Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_13-cv-01362/USCOURTS-alnd-5_13-cv-01362-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Adtran, Inc.
Defendant
Joseph E. King
Plaintiff

Document Text:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

JOSEPH E. KING,

Plaintiff,

vs.

ADTRAN, INC.,

Defendant.

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 Civil Action No. 5:13-CV-1362-CLS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDERS

Plaintiff, Joseph King, asserts claims for age discrimination and retaliation in

violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et

seq. (“ADEA”), and the Alabama Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1997, 

Ala. Code § 25-1-20 et seq. (1975) (“AADEA”), against his former employer, Adtran,

Inc.1

 Plaintiff’s complaint also asserts a state-law claim for “negligent and/or wanton

hiring, training, supervision and retention.”2

 The case presently is before the court on

defendant’s motion for summary judgment.3

 Upon consideration of the pleadings,

briefs, and evidentiary submissions, this court concludes that the motion should be

granted. 

1 See doc. no. 1 (Complaint), ¶ 1. 

2 Id.

3 See doc. no. 11 (Summary Judgment Motion). 

1

FILED

 2014 Dec-10 AM 11:13

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 5:13-cv-01362-CLS Document 24 Filed 12/10/14 Page 1 of 25
I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that a court “shall grant summary

judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In

other words, summary judgment is proper “after adequate time for discovery and upon

motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the

existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear

the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). “In

making this determination, the court must review all evidence and make all reasonable

inferences in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.” Chapman v. AI

Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Haves v. City of

Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995)). Inferences in favor of the non-moving

party are not unqualified, however. “[A]n inference is not reasonable if it is only a

guess or a possibility, for such an inference is not based on the evidence, but is pure

conjecture and speculation.” Daniels v. Twin Oaks Nursing Home, 692 F.2d 1321,

1324 (11th Cir. 1983) (alteration supplied). Moreover,

[t]he mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat summary

judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the

outcome of the case. The relevant rules of substantive law dictate the

materiality of a disputed fact. A genuine issue of material fact does not

exist unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for

a reasonable jury to return a verdict in its favor.

2

Case 5:13-cv-01362-CLS Document 24 Filed 12/10/14 Page 2 of 25
Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1023 (quoting Haves, 52 F.3d at 921) (emphasis and alteration

supplied). See also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251–52 (1986)

(asking “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require

submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a

matter of law”). 

II. SUMMARY OF FACTS

Adtran, Inc., headquartered in Huntsville, Alabama, designs and manufactures

telecommunications equipment, and employs approximately 2,500 persons around the

world.4

 The company does not market its telecommunications equipment directly to

consumers.5

 Instead, it sells to other companies that, in turn, sell to consumers. 

Adtran refers to this structure as a “sales channel.”6

 

Adtran markets its products through two types of sales channels: a “Network

Service Provider” channel and a “Value Added Reseller” channel.7

 A Network Service

Provider (“NSP”) is a media carrier company (e.g., AT&T) that sells “enterprise

products” (e.g., routers and switches) to consumers.8

 A Value Added Reseller

4

 Doc. no. 13-2 (Koch Affidavit), ¶ 2.

5

 Doc. no. 13-4 (Koch Deposition), at 12–13. It is also sometimes referred to as a

“distribution channel.” See, e.g., doc. no. 13-2 (Koch Affidavit), ¶ 9.

6

 Doc. no. 13-4 (Koch Deposition), at 12–13.

7

 Doc. no. 13-2 (Koch Affidavit), ¶ 8.

8 Id. Network Service Providers are sometimes referred to as “carriers.” See, e.g., doc. no.

12 (Defendant’s Summary Judgment Brief), at 3.

3

Case 5:13-cv-01362-CLS Document 24 Filed 12/10/14 Page 3 of 25
(“VAR”) is a company that markets and sells Adtran data communication products

and services to consumers.9

 Adtran’s sales employees are expected to develop

relationships with Network Service Providers and Value Added Resellers, and to

divide their time equally between the two sales channels.10 

A. Joseph King’s Employment at Adtran

Plaintiff, Joseph King, was hired into Adtran’s sales department as a “channel

account manager” in 1996.11 He held several sales positions at the company before

his 2003 promotion to “Territory Manager for the Southeast.”12 In that position,

plaintiff was responsible for Network Service Provider and Value Added Reseller

sales in Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, and Florida.13 His responsibilities included

“territory management,” cultivating relationships with Network Service Providers and

9

 Doc. no. 13-1 (Plaintiff Deposition), 21–24.

