Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-15-01338/USCOURTS-ca8-15-01338-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lou Aemisegger
Appellant
Richard Allen
Appellant
Amalgamated Transit Union
Appellee
Ron Barrios
Appellant
Jeff Baum
Appellant
Joe Becker
Appellant
Jesse Berry
Appellant
Joseph Bevenue
Appellant
Bi-State Development Agency of Missouri/Illinois Metropolitan District
Appellee
Shelly Boatman
Appellant
Ralph Bowen
Appellant
Brian Bowers
Appellant
Glenn Bowman
Appellant
Richard Brackett
Appellant
Tim Bray
Appellant
William Brown
Appellant
Tom Busick
Appellant
Matt Butcher
Appellant
Mike Canepari
Appellant
Steve Chausse
Appellant
Terry Clinton
Appellant
Travis Coaley
Appellant
Steve Coleman
Appellant
Marty Cornehlson
Appellant
Mike Cornehlson
Appellant
Tyler Correll
Appellant
Jerry Creahan
Appellant
Mitch Dale
Appellant
Tim Dempsey
Appellant
Anthony Digmetano
Appellant
Mike Dowthit
Appellant
Eric Dressler
Appellant
Matt Easter
Appellant
James Ehlers
Appellant
Mike Ellender
Appellant
Andrew Eorawski
Appellant
Matt Fisher
Appellant
Tim Fletcher
Appellant
Corey Flood
Appellant
Kevin Flora
Appellant
Dave Foster
Appellant
Narvala Fritsche
Appellant
Corey Fritz
Appellant
Arbi Ghookasian
Appellant
Rich Goddard
Appellant
Kevin Graham
Appellant
Dave Harrison
Appellant
Miker Havener
Appellant
Tim Hayes
Appellant
Jeff Hever
Appellant
Charles Hintze
Appellant
Rick Howard
Appellant
Michael Huntsman
Appellant
Kevin Jones
Appellant
Jason Kawalic
Appellant
Matt Kelly
Appellant
Tom Kelly
Appellant
Scott Klinkardt
Appellant
Charle Kohn
Appellant
Tim Kolb
Appellant
Stephen Kozenczak
Appellant
Kerry Kozma
Appellant
Joseph Krack
Appellant
Dave Kucera
Appellant
Richard Kurtz
Appellant
Ryan Lang
Appellant
Robert Langrehr
Appellant
Gregory Linear
Appellant
Mike Little
Appellant
Chris Lombardo
Appellant
John Long
Appellant
Albert Loughary
Appellant
Mark Mabra
Appellant
Douglas Meyer
Appellant
Joe Meyer
Appellant
Richard Meyerpeter
Appellant
Kevin Meyers
Appellant
Eric Miller
Appellant
Mike Miller
Appellant
John Molitor
Appellant
Kevin Moore
Appellant
Bobby Mueller
Appellant
Joseph Obenhaus
Appellant
John Ohlendorf
Appellant
John Osbourne
Appellant
Harold Parks
Appellant
James Paxton
Appellant
Wally Peters
Appellant
Zachary Pilgrim
Appellant
Kyle Pinkard
Appellant
Mike Presley
Appellant
Eric Rackovan
Appellant
Dan Rasch
Appellant
Gerald Reckelhoff
Appellant
William Reissing
Appellant
Dan Rekosh
Appellant
Steve Renner
Appellant
George Richardson
Appellant
Kyle Roques
Appellant
Daryl Roth
Appellant
Noah Rupp
Appellant
Rick Satterfield
Appellant
Pat Seymour
Appellant
Dennis Singleton
Appellant
Elmir Sobo
Appellant
David Spruiel
Appellant
Sean Stancliff
Appellant
Edward Stangel
Appellant
Jay Statler
Appellant
Michael Stenger
Appellant
Rich Stone
Appellant
Michael Strovinsky
Appellant
Tim Strube
Appellant
Joe Todd
Appellant
Brad Troutman
Appellant
Mike Vaccara
Appellant
Fredy Valenzuela
Appellant
Steven Voigt
Appellant
Branko Vokomanovic
Appellant
Zejko Vokomanovic
Appellant
Lee Walker
Appellant
Tom Ward
Appellant
Ron Weakly
Appellant
Matt Wellen
Appellant
Fred Werner
Appellant
Fred Widel
Appellant
Lowell Wisdom
Appellant
Nate Wood
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 15-1338

