Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-15-01255/USCOURTS-caDC-15-01255-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Enterprise Leasing Company of Florida
Respondent
National Labor Relations Board
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 17, 2016 Decided August 5, 2016 

No. 15-1200 

ENTERPRISE LEASING COMPANY OF FLORIDA, DOING BUSINESS 

AS ALAMO RENT-A-CAR, 

PETITIONER

v. 

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, 

RESPONDENT

Consolidated with 15-1255 

On Petition for Review and Cross-Application 

 for Enforcement of an Order of 

the National Labor Relations Board 

D. John Sauer argued the cause for petitioner. With him 

on the briefs was Daniel R. Begian. 

Greg Lauro, Attorney, National Labor Relations Board, 

argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were 

Richard F. Griffin, Jr., General Counsel, John H. Ferguson, 

Associate General Counsel, Linda Dreeben, Deputy Associate 

General Counsel, and Julie B. Broido, Supervisory Attorney. 

Before: GRIFFITH, PILLARD and WILKINS, Circuit Judges. 

USCA Case #15-1255 Document #1628759 Filed: 08/05/2016 Page 1 of 27
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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge PILLARD. 

PILLARD, Circuit Judge: The National Labor Relations 

Board concluded that petitioner Enterprise Leasing Company 

of Florida (Enterprise, or the Company) committed several 

unfair labor practices in late 2009 and early 2010 at a Miami, 

Florida, car rental facility. Enterprise violated the National 

Labor Relations Act (the Act), the Board determined, by 

telling employees it was terminating short-term disability 

benefits on account of their union membership, encouraging 

an employee to circulate a petition to decertify the Union as 

its employees’ bargaining representative, unilaterally 

terminating employees’ short-term disability benefits, 

interfering with a union representative’s contractual right of 

access to Enterprise’s facility, unlawfully decertifying the 

Union as its employees’ bargaining representative based on a 

petition tainted by unfair labor practices, and thereafter 

refusing to bargain with the Union or collect or remit union 

dues. See Enterprise Leasing Co. of Fla., 362 NLRB No. 135 

(June 26, 2015). We hold that substantial record evidence 

supports each of the Board’s findings and conclusions. We 

lack jurisdiction to consider the Company’s additional claim 

that the Board’s remedy was unlawfully punitive, because 

Enterprise failed to raise the argument before the Board. 

Accordingly, we deny its petition and grant the Board’s crossapplication for enforcement. 

I. Background 

A. Facts 

Enterprise is a national car rental company that operates a 

facility at Miami International Airport, where it rents cars 

under the Enterprise, National Car Rental, and Alamo RentUSCA Case #15-1255 Document #1628759 Filed: 08/05/2016 Page 2 of 27
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A-Car (Alamo) brands.1

 Enterprise obtained the Alamo 

operation, among others, during its acquisition of Vanguard 

Car Rental, USA (Vanguard) in August 2007. At that time, 

Teamsters Local Union No. 769 (the Union) represented the 

employees of Alamo Miami (unit employees) in a wall-towall bargaining unit. Before the acquisition, the Union and 

Vanguard had negotiated a collective bargaining agreement 

for Alamo employees, which was effective from November 

29, 2005, through January 2, 2010. In December 2009, after 

the acquisition, the Union and Enterprise agreed to extend the 

existing agreement through March 31, 2010, while 

negotiating a successor agreement. 

 Enterprise provided benefits to unit employees under a 

Comprehensive Group Insurance Plan (the Group Plan), 

referenced in the collective bargaining agreement. Until 

August 2009, the Group Plan encompassed a subsidiary 

Vanguard Short-Term Disability Plan (the Vanguard Plan). 

 Enterprise terminated the Vanguard Plan on August 1, 

2009, eliminating the third-party administrator, as it 

streamlined its National and Alamo human-resources 

operations. Between that date and the end of 2009, Enterprise 

continued to provide short-term disability benefits to unit 

employees, but Enterprise administered those benefits on a 

self-insured basis instead of through the Vanguard Plan. 

 

1

 We draw the facts from the Board’s decision, Enterprise Leasing 

Co. of Fla., 362 NLRB No. 135 (June 26, 2015), which 

incorporated by reference its 2013 decision, Enterprise Leasing Co. 

of Fla., 359 NLRB No. 149 (July 2, 2013), appending the 

Administrative Law Judge’s decision. Accordingly, citations in 

this section are to the 2013 Board decision reflecting the ALJ’s 

factual findings. 

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 Enterprise’s provision of short-term disability benefits 

was short-lived, although the Company only belatedly 

informed its employees of the change. In previous years, 

Enterprise typically held a benefits open-enrollment period in 

October and November each year, but it did not do so in 2009 

for the 2010 plan year. When Enterprise Union Steward 

Marjorie Wisecup asked Enterprise’s Human Resource 

Manager Lissette Dow about the omission, Dow reviewed the 

2010 employee-benefits package with Wisecup, but she did 

not mention that the Company had converted to a self-insured 

short-term disability benefits plan in anticipation of 

eliminating those benefits altogether at the end of 2009. 

Around the same time, Wisecup heard Dow tell other 

employees not to worry about enrollment, because benefits in 

2010 would be the same as in 2009. 

It was not until late November or early December, after 

an open-enrollment period would have closed had it been 

offered, that Dow informed Wisecup that Enterprise would no 

longer provide short-term disability benefits to unit 

employees in 2010. When Wisecup asked why, Dow replied 

that the collective bargaining agreement did not specify shortterm disability benefits; those benefits, she said, were not 

included in the Group Plan called for by the agreement. 

