Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-17595/USCOURTS-ca9-12-17595-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
A.V.E.L.A., INC.
Appellee
Central Mills, Inc. (Freeze)
Appellee
Fifty-Six Hope Road Music, Ltd.
Appellant
Jem Sportswear
Appellee
Leo Valencia
Appellee
X ONE X Movie Archive, Inc.
Appellee
Zion Rootswear, LLC
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC, LTD.;

ZION ROOTSWEAR, LLC,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

A.V.E.L.A., INC.; X ONE X MOVIE

ARCHIVE, INC.; CENTRAL MILLS,

INC. (FREEZE); LEO VALENCIA,

Defendants-Appellants,

and

JEM SPORTSWEAR,

Defendant.

No. 12-17502

D.C. No.

2:08-cv-00105-

PMP-GWF

FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC, LTD.;

ZION ROOTSWEAR, LLC,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

A.V.E.L.A., INC.; X ONE X MOVIE

ARCHIVE, INC.; CENTRAL MILLS,

INC. (FREEZE); LEO VALENCIA,

Defendants,

No. 12-17519

D.C. No.

2:08-cv-00105-

PMP-GWF

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2 FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC V. A.V.E.L.A.

and

JEM SPORTSWEAR,

Defendant-Appellant.

FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC, LTD.;

ZION ROOTSWEAR, LLC,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

A.V.E.L.A., INC.; X ONE X MOVIE

ARCHIVE, INC.; CENTRAL MILLS,

INC. (FREEZE); LEO VALENCIA; JEM

SPORTSWEAR,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 12-17595

D.C. No.

2:08-cv-00105-

PMP-GWF

FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC, LTD.;

ZION ROOTSWEAR, LLC,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

A.V.E.L.A., INC.; X ONE X MOVIE

ARCHIVE, INC.; LEO VALENCIA,

Defendants-Appellants.

No. 13-15407

D.C. No.

2:08-cv-00105-

PMP-GWF

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FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC V. A.V.E.L.A. 3

FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC, LTD.;

ZION ROOTSWEAR, LLC,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

A.V.E.L.A., INC.; X ONE X MOVIE

ARCHIVE, INC.; LEO VALENCIA;

CENTRAL MILLS, INC. (FREEZE); JEM

SPORTSWEAR,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 13-15473

D.C. No.

2:08-cv-00105-

PMP-GWF

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Philip M. Pro, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

July 8, 2014—San Francisco, California

Filed February 20, 2015

Before: Ferdinand F. Fernandez, N. Randy Smith,

and Morgan Christen, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge N.R. Smith;

Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Christen

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4 FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC V. A.V.E.L.A.

SUMMARY*

Lanham Act

The panel affirmed the district court’s judgment after a

jury trial on claims under the Lanham Act and Nevada state

law regarding the use of Bob Marley images on apparel and

other merchandise.

Affirming the denial of defendants’ post-trial motion for

judgment as a matter of law on a false endorsement claim, the

panel held that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s

finding that defendants violated the Lanham Act because they

(a) used Marley’s image (b) on their t-shirts and other

merchandise, (c) in a manner likely to cause confusion as to

plaintiffs’ sponsorship or approval of these t-shirts and other

merchandise. The panel held that defendants waived several

defenses. It rejected the argument that allowing a plaintiff to

vindicate a false endorsement claim based on the use of a

deceased celebrity’s persona essentiallycreates a federal right

of publicity.

The panel held that the district court did not abuse its

broad discretion in determining the profits for three

defendants. There was sufficient evidence to find that

defendant Freeze willfully infringed plaintiffs’ rights. The

Seventh Amendment did not require that a jury calculate

these profits.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC V. A.V.E.L.A. 5

The panel held that the district court did not abuse its

discretion by ordering three defendants to pay attorneys’ fees

to plaintiffs because (1) plaintiffs were prevailing parties, and

(2) the case was exceptional, as these defendants’ conduct

was willful.

The panel affirmed the district court’s grant of summary

judgment to defendants on a right of publicity claim under

Nevada law.

The panel held that there was sufficient evidence to

support the jury’s finding that three defendants interfered

with plaintiffs’ prospective economic advantage.

The panel held that the district court did not err in

granting defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law

on the issue of punitive damages.

Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge Christen

concurred in the result but did not join the reasoning in

Subsection I.B.2 of the majority’s opinion, addressing

likelihood of confusion. Judge Christen wrote that the narrow

holding in Part I, concluding that the evidence presented at

trial was sufficient for the jury to find that defendants

violated the Lanham Act by using Marley’s likeness, was

dictated by the standard of review on appeal, and by the

defenses actually pursued by defendants.

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6 FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC V. A.V.E.L.A.

COUNSEL

Jill M. Pietrini (argued) and Paul A. Bost, Sheppard, Mullin,

Richter & Hampton, Los Angeles, California, for PlaintiffAppellee/Cross-Appellant Fifty-Six Hope Road Music, Ltd.

Timothy J. Ervin (argued), Gallant & Ervin, Chelmsford,

Massachusetts, for Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant Zion

Rootswear, LLC.

Michael Bergman (argued), Law Offices of Michael

Bergman, Century City, California, and Melissa W. Woo,

Carlsbad, California, for Defendants-Appellants/CrossAppellees A.V.E.L.A., Inc., X One X Movie Archive, Inc.,

Central Mills, Inc., and Leo Valencia.

John Yates (argued), Greenberg & Bass LLP, Encino,

California, for Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee Jem

Sportswear, Inc.

OPINION

N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

1. The district court did not err by denying Defendants’

post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law on the

Lanham Act false endorsement claim of Fifty-Six Hope Road

Music (“Hope Road”) and Zion Rootswear, LLC (“Zion”). 

The jury found Appellees, A.V.E.L.A., X One X Movie

Archive, Leo Valencia, Freeze, and Jem Sportswear

(collectively “Defendants”), (a) used Bob Marley’s image

(b) on their t-shirts and other merchandise, (c) in a manner

likely to cause confusion as to Plaintiffs’ sponsorship or

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FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC V. A.V.E.L.A. 7

approval of these t-shirts and other merchandise. See 15

U.S.C. § 1125(a); White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971

F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1992). Defendants waived several

defenses to the Plaintiffs’ claim by failing to properly raise

them in the district court. See Arizona v. Components Inc., 66

F.3d 213, 217 (9th Cir. 1995). Given such waivers, and

without opining on the merits of those defenses, we must

affirm on the basis that there was sufficient evidence to

support the jury’s verdict for Plaintiffs.

2. The district court did not abuse its broad discretion in

determining the profits for A.V.E.L.A., Freeze, and Jem

Sportwear (“Jem”). There was sufficient evidence to find

Freeze willfully infringed Plaintiffs’ rights, because Freeze’s

vice president of licensing testified that she knew that

Plaintiffs had the right to merchandise Marley’s image before

Freeze began selling similar goods. The Seventh Amendment

does not require that a jury calculate these profits, because

juries have not traditionally done so, and a claim for profit

disgorgement is equitable in nature. See Reebok Int’l, Ltd. v.

Marnatech Enters., Inc., 970 F.2d 552, 561 (9th Cir. 1992).

3. The district court did not abuse its discretion by

ordering A.V.E.L.A., X One X Movie Archive, and Valencia

(collectively“A.V.E.L.A. Defendants”) to payattorneys’ fees

to Plaintiffs, because (1) Plaintiffs were prevailing parties,

having achieved a material alteration in their legal

relationship with Defendants, see Klamath Siskiyou

Wildlands Ctr. v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 589 F.3d 1027,

1030 (9th Cir. 2009); and (2) the case was exceptional, as

Defendants’ conduct was willful, see Gracie v. Gracie,

217 F.3d 1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 2000). Because there was less

evidence of Jem’s and Freeze’s willfulness, the district court

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8 FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC V. A.V.E.L.A.

was also not required to order them to pay Plaintiffs’

attorneys’ fees.

4. We affirm the district court’s grant of summary

judgment to Defendants on the right of publicity claim,

because Nev. Rev. Stat. § 597.800.4 and .5 unambiguously

provides that a publicity right successor waives its publicity

rights (and not just the right to sue a particular defendant)

when it fails to timely register its rights.

5. There was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s

finding that A.V.E.L.A. Defendants interfered with Plaintiffs’

prospective economic advantage, based on Hope Road’s

licensing agent’s testimony that one of Hope Road’s licensees

lost an order intended for Walmart, because Jem sold Marley

t-shirts there.

6. Finally, the district court did not err in granting

Defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law on the

issue of punitive damages, because the district court’s

statement during trial did not contradict its later grant of the

motion.

FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Bob Marley transcended celebrity roles from pop idol to

muse, championing social change and diffusing his music and

message to an ever-growing audience. Even now—more than

thirty years after his death—Marley’s influence continues to

resonate, and his iconic image to command millions of

dollars each year in merchandising revenue. The primacy of

rights to Marley’s image forms the basis of the instant case.

