Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01386/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01386-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City Of Fresno
Defendant
County of Fresno
Defendant
Fresno Police Department
Defendant
John Lee Williams
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 The City, Fresno Police Department and County will be referred to collectively as “defendants.” 1

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN LEE WILLIAMS, CASE NO. CV F 07-1386 LJO SMS

Plaintiff, ORDER TO DISMISS 

vs. (Doc. 6.)

CITY OF FRESNO, FRESNO POLICE

DEPARTMENT, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff John Lee Williams (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner and proceeds pro se and in forma

pauperis in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action which was removed to this Court. Plaintiff proceeds on a

California Judicial Council form first amended complaint (“first amended complaint”) to name as

defendants the City of Fresno (“City”), Fresno Police Department and County of Fresno (“County”).1

Although the City filed alternative F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and 12(e) motions, this Court exercises it

authority to screen the first amended complaint, DISMISSES claims against defendants, and GRANTS

plaintiff leave to amend certain claims.

Case 1:07-cv-01386-LJO -SMS Document 9 Filed 10/02/07 Page 1 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff appears to take issue with two post-parole arrests. This Court summarizes the first

amended complaint’s factual allegations:

On December 5, 2005, J. Campos and B. Williams (who are apparently peace officers) stopped

a vehicle in which plaintiff was a passenger. Plaintiff advised of J. Campos and B. Williams of his

parole status and was arrested for possession of paraphernalia after a search. On February 16, 2006,

charges were dismissed against him. On February 19, 2006, “plaintiff was re-arrested on parole

violation charges stemming directly from defendants B. Williams and J. Campos’s [sic] arrest on 12-5-

05.” In March and April 2006, plaintiff’s parole was revoked for which he serves a one-year sentence.

The first amended complaint lists “violations of law” of false arrest and imprisonment,

negligence, Fourth Amendment illegal search and seizure, Fourteenth Amendment denial of due process

and equal protections [sic] of law, and mental anguish and emotional distress. The first amended

complaint alleges: “Defendants falsely arrested and imprisoned the plaintiff, which did deprive plaintiff

of his right not to be illegally seized. Further, plaintiff was denied equal protection of the law, life and

liberty without due process.” The first amended complaint seeks compensatory and punitive damages,

permanent restraining orders and declaratory judgment. 

DISCUSSION

Standards For Screening

This Court is entitled to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). This Court

must dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, which “is frivolous, malicious or fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and (2). Moreover, “[a] trial court may dismiss a claim sua sponte

under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). . . . Such dismissal may be made without notice where the claimant cannot

possibly win relief.” Omar v. Sea-Land Service, Inc., 813 F.2d 986, 991 (9 Cir. 1987); see Wong v. th

Bell, 642 F.2d 359, 361-362 (9 Cir. 1981). Sua sponte dismissal may be made before process is served

th

on defendants. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989) (dismissals under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)

are often made sua sponte); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1226 (9 Cir. 1984) (court may dismiss

th

Case 1:07-cv-01386-LJO -SMS Document 9 Filed 10/02/07 Page 2 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

frivolous in forma pauperis action sua sponte prior to service of process on defendants). 

When a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, a Court, notwithstanding any filing fee that may

have been paid,shall dismiss a case at any time if the court determines the action is frivolous, malicious,

fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against an immune

defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e); 2 Schwarzer, Tashima & Wagstaffe, California Practice Guide:

Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial (2007) Attacking the Pleadings, para. 9:226.1, pp. 9-69. A court

need not accept as true factual allegations in in forma pauperis complaints and may reject “completely

baseless” allegations, including those which are “fanciful,” “fantastic” or “delusional.” Denton v.

Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32, 112 S.Ct. 1728, 1733 (1992).

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact. Neitzke, 490

U.S. at 325; Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227-1228. A federal court may dismiss a claim as frivolous where

it is based on an indisputablymeritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless.

Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.

The test for maliciousness is a subjective one and requires the court to “determine the . . . good

faith of the applicant.” Kinney v. Plymouth Rock Squab Co., 236 U.S. 43, 46 (1915); see Wright v.

