Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-05034/USCOURTS-ca10-95-05034-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jane Phillips Episcopal Hospital, Inc.
Appellee
Jane Phillips Episcopal Memorial Medical Center
Appellee
Marriott Corporation
Not Party
Max Lee Rishell
Appellant
Charles Wellshear
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

MAX LEE RISHELL, Curator of the 

person and estate of Kathleen Lacey, 

an incapacitated person, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

and 

MARRIOTT CORPORATION, as Plan 

Fiduciary of the Marriott Corporation 

Multi-Med Health Plan, 

FILED 

United S~tes Court or Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

AUG 2 6 1996 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

Plaintiff-Intervenor, No. 95-5034 

v . 

JANE PHILLIPS EPISCOPAL 

MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER; 

JANE PHILLIPS EPISCOPAL 

HOSPITAL, INC., formerly Jane G. 

Phillips Memorial Hospital, Inc., 

doing business as Oklahoma Medical 

Collection Services; CHARLES 

WELLSHEAR, M.D., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. 94-C-636-B) 

Larry Alan Tawwater (BenT. Lampkin and Jo L. Slama, with him on the brief), 

of Lampkin, McCaffrey & Tawwater, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for PlaintiffAppellate Case: 95-5034 Document: 01019278178 Date Filed: 08/26/1996 Page: 1 
Appellant. 

!nona Jane Harness (Haven Tobias, with her on the briefs), of Pierce, Couch, 

Hendrickson, Baysinger & Green, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for DefendantAppellee Charles Wellshear, M.D. 

Stephen J. Rodolf (Barry L. Smith and Leslie C. Weeks, with him on the briefs), 

of Barkley & Rodolf, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellee Jane Phillips 

Episcopal Hospital. 

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, PORFILIO, and TACHA, Circuit Judges. 

SEYMOUR, Chief Judge. 

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This case is before us a second time for review of a pretrial ruling. In the 

previous appeal, we reversed the district court's determination that diversity 

jurisdiction was lacking and remanded for further proceedings on the 

jurisdictional issue. Rishell v. Jane Phillips Episcopal Memorial Medical Ctr., 12 

F. 3d 171 (1Oth Cir. 1993). On remand the district court overruled defendants' 

motion to dismiss for lack of diversity jurisdiction, but dismissed the action under 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 for failure to join indispensable parties. Plaintiff again 

appeals and we reverse. 

I 

Plaintiff Max Lee Rishell is the curator of the person and estate of 

Kathleen Lacey. Mrs Lacey exists in a permanent vegetative state as a result of 

her failed attempt to commit suicide while she was hospitalized.in defendant 

institution and under the care of defendant Dr. Charles Wellshear. Mr. Rishell 

brought this negligence action to recover damages resulting from Mrs. Lacey's 

In Junes. 

This case has already had a tortuous procedural history. It was originally 

filed in the Western District of Oklahoma. After that court dismissed for lack of 

diversity jurisdiction, Mr. Rishell filed this appeal and, together with Mrs. 

Lacey's husband and children, also filed an action in state court to prevent 

perceived statute-of-limitations problems. Defendants filed a motion with this 

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court to dismiss the appeal, arguing for the first time that Mrs. Lacey's husband 

and children are indispensable parties whose joinder would destroy diversity 

jurisdiction. We summarily denied the motion and directed the parties to proceed 

with the oral argument scheduled some ten days later. After we reversed and 

remanded, defendants moved in district court to dismiss for failure to join 

indispensable parties. While this motion was pending, the court transferred the 

action to the Northern District of Oklahoma, which granted the motion. 

In this appeal, Mr. Rishell contends that this court's order denying 

defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of indispensable parties constitutes the law 

of the case, and that the district court therefore had no authority to consider the 

merits of that issue. Mr. Rishell argues in the alternative that Mrs. Lacey's 

husband and children are not indispensable parties and that the lower court 

abused its discretion in holding to the contrary. We conclude that the doctrine of 

the law of the case does not apply in the circumstances here. We further hold, 

however, that Mrs. Lacey's husband and children are not indispensable parties. 

Accord-ingly, we again reverse and remand for further proceedings. 

