Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02770/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02770-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Marlinda S. Heitzenrater
Appellee
Rodney A. Heitzenrater
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

United FI LED . ·~ .. . Stiu~ ~,, t;f Ai,,o,1- 'f~th r1r.,...:,. ORITBD STATES COURT OP APPEALS .. . 

RODNEY A. HEITZENRATER & 

MARLINDA S. HEITZENRATER, 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

TBN'.ffl CIRCUIT 

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F£8 2 ~ ii81 

ROBERT L. HOBCKER 

Clerk 

No. 88-2770 

(D. C. No. 86-C-757) 

(D. Colo.) 

ORDER ARD JUDGIIEN'.r* 

Before BALDOClt and EBEL, Circuit Judges, and SAIi, District 

Judge.** 

Plaintiffs Rodney and Marlinda Heitzenrater brought this 

action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims 

Act, 28 U.S.C. S 1346(b) and SS 2671 et seq., for injuries 

suffered by Mr. Heitzenrater while a patient at the Denver 

Veterans' Administration Hospital. The government stipulated to 

liability, a bench trial was held on the question of damages, and 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppal. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

** Honorable David Sam, United States District Judge for the 

District of Utah, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 88-2770 Document: 010110103833 Date Filed: 02/22/1991 Page: 1 
judgment was entered in favor of plaintiffs. We affirm in part, 

reverse in part, and remand. 

BACKGROUND 

In the spring of 1983, Mr. Heitzenrater moved with his wife 

and children to New York, where he began working in his brother's 

scuba shop. Mr. Heitzenrater worked for his brother for about 

three weeks. During that time, he became quite fervent in his 

religious beliefs, which he had recently embraced as a result of 

attending a Pentecostal tent meeting. Mr. Heitzenrater began 

"preaching" to his wife and brother. He became extremely critical 

of Mrs. Heitzenrater, verbally abusing her and sometimes "kicking 

her in the backside." Mrs. Heitzenrater took the couple's 

children and moved out of the apartment that they had shared. 

Two days later, Mr. Heitzenrater set off for Colorado. 

Although originally intending to seek employment in Colorado, Mr. 

Heitzenrater explained that the journey became dominated by his 

religious preoccupations. Sometime after he arrived in Denver, 

Mr. Heitzenrater was found in a partially incoherent state and 

taken to Denver General Hospital for two days of observation and 

psychiatric treatment. 

On May 25, 1983, Mr. Heitzenrater was transferred from Denver 

General Hospital to the Denver Veterans' Administration Hospital. 

He was placed in the psychiatric ward and housed in a room on the 

seventh floor of the hospital. While in the V.A. hospital, Mr. 

Heitzenrater had a vision (later diagnosed as a brief, reactive 

psychosis) which led him to break through the window of the 

hospital and fall seven floors to the ground below. 

2 

Appellate Case: 88-2770 Document: 010110103833 Date Filed: 02/22/1991 Page: 2 
As a result of his fall, Mr. Heitzenrater was partially 

paralyzed. Mr. Heitzenrater received many months of treatment, 

but the lower part of his body remains totally paralyzed, and he 

has impaired movement in his upper body such that he has been 

diagnosed as a quadriplegic. Mr. Heitzenrater's paralysis is 

permanent, and he requires assistance in performing many of the 

tasks necessary for day-to-day living. 

Mr. and Mrs. Heitzenrater brought this action against the 

United States for damages sustained as a result of Mr. 

Heitzenrater's injuries. The government conceded liability for 

negligent supervision of Mr. Heitzenrater while he was a patient 

at the V.A. hospital. After a bench trial on the question of 

damages, the district court awarded damages to Mr. Heitzenrater in 

the amount of $5,685,502 and to Mrs. Heitzenrater in the amount of 

$1,098,591. 

Of the twelve separate damage awards to Mr. Heitzenrater, the 

government appeals as excessive the following three awards: 

$2,000,000 for pain and suffering; $2,111,022 for future nursing 

services; and $603,557 for future lost earnings. Of the three 

separate damage awards to Mrs. Heitzenrater, the government 

appeals as excessive the following two: $750,000 for loss of 

consortium; and $215,037 for future nursing care services to be 

performed on behalf of her husband. The government has paid the 

Heitzenraters $1,067,898 to satisfy the judgment for those damage 

awards not appealed. 