___________________________

Michael Stenger; Tim Dempsey; Mike Little; Kevin Moore; Matt Wellen; Mike

Canepari; Daryl Roth; Tim Bray; Lee Walker; Nate Wood; Mitch Dale; Kerry

Kozma; Matt Butcher; Fredy Valenzuela; Jerry Creahan; John Long; Ralph

Bowen; Lou Aemisegger; Terry Clinton; Richard Kurtz; Douglas Meyer; Jesse

Berry; Joe Todd; Mike Ellender; Mike Vaccara; Steve Renner; Kevin Flora; Scott

Klinkardt; Rick Howard; Miker Havener; Steve Coleman; Tom Kelly; Arbi

Ghookasian; Mike Cornehlson; Marty Cornehlson; Gerald Reckelhoff; Jeff Baum;

Tom Ward; Joseph Bevenue; Jay Statler; Brad Troutman; Zachary Pilgrim; Joe

Becker; Richard Meyerpeter; Eric Rackovan; Tyler Correll; Charles Hintze; Tom

Busick; Michael Strovinsky; William Brown; Dave Foster; Edward Stangel; Corey

Fritz; Brian Bowers; Richard Allen; Zejko Vokomanovic; Branko Vokomanovic;

Joseph Krack; Lowell Wisdom; James Paxton; Albert Loughary; Mike Dowthit;

Pat Seymour; Jason Kawalic; Travis Coaley; Michael Huntsman; Corey Flood;

Dan Rasch; Joseph Obenhaus; Stephen Kozenczak; Andrew Eorawski; Narvala

Fritsche; Anthony Digmetano; Mike Miller; Dave Kucera; John Osbourne; Mark

Mabra; Steve Chausse; Joe Meyer; John Ohlendorf; Richard Brackett; Kevin

Graham; Eric Dressler; Jeff Hever; Dave Harrison; Fred Werner; George

Richardson; Tim Fletcher; Tim Hayes; Fred Widel; Dan Rekosh; Kevin Meyers;

Rich Stone; Kyle Roques; Chris Lombardo; Tim Strube; Ryan Lang; Elmir Sobo;

Tim Kolb; Robert Langrehr; Steven Voigt; Matt Fisher; John Molitor; Kevin

Jones; Shelly Boatman; Noah Rupp; Bobby Mueller; Harold Parks; Ron Barrios;

Eric Miller; David Spruiel; William Reissing; Glenn Bowman; Rick Satterfield;

Kyle Pinkard; Matt Easter; Ron Weakly; Charle Kohn; James Ehlers; Wally

Peters; Mike Presley; Rich Goddard; Dennis Singleton; Gregory Linear; Sean

Stancliff; Matt Kelly

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiffs - Appellants

v.

Appellate Case: 15-1338 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/15/2015 Entry ID: 4346605 
Bi-State Development Agency of Missouri/Illinois Metropolitan District, doing

business as Metro

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee

Amalgamated Transit Union, Division 788

lllllllllllllllllllllIntervenor Defendant - Appellee

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis

____________

 Submitted: September 23, 2015

 Filed: December 15, 2015

____________

Before WOLLMAN, COLLOTON, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

____________

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Appellants are a group of 1A MAT mechanics (the Mechanics), members of

the Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 788 (the Union), and employees of Bi-State

Development Agency of Missouri/Illinois Metropolitan District (Metro). The

Mechanics filed a declaratory judgment action, seeking a declaration under section

13(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 (UMTA) that Metro must

establish a framework through which they could forma bargaining unitseparate from

the Union. The Union intervened and moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim on

which relief could be granted. The district court granted the Union’s motion, 1 2

Metro has not taken a position on the Union’s motion to dismiss. It maintains 1

that this action is ultimately a dispute between the Mechanics and the Union. See

J.A. 19 (“[A]t its core, Plaintiffs’ dispute focuses on the relationship between

-2-

Appellate Case: 15-1338 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/15/2015 Entry ID: 4346605 
holding that section 13(c) does not provide a federal private cause of action. We

affirm.

I. Background

Congress passed the UMTA in 1964 to help state and local governments

improve their cities’ mass transit systems. To accomplish this goal, the UMTA

created a federal grant system that provided funds with which state and local

governments could purchase failing privately owned mass transit companies. 