Because the agreement did not specify short-term disability 

benefits, Dow explained, the unit employees could not have 

them. 

 In early December, Dow and Enterprise Airport Market 

Manager Bridget Long conducted several employee meetings 

to discuss Enterprise’s elimination of short-term disability 

benefits. At one of the meetings, Long informed employees 

about the change and apologized for the Company’s delay in 

announcing it. Dow acknowledged that when she had met 

with Wisecup earlier in the fall, she had known about 

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Enterprise’s plan to eliminate short-term disability benefits, 

but that she had not mentioned the change because she did not 

think it was a big deal. Another employee, Andy Felgentres, 

asked Long why the benefits were being eliminated, and Long 

responded, “because you’re union, you can’t have short-term 

disability.” Enterprise Leasing Co. of Fla., 359 NLRB No. 

149, at *8 (July 2, 2013). When Felgentres said that was 

discrimination, Long replied, “don’t worry, Enterprise has 

very good lawyers.” Id. 

 At another meeting, Enterprise employee Wanda Rivera 

asked Dow if Enterprise was eliminating short-term disability 

benefits because of the union contract and whether the 

Company was eliminating the benefits at other locations. 

Dow responded that employees at non-union locations would 

retain their short-term disability benefits. Another employee, 

Sara Rivera, asked whether employees would still have such 

benefits if not for the Union, and Dow replied, “yes,” the 

reason the unionized employees would not get the benefits 

was “because [Enterprise] had to follow the union contract.” 

Id. at 9. Dow repeated that at locations where there was no 

union, employees would keep short-term disability benefits. 

 On January 1, 2010, Enterprise eliminated the unit 

employees’ short-term disability benefits without notifying or 

bargaining with the Union. 

 At around the same time, Cirilo Garcia, an Enterprise 

employee who was dissatisfied because of the elimination of 

unit employees’ short-term disability benefits, began 

circulating to unit employees a petition to decertify the Union 

as their collective-bargaining representative. 

 Shortly thereafter, on January 4, Union Business 

Representative Eddie Valero, along with two other Union 

agents, visited the Miami Alamo facility to investigate a 

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report that the decertification petition was being circulated on 

company time. The then-effective collective bargaining 

agreement provided that “[a]fter making [their] presence 

known to a member of management,” authorized union 

representatives “shall be permitted to enter the premises of the 

Employer for the purpose of determining” compliance with 

the agreement. Id. at 12 (quoting Miami Alamo Collective 

Bargaining Agreement, J.A. 372). Accordingly, upon arrival, 

Valero attempted to notify a supervisor of his presence. 

Valero had made similar investigative visits in the past—

unannounced until arrival—and had not experienced any 

problems. 

During the January 4 visit, however, Valero and his team 

ran into trouble. When they arrived, Dow came out of the 

building with her arms raised, screaming at Valero and 

demanding to know why he was there. Valero responded that 

he was conducting an investigation. Dow announced that she 

would follow him during the visit because she had orders 

from above. Although Valero told Dow that he would report 

her conduct to the Board if she interfered with the visit, Dow 

persisted, following Valero and his team into the building 

and, once inside, standing beside them for about thirty-five 

minutes while they sat on a bench. It was only after Valero 

called the Company’s labor-relations coordinator to report the 

incident that Enterprise manager Long allowed the group to 

use the break room for their investigation, reminding them not 

to interrupt the workforce. Dow continued to follow Valero 

and his group throughout the visit, both outside and inside the 

building, and retreated only when they returned to the break 

room, although other managers periodically stopped in to 

monitor the group. After approximately twenty-five minutes, 

Valero and his group left the facility. 

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Just over a week later, on January 13, Enterprise 

supervisors Larry Elsass and Rodolfo Browne spoke with 

Garcia on company property. Elsass and Browne asked 

Garcia how many signatures he had obtained on the 

decertification petition. At that point, only sixty-six of the 

unit’s 159 employees had signed the petition. When Garcia 

reported on his progress, Browne said that number was not 

enough, and told Garcia to go back and get more. Garcia then 

arranged to secure additional signatures to push the number 

above the 50 percent mark. 

Enterprise withdrew recognition from the Union on 

January 19, based solely on the decertification petition that by 

then reflected verified signatures of a majority of unit 

employees. 

 Later that month, Enterprise Station Manager Johnny 

Betancourt interrogated employees about, and solicited them 

to withdraw, their union membership. And, over the course 

of the following year, Enterprise made a series of changes to 

unit employees’ terms and conditions of employment without 

notifying or bargaining with the Union. In February, the 

Company ceased deducting and remitting union dues for 

employees who had signed dues-checkoff authorizations, 

despite the requirement of the collective bargaining 

agreement (effective through the end of March) to deduct and 

remit those dues. The Company also made a variety of wageand-benefits changes, and it declined to process an employee 

grievance. 

B. Decision Below 

 Based on the foregoing conduct, between December 18, 

2009, and February 16, 2011, the Union filed a series of 

unfair labor practice charges against Enterprise. On April 8, 

2011, the NLRB’s Acting General Counsel issued an 

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amended, consolidated complaint alleging that Enterprise had 

committed multiple violations of section 8(a)(1) and (a)(5) of 

the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (5). 

Among other things, the complaint charged that 

Enterprise violated section 8(a)(1) when Betancourt 

coercively interrogated employees about, and solicited them 

to withdraw, their union membership. Although the Company 

initially denied that it committed those unfair labor practices, 

it later admitted to them at the hearing before the ALJ, and it 

does not contest them here. We therefore summarily enforce 

the Board’s findings and order as to those charges. See Allied 

Mech. Servs., Inc. v. NLRB, 668 F.3d 758, 765 (D.C. Cir. 

