Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00238/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00238-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Christie A. Mitchell
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRISTIE A. MITCHELL,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

Case No. 1:14-cv-00238-SMS

ORDER AFFIRMING AGENCY’S DENIAL 

OF BENEFITS AND ORDERING 

JUDGMENT FOR COMMISSIONER

Plaintiff Christie A. Mitchell, by her attorney, Jacqueline Anna Forslund, seeks judicial 

review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her 

application for supplemental security income (“SSI”) pursuant to Title XVI of the Social Security 

Act (42 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.) (the “Act”). The matter is before the Court on the parties' cross-briefs, 

which were submitted, without oral argument, to the Honorable Sandra M. Snyder, U.S. Magistrate 

Judge. 

Plaintiff contends that the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") failed to give legally adequate 

reasons for rejecting (1) the examining psychologist's opinion and (2) the statement of Plaintiff's 

daughter. Following a review of the complete record and applicable law, the Court finds the 

decision of the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") to be supported by substantial evidence in the 

record as a whole and based on proper legal standards.

///

///

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I. Procedural History

On May 27, 2005, Plaintiff applied for supplemental security income, alleging disability 

beginning June 1, 1986. The Commissioner initially denied the claim on October 26, 2005, and 

upon reconsideration, on March 6, 2007. Following a hearing on March 19, 2008, the ALJ denied 

the application.1

On March 1, 2010, Plaintiff again applied for supplemental security income, alleging

disability beginning April 22, 2008. The Commissioner initially denied the claim on October 18, 

2010, and upon reconsideration, on March 10, 2011. On May 9, 2011, Plaintiff filed a timely 

request for a hearing.

Plaintiff appeared and testified at a hearing on May 14, 2012. Jose L. Chaparro, an impartial 

vocational expert, also appeared and testified. 

On May 22, 2012, Administrative Law Judge Michael J. Haubner denied Plaintiff’s 

application. The Appeals Council denied review on December 20, 2013. On February 20, 2014, 

Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking this Court’s review. 

II. Factual Background

Plaintiff (born December 18, 1948) testified that she last worked, off-the-books, as a 

babysitter in the 1980's. (In her adult disability report, Plaintiff reported that she stopped working 

when she married in 1972.) Plaintiff is a high school graduate. She does not have a driver's license.

Plaintiff estimated that she could easily walk for two hours at a time. She could stand for 

about thirty minutes at a time and sit for twenty minutes. The most she could carry was twenty 

pounds. Generally, she needed to rest about one hour in an eight-hour day. She could pay attention 

for about twenty minutes at a time. 

Plaintiff shared a single-family home with her elderly mother, her younger brother, and a 

second brother and his wife. Plaintiff cared for two cats and three dogs. She cooked once or twice a 

day, cleaned up afterward, and took out the trash. She swept inside and outside, and mopped the 

floors, but did not vacuum. She did laundry daily. Plaintiff did daily yard work, including watering 

and weeding, but did not mow the grass. She shopped daily. Although Plaintiff helped her 

 

1

Plaintiff had also been denied disability benefits in 1992 and 1997.

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bedridden mother to perform her personal needs, she testified that her health would not allow her to 

take care of a sick person as a full-time job.

Plaintiff visited her adult daughter once or twice a month. She enjoyed writing letters and 

watching television. She was able to dress herself and perform her own personal care.

In an adult function report dated June 15, 2010,2Plaintiff denied that she cared for any other 

family members, including parents. She claimed difficulty dressing herself, particularly managing

pants, long sleeves, and socks. She was able to prepare her own meals, and to do light housework 

and yard work. 

Plaintiff went outside daily, walking, riding in a car, or using public transportation. She 

stopped driving after seven accidents. Her condition limited lifting, squatting, bending, reaching, 

kneeling, hearing, seeing, completing tasks, concentrating, understanding, following instructions, 

using hands, and getting along with others. She complained of leg, foot, and ear pain, swelling of 

her extremities, and difficulty chewing. (She reported that she had no teeth.) She needed glasses, 

hearing aids, and a cane. From 2008 to 2009, Plaintiff lost 145 pounds. 

