Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-04713/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-04713-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ben Curry
Respondent
Pedro Feliciano
Petitioner

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PEDRO FELICIANO,

Petitioner,

 v.

BEN CURRY, Warden,

Respondent.

 /

No. C 07-4713 CW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS; DENYING

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

INTRODUCTION

Pro se Petitioner Pedro Feliciano, a state prisoner

incarcerated at the Correctional Training Facility in Soledad,

California, seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254

challenging the August 31, 2005 decision of the California Board of

Parole Hearings (BPH) to deny him parole at his fourth parole

suitability hearing. Doc. No. 1 at 10. 

On February 7, 2008, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause

why the writ should not be granted. Doc. No. 3. On April 30, 2008,

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the Petition on the ground that

it was untimely, which the Court denied on March 11, 2009. 

Case 4:07-cv-04713-CW Document 19 Filed 07/29/10 Page 1 of 14
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Doc. Nos. 7 & 11. On June 8, 2009, Respondent filed an Answer. 

Doc. No. 12. On June 18, 2009, Petitioner filed a Traverse. Doc.

No. 13. 

After the matter was submitted, on April 22, 2010, the Ninth

Circuit issued its decision in Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F.3d 546 

(9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), which addressed important issues relating

to federal habeas review of BPH decisions denying parole to

California state prisoners. On May 6, 2010, the Court ordered the

parties to file Supplemental Briefing explaining their views of how

the Hayward en banc decision applies to the facts presented in

Petitioner’s challenge to the BPH’s decision denying him parole. 

Doc. No. 14. Respondent filed Supplemental Briefing on May 28,

2010; Petitioner filed his on June 14, 2010. Doc. Nos. 15 & 16. 

 Having considered all of the papers filed by the parties, the

Court DENIES the Petition.

BACKGROUND

At Petitioner’s August 31, 2005 parole suitability hearing, the

BPH read two factual summaries of Petitioner’s commitment offense. 

Doc. No. 12-1 at 36–39. The first derives from Petitioner’s 2004

parole suitability hearing and is set forth below. 

On June 15, 1[9]82 at approximately 8:18

p.m. officers from the Colton Police Department

responded to East Congress Street in Colton to

[a] call [of] shots fired. Subsequent

investigation revealed that [Petitioner’s]

estranged common-law wife Lazarra . . .

Hernandez, victim, went to his residents [sic]

in order to see her three children. She was

driven to the house by her boyfriend of two

months, Pedro Rodriguez. While still in the

vehicle, they were approached by [Petitioner],

who advise[d] Rodriguez to . . . “take out the

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rifle” . . . because he was going to obtain one. 

Mr. [Rodriguez] then informed [Petitioner] that

[he] did not have a rifle. [Petitioner] obtained

a 22 caliber automatic rifle from his . . .

house, stood in the . . . area of the doorway

and fired two to four shots in the direction of

the vehicle striking Rodriguez in the neck and

Ms. Hernandez in the head. Rodriguez was able

to drive the vehicle away from the area and made

contact with police. Both victims received

emergency medical care and shortly there after

[sic] Ms. Hernandez was pronounced dead at Loma

Linda Medical Center. [Petitioner] was arrested

at his residents [sic] at approximately 8:33

p.m. 

Doc. No. 12-1 at 36–38. 

Below is Petitioner’s version of the commitment offense that

originally was set forth in a statement made in 1998, which

Petitioner maintained as true at his 2005 parole suitability

hearing. 

[Petitioner] stated that he never told Rodriguez

to take out the rifle. He stated that when

Rodriguez pulled up in his car, he parked right

in front of [Petitioner’s] apartment.

[Rodriguez] told . . . [Petitioner] that . . .

Ms. Hernandez wanted her children back.

[Petitioner] told him that he would not give up

the children and told Rodriguez to move his car

from in front of his apartment. . . .

[Petitioner] claimed . . . that he told

Rodriguez that [Ms.] Hernandez could go to the

end of the apartment to see her children. Then

he said that Rodriguez refused to move his car

so [Petitioner] went to his apartment, got a 22.

[sic] [c]aliber rifle. It [sic] says that he

stood in his doorway. He saw Rodriguez reach

down. He thought Rodriguez was reaching for a

relationship [sic], so he claims he fired two

rounds not knowing his common-law wife was still

in the car. He did not believe at first that he

had killed – I’ll back up. He claims that even

when he was arrested, he did not believe at fist

[sic] that he had killed Hernandez. He said he

felt badly and was concerned because he knew he

was going to jail and that . . . [there] would

be nobody to take care of his children. He said

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he didn’t have any problems with his ex-common

law wife and never intended to kill her. 

Doc. No. 12-1 at 38–39. 

