Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-05908/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-05908-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Martin Eng
Plaintiff
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Defendant
United Commercial Bank
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARTIN ENG,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED COMMERCIAL BANK, et

al,

Defendant(s).

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No. C09-5908 (BZ)

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO

REMAND CASE TO STATE COURT

Plaintiff and cross-defendant Martin Eng (“Eng”) seeks

remand to state court of this action against defendant and

cross-complainant Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

(“FDIC”), as receiver for United Commercial Bank. Since the

jurisdictional provisions of the Financial Institution Reform,

Recovery, and Enforcement Act (“FIRREA”) confer upon the FDIC

a right to litigate in federal court, and the FDIC’s removal

of the case from state court was timely, IT IS ORDERED that

Eng’s motion to remand this case to state court is DENIED. 

Eng brought two actions, which were consolidated, against

United Commercial Bank in state court for among other claims,

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fraud, breach of contract, and intentional infliction of

emotional distress. United Commercial Bank cross complained

for breach of contract and common counts. On December 8,

2009, the state court ordered that the FDIC, receiver for

United Commercial Bank, be substituted as defendant and crosscomplainant. On December 17, 2009, the FDIC removed the

action to this Court. 

The FIRREA, which describes the powers of the FDIC,

provides that “all suits of a civil nature . . . to which the

Corporation . . . is a party shall be deemed to arise under

the laws of the United States.” 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(A). 

The Act further provides that “the Corporation may . . .

remove any action, suit, or proceeding from a State court to

the appropriate United States district court before the end of

the 90-day period beginning on the date . . . the Corporation

is substituted as a party.” 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(B). 

Furthermore, the jurisdictional provisions of the FIRREA

confer upon the FDIC a right to litigate cases in federal

court. Kirkbride v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 933 F.2d 729, 731-32

(9th Cir. 1991). In Kirkbride, the Ninth Circuit reversed the

district court’s order remanding to state court a case against

the FDIC as receiver for an insolvent savings and loan

association, holding that the district court “erred by failing

to exercise its jurisdiction.” Id. at 735. The Ninth Circuit

explained that “the grant of subject matter jurisdiction

contained in FDIC’s removal statute evidences ‘Congress’

desire that cases involving FDIC should generally be heard and

decided by the federal courts.’” Id. at 731-32 (citing FDIC

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1 Eng did not argue that any exception specified in

section 1819(b)(2)(D) applies, and the Court is unaware of any

case law holding that the FDIC, as receiver of United

Commercial Bank falls under any exception.

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v. Nichols, 885 F.2d 633, 636 (9th Cir. 1989)). 

Here, the FDIC is receiver for United Commercial Bank and

a party to this action, and thus the jurisdictional provisions

of the FIRREA apply. Eng does not deny that the FDIC timely

removed this case. Therefore, the removal is proper and the

Court has subject matter jurisdiction.

Eng’s contention that this case should be remanded to

state court because it solely implicates state law fails to

address the jurisdictional provisions of the FIRREA. Not only

does Eng cite no authority for the proposition that state law

claims against the FDIC belong in state court, that would be

contrary to the unequivocal congressional intent to confer upon

the FDIC the right to litigate in federal court.1

Therefore, IT IS ORDERED that Eng’s motion to remand this

case to the state court is DENIED.

Dated: March 4, 2010

 Bernard Zimmerman 

 United States Magistrate Judge

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