Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-11-17051/USCOURTS-ca9-11-17051-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ethics Bureau at Yale
Amicus Curiae
Martin Soto Fong
Appellant
Charles Goldsmith
Appellee
Charles L. Ryan
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARTÍN RAÙL FONG SOTO,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

CHARLES L. RYAN and CHARLES

GOLDSMITH, Warden,

Respondents-Appellees.

No. 11-17051

D. Ct. No.

CV-04-68-TUCDCB

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

David C. Bury, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

September 10, 2013—San Francisco, California

Filed July 25, 2014

Before: Mary M. Schroeder and Jay S. Bybee, Circuit

Judges, and Robert J. Timlin, Senior District Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Timlin;

Dissent by Judge Schroeder

* The Honorable Robert J. Timlin, Senior District Judge for the U.S.

District Court for the Central District of California, sitting by designation.

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2 FONG V. RYAN

SUMMARY**

Habeas Corpus

The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of an

Arizona state prisoner’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus

petition challenging convictions of murder, robbery and

attempt, and aggravated robbery and attempt arising from a

triple homicide.

The panel held that the Arizona courts did not engage in

an unreasonable determination of the facts or an unreasonable

application of controlling federal law when denying the

petitioner’s claim under Napue v. Illinoisthat the prosecution

knowingly elicited and used the false testimony of a detective

regarding when the petitioner became a suspect in this case.

The panel held that the Arizona courts likewise did not

engage in an unreasonable determination of facts or an

unreasonable application of controlling federal law when

denying petitioner’s claim that his trial counsel provided

ineffective assistance of counsel by calling as a witness, in

pursuit of a mistaken-identity defense, a state informant who

otherwise would not have testified at the trial.

Dissenting, Judge Schroeder wrote that the petitioner did

not receive a fair trial and the district court should have

granted him habeas relief because the jury convicted the

petitioner after a trial marked by perjury and incompetence.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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FONG V. RYAN 3

COUNSEL

Amy Armstrong and Emily Skinner, Arizona Capital

Representation Project, Tucson, Arizona, for PetitionerAppellant.

Thomas C. Horne, Attorney General; Kent E. Cattani,

Division Chief Counsel; Joseph T. Maziarz, Section Chief

Counsel; Aaron J. Moskowitz, Assistant Attorney General,

Criminal Appeals/Capital Litigation Division, Phoenix,

Arizona, for Respondents-Appellees.

Professor Susan Martyn, University of Toledo College of

Law, Toledo, Ohio; Emeritus Professor Gary Lowenthal,

ArizonaState University, Tempe, Arizona, for Amicus Curiae

Ethics Bureau at Yale.

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4 FONG V. RYAN

OPINION

TIMLIN, District Judge:

Arizona state prisoner Martín Raùl Fong Soto

(“Petitioner” or “Fong”)

1

appeals the district court’s denial of

his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition challenging his

jury convictions of murder, robbery and attempt, and

aggravated robbery and attempt arising from a triple

homicide. A separate jury convicted Petitioner’s codefendants, Christopher McCrimmon (“McCrimmon”) and

Andre Minnitt (“Minnitt”), of similar charges in later

prosecutions brought by the same prosecutor in Petitioner’s

case. However, McCrimmon was acquitted after his second

trial and Minnitt’s convictions were vacated after three trials

once prosecutorial misconduct during Minnitt’s and

McCrimmon’s first two trials was uncovered. Specifically,

the prosecutor was found to have knowingly elicited from

Detective Joseph Godoy of the Tucson Police Department

false testimony about how and when the three defendants

became suspects in the case in order to bolster the credibility

of the key state witness, Keith Woods, whose testimony tied

the defendants to the crime. The prosecutor was later

disbarred for his misconduct.

Petitioner raises two certified claims on appeal. First, he

contends that the Arizona courts unreasonably rejected his

claim that, during his trial, the prosecution also knowingly

1 Though previous case captions in this matter have referred to Petitioner

as “Martin Soto Fong,” the Court recognizes that before the district court,

Petitioner identified his actual name as Martín Raùl Fong Soto, or, more

commonly, Martín Fong, and that Petitioner captions his filings with this

Court in accord with that representation.

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FONG V. RYAN 5

elicited and used the false testimony of Detective Joseph

Godoy regarding when Petitioner became a suspect in this

case in order to secure his conviction. Second, he argues that

the Arizona courts unreasonably rejected his claim that his

counsel was ineffective for calling state informant Keith

Woods (“Woods”) as a witness whenWoods otherwise would

not have testified at Petitioner’s criminal trial.2

We have jurisdiction over this timely appeal pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Crimes of Conviction

Petitioner’s convictions arose out of the June 24, 1992

lethal shootings at the El Grande Market in Tucson, Arizona,

of Fred Gee (“Gee,” the market manager), Ray Arriola (a

market employee), and Zewan Huang (Gee’s elderly uncle). 

State v. Soto-Fong, 928 P.2d 610, 614 (Ariz. 1996). Shortly

after the shootings, police found an abandoned car three

blocks from the market. Id. The car had been left mid-turn,

rather than parked near the curb. Id. at 624–25. The doors

were unlocked, the rear windows rolled down, and the hood

was warm to the touch. Id. at 625. McCrimmon’s fingerprint

was found on the driver’s side window. Id. at 614, 625.

The market was in the process of closing at the time the

murders took place. Id. at 615. Gee’s body was found near

the open cash register at the liquor counter. The cash register

2 Fong also raises a number of uncertified issues in his opening brief,

which we address separately in a concurrently filed memorandum

disposition.

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6 FONG V. RYAN

had a sale rung up on it, and nearby on the counter were bags

containing a cucumber and three lemons. Id. Petitioner’s

fingerprints were found on the bags. Id. Also, on the floor

near Gee’s body were two foodstamps not yet stamped with

the market’s name. Petitioner’s fingerprint was found on one

of the stamps. Id. At least $175.52 was missing from the

store. Id.

B. State Informant Keith Woods and Information

about a “Chachi”

Shortly after being released from prison in late August

1992, Woods was arrested byTucson police on a drug charge. 

Id. In exchange for his release and the dismissal of that

charge, which could have subjected Woods to 25 years in

prison, Woods agreed to act as a state informant. Id. at 616. 

On September 8, 1992, the lead homicide detective in the El

Grande murder case, Joseph Godoy (“Godoy” or “Detective

Godoy”), interviewed Woods because of information Woods

represented he had about the triple homicide. Id. at 615. 

Godoy initially engaged in an untaped interview with Woods

that lasted approximately 30 to 45 minutes, after which police

transferred Woods to a “bugged” room in order to tape his

statement. State v. Minnitt, 55 P.3d 774, 777 (Ariz. 2002).

During the taped portion of the interview, Woods stated

that McCrimmon and Minnitt had confessed to him that they

had completed the El Grande murders with a third person

identified as “Cha-Chi”3 who used to work at the market. 

Woods stated that Chachi “masked down or whatever” during

3 The Court utilizes the spelling “Chachi” when not directly quoting

another court decision, the parties’ pleadings, or the excerpts ofrecord, all

of which include varied spellings and capitalizations of that name.

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FONG V. RYAN 7

the shooting. Woods also represented that he had never seen

or met Chachi before and could not describe what Chachi

looked like. Woods relayed that McCrimmon and Minnitt

confessed to him on the first day that Woods was released

from prison in late August 1992.

Woods’ September 8, 1992 statement was not the first

date on which Detective Godoy learned of a Chachi being a

possible suspect in the El Grande murders. In an

investigative report dated September 9, 1992, Godoy stated

that on August 31, 1992, he received a call from an unknown

male who stated that “Martin Soto and a black guy named

McKinney” committed the shootings. According to the

September 9, 1992 report, later that same day, a Detective

Zimmerling (“Zimmerling”) advised Godoy that a female

confidential informant represented that “a Hispanic male

named Chachi and a black male named Christopher

McCrimmon” were involved in the triple homicide. Godoy

went on to relate in his report that on September 1, 1992, he

obtained information from the Tucson Police Department’s

Gang Unit that Petitioner Fong was an associate of

McCrimmon’s, that his AKA was Martin Soto, and that he

also went by the name Chachi.

In another investigative report dated September 15, 1992,

Godoy related slightly different facts about when and from

whom he learned about a Chachi. For example, in this

subsequently dated report, Godoy related that on August 31,

1992, the unknown male caller identified McKinney and a

Chachi (not a Martin Soto) as involved in the El Grande

murders. Godoy also related that on that same day,

Zimmerling called to state that a confidential informant had

identified as suspects a black male known as Christopher

McCrimmon and a Mexican male known as Martin Soto or

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8 FONG V. RYAN

Chachi. In the report, Godoy represented that he then

completed a records check on Christopher McCrimmon and

Martin Soto, but that no information came back on a Martin

Soto.

As a result, Godoy went to the El Grande Market to see if

Tommy Gee, a relative of the deceased market manager,

recognized either name. Tommy Gee said that he did not but

that an individual named Martin Fong, i.e., Petitioner, used to

work at the market. Godoy stated in his report that he then

completed a records check on Martin Fong which was

successful and revealed that Martin Fong used the name

Martin Soto. Godoy also related that the next day, on

September 1, 1992, Detective Fuller with the Tucson Police

Department told him that McCrimmon was best friends with

an individual named Martin Fong or Martin Soto.

As reflected in the September 15, 1992 report, on

September 2, 1992, Detective Godoy helped Detective Fuller

arrest Minnitt and McCrimmon for a robbery committed in

Tucson at Mariano’s Pizzeria on August 26, 1992. Detective

Godoy questioned each of them about their involvement in

the El Grande murders, and both denied any involvement in

those murders or in the Mariano’s Pizzeria robbery. 

McCrimmon also denied having seen Fong recently, and

Minnitt claimed not to know Fong at all.4 Nonetheless, after

a forensic identification technician concluded on September

10, 1992, that Fong’s fingerprints matched those found on

certain items at the El Grande Market crime scene, Petitioner

was arrested on September 11, 1992.

4 State informant Keith Woods also was told by police on September 8,

1992, that he was a suspect in the Mariano’s Pizzeria robbery, before he

offered to provide detectives with information on the El Grande murders.

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FONG V. RYAN 9

Detective Godoy completed a second interview with

Woods on November 20, 1992. On that date, the police

apprehended Woods after he had gone into hiding for a few

weeks in an attempt to renege on his deal to aid law

enforcement in the prosecution of the El Grande homicides. 

This interview also began with an untaped portion. In the

taped portion of the interview, Woods began by continuing to

represent that when Minnitt and McCrimmon confessed to

him, they only referred to the third individual as “Chachi.” 

Woods also related that McCrimmon and Minnitt told Woods

that Chachi made the plans to commit the robbery at the

market because he used to work there, and he could get them

inside because the market employees would recognize him.

Woods went on to tell Godoy that he had met Chachi at

the house of McCrimmon’s girlfriend, Bridget Lucero, on a

date after McCrimmon and Minnitt had been arrested in early

September 1992 in connection with the Mariano’s Pizzeria

case. As a result, Woods said that he could now identify

Chachi as Petitioner because Woods had also seen Petitioner

on television after Petitioner was arrested for the El Grande

murders on September 11, 1992 (though on September 8,

1992, Woods claimed to have never met Chachi).

Later in the interview, when Godoy again referred to

Woods meeting Chachi, Woods stated that “they” were

actually calling him Martin, not Chachi, and that Woods was

not sure if Martin and Chachi were two different people. 

Then, for the first time, Woods specifically related that,

during McCrimmon and Minnitt’s joint confession to him on

the day that he was released from prison, McCrimmon had

talked about committing the homicides with a guy named

“Martin” and “Chachi.” Woods again repeated that he was

not sure if Martin and Chachi were the same person. At that

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10 FONG V. RYAN

point in the interview, Godoy then identified “Martin’s”

girlfriend as Betty Christopher (Petitioner’s girlfriend) and

asked Woods if he knew BettyChristopher; Woods answered

in the affirmative.

Petitioner’s attorney, James Stuehringer (“Stuehringer”),

conducted a March 4, 1993 pretrial interview of Woods. 

During that interview, Woods expressly stated that

McCrimmon and Minnitt had told him during their joint

confession to the El Grande murders that “Martin” and 

“Chachi” had committed the crime with them, and that both

names referred to a single person, Betty Christopher’s

boyfriend. During this interview, Woods also receded from

his September 8, 1992 statement that Chachi wore a mask

during the commission of the murders. That is, he indicated

that he only assumed Chachi wore a mask but had not

explicitly been told that by McCrimmon or Minnitt. Woods

also told Stuehringer that McCrimmon had told him that

Chachi lived behind a Circle K off of a street called Prince.

C. Petitioner’s State Court Trial

The prosecution’s theory of the case was that, as an

undisputed former El Grande Market employee, Fong

exploited the store employees’ recognition of him to gain

access to the store while it was in the process of closing,

enabling him, Minnitt and McCrimmon to commit the

charged crimes. See, e.g., Soto-Fong, 928 P.2d at 620. 

However, the state did not plan to call Woods as a witness in

Petitioner’s case because Fong was not present when

McCrimmon and Minnitt allegedly confessed to Woods,

raising Sixth Amendment confrontation clause issues under

Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).

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FONG V. RYAN 11

Petitioner’s attorney nonetheless listed Woods as a

defense witness in order to support a primary defense theory

of mistaken identity: that Chachi was not Petitioner but

Martin Garza, a close friend of McCrimmon’s with the

nickname “Chachi.” Soto-Fong, 928 P.2d at 615. 

