Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-01982/USCOURTS-ca8-03-01982-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Duane Carl Carpenter
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-1982

___________

United States of America, *

 *

Plaintiff - Appellee, *

 * Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Southern

 * District of Iowa.

Duane Carl Carpenter, *

 *

Defendant - Appellant. * 

 *

___________

Submitted: April 29, 2005

Filed: September 6, 2005

___________

Before MURPHY, HEANEY, and SMITH, Circuit Judges. 

___________

MURPHY, Circuit Judge.

This case is back before us after the Supreme Court granted Duane Carpenter's

petition for certiorari, vacated our earlier judgment in his case, and remanded for

further proceedings in light of United States v. Booker. 125 S. Ct. 1037 (2005). We

previously affirmed all but one of Carpenter's convictions and his sentence, as well

as the convictions of coconspirators Bart Underwood and Gayle Steele. See United

States v. Underwood, 364 F.3d 956 (8th Cir. 2004). We affirmed Carpenter's

convictions for conspiring to manufacture methamphetamine, for endangering human

life during the manufacture of methamphetamine, for manufacturing

methamphetamine within 1000 feet of a school, for felon in possession of a firearm,

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1

The Honorable James E. Gritzner, United States District Judge for the

Southern District of Iowa. 

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for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and for

possession of an unregistered short barreled shotgun.

Additional briefing was ordered following the mandate of the Supreme Court

so that the parties could address the impact of Booker on Carpenter's case. After

studying those briefs and reconsidering Carpenter's case, we conclude that he is not

entitled to relief because he did not raise a Sixth Amendment objection to his

sentence in the district court1

 and he has not shown plain error in the sentence

imposed. See United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543. We therefore affirm his

convictions and sentence with the exception of his conviction for manufacturing

methamphetamine. Since that conviction is barred by the double jeopardy clause, it

is reversed. 

I.

Duane Carpenter, Bart Underwood, and Gayle Steele manufactured

methamphetamine at Carpenter's residence in Council Bluffs, Iowa. By August 2001,

there were at least two to three one ounce methamphetamine cooks at Carpenter's

house each week. The cooks continued until Carpenter was apprehended by law

enforcement in late November 2001. Carpenter exchanged methamphetamine for

precursor materials and equipment to use in the cooks. He directed most of the cooks

at the residence and possessed two firearms, one that he carried while supervising the

cooks and a sawed off shotgun that he kept in the house to protect his

methamphetamine operation. 

Steele and Underwood frequented the house and regularly participated in the

cooks by peeling lithium batteries, popping pseudoephedrine pills from blister

packages and crushing them, and "bubbling" the methamphetamine during the final

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stages of production. They also obtained chemicals and supplies for Carpenter's

cooks and for their own. With the assistance of Underwood, Steele occasionally

conducted her own cooks using Carpenter's equipment and then shared her batch with

Carpenter.

On November 27, 2001 law enforcement agents searched Carpenter's residence

pursuant to a warrant and uncovered the active methamphetamine lab on the second

floor. They also discovered methamphetamine production byproducts, precursor

chemicals, and equipment used to manufacture methamphetamine scattered

throughout the house. This included pseudoephedrine, sulfuric acid, starter fluid,

waste sludge materials containing anhydrous ammonia, and lithium. A single

kerosene heater with an open heating element sat in the second floor foyer as the sole

source of heat for the entire house; it was plugged into an extension cord running

from the house next door. Because chemical fumes pervaded the house, the police

ran a safety assessment and identified several potential hazards. There were apparent

dangers at the site presented by exposure to chemicals, the mixing of dangerous

chemicals such as hydrogen chloride gas and flammable fuel vapors, numerous

potential sources of open flames, and three large dogs running loose in the house.

Six people were apprehended in the house during the search. Steele and

Underwood were in a second floor bedroom, where waste from methamphetamine

cooks was found on a TV tray near the bed, including jars with residue, used coffee

filters, and salt. Christy O'Neal and Twyla Pike were found in another second floor

room, and Franklin Freese was in the attic. After a second sweep of the house, the

police discovered Carpenter in the attic with a loaded, unregistered short barrel

shotgun.

A grand jury indicted Carpenter for conspiracy to manufacture

methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, for manufacturing

methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and for felon in possession,

possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and possession of

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2

Carpenter also moved for dismissal, for election of counts, and for the court

to rule in limine on evidentiary issues regarding expert testimony, Fed. R. Evid.

