Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01947/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01947-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael Craig Anderson
Plaintiff
United States of America
Defendant

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Michael Craig Anderson, 

Defendant/Movant. 

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No. CR 04-1281-PHX-DGC

No. CV 07-1947-PHX-DGC (LOA)

ORDER

Michael Craig Anderson, who is now confined in Federal Prison Camp La Tuna in

Anthony, Texas, filed a pro se Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person

in Federal Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Dkt. #1. Magistrate Judge Lawrence O.

Anderson issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending that the Court deny

the motion. Dkt. #2. The Court will accept the R&R as set forth in this order and deny the

motion. 

I. Background.

Anderson pled guilty to Receiving a Bribe by a Public Official (18 U.S.C. §

201(b)(2)(C)), Conspiracy to Import More than 1000 Kilograms of Marijuana (21 U.S.C. §

963, 952(a), 960(b)(1)(G)), Money Laundering (18 U.S.C. § 1957), and Filing a False Tax

Return (26 U.S.C. § 7206(1)). Dkt. #1 at 1. On October 11, 2006, the Court sentenced

Case 2:07-cv-01947-DGC Document 4 Filed 11/18/08 Page 1 of 8
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In the alternative, Judge Anderson found that even if the claims were not waived,

they should be dismissed on the merits.

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Although Anderson reiterates his arguments in support of his disparate sentencing

theory, he does not object to Judge Anderson’s finding that he waived this claim by not

raising it in the initial motion. Since Anderson does not object to this finding of waiver, the

Court will accept Judge Anderson’s recommendation and deny this claim.

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Anderson to 108 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release. Dkt. #147-4

at 29, CR-04-01281. 

In his motion under § 2255, Anderson asks the Court to reduce his sentence from 108

months to 60 months. Id. at 13. Anderson argues that defense counsel was ineffective

because counsel failed to object to the inclusion of 792 pounds of marijuana in the base

offense level, Anderson did not receive the 60-month sentence of imprisonment that the

government and defense counsel allegedly promised, and defense counsel did not appeal the

sentence. Id. at 4-5. Judge Anderson evaluated Anderson’s motion and the Government’s

response and issued the R&R on September 16, 2008. Dkt. #2. Judge Anderson

recommends that all of Anderson’s claims be dismissed because Anderson waived his right

to collaterally attack the sentence as part of the plea agreement. Dkt. #2 at 3-6.1

 

Anderson filed several objections to the R&R. Dkt. #3 at 1. Anderson first objects

to the finding that Anderson waived his claims as part of the plea agreement. Anderson

argues that the Magistrate Judge overlooked the fact that the waiver was not knowing and

voluntary because Anderson was falsely promised a 60-month sentence to induce him to

enter the agreement. Id. at 1-2. Anderson also objects to the Magistrate Judge’s alternative

finding on the merits that defense counsel’s failure to object to 792 pounds of marijuana did

not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 7-8. Finally, Anderson objects that the

Magistrate Judge failed to consider the prosecutor’s high standards of integrity and honorable

conduct when alternatively finding on the merits that the government did not breach the plea

agreement. Id. at 5-6.2

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II. Waiver.

A defendant may waive the statutory right to bring a § 2255 action challenging the

length of his sentence. United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431, 433 (9th Cir. 1994). In this case,

Anderson waived that right as part of his plea agreement. The plea agreement clearly states

that the defendant waives “any right to collaterally attack defendant’s conviction and

sentence under Title 28, United States Code, Section 2255, or any other collateral attack.”

Dkt. #147-2 ¶ 4, CR-04-01281. In the R&R, the Magistrate Judge found that Anderson

waived his right to § 2255 review of his claims in the plea agreement and recommended that

the motion be denied on that basis. Dkt. #2 at 6. Anderson objects to the R&R on the

grounds that the Magistrate’s waiver analysis fails to consider Anderson’s argument that he

only entered into the plea agreement because he was assured a 60-month sentence by defense

counsel and the government. Dkt. #3 at 1. 

A district judge “must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s

disposition that has been properly objected to.” Fed. R. of Civ. P. 72(b)(3). Courts will

enforce a waiver of the right to appeal if (1) the language of the waiver encompasses the

grounds claimed in the appeal and (2) the waiver is knowingly and voluntarily made. United

States v. Nunez, 223 F.3d 956, 958 (9th Cir. 2000). Anderson does not argue, nor could he,

that the language of the waiver in the plea agreement does not encompass collateral attacks

on the sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See Dkt. #147-2 ¶ 4, CR-04-1281 (stating

defendant waives “any right to collaterally attack defendant’s conviction and sentence under

Title 28, United States Code, Section 2255, or any other collateral attack”). 

Instead, Anderson claims that the waiver is not valid because he did not knowingly

and voluntarily enter into the plea agreement. Dkt. #3 at 1-2. Anderson contends that (1) he

did not know the consequences of entering the agreement because he was misled by defense

counsel and the prosecution to believe that he would receive a sentence of 60 months, and

(2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel when promised that he would receive a 60-

month sentence which rendered his entry into the plea agreement unknowing and

involuntary. Id. at 2-3. The Court does not find either argument persuasive.

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A. Anderson was fully aware of the consequences of his actions.

Plea agreements are contractual in nature and courts apply contract principles,

including the parol evidence rule, in interpreting these agreements. Nunez, 223 F.3d at 958.

Under the parole evidence rule, “a court looks to, and enforces, the plain language of a

contract and does not look to extrinsic evidence” to interpret the terms of an unambiguous

written agreement. Id. (internal quotation omitted). Therefore, an agreement’s plain

language will generally be enforced if it is clear and unambiguous on its face. United States

v. Jeronimo, 398 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005).

