Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-03009/USCOURTS-caDC-96-03009-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Paul L. Barrett
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 28, 1997 Decided May 2, 1997

No. 96-3009

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

PAUL L. BARRETT,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 95cr00121-01)

John M. Colette argued the cause for the appellant.

William D. Weinreb, Assistant United States Attorney, 

argued the cause for the appellee. Eric H. Holder, Jr.,

United States Attorney, and John R. Fisher, Elizabeth Trosman and Mark H. Dubester, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on brief.

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1This section provides:

(a) Whoever under oath (or in any declaration, certificate, 

verification, or statement under penalty of perjury as permitted 

under section 1746 of title 28, United States Code) in any 

proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand jury of the 

United States knowingly makes any false material declaration 

or makes or uses any other information, including any book, 

paper, document, record, recording, or other material, knowing 

the same to contain any false material declaration, shall be 

fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or 

both.

18 U.S.C. § 1623(a). 

2Because we reverse the count 1 conviction for lack of materiality, we do not reach Barrett's sixth amendment challenge to that 

conviction or his challenge to the district judge's enhancement of 

the count 1 sentence. 

Before: GINSBURG, HENDERSON and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Appellant Paul 

L. Barrett appeals his conviction and sentences on two counts 

of making "a false material declaration" under oath in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a),1

once before a grand jury investigating J.C. Herbert Bryant (Bryant) (count 4) and once at 

Bryant's subsequent bench trial (count 1). Barrett asserts 

that neither of the charged declarations was "material," as 

expressly required by section 1623(a), and that the district 

judge erroneously enhanced the sentences on each conviction. 

For the reasons set out below, we conclude that the grand 

jury declaration was material but that the trial declaration 

was not. We further conclude that the sentencing enhancement on count 4 was proper.2

I. BACKGROUND

On September 2, 1992, Bryant, a Virginia resident, drove 

his truck, outfitted with flashing lights, a siren and a police 

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radio, into the District of Columbia and parked it outside the 

Mayflower Hotel, which was then hosting an Israeli diplomatic delegation. In the truck's rear compartment, in plain view, 

lay three 9 mm Beretta pistols, a .44 caliber magnum revolver, a .357 caliber magnum revolver and a .22 caliber derringer; in the front window was displayed a placard bearing the 

words "United States Marshal" in large bold print. The 

mobile arsenal eventually drew the attention of an Israeli 

security agent, the Mayflower Hotel's security director, two 

United States Diplomatic Security Service Agents and three 

Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) officers. When 

Bryant returned to the truck he explained to the MPD 

officers that he had left the weapons in the truck's rear 

compartment after a target shooting session at a northern 

Virginia firing range. He also claimed, according to trial 

testimony credited by the district judge, that he was a United 

States deputy marshal and had supporting credentials in a 

briefcase at home. In addition, he showed those present a 

Warren County, Mississippi Deputy Sheriff badge.

The MPD officers contacted the United States Marshal for 

the District of Columbia to determine whether Bryant was a 

deputy marshal. When the Marshal was unable to ascertain 

Bryant's status, despite repeated telephone inquiries to the 

national Marshals Service headquarters in Virginia, he directed his deputies to bring both Bryant and the truck to the 

District of Columbia Marshals Service office. After a short 

time the Marshal released Bryant and his truck but retained 

the firearms. It was later determined that Bryant held no 

official position with the Marshals Service at that time, although he had been a "Special Deputy Marshal" for several 

successive one-year terms, the last of which ended on June 

30, 1992.

About one month after the incident, on October 8, 1992, 

Barrett, then Sheriff of Warren County, Mississippi, wrote a 

letter at the request of Bryant and his lawyer addressed "To 

Whom It May Concern." The letter purported to "confirm 

that J.C. Herbert Bryant, Jr. is currently and has been 

continuously since April 9, 1984, a duly authorized Deputy 

Sheriff for Warren County, Mississippi" and averred that 

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"[o]n September 2, 1992, Mr. Bryant was on a detail in the 

D.C. Metro areas performing duties as a Deputy Sheriff." 

