Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_24-cv-00182/USCOURTS-azd-2_24-cv-00182-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Attorney General of the State of Arizona
Respondent
German Solis-Antonio
Petitioner
Ryan Thornell
Respondent

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

German Solis-Antonio,

Petitioner,

v. 

Ryan Thornell, Attorney General of the 

State of Arizona,

Respondents.

No. CV 24-00182 PHX MTL (CDB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE MICHAEL T. LIBURDI:

Petitioner German Solis-Antonio seeks relief from his state conviction and sentence, 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The matter is now ready for the Court’s review.

I. Background

A Maricopa County grand jury indictment returned August 12, 2015, charged SolisAntonio with two counts of physical child abuse, regarding two victims; the crimes were 

charged as class 2 felonies and dangerous crimes against a child. (ECF No. 11-1 at 4-7).

On April 19, 2017, pursuant to a written plea agreement and after a settlement conference 

and a Donald hearing (ECF No. 11-1 at 21-29),1 Solis-Antonio pleaded guilty to one count 

of child abuse, a class 2 felony and a dangerous crime against a child, and one amended 

1 A “Donald” hearing is a hearing before a judge where a defendant is informed of the 

details of a plea agreement as well as the risks of going to trial and the sentencing range that the 

defendant would face were he to be convicted on some or all of the charges against him. See State 

v. Donald, 198 Ariz. 406 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000). At the Donald hearing, Solis-Antonio was advised 

that if he went to trial and was found guilty on both charges he faced a minimum of 20 years’ 

imprisonment and a maximum of 48 years’ imprisonment. (ECF No. 11-1 at 25). 

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count of attempted child abuse, a class 3 felony and a dangerous crime against a child. 

(ECF No. 11-1 at 43-61). In the written plea agreement the parties stipulated that SolisAntonio would be sentenced to ten to 17 calendar years imprisonment for child abuse and 

to lifetime probation for attempted child abuse. (ECF No. 11-1 at 66-68). In return for the 

guilty pleas the State agreed to dismiss the allegation that the attempted count was a 

dangerous crime against a child in the first degree. (ECF No. 11-1 at 67).

Solis-Antonio signed the plea agreement, averring he understood and approved all 

of the terms of the plea agreement. (ECF No. 11-1 at 68). Solis-Antonio further avowed 

his “plea [wa]s voluntary and not the result of force, or threat, or promises other than those 

contained in the plea agreement.” (Id.). At a contemporaneous plea hearing the state trial 

court reviewed the plea agreement with Solis-Antonio. (ECF No. 11-1 at 43-60). SolisAntonio averred the plea was not the result of threats or promises not contained in the plea 

agreement. (ECF No. 11-1 at 47). Solis-Antonio agreed he had signed the plea agreement 

voluntarily and of his own free will. (Id.). Solis-Antonio confirmed he agreed with and 

signed the factual basis addendum (ECF No. 11-1 at 69), and he understood the recitation 

of the factual basis for his guilty pleas before signing the addendum. (ECF No. 11-1 at 48). 

The court advised Solis-Antonio of the range of his possible sentence and all the 

constitutional rights and rights of review he was waiving by pleading guilty. (ECF No. 11-

1 at 48-51, 54-55). Solis-Antonio confirmed he understood his rights, and averred he 

wanted to waive those rights and plead guilty. (ECF No. 11-1 at 57-58). The state trial court 

found Solis-Antonio was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently pleading guilty to the 

counts of conviction. (ECF No. 11-1 at 59). 

On June 30, 2017, at the conclusion of a hearing during which both Solis-Antonio 

and his counsel addressed the court, the trial court accepted the plea agreement and 

sentenced Solis-Antonio to the presumptive term of 17 years’ imprisonment followed by 

lifetime probation. (ECF No. 11-1 at 71-99).

On July 26, 2017, Solis-Antonio initiated a post-conviction proceeding pursuant to 

Rule 33.1 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (ECF No. 11-1 at 107-09). In his 

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petition Solis-Antonio asserted a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (Id.). SolisAntonio was appointed post-conviction counsel. (ECF No. 11-1 at 111-12). His appointed 

post-conviction counsel advised the state habeas court they had reviewed transcripts from 

the settlement conference, the change-of-plea hearing, and sentencing, and also reviewed

information from Solis-Antonio’s trial counsel. (ECF No. 11-1 at 114-17). Post-conviction 

counsel averred that, after investigating the case for any colorable claims, they determined 

there were no colorable claims to raise on Solis-Antonio’s behalf. (Id.). The trial court 

granted Solis-Antonio additional time to file a pro per petition. (ECF No. 11-1 at 119-31).

