Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-10097/USCOURTS-ca9-13-10097-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
James E. Johnston
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JAMES E. JOHNSTON,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-10097

D.C. No.

2:07-cr-00425-MCE-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Morrison C. England, Jr., Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

March 9, 2015—San Francisco California

Filed May 26, 2015

Before: M. Margaret McKeown, Mary H. Murguia,

and Michelle T. Friedland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge McKeown

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2 UNITED STATES V. JOHNSTON

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed convictions for receipt of child

pornography and conspiracy to produce child pornography

and to travel internationally to engage in illicit sex, but

vacated the judgment and remanded with instructions that the

district court vacate the defendant’s conviction for possession

of child pornography.

The panel reiterated that the offense of possession of child

pornography is a lesser included offense of receipt of child

pornography, and that under the Double Jeopardy Clause of

the Fifth Amendment, it is constitutional error to enter a

conviction against a defendant for both receipt and possession

of child pornography for the same conduct. The panel held

that in this case the record does not allow the conclusion that

the convictions for receipt and possession were based on

separate conduct.

The panel held that a reasonable jury could have found

beyond a reasonable doubt each element of conspiracy to

produce child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2251, and that

the search of the defendant’s computer did not exceed the

scope of the search warrant. 

The panel rejected the defendant’s contention that the

district court erred at sentencing by referencing facts that

were stripped from the draft presentence report and by

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. JOHNSTON 3

admonishing him for failing to apologize for his actions,

where the district court (1) clarified that the sentence was

based solely on facts that were proven to the jury and

undisputed sections of the presentence report and (2)

explicitly recognized that remaining silent was the

defendant’s right.

COUNSEL

Joseph J. Wiseman (argued), Wiseman Law Group, PC,

Davis, California, for Defendant-Appellant.

Heiko P. Coppola (argued), Assistant United States Attorney;

Benjamin B. Wagner, United States Attorney; Camil A.

Skipper, Assistant United States Attorney and Appellate

Chief, Sacramento, California, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge:

An investigation of a major child pornography website,

“Illegal.cp”, led federal agents to a desktop computer in

James Johnston’s home office. The contents of that computer

were the basis of his convictions for possession and receipt of

child pornography as well as conspiracy to produce child

pornography and to travel internationally to engage in illicit

sex.

Central to this appeal are Johnston’s convictions for both

receipt and possession of child pornography. Consistent with

our precedent in United States v. Davenport, 519 F.3d 940

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4 UNITED STATES V. JOHNSTON

(9th Cir. 2008), as well as the views of a majority of the other

circuits to consider the issue, we reiterate that the offense of

possession of child pornography is a lesser included offense

of receipt of child pornography. Under the Double Jeopardy

Clause of the Fifth Amendment, it is constitutional error to

enter a conviction against a defendant for both receipt and

possession of child pornography for the same conduct. See

Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 168–69 (1977); Davenport,

519 F.3d at 947–48. Johnston’s conviction for possession of

child pornography must be vacated. Johnston’s remaining

challenges do not merit reversal—sufficient evidence

supports the jury’s verdict; the search of his computer did not

exceed the scope of the search warrant; and the district

court’s comments at sentencing do not constitute procedural

or constitutional error.

BACKGROUND

In February 2006, federal agents learned that James

Johnston had applied for membership with a child

pornography website. Later that year, agents obtained and

executed a search warrant for his home and computers.

This search revealed that Johnston had stored images and

videos depicting child pornography in three places. To begin,

Johnston’s hard drive contained 304 videos downloaded from

the internet. Johnston also had received a compact disc with

more than ninety explicit images. Finally, Johnston’s email

inbox contained a total of four emails with attached images

that were duplicates of the images contained on the compact

disc.

Agents searching Johnston’s computer also discovered a

series of sexually explicit Yahoo Instant Messenger chats

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UNITED STATES V. JOHNSTON 5

between Johnston and a user named “Switlass.” In these

chats, Johnston expressed a desire to obtain child

pornography and travel overseas to engage in sex acts with

adolescent girls.

In one exchange, Johnston requested that Switlass take

pictures of nude children for him. Switlass agreed to do so if

Johnston paid for her to purchase a “digicam.” Johnston told

Switlass “We are partners,” and the same day sent her $350

via Western Union. Just a few days later, Switlass sent

Johnston three emails and a CD with images of child

pornography.

In another series of chats, Johnston made arrangements to

meet Switlass in the Philippines. Switlass promised to

arrange sexual encounters for Johnston with adolescent girls. 

