Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02715/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02715-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mark Joseph Hawes
Petitioner
Kim Holland
Respondent

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MARK JOSEPH HAWES, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

KIM HOLLAND, 

Respondent. 

No. 2:14-cv-02715-KJM-GGH 

ORDER AND FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner was convicted of lewd and lascivious acts with a child, 

unlawful sexual intercourse with a child more than three years younger, oral copulation with a 

child under 18, sexual penetration by foreign object with a child under 18, sodomy with a victim 

under 18, and engaging in three or more sex acts with a child under 14. Petitioner challenges his 

conviction on the following grounds: 1) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel 

by, inter alia, failing to perform forensic testing of physical evidence, failing to investigate or call 

witnesses, failing to subpoena medical records, failing to object to privileged testimony, and 

failing to communicate with petitioner; 2) the trial court violated petitioner’s Sixth Amendment 

right to counsel when it failed appoint new counsel at the Marsden hearing; 3) the admission of 

Angela Bryant’s testimony regarding her sexual relationship with petitioner violated petitioner’s 

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right to due process; 4) there was insufficient evidence to convict petitioner of oral copulation of 

K.; and 5) the prosecution withheld exculpatory material evidence from petitioner. In conjunction 

with his ineffective assistance of counsel claims, petitioner has requested an evidentiary hearing 

be held. 

Upon careful consideration of the record and the applicable law, the request for an 

evidentiary hearing is denied and undersigned recommends that petitioner’s application for 

habeas corpus relief be denied. 

BACKGROUND 

 In its unpublished memorandum and opinion affirming petitioner’s judgment of 

conviction on appeal, the California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District provided the 

following factual summary: 

Defendant was in law enforcement from 1990 to 2001, then went to 

work for United Parcel Service. When he married the victims’ 

mother, she had three small children: two little girls and a boy. He 

took charge of the family, and the children complied with his 

orders. For the girls, this meant years of subjugation and sexual 

abuse. Their testimony at trial was harrowing. 

The Victims

M. was 17 when she testified. The abuse began when she was nine. 

She was lying in her bed when defendant began rubbing her leg and 

then her vagina. The prosecutor asked her to chronical the 

molestations—oral, vaginal, and anal sex—that occurred during the 

two-year period that preceded her disclosure. 

As for the molestations, she estimated that defendant would rub her 

leg and vagina as he tucked her in at night at least twice a week. He 

threatened her, telling her she would never see her mother again if 

she ever told anyone. If she said no, he would stomp off, slam the 

door, retreat to his room, and not speak to anyone for days. He 

molested her while the family watched television or went 

swimming. On four occasions, he instructed her to pretend she was 

sick and unable to go to church with her mother. When the family 

was gone, he would molest her. On another occasion he jumped 

out of the closet in her room while other family members were 

outside swimming, and touched her vagina underneath her clothes. 

M. estimated that she put her mouth on defendant’s penis 8 to 10 

times, and he put his mouth on her vagina 10 to 15 times. The oral 

copulation occurred in both her bed and his. On one occasion, he 

came into her room, pulled down his pajama bottoms, began 

rubbing his penis, and then, holding the bars on her bed, thrust his 

penis into her mouth. When she tried to move her head, he moved 

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it back and held it there. On other occasions, he would kneel beside 

her bed or get on the bed on his knees, hold the bars, and put his 

mouth on her vagina and lick it. 

During the same two-year period, defendant had sexual intercourse 

with M. 10 to 15 times. If she grimaced, he made her smile. If she 

cried, he made her stop. Sometimes he made her masturbate in 

front of him before sexual intercourse because, he said, it made him 

hard and got him in the mood. One of the mornings when he made 

her pretend to be sick, he went into her bedroom and instructed her 

to come into his room. When she walked into the room, he was 

lying naked on the bed. He made her sit on him, and eventually he 

penetrated her vagina. 

Defendant put his fingers inside M.’s vagina about 30 times over 

those two years. She described one incident when the rest of the 

family was in the backyard swimming: she and defendant were in 

the living room with the blinds closed, and he started kissing her 

neck and forehead. Eventually he placed his hands down her shorts 

and his fingers in her vagina. 

Frequently, defendant asked M. to wear a skirt with no underwear. 

Once, he ordered her downstairs to try something different. He put 

her on the couch with her buttocks up on him. Standing, he put his 

penis in her “butt.” She told him to stop because it hurt, but he 

assured her the pain would only last a few minutes. On another 

occasion, he put his penis in her anus and she bled. 

Although during this time defendant was having very little sex with 

his wife, he was having sex regularly with not only M., but her 

younger sister K. as well. Following a back injury, defendant had 

difficulty sustaining an erection. Although he told his wife he had 

discontinued the medication he was taking for this condition 

because of the side effects, in fact he refilled the prescription many 

times. Empty and near-empty bottles were found among his things. 

K. was only four or five years old when defendant began exploiting 

her. Her account, like that of her sister, is gut wrenching. She was 

12 at the time of trial. When she was four or five she would 

pretend to be a princess by taking off all her clothes and wrapping 

herself in a Mickey Mouse blanket as her gown. Defendant would 

kiss her neck and put his finger in her private every time her mother 

left the house. She estimated it was more than 100 times. 

Defendant also made her grab on to his penis, and he licked her 

vagina several times. When K. was in about third grade and under 

10 years old, defendant had her take off her pants and underwear 

and sit on his shoulders with his face toward her vagina. He shoved 

her against the wall and started licking her vagina. She 

remembered that this incident occurred in defendant’s bedroom. 

The many other incidents were equally sordid. While her aunt was 

out of town, defendant and K. went to her house, and on multiple 

occasions, he made her give him a “big kissy,” licked her vagina, 

and put his finger in her vagina. While K. was naked, defendant 

would “spank” her by rubbing her bare buttocks and putting his 

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fingers in her vagina. He made her look at his penis, even though 

she told him she did not want to see it. 

K. described some of the things her father said to her when she was 

doing things he made her do, such as, “[Y]ou didn’t think this was 

creepy a few years ago and now you are all freaked out.” Referring 

to her ability to make his penis hard, he said, “[O]h, [K.], baby you 

are making me feel so good.” After every encounter, he warned her 

never to tell anyone. 

On one occasion, defendant made K. get on her hands and knees 

like a dog, placed his penis in her vagina, and went back and forth 

with it. He instructed her to “[l]et it go.” When he finished, he 

made her “pinky promise” not to tell anyone. 

Defendant’s charade all fell apart before a family pizza and movie 

night on Friday, August 20, 2010. K. testified that after she arrived 

home from school, defendant instructed her to wear a skirt without 

shorts on underneath. He signaled her to come into his bedroom, 

and locked the door. He made K. kiss him on the mouth and get on 

the bed. He put a vibrator inside K.’s vagina and started moving it 

around, all the while instructing her to “[l]et it go” and to just “go 

crazy.” He put his fingers in her vagina and touched her buttocks 

and breasts. He orally copulated her. Before leaving, defendant 

made K. give him another “big kiss.” 

M. accompanied her mother to pick up the pizza. En route, M. 

encouraged her mother to divorce defendant. When her mother 

resisted, M. told her that defendant had touched her. He mother 

was horrified and shocked. She dropped M. off at a family friend’s 

house and went home to confront her husband. He denied having 

any inappropriate physical contact with M. 

M. was interviewed and defendant was arrested. As her mother 

explained to her why defendant had been arrested, K. blurted out 

that defendant had “been doing that to me for years.” K. was later 

interviewed at a special assault forensic evaluation (a SAFE 

interview). The video of the SAFE interview was played for the 

jury. 

Other Women Step Forward

The victims were not the only ones to testify to defendant’s creepy 

behavior. Kr., his daughter from a previous marriage, lived with 

defendant and his new family for a couple of years. She testified 

she had observed seven- or eight-year old M. on the top bunk of her 

bed with her legs dangling over the side with each of her legs on 

defendant’s shoulders. She saw her father’s face between M.’s 

legs, and M. was giggling. When he realized Kr. was there, he 

angrily ordered her to go downstairs. She also testified on another 

occasion she observed her father supervising her younger siblings 

and cousins, all running around through the sprinklers naked. He 

was the only adult present, and although Kr. told him it “was not 

right,” he told her he thought it was funny. 

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In the early 1990’s defendant had a sexual relationship with Angela 

B. She testified that before and during her brief marriage to 

defendant, he had her act like a little girl during sex. He had her 

wear short clothing and put her hair in pigtails. Then they would 

play-act. He would have her get into bed. While she pretended to 

sleep, he would quietly crawl into bed behind her and rub his penis 

against her back and bottom. He referred to her as “daddy’s little 

girl” and asked her questions like, “Has daddy’s little girl been 

bad?” 

