Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-02090/USCOURTS-ca10-92-02090-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Wayne David Simms
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALMtlnM ~ . :!i~ Appeab:-

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT JAN 2 8 1993 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

WAYNE DAVID SIMMS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

No. 92-2090 

(D.C. No. CR-91-610-01) 

{D. New Mexico) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MOORE, BRORBY, and EBEL, Circuit Judges . 

Defendant Wayne David Simms appeals his conviction for 

possession with intent to distribute marijuana, raising the 

following issues: (a) whether the district court erred in 

concluding his referral to the secondary inspection area of a 

permanent border patrol checkpoint did not violate the Fourth 

Amendment; (b) whether the court erred in admitting prior 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 92-2090 Document: 010110163960 Date Filed: 01/28/1993 Page: 1 
conviction evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 404 (b ) ; (c ) whether the 

court conunitted plain error in not providing a limiting 

instruction regarding the jury's use of his prior conviction; and 

(d) whether the court erred in denying his request for a downward 

departure. We affirm. 

While driving into a permanent border patrol checkpoint near 

Alamogordo, New Mexico, defendant encountered U.S. Border Patrol 

Agent Eligio Pena at the primary inspection area. On initial 

contact with defendant's van, Agent Pena smelled the 

"overwhelming" odor of "rotten fruit" and inunediately became 

suspicious that the odor might be masking the smell of contraband. 

He asked defendant if the van contained an air freshener. 

Defendant replied, "Yeah, I'm not sure, but the van has just been 

cleaned." After walking around the van and observing no luggage, 

Agent Pena asked defendant where he was going. Defendant said he 

was traveling to Alamogordo to pick up a friend before checking 

into the Veterans Administration Hospital in Big Spring, Texas. 

Agent Pena requested permission to search the van with a "sniffer 

dog," and defendant responded, "Sure, go ahead. 111 Agent Pena 

then referred the van to the secondary inspection area . A dog 

search was conducted and the dog alerted. Defendant was advised 

of his rights and asked to sign a consent to search form. After 

defendant signed the form, agents searched the van and recovered 

approximately 143 pounds of marijuana. 

1Defendant does not contest the voluntariness of his consent. 

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Defendant was indicted on one count of possession with intent 

to distribute more than 50 kilograms of marijuana in violation of 

21 U.S.C. §§ 84l(a) (1) and 841(b) (1) (C). He entered a not-guilty 

plea and filed a motion to suppress the marijuana seized by border 

patrol agents. At the suppression hearing, Agent Pena testified 

for the government while defendant presented no testimony. 

Defendant's motion was denied, and the case proceeded to trial. 

Defendant was found guilty and sentenced to fifty-one months' 

imprisonment followed by three years' supervised release. 

Mr. Simms challenges the district court's conclusions that 

reasonable suspicion is not required for referral to a secondary 

inspection area and, alternately, that Agent Pena nonetheless had 

reasonable suspicion to make the referral. First, defendant 

contends the court "incorrectly held that a referral to the 

secondary for non-irranigration concerns did not require reasonable 

suspicion." Though defendant concedes referral for further 

irranigration- related questioning absent reasonable suspicion is 

justified as "an extension of the initial stop at the primary," he 

argues that an agent must have reasonable suspicion before making 

a referral if all concerns about irranigration status and 

citizenship have been allayed. Defendant maintains that because 

he was "an American citizen driving a car with Texas 

registration," Agent Pena "had no suspicions" that he was 

violating any irranigration laws. Therefore, defendant claims his 

referral to the secondary for drug-related reasons was 

constitutionally permissible only if supported by reasonable 

suspicion. 

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"In reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress, the trial 

court's finding of fact must be accepted by this court unless 

clearly erroneous." 

(10th Cir. 1985) 

United States v . Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 548 

(citation omitted) . Moreover, "[w] e must 

consider the evidence addressed at a suppression hearing in the 

light most favorable to the prevailing party." United States v. 

Johnson, 895 F.2d 693, 697-98 (10th Cir. 1990) (citations 

omitted) . The ultimate determination of reasonableness under the 

Fourth Amendment, however, is a conclusion of law which we review 

de novo. United States v. Butler, 904 F.2d 1482, 1484 (10th Cir. 

1990) (citations omitted). 

The district court denied defendant's motion to suppress 

because "questioning and referral of [a] motorist to a secondary 

inspection [area] are permissible under the Fourth Amendment even 

in the absence of any individualized suspicion, much less probable 

cause. "

2 The court also determined that defendant's referral was 

justified in any case because Agent Pena had reasonable suspicion 

to believe defendant was engaged in drug smuggling based on his 

"seven years'" experience as a border patrol agent, the intense 

"rotten fruit smell" emanating from defendant's van, and the 

absence of luggage. 