2012); Flying Food Grp., Inc. v. NLRB, 471 F.3d 178, 181 

(D.C. Cir. 2006). 

 The Acting General Counsel’s complaint further charged 

that Enterprise violated section 8(a)(1) of the Act by telling 

employees that they would lose their short-term disability 

benefits because of their union representation, and 

encouraging employees to circulate a petition to decertify the 

Union as their bargaining representative. The complaint also 

alleged that the company violated section 8(a)(1) and (a)(5) 

by unilaterally terminating short-term disability benefits, 

interfering with the Union’s contractual right of access to 

Enterprise’s facility, withdrawing recognition from the Union 

as the employees’ collective-bargaining representative based 

on a tainted decertification petition, and thereafter unilaterally 

changing terms of employment, refusing to bargain with the 

Union regarding an employee grievance, and failing to deduct 

and remit dues to the Union. Although Enterprise admitted to 

unilaterally terminating short-term disability benefits, 

withdrawing recognition from the Union, and declining to 

bargain with the Union post-withdrawal, it contested that any 

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of the alleged conduct was unlawful and denied the 

commission of the other unfair labor practices charged. 

After an evidentiary hearing, on April 11, 2012, the ALJ 

issued a decision that Enterprise had violated the Act as 

alleged, save one charge of unlawful interrogation not at issue 

in this petition. Enterprise excepted to the ALJ’s decision. 

The General Counsel, too, filed exceptions seeking, among 

other things, an amended remedy, which Enterprise generally 

opposed. 

On July 2, 2013, the Board issued a decision and order 

(the 2013 Decision) largely adopting the ALJ’s findings and 

conclusions and amending the ALJ’s remedy as requested by 

the Board. See Enterprise Leasing Co. of Fla., 359 NLRB 

No. 149. The following year, while Enterprise’s petition for 

review of the Board’s decision was pending, the Supreme 

Court’s decision in NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 

(2014), invalidated the appointments of two of the three 2013 

Decision panel members. The Board set aside the 2013 

Decision, and, on June 26, 2015, upon de novo review, a 

lawfully constituted panel of the Board issued a Decision and 

Order largely adopting the 2013 Decision, see Enterprise 

Leasing Co. of Fla., 362 NLRB No. 135, at *1-4, with one 

Member dissenting in part, see id. at *4-8. We discuss the 

specifics of the Board’s Decision and Order at greater length 

where relevant below. Enterprise timely petitioned for review 

of the Board’s decision, and the Board filed a crossapplication for enforcement of its order. We have jurisdiction 

under 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)-(f). 

II. Section 8 Violations 

 Enterprise contests the substantiality of the evidence 

underlying the Board’s findings that it violated section 8(a)(1) 

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and (a)(5) of the Act. Each of Enterprise’s arguments comes 

up short. 

A. Standard of Review 

Assuming a “limited” role, Stephens Media, LLC v. 

NLRB, 677 F.3d 1241, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 2012), we review the 

Board’s decision to determine whether it is supported by 

substantial evidence in the record as a whole, see 29 U.S.C. 

§ 160(e) (“The findings of the Board with respect to questions 

of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the record 

considered as a whole shall be conclusive.”); accord 

Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951). 

We must “uphold[] the Board’s application of law to facts 

unless arbitrary or otherwise erroneous, and give[] substantial 

deference to inferences the Board draws from the facts.” 

Allied Mech. Servs., 668 F.3d at 764 (internal quotation marks 

and citations omitted). “An ALJ’s determinations regarding 

the credibility of witnesses will not be reversed ‘unless those 

determinations are hopelessly incredible, self-contradictory, 

or patently unsupportable.’” Stephens Media, 677 F.3d at 

1250 (quoting Federated Logistics & Operations v. NLRB, 

400 F.3d 920, 924 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). We must “abide [the 

Board’s] interpretation of the Act if it is reasonable and 

consistent with controlling precedent.” Brockton Hosp. v. 

NLRB, 294 F.3d 100, 103 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 

B. Section 8(a)(1) Violations 

We begin with Enterprise’s challenge to the Board’s 

determinations that it violated section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The 

Board found two violations. The first occurred when 

Enterprise repeatedly told its employees that it was 

terminating their short-term disability benefits on account of 

their union membership. The second was due to Enterprise 

managers encouraging an employee to circulate a petition to 

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decertify the Union as its employees’ bargaining 

representative. 

Under section 8(a)(1), it is “an unfair labor practice for an 

employer . . . to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees 

in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in [section 7] of [the 

Act].” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). Section 7 grants employees 

“the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor 

organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives 

of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted 

activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other 

mutual aid or protection.” Id. § 157. An employer’s 

statement that, “considering the totality of the 

circumstances, . . . has a reasonable tendency to coerce or to 

interfere with those rights,” violates section 8(a)(1). Tasty 

Baking Co. v. NLRB, 254 F.3d 114, 124 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see 

Bridgestone Firestone S.C., 350 NLRB 526, 529 (2007). In 

reviewing section 8(a)(1) claims, the Board “must take into 

account the economic dependence of the employees on their 

employers, and the necessary tendency of the former, because 

of that relationship, to pick up intended implications of the 

latter that might be more readily dismissed by a more 

disinterested ear.” NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 

575, 617 (1969). 

i. Withholding Benefits from Employees Because of 

 Union Representation 

Enterprise challenges on evidentiary grounds the Board’s 

conclusion that the Company violated section 8(a)(1) of the 

Act by informing employees it was terminating their shortterm disability benefits because of their union representation. 

