Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-05157/USCOURTS-ca10-90-05157-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Byron W. Matthews
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FILED 

United St.ates Court of Appeals Tent.'1 Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 211991 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

vs. ) 

) 

BYRON W. MATTHEWS, } 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-5157 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. 89-CR-090-004-C) 

James L. Swartz, Assistant United States Attorney, Tulsa, Oklahoma 

(Tony M. Graham, United States Attorney, Tulsa, Oklahoma, with him 

on the brief) for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Randal D. Morley, Tulsa, Oklahoma for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, BRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge*, and 

SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge. 

BRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Byron Matthews appeals his convictions and Guidelines sentence 

for conspiracy, possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, 

and use of a firearm in a drug trafficking offense. See 21 u.s.c. 

§§ 846, 841(a) (1) (1988}; 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c) (1) (1988} (amended 

1990}. Matthews disputes the voluntariness of his confession, the 

validity of the Government's search warrant and the sufficiency of 

*Honorable Myron H. Bright, United States Senior Circuit Judge for 

the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 90-5157 Document: 01019726854 Date Filed: 08/21/1991 Page: 1 
the evidence for the firearms count. Matthews further contends 

that the court erroneously enhanced his sentence based on a 

kilogram of cocaine base that his co-conspirators acquired before 

he entered the conspiracy. We affirm Matthews' convictions for 

conspiracy and drug distribution, but reverse his conviction on the 

firearms count. We also reverse Matthews' sentence insofar as it 

includes the additional kilogram of cocaine base. 

I. 

The indictment charged that on March 10-11, 1989, Matthews 

conspired with members of an ongoing cocaine conspiracy to sell 

three ounces of crack cocaine in violation of 21 u.s.c. 

§§ 841(a) (1) I 846. The indictment further charged Matthews 

individually with planning to sell the above cocaine amount and 

with using firearms in connection with this offense in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). 

At trial, the Government relied heavily on the testimony of 

Bernard Saunders, an unindicted cooperating witness. In December 

1988, a California drug distributor asked Saunders to help him set 

up operations in Tulsa, Oklahoma. Thereafter, Saunders rented a 

Tulsa apartment, which eventually became a "safe house" for an 

ongoing drug conspiracy. 

According to Saunders, Matthews and another party, Troy 

Coleman, arrived from California late. in the evening on March 10, 

1989. Saunders expected Coleman, but had never seen Matthews in 

Tulsa before. The two men had two to three ounces of crack cocaine 

with them. They met with members of the conspiracy and agreed to 

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help sell the cocaine the next morning. However, Saunders, who 

worked both sides, tipped off the police. 

Within hours, the police obtained a warrant and raided the 

apartment. During the raid, the police found Matthews in a 

bathroom attempting to flush fourteen grams of cocaine base down 

the toilet. The police recovered roughly two more ounces of 

cocaine base from other locations in the apartment. The police 

also confiscated two pistols from beside a TV stand in the living 

room. The pistols could be seen by a person sitting on the floor 

watching television. According to Saunders, members of the 

conspiracy routinely took the weapons with them on drug-selling 

excursions in order to protect the drugs and cash they carried. 

After receiving Miranda warnings, Matthews agreed to make a 

statement. Matthews told the officers that he had been in 

California the previous night when Coleman app.roached him and asked 

to be driven to Tulsa. Coleman promised Matthews an easy $1,500. 

Once in Tulsa, Matthews met the other conspirators and agreed to 

help distribute the cocaine base in question. 

The jury convicted Matthews on all counts. At sentencing, the 

district court determined that the conspiracy Matthews joined had 

previously distributed a kilogram of cocaine base. The court 

attributed this amount to Matthews under the Sentencing Guidelines' 

relevant conduct provisions, u.s.s.G. § 1Bl.3(a) (2), and imposed 

a 360-month sentence. 

This appeal followed. 

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II. 

A. confession 

Matthews contends that the statements he made to police on the 

day of arrest should have been suppressed as involuntary. 1 He 

argues that, among other things, the officers used trickery and 

false promises to induce his statements. We disagree. 

The fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination 

prohibits the admission of incriminating statements where 

governmental acts, threats or promises cause the defendant's will 

to become overborne. United States v. Fountain, 776 F.2d 878, 885 

(10th Cir. 1985). We must look at the totality of the 

circumstances to determine whether this happened. Arizona v. 

Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 124~, 1251-52 (1991). The issue presents 

a legal question, requiring de novo review. See id. at 1252. 

After reviewing the record, we conclude that Matthews made the 

statements voluntarily. The officers testified that Matthews 

received Miranda warnings but nevertheless offered to cooperate. 

The officers also testified that they agreed to release Matthews 

pending further investigation if he accompanied them to the Tulsa 

airport and identified certain drug operators believed to be 

arriving from California later that day. The officers subsequently 

released Matthews even though he remained unable to make the 

requisite identification at the airport. Finally, the officers 

testified that they assured Matthews that no state charges would 

1

Matthews also argues that his statements should be suppressed 

as the product of an unlawful search, arrest and detention. These 

arguments cannot be supported on the facts of this case. 