Johnston informed Switlass that he would be in the

Philippines in September 2006 and promised to bring

“hundreds of dollars” for the “underage girls.” He flew from

San Francisco to Hong Kong on August 31, 2006 and stayed

overseas until September 2007. Government agents followed

Johnston for one day in Bangkok; they observed him visiting

adult entertainment establishments but did not witness any

improper conduct towards minors.

Johnston was arrested when he returned from Asia in

September 2007. He was eventually charged with and

convicted of one count of conspiracy to produce child

pornography, two counts of receipt of child pornography, one

count of possession of child pornography, and one count of

conspiracy to travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual

conduct.

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6 UNITED STATES V. JOHNSTON

The trial judge recused herself before sentencing. Judge

England assumed responsibility for Johnston’s case and

sentenced him to a within-Guidelines sentence of 293

months’ imprisonment.

ANALYSIS

I. DOUBLE JEOPARDY CHALLENGE

The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment

provides that no person “shall . . . be subject for the same

offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” The

Supreme Court has explained that this provision precludes

dual convictions in situations where two different statutes

define the “‘same offense,’ typically because one is a lesser

included offense of the other.” Rutledge v. United States,

517 U.S. 292, 297 (1996).

Johnston’s case fits this principle “to a T.” In Davenport,

we held that the offense of possession of child pornography,

18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B), is a lesser included offense of

receipt of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2). 

519 F.3d at 947. Even if the second conviction does not

result in a greater sentence, imposing convictions under both

statutes for the “same conduct” constitutes plain error. Id. at

947–48. A majority of circuits that have considered the

question agree that possession of child pornography is a

lesser included offense of receipt and that imposing

convictions under both statutes for the same conduct violates

the Double JeopardyClause. See United States v. Benoit, 713

F.3d 1, 15–16 (10th Cir. 2013); United States v. Dudeck, 657

F.3d 424, 430 (6th Cir. 2011); United States v. Muhlenbruch,

634 F.3d 987, 1003 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. Bobb,

577 F.3d 1366, 1374 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Miller,

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UNITED STATES V. JOHNSTON 7

527 F.3d 54, 72 (3d Cir. 2008). Two additional circuits have

signaled their agreement with Davenport’s holding without

explicitly deciding the issue. See United States v. Brown, 701

F.3d 120, 127 (4th Cir. 2012) (stating without explanation

that a defendant convicted of both receipt and possession of

child pornography “has been convicted of multiplicitous

offenses”); United States v. Polouizzi, 564 F.3d 142, 159 (2d

Cir. 2009) (noting, in a case involving receipt and possession

charges based on separate conduct, that “we find the

reasoning of Davenport and Miller persuasive”). But see

United States v. Halliday, 672 F.3d 462, 470 (7th Cir. 2012)

(noting that “[o]ur sister circuits’ holdings regarding § 2252A

would cause us to question our earlier decisions” but

declining to reach the question because separate images

supported the defendant’s convictions for possession and

receipt).

In later cases we reiterated that the Davenport rule

extends only to multiple convictions for the same criminal

act. “[W]here separate conduct supports each offense, the

Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause is not

implicated.” United States v. Overton, 573 F.3d 679, 695

(9th Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Schales, 546 F.3d

965, 978 (9th Cir. 2008). In the context of child

pornography, a defendant may be convicted both of receipt of

one image and possession of another image, or for receipt of

an image on a hard drive and possession of the same image

on a compact disc, but not for receipt and possession of the

same image on the same device. See Schales, 546 F.3d at

979.

To avoid offending the Double Jeopardy Clause when

prosecuting a defendant both for a crime and a lesserincluded offense, the government “must distinctly set forth”

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8 UNITED STATES V. JOHNSTON

the criminal activity that forms the basis of each count. Id. at

980. In this appeal, we ask whether the record “allow[s] us

to conclude that the jury found [Johnston] guilty of separate

conduct.” Id.

The record here allows no such conclusion. Agents

linked Johnston to three discrete sources of child

pornography: videos on his hard drive, images on a compact

disc, and images attached to emails. The indictment and the

jury verdict form both state that the possession charge (count

4) is based on Johnston’s possession of the hard drive and the

compact disc. In a special verdict, the jury found that he

possessed child pornography in both mediums.

The receipt charges, however, do not specify the medium

in which Johnston received child pornography. Instead, the

indictment and jury instructions on those charges simply

reference the date range on which the receipt occurred. The

first receipt charge (count 2) alleged that Johnston received

child pornography “between on or about February 10, 2006,

and on or about March 4, 2006.” The second receipt charge

(count 3) alleged that Johnston received child pornography

“between on or about May 26, 2006, and on or about August

19, 2006.”