An employer violates section 8(a)(1) when it “threaten[s] to 

penalize employees if they choose union representation, or . . . 

offer[s] to reward employees if they reject it.” Avecor, Inc. v. 

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NLRB, 931 F.2d 924, 931 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (internal citations 

omitted). Such threats and promises will violate the Act, 

whether they are explicit or implicit, see Unifirst Corp., 346 

NLRB 591, 593 (2006); the dispositive question is whether an 

employee “could reasonably perceive a direct connection 

between union activities” and loss of a job or benefit, 

Progressive Elec., Inc. v. NLRB, 453 F.3d 538, 545 (D.C. Cir. 

2006). 

Incorporating the ALJ’s decision, the Board found that 

the statements made by Dow and Long at various employee 

meetings had a reasonable tendency to interfere with section 7 

rights, and thus were unlawfully coercive. Enterprise Leasing 

Co. of Fla., 362 NLRB No. 135, at *1 & 2 n.3. Enterprise 

supervisors Dow and Long explained to unit employees that 

they would lose their short-term disability benefits because 

they were union and because the union contract did not 

specify provision of such benefits, Id. But the Company 

would continue to provide those benefits, Long explained, to 

employees at other, non-union facilities. Id. From Dow and 

Long’s statements, the Board concluded, see id., employees 

could “reasonably perceive a direct connection between” their 

union membership and Enterprise’s withdrawal of an 

important benefit. Progressive Elec., 453 F.3d at 545. 

Enterprise contends, and dissenting Board Member 

Miscimarra agreed, that the Board inaccurately paraphrased 

the record. Enterprise insists that it simply offered its 

employees truthful information about their collective 

bargaining agreement, which cannot constitute an unfair labor 

practice. Specifically, Enterprise urges that the Board erred in 

not relying solely on the version of events described in 

employee Wisecup’s grievance form, in which she noted only 

that Dow and Long “informed us that the reason for [the 

elimination of short-term disability benefits] is [] the fact that 

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the bargaining [a]greement does not specify that [the benefit] 

has to be given to employees.” Wisecup Grievance Form, 

J.A. 843. 

Enterprise’s argument ignores substantial record evidence 

that directly supports the Board’s finding. According to 

Wisecup’s testimony at the hearing before the ALJ, Long 

explained to employees “because you’re union, you can’t 

have short-term disability.” Testimony of Marjorie Wisecup, 

J.A. 54. Wisecup additionally recounted that, when accused 

of discriminating based on union membership, Long stated, 

“don’t worry, Enterprise has very good lawyers.” Id. 

Wisecup’s account was consistent with those given by two 

other employees, Sara Rivera and Wanda Rivera. Moreover, 

in light of Dow and Long’s contemporaneous statements 

linking the loss of benefits to their union-represented status, 

the employees readily could have understood Dow and 

Long’s references to the collective bargaining agreement—as 

recounted in Wisecup’s grievance form—also to tie the 

withdrawal of those benefits to union membership. Dow and 

Long’s union-contract justification, viewed in context, thus 

“went beyond permissible statements of fact.” ALJ Decision, 

J.A. 2096; see Enterprise Leasing Co. of Fla., 362 NLRB No. 

135, at *1 & 2 n.3. 

Finally, to the extent Dow and Long’s version of events 

differed from the testimony of employees Wisecup, Sara 

Rivera, and Wanda Rivera, the ALJ specifically credited the 

employees’ testimony, which was mutually corroborative and 

adverse to their current employer, favoring reliance on that 

testimony. Those well-reasoned credibility determinations 

were not “hopelessly incredible, self-contradictory, or 

patently unsupportable.” Stephens Media, 677 F.3d at 1250. 

Substantial evidence thus supports the Board’s determination 

that, under the circumstances, Dow and Long’s justification 

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for eliminating short-term disability benefits was unlawfully 

coercive. 

ii. Encouragement of Decertification Petition 

Enterprise also contests the Board’s determination that it 

violated section 8(a)(1) by encouraging an employee to 

circulate a petition to decertify the Union as the employees’ 

bargaining representative. Employer statements about union 

decertification are not altogether off limits. For example, the 

Board has held that an employer does not violate the Act if it 

furnishes accurate information about, or ministerial aid to, the 

decertification process, and does so without making threats or 

offering benefits. See Lee Lumber & Bldg. Material Corp., 

306 NLRB 408, 409-10 (1992); E. States Optical Co., 275 

NLRB 371, 372 (1985). An employer violates section 

8(a)(1), however, “by ‘actively soliciting, encouraging, 

promoting, or providing assistance in the initiation, signing, 

or filing of an employee petition seeking to decertify the 

bargaining representative.’” Mickey’s Linen & Towel Supply, 

Inc., 349 NLRB 790, 791 (2007) (quoting Wire Prods. Mfg. 

Co., 326 NLRB 625, 640 (1998), enforced sub nom. NLRB v. 

R.T Blankenship & Assocs., Inc., 210 F.3d 375 (7th Cir. 2000) 

(unpublished)); see E. States Optical Co., 275 NLRB at 372. 

The Board adopted the ALJ’s finding that supervisors 

Elsass and Browne unlawfully coerced employee Cirilo 

Garcia to collect more signatures when, after instructing him 

that the number of signatures he had gathered was not 

enough, they told him to go back and get more. Enterprise 

Leasing Co. of Fla., 362 NLRB No. 135, at *1 & 2 n.3. 

