Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca6-24-03312/USCOURTS-ca6-24-03312-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Papa Cheikhou Diop
Petitioner
Merrick B. Garland
Respondent

Document Text:

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 24a0471n.06

No. 24-3312

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

PAPA CHEIKHOU DIOP,

Petitioner,

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,

Respondent.

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ON PETITION FOR REVIEW 

FROM THE UNITED STATES 

BOARD OF IMMIGRATION 

APPEALS

OPINION

Before: GILMAN, READLER, and BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. Papa Cheikhou Diop petitions this court for review of an order of the 

Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming, without opinion, the denial of his application for 

deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). As set forth below, we deny 

Diop’s petition for review. 

Diop, a native and citizen of Senegal, entered the United States as a lawful permanent 

resident in October 2011, when he was 16 years old. Diop lived in Detroit, Michigan, with his 

parents and siblings.

Diop was arrested in April 2019 after a federal grand jury in the Eastern District of 

Tennessee returned an indictment charging him and others in connection with a drug-trafficking 

operation. United States v. Diop, No. 19-cr-65 (E.D. Tenn.). Diop ultimately pleaded guilty to 

conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute fentanyl and heroin, in violation of 21 

U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) and 846, and he was sentenced to time served.

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In July 2023, the Department of Homeland Security served Diop with a notice to appear in 

removal proceedings, charging him with removability because he had been convicted of (1) an 

aggravated felony and (2) a controlled substance offense. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), 

(a)(2)(B)(i). Appearing before an immigration judge (IJ), Diop admitted the factual allegations set 

forth in the notice to appear and conceded both charges of removability.

Diop applied for deferral of removal under the CAT. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(a). Diop

asserted that, if he returned to Senegal, he would be harmed or killed because he had denounced 

the president and joined the opposition party, the African Patriots of Senegal for Work, Ethics, and 

Fraternity (PASTEF). In his application, Diop described himself as being “known as the biggest 

[PASTEF] member.”

At the hearing on his application, Diop and his brother testified about his support for the 

PASTEF party. Diop began following the PASTEF party in 2017 and, after watching videos about

the PASTEF presidential candidate, became a member of the party. Diop organized online 

meetings and posted comments and live videos on social-media sites such as Facebook and 

Instagram.

Diop and his brother also testified about their trip to Senegal in December 2018. While 

visiting family in Senegal, Diop attended a campaign meeting for the PASTEF party with 

approximately 1,000 other people. After the meeting, Diop took a taxi to the building where his 

family was staying about an hour away. When he got out of the taxi, Diop was attacked by three 

men, who beat him, robbed him, and stabbed him in the side. According to Diop, the men 

recognized him from his social-media activity because they said his name and knew that he was a 

member of the PASTEF party and lived in the United States. The men fled in a car when a neighbor 

began to yell. A few nights later, some individuals attempted to break into the building where 

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Diop’s family was staying, but were scared off when a shopkeeper screamed at them. Diop, who 

did not see these individuals, believed that the attempted break-in was related to the earlier attack.

Diop maintained that he continues to oppose the president in Senegal and support the 

PASTEF party. Diop claimed that, if he returned to Senegal, he would be recognized and arrested 

at the airport based on his social-media activity and then taken to a camp, where he would be 

beaten and possibly killed.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the IJ denied Diop’s application for deferral of removal 

under the CAT and ordered his removal to Senegal. The IJ found that Diop and his brother were 

not credible witnesses, identifying inconsistencies and implausibilities in their testimony. The IJ 

also noted that Diop had failed to provide evidence to corroborate key portions of his claim. The 

IJ concluded that Diop had therefore failed to prove that it was more likely than not that he would 

be tortured upon his return to Senegal.

Diop appealed the IJ’s decision. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision without opinion.

This timely petition for review followed. Diop argues that the IJ erred in determining that 

Diop did not provide credible testimony or sufficient corroboration. Diop also contends that this 

case should be remanded based on new country conditions—the recent inauguration of a member 

of the PASTEF party as the president of Senegal. 

Where, as here, the BIA affirms the IJ’s decision without opinion, we review the IJ’s 

decision as the final agency determination. See King v. Holder, 570 F.3d 785, 787 (6th Cir. 2009);

Hasan v. Ashcroft, 397 F.3d 417, 419 (6th Cir. 2005). We review the agency’s factual findings, 

including credibility determinations, for substantial evidence, meaning that the agency’s findings 

“are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the 

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contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see Slyusar v. Holder, 740 F.3d 1068, 1072-73 (6th Cir. 

2014); El-Moussa v. Holder, 569 F.3d 250, 255-56 (6th Cir. 2009). 