10 Doc. no. 13-2 (Koch Affidavit), ¶ 9.

11 Doc. no. 13-1 (Plaintiff Deposition), at 69.

12 Id. at 69–70; doc. no. 15-1 (Exhibit E (January 1, 2004 Performance Appraisal)), at ECF

16; see also doc. no. 14 (Plaintiff’s Response to Summary Judgment Motion), at 6. It should be

noted that some documents list plaintiff’s position as “Enterprise Territory Manager.” See, e.g., doc.

no. 15-1 (Exhibit E (January 1, 2008 Performance Appraisal)), at ECF 2. “ECF” is the acronym for

“Electronic Case Filing,” a system that allows parties to file and serve documents electronically. 

See Atterbury v. Foulk, No. C-07-6256 MHP, 2009 WL 4723547, *6 n.6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2009). 

Bluebook Rule 7.1.4 permits citations to the “page numbers generated by the ECF header.” Wilson

v. Fullwood, 772 F. Supp. 2d 246, 257 n.5 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing The Bluebook: A Uniform System

of Citation R. B. 7.1.4, at 21 (Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al., 19th ed. 2010)). Even so, the

Bluebook recommends “against citation to ECF pagination in lieu of original pagination.” Wilson,

772 F. Supp. 2d at 257 n.5. Thus, unless stated otherwise, this court will cite the original pagination

in the parties’ pleadings. When the court cites to pagination generated by the ECF header, it will,

as here, precede the page number with the letters “ECF.” 

13 Doc. no. 13-1 (Plaintiff Deposition), at 10.

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Case 5:13-cv-01362-CLS Document 24 Filed 12/10/14 Page 4 of 25
Value Added Resellers, and developing new sales opportunities.14 Like all sales

employees at Adtran, plaintiff’s compensation included sales commissions, the size

of which depended upon his performance in relation to quotas set by his supervisors.15

Plaintiff held the position of Territory Manager for the Southeast until his employment

was terminated on March 20, 2012.16

The identity of the person who served as plaintiff’s direct supervisor during the

time he held the position of Territory Manager for the Southeast is not clear. It is

undisputed, however, that Tom Koch became one of plaintiff’s supervisors on March

23, 2011: the date on which Koch was promoted to the position of “Director of Sales

for Value Added Resellers in the United States.”17 Koch’s promotion coincided with

Adtran’s decision to prioritize the Value Added Reseller sales channel, and to create

a Value Added Reseller-only sales team beginning the following year, in January of

14 Doc. no. 13-4 (Koch Deposition), at 126–127. Significantly, Plaintiff never received a

formal job description from Adtran. Id. at 33. 

15 Doc. no. 13-2 (Koch Affidavit), ¶ 11.

16 Doc. no. 13-1 (Plaintiff Deposition), at 10, 69. 

17 Doc. no. 13-4 (Koch Deposition), at 18–19. Plaintiff testified that Tom Koch, who

terminated Plaintiff’s employment in 2012, was not his direct supervisor. He testified that Dave

Sanford, Director of Sales, was his direct supervisor throughout his employment. See doc. no. 13-1

(Plaintiff Deposition), at 54, 191, 199. He also testified, however, that Tom Koch became his direct

supervisor in 2011. Id. at 211–212. An “Employee Status Change Form,” dated January 28, 2008,

listed Plaintiff’s “Current Supervisor” as Dave Sanford and his “New Supervisor” as Tom Koch. 

Doc. no. 15-2 (Defendant’s Exhibit “F” (Employee Status Change Form)). Dave Sanford signed

Plaintiff’s 2009 and 2010 performance evaluations as “Supervisor,” however. Doc. no. 15-3

(Defendant’s Exhibit “G” (January 1, 2009 Performance Evaluation)), at ECF 9. Koch testified that

he became Plaintiff’s supervisor in March of 2011, when he became the Director of Sales for Value

Added Resellers. Doc. no. 13-4 (Koch Deposition), at 18–19.

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Case 5:13-cv-01362-CLS Document 24 Filed 12/10/14 Page 5 of 25
2012.18 Director of Sales Dave Sanford also served as plaintiff’s supervisor while

plaintiff held the position of Territory Manager for the Southeast.19 Vice President of

Sales Ted Cole served as direct supervisor of both Tom Koch and Dave Sanford.20 B.