3 

Appellate Case: 88-2770 Document: 010110103833 Date Filed: 02/22/1991 Page: 3 
DISCUSSION 

Actions brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") 

are tried before the district court judge without a jury. 28 

u.s.c. S 2402. The district court's factual findings in support 

of damages awarded in FTCA cases are reviewed only for clear 

error. See Hoskie v. United States, 666 F.2d 1353, 1354 (10th 

Cir. 1981). A finding is clearly erroneous only if after 

reviewing the record, the appellate court is "left with the 

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." 

United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 

(1948). 

An award is excessive if it "shocks the judicial conscience." 

Miller v. United States Ex. Rel. Dept. of the Army, 901 F.2d 894, 

897 (10th Cir. 1990). See also Wells v. Colorado College, 478 

F.2d 158, 162 (10th Cir. 1973) (noting that a fact finder's bias, 

passion, or prejudice in awarding damages can be inferred from 

excessiveness). Accordingly, we proceed to review the five 

individual damage awards appealed by the government in light of 

this standard. 

A. The Award for Pain and Suffering 

The record is replete with evidence of the pain and suffering 

experienced by Mr. Heitzenrater as a result of his fall. As the 

district court recognized in its order, there was also significant 

evidence presented showing that this pain and suffering will 

continue for the duration of Mr. Heitzenrater's life. 

4 

Appellate Case: 88-2770 Document: 010110103833 Date Filed: 02/22/1991 Page: 4 
Nevertheless, because we find the district court's award of 

$2,000,000 to be excessive, we reduce the award. 

We begin by acknowledging how difficult it is to place a 

monetary value on pain and suffering: 

Just as no human being can truly measure the sorrow of 

another, neither can he put a specific monetary price on 

it .•.. And yet, since monetary compensation is the 

only type we can assess against the defendant[] in cases 

such as this, we must attempt to arrive at some monetary 

measure. 

Felder v. United States, 543 F.2d 657, 674 (9th Cir. 1976). In 

Hoskie v. United States, 666 F.2d 1353 (10th Cir. 1984), this 

court stated that "[i]t is a difficult and often fruitless task to 

compare damages in one case with those in another, and we do not 

generally countenance such comparisons." Id. at 1358 n.4. 

Nonetheless, in Hoskie, we engaged in this exercise to review a 

damage award for pain and suffering under the FTCA. Our research 

of the published decisions of this court, the district courts 

within this circuit, and the highest state courts of those states 

within our jurisdiction has disclosed virtually no cases involving 

a review of damage awards for excessiveness for injuries rendering 

a plaintiff a quadriplegic. 1 Appellants contend that the two 

1 Recently, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed a $5,000,000 

jury verdict in favor of a plaintiff who was rendered a 

quadriplegic as a result of a skiing accident. Aspen Skiing 

Company v. Peer, No. 895C548, slip op. (Colo. filed Jan 14, 1991). 

However, we have no way of knowing what percent of the award was 

attributable to pain and suffering. Further, the court never 

addressed the issue of whether the award was excessive. 

The reported cases involving awards for injuries causing 

paraplegia are equally scant. See L.9...:,., United States Steel v. 

Warner, 378 F.2d 995 (10th Cir. 1967) ($160,000 awarded to 

paraplegic for all damages including pain and suffering); Hampton 

v. State Comm., 209 Kan. 565, 498 P.2d 236 (1972) ($450,000 

awarded to paraplegic without specifying what portion was for pain 

and suffering). 

5 

Appellate Case: 88-2770 Document: 010110103833 Date Filed: 02/22/1991 Page: 5 
• 

million dollars awarded to Mr. Heitzenrater for his pain and 

suffering is larger than any damage award for pain and suffering 

that has ever been sustained upon review for excessiveness in the 

state courts of Colorado. Appellees do not refute this 

assertion, 2 and our research has disclosed no authority to the 

contrary. 3 The case closest on point is Garcia v. United States, 

697 F. Supp. 1570 (D. Colo. 1988). In Garcia, the United States 

District Court for the District of Colorado awarded $300,000 in 

damages under the FTCA for non-economic losses, primarily pain and 

suffering, to a plaintiff who was rendered a quadriplegic by the 

2 Appellees point to the decision of the Colorado Court of 

Appeals in Whitlock v. University of Denver, 712 P.2d 1072, 1077 

(Colo. Ct. App. 1985) (improper for district court to remit jury 

verdict of $7.3 million dollars in favor of quadriplegic to $4 

million dollars), rev'd on other grounds, 744 P.2d 54 (Colo. 

