Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-06-03087/USCOURTS-caDC-06-03087-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Franco Jefferson Rawlings
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 19, 2008 Decided April 15, 2008

No. 06-3087

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

FRANCO JEFFERSON RAWLINGS,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 04cr00456-2)

Sandra G. Roland, Assistant Federal Public Defender,

argued the cause for the appellant. A. J. Kramer, Federal Public

Defender, was on brief.

Louis Ramos, Assistant Unites States Attorney, argued the

cause for the appellee. Jeffrey A. Taylor, United States

Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese III, Assistant United States

Attorney, were on brief.

Before: HENDERSON, TATEL and GARLAND, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Franco J.

Rawlings appeals his conviction of one count of felon in

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possession of a firearm and ammunition on the grounds that the

trial judge improperly permitted the jurors to submit questions

directed to trial witnesses and that the prosecutor’s closing

argument improperly bolstered the credibility of the

Government witnesses and shifted the burden of proof to the

defendant. Rawlings did not object to the judge’s questioning

of jurors or the prosecutor’s argument and we find no plain error

in either. We therefore affirm Rawlings’s conviction. 

I.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, see

United States v. Roy, 473 F.3d 1232, 1233 (D.C. Cir. 2007), the

evidence establishes the following facts. About 5:30 p.m. on

October 13, 2004, District of Columbia Metropolitan Police

Department Detective Kevin Copeland and Officer Harry Allen

were in separate cars in a supermarket parking lot in the 1600

block of Maryland Ave., N.E. when they observed Rawlings

drive a white car into the parking lot and then drive out again

shortly thereafter. Allen, who was in plain clothes, and

Copeland, wearing a bullet-proof vest displaying the word

“POLICE” in large capital letters, gave chase in their separate

unmarked cars. Allen took the lead and Copeland followed

close behind, with a flashing red police light on his dashboard.

While being chased, Rawlings ran a red light at the

intersection of 17th Street and Massachusetts Avenue, S.E. and

collided with a car driven by Julio Orozco. Rawlings lost

control of his car which then ran up onto the curb. He climbed

out of the car and began to run. According to the testimony of

Copeland and Aretha Holland—a social worker at the nearby

Boys and Girls Club who ran outside when she heard the

crash—Rawlings emerged from the car carrying a gun, which he

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According to Copeland, Rawlings crouched down and looked

toward Copeland before tossing the gun. 12/20/05 Tr. 76. Holland

testified Rawlings briefly pointed the gun directly at Allen before he

tossed it. Id. 198.

threw to the ground as he passed the front of his car.1 Neither

Allen nor Orozco recalled seeing a gun. Rawlings continued to

run across Massachusetts Avenue, with Copeland and Allen in

pursuit, and then came to a stop. The officers ordered Rawlings

to the ground and, when he did not comply, they forced him

down and handcuffed him. Allen then returned to the front of

Rawlings’s car and located the gun on the ground where

Copeland told him Rawlings tossed it. A crime scene technician

arrived a short time later and took custody of the gun, a loaded

Glock semi-automatic .45 caliber pistol. 

Rawlings’s trial began on December 20, 2005. Immediately

beforehand, defense counsel moved orally to preclude the

Government from making reference to the circumstances that

brought Rawlings and the two officers to the parking lot on

October 13, 2004. Rawlings had driven there with a passenger–

Ricardo Lacy–who had arranged to sell phencyclidine and

cocaine base to a man who, unbeknownst to him, was an

undercover police officer. Copeland and Allen were there in

connection with the undercover drug transaction. When Lacy

attempted to make the sale, he was arrested and Rawlings drove

off. The Government, with the judge’s approval, agreed not to

elicit testimony about the drug transaction. 

On January 9, 2006, a jury convicted Rawlings of one count

of unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition by a

convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and

acquitted him of one count of assaulting a police officer in

violation of D.C. Code § 22-405(b). On May 19, 2006 the

district court sentenced Rawlings to 120 months’ imprisonment.

Rawlings filed a notice of appeal on May 30, 2006.

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II.

Rawlings contends his conviction should be reversed based

on (1) the judge’s practice of allowing jurors to submit questions

to be asked of witnesses and (2) improper closing arguments by

the prosecutor. We address each ground separately.

