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Parties Involved:
Raymond Leon Arnold
Appellant
Attorney General of the State of Oklahoma
Appellee
R. Michael Cody
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FIL~D United Stat~Js Co~rt ~! Appc~b Tent~ C1rcw ~ 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

DEC 1 6 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECI'a.ER 

Clerl!: TENTH CIRCUIT 

RAYMOND LEON ARNOLD 1 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

R. MICHAEL CODY; THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 

OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, 

Respondents-Appellees. 

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No. 91-7061 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. CIV-90-480-S) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Raymond Leon Arnold, Pro Se. 

Susan Br~er Loving, Attorney General of Oklahoma, and Steven 

Spears Kerr, Assistant Attorney General, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 

for Respondents-Appellees. 

Before ANDERSON, BARRETT, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has deter.mined unan~ously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

Appellate Case: 91-7061 Document: 01019324097 Date Filed: 12/16/1991 Page: 1 
34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Petitioner appeals from an Order of the district court 

denying his Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus filed pursuant to 

28 u.s.c. § 2254. On appeal, he argues that the 1989 amendments 

to the 1 Oklahoma Prison Overcrowding Emergency Powers Act, Okla. 

Stat. tit. 57, §§ 570-576, as applied to him violate the ex post 

facto clause of the United States Constitution. He maintains that 

the statutes prior to amendment, which provided him with emergency 

time credits, should apply to him. 

denial of habeas relief. 

We agree and reverse the 

Prior to 1989, Petitioner was convicted after pleading guilty 

to child pornography2 and sentenced to twenty years imprisonment. 

~ Thereafter, he filed an application for post-conviction relief, 

alleging that amended section 574 was an improper imposition of an 

ex post facto law. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals denied 

habeas relief, concluding that the amendment which modified the 

amount of emergency credits did not violate the ex post facto 

clause. 

1 The Oklahoma Prison Overcrowding Emergency Powers Act grants 

credits to qualifying prisoners when the inmate population exceeds 

95% of the capacity of the correctional system for thirty 

consecutive days, and the governor either declares a state of 

emergency or fails to declare a state of emergency within fifteen 

days of the Department of Corrections' request for a declaration. 

Okla. Stat. tit. 57 §§ 571-573. The 1989 amendment to the Act 

provides that if a prisoner is denied parole, he cannot earn 

emergency credits. Id. § 574.1. 

2 The district court incorrectly stated that Petitioner was 

convicted of sodomy, attempted sodomy, lewd molestation, and 

engaging a child in child pornography. The record on appeal shows 

that Petitioner was convicted of only the latter offense. 

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Petitioner then filed an application for habeas relief in the 

federal district court, challenging application of the amended 

emergency credit law as an ex post facto violation. Because the 

parole board failed to recommend him for parole, he contended that 

under the amendment he was no longer eligible to earn emergency 

credits. Id. § 574.1. In addition, he argued that section 574 

was amended to decrease the amount of credits which could be 

earned. Upon referral, the magistrate judge deter.mined that there 

was no ex post facto question raised. The district court adopted 

the magistrate judge's findings and recommendations as its 

opinion. Petitioner appealed. 

Article I of the Constitution provides that the States shall 

not pass ex post facto laws. Art. I, § 9, cl. 3; Art. I, § 10, 

~ cl. 1. The ex post facto prohibition forbids the enactment of a 

law imposing additional punishment on that prescribed at the time 

the offense was committed. Weaver v. Graham, 450 u.s. 24, 28 

(1981). In order for a law to be ex post facto, (1) it must be 

retrospective, applying to events occurring before enactment, and 

(2) it must disadvantage the prisoner. Id. at 29. The law, 

however, need not impair a vested right. Id.; see Devine v. New 

Mexico Dep't of Corrections, 866 F.2d 339, 342 (lOth Cir. 

1989)(certain retrospectively applied post-offense restrictions 

for supervised release are in violation of the ex post facto 

clause). "Thus, even if a statute merely alters penal provisions 

accorded by the grace of the legislature, it violates the Clause 

if it is both retrospective and more onerous than the law in 

effect on the date of the offense." Ekstrand v. Oklahoma, 791 

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Appellate Case: 91-7061 Document: 01019324097 Date Filed: 12/16/1991 Page: 3 
P.2d 92, 94 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990)(citing Weaver, 450·u.s. at 

30). 

The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has addressed whether 

the emergency credits statute as amended in 1989 is an ex post 

facto law. Barnes v. Oklahoma, 791 P.2d 101 (Okla. Crim. App. 

1990). In holding that it is not an ex post facto law, the court 

reasoned as follows: 

Under the reasoning of Weaver, 57 o.s. Supp. 1989 

§ 574 is barred as to Petitioner by the ex post facto 

prohibitions of the State and federal constitutions if 

it both alters the consequences attached to a crime 

already completed and disadvantages the Petitioner. We 

agree that the new "cap" law may disadvantage the 

petitioner, for it reduces by half the "cap" credits 

which the petitioner may earn in the event that the 

prison population reaches ninety-five per cent (95%) of 

capacity, the governor declares a state of emergency and 

the petitioner meets the criteria of Section 573. The 

determinative issue is whether Section 574 as amended 

alters the consequences attached to the crime Petitioner 

committed. Section 574 is designed to provide the state 

with an administrative option to alleviate overcrowding 

in the Oklahoma prison system. Its use is triggered 

exclusively by the size of the prison population. The 

size of the prison population cannot be seen to be a 

consequence attached to the crime Petitioner committed. 