The government acknowledges the conundrum of

multiplicitous convictions through its explanation that it

offered a special verdict on the possession charge in the event

the jury did not convict on one of the receipt charges. But

here, the government missed a step because the form does not

assure us that separate conduct formed the basis of the jury’s

decision to convict on each count. Admittedly, based on the

evidence, the date range specified in count 2 appears to limit

that count to the hard drive images. Although the

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UNITED STATES V. JOHNSTON 9

government now asserts that count 3 relates only to the

images attached to the emails (which in fact were essentially

duplicates from the CD), the date range listed encompasses

the time during which Johnston received both the CD and the

emails. Therein lies the problem—there is an obvious

overlap between the dates and evidence for the possession

count and count 3 receipt. See United States v. Teague,

722 F.3d 1187, 1191–92 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that charging

documents with overlapping date ranges and mediums

“create[] the possibility of multiplicitous convictions”). We

are left with the inescapable result that we cannot confirm

that the jury convicted Johnston of separate conduct in the

possession charge.

To bridge this gap, the government argues that we should

overlook its failure to specify the separate conduct underlying

each conviction in the indictment and jury instructions

because the prosecutor’s closing argument clarified what

evidence supported each count. To begin, a prosecutor’s

closing argument is simply that—argument—and cannot

supply a missing evidentiary link. As the court appropriately

instructed the jury, “what the lawyers have said in their . . .

closing arguments . . . is intended to help you interpret the

evidence, but it is not evidence.” Even so, in this case we

cannot discern anything helpful from the summation. The

prosecutor repeatedly referred to the receipt and possession

counts in the same breath without any indication that the jury

was required to consider separate conduct for each count. 

Even more confusing was the mixing and matching of

references to whether count 3 related to the CD or the email

photographs.

It bears emphasizing that the decision of how to charge

and prosecute a defendant accused of both receiving and

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10 UNITED STATES V. JOHNSTON

possessing child pornography rests entirely within the

government’s control. A prosecutor may pursue both receipt

and possession convictions in a child pornography case by

specifying the different criminal acts that form the basis of

each count. An obvious solution up front is to consider

delineating in the indictment which images relate to which

count. Alternatively, the government could submit to the jury

both a receipt and a possession count based on the same

conduct, but request that the court vacate or stay the

possession conviction if there is a receipt conviction for

duplicate conduct. Indeed, the range of electronic media will

often result in separate conduct stemming from images

downloaded to a hard drive, images transferred from a hard

drive to a CD, or physical prints of digitally transmitted

images. The government’s options are as varied as the

technology the defendant might employ, but the law requires

sufficient specificity to avoid implicating the Double

Jeopardy Clause. We vacate the judgment and remand with

instructions that the district court vacate Johnston’s

conviction for possession of child pornography.

II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Johnston argues that there was insufficient evidence to

support his conviction for conspiracy to produce child

pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2251. Although Johnston

advances an interpretation of the evidence that absolves him

of guilt, we affirm because a reasonable jury could have

found each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).

According to chat records, Switlass—whom agents

believed to be an adult prostitute located overseas—and

Johnston discussed sex with young girls, money, photos, and

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UNITED STATES V. JOHNSTON 11

a possible party with Switlass and two girls. On May 25,

2006, the conversation turned to production of pictures. 

Johnston told Switlass that he wanted her to produce child

pornography. At Switlass’s request, Johnston promptly sent

her $350 to purchase a “digicam” to take photographs of

minor females. After that discussion, Johnston told Switlass

“we are partners” and asked her to “send me one 12 year

picture.” Although Switlass asked for $400, Johnston in a

later chat explained that $350 should be enough for a camera.

Based on the chat transcripts, the enterprise on the table

on May 25 was an effort, which Johnston characterized as a

partnership, to photograph underage girls. The conspiracy

was born. A reasonable jury could have viewed that evidence

as more than sufficient to establish that Johnston and Switlass

formed a conspiracy to produce child pornography in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251.