Defendant Testifies

Defendant categorically denied all the testimony offered by M., K., 

Kr., and Angela. He proclaimed his innocence of all charges. 

M., he claimed, had come on to him several times the week before 

she accused him of sexually abusing her. Each time he rebuffed her 

advances. He never told her mother because he did not want to 

destroy his family. He explained that he had told M. she might 

have to be home schooled again because of the strain her schedule 

had on the family. He believed she was angry with him and lied so 

she could remain in public school. She was unhappy because her 

mother would not divorce him. 

Defendant speculated that M. might be responsible for K.’s stories. 

He put a different spin on many of the accounts K. had provided. 

He insisted he would never sexually abuse a child. 

Defense counsel attempted to discredit both Kr. and Angela. Kr. 

admitted she had been unhappy living with her father as a teenager 

and wanted to return to Alabama to live with her mother. During a 

heated and protracted custody battle, she ultimately stated she did 

not believe her father had done anything inappropriate. 

During cross-examination of Angela, defense counsel exposed her 

mental health history, including two hospitalizations and a 

diagnosis of depression as well as attention deficit and obsessivecompulsive disorders. Angela assured the court and jury that her 

diagnoses did not impact her ability to recall the evens she had 

described. 

People v. Hawes, 2012 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7307, at **1–9 (October 5, 2012). 

 After petitioner’s judgment of conviction was affirmed by the California Court of Appeal, 

he filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. Resp’t’s Lod. Doc. 9. The 

Supreme Court summarily denied that petition without comment or citation by order. Resp’t’s 

Lod. Doc. 10. Petitioner then filed three state habeas petitions. The first petition, filed with the 

Sacramento Superior Court, was denied in a reasoned order. Resp’t’s Lod. Docs. 11 & 12. The 

second and third petitions, filed with the Third District Court of Appeal and the California 

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Supreme Court, respectively, were denied without comment or citation. Resp’t’s Lod. Docs. 13–

16. 

DISCUSSION 

I. AEDPA Standards 

 The statutory limitations of federal courts’ power to issue habeas corpus relief for persons 

in state custody is provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective 

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). The text of § 2254(d) states: 

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be 

granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits 

in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim- 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 

State court proceeding. 

 As a preliminary matter, the Supreme Court has recently held and reconfirmed “that § 

2254(d) does not require a state court to give reasons before its decision can be deemed to have 

been ‘adjudicated on the merits.’” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 785 (2011). 

Rather, “when a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied 

relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence 

of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.” Id. at 784–785, citing Harris 

v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 265, 109 S.Ct. 1038 (1989) (presumption of a merits determination when 

it is unclear whether a decision appearing to rest on federal grounds was decided on another 

basis). “The presumption may be overcome when there is reason to think some other explanation 

for the state court's decision is more likely.” Id. at 785. 

The Supreme Court has set forth the operative standard for federal habeas review of state 

court decisions under AEDPA as follows: “For purposes of § 2254(d)(1), ‘an unreasonable

application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.’” Harrington, 

131 S.Ct. at 785, citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (2000). “A state 

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court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 

‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Id. at 786, 

citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664, 124 S.Ct. 2140 (2004). 

Accordingly, “a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported or . . . 

could have supported[] the state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible 

fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the 

holding in a prior decision of this Court.” Id. “Evaluating whether a rule application was 

unreasonable requires considering the rule’s specificity. The more general the rule, the more 

leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations.’” Id. Emphasizing the 

stringency of this standard, which “stops short of imposing a complete bar of federal court 

relitigation of claims already rejected in state court proceedings[,]” the Supreme Court has 

cautioned that “even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court’s contrary conclusion 

was unreasonable.” Id., citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75, 123 S.Ct. 1166 (2003). 

 The undersigned also finds that the same deference is paid to the factual determinations of 

state courts. Under § 2254(d)(2), factual findings of the state courts are presumed to be correct 

subject only to a review of the record which demonstrates that the factual finding(s) “resulted in a 

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the state court proceeding.” It makes no sense to interpret “unreasonable” in § 

2254(d)(2) in a manner different from that same word as it appears in § 2254(d)(1) – i.e., the 

factual error must be so apparent that “fairminded jurists” examining the same record could not 

abide by the state court factual determination. A petitioner must show clearly and convincingly 

that the factual determination is unreasonable. See Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338, 126 S.Ct. 

969, 974 (2006). 

 The habeas corpus petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating the objectively 

unreasonable nature of the state court decision in light of controlling Supreme Court authority. 

Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 123 S. Ct. 357 (2002). Specifically, the petitioner “must 

show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in 

justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond 

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any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 786–87. “Clearly 

established” law is law that has been “squarely addressed” by the United States Supreme Court. 

Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125, 128 S.Ct. 743, 746 (2008). Thus, extrapolations of 

settled law to unique situations will not qualify as clearly established. See e.g., Carey v. 

Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 76, 127 S.Ct. 649, 653–54 (2006) (established law not permitting state 

sponsored practices to inject bias into a criminal proceeding by compelling a defendant to wear 

prison clothing or by unnecessary showing of uniformed guards does not qualify as clearly 

established law when spectators’ conduct is the alleged cause of bias injection). The established 

Supreme Court authority reviewed must be a pronouncement on constitutional principles, or other 

controlling federal law, as opposed to a pronouncement of statutes or rules binding only on 

federal courts. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 9, 123 S. Ct. 362, 366 (2002). 

 When a state court decision on a petitioner’s claims rejects some claims but does 

not expressly address a federal claim, a federal habeas court must presume, subject to rebuttal, 

that the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits. Johnson v. Williams, ___ U.S. ___, 133 

S.Ct. 1088, 1091 (2013). However, if the state courts have not adjudicated the merits of the 

federal issue, no AEDPA deference is given; the issue is reviewed de novo under general 

principles of federal law. Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 860 (9th Cir. 2012). 

 The state courts need not have cited to federal authority, or even have indicated awareness 

of federal authority in arriving at their decision. Early, 537 U.S. at 8. Where the state courts have 

not addressed the constitutional issue in dispute in any reasoned opinion, the federal court will 

independently review the record in adjudication of that issue. “Independent review of the record 

is not de novo review of the constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can 

determine whether a silent state court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Himes v. Thompson, 

336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). 

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II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (Claims 1 through 19) 

Petitioner claims that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel. He contends that 

trial counsel was ineffective for the following reasons: 

Claim 1: Failing to conduct DNA analysis on the massager used on K. 

Claim 2: Failing to subpoena M.’s medical records. 

Claim 3: Failing to secure petitioner’s medical records. 

Claim 4: Failing to conduct DNA analysis of petitioner’s bedding. 

Claim 5: Failing to investigate a prior molest of M. and K. by their biological father. 

Claim 6: Failing to follow the procedures outlined in California Evidence Code section 

782 to show M.’s propensity to lie about sexual matters. 

Claim 7: Failing to subpoena M.’s Facebook account. 

Claim 8: Failing to subpoena M.’s computer and media. 

Claim 9: Failing to interview M.’s friends. 

Claim 10: Failing to obtain an expert to testify regarding the special assault forensic 

evaluation (“SAFE”) interview technique. 

Claim 11: Failing to interview alibi witnesses. 

Claim 12: Failing to raise a marital privilege objection on petitioner’s behalf. 

Claim 13: Failing to subpoena Angela Bryant’s medical records. 

Claim 14: Failing to collect information from petitioner’s computer. 

Claim 15: Failing to subpoena Comcast’s operation records. 

Claim 16: Failing to request rape/assault kits of M. and K. 

Claim 17: Failing to secure a lie detector test. 

Claim 18: Failing to properly communicate with petitioner. 

Claim 19: Cumulative error. 

As more fully discussed below, petitioner failed to show that trial counsel’s representation 

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and how he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s 

alleged ineffectiveness. Accordingly, petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims should 

be denied. 

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A. Applicable Legal Principles 

The test for demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel is set forth in Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). First, a petitioner must show 

that, considering all the circumstances, counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness. Id. at 688. To this end, the petitioner must identify the acts or omissions that are 

alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. Id. at 690. The federal 

court must then determine whether in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or 

omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. Id. “We strongly 

presume that counsel's conduct was within the wide range of reasonable assistance, and that he 

exercised acceptable professional judgment in all significant decisions made.” Hughes v. Borg, 

898 F.2d 695, 702 (9th Cir.1990), citing Strickland at 466 U.S. at 689. 

Second, a petitioner must affirmatively prove prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. 

