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Parties Involved:
Renee R. Covert
Appellee
Christopher Ray Ingram
Appellant
Lauderdale County Youth Court
Appellee
Jane S. Miller
Appellee
Carolyn Mooney
Appellee
Frances S. Stephenson
Appellee
Veldore Young
Appellee

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-60387

Summary Calendar 

CHRISTOPHER RAY INGRAM, 

Plaintiff-Appellant 

v. 

CAROLYN MOONEY, Chancery Clerk, Lauderdale County, Mississippi; 

JANE S. MILLER, Staff Attorney; RENEE R. COVERT, D.C., Circuit Court; 

FRANCES S. STEPHENSON, Esq.; LAUDERDALE COUNTY YOUTH 

COURT; JUDGE VELDORE YOUNG, 

Defendants-Appellees 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Mississippi 

USDC No. 3:13-CV-964

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, PRADO, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Christopher Ray Ingram, Mississippi prisoner # 110941, filed a civil 

rights complaint against, among other defendants, Mississippi Youth Court 

Judge Veldore F. Young and Frances S. Stephenson, Ingram’s former attorney, 

alleging that they violated his constitutional rights and Mississippi state law 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 13, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 15-60387

2 

during the course of child custody proceedings involving Ingram’s son and 

daughter. The district court ruled that Judge Young was entitled to absolute 

immunity, dismissed for failure to state a claim the claims against the other 

defendants except for Stephenson, and later declined to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction over Ingram’s state-law claims against Stephenson. Ingram 

challenges only the court’s rulings on his claims against Judge Young and 

Stephenson. He thus has abandoned the claims that he raised against the 

remaining defendants, and we do not address them. See Brinkmann v. Dallas 

Cty. Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987). To the extent 

that he now seeks to allege that a court reporter violated his right to due 

process, he may not raise a claim for the first time in this court. See Varnado 

v. Lynaugh, 920 F.2d 320, 321 (5th Cir. 1991). 

The district court dismissed Ingram’s claims against Judge Young at the 

screening stage of the proceedings, and we review that decision de novo. See 

Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 373 (5th Cir. 2005). Denying Ingram’s motion 

to recuse was within Judge Young’s judicial capacity, see Mireles v. Waco, 502 

U.S. 9, 9-10 (1991); Ballard v. Wall, 413 F.3d 510, 515 (5th Cir. 2005), and 

Ingram has not shown that she acted in the “complete absence of all 

jurisdiction,” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12. Ingram’s allegations that she erred in 

the manner that she dismissed the motion, committed misconduct, and acted 

in bad faith are insufficient to deprive her of immunity. See Mireles, 502 U.S.

at 11-13.

As for Stephenson, to the extent that Ingram intended to allege federal 

constitutional claims and not simply state-law claims against her, private 

attorneys are not official state actors and thus are generally not subject to suit 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Mills v. Criminal Dist. Court No. 3, 837 F.2d 677, 679 

(5th Cir. 1988); see Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 324-25 (1981). Moreover, 

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because Ingram’s federal claims were properly dismissed, the district court did 

not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 

his state-law claims against Stephenson. See Heggemeier v. Caldwell Cty., 

Texas, 826 F.3d 861, 872 (5th Cir. 2016); 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). 

Ingram’s motion to strike Stephenson’s brief is DENIED. The district 

court’s judgment is AFFIRMED. The district court’s partial dismissal for 

failure to state a claim counts as a strike under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), and 

Ingram has at least one additional strike. Ingram v. Lauderdale County, Miss., 

4:10-CV-7, 34, 2-3 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 26, 2011). He is WARNED that if he 

accumulates a third strike, he will not be allowed to proceed in forma pauperis

in any civil action or appeal while incarcerated or detained in any facility 

unless he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. See § 1915(g).

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