Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca6-09-03521/USCOURTS-ca6-09-03521-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Martin T. Williams
Appellant

Document Text:

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206

File Name: 10a0204p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MARTIN T. WILLIAMS,

 Defendant-Appellant.

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No. 09-3521

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland.

No. 02-00022-003—Ann Aldrich, District Judge.

Argued: June 8, 2010

Decided and Filed: July 15, 2010 

Before: DAUGHTREY, GILMAN, and SUTTON, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Kenneth P. Tableman, KENNETH P. TABLEMAN, P.C., Grand Rapids,

Michigan, for Appellant. Carol M. Skutnik, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,

Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Kenneth P. Tableman, KENNETH P.

TABLEMAN, P.C., Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellant. Carol M. Skutnik,

ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee. 

_________________

OPINION

_________________

RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. A jury convicted Martin T. Williams on

five counts of fraudulently overbilling Medicare, Medicaid, and several private insurance

companies as an employee of a psychiatric medical practice. The district court sentenced

Williams to 12 months of probation and ordered him to pay restitution in the amount of

$822,459.21. Williams appeals his conviction, as well as the amount of restitution that he

1

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was ordered to pay. He also brings a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. For the

reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the portion of the district court’s judgment relating to

Williams’s conviction, DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE Williams’s ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claim, VACATE the portion of the district court’s judgment that

concerns restitution, and REMAND the restitution issue for further consideration.

I. BACKGROUND

In January 2002, Dr. Lal P. Rohira, Sharonne A. Szyrej, and Williams were indicted

on one count of conspiracy to commit mail fraud, wire fraud, and healthcare fraud; on three

counts of wire fraud; and on one count of healthcare fraud. The relevant conduct took place

between approximately July 1991 and September 1997. Szyrej and Williams worked as

employees of Rohira, a psychiatrist. All three were charged with illegally billing the federal

government’s Medicare and Medicaid programs, as well as a number of private insurance

companies, primarily at the direction of Rohira. Specifically, the indictment charged Rohira,

Szyrej, and Williams with “upcoding” (billing for full therapy sessions when only medicine

checkups were provided), billing for scheduled patients who missed their appointments, and

billing for therapy services provided by Szyrej, who was not licensed to perform such

services.

The district court severed the trial of Williams from the joint trial of Rohira and

Szyrej. Szyrej subsequently pled guilty to the conspiracy charge and agreed to testify against

her codefendants in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining four charges against her.

She later testified as a government witness at the separate trials of both Rohira and Williams.

Rohira was tried before a jury in July 2003 and was found guilty on all five counts.

He then filed motions for acquittal and for a new trial. These motions remained pending

before the district court when Williams went to trial.

Williams was tried before a jury in December 2003. After the close of the evidence,

Williams’s trial counsel objected to a proposed jury instruction dealing with the concept of

deliberate ignorance. His counsel argued that this instruction conflicted with a later

instruction explaining the mental state required to show “the defendant’s connection to the

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conspiracy.” The district court overruled Williams’s objection and included the instruction

in its charge to the jury. Williams was found guilty on all counts.

Three days later, the district court sentenced Szyrej to one year of probation. In

addition, the court ordered Szyrej to pay restitution in the amount of $600, concluding that

the conspiracy victims had not been able to establish the amount of their losses.

A prior panel of this court described the subsequent procedural history of this case

as follows:

Williams filed timely post-trial motions for judgment of acquittal and

for a new trial with the court. In the latter filing, he alleged that the

prosecution had failed to disclose a letter sent by the government to two

prosecution witnesses, a letter that Williams contends constituted a “secret

agreement” not to prosecute the witnesses in exchange for their testimony

against Rohira and Williams, despite the witnesses’ own guilt in the

fraudulent billing scheme. According to the defendant, such non-disclosure

violated the mandates of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Giglio

v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), Supreme Court decisions requiring

the prosecution to provide criminal defendants with evidence in the

government’s possession that could be considered exculpatory or that could

serve to impeach the credibility of prosecution witnesses.

Over a year later, on February 4, 2005, the district court addressed

not only Williams’s motions for judgment of acquittal and for a new trial,

but also Rohira’s similar motions that had remained unresolved during the

pendency of Williams’s trial. In ruling upon those motions in separate

decisions, however, the district judge focused upon an issue that had not

been raised by either Williams or Rohira. In Williams’s case, the district

court noted:

The prosecution called FBI Special Agent Graupmann to

testify about the amount of financial loss caused by the

defendant’s alleged billing fraud; through a dubious method,

he estimated the loss at over $1 million. Under Booker and

Blakely, that is a fact that must be admitted by the defendant

or expressly found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt

before it may be used to help convict him or to increase his

sentence.

United States v. Williams, 355 F. Supp. 2d 903, 908 (N.D. Ohio 2005)

(footnote omitted), (citing United States v. Booker, 543 U .S. 220 (2005),

and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004)). Because the defendant’s

“jury was never expressly charged with finding the amount of loss,” the

district judge “concluded that Williams is entitled to a new trial under

Booker and Blakely.” Williams, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 909-10. The court “also

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noted that the prosecution’s alleged Brady violation might entitle Williams

to a new trial as well,” id. at 904, but, having already relied upon Booker and

Blakely to grant relief to the defendant, ruled that “Williams’s motion for a

new trial on the ground of the prosecution’s alleged violation of Brady v.

Maryland and his motion for judgment of acquittal due to insufficient

evidence are denied without prejudice.” Id. at 910.

On February 14, 2005, Rohira filed with the district court a timely

motion for reconsideration. In that filing, Rohira asked, in the interest of

judicial economy, for a ruling by the court on his unresolved request for

judgment of acquittal and for a new trial on grounds that he had originally

identified in his post-trial motion, including a Brady violation, prosecutorial

misconduct, and ineffective assistance of counsel. Eight days later, on

February 22, Williams filed his own motion for reconsideration, referencing

“the reasons more fully elucidated” by Rohira.

