Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-10064/USCOURTS-ca9-13-10064-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Miguel Torralba-Mendia
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MIGUEL TORRALBA-MENDIA,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-10064

D.C. No.

4:10-cr-00754-

CKJ-JR-13

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Cindy K. Jorgenson, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

February 2, 2015—San Francisco, California

Filed April 28, 2015

Before: Richard C. Tallman and Johnnie B. Rawlinson,

Circuit Judges, and Stephen Joseph Murphy III, District

Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Murphy

* The Honorable Stephen Joseph Murphy III, District Judge for the U.S.

District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.

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2 UNITED STATES V. TORRALBA-MENDIA

SUMMARY**

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed a conviction for conspiring to smuggle

undocumented immigrants into the United States, in violation

of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I).

The panel held that, in light of United States v. Vera, 770

F.3d 1232 (9th Cir. 2014), the district court committed plain

error by not instructing the jury on how to properly evaluate

the testimony of ICE Agent Frazier, whom the government

used as both an expert and lay witness. The panel found that

the error was not prejudicial because the government

bifurcated Frazier’s expert and lay opinion testimony, there

was an adequate foundation for his observations, and

sufficient evidence independent of his testimony linked the

defendant to the conspiracy. 

The panel held that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in admitting ICE Agent Burrola’s expert testimony

about alien smuggling organizations. The panel held that the

testimony helped the jury understand the defendant’s role in

the alien smuggling scheme, and that the testimony was not

unduly prejudicial.

The panel held that a rational juror could find beyond a

reasonable doubt that the defendant joined the conspiracy

with the intent to further it.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. TORRALBA-MENDIA 3

The panel rejected the defendant’s arguments that I-213

immigration forms, which the government introduced to show

that many of the passengers detained during the investigation

were in fact deported, contained inadmissible hearsay and

that their introduction violated the Confrontation Clause. The

panel held that the redacted forms were admissible under Fed.

R. Evid. 803(8) as ministerial records, kept in the regular

course of Department of Homeland Securitybusiness, and not

implicating the purposes animating the law enforcement

exception to admissibility. The panel held that admission of

the forms did not violate the defendant’s confrontation rights

because nothing in them suggests they were completed in

anticipation of litigation, and they are not testimonial.

COUNSEL

Saji Vettiyil, Vettiyil & Associates, Nogales, Arizona, for

Defendant-Appellant.

John S. Leonardo, United States Attorney, Robert L. Miskell,

Appellate Chief, Bruce M. Ferg (argued), Assistant United

States Attorney, United States Attorney’s Office, Tucson,

Arizona, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

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4 UNITED STATES V. TORRALBA-MENDIA

OPINION

MURPHY, District Judge:

A jury convicted Miguel Torralba-Mendia of conspiring

to smuggle undocumented immigrants into the United States,

in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I). Torralba

appeals his conviction, contending there was insufficient

evidence connecting him to the conspiracy. In addition, he

argues the district court incorrectly allowed an expert witness

to testify about common practices of alien smuggling

organizations. He contends the district court erred in allowing

the case agent to offer both lay and expert testimony without

giving a curative instruction. And he argues the district court

incorrectly admitted redacted I-213 immigration forms. We

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, find no prejudicial

error, and affirm.

I

A

Between 2007 and 2010, Immigration and Customs

Enforcement (“ICE”) agents investigated a human smuggling

operation near Nogales, Arizona. The investigation revealed

that members of the smuggling organization would meet

migrants on the Mexican side of the border. Escorts would

guide the migrants through the ravines and creek-beds that lie

adjacent to Nogales. Once inside the United States, a van or

sedan would meet the migrants in the desert and drive them

to Geuro Shuttle (“GS”), a company operating out of Tucson.

From there, shuttles would drive the migrants to safe houses

where they were confined until family members paid for their

release.

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UNITED STATES V. TORRALBA-MENDIA 5

During the investigation, agents observed Torralba at GS

between twenty and twenty-five times. Through intercepted

phone calls, agents overheard Torralba coordinate the pick up

of migrants and organize their drive north. Agents listened as

a person at GS told Torralba to charge $2100 to drive two

people to Tucson. And agents observed Torralba pick up and

deliver suspected illegal immigrants to locations in Phoenix.

