Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-mj-71055/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-mj-71055-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alejandro Toledo Manrique
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE MATTER OF THE 

EXTRADITION OF ALEJANDRO 

TOLEDO MANRIQUE 

Case No. 19-mj-71055-MAG-1 (TSH)

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

RECONSIDERTION

Re: Dkt. No. 49

In an extradition proceeding, there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel, see United 

States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 142 n.66 (2d Cir. 2003); DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 181 F.3d 865, 868 

(7th Cir. 1999), and there is no statutory right to it either. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(1) & (2). 

However, this District’s General Order No. 2 provides for the discretionary appointment of 

counsel “[w]henever a district judge or magistrate judge determines that the interests of justice so 

require . . . for any financially eligible person who . . . is held for international extradition under 

Title 18 U.S.C. Chapter 209.” G.O. 2 § IV(a)(2)(g). On August 6, 2019, Alejandro Toledo signed 

a financial affidavit that stated he had minimal monthly income and little in assets and that his 

wife had no monthly income. The Court relied on that financial affidavit to conclude that Toledo 

is a “financially eligible person.” Given the complexities of this extradition proceeding and the 

nature of Peru’s accusations against Toledo, the Court additionally found that the appointment of 

counsel was in the interests of justice.

Beyond simply the affidavit, Toledo made expansive arguments concerning his and his 

wife’s lack of assets. In support of his argument that he lacks the financial means to flee, and 

therefore should be released from detention, “Dr. Toledo has disputed, and continues to dispute, 

the government’s suggestion that his wife has access to significant amounts of money.” ECF No. 

Case 3:19-mj-71055-MAG Document 88 Filed 01/31/20 Page 1 of 5
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39 at 9; see also ECF No. 32 at 16 (asserting that “[t]he Toledos were struggling”).

The government moved for reconsideration of the Court’s order appointing counsel.1 Bank 

statements revealed that in the five months preceding the date of Toledo’s financial affidavit, his 

wife, Elaine Karp-Toledo, received more than a million dollars in wire transfers from her mother, 

Eva Fernenbug. The defense argued that Toledo did not lie in his financial affidavit because these 

transfers were gifts rather than income, and in the alternative, that he may not have known about 

the money. However, the obvious purpose of the financial affidavit is to determine the 

defendant’s ability to pay for counsel, so this hairsplitting distinction between gifts and income –

which would, of course, be appropriate in a tax return – caused the Court to have some concerns 

about the quality of the information provided in the affidavit, especially since the gifts were so 

large. Also, outside of the affidavit, Toledo’s arguments about his and his wife’s lack of assets 

were more sweeping and did not seem susceptible to the gifts/income distinction. The government 

also submitted checks showing that for at least five months between November 2018 and June 

2019, Karp-Toledo paid the $10,000 monthly legal fee for her husband’s then-retained attorney, 

not to mention the rent for the Toledos’ house, suggesting the availability of funds to pay for 

counsel. Toledo’s alternative argument that he sincerely thought his wife was out of money when 

she was in fact a millionaire strained credulity.

Under the circumstances, the Court required greater disclosure in order to determine 

whether the appointment of counsel continued to be justified and, if so, whether Toledo should be 

required to pay for some or all of that expense. See G.O. 2 § IV(B)(3) ¶ 5. Accordingly, the Court 

ordered Toledo to complete and submit to the Court the Expanded Declaration in Support of 

Attorney or Other Services Pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act, ECF No. 72, which he has done. 

The Court now addresses the merits of the government’s motion for reconsideration. The 

Criminal Justice Act requires each district court to establish “a plan for furnishing representation 

1 The Court rejects Toledo’s argument that the government lacks standing to bring this motion. 

The Ninth Circuit did not so hold in United States v. Wells, 879 F.3d 900 (9th Cir. 2018). And 

Volume 7, section 210.40.20(g) of the Guide to Judiciary Policy states that “[t]he prosecution and 

other interested entities may present to the court information concerning the person’s eligibility” 

for appointed counsel. 

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for any person financially unable to obtain adequate representation . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a). 

This Court has done so in its General Order No. 2. G.O. 2 § I. The second paragraph of section 

IV(B)(3) of the General Order specifically addresses the issue of family resources. It says:

The initial eligibility determination must be made without regard to 

the financial ability of the person’s family to retain counsel unless the 

person’s family indicates a willingness and ability to do so promptly. 