Plaintiff’s Performance Improvement Plan (“PIP”)

As plaintiff’s immediate supervisor, Tom Koch frequently evaluated plaintiff’s

performance by reviewing his weekly reports, partner participation data, and sales

activity.21 During 2011 Koch identified several aspects of plaintiff’s performance that

concerned him. First, he determined that plaintiff was failing to meet his Value Added

Reseller sales quota.22 That concerned Koch, because plaintiff was slated to join

Koch’s Value Added Reseller-only sales team that was to be established the following

year, in January of 2012.23 Second, Vice President of Sales Ted Cole informed Koch

that one of plaintiff’s Value Added Resellers had complained that plaintiff had not

been devoting sufficient time to developing a relationship with that company.24

Finally, Koch received complaints from an account manager hired to assist plaintiff

18 Doc. no. 13-2 (Koch Affidavit), ¶ 18.

19 See supra note 17.

20 Doc. no. 13-4 (Koch Deposition), at 16–17.

21 Doc. no. 13-2 (Koch Affidavit), ¶ 26.

22 Id. ¶ 28. Plaintiff’s Value Added Reseller sales were below 65% of quota in 2008, 2009,

and 2010. Doc. no. 13-1 (Dec. 1, 2011 Letter to Plaintiff), at ECF 124.

23 Doc. no. 13-2 (Koch Affidavit), ¶ 30. As previously noted, Adtran sales employees were

expected to devote equal time to the Value Added Reseller and Network Service Provider channels. 

This policy continued until the end of 2011.

24 Doc. no. 13-2 (Koch Affidavit), ¶ 28.

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Case 5:13-cv-01362-CLS Document 24 Filed 12/10/14 Page 6 of 25
with sales in Florida that plaintiff “was not returning his calls and not traveling with

him.”25 Based upon those and other concerns, Koch decided to issue plaintiff a

“Performance Improvement Plan” (PIP): a document that identifies areas of an

employee’s job duties and responsibilities that require improvement, defines clear

performance expectations, and specifies a discrete time period within which the

employee must meet the performance expectations.26 Plaintiff’s Performance

Improvement Plan was intended to last for sixty days. Before Koch delivered the

document to plaintiff, however, he consulted Frank Humphrey, Adtran’s Employment

Relations and Compliance Manager, who reviewed the Plan for clarity and fairness.27

Koch issued the Performance Improvement Plan to plaintiff on November 17,

2011, and discussed it with him during a telephone conversation that same day.28

Koch told plaintiff that he had issued the PIP because he wanted plaintiff to raise his

sales performance to the level of his peers.29 The first page of the plan listed several

aspects of plaintiff’s performance that Koch found to be inadequate: 

C Partner coverage in the Territory. Feedback from partners

25 Id. ¶ 29.

26 Id. ¶ 30; doc. no. 13-3 (Humphrey Deposition), at 18–19; doc. no. 13-4 (Koch Deposition),

at 54. It should be noted that, if a sales employee fails to meet his quota, disciplinary action is at the

discretion of the employee’s supervisors, and, therefore, discipline for failure to meet a quota is not

uniform. See doc. no. 13-1 (Plaintiff Deposition), at 96–97.

27 Doc. no. 13-3 (Humphrey Deposition), at 7, 18, 21–22.

28 Doc. no. 13-4 (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 12 — Performance Improvement Plan), at ECF 85.

29 Doc. no. 13-4 (Koch Deposition), at 63.

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Case 5:13-cv-01362-CLS Document 24 Filed 12/10/14 Page 7 of 25
suggesting you’re unwilling to work with them.

C Inability to manage accounts in your territory as illustrated by

numerous customer problems and lost business without your

knowledge (UNA [University of North Alabama], State of

Alabama opportunities, Madison County opportunities as

examples)

C Not a positive example for others to follow.

C Consistent under performance of Value Added Reseller segment

for 2 years. Performance in 2010 below 71% of plan. 2011

Performance below plan 8 out of the first 10 months

C Not motivated, doesn’t demonstrate a positive, optimistic attitude.

C Poor communication skills.

C Lack of demonstrated knowledge of policies or processes:

specialization, deal registration, on-boarding partners, ongoing

partner lifestyle management.

C Failure to manage time to drive towards strategic goals. Does not

reinforce EN goals and objectives.

C Failure to mentor new hires in territory.

. . . .