Although the Board did not find that the statements 

constituted “unlawful[] assist[ance],” it concluded that the 

direct exhortation from management, “[e]ven assuming the 

conversation was friendly,” could only have further impelled 

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Cirilo to continue his campaign, unlawfully promoting it. Id. 

at 2 n.3. It did not matter, the Board explained, that Garcia 

himself had commenced and led the campaign before the 

conversation at issue. 

As an initial matter, contrary to Enterprise’s contention, 

the Board “engage[d] in reasoned decisionmaking” in thus 

adopting and elaborating on the thorough, well-reasoned 

analysis of the ALJ. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 

147, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 294 F.3d 186, 188 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 

Moreover, the record contains substantial evidence to support 

the findings underlying the violation. According to the 

credited testimony of Enterprise employee Glinda Jefferies, 

Jefferies observed Garcia showing the decertification petition 

to Elsass and Browne. Jefferies overheard them ask Garcia 

how many signatures he had gotten, and Browne told him “it 

wasn’t enough, to go back and get more.” Testimony of 

Glinda Jefferies, J.A. 78. Garcia then arranged to secure 

additional signatures to push the number “over the 50 percent 

mark.” Testimony of Jesus Torres, J.A. 202. 

The record refutes Enterprise’s contention that Jefferies’s 

account is incredible because Jefferies, who does not speak 

Spanish, would not have been able to understand the 

conversation with Garcia, who does not speak or understand 

very much English. As the ALJ explained, Elsass, who 

speaks only English, testified that he was able to 

communicate basic instructions to Garcia in English and that 

other employees could translate for him when necessary, 

confirming that Jefferies indeed could have overheard the 

conversation to which she testified. 

Enterprise further argues that even if the conversation 

transpired as Jefferies testified, Elsass and Browne solely 

provided employees truthful information about the 

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decertification process and how many signatures would be 

required for a petition to be successful. That argument is only 

partly correct. The first part of Browne’s statement, 

informing Garcia that the number of signatures he had 

collected “wasn’t enough,” Testimony of Glinda Jefferies, 

J.A. 78, is what Enterprise suggests—a lawful, accurate 

statement about the decertification process that, by itself, 

constitutes no more than ministerial aid. See Lee Lumber & 

Bldg. Material Corp., 306 NLRB at 409-10; E. States Optical 

Co., 275 NLRB at 372; see also Exxel/Atmos, Inc. v. NLRB, 

147 F.3d 972, 975 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 

But Browne did not stop there. Instead, he directed 

Garcia “to go back and get more” signatures. Testimony of 

Glinda Jefferies, J.A. 78. That statement, on which the Board 

relied in finding a violation of section 8(a)(1), constitutes not 

merely the provision of accurate information, but the “active[] 

. . . encourag[ement]” and “promot[ion]” of a decertification 

petition that is prohibited by the Act. Mickey’s Linen & 

Towel Supply, Inc., 349 NLRB at 791. 

We therefore deny Enterprise’s petition for review and 

grant the Board’s cross-application for enforcement as to the 

section 8(a)(1) violations. 

C. Section 8(a)(1) and (a)(5) Violations 

We next address Enterprise’s challenge to the Board’s 

conclusion that it violated section 8(a)(1) and (a)(5) of the Act 

by unilaterally withdrawing short-term disability benefits, 

interfering with union agents’ contractual right of access to 

the Miami Alamo facility, unlawfully decertifying the Union 

as its employees’ bargaining representative, and then refusing 

to bargain with the Union or collect or remit union dues. 

Section 8(a)(5) makes it an unfair labor practice for an 

employer “to refuse to bargain collectively with the 

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representatives of his employees.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5). An 

employer that violates section 8(a)(5) also derivatively 

violates section 8(a)(1)’s prohibition against “interfer[ing] 

with, restrain[ing], or coerc[ing] employees in the exercise of 

the rights guaranteed in section [7 of the Act],” id.

§ 158(a)(1), including the right to “bargain collectively 

through representatives of their own choosing,” id. § 157. See 

Metro. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 698 n.4 (1983);

Pac. Coast Supply, LLC v. NLRB, 801 F.3d 321, 325 n.2 

(D.C. Cir. 2015). For the reasons that follow, we deny 

Enterprise’s petition as to all of the challenged section 8(a)(5) 

and derivative section 8(a)(1) violations. 

i. Unilateral Termination of Benefits 

Enterprise first contests the Board’s decision that the 

Company’s unilateral termination of short-term disability 

benefits violated section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. Section 

8(d) provides that the obligation to bargain protected by 

section 8 extends to “wages, hours, and other terms and 

conditions of employment.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). Those 

mandatory bargaining subjects include employee benefits, 

such as short-term disability. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 

736, 743-44 (1962). “[A]n employer’s unilateral change in 

conditions of employment under negotiation is . . . a violation 

of [section] 8(a)(5),” and, derivatively, 8(a)(1). Id. at 743; see 

Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 1466, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 

795 F.2d 150, 153 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 

In this case, a divided Board determined that Enterprise 

committed an unfair labor practice by eliminating employees’ 

short-term disability benefits at the end of 2009 without first 

notifying the Union or giving it an opportunity to bargain. 

Enterprise does not contest that it unilaterally terminated the 

benefits at issue, but argues that the Union waived or, 

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alternatively, contracted away the protections of section 

8(a)(5). 

Where a bargaining unit has affirmatively waived its 

right to negotiate as to a subject, an employer’s unilateral 

change to contract terms on that subject does not violate the 

Act. But such waiver occurs only upon a bargaining unit’s 

“clear and unmistakable” relinquishment of the right. Ga. 

