Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_13-cv-00526/USCOURTS-almd-2_13-cv-00526-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Veverly Arrington
Defendant
Mary Briers
Defendant
Eleanor Dawkins
Defendant
W. Durden Dean
Defendant
Donald Dotson
Defendant
Ron Glover
Defendant
Vickie Holloway
Defendant
Sophia Johnson
Defendant
Montgomery County Board of Education
Defendant
James Owens
Plaintiff
Kim Pitts
Defendant
Robert Porterfield
Defendant
Beverly Ross
Defendant
Heather Sellers
Defendant
Ann Sippial
Defendant
Melissa Snowden
Defendant
Barbara Thompson
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHERN DIVISION 

JAMES OWENS, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

v. ) CASE NO. 2:13-cv-526-MHT-WC 

 ) 

BARBARA THOMPSON, et al., ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Plaintiff filed his Complaint (Doc. 1) alleging claims under Title VII of the Civil 

Rights Act of 1964 for employment discrimination. The District Judge entered an Order 

referring this matter to the undersigned Magistrate Judge “for consideration and 

disposition or recommendation on all pretrial matters as may be appropriate.” Order 

(Doc. 19). 

Before the court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim 

(Doc. 20). After reviewing Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, the court ordered plaintiff to 

amend his complaint to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. (Doc. 29.) 

Plaintiff then filed a response to the Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 30.) The court again 

ordered Plaintiff to file an amended complaint that complies with Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 8 (Doc. 31), and Plaintiff filed a “Motion to Amend the Complaint.” (Doc. 

32.) Upon review of the pleadings, it is the Recommendation of the undersigned 

Magistrate Judge that Defendant’s Motion (Doc. 20) be GRANTED. 

Case 2:13-cv-00526-MHT-WC Document 33 Filed 11/18/13 Page 1 of 10
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I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must accept all wellpleaded factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiff. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Christopher v. 

Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 406 (2002). “To survive dismissal, the complaint’s allegations 

must plausibly suggest that the [plaintiff] has a right to relief, raising that possibility 

above a speculative level; if they do not, the plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed.” 

James River Ins. Co. v. Ground Down Eng’g, Inc., 540 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir. 2008) 

(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)); see also Edwards 

v. Prime Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1291 (11th Cir. 2010). The former rule—that “[a] 

complaint should be dismissed only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiffs can 

prove no set of facts which would entitle them to relief,” La Grasta v. First Union Sec., 

Inc., 358 F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004)—has been retired by Twombly. James River Ins. 

Co., 540 F.3d at 1274. Thus, the court engages in a two-step approach: “When there are 

well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine 

whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662 (2009). The court need not accept as true legal conclusions or mere conclusory 

statements. Id.

II. BACKGROUND 

On July 23, 2013, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint alleging 

“retaliation, age and workplace issues covered by [Title VII of] the Civil Rights act of 

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1964” and named as defendants the Montgomery County Board of Education1 (“Board”), 

Barbara Thompson, Heather Sellers, Eleanor Dawkins, Melissa Snowden, Beverly Ross, 

Mary Briers, Robert Porterfield, W. Durden Dean, Veverly Arrington, Donald Dotson, 

Vickie Holloway, Ann Sippial, Kim Pitts, Sophia Johnson, and Ron Glover. Compl. 

(Doc. 1). Plaintiff alleged that, from January 2, 2013 through the present, “The [Board] 

and its agents have used retaliatory methods to derive, delay, and annoy the fifty-nine 

year old employee.” Id. at 2. Plaintiff stated that he is “a twenty-eight year educator that 

was awarded a new three-year contract that the Board and its agents have failed or 

refused to allow to work without retaliation measures,” including “rewriting section 16-

24B-4 of the Alabama Teacher Accountability Act, micro-management, denied transfer 

to a more desirable position and denial of training opportunities.” Id. Plaintiff did not 

include any additional facts in the Complaint. 

Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim or, in the 

Alternative, a Motion for More Definite Statement. (Doc. 20.) Plaintiff later filed a 

Motion to Amend the Caption of the Case (Doc. 27) to request clarification that 

Montgomery County Board of Education is an intended defendant in this case. The court 

issued an order granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend the Caption. Order (Doc. 29). In 

the same Order, prior to ruling on the Motion to Dismiss, the court ordered Plaintiff to 

file an amended complaint that complies with Rule 8. Id. 

Plaintiff did not file an amended complaint; rather, Plaintiff filed a response to 

 

1

 In the Complaint, Plaintiff listed “Montgomery County Board of Education” as a defendant in the 

caption but then drew a line through those words and initialed the change. (Doc. 1) at 1. However, 

Plaintiff did refer to “[t]he [Board] and its agents” in the text of the complaint. Id. at 2. 