404(b), and prior convictions. 

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a short barreled shotgun, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e)(1),

924(c)(1)(A), and 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). A superceding indictment later added charges

against Carpenter for manufacturing drugs within 1000 feet of a school, and for

endangering human life, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 860 and 858.

Carpenter filed several pretrial motions, including motions to suppress the

evidence found in the November search and for a Franks hearing. His motions were

denied after a hearing.2

 The district court found that he had not made a substantial

preliminary showing that the warrant affidavit contained false statements made

knowingly or intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth. The court also

concluded that the warrant affidavit sufficiently showed probable cause because it

was based on information from a reliable informant and his tip was corroborated. 

A jury returned a guilty verdict on October 8 against Carpenter, Steele, and

Underwood for conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine, and it found each

responsible for 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing

methamphetamine. The jury also convicted Carpenter of manufacturing

methamphetamine, felon in possession of a firearm, possession of a firearm in

furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, possession of an unregistered short barreled

shotgun, endangering human life during the manufacture of methamphetamine, and

manufacturing methamphetamine within 1000 feet of a school. The district court

denied Carpenter's motion for a new trial or a judgment of acquittal, and he was

sentenced in a separate proceeding. 

Carpenter was sentenced to life imprisonment for his convictions of conspiracy,

manufacturing, felon in possession, and manufacturing within 1000 feet of a school;

concurrent sentences of ten years for possession of a short barreled shotgun and

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endangering human life; and a consecutive term of ten years for possession of a

firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. He received enhancements for his

role as a leader in the conspiracy and for endangering human life, and he was

categorized as a career offender. He unsuccessfully sought a downward departure for

overstatement of his criminal history. On his appeal, Carpenter challenges the denial

of his suppression motion, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the constitutionality

of the endangerment statute. He also raises a double jeopardy issue based on his

convictions for manufacturing, manufacturing within 1000 feet of a school, and

endangering human life. As to his sentence, he appeals the district court's findings

relating to the sentencing enhancements for his role in the conspiracy and the amount

of drugs produced by the conspirators. He maintains that the district court erred by

designating him as a career offender, arguing that his prior conviction does not

constitute a violent felony. He also argues that he is entitled to resentencing because

his sentence was based on facts never found by a jury and because the district court

was acting under a mandatory guideline regime. 

II.

A.

Carpenter claims that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by a search

under an invalid warrant. He contends that the district court erred by not suppressing

the evidence from the November search because no probable cause existed for the

search warrant since it was based on information from an unreliable informant and

a law enforcement official who misrepresented the underlying facts in violation of

Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). The denial of a motion to suppress is

reviewed de novo with the underlying factual determinations reviewed for clear error.

United States v. Coleman, 349 F.3d 1077, 1083 (8th Cir. 2003).

 

A search warrant is valid under the Fourth Amendment if it establishes

probable cause. Probable cause exists, if under the totality of the circumstances, a

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showing of facts can be made "'sufficient to create a fair probability that evidence of

a crime will be found in the place to be searched.'" United States v. Gabrio, 295 F.3d

880, 883 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Wells, 223 F.3d 835, 838 (8th Cir.

2000)). Information from an informant may be sufficient to establish probable cause

"if the tip 'is corroborated by independent evidence.'" Id. at 883 (citing United States

v. Williams, 10 F.3d 590, 593 (8th Cir. 1993)).

Carpenter asserts that the search warrant did not support probable cause

because the affiant had relied on a confidential informant who was not credible and

on the fruits of a previous search later invalidated by a state court. He argues that the

informant was unreliable because he offered information only to decrease his own

culpability. We have recognized that informants are often motivated "in the hopes

of obtaining leniency with respect to their own situation [but] that does not

necessarily mean they are unreliable." Id. at 884. Here, officers could assess the

informant's credibility because the information was provided in person. See id. at

883. The agent also corroborated the tip through his own investigation, which

confirmed the location of the house and verified the name and address provided by

the informant. See United States v. Williams, 10 F.3d 590, 594 (8th Cir. 1993). The

officer had also previously received tips from the police hotline and others about drug

related activities at the address. The district court did not err in denying the motion

to suppress because probable cause was shown by corroborated information from a

reliable informant. 