A noncitizen who is subject to the provisions for mandatory denial of withholding of 

removal,

1 but is otherwise entitled to CAT protection, “shall be granted deferral of removal to the 

country where he or she is more likely than not to be tortured.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(a). However, 

“[a]n adverse credibility finding is usually fatal to” a noncitizen’s ability to prove entitlement to 

CAT protection. Luna-Romero v. Barr, 949 F.3d 292, 294 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting RubioMauricio v. Barr, 782 F. App’x 444, 446 (6th Cir. 2019)). Pursuant to the REAL ID Act, “[t]here 

is no presumption of credibility” In favor of an applicant seeking relief from removal. 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1229a(c)(4)(C). “In evaluating the testimony of the applicant or other witness in support of the 

application, the [IJ] will determine whether or not the testimony is credible, is persuasive, and 

refers to specific facts sufficient to demonstrate that the applicant has satisfied the applicant’s 

burden of proof.” Id. § 1229a(c)(4)(B). The IJ may base the credibility determination on “the 

inherent plausibility of the applicant’s or witness’s account,” the consistency between the 

applicant’s statements and other evidence in the record, and any other relevant factor. Id. 

§ 1229a(c)(4)(C). The IJ may require corroborating evidence to supplement even credible 

testimony “unless the applicant demonstrates that the applicant does not have the evidence and 

cannot reasonably obtain the evidence.” Id. § 1229a(c)(4)(B). 

As the IJ pointed out, Diop “provided absolutely no evidence whatsoever of his social 

media presence.” Diop argues that he provided a reasonable explanation for his inability to provide 

such evidence—he no longer had access to his social-media accounts because they were shut down 

1 Diop does not dispute that his conviction of an aggravated felony constitutes a “particularly 

serious crime,” rendering him ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal. See 8 U.S.C. 

§§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), (b)(2)(B)(i), 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(d)(2). 

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by Facebook. According to Diop, the IJ took “judicial notice” that social-media accounts can be 

shut down. Although the IJ stated that he “would be prepared to take judicial notice” of the 

suspension of former President Trump’s Twitter account because that fact was “so public that I 

think it’s common knowledge,” the IJ went on to state that “I have no ability to take any 

administrative notice on Facebook shutting down” Diop’s accounts. In any event, Diop failed to 

explain why he could not have submitted other evidence of his social-media activity, such as 

notices about the deactivation of his accounts, his more recent posts on other accounts, or letters 

from his followers. 

Diop also asserts that the IJ recognized that the Senegalese government may allow the 

torture of supporters of the PASTEF party, but went on to find that he could not prove that he 

would be targeted specifically, even though he had already been targeted and attacked in Senegal. 

As the IJ recognized, country-conditions evidence showing political unrest and human-rights 

violations in Senegal is insufficient to establish that Diop himself “faces a particularized and likely 

threat of torture at the hands of a public official, or with the consent or acquiescence of a public 

official.” Vasquez-Rivera v. Garland, 96 F.4th 903, 911 (6th Cir. 2024) (quoting Marqus v. Barr, 

968 F.3d 583, 587 (6th Cir. 2020)). Diop claimed that the authorities in Senegal would recognize 

him based on his social-media activity and would arrest and torture him for his support of the 

PASTEF party. But Diop failed to provide any evidence corroborating his social-media presence 

or his support for the PASTEF party and otherwise failed to testify credibly in support of his claim. 

In the absence of credible testimony and corroborating evidence, the record does not compel the 

conclusion that Diop himself is more likely than not to be tortured in Senegal.

Diop submitted medical and police reports in support of his application. According to 

Diop, the IJ’s finding that these documents were “fabricated” was not based on any evidence. 

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But the IJ did not specifically find that these documents were fabricated, instead observing that 

these documents lacked the information that would normally appear in a medical record or police 

report. The medical report, purportedly issued by the doctor in Senegal who treated Diop after his 

beating and stabbing, provided no information about Diop’s injuries and treatment, used atypical 

syntax, and appeared to be a certificate excusing Diop from work for 40 days even though he did 

not live or work in Senegal. The purported police report appeared to be a narrative prepared by

Diop about the attack rather than an official record prepared by a police officer. No reasonable 

adjudicator would be compelled to conclude that these documents sufficiently supported Diop’s 

testimony or independently satisfied his burden of proof.

Diop also fails to address the inconsistencies, implausibilities, and other discrepancies that 

the IJ identified with respect to Diop’s claim. In any event, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s 

adverse-credibility determination. For example, Diop testified that one of his attackers stabbed 

him and that his father took him to the hospital for treatment the next morning. But Diop failed to 

mention in his application that he was stabbed. The IJ also found it implausible that a father would 

find his son “left for dead” and then delay seeking treatment until the next morning because there 

would be a long wait at the hospital. These inconsistencies and implausibilities involving a key 

part of Diop’s claim support the IJ’s adverse-credibility determination. 

Diop finally contends that this case should be remanded based on new country conditions—

the recent inauguration of a member of the PASTEF party as the president of Senegal. According 

to Diop, this case should be remanded to the IJ for additional testimony and evidence as to how 

members of the PASTEF party are being treated by members of the former ruling party and 

whether the PASTEF party is able to protect its members. In light of the IJ’s adverse-credibility 

determination, remand would be futile. See Karimijanaki v. Holder, 579 F.3d 710, 721 (6th Cir. 

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2009). Furthermore, Diop should file a motion to reopen his removal proceedings if he wishes to 

present new evidence to the agency. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c), 

1003.23(b)(3). 

For these reasons, we DENY Diop’s petition for review. 

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