Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_05-cv-00191/USCOURTS-alsd-1_05-cv-00191-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jo Anne B. Barnhart
Defendant
Cherise M. Williams
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

On this date, Plaintiff filed her Complaint (Doc. 1) and motion for

leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

CHERISE M. WILLIAMS, *

 *

Plaintiff, *

 *

vs. * CIVIL ACTION No. 05-00191-CG-B

 *

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, *

Commissioner of Social *

Security, *

 *

Defendant. *

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for an

Award of Attorney's Fees Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice

Act (Doc. 18). This action was referred to the undersigned

Magistrate Judge for report and recommendation pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72.2(c)(3). Upon

consideration of the pertinent pleadings, it is the recommendation

of the undersigned that Plaintiff should receive a reasonable

attorney's fee in the amount of $1,800.00.

I. Findings Of Fact

1. Plaintiff commenced this action on March 28, 2005.1

(Doc. 1). On November 14, 2005, the Court entered Judgment

pursuant to sentence four of § 205(g) of the Social Security Act,

42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and reversed and remanded this cause to the

Commissioner of Social Security for further proceedings. (Docs.

Case 1:05-cv-00191-CG-B Document 23 Filed 08/02/06 Page 1 of 6
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16-17).

2. Plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees was filed on

January 27, 2006. (Doc. 18). In the motion, Plaintiff requests an

attorney's fee award of $2,234.74. (Id.) The attorney's fee award

represents a total of 14.40 hours, at an hourly rate of $155.19 per

hour, for attorney time spent representing Plaintiff in this Court.

(Id.) 

3. The Commissioner of Social Security filed a Response to

Plaintiff's motion on February 13, 2006, and therein objected to

the requested hourly rate on the grounds that it exceeds the EAJA

$125.00 hourly cap as well as this district's prevailing hourly

rate of $125.00. (Docs. 20 (Ex. A), 22). The Commissioner also

objected to the amount of time for which Plaintiff seeks

compensation. (Id.) The Commissioner further advised that

notwithstanding the objections, the parties have agreed on the EAJA

rate of $125.00 and on 14.40 hours for time spent on this action.

(Id.) Accordingly, the Commissioner no longer opposes Plaintiff's

EAJA petition as long as the award is limited to $1,800.00, which

represents 14.40 hours at a hourly rate of $125.00. (Id.)

II. Conclusions Of Law

1. The Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) requires a

district court to “award to a prevailing party . . . fees and other

expenses . . . incurred by that party in any civil action . . .

including proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought

Case 1:05-cv-00191-CG-B Document 23 Filed 08/02/06 Page 2 of 6
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“[A] party who wins a sentence-four remand order is a prevailing

party.” Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993). 

3

The EAJA requires a prevailing party to file an application for

attorney’s fees within thirty (30) days of final judgment in the action. 28

U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). The thirty (30) day clock did not begin to run in

this action until this Court’s Order of Judgment dated November 14, 2005 (Doc.

17) became final, which would have occurred at the end of the sixty (60) days

for appeal provided under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1). See Shalala, 509 U.S. at

302. Because Plaintiff’s motion was filed on January 27, 2006 (Doc. 18), it

is found to be timely filed.

4

On March 29, 1996, the EAJA was amended so as to increase the statutory

cap on EAJA fees from $75.00 per hour to $125.00 per hour. See, e.g, Ikner v.

Apfel, 2000 WL 1844704, *2 n.1 (S.D. Ala. Nov 9, 2000). These amendments

apply to civil actions commenced on or after the date of enactment; therefore,

the statutory cap of $125.00 per hour applies in this present action.

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by or against the United States . . . unless the court finds that

the position of the United States was substantially justified or

that special circumstances make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. §

2412(d)(1)(A). The Commissioner does not dispute the issues of

prevailing party status,2 timeliness,3 or substantial justification.

2. With regard to a determination of the hourly rate to

apply in a given EAJA case, the express language of the Act, as

recently amended,4 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

The amount of fees awarded under this subsection shall be

based upon prevailing market rates for the kind and

quality of the services furnished, except that . . .

attorneys fees shall not be awarded in excess of $125.00

per hour unless the court determines that an increase in

the cost of living or a special factor, such as the

limited availability of qualified attorneys for the

proceedings involved, justifies a higher fee.

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). 

