Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-06-03093/USCOURTS-caDC-06-03093-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Carroll Washington
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 11, 2008 Decided March 27, 2009 

No. 06-3093 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

APPELLEE

v. 

CARROLL WASHINGTON, ALSO KNOWN AS WAYNE WATSON, 

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 04cr00344-01) 

Beverly G. Dyer, Assistant Federal Public Defender, 

argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was 

A.J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender. 

Stratton C. Strand, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Jeffrey A. 

Taylor, U.S. Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese III, Assistant 

U.S. Attorney. 

Before: GINSBURG, GARLAND and KAVANAUGH, Circuit 

Judges. 

USCA Case #06-3093 Document #1172571 Filed: 03/27/2009 Page 1 of 9
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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge 

KAVANAUGH.

KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge: On a May night in 2004, a 

District of Columbia High Impact Tactical police team 

operated an “aggressive traffic patrol” in a crime-plagued 

neighborhood in Southeast Washington. The officers sought 

to detect illegal drug and gun crimes; to advance that goal, 

they would stop cars when they observed traffic violations 

and then look for suspicious behavior by the driver or 

passengers. 

When the police saw Carroll Washington run a stop sign, 

they pulled over his vehicle. After noticing Washington reach 

toward the floorboard, as well as other suspicious behavior, 

the officers ordered him to get out and then searched the car. 

See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983); Pennsylvania v. 

Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 

(1968). The officers uncovered a loaded gun near where 

Washington had moved his hand. After arresting 

Washington, they also found $6840 on his person and 795 

pills of ecstasy in the car. Washington was convicted and 

sentenced to 16 years and 8 months in prison. 

On appeal, the sole question presented is whether the 

search of the car violated the Fourth Amendment. To begin 

with, the Government correctly says the officers’ actual 

subjective motives – detecting drug and gun crimes – are 

irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment analysis of the traffic 

stop and protective search of the car. See Whren v. United 

States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). The Fourth Amendment test is 

objective. Therefore, when the police have an objectively 

reasonable basis to conduct a traffic stop for a suspected 

moving violation (as they concededly did here) and possess or 

develop an objectively reasonable fear that the driver may be 

armed, the officers may frisk the driver and search the car. In 

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this case, the Government contends that the officers possessed 

an objectively reasonable fear that Washington might be 

armed because Washington suspiciously reached toward the 

floor of the car, he lied to police about why he had done so, he 

appeared extremely nervous and was sweating profusely, he 

repeatedly looked back over his shoulder at one of the 

officers, and the neighborhood was a high-crime area. We 

agree with the Government’s position, and we affirm the 

judgment of the District Court. 

I 

According to testimony at the suppression hearing, 

District of Columbia police sometimes conduct “aggressive 

traffic patrols” and use routine traffic stops to try to detect and 

prevent drug and gun crimes. Tr. of Mot. Hr’g 24:3-15, Jan. 

21, 2005. On May 28, 2004, several officers from one of the 

Police Department’s High Impact Tactical teams employed 

that procedure in a Southeast Washington neighborhood 

known for narcotics trafficking, shootings, and homicides. 

At 9:30 p.m. that night, a member of the police team saw 

Carroll Washington run a stop sign. The officer radioed 

ahead to other officers to pull over Washington’s car. 

Officers Teixeira and Dailey then did so. 

When Officer Dailey approached the driver’s side 

window, he observed Washington talking on his cell phone. 

Officer Dailey told Washington to end his call. Complying 

with Officer Dailey’s instruction, Washington placed the 

phone on the passenger seat next to him. Washington 

appeared extremely nervous and was sweating profusely. He 

repeatedly glanced over his right shoulder at Officer Teixeira. 

Officer Teixeira found that to be unusual because people 

usually “focus most of their attention to the officer actually 

conducting the traffic stop.” Id. at 17:2-5. 

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Officer Dailey returned to his police car to check the 

status of Washington’s license and registration. While 

Officer Dailey was in his cruiser, Officer Teixeira saw 

Washington “reach underneath his driver’s seat” and “make 

some type of motion up by his feet in the floorboard area.” 

Id. at 18:6-9. Officer Teixeira so informed Officer Dailey. 

