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Parties Involved:
Department of Energy
Appellee
Jane E. O'Connor
Appellant
William J. O'Connor
Appellant

Document Text:

( 

FILED 

Unit.eel Stat.es Court of Appealo 

PUBLISH Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 2 0 1991 

TENTH CIRCUIT ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

WILLIAM J. O'CONNOR, and 

JANE E. O'CONNOR, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Petitioners-Appellants, 

v. No. 91-6085 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY,) 

) 

-Respondent-Appellee. ) 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. CIV-90-1340-T) 

1 Bobbie T. Shell of Baker & Botts, Houston, Texas, for PetitionersAppellants. 

Stuart M. Gerson, Assistant United States Attorney General, 

Washington, D.C.; Timothy D. Leonard, United States Attorney, 

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; William Kanter and Robert M. Loeb, 

Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent-Appellee. 

Before ANDERSON, TACHA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P • 

Appellate Case: 91-6085 Document: 01019726855 Date Filed: 08/20/1991 Page: 1 
34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9 The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

The pivotal question presented by this appeal is whether a 

bankruptcy court is a "court" under the Equal Access to Justice 

Act (EAJA). 

This appeal was born before a bankruptcy court. The United 

States Department of Energy (DOE), an unsecured creditor, filed a 

motion to enforce a reorganization plan and alternatively, to 

convert the bankruptcy from a Chapter 11 to a Chapter 7 

proceeding. The bankruptcy court denied this motion. 

Debtor then requested costs and attorney fees under the EAJA 

(28 u.s.c. § 2412(d)(1)(A)). After a hearing, the bankruptcy 

court found that DOE's position was not substantially justified 

and no special circumstances existed which would make any award 

unjust. Debtor was awarded fees and costs. 

DOE appealed this decision to the district court contending: 

(1) the bankruptcy court lacks jurisdiction to award costs and 

fees under the EAJA; (2) the debtor was not an "eligible party" 

under the EAJA and thus had no standing; and (3) there was a 

reasonable basis at law for DOE's litigation position. 

The district court reversed. 

Circuit's decision in In re Davis, 899 

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Relying on 

F.2d 1136 

the Eleventh 

(11th Cir.), 

Appellate Case: 91-6085 Document: 01019726855 Date Filed: 08/20/1991 Page: 2 
cert. denied, 111 s. Ct. 510 (1990), the district court held that 

"a court" under the EAJA does not include non-Article III courts; 

therefore, the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to award costs 

and fees under the EAJA. The district court did not address DOE's 

remaining two issues. 

Debtor appeals. The sole issue presented is whether a 

bankruptcy court lacks jurisdiction to make awards under the EAJA, 

or, stated somewhat differently, whether a bankruptcy court is "a 

court" under 28 u.s.c. § 2412(d)(1)(A). 

At present, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals is the only 

circuit to have addressed this issue directly. In Davis, and more 

recently in In re Brickell Inv. Corp., 922 F.2d 696 (11th Cir. 

1991), that court held that bankruptcy courts do not have 

jurisdiction to award fees under 28 u.s.c. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The 

jurisdictional issue in Davis and Brickell was controlled, 

however, by an earlier decision in Bowen v. Commissioner of 

Internal Revenue, 706 F.2d 1087 (11th Cir. 1983), holding that the 

non-Article III tax court lacked jurisdiction to award EAJA fees. 

These restrictive interpretations of 28 u.s.c. 

§ 2412(d)(1)(A) have two primary bases. First, the Eleventh 

Circuit relied on language in§ 2412(d)(1)(A) that allows a court 

to award those "costs" enumerated in 28 u.s.c. § 1920. While the 

provision in question refers to "any court," a phrase not defined 

in the statute, § 1920 uses the phrase "any court of the United 

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Appellate Case: 91-6085 Document: 01019726855 Date Filed: 08/20/1991 Page: 3 
States, 111 defined in§ 451 as including specified courts, "the 

judges of which are entitled to hold office during good 

behavior. 112 The Eleventh Circuit concluded that jurisdiction to 

award fees under the EAJA is therefore limited to Article III 

courts. Second, the Eleventh Circuit relied on limited legislative 

history pertaining to § 2412(b), which also employs the phrase 

"any court," to conclude that only those courts defined in § 451 

1 

2 

28 u.s.c. § 1920 reads: 

A judge or clerk of any court of the United States 

may tax as costs the following: 

(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal; 

(2) Fees of the court reporter for all or any part 

of the stenographic transcript necessarily obtained for 

use in the case; 

( 3) Fees 

witnesses; 

and disbursements for printing and 

(4) Fees for exemplification and copies of papers 

necessarily obtained for use in the case; 

(5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title; 

(6) Compensation of court appointed experts, 

compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees, 

expenses, and costs of special interpretation services 

under section 1828 of this title. 