Carpenter also argues that the agent relied on the fruits of a previous illegal

search near Henderson, Iowa in September 2001. During the earlier search, police

found a .22 caliber pistol on Carpenter, as well as precursor materials –

pseudoephedrine and lithium batteries. Even without the fruits of this search,

probable cause existed to issue the warrant because the application relied on a number

of other sources, including the informant's tips, their corroboration, and the hotline

reports.

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Carpenter contends that the district court erred in denying his motion for a

Franks hearing and that the evidence should have been suppressed because the agent

violated Franks in obtaining the warrant. He claims that the agent actively

misrepresented his investigations, affirmatively indicated that the informant had

previously given reliable information when he had not, and omitted mentioning that

the earlier search of Carpenter had been suppressed in state court. We review the

denial of a request for a Franks hearing for abuse of discretion. Gabrio, 295 F.3d at

882. 

A defendant is entitled to a Franks hearing if he makes a substantial

preliminary showing that a false statement was included in the warrant affidavit either

intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth and the information was

necessary to the finding of probable cause. United States v. Fairchild, 122 F.3d 605,

610 (8th Cir. 1997). Since Carpenter did not make a substantial preliminary showing

that a Franks violation had occurred, the district court did not abuse its discretion by

denying his motion for a Franks hearing.

To prevail on a Franks challenge to a warrant, a defendant must first

demonstrate that the law enforcement official deliberately or recklessly included a

false statement or omitted a truthful statement from his warrant affidavit. Coleman,

349 F.3d at 1083. "Mere negligence on the part of law enforcement officers" does not

satisfy this initial requirement. United States v. Gibson, 123 F.3d 1121, 1124 (8th

Cir. 1997). Second, a defendant must show that if the offensive content in the

warrant affidavit is ignored, its remaining content "would be insufficient to establish

probable cause." Coleman, 349 F.3d at 1083. 

Carpenter cannot meet the first Franks requirement because he relies entirely

on his own accusations that the agent acted deliberately or recklessly. He points to

several minor discrepancies in the warrant affidavit, such as the listing of a different

address for Carpenter in a prior police report, but these minor differences do not show

deliberate or reckless falsehood. Id. at 1084. Stating that an informant has not given

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false information even though he has never given information in the past does not

amount to a false or reckless omission of relevant information. Gibson, 123 F.3d at

1124. Carpenter also charges that the agent falsely or recklessly omitted information

that the fruits of the earlier search had been suppressed by a state court. While the

agent did omit this information, Carpenter has not demonstrated that this was

intentional rather than negligent. Id. at 1084-85. Thus, he has not shown that the

agent acted deliberately or recklessly in preparing the warrant application. Even if

Carpenter could meet the first requirement, it would not undermine the probable

cause underlying the warrant, which was based on several untainted sources of

information. Because probable cause existed for the warrant and Carpenter has not

shown a Franks violation, the district court did not err in denying the suppression

motion.

B.

Carpenter asserts that his conviction is not supported by the evidence.

Carpenter challenges his convictions for conspiracy, manufacturing within 1000 feet

of a school, and endangerment to human life because of alleged deficiencies in the

testimony of witnesses. He argues that the testimony of the government's cooperating

witnesses is unbelievable on its face.

Sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury verdict is reviewed de novo.

United States v. Campa-Fabela, 210 F.3d 837, 839 (8th Cir. 2000). The facts are

viewed in the light most favorable to support the verdict, all reasonable inferences are

accepted, and reversal is only appropriate if no reasonable jury could have found the

defendant guilty. United States v. Stroh, 176 F.3d 439, 440 (8th Cir. 1999). While

corroborating evidence can support the testimony of witnesses, the cases relied on by

Carpenter, see, e.g., United States v . Hulse, 198 F.3d. 665, 668 (8th Cir. 1999);

United States v. Del Toro-Aguilera, 138 F.3d 340, 342 (8th Cir. 1998), do not hold

that witness testimony must be corroborated. Rather, the credibility of witnesses is

for the jury to evaluate. See, e.g., United States v. Espino, 317 F.3d 788, 794 (8th

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Cir. 2003); United States v. Mangine, 302 F.3d 819, 823 (8th Cir. 2002). Because

Carpenter bases his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence solely on witness

credibility, he cannot prevail.

C.