Concluding that Williams’s motion for reconsideration was untimely

and, thus, was not an impediment to the district court’s February 4 ruling

becoming final, the United States filed an appeal to this court on March 3,

2005 (docketed here as No. 05-3293). On August 9, 2005, however, the

district judge issued a decision addressing Williams’s motion for

reconsideration and specifying that the prosecution’s failure to “turn over a

letter which could readily be construed as a promise of nonprosecution in

exchange for the testimony of two key government witnesses” did indeed

result in a constitutional violation that entitled the defendant to a new trial.

The district court also concluded, however, that Williams’s motion for

judgment of acquittal should be denied “because the jury’s guilty verdicts

are supported by substantial and competent evidence.” The government then

filed a second appeal to this court that challenged only the propriety of the

August 9 ruling (docketed here as No. 05-4160). The two matters have now

been consolidated for appeal.

United States v. Williams, Nos. 05-3293, 05-4160, 2006 WL 3203748, at *1-*2 (6th Cir.

Nov. 6, 2006) (brackets and ellipses removed).

With regard to the government’s first appeal, this court concluded that the district

court erred in holding that Blakely and Booker mandated a new trial for Williams. Id. at *4.

The rule set forth by the Supreme Court in Blakely and Booker was not implicated because

“the district court never imposed sentence upon [Williams],” and the rule does not otherwise

apply to “the jury’s resolution of the issues presented to it.” Id. 

Concerning the government’s second appeal, this court determined that because the

district court lacked jurisdiction to enter the August 9, 2005 order, that order “was a legal

nullity.” Id. at *7. The panel noted, however, that “because the district court originally

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denied without prejudice the defendant’s motion for a new trial based upon alleged

Brady/Giglio violations, Williams remains free to file any subsequent collateral attack upon

his convictions that he deems proper.” Id. In conclusion, the court reversed the grant of a

new trial in Case Number 05-3293, vacated the judgment in Case Number 05-4160,

reinstated Williams’s convictions, and remanded the matter for sentencing. Id.

When the district court granted Williams’s motions for a new trial and for

reconsideration, the court also granted Rohira’s motions for the same relief on the same

grounds. The government appealed the court’s orders as to Rohira but, while that appeal was

pending, the parties reached a plea agreement. Rohira agreed to plead guilty to all five

counts of the indictment in exchange for a stipulation that, “[a]s a result of the conduct of

[Rohira] and his co-conspirators, [the conspiracy victims] suffered a loss of $500,000.”

While plea negotiations were taking place between the government and Rohira, the

same parties settled a qui tam action filed against Rohira for submitting false claims to

Medicare. Rohira agreed to pay $400,000 as a result of this settlement, and the qui tam

action was dismissed.

At Rohira’s sentencing, the government stated that the “negotiated” total amount of

the conspiracy victims’ losses was $400,000, and that this loss had been fully satisfied by

Rohira’s qui tam settlement payment. The government thus represented that the total amount

of the loss was $100,000 less than that set forth in the plea agreement, and then

(inaccurately) stated that the qui tam settlement payment would be divided up among all

victims of the conspiracy, when in fact a Federal Claims Act judgment is payable only to the

government and the relator. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729(a)(1), 3730(d). Rohira was therefore

not ordered to pay any further restitution, and he was sentenced to one year of probation.

Several months after the district court sentenced Rohira, this court reversed the

district court’s decision to grant a new trial to Williams, as detailed above, and remanded the

case for sentencing. On remand, a new Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) took

charge of the case. This new AUSA disagreed with Williams as to the appropriate sentence.

The AUSA also took a new position concerning the amount of restitution owed, claiming

that the victims’ losses had not in fact been fully compensated by Rohira’s settlement

payment as previously represented, and seeking restitution from Williams in the amount of

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$822,459.21. Williams argued in response that the government’s prior representation that

the total amount of the conspiracy victims’ losses was paid in full through Rohira’s $400,000

settlement estopped the government from seeking additional restitution from Williams. He

further contended that the government’s methodology was flawed in arriving at its new loss

calculations. 

After hearing the parties’ arguments, the court sentenced Williams to one year of

probation and issued an order of restitution against him for the full amount sought by the

government, without providing any factual findings concerning the amount of the loss or

ruling on Williams’s estoppel argument. Williams now appeals both his conviction and the

order of restitution.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Deliberate-ignorance instruction

On appeal, Williams challenges his conviction on the ground that the district court

gave an improper jury instruction that allowed “the jury to convict Williams of conspiracy

based on a theory that he was deliberately ignorant about the conspiratorial agreement.”

This instruction allegedly “contradicted the court’s later instruction that mere knowledge or

even approval was not enough to show that Williams was part of the conspiracy.”

The government responds that Williams is conflating two separate instructions. It

contends that the first instruction dealt with “deliberate ignorance and Williams’[s]

knowledge requirement concerning the illegal activity.” The second instruction “required

the jury to find Williams ‘knowingly and voluntarily’ joined the conspiracy.” Thus, the

government asserts that the instruction was proper and, even if it was improper, the

instruction was harmless error.

1. Standard of review

We review challenges to jury instructions under the abuse-of-discretion standard.

United States v. Russell, 595 F.3d 633, 642 (6th Cir. 2010). “When jury instructions are

claimed to be erroneous, we review the instructions as a whole, in order to determine

whether they adequately informed the jury of the relevant considerations and provided a

basis in law for aiding the jury in reaching its decision.” United States v. Frederick, 406

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F.3d 754, 761 (6th Cir. 2005). “A judgment may be reversed based upon an improper jury

instruction only if the instructions, viewed as a whole, were confusing, misleading, or

prejudicial.” United States v. Kuehne, 547 F.3d 667, 679 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). This means that we “will not reverse on the basis of an

erroneous jury instruction if the error was harmless.” Frederick, 406 F.3d at 761.