Government's Record Material (Gov't Rec. Mat.) Tab O.

Over nine months later, in July 1993, Barrett was subpoenaed to appear before a grand jury investigating Bryant. On 

August 27, 1993 Barrett testified before the grand jury that 

Bryant was a "sworn" deputy sheriff and identified Bryant's 

signature on a certified copy of an oath of office dated April 6, 

1987. The oath of office certificate bore the signature and 

seal of a Warren County court clerk. When asked about the 

"circumstances" surrounding the oath Barrett responded: 

"When he was sworn in, it was done in that clerk's office and 

they file it there then." Gov't Rec. Mat. Tab U at 34. 

Barrett further testified that he thought he had given Bryant 

"a badge and maybe a card" before that date but that "that 

doesn't have any authority with it until he was sworn in." Id.

at 21. Later in his testimony he identified a photocopy of a 

Warren County deputy sheriff badge and a deputy sheriff 

identification card, dated April 9, 1984, bearing the signatures 

of Barrett and Bryant and the signature and seal of the same 

clerk as appeared on the oath of office certificate.

Almost two years after the Mayflower incident, on June 14, 

1994, Bryant was indicted on 3 counts: (1) violating 18 U.S.C. 

§ 912 in that he "did falsely assume and pretend to be a 

Special Deputy United States Marshal and in such pretended 

character, demanded and obtained that he not be arrested by 

the Metropolitan Police Department for possessing and carrying weapons in the District of Columbia"; (2) violating D.C. 

Code § 22-3204(a) in that he "did carry, openly, and concealed on or about his person, pistols, without a license issued 

as provided by law"; and (3) violating 18 U.S.C. § 1001 in 

that "in a matter within the jurisdiction of a department and 

agency of the United States, to wit, the United States Marshals Service, did knowingly make a false and fraudulent 

statement." Gov't Rec. Mat. Tab N.

Bryant was tried by consent by the district court in early 

October 1994, raising as a defense to the first and third 

counts that he never identified himself as a deputy marshal 

and as a defense to the second count that as a duly appointed 

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3D.C. Code § 22-3205(a) provides in part: "The provisions of 

§ 22-3204 shall not apply to marshals, sheriffs ... or their deputies...." 

deputy sheriff of Warren County, Mississippi he was exempt 

under D.C. Code § 22-3205(a) from the prohibition against 

carrying pistols without a license.3In support of the latter 

defense, Barrett testified at trial that he had "appointed" 

Bryant a "sworn" deputy in 1984 and "thought he was sworn 

in 1984, and he may be." Excerpt from 10/5/94 Trial Tr. at 34 

(filed 10/26/94). Bryant testified with greater assurance that 

Barrett took him to the courthouse in 1984 and "had [him] 

sworn by the clerk." Excerpt from 10/6/94 Trial Tr. at 14 

(filed 11/3/94). Also during the trial Barrett again identified 

the same 1984 badge and identification card and the same 

April 6, 1987 oath of office certificate that he had originally 

identified before the grand jury. This time, however, he 

testified that he could not say for certain whether Bryant had 

personally signed the oath. When pressed on crossexamination, he admitted the "possibility" that he himself had 

signed Bryant's name on the oath. Excerpt from 10/5/94 

Trial Tr. at 45 (filed 10/26/94). A subsequent analysis by the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation concluded that Bryant's signature on the oath "was written by" Barrett. Gov't Rec. Mat. 

Tab S. Barrett also acknowledged on cross-examination that 

he had received many benefits from his long-standing friendship with Bryant and his family, including hunting privileges 

on the Bryants' farm from Bryant's father, campaign contributions totaling about $1,000 from Bryant's mother, an expense-paid trip to Los Angeles from a law enforcement 

association headed by Bryant and a $4,600 loan and a motorcycle from Bryant himself. Barrett explained that he had 

"wrecked" the motorcycle and thereafter sold it to a Dr. 