Stuehringer likewise filed a motion in limine asking the trial

court to limit the scope of Woods’ testimony to his

September 8, 1992 statement wherein he implicated a former

El Grande employee named Chachi but failed explicitly to

identify Chachi as Petitioner.

The judge denied Stuehringer’s motion in limine and

ruled that, if Woods testified, all of his statements to law

enforcement about McCrimmon’s and Minnitt’s joint

confession to him, including Woods’ November 20, 1992

statement, would be admissible at trial. Soto-Fong, 928 P.2d

at 616–17. Stuehringer still decided to call Woods as a

witness, who went on to testify, inter alia, to the contents of

his September 8 and November 20, 1992 statements. 

Soto-Fong, 928 P.2d at 620 (noting that Woods testified that

“the third murderer was ‘Martin,’ ‘the Mexican dude,’ who

‘used to work there[.]’”); see also id. at 624. During trial,

Woods also expressly stated that McCrimmon and Minnitt

told him when they confessed to the crimes that Martin was

Betty Christopher’s boyfriend, consistent with his statement

to Stuehringer during the March 4, 1993 pretrial interview. 

Id. at 624. And Woods related that he understood Chachi to

be Petitioner after meeting him at Bridget Lucero’s house.

As part of the mistaken identity defense, Stuehringer also

introduced evidence that Petitioner had never been known as

“Cha-Chi.” Id. at 616 n.2. Stuehringer likewise called

Martin Garza as a witness and elicited from him that his

nickname was Chachi, that he and McCrimmon were friends

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12 FONG V. RYAN

who lived around the corner from one another, that

McCrimmon called him Chachi, and that he lived near the

Circle K off of a street called Prince. Moreover, Stuehringer

elicited from Detective Godoy that, after his September 8,

1992 meeting with Woods but before November 20, 1992,

Godoy misstated in a telephonic search warrant affidavit and

under oath during a juvenile court transfer hearing that

Woods had identified Petitioner as Chachi, that Petitioner

confessed to the crimes, and that Petitioner had the murder

weapon. As a result, Stuehringer argued to the jury that

Godoy had an incentive to feed Woods additional

incriminating information connecting Chachi to Petitioner

when Godoy and Woods met for the second time on

November 20, 1992, after Woods had gone into hiding. As

another part of the defense strategy, Stuehringer presented

evidence and argument that the detectives, including

Detective Godoy, misrepresented and mishandled the

fingerprint evidence implicating Petitioner, making that

evidence unreliable. Soto-Fong, 928 P.2d at 615, 621.

In addition to the testimony from defense witness Woods

and the state’s presentation of the fingerprint evidence linking

Petitioner to the crime scene, the jury also heard from a

primary state witness named Queen E. Ray (“Ray”). Ray

testified that she loaned the abandoned car found near the El

Grande shootings with McCrimmon’s fingerprint on it to

McCrimmon in return for money on the evening of the El

Grande shootings. Id. at 614. She further testified that

McCrimmon, Minnitt, and a third person, whom she knew as

“Martinez,” left McCrimmon’s apartment with the car around

10:00 p.m. Id. She identified Petitioner as Martinez during

trial. Id. at 614–15. She went on to testify that McCrimmon,

Minnitt, and Petitioner returned to McCrimmon’s apartment

about an hour after she loaned them the car, without the car,

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FONG V. RYAN 13

and that McCrimmon gave her $30 and the car keys. Id. at

615.

Petitioner, seventeen at the time the crimes were

committed, was convicted on all counts except a burglary

count and ultimatelysentenced to death. Soto-Fong, 928 P.2d

at 615.

D. State Misconduct and the Trials of Petitioner’sCoDefendants

Petitioner’s co-defendants, McCrimmon and Minnitt,

were tried three weeks later. During that joint trial, the

prosecutor in the El Grande murder cases, Kenneth Peasley

(“Peasley”), represented during his opening and closing

statements that Godoy did not have the names of Petitioner,

McCrimmon, or Minnitt until he met with Woods on

September 8, 1992, and also stated that Godoy did not suspect

a former market employee or know that Petitioner worked at

the El Grande Market until he interviewed Woods; Godoy

gave testimony consistent with Peasley’s representations. 

Minnitt, 55 P.3d at 778. Both Minnitt and McCrimmon were

convicted and sentenced to death. However, McCrimmon’s

and Minnitt’s initial convictions were overturned on appeal

because of jury coercion, while Petitioner’s convictions were

affirmed on direct review. State v. McCrimmon, 927 P.2d

1298, 1303 (Ariz. 1996); Soto-Fong, 928 P.2d at 635.

Meanwhile, the state retried Minnitt and McCrimmon in

separate trials. Minnitt’s 1997 initial retrial resulted in a hung

jury. Minnitt, 55 P.3d at 777. During that trial and in line

with questions asked during the 1993 joint trial, Peasley

repeatedly elicited testimony from Godoy that Godoy did not

suspect McCrimmon, Minnitt, Fong or a “Cha-chi” of

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14 FONG V. RYAN

committing the El Grande murders until Godoy spoke with

Woods on September 8, 1992. Id. at 779. At McCrimmon’s

1997 retrial, his defense counsel confronted Godoy about this

testimony, and Godoy admitted that it was false but that he

feared causing a mistrial by improperly revealing information

obtained from confidential informants. Id. McCrimmon was

acquitted.

Minnitt was then tried for the third time by a different

prosecutor and was convicted again in 1999. Id. at 776, 780. 

But, on October 11, 2002, the Arizona Supreme Court

vacated his conviction and held that his latest retrial should

have been barred under the double jeopardy clause of the

Fifth Amendment because of Peasley’s repeated and knowing

use of false testimony during Minnitt’s prior two trials. Id. at

783.

In summarizing the context of the prosecutorial

misconduct, the Arizona Supreme Court recounted the

following:

Before discussing the actualmisconduct in

this case, we recount the context in which it

occurred. Deputy County Attorney Kenneth

Peasley conducted the 1993 Soto-Fong trial

and the 1993 and 1997 trials of Minnitt and

McCrimmon. He did not participate in

Minnitt’s 1999 trial. In all three Minnitt trials

and in both McCrimmon trials, the state’s

case depended heavily on Keith Woods’

credibility. Importantly, as of September 2,

the police had identified Soto-Fong,

McCrimmon, and Minnitt as suspects in the El

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FONG V. RYAN 15

Grande crimes and had interviewed them.5

But according to Godoy, police had yet to

interview anyone who could provide direct

evidence linking any of the three to the

crimes. Woods was not interviewed until

September 8, six days after the McCrimmon

and Minnitt interviews. Godoy claimed to

have received his first knowledge of any

involvement by McCrimmon and Minnitt

from his interview with Woods. This was the

information the police were seeking-that

McCrimmon and Minnitt had implicated

themselves in the murders and that a witness

would so testify.

Woods’ credibility was tenuous. He was a

convicted felon and drug addict who entered

into an agreement with the state to provide

testimony to avoid a lengthy prison sentence.

The state had no plausible explanation why

Godoy conducted the untaped [portion of the

September 8] interview with Woods. The

defense strategy in the Minnitt and

McCrimmon trials was to show that Godoy

was the source of Woods’ information about

Minnitt’s and McCrimmon’s involvement in

the case, and that during the untaped

interview, he fed that information to Woods.

If Godoy was indeed the source, Woods’

testimony would not have helped the state.

5 Contrary to how this statement reads, only Minnitt and McCrimmon

were interviewed prior to Godoy’s September 8, 1992 interview with

Woods. Godoy did not interview Petitioner until September 9, 1992.

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16 FONG V. RYAN

Similarly, without Woods, the state’s case

would be significantly weakened because no

direct or physical evidence connected Minnitt

to the crime, and the credibility of the

remaining witnesses was questionable.

Id. at 777–78.

In summarizing the extent of the misconduct, the Arizona

Supreme Court further concluded:

Peasley’s misdeeds were not isolated

events but became a consistent pattern of

prosecutorial misconduct that began in 1993

and continued through retrial in 1997. The

prosecutor knowingly and repeatedly misled

the jury as to how, when, and from whom

Godoy first learned the names of the three

defendants. By allowing the jury to believe

that Woods was the initial source, the state

avoided the credibility obstacle that would

have been apparent had Godoy himself been

the source. It is clear that Godoy testified

falsely and that his testimony was used to

bolster the credibility of the state’s key

witness. Moreover, the record establishes that

Peasley knew the testimony was false and not

only failed to clarify the mistake but argued

the evidentiary point to the jury. Peasley’s

calculated deception reveals the actual

weakness of the state’s case.

Id. at 782.

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FONG V. RYAN 17

Because of his misconduct in the McCrimmon and

Minnitt trials, Peasley was disbarred. In re Peasley, 90 P.3d

764, 781 (Ariz. 2004).

E. Petitioner’s Post-Conviction Relief Proceedings in

State and Federal Court

Fong filed his first state postconviction relief (“PCR”)

petition in Arizona Superior Court on August 20, 1999. That

petition included, inter alia, a claim alleging prosecutorial

misconduct based on perjury by Detective Godoy akin to that

ultimately found to have occurred in Minnitt’s and

McCrimmon’s trials. It also included a claim alleging

ineffective assistance of counsel because of Stuehringer’s

decision to call Keith Woods as a defense witness.

During evidentiary hearings occurring in January and

August 2001, Stuehringer testified about his defense strategy,

and Peasley testified about the prosecutorial misconduct and

certain Brady v. Marlyand allegations. Because Godoy was

under indictment for perjury stemming from McCrimmon’s

and Minnitt’s trials at that time, he invoked his rights under

the Fifth Amendment and refused to testify at the evidentiary

hearings.

Prior to issuing a ruling on the petition, Fong’s assigned

state court judge died, and when a new judge was assigned to

the matter, the parties agreed that a number of issues raised

by Fong could be decided without further evidentiary

development. After those claims were resolved and denied in

a June 27, 2002 order, the superior court then held another

evidentiary hearing on Petitioner’s remaining claims in

August 2002. Godoy again did not appear as a witness due to

his intention to invoke the Fifth Amendment if so called, even

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18 FONG V. RYAN

though he no longer was under indictment for his conduct in

McCrimmon’s and Minnitt’s prosecutions. In an October 7,

2002 ruling, the Arizona Superior Court denied Petitioner’s

remaining claims, including his prosecutorial misconduct

claim based on Godoy’s alleged perjury and his claim for

ineffective assistance of counsel based on Stuehringer’s

decision to call Woods as a defense witness.

Fong filed two more PCR petitions in state superior court

and engaged in a number of related state appellate

proceedings in a continued effort to challenge his conviction

and sentence. While he successfully had his death sentence

vacated as a result of the United States Supreme Court’s

decision in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), he

obtained no other relief in state court, and the October 7,

2002 Arizona Superior Court ruling remains the last reasoned

state court decision on the two certified issues addressed

herein.

Fong’s federal habeas petition asserted 24 claims for

relief. On August 5, 2011, the district court found that

Petitioner was not entitled to habeas relief on any of his

claims. However, it issued a certificate of appealability on the

two issues addressed in the instant opinion after finding that

Petitioner had not met the requirements for habeas relief

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) for claims adjudicated on the

merits in state court proceedings.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because Fong filed his federal habeas petition after April

1, 1996, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(“AEDPA”) applies to his claims. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S.

320, 336, 117 S. Ct. 2059 (1997). Under the AEDPA, a

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FONG V. RYAN 19

federal court can grant relief only if the state court’s

adjudication of a petitioner’s claim on the merits was

“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States” or if the state proceeding

“resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented

in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The

AEDPA sets forth a “highly deferential standard for

evaluating state-court rulings,” Lindh, 521 U.S. at 333 n.7,

and “demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit

of the doubt,” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24, 123 S.

Ct. 357 (2002).

On federal habeas review, the court “look[s] through

unexplained state court decisions leaving, in effect, the denial

of post-conviction relief to the last reasoned state court

decision to address the claim at issue.” Medley v. Runnels,

506 F.3d 857, 862 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). A state court

renders a decision “contrary to” federal law if it reaches “a

conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court]

on a question of law or if [it] decides a case differently than

[the Supreme Court] has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

413, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000).

A state court unreasonably applies federal law if it

“identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the

Supreme Court’s] decisions but unreasonably applies that

principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. Under the

“unreasonable application” inquiry, “the state court decision

[must] be more than incorrect or erroneous.” Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75, 123 S. Ct. 1166 (2003). Instead,

the decision must be “objectivelyunreasonable.” Id.; see also

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20 FONG V. RYAN

Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786–87 (2011) (“As a

condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a

state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the

claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in

justification that there was an error well understood and

comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for

fairminded disagreement.” (emphasis added)). This same

standard of unreasonableness applies to state court factual

determinations under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Taylor v.

Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Torres v.

Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107–08 (9th Cir. 2000)); see also

Murray v. Schriro, __F.3d__, 2014 WL 997716, *11 (Mar.

17, 2014 9th Cir. 2014) (“[W]e may only hold that a state

court’s decision was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts if ‘we [are] convinced that an appellate panel,

applying the normal standards of appellate review, could not

reasonably conclude that the finding is supported by the

record.’” (alternation in original) (quoting Taylor, 366 F.3d

at 1000)).