2. Merits of the arguments

The contested deliberate-ignorance jury instruction provided at Williams’s trial was

as follows:

Required mental state. Ordinarily, there is no way that a Defendant’s state

of mind can be proved directly, because no one can read another person’s

mind and tell what that person is thinking. But a Defendant’s state of mind

can be proved indirectly from the surrounding circumstances. This includes

things like what Mr. Williams said or what Mr. Williams did, how Mr.

Williams acted, and any other facts and circumstances in evidence that show

what was in Mr. Williams’[s] mind.

You may also consider the natural and probable results of any acts

that Mr. Williams knowingly did, and whether it is reasonable to conclude

that Mr. Williams intended those results. This, of course, is all for you to

decide.

No one can avoid responsibility for a crime by deliberately ignoring

the obvious. If you are convinced that Mr. Williams deliberately ignored a

high probability that the alleged co-conspirators were engaged in the fraud

charged, then you may find that he knew that they were engaged in that

fraud, but to find this you must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that

Mr. Williams was aware of a high probability that he was engaged in the

fraud charged, and that Mr. Williams deliberately closed his eyes to what

was obvious.

Carelessness or negligence or foolishness on their part is not the

same as knowledge, and is not enough to convict. This, of course, is all for

you to decide.

Williams argues that this instruction confused the jury and contradicted the district

court’s later instruction concerning the conspiracy charge, which was as follows:

If you are convinced that there was a criminal agreement, you must decide

whether the Government has proved that Mr. Williams knowingly and

voluntarily joined that agreement to convict. The Government must prove

that Mr. Williams knew the conspiracy’s main purpose and that he

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voluntarily joined it, intending to help advance or achieve its goals. This

does not require proof that Mr. Williams knew everything about the

conspiracy, or everyone else involved, or that he was a member of it from

the beginning, nor does it require proof that Mr. Williams played a major

role in the conspiracy or that his connection to it was substantial. A slight

role or connection may be enough.

But proof that Mr. Williams simply knew about a conspiracy or was

present at times or associated with members of the group is not enough, even

if he approved of what was happening or did not object to it. 

Similarly, just because Mr. Williams may have done something that

happened to help the conspiracy does not necessarily make him a

conspirator. These are all things that you may consider in deciding whether

the Government has proved that Mr. Williams joined this conspiracy.

Without more, these are not enough.

What the Government must prove is that Mr. Williams knew the

conspiracy’s main purpose and that he voluntarily joined it, intending to help

advance or achieve its goals. That is essential. 

A Defendant’s knowledge can be proved indirectly by facts and

circumstances which lead to a conclusion that he knew the conspiracy’s

main purpose, but it is up to the Government to convince you that such facts

and circumstances existed in this particular case.

Williams first contends that the deliberate-ignorance instruction is flawed because

“the district court substituted ‘their’ for ‘his’ in the last paragraph of the instruction, so that

the jury was not given the clear direction that Williams’[s] carelessness, negligence, or

foolishness was not the same as knowledge.” Because Williams did not raise this objection

at trial, we will review the alleged misstatement under the plain-error standard. See Russell,

595 F.3d at 643 (utilizing this standard where a defendant challenged a jury instruction on

appeal on a ground that was not raised before the district court). 

Although the use of the word “their” in this instruction was incorrect grammatically,

we conclude that this minor defect did not render the instruction itself confusing. The

instruction still “adequately informed the jury of the relevant considerations and provided

a basis in law for aiding the jury in reaching its decision.” See Frederick, 406 F.3d at 761.

In any event, the district court’s use of the word “their” does not constitute plain error. See

Russell, 595 F.3d at 643 (explaining that, under plain-error review, this court has “discretion

to correct the error only if the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public

reputation of the judicial proceedings” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

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Williams next argues that the deliberate-ignorance jury instruction “told the jury that

it could find Williams’[s] required mental state—that he intended to join the

conspiracy—even if he deliberately ignored the conspiracy.” But the deliberate-ignorance

instruction was provided well before the court’s instruction about the elements of a criminal

conspiracy. The deliberate-ignorance instruction instead explained the degree of knowledge

required by Williams concerning the illegality of his actions and the actions of others. This

court has previously held that such an instruction is permissible. See United States v.

Warshawsky, 20 F.3d 204, 210 (6th Cir. 1994) (explaining that “a ‘deliberate ignorance’

instruction is permissible to show a conspirator’s knowledge of the unlawful aims of a

conspiracy”). 

In a completely separate portion of the instructions, after the district court had recited

the facts in the indictment underlying the conspiracy charge, the court clearly stated that the

government had to prove that “Williams knowingly and voluntarily joined” the conspiracy.

Williams does not argue that this instruction was incorrect, and he has failed to demonstrate

how this instruction contradicts the court’s deliberate-ignorance instruction. He has cited

no authority for his argument that a deliberate-ignorance instruction is appropriate in cases

where a defendant denies knowledge of the illegal activity, but prejudicial where a defendant

admits such knowledge. 

