Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01561/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01561-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rico J. Speed
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

Nos. 15‐1520 & 15‐1561

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

JERMAINE R. SPEED AND RICO J. SPEED,

Defendants‐Appellants.

____________________

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

Central District of Illinois.

Nos. 14‐cr‐20056 & 14‐cr‐20057 — Colin S. Bruce, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED NOVEMBER 5, 2015 — DECIDED JANUARY 19, 2016

____________________

Before FLAUM, MANION, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.

MANION, Circuit Judge. Rico and Jermaine Speed are cous‐

ins who were caught dealing crack in the city of Kankakee,

Illinois. Rico also sold firearms and ammunition in violation

of the law. After the cousins each serve 18 years in federal

prison, they must each complete eight years of supervised

release. These consolidated appeals focus on three identical

challenges to Rico’s and Jermaine’s conditions of supervised

release: the district judge’s decisions to limit contact with

Case: 15-1561 Document: 33 Filed: 01/19/2016 Pages: 13
2 Nos. 15‐1520 & 15‐1561

felons, impose alcohol‐related restrictions, and prohibit them

from using dangerous weapons. We affirm, while clarifying

the standards of review that apply when defendants chal‐

lenge conditions of supervised release.

I. Background

When Rico and Jermaine Speed sold cocaine base, also

known as crack cocaine, their drug deals were secretly re‐

ported to law enforcement. Rico Speed sold 30 grams of

crack to a confidential informant once, and sold firearms and

ammunition to the same informant four times, between 2011

and 2013. After he was indicted on four counts, he pleaded

guilty to one count of possessing a firearm as a felon and one

count of knowingly distributing crack. Jermaine Speed was

indicted on four counts for selling cocaine four times in 2010

and 2011: he sold 8.9 grams, 10.2 grams, 27.2 grams, and 29.6

grams of cocaine to a confidential informant. He pleaded

guilty to the last count only, for his largest cocaine sale.

In separate sentencing hearings, District Judge Colin

Bruce varied downward and imposed 216 months in prison,

or 18 years, on each defendant. Judge Bruce also sentenced

each to the mandatory eight years of supervised release.

When Judge Bruce began these sentencing hearings, Ri‐

co’s attorney and Jermaine’s attorney each offered objections

to the presentence investigation reports (PSRs) provided by

probation, but neither attorney objected to the PSRs’ recom‐

mended conditions of release. As probation read its recom‐

mendations for supervised‐release conditions, Judge Bruce

adopted the conditions and reasoning found in each PSR.

First, for both Rico and Jermaine, the district court re‐

quired that “[t]he defendant shall not knowingly meet,

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Nos. 15‐1520 & 15‐1561 3

communicate, or otherwise interact with any person whom

he knows to be a convicted felon or to be engaged in, or

planning to engage in, criminal activity, unless granted per‐

mission to do so by the probation officer.” The district court

reasoned that this would give each defendant his best chance

of succeeding in supervised release, by keeping him away

from people who would entice him to commit crimes.

Second, Judge Bruce directed each defendant that “[y]ou

shall, at the direction of the U.S. Probation Office, participate

in a program for alcohol treatment, including testing, to de‐

termine if you have used alcohol. You shall abide by the

rules of the treatment provider.” Judge Bruce reasoned that

it is not unusual for drug‐dependent individuals to drink

more alcohol when drugs become unavailable. As he noted,

alcohol‐treatment programs would also require Rico and

Jermaine to abstain from alcohol. Later, in his written judg‐

ments, Judge Bruce added this language to the conditions of

release: “You shall refrain from any use of alcohol.”

Third, although the PSR contained no recommendation

on this issue, the district judge added a condition during the

oral sentencings. He ordered that Rico and Jermaine “shall

not possess a firearm, ammunition, destructive device, or

any other dangerous weapon.” Judge Bruce did not provide

reasons for imposing this condition on either defendant.

Rico and Jermaine Speed now bring these direct appeals.

II. Discussion

A. Waiver

We begin with the government’s argument that the

Speeds waived their rights to appeal their conditions of re‐

lease because they never objected below.

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4 Nos. 15‐1520 & 15‐1561

Waiver requires a defendant to intentionally surrender a

known right. United States v. Hinds, 770 F.3d 658, 665 (7th Cir.

2014). On this issue of appealing supervised‐release condi‐

tions, we recently explained that there is no waiver if a de‐

fendant “merely answered ‘[n]o’” when a district court gen‐

erally invited legal objections to a sentence. Id. To waive a

right in response to a general question, at the end of sentenc‐

ing the defendant must (1) expressly approve the condition,

or (2) have a strategic reason to avoid raising an argument in

the sentencing hearing. Id.