A. Juror Questions

Rawlings first objects to the judge’s practice of permitting

jurors to submit questions in writing for the judge to ask the

witnesses. At the beginning of the trial, the judge advised the

jury as follows:

I do permit jurors to ask questions. . . .

 . . . We will get you some 3 by 5 cards so you can, if

you deem it appropriate, ask questions.

 I can’t let you ask questions the way the lawyers do

verbally, but if you have a question, just take a 3 by 5

card and write down what your question is. I will review

that with the lawyers. If I think it’s an appropriate

question, I will ask it. If I think it’s not an appropriate

question, I will not ask it.

 And that’s why we do not let jurors verbally ask

questions because most of you are not legally trained

and may not know some of the nuances of the law and,

therefore, not appreciate what are appropriate or

inappropriate questions. And, therefore, I have to have

you write them down, review them with the lawyers, and

decide whether they’re appropriate.

 If I decide not to ask a question, the juror who asked

that question has to disregard the fact that they even

asked it and cannot speculate or guess as to what the

answer would have been.

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12/20/05 Tr. 41-42. Because Rawlings did not object to the

judge’s instruction, we review his challenge for plain error. See

United States v. Perry, 479 F.3d 885, 892 (D.C. Cir. 2007)

(plain error review of jury instruction not objected to). Under

the plain error standard, 

we will remedy a trial court error only if there is “(1)

‘error,’ (2) that is ‘plain,’ and (3) that ‘affect[s]

substantial rights[ ]’ . . . [and] (4) the error ‘seriously

affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of

judicial proceedings.’ ” Johnson v. United States, 520

U.S. 461, 466-67 (1997) (quoting [United States v

Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)]). An error “affec[ts]

substantial rights” if it is “prejudicial” or “affected the

outcome of the district court proceedings.” Olano, 507

U.S. at 734. 

Id. (full Olano citation added; other alterations in original).

There was no plain error here.

Rawlings urges that the court “establish a bright-line rule

forbidding jurors to pose questions for the witnesses,” relying on

cases from other circuits that warn of the risks involved in

allowing jurors to pose questions to witnesses. Appellant’s Br.

25. At the same time, however, Rawlings concedes that

“[e]very Court of Appeals to address this issue has determined

that it is a matter within the discretion of the trial court, and that

it is not prejudicial per se.” Id. 22. As of the time of trial, at

least ten circuits had considered the issue and concluded that

juror questions are within the trial judge’s discretion. See

United States v. Sutton, 970 F.2d 1001, 1005 (1st Cir. 1992);

United States v. Bush, 47 F.3d 511, 515 (2d Cir. 1995); United

States v. Hernandez, 176 F.3d 719, 723 (3d Cir. 1999);

DeBenedetto v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 512, 516

(4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Callahan, 588 F.2d 1078, 1086

(5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Collins, 226 F.3d 457, 461 (6th

Cir. 2000); United States v. Feinberg, 89 F.3d 333, 337 (7th Cir.

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1996); United States v. Groene, 998 F.2d 604, 606 (8th Cir.

1993); United States v. Gonzales, 424 F.2d 1055, 1056 (9th Cir.

1970); United States v. Richardson, 233 F.3d 1285, 1288-89

(11th Cir. 2000). Given the unanimous view of ten sister

circuits and the absence of law in this Circuit, Rawlings cannot

establish that the trial judge’s practice constituted an error that

was “ ‘plain’ or ‘obvious’ under the law as it stood at the time

of trial” under the second prong of the plain error standard. See

United States v. Spriggs, 102 F.3d 1245, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1996)

(finding no plain error in jury instruction that was “consistent

with the approach taken by several other circuits at the time”).

Further, we conclude the judge’s practice was not error at all

under the plain error standard’s first prong. 