There is in fact authority to the contrary. See United States v. Mendoza-Medina, 346

F.3d 121, 134 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that “an error in giving the deliberate ignorance

instruction is harmless where there is substantial evidence of actual knowledge” (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted)). Williams’s argument that the deliberate-ignorance

instruction somehow confused the jury about the mental state required to join a conspiracy

is accordingly without merit. See United States v. Smigiel, Nos. 97-1571, 97-1577, 173 F.3d

857, 1999 WL 196575, at *3 (6th Cir. Mar. 29, 1999) (unpublished table decision) (“Since

the deliberate ignorance instruction was clearly directed toward defendants’ knowledge of

the aims of the conspiracy, the district court was not required to give a specific instruction

directing the jury that it could not find conspiracy based upon a deliberate ignorance

theory.”). And, at worst, any error in giving the instruction was harmless. See United States

v. Rayborn, 491 F.3d 513, 520 (6th Cir. 2007) (explaining that “even when it is unsupported

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by evidence, a deliberate ignorance instruction that properly states the law is harmless

error”).

B. Ineffective assistance of counsel

Williams urges us to vacate his conviction for an additional reason: he contends that

his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to timely move the district court for

reconsideration of its order on his motion for a new trial before it lost jurisdiction due to the

pending appeal. The government replies that the record is insufficiently developed for us

to review the claim on direct appeal and, in any event, that Williams’s ineffective-assistance

claim is meritless.

“As a general rule, a defendant may not raise ineffective assistance of counsel claims

for the first time on direct appeal, since there has not been an opportunity to develop and

include in the record evidence bearing on the merits of the allegations.” United States v.

Wunder, 919 F.2d 34, 37 (6th Cir. 1990). Such claims “are more properly available in a

post-conviction proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, after the parties have had the

opportunity to develop an adequate record on the issue from which the reviewing court is

capable of arriving at an informed decision.” United States v. Rahal, 191 F.3d 642, 645 (6th

Cir. 1999). 

We recognize that this court provides an exception to this general rule and will

review an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim on direct appeal where “the record is

adequately developed to allow the court to properly assess the merits of the issue.” United

States v. Fortson, 194 F.3d 730, 736 (6th Cir. 1999). But Williams has not provided any

substantive argument concerning why the record here is sufficiently developed for us to rule

on his ineffective-assistance claim on direct review. We therefore conclude that his claim

is premature and decline to depart from the general rule that such a claim should be brought

as a post-conviction proceeding pursuant to § 2255. 

C. Restitution

Turning now to the issue of restitution, we note that Williams offers four arguments

in support of his contention that the district court erroneously ordered him to pay

$822,459.21. He first argues that the government should be collaterally estopped from

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claiming that Williams owes any money beyond the $600 paid by Szyrej and the $400,000

paid by Rohira in restitution because the government previously represented to the court that

the total amount of the conspiracy victims’ losses was $400,000. Second, Williams asserts

that the court violated Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by failing to rule

on his objections to the victims’ loss calculations as set forth in the Presentence Report

(PSR). He next argues that his right to the due process of law prohibits the government from

taking conflicting positions concerning restitution as between him and his codefendants.

Finally, Williams contends that judicial estoppel prohibits the government from taking such

conflicting positions.

The government’s primary response to Williams’s arguments is that “[t]he

defendants in this case were not similarly situated at the time of their sentencing.”

Specifically, it contends that Rohira and Szyrej were differently situated from Williams

because they both pled guilty, whereas Williams elected to proceed to trial. Thus, according

to the government, it did not take inconsistent positions regarding restitution during the

sentencings of the three codefendants. It further argues that the district court did not violate

Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by failing to rule on Williams’s

objections because “Williams did not file any objections to the Presentence Report.”

1. Standard of review

“The propriety and the amount of a restitution order are subject to different standards

of review.” United States v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 832, 849 (6th Cir. 2006). We review de

novo “[w]hether a restitution order is permitted under the law.” United States v. Bogart, 576

F.3d 565, 569 (6th Cir. 2009). If we determine that restitution is permissible, then the

amount of restitution ordered by the district court is reviewed under the abuse-of-discretion

standard. Id.

2. Relevant statutory law

Both parties acknowledge that the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996

(MVRA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663A-3664, applies to the present case. The MVRA mandates the

imposition of restitution as part of the sentence of a defendant who has committed certain

crimes. Id. § 3663A(a)(1), (c)(1). Section 3664 sets forth the relevant procedures for

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applying the MVRA. This section requires the district court to “order restitution to each

victim in the full amount of each victim’s losses as determined by the court and without

consideration of the economic circumstances of the defendant.” Id. § 3664(f)(1)(A). The

government bears the burden of proving the amount of each victim’s loss by a preponderance

of the evidence. Id. § 3664(e).

To determine the appropriate amount of restitution, the district court must order the

Probation Office to issue a report that includes “information sufficient for the court to

exercise its discretion in fashioning a restitution order.” Id. § 3664(a). This requires the

Probation Office to obtain a list of the victims and the amounts subject to restitution from

the AUSA, and then to seek confirmation of these amounts from the identified victims. Id.

§ 3664(d)(1)-(2). The MVRA further requires that,

[i]f the victim’s losses are not ascertainable by the date that is 10 days prior

to sentencing, the attorney for the Government or the probation officer shall

so inform the court, and the court shall set a date for the final determination

of the victim’s losses, not to exceed 90 days after sentencing. If the victim

subsequently discovers further losses, the victim shall have 60 days after

discovery of those losses in which to petition the court for an amended

restitution order. Such order may be granted only upon a showing of good

cause for the failure to include such losses in the initial claim for

restitutionary relief.

Id. § 3664(d)(5).

Any amount of restitution ordered must be “reduced by any amount later recovered

as compensatory damages for the same loss by the victim” in a subsequent federal or state

civil proceeding. Id. § 3664(j)(2). This is because “the restitution statutes do not permit

victims to obtain multiple recoveries for the same loss.” United States v. McDaniel, 398

F.3d 540, 555 (6th Cir. 2005). 