Rather it is a consequence of the statewide interaction 

between the convictions and sentences imposed and the 

prison space available. Section 574 as amended can be 

imposed only on the basis of events which occur after it 

was enacted, that is when the prison population reaches 

ninety-five percent (95%) of capacity. See 57 o.s. 1989 

Supp., § 574. Having found that the effect of Section 

574 as amended on the petitioner is not a consequence of 

the crime he committed, and that the law is only 

triggered by events which occur after its enactment, we 

conclude that it is not retrospective. Since it is not 

retrospective, its application to the petitioner does 

not violate the ex post facto prohibitions of the state 

and federal constitutions. 

Id. at 103. 

In this case, Respondents agree with Petitioner that he is 

disadvantaged by the amendment and cannot receive the same number 

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Appellate Case: 91-7061 Document: 01019324097 Date Filed: 12/16/1991 Page: 4 
of credits he once could. The parties disagree, however, as to 

whether the amendment is a retrospective application. Respondents 

argue, based on Barnes, that the law is prospective, attaching 

only to a future event of prison overcrowding. Petitioner 

counters that Barnes is contrary to Ekstrand, which held that a 

retrospective application of the earned credits statute violated 

ex post facto laws. Also, Petitioner argues that the amendment is 

retrospective, because it restricts the possibility of a shortened 

prison stay. 

In accordance with Petitioner's arguments, we do not agree 

with the court's reasoning or conclusion in Barnes. Instead, we 

believe the reasoning and conclusion of Ekstrand should also apply 

to emergency credits cases such as this one. 

In Ekstrand, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals addressed 

whether amended Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 138 (1988) was an ex post 

facto law when its application to prisoners resulted in the 

computing of fewer earned credits than under the statute before 

amendment, thereby lengthening the prisoners' sentences. 791 P.2d 

at 93. In resolving the issue, the court initially considered 

whether amended section 138 applied to prisoners convicted of 

crimes committed before the November 1, 1988, effective date of 

amended section 138. Id. at 94. The court found that amended 

section 138 was retrospective, because it applied to all inmates 

from the effective date of the amendment. Id. Second, the court 

considered whether the amendment was disadvantageous to prisoners. 

Id. After comparing the potential for earning credits before and 

after amendment, the court concluded that the amendment was 

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Appellate Case: 91-7061 Document: 01019324097 Date Filed: 12/16/1991 Page: 5 
disadvantageous. The amendment added requirements and reduced the 

number of credits which could be earned. Id. at 94-95. Because 

the reduction lengthened the amount of t~e a prisoner must be 

incarcerated, the court determined the amendment made the 

punishment for the crime more onerous than before the amendment. 

Id. at 95. The court, therefore, found an ex post facto 

violation. Id. Accordingly, the court held that "inmates who are 

disadvantaged by the amended statute, shall be entitled to the 

credits allotted under the statute effective on the date their 

cr~e was committed." Id. 

We believe there is no difference between the earned credits 

statute in Ekstrand and the emergency credits statute at issue 

here. Thus, we conclude the reasoning in Ekstrand and not Barnes 

applies. As in Ekstrand, the amended statute is retrospectively 

applied to all prisoners regardless of when they committed their 

crimes. See Okla. Stat. tit. 57 s· 574.1. Additionally, as the 

parties agree, the amended statute is disadvantageous. Section 

574.1 has imposed an eligibility requirement, recommendation for 

parole, not imposed under the 1984 statute. 

The purpose of the emergency credits statute is to permit 

earlier release to alleviate prison overcrowding. An emergency 

situation due to overcrowding as described in the statute cannot 

justify postponing a prisoner's release, which is the result 

caused by the amended statute in this case. By amending the 

emergency credits statute, the Oklahoma legislature made it more 

difficult for prisoners who have been denied parole to obtain 

release. In Ekstrand, such a disadvantage was set aside as an ex 

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Appellate Case: 91-7061 Document: 01019324097 Date Filed: 12/16/1991 Page: 6 
post facto violation. We conclude the situation with regard to 

emergency credits is the same. 

Respondents fail to show any rational relationship between 

the amended emergency statute's purpose to correct an emergency 

situation and the result on certain prisoners, such as Petitioner, 

to keep them in prison longer. Because there is no compelling 

reason to deny Petitioner and others sLmilarly situated emergency 

credits, we conclude that the district court erred in denying 

habeas corpus relief and in failing to hold that denial of 

emergency credits under the statutes prior to amendment is an ex 

post facto violation. Petitioner, while not entitled to immediate 

release, is entitled to have emergency credits currently 

calculated in accordance with the statute in effect at the time 

the offense he was convicted of was committed. See Wallace v. 

Cody, ___ F.2d ___ , No. 91-6057 (lOth Cir. Dec. 9, 1991). 

Petitioner's Application for a Certificate of Probable Cause 

and Motion for Leave to Proceed on Appeal without Prepayment of 

Costs or Fees are GRANTED. The judgment of the United States 

District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma is REVERSED. 

The action is REMANDED to the district court with directions to 

enter an order directing Respondents to calculate Petitioner's 

emergency credits under the 1984 statute. See Wallace, 

F.2d -- -- Petitioner's Motion for Leave to Supplement Record is 

DENIED, because the materials Petitioner seeks to include in the 

record are already included. 

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