Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-04081/USCOURTS-ca8-05-04081-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Pedro Arellano-Garcia
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

 The Honorable Richard H. Kyle, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota, sitting by designation.

2

 The Honorable Donald E. O’Brien, United States District Judge for the

Northern District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-4081

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Northern District of Iowa.

Pedro Arrellano-Garcia, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: September 28, 2006

Filed: December 22, 2006

___________

Before RILEY and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges, and KYLE,1

 District Judge.

___________

KYLE, District Judge.

Pedro Arellano-Garcia appeals his conviction for conspiring to distribute over

500 grams of methamphetamine. Arellano-Garcia argues that the district court2

 erred

when it (1) denied his motion to dismiss under the Speedy Trial Act and (2) denied his

motion for judgment of acquittal. We find no merit to either of these contentions and,

accordingly, affirm.

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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In September 2003, Somsock Senlouangrat (“Sock”) and Daosadeth

Keophounsouk (“Dao”) were traveling in a car on Interstate 29 in Iowa. A Monona

County Sheriff’s Deputy stopped the car for a license-plate violation. The deputy

found two pounds of methamphetamine inside; Sock and Dao were arrested. The two

admitted their involvement in drug trafficking and agreed to cooperate in identifying

the source of their drugs.

Sock and Dao were then placed in the custody of Special Agent Scott Garland

of the Drug Enforcement Administration. They informed Agent Garland that a

telephone number stored in Sock’s cellular telephone belonged to their supplier, an

individual named “Pedro.” Sock and Dao then made several tape-recorded telephone

calls to Pedro. In the last of these telephone calls, Dao informed Pedro to meet him

at a hotel in California; the meeting was a set-up in order to arrest Pedro, but DEA

agents failed to arrive in time to make the arrest.

On September 24, 2003, Sock, Dao, and Arellano-Garcia were indicted in the

Northern District of Iowa. Arellano-Garcia was apprehended shortly thereafter at the

United States/Mexico border and was transferred to custody in Iowa. Sock was

released on bond pending trial, but absconded and has not been located; Dao and

Arellano-Garcia were both detained prior to trial at the Fort Dodge Correctional

Facility.

While on pre-trial detention, Dao received several notes from Arellano-Garcia.

Dao made two of those notes available to law enforcement, including one containing

threats against Dao should he testify against Arellano-Garcia and promises to help him

if he would change his testimony. Arellano-Garcia also told two other inmates at Fort

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Dodge that he had provided the methamphetamine to Sock and Dao and that he had

written the notes to Dao.

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Arellano-Garcia was arraigned on November 3, 2003. His trial did not

commence until June 20, 2005, however, because of delays occasioned by several pretrial motions. The longest such delay arose out of Arellano-Garcia’s May 10, 2004

motion in limine seeking to exclude the notes he had written to Dao. The district court

granted that motion on June 11, 2004, and the Government filed an interlocutory

appeal of that decision on June 17, 2004. On June 18, 2004, the district court stayed

proceedings as to Arellano-Garcia, pending this Court’s decision on the interlocutory

appeal.

On January 24, 2005, this Court issued its judgment reversing the district

court’s ruling on the motion in limine. For reasons not disclosed by the record,

however, the mandate did not issue until April 29, 2005. The district court received

the mandate on May 2, 2005, and promptly set a June 20, 2005, trial date.

On June 13, 2005, Arellano-Garcia moved to dismiss the indictment, alleging

that the Speedy Trial Act had been violated. The district court denied that motion on

June 17, 2005. Trial commenced on June 20, 2005; during the trial, Dao identified

Arellano-Garcia in open court and testified that Arellano-Garcia supplied the drugs

that were in his and Sock’s possession when they were arrested. On June 23, 2005,

the jury returned a guilty verdict. This appeal followed.

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 We have examined the remaining time periods excluded by the district court

and agree with the exclusion of those periods (none of which Arellano-Garcia has

challenged). However, the district court improperly included one day – November 3,

2003, the day of Arellano-Garcia’s arraignment – in its Speedy Trial Act calculation.

(App. at 87.) The speedy-trial clock does not commence until the day after a

defendant’s arraignment. See United States v. Yerkes, 345 F.3d 558, 561 (8th Cir.

2003); United States v. Long, 900 F.2d 1270, 1274 (8th Cir. 1990). Accordingly, the

district court should have concluded that 48 includable days, not 49 days, had elapsed

before the trial began. 

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III. DISCUSSION

A. Speedy Trial Act

The Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, requires a defendant’s trial to

commence within 70 days of the latter of (1) the filing of the indictment or (2) the

defendant’s arraignment. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1); United States v. McKay, 431 F.3d

1085, 1091 (8th Cir. 2005). If a defendant’s rights under the Speedy Trial Act are

violated, the indictment must be dismissed. Id. However, the Act excludes certain

delays from the 70-day calculation, such as those occasioned by pre-trial motions or

interlocutory appeals. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(d), (h).