Recognizing that the transit employees’ transition fromprivate employment to public

employment could negatively affect their collective-bargaining rights, Congress

included section 13(c), which requires, as a condition precedent to receiving federal

funds, that the Secretary of Labor certify that transit employees’ rights are protected

by “fair and equitable” arrangements between employers and unions. 49 U.S.C.

§ 5333(b)(1) (2012). Those arrangements must ensure, inter alia, “the preservation

of rights, privileges, and benefits . . . under existing collective bargaining

agreements” and “the continuation of collective bargaining rights.” 

Id. § 5333(b)(2)(A)-(B). Once the Secretary certifies that the arrangements comply

with section 13(c), they are made part of the grant contract between the recipient and

the Department of Transportation, and the Department of Transportation releasesthe

funds to the recipient. 

Metro receives federal funds under the UMTA. It is an interstate compact that

was created by Illinois and Missouri in 1949, formed to provide a unified mass transit

system in the bi-state St. Louis area. 45 Ill. Comp. Stat. 100/1 (2015); Mo. Rev.

Plaintiffs and the Union and whether Plaintiffs are properly included and represented

in the historical bargaining unit.”).

The Honorable Audrey G. Fleissig, United States District Judge for the

2

Eastern District of Missouri.

-3-

Appellate Case: 15-1338 Page: 3 Date Filed: 12/15/2015 Entry ID: 4346605 
Stat. § 70.370 (2015). It is an agency that functions like a municipality,

3

encompassing territory in both Illinois and Missouri. It owns and operates the city’s

light rail and bus services, the St. Louis Downtown Airport, and certain other services

provided by the city, such as the tram that lifts visitors to the top of the Gateway

Arch. 

As a longtime recipient of federal funds, Metro has been a party to several

section 13(c) arrangementsthat the Secretary of Labor has certified and incorporated

into Metro’s grant contracts with the Department of Transportation. In the past,

Metro has negotiated with the Union and has entered into several collectivebargaining agreements that have named the Union as the exclusive bargaining

representative of Metro’s employees. The Union represents most of Metro’s nonsupervisory employees, including the Mechanics, bus drivers, light rail operators,

maintenance employees, sewer workers, and others. 

In October 2013, the Mechanics submitted a petition to Metro’s governing

body, the Board of Commissioners (Board), that was signed by 178 of Metro’s 272

1A MAT mechanics. Speaking through the petition, the Mechanicsrequested that the

Board “adopt a framework by which they could exercise the same collective

bargaining rights as other private and public sector employees in the states of

Missouri and Illinois,” in sum, a request that Metro create a procedure through which

the Mechanics could forma separate bargaining unit. Such a separate bargaining unit

was necessary, the Mechanics said, because they had no “frequency of interchange

with other bargaining unit employees,” because they had “separate and distinct

managerial control over employees and daily operations,” and because they had

minimal integration with other employees in their bargaining unit. 

Congress approved the compact’s formation two yearslater. Joint Resolutions 3

of the United States Congress of August 31, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-743, 64 Stat. 568. 

-4-

Appellate Case: 15-1338 Page: 4 Date Filed: 12/15/2015 Entry ID: 4346605 
The Board took no action on the petition, whereupon the Mechanics brought

this suit, in which they claimed that because Metro is an interstate compact, neither

Illinois nor Missouri labor laws apply to its employees. Further, they alleged that

because Metro is a political subdivision of Illinois and Missouri, it is exempt from

federal labor regulations under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 

29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2012). Thus, declaratory relief was necessary in the absence of

state or federal law that would provide a procedure for the creation of the separate

bargaining unit needed to allow them to exercise their collective bargaining rights. 

As recounted above, the district court granted the Union’s motion to dismiss,

concluding that in Jackson Transit Authority v. Local Division 1285, Amalgamated

Transit Union, AFL-CIO-CLC, 457 U.S. 15, 29 (1982), the Supreme Court held that

section 13(c) does not provide a federal private cause of action. On appeal, the

Mechanics argue that Jackson Transit Authority is distinguishable because it did not

address the unique legal status of an interstate compact.

II. Discussion

“‘Whether a complaint states a cause of action is a question of law,’ and our

‘review on appeal [is] de novo.’” Zayed v. Associated Bank, N.A., 779 F.3d 727, 732

(8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Miller v. Redwood Toxicology Lab., Inc., 688 F.3d 928, 936

(8th Cir. 2012)).

Congressional intent is the touchstone when determining whether a federal

statute creates a federal private cause of action. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S.