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FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC V. A.V.E.L.A. 9

Plaintiff Hope Road is an entity owned by Marley’s

children, formed for the purpose of acquiring and exploiting

assets, rights, and commercial interests in the late Bob

Marley. In 1999, Hope Road granted Zion an exclusive

license to design, manufacture, and sell t-shirts and other

merchandise bearing Marley’s image. Hope Road authorizes

Zion to use hundreds of different images of Marley on its

products.

Defendants were involved with the sale of competing

Marley merchandise. A.V.E.L.A. publishes and licenses

photographs, images, movie posters, and other artwork for

use in the retail marketplace. Defendant X One X Movie

Archive holds the copyrights to these photographs, images,

movie posters, and other artwork; and Valencia serves as

president and CEO of both companies. In 2004, A.V.E.L.A.

acquired some photos of Marley from a photographer named

Roberto Rabanne. After acquiring the Marley photographs,

A.V.E.L.A. began licensing them to defendants Jem and

Freeze (as well as entities not a party to this suit) for the

production of Marley t-shirts and other merchandise. These

items were sold at Target, Walmart, and other large retailers.

On January 23, 2008, Plaintiffs filed suit against

Defendants, alleging five claims arising from Defendants’ use

of Marley’s likeness: (1) trademark infringement under 15

U.S.C. § 1114, (2) false endorsement under 15 U.S.C.

§ 1125(a), (3) common law trademark infringement,

(4) unauthorized commercial use of right to publicity under

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 597.770 et seq., and (5) intentional

interference with prospective economic advantage.

The district court granted Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment as to the 15 U.S.C. § 1114 claim, the

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10 FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC V. A.V.E.L.A.

common law trademark claim, and the state law right of

publicity claim. The two remaining claims were tried to a jury

between January 4 and January 20, 2011. Plaintiffs won on

their interference claim, although only against A.V.E.L.A.

Defendants. The jury awarded $300,000 in compensatory

damages for the interference.

The jury also returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiffs on

the 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) claim with respect to all Defendants.

Prior to trial, Plaintiffs had requested that a jury calculate

Defendants’profits,forwhich Plaintiffs sought disgorgement.

The district court denied this request and reopened discovery

after trial for submission of evidence of A.V.E.L.A.’s, Jem’s,

and Freeze’s profits from Marleymerchandise. Subsequently,

the district court assessed A.V.E.L.A.’s net profits at

$348,543.00; Jem’s at $413,638.29; and Freeze’s at

$19,246.54. On July 3, 2012, the district court entered

judgment against A.V.E.L.A., Jem, and Freeze in these

amounts.

Plaintiffs also moved for attorneys’ fees, and the district

court ordered A.V.E.L.A. Defendants to pay $1,518,687.94.

Defendants appealed the judgment. A.V.E.L.A. and

Freeze additionally appealed the award of profits, and

A.V.E.L.A. Defendants also appealed the order to pay

attorneys’ fees. Plaintiffs appealed the order granting

summary judgment on the right of publicity claim, the order

granting judgment as a matter of law on their punitive

damages claim, the order awarding profits, and the order

awarding attorneys’ fees. All of these timely appeals were

consolidated.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

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FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC V. A.V.E.L.A. 11

DISCUSSION

I. The district court did not err in denying the renewed

motion for judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiffs’

false endorsement claim.

This case presents a question that is familiar in our

circuit: when does the use of a celebrity’s likeness or persona

in connection with a product constitute false endorsement that

is actionable under the Lanham Act? We conclude that the

evidence presented at trial was sufficient for a jury to find

Defendants violated the Lanham Act by using Marley’s

likeness. Our narrow holding relies on the familiar principles

that underlie celebrity false endorsement claims, and we

reject Defendants’ contention that the application of those

principles results in a federal right of publicity.

Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)

provides in relevant part:

Any person who, on or in connection with any

goods or services, or any container for goods,

uses in commerce any . . . name, symbol, or

device, or any combination thereof . . . which

. . . is likely to cause confusion, or to cause

mistake, or to deceive as to . . . the origin,

sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods,

services, or commercial activities by another

person . . . shall be liable in a civil action by

any person who believes that he or she is or is

likely to be damaged by such act.

On appeal, Defendants raise several potentially salient

defenses to challenge the judgment against them on the

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12 FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC V. A.V.E.L.A.

§ 1125(a) claim. However, we will not undo the entirety of

the proceedings in the court below and reverse the jury’s

verdict when these defenses were not sufficiently asserted in

the district court to preserve them for appeal. SeeComponents

Inc., 66 F.3d at 217. We express no opinion on the waived

defenses’ applicability to this case or any future case, and

address only the reviewable issues below.1

A. Hope Road has a property right under the

Lanham Act to Marley’s persona.

Defendants claim that the § 1125(a) claim fails as a

matter of law, because a celebrity’s “persona” is too

“amorphous” to constitute a “name, symbol, or device” under

§ 1125(a). This premise is incorrect. Our jurisprudence

recognizes a § 1125(a) claim for misuse of a celebrity’s

persona. “[A] celebrity whose endorsement of a product is

implied through the imitation of a distinctive attribute of the

celebrity’s identity, has standing to sue for false endorsement

1 Defendants waived the aesthetic functionality defense by raising it only

in their Answer and never developing the theory. They waived the

Copyright Act defense under Dastar Corp. v. TwentiethCentury Fox Film,

Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003) by never addressing it in the district court. They

waived the First Amendment defense under Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d

994 (2d Cir. 1989). On summary judgment, the Defendants argued the

alternate test (likelihood of confusion) to the exclusion of the Rogers test,

and they did not respond to Plaintiffs’ treatment of the Rogers test. We

specifically note that Curtis Publishing Company v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130

(1967) does not preclude waiver of the First Amendment defense in this

case. See id. at 145. Here, there was no intervening change in the law; this

court recognized the Rogers test well before the trial in the instant case

occurred. See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 902 (9th

Cir. 2002) (adopting the Rogers standard). Moreover, upon our review, the

record has not been sufficiently developed to rule on these issues. See

Peterson v. Highland Music, Inc., 140 F.3d 1313, 1319 (9th Cir. 1998).

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FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC V. A.V.E.L.A. 13

under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.” Waits v. Frito-Lay,

Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1110 (9th Cir. 1992), abrogated on other

grounds by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components,

Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1385, 1391 (2014); see also White,

971 F.2d at 1400 (analyzing the level of recognition of the

celebrity’s “persona” to determine whether a likelihood of

confusion exists under § 1125(a)); Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc.,

125 F.3d 806, 809 (9th Cir. 1997) (analyzing § 1125(a)

claims actors who played characters in Cheers brought

against the creator of animatronic figures set in airport bars

modeled after the Cheers set).

B. There was sufficient evidence at trial to support

the jury’s finding that consumers would likely be

confused about whether Plaintiffs sponsored or

approved Defendants’ Marley products.2

1. Standard of review

We review de novo the denial of a renewed motion for

judgment as a matter of law. Escriba v. Foster Poultry

Farms, Inc., 743 F.3d 1236, 1242 (9th Cir. 2014). We must

sustain the verdict unless “the evidence, construed in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party, permits only one

2 We only entertain A.V.E.L.A. Defendants’ and Freeze’s sufficiency of

the evidence challenges on appeal, because Jem failed to file a postverdict motion for judgment as a matter of law—an “absolute prerequisite

to any appeal based on insufficiency of the evidence.” Nitco Holding

Corp. v. Boujikian, 491 F.3d 1086, 1089 (9th Cir. 2007).

Contrary to Hope Road’s argument, A.V.E.L.A. Defendants and

Freeze argued insufficiency of the evidence in their post-verdict Rule

50(b) motion and thus preserved the issue for appeal. See Components

Inc., 66 F.3d at 217.

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14 FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC V. A.V.E.L.A.

reasonable conclusion, and that conclusion is contrary to the

jury’s verdict.” Pavao v. Pagay, 307 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir.

2002). In determining whether the verdict is supported by

sufficient evidence, we do not weigh the evidence. Harper v.

City of L.A., 533 F.3d 1010, 1021 (9th Cir. 2008). Instead, we 

“must . . . draw all reasonable inferences in the favor of the

non-mover, and disregard all evidence favorable to the

moving party that the jury is not required to believe.” Id.

2. Analysis

“The ‘likelihood of confusion’ inquirygenerallyconsiders

whether a reasonably prudent consumer in the marketplace is

likely to be confused” as to the sponsorship or approval of the

goods bearing the marks at issue in the case.3 Rearden LLC

v. Rearden Commerce, Inc., 683 F.3d 1190, 1209 (9th Cir.

2012). In celebrity cases, the court generally applies eight

factors to determine likelihood of confusion:

1. [T]he level of recognition that the

[celebrity] has among the segment of the

society for whom the defendant’s product is

intended;

2. [T]he relatedness of the fame or success of

the [celebrity] to the defendant’s product;

3. [T]he similarity of the likeness used by the

defendant to the actual [celebrity];

4. [E]vidence of actual confusion;

3 At oral argument, Plaintiffs disclaimed any theory that consumers

would likely be confused as to the origin of Defendants’ goods.