It is well established in this Circuit that "[n] o 

individualized suspicion is necessary to stop, question and then 

selectively refer motorists to a secondary inspection checkpoint." 

United States v. Sanders, 937 F . 2d 1495, 1499 (10th Cir. 1991), 

2

The court based its ruling on United States v. Rubio-Rivera, 917 

F.2d 1271 (10th Cir. 1990). 

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cert. denied, 112 S . Ct. 1213 (1992) (citations omitted). See 

also United States v. Benitez, 899 F.2d 995, 997 (10th Cir. 1990) 

( "[A) vehicle may be stopped and its occupants may be questioned 

briefly, even if there is no reason to believe the particular 

vehicle contains illegal aliens. 11 ); United States v . Espinosa, 782 

F . 2d 888, 891 (10th Cir. 1986 ) ("The border agent may question the 

driver and passengers about their citizenship and immigration 

status, and ask them to explain suspicious circumstances. " ) 

(emphasis added); Johnson, 895 F.2d at 696 (quoting Adams v . 

Williams, 407 U. S. 143, 146 (1972)) (citations omitted) ( "A brief 

stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his 

identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining 

more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts 

known to the officer at the time.") . 

Moreover, "[d)etention and questioning at borders based only 

on suspicious circumstances are approved as consistent with the 

accepted government policy of ensuring that ... no one is 

permitted to secrete contraband through the border." Sanders, 937 

F.2d at 1500. Indeed, border patrol agents may question motorists 

about suspected drug activity because such questioning "bears a 

reasonable relationship to their unique duties." Id. Contrary to 

defendant's assertions, 11 [b)order patrol agents are not required 

to ignore suspicious circumstances, even if such circumstances may 

not be pertinent to citizenship and immigration status." United 

States v. Rubio-Rivera, 917 F.2d 1271, 1276 (10th Cir . 1990) 

(citations omitted). Therefore, the district court correctly 

concluded Agent Pena did not need reasonable suspicion to refer 

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defendant to the secondary inspection area. Although we agree 

with the district court's conclusion that Agent Pena had 

reasonable suspicion, our resolution of the first issue renders 

the second moot. 

In his opening statement at trial, defense counsel asserted 

that Mr. Simms did not know the van contained marijuana . The 

government subsequently sought to admit evidence of defendant's 

1989 Texas felony conviction for cocaine possession to rebut 

defendant's anticipated defense that he was unaware of the 

marijuana . The court initially rejected the government's proffer, 

s~ggesting the conviction would be admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 

609 to impeach defendant if he testified. During a bench 

conference preceding the defense's case presentation, the court 

asked defense counsel who his witnesses were. Defense counsel 

noted he would be calling two witnesses and "possibly Mr. Simms." 

The court then reconsidered its previous ruling denying admission 

of defendant's prior conviction and concluded the evidence was 

admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) to rebut defense counsel's 

remarks concerning defendant's alleged ignorance of the marijuana. 

Specifically, the court told the prosecution, "I'm going to allow 

you to go under 404(b), because [defense] counsel . in opening 

statement ... in essence, testified on behalf of his client 

that he didn't know anything about [the marijuana in the van). So 

you can go into that." Defense counsel objected to the ruling, 

and defendant later testified on his own behalf. 

On appeal, defendant claims the district court abused its 

discretion in admitting the evidence because "(t]he relevancy of 

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evidence cannot be based on argument of c ounsel duri ng openi ng 

statement since those statements provide no evidentiary basis t o 

justify admission." Defendant further contends he was "clearly 

prejudiced" by the admission of the evidence because he was 

"forced" into the "tactical position" of "having to testify in 

order to rebut the implications raised by the prior conviction. " 

"A trial court's evidentiary rulings are reviewed for an 

abuse of discretion." Durtsche v. American Colloid Co . , 958 F.2d 

1007, 1011 (10th Cir. 1992 ) (citation omitted). "Under the abuse 

of discretion standard, a trial court's decision will not be 

disturbed unless the appellate court has a definite and firm 

conviction that the lower court made a clear error of judgment or 

exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances." 

United States v. Ortiz , 804 F . 2d 1161, 1164 n.2 (10th Cir. 1986). 

In relevant part, Rule 404(b) provides that although evidence 

of "other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the 

character of a person in order to show action in conf ormity 

therewith," such evidence may be admissible "for other purposes, 

such as proof of ... knowledge .. . or absence of mistake." 

Moreover, "[e]xtrinsic acts evidence may be critical to the 

establishment of the truth as to a disputed issue, especially when 

that issue involves the actor's state of mind and the only means 

of ascertaining that mental state is by drawing inferences from 

conduct." Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 (1988) . 