Plaintiff's daughter, Andrea Pritchett, completed a third-party adult function report dated 

June 15, 2010. Ms. Pritchett dismissed her mother's cooking and cleaning abilities, reporting that 

she took too long and failed to do an adequate job. Plaintiff, she said, annoyed neighbors and local 

school personnel by talking nonsense and making unwanted telephone calls. When Plaintiff lived 

with Ms. Pritchett and her family, they were forced to take out their phone to end her habit of 

making annoying phone calls to others. For example, Plaintiff repeatedly called the local school 

nurse to complain about her illnesses. Plaintiff could dress herself but lacked a sense of personal 

modesty, going outside to talk to people without pants or in her pajamas.

According to Ms. Pritchett, Plaintiff no longer shopped because she talked to those she 

encountered about private family matters and came home with items that she should not have 

purchased. She had difficulty following written and spoken instructions. Never having worked, 

Plaintiff lacked the ability to budget or handle money: when Ms. Pritchett was a child, her 

///

 

2 Because Plaintiff went over her handwriting multiple times, the adult function report is difficult to read.

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grandmother supplemented Plaintiff's welfare check and paid Plaintiff's bills for her. Plaintiff 

enjoyed watching children's television programs and writing words.

Ms. Pritchett opined that, although Plaintiff shook and had difficulty squatting and bending, 

"mostly it's mental." AR 195. She needed glasses and diabetic supplies. Plaintiff, said Ms. 

Pritchett, is a hypochondriac who would feign sickness to avoid stress or an unfamiliar situation. 

Plaintiff also sees and hears things that are not there, and claims to care for ten or twelve 

grandchildren, although she has only two teen-aged grandchildren. Similarly, Plaintiff claimed to 

have had multiple traffic accidents but was actually only in one accident--when she was sixteen 

years old and her mother was driving.

Medical records. Plaintiff received regular physical medical care at University Health 

Services on April 3, June 25, July 18, and November 10, 2008; and February 3, June 30, and 

December 2, 2009. Her diagnoses reflected high blood pressure and diabetes mellitus. Plaintiff's 

blood sugar ranged from 80 to 108 mg/dL: her physicians attempted to adjust her Metformin3to 

achieve a consistent normal level. Her blood pressure was generally elevated. Her doctors 

encouraged a low salt diet and exercise.

Despite Plaintiff's representation of substantial weight loss in this time period, the notes show 

that Plaintiff's weight varied within a range of 153.7 to 184 pounds. Plaintiff was about five feet one 

inch tall. The UHS records reflect diagnoses of bipolar disorder and schizophrenia, and referrals to 

Fresno County Behavioral Services. Plaintiff stopped taking her prescriptions, Metformin and 

thioridazine (Mellaril),

4

on multiple occasions. 

On July 18, 2010, internist Robert Wagner, M.D., prepared a consultative internal medicine 

evaluation for the agency. Plaintiff told Dr. Wagner that because she had weighed 338 pounds six 

months to one year before, but now weighed 150 pounds, she no longer needed any medication. Dr. 

Wagner noted that no documentation supported her claim. Plaintiff also told him that her left knee 

"gave out" occasionally, but that she could walk long distances at other times and that she had no 

significant pain. The doctor observed, "She may not be a very reliable historian per review of 

 

3 Metformin is used alone or with other medications to treat Type 2 diabetes. 

www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/druginfo/meds/a696005.html (April 8, 2015).

4 Mellaril (Thioridazine) is an antipsychotic drug used to treat schizophrenia. 

www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/druginfo/meds/a682119.html (April 8, 2015).

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records." AR 250. Although Dr. Wagner deferred evaluation of her mental health to psychiatry, he 

noted:

The client has bright affect, however, she presents speaking very rapidly, often 

going off topic and very hard to direct back into the topic at hand. She did

mention coming into the examination that she has multiple 15-year-old daughters 

who keep her very busy, a statement that is not true per the records I reviewed. 

The claimant was pleasant to talk with.

AR 250.

Plaintiff was able to rise from her waiting room chair and walk to the examining room 

without assistance, easily get on and off the examining table, and put on her own shoes and socks. 

Dr. Wagner opined that Plaintiff had no limitations in sitting, standing, walking, or manipulation. 

She could lift and carry fifty pounds occasionally and 25 pounds frequently. Because "she may not 

apprehend dangers normally," she should not climb or balance. AR 253. 

On July 23, 2010, psychologist Gerardine Gauch, Psy.D., prepared a consultative psychiatric 

evaluation for the agency. Dr. Gauch reviewed no medical records, relying solely on Plaintiff's 

representations.

