Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-19-01303/USCOURTS-ca13-19-01303-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alibaba.com Hong Kong Ltd.
Appellee
Booking.com B.V.
Appellee
Ebay Inc.
Appellee
Global Equity Management (SA) Pty. Ltd.
Appellant

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

GLOBAL EQUITY MANAGEMENT (SA) PTY. LTD.,

Appellant

v.

EBAY INC., ALIBABA.COM HONG KONG LTD., 

BOOKING.COM B.V.,

Appellees

______________________

2019-1303, 2019-1304

______________________

Appeals from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in Nos. IPR2016-

01828, IPR2016-01829.

______________________

SEALED OPINION ISSUED: December 23, 2019 

PUBLIC OPINION ISSUED: January 14, 2020* 

______________________

MARK A. CANTOR, Brooks Kushman PC, Southfield, MI, 

argued for appellant. Also represented by THOMAS A.

LEWRY. 

 

* This opinion was originally filed under seal and has 

been unsealed in its entirety. 

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2 GLOBAL EQUITY MANAGEMENT (SA) v. EBAY INC.

 BENJAMIN EDWARD WEED, K&L Gates LLP, Chicago, 

IL, argued for all appellees. Appellee Ebay Inc. also represented by GINA A. JENERO. 

 CAREY RICHARD RAMOS, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & 

Sullivan, LLP, New York, NY, argued for all appellees. Appellee Alibaba.com Hong Kong Ltd. also represented by 

BRETT NELSON WATKINS, Houston, TX; JEFFREY GERCHICK, 

Washington, DC. 

 TODD M. SIEGEL, Klarquist Sparkman, LLP, Portland, 

OR, for appellee Booking.com B.V. Also represented by 

ANDREW M. MASON. 

 ______________________

Before WALLACH, CLEVENGER, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.

WALLACH, Circuit Judge. 

Appellees eBay Inc., Alibaba.com Hong Kong Ltd., and 

Booking.com B.V. (“Booking”) (collectively, “Petitioners”) 

sought inter partes review (“IPR”) of claims 1, 2, 16, and 28 

of U.S. Patent No. 6,690,400 (“the ’400 patent”) and 

claims 1–7 of U.S. Patent No. 7,356,677 (“the ’677 patent”) 

(together, “the Challenged Patents”), both owned by Appellant Global Equity Management (SA) Pty. Ltd. (“GEMSA”). 

GEMSA moved to terminate the IPR proceedings pursuant 

to 35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(1) (2012) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(1) 

(2018). J.A. 2357–75 (Motion to Terminate IPR2016–

01828), 6662–80 (Motion to Terminate IPR2016-01829). In 

a single decision, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s 

Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) denied GEMSA’s 

motions to terminate. See eBay Inc. v. Glob. Equity Mgmt. 

(SA) Pty. Ltd. (eBay I), Nos. IPR2016–01828, IPR2016–

01829, 2018 WL 485988, at *3 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 18, 2018) (Decision) (J.A. 3487–93, 7801–07). The PTAB subsequently 

found claims 1 and 2 of the ’400 patent and claims 1, 2, 6, 

and 7 of the ’677 patent unpatentable. See eBay Inc. v. 

Glob. Equity Mgmt. (SA) Pty. Ltd. (eBay II), No. IPR2016–

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01828, 2018 WL 1881463, at *12 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 18, 2018) 

(Final Written Decision) (J.A. 1–31); eBay Inc. v. Glob. Equity Mgmt. (SA) Pty. Ltd. (eBay III), No. IPR2016–01829, 

2018 WL 1898071, at *21 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 19, 2018) (Final 

Written Decision) (J.A. 32–78). 

GEMSA appeals.1 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A) (2012). We affirm. 

BACKGROUND 

Between 2015 and 2016, GEMSA filed nearly forty patent infringement lawsuits in the U.S. District Court for 

the Eastern District of Texas (“Eastern District of Texas”), 

alleging infringement of the Challenged Patents. J.A. 330–

33. The majority of GEMSA’s lawsuits were filed against 

customers of Amazon Web Services, Inc. and 

VADATA, Inc., both wholly-owned subsidiaries of Amazon.com, Inc.,2 alleging infringement based on the use of 

Amazon’s technology. J.A. 2379–83.3 GEMSA’s remaining 

lawsuits were filed against entities—including the Petitioners—that were not Amazon customers. J.A. 2713 

(GEMSA admitting that the Petitioners were “not using”

the Amazon technology), 7018 (same). 

 

1 On appeal, GEMSA does not challenge the PTAB’s 

patentability determinations; rather, GEMSA challenges 

only the PTAB’s Decision denying GEMSA’s Motions to 

Terminate. See generally Appellant’s Br. 

