Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00328/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00328-10/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
I. Barrimond
Defendant
J. Capriola
Defendant
City Of Fresno
Defendant
Zella Maye Freeman
Plaintiff
R. Garrison
Defendant
J. Hollins
Defendant
R. Perez
Defendant
A. Simonson
Defendant
Mark A. Yee
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ZELLA MAYE FREEMAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF FRESNO, R. GARRISON

(F.P.D. Badge No. 780), MARK A.

YEE (F.P.D. Badge No. 692), J.

CAPRIOLA (F.S.O. Badge No.

7622), I. BARRIMOND (F.S.O.

Badge No. 1153), J. HOLLINS

(F.S.O. Badge No. 2346), R.

PEREZ (F.S.O. Badge No. 6169),

A. SIMONSON (F.S.O. Badge No.

9364), inclusive,

Defendants.

 

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1:05-cv-0328 OWW SMS

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND

ORDER GRANTING/DENYING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Zella Maye Freeman (“Freeman” or “Plaintiff”)

filed a complaint against Defendants for their alleged

unreasonable search and seizure of her home in violation of her

federal civil rights, as well as various state laws. (Doc. 1,

Complaint, Filed March 8, 2005.) This action comes before the

court on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment of Freeman’s

claims. (Doc. 61-2, Motion for Summary Judgment, Filed July 31,

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2006.) Freeman opposes the motion. (Doc. 89, Pl.’s Amended

Opp., Filed October 4, 2006.)

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Freeman filed her initial complaint on March 8, 2005. (Doc.

1, Complaint.) On June 28, 2005 Freeman amended her complaint. 

(Doc. 24, First Amended Complaint.) On July 31, 2006 Defendants

filed a motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 61-2, Motion for

Summary Judgment.) Freeman opposed the motion on October 2,

2006. (Doc. 81, Pl.’s Opp. to Mot. for Summary Judgment.) 

Freeman then filed an amended opposition on October 4, 2006. 

(Doc. 89, Pl.’s Amended Opp.) Defendants filed their reply on

October 16, 2006. (Doc. 96, Def’s Reply.) 

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. UNDISPUTED FACTS

1. Facts Relevant to Obtaining the Search Warrant

During his assignment with the Multi Agency Gang Enforcement

Consortium (“M.A.G.E.C.”), Detective Mark Yee along with several

other investigators, became involved in a one and a half year

investigation of criminal activities including gang-related

shootings, homicides and attempted homicides committed by rival

African American gangs in the southwest Fresno area. (DSUF, No.

2) Specifically, the investigation focused on validated criminal

street gangs the “West Side Strother Boys”, its gang leader

Darryl “Dedo” Hilliard, and their rival, “the Garrett Street

Gang.” (DSUF, No. 3) 

In February 2004, Detective Yee authored a thirty one page

search warrant affidavit, arising out of the investigation

stemming from the gang related shootings by the subject gangs. 

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 For an exhaustive list of the incidents and the details of 1

each incident see Doc. 61, Def.’s Motion for Summary Judgment,

Filed July 31, 2006, pp. 5-16. 

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(DSUF, No. 5) The Search Warrant Affidavit was signed by

Detective Yee under penalty of perjury. (DSUF, No. 7) At that

time, the West Side Strother Boys was still an active gang

committing violent crimes and there were investigations

outstanding. (DSUF, 8) The Affidavit provided specific details

of incidents during that investigation.

2. Detective Yee’s Investigation 

i. History of Yee’s One and a Half Year Investigation

in Support of Probable Cause

It is undisputed that the record contains an extensive

account of various incidents of violence between the Strother

Boys and the Garret Street gang. These incidents were described

in Yee’s twenty four page statement of probable cause in support

of the Search Warrant. Yee’s affidavit provided specific details

of incidents that included the following : 1

1. shots fired at Strother Boys Gang on November 19, 2002, 

2. shots fired at Garret Street Gang on November 20, 2002, 

3. the shooting of a six year old boy shot in the crossfire

between Srother Boys and Garret Street gangs on December 26,

2002.

4. Strother Boy Darryl Hilliard’s Fingerprints on a firearm at

a disturbance on March 5, 2003, 

5. Shootout between Darryl Hilliard and Garret Street Boys on

March 11, 2003, and 

6. Garret Street Gang member shot on January 29, 2004. 

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 It is undisputed that Detective Yee requested the 2

confidential portion of the affidavit be sealed under People v.

Hobbs, 7 Cal. 4th 948 (1994) in order to protect the safety and

welfare of the confidential informant(s). (DSUF, No. 54.) It is

also undisputed that, according to Freeman’s police practices

expert, Roger Clark, requesting to seal a portion of an affidavit

should be done very carefully, so as to protect the confidential

sources, because people can die if such information is disclosed. 

(DSUF, No. 55.) It was Detective Yee’s practice never to break

this promise. (Id.) 

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ii. Detective Yee’s Conclusions of the Investigation

Detective Yee, who has been an officer with the Fresno

Police Department since 1994, was assigned to the M.A.G.E.C. Unit

in 1997. (DSUF, No. 236)

In addition to the information described above, along with

confidential information contained in a sealed portion of the 2

affidavit, Detective Yee relied on the following in seeking

authorization to search the ten residences: 

1. There was a long-standing and ongoing feud between

members of the “West Side Strother Boys” and “The

Garrett Street Boys” and that feud involved many

acts of violence on both sides. (DSUF, No. 42) 

2. Detective Yee knew that the Strother Boys were a

close knit group, and that it was not uncommon for

many of the members to be involved in related acts

of violence. (DSUF, No. 43) 

3. When an ongoing feud involving many separate

members of the same gang exists, it is not

uncommon for the violent members at the central

core of the gang to associate with each other, and

to plan together aggressive acts and/or acts of

violent retaliation to be perpetrated by a few

members of this violent central cadre. (DSUF, No.

44) 

4. The pattern of violent acts perpetrated by “The

West Side Strother Boys” and the large number of

people involved in these acts, made it more likely

than not that there was a general common plan

existing among the gang to commit acts of violence

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against persons they believed to belong to or to

associate with their rivals. (DSUF, No. 45) 

5. In a long-standing gang shooting feud, members of

the victim’s gang in one shooting frequently know

or suspect that they know who the perpetrators

are. This is because of the “word on the street”,

which is information passed from person to person,

often based on sources within the perpetrator’s

gang; on eyewitnesses reluctant to cooperate with

the police; or on gang graffiti, composed of

writings on buildings or walls, which is a means

used by some gang members to take credit for a

violent incident. (DSUF, No. 46) 

6. Because of the above, a person involved as a

shooter in a gang-related feud incident will

generally assume his identity is known on the

streets. (DSUF, No. 47) While he must

temporarily dispose of the weapon used in the

underlying offense, he must at the same time have

accessible to himself a weapon which can be used

for self-defense upon short notice. (Id.) 

7. That gang members who are involved in an ongoing

feud of shooting incidents frequently do not

permanently dispose of their weapons, preferring

to retain access to them for protection from

retaliation or for further use in acts of

aggression while the feud is continuing. (DSUF,

No. 48) 

8. Gang members who use a firearm in gang feud

situations frequently borrow the weapon used from

a fellow gang member, and after the commission of

a violent act with the weapon, they return it to

the gang member they borrowed it from, to prevent

it being seized by law enforcement officers during

a search conducted shortly after the commission of

the crime. (DSUF, No. 49) 

9. Gang members who do use their own firearms in gang

war situations frequently pass the weapons used to

fellow gang members for safe keeping, in order to

avoid the weapon being seized by law enforcement

officers during a search of their residence,

vehicle or person. (DSUF, No. 50) 

10. When a gang member in the above situation believes

that he is no longer liable to be searched as a

suspect in the shooting incident, he will

frequently retrieve the weapon used and store it

where it would be readily accessible for defense

or offense, such as in his residence, on his

person or in a vehicle to which he has access. 

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(DSUF, No. 51) 

iii. Facts Regarding Detective Yee’s Request for a

Search Warrant

It is undisputed that the ten residences were listed and

described with particularity in Attachment “A” to the Search

Warrant Affidavit. (DSUF, No. 58) The items to be seized

included evidence of gang membership, firearms and ammunition,

and were listed in Attachment “B” to the Search Warrant

Affidavit. (DSUF, No. 59) Detective Yee had probable cause to

believe, and did believe, that the property described in

Attachment “B” to the Affidavit was lawfully seizable pursuant to

California Penal Code Section 1524. (DSUF, No. 60)

It is also undisputed that on or about February 17, 2004,

Detective Yee took the Search Warrant Affidavit and Confidential

Attachment to the Honorable Judge Franklin P. Jones’ chambers in

the Fresno County Superior Court. (DSUF, No. 63) Detective Yee

believed that Judge Jones was a detached and neutral magistrate

at the time he presented the Search Warrant Affidavit to him. 

(DSUF, No. 64) Freeman does not dispute that Judge Jones signed

the Search Warrant after thorough review on February 17, 2004 and

authorized the search of the ten residences. (DSUF, No. 69) 

Judge Jones ordered the confidential portion of the Affidavit to

be sealed, which was kept in the custody of the Fresno County

Superior Court. (DSUF, No. 70)

iv. Judge Jones Reliance on Detective Yee’s Training

and Experience

Defendants argue that Detective Yee described in detail his

professional experience, his experience with street gangs, his

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assignments, and his duties and training with the Fresno Police

Department. It is undisputed that Detective Yee had extensive

training and experience, which included the following:

1. Identification and validation of gangs and gang

members

2. The investigation of gang-related shootings,

homicides and other violent gang crimes leading to

the arrests and the conviction of numerous violent

gang offenders and the recovery of narcotic

paraphernalia, controlled substances and/or stolen

property

3. Gathering of gang intelligence information; the

maintenance of gang files/information shared with

detectives from other local law enforcement

agencies, other departments in the State of

California and other states across the nation

4. He has received ongoing advanced officer training

courses on the preparation and service of search

warrants

5. Cultural awareness, use of force, informant

development

6. Interview and interrogation and various other

classes and seminars. 

(DSUF, No. 71)

It is also undisputed that in his assignment with

M.A.G.E.C., Detective Yee had become acquainted with numerous

gang members and associates through investigations, arrests,

field interviews, vehicle stops, subject checks, consensual

contacts and informants. (DSUF, No. 72) Detective Yee is

familiar with street gang habits, mannerisms, and techniques used

in committing violent offenses and gang members’ behaviors in

attempting to conceal evidence of such occurrences from detection

by both the general public and law enforcement. (DSUF, No. 73) 

At the time of preparing this Search Warrant Detective Yee had

been specializing in Black gangs and investigating gang-related

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 Freeman does not dispute that M.A.G.E.C.’s mission is to 3

eradicate criminal activity of street gangs whose members

threaten, terrorize, and commit a multitude of crimes against the

peaceful citizens of their neighborhoods, schools and businesses. 

(DSUF, No. 79) M.A.G.E.C. utilizes the California State Office

of Criminal Justice 10-point criteria to validate gang members

and associates. (DSUF, No. 80) Three or more of the ten points

can validate the subject as an active gang member. Two of the

ten points can validate the subject as an associate of the gang. 

(DSUF, No. 81)

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shootings, homicides, and other violent gang crimes for six

years. (DSUF, No. 74) Detective Yee has also taught Black Gang

Awareness Training Seminars in Fresno County and conducted gang

presentations to numerous civic groups. (DSUF, No. 75) 

Freeman does not dispute that Detective Yee participated in

numerous parole/probation searches of residences of known,

validated criminal street gang members/associates where gang

paraphernalia was located. (DSUF, No. 76) He was a member of

the California Gang Investigator’s Association, Northern

California Gang Investigator’s Association, California Homicide

Investigator’s Association, and California Narcotics Officer’s

Association. (DSUF, No. 77)

Detective Yee received some of this training through his

department agency while serving on the M.A.G.E.C. team. (DSUF, 3

No. 78) Most of the named suspects included in Detective Yee’s

Affidavit, were validated gang members or associates. (DSUF, No.

82) Detective Yee has qualified and testified as an expert on

Black gangs in the California Superior Court and Federal Court. 

(DSUF, No. 83) It is his expert opinion that it is common for

girlfriends and parents to aid and abet their boyfriend or child

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who are known criminals by hiding, concealing and disposing of

any type of evidence that might contribute to their prosecution.

(DSUF, No. 84)

v. Facts Relating to Freeman’s Residence and Its

Proximity to Gang Activity

Defendants state that Freeman’s residence is situated in a

lower economic neighborhood that is well known for criminal gang

activity and violence. (DSUF, No. 85) It is undisputed that

Freeman’s home is located in the heart of where most of the gangrelated shootings occurred. (DSUF, No. 86) 

On January 22, 2004, Darryl Hilliard was under surveillance

by law enforcement officers, including Detective Yee. (DSUF, No.