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Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 30.) In the response,2 Plaintiff states, 

The [Board] and its agents are denying plaintiff of his rights to be a 

principal according to the law. While allowing a principal to be the chief 

administrator of a school without having a valid certificate. This is the 

systematic problem with the [Board]. Further the plaintiff has an 

agreement on file that the [Board] and its agents have deprived him of his 

rights to operate as a principle. This is an obstruction of justice, contempt, 

and breach of agreement. 

Id. at 1. Further, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants have “taken part in an intentional 

scheme to deprive plaintiff of his rights as guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause of 

the 14th Amendment” and that Defendants “saw it better to fill a position with a person 

with an expired certificate rather than abide by an agreement by the court.” Id. at 4 

(emphasis in original). Plaintiff states that retaliation against a person who files an 

EEOC complaint is unlawful and lists his age and race. Id. at 5. Concluding, Plaintiff 

asserts that the Board and its agents “intentionally discriminated and retaliated” against 

him, “reduced and place [sic] him in an environment where he cannot carry out his 

functions as a principal,” and “intentionally deprived” Plaintiff “for filing an EEOC 

complaint and his age, among other factor [sic] of Title VII.” Id. “This scheme 

employed involves breaking any and every law to achieve their purpose.” Id. 

The court again ordered Plaintiff to file amended complaint that complies with 

Rule 8 and specifies how and when Defendants discriminated and retaliated against him. 

 

2

 The court notes that a plaintiff “may not supplant allegations made in [the] Complaint with new 

allegations raised in a response to a motion to dismiss.” Rule v. Chase Home Fin. LLC, 2012 WL 

1833394, at *4 (M.D. Ga. May 18, 2012) (citing Irwin v. Miami–Dade Cnty. Pub. Schs., 2009 WL 

465038, at *2 (S.D. Fla., Feb. 24, 2009) (citations omitted) (disregarding the new allegations and 

analyzing motion to dismiss under the assertions set forth in the Second Amended Complaint) and Bickley 

v. Caremark RX, Inc., 461 F.3d 1325, 1330 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding court is limited to “reviewing what 

is within the four corners of the complaint on a motion to dismiss.”)). 

Case 2:13-cv-00526-MHT-WC Document 33 Filed 11/18/13 Page 4 of 10
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Order (Doc. 31). Included in the court’s order was the following warning: “Plaintiff is 

hereby warned that failure to comply with the court’s order will result in the court’s 

recommendation that Plaintiff’s claim be dismissed.” (Doc. 31) at 2 (emphasis in 

original). 

On November 7, 2013, Plaintiff filed a “Motion to Amend the Complaint” (Doc 

32). Although Plaintiff’s pleading is styled as a “Motion to Amend” and Plaintiff fails to 

incorporate his previous Complaint, Plaintiff is clearly responding to the court’s order to 

file an amended complaint, and, accordingly, the court will construe this document (Doc. 

32) as Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. 

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint makes the following allegations: “[T]here was no 

proration for education during the time of the proposed school closing,” (Doc. 32) at 1; 

“The [Board] and its agents failed or refused to provide an opportunity for comments and 

recommendations from citizens and school personnel,” id.; and 

In the work assignment for Principal of 6th Grade at Capitol Heights Middle 

School, I do not have the authority, duties or responsibilities that would be 

associated with being a Contract Principal. I have been stripped of the 

following in my present job assignment: (a) Supervision of the daily 

operation and management of personnel[;] (b) Finances[;] (c) Facilities[;] 

(d) and other matters of the school or campus for which the principal or 

contract principal is responsible[;] (e) Instructional Leadership[;] (f) 

Evaluation for the education program. 

id. at 2. Plaintiff also includes the following entries, among others, in a chart format: 

Jan. 3, 2012 [Plaintiff] assigned to Fews Program 

October 31, 2012 Denied professional leave- Detached Duty for 

Employees 

Nov. 9, 2012 No Notification for Meeting at E.D. Nixon 

Jan. 15, 2013 Principal removed (no due process) 

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Id. at 2-3. Lastly, Plaintiff explains, 

Mrs. Sophia Johnson micro-managed the Fews Program after the complaint 

to EEOC was filed in October of 2012. It started October 18, 2012- 

Plaintiff had to notify of days of absenteeism. Mrs. Johnson stated it was 

for payroll purposes. However, the payroll was kept at the program by the 

secretary/bookkeeper. 

Id. at 4. 