On one occasion, Torralba picked up several people from

GS. Before starting the drive to Phoenix, Torralba did a “heat

run” through a local neighborhood: He rapidly accelerated

and decelerated, to check if police were following him. He

then parked outside a carwash for ten minutes, watching the

road. On another occasion, he drove past an unmarked police

car with tinted windows parked across from GS. Torralba

stopped his car next to the vehicle and tried to look in. He

then called GS and told them about the car. Torralba also

called GS to tell them that “[t]hey just opened up over here,

straight ahead.” GS then notified other shuttle drivers that

ICE was not operating its checkpoint along the route from

Nogales to Tucson.

B

At trial, the government called Agent Burrola as an expert

witness. Burrola has more than a decade of law enforcement

experience along the border, including three years undercover

smuggling undocumented immigrants from Nogales to stash

houses in Tucson and Phoenix. He testified about the standard

practices of alien smuggling organizations, including how

they escorted people over the border, circumvented ICE

checkpoints, and utilized safe houses. He explained how to

identify undocumented immigrants en route from Mexico,

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6 UNITED STATES V. TORRALBA-MENDIA

interpreted common code words, and described typical

methods and amounts of payment.

The government also called Agent Frazier as both an

expert and lay witness. Frazier spent nine years patrolling the

border near Nogales. Like Burrola, he explained how

smugglers evaded checkpoints and provided ways to

distinguish between a guide and a migrant.

After giving expert testimony about the standard practices

of alien smuggling organizations, Frazier began to offer lay

testimony. The government transitioned from expert to lay

testimony by asking, “[a]nd were you eventually assigned to

an investigation involving Southern Arizona shuttle

companies?” Frazier then testified intermittently over the

next few days about his observations in this case. He narrated

surveillance videos showing vehicles dropping off and

picking up people from GS. He told the jury the duration of

time lapses in the videos, pointed out the vehicles’ identifying

marks, tied the cars to various conspirators, and counted the

number of people exiting and entering different vehicles. He

also interpreted phrases in phone calls between shuttle drivers

and GS. And he explained which conspirators he thought

were the organization’s leaders based on evidence that they

controlled the migrants, recruited workers, and gave orders to

the drivers.

During the trial, the government introduced I-213

immigration forms to prove the migrants detained during the

investigation either voluntarily returned to their country of

origin or were deported. The admitted forms contained the

migrants’ photos, fingerprints, physical characteristics, and

whether they had been deported or voluntarily returned to

their country of origin. The government redacted the agent’s

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UNITED STATES V. TORRALBA-MENDIA 7

narrative detailing how people were apprehended, and all

other statements made by the detainee.

II

Torralba challenges the government’s use of Agent

Frazier as both an expert and lay witness. He contends the

district court erred by not instructing the jury on how to

evaluate Frazier’s dual role testimony, and that much of

Frazier’s testimony invaded the province of the jury. We hold

that, in light of our opinion in United States v. Vera, 770 F.3d

1232 (9th Cir. 2014), the district court committed plain error

by not instructing the jury on how to properly evaluate

Frazier’s testimony. Nonetheless, we find that the error was

not prejudicial because the government bifurcated Frazier’s

expert and lay opinion testimony, there was an adequate

foundation for Frazier’s observations, and sufficient evidence

independent of Frazier’s testimony linked Torralba to the

conspiracy.

A

Torralba argues the district court erred by not instructing

the jury on how to properly evaluate Agent Frazier’s expert

and lay testimony. Because Torralba did not object to the

absence of such a jury instruction, we review for plain error.

See United States v. Fuchs, 218 F.3d 957, 961 (9th Cir.

2000); see also Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135

(2009) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 51(b) & 52(b)).

We have cautioned district courts about the dangers of

allowing a case agent to offer both expert and lay opinion

testimony. See Vera, 770 F.3d at 1242; United States v.

Anchrum, 590 F.3d 795, 803 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v.

