Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_05-cv-00059/USCOURTS-azd-4_05-cv-00059-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Don Bertsch
Defendant
Mack Dunham
Defendant
Arnulfo Mendez
Plaintiff
John Morgan
Defendant
Tucson Police Department
Defendant

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WO RP

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Arnulfo Mendez, )) Plaintiff, )) CV-05-59-TUC-JMR v. )) City of Tucson Police Department, )

et al., ) O R D E R

) Defendants. ) ________________________________ )

Arnulfo Mendez (Plaintiff), presently confined under Arizona Department

of Corrections (ADOC) custody in the Newton County Correctional Center in

Newton, Texas (NCCC-Newton), filed with the Clerk of the Court a pro se "Civil

Rights Complaint By A Prisoner" (Document #1) (Complaint), which includes a

"Memorandum" (Memorandum). Plaintiff has not paid a filing fee, but has filed

an uncertified "Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis By A Prisoner Civil

(Non-Habeas)" (Application To Proceed) with the Complaint, which includes a

"Certified Statement Of Account" (Account Statement).

APPLICATION TO PROCEED AND FILING FEE

Although Plaintiff's Application To Proceed has not been certified by a

correctional official, his Account Statement has been certified as required.

Case 4:05-cv-00059-JMR Document 3 Filed 12/13/05 Page 1 of 13
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Accordingly, in the interest of justice, the Court will overlook the lack of

certification on the Application To Proceed and grant the Application.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory

filing fee. Effective February 7, 2005, the filing fee for a civil rights action

increased from one hundred and fifty dollars ($150.00) to two hundred and fifty

dollars ($250.00). See 28 U.S.C. § 1914, amended by, Consolidated Appropriations

Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447, 118 Stat. 2809, Sec. 307 (December 8, 2004).

Plaintiff’s Complaint, however, is not subject to the increased fee because Plaintiff

filed his Complaint prior to February 7, 2005. Accordingly, Plaintiff is obligated

to pay only the one hundred and fifty dollar ($150.00) filing fee.

Based on the average monthly deposits in Plaintiff’s account for six (6)

months preceding the filing of the Complaint, an initial partial filing fee of sixteen

dollars and ninety-seven cents ($16.97) will be assessed by this Order. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1).

By separate order, the Court will direct the appropriate agency to collect the

initial partial filing fee from Plaintiff’s trust account and forward it to the Clerk of

the Court. Thereafter, Plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments of twenty

percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income credited to Plaintiff’s trust

account. These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk

of the Court each time the amount in Plaintiff’s account exceeds ten dollars

($10.00), until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

Plaintiff should take notice that if he is released before the filing fee is paid

in full, he must pay the remaining unpaid amount of the filing fee within one

hundred and twenty (120) days of the date of his release. If Plaintiff fails to pay

the remainder of the filing fee within one hundred and twenty (120) days of the

date of his release, the action will be dismissed, unless Plaintiff shows good cause,

in writing, why he is unable to pay the remainder of the filing fee.

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Plaintiff also should take notice that a prisoner may not bring a civil action

without complete prepayment of the appropriate filing fee if the prisoner has

brought, on three (3) or more occasions, an action or appeal in a federal court that

was dismissed as frivolous, as malicious, or for failure to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is in imminent danger of serious physical

injury. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

STATUTORY SCREENING OF PRISONER COMPLAINTS

The Court is required to screen complaints or amended complaints brought

by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of

a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint

or portion thereof if the Plaintiff has raised claims that are legally frivolous or

malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §

1915A(b)(1),(2).

 COMPLAINT

Plaintiff alleges one (1) count in his Complaint. (Complaint at 4).

Named as Defendants in the Complaint are: (1) City of Tucson Police

Department; (2) Mack Dunham, Police Officer, Tucson Police Department; (3)

Don Bertsch, Sergeant, Tucson Police Department; and (4) John Morgan, Police

Officer, Tucson Police Department. (Complaint at 1-2). 

Plaintiff seeks a jury trial, declaratory and injunctive relief, and

compensatory monetary damages. (Complaint at 7).

DISMISSAL OF DEFENDANTS

City of Tucson Police Department

To impose liability upon Defendant City of Tucson Police Department, or the

City of Tucson, Plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of a particular official city

policy or established custom and that the policy or custom caused him to be

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subjected to a deprivation of a constitutional right. Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471

U.S. 808, 829-30 (1985) (Justice Brennan, concurring); See also, Monell v. New

York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 694 (1978); Ybarra

v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Village, 723 F.2d 675, 681 (9th Cir. 1984).

