Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00728/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00728-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Tom L. Carey
Respondent
James E. Street
Petitioner

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

This information is derived from the petition for writ of habeas corpus, Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition,

and Petitioner’s opposition to Respondent’s motion to dismiss.

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES E. STREET, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

TOM L. CAREY, Warden, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:05-CV-0728 AWI SMS HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING RESPONDENT’S MOTION

TO DISMISS 

[Doc. #7]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

BACKGROUND1

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant to

a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Tulare, imposed on June 1, 1992,

following his conviction by guilty plea to murder in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 187. See Lodged

Document No. 1. Petitioner was sentenced to serve an indeterminate term of 15 years to life in state

prison. Id.

Case 1:05-cv-00728-AWI -SMS Document 15 Filed 11/17/05 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2Although the petition was filed in the Tulare County Superior Court on December 9, 1997, the petition bore a proor

of service dated December 3, 1997. In Houston v. Lack, the Court held that a pro se habeas petitioner's notice of appeal is

deemed filed on the date of its submission to prison authorities for mailing, as opposed to the date of its receipt by the court

clerk. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 2385 (1988). The Ninth Circuit has applied the rule to assess

the timeliness of federal habeas filings under the AEDPA limitations period. Huizar v. Carey, 273 F.3d 1220, 1222, (9th Cir.

2001), citing Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 2385 (1988). Therefore under the mailbox rule, the Court

deems the petition filed on December 3, 1997, the date Petitioner presumably handed his petition to prison authorities for

mailing. 

3

Respondent states he has been unable to obtain a copy of the ruling from the state court. As will be explained,

however, the ruling is not needed to make a determination on Respondent’s motion.

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 2

Petitioner did not appeal the conviction. 

On December 9, 1997, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Tulare

County Superior Court.2 See Lodged Document No. 2. The petition was denied thereafter on an

unknown date.

3

 

On October 23, 1998, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California

Court of Appeals, Fifth Appellate District (hereinafter “5th DCA”). See Lodged Document No. 3. 

The petition was denied on February 18, 1999. See Lodged Document No. 4. 

On November 3, 2003, Petitioner filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

Tulare County Superior Court. See Lodged Document No. 5. The petition was denied on November

7, 2003. See Lodged Document No. 6.

On December 16, 2003, Petitioner filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 5th

DCA. See Lodged Document No. 7. The petition was denied on December 30, 2003. See Lodged

Document No. 8. 

On February 25, 2004, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California

Supreme Court. See Lodged Document No. 9. The petition was denied on December 15, 2004. See

Lodged Document No. 10.

On June 6, 2005, Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court. 

The petition raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Within this claim, Petitioner presents

a multitude of instances where Petitioner contends his counsel provided ineffective assistance.

On October 4, 2005, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition as being filed outside

the one-year limitations period prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) and for failure to exhaust state

Case 1:05-cv-00728-AWI -SMS Document 15 Filed 11/17/05 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 3

remedies. 

On October 26, 2005, Petitioner filed an opposition to Respondent’s motion to dismiss.

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not

entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer if

the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being in violation of the

state’s procedural rules. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990) (using Rule

4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to exhaust state remedies); White v. Lewis, 874

F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989) (using Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review motion to dismiss for

state procedural default); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). 

Thus, a respondent can file a motion to dismiss after the court orders a response, and the Court

should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533 F. Supp. at 1194 & n. 12.

In this case, Respondent's motion to dismiss is based on a violation of 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)'s

one-year limitations period and for failure to exhaust state remedies. Because Respondent has not

yet filed a formal answer, the Court will review Respondent’s motion to dismiss pursuant to its

authority under Rule 4. 

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (hereinafter “AEDPA”). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of

habeas corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059,

2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct.

586 (1997). 

In this case, the petition was filed on June 6, 2005, and therefore, it is subject to the

provisions of the AEDPA. The AEDPA imposes a one-year period of limitation on petitioners

seeking to file a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended,

Case 1:05-cv-00728-AWI -SMS Document 15 Filed 11/17/05 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 4

§ 2244, subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In most cases, the limitation period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. The AEDPA, however, is silent on how the one year limitation period affects

cases where direct review concluded before the enactment of the AEDPA. The Ninth Circuit has

held that if a petitioner whose review ended before the enactment of the AEDPA filed a habeas

corpus petition within one year of the AEDPA’s enactment, the Court should not dismiss the petition

pursuant to § 2244(d)(1). Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283,1286 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 899 (1998); Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Kelly), 127 F.3d

782, 784 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1395 (1998). In such circumstances, the limitations

period would begin to run on April 25, 1996. Patterson v. Stewart, 2001 WL 575465 (9th Cir. Ariz.). 