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FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC V. A.V.E.L.A. 15

5. [M]arketing channels used;

6. [L]ikely degree of purchaser care;

7. [D]efendant’s intent on selecting the

[celebrity]; and

8. [L]ikelihood of expansion of the product

lines.

Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1007–08

(9th Cir. 2001). These factors “are not necessarily of equal

importance, nor do they necessarily apply to every case.” Id.

at 1008. “The list of factors is not a score-card—whether a

party ‘wins’ a majority of the factors is not the point. Nor

should ‘[t]he factors ... be rigidly weighed; we do not count

beans.’” Thane Int’l, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894,

901 (9th Cir. 2002), superseded by statute on other grounds,

Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 108-

312, 120 Stat. 1730 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125). Where the

plaintiff is not the celebrity himself, an additional factor

becomes relevant: the strength of association between the

mark and the plaintiff. Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 107 F.

Supp. 2d 1212, 1217 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (“Cairns II”).

Examining the record as a whole in light of these factors,

we cannot say that the evidence compels a finding contrary to

the jury’s verdict. See Pavao, 307 F.3d at 918.

First, Plaintiffs presented undisputed testimony to

establish a high level of recognition of Marley’s image

among Defendants’ target market. As to the second factor,

Plaintiffs also introduced testimony that Marley’s image has

long been associated with apparel. Marley used to sell his

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16 FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC V. A.V.E.L.A.

own merchandise, and his successors-in-interest have

continued to do so. No one disputes the third factor:

A.V.E.L.A. used actual photos of Marley on its merchandise.

The fourth factor, evidence of actual confusion, draws the

most fire from A.V.E.L.A. Defendants and Freeze in the form

of objections to the consumer confusion survey. The survey

collected data from 509 face-to-face interviews conducted by

professional interviewers with individuals in shopping malls.

The survey respondents were divided into a test group and a

control group. Interviewers showed the test group an actual

A.V.E.L.A. T-shirt bearing Bob Marley’s image and showed

the control group a T-shirt bearing the image of an

unrenowned African-Americanman with dreadlocks. Several

questions were put to both groups, including: “Who do you

think gave their permission or approval for this particular Tshirt to be made or put out?” Thirty-seven percent of the test

group answered that “Bob Marley/the person on the shirt or

his heirs, estate, or agents” gave their permission or approval

for the T-shirt to be made or put out. Twenty percent of the

control group answered the same. Many survey respondents

subsequently opined that the law required permission from

the person whose image appeared on the shirt. We need not

entangle ourselves in lay legal opinion. Rather, we look

solely at the former set of responses, which indicates actual

confusion. The latter responses only answer why some of

those surveyed were confused.

A.V.E.L.A. Defendants and Freeze argue that the “survey

questions were indefinite with respect to endorsement by

Marley. . . . A viable false endorsement claim should have an

identifiable person as the putative endorser.” A.V.E.L.A.

offers no precedent showing that it must be a single entity

that is falsely attributed as the party that approved the product

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FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC V. A.V.E.L.A. 17

or that the survey taker must be able to identify the party.

Thus, identifying Marley or whoever holds the rights to his

persona in the alternative does not render the survey data

useless or irrelevant. See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v.

Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149, 155 (9th Cir. 1963).

Rather, the imprecision of the data merely decreases its

probative value. Drawing all reasonable inferences in

Plaintiffs’ favor, Harper, 533 F.3d at 1021, the survey shows

some actual confusion. See Thane Int’l, Inc., 305 F.3d at

902–03. Accordingly, the jury could rely on the data (along

with evidence of the other factors) to find likelihood of

confusion. Evidence of actual confusion is relevant to

likelihood of confusion but not required in a false

endorsement claim. See Gracie, 217 F.3d at 1068 (holding

that a 15 U.S.C. § 1114 violation does not require evidence of

actual confusion, because only “likelihood of confusion” is

mentioned in the statute).4

Regarding the fifth factor, marketing channels used, Hope

Road introduced testimony that A.V.E.L.A.’s licensees sold

A.V.E.L.A.-licensed Marley products in some of the same

retail stores as Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ licensees—Wet Seal,

J.C. Penney, Target, and Walmart.

4 A.V.E.L.A. Defendants and Freeze also argue that the district court

abused its discretion by failing to reopen discovery so that they could

respond to the survey evidence. However, they “forfeit[ed their] right to

appellate review” of the magistrate judge’s nondispositive order denying

their motion to reopen, for failure to file any objections with the district

court. Simpson v. Lear Astronics Corp., 77 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir.

1996); Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 72(a); Advisory Committee Notes to Fed. R.

Civ. Proc. 72, 97 F.R.D. 165, 228 (Rule 72(a) applies to oral orders read

into the record.).

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18 FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC V. A.V.E.L.A.

Sixth, the likely low degree of purchaser care was also

supported by testimony at trial. Liza Acuna, A.V.E.L.A.’s

licensing agent, testified that she did not believe A.V.E.L.A.’s

licensed t-shirts priced $7.50 and $12.99 were expensive.

Kimberly Cauley, vice president of licensing at Freeze,

testified that Freeze’s Marley apparel priced $10.00 to $15.00

was “generally not expensive.” Jacob Goldszer of JGR Copa,

A.V.E.L.A.’s beach towel licensee, testified that beach towels

are “impulse item[s].” Heather Vogel, buyer for Target,

testified that graphic t-shirts priced $9.99 to $14.99 were “a

good value” and “an impulse purchase.” A.V.E.L.A.

Defendants and Freeze do not dispute that low prices imply

correspondingly low consumer care when purchasing

Defendants’ Marley products. See Cairns II, 107 F. Supp. 2d

at 1218.

With respect to the seventh factor, the salient inquiry is

not whether A.V.E.L.A. Defendants and Freeze knew their

actions were unlawful, but whether they intended to

“confus[e] consumers concerning the endorsement of [their

products].” White, 971 F.2d at 1400 (internal quotation mark

omitted). To that end, Plaintiffs showed the jury photographs

comparing an A.V.E.L.A.-licensed t-shirt to a t-shirt Zion had

been selling for ten years. Both t-shirts featured a single, softfocus image of Marley’s face with his mouth open slightly, as

if speaking. Both t-shirts are black, and overlay Rastifarian

green, yellow, and red in dithered stripes across Marley’s

face. Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, one

would infer that A.V.E.L.A. Defendants sought to associate

their product with Plaintiffs by intentionally creating similar

merchandise.5

5 The parties do not address the eighth Downing factor, likelihood of

expansion of the product lines.

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FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC V. A.V.E.L.A. 19

Because the celebrity himself, Marley, is not the plaintiff,

we must apply the additional factor–the strength of the

association between Marley and the Plaintiffs. That carries

greater weight where, as here, the evidence introduced to

support the Downing factors primarily demonstrates that the

celebrity himself sponsored or approved the defendants’

products. Under these circumstances, the additional factor

and the seventh factor wax in significance, because they link

likelihood of confusion to Plaintiffs. See Cairns II, 107 F.

Supp. 2d at 1217.

In Cairns II, the court held that Princess Diana’s image

was only weakly associated with the plaintiffs, largely

because Princess Diana’s image had not served a sourceidentifying (trademark) function during her life or after her

death. See id. “[P]ervasive unauthorized use of a celebrity’s

persona will tend to dull the popular perception that use of

that persona signifies an endorsement at all, weakening the

initial automatic association between the celebrity and his or

her estate.” Id. (alteration in original). The Cairns defendants

had been selling products bearing Princess Diana’s image

since before her death, and other parties had been doing the

same. Id. Critical to the analysis, Princess Diana “knew of the

vast commercial uses of her image” and “did nothing to

prevent others from using her image while she was alive.” Id.

Here, unlike Princess Diana, Marley sold merchandise

bearing his image during his lifetime, and his successors-ininterest have continued to do so, implying that his image

served (and continues to serve) a source-identifying function.

There has been significant unauthorized use of Marley’s

persona since his death. However, that use was not

“uncontested” as in Princess Diana’s situation. Plaintiffs

introduced uncontroverted evidence that they and their

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20 FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC V. A.V.E.L.A.

predecessors have sent more than 400 cease and desist letters

and filed more than 20 lawsuits. Thus, the jury was free to

infer that the source-identifying function of Marley’s persona

had not weakened to the extent that there was no likelihood

of confusion.

Also, Plaintiffs introduced evidence that Valencia

approached Rohan Marley, one of Bob Marley’s sons and an

owner of Hope Road, seeking rights to create Bob Marley

merchandise. These actions imply Hope Road was known to

be associated with Bob Marley’s image. Additionally, Scott

Holroyd, general manager at Balzout (a former A.V.E.L.A.

licensee), testified in a video deposition played at trial that it

was “common understanding in the licensing industry” that

Hope Road owned the rights to Marley. Kimberly Cauley,

Freeze’s vice president of licensing, also stated that she knew

of Zion’s license to Marley’s persona based on “market

knowledge.”

