Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01175/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01175-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Philip A. Beachy
Appellee
James K. Chen
Appellee
Michael K. Cooper
Appellee
Jeffrey A. Porter
Appellee
Anssi Jussi Nikolai Taipale
Appellee
Sinan Tas
Appellant

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

SINAN TAS,

Appellant

v.

PHILIP A. BEACHY, MICHAEL K. COOPER, 

JEFFREY A. PORTER, JAMES K. CHEN, ANSSI 

JUSSI NIKOLAI TAIPALE,

Appellees

______________________ 

2015-1175

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in Nos. 105,926, 

105,949.

______________________ 

Decided: September 29, 2015

______________________ 

 SINAN TAS, Bor, Turkey, pro se. 

 OLIVER ASHE, JR., Ashe, P.C., Reston, VA, for appellees. Also represented by BRION P. HEANEY, Millen, White, 

Zelano & Branigan PC, Arlington, VA. 

______________________ 

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2 TAS v. BEACHY

Before PROST, Chief Judge, NEWMAN, and CHEN,

Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

This case involves Interference Nos. 105,926 and 

105,949 (the ’926 and ’949 interferences, respectively).1 

The subject matter of the interferences relates to a method of treating humans that have a specific type of cancer, 

a basal carcinoma cell (BCC) tumor, with a compound 

called cyclopamine, as well as acceptable cyclopamine 

alternatives. BCC tumors form when a signaling pathway used by cells for initiating apoptosis (programmed 

cell death) mutates, resulting in the uncontrolled proliferation of cells. The relevant signaling pathway here is the 

Hedgehog/Smoothened (Hh/Smo) cell signaling pathway 

and involves two proteins: Hedgehog (Hh) and Smoothened (Smo). Cyclopamine takes advantage of the Hh/Smo 

signaling pathway to initiate apoptosis, which inhibits the 

BCCs from proliferating.

This dispute arose when Dr. Sinan Taş and his coinventor added claims to the application that became U.S. 

Patent No. 7,893,078 (the ’078 patent). These claims

recited “cyclopamine or another compound that selectively 

inhibits Hedgehog/Smoothened signaling.” See J.A. 

4379–80 (emphasis added). Philip Beachy and four other 

inventors (collectively, Beachy) then filed two patent 

applications that claimed and purportedly also described 

the subject matter claimed in the ’078 patent: U.S. Patent Application Nos. 13/363,934 and 13/364,121 (the ’934 

1 The America Invents Act (AIA), Pub. L. No. 112-

29, eliminated interference proceedings. Because the 

applications and patents at issue in this case were filed 

before March 16, 2013, we apply the pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 

§ 135. 

 

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TAS v. BEACHY 3

and ’121 applications, respectively).2 The United States 

Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) Patent Trial and 

Appeal Board (PTAB) initiated two interferences to 

determine whether Taş or Beachy first invented the 

relevant subject matter, and consolidated the proceedings. 

The interferences contain one Count each, numbered 

Count 2 in the ’949 interference and Count 3 in the ’926 

interference. There is no Count 1. The PTAB designated 

all claims of the ’078 patent (claims 1–23) and all pending

claims of the ’121 application (claims 201–213) as corresponding to Count 2, and all claims of the ’078 patent and 

all pending claims of the ’934 application (claims 101–112 

and 114–127) as corresponding to Count 3.

For both interferences, the PTAB declared Beachy the 

Senior Party and Taş the Junior Party because it accorded (1) the ’078 patent the benefit of International Application No. PCT/TR01/00027, filed July 2, 2001, (2) the ’934 

application the benefit of four prior applications, including U.S. Patent Application No. 09/668,076 (the ’076 

application), filed October 13, 2000, and (3) the ’121 

application the benefit of four prior applications, including U.S. Patent Application Nos. 09/708,964 (the ’964 

application), filed November 8, 2000, and 09/685,244 (the 

’244 application), filed October 10, 2000. 

Taş admitted that he cannot prove an actual date of 

invention prior to the July 2, 2001, priority date. See J.A. 

