Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-23-03187/USCOURTS-caDC-23-03187-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jonathan Joshua Munafo
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 8, 2024 Decided December 31, 2024

No. 23-3187

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

JONATHAN JOSHUA MUNAFO,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:21-cr-00330-1)

Kevin Lerman, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued 

the cause and filed the briefs for appellant.

Reuven Dashevsky, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Matthew M. 

Graves, U.S. Attorney, and Chrisellen R. Kolb, Nicholas P. 

Coleman, and Sean P. Murphy, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: PILLARD, PAN, and GARCIA, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge PILLARD. 

USCA Case #23-3187 Document #2091979 Filed: 12/31/2024 Page 1 of 17
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PILLARD, Circuit Judge: Jonathan Joshua Munafo 

pleaded guilty to two charges related to his role in the January 

6, 2021, attack on the United States Capitol. The district court 

accepted the plea and entered a judgment of conviction. The 

parties agreed that the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range for the 

offenses at issue was 30-37 months, and the court sentenced 

Munafo to 33 months imprisonment.

On appeal, Munafo argues that the government breached 

his plea agreement in two ways, and that he is entitled to 

resentencing in conformity with the plea agreement as he reads 

it. First, he asserts that the agreement required the dismissal of 

a pending misdemeanor assault charge in D.C. Superior Court. 

Second, he claims that the agreement barred the government 

from referring at sentencing to some of Munafo’s past 

statements and affiliations. We hold that Munafo has forfeited 

the first objection by failing to press it before the district court, 

and that in any event both fail on their merits because neither 

argument is supported by the text of the plea agreement. 

Munafo also asks that his sentence be vacated because—

he claims—it presents the appearance of having been based on 

his constitutionally protected political speech and affiliations. 

But in the plea agreement Munafo waived the right to appeal 

his sentence, and we hold that he has made no colorable claim 

of a miscarriage of justice that would support voiding that 

waiver. We therefore affirm Munafo’s sentence.

I.

A.

The sentence at issue here stems from Munafo’s 

participation in the mob attack on the United States Capitol on 

January 6, 2021, waged to prevent Congress from certifying 

President Biden as the winner of the 2020 Presidential Election. 

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Unless otherwise specified, in describing the relevant facts we 

rely on the Statement of Offense that Munafo confirmed was 

“true and accurate” as part of his plea agreement. Statement of 

Offense 6 (Appellant’s Appendix (App.) 57).

Munafo traveled to Washington, D.C., on January 6 to 

support President Trump. On the afternoon of January 6, 

Munafo joined a violent mob that breached the police line 

surrounding the Capitol and overran the West Plaza. Capitol 

Police then endeavored to block the rioters from forcing their 

way into the Capitol Building through the Inauguration Tunnel. 

Munafo was among the rioters who physically attacked law 

enforcement officers in an effort to force their way through the 

Inauguration Tunnel. During the fighting, rioters succeeded in 

pulling Capitol Police Officer Michael Fanone out of the police 

line. When Metropolitan Police Department Officer Neil 

McAllister attempted to protect Fanone, Munafo punched 

Officer McAllister twice and pulled McAllister’s riot shield out 

of his grasp. Statement of Offense ¶ 10 (App. 55). Munafo 

also used a flagpole to repeatedly strike a window of the 

Capitol Building.

B.

The government charged Munafo with ten offenses. 

Munafo agreed to plead guilty to Counts One and Two:

obstructing, impeding, and interfering with law enforcement 

during a civil disorder in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3) 

(Count One) and assaulting, resisting, or impeding a federal 

officer in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) (Count Two). 

Munafo also agreed that the aforementioned Statement of 

Offense accurately described his conduct on January 6. In view 

of the government’s agreement to support a three-level 

reduction of Munafo’s offense level in return for his timely 

acceptance of responsibility, Munafo’s estimated Sentencing 

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Guidelines range was 30-37 months imprisonment. The parties 

agreed that a sentence within that range would be “reasonable” 

under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), even as they reserved the right to 

seek a variance and request a sentence outside of that range. 

Moreover, the Reservation of Allocution clause of the plea 

agreement reserved to both parties “the right to describe 

fully . . . to the sentencing judge[] the nature and seriousness of 

[Munafo’s] misconduct, including any misconduct not 

described in the charges to which [Munafo] is pleading guilty” 

and to “inform the presentence report writer and the Court of 

any relevant facts.” Plea Letter 5 (App. 44).