89) It is undisputed that as of January 22, 2004 a green 2003

Pontiac Grand Am was parked in Freeman’s driveway and that a

records check confirmed this vehicle was registered to her. 

(DSUF, No. 92) It is also undisputed that Hilliard’s mother

dropped off Hilliard at Freeman’s residence, and then drove away

without him. (DSUF, No. 93)

Freeman also does not dispute that later that same day,

after a court appearance at the Fresno County Courthouse,

Hilliard was observed getting into Freeman’s Pontiac Grand Am. 

(DSUF, No. 95) It is undisputed that on the way to Hilliard’s

mother’s house, located at 4430 N. Sequoia Avenue in Fresno, Ms.

Dillingham was observed driving at high speeds and making quick

turning movements as Hilliard leaned down in the front passenger

seat as if to conceal himself. (DSUF, No. 97) This behavior was

consistent with counter-surveillance techniques. (DSUF, No. 98) 

Surveillance of Hilliard continued on February 2, 2004. 

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(DSUF, No. 99) After taking him to court, Ms. Dillingham drove

Hilliard back to his mother’s house. (DSUF, No. 101) Shortly

thereafter, Hilliard was observed driving Freeman’s vehicle to

various locations where he made contact with various other

Strother Boys gang affiliates. (DSUF, No. 105) Hilliard’s

behavior while driving around in Plaintiff’s vehicle was

consistent with that of a person dealing drugs. (DSUF, No. 106) 

Freeman also does not dispute that due to the lack of resources

and manpower amongst law enforcement, it was not feasible to

monitor every move Darryl Hilliard made. (DSUF, No. 108) 

It is common practice for gang members to keep their

weaponry, stolen property and other evidence of their crime

involvement at their homes or “safe houses”. (DSUF, No. 109) It

is undisputed that, in an attempt to evade detection by the

police, gang members will routinely move the property among

associates/members/girlfriends within their own specific gang. 

(DSUF, No. 110) Detective Yee was looking for ballistic evidence

that would tie Darryl Hilliard to some of the crimes he was a

prime suspect in, i.e. drive by shootings, shooting into homes,

shooting into cars, and shooting people. (DSUF, No. 111) 

Freeman’s primary physician testified that she currently has

stress as a result of her granddaughter living with her. (DSUF,

No. 244) Freeman does not dispute that her home had been shot at

while she was in her living room causing bullet hole damage to

her house before this incident. (DSUF, No. 245) Further,

Freeman’s neighbor across the street was almost shot when her

home was hit with gunfire. [Anthony Lyday testified that while

his mother was cooking at the stove in her kitchen, Anthony heard

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 It is undisputed that February 19, 2004 was a clear, 4

bright, and sunny day. (DSUF, No. 113) 

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gun fire so he grabbed his mother and threw her to the ground. 

Immediately thereafter, bullets came through her kitchen where

she was standing. There have been a couple of these incidents

where he has had to save his mom.] (DSUF, No. 247)

B. Facts Relevant to the Service of the Search Warrant

1. The Search Warrant Briefing

On the morning of February 19, 2004 , all officers who were 4

to participate in serving the Search Warrant, met at the

M.A.G.E.C. headquarters for a briefing before the search. (DSUF,

No. 114) Detective Mark Yee was assigned to the Metro

Investigations Team, which was to serve the Warrant at four

locations, none of which are a subject of this lawsuit. (DSUF,

No. 115) 

The Rural Tactical Team is a uniform team focused primarily

on the tactical operation of eradicating criminal activity within

the rural County of Fresno. (DSUF, No. 116) Members of this

team consisted primarily of Fresno County Sheriff Deputies, who

included: Defendants Ian Barrimond, John Capriola, Jason Hollins,

Robert Perez, and Andrew Simonson; as well as Fresno Police

Officer Robert Garrison. (Id.) It also included non-defendant

Officers Andrew Camerana and Michael Higgins. This team was

assigned to search two homes. (Id.) 

During the briefing, Detective Yee provided all the officers

with the following: 

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1. a background of his investigations

2. a history of the ongoing gang-related shootings

3. the nature of the Search Warrant and information

regarding suspect Darryl Hilliard

4. a photograph of Darryl Hilliard

5. the locations to be searched

6. copies of the list of items authorized to be

searched for and seized

7. and a copy of the Notice of Search Warrant that

each team was to serve on the occupants of the

residences

(DSUF, No. 117) Specifically, Detective Yee cautioned the

officers that they were serving a “high risk” Search Warrant and

to expect for Darryl Hilliard or his fellow gang members and/or

associates, to be at any of the locations. He also cautioned

that it was very likely that such individuals would be armed. 

(DSUF, No. 118) 

Sergeant Barrimond had assigned Fresno Police Officer Robert

Garrison to be the Case Agent for their team, whose

responsibilities included: giving the knock and notice,

collecting and documenting all the evidence and property seized,

preparing the report, and booking the evidence into the Fresno

Police Department (“FPD”) property room. (DSUF, No. 119) 

Sergeant Barrimond chose Officer Garrison because he was the only

Fresno Police Officer on the team and since the Case Agent for

the entire operation was Detective Yee, a Fresno Police Officer,

it would make the processing, documentation and booking of

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evidence easier to have a Fresno Police Officer act as Case

Agent. (DSUF, No. 120) 

After the briefing, Officer Garrison contacted the FPD

Records Department by telephone and spoke with a Records’ Clerk

who informed him that there had been several prior calls for

service at Plaintiff’s residence, which included prior

disturbances and prior warrant service attempts. (DSUF, No. 121) 

The Rural Tactical Team then proceeded to the Chandler

Airport, a neutral location near the Plaintiff’s residence, to

conduct a second briefing. At this location, the officers

checked their equipment, ammunition, and gear to ensure

everything was properly functional. Each officer was in full law

enforcement tactical gear wearing bullet proof vests that bore

the name, M.A.G.E.C. on the back. Each of their uniforms were

clearly marked with their respective law enforcement agency

insignia or patch. (DSUF, No. 122) 

Sergeant Barrimond gave the officers position assignments

and assigned Deputies Perez and Simonson to the perimeter of the

residence. (DSUF, No. 123) Officers Garrison, Camerana and

Higgins, and Deputies Capriola and Hollins, were all assigned to

the Entry Team. (DSUF, No. 124) Due to the variety of risks

involved in serving this Search Warrant, Sergeant Barrimond

ensured that all the officers were mentally prepared and asked

them, “are you all here?”. (DSUF, No. 125) He wanted to make

sure they were focused and did not have their minds on extraneous

matters. (Id.) 

Defendants Barrimond, Capriola, Hollins, Perez, Simonson and

Garrison, were of the understanding that they were going to

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search Plaintiff’s residence pursuant to a valid search warrant

signed by a judge and had no reason to believe the Search Warrant

was unlawful or invalid in any respect. (DSUF, No. 157)

2. Search of Freeman’s Residence 

All the officers who participated in the service of this

Search Warrant understood that this was a “high risk” warrant due

to the nature of the underlying crimes being committed by the

suspect Darryl Hilliard that included homicide, gang-related

shootings, and other criminal activity. (DSUF, No. 221) All the

officers understood Hilliard was a validated gang member whose

fellow gang members, associates and affiliates were also very

dangerous. (DSUF, No. 222) Freeman does not dispute that the

officers also understood they were searching for firearms,

ammunition, gang indicia and other evidence of criminal activity. 

(DSUF, No. 223)

While approaching the front of the house, Deputies Perez and

Simonson branched out of the line to take a position near the

driveway, perimeter area. (DSUF, No. 126) The lead Officer was

Garrison who was followed by Officer Higgins who was then

followed by Deputy Capriola. (DSUF, No. 127) 

Plaintiff’s front door is on a two step elevation from the

ground. The house has barred windows on each side of the front

door. (DSUF, No. 128) Officer Garrison did not stand in front

of the door but positioned himself directly under the right front

window on the ground level. (DSUF, No. 130) Officer Garrison

had his department issued handgun in his right hand, and used his

left hand to bang on the security door. (DSUF, No. 131) He

checked and confirmed the security door was locked. (DSUF, No.

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133)

Plaintiff, who was inside the residence, did not immediately

open the door and the Officers on the “stick” (line-up of

officers on the entry team going through the door) were growing

concerned that the team was taking too long to make entry. After

a lengthy period of time, the interior door finally opened. 

(DSUF, No. 134) Plaintiff, responded, “what do you want?” 

(DSUF, No. 136) Officer Garrison continued to tell Plaintiff to

open the door. (DSUF, No. 137) Plaintiff finally unlocked the

security door at which point Officer Garrison grabbed the door

handle and pulled the door open. (DSUF, No. 138) Officer

Garrison stepped onto the front step and made entry into the

home, he was telling Plaintiff to get down on the floor. (DSUF,

No. 139) Plaintiff was verbally abusive to Officer Garrison as

well as the Paramedics who arrived on scene. (DSUF, No. 243)

It is undisputed that Detective Yee did not participate in

serving the Search Warrant at Plaintiff’s residence and was never

present at any time during the search of her residence. (DSUF,

No. 112) Two of Plaintiff’s neighbors who were positioned across

the street and witnessed the entry, testified in deposition that

they could hear the officers shouting for Plaintiff to open the

door for several minutes. (DSUF, No. 217) Specifically, Anthony

Lyday estimated that it took two to three minutes before the

officers made entry. (DSUF, No. 218) Gwen Echoles and Anthony

Lyday both heard the officers shout and announce their presence

while pounding on the front metal security door of Plaintiff’s

residence. (DSUF, No. 219) Neither Gwen Echoles or Anthony

Lyday heard the officers ever threaten to shoot Plaintiff. 

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(DSUF, No. 220) During the search, Officer Garrison seized a

loaded six shot revolver that was located in the bedroom. (DSUF,

No. 226)

3. Officer Garrison’s Use of Force

Officer Garrison has been with the Fresno Police Department

since 1996 and was assigned to the M.A.G.E.C. Unit in 2003. 

(DSUF, No. 237) Officer Garrison immediately entered the

residence but was not able to clearly see inside due to a brief

eye adjustment caused by coming in from outside where it was

bright and sunny, into a small, dimly lit room. (DSUF, No. 140) 

Deputy Capriola also saw that it was very dark and he could not

see much inside the residence. (DSUF, No. 141) Officer Garrison

felt his foot brush against an object on the floor then saw a

form in front of him. He yelled, “Police Department, get on the

ground, get on the ground.” (DSUF, No. 142)

There was no cover or concealment for any of the officers

who were in that doorway. (DSUF, No. 146) Deputy Garrison

immediately thought, “this isn’t good” because the officers were

not entering as fast as they should have. (DSUF, No. 147)

The doorway is known as the “funnel of death”. This is due

to the high likelihood of officers being injured or killed in the

doorway because of the backlighting. Therefore it is necessary

to get through the doorway as quickly and safely as possible. 

This ensures the safety of the officers and the subjects of the

residence. (DSUF, No. 148)

Given the amount of time between Officer Garrison entering

the residence, feeling this perceived threat to his gun arm,

combined with his inability to see clearly, and his men directly

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behind him moving quickly, he did not have sufficient time to

evaluate the age and characteristics of this individual. (DSUF,

No. 150) Ordinarily, an entry would be very rapid, and although

the momentum of the officers on this team was originally quick,

the entry was much slower due Officer Garrison’s encounter with

Plaintiff. (DSUF, No. 153)

After the home was secured, Officer Garrison returned to the

living room area, which was the first time he realized Plaintiff

was an elderly female. (DSUF, No. 154) Officer Garrison

inquired as to whether Plaintiff was okay and offered to call her

an ambulance, but she refused. (DSUF, No. 155)

He asked her for her name, but she was uncooperative and

verbally abusive towards him. Officer Garrison did not want to

aggravate the tension Plaintiff was already exhibiting, so, he

limited his contact with her. (DSUF, No. 156) Officer Garrison

as well as all the officers on this team deny that Officer

Garrison ever threatened to shoot Plaintiff. (DSUF, No. 216)

4. Deputy Perez

Deputy Perez remained outside of the residence securing the

perimeter where he remained throughout the entire duration of the

search. (DSUF, No. 159) Deputy Perez looked for threats and/or

suspects who may have tried to flee the area. (DSUF, No. 160) 

At no time during the duration of the search did Deputy Perez

ever enter Plaintiff’s residence. (DSUF, No. 161) At no time

during the search did Deputy Perez ever make any contact,

physical or verbal, with the Plaintiff. (DSUF, No. 162)

5. Deputy Simonson

Deputy Simonson remained outside of the residence securing

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the perimeter until the entry team was done securing the interior

of the residence. (DSUF, No. 163) Deputy Simonson then went

inside the residence to assist in documenting evidence seized on

an inventory log. (DSUF, No. 164) At no time while inside the

residence did Deputy Simonson ever make any physical or verbal

contact with the Plaintiff. (DSUF, No. 165) He was not present

during the initial entry and did not observe the physical contact

between Plaintiff and Officer Garrison. (DSUF, No. 166)

6. Deputy Capriola

Deputy Capriola was the third officer who entered

Plaintiff’s residence, behind Officer Higgins, who was behind

Officer Garrison. (DSUF, No. 167) Usually, the entry into a

residence is very rapid, however, on this particular day, it was

slower. (DSUF, No. 168) Deputy Capriola’s immediate thought

was, “this isn’t good...this is going too slow” because the

officers were not entering into the house as fast they should

have. (DSUF, No. 169)

Deputy Capriola looked beyond the physical contact into the

dark living room and beyond Officer Garrison to see if there were

any other threats ahead. (DSUF, No. 172) Deputy Capriola was

very concerned because Officer Garrison got hung up just inside

the doorway, causing Officer Higgins to stall in the door frame,

thereby causing Deputy Capriola to stall just outside the

doorway. (DSUF, No. 173) In this position, there was no cover

or concealment for any of the officers who were in that doorway. 