This Court reviews de novo a district court’s denial of

habeas corpus relief. Tanner v. McDaniel, 493 F.3d 1135,

1139 (9th Cir. 2007). The district court’s factual findings are

reviewed for clear error. Allen v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 979,

992 (9th Cir. 2005).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Alleged Napue Violation

In Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959), the

Supreme Court held “that a conviction obtained through use

of false evidence, known to be such by representatives of the

State, must fall under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Under

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FONG V. RYAN 21

this clearly established Supreme Court precedent, “the

petitioner must show that (1) the testimony (or evidence) was

actuallyfalse, (2) the prosecution knew or should have known

that the testimony was actually false, and (3) that the false

testimony was material. United States v. Zuno-Arce,

339 F.3d 886, 889 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Alcorta v. Texas,

355 U.S. 28, 31 (1957) (the state cannot allow a witness to

give a material false impression of the evidence). “In

addition, the state violates a criminal defendant’s right to due

process of law when, although not soliciting false evidence,

it allows false evidence to go uncorrected when it appears.” 

Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 978 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing

Alcorta and Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942)).

False testimony is material if there is “any reasonable

likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the

judgment of the jury.” Id. (internal quotations and citation

omitted). “Under this materiality standard, [t]he question is

not whether the defendant would more likely than not have

received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in

its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial

resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.” Id. (alteration in

the original) (internal quotations and citation omitted); see

also Dow v. Virga, 729 F.3d 1041,1048 (9th Cir. 2013)

(“Napue requires us to determine only whether the error

could have affected the judgment of the jury, whereas

ordinary harmless error review requires us to determine

whether the error would have done so.” (emphasis in

original)).

On appeal, Petitioner asserts that the prosecution built its

case on false testimony by Detective Godoy implying that he

did not suspect Petitioner, Minnitt, or McCrimmon of

committing the El Grande homicides until he first spoke with

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22 FONG V. RYAN

Woods on September 8, 1992. Petitioner contends that

because this testimony left the jury with the false impression

that Woods was the original source of Godoy’s suspicion of

Fong, it bolstered the credibility of Godoy and Woods and

discredited the defense argument that Godoy told Woods

what to say.

As framed before the state courts, Petitioner’s claim

focuses on a single question Peasley asked Godoy during

direct examination, as well as a series of questions

Stuehringer proceeded to ask Godoy on cross-examination. 

Godoy testified after Stuehringer had already called Woods

as a defense witness, wherein Woods had testified that, on

September 8, 1992, he had told Godoy that McCrimmon,

Minnitt, and an individual called “Chachi” were responsible

for the El Grande murders. The next day, during Godoy’s

direct examination, Peasley asked the following question:

Peasley: What I’m going to do is this: Ask

you to focus on the time period of

June 24th until the end of August

of 1992. During that time period,

had you developed any

information up to the end of

August, had you developed any

information that would lead you to

believe that either Christopher

McCrimmon, Andre Minnitt, or

Martin Fong were suspects in the

killings of these three men at the

El Grande Market?

Godoy: No, sir.

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FONG V. RYAN 23

This question was not directly followed by questions about

Godoy’s September 8, 1992 contact with Woods.

However, the next day, on cross-examination, Stuehringer

asked Godoy about Keith Woods’ September 8, 1992

statement:

Stuehringer: So what you were saying to

Mr. Woods and what Mr.

Woods was saying to you was

committed to a tape [on

September 8, 1992]?

Godoy: That’s correct.

...

Stuehringer: In the course of that statement

is when you learn about Mr.

McCrimmon and Mr. Minnitt?

Godoy: Yes.

Stuehringer: And this third person named

Cha-Chi?

Godoy: That’s correct.

Stuehringer: I think you testified earlier this

afternoon that after September

8th, your next contact with

Mr. Woods wasn’t until

November 20th?

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24 FONG V. RYAN

Godoy: That’s correct.

Stuehringer: So whatever information you

had that you testified to

between September 8th and

November 20th came from

that September 8th session?

Godoy: Yes.

Petitioner argued before the state courts (as he argues

here) that Godoy’s testimony in response to the above

questions constituted perjury and left the jury with the false

impression that Woods was the original source of Godoy’s

suspicion of Fong.

As to the direct examination question byPeasley, the state

PCR court ruled that Godoy’s response did not meet the

definition of perjury under Arizona law because of Fong’s

own representation in his petition that Godoy’s answer was

“technically [] true (although misleading),” considering

Godoy stated in his September 9 and 15, 1992 investigative

reports that he had obtained information by August 31, 1992

– i.e., the end of August – implicating McCrimmon and

Petitioner in the crimes. In other words, the state court ruled

that a technically true statement, by definition, could not

constitute perjury under Arizona law.

As to the alleged perjury committed by Godoy during

Stuehringer’s cross-examination of him, the state PCR court

reasoned that Stuehringer’s questions and Godoy’s answers

had to be considered in the entire context of Godoy’s

testimony. In particular, the state court found that when

Godoy answered the above questions by Stuehringer, Godoy

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FONG V. RYAN 25

did not actually state that he had never heard of the three

defendants’ names before meeting with Woods. Specifically

regarding Fong, the state PCR court pointed out that earlier

in Stuehringer’s cross-examination of Godoy, Stuehringer

had elicited testimony from Godoy that sometime in late June

to late August, Godoy got in touch with members of the Gee

family to obtain a list of current and former El Grande market

employees and that Godoy found out from them that

Petitioner was a former employee.

Most significant for the state court, on Peasley’s redirect

of Godoy, Peasley attempted to explore further the

circumstances under which Godoy first spoke with the Gee

family and how and from whom he first learned Petitioner

was a possible suspect. Those questions began as follows:

Peasley: When did that conversation

with the Gee family actually

take place?

Godoy: I had spoken to them a couple

of times throughout the

summer about who worked

there and specifically asked

him right when Mr. Fong

became a focus of this case –

and the first week was

September – about who

actually worked there.

Peasley: So when you talked to Mr.

Gee and you asked him about

his employment records, did

you refer by name to the

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26 FONG V. RYAN

individual you were concerned

about whether or not he had

worked there?

Godoy: Yes, I believe I at that time

asked for Mr. Martin Soto.

Peasley: And had you gotten

information, sir, before that

conversation with Mr. Gee

that provided you with the

name, Martin Soto, so you

would have a name to ask Mr.

Gee about in the first place?

Godoy: Yes.

Peasley: And from how many different

sources had you gotten the

name, Martin or Martin Soto,

prior to your conversation with

Mr. Gee where you asked him

about whether or not Martin

Soto had ever worked there?

Stuehringer: Judge, objection, hearsay,

foundation.

Peasley: The door was opened on that

one, Judge. And, again, if I

need to be heard, but Mr.

Stuehringer made inquiry

about that conversation.

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FONG V. RYAN 27

Court: Sustained.

Peasley: Did you speak with Sergeant

Zimmerling before your

conversation with Mr. Gee

where you asked about

employment records? Did you

s p e a k wi t h Se r ge a n t

Zimmerling of the Tucson

Police Department?

Godoy: Yes, I did.

Peasley: Without going into the nature

of the conversation that you

had with Sergeant Zimmerling

–

Stuehringer: Judge, could I approach the

bench and be heard?

Stuehringer and Peasley then engaged in a sidebar with

the trial court judge in which Stuehringer asked that Peasley

be precluded from exploring with Godoy in any fashion any

anonymous sources of information possibly connecting

Petitioner or a “Martin Soto” to the crime because such

testimony lacked foundation and was prejudicial hearsay. 

The court, this time, overruled Stuehringer’s objection, and

Peasley proceeded as follows:

Peasley: Sir, I was asking you about

your conversation with

Sergeant Zimmerling of the

Tucson Police Department. 

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28 FONG V. RYAN

When was it that you actually

s pok e wit h S e r g e an t

Zimmerling?

Godoy: The exact date I believe was

August 31st.

...

Peasley: Without going into the nature

of the information, did

Sergeant Zimmerling give you

information that you thought

was pertinent to this particular

case?

Stuehringer: Judge, may I just have a

continuing objection?

Court: Yes, you may.

Godoy: Yes.

Peasley: Was it after your conversation

with Sergeant Zimmerling

that you contacted the Gees

and made inquiry about

employment records?

Godoy: Yes.

Peasley: And was it after that

conversation, sir, that you

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FONG V. RYAN 29

specifically asked about

Martin Soto?

Godoy: Yes, sir.

Peasley: Were you at some point, then,

after that inquiry provided

with records concerning

Martin Fong who you later

came to know as Martin Soto?

Godoy: Yes.

Based on the above testimony, the state court concluded

that the jury actually was informed that Godoy suspected

Petitioner’s involvement in the El Grande murders prior to

Godoy’s September 8, 1992 meeting with Woods and at least

as early as August 31, 1992, and that any limitations on the

extent of the information presented to the jury about what

Godoy knew prior to talking to Woods was caused, in part, by

Petitioner’s own counsel who kept objecting to Godoy

testifying about information contained in his September 9 and

15, 1992 investigative reports.

The state PCR court likewise concluded that Godoy’s

quoted testimony on direct and cross-examination, in addition

to not being perjurious, also did not give a material false

impression to the jury that Godoy did not suspect Petitioner’s

involvement in the homicides until Godoy met with Woods. 

Stuehringer’s admitted trial strategy was of particular import

to the state PCR court in evaluating Petitioner’s false

impression argument.

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30 FONG V. RYAN

Specifically, the state PCR court noted that Stuehringer’s

defense strategy in calling Woods as a defense witness was to

try and connect the Chachi that Woods had referred to on

September 8, 1992, to Martin Garza and to suggest that when

Woods later stated to Detective Godoy on November 20,

1992, that, inter alia, Chachi was also referred to as “Martin”

and was “Betty Christopher’s boyfriend,” those additional

details connecting Chachi to Petitioner had been fed to

Woods by Godoy. In other words, Petitioner’s mistaken

identity defense aimed to keep from the jury any inculpatory

information – such as information in Godoy’s September 9

and 15, 1992 investigative reports – identifying Petitioner as

Chachi or a murder suspect prior to September 8, 1992, the

date on which Woods first implicated a Chachi who

seemingly could be connected to Martin Garza.

As a result, the state PCR court found that the prosecution

could not be faulted for failing to elicit fully the very

information that Petitioner affirmatively sought to keep out at

trial. Moreover, the state PCR court noted that Fong, in

apparent contradiction of his own argument, even

acknowledged in his petition that Peasley attempted to elicit

from Godoy at trial that Godoy had information implicating

Fong in the crimes prior to September 8, 1992, and cited to

Peasley’s redirect of Godoy on October 20, 1993, quoted

above, in which Peasley asked Godoy about information

obtained from Sergeant Zimmerling and the Gee family. And

the state PCR court again emphasized that the prosecution

was nonetheless able to present the jury with some evidence,

over defense counsel’s repeated objections, that Petitioner

became a suspect in the case on or about August 31, 1992,

before Godoy spoke with Woods. Therefore, the state PCR

court also rejected Petitioner’s false impression argument.

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FONG V. RYAN 31

Based on the above state PCR court reasoning and trial

testimony at issue, Petitioner fails to show that the state PCR

court’s decision denying him relief on his Napue claim was

unreasonable under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1) or (d)(2).

Petitioner first argues that Godoy’s testimony on direct

examination – that he developed no information suggesting

that McCrimmon, Minnitt, and Petitioner were suspects in the

El Grande murders during the time period from June 24 until

the end of August 1992 – was in fact false because evidence

shows that: 1) Godoy had suspected Petitioner and had been

pursuing him all summer, and 2) Godoy had allegedly

received certain information from Sergeant Zimmerling and

an anonymous caller possibly implicating Petitioner and

McCrimmon in the triple homicide as of August 31, 1992.

But neither of Petitioner’s two factual allegations renders

the state court’s decision denying his Napue claim

unreasonable because the evidence Petitioner claims reveals

the deception in Godoy’s direct examination testimony was

in fact disclosed to the jury during trial, as acknowledged by

the state PCR court. For example, Petitioner supports his first

factual allegation – that Godoy had suspected Fong all

summer – by citing to an August 27, 1992 investigative report

authored by Godoy in which Godoy stated that he contacted

the El Grande Market on June 30, 1992, to receive a list of

former and current employees.

However, as the state PCR court noted, Godoy testified to

substantially similar facts during Stuehringer’s crossexamination of him wherein Godoy stated that he had

contacted the Gees about obtaining a list of current and

former employees somewhere in the time frame of late June

to late August and thereafter learned that Petitioner was a

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32 FONG V. RYAN

former employee. Moreover, during Stuehringer’s recross of

Godoy, Stuehringer expressly asked Godoy about the August

27, 1992 investigative report and Godoy’s representation

therein that he asked the Gees for an employee list on June

30, 1992. Considering such evidence was disclosed to the

jury, Petitioner does not explain how these facts would

otherwise render Godoy’s direct-examination testimony false

or misleading.

6

6 Petitioner also supports this first factual allegation – that Godoy

suspected Petitioner all summer – by reference to an article from The New

Yorker he used in support of an actual innocence claim raised in his

second state PCR petition, filed in 2005. While this article was presented

to the state PCR court, Petitioner appears not to have attempted to use this

article in state court to support an allegation that the prosecution

knowingly presented Godoy’s false testimony at trial. For that reason, this

Court may be precluded from considering such evidence in evaluating

Petitioner’s Napue claim. Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398

(2011).