After going back to Washington’s car, Officer Dailey asked 

Washington why he had reached under the seat. Washington 

claimed that he had dropped his phone to the floor and then 

picked it up. The officers did not believe Washington 

because they had earlier seen him put the phone on the 

passenger seat. 

The officers ordered Washington out of the car, as 

permitted under Pennsylvania v. Mimms during any traffic 

stop. 434 U.S. 106, 111 n.6 (1977); see also United States v. 

Bullock, 510 F.3d 342, 344-45 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Officer 

Dailey then searched the car to ensure that Washington did 

not have a weapon. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 

1049 (1983). Officer Dailey found a loaded gun under the 

driver’s floor mat near where Officer Teixeira had seen 

Washington move his hand. The officers arrested 

Washington and searched his person, finding $6840 in cash. 

Later, at the police station, the officers conducted a more 

extensive search of the car and uncovered 795 pills of ecstasy. 

A jury convicted Washington of one count of possession 

of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and one count of possession with 

intent to distribute ecstasy in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(a)(1). The District Court sentenced him to 16 years and 

8 months of imprisonment. 

On appeal, Washington contests the District Court’s 

decision to admit the evidence seized from his car and from 

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his person. He argues that the police did not possess 

sufficient justification under Fourth Amendment precedents to 

search his car during the routine traffic stop. We review de 

novo the District Court’s conclusion that the search was 

reasonable. 

II 

 The Supreme Court and this Court have repeatedly 

recognized that a car stop is “one of the more perilous duties 

imposed on law enforcement officers.” United States v. 

Holmes, 385 F.3d 786, 791 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Because of that 

inherent danger, police may order the driver and passengers 

out of the car during a traffic stop. See Maryland v. Wilson, 

519 U.S. 408, 413 n.1 (1997); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 

U.S. 106, 111 n.6 (1977); United States v. Bullock, 510 F.3d 

342, 344-45 (D.C. Cir. 2007). In addition, the police may 

frisk the driver and search the car when officers possess or 

develop a “reasonable belief based on ‘specific and articulable 

facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from 

those facts, reasonably warrant’ the officer in believing that 

the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate 

control of weapons.” Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 

1049-50 (1983) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 

(1968)). The reasonableness of a frisk and car search during a 

stop depends on “‘whether a reasonably prudent [officer] in 

the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his 

safety or that of others was in danger.’” Id. at 1050 (quoting 

Terry, 392 U.S. at 27).*

In this case, a number of factors would have led 

reasonable officers to fear for their safety during the stop. 

Officer Teixeira saw Washington move his hand and body as 

 *

 Some suspected crimes, by their nature, justify police in 

fearing that the suspect may be armed and dangerous. See Bullock, 

510 F.3d at 347 (collecting cases). 

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if to reach under the seat – a movement reasonably 

suggesting, given the circumstances, that Washington might 

be concealing or retrieving a weapon. “It is well settled that 

an individual’s furtive movements may be grounds for 

reasonable suspicion and fear, justifying a Terry stop and 

search.” United States v. Brown, 334 F.3d 1161, 1167 (D.C. 

Cir. 2004); see also Bullock, 510 F.3d at 348; Holmes, 385 

F.3d at 788-90; United States v. Edmonds, 240 F.3d 55, 61 

(D.C. Cir. 2001); United States v. Mitchell, 951 F.2d 1291, 

1296 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United States v. Moore, 554 F.2d 

1086, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United States v. Green, 465 F.2d 

620, 623-24 (D.C. Cir. 1972); 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH 

AND SEIZURE § 9.6(a) at 628-29 (4th ed. 2004). In addition, 

when the officers asked Washington about his reaching 

movement, they did not believe his answer because they had 

earlier seen him place his cell phone on the passenger seat. 

Washington’s statement – which the officers reasonably 

believed was false – increased the officers’ fear that he might 

have a weapon. See United States v. Smith, 614 F. Supp. 25, 

28 (D.D.C. 1984) (Hogan, J.) (“furtive movements” together 

with “the fabrication for the reason for being illegally parked” 

provided reason for officers to fear for their safety). Officer 

Teixeira testified, moreover, that Washington was extremely 

nervous, sweating excessively, and behaving oddly during the 

encounter – all of which suggested something was afoot. See, 

e.g., Brown, 334 F.3d at 1167-68. Finally, the stop occurred 

in a high-crime area – a fact that we have found significant in 

previous car search cases. See, e.g., Bullock, 510 F.3d at 348; 

United States v. Edwards, 424 F.3d 1106, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 

2005). 