The Territory you are responsible for is currently performing not

only below plan but well below the national average performance of

other Territories in the company. The data below does not include

performance for the State of Florida as it is now directly supported by

Troy Corbin. 

Doc. no. 13-4 (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 12 – Performance Improvement Plan), at ECF 85

8

Case 5:13-cv-01362-CLS Document 24 Filed 12/10/14 Page 8 of 25
(alterations supplied).30 

The PIP indicated that, as of October of 2011, plaintiff’s Value Added Reseller

sales were 86.1% of quota: three percentage points below Adtran’s national average

of 89.1%.31 The PIP directed plaintiff to match the national average by the end of

2011.32 It also directed plaintiff to create sales plans for current and potential Value

Added Resellers, and to “secure the essential resources to execute” those plans.33 The

document did not address plaintiff’s Network Service Provider sales — sales which,

at the time, exceeded his quota.34 

C. Plaintiff’s Responses to the Performance Improvement Plan

Plaintiff requested in a November 28, 2011 letter addressed to Tom Koch that

“the [sixty-day] time line to review and accomplish the PIP be extended to the end of

[the second quarter of] 2012, allowing a reasonable time frame [within which] to

30 It should be noted that Koch did not include Florida in his analysis even though, at the time

the PIP was issued, Plaintiff remained involved in sales in Florida and continued to receive

commissions on those sales. See doc. no. 13-1 (Plaintiff Deposition), at 10, 131.

31 Doc. no. 13-4 (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 12 — Performance Improvement Plan), at ECF 86.

32 Id. at 86–87. Significantly, Plaintiff previously had been required to meet short-term

Value Added Reseller goals in the first quarter of 2011 due to his poor Value Added Reseller sales

in 2010. See doc. no. 13-1 (Plaintiff Deposition), at 117.

33 Doc. no. 13-4 (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 12 — Performance Improvement Plan), at ECF 86.

34 Doc. no. 13-1 (Plaintiff Deposition), at 142–43. Indeed, Plaintiff met his total sales quota

in 2010, even though his Value Added Reseller sales reached only 64.1% of quota. See doc. no. 13-

1 (January 1, 2011 Performance Appraisal), at ECF 111; doc. no. 13-1 (December 1, 2011 Letter to

Plaintiff), at ECF 124.

9

Case 5:13-cv-01362-CLS Document 24 Filed 12/10/14 Page 9 of 25
accomplish these items.”35 Koch declined that request in a December 1, 2011 letter

to plaintiff.36 

Plaintiff complained during a December 7, 2011 meeting with Frank

Humphrey, Adtran’s Employment Relations and Compliance Manager — who, as

previously noted, had reviewed the Performance Improvement Plan for clarity and

fairness before it was issued to plaintiff — that the document “was essentially a set-up

. . . to get an older employee out of Adtran.”37 Plaintiff also described the document

as “pretextual.”38 He identified during the meeting several younger employees whose

Value Added Reseller sales were below quota for the 2011 fiscal year, but who did not

receive PIPs: i.e., Brent Frederick, who reached 62.4% of his Value Added Reseller

quota; Stewart Austin, who reached 77.8%; and Andy Solomon, who reached 78.8%

of quota.39 

On some undisclosed date after that meeting, Humphrey advised Koch that he

should not meet with plaintiff without a witness present, because Humphrey believed

35 Doc. no. 13-1 (Letter to Plaintiff), at ECF 124 (alterations supplied).

36 Id.

37 Doc. no. 13-1 (Plaintiff Deposition)), at 128, 151.

38 Id. at 151. 

39 Id. at 225; doc. no. 13-4 (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 13 — 2011 Sales Team Performance

Summary), at ECF 89. Plaintiff asserts in his brief, with dubious support, that Stewart Austin and

Brent Frederick both were under the age of forty during 2011, but Adtran disputes those facts. See

doc. no. 14 (Plaintiff’s Response to Summary Judgment Motion), at 20, ¶¶ 64–65; doc. no. 18

(Defendant’s Reply Brief), at 4, ¶¶ 64–65. 