But, even if the Court could properly consider such evidence in

evaluating Petitioner’s Napue claim, the contents of that article do not

support a conclusion that the state PCR court’s finding regarding Godoy’s

direct testimony was unreasonable. In that article, Godoy is quoted as

saying that he “decided to find all the people who had worked at the El

Grande. It took weeks, but I found everyone except this one guy, this guy

named Martin. . . . I was looking for him, but I was always one step

behind. I needed to make him or clear him.” However, this statement by

Godoy is not tied to any express time frame and can be construed as

consistent with Godoy’s trial testimony that he sought a list of current and

former market employees from the Gees as part of his general

investigation of the crimes. That is, Godoy’s representations in the article

simply show that he generally sought to clear all market employees as

suspects but does not suggest that he had any particular knowledge beyond

Fong’s status as a former employee that tended to show he might be

involved in the El Grande murders prior to August 31, 1992. And it bears

repeating that the jury nonetheless heard through Peasley’s redirect

examination of Godoy that Godoy obtained specific knowledge more

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FONG V. RYAN 33

Petitioner’s second factual allegation – that Godoy’s

direct testimony was false because undisclosed evidence

shows that he actually obtained information implicating Fong

from Sergeant Zimmerling and an anonymous caller by

August 31, 1992 – is belied by the state court trial testimony

quoted above. Here, again, the jury was presented with the

evidence that Petitioner urges on appeal was not presented to

the jury and rendered Godoy’s testimonymisleading. Indeed,

as the state PCR court found, on redirect, the prosecution did

in fact elicit that Godoy had learned via conversations with

Zimmerling information implicating Petitioner in the case –

the suspect name “Martin Soto” – by at least August 31,

1992, approximately one week before Godoy spoke with

Woods. Moreover, the prosecution asked Godoy from what

other sources he had obtained incriminating information

about a “Martin” or “Martin Soto” at that time, but

Petitioner’s counsel made an objection to the admission of

such testimony into evidence, which the court sustained. As

a result, the prosecution was hampered in its ability to flesh

out all information Godoy had that potentially implicated

Petitioner prior to his meeting with Woods.

Petitioner nonetheless attempts to get around the fact that

Godoy testified to obtaining certain incriminating facts from

Zimmerling as of August 31, 1992, by contending that

Godoy’s testimony that he received the name “Martin Soto”

from Zimmerling as of August 31, 1992, was also false. In

support of this allegation, Petitioner notes that Godoy’s

September 9 and 15, 1992 investigative reports contain varied

details about whether Zimmerling identified a “Chachi” as a

possible suspect or a “Martin Soto” as a suspect. Petitioner

directly implicatingPetitioner onor about August 31, 1992, approximately

one week prior to his September 8, 1992 contact with Woods.

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34 FONG V. RYAN

also notes that during pretrial interviews, both Zimmerling

and Godoy stated that Zimmerling had identified as a possible

suspect an individual named “Chachi” or “Martin” but had

never used the last name “Soto.”

But Petitioner’s references to what very well may be

inconsistencies between Godoy’s trial testimony and other

evidence detailing what Zimmerling told Godoy about

possible suspect names on August 31, 1992, obfuscate the

issue on appeal. Petitioner’s Napue claim in state and federal

court has always centered on whether Godoy’s direct

examination testimony was false and misleading because it

allowed the jury to infer that Woods was the source of

Godoy’s suspicion of Fong. Even if Godoy’s testimony about

what information Zimmerling gave him was not fully

accurate, Petitioner does not cogently dispute that Godoy’s

testimony on redirect at least communicated to the jury that

Godoy’s suspicion of Petitioner preceded his September 8,

1992 interview with Woods and instead arose from his prior

contacts with Sergeant Zimmerling and the Gee family,

thereby correcting any impression that Woods was the initial

source of information linking Petitioner to the crime. In other

words, Petitioner fails to develop the significance of possible

inconsistencies concerning Godoy’s trial testimony and

statements about information received from Zimmerling for

purposes of his Napue claim.

Petitioner also argues on appeal that the state court was

unreasonable in concluding that Godoy’s cross-examination

testimony in which he testified that he “learned about”

McCrimmon, Minnitt, and a “Chachi” from Woods during

their September 8, 1992 conversation was not perjurious. 

However, as the state PCR court noted, when Godoy testified

“yes” in response to a question phrased by defense counsel

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FONG V. RYAN 35

asking if Godoy learned about Minnitt, McCrimmon, and a

Chachi on that date, Godoy did not affirmatively state that he

learned the names of those three individuals for the first time

during that conversation.

Moreover, as the state argues on appeal, it is reasonable

to construe the phrase “learn about” in the context of the

question posed by defense counsel to refer to the role played

by a Chachi in the murders, rather than simply the name

Chachi. Petitioner does not dispute that Godoy first learned

about the details of a Chachi’s alleged role in the El Grande

murders from his conversation with Woods on September 8,

1992, though Godoy had otherwise obtained the name

“Chachi” as a possible suspect by at least August 31, 1992, as

reflected in his September 9 and 15, 1992 investigative

reports.

Godoy’s affirmative one-word answer to a question

phrased by defense counsel in this case also directly contrasts

with Godoy’s testimony in the trials of Petitioner’s

co-defendants, where Woods was the key state witness and

the prosecution expressly asserted in its opening statement

that Godoy did not have the names of McCrimmon, Minnitt,

or Petitioner until after he met with Woods on September 8,

1992. Minnitt, 55 P.3d at 778–79. Here, because Woods was

a defense witness, the prosecution did not even mention

Woods in its opening statement. Moreover, in those later

trials, Peasley asked Godoy when McCrimmon, Minnitt, and

Fong became suspects and Godoy expressly responded that

he did not suspect any of the named defendants until he met

with Woods on September 8, 1992, and that he did not

suspect a former employee in the El Grande homicides and

did not get in contact with the Gee family about a former

employee until after he spoke with Woods on that date. Id.;

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36 FONG V. RYAN

see also In Re Peasley, 90 P.3d at 767–68. Godoy’s isolated

“learn about” answer in the context of Petitioner’s trial does

not approach this same level of affirmative misrepresentation.

Even if Godoy’s direct and cross-examination testimony

was not outright perjurious, Petitioner nonetheless urges that

Godoy’s quoted testimony still created a material false

impression that Woods was the source of the name Chachi –

if not the source of Godoy’s general suspicion of Fong –

because the prosecution’s redirect examination of Godoyonly

focused on whether Godoy had suspected a former market

employee,

7

a “Martin,” or a “Martin Soto” on or about 

 

7

 Petitioner recognizes that the damaging aspect of Woods’ September

8, 1992 statement that links Chachi to him as opposed to Martin Garza is

the reference to Chachi being a former market employee. As a result, he

at times appears to argue on appeal that Godoy’s at-issue testimony was

also misleading because Godoy’s answers in conjunction with Woods’

trial testimony made it appear as if Woods was the source of Godoy’s

suspicion of Petitioner as a former market employee, and thereby deprived

Petitioner of a meaningful opportunity to argue that Godoy fed that piece

of information to Woods.

To the extent he means to make such an argument, the Court finds it

to be without merit. To begin, Petitioner did not so precisely argue in

front of the state PCR court that Godoy’s direct and cross-examination

testimony in Petitioner’s trial was false because it left an impression that

Woods was the source of Godoy’s suspicion of a former employee. 

Instead, his arguments pressed in state court focused on whether Godoy’s

testimony gave the impression that Woods was the source of Godoy’s

suspicion of Fong generally.

But, turning to the merits of this more focused claim, Peasley’s

questions on redirect examination, admittedly did not expressly elicit a

date by which the Gees identified Petitioner to Godoy as a former market

employee, though a specific date was provided regarding Godoy’s contact

withSergeant Zimmerling. But, Peasley’s questions and Godoy’s answers

support a reasonable conclusion under the AEDPA’s deferential reviewof

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FONG V. RYAN 37

August 31, 1992. In other words, Petitioner argues that the

state PCR court’s reliance on Peasley’s redirect of Godoy as

mitigating any misunderstanding about when Petitioner

generally became a suspect in the case was unreasonable

because the state court failed to acknowledge the more

nuanced point that the jury remained uninformed that Godoy

already suspected a Chachi of the crime and had information

linking Petitioner to the name “Chachi” prior to his

September 8, 1992 contact with Woods.

the state PCR court’s fact-finding that Peasley conveyed to the jury that

Godoy obtained information from the Gees that Petitioner was a former

market employee prior to Godoy’s September 8, 1992 contact with

Woods; the order of Peasley’s questions suggested that Godoy got in

contact with the Gees shortly after learning from Zimmerling

incriminating information about a Martin or Martin Soto on August 31,

1992, more than a week before Godoy first met with Woods. Moreover,

as noted by the state PCR court, the jury heard during Godoy’s

cross-examination by Stuehringer that Godoy’s contact with the Gees

occurred around late August. The jury also heard Godoy state on redirect

examination that he immediately contacted the Gees when Petitioner

became a focus of the case as of September.

Peasley’s questions and Godoy’s answers also made clear that Godoy

was prompted to contact the Gees about a suspected former employee

because of his August 31, 1992 contact with Sergeant Zimmerling, not

because of his later contact with Woods. This testimony directly contrasts

with Godoy’s false testimony and Peasley’s improper arguments during

the trials of Petitioner’s co-defendants that Woods’ September 8th

statement caused Godoy to contact the Gees about a former employee. In

other words, Peasley’s redirect questions in Petitioner’s criminal case

made clear that Woods was not the initial source of Godoy’s suspicion of

Petitioner as a former market employee. Because the jury was informed

that Godoy was suspicious of a former employee (namely, Petitioner)

before Godoy met with Woods, the defense was not deprived of an

opportunity to argue to the jury that Godoy fed that detail to Woods during

their September 8, 1992 meeting.

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38 FONG V. RYAN

However, this distinction between a general suspicion of

Petitioner and suspicion of a Chachi was not lost on the state

PCR court. Instead, as the state PCR court repeatedly

emphasized in its decision denying Petitioner relief,

Petitioner’s counsel consistently objected when Peasley

began asking Godoy about the contents of his September 9

and 15, 1992 investigative reports. While it remains unclear

if the prosecutor meant to at some point ask Godoy about a

Chachi as referred to in those reports, the state PCR court’s

focus on such defense objections at least acknowledges that

the prosecutor was hampered in his ability to reveal fully to

the jury the contents of the September 9 and 15, 1992

investigative reports, which contained information linking

Petitioner to the name Chachi.

But, more significantly, the state PCR court’s focus on

Petitioner’s defense theory in rejecting his false impression

claim demonstrates that it reasonably concluded that the

original source of the name Chachi was not material to

Petitioner’s defense. In other words, Petitioner’s defense

theory did not aim to prove that Godoy fed the name Chachi

to Woods during their September 8, 1992 meeting, in

comparison to the defense theories of Petitioner’s codefendants who were explicitly named by Woods in his

September 8, 1992 statement and wanted to prove that Godoy

fed their names to Woods on that date. Minnitt, 55 P.3d at

778.

While Stuehringer no doubt at times pointed out that it

was suspect for Godoy to engage in untaped communications

with Woods on September 8, 1992, Stuehringer actually

wanted the jury to believe Woods’ September 8, 1992

representation that a Chachi – Martin Garza – had committed

the El Grande murders with McCrimmon and Minnitt as part

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FONG V. RYAN 39

of Petitioner’s mistaken identity defense. As a result,

Stuehringer purposefully did not present the jury with any

argument that Godoy was motivated to feed the name

“Chachi” to Woods on that date. Indeed, when testifying

about his defense strategy during two different state PCR

court evidentiary hearings, Stuehringer expressly stated that

he aimed to have the jury believe Woods’ September 8, 1992

representation that a Chachi committed the crimes.

Stuehringer’s opening statement comports with his

articulation of the defense strategymade during the state PCR

court evidentiary hearings. As reflected in that opening

statement, Petitioner’s mistaken identity defense focused on

Godoy feeding Woods additional information connecting

Chachi to Petitioner after Godoy met with Woods on

September 8, 1992, information – that McCrimmon and

Minnitt referred to Chachi as “Martin” and “Betty

Christopher’s boyfriend” and that Woods could now identify

Petitioner as Chachi – which Woods only included in his later

November 20, 1992 statement. For example, during opening

statement, Stuehringer began by presenting to the jury as

worthy of belief Woods’ initial September 8, 1992 statement

to Godoy. In particular, he highlighted that on that date

Woods told Godoy that he had never met Chachi, did not

know who he was, and understood Chachi to have been

masked during the triple homicide. Stuehringer also omitted

that Woods referred to Chachi as a market employee on that

date, the primaryfact in Woods’ September 8, 1992 statement

undermining Petitioner’s mistaken identity defense.

Stuehringer went on to tell the jury that after September 8,

1992, Detective Godoy affirmatively misrepresented under

oath during a juvenile court transfer hearing that Woods told

him that: Petitioner had also confessed to the crime;

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40 FONG V. RYAN

Petitioner was in possession of the murder weapon; and

Chachi was Petitioner.

Because Godoy had gone “out on a limb” when testifying

in juvenile court, Stuehringer told the jury that Godoy had a

clear motive to feed Woods additional information that more

explicitly connected Chachi to Petitioner when Godoy and

Woods met again on November 20, 1992. Stuehringer

informed the jury that it would have to decide how “credible”

Keith Woods’ “second version” of events as reflected in his

November 20, 1992 statement was when compared to his

initial September 8, 1992 statement. In other words,

Stuehringer attempted to characterize Woods’ two primary

statements to Godoy as distinct and irreconcilable, rather than

cohesive iterations of a single story about McCrimmon and

Minnitt’s joint confession to Woods on the day he was

released from prison. Stuehringer then argued to the jury that

the real Chachi in this case would prove to be Martin Garza.

