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Parties Involved:
James Earl Alexander
Appellant
Steve Amos
Appellee
Tillmon Bishop
Appellee
Eddie Jean Carr
Appellee
Copiah County, Mississippi Board of Supervisors
Appellee
Delores Frye
Appellee
Hinds County, Mississippi Board of Supervisors
Appellee
Jim Hood
Appellee
Jefferson County, Mississippi Board of Supervisors
Appellee
Mike Jinks
Appellee
David Earl Johnson
Appellee
Lamar County, Mississippi Board of Supervisors
Appellee
Lawrence County, Mississippi Board of Supervisors
Appellee
Lincoln County, Mississippi Board of Supervisors
Appellee
Lincoln County, Mississippi City Council
Appellee
Ronny Lott
Appellee
Madison County, Mississippi Board of Supervisors
Appellee
Marshall County, Mississippi Board of Supervisors
Appellee
Pearl River County, Mississippi Board of Supervisors
Appellee
Rankin County, Mississippi Board of Supervisors
Appellee
Kevin Rayborn
Appellee
Wayne Smith
Appellee
State of Mississippi
Appellee
Larry Swales
Appellee
Chuck Thomas
Appellee

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-60875

Summary Calendar

JAMES EARL ALEXANDER, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI; KEVIN RAYBORN, Board of Supervisors and 

(Chanceries) of Lawrence County; DAVID EARL JOHNSON, Board of 

Supervisors and (Chanceries) of Pearl River County; DELORES FRYE, Board 

of Supervisors and (Chanceries) of Jefferson County; EDDIE JEAN CARR, 

Board of Supervisors and (Chanceries) of Hinds County; RONNY LOTT, 

Board of Supervisors and (Chanceries) of Madison County; LARRY SWALES, 

Board of Supervisors and (Chanceries) of Rankin County; STEVE AMOS, 

Board of Supervisors and (Chanceries) of Copiah County; WAYNE SMITH, 

Board of Supervisors and (Chanceries) of Lamar County; CHUCK THOMAS, 

Board of Supervisors and (Chanceries) of Marshall County; TILLMON 

BISHOP, Board of Supervisors and (Chanceries) of Lincoln County; MIKE 

JINKS, City Council and (City Clerk) of the City of Brookhaven; JIM HOOD, 

Attorney General, State of Mississippi; LAWRENCE COUNTY, 

MISSISSIPPI BOARD OF SUPERVISORS; PEARL RIVER COUNTY, 

MISSISSIPPI BOARD OF SUPERVISORS; JEFFERSON COUNTY, 

MISSISSIPPI BOARD OF SUPERVISORS; HINDS COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI 

BOARD OF SUPERVISORS; MADISON COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI BOARD 

OF SUPERVISORS; RANKIN COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI BOARD OF 

SUPERVISORS; COPIAH COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI BOARD OF 

SUPERVISORS; LAMAR COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI BOARD OF 

SUPERVISORS; LINCOLN COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI BOARD OF 

SUPERVISORS; LINCOLN COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI CITY COUNCIL; 

MARSHALL COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, 

 Defendants - Appellees

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 8, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 15-60875

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Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 3:15-CV-129

Before KING, CLEMENT, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Plaintiff-Appellant James Earl Alexander appeals the district court’s 

grant of the Defendants-Appellees’ motions to dismiss and for judgment on the 

pleadings and the district court’s denial of his motion for relief.

Alexander, proceeding pro se, claims that the chancery clerks of various 

Mississippi counties refused to give him the property deeds for land that he 

bought through tax sales. Alexander sued the state of Mississippi and various 

counties and clerks (collectively, “Defendants”) in federal court, asserting that 

the clerks’ refusals violated state law and the Equal Protection Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment. Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a 

claim and for judgment on the pleadings. Alexander then filed a “motion for 

relief” that asserted violations of the Equal Protection Clause, 42 U.S.C. § 

1982, and the Due Process Clause.1

The district court construed Alexander’s “motion for relief” as a motion 

to amend his complaint, but denied the motion as futile because Alexander

failed to state a plausible federal claim. The district court granted Defendants’ 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

1 Alexander asserted due process claims arising from: (1) the clerks’ refusals to grant 

the land deeds; (2) a judge’s refusal to comply with a state appellate court ruling; and (3) a 

state judge’s barring him from suing with regard to certain land parcels and a state court’s 

dismissal of his appeal of this ruling. 

