Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01253/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01253-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Coalinga State Hospital
Defendant
Audrey King
Defendant
Michael B. Williams
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL B. WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

v.

AUDREY KING, et al.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:13-cv-01253-MJS (PC)

ORDER (1) DISMISSING ACTION WITH 

PREJUDICE FOR FAILURE TO STATE A 

CLAIM (ECF No. 13), AND (2) DENYING 

MOTION FOR DECLARATORY 

JUDGMENT AND COURT ORDER (ECF 

No. 12)

CLERK TO CLOSE CASE

Plaintiff is a civil detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil 

rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF Nos. 8 & 13.) Plaintiff has 

consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction. (ECF No. 4.) No other parties have appeared 

in the action.

Plaintiff’s complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim, but he was given 

leave to amend. (ECF No. 11.) His first amended complaint (ECF No. 13) is before the 

Court for screening. Also before the Court is Plaintiff’s “Motion for Declaratory Judgment 

and Court Order Directing Defendants to Show Cause why his Continued Hospital 

Confinement is not Unconstitutional.” (ECF No. 12.) Aside from the caption, the motion is 

identical to the first amended complaint.

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I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The in forma pauperis statute provides, “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any 

portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if 

the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

II. PLEADING STANDARD

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.”

Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for 

vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 

(1989).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and 

(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state 

law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 

1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere 

possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are 

accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78.

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III. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff is detained at Coalinga State Hospital (“CSH”). He names as Defendants: 

(1) Audrey King, Executive Director of CSH, and (2) CSH. 

Plaintiff’s allegations may be summarized essentially as follows.

On December 6, 2000, the San Francisco District Attorney filed a petition 

pursuant to California’s Sexually Violent Predator Act (“SVPA”) to have Plaintiff civilly 

detained for an involuntary two year hospital term.1 Plaintiff has been detained by the 

California Department of State Hospitals since January 3, 2003. 

On April 26, 2013, Plaintiff filed in state court a motion to dismiss the prior 

commitment petition on speedy trial grounds. The motion was denied. Plaintiff still has 

not had a commitment trial, and is being held at CSH based solely on the state court’s 

determination of probable cause. It is unclear whether Plaintiff alleges that he never had 

a civil commitment trial, or only whether he did not have a subsequent trial after his initial 

two-year commitment term expired. 

Plaintiff seeks a declaration that the SVPA is unconstitutional as applied because 

he has been awaiting a civil commitment trial for twelve years. He further seeks a 

declaration that his continued detention is unconstitutional.

IV. ANALYSIS

The exclusive method for challenging the fact or duration of Plaintiff’s confinement 

is by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 

(2005). See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Such claims may not be brought in a section 1983 

action. Nor may Plaintiff seek to invalidate the fact or duration of his confinement 

indirectly through a judicial determination that necessarily implies the unlawfulness of the 

State’s custody. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81. A section 1983 action is barred, no matter the 

 

1

Prior to the SVPA’s amendment in 2006, a sexually violent predator was committed to the custody of the 

Department of Mental Health for a two year term, and was not kept in custody in excess of two years 

unless a new petition to extend the commitment was filed. Bourquez v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 

142, 144 (Cal. App. 2007). The law since has been changed to provide for indefinite commitment of 

sexually violent predators, with periodic review. Id.; Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6604 (2006).

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relief sought, if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of 

confinement or its duration. Id. at 81-82; Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 489 (1994) 

(unless and until favorable termination of the conviction or sentence, no cause of action 

under section 1983 exists); Huftile v. Miccio-Fonseca, 410 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 

2005) (applying Heck to SVPA detainees with access to habeas relief). 

Plaintiff’s request for a declaratory judgment seeks to invalidate aspects of the 

SVPA or its implementation that have resulted in his continued detention beyond the 

expiration of his initial SVPA commitment order. Thus, his claim directly challenges his 

continued custody, and may not be brought in a section 1983 action. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 

at 78. Until Plaintiff’s civil detention has been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by 

executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such 

determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas 

corpus,” Plaintiff is barred from bringing his claims under section 1983. Heck, 512 U.S. at 

487.

Plaintiff previously was advised of this deficiency and provided an opportunity to 

amend his complaint to explain how his claims are cognizable in light of the above 

restrictions. (ECF No. 11.) He has not so explained. Further leave to amend would be 

futile and will be denied. Because Plaintiff’s motion for declaratory judgment and court 

order (ECF No. 12) is substantively identical to the first amended complaint (ECF No. 

13), it will be denied on the same ground.

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff’s claims challenge the validity of his confinement and may only be 

brought in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to state any 

claims that are cognizable under section 1983. This deficiency is not capable of being 

cured through amendment. Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212-13 (9th Cir. 2012). 

Plaintiff will not be given further leave to amend.

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

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1. The action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim, 

2. Plaintiff’s motion for declaratory judgment and court order (ECF No. 12) is 

DENIED, and

3. The Clerk of court shall terminate any and all pending motions and CLOSE 

this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 27, 2015 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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