Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-03646/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-03646-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ayers
Respondent
Harry W. Barton
Petitioner

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HARRY W. BARTON, JR.,

Petitioner,

v.

R. AYERS, warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 06-3646 SI (pr)

ORDER DENYING HABEAS

PETITION

INTRODUCTION

Harry W. Barton, an inmate at San Quentin State Prison, filed this pro se action seeking

a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This matter is now before the court for

consideration of the merits of the pro se habeas petition. For the reasons discussed below, the

petition will be denied. 

BACKGROUND

Barton was convicted in Alameda County Superior Court of second degree murder and

was sentenced in 1979 to 15 years to life in prison. His habeas petition does not challenge his

conviction but instead challenges a November 30, 2005 of the Board of Parole Hearings ("BPH")

that found him not suitable for parole. 

The BPH identified the circumstances of the commitment offense, Barton’s unstable

social history, the unfavorable psychological evaluation, and the need for further therapy as the

reasons for the determination that Barton was not suitable for parole. Resp. Exh. 2 (reporter's

transcript of Nov. 30, 2005 BPH hearing (hereinafter “RT”) at 88-92. The specifics regarding

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the crime and the circumstances supporting the finding of unsuitability are described in the

Discussion section later in this order.

Barton sought relief in the California courts. The Alameda County Superior Court denied

his petition for writ of habeas corpus in 2006 in a short but reasoned order. See Resp. Exh. 15.

The California Court of Appeal and California Supreme Court summarily denied Barton's

petitions for writ of habeas corpus. See Resp. Exhs. 16-19.

Barton then filed his federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The court found

cognizable a claim that the evidence was insufficient to support the BPH’s decision and ordered

respondent to show cause why the writ should not issue. Respondent filed an answer and Barton

filed a traverse. The matter is now ready for a decision on the merits.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This court has subject matter jurisdiction over this habeas action for relief under 28

U.S.C. § 2254. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This action is in the proper venue because the challenged

action concerns the execution of the sentence of a prisoner housed at San Quentin State Prison

in Marin County, within this judicial district. 28 U.S.C. §§ 84, 2241(d).

EXHAUSTION

Prisoners in state custody who wish to challenge collaterally in federal habeas

proceedings either the fact or length of their confinement are required first to exhaust state

judicial remedies, either on direct appeal or through collateral proceedings, by presenting the

highest state court available with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of each and every claim

they seek to raise in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c). The parties do not dispute that

state court remedies were exhausted for the claim asserted in the petition.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus "in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

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violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The

petition may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state

court unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

409-13 (2000). Section 2254(d) applies to a habeas petition from a state prisoner challenging

the denial of parole. See Sass v. California Board of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1126-27 (9th

Cir. 2006).

DISCUSSION

A. Due Process Requires That Some Evidence Support a Parole Denial

A California prisoner with a sentence of a term of years to life with the possibility of

parole has a protected liberty interest in release on parole and therefore a right to due process in

the parole suitability proceedings. See Sass, 461 F.3d at 1127-28; Board of Pardons v. Allen,

482 U.S. 369 (1987); Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1

(1979); Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b). 

A parole board's decision satisfies the requirements of due process if “some evidence”

supports the decision. Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128-29 (adopting some evidence standard for

disciplinary hearings outlined in Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1985)). "To

determine whether the some evidence standard is met 'does not require examination of the entire

record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence.

Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support

the conclusion reached'" by the BPH. Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128 (quoting Superintendent v. Hill,

472 U.S. at 455-56). The "some evidence standard is minimal, and assures that 'the record is not

so devoid of evidence that the findings of the . . . board were without support or otherwise

arbitrary.'" Id. at 1129 (quoting Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. at 457). The some evidence

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standard of Superintendent v. Hill is clearly established law in the parole context for purposes

of § 2254(d). Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129. 

A critical issue in parole denial cases concerns the parole authority's use of evidence

about the murder that led to the conviction. Three Ninth Circuit cases provide the guideposts

for applying the Superintendent v. Hill some evidence standard on this point: Biggs v. Terhune,

334 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2003), Sass, 461 F.3d 1123, and Irons v. Carey, No. 05-15275, slip op.

