Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-07-03006/USCOURTS-caDC-07-03006-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Roland James Bailey
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 14, 2010 Decided October 26, 2010

No. 07-3006

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

ROLAND JAMES BAILEY,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 03cr00441-15)

Richard K. Gilbert, appointed by the court, argued the cause

and filed the briefs for appellant. 

Suzanne G. Curt, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellee. With her on the brief were Ronald C. Machen Jr.,

U.S. Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese III, John P. Mannarino, and 

William J. O'Malley, Assistant U.S. Attorneys. Mary B.

McCord, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: GINSBURG and ROGERS, Circuit Judges, and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

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ROGERS, Circuit Judge: Roland Bailey appeals his

conviction by a jury of possession with intent to distribute 500

grams or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§

841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B)(ii). He contends the district court erred

in denying his motion to suppress the drugs seized from his car,

because the police had observed no criminal activity on his part

and no crime had been reported, and thus neither probable cause

nor articulable suspicion existed for his arrest. We hold the

district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress. 

Appellant was “observed walking with and talking to a

suspected drug dealer at the very time and in the very place of

the suspected drug dealing,” United States v. McKie, 951 F.2d

399, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1991). He responded to events in a manner

that provided the police with “a reasonable suspicion, based on

‘specific and articulable facts,’” id. at 401 (quoting Terry v.

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)), to detain him briefly. Based on a

prior purchase from the same drug dealer, the undercover officer

could reasonably infer that appellant, after speaking with the

drug dealer, had been waiting for the arrival of drugs he wanted

to purchase when he drove into the alley after another car

entered the alley, briefly stopped adjacent to that car, and then

promptly drove out of the alley. Upon stopping appellant, the

officers had probable cause to search his car, see id. at 402,

because, as he concedes, a package containing cocaine was in

plain view on the passenger’s seat. 

Appellant’s other claim of legal error, based on Brady v.

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), is unpersuasive because he fails

to show he was prejudiced by the government’s late disclosure

during trial that it could not locate a traffic ticket allegedly

written when appellant was stopped for running a stop sign.

However, we remand the record to the district court for

consideration of appellant’s policy objection to the career

offender provision of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, § 4B1.1,

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in view of Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007),

which was decided after appellant’s sentencing. Upon remand

the district court also can address appellant’s objection that it

never issued a promised order regarding false testimony

presented to the grand jury.

I.

Detective King Watts testified that on July 3, 2003, while

working as an undercover police officer, he was attempting to

make another purchase of cocaine from Walter Webb. In June

2002 Watts had purchased cocaine from Webb, who owned a

restaurant at 1361 U Street, N.W. The purchase had taken place

in a storage shed in the alley behind the restaurant; the alley was

to the east of the restaurant and could be entered from U Street

and ran north-south, parallel to 14th Street. On July 3, Watts

drove to the restaurant around 3 p.m. and parked on the south

side of U Street, across the street from the alley and Webb’s

restaurant, several cars behind Webb’s truck in which Webb was

sitting. Watts was wearing monitoring equipment consisting of

an Eagle recorder and body wire; he also had a cell phone with

a “direct connect” feature. Detectives Manley and Dessin were

parked nearby on the north side of U Street.

Watts testified that when he arrived on U Street, he

telephoned Webb, who told Watts to get into Webb’s truck,

which he did. Webb asked Watts, “What’s up boss?” Eagle Tr.

July 3, 2002 at 2. A conversation ensued in which the two men

discussed the price of the drugs Watts wanted to buy, Webb

stating that the price had increased. Webb appeared to make

several phone calls attempting to find drugs at the price Watts

offered to pay. During the second call, Watts saw appellant

come to the driver’s side of Webb’s truck. Webb asked

appellant, “What’s up boss?” Id. at 5. Appellant’s response was

unintelligible on the Eagle recorder but Webb replied, “Okay, I

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know it. I thought he told that guy 3:00.” Id. Appellant then

went and waited by his truck, which was parked on the north

side of U Street. Shortly thereafter Watts and Webb agreed

Webb would make the sale to Watts, and Webb indicated that

someone would be bringing the drugs that Watts wanted:

“I’mma [sic] call the guy and tell him to come on up here and

bring that[,] and it shouldn’t take me long[,] but I’ll let you

know just how long it’ll take i[n] a few minutes.” Id. at 6. 

