Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00259/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00259-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael Wayne Ary
Plaintiff
Kern County Superior Court
Defendant
McNutt
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL WAYNE ARY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE COUNTY )

OF KERN AND HONORABLE JUDGE )

McNUTT )

 )

Defendants. )

 )

1:06-cv-00259 AWI TAG

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO 

DENY APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN

FORMA PAUPERIS AND TO DISMISS

COMPLAINT

(Docs. 1 and 8)

Plaintiff, an inmate at Wasco State Prison, has filed a pro se civil rights complaint under

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 8).

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

A court of the United States may authorize the commencement of an action, without

prepayment of fees, by a prisoner who submits an affidavit which includes a statement of all

assets such prisoner possesses and that the prisoner is unable to pay the required filing fees. 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Notwithstanding a prisoner’s financial ability to proceed, the court must

screen and dismiss the case at any time if it determines that the allegation of poverty is untrue or

if the action (1) is frivolous, (2) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted or (3) seeks

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 

Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t., 901 F.2d 696,

699 (9th Cir. 1990). Here, this Court need not reach Plaintiff’s financial ability to proceed since

his complaint, as noted below, seeks monetary relief against defendants who are immune from

suit and therefore is precluded by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

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 Charles P. McNutt is a judge in the Superior Court of California, County of Kern. Superior Court of

California, Judicial Officers, http://www.kern.courts.ca.gov/judicial.asp (last modified April 3, 2006).

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B. Legal Claims

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements:

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that

the violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487

U.S. 42, 48 (1988). In the instant case, Plaintiff contends that on October 29, 2003, Kern County

Superior Court Judge [Charles P.] McNutt1 illegally applied Cal. Penal Code § 1210.1 (referred

to as “Prop. 36") in sentencing him to felony probation in Kern County Superior Court case

number BF105501A. (Doc. 1, pp. 2-3). According to Plaintiff, the illegal application of Prop.

36 caused him to attend “A.A.” and “N.A.” meetings under duress, caused him to miss time at

work with consequential lost earnings, caused him to lose his family and home, defamed him,

and precluded him from attaining time credits that could have been used towards a subsequent

conviction and incarceration. (Id.) Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks $3,000,000 in damages from the

only two named defendants: Judge McNutt and the Superior Court for the County of Kern. (Doc.

1, p. 4).

The Superior Court for Kern County is an arm of the state and thus under the Eleventh

Amendment cannot be sued in federal court. See, e.g., Simmons v. Sacramento County Superior

Court, 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003)(Eleventh Amendment bars suit against state superior

court); Hyland v. Wonder, 117 F.3d 405, 413 (9th Cir.)(California Superior Court is a state

agency), amended, 127 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1148 (1998); Greater

Los Angeles Council on Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103, 1110 & n.10 (9th Cir.

1987)(Eleventh Amendment bars suit against Superior Court of California regardless of relief

sought). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against the Superior Court for the County of Kern

should be dismissed with prejudice.

Plaintiff’s claim against the remaining defendant, Superior Court Judge McNutt, is also

barred. State judges are absolutely immune from civil liability for damages for acts performed in

their judicial capacity. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-55 (1967)(judicial immunity

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applicable to actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Simmons, 318 F.3d at 1161 (plaintiff cannot state

a claim under § 1983 against a judge because of his absolute immunity for judicial acts). 

Whether an act by a judge is a judicial act relates to (1) the nature and function of the act, i.e.,

whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to (2) the expectations of the parties,

i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his or her judicial capacity. Stump v. Sparkman, 435

U.S. 349, 362 (1978). Moreover, “a judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action

he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be

subject to liability only when he has acted in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’” Stump, 435

U.S. 356-57 (citing Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351 (1872)). Here, Plaintiff

contends that Judge McNutt illegally applied Prop. 36 in sentencing him to probation on October

29, 2003. (Doc. 1, pp. 2-3). Judge McNutt’s conduct in sentencing Plaintiff was quintessentially

judicial in nature and clearly taken within his judicial capacity. Consequently, Plaintiff’s claims

against Judge McNutt are barred by judicial immunity.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned recommends that this case be dismissed

with prejudice.

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to this action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and this Court’s Local Rule 72-304. 

No later than thirty (30) days after service of this Report and Recommendation, any party may

file written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the Court and serve a copy on all

parties and the Magistrate Judge in compliance with this Court’s Local Rule 72-304(b). Such a

document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation.” 

Responses to objections shall be filed and served no later than ten (10) days after service of the

objections and otherwise in compliance with this Court’s Local Rule 72-304(d). A copy of the

responses shall be served on the Magistrate Judge. The District Judge will review the Magistrate

Judge’s Report and Recommendation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).

///

///

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The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive

the right to appeal the District Judge’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 7, 2006 /s/ Theresa A. Goldner 

j6eb3d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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