Here, neither defendant expressly approved the chal‐

lenged conditions of release, so that path to waiver is closed.  

The government urges that, because Rico told the court

he was taking this criminal conviction as his opportunity to

“grow[] up to be like a man,” it would have been strategical‐

ly unwise for him to also object to conditions on his interac‐

tions with felons, alcohol consumption, and possession of

dangerous weapons. This could be true, but it is merely

speculative. Though we draw no conclusions here, it could

also be that Rico believed that, as a mature man, he could

handle things like responsible drinking.1 The government

has not shown that Rico actually waived a right. And con‐

cerning Jermaine, the government suggests no strategic rea‐

son at all for him to withhold objections. This path to waiver

is also closed.

                                                  1 We also note the irony in the government’s request that we allow

Rico to be treated “like a man,” while it argues that his drinking must be

monitored for nearly a decade.

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Nos. 15‐1520 & 15‐1561 5

In arguing that the Speeds waived their right to appeal,

the government relies in part upon our decision in United

States v. Garcia‐Segura, 717 F.3d 566 (7th Cir. 2013). Under

Garcia‐Segura, as later described in Donelli, a defendant

waives his right to appeal mitigation arguments if a trial

judge asks whether the defendant needs “any further elabo‐

ration” of the reasons for a sentence and the defendant says

no. United States v. Donelli, 747 F.3d 936, 941 (7th Cir. 2014).

The government urges that, when the district court in this

case asked whether there was “anything unclear or confus‐

ing,” the Speeds waived their rights to appeal because their

attorneys answered “no” or “I can’t think of anything else.”

These facts might appear to satisfy Garcia‐Segura, as de‐

scribed in Donelli, but we never intended to imply that a

general “anything else?” results in the waiver of a specific

right. Instead, Garcia‐Segura’s protection of affirmative, spe‐

cific waiver holds true:

we encourage sentencing courts to inquire of defense

counsel whether they are satisfied that the court has ad‐

dressed their main arguments in mitigation. If the re‐

sponse is in the affirmative, a later challenge for fail‐

ure to address a principal mitigation argument under

the reasoning of Cunningham would be considered

waived. If not, the trial court would have the oppor‐

tunity to clarify whether it determined that the argu‐

ment was “so weak as not to merit discussion,” lacked

a factual basis, or has rejected the argument and pro‐

vide a reason why.

Garcia‐Segura, 717 F.3d at 569 (emphasis added). Here, when

the defendants merely answered a generalized question

about whether they were confused, Garcia‐Segura was not

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6 Nos. 15‐1520 & 15‐1561

met. Rico and Jermaine did not affirmatively waive specific

rights.

For these reasons, we conclude that neither defendant

waived his right to appeal the conditions of supervised re‐

lease.

B. Supervised Release: The Standards of Review

Turning to the substance of the Speeds’ appeal, we first

consider what standard of review controls. On procedural

error, we conduct de novo review of whether a district court

made sufficient findings to support conditions of release.

United States v. Moore, 788 F.3d 693, 696 (7th Cir. 2015). The

standard of review we apply to substantive error has been

less clear.

The government argues that plain‐error review applies.

As the Speeds note, however, we have recognized “tension”

in whether we review unobjected‐to conditions for plain er‐

ror or abuse of discretion. See United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d

828, 844 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Shannon, 743

F.3d 496, 499 (7th Cir. 2014)) (internal marks omitted).

In United States v. Hinds, we called the standard of review

“an open question” when defendants failed to object to su‐

pervised‐release conditions below. Hinds, 770 F.3d at 665.

Hinds deferred resolving this issue because the defendant

prevailed under either standard. Id. Other Seventh Circuit

cases have likewise declined to specify the standard where

the outcome was the same either way. See Kappes, 782 F.3d at

844 (gathering citations). We have cautioned defendants,

however, against failing to object to supervised‐release con‐

ditions on the belief that we will continue treating the two

standards as interchangeable. Id.

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Nos. 15‐1520 & 15‐1561 7

In general, our rule has been to review for abuse of dis‐

cretion when defendants contest conditions of release in the

district court, while examining uncontested conditions for

plain error. Id. (citing United States v. Baker, 755 F.3d 515, 522

(7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Ross, 475 F.3d 871, 873 (7th Cir.

