Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00392/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00392-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Floyd Hamilton
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

FLOYD HAMILTON, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY, 

Defendant. 

No. 2:14-cv-00392-KJM-CMK 

ORDER 

Floyd Hamilton brings this action for judicial review of a decision by the 

Commissioner of Social Security under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Hamilton is represented by counsel 

in this action, which was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to Local Rule 

302(c)(15). On September 14, 2015, the magistrate judge filed findings and recommendations 

and recommended the matter be remanded to the Commissioner to further develop the evidentiary 

record with respect to Hamilton’s mental impairments. ECF No. 25. The Commissioner filed 

timely objections. ECF No. 26. For the following reasons, the court declines to adopt the 

magistrate judge’s recommendation and affirms the ALJ’s decision. 

I. BACKGROUND 

The parties do not object to the magistrate judge’s summary of this case’s 

procedural history, which the court adopts in full. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 

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1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (the court need not “review, de novo, findings and 

recommendations that the parties themselves accept as correct”); Orand v. United States, 

602 F.2d 207, 208 (9th Cir. 1979). For ease of reference, the court reproduces that summary in 

full here: 

Plaintiff applied for social security benefits on April 20, 2011, 

alleging an onset of disability on August 22, 2010, due to 

depression, anxiety, paranoia, diabetes, high blood pressure, and a 

right hand problem (Certified administrative record (“CAR”) 61, 

73, 74, 144, 160–61). Plaintiff’s claim was denied initially and 

upon reconsideration. Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing, 

which was held on August 1, 2012, before Administrative Law 

Judge (“ALJ”) Mark C. Ramsey. In a September 11, 2012, 

decision, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff is not disabled based on 

the following findings: 

1. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

since April 20, 2011, the application date (20 CFR 416.971 

et seq.). 

2. The claimant has the following severe impairments: PTSD, 

diabetes, depression, anxiety, and history of drug abuse 

(20 CFR 416.920(c)). 

3. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination 

of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity 

of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, 

Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 416.920(d), 416.925 and 

416.926). 

4. After careful consideration of the entire record, the 

undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual 

functional capacity to perform the full range of medium 

work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(c). Mentally, he is able 

to perform simple unskilled work without frequent public or 

fellow employee contact. 

5. The claimant is capable of performing past relevant work 

(work performed within the past 15 years, performed long 

enough to learn the work, and performed as substantial 

gainful activity). This work does not require the 

performance of work-related activities precluded by the 

claimant’s residual functional capacity (20 CFR 416.965). 

6. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in 

the Social Security Act, since April 20, 2011, the date the 

application was filed (20 CFR 416.920(f)). (CAR 8-16). 

After the Appeals Council declined review on December 5, 2013, 

this appeal followed. 

Findings and Recommendations (F&Rs) 1–3, ECF No. 25 (footnote omitted). 

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Hamilton sought judicial review in this court and now moves for summary 

judgment, advancing arguments in three categories. See Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 17. The 

Commissioner filed a cross-motion, which addresses essentially the same three points. See Def.’s 

Mot. Summ. J. 8 & n.5, ECF No. 23. First, Hamilton argues the ALJ did not properly develop the 

record and evaluate whether he suffers from an intellectual disability. Pl.’s Mot. at 10–13. 

Second, he argues the ALJ did not properly weigh opinion evidence when he made his decision 

about the plaintiff’s residual functional capacity. Id. at 13–18. And third, he argues the ALJ did 

not properly evaluate his testimony and another witness’s statements. Id. at 19–22. The 

magistrate judge accepted the first of these arguments, rejected the second and third, and 

recommended the case be remanded for further proceedings. See F&Rs at 4–14. With respect to 

this first argument, the magistrate judge determined that although Hamilton had claimed no 

intellectual disability, evidence had come to light that could have led the ALJ to conclude that 

Hamilton was intellectually disabled. Id. at 5–7. Therefore, the magistrate judge determined, 

because the ALJ did not investigate Hamilton’s intellectual disability to a greater extent, he 

committed reversible error. Id. at 7. 