Newsome, 795 F.2d 964, 968 n. 1 (11 Cir. 1986). A lack of good faith is found most commonly in th

repetitive suits filed by plaintiffs who have used the advantage of cost-free filing to file a multiplicity

of suits. A complaint is malicious if it suggests an intent to vex defendants or abuse the judicial process

by relitigating claims decided in prior cases. Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305, 1309 (D.C. Cir. 1981);

Phillips v. Carey, 638 F.2d 207, 209 (10 Cir. 1981); Ballentine v. Crawford, 563 F.Supp. 627, 628-629 th

(N.D. Ind. 1983); cf. Glick v. Gutbrod, 782 F.2d 754, 757 (7 Cir. 1986) (court has inherent power to

th

dismiss a case demonstrating “clear pattern of abuse of judicial process”). A lack of good faith or malice

also can be inferred from a complaint containing untrue material allegations of fact or false statements

made with intent to deceive the court. See Horsey v. Asher, 741 F.2d 209, 212 (8 Cir. 1984). th

A complaint, or portion thereof, may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond

doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to

relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,

45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99 (1957)); see also Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass’n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294

Case 1:07-cv-01386-LJO -SMS Document 9 Filed 10/02/07 Page 3 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

(9 Cir. 1981). “[W]hen a federal court reviews the sufficiency of a complaint, before the reception of th

any evidence either by affidavit or admissions, its task is necessarily a limited one. The issue is not

whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to

support claims.” Scheurer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1688 (1974); Gilligan v. Jamco

Development Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9 Cir. 1997). th

As further explained below, the first amended complaint demonstrates that plaintiff is entitled

to offer no evidence for its vague, deficient claims.

General Deficiencies

F.R.Civ.P. 8 establishes general pleading rules and provides in pertinent part:

(a) Claims for Relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief . . . shall

contain (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court’s jurisdiction

depends, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new grounds

of jurisdiction to support it, (2) a short plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader

seeks.

. . .

(e) Pleading to be Concise and Direct; Consistency. 

(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise and direct.

A pleading may not simply allege a wrong has been committed and demand relief. The

underlying requirement is that a pleading give “fair notice” of the claim being asserted and the “grounds

upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48, 78 S.Ct. 99, 103 (1957); Yamaguchi v.

United States Dept. of Air Force, 109 F.3d 1475, 1481 (9 Cir. 1997). Although a complaint need not th

outline all elements of a claim, “[i]t must be possible . . . for an inference to be drawn that these elements

exist.” Walker v. South Cent. Bell Telephone Co., 904 F.2d 275, 277 (5 Cir. 1990); Lewis v. ACB th

Business Service, Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 405-406 (6 Cir. 1998). Despite the flexible pleading policy of th

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must give fair notice and state the elements of the

claim plainly and succinctly. Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9 Cir. 1984). th

A plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt facts which defendant engaged

in to support plaintiff’s claim. Jones, 733 F.2d at 649. 

The first amended complaint alleges no discernable causes of action against defendants. In fact,

Case 1:07-cv-01386-LJO -SMS Document 9 Filed 10/02/07 Page 4 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

the first amended complaint does not clearly name or define defendants. The first amended complaint’s

first page refers to the City, Fresno Police Department and County as defendants. However, the first

amended complaint appears to target J. Campos and B. Williams, presumably peace officers. The first

amended complaint lacks specific allegations of facts or wrongs to support claims against the named

defendants, J. Campos or B. Williams. The first amended complaint’s specific claims and intended

defendants are unclear. The first amended complaint fails to give fair notice and state the elements of

claims plainly and succinctly.

Section 1983 Deficiencies

To the extent plaintiff attempts to allege constitutional violations, the complaint fails in that

section 1983 provides:

Every person who, under the color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected,

any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action

at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceedings for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

To state a section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must plead that: (1) defendant acted under color of state

law at the time the complained of act was committed; and (2) defendant deprived plaintiff of rights,

privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Gibson v. United

States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9 Cir. 1986). The first amended complaint fails to state colorable claims th

against defendants. The complaint fails to allege that defendants acted under color of state law. The

complaint points to no constitutional right of which defendants deprived plaintiff.

Moreover, section 1983 requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions

of defendant and deprivation allegedly suffered. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S.