861 (Taş’s Preliminary Statement stating that “Taş 

[relies] for its earliest constructive reduction to practice 

on PCT/TR01/00027, filed on 02 July 2001.”); 37 C.F.R. § 

2 For the purposes of these interferences, Johns 

Hopkins University School of Medicine and Genentech, 

Inc. are the real parties in interest in the ’934 and ’121 

applications. The PTAB below and the parties on appeal 

refer to the appellee as Beachy, and we do the same.

 

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4 TAS v. BEACHY

1.629(a) (“A party shall be strictly held to any date alleged 

in the preliminary statement.”). Taş instead argues, for 

the ’949 interference, that no interference-in-fact exists 

between the ’078 patent and the ’121 application. Taş 

also attacks the written description and enablement 

support of the priority applications to both Beachy applications, which, if successful, would give the Beachy applications a priority date later than the ’078 patent. See 

Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1170 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (Noting that the earlier-filed priority application must satisfy 

section 112, paragraph 1.).

We affirm the PTAB’s determination that an interference-in-fact exists between Taş’s ’078 patent and Beachy’s 

’121 application. We also affirm the PTAB’s determination that both the Counts and all the pending claims of 

the ’121 and ’934 applications are sufficiently described 

and enabled by the Beachy priority applications.

I 

“An interference exists if the subject matter of a claim 

of one party would, if prior art, have anticipated or rendered obvious the subject matter of a claim of the opposing party and vice versa.” 37 C.F.R. 41.203(a); see Eli 

Lilly v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Washington, 334 F.3d 

1264, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Once the PTAB declares an 

interference, the party claiming that an interference-infact does not exist bears the burden of persuasion. Case v. 

CPC Int’l, Inc., 730 F.2d 745, 750 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

Count 3 contains two alternatives. See J.A. 8–9. The 

first alternative, based in large measure on claims 15 and 

20 of Taş’s ’078 patent, recites a medicament comprising 

cyclopamine that “causes decrease of size or disappearance of the tumor.” The second alternative, based in large 

measure on claims 115–116 of Beachy’s ’934 application,

recites a medicament comprising cyclopamine that “inhibits tumor cell proliferation.” In the ’949 interference, Taş 

filed a preliminary motion in which he argued that the 

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TAS v. BEACHY 5

two alternatives are not the same, and thus no interference-in-fact exists, because inhibiting proliferation of a 

tumor is not the same as causing the decrease of size or 

disappearance of the tumor. The PTAB first correctly 

noted that it must compare the claims of the patent and 

application at issue, not the alternatives of a Count, to 

determine whether an interference-in-fact exists. See 37 

C.F.R. § 41.203(a). The PTAB nevertheless proceeded to 

decide the merits of Taş’s argument because it determined 

that Taş’s motion “essentially has compared” claims 15 

and 20 of the ’078 patent to claim 201 of the ’121 application. 

In response to Taş’s motion, the PTAB pointed out 

that the claims also require the medicament comprising 

cyclopamine to “induce apoptosis” in a BCC tumor. The 

PTAB found that when apoptosis takes place in a BCC 

tumor, the results recited in both Count 3 alternatives 

occur: the tumor decreases in size and possibly disappears, and the tumor cells stop proliferating. The PTAB

thus held that an interference-in-fact exists because the 

claims recite consistent result limitations that are a 

consequence of apoptosis having taken place. 

On appeal, Taş argues that the PTAB improperly construed the “inhibits tumor cell proliferation” limitation 

when the PTAB stated that “[i]f proliferation is inhibited, 

then the tumor does not grow.” Taş Opening Br. at 41 

(quoting J.A. 17). Taş contends that the “inhibits tumor 

cell proliferation” limitation can also be met if the tumor 

grows at a slower pace. But even under his proposed 

construction, Taş does not dispute that inhibiting tumor 

cell proliferation is a result of apoptosis in a BCC tumor. 

Accordingly, the PTAB’s determination that the claims 

recite consistent result limitations that are a consequence 

of apoptosis having taken place remains unchallenged. 

We therefore affirm the PTAB’s declaration that an 

interference-in-fact exists between claims 15 and 20 of the 

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6 TAS v. BEACHY

’078 patent and claim 201 of the ’121 application, as well 

as the other claims unchallenged on appeal.