When ordering restitution in a case where the district court determines that multiple

defendants have contributed to a victim’s loss, “the court may make each defendant liable

for payment of the full amount of restitution or may apportion liability among the defendants

to reflect the level of contribution to the victim’s loss and economic circumstances of each

defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 3664(h). In cases where the United States is a victim, “the court

shall ensure that all other victims receive full restitution before the United States receives

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any restitution.” Id. § 3664(i). And any such “sentence that imposes an order of restitution

is a final judgment notwithstanding the fact” that the sentence may later be modified. Id.

§ 3664(o).

3. Estoppel

In his first and fourth arguments against the imposition of restitution, Williams

contends that the equitable doctrines of collateral estoppel and judicial estoppel barred the

government from claiming, as it did during Williams’s sentencing proceedings, that the total

amount of the conspiracy victims’ loss was greater than $400,000—the amount set forth by

the government during Rohira’s sentencing proceedings. The government responds that

these doctrines are inapplicable because Rohira and Williams “were not similarly situated

at the time of their sentencing.” We conclude that the government was not estopped from

seeking additional restitution from Williams, but for reasons different from those advocated

by the government, as explained below.

Estoppel doctrines are equitable in nature and therefore are “invoked by a court at

its discretion.” New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750 (2001) (citation omitted)

(describing judicial estoppel). Our circuit nevertheless reviews the application of these

doctrines de novo. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Chester, Willcox & Saxbe, LLP, 546 F.3d 752,

757 (6th Cir. 2008) (judicial estoppel); United States v. Vasilakos, 508 F.3d 401, 405 (6th

Cir. 2007) (collateral estoppel).

The purpose of equitable doctrines is “to avoid injustice in particular cases.” Heckler

v. Cmty. Health Servs., 467 U.S. 51, 59 (1984). Courts typically utilize a multi-factored test

to determine whether a particular equitable doctrine is applicable. See New Hampshire, 532

U.S. at 750-51 (citation omitted) (describing a three-factor test for judicial estoppel);

Hammer v. INS, 195 F.3d 836, 840 (6th Cir. 1999) (setting forth a five-factor test for

collateral estoppel). Where the doctrine is invoked against the government, additional

considerations are warranted because “it is well settled that the Government may not be

estopped on the same terms as any other litigant.” Heckler, 467 U.S. at 60.

The Supreme Court has explained that “[w]hen the Government is unable to enforce

the law because the conduct of its agents has given rise to an estoppel, the interest of the

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citizenry as a whole in obedience to the rule of law is undermined.” Id. Accordingly, if

estoppel ever applies against the government, it is only in the rare case where “the public

interest in ensuring that the Government can enforce the law free from estoppel [is]

outweighed by the countervailing interest of citizens in some minimum standard of decency,

honor, and reliability in their dealings with their Government.” Id. at 60-61; see also id. at

60 n.12 (noting that “at least two of our cases seem to rest on the premise that when the

Government acts in misleading ways, it may not enforce the law if to do so would harm a

private party as a result of governmental deception”). 

Williams argues that the government should be bound in the present case by its

previous representation that the conspiracy victims’ losses had been satisfied by Rohira’s qui

tam settlement payment. This argument has some plausibility because the government made

inaccurate statements to the district court during Rohira’s sentencing proceedings, and the

court accepted and adopted those statements when it sentenced Rohira. 

In Rohira’s plea agreement, for instance, the government and Rohira stipulated that

“[a]s a result of conduct of Defendant and his co-conspirators, [the conspiracy victims]

suffered a loss of $500,000” and that, “under ex post facto principles, due to the dates

charged in the indictment, the restitution provision applicable in this case is 18 U.S.C.

§ 3663 as opposed to 18 U.S.C. § 3663A.” Both representations are inaccurate—the former

as a factual matter and the latter as a legal matter. Here, the government charged Rohira with

participating in a conspiracy that continued after the effective date of the MVRA. See 18

U.S.C.A. § 3663A note (Historical and Statutory Notes, Effective and Applicability

Provisions, 1996 Acts). The MVRA therefore applied to Rohira’s sentencing. See United

States v. Elson, 577 F.3d 713, 721 (6th Cir. 2009) (explaining that the MVRA applies to

crimes that occurred prior to and continue past the effective date of the MVRA, and that this

application does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause); United States v. Yaker, 87 F. App’x

532, 533-34 (6th Cir. 2004) (same).

And the statement in Rohira’s PSR that the actual and intended loss amount was

approximately $1.8 million does little to remedy this misrepresentation because the MVRA

applies to only the actual loss amount. See United States v. Simpson, 538 F.3d 459, 465-66

(6th Cir. 2008) (“It is true that the MVRA refers only to ‘actual’ loss, and unlike § 2B1.1 of

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No. 09-3521 United States v. Williams Page 15

the Guidelines does not include ‘intended loss.’” (citation omitted)). Moreover, the MVRA

applies regardless of any plea agreement and, significantly, it does not include the provision

found in the discretionary restitution statute cited in Rohira’s plea agreement that “[t]he court

may also order restitution in any criminal case to the extent agreed to by the parties in a plea

agreement.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(3).

Rohira’s PSR listed six healthcare and insurance providers (including Medicare) as

victims of the conspiracy, and inaccurately stated that Rohira’s $400,000 qui tam settlement

satisfied all restitution issues. At Rohira’s sentencing hearing, the AUSA gave the following

explanation of the government’s position on the losses caused by Rohira’s healthcare-fraud

conspiracy:

He pleaded guilty to a massive fraud scheme that lasted six years and caused

the Medicare and Medicaid programs, as well as numerous insurance

companies, more than a negotiated amount, not more than the negotiated

amount of $400,000. I submit to you that before Booker and after Booker,

the dollar loss is not an element of the crime of conspiracy, of wire fraud, or

of healthcare fraud. And that the dollar amount is a loss—the dollar amount

of loss is for the Court to decide by a preponderance of the evidence at

sentencing. The parties have negotiated that $400,000 amount and

submitted it to you. 

