Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-05035/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-05035-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of Energy Western Area Power Administration
Defendant
Lisa Marie Donaldson
Plaintiff

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Lisa Marie Donaldson,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Department of Energy Western Area Power 

Administration,

Defendant.

No. CV-19-05035-PHX-DWL

ORDER 

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Application for Leave to Proceed In Forma 

Pauperis (Doc. 2), which the Court hereby grants. The Court will screen Plaintiff’s

complaint (Doc. 1) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)1 before it is allowed to be served. 

Pursuant to that screening, the complaint will be dismissed. 

I. Legal Standard

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), a complaint is subject to dismissal if it contains 

claims that are “frivolous or malicious,” that “fail[] to state a claim upon which relief may 

be granted,” or that “seek[] monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such 

relief.” Id. Additionally, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must 

contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 

relief.” Id. Although Rule 8 does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands 

more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. 

1 Although section 1915 largely concerns prisoner litigation, section 1915(e) applies 

to all in forma pauperis proceedings. Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”).

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Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.

“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content 

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 

experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual 

allegations may be consistent with a claim, a court must assess whether there are other 

“more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681.

The Ninth Circuit has instructed that courts must “construe pro se filings liberally.” 

Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se litigant] 

‘must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id.

(quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). Conclusory and vague 

allegations, however, will not support a cause of action. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. 

of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). A liberal interpretation may not supply 

essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled. Id.

II. Analysis

Plaintiff sues the Department of Energy Western Area Power Administration (“the 

Department”) under the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging that “an ongoing nuisance 

occurred” at Plaintiff’s residence between December 2011 and December 2015 in that the 

Department’s electrical tower emitted electromagnetic fields (“EMFs”) “that trespassed 

into [] Plaintiff’s home where she continued to experience repeated unpleasant[,] disturbing 

and offensive electrical shocks, unpleasant tingling, serious medical and health issues, 

including but not limited to: heart accelerations later diagnosed as supra ventricular 

tachycardia (SVT)[,] severe and debilitating headaches, head congestion to the point she 

cannot think, spastic uncontrollable leg twitching, gastrointestinal problems, debilitating 

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fatigue, full body tremors, eye drooping, vision problems, rashes, hair loss, ringing in the 

ear, a burning sensation, memory loss, confusion, stuttering and many other ailments.” 

(Doc. 1 at 1.)

“[A] complaint, containing both factual allegations and legal conclusions, is 

frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 

U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The Ninth Circuit has recognized that although “there is a generally 

acknowledged public perception that EMFs cause health problems,” in fact “there is no 

scientific evidence that EMFs from power lines . . . cause adverse health effects in nearby 

residents.” United States v. 87.98 Acres of Land More or Less in the Cty. of Merced, 530 

F.3d 899, 902 (9th Cir. 2008) (emphases added).

In Merced, the district court ruled “that there could be no evidence at trial that EMFs 

cause actual health problems in nearby residents”—a ruling that no party appealed and 

which the Ninth Circuit emphasized “accords with widespread authority holding that such 

evidence is not scientifically reliable.” Id. at 903 & n.1. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the 

district court judge’s decision to exclude testimony that “might tend to prejudice a jury 

inclined to believe that EMFs do, in fact, cause health problems in nearby residents.” Id.

at 903.

Plaintiff’s claim is therefore frivolous—no scientifically reliable evidence could 

establish that EMFs caused the harm alleged in the complaint. Cf. Jordan v. Georgia 

Power Co., 466 S.E.2d 601, 606 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (concluding that a trespass action 

alleging damage from EMFs was not legally cognizable).

2 As such, it must be dismissed.

2

In Jordan, the Georgia Court of Appeals noted—in 1995—that “scientific evidence 

regarding whether EMFs cause harm of any kind” was “inconclusive,” such that “summary 

judgment was proper” because invasion from EMFs could not “constitute a trespass.” 466 

S.E.2d at 606. However, the court was careful to “not close the door on the possibility” 

that later scientific research could reveal that EMFs do, in fact, cause damage, such that a 

lawsuit alleging damage from EMFs could become “legally cognizable” and a trespass 

action could lie. Id. Nevertheless, Merced was decided 13 years after Jordan, and more 

recent cases continue to acknowledge that fears of EMFs, although pervasive, are irrational.

See, e.g., United States v. An Easement & Right-of-way Over 6.09 Acres of Land, More or 

Less, in Madison Cty., Alabama, 140 F. Supp. 3d 1218, 1261 (N.D. Ala. 2015) (although 

the public may have “health and safety concerns” regarding EMFs, those concerns appear 

“overstated or even irrational given existing science”); Lakey v. Puget Sound Energy, Inc., 

296 P.3d 860, 864-66 (Wash. 2013) (affirming exclusion of homeowners’ expert, who 

sought to opine “that EMF was a possible cause of childhood and adult leukemia, 

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The remaining question is whether to grant leave to amend. “Dismissal of a pro se 

complaint without leave to amend is proper only if it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies 

of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 

1202, 1203-04 (9th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “If a 

pleading can be cured by the allegation of other facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an 

opportunity to amend before the final dismissal of the action.” Ball v. Cty. of Maricopa, 

2017 WL 1833611, *1 (D. Ariz. 2017).

The basic factual premise of Plaintiff’s complaint is fanciful. Denton v. Hernandez, 

504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992) (“[T]he in forma pauperis statute . . . accords judges not only the 

authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the 

unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those 

claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless,” which is “a category encompassing 

allegations that are ‘fanciful’”). The Court can perceive no factual amendment that could 

cure this fundamental deficiency. Amendment being futile, the complaint will be 

dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED granting the Application to Proceed in District Court without 

Prepaying Fees or Costs (Doc. 2).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 1) is dismissed with 

prejudice and without leave to amend. The Clerk of Court shall terminate the action.

Dated this 19th day of February, 2020.

Alzheimer’s disease, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, and infertility,” because the expert 

“selectively sampled data within one of the studies he used, taking data indicating an EMFillness link and ignoring the larger pool of data within the study that showed no such link”).

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