Poole for $1500. Poole, who did not testify at Bryant's trial, 

had apparently earlier told investigating officers he paid 

Barrett $10,000 for the motorcycle.

On October 12, 1994 the district judge convicted Bryant on 

the first and third counts, finding that Bryant had misrepresented to various law enforcement officers on September 2, 

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4While it is of no consequence here, we note that the trial judge 

seems to have misallocated the burden of proving a § 22-3205(a) 

defense which, under District of Columbia Law, rests on the 

defendant. Middleton v. United States, 305 A.2d 259 (D.C. 1973); 

Williams v. United States, 237 A.2d 539 (D.C. 1968). 

5The other three counts were ultimately dismissed. 

1992 that he was a "Special Deputy United States Marshal" 

and that he had credentials at home to establish that status. 

The judge acquitted Bryant on count 2, concluding that the 

government "failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 

on September 2, 1992 Mr. Bryant was not a duly appointed 

sworn deputy sheriff of the Warren County Mississippi Sheriff's Office"4

and that Bryant therefore came within the 

exception to section 22-3204's prohibition. 10/12/94 Trial Tr. 

at 8 (filed 11/30/94). The judge noted in particular that "Mr. 

Bryant's credentials as a deputy sheriff are ... signed by 

clerk of court" and that "[t]here is no evidence that there is 

no 1984 oath on file, or of the circumstances of the clerk's 

signature and seal on Mr. Bryant's credentials." Id. at 8-9.

Nine months later, on June 13, 1995, a grand jury indicted 

Barrett on two counts of witness tampering in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 1512(b) (counts 2 and 3), one count of obstruction of 

justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (count 5) and two 

counts (those at issue here) of making false declarations 

under oath in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a) (counts 1 and 

4). Specifically, count 1 charged Barrett with falsely testifying at Bryant's trial that he sold the motorcycle to Poole for 

$1500 (rather than $10,000) and count 4 charged him with 

falsely testifying before the grand jury that Bryant's signature on the April 6, 1987 oath of office certificate was in fact 

Bryant's.

The case was assigned to the same district judge who had 

tried Bryant. By agreement of the parties, counts 1 and 2 

were severed and tried before the judge on stipulated facts.5

On October 12, 1995 the judge found Barrett guilty of both 

counts and on January 23, 1996 he sentenced Barrett to two 

concurrent 15-month prison terms, to be followed by 2 years 

of supervised release, and fined him $2,000. The sentences 

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6This section provides: "Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the 

United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his 

impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 

were based in part on enhancements for breach of public 

trust on both counts and for obstruction of justice on count 1. 

Barrett appeals both the convictions and the sentences.

II. DISCUSSION

Initially, we consider briefly two general challenges Barrett 

raises to his convictions. First, Barrett argues there was 

insufficient evidence to support the convictions because the 

trial exhibits were never formally admitted into evidence but 

only marked for identification. We find no merit to this 

challenge. The exhibits were treated below, without objection, as if they were admitted into evidence; they are therefore deemed admitted. See United States v. Bizanowicz, 745 

F.2d 120, 123 (1st Cir. 1984) (tape played for jury deemed 

admitted "where at least a quo there was no doubt that [it] 

was admitted, notwithstanding the judge's failure to instruct 

the courtroom deputy directly to mark the tape as an exhibit" 

and appellant did not object to playing); United States v. 

Stapleton, 494 F.2d 1269, 1270 (9th Cir.) (seven exhibits 

marked for identification but not formally offered or received 

into evidence deemed admitted where "[t]here was extensive 

testimony about each of them," "both parties, and the judge, 

acted as if they were in evidence, and the judge relied upon 

them in finding [the defendant] guilty" and "defense counsel 

raised no question about the exhibits not being in evidence"), 

cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1002 (1974).