Defendant concedes that in United States v. Morales-Ouinones, 

812 F.2d 604 (10th Cir. 1987), we "appeared to endorse the method 

employed by the trial judge in the instant case . " Defendant 

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argues, however, that his prior conviction does not satisfy the 

admissibility requirements articulated in Morales-Ouinones. 3 This 

argument is without merit. 

In Morales-Ouinones, we held that prior conviction evidence 

must meet four requirements for admissibility under Rule 404 (b ): 

[The evidence] (1) must tend to establish 

knowledge .. . or absence of mistake or accident; (2) 

must also be so related to the charge that it serves to 

establish ... knowledge ... or absence of mistake or 

accident; (3) must have real probative value, not just 

possible worth; and (4) must be close in time to the 

crime charged." 

812 F.2d at 612 (citation omitted). Defendant's prior conviction 

meets each of these requirements. First, the conviction tends to 

establish his familiarity with narcotics and his potential 

knowledge of the marijuana found in his van. Second, the 

conviction involves the same type of criminal activity at issue 

here, possession of narcotics. Third, the conviction contains 

real probative value by virtue of its similarity to the criminal 

conduct now charged. Finally, the conviction occurred less than 

three years before defendant's indictment in the instant case. 

Thus, the introduction of his prior conviction to show knowledge 

3

Defendant suggests two other grounds for distinguishing MoralesOuinones, each of which is unpersuasive. First, defendant's 

contention that Morales-Quinones "elected not to testify" while he 

was "forced" to testify is fatuous. Indeed, the fact that 

Morales-Quinones chose not to testify only illustrates that here 

defendant testified of his own volition. Second, defendant's 

argument that counsel's opening statement in Morales-Ouinones "was 

far more specific in terms of the defendant's lack of knowledge . 

than any assertion by defense counsel here" cannot be 

evaluated because defendant's brief does not reveal precisely what 

defense counsel said, and counsel's opening statement is not part 

of the record submitted on appeal. 

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and absence of mistake was proper under Rule 404(b) 

Ouinones, in light of defense counsel's opening 

defendant knew nothing about the marijuana. 

and Moralesremark that 

We are further unpersuaded that the admission of the 

conviction evidence forced defendant to make a "tactical" decision 

to testify. Because defense counsel had told the jury Mr . Simms 

did not know the van contained marijuana, and because the evidence 

to back that statement could only have come from Mr. Simms, it is 

logical to assume the decision for him to testify had been made 

long before the district court's ruling. 

Though defendant freely admits he did not request a limiting 

instruction, he nonetheless claims the district court's failure to 

independently provide one "constitutes plain and reversible 

error." According to defendant, limiting instructions are "an 

element of such significance that the fairness of the trial 

process must be questioned if evidence of prior convictions are 

[sic] allowed without cautioning the jury on their [sic] limited 

use." Because no limiting instruction was given, defendant 

contends his conviction "could be the result of the jury's 

unrestricted consideration of his prior criminal ways." 

"In order to appeal the propriety of a given jury instruction 

or the refusal to give a suggested jury instruction, a defendant 

must make a specific objection in the district court." United 

States v. Barbee, 968 F.2d 1026, 1032 (10th Cir. 1992). See also 

Fed. R. Crim. P . 30 (With respect to jury instructions, "[n]o 

party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission 

therefrom unless that party objects thereto before the jury 

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Appellate Case: 92-2090 Document: 010110163960 Date Filed: 01/28/1993 Page: 9 
retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to 

which that party objects and the grounds of the objection." ) . 

Because defendant failed to request a limiting instruction or 

object to the absence of one, "we review the record only for plain 

error. " Barbee, 968 F.2d at 1032. 

Defendant's contention that the district court was required 

to independently provide a limiting instruction is meritless. 

Fed. R. Evid. 105 expressly states that when a court admits 

evidence admissible for one purpose but not another, as with Rule 

404(b), "the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to 

its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly." 

added). As the Supreme Court noted in Huddleston: 

(emphasis 

We share petitioner's concern that unduly prejudicial 

evidence might be introduced under Rule 404(b) . ... We think, however, that the protection against such 

unfair prejudice emanates not from a requirement of a 

preliminary finding by the trial court, but rather from .. Federal Rule of Evidence 105, which provides that 

the trial court shall, upon request, instruct the jury 

that the similar acts evidence is to be considered only 

for the proper purpose for which it was admitted. 

485 U.S. at 691-92 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Nowhere 

does Rule 105 require a court to provide aTM sponte limiting 

instruction. Nor does defendant cite any case law to support his 

position. Clearly the district court did not abuse its 

discretion, let alone commit plain error. 