2469 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 2007). Biggs explained that the value of the criminal offense fades over

time as a predictor of parole suitability: “The Parole Board’s decision is one of ‘equity’ and

requires a careful balancing and assessment of the factors considered. . . . A continued reliance

in the future on an unchanging factor, the circumstance of the offense and conduct prior to

imprisonment, runs contrary to the rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison system and could

result in a due process violation.” Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916-17. Biggs upheld the initial denial of

a parole release date based solely on the nature of the crime and the prisoner’s conduct before

incarceration, but cautioned that “[o]ver time . . ., should Biggs continue to demonstrate

exemplary behavior and evidence of rehabilitation, denying him a parole date simply because

of the nature of Biggs’ offense and prior conduct would raise serious questions involving his

liberty interest in parole.” Id. at 916. Next came Sass, which criticized the Biggs statements as

improper and beyond the scope of the dispute before the court: "Under AEDPA it is not our

function to speculate about how future parole hearings could proceed." Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129.

Sass determined that the parole board is not precluded from relying on unchanging factors such

as the circumstances of the commitment offense or the petitioner's pre-offense behavior in

determining parole suitability. See id. (commitment offenses in combination with prior offenses

provided some evidence to support denial of parole at subsequent parole consideration hearing).

Sass also put to rest any idea from Biggs that the commitment crime and pre-offense behavior

only support the initial denial of parole. Recently, Irons determined that due process was not

violated by the use of the commitment offense and pre-offense criminality to deny parole for a

prisoner 16 years into his 17-to-life sentence. Irons emphasized that all three cases (Irons, Sass

and Biggs) in which the court had "held that a parole board's decision to deem a prisoner

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Interestingly, Irons was referring the actual number of years the inmate had been in

prison and not the fictional number of years based on reductions for time credits. In Irons, the

inmate had been in custody 16 years on his 17-to-life sentence, having been convicted in 1985

and challenging at 2001 parole decision. See Irons, slip op. at 2473-74. 

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unsuitable for parole solely on the basis of his commitment offense comports with due process,

the decision was made before the inmate had served the minimum number of years required by

his sentence." Irons, slip op. at 2481.1

 Interpreting this statement from Irons to suggest that the

offense can only be relied on until the minimum number of years has been reached would suffer

the same problem that Sass identified in Biggs: it is not the holding of the case. The dicta in

Biggs and Irons are speculative and do not determine when a denial of parole based solely upon

the commitment offense or pre-offense behavior violates due process. Neither logic nor Irons

compel a decision that such reliance must cease when the prisoner reaches the minimum number

of years in his sentence, such as the fifteenth year of a 15-to-life sentence.

The upshot of these three cases is that the BPH can look at immutable events, such as the

nature of the conviction offense and pre-conviction criminality, to predict that the prisoner is not

currently suitable for parole even after the initial denial (Sass), but the weight to be attributed

to those immutable events should decrease over time as a predictor of future dangerousness as

the years pass and the prisoner demonstrates favorable behavior (Biggs and Irons). Sass did not

dispute the principle that, other things being equal, a murder committed 50 years ago is less

probative of a prisoner's current dangerous-ness than one committed 10 years ago. Not only

does the passage of time in prison count for something, exemplary behavior and rehabilitation

in prison count for something according to Biggs and Irons. Superintendent v. Hill's standard

might be quite low, but it does require that the decision not be arbitrary, and reliance on only the

facts of the crime might eventually make for an arbitrary decision.

What little guidance has come from the Supreme Court suggests that judicial review

should be extremely deferential to the original decision-maker in the parole context. In addition

to the very low evidentiary standard that Superintendent v. Hill imposes, other Supreme Court

comments suggest that the judiciary should be quite mindful of the subjective and predictive

nature of a parole board's decision. See Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 13. "No ideal, error-free way

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to make parole-release decisions has been developed; the whole question has been and will

continue to be the subject of experimentation involving analysis of psychological factors

combined with fact evaluation guided by the practical experience of decisionmakers in

predicting future behavior. Our system of federalism encourages this state experimentation."

Id.; see also id. at 8. 

Past criminal conduct is not some arbitrary factor like eye color that has nothing to do

with present dangerousness. Recidivism concerns are genuine. See Ewing v. California, 538

U.S. 11, 26 (2003) (O'Connor J.) (noting a report stating that over 60% of violent offenders were

arrested again within three years of their release). California's parole scheme does not offend

due process by allowing the BPH to predict that an inmate presents a present danger based on

a murder he committed many years ago.

Having determined that there is a due process right, and that some evidence is the

evidentiary standard for judicial review, the next step is to look to state law because that sets the

criteria to which the some evidence standard applies. One must look to state law to answer the

question, "'some evidence' of what?"