On November 21, 2018, Solis-Antonio filed a pro per petition for post-conviction 

relief. (ECF No. 11-1 at 134-48). Solis-Antonio asserted he was denied the effective 

assistance of counsel; the trial court erred in declining to appoint new counsel at the Donald

hearing; and he was “not guilty” and had been “wrongfully convicted.” (Id.).

The state habeas trial court denied relief in an order issued May 1, 2019, concluding

Solis-Antonio failed to assert a colorable claim for relief. (ECF No. 11-1 at 196-202). Inter 

alia, after a thorough examination of the claims the court found trial counsel’s performance 

was not deficient and Solis-Antonio was not prejudiced by counsel’s alleged deficient 

performance. (ECF No. 11-1 at 197-201). 

The record in this matter does not indicate Solis-Antonio sought review of the denial 

of relief by the Arizona Court of Appeals, timely or otherwise. (ECF No. 11-2 at 51-52).2

On January 4, 2023, Solis-Antonio filed a second petition for postconviction relief. 

(ECF No. 11-2 at 2-20). The state habeas trial court noted that because Solis-Antonio had 

entered a guilty plea, the first Rule 33 action was an appeal of right and Solis-Antonio was 

allowed to file a second petition only “for the purpose of challenging the effectiveness of 

2 Solis-Antonio does not speak or write in English, and he had an interpreter throughout 

his state court criminal proceedings. His habeas petition, written in English and evidently prepared 

with assistance, incorrectly states he was sentenced to 20 years of flat time, and that he took a 

direct appeal in November of 2015 (ECF No. 1 at 2), in addition to stating he took an appeal to the 

Arizona Supreme Court in September of 2023 (ECF No. 1 at 3) and he filed an appeal of the trial 

court’s denial of post-conviction relief in January of 2017 (ECF No. 1 at 4). Respondent has 

supplied the Court with the state-court docket in the case, CR2015-136324 (ECF No. 11-2 at 47-

64), which supports the recitation of the criminal and post-conviction proceedings provided herein.

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post-conviction relief counsel” in the first proceeding. (ECF No. 11-2 at 22). The court 

further found that the second petition would have been due within 30 days of the final order 

in the first action, i.e., no later than May 31, 2019. Accordingly, on February 13, 2023, the 

state trial court dismissed the petition, finding it was untimely. (Id.). 

Solis-Antonio filed a petition for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals (ECF No. 

11-2 at 26-35), which was denied on July 26, 2023 (ECF No. 11-2 at 38-40). The appellate 

court found and concluded:

In January 2023, Solis-Antonio filed a second petition for postconviction relief, asserting claims under Rule 33.1(a), (e), and (h). In a 

memorandum attached to his petition, Solis-Antonio described several 

aspects of the pretrial and plea process, mentioning a litany of issues, 

including ineffective assistance of trial counsel, constitutional violations, the 

denial of his request for new counsel, conflicts of interest, language barriers, 

being forced to plead guilty, and actual innocence. 

The next month, the superior court summarily dismissed SolisAntonio’s petition. As to Rule 33.1(a), the court determined that his claims 

were precluded because he either had raised them in his previous petition or 

he could have done so. As to Rule 33.1(e), the court observed that SolisAntonio had not “provide[d] any new facts or evidence” to support relief but 

instead raised “a series of arguments rejected in his first Rule 33 proceeding.” 

The court explained these were neither “facts” nor “new.” Finally, as to 

Rule 33.1(h), the court determined that Solis-Antonio had failed to 

demonstrate “by clear and convincing evidence that the facts underlying the 

claim would be sufficient to establish that no reasonable fact-finder would 

find the defendant guilty of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” ...