Power Co., 325 NLRB 420, 420 (1998) (quoting Metro. 

Edison Co., 460 U.S. at 708). Agreeing with the ALJ, the 

Board concluded that the parties’ then-effective collective 

bargaining agreement did not effect a waiver of the Union’s 

statutory right to bargain over the elimination of short-term 

disability benefits; the unilateral change on that mandatory 

subject of bargaining thus violated the Act. Enterprise 

Leasing Co. of Fla., 362 NLRB No. 135, at *1-2 & n.4. 

Enterprise challenges the Board’s non-waiver determination, 

contending that the parties’ agreement effected a “clear and 

unmistakable” waiver of the bargaining unit’s right to 

negotiate benefits encompassed within the Group Insurance 

Plan. 

 Enterprise alternatively challenges the Board’s order by 

invoking the contract-coverage doctrine. In Enterprise’s 

view, the collective bargaining agreement itself covers 

anything having to do with the provision of benefits, 

including short-term disability benefits, and thereby gives 

Enterprise a contractual right to terminate those benefits 

without bargaining. Under the contract-coverage doctrine, 

when a subject is “covered by the collective bargaining 

agreement,” the union already “has exercised its bargaining 

right” on the matter—by, for example, agreeing to a particular 

benefits plan that includes a reservation-of-rights clause—

leaving the employer free to make unilateral changes to such a 

covered plan without running afoul of the Act. BP Amoco 

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Corp. v. NLRB, 217 F.3d 869, 873 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting 

NLRB v. U.S. Postal Serv., 8 F.3d 832, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1993)). 

We need not reach the merits of either Enterprise’s 

waiver or its contract-coverage contention, or otherwise 

venture to interpret the collective bargaining agreement, 

because we sustain the Board’s determination on the ground 

that at the time Enterprise terminated the contested benefits, 

they were no longer provided pursuant to the collective 

bargaining agreement. According to the Board, the record 

established that as of August 2009—well before Enterprise’s 

January 1, 2010, unilateral termination of the short-term 

disability benefits—the Company had begun selfadministering those benefits. Enterprise Leasing Co. of Fla., 

362 NLRB No. 135, at *1-2. The Board relied on that change 

as an “alternative,” and “independently sufficient basis” to 

uphold the ALJ’s decision. Id. at *2; see Local 702, Int’l Bhd. 

of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 215 F.3d 11, 15 (D.C. 

Cir. 2000) (“[S]ince the Board is the agency entrusted by 

Congress with the responsibility for making findings under 

the statute, it . . . is free to substitute its judgment for the 

ALJ’s.” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)). 

Accordingly, “[e]ven assuming the [Company’s] waiver 

arguments might otherwise have merit,” the Board explained, 

“they fail here because, after August 1, 2009, [the Company] 

did not provide [short-term disability] benefits pursuant to any 

‘plan,’ or at least not pursuant to one of the Vanguard plans 

referenced in the [agreement].” Enterprise Leasing Co. of 

Fla., 362 NLRB No. 135, at *1. The Company’s failure to 

bargain over that mandatory subject of bargaining thus 

violated the Act. Id. at *3. 

Substantial record evidence supports the Board’s 

conclusion that, at the time Enterprise unilaterally terminated 

the short-term disability benefits, the Company did not 

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provide those benefits pursuant to any plan referenced in the 

collective bargaining agreement. Specifically, Dana Beffa, 

Enterprise’s vice president of employee benefits, testified that 

Enterprise terminated the Vanguard Plan on August 1, 2009, 

and the third-party administrator ceased administering shortterm disability benefits. From August 1 until the end of the 

year, Beffa explained, Enterprise itself administered the 

benefits on a self-insured basis. Enterprise accordingly 

cannot rely on any waiver or contract coverage the agreement 

might have effected with respect to Group Plan benefits. 

Nor was the Company’s provision of short-term disability 

benefits after August 1 a “one-time gratuity” exempt from 

collective-bargaining requirements, as Enterprise claims. 

Reply Br. 12. Enterprise provided the benefits—first through 

the Vanguard Plan and then on its own, with no break in 

coverage—with such regularity to “justif[y] its employees’ 

expectations that they would receive the” benefit in the future. 

Sykel Enters., Inc., 324 NLRB 1123, 1125 (1997). We 

therefore decline to disturb the Board’s finding that 

Enterprise’s unilateral benefits termination violated the Act. 

ii. Interference With Union’s Workplace Access 

Enterprise further challenges the Board’s conclusion that 

Enterprise violated section 8(a)(1) and (a)(5) of the Act by 

interfering with the Union’s contractual right of access to the 

Miami facility. Where a collective bargaining agreement 

permits union officials to access an employer’s worksite, it is 

a violation of section 8(a)(5) to interfere with the bargainedfor access. See Frontier Hotel & Casino, 309 NLRB 761, 765 

(1992), enforced sub. nom. NLRB v. Unbelievable, Inc., 71 

F.3d 1434 (9th Cir. 1995). Any “undue restriction[] upon a 

union representative’s access to the worksite impairs a 

union’s ability to police its agreement and thereby diminishes 

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employees’ Section 7 rights.” Houston Coca-Cola Bottling 

Co., 265 NLRB 766, 777 (1982), enforced as modified sub. 

nom. NLRB v. Great W. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 740 F.2d 

398 (5th Cir. 1984). 