II 

We first address and reject Mr. Rishell's assertion that the district court 

was precluded by the law of the case from considering the indispensable party 

issue. As we have noted, defendants' motion filed in this court seeking dismissal 

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for failure to join indispensable parties was summarily denied without discussion. 

"Law of the case principles do 'not bar a district court from acting unless an 

appellate decision has issued on the merits of the claim sought to be precluded."' 

Wilmer v. Board of County Comm'rs, 69 F.3d 406, 409 (lOth Cir. 1995) 

(quoting United States v. Caterino, 29 F.3d 1390, 1395 (9th Cir. 1994)). 

Mr. Rishell correctly argues that law of the case applies to issues that are 

resolved implicitly as well as to those decided explicitly. We have articulated 

three circumstances in which an issue will be considered implicitly decided for 

purposes of the law of the case. See Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Local No. 9, 

10 F.3d 700, 707 (lOth Cir. 1993), modified on other grounds, 39 F.3d 1078 

(lOth Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1691 (1995). The doctrine applies 

when: 

(1) resolution of the issue was a necessary step in resolving the 

earlier appeal; (2) resolution of the issue would abrogate the prior 

decision and so must have been considered in the prior appeal'; and 

(3) the issue is so closely related to the earlier appeal its resolution 

involves no additional consideration and so might have been resolved 

but unstated. 

Id. The district court determined that our summary denial did not fall within any 

of these circumstances and that we therefore did not implicitly decide the 

indispensable party issue. 1 

1 In rejecting Mr. Rishell's argument on this issue, the district court 

pointed to the fact that defendants' motion was filed less than two weeks before 

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Mr. Rishell does not argue that the district court applied these factors 

incorrectly. He contends instead that our summary denial implicitly decided the 

issue because it was presented in the motion we denied. Although we 

acknowledge that the three factors set out above are not exhaustive, see id. at 707 

n.5, we nevertheless rejected an analogous argument in Wilmer. There the 

defendant argued that because a court must always satisfy itself of its 

jurisdiction, a decision on the merits is an implicit ruling that jurisdiction is 

present. We disagreed, holding that even though the jurisdictional issue had been 

recognized by the dissenting opinion, "such a theoretical consideration should not 

be confused with the implicit but actual determination necessary to invoke the 

law of the case doctrine." Wilmer, 69 F.3d at 409 (emphasis in original). Here, 

as in Wilmer, the fact that a court of appeals should raise the issue of 

indispensable parties sua sponte does not in and of itself require the imputation 

of an implicit determination of the issue. We conclude that the district court was 

not barred from addressing the indispensable party issue on remand, and we 

therefore tum to the merits of that issue. 

III 

"We review a district court's decision as to whether a party is 

oral argument was scheduled. The court concluded that this "eleventh hour" 

motion was not well received on the basis of timing rather than on the basis of 

substance. 

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indispensable for an abuse of discretion." Resolution Trust Corp. v. Stone. 998 

F.2d 1534, 1549 (lOth Cir. 1993). In so doing, we "must consider 'whether the 

decision maker failed to consider a relevant factor, whether he [or she] relied on 

an improper factor, and whether the reasons given reasonably support the 

conclusion."' Kickapoo Tribe of Indians in Kansas v. Babbitt, 43 F.3d 1491, 

1497 (D.C. Cir. 1995)(quoting Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 3654, 365 

(d.C. 1979)) (alteration in original). The standards set out in Rule 19 for 

assessing whether an absent party is indispensable are to be applied "in a 

practical and pragmatic but equitable manner." Francis Oil & Gas. Inc. v. Exxon 

Corp .. 661 F.2d 873, 878 (lOth Cir. 1981). See also Provident Tradesmens Bank 

& Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 106-07 (1968). "The moving party has 

the burden of persuasion in arguing for dismissal." Makah Indian Tribe v. 

Verity, 910 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Determining whether an absent party is indispensable requires a two-part 

analysis. See id.; Francis Oil & Gas, 661 F.2d at 877-78. The court must first 

determine under Rule 19(a) whether the party is necessary to the suit and must 

therefore be joined if joinder is feasible. If the absent party is necessary but 

cannot be joined, the court must then determine under Rule 19(b) whether the 

party is indispensable. If so, the suit must be dismissed. 

