, we have • a lot more 

cases where this has happened. 

IV R. 53. See also VIII R. 22 ("I find there is the issue that is 

a very vexatious problem with me and that is whether or not the 

jury was prejudiced by [the introduction of evidence of other 

crimes] and it's of great concern to me that these kinds of things 

have happened. We've had ... two trials ... and we have in 

each case with the same prosecutor •.. somebody saying something 

about something that isn't admissible, that's just a blurted 

pronouncement that the man .•. who is on trial is guilty of some 

other even more heinous crime than he is being charged with."). 

We agree with the trial court that the testimony by Anderson 

concerning other offenses did not require granting Grist's motion 

for mistrial in this case. At the same time, however, we fully 

share the trial court's - concern over -the pervasiveness of the 

problem, and warn that "[w]e may not be as receptive to similar 

claims of inadvertence in the future." United States v. Krevsky, 

741 F.2d 1090, 1094 (8th Cir. 1984). 

6 

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defendant has been guilty of a prior crime, and the evidence plays 

a prominent part in the conduct of the trial." United States v. 

Taylor, 605 F. 2d 1177, 1179 ( 10th Cir. 1979}. "Conversely, 

prejudicial error is least likely to occur when the evidence is 

excluded, the jury is instructed to disregard it, and the 

reference is both vague and passing in nature." Id. Because the 

trial court is in the best position to evaluate the prejudicial 

effect of improperly introduced evidence, the decision to grant or 

deny a motion for mistrial is within the trial court's sound 

discretion, and will not be overturned, absent an abuse of 

discretion. United States v. Day, 830 F.2d 1099, 1106. 

We believe the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying Grist's motion for a mistrial. Anderson's testimony that 

"they had been smoking whack, or something," IV R. 50, while 

clearly inadmissible, was "both vague and passing in nature." 

Taylor, 605 F.2d 1179. Furthermore, the trial court offered to 

cure any prejudice by admonishing the jury to disregard Anderson's 

statement, an offer Grist declined when the mistrial motion was 

denied. IV R. 55-56. Moreover, Anderson's testimony appears to 

have been the result of an unresponsive answer rather than to have 

been elicited deliberately. See United States v. MoralesQuinones, 812 F.2d 604, 613 (10th Cir. 1987). Indeed, at the 

sidebar conference, the prosecutor stated that Anderson had been 

instructed "not to mention about Jerry Grist's drug use unless it 

was specifically asked." IV R. 51. In our consideration of this 

claim of prejudicial error, we note too the fact that the jury 

found Grist not guilty on Counts x to XXVII, the counts charging 

alteration of the vehicle identification numbers. We do not feel 

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the argument that the jury's 

influenced is persuasive in view 

verdicts. 

deliberations were prejudicially 

of these numerous not guilty 

The claim of error is troublesome because, as requested by 

the defendant when the mistrial was denied, any further comment on 

the objection to the "whack'' remark, and any admonition to 

disregard it, is absent from the record. Nevertheless, for the 

reasons stated, we hold that the denial of the mistrial motion was 

not an abuse of discretion. 

III. Sufficiency of the evidence 

Grist's second argument is that the evidence presented by the 

prosecution on the three counts of transporting a stolen vehicle 

in interstate commerce, and on the three counts of receiving, 

concealing, storing, bartering, selling or disposing of a motor 

vehicle, was insufficient to support a guilty verdict. Again, we 

must disagree. 

In assessing whether 

conviction, a court must 

evidence is sufficient to support a 

consider both the direct and 

circumstantial evidence, including reasonable inferences that can 

be drawn, in the light most favorable to the verdict. United 

States v. Taylor, 832 F.2d 1187, 1192 (10th Cir. 1987); United 

States v. Washita Constr. Co., 789 F.2d 809, 815 (10th Cir. 1986); 

United States v. Gamble, 541 F.2d 873, 877 (10th Cir. 1976). A 

court of appeals ''will not sift the record in order to make an 

independent determination of the sufficiency of the evidence." 

United States v. Downen, 496 F.2d 314 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 

419 U.S. 897 (1974). "Jurors -are charged with the duty of 

assessing the credibility of witnesses and determining the weight 

8 

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to be given any testimony, taking into consideration the 

appearance and general demeanor of each and every witness." Id. 

