Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00748/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00748-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mark Delk
Petitioner
Karen Prosper
Respondent

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARK DELK, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

KAREN PROSPER, Warden, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:06-cv-00748-LJO-TAG HC

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY PETITION

SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED FOR

FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE STATUTE

OF LIMITATIONS

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

The instant petition was filed on June 14, 2006. (Court Doc. 1). It raises four grounds for

relief: (1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to file motions on behalf

of Petitioner and failed to get a reduced charge from the prosecution or request a jury trial on the

prior “strike” charge; (2) denial of due process because Petitioner claims he was not told his

sentence could be doubled because of a prior “strike” conviction; (3) use of the prior strike

conviction violates federal double jeopardy principles; and (4) the evidence did not support his

conviction for transportation of illegal drugs. (Doc. 1, pp. 4-5).

DISCUSSION

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases requires the Court to make a preliminary

review of each petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Court must dismiss a petition "[i]f it

plainly appears from the face of the petition . . . that the petitioner is not entitled to relief." Rule

4 of the Rules Governing 2254 Cases; Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1990).

 ///

Case 1:06-cv-00748-LJO -TAG Document 6 Filed 11/26/07 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Otherwise, the Court will order Respondent to respond to the petition. Rule 5 of the Rules

governing § 2254 Cases.

The Ninth Circuit has held that a district court may raise the statute of limitations sua

sponte and dismiss the petition on those grounds. Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039, 1042-1044

(9th Cir. 2001) (indicating that once a petitioner is given adequate notice and opportunity to

respond to allegations that his petition is subject to dismissal pursuant to AEDPA's statute of

limitations, petitioner has the burden of providing an adequate response).

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas

corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059,

2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 th

S.Ct. 586 (1997). The instant petition was filed on June 14, 2006; thus, it is subject to the

provisions of the AEDPA. 

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a

federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, § 2244,

subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. 

The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized

by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and

made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or

claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this

subsection. 

Case 1:06-cv-00748-LJO -TAG Document 6 Filed 11/26/07 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

Here, Petitioner asserts that he was convicted on April 29, 2001, in the Tulare County

Superior Court. (Doc. 1, p. 1). Petitioner does not allege that he ever filed a direct appeal from

his plea of nolo contendere. (Doc. 1, pp. 2-3). Subsequently, on December 19, 2005, Petitioner

initiated a state habeas petition in the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District (“5th

DCA”), which was denied on December 29, 2005. Shortly thereafter, Petitioner initiated two

habeas petitions in the California Supreme Court, which were denied in February, 2006. 

Because Petitioner never appealed his original conviction from his plea of nolo

contendere, his conviction would have become final sixty days after judgment, or on June 28,

2002. Kapral v. United States, 166 F.3d 565, 575 (3d Cir. 1999)(if petitioner does not appeal his

conviction, conviction becomes final on date on which the time for filing appeal expired); see

Lewis v. Mitchell, 173 F.Supp. 2d 1057, 1060 (C.D. Cal. 2001); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 31(d). 

Petitioner would then have one year from June 28, 2002, or until June 28, 2003, absent

applicable tolling, in which to file his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. The instant case

was not filed until June 14, 2006, a period of almost three years after the limitations period

would have expired. 

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). See Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002) (the Court held that a petitioner

is normally entitled to one “full round” of collateral review in state court without federal

interference. While the “full round” is properly in progress, the AEDPA’s one-year statute is

tolled). Welch v. Carey, 350 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The form petition alleges that Petitioner did initiate a round of state habeas proceedings

on December 19, 2005. However, at that point, the AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations had

long since expired; thus, the state habeas proceedings had no statutory tolling effect. Green v.

White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9 Cir. 2000)(Petitioner not entitled to tolling where limitations th

period already had expired prior to filing state habeas proceedings); see Webster v. Moore, 199

Case 1:06-cv-00748-LJO -TAG Document 6 Filed 11/26/07 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Although Petitioner did not provide details and information regarding these state habeas petitions, the 1

Court has determined from the official electronic database of the California Courts that the state supreme court had

denied both of Petitioner’s state habeas petitions citing In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4 770 (1998); In re Swain, 34 Cal. 2d th

300 (1949), In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750 (1993), and In Re Dixon, 41 Cal.2d 756 (1953). Thus, Petitioner’s state

habeas proceedings were procedurally barred and cannot therefore be considered “properly filed” under the AEDPA

for purposes of statutory tolling. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)(time limits are “filing” conditions

for AEDPA, and where state court rejects petition as untimely, it was not “properly filed” under AEDPA and

petitioner is thus not entitled to statutory tolling under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)).

4

F.3d 1256, 1259 (11 Cir. 2000)(same); Jackson v. Dormire, 180 F.3d 919, 920 (9 Cir. th th

1999)(petitioner fails to exhaust claims raised in state habeas corpus filed after expiration of oneyear limitations period).

However, even, arguendo, had the limitations period not already expired, the California

Supreme Court denied both state habeas petitions based on the lengthy delay in filing them and

because they raised issues that could have been raised in a direct appeal. Thus Petitioner would 1

not have been entitled to statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(1) in any event.

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY ORDERS: 

1. Petitioner is GRANTED THIRTY (30) days from the date of service of this Order, to

SHOW CAUSE why the Petition should not be dismissed for failing to comply with

the one-year limitations period. 

Petitioner is forewarned that his failure to comply with this order will result in a

Recommendation that the Petition be dismissed pursuant to Local Rule 11-110.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 21, 2007 /s/ Theresa A. Goldner 

j6eb3d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Case 1:06-cv-00748-LJO -TAG Document 6 Filed 11/26/07 Page 4 of 4