Defendant filed a notice and request for downward departure 

under 18 U. S.C. § 3553(b) and U.S.S.G. §§ 5Hl.3 and 5Hl.4, 

alleging extraordinary physical, mental, and emotional conditions. 

Attached to defendant's request were physician and psychiatrist 

statements documenting the following alleged "extraordinary 

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impairments": chronic osteoarthritis, a history of malignant 

melanoma, and chronic psychiatric illness. The distric t court 

reviewed and rejected defendant's request on the ground that it 

was "without merit. " Defense counsel then asked the court whether 

its ruling was based on an exercise of discretion or a finding 

that the request lacked legal merit. The court replied, "Well, i t 

d oes not meet the criteria for a downward departure. Based on his 

physical condition, that was taken into consi deration by the 

Sentencing Commission . " 

On appeal, defendant concedes that a trial court's 

discretionary refusal to depart downward is not reviewable by this 

court . However, he maintains the district court ' s ruling violated 

18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a ) because the ruling imposed a sentence greater 

than necessary to meet the sentencing purposes of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a) (2) (i.e. , retribution, deterrence, incapacitation and 

rehabilitation) .

4 Thus, defendant argues that the court ' s refusal 

to depart downward is appealable under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (1 ) as a 

"violation of law." Alternately, defendant claims the ruling is 

reviewable under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2) because the court's 

"legal" conclusion that the sentencing guidelines already 

accounted for his medical condition constituted "an incorrect 

application of the sentencing guidelines. " Thus, he urges "a 

4

specifically, defendant claims his "extraordinary medical 

condition created conditions of confinement substantially harsher 

than those whose crime was similarly situated but who did not 

experience as dire a medical condition." According to defendant, 

the district court's failure "to take into account" his condition 

"exacted a higher punishment than necessary in terms of 

retribution, incapacitation and deterrence . " 

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limited remand for directing the district court to rule on the 

merits" of his request for downward departure . 

"This court reviews sentences imposed under the Sentencing 

Guidelines according to the statutory standard provided by the 

Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and codified at 18 U. S.C. § 3742." 

United States v. Davis, 900 F.2d 1524, 1528 (10th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 111 S. Ct . 155 (1990) (quoting United States v. Smith, 888 

F.2d 720, 723 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1068 

(1990)). Section 3742(e) expressly provides that 

[t]he court of appeals shall give due regard to the 

opportunity of the district court to judge the 

credibility of the witnesses, and shall accept the 

findings of fact of the district court unless they are 

clearly erroneous and shall give due deference to the 

district court's application of the guidelines to the 

facts. 

(emphasis added) . Moreover, "it is settled law in this circuit 

that section 3742 does not grant appellate jurisdiction over a 

trial court's discretionary refusal to depart downward from the 

[sentencing] guidelines," unless the trial court "erroneously 

believe[d] the guidelines do not permit a downward departure." 

United States v. Soto, 918 F.2d 882, 883-84 (10th Cir. 1990) . See 

~ Davis, 900 F.2d at 1530; United States v. Spedalieri, 910 

F.2d 707, 710 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Gines, 964 F.2d 

972, 976 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, U.S. , No. 

92-6747, 1992 WL 368734 (Jan. 11, 1993) . Thus, " [t] he 

determination of whether a downward departure is warranted . . . 

is committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge." 

States v. Bromberg. 933 F.2d 895, 897 (10th Cir. 1991) . 

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United 

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Here , the district court "reviewed" defendant's request, 

which clearly indicates the court believed it had discretion to 

depart downward. Cf. United States v. Slater, 971 F.2d 626, 634 

(10th Cir. 1992 ) (remand necessary where district court 

erroneously held it was without authority under U.S.S.G. § SHl.4 

to depart from the sentencing guidelines). Exercising its 

discretion, the court concluded defendant's request was "without 

merit 11 because the request did "not meet the criteria for a 

downward departure . " Cf. United States v. Fox, 930 F . 2d 820, 824 

(10th Cir. ) (partial remand required where district court never 

finished stating its reasons for refusing to depart downward after 

being interrupted by counsel), cert . denied, 112 S. Ct. 218 

(1991) . Defendant's § 3742(e) (2) argument is similarly 

unpersuasive. The district court's statement that his physical 

condition had been "taken into consideration by the Sentencing 

Commission" simply cannot be interpreted to mean the court 

believed it lacked discretion to depart downward. Rather, the 

court's statement is entirely consistent with the fact that 

mental, emotional, and physical conditions are "not ordinarily 

relevant in determining whether a sentence should be outside the 

applicable guideline range . " U.S. S .G. §§ SHl. 3, SHl. 4. Because 

the district court exercised discretion in denying defendant's 

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request for downward departure, we have no jurisdiction to 

evaluate the propriety of the court's ruling . 

AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

John P. Moore 

Circuit Judge 

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