"As long as substantial evidence supports the jury verdict, it 

cannot be set aside." Taylor, 832 F.2d at 1192; United States v. 

Shelton, 736 F.2d 1397, 1402 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 

857 (1984). 

A. 

To sustain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. §2312 (1982), the 

prosecution must prove (1) that the vehicle was stolen; (2) that 

it was transported in interstate commerce; and (3) that such 

transportation was with knowledge the vehicle was stolen. United 

States v. Brazeal, 464 F.2d 1, 2 (10th Cir. 1972). Accord United 

States v. Spoone, 741 F.2d 680, 686 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied 

sub nom. Bates v. United States, 469 U.S. 1162 (1985); United 

States v. Mansaw, 714 F.2d 785, 792 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 

U.S. 986 (1983); United States v. Martinez, 694 F.2d 71, 72 (5th 

Cir. 1982). 

Testimony and business records established that the two 

vehicles underlying counts two through five had been stolen from a 

Chevrolet dealership in Dallas, Texas. See V R. 356-61 and Exs. 

89-90. Similarly, the owner of the vehicle involved in counts 

eight and nine testified that the car had been stolen from his 

apartment complex in Sherman, Texas. See IV R. 145-57 and Exs. 

16-22. Grist argues that there is no evidence either that he knew 

the vehicles had been stolen or that he transported the vehicles 

in interstate commerce. 

Proof · that a -defendant was in possession in one state of 

vehicles recently stolen in another state, unless satisfactorily 

9 

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explained, will permit the inferences that the defendant knew the 

vehicles were stolen and that he transported them in interstate 

commerce. Rogers v. United States, 416 F.2d 926, 927 (10th Cir. 

1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 952 (1970). Accord United States v. 

Wiesner, 789 F.2d 1264, 1267-68 (7th Cir. 1986}; Mansaw, 714 F.2d 

at 792; United States v. Sroka, 621 F.2d 1012, 1014 (1st Cir. 

1980). However, Grist argues that the government failed to prove 

that he was ever "in possession" of the vehicles. At most, Grist 

claims, the government proved that three stolen vehicles were 

located on property that might have been leased by him. This, 

Grist asserts, could have created only a suspicion of possession. 

"[T]he mere suspicion of possession will not support the 

inferences of transportation and guilty knowledge.'' Mansaw, 714 

F.2d at 792. See also Paige v. United States, 394 F.2d 105, 107 

( 5th Cir. 1968}. 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

verdict, we believe that a jury could have rationally concluded 

that Grist was ''in possession" of the three stolen vehicles. See 

United States v. Wolfenbarger, 426 F.2d 992, 994-95 (6th Cir. 

1970} ("A person who, although not in ac~ual possession, knowingly 

has both the power and intention at any given time to exercise 

dominion and control over a thing is then in constructive 

possession of such property."}; United States v. Nitti, 444 F.2d 

1056, 1057 (7th Cir. 1971) ("Generally, it is held that possession 

is dependant upon the extent of the defendant's dominion and 

control over the stolen property."}; Rogers, 416 F.2d at 927-28 

( "Possession means actual contr-ol, dominion, or authority."). In 

order to prove possession, the prosecution need only establish 

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"such a nexus between the defendant and the goods that it is 

reasonable to treat the extent of the defendant's dominion and 

control as if it were actual possession." United States v. 

Bennetts, 747 F.2d 1159, 1164 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 

U.S. 1058 (1985), quoting United States v. Parent, 484 F.2d 726, 

732 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 923 (1974). Accord 

United States v. Casalinuovo, 350 F.2d 207, 209 (2d Cir. 1965). 

Thus, in Casalinuovo, a superintendent of an apartment building 

was held to be in possession of goods stored in the building's 

locked basement to which he had a key. And in United States v. 

Cordo, 186 F.2d 144 (2d Cir.}, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 952 (1951), 

the court found that a defendant, who had non-exclusive control of 

a garage in which stolen goods were to be stored, and who provided 

and helped move the goods to a substitute storage place for the 

goods after another person refused to allow storage in the garage, 

had sufficient "custody and control" of the goods to possess them. 