Johnston attempts to escape this conclusion by pointing

out that some of the photographs he received from Switlass

were produced months before their chats. In Johnston’s view,

this timing demonstrates that Switlass never intended to

produce any new child pornography, but instead only to sell

Johnston already-existing images. According to Johnston,

there was only a “one-way” agreement; because Switlass

and he never had a shared criminal intent, there was never a

“meeting of the minds” required to support a conspiracy

conviction.1

1 The government’s position that Switlass’s intent is irrelevant so long

as Johnston honestly believed he was entering a conspiracy contradicts

well-established law. The essence of a conspiracy is a “meeting of the

minds.” If “two defendants act in concert to achieve a different goal, the

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12 UNITED STATES V. JOHNSTON

Although Johnston’s version of events is not entirely

implausible, the jury was entitled to reject it. Notably,

Johnston’s gloss on the evidence overlooks the almost

contemporaneous events of his solicitation to Swittlass, her

request for money to undertake the filming, and Johnston’s

confirmation that they were “partners.” Even if the evidence

regarding the production date of the photographs had been

iron-clad (which it was not), a “rational factfinder” could

have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the chat

records nonetheless demonstrated the existence of an

agreement between Johnston and Switlass to produce child

pornography. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324. We decline to

second-guess a reasonable jury’s interpretation of the

evidence.

III. COMPUTER SEARCH

The government obtained a warrant in September 2006 to

search Johnston’s computer for child pornography, sexual

activity with children, and the production, distribution,

possession, or receipt of child pornography. Initially the

government performed what it termed “preliminary

forensics” and a “bare minimum” scan of his home office

computer. Johnston challenges a much later search, in 2011,

when a government agent viewed Johnston’s emails, chat

logs, and internet search history. He argues that this search

exceeded the scope of the warrant and thus that evidence

relating to his convictions for conspiracy to produce child

pornography and conspiracy to travel overseas for the

purpose of having illicit sex was obtained through an illegal

search.

government has not shown a meeting of the minds as to a common scheme

or plan.” United States v. Lorenzo, 995 F.2d 1448, 1459 (9th Cir. 1993).

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UNITED STATES V. JOHNSTON 13

The principles relating to execution of search warrants are

well known. To pass constitutional muster, the “search must

be one directed in good faith toward the objects specified in

the warrant or for other means and instrumentalities by which

the crime charged had been committed.” United States v.

Rettig, 589 F.2d 418, 423 (9th Cir. 1978). When the

defendant challenges the manner in which a search was

conducted, we examine the language of the search warrant

and ask whether “a reasonable officer [would] have

interpreted the warrant to permit the search at issue.” United

States v. Gorman, 104 F.3d 272, 274 (9th Cir. 1996). Thus, a

search authorized by a valid warrant may nonetheless be

unreasonable if the officers conducting the search exceed the

scope of the warrant and, for example, begin looking for files

that are not related to the subject of the search warrant. See

United States v. Hill, 459 F.3d 966, 978 (9th Cir. 2006).

In September 2006, federal agents obtained a search

warrant to search Johnston’s home, computers, and any other

“computer-related” hardware, software, and equipment for:

# Any and all visual depictions of minors

engaging in sexually explicit conduct in

any format or media, including, but not

limited to, computer photographs . . .

[and] information pertaining to the sexual

interest in child pornography, sexual

activity with children or the production,

distribution, possession or receipt of child

pornography[;]

# Correspondence pertaining to the

possession, receipt, distribution, or

advertisement of [child pornography;]

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14 UNITED STATES V. JOHNSTON

# Envelopes, letters, and other

correspondence including, but not limited

to, electronic mail, chat logs, and

electronic messages, offering to transmit

[child pornography; and]

# Records or other items which evidence

ownership or use of computer equipment

found in the . . . residence.

Johnston did not challenge the scope or legality of the

warrant. At an evidentiary hearing on Johnston’s motion to

suppress, Special Agent Brian Cardwell of the California

Department of Justice testified regarding the methods

employed to search Johnston’s computer. The search took

place in three distinct phases. On September 6, 2006, Agent

Cardwell entered Johnston’s home and used specialized

software to conduct a “forensic preview.” The forensic

preview preserves data on the computer and performs a brief

scan of its hard drive; within “five to ten minutes” the

software indicated that there were child pornography videos

stored on the computer. About a week later, Cardwell

conducted a “bare minimum” forensic scan of the computer. 

He used software called “EnCase” to create a gallery of all

the images and videos on the computer. Cardwell browsed

that gallery to confirm that it included images and videos

depicting child pornography and then created a compact disc

for use by prosecutors.

A second review of the computer data occurred some five

years later in the spring of 2011, after Johnston declined to

accept a plea deal. During this search, Cardwell repeated his

previous search for child pornography, then perused

Johnston’s internet history and email correspondence. 

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UNITED STATES V. JOHNSTON 15

Cardwell also began looking at files associated with

Johnston’s credit card number and e-mail address.