(DSUF, No. 174)

Once inside the door, Deputy Capriola observed Plaintiff

laying partially on the ground and halfway on a chair that was

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situated a foot or two on the right, inside the door. (DSUF, No.

175) Plaintiff’s legs were sticking out partially in the doorway

but Deputy Capriola did not see how it was she landed in that

position. (DSUF, No. 176) Deputy Capriola stepped over

Plaintiff’s feet and went left into the kitchen to secure that

area. (DSUF, No. 177) After the house was determined to be

secured, he walked over to the Plaintiff and assisted Sergeant

Barrimond in helping Plaintiff to a couch. (DSUF, No. 178) 

Deputy Capriola had no further contact or communication with

Plaintiff. (DSUF, No. 179)

7. Deputy Hollins

Deputy Hollins was one of the last officers to enter

Plaintiff’s residence because he was assigned to the breaching

device that is used to force entry when necessary. (DSUF, No.

180) The breaching device requires two hands to carry so he did

not have a firearm in hand. (DSUF, No. 181) The knock and

notice took much longer than any other search warrant he had ever

been on. (DSUF, No. 182) Deputy Hollins, who stands six feet,

four inches tall, was able to see over the officers in front of

him. (DSUF, No. 183)

As the officer made their way into the residence, Deputy

Hollins caught a glimpse of Plaintiff falling near a chair that

was by the front door. (DSUF, No. 184) Deputy Hollins did not

see how she fell or what caused her to fall. (DSUF, No. 185)

After securing the residence but prior to conducting the

search, Deputy Hollins photographed the residence. He also

photographed the items and locations from where they were seized. 

(DSUF, No. 186) He had no physical or verbal contact with the

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Plaintiff the entire duration of the search. (DSUF, No. 187)

8. Sergeant Barrimond

Sergeant Barrimond was the supervisor for the Rural Tactical

Team. (DSUF, No. 188) Sergeant Barrimond’s responsibilities as

Supervisor were to make the assignments and to ensure that his

team executed the search warrant in a lawful, efficient and safe

manner. (DSUF, No. 189) Prior to embarking to the Plaintiff’s

residence, Sergeant Barrimond obtained, reviewed and familiarized

himself with a copy of the entire Search Warrant Affidavit and

attachments because he wanted to be comfortable with it since his

team did not write the Search Warrant. (DSUF, No. 190)

When the team arrived to Plaintiff’s residence, Sergeant

Barrimond got in position about the fourth or fifth officer in

the entry stick. (DSUF, No. 191) Officer Garrison continued to

knock without anyone from within the residence opening the door.

(DSUF, No. 193) The team waited a long enough period of time

before receiving a response from within the residence, that

Sergeant Barrimond almost ordered the team to force entry by

using the breaching device. (DSUF, No. 194)

During the knocking he heard a voice from within the home. 

Finally the occupant of the home unlocked the door at which point

Sergeant Barrimond gave the command, “let’s go”. (DSUF, No.

195) Sergeant Barrimond was concerned about the officers being

in the “funnel of death” because they did not know whether there

was anyone within the residence who had weapons. (DSUF, No. 196) 

The officers had a disadvantage because the sunlight was behind

them, so they were backlit and the interior of Plaintiff’s

residence was somewhat dark. (DSUF, No. 197)

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After making entry, Sergeant Barrimond’S eyes had to

acclimate to the dimness of the house. (DSUF, No. 198) After

the residence was secured, Sergeant Barrimond focused his

attention on Plaintiff who was leaning on a chair, and the

children who were on the couch in the living room. (DSUF, No.

199)

Sergeant Barrimond helped Plaintiff get seated on a chair

and explained to her why the officers were there and the purpose

of their search. (DSUF, No. 200) He advised her that the

officers were looking for guns and gang-related items pursuant to

a search warrant. (DSUF, No. 201) Sergeant Barrimond then began

talking to the children and tried to calm them down by making

funny faces and small talk to try and make them comfortable. 

(DSUF, No. 202) He asked Plaintiff if the kids needed to be

changed, fed or taken care of in any way. (DSUF, No. 203)

Officer Garrison explained to Sergeant Barrimond that when

he went in through the door, someone grabbed for his gun arm, so

he pushed them away. (DSUF, No. 204) Sergeant Barrimond

understood that in the heat of the moment, the normal reflex for

a person who is concerned for the safety of children in her

residence, is to challenge a person coming into the residence

with a gun, which would include grabbing at that person. (DSUF,

No. 205)

Officers have discretion as to how to evaluate a tactical

situation. Plaintiff was not arrested or cited for her offense,

nor was she ever patted down, searched, placed in handcuffs or

restrained in any other way. In fact, she was allowed to use the

telephone to receive and make phone calls. (DSUF, No. 206)

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Sergeant Barrimond asked Plaintiff if she was okay and

whether or not she would like an ambulance called. (DSUF, No.

195) Plaintiff complained of hip pain but refused the offer to

have an ambulance called. (DSUF, No. 207) Nevertheless, Sergeant

Barrimond directed Officer Garrison to call an ambulance because

he wanted to make sure she was okay. When the paramedics

arrived, Plaintiff refused treatment by them. (DSUF, No. 208) 

After the search, Sergeant Barrimond ensured that all his

officers had their equipment and materials before leaving

Plaintiff’s residence. (DSUF, No. 209) At some point after the

search, Sergeant Barrimond contacted Detective Yee to advise him

that suspect Darryl Hilliard was not at Plaintiff’s location. 

(DSUF, No. 211) Detective Yee responded that Darryl Hilliard was

apprehended at another location and was in custody. (DSUF, No.

212)

9. Oversight and Training of Fresno Police Officers

Officer Yee and Garrison are obligated to comply with the

ongoing training requirements of the Department. (DSUF, No. 228)

C. Disputed Facts

1. Facts Relevant to Obtaining the Search Warrant

Freeman disputes the fact that Detective Yee received

credible information from reliable sources, including

confidential informants, and continued to monitor the information

provided to him from those informants. (DSUF, No. 4). Freeman

also disputes that the twenty-four page statement of probable

cause in support of the Search Warrant accurately described the

one and a half year investigation arising out of the gang related

shootings in Fresno and other criminal acts committed by members

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 Officers Eddie and Cardinelli are not parties to this 5

dispute. 

23

of the West Side Strother Boys and Garrett Street gangs. (DSUF,

No. 6)

Freeman argues that Detective Yee’s affidavit lacked

adequate foundation for the reliability of any of the

confidential and/or anonymous sources. (PSDF, No. 1) Freeman

also argues that Detective Yee lacked personal corroboration

information regarding the confidential/anonymous sources which

had been deemed “reliable by Officers other than Detective Yee. 

i. Detective Yee’s Use of Confidential Informants and

Witnesses in His Affidavit

Detective Yee failed to do anything to personally assess the

credibility of Confidential Informant #1. (PSDF, No. 3) Freeman

also argues that Detective Yee did not affirmatively establish

the following:

1. whether both officers Eddy and Cardinelli utilized 5

Confidential Informant #1. (PSDF, No. 4) 

2. whether said officers vouched for the reliability of

Confidential Informant #1. (PSDF, No. 5)

3. the particular factors upon which said Officers based their

opinions as to the reliability of Confidential Informant #1. 

(PSDF, No. 6)

Freeman also argues that during his deposition, Detective

Yee could not remember who the witnesses were who he listed on

page 13 of his affidavit. (PSDF, No. 7) Yee did not author

reports concerning the page 13 witnesses and could not

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affirmatively establish the existence of written reports. (PSDF,

No. 8) Yee also never spoke to the page 13 witnesses or

determined the reliability of page 13 witnesses. (PSDF, No. 9 -

10)

Detective Yee did not speak to any of the witness listed on

page 15, lines 3-11, of his Affidavit. (PSDF, No. 11) Further,

Detective Yee determined the reliability of the anonymous caller

on page 15 of his affidavit by traveling to the Cooley Plaza

Apartments and determining that Antoinette Hilliard’s vehicle was

parked at said location. (PSDF, No. 12)

Detective Yee did not write a report concerning said page 15

anonymous caller. (PSDF, No. 13) Detective Yee did not know the

identity of the page 15 anonymous caller. (PSDF, No. 14) 

Detective Yee did not take any steps to independently corroborate

the trustworthiness of the witness listed in his search warrant

affidavit at page 15. (PSDF, No. 15) 

Detective Yee’s search warrant affidavit at page 16, relies

upon an anonymous source, who Detective Yee did not speak to, nor

did he write a report concerning this anonymous source’s

information. (PSDF, No. 19) Detective Yee did not corroborate

the accuracy of the page 16 anonymous source’s information. 

(PSDF, No. 20)

Detective Yee did not know the identity of the confidential

informant #2 listed on page 16, line 330 of his affidavit. (PSDF,

No. 21) Detective Yee did not “handle” Confidential Informant

#2. (PSDF, No. 22) Detective Yee did not know which officer

handled Confidential Informant #2. (PSDF, No. 23) Detective Yee

did not know who determined that confidential informant #2 was

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trustworthy. (PSDF, No. 24) Detective Yee surmised that since

the information turned out to be true that confidential informant

#2 would be deemed trustworthy. (PSDF, No. 25)

Detective Yee knew the identity of the confidential

informant #3 listed on page 17 line 357 of his affidavit. (PSDF,

No. 26) Detective Yee did not handle confidential informant #3,

prior to authorizing the search warrant affidavit. (PSDF, No. 27) 

Detective Yee determined that confidential informant #3's

trustworthiness and reliability were established based upon what

other detectives told him. (PSDF, No. 28) Detective Yee did not

know “specifically” how confidential informant #3 was deemed

reliable by those other officers. (PSDF, No. 29) Detective Yee

indicated that confidential informant #3 had not been paid for

any information contained in the search warrant affidavit. (PSDF,

No. 30)

Detective Yee indicated that confidential informant #3 had

been paid in the past by other detectives. (PSDF, No. 31)

Detective Yee stated that the services of confidential informants

were utilized in coming to the conclusion that Darryl Hilliard

had committed assault with a deadly weapon. (PSDF, No. 34)

Detective Yee indicates that the reliability of the

informants is contained within the “sealed” Hobbs portion of the

search warrant affidavit. (PSDF, No. 35) Detective Yee did not

include his allegation that D. Hilliard went into Freeman’s

house, within his search warrant affidavit. (PSDF, No. 36) 

ii. Monique Thomas

Detective Yee admitted that he did not take Monique Thomas’s

complaint and that he knew that Detective Andreas and Torres were

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unable to corroborate her information. (PSDF, No. 16 and No. 53)

Detective Yee knew that there were inconsistencies in Monique

Thomas’ statements and further knew that Detective Andrews’ and

Torres’ were unable to corroborate her information. (PSDF, No.

17)

Detective Yee knew that Mr. Green, another potential victim

in the alleged attempted shooting of Monique Thomas, gave a

different account of said alleged shooting, inconsistent with Ms.

Thomas’s account. (PSDF, No. 18)

2. Detective Yee’s Investigation 

i. History of the Investigation

Freeman does not dispute most of the facts in the record

regarding the extensive incidents of violence between Strother

Boys and Garret Street gangs. However Freeman disputes

Defendants contention that on February 13, 2003 Monique Thomas

(“Thomas”), the girlfriend of Garrett Street gang member Monette

Solomon, was allegedly shot near Martin Luther King Jr. Boulevard

and Florence Avenues. (DSUF, No. 18) Freeman disputes the fact

that Thomas was the passenger in a vehicle driven by Robin Green

when they were shot at by Strother Boys gang members Daniel Pena

and Darryl Hilliard. (Id.) Freeman also disputes that Thomas

related that Pena leaned out of the passenger's side of

Hilliard's light blue Ford Mustang that had pulled alongside of

her, that Pena started shooting at them with an assault-type

rifle, striking the vehicle in which she was traveling in, and

that Thomas recognized Pena and Hilliard on sight. (Id.) 