In this case, judgment was rendered on June 1, 1992, and Petitioner did not file an appeal. 

Pursuant to Rule 31(a) of the California Rules of Court, Petitioner had sixty (60) days in which to

file a notice of appeal. Rule 31(a), Cal.R.Ct.; People v. Mendez, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 301, 302, 19 Cal.4th

1084, 1086, 969 P.2d 146, 147 (1999). Because Petitioner did not file a notice of appeal, his direct

review concluded on July 31, 1992. Because direct review concluded before the enactment of the

AEDPA, Petitioner had one year until April 25, 1997, to file his federal petition for writ of habeas

Case 1:05-cv-00728-AWI -SMS Document 15 Filed 11/17/05 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 5

corpus. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir.2001). However, Petitioner delayed

filing the instant petition until June 6, 2005, over eight years beyond the due date. Absent any

applicable tolling, the instant petition is barred by the statute of limitations.

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In

Carey v. Saffold, the Supreme Court recently held the statute of limitations is tolled where a

petitioner is properly pursuing post-conviction relief, and the period is tolled during the intervals

between one state court's disposition of a habeas petition and the filing of a habeas petition at the

next level of the state court system. 122 S.Ct. 2134, 2135-36 (2002); see also Nino v. Galaza, 183

F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1846 (2000); Welch v. Newland, 267 F.3d

1013, 1016 (9th Cir.2001) (“tolled period includes intervals between the disposition of a state court

petition and the filing of a subsequent petition at the next state appellate level”); Patterson v.

Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir.2001) (stating that the "AEDPA's one-year grace period is

tolled during the pendency of properly filed state petitions challenging the judgment or claim at

issue."); cf. Dils v. Small, 260 F.3d 984, 986 (9th Cir.2001) (Court found no tolling between

consecutive filings at the same level); Lewis v. Mitchell, 173 F.Supp.2d 1057, 1061 (C.D. Cal.2001)

(holding that the interval between a motion for sentence modification in the state superior court and

a habeas petition in the superior court was not tolled pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)).

As stated above, the statute of limitations began to run on April 25, 1996, and expired on

April 25, 1997. Although Petitioner filed five post-conviction collateral challenges with respect to

the pertinent judgment or claim in state court, the petitions did not operate to toll the statute of

limitations. The first collateral challenge was filed on December 3, 1997, over seven months after

the limitations period expired. Because the limitations period had already expired, the collateral

challenges had no tolling consequences. Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9th Cir.2000)

(Petitioner is not entitled to tolling where the limitations period has already run); see also Webster v.

Moore, 199 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir.2000); Rendall v. Carey, 2002 WL 1346354 (N.D.Cal.2002). 

Case 1:05-cv-00728-AWI -SMS Document 15 Filed 11/17/05 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 6

Therefore, the petition is untimely.

D. Equitable Tolling

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if “extraordinary circumstances beyond a

prisoner’s control” have made it impossible for the petition to be filed on time. Calderon v. U.S.

Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9th Cir. 1998), citing Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107

F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1996), cert denied, 522 U.S. 814 (1997); (Beeler), 128 F.3d at 1288 (noting

that "[e]quitable tolling will not be available in most cases, as extensions of time will only be granted

if 'extraordinary circumstances' beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file a petition on

time"). "When external forces, rather than a petitioner's lack of diligence, account for the failure to

file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate." Id.; Miles v.

Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). Petitioner bears the burden of alleging facts that would

give rise to tolling. Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809 (9th Cir.2002); Hinton v. Pac. Enters., 5 F.3d

391, 395 (9th Cir.1993).

Petitioner claims that extraordinary circumstances prevented him from timely filing his

federal petition. Petitioner argues that he is illiterate, ignorant of the law, and relies on the assistance

of fellow inmates. See p. 3-4, Petitioner’s Opposition to Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss. He

further claims he was deprived of his preliminary hearing transcripts “[f]rom early 2000 until 7-15-

02.” Id. at 4.

Petitioner’s claims of illiteracy and ignorance of the law are insufficient to justify equitable

tolling. See Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir.1986) (pro se

prisoner's illiteracy and lack of knowledge of law unfortunate but insufficient to establish cause);

Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir.2000); Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710 (5th Cir.