Anderson contends that he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter into the plea

agreement because he was “tricked into signing a plea agreement which did not contain his

actual sentence exposure.” Dkt. #3 at 2. According to Anderson, he could not have known

the consequences of signing the plea agreement because he was mislead by his attorney and

the prosecutor to think that he would receive a 60-month sentence. Id. This argument is

contradicted by both the plea agreement itself and Anderson’s sworn statements in court. 

The plea agreement clearly states that in determining the sentence, “the parties

stipulate that the defendant shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment between 60 and 108

months.” Dkt. 147-2 ¶ 2b. Anderson was sentenced to 108 months. It is undeniable that the

written plea agreement contained Anderson’s actual sentence exposure.

In addition, the Court questioned Anderson with regards to his understanding of the

range of possible sentences he could receive. The Court directly inquired into whether

Anderson understood the range of his possible sentence under the plea agreement. 

THE COURT: Paragraph 2(b) [of the plea agreement] says you and the

government are stipulating that your sentence in this case will be no less than

60 months and no more than 108 months. Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.

THE COURT: Do you understand that if I accept the plea agreement, my

sentence will have to be within that range?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.

Dkt. #147-3 at 26. 

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Furthermore, the Court explained to Anderson that there was no way to predict his

sentence at the time Anderson entered his guilty plea. 

THE COURT: Do you understand, Mr. Anderson, that neither your attorney,

the government’s attorney, nor I can tell you today what your sentence will be?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Do you understand that if the sentence turns out to be different

than you expect, you will still be bound by your guilty plea if the sentence is

consistent with the plea agreement?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

Id. 

Even assuming that Anderson’s counsel incorrectly predicted he would receive a 60-

month sentence if he entered into the plea agreement, the Court clearly explained otherwise

during the change of plea proceeding. The Court explicitly told Anderson that he could be

sentenced anywhere between 60 and 108 months and that nobody could tell him what his

sentence would be. Anderson told the court that he understood all of this. The Court finds

that Anderson understood the sentencing consequences of entering the plea agreement.

Anderson also understood the consequences of waiving his right to collaterally attack

the sentence. The Court took care to ensure that Anderson understood that he was giving up

this right. At the change of plea proceeding, the Court questioned Anderson about whether

he understood the rights he was waiving. 

THE COURT: The plea agreement also says that you’re giving up your right

to appeal or collaterally attack the judgment of this court. That means that if

I impose a sentence that is consistent with the plea agreement, there is no other

court you can go to to get it changed. Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.

THE COURT: Are you willing to give up your right to appeal or collaterally

attack the judgment of this court?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I am.

Id. at 20.

Both the explicit language of the plea agreement and Anderson’s responses to the

Court’s questioning reveal that Anderson knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to

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collaterally attack his sentence. The Court finds that Anderson understood the consequences

of entering into both the plea agreement and waiver. 

B. Defense counsel was not ineffective.

Anderson next argues that the waiver should not be enforced because he was only

induced to enter the agreement because of the ineffective assistance of defense counsel. A

plea agreement cannot waive claims that the waiver itself was involuntary or that ineffective

assistance of counsel rendered the waiver involuntary. See Washington v. Lampert,

422 F.3d 864, 871 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a plea agreement that waives the right to a

federal habeas petition pursuant to § 2254 is unenforceable with respect to an ineffective

assistance of counsel claim that challenges the voluntariness of the waiver). 

A defendant who enters a guilty plea on the advice of counsel may only challenge the

voluntary and intelligent character of the plea by showing that the advice he received was not

“within the range of competence demanded of attorneys.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56

(1985) (internal quotations omitted). To establish that ineffective assistance of counsel

rendered the waiver invalid, Anderson must show both that counsel’s representation fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness and that this deficiency resulted in prejudice

to Anderson. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688-692 (1984); see also

Washington, 422 F.3d at 872-73.

Under the Strickland test, Anderson must first establish that defense counsel’s

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Anderson claims that

defense counsel induced him to enter the guilty plea, including the waiver, by promising

Anderson a 60-month sentence. Anderson offers no evidence in support of this promise aside

from his assertion that it occurred. 

Anderson’s assertion in this case, however, directly contradicts his sworn statements

during the change of plea proceeding. The Court specifically asked Anderson whether any

promises not contained in the written plea agreement had been made to him: 

THE COURT: Is there anything about the plea agreement that you do not

understand?

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Even if Anderson had not waived his claims, this Court finds persuasive and accepts

Judge Anderson’s analysis recommending denial of all claims on the merits. 

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THE DEFENDANT: No, sir, there’s not.

THE COURT: Does the agreement contain everything that you and the

government have agreed to in this case?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, it does.

THE COURT: Have any promises been made to you or commitments made

that are not contained in the plea agreement?

THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.

THE COURT: Other than the plea agreement, has there been any promise

made to you about what your final sentence will be?

THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.

Dkt. #147-3 at 17, CR-04-01281. 

Anderson’s “solemn declarations made in open court carry a strong presumption of

verity.” United States v. Rivera-Ramirez, 715 F.2d 453, 458 (9th Cir. 1983). Anderson has

not provided evidence sufficient to overcome this presumption of truthfulness and convince

the Court that he lied under oath. As a result, the Court finds that Anderson has failed to

demonstrate that defense counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness as required by Strickland and, by extension, that the waiver was involuntary.

The Court will enforce Anderson’s waiver of his right to collaterally attack his sentence.

III. Anderson waived his claims under § 2255.

Because the Court holds that the waiver is valid, Anderson is barred from challenging

his sentence under § 2255.3

 The Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is denied.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Magistrate Judge Lawrence O. Anderson’s R&R (Dkt. #2) is accepted as set

forth in this order.

2. The Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255 (Dkt. #1) is denied.

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3. The Clerk of Court shall terminate this action.

DATED this 17th day of November, 2008.

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