Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06222/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06222-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Attorney General
Appellee
Robert H. Henry
Appellee
John Michael Hooker
Appellant
James Saffle
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT JAN 2 2 1991 

JOHN MICHAEL HOOKER, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

JAMES SAFFLE, Warden, and 

ROBERT H. HENRY, Attorney General 

of the State of Oklahoma, 

Respondents-Appellees. 

) OBERT L. livl!;CKFR 

) Clerk 

) 

) 

) No. 90-6222 

) (D.C. No. CIV-90-366-P) 

) (W.D. Okla.) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before LOGAN, SEYMOUR, and TACHA, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Therefore, the case is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Petitioner-appellant John Michael Hooker is an Oklahoma state 

prisoner who appears prose and in forma pauperis seeking federal 

habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In his 

petition for writ of habeas corpus, petitioner attacks his 

convictions in Case Nos. CRF-71-396 and CRF-71-398 in the District 

Court of Oklahoma County. He was sentenced on June 7, 1971 to 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-6222 Document: 010110080084 Date Filed: 01/22/1991 Page: 1 
forty years' imprisonment for each conviction, with the sentences 

to run concurrently. On February 1, 1980, the then-governor of 

Oklahoma commuted petitioner's sentences to twenty-five years' 

imprisonment. On January 27, 1981, a state trial judge granted 

petitioner's application for post-conviction relief. His sentence 

in Case No. CRF-71-396 was modified to twenty years' imprisonment. 

Petitioner was also given credit on that sentence for five years' 

imprisonment he had previously served on another sentence that was 

ordered vacated. 

In response to this habeas petition, respondents-appellees 

James Saffle and Robert Henry filed a motion to dismiss, alleging 

petitioner did not meet the "in custody" requirement as to the 

convictions he is now attacking. Respondents argued a court 

cannot assume jurisdiction over a habeas petition unless the 

petitioner is in custody under the conviction he challenges. 

28 U.S.C. §§ 224l(c)(3), 2254(b); Rule l(a)(l), Rules Governing 

Section 2254 Cases. They noted petitioner is presently in custody 

for his conviction in Case No. CRF-88-1939 in the District Court 

of Oklahoma County. He received a sentence of death for this 

first degree murder conviction. Respondents argued the district 

court cannot consider this petition because petitioner has 

completely discharged the sentences he now attacks. 

The district court granted the motion to dismiss on June 7, 

1990. Before reaching the merits of this appeal, we must 

determine whether a certificate of probable cause should be 

granted. After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude 

petitioner has made a "substantial showing of the denial of a 

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Appellate Case: 90-6222 Document: 010110080084 Date Filed: 01/22/1991 Page: 2 
federal right" necessary for the issuance of a certificate of 

probable cause. See Barefoot Y...!... Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 

(1983). 

On appeal, petitioner argues he is in fact in custody for the 

convictions in Case Nos. CRF-71-396 and CRF-71-398 because these 

convictions were used for enhancement of the sentence he received 

on his present conviction. In sentencing petitioner for his 

conviction in Case No. CRF-88-1939, the jury found four 

aggravating circumstances warranting the imposition of the death 

penalty: (1) petitioner was previously convicted of a felony 

involving the use or threat of violence to the person (the 

convictions now challenged in the habeas petition); (2) petitioner 

knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person; 

(3) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; and 

(4) the existence of a probability petitioner would commit 

criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing 

threat to society. 

In the recent decision Maleng Y...!... Cook, 109 S. Ct. 1923, 1926 

(1989) (per curiam), the Supreme Court held that when a sentence 

has fully expired, the possibility that that conviction will be 

used to enhance the sentences imposed for any subsequent crimes is 

not sufficient to render a petitioner "in custody" for purposes of 

a habeas petition. The Court, however, left open the question of 

to what extent a petitioner may challenge an expired conviction in 

an attack on a conviction for which the petitioner is in custody, 

when the latter conviction has been enhanced by the prior one. 

Id. at 1927. 

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Appellate Case: 90-6222 Document: 010110080084 Date Filed: 01/22/1991 Page: 3 
This court held in Gamble Y.!.. Parsons, 898 F.2d 117, 118 (10th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 111 s. Ct. 212 (1990), that although a 

petitioner cannot directly attack an expired conviction, he may 

direct his attack toward the sentence under which he is in 

custody, arguing it has been enhanced by a prior, unconstitutional 

conviction. See also Clark Y.!.. Pennsylvania, 892 F.2d 1142, 1145 

(3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom. Castille Y.!.. Clark, 110 S. 

Ct. 3229 (1990); Taylor Y.!.. Armantrout, 877 F.2d 726, 727 (8th Cir. 

1989). The court in Gamble further noted a prose litigant's 

petition challenging an expired conviction "should be read as 

asserting a challenge to his present sentence to the extent that 

it has been enhanced by the allegedly invalid prior conviction." 

898 F.2d at 118 (citing Maleng, 109 S. Ct. at 1927); see also 

Feldman Y.=.. Perrill, 902 F.2d 1445, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1990). 

We agree, however, with the district court's conclusion that 

this petition should not be construed in this manner. That court 

properly noted that "rendering this petition as an attack upon 

Petitioner's later conviction [in Case No. CRF-88-1939] might have 

the effect of barring Petitioner from presenting other objections 

to the latter conviction that were not included in this petition. 

Rule 9(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 111 Rule 9(b) 

requires a petitioner to assert all his federal challenges to his 

1 Rule 9(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, states: 

A second or successive petition may be dismissed if the 

judge finds that it fails to allege new or different 

grounds for relief and the prior determination was on 

the merits or, if new and different grounds are alleged, 

the judge finds that the failure of the petitioner to 

assert those grounds in a prior petition constituted 

abuse of the writ. 

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Appellate Case: 90-6222 Document: 010110080084 Date Filed: 01/22/1991 Page: 4 
conviction in one petition. Certainly petitioner does not intend 

this to be his sole federal attack on his death sentence and it 

would not be to his benefit to do so. All of petitioner's federal 

attacks against this conviction should be considered in one habeas 

petition. See Sanders Y...!.. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 18 (1963) 

("Nothing in the traditions of habeas corpus requires the federal 

courts to tolerate needless piecemeal litigation .••. "); Jacks 

Y...!.. Duckworth, 857 F.2d 394, 398-99 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 

489 U.S. 1017 (1989) (law disfavors successive habeas petitions). 

We therefore conclude the district court did not err in concluding 

petitioner is not in custody under the convictions attacked in 

this case and thus it did not have jurisdiction to consider the 

petition. We agree with the district court that "[t]his dimissal 

does not prevent the Petitioner from filing an appropriate 

petition attacking his current conviction." 

Petitioner also contends the district court erred by 

permitting respondents to file a motion to dismiss rather than a 

formal answer to his habeas petition. We find this assertion to 

be without merit. We thus AFFIRM the rulings of the district 

court. The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

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ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Deanell Reece Tacha 

Circuit Judge 

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