The third, and most exhaustive, phase of the search began

in July of 2011. Over the course of several sessions, Cardwell

browsed and searched Johnston’s email, chat logs, and

“unallocated space.” He searched for generic keywords such

as “child porn,” “pedo,” “Baby J,” “Lolita,” and “hussy fan.” 

Cardwell also searched the computer using Johnston’s credit

card number, Yahoo screen name, and Western Union

account information. These efforts turned up evidence about

Johnston’s travels abroad for the purpose of having sex with

minors and agreement with Switlass to produce child

pornography.

Johnston claims that the third review was nothing more

than “rummaging for more offenses.” He urges us to reverse

the district court’s denial of the suppression motion and adopt

the reasoning in United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268 (10th

Cir. 1999). The difficulty with this argument is that Carey

presented an entirely different situation—the government

agent was searching a computer for evidence of drug sales

when he stumbled across child pornography images. 

Although the search warrant directed the agent to look only

for evidence of narcotics activities, he began opening

computer files that he believed would contain child

pornographyimages. Not surprisingly, the Tenth Circuit held

that the search violated the Fourth Amendment because the

agent “abandoned” his search for drug evidence and started

an entirely new, warrantless search. Id. at 1273.

Nothing of the sort happened here. To begin, the plain

language of the warrant authorized the government to search

not only for child pornography, but also evidence of sexual

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16 UNITED STATES V. JOHNSTON

activity with children, correspondence related to child

pornography, and “items which evidence ownership or use of

computer equipment found in the . . . residence.” Each of the

search methods Cardwell employed related directly to this

mandate. Nothing suggests that Agent Cardwell directed his

search efforts towards anything other than child pornography,

sexual activity with children, and Johnston’s ownership and

control over the computer. He was not digging around in

unrelated files or locations that might have prompted the need

for a second warrant. Cardwell’s discovery of evidence of

additional crimes is a reflection of the practical reality that

Johnston’s statements about child pornography were

intermingled with chats about foreign trips for the purpose of

having sex with minors and discussion about buying a camera

to produce explicit images of children.

IV. SENTENCING PROCEEDING

Johnston’s last challenge is that the district court erred at

sentencing by referencing facts that were stripped from the

draft presentence report and admonishing him for failing to

apologize for his actions.

Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(3)(B),

the sentencing judge “must—for any disputed portion of the

presentence report or other controverted matter—rule on the

dispute or determine that a ruling is unnecessary either

because the matter will not affect sentencing, or because the

court will not consider the matter in sentencing.” In United

States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 993 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc),

we held that it is a “significant procedural error” for a

sentencing judge to “choose a sentence based on clearly

erroneous facts.”

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UNITED STATES V. JOHNSTON 17

During sentencing proceedings, the district court made

reference to factual matters that were stricken from

Johnston’s presentence report. He stated that Johnston had

traveled outside of the United States “to have contact with

these prepubescent females,” and to “engage in sex with 12-

to 15-year-old virgins.” The judge also noted that Johnston

had molested his stepchildren in the 1980s, and praised the

prosecutor for not bringing those children to the sentencing

hearing to testify.

While these comments raise the specter of sentencing

error, the district court made clear that it took into account

only “what was found by the jury” in this case. The court

stated:

I’m not taking [the abuse allegations] into

consideration right now . . . . I’m only taking

into account what was found by the jury in

this particular case.

The previous judge excluded a number of

things from that jury, and there were things

that were stricken from the probation report. 

I’m taking the probation report and the jury’s

findings as they are. I don’t need to go back

any further than what I have in front of me.

This statement clarified that Johnston’s sentence was

based solely on facts that were proven to the jury and the

undisputed sections of the presentence report. The district

court did not violate either Rule 32 or the teaching of Carty.

Johnston also claims that he is entitled to resentencing

because, in violation of Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S.

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18 UNITED STATES V. JOHNSTON

314, 321 (1999), the district court drew an adverse inference

from Johnston’s failure to testify. The question of how the

Fifth Amendment privilege interacts with the legitimate

sentencing consideration of lack of remorse is a difficult one. 

The Supreme Court expressly declined to address this issue

in Mitchell. Id. at 326 (“Whether silence bears upon the

determination of lack of remorse . . . is a separate question

. . . . [W]e express no view on it.”).

Although the district court commented on Johnston’s

reticence at the sentencing hearing, Judge England also

explicitly recognized that remaining silent was “his right.” 

Particularly when considered in the context of the district

court’s careful review of the record and extensive explanation

of the sentence imposed, this comment reinforces that

Johnston’s sentence was not affected by an adverse inference

drawn from his silence. He is not entitled to resentencing on

this ground.

AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and

REMANDED.

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