Plaintiff makes no allegations in the Complaint regarding a particular policy

or custom of the City of Tucson Police Department or the City of Tucson. Instead,

Plaintiff alleges that "the police were acting while clot[h]ed in their authority as

city police officers and the city had employed this law police enforcement officers

at all times in this abuse against [P]laintiff." (Complaint at 4). However, the City

of Tucson Police Department and City of Tucson “cannot be held liable under §

1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. Accordingly, the

City of Tucson Police Department is not a proper Defendant, and will be dismissed

without prejudice from this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and

1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Don Bertsch and John Morgan

To state a viable constitutional claim, Plaintiff must show an affirmative link

between the alleged injury and the conduct of an individual Defendant. Rizzo v.

Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976). To state a claim against a state official,

the civil rights complainant must allege that the official personally participated in

the constitutional deprivation, or that a state supervisory official was aware of the

widespread abuses and with deliberate indifference to the inmate's constitutional

rights failed to take action to prevent further misconduct. King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d

565, 568 (9th Cir. 1987); See also Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Williams v. Cash, 836

F.2d 1318, 1320 (11th Cir. 1988).

There is no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on a theory of respondeat

superior, and therefore, a defendant’s position as the supervisor of persons who

allegedly violated a plaintiff’s constitutional rights does not impose liability.

Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 54 n.12 (1988); Ybarra, 723

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F.2d at 680-81.

Although Plaintiff names Don Bertsch and John Morgan as Defendants, he

has not made any allegations against them individually in the sole count of the

Complaint. Plaintiff does not allege how each of them personally participated in

the deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights, nor does he allege that these

Defendants were aware of widespread abuses and failed to act. Conclusory

allegations that a defendant or group of defendants have violated a constitutional

right are not acceptable. Accordingly, Defendants Don Bertsch and John Morgan

will also be dismissed without prejudice from this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted.

DISCUSSION

In Count I of the Complaint, Plaintiff claims that his Fourth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and

1985 when he was arrested on August 21, 2003. (Complaint at 1, 4). Plaintiff

appears to be making three (3) claims in conjunction with his arrest: 1) that he was

subjected to an illegal arrest, search, and seizure; 2) that he was subjected to

excessive force when his wrist was broken during the process of being handcuffed;

and 3) that he was deprived of emergency medical attention. Id. 

42 U.S.C. § 1981

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1981 “prohibits racial discrimination in the making and

enforcement of private contracts.” Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S.

164, 174 (1989). Where an alleged act of discrimination does not involve the

impairment of the right to make or enforce a contract, § 1981 provides no relief.

Id. at 176. Here, Plaintiff does not allege that the Defendants’ acts in any way

impaired his right to make or enforce a contract. Accordingly, Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C.

§ 1981 claim in Count I will be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief

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may be granted. 

42 U.S.C. § 1985

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1985 "proscribes conspiracies to interfere with certain civil

rights. A claim under this section must allege facts to support the allegation that

defendants conspired together. A mere allegation of conspiracy without factual

specificity is insufficient." Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d

621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana, 936 F.2d 1027,

1039 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Moreover, although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Haines v.

Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), conclusory and vague allegations will not support a

cause of action. Ivey v. Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d

266 (9th Cir. 1982); Rhodes v. Robinson, 612 F.2d 766, 772 (3rd Cir. 1979).

Further, a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential

elements of the claim that were not initially pled. Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268. 

Plaintiff has failed to allege any supporting facts for his vague allegation of

a conspiracy, or to clarify its meaning, and therefore, the allegation is clearly

conclusory. Accordingly, Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claim in Count I will be

dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and

1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

Illegal Arrest, Search, and Seizure 

Plaintiff claims in Count I that his rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were

violated when he was subjected to an illegal arrest, search, and seizure. (Complaint

at 4). However, Plaintiff fails to explain how the arrest, search, or seizure was

illegal. Moreover, he presents no facts relating to what he was arrested for, what

type of search he was subjected to, or what was seized. 

Plaintiff's allegations are both conclusory and vague. See Ivey, 673 F.2d at

268. Accordingly, Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim in Count I that he was

subjected to an illegal arrest, search, and seizure will be dismissed without

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prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1) for failure

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

In so doing, the Court notes that the case of Heck v. Humphrey holds: 

[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose

unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a §1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed

on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a

state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into

question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28

U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not

cognizable under § 1983.

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486 (1994).