According to Plaintiff, her chief psychological complaint was withdrawing into herself and 

isolating socially: 

The claimant is seeking SSI benefits because "I pulled into myself and I don't talk 

to anymore [sic]. I've had multiple motor vehicle accidents and injury to my left 

side." She stated, "I've been going to mental health since 1986 because of an 

abusive marriage.["] She stated that she also has a cast on her leg since an 

automobile accident in 1964 at age 16. She also has hearing problems, she is deaf 

in one ear and her right ear is now sore.

AR 254.

Her current medications were Lexapro,5Lipitor,6Enalapril,7 Hydrochlorothiazide,8aspirin, 

 

5 Lexapro is used to treat depression and generalized anxiety disorder. 

www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/druginfo/meds/a603005.html (April 8, 2015).

6 Lipitor (atorvastatin) is prescribed with diet, weight loss, and exercise to reduce the risk of heart disease by decreasing 

the amount of fatty substances in the blood. www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/druginfo/meds/a600045.html (April 8, 

2015).

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Phemfilcon,9and, in the old days, Dibenzyline.10 Plaintiff had a long history of psychiatric 

treatment and took Mellaril for many years. Plaintiff told Dr. Gauch that she had never been 

hospitalized nor attempted suicide, and that she had recently lost 180 pounds.

Plaintiff came to the appointment dressed in a shirt, jeans, and bedroom slippers. Although 

she displayed adequate hygiene, her hair was carelessly drawn to the side using a plastic clip. Her 

purse retained its paper tag. She had good eye contact, used appropriate expressions, and was 

cooperative and pleasant.

Plaintiff's speech was logical, coherent, and concise. Her stream of thought was within 

normal limits without indication of hallucinations or delusions. Intellectual functioning appeared 

normal. Her memory was adequate. Speech was clear and of normal volume, but rapid. Plaintiff 

had sufficient concentration for conversation.

Plaintiff's abstract thinking was limited. For example, when asked the meaning of the 

proverb "People who live in glass houses shouldn't throw stones," Plaintiff stated:

For one thing glass is expensive, for another thing I wouldn't live in a glass house

if they gave it to me because they hurt people[s'] feelings and they are breaking 

things, see that is what my husband does, he lives in a glass house and he is 

constantly throwing stones, that would be the best way to describe my exhusband, he lives in a glass house because he thinks he is above everybody and he 

is a restless spirit, he is constantly moving. I try to be calm and be with family. I 

do know that he loves to travel and I don't, after that accident and several more 

after that, you would want me to stay off the road.

AR 257.

Dr. Gauch diagnosed:

Axis I: 296.9 Mood disorder not otherwise specified.

Axis II: 799.9 Deferred

 

7 Enalapril, an ACE inhibitor, is used with hydrochlorothiazide to reduce high blood pressure. 

www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/druginfo/meds/a601047.html (April 8, 2015).

8 Hydrochlorothiazide is used alone, or in combination with other medications, to treat high blood pressure. It is a 

diuretic that treats edema caused by other medications. www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/druginfo/meds/a682571.html

(April 8, 2015).

9

Phemfilcon is a material used in the manufacture of certain soft contact lenses. 

www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15017179 (April 8, 2015).

10 Dibenzaline (Phenoxybenzamine) is used to treat high blood pressure. 

www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/druginfo/meds/a682059.html (April 8, 2015). 

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Axis III: Status-post hysterectomy, diabetes type II

Axis IV: Unemployed, financial stressors

Axis V: Current GAF 55

AR 258.

The doctor noted that Plaintiff's symptoms and mood disorder were mild, and that there was 

fair likelihood of improvement within twelve months. She opined that Plaintiff had good ability to 

understand and remember very short and detailed instructions, and to interact with co-workers; fair 

ability to understand and remember detailed instructions, to maintain concentration and attention, to 

accept instructions from a supervisor and respond appropriately, and to deal with changes in the 

work setting; and poor ability to sustain an ordinary routine without special supervision, and to 

complete a normal workday and work week without interruptions influenced by her mood disorder. 

Because of her mood disorder, Plaintiff also had fair likelihood of emotionally deteriorating in the 

workplace. She was not capable of managing her funds.

When Plaintiff began receiving routine care at the Family Health Center at Community 

Medical Center on September 3, 2010, she had not taken any medications since January 2010. Her 

blood pressure was uncontrolled; the batteries in her blood glucose monitor were dead. When 

Plaintiff returned on December 10, 2010, Dr. Vang noted that Plaintiff had not taken her medications 

for over one year.

