Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01323/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01323-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Connie Gipson
Respondent
Gerald Haydn Worsley
Petitioner

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding in propria persona with a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner filed his written consent to the jurisdiction of the 

Magistrate Judge for all purposes on September 4, 2014. (Doc. 5). 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The instant petition was filed on August 25, 2014.

1

 After a preliminary review of the petition 

 

1

In Houston v. Lack, the United States Supreme Court held that a pro se habeas petitioner’s notice of appeal is deemed filed 

on the date of its submission to prison authorities for mailing, as opposed to the actual date of its receipt by the court clerk. 

Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 166, 276, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 2385 (1988). The rule is premised on the pro se prisoner’s mailing of 

legal documents through the conduit of “prison authorities whom he cannot control and whose interests might be adverse to 

his.” Miller v. Sumner, 921 F.2d 202, 203 (9th Cir. 1990); see Houston, 487 U.S. at 271. The Ninth Circuit has applied the 

“mailbox rule” to state and federal petitions in order to calculate the tolling provisions of the AEDPA. Saffold v. Neland, 

250 F.3d 1262, 1268-1269 (9th Cir. 2000); Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 2003). The date the petition 

is signed may be considered the earliest possible date an inmate could submit his petition to prison authorities for filing 

under the mailbox rule. Jenkins v. Johnson, 330 F.3d 1146, 1149 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, for all of Petitioner’s 

state petitions and for the instant federal petition, the Court would normally consider the date of signing of the petition (or 

GERALD HAYDN WORSLEY,

 Petitioner,

v.

CONNIE GIPSON, Warden

Respondent.

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Case No.: 1:14-cv-01323-JLT

ORDER TO DISMISS PETITION FOR 

VIOLATION OF THE ONE-YEAR STATUTE OF 

LIMITATIONS (Doc. 1)

ORDER DIRECTING THE CLERK OF COURT TO 

ENTER JUDGMENT AND CLOSE THE CASE

ORDER DECLINING TO ISSUE CERTIFICATE 

OF APPEALABILITY

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revealed that the petition may be untimely and should therefore be dismissed, the Court, on August 28, 

2014, issued an Order to Show Cause why the petition should not be dismissed as untimely. (Doc. 4). 

On September 10, 2014, Petitioner filed his response, in which he contends that he is entitled to 

equitable tolling because he is not versed in the law and needed assistance from another inmate to 

proceed. (Doc. 6). For the following reasons, the Court finds Petitioner’s claim of equitable tolling to 

be insufficient to avoid dismissal of the petition for violating the one-year limitation period. 

Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the petition as untimely.

DISCUSSION

A. Preliminary Review of Petition.

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a petition if 

it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not 

entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. The 

Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 8 indicate that the court may dismiss a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus, either on its own motion under Rule 4, pursuant to the respondent’s motion to dismiss, or after 

an answer to the petition has been filed. Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir.2001).

The Ninth Circuit, in Herbst v. Cook, concluded that a district court may dismiss sua sponte a 

habeas petition on statute of limitations grounds so long as the court provides the petitioner adequate 

notice of its intent to dismiss and an opportunity to respond. 260 F.3d at 1041-42. By issuing this 

Order to Show Cause, the Court is affording Petitioner the notice required by the Ninth Circuit in 

Herbst.

B. Limitation Period For Filing Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 

(AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed 

after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997); Jeffries v. 

Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997). The instant 

 

the date of signing of the proof of service if no signature appears on the petition) as the earliest possible filing date and the 

operative date of filing under the mailbox rule for calculating the running of the statute of limitation. However, in this case, 

Petitioner signed the instant petition under penalty of perjury and indicated the year, i.e., “2014,” but did not write a specific 

date on the final page of the petition. (Doc. 1, p. 15). Accordingly, the Court will consider the actual filing date in this Court

to be the operative date for any statute of limitations analysis.

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petition was filed on August 25, 2014, and thus, it is subject to the provisions of the AEDPA. 

The AEDPA imposes a one-year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a federal 

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, § 2244, subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas 

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The 

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct 

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is 

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by 

the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral 

review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented 

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or 

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending 

shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In most cases, the limitation period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct review 

became final. Here, the Petitioner was convicted on November 24, 2002. (Doc. 1, p. 1). Petitioner 

appealed to the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District (“5th DCA”), which reversed the 

judgment and remanded for re-sentencing on February 28, 2005. (Id., p. 2). Though Petitioner does not 

specify the chronology of his entire direct appeal, the Court has accessed the California court system’s 

electronic database to fill in the necessary dates. 2 Petitioner then filed a petition for review that was 

denied by the California Supreme Court on May 16, 2005 in case no. F044504. Following re-

 

2

The court may take notice of facts that are capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose 

accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); United States v. Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 331, 333 (9th 

Cir. 1993). The record of state court proceeding is a source whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned, and judicial 

notice may be taken of court records. Mullis v. United States Bank. Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 n.9 (9th Cir. 1987); Valerio v. 