Prejudice is found where “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. “That requires a 

‘substantial,’ not just ‘conceivable,’ likelihood of a different result.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. 

Ct. 1388, 1403, 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011) quoting Richter, 562 U.S., at ----, 131 S. Ct. at 791. 

The Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of giving deference to trial counsel's 

decisions, especially in the AEDPA context: 

In Strickland we said that “[j]udicial scrutiny of a counsel's 

performance must be highly deferential” and that “every effort 

[must] be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to 

reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and 

to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time.” 466 

U.S., at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 [ ]. Thus, even when a 

court is presented with an ineffective-assistance claim not subject to 

§ 2254(d)(1) deference, a [petitioner] must overcome the 

“presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 

‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’ ” Ibid. (quoting Michel 

v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101, 76 S.Ct. 158, 100 L.Ed. 83[ ] 

(1955)). 

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For [petitioner] to succeed, however, he must do more than show 

that he would have satisfied Strickland's test if his claim were being 

analyzed in the first instance, because under § 2254(d)(1), it is not 

enough to convince a federal habeas court that, in its independent 

judgment, the state-court decision applied Strickland incorrectly. 

See Williams, supra, at 411, 323 U.S. 471, 65 S.Ct. 363, 89 L.Ed. 

398[ ]. Rather, he must show that the [ ]Court of Appeals applied 

Strickland to the facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable 

manner. 

Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698–99, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 1852, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002). 

B. Analysis 

1. Claims 1 and 4 – DNA Analysis 

Petitioner contends trial counsel was ineffective for failing to conduct DNA analysis on 

the “massager” that was used on K. and on petitioner’s bedding. He argues that because the 

police seized both the massager and the bedding, there was substantial DNA evidence to prove or 

disprove M. and K.’s allegations. Petitioner contends trial counsel should have filed a motion to 

require forensic examination and the failure to do so constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Petitioner presented these claims to state court in a habeas petition. Resp’t’s Lod. Doc. 11, 

Grounds 3 & 4. The state court rejected these claims reasoning that petitioner did not present 

results of any DNA testing on physical evidence and thus could not show prejudice as the result 

of trial counsel’s actions. Resp’t’s Lod. Doc. 12, at 2. 

The decision to perform forensic testing on physical evidence is a tactical one. See 

Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 789; Grisby v. Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365, 372 (9th Cir. 1997). The Supreme 

Court has noted that defense strategies in criminal cases will differ even among the best attorneys: 

There are, however, “countless ways to provide effective assistance 

in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would 

not defendant a particular client in the same way.” Rare are the 

situations in which the “wide latitude counsel must have in making 

tactical decisions” will be limited to any one technique or approach. 

Richter, 131 S.Ct. 788–89 (internal citation omitted). There may have been many reasons for trial 

counsel to decide against testing the massager and the bedding. For example, the risk of a 

positive match to defendant may well have been too great to proceed with this tactic. Instead, 

trial counsel put together a defense consisting of discrediting M. and K.’s account of the events (1 

RT 131, 338), showing bias on the part of M. (1 RT 132), discrediting Krystal Hawes’s 

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testimony (1 RT 172), discrediting Angela Bryant’s testimony via introducing evidence of her 

mental disorders (1 RT 378), presenting an appearance that the police investigation was shoddy (1 

RT 405), and allowing defendant to testify to explain the allegations (1 RT 408–36). If trial 

counsel had ordered the testing, it would have been at the cost of forgoing one or more of these 

other strategies and for very little benefit. That is, even if DNA testing on the massager and 

bedding came back favorable to petitioner, that potential evidence may have been relevant to two 

of the seventeen counts of sexual misconduct all of which petitioner was found guilty. (1 CT 

196–212). On the other hand, unfavorable testing results would severely undermine the defense’s 

theory that all of the allegations were fabricated and/or easily explained away. As such, petitioner 

cannot show that trial counsel’s tactical decision fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness. 

 Even if petitioner can argue that his counsel should have done what petitioner in hindsight 

alleges presently, in no way, shape, or form has petitioner demonstrated with facts the potential 

for any prejudice. The undersigned pauses here to remark on a continuing problem with 

petitioner’s arguments that exist not only here, but for the vast majority of claims made herein. 

Petitioner believes that he can simply posit the allegation of potential prejudice, and the federal 

court must hold an evidentiary hearing to see if the allegation is true. However, as discussed in 

the last section of these Findings, Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388 (2013), precludes this 

court from ascertaining the facts outside the state court record. Petitioner may not use federal 

habeas as a mechanism to discover and prove the facts which he did not present to the state 

courts. If his presentation of evidence in the state courts is “zero,” and the state court decides the 

claim on “zero,” and assuming that the state courts did nothing to unduly thwart the presentation 

of facts which would require the state court to hold an evidentiary hearing, “zero,” is what the 

federal court must make its decision upon. It follows that: zero plus zero equals zero. 

 Given that petitioner demonstrated no facts which would have required the state court to 

hold an evidentiary hearing on his DNA claims, his “zero” presentation requires a finding of no 

prejudice herein. 

/ / / 

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2. Claims 2, 3 & 13 – Medical Records Subpoenas 

Petitioner further contends trial counsel was ineffective for failing to subpoena certain 

medical records, including records exposing M.’s allergy to latex, showing petitioner’s severe 

back injury, and demonstrating Angela Bryant’s mental disorders. He contends records showing 

M.’s allergy to latex would have demonstrated that M.’s testimony regarding petitioner using 

latex condoms when he had vaginal intercourse with her was false. As to the records of his 

severe back injury, he contends these records showing petitioner was limited to lifting five 

pounds would negate K.’s testimony that, during the same time period, petitioner lifted K. up to 

place her on his shoulders. With regard to Angela Bryant’s records, petitioner contends these 

would show that her mental disorders rendered her incompetent to testify. 

Petitioner presented these claims to state court in a habeas petition. Resp’t’s Lod. Doc. 

11, Grounds 11, 12 & 13. The state court rejected these claims reasoning that petitioner did not 

present documents demonstrating what trial counsel would have discovered had she subpoenaed 

them. Resp’t’s Lod. Doc. 12, at 2. In addition to the lack of documentation supporting these 

claims, the information the records would have revealed were presented at trial. Rebecca Hawes, 

M.’s mother, testified that M. was not allergic to latex. 1 RT 482. Several witnesses 

acknowledged that petitioner had a back injury. See e.g., 1 RT 137 (M. noting that petitioner had 

a back injury while he homeschooled M.), 226 (Rebecca Hawes noting petitioner’s back injury). 

Angela Bryant’s mental disorders were thoroughly discussed. See e.g., 1 RT 378 (Ms. Bryant’s 

testimony regarding her diagnosis of major depression, obsessive compulsive disorder and 

attention deficit disorder). As such, petitioner cannot show that he suffered prejudice from the 

lack of medical records relating to these topics. 

3. Claim 5 – Failure to Investigate Prior Molest by Victims’ Biological Father 

Petitioner claims trial counsel should have investigated into a prior molest by M. and K.’s 

biological father. Petitioner made this identical claim in his state habeas corpus petition. Resp’t’s 

Lod. Doc. 11, Ground 1. The trial court rejected this claim stating that “[p]etitioner makes 

numerous allegations that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to conduct adequate pre-trial 

investigation. Yet, Petitioner has not attached any evidence of what counsel could have 

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discovered by conducting such an investigation: [inter alia,] no documents showing the alleged 

molestation by the victims’ biological father . . . .” Resp’t’s Lod. Doc. 12 at 2. This claim wholly 

consists of petitioner’s unsubstantiated statements. Accordingly, this claim should be dismissed. 

4. Claim 6 – Failure to Comply with Evidence Code Section 782 

Petitioner claims trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to 

follow the proper procedures to attack M.’s credibility on the basis of her alleged past sexual 

conduct. The California Court of Appeal denied this claim as follows: 

The trial court aborted defense counsel's attempt to discredit M., 

suggesting she had lied to a police officer about her sexual history. 