We agree with our sister circuits that whether to allow jurors

to question witnesses is a matter within the trial judge’s

discretion. As other courts have observed, the practice offers

substantial benefits. For example, it can help focus the jurors,

clear up confusion, alert counsel to evidentiary lacunae and

generally ensure that the jurors have the information needed to

reach a reasoned verdict. See United States v. Collins, 226 F.3d

at 462; United States v. Bush, 47 F.3d at 514, 516; United States

v. Sutton, 970 F.2d at 1005 n.3; United States v. Callahan, 588

F.2d at 1086. We also agree with other circuits, however, that

the practice carries significant risk:

There are a number of dangers inherent in allowing juror

questions: jurors can find themselves removed from their

appropriate role as neutral fact-finders; jurors may

prematurely evaluate the evidence and adopt a particular

position as to the weight of that evidence before

considering all the facts; the pace of trial may be

delayed; there is a certain awkwardness for lawyers

wishing to object to juror-inspired questions; and there

is a risk of undermining litigation strategies. In light of

jurors’ lack of knowledge of the rules of evidence, a

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juror question may be improper or prejudicial. When a

court declines to ask a question, the questioning juror

may feel that her pursuit of truth has been thwarted by

rules she does not understand. Concern has also been

expressed over a risk that a sense of camaraderie among

jurors may lead them to attach more significance to

questions propounded by fellow jurors than those posed

by counsel.

United States v. Collins, 226 F.3d at 461-62 (citations omitted);

see also United States v. Richardson, 233 F.3d at 1290; United

States v. Feinberg, 89 F.3d at 336-37; United States v. Bush, 47

F.3d at 516-17; United States v. Groene, 998 F.2d at 606; United

States v. Sutton, 970 F.2d at 1005; DeBenedetto v. Goodyear

Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d at 516. To minimize these risks,

a district judge who decides to permit questioning by jurors in

a given case should implement specific precautionary

procedures.

First, the court should inform counsel in advance that juror

questions will be allowed, should require that all juror questions

be submitted in writing, should review them with counsel out of

the presence of the jury (evaluating objections, if any) and then,

if it finds the question proper, should itself ask the question of

the witness. See United States v. Richardson, 233 F.3d at 1290-

91; United States v. Collins, 226 F.3d at 464; United States v.

Feinberg, 89 F.3d at 337; United States v. Bush, 47 F.3d at 516;

United States v. Groene, 998 F.2d at 606. In addition, before

any questioning begins, the court should instruct the jurors about

the function of the questioning procedure in clarifying factual

(not legal) issues and should direct them to remain neutral and,

if the judge fails to ask a particular question, not to take offense

or to speculate as to the reasons therefor or what answer might

have been given. See United States v. Collins, 226 F.3d at 464-

65; United States v. Sutton, 970 F.2d at 1005. Then, after a

particular witness has responded to the questions, the court

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should permit counsel to re-question the witness. See United

States v. Collins, 226 F.3d at 465; United States v. Hernandez,

995 F.2d 307, 312 (1st Cir. 1993); DeBenedetto v. Goodyear

Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d at 515 n.1. We also think it

prudent to repeat the instructions in the closing charge. Because

the judge in this case scrupulously adhered to these prophylactic

procedures, we conclude that his practice of asking juror

questions was not an abuse of discretion even had Rawlings

objected to it. See United States v. Collins, 226 F.3d at 465

(“Nor do we find an abuse of discretion in the court’s

implementation of measures to minimize the potential risks of

allowing such questions.”); United States v. Hernandez, 76 F.3d

at 723 (“The procedure utilized here is consistent with our

admonitions and consistent with the sound exercise of judicial

discretion.”); United States v. Callahan, 588 F.2d at 1086 n.2

(“There was no error committed in allowing the question to be

asked, and the procedure employed of requiring jurors to put

their questions in writing and clear their relevancy with the court

was not an abuse of the court’s discretion to conduct the trial

fairly.”). Nonetheless, this case illustrates just how perilous it

can be for the court to routinely solicit and ask juror questions.

Notwithstanding all of the judge’s precautions, one of the

juror questions he asked, although seemingly innocuous, invited

possible prejudicial error. At one juror’s request, the judge

asked witness Copeland: “And why did you follow the vehicle

out of the lot?” The following exchange ensued:

WITNESS: Because the vehicle was part of the actual—

COURT: But was there something about the movement

of the vehicle that caused you to follow it?