2 Consistent with the parties’ briefs, we will refer to 

Amazon.com, Inc., Amazon Web Services, Inc., and 

VADATA, Inc. individually and collectively as “Amazon.” 

See, e.g., Appellant’s Br. 7 n.3, Appellee’s Br. 4 n.3. 

3 The Amazon technology-at-issue included “cloudbased products and services” (“the Amazon technology”) 

that were developed, provided, and serviced by Amazon. 

J.A. 2378. 

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In July 2016, Amazon filed a complaint for declaratory 

judgment in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District 

of Virginia (“Eastern District of Virginia”), J.A. 2376–95 

(Complaint for Declaratory Judgment), “to relieve their 

customers of the unnecessary burden of litigating 

GEMSA’s cases targeting [the] Amazon technology, and to 

once and for all remove the cloud of uncertainty that has 

been cast over that technology,” J.A. 2385. Amazon alleged 

that GEMSA had “strategically chosen to sue [Amazon’s]

customers rather than [Amazon itself] to avoid testing its 

claims against the suppliers of the accused technology, who 

have the greatest interest in and ability to defend against 

[GEMSA’s] claims, in the hopes of extracting cost of litigation settlements from scores of customers.” J.A. 2384. 

Later that month, GEMSA “amended the complaints in 

[twenty] of its [thirty-five] . . . lawsuits” in the Eastern District of Texas to “add” Amazon “as [a] defendant[].” 

J.A. 2412. 

In August 2016, Amazon filed a motion in the Eastern 

District of Texas to dismiss or transfer GEMSA’s lawsuits 

“against customers” of Amazon, J.A. 2411; see J.A. 2407–

33 (Motion to Dismiss or Transfer), arguing that, because 

“Amazon is the real party-in-interest” (or “RPI”) “with respect to GEMSA’s infringement allegations, . . . venue is 

proper in the first-filed forum, the Eastern District of Virginia,” J.A. 2425. Thus, Amazon argued, the Eastern District of Texas should “dismiss GEMSA’s claims against 

Amazon . . . or, in the alternative, transfer those claims to 

the Eastern District of Virginia.” J.A. 2427. In September 2016, Booking likewise moved to stay GEMSA’s claims 

of infringement in the Eastern District of Texas “pending 

resolution” of Amazon’s declaratory judgment action, 

J.A. 2464, arguing that “Amazon, as the developer, owner, 

and supplier of the accused technology, is the real party-ininterest with respect to GEMSA’s [Amazon]-related infringement allegations,” J.A. 2469; see J.A. 2464–74 

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(Motion to Stay).4 In January 2017, the Eastern District of 

Texas stayed GEMSA’s lawsuits in that district “pending 

resolution of the Eastern District of Virginia declaratory 

judgment action.” J.A. 2511–12. 

In September 2016, the Petitioners sought IPR of the 

Challenged Patents. J.A. 320–407 (Petition for IPR of the 

’400 patent), 3754–835 (Petition for IPR of the ’677 patent). 

The Petitioners identified seventeen RPIs pursuant to 37 

C.F.R. § 42.8, including Amazon customers Expedia, Inc. 

(“Expedia”) and TripAdvisor LLC (“TripAdvisor”), 

J.A. 328–29, 3765–66, both of which had been sued by 

GEMSA in the Eastern District of Texas, J.A. 332–33, 

3768–69. The Petitioners did not identify Amazon as an 

RPI. See J.A. 328–29, 3765–66. In April 2017, the PTAB 

instituted two IPR proceedings (together, “the IPR proceedings”), a first on claims 1 and 2 of the ’400 patent, and a 

second on claims 1, 2, 6, and 7 of the ’677 patent. J.A. 1675, 

6088. In September 2017, GEMSA moved to terminate the 

IPR proceedings, arguing that: (1) Amazon’s Complaint for 

Declaratory Judgment “bars” the IPR proceedings “under 

35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(1)[,]” because Expedia and TripAdvisor 

are RPIs to Amazon’s declaratory judgment action, 

J.A. 2367, 6672;5 and (2) the Petitioners violated 37 C.F.R. 

 

4 While GEMSA initially sued Booking in the Eastern District of Texas based on Booking’s alleged use of the 

Amazon technology, see J.A. 2465, GEMSA later admitted 

that Booking was “not using” that technology, J.A. 2713, 

7018. 

5 Section 315(a)(1) of Title 35 of the U.S. Code provides that “[a]n [IPR] may not be instituted if, before the 

date on which the petition for such a review is filed, the 

petitioner or real party in interest filed a civil action challenging the validity of a claim of the patent.” 