Agency physician H. Amado, M.D., completed the psychiatric review technique on October

14, 2010. Dr. Amado characterized Plaintiff as having affective disorders and anxiety-related 

disorders, with co-existing physical impairments. Her affective disorder did not fit the existing 

categories set forth on the form, diagnosed as either bipolar affective disorder or, per the consultative 

examiner, mood disorder not otherwise specified. Plaintiff's diagnosis of anxiety not otherwise 

specified had been established in the April 2008 hearing decision. Dr. Amado opined that Plaintiff 

had mild restriction of activities of daily living and in maintaining social functioning; moderate 

///

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limitations in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace; and no repeated episodes of 

decompensation. He noted:

After reviewing the evidence on file, would suggest [mental residual functional 

capacity] for unskilled work activity with physical issues to the side, applying 

Chavez AR and thereby adopting the ALJ['s] decision of 4/08 with no apparent 

material changes in circumstances noted. The psych[iatric consulting examiner] 

diagnosed a mood disorder as opposed to Anxiety NOS per ALJ, but the latter had 

been aware of the mood swings reported, not a newly discovered impairment 

since the time of ALJ decision in 4/08. The current [consulting examiner] offered 

an adverse [medical source statement] that is not given great weight—Chavez AR 

aside for the moment—as it seems disproportionately restrictive compared to the 

MSE findings and functional information on file. Mental allegations are partially 

supported.

AR 277.

Dr. Amado opined that Plaintiff was moderately limited in the ability to carry out detailed 

instructions; to maintain attention and concentration for extended periods; to perform activities 

within a schedule, maintain regular attendance, and be punctual within customary tolerances; to 

work in coordination with or proximity to others without being distracted by them; to complete a 

normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms and to 

perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods; and to

respond appropriately to changes in the work setting. He acknowledged that these impairments 

might be construed to signify that Plaintiff was unable to be employed gainfully, but that these were 

the same impairments with which the 2008 hearing decision had concluded she was able to work.

When Plaintiff returned to the Family Health Center on September 20, 2011, she had taken 

no medications since April 2011. Plaintiff claimed that she had been off her diabetes medications 

since 2009 following weight loss. Although Plaintiff complained of burning during urination, tests 

for a urinary tract infection were negative. Blood pressure was at goal. Dr. Vang referred Plaintiff 

for dental care. On December 15, 2011, dental surgeon Kho Choy noted that tooth #31 was decayed 

to the pulp and gum line, and extracted the tooth. 

///

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 Vocational expert testimony. Vocational expert Jose Chaparro testified that Plaintiff had 

no past relevant work. For all hypothetical questions, the ALJ directed Chaparro to assume a 

hypothetical person of the same age, education, language, experience, and background as Plaintiff.

For the first hypothetical question, the ALJ directed Chaparro to assume an individual with 

no standing or walking limitations, who could lift and carry fifty pounds occasionally and 25 pounds 

frequently; could not climb or balance; had no manipulative limitations; and should not work around 

heights or heavy machinery. Chaparro opined that the hypothetical person could perform the jobs of 

bagger, retail trade, (medium, unskilled, DOT No. 920.687-014) with approximately 153,000 jobs 

nationally and 21,000 jobs in California; hand packager (medium, unskilled, DOT No. 920.587-018) 

with approximately 54,500 jobs nationally and 7000 to 7300 in California; or hospital cleaner 

(medium, unskilled, DOT No. 323.687-010) with 69,000 jobs nationally and 7200 jobs in California.

For the second hypothetical question, the ALJ directed Chaparro to assume a hypothetical 

person, who was moderately limited in the ability to carry out detailed instructions; to maintain 

attention and concentration for extended periods; to maintain regular attendance and be punctual; 

complete a normal work day or work week; work in coordination and proximity to others; and 

respond appropriately to changes in work setting. The individual is not precluded from unskilled, 

entry level work on a sustained basis. Chaparro opined that the second hypothetical person could 

perform "the world of unskilled work" so that the grids would apply.

For the third hypothetical question, the ALJ directed Chaparro to assume a hypothetical 

person who is not capable of handling her own funds; has fair ability to understand and remember 

detailed instructions, to maintain attention and concentration, to accept instruction from supervisors, 

and to deal with various changes; has poor ability to sustain normal routine without supervision, and 

to complete a regular workday or workweek; has good ability to understand, remember and carry out 

short and simple instructions; and has a fair likelihood of emotional deterioration in the work 

environment. Chaparro opined that no jobs would be available for the third hypothetical person.

