Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01739/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01739-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jo Anne B. Barnhart
Appellee
Naomi L. Tellez
Appellant

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Charles R. Wolle, United States District Judge for the Southern

District of Iowa. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-1739

___________

Naomi L. Tellez, *

*

Appellant, * Appeal from the United States 

* District Court for the

v. * Southern District of Iowa.

*

Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner * 

of the Social Security Administration, *

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: December 13, 2004

Filed: April 8, 2005

___________

Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, BEAM, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

___________

BEAM, Circuit Judge.

Naomi Tellez appeals the district court's1

 order upholding the decision of the

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (Commissioner) denying

supplemental security income (SSI) benefits following a hearing before an

administrative law judge (ALJ), and a subsequent denial of review by the Appeals

Council. We affirm because the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial

evidence. 

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We have reviewed but do not discuss this argument, as the ALJ's

determination regarding substantial gainful activity had no bearing on the ultimate

denial of Tellez's claim. The ALJ determined that Tellez had not engaged in

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I. BACKGROUND

Tellez filed her application for SSI disability benefits in March 2000, alleging

disability since 1970. The Commissioner initially denied benefits and the ALJ

affirmed that denial. The ALJ held that Tellez's impairments included major

depressive disorder with dysthymia; a personality disorder; asthma; obesity; and a

medically determinable impairment with complaints of lower back, foot, and ankle

pain. Tellez has worked since her alleged onset in various part-time positions

including work at a doughnut shop, a telemarketing business, a food department at

a local college, and two fast food chains.

Following the regulatory five-step sequential evaluation, the ALJ concluded

that Tellez had not engaged in "substantial gainful activity" at any time relevant to the

decision, and that although her impairments were severe, the combined clinical

findings did not reach the level of severity contemplated in the Listings. See 20

C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. Finally, the ALJ held that Tellez's impairments do

not prevent her from doing her past relevant work, nor do they prevent her from doing

any other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. The ALJ

noted that Tellez's activities of daily living were inconsistent with an allegation of

total disability and that there were issues of non-compliance throughout the record.

The ALJ did not give significant weight to the limitations noted by Tellez's treating

physician and others because they were inconsistent with Tellez's work history and

the evidence as a whole.

On appeal, Tellez challenges the ALJ's opinion, arguing that the ALJ: (1) erred

in his determination that she had achieved substantial gainful activity,2

 (2) should

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substantial gainful activity at any time relevant to this decision.

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have given the treating psychiatrist and nurse practitioner's opinions controlling

weight, or at the very least great weight, (3) relied on his own view of the medical

evidence rather than the evidence from a mental health professional in assessing

Tellez's limitations, (4) failed to properly weigh the opinion of the vocational

counselor, (5) failed to evaluate Tellez's credibility under the Polaski standard, and

(6) failed to credit all of the other third-party observations contained in the record. 

II. DISCUSSION

Our review is limited to determining whether the Commissioner's decision is

supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Raney v. Barnhart, 396

F.3d 1007, 1009 (8th Cir. 2005). "Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a

reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support the Commissioner's

conclusion." Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000). In reviewing the

Commissioner's decision, we do not substitute our own view of the evidence for that

of the Commissioner. Kelley v. Barnhart, 372 F.3d 958, 960 (8th Cir. 2004).

Whether the record supports a contrary result or whether we might decide the facts

differently is immaterial. We must affirm the Commissioner's decision if the

findings are supported by substantial evidence. Roberts v. Apfel, 222 F.3d 466, 468

(8th Cir. 2000). 

Tellez argues that the ALJ erred in failing to give controlling weight to the

opinions of her treating psychiatrist and nurse practitioner. An ALJ will give

controlling weight to a treating source's opinion if it "is well-supported by medically

acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with

the other substantial evidence" in the record. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2). In addition

to the treatment notes included in the record, Tellez's treating psychiatrist and nurse

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practitioner jointly completed a questionnaire describing Tellez's residual functional

capacity (RFC), including limitations such as marked impairment in her ability to

relate to other people, attend activities of daily living, remember work-like

procedures, and to maintain regular work attendance. In spite of that assessment,

however, the ALJ recognized that although Tellez had reported difficulty in terms of

social functioning, her degree of limitation had been modest and had never caused her

to lose a job. 

