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Parties Involved:
Weslie C. Mays
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

.. 

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

F LE 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Cfrcui: 

M 7 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. No. 89-6123 

WESLIE C. MAYS 

Defendant-Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. CR 89-19-T) 

Robert G. Mccampbell, Assistant United States Attorney, (Robert 

E. Mydans, United States Attorney, with him on the Brief) 

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Susan M. Otto, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judge, and 

BRA"rl'ON, Senior District Judge.* 

BRA"rl'ON, District Judge. 

* Honorable Howard C. Bratton, Senior United States District 

Judge for the District of New Mexico, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 89-6123 Document: 01019970056 Date Filed: 05/07/1990 Page: 1
Weslie c. Mays entered a plea of guilty to the charge of 

distribution of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(l) on 

February 3, 1989 and was sentenced to a term of incarceration of 

27 months. In computing the defendant's sentence, two points 

were added to the defendant's base offense level for the 

defendant's "role in the offense." See§ 3Bl.l(c) of the 

guidelines promulgated by the United States Sentencing 

Commission, Guidelines Manual, at 3.5 (Nov. 1989) [hereinafter 

"U.S.S.G." or the "guidelines"]. 

Pursuant to§ 3Bl.1 of the guidelines, a defendant's base 

offense level must be enhanced by varying numbers of points if 

the defendant's role in the offense can be characterized as that 

of an "organizer or leader," or a "manager or supervisor" in any 

criminal activity. The degree to which a defendant's base 

offense level should be increased relates proportionally to the 

defendant's responsibility in the enterprise and the number of 

participants involved. In the instant case, the district court 

found that the defendant was an "organizer, leader, manager, or 

supervisor" of a criminal activity involving four individuals 

and, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3Bl.l(c), increased the defendant's 

base offense level by two points. 1 

1

In United States v. Rutter, F.2d , No. 89-1015, slip 

op. at 10, (10th Cir. March 13, 1990), we indicated that the twolevel enhancement of § 3Bl.l(c) appears to be indicated for 

organizers and managers of small criminal enterprises which are not 

extensive in scope and have fewer than five participants. Id., 

slip op. at 11 . -

2 

Appellate Case: 89-6123 Document: 01019970056 Date Filed: 05/07/1990 Page: 2
The defendant appeals the imposition of the sentence as 

enhanced by the lower court pursuant to§ 3Bl.l(c). He first 

challenges the predicate factual finding by the lower court 

regarding his role in the offense. Second, the defendant takes 

issue with the constitutional vigor of§ 3Bl.1, arguing that the 

terms organizer, leader, manager, supervisor, and criminal 

activity are unconstitutionally vague. 

DEFENDANT'S ROLE IN THE OFFENSE 

At the sentencing hearing, the only information elicited 

concerning the defendant's status as a leader, supervisor, 

manager, or organizer was the oral testimony of the case agent, a 

Drug Enforcement Administration special agent. The agent 

testified that the defendant was involved in a small-scale 

criminal network involving four individuals. He first described 

the related activities of Margaret Patterson, the individual who 

became the government's informant subsequent to her arrest. The 

agent related to the court hearsay statements of Patterson 

wherein Patterson stated she was directed by the defendant to set 

up the cocaine transaction between the defendant and the 

undercover agent. 2 

A second individual allegedly connected to the enterprise is 

the informant's sister, Edith Young. The agent testified that 

the defendant used Edith Young as a reference when discussing the 

2

With regard to the above-noted transaction, the agent further 

indicated that the defendant was the one who actually made the 

delivery of the cocaine and accepted the money during the 

transaction for the cocaine. 

3 

Appellate Case: 89-6123 Document: 01019970056 Date Filed: 05/07/1990 Page: 3
cocaine sale in a phone conversation with the undercover agent, 

and that the defendant supplied both Patterson and Young with 

their cocaine for resale. 

The remaining individuals allegedly involved in this network 

were Versilla O'Guinn and an unnamed narcotics supply source in 

California. O'Guinn is said to have rented an apartment, an 

automobile, and various telephone pagers on behalf of the 

defendant. As to the significance of the unnamed supplier of the 

cocaine in California, the defendant admitted that, of the 

individuals allegedly constituting the group or enterprise, he 

alone had access to the California supplier. From these facts 

the district judge concluded that the defendant exercised a 

managerial or supervisory role in a small-scale criminal network. 

