Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-05273/USCOURTS-caDC-96-05273-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gary E. Byrd
Appellant
John S. Henderson
Appellee
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 1, 1997 Decided July 25, 1997 

No. 96-5273

GARY E. BYRD,

APPELLANT

v.

JOHN S. HENDERSON AND 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 96cv00223)

Michael L. Converse argued the cause for the appellant. 

Larry S. Gondelman was on brief.

Mary-Patrice Brown, Assistant United States Attorney, 

argued the cause for the appellees. Eric H. Holder, Jr.,

United States Attorney, and John R. Fisher, John M. Facciola and L. Jackson Thomas, II, Assistant United States AttorUSCA Case #96-5273 Document #286515 Filed: 07/25/1997 Page 1 of 6
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neys, were on brief. R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant United 

States Attorney, and Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel, entered appearances.

Before: WALD, HENDERSON and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM : Appellant Gary Byrd petitioned the district 

court for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the District of 

Columbia Court of Appeals (Court of Appeals), in affirming 

the sentence imposed on him by the District of Columbia 

Superior Court (Superior Court), applied a harmless error 

analysis that violated Byrd's due process rights under the 

fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution.1 The district court dismissed the case for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that Byrd had an 

adequate and effective means of collaterally attacking his 

sentence by motion in the Superior Court and therefore was 

not entitled to a federal forum. We affirm the district court.

I.

In 1985 Byrd was convicted in the Superior Court of two 

counts of assault with a dangerous weapon, in violation of 

D.C. Code § 22-502 (1981); one count of assault with intent 

to kill while armed, in violation of D.C. Code § 22-501; and 

two counts of carrying a pistol without a license, in violation 

of D.C. Code § 22-3204. Byrd v. United States, 551 A.2d 96, 

97 (D.C. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 968 (1989). In his 

appeal to the Court of Appeals Byrd argued, inter alia, that 

the Superior Court jointly tried offenses relating to separate 

incidents in violation of Superior Court Criminal Rule 8(b) 

(Rule 8(b)).2 The Court of Appeals held that the trial should 

__________

1 Defendant John Henderson, Warden of the Lorton Correctional 

Complex, is Byrd's custodian.

2 The rule, which is identical to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(b), "permits the joinder of offenses in a multiple defendant 

case, but only if the offenses 'are based on the same act or 

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have been severed but that the Superior Court's joinder error 

was harmless. Byrd, 551 A.2d at 99-101. Byrd's subsequent 

petitions for rehearing and rehearing en banc were denied, 

JA 48, as was his petition for certiorari to the United States 

Supreme Court, Byrd v. United States, 493 U.S. 968 (1989).

Seven years after the Supreme Court denied certiorari, 

Byrd filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United 

States District Court for the District of Columbia. The basis 

of Byrd's petition was that the Court of Appeals's harmless 

error analysis, because it contradicted the standards established in United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438 (1986), denied 

Byrd his right to due process under the fifth and fourteenth 

amendments to the United States Constitution. A magistrate 

judge issued a report finding that the district court lacked 

jurisdiction and recommended dismissal. The district court 

accepted the magistrate judge's findings and dismissed 

Byrd's petition. The district court issued a certificate of 

probable cause and we therefore have jurisdiction to hear this 

appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 22(b).3

II.

Before passage of the District of Columbia Court Reform 

and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970 (Court Reform Act), Pub. 

L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473, a District of Columbia prisoner 

collaterally attacking his sentence sought relief in the United 

__________

transaction or series of acts or transactions.' " Byrd, 551 A.2d at 99 

(quoting Ray v. United States, 472 A.2d 854, 857 (D.C. 1984)).

3 Under section 102 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, which 

amended 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1), Byrd was required to obtain a 

"certificate of appealability" rather than a "certificate of probable 

cause." Because the substantive standards for the two are the 

same, we treat the district court's certificate of probable cause as 

the required certificate of appealability. See Drinkard v. Johnson,

97 F.3d 751, 756 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1114 (1997); 

Herrera v. United States, 96 F.3d 1010, 1012 (7th Cir. 1996); Reyes 

v. Keane, 90 F.3d 676, 680 (2d Cir. 1996); Lennox v. Evans, 87 F.3d 

431, 434-35 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 746 (1997).

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States District Court for the District of Columbia. See 

Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 375 n.4 (1977) (describing 

limited jurisdiction of Superior Court before Court Reform 

Act). Since passage of the Court Reform Act, however, a 

District of Columbia prisoner seeking to collaterally attack 

his sentence must do so by motion in the sentencing court

the Superior Courtpursuant to D.C. Code § 23-110.4 Thus 

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4 Section 23-110 provides:

(a) A prisoner in custody under sentence of the Superior 

Court claiming the right to be released under the ground that 

(1) the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution of 

the United States or the laws of the District of Columbia, (2) 

the court was without jurisdiction to impose the sentence, (3) 

the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, 

(4) the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may 

move the court to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence.