The ALJ found Tellez's actual work history and work assessments from

Tellez's employers quite persuasive in his ultimate decision to deny benefits. The

record contains statements from at least three employers, two of whom praised

Tellez's work and noted her punctuality and the quality of her work. Thus, the reports

of her actual behavior in the workplace were clearly at odds with the extreme

limitations described by her psychiatrist and nurse practitioner. Given that

discrepancy, substantial evidence supports the ALJ's determination not to afford

controlling weight to those opinions. 

The record also adequately supports the ALJ's assessment concerning Tellez's

limitations. Tellez contends that the ALJ did not "fully and fairly develop the record"

concerning her limitations and that if the "ALJ did not believe that the professional

opinions available . . . were sufficient to allow him to form an opinion, he should

have further developed the record." However, there is no indication that the ALJ felt

unable to make the assessment he did and his conclusion is supported by substantial

evidence. "It is the ALJ's responsibility to determine a claimant's RFC based on all

relevant evidence, including medical records, observations of treating physicians and

others, and claimant's own descriptions of his limitations." Pearsall v. Massanari, 274

F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001). The ALJ must first evaluate the claimant's

credibility before determining a claimant's RFC. Id. at 1218. Tellez fails to recognize

that the ALJ's determination regarding her RFC was influenced by his determination

that her allegations were "less than fully credible," and we give the ALJ deference in

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We acknowledge Tellez's assertion that her reason for not medicating as

prescribed was due to her daughter's death in November 2000. Understandably, that

would be a traumatic event to overcome. However, that does not justify her noncompliance during the entire period since her alleged onset date. 

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that determination. See Hogan v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 958, 962 (8th Cir. 2001) (deference

to ALJ is appropriate when he explicitly discredits claimant and gives good reasons

for doing so). 

In Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984), this circuit set out the

factors to be considered in evaluating a claimant's subjective allegations, including

complaints of pain. Using the Polaski factors, the ALJ reviewed the following in

making this determination: Tellez's daily activities; duration, frequency and intensity

of pain; dosage and effectiveness of medication; precipitating and aggravating

factors; and functional restrictions. Id. at 1322. We note further that "[t]he credibility

of a claimant's subjective testimony is primarily for the ALJ to decide, not the courts."

Pearsall, 274 F.3d at 1218. 

The ALJ considered Tellez's testimony and found that it was inconsistent with

the record as a whole. In short, the ALJ concluded that Tellez's daily living

activities–including the care of her special needs children, bill paying, laundry, and

cooking–were inconsistent with her allegation of total disability. And Tellez noted

that her concern with working was not that she couldn't perform the work required,

but that she wasn't scheduled enough hours to sustain herself. 

The ALJ also noted Tellez's medical non-compliance. Not only would Tellez

regularly miss medication checks and psychiatric appointments, but she did not take

her medications as prescribed.3

 Further, there were inconsistencies in the information

Tellez provided physicians and others treating her about her own physical health and

well-being and her work history. See Guilliams v. Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798, 801 (8th

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Cir. 2005) (deference to ALJ's credibility determination is warranted if the

determination is supported by good reasons and substantial evidence). 

Finally, the ALJ did not ignore the testimony and reports of Tellez's other

witnesses, but rather considered those opinions and held that the testimony "was

credible but did not show that the claimant's impairments were so limiting as to

render her disabled." As to Tellez's own vocational rehabilitation counselor, the ALJ

determined that her opinion was "not consistent with the claimant's work history or

the evidence as a whole." The ALJ did consider, however, the opinion of vocational

expert G. Brian Paprocki, who testified in response to a hypothetical question that

given Tellez's particular limitations, a person could perform her past relevant work

as a commercial cleaner, as Tellez performed it, as a salad maker both as Tellez

performed it and as it is normally performed in the national economy, and as a power

press tender as Tellez performed it and as it is normally performed in the national

economy. Based on that testimony, the ALJ found that Tellez can perform her past

relevant work. Given all of the evidence, and regardless of how we would weigh the

same evidence, substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's decision. 

 

III. CONCLUSION

The district court's judgment is affirmed.

______________________________

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