Based on Eddie Valero’s credited testimony and the 

terms of the applicable collective bargaining agreement, the 

Board found that, on January 4, 2010, Dow and Long 

interfered with the Union’s contractual right of access by 

confronting, yelling at, following, and limiting access by 

Eddie Valero and other union agents when they visited the 

Alamo Miami facility to investigate a reported violation of the 

collective bargaining agreement. Enterprise Leasing Co. of 

Fla., 362 NLRB No. 135, at *1. 

Enterprise does not contest that it interfered with 

Valero’s access. Instead, it insists that Valero had no right of 

visitation because, it contends, he failed to provide advance 

notice, was not on site to monitor compliance with the 

collective bargaining agreement, and interfered with 

Enterprise’s business. The Board’s reasonable conclusions to 

the contrary have substantial record support. 

The Company’s first contention fails because the 

agreement plainly does not require advance notice; it requires 

Union representatives to “mak[e] [their] presence known to a 

member of management” upon arrival. Miami Alamo 

Collective Bargaining Agreement, J.A. 372. Once they do so, 

those representatives “shall be permitted to enter the 

premises” to conduct an investigation. Id. According to 

Valero’s credited testimony, in the past Valero never had 

given any additional, advance notice before such investigative 

visits—a point corroborated by Dow on cross-examination—

and he had never encountered any problems until the visit on 

January 4. And on that visit, too, Valero immediately gave 

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the required notice—to Dow herself—upon arriving at the 

property. The record adequately supports the Board’s 

conclusion that the agreement’s notice requirement was 

satisfied. 

 Enterprise’s attempt to impugn Valero’s motives and onsite conduct fares no better. In support of its version of 

events, the Company points only to Long’s account of the 

union representatives’ conduct on January 4. That testimony 

does not speak to Valero’s reasons for being on site, however, 

and, to the extent it suggests that Valero interrupted 

workplace activities, it conflicts with Valero’s detailed, 

credited testimony about his group’s interactions at the Alamo 

Miami facility that day. Substantial record evidence thus 

supports the Board’s finding that Enterprise interfered with 

the Union’s right of access to the Alamo facility. 

iii. Withdrawal of Union Recognition 

Enterprise next takes issue with the Board’s conclusion 

that the Company’s withdrawal of recognition from the Union 

violated the Act. Although “an incumbent union enjoys a 

presumption that it represents a majority of employees,” BPH 

& Co. v. NLRB, 333 F.3d 213, 217 (D.C. Cir. 2003), an 

employer may overcome the presumption and “unilaterally 

withdraw recognition from a union if it can show through 

objective evidence that the union has lost majority support as, 

for example, by presenting a petition signed by a majority of 

employees in the bargaining unit stating that they no longer 

wish to be represented by the union,” SFO Good-Nite Inn, 

LLC v. NLRB, 700 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 

An employer’s “privilege” to withdraw recognition based 

on a petition from a majority of employees “is not absolute.” 

Id. “[I]f unfair labor practices ‘significantly contribute to 

such a loss of majority or to the factors upon which doubt of 

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such majority is based’”—thus “taint[ing]” the decertification 

petition—then “the employer may not withdraw recognition” 

from the union. BPH & Co., 333 F.3d at 217-18 (quoting St. 

Agnes Med. Ctr. v. NLRB, 871 F.2d 137, 146-47 (D.C. Cir. 

1989)). Where unfair labor practices alleged to have tainted 

the decertification process are not directly related to that 

process, the Board applies the four-factor test articulated in 

Master Slack Corp., 271 NLRB 78, 84 (1984), to evaluate the 

causal link between the violations and the decreased union 

support. But if the employer’s unfair labor practices involved 

the decertification process itself, the Board does not demand 

any such showing of causation between the unfair labor 

practices and the anti-union vote; the Board will presume that 

a decertification petition is tainted where it was instigated or 

propelled by an employer. See SFO Good-Nite Inn, 700 F.3d 

at 8. If taint is established, withdrawal of recognition violates 

section 8(a)(5), and thus also 8(a)(1). See NLRB v. Curtin 

Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 778 (1990). 

In this case, the Board determined that the Company 

violated the Act by unlawfully withdrawing recognition from 

the Union based solely on a decertification petition tainted by 

the aforementioned unfair labor practices. See Enterprise 

Leasing Co. of Fla., 362 NLRB No. 135, at *1-3. Enterprise 

disputes that any of the cited conduct contributed to the loss 

of majority support reflected in the signed petition, arguing at 

length that each alleged unfair practice was insufficiently 

significant, close in time, or otherwise related to the petition 

to have tainted the petition under the Master Slack test. We 

need not, and do not, reach the merits of those arguments. As 

the Board found, the Company’s unlawful propulsion of the 

decertification petition—through the direction of Enterprise 

supervisors Elsass and Browne to employee Garcia, see supra 

Section II.B.ii.—constitutes a per se taint of that petition. 

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SFO Good-Nite Inn, 700 F.3d at 8. We therefore enforce that 

portion of the Board’s order. 

iv. Post-Withdrawal Actions 

The Board additionally concluded that, after the 

Company withdrew its recognition from the Union, Enterprise 

violated section 8(a)(5), and thus also 8(a)(1), by failing to 

deduct and remit dues to the Union pursuant to the contractual 

dues-checkoff provision in the still-effective collective 

bargaining agreement, unilaterally changing the employees’ 

wages and other terms and conditions of employment, and 

declining to process an employee grievance. Enterprise 

Leasing Co. of Fla., 362 NLRB No. 135, at *1-3. Enterprise 

admits that it engaged in all the post-withdrawal conduct 

underlying those violations, and that it did so without 

bargaining with the Union. It claims, however, that its postwithdrawal conduct did not violate the Act because its 

withdrawal of recognition from the Union was lawful. 

