Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-15-03043/USCOURTS-ca8-15-03043-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Charles Bryan Ewert
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 15-3043

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Charles Bryan Ewert

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Iowa - Davenport

____________

 Submitted: April 15, 2016

 Filed: July 7, 2016

____________

Before RILEY, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

____________

RILEY, Chief Judge.

After responding to a report of a domestic assault at the home of Charles Bryan

Ewert (Ewert) and his wife, Colleen, police executed a search warrant at the home

and located eight firearms and a substantial cache of ammunition belonging to Ewert. 

Investigation revealed Ewert had a lengthy criminal history and had obtained at least

one of the firearms using false identification. Ewert wasindicted and ultimately pled

guilty to making a false statement during the purchase of a firearm and being a felon

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in possession of firearms, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(1)(A), (a)(2). The

district court sentenced Ewert to 84 months in prison. Ewert appeals, challenging 1

(1) the constitutionality of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G. or

Guidelines), (2) the district court’s calculation of his advisory Guidelines range,

(3) its imposition of an alternative sentence, and (4) the substantive reasonableness

of the sentence. Having jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

On August 14, 2014, Colleen called 911 to report that Ewert had assaulted her

in the early morning hours that day at their home in Davenport, Iowa. According to

Colleen, Ewert was upset and began accusing Colleen of “talking to other people.” 

Ewert forced Colleen into the basement of their home and held her there for

approximately three hours, threatening her, “shak[ing] [her] head,” and “repeatedly

hit[ting] [her] in the leg causing bruises.” Among other threats, Colleen reported

“Ewert told Colleen that she had two options: cut off her own hand or put two bullets

in a gun, spin it, and pull the trigger.” 

Ewert eventually let Colleen go without acting on the threat. Colleen “gave

[Ewert] a double dose of Nyquil to make him sleep.” Within the next two hours

Colleen called the police, gathered her children, and escaped to her neighbor’s home. 

Based on Colleen’s report that Ewert “had multiple firearms at the residence,” the

police “surrounded the residence” and treated the situation “as a barricaded suspect

who was possibly armed.” After an hour-long “stand-off,” Ewert was arrested. 

After the arrest, police obtained and executed a search warrant on the Ewert

residence and located in the garage eight firearms and a large quantity of ammunition. 

Investigation revealed Ewert had purchased one ofthe firearms using the “gun permit,

The Honorable John A. Jarvey, Chief Judge, United States District Court for

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the Southern District of Iowa. 

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driver’s license, and Form 4473 for a person with the last name of McCarthy.” 

Investigation also revealed Ewert “was convicted in 2002 of felony eluding,” see

Iowa Code § 321.279(3), and was thus prohibited from possessing firearms.

In October 2014, a grand jury returned an indictment charging Ewert with

making false statements during the purchase of a firearm, see 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(a)(1)(A); conspiracy “to commit felon in possession of a firearm,” see

18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 922(g); and being a felon in possession of firearms, see 18 U.S.C.

§§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). Several months later, Ewert pled guilty to making a false

statement during the purchase of a firearm and being a felon in possession of

firearms.

At sentencing, the district court determined Ewert had a base offense level of

20, with two four-level enhancements for the specific offense characteristics of

possessing between eight and twenty-four firearms and “us[ing] or possess[ing] any

firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony offense.” U.S.S.G.

§ 2K2.1(b)(1)(B), (6)(B). Ewert also received a three-level reduction for acceptance

of responsibility. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a), (b). Based on the resulting offense level

of 25 and Ewert’s criminal history category of III, the district court determined

Ewert’s advisory Guidelines range was 70 to 87 months and sentenced Ewert to 84

months imprisonment and three years of supervised release. Ewert appeals. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standards of Review

“We review the district court’s interpretation of the guidelines de novo, and its

factual findings . . . for clear error.” United States v. Howard, 759 F.3d 886, 889 (8th

Cir. 2014). “When the guidelines are incorrectly applied, we remand for resentencing

unlessthe error was harmless, such as when the district court would have imposed the

same sentence absent the error.” United States v. Idriss, 436 F.3d 946, 951 (8th Cir.

2006). 

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We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion. 

See United States v. Keys, 785 F.3d 1240, 1243 (8th Cir. 2015). “‘On review,

sentences within the advisory Guidelines range . . . are presumptively reasonable,’” 

id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Solis-Bermudez, 501 F.3d 882,

884 (8th Cir. 2007)), but the “‘district court abuses its discretion and imposes an

unreasonable sentence when itfailsto consider a relevant and significant factor, gives

significant weight to an irrelevant or improper factor, or considers the appropriate

factors but commits a clear error of judgment in weighing those factors.’” Id. at

1243-44 (quoting United States v. Robison, 759 F.3d 947, 950-51 (8th Cir. 2014)). 

B. Constitutionality of Sentencing Guidelines

We first address Ewert’s contention the Guidelines cannot be applied to him

because they are unconstitutional in that they “violate . . . separation of powers

principles.” Ewert also theorizes “the Guidelines undermine the integrity of the

Judiciary,” and he proposes his “case perfectly illustrates how the United State [sic]

Sentencing Guidelines have transformed the Judicial Branch to a system that

promotes incarceration, rather than Justice.”

