Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-03129/USCOURTS-caDC-96-03129-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Troy E. Lampkin
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 1, 1998 Decided November 3, 1998

No. 96-3128

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Melvin L. Lampkin,

Appellant

Consolidated with

96-3129

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 96cr00103-01)

(No. 96cr00103-02)

Lisa B. Wright, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued

the cause for appellant, with whom A. J. Kramer, Federal

Public Defender, was on the briefs.

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Richard E. Gardiner, appointed by the court, was on the

brief for appellant Troy E. Lampkin.

Kimberley S. Knowles, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee, with whom Wilma A. Lewis, U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher, Thomas C. Black and T. Anthony

Quinn, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, were on the brief. MaryPatrice Brown and M. Evan Corcoran, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, entered appearances.

Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Henderson and Garland,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge Edwards.

Edwards, Chief Judge: On March 5, 1996, pursuant to a

search warrant, police officers searched an apartment at 1962

West Virginia Avenue, N.E., in the District of Columbia. At

the time of the search, there were three adults (appellants

Melvin Lampkin and Troy Lampkin, and Thomas Davenport)

and five juveniles (Michael Thomas, Anthony Millhouse, Lavon Howard, Kellie Mitchell, and Catherine Pledger) in the

apartment. The search uncovered ziplock bags of cocaine

base on a table and hidden in a ceiling light fixture, and a

pistol hidden in a chair cushion. Subsequently, an indictment

was returned, charging both Melvin and Troy Lampkin with

possession with intent to distribute more than 5 grams of

cocaine base ("PWID"), in violation of 21 U.S.C. s 841(a)(1)

and (b)(1)(B)(iii) [Count One], and employing a minor to

commit the same drug offenses, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

s 861(a)(1) [Count Three]; Melvin Lampkin, alone, was

charged with carrying a firearm during a drug trafficking

offense [Count Two], carrying a pistol without a license

[Count Four], and possession of unregistered ammunition

[Count Five]. Following trial on these counts, a jury convicted both Lampkins on Counts One and Three; however,

Melvin Lampkin was acquitted on Counts Two, Four, and

Five.

Appellants seek to overturn their convictions on a number

of grounds, only three of which raise substantial questions for

consideration by this court. Appellants claim that the trial

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judge erred (i) in repeatedly instructing the jury that three

juvenile witnesses who testified against the Lampkins could

not face prosecution in federal court, (ii) in allowing the jury

to consider video-taped evidence that was never presented in

open court or subjected to cross-examination, and (iii) in

admitting a prior consistent statement of a key Government

witness. Appellants also claim that the trial judge erred in

imposing a special assessment of $100, rather than $50, for

each of appellants' convictions. The Government concedes

that we must remand the special assessment to allow the trial

court to impose the correct amount. The Government also

concedes error on the first three points, but argues that each

error is harmless.

After careful review of the record in this case, we find that

the first two errors at issue require the reversal of both

appellants' convictions on Count Three, as well as Troy

Lampkin's conviction on Count One. The errors were harmless, however, with respect to Melvin Lampkin's conviction on

Count One, because there was ample independent evidence

linking him to the drugs. As for the third cited error, we

agree with the Government that it was harmless error for the

District Court to admit a prior consistent statement of Kellie

Mitchell, because the statement was merely cumulative of

other evidence adduced at trial.

I. Background

A.The Arrest and Indictment

On March 5, 1996, three members of the Metropolitan

Police Department executed a search warrant in an apartment at 1962 West Virginia Avenue, N.E., in the District of

Columbia. Inside, the police found eight people, 2.3 grams of

cocaine base in 16 ziplock bags on a table, 31 grams of cocaine

base in 202 ziplock bags hidden in a ceiling light fixture, and a

pistol hidden in the cushion of a chair. Of the eight people in

the apartment, three were adults--appellants Melvin and

Troy Lampkin, as well as Thomas Davenport--and five were

juveniles--Michael Thomas, Anthony Millhouse, Kellie Mitchell, Lavon Howard, and Catherine Pledger. The police also

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found keys to the apartment in Melvin Lampkin's jacket, as

well as Melvin Lampkin's car registration on the same table

as the 16 ziplock bags. They also found $231 in cash in Troy

Lampkin's pants pocket.