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8 UNITED STATES V. TORRALBA-MENDIA

Freeman, 498 F.3d 893, 903–04 (9th Cir. 2007). “[A]n

agent’s status as an expert could lend him unmerited

credibility when testifying as a percipient witness, crossexamination might be inhibited, jurors could be confused and

the agent might be more likely to stray from reliable

methodology and rely on hearsay.” Vera, 770 F.3d at 1242.

There are several ways to mitigate these concerns. First,

the district court should clearly separate the case agent’s

testimonybetween layobservations and expert testimony. See

Anchrum, 590 F.3d at 803. Second, the district court should

require an adequately specific foundation, so that the jury has

the information needed to evaluate the case agent’s

testimony. See Vera, 770 F.3d at 1243. Third, “the jury must

be instructed about what the attendant circumstances are in

allowing a government case agent to testify as an expert.” Id.

at 1242 (internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, the court

should not allow an officer to “testify based on speculation,

rely on hearsay, or interpret unambiguous, clear statements.”

Id.

In Vera, we held that “[i]n light of our Circuit’s clearly

expressed concerns about case agents testifying in both lay

and expert capacities, the district court’s failure to give an

instruction explaining [the agent’s] dual roles was plain

error.” Id. at 1246. We emphasized that, although the defense

had not objected to the jury instructions, “the ultimate

responsibility for assuring the reliability of expert testimony

and for instructing the jury on how to evaluate case agent

dual role testimony rests with the district court.” Id. at 1243.

In the present case, the district court offered to instruct the

jury on how to properly evaluate expert and lay testimony.

The government also stated it had an instruction that would

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UNITED STATES V. TORRALBA-MENDIA 9

help the jury evaluate Frazier’s dual role testimony. Torralba

objected to the government’s proposed instruction, however,

and failed to offer an instruction of his own. The district court

instructed the jury on how to evaluate opinion testimony

generally, but did not include any instruction on

differentiating between layand expert testimony. Torralba did

not object to the instructions read to the jury.

We hold the district court committed plain error by not

instructing the jury on how to evaluate dual role testimony.

While there is a small degree of invited error—the district

court solicited Torralba to offer an instruction about dual role

testimony—our cases make clear that the trial court is

ultimately responsible for ensuring the jury understands how

to evaluate dual role testimony. Vera, 770 F.3d at 1243.

Accordingly, the district court committed plain error by not

giving a curative instruction, though the error was not

prejudicial for the reasons stated in section C.

B

Torralba also argues the district court erred in allowing

Frazier to narrate videos, interpret phrases in recorded phone

calls, and opine about the role of various conspirators. With

a few exceptions, Torralba did not object to Frazier’s

testimony. We review objected to evidentiary rulings for

abuse of discretion, and unobjected to evidentiary issues for

plain error. United States v. Banks, 514 F.3d 959, 975–76 (9th

Cir. 2008). For the following reasons, we find Frazier offered

proper lay testimony and did not invade the province of the

jury.

First, we have previously held that an officer who has

extensively reviewed a video may offer a narration, pointing

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10 UNITED STATES V. TORRALBA-MENDIA

out particulars that a casual observer might not see. In United

States v. Begay, 42 F.3d 486, 502–03 (9th Cir. 1994), an

officer narrated a video of a riot. We held the narrative was

proper lay testimony. The officer had personal knowledge of

the events in the video because he had watched the video

nearly a hundred times. And his narration was helpful

because he pointed out details a casual observer was likely to

miss. Thus, the officer’s “testimony concerning which

persons were engaged in what conduct at any given moment

could help the jury discern correctly and efficiently the events

depicted in the video.” Id. at 503.

Torralba did not object when Frazier narrated videos

showing cars arriving and departing from GS. Frazier

testified that he had watched each video roughly fifty times,

and that he would often watch the video feed live while it was

being recorded. The narratives helped the jury understand

what they were seeing. For example, Frazier provided the

length of time lapses between video clips. He pointed out

unique characteristics of the vehicles—like their makes,

models, and whether any bodywork had been done to

them—that helped the jury identify the same cars in

subsequent videos. He linked the different cars to specific

conspirators. He counted the number of passengers exiting or

entering the vehicles (a difficult task because the video’s

angle obscured the view). And he pointed out the particular

clothing of certain passengers, to show that a person dropped

off in one video was the same person picked up in a later

video. Frazier’s narratives were based on his repeated

viewing of the recordings, and helped the jury understand the

import of the videos.