Webb told Watts to wait in his car and went into the restaurant. 

Webb later came out of the restaurant and he and appellant went

into the alley.

While waiting in his car, Watts called Detective Manley to

advise him of what had transpired and that Webb had telephoned

to say it would be less than 10 minutes and that the “guy is on

his way.” Id. at 7. A person later identified as Raven Carroll,

Webb’s supplier, drove into the alley in a black car, stopping

beside the storage shed where Watts had previously brought

drugs from Webb. About 20 to 30 seconds later, appellant

emerged from the alley, got into his car, drove into the alley

behind Webb’s restaurant, and stopped parallel to Carroll’s car. 

Watts told Manley about appellant, stating Webb was “getting

ready to serve” him. Id. About two minutes after appellant

went into the alley, Webb called Watts and told him to come

into the alley. Watts notified Detectives Manley and Dessin that

appellant was in the alley. No police officer was able to observe

appellant’s actions in the alley. When Watts pulled into the

alley, Carroll’s car was still there but appellant’s car was not. 

About a minute later Carroll drove out of the alley. Watts made

his planned purchase of cocaine from Webb inside the freezer

located in the shed, where the previous buy had taken place. 

After appellant left the alley, he was stopped by Officer Shaw

for rolling through a stop sign. The police seized a kilogram of

cocaine in plain sight on the passenger seat of appellant’s car.

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On October 7, 2003, appellant and eighteen others were

indicted for violating federal drug laws. The district court

denied appellant’s motion to suppress the drugs seized from his

car, which were the basis for count 8 of the indictment, which

charged possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more

of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),

841(b)(1)(B)(ii). The jury found appellant guilty on count 8, but

acquitted him on count 1, which charged conspiracy to import

one kilogram or more of heroin and five kilograms or more of

cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963. The jury was unable to

reach a verdict on count 2, which charged conspiracy to

distribute and possess with intent to distribute one kilogram or

more of heroin, five kilograms or more of cocaine, and fifty

grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846;

the government moved to dismiss count 2 after the district court

declared a mistrial on that count. The district court denied

appellant’s motion for a new trial, which, among other things,

renewed his suppression arguments about the drugs seized from

his car based on inconsistencies between police officers’

testimony at the suppression hearing and their testimony at trial. 

The district court also denied appellant’s renewed motion to

dismiss the indictment, which alleged, among other things, that

Officer Manley had provided perjurious testimony to the

indicting grand jury. The district court sentenced appellant, as

a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B.1.1, to life imprisonment

and eight years’ supervised release. 

II.

Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied

appellant’s motion to suppress the cocaine seized from his car

on two alternative grounds, each of which appellant contends

raises separate legal issues. The district court ruled that the

police had probable cause and/or reasonable suspicion to believe

that appellant had been involved in a drug transaction, thus

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giving the police grounds to stop appellant’s car after it exited

the alley behind Webb’s restaurant. Alternatively, the district

court ruled appellant was observed committing a traffic

violation, justifying the stop. Based on Officer Delpo’s trial

testimony that he saw drugs on the passenger seat, appellant

does not challenge the district court’s finding that the drugs were

in plain view. Rather, appellant challenges the district court’s

legal ruling on the ground that the record reveals an insufficient

basis for either probable cause or reasonable suspicion that he

was engaged in criminal activity. 

When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress physical

evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, the court reviews the

district court’s factual findings for clear error, and considers the

district court’s legal conclusions concerning reasonable

suspicion and probable cause de novo. Ornelas v. United States,

517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996). The court will give due weight to

inferences drawn from those facts by the district court. Id. The

court may consider both evidence offered at the suppression

hearing and the trial. United States v. Hicks, 978 F.2d 722, 724-

25 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.

132, 162 (1925)); see also United States v. Brown, 510 F.3d 57,

64 n.6 (1st Cir. 2007); 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND

SEIZURE § 11.7(d) (3d ed. 1996).1

1

 The government relies on United States v. Harley, 990 F.2d

1340, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1993), for the proposition that the court must

uphold the district court’s legal ruling if any reasonable view of the

evidence supports it. However, the Harley standard applies only

where the district court failed to make factual findings on the record

as required by FED.R.CRIM.P. 12(e) but the defendant has waived his

Rule 12(e) objection. Id. Where, as here, the district court makes the

required findings, those findings are reviewed for clear error. See

Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699.