The insurance companies are not here today complaining, but they

were in the witness box at trial, and each one of them came and testified to

their loss and to their victim status in this case. And they do wait to be paid,

and they will have to divide up the $400,000 that has been negotiated. As

to the 3553(a) factors, Dr. Rohira is a highly educated man, who ran his own

practice for many years. He has been in this country for 30 years. He

controlled every aspect of his practice, including the supervision of the other

two individuals; one of whom pleaded guilty, one of whom stood trial in this

case, and whose case is presently on appeal.

Based on the above representations and the information in Rohira’s PSR, the district

court determined that “there is no restitution still remaining.” The court also noted in its

Statement of Reasons, filed with the Probation Office as a part of the court’s sentencing

determinations, that there was “no further restitution owed to either Medicare or the

defrauded insurance companies.” But this was not correct, as demonstrated by the

government’s arguments during Williams’s sentencing.

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No. 09-3521 United States v. Williams Page 16

Because of the government’s misstatements, as well as the district court’s entry of

restitution orders against Rohira and Szyrej based on incomplete and inaccurate information,

the procedures utilized in this case to impose restitution on Rohira, Szyrej, and Williams did

not comport with the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3664. All three either pled guilty or were

convicted of conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud, and thus were each responsible for the

losses of all victims “directly and proximately harmed” by the conspiracy. See id.

§ 3663A(a)(2). The total loss suffered by the victims of the conspiracy, even if difficult to

ascertain, should have been the same with respect to all three of the codefendants.

But the government’s assessment of the total loss did change as to each of them, and

the district court did not defer issuing restitution orders applicable to Rohira and Szyrej until

more complete information could be obtained, as perhaps it should have. Such deferral is

permissible under the MVRA, as demonstrated by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in

Dolan v. United States, No. 09-367, 2010 WL 2346548, at *3 (U.S. June 14, 2010). See id.

(holding that “a sentencing court that misses the 90-day deadline [for imposing restitution

under the MVRA] nonetheless retains the power to order restitution—at least where, as here,

the sentencing court made clear prior to the deadline’s expiration that it would order

restitution, leaving open (for more than 90 days) only the amount”); see also United States

v. Vandeberg, 201 F.3d 805, 814 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that the MVRA’s 90-day deadline

is not jurisdictional and that the Act “permits amendments to restitution orders to reflect

changed circumstances”). 

Rohira and Szyrej are not, however, before us in the present appeal—only Williams

is. Our inquiry is therefore limited to whether the above-described procedural missteps

preclude the district court from ordering Williams to pay additional restitution. This requires

us to determine whether applying an equitable doctrine against the government would be

consistent with the MVRA’s statutory framework.

In this case, the district court was unable to exercise its discretion to determine how

the obligation to pay restitution for the conspiracy victims’ losses should be apportioned

between the three codefendants due to its (and the government’s) failure to comply with the

procedural requirements of the MVRA. But the restitution ordered in Williams’s case is

nevertheless a permissible outcome under the MVRA. This is because the Act provides that

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each defendant may be required to shoulder the entire restitution burden for the loss caused

by multiple defendants. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(h) (“If the court finds that more than 1

defendant has contributed to the loss of a victim, the court may make each defendant liable

for payment of the full amount of restitution or may apportion liability among the

defendants . . . .”).

Thus, by participating in a conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud, Williams bore the

risk of becoming financially responsible for the entire amount of the conspiracy victims’

losses. The restitution order in his case may well be disproportionate when compared to that

of his codefendants, but when compared to the losses sustained by the innocent victims of

the conspiracy, Williams has no basis to complain. See Dolan, 2010 WL 2346548, at *5

(noting that “the statute’s text places primary weight upon, and emphasizes the importance

of, imposing restitution upon those convicted of certain federal crimes”).

Despite the mistakes made during the sentencings of Rohira and Szyrej, the

government still had a mandatory obligation under the MVRA to seek the full remaining

amount of the conspiracy victims’ losses as restitution in Williams’s case. The equitable

doctrines that Williams seeks to have imposed against the government to thwart this

obligation, in contrast, are discretionary in nature. Because we are faced with choosing

between a statutory obligation and an equitable doctrine, we conclude that the mandatory

language of the MVRA trumps the equitable policies underlying the discretionary doctrines

of collateral estoppel and judicial estoppel. See, e.g., Dantran, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor,

171 F.3d 58, 66 (1st Cir. 1999) (declining to apply estoppel to “prevent[] the sovereign from

enforcing valid laws for no better reason than that a government official has performed his

enforcement duties negligently”); United States v. Marine Shale Processors, 81 F.3d 1329,

1348 (5th Cir. 1996) (refusing to apply estoppel against the government where “a private

party seeks to avoid the coverage of a law because of a government agent’s

misrepresentation that the law does not apply” and noting “the importance of separation of

powers principles to claims of estoppel against the government”); FDIC v. Husley, 22 F.3d

1472, 1489 (10th Cir. 1994) (“Courts generally disfavor the application of the estoppel

doctrine against the government and invoke it only when it does not frustrate the purpose of

the statutes expressing the will of Congress or unduly undermine the enforcement of the

public laws.”); cf. McLean v. NLRB, 333 F.2d 84, 88 (6th Cir. 1964) (refusing to apply “the

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No. 09-3521 United States v. Williams Page 18

doctrine of waiver or estoppel . . . to excuse the employer from its statutory duty to bargain

in good faith with the union during the certification period”). The district court therefore did

not err in refusing to apply these doctrines against the government in the present case.

