Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01529/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01529-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
C. Chen
Defendant
Michael Coen
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL COEN,

Plaintiff,

v.

C. CHEN, M.D., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:15-cv-01529-BAM-PC

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT, WITH 

LEAVE TO AMEND, FOR FAILURE TO 

STATE A COGNIZABLE CLAIM FOR 

RELIEF

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. Plaintiff has consented to proceed before a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(c).

1

 Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s complaint, filed on October 8, 2015.

I.

SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 

legally “frivolous or malicious,” that “fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or 

that “seek monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 

 

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Plaintiff filed a consent to proceed before a magistrate judge on October 26, 2015. (ECF No. 5.)

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1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)(citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken 

as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, 

Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009)(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings 

liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338,

342 (9th Cir. 2010)(citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially 

plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each 

named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. 

Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has 

acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s 

liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 

F.3d at 969. 

II.

COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff, an inmate in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation (CDCR) at Kern Valley State Prison, brings this civil rights action against 

Defendant C. Chen, M.D., a CDCR employee at Kern Valley, and Does 1-40. Plaintiff claims 

that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the 

Eighth Amendment, and that Defendant Chen retaliated against Plaintiff for filing an inmate 

grievance in violation of the First Amendment.

Plaintiff alleges that on September 19, 2012, he underwent a liver biopsy, which revealed 

that he had “genotype 1, stage 1 HCV.” (ECF No. 1 p. 3.) Regarding an unrelated condition, on 

September 24, 2012, Defendant Chen removed Plaintiff from ADA status for his chronic back 

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pain. Plaintiff filed an inmate grievance regarding his removal from ADA status. Plaintiff’s 

liver biopsy results were reviewed on October 9, 2012. Treatment for Plaintiff’s HCV was 

denied.

Plaintiff did not seek further treatment until February 24, 2014, when he submitted a 

Health Care Services Request Form. Plaintiff alleges that he was seen by “one of the 

defendants,” and treatment was denied. (Id.) On March 4, 2014, Plaintiff submitted another 

request, indicating that his symptoms were worsening. Plaintiff stated that the 2012 liver biopsy 

showed scarring, which was a symptom of fibrosis, and a precursor to cirrhosis of the liver. 

Plaintiff alleges that he was seen by one of the unidentified defendants and denied treatment. 

On May 23, 2014, Plaintiff submitted another health care request, asking that he be 

allowed to pay for his own HCV treatments. Plaintiff was subsequently seen by one of the 

unidentified defendants. Plaintiff’s request to pay for his treatment was denied. Plaintiff 

submitted another health care request on July 30, 2014, seeking treatment for his HCV. Plaintiff 

was again denied treatment by an unidentified defendant. 

On October 24, 2014, in response to complaints of abdominal pain, Plaintiff underwent 

an x-ray. On February 6, 2015, Plaintiff received an “in depth review of his medical history, 

current symptoms, and tests. Plaintiff’s Fibrosis (FIB) 4 score was .47. Based upon this, he was 

denied treatment for his HCV.” (Id. p. 4.) 

On March 20, 2015, Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Chen regarding his inmate grievance 

concerning his HCV. Dr. Chen told Plaintiff that due to the state of his HCV, he was ineligible 

for treatment. Plaintiff informed Dr. Chen that recent studies and new treatments made him 

eligible for treatment. Dr. Chen disagreed, and denied Plaintiff treatment for his HCV.

On April 7, 2015, at a follow up appointment with an unidentified doctor, Plaintiff 

requested treatment for his HCV. Plaintiff specifically requested a particular medication. The 

doctor characterized Plaintiff as asymptomatic, and ordered laboratory tests. The test results 

were unchanged, and Plaintiff was denied treatment. Plaintiff was seen on June 8, 2015, and 

August 17, 2015, and again denied treatment.

Regarding his claim that Defendant Chen retaliated against him for filing a grievance, 

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Plaintiff alleges that during an appointment with Dr. Chen in 2015, he got into an argument with 

Dr. Chen over his treatment for HCV. Dr. Chen told Plaintiff that if he was unhappy about the 

course of his treatment, he could “file another appeal on me.” (Id. p. 5.) Plaintiff asked Dr. 

Chen “what appeal?” and Dr. Chen referred to the previous grievance from 2012 that challenged 

Dr. Chen’s removal of Plaintiff from ADA status related to his back pain. Plaintiff alleges that 

Dr. Chen’s refusal to treat Plaintiff’s HCV is in retaliation for filing the grievance regarding his 

removal from ADA status. 

III.

DISCUSSION

A. Medical Care

While the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution entitles Plaintiff to 

medical care, the Eighth Amendment is violated only when a prison official acts with deliberate 

indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs. Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 985 (9th 

Cir. 2012), overruled in part on other grounds, Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1082-83 (9th 

Cir. 2014); Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012); Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 

1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff “must show (1) a serious medical need by demonstrating 

that failure to treat [his] condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and 

wanton infliction of pain,” and (2) that “the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately 

indifferent.” Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122 (citing Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096). The requisite state of 

mind is one of subjective recklessness, which entails more than ordinary lack of due care. Snow, 

681 F.3d at 985 (citation and quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122.

“A difference of opinion between a physician and the prisoner – or between medical 

professionals – concerning what medical care is appropriate does not amount to deliberate 

indifference.” Snow, 681 F.3d at 987 (citing Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 

1989)), overruled on other grounds, Peralta, 744 F.3d at 1082-83.; Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122-23

(citing Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1986)). Rather, Plaintiff “must show that 

the course of treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the circumstances 

and that the defendants chose this course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to [his] 

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health.” Snow, 681 F.3d at 988 (citing Jackson, 90 F.3d at 332 ) (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts that state a claim for relief under the Eighth 

Amendment. Plaintiff’s central claim is that he was denied treatment for HCV. While Plaintiff 

has alleged that he suffers from an objectively serious medical condition, he has not alleged any 

facts indicating that Dr. Chen was deliberately indifferent to his HCV. Plaintiff alleges that Dr. 