We next reject Barrett's contention that the district judge 

was required to recuse himself under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).6

While recusal might well be prudent when a perjury bench 

trial involves testimony from a proceeding over which the 

same judge presided, section 455(a) does not require it. See 

United States v. Parker, 742 F.2d 127, 128-29 (4th Cir.) 

(§ 455 does not require judge to recuse himself from perjury 

prosecution for contradictory testimony at trial and hearing 

at both of which he presided), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076 

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(1984). In any event, Barrett did not request recusal below 

and has therefore waived his right to do so here. "More than 

one court has recognized the sensible principle that "[a] 

defendant cannot take his chances with a judge and then, if 

he thinks that the sentence is too severe, secure a disqualification and a hearing before another judge.' " United States 

v. Owens, 902 F.2d 1154, 1156 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting Taylor 

v. United States, 179 F.2d 640, 642 (9th Cir. 1950)) (citation 

omitted). Thus, while section 455(a) contains no express 

timeliness provision, most circuits considering the matter 

have concluded that a litigant must raise the disqualification 

issue within a reasonable time after the grounds for it are 

known. See United States v. Brinkworth, 68 F.3d 633 (2d 

Cir. 1995) ("Although § 455 does not specify a time limit for 

application, a timeliness provision has been judicially implied. 

A party must bring a disqualification motion "at the earliest 

possible moment after obtaining knowledge of facts demonstrating the basis for such a claim.' ") (quoting Apple v. 

Jewish Hosp., 829 F.2d 326, 333 (2d Cir. 1987)) (internal 

citations omitted); Owens, 902 F.2d at 1156 ("Timeliness is an 

essential element of a recusal motion.... It is judicially 

implied in § 455."); Delesdernier v. Porterie, 666 F.2d 116, 

121-22 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 839 (1982) (concluding 

that "timeliness may not be disregarded in all cases regarding 

disqualification under § 455(a)" and that "the facts of the 

present case are well suited to a timeliness requirement"); 

In re Kansas Pub. Employees Retirement Sys., 85 F.3d 1353 

(8th Cir. 1996) ("We have held in the past that even though 

§ 455 has no express timeliness requirements, claims under 

§ 455 will not be considered unless timely made.") (citations 

omitted); E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 

1280, 1295 (9th Cir. 1992) ("It is well established in this circuit 

that a recusal motion must be made in a timely fashion.... 

While there is no per se rule that recusal motions must be 

made at a fixed point in order to be timely, such motions 

"should be filed with reasonable promptness after the ground 

for such a motion is ascertained.") (citations omitted); United 

States v. Slay, 714 F.2d 1093, 1094 (11th Cir. 1983) ("A motion 

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7The Seventh Circuit has since questioned the continuing force of 

the Morgan decision. See United States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518, 

1539 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting the "[Morgan] decision stands alone" 

but concluding that it "need not decide whether to reconsider 

Morgan"); Union Carbide Corp. v. U.S. Cutting Serv., Inc., 782 

F.2d 710, 716-17 (7th Cir. 1986) ("It should not go unmentioned that 

Union Carbide may have waited too long to move to recuse [the 

trial judge].... Although SCA Services, Inc. v. Morgan, supra,

557 F.2d at 117, holds that there are no time limits on motions to 

disqualify under 28 U.S.C. § 455, this position has been uniformly 

rejected in the other circuits. See United States v. Murphy, supra,

768 F.2d at 1539, and cases cited there. Murphy questions it and 

[United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1205 (7th Cir. 1985)], 

cited earlier, undermines it by stressing the importance of promptly 

raising any ground for questioning the judge's impartiality. But in 

view of our other grounds for rejecting Union Carbide's argument 

for recusal under section 455(a), we have no need to decide whether 

this holding of Morgan should be reconsidered."). 

to disqualify a magistrate under § 455(a) must be timely.") 

(citations omitted), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1050 (1984). But 

see SCA Servs., Inc. v. Morgan, 557 F.2d 110, 117 (7th Cir. 