The police arrested the adults and brought the juveniles in

for questioning. That night, the police conducted video-taped

interviews of the juveniles. Upon examination, Michael

Thomas's fingerprints were found on the clip of the gun and

Lavon Howard's fingerprints were found on the light fixture.

No fingerprints from Melvin or Troy Lampkin were found on

either the gun or the drugs.

On April 2, 1996, the Lampkins were charged with PWID

and employing a minor to commit the drug offenses. Melvin

Lampkin was also charged with three gun and ammunition

possession offenses. The juveniles were not charged with

any offenses.

B.The Trial

Melvin and Troy Lampkin were tried together, in a trial

commencing on June 25, 1996. During the trial, the building

landlord testified that he had rented the searched apartment

to Melvin Lampkin, and the police officers testified as to the

items found in the apartment. The heart of the Government's case, however, was the testimony of three of the

juveniles: Thomas (age 17), Millhouse (age 14), and Mitchell

(age 15). Thomas and Millhouse testified that they had sold

drugs for the Lampkins in the past, and that the Lampkins

kept the drugs in the light fixture. Millhouse also testified

that, on the night of the search, he had seen Melvin Lampkin

with a gun. Mitchell testified that she saw Melvin reach into

the light fixture that night and give Troy some cocaine to sell

to a customer waiting at the door. She also testified that she

saw Melvin Lampkin remove a gun from his waistband and

place it under a pillow on the couch.

The credibility of the juvenile witnesses was suspect, to say

the least. Thomas, in particular, seemed to have difficulty

understanding most of the questions asked of him, his answers were often vague and unresponsive, the prosecutor led

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him on a number of occasions, and his answers to most of the

central questions about the drugs and the gun changed after

his recollection was refreshed by reference to the testimony

that he had given before the grand jury. Millhouse testified

that he had been smoking marijuana on the night of the

search and that he did not have a good memory of the events

of that night. Mitchell admitted that she had been smoking

marijuana on the night of the search, that during her initial

police interview she said she did not know if Melvin Lampkin

sold drugs, and that during this interview she said it was

Thomas, not Melvin Lampkin, who had taken drugs from the

light fixture that night.

1.The Erroneous Instruction

During the cross-examination of Thomas, defense counsel

attempted to show that Thomas had a deal with the prosecutor, pursuant to which he would escape prosecution in exchange for testifying against the Lampkins. See Trial Transcript ("Tr."), 6/26/96 at 209-11. In response to questions

from defense counsel, Thomas appeared to indicate that he

had been told by a prosecutor that he was not being charged

because he was testifying against the Lampkins. See id. at

210-11. However, at a bench conference during crossexamination, the trial judge made it clear to counsel that his

line of inquiry was pointless. The court instructed counsel

that

it is only fair, and it becomes more and more fair as we

go, to make it abundantly clear to this jury that the

United States [Attorney's Office] does not have jurisdiction [over the juvenile witnesses], that's why I wanted to

say it at first and that's why I wanted to say it for every

juvenile.

Id. at 218-19. Then, immediately following Thomas's testimony, the court instructed the jury as follows:

Members of the Jury, you have heard the testimony of

Mr. Michael Thomas, who is a juvenile, providing testimony on behalf of the Government.... You are instructed that it is the District of Columbia Corporation

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Counsel that has the authority, the jurisdiction, to decide

whether to proceed with any charges against a juvenile.

The United States Attorney and his Assistant United

States Attorney, such as the Assistant United States

Attorney in this case, has no such authority.... A

supervisor at the District of Columbia Corporation Counsel has ... indicated there will be no prosecution of Mr.

Thomas as a juvenile arising from the events of [March

5, 1996].

Tr. 6/27/96 at 77-78.