On January 27, 1983, Petitioner was convicted in San Bernardino

County Superior Court of one count of first degree murder and one

count of attempted first degree murder with firearm enhancements

attached to both counts. Doc. No. 1 at 2. He was sentenced to a

term of twenty-seven years to life in state prison. Id. His

minimum eligible parole date was June 16, 2000. Doc. No. 12-1 at

27. 

On August 31, 2005, Petitioner appeared before the BPH for his

fourth parole suitability hearing, having served over twenty two

years on his twenty seven to life sentence. Doc. No. 12-1 at 27;

Doc. No. 1 at 10. At the hearing, the BPH found Petitioner was not

yet suitable for parole and that he would pose an unreasonable risk

of danger to society or threat to public safety if released from

prison, citing the circumstances of the commitment offense and

expressing concern over Petitioner’s absence of realistic parole

plans, including his lack of “firm job offers at this time.” Doc.

No. 12-1 at 45 & 64–65. 

Petitioner unsuccessfully challenged the BPH’s decision in the

state superior and appellate courts. Doc. No. 12-3 at 22–24. On

August 8, 2007, the California Supreme Court summarily denied

Petitioner habeas relief. Doc. No. 1 at 23. This federal Petition

for a Writ of Habeas Corpus followed. Doc. No. 1. 

LEGAL STANDARD

In Hayward, the Ninth Circuit explained the law in California

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as it relates to parole suitability determinations: 

The California parole statute provides that the

Board of Prison Terms “shall set a release date unless

it determines that the gravity of the current convicted

offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of

current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such

that consideration of the public safety requires a more

lengthy period of incarceration for this individual.” 

The crucial determinant of whether the prisoner gets

parole in California is “consideration of the public

safety.”

In California, when a prisoner receives an

indeterminate sentence of fifteen years to life, the

“indeterminate sentence is in legal effect a sentence

for the maximum term, subject only to the ameliorative

power of the [parole authority] to set a lesser term.” 

Under the California parole scheme, the prisoner has a

right to a parole hearing and various procedural

guarantees and rights before, at, and after the

hearing; a right to subsequent hearings at set

intervals if the Board of Prison Terms turns him down

for parole; and a right to a written explanation if the

Governor exercises his authority to overturn the Board

of Prison Terms’ recommendation for parole. Under

California law, denial of parole must be supported by

“some evidence,” but review of the [decision to deny

parole] is “extremely deferential.” 

Hayward, 603 F.3d at 561–62 (footnotes and citations omitted). 

The court further explained that: 

[s]ubsequent to Hayward’s denial of parole, and

subsequent to our oral argument in this case, the

California Supreme Court established in two decisions, In

re Lawrence [190 P.3d 535, 549 (Cal. 2008)] and In re

Shaputis, [190 P.3d 573, 582 (Cal. 2008)] that as a matter

of state law, “some evidence” of future dangerousness is

indeed a state sine qua non for denial of parole in

California. We delayed our decision in this case so that

we could study those decisions and the supplemental briefs

by counsel addressing them. As a matter of California

law, “the paramount consideration for both the Board [of

Prison Terms] and the Governor under the governing

statutes is whether the inmate currently poses a threat to

public safety.” [Lawrence, 190 P.3d at 552.] There must

be “some evidence” of such a threat, and an aggravated

offense “does not, in every case, provide evidence that

the inmate is a current threat to public safety.” [Id. at

554.] The prisoner’s aggravated offense does not

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1

 Applying this standard to the facts presented in Hayward, the

court concluded that the state court’s decision finding there was

“‘some evidence’ of Hayward’s future dangerousness because of ‘the

nature of the commitment offense’ and ‘the somewhat unfavorable

psychological and counsel reports,’” one of which noted that Hayward

“would pose a ‘low’ to ‘moderate’ risk of danger if released, as

opposed to ‘no’ or merely ‘low’ risk,” was not unreasonable and

therefore did not warrant federal habeas relief. Hayward, 603 F.3d

at 563. 

6

establish current dangerousness “unless the record also

establishes that something in the prisoner’s pre- or

post-incarceration history, or his or her current demeanor

and mental state” supports the inference of dangerousness. 

[Id. at 555.] Thus, in California, the offense of

conviction may be considered, but the consideration must

address the determining factor, “a current threat to

public safety.” [Id. at 539.] 

Hayward, 603 F.3d at 562 (footnotes and citations omitted).

After providing this background on California law as it applies

to parole suitability determinations, the court then explained the

role of a federal district court charged with reviewing the decision

of either the BPH or the governor in denying a prisoner parole. 

According to the Ninth Circuit, this Court must decide whether a

decision “rejecting parole was an ‘unreasonable application’ of the

California ‘some evidence’ requirement, or was ‘based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence.’”1

Hayward, 603 F.3d at 562–63 (citations omitted); see also Cooke v.