(emphasis added) 

That language is clear. The Court can’t include spousal assets in the financial eligibility 

determination unless the spouse indicates a willingness to pay. See also United States v. Lexin, 

434 F. Supp. 2d 836, 841-42 (S.D. Cal. 2006) (interpreting similar language in Volume VII of the 

Guide to Judiciary Policy). It’s true that the General Order states that the “initial” eligibility 

determination must be made without regard to the family’s assets (unless they are willing and able 

to pay), but that does not imply that a subsequent eligibility determination can be made differently. 

The General Order goes on to state in the fifth paragraph of section IV(B)(3) that “[i]f at any time 

after the appointment of counsel a judge finds that a person provided representation is financially 

able to retain private counsel or make partial payment for the appointed representation, the judge 

may terminate the counsel appointment or direct the defendant to pay available funds as provided 

in 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(f).” The financial ability tests in paragraphs two and five are substantively 

the same; the fifth paragraph simply addresses the situations of changed circumstances or new or 

different information becoming available to the Court.

Here, Karp-Toledo has not indicated a willingness to pay. To the contrary, defense 

counsel states that she is unwilling to do so, in part because she may need the money she has to 

pay for expenses in connection with her own potential legal issues.

However, this is not necessarily the end of the matter because sometimes people lie about 

what assets they have, or who has them. Putting all your money in your spouse’s name to avoid 

payment obligations is hardly a new idea. A defendant who has a lot of money but who wants the 

government to foot the bill for his defense has an incentive to say his money all belongs to family 

members, and courts can’t just credulously accept that assertion when it seems false. See, e.g., 

United States v. Lefkowitz, 125 F.3d 608, 621 (8th Cir. 1997). Indeed, an affidavit claiming 

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indigency is particularly unworthy of belief when the government later comes forward with 

information that the defendant had access to significantly more funds than he disclosed in the

affidavit. See United States v. Harris, 707 F.2d 653, 660-61 (2d Cir. 1983).

If Toledo had accurately disclosed his wife’s assets in the first place, this motion would be 

easy. His wife is sitting on a large amount of cash, given to her by her mother. Yes, she used her 

personal funds to pay for some joint expenses, as well as for Toledo’s prior retained counsel, but 

that’s not unusual in a marriage, and in any event, now she’s no longer willing to pay for his 

counsel. Whether she’s willing to do something or not is for her to say, see G.O. 2 § IV(B)(3) 

(family must “indicate[]” they are willing and able to pay), and people can change their minds. 

Maybe she was willing to pay for retained counsel when the monthly expense was small, but once 

her husband was arrested and a formal extradition proceeding began, it became too much. 

Regardless, she is the decider of what she is willing to do. 

Nothing about this situation suggests her money isn’t really hers. It’s not in a joint bank 

account, for example, and there is no evidence that the money was ever in her husband’s 

possession. There are at least two transfers of money from Karp-Toledo to her husband, but the 

government is wrong to say this proves they have joint access to the funds. If these were joint 

accounts, after all, she wouldn’t have needed to do a transfer. The transfers actually show that 

Toledo did not have access to this money; it was in his wife’s control. Further, the transfers do not 

show that Toledo is hiding his assets in his wife’s name because they are in the wrong direction –

from her to him. (Transfers from a defendant who later claims indigency would be a red flag.) As

to the source of the funds, if his mother had gifted her this money, that would look like an attempt 

to put the husband’s assets in the wife’s name. But the money came from her own mother, and a 

child is a natural recipient of a parent’s gift. 

The question, then, is whether Toledo’s false representation to the Court that his wife did 

not have access to significant funds changes the equation. Certainly, that misrepresentation is 

concerning. But it’s also to the side of the issue now before the Court. Under General Order No. 

2, if Toledo’s wife is unwilling to pay for his legal expenses, it doesn’t matter how much money 

she has, so Toledo lied about something that is ultimately irrelevant to the appointment of counsel. 

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While misrepresentations are not to be condoned or rewarded, taking all of the facts into account, 

there just doesn’t seem to be a basis to conclude that the money in his wife’s accounts is actually 

his. Also, there is no reason to think he lied about how much money he has, and it’s not enough to 

afford counsel in this complex extradition case.

Accordingly, the government’s motion for reconsideration is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 31, 2020

THOMAS S. HIXSON

United States Magistrate Judge

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