Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-08-40503/USCOURTS-ca5-08-40503-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ruben Rangel-Ibarra
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-40503

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

RUBEN RANGEL-IBARRA,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:07-CR-1181-1

Before JONES, Chief Judge, and DAVIS and WIENER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Ruben Rangel-Ibarra appeals the 41-month sentence he received for his

conviction for being an alien found unlawfully in the United States after having

been deported following an aggravated felony conviction. He contends that the

district court erred in applying an eight-level enhancement under U.S.S.G.

§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(C). He argues that his successive drug convictions were not

punishable as a felony under 21 U.S.C. § 844(a), and consequently did not

qualify as an “aggravated felony” for purposes of § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C), because (1) the

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

April 30, 2010

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 08-40503

2

Government failed to prove that the offenses underlying those convictions were

committed after one of his prior drug convictions had become final and (2) the

Government failed to prove that those convictions were secured in compliance

with notice and procedural requirements that were commensurate to those in

21 U.S.C. § 851. 

Because Rangel-Ibarra preserved these arguments in the district court,

the district court’s application of § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) is reviewed de novo, and the

district court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error. Section 2L1.2

adopts the definition of “aggravated felony” contained in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43).

§ 2L1.2, comment. (n.3(A)). Under § 1101(a)(43)(B), “aggravated felony” means

“illicit trafficking in a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of Title 21),

including a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 924(c) of Title 18).”

Under § 924(c)(2), the definition of “drug trafficking crime” includes “any felony

punishable under the Controlled Substances Act” (CSA). Simple possession of

a controlled substance may be punishable as a felony under the CSA only if it is

committed after a prior conviction for a controlled substance violation has

become final. § 844(a); Smith v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 272, 277 (5th Cir. 2006).

According to the Government, Rangel-Ibarra satisfied the “aggravated felony”

definition under § 1101(a)(43)(B) and § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) because at least one of his

simple drug-possession offenses was committed after one of his prior drug

convictions had become final.

A conviction is final if it is no longer subject to challenge on direct appeal

or discretionary review by any court. United States v. Andrade-Aguilar,

570 F.3d 213, 218 (5th Cir. 2009). Because the Government sought the

§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) enhancement, the Government bore the burden of proving

finality by a preponderance of the evidence. See id. at 217. To establish that

Rangel-Ibarra had at least one drug conviction that was final when he

committed a later drug-possession offense, the Government introduced into

evidence the judgments for two of Rangel-Ibarra’s prior convictions: his

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November 1996 Florida conviction for trafficking cannabis and his 2004 Texas

conviction for possession of marijuana. According to the 2004 judgment,

Rangel-Ibarra committed the offense underlying the 2004 conviction on January

1, 2004.

The Government’s burden of showing finality for § 844(a) purposes may

be satisfied in some cases by the passage of a substantial amount of time without

a direct appeal or discretionary review. Andrade-Aguilar, 570 F.3d at 218 & n.6.

Under Florida law, Rangel-Ibarra’s window for filing a direct appeal of his 1996

conviction was 30 days. See FLA. R. APP. P. 9.140(b)(3). Rangel-Ibarra has not

asserted that he appealed the 1996 conviction, much less that he sought

discretionary review of the conviction. The passage of about seven years

between his 1996 conviction and the commission of his 2004 offense would make

it extremely unlikely that the 1996 conviction had not become final by January

2004. See Andrade-Aguilar, 570 F.3d at 218 n.6. The Government’s introduction

of the judgments for Rangel-Ibarra’s 1996 and 2004 drug convictions satisfied

its burden of proof regarding finality. See id.

Rangel-Ibarra’s argument concerning § 851 is also unavailing. Although

he indicates that his argument concerning § 851 is “apparently” foreclosed by

this court’s decision in United States v. Cepeda-Rios, 530 F.3d 333, 335-36 (5th

Cir. 2008), he also contends that his argument differs from the one rejected in

Cepeda-Rios. Specifically, he argues that his later possession convictions do not

qualify as aggravated felonies because there has been no showing that a state

prosecutor prosecuting those cases invoked procedures equivalent to those set

out in § 851. As we noted in Cepeda-Rios, “the relevant inquiry under the

sentencing guidelines is whether the crime is punishable under § 844(a).”

530 F.3d at 336 n.11 (emphasis in original). The Government satisfied its

burden of proof in that regard.

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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