658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that “[a]

person ‘subjects’ another to deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983,

if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which

he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy,

588 F.2d 740, 743 (9 Cir. 1978). “A plaintiff must allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show that th

an individual was personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights.” Barren v. Harrington, 152

Case 1:07-cv-01386-LJO -SMS Document 9 Filed 10/02/07 Page 5 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

F.3d 1193, 1194 (9 Cir. 1998). The complaint fails to satisfy the linking requirement as to a defendant th

and to articulate how a defendant deprived plaintiff of constitutional rights and resulting harm.

More specifically, the first amended complaint fails to allege how plaintiffs’ arrests and

imprisonment were unlawful and facts to demonstrate unlawful arrest and imprisonment. The first

amended complaint lacks facts of denial of due process or equal protection of law. “To state a claim

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a

plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with intent or purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff

based upon membership in a protected class.” Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194.

In addition, the Fresno Police Department is an improperly named defendant. The term

“persons” under section 1983 encompasses state and local officials sued in their individual capacities,

private individuals and entities which acted under color of state law, and local governmental entities.

Vance v. County of Santa Clara, 928 F.Supp. 993, 995-996. However, the term “persons” does not

encompass municipal departments. Vance, 928 F.Supp. at 996. “Naming a municipal department as

a defendant is not an appropriate means of pleading a § 1983 action against a municipality.” Stump v.

Gates, 777 F.Supp. 808, 816 (D.Colo.1991).

State Tort Claim Requirements 

The first amended complaint appears to attempt to allege California tort claims of false

arrest/imprisonment and negligence. Such claims require compliance with what is commonly referred

to as the California Tort Claims Act, Gov. Code, §§ 810, et. seq.

The California government claims statutes require timely filing of a proper claim as condition

precedent to maintenance of an action. Cal. Gov. Code, §§ 905, 911.2, 945.4 (presentment of a written

claim to the applicable public entity is required before a “suit for money or damages may be brought

against a public entity”); County of San Luis Obispo v. Ranchita Cattle Co., 16 Cal.App.3d 383, 390,

94 Cal.Rptr. 73 (1971). The claims procedures applicable to actions against public employees are the

same for actions against public entities. Cal. Gov. Code, §§ 950-950.6. Compliance with the claims

statutes is mandatory. Farrell v. County of Placer, 23 Cal.2d 624, 630, 145 P.2d 570 (1944). Failure

to file a claim is fatal to the cause of action. Johnson v. City of Oakland, 188 Cal.App.2d 181, 183, 10

Cal.Rptr. 409 (1961). “[F]ailure to allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the claim

Case 1:07-cv-01386-LJO -SMS Document 9 Filed 10/02/07 Page 6 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

presentation requirement subjects a claim against a public entity to a demurrer for failure to state a cause

of action.” State v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.4th 1234, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 534, 538 (2004).

The first amended complaint alleges that on July 26, 2006, plaintiff filed a claim with the State

Board of Control which failed to respond to the claim to render it rejected. Plaintiff attaches to his first

amended complaint a Government Claims Form, California Victim Compensation and Government

Claims Board (“state claims form”), received by the Victim Compensation and Government Claims

Board on July 26, 2006. Plaintiff addressed the state claims form to the “Clerk of State Board of

Control.” As such, the first amended complaint fails to plead that plaintiff filed an appropriate claim

form with the City or County.

The California claims statutes are designed to protect governmental agencies from stale and

fraudulent claims, provide an opportunity for timely investigation and encourage settling meritorious

claims. Johnson v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 217 Cal.App.3d 692, 697, 266 Cal.Rptr. 187 (1990).

Since the claims statutes should not be used as traps for the unwarywhen their underlying purposes have

been satisfied, courts employ a test of substantial compliance, rather than strict compliance, in

determining whether the plaintiff has met the filing requirements of the Tort Claims Act. Johnson, 217

Cal.App.3d at 697, 266 Cal.Rptr. 187. Nonetheless, the “doctrine of substantial compliance is not

applicable to a claim which is addressed to the wrong entity.” Johnson, 217 Cal.App.3d at 697 (plaintiff

student did not substantially comply with Tort Claims Act requirements when she filed her claim with

the State Board of Control, not the San Diego Unified School District, the entity subject to plaintiff’s

claims). 