1977) (rejecting timeliness requirement because "any decision 

to deny disqualification based on grounds of waiver and 

estoppel would frustrate the purpose of [section 455]");7cf. 

Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 867 F.2d 1415 (Fed.

Cir.) (finding no timeliness requirement for claims under 

subsection (b) of section 455), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1047 

(1989). Barrett was aware of the facts underlying his bias 

claim from the start. Accordingly, his attempt to raise it for 

the first time on appeal must be rejected as untimely. See 

Delesdernier v. Porterie, 666 F.2d at 122-23 ("[I]t cannot be 

seriously argued that Delesdernier or her counsel were unaware before trial began of facts which might arguably support a § 455(a) motion for disqualification. We think that the 

motion raised for the first time on appeal, and after two full 

trials on the merits, is too tardily made for us to consider it 

now.") (footnotes omitted); Pedrina v. Chung, 97 F.3d 1296, 

1303 (9th Cir. 1996) ("Because the plaintiffs failed to raise 

their claims of judicial bias below, we will not consider them 

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8The holding in Pedrina is consistent with other recent Ninth 

Circuit decisions requiring a timely motion for disqualification under section 455(a). See Davies v. Commissioner, 68 F.3d 1129, 1130 

(9th Cir. 1995) (rejecting on appeal as "not timely" disqualification 

argument made one year after grounds were known and after 

adverse judgment issued); E. & J. Gallo Winery, 967 F.2d at 1295 

(concluding on appeal that disqualification claim first raised in 

motion for new trial was "not timely"); see also United States v. 

Conforte, 624 F.2d 869, 879 (9th Cir. 1980) (where defendant had 

"notice" before trial of alleged grounds for disqualification, disqualification claim first raised in new trial motion was untimely and its 

rejection unappealable). Two earlier Ninth Circuit decisions expressly stated that failure to move for recusal before the trial court 

"does not preclude raising on appeal the issue of recusal under 

§ 455." Pau v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 928 F.2d 880, 884-85 

(9th Cir. 1991); Noli v. Commissioner, 860 F.2d 1521, 1527 (9th Cir. 

1988). 

9Barrett's counsel conceded the falsity of the representations 

before trial: "And to go to the nub of it, certainly we're not going to 

context [sic] that instead of $1,500 the motorcycle was sold for 

$10,000. And we're not going to contest that the signature that was 

on the oath of office in 1987 was that ofwe're not going to say it 

was Bryant's signature.... [W]e are in effect embracing the 

alleged falsity of the two counts...." Gov't Rec. Mat. Tab C at 6-7. 

here.") (citing E. & J. Gallo Winery, 967 F.2d at 1295);8

United States v. Slay, 714 F.2d at 1094 (where "counsel was 

aware prior to the hearing on the motion to suppress of the 

facts which he now contends support a § 455(a) motion," a 

disqualification argument raised first on appeal is "untimely 

and need not be considered by this Court on appeal"); cf. 

United States v. Widgery, 778 F.2d 325, 327 (7th Cir. 1985) 

(rejecting section 455(a) claim on appeal "[b]ecause [the defendant] never moved for disqualification in the district 

court," reasoning: "Disqualification for the appearance of 

impropriety runs prospectively only; even a successful motion 

does not vitiate acts taken before the motion was filed.") 

(citing United States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518, 1539-41 (7th 

Cir. 1985)).

We now reach the heart of Barrett's appeal of his convictions, namely neither of his misstatements under oath was 

"material" to the proceeding in which it was made as required 

under 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a).9"The test of materiality is 

whether the statement "has a natural tendency to influence, or 

was capable of influencing, the decision of the tribunal in 

making a [particular] determination.' Proof of actual reliance 

on the statement is not required; the Government need only 

make a reasonable showing of its potential effects." United 

States v. Hansen, 772 F.2d 940, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (quoting 

United States v. Diggs, 613 F.2d 988, 999 (D.C. Cir. 1979), 

cert. denied, 446 U.S. 982 (1980)) (alteration in original), cert. 