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For the fourth hypothetical question, the ALJ directed Chaparro to assume a hypothetical 

person, who could lift and carry 20 pounds; could sit twenty minutes at a time; could walk two hours 

at a time; concentrate twenty minutes at a time; and needed one unscheduled one-hour break per day.

According to Chaparro, no work would be available for the fourth hypothetical person.

III. Discussion

A. Scope of Review

Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision to 

deny benefits under the Act. In reviewing findings of fact with respect to such determinations, a 

court must determine whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s decision. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 405(g). Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla” (Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 

389, 402 (1971)), but less than a preponderance. Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 n. 

10 (9th Cir. 1975). It is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion.” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401. The record as a whole must be considered, 

weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s 

decision. Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). In weighing the evidence and making 

findings, the Commissioner must apply the proper legal standards. See, e.g., Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 

F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988). This Court must uphold the ALJ’s determination that the claimant 

is not disabled if the ALJ applied the proper legal standards and the ALJ’s findings are supported by 

substantial evidence. See Sanchez v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 812 F.2d 509, 510 

(9th Cir. 1987). 

B. Legal Standards

To qualify for benefits, a claimant must establish that he or she is unable to engage in 

substantial gainful activity because of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment 

which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 

See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). A claimant 

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must demonstrate a physical or mental impairment of such severity that he or she is not only unable 

to do his or her previous work, but cannot, considering age, education, and work experience, engage 

in any other substantial gainful work existing in the national economy. Id.

To encourage uniformity in decision making, the Commissioner has promulgated regulations 

prescribing a five-step sequential process for evaluating an alleged disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1520; 416.920. The process requires consideration of the following questions:

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful activity? If so, the 

claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed to step two.

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? If so, proceed to 

step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is appropriate.

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments 

meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1? If so, 

the claimant is automatically determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four.

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past work? If so, the 

claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step five.

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional capacity to perform 

any other work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the claimant is 

disabled.

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n. 5 (9th Cir. 1995). If a claimant is found "disabled" or "not 

disabled" at any step, the remaining steps need not be addressed. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098.

At steps one through four, the claimant bears the burden of proof, subject to the presumed 

non-adversarial nature of Social Security hearings and the Commissioner's affirmative duty to assist 

claimants in developing the record whether or not they are represented by counsel. Tackett, 180 

F.3d at 1098 n. 3; Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1288 (9th Cir. 1996). If the first four steps are 

adequately proven, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove at step five that considering the 

claimant's residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience, he or she can perform 

other work that is available in significant numbers. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098; Reddick v. Chater, 

157 F.3d 715, 721 (9th Cir. 1998).

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The ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the 

application date of March 1, 2010. Her severe impairments were anxiety disorder and knee pain. 

Neither of these impairments alone or in any combination met or medically equaled the severity of 

an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appx. 1 (416.920(d), 416.925, and 416.926). 

Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform medium work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 

416.967(c), except that she is limited to performing simple, repetitive tasks but can maintain 

adequate concentration, persistence, and pace for simple tasking. She is capable of dealing with

routine changes in the work place and appropriately interacting with others. Plaintiff had no past 

relevant work. Nonetheless, considering Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and residual 

functional capacity, she could perform other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national 

economy.

C. Plaintiff's Credibility

Remembering Plaintiff's consistent lack of credibility before analyzing her substantive claims 

is imperative in this case. Citing her dismal work history, history of unreported income, and a "very 

wide range of activities of daily living " that were inconsistent with her claims of disability, the ALJ 

found Plaintiff's credibility to be "quite poor." AR 27. His assessment was consistent with Dr. 

Wagner's observation that Plaintiff was a poor historian, as illustrated by multiple representations 

that could not be documented or were demonstrably untrue, and with Ms. Pritchett's representation 

of her mother as a hypochondriac who would feign illness to avoid challenging or undesirable 

situations.