The burden of proof that the defendant exercised a 

managerial or supervisory role is upon the government. It must 

prove the predicate facts by a preponderance of the evidence. 

United States v. Beaulieu, 893 F.2d 1177, 1181, n. 7 (10th Cir. 

1990). In arriving at its determination of a particular 

defendant's role in the criminal activity, the sentencing court 

may consider any reliable information, including hearsay. United 

States v. Rutter, F.2d __ , No. 89-1015, slip op. at 10, 

(10th Cir. March 13, 1990) citing Beaulieu, 893 F.2d at 1180. 

We, in turn, review the factual determination of the lower 

court under the clearly erroneous standard. See Beaulieu, 893 

F.2d at 1181-1182; see also United States v. Roberts, F.2d 

4 

Appellate Case: 89-6123 Document: 01019970056 Date Filed: 05/07/1990 Page: 4
, No. 88-2125, slip op. at 10, n. 3 (10th Cir. March 15, 1990); 

United States v. Rutter, F. 2d , No. 89-1015, slip op. at 

10 (10th Cir. March 13, 1990); United States v. Williams, 

F.2d , No. 88-2907, slip op. at 12-13 (10th Cir. March 5, 

1990). In accordance with that standard, we will not reverse the 

district court "unless the court's finding was without factual 

support in the record, or if after reviewing all evidence we are 

left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 

been made." Beaulieu, 893 F.2d at 1182. 

Based upon our review of the record, we find ample evidence 

to support the decision of the court below. We recognize, of 

course, that the defendant's supervisory or managerial status is 

not sufficiently proved by indicating a mere buyer/seller 

relationship between the defendant and the alleged group or 

network participants. See United States v. Weidner, 703 F. Supp. 

1350, 1354 (N.D. Ind. 1988) aff'd 885 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1989). 3 

3we also, however, suffer under no illusion that drug dealers 

at this level have developed formalistic management structures. 

As we quoted recently in United States v. Rutter, supra, wherein 

a two-level base offense enhancement under§ 3Bl.l(c) was deemed 

appropriate: 

There need be no particular formality in the 

ossature of a narcotics enterprise to justify invocation 

of section 3Bl .1. Drug dealers are unlikely to make much 

use of position descriptions or organizational charts. 

Particularly with respect to the relatively small 

criminal cabals contemplated by section 3Bl.l(c)--2 to 

5 people . . . . 

Slip op. at 12, citing United States v. Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d 

43, 48 (1st Cir.) cert. denied 110 S. Ct. 177 (1989). 

5 

Appellate Case: 89-6123 Document: 01019970056 Date Filed: 05/07/1990 Page: 5
Though we would not characterize the evidence with regard to 

the defendant's role in this offense as overwhelmingly supportive 

of the lower court's decision, there is sufficient evidence from 

which the judge might draw a conclusion that the defendant 

exercised some authority or, at least, independent management 

initiative4 in a loosely-affiliated criminal organization. The 

testimony indicated that the defendant directed Margaret 

Patterson, the informant, to set up the drug transaction with the 

arresting agent. Further, the defendant controlled the source of 

the narcotics to all involved individuals, personally met with 

the purchasing undercover agent and alone received the money in 

exchange for the cocaine. The testifying agent also conjectured 

that O'Guinn acted at the behest of the defendant in renting an 

apartment, an automobile, and various telephone pagers for the 

defendant's use. 5 

We find sufficient indication from the testimony presented 

to support the district court in its finding that the defendant 

exercised a managerial or supervisory role in the offense 

4 See, analogously, United States v. Mannino, 635 F.2d 110 (2d 

Cir. 1980) (under the continuing criminal enterprise statute, 21 

u.s.c. §848, superior/subordinate position need not be established 

for a finding that the defendant exercised some supervisory or 

managerial authority). 

5

Factors indicative of supervision or management include: "the 

exercise of decision making authority, . the recruitment of 

accomplices, the claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of 

the crime, the degree of participation in planning or organizing 

the offense, the nature and scope of the illegal activity, and the 

degree of control and authority exercised over others." U.S.S.G 

§ 3Bl.1, Commentary Application Note 3, at 3.5. 

6 

Appellate Case: 89-6123 Document: 01019970056 Date Filed: 05/07/1990 Page: 6
pursuant to §3Bl.l(c). Accord United States v. Otero, 890 F.2d 

366 (11th Cir. 1989)(§ 3Bl.l(c) applicable when the defendant was 

the individual within a network who located the seller, set the 

price, and determined the time and location for the sale of the 

narcotics); United States v. Silverman, 889 F.2d 1531 (6th Cir. 