A bill of costs shall be filed in the case and, 

upon allowance, included in the judgment or decree. 

28 U.S.C. § 451 reads: 

As used in this title: 

The term "court of the United States" includes 

the Supreme Court of the United States, courts of 

appeals, district courts constituted by chapter 5 

of this title, including the Court of International 

Trade and any court created by Act of Congress the 

judges of which are entitled to hold office during 

good behavior. 

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Appellate Case: 91-6085 Document: 01019726855 Date Filed: 08/20/1991 Page: 4 
are empowered to award fees under section 2412(d)(l)(A). Davis, 

899 F.2d at 1139 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 96-1418, 96th Cong., 2d 

Sess. 17, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 4953, 

4984, 4996.) 

We begin our inquiry with an examination of the EAJA. 3 The 

overall purpose of this statute is to place the private litigant 

and the United States on equal footing as regards the award of 

costs to the prevailing party in litigation involving the 

government. 4 The provision in question clearly permits "a court" 

to award attorney fees and costs against the United States in "any 

civil action ... in any court having jurisdiction of that action," 

under certain conditions not in dispute in the case before us. 

When called upon to interpret a statute, the court must first 

examine the statutory language itself. United States v. Turkette, 

452 U.S. 576, 580, (1981); Wilson v. Stocker, 819 F.2d 943, 948 

(10th Cir. 1987). When the language of the statute is clear and 

3 

4 

28 u.s.c. § 2412(d)(l)(A) reads: 

Except as otherwise specifically provided by 

statute, a court shall award to a prevailing party other 

than the United States fees and other expenses, in 

addition to any costs awarded pursuant to subsection 

(a), incurred by that party in any civil action (other 

than cases sounding in tort), including proceedings for 

judicial review of agency action, brought by or against 

the United States in any court having jurisdiction of 

that action, unless the court finds that the position of 

the United States was substantially justified or that 

special circumstances make an award unjust. 

S. Rep. No. 1329, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1966 U.S. 

Code Cong. & Admin. News 2527, 2528. 

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Appellate Case: 91-6085 Document: 01019726855 Date Filed: 08/20/1991 Page: 5 
unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete and that language 

controls absent rare and exceptional circumstances. Rubin v. 

United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981); Wilson, 819 F.2d at 948. 

A court should venture into the thicket of legislative history 

only when necessary to determine "a statutory purpose obscured by 

ambiguity." Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 

481 U.S. 454, 461 (1987). We find no such circumstances here. 

The purpose of the EAJA is clear and the language "any court 

having jurisdiction of that action," is plain, simple, and 

unambiguous. We therefore decline to follow the Eleventh 

Circuit's analysis and instead look to the plain meaning of the 

language to determine the jurisdictional scope of§ 2412(d)(l)(A). 

The term "court" is generally defined in its plain, ordinary, 

and every day meaning as "[a] person or group of persons whose 

task is to hear and submit a decision on cases at law." Webster's 

II New Riverside University Dictionary. While courts may be 

classified according to their means of creation as either 

constitutional (Article III) or legislative (i.e., Bankruptcy), 

Congress chose not to modify the word "court" when it drafted 28 

U.S.C. § 2412(d)(l)(A). Had it meant to restrict the use of this 

provision to constitutional courts, Congress could have done so. 

The broad language employed by Congress, in its ordinary usage, 

would include the bankruptcy court. 

