Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-05610/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-05610-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Aileen Defeo
Defendant
Alison Lorraine Hatheway
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Alison Lorraine Hatheway,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Aileen Defeo,

Defendant.

No. CV-19-05610-PHX-DLR

ORDER 

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment against Defendant 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b). (Doc. 14.) No response has been filed 

and the time for filing one has passed. For reasons stated below, the Court will deny default 

judgment. 

I. Background

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint on November 12, 2019, which brings

claims against Defendant for violating 15 U.S.C. § 45 and the Connecticut Unfair Trade 

Practices Act, conspiracy, and unjust enrichment. (Doc. 1.) Specifically, the complaint 

alleges that Defendant, a Connecticut Coldwell Banker branch vice president and 

brokerage manager, caused 112 Cedar Swamp Road Deep River, CT (the “Property”) to 

be listed for sale and mischaracterized as bank-owned on certain real estate websites, even 

though Plaintiff contends that the Property is actually owned by a common law trust 

Case 2:19-cv-05610-DLR Document 15 Filed 04/09/20 Page 1 of 4
- 2 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

controlled by Plaintiff.

1

(Id. at 2.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s actions caused 

Plaintiff to be locked out of and unable to use the Property, which is currently sale-pending. 

The complaint seeks, among other things, damages in the amount of one million dollars. 

(Id. at 7.) Plaintiff served her complaint on Defendant on December 31, 2019. (Doc. 9.) 

After Defendant failed to file an answer or otherwise respond, on February 21, 2020 

Plaintiff filed an application for entry of default, which the Clerk of Court granted on 

February 24, 2020. (Docs. 12, 13.) Plaintiff filed her motion for default judgment on 

March 18, 2020. The motion is now ripe. 

II. Default Judgment Standard

After default is entered by the clerk, the district court may enter default judgment 

pursuant to Rule 55(b). The court’s “decision whether to enter a default judgment is a 

discretionary one.” Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). Although the 

court should consider and weigh relevant factors as part of the decision-making process, it 

“is not required to make detailed findings of fact.” Fair Housing of Marin v. Combs, 285 

F.3d 899, 906 (9th Cir. 2002).

The following factors may be considered in deciding whether default judgment is 

appropriate: (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of the claims, 

(3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the amount of money at stake, (5) the possibility 

of factual disputes, (6) whether default is due to excusable neglect, and (7) the policy 

favoring decisions on the merits. See Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 

1986). In considering the merits and sufficiency of the complaint, the court accepts as true 

the complaint’s well-pled factual allegations, but the plaintiff must establish all damages 

sought in the complaint. See Geddes v. United Fin. Group, 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 

1977).

1 Plaintiff contends that her control over the property persists, even though she 

admits that “[a] certificate of foreclosure was placed on the land record in 2018” and the 

Bank of New York Mellon was the grantee of the certificate of foreclosure. (Doc. 1 at 2, 

3.) Confusingly, Plaintiff argues that Defendant, or perhaps Coldwell Banker itself, cannot 

advertise the Property for sale—and in doing so is violating Plaintiff’s rights—because

Defendant was not a party to the foreclosure and Plaintiff was not shown the contract 

between the Bank of New York Mellon and Coldwell Banker to advertise the Property. 

(Id. at 3.) 

Case 2:19-cv-05610-DLR Document 15 Filed 04/09/20 Page 2 of 4
- 3 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

III. Discussion

Because the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to stated a claim upon which relief 

can be granted under the second Eitel prong, and in light of the one-million-dollar judgment

requested under the fourth Eitel prong, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion. Looking to 

the merits, the complaint fails to show how Plaintiff may be entitled to relief. First, it does 

not explain how Plaintiff could plausibly maintain control of or even possess an interest in

the Property after the 2018 foreclosure. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(“[A] complaint must . . . ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”). Second, 

the complaint does not explain why relief should be recoverable from Defendant, 

particularly.2 Third, even though personal jurisdiction can be waived, the complaint does 

not allege facts that support a finding that the Court has either general3 or specific4 personal 

jurisdiction over Defendant. In light of the complaint’s shortcomings and the massive

relief requested, default judgment is inappropriate under Rule 55(b). 

2 Plaintiff has previously filed lawsuits against other entities and individuals—

including Coldwell Banker listing agents, a Connecticut lawyer, the Bank of New York 

Mellon and its CEO—arising from facts surrounding the Property. All were dismissed. 

See Hatheway v. Bank of New York Mellon, Civ. No. 18-08332-PCT-DLR, 2019 WL 

2415287 (D. Ariz. June 7, 2019); Hatheway v. Sirochman, Civ. No. 19-08028-PCT-DWL, 

2019 WL 3973658 (D. Ariz. Aug. 22, 2019); Hatheway v. Taylor, Civ. No. 19-CV-08173. 

Failing to obtain relief against these parties, Plaintiff now attributes the allegedly violative 

actions to Defendant. However, the complaint fails to make clear why Defendant is the 

proper party. The complaint only states that Defendant “is an individual, a U S Citizen, 

living in the State of Connecticut.” (Doc. 1 at 1.) The Court was only able to determine 

Defendant’s employment or likely connection to the Property by conducting independent 

research. 

3 Plaintiff has made no allegation that Defendant engages in “continuous and 

systemic general business contacts” in Arizona as required to establish general personal 

jurisdiction. Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Because Defendant is employed at a Coldwell Banker branch in Connecticut, it is highly 

unlikely that Defendant operates continuously and systemically in Arizona. 

4 The Ninth Circuit applies a three-part test to determine whether a defendant is 

subject to specific personal jurisdiction: “(1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully 

direct [her] activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; 

or perform some act by which [s]he purposefully avails h[er]self of the privilege of 

conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; 

(2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forum-related 

activities; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial 

justice, i.e., it must be reasonable.” Morrill v. Scott Fin. Co., 873 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th 

Cir. 2017). Because this case involves a Coldwell Banker employee’s advertising of the 

Property in Connecticut and is tied to Arizona only insofar as Plaintiff is domiciled here, it

does not arise out of or relate to any activities conducted by Defendant in Arizona. 

Case 2:19-cv-05610-DLR Document 15 Filed 04/09/20 Page 3 of 4
- 4 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment (Doc. 14) is 

DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is required to show cause, by no later 

than April 21, 2019, why the Court should not dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to 

state a claim in light of the concerns identified in this order. The Clerk is directed to 

terminate this case without further order if Plaintiff fails to respond to this order to show 

cause by the deadline stated herein.

Dated this 9th day of April, 2020.

Douglas L. Rayes

United States District Judge

Case 2:19-cv-05610-DLR Document 15 Filed 04/09/20 Page 4 of 4