2007)). When we are reviewing uncontested conditions,

plain‐error review is generally fitting: it is consistent with

the standard of review in other criminal appeals. When a de‐

fendant fails to object to evidence at trial, for example, we

review for plain error. United States v. Rangel, 350 F.3d 648,

650 (7th Cir. 2003). Likewise, if a defendant does not object to

a prosecutor’s statements in district court, we review for

plain error. United States v. Sandoval, 347 F.3d 627, 631 (7th

Cir. 2003). We thus hold that we apply plain‐error review

when a defendant fails to object to supervised‐release condi‐

tions below, while reviewing for abuse of discretion when

the defendant does object in district court. See United States v.

Poulin, No. 14‐2458, 2016 WL 51387, at *4 (7th Cir. Jan. 5,

2015).

As we have previously recognized, however, this stand‐

ard may need to be adjusted if the sentencing hearing is the

first time that a defendant is faced with a condition of su‐

pervised release. See Kappes, 782 F.3d at 843–44. If a condition

appears in a statute or the Sentencing Guidelines, the de‐

fendant is charged with being on notice of the condition. Id.

at 842. Sentencing judges are encouraged to provide advance

notice of potential supervised‐release conditions. Id. Specific

advance notice is only required, however, if a condition does

not appear in a federal statute or the Sentencing Guidelines.

Id. Thus, if a condition (1) is imposed on the defendant at

sentencing and (2) does not appear in a statute or the Guide‐

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8 Nos. 15‐1520 & 15‐1561

lines, we will review for abuse of discretion even if the sur‐

prised defendant failed to object at sentencing.

With these holdings on standards of review, we now ex‐

amine the Speeds’ three objections to conditions of release.

C. Supervised Release: The Conditions

When a sentencing judge imposes conditions of super‐

vised release, they must reasonably relate to four factors.

These are “[1] the defendant’s offense, history, and character‐

istics; [2] the need for deterrence; [3] the need to protect the

public from the defendant; and [4] the need to provide the

defendant with treatment.” United States v. Musso, 643 F.3d

566, 571 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)). Any con‐

dition must reasonably relate to the first factor. 18 U.S.C.

§ 583(d)(1). It also cannot deprive more liberty than reasona‐

bly necessary to achieve the latter three factors. 18 U.S.C.

§ 3583(d)(2).

1. Contact with felons

Rico and Jermaine object first to the restriction on contact

with felons during supervised release. This case picks up the

thread where United States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368 (7th Cir.

2015), left off. In Thompson, the court found a condition of

release vague when it barred a defendant from “associat[ing]

with any person convicted of a felony, unless granted per‐

mission” by the probation officer. Id. at 377.

Our decision in Thompson suggested instead telling a de‐

fendant that he may not “meet, communicate, or otherwise

interact with a person whom he knows to be engaged, or

planning to be engaged, in criminal activity.” Id. And in the

Speeds’ cases, the following condition was imposed on both

defendants: “The defendant shall not knowingly meet,

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Nos. 15‐1520 & 15‐1561 9

communicate, or otherwise interact with any person whom

he knows to be a convicted felon or to be engaged in, or

planning to engage in, criminal activity, unless granted per‐

mission to do so by the probation officer.” This language

makes the meaning of “association” clear. Further, it requires

scienter and goes beyond Thompson by creating a safety

valve for probation‐approved interactions with felons and

criminals.

Rico and Jermaine do not object to the ban on interacting

with people who are actually committing crimes, but they

appeal the prohibition on interacting with people convicted

of felonies. This is not an abstract argument. The cousins,

who will enter supervised release as felons themselves, urge

that this condition will restrict their constitutional freedom

of association with people in their family and community.

For that matter, the condition prevents them from interacting

with each other during their terms of supervised release, un‐

less their probation officers grant permission.

The Speeds do not cite any cases on how this condition

violates the Constitution, however, and we do not find any

grounding for their argument. On the contrary, prohibiting

contact with felons is not an unusual federal condition of

supervised release, particularly where probation officers can

approve the requested contact. See, e.g., id.; United States v.

Walker, 742 F.3d 614, 615 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Pee‐

bles, 624 F.3d 344, 346 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Napulou,

593 F.3d 1041, 1044 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Charles,

531 F.3d 637, 639 (8th Cir. 2008); United States v. Smith, 436

F.3d 307, 309 (1st Cir. 2006). If Rico or Jermaine needs to in‐

teract with a family member, friend, colleague, or any other

individual with a felony conviction, he can speak with his

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10 Nos. 15‐1520 & 15‐1561

probation officer, who knows the individual circumstances

and can approve appropriate requests.

Because this condition does not appear in a statute or the

Guidelines, we review for abuse of discretion. The district

judge did not abuse his discretion when imposing this con‐

dition.