B. State Law Standards For Parole For Murderers In California

California uses indeterminate sentences for most non-capital murderers, with the term

being life imprisonment and parole eligibility after a certain minimum number of years. A first

degree murder conviction yields a minimum term of 25 years to life and a second degree murder

conviction yields a minimum term of 15 years to life imprisonment. See In re Dannenberg, 34

Cal. 4th 1061, 1078 (Cal.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 92 (2005); Cal. Penal Code § 190. The

upshot of California's parole scheme described below is that a release date normally must be set

unless various factors exist, but the "unless" qualifier is substantial. 

A BPH panel meets with an inmate one year before the prisoner's minimum eligible

release date "and shall normally set a parole release date. . . . The release date shall be set in a

manner that will provide uniform terms for offenses of similar gravity and magnitude in respect

to their threat to the public, and that will comply with the sentencing rules that the Judicial

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 The listed circumstances tending to show unsuitability for parole are the nature of the

commitment offense, i.e., whether the prisoner committed the offense in "an especially heinous,

atrocious or cruel manner;" the prisoner has a previous record of violence; the prisoner has an

unstable social history, the prisoner previously engaged in a sadistic sexual offense, the prisoner

has a lengthy history of severe mental problems related to the offense; and negative institutional

behavior. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(c). The listed circumstances tending to show suitability

for parole are the absence of a juvenile record, stable social history, signs of remorse, a stressful

motivation for the crime, whether the prisoner suffered from battered woman's syndrome, lack

of criminal history, the present age reduces the probability of recidivism, the prisoner has made

realistic plans for release or developed marketable skills, and positive institutional behavior. 15

Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(d). 

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Council may issue and any sentencing information relevant to the setting of parole release

dates." Cal. Penal Code § 3041(a). Significantly, that statute also provides that the panel "shall

set a release date unless it determines that the gravity of the current convicted offense or

offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that

consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration for this

individual, and that a parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed at this meeting." Cal. Penal Code

§ 3041(b). 

One of the implementing regulations, 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2401, provides: "A parole

date shall be denied if the prisoner is found unsuitable for parole under Section 2402(c). A

parole date shall be set if the prisoner is found suitable for parole under Section 2402(d). A

parole date set under this article shall be set in a manner that provides uniform terms for offenses

of similar gravity and magnitude with respect to the threat to the public."2

 The regulation also

provides that "[t]he panel shall first determine whether the life prisoner is suitable for release on

parole. Regardless of the length of time served, a life prisoner shall be found unsuitable for and

denied parole if in the judgment of the panel the prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk of

danger to society if released from prison." 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(a). The panel may

consider all relevant and reliable information available to it. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(b). 

The regulations contain a matrix of suggested base terms for several categories of crimes.

See 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2403. For example, for second degree murders, the matrix of base

terms ranges from the low of 15, 16, or 17 years to a high of 19, 20, or 21 years, depending on

some of the facts of the crime. Some prisoners estimate their time to serve based only on the

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matrix. However, going straight to the matrix to calculate the sentence puts the cart before the

horse because it ignores critical language in the relevant statute and regulations that requires him

first to be found suitable for parole.

The statutory scheme places individual suitability for parole above a prisoner's

expectancy in early setting of a fixed date designed to ensure term uniformity. Dannenberg, 34

Cal. 4th at 1070-71. Under state law, the matrix is not reached unless and until the prisoner is

found suitable for parole. Id. at 1070-71; 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2403(a) ("[t]he panel shall set

a base term for each life prisoner who is found suitable for parole"). The California Supreme

Court's determination of state law in Dannenberg is binding in this federal habeas action. See

Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 629-30 (1988). 

The California Supreme Court also has determined that the facts of the crime can alone

support a sentence longer than the statutory minimum even if everything else about the prisoner

is laudable. "While the Board must point to factors beyond the minimum elements of the crime

for which the inmate was committed, it need engage in no further comparative analysis before

concluding that the particular facts of the offense make it unsafe, at that time, to fix a date for

the prisoner's release." Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1071; see also In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th

616, 682-83 (Cal. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 980 (2003) ("[t]he nature of the prisoner's

offense, alone, can constitute a sufficient basis for denying parole" but might violate due process

"where no circumstances of the offense reasonably could be considered more aggravated or

violent than the minimum necessary to sustain a conviction for that offense"). 

 C. Some Evidence Supports The BPH’s Decision In Barton’s Case

The BPH identified the circumstances of the murder, Barton’s unstable social history, the

unfavorable psychological report, and the need for further therapy as the reasons for its

determination that Barton was not suitable for parole. RT 88-92.