Second, we have held that an officer may give lay

testimony about the meaning of ambiguous phrases in

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UNITED STATES V. TORRALBA-MENDIA 11

recorded calls. The interpretations must be based on the

officer’s observations in the case, should not rely on hearsay,

and must be helpful; i.e., the officer should not interpret clear

language. Freeman, 498 F.3d at 902, 904–05. For example,

in Freeman, we found an officer properlyinterpreted “‘[m]an,

it’s done already’ to mean ‘he’s given the cocaine to Kevin

Freeman and that he’s received money for it.’” Id. at 902.

That testimony was based on the witness’ personal

knowledge of the investigation and was helpful to the jury.

To the contrary, in Vera we explained that a case agent

improperly interpreted the demand that a supplier “‘lower the

price for you, fool, because tell her that it is a little expensive,

fool,’ as meaning that ‘whatever she is selling it for, Mr. Vera

probably feels it’s a little more expensive than what he wants

to pay for it, so he’s trying to negotiate, maybe get the price

lowered.’” Vera, 770 F.3d at 1246 n.9. The testimony merely

restated the obvious, and was not helpful.

Here, Frazier interpreted multiple recorded phrases.

Torralba objected to only two of the interpretations. He

objected when Frazier stated the word “radio” referred to a

Nextel push-talk phone, arguing the meaning of “radio” was

obvious and not helpful to the jury. The government argued

that Frazier’s interpretation was based on his listening to

thousands ofrecorded phone calls, and the explanation helped

the jury put the calls in context. Even if the interpretation was

not proper lay testimony—it is unclear why the distinction

between a traditional radio and a Nextel push-talk phone is

relevant—its admission was harmless for the reasons stated

below.

Torralba also objected when the government asked

Frazier to interpret Torralba’s statement that “it’s open

straight ahead.” At a bench conference, the government stated

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it expected Frazier to testify that the phrase meant ICE was

not operating its checkpoint. After the testimony resumed,

Frazier stated it was common for smugglers to tell each other

when ICE was not operating the checkpoint. But he did not

interpret the phrase “it’s open straight ahead,” and therefore

no error occurred.

Torralba did not object when Frazier interpreted phrases

in other recorded phone calls. For example, Frazier stated the

words “in the fight” meant the smugglers were trying to guide

the migrants around an ICE checkpoint. In support, he

explained that he heard that phrase in many phone

conversations when the smugglers were transporting people

from Nogales to Tucson. According to Frazier, the region

south of Tucson contained “a particularly heavy

concentration of United States Border Patrol Agents.” The

district court did not commit plain error in admitting this, and

similar, unobjected to testimony: Frazier interpreted arguably

ambiguous phrases based on his extensive review of the

recorded phone calls, and he consistently explained his

reasoning.

Finally, Torralba argues Frazier invaded the province of

the jury when he opined that Chapo Casino, Geuro Pesado,

and Alfredo Olea—three men frequentlyoverheard talking on

the phone and meeting at GS—led the alien smuggling

organization. Torralba objected to this portion of Frazier’s

testimony at trial. A lay witness may opine about a person’s

role in an organization when the opinion is based on his own

perceptions, is helpful to the jury, and does not require

specialized knowledge. See Fed. R. Evid. 701; United States

v. Figueroa-Lopez, 125 F.3d 1241, 1245–46 (9th Cir. 1997)

(explaining that lay witnesses may testify about the

implication of an observation when the “observations are

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UNITED STATES V. TORRALBA-MENDIA 13

common enough and require such a limited amount of

expertise, if any, that they can, indeed, be deemed lay witness

opinion”).

