Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03241/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03241-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
L.S.
Plaintiff
Newark Unified School District
Defendant

Document Text:

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

L.S.,

Plaintiff,

 v.

 NEWARK UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 05-03241 JSW

NOTICE OF QUESTIONS FOR

HEARING

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, PLEASE TAKE

NOTICE OF THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS FOR THE HEARING SCHEDULED ON

APRIL 28, 2006, AT 9:00 A.M.:

The Court has reviewed the parties’ memoranda of points and authorities and, thus, does

not wish to hear the parties reargue matters addressed in those pleadings. If the parties intend to

rely on authorities not cited in their briefs, they are ORDERED to notify the Court and opposing

counsel of these authorities reasonably in advance of the hearing and to make copies available at

the hearing. If the parties submit such additional authorities, they are ORDERED to submit the

citations to the authorities only, without argument or additional briefing. Cf. N.D. Civil Local

Rule 7-3(d). The parties will be given the opportunity at oral argument to explain their reliance

on such authority.

The parties each shall have 20 minutes to address the following questions:

1. Is Plaintiff asking the Court to apply the version of the IDEA as revised effective

July 2005? If so, does Plaintiff have any authority to support his position that the

Court should apply a version of the statute that was not in effect during the

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relevant time period? See, e.g., Amanda J. v. Clark County School Dist., 267

F.3d 877, 882 n.1 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying version of statute in force during

relevant time period).

2. Plaintiff, relying on Schaffer v. Weast, 126 S.Ct. 528 (2005), urges the Court to

place the burden of proof on Defendant. In Schaeffer, however, the Supreme

Court addressed which party had the burden of proof at the due process hearing,

and concluded that the party seeking relief bore that burden. Ninth Circuit

authority, however, makes clear that the party challenging the agency’s decision

bears the burden of proof in the district court. Clyde K. v. Pullayup Sch. Dist.,

No. 3, 35 F.3d 1396 (9th Cir. 1994). Does Plaintiff have any authority to suggest

that the Supreme Court’s decision in Schaffer overrules the holding in Clyde K?

3. Does Plaintiff dispute the Hearing Officer’s findings that the April 2004 meeting

did not result in procedural violations or does Plaintiff challenge the Hearing

Officer’s findings based on alleged cumulative errors from all three meetings? If

the former, which findings from the April 24, 2004 meeting does Plaintiff

challenge? If the latter, what are the specific provisions of the IDEA’s

procedural requirements that Plaintiff claims the Defendant violated?

4. Although Plaintiff seems to contend that the May 24, 2004 meeting resulted in a

final “offer,” in his Complaint, Plaintiff admits that the “team did not finish its

business and the meeting was continued to August 25, 2004.” How does

Plaintiff reconcile his current position with the admission in his Complaint?

5. At the administrative hearing, Plaintiff challenged the “accuracy and lack of

documentation of his then-current levels of functioning (at Charles Armstrong) to

determine his program for the 2004-2005 school year.” (Decision at 3.) Does

Plaintiff renew that challenge in this Court? If so, where does Plaintiff address

that challenge in his papers?

6. How would Plaintiff distinguish Katherine G. v. Kentfield School Dist., 261 F.

Supp. 2d 1159 (N.D. Cal. 2003), in which the court concluded that there was no

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authority to support a conclusion that “the IDEA requires adequate discussion of

mainstreaming opportunities with the parents of a disabled child at an IEP

meeting?” Id. at 1191.

7. Plaintiff takes issue with the Hearing Officer’s use of the term “some educational

benefit,” and contends that Rachel H sets forth “a satisfactory education” as the

appropriate standard. However, the “some educational benefit” standard appears

to be derived directly from Rowley. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200; see also W.G. v.

Bd. of Trustees of Target Range Sch. Dist. No. 23, Missoula, Montana, 960 F.2d

1479, 1487 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that with regard to the provision of a FAPE,

“[t]he substantive standard is simply ‘some educational benefit’”). What is

Plaintiff’s best argument that the Hearing Officer erred in using the “some

educational benefit” standard in his evaluation of the evidence?

Dated: April 26, 2006 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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