Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca6-08-01732/USCOURTS-ca6-08-01732-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Eric J. Curry
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

*

This decision was originally issued as an “unpublished decision” filed on February 10, 2010.

The court has now designated the opinion as one recommended for full-text publication.

**The Honorable Thomas A. Wiseman, Jr., Senior United States District Judge for the Middle

District of Tennessee, sitting by designation.

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206

File Name: 10a0146p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ERIC J. CURRY,

Defendant-Appellant.

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No. 08-1732

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Michigan at Grand Rapids.

No. 04-00119—Gordon J. Quist, District Judge.

Submitted: January 12, 2010

Decided and Filed: February 10, 2010*

Before: BATCHELDER, Chief Judge; SUTTON, Circuit Judge; 

WISEMAN, District Judge.**

_________________

COUNSEL

ON BRIEF: Ray S. Kent, FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE, Grand Rapids,

Michigan, for Appellant. Michael L. Schipper, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES

ATTORNEY, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellee.

1

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No. 08-1732 United States v. Curry Page 2

1

Curry has legally changed his last name to Curry-El, but the Court will, for purposes of

consistency with the other filings in this matter, continue to refer to him as “Curry.”

_________________

OPINION

_________________

WISEMAN, District Judge. Defendant-Appellant Eric James Curry1 challenges

the district court’s denial of his motion to modify or reduce his sentence pursuant to 18

U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). He asks that this Court remand his case to the district court with

instructions that his motion be granted. Because the district court properly concluded

that it had the discretion to consider the motion, and did not abuse that discretion in

denying the motion, we affirm.

I.

An initial indictment was issued June 8, 2004, and a superseding indictment

issued July 15, 2004, charging Curry with being a felon in possession of three different

firearms (Count One); with possession of a certain quantity of crack cocaine (Count

Two); and with being a felon in possession of another firearm (Count Three). (Record

on Appeal (“ROA”) at 41–43.) Curry entered into a plea agreement with the

Government pursuant to which he pleaded guilty to Count Three of the superseding

indictment in exchange for dismissal of the other two counts. (ROA at 49–55.)

At sentencing, Curry stipulated that the total offense level indicated in the

Presentence Report (“PSR”) was 27, his criminal history category was III, and the

applicable guideline range was 87–108 months of imprisonment. (Def.’s Sentencing

Mem., ROA at 59.) The PSR recommended a sentence of 102 months of incarceration

plus 3 years of supervised release, but District Judge Gordon J. Quist imposed a sentence

of 87 months imprisonment, at the very bottom of the Sentencing Guidelines range, plus

3 years of supervised release. Judge Quist specifically stated on the record that if the

Guidelines had been advisory rather than mandatory, “then the sentence would be 60

months.” (Id. at 15:15–16.) Judgment was entered on November 19, 2004.

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Curry promptly filed his Notice of Appeal, and the Sixth Circuit, pursuant to a

joint motion to remand, vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing in light of

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). At Curry’s first resentencing, which took

place October 19, 2005, Judge Quist first noted that he was not bound by his statement

at the earlier sentencing hearing that he would impose a 60-month prison sentence if it

was later determined that the Guidelines were advisory rather than mandatory, and

indicated that he had reconsidered that position. He did, however, state that he would

“depart somewhat from the guidelines,” by just one year (10/19/2005 Resentencing Hr’g

Transcript at 18), and he explained that his decision to do so was based upon his finding

that the defendant was “making a good effort to reform himself, and we don’t see that

very often here.” (Id. at 20.) He reduced the sentence from 87 to 75 months, plus 3

years of supervised release. The amended judgment was entered October 21, 2005.

Curry appealed that sentence as well, on reasonableness grounds; the Sixth

Circuit affirmed. On February 25, 2008, however, Curry filed a pro se Motion for

Modification or Reduction of Sentence Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), based on the

application of Amendments 706 and 711 to the Sentencing Guidelines (the “Crack

Amendments”), which were made retroactive as of March 3, 2008. (ROA at 125.)

Judge Quist referred this motion to District Judge Robert J. Jonker.