In return for Munafo’s guilty plea, the government 

promised to “request that the Court dismiss the remaining 

counts of the Indictment.” Plea Letter 2 (App. 41). The 

agreement also guaranteed that Munafo “will not be further 

prosecuted criminally . . . for the conduct set forth in the 

attached Statement of Offense.” Plea Letter 2 (App. 41). And 

the government pledged that Munafo “will not be charged with 

any non-violent criminal offense in violation of Federal or 

District of Columbia law which was committed within the 

District of Columbia by [Munafo] prior to the execution of this 

Agreement and about which [the government] was made aware 

by [Munafo] prior to the execution of this Agreement.” Plea 

Letter 2 (App. 41).

Finally, Munafo agreed to waive his right to appeal his 

sentence unless it exceeded the statutory maximum or 

Guidelines range for his offenses of conviction.

C.

Both parties submitted memoranda in advance of 

Munafo’s sentencing. Munafo sought to portray his conduct as 

an aberrant departure from his peaceful political activity as a 

“Front Row Joe”—a moniker for certain dedicated supporters 

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of President Trump who queued for front row seats at campaign 

rallies. The government emphasized Munafo’s history of 

violent conduct, as well as allegations that Munafo recently 

joined with inmates in the D.C. Jail to assault other inmates.

At Munafo’s sentencing hearing, the government 

presented further information as showing Munafo’s lack of 

respect for the law. First, the government quoted a statement 

by Saundra Kiczenski, a fellow “Front Row Joe” who appears 

next to Munafo in a picture included in Munafo’s own 

sentencing memorandum, that the January 6 rioters “were just 

there to overthrow the government.” Sentencing Tr. 7:16-17 

(App. 128). Second, the government recounted that, on a 

phone call to participants in a prayer vigil for January 6 

prisoners, Munafo said that his case was before Judge Boasberg 

and so he hoped to receive the “Boasberg discount” of a 

sentence half as long as what the government recommended. 

Sentencing Tr. 8:14-21 (App. 129). The government also noted 

that Munafo praised the book Becoming a Barbarian, which—

as the government described it—urges readers to “choose your 

values” and “go all in and devote [your] lives to one group of 

people above all others.” Sentencing Tr. 8:22-9:12 (App. 129-

30). The government requested a sentence of 37 months.

For his part, Munafo denied that he had assaulted anyone

in jail as the government asserted. And, while he conceded that 

the government’s sentencing recommendation was in line with 

the plea agreement, Munafo objected that the government’s 

sentencing presentation breached the agreement because it 

covered topics beyond the agreed-upon Statement of Offense, 

exceeded the limitations of the plea agreement’s Reservation 

of Allocution clause, was based on unvetted and unreliable 

statements, and sought to “impute the actions of others” to

Munafo. Sentencing Tr. 30:20-37:18 (App. 151-58).

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Munafo did not seek to withdraw his guilty plea, but 

instead requested “specific performance,” meaning a

resentencing at which the government would be prevented 

from engaging in “allocution and advocacy that’s outside of the 

agreed-upon framework by the parties.” Sentencing Tr. 35:13-

36:23, 37:17-18 (App. 156-58).

The district court ruled that the government had not 

breached the agreement and emphasized that it based Munafo’s

sentence solely on his admitted conduct. The district court 

sentenced Munafo to 33 months imprisonment, 36 months 

supervised release, and a special assessment of $200. Munafo 

reiterated his objection to the court “taking into account factors 

that it wasn’t supposed to” in deciding his sentence. 

Sentencing Tr. 45:15-20 (App. 166).

With the sentence determined and the proceeding drawn to 

a close, Munafo’s counsel brought “one additional matter” to 

the district court’s attention. Sentencing Tr. 46:5-13 (App. 

167). Counsel stated his understanding that the government 

also “agree[d] to dismiss and not charge Mr. Munafo in the 

superior court for additional crimes that occurred prior to the 

execution of the [plea] agreement,” including a pending D.C. 

Superior Court misdemeanor charge unrelated to Munafo’s 

conduct on January 6. Sentencing Tr. 46:5-13 (App. 167). 

After a brief discussion of whether the plea agreement required 

dismissing that charge, the district court said “[l]et me just look 

at the agreement” and then announced it was “not going to say 

anything about that” and suggested Munafo’s counsel speak to 

the Superior Court division of the U.S. Attorney’s Office. 