Carpenter challenges his conviction for endangering human life during the

manufacture of methamphetamine on the basis that 21 U.S.C. § 858 is

unconstitutionally vague. He contends the words "harm to human life" do not place

a defendant on notice as to the conduct prohibited and can lead to arbitrary

enforcement. We review a challenge to a criminal statute's constitutionality de novo.

United States v. Koons, 300 F.3d 985, 990 (8th Cir. 2002). A criminal statute is

vague if persons of a "'common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and

differ as to its application.'" United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617, 622-23 (8th Cir.

1999) (citing Planned Parenthood of Minn. v. Minnesota, 910 F.2d 479, 482 (8th Cir.

1990)). A statute gives fair warning if either on its face, or as construed, it made

reasonably clear at the relevant time that the defendant's conduct was criminal.

United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 267 (1997). 

Here, Carpenter had adequate notice that his conduct was proscribed, and his

arrest and conviction were not arbitrary. While Carpenter argues that he had no

actual notice that he could be charged for endangerment to human life, actual notice

is not required. See United States v. Washam, 312 F.3d 926, 930 (8th Cir. 2002).

The plain reading of the statute indicates that Carpenter's activities fell within it. A

common interpretation of the words "substantial risk of harm to human life" suggests

not mental, emotional, or spiritual harm as Carpenter argues, but rather that the

activity engaged in increases the likelihood of imminent physical danger to humans.

The district court correctly used the plain meaning of the statutory language in its jury

instructions. The jury instructions defined the risk as originating from either the

process of manufacturing methamphetamine or the storage, transportation, or mixing

of chemicals used in methamphetamine production. The court's instructions limited

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3

Carpenter also challenges his convictions for endangerment and

manufacturing near a school on the grounds that the district court improperly allowed

the expert testimony of Special Agent Michael Mittan and Melvin Samples, a

surveyor with HGM Associates, Inc., who testified that Carpenter's house was within

1000 feet of a school. To prevail on this claim, Carpenter has to show not only that

a discovery rule was violated but also that the violation was prejudicial. United

States v. Kuenstler, 325 F.3d 1015, 1023 (8th Cir. 2003). Carpenter has not

established any prejudice. 

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the risk to one that was real and significantly large, that created a potential for current

physical damage, and that endangered a person other than the defendant. Similar jury

instructions have been held constitutional. See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 318 F.3d

1011, 1016 (10th Cir. 2003); United States v. Jackson, 199 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1087-88

(D. Kan. 2002). The district court did not clearly err or abuse its discretion in

instructing the jury, and the statute as construed and applied to Carpenter is not

unconstitutionally vague.3

D.

Carpenter argues that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated when he was

tried and convicted on multiple counts for the same conduct. Multiplicity in charging

an offense is reviewed de novo. United States v. Okolie, 3 F.3d 287, 289 (8th Cir.

1993). Under the Fifth Amendment, a defendant is protected from being subject to

double jeopardy. Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 106 (2003). Where each

offense requires proof of a different element, there is not a double jeopardy problem.

See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (holding that convictions

for separate counts arising out of the same narcotics sale did not constitute double

jeopardy because each count required proof of an additional fact that the other did

not). Carpenter argues that he cannot be convicted for manufacturing

methamphetamine, manufacturing within 1000 feet of a school, and endangering life

during the manufacture of methamphetamine because the manufacturing count is a

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4

21 U.S.C. § 860 states:

Any person who violates section 841(a)(1) of this title or

section 856 of this title by distributing, possessing with

intent to distribute, or manufacturing a controlled

substance in or on, or within one thousand feet of, the real

property comprising a public or private elementary,

vocational, or secondary school or a public or private

college, junior college, or university, or a playground, or

housing facility owned by a public housing authority, or

within 100 feet of a public or private youth center, public

swimming pool, or video arcade facility, is (except as

provided in subsection (b) of this section) subject to (1)

twice the maximum punishment authorized by section

841(b) of this title; and (2) at least twice any term of

supervised release authorized by section 841(b) of this title

for a first offense.

5

At sentencing, the district court recognized that there could be a double

jeopardy challenge on appeal in respect to Carpenter's § 841 and § 860 convictions,

-11-

lesser included offense of either the endangerment count or the school proximity

count.