1999); Rose v. Dole, 945 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir.1991). Petitioner’s circumstances are no different

than the majority of incarcerated prisoners attempting to file petitions for writ of habeas corpus. If

illiteracy and ignorance of the law were an excuse for not complying with the limitations period,

Congress would never have enacted the AEDPA as most incarcerated prisoners share these same

problems. 

Case 1:05-cv-00728-AWI -SMS Document 15 Filed 11/17/05 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 7

Petitioner’s claim that the Superior Court thwarted his attempts at obtaining a copy of his

preliminary hearing transcripts from early 2000 to July 15, 2002, is without merit. Even if the Court

were to grant equitable tolling for this period of time, the petition would continue to be untimely

since the limitations period had already expired two years prior. To the extent that Petitioner may

have been without these transcripts prior to the time he began seeking them from the state courts in

early 2000, he should not be entitled to tolling. He makes no showing why these transcripts were

necessary. Moreover, only Petitioner’s lack of diligence can be blamed for his failure to endeavor to

obtain them prior to 2000. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling and the petition

remains untimely. 

E. Exhaustion

Respondent also contends that two subclaims of Petitioner’s claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel remain unexhausted. Respondent requests dismissal for Petitioner’s failure to

exhaust these two subclaims. 

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by a

petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The

exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial

opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158,

1163 (9th Cir. 1988). 

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with a

full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. Duncan v.

Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88

F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full

and fair opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the

claim's factual and legal basis. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365 (legal basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504

U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis). 

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a

federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669

Case 1:05-cv-00728-AWI -SMS Document 15 Filed 11/17/05 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 8

(9th Cir.2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (2001); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir.1999);

Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir.1998). In Duncan, the United States Supreme Court

reiterated the rule as follows: 

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 . . . (1971), we said that exhaustion 

of state remedies requires that petitioners "fairly presen[t]" federal claims to the 

state courts in order to give the State the "'opportunity to pass upon and correct 

alleged violations of the prisoners' federal rights" (some internal quotation marks

omitted). If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations 

of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners 

are asserting claims under the United States Constitution. If a habeas petitioner 

wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due 

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only 

in federal court, but in state court. 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule further, stating:

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not "fairly presented" (and thus 

exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to 

that court that those claims were based on federal law. See Shumway v. Payne, 

223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2000). Since the Supreme Court's decision in 

Duncan, this court has held that the petitioner must make the federal basis of the 

claim explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even

if the federal basis is “self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 889 

(9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 . . . (1982), or the 

underlying claim would be decided under state law on the same considerations 

that would control resolution of the claim on federal grounds. Hiivala v. Wood, 

195 F3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830-31 

(9th Cir. 1996); . . . .

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert the state court to 

the fact that the relevant claim is a federal one without regard to how similar the 

state and federal standards for reviewing the claim may be or how obvious the 

violation of federal law is. 

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2000) (italics added). 

In the instant petition, Petitioner raises one ground for relief: ineffective assistance of

counsel. This ground contains several instances of defense counsel’s alleged ineffective assistance. 

Respondent argues that Petitioner failed to exhaust two of these sub-parts, to wit, an alleged failure

by defense counsel to seek a 90-day psychiatric observation and an alleged failure by counsel to visit

Petitioner for a sufficient time. Petitioner concedes that these two subclaims were not presented to

the California Supreme Court and remain unexhausted. He requests that they be withdrawn from the

petition. Normally, the Court would allow Petitioner’s request. See Jefferson v. Budge, 419 F.3d

1013 (9th Cir.2005); Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568, 574 (9th Cir.2000) (“district courts must

provide habeas litigants with the opportunity to amend their mixed petitions by striking unexhausted

Case 1:05-cv-00728-AWI -SMS Document 15 Filed 11/17/05 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 9

claims as an alternative to suffering dismissal”). However, because the petition violates the statute of

limitations, granting Petitioner’s request would be meaningless at this time.

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the motion to dismiss be

GRANTED and the habeas corpus petition be DISMISSED with prejudice for Petitioner’s failure to

comply with 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)’s one year limitation period.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Anthony W. Ishii, United

States District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule

72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of

California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections

with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and

filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the objections. 

The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 16, 2005 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:05-cv-00728-AWI -SMS Document 15 Filed 11/17/05 Page 9 of 9