Sentencing Tr. 46:25, 47:3-7 (App. 167-68). Munafo’s counsel 

acknowledged the court’s statement without objection.

Munafo timely appealed his sentence. We have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.

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II.

We first address Munafo’s two claims of breach of the plea 

agreement. To preserve a claim of error, a party must inform 

the court “of the action the party wishes the court to take, or the 

party’s objection to the court’s action and the grounds for that 

objection.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 51(b); see United States v. Mack, 

841 F.3d 514, 525-26 (D.C. Cir. 2016). As to claims that 

Munafo preserved, we “interpret the terms of the plea 

agreement de novo” and, “[c]onsistent with constitutional 

principles and the settled rule that contracts are construed 

against their drafters, we construe any ambiguities . . . against 

the government.” United States v. Moreno-Membache, 995 

F.3d 249, 254 (D.C. Cir. 2021). “[T]he law demands clarity 

when constitutional rights are waived.” Id. at 251. An 

unpreserved claim of breach of a plea agreement, by contrast,

is reviewed only for plain error. Puckett v. United States, 556 

U.S. 129, 143 (2009). Such a claim merits reversal only if the 

breach was “clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable 

dispute,” the breach resulted in prejudice, and the breach 

resulted in a “miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Thomas, 

999 F.3d 723, 728 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (quoting Puckett, 556 U.S. 

at 135); see Fed R. Crim. P. 52(b).

Munafo asserts both that the plea agreement required the 

dismissal of his D.C. Superior Court misdemeanor charge and 

that it forbade some of the government’s factual assertions at 

sentencing. We review the former claim for plain error,

because Munafo failed to obtain a ruling from the district court 

on whether the plea agreement required that charge’s dismissal, 

and review the latter argument de novo. Because each 

challenge rests on an erroneous interpretation of the plea 

agreement, we reject both arguments.

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A.

Munafo first argues that the plea agreement’s promise that 

he “will not be charged with any non-violent criminal 

offense . . . committed within the District of Columbia by [the 

defendant] prior to the execution of this Agreement” required

that the government dismiss a 2020 misdemeanor assault 

charge that, at the time of sentencing in this case, was pending 

in D.C. Superior Court. Plea Letter 2 (App. 41). We hold that 

the relevant provision of the plea agreement applies only to 

hypothetical future charges based on Munafo’s pre-plea

conduct, and not to the already-pending 2020 assault charge.

We first determine whether Munafo preserved this issue 

for appellate review. After the district court imposed the 

sentence and, per the plea agreement, dismissed the remaining 

counts of the indictment, Munafo’s counsel told the court that 

he believed the plea agreement required the government also to 

dismiss the 2020 assault charge. Sentencing Tr. 46:5-13 (App. 

167). The government responded that “this wasn’t part of 

something that they have requested of me beforehand,” and that 

the Superior Court action “is not related to January 6. It’s a 

separate incident that happened during a previous visit to 

Washington, D.C.” Sentencing Tr. 46:18-22 (App. 167). 

Without expressly ruling on whether Munafo’s interpretation 

of the plea agreement was correct, the district court declared “I 

am not going to say anything about that” issue and suggested 

that Munafo’s counsel discuss it with the U.S. Attorney’s 

Office. Sentencing Tr. 47:3-7 (App. 168). Rather than object 

or demand that the district court rule on the question, Munafo’s 

counsel merely responded “Okay.” Sentencing Tr. 47:8 (App. 

168). That did not suffice to preserve the claim. And, after the 

U.S. Attorney’s Office refused Munafo’s request to dismiss the 

D.C. Superior Court charge, counsel did not return to ask the 

district court to enforce his reading of the plea agreement as

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requiring that the 2020 assault charge be dropped. We review 

Munafo’s unpreserved objection for plain error. 

Accordingly, to prevail here Munafo must show (1) a clear 

breach of the plea agreement (2) that caused him prejudice, and 

(3) that the breach resulted in a miscarriage of justice. The 

second and third factors are easily met here. A governmental 

refusal to fulfill a binding agreement to dismiss a criminal 

charge would cause obvious prejudice to the defendant. And 

allowing the government to secure a guilty plea in return for its 

promise to drop a charge that the government then refuses to 

dismiss would “seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public 

reputation of judicial proceedings.” Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135

(quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993) 

(formatting altered)). As to the first factor, if a plea agreement 

required dismissal of a charge, the government’s unexplained 

failure to fulfill that requirement would almost certainly satisfy 

the plain error standard.

