Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01475/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01475-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Charles W. Lewis
Plaintiff
M. Perez
Defendant
Arnold Schwarzenegger
Defendant

Document Text:

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES W. LEWIS,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-05-1475 GEB DAD P

vs.

M. PEREZ, et al.,

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, commenced this action on May 23,

2005, by filing a civil rights complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern

District of California. The action was transferred to the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of California on July 22, 2005. The case has been referred to the undersigned

magistrate judge in accordance with Local Rule 72-302 and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

Plaintiff’s complaint was accompanied by an application to proceed in forma

pauperis. The application reveals that the average balance in plaintiff’s prison trust account

during the six months preceding May 5, 2005, was $1,007.45. The filing fee is $250.00. The

undersigned will recommend that plaintiff’s application be denied.

District courts are required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking

relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of such an entity. See 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and (2).

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28

(9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th

Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

A complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted only if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support

of the claims that would entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73

(1984); Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass’n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). For

purposes of reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court accepts as true the allegations of

the complaint. See Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976). The

court also construes the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolves all

doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the

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meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts or

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which

complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

In the present case, plaintiff has sued Margarita Perez, as the commissioner and

chair of the California Board of Prison Terms (“BPT”), along with Arnold Schwarzenegger and

100 commissioners and deputy commissioners identified as J. Does #1 - #100. Plaintiff seeks

only injunctive relief in the form of an order enjoining defendants “from ‘continued reliance in

the future on an unchanging factor, the circumstance of the offense and conduct prior to

imprisonment.’” In this regard, plaintiff cites Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 917 (9th Cir.

2003), and Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005).

Plaintiff alleges as follows: He was convicted of first degree murder on October

25, 1977, and was sentenced to a term of life in state prison with parole eligibility after seven

years; his criminal history prior to 1977 consisted of convictions in 1960 for disturbing the peace

and statutory rape, a conviction in 1963 for petty theft, and convictions in 1966 for grand theft

and bank robbery; he has been eligible for parole release since July 12, 1984; prior to April 10,

1986, he was convicted of rule violations for possession of inmate-manufactured alcohol,

disobeying orders, possession of U.S. currency, and possession of marijuana; his behavior has

been exemplary since 1986; he had parole consideration hearings in 1983, 1985, 1986, 1987,

1988, 1989, 1990, 1992, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2001, and 2004; the Board found

plaintiff suitable for parole at the hearings on 2001 and 2004, but the 2001 proposed decision

was reversed by the governor on March 8, 2002, and the 2004 proposed decision was reversed by

the governor on February 8, 2005; each time parole has been denied, the denial was based on the

unchanging circumstances of plaintiff’s offense and prior conduct. Plaintiff asserts that

defendants’ continued reliance on unchanging factors in his case is arbitrary, runs contrary to the

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 The undersigned notes that plaintiff’s dispute is not necessarily with the actions of the 1

Parole Board. The Board found him suitable for parole in 2001 and 2004 with the governor

reversing those decisions based on the unchanging circumstances of plaintiff’s offense and prior

conduct. 

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rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison system, and violates due process guarantees under the

Fourteenth Amendment.1

Plaintiff states that he is challenging procedures used in past parole consideration

hearings and that he is seeking relief concerning procedures to be used in future parole

consideration hearings. Plaintiff argues that the injunction he seeks will not necessarily result in

his immediate or earlier release.

In Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 76 (2005), the Supreme Court ruled that,

under certain circumstances, prisoners can challenge the constitutionality of state parole

procedures in actions under § 1983 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. In the Wilkinson

case, the plaintiffs were two Iowa state prisoners whose cases were consolidated by the Court of

Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. One of the plaintiffs challenged the retroactive application of new,

harsher guidelines to his preguidelines case. He contended that applying the new guidelines

violated his rights under the Ex Post Facto and Due Process Clauses. He sought a declaration to

that effect and an injunction ordering prison officials to grant him a parole hearing in accordance

with the laws and rules that were in effect when he committed his crimes. The second plaintiff

raised an Ex Post Facto challenge to the new guidelines and also alleged that due process

violations occurred at his first parole hearing; he sought a new parole hearing conducted under

constitutionally proper procedures and an injunction ordering the state to comply with

constitutional due process and ex post facto requirements in the future. Id. at 77. The Supreme

Court found that the connection between the constitutionality of the prisoners’ parole

proceedings and their release from confinement was tenuous. Id. at 78. The Court concluded

that “ § 1983 remains available for procedural challenges where success in the action would not

necessarily spell immediate or speedier release for the prisoner.” Id. at 81.