C. The false endorsement claim does not fail for lack

of an endorsement.

Defendants argue that the 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) claim fails,

because Marley’s image needed to have been used in

connection with a separate product or service to constitute an

“endorsement.” As Plaintiffs point out, the statute does not

mention “endorsement.” Rather, we commonly call § 1125(a)

claims “false endorsement claims” because theyoften involve

likelihood of confusion as to a plaintiff’s “sponsorship or

approval” of the defendant’s product. See § 1125(a)(1)(A).

Rather than the lack of the word “endorsement,” it is the

statutory phrase referring to a defendant’s use of the mark “on

. . . any goods,” § 1125(a)(1) (emphasis added), that requires

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FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC V. A.V.E.L.A. 21

us to reject Defendants’ argument. The “goods” in the phrase

“on any goods” refers to the goods consumers may

mistakenly think are approved by the owner of the mark. See

id. Thus, the plain text of the statute establishes that a viable

false endorsement claim does not require that the mark be

used in connection with separate goods to promote the

purchase of those separate goods—but may be used directly

on the defendant’s goods. See id.; Wendt, 125 F.3d at 812–14

(denying defendants’ summary judgment motion on a

§ 1125(a) claim arising from the placement of animatronic

robots resembling Cheers actors in defendants’ bars to

purportedly imply the actors’ endorsement of defendants’

bars).

Here, the fact that Marley’s image appears directly on

Defendants’ merchandise does not preclude relief under

§ 1125(a). Instead, as in any § 1125(a) claim, the particular

use and placement of the mark is probative of likelihood of

confusion. As discussed above, the jury found Defendants’

use was likely to confuse, and we may not disturb that

finding.

D. The judgment does not overextend the Lanham

Act by creating a federal right of publicity.

A.V.E.L.A. Defendants and Freeze argue that allowing a

plaintiff to vindicate a 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) claim predicated

on the use of a deceased celebrity’s persona essentially

creates a federal right of publicity.

Assuming Congress did not intend the Lanham Act to

protect such rights, the § 1125(a) claim in this case is not

tantamount to a federal right of publicity. State publicity right

claims protect a plaintiff when the defendant uses the

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22 FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC V. A.V.E.L.A.

plaintiff’s identity for commercial advantage, without

permission. See e.g., Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp.,

85 F.3d 407, 414 (9th Cir. 1996) (analyzing California law).

However, § 1125(a) claims require an additional element—

that the use be likely to confuse as to the sponsorship or

approval of a defendant’s goods. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). We

have previously distinguished between publicity right claims

and § 1125(a) claims on the basis of this additional element.

See Abdul-Jabbar, 85 F.3d at 414; c.f. Cairns v. Franklin

Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1149 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Cairns III”)

(“Under the law of false endorsement, likelihood of customer

confusion is the determinative issue.”). Moreover, the Second

Circuit agrees that this distinction is significant. Rogers, 875

F.2d at 1004 (“Because the right of publicity, unlike the

Lanham Act, has no likelihood of confusion requirement, it

is potentially more expansive than the Lanham Act.”).

A.V.E.L.A. Defendants and Freeze assert that “the

Lanham Act false association claim is essentially a federal

right of publicity claim in disguise,” because consumers

would always “associate a deceased celebrity’s image with

that of his or her estate.” But a plaintiff must show more than

mere association to succeed in a false endorsement claim. See

Downing, 265 F.3d at 1007–08. As discussed above, we

cannot disturb the jury’s finding regarding likelihood of

confusion, but the outcome of this case is in part a function of

defenses expressly waived by Defendants. We are not in the

position to assess the Defendants’ litigation strategy.

Contrary to their assertion, our decision to affirm the jury’s

verdict does not create a federal right of publicity.

To the extent A.V.E.L.A. Defendants and Freeze argue

that Congress generally did not intend § 1125(a) to cover

claims brought bycelebrities’ estates or successors-in-interest

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FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC V. A.V.E.L.A. 23

based on celebrity persona, the legislative history does not

demonstrate limitation of such claims. Further, this court

already treats a celebrity’s persona as identifiable intellectual

property protectable under the Lanham Act. See White,

971 F.2d at 1400. This property exists whether the holder is

the celebrity or a successor in interest. Thus, the fact of the

celebrity’s death does not preclude a § 1125(a) claim. Rather,

the “determinative issue” (in any § 1125(a) claim) is

likelihood of confusion. See Cairns III, 292 F.3d at 1149.

II. The district court did not err in awarding Plaintiffs

$348,543.00 (A.V.E.L.A.’s, Jem’s, and Freeze’s total

net profits).

15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) provides:

When a violation of any right of the registrant

of a mark registered in the Patent and

Trademark Office, a violation under section

1125(a) or (d) of this title, or a willful

violation under section 1125(c) of this title,

shall have been established in any civil action

arising under this chapter, the plaintiff shall

be entitled, subject to the provisions of

sections 1111 and 1114 of this title, and

subject to the principles of equity, to recover

(1) defendant's profits, (2) any damages

sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs of

the action. The court shall assess such profits

and damages or cause the same to be assessed

under its direction. In assessing profits the

plaintiff shall be required to prove defendant’s

sales only; defendant must prove all elements

of cost or deduction claimed. . . . If the court

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shall find that the amount of the recovery

based on profits is either inadequate or

excessive the court may in its discretion enter

judgment for such sum as the court shall find

just, according to the circumstances of the

case. Such sum . . . shall constitute

compensation and not a penalty.

An award of profits “is not automatic” upon a finding of

infringement. Lindy Pen Co. v. Bic Pen Corp., 982 F.2d 1400,

1405 (9th Cir. 1993), superseded by statute on other grounds,

Trademark Amendments Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-43,

113 Stat. 218. Rather, profits “must be granted in light of

equitable considerations.” Id. In seeking to achieve equity

between the parties, the court must fashion a remedy wherein

the defendant may “not retain the fruits, if any, of

unauthorized trademark use or continue that use [and the]

plaintiff is not . . . [given] a windfall.” Bandag, Inc. v. Al

Bolser’s Tire Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d 903, 918 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

Awarding profits “is proper only where the defendant is

‘attempting to gain the value of an established name of

another.’” Lindy Pen Co., 982 F.2d at 1406 (quoting Maier

Brewing Co. v. Fleischmann Distilling Co., 390 F.2d 117, 123

(9th Cir. 1968)). “Willful infringement carries a connotation

of deliberate intent to deceive.” Id. Generally, “deliberate,

false, misleading, or fraudulent . . . conduct . . . meets this

standard.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

“Willfulness . . . ‘require[s] a connection between a

defendant’s awareness of its competitors and its actions at

those competitors’ expense.’” Id. (quoting ALPO Petfoods,

Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 913 F.2d 958, 966 (D.C. Cir.

1990)).

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FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC V. A.V.E.L.A. 25

A. There was sufficient evidence to support the

finding of willfulness as to Freeze.

Freeze claims that there was insufficient evidence to

support the jury’s finding that Freeze violated 15 U.S.C.

§ 1125(a) willfully, requiring reversal of the district court’s

order disgorging Freeze’s profits. Freeze is incorrect.

At trial, Kim Cauley, vice president of licensing for

Freeze, testified as follows: Before Freeze began selling

Marley merchandise, Cauley received a phone call from

Doreen Crujeiras, a licensing agent for Hope Road, who

notified her that “Hope Road or the Marley family owned the

rights in Bob Marley.” Crujeiras said that A.V.E.L.A. did not

have the right to use Marley’s name and likeness. Cauley also

knew that Zion had a license to sell Bob Marleymerchandise,

and this awareness predated Freeze’s first sales of Marley

merchandise. Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to Plaintiffs, Cauley’s testimony demonstrates

Freeze’s “awareness of its competitors and its actions at those

competitors’ expense.” Lindy Pen Co., 982 F.2d at 1406

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also E. & J. Gallo

Winery v. Consorzio del Gallo Nero, 782 F. Supp. 472, 475

(N.D. Cal. 1992) (“Use of an infringing mark, in the face of

warnings about potential infringement, is strong evidence of

willful infringement.”).

B. There is no Seventh Amendment right to have a

jury calculate profits.

A jury found Defendants had violated § 1125(a). Over

Plaintiffs’ objection, the trial judge calculated A.V.E.L.A.’s,

Jem’s, and Freeze’s net profits from Marley merchandise

based on the evidence the parties submitted. Plaintiffs claim

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that this procedure violated their Seventh Amendment right

to a jury trial, because the Seventh Amendment necessitates

a jury calculation of profits to be disgorged.6 We review the

question of entitlement to a jury trial de novo. S.E.C. v. Rind,

991 F.2d 1486, 1493 (9th Cir. 1993).

The Seventh Amendment guarantees a litigant’s right to

a jury trial on “suits at common law.” U.S. Const. amend.