At the conclusion of Millhouse's testimony, the District

Court told the jury that the same instruction applied to

Millhouse. See Tr. 6/27/96 at 143. Defense counsel then

brought to the court's attention the fact that under 18 U.S.C.

s 5032, the U.S. Attorney's Office did in fact have jurisdiction

to prosecute the juveniles. The court acknowledged the

error, but nevertheless repeated the instruction, over defense

objection, in its final charge to the jury. See Tr. 7/2/96 at 6A11.

2.The Thomas Video Tape

Early in the trial, the Government offered into evidence the

video tape of the police interviews of the three juveniles made

on the night of the arrests. Defense counsel objected, claiming that admission of the tape would violate the Confrontation

Clause. See Tr. 6/26/96 at 41. The trial judge admitted the

tape over counsel's objection. Subsequently, Government

counsel attempted to rehabilitate Thomas on re-direct by

playing the portion of Thomas's video-taped interview in

which he said that he retrieved drugs from the light fixture at

the request of Troy Lampkin. See Tr. 6/27/96 at 73. Over

defense counsel's objections, the District Court allowed the

Government to play a portion of the tape.

It appears that approximately three minutes of Thomas's

statement were actually played during trial, see id. at 69, an

amount that Government counsel recalls as "only a short

segment" of the total interview. Brief for Appellee at 40

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tions, the jury sent a note to the trial court asking for the

video tape of the police interviews and the transcript of each

of the juveniles' trial testimony. The trial court informed the

jury that the trial transcript was unavailable; but the trial

judge gave the jury the entire video tape to play in the jury

room, including the portion of the Thomas statement that was

never played in court. Government counsel conceded that it

was error for the District Court to allow the jury to hear and

consider the entire video-taped statement.

3.Mitchell's Prior Consistent Statement

On cross-examination, Mitchell was impeached with her

statement to the police that it was Michael Thomas, not

Melvin Lampkin, who had retrieved drugs from the light

fixture during the night in question. On re-direct, the Government elicited from Mitchell, over objection, that she had

told the grand jury that it was Melvin Lampkin who had

retrieved the drugs from the light. See Tr. 6/28/96 a.m. at 76.

The Government concedes that admission of this prior consistent statement was error.

4.The Special Assessment

On July 8, 1996, the jury returned guilty verdicts against

both Lampkins for PWID and for employing a minor to

commit the drug offenses. The jury acquitted Melvin Lampkin of the gun and ammunition possession charges. The

District Court imposed a special assessment of $100 for each

of appellants' convictions.

II. Analysis

A.The Erroneous Instruction

All parties agree that the District Court's repeated instructions to the jury that the United States did not have jurisdiction to prosecute the juvenile witnesses was an erroneous

statement of the law. See 18 U.S.C. s 5032 (Supp. II 1996)

(establishing procedures for federal prosecution of juveniles).

Therefore, we must determine whether this conceded error

requires reversal. To do so, we look to the proceedings as a

whole and reverse only if the error "undermine[s] confidence

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in the conviction when viewed in light of all that took place."

United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

If the error "had substantial and injurious effect or influence

in determining the jury's verdict," it cannot be viewed as

harmless. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776

(1946).

The trial judge gave the erroneous instruction three times:

once following Thomas's testimony, once when the judge told

the jury that the instruction applied to Millhouse's testimony,

and once in the court's final charge (after the trial judge had

been advised by counsel that the instruction was legally in

error). The prejudice from the error is arguably mitigated

somewhat by the fact that the United States Attorney rarely

exercises its jurisdiction over juveniles. Nonetheless, there

was no good reason for the District Court to offer any

instruction on this matter, much less sua sponte. It goes

without saying that the trial judge certainly would not have

advised the jury on the frequency with which the United

States makes deals with cooperating witnesses, for such an

instruction would not be in the Government's interest and it

would offer the jury little, if any, relevant information. So we

are not here pondering whether the erroneous instruction

that was given was close to something that the trial judge

might reasonably have given to the jury. Rather, we are

considering an instruction that was clearly wrong with respect to a matter that should not have been before the jury.

The most important point to be made here is that the trial

judge's erroneous instruction robbed the appellants of their

primary defense. The defendants wanted to show that the

principal witnesses against them testified only to escape

prosecution themselves, and thus that they lied with good

motive to do so. The defendants were improperly foreclosed

from pursuing this line of defense. In United States v.