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motions, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Alexander’s state 

law claims, and dismissed the case. Alexander appealed.

Standard of Review

We review a district court’s rulings on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss 

and a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings de novo, applying the 

same standard as the district court. Gentilello v. Rege, 627 F.3d 540, 543-44 

(5th Cir. 2010). “The central issue is whether, in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff, the complaint states a valid claim for relief.” Id. We review a district 

court’s denial of a motion to amend and its decision over whether to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction for abuse of discretion. Powers v. United States, 783 

F.3d 570, 576 (5th Cir. 2015); Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 638 (5th Cir. 

2013). 

Discussion

Alexander argues that the district court erred by granting Defendants’

motions to dismiss and for judgment on the pleadings and by denying his 

motion for relief.

The district court rightly granted Defendants’ motions because

Alexander’s sole federal equal protection claim is without merit. To state an 

equal protection claim, the plaintiff must allege, among other things, that he 

has been intentionally treated differently from other similarly situated

individuals. Gibson v. Tex. Dep’t of Ins., 700 F.3d 227, 238 (5th Cir. 2012).

Alexander fails to make such an allegation; his complaint is devoid of any 

allegations that he was treated differently from others similarly situated. 

Accordingly, he has failed to state an equal protection claim. See Priester v. 

Lowndes Cnty., 354 F.3d 414, 424 (5th Cir. 2004). 

The district court also properly denied Alexander’s motion for relief as a 

futile motion to amend his complaint. Denying a motion to amend is not an 

abuse of discretion when the amendment fails to state a claim. Stripling v. 

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Jordan Prod. Co., 234 F.3d 863, 872-73 (5th Cir. 2000). Alexander fails to state

an equal protection, § 1982, or due process claim. Again, even in his motion for 

relief, he fails to allege that the clerks treated him differently from other 

similarly situated persons. See Priester, 354 F.3d at 424. Alexander fails to 

state a § 1982 claim because he does not allege intentional discrimination. See

Vaughner v. Pulito, 804 F.2d 873, 877 (5th Cir. 1986) (“A cause of action based 

upon section 1982 . . . requires an intentional act of racial discrimination.”). 

And he fails to state a due process claim because he challenges state employees’ 

actions, and Mississippi law provides adequate post-deprivation remedies—

either a suit under Miss. Code Ann. § 25-45-1 against the clerk for misfeasance 

in office or a bill of chancery under Miss. Code Ann. § 27-45-27 to enforce the 

lien acquired through the tax sale.2 See Holloway v. Walker, 784 F.2d 1287,

1291-92 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that an adequate post-deprivation state 

remedy satisfies due process when a plaintiff challenges unauthorized conduct 

by state employees, rather than established state procedure).3

Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion when, after 

dismissing all of Alexander’s federal claims, it declined to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims. “District courts enjoy wide 

discretion in determining whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction over a 

state claim once all federal claims are dismissed.” Noble v. White, 996 F.2d 797, 

 

2 As to Alexander’s due process claim arising from a state judge’s alleged refusal to 

comply with a state court judgment, the plaintiff can seek a writ of mandamus in the state 

court of appeals. See Moye v. Clerk, DeKalb Cnty. Superior Court, 474 F.2d 1275, 1276 (5th 

Cir. 1973) (“[A] federal court lacks the general power to issue writs of mandamus to direct 

state courts and their judicial officers in the performance of their duties.”). 

3 As to Alexander’s due process claim arising from a state court’s barring him from 

suit, the district court properly concluded it lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman 

doctrine, which dictates that federal district courts do not have power to review state court 

final judgments. See Hale v. Harney, 786 F.2d 688, 691 (5th Cir. 1986) (noting that plaintiffs 

cannot circumvent the Rooker-Feldman doctrine by casting complaints about state court 

judgments “in the form of civil rights suits”); Dist. of Columbia Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 

460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). 

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799 (5th Cir. 1993); see Brookshire Bros. Holding, Inc. v. Dayco Prods., Inc., 

554 F.3d 595, 602 (5th Cir. 2009) (“The general rule is that a court should 

decline to exercise jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims when all 

federal-law claims are eliminated before trial.”). The district court thus acted 

within its broad discretion when it declined jurisdiction.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is 

AFFIRMED.

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