But Munafo’s claim fails at the first step: There was no 

breach of the plea agreement, let alone one that was “clear or 

obvious.” Thomas, 999 F.3d at 728. The wording of the 

disputed clause does not require dismissal of the unrelated 

assault charge that was pending against Munafo when he 

entered the plea agreement in this case. Reading the clause in

context with other terms of the agreement further confirms that 

it applies only to yet-to-be-filed charges. 

The disputed clause promises that Munafo “will not be 

charged with any non-violent criminal offense in violation of 

Federal or District of Columbia law which was committed 

within the District of Columbia . . . prior to the execution of 

this Agreement.” Plea Letter 2 (App. 41). By agreeing that the 

defendant, upon pleading guilty, “will not be charged” with 

additional offenses, the government made a promise about its 

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own future charging behavior: It pledged not to initiate any 

new prosecution relating to Munafo’s past, non-violent 

conduct in the District of Columbia. 

Munafo argues that the phrase “will not be charged” refers 

to an ongoing status of continuing to “be charged” with an 

offense, which persists until the charge is dropped or otherwise 

resolved. Munafo Reply Br. 15. His reading is unsupported. 

To “charge” someone means “[t]o accuse (a person) of an 

offense.” Charge, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) 

(def. 1). The plea agreement’s use of the future tense “will not 

be charged” refers to conduct that has yet to occur—

specifically, the act of charging Munafo with other applicable

crimes. It is not naturally read to undo or reverse the 

government’s past charging decisions. Nor does the 

agreement’s use of the future passive “will not be charged” 

phrasing, rather than the equivalent “will not charge Munafo” 

with a non-violent criminal offense, support Munafo’s 

interpretation.

The language of the relevant phrase of the plea agreement 

is thus sufficient to resolve this challenge. But if additional

evidence were needed, the plea agreement notably uses 

different, clearly distinct language when referring to the 

disposition of charges that (like those in the 2020 assault case)

had already been filed at the time of the agreement. First, the 

agreement promises that Munafo “will not be further 

prosecuted criminally” for the conduct described in the 

Statement of Offense. Plea Letter 2 (App. 41). Second, the 

government pledges to “request that the Court dismiss the 

remaining counts of the Indictment in this case.” Plea Letter 2 

(App. 41). Both of those phrases—“further prosecute” and 

“dismiss”—unambiguously cover offenses with which Munafo 

had already been charged, and for which his prosecution had 

already begun. But neither of those provisions covers the 2020 

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misdemeanor assault charge, which did not involve conduct 

described in the Statement of Offense and was not contained in 

the federal indictment. The plea agreement’s use of “will not 

be charged” to describe offenses beyond those in the Statement 

of Offense and the indictment, rather than promising that the 

government would “dismiss” or not “further prosecute” such

offenses, confirms that the former provision applies only to 

potential future charges resulting from Munafo’s conduct.

B.

Munafo also claims that the government’s sentencing

allocution violated the terms of the plea agreement. There is 

no dispute that Munafo preserved this argument. We conclude 

on de novo review that Munafo has failed to demonstrate that 

the government’s allocution breached the plea agreement.

Munafo primarily objects to the government’s references 

to the statement of his fellow “Front Row Joe” Saundra 

Kiczenski and to Munafo’s comments on the phone call with 

people holding a prayer vigil for the January 6 prisoners. 

Nothing in the plea agreement forbade the government from 

referencing that information at sentencing. The agreement 

expressly reserved—to both parties—the right to “describe 

fully . . . any misconduct not described in the charges to which 

[Munafo] is pleading guilty” and to “inform . . . the Court of 

any relevant facts” at sentencing. Plea Letter 5-6 (App. 44-45) 

(emphasis added). Information that the government believed 

shed light on Munafo’s respect for the law, a relevant 

consideration at sentencing per 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A), was 

within the permissible scope of the sentencing allocution under 

the plea agreement. The same is true of the allegation that 

Munafo engaged in violence while in custody in the D.C. Jail.

Munafo seeks to draw support from United States v. 