Salerno, 937 F.2d 797, 809-10 (2d Cir. 1991), the trial judge

refused to allow the defendant to cross-examine key Government witnesses on the issue of bias, and then refused to allow

him to raise the issue when presenting his own case. The

court held:

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This was not a harmless error. By instructing Ianniello

to wait to make the bias inquiry, and then refusing to

allow it, the district court effectively prevented Ianniello

from presenting a defense. This was an error of constitutional magnitude. The Supreme Court has long held

that criminal defendants have, at a minimum, "the right

to put before a jury evidence that might influence the

determination of guilt." Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480

U.S. 39, 56 (1987). See also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410

U.S. 284 (1973)....

Id. at 810, rev'd on other grounds, 505 U.S. 317 (1992).1 We

think that the holding in Salerno is precisely on point here: if

a trial court commits error and thereby prevents a defendant

from presenting a viable defense, that error is not harmless.

The Government emphasizes that Michael Thomas appeared to believe that he had been offered a deal in exchange

for his testimony. As long as Thomas had the subjective

belief that he had made a deal to cooperate, and he was

vigorously cross-examined on the subject, the Government

argues, the court's erroneous instruction did nothing to bolster his credibility and was therefore harmless error. We

disagree.

The erroneous instruction followed immediately after

Thomas's confused testimony, then the instruction was repeated twice more. Indeed, the trial court carried out its

stated desire to make it "abundantly clear" to the jury that

the United States could not prosecute Thomas or any of the

juvenile witnesses. Furthermore, even if Thomas thought he

had made a deal with the Government (and his testimony is

very confusing on this point), Millhouse and Mitchell testified

__________

1 Ianniello's convictions, along with those of his seven codefendants, were also reversed on an entirely unrelated ground.

The Supreme Court subsequently reversed the Second Circuit on

this unrelated ground. See United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317

(1992). The Second Circuit's holding as to Ianniello's inability to

present a defense, however, remained intact; Ianniello was subsequently severed from the case. See United States v. Salerno, 974

F.2d 231, 232 (2d Cir. 1992).

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to no such thing. It is true that defense counsel decided not

to cross-examine Millhouse on agreements to cooperate and

only briefly cross-examined Mitchell on the subject. But the

decision to forego this line of cross-examination was certainly

reasonable, given that the District Court had made it absolutely clear that it was going to impress upon the jury the

"fact" that the United States did not have jurisdiction to

prosecute the juveniles. In short, the jurors were given the

clear view that the juveniles could not be prosecuted by the

Government. The result was that the defendants were effectively foreclosed from attempting to show that the juveniles

had a strong motive to testify on behalf of the Government

and against the Lampkins.

Under these circumstances, there is a real possibility that

the instruction had a substantial effect on the jury's verdict

with respect to the Lampkins' convictions for unlawfully

employing a minor. See Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 765. The

evidence against the Lampkins on this charge was far from

overwhelming, given that the credibility of the juveniles was

very much in doubt throughout the trial. The jurors apparently did not believe Millhouse's and Mitchell's testimony

regarding Melvin Lampkin's possession of the gun, for they

acquitted him of the gun charges. Thomas's testimony was

even more suspect. At one point during his testimony, the

trial court even asked him if he had been high on marijuana

during his testimony the previous day. See Tr. 6/27/96 at 13.

Absent the juveniles' testimony--tainted by conceded error--

that they sold drugs for the Lampkins, there was literally no

evidence to convict appellants of this offense.

We need not decide whether this error without more

warrants reversal. Rather, we find that, when the erroneous

instruction is considered along with the trial court's error in

allowing the jury to consider video-taped evidence that was

never presented in open court or subjected to crossexamination, there is no doubt that reversible error was

committed. Accordingly, both Lampkins' convictions for unlawfully employing a minor must be reversed. See United

States v. Smart, 98 F.3d 1379, 1391 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("[I]f the

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evidence presented at trial is ambiguous, even a relatively

minor error requires reversal.").