Boise Cascade Corp., 80 F.R.D. 626, 635 n. 1 (N.D.Cal.1978), aff'd, 645 F.2d 699 (9th Cir.); see also Colonial Penn Ins. 

Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989); Rodic v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 615 F.2d 736, 738 (6th. Cir. 

1980). As such, the internet website for the California Courts, containing the court system’s records for filings in the Court 

of Appeal and the California Supreme Court are subject to judicial notice.

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sentencing, Petitioner again appealed to the 5th DCA, and in case no. F048376, the 5th DCA affirmed 

the sentence following remand on May 26, 2006, but remanded the case for unspecified reasons. 

Petitioner did not file a petition for review following the 5th DCA’s ruling. The State of California’s 

court records to not indicate any further action by the appellate courts on Petitioner’s conviction and 

sentence following the final remand.

According to the California Rules of Court, a decision of the Court of Appeal becomes final 

thirty days after filing of the opinion, Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 8.264(b)(1), and an appeal must be 

taken to the California Supreme Court within ten days of finality. Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 

8.500(e)(1). Thus, Petitioner’s conviction would become final forty days after the Court of Appeal’s 

decision was filed, or on July 5, 2006. Petitioner would then have one year from the following day, 

July 6, 2006, or until July 5, 2007, absent applicable tolling, within which to file his federal petition for 

writ of habeas corpus. 

As mentioned, the instant petition was filed on August 25, 2014, seven years after the date the 

one-year period would have expired. Thus, unless Petitioner is entitled to either statutory or equitable 

tolling sufficient to account for ensuing seven years, the instant petition is untimely and should be 

dismissed.

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Under the AEDPA, the statute of limitations is tolled during the time that a properly filed 

application for state post-conviction or other collateral review is pending in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(2). A properly filed application is one that complies with the applicable laws and rules 

governing filings, including the form of the application and time limitations. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 

U.S. 4, 8, 121 S. Ct. 361 (2000). An application is pending during the time that ‘a California petitioner 

completes a full round of [state] collateral review,” so long as there is no unreasonable delay in the 

intervals between a lower court decision and the filing of a petition in a higher court. Delhomme v. 

Ramirez, 340 F. 3d 817, 819 (9th Cir. 2003), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by Waldrip v. 

Hall, 548 F. 3d 729 (9th Cir. 2008)(per curium)(internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see

Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 193-194, 126 S. Ct. 846 (2006); see Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 

220, 222-226, 122 S. Ct. 2134 (2002); see also, Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). 

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Nevertheless, there are circumstances and periods of time when no statutory tolling is allowed. 

For example, no statutory tolling is allowed for the period of time between finality of an appeal and the 

filing of an application for post-conviction or other collateral review in state court, because no state 

court application is “pending” during that time. Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006-1007; Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 

F.3d 1150, 1153 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2006). Similarly, no statutory tolling is allowed for the period between 

finality of an appeal and the filing of a federal petition. Id. at 1007. In addition, the limitation period 

is not tolled during the time that a federal habeas petition is pending. Duncan v. Walker, 563 U.S. 167, 

181-182 (2001); see also, Fail v. Hubbard, 315 F. 3d 1059, 1060 (9th Cir. 2001)(as amended on 

December 16, 2002). Further, a petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling where the limitation period 

has already run prior to filing a state habeas petition. Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th 

Cir. 2003) (“section 2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended 

before the state petition was filed.”); Jiminez v. White, 276 F. 3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001). Finally, a 

petitioner is not entitled to continuous tolling when the petitioner’s later petition raises unrelated 

claims. See Gaston v. Palmer, 447 F.3d 1165, 1166 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Here, Petitioner alleges that he filed the following state habeas petitions: (1) petition filed in the 

Superior Court of Kern County on September 24, 2013, and denied with no date specified;

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and (2) 

petition filed in the California Supreme Court on June 16, 2014, and denied on August 13, 2014. 

Although the record does not reflect the date on which the Kern County Superior Court denied 

the petition filed on September 24, 2013, that is of no importance since a petitioner is not entitled to 

statutory tolling where the limitations period has already run prior to filing a state habeas petition. 

Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9th Cir. 2000); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478 (9th Cir. 2001); see

Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 2000)(same); Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820 

(9th Cir. 2003)(“section 2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended 

before the state petition was filed.”); Jackson v. Dormire, 180 F.3d 919, 920 (8th Cir. 1999) (petitioner 

fails to exhaust claims raised in state habeas corpus filed after expiration of the one-year limitations 

 

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In computing the running of the statute of limitations, the day an order or judgment becomes final is excluded and time 

begins to run on the day after the judgment becomes final. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(Citing Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).

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period). Here, as mentioned, the limitations period expired on July 5, 2007, and Petitioner did not file 

his first state habeas petition until September 24, 2013, over six years later. Accordingly, Petitioner

cannot avail himself of the statutory tolling provisions of the AEDPA for his two state habeas petitions. 

D. Equitable Tolling.

The running of the one-year limitation period under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) is subject to equitable 

tolling in appropriate cases. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 651-652, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2561 

(2010); Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct., 128 F.3d 1283, 1289 (9th Cir. 1997). The limitation period 

is subject to equitable tolling when “extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it 

impossible to file the petition on time.” Shannon v. Newland, 410 F. 3d 1083, 1089-1090 (9th Cir. 

2005)(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “When external forces, rather than a petitioner’s 

lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of 

limitations may be appropriate.” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). “Generally, a 

litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements: “(1) that he has been 

pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” 

Holland, 560 U.S. at 651-652; Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S. Ct. 1807 (2005). “[T]he 

threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling under AEDPA is very high, lest the exceptions swallow 

the rule.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F. 3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002)(citation omitted). As a 

consequence, “equitable tolling is unavailable in most cases.” Miles, 187 F. 3d at 1107. 

Here, Petitioner, in his response to the Order to Show Cause, contends that he is entitled to 

equitable tolling because of his lack of knowledge of legal matters and his need to enlist the help of 

other inmates to proceed. Such allegations are insufficient to invoke the doctrine of equitable tolling. A 

petitioner’s claims of ignorance of the law, lack of education, or illiteracy are not grounds for equitable 

tolling. Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006); see, e.g., Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. 

of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir.1986) (pro se prisoner's illiteracy and lack of knowledge of 

law unfortunate but insufficient to establish cause); Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710 (5th Cir. 1999); 

Rose v. Dole, 945 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir.1991). Petitioner’s indigent status and limited legal 

knowledge is no different than the overwhelming majority of incarcerated state prisoners attempting to 

file federal petitions for writ of habeas corpus. Such circumstances, therefore, are, by definition and 

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necessity, not extraordinary and, hence, do not justify equitable tolling. If limited resources and legal 

knowledge were excuses for not complying with the limitations period, Congress would have never 

enacted the AEDPA since most incarcerated prisoners share these same problems. Thus, the limitations 

period will not be equitably tolled on the grounds set forth by Petitioner in his response to the Order to 

Show Cause. Accordingly, the petition is untimely by almost seven years and must be dismissed. 

Moreover, the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability. A state prisoner seeking a 

writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal a district court’s denial of his petition, and 

an appeal is only allowed in certain circumstances. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-336 

(2003). The controlling statute in determining whether to issue a certificate of appealability is 28 

U.S.C. § 2253, which provides as follows:

(a) In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under section 2255 before a district judge, 

the final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by the court of appeals for the circuit 

in which the proceeding is held.

(b) There shall be no right of appeal from a final order in a proceeding to test the validity of a 

warrant to remove to another district or place for commitment or trial a person charged 

with a criminal offense against the United States, or to test the validity of such person's 

detention pending removal proceedings.

(c)(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not 

be taken to the court of appeals from—

(A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention

complained of arises out of process issued by a State court; or

(B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.

(2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the applicant has made 

a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

(3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall indicate which specific issue or 

issues satisfy the showing required by paragraph (2).

If a court denied a petitioner’s petition, the court may only issue a certificate of appealability 

when a petitioner makes a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 

2253(c)(2). To make a substantial showing, the petitioner must establish that “reasonable jurists could 

debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different 

manner or that the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further’.” 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 (1983)).

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In the present case, the Court finds that Petitioner has not made the required substantial showing 

of the denial of a constitutional right to justify the issuance of a certificate of appealability. Reasonable 

jurists would not find the Court’s determination that Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas corpus 

relief debatable, wrong, or deserving of encouragement to proceed further. Thus, the Court 

DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability. 

 ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court HEREBY ORDERS: 

1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1), is DISMISSED as untimely;

2. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment and close the file; and,

3. The Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 11, 2014 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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