Williams acknowledges in his reply brief that “[t]he MVRA requires the court to

order restitution in the full amount of each victim’s losses as determined by the court, not

the parties.” But this observation undercuts Williams’s argument that he should not have

been ordered to pay restitution. This is because the application of estoppel against the

government would not extinguish the court’s independent duty under the MVRA to obtain

information from the Probation Office about the victims’ losses so that it may order

appropriate restitution. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(a), (f)(1)(A). The district court therefore did

not err in ordering Williams to pay restitution, and we conclude that his arguments to the

contrary are without merit.

4. Due process

Williams next argues that constitutional considerations warrant the application of

estoppel against the government. Caselaw recognizes that estoppel may be so applied where

the constitutional rights of a private party would otherwise be infringed. See, e.g., Ashe v.

Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445-47 (1970) (determining that the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee

against double jeopardy requires the application of collateral estoppel to preclude the

government from relitigating any issue that was necessarily decided by a jury’s acquittal in

a prior trial). Williams contends that the Due Process Clause precludes the government from

seeking additional restitution against him. But Williams did not raise this argument below.

We therefore review this belated claim under the plain-error standard. See United States v.

Henry, 545 F.3d 367, 376 (6th Cir. 2008) (applying the plain-error standard to an argument

raised for the first time on appeal). Under this standard, we will not reverse a challenged

decision of the district court unless there was (1) an error, (2) that “was obvious or clear,”

(3) that affected the substantial rights of the defendant, and (4) that “seriously affected the

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” Id. at 376-77.

Williams argues that “[t]he use of inconsistent theories to secure convictions against

more than one defendant in proceedings for the same crime violates due process.” He cites

Stumpf v. Mitchell, 367 F.3d 594 (6th Cir. 2004), for this proposition—a case in which this

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court vacated a defendant’s plea of guilty and sentence of death, reasoning “that the use of

inconsistent, irreconcilable theories to convict two defendants for the same crime is a due

process violation.” Id. at 611, 616. But the Supreme Court later reversed this court’s

judgment concerning the defendant’s guilty plea, vacated the judgment concerning the death

sentence, and remanded for further consideration of the defendant’s “prosecutorial

inconsistency claim” as it related to his “death sentence in particular.” Bradshaw v. Stumpf,

545 U.S. 175, 186-88 (2005); see also id. at 190 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“This Court has

never hinted, much less held, that the Due Process Clause prevents a State from prosecuting

defendants based on inconsistent theories.”). This court has not yet issued a decision on

remand, and no other case in this circuit has determined the issue. See Blalock v. Wilson,

320 F. App’x 396, 418 n.26 (6th Cir. 2009) (noting that there is no “‘clearly established’

Supreme Court or Sixth Circuit precedent showing that such a prosecutorial strategy would

violate a defendant’s due process rights”).

Moreover, the circuits that have considered the issue have not agreed on whether

inconsistent prosecutorial theories violate due process. See United States v. Presbitero, 569

F.3d 691, 702 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing cases). And where a defendant challenges an area of

the law that has not been conclusively decided by this court or the Supreme Court, a “circuit

split precludes a finding of plain error.” United States v. Williams, 53 F.3d 769, 772 (6th

Cir. 1995). Williams has therefore failed to demonstrate that the district court plainly erred

under the Due Process Clause when it entered the order of restitution against Williams. See

United States v. Coker, 514 F.3d 562, 569 (6th Cir. 2008) (rejecting a similar challenge to

loss calculations made to determine the defendant’s U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range and

reasoning that “the government’s different loss calculations cannot be prosecutorial

misconduct—let alone misconduct that rises to plain error—because the government has no

obligation to stipulate to identical loss amounts with co-conspirators”).

5. Rule 32

Finally, Williams urges us to “vacate the restitution order and remand the case for

further proceedings” due to the fact that the district court allegedly violated Rule 32(i)(3)(B)

of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by failing to address his objections to “the way

the restitution was calculated in the presentence report” and to the fact that “there was no

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reliable way to determine the amount of loss to the victim[s].” The government responds by

contending that Williams waived this argument by failing to timely file any written

objections to the PSR. It further notes that “[t]he only disagreement Williams expressed with

his PSR was his reference to his Sentencing Memorandum at the [s]entencing [h]earing.”

And in any event, the government asserts that the court “made a factual finding about

restitution at sentencing by adopting the loss amounts submitted by the victims in the revised

presentence report.”

Rule 32(f) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires a party to state in

writing any objections to the PSR within 14 days of receiving the report. But where a party

has not followed this procedure, Rule 32(i)(1)(D) permits the district court “for good cause”

to “allow a party to make a new objection at any time before sentence is imposed.” Once an

objection has been made, Rule 32(i)(3)(B) provides that the court “must—for any disputed

portion of the presentence report or other controverted matter—rule on the dispute or

determine that a ruling is unnecessary either because the matter will not affect sentencing,

or because the court will not consider the matter in sentencing.” This court “has consistently

construed the requirements of Rule 32 in a strict manner.” United States v. Vandeberg, 201

F.3d 805, 814 (6th Cir. 2000). As we have explained:

This circuit requires “literal compliance” with this provision. This strict

requirement helps to ensure that defendants are sentenced on the basis of

accurate information and provides a clear record for appellate courts, prison

officials, and administrative agencies who may later be involved in the case.

If the sentencing court fails to make these factual findings, we must remand

for resentencing.

United States v. Tackett, 113 F.3d 603, 613-14 (6th Cir. 1997) (citations and footnote

omitted).