We also think it significant that the phrases utilized in 

§ 2412(d)(l)(A) are simply "a court" and "any court" as opposed to 

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Appellate Case: 91-6085 Document: 01019726855 Date Filed: 08/20/1991 Page: 6 
the phrase "court of the United States" as used in § 1920 and 

defined in § 451. The reference in§ 2412(d)(l)(A) to§ 1920 

clearly enumerates only the types of costs that can be awarded 

under this provision, not the types of courts having jurisdiction 

over EAJA awards. Any attempt to splice the jurisdictional 

phraseology of§ 1920 onto§ 2412(d)(l)(A) violates the plain and 

unambiguous meaning of "any court." Again, had Congress meant to 

limit jurisdiction under § 2412(d)(l)(A) to "any court of the 

United States," it could have done so. Rather, the plain and 

unambiguous statutory language gives "any court," including the 

bankruptcy court, the power to make a fee award under the EAJA. 

Our conclusion is consistent with the undisputed purpose of 

the EAJA to encourage individuals and small businesses to 

challenge adverse government action notwithstanding the high cost 

of civil litigation. Unlike the many specialized statutes enacted 

to authorize the award of attorney fees, 5 the EAJA applies 

generally to a wide range of cases. The breadth of the EAJA is 

evidenced by its second prong codified at 5 u.s.c. § 504. This 

section grants administrative agencies the authority to award fees 

and costs arising from an adversary agency d . d' t' 6 

a JU ica ions. 

5 ~' Freedom of Information Act, 5 u.s.c. § 552(a)(4)(E) 

(1988); Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 u.s.c. §§ 2060(c), 

2072(a), 2073 (1988); Organized Crime Control Act, 18 u.s.c. 

§ 2520(b)(3) (1988); Voting Rights Act of 1975, 42 u.s.c. 

§ 1973l(e) (1988); Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 

1976, 42 u.s.c. § 1988 (1988); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 u.s.c. 

§§ 2000a-3(b), 2000b-1, 2000e-5(k) (1988); Civil Rights Act of 

1968, 42 u.s.c. § 3612(p) (1988). 

6 5 u.s.c. § 504(a)(l) reads in relevant part: 

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Granting bankruptcy courts jurisdiction under the plain language 

of§ 2412(d)(l)(A) is therefore congruous with the statutory 

scheme7 and furthers the statutory purpose by placing the initial 

determination of whether fees are warranted with the forum most 

familiar with the merits of the action. 

Our conclusion is also consistent with the principles of 

statutory construction applied by this court in In re Skinner, 917 

F.2d 444 (10th Cir. 1990). In that case, as in the present case, 

statutory interpretation was necessary to determine the scope of 

the bankruptcy court's powers. In Skinner we were called upon to 

determine whether bankruptcy courts have jurisdiction to enter 

sanctions against a party for civil contempt. In holding the 

bankruptcy court does have the statutory power under 11 U.S.C. 

§ 105 to enter monetary sanctions for civil contempt we found, as 

we do here, no reason to read into the statute anything other than 

its plain meaning. Skinner, 917 F.2d at 447. 

Other courts, by implication, have supported the jurisdiction 

of bankruptcy courts over EAJA applications. Most notably, the 

7 

An agency that conducts an adversary adjudication 

shall award, to a prevailing party other than the United 

States, fees and other expenses incurred by that party 

in connection with that proceeding, unless the 

adjudicative officer of the agency finds that the 

position of the agency was substantially justified or 

that special circumstances make an award unjust. 

In Davis, the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged the incongruity of 

limiting EAJA jurisdiction under § 2412 to Article III courts in 

light of 5 u.s.c. § 504. However, the court was bound to that 

limitation by its prior decision in Bowen. Davis, 899 F.2d at 

1139-40 n.7. 

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Fifth Circuit never questioned the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy 

court when it remanded In re Esmond, 752 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 

1985), to the bankruptcy court to determine the issue of whether 

the Small Business Administration was substantially justified in 

filing an objection to the debtor's bankruptcy discharge. See 

also In re Armstead, 106 B.R. 405 (D.E.D.Pa. 1989), and In re 

Hagan, 44 B.R. 59 (D.R.!. 1984). 

We conclude that the bankruptcy court is a "court" under the 

EAJA, 28 u.s.c. § 2412(d)(l)(A). The unambiguous language of that 

provision authorizes bankruptcy courts to make awards of costs and 

attorney fees in appropriate circumstances. The judgment of the 

United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma 

is REVERSED and the action is REMANDED for the district court to 

resolve the remaining substantive issues raised by the Department 

of Energy. 

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