///

///

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ii. Detective Yee’s Conclusions of the Investigation -

Confidential Facts

Freeman disputes that Detective Yee’s Affidavit was also

supported by a “Confidential Attachment” which set forth

additional information he considered in making his determination

that there was probable cause to request the issuance of the

Search Warrant. (DSUF, No. 52) Freeman also disputes that the

information within the “Confidential Attachment” was provided to

Detective Yee by confidential informant(s) and could not be

included in the Affidavit. (DSUF, No. 53) 

Detective Yee confirmed that Darryl Hilliard was only

charged for Health and Safety Code 11351.5, Possession of

Marijuana for Sale, and committing a crime while out on bail. 

(PSDF, No. 32) According to Freeman, Detective Yee stated there

was no probable cause to believe Darryl Hilliard had committed

murder, attempted murder, or conspiracy to commit murder. (PSDF,

No. 33.) 

iii. Facts Regarding Detective Yee’s Request for a

Search Warrant

Freeman disputes the following facts set forth in

Defendants’ statement of undisputed facts: 

1. That Detective Yee requested a search warrant for

ten (10) residences in Fresno County of suspects

or affiliates who, based upon his investigation,

he believed were in possession of weapons and

gang indicia that had been used in the gang

related shootings he was investigating. (DSUF,

No. 56) 

2. that surveillance conducted of Darryl Hilliard,

determined an association between him and these

ten residences. (DSUF, No. 57) that Yee also

believed there was a strong possibility that said

property was located at the locations set forth in

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Attachment “A” to the Affidavit. (DSUF, No. 61) 

3. that the Search Warrant was considered a “high

risk” Search Warrant because it involved the

search for numerous weapons, mostly firearms and

gang indicia, suspected to have been used in

numerous gang-related shootings between rival

criminal street gangs; and which were believed to

be located at those residences associated with

gang members. (DSUF, No. 62)

4. that all of the information Detective Yee

presented to Judge Jones was accurate and truthful

and at no time did he mislead or make any

misrepresentations to him. (DSUF, No. 65)

5. that Detective Yee had a good faith belief that

there was sufficient probable cause to justify the

issuance of the Search Warrant for the search of

the ten residences. (DSUF, NO. 66)

6. that Yee also had a good faith belief that the

warrant was not overbroad.

7. that Detective Yee had no reason to believe that

the warrant was unlawful or otherwise invalid in

any respect and signed it under penalty of

perjury. (DSUF, NO. 67)

8. that Detective Yee disclosed to Judge Jones

information pertaining to the reliability of the

confidential informant(s). (DSUF, NO. 68)

iv. Disputed Facts Relating to Freeman’s Residence and

It’s Proximity to Gang Activity

Freeman disputes Defendants contention that her

granddaughter, Shatera Dillingham, had lived with her for a

significant period of time before the search. (DSUF, No. 87)

Freeman also disputes that Ms. Dillingham was the girlfriend of

suspect, Darryl Hilliard and the mother of his child; and

Plaintiff provided care and babysitting for Darryl Hilliard’s

child on a daily basis. It is also disputed that on the day of

the search, Ms. Dillingham drove by her grandmother’s home, saw

law enforcement officers there, but did not stop, instead, kept

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driving because she got nervous. (DSUF, No. 88)

Freeman further disputes the following: 

1. Shatera Dillingham was observed with Darryl

Hilliard more than half the time he was under

surveillance. (DSUF, No. 90)

2. During this surveillance, Hilliard was observed

being dropped off at the Plaintiff’s residence by

his mother, and seen walking to her front door. 

(DSUF, No. 91)

3. Detectives no longer saw Hilliard and determined

he went inside Plaintiff’s residence. (DSUF, No.

94)

4. His girlfriend, Shatera Dillingham, was driving

Plaintiff’s vehicle. (DSUF, No. 96)

5. Hilliard exited his mother’s residence and got

into Plaintiff’s vehicle with his girlfriend,

Shatera Dillingham, driving. (DSUF, No. 100)

6. Darryl Hillard later left his mother’s residence

as a passenger in Plaintiff’s car. (DSUF, No.

102)

7. Later that same day, Hilliard was driven in

Plaintiff’s car to a residence on Tuolomne street. 

(DSUF, No. 103)

8. On February 2, 2004 at approximately 4:28 p.m.,

Hilliard was driven to the Plaintiff’s residence,

where he exited the vehicle and walked inside the

house and remained there briefly. (DSUF, No. 104)

9. Detective Yee determined that it was likely that

Darryl Hilliard possessed weapons used in the

rival gang shootings and other criminal indicia. 

Hilliard could have circulated them among his

fellow gang members including his girlfriend,

Shatera Dillingham. (DSUF, No. 107) 

10. Plaintiff’s home had been searched on at least

three occasions prior to this incident. (DSUF,

No. 246)

According to Freeman, Shatera Dillingham was no longer the

girlfriend of Darryl Hilliard on February 2, 2004. (PSDF, No. 54)

///

///

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3. Facts Relevant to the Service of the Search Warrant

i. Search of Freeman’s Residence 

Freeman disputes the following facts: 

1. The officers were unable to see through the locked

security door and could not tell whether or not

the interior door was opened. (DSUF, No. 129)

2. Officer Garrison knocked loudly on the door and

shouted words similar to, “Police Department,

Search Warrant, Open the door!” several times. 

(DSUF, No. 132)

3. Again, Officer Garrison shouted, “Police

Department, Search Warrant, Open the door!” 

(DSUF, No. 135)

4. Defendants served the Search Warrant lawfully,

professionally and ethically. (DSUF, No. 158)

5. All the officers understood that Darryl Hilliard

or any of his fellow gang members or affiliates

could be at Plaintiff’s residence and possibly

armed. (DSUF, No. 224)

6. Given the totality of the available information,

including two independent civilian witnesses,

Defendants’ Police Practices Expert, Joseph

Callanan agrees that these officers complied with

standard police procedures in their approach to

the Plaintiff’s residence and in their verbal

announcements attempting to identify themselves,

establish the reason for their presences, and

demand entry. From a law enforcement perspective,

the described police procedures fully comport with

professional training based on both federal and

state guidelines. (DSUF, No. 227)

On February 2, 2004, Shatera Dillingham was not a resident

of 139 W. Eden Ave. (PSDF, No. 50)

ii. Officer Garrison’s Entry

The following facts are also disputed: 

1. Within seconds and a foot or two within the front

doorway, Officer Garrison felt someone (Plaintiff)

grab his right arm, which was holding his gun. 

(DSUF, No. 143)

2. Officer Higgins, who was directly behind Officer

Garrison, and who was standing in the doorframe,

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saw Plaintiff grab Officer Garrison’s gun arm. 

(DSUF, No. 144)

3. Deputy Capriola, who was directly behind Officer

Higgins and who was just outside the doorframe,

also saw Plaintiff grab Officer Garrison’s gun

arm. (DSUF, No. 145) 

4. Upon feeling someone grab his arm, Officer

Garrison’s immediate reaction was to use his left

hand and push away the threat, which he perceived

to be someone attempting to disarm him. (DSUF,

No. 149)

5. As Officer Garrison pushed Plaintiff away from

him, she continued to grab onto his arm, thereby

causing the two to lose balance, entangle their

feet, and Plaintiff fell over the arm of a chair

then to the ground. (DSUF, No. 151)

6. Officer Garrison struggled with keeping his

balance but was able to stay on his feet and he

proceeded down the hall toward the back of the

house to clear the residence. (DSUF, No. 152)

7. At the moment Officer Garrison felt the physical

contact on his arm, he had no idea whether this

person was the suspect, a fellow gang member or an

innocent bystander. (DSUF, No. 225)

(a) Freeman’s Allegations

Freeman testified that the Officers did not knock on the

front door, but instead, she saw them through a window and went

to open the door. (DSUF, No. 213) According to Freeman after

Plaintiff was knocked onto the floor, Officer Garrison told her

to get up or he would shoot her. (DSUF, No. 214 - 215) 

Freeman denied having any dealings with gang members. 

(PSDF, No. 47) Further, Freeman was visibly upset. (PSDF, No.

48) According to Freeman upon entry Garrison shouted to

Freeman, “Get down on the ground or I’ll shoot you!” (PSDF, No.

51) As a direct result of the excessive force applied by the

Defendants, Freeman alleges that she suffered severe physical

and emotional injuries. (PSDF, No. 55) 

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iii. Deputy Capriola’s Entry

Freeman disputes that as Deputy Capriola stood just outside

the doorway, he saw a hand from his right peripheral vision,

reach out and grab Officer Garrison’s right, gun arm. (DSUF,

No. 170) Freeman also disputes that Deputy Capriola immediately

perceived this as a threat and thought this person was grabbing

for Officer Garrison’s handgun. (DSUF, No. 171)

iv. Sergeant Barrimond

Freeman disputes the following facts: 

1. When Sergeant Barrimond reached Plaintiff’s front

door, he positioned himself underneath the front

window and waited while Officer Garrison knocked

loudly on the metal, security door and gave the

appropriate notice. (DSUF, No. 192)

2. Barrimond indicated hearing a female voice from

inside 139 W. Eden when they started knocking. 

(PSDF, No. 37)

3. Barrimond recalled the voice as saying either

“I’m coming” or “who is it?” (PSDF, No. 38)

4. Barrimond noted that the team had a ram and a

pick to force entry if necessary. (PSDF, No. 39)

5. Barrimond gave the command “let’s go” as soon as

he saw Ms. Freeman’s door knob turn. (PSDF, No.

40)

6. Barrimond lost sight of the first member of the

entry team for seconds. (PSDF, No. 41)

7. Barrimond confirmed that all members of the entry

team had their weapons drawn upon entry. (PSDF,

No. 42)

8. Right after the point of entry, Barrimond did not

notice Freeman and he didn’t really pay attention

to her. (PSDF, No. 43)

9. Upon entry, Barrimond saw and heard little

children crying. (PSDF, No. 44)

10. Barrimond entered the house yelling at people to

get down on the ground. (PSDF, No. 45)

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11. Barrimond was unable to see Freeman upon first

entry. (PSDF, No. 49)

4. Oversight and Training of Fresno Police Officers

Freeman disputes the following with respect to the

oversight and training of police officers: 

1. Officers employed with the Fresno Police

Department are given training over and above that

required by POST, (Peace Officer Standards and

Training) the commission which regulates training

for law enforcement officers in California. 

(DSUF, No. 229)

2. The Fresno Police Department had training units

that ensured that the officers employed by the

Department received training in compliance with

POST. (DSUF, No. 230)

3. The training provided to officers employed by the

Department meets or exceeds POST guidelines. 

(DSUF, No. 231)

4. Prior to February 19, 2004, the Fresno Police

Department provided training to all their

officers including those assigned to the

M.A.G.E.C. Unit receive training on topics,

including but not limited to: (1) the appropriate

means and manner of conducting a search and

seizure, in light of the totality of the

circumstances faced by the officers; (2) proper

use of force; (3) proper investigation and

acquisition of search warrants. (DSUF, No. 232)

5. New police officer recruits are required go

through a field training program and are required

to complete 24 hours of POST training every 24

months. They also undergo a rigorous sixteen

week training program which includes training on

the appropriate use of force, including lethal

force. (DSUF, No. 233)

6. Officers are also provided training in the use of

force, including lectures and scenario-based

performances. The Fresno Police Department’s

policy regarding the use of force is part of the

instruction given in any class in which the use

of force is reviewed. (DSUF, No. 234)

7. Plaintiff’s retained police procedural matters

expert, Roger Clark, has expressed his opinion in

this case, the training provided by Fresno Police

Department to its police officers is consistent

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with POST mandates. (DSUF, No. 235)

8. At all times relevant to this lawsuit, it has

been the policy of the Fresno Police Department

to conduct thorough internal investigations into

allegations of misconduct by employees of the

Department. (DSUF, No. 238)

9. It has also been the policy of the Fresno Police

Department to take sufficient corrective action

to prevent their employees from committing

constitutional violations, or any violations of

state or federal law. (DSUF, No. 239)

10. At no time relevant to this lawsuit has the

Fresno Police Department had any policies,

practices or customs of the following: (1)

tolerating the use of excessive or unjustified

force; (2) allowing constitutional violations by

encouraging unlawful police activity, withholding

or concealing material information from a search

warrant; (3) performing pretextual investigations

that vindicate and ratify an officer’s

misconduct; (4) taking insufficient corrective

actions to prevent alleged patterns of

constitutional violations from continuing; (5)

delegation of obligations to manage, supervise,

train and control officers; and/or (6) avoiding

proper public oversight of the actions of

officers. (DSUF, No. 240)

11. The hiring process for new recruits with the

Fresno Police Department includes, among other

matters, obtaining a background check and a

psychological evaluation of the applicant prior

to hiring. The applicant’s propensity toward

untruthfulness is tested and used as a basis of

exclusion of potential applicants. (DSUF, No.

