Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-03102/USCOURTS-ca7-15-03102-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dakota R. Moss
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted May 23, 2016

Decided May 26, 2016

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

No. 15‐3102

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

DAKOTA R. MOSS,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 3:14‐CR‐30208‐DRH‐1

David R. Herndon,

Judge.

O R D E R

Dakota Moss and a friend stole a pickup truck, used it to ram the 10‐foot tall gate

outside a farm‐supply store, smashed a window to gain access and, over the course of

three separate burglaries of the same store that night, stole 39 firearms, candy, and soda.

They were arrested the following day and confessed to conspiring to sell the stolen

firearms either to protestors in Ferguson, Missouri, or to “other criminal elements” in

Centralia, Illinois. Moss pleaded guilty to stealing firearms from a federal firearms

licensee, 18 U.S.C. § 922(u), conspiring to interfere with commerce by violence against a

person or property, 18 U.S.C. § 371, carrying a firearm during a crime of violence,

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), and possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The

district court sentenced him to 248 months’ imprisonment, the bottom of the calculated

guidelines range.   

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

Case: 15-3102 Document: 20 Filed: 05/26/2016 Pages: 2
No. 15‐3102    Page 2

Moss’s plea agreement includes a broad appeal waiver, but he still filed a notice

of appeal. His appointed lawyer (who represented Moss below) has concluded that the

case is frivolous and moves to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744

(1967). Moss opposes counsel’s motion. See CIR. R. 51(b). Counsel has submitted a brief

that explains the nature of the case and addresses issues which an appeal of this kind

might be expected to involve. Because the analysis in the brief appears to be thorough,

we limit our review to the subjects the lawyer discusses, plus the issue Moss raises in

opposition. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v.

Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996).   

Moss’s attorney says that his client does not wish to challenge his guilty plea,

and thus counsel appropriately forgoes any discussion of the adequacy of the plea

colloquy. See United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 670–71 (7th Cir. 2002). Although Moss

now wishes to challenge his sentence as unreasonable, counsel properly concludes that

this argument would be frivolous because the guilty plea is valid and thus, so is the

appeal waiver, see United States v. Zitt, 714 F.3d 511, 515 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v.

Sakellarion, 649 F.3d 634, 639 (7th Cir. 2011), and counsel has not identified any

exception that would apply here, see United States v. Adkins, 743 F.3d 176, 192–93 (7th

Cir. 2014).   

Finally, Moss tells us that he wishes to challenge counsel’s performance as

deficient; he vaguely asserts that his attorney failed to “explain everything about [the]

case” and provide him with full access to discovery before he pleaded guilty. But we

have emphasized that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel should be reserved for

collateral review, so that a record may be developed in the district court. See Vinyard v.

United States, 804 F.3d 1218, 1227 (7th Cir. 2015); United States v. Flores, 739 F.3d 337,

341–42 (7th Cir. 2014).

Accordingly, counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED and the appeal is

DISMISSED.

Case: 15-3102 Document: 20 Filed: 05/26/2016 Pages: 2