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be filed against him and that federal charges probably would not 

ensue if Matthews continued to cooperate with authorities. After 

his release, however, Matthews called the officers only twice in 

a three-month span and provided no further information. As 

Matthews failed to keep his end of the bargain, he cannot now claim 

entitlement to its benefits. See Fountain, 776 F.2d at 884. 

B. search warrant 

Matthews next argues that the firearms seized from the living 

room of the apartment must be suppressed as exceeding the scope of 

the warrant. 2 He points out that the police had reason to suspect 

that firearms would be present, yet made no request to include them 

in the warrant. The Government concedes that the warrant, which 

authorized seizure of "cocaine, fruits, instrumentalities, monies, 

notations relating to the offense thereof, (and] evidence that 

establishes occupancy or control of the residence," failed to 

describe the firearms with particularity. The Government 

nevertheless contends that the officers justifiably seized the 

weapons after discovering them in plain view. Based on the Supreme 

Court's recent analysis in Horton v. California, 110 s. Ct. 2301, 

2305-11 (1990), we agree. 

In Horton, the Supreme Court revisited the plain-view 

doctrine. It dismissed as dicta a previous statement in Coolidge 

2

Matthews also attacks a police search of his automobile, 

parked in the apartment complex parking lot. The Government admits 

that the warrant contained no grant of authority to search 

Matthews' vehicle. Nevertheless, Matthews suffered no prejudice 

because the Government did not introduce any i terns seized from 

Matthews' vehicle into evidence at trial. 

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v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 469 (1971) (Stewart, J.) (plurality 

opinion) , requiring the discovery of evidence in plain view to be 

inadvertent. Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2308. The Court nonetheless 

embraced Coolidge insofar as it held that plain view alone can 

never justify a warrantless seizure and went on to impose two 

conditions. Id. at 2307-08. First, the object's incriminating 

character must be immediately apparent. Id. at 2308. Second, the 

officer must have lawful access to the object itself. Id. 

We think the seizure in this case satisfied both conditions. 

Here, the officers came across the weapons during the course of a 

lawful search for illegal drugs. Moreover, it has become common 

knowledge that drug operators frequently acquire weapons for use 

in connection with drug activities. Hence, we think that the 

weapons' accessibility and proximity to illegal drugs satisfy the 

condition that their incriminating character be immediately 

apparent to the officers. 

c. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

For his third point, Matthews argues a failure of proof on the 

firearms count. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1). Matthews contends that 

no rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that he used 

the firearms found in the living room during and in relation to the 

charged drug trafficking offense. Although this case presents a 

close issue, we agree. 

Count III of the indictment charges that Matthews "did, during 

and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, to wit: Possession 

with Intent to Distribute a Controlled Substance, use or carry 

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firearms." (Citation omitted). In United States v. McKinnell, 888 

F.2d 669, 675 (10th Cir. 1989), we held that a defendant "uses" a 

firearm under section 924(c) (1) where the firearm (1) is readily 

accessible, (2) forms an integral part of the defendant's criminal 

undertaking, and (3) increases the likelihood of success for that 

undertaking. 3 

To be sure, the officers' discovery of the firearms in plain 

view suggests they were readily accessible. However, section 

924(c) requires more than mere access to a firearm. United states 

v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 1403, 1432 & n.45 (10th Cir. 1990) (2-1 

decision) • The firearm also must be used "during and in relation 

to" the charged drug trafficking offense. To prove this 

necessary relation, the · Government's evidence must support a 

finding that the defendant intended the weapon to be available for 

use during the drug transaction. United States v. Feliz-Cordero, 

859 F.2d 250, 254 (2d Cir. 1988); cf. s. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 

1st Sess. 1, 314 n.10 {1983) ("Evidence that the defendant had a 

gun in his pocket but did not display it, or refer to it, could 

nevertheless support a conviction for 'carrying' a firearm in 

relation to the crime if from the circumstances or otherwise it 

could be found that the defendant intended to use the gun if a 

contingency arose or to make his escape."), reprinted in 1984 U.S. 

Code Cong. & Admin. News 3182, 3492 n.10. 

3No one contends that Matthews actually carried a firearm. 

Thus, we will confine our discussion to whether the Government has 

proved "use" under the statute. 

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We see no evidence here that Matthews intended to avail 

himself of the firearms in question. The record is devoid of 

evidence that Matthews ever handled the weapons or saw another 

conspirator do so in connection with cocaine activities. When the 

police raided the apartment, the weapons lay next to the TV -- not 

in the hands of Matthews or any other conspirator. Moreover, the 

sole explanation for the presence of the weapons comes from 

Saunders' testimony that the firearms provided conspirators with 

protection on drug-selling excursions. 

on a conspiracy drug-selling excursion. 