241)

12. New recruits are required to undergo a rigorous

sixteen week training program which includes

training on the appropriate use of force. (DSUF,

No. 242)

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is warranted only “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

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genuine issue as to any material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56©;

California v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Therefore, to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must show (1) that a genuine factual issue exists

and (2) that this factual issue is material. Id. A genuine

issue of fact exists when the non-moving party produces evidence

on which a reasonable trier of fact could find in its favor

viewing the record as a whole in light of the evidentiary burden

the law places on that party. See Triton Energy Corp. v. Square

D Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252-56 (1986). Facts are

“material” if they “might affect the outcome of the suit under

the governing law.” Campbell, 138 F.3d at 782 (quoting

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). 

The nonmoving party cannot simply rest on its allegations

without any significant probative evidence tending to support

the complaint. Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th

Cir. 2001).

[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the

entry of summary judgment, after adequate time

for discovery and upon motion, against a party

who fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential

to the party's case, and on which that party

will bear the burden of proof at trial. In

such a situation, there can be “no genuine

issue as to any material fact,” since a

complete failure of proof concerning an

essential element of the nonmoving party’s case

necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrell, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The more

implausible the claim or defense asserted by the nonmoving

party, the more persuasive its evidence must be to avoid summary

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judgment. See United States ex rel. Anderson v. N. Telecom,

Inc., 52 F.3d 810, 815 (9th Cir. 1996). Nevertheless, the

evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. A court’s role on

summary judgment is not to weigh evidence or resolve issues;

rather, it is to determine whether there is a genuine issue for

trial. See Abdul-Jabbar v. G.M. Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 410 (9th

Cir. 1996).

B. Summary Judgment in a Qualified Immunity Case

In this case, Defendants assert the defense of qualified

immunity on behalf of all the individual defendants. Deciding

qualified immunity entails a two-step analysis. First, a court

must ask whether a constitutional violation occurred at all. If

the answer to this question is yes, the court must then inquire

whether the right violated was “clearly established” by asking

whether a reasonable officer could believe that the defendant’s

actions were lawful. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201

(2001). 

The traditional summary judgment approach should be used in

analyzing the first step of the Saucier analysis: 

A court required to rule upon the qualified immunity

issue must consider, then, this threshold question:

Taken in the light most favorable to the party

asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the

officer's conduct violated a constitutional right?

Where the facts are disputed, their resolution and

determinations of credibility are manifestly the

province of a jury.

Wall v. County of Orange, 364 F.3d 1107, 1110-1111 (9th Cir.

2004) (internal citations and quotations omitted). In the

second step, the court must ask whether it would be clear to a

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reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the

situation confronted. Although this inquiry is primarily a

legal one, where the reasonableness of the officer’s belief that

his conduct was lawful “depends on the resolution of disputed

issues of fact...summary judgment is not appropriate.” Wilkins

v. City of Oakland, 364 F.3d 949, 1110-11 (9th. Cir. 2003)

(citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 216 (Ginsburg J., concurring)). 

C. Civil Rights Claims Under 42 U.S.C. section 1983

“Section 1983 provides for liability against any person

acting under color of law who deprives another ‘of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’

of the United States.” S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana,

336 F.3d 885, 887 (9th Cir. 2003)(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 

“The rights guaranteed by section 1983 are ‘liberally and

beneficently construed.’” Id. (quoting Dennis v. Higgins, 498

U.S. 439, 443 (1991). Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff

may bring a civil action for deprivation of rights under the

following circumstances: 

Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State

or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United

States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof

to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall

be liable to the party injured in an action at law,

suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for

redress, except that in any action brought against a

judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such

officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall

not be granted unless a declaratory decree was

violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For

the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress

applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia

shall be considered to be a statute of the District of

Columbia. 

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 Although Monell dealt with a municipal government’s 6

liability under § 1983, the standard there announced was

more broadly framed in terms of “a local government.” Brass

v. County of L.A., 328 F.3d 1192, 1198 (9th Cir. 2003). 

 “There is certainly no constitutional impediment to 7

municipal liability. ‘The Tenth Amendment’s reservation of

nondelegated powers to the States is not implicated by a

federal-court judgment enforcing the express prohibitions of

unlawful state conduct enacted by the Fourteenth

Amendment.’” Monell, 436 U.S. 691 (quoting Milliken v.

Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 291 (1977)). There is no “basis for

concluding that the Eleventh Amendment is a bar to municipal

liability.” Id. (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S.

445, 456 (1976); Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530

(1890)).

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D. Fourth Amendment 

Under the Fourth Amendment the right of the people to be

secure in their persons, houses, and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. U.S.

Const. amend. IV.; Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F. 3d 1113,

1152 (9th Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court has held that “in the

ordinary case, seizures of personal property are unreasonable

within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, without more, unless

accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant issued by a neutral

and detached magistrate after finding probable cause. Id. 

However, when faced with special law enforcement needs, the

Supreme Court has found that certain general, or individual,

circumstances may render a warrantless search or seizure

reasonable. Id. 

E. The Monell Doctrine

Local governments are “persons” subject to suit for 6

“constitutional tort[s]” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Haugen v. 7

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8 In Brass v. County of Los Angeles, the Ninth Circuit

followed evolution of municipal liability from Monroe to

Monell: 

In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 [](1961), the

Supreme Court held that municipal corporations

were not subject to liability under § 1983. In

Monell, 436 U.S. at 665, the Court, based upon

its “fresh” review of the legislative history of

the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (the statutory

predecessor to § 1983), “overrule[d] Monroe v.

Pape...insofar as it holds that local

governments are wholly immune from suit under §

1983.” Id. at 663 (footnote omitted). The

39

Brosseau, 339 F.3d 857, 874 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Monell v.

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 n.55 (1978)) (also

finding the fact that “local governments can be sued under § 1983

necessarily decides that local government officials sued in their

official capacities are “persons” under § 1983 in those cases in

which, as here, a local government would be suable in its own

name”). “[T]he legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of

1871 compels the conclusion that Congress did intend

municipalities and other local government units to be included

among those persons to whom § 1983 applies.” Id. at 690. “Local

governing bodies, therefore, can be sued directly under § 1983

for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where, as here,

the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or

executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision

officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers...[or

for] deprivations visited pursuant to governmental ‘custom’ even

though such a custom has not received formal approval through the

body’s official decision making channels.” Id. 690-91. 8

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Court, however, upheld Monroe “insofar as it

holds that the doctrine of respondeat superior

is not a basis for rendering municipalities

liable under § 1983 for the constitutional torts

of their employees.” Id. at 663 n.7. It stated

that “the language of § 1983, read against the

background of the same legislative history,

compels the conclusion that Congress did not

intend municipalities to be held liable unless

action pursuant to official municipal policy of

some nature caused a constitutional tort.” Id.

at 691.

328 F.3d at 1198. 

40

A local government’s liability is limited. Although a local

government can be held liable for its official policies or

customs, it will not be held liable for an employee’s actions

outside of the scope of these policies or customs. “[T]he

language of § 1983, read against the background of the same

legislative history, compels the conclusion that Congress did not

intend municipalities to be held liable unless action pursuant to

official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional

tort. In particular,...a municipality cannot be held liable

solely because it employs a tortfeasor, in other words, a

municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat

superior theory.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. The statute’s

“language plainly imposes liability on a government that, under

color of some official policy, [that] ‘causes’ an employee to

violate another’s constitutional rights.” Id. at 692. 

Therefore, “a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for

an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead,

it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether

made by its law-makers or by those whose edicts or acts may

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fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury

that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” 

Id. at 694.

F. Suits Against Government Officials: Official Capacity and

Individual Capacity Suits

“1983 claims against government officials in their official

capacities are really suits against the governmental employer

because the employer must pay any damages awarded.” Butler v.

Elle, 281 F.3d 1014, 1023 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Ky. v. Graham,

473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985)); see also Doe v. Lawrence Livermore

Nat’l Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that “a

suit against a state official in his official capacity is no

different from a suit against the [official’s office or the]

State itself”)(citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491

U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989). In such suits, the real party in interest

is the entity for which the official works. Hafer v. Melo, 502

U.S. 21, 25 (1991). A federal action for monetary damages

against an individual state official acting in his official

capacity is barred by the Eleventh Amendment in the same way that

an action against a State is barred. Doe v. Lawrence Livermore

Nat’l Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997). “As the Supreme

Court has stated, ‘official-capacity suits...generally represent

only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which

an officer is an agent.’” Ruvalcaba v. City of Los Angeles, 167

F.3d 514, 524 n.3 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Graham, 473 U.S. at

165). “‘As long as the government entity receives notice and an

opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all

respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the

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entity.’” Ruvalcaba, 167 F.3d at 524 n.3 (quoting Graham, 473

U.S. at 166.)

By contrast, “[p]ersonal-capacity suits seek to impose

personal liability upon a government official for actions [taken]

under color of state law.” Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020,

1027 (9th Cir. 1999)(citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165

(1985))(internal quotations omitted). To establish personal

liability in a §1983 or §1985 action, it is enough to show that

the official, “acting under color of state law, caused the

deprivation of a federal right.” Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25 (internal

quotations omitted). Public officials sued in their personal

capacity may assert personal liability defenses, such as

qualified immunity. Dittman, 191 F.3d at 1027. 

V. DISCUSSION

A. Federal Claims

1. Qualified Immunity of the Individual Defendant Officers

Defendants assert qualified immunity for the individual

officers in this case. Qualified immunity grows out of the

policy concern that few individuals would enter public service if

they risked personal liability for their official decisions. 

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982). The immunity

protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly

violate the law,” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991),

and "spare[s] a defendant not only unwarranted liability, but

unwarranted demands customarily imposed upon those defending a

long drawn out lawsuit.” Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232

(1991). Qualified immunity is not a defense on the merits; it is

an “entitlement not to stand trial or face the burdens of

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 Plaintiff offers a litany of facts that would support an 9

excessive force claim. However, Plaintiff has not asserted a

Fourth Amendment violation based on excessive force. Such facts

are still relevant to the reasonableness of executing the search

warrant. 

 In their motion papers the parties make arguments in 10

reference to alleged excessive use of force. However, Freeman

does not bring an excessive use of force claim. For the purposes

of this motion the inquiry as to the individual officers’ inquiry

is limited to their actions in reliance on the executed search

warrant. 

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litigation” that may be overcome only by a showing that (1) a

constitutional right was in fact violated and (2) no reasonable

officer could believe defendant’s actions were lawful in the

context of fact-specific, analogous precedents. Saucier v. Katz,

533 U.S. 194, 200-202 (2001). 

Here, Freeman alleges that Defendant Officers violated her

Fourth Amendment right based on an allegedly unreasonable search

and seizure of her home. Freeman claims the search and seizure

was illegal because (1) Detective Yee’s affidavit in support of

the warrant contained material misrepresentations and failed to

establish probable cause and (2) Defendants Garrison, Capriola,

Barrimond, Hollins, Perez, and Simons “acted unreasonably” and

with excessive force in their conduct in executing said warrant 9

and detaining plaintiff. Because it is undisputed that 10

Detective Yee was not present during the execution of the search

warrant, Freeman’s claims require a different qualified immunity

inquiry for Detective Yee than the remaining Defendant Officers.

i. Detective Yee

Freeman can only survive summary judgment on a Yee’s defense

of qualified immunity if she can establish both (1) a substantial

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showing of a deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard by Yee

and (2) that but for the dishonestly included or omitted

information, the magistrate would not have issued the warrant. 

Butler v. Elle, 281 F.3d 1014, (9th Cir. 2002); Hervey v. Estes,

65 F. 3d 784, 789 (9th Cir. 1995) Put another way, Freeman must

establish that the remaining information in the affidavit is

insufficient to establish probable cause. Hervey, 65 F. 3d at

789.

(a) Freeman Fails to Show a Substantial Showing

by Yee’s of Deliberate Falsehood or Reckless

Disregard 

If an officer submitted an affidavit that contained

statements he knew to be false or would have know to be false had

he not recklessly disregarded the truth, he cannot be said to

have acted in an objectively reasonable manner. Butler v. Elle,

281 F.3d 1014, 1024 (9th Cir. 2002.) 

Plaintiff argues that Yee had knowledge his affidavit

contained false statements. According to Plaintiff, Yee did not

take Monique Thomas’ complaint and he knew that Detective Andreas

and Torres were unable to corroborate her information. (PSUF,

No. 53) Plaintiff argues that Yee knew that there were

inconsistencies in Monique Thomas’ statement. However, Plaintiff

fails to establish how failure to corroborate witness testimony

makes such testimony false or establishes Yee’s deliberate

falsehood. 

In support of her arguments, Freeman disputes the fact that

Detective Yee received credible information from reliable

sources, including confidential informants, and continued to

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monitor the information provided to him from those informants. 