1989)(defendant found to be a manager or supervisor upon evidence 

that the defendant took charge of the sale and exercised dominion 

over the money garnered from the cocaine sale); United States v. 

Vasquez, 874 F.2d 250 (5th Cir. 1989)(defendants recruited others 

to commit crimes, utilized their own apartments as bases, paid 

for trips for others involved in the criminal activity and 

arranged bail and attorneys fees for arrested group members). 

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF§ 3Bl.l(c) 

The defendant next argues that the terms organizer, leader, 

manager, supervisor, and criminal activity are unconstitutionally 

vague. Despite the fact that the guidelines fail to particularly 

define these terms, the district court justified utilization of§ 

3Bl.l(c) based upon a plain reading of the provision, a decision 

in which we find no basis for fault. 

A legal standard which permits arbitrary and discriminatory 

enforcement by failing to provide explicit standards for its 

application offends due process. United States v. Roberts, 

supra, slip op. at 6. Therefore, the constitutional validity of 

a standard challenged as vague is tested by ascertaining whether 

"the ordinary person exercising ordinary common sense" can 

understand and comply with the standard. United States v. Hines, 

7 

Appellate Case: 89-6123 Document: 01019970056 Date Filed: 05/07/1990 Page: 7
696 F.2d 722, 727 (10th Cir. 1982) citing csc v. Letter Carriers, 

413 U.S. 548, 579 (1973). In the analogous context of the 

continuing criminal enterprise statute, 21 U.S.C. §848, terms 

similar to those at issue here have been held not 

unconstitutionally vague. United States v. Valenzuela, 596 F.2d 

1361, 1367 (9th Cir.) cert. denied 444 U.S. 865 (1979). The 

Valenzuela court stated: 

[T]he words encompassed within the phrase 

"organizer, a supervisory position, or any other 

position of management," enjoy a wide currency in the 

business community and are commonly understood by 

members of the general public. 

Id. at 1367. 

Following the reasoning of Valenzuela, we see no reason to label 

the phrase organizer, leader, manager or supervisor in§ 3Bl.l(c) 

as constitutionally infirm. 

Likewise, the phrase criminal activity is not impermissibly 

vague. By plain reading the phrase excludes all activity which 

is not violative of a criminal statute. Similar phrases under 

the witness immunity statute6 , 18 u.s.c. §6002 ("criminal case"), 

the continuing criminal enterprise statute7 ("continuing series 

of violations"), the Fifth Amendment ("criminal case") and the 

Sixth Amendment ("criminal prosecutions") have not proved 

impossible or unworkable to apply. 

6 See,~, Unite . d States v. Gregory, 730 F.2d 692, 697 (11th 

Cir.) cert. denied 469 U.S. 1208 (1984). 

7

see, ~, Valenzuela, supra; see also United States v. 

cravero, 545 F.2d 406, 410-11 (5th Cir. 1976) cert. denied 429 U.S. 

110 and 430 U.S. 983 (1977). 

8 

Appellate Case: 89-6123 Document: 01019970056 Date Filed: 05/07/1990 Page: 8
Moreover, vagueness challenges to statutes which do not 

involve First Amendment rights are generally limited to the facts 

of the case at hand. See United States v. Hines, 696 F.2d 722, 

727 (10th Cir. 1982). In Hines, we stated, "'one to whose 

conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully challenge 

it for vagueness."' Id. citing Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756 

(1979). In this case, the defendant's conduct was clearly 

proscribed. He was, without question, engaged in criminal 

activity involving the distribution of cocaine with a number of 

other people--a fact which militates heavily against the success 

of the defendant's argument.a 

the district court is AFFIRMED. 

Accordingly, the decision of 

awe also note the recent cases handed down by this court 

wherein the language of§ 3Bl.l was applied. We are not now aware 

of any expressed difficulty on the grounds of vagueness in the 

application of§ 3Bl.l to the facts particular to those cases. See 

United States v. Rutter, F.2d , No. 89-1015, slip op. atlO 

(10th Cir. March 13, 1990);UnitedStates v. Williams, F.2d 

, No. 88-2907, slip op. at 12-13 (10th Cir. March 5 1990);United 

States v. Beaulieu, 893 F.2d 1177, 1181, n. 7 (10th Cir. 1990). 

9 

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