VII. “Although the thrust of the Amendment was to preserve

the right to jury trial as it existed in 1791, it has long been

settled that the right extends beyond the common-law forms

of action recognized at that time.” Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S.

189, 193 (1974). “Suits at common law” include statutory

claims that are legal (as opposed to equitable). Feltner, 523

U.S. at 348. To determine whether a particular claim invokes

this right, we (1) “must ‘compare the statutory action to the

18th-century actions brought in the courts of England prior to

merger of the courts of law and equity,” and (2) “must

‘examine the remedy sought and determine whether it is legal

or equitable in nature.’” Rind, 991 F.2d at 1493 (quoting Tull

v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417–18 (1987)). “The second

inquiry is more important.” Id.

6 Plaintiffs do not argue that the trial judge violated § 1117 by

calculating the profits himself. Indeed, § 1117(a) vests “the court”

(meaning the judge) with the power to assess profits. See Feltner v.

Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 346 (1998) (The word

“court” means “judge” when used “in contexts generally thought to confer

authority on a judge, rather than a jury,” e.g., granting injunctions.);

15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(iv) (“The court may also grant injunctive relief

. . . .”); 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d) (authorizing “the court” to grant an order

“providing for the seizure of goods and counterfeit marks” and requiring

such order to contain findings of fact and conclusions of law).

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FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC V. A.V.E.L.A. 27

If the overall claim “belongs in the law category, we then

ask whether the particular trial decision must fall to the jury

in order to preserve the substance of the common-law right as

it existed in 1791” (when the Seventh Amendment was

ratified). City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey,

Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 708 (1999). We consider whether, in

1791, juries typically decided the issue in question (or an

analogous one). Id. at 718. If “history does not provide a clear

answer, we look to precedent and functional considerations.”

Id.

In applying this framework, we keep in mind that the

narrow Seventh Amendment right “preserve[s] the basic

institution of jury trial in only its most fundamental

elements.” Tull, 481 U.S. at 426 (quoting Galloway v. United

States, 319 U.S. 372, 392 (1943)). Accordingly, “[o]nly those

incidents which are regarded as fundamental, as inherent in

and of the essence of the system of trial by jury, are placed

beyond the reach of the legislature.” Id.

A claim for disgorgement of profits under § 1117(a) is

equitable, not legal. Litigants filed trademark-like actions in

“deceit” prior to 1791, but these suits were rare. See Mark A.

Thurman, Ending the Seventh Amendment Confusion: A

Critical Analysis of the Right to a Jury Trial in Trademark

Cases, 11 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 1, 60–63 (2002) (only three

known cases prior to 1791—two in courts of law, one in court

of equity). While this historical record illuminates little, the

current law recognizes that actions for disgorgement of

improper profits are equitable in nature. See Chauffeurs,

Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558,

570 (1990); Tull, 481 U.S. at 424; City of Monterey, 526 U.S.

at 710 (equitable monetary remedies focus on “what . . . the

[defendant] gained”); Reebok Int’l, Ltd., 970 F.2d at 559 (“An

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28 FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC V. A.V.E.L.A.

accounting of profits under § 1117(a) is not synonymous with

an award of monetary damages: [a]n accounting for profits

. . . is an equitable remedy subject to the principles of equity.”

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

Contrary to Plaintiffs’ argument, Dairy Queen, Inc. v.

Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962) does not broadly hold that a

Lanham Act claim for disgorgement of profits is a legal

claim. Rather, the Supreme Court characterizes the Dairy

Queen claim as a legal claim for damages (not disgorgement

of profits). See Feltner, 523 U.S. at 346.

Moreover, even if the claim were legal, the specific issue

of profit determination cannot be said to be traditionally tried

to a jury. See City of Monterey, 526 U.S. at 718. Again, the

slim history of pre-1791, trademark-like cases certainly does

not support that notion. Turning to current law, § 1117’s

language allows judges to determine the amount of profits,

which judges regularly do. Consequently, the determination

of profits under § 1117 is not “fundamental, . . . inherent in

and of the essence of the system of trial by jury.” Tull,

481 U.S. at 426.

C. The district court did not err in calculating profits.

“[A]ny decision concerning the awarding of an

accounting of profits remedy should remain within the

discretion of the trial court.” Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Baccarat

Clothing Co., 692 F.2d 1272, 1275 (9th Cir. 1982).

Accordingly, we will not disturb the district court’s decision

“unless there is a ‘definite and firm conviction that the court

below committed a clear error of judgement in the conclusion

it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors.’” Id.

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FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC V. A.V.E.L.A. 29

(quoting Chism v. Nat’l Heritage Life Ins. Co., 637 F.2d

1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1981).

The trademark holder has the burden to prove the

defendant infringer’s gross revenue from the infringement.

Lindy Pen Co., 982 F.2d at 1408. Then the burden shifts to

the defendant infringer to prove expenses that should be

deducted from the gross revenue to arrive at the defendant

infringer’s lost profits. See Experience Hendrix v.

Hendrixlicensing.com, Nos. 11-35858, 11-35872, slip op. at

27 (9th Cir. Aug. 8, 2014).

1. A.V.E.L.A.’s deductions

A.V.E.L.A. claims that the district court abused its

discretion by not allowing deductions reflecting (1) a 40%

royalty fee paid to V. International, which A.V.E.L.A.

claimed equaled $222,771.00; and (2) marketing, travel,

overhead, and trade show expenses connectedwith promoting

Marley merchandise. Not so. Acting within its discretion, the

district court held that A.V.E.L.A. failed to meet its burden to

prove these deductions. The royalty fee arrangement was not

an arms’ length transaction. The sole shareholder and

employee of V. International was Valencia’s girlfriend, Liza

Acuna. Moreover, the documentary evidence leaves

uncertainty as to the amount of royalty fees paid. Regarding

the other expenses, Plaintiffs argue A.V.E.L.A. did not

produce sufficient documentation to prove the specific

amounts. A.V.E.L.A. does not attempt to rebut any of these

arguments. Given these doubts, the district court was within

its discretion to deny these deductions.

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2. Jem’s deductions

First, Plaintiffs claim the district court erred by reopening

discovery to allow Jem to produce proof of its deductible

costs after trial, when Jem had only produced an unsupported

summary document of its costs prior to trial. While Plaintiffs

might consider this unfair, the district court’s decision was

within its broad discretion. Plaintiffs cite no legal support

showing otherwise.

Second, Plaintiffs claim that Jem introduced insufficient

supporting documentation to sustain its burden to prove that

it paid salespersons $130,271.47. The district court did not

abuse its discretion by relying on the report by Jem’s

controller, Linda Lyth. Lyth testified in her declaration as an

expert, and in general, experts need not disclose all

underlying documents on which they rely. See Fed. R. Evid.

705.7 For the same reason, we reject Plaintiffs’ objection to

Jem’s Gross Margin Invoice Summary Register.

Third, Plaintiffs challenge the $72,989.64 deduction for

discounts given to retailers. The district court considered

Jem’s agreements with retailers showing their respective

discounts. The dollar value of retailer discounts was reached

by multiplying these rates by the total sales. Contrary to

Plaintiffs’ argument, Jem did not need to submit proof that

the retailers used their discounts, when there was no evidence

that they did not do so. It would be reasonable to infer that the

retailers took advantage of wholesale markdowns when they

7 While Plaintiffs claim Lyth “admitted she had no personal knowledge

of [the commission] payments,” the record evidence they cite contains no

such admission.

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FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC V. A.V.E.L.A. 31

contracted for them, a matter within the district court’s

discretion. See Playboy Enters., Inc., 692 F.2d at 1275.

Finally, Plaintiffs argue that Jem did not prove that the

$0.80-per-garment processing cost Jem paid its affiliate (Jem

Equipment) was competitive. However, the law does not

require that an infringer prove its expenses were competitive

in addition to proving it actually incurred them.

3. Increased profits

Plaintiffs also argue that the district court abused its

discretion bydeclining to award increased profits. The district

court has discretion to increase the profit award above the net

profits proven “[i]f the court shall find . . . the amount of the

recovery . . . inadequate.” 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). It must apply

“principles of equity,” id., and ensure that the defendant “may

not retain the fruits, if any, of unauthorized trademark use or

continue that use [and the] plaintiff is not . . . [given] a

windfall,” Bandag, Inc., 750 F.2d at 918. “The Lanham Act

allows an award of profits only to the extent the award

‘shall constitute compensation and not a penalty.’”

TrafficSchool.com, Inc. v. Edriver Inc., 653 F.3d 820, 831

(9th Cir. 2011) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a)).

The district court ought to tread lightly when deciding

whether to award increased profits, because granting an

increase could easily transfigure an otherwise-acceptable

compensatory award into an impermissible punitive measure.

See Skydive Ariz., Inc. v. Quattrocchi, 673 F.3d 1105,

1114–15 (9th Cir. 2012). Generally, actual, proven profits

will adequately compensate the plaintiff. Because the profit

disgorgement remedy is measured by the defendant’s gain,

the district court should award actual, proven profits unless

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the defendant infringer gained more from the infringement

than the defendant’s profits reflect.