Indeed, defense counsel’s decision to call Woods as a

witness at all – when he otherwise would not have testified on

behalf of the state – was based on this defense theory that

Woods’ September 8, 1992 statement was exculpatory as to

Petitioner because that statement did not expressly name or

directly identify Petitioner as a perpetrator and provided an

opportunity to argue that Martin Garza, McCrimmon’s close

friend who was undisputedly nicknamed Chachi, actually

committed the crimes with McCrimmon and Minnitt. For

that reason, Stuehringer (unsuccessfully) moved in limine to

preclude the admission of Woods’ November 20, 1992

statement, which Stuehringer asserted raised confrontation

clause problems because it included the alleged confessions

of Fong’s co-defendants in a manner that more directly

implicated Petitioner, but simultaneously sought to have

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FONG V. RYAN 41

Woods’ September 8, 1992 statement admitted in support of

Petitioner’s mistaken identity defense.

Defense counsel’s decision to utilize Woods’ September

8, 1992 statement to pursue a mistaken identity defense may

have been imperfect, considering that statement also included

reference to Chachi being a market employee when Martin

Garza undisputedly had never worked at the El Grande

Market. But, imperfections in the defense theory8

do not

otherwise render the original source of the name Chachi

material to Petitioner’s innocence claim under Napue.

Instead, as the state PCR court realized, any testimony

from Godoy that he obtained the name “Chachi” prior to his

meeting with Woods on September 8, 1992, would have

undermined rather than benefitted Petitioner’s mistaken

identity defense because that defense required Stuehringer to

minimize any connections between Petitioner and a so-called

Chachi. Godoy’s investigative reports,9 which showed that

he had the name “Chachi” prior to meeting with Woods on

September 8, 1992, also problematically linked the name

“Chachi” to “Martin Soto” and “Martin Fong.” Because of

those connections, Stuehringer testified during the state PCR

court evidentiary hearings that he sought to prevent Godoy

from testifying to any of this information, resulting in

Stuehringer’s objections when Peasley began to question

8 The Court addresses below the merits of Petitioner’s ineffective

assistance of counsel claim based on Stuehringer’s decision to call Woods

as a defense witness.

9 The Court addresses Fong’s Brady claim premised on the alleged nondisclosure of Godoy’s September 9, 1992 investigative report in the

concurrently filed memorandum disposition. The state undisputedly

disclosed Godoy’s September 15, 1992 investigative report to Petitioner.

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42 FONG V. RYAN

Godoyabout information obtained from Sergeant Zimmerling

and other sources. In contrast to Godoy’s investigative

reports, Keith Woods’ initial statement to Godoy on

September 8, 1992, did not so directly tie Chachi to

Petitioner. Indeed, Woods’ initial statement referred to

Chachi wearing a mask, undermining the state theory that

Chachi knew the store employees as a former employee

himself and exploited their recognition of him to enter the

store. Further, Woods testified that McCrimmon told him

that Chachi lived on the street where Martin Garza lived. 

Based on these statements by Woods, the state PCR court

reasonably concluded that Petitioner’s mistaken identity

defense was bolstered by having the jury believe Woods’

September 8, 1992 statement that McCrimmon and Minnitt

had confessed to committing the crime with a masked Chachi.

Petitioner’s characterization of his trial defense theory

during his postconviction proceedings and before this Court

is somewhat revisionist because he now claims that his

defense theory was premised on Godoy feeding Woods the

name Chachi during their September 8, 1992 meeting and

fabricating that a Chachi was ever involved in the murders,

making his defense theory more like that of his codefendants. Understandably, Petitioner wants to draw

parallels to the trials of his co-defendants because Godoy and

Peasley were found to have committed misconduct in those

cases.

But his recharacterization not only contradicts the trial

transcripts in this matter and Stuehringer’s articulation of the

defense strategy during the state PCR evidentiary hearings,

but it also fails to account for the key difference in

Petitioner’s case as compared to the prosecutions of his codefendants. Again, the state undisputedly was not going to

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FONG V. RYAN 43

call Woods as a witness or present his September 8, 1992 and

November 20, 1992 statements as evidence during

Petitioner’s prosecution. Unlike his co-defendants, Petitioner

never would have had to neutralize or otherwise attack

Woods’ September 8, 1992 statement in order to establish his

innocence at trial. If Petitioner did not want the jury to hear

and believe that Woods had been told by McCrimmon and

Minnitt that they committed the crimes with a Chachi,

Petitioner had the option of not calling Woods as a witness

and introducing a suspected Chachi into the proceedings. 

Petitioner offers no plausible explanation for why he would

have chosen to call Woods as a defense witness if he only

meant to demonstrate that Woods’ September 8, 1992

statement was false in its entirety and that Godoy fed Woods

all of the information about a Chachi on that date.

As a result, the state PCR court was reasonable in

concluding that neither Godoy’s direct nor cross-examination

testimony gave a material false impression of the evidence in

light of the mistaken identity defense that Petitioner advanced

at trial, which hinged on the jury believing Woods’

initial account that a masked individual nicknamed

Chachi, i.e., Martin Garza, had committed the crimes

with Minnitt and McCrimmon.10 This Court’s conclusion 

10 The substance of Petitioner’s Napue argument focuses on whether

Godoy’s testimony was false or misleading because it gave an impression

that Woods was the initial source of Godoy’s suspicion of Petitioner

specifically, hence Petitioner’s focus on what information Godoy had

implicating Petitioner prior to September 8, 1992, and whether Peasley’s

redirect of Godoy sufficiently revealed that Godoy had information

implicating Petitioner in the crimes prior to Godoy’s first meeting with

Woods.

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44 FONG V. RYAN

But Petitioner also at times generally states that Godoy’s testimony

was false and misleading because it gave the impression that Woods was

the initial source of Godoy’s suspicion of Petitioner, Minnitt, and

McCrimmon, collectively. To the extent Petitioner is arguing that

Godoy’s testimonywas alsomaterially false and misleading inPetitioner’s

case because it failed to communicate that Godoy likewise suspected

Minnitt and McCrimmon prior to meeting Woods on September 8, 1992,

the Court rejects this argument.

Again, as the state PCR court found, Godoy never affirmatively

testified that he did not have the names of these three individuals prior to

his meeting with Woods, in contrast to his testimony during Minnitt’s and

McCrimmon’s trials. The undisputed factual record also shows that

Godoy’s September 8, 1992 contact with Woods was the first date on

which Godoy spoke with someone who communicated specific details

about McCrimmon’s, Minnitt’s, and Chachi’s alleged roles in the El

Grande murders.

But, more significantly, the initial source of Godoy’s suspicion of

Minnitt and McCrimmon was not material to Petitioner’s defense in the

same way that the initial source of the name Chachi was not material to

Petitioner’s defense. As part of his mistaken identity defense, Petitioner

wanted the jury to believe that Minnitt and McCrimmon had committed

the El Grande murders with Martin Garza. As a result, Petitioner was not

motivated to ensure that the jury understood that Godoy had those two

suspect names prior to his meeting with Woods because Petitioner never

intended to argue that Godoy fed those names to Woods or that

McCrimmon and Minnitt were innocent. Instead, Petitioner wanted the

jury to believe those portions of Woods’ September 8, 1992 statement that

implicated Minnitt and McCrimmon, as well as those portions that

implicated a masked Chachi. See, e.g., Dist. Ct. Docket No. 144-3, Exh.

W at 49 (Stuehringer’s testimony at state PCR evidentiary hearing that he

wanted the jury to “believe somebody by the name of ChaChi with a mask

came into the store, together with McCrimmon and Minnitt, and

perpetrated the killings.”) (emphasis added).

In light of Petitioner’s defense at trial and because Godoy never

affirmatively testified that he did not have Minnitt’s and McCrimmon’s

names before his contact with Woods, the prosecutor likewise would have

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FONG V. RYAN 45

does not mean to suggest that a criminal defendant’s chosen

defense theory can nullify what might otherwise be a false

impression of the evidence caused by a state witness and left

uncorrected bythe prosecution. As Petitioner correctlypoints

out, the state has a constitutional duty to correct false

testimony given by its witnesses, even when the defense

knows the testimony was false but does nothing to point out

such falsity to the jury or judge. See, e.g., United States v.

LaPage, 231 F.3d 488, 492 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he

government’s duty to correct perjury by its witnesses is not

discharged merely because defense counsel knows, and the

jury may figure out, that the testimony was false.”).

However, on the facts of this case and under the

AEDPA’s deferential review, Petitioner fails to show that the

state PCR court’s rejection of his Napue claim involved an

unreasonable application of controlling federal law.11 Again,

had no obligation to clarify further to the jury that McCrimmon and

Minnitt were already suspects when Godoy spoke with Woods on

September 8, 1992.

11 For the first time in his reply brief, Petitioner argues that the state PCR

court’s false impression analysis was not just unreasonable under Alcorta

but that it was also contrary to Alcorta and Napue. While the state PCR

court correctly recited federal law under Alcorta, it admittedly went on to

discuss State v. Orantez, 902 P.2d 824 (Ariz. 1995), at some length when

addressing Petitioner’s false impression argument. As Petitioner points

out, the state PCR court’s discussion of Orantez appears inconsistent with

federal law by suggesting that the onus is on defense counsel to expose

false or misleading testimony. As this Court has stated, “It is ‘irrelevant’

whether the defense knew about the false testimony and failed to object

or cross-examine the witness, because defendants ‘c[an]not waive the

freestanding ethical and constitutional obligation of the prosecutor as a

representative of the government to protect the integrity of the court and

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46 FONG V. RYAN

Godoy never affirmatively testified that he first obtained the

name “Chachi” from Woods. But even putting that fact aside,

the original source of that nickname was not independently

significant to or probative of Petitioner’s guilt or innocence

outside the context of Petitioner’s defense strategy. And, in

light of the testimonial evidence presented at trial, Petitioner

also has not shown that the state PCR court engaged in an

unreasonable determination of the facts when it concluded

that the jury had otherwise been apprised that Godoy

suspected Petitioner, if not a Chachi, prior to Godoy’s

September 8, 1992 contact with Woods. The record reflects

that the prosecution presented the jury with evidence that

Godoy began to suspect Petitioner after he spoke with

Sergeant Zimmerling on August 31, 1992, and shortly

thereafter learned from the Gees that Petitioner was a former

the criminal justice system.’” Sivak v. Hardison, 658 F.3d 898, 909 (9th

Cir. 2011) (alternation in original) (citation omitted); LaPage, 231 F.3d at

492.

But, despite the state PCR court’s misplaced citation to Orantez, it

nonetheless properly relayed federal law under Alcorta, and its denial of

Petitioner’s false impression claim, as discussed above, still squares with

a reasonable interpretation of Alcorta and Napue. In other words, the state

PCR court did not denyPetitioner’s false impression claimsimply because

Stuehringer could have but failed to object to Godoy’s purportedly

misleading testimony while the prosecutor idly sat by. Instead, it noted

that the prosecution, after defense counsel elicited some ofthe purportedly

problematic testimony, actually tried to and did get information to the jury

that Godoy suspected Petitioner before Godoy first met with Woods. The

state court also recognized that defense counsel affirmatively aimed to

preclude trial testimony identifying Petitioner as Chachi or a murder

suspect prior to September 8, 1992, because, in defense counsel’s opinion,

those facts undermined the mistaken identity defense. Again, the state

court’s decision reasonably recognized that the materiality of the source

of the name “Chachi” could not be considered in a vacuum, but had to be

evaluated in the context of Petitioner’s defense at trial.

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FONG V. RYAN 47

market employee, prior to Godoy’s September 8, 1992

contact with Woods. As a result, Godoy’s testimony did not

create a material false impression that Woods was the initial

source of Godoy’s suspicion of Fong or a former market

employee.

Before the state PCR court, Petitioner also cited two

statements Peasley made in closing argument at trial to

support his position that the prosecutor, Peasley, went on to

argue Godoy’s allegedly false testimony to the jury. Having

found Godoy’s testimony not to be false or materially

misleading, the state PCR court did not proceed to address

expressly Peasley’s closing remarks. However, because

Petitioner recites those remarks on appeal, we here conclude

that Peasley’s comments in closing also do not render the

state court’s decision denying his Napue claim unreasonable.

First, Peasley repeated in closing argument that the

Tucson police did not suspect Petitioner or his co-defendants

from June 24, 1992, until late August 1992, and stated

directly after that that “[t]he first time that Detective Godoy

is able to sit down and talk with anybody who gives him

direct information about what happened is that contact on

September 8th with Keith Woods.” But again, this remark

does not state affirmatively that Godoy failed to suspect

Petitioner as a former market employee until he spoke with

Woods. This comment also has to be considered in the

context of the evidence that the state PCR court reasonably

found to have been presented to the jury, i.e., that the jury

was informed that Petitioner became a suspect on or about

August 31, 1992, due in large part to Peasley’s redirect

examination of Godoy. And again, Petitioner does not

dispute that the first individual to provide Godoy with details

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48 FONG V. RYAN

about a Chachi’s alleged role in the El Grande murders was

Woods.