II 

Prior to the AIA, the person who first conceived and 

reduced the invention to practice was generally considered to be the first inventor. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) 

(2006). Under this regime, the filing of a patent application serves as constructive reduction to practice of the 

subject matter disclosed therein. Hyatt v. Boone, 146 F. 

3d 1348, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1998). When a party to an interference seeks the benefit of an earlier-filed U.S. patent 

application, the earlier application must contain a written 

description of the subject matter of the interference 

Count, and must meet the enablement requirement. Id.

In both interferences, Taş filed preliminary motions 

challenging the written description and enablement 

support for both Counts and the pending claims of the 

Beachy applications. In one preliminary motion, Taş 

argued that the ’076 priority application does not provide 

written description or enablement support for five limitations of Count 3. In another preliminary motion, Taş 

argued that the ’244 and ’964 priority applications do not 

provide written description or enablement for five limitations of Count 2. And, in yet another preliminary motion, 

Taş argued that the pending claims of the ’121 and ’934 

applications are unpatentable because ten limitations 

lack written description in the respective specifications of 

those applications.3

To satisfy the written description requirement, the 

specification must sufficiently describe the claimed inven3 Taş also argued to the PTAB that the pending 

claims of the ’121 and ’934 applications are unpatentable 

as indefinite. The PTAB denied Taş’s indefiniteness 

challenge. Taş does not appeal the PTAB’s denial.

 

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TAS v. BEACHY 7

tion to a person skilled in the art and show that the 

inventor actually invented the claimed invention. Ariad 

Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. 

Cir. 2010) (en banc). Whether a specification provides 

written support for a claim is a question of fact. Id. To 

satisfy the enablement requirement, the specification 

must describe the manner of making and using the invention “in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to 

enable any person skilled in the art . . . to make and use 

the same . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1; see Rasmusson v. 

SmithKline Beecham Corp., 413 F.3d 1318, 1322 (Fed. 

Cir. 2005). Whether a specification enables a claim is a 

question of law based on underlying factual findings. In 

re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 735 (Fed. Cir. 1988). We review 

the PTAB’s enablement determination de novo, and its 

factual findings for substantial evidence. In re Gartside, 

203 F.3d 1305, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2000); In re Vaeck, 947 

F.2d 488, 495 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

Substantial evidence “means such relevant evidence 

as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support 

a conclusion.” Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 

229 (1938). Our review of factual findings for substantial 

evidence examines the record as a whole, taking into 

account evidence that supports the PTAB’s position as 

well as that evidence detracting from the PTAB’s conclusion. Gartside, 203 F.3d at 1312. “[T]he possibility of 

drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence” 

will not render the PTAB’s findings unsupported by 

substantial evidence. See Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 

383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). If the evidence in record will 

support several reasonable but contradictory conclusions, 

we will not find the PTAB’s decision unsupported by 

substantial evidence simply because the PTAB chose one 

conclusion over another plausible alternative. In re 

Jolley, 308 F.3d 1317, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

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A 

As a preliminary matter, we note that the PTAB credited and relied on, to some extent, the testimony of 

Beachy’s expert, Dr. Curran, for many of its findings. Taş 

argues that the PTAB’s acceptance of Dr. Curran’s testimony was in error because Dr. Curran is not a physician, 

and the subject matter requires the expertise of a physician. Taş also argues that Dr. Curran’s testimony is not 

reliable because certain publications contradict Dr. Curran’s testimony. Beachy responds by listing Dr. Curran’s 

qualifications and pointing out that Taş failed to object to 

Dr. Curran’s testimony in accordance with PTAB rules. 

The PTAB addressed Taş’s challenge to Dr. Curran in 

its decision on rehearing. The PTAB noted that Taş failed 

to challenge Dr. Curran’s qualifications in any of the 

motions it decided, and the issue could not be raised for 

the first time on rehearing. Because Taş’s challenge to 

Dr. Curran was not properly raised below, we will not 

consider it on appeal. 