The facts in this case – the totality of the circumstances – 

are sufficient under our precedents to demonstrate the 

reasonableness of the protective frisk and car search. In so 

concluding, we of course do not mean to imply that any or all 

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of the above facts are necessary to justify a protective frisk 

and car search during a traffic stop. 

III 

In response, Washington relies primarily on United States 

v. Spinner, 475 F.3d 356 (D.C. Cir. 2007). In Spinner, the 

police searched a car based on nothing other than the 

suspect’s nervousness and a “fiddling” movement with his 

hand. Id. at 359. Consistent with our prior decisions, we said 

that “the suspicion that someone is armed – or, in this case, 

might have a weapon available in his vehicle – must be based 

upon something more than his mere nervousness.” Id. at 360. 

We explained that a person “stopped by the police is entitled 

to be nervous without thereby suggesting he is armed and 

dangerous or, indeed, has anything to hide.” Id. We further 

stated: “The officers suspected he put something in his truck 

but they had no reason whatsoever to believe it was a 

weapon.” Id. (emphasis added). Washington’s reliance on 

Spinner is misplaced. Unlike in Spinner, Washington’s 

suspicious movement of reaching toward the floorboard could 

have been an act of retrieving or concealing a weapon; in 

addition, as discussed above, a variety of other facts in this 

case justified the officers’ reasonable fear for their safety. 

 On a different tack, Washington argues that the officers’ 

justification for the original stop ceased when they determined 

that his license and registration were valid – in other words, 

that the basis for the stop ended before the officers searched 

the car. But we have stated that the police’s concern for 

safety during a traffic stop ordinarily does not terminate until 

the officers allow the driver to depart. See United States

Bullock, 510 F.3d 342, 348-49 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The 

Supreme Court recently confirmed this commonsense 

principle. See Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S. Ct. 781, 788 (2009) 

(“Normally, the stop ends when the police have no further 

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need to control the scene, and inform the driver and 

passengers they are free to leave.”). 

Finally, Washington contends that “the officers’ motives, 

and the fact that this [stop] was purely pretextual should give 

this Court some pause in considering the officers’ 

explanations for what [they were] in fact doing.” Tr. of Oral 

Arg. at 23:15-18, Dec. 11, 2008. As Washington correctly 

points out, the officers here were not interested in enforcing 

the traffic laws. Indeed, the officers involved in the stop 

apparently were not even using traffic-ticket books to issue 

tickets. Tr. of Mot. H’rg at 33:18-34:10, Jan. 21, 2005. 

Rather, the police were performing an “aggressive traffic 

patrol” – looking “for moving violations, tag violations, 

reasons to pull vehicles over” – because, as Officer Teixeira 

testified, “that’s normally how we get a lot of our narcotics 

and gun arrests.” Id. at 24:3-14. 

 But Washington’s suggestion that we consider the 

officers’ actual motives runs afoul of Whren v. United States. 

There, the Supreme Court held that an officer who possesses 

an objective basis to stop a motorist for a suspected traffic 

violation may do so regardless of the officer’s subjective 

motive. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810-13 

(1996). Whren exemplifies the broader principle that courts 

analyze searches and seizures based on what an objectively 

reasonable officer could have believed and done, not what the 

officers subjectively thought. In light of the Supreme Court’s 

precedents, we cannot accept Washington’s invitation to 

decide this case based on the officers’ actual subjective 

motives. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968) (in 

assessing validity of frisk, “it is imperative that the facts be 

judged against an objective standard”); United States v. 

Jackson, 415 F.3d 88, 91 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“officers’ actual 

motives for conducting the search are not relevant as long as 

their actions were objectively reasonable”) (internal quotation 

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marks and alterations omitted); United States v. Holmes, 385 

F.3d 786, 790 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“The propriety of a search 

under the Fourth Amendment depends on an objective 

assessment of the officer’s actions in light of the facts and 

circumstances confronting him at the time and not on the 

officer’s own subjective intent in executing the search.”) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

* * * 

The police search of Washington’s car was reasonable 

under the Fourth Amendment. We affirm the judgment of the 

District Court. 

 

 So ordered. 

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