Whether Mrs. Lacey's husband and children are necessary parties under 

Rule 19(a) requires assessment of three factors. The court must consider (1) 

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whether complete relief would be available to the parties already in the suit, (2) 

whether the absent party has an interest related to the suit which as a practical 

matter would be impaired, and (3) whether a party already in the suit would be 

subjected to a substantial risk of multiple or inconsistent obligations. 2 In ruling 

that the absent parties here are necessary, the district court concluded that a 

disposition in this action might impair or impede their ability to protect their own 

interests. See Aplt. App. vol. III, at 594. 3 

We are not convinced that, as a practical matter, the interests of the absent 

parties will be impaired by this suit. It is true that under Oklahoma law the 

2 Rule 19(a) provides in pertinent part : 

A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will 

not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the 

action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in the·person's 

absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already 

parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of 

the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the 

person's absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the 

person's ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the 

persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring 

double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of 

the claimed interest. 

Fed. R. Civ. p· 19(a). We consider parts 2(i) and 2(ii) separately in our analysis. 

3 The district court relied on Aguilar v. Los Angeles County, 75 1 F .2d 1089 

(9th Cir. 1985), and Lopez v. Martin Luther King. Jr. Hosp., 97 F.R.D. 24 (C.D. 

Cal. 1983), in finding prejudice to the absent parties. To the extent that those 

cases are contrary to the authorities and analysis we have set out in the text on 

this issue, we do not find them persuasive. Indeed, the dissenting opinion in 

Aguilar is more convincing and in keeping with the weight of authority. 

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interest of the husband in recovering damages for loss of consortium arising from 

injuries to his wife is derivative of the wife's right to recover, and that the 

husband would therefore be barred in the state court action by an adverse 

determination here. See Laws v. Fisher, 513 P.2d 876 (Okla. 1973).4 However, 

the prejudice to the relevant party's interest "may be minimized if the absent 

party is adequately represented in the suit." Makah Indian Tribe, 910 F.2d at 

558. See also Wichita & Affiliated Tribes of Oklahoma v. Hodel, 788 F.2d 765, 

774-75 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 444-45 

(1912); 3A James Moore, Moore's Federal Practice ~19.07[2.-1], at 19-106 (2d 

ed. 1995) ("the fact that the absent person may be bound by the judgment does 

not of itself require his joinder if his interests are fully represented by parties 

present"). 

Mr. Rishell, as Mrs. Lacey's curator, has an interest in establishing a right 

to recover for her injuries that is virtually identical to the interest of her husband 

and children in establishing their derivative claim. Indeed, Mr. Rishell presented 

an affidavit to the district court executed by Mr. Lacey in which Mr. Lacey 

4 The Oklahoma courts have consistently described a spouse's loss of 

consortium as a derivative interest. See. e.g .. Walker v. City of Moore, 836 P.2d 

1289, 1292 n.4 (Okla.l992). Those courts have also held that children may 

maintain a cause of action for loss of parental consortium which contains many of 

the same elements that make up the spousal claim. See Williams v. Hook, 804 

P.2d 1131, 1132 n.1 (Okla 1990). Although the Oklahoma courts have not 

directly addressed the issue, we presume that the children's claim is derivative as 

well. 

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acknowledges and agrees to the likely impairment of his interest and that of the 

children. The district court discounted the affidavit because Mr. Lacey had not 

signed a waiver agreeing to drop the state court claim, relying on Saratoga Dev. 

Cor.p. v. United States, 777 F. Supp. 29 (D.D.C. 1991). The court's reliance 

upon Saratoga was unwarranted in two regards. First, the court in that case did 

not require a waiver; the court merely observed that the execution of a waiver 

eliminated any possible prejudice. Id. at 34. Second and more significantly, in 

requiring a written waiver here the district court applied a mechanical approach 

rather than assessing the circumstances pragmatically. If, as a practical matter, 

the interests of the absent parties will be adequately represented, their interests 

will not be impaired and a waiver becomes a mere technicality. 5 Consequently, 

we are not persuaded defendants carried their burden of persuasion on the 

necessary party issue. 