OFFICER: Yes. Well, the vehicle was a part of the scene

that had just transpired.

COURT: Well, was there something about the

movement of the vehicle that caused you to follow it?

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Had Rawlings objected at trial that this specific question was

prejudicial or even generally objected to the practice of allowing juror

questions before this question was asked, we would review the

question itself for abuse of discretion rather than for plain error. See

United States v. Johnson, 914 F.2d 136, 138 (8th Cir. 1990) (specific

jury questions to which objection made at trial reviewed for abuse of

discretion); United States v. Richardson, 233 F.3d at 1288 (juror

questions asked after objection to general practice reviewed for abuse

of discretion). He did not. See 12/20/05 Tr. 183 (Rawlings’ objection

to group of questions, including this one, as not “needed” because

“probably” already asked).

OFFICER: Yes. It sped off at a high rate of speed.

Tr. 12/20/05 at 185-86. Had the judge not quickly cut off

Copeland’s first response and rephrased the juror’s question,

Copeland might have testified on the very subject that counsel

and the court agreed to avoid, namely, the planned drug

transaction that Rawlings had facilitated. Because the court’s

corrective action prevented Copeland from testifying about the

prohibited subject of the drug sale, the question, if error, was not

plain error because it was not prejudicial so as to “affec[t]

substantial rights” under the third prong of the plain error

standard. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 734.2 Nonetheless, prejudice

was only narrowly averted. The episode highlights the risk of

allowing jury questions during trial and demonstrates why other

circuits have advised that they be used only sparingly. To limit

such risk in the future, we, as have our sister circuits, advise trial

judges to consider on a case-by-case basis whether and to what

extent jury questions are appropriate, balancing the potential

benefit of such questions against the dangers they pose. See

United States v. Collins, 226 F.3d at 463 (“In general, . . . we

think that a court should attempt to balance the risks and

benefits of juror questions before trial . . . .”); United States v.

Richardson, 233 F.3d at 1290 (“[I]n determining whether to

permit juror questioning, the trial court should ‘weigh the

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potential benefit to the jurors against the potential harm to the

parties, especially when one of those parties is a criminal

defendant.’ ” (quoting United States v. Feinberg, 89 F.3d at

337)); United States v. Callahan, 588 F.2d at 1086 n.2 (“District

courts must in each case balance the positive value of allowing

a troubled juror to ask a question against the possible abuses that

might occur if juror questioning became extensive.”).

Permitting juror questions as a matter of course is ill-advised.

See United States v. Collins, 226 F.3d at 461 (“Allowing juror

questions should not become a routine practice, but should occur

only rarely after the district court has determined that such

questions are warranted.”); United States v. Feinberg, 89 F.3d

at 337 (“There may be cases [in which] jurors should be allowed

to ask questions in order to perform their duties as fact-finders.

Of course those cases are the exceptions, not the rule. In the vast

majority of cases the risks outweigh the benefits.”); United

States v. Sutton, 970 F.2d at 1005 (“[J]uror participation in the

examination of witnesses should be the long-odds exception, not

the rule.”); cf. United States v. Ajmal, 67 F.3d 12, 14-15 (2d Cir.

1995) (“[T]he district court, as a matter of course, established at

the outset of the trial that jurors would be allowed to question

witnesses. . . . [T]he district court’s solicitation of juror

questioning absent a showing of extraordinary circumstances

was an abuse of discretion.”). 

B. Prosecutor’s Closing Argument

Rawlings next contends the prosecutor’s closing argument

“overstepped the bounds of proper advocacy” in two respects.

Appellant’s Br. 27. First, Rawlings objects to the prosecutor’s

laudatory references to Government witnesses Allen, Copeland

and Holland, who, the prosecutor stated, “should be applauded

because what they have done is taken this weapon off the

street,” 12/23/05 Tr. 106, and whom he repeatedly characterized

as having done the “right thing”—Allen and Copeland in their

performance as police officers and Holland in getting “involved”

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both “to help the police” and to make sure children from the

nearby Boys and Girls Club were not “involved” in the

automobile crash. Id. 98, 102, 105-06. He also objects to the

prosecutor contrasting the conduct (and credibility) of

Government witness Holland with that of defense witness

Orozco: Of Orozco, the prosecutor remarked: 

That’s why it was important when I asked whether or not

[Mr. Orozco] talked to the police. “Did you tell them?