1987). However, because that decision was reversed, it is without 

precedential effect. 

3 In Rawson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 615 F. Supp. 1546 (D.Colo. 

1985), rev'd on other grounds, 822 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1987), 

cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1006 (1988), the federal district court 

awarded plaintiff nineteen million dollars for pain and suffering 

under a Colorado wrongful discharge statute and noted that the 

defendant's brief cited "two recent Colorado district court cases 

awarding quadriplegic plaintiffs $4,900,000 and $4,100,000 for 

pain and suffering, loss of income, and medical expenses." Id. at 

1548. We cannot consider those verdicts in our review of the 

award in this case because there is no way of determining what 

portion of the award was for pain or suffering or whether the 

verdicts were sustained on appeal. Moreover, we do not consider 

the verdict in the Rawson case because that decision was reversed 

on appeal. 

Of the Tenth Circuit cases cited by appellees, only two 

involve awards for pain and suffering in excess of $1 million 

dollars which were upheld on appeal. See Miller, 901 F.2d at 897 

($1.5 million dollar award for pain and suffering of a braindamaged teenager in an Oklahoma FTCA action sustained); Blevins v. 

Cessna Aircraft Co., 728 F.2d 1576, 1579 (10th Cir.), cert. 

dismissed, 468 U.S. 1228 (1984) (Wyoming jury verdict for $1.3 

million dollars to a plaintiff injured in an airplane crash did 

not shock the judicial conscience). However, neither of those 

cases arose in Colorado nor involved injuries similar to Mr. 

Heitzenrater's. 

6 

Appellate Case: 88-2770 Document: 010110103833 Date Filed: 02/22/1991 Page: 6 
defendants' medical malpractice. 4 Id. at 1570, 1576. The amount 

of the judgment in Garcia is a useful touchstone for determining 

whether the $2,000,000 pain and suffering award in this case was 

excessive. 

If this action had arisen after 1986, the district court 

would have been constrained by the Colorado damages limitation 

statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. S 13-21-102.5(3)(a), to limit Mr. 

Heitzenrater's damages for pain and suffering to $250,000 (or 

$500,000 if shown by clear and convincing evidence). Although we 

recognize that this statute does not control the present case, 5 it 

was in effect at the time the district court made its award, and 

we consider it to be a strong policy statement on the parameters 

of liability in Colorado. The policy represented by this statute 

as well as the paucity of Colorado appellate authority supporting 

awards of this size convince us that the $2,000,000 pain and 

suffering award was excessive. 6 

4 Garcia was decided under the Colorado damages limitation 

statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. S 13-21-102.S(J)(a), which places a 

$500,000 limit on pain and suffering awards where the plaintiff 

proves his damages by clear and convincing evidence. However, the 

damages awarded by the district court fell $200,000 below the 

statutory ceiling. 

5 See Appellant's Br. at 13, n.8 (conceding that because this 

action was filed before the statute was adopted, it is not 

controlling). 

6 Appellees' attempt to portray the $2,000,000 award as a mere 

$40,000 per year compensation to Mr. Heitzenrater over the 

estimated remaining forty-nine years of his life simply ignores 

the present value of that award. If Mr. Heitzenrater were to 

invest the $2,000,000 award, even a modest seven percent return 

would generate $140,000 of income a year, while leaving the 

principal unaffected. Employing those same conservative 

calculations, our modification of the award to $1,000,000 will 

generate $70,000 a year for Mr. Heitzenrater without requiring him 

[Footnote continued on next page .•• ] 

7 

Appellate Case: 88-2770 Document: 010110103833 Date Filed: 02/22/1991 Page: 7 
Our next task is to determine the appropriate damages to be 

awarded to Mr. Heitzenrater to compensate him for his pain and 

suffering. Our task is made easier because the parties' views as 

to what constitutes a fair figure seemingly converges to a figure 

of $1,000,000. The United States urges us to "lower the award for 

pain and suffering to not more than$ 1 million." Appellant's Br. 

at 15. Mr. Heizenrater in closing urged that "the interests of 

justice would be served by compensating [Mr. Heitzenrater] for his 

physical and mental pain and suffering, his loss of enjoyment of 

life, certainly by an amount that would be not less than one 

million dollars." R. Vol. VII at 605. Therefore, we modify the 

7 pain and suffering award to $1,000,000. 