Second, Petitioner cites Peasley’s statement in closing

that Keith Woods told Godoy that “Martin” was “a guy who

used to work there, the boyfriend of Betty Christopher” and

that Godoy got this information from Woods “beginning on

September 8th, up through basically November 20th when he

talks to the detective again. . . .” However, this statement

primarily summarizes the content of Woods’ trial testimony

and memorialized statements. Such a summary does not

suggest Godoy failed to suspect Petitioner until he spoke with

Woods. By this closing remark, Peasley also neither

explicitly nor implicitly claimed to be summarizing all the

evidence in the case implicating Petitioner in the triple

homicide, such that the jury might infer from Peasley’s

comment that Woods’ September 8, 1992 statement to Godoy

was the first piece of evidence obtained by the state tending

to show that Petitioner might have been involved in the triple

homicide.

The remaining arguments Petitioner presses on appeal

related to his Napue claim likewise do not entitle him to any

relief. For example, he argues that the state PCR court was

unreasonable in hinging its decision on the fact that Godoy

had not admitted to committing perjury during Petitioner’s

trial. However, Petitioner mischaracterizes the state’s

decision. Instead, the state PCR court noted that Petitioner

had claimed that Godoy admitted to perjuring himself in State

v. Soto-Fong, but Petitioner provided no evidence showing

that Godoy had made such admissions. The state PCR court

still went on to undertake its own analysis of whether Godoy

perjured himself, as discussed at length above, and reasonably

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FONG V. RYAN 49

concluded that he had not provided false testimony during

Petitioner’s trial.

Petitioner also argues that the state court was

unreasonable because it hinged its decision on the fact that no

judicial or administrative decision found Godoy to have

perjured himself in State v. Soto-Fong. Here again, Petitioner

misinterprets the state PCR court’s decision. The state court

only made that point because Petitioner asserted that Godoy

had admitted to committing perjury in Petitioner’s trial. The

state court still independently analyzed the merits of

Petitioner’s perjury and false impression arguments and did

not deny them solely because no other court had ruled on

them.

Petitioner also has not shown that the state PCR court’s

decision is unreasonable because the Arizona Supreme Court

has since found that Godoy and Peasley engaged in

misconduct during the later trials of his co-defendants. As

addressed previously, the testimony Godoy gave and the

arguments Peasley made during Petitioner’s trial are

materially distinguishable from Godoy’s and Peasley’s

conduct during the trials of Petitioner’s co-defendants. 

Again, in those later trials, Peasley represented and Godoy

affirmatively testified that the police had not obtained the

names of McCrimmon, Minnitt, or Petitioner as possible

suspects in the triple homicide until Godoy spoke with

Woods on September 8, 1992. They also represented that

Godoy did not suspect a former employee in the murders and

did not contact the Gee family about a former employee until

Godoy spoke with Woods. Minnitt, 55 P.3d at 778; In Re

Peasley, 90 P.3d at 767–68. As evaluated in detail above, the

trial record in Petitioner’s case shows that these same

misrepresentations were not made to the jury during

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50 FONG V. RYAN

Petitioner’s trial. And the partial transcripts Petitioner

supplies of Godoy’s and Peasley’s testimony given during

hearings related to their misconduct in the later trials of

Petitioner’s co-defendants do not undermine such a

conclusion, contrary to Petitioner’s suggestion. The cited

transcripts do not demonstrate that Peasley and Godoy

admitted to misconduct in Petitioner’s trial, as asserted by

Petitioner, but instead show how Godoy’s testimony and

Peasley’s arguments morphed from accurate information in

Petitioner’s trial to affirmative misrepresentations during the

trials of his co-defendants.12, 13

12 Petitioner also argues that the state PCR court’s rejection of his Napue

claim was unreasonable because Woods has now admitted, as reflected in

a 2005 affidavit, that Godoy and Peasley fed himinformation and told him

what to say during Petitioner’s trial. By making this argument, Petitioner

attempts to incorporate his uncertified claim that the state fabricated

Woods’ trial testimony into this distinct, though related, certified issue

respecting Godoy’s trial testimony. However, the Court separately

addresses and rejects Petitioner’s testimonial fabrication claim in the

concurrently filed memorandum disposition and will not repeat its

reasoning here. The Court also separately addresses and rejects in the

concurrentlyfiledmemorandumdispositionPetitioner’s claimthat Peasley

improperly vouched for Godoy during closing argument,thoughPetitioner

likewise refers to Peasley’s alleged improper vouching when arguing this

certified Napue claim.

13 Petitioner contends that the district court erred in denying him an

evidentiary hearing on his Napue claim under Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at

1398 (holding that reasonableness review under the AEDPA is limited to

the record before the state PCR court that adjudicated the claim on the

merits), because he has otherwise shown that the state court’s merits

decision was unreasonable under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2). 

Because we reject his reasonableness challenges to the state PCR court’s

legal analysis and fact-finding, we affirm the district court’s denial of an

evidentiary hearing on whether the prosecution knowingly presented false

testimony to the jury through Detective Godoy. Notwithstanding

Pinholster’s limitations on evidentiary development in federal court,

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FONG V. RYAN 51

In denying Petitioner relief on his prosecutorial

misconduct claim, the Court sympathizes with Petitioner’s

understandable concern that the same egregious misconduct

perpetrated by Peasley and Godoy during the prosecutions of

Petitioner’s co-defendants must have infected his earlier trial. 

However, in light of the deference owed state court decisions

under the AEDPA and upon a thorough consideration of the

trial record in Petitioner’s case, the Court cannot conclude

that the state PCR court’s decision denying Petitioner relief

on this claim was “so lacking in justification that there was an

error well understood and comprehended in existing law

beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” 

Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786–87

B. Alleged Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Fong’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is governed

by the two-part standard articulated by the Supreme Court in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under this

clearlyestablished federal law, “a [petitioner]must show both

deficient performance and prejudice.” Knowles v.

Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 122 (2009). In evaluatingwhether

an attorney’s performance was deficient, “courts must

‘indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls

within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance’

and make every effort ‘to reconstruct the circumstances of

counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct

from counsel’s perspective at the time.’” Hibbler v.

Benedetti, 693 F.3d 1140, 1149 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). To establish prejudice,

Petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable probability

Petitioner provides no further persuasive explanation for why he should

be entitled to evidentiary development in federal court on this claim.

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52 FONG V. RYAN

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 694.

Moreover, under the AEDPA, this Court asks “not

‘whether counsel’s actions were reasonable’ but ‘whether

there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied

Strickland’s deferential standard.’” Hibbler, 693 F.3d at

1150 (quoting Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 788). In other words, “a

‘doubly deferential review’ applies to Strickland claims

rejected by the state court.” Id. (quoting Mirzayance,

556 U.S. at 123); see also Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786 (“It bears

repeating that even a strong case for relief [under Strickland]

does not mean the state court’s contrary conclusion was

unreasonable.”); id. at 786–87.

Petitioner argues that his defense attorney violated wellestablished professional norms by calling the state’s

informant, Keith Woods, as a defense witness to pursue a

tenuous mistaken identity defense when the prosecution

undisputedly did not plan to have Woods testify during its

case-in-chief because of concerns under Bruton. He contends

that Woods’ testimony was prejudicial under Strickland

because it allowed for the admission of McCrimmon’s and

Minnitt’s alleged confessions to committing the El Grande

murders with a Chachi, an individual whose identity was also

linked to Petitioner by Woods’ testimony. Fong asserts that

the state PCR court’s rejection of his ineffective assistance of

counsel claim constitutes both an unreasonable determination

of the facts and an unreasonable application of Strickland.

14

14 Though Petitioner also refers to the state PCR court’s denial of his

claim as “contrary to” federal law in a heading, he fails to develop such

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FONG V. RYAN 53

The relevant portion of the last reasoned state court

decision denying Petitioner relief on this claim bears

repeating in full:

Defense counsel’s reasoned trial strategy

was to use Keith Woods’ original statement of

September 9, 1992 [sic]15

to implicate the

person referred to as “Cha-Chi” and direct the

jury’s attention to this person and away from

the defendant and particularly away from the

fingerprint evidence implicating the

defendant. This was a particularly plausible

theory as the Petitioner/defendant’s attorney

not only provided evidence of a plausible

identity for this third person in Martin Garza

who has the nickname ChaChi and was a

friend of one of the co-defendants and lived in

a referenced neighborhood. This was a

critical part of the defense strategy. The

“Cha-Chi” described by Keith Woods wore a

mask. The state claimed the defendant was

able to gain after-hours access to the market

because he was known by Mr. Gee. The two

points are not reconcilable. If the perpetrator

needed to reveal himself to gain access he

would not wear a mask. The use of a mask

implies “Cha-Chi” was not Martin Soto-Fong,

from which the jury may infer Martin SotoFong was not a participant in the crimes. 

an argument. And the state court correctly recited Strickland’s standard

when denying all of Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

 

15 The date should undisputedly read September 8, 1992.

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54 FONG V. RYAN

Keith Woods was critical to the defense’s

theory of the case. This was a calculated and

reasoned trial strategy by an experienced

criminal defense attorney.

16

Consistent with the state PCR court’s articulation of the

defense theory, Stuehringer provided testimony at two

different state PCR evidentiary hearings in which he

represented that he chose to call Keith Woods in order to

diffuse the fingerprint evidence implicating Petitioner and to

create reasonable doubt about the identity of the third

perpetrator who committed the crimes with McCrimmon and

Minnitt based on Woods’ September 8, 1992 identification of

a masked Chachi. In particular, Stuehringer testified that

Woods’ identification of a masked Chachi as a perpetrator

allowed him to undermine the state theory that Petitioner

exploited the store employees’ recognition of him to gain

entry into the market and also allowed him to point the finger

at Martin Garza, McCrimmon’s friend who, unlike Petitioner,

undisputedly went by the nickname Chachi. In addition,

Stuehringer claimed to have discussed with Petitioner

16 On direct review, the Arizona Supreme Court also made note of

Stuehringer’s “tactical” decision to call Woods, stating the following:

Nor will we second-guess trial counsel’s tactical

decision to introduce evidence that the murderer was

Cha-Chi, even at the expense of opening the door to

Woods’ later statements. Fingerprint evidence and

other testimony connected defendant to the crime. It is

understandable that defense counsel would want to

raise the issue of whether Cha-Chi, a person other than

Fong, committed the murders, even at the expense of

other evidence indicating that “Cha-Chi” was Fong.

Soto-Fong, 928 P.2d at 618.

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FONG V. RYAN 55

whether to call Woods as a witness and testified that he

sought guidance from other peer attorneys about whether to

utilize Woods for a mistaken identity defense.

On appeal, Petitioner urges that the state PCR court was

unreasonable in treating as a “calculated and reasoned trial

strategy” Stuehringer’s decision to call Woods as a witness

and utilize his September 8, 1992 statement in pursuit of a

mistaken identify defense for a number of reasons. In

particular, he points out that: 1) Woods’ September 8, 1992

statement already referred to Chachi as a market employee –

a fact implicating Petitioner rather than Martin Garza;

2) Stuehringer also had learned in a pretrial March 4, 1993

interview of Woods that he was not certain and had only

assumed Chachi wore a mask during the homicides despite

his comment to that effect in his September 8, 1992

statement; 3) Stuehringer was on notice that Woods’ later

November 20, 1992 statement, with additional information

linking Petitioner to Chachi, would no doubt be introduced at

trial after the trial court denied Stuehringer’s motion in limine

to preclude the introduction of that statement; and

4) Stuehringer could have introduced the name “Chachi”

through Godoy’s testimony without calling Woods as a

witness in order to pursue a mistaken identity defense. 

Petitioner also asserts that Stuehringer did not act reasonably

by ignoring significant forensic evidence – Petitioner’s

fingerprints at the scene – in order to pursue a tenuous

mistaken identity defense.

None of Petitioner’s arguments demonstrates that the state

PCR court engaged in an unreasonable application of

Strickland or made an unreasonable determination of the facts

in denying his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 

Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786–87 (state court ruling must be “so

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56 FONG V. RYAN

lacking in justification that there was an error well understood

and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for

fairminded disagreement”). First, Petitioner correctly points

out that Woods’ September 8, 1992 statement did refer to

Chachi being an El Grande Market employee, undermining

the argument that Martin Garza, who undisputedly never

worked at the market, was the Chachi who had committed the

murders. However, as the state PCR court emphasized,

Woods’ September 8, 1992 statement also referred to Chachi

being “masked down or whatever” when he committed the

crimes. As the state PCR court recognized and as Stuehringer

testified during the state PCR evidentiary hearing, Chachi’s

use of a mask to hide his face during the robbery was

inconsistent with the state’s theory of the case that Petitioner

exploited the store employees’ recognition of him as a former

employee to gain entrance to the El Grande Market, thus

casting doubt on whether Chachi was in fact Petitioner or a

former employee.

Moreover, Stuehringer had obtained from Woods during

a March 4, 1993 pretrial interview his statement that

McCrimmon told him that Chachi lived behind a Circle K off

of a street called Prince – Martin Garza’s approximate

address at the time of the El Grande homicides and what the

state PCR court referred to as the “referenced neighborhood.” 

The state court was reasonable in concluding that this

address, along with the reference to Chachi being masked,

provided Stuehringer with a significant opportunity to point

the finger at Martin Garza – an undisputed friend of

McCrimmon’s who, unlike Petitioner as argued by the

defense, went by the nickname Chachi – and to undermine

indirectlyand implicitlyWoods’ representation on September

8, 1992, that Chachi also was a former market employee.