In response to the motion, the Probation Office prepared a Sentence Modification

Report (“SMR”); both Curry and the Government submitted briefs. The SMR noted that

Curry’s original Sentencing Guidelines range was 87 to 108 months based on an offense

level of 27 and a criminal history category of III. It indicated an amended range of 70

to 87 months based on a revised offense level of 25 and a criminal history category of

III, in recognition of the fact that Curry’s original sentence for being a felon in

possession was impacted by the drug-quantity guidelines, but did not recommend further

reduction of Curry’s sentence, as the sentence he was currently serving fell within the

modified range.

In his Memorandum in opposition to the SMR, Curry maintained that the SMR,

in failing to recommend a sentence reduction, “ignore[d] the plain language of 18 U.S.C.

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§ 3582(c)(2) and the U.S. Sentencing Guideline 1B1.10.” (Id. at 132.) He raised

essentially the same arguments he reiterates in his present appeal, as discussed below,

in support of a reduction. The Government argued both that a reduction in sentence

would not be appropriate pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B), and that, even if Curry

were eligible for a sentence reduction, the court should exercise its discretion to deny the

requested reduction.

No hearing on the motion for resentencing was conducted. On May 19, 2008,

Judge Jonker entered a very succinct order declining to reduce Curry’s sentence any

further, despite the Crack Cocaine amendments and the consequent reduction in Curry’s

base offense level. (See ROA at 172 (5/19/2008 Order).) It is from that order that

Curry’s present appeal arises.

II.

Curry raises two distinct arguments in this appeal: first, that the district court

applied an incorrect legal standard in concluding that a further reduction of sentence was

not appropriate, insofar as it failed to recognize that it had the discretion to grant the

motion; and, alternatively, to the extent the district court recognized it had the discretion

to consider the motion, it abused that discretion when it denied the motion without

considering all the relevant sentencing factors when it denied the motion. We consider

each of these arguments in turn.

A.

Generally speaking, once a court has imposed a sentence, it does not have the

authority to change or modify that sentence unless such authority is expressly granted

by statute. United States v. Houston, 529 F.3d 743, 748 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing United

States v. Ross, 245 F.3d 577, 585 (6th Cir. 2001)). Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582, one

of the authorized exceptions to the rule against modifying a sentence is “in the case of

a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing

range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to

28 U.S.C. 994(o),” in which case a court “may” reduce a prison term “after considering

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the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if such a

reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing

Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The statute and the Guidelines policy statements

are read together to mean that a previously imposed sentence may be reduced if the

guideline range originally applicable to the defendant was lowered as a result of a

retroactive amendment listed in § 1B1.10 of the Sentencing Guidelines. U.S.S.G.

§ 1B1.10(a)(1). Amendment 706 to the Sentencing Guidelines, which was made

effective November 1, 2007, reduced the base offense level for most crack offenses.

U.S.S.G., App. C, Amend. 706. Amendment 706 is one of the retroactive amendments

listed in § 1B1.10. United States v. Poole, 538 F.3d 644, 645 (6th Cir. 2008). There is

no dispute that Curry’s sentencing range for his felon-in-possession charge was

computed based upon a cross-reference to the Sentencing Guideline applicable to crackcocaine offenses.

Regardless of a defendant’s eligibility for resentencing, the district court’s

decision to modify a sentence under § 3582(c)(2) is discretionary and, as such, is

reviewed by this Court for abuse of discretion. United States v. Carter, 500 F.3d 486,

490 (6th Cir. 2007). “A district court abuses its discretion when it relies on clearly

erroneous findings of fact, or when it improperly applies the law or uses an erroneous

legal standard.” United States ex rel. A+ Homecare, Inc. v. Medshares Mgmt. Group,

Inc., 400 F.3d 428, 450 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Tompkin v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 362

F.3d 882, 891 (6th Cir. 2004)). If, however, the district court does not simply decline

to use its authority under § 3582(c)(2) but instead concludes that it lacks the authority

to reduce a defendant’s sentence under the statute, the district court’s determination that

the defendant is ineligible for a sentence reduction is a question of law that is reviewed

de novo. United States v. Johnson, 569 F.3d 619, 623 (6th Cir. 2009).