(DSUF, No. 4). Freeman also disputes that the twenty-four page

statement of probable cause in support of the Search Warrant

accurately described the one and a half year investigation

arising out of the gang related shootings in Fresno and other

criminal acts committed by members of the West Side Strother Boys

and Garrett Street gangs. (DSUF, No. 6)

Freeman argues that Detective Yee’s affidavit lacked

adequate foundation for the reliability of any of the

confidential and/or anonymous sources. (PSDF, No. 1) Freeman

also argues that Detective Yee lacked personal corroboration

information regarding the confidential/anonymous sources which

had been deemed “reliable” by Officers other than Detective Yee. 

Freeman offers no support in the form of affidavits,

exhibits, or any other information or evidence to show that Yee

did not receive credible information from reliable sources,

including confidential informants or that his declaration was not

made in good faith. Freeman disputes the accuracy of Yee’s

affidavit by arguing that: 

1. Yee did not ensure the reliability of several

confidential informants he used to gather his

information 

2. Yee did not know or speak to several of the

confidential informants to determine the accuracy

of the information they provided

3. There is no way of telling the reliability of

these informants because that information is

contained in the sealed portion of the affidavits 

4. Detective Yee did not take Monique Thomas’

complaint and knew that Detective Andreas and

Detective Torres were unable to corroborate her

information 

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Freeman further argues that, based on his investigation,

Detective Yee was not reasonable in concluding the following: 

1. That the ten residences searched were in

possession of weapons and gang indicia that had

been used in the gang related shootings he was

investigating. 

2. That surveillance conducted of Darryl Hilliard

determined an association between him and the ten

residences. 

3. That there was a strong possibility that evidence

of gang membership, firearms and ammunition would

be found at these homes. 

4. That the search warrant should be a “high risk”

warrant because it involved the search for

weapons, mostly firearms and gang indicia

5. That he had a good faith belief that there was

sufficient probable cause to justify the issuance

of the warrant, that the warrant was not

overbroad, that the warrant was lawful, and that

the informants used were reliable. 

However, Freeman does not dispute that Yee knew that at the

time the warrant was sought, a long history of violence existed

between the Strother Boys and the Garret Street gangs and that

these incidents were described in Yee’s affidavit. Plaintiff

admits that her residence is located in an area well known for

criminal street gang activity and violence where most of the

gang-related shootings in the southwest occur. Freeman also

admits that Hilliard’s mother dropped off Hilliard at her

residence and drove away without him. Further, later that same

day, after a court appearance at the Fresno County Courthouse,

Hilliard was observed getting into Freeman’s automobile. While

Freeman disputes that her granddaughter, Shatera Dillingham lived

with her for a significant period of time and that Shatera was

still Hilliard’s girlfriend at this point. Plaintiff does not

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dispute that Dillingham drove Hilliard to his mother’s house at

high speeds making quick turning movements as Hilliard leaned

down in the front passenger seat to conceal himself. Plaintiff

does not dispute that Hilliard was a suspected gang member.

Further, on February 2, 2004, after attending court Hilliard

was observed driving Freeman’s vehicle to various locations,

where he made contact with several Strother Boy gang affiliates. 

Freeman admits that Hilliard’s behavior while driving her car was

consistent with that counter-surveillance activities of a person

involved in dealing drugs. Further Freeman also does not dispute

that it is common practice for gang members to keep their

weaponry, stolen property, and other evidence of their crime

involvement at their homes or “safe houses.” Freeman does not

dispute that a gang member will attempt to evade detection by the

police by moving their property among associates, members, and

girlfriends within their own gang. 

Viewing the facts in dispute in Freeman’s favor, the

undisputed facts do not show that Yee’s affidavit was based on

deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard, because Yee had

extensive knowledge of local West Fresno gang members and that

his conclusions came as the result of a one and a half year

investigation into gang violence between Strother Boys and Garret

Street Gangs. The undisputed facts also show and Plaintiff

cannot credibly deny that Hilliard is a violent gang member of

the West Side Strother Boys; Hilliard had numerous contacts with

Freeman’s granddaughter Shatera, rode in Freeman’s car; and was

in Freeman’s residence on more than one occasion prior to the

search. Further, Freeman’s objection to Yee’s reliance on

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confidential informants and witnesses in no way establishes that

Yee’s affidavit was based on falsehood and misrepresentation to

the court. 

(b) Even if Freeman’s Disputes As to the

Confidential Informants and Witnesses Are

Sufficient to Show Misrepresentations in the

Affidavit, Such Misrepresentations Are Not So

Material That the Warrant Would Not Have Been

Issued 

Even assuming arguendo the alleged failings in portions of

Yee’s declaration, it cannot be said that the search warrant

would not have been issued but for the alleged misrepresentations

by Yee obtained from reliance on confidential informants and

witnesses. Freeman does not dispute that Yee observed Hilliard,

a violent Strother Boy gang member was present in Plaintiff’s,

Hilliard’s, house, drove around in her car; and had a

relationship with Plaintiff’s grandaughter. Where a law

enforcement officer’s observations support a reasonable belief

that a parolee resides at a particular address, this provides a 

reasonable basis for a parole search. Motley v. Parks, 432 F.3d

1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 2005.) The undisputed facts show that

Detective Yee’s year and a half long investigation of the

Strother Boys and Garret Street gang and Hilliard’s involvement

as described, was fully sufficient to establish the requisite

probable cause for a search warrant. 

Plaintiff cannot deny Hilliard was a violent gang member and

convicted felon. On the basis of all the evidence known to Yee,

he had a duty to seek a search warrant to lawfully endeavor to

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locate the suspected weapon used in a gang shooting. Summary

judgment in favor of Defendant Yee is GRANTED.

ii. Defendant Officers’ Reliance on the Search Warrant

To establish a Fourth Amendment violation by Defendants

Garrison, Capriola, Barrimond, Hollins, Perez, and Simons Freeman

must show they (1) unreasonably relied on the search warrant to

conduct the search of her residence and, if so, (2) that no

reasonable officer, confronting the same circumstances and with

the same information, would have executed the warrant and made

their entry into Freeman’s home the same way. See Saucier, 533

U.S. at 202.

(a) Defendant Officers Were Not Unreasonable In

Relying on a Valid Search Warrant to Conduct

Their Search of Freeman’s Home 

A warrant must name the places to be searches and the items

to be seized with reasonable precision. United States v. Mann,

389 F.3d 869, 877 (9th Cir. 2004). While a search warrant must

describe items to be seized with particularity sufficient to

prevent a general, exploratory rummaging in a person’s

belongings, it need only be reasonably specific rather than

elaborately detailed. Id. 

It is undisputed that the ten residences were listed and

described with particularity in Attachment “A” to the Search

Warrant Affidavit. (DSUF, No. 58) The items to be seized

included evidence of gang membership, firearms and ammunition,

and were specifically listed in Attachment “B” to the Search

Warrant Affidavit. (DSUF, No. 59) Detective Yee had probable

cause to believe, and did believe, that the property described in

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Attachment “B” to the Affidavit was lawfully seizable pursuant to

California Penal Code Section 1524. (DSUF, No. 60)

It is also undisputed that on or about February 17, 2004,

Detective Yee took the Search Warrant Affidavit and Confidential

Attachment to the Honorable Judge Franklin P. Jones’ chambers in

the Fresno County Superior Court. (DSUF, No. 63) Detective Yee

believed that Judge Jones was a detached and neutral magistrate

at the time he presented the Search Warrant Affidavit to him. 

There is no evidence to the contrary. (DSUF, No. 64) Freeman

does not dispute that Judge Jones signed the Search Warrant after

thorough review on February 17, 2004 and authorized the search of

the ten residences. (DSUF, No. 69) Judge Jones ordered the

confidential portion of the Affidavit to be sealed, which was

kept in the custody of the Fresno County Superior Court. (DSUF,

No. 70) All the officers who participated in the service of this

Search Warrant understood that this was a “high risk” warrant due

to the nature of the underlying crimes being committed by the

suspect Darryl Hilliard that included homicide, gang-related

shootings, and other criminal activity. Freeman also does not

dispute that the officers also understood they were searching for

firearms, ammunition, gang indicia and other evidence of criminal

activity. (DSUF, No. 223) Plaintiff had the right to obtain the

confidential portion of the search warrant affidavit in discovery

in this case and apparently failed to do so. 

The search warrant in this case was not overbroad or

insufficiently particular. Officers in this case reasonably

relied on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral

magistrate. 

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(b) A Reasonable Officer Confronting the Same

Circumstances and With the Same Information

Would Have Executed the Search Warrant In the

Same Manner 

While Freeman does not bring an excessive force claim, she

argues that police conduct was unreasonable in executing the

warrant upon entry into her home when she was knocked on the

floor. 

(1) Undisputed Facts Regarding Officers’

Briefing 

It is undisputed that On the morning of February 19, 2004,

all officers who were to participate in serving the Search

Warrant, met at the M.A.G.E.C. headquarters for a briefing before

the search. (DSUF, No. 114) Members of this team consisted

primarily of Fresno County Sheriff Deputies, who included:

Defendants Ian Barrimond, John Capriola, Jason Hollins, Robert

Perez, and Andrew Simonson; as well as Fresno Police Officer

Robert Garrison. During the briefing, Detective Yee provided all

the officers with the following:

1. a background of his investigations 

2. a history of the ongoing gang-related shootings

3. the nature of the Search Warrant and information

regarding suspect Darryl Hilliard

4. a photograph of Darryl Hilliard

5. the locations to be searched

6. copies of the list of items authorized to be

searched for and seized 

7. and a copy of the Notice of Search Warrant that

each team was to serve on the occupants of the

residences

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Detective Yee cautioned the officers that they were serving

a “high risk” Search Warrant and to expect for Darryl Hilliard or

his fellow gang members and/or associates, to be at any of the

locations. He also cautioned that it was very likely that such

individuals would be armed.

(2) Search of Freeman’s Residence 

It is also undisputed that all the officers who participated

in the service of the Search Warrant understood that it was 

“high risk” due to the nature of the underlying crimes being

committed by the suspect Darryl Hilliard. These crimes included

homicide, gang related shootings, and other criminal activity. 

All the officers understood that Hilliard was a validated gang

member whose fellow gang members and associates were very

dangerous. Freeman does not dispute that the officers also

understood they were searching for firearms, ammunition, gang

indicia and other evidence of criminal activity. 

It is undisputed that Plaintiff’s front door is on a two

step elevation from the ground. The house has barred windows on

each side of the front door. (DSUF, No. 128) Officer Garrison

did not stand in front of the door but positioned himself

directly under the right front window on the ground level. 

(DSUF, No. 130) Officer Garrison had his department issued

handgun in his right hand, and used his left hand to bang on the

security door. (DSUF, No. 131) He checked and confirmed the

security door was locked. (DSUF, No. 133)

Plaintiff, who was inside the residence, did not immediately

open the door and the Officers on the stick were growing

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concerned that the team was taking too long to make entry. After

a lengthy period of time, the interior door finally opened. 

(DSUF, No. 134) Plaintiff, responded, “what do you want?” 

(DSUF, No. 136) Officer Garrison continued to tell Plaintiff to

open the door. (DSUF, No. 137) Plaintiff finally unlocked the

security door at which point Officer Garrison grabbed the door

handle and pulled the door open. (DSUF, No. 138) Officer

Garrison stepped onto the front step and made entry into the

home, he was telling Plaintiff to get down on the floor. (DSUF,

No. 139) Plaintiff was verbally abusive to Officer Garrison as

well as the Paramedics who arrived on scene. (DSUF, No. 243) 

There was no cover or concealment for any of the officers who

were in that doorway. (DSUF, No. 146) The doorway is known as

the “funnel of death”. This is due to the high likelihood of

officers being injured or killed in the doorway because of the

backlighting. Therefore it is necessary to get through the

doorway as quickly and safely as possible. This ensures the

safety of the officers and the subjects of the residence. (DSUF,

No. 148)

However, Freeman disputes the following facts related to the

entry to her residence: 

1. The officers were unable to see through the locked

security door and could not tell whether or not

the interior door was opened. (DSUF, No. 129) 

2. Officer Garrison knocked loudly on the door and

shouted words similar to, “Police Department,

Search Warrant, Open the door!” several times. 

(DSUF, No. 132)

3. Again, Officer Garrison shouted, “Police

Department, Search Warrant, Open the door!” 

(DSUF, No. 135)

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4. Defendants served the Search Warrant lawfully,

professionally and ethically. (DSUF, No. 158)

5. All the officers understood that Darryl Hilliard

or any of his fellow gang members or affiliates

could be at Plaintiff’s residence and possibly

armed. (DSUF, No. 224)

6. Given the totality of the available information,

including two independent civilian witnesses,

Defendants’ Police Practices Expert, Joseph

Callanan agrees that these officers complied with

standard police procedures in their approach to

the Plaintiff’s residence and in their verbal

announcements attempting to identify themselves,

establish the reason for their presences, and

demand entry. From a law enforcement perspective,

the described police procedures fully comport with

professional training based on both federal and

state guidelines. (DSUF, No. 227)

These disputes raise the issue whether the search warrant

was lawfully executed and whether Defendants’ handling of

Plaintiff effected an unlawful seizure under the Fourth

Amendment. 