Frazier testified that Chapo Casino, Geuro Pesado, and

Alfredo Olea headed the alien smuggling organization. In

support, he pointed to phone conversations in which the men

tried to recruit shuttle operators. Furthermore, they referred

to the migrants as “mine” or “theirs,” and showed control

over the undocumented immigrants. They coordinated the

shuttles and gave orders to the drivers.

Frazier’s testimonywas based entirelyon his observations

in the case. He listened to hours of recorded phone calls,

during which he discerned the relationship between the

speakers. The phone calls that he based his inferences upon

were received as evidence. By knowing the relationship

between the speakers, the jury could better understand the

meaning and context of the calls. And Frazier’s opinion about

the members’ organizational roles was not based on

specialized knowledge or expertise in alien smuggling:

Managers in a wide variety of organizations recruit

employees, coordinate operations, and give orders to workers.

In short, Frazier offered appropriate lay testimony when

he narrated the videos, interpreted ambiguous phrases in

recorded phone calls, and stated he thought certain people led

the alien smuggling organization.

C

The district court committed plain error when it failed to

instruct the jury on how to evaluate Frazier’s dual role

testimony. We remedy a district court’s plain error only when

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the defendant shows that the error affected his substantial

rights. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135. Put

differently, there “must be a reasonable probability that the

error affected the outcome of the trial.” United States v.

Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262 (2010).

In Vera, we held the court’s failure to instruct the jury on

how to evaluate an agent’s dual role testimony prejudiced the

defendants. We noted the agent’s opinion “comprised the sole

evidence” about the quantity of drugs at issue. 770 F.3d at

1246. The district court did not “require an adequately

specific foundation” for the agent’s opinions. Id. at 1243. And

the agent testified about the meaning of phone calls “well

within the understanding of an ordinary juror,” which “may

have encouraged the jury to defer to [the agent’s] opinions

instead of listening to the calls and reaching an independent

judgment.” Id. at 1246.

Here, Torralba has not shown the absence of a curative

instruction affected the outcome of the trial. First, the

government bifurcated Frazier’s testimonybetween his expert

testimony and percipient observations. Frazier’s testimony

began with his credentials in the field of alien smuggling, his

descriptions of how smugglers circumvented ICE

checkpoints, and the common characteristics of

undocumented immigrants en route from Mexico. After the

completion of his expert testimony, the government

transitioned to questions about the instant case, asking “[a]nd

were you eventually assigned to an investigation involving

Southern Arizona shuttle companies?” From that point

forward, Frazier testified about his observations during the

investigation of GS. When the government divided Frazier’s

“testimony into two separate phases it avoided blurring the

distinction between Agent [Frazier’s] distinct role as a lay

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UNITED STATES V. TORRALBA-MENDIA 15

witness and his role as an expert witness.” United States v.

Anchrum, 590 F.3d 795, 804 (9th Cir. 2009).

Second, Frazier provided an adequate foundation formost

of his observations. Whether he was narrating videos,

interpreting phone calls, or opining on the role of various

conspirators, he consistentlyexplained his reasoning. And the

evidence that he based his testimony on—videos, phone call

recordings, still frame photos—was all given to the jury.

Thus, the jury had the information it needed to evaluate

Frazier’s opinions.

Third, a substantial amount of evidence, aside from

Frazier’s testimony, connected Torralba to the conspiracy.

Videos captured him repeatedly picking up suspected illegal

immigrants from GS. Recorded phone conversations detailed

his efforts to retrieve groups from the desert, as well as the

amount of money he intended to charge. And his

actions—engaging in counter-surveillance, alerting GS to a

suspected police vehicle, and telling GS that ICE was not

operating its checkpoint—all support the verdict.

Accordingly, while the court committed plain error in not

giving a curative instruction, the error was not prejudicial and

does not require reversal.

III

Torralba next claims the district court erred in allowing

Agent Burrola to offer expert testimony about alien

smuggling organizations, arguing the testimony’s probative

value was greatly outweighed by unfair prejudice. See Fed. R.

Evid. 403. We review a district court’s decision to admit

expert testimony for abuse of discretion. See United States v.