In his petition [for review], Solis-Antonio asks this court to accept 

jurisdiction and conduct a de novo review. He seems to suggest the superior 

court erred by rejecting his claims in a “boilerplate” ruling, but he fails to 

develop any cognizable legal argument. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

33.16(c)(2)(B), (D) (petition for review must contain “statement of issues the 

trial court decided that the defendant is presenting for appellate review” and 

“reasons why the appellate court should grant the petition, including citations 

to supporting legal authority”). He also fails to cite any legal authority or 

record references supporting his position. See Ariz. R. Crim. 

P. 33.16(c)(2)(C), (D). His failure to comply with our rules or present 

meaningful argument justifies our summary denial of review. ...

(ECF No. 11-2 at 39-40). 

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On August 9, 2023, Solis-Antonio filed a petition for review in the Arizona Supreme 

Court, which was denied on November 8, 2023. (ECF No. 11-2 at 42, 45).

In his federal habeas petition Solis-Antonio asserts he is entitled to relief from his 

conviction and sentence because he was subjected to a “miscarriage of justice;” he was 

denied the effective assistance of counsel; he was denied his right to be free of double 

jeopardy; and he was subjected to vindictive prosecution. (ECF No. 1). Upon screening the 

petition the first claim for relief was dismissed and Respondents were ordered to answer 

the other three claims for relief. (ECF No. 6). In response to the petition, Respondents 

assert federal habeas relief is barred by the governing statute of limitations. (ECF No. 11).

II. Analysis

Solis-Antonio’s petition for habeas corpus relief is barred by the statute of 

limitations stated in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). The 

AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on state prisoners seeking federal habeas 

relief from their state convictions. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The one-year statute of 

limitations on habeas petitions begins to run on “the date on which the judgment became 

final by conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 

Id. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The limitations period is statutorily tolled during the time a “properly 

filed” state action for post-conviction relief is pending in the state courts. Id. § 2244(d)(2).

To assess the timeliness of the pending petition, the Court must first determine the 

date on which Solis-Antonio’s conviction became “final by the conclusion of direct 

review.” Id. § 2244(d)(1)(A). By pleading guilty, Solis-Antonio was precluded from 

pursuing a direct appeal in the Arizona Court of Appeals. Instead, Solis-Antonio was 

entitled to seek review of his conviction and sentence in an “of-right” proceeding pursuant 

to Rule 33 (formerly Rule 32) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, the functional 

equivalent of a direct appeal with regard to a pleading defendant in Arizona. See, e.g., 

Bryant v. Arizona Att’y Gen., 499 F.3d 1056, 1058 n.1 (9th Cir. 2007), citing Summers v. 

Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 715-16 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[b]ecause a Rule 32 of-right proceeding is 

a form of direct review, AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations does not begin to run 

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until the conclusion of the Rule 32 of-right proceeding and review of that proceeding, or 

until the expiration of the time for seeking such proceeding or review.”). See also 

Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1074 n.4 (9th Cir. 2007); Van Norman v. Schriro, 

616 F. Supp. 2d 939, 948 (D. Ariz. 2007).

Solis-Antonio timely filed a state action for post-conviction relief pursuant to 

Rule 33. The state habeas trial court denied relief in an order entered May 1, 2019, and the 

time allowed for Solis-Antonio to seek review by the Arizona Court of Appeals expired 

May 31, 2019. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 33.16(a)(1). Solis-Antonio did not file a petition for

appellate review on or before May 31, 2019. Accordingly, the statute of limitations on his 

federal habeas petition began to run on June 1, 2019, and the statute of limitations expired 

June 1, 2020. Solis-Antonio’ federal habeas petition, signed and placed in the prison mail 

system on January 22, 2024, was filed more than three years after the statute of limitations 

expired.

The limitations period is statutorily tolled during the time a “properly filed” state 

action for post-conviction relief is pending in the state courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).

“Properly filed means the petition’s delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the 

applicable laws and rules governing filings in that state.” Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 

1148 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted). In Pace v. DiGuglielmo, the Supreme 

Court held that “[w]hen a postconviction petition is untimely under state law, that [is] the 

end of the matter for purposes of § 2244(d)(2).” 544 U.S. 408, 410, 413 (2005) (holding a 

state petition that is not filed within the state’s required time limit is not “properly filed.”). 