The government responds that Ewert has waived his challenge to the

constitutionality of the Guidelines because he did not raise that issue in the district

court. See, e.g., Liberty State Bank v. Minn. Life & Health Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 149

F.3d 832, 834 (8th Cir. 1998) (“[W]e do not consider constitutional argumentsraised

for the first time on appeal absent exceptional circumstances, such as when the proper

result is clear or when our failure to consider the new issue would result in injustice.”

(citation omitted)). Even assuming Ewert preserved the issue, his argument on the

merits is foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Mistretta v. United States,

488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989) (upholding the constitutionality of the sentencing

commission and the Guidelines, and rejecting the separation of powers violation

argument). It is not the province of this court, as Ewert urges, to “revisit the rationale

of Mistretta.” 

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C. Sentencing Enhancement

Ewert next argues the district court improperly calculated his Guidelines range

because it applied a four-level enhancement for use or possession of a firearm in

connection with another felony offense. See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) (“If the

defendant . . . [u]sed or possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with

another felony offense . . . increase by 4 levels.”). Ewert acknowledges he used or

possessed a firearmin connection with the offense of “Harassment in the first degree”

under the Iowa Code, § 708.7(1)(b), which is punishable by up to two years

imprisonment, see Iowa Code § 903.1(2), but he assertsthis offense is “an aggravated

misdemeanor,” as defined in the Iowa Code, not a felony. 

Ewert isincorrect. The Guidelines define “felony conviction” as “a prior adult

federal or state conviction for an offense punishable by . . . imprisonment for a term

exceeding one year, regardless of whether such offense is specifically designated as

a felony and regardless of the actual sentence imposed.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 n.1. In

United States v. Anderson, we explained that an “‘aggravated

misdemeanor’ . . . punishable by up to two years imprisonment, Iowa Code

§ 903.1(2)” is a felony conviction within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 because

it is an “offense . . . punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.”

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United States v. Anderson, 339 F.3d 720, 724 (8th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation

marks omitted); see also, e.g., United States v. Littrell, 557 F.3d 616, 618 (8th Cir.

2009). The district court properly determined Ewert used or possessed a firearm in

The definition of “felony conviction,” once referred to as “felony offense,”

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was previously located in § 2K2.1 n.7 of the Guidelines, as referenced in Anderson.

The definition has been rephrased since Anderson, but not substantively changed. 

See United States v. Anderson, 339 F.3d 720, 724 (8th Cir. 2003).

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connection with another felony offense, and did not err by applying the corresponding

four-level enhancement.3

D. Substantive Reasonableness

Finally, Ewert argues his sentence is substantively unreasonable. “A sentence

within the Guidelines range is accorded a presumption ofsubstantive reasonableness

on appeal.” United States v. Robinson, 516 F.3d 716, 717 (8th Cir. 2008). Ewert

urges us to “abandon the use of the Presumption of Reasonableness in all cases, or

find it cannot be applied in the instant case.” We decline this proposal because the

Supreme Court has upheld this presumption, and it is the well-established law of our

circuit. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007); Robinson, 516 F.3d at

717. 

Ewert seems to suggest the district court improperly applied a presumption of

reasonableness, asserting the district court did not conduct an “individualized

assessment” and selected “a sentence that just happened to fall in the middle of the

Guidelines range.” Cf. Robinson, 516 F.3d at 718 (noting the presumption of

reasonableness may be applied by the appellate court, but not the district court). 

Ewert suggests the district court should have “explain[ed] why the range the

Commission came up with for a class of conduct can possibly be reasonably related

to the specific family history, employment history, criminal history, substance abuse

and psychological history of . . . Ewert, and the real conduct that brought [Ewert] to

the federal court.” In Ewert’s view, the district court “said nothing specific about Mr.

Ewert’s past, current or future life.” 

Because we conclude the district court properly calculated the Guidelines

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range, we need not consider Ewert’s challenge to the district court’s alternative

sentence. 

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The sentencing record and transcript tell a different story. The district court

specifically noted the court “looked to the Sentencing Guidelines as an important,

though not in any way controlling factor to be considered.” The district court

discussed Ewert’s past criminal history and permitted Ewert the opportunity to

explain why, after “a lot of chances to reform this exact kind of behavior,” Ewert

believed this time he would be able to conform his conduct to the law. The district

court also “considered the statements in support of Mr. Ewert, both from his friends

and family and from [Ewert’s attorney]” and “considered [Ewert’s] attempts at postoffense rehabilitation and . . . genuine expression of remorse.” The record

demonstratesthe district court adequately analyzed the sentencing factors, 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a), and we are satisfied the district court “‘considered the parties’ arguments

and ha[d] a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking authority.’” 

Robinson, 516 F.3d at 718 (quoting Rita, 551 U.S. at 356). “[W]hen a judge decides

simply to apply the Guidelines to a particular case [as was done in Ewert’s case],

doing so will not necessarily require lengthy explanation.” Rita, 551 U.S. at 356-57. 

The district court did not abuse its discretion.

III. CONCLUSION

The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 

______________________________

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