(3) Sergeant Barrimond

It is undisputed that prior to embarking to the Plaintiff’s

residence, Sergeant Barrimond obtained, reviewed and familiarized

himself with a copy of the entire Search Warrant Affidavit and

attachments because he wanted to be comfortable with it since his

team did not write the Search Warrant. (DSUF, No. 190)

When the team arrived at Plaintiff’s residence, Sergeant

Barrimond got in position about the fourth or fifth officer in

the entry “stick.” (DSUF, No. 191) Officer Garrison continued

to knock, but no one from within the residence opened the door.

(DSUF, No. 193) The team waited a reasonable period of time

before receiving a response from within the residence, that

Sergeant Barrimond almost ordered the team to force entry by

using the breaching device. (DSUF, No. 194)

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During the knocking Barrimond heard a voice from within the

home. Finally the occupant of the home unlocked the door at

which point Sergeant Barrimond gave the command, “let’s go”. 

(DSUF, No. 195) Sergeant Barrimond was concerned about the

officers being in the “funnel of death” because they did not know

whether there was anyone within the residence who had weapons. 

(DSUF, No. 196) The officers had a disadvantage because the

sunlight was behind them, so they were backlit and the interior

of Plaintiff’s residence was somewhat dark. (DSUF, No. 197)

After making entry, Sergeant Barrimond’S eyes had to

acclimate to the dimness of the house. (DSUF, No. 198) After

the residence was secured, Sergeant Barrimond focused his

attention on Plaintiff who was leaning on a chair, and the

children who were on the couch in the living room. (DSUF, No.

199)

The facts raise a question whether Sergeant Barrimond was

reasonable in his execution of the search warrant. He gave the

command to enter based upon the belief that persons inside the

residence were not responding. Plaintiff declares that she

answered the door and there was no need for forced entry. The

facts show that once inside the residence, Sergeant Barrimond

helped Plaintiff get seated on a chair and explained to her why

the officers were there and the purpose of their search. He

advised her that the officers were looking for guns and gangrelated items pursuant to a search warrant. Further, in an

attempt to calm the children in the house, Sergeant Barrimond

then began talking to the children and tried to make funny faces

and small talk to make them comfortable. (DSUF, No. 202) He

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asked Plaintiff if the kids needed to be changed, fed or taken

care of in any way. (DSUF, No. 203)

Plaintiff was not arrested or cited for any offense, nor was

she ever subjected to a pat down search, placed in handcuffs or

restrained in any other way. In fact, she was allowed to use the

telephone to receive and make phone calls. (DSUF, No. 206)

Sergeant Barrimond asked Plaintiff if she was okay and

whether or not she would like an ambulance called. (DSUF, No.

195) Plaintiff complained of hip pain but refused the offer to

have an ambulance called. (DSUF, No. 207) Nevertheless, Sergeant

Barrimond directed Officer Garrison to call an ambulance because

he wanted to make sure Plaintiff was okay. When the paramedics

arrived, Plaintiff refused treatment. (DSUF, No. 208) 

Freeman however argues that Barrimond entered the house

yelling at people to get on the ground and that he in fact did

see Freeman upon first entry, contrary to what he claims. 

If a trier of fact believes Plaintiff’s version of the

events, there was no need for forced entry to execute the search

warrant. 

Summary Judgment in favor of Sergeant Barrimond is DENIED.

(4) Officer Garrison 

Freeman does not dispute that Officer Garrison immediately

entered the residence but was not able to clearly see inside due

to a brief eye adjustment caused by coming in from outside where

it was bright and sunny, into a small, dimly lit room. It is

further undisputed that given the amount of time between Officer

Garrison entering the residence, feeling a perceived threat to

his gun arm, combined with his inability to see clearly, and his

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men directly behind him moving quickly, he did not have

sufficient time to evaluate the age and characteristics of this

individual. Ordinarily, a search warrant entry should be very

rapid, and although the momentum of the officers on this team was

originally quick, the entry was much slower due Officer

Garrison’s encounter with Plaintiff. 

After the home was secured, Officer Garrison returned to the

living room area, which was the first time he realized Plaintiff

was an elderly female. Officer Garrison inquired as to whether

Plaintiff was okay and offered to call her an ambulance, but she

refused. He asked her for her name, but she was uncooperative

and verbally abusive towards him. Plaintiff does not dispute

these facts. Officer Garrison did not want to aggravate the

tension Plaintiff was already exhibiting, so, he limited his

contact with her. (DSUF, No. 156) Officer Garrison as well as

all the officers on this team deny that Officer Garrison ever

threatened to shoot Plaintiff. (DSUF, No. 216)

However, there is a factual dispute as to whether Garrison

felt someone grab his right arm which was holding his gun. 

Plaintiff says she did not. There is also dispute as to whether

Garrison pushed plaintiff away from him and whether she continued

to grab his arm, thereby causing the two to lose balance and

entangle their feet. Lastly, there is a factual dispute as to

whether Garrison yelled at Freeman to “Get down on the ground, or

I’ll shoot you!” The facts raise a dispute as to whether a

reasonable officer confronting the same circumstances as

Garrison, with the same information under the totality of

circumstances, would have made forced entry into Freeman’s home

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in the same manner. Whether Freeman’s Fourth Amendment rights to

be free of an unreasonable search and seizure and injured as a

result, remain in dispute. 

Summary Judgment in favor of Officer Garrison is DENIED.

(5) Deputy Capriola

It is undisputed that Deputy Capriola was the third officer

who entered Plaintiff’s residence, behind Officer Higgins, who

was behind Officer Garrison. Once inside the door, Deputy

Capriola observed Plaintiff laying partially on the ground and

halfway on a chair that was situated a foot or two on the right,

inside the door. (DSUF, No. 175) Plaintiff’s legs were sticking

out partially in the doorway but Deputy Capriola did not see how

it was she landed in that position. (DSUF, No. 176) Deputy

Capriola stepped over Plaintiff’s feet and went left into the

kitchen to secure that area. (DSUF, No. 177) After the house

was determined to be secured, he walked over to the Plaintiff and

assisted Sergeant Barrimond in helping Plaintiff to a couch.

(DSUF, No. 178) Deputy Capriola had no further contact or

communication with Plaintiff. (DSUF, No. 179)

Plaintiff fails to offer any evidence that Deputy Capriola’s

entry and conduct was unreasonable or that he acted unlawfully in

any way, because he had no command responsibility, made no

independent decision to force entry, and did not use force of any

kind against anyone. 

Summary judgment in favor of Deputy Capriola is GRANTED.

(6) Deputy Simpson

Plaintiff does not dispute that Deputy Simonson remained

outside of the residence securing the perimeter until the entry

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team was done securing the interior of the residence. (DSUF, No.

163) Deputy Simonson then went inside the residence to assist in

documenting evidence seized on an inventory log. (DSUF, No. 164) 

At no time while inside the residence did Deputy Simonson ever

make any physical or verbal contact with the Plaintiff. (DSUF,

No. 165) He was not present during the initial entry and did not

observe the physical contact between Plaintiff and Officer

Garrison. (DSUF, No. 166) Plaintiff fails to offer any evidence

that Deputy Simpson’s conduct was unreasonable. 

Summary judgment in favor of Deputy Simpson is GRANTED.

(7) Deputy Hollins

Deputy Hollins was one of the last officers to enter

Plaintiff’s residence because he was assigned to the breaching

device that is used to force entry when necessary. (DSUF, No.

180) The breaching device requires two hands to carry so he did

not have a firearm in hand. (DSUF, No. 181) After securing the

residence but prior to conducting the search, Deputy Hollins

photographed the residence. He also photographed the items and

locations from where they were seized. (DSUF, No. 186) He had

no physical or verbal contact with the Plaintiff the entire

duration of the search. (DSUF, No. 187). Plaintiff fails to

offer any factual dispute as to any unlawful conduct by Deputy

Hollins. 

Summary Judgment in favor of Deputy Hollins is GRANTED.

B. Freeman’s Monell claim against the City of Fresno

To prevail on a § 1983 complaint against a local government

under Monell, a plaintiff must satisfy a three-part test: (1)

The official(s) must have violated the plaintiff’s constitutional

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 “[A] public official is liable under § 1983 only if he 1

causes the plaintiff to be subjected to deprivation of his

constitutional rights.’” Brass, 328 F.3d at 1200 (quoting Baker

v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 142 (1979)(citation and internal

quotation marks omitted)). “‘Section 1983 imposes liability for

violations of rights protected by the Constitution, not for

violations of duties of care arising out of tort law.” Brass,

328 F.3d at 1200 (quoting Baker, 443 U.S. at 146).

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rights; (2) The violation must be a part of policy or custom and 1

may not be an isolated incident; and (3) A nexus must link the

specific policy or custom to the plaintiff’s injury. See Monell,

436 U.S. at 690-92. There are three ways to show a policy or

custom of a municipality:

(1) By showing a longstanding practice or

custom which constitutes the standard

operating procedure of the local

government entity; 

(2) By showing that the decision-making

official was, as a matter of state law,

a final policymaking authority whose

edicts or acts may fairly be said to

represent official policy in the area of

decision or 

(3) By showing that an official with final

policymaking authority either delegated

that authority to, or ratified the

decision of, a subordinate. 

Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1147 (9th Cir. 2005).

A municipal policy may be inferred from widespread practices or

evidence of repeated constitutional violations for which the

errant municipal officers were not discharged or reprimanded. 

Id.

Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ alleged constitutional

violations were according to official or tacitly approved policy,

practice and custom of the City of Fresno. Plaintiff further

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argues that Defendants City of Fresno negligently hired, trained,

staffed, and supervised Defendant officers by failing to

adequately and properly supervise, control, and discipline them

for violating her Fourth Amendment rights. However, Plaintiff

has not introduced evidence creating a material issue of fact as

to whether the Defendant officers were acting pursuant to a

municipal policy or custom. Plaintiff disputes a number of facts

regarding the training requirements that the Police Department

requires its officers to undergo. Freeman disputes the following

facts: 

1. Officers employed with the Fresno Police

Department are given training over and above that

required by POST, (Peace Officer Standards and

Training) the commission which regulates training

for law enforcement officers in California. 

(DSUF, No. 229)

2. The Fresno Police Department had training units

that ensured that the officers employed by the

Department received training in compliance with

POST. (DSUF, No. 230)

3. The training provided to officers employed by the

Department meets or exceeds POST guidelines. 

(DSUF, No. 231)

4. Prior to February 19, 2004, the Fresno Police

Department provided training to all their officers

including those assigned to the M.A.G.E.C. Unit

receive training on topics, including but not

limited to: (1) the appropriate means and manner

of conducting a search and seizure, in light of

the totality of the circumstances faced by the

officers; (2) proper use of force; (3) proper

investigation and acquisition of search warrants. 

(DSUF, No. 232)

5. New police officer recruits are required go

through a field training program and are required

to complete 24 hours of POST training every 24

months. They also undergo a rigorous sixteen week

training program which includes training on the

appropriate use of force, including lethal force. 

(DSUF, No. 233)

6. Officers are also provided training in the use of

force, including lectures and scenario-based

performances. The Fresno Police Department’s

policy regarding the use of force is part of the

instruction given in any class in which the use of

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force is reviewed. (DSUF, No. 234)

7. Plaintiff’s retained police procedural matters

expert, Roger Clark, has expressed his opinion in

this case, the training provided by Fresno Police

Department to its police officers is consistent

with POST mandates. (DSUF, No. 235)

8. At all times relevant to this lawsuit, it has been

the policy of the Fresno Police Department to

conduct thorough internal investigations into

allegations of misconduct by employees of the

Department. (DSUF, No. 238)

9. It has also been the policy of the Fresno Police

Department to take sufficient corrective action to

prevent their employees from committing

constitutional violations, or any violations of

state or federal law. (DSUF, No. 239)

10. At no time relevant to this lawsuit has the Fresno

Police Department had any policies, practices or

customs of the following: (1) tolerating the use

of excessive or unjustified force; (2) allowing

constitutional violations by encouraging unlawful

police activity, withholding or concealing

material information from a search warrant; (3)

performing pretextual investigations that

vindicate and ratify an officer’s misconduct; (4)

taking insufficient corrective actions to prevent

alleged patterns of constitutional violations from

continuing; (5) delegation of obligations to

manage, supervise, train and control officers;

and/or (6) avoiding proper public oversight of the

actions of officers. (DSUF, No. 240)

11. The hiring process for new recruits with the

Fresno Police Department includes, among other

matters, obtaining a background check and a

psychological evaluation of the applicant prior to

hiring. The applicant’s propensity toward

untruthfulness is tested and used as a basis of

exclusion of potential applicants. (DSUF, No.