On its own motion, the trial court interrupted cross-examination and 

pointed out that defense counsel had failed to follow the procedures 

set forth in Evidence Code section 782 as a condition precedent to 

introducing evidence of a victim's prior sexual conduct. Defense 

counsel declined an invitation to comment. The trial court struck 

M.'s answer to defense counsel's question and admonished the jury 

to disregard the question and answer. Defendant asserts his lawyer 

provided inadequate representation, and denied him his right to 

effective cross-examination and confrontation of M. in violation of 

the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 

A criminal defendant must demonstrate not only that counsel's 

performance was deficient but that "there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of 

the proceeding would have been different." (Strickland, supra, 466 

U.S. at p. 694.) Prejudice is a prerequisite to defendant's claim, a 

hurdle he is unable to surmount. 

Defendant exaggerates the weaknesses in M.'s testimony and 

ignores the strength of the corroboration offered by other witnesses. 

He suggests that the number of alleged episodes kept dribbling out 

and growing over time. He asserts she had the motive to lie to 

encourage her mother to divorce him and to thwart his threat of 

home schooling. Had the jurors known that she did not tell the 

whole truth to the investigating police officer about having had any 

sex with someone other than defendant, in defendant's view they 

would have disregarded her account entirely. Defendant's 

speculation is implausible. 

It is not surprising that a teenager would deny or minimize her past 

sexual conduct when confronted by a police officer. Her adolescent 

prudishness seems trite when compared to the strength of her 

testimony describing the innumerable sexual episodes initiated by 

defendant. She described, in convincing and shocking detail, how 

defendant forced himself on her repeatedly for many years and 

how, defenseless as a little girl, she was forced to engage in oral 

copulation, sexual intercourse, and sodomy in addition to enduring 

years of molestation. We reject defendant's contention that the jury 

would have ignored or discounted her testimony because, at the 

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time of her initial interview, she was not immediately forthcoming. 

Moreover, even if the jury had learned she lied, it is not reasonably 

probable they would have discounted K.'s, Angela's, and Kr.'s 

testimony, all of which soundly corroborated M.'s accounts. Indeed, 

K. testified that she remembered one night when she still shared a 

room with M. that defendant came into the room, climbed up on the 

top bunk, and the bunk rocked back and forth. K. blurted out her 

account that defendant had sexually abused her consistently since 

she was four or five years old as soon as her mother explained what 

had happened and without the opportunity to discuss the allegations 

with M. Any minor inconsistencies in her testimony pale in 

comparison to the specificity she provided and the grim reality that 

defendant victimized her on such a regular basis over such a long 

period of time. 

Of course, Angela's testimony established defendant's proclivity for 

having sex with young girls, since he made his young girlfriend, 

and later wife, dress like a little girl with pigtails and play-act that 

he was her daddy. Given K.'s and Angela's testimony, there is no 

reasonable probability that the jury would have disbelieved all of 

M.'s testimony even if she had had another sexual relationship and 

lied about it. 

And finally, defendant's own daughter corroborated M.'s testimony 

that something very unseemly had occurred. Arriving in M.'s 

bedroom unannounced, she observed her father's face close to M.'s 

crotch and M.'s legs perched on his shoulders. It is true that 

defendant took every opportunity to impeach Angela and Kr. by 

attacking their mental health and their motives to lie. The jury was 

made well aware of any liabilities they had. But in considering the 

testimony cumulatively, the evidence is consistent and 

overwhelming that defendant preyed on M. and K. in a manner 

consistent with his long-standing attraction to young girls. For all 

these reasons, there is simply no reasonable probability that the 

result of the proceeding would have been any different even if 

counsel had complied with Evidence Code section 782, and even if, 

however unlikely, the trial court had admitted the evidence to 

discredit M. 

Hawes, 2012 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7307, at **15–19. 

 Trial counsel may have made a mistake in failing to follow the proper procedure to attack 

M.’s credibility pursuant to California Evidence Code section 782, but she declined the court’s 

invitation to comment and proceeded with another line of questioning on cross-examination. 

Trial counsel may have made this tactical decision to press forward and to rely on the previous 

inconsistent statements M. had made rather than to paint a more specific picture that M. 

consistently lied about sexual matters. She may have decided that cornering a 17-year-old 

witness—who just described, in detail, numerous instances of molest—about a collateral matter 

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might have made her look like a bully in the eyes of the jury. Whatever the reasoning was behind 

the decision to forgo exploration into M.’s sexual conduct, it cannot be said that the decision fell 

below an objective standard of reasonableness. As explained by the California Court of Appeal, 

M.’s testimony was corroborated by several witnesses. As a result, petitioner cannot demonstrate 

prejudice resulting from trial counsel’s misstep, if it even can be called that. Petitioner has not 

satisfied the requirements of Strickland, thus, failed to show that the California Court of Appeal’s 

decision on this claim as objectively unreasonable. This claim should be denied. 

5. Claims 7 & 8 – Failure to Subpoena M.’s Computer and Social Media Activity 

Petitioner contends trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain information from 

M.’s electronic and social media activity. He asserts that, at the time of his arrest, M. described 

her life as “perfect” on her Facebook profile and that emails and messages between M. and her 

friends would support petitioner’s theory that M.’s story was “ever changing.” Petitioner made 

these claims in his state habeas corpus petition. Resp’t’s Lod. Doc. 11, Grounds 8 & 15. The 

trial court rejected these claims stating that petitioner did not attach any evidence of what counsel 

could have discovered by conducting such an investigation into records from M.’s Facebook 

activity, her computer, or her cell phone. Resp’t’s Lod. Doc. 12, at 2. 

It is not surprising that a teenage girl would describe her life as “perfect” on social media 

but in reality experience horrific circumstances at home. Here, M had resisted telling anyone 

about the molest for a lengthy period of time. It is therefore not surprising, or worthy of an 

evidentiary hearing, to view records where M had not presented herself as an unwilling 

participant in years of abuse. A recordation of abuse would have meant that M had determined to 

turn her stepfather over to authorities—a decision that would inevitably involve M in reliving all 

of the abuse, and having such abuse become the focal point of her life for months in a criminal 

process. This is a decision that is seldom made at the start of an abusive relationship. 

 Moreover, it is beyond cavil that most youths like to portray themselves as attractive to 

other persons. A recoded chronology of being abused would have made M very unattractive to 

many persons, making most persons shy away—either not wanting to be vicariously involved in 

what was undeniably a criminal situation, or not having a relationship with someone who would 

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be most certainly psychologically scarred. Reflecting that her life was “perfect” on social media 

is no different than her saying “good,” when asked by anyone “how are you doing?” 

 In addition, petitioner’s reasoning for seeking M.’s text messages—that she texted her 

friends a lot—does not describe a unique characteristic of M. Indeed M., like any teenage girl 

with a cell phone, sent text messages to her friends. There is no indication that a review of those 

text messages would have lead to relevant, exculpatory evidence. See above discussion. Trial 

counsel’s decision to not review these messages cannot be said to have been objectively 

unreasonable. Furthermore, similar to Claim 6 which also related to information that would 

attack M.’s credibility, petitioner failed to demonstrate prejudice, as even if those records 

revealed what petitioner said they would, several other witnesses corroborated M.’s testimony. 

Accordingly, these claims should be denied. 

6. Claims 9 & 11– Failure to Interview or Call Witnesses 

Petitioner claims trial counsel was ineffective for failing to interview or call M.’s close 

friends as witnesses, all of whom could testify to M.’s propensity to lie, as well as failing to 

interview two alibi witnesses, whose testimony would have placed petitioner away from the 

alleged scene on the dates specified by K. Petitioner made these claims in his state habeas corpus 

petition. Resp’t’s Lod. Doc. 11, Grounds 6 & 9. The trial court rejected these claims stating that 

petitioner did not attach any evidence of what counsel could have discovered had she interviewed 

these witnesses. Resp’t’s Lod. Doc. 12, at 2. 

As the state court reasonably concluded, these claims fail because petitioner has not 

provided declarations from M.’s friends or from the alibi witnesses, demonstrating their 

willingness to testify and the substance of their testimony. See Allen v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 979, 

1002 n.2 (9th Cir. 2004) (district court correctly disregarded counsel's failure to call witnesses 

because petitioner made no showing that they would have testified); Dows v. Wood, 211 F.3d 

480, 486–87 (9th Cir. 2000) (petitioner presented no evidence that alleged alibi witness actually 

existed or that they would have provided helpful testimony; i.e. presented no affidavit from the 

witness); Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 2001) (petitioner failed to identify what 

witness would have said, thus his claim was wholly speculative); United States v. Berry, 814 F.2d 

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1406, 1409 (9th Cir. 1989) (petitioner “offers no indication of what these witnesses would have 

testified to, or how their testimony might have changed the outcome of the hearing”). 