Mejia-Luna, 562 F.3d 1215, 1218 (9th Cir. 2009).

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We have previously held that government agents may

testify about the general practices of alien smuggling

organizations to establish their modus operandi. In MejiaLuna, we found the district court did not abuse its discretion

by admitting expert testimony about “how alien smuggling

operations typically operate, the division of responsibility

among numerous actors, the methods used, and the manner

and method of payment.” Id. at 1219. Similarly, in United

States v. Lopez-Martinez, we held the district court did not

commit plain error by allowing a government agent to testify

“about patterns and methods common among smugglers” in

the local area. 543 F.3d 509, 514–15 (9th Cir. 2008). We have

also found that expert witnesses may testify about the

meaning of code words or specialized jargon. See United

States v. Vera, 770 F.3d 1232, 1241 (9th Cir. 2014).

In the present case, Burrola testified about how alien

smuggling organizations guide people across the border,

evade ICE checkpoints and patrols, and employ safe houses.

He pointed out common characteristics of undocumented

immigrants en route from Mexico: They were often dirty due

to spending several days and nights walking through the

wilderness, carried little luggage, and were controlled by

guides. He also interpreted common code words or jargon,

and described the amounts and methods of payment.

Burrola’s testimony helped the juryunderstandTorralba’s

role in the alien smuggling scheme. Based on the common

characteristics of migrants en route from Mexico, a jury could

determine Torralba knew many of his passengers were not

legitimate travelers. Burrola’s testimony about the typical

smuggling rate is consistent with the amount Torralba stated

he would collect to drive two people to Tucson. And

Burrola’s statements about how guides escort people across

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UNITED STATES V. TORRALBA-MENDIA 17

the border and around ICE checkpoints helped the jury

understand why Torralba coordinated the pick up of groups

from remote areas of the desert.

Furthermore, Torralba has not shown the testimony was

unduly prejudicial. The only Ninth Circuit precedent he cites

were non-conspiracy cases in which we found evidence about

the structure of a criminal organization was highly prejudicial

and not relevant. See United States v. Varela-Rivera,

279 F.3d 1174, 1179 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[E]xpert testimony on

the modus operandi of drug trafficking organizations is

inadmissible in cases where, as here, the defendant is not

charged with conspiracy to distribute drugs.”); United States

v. Pineda-Torres, 287 F.3d 860, 864 (9th Cir. 2002) (same);

United States v. Vallejo, 237 F.3d 1008, 1015–17 (9th Cir.

2001) (same). Here, by contrast, the government charged

Torralba with a conspiracy. Evidence about the smuggling

organization’s methods helped prove the existence of a

conspiracy and put Torralba’s actions in context.

Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in

admitting Burrola’s expert testimony.

IV

Torralba concedes the government proved an alien

smuggling organization was operating out of GS, but argues

there was no evidence he was aware of, or joined, any

conspiracy. “We review de novo the district court’s denial of

a motion for judgment of acquittal based on insufficient

evidence.” United States v. Mincoff, 574 F.3d 1186, 1191–92

(9th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). When reviewing the

sufficiency of the evidence, we “view the evidence in the

light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether

any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant

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guilty of each element of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt.” United States v. Heller, 551 F.3d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir.

2009).

Section 1324 provides criminal penalties for “[a]ny

person who . . . engages in any conspiracy to commit any of

the preceding acts.” 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(v). To establish

an alien smuggling conspiracy, the government must prove an

agreement to carry out one of the substantive offenses, and

that Torralba had the intent necessary to commit the

underlying offense. See United States v. Herrera-Gonzalez,

263 F.3d 1092, 1095 (9th Cir. 2001) (interpreting a similarly

worded drug conspiracy statute); see also United States v.

Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 13 (1994)(holding conspiracies require

an overt act only when explicitly stated in the statute’s text).

It is undisputed that a conspiracy to smuggle

undocumented immigrants into the United States existed. The

only question is whether Torralba was part of the conspiracy

and whether he intended to further it. Once the government

has established the existence of a conspiracy, “evidence of

only a slight connection is necessary to support a conviction

of knowing participation in that conspiracy.” United States v.

