Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-19-02604/USCOURTS-ca3-19-02604-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Germaine Kelly
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_______________

No. 19-2604

_______________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

GERMAINE KELLY,

Appellant

_______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 2-16-cr-00031-001)

District Judge: Honorable Cathy Bissoon

_______________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

on November 8, 2024

Before: KRAUSE, BIBAS, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges

(Filed: December 18, 2024)

_______________

OPINION*

_______________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.

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2

KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.

Appellant Germaine Kelly appeals the District Court’s imposition of a career 

offender enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, after he pleaded guilty to two counts

of bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). Discerning no error, we will affirm.

I. DISCUSSION1

Under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, a defendant may be sentenced as a career offender when 

the instant offense “is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance 

offense” and the defendant has at least two such prior convictions. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). 

Here, Kelly does not dispute the District Court’s determination that the instant offense 

was a crime of violence or that his 2002 narcotics conviction qualifies as a first predicate 

offense. Rather, he claims the Court erred in determining that his 2005 robbery

conviction, in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3701, qualifies as a second. Specifically, 

he argues that the record establishes a first-degree felony under § 3701, which is not 

necessarily a crime of violence,2rather than a specific violation of § 3701(a)(1)(ii), which 

1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

2 The Pennsylvania robbery statute does not “set[] out a single . . . set of elements to 

define a single crime.” Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500, 504–05 (2016). Instead, it 

“list[s] elements in the alternative, and thereby define[s] multiple crimes.” Id. at 505. 

Not all the crimes defined under § 3701 are crimes of violence. See United States v. 

Blair, 734 F.3d 218, 225 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal quotations omitted) (noting that 

subsection (iii) “criminalizes robbery wherein the perpetrator commits or threatens 

immediately to commit any” first- or second-degree felony, and some first- and seconddegree felonies “involve no violence”). 

Case: 19-2604 Document: 74 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/18/2024
3

“involves the requisite force and mens rea to qualify.” United States v. Henderson, 80 

F.4th 207, 215 (3d Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 1379 (2024).

We review Kelly’s challenge to the application of the career offender 

enhancement de novo. United States v. Quinnones, 16 F.4th 414, 417 n.2 (3d Cir. 2021).3 

Our task is to “identify the specific statutory provision” under which Kelly was convicted 

by applying the modified categorical approach. United States v. Amos, 88 F.4th 446, 457 

(3d Cir. 2023). We may rely on “a limited class of documents” to settle this inquiry, 

including “the indictment, jury instructions, or plea agreement and colloquy.” Mathis v. 

United States, 579 U.S. 500, 505–06 (2016). To justify the sentencing enhancement, 

these materials must “speak plainly” and show that Kelly was convicted under § 

3701(a)(1)(ii). Id. at 519. 

To establish the specific statute of conviction, the Government points to the four 

criminal informations from Kelly’s Pennsylvania robbery convictions, the plea transcript 

of the 2005 conviction,4and the affidavits of probable cause. The Government has met 

its burden to show that Kelly was convicted in 2005 for violating § 3701(a)(1)(ii).

3 The Government argues for plain error review, claiming that Kelly forfeited his 

argument that the documents related to his Pennsylvania robbery conviction were 

ambiguous but Kelly’s counsel explicitly argued at sentencing that “[t]he Pennsylvania 

documents provided by the government . . . do not note a specific subsection of robbery.” 

App. 130-31. In any event, the District Court did not commit any error, let alone plain 

error. 

4 Though the government did not introduce the plea colloquy in the District Court, 

Appellant does not dispute the authenticity of the transcript, and we will take judicial 

notice of it as a document “not subject to reasonable dispute.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). 

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We start with the criminal informations, which would suffice, even without the 

additional evidence before us, to establish that Kelly was convicted of § 3701(a)(1)(ii)

and is validly subject to the sentencing enhancement. Each information states: “the 

above-named defendant did in the course of committing a theft...” and then lists several 

alternative actions. App. 169, 180, 207, 234. The second action in this list, corresponding 

to “[t]hreaten, or intentionally put [the victim] in fear of immediate serious bodily injury”

is then circled by hand—a categorical match to § 3701(a)(1)(ii). Id. And each of the four 

documents was signed by Kelly himself. 

The external evidence offered by the Government—the plea transcript and the 

probable cause affidavit to which it refers—merely corroborates what the informations 

show on their face. As reflected in the transcript of the plea proceeding, the prosecutor 

referenced four probable cause affidavits as “the factual basis” for the plea, see Supp. 

App. at 8-9, and Kelly’s counsel neither objected to that offer nor contested any specific 

facts within them, see Supp. App. at 9.5 The affidavits, in turn, describe conduct that 

satisfies § 3701(a)(1)(ii)’s elements of “threaten[]” or “intentionally put[]” his victims “in 

fear of immediate serious bodily injury,” namely, that Kelly brandished a handgun and 

demanded money. By doing so, he “intentionally put[]” his victims “in fear of immediate 

serious bodily injury,” the action prohibited by § 3701(a)(1)(ii).

5 Affidavits of probable cause are not themselves Shepard documents but may be 

considered in the context of the modified categorical approach when incorporated into a 

plea transcript. See Parilla v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 1038, 1044 (9th Cir. 2005). 

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Kelly argues the handwritten circles on the criminal informations should not be 

considered as a due process matter because they are insufficiently reliable. But 

“sufficient indicia of reliability” are present here. United States v. Howard, 599 F.3d 269, 

271 (3d Cir. 2010). The handwritten circles are consistent across all four informations

and each document was signed by Kelly himself. The meaning of those notations is 

corroborated by the plea transcript (the authenticity of which Kelly does not dispute) and 

the affidavits to which it refers. See United States v. Beasley, 442 F.3d 386, 394 (6th Cir. 

2006) (determining that “CA:M2” notation on state judgment of conviction meant 

“criminal attempt, second degree murder” based on “basic common sense” and as 

corroborated through non-Shepard evidence). It is not sufficient for the defendant to 

“merely hint[] at some lingering metaphysical doubt as to the translation of the [the 

notation] . . . without supplying any factual basis for this challenge or suggesting some 

other plausible meaning for this notation.” Id. at 393.

In sum, because Kelly’s 2005 robbery conviction meets the criteria for a “crime of 

violence” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, he qualifies as a career offender, and the District 

Court properly applied the enhancement. 

II. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.

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