Accordingly, these claims should be denied. 

7. Claim 10– Failure to Retain an Expert Regarding SAFE Interview Techniques 

Petitioner claims the SAFE interview technique asks suggestive questions with “yes” or 

“no” answers. He argues that defense counsel should have obtained an expert on the interview 

technique to poke holes in the reliability of the interview. However, petitioner has provided no 

declaration from an expert supporting this claim. Speculation about what an expert could have 

said is not enough to establish prejudice. See Grisby, 130 F.3d at 373. Accordingly, this claim 

should be denied. 

8. Claim 12 – Failure to Object and Assert Privilege on Petitioner’s Behalf 

Petitioner contends trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object on marital privilege 

grounds to questions posed to Angela Bryant, petitioner’s ex-wife, regarding their sex life. The 

court of appeal rejected this claim as follows: 

Finally, defendant complains that his lawyer did not assert his 

marital privilege to keep out the testimony of his ex-wife about his 

deviant sexual practices before and during marriage. His claim fails 

again because he cannot demonstrate the requisite prejudice. 

The Attorney General does not dispute that oral and written 

confidential communications between spouses are privileged. 

(Evid. Code, § 980; People v. Cleveland (2004) 32 Cal.4th 704, 

742-743.) The problem with defendant's argument, however, is that 

the record discloses the same play-acting occurred both before and 

during the marriage. Thus, even if defendant's lawyer had asserted 

the privilege and successfully excluded evidence that defendant told 

his wife to dress up like a little girl, put her hair in pigtails, and 

crawl into bed and pretend she was asleep so he could sneak in and 

rub his penis on her back and buttocks, the same evidence would 

have been admitted that he made those statements before they were 

married. The privilege does not apply to descriptions of sex acts or 

communications between defendant and Angela before they were 

married. (Rubio v. Superior Court (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 1343, 

1347; People v. Dorsey (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 706, 717.) 

We disagree with defendant's representation of the record. He 

insists that the evidence that he asked, suggested, directed, or 

ordered Angela to play-act before they were married is minimal. 

Not so. Angela testified that she had dated defendant on and off for 

about a year before their brief, nine-month marriage. The 

prosecutor specifically asked: "During the time that you were 

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indicating Mr. Hawes on and off again for a year and married to 

him for approximately nine months, do you have a recollection of 

how many times you play acted this situation being a little girl?" 

Angela responded, "A lot. I don't -- I can't say how many times. It 

was a lot." She then described the acts again in some detail. 

Regarding the time during which they were dating and not married, 

the prosecutor asked: "And then what were your instructions? What 

were you to do, Ms. Bryant, when Mr. Hawes snuck into the bed 

like that and did that to you?" She testified: "He would ask me 

questions, 'Has daddy's little girl been bad?' You know, 'Does 

daddy's little girl like this?' Those kinds of things. And I was 

supposed to say yes and call him daddy while we were having sex." 

To emphasize the point that it was defendant who communicated 

these instructions, the prosecutor clarified: "And these responses 

that you gave him saying yes, were these at his direction?" She 

replied, "Yes, ma'am." Leaving no room for doubt, the prosecutor 

again emphasized: "He told you to say these things?" Again she 

responded, "Yes ma'am." 

Whether or not defendant communicated the same instructions 

during the marriage as he did before is of little, if any, significance. 

The power of the testimony is not when it occurred, but the fact that 

defendant demonstrated his obsession for sex with young girls 

many years before he acted on his obsession with M. and K. Since 

the record demonstrates that this behavior occurred while he was 

dating Angela, the privilege would not have kept the damaging 

testimony from the jury. As a result, defendant fails to demonstrate 

it is reasonably probable that his lawyer's failure to invoke the 

marital privilege would have changed the outcome. 

Hawes, 2012 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7307, at **19–21. As with many of petitioner’s 

ineffective assistance of counsel claims, this claim fails to show any prejudice at all. As the Court 

of Appeal explained, Ms. Bryant testified that petitioner’s penchant for play acting and role 

playing began when they were dating. As such, even if trial counsel had objected to this 

evidence, such an objection would not have precluded Ms. Bryant from testifying as to what 

happened before they were married. Accordingly, this claim should be denied. 

9. Claim 14 – Failure to Conduct Forensic Analysis on Petitioner’s Computer 

Petitioner contends trial counsel was ineffective because she failed to obtain information 

from petitioner’s computer hard drive. He argues that if an individual is sexually interested in 

children, that interest almost always is accompanied by child pornography. He claims there was 

no child pornography on his computer and thus he has proof that he has no sexual interest in 

children. Petitioner raised this claim in his state habeas corpus petition. Resp’t’s Lod. Doc. 11, 

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Ground 10. The trial court rejected this claim stating that petitioner did not attach any 

documentation of what counsel could have discovered had she obtained a mirror image of 

petitioner’s hard drive. Resp’t’s Lod. Doc. 12, at 2. Even if the jury had this mirror image, it 

cannot be said that petitioner’s “absence of evidence” argument would have provided a 

reasonable probability of changing the result. That is, even if petitioner’s computer had no 

evidence of child pornography, there were several witnesses who testified that he in fact had a 

sexual interest in children and acted on that interest. As such, petitioner cannot establish 

prejudice and this claim should be dismissed. 

10. Claim 15 – Failure to Subpoena Comcast’s Operational Records 

Petitioner contends trial counsel was ineffective because she failed to subpoena records 

from Comcast showing when episodes of Star Trek were televised. He argues that these records 

would contradict K.’s testimony that petitioner would molest her while they were on the family 

room couch watching Star Trek because the show aired at a time when petitioner’s wife was 

home. As such, so the argument goes, it would have been impossible for the acts of molestation 

committed on K. to occur as she testified. 

Petitioner raised this claim in his state habeas corpus petition. Resp’t’s Lod. Doc. 11, 

Ground 7. The trial court rejected this claim stating that petitioner did not attach any 

documentation of what counsel could have discovered had she obtained these records from 

Comcast. Resp’t’s Lod. Doc. 12, at 2. Even if the jury had this information, it cannot be said that 

would have provided a reasonable probability of changing the result. That is, even if Star Trek 

had in fact aired at a time when Rebecca Hawes was home, K. testified that petitioner molested 

her in his bedroom and in her bedroom as well. As such, petitioner cannot establish prejudice and 

this claim should be dismissed. 

11. Claims 16 & 17– Failure to Obtain Rape Kits and to Secure a Lie Detector Test 

Petitioner claims trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain a rape kit from K. and 

M. and for failing to secure a lie detector test. He asserts that on the day of his arrest, K. alleged 

petitioner had molested her that afternoon. As such, a forensic kit would have been able to show 

his innocence. Petitioner raised these claims in his state habeas corpus petition. Resp’t’s Lod. 

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Doc. 11, Ground 5 & 14. The trial court rejected these claims as follows: 

Petitioner also complains that trial counsel failed to demand that a 

rape kit be prepared for one or both victims. However, there is no 

indication that at the time that counsel was appointed (on August 

24, 2010, at least four days after the latest charged offense) a rape 

kit or examination would have revealed any relevant evidence. In 

addition, Petitioner argues that counsel failed to present the 

prosecutor with Petitioner’s offer to submit to a lie detector test. 

Again, there is no indication that the prosecutor would have 

accepted the offer or what the lie detector test would have revealed. 

Resp’t’s Lod. Doc. 12, at 2–3. 

 As the state court concluded, it is not even clear if any kind of forensic testing of K. or M. 

would have been feasible at the time counsel was appointed. Furthermore and as respondent 

notes, counsel did not have the power to compel M. or K. to submit to such testing under 

California law. Cal. Penal Code § 13823.95(b). Again, the decision to perform forensic testing is 

a tactical one and as noted above (see supra Section II.B.1), there may have been several strategic 

reasons for not seeking this testing. As to prejudice and petitioner’s desire for a polygraph test, 

the effect of that test would presumably be that petitioner shows he answered the prosecution’s 

questions truthfully. Petitioner had this opportunity when he testified at trial. As such, this claim 

should be dismissed. 

12. Claim 18 – Failure to Communicate with Petitioner 

Petitioner contends trial counsel failed to communicate and consult with petitioner in 

order to present a defense. Petitioner presented this claim in a state habeas petition (Resp’t’s Lod. 