Chen told him that, based upon his medical history, he was ineligible for treatment. Plaintiff 

alleges in his complaint that he contracted HCV in 2001. (ECF No. 1 p. 3.) That Dr. Chen, in his 

professional medical opinion, denied Plaintiff’s request for a specific treatment in 2014 because 

of his medical condition, does not subject him to liability. As noted, a difference of opinion 

between a physician and a prisoner regarding what medical care is appropriate does not amount 

to deliberate indifference. 

In order to state a claim for relief against Dr. Chen, Plaintiff must allege some facts 

indicating that Dr. Chen’s decision to deny Plaintiff the treatment he sought was medically 

unacceptable under the circumstances and in disregard of an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health. 

Plaintiff alleges facts indicating that Dr. Chen’s decision was based on Plaintiff’s medical 

history, and Dr. Chen’s professional medical opinion. Plaintiff fails to allege any facts, other 

than his subjective belief, from which Dr. Chen would know that his decision was medically 

unacceptable under the circumstances. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim should therefore be 

dismissed for Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 

B. Retaliation

Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment rights to speech or 

petition the government may support a section 1983 claim. Silva v. DiVittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 

1104 (9th Cir. 2011); Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 1985); see also

Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 

(9th Cir. 1995). “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails 

five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an 

inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the 

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inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a 

legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) ; 

accord Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 2012); Silva, 658 F.3d at 1104; 

Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009).

Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief. Plaintiff concludes that because Dr. Chen was 

aware of Plaintiff’s grievance filed in 2012, his decision to deny Plaintiff the treatment he 

sought was in retaliation for the grievance filed by Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s conclusory allegation is 

unsupported by any facts. The facts alleged indicate that the 2012 grievance concerned an 

unrelated decision to remove Plaintiff from ADA status due to back pain. Further, as noted 

above, Plaintiff has alleged facts indicating that the decision to deny Plaintiff the treatment he 

sought was based on Dr. Chen’s opinion (after review of Plaintiff’s laboratory tests and medical 

history) that Plaintiff was medically ineligible for the treatment. A bare allegation that Plaintiff 

filed a grievance against Dr. Chen, and that, over one year later, Dr. Chen made a medical 

decision that Plaintiff disagreed with, does not state a claim for retaliation. Plaintiff must allege 

some fact indicating that Dr. Chen took adverse action against Plaintiff in response to Plaintiff’s 

exercise of his First Amendment rights. Plaintiff has not done so here. Plaintiff’s retaliation 

claim should therefore be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be 

granted.

C. Doe Defendants

Plaintiff names 40 Doe Defendants. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure include no 

provision “permitting the use of fictitious defendants.” McMillan v. Department of Interior, 907 

F. Supp. 322, 328 (D. Nev. 1995), aff’d, 87 F.3d 1320 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied , 519 U.S. 

1132 (1997). “As a general rule, the use of ‘John Doe’ to identify a defendant is not favored.” 

Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). Where “a plaintiff does not know the 

identity of a defendant prior to the filing of a complaint, he ‘should be given an opportunity 

through discovery to identify the unknown defendants . . .” Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 

968 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 642.

However, Plaintiff has not linked each individual Doe Defendant with conduct that 

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constitutes a deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights. Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the 

violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or other federal rights by persons acting under color of state 

law. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2009); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 

442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). 

“Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for

vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Crowley v. Nevada ex rel. Nevada Sec’y of 

State, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 2012)(citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 

(1989))(internal quotation marks omitted). To state a claim, Plaintiff must allege facts 

demonstrating the existence of a link, or causal connection, between each defendant’s actions or 

omissions and a violation of his federal rights. Lemire v. California Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab., 

726 F.3d 1062, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2013); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-08 (9th Cir. 2011). 

In order to serve the Doe Defendants, Plaintiff must identify each Defendant by name, and allege 

specific conduct as to that Defendant that constitutes a violation of Plaintiff’s rights. Plaintiff 

has not done so here. The Doe Defendants should therefore be dismissed.

IV.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons stated, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may 

be granted. Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days. Noll 

v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff may not change the nature of this 

suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 

607 (7th Cir. 2007)(no “buckshot” complaints).

Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but must state what 

each defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or other federal rights. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678. “The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the 

duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to 

have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief 

above the speculative level. . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted).

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Finally, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, Forsyth v. Humana, 

Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987), 

and must be “complete in and of itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading,” 

Local Rule 220. “All causes of action alleged in an original complaint which are not alleged in 

an amended complaint are waived.” King, 814 F.2d at 567 (citing to London v. Coopers 

Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1981)); accord Forsyth, 114 F.3d at 1474. 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send to Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

2. Plaintiff’s complaint, filed October 8, 2105, is dismissed for failure to state a 

claim;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file a

first amended complaint or a notice of voluntary dismissal; and

4. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, the 

Court will recommend that this action be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to 

state a claim and to obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 6, 2016 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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