Troy Lampkin's PWID conviction must be reversed for the

same reason. The only evidence, other than the juveniles'

testimony, offered against him on this count was the fact that

he was in the apartment at the time of the search and $231 in

cash was found on his person. This evidence would not have

been sufficient to convict Troy Lampkin on Count One. See,

e.g., United States v. Foster, 783 F.2d 1087, 1089 (D.C. Cir.

1986) ("Numerous decisions of this Circuit have made clear

that mere proximity or accessibility to contraband will not

support a conclusion that an individual had knowing dominion

and control over it."); United States v. Pardo, 636 F.2d 535,

549 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (same).

We decline, however, to reverse Melvin Lampkin's PWID

conviction. Apart from the juveniles' testimony, there was

ample circumstantial evidence of Melvin's dominion and control over the apartment and the drugs inside: the testimony

of the landlord that Melvin Lampkin had rented the apartment and lived there; the discovery of the apartment keys in

his jacket and of his car registration on the table; and the

presence of the ziplock bags both in plain view on the table

and in the light fixture. Given this independent evidence, we

are satisfied that the erroneous instruction did not have a

substantial effect on the jury's verdict against Melvin Lampkin on Count One.

B.The Thomas Video Tape

Throughout the trial, defense counsel strongly objected to

the admission of the video tape of the police interviews of the

juveniles, on both Confrontation Clause and hearsay grounds.

See Tr. 6/26/96 at 41; 6/27/96 at 68, 74. Reasonably construed, these objections encompass the original admission of

the tape, the playing of small segments of the tape for the

jury during the course of trial, and the release of the entire

tape to the jury for its review and consideration during jury

deliberations. Indeed, during oral argument before this

court, Government counsel conceded that it was error for the

District Court to allow the jury access to the entire videotaped police statement of Michael Thomas, when only a brief

portion of the statement was subjected to cross-examination

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in court. We agree. The only question here is whether the

error was harmless.

"To protect jury deliberations from improper influence, we

ordinarily restrict the jury's access only to exhibits that have

been accepted into evidence and 'consideration by the jury of

documents not in evidence is error.' " United States v.

Holton, 116 F.3d 1536, 1542 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citation omitted); see also Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472-73

(1965) ("[T]rial by jury in a criminal case necessarily implies

at the very least that the 'evidence developed' against a

defendant shall come from the witness stand in a public

courtroom where there is full judicial protection of the defendant's right of confrontation, of cross-examination, and of

counsel."); United States v. Cunningham, 145 F.3d 1385,

1397 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (reversing convictions where jury was

inadvertently provided with unredacted 911 tapes implicating

appellant). The precise content of the unconfronted portion

of Thomas's statement is not clear from the record; it is

clear, however, that the disputed amount of tape that was

made available to the jury was not an insignificant portion of

the tape, because the Government acknowledges that only a

minor segment of Thomas's taped statement was played for

the jury in open court. It is also clear that the jury had a

great interest in reviewing the testimony of the juveniles--

during its deliberations, the jury asked for all of the juveniles'

testimony, but received only the video tape.

The burden is on the Government to establish that the

unconfronted portions of the tape given to the jury were not

prejudicial, i.e., that the error was harmless. See Smart, 98

F.3d at 1390; Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 760-61. In the seminal

Turner case, two key Government witnesses acted as deputy

sheriffs in charge of the jury throughout the trial. There was

no showing that the deputies discussed the case with the jury

members, but the Court noted that the deputies' testimony at

trial was central to the Government's case, and their credibility was "assailed" on cross-examination. Turner, 379 U.S. at

473. The Court reversed the convictions, explaining that

"[t]he requirement that a jury's verdict 'must be based upon

the evidence developed at the trial' goes to the fundamental

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integrity of all that is embraced in the constitutional concept

of trial by jury." Id. at 472 (citation omitted). Thus, under

Turner, when evidence that directly pertains to the case has

not been subjected to cross-examination but is nevertheless

submitted to the jury, reversal is required unless the Government can show that the evidence did not prejudice the

defendant.