Hamilton filed no objections, but the Commissioner objected to the magistrate 

judge’s decision to accept Hamilton’s first argument. See Objections, ECF No. 26. 

II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Section 405(g) of Title 42, United States Code, provides for judicial review of the 

Social Security Administration’s disability determinations.1

 “An ALJ’s disability determination 

should be upheld unless it contains legal error or is not supported by substantial evidence.” 

Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1009 (9th Cir. 2014). “‘Substantial evidence’ means more than 

a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person 

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 That section provides, in relevant part, “Any individual, after any final decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the 

amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action . . . in the district 

court of the United States for the judicial district in which the plaintiff resides . . . . The court 

shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, 

modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without 

remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

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might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 

(9th Cir. 2007). The court must review the record as a whole, but the ALJ is responsible for 

weighing the credibility of evidence and resolving evidentiary conflicts. Garrison, 759 F.3d 

at 1009–10. If the evidence would support both upholding and reversing the ALJ’s decision, the 

district court affirms that decision rather than substituting its own judgment for that of the ALJ. 

Id. at 1010. But the court cannot affirm by simply “isolating a specific quantum of supporting 

evidence,” Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1035, and cannot affirm the ALJ’s decision for reasons she 

did not herself rely on, Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Here, as the matter is before this court on review of a magistrate judge’s findings 

and recommendations, the court must make a “de novo determination of those portions of the 

report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings 

and recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” Id. 

III. DISCUSSION 

The court has reviewed the record, the parties’ briefing, and the magistrate judge’s 

findings and recommendations, and adopts the magistrate judge’s thorough consideration of 

Hamilton’s second and third arguments. See F&Rs at 7–14. In these respects, the ALJ 

committed no error. This leaves Hamilton’s argument that the ALJ erred because he did not 

further develop evidence of Hamilton’s mental impairment. See Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. 10–13. The 

court first reviews the statutory and regulatory background. 

A. Statutory and Regulatory Background 

“Disability claims are evaluated using a five-step sequential analysis,” Burch v. 

Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4): 

 First, “the ALJ determines whether a claimant is currently engaged in substantial 

gainful activity. If so, the claimant is not disabled.” If not, the ALJ proceeds to 

the next step. 

///// 

///// 

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 Second, the ALJ “evaluates whether the claimant has a medically severe 

impairment or combination of impairments. If not, the claimant is not disabled.” 

If so, then the ALJ proceeds to the next step. 

 Third, the ALJ “considers whether the impairment or combination of impairments 

meets or equals a listed impairment under 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, App. 1. If 

so, the claimant is automatically presumed disabled.” If not, the ALJ proceeds to 

the next step. 

 Fourth, the ALJ “assesses whether the claimant is capable of performing her past 

relevant work. If so, the claimant is not disabled.” If not, the ALJ proceeds to the 

next step. 

 Fifth, the ALJ “examines whether the claimant has the residual functional capacity 

(‘RFC’) to perform any other substantial gainful activity in the national economy. 

If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled.” 

Burch, 400 F.3d at 679. “The burden of proof is on the claimant at steps one through four, but 

shifts to the Commissioner at step five.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1011 (quoting Bray v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 2009)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A) (“An 

individual shall not be considered to be under a disability unless he furnishes such medical and 

other evidence of the existence thereof as the Commissioner of Social Security may require.”). 

The parties’ dispute concerns the ALJ’s analysis at step three and the definition of 

“intellectual disability” under Listing 12.05(C) of 20 C.F.R. Part 404, subpart P, Appendix 1. 

F&Rs at 5–7; Pl.’s Mot. at 10–11; Def.’s Mot. at 8–15. Listing 12.05 provides in relevant part as 

follows: 

Intellectual disability refers to significantly subaverage general 

intellectual functioning with deficits in adaptive functioning 

initially manifested during the developmental period; i.e., the 

evidence demonstrates or supports onset of the impairment before 

age 22. 

The required level of severity for this disorder is met when the 

requirements in A, B, C, or D are satisfied. 

. . . 

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C. A valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ of 60 through 70 

and a physical or other mental impairment imposing an additional 

and significant work-related limitation of function; . . . . 