The State of California, with whom plaintiff filed his state claims form, is a different public

entity than either the City or County. Plaintiff’s service of his state claims form on the State Victim

Compensation Board and Government Claims Board does not equate to service on any of the defendants.

Plaintiff has failed establish substantial compliance with the Tort Claims Act filing requirements to bar

his tort claims against defendants.

Negligence

The first amended complaint’s negligence claims are suspect in the absence of a statutory or

factual basis of defendants’ negligence.

Case 1:07-cv-01386-LJO -SMS Document 9 Filed 10/02/07 Page 7 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

A public entity's potential liability for another’s injury arises under the Tort Claims Act and has

two sources:(1)liability based on the public entity’s own conduct and legal obligations; and (2) liability,

based on respondeat superior principles, for the misconduct of the public entity’s employees that

occurred in the scope of their employment. Zelig v. County of Los Angeles, 27 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1128,

119 Cal.Rptr.2d 709, 722 (2002). The Tort Claims Act draws a clear distinction between the liability

of a public entity based on its own conduct, and the liability arising from the conduct of a public

employee. Zelig, 27 Cal.App.4th at 1128, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d at 722. Although the Tort Claims Act

provides that a public employee generally is liable for an injury caused by his or her act or omission "to

the same extent as a private person" (Cal. Gov. Code, § 820(a)) and that, when the act or omission of

the public employee occurs in the scope of employment the public entity will be vicariously liable for

the injury (Cal. Gov. Code, § 815.2), the Tort Claims Act contains nothing similarly providing that a

public entity generally is liable for its own conduct or omission to the same extent as a private person

or entity. Zelig, 27 Cal.App.4th at 1128, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d at 722. Rather, the Tort Claims Act provides

that a public entity is not liable for an injury "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute . . ." Cal. Gov.

Code, § 815. Certain statutes provide expressly for public entity liability in circumstances that are

somewhat parallel to the potential liability of private individuals and entities but the Tort Claims Act’s

intent “is not to expand the rights of plaintiffs in suits against governmental entities, but to confine

potential governmental liability to rigidly delineated circumstances." Brown v. Poway Unified School

Dist., 4 Cal.4th 820, 829, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 679 (1993); see Michael J. v. Los Angeles County Dept. of

Adoptions, 201 Cal. App.3d 859, 866, 247 Cal.Rptr. 504 (1988) (“Under the Act, governmental tort

liability must be based on statute; all common law or judicially declared forms of tort liability, except

as may be required by state or federal Constitution, were abolished.”)

The first amended complaint appears to allege common law negligence for which defendants are

not liable. In the absence of liability based on statute, plaintiff’s negligence claims fail.

Punitive Damages

The first amended complaint seeks punitive damages against defendants. Generally, punitive

damages are not allowed against a municipality unless expressly authorized by statute. City of Newport

v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 259-260, 101 S.Ct. 2748 (1981) (“Judicial disinclination to award

Case 1:07-cv-01386-LJO -SMS Document 9 Filed 10/02/07 Page 8 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

punitive damages against a municipality has persisted to the present day in the vast majority of

jurisdictions.”) Under California Government Code section 818, a public entity, like defendants, is not

subject to punitive damages. As such, the first amended complaint’s punitive damages claims fails.

Declaratory Relief

The first amended complaint seeks “a declaratory judgement against defendants for violation of

the laws.”

28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) provides in pertinent part:

In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any court of the United

States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal

relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief

is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final

judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.

A declaratory relief action requires a district court to consider two issues:

First, the court must inquire whether there is a case of actual controversy within

its jurisdiction. Jurisdiction to award declaratory relief exists only in a case of actual

controversy. . . .

Second, if there is a case or controversy within its jurisdiction, the court must

decide whether to exercise that jurisdiction. The statute gives discretion to courts in

deciding whether to entertain declaratory judgments; it states that the court “may declare

rights . . . of any interested party.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).