 

As the government conceded at oral argument, convictions under both 21

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 21 U.S.C. § 860 violate the double jeopardy clause because

one of the elements of § 860 is a violation of § 841(a)(1).4

 See 21 U.S.C. § 860 (West

2004); United States v. Freyre-Lazaro, 3 F.3d 1496, 1507 (8th Cir. 1993). A violation

of 21 U.S.C. § 841 is a lesser included offense of 21 U.S.C. § 860. Id. While a

defendant may be tried for lesser and greater offenses during the same trial, a

judgment of conviction and punishment for both violates the double jeopardy clause.

United States v. Jelinek, 57 F.3d 655, 660 (8th Cir. 1995). Because Carpenter was

convicted and sentenced on both counts, we must remand so the district court can

vacate both Carpenter's judgment of conviction and his sentence for the lesser offense

of manufacturing methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841.5

 Id.

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and it determined that the manufacturing conviction did not materially affect his life

sentence imposed for conspiracy, felon in possession, and manufacturing within 1000

feet of a school. The court stated explicitly that vacation of the manufacturing

conviction would not affect Carpenter's sentence on the other counts of conviction.

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III.

Carpenter raises a number of issues in respect to his sentence. First, he argues

that the district court clearly erred in its factual findings about his role in the offense

and the quantity of drugs for which he was responsible. Second, he complains the

district court erred by treating him as a career offender. Third, he claims that these

errors also violated his Sixth Amendment rights and that he is entitled to resentencing

under Booker. The government responds that there was sufficient evidence for the

district court to find that Carpenter was a leader in the conspiracy and that he should

be held responsible for producing over 250 grams of actual methamphetamine. The

government maintains that the district court did not err in concluding that Carpenter

was a career offender. It also argues that Carpenter's complaints under the Sixth

Amendment are subject to plain error review and that there is no indication the

district court would have sentenced Carpenter any differently under an advisory

guideline regime. 

A.

Carpenter argues that the district court erred in sentencing in respect to his role

in the offense. A district court's factual findings at sentencing are reviewed for clear

error, United States v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1177, 1181 (8th Cir. 2003), and this remains

true under Booker. United States v. Mashek, 406 F.3d 1012, 1017 (8th Cir. 2005). 

Carpenter challenges the district court's enhancement of his sentence under

USSG § 3B1.1 for being an organizer or leader in the conspiracy. He alleges that he

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did not manage anyone and that other individuals simply used the methamphetamine

lab for their own cooks. Under § 3B1.1, a defendant's offense level may be increased

by four levels if he was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity involving five or

more participants. A defendant who did not directly control the other conspirators

may still receive an enhancement for being a leader or organizer. United States v.

Logan, 54 F.3d 452, 456 (8th Cir. 1995). Here, the district court applied the

enhancement based on all the evidence, including the number of people involved in

the conspiracy, the activity that took place in Carpenter's house, evidence that

Carpenter directed the cooks and directed others to get precursors or bury sludge in

the backyard. The district court did not clearly err by finding Carpenter was a leader

in the conspiracy.

According to Carpenter, the district court erred in calculating the drug quantity

by overestimating the efficiency of the methamphetamine laboratory and the quantity

of the precursor materials used. He contends that his cooks only produced a yield of

15% from the precursor materials, rather than the 30% yield found by the district

court. The correct efficiency finding would have lowered the drug quantity he says

and would have resulted in a 2 level reduction in his base offense level. A district

court's findings of fact regarding the quantity of drugs attributed to the defendant is

reviewed for clear error. United States v. Maggard, 156 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir.

1998); See Mashek, 406 F.3d at 1017. District courts determine the drug quantity

attributable to the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence and make credibility

decisions in the process. United States v. Johnston, 353 F.3d 617, 625 (8th Cir. 2003)

(per curiam). The district court heard the evidence and found the drug quantities had

been proven by a preponderance of evidence. Its reliance on trial testimony and the

jury's credibility findings in its determination of drug quantity was not clear error.

Finally, Carpenter contends that he is not a career offender under USSG §

4B1.1 because his Iowa conviction for "going armed with intent" is not a crime of

violence. Under § 4B1.1, a defendant is a career offender if "the instant offense of

conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance

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offense" and he "has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence

or a controlled substance offense." USSG § 4B1.1. We have already determined that

an Iowa conviction for going armed with intent qualifies as a crime of violence for

sentencing purposes and can be used in determining whether a defendant is a career

offender. See United States v. Gomez-Hernandez, 300 F.3d 974, 980 (8th Cir. 2002).

Because Carpenter's Iowa conviction was for a crime of violence, the court did not

err in finding him a career offender for sentencing purposes.