Sanchez-Mata, 925 F.2d 1166, 1167 (9th Cir. 1991). A “slight

connection means that a defendant need not have known all

the conspirators, participated in the conspiracy from its

beginning, participated in all its enterprises, or known all its

details.” Herrera-Gonzalez, 263 F.3d at 1095. But it does

require more than a “[m]ere casual association with

conspiring people.” United States v. Estrada-Macias,

218 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States

v. Cloughessy, 572 F.2d 190, 191 (9th Cir. 1977)).

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UNITED STATES V. TORRALBA-MENDIA 19

Ample evidence showed that Torralba joined the

conspiracy with the intent to further its objectives. For

example, in a recorded phone call, Torralba agreed to deliver

two people for $2100, an amount consistent with the rates

traffickers charge to smuggle people to Tucson. In other calls,

Torralba coordinated the pick up and delivery of migrants,

and videos showed him transporting suspected illegal

immigrants from GS on multiple occasions. Furthermore,

many of Torralba’s actions are inconsistent with being simply

an unsuspecting shuttle driver. He engaged in countersurveillance techniques to evade police, informed GS of an

unmarked police car watching the business, and called GS to

tell them the ICE checkpoint was not operating. Based on

these facts, a rational juror could find beyond a reasonable

doubt that Torralba joined the conspiracy with the intent to

further it.

V

The government introduced I-213 immigration forms,

which were labeled a “Record of Deportable/Inadmissible

Alien.” The government introduced the forms to show that

many of the passengers detained during the investigation

were, in fact, deported. Torralba argues that the forms

contained inadmissible hearsay and their introduction

violated the Confrontation Clause. We review the district

court’s rulings on the Confrontation Clause and its

construction of the hearsay rules de novo. United States v.

Morales, 720 F.3d 1194, 1199 (9th Cir. 2013). We review

decisions to admit evidence under a hearsay exception for

abuse of discretion. Id.

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20 UNITED STATES V. TORRALBA-MENDIA

A

Torralba first argues the forms are inadmissible hearsay.

Under Rule 803(8), a record or statement of a public office is

admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule if it sets out “a

matter observed while under a legal duty to report, but not

including, in a criminal case, a matter observed by lawenforcement personnel.” Fed. R. Evid. 803(8)(A)(ii).

In United States v. Lopez we held the public records

exception applied to a “Verification of Removal.” 762 F.3d

852, 861 (9th Cir. 2014). The verification of removal

contained the date, port, and manner of the alien’s departure,

as well as the alien’s photograph, signature and fingerprint,

and an officer’s signature. Id. at 856. We reasoned the officer

had a legal duty to fill out the form, explaining that

“[r]ecording and maintaining verifications that an individual

has been deported falls under the rubric of responsibilities

assigned to the Department of Homeland Security; therefore,

completing the verification of removal form is appropriate to

the function of the agency.” Id. at 862. Furthermore, we

found the documents admissible notwithstanding the general

prohibition against admitting records created by law

enforcement. We reasoned the law enforcement prohibition’s

purpose was to “exclude observations made by officials at the

scene of the crime or apprehension, because observations

made in an adversarial setting are less reliable than

observations made by public officials in other situations.” Id.

at 861 (quoting United States v. Hernandez-Rojas, 617 F.2d

533, 535 (9th Cir. 1980)). The verification of removal, by

contrast, was a “ministerial, objective observation” that

merely “records the movement of aliens across the United

States border,” and was therefore “inherent[ly] reliab[le]

because of the Government’s need to keep accurate records

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UNITED STATES V. TORRALBA-MENDIA 21

of the movement of aliens.” Id. (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted); see also United States v. LoyolaDominguez, 125 F.3d 1315, 1317–18 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding

warrants ofremoval/deportation were admissible under public

records hearsay exception).