B. The Award to Mr. Heitzenrater of $2,111,022 for Future 

Nursing Services 

In Colorado, "[a]n award of future medical expenses must be 

based upon substantial evidence which establishes the reasonable 

probability that such expenses will necessarily be incurred." 

Reynolds v. Reichwein, 510 P.2d 895, 896 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973). 

[ ... footnote continued] 

to invade principal. In addition, of course, Mr. Heitzenrater has 

received other awards in excess of $2,000,000 which are final 

because the government did not appeal as to them; he and his wife 

will receive other awards in excess of $700,000 which we are 

affirming on this appeal; and he has the potential for still 

further awards as several claims are being remanded to the 

district court for further consideration. 

7 We have determined that remanding the calculation of the pain 

and suffering award back to the district court would not serve the 

interests of justice or the best interests of the parties. See 

Felder, 543 F.2d at 671; Drayton v. Jiffee Chemical Corp., 591 

F.2d 352, 367 (6th Cir. 1978). Therefore, we exercise our power 

under 28 u.s.c. S 2106 and set the award at one-million dollars. 

8 

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Because we hold that the district court's award was not supported 

by such evidence, we reverse and remand for recalculation. 

In assessing the appropriate amount of damages for Mr. 

Heitzenrater's future nursing and rehabilitative services, the 

district court stated: 

almost 90 percent of the damages that I award in this 

order are fully consistent with the recommendations of 

the government's advisory witness, John E. Dahlberg, in 

either his report of "Anticipated Annual Medical and 

Rehabilitation Expenses-Rodney Heitzenrater," or his 

testimony at trial. The actual damages amounts awarded 

were predominantly based on his estimates of their 

probable expense. 

Based on Mr. Dahlberg's testimony and other evidence in 

the record, I find that these special services have a 

reasonable annual cost of $45,619. I further find that 

the present value of such future daytime nursing, 

nurse's aide, attendant and housecare services equals $2,111,022. 

R. Vol., Doc. 3 at 9, 16. The government argues that the district 

court's award is not supported by evidence in the record because 

Mr. Dahlberg testified at trial that he no longer believed his 

original projection of $45,619.20 per year was correct. 

On direct examination, Mr. Dahlberg testified that the 

estimate for annual attendant care in his report was $45,619.20. 

R. Vol.Vat 372; see Plaintiffs' Ex. 6. However, after reading 

Mr. Heitzenrater's records from the rehabilitative program at 

Craig Hospital, Mr. Dahlberg indicated that his earlier assessment 

might no longer be accurate: 

the next area that comes to mind is the -- that I come 

to, rather, is the attendant care, and from looking at 

the records at Craig Hospital, they in several -- various parts, they are talking about Mr. Heitzenrater's 

capability of being totally independent. If in fact he 

were totally independent, the first two areas of 

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Appellate Case: 88-2770 Document: 010110103833 Date Filed: 02/22/1991 Page: 9 
attendant care, the live-in nurse aide at $31,000 and 

the skilled nursing visit of $12,775 would not be 

required. And, once again, those are the projected -- the projections from the therapists, at Craig Hospital. 

R. Vol.vat 384-85. Despite Mr. Dahlberg's testimony that his 

original estimated annual cost for attendant care of $45,619.20 

might be based on invalid premises, the district court adopted the 

original figure without modification. 

Despite the discrepancies between Mr. Dahlberg's prepared 

report and his testimony at trial, appellees nevertheless contend 

that the district court's award is supported by substantial 

evidence in the record. Appellees emphasize those portions of the 

record demonstrating that Mr. Heitzenrater had not achieved full 

independence as of the time of trial. However, the only evidence 

that appellees point to which even remotely indicates that Mr. 

Heitzenrater will need attendant care for the rest of his life is 

the testimony of Ms. Helen Woodard, a rehabilitation expert called 

as the plaintiffs' witness: 

Q: So then with a --- let's say, a new accessible 

house, and appropriate training, perhaps at Craig, he 

should be substantially more functionally independent 

than he is now? 

