Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_06-mc-03292/USCOURTS-almd-2_06-mc-03292-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
William D. Paul
Plaintiff
United States of America
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

WILLIAM D. PAUL, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 2:06-mc-3292-WKW

) (WO)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Respondent. )

ORDER

On March 28, 2006, petitioner filed the present action seeking to quash summons

issued by Special Agent Larry J. Ellis of the Criminal Investigation Division of the Internal

Revenue Service seeking records pertaining to plaintiff and served on various financial

institutions and an accounting office. Petitioner contends that the summons are due to be

quashed because he is a bishop in a religious organization and has taken a vow of poverty

and, thus, he is exempt from federal income taxation. This action is presently before the

court on the motion to dismiss filed by the United States on April 27, 2006 (Doc. # 4) and

petitioner’s response to the motion (Doc. # 6). Upon consideration of the motion to dismiss,

the court concludes that it is due to be granted.

The United States argues that this court lacks personal jurisdiction over it because

petitioner failed to serve process in this action in the manner set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i).

That rule provides:

(1) Service upon the United States shall be effected

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(A) by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the

United States attorney for the district in which the action is brought or to an

assistant United States attorney or clerical employee designated by the United

States attorney in a writing filed with the clerk of the court or by sending a

copy of the summons and of the complaint by registered or certified mail

addressed to the civil process clerk at the office of the United States attorney

and

(B) by also sending a copy of the summons and of the complaint by

registered or certified mail to the Attorney General of the United States at

Washington, District of Columbia, and

(C) in any action attacking the validity of an order of an officer or

agency of the United States not made a party, by also sending a copy of the

summons and of the complaint by registered or certified mail to the officer or

agency.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i).

The court’s docket does not reflect that petitioner has effected service in the manner

set forth in Rule 4(i). In its motion, the United States cites Rule 4(i) and notes that no

summons has been served on the United States Attorney or on the Attorney General of the

United States, as required by the rule. Because Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) allows 120 days to

effect service, the court has deferred ruling on the present motion to allow petitioner an

opportunity to cure the defects in service outlined in the motion. Petitioner responds only

that “[t]he petition was served upon the appropriate parties, including the United States

(Agent Larry J. Ellis, IRS-CI 1285 Carmichael Way, Montgomery, Alabama) as required by

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4., by depositing a copy of the same in the U.S. Mail,

postage prepaid, on the 28th day of March, 2006.” (Doc. # 6). 

Service on Agent Ellis by first class mail is insufficient to confer jurisdiction on the

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Rule 4(i)(3) is inapplicable, as this is not an action against Agent Ellis in his individual 1

capacity and plaintiff has served neither the Attorney General nor the United States attorney.

 Petitioner has filed, in this action, a motion to quash summons served by Agent Ellis on 2

July 13, 2006. (Doc. # 7). This motion has been served by first class mail to Special Agent Ellis and

R. Randolph Neeley, the Assistant United States Attorney defending the present action. (Id., p. 4).

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United States. “‘Failure to properly serve the United States deprives the court of personal

jurisdiction. . . . A jurisdictional defect of this sort is fatal to maintenance of an action.’”

Holmstrom v. United States, 2003 WL 21254624, *2 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 4, 2003) (quoting

Thompson v. Internal Revenue Service, 23 F. Supp.2d 923, 924 (N.D. Ind. 1998)).

Additionally, petitioner has not shown good cause for extension of the 120-day period

of time for service under Rule 4(m). The United States brought the defect in service to

petitioner’s attention in its motion to dismiss, three months prior to the expiration of the 120-

day period, and petitioner failed to take the appropriate corrective action. See Flory v. United

States, 79 F.3d 24 (5th Cir. 1996) (affirming district court’s dismissal of action against the

United States because of plaintiff’s failure to serve the Attorney General, and stating, “[b]y

raising the defense of defective service well within the expiration of the 120-day period

allowed for service (the answer was served on the 94th day after Flory’s complaint was

filed), the United States allowed plaintiff Flory time to cure the defect, which she did not

do.”). 

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Because petitioner has not produced evidence that he has properly served the required

parties, this action is due to be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction over the respondent. Accordingly, it is hereby 2

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The filing of a second motion in the present case does not affect the court’s analysis.

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ORDERED that respondent’s motion to dismiss (Doc. # 4) is GRANTED.

A separate judgment will be entered.

DONE this 25th day of August, 2006.

 /s/ W. Keith Watkins 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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