Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-55027/USCOURTS-ca9-14-55027-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Teng Jiao Zhou
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

TENG JIAO ZHOU,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 14-55027

D.C. No.

2:13-cv-02145-

BRO-CW

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Beverly Reid O’Connell, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

February 8, 2016—Pasadena, California

Filed March 7, 2016

Before: Marsha S. Berzon, Andre M. Davis*

,

and John B. Owens, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Owens

* The Honorable Andre M. Davis, Senior Circuit Judge for the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, sitting by designation.

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2 UNITED STATES V. ZHOU

SUMMARY**

Immigration

The panel affirmed the district court’s order granting the

government’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and its

judgment revoking Teng Jiao Zhou’s naturalization pursuant

to 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a).

The panel affirmed the district court’s denaturalization

judgment under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f), the “catch-all” provision,

on the ground that Zhou’s robbery conviction prevented him

from establishing good moral character during the statutory

period. The panel held that robbery was an unlawful act

which reflected adversely on Zhou’s moral character and for

which he could not show extenuating circumstances.

COUNSEL

Armineh Ebrahimian (argued), Rosemead, California, for

Defendant-Appellant.

Troy D. Liggett (argued), Stuart F. Delery, William C.

Peachey, and Elizabeth J. Stevens, United States Department

of Justice, Civil Division, Office of Immigration Litigation,

Washington, D.C., for Plaintiff-Appellee.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. ZHOU 3

OPINION

OWENS, Circuit Judge:

Appellant Teng Jiao Zhou appeals from the district

court’s order granting the government’s motion for judgment

on the pleadings and its resulting judgment of

denaturalization. Zhou committed robbery during the

relevant statutory period prior to his naturalization. Because

the robbery is an unlawful act that reflects adversely on

Zhou’s moral character and for which he cannot show

extenuating circumstances, we affirm.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL

HISTORY

Zhou emigrated from China in 1985, and applied for

naturalization in 1993. He attended his naturalization

interview, filled out the necessary Form N-400 application,

and passed the naturalization exam.

Also in 1993, Zhou went into business with a man named

Tong, but that relationship broke bad. On March 8–9, 1994,

Zhou physically seized Tong, threatened him, and stole from

him. Due to this conduct, Zhou was ultimately charged with

robbery, kidnaping, and extortion. Although his first jury

deadlocked, a second jury found him guilty of Robbery of the

First Degree (Cal. Penal Code § 211) and False Imprisonment

with Violence or Menace (Cal. Penal Code §§ 236–37) on

November 21, 1994. The trial judge sentenced Zhou to the

“high term” of six years for the false imprisonment

conviction, finding in aggravation Zhou’s “threats of great

bodily harm to the victim” and his “position of leadership

over others during the commission of the offense.” The judge

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4 UNITED STATES V. ZHOU

concurrently sentenced Zhou to the “mid term” of two years

for the robbery conviction.

Despite this serious criminal activity, Zhou’s quest for

citizenship continued. On March 22, 1994—after Zhou’s

March 8–9 criminal activity but before his June arrest and his

November jury conviction—he completed a Form 445-A, in

which Zhou updated his earlier Form N-400. Form 445-A

asked whether, since his initial naturalization interview, Zhou

had “knowingly committed any crime or offense, for which

[he] ha[d] not been arrested?” Zhou answered no. On March

31, 1994, Zhou took his oath of allegiance and became a

naturalized U.S. citizen.

Nearly 20 years passed, and the record reveals no

additional misconduct by Zhou. However, on March 25,

2013, the government filed a complaint to revoke Zhou’s

naturalization. The government argued that the 1994

convictions—for which the underlying unlawful conduct

occurred during the relevant five-year period preceding

Zhou’s naturalization—meant that Zhou lacked the necessary

good moral character required to naturalize. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1427(a)(3) (no person shall be naturalized unless the

applicant “has been and still is a person of good moral

character”).1 The government then moved for judgment on

1 The nearly 20-year delay between Zhou’s conviction and the complaint

to revoke his naturalization is very troubling, and the government (in its

briefs and at argument) failed to explain why it waited so long to bring this

action. While this delay could make a strong case for laches against the

government, Zhou never made a laches argument before the district court

or this court, so we do not reach this issue. See Costello v. United States,

365 U.S. 265, 282 (1961) (leaving the question of laches open in the

denaturalization context); United States v. Dang, 488 F.3d 1135, 1143–44

(9th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that the issue remains open).