In the present case, the government’s assertion that Williams never objected to the

PSR is inaccurate, and its argument that the district court effectively ruled on all disputed

matters by adopting the factual statements in the PSR does not convince us that the court

satisfied Rule 32, given the multiple PSRs and the court’s ambiguous ruling. See United

States v. Gapinski, 561 F.3d 467, 473-78 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d

645, 667 (6th Cir. 2003). According to the dates listed on the first page of Williams’s PSR,

the report was first prepared in January 2004 and then revised the following month. These

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No. 09-3521 United States v. Williams Page 21

first two drafts of the PSR listed the total amount of the conspiracy victims’ losses at

$403,475.56 (according to the government’s Sentencing Memorandum). Williams did not

file an objection to the PSR at the time, but instead, in January 2004, filed motions for

acquittal and for a new trial. His motion for a new trial was granted over a year later, in

February 2005. The district court’s order was later overturned by this court on appeal, with

the mandate issuing in December 2006. 

On remand, the district court held two status conferences to discuss restitution.

During the second conference, which was held in October 2008, the court expressed its

concern about the disparity between the government’s recommendations for Williams’s

sentencing (prison time) and restitution on the one hand and the government’s

recommendations for Rohira and Szyrej on the other. It then ordered briefing from the two

parties on the propriety of imposing a harsher sentence and a much larger amount of

restitution on Williams than on his two codefendants.

The government conceded in its Sentencing Memorandum that it informed Williams

for the first time on the date of the October 2008 status hearing that the conspiracy victims’

losses were greater than the approximately $400,000 reported in the 2004 PSRs. In

response, Williams raised an objection concerning the manner in which the PSR calculated

the victims’ losses due to upcoding. He argued as follows:

In paragraph 12 of the PS[R], the government states that Dr. Rohira would

bill for half hour psychotherapy sessions at a rate of $65.00 when actually

he performed services worth $40.00. In paragraph 14, the government then

calculates this loss from upcoding as 60 patients a week at $85.00 per hour

for a total of $984,000. The actual loss to the victims for the upcoding is the

difference between the actual service provided and the incorrect charged

amount. Thus, the victims were damaged in an amount of $25.00 per hour

for all upcoding. Substituting the amount of $25.00 for the $85.00, the

correct value is an amount $289,411.65. It is unclear how this amount was

dispersed throughout the victim impact calculations, but it does demonstrate

that the amount should be less than stated in the PS[R].

The Probation Office then prepared a second revised PSR on March 13, 2009—one

week before Williams’s sentencing. This PSR was the first to list the total amount of the

conspiracy victims’ losses at approximately $823,000. During the March 20, 2009

sentencing hearing, the district court asked if there were any unresolved objections to the

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second revised PSR. Williams’s counsel responded that he intended his Sentencing

Memorandum, filed in response to the court’s request for briefing on restitution, to function

as an objection to the PSR. The district court did not directly address this statement, but

noted that it had concerns about the amount of restitution sought by the government.

Later during Williams’s sentencing hearing, when the court asked if Williams’s

counsel had anything further to add, counsel responded: “Your Honor, I merely stand by the

arguments advanced in our sentencing memorandum.” The court said, “All right,” but it did

not expressly rule on the objections that had been raised in the Memorandum by Williams.

Instead, the court simply adopted the PSR’s recommendation concerning the amount of

restitution that Williams owed.

In summary, significant litigation took place concerning the validity of Williams’s

conviction between the time that the first two PSRs were prepared in 2004 and the

preparation of the final version in 2009. Given the fact that the district court vacated

Williams’s conviction in February 2005, his failure to object to the 2004 PSRs is irrelevant,

to say nothing of the fact that the restitution amount shown in 2004 is essentially equal to

what Rohira paid in the qui tam action against him. This court later reversed the district

court’s grant of a new trial and, on remand, the district court ordered briefing on the issue

of restitution. In his Sentencing Memorandum provided in response to the court’s order,

Williams raised several objections to the much higher amount of restitution that the

government was asking the court to impose. The Probation Office then prepared a second

revised PSR that incorporated the higher amount of restitution requested by the government,

and Williams’s counsel informed the court at the sentencing hearing seven days later that he

wished his Sentencing Memorandum to be construed as Williams’s objection.

We conclude that, under these circumstances, Williams properly raised an objection

to the calculation of the conspiracy victims’ losses. And unlike in United States v. Vonner,

516 F.3d 382, 388-89 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc), Williams objected to a factual matter over

which there was a genuine dispute between the parties. Cf. id. (concluding that the

mitigation arguments that the defendant claimed were not considered by the district court did

not present “controverted matters,” thus leaving “no ‘dispute’ for the district court to have

ruled on” (brackets, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted)). In contrast, the district

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No. 09-3521 United States v. Williams Page 23

court here was required by Rule 32(i)(3)(B) to “rule on the dispute or determine that a ruling

is unnecessary either because the matter will not affect sentencing, or because the court will

not consider the matter in sentencing.” 

But the record does not show any such ruling, nor does it otherwise indicate that the

district court fully understood and considered Williams’s argument. Cf. Vonner, 516 F.3d

at 388 (holding that “[n]othing in the record, or the context of the hearing, suggests that the

court did not listen to, consider and understand every argument [the defendant] made”

(brackets, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted)). We emphasize that this is not an

ordinary case. The government significantly revised the information in the multiple PSRs

that it provided to the district court, and the court issued an ambiguous ruling on the

calculation of the restitution amount. Given these irregularities, we will vacate the order of

restitution and remand the case to the district court so that it may properly rule on Williams’s

upcoding argument under Rule 32(i)(3)(B) and, after having done so, issue an appropriate

order of restitution. See United States v. Lanesky, 494 F.3d 558, 560-61 (6th Cir. 2007)

(vacating and remanding for resentencing where “the district court did not rule on the

disputes at sentencing, but adopted the PSR in its sentencing order”).

III. CONCLUSION

For all of the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the portion of the district court’s

judgment relating to Williams’s conviction, DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE

Williams’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, VACATE the portion of the district

court’s judgment that concerns restitution, and REMAND the restitution issue for further

consideration.

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