Heck not only bars claims for damages challenging the validity of a

conviction or sentence, it also bars claims challenging the validity of an arrest and

prosecution, see Smithart v. Towery, 79 F.3d 951, 952 (9th Cir.1996), as well as

claims which necessarily implicate the validity of pending criminal charges, see

Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 700-01 (9th Cir.1997). A civil

claim which necessarily implicates the validity of pending criminal charges does

not accrue until after one has succeeded in the criminal realm. Id. (citing Heck).

Plaintiff's allegations in Count I that he was subjected to an illegal arrest,

search, and seizure necessarily implicate the validity of pending criminal charges,

or a conviction or sentence based on them. Therefore, under Heck, these

allegations are not cognizable in this action because Plaintiff has not shown that

he has been successful in the criminal realm by having charges against him

dropped, or by having his conviction or sentence invalidated by a state or federal

court.

Excessive Force

Plaintiff appears to claim in Count I that his rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

were violated while he was being handcuffed when Defendant Mack Dunham

"among other officer [sic] caused" injuries to his wrist. (Complaint at 4,

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Memorandum at 1). Plaintiff alleges that six (6) days later the jail doctor

determined that Plaintiff's wrist was broken. Id. 

In reviewing Plaintiff's excessive force claim, the Court notes that “all claims

that law enforcement officers have used excessive force - deadly or not - in the

course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be

analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’ standard.”

Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s excessive

force claim will be construed as raising a Fourth Amendment claim, rather than an

Eighth Amendment claim. See Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 623 (“In civil rights

cases where the plaintiff appears pro se, the court must construe the pleadings

liberally and must afford the plaintiff the benefit of any doubt”). 

The Court also notes that the “Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel and

unusual punishments’ applies only ‘after conviction and sentence.’ Graham, 490

U.S. at 393 & n. 6 (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n. 40 (1977)).”

Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001). Because Plaintiff

does not appear to have been convicted of, or sentenced for, any crime at the time

of the incident in question, he is “accorded no rights under the Eighth Amendment”

with regard to the incident. Id. (citation omitted)

Liberally construed, Plaintiff states an excessive force claim for relief under

the Fourth Amendment against Defendant Mack Dunham. Accordingly, the Court

will call for an answer from Defendant Dunham to the Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983

excessive force claim in Count I. 

Emergency Medical Attention

Plaintiff also claims in Count I that his rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were

violated when Defendant Mack Dunham "among other officer [sic]" deprived him

of emergency medical attention because of Plaintiff's inability to communicate

fluently with them, "delivering indifference to serious medical injuries and harm"

in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Complaint at 4).

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To state a § 1983 medical claim, a plaintiff must show that the defendants

acted with “deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.” Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Deliberate indifference may occur if “officials

deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment.” Hutchinson v.

United States, 838 F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1988). However, a mere delay in

medical care, without more, is insufficient to state a claim against prison officials

for deliberate indifference. May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980);

Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir.

1985).

The indifference must be substantial. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06. The

action must rise to a level of “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Id. at

106. Mere claims of “indifference,” “negligence,” or “medical malpractice” do not

support a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622

F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980). Not every claim by a prisoner that he has not

received adequate medical treatment states a violation of the Eighth Amendment.

Because Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the time of the actions he

complains of in the Complaint, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment, rather than the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and

unusual punishment, would apply to his medical claim. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441

U.S. 520, 535-37 (1979); Jones v. Johnson, 781 F.2d 769, 771 (9th Cir.1986).

However, in general, the Court borrows from Eighth Amendment jurisprudence

when analyzing the rights of pretrial detainees. See Redman v. County of San

Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1443 (9th Cir. 1991); Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles,

864 F.2d 1454, 1461 n. 2 (9th Cir.1988) (subsequent history omitted).

Plaintiff's medical claim in Count I against Defendant Dunham fails to rise

to the level of a constitutional violation under the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments. At most Plaintiff's allegations against Defendant Dunham amount

to indifference or negligence which does not satisfy the deliberate indifference

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standard. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06. This is particularly true where Plaintiff

attributes the failure to provide medical attention to an inability communicate

fluently. (Complaint at 4). Accordingly, Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim in

Count I that he was deprived of emergency medical attention will be dismissed

without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1) for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

RULE 41(b) WARNING

Plaintiff is cautioned that if he fails to timely comply with every provision

of this Order, this action will be dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir.)