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The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches

and seizures” by law enforcement officials, and this protection

extends to a brief investigatory stop of persons or vehicles,

whether or not an arrest follows. United States v. Arvizu, 534

U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968);

United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)). A law

enforcement official may effect a brief investigatory stop of an

individual if the official has “‘a reasonable suspicion, grounded

in specific and articulable facts, that a person . . . was involved

in or is wanted in connected with a completed felony.’” United

States v. Abdus-Price, 518 F.3d 926, 929 (D.C. Cir. 2008)

(quoting United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985)). 

Mere generalized inarticulable hunches are insufficient. Ybarra

v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 92-93 (1979). 

According to appellant, the principal bases for reasonable

suspicion are a law enforcement official’s personal observations,

see Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000), and an

officer’s knowledge that a crime has been committed, see

Hensley, 469 U.S. at 233-35. However, these are not the

exclusive bases. Pursuant to Terry, “an officer may briefly

detain a citizen if he has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that

‘criminal activity may be afoot.’” United States v. Edmonds, 240

F.3d 55, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30). A

Terry stop requires only a “minimal level of objective

justification.” INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 (1984). 

Although an officer does not have articulable suspicion a person

is committing a crime merely because a person is in an area of

suspected criminal activity, “officers are not required to ignore

the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether

the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further

investigation.” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124. An officer may

initiate a Terry stop based not on certainty but on the need “to

‘check out’ a reasonable suspicion.” United States v. Clark, 24

F.3d 299, 303 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Moreover, whether reasonable

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suspicion exists depends on the totality of circumstances as

“‘viewed through the eyes of a reasonable and cautious police

officer on the scene, guided by his experience and training.’” 

Edmonds, 240 F.3d at 60 (quoting United States v. Hall, 525

F.2d 857, 859 (D.C. Cir. 1976)); see United States v. Cortez, 449

U.S. 411, 418 (1981).

The district court’s factual findings are not clearly

erroneous. The district court found that undercover officer

Watts had previously purchased drugs from Webb in the alley

behind Webb’s restaurant, that restaurant owners generally do

not sell food in alleys behind their restaurants, that Watts’s

“inference or conclusions were accurate,” Tr. May 24, 2005 at

91, that Webb wanted to sell drugs to Watts and was arranging

for drugs to be delivered, and that “one could reasonably infer

that Webb and [appellant] had previously had a discussion about

somebody else having something available, or made available to

[appellant],” id. The district court concluded that after appellant

and Webb walked into the alley, after Webb called Watts and

told him a person would soon deliver the product, after a black

car arrived in the alley, and after appellant left the alley and

drove his car into the alley and parked beside the black car, even

though “there are no observations made of what occurs at that

time,” that “one could reasonably infer that consistent with the

purpose that Watts was there, [appellant] was there for the same

purpose.” Id. at 92. The district court also concluded that “one

could reasonably infer” appellant left the alley “quickly because

he had acquired what he had been there waiting for.” Id. at 93. 

The district court further concluded that it “is a reasonable

inference to draw” that “a reasonably prudent police officer

could believe that what transpired was [appellant] making a

purchase of drugs.” Id. at 92. 

Additionally, upon de novo review of the district court’s

inferences from the evidence and its Terry analysis, we find no

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error. Overall, the district court concluded the evidence “clearly

is sufficient to establish articulable suspicion to believe that

[appellant] was involved in the same type of activity that Watts

was involved in, considering the consistency of what was taking

place and the statements that were made by Webb to both Watts

and [appellant] prior to the purported transaction.” Id. at 92-93. 

The district court further concluded that when Bailey drove out

of the alley, “there was, in my view, clearly articulable suspicion

to believe that [appellant] was involved in illegal criminal

activity.” Id. at 93. The district court analyzed “what is

reasonable and what would a reasonably prudent police officer

subjectively believe from the circumstances as they evolved,” 

id. at 90, stating with respect to its factual findings that “it is my

understanding of Terry that that is sufficient to justify a Terry

contact” and that the police thus “could have stopped the

vehicle, and they could have investigated,” id. at 93-94.