III. DISCUSSION 

Defendants make three arguments for dismissal of Plaintiff’s case: (1) Plaintiff’s 

case should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted 

based on Plaintiff’s “fail[ure] to name the [Board] as a party-defendant,” id. at 2-3; (2) 

Plaintiff’s case should be dismissed for failure to join a party under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 19 based on Plaintiff having “struck [the Board] as a party-defendant,” id. at 3; 

and (3) Plaintiff’s case should be dismissed for failure to plead properly based on 

Plaintiff’s failure to “specify how Defendants discriminated against him on the basis of 

his age, [or] identif[y] any comparators []or any facts showing he is entitled to any 

relief,” id. at 3-4. 

A. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim upon which 

Relief Can be Granted 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s case should be dismissed for failure to state a 

claim upon which relief may be granted, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6), based on Plaintiff’s “fail[ure] to name the [Board] as a party-defendant.” (Doc. 

20) at 2-3. Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend the Caption to include the Board was granted. 

Order (Doc. 29). Thus, this issue is moot, as the Board is named as a party-defendant. 

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B. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Join a Party under Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 19 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s case should be dismissed, pursuant to Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(B)(7), for failure to join a party under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 19 based on Plaintiff having “struck [Board] as a party-defendant.” (Doc. 20) 

at 3. Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend the Caption to include the Board was granted. Order 

(Doc. 29). Thus, this issue is moot, as the Board is named as a party-defendant. 

C. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Plead Properly Pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, or, in the alternative, Motion for a 

More Definite Statement Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(e) 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s case should be dismissed, or a more definite 

statement ordered, for Plaintiff’s failure to plead in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 8. (Doc. 20) at 3-4. Specifically, Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to 

“specify how Defendants discriminated against him on the basis of his age, [or] identif[y] 

any comparators []or any facts showing he is entitled to any relief.” Id.

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint need not contain “detailed factual 

allegations,” but it must contain sufficient factual allegations to suggest the required 

elements of a cause of action. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); 

Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1295-96 (11th Cir. 2007). “[A] formulaic 

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 

Nor will mere labels and legal conclusions withstand a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Id. 

Under the standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Twombly, the complaint must 

contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. 

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“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the 

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 

In this case, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for 

discrimination or retaliation under the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Plaintiff alleges 

a violation of Title VII based on retaliation and age discrimination; however, upon a 

liberal construction of Plaintiff’s pleadings,3

 the court can only speculate as to the basis 

for Plaintiff’s claims. Neither the Complaint nor the Amended Complaint include any 

facts that tell the court how Plaintiff feels he was discriminated against or retaliated 

against based on his age. 

Despite the multiple opportunities to amend, the court is truly at a loss as to what 

conduct Plaintiff asserts as discriminatory or retaliatory, by whom that conduct was 

undertaken, and what harm Plaintiff suffered as a result. The Defendants’ alternative 

request for a more definite statement is unnecessary here. Because Plaintiff has failed to 

allege sufficient facts that, if taken as true, allow the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged, Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss is due to be granted. 

 

3

 “In the case of a pro se action . . . the court should construe the complaint more liberally than it would 

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Powell v. Lennon, 914 F.2d 1459, 1463 (11th Cir. 1990). “While a 

complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, ‘a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the “grounds” of 

his “entitle[ment] to relief” requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of a 

cause of action’s elements will not do.’” Simpson v. Zwinge, 2013 WL 5340509, at *1 (11th Cir. Sept. 

25, 2013) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

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D. Individual Defendants 

In addition, Plaintiff’s claims against the Individual Defendants in their individual 

capacities cannot be maintained. “The relief granted under Title VII is against the 

employer, not individual employees whose actions would constitute a violation of the 

act.” Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir. 1991). 

IV. CONCLUSION 

Accordingly, it is 

ORDERED that Plaintiff’s “Motion to Amend” (Doc. 32) is hereby construed as 

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. The clerk of the court is directed to docket the 

document styled “Motion to Amend” (Doc. 32) as Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. 

Further, it is 

the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss (Doc. 20) be GRANTED pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 

because it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

 It is further 

 ORDERED that the parties are DIRECTED to file any objections to the 

Recommendation on or before December 2, 2013. Any objections filed must 

specifically identify the findings in the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which a 

party objects. Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be considered by the 

District Court. The parties are advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of 

the court and, therefore, it is not appealable. 

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 Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the 

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by 

the District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from 

attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the 

District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. 

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., 667 F.2d 33 

(11th Cir. 1982); see also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en 

banc) (adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit 

handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981). 

Done this 18th day of November, 2013. 

 /s/ Wallace Capel, Jr. 

 WALLACE CAPEL, JR. 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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