Solis, 606 F.3d 1206, 1208, n.2 & 1213 (9th Cir. 2010) (applying

Hayward and explicitly rejecting the state’s argument that “the

constraints imposed by AEDPA preclude federal habeas relief” on

petitioner’s claim; noting that in Hayward, the court “held that due

process challenges to California courts’ application of the ‘some

evidence’ requirement are cognizable on federal habeas review under

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AEDPA”).

DISCUSSION

I. California Law Regarding Parole Suitability Determinations

When assessing whether California’s parole board’s suitability

determination was supported by “some evidence,” this Court’s

analysis is framed by California’s “regulatory, statutory and

constitutional provisions that govern parole decisions in

California.” Cooke, 606 F.3d at 1213 (citing In re Rosenkrantz, 29

Cal. 4th 616 (2002)); see Hayward, 603 F.3d at 561–62. Under

California law, prisoners serving indeterminate life sentences, like

Petitioner, become eligible for parole after serving minimum terms

of confinement required by statute. In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th

1061, 1069-70 (2005). Regardless of the length of the time served,

“a life prisoner shall be found unsuitable for and denied parole if

in the judgment of the panel the prisoner will pose an unreasonable

risk of danger to society if released from prison.” Cal. Code Regs.

tit. 15, § 2402(a). In making this determination, the BPH must

consider various factors, including the prisoner’s social history,

past and present mental state, past criminal history, the base and

other commitment offenses, including behavior before, during and

after the crime, past and present attitude toward the crime and any

other information that bears on the prisoner’s suitability for

release. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(b)–(d).

In considering the commitment offense, the BPH must determine

whether “the prisoner committed the offense in an especially

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heinous, atrocious or cruel manner.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15,

§ 2402(c)(1). The factors to be considered in making that

determination include: “(A) Multiple victims were attacked, injured

or killed in the same or separate incidents; (B) The offense was

carried out in a dispassionate and calculated manner, such as an

execution-style murder; © The victim was abused, defiled or

mutilated during or after the offense; (D) The offense was carried

out in a manner which demonstrates an exceptionally callous

disregard for human suffering; (E) The motive for the crime is

inexplicable or very trivial in relation to the offense.” Id. 

According to the California Supreme Court, “the core statutory

determination entrusted to the Board and the Governor [in

determining a prisoner’s parole suitability] is whether the inmate

poses a current threat to public safety . . . .” In re Lawrence, 44

Cal. 4th 1181, 1191 (2008). And, “the core determination of ‘public

safety’ under the statute and corresponding regulations involves an

assessment of an inmate’s current dangerousness.” Id. at 1205

(emphasis in original) (citing Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th 616 and

Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061). The court further explained that: 

a parole release decision authorizes the Board (and the

Governor) to identify and weigh only the factors

relevant to predicting “whether the inmate will be able

to live in society without committing additional

antisocial acts.” . . . These factors are designed to

guide an assessment of the inmate’s threat to society,

if released, and hence could not logically relate to

anything but the threat currently posed by the inmate.

Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th at 1205–06 (citations omitted). The relevant

inquiry, therefore, is: 

whether the circumstances of the commitment offense,

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when considered in light of other facts in the record,

are such that they continue to be predictive of current

dangerousness many years after commission of the

offense. This inquiry is, by necessity and by

statutory mandate, an individualized one, and cannot be

undertaken simply by examining the circumstances of the

crime in isolation, without consideration of the

passage of time or the attendant changes in the

inmate’s psychological or mental attitude. 

In re Shaputis, 44 Cal. 4th 1241, 1254–55 (2008). 

The evidence of current dangerousness “must have some indicia

of reliability.” In re Scott, 119 Cal. App. 4th 871, 899 (2004)

(Scott I). Indeed, “the ‘some evidence’ test may be understood as

meaning that suitability determinations must have some rational

basis in fact.” In re Scott, 133 Cal. App. 4th 573, 590, n. 6

(2005) (Scott II); see also Cooke, 606 F.3d at 1216 (holding that

the state court decision upholding the denial of parole was “‘based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence[],’” Hayward, 603 F.3d at 563 (quoting 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(2)), and therefore finding petitioner entitled to habeas

relief because “[n]othing in the record supports the state court’s

finding that there was ‘some evidence’ in addition to the

circumstances of the commitment offense to support the Board’s

denial of petitioner’s parole”).

II. Analysis of Petitioner’s Claim

Petitioner initially sought federal habeas corpus relief from

the BPH’s August 31, 2005 decision finding him unsuitable for parole

and denying him a subsequent hearing for two years, on the ground

that the decision did not comport with due process. Doc. No. 1. 

Specifically, Petitioner argued that at his 2005 parole suitability

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hearing, the BPH “fail[ed] to address the exact nature of

Petitioner’s CURRENT character.” Id. at 11 (emphasis in original). 