Plaintiffs have not presented evidence or argument to

inspire a “definite and firm conviction” that the district court

“committed a clear error of judgement,” Playboy Enters.,

Inc., 692 F.2d at 1275, in declining to award increased

profits. While Plaintiffs allude to Defendants accruing

goodwill from their infringement, they cite no supporting

evidence. Similarly, Plaintiffs only cursorily explain how

putative sales abroad might fall within the Lanham Act’s

coverage under Ocean Garden, Inc. v. Marktrade Co.,

953 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1991). We will not manufacture

arguments on their behalf or pick through the record without

further direction. See Greenwood v. FAA, 28 F.3d 971, 977

(9th Cir. 1994). Nor do we find compelling the evidence

Plaintiffs cited to show that Defendants concealed some of

their profits.

Given the district court’s “wide scope of discretion . . . in

. . . fashioning . . . a remedy,” Faberge, Inc. v. Saxony Prods.,

Inc., 605 F.2d 426, 429 (9th Cir. 1979) (internal quotation

marks omitted), it did not err by denying Plaintiffs an

increased award of profits.

III. The district court did not err in ordering

A.V.E.L.A. Defendants to pay attorneys’ fees.

“The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable

attorney fees to the prevailing party.” 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).

We review an attorneys’ fee award for abuse of discretion,

except that “the district court’s legal determination that an

action is ‘exceptional’ under the Lanham Act” we review de

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FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC V. A.V.E.L.A. 33

novo. Secalt S.A. v. Wuxi Shenxi Constr. Mach. Co., 668 F.3d

677, 687 (9th Cir. 2012).

A. Prevailing party

The district court determined that Plaintiffs were the

prevailing party. A party is a prevailing party for purposes of

an attorneys’ fee award if it “achieved a material alteration in

the legal relationship of the parties that is judicially

sanctioned.” Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr., 589 F.3d at

1030 (internal quotation marks omitted).8

“The material

alteration in the legal relationship of the parties must be relief

that the would-be prevailing party sought.” Id. A party need

not succeed in all of its claims to be the prevailing party. San

Diego Police Officers’ Ass’n v. San Diego City Emps.’ Ret.

Sys., 568 F.3d 725, 741 (9th Cir. 2009). Because Plaintiffs

obtained an injunction against all Defendants and

disgorgement of profits from A.V.E.L.A., Jem, and Freeze,

Plaintiffs obtained “a material alteration in the legal

relationship of the parties that is judicially sanctioned.” See

Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr., 589 F.3d at 1030.9 Thus,

the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding

Plaintiffs were the prevailing party.

8

 The term “prevailing party” is interpreted consistently throughout the

U.S. Code. Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr., 589 F.3d at 1030.

9 Also, the record does not support A.V.E.L.A. Defendants’surmise that

the district court relied on a media headline stating Plaintiffs were

prevailing parties in making its determination.

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34 FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC V. A.V.E.L.A.

B. Exceptional case

The district court also held that the instant action was an

exceptional case within the meaning of § 1117(a) as to all

Defendants. A case is considered exceptional “when the

infringement is malicious, fraudulent, deliberate, or willful.”

Gracie, 217 F.3d at 1068 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Egregious conduct is not required. TrafficSchool.com, Inc.,

653 F.3d at 833. Nor is bad faith. See Earthquake Sound

Corp. v. Bumper Indus., 352 F.3d 1210, 1218 (9th Cir. 2003).

We consider the relief obtained, see TrafficSchool.com, Inc.,

653 F.3d at 832, and whether the relevant area of law was

unclear when the defendant’s conduct occurred, Tamko

Roofing Prods., Inc. v. Ideal Roofing Co., 282 F.3d 23, 32–33

(1st Cir. 2002).

The district court properly considered the relevant

evidence and held that Defendants had acted willfully. See id.

at 31. A.V.E.L.A. Defendants argue that the uncertainty of

the law makes A.V.E.L.A.’s infringement not willful. In this

case, the uncertainty of the law weighs in A.V.E.L.A.

Defendants’ favor, but that consideration is only one aspect

of the willfulness inquiry. There was significant evidence that

A.V.E.L.A. Defendants were aware their conduct conflicted

with Plaintiffs’ rights. Rohan Marley testified that Valencia

(president and CEO of both A.V.E.L.A. and X One X)

approached him seeking a license to sell Marleymerchandise,

which neither Rohan nor Hope Road granted. Roberto

Rabanne, a photographer who took pictures of Bob Marley,

testified that Valencia had convinced him to write a false

email to help Valencia negotiate with the Marley family for

a license. The email falsely stated that Rabanne had used

photographs of Marley on merchandise during Marley’s

lifetime. Rabanne also testified that he refused Valencia’s

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FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC V. A.V.E.L.A. 35

request to backdate a 2006 photograph licensing agreement

between them to 2003 or 2004. According to Rabanne,

Valencia claimed that backdating the agreement would help

him in “negotiations.” Valencia also asked Rabanne to delete

emails from him and files on his hard drive and said he would

flood the market with Marley merchandise so that Plaintiffs

could not use the photographs of Marley anymore. Liza

Acuna, A.V.E.L.A.’s licensing agent and Valencia’s

girlfriend, testified that she had known since 2005 that Zion

had the license for Marley. Thus, even considering the

uncertainty of the law, this conduct exhibits a subjective

belief that A.V.E.L.A. Defendants’ conduct infringed 

Plaintiffs’ intellectual property rights.

A.V.E.L.A. Defendants also assert that the district court

erred in finding the case “exceptional,” because (1) Plaintiffs

achieved only limited success, and (2) Plaintiffs’ other

awards make A.V.E.L.A.’s infringement unprofitable. We

reject these contentions. While it is true that Plaintiffs only

prevailed on two of their five claims, they successfully

enjoined Defendants from any future merchandising of

Marley’s image and disgorged profits. The five claims were

merely different means to that end.

Regarding the next issue, whether A.V.E.L.A.’s conduct

was rendered unprofitable is inapposite. The attorneys’ fee

award served the separate purpose of encouraging the

enforcement of trademark rights by more fully compensating

Plaintiffs. See id. at 34. Thus, we affirm the district court’s

award of attorneys’ fees against A.V.E.L.A. Defendants.

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36 FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC V. A.V.E.L.A.

C. Declining to award attorneys’ fees as to Jem and

Freeze

Plaintiffs claim that the district court abused its discretion

by determining the case “exceptional . . . as to each

Defendant” but then failing to assess attorneys’ fees against

Jem and Freeze. However, the plain language of the statute

allows the court to choose whether to award fees, even after

finding the case exceptional. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (“The

court in exceptional cases may award . . . fees .”). The fact

that “in exceptional cases” precedes “may” means that the

case must be exceptional for attorneys’s fees to be awarded,

but in an exceptional case, the district court “may” (or may

not) award fees.

Plaintiffs also argue that the district court’s decision that

the evidence of willfulness was sufficient to support the

jury’s finding and the court’s statement that the evidence of

Jem’s willfulness was weak were in conflict. Plaintiffs are

wrong, because the sufficiency of the evidence standard is

lower than the standard for showing a case is exceptional. See

Harper, 533 F.3d at 1021. Thus, the court consistently

concluded that evidence of Jem’s willfulness was sufficient,

yet too weak to merit an award of attorneys’ fees as to Jem

and Freeze.

Plaintiffs seeminglyclaim that the district court’s decision

to not grant fees as to Jem and Freeze was illogical or

inconsistent with its decision to grant fees as to A.V.E.L.A.

Defendants. Plaintiffs claim that some of the bases on which

the district court relied to deny fees as to Jem and Freeze also

existed with respect to A.V.E.L.A. Defendants (prevailing on

“one Lanham Act claim,” other monetary awards serve

different purposes than an award of attorneys’ fees).

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FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC V. A.V.E.L.A. 37

However, the mere fact that the district court, after weighting

the various considerations, awarded fees as to the A.V.E.L.A.

Defendants does not demonstrate that the district court was

required to award fees as to the other Defendants. On balance,

theweightier evidence of A.V.E.L.A. Defendants’ willfulness

justified an award of fees. Moreover, the district court pointed

out that the evidence that Jem and Freeze caused actual

damages was comparatively weak.

Plaintiffs’ argument that the district court should not have

relied on the award of profits to deny fees as to Jem and

Freeze has some merit. A monetary award should support the

decision to assess fees. See TrafficSchool.com, Inc., 653 F.3d

at 832. However, the district court discussed the weight of the

evidence of willfulness and actual damages at length and only

mentioned profits briefly, apparently considering the

underlying actions of the parties to be the main reason to

deny fees as to Jem and Freeze. Consequently, the district

court did not abuse its discretion in denying attorneys’ fees as

to Jem and Freeze.