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FONG V. RYAN 57

Petitioner also accurately points out that, after making his

September 8, 1992 statement, Woods equivocated on whether

Chachi wore a mask. During a March 4, 1993 pretrial

interview, Woods told Stuehringer that he just assumed that

Chachi wore a mask and was not told that by McCrimmon or

Minnitt. Because of this equivocation, Petitioner argues that

Stuehringer and the state PCR court placed too much

emphasis on Woods’ initial September 8, 1992 statement that

Chachi was masked when justifying Stuehringer’s decision to

use Woods’ testimony at trial in support of a mistaken

identity defense.

Stuehringer nonetheless was able to elicit the following

testimony from Woods during trial:

Stuehringer: Do you recall telling Detective

Godoy that McCrimmon and

Minnitt told you Chachi had

on a mask when he went into

the market?

Woods: Yeah.

Stuehringer: Thank you, sir. Now, you did

your best that day to be

truthful with Detective

Godoy?

Woods: Yes.

On cross-examination, Peasley admittedly went on to elicit

from Woods that he said Chachi was “masked down or

whatever” because he assumed Chachi was wearing a mask

but was not sure of that fact. But, on redirect examination,

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Stuehringer elicited from Woods that he never told Godoy

that his comment that Chachi was “masked down or

whatever” was just an assumption and not information

directly obtained from McCrimmon and Minnitt.

Based on this trial testimony, Petitioner has not shown

that the state PCR court engaged in unreasonable fact-finding

in concluding that Woods described Chachi as wearing a

mask. See McClure v. Thompson, 323 F.3d 1233, 1243–44

(9th Cir. 2003) (holding that state court findings of fact are

entitled to deference even though evidence may cast doubt on

findings such that federal court would have made different

findings of fact). Woods indeed made such a statement on

September 8, 1992, even if he later equivocated on that point. 

And Stuehringer attempted to undermine Woods’

equivocation on redirect examination by pointing out that

Woods never told Godoy that he was not sure if Chachi

actually wore a mask. Moreover, even if Woods later

equivocated about whether Chachi wore a mask, that Woods

ever referred to Chachi as masked still provided Stuehringer

with an opportunity to cast doubt on the state’s theory of the

case that Petitioner was Chachi and exploited the store

employees’ recognition of him as a former employee to enter

the El Grande Market, especially considering Stuehringer

presented additional evidence that Petitioner was not known

by the nickname “Chachi” and that Martin Garza had such a

nickname, lived on a referenced street identified by Woods,

and was close friends with McCrimmon. Richter, 131 S. Ct.

at 786 (“It bears repeating that even a strong case for relief

[under Strickland] does not mean the state court's contrary

conclusion was unreasonable.”).

Petitioner also urges that the state PCR court was

unreasonable in condoning Stuehringer’s decision to call

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FONG V. RYAN 59

Woods as a defense witness after Stuehringer lost a motion in

limine seeking to prevent Woods from testifying to the

contents of his November 20, 1992 statement which included

additional details linking Chachi to Petitioner. But the state

PCR court concluded that, “Keith Woods was critical to the

defense’s theory of the case.” That conclusion implies that

the state PCR court found reasonable Stuehringer’s

determination that the benefits of calling Woods to testify

outweighed the negatives associated with the introduction of

his November 20, 1992 statement. See, e.g., Brown v.

Ornoski, 503 F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Although

[defense counsel’s] decision to put [a witness] on the stand

came with some risks, it came with benefits to [the defendant]

as well. . . . [that] were available only if [the witness] were

called.”).

Based on the record before this Court, Woods was the

only source of information that McCrimmon and Minnitt

confessed to committing the homicides with a Chachi whom

Woods had never met, that Chachi wore a mask, and that

McCrimmon had identified Chachi as living on the street

where Martin Garza testified to living. Petitioner has not

shown that the state PCR court was unreasonable in

concluding that the value of this testimony to Petitioner’s

mistaken identity defense outweighed the dangers of calling

Woods to testify even if Woods might testify to further

information implicating Petitioner in the triple homicide,

especially considering that, as discussed below, significant

fingerprint evidence already connected Petitioner to the

crimes.17

17 Petitioner cites a number of out-of-circuit cases that he says show that

counsel is ineffective when he or she opens the door to otherwise

inadmissible evidence. See, e.g., Ward v. United States, 995 F.2d 1317,

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Indeed, Stuehringer testified during state PCR evidentiary

hearings that he decided to go ahead and call Woods as a

witness even after the trial court ruled that Woods’ November

20, 1992 statement would be admissible at trial because the

inconsistencies between Woods’ two statements provided

Stuehringer with an opportunity to “dirty up” Godoy and

suggest that Godoy was feeding information to Woods after

September 8, 1992, to further implicate Petitioner, a course of

action by Stuehringer consistent with the related defense

1322 (6thCir. 1993); United States v. Villalpando, 259 F.3d 934, 939 (8th

Cir. 2001); Goodman v. Bertrand, 467 F.3d 1022, 1029–31 (6th Cir.

2006); White v. Thaler, 610 F.3d 890, 899–900 (5thCir. 2010). However,

those cases – two of which are direct review cases – either involve

scenarios in which the attorney’s initial decision which opened the door

to otherwise inadmissible, inculpatory evidence was deemed not sound

strategy (sometimes because the attorney actually admitted he or she had

no strategy in pursuing a particular course of action) or involve

circumstances where an attorney’s performance comprised a catalog of

errors which together resulted in prejudice to the defendant. In contrast,

here, the state PCR court was reasonable in concluding that Stuehringer’s

initial decision to pursue a mistaken identity defense using Woods was

reasonably strategic, despite some of the negative consequences which

ensued, especially because fingerprint evidence already linked Petitioner

to the crime and because Stuehringer was otherwise able to challenge the

veracity of Woods’ later, more inculpatory statements linking Petitioner

to Chachi, as addressed infra. Cf. Edwards v. Lamarque, 475 F.3d 1121,

1127–29 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (state court decision finding counsel’s

conduct objectively reasonable owed deference where counsel asked

defendant to explain his suspicious behavior testified to by his wife even

though such risky questioning resulted in waiver of marital privilege and

wife’s further testimony about defendant’s inculpatory statements to her

about murder, especially considering state otherwise had strong case

against defendant). In addition, none of the cases Petitioner cites involves

the Supreme Court’s elucidation of Strickland. Andrade, 538 U.S. at

71–72 (“‘[C]learly established Federal law’ under § 2254(d)(1) is the

governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at

the time the state court renders its decision.” (citation omitted)).

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FONG V. RYAN 61

strategy (as reflected in the trial record) of casting Godoy as

an overzealous detective who repeatedly misrepresented and

mishandled evidence in Petitioner’s case.

Petitioner agrees that the inconsistencies between Woods’

two primary statements strongly show that Godoy fed Woods

information on November 20, 1992, and that Stuehringer

could have mitigated the harmfulness of calling Woods as a

defense witness if Stuehringer was able to elicit those

inconsistencies and argue them to the jury. However, he

contends that Stuehringer failed on this account too. But,

while Petitioner may demonstrate that Stuehringer was far

from perfect in his exploitation of the differences between

Woods’ September 8, 1992 and November 20, 1992

statements, he overstates the case in saying that Stuehringer

wholly failed to argue such differences to the jury. 

Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003) (“The Sixth

Amendment guarantees reasonable competence, not perfect

advocacy judged with the benefit of hindsight.”).

For example, Stuehringer repeatedly emphasized to the

jury during opening and closing arguments that Woods only

claimed to have met Chachi and identified Chachi as

“Martin” and “Betty Christopher’s boyfriend” on November

20, 1992, after Godoy had misrepresented in a telephonic

search warrant affidavit and during a juvenile court transfer

hearing that Woods had identified Petitioner as Chachi, said

that Petitioner confessed to the murders, and said that

Petitioner had the murder weapon – information which

undisputedly was not included in Woods’ initial September

8, 1992 statement. Indeed, Stuehringer elicited from Godoy

that, after Godoy met with Woods on September 8, 1992, but

before their second meeting on November 20, 1992, Godoy

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62 FONG V. RYAN

made these misstatements in a telephonic search warrant

affidavit and during a juvenile court transfer hearing.

Moreover, Stuehringer elicited from Woods that, some

time after Woods gave his September 8, 1992 statement to

law enforcement, Woods went into hiding in an attempt to

renege on his deal to aid in the prosecution of the El Grande

homicides until he was taken into custody on November 20,

1992, the date on which he gave his second statement to

Detective Godoy. Stuehringer also elicited from Woods that

Woods had not spoken to Minnitt or McCrimmon a second

time after Woods made his September 8, 1992 statement to

Godoy, implying that it was strange for Woods to remember

additional facts allegedly provided by Minnitt and

McCrimmon connecting Chachi to Petitioner over two

months later when Woods ostensibly should have had such

information during his initial meeting with Godoy. 

Stuehringerlikewise attempted to elicit from Woods, a hostile

witness, that Woods spoke with Godoy off tape on November

20, 1992, and that Woods added details to his November 20,

1992 statement and later statements to law enforcement

which were not included in his September 8, 1992 statement.

Stuehringer further elicited from Woods that he had seen

via television or the newspaper that Petitioner had been

arrested in this case by the time Woods gave his second

November 20, 1992 statement to law enforcement in which

Woods claimed to have met Chachi at Bridget Lucero’s house

and physically identified Petitioner as Chachi. As a result,

Stuehringer implied to the jury that Petitioner’s arrest

subsequent to Woods’ first statement improperly informed

Woods’ belated identification of Petitioner as Chachi. In

other words, the trial record demonstrates that Stuehringer did

take steps to mitigate the harmful effects of Woods’

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FONG V. RYAN 63

November 20, 1992 statement by eliciting testimony from

Godoy and Woods suggesting that, on November 20, 1992,

Godoy had an incentive to feed incriminating information to

a receptive Woods who needed to make good on his deal to

provide law enforcement with information about the El

Grande homicides in exchange for the dismissal of the drug

charges against him.

Petitioner further argues that the state PCR court’s

decision denying his ineffective assistance of counsel claim

was unreasonable because Stuehringer did not have to call

Woods at all to introduce a suspected Chachi into the trial

who could be tied to Martin Garza.18

In particular, Petitioner

suggests that Stuehringer could have simply asked Godoy

whether he suspected a Chachi of committing the triple

homicide, in much the same way that Peasley asked Godoy if

he obtained the name “Martin Soto” from Detective

Zimmerling on August 31, 1992. That is, Petitioner asserts

that Stuehringer could have asked Godoy about the contents

of his investigative reports in which Godoy represented

receiving the name “Chachi” from Zimmerling and a

confidential source.

 

18 As part of this argument, Petitioner asserts that Stuehringer made an

ill-informed representation to the trial court that Woods had to testify

when the trial court asked if evidence implicating Chachi could come in

through another witness. However, Petitioner misrepresents Stuehringer’s

exchange with the trial court judge. The judge did not ask Stuehringer in

a general or open-ended manner if there was any way evidence of a

Chachi could come in without putting Woods on the witness stand. 

Instead, the judge specifically asked if Woods’ September 8, 1992

statement could be introduced through a witness other than Woods, and

Stuehringer said that he did not think that would be appropriate under

applicable hearsay rules.

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In response to this argument, the district court ruled that

the prosecution likely would have successfully precluded

Godoy from testifying to the contents of his investigative

reports on hearsay grounds. However, even if a hearsay

objection to Godoy’s testimony would not have been made or

passed muster, this Court also finds it probable that the state

trial court would not have simply limited Godoy’s testimony

to whether he suspected a Chachi and prevented the

prosecution from exploring in any fashion with Godoy his

sources for that name and his suspicion of that individual. 

For example, when Stuehringer argued that Woods’

testimony should be limited to his September 8, 1992

statement because of Bruton issues tied to the November 20,

1992 statement, the prosecution argued that such a limitation

was unfair because the prosecution would have been

hampered in cross-examination in its efforts to explore a full

and accurate picture of who Woods understood Chachi to be

in order to counter Petitioner’s mistaken identity defense. 

The state trial court agreed.

In a similar fashion, if Stuehringer utilized Godoy as a

defense witness and asked him whether he suspected a

Chachi based on alleged hearsay information contained in his

investigative reports, the prosecution likely would have

successfullyargued that Stuehringer’s questioning opened the

door to additional information about a Chachi contained in

Godoy’s reports, so that the prosecution could present a full

and accurate picture on cross-examination about what those

sources said related to a suspected Chachi in order to counter

Petitioner’s defense. See, e.g., State v. Woratzeck, 657 P.2d

865, 867 (Ariz. 1982) (defendant’s direct examination of a

witness on topic opens door to further inquiry on topic during

cross-examination); State v. Mincey, 636 P.2d 637, 653 (Ariz.

1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1003 (1982) (“Arizona follows

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FONG V. RYAN 65

the English or ‘wide open’ rule, wherein cross-examination

may extend to all matters covered by direct examination

. . . .” (internal citation and quotations omitted)). And that

information was harmful to Petitioner’s theory that Chachi

was someone other than Petitioner. In particular, the

undisputedly disclosed September 15, 1992 report states that

a “Suspect Number 2 was described as a Mexican male

named ‘Martin Soto’ also known as ‘Cha-Chi,’” and that

“Martin Fong” used the name “Martin Soto,” thereby linking

the name “Chachi” back to Petitioner. Similar information is

contained in Godoy’s allegedly undisclosed September 9,

1992 report, which states that “Martin Fong’s AKA was listed

as Martin Soto” and “that he also went by Cha-Chi.”