With respect to Troy Lampkin's PWID conviction, the

Government offers nothing to suggest that the conceded error

was other than prejudicial. No one doubts that the unconfronted portions of the video-taped statement were directly

relevant to the case. We know from the portion that was

played in court that Thomas's statement strongly implicated

Troy Lampkin. Furthermore, the Government conceded at

oral argument that Thomas had not yet been informed that

he was not going to be prosecuted at the time when he was

interviewed. Finally, there seems little doubt that the jury

reviewed the video tape, for the jury asked for all of the

juveniles' testimony (but received only the video tape to

review). On these facts, we cannot assume that the Government has met its burden. Rather, we must suppose that an

error of this magnitude--jury exposure to unconfronted

statements from a principal prosecution witness--is prejudicial unless the Government shows otherwise. The Government has shown nothing to support its claim of harmless

error.

We very recently reiterated that in a harmless error inquiry, "[t]he question is 'whether the guilty verdict actually

rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error' "

and not whether the appellant would have been convicted but

for the error. United States v. Maddox, No. 97-3082, slip op.

at 7 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 9, 1998) (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana,

508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993)). "If the judge is in 'grave doubt'

about the harmlessness of the error, he or she must reverse

the conviction." Smart, 98 F.3d at 1390 (quoting O'Neal v.

McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436 (1995)). Particularly with respect to a witness like Thomas, who was effectively impeached on cross-examination, we cannot say that under

these circumstances it was harmless error for the jury to

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have unlimited access to Thomas's video-taped statement

about which he was never cross-examined. And, as noted

above, when this error is considered along with the erroneous

instruction, there is no doubt that reversible error was committed. Accordingly, we reverse Troy Lampkin's PWID conviction.

There is no basis, however, for us to reverse Melvin

Lampkin's PWID conviction. As discussed above, there was

ample independent evidence linking Melvin to the drugs such

that we can say with fair assurance that the error here did

not affect the jury's verdict against him.

C.Mitchell's Prior Consistent Statement

Mitchell testified on direct examination that she had seen

Melvin Lampkin take drugs out of the light fixture on the

night of the search. She was impeached on crossexamination with her statement to the police that it was

Thomas, not Melvin Lampkin, who had taken the drugs out of

the fixture that night. The District Court then allowed the

Government to elicit on re-direct Mitchell's grand jury testimony that she saw Melvin take drugs out of the light fixture

on the night of the search and give them to Troy. Tr. 6/28/96

a.m. at 76. The Government concedes that this testimony

was inadmissible hearsay that improperly bolstered Mitchell's

direct testimony.

We find that this error was harmless in light of the strong

circumstantial case against Melvin discussed above, the trial

testimony of Thomas that the light fixture was a "stash spot"

and that he had seen Melvin remove drugs from it, and

Millhouse's testimony that the Lampkins kept drugs in the

fixture and that he had seen Melvin "serve" drugs from the

apartment on the day of the search. In other words, we are

confident that Mitchell's prior consistent statement, which

was merely cumulative of other evidence adduced at trial, did

not affect the jury's verdict. See Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776.

D.The Special Assessment

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. s 3013, appellants should have been

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tions. However, the District Court imposed a special assessment of $100 for each conviction, apparently pursuant to a

recent amendment to s 3013 increasing the mandatory special assessment for felony convictions. See Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, tit. II,

s 210, 110 Stat. 1214, 1240 (1996). The Government concedes

that the amendment was passed subsequent to the date of the

offense and that a remand is therefore necessary in order to

impose the appropriate special assessment of $50 per conviction. See United States v. Grace, 778 F.2d 818, 823 (D.C. Cir.

1985). Because we affirm Melvin Lampkin's PWID conviction, we remand for the purpose of adjusting the special

assessment on this conviction to accord with the preamendment version of 18 U.S.C. s 3013.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons explained above, we reverse Troy Lampkin's convictions on Count One and Count Three. We also

reverse Melvin Lampkin's conviction on Count Three. We

affirm Melvin Lampkin's conviction on Count One, but remand to the sentencing court for imposition of the appropriate special assessment. The reversed counts are remanded

for new trial.

So ordered.

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