Doc. 11, Ground 18) which the state court rejected as follows: 

This question was substantively raised during Petitioner’s Marsden 

motion and subsequent hearing. Although counsel conceded that 

there was a lack of communication because of Petitioner’s mistrust 

of counsel, the trial court concluded that despite their difficulties, 

there had not been a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship 

that resulted in an irreconcilable conflict. The Court of Appeal 

agreed. Since Petitioner has not shown that trial counsel’s conduct 

was objectively unreasonable or that any of the acts or omissions 

affected the outcome of the case, he has not shown that he is 

entitled to any relief. 

Resp’t’s Lod. Doc. 12, at 3. Contrary to petitioner’s claim, there is no indication that trial counsel 

ignored petitioner’s questions or failed to communicate important developments, such as a plea 

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offer from the prosecution. See United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1465–69 (9th Cir. 1994) 

(ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to communicate plea offer). 

 There were four sets of complaints which trial counsel addressed to the trial court’s 

satisfaction. First, petitioner stated that trial counsel had not visited him enough to prepare for the 

case. (1 CT 35). In response, trial counsel noted that she had spent time throughout the case and, 

as a practice, does not let a month pass without seeing her clients. (1 CT 46). Petitioner was also 

dissatisfied with the fact that he could not view the video recording of K.’s SAFE interview. (1 

CT 37). Trial counsel explained that, for some time, the defense panel policies prevented her 

from showing the video. (1 CT 40). Once those policies lifted that restriction, she put in a 

request to show the video but had not heard back on the decision of that request. (1 CT 41). In 

addition, petitioner stated that trial counsel failed to subpoena certain witnesses. (1 CT 41). Trial 

counsel had, in fact, hired an investigator to track down these witnesses. (1 CT 48–49). That 

investigator was unsuccessful, despite several attempts, in obtaining statements from some of 

these witnesses. (1 CT 48–49). Finally, as the state court noted, it was clear that there was a lack 

of trust between petitioner and trial counsel. (1 CT 41). Apparently, petitioner simply did not 

believe trial counsel’s responses to his questions. (1 CT 41, 50–51). However, the trial and 

appellate courts found that while the relationship between trial counsel and petitioner was 

strained, it did not rise to irreconcilable conflict. This finding was not objectively unreasonable. 

Furthermore, petitioner cannot demonstrate prejudice. As discussed supra, petitioner’s claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel, some of which involved trial counsel’s tactical decisions to not 

introduce testimony from certain witnesses and to not seek testing of physical evidence, should be 

denied. Thus, petitioner’s claims that the breakdown in communication resulted in trial counsel 

rendering constitutionally ineffective assistance should be denied. 

13. Claim 19 – Cumulative Error in Legal Representation 

Petitioner argues that he is entitled to habeas relief based on the cumulative errors of trial 

counsel which effectively rendered representation nonexistent. Petitioner presented this claim 

before the state court on habeas. Resp’t’s Lod. Doc. 11, Ground 16. The state court denied 

petitioner’s claim concluding that petitioner “has not shown that trial counsel’s conduct was 

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objectively unreasonable or that any of the acts or omissions affected the outcome of the case . . .” 

Resp’t’s Lod. Doc. No. 12 at 3. “Cumulative error applies where, ‘although no single trial error 

examined in isolation is sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal, the cumulative effect of 

multiple errors may still prejudice a defendant.’ ” Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939, 957 (9th 

Cir. 2002), quoting United States v. Frederick, 78 F.3d 1370, 1381 (9th Cir. 1996). In the instant 

case, “[b]ecause there is no single constitutional error in this case, there is nothing to accumulate 

to a level of a constitutional violation.” Id. The denial of this claim by the state court was not an 

unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court authority. Accordingly, this claim 

should be denied. 

III. Claim 20 – Failure to Appoint New Counsel 

Petitioner claims that the trial court should have appointed him new counsel at the 

Marsden hearing. The California Court of Appeal rejected petitioner’s claim as follows: 

Defendant was given the opportunity to vent his complaints about 

his lawyer as justification for his request for a new one. He does not 

suggest otherwise. He recognizes that a criminal defendant is not 

the boss when it comes to trial tactics. Nor can he complain about 

conflicts he manufactures. (Smith, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 606.) Yet 

he insists he was entitled to substitute his lawyer because he was 

embroiled in such an irreconcilable conflict with her that ineffective 

representation was likely to result. (People v. Abilez (2007) 41 

Cal.4th 472, 488.) 

At his Marsden hearing, defendant listed his grievances. In short, he 

complained that his lawyer did not spend enough time with him, did 

not follow his directions about securing witnesses, did not watch a 

videotape of K.'s SAFE interview with him, did not answer his 

questions, and did not subpoena the medical records about his 

prescription for Levitra. 

Defendant's lawyer was an experienced advocate, and more than 

half of her caseload involved sexual abuse cases. She disputed some 

of defendant's allegations and explained others. She assured the 

court she had spent much more time with defendant than he 

represented. She provided defendant with copies of discovery, 

including witness statements and a summary of K.'s SAFE 

interview. Jail policies prevented a viewing of digital recordings. 

Her investigator had worked closely with defendant, followed his 

leads although they did not bear fruit, visited defendant although he 

did not get paid for jail visits, and had investigated matters at 

defendant's request that the investigator believed were irrelevant. 

That is not to say that the relationship was without friction. 

Defendant's lawyer explained that defendant did not trust her and 

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accused her of lying to him. Often the visits became 

confrontational. Because defendant would not believe her, she 

conceded there was a lack of communication. 

The trial court thus was confronted with a rather garden-variety 

credibility contest. The court believed defendant's lawyer. The court 

further found that she had properly represented defendant and 

would continue to do so throughout the course of the trial. The 

court concluded, "I find that there has not been a breakdown in the 

relationship between Mr. Hawes and Ms. Franco and [sic] such a 

kind that would make it impossible for counsel to properly 

represent Mr. Hawes." 

Discounting, if not ignoring, the exceedingly deferential scope of 

appellate review, defendant insists the irreconcilable conflict in the 

relationship entitled him to a new lawyer. We disagree. We can find 

no abuse of discretion in this record. 

From the trial court's up close vantage point, defense counsel met 

her professional responsibilities to her client and provided proper 

representation. To the extent the court believed the lawyer and not 

defendant, we must defer to the court's credibility determinations. 

Defense counsel spent adequate time with defendant, respected his 

suggestions, and directed her investigator to work closely with him. 

Yet she remained in charge and was not obligated to succumb to his 

every wish and desire, or to adopt his ill informed trial strategy. 

Moreover, we must also defer to the court's assessment that the 

relationship had not deteriorated to the point that adequate 

representation was in jeopardy. Everyone recognized that 

communication between lawyer and client was strained. But we 

reject defendant's assertion that his demands, accusations, and 

reprisals entitled him to a new lawyer. There is certainly ample 

evidence here to suggest that he alone had manufactured the 

conflict. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by shielding the 

lawyer and the justice system from defendant's manipulation. 

Hawes, 2012 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7307, at **12–15. 

Here, the ultimate constitutional question is whether an irreconcilable conflict between 

trial counsel and petitioner in fact existed. See Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1026 (9th Cir. 

2000) (en banc). As the court of appeal explained, petitioner was given the opportunity to discuss 

his concerns regarding his trial attorney. (1 CT 34–38). These included failing to follow his 

suggestions, such as which witnesses to secure and what to investigate, and failing to spend 

enough time with petitioner. (1 CT 34–38). The trial court then asked trial counsel for her 

experience revealing that she had been a criminal defense attorney for 13 years and half of her 

practice consisted of sexual abuse cases. (1 CT 38). Trial counsel revealed that she hired an 

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investigator to interview the potential witnesses petitioner identified and spoke with petitioner 

about his attempts to interview those potential witnesses. (1 CT 49). Trial counsel noted there 

was a lack of communication and that visits were confrontational. (1 CT 41, 46). After hearing 

from petitioner and trial counsel, the trial court found that trial counsel had properly presented 

petitioner up to that point and that the relationship had no broken so as to prevent trial counsel 

from properly representing petitioner. The state court decision rejecting this claim was not 

unreasonable. Accordingly, this claim should be denied. 

IV. Claim 21 - Admission of Privileged Marital Communications 

A. Exhaustion 

Respondent argues that this claim is unexhausted because petitioner failed to present it 

before the California Supreme Court. The exhaustion of available state remedies is a prerequisite 

to a federal court's consideration of claims presented in habeas corpus proceedings. See Rose v. 

Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); see also 

Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006). A petitioner 

satisfies the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with a full and fair 

opportunity to consider all claims before presenting them to the federal court. Picard v. Connor, 

404 U.S. 270, 276, 92 S.Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 

1086 (9th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021, 106 S.Ct. 3336, 92 L.Ed.2d 741 (1986). A 

petitioner is deemed to have exhausted state remedies if he makes a fair presentation of his 

federal claims to the state courts. Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1155–56. Fair 

presentation requires that a state's highest court has “a fair opportunity to consider [an appellant's 

constitutional claim] and to correct that asserted constitutional defect.” Picard, 404 U.S. at 276; 

see also Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir.1999) (requiring that petitioner “alert” the 

state courts of the constitutional issues that are on appeal). 

Contrary to respondent’s claim, petitioner fairly raised this claim in front of the California 

Supreme Court and thus this claim is exhausted. On appeal, petitioner argued that the trial court 

abused its discretion under California law and also rendered the trial fundamentally unfair in 

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment by permitting evidence of petitioner’s sexual role playing 

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with Ms. Bryant. Resp’t’s Lod. Doc. 5, at 48. In his petition for review before the California 

Supreme Court, petitioner argued that the trial court should have excluded this evidence under 

California Evidence Code section 352 and that its admission in the trial court was a violation of 

petitioner’s right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. Resp’t’s Lod. Doc. 9, 

at 8. Accordingly, the undersigned is satisfied that petitioner fairly presented this claim to the 

California Supreme Court. 

B. Background 

The Third District Court of Appeal addressed this claim as follows: 

According to defendant, if his lawyer is not to blame for allowing 

the jury to hear the evidence of his play-acting a dad having sex 

with his little girl, then the trial court is to blame for allowing 

evidence of prior conduct that is far more prejudicial than 

probative. He argues that admission of the evidence rendered the 

trial fundamentally unfair. The essence of his argument is that his 

play-acting with a consenting adult is not illegal and not indicative 

of an intent to act out the fantasy on a real child. 

We review the trial court's admission of the evidence pursuant to 

Evidence Code sections 1101, subdivision (b) and 352 for an abuse 

of discretion. (People v. Frazier (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 30, 42.) The 

trial court explained that the evidence should be admitted under 

section 352 because its probative value substantially outweighed 

the prejudice emanating from disclosure to the jury. Moreover, it 

was also admissible pursuant to section 1101, subdivision (b), as 

the court explained: "On an intent analysis, I find that the 

information is relevant in that the obvious nature of the sexual 

offenses alleged in the current case involves allegations of the 

defendant [engaging in] sexual activity with young girls ranging in 

age from, I think, as young as 5 or 6, up to their early to mid teens. 

"Consequently, engaging in sexual activity with an adult who is 

herself portraying a young child both, physically in terms of the 

nature of her dress and visually in terms of the manipulation of her 

hair into pig tails, to include verbal references to calling her sexual 

name daddy is highly relevant and probative on the issue of intent 

necessary to commit the alleged offenses." 

We can add little to the court's apt analysis. We reject defendant's 

suggestion that because the conduct was legal and involved a 22-

year-old woman, it was not probative of his intent with respect to 

young girls. His suggestion ignores the obvious significance of the 

fact that he had his young girlfriend dress like she was a little girl, 

pigtails and all. All the more more damaging is the evidence that he 

made her call him "daddy" during the sexual encounters, thereby 

drawing an even stronger parallel between his prior play-acting and 

his later predatory behavior. We certainly cannot say the trial court 

abused its discretion by admitting evidence that defendant engaged 

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in conduct with such a high degree of similarity to the conduct 

alleged against him. Its probative value is unassailable; that a man 

who would pretend to crawl into bed with a little girl actually did so 

many years later may reasonably be inferred. 

Hawes, 2012 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7307, at **22–24. 

C. Analysis 

A federal writ of habeas corpus is not available for alleged error in the interpretation or 

application of state law. Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. ---, 131 S.Ct. 13, 16, 178 L.Ed.2d 276 

(2010). Absent some federal constitutional violation, a violation of state law does not provide a 

basis for habeas relief. Id. A petitioner may not “transform a state-law issue into a federal one” 

merely by asserting a violation of the federal constitution. Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 

(9th Cir. 1997). Rather, petitioner must show that the decision of the California Court of Appeals 

“violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Little v. Crawford, 449 F.3d 

1075, 1083 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480 

(1991)). Accordingly, to the extent petitioner’s due process claims are based on alleged 

violations of state law governing the admissibility of evidence, they should be rejected. 

A state court’s evidentiary ruling, even if erroneous, is grounds for federal habeas relief 

only if it renders the state proceedings so fundamentally unfair as to violate due process. Holley 

v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009); Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 

(9th Cir. 1991). Even so, as the Ninth Circuit has observed: 

The Supreme Court has made very few rulings regarding the 

admission of evidence as a violation of due process. Although the 

Court has been clear that a writ should be issued when 

constitutional errors have rendered the trial fundamentally unfair 

(citation omitted), it has not yet made a clear ruling that admission 

of irrelevant or overtly prejudicial evidence constitutes a due 

process violation sufficient to warrant issuance of the writ. 

Holley, 568 F.3d at 1101. Therefore, “under AEDPA, even clearly erroneous admissions of 

evidence that render a trial fundamentally unfair may not permit the grant of federal habeas 

corpus relief if not forbidden by ‘clearly established Federal law,’ as laid out by the Supreme 

Court.” Id. On the basis of these authorities, the state court’s rejection of petitioner’s due process 

claim here does not support federal habeas relief under AEDPA because the admission of 

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evidence at trial regarding sexual role-playing between petitioner and his ex-wife did not violate 

any clearly established federal law. See id. 

V. Claim 22 - Sufficiency of Evidence 

Petitioner contends there was insufficient evidence to convict him on Count 12, that he 

willfully and unlawfully orally copulated K. between August 1, 2007 and June 1, 2008. 1 CT 29. 

The Third District Court of Appeal rejecting this claim as follows: 

Defendant's final challenge is to the sufficiency of the evidence that 

he orally copulated K. as charged. She testified that when she was 

in the third grade and not yet 10 years old, defendant made her take 

her pants and underwear off and sit on his shoulders. With his face 

in her vagina, he shoved her up against a wall and started licking 

her. At trial she did testify that the oral copulation took place in the 

master bedroom, but she did not identify in which of the houses 

they had lived that it occurred. 

Defendant, however, points to excerpts from her SAFE interview in 

which K. had also described defendant's putting her up against the 

wall in his bedroom and orally copulating her vagina by "licking it 

and sucking on it and everything." She thought she was in the third 

grade. During the interview, she stated she was "pretty sure" it 

happened when they lived at a particular address, but she also stated 

that it happened at the other house, too, and "I'd have to say like a 

hundred or more times." Because her mother testified they lived at 

the address K. named between July 2008 and July 2009, and the 

information charged that one act of oral copulation occurred 

between August 1, 2007, and June 1, 2008, defendant contends 

there is insufficient evidence to support the conviction. 

Defendant is well aware of the limited scope of appellate review of 

a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. We review the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and presume 

every fact the jurors could have reasonably deduced from the 

evidence in support of the judgment. (People v. Griffin (2004) 33 

Cal.4th 1015, 1028.) 

The Supreme Court has provided additional guidance when 

reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence of a child's generic 

testimony. In People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 315 (Jones), 

the court explained: "[I]n determining the sufficiency of generic 

testimony, we must focus on factors other than the youth of the 

victim/witness. Does the victim's failure to specify precise date, 

time, place or circumstance render generic testimony insufficient? 

Clearly not. As many of the cases make clear, the particular details 

surrounding a child molestation charge are not elements of the 

offense and are unnecessary to sustain a conviction. [Citations.] [¶] 

The victim, of course, must describe the kind of act or acts 

committed with sufficient specificity, both to assure that unlawful 

conduct indeed has occurred and to differentiate between the 

various types of proscribed conduct (e.g., lewd conduct, 

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intercourse, oral copulation or sodomy). Moreover, the victim must 

describe the number of acts committed with sufficient certainty to 

support each of the counts alleged in the information or indictment 

(e.g., 'twice a month' or 'every time we went camping'). Finally, the 

victim must be able to describe the general time period in which 

these acts occurred (e.g., 'the summer before my fourth grade,' or 

'during each Sunday morning after he came to live with us'), to 

assure the acts were committed within the applicable limitation 

period. Additional details regarding the time, place or circumstance 

of the various assaults may assist in assessing the credibility or 

substantiality of the victim's testimony, but are not essential to 

sustain a conviction." (Id. at pp. 315--316.) 