Did you see anything? Did you have any contact with

the police?” “No, I didn’t,” but five months later he had

that contact with the defense investigator, which he

signed a statement for.

12/23/05 Tr. 96-97. Of Ms. Holland, he observed:

Since I have mentioned Mr. Orozco, let me mention Ms.

Holland, another civilian waitress. Contrast her

testimony with Mr. Orozco’s. On that day, Ms.

Holland—what did she do? She got involved. That’s

what this case is about. She heard something. She saw

something. She went out, saw more things, and then

told the police what she saw.

12/23/05 Tr. 97. Rawlings contends these remarks improperly

urged the jurors “to slip out of their role as neutral arbiters of the

facts and into the role of cheerleaders for Copeland, Allen and

Holland.” Appellant’s Br. 28. Second, Rawlings claims the

prosecutor effectively shifted the burden of proof to Rawlings

when he argued that there was no evidence contradicting the

Government’s evidence of Rawlings’s guilt: “I stood up here

before in my opening statement. I said, ‘This is a pretty simple

case. The defendant did what we have alleged by way of

indictment. The evidence will support it.’ And there is no

evidence to the contrary—not one single piece of evidence to the

contrary. . . . There is not one shred of evidence that Officer

Copeland didn’t see what he said he saw.” 12/23/05 Tr. 99-100.

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Because Rawlings failed to object to the prosecutor’s closing

remarks, we again review only for plain error and again we find

none. Rawlings has failed to establish that any of the challenged

statements was prejudicial under the third prong of the plain

error standard.

“To judge the prejudicial effect of a closing argument error

we look to the severity of the alleged misconduct, the centrality

of the issue affected by the error, the steps taken to mitigate the

error, and the closeness of the case.” United States. v. Wilson,

240 F.3d 39, 45 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing United States v.

Gartmon, 146 F.3d 1015, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). In United

States v. Brown, 508 F.3d 1066 (D.C. Cir. 2007), we found no

plain error in the prosecutor’s statements that, like the comments

here, attempted to bolster the credibility of a Government

witness. In that case, the prosecutor told the jury regarding a

witness’s testimony: “I believe her testimony regarding this

defendant and his actions proves him guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt. And her testimony had a ring of truth or a ring of

trustworthiness that you could take to the bank.” 508 F.3d at

1074. Although the court “h[e]ld that there was an ‘error’ that

was ‘plain,’ ” the court could not find that the error either

“affected appellant’s substantial rights” or “seriously affected

the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial

proceeding.” Id. at 1076. The court gave two reasons for its

conclusion: first, the evidence against the defendant was “quite

strong” and, second, the trial judge gave the jurors instructions

“making it clear that the prosecutor’s personal beliefs were

irrelevant.” Id. In closing instructions to the jury, the judge

there directed:

You [jurors] are the sole judges of the facts. You alone

decide what weight to give to the evidence presented

during the trial, you decide the value of the evidence and

you decide the believability of the witnesses. . . . The

statements and arguments of the lawyers are not

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evidence. They are only intended to assist you in

understanding the evidence. . . . You are the sole judge

of the credibility of the witnesses; in other words, you

alone are to determine whether to believe any witness,

and the extent to which any witness should be believed.

Id. (record citations omitted). In this case too, the evidence

against Rawlings was strong. The only disputed factual question

was whether he was carrying a gun when he got out of the car.

Both Copeland and Holland testified that he was and neither

Orozco nor Allen contradicted their testimony—each of them

testified only that he himself did not see a gun then. See

12/21/05 Tr. 100 (Allen); Tr. 12/23/05 Tr. 16-17 (Orozco).