The same principles apply here. The admitted record of a

deportable alien contains the same information as a

verification of removal: The alien’s name, photograph,

fingerprints, as well as the date, port and method of departure,

and the officer’s signature. The government redacted all other

statements, including the officer’s narration explaining how

the alien was apprehended, and the alien’s statements

regarding his country of origin and address. Furthermore, the

record of a deportable alien, like a verification of removal, is

part of an alien’s A-File, filled out and kept by the

Department of Homeland Security in its regular course of

business. Finally, the admitted forms are a ministerial,

objective observation detailing how the aliens were

repatriated, and do not implicate the purposes animating the

law enforcement exception. Other circuits addressing this

issue have found I-213 forms admissible under Rule 803(8).

See United States v. Caraballo, 595 F.3d 1214, 1226 (11th

Cir. 2010); Renteria-Gonzalez v. I.N.S., 322 F.3d 804, 817

n.16 (5th Cir. 2003).

Torralba’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing. He

contends the Court must evaluate whether the aliens’

statements independently qualify for a hearsay exception. For

example, in Morales, we held an I-826 form containing

migrants’ statements about their country of origin and

admissions that they were in the United States illegally did

not fall within the public records exception. 720 F.3d at

1201–02. We explained that the aliens did not have a duty to

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22 UNITED STATES V. TORRALBA-MENDIA

report their immigration status or their place of birth. Here,

by contrast, the government has thoroughly redacted the

forms. The I-213 forms do not contain any alien statements

about their country of origin, or any admission that they were

in the United States illegally. Accordingly, there is no need to

determine if the aliens’ statements qualify for a hearsay

exception, as no such statements were included in the forms.

B

Torralba also contends the admission of the I-213 forms

violated his confrontation rights. The Sixth Amendment

provides, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall

enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against

him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. “[T]he Confrontation Clause

bars admission of testimonial statements unless the declarant

is unavailable to testify and the defendant previously had an

opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.” United States v.

Albino-Loe, 747 F.3d 1206, 1210 (9th Cir. 2014). A statement

is within the “core class of testimonial statements” when it

was “made under circumstances which would lead an

objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement

would be available for use at a later trial.” Melendez-Diaz v.

Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310 (2009) (quoting Crawford

v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004)).

The Supreme Court has explained that public records are

normally non-testimonial because they are “created for the

administration of an entity’s affairs and not for the purpose of

establishing or proving some fact at trial.” Id. at 324. We

have repeatedly held that immigration documents contained

in an alien’s A-file are non-testimonial because they are “not

made in anticipation of litigation, and because [they are]

simply a routine, objective cataloging of an unambiguous

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UNITED STATES V. TORRALBA-MENDIA 23

factual matter.” Lopez, 762 F.3d at 860 (holding verification

of removal was non-testimonial); see also Albino-Loe,

747 F.3d at 1210–11 (holding notice to appear was nontestimonial); Morales, 720 F.3d at 1200 (holding I-826 forms

were non-testimonial); United States v. Orozco-Acosta,

607 F.3d 1156, 1164 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding warrants of

removal were non-testimonial); United States v. BahenaCardenas, 411 F.3d 1067, 1075 (9th Cir. 2005) (same).

The same principles apply here. Nothing in the I-213

forms suggest the documents were completed in anticipation

of litigation. Rather, the I-213 form “is routinely completed

by Customs and Border Patrol agents in the course of their

non-adversarial duties, not in the course of preparing for a

criminal prosecution.” Caraballo, 595 F.3d at 1226. As is

evident from the form itself, the record of a deportable alien

merelycollects the alien’s biographical information, gives the

officer an opportunity to describe how the person was

apprehended (which the government redacted), and states

whether they were deported or voluntarily returned. Agents

complete I-213 forms regardless of whether the government

decides to prosecute anyone criminally. See id. at 1228

(“[T]he I-213 form is routinely requested from every alien

entering the United States, and the form itself is filled out for

anyone entering theUnited States without proper immigration

papers.”). As with other evidence in an alien’s A-file, the

documents are prepared for administrative purposes, not as

evidence in a later trial. Accordingly, because the documents

are not testimonial, their admission did not run afoul of the

Confrontation Clause.

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24 UNITED STATES V. TORRALBA-MENDIA

VI

There was no reversible error and we therefore affirm.

AFFIRMED.

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