3. In Meyer v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 1029 (11th Cir. 1992), the

Court determined that the EAJA establishes a two-step analysis for

determining the appropriate hourly rate to be applied in

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calculating attorneys fees under the Act: 

The first step in the analysis, . . . is to determine the

market rate for “similar services [provided] by lawyers

of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and

reputation.” . . . The second step, which is needed only

if the market rate is greater than [$125.00] per hour, is

to determine whether the court should adjust the hourly

fee upward from [$125.00] to take into account an

increase in the cost of living, or a special factor. 

Id. at 1033-1034 (citations and footnote omitted).

4. The prevailing market rate in the Southern District of

Alabama has been previously determined to be $125.00 per hour. See

Boggs v. Massanari, C.A. 00-0408-P-C (S.D. Ala. (Jun. 13, 2001));

Boone v. Apfel, C.A. 99-0965-CB-L (S.D. Ala. (Aug. 30, 2001)).

Because the market rate is not greater than the statutory rate of

$125.00 per hour, this Court need not reach the second step of the

Meyer analysis.

5. With regard to the reasonableness of the hours claimed by

Plaintiff’s attorney, “[t]he fee applicant bears the burden of

establishing entitlement and documenting the appropriate hours and

hourly rates.” Norman v. Housing Auth. of City of Montgomery, 836

F.2d 1292, 1303 (11th Cir. 1988). “[T]he measure of reasonable

hours is determined by the profession’s judgment of the time that

may be conscionably billed and not the least time in which it might

theoretically have been done.” Id. at 1306. 

6. In the case sub judice, attached to Plaintiff’s motion is

a time sheet detailing the description of work performed, the time

expended, and the date on which the work was performed. (Doc. 18

Case 1:05-cv-00191-CG-B Document 23 Filed 08/02/06 Page 4 of 6
at Ex. A). The undersigned has reviewed this document and

Defendant's response, and finds that, under the circumstances, and

given the usual number of hours billed by attorneys in similar

actions, Plaintiff's counsel is entitled to 14.40 hours of attorney

time expended representing Plaintiff in federal court.

III. CONCLUSION

Therefore, upon consideration of the pertinent pleadings, the

undersigned Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff's Motion for

an Award of Attorney's Fees Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice

Act (Doc. 18) be GRANTED in part, and that the award be limited to

the EAJA rate of $125.00 per hour, thereby resulting in an award of

$1,800.00 for 14.40 attorney hours spent representing Plaintiff in

connection with this action. 

The attached sheet contains important information regarding

objections to the Report and Recommendation of the undersigned

Magistrate Judge.

DONE this 2nd day of August, 2006.

 /s/ Sonja F. Bivins 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:05-cv-00191-CG-B Document 23 Filed 08/02/06 Page 5 of 6
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS

AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION

AND FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

1. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything

in it must, within ten days of the date of service of this document, file

specific written objections with the clerk of court. Failure to do so

will bar a de novo determination by the district judge of anything in the

recommendation and will bar an attack, on appeal, of the factual findings

of the magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); Lewis v. Smith,

855 F.2d 736, 738 (11th Cir. 1988). The procedure for challenging the

findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge is set out in more

detail in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which provides, in part, that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a magistrate

judge in a dispositive matter, that is, a matter excepted by

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), by filing a “Statement of Objection

to Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation” within ten days after

being served with a copy of the recommendation, unless a

different time is established by order. The statement of

objection shall specify those portions of the recommendation

to which objection is made and the basis for the objection.

The objecting party shall submit to the district judge, at the

time of filing the objection, a brief setting forth the

party’s arguments that the magistrate judge’s recommendation

should be reviewed de novo and a different disposition made.

It is insufficient to submit only a copy of the original brief

submitted to the magistrate judge, although a copy of the

original brief may be submitted or referred to and

incorporated into the brief in support of the objection.

Failure to submit a brief in support of the objection may be

deemed an abandonment of the objection.

A magistrate judge’s recommendation cannot be appealed to a Court

of Appeals; only the district judge’s order or judgment can be appealed.

2. Opposing party’s response to the objection. Any opposing party may

submit a brief opposing the objection within ten (10) days of being

served with a copy of the statement of objection. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72;

SD ALA LR 72.4(b). 

3. Transcript (applicable where proceedings tape recorded). Pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), the magistrate judge finds

that the tapes and original records in this action are adequate for

purposes of review. Any party planning to object to this recommendation,

but unable to pay the fee for a transcript, is advised that a judicial

determination that transcription is necessary is required before the

United States will pay the cost of the transcript.

 /s/ SONJA F. BIVINS 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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