241)

12. New recruits are required to undergo a rigorous

sixteen week training program which includes

training on the appropriate use of force. (DSUF,

No. 242)

Plaintiff does not offer evidence to create factual disputes in

this case to sustain Freeman’s Fourth Amendment claim. Freeman

merely denies that there was no policy or custom in place

tolerating the use of excessive force. Freeman has not

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established by any evidence that any conduct against her person

by any officer resulted from any Monell policy or pattern and

practice. To the contrary, Plaintiff’s expert agreed that Fresno

City Police Officer training meets or exceeds P.O.S.T. standards. 

Freeman has no evidence that any alleged of rights violation was

the product of a pattern, practice, or policy of the City of

Fresno. Plaintiff has submitted no affidavits or testimony that

establishes any disputed issues of fact that her alleged injuries

were the result of a longstanding practice or custom by the City

of Fresno to hire and keep “rogue cops” or failure to train its

officers. 

Based on the totality of the record, and viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there are no

material issues concerning the adequacy of training, hiring, and

supervisory measures of the City of Fresno in the administration

of its Police department. Nor is there evidence that the City is

responsible for the training and supervision of M.A.G.E.C. or

that any M.A.G.E.C. practice or tactic violates the law or any

P.O.S.T. standard. 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Freeman’s

Monell claim against the City of Fresno is GRANTED.

C. State Law Claims Against Garrison, Yee, and City of Fresno

1. Supplemental Jurisdiction Under 1367(a)

Title 28 U.S.C. section 1367(a) provides in pertinent part:

“In any civil action of which the district courts have original

jurisdiction, the district court shall have supplemental

jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to the

claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they

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form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of

the United States Constitution.” 

Freeman alleges a § 1983 claim for Fourth Amendment

violations. Freeman’s state law claims invoke supplemental

jurisdiction and arise from the same facts in controversy in her

§1983 claim. 

2. California Tort Claims Act

In California, a person making a claim against a public

entity or a public employee must present such a claim in writing

to the clerk, auditor or secretary of the local public entity

within six months after the accrual of the cause of action. Cal.

Gov. Code § 911.2.; see also Javor v. Taggart, 98 Cal. App. 4th

795, 804 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (submission of a claim to a public

entity pursuant to the California Tort Claims Act is a condition

precedent to a civil action against the state or its employees

and failure to present the claim bars the action.) A person may

not maintain a cause of action against a public entity or public

employee without having first presented a claim as required by

California Statute. Cal. Gov. Code 945.4. Cal. Gov. Code

section 954.6 requires that a claimant file a civil action within

six months after the public agency issues its decision. Javor,

98 Cal. App. 4th at 804. Defendants concede that Plaintiff’s

claim was timely filed. 

3. California Civil Code § 43 claims

California Civil Code § 43 states in relevant part, “Besides

the personal rights mentioned or recognized in the Government

Code, every person has, subject to the qualifications and

restrictions provided by law, the right of protection from bodily

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restraint or harm from personal insult, from defamation, and from

injury to his personal relations.” 

There are no issues of disputed fact showing that Freeman

was subjected to bodily restraint, harm from personal insult,

defamation, or injury to her personal relations. 

Summary Judgment is GRANTED in favor of Defendants on

Plaintiff’s Civil Code § 43 claims. 

4. California Civil Code § 52.1 

Cal. Civ. Code § 52 sets forth a damages remedy for civil

rights violations under California Law. Koebke v. Bernardo

Heights Country Club, 36 Cal. 4th 824, 836 (Cal. 2004). Civ.

Code § 52.1(a) provides that if a person interferes, or attempts

to interfere, by threats, intimidation, or coercion, with the

exercise or enjoyment of the constitutional or statutory rights

of an individual or individuals, a civil action may be brought

for equitable or injunctive relief. Venegas v. County of Los

Angeles, 32 Cal. 4th 820, 841 (Cal. 2004). Cal. Civ. Code §

52.1(b) allows any individual so interfered with to sue for

damages. Id. Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(g) states that an action

brought under § 52.1 is independent of any other action, remedy

or procedure that may be available to an aggrieved individual

under any other provision of law. Id. To state a claim under

California Civil Code § 52.1, Plaintiffs must allege that the

interference with the plaintiff’s rights by means of threats,

intimidation, or coercion was “because of” their membership in a

protected classification. Nelson v. City of Irvine, 143 F.3d

1196, 1206 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Here, although Plaintiff is African-American, she does not

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 Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b) provides, “All persons within the 1

jurisdiction of this state are free and equal no matter what

their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin,

disability, medical condition, marital status, or sexual

orientation are entitled to the full and equal accommodations,

advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business

establishments of every kind whatsoever.” 

 Cal. Civ. Code § 51(e) provides definitions for the terms 2

“Disability,” “Medical condition,” “Religion,” “Sex,” and “Sexual

Orientation.” 

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allege that Defendants interfered with her legal rights due to

her particular membership in a protected class. 

Summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of Defendants on

Plaintiff’s California Civil Code § 52.1 claim. 

5. California Civil Code § 51.7

California Civil Code § 51.7(a) states: 

“All persons within the jurisdiction of this state have the right

to be free from any violence, or intimidation by threat of

violence, committed against their persons or property because of

political affiliation, or on account of any characteristic listed

or defined in subdivision (b) or (e) of Section 51, or position 1 2

in a labor dispute, or because another person perceives them to

have one or more of those characteristics.” 

California Civil Code § 51.7 is a separate and independent

enactment referred to in § 52.1. California Civil Code § 52.1(b)

makes persons who violate § 51.7 liable for actual and exemplary

damages. 

Plaintiff does not bring claims against Defendants on a

theory that she suffered a constitutional deprivation because she

is a member of a protected class. 

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Summary Judgment is GRANTED in favor of Defendants on

Plaintiff’s California Civil Code § 51.7 claim. 

6. Assault and Battery

To establish civil assault, plaintiff would need to

establish that (1) the officers threatened to touch her in a

harmful or offensive manner (2) it reasonably appeared to her

that they were about to carry out the threat (3) she did not

consent to the conduct (4) she was harmed and (5) the officers’

conduct was a substantial factor in causing the harm. CAL. PEN.

CODE § 240; Tekle v. United States, 457 F.3d 1088, 33 (9th Cir.

2006) 

A civil battery claim requires that plaintiff show 1)

defendant intentionally did an act which resulted in a harmful or

offensive contact with the plaintiff's person, 2) plaintiff did

not consent to the contact, and 3) the harmful or offensive

contact caused injury, damage, loss or harm to the plaintiff. 

CAL PENAL CODE § 242; Tekle 457 F.3d at 33; Piedra v. Dugan, 123

Cal. App. 4th 1483, 1495 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004)(internal quotations

omitted). A battery is any intentional, unlawful, and harmful

contact by one person with the person of another. Id. A harmful

contact, intentionally done is the essence of a battery. Id. A

contact is unlawful if it is unconsented to. Id. 

The court in Tekle found that Plaintiff in that case raised

genuine issues of material facts regarding officers’ engaging in

assault and battery. Tekle 457 F.3d at 35. According to

Plaintiff’s deposition in that case, an officer handcuffed

plaintiff while he was lying face down on the ground, then picked

him up by the chain of the handcuffs cutting his skin. Id. The

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court noted that over twenty armed officers encountered a

barefoot, unarmed eleven year old Plaintiff who was not resisting

them. Id. Further, Plaintiff testified that the officers

continued to keep their guns trained upon him throughout the

incident and that one officer picked him up from behind by the

chain of the handcuffs. Id.

Freeman’s allegations, if believed, are that she offered no

resistance and there was no need to push her to the floor.

This requires that summary judgment be DENIED on Plaintiff’s

state assault and battery claim. 

7. False Imprisonment

The basis for the tort of false imprisonment is the unlawful

restraint of another’s liberty. Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley

Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 920 (9th Cir. 2001.) 

There are no facts to show that Plaintiff was restrained,

arrested, or confined in any way during the officers’ execution

of the warrant. While Plaintiff was unfortunately knocked over

during the execution of the warrant, the undisputed facts show

that, upon securing the perimeter, the officers assisted her onto

the couch and even allowed her to use the phone. She was not

handcuffed or restrained in any way. During the execution of a

search warrant, officers may keep persons on the premises in view

and from interfering with the search. Plaintiff offered no

evidence she was unreasonably detained.

Summary Judgment is GRANTED in favor of Defendants as to

Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim. 

8. Trespass to Land

Trespass is an unlawful interference with possession of

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property. Saples v. Hoefke, 189 Cal. App. 3d 1397, 1406 (1987). 

A police officer executing a valid search warrant may enter a

plaintiff’s home. Brunette v. Humane Soc’y, 294 F.3d 1205, 1210

(9th Cir. XXX) Despite this privilege to enter, the police

officer’s actions while executing the warrant must relate to the

objectives of the authorized intrusion. Id. 

The officers in this case entered Freeman’s home pursuant to

a valid search warrant. It is undisputed that Freeman’s home was

listed and described with particularity in Attachment “A” to the

Search Warrant Affidavit. (DSUF, No. 58) The items to be seized

were also detailed in the warrant. These items included evidence

of gang membership, firearms and ammunition, and were listed in

Attachment “B” to the Search Warrant Affidavit. (DSUF, No. 59) 

Summary judgment as to Plaintiffs claim for tresspass is

GRANTED in favor of Defendants. 

9. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 

Freeman asserts intentional infliction of emotional distress

against Defendant Officers. 

To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional

distress, a plaintiff must allege 1) extreme and outrageous

conduct by the defendant, with the intent or reckless disregard

of the probability of causing emotional distress 2) plaintiff

suffered severe emotional distress and 3) that defendant was the

cause of the emotional distress. Ess v. Eskaton Properties,

Inc., 97 Cal. App. 4th 120, 129 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). The

conduct must be extreme and outrageous, so as to be intolerable

in a civilized society. See, Tekle v. United States, 457 F.3d

1088, 1103 (9th Cir. 2006). 

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Freeman’s state claim for intentional infliction of

emotional distress by the officers fails to show evidence of

extreme and outrageous conduct in executing the search warrant. 

Emotional distress damages are provable as part of Plaintiff’s

§ 1983 claim. On the record presented, the officers’ conduct was

not so extreme or outrageous to support a claim for intentional

infliction of emotional distress. 

Summary Judgment in favor of Defendants is GRANTED. 

10. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

To prove a claim for negligent infliction of emotional

distress a plaintiff mist show: 1) serious emotional distress, 2)

actually and proximately caused by 3) wrongful conduct 4) by a

defendant who should have foreseen that the conduct would cause

such distress. Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1172 (9th Cir.

2004). It is well settled that negligent infliction of emotional

distress is not an independent tort; rather it is the tort of

negligence to which the duty element applies. Marlene F. v.

Affiliated Psychiatric Med. Clinic, Inc., 48 Cal. 3d 583, 588

(Cal. 1989); Friedman, 107 Cal. App. 4th at 464;. 

Where injury such as mental and emotional distress is caused

by the constitutional violation, that injury is compensable under

§ 1983. Anderson v. Cent. Point Sch. Dist., 746 F.2d 505, 508

(9th Cir. 1984); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 263-264 (1978). 

Freeman’s emotional distress claims are properly alleged under

her §1983 claim. The circumstances of this case do not support a

claim for NIED. Freeman was not a target of the search, the

officers had no animus as to her, and did not intentionally act

to cause her harm.

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Freeman does not dispute that she has stress. However,

according to the undisputed facts, this stress is the result of

her granddaughter living with her and does not result from the

officers’ conduct. 

Summary Judgment GRANTED in favor of Defendants on the

negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. 

VI. CONCLUSION

• Summary Judgment as to Detective Yee is GRANTED. 

• Summary judgment as to Sergeant Barrimond is DENIED. 

• Summary Judgment as to Officer Garrison is DENIED.

• Summary Judgment as to Deputy Capriola is GRANTED in favor

of Defendants

• Summary Judgment as to Deputy Simpson is GRANTED in favor of

Defendants

• Summary Judgment as to Deputy Hollins is GRANTED in favor of

Defendants

• Summary Judgment as to the City of Fresno is GRANTED in

favor of Defendants

• Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs claims under Cal. Civ.

Code §43 is GRANTED in favor of Defendants 

• Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs claims under Cal. Civ.

Code 52.1 is GRANTED in favor of Defendants

• Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs claims under Cal. Civ.

Code 51.7 is GRANTED in favor of Defendants

• Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs claims for assault and

battery is DENIED.

• Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs claims for false

imprisonment is GRANTED in favor of Defendants

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• Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs claims for trespass to

land is GRANTED in favor of Defendants

• Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs claims for intentional

infliction of emotional distress is GRANTED in favor of

Defendants

• Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs claims for negligent

infliction of emotional distress is GRANTED in favor of

Defendants

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 22, 2006 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

dd0l0 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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