Appellant maintains that there was no basis for reasonable

suspicion because appellant and Webb did not mention drugs in

the presence of undercover officer Watts, the officers did not

recognize the black car or its driver, Watts’s previous

undercover drug buys had been in a small shed behind the

restaurant rather than in the alley behind the restaurant, and no

officer observed what appellant did in the alley or whether

anyone else was in the alley. But appellant ignores the evidence

supporting articulable suspicion that he had just been involved

in a drug transaction, and that is all that is required for a Terry

stop. In United States v. McKie, 951 F.2d 399 (D.C. Cir. 1991),

the court concluded that “there may well have been reasonable

suspicion to justify a stop” of a defendant the officers had

observed “walking with and talking to a suspected drug dealer

at the very time and in the very place of the suspected drug

dealing.” Id. at 402. Hence, the court held that there was

reasonable suspicion once the defendant entered the drug

dealer’s car because that action demonstrated they were “not

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mere strangers” and the officers had been tipped that the dealer

kept his drug supply in his car. Id.

Although appellant distinguishes McKie as involving police

observation of the dealer and the defendant interacting, the

officers observed and recorded appellant and Webb talking and

walking together at the time and place Webb was arranging to

sell drugs to undercover officer Watts. Appellant 

unpersuasively attempts to distinguish McKie as involving the

dealer’s car speeding up when the police began following it,

because the court in McKie did not rely on this in concluding

there was reasonable suspicion. As in McKie, to the officers on

the scene appellant’s conduct strongly suggested that Carroll

was Webb’s supplier and appellant quickly obtained from

Carroll that for which he and Watts had come. The

circumstances observed by police in this case – appellant 

talking with Webb, waiting until the black car arrived to drive

his car into the alley, and leaving before the black car, which

was still parked next to the shed where Watts had bought drugs

from Webb in June 2002 – are very similar to the circumstances

relied on by the court in McKie to hold that there was reasonable

suspicion the defendant was involved in criminal activity. 

Appellant, like the defendant in McKie, emphasizes the

seemingly innocuous aspects of his conduct and maintains there

was no contact between appellant and Webb after their initial

recorded conversation. However, appellant and Webb went into

the alley together thereafter and the evidence indicated appellant

was on familiar terms with Webb and that he had come to meet

Webb, a known drug dealer, at the time and place where Watts

had recently bought drugs from Webb and was about to buy

drugs from him again. To Watts, it was obvious that appellant,

like Watts, was waiting for someone to arrive. Indeed, once

Carroll, Webb’s apparent supplier, entered the alley, appellant

and Webb did too, soon followed by Watts at Webb’s invitation. 

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This evidence provided the “minimal level of objective

justification,” Delgado, 466 U.S. at 217, that appellant had

engaged in drug-related activity and a stop was warranted. 

Appellant’s suggestion that there was no basis for reasonable

suspicion because he did not flee when he saw the police and did

not engage in furtive movements erroneously transforms

circumstances attendant to a sufficient finding into a required

showing. 

Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not err in

ruling there was articulable suspicion to stop appellant and

properly denied the motion to suppress. 

III.

Appellant also presents a challenge under Brady v.

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), to the district court’s alternative

ruling that there was probable cause to stop appellant for a

traffic violation. This challenge is based on the impeachment

value at trial of evidence that the government was unable to

locate the ticket that Officer Shaw allegedly wrote in connection

with stopping appellant because he ran a stop sign. According

to appellant, the lack of any record of the traffic ticket was

exculpatory because it not only casts doubt that a traffic

violation occurred but also impeached Officer Shaw’s

testimony. At trial Officer Shaw testified that he “believe[d]” he

wrote a ticket for running a stop sign and gave all the copies to

Detective Manley. Tr. Jan. 10, 2006 at 103-04. No such ticket

was ever produced despite defense requests. Appellant submits

the most likely inference is that the ticket never existed. The

evidence of its nonexistence, he continues, thus impeaches the

only witness who testified he saw a traffic violation. In

appellant’s view, because he was convicted on the basis of

evidence seized from his car, if the traffic stop was not

legitimate, then the case against him dissolves. Any evidence

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tending to discredit Officer Shaw’s testimony was, he maintains,

vital to his defense, as in United States v. Lyons, 352 F. Supp. 2d

1231 (M.D. Fla. 2004).