In ruling on Arellano-Garcia’s motion to dismiss, the district court concluded

that only 49 includable days had elapsed from Arellano-Garcia’s arraignment to his

trial. Arellano-Garcia argues that the district court improperly excluded four time

periods when calculating how much speedy-trial time had elapsed.3

Arellano-Garcia first argues that the district court improperly excluded the

period from November 7 to November 25, 2003. On November 6, 2003, the district

court entered an Order setting a plea hearing for Dao. In that Order, the district court

(properly) excluded from Dao’s speedy-trial calculation the time period from

November 6, 2003, to the date of the plea hearing. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)

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(excluding delays resulting from “proceedings concerning the defendant”). Dao

actually pled guilty on November 25, 2003. Accordingly, the period from November

6 to November 25, 2003, was excludable as to Dao. And, because “exclusions of time

attributable to one defendant apply to all codefendants,” United States v. Patterson,

140 F.3d 767, 772 (8th Cir. 1998); accord United States v. Jones, 801 F.2d 304, 316

(8th Cir. 1986), this period was also excludable as to Arellano-Garcia.

Arellano-Garcia next argues that the period from February 14 to May 2, 2005,

should not have been excluded. As discussed above, on January 24, 2005, this Court

issued its judgment reversing the district court’s ruling on the Government’s motion

in limine. Arellano-Garcia had until February 7, 2005, to petition the Court for

rehearing, see Fed. R. App. P. 40(a)(1), but he did not do so. Accordingly, the Court’s

mandate should have issued on February 14, 2005. See Fed. R. App. P. 41(b). For

reasons not disclosed by the record, however, the mandate did not issue until April 29,

2005, and was not received by the district court until May 2, 2005. Arellano-Garcia

argues that the period from February 14, 2005 – when the mandate should have issued

– to May 2, 2005 – when the mandate was actually received – should not have been

excluded by the district court. We disagree.

Section 3161(h)(1)(E) of Title 18, United States Code, excludes from speedytrial time a delay in commencing a defendant’s trial resulting from “any interlocutory

appeal.” Such a delay necessarily lasts until the district court receives the mandate,

because the district court is without jurisdiction to act until the mandate is received.

See United States v. Long, 900 F.2d 1270, 1276 (8th Cir. 1990). In other words,

because a district court cannot commence the trial until it receives the mandate, the

excludable “delay” under the Speedy Trial Act – that is, the delay in commencing the

defendant’s trial occasioned by an interlocutory appeal – must extend up to the date

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 Arellano-Garcia argues that the excludable delay should terminate on the date

the mandate issues, rather than the date it is received by the district court, but this

argument is foreclosed by Long. See also Committee on the Administration of the

Criminal Law of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Guidelines to the

Administration of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, as amended, 106 F.R.D. 271, 288

(1985) (excludable delay caused by interlocutory appeal ends on the “[d]ate the

district court receives the mandate or order of the court of appeals”).

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in which the mandate is received by the district court. Id. (“The district court is

unable to proceed to trial until it has received the appellate court’s mandate.”).4

Relying on Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and United

States v. Stafford, 29 F.3d 181 (5th Cir. 1994), Arellano-Garcia argues that the district

court could have commenced the trial before receiving this Court’s mandate because

it enjoyed “dual jurisdiction” with this Court after February 14, 2005, the date the

mandate should have issued. Rule 41, however, makes no mention of “dual

jurisdiction.” Moreover, the exercise of “dual jurisdiction” by a district court would

contravene the Supreme Court’s admonition that “a federal district court and a federal

court of appeals should not attempt to assert jurisdiction over a case simultaneously.”

Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982). Indeed, even

the Stafford court recognized that “the district court should have awaited our

mandate” before proceeding. 29 F.3d at 184 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 181

(“we do not endorse the district court’s decision to act upon our judgment before the

mandate issued”). Accordingly, we conclude that the district court properly excluded

the period from February 14 to May 2, 2005, in its speedy-trial calculation.

Arellano-Garcia next argues that the district court improperly excluded the

period between May 2 and June 13, 2005. The record is clear, however, that the

district court actually included that period in its calculation. (App. at 88.)

Finally, Arellano-Garcia argues that the period from April 14 to May 5, 2004,

was improperly excluded by the district court. That delay resulted from a continuance

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of the trial date at the Government’s behest. The district court granted the

continuance, but failed to state that the ends of justice served by doing so outweighed

Arellano-Garcia’s (and the public’s) interest in a speedy trial. 18 U.S.C.

§ 3161(h)(8)(A). Arellano-Garcia argues that, without such an “ends-of-justice”

finding, the district court improperly excluded the period.

Regardless of the merit in Arellano-Garcia’s argument, the Court need not

address it because the district court properly excluded the other time periods ArellanoGarcia now challenges. Thus, even if this 21-day period were added to the other 48

includable days that had elapsed before trial, Arellano-Garcia still would have been

brought to trial within the requisite 70 days. Accordingly, assuming arguendo that the

district court erred by excluding this period, such error was harmless.

B. Motion for judgment of acquittal

Arellano-Garcia next argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his

conviction and that the district court therefore erred in denying his motion for

judgment of acquittal. Specifically, he argues that the Government failed to offer any

evidence indicating that he was the same “Pedro” identified in tape-recorded

conversations played for the jury. However, he either ignores or overlooks the fact

that Dao identified Arellano-Garcia’s voice on those tape recordings and identified

him in open court as the supplier of the drugs in Dao’s and Sock’s possession when

they were arrested. Finally, two other cooperating witnesses testified that ArellanoGarcia admitted his involvement in a conspiracy to distribute drugs with Sock and

Dao. The evidence, therefore, was clearly sufficient to establish that Arellano-Garcia

knowingly participated in a conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. See United

States v. Adams, 401 F.3d 886, 893 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Aguilar-Portillo,

334 F.3d 744, 747 (8th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, the district court did not err in

denying Arellano-Garcia’s motion for judgment of acquittal.

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V. CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

________________________________

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