Mojica-Ramos, 103 F.4th 844 (1st Cir. 2024), in which the

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imposition of an upward-variant sentence following the

prosecutor’s suggestions that the defendant likely committed 

other crimes and was “exceptional[ly]” dangerous implicitly 

breached the government’s commitment in the plea agreement 

to advocate for a sentence within the Guidelines range. Id. at 

850-51. As an initial matter, even if we agreed with Munafo 

that the government was subtly urging the district court in his 

case to vary upward from the Guidelines range—which we do 

not—that would not have breached his plea agreement, which

(unlike Mojica-Ramos) expressly permitted either party to 

request a variance. Plea Letter 5 (App. 44).

In any event, Munafo identifies nothing like a suggestion

that Munafo was exceptionally dangerous or otherwise 

deserving of an atypically harsh sentence. At sentencing, the 

government recommended a 37-month sentence of 

imprisonment even as it noted that it would not “quibble” with 

the judge “over [the] one month” it sought beyond the 

probation office’s recommendation of 36 months. Sentencing 

Tr. 13:8-21 (App. 134). And, unlike the sentence on appeal in

Mojica-Ramos, the 33-month sentence the court imposed on 

Munafo was within the agreed-upon Guidelines range and

below the government’s recommendation. Sentencing Tr. 

43:21-24 (App. 164); see Mojica-Ramos, 103 F.4th at 848-49.

III.

Lastly, we address Munafo’s claim that, even if the 

government did not breach the plea agreement, his sentence 

must be reversed on the ground that it appears to have been 

based on Munafo’s constitutionally protected political speech 

and associations. We see no basis in the record that would 

cause any fair observer to suspect that the district court 

impermissibly disfavored Munafo because of his political 

beliefs or associations. And this claim stumbles at the gate 

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because Munafo expressly waived his right to appeal his 

sentence outside of circumstances not implicated in this case—

namely, a sentence “above the statutory maximum or 

guidelines range.” Plea Letter 8 (App. 47). 

A criminal defendant “may waive his right to appeal his 

sentence as long as his decision is knowing, intelligent, and 

voluntary.” United States v. Guillen, 561 F.3d 527, 529 (D.C. 

Cir. 2009). But because such a defendant does not “agree to 

accept any defect or error that may be thrust upon him by . . . an 

errant sentencing court,” we will not enforce a waiver of the 

right to appeal “if the sentencing court’s failure in some 

material way to follow a prescribed sentencing procedure 

results in a miscarriage of justice.” Id. at 530-31. For example, 

we will not enforce a waiver if a sentence “is ‘colorably alleged 

to rest upon a constitutionally impermissible factor, such as the 

defendant’s race or religion.’” United States v. Adams, 780 

F.3d 1182, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Guillen, 561 F.3d at 

531). And, while “the Constitution does not erect a per se 

barrier” to the admission of First Amendment-protected beliefs 

and associations at sentencing, the First Amendment does 

prohibit consideration “of a defendant’s abstract beliefs at a 

sentencing hearing when those beliefs have no bearing on the 

issue being tried.” Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 165, 

168 (1992).

Munafo does not dispute that his appeal waiver was 

knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Instead, he contends that 

his sentence falls into the “miscarriage of justice exception” to 

enforceability, Adams, 780 F.3d at 1184 (formatting altered),

because it appears to rest on Munafo’s First Amendmentprotected activities.

Munafo’s argument immediately runs into difficulty 

because he alleges only that his sentence “has the appearance” 

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of resting on his constitutionally protected expression. Munafo 

Br. 35. But our circuit’s miscarriage of justice exception 

applies when a sentence is “colorably alleged to rest upon a 

constitutionally impermissible factor,” Guillen, 561 F.3d at 

531 (emphasis added), not necessarily when a sentence is only

alleged to appear to rest upon such a factor. The government 

argues that the distinction supports affirmance here. Munafo 

responds that even the appearance of reliance on an 

impermissible factor can invalidate a sentence. For that variant 

of taint, Munafo relies principally on the Second Circuit’s 

decision in United States v. Kaba, 480 F.3d 152, 158 (2d Cir. 

2007), which vacated and remanded a sentence that the district 

court had justified in part as a crime deterrent directed at people 

of the defendant’s national origin. But Kaba—unlike 

Munafo—had not waived her right to challenge her sentence

on appeal, id., and the Second Circuit accordingly did not 

address whether proof that the circumstances of sentencing 

gave rise to an appearance that the sentence was influenced by 

an impermissible factor would suffice to void a knowing and 

voluntary waiver.