To prove a Brady violation requires a showing that the

evidence at issue is favorable to the accused because it is

exculpatory or impeaching, that the evidence was suppressed by

the government either willfully or inadvertently, and that the

accused was prejudiced. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263,

281-82 (1999); United States v. Andrews, 532 F.3d 900, 905

(D.C. Cir. 2008). To establish prejudice, the withheld material

must be “material,” i.e., there must be “a reasonable probability”

that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense the result of

the proceeding would have been different. Strickler, 527 U.S.

at 280; Andrews, 532 F. 3d at 905. Appellant posits that he had

a credible argument that there was no traffic infraction and the

traffic stop was manufactured. Detective Manley admitted he

wanted to stop appellant, and that he called Officers Shaw and

Washington so they could make the traffic stop. Detective

Manley’s instruction to the officers that appellant be stopped for

a traffic infraction, appellant suggests, can be viewed as a tacit

admission that he knew he did not have probable cause to stop

appellant on other grounds. To appellant, the coincidence in the

timing of Manley’s instruction and Shaw’s report that appellant

had made a rolling stop at an intersection, is suspicious:

Appellant was not acting furtively or suspiciously and did not

attempt to run when he saw the police. Further, appellant

maintains that Shaw’s testimony about being able to see the

contents of the paper bag from the passenger’s side of

appellant’s car is questionable because, for example, it is

inconsistent with Officer’s Delpo’s testimony that he could see

nothing suspicious from the driver’s side of the car. 

During cross examination by appellant’s trial counsel,

Officer Shaw testified that he believed he wrote a traffic ticket

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after he stopped appellant. This was the first time Shaw

mentioned writing a ticket. Shaw also testified that he thought

the ticket “went down” with appellant’s arrest paperwork, which

included the PD 163 report on the incident. Tr. Jan. 10, 2006 at

104. After the lunch recess, appellant’s counsel told the district

court that she had not received a copy of the ticket and that the

government did not have it. The prosecutor confirmed he had

been unable to locate the ticket, noting that unless an officer

retained a personal copy there would be no copy three years

after the date it was written. Shaw confirmed during voir dire

that he did not have a copy of the ticket. Defense counsel

moved to strike Shaw’s testimony. The district court denied the

motion as too severe a sanction absent any indication of the

willful destruction of evidence, and stated it would await the

government’s further efforts to locate the ticket. Defense

counsel raised the issue of the missing ticket on two additional

occasions during trial but the district court deferred ruling. On

the last day of trial, defense counsel submitted a stipulation that

no record of the ticket could be found, which the prosecutor

joined, and requested a missing evidence instruction.

The district court denied the requested missing evidence

instruction on the ground the absence of the ticket would not

shed any light on the issue of whether the drugs were found in

appellant’s car after the stop, and that the issue of the legality of

the stop was not before the jury. However, the district court

allowed appellants’ trial counsel to argue to the jury that it could

consider the ticket’s absence when assessing Officer Shaw’s

testimony. During closing argument to the jury counsel, in fact, 

focused on the lack of credibility of the evidence placing the

drugs in appellant’s car and mentioned on four occasions the

absence of the traffic ticket. The district court, prior to imposing

sentence, denied appellant’s motion for a new trial, which

included the argument that Officer Shaw had not mentioned the

traffic ticket at the suppression hearing and that the

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government’s inability to locate the ticket reflected adversely on

Officer Shaw’s testimony. The district court referred to its

finding of articulable suspicion to stop appellant, noting Watts’

testimony and the recorded conversations, which was

independent of Officer Shaw’s testimony, and to the suppression

hearing testimony by Officer Manley and others that 

“conclusively indicate[d]” that there was a traffic violation when

appellant ran a stop sign. Tr. Dec. 22, 2006 at 12.