(b) A motion for such relief may be made at any time.

(c) Unless the motion and files and records of the case 

conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the 

court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon the prosecuting authority, grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the 

issues, and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with 

respect thereto. If the court finds that (1) the judgment was 

rendered without jurisdiction, (2) the sentence imposed was not 

authorized by law or is otherwise open to collateral attack, (3) 

there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, the court shall vacate and set the 

judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner, resentence 

him, grant a new trial, or correct the sentence, as may appear 

appropriate.

(d) A court may entertain and determine the motion without 

requiring the production of the prisoner at the hearing.

(e) The court shall not be required to entertain a second or 

successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same 

prisoner.

(f) An appeal may be taken to the District of Columbia 

Court of Appeals from the order entered on the motion as from 

a final judgment on application for a writ of habeas corpus.

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a District of Columbia prisoner bears a certain resemblance 

to his federal counterparts who must collaterally challenge 

their sentences, not by seeking a writ of habeas corpus in the 

district where they are in custody, but by motion pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the district where they were sentenced. 

Despite the similarity there is one obvious difference between 

a federal prisoner and a District of Columbia prisoner: a 

federal prisoner who seeks collateral relief pursuant to section 2255 is heard by an Article III court (i.e. the federal 

district court that imposed sentence) whereas a District of 

Columbia prisoner who seeks collateral relief pursuant to 

section 23-110 of the D.C. Code is heard by an Article I court 

(i.e. the Superior Court). In order to collaterally attack his 

sentence in an Article III court a District of Columbia 

prisoner faces a hurdle that a federal prisoner does not. 

Namely, he must show that the relief by motion in Superior 

Court pursuant to section 23-110 of the D.C. Code "is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention." 

D.C. Code § 23-110(g).

In his petition Byrd maintains that the Court of Appeals's 

application of the harmless error test to his misjoinder claim, 

see United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438 (1986), was so 

arbitrary and capricious as to constitute a violation of his 

right to due process under the fifth and fourteenth amendments. He argues further that any remedy he may have by 

way of motion in Superior Court meets the "inadequate or 

ineffective" requirement because the Superior Court cannot 

review the proceedings of the Court of Appeals. See Watson 

v. United States, 536 A.2d 1056, 1060 (D.C. 1987), cert. denied,

486 U.S. 1010 (1988). Byrd's attack on the Court of Appeals's 

harmless error analysis, however, is not a meritorious due 

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(g) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a 

prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section shall not be entertained by the Superior 

Court or by any Federal or State court if it appears that the 

applicant has failed to make a motion for relief under this 

section or that the Superior Court has denied him relief, unless 

it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or 

ineffective to test the legality of his detention.

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process claim. Byrd repeatedly accuses the Court of Appeals 

of ignoring the Lane framework. But Lane did not, as Byrd 

suggests, set forth a three prong test for evaluating harmless 

error. Lane holds that misjoinder under Federal Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 8(b) does not always require reversal but 

instead is subject to harmless error analysis. In Lane the 

Court found that misjoinder was harmless on the facts. The 

Court listed three factors to support its conclusion: overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt; a proper limiting 

instruction to the jury; and the fact that evidence underlying 

the severed counts would likely have been admissible in each 

trial had separate trials taken place. Lane, 474 U.S. at 450. 

But the Court did not state that all three factors had to exist 

to find harmless error. Instead, the Court held that error is 

not harmless if it " 'had substantial and injurious effect or 

influence in determining the jury's verdict.' " Id. at 449 

(quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)). 

Here the Court of Appeals concluded misjoinder was harmless based only on the third Lane factor. See Byrd, 551 A.2d 

at 100-01. We think the Court of Appeals gave a reasonable 

reading to Lane and, accordingly, its decision comes nowhere 

near being so arbitrary and capricious as to deny Byrd due 

process. Byrd's attack on the Court of Appeals's harmless 

error analysis is thus at most a claim that the Court of 

Appeals's resolution of his Rule 8(b) claim was erroneous. 

Byrd cannot raise his claim of non-constitutional error in 

Superior Court by motion for collateral relief because the 

Superior Court lacks the power to review the Court of 

Appeals's decision. See Watson, 536 A.2d at 1060. That does 

not, however, render Byrd's remedy by motion inadequate or 

ineffective to test the legality of his detention. See Garris v. 

Lindsay, 794 F.2d 722, 726-27 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 479 

U.S. 993 (1986). Accordingly, the district court's dismissal of 

Byrd's petition for a writ of habeas corpus is

Affirmed.

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