B 

On appeal, Taş first takes issue with the following 

sentence from the ’076 and ’964 applications: “For instance, the subject compounds can be utilized to cause 

such transformed cells to become either post-mitotic or 

apoptotic.” ’076 application, 38:9–12; ’964 application, 

36:11–14. Taş argues that a person skilled in the art 

would not believe this sentence is true, and the sentence 

therefore does not provide written description or enablement support. 

First, Taş argues that a person skilled in the art 

would not believe this sentence because the “subject 

compounds” in the applications (e.g., cyclopamine) are Hh 

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TAS v. BEACHY 9

antagonists, but this sentence was “plagiarized”4 from an 

earlier patent that discussed the opposite, Hh agonists. 

The PTAB dismissed this argument because Taş cited no 

legal authority to suggest that the alleged act of plagiarism is at all relevant to the written description or enablement analysis. On appeal, Taş argues that the alleged 

act of plagiarism is relevant because a person skilled in 

the art, knowing the content of the earlier patent and 

presuming the earlier patent to be correct, would not 

believe the sentence-at-issue in the applications. We 

understand Taş’s argument to not be about the alleged act 

of plagiarism itself, for which he still provides no legal 

authority, but rather to be about what a person skilled in 

the art would understand the applications to teach. On 

this point, Taş contends that a person skilled in the art 

would believe the earlier patent over the applications 

because prior art references do not corroborate the statement made in the applications. The PTAB heard arguments from both sides about what the applications teach 

a person skilled in the art, favored Beachy’s evidence over 

Taş’s, and credited the plain disclosure of the applications. After reviewing the record, we find that the PTAB’s 

findings are supported by substantial evidence. 

Taş next argues that a person skilled in the art would 

not believe that cyclopamine can be used to cause the 

relevant cells to become apoptotic because figure 4A in the 

same applications contradicts this result. Taş describes 

4 On appeal, Taş elevates its “plagiarism” allegations to also include accusations that the inventors intentionally deceived the USPTO, engaged in fraud upon the 

USPTO, and violated 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a), which is the 

duty of the inventor to disclose to the USPTO information 

material to patentability. Taş waived these allegations by 

failing to raise them below, and we find no merit to the 

allegations.

 

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10 TAS v. BEACHY

figure 4A as showing tumor cells treated with cyclopamine at various dose levels in which microscopically 

visible cell death was not observed. Because apoptosis is 

a form of cell death detectable by microscopic examination, Taş argues that figure 4A expressly teaches against 

using a sufficient dose of cyclopamine to cause the relevant cells to become apoptotic. Again, the PTAB heard 

arguments from both sides and credited the testimony of 

Beachy’s expert that the applications teach a person 

skilled in the art that cyclopamine could be administered 

in doses sufficient to induce apoptosis in BCCs. Applying 

this Court’s guidance in Ariad Pharm., 598 F.3d at 1352, 

the PTAB also determined that a working example of a 

particular dose level resulting in measurable cell death

was not necessary to adequately describe or enable an 

embodiment within the scope of Count 3. The PTAB 

correctly applied the law, and its findings are supported 

by substantial evidence.

C 

Taş also takes issue with the following sentence from 

the ’076 and ’964 applications: “An ‘effective amount’ of a 

subject compound, with respect to the subject method of 

treatment, refers to an amount of the antagonist in a 

preparation which, when applied as part of a desired 

dosage regimen brings about, e.g., a change in the rate of 

cell proliferation and/or the state of differentiation of a 

cell and/or rate of survival of a cell according to clinically 

acceptable standards for the disorder to be treated or the 

cosmetic purpose.” ’076 application, 10:8–15 (emphasis 

added); ’964 application, 12:22–29. According to Taş, the 

inventors did not have possession of this subject matter 

because the sentence does not specify which cells it is 

referring to, or whether the change is an increase or a 

decrease in the rate of proliferation, the state of differentiation, or the rate of survival. 

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TAS v. BEACHY 11

The claims and Counts at issue here involve the administration of cyclopamine to treat humans having BCC

tumors, which requires a sufficient dose of cyclopamine to 

induce apoptosis and cause a decrease of size or disappearance of the tumor. The PTAB found that the applications sufficiently described those claims and Counts, and 

the PTAB’s findings are supported by substantial evidence.