To the extent appellant contends the undisclosed

information would have been useful at the suppression hearing,

the issue is moot because the district court correctly ruled that

reasonable suspicion of a drug transaction justified the stop,

without regard to the traffic violation. However, as regards the

motion for a new trial, we hold that appellant fails to show a

Brady violation because the inability to locate the traffic ticket

was disclosed at trial in sufficient time for appellant to make

effective use of the ticket’s absence. Although the inability to

locate the traffic ticket was not acknowledged by the prosecutor

to the jury until the last day of the trial by stipulation that the

ticket could not be found, appellant was able to argue the

ticket’s absence during closing argument to the jury in attacking

Officer Shaw’s credibility and, indeed, the government’s

evidence generally regarding the drugs claimed to have been

found in appellant’s car. See Tr. Feb. 8, 2006 at 31, 32, 42, 47. 

Appellant also could have asked to re-call Officer Shaw to

question him further about the apparent discrepancy, but he did

not do so. 

These circumstances are not unlike the circumstances where

this court has rejected claims of prejudice as a result of the

government’s late Brady disclosure. In Andrews, 532 F.3d at

904-05, the government did not disclose an agent’s handwritten

notes from her interview with the defendant, which may have

contradicted her subsequent interview report, until the morning

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of the fourth day of trial, after the agent had left the witness

stand and near the close of the government’s case-in-chief. The

defendant argued on appeal that this delay “did not leave

defense counsel with enough time to use the material properly,

to build a responsive defense theory, or effectively impeach” the

agent, who would have to have been recalled. Id. at 907. The

court rejected the argument, concluding that the defendant could

have recalled the witness if the alleged discrepancies “were as

powerful as she believes they were.” Id. at 907-08. Similarly,

in United States v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384 (D.C. Cir. 1988),

the court concluded that mid-trial disclosure of a government

witness’s prior contradictory statements did not prejudice the

defendant, because “the defense was not foreclosed from

arguing any inconsistencies to the jury at a later point in the

trial.” Id. at 1417. 

IV.

At sentencing appellant’s trial counsel objected to the

application of the career offender provision of the Sentencing

Guidelines, § 4B1.1, on the grounds it was unfair because it

double counted his convictions. On appeal, he contends that the

district court erred in not considering appellant’s policy

argument. Appellant seeks a remand for resentencing in light of 

Kimbrough, 552 U.S. 85, decided after his sentencing, which

held that in a post-Booker advisory sentence scheme the district

court could reject the Guidelines on policy grounds, see id. at

89. Appellant concedes that this court may presume a sentence

within the guideline range is reasonable, see Rita v. United

States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007), and he does not appeal the

reasonableness of his life sentence independent of his legal

argument that the district court should have rejected the career

offender guideline. We conclude appellant has presented “some

record showing that the district court misunderstood its

sentencing authority” to consider a policy objection under the

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Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Mouling, 557 F.3d 658,

668 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 

The parties agreed at sentencing that but for application of

the career offender sentencing guideline, appellant would have

had a base offense level of 26 and a criminal history category of

V, which would have resulted in a sentencing guideline range of

110-137 months. Applying § 4B1.1, appellant’s offense level

was raised to 37 and his criminal history category to VI,

resulting in a sentencing guideline range of 360 months to life. 

At the sentencing hearing, appellant’s trial counsel challenged 

the career offender provision as “unfair” because it “ultimately

double-count[s] his convictions” by “essentially doublecounting his criminal history to increase the offense level and

increase his criminal history again.” Tr. Dec. 22, 2006 at 23. 

When the district court clarified that this objection was

“challenging the sentencing guidelines themselves” as unfair

rather than challenging the calculation of appellant’s sentence,

id., the district court stated, “[t]hen I will have to deny that

request,” id. at 24. 

 Appellant maintains that the “have to” statement indicated

that the district court viewed the career offender guideline as

mandatory. The government unpersuasively suggests that

appellant failed to argue below that the district court wrongly

thought that it could not reject the guideline on policy grounds

or that the guideline was mandatory, and so our review is for

plain error; defense counsel’s objection sufficiently alerted the

district court to the issue. To the extent the government also

maintains that the record does not indicate that the district court

viewed the career offender provision as mandatory, appellant

persuasively responds that, in view of the policy objection

presented, the district court was obligated to state clearly

whether it thought the career offender guideline was mandatory.

The record shows the district court refused to entertain the

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objection, and appellant thus properly relies on United States v.