A: That would be what we hope the goal of the program 

was. Given how far it is post-injury, there are some 

psychological things that have developed that may make 

that much more difficult, if not impossible. 

Q: Do you think more probably than not that he will 

ever achieve full independence this far after the event, 

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Appellate Case: 88-2770 Document: 010110103833 Date Filed: 02/22/1991 Page: 10 
even given motivation and -- for example, Craig Hospital 

rehabilitation. 

A: Probably not. 

R. Vol. v. at 336, 355-56. Such equivocal testimony simply does 

not constitute the "substantial evidence" forming a "reasonable 

probability" of continued dependence to support the district 

court's conclusion that Mr. Heitzenrater "will be dependent upon 

the care of others for the remainder of his life." R. Vol. I, 

Doc. 3 at 7. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's award 

and remand for further findings by the district court and a 

recalculation of the appropriate award. 

C. The Award to Mr. Heitzenrater of $603.557 for Lost Future 

Earning Capacity 

The next award of damages appealed by the government is that 

of $603,557 for Mr. Heitzenrater's loss of future earning 

capacity. The government argues that because of Mr. 

Heitzenrater's sporadic work history and his low earned income for 

the several years preceding the accident, the district court erred 

in concluding that Mr. Heitzenrater would have achieved parity 

with other similarly situated workers. 

In Colorado, as elsewhere, "[in] determining the 

compensation to be awarded for the impairment of physical capacity 

and ability to earn, the test to be applied is what the capacity 

would have been if not interfered with because of the injury 

proximately caused by the defendant." Brittis v. Freemon, 527 

P.2d 1175, 1179 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974). Implicit in that 

determination is an assessment of what the plaintiff's earnings 

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capacity is in light of the injury forming the basis for 

liability. 

In this case, the district court's calculations were premised 

on the following findings: 

[Mr. Heitzenrater's] chances for future employment are 

minimal. Uncontroverted evidence at trial showed that 

only about 10-20% of quadriplegics similar to Rodney are 

able to either secure or physically withstand 

employment. Of that number, most have higher levels of 

education and intelligence than Rodney. It is 

especially significant that Rodney suffers from 

dysfunctional use of both hands, especially his right. 

He is right handed. Based on all the evidence, I find 

that this disability precludes his performing adequately 

the skills necessary for clerical, receptionist and 

other similar positions where manual dexterity is 

required. I therefore conclude that it is more probable 

than not that Rodney will not be employable in the 

future and thus he has sustained a complete loss of 

earning capacity. 

R. Vol., Doc. 3 at 19 (emphasis added). After a careful review of 

the record, we hold that the district court's finding that Mr. 

Heitzenrater is permanently unemployable, although controverted by 

some evidence in the record, is not clearly erroneous and must 

therefore be affirmed. Having accepted the district court's 

finding of Mr. Heitzenrater's lifelong full employment disability, 

we must next review the amount of the district court's award for 

future earnings. 

The district court awarded Mr. Heitzenrater $603,557 for lost 

future earnings based on the evidence of Dr. Larry Singell, an 

economist called as an expert witness by the plaintiffs. Dr. 

Singell had calculated Mr. Heitzenrater's lost earnings from the 

time of the accident to the date of trial on the assumption that, 

had it not been for the accident, Mr. Heitzenrater would have been 

able to earn only 70% of what an average white male with one to 

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Appellate Case: 88-2770 Document: 010110103833 Date Filed: 02/22/1991 Page: 12 
three years of high school education could earn. However, for the 

purpose of calculating lost future earnings subsequent to trial, 

Dr. Singell assumed that Mr. Heitzenrater would earn 100% of what 

an average white male with one to three years of high school would 

earn. The government maintains this was error because there is no 

evidence in the record indicating that Mr. Heitzenrater would ever 

have achieved the full earnings level of a person in that class. 

In his deposition, Dr. Singell explained that in making his 

calculation of lost future earnings he took account of Mr. 

Heitzenrater's past earnings record as well as his education: 

Now, I mentioned he completed high school and, in 

fact, had part of a college year but, to be 

conservative, I used the earnings of high school 

dropouts .... 