D 

Taş next argues that some teachings of the ’076 and 

’964 applications are not enabling because they are “inoperative in entire categories,” such as treating injuries of 

nervous system and immunology affected diseases, and 

enhancing regeneration of tissue and organs. The claims 

and Counts at issue here, however, only involve the 

administration of cyclopamine to treat humans having a 

BCC tumor. The teachings Taş complained of are for 

embodiments not covered by the claims and Counts and 

are therefore irrelevant to whether the applications 

enable the claims and Counts.

E 

Taş also argues that the disclosure of human cancers 

in the ’076 and ’964 applications does not provide written 

description or enablement support for the Counts or 

claims at issue. According to Taş, the applications must 

describe the actual treatment of a human because (1) 

Hh/Smo signaling was known to be necessary for nonBCC cells required for human life, (2) effective doses of 

cyclopamine was known to kill a high proportion of 

adults, (3) the vast majority of cancer chemotherapy 

tested in laboratory animals was known to fail in treating 

cancer in humans, and (4) tumor cells were known to have 

greater Hh/Smo signaling than normal cells, so inhibiting 

the signaling would cause normal cells to succumb before 

the tumor cells. In response, Beachy points to evidence in 

front of the PTAB that teaches Hh signaling is inactive in 

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12 TAS v. BEACHY

most adult tissues and cyclopamine was known to have no 

adverse effects in humans. 

The PTAB correctly stated that the written description and enablement requirements do not demand as a 

matter of law actual examples or an actual reduction to 

practice. See Eli Lilly, 598 F.3d at 1352; Wands, 858 F.2d 

at 735. The PTAB found that the description in the 

priority applications of methods by which cyclopamine 

may be administered, appropriate and effective dosages, 

how the subject medicament works within the cancerous 

cell, and a spectrum of conditions against which administration of the cyclopamine may be effective sufficiently 

described the subject matter to a person skilled in the art, 

and enabled such a person to make and use the invention 

without undue experimentation. After considering all the 

arguments and the record, we see no reason to disturb 

that finding.

F 

In a final attack on the teachings of the ’076 and ’964 

applications, Taş argues that the descriptions of mice 

grafted with foreign tumor cells does not provide written 

description or enablement support because (1) the amount 

of cyclopamine applied to each mouse is not specified, (2) 

the volume of the tumor grafts is not described, (3) the 

described change in the size of the graft might be from a 

spontaneous change instead of from a reaction to the 

cyclopamine, and (4) the induction of apoptosis in the 

tumor grafts is not described. These are the same arguments Taş presented to the PTAB. See J.A. 36–37, 46. 

The PTAB considered Taş’s arguments and evidence, 

teachings from the applications, and the testimony from 

Beachy’s expert, Dr. Curran, that a person skilled in the 

art would have known that the administration of a sufficient amount of cyclopamine to a human to inhibit Hh 

signaling in the tumor would also result in a decrease in 

tumor size. Substantial evidence therefore supports the 

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TAS v. BEACHY 13

PTAB decision that Taş failed to meet it burden of showing that the ’076 and ’964 applications do not provide 

written description or enablement support.

III

Beachy also filed preliminary motions in the interference proceedings below, asking the PTAB to find the 

claims of Taş’s ’078 patent invalid as lacking written 

description, lacking enablement, and being indefinite. 

The PTAB granted one of Beachy’s motions as to the lack 

of written description for claims 2–20 and 23, and another 

of Beachy’s motions as to the lack of written description 

for claim 7. Taş appeals. Because claims 1–23 of the ’078 

patent are unpatentable to Taş under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) 

based on Beachy’s prior invention of Counts 2 and 3, we 

do not need to reach whether claims 2–20 and 23 are also 

invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 112. 

* * *

We have considered all other arguments and find 

them without merit.

We therefore affirm the PTAB’s denial of Taş’s preliminary motions regarding no interference-in-fact and lack 

of written description and enablement for the Counts of 

the ’926 and ’949 interferences and the claims of the ’121 

and ’934 applications. With respect to these issues, the 

PTAB correctly applied the law, and its findings are 

supported by substantial evidence.

AFFIRMED

No costs.

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