See also Allen v. Siebert, 552 U.S. 3, 5-7 (2007) (holding the Pace rule applies even where 

there are exceptions to the state-court filing deadlines, and reaffirming that a state court’s 

rejection of a petition as untimely is “the end of the matter”). 

Solis-Antonio initiated a second state action for post-conviction relief on January 4, 

2023, more than two years after the statute of limitations had expired with regard to a

federal habeas action. Solis-Antonio’s second Rule 32 action was not a “properly filed” 

action for state post-conviction relief, as the state court found the second petition was 

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untimely. See Pace, 544 U.S. at 413 (holding that a state petition that is not filed within the 

state’s required time limit is not “properly filed.”). See also Allen, 552 U.S. at 5-7.

Furthermore, Solis-Antonio’s second post-conviction action did not revive or restart the 

already-expired limitations period with regard to his federal habeas petition. See Larson v. 

Soto, 742 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 2013); Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th 

Cir. 2003); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001). 

The one-year statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas petition may be 

equitably tolled if extraordinary circumstances beyond the petitioner’s control prevented 

them from filing their petition on time and the petitioner was diligent in pursuing their postconviction remedies. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010); Gibbs v. Legrand, 

767 F.3d 879, 884-85 (9th Cir. 2014). As to the first element, “[t]he diligence required for 

equitable tolling purposes is reasonable diligence, not maximum feasible diligence.” 

Holland, 560 U.S. at 653 (internal citations and quotations omitted). To be entitled to 

equitable tolling, the petitioner must establish “due diligence,” i.e., that he diligently 

pursued his claims and that “some extraordinary circumstance” beyond his control 

“prevented” the timely filing of his habeas petition. Smith v. Davis, 953 F.3d 582, 595 (9th 

Cir. 2020) (internal quotations and citations omitted, emphasis in original). As to the 

second element, “[e]quitable tolling is applicable only if extraordinary circumstances 

beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time.” Roy v. Lampert, 

465 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2006) (quotations and citations omitted). The “extraordinary 

circumstance” must be attributable to an external force rather than a petitioner’s lack of 

diligence or his lack of legal knowledge. See Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th 

Cir. 1999). Equitable tolling is also available if the petitioner establishes their actual, 

factual innocence of the crimes of conviction. See McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 

386 (2013); Stewart v. Cate, 757 F.3d 929, 937-38 (9th Cir. 2014).

Equitable tolling is to be rarely granted. See, e.g., Yow Ming Yeh v. Martel, 751 F.3d 

1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 2014); Waldon-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 

2009). It is the petitioner’s burden to establish that equitable tolling is warranted in his 

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case. See Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir. 2010); Waldon-Ramsey, 556 F.3d 

at 1011; Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2004). To be 

entitled to equitable tolling Solis-Antonio must show “extraordinary circumstances were 

the cause of his untimeliness and that the extraordinary circumstances made it impossible

to file a petition on time.” Porter, 620 F.3d at 959 (emphasis added and internal quotations 

omitted). See also Bryant, 499 F.3d at 1060 (holding the petitioner must establish a “causal 

connection” between the extraordinary circumstances and their failure to file a timely 

petition).

Solis-Antonio has not filed a reply in support of his habeas petition addressing 

Respondents’ contention that his claims are time-barred. Solis-Antonio fails to assert any 

basis for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations, and he does not assert the existence 

of any extraordinary circumstances that were the cause of his failure to timely file a federal 

habeas petition. Nor has he established his factual innocence of the crimes of conviction. 

Accordingly, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations is not warranted in this matter. 

III. Conclusion

Solis-Antonio’s federal habeas petition was not filed within the applicable statute 

of limitations. Solis-Antonio has not presented an argument that equitable tolling of the 

statute of limitations is warranted. Accordingly,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the petition seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus 

at ECF No. 1 be DENIED.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment.

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have 

fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which 

to file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) 

days within which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2(e)(3) of the 

Local Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of 

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Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not exceed ten (10) pages in 

length. Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate 

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2003) (en banc). 

Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District 

Courts requires the Court to “issue or a deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a 

final order adverse to the applicant.” Rule 11, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. The undersigned 

recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted and, should SolisAntonio seek a certificate of appealability, a certificate of appealability should be denied 

because he has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

Dated this 22nd day of November, 2024.

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