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§ 42.8(b)(1) by “failing to identify” Amazon as an RPI, 

J.A. 2373, 6678.6 

In January 2018, the PTAB issued its Decision denying 

GEMSA’s Motions to Terminate. See eBay I, 2018 WL 

485988, at *3. The PTAB explained that “[f]or [GEMSA] to 

prevail, . . . a ‘petitioner or real party in interest’ in the[] 

IPR proceedings must have previously ‘filed a civil action 

challenging the validity of a claim of the patent.’” Id. at *2 

(quoting 35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(1)). However, as the PTAB explained, GEMSA argued only that Expedia and TripAdvisor “are real parties in interest in the Virginia action,” id., 

but did not explain how their status as RPIs to the “Virginia action triggers a statutory bar to institution of these 

IPR proceedings given the unambiguous language of 35 

U.S.C. § 315(a)(1), which bars institution only if a petitioner or RPI in these proceedings also previously filed a 

civil action challenging the validity of a claim of the patent 

at issue,” id. at *3. In April 2018, the PTAB issued its Final Written Decisions finding claims 1 and 2 of the ’400 patent and claims 1, 2, 6, and 7 of the ’677 patent 

unpatentable. See eBay II, 2018 WL 1881463, at *12; 

eBay III, 2018 WL 1898071, at *21. 

DISCUSSION 

I. Standard of Review and Legal Standard 

“An [IPR] may not be instituted if, before the date on 

which the petition for such a review is filed, the petitioner 

or real party in interest filed a civil action challenging the 

validity of a claim of the patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(1). 

 

6 Section 42.8(b)(1) of Title 37 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations provides, in relevant part, that a “notice[]” 

“[i]dentify[ing] each real party-in-interest for the [petitioner]” “must be filed” with the PTAB. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.2 

(defining “party” as “at least the petitioner and the patent 

owner”). 

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The RPI inquiry at common law, which defines the meaning of the term in § 315(a)(1), “seeks to ascertain who, from 

a practical and equitable standpoint, will benefit from the 

redress that the chosen tribunal might provide.” Applications in Internet Time, LLC v. RPX Corp., 897 F.3d 1336, 

1349 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “There is no ‘bright line test.’ Considerations may include, for example, whether a non-party 

exercises [or could exercise] control over a petitioner’s participation in a proceeding, or whether a non-party is funding the proceeding or directing the proceeding.” Id.

at 1342–43 (quoting Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 

Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,759 (Aug. 14, 2012)); see Office Patent 

Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,759 (“A common 

consideration is whether the non-party exercised or could 

have exercised control over a party’s participation in a proceeding.”). A “petitioner’s initial identification of the real 

parties in interest should be accepted unless and until disputed by a patent owner.” Worlds Inc. v. Bungie, Inc., 903 

F.3d 1237, 1243 (Fed. Cir. 2018). To dispute it, the patent 

owner “must produce some evidence that tends to show 

that a particular third party should be named a real party 

in interest.” Id. at 1244. Whether a third party is an RPI 

is a question of fact we review for substantial evidence. See

Applications in Internet Time, 897 F.3d at 1356. 

II. The Record Is Insufficient to Establish that Amazon Is

an RPI to the IPR Proceedings 

On appeal, GEMSA argues—for the first time—that 

the IPR proceedings should be terminated pursuant to 35 

U.S.C. § 315(a)(1) because Amazon, which GEMSA contends is an RPI to the IPR proceedings, filed its Complaint 

for Declaratory Judgment before the IPR petitions were 

filed. See generally Appellant’s Br. 22–37. While GEMSA 

asserted in its Motions to Terminate before the PTAB that 

Amazon is an RPI to the IPR proceedings, see J.A. 2373, 

6678, when asked where in the record GEMSA made the 

argument it now raises on appeal, viz., that “Amazon is a 

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real party-in-interest to the IPR[ proceedings] and therefore [§] 315(a) applies,” Oral Arg. at 7:34–7:46, 

http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=2019-1303.mp3 (emphasis added), GEMSA 

failed to provide a record cite and responded only that it 

would “not . . . tell [the court] that the [motions] w[ere] as 

good as [they] could be,” id. at 8:18–8:23; see id. at 7:34–

9:54. Indeed, before the PTAB, GEMSA’s termination argument focused on a different theory altogether: viz., that 

Expedia and TripAdvisor, which are RPIs to the IPR proceedings, were also RPIs to Amazon’s declaratory judgment 

action, thereby barring the IPR proceedings under 

§ 315(a)(1). See J.A. 2367–71, 6672–76. Not surprisingly 

then, the PTAB never addressed the argument GEMSA 

now raises on appeal. See generally eBay I, 2018 WL 

485988. “It is the general rule, . . . that a federal appellate 

court does not consider an issue not passed upon below.” 

Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976). “Appellate 

courts are, however, given the discretion to decide when to 

deviate from this general rule[.]” Interactive Gift Exp., Inc. 

v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2001)

(citing Singleton, 428 U.S. at 121). 

GEMSA did not meet its initial burden before the 

PTAB to “produce some evidence that tends to show that 

[Amazon] should be named a real party in interest” to the 

IPR proceedings. Worlds, 903 F.3d at 1244 (emphasis omitted). Indeed, GEMSA’s mere assertion before the PTAB 

that Amazon is an RPI to the IPR proceedings, see

J.A. 2373, 6678, is insufficient to properly preserve that argument, let alone the argument GEMSA now raises on appeal, see Game & Tech. Co. v. Wargaming Grp. Ltd., 942 

F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“Mere assertions . . . without explanation or legal argument are usually insufficient [to avoid waiver].”); SmithKline Beecham 

Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 439 F.3d 1312, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 

(holding that when a party provides no developed argument on a point, we treat that argument as waived). 

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Accordingly, we view GEMSA’s argument on appeal as 

waived.

Even if not waived, however, we are not persuaded by 

GEMSA’s argument. In fact, as it had before the PTAB, see

J.A. 2652–53, GEMSA admitted during oral argument that 

“as a fact, there are no facts” in the record “that Amazon 

actually wrote the IPR [petitions] or controlled the IPR 

[proceedings],” Oral Arg. at 5:09–5:19; see id. at 4:27–4:50 

(GEMSA admitting that it “do[es]n’t believe there is anything in the record below that Amazon drafted the IPR [petitions] or controlled the IPR [proceedings]”), 6:53–6:59 

(GEMSA agreeing that it is “undisputed that [Amazon] had 

no control over the IPR [proceedings]”), 11:41–12:05 

(GEMSA agreeing that it “can’t point to a single item 

of . . . Amazon’s behavior vis-à-vis . . . the IPR proceeding[s]”). Indeed, GEMSA acknowledged that Amazon’s 

“only . . . potential[]” relationship to the Petitioners is 

based on Booking’s representation to the Eastern District 

of Texas, Oral Arg. at 12:52–13:09, that Amazon “is the real 

party-in-interest with respect to GEMSA’s [Amazon]-related infringement allegations” in that district, J.A. 2469. 

However, Booking’s representation in that separate proceeding, as with Amazon’s earlier admission that it “[wa]s 

the real party-in-interest with respect to GEMSA’s infringement allegations,” J.A. 2425, was premised on facts

neither present in nor relevant to the IPR proceedings, viz., 

that Amazon “supplie[d] . . . the accused technology” and 

had “the greatest interest in and ability to defend against 

GEMSA’s claims,” J.A. 2411. 

GEMSA’s reliance on Amazon’s relationship with Expedia, a named RPI, fares no better. GEMSA argues, for 

example, that Amazon “stood in the shoes of Expedia” visà-vis the IPR proceedings pursuant to an indemnification 

agreement with Expedia. Oral Arg. at 6:06–6:27. 

GEMSA’s argument is, however, belied by the very evidence GEMSA relies on for support, see id. (GEMSA referencing a declaration of an Expedia attorney), which 

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explains that although Amazon’s counsel “assumed responsibility for defending Expedia . . . against GEMSA’s [infringement] allegations” in the Eastern District of Texas,

J.A. 2515, Amazon “did not control, fund, or direct any activities of Expedia . . . with regard to the IPR petitions,” 

J.A. 2516; see J.A. 2516 (“At no point was [Amazon] or any 

other Amazon entity involved in any way in Expedia[’s] financial contribution to the IPRs.”). In fact, the plain language of Amazon’s indemnification agreement with 

Expedia does not permit Amazon to control or otherwise 

participate in the IPR proceedings, as those proceedings 

were not—and, as a matter of law, could not be—within the 

scope of that agreement. Compare J.A. 2576 (providing 

that Amazon may “assume control of or otherwise participate in the defense” of “third-party alleg[ations]” that Amazon technology “infringe[s] that party’s intellectual 

property rights”), with 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (delimiting the 

scope of IPR proceedings, and not including claims of patent infringement). GEMSA’s remaining arguments are 

likewise unsupported by the record. Accordingly, GEMSA 

did not meet its burden to “produce some evidence that 

tends to show that [Amazon] should be named a real party 

in interest.” Worlds, 903 F.3d at 1244 (emphasis omitted). 

CONCLUSION

We have considered GEMSA’s remaining arguments 

and find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, the Decision of 

the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s Patent Trial and 

Appeal Board denying GEMSA’s Motions to Terminate, is 

AFFIRMED 

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