Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01474/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01474-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
William Bowles
Plaintiff
United States of America
Defendant

Document Text:

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

William Bowles, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

United States of America, 

 Defendant.

 

No. CV11-1474 PHX DGC 

ORDER 

 

 Plaintiff William Bowles filed a complaint on July 27, 2011, alleging that he was 

“defamed and painted in a false light.” Doc. 1 ¶ 21. The complaint also alleges that 

Defendant harassed and retaliated against Plaintiff, and that Defendant intentionally 

inflicted emotional stress on Plaintiff. See id. ¶¶ 7, 20. 

The claims arise out of Plaintiff’s employment with United States Customs and 

Border Protection (“CBP”). Doc. 1. According to the complaint, Plaintiff was at a 

firing range when he observed a co-worker, Robert Martinez, in possession of alcohol. 

Id. ¶ 4. Believing this was against CBP policy, Plaintiff reported the incident to the 

range master, who in turn reported the incident to the supervisor on duty, Mr. Martinez’s 

wife Susan. Id. ¶ 5. Mrs. Martinez concluded that her husband’s alcohol possession 

was not a policy violation, and the alcohol remained on the range. Id. Plaintiff later 

reported this incident to his superior. Id. ¶ 6. When Plaintiff was not contacted for 

investigation as he assumed he would be, Plaintiff reported the incident to the San Diego 

Field Office. Id. A short time after Plaintiff reported the incident to the field office, Mr. 

Martinez was “stripped of his ‘acting’ supervisory role.” Id. 

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Ten days later, CBP sent Plaintiff a letter cataloguing Plaintiff’s “unacceptable” 

behaviors. Id. ¶ 7. Plaintiff maintains that all the behaviors contained in the letter are in 

some way inaccurate, misleading, or untrue. Id. ¶¶ 8–15. Since receiving the letter, 

Plaintiff has been the subject of an investigation with possibly other investigations in 

progress. Id. ¶¶ 16–19. Plaintiff claims that the letter and the investigations are in 

retaliation for Plaintiff’s report of alcohol on the firing range. Id. ¶ 20. Plaintiff further 

claims that these actions amount to harassment that creates a hostile work environment, 

and that they have caused him severe emotional distress. Id. 

Defendant moves to dismiss the complaint under Rules 12(b)(1) and (6). Doc. 6. 

Defendant argues that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff’s 

claims are barred by § 2680(h) of the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). Id. at 6. Even 

if the claims are not barred, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim. 

Id. at 9. Plaintiff concedes that his false light claim is barred by § 2680(h), but 

maintains that the emotional distress, retaliation, and hostile work environment claims 

are not barred and are sufficiently pleaded. Doc. 7 at 7–11. Defendant responds that 

Plaintiff has no claim for either retaliation or hostile work environment because he has 

not alleged that he engaged in a protected activity as required by Title VII. Doc. 10 at 1. 

Defendant also argues that, along with the false light claim, the FTCA bars Plaintiff’s 

emotional distress claim. Id. at 2. 

The parties have not requested oral argument. For the reasons stated below, the 

Court will grant Defendant’s motion to dismiss. 

I. Legal Standards.

A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) 

can be either a facial or factual attack on the allegations. Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. Gen. 

Tel. & Elec. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979). A facial attack occurs when the 

moving party asserts that the allegations contained in the complaint are “insufficient on 

their face to invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 

1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). In a factual attack, the moving party “disputes the truth of 

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the allegations that, by themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.” Id. 

If the attack on jurisdiction is facial, the complaint’s factual allegations are taken 

as true and construed in favor of the non-moving party. Jacobson v. Katzer, 609 F. 

Supp. 2d 925, 930 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (citing Fed’n of African Am. Contractors v. City of 

Oakland, 96 F.3d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir. 1996)). If the attack is factual, the plaintiff’s 

allegations are not entitled to a presumption of truthfulness, a court may look beyond the 

pleadings to resolve factual disputes, and the plaintiff has the burden of proving 

jurisdiction in fact exists. Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039. 

When analyzing a complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the 

well-pleaded factual allegations “‘are taken as true and construed in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party.’” Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 

2009) (citation omitted). Legal conclusions couched as factual allegations “are not 

entitled to the assumption of truth,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009), and 

therefore “‘are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,’” In 

re Cutera Sec. Litig., 610 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). To avoid a 

Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, the complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 

This plausibility standard “is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more 

than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the 

court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—

but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 1950 (quoting 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). 

II. Analysis.

Defendant’s 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is a facial attack because Defendant, for 

purposes of arguing its motion, does not substantially challenge the truth of the 

underlying facts in the complaint. Thus, under both 12(b)(1) and (6), the Court will 

assume the facts contained in the complaint to be true. 

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Because Plaintiff concedes that his defamation and false light claims are barred 

by the FTCA, those claims will be dismissed. Thus, the only claims that remain are for 

intentional infliction of emotional distress, and for retaliation and hostile work 

environment under Title VII. The Court will consider each in turn. 

A. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. 