A rational jury could have concluded that the three stolen 

vehicles were located on property leased to Grist. 4 This, we 

4 

Grist argues that the evidence was insufficient to show that 

he ever leased the property from which the vehicles were seized. 

Grist was linked to the property by the testimony of Wayne 

Baughman, the owner of the property; by an application for 

electrical services from Southeastern Electric Co-op; and by the 

fact that Grist's principal employee drove up to the property 

while it was being searched. Baughman's testimony, however, was 

somewhat equivocal: 

Q Okay. Did you have occasion, sir, to rent any of 

this property to Jerry Grist during the month of March, 

1986? 

A I rented it. It was back in January, I think it was 

in January. It was after the first of the year. 

Q Who did you rent it to, sir? 

(Footnote continued on next page} 

11 

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believe, is sufficient "actual control, dominion or authority,'' 

Rogers, 416 F.2d at 927-28, to constitute possession under 28 

u.s.c. §2312 (1982). And from that possession, the jury could 

have inferred both that Grist knew the vehicles were stolen and 

that he transported or aided, procured or caused the 

transportation of the vehicles in interstate commerce. Moreover 

the inferences could be weighed in light of the testimony about 

Grist's involvement in the car theft scheme by his coconspirators. 

(Footnote continued): 

A Well, Jerry and some other man come up there one day 

in a black van, and come in and talked to me, I was in 

bed, and rented it, yeah. 

Q How much did you get in exchange for renting it to 

Grist? 

A A thousand dollars. 

Q How long did you rent it to him for? 

A Well, it had been rented for pasture for years for a 

thousand dollars for a year. It was a hundred and 

thirty acres, and the barns and what have you. 

Q All right. Is that the property that you rented to 

Jerry Grist? 

A It's the day -- the one I rented that day, yes. But 

now, this other fellow that was there, one of the two, I 

don't know -- I was in bed, in the hospital bed flat of 

my back, and they stood at the foot of the bed and the 

money was left. I don't remember if it was on the bed, 

or in my dresser, or beside of the bed or what. But in 

other words, when they left, I had the thousand dollars, 

yes. 

V R. 273-74. Likewise, the defense demonstrated that it would 

have been possible for someone other than Grist to have applied 

for electrical service for the property in Grist's name. See IV 

R. 98-107. Nonetheless, we believe the evidence was sufficient to 

allow a jury to find that Grist was, in fact, the lessee of the 

property. "[T]he law does not require the jury to credit [a 

defendant's] explanation or to accept it as satisfactory." United 

States v. Bennetts, 747 F.2d 1159, 1163 (7th Cir. 1984). 

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In sum, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to support 

Grist's convictions under 18 U.S.C. §2312 (1982). 

B. 

Similarly, we believe the evidence was sufficient to support 

Grist's convictions for receiving, concealing, storing, bartering, 

selling, or disposing of the three vehicles, in violation of 18 

u.s.c. §2313 (1982). 

In order to prove a violation of 18 u.s.c. §2313, the 

prosecution must demonstrate that (1) the vehicle was stolen; (2) 

the vehicle was transported in interstate commerce; and (3) the 

defendant had knowledge that the vehicle was stolen when he 

received, concealed, stored, bartered, sold or disposed of it. 

United States v. Hines, 564 F.2d 925, 927 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. 

denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978). Accord United States v. Dennett, 

551 F.2d 261, 262 (10th Cir. 1977); Seefeldt v. United States, 183 

F.2d 713, 714 (10th Cir. 1950). Grist insists that the evidence 

is insufficient to prove that he received or concealed the stolen 

vehicles; that he had knowledge they were stolen; or, indeed, that 

he had any connection with them. Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 

16. 

From the record, it is clear that a reasonable jury could 

have concluded that the vehicles were found in a rural location 

· between a quarter and a half mile from the county line road. In 

addition, the dirt road leading to the sheds on the property was 

blocked off by a gate. At least two of the three vehicles were 

contained in the sheds. This, we believe, constitutes sufficient 

· "concealment" to satisfy the requirements of 18 U.S.C. §2313 

(1982). At the same time, as to any argument that he had no 

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knowledge that the vehicles were stolen, our disposition of 

Grist's identical argument challenging his convictions under 18 

u.s.c. §2312 (1982) disposes of his attack on his convictions 

under 18 U.S.C. §2313 (1982) as well. 