Yet, Matthews never went 

Moreover, as to the second factor, we remain unable to locate 

any proof that the firearms formed an integral part of the criminal 

activity Matthews agreed to undertake. By Saunders' admission, 

Matthews had never been in town until his unexpected arrival the 

night before the raid. The record contains no indication that the 

conspirators ever discussed the weapons in Matthews' presence, or 

that Matthews knew their practice of carrying weapons during drug 

excursions. Furthermore, Saunders freely admitted that the 

firearms had been brought in at least two weeks prior to Matthews' 

arrival. 

Under these circumstances, we think the Government failed to 

prove that Matthews intended or approved the use of firearms in 

connection with the criminal activity he undertook. The facts of 

Matthews' case are even more compelling than in Sullivan, supra, 

where we held that Mary Sullivan's mere constructive possession 

could not support a conviction for use of a firearm in drug 

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trafficking. 919 F.2d at 1432. In that case, the evidence showed 

that Sullivan participated in a drug manufacturing conspiracy 

operating, in part, out of her home. The evidence further showed 

that Sullivan had seen her husband, also a conspirator, handling 

ammunition for the weapon in question, and that the weapon was 

stored in a cabinet in their master bedroom. On this evidence, we 

concluded that Mary Sullivan had constructive possession of the 

firearm, but held that this factor, without more, could not sustain 

a conviction for use of a firearm for a drug trafficking offense. 

Like Sullivan, Matthews played no role in securing the weapons 

in question, and nothing suggests that he handled them. 

Additionally, Matthews joined the conspiracy only hours earlier and 

was a mere visitor to the residence where the police found the 

weapons and contraband. Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence 

cannot sustain Matthews' conviction on the firearms count. 

D. Sentencing consideration 

The Government seeks to hold Matthews accountable for 

approximately one kilogram of crack cocaine that the conspiracy 

distributed before Matthews joined it. 4 The Government contends 

that the Guidelines' relevant conduct provisions, u.s.s.G. 

§ 1Bl.3(a) (2), make Matthews responsible for all prior conduct of 

4

Additionally, the pre-sentence report (PSR) stated: 

"Investigators also learned that the co-conspirators were awaiting 

a one kilogram deli very of crack cocaine from Alonzo Smith." 

However, the district court did not rely on this statement in 

making its findings at sentencing. Moreover, the Government made 

no serious attempt to prove the statement's accuracy, or to urge 

this quantity as an alternate basis for affirmance on appeal. 

Consequently, we need not address the issue of potential incoming 

cocaine in our discussion. 

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the conspiracy. We must agree with Matthews, however, that the 

relevant conduct provisions do not reach this far. 

The Government bears the burden of proving uncharged conduct 

by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Russell, 905 

F.2d 1439, 1441 (10th Cir. 1990). As a late-entering coconspirator, Matthews can be sentenced only for past quantities 

that he knew or should have known the conspiracy distributed. 

United States v. Miranda-Ortiz, 926 F.2d 172, 178 (2d Cir. 1991); 

see also United States v. Sanders, 929 F.2d 1466, 1475 (10th Cir. 

1990) (drug quantity limited to time of marriage for wife who 

joined husband's heroin conspiracy), petition for cert. filed, No. 

90-8350 (June 17, 1991); United States v. Willard, 909 F.2d 780, 

781 (4th Cir. 1990) (defendant responsible only for known or 

reasonably foreseeable criminal conduct in furtherance of 

conspiracy); cf. United States v. Wood, 924 F.2d 399, 404-05 (1st 

Cir. 1991) (conspiracy defendant's status as after-the-fact 

beneficiary does not turn wife's independent drug transaction into 

relevant conduct). In addition, the foreseeability of past 

misconduct must be evaluated in connection with the criminal 

activity Matthews agreed to undertake. See U.S. S. G. § 1B1. 3 (a) ( 2) , 

comment. (n.1). 

After a thorough review, we see no indication that Matthews 

received information on the conspiracy's prior drug dealings. 

Moreover, the evidence strongly suggests that the scope of 

Matthews' agreement was narrow. He came into town to make a fast 

buck by selling two to three ounces of crack cocaine. Nothing in 

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the record shows that the parties contemplated any more extensive 

relationship than this. We think it implausible that a person who 

undertakes a one-time drug deal in concert with others thereby 

assumes responsibility for the entire past misdeeds of his or her 

co-conspirators. Accord United States v. North, 900 F.2d 131, 133-

34 (8th Cir. 1990) (where conspiracy has limited objective, 

defendant not responsible for co-conspirator's independent drug 

activities); u.s.s.G. § lBl.3, comment. (n.l(e)). 

Accordingly, Matthews may be sentenced only for the two or 

three ounces he agreed to distribute and not the amounts sold 

without Matthews' knowledge or agreement prior to his entry into 

the conspiracy. In view of our holding on this point, we need not 

address Matthews' remaining points of contention with the district 

court's drug quantity calculation. 

III. 

We affirm Matthews' convictions for conspiracy and for 

possession with intent to distribute cocaine base. However, we 

reverse Matthews' conviction for use of firearms during and in 

relation to drug trafficking. We also reverse Matthews' sentence 

insofar as it includes a kilogram of cocaine base distributed prior 

to his joining the conspiracy and remand for resentencing based 

only on the two to three ounces supported by the record. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

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