American States Ins. Co. v. Kearns, 15 F.3d 142, 143-144 (9 Cir. 1994). th

Actual Controversy

As to a controversy to invoke declaratory relief, the question is whether there is a “substantial

controversy, between parties having adverse legal rights, orsufficient immediacy and reality to warrant

the issuance of a declaratory judgment.” Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270,

273, 61 S.Ct. 510, 512 (1941). The United States Supreme Court has further explained:

A justiciable controversy is thus distinguished from a difference or dispute of a

hypothetical or abstract character; from one that is academic or moot. . . . The

controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having

adverse legal interests. . . . It must be a real and substantial controversy admitting of

specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from a opinion

advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.

Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-241, 57 S.Ct. 461, 464 (1937) (citations

omitted). 

Case 1:07-cv-01386-LJO -SMS Document 9 Filed 10/02/07 Page 9 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

The first amended complaint fails to identify a substantial controversy between plaintiff and

defendants and asks for no definitive relief. The first amended complaint appears to request no more

than a declaration that defendants violated the laws. Such a declaration is moot in the absence of an

ongoing substantial controversy. A case, or an issue in a case, is considered moot “if it has ‘lost its

character as a present, live controversy of the kind that must exist if we are to avoid advisory opinions

on abstract propositions of law. ’ ” Lindquist v. Idaho State Board of Corrections, 776 F.2d 851, 853-54

(9th Cir.1985) (quoting Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 673 F.2d 1110, 1113 (9th

Cir.1982)). A court is unable to take jurisdiction over a claim as to which no effective relief can be

granted, United States v. Geophysical Corp., 732 F.2d 693, 698 (9th Cir.1984) (citing Oregon

Environmental Council v. Kunzman, 714 F.2d 901, 903 (9th Cir.1983)), because “federal courts are

without power to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them.”

North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246, 92 S.Ct. 402, 404, 30 L.Ed.2d 413 (1971).

Discretion

As to a court’s discretion to render declaratory relief, the United States Supreme Court has

observed:

Consistent with the nonobligatory nature of the remedy, a district court is authorized, in

the sound exercise of its discretion, to stay or to dismiss an action seeking a declaratory

judgment before trial or after all arguments have drawn to a close. In the declaratory

judgment context, the normal principle that federal courts should adjudicate claims

within their jurisdiction yields to considerations of practicality and wise judicial

administration.

Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 288, 115 S.Ct. 2137, 2143 (1995).

When considering whether to exercise its discretion, a district court “must balance concerns of

judicial administration, comity, and fairness to the litigants.” Chamberlain v. Allstate Ins. Co., 931 F.2d

1361, 1367 (9 Cir. 1991). No showing of “exceptional circumstances” is required for a district court th

to abstain to hear a declaratory relief action. Wilton, 515 U.S. at 286-289, 115 S.Ct. At 2142-2144. 

The discretionary nature of declaratory relief provides further grounds to dismiss the first

amended complaint’s declaratory relief request.

Malice

This Court is concerned that plaintiff has brought this action in absence of good faith and

Case 1:07-cv-01386-LJO -SMS Document 9 Filed 10/02/07 Page 10 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

attempts to vex defendants. Such attempt provides further grounds to dismiss plaintiff’s first amend

complaint.

Attempt At Amendment

Plaintiff is granted an opportunity to attempt to amend his first amended complaint to cure

deficiencies. Plaintiff is further admonished that this Court’s Local Rule 15-220 requires an amended

complaint to be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an amended

complaint supersedes prior complaints. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9 Cir. 1967). After the th

filing of an amended complaint, the prior pleadings serve no further function. Thus, in an amended

complaint, each claim and involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons discussed above, this Court:

1. DISMISSES defendant City of Fresno, Fresno Police Department and County of Fresno;

2. DISMISSES and STRIKES the first amended complaint’s requests for punitive damages

against defendants City of Fresno, Fresno Police Department and County of Fresno;

3. DISMISSES and STRIKES the first amended complaint’s request for a declaratory

judgment; and

4. ORDERS plaintiff, no later than October 31, 2007, to file a second amended complaint

which complies with the pleading requirements outlined above; and 

5. Admonishes plaintiff that failure to file a second amended complaint in compliance

with this order will result in a recommendation to dismiss this action for failure to

obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 28, 2007 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

66h44d UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:07-cv-01386-LJO -SMS Document 9 Filed 10/02/07 Page 11 of 11