20 C.F.R. Part 404, subpt. P, App. 1, Listing 12.05. 

With these rules and process in mind, the court turns to the dispute at hand. 

B. Whether the ALJ Was Required to Consider Listing 12.05(C) 

Hamilton bore the burden to present evidence of his disability, Garrison, 759 F.3d 

at 1011, but he did not allege he suffered from an intellectual disability, and he did not present 

evidence to show he suffered from an intellectual disability; rather, at an August 2012 hearing, 

Hamilton mentioned he had been in special education and described himself as “slow,” see Hr’g 

Tr. (Aug. 1, 2012), CAR 47, ECF No. 12-3, and his IQ tests resulted in a score within the range 

identified by Listing 12.05(C). But neither Hamilton nor his attorney developed this evidence, he 

was not diagnosed with an intellectual disability, and counsel agreed the ALJ had received 

Hamilton’s complete medical records. The ALJ therefore did not commit error by omitting 

consideration of any possible intellectual disability under Listing 12.05. 

In some cases, the Ninth Circuit has held that an ALJ has an independent 

obligation to flesh out evidence of a disability for which the claimant did not advocate, but those 

decisions do not require reversal here. A representative example is Celaya v. Halter, 332 F.3d 

1177 (9th Cir. 2003). In Celaya, the Ninth Circuit reviewed an ALJ’s decision that a claimant 

was not disabled despite her obesity, diabetes, and hypertension. See id. at 1179–80. On appeal, 

the Ninth Circuit found that the ALJ had erred by not considering the interaction of the claimant’s 

obesity with her other impairments, despite her failure to expressly raise obesity as a disabling 

factor. Id. at 1182–83. The Circuit cited three reasons for its decision: (1) the evidence implicitly 

raised the issue of obesity; (2) the record clearly showed claimant’s obesity fell just short of a 

listing condition that would have entitled her to a presumption of a disability; and (3) she was 

both illiterate and unrepresented by counsel. Id. at 1182. 

The third reason appears to have been particularly significant to the circuit court, 

which explained that the ALJ had a pressing responsibility to “fairly develop the record and 

assure the claimant’s interests are considered” in light of the claimant’s pro se status and 

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illiteracy. Id. at 1183 (citing Higbee v. Sullivan, 975 F.2d 558, 561 (9th Cir. 1992), and Brown v. 

Heckler, 713 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir. 1983)). The Celaya court quoted the following passage 

from Higbee: 

“[T]he ALJ is not a mere umpire at such a proceeding, but has an 

independent duty to fully develop the record, especially where the 

claimant is not represented: . . . it is incumbent upon the ALJ to 

scrupulously and conscientiously probe into, inquire of, and explore 

for all the relevant facts. He must be especially diligent in ensuring 

that favorable as well as unfavorable facts and circumstances are 

elicited.” 

Id. (quoting 975 F.2d at 561) (alterations in Celaya); see also Cox v. Califano, 587 F.2d 988, 991 

(9th Cir. 1978) (same). 

A dissenter disagreed with the Celaya majority’s decision in this respect. See id.

at 1184–86 (Rawlinson, J., dissenting). The dissenting judge worried the majority’s decision 

risked “transform[ing] Social Security administrative hearings into séance-like proceedings where 

the ALJ must divine implicit impairments, diagnose disabilities lying close to the listing criterion 

and detect any aura compelling further development of the record.” Id. at 1186. The majority 

responded to this criticism by emphasizing that the claimant’s obesity would have been apparent 

to the ALJ upon meeting her in person, as would have, for example, a missing limb. See id.

at 1183 n.3. 

To explain her concerns, the Celaya dissenter distinguished Sampson v. Chater, 

103 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 1996). See id. at 1185. In Sampson, the Ninth Circuit reversed a Social 

Security disability determination because the ALJ had not “develop[ed] the record fully and 

fairly,” as he was required to do “when a claimant is unrepresented.” 103 F.3d at 922. 

Specifically, the Circuit cited the ALJ’s failure to explore why the claimant’s medical records 

included an eleven-year gap after the time he was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis and began 

experiencing difficulty walking and had blurred vision, numbness, back pain, and muscle spasms. 