In other words, Petitioner seemingly overstates how easy

it would have been to introduce a suspected Chachi into the

proceeding via Godoy and at the same time preclude the

prosecution from exploring any other information related to

a Chachi that might have implicated Petitioner. Instead,

Stuehringer may have had to abandon entirely a mistaken

identity defense based on Martin Garza being Chachi to

prevent any evidence linking Chachi to Petitioner from

coming in at trial.

Moreover, whether Stuehringer could have gotten the

name Chachi introduced at trial through someone other than

Woods still does not render unreasonable the state PCR

court’s decision denying Petitioner relief on his ineffective

assistance of counsel claim. Again, the state PCR court found

that Woods was a particularly critical witness for the

mistaken identity defense because only his testimony

suggested that Chachi wore a mask and linked the Chachi

who Woods discussed with McCrimmon to the address of

Martin Garza. As the state points out on appeal, having

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Woods testify arguably showed the jurors: 1) why they

should believe a Chachi committed the crimes – because

Minnitt and McCrimmon confessed to committing the

murders with a Chachi; 2) why the jury should believe that

Chachi was not Petitioner – because Chachi wore a mask and

lived at the location McCrimmon identified to Woods as

Martin Garza’s address; and 3) why the jury should

disbelieve Godoy and mistrust Woods’ second statement to

law enforcement – because an overzealous Godoy was

incentivized to coerce a reneging Woods into adding

information incriminating Petitioner to Woods’ November

20, 1992 and later statements.

Petitioner’s argument that Stuehringer simply ignored the

fingerprint evidence in pursuit of a mistaken identity defense

when he should have also challenged that evidence based on

the alleged sloppiness of the forensic investigation likewise

is not supported by the record before this Court. Instead, the

record reflects that Stuehringer obtained a fingerprint expert

who confirmed the state’s finding that the fingerprints found

at the scene were Fong’s. Nonetheless, through the crossexaminations of Godoy and his partner, Detective Karen

Wright, Stuehringer engaged in a thorough attack of the

forensic investigation.

For example, Stuehringer elicited testimony from

Detective Wright confirming the oddity of the crime-scene

investigators only locating Petitioner’s fingerprints at the

scene when one would expect that the store owner’s and other

store employees’ fingerprints would also be found there. She

also testified that her initial crime scene log only showed one

foodstamp found by murder victim Fred Gee and a single

plastic bag on the counter, contrary to later records showing

that two plastic bags were found on the counter and that two

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foodstamps were located near Mr. Gee’s body. In addition,

Stuehringer elicited from Detective Wright that she testified

at the grand jury hearing that both foodstamps found near Mr.

Gee’s body had Fong’s fingerprints on them, though evidence

admitted at trial showed only one foodstamp bore Fong’s

fingerprints. Stuehringer further elicited from her that the

Tucson Police Department deviated from its normal

evidence-storage protocols in handling the items which bore

Fong’s fingerprints.

In a similar vein, Stuehringer questioned Godoy about his

decision initially to store the evidence in this case outside of

the normal location used by the police department for such

evidence storage. Stuerhringer was also able to elicit from

Detective Godoy a number of contradictory statements he

gave throughout the case’s prosecution about the fingerprint

evidence, including: (1) that Godoy represented in a search

warrant affidavit and during an under-oath phone call to a

judge that the foodstamp bearing Fong’s fingerprints was

found in the cash register, rather than next to Fred Gee’s body

on the floor; (2) that Godoy also misstated in the search

warrant affidavit that there was only one plastic bag on the

counter when a photograph of the scene showed two bags;

(3) that Godoy misrepresented under oath to a judge that

Fong’s fingerprints were found on the cucumber sitting on the

market’s checkout counter; (4) that Godoy incorrectly stated

during a pretrial interview that no one at the crime scene had

touched the plastic bags bearing Fong’s fingerprints or

removed the contents of those bags even though a crimescene photograph showed that the forensic identification

technician touched the bags and removed and dusted the

cucumber and lemons found inside them at the crime scene;

and (5) that Godoy misrepresented that the lemons found at

the scene were taken back to the Tucson Police Department

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68 FONG V. RYAN

for processing and that he saw the forensic identification

technician with them at the station when the lemons actually

were left at the crime scene.

In other words, though Stuehringer conceded that the

fingerprints found at the scene belonged to Fong, he also took

steps to show the jury that the fingerprint evidence was

mishandled, misrepresented, and possiblyeven manufactured. 

Indeed, during closing argument, Stuehringer extensively

argued that Godoy’s inconsistent representations about the

fingerprint evidence, as well Godoy’s and the police

department’s deviations from proper evidence handling and

storage protocols, created reasonable doubt about whether the

fingerprint evidence established Fong’s culpability for the

murders.

In addition, Petitioner has not shown that the state PCR

court was unreasonable in condoning Stuehringer’s risky

decision to call Woods and not abandon the mistaken identity

defense altogether when weighed against the fingerprint

evidence connecting Petitioner to the crimes. While

Petitioner tries to minimize that fingerprint evidence, the

Arizona Supreme Court found it quite compelling evidence

of guilt on direct review because the placement and location

of Petitioner’s fingerprints were consistent with them being

left during the commission of the crime:

Although defendant claims his prints

could have been left in the store when he

worked there several months before, this does

not explain the presence of his prints on

unstamped food stamps found on the floor

next to the body of Fred Gee. Testimony

indicated that the food stamps would have

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FONG V. RYAN 69

been marked by the store on the day they were

received. Also, the fingerprints found on the

lemon and cucumber bags on the counter near

Gee’s body belonged to Fong, not Garza.

Although Fong may have touched baggies

while working in the store months prior to the

murders, or even while shopping in the store

prior to the murders, it is highly unlikely that

Fong unrolled a spool of plastic bags, placed

his prints on a baggie, and then rolled it back

up on the spool. Likewise, assuming Fong

touched bags that were lying around the store,

it is unlikely that days, weeks, or even months

after Fong touched those two particular bags,

the killer entered the store, found those same

bags, and used them to carry lemons and a

cucumber to the liquor counter where Gee

was shot.

Soto-Fong, 928 P.2d at 623; see also Mikes v. Borg, 947 F.2d

353, 356–57 (9th Cir. 1991) (conviction based on fingerprint

evidence alone may be sustained where sufficient evidence

presented that fingerprints had to have been left on items

during commission of the crime); State v. Rodriguez,

961 P.2d 1006, 1009 (Ariz. 1998) (conviction based on

fingerprint evidence alone should be sustained where “jury

could reasonably infer that the prints could only have been

impressed when the crime was committed”). As a result, the

state PCR court was reasonable in concluding that

Stuehringer was justified in pursuing a risky mistaken

identity defense as an attempt to diffuse the fingerprint

evidence.

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Petitioner also urges that Stuehringer’s testimony before

the state PCR court about his trial strategy is unworthy of

belief because, at the time it was given, Stuehringer was a

conflicted witness who was representing Peasley in the

various state disciplinary proceedings related to Peasley’s

misconduct during the trials of Petitioner’s co-defendants.19

But, Stuehringer’s representation of Peasley in those other

proceedings, though unusual, does not render untrustworthy

Stuehringer’s testimony during a state PCR evidentiary

hearing about his own trial performance. See Weaver v.

Palmateer, 455 F.3d 958, 964–65 (9th Cir. 2006) (implicit

credibility determinations made by state court in favor of

defense attorney’s testimony related to ineffective assistance

of counsel claim owed AEDPA deference). And, upon this

Court’s review, the trial transcripts provided by Petitioner on

appeal, including Stuehringer’s opening statement, his closing

argument, and his examinations of Woods and Godoy,

support his characterization of his trial strategy before the

state PCR court.

Because we find reasonable the state court’s conclusion

that Fong’s counsel was not deficient in deciding to call

Woods as a witness to pursue a mistaken identity defense, we

refrain from addressing whether Fong was prejudiced by his

counsel’s performance.

Stuehringer’s decision to call Woods as a witness in

pursuit of a mistaken identity defense was unquestionably

risky, and Stuehringer’s presentation of that defense via

Woods may not have panned out exactly how Stuehringer

19 Petitioner’s independent claim for relief centering on Stuehringer’s

representation of Peasley in those state disciplinary proceedings is

addressed in the concurrently filed memorandum disposition.

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FONG V. RYAN 71

hoped. However, giving proper deference to the state PCR

court, “and even though we might reach a different

conclusion under a different standard of review, we cannot

say that [the state court’s denial of Petitioner’s ineffective

assistance of counsel claim] was an objectively unreasonable

application of Strickland to the facts of this case,” or involved

an unreasonable determination of the facts. Edwards,

475 F.3d at 1128–29.

IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the district court’s denial of Fong’s habeas

petition on the two certified issues addressed herein. The

Arizona Courts did not engage in an unreasonable

determination of the facts or an unreasonable application of

controlling federal law when denying Petitioner’s

prosecutorial misconduct claim based on Godoy’s trial

testimony or Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel

claim based on Stuehringer’s decision to call Woods as a

defense witness in pursuit of a mistaken identity defense.

AFFIRMED.

SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

This is a very troubling and confusing case. The crime

was a highly publicized triple murder-robbery in the Tucson

area. Fong was only seventeen at the time the crime was

committed. There were no eyewitnesses. The principal trial

witnesses were hardly upstanding citizens. The police

informant, Woods, had only recently been released from

prison and, absent cooperation, would have soon been back

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72 FONG V. RYAN

in prison on drug charges. The owner of the getaway car was

a known cocaine user. The prosecution had very little direct

evidence linking the three defendants, Fong, McCrimmon,

and Minnitt, to the crime. McCrimmon’s fingerprints were

on the getaway car, and Fong’s fingerprints were at the scene

of the robbery. During the trial Fong was apparently referred

to by several different names, includingChachi and Martinez,

while another person, also named Martin, may also have been

called Chachi.

What is now clear is that in order to bolster the dubious

credibility of the informant, Woods, the prosecution

knowingly put on perjured testimony of the police

investigator, Godoy. While Godoy lied at the trials of all of

the defendants, this fact came out only after Fong’s

conviction had become final and the convictions of the other

two defendants had been reversed for juror coercion. In their

retrials, where the perjury was disclosed, McCrimmon was

acquitted, and Minnitt’s jury hung, and he was eventually

freed on double jeopardy grounds.

Fong’s prosecutor was ultimately disbarred for the

knowing use of perjured testimony in the original trials of

Minnitt and McCrimmon. See State v. Minnitt, 55 P.3d 774

(Ariz. 2002). Fong, however, has served more than twenty

years in prison for the murders.

The informant, Woods, provided damaging testimony in

Fong’s trial. The prosecution could not put Woods on the

stand in Fong’s trial because he would testify to the alleged

confession of McCrimmon and Minnitt, whom Fong could

not cross-examine. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123

(1968) (holding that testimony recounting a co-defendant’s

confession violated the Confrontation Clause and due

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FONG V. RYAN 73

process). Fong’s own attorney called the informant as a

witness, hoping, without any legal basis whatsoever, that he

would be able to limit the testimony to identifying Minnitt,

McCrimmon, and a person named “Chachi,” and to exclude

any description of “Chachi” that would identify him as Fong. 

The cherry-picking attempt failed. See State v. Soto-Fong,

928 P.2d 610, 618 (Ariz. 1996). Woods’ testimony inevitably

inculpated Fong.

It is, of course, quite possible that Fong would have been

convicted without Woods’ testimony. But with that

testimony, there was no way that the jury could have failed to

convict Fong. His own lawyer put the nail in his coffin. In

the original appeal, the state Supreme Court opinion

emphasized that Fong put Woods on as a witness, and

disclaimed any intent to second guess the strategy. The court

said:

Having chosen a strategy which brought into

issue portions of McCrimmon’s and Minnitt’s

statements to Woods, defendant cannot

complain that the court should have precluded

the state from introducing additional portions

of those same statements.

Soto-Fong, 928 P.2d at 618.

Fong raised multiple issues before the district court, but

the district court correctly identified the two most important

for certification on appeal: the knowing use of the perjured

testimony of Godoy, and the conduct of defense counsel in

calling Woods to the stand.

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74 FONG V. RYAN

The majority accurately explains that Godoy’s false

testimony played a lesser role in Fong’s trial than it did in the

later trial of McCrimmon and Minnitt. Godoy, in order to

bolster Woods’ credibility, lied about learning for the first

time from Woods about the trio’s involvement. The lie was

less critical here than in the other trials because there was

strong evidence, apart from Woods’ statements, that Fong

was involved. There was thus less need to bolster Woods’

credibility. Godoy’s testimony nevertheless reinforced

Woods’ testimonyand out-of-courtstatementsthatimplicated

Fong and that were key to his conviction.

It is also probable that had Fong’s attorney not put Woods

on the stand to testify about what Woods told the police, the

perjured testimony of Godoy as to the importance of Woods’

statements would have played a more important role in

Fong’s trial, and become nearly as important as Godoy’s

perjury was in the trials of McCrimmon and Minnitt, perjury

that eventually resulted in their walking free. If Fong’s

attorney had not called Woods, the jury would have been able

to assess the credibility of Woods’ statements only by

assessing the credibility of Godoy.

Because the jury convicted Fong after a trial marked by

perjury and incompetence, I conclude that Fong did not

receive a fair trial. The district court should have granted him

habeas relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

I therefore respectfully dissent.

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