The Alameda County Superior Court upheld the decision in a reasoned order. See Resp.

Exh. 15. The Alameda County Superior Court found that “there was certainly some evidence,

including, but not limited to the committing offense, the contents of the psychological report by

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Dr. Saunders, which, among other things, called into question the Petitioner’s abilities to cope

with stress in the outside world, Petitioner’s lack of insight in dealing with conflict in intimate

relationships, and Petitioner’s failure to understand his risk factors for future violence.” Id. The

Alameda court correctly identified the “some evidence” standard as the applicable standard for

judicial review, as evidenced by its citation to In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th 616 (Cal. 2002),

which had cited and adopted the Superintendent v. Hill some evidence standard as the proper

standard for judicial review of evidentiary sufficiency for parole denial cases. See Rosenkrantz,

29 Cal. 4th at 665-67. Because the Alameda County Superior Court’s decision is the last

reasoned decision, that is the decision to which § 2254(d) applies. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501

U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991); Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2005), cert.

denied, 126 S. Ct. 2041 (2006). 

1. Commitment Offense

The crime was summarized in the Life Prisoner Evaluation Report available to the BPH:

Victim Patty McKissick had been going out with defendant Harry Barton for

approximately ten months prior to the instant offense. During that time, she would also

date other men, which angered and frustrated Barton.

On Friday, November 17, 1978, at approximately 04:20 a.m., Ms. McKissick left her

apartment en-route to her garage. The garage, usually illuminated by a light, was dark.

Subsequent investigation revealed the bulb had been unscrewed. At approximately the

same time that morning, a neighbor heard a woman screaming and called the Sheriff’s

Department. Sergeant Leaper arrived on the scene and conducted a walking search of the

garage. As he located a repeating thudding sound, he observed Barton holding Ms.

McKissick by the shoulders and throwing her to the concrete curb. Approximately eight

minutes and forty-five seconds had elapsed from the time of the call to the Sheriff’s

Department to the interruption of the beating.

Upon arrest Barton was wearing leather gloves and boots, both of which were blood

soaked. Barton’s right foot was inflamed and bruised from kicking Ms. McKissick.

Attempts to revive Ms. McKissick were hampered because her face was mutilated to the

point that her mouth could not be located. Two bloody ink pens, one bent and broken,

were found next to Ms. McKissick. She suffered cuts to the face and scalp, a broken nose

and broken teeth, seven stab wounds to the neck (three from an ink pen, four from a

cutting type instrument), fractures of the facial bones and hemorrhage of the brain. The

cause of death was determined to be blunt injuries to the head and stab wounds to the

neck. 

Resp. Exh. 5, pp. 1-2. 

The BPH considered a circumstance and factors proper under California law. A

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circumstance tending to indicate unsuitability for parole is that "the prisoner committed the

offense in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner." 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(c)(1).

The factors to be considered in determining whether that circumstance exists are that there were

multiple victims, "[t]he offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated manner, such

as an execution-style murder," "[t]he victim was abused, defiled or mutilated during or after the

offense," "[t]he offense was carried out in a manner which demonstrates an exceptionally callous

disregard for human suffering," and "[t]he motive for the crime is inexplicable or very trivial in

relation to the offense." 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(c)(1). 

There was some evidence to support the BPH’s determination that the circumstances of

the murder indicated unsuitability. Under state law, the BPH’s finding of unsuitability for parole

can be supported solely by facts of the commitment offense—beyond the minimum

elements—that indicate that the prisoner is unsafe for release. See Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at

1071; see also In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th at 682-83. The facts of this murder were far

beyond the minimum elements of a second degree murder. The attack lasted more than 8

minutes, involved multiple and different uses of force – multiple stabs, kicks so forceful that

they caused bruising and inflammation of Barton’s foot, and throwing the victim into a concrete

curb – and was so extreme that the victim’s face was mutilated. And there was some evidence

to suggest premeditation, as the lightbulb that would have illuminated the area had been

unscrewed and Barton was wearing gloves and heavy boots at the time he was caught killing

McKissick. The facts of the crime provide very solid support for the BPH’s determinations that

the “offense was carried out in a specially cruel and callous manner. The offense was carried

out in a dispassionate manner. The victim was abused and mutilated during the offense. . . .[and]

. . . this offense was carried out in a manner which demonstrates an exceptionally callous

disregard for human suffering.” RT 88-89. 