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denied, 475 U.S. 1045 (1986), quoted in United States v. Dale,

991 F.2d 819, 834 n.27 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 286, 

114 S. Ct. 650 (1993). Applying this deferential standard, we 

do not believe Barrett's misrepresentation of the motorcycle's 

sales price was material.

The government would have us believe the misstatement 

had the potential to mislead the district judge regarding the 

motorcycle's value when Barrett received it from Bryant and 

thereby to diminish Barrett's bias toward Bryant, leading the 

district judge to credit Barrett's testimony regarding 

Bryant's status and, based on that testimony, to find that on 

September 2, 1992 Bryant was a deputy sheriff and therefore 

authorized to possess firearms in the District of Columbia 

under section 22-3205(a). We reject this tortuous reasoning. 

Even assuming Barrett's misrepresentation of the price at 

which he sold the motorcycle to Poole suggested the motorcycle was less valuable when Bryant gave it to Barrett than it in 

fact was, it is highly improbable that the difference in value 

would lead a fact finder to consider Barrett significantly less 

biased or less likely to testify in Bryant's favor given Barrett's considerable testimony about his long and beneficial 

relationship with Bryant and Bryant's family. Viewed 

against that background, the single gift of a motorcycle seems 

a rather trifling matter and Barrett's misrepresentation of its 

sales price even more so. In addition, Barrett's testimony 

constituted only a minor component of the substantial trial 

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evidence, including the unchallenged 1984 badge and identification card, that convinced the judge Bryant was a bona fide 

Warren County deputy on September 2, 1992. Given the 

other, far more persuasive evidence of Bryant's status, it is 

difficult to conceive that the credibility of Barrett's corroboration would much matter to the finder of fact. In short, 

Bryant's misrepresentation regarding the motorcycle sales 

price lacked the "capability" or "natural tendency" to affect 

the trial's outcome that is necessary for a finding of materiality.

By contrast, Barrett's misidentification of Bryant's signature on the April 6, 1987 oath of office certificate was material 

to the grand jury decision whether to indict. The test of 

materiality in a grand jury investigation is substantially the 

same as at trial, although we have stated that "[m]ore specifically, in a grand jury setting, the false testimony must have 

"the natural effect or tendency to impede, influence or dissuade the grand jury from pursuing its investigation' " and 

that "the effect necessary to meet the materiality test is 

relatively slight, and certainly not substantial." United 

States v. Moore, 613 F.2d 1029, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (quoting 

United States v. Stone, 429 F.2d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 1970)), cert. 

denied, 446 U.S. 954 (1980). Under our precedent Barrett's 

misrepresentation to the grand jury had the "natural tendency" to influence its investigation.

Whether Bryant violated D.C. Code § 22-3204 by unlawfully carrying pistols in the District depended entirely on whether he came within the section 22-3205(a) exemption. The 

authenticity of Bryant's signature on the April 6, 1987 oath, 

indicating that he was sworn in on that date, was critical to 

the grand jury's resolution of the issue. Unlike the district 

judge, the grand jury heard no testimony that Bryant was 

sworn in at any other time and Barrett himself stressed to 

the grand jury that the badge and the 1984 identification card 

conferred no authority on Bryant "until he was sworn in." 

Thus, if the grand jurors determined Bryant had not been 

sworn in on April 6, 1987, they would most probably also 

conclude he was not a duly appointed deputy sheriff and not 

exempt from the prohibition of section 22-3204. We thereUSCA Case #96-3009 Document #269791 Filed: 05/02/1997 Page 12 of 15
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fore conclude that Barrett's false authentication of the April 

6, 1987 oath signature constituted a "false material declaration" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1623.