K.'s testimony satisfies the Jones criteria. She described the kind of 

act with sufficient specificity; that is, she described how defendant 

licked her vagina. She described the general time period as being 

when she was in third grade. She described one particular incident 

of being thrust up against the wall in defendant's master bedroom 

with particular specificity. Although there was some ambiguity as 

to whether that incident occurred in one master bedroom or another, 

the precise location was not essential to sustain the conviction. K. 

provided sufficient information that it occurred when she was in 

third grade, and from that testimony the jury could infer that 

defendant orally copulated her within the time period alleged in the 

information. His challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence fails. 

Hawes, 2012 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7307, at **24–27. 

When a challenge is brought alleging insufficient evidence, federal habeas corpus relief is 

available if it is found that upon the record evidence adduced at trial, viewed in the light most 

favorable to the prosecution, no rational trier of fact could have found “the essential elements of 

the crime” proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 

2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Jackson established a two-step inquiry for considering a challenge 

to a conviction based on sufficiency of the evidence. United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 

1164 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 

First, a reviewing court must consider the evidence presented at 

trial in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Jackson, 443 

U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781. . . [W]hen “faced with a record of 

historical facts that supports conflicting inferences” a reviewing 

court “must presume—even if it does not affirmatively appear in 

the record—that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor 

of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.” Id. at 326, 99 

S.Ct. 2781; see also McDaniel, 130 S.Ct. at 673–74. 

Second, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the prosecution, the reviewing court must determine whether this 

evidence, so viewed, is adequate to allow “any rational trier of fact 

[to find] the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 

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doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781. 

[¶] . . .[¶] 

At this second step, we must reverse the verdict if the evidence of 

innocence, or lack of evidence of guilt, is such that all rational fact 

finders would have to conclude that the evidence of guilt fails to 

establish every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

See id. 

Id. at 1164–65. 

Superimposed on these already stringent insufficiency standards is the AEDPA 

requirement that even if a federal court were to initially find on its own that no reasonable jury 

should have arrived at its conclusion, the federal court must also determine that the state appellate 

court could not have affirmed the verdict under the Jackson standard in the absence of an 

unreasonable determination. Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274 (9th Cir. 2005). 

A federal habeas court determines sufficiency of the evidence in reference to the 

substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 

324 n. 16; Chein v. Shumsky, 373 F.3d 978, 983 (9th Cir. 2004). California Penal Code section 

288.7(b) provides “[a]ny person 18 years of age or older who engages in oral copulation or sexual 

penetration, as defined in Section 289, with a child who is 10 years of age or younger is guilty of 

a felony . . . .” As supplemented by People v. Jones, discussed and cited in the appellate court 

opinion, K.’s testimony was sufficient to establish the elements of this crime. Any rational trier 

of fact could have believed K.’s testimony, which described the kinds of acts petitioner 

committed, the approximate number of times it occurred and the general time period when the 

molests occurred. Certainly, the appellate court was not AEDPA unreasonable in finding the 

evidence sufficient. As such, petitioner’s sufficiency of evidence claim should be denied. 

VI. Claim 23 - Brady Claim 

Petitioner contends the district attorney failed to disclose exculpatory material consisting 

of DNA evidence, rape/assault kit evidence and computer data. He raised this claim in a state 

habeas petition which the trial court denied as follows: 

A petitioner seeking relief by way of habeas corpus has the burden 

of stating a prima facie case. (In re Bower (1985) 38 Cal.3d 865, 

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872.) A petition for writ of habeas corpus should attach as exhibits 

all reasonably available documentary evidence or affidavits 

supporting the claim. (People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474.) 

The prosecution has the duty to disclose any material exculpatory 

evidence to the defense. (Pen. Code, § 1054.1(e); Brady v. 

Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83.) The failure to disclose Brady 

evidence is only prejudicial if the evidence was “material,” – 

meaning that that there is a reasonably probability of a different 

result. (People v. Kasim (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1382.) 

Petitioner argues that the prosecutor withheld exculpatory evidence: 

that no DNA evidence was located from the evidence seized from 

Petitioner’s residence that would support one victim’s statement; 

that no DNA evidence was obtained from any rape kits; and that no 

child pornography was located on Petitioner’s computer. Petitioner 

has not attached any of the evidence that was purportedly withheld. 

Nor has he shown that it is “exculpatory”: absence of evidence is 

not necessarily exculpatory. Finally, Petitioner has not shown that 

the purported evidence was material. In light of the fact that 

defense counsel could have pointed to the absence of evidence, that 

Petitioner testified in his own defense denying all of the charges, 

and that the evidence against Petitioner was characterized by the 

Court of Appeal as “overwhelming [evidence] that defendant 

preyed on M. and K. in a manner consistent with his long-standing 

attraction to young girls,” he has not shown a reasonable probability 

of a different result. 

Resp’t’s Lod. Doc. 12, at 1–2. 

A Brady claim contains three elements: “the evidence at issue must be favorable to the 

accused, either because it is exculpatory or because it is impeaching; [the] evidence must have 

been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” 

Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691, 124 S.Ct. 1256, 157 L.Ed.2d 1166 (2004) (citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted). But it is not just any prejudice that will be sufficient to make 

the undisclosed evidence material. “Evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability 

that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different. A reasonable probability of a different result exists when the government's evidentiary 

suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.” Jones v. Ryan, 733 F.3d 825, 

837 (9th Cir. 2013) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

It is insufficient for a federal court in habeas to make a materiality decision on a de novo 

basis. Rather, the ultimate inquiry here is whether “fairminded jurists” could not agree with the 

state supreme court decision that the alleged withheld information in this case was not actionable 

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or was immaterial. Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 786. 

Petitioner has not indicated that this allegedly withheld evidence even existed. First, 

Sergeant Brian Dean, the lead detective on this case, testified that he did not process the physical 

evidence he retrieved, which included petitioner’s bedding, for DNA or fingerprints. (1 RT 405). 

As to the rape/assault kit, petitioner admits that one never existed because he claimed his trial 

counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain one. See Claim 16. Finally, as to the computer data, 

there is no indication that the data was copied or retrieved. Again, he admits as much in claiming 

that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain M.’s electronic and social media activity 

(Claims 7 and 8) and for failing to obtain an image of his hard drive (Claim 14). 

In effect, petitioner’s intended claim appears to be a non-preservation of evidence claim. 

See, Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988). As such, petitioner’s intended claim is 

unexhausted. Moreover, petitioner has failed to set forth any facts regarding an intentional 

destruction of evidence as required by Youngblood. With respect to his stated Brady claim, 

petitioner failed to meet the first element of a Brady claim and, thus, the state court’s decision 

was not objectively unreasonable. This claim should be denied. 

VII. Evidentiary Hearing 

Petitioner has requested an evidentiary hearing be held to assess the prejudice he suffered 

in relation to his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. In Cullen v.Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388 

(2013), the United States Supreme Court held that federal review of habeas corpus claims under 

§ 2254(d)(1) is “limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on 

the merits.” 131 S.Ct. at 1398. See also Dow v. Virga, 729 F.3d 1041, 1043 (9th Cir. 2013). 

Therefore, evidence introduced at an evidentiary hearing in federal court may not be used to 

determine whether a state court decision on the merits of a petitioner's habeas claim violates § 

2254(d). Pinholster, at 1398. Following the decision in Pinholster, the holding of an evidentiary 

hearing in a federal habeas proceeding is futile unless the district court has first determined that 

the state court's adjudication of the petitioner's claims was contrary to or an unreasonable 

application of clearly established federal law, and therefore not entitled to deference under § 

2254(d)(1), or that the state court unreasonably determined the facts based upon the record before 

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it, and therefore deference is not warranted pursuant to § 2254(d)(2). 

Here, this undersigned has already determined that the state court's decision was not 

contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Nor was it an 

unreasonable determination of the facts. Therefore, petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing 

is denied. 

CONCLUSION 

 For all the foregoing reasons, the petition should be denied. Pursuant to Rule 11 of the 

Federal Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, this court must issue or deny a certificate of 

appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant. A certificate of appealability 

may issue only “if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitution 

right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). For the reasons set forth in these findings and recommendations, 

a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right has not been made in this case. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that petitioner’s request for an evidentiary 

hearing is denied. 

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 

1. Petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied; and 

2. The District Court decline to issue a certificate of appealability. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a documents should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections 

shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. Failure to file 

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: July 6, 2015 

 /s/ Gregory G. Hollows 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Case 2:14-cv-02715-KJM-GGH Document 26 Filed 07/08/15 Page 33 of 33