I think reasonable probabilities would say that he 

would have moved toward having some kind of a job work 

history. That is, most -- 95 percent of the males in 

our society work approximately full-time, that is, they 

normally experience some unemployment, too, but they -- it's typical that the most likely expectation is that he 

would have moved on to work and, in fact, in most of his 

adult life he worked and made an income, either in the 

military or otherwise, so I'm trying to factor in his 

actual demonstrated history and this pattern in his past 

to arrive at what, in my judgment, is a reasonable 

expectation of what he would have earned if he hadn't 

been injured. 

If you evaluate this from a reasonable economic 

point of view, it seems likely that Mr. Heitzenrater 

would have developed into a reasonable worker. Most 

people do. As I said before, 95 percent or more of 

white males with a high school diploma, with some 

college, develop into reasonable workers. 

Deposition of Dr. Singell at 53-54, 70 (emphasis added). 

The government challenges Dr. Singell's analysis arguing that 

"[t]here is no evidence that Mr. Heitzenrater had any college 

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Appellate Case: 88-2770 Document: 010110103833 Date Filed: 02/22/1991 Page: 13 
training." Appellant's Reply Br. at 9 n.S. In their brief, 

appellees do not suggest that Mr. Heitzenrater ever attended 

college, or that any evidence was introduced to that effect. We 

have not found any evidence in the record suggesting Mr. 

Heitzenrater ever attended college other than the remarks of Dr. 

Singell. As the above testimony shows, although Dr. Singell at 

one point indicated that he assumed Mr. Heitzenrater would have 

established a stable work pattern because 95% of white males with 

"some college" do so, he had earlier stated that same projection 

without reference to any college education. Importantly, Dr. 

Singell's projections used the income levels of white male high 

school dropouts, even though Mr. Heitzenrater has a high school 

degree, thus taking into account Mr. Heitzenrater's inconsistent 

work history. Therefore, we hold that whether or not Dr. 

Singell's assumption that Mr. Heitzenrater had at some point 

attended college was correct, the district court's finding that 

Mr. Heitzenrater's lost future income had a present value of 

$603,557 based on Dr. Singell's testimony and report is not 

clearly erroneous. 8 

8 Dr. Singell's report estimated Mr. Heitzenrater's lost future 

earnings as $505,800 and his loss of future benefits as 101,400. 

See Plaintiff's Ex. 10. Although the district court purported to 

rely on Dr. Singell's report, the court concluded that the amount 

Mr. Heitzenrater's lost future earnings was $502,765 and that his 

lost future fringe benefits were valued at $100,792. See R. Vol. 

I, Doc. 3 at 20. Although the reason for this small discrepancy 

is unclear, we need not address the question as neither party 

challenges it on appeal. 

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D. The Award to Mrs. Heitzenrater of $215,000 for Future 

Nighttime Services to Mr. Heitzenrater 

The district court awarded Mrs. Heitzenrater $215,000 for 

future nighttime services that she would have to perform on her 

husband's behalf as a result of the accident (primarily consisting 

of repositioning him at two-hour intervals during the night to 

prevent bed sores). The district judge explained that: 

While I have awarded damages to Rodney Heitzenrater 

in an amount intended to provide daytime nursing and 

attendant care in the future so as to relieve Marlinda 

of this burden, Marlinda will still be expected to 

provide night-time (sic] attendant care for the 

remainder of Rodney's life. He requires assistance to 

change positions in bed, and cannot get out of bed or 

exit the house in the event of a fire or other 

emergency. I find that nighttime attendant care is 

necessary to help ensure Rodney's health and safety. 

Based on the evidence, I award Marlinda Heitzenrater 

$4.18 per hour for four hours per night. Based on Dr. 

Singell's calculations I find that the annual value of 

this service is $6,100, and that the discounted present 

value of this care amount equals $215,037. 

R. Vol. I, Doc. 3 at 22. The government argues, and we agree, 

that there is absolutely no evidence in the record supporting the 

district court's conclusion that it would take Mrs. Heitzenrater 

four hours each evening to assist Mr. Heitzenrater. 