Finally, Barrett challenges the district judge's enhancement of his sentence on count 4 for abuse of public trust 

under section 3B1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Barrett does not dispute that his position as sheriff 

was one of public trust but argues that his testimony before 

the grand jury could not have been an abuse of that position 

because he testified only in his individual, not in his official, 

capacity. We reject this argument as well. Section 3B1.1 

provides for a 2-level enhancement "[i]f the defendant abused 

a position of public or private trust, or used a special skill, in 

a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or 

concealment of the offense." There can be little doubt, if any, 

that Barrett's position as sheriff "substantially facilitated" his 

false testimony. It was by virtue of his office that he was 

able to describe the circumstances surrounding the April 6, 

1987 oath and to affirm that Bryant in fact affixed his own 

signature to it. Thus, according due deference to the district 

judge's conclusion that Barrett abused his office so as to 

facilitate significantly his false identification of Bryant's signature, we affirm the two-point enhancement. See United 

States v. Broumas, 69 F.3d 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (district 

court's application of abuse of trust enhancement "receives 

due deference" on appeal), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1447 (1996).

For the preceding reasons, we reverse Barrett's conviction 

on count 1 and affirm his conviction on count 4. We further 

affirm the breach of trust enhancement of the sentence on 

count 4. Accordingly we remand for the district court to 

resentence Barrett on count 4 only insofar as his sentence on 

that count may be affected by our reversal of the count 1 

conviction.

So ordered.

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TATEL, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I agree that the district judge had no obligation to recuse 

himself under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). Maj. Op. at 7. As the 

Supreme Court explained in Liteky v. United States, "opinions formed by [a] judge on the basis of facts introduced or 

events occurring in the course of present proceedings, or of 

prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or 

partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism 

or antagonism...." 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994); see also 

United States v. Roach, --- F.3d ---, 1997 WL 143896, at *6 

(D.C. Cir. Apr. 1, 1997). "Judicial rulings alone," the Court 

announced, "almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or 

partiality motion ... only in the rarest circumstances [do 

they] evidence the degree of favoritism or antagonism required...." Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555. Because Barrett argues for recusal on the basis of knowledge the district judge 

acquired in the course of Bryant's trial and Barrett's proceedings and rulings made in the latter, and because he makes no 

allegation of "deep-seated favoritism or antagonism," the 

judge was not required to recuse.

I disagree, however, with the court's further, and apparently unnecessary, statement that "Barrett did not request recusal below and has therefore waived his right to do so here." 

Maj. Op. at 8. Unlike 28 U.S.C. § 144, which provides for 

recusal upon motion by a party, section 455(a) imposes an 

independent obligation on judges: "Any justice, judge, or 

magistrate of the United States shall disqualify himself in any 

proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be 

questioned." 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (emphasis added). Failure 

to move for recusal may lower the standard of appellate 

review, see FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b) ("Plain errors or defects 

affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they 

were not brought to the attention of the court."), but because 

section 455 requires judges to consider recusal sua sponte, 

Christiansen v. National Sav. & Trust Co., 683 F.2d 520, 524 

(D.C. Cir. 1982), such failure cannot entirely bar appellate 

review of a judge's exercise of this statutory duty. See, e.g., 

Noli v. Commissioner, 860 F.2d 1521, 1527 (9th Cir. 1988) 

("Failure to move for recusal at the trial level ... does not 

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preclude raising on appeal the issue of recusal under § 455."); 

United States v. Schreiber, 599 F.2d 534, 535-36 (3d Cir. 

1979) (applying plain-error review to recusal claim first raised 

on appeal); cf. United States v. Walker, 473 F.2d 136, 138 

(D.C. Cir. 1972) (applying plain-error review to failure to 

recuse and jury waiver raised for first time on appeal). 

Although I agree that timeliness is a factor to be considered, 

the obligation section 455(a) places on judges means that even 

an untimely recusal claim cannot deprive a circuit court of its 

responsibility to review a judge's failure to recuse. In my 

view, the integrity and public reputation of the federal judiciary require clear and firm answers on the merits to even 

delayed charges of judicial impropriety.

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