B.

In the present case, Curry first argues that the district court’s denial of his motion

to modify his sentence should not be reviewed for simple abuse of discretion, because,

he contends, the court’s decision appears to have been unduly influenced by a

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misapprehension of the policy statement contained in Sentencing Guideline

§ 1B1.10(b)(2)(B). In response, the Government argues that the second sentence of

§ 1B1.10(b)(2)(B) establishes a presumption that a further reduction “would not [have

been] appropriate” in this case because Curry had already received a “non-guidelines

sentence [determined] pursuant to § 3553(a) and Booker.” (Appellee’s Brief at 14.)

Thus, the issue presented here is whether and to what extent the second sentence of

§ 1B1.10(b)(2)(B) may limit a sentencing court’s discretion to resentence a defendant.

In that regard, as previously indicated, resentencing is authorized under

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) only if the defendant was originally sentenced “based on a

sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.”

If that hurdle is met and the amendment has been made retroactive, the district court has

the discretion to reduce a prison term “after considering the factors set forth in section

3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with

applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 3582(c)(2).

Sentencing Guideline § 1B1.10 incorporates policy statements that are to be

considered in any resentencing decision. The “policy statement” that has served to cause

confusion in this case states as follows:

If the original term of imprisonment imposed was less than the term of

imprisonment provided by the guideline range applicable to the

defendant at the time of sentencing, a reduction comparably less than the

amended guideline range determined under subdivision (1) of this

subsection may be appropriate. However, if the original term of

imprisonment constituted a non-guideline sentence determined pursuant

to 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005),

a further reduction generally would not be appropriate.

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B). The parties disagree as to how the first and second

sentences of this provision should be construed in conjunction with the other.

The Government interprets the first sentence of subsection (B) to refer to

sentences where a “downward departure” expressly authorized under the Guidelines was

granted at the initial sentencing. In making this argument, the Government distinguishes

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2

In United States v. Blue, 557 F.3d 682 (6th Cir. 2009), this Court cited the Seventh Circuit’s

opinion in United States v. Blue, 453 F.3d 948, 952 (7th Cir. 2006), but did not go so far as to agree with

the Seventh Circuit that departures under the Guidelines have been rendered “obsolete” by Booker. Blue, 557 F.3d at 686 n.1 (6th Cir.) (noting that the term “‘[o]bsolete’ may be a bit strong – a departure described

in the Guidelines, though now only advisory, exemplifies a special discretion because it is anticipated by

the Guidelines Commission” (citing Blue, 453 F.3d at 952 (7th Cir.)).

between departures, still made pursuant to the Guidelines themselves, and a variance

from the Guidelines under Booker. See United States v. Johnson, 544 F.3d 656, 671 n.12

(6th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1382 (2009) (“A sentence outside the Guidelines

based on Chapter 5 of the Guidelines is a ‘departure’ or ‘Guideline departure,’ whereas

a sentence outside the Guidelines based on the § 3553(a) factors is a ‘variance’ or ‘nonGuideline departure.’”), quoted in Appellee’s Brief at 15–16. In this case, Curry

received a sentence that was below his original Guideline range based on Booker. The

Government therefore argues that Curry’s situation is exactly the type described in the

second sentence of § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B) in which a further reduction in sentence would

generally not be appropriate.

In his reply brief, Curry points out that § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B) itself makes no

mention of either departures or variances and further argues that, post-Booker, there is

no longer any substantive legal distinction between variances and departures for

sentencing purposes. Cf. United States v. Blue, 557 F.3d 682, 685–86 & n.2 (6th Cir.

2009) (noting the waning significance of “the departures described in Chapter 5” of the

Guidelines in light of Booker and observing that the Seventh Circuit has gone so far as

to describe “guideline departures” as “obsolete”), cited in Reply Brief at 5.2

Nonetheless, although the defendant is likely correct that, in the post-Booker age of

sentencing, the distinction between a variance and a departure has become less

significant, this Court cannot read as immaterial the distinction between the situations

described in the first sentence of § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B) and those described in the second

sentence. Other courts, too, have struggled with the distinction, with some appearing to

conclude that in situations described by the second sentence they had no discretion to

resentence. See, e.g., United States v. Sipai, 582 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2009) (affirming the

district court’s conclusion that it lacked authority to resentence where the revised

sentence apparently was a variance covered by the second sentence of that provision).