When weighing a claimant=s credibility, the ALJ may consider the claimant=s reputation for 

truthfulness, inconsistencies in claimant=s testimony or between her testimony and conduct, 

claimant=s daily activities, claimant=s work record, and testimony from physicians and third parties 

about the nature, severity and effect of claimant=s claimed symptoms. Light v. Social Security 

Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997). The ALJ may consider A(1) ordinary techniques of 

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credibility evaluation, such as claimant=s reputation for lying, prior inconsistent statements 

concerning the symptoms, and other testimony by the claimant that appears less than candid; (2) 

unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of 

treatment; and (3) the claimant=s daily activities.@ Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th

Cir. 2008), citing Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1273. If the ALJ=s finding is supported by substantial evidence, 

the Court may not second-guess his or her decision. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. 

2002).

Reviewing a cold record, the Court cannot be certain whether Plaintiff's many 

misrepresentations and exaggerations are attempts to manipulate the outcome of her disability claim 

or symptoms of the mental impairment. Resolving that question is not required. Medical treatment 

necessarily relies on the patient=s account of his or her physical or mental condition, specific 

symptoms, effects of medications and other treatment, and such. Although Plaintiff certainly 

possesses multiple serious impairments, her medical records are replete with inconsistencies, patent 

exaggerations, and questionable representations that complicate a fact finder=s attempts to identify 

the truth, especially within the limits of an administrative proceeding such as one evaluating a 

claimant=s application for disability benefits. As the ALJ concluded, the opinions of Plaintiff=s 

physicians must be carefully evaluated in light of Plaintiff=s limited credibility.

D. Doctors' Opinions and the Presumption of Non-Disability

Since Dr. Amado was a non-examining physician, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in 

rejecting the opinion of Dr. Gauch, who examined Plaintiff. Pointing out that Plaintiff totally 

ignores the presumption of non-disability that applies in this case, the Commissioner responds that 

the ALJ appropriately applied Dr. Amado's opinion in the course of determining whether Plaintiff 

established changed circumstances. The Court agrees with the Commissioner. When an applicant 

has one or more previous denials of applications for disability benefits, as Plaintiff has in this case, 

he or she must overcome a presumption of non-disability. 

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The principles of res judicata apply to administrative decisions, although the doctrine is less 

rigidly applied to administrative proceedings than in court. Chavez v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 691, 693 (9th

Cir. 1988); Gregory v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 664, 666 (9th Cir. 1988). Social Security Ruling (ASSR@) 

96-4(9), adopting Chavez, applies to cases involving a subsequent disability claim with an 

unadjudicated period arising under the same title of the Social Security Act as a prior claim in which 

there has been a final administrative decision that the claimant is not disabled. A previous final 

determination of non-disability creates a presumption of continuing non-disability in the 

unadjudicated period. Lester, 81 F.3d at 827. 

The presumption may be overcome by a showing of changed circumstances, such as new and 

material changes to the claimant=s RFC, age, education, or work experience. Id. at 827-28; Chavez, 

844 F.2d at 693. In evaluating the new application, the ALJ must first determine whether changed 

circumstances exist that prevent a finding of continuing non-disability. Scott v. Colvin, 2014 WL 

3797491 at * 15 (S.D.Cal. Aug. 1, 2014) (No. 13-CV-1189 W(DHB)). If changed circumstances 

exist, the prior residual functional capacity is still entitled to res judicata. Id. The ALJ must then 

determine whether new and material evidence exists that could support a finding that the plaintiff's 

residual functional capacity had changed. Id. 

"Chavez explicitly states that a claimant must prove 'changed circumstances' indicating

greater disability." Bose v. Astrue, 2011 WL 1211601 at * 9 (D.Ariz. Mar. 31, 2011) (No. CV 09-

02257-PHX-MHM). Thus, Plaintiff needed to prove both changed circumstances and that those 

changes resulted in greater disability. Id. at *10. Plaintiff does not argue, however, that the Dr. 

Gauch's opinion supported a finding of either changed circumstances or greater disability. In fact, as 

the Commissioner points out, Plaintiff does not address the presumption of non-disability in any 

way.

The ALJ began his analysis by stating: "The Disability Determination Service psychiatric 

consultant, Dr. Amado, imposed limits that would likely preclude substantial gainful activity, but as 

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noted by the Disability Determination Service, there is no material change in the claimant's 

psychiatric condition from the April 2008 Administrative Law Judge decision. AR 26 (citations to 

record omitted).11 The ALJ added that, in any event, the Disability Determination Service 

evaluators concluded that Plaintiff remained capable of unskilled, entry-level employment despite 

various continued limitations. 