IV. The district court did not err in granting summary

judgment for Defendants on Plaintiffs’ Nevada

right of publicity claim.

The district court granted summary judgment in

Defendants’ favor on the basis that Plaintiffs knew of a thirdparty’s unauthorized commercial use of Marley’s publicity

right more than six months before Plaintiffs registered this

right with the Nevada Secretary of State. We review the

district court’s interpretation of a state statute de novo. Wetzel

v. Lou Ehlers Cadillac Group Long Term Disability Ins.

Program, 222 F.3d 643, 646 (9th Cir. 2000).

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Nevada law establishes “a right of publicity in the name,

voice, signature, photograph or likeness of every person,”

which lasts 50 years after the person’s death. Nev. Rev. Stat.

§ 597.790.1. “Any commercial use by another of the name,

voice, signature, photograph or likeness of a person requires

the written consent of that person or his or her successor in

interest,” id. § 597.790.2, unless the person whose right of

publicity is at issue dies and has no successors in interest. Id.

§ 597.800.2.10 The right of publicity “is freely transferable.”

Id. § 597.800.1.

“A successor in interest . . . of a deceased person may file

in the Office of the Secretary of State . . . a verified

application for registration of his or her claim.” Id.

§ 597.800.3 (emphasis added). “A successor in interest . . . of

a deceased person may not assert any right against any

unauthorized commercial use of the deceased person’s name,

voice, signature, photograph or likeness that begins before the

filing of an application to register his or her claim.” Id.

§ 597.800.4.

A person, firm or corporation seeking to use

the name, voice, signature, photograph or

likeness of a deceased person for commercial

purposes must first make a reasonable effort,

in good faith, to discover the identity of any

person who qualifies as a successor in interest

to the deceased person. A person claiming to

be a successor in interest to a deceased person

must, within 6 months after the date he or she

10 There are also exceptions to the requirement of written consent for

certain types of commercial use, see § 597.790.2, but those are not at issue

here.

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FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC V. A.V.E.L.A. 39

becomes aware or should reasonably have

become aware of an unauthorized commercial

use of the deceased person’s name, voice,

signature, photograph or likeness, register a

claim with the Secretary of State pursuant to

subsection 3. Failure to register shall be

deemed a waiver of any right of publicity.

Id. § 597.800.5 (emphasis added). The district court relied on

this last sentence to hold that Plaintiffs had waived Marley’s

publicity rights as against any defendant for any unauthorized

use. Plaintiffs became aware of the unauthorized use of

Marley’s publicity rights by someone other than Defendants,

and Plaintiffs failed to register their claim within the next six

months. Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in its

interpretation of the statute, because the six-month

registration requirement applies with respect to each

unauthorized use, and Plaintiffs registered their rights either

before or within six months after learning of Defendants’

unauthorized use.

There is no Nevada case law interpreting this registration

timeliness requirement. Thus, we must seek to “predict how

the [Nevada] high court would resolve” the matter. Giles v.

Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 494 F.3d 865, 872 (9th Cir.

2007). Accordingly, we must construe the statute to give

effect to the legislature’s intent, beginning with the plain

statutory text, and giving effect to any unambiguous

language. Richardson Constr., Inc. v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist.,

156 P.3d 21, 23 (Nev. 2007). If the statutory language is

ambiguous, the panel should “examine the statute in the

context of the entire statutory scheme, reason, and public

policy to effect a construction that reflects the Legislature’s

intent.” Id.

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Beginning with the text at issue, “[f]ailure to register shall

be deemed a waiver of any right of publicity” is

unambiguous. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 597.800.5. “[A]ny right

of publicity” indicates that the forfeiture is broad, not limited

to the particular unauthorized use a plaintiff became aware of

six months or more before. Even assuming ambiguity, the

context, reason, and public policy align with the district

court’s interpretation. Section 597.800.3 provides for

permissive registration without reference to the successor in

interest’s knowledge of any unauthorized use. The successor

in interest may only enforce its rights with respect to

unauthorized use that occurred after registration. Id.

§ 597.800.4. However, upon learning of an unauthorized use,

registration becomes mandatory. See id. § 597.800.5. Thus,

the permissive and mandatory descriptions are in harmony, as

they apply to different situations. Read together, they

encourage successors in interest to register sooner rather than

later.

Plaintiffs argue that the legislature only intended to create

a system to perfect successor rights in § 597.800.3 through .5.

If this were so, the difference in language would not make

sense. Section 597.800.4 penalizes failure to register by not

allowing the successor to “assert any right” against

unauthorized use that occurred prior to registration. In

contrast, § 597.800.5 penalizes failure to register by deeming

a “waiver of any right” of publicity. If the legislature meant

that the successor merely could not assert its right (but still

retains it), it seems the legislature would have used language

parallel to that in § 597.800.4. Moreover, § 597.800.5 refers

to any “right of publicity,” implying the right itself, not the

right to assert claims based on the right of publicity.

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FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC V. A.V.E.L.A. 41

Plaintiffs also argue that the purpose of the statute is to

bestow rights, not forfeit them. Of course this is broadly true.

However, the legislature apparently intended to limit a

successor’s right. The successor’s right extinguishes 50 years

after the person’s death. Id. § 597.790.1. Also, living persons

enforcing their own rights to publicity do not ever have to

register their rights. See id. § 597.790–.800. Thus, the sixmonth registration requirement is in line with the qualified

nature of rights allowed successors under the statute.

V. There was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s

verdict on the interference claim.

Liability for the tort of intentional interference

with prospective economic advantage requires

proof of the following elements: (1) a

prospective contractual relationship between

the plaintiff and a third party; (2) knowledge

by the defendant of the prospective

relationship; (3) intent to harm the plaintiff by

preventing the relationship; (4) the absence of

privilege or justification by the defendant; and

(5) actual harm to the plaintiff as a result of

the defendant’s conduct.

Wichinsky v. Mosa, 847 P.2d 727, 729–30 (Nev. 1993).

With respect to Plaintiffs’ prospective relationship with

Walmart, A.V.E.L.A.Defendants claim there was insufficient

evidence to support the fifth element—whether Plaintiffs

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42 FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC V. A.V.E.L.A.

were harmed as a result of A.V.E.L.A. Defendants’ conduct.11

At trial, Doreen Crujeiras, a licensing agent for Hope Road,

testified to the following: Hybrid was an apparel

manufacturer and one of Hope Road’s Marley merchandise

licensees that generally sold apparel at K-Mart, Target, and

Walmart. Hybrid “lost” an order “intended for Walmart.”

Jem, a licensee of A.V.E.L.A., “got the order instead.” This

order was “100,000 units of T-shirts and 100,000 units of

hoodies.” The gross sales would have been “like 1.8 million

dollar[s],” and Hope Road’s royalty on those sales would

have been “about $250,000.”

A.V.E.L.A. Defendants do not assert that they offered

evidence contradicting Crujeiras’s testimony on this point.

Rather, theyargue that they impeached Crujeiras’s testimony.

Crujeiras admitted she could not remember “exactlywho told

[her]” about the lost order. Also, defense counsel asked

Crujeiras, “[Y]ou don’t have any knowledge that A.V.E.L.A.

or anybody from the defendants went in and undercut

Hybrid’s efforts to sell to Walmart[?]” Crujeiras answered,

“Well, I did have that one conversation with the owner of

Hybrid. It was a conference call that I participated on. And he

was very upset and he did say that, you know, it was a

problem for him.” Crujeiras’s cryptic answer could give rise

to an inference that she had no basis for believing Defendants

were responsible for the lost order, and that she actively

avoided admitting that. However, her answer could also be

understood to mean that A.V.E.L.A. Defendants’ interference

was the “problem” to which the owner of Hybrid referred.

11 In their opening brief, A.V.E.L.A. Defendants only challenged

sufficiency of the evidence as to Walmart on this basis. Thus, claims of

insufficient evidence based on other elements of the tort are waived. See

Kim v. Kang, 154 F.3d 996, 1000 (9th Cir. 1998).

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Without more, this vague answer on cross-examination does

not establish that Crujeiras’s uncontradicted testimony was

“sheer surmise and conjecture,” as A.V.E.L.A. Defendants

claim, because the evidence must be “construed in the light

most favorable to [Plaintiffs].” See Harper, 533 F.3d at 1021.

A.V.E.L.A. Defendants also argue that Crujeiras’s

testimony was biased. This argument fails, because we may

not assess the credibility of witnesses in determining whether

sufficient evidence exists. See id. A.V.E.L.A. Defendants cite

no authority for their argument that Hope Road needed to

state the exact amount of lost royalties in order for its

evidence that Hope Road was actually damaged to be

sufficient. Moreover, providing sufficient evidence that Hope

Road lost royalties from a prospective deal, no matter how

much the loss equaled, would satisfy this inquiry. The amount

of the loss is necessary for damage calculation, not proving

Hope Road was “actual[ly] harm[ed].” See Wichinsky,

847 P.2d at 730. The evidence was sufficient to support the

challenged element of actual harm.12

VI. The district court did not err in granting

Defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of

law on the issue of punitive damages.