Allen testified without contradiction, however, that he found the

gun next to the car, where Copeland told him Rawlings had

dropped it. Id. 98-99, 127. Also, as in Brown, the trial judge

here instructed the jurors that they alone were to determine the

witnesses’ credibility:

You are the sole judges of the facts. You alone will

decide what weight to give to the evidence presented

during the trial. You decide the value of the evidence,

and the believability of the witnesses. . . . [I]f any

reference by myself or by the attorneys to evidence does

not coincide with your own recollection of the evidence,

it is your recollection which should control during your

deliberations. . . . [T]he statements and the arguments

of the lawyers are not evidence. They are only intended

to assist you in understanding their position of what the

evidence indicated. . . . You are the sole judges of the

credibility or believability of the witnesses. In other

words, you alone are to determine whether to believe

any witness and the extent to which any witness should

be believed. . . . [A] police officer’s testimony should

be considered by you just as any other evidence in the

case. In evaluating an officer’s credibility, you should

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use the same guidelines which you apply to the

testimony of any other witness. In no event should you

give either greater or lesser weight to the testimony of a

witness because that witness happens to be a police

officer.

12/23/05 Tr. 137-39, 143, 145. Accordingly, as in Brown, we

conclude that any error in the prosecutor’s bolstering remarks

was harmless and that Rawlings has therefore failed to reach the

“high threshold” the plain error standard imposes. Brown, 508

F.3d at 1076.

We likewise find no plain error in the prosecutor’s

comments on the absence of evidence contradicting the

Government’s case. The circumstances here are similar to those

in United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565 (D.C. Cir. 1996), in

which the prosecutor began his closing argument with the

following statement: “ ‘No witness came here from this busy

street and says, “Folks, it didn’t happen that day.” ’ ” 97 F.3d

at 573 (record citation omitted). In Catlett, we concluded the

prosecutor’s remark was not plain error, reasoning that “[e]ven

if the prosecutor crossed the line of proper argument, . . . he did

not thereby deprive the defendants of a fair trial” because at the

end of the trial the judge gave an adequate curative instruction.

Id. The trial judge had charged the jury: “ ‘The burden is on the

prosecution, the government, to prove the defendants guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt. This burden of proof never shifts

throughout the trial. The law does not require the defendants to

prove their innocence or to produce any evidence.’ ” Id. (record

citation omitted). In Catlett, we concluded: “These instructions

would have cured any confusion caused by the prosecutor’s

remarks.” Id. (citing United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 768

(D.C. Cir. 1979)). 

Similarly, in United States v. Venable, 269 F.3d 1086, 1091

(D.C. Cir. 2001), we found no plain error in the prosecutor’s

argument that, in order to acquit the defendant, the jurors would

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have to “ ‘disbelieve the testimony’ ” of the Government

witnesses. 269 F.3d at 1089. We reasoned that (1) “the

offending comment consisted of a single sentence in the course

of a closing that was otherwise devoted to proper argument,”

269 F.3d at 1091; (2) it “was mitigated by the court’s

twice-delivered instructions that the ‘law doesn’t require a

defendant to prove his innocence, produce evidence or testify,’

and that the burden of proof ‘is on the Government to prove the

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and that burden of

proof never shifts throughout the trial,’ ” id. (citing United

States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d at 573); and (3) the evidence, while

“not overwhelming . . . was sufficiently strong, in light of the

foregoing factors, to undermine the assertion that the outcome

of the trial was affected by the prosecutor’s statement,” id. at

1092. 

In this case, we find no plain error for the same reasons. The

claimed error consists of only a few sentences in the rebuttal

argument and any effect they might otherwise have had was

minimized when the judge subsequently gave an instruction

similar to those in Catlett and Venable, directing the jury: “The

burden is on the Government to prove the defendant guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt. This burden of proof never shifts

throughout the trial. The law does not require a defendant to

prove his innocence or to produce any evidence.” 12/23/05 Tr.

141-142; see also 12/20/05 Tr. 25-26 (virtually identical

instruction at start of trial). Given the curative instruction and

the strength of the Government’s case, we cannot say the

prosecutor’s comments constituted plain error.

Although we find no plain error in the prosecutor’s

statements regarding the Government witnesses’ credibility or

the absence of contradictory evidence, this is not to say his

comments were proper. Had Rawlings preserved an objection

or had the Government’s case been weaker, our disposition

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might well be different. The Government is cautioned to avoid

similar argument in the future.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court

is affirmed.

So ordered.

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