Since Dr. Gauch did not address whether Plaintiff's circumstances had changed, her opinion 

had little direct relevance to the changed-circumstances analysis. Because Plaintiff failed to 

establish changed circumstances sufficient to overcome the presumption of non-disability, neither 

the ALJ nor this Court need examine her opinion of Plaintiff's limitations or the vocational 

examiner's opinion of the employability of a person with Plaintiff's limitations. Without changed 

circumstances, the Court must presume non-disability.

D. Ms. Pritchett's Third-Party Opinion

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in giving little weight to the opinion of her daughter, 

Ms. Pritchett. In the absence of changed circumstances, Ms. Pritchett's report of her mother's 

functioning has little relevance. In any event, the ALJ adequately explained his reasons for giving

substantial weight to some portions of Ms. Pritchett's report and little weight to others.

ALay testimony as to a claimant=s symptoms is competent evidence which the Secretary must 

take into account, unless he ultimately determines to disregard such testimony, in which case >he 

must give reasons that are germane to each witness.=@ Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1467 (9th

 

11 The Court is puzzled by the ALJ's repeated statements that Chavez does not apply directly to Title XVI claims. That 

the presumption of nondisability applies in successive Title XVI cases is settled law. Pursuant to Taylor v. Heckler, 765 

F.2d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 1985), "[w]hen a claimant's application for SSI benefits is denied and the claimant does not 

appeal, the decision denying benefits becomes binding on all parties and creates a presumption of continuing 

nondisability." Cabe v. Barnhart, 168 Fed.Appx. 180, 181 (9th Cir. 2006). To prevail, "in a subsequent application for 

SSI based on the same disability, the claimant 'must prove 'changed circumstances' indicating a greater disability." Id.

(quoting Chavez, 844 F.2d at 693). "Because [the claimant] applied for SSI on May 8, 1998, and was denied, under res 

judicata, the ALJ must respect the decision of previous courts unless there are 'changed circumstances' since the last 

request for SSI." Winters v. Barnhart, 2003 WL 22384784 at * 5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2003) (No. C 02-5171 SI) (citing 

Chavez). See also, for example, Fenton v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2014 WL 3891640 at * 4 (D. Ore. August 6, 2014) (No. 

3:13-cv-01455-HZ); Chunglo-Stewart v. Colvin, 2014 WL 3846121 at * 4 (W.D. Wash. August 5, 2014) (No. C13-1872-

JCC); McAfee v. Colvin, 2013 WL 4008746 at * 1 (C.D. Cal. August 5, 2013) (ED CV 12-01630-VBK); Ingram v. 

Astrue, 2010 WL 4392796 at *1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2010) (No. 1:08-cv-2829-GGH); Moua v. Astrue, 2010 WL 1340853 

at * 4 (E.D. Cal. March 31, 2010) (No. 1:08-cv-01941-DAD); Olivas v. Astrue, 2009 WL 2163522 at * 2 (C.D. Cal. July 

16, 2009) (No. SACV 08-01085-MLG).

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Cir. 1996), quoting Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 1993). Friends and family 

members who are in a position to observe the claimant=s symptoms and daily activities are 

competent to testify about their observations of the claimant=s condition. Dodrill, 12 F.3d at 918-19. 

An ALJ=s disregard of the testimony of friends and family members violates the regulations, which 

provide for consideration of the observations of non-medical sources regarding the effects of the 

claimant=s impairments on his ability to work. Id., citing 20 C.F.R. ' 404.1513(e)(2).12 See also

Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 1987). When a claimant alleges symptoms that are 

not supported by medical evidence in the record, the agency directs the adjudicator to obtain 

information about those symptoms from third parties likely to have such knowledge. SSR 88-13. 

The ALJ must give Afull consideration@ to such testimony. Id.

The ALJ gave significant weight to Ms. Pritchett's detailed statements regarding Plaintiff's 

activities of daily living, but rejected Ms. Pritchett's statements regarding Plaintiff's physical 

functions as (1) vague and unquantifiable, and (2) inconsistent with Dr. Wagner's findings and 

conclusions. He was not required to do more.

III. Conclusion and Order

The Court finds that the ALJ applied appropriate legal standards and that substantial 

evidence supported the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff was not disabled. Accordingly, the Court

DENIES Plaintiff’s appeal from the administrative decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. 

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of the Commissioner and against 

Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 15, 2015 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 

12

 The relevant section is now designated 20 C.F.R. ' 1513 (d)(4).

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