Appellees point out that Helen M. Woodard, a rehabilitation 

counselor called as an expert witness by the plaintiffs, testified 

that without the availability of Mrs. Heitzenrater's assistance, 

Mr. Heitzenrater would need a night attendant. See R. Vol. IV at 

270. Although Ms. Woodard never explicitly testified that she had 

assumed that a night attendant would be required for eight hours 

each evening, her calculations were apparently based on that 

15 

Appellate Case: 88-2770 Document: 010110103833 Date Filed: 02/22/1991 Page: 15 
premise. 9 While a hired night attendant might be required for an 

eight-hour shift to assist Mr. Heitzenrater at two-hour intervals, 

at no point did Ms. Woodard ever explain why it would take Mrs. 

Heitzenrater eight hours each evening to reposition her husband in 

bed. In fact, there was some evidence presented suggesting that 

Mr. Heitzenrater may only need minimal nighttime assistance. See 

R. Vol. VI at 445 (testimony of Mrs. Heitzenrater that Mr. 

Heitzenrater can turn to the right without assistance); Id. at 477 

(testimony of Mrs. Heitzenrater that her husband sleeps primarily 

on his stomach, independently turning himself to his backside and 

in the early morning hours turning himself from his backside to 

his right side); R. Vol. III at 140 (testimony of Mr. Heitzenrater 

that he sleeps on his stomach and needs his wife's assistance with 

that original transfer). 

The district judge recognized that Ms. Woodard's estimate was 

flawed and stated "I question whether [nighttime attendant care) 

would be necessary for eight hours every night. But I also 

question whether the $4.18 an hour for the kind of skill she has 

shown is adequate, so maybe they offset to some extent." R. Vol. 

VII at 607. In an attempt to modify Ms. Woodard's assumption that 

eight hours of assistance would be needed nightly, the district 

court halved the hours and calculated the damages award on that 

basis. Although we believe the district court correctly 

questioned the need for eight hours of Mrs. Heitzenrater's 

services each evening, we must reverse the court's award because 

9 

care 

days 

In her report, Ms. Woodard calculated the annual cost of such 

at $12,200 per year at $4.18 an hour ($4.18 x 8 hrs. x 365 

= $12,200). See Plaintiffs' Exhibit 11. 

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the court's estimate of four hours of assistance each evening is 

unsupported by any evidence in the record. We therefore reverse 

the damages award and remand so that the district court may 

conduct the further proceedings necessary to determine the actual 

amount of time which will be required of Mrs. Heitzenrater to 

reposition her husband during the night and recalculate the 

damages award accordingly. 

E. The Award of S750,000 to Mrs. Heitzenrater for Loss 

of Consortium 

The district court awarded Mrs. Heitzenrater $750,00 for loss 

of consortium, ruling as follows: 

Plaintiffs' marriage prior to Rodney's injuries was far 

from ideal. Rodney had committed infidelity and 

Marlinda had once filed a petition for divorce. 

However, since her husband's injuries, Marlinda has 

shown an intense loyalty and devotion to her husband and 

the relationship currently appears stable. Both are 

devoutly religious. Marlinda regularly attends church 

services three times a week. Moreover, both plaintiffs 

demonstrate deep affection for their three daughters and 

solid commitment to their marriage. Thus, I find and 

conclude that the marriage is secure and likely to be 

lifelong. 

Nevertheless, Rodney's injuries and resulting 

disability have tremendously impacted the marital 

relationship and have forced Marlinda to assume many 

onerous, sometimes repulsive, burdens and 

responsibilities far beyond the scope of a wife's duties 

in an ordinary marriage. Moreover she has been denied, 

at a youthful age, most of the joy, benefits, support 

and security of a normal marital relationship. I 

therefore award to Marlinda Heitzenrater as reasonable 

damages for past and future loss of consortium, the 

amount of $750,000. 

R. Vol. I, Doc. 3 at 21. 

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In Colorado, damages for non-economic loss of consortium 

include "damages in the form of loss of affection, society, 

companionship, and aid and comfort of the injured spouse 

Colorado Jury Instructions-Civil 3d S 6:6(1) (1989). It is 

evident from this definition that damages for loss of consortium 

attempt to compensate for the intangible loss of affection. 