Although the murder conviction was apparently Barton’s first conviction, he admitted that

he previously had physically assaulted the victim as well as his wife. RT 28-30. The BPH did

not separately identify it, but this previous record of violence also would weigh against a finding

of suitability for parole. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(c)(2). 

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2. Unstable Social History

The BPH relied on Barton’s unfavorable social history, which included alcoholism, in

support of its decision to find him unsuitable for parole. Barton admitted his alcohol and

methamphetamine abuse before the murder. RT 30-33. The psychologist’s evaluation included

a diagnosis of alcohol dependency in institutional remission and methamphetamine abuse in

institutional remission. Resp. Exh. 10, p. 1. There was some evidence to support the BPH’s

reliance on the unstable social history as tending to show unsuitability.

 

3. Unfavorable Psychological Evaluation

The BPH can consider psychological factors in determining parole suitability because it

is required to consider all relevant reliable information, including information about “past and

present mental state, [and] past and present attitude toward the crime.” 15 Cal. Code Regs. §

2402(b). 

Barton’s psychological evaluation was quite unfavorable. The psychologist stated, among

other things, that Barton did not have any insight about what risk factors specifically would lead

to his inflicting severe injury or death on another person in the future, had no insight about what

part he might have played in the dynamics of past intimate relationships that upset him, and did

“not appear to understand the concept of rage and the risk factors associated with the triggering

of rage.” Resp. Exh. 10, pp. 3-8.

Mr. Barton has exhibited some limited insights into his crime and to a degree what the

impact of his crime has had on himself and on others. Issues concerning (1) rage, (2)

what part he plays in relationships that might result in violence, and (3) what steps he

must take to anticipate high-risk factors that could lead him to violent behavior are

relatively unexplored. He does not have a feasible risk management plan in place to

manage these factors. This leaves him more likely to find himself in high-risk situations

for violence, possibly without realizing what chain of behaviors led him to that point. He

does not currently see himself as potentially at risk, which is in itself another risk factor.

Any relapse into drug or alcohol abuse would pose a very high risk situation. 

Id. at 7. The psychologist thought that additional therapy and group work could significantly

affect Barton's clinical and risk management factors. Id. 

The BPH read portions of that unfavorable report into the record at the hearing, RT 2-3,

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5-7, and relied on it as support for the decision. “[F]rankly, this report raises a lot of

troublesome issues, and issues that I think you’re going to have to take some time to resolve.”

RT 90. There was substantial evidence to support the BPH’s reliance on the unfavorable

psychological evaluation in determining that Barton was not suitable for parole. 

The psychologist’s 2004 opinion that Barton has only limited and recent understanding

of the rage that led him to commit such a brutal murder and how to handle conflict in the future

is stunning as it was made more than 25 years after the murder and as to a person who was 61

years old. It is rather late in his sentence and in life to have just a nascent understanding of a

rage problem and how to handle conflict when adversity, conflict and rejection certainly would

be in his future if he were released from prison. Barton’s tenuous grasp on his anger

management problem is even evident in the transcript of the BPH hearing, which shows Barton

repeatedly interrupting, arguing, and getting into shouting matches with the hearing officers.

See, e.g., RT 52-53 (arguing about whether his wife benefitted financially by his incarceration

and their divorce), 70-71 (arguing about whether his sewing machine repair career plans were

feasible), 75 (commissioner took a pen away from Barton because Barton was starting to lose

his temper), 99 (commissioner and Barton “[b]oth shouting loudly over each other”). And his

attitude about his need to address his alcoholism problem didn’t appear particularly positive

when he responded to a question about coping with conflict with this comment: “Well, I’m

going to be stuck with AA so I would be calling my sponsor.” RT 79. 

There was some evidence to support the BPH’s determination that Barton’s psychological

evaluation tended to show unsuitability for parole.

4. Need For Further Therapy

The BPH found that Barton needed further “therapy in order to face, discuss, understand

and cope with stress in a non-destructive manner.” RT 92. For the reasons stated in the

preceding section, this was a factor that could be relied on and there was some evidence to

support the BPH’s reliance on it. 

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5. Summary

The BPH noted that Barton had various in-prison achievements but concluded that the

positive factors did not outweigh the factors above showing unsuitability. The factors listed by

the BPH in support of its determination that Barton was not suitable for parole had some

evidentiary support. And the factors were factors that could be considered in determining parole

suitability. The Alameda County Superior Court's rejection of Barton's insufficient evidence

claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of the Superintendent v. Hill some

evidence standard. Barton is not entitled to the writ.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition is denied on the merits. The clerk shall close the

file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 10, 2007 

 SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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