Because the post-withdrawal violations thus rise and fall with 

the validity of the withdrawal itself and, as we have 

concluded, the Board’s determination that the withdrawal 

violated the Act is supported by substantial evidence and not 

otherwise arbitrary, see discussion supra Section II.C.iii., we 

deny Enterprise’s petition for review, and grant the Board’s 

cross-application for enforcement, of the Board’s order that 

the Company’s post-withdrawal conduct violated section 

8(a)(1) and (a)(5). 

III. Challenge to Remedial Order 

 Finally, Enterprise challenges the Board’s remedial order 

as unlawfully punitive. The Board ordered Enterprise to 

reimburse the Union from its own funds for all union dues it 

failed to pay after withdrawing recognition from the Union. 

Amending the ALJ’s remedy, the Board further barred 

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Enterprise from recouping those unpaid dues from employees. 

The Company claims that the Board’s order goes beyond 

restoring the status quo because, had the dues been paid in the 

ordinary course, the employees, not the Company, would 

have had to shoulder their cost. The Board counters that this 

court lacks jurisdiction to review Enterprise’s challenge to the 

recoupment bar because Enterprise failed to raise its 

objections before the Board as required under section 10(e) of 

the Act. We agree with the Board. 

 Section 10(e) of the NLRA provides that “[n]o objection 

that has not been urged before the Board, its member, agent, 

or agency, shall be considered by the court, unless the failure 

or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of 

extraordinary circumstances.” 29 U.S.C. § 160(e); see also 

29 C.F.R. § 102.46(b), (c)(3). Section 10(e) is a 

“jurisdictional bar,” in the face of which we are “powerless, in 

the absence of extraordinary circumstances, to consider 

arguments not made to the Board.” W & M Props. of Conn., 

Inc. v. NLRB, 514 F.3d 1341, 1345 (D.C. Cir. 2008); see Nova 

Se. Univ. v. NLRB, 807 F.3d 308, 313 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 

Enterprise failed to challenge the recoupment bar before 

the Board as section 10(e) requires. Nowhere in any of its 

filings in the proceedings below did Enterprise argue that it 

was impermissibly punitive or otherwise unlawful for the 

Board to prevent Enterprise from collecting from its 

employees the dues it had failed to pay to the Union. 

Enterprise objected generally to the ALJ’s remedy, but that 

remedy did not contain any recoupment bar. “[A]n exception, 

no matter how broadly formulated, cannot preserve an 

objection to something that the ALJ never imposed.” HTH 

Corp. v. NLRB, 823 F.3d 668, 673 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 

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It was the Acting General Counsel’s exceptions that first 

requested the recoupment bar the Board eventually imposed, 

but Enterprise’s objections to those exceptions were silent on 

the subject. Instead, the Company focused on the dates of its 

unpaid-dues obligations, contending that the ALJ correctly 

declined to order dues collection beyond the March 2010 

expiration of the collective bargaining agreement. When the 

Board amended the ALJ’s remedy to prevent Enterprise from 

recouping the unpaid dues from employees, Enterprise failed 

to file a motion for reconsideration addressing the recoupment 

bar. See Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc. v. NLRB, 456 U.S. 

645, 666 (1982); HTH Corp., 823 F.3d at 673. 

Board Member Miscimarra’s dissent, which viewed the 

Board’s recoupment-bar remedy to be impermissibly punitive, 

does not excuse Enterprise’s failure to raise the objection. 

“[A] party may not rely on arguments raised in a dissent or on 

a discussion of the relevant issues by the majority to 

overcome the § 10(e) bar; the Act requires the party to raise 

its challenges itself.” HTH Corp., 823 F.3d at 673. 

Notwithstanding its failure to make the argument below, 

Enterprise contends that another party—the Acting General 

Counsel—sufficiently raised the recoupment-bar “issue” in 

his exceptions to the ALJ’s decision and remedy. Enterprise 

Br. 57 n.8; Reply Br. 23-27. As support, the Company 

invokes our decision in Mourning v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 768, 771 

& n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (per curiam), where we held that a 

petitioner’s failure to raise an argument before the Board did 

not result in its waiver under section 10(e), because the 

Board’s General Counsel sufficiently had done so. But 

Mourning is inapposite here. There, the petitioner was not 

“precluded from pressing the issue,” because the precise 

question already had been identified and countered by the 

General Counsel. Id. Here, in contrast, the Acting General 

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Counsel neither raised nor refuted the argument petitioner 

now advances. The General Counsel excepted to the ALJ’s 

finding that Enterprise had not violated the Act by failing to 

collect dues after March 2010, when the collective bargaining 

agreement expired, and also excepted to the ALJ’s remedy on 

various grounds. As relevant here, it sought modification of 

the remedy to include remittance of dues to the Union after 

March 2010, as well as “a prohibition against [Enterprise] 

recouping the dues monies owed to the Union from its 

employees’ wages.” Acting General Counsel’s Exceptions, 

J.A. 2119. In requesting the recoupment bar, the Acting 

General Counsel identified that specific remedy. But it did 

not thereby put before the Board and preserve for our review 

Enterprise’s objection that such remedy is impermissibly 

punitive. Enterprise’s “argument was not made to the Board 

and so comes too late.” W & M Props., 514 F.3d at 1345. 

We thus lack jurisdiction to consider it. See Woelke, 456 U.S. 

at 665. 

* * * 

For the reasons set forth above, we deny Enterprise’s 

petition for review and grant the Board’s cross-application for 

enforcement. 

So ordered. 

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