It 

All but one of the considerations relied on by the district 

court were improper for determining the non-economic damages of 

Mrs. Heitzenrater under Colorado law. First, the fact that the 

Heitzenraters have achieved greater marital harmony and been 

brought closer together as a result of Mr. Heitzenrater's tragic 

accident, while admirable, is not a proper consideration for 

measuring what Mrs. Heitzenrater lost as a result of her husband's 

injuries. Second, the burdens of caring for Mr. Heitzenrater that 

were imposed on Mrs. Heitzenrater were accounted for elsewhere in 

the court's damage awards. Mrs. Heitzenrater was compensated for 

pretrial services on her husband's behalf in that portion of the 

damage award which the government elected not to appeal. As to 

the future, the award for future nighttime services by Mrs. 

Heitzenrater and the award to Mr. Heitzenrater for daytime 

attendant care, once recalculated on remand, will remove any 

future uncompensated impositions on Mrs. Heitzenrater. Any award 

of loss of consortium for those burdens would be a duplicative 

award. 

The only factor which the district court should have 

considered in awarding damages for non-economic loss of consortium 

is the loss of Mr. Heitzenrater's "affection, society, 

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companionship, aid and comfort" which Mrs. Heitzenrater incurred 

as a result of her husband's injuries. We believe that when the 

amount of the award is viewed against that standard, it is evident 

that the damages award in this case was improper. 

The district court's characterization of the Heitzenraters' 

marriage prior to the accident as "far from ideal" understates the 

seriousness of their marital problems. Six months after the 

couple was married (approximately two years before the accident), 

Mrs. Heitzenrater moved in with her brother for four or five days 

because she learned that her husband had been involved in an 

extramarital affair. R. Vol. II at 64. Mr. Heitzenrater 

testified that he had a second affair in June 1982, which again 

resulted in a separation. Id. at 65. That separation lasted five 

months, although the two saw one another frequently. Id. It was 

during that time period that divorce papers were filed and a 

restraining order was entered against Mr. Heitzenrater in light of 

his past altercations with Mrs. Heitzenrater's brother. Id. at 

66-67. Mr. Heitzenrater testified at trial that in May 1983, two 

days before he set out on his journey for Colorado, he had been so 

verbally abusive to his wife that she had become fearful of him 

and, with the children, moved out of the family's apartment. When 

asked if he had struck his wife, Mr. Heitzenrater testified "I 

pushed her out of the way .... I do remember kicking her in 

the backside and telling her she was no good." R. Vol. II at 96. 

In light of Mr. Heitzenrater's history of abuse and 

infidelity, it is clear that his injuries did not deprive Mrs. 

Heitzenrater of "affection, society, companionship, aid and 

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comfort" so as to justify a $750,000 award for loss of consortium. 

See Gelinas v. Mackey, 465 A.2d 498, 501 (N.H. 1983) (where couple 

had been separated at the time of trial, "[t]he jury might have 

concluded that their relationship was so strained or non-existent 

[sic] at the time of the collision as to justify a zero verdict on 

the issue of loss of consortium"). 10 Accordingly, we modify the 

award down to an amount of $100,000. 

CONCLUSION 

We REVERSE the award of $2,000,000 to Mr. Heitzenrater for pain 

and suffering and MODIFY the award to $1,000,000. We AFFIRM the 

award to Mr. Heitzenrater for future lost income. We REVERSE the 

district court's award of $750,000 to Mrs. Heitzenrater for loss 

of consortium and MODIFY the award to $100,000. We REVERSE the 

award to Mr. Heitzenrater for future attendant care and the award 

to Mrs. Heitzenrater for future nighttime services and order that 

10 We would reverse this award for loss of consortium even if 

there were other Colorado cases in which comparably sized awards 

were upheld. However, we are especially persuaded that reversal 

is warranted here in light of the government's assertion that this 

award is the single largest damage award for loss of consortium 

under Colorado law. Appellees do not direct our attention to any 

published opinions to the contrary, and we have found none in our 

research. See,~, Schell v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 693 

P.2d 382, 384 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984) (award of $48,550 for loss of 

consortium); Garcia v. United States, 697 F. Supp. 1570, 1576 

(D.Colo. 1988) (award of $150,000 for loss of consortium); Mays v. 

United States, 608 F. Supp. 1476, 1483 (D.Colo. 1985) (award of 

$36,000 for loss of consortium), rev'd on other grounds, 806 F.2d 

976 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 913 (1987). 

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these damage claims be REMANDED for further proceedings consistent 

with this order. 

Entered for the Court 

David M. Ebel 

Circuit Judge 

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