B.

Carpenter now argues that he is entitled to resentencing because the district

court sentenced him based on facts not found by the jury and under a mandatory

guideline regime. He first argues that he is entitled to resentencing without having

to show the district court committed plain error both because of the procedural

posture of his case at the time Booker was decided and because he preserved error at

the district court. In the alternative, he argues that there was plain error because there

is a reasonable probability the district court would have sentenced him differently

under an advisory guideline system. 

Carpenter argues that he should not have to show plain error to obtain

resentencing because at the time the Supreme Court decided Booker there was no

final judgment in the district court because it had not yet acted on remand to vacate

one of his convictions on double jeopardy grounds. Although the district court had

yet to vacate the conviction for manufacturing methamphetamine, Carpenter still must

establish plain error if he forfeited his Sixth Amendment objection in the district

court. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 769; Pirani, 406 F.3d 543 (2005); Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).

Carpenter's only objection at sentencing was that the district court erred in its

factual findings. He did not raise any Sixth Amendment issue or object to the

application of mandatory sentencing guidelines or cite Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530

U.S. 466 (2000). As a result, we review Carpenter's sentence for plain error. See

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United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 548-49 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc). To establish

plain error, Carpenter must establish (1) an error, (2) that is plain, that not only (3)

affected his substantial rights, but also (4) "seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity,

or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461,

466-67 (1997). When, as here, the district court treated the guidelines as mandatory,

the first two prongs are established. To meet the third prong, Carpenter must show

a "reasonable probability" the district court would have imposed a more lenient

sentence under the now advisory guidelines. Pirani, 406 F.3d at 551.

Carpenter argues that the district court committed plain error by imposing a

sentence that held him responsible for over 250 grams of actual methamphetamine

when the jury only found him responsible for 500 grams or more of a

methamphetamine mixture. Carpenter argued at sentencing that a base level for

between 50 and 150 grams of actual methamphetamine would more accurately reflect

the actual amount of methamphetamine for which he should be held responsible. The

district court disagreed and held Carpenter responsible for 256.83 grams of actual

methamphetamine based on "the record of this case." Carpenter had the opportunity

to present all of his arguments to the district court, and the district court agreed with

the government's position. There is nothing in the record that indicates the district

court would have imposed a different sentence had it treated the guidelines as being

advisory only. 

The district court imposed Carpenter's sentence of life imprisonment plus ten

years on a record which included facts about his dangerous method of manufacturing

large amounts of methamphetamine near an elementary school, his attempt to evade

arrest by hiding in his attic with a sawed off shotgun during the warrant search, his

prior record and conviction for a violent felony, his repeated unlawful possession of

firearms, and the danger he presented to the public. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 

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6

 Carpenter's recently filed pro se motion for an evidentiary hearing is also

denied. In this motion Carpenter reargues many of the points previously raised

relating to the search warrant, just as in his supplemental briefing. We also note that

any claim for ineffective assistance of counsel should almost always be brought by

motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, rather than on direct appeal. 

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IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we once again affirm Carpenter's conviction for

conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine, manufacturing methamphetamine

within 1000 feet of a school, endangering human life during the manufacture of

methamphetamine, felon in possession of a firearm, possession of a firearm in

furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and possession of an unregistered short

barreled shotgun. We reverse Carpenter's conviction for manufacturing

methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841, and remand to the district court

for it to vacate the judgment on double jeopardy grounds since it is a lesser included

offense of 21 U.S.C. § 860. After further briefing and consideration of his sentence

in light of Booker, we again affirm Carpenter's sentence, except for that portion

imposed on the count of manufacturing methamphetamine.6

HEANEY, Circuit Judge, concurring.

I continue to believe that a defendant's challenge to the factual basis for a

sentence enhancement preserves his Sixth Amendment sentencing claim. See United

States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 555-62 (en banc) (Heaney, J., dissenting). Moreover,

I adhere to the view stated by Judge Bye in Pirani, that defendants who did not

properly preserve their Booker claims in the district court are nonetheless generally

entitled to resentencing under a constitutional regime. Pirani, 406 F.3d at 562-67

(Bye, J., dissenting). Because a majority of our court held to the contrary on both

counts, however, I concur.

___________________________

Appellate Case: 03-1982 Page: 16 Date Filed: 09/06/2005 Entry ID: 1948166