Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01421/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01421-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mitchell C. Beem
Plaintiff
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MITCHELL C. BEEM, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security 

Defendant. 

No. 2:15-cv-1421-EFB 

ORDER 

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”) denying his applications for a period of disability and Disability Insurance 

Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI of the 

Social Security Act. The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. For the 

reasons discussed below, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied and the 

Commissioner’s motion is granted. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff filed applications for a period of disability, DIB, and SSI, alleging that he had 

been disabled since March 6, 2012. Administrative Record (“AR”) 201-211. Plaintiff’s 

applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration. Id. at 123-128, 131-136. On August 

12, 2013, a hearing was held before administrative law judge (“ALJ”) Peter Belli. Id. at 26-64. 

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Plaintiff was represented by counsel at the hearing, at which he and a vocational expert testified. 

Id.

On November 22, 2013, the ALJ issued a decision finding that plaintiff was not disabled 

under sections 216(i), 223(d), and 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Act.1 Id. at 11-21. The ALJ made the 

following specific findings: 

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through 

December 31, 2012. 

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 6, 2012, the 

alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq., and 416.971 et seq.). 

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 Disability Insurance Benefits are paid to disabled persons who have contributed to the 

Social Security program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) is paid 

to disabled persons with low income. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382 et seq. Under both provisions, 

disability is defined, in part, as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” due to 

“a medically determinable physical or mental impairment.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(a) & 

1382c(a)(3)(A). A five-step sequential evaluation governs eligibility for benefits. See 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 423(d)(1)(a), 416.920 & 416.971-76; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987). The 

following summarizes the sequential evaluation: 

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful 

activity? If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed 

to step two. 

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? 

If so, proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is 

appropriate. 

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination 

of impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 

404, Subpt. P, App.1? If so, the claimant is automatically 

determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four. 

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past 

work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step 

five. 

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional 

capacity to perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not 

disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled. 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). 

 

The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 

process. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5. The Commissioner bears the burden if the sequential 

evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.

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3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: musculoskeletal limitations secondary 

to chronic pain syndrome with history of arthritis of the lumbar spine, left shoulder joint 

[pain], in addition to mood disorder associated with general medical condition (20 CFR 

404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)). 

* * * 

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or 

medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart 

P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, and 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 

416.926). 

* * * 

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has 

the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) 

and 416.967(b) except claimant is limited to no climbing of ladders/ropes/scaffolds, 

occasional postural maneuvers of stooping, kneeling, crouching and crawling. In addition, 

he is limited to frequent detail job instructions. 

* * * 

6. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work (20 CFR 404.1565 and 

416.965). 

* * * 

7. The claimant was born on February 28, 2961 and was 51 years old, which is defined as an 

individual closely approaching advanced age, on the alleged disability onset date (20 CFR 

404.1563 and 416.963). 

8. The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to communicate in English 

(20 CFR 404.1564 and 416.964). 

9. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability because using 

the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding that the claimant is “not 

disabled,” whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills (See SSR 82-41 and 20 

CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2). 

10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional 

capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the 

claimant can perform (20 CFR 404.1569, 404.1569(a), 416.969, and 416.969(a)). 

* * * 

11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from 

October 31, 2009, through the date of this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(g) and 416.920(g)). 

Id. at 13-21. 

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Plaintiff’s request for Appeals Council review was denied on May 8, 2015, leaving the 

ALJ’s decision as the final decision of the Commissioner. Id. at 1-4. 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS 

The Commissioner’s decision that a claimant is not disabled will be upheld if the findings 

of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the record and the proper legal standards were 

applied. Schneider v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 223 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2000); 

Morgan v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999); Tackett v. Apfel, 

180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 The findings of the Commissioner as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are 

conclusive. See Miller v. Heckler, 770 F.2d 845, 847 (9th Cir. 1985). Substantial evidence is 

more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521 (9th 

Cir. 1996). “‘It means such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.’” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. 

N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). 

 “The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical 

testimony, and resolving ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 

2001) (citations omitted). “Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” 

Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). 

III. ANALYSIS 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to pose a complete hypothetical to the 

vocational expert. ECF No. 16. At step five of the sequential evaluation process, the 

Commissioner bears the burden of showing that the plaintiff has the ability to perform work 

available in the national economy. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5. To meet this burden, an ALJ 

may utilize a vocational expert “to testify as to (1) what jobs the claimant, given his or her 

functional capacity, would be able to do; and (2) the availability of such jobs in the national 

economy.” Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1101 (9th Cir. 1999). The ALJ must pose 

“hypothetical questions to the vocational expert that set out all of the claimant’s impairments for 

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the vocational expert’s consideration.” Id. (quotations omitted). However, the “ALJ must only 

include those limitations supported by substantial evidence.” Robbins v. Social Sec. Admin., 466 

F.3d 880, 886 (9th Cir. 2006). Where the weight of the medical evidence supports the 

hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert, the ALJ’s decision will not be disturbed. 