(District Court may dismiss action for failure to comply with any order of the

Court), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 915 (1992).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

(1) That Plaintiff’s "Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis By A

Prisoner Civil (Non-Habeas)" filed with the Complaint is GRANTED; 

(2) That Plaintiff is OBLIGATED to pay the statutory filing fee of one

hundred and fifty dollars ($150.00) for this action. Plaintiff is ASSESSED an

initial partial filing fee of sixteen dollars and ninety-seven cents ($16.97). All fees

shall be collected and paid in accordance with this Court’s Order to the Director

of the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADOC) filed concurrently herewith;

(3) That Defendants City of Tucson Police Department, Don Bertsch, and

John Morgan are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE from this action pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted; 

(4) That all of Plaintiff's claims in Count I of the Complaint, EXCEPT his

42 U.S.C. § 1983 excessive force claim, are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted; 

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(5) That Defendant Mack Dunham is REQUIRED TO FILE an answer to

Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 excessive force claim in Count I of the Complaint; 

(6) That the Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to send Plaintiff a service

packet, including a copy of this Order, a copy of the Complaint (Document #1),

and both summons and request for waiver forms for Defendant Mack Dunham;

(7) That Plaintiff SHALL COMPLETE AND RETURN the service

packets to the Clerk of the Court within twenty (20) days of the date of filing of

this Order. The United States Marshal will not provide service of process if

Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order;

(8) That if Plaintiff does NOT either obtain a waiver of service of

summons or complete service of the summons and Complaint on Defendant within

one hundred and twenty (120) days of the date the Complaint was filed, or within

sixty (60) days of the filing of this Order, whichever is later, the ACTION MAY

BE DISMISSED as to Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure and Rule 16.2(b)(2)(B)(i) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure

(LRCiv); 

(9) That the United States Marshal SHALL RETAIN the summons, a copy

of the Complaint (Document #1), and a copy of this Order for future use;

(10) That the United States Marshal SHALL NOTIFY Defendant Mack

Dunham of the commencement of this action and REQUEST WAIVER OF

SERVICE pursuant to Rule 4(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The

notice to Defendant shall include a copy of this Order. The Marshal shall file

waivers of service of the summons or requests for waivers that are returned as

undeliverable as soon as they are received. If a waiver of service of summons is

not returned by Defendant to the Marshall within thirty (30) days from the date the

request for waiver was sent by the Marshal, the Marshal shall:

(a) Personally serve copies of the summons, Complaint (Document

#1), and this Order upon the Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(e)(2) of

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the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;

(b) Within ten (10) days after personal service is effected, file the

return of service for the Defendant, along with evidence of the

attempt to secure a waiver of service of the summons and of the costs

subsequently incurred in effecting service upon the Defendant. The

costs of service shall be enumerated on the return of service form

(USM-285) and shall include the costs incurred by the Marshal for

photocopying additional copies of the summons, Complaint, or this

Order and for preparing new process receipt and return forms

(USM-285), if required. Costs of service will be taxed against the

personally served Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(d)(2) and (5) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise ordered by the

Court;

(11) That if Defendant agrees to waive service of the summons and

Complaint, he SHALL RETURN the signed waiver form to the United States

Marshal, not to Plaintiff; 

(12) That Defendant Dunham SHALL ANSWER Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. §

1983 excessive force claim in Count I of the Complaint or otherwise respond by

appropriate motion within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Rule

12(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; 

(13) That a clear, legible copy of every pleading or other document filed

SHALL ACCOMPANY each original pleading or other document filed with the

Clerk for use by the District Judge or Magistrate Judge to whom the case is

assigned. See LRCiv 5.4. Failure to submit a copy along with the original

pleading or document will result in the pleading or document being stricken

without further notice to Plaintiff;

(14) That Plaintiff SHALL SERVE upon Defendant(s), or if appearance has

been entered by counsel, upon the attorney, a copy of every further pleading or

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other document submitted for consideration by the Court. Plaintiff shall include

with the original document and copy, to be filed with the Clerk of the Court, a

certificate stating the date a true and correct copy of the pleading or document was

mailed to Defendant or the counsel. Any paper received by a District Court Judge

or Magistrate Judge which has not been filed with the Clerk of the Court may be

disregarded by the Court; 

(15) That at all times during the pendency of this action, Plaintiff SHALL

IMMEDIATELY ADVISE the Court and the United States Marshal of any change

of address and its effective date. Such notice shall be captioned “NOTICE OF

CHANGE OF ADDRESS.” The notice shall contain only information pertaining

to the change of address and its effective date, except that if Plaintiff has been

released from custody, the notice should so indicate. The notice shall not include

any motions for any other relief. Plaintiff shall serve a copy of the notice on all

opposing parties. Failure to file a NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS may

result in the dismissal of the action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 41(b).

DATED this 6th day of December, 2005.

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