For the purpose of this appeal, we nonetheless assume 

without deciding that we may decline to enforce an appeal 

waiver when the defendant colorably alleges that his sentence 

appears to rest on constitutionally impermissible factors. 

Munafo argues that courts should “take great care to avoid” 

imposing a sentence that “leaves the appearance of being based 

on beliefs and associations protected by the First Amendment.” 

Munafo Reply Br. 21. There are compelling arguments in 

favor of such a standard. Requiring a colorable allegation that 

a challenged sentence in fact rested on impermissible factors 

might place defendants—and courts on review—in the 

uncomfortable position of choosing between abandoning a 

claim and accusing a sentencing judge of bigotry. In Kaba, for 

example, the district court announced from the bench that it 

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hoped that the harsh sentence it imposed on Kaba would send 

a message to other “people from the Guinea community” in 

New York. 480 F.3d at 155-56, 158-59. In vacating that 

sentence, the Second Circuit asserted that it had “no doubt that 

the district court ‘harbored no bias’ toward Kaba because of her 

national origin,” and identified the problem as only “the 

appearance of unfairness.” Id. at 158. Vigilance against 

unconstitutional factors affecting judicial decision making is 

also manifest in the due process standard for claims of judicial 

bias, which “may sometimes demand recusal even when a 

judge ‘ha[s] no actual bias’” if, “objectively speaking, ‘the 

probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or 

decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.’” See 

Rippo v. Baker, 580 U.S. 285, 287 (2017) (per curiam) (first 

quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825 

(1986), then quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 

(1975)). On the other hand, we have noted that the reliable 

enforceability of appeal waivers is part of what makes them 

valuable to defendants as “an additional bargaining chip” to use 

in plea negotiations. Adams, 780 F.3d at 1184 (quoting 

Guillen, 561 F.3d at 530). In defending the narrowness of the 

“miscarriage of justice” exception to such waivers, we stressed 

that a waiver may “lose its value” as negotiating leverage “[i]f 

the Government cannot count upon the waiver being enforced.” 

Id. 

The precise rule is ultimately immaterial here because 

even under Munafo’s preferred standard his appeal waiver 

must be enforced. There is no indication whatsoever that the 

district court’s sentence presents the appearance of relying on 

any constitutionally impermissible factor, such as Munafo’s 

political beliefs. To the contrary, the district court repeatedly 

declared that Munafo’s sentence was based only on Munafo’s 

own conduct and background, and that the court was not 

assuming that Munafo had “adopted any statement” of others 

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or “attributing others’ behavior” to Munafo. Sentencing Tr. 

17:11-17, 43:3-5 (App. 138, 164). Munafo’s reliance on Kaba

is therefore misplaced. In holding that Kaba’s harsh sentence 

raised the appearance of unconstitutional reliance on her 

national origin, the Second Circuit primarily relied on the 

district court’s own explanation. The district court highlighted 

deterrence, expressing hope that, in sentencing a person of 

Guinean origin, its message would reach other people from 

Guinea who might be involved in the heroin trade and would 

“deter other people from that background” from committing 

similar offenses. Kaba, 480 F.3d at 155-56. 

In sharp contrast to the Kaba court, the district court here

gave unambiguous assurance that it was “merely considering 

[Munafo’s] conduct” rather than any impermissible factor. 

Sentencing Tr. 17:17 (App. 138). Munafo contends that the 

district court’s statement that there had been “plenty of 

violence in [Munafo’s] past,” Sentencing Tr. 43:6-13 (App. 

164), demonstrates that the court was persuaded by the 

government’s suggestions that Munafo was politically 

affiliated with other violent January 6 defendants and violent 

D.C. Jail inmates. But the court made that observation based 

on the record before it and in the context of expressing hope 

that, with mental health treatment, Munafo could avoid a 

recurrence of “the kinds of things that’s happened over the last 

20 years.” Sentencing Tr. 43:8-13 (App. 164). Rather than 

imputing the violence of his putative political associates to 

Munafo, the district court referenced the many prior incidents 

of Munafo’s own violent conduct spanning decades, as 

recounted in the presentence report. No reasonable observer 

could view Munafo’s sentence as potentially resting on any 

“constitutionally impermissible factor.”

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IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the sentence the 

district court imposed.

So ordered.

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