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3

Other courts have found that where the original sentence already incorporated a variance from

the otherwise applicable Guidelines range based upon the district court’s taking into consideration, under

Booker, the disparity between crack cocaine and powder cocaine sentences prior to the Crack

Amendments’ actually taking effect, further reduction after adoption of the Crack Amendments was not

warranted under § 3582(b)(2). See, e.g., United States v. Reid, 566 F. Supp. 2d 888 (E.D. Wis. 2008).

4

The Courts of Appeal are in accord that a sentence reduction is not authorized where the original

sentence was not “based on” a sentencing range that was subsequently lowered. See, e.g., United States

v. Perdue, 572 F.3d 288 (6th Cir. 2009) (affirming the district court’s denial of defendant’s motion for

resentencing in light of the Crack Amendments where defendant was originally sentenced based on the

career-offender guideline and not the crack cocaine guideline); United States v. Caraballo, 552 F.3d 6 (1st

Cir. 2008) (same), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1929 (2009); United States v. Thomas, 524 F.3d 889 (8th Cir.

2008) (per curiam) (same); United States v. Sharkey, 543 F.3d 1236 (10th Cir. 2008) (same); United States

v. Moore, 541 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2008) (same).

Others have reached the opposite conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 318

Fed. App’x. 127, 129 (3d Cir. 2009) (concluding that the district court had properly

concluded that Guidelines § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B) did not “mandat[e] a specific result”).

District courts within this Circuit have likewise generally concluded that they have

discretion to reduce a sentence which was already the subject of a variance, and have

exercised it to grant further sentence reductions under Amendment 706, where the initial

sentencing used the crack cocaine guidelines and did not incorporate any reduction in

sentence based upon the disparity between crack and powder cocaine sentences. See,

e.g., United States v. Allen, No. 2:05-cr-130, 2009 WL 1585793 (S.D. Ohio June 4,

2009); United States v. Benjamin, No. 3:06-CR-154, 2008 WL 972698 (E.D. Tenn.

April 7, 2008).3

Despite the confusion surrounding § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B), two things appear to be

clear: (1) Courts are only authorized to reduce sentences that are“based on” a sentencing

range subsequently lowered by an amendment to the Guidelines that has been made

retroactive;4

 and (2) the language of the second sentence of § 1B1.10(b)(B) does not

serve to remove the sentencing courts’ discretion to reduce a sentence where the original

sentence was, in fact, “based on” a subsequently lowered guideline range, even if the

sentence originally imposed was below the otherwise-applicable guideline range,

whether pursuant to a departure or a variance. The distinction between a sentence in

which the district court applies a variance from the recommended guideline range based

upon Booker and the § 3553(a) factors but the sentence is nonetheless “based on” the

Guidelines, and one where the sentence is not “based on” the Guidelines at all may

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indeed be subtle. The district courts, however, are fully capable of making that

distinction and determining whether a further reduction is appropriate, regardless of

whether the original sentence incorporated a variance or departure from the Guidelines.

In light of the foregoing discussion, this Court concludes that the sentencing

court retained the discretion to resentence Curry in this case, because there is no dispute

that the 75-month sentence imposed by Judge Quist at the post-Booker sentencing was

still to some extent “based on” the Guideline pertaining to crack cocaine offenses, and

that Judge Quist did not take into account the disparity between powder and crack

cocaine sentences in imposing the reduced sentence. The next issue, then, is whether the

court recognized that it retained such discretion.

In that regard, the record is clear that the district court recognized that it did, but

that it exercised that discretion to deny the motion. In the order denying Curry’s motion,

the district court specifically stated that it found “in its discretion, that no reduction in

sentence was warranted on the facts of this case.” (ROA at 172 (5/19/2008 Order).)