Id. at 920, 922. The ALJ had also disregarded the claimant’s testimony as non-credible without 

explanation. Id. at 922. 

In Burch v. Barnhart, the Circuit distinguished Celaya two years after it was 

decided. See Burch, 400 F.3d at 682; see also Broom v. Colvin, No. 14-04153, 2015 WL 

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1180514, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2015) (comparing Celaya and Burch and finding Burch

limited the holding of Celaya). In Burch, unlike Celaya, the claimant was represented by 

counsel, and the claimant did not explain or show why her obesity was the equivalent of a listed 

condition. See 400 F.3d at 682–83.2 The Burch court cited the general rule that “a claimant 

carries the initial burden of proving a disability.” Id. at 683 (citing Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 

683, 687 (9th Cir. 1989)). It noted a claimant “bears the burden of proving that . . . she has an 

impairment that meets or equals the criteria of an impairment listed in Appendix 1 of the 

Commissioner’s regulations.” Id. And it held, “An ALJ is not required to discuss the combined 

effects of a claimant’s impairments or compare them to any listing in an equivalency 

determination, unless the claimant presents evidence in an effort to establish equivalence.” Id. 

Although the Burch court’s decision describes a claimant’s burden with respect to equivalency, 

an issue not before this court, its conclusion is nonetheless persuasive. The same general standard 

of review applies, a claimant bears the same burden, and both this case and Burch concerned a 

represented claimant. 

Here, unlike in Celaya, Higbee, Cox, and similar cases, the claimant was 

represented by counsel, and the ALJ did not overlook critical evidentiary shortfalls. Hamilton did 

not allege he suffered from an intellectual disability and did not attempt to show he met the 

requirements of Listing 12.05(C). See F&Rs at 5–6. At the beginning of a hearing before the 

ALJ in August 2012, Hamilton’s attorney confirmed the medical records before the ALJ were 

“up-to-date,” confirmed he had no objections that prevented those exhibits’ admission in the 

record, requested no further development of the evidence, and filed no brief. See CAR 22. The 

ALJ allowed Hamilton’s attorney to ask Hamilton questions about what “medical problems” kept 

him from work. Id. at 40. But, as noted above, counsel did not address whether Hamilton 

suffered from an intellectual disability, even though Hamilton mentioned he had been in special 

education and described himself as “slow.” See id. at 47. At the end of the hearing, counsel 

 2

 In the years between the ALJ decisions at issue in Celaya and Burch, the Social Security 

Administration removed obesity from the listing of impairments. See Celaya, 332 F.3d at 1181 

n.1 (citing 64 Fed. Reg. 46,122). 

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confirmed the ALJ had “all of Mr. Hamilton’s medical records.” Id. at 53. The proceedings 

before the ALJ are therefore not an example of an obviously overlooked disability and 

underdeveloped record. 

This case also lacks the sort of objective indications of disability the Celaya

majority drew on to assure itself that its ruling would not force an ALJ to “divine implicit 

impairments” from the record. 332 F.3d at 1183 n.3. After reviewing the transcript of the August 

2012 hearing before the ALJ, this court finds that no “combination of a condition’s presence in 

the record and in person trigger[ed] a need for review.” Id. Rather, among other evidence, the 

ALJ saw that Hamilton had worked in several unskilled positions, CAR 26–27, maintained his 

personal hygiene on his own, CAR 48, usually took medication on his own, id., and completed 

eleventh grade, CAR 162. Although Hamilton’s IQ scores fell within the range identified in 

Listing 12.05(C) and some evidence suggested his attention, short-term memory, and ability to 

learn new information were poor, see CAR 666–72, he had received no diagnosis of an 

intellectual disability; rather, his medical treatment consistently focused on the other impairments 

for which he specifically sought disability benefits, see, e.g., CAR 652–53, 666–72. In light of 

this evidence, the court finds there is no basis for it to substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

Hamilton’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED, and the Commissioner’s 

cross-motion is GRANTED. CASE CLOSED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: March 28, 2016. 

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