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UNITED STATES V. ZHOU 5

the pleadings on two bases: (1) 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(3) (for

having committed crimes involving moral turpitude during

the statutory period); and (2) the “catch-all” provision of

8 U.S.C. § 1101(f), as promulgated in 8 C.F.R.

§ 316.10(b)(3)(iii) (for having committed unlawful acts that

adversely reflect on one’s moral character during the

statutory period). The district court granted the government’s

motion on both grounds. Because we affirm the district

court’s application of section 1101(f)’s “catch-all” provision,

we need not review the application of section 1101(f)(3).

Relevant to our review under the “catch-all” provision,

the district court concluded that First Degree Robbery, as

defined in Cal. Penal Code § 211, is a crime involving moral

turpitude, which constitutes an unlawful act that adversely

reflects on one’s moral character. See Mendoza v. Holder,

623 F.3d 1299, 1302–04 (9th Cir. 2010).2 Zhou attempted to

downplay the seriousness of his crimes, arguing that (1) they

arose from a mere business dispute, (2) the first jury could

not reach a verdict, and (3) he had no other criminal

convictions. Following United States v. Jean-Baptiste,

395 F.3d 1190, 1195 (11th Cir. 2005), and United States v.

Suarez, 664 F.3d 655, 662 (7th Cir. 2011), the district court

rejected these attempts to establish “extenuating

circumstances” under 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(3)(iii). The

district court reasoned that it had limited discretion to apply

this exception, and that none of the stated grounds rendered

Zhou’s crimes “less reprehensible than [they] otherwise

2 The district court also held that the False Imprisonment with Violence

or Menace conviction was an unlawful act that adversely reflected on

Zhou’s moral character. We need not review that alternative holding here,

as Zhou’s robbery conviction prevented himfromestablishing good moral

character during the statutory period.

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6 UNITED STATES V. ZHOU

would be, or tend[ed] to palliate or lessen [his] guilt.” 

Suarez, 664 F.3d at 662 (quotingBlack’s Law Dictionary(6th

ed. 1990)). The district court entered the judgment of

denaturalization, and this appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

We review a district court’s order granting judgment on

the pleadings de novo. Lyon v. Chase Bank USA, N.A.,

656 F.3d 877, 883 (9th Cir. 2011). “A judgment on the

pleadings is properly granted when, taking all the allegations

in the non-moving party’s pleadings as true, the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fajardo v. Cty. of

L.A., 179 F.3d 698, 699 (9th Cir. 1999).

III. ANALYSIS

A naturalized individual’s citizenship “should not be

taken away without the clearest sort of justification and

proof,” Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 122

(1943), as “its loss can have severe and unsettling

consequences,” Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490,

505 (1981). Due to the extremelyhigh stakes involved, “[t]he

evidence justifying revocation of citizenship must be clear,

unequivocal, and convincing and not leave the issue in

doubt.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

If the government meets its high burden, however, a court

must enter a judgment of denaturalization—it lacks any

discretion to do otherwise. Id. at 517–18.

Under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a), the government may file a

complaint to revoke naturalization if a citizen’s naturalization

was “illegally procured” or “[was] procured by concealment

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UNITED STATES V. ZHOU 7

of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation.” Only the

illegal procurement theory is at issue in this appeal.

Naturalization was “illegally procured” if the individual

did not meet the statutory requirements for citizenship. 

Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 506; United States v. Dang, 488 F.3d

1135, 1139 (9th Cir. 2007). One requirement for citizenship

is that an applicant must be of “good moral character” for the

five years immediately preceding the date of the filing of the

application for naturalization until the time the applicant

takes the oath of allegiance. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a). Under

section 1101(f), a person will not “be regarded as, or found to

be, a person of good moral character” if, within the statutory

period, he fell into any of several enumerated categories. 