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In the present case, plaintiff seeks to “[e]njoin defendants from ‘continued

reliance in the future on an unchanging factor, the circumstance of the offense and conduct prior

to imprisonment,’ per Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 917 (9th Cir. 2003).” The relief requested 

would not necessarily spell his immediate or speedier release and therefore may be sought in an

action brought pursuant to § 1983.

The undersigned finds, however, that Biggs does not provide a basis for the order

plaintiff seeks. In Biggs, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a California

state prisoner’s habeas petition challenging the Board of Prison Terms’ failure to find him

suitable for parole. The court observed that

California law allows the Board to consider a myriad of factors

when weighing the decision of granting or denying parole. Parole

may be denied if the Board “determines that the gravity of the

current convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of

current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that

consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of

incarceration for [the] individual.” Cal. Penal Code § 2041(b). 

Additionally, the Board can consider all relevant information

including potential threats to public safety, whether the offense was

carried out in a manner which demonstrates exceptionally callous

disregard for human life, and whether the prisoner engaged in

misconduct while in jail. 15 Cal. Code of Regs. § 2402(c)(6); see

In re Ramirez, 94 Cal. App. 4th 549, 565-67, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 381

(2001).

334 F.3d at 915. The court agreed that “many of the conclusions reached and factors relied upon

by the Board [in Biggs’ case] were devoid of evidentiary basis,” but

the district court was correct in finding that in spite of the fact that

several of the Board’s findings were unsupported, there was some

evidence supporting the Board’s decision that Biggs is not entitled

to relief at this time. Section 3041(b) allows the gravity of the

offense to be considered in requiring a period of longer

incarceration. The murder of which Biggs was convicted involved

killing a witness in a manner which exhibited a callous disregard

for life. Under a ruse, the co-conspirators tricked the witness into

believing they were taking him out of state, and then they

bludgeoned him to death. While Biggs did not commit the murder

himself, he was intertwined with the conspiracy from the very

beginning.

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 Thus, plaintiff may seek habeas relief challenging a particular decision to deny him 2

parole.

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Id. at 916. The Board’s “sole supportable reliance on the gravity of the offense and conduct prior

to imprisonment” justified denial of parole in 1999, despite the evidence that Biggs was a model

inmate who had made many gains in prison following his conviction in 1985. Id. at 912 & 916.

The Ninth Circuit observed that “[o]ver time, however, should Biggs continue to

demonstrate exemplary behavior and evidence of rehabilitation, denying him a parole date simply

because of the nature of Biggs’ offense and prior conduct would raise serious questions involving

his liberty interest in parole.” Id. at 916. Describing due process as “a delicate process of

adjustment inescapably involving the exercise of judgment by those whom the Constitution

entrusted with the unfolding of the process,” the court concluded that “continued reliance in the

future on an unchanging factor, the circumstance of the offense and conduct prior to

imprisonment, runs contrary to the rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison system and could

result in a due process violation.” Id. at 917.

Biggs did not hold that the Board can be prohibited from considering an

unchanging factor after a specific number of years or a certain number of parole consideration

hearings. Biggs did not hold that federal courts can enjoin the Board from considering factors it

is authorized to consider under state law. While continued reliance on an unchanging factor may

raise serious questions, it appears that those questions should be considered in the context of a

particular decision to deny parole, as they were in Biggs.2

The undersigned finds that plaintiff’s civil rights complaint fails to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted under § 1983. The authority relied upon by plaintiff does not

permit this court to enjoin the defendants from considering plaintiff’s conviction and criminal

history in future parole consideration hearings.

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiff’s May 23, 2005 application to proceed in forma pauperis be denied;

2. Plaintiff’s May 23, 2005 motion for order directing service to be effected by a

United States Marshal be denied; and

3. This action be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted.

These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States

District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within

twenty days after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file

written objections with the court. A document containing objections should be titled “Objections

to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may, under certain circumstances, waive the right to appeal

the District Court’s order. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: July 13, 2006.

DAD:13

lewi1475.56

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