2. Alcohol consumption, testing, and treatment

The Speeds next challenge the alcohol‐related conditions

of their supervised release.

They argue first that the written judgment’s ban on all al‐

cohol consumption is inconsistent with the oral sentence,

and that the oral sentence governs. It is well established that

an oral sentence controls if it conflicts with the written

judgment. United States v. Johnson, 765 F.3d 702, 710–11 (7th

Cir. 2014). At the Speeds’ sentencings, the probation officer

stated that “any treatment program [the defendant] is in will

require him to abstain from alcohol,” and the district court

expressly adopted that statement. There is no conflict be‐

tween this statement, or other statements the court made

during the hearing, and the written judgment’s full ban on

drinking alcohol. Thus, the conflict rule is not triggered and

the written judgment stands.

The Speeds also contend that, because the district court

did not actually restrict their alcohol consumption, there is

no purpose in requiring them to undergo alcohol testing and

treatment. To begin with, the district court’s ban on all alco‐

hol consumption is effective. Even were it not, the testing

and treatment requirements would be appropriate condi‐

tions. Rico has a prior conviction for driving under the influ‐

ence, and he underwent alcohol treatment after that convic‐

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Nos. 15‐1520 & 15‐1561 11

tion. Though he claimed to have stopped drinking, he admit‐

ted daily marijuana use. It was permissible for the district

court to conclude that Rico might return to alcohol if he

could not use drugs during supervised release. In addition,

Jermaine admits in his briefing to “usually” drinking alcohol

“two or three times a week when he is upset or depressed.”

This is also sufficient support for the district court’s decision.

These conditions also do not appear in a statute or the

Guidelines and, once again, we conclude that the district

court did not abuse its discretion.

3. Dangerous weapons

Finally, the defendants challenge the ban on possessing

“a firearm, ammunition, destructive device, or other danger‐

ous weapon.”

First, the Speeds argue that they received no notice of this

condition. But this is an enumerated special condition of re‐

lease. Under Sentencing Guideline § 5D1.3(d)(1), if a defend‐

ant is being sentenced for a felony, the recommendation is to

impose “a condition prohibiting the defendant from pos‐

sessing a firearm or other dangerous weapon.” The Speeds

are deemed to have notice of this condition because it was

enumerated in the Guidelines. See Kappes, 782 F.3d at 842.

Their notice argument therefore fails.

Second, the Speeds object because the district judge did

not explain this condition of release at the sentencing hear‐

ing. We review the condition in light of the judge’s com‐

ments during the full sentencing hearing. Id. at 859. Rico was

pleading guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm,

while Jermaine was seen in illegal possession of a pistol. On

facts like these, it was reasonable for the district judge to re‐

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12 Nos. 15‐1520 & 15‐1561

strict their access to firearms. And the defendants both con‐

cede that, as convicted felons, they cannot possess firearms.

This condition therefore relates at least to the defendants’

histories and the need to protect the public going forward.

Third, the defendants argue that “dangerous weapon” is

a vague term. We recently addressed this issue in United

States v. Armour, 804 F.3d 859, 869 (7th Cir. 2015), where we

concluded that a condition prohibiting dangerous weapons

provides sufficient notice of the prohibited conduct to a per‐

son of reasonable intelligence. Armour recognized that, “alt‐

hough [i]t would be better if the [condition] stated that ‘dan‐

gerous weapon’ includes objects used, though not designed

to be used, as weapons ... it is not a fatal infirmity.” Id. (in‐

ternal marks omitted). The condition is not vague.

The defendants correctly observe that courts put a wide

range of objects in the dangerous‐weapons category: a car, a

metal hoe, shoes, and more. See United States v. Schoenborn, 4

F.3d 1424, 1432 (7th Cir. 1993). In short, a dangerous weapon

can mean “virtually any object given appropriate circum‐

stances.” Id. But how the defendant uses it matters: the defi‐

nition of a dangerous weapon “turns not on the object’s la‐

tent capability alone, but also on the manner in which the

object was used.” Id. While the Speeds urge that there is no

scienter requirement, the person holding the shoe (or any

other potential dangerous weapon) is the one with the pow‐

er to keep it a mere shoe or transform it into a dangerous

weapon.  

The Speeds had notice of this condition because it ap‐

pears as a special condition in the Guidelines. On plain‐error

review, we conclude that the district court did not err.

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Nos. 15‐1520 & 15‐1561 13

III. Conclusion

The supervised‐release conditions are thus AFFIRMED.

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