Vazquez, 558 F.3d 1224 (11th Cir. 2009), cert. granted and

judgment vacated, 130 S. Ct. 1135 (2010), where the Supreme

Court accepted the Solicitor General’s concession of error when

the district court refused to consider its disagreement with the

career offender sentencing guideline, 558 F.3d 1224, 1228-29

(11th Cir. 2009). The government further notes that the

sentencing memoranda of appellant and the government referred

to the fact that the Guidelines are advisory rather than

mandatory under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 

However, appellant draws a reasonable distinction between

knowing the Guidelines are advisory after Booker and deciding

not to apply the Guidelines in an individual case and, on the

other hand, deciding that a particular guideline should be

disregarded categorically in all cases because it was bad policy. 

Finally, anticipating that the government would respond a

remand is unnecessary in view of the district court’s extensive

discussion of its decision to sentence appellant to life in prison,

appellant urges this court not to assume on the basis of the

current record that the district court would reject his policy

challenge. He notes that other district courts have concluded the

career offender guideline is unfair, see, e.g., United States v.

Ragland, 568 F. Supp. 2d 19, 20 (D.D.C. 2008); United States

v. Phelps, 366 F. Supp. 2d 580, 590 & n.5 (E.D. Tenn. 2005),

and maintains that his criminal record is insufficient to justify a

greatly increased sentence from 137 to 150 months to life

without parole.

At sentencing the district court discussed the harsh and

deleterious effects of appellant’s illegal drug activities on the

community, and it concluded from appellant’s criminal record

that he would be “a criminal for the rest of [his] life” and that

“there is a place for criminals for the rest of their life, and that

is in prison.” Tr. Dec. 22, 2006 at 31. Nonetheless it is unclear

whether the district court exercised the option afforded by

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Kimbrough and either rejected appellant’s policy objection to §

4B1.1 on the merits or regarded the objection as inappropriate

in view of appellant’s criminal record. Therefore, we remand

the record to the district court to address appellant’s policy

objections to § 4B1.1 of the Guidelines and to “determine

whether it would have imposed a different sentence materially

more favorable to the defendant had it been fully aware” of its

authority, United States v. Coles, 403 F.3d 764, 770 (D.C. Cir.

2005).

 

V. 

On remand the district court can address appellant’s

objection that it failed to issue a promised order in response to

appellant’s claim that false testimony was presented to the grand

jury. The false grand jury testimony was Detective Manley’s

testimony that undercover officer Watts had seen Webb give

drugs to appellant in the alley behind Webb’s restaurant, when

Watts actually had not been able to see into the alley when

appellant was there. At the sentencing hearing, the district court

denied appellant’s renewed motion to dismiss the indictment

because the government represented that the false grand jury

testimony had not been presented to the grand jury that indicted 

appellant. However, the district court stated that it would review

ex parte the testimony presented to both grand juries, and that

“[i]f it is inconsistent with what the government is representing,

then I will have to vacate the sentence and come back and revisit

the issue, but I assume what the government is saying is accurate

and, if that’s true, I will issue a written order saying I have

reviewed it, and it’s consistent with the government’s

representation.” Tr. Dec. 22, 2006 at 19.

The district court has not issued an order either vacating the

sentence or confirming the government’s representation

regarding the false grand jury testimony. Appellant attempted

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to request the district court to issue one of the promised orders,

but the district court denied the requests because appellant did

not submit the request through his trial attorney. Appellate

counsel advises this court that appellant also sought to dismiss

his appeal without prejudice in order to obtain the ruling, but

appellate counsel disagreed and decided to raise the ruling issue

on appeal instead. See Reply Br. at 25-26. The government

suggests appellant is not entitled to the “promised” order and, in

any event, this court can resolve the legal question because the

false testimony concerned only the conspiracy count of which

appellant was acquitted. However, the district court is better

situated, in the first instance, to assess whether Detective

Manley’s testimony was false and if so, whether it had a

spillover effect on the grand jury’s determinations, see

Tarantino, 846 F.2d at 1391 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Appellant made

attempts to obtain the order, and it can be issued upon remand.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of conviction

concerning appellant’s motion to suppress evidence, but we

remand the record to the district court for consideration of

appellant’s policy objection to § 4B1.1 of the Guidelines, and

for a determination of whether resentencing is appropriate as a

result, and also to issue the promised order upon review of the 

grand jury testimony.

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