IV. Duplication of offenses 

Grist lastly argues that his convictions for transporting 

stolen vehicles in interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§2312 (1982), unconstitutionally duplicates his convictions for 

receiving or concealing stolen vehicles, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§2313 (1982). We disagree. 

In determining whether separate convictions are duplicative, 

the test to be applied is "[w]hether each provision requires proof 

of an additional fact which the other does not." Blockburger v. 

United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). Accord Lindsay v. United 

States, 134 F.2d 960, 961-62 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 

763 (1943); Ward v. United States, 694 F.2d 654, 661 (11th Cir. 

1983); United States v. Caston, 615 F.2d 1111, 1117 (5th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 449 U.S. 831 (1980). While §2312 and §2313 may be 

connected, "each require[s] proof of a fact 

establish [the other offense]." Lindsay, 134 F.2d 

not required to 

960. Section 

2312 requires, inter alia, that the defendant transport the stolen 

vehicle in interstate commerce. Section 2313 requires, inter 

alia, that the vehicle be one that has been transported in 

interstate commerce but also that the defendant receive, conceal, 

possess, etc. the stolen vehicle; §2312 does not require the 

-latter- element. -- Consequently, we conclude that §2312 and §2313 

(1982) are not duplicative. Lindsay, 134 F.2d at 961-62; Record 

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v. Hudspeth, 126 F.2d 215, 216 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 

703 (1942); Jackson v. Hudspeth, 111 F.2d 128, 129 (10th Cir. 

1940); Chrysler v. Zerbst, 81 F.2d 975, 976 (10th Cir. 1936). 

Accord, Caston, 615 F.2d at 1117; United States v. Marvel, 493 

F.2d 15, 16 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Ploof, 464 F.2d 116, 

120 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Godin v. United States, 409 

U.S. 952 (1972); United States v. Stone, 411 F.2d 597, 599 (5th 

Cir. 1969); Strother v. United States, 387 F.2d 385, 386 (5th Cir. 

1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 971 (1968); United States v. 

Linkenauger, 357 F.2d 925, 925-26 (6th Cir. 1966); United States 

v. Lankford, 296 F.2d 34, 36 (4th Cir. 1961); United States v. 

Pearce, 275 F.2d 318, 325 (7th Cir. 1960); Woody v. United States, 

258 F.2d 535, 536 (6th Cir. 1957), aff'd by an equally divided 

court, 359 U.S. 118 (1959); Doll v. Johnston, 95 F.2d 838, 838-39 

(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 574 (1938). 

Noting that the Supreme Court was evenly divided on the 

question whether §2312 and §2313 are duplicative, see, Woody v. 

United States, 258 F.2d 535 (6th Cir. 1957), aff'd by an equally 

divided court, 359 U.S. 118 (1959), Grist "requests an opportunity 

to allow a majority of the Supreme Court to hold that 18 U.S.C. 

Section 2312 and 18 U.S.C. Section 2313 are duplicitous." Brief 

of Appellant at 18. While we recognize that a decision by an 

equally divided Supreme Court settles no issue of law and is not 

entitled to precedential weight, see,~, Neil v. Biggers, 409 

U.S. 188, 192 (1972), we remain convinced that our view, and that 

of the other circuits cited, is correct. Any review of this issue 

- by the -Supreme Court, of course~ would be at its discretion. 

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V 

Grist argues that the witnesses testifying on the conspiracy 

charge were admitted to be convicted felons, some convicted three 

times; that there was no physical evidence connecting Grist with 

any count; and that the testimony about Grist's being a drug 

abuser contributed to his convictions because of the public's 

revulsion against drug abusers. Therefore a new trial on the 

conspiracy count is sought. 

We have previously rejected the claim of prejudicial effect 

of the "whack" statement. It was for the jurors to determine the 

credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their 

testimony. Downen, 496 F.2d at 319. 

VI 

No reversible error has been demonstrated and the convictions 

are accordingly 

AFFIRMED. 

16 

Entered for the Court 

William J. Holloway, Jr. 

Chief Judge 

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