Even assuming they did, however, we do not agree with the district court 

that the absent parties are indispensable under Rule 19{b ). Determining whether 

an absent party is indispensable requires a court to consider: 

first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence 

5 The district court did not directly address the affidavit in the context of 

assessing prejudice to defendants. As we discuss in reviewing the court's Rule 

19(b) analysis, however, the court was clearly concerned with prejudice to the 

defendants arising from their need to defend two suits, and accordingly gave 

primary emphasis to the judicial economy of deciding all claims in one action. 

As we set out in text, this concern cannot be made dispositive under the 

circumstances here. 

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might be prejudicial to the person or those already parties; second, 

the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the 

shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or 

avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence 

will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate 

remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b ). The district court based its decision to dismiss primarily 

on the fourth factor, the availability of an alternative forum. In so doing, it 

misperceived the circumstances in which this factor may be viewed as 

dispositive. 

Rule 19(b) analysis requires that the factors be evaluated in a practical and 

equitable manner, and be given the appropriate weight. As we have discussed 

above, prejudice to the absent parties is not a concern here because of the 

identity of interests between Mr. Rishell and those parties. Moreover, prejudice 

to defendants is minimized due to the likelihood that a verdict in their favor in 

this action would bar recovery by the absent parties in the state· action, while a 

verdict against them would not itself increase their exposure. 6 The first factor 

therefore weighs against dismissal. Because prejudice here is minimal, we need 

not be concerned with the second factor, which addresses the availability of 

6 We reject as sheer speculation and otherwise inappropriate defendants' 

argument that a state court jury would award damages to the husband and 

children separately in an amount greater than would be awarded in a single 

action. We likewise reject plaintiff's argument that a state court jury would be 

more sympathetic to defendants. See Walsh v. Centeio, 692 F.2d 1239, 1244 n.5 

(9th Cir. 1982) (loss of the benefit of diversity jurisdiction will not alone prevent 

a dismissal under Rule 19(b)). 

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means for lessening or avoiding prejudice. The third factor requires 

consideration of whether an adequate remedy can be awarded without the absent 

party. Mr. Rishell, should he prevail, would be able to recover damages on 

behalf of Mrs. Lacey for her injuries despite the lack of her husband and children 

as parties. The third factor therefore also counsels against dismissal. 

We tum then to the fourth factor and assess whether the fact that Mr. 

Rishell may have an adequate remedy in state court requires dismissal of this 

action. The district court gave this factor dispositive weight, observing that 

some courts have viewed this consideration as the most important one of the four. 

Most courts have done so, however, only when an alternative forum is not 

available. "The availability of an alternative forum is primarily of negative 

significance under Rule 19. The absence of an alternative forum would weigh 

heavily, if not conclusively against dismissal while the existence of another 

forum would not have as significant an impact in favor of dismissal." Pasco Int'l 

(London) Ltd. v. Stenograph Cor.p., 637 F.2d 496, 501 n.9 (7th Cir. 1980). 

Hence, courts "'do not view the availability of an alternative remedy, standing 

alone, as a sufficient reason for deciding that the action should not proceed 

among the parties before the court."' Id. at 501 (quoting Bio-Analytical Servs .. 

Inc. v. Edgewater Hosp .. Inc., 565 F.2d 450, 453 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 

439 U.S. 820 1978)). "[T]he potential existence of another forum does not, in 

and of itself, outweigh a plaintiff's right to the forum of his or her choice. Some 

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additional interest of either the absent party, the other properly joined parties or 

entities, or the judicial system must also be present." Local 670, United Rubber 

Workers v. International Union. United Rubber Workers, 822 F.2d 613, 622 (6th 

Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1019 (1988). Accord Pasco, 637 F.2d at 501. 

"[J]udicial economy and convenience do not in themselves provide grounds for 

dismissal." Boone v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 682 F.2d 552, 554 (5th 

Cir. 1982). 

We agree with these courts. The district court should not have given 

dispositive weight to the availability of an alternative forum. Mr. Rishell, as 

plaintiff, has an interest recognized by federal law in the forum of his choice, 

which is not outweighed here by the interests of the absent parties, defendants, or 

the judicial system. Accordingly, we conclude the district court abused its 

discretion in dismissing Mr. Rishell's action under Rule 19. 

We REVERSE the judgment of the district court and REMAND for 

further proceedings. 

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