Martinez v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 774 (9th Cir. 1987). 

 Plaintiff contends that the hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert, and relied 

upon by the ALJ in finding that he was not disabled, was incomplete because it did not include a 

limitation that plaintiff must work in close proximity to a bathroom. Id. at 4-7. This particular 

limitation was assessed by examining physician Dr. Steven E. Gerson. 

 Dr. Gerson completed an independent internal medicine evaluation in relation to 

plaintiff’s applications for disability benefits. AR 346-352. Plaintiff’s primary complaint was 

back pain. Id. at 346. He was well developed, well nourished, coherent, and in no acute distress. 

Id. at 348. He reported nonspecific pain in his midline lumbar spine and hips. Id. at 348-349. 

Motor exam was normal and his fine motor coordination was intact. Id. at 349. Dr. Gerson 

diagnosed plaintiff with a history of arthritis of the back and hips with ongoing pain. Id. at 350. 

He opined that plaintiff could lift 25 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; stand and/or 

walk for up to 6 hours in an eight-hour workday; sit for up to 6 hours in an eight-hour workday; 

frequently balance; occasionally climb, stoop, bend, crouch, and squat; but never crawl. Id. 

Without explanation, Dr. Gerson also stated that “the claimant should be in close proximity to a 

bathroom.” Id. at 351. Nothing in the report explains this latter limitation, nor does it identify 

any impairment that would require plaintiff to work near a bathroom, at least any nearer a 

bathroom than would typically be provided in the workplace 

 Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record that would support such a limitation. At 

no time during the administrative proceedings did plaintiff allege any genitourinary or 

gastrointestinal impairment that would require him to work near a bathroom. His allegations of 

impairment simply do not relate to any condition relevant to such a restriction. His initial 

disability report includes allegations that he was disabled due to shoulder pain and arthritis in his 

spine, neck, and hips. Id. at 227. An updated report indicated that plaintiff’s condition had 

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worsened and he was experiencing greater pain. Id. at 248. He identified difficulty with 

concentration and memory as new impairments, but did not identify any new physical limitations. 

Id. In a functional report, he reported that when he uses the toilet he has difficulty wiping, but he 

did not make any statement regarding frequency or urgency of bathroom use. Id. at 278. 

 At his administrative hearing, when asked to identify his medical problems, plaintiff 

responded that he had issues with his lower back, upper neck, and right shoulder. Id. at 34-35. 

He also testified that he has difficulty bending over due to extreme lower back pain, and that he 

could only walk a couple blocks. Id. at 41-42. He did not, however, testify to having any 

impairment that would require him to work near a bathroom. Significantly, at the hearing 

plaintiff’s counsel posed two hypothetical questions to the vocational expert, neither containing 

any limitations requiring close proximately to a bathroom. Id. at 59-61. Surely if plaintiff had 

such a limitation, counsel would have brought it to the ALJ’s attention. See Solorzano v. Astrue, 

2012 WL 84527, at * 6 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2012) (holding that counsel had an obligation to raise 

at the administrative level any deficiency in the vocational expert’s testimony and that “[f]ailure 

to do so is tantamount to inviting error . . . . Counsel are not supposed to be potted plants at 

administrative hearings. They have an obligation to take an active role and to raise issues that 

may impact the ALJ’s decision while the hearing is proceeding so that they can be addressed.”) 

 Aside from the one statement in Dr. Gerson’s report, the record is devoid of any evidence 

that would even suggest that plaintiff was incontinent or had a genitourinary or gastrointestinal 

disorder.2

 As the great weight of evidence does not support a limitation to working near a 

bathroom, the ALJ did not error in failing to include the limitation in the hypothetical question 

posed to the vocational expert. See Heckler, 807 F.2d at 774 (finding no error where despite 

“conflicting evidence, . . . the weight of medical evidence support[ed] the hypothetical questions 

posed by the ALJ.”). 

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 The court has independently reviewed the record and is unable to find any evidence that 

would support such a limitation. To no surprise, plaintiff’s brief fails to direct the court to any 

evidence that would support a finding that plaintiff must work in proximity to a bathroom. 

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IV. CONCLUSION 

 Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that: 

 1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied; 

 2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment is granted; and 

 3. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in the Commissioner’s favor. 

DATED: September 21, 2016. 

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