We review de novo the district court’s order granting a

motion for judgment as a matter of law. Saman v. Robbins,

173 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 1999). Defendants moved for

12 Because there was sufficient evidence with respect to the prospective

business relationship with Walmart, we need not reach A.V.E.L.A.

Defendants’ other arguments regarding Wet Seal, JGR Copa, Target, and

Ecko. The interference claim only requires an expectancy of a single

business relationship. See Wichinsky, 847 P.2d at 729–30.

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judgment as a matter of law at trial. The district court granted

the motion as to Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages and

denied as to Plaintiffs’ claim for intentional interference with

a prospective business relationship. Plaintiffs first argue that

this decision was inconsistent, because both claims relied on

the same evidence of Defendants’ intent.

Punitive damages require a showing by clear and

convincing evidence that Defendants acted with “oppression,

fraud or malice, express or implied.” Nev. Rev. Stat.

§ 42.005.1. “Malice, express or implied” is defined as

“conduct which is intended to injure a person or despicable

conduct which is engaged in with a conscious disregard of the

rights or safety of others.” Id. § 42.001. The intentional

interference claim requires a plaintiff to prove that the

defendant “inten[ded] to harm the plaintiff by preventing the

relationship.” Wichinsky, 847 P.2d at 729–30. However, the

burden of proof for an intentional interference claim is

preponderance, not clear and convincing. See Holliday v.

McMullen, 756 P.2d 1179, 1180 (Nev. 1988) (per curiam). In

a case analyzing intentional interference with a prospective

business relationship, the Nevada Supreme Court held that

“[t]ort liability alone is insufficient to support an award of

punitive damages.” Wichinsky, 847 P.2d at 730. Thus, the

district court’s decisions were not inconsistent.

We also reject Plaintiff’s second argument—that the

district court found there was sufficient evidence to instruct

the jury on punitive damages before granting judgment as a

matter of law to Defendants on the same issue. Plaintiffs are

simply wrong in their construction of the trial transcript,

which reveals that the district court did not find that there was

sufficient evidence to instruct the jury on punitive damages.

Instead, the district court merely expressed its current

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FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC V. A.V.E.L.A. 45

thoughts on the matter, stating that “at this stage” “I think the

jury should be instructed on punitive [damages].” Due to the

inconclusive nature of the statement, there was no conflict.13

CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM all decisions of the district court appealed

in this case.

CHRISTEN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting

in part:

I concur in the result reached by the court but do not join

the reasoning in Subsection I.B.2 of its opinion. In my view,

the narrow holding in Part I is dictated by the standard of

review on appeal, and by the defenses actually pursued by

defendants.

I.

Presented with two T-shirts—one bearing an iconic image

of Bob Marley and one bearing the image of an unknown

African American male with dreadlocks—members of the

public were asked: (1) “Who do you think made or put out

this particular T-shirt?” and (2) “Who do you think gave their

permission or approval for this particular T-shirt to be made

or put out?” The first question bears upon a “source or

13 Plaintiffs raise a new basis for challenging punitive damage decision

in their reply brief, citing for the first time evidence they claim shows

Defendants’ malice. Because Plaintiffs did not cite any of this evidence in

their first brief, we will not consider it. See Kim, 154 F.3d at 1000.

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origin” claim. Because plaintiffs concede their infringement

claim “is not based on consumer confusion as to the source or

origin of Defendants’ merchandise,” the responses to the first

survey question lend no support to plaintiffs’ cause.

If any evidence of consumer confusion is to be gleaned

from the responses to plaintiffs’ survey, it would have to

come from the second question: “Who do you think gave

their permission or approval for this particular T-shirt to be

made or put out?” 37% of respondents in the test group and

20% of respondents in the control group answered “Bob

Marley” (or “the person on the shirt”) or his heirs, estate, or

agents. Respondents were then asked why they thought this

was the case. Representative answers include: “Because I

don’t know anyone else that would have those types of

rights,” “Because his picture is on the shirt,” and “I’m

assuming there’s some kind of copyright.”

The responses to the second question show two things:

(1) members of the public have no problem recognizing the

late Bob Marley, an internationally famous musician; and

(2) members of the public share a common lay legal opinion

that Marley, or someone connected with Marley, must have

sponsored the T-shirt. But this lay legal opinion is likely to be

held by the majority of survey respondents every time

merchandise bears a readily recognizable celebrity image. 

See McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition

§ 24:12 (4th ed. 2014) (describing survey in which 91.2% of

consumers agreed with the statement: “No product can bear

the name of an entertainer, cartoon character, or some other

famous person unless permission is given for its use by the

owner of the name or character.”).

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FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC V. A.V.E.L.A. 47

The T-shirts in this case do not bear an affixed,

recognizable label, logo, or mark. Indeed, plaintiffs

repeatedly refer to their asserted interest as “trademark-like.” 

They argue that their interest lies in Marley’s image itself,

which appears on the T-shirt and was arguably the very

product being purchased. For this reason, this case presents

a unique situation: rather than being deceived by the mark on

the product being purchased, the facts suggest that consumers

may have received exactly what they bargained for: a T-shirt

with a picture of Bob Marley on the front.

The purpose of a § 43(a) claim is to prevent consumers

from being misled or tricked into making purchases through

use of a trademark. Pom Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co.,

134 S.Ct. 2228, 2233 (2014) (“The Lanham Act creates a

cause of action for unfair competition through misleading

advertising or labeling.”); Int’l Order of Job’s Daughters v.

Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 918 (9th Cir. 1980)

(observing the purpose of Lanham Act trademark provision

is “to protect consumers against deceptive designations of the

origin of goods and, conversely, to enable producers to

differentiate their products from those of others”). The

responses to the second survey question tell us nothing about

whether consumers’ purchasing decisions are likely to be

influenced by confusion about who had given permission to

produce the shirts.1 Plaintiffs did not allege that the use of

1 The record contains only three survey responses that might have

possibly affected purchasing decisions: “He should get paid when

someone uses his picture, even if he’s not with us,” “If he was my family,

I would want someone to ask my permission if they were going to sell Tshirts of a dead family member,” and “Because it’s based on a celebrity,

and his son will probably get the royalties.” Even when construed in the

light most favorable to plaintiffs, three responses are insufficient to

establish actual consumer confusion.

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Marley’s image conveyed an indication or endorsement that

the T-shirts were of a particular quality, or that they were the

“official” T-shirt that had special memorabilia value. 

Plaintiffs’ claim is simply that consumers mistakenly

understood that Marley (or someone connected with his

estate) must have given permission for the use of Marley’s

image on the T-shirt. Without a showing that consumers

cared whether permission had been given, the second survey

question only shows that most consumers share a common

lay legal opinion that a celebrity must give permission before

his or her image may be used; it does nothing to suggest that

the use of Marley’s image on the T-shirt runs afoul of the

purpose of the Lanham Act.

In my view, the word “confusion” in § 43(a) must be read

in light of the Lanham Act’s purpose. Therefore, where a

celebrity image is itself the only indication of sponsorship, I

would hold that a finding of actual confusion under § 43(a)

must be supported by some evidence that the confusion could

have had an impact on the consumers’ purchasing decisions. 

See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising

Right: Fragile Theory or Fait Accompli, 54 Emory L.J. 461,

488 (2005) (“If individuals don’t care one way or the other

whether the trademark holder sponsors or endorses such

products or whether the products are officially licensed, then

the competitive process certainly does not suffer from their

assumption that the use required a license.”). If not read in

context, Downing’s actual confusion factor becomes a nullity

because consumers’ common understanding about who must

have authorized the use of a celebrity image may well have

nothing to do with the product. Here, I would give no weight

to plaintiffs’ survey responses because plaintiffs did not show

that consumers might be misled into buying the T-shirt based

on whether permission had been given.

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II.

Evidence of actual consumer confusion is just one of the

eight factors considered under Downing, and, in this case,

several other Downing factors support the jury’s finding of

consumer confusion. See Hana Fin., Inc. v. Hana Bank,

574 U.S. __ (2015) (“Application of a test that relies upon an

ordinary consumer’s understanding of the impression that a

mark conveys falls comfortably within the ken of a jury. . . .

[W]hen the relevant question is how an ordinary person or

community would make an assessment, the jury is generally

the decision maker that ought to provide the fact-intensive

answer.”). On this record, I cannot conclude that “the

evidence, construed in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party, permits only one reasonable conclusion,

and that conclusion is the contrary to the jury’s verdict.” 

Pavao v. Pagay, 307 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 2002).

It is difficult to over-state the extent to which this result

is the product of the unique way this case was litigated. We

address the case as it is presented to us, but it is worth

restating that our holding is very narrow, and largely a

function of issues and defenses the parties chose not to

litigate.

 Case: 12-17595, 02/20/2015, ID: 9427595, DktEntry: 86-1, Page 49 of 49