Section 1101(f)’s additional “catch-all” provision provides

that “[t]he fact that any person is not within any of the

foregoing [categories] shall not preclude a finding that for

other reasons such person is or was not of good moral

character.”

Under section 1101(f), the government promulgated 8

C.F.R. § 316.10, which offers guidance on making moral

character determinations. It includes the following language:

Unless the applicant establishes extenuating

circumstances, the applicant shall be found to

lack good moral character if, during the

statutory period, the applicant: (i) Willfully

failed or refused to support dependents;

(ii) Had an extramarital affair which tended

to destroy an existing marriage; or

(iii) Committed unlawful acts that adversely

reflect upon the applicant’s moral character,

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8 UNITED STATES V. ZHOU

or was convicted or imprisoned for such acts

. . . .

8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(3).3 We have held that this regulation

is a permissible interpretation of section 1101(f) under

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,

Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), so we apply it here. See Dang,

488 F.3d at 1140–41.

The facts of Zhou’s case are unusual in that, while he

committed the relevant crime during the statutoryperiod prior

to his naturalization, he was not charged with, arrested for, or

convicted of the crime until after he took his oath of

allegiance and became a naturalized citizen. We have not

applied sections 1101(f) and 316.10(b)(3)(iii) in precisely

these circumstances, but we have applied those provisions to

a situation where the commission of, and indictment and

arrest for, the crime occurred before the oath of allegiance,

but the resulting conviction came after.

In Dang, Dang set fire to her van while she and her son

were inside as part of an insurance fraud scheme. Shortly

after the fire (and while out on bail after arrest), Dang took

the oath of allegiance and became a United States citizen. 

Later that same year, she was convicted of arson and related

crimes and sentenced to eleven years in prison. 488 F.3d at

1137–38. As in this case, the government in Dang moved for

her denaturalization because she lacked good moral character

at the time of naturalization under the section 1101(f) “catchall” provision and 8 C.F.R. § 316.10 as promulgated thereto.

3 An earlier version of the regulation was in effect in 1994, and is

materially identical to the version that the district court analyzed. See

Administrative Naturalization, 56 Fed. Reg. 50,486 (Oct. 7, 1991).

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UNITED STATES V. ZHOU 9

Our court rejected Dang’s various statutory and

constitutional challenges to 8 C.F.R. § 316.10. We affirmed

the district court’s decision to denaturalize Dang, even though

her convictions for arson and related offenses came after she

took the oath to become a United States citizen. Id. at

1137–38, 1144.

The Dang decision is in accord with those in other

circuits, including at least one in which the indictment, arrest,

and conviction all occurred after naturalization. Suarez,

664 F.3d at 657; see also id. at 661 (explaining that, under the

“catch-all” provision, “a conviction during the statutory

period is not necessary for a finding that an applicant lacks

good moral character,” and “[i]t is enough that the offense

was ‘committed’ during that time”); Jean-Baptiste, 395 F.3d

at 1191, 1194 (holding that a naturalized citizen who

committed unlawful acts under the “catch-all” provision

during the statutory period prior to taking the oath of

allegiance, but who was indicted, arrested, and convicted only

after naturalization, could have his citizenship revoked for

lack of good moral character).

Applying these cases, the same result obtains here. A jury

convicted Zhou of robbery, a crime involving moral

turpitude. See Mendoza, 623 F.3d at 1302–04. The parties

agree that these acts occurred during the relevant five-year

period for which Zhou was required to demonstrate good

moral character. With these facts, the district court did not

err in concluding that the “unlawful act” of robbery reflected

“adversely” on Zhou’s moral character.4 Zhou has no serious

4 Our opinion is limited to reviewing the application of 8 C.F.R.

§ 316.10(b)(3)(iii), involving “unlawful acts” that “adversely reflect” on

moral character, to the facts at hand. We do not consider the legitimacy

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10 UNITED STATES V. ZHOU

response on this issue, and conceded at argument that there is

no dispute that Zhou committed a crime involving moral

turpitude during the statutory period.