Petitioner further argues that “a multi-year denial can only be

applicable when valid grounds exist to find Petitioner unsuitable

for parole.” Id. at 17. 

 Respondent, in both the Answer and post-Hayward Supplemental 

Briefing, argues that Petitioner is not entitled to relief because

he has not demonstrated that the state court decision was contrary

to, or an unreasonable application of, the California “some

evidence” standard, or that it was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence. Doc. Nos. 12 &

15. 

After reviewing the petition filed in superior court

challenging Petitioner’s 2005 parole denial, that court concluded: 

“A review of the record supports a finding that there was ‘some

evidence’ which led the Board to its finding of unsuitability of the

Petitioner for parole, for as the [California Supreme Court]

described such evidence, it need be only a ‘modicum’ of evidence.” 

Doc. No. 12-3 at 24. As explained below, after careful review of

the record, the Court finds that the state court’s approval of the

BPH’s decision to deny Petitioner parole was not an unreasonable

application of the California “some evidence” standard, nor was it

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence. See Hayward, 603 F.3d at 562–63. 

The record shows that, at Petitioner’s August 31, 2005 parole

suitability hearing, the BPH afforded Petitioner and his counsel an

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opportunity to speak and present Petitioner’s case, gave them time

to review documents relevant to Petitioner’s case and provided them

with a reasoned decision in denying parole. Doc. No. 12-1 at 31–36

& 64–71. The record also shows that the BPH relied on several

circumstances tending to show unsuitability for parole and that

these circumstances formed the basis for its conclusion that

Petitioner was not yet suitable for parole and would pose an

unreasonable risk of danger to society or threat to public safety if

released from prison. Doc. No. 12-1 at 64; see Cal. Code Regs. tit.

15, § 2402(a) (stating that a prisoner determined to be an

unreasonable risk to society shall be denied parole). 

At the hearing, the BPH commended Petitioner for his lack of

prior criminal history, for being free since 1995 of counseling

chronos and since 1984 of serious rules violations, and for

receiving several laudatory chronos. Doc. No. 12-1 at 65. The BPH

expressed concern, however, that Petitioner’s “[v]ocational [and]

educational participation . . . has been nonexistent for about a

decade.” Id. at 67. Further, the BPH was “troubled” by

Petitioner’s parole plans. Id. at 65. The BPH acknowledged that

Petitioner had an offer of employment in construction, but also

noted that during the evidentiary portion of the hearing Petitioner

explained he had various physical limitations which precluded him

from working while in prison. Id. at 52–53 & 65. Thus, the BPH did

not consider Petitioner’s construction job offer to be viable. And,

although Petitioner had a place to live with his wife in Hanford,

she was unable to work because of an injury sustained in a car

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2

 In light of this conclusion, Petitioner’s argument that “a

multi-year denial can only be applicable when valid grounds exist to

find Petitioner unsuitable for parole,” Doc. No. 1 at 17, necessarily

fails as well. 

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accident. Id. at 46–47 & 65–66. It therefore was not clear how

Petitioner planned to support himself (and his wife) and establish a

degree of self-sufficiency. 

The BPH also relied on the circumstances of Petitioner’s

commitment offense in deciding to deny Petitioner parole, noting the

crime was “particularly callous and was clearly carried out in a

dispassionate calculated manner.” Doc. No. 12-1 at 64. The BPH

concluded the hearing by recommending that Petitioner remain

disciplinary-free, learn a trade if possible, earn positive chronos

and participate in self-help programs. Doc. No. 12-1 at 70. 

Based on the entire body of evidence presented at Petitioner’s

August 31, 2005 parole suitability hearing, this Court cannot say

that the state court’s approval of the BPH’s decision to deny

Petitioner parole was an unreasonable application of the California

“some evidence” standard, nor that it was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence.2

 See Hayward,

603 F.3d at 563. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Petition for a Writ of Habeas

Corpus is DENIED. Petitioner is advised to file timely any state

court habeas petitions after any future parole denials, and attach

thereto any documents required by the state court. 

Further, a certificate of appealability is DENIED. See

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Hayward, 603 F.3d at 554–55. Petitioner has failed to make “a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." Id.

(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)). Nor has Petitioner demonstrated

that his claim is “debatable among reasonable jurists.” See

Hayward, 603 F.3d at 555. 

The Clerk of Court shall terminate all pending motions as

moot, enter judgment in accordance with this order and close the

file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 7/29/2010 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PEDRO FELICIANO,

Plaintiff,

 v.

BEN CURRY et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV07-04713 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court,

Northern District of California.

That on July 29, 2010, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said copy(ies)

in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said envelope in

the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located in the Clerk's

office.

Pedro Feliciano C-59854

P.O. Box 689, ZW-321L

Soledad, CA 93960-0689

Dated: July 29, 2010

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Nikki Riley, Deputy Clerk

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