Contrary to Curry’s assertions, there is simply no implication that Judge Jonker believed

he lacked the authority further to reduce Curry’s sentence. That conclusion is bolstered

by the Sentence Modification Report, which also indicated that the defendant was

eligible for a reduction but did not recommend a further reduction:

In this case, a reduction of sentence is consistent with the policy

statements.

Because the Court imposed a sentence of 75 months pursuant to a

variance from the guideline range, the U.S. Probation Office

recommends no modification of sentence. The Court found that a

sentence outside the guideline range was warranted, and all statutory

sentencing factors were considered in choosing the post-Booker sentence

of imprisonment.

(SMR at 5.) In sum, the district court applied the correct legal standard when it

concluded that it had the discretion to entertain Curry’s motion on the merits.

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No. 08-1732 United States v. Curry Page 10

C.

Curry further argues, however, that the district court abused its discretion by not

providing more specific reasons in support of its denial of the motion for resentencing.

The Court disagrees. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), the district court may reduce

a previously imposed sentence if the statutory requirements, discussed above, are met.

Section § 3582 does not create a right to a reduced sentence, however. See U.S.S.G.

§ 1B1.10 cmt. background (noting that a reduction under § 1B1.10 is discretionary and

“does not entitle a defendant to a reduced term of imprisonment as a matter of right”).

When determining whether a defendant should receive a sentence reduction, the district

court must (“shall”) consider both the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and “the nature and

seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that may be posed by a

reduction in the defendant’s term of imprisonment,” and “may consider post-sentencing

conduct of the defendant.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 cmt. n. 1(B) (emphasis added). However,

“proceedings under 18 U.S.C. [§] 3582(c)(2) and [§ 1B1.10] do not constitute a full

resentencing of the defendant.” § 1B1.10(a)(3).

In the present case, the district court did not conduct a hearing on Curry’s

motion, and did not expressly consider all the § 3553 factors that might have been

relevant. Curry argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion

without either specifically articulating the reasons for doing so or identifying factors in

Curry’s particular record that justified the denial. The only case Curry cites in support

of his argument that the lack of specificity constituted an abuse of discretion is United

States v. Williams, 557 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2009). (Appellant’s Brief at 2.) That case,

besides being from the Eleventh Circuit, does not advance Curry’s cause, as it simply

held that while a district court “‘must consider the factors listed in § 3553(a)’ when

determining whether to reduce a defendant’s original sentence . . . [,] the district court

is not required to articulate the applicability of each factor, ‘as long as the record as a

whole demonstrates that the pertinent factors were taken into account by the district

court.’” Williams, 557 F.3d at 1256 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Vautier,

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144 F.3d 756, 762 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. Eggersdorf, 126 F.3d 1318,

1322 (11th Cir. 1997)).

In Eggersdorf, the Eleventh Circuit found, in the context of reviewing the denial

of a motion for resentencing under § 3582(c)(2), that the district court’s order, though

short, was “based on the record as a whole” and “enunciated sufficient reasons for its

order denying resentencing.” Eggersdorf, 126 F.3d at 1322. There, although the district

court had not specifically weighed the § 3553(a) factors, the Eleventh Circuit held that

the lower court had not abused its discretion and had provided sufficient reasons for its

decision to deny resentencing, “[e]specially considering that the district court’s final

order specifically referenced the Government’s Opposition, which in turn cited specific

elements that were relevant to the necessary section 3553(a) inquiry and that were

supported by the record.” Id. at 1323.

The same principles apply here. Clearly, the district court’s order denying

Curry’s motion to resentence was cursory at best. However, as in Eggersdorf, the record

had been amply developed before the resentencing motion at issue here was filed. Judge

Quist had already considered the relevant factors in some depth at the original

sentencing and the first resentencing under Booker, at which time he imposed a (then)

below-guidelines sentence of 75 months. Judge Jonker indicated he had reviewed the

entire record, including the parties’ recommendations, and had considered all the

relevant § 3553(a) factors and the Sentencing Guidelines in making his decision. Under

the circumstances, this Court cannot conclude that he abused his discretion in denying

the defendant’s motion for further modification of his sentence.

III.

For the reasons articulated herein, we affirm the district court’s denial of the

motion to modify or reduce Curry’s sentence.

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