Instead, Zhou tries to argue that the facts of his case

entitle him to invoke the “extenuating circumstances”

exception, which would enable him to avoid denaturalization. 

See 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(3)(iii). Although he attempts to

minimize his culpability and role in the offense—referring to

it as a mere “business dispute”—a jury unanimously thought

otherwise, and that verdict binds this court. See, e.g., JeanBaptiste, 395 F.3d at 1194 (“Collateral estoppel bars a

defendant who is convicted in a criminal trial from contesting

this conviction in a subsequent civil action with respect to

issues necessarily decided in the criminal trial.”).

To the extent that Zhou contends that his otherwise clean

record creates “extenuating circumstances,” that contention

misapprehends the nature of the exception. The narrow

“extenuating circumstances” exception, applicable to having

failed to support dependents or engaged in an extramarital

affair, as well as to the commission of a crime, focuses on the

circumstances during the statutory period, and so, here,

focuses on circumstances during the statutory period that may

“palliate or lessen” an offender’s guilt for an offense. Suarez,

664 F.3d at 662 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed.

1990)). It is not a post-naturalization retrospective on the

of denaturalization based on other parts of section 316.10, including the

subsections specifying that having “[w]illfully failed or refused to support

dependents” or engaged in “extramarital affair[s] which tended to destroy

. . . existing marriage[s],” § 316.10(b)(3)(i), (ii), precludes a finding of

good moral character, absent extenuating circumstances. Nor do we

address the categories listed in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(f)(1) through 1101(f)(9).

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UNITED STATES V. ZHOU 11

person, his achievements, or the unfortunate effect that

denaturalization will surely have. See Jean-Baptiste,

395 F.3d at 1195 (explaining that “extenuating circumstances

. . . must pertain to the reasons showing lack of good moral

character, including acts negating good character, not to the

consequences of these matters, including the consequence of

denaturalization”). Zhou, however, has not pointed to

anything in the record that demonstrates any extenuating

circumstances during the statutory period. The seriousness of

Zhou’s conviction, his significant sentence, and the absence

of any record concerning mitigating matter during the

statutory period, confirms that there are no “extenuating

circumstances” that would permit relief here.

Zhou also argues that for the government to demonstrate

that Zhou “illegallyprocured” his naturalization under section

1451(a), it needed to prove that Zhou knew his actions of

March 8–9, 1994 constituted a crime when he completed his

Form 445-A. Zhou states that he had no knowledge that he

had committed a crime (and to this day maintains his

innocence), so any misrepresentation on his form was

inadvertent.

As stated above, under section 1451(a), the government

may seek denaturalization under two independent legal

theories: that naturalization was procured (1) illegally; and

(2) through concealment of a material fact or by willful

misrepresentation. While the individual’s scienter with

respect to any misrepresentation is relevant to the latter

theory, there is no authority in the statute or case law to

require the government to prove that Zhou knew his conduct

was illegal at the time he naturalized under the former. See

Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 516–17 (explaining that if an

individual does not meet the statutory requirements for

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12 UNITED STATES V. ZHOU

naturalization, naturalization was illegally procured). Zhou

exhibited a lack of moral character by committing a serious

crime—robbery. Whether at the time he took the oath of

allegiance he knew that he violated any specific law or that he

lacked moral character is irrelevant to our “illegally

procured” analysis.

Accordingly, the district court did not err in holding that

Zhou could not establish good moral character under section

1101(f) and 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(3)(iii). Thus, it was

required to enter a judgment of denaturalization.

IV. CONCLUSION

While we fail to understand why the government waited

nearly two decades to bring this action against an otherwise

law-abiding individual, ultimately our lack of comprehension

is irrelevant. What matters is that Zhou committed an

unlawful act just days before he took the oath of allegiance. 

That unlawful act, absent extenuating circumstances,required

the district court to revoke Zhou’s certificate of

naturalization.

AFFIRMED.

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