275, 286-287 (2001) (“The judicial task isto interpret the statute Congress has passed

to determine whether it displays an intent to create not just a private right but also a

private remedy.”). In Jackson Transit Authority, 457 U.S. at 23-28, the Court

determined that Congress did not intend to provide a federal forum for disputes

between unions and transit authorities, but rather intended that such disputes be

settled by state courts applying state law, id. at 27-28 (“Section 13(c) would not

-5-

Appellate Case: 15-1338 Page: 5 Date Filed: 12/15/2015 Entry ID: 4346605 
supersede state law, it would leave intact the exclusion of local government

employers from the National Labor Relations Act, and state courts would retain

jurisdiction to determine the application of state policy to local government transit

labor relations.”). Further, the Court determined that, rather than creating a federal

private cause of action, “Congress intended that § 13(c) would be an important tool

to protect the collective-bargaining rights of transit workers, by ensuring that state

law preserved their rights before federal aid could be used to convert private

companies into public entities.” Id.; see also Burke v. Utah Transit Auth., 462 F.3d

1253, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that section 13(c) does not create a federal

private cause of action). Accordingly, any framework through which the Mechanics

might reorganize as a separate bargaining unit must derive, if anywhere, from “state

law applied in state courts.” See Jackson Transit Auth., 457 U.S. at 29.

The Mechanics argue that Jackson Transit Authority did not address what

Congress intended would occur if there were no state labor law to apply. The Court

did, however, say that section 13(c) would not create, for example, a right to strike

where no such right existed under state law. Id. at 26 (referring to statements from

Senator Morse that “it would be for the State court to decide whether [the employees]

had” the right to strike where no specific state laws forbade it (alteration in original)

(quoting 109 Cong. Rec. 5674 (1963))). We read this as expressing the Court’s view

that Congress did not intend that federal law would fill gaps left by an absence of

state law.

Moreover, the language and structure of section 13(c) do not suggest that

Congress intended to create a federal private cause of action. Congressional intent

to create a federal private cause of action is manifested by the inclusion of “‘rightscreating’ language”—language that focuses on the individuals the statute is meant to

protect, rather than those the statute seeks to regulate. See Alexander, 532 U.S. at

288 (quoting Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 690 n.13 (1979)). The

structure of a statute indicates congressional intent to create a federal private cause

-6-

Appellate Case: 15-1338 Page: 6 Date Filed: 12/15/2015 Entry ID: 4346605 
of action when the statute focuses on individual, rather than aggregate effects. See

Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 288 (2002). Section 13(c) contains no rightscreating language. It provides, “As a condition of financial assistance . . . , the

interests of employees affected by the assistance shall be protected under

arrangements the Secretary of Labor concludes are fair and equitable.” 

49 U.S.C. § 5333(b)(1). The statutory language thus focuses on steps the Secretary

of Labor must take to ensure that employee protections are in place, but does not

create any specific rights itself. See Alexander, 532 U.S. at 289. The structure of

section 13(c) also indicates that Congress did not intend to create a federal private

cause of action, because it protects only the rights of employees generally, not “the

needs of any particular person.” Gonzaga Univ., 536 U.S. at 288 (quoting Blessing

v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 343 (1997)). The federal grant program established by

the UMTA helps state and local governments improve their mass transit systems. 

Section 13(c) functions only to ensure that minimum employee protections are in

place before the Department of Transportation disburses the funds. The absence of

any focus on individual employees’ rights indicates the lack of any congressional

intent to create a federal private cause of action. 

Although the issue raised by the Mechanics’ claim—whether section 13(c)

provides a federal private cause of action—differs from the issue raised in Jackson

Transit Authority—whether section 13(c) arrangements constitute federally

enforceable contracts—this difference is not material, because “the critical factor” in

both questions “is the congressional intent behind the particular provision at issue.” 

Jackson Transit Auth., 457 U.S. at 22. Because, as the Court made clear, the

“consistent theme” in Section 13(c)’s legislative history wasthat “Congress intended

that labor relations between transit workers and local governments would be

controlled by state law,” id. at 24, the district court correctly concluded that section

13(c) does not entitle the Mechanics to the relief they seek. 

-7-

Appellate Case: 15-1338 Page: 7 Date Filed: 12/15/2015 Entry ID: 4346605 
III. Conclusion

The judgment is affirmed.

______________________________

-8-

Appellate Case: 15-1338 Page: 8 Date Filed: 12/15/2015 Entry ID: 4346605