The FTCA provides a limited waiver of the government’s sovereign immunity for 

certain tort claims. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671–80; United States v. S.A. Empresa de 

Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 807–08 (1984). Section 

2680(h) provides that the government remains immune from suits for “[a]ny claim 

arising out of . . . libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract 

rights.” Both parties agree that the defamation and false light claims, though not 

explicitly enumerated in the statute’s exceptions, are barred because they arise out of 

libel and slander. Doc. 7 at 7; Doc 6 at 8–9. The parties disagree whether the emotional 

distress claim is similarly barred. 

Courts are split on whether the FTCA bars claims beyond those explicitly listed 

in § 2680(h). Compare Gross v. United States, 676 F.2d 295, 304 (8th Cir. 1982) 

(holding that FTCA does not bar intentional infliction of emotional distress claim 

because it is not enumerated in the statute) and Black v. Sheraton Corp. of Am., 564 F.2d 

531, 539–40 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that invasion of privacy claim was not barred by 

statute) with Metz v. United States, 788 F.2d 1528, 1532–36 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding 

that false light and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims are barred by FTCA 

when the underlying government conduct essential to the plaintiff’s claim constitutes an 

excepted cause of action). 

The Ninth Circuit holds that the FTCA bars claims not listed in the statute. See, 

e.g., Thomas-Lazear v. F.B.I., 851 F.2d 1202, 1206–07 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Metz, 788 

F.2d at 1535, and holding that negligent infliction of emotional distress claim is barred 

because the underlying government conduct constituted slander). In Sheehan v. United 

States, 896 F.2d 1168 (9th Cir. 1990), the Ninth Circuit explained that “§ 2680(h) bars 

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suit for claims based on conduct which constitutes one of the excepted torts, and bars 

suit for no other claims.” Id. at 1171 (emphasis added). The government’s conduct, 

then, is the touchstone for determining whether § 2680(h) bars Plaintiff’s emotional 

distress claim. If Defendant’s conduct giving rise to the emotional distress claim 

constitutes one of the torts listed in § 2680(h), Plaintiff’s claim must be dismissed. 

Plaintiff’s complaint provides a very thorough account of the allegedly tortious 

conduct, and devotes nearly all of its allegations to defamation-type acts. Plaintiff 

alleges that Defendant issued a false and defamatory letter, and that Defendant’s 

employees painted him in a false light. Plaintiff’s distress arises from his damaged 

reputation. Thus, the underlying government actions constitute libel- and slander-type 

actions listed in § 2680(h). See Sheehan, 896 F.2d at 1171 (stating that to allow a 

plaintiff to proceed on a claim not listed in the statute, but that constitutes a cause of 

action listed in the statute, would be to allow a plaintiff to evade the substance of 

§ 2680(h)). The Court must dismiss this claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 

under Rule 12(b)(1). 

B. Retaliation. 

Title VII makes it unlawful for “an employer to discriminate against [an 

employee] . . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment 

practice” by Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). In order to state a Title VII retaliation 

claim, “an employee must show that (1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) his 

employer subjected him to an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link exists 

between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 

1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 

1464 (9th Cir.1994)). An employee engages in a “protected activity” when the 

employee complains about or protests conduct that the employee reasonably believes 

constitutes an unlawful employment practice. Trent v. Valley Elec. Ass’n Inc., 41 F.3d 

524, 526 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing E.E.O.C. v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 720 F.2d 1008, 

1013 (9th Cir. 1983)). 

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Plaintiff claims that he engaged in a protected activity when he reported the 

alcohol at the firing range. Doc. 7 at 9. But Plaintiff has failed to show that he 

reasonably believed he was complaining about an employment practice made unlawful 

by Title VII. Indeed, it seems hard to imagine how an individual co-worker possessing 

alcohol in violation of an employer’s policy amounts to an employment practice at all, 

let alone one that Title VII makes unlawful. Some examples of protected activities 

include filing an E.E.O.C complaint, Ray, 217 F.3d at 1240, protesting a company policy 

that requires certain races to be treated differently, Moyo v. Gomes, 40 F.3d 982, 985 

(9th Cir. 1994), and complaining to the employee’s general manager about being denied 

accommodations for religious beliefs, E.E.O.C. v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1514 

(9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Burrell v. Star Nursery, Inc., 170 F.3d 

951 (9th Cir. 1999). The alcohol possession that Plaintiff complained about is not an 

employment practice prohibited by Title VII. Plaintiff therefore has failed to state a 

claim for retaliation. 

C. Hostile Work Environment. 

The Ninth Circuit recognizes a claim for hostile work environment under 

Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision. Ray, 217 F.3d at 1245. As with retaliation, 

however, an employee’s participation in a protected activity is a necessary element of 

this claim. Id. (“Harassment as retaliation for engaging in a protected activity should be 

no different [than harassment based on race or gender]” (emphasis added)). Because 

Plaintiff has not engaged in a protected activity, the complaint does not properly state a 

claim for hostile work environment. 

IT IS ORDERED: 

1. Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 6) is granted. 

2. The Clerk is directed to terminate this action. 

Dated this 13th day of December, 2011. 

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