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Case 5:13-cv-01362-CLS Document 24 Filed 12/10/14 Page 10 of 25
that plaintiff “was heading towards a legal discussion or legal issue.”40 Koch

previously had told plaintiff that he would meet with him in mid-December and midJanuary, to discuss his progress on achieving the objectives outlined in the PIP; but,

acting upon Humphrey’s advice, Koch never scheduled any such meetings.41 

Plaintiff detailed his disagreements with ten statements contained in the

Performance Improvement Plan in a December 14, 2011 e-mail to Frank Humphrey.42

Plaintiff did not mention age discrimination in that communication, but, in an e-mail

to Humphrey preceding the December 14th message, he wrote: “I trust that we can

mutually work this out and that this PIP is not pre-textual such that there is some

underlying cause.”43 

Plaintiff re-iterated his disagreements with the PIP during a conference

telephone call with Humphrey and Koch on January 4, 2012: a call that plaintiff

recorded without the knowledge of the other participants.44 Plaintiff did not mention

age discrimination during that conversation, either explicitly or implicitly (e.g.,

through the use of legal jargon, such as the term “pretext”).45 

40 Doc. no. 13-4 (Koch Deposition), at 67.

41 See id.; doc. no. 13-1 (Letter to Plaintiff), at ECF 124–125.

42 Doc. no. 13-1 (Plaintiff Deposition), at 147–49. That e-mail was requested by Humphrey. 

Id.

43 Doc. no. 13-1 (Defendant’s Exhibit 23 – E-mail Exchange Between Plaintiff and

Humhrey), at ECF 126, 128.

44 Doc. no. 13-4 (Transcript of January 4, 2012 Conference Call), at ECF 90–122.

45 See id.

11

Case 5:13-cv-01362-CLS Document 24 Filed 12/10/14 Page 11 of 25
Despite Humphrey’s admonition to meet with plaintiff only when another

witness was present — because Humphrey believed that plaintiff “was heading

towards a legal discussion or legal issue”46 — Koch testified that Humphrey never

stated directly that King had allege discrimination on the basis of age:47 i.e., that the

PIP “was essentially a set-up . . . to get an older employee out of Adtran.”48 

D. Huntsville City Schools Account 

On some undisclosed date during the sixty-day period of plaintiff’s

Performance Improvement Plan — i.e., between November 17, 2011 and January 17,

2012 — Adtran lost a potential sales opportunity with the Huntsville City Schools to

its primary competitor, Cisco Systems, Inc. According to Tom Koch, that lost

opportunity 

had the potential for $1.1 million in revenue. This was also critical to

ADTRAN since Huntsville City Schools is in the city of ADTRAN’s

corporate headquarters. This was also significant because this was

within Mr. King’s territory. This was also very concerning because Mr.

King failed to notify me, Dave Sanford, or anyone else of any potential

issues with obtaining the business or problems that he was encountering

in having contact with Huntsville City Schools. On multiple occasions

in early 2012, Mr. King had communicated that we were going to be

able to secure the business and expressed confidence in ADTRAN’s

ability to do so. The loss, without any further notification that the

potential business was at risk, was very concerning to me. This further

illustrated to me Mr. King’s lack of engagement with ADTRAN’s

46 Doc. no. 13-4 (Koch Deposition), at 67.

47 Doc. no. 13-2 (Koch Affidavit), ¶ 50.

48 Doc. no. 13-1 (Plaintiff Deposition)), at 128, 151.

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Case 5:13-cv-01362-CLS Document 24 Filed 12/10/14 Page 12 of 25
overall strategic objectives.

Doc. no. 13-2 (Koch Affidavit), ¶ 49 (emphasis supplied). 

E. Plaintiff’s Termination 

Koch made the decision to terminate plaintiff’s employment on some

undisclosed date prior to February 21, 2012, even though all of the data concerning

plaintiff’s sales during the sixty-day period of his Performance Improvement Plan

would not be available for Koch’s review until March 1, 2012.49 From the data

available at the time Koch made his decision, however, he determined that plaintiff

was meeting his Value Added Resellers sales quota.

50 Even so, Koch stated in the

affidavit submitted in support of summary judgment that he had determined that

plaintiff “had not met the elements of the [PIP], including what his [Value Added

Reseller] partners had done, and likely would not be successful in doing so” by March

1st.51 In his deposition, however, Koch testified that he could not point to any specific

aspect of the PIP that King had not met.52 

Koch obtained approval to replace plaintiff from Vice President of Sales Ted

Cole and Cole’s supervisor, Division General Manager Rick Schaunsman.53 He

49 Doc. no. 13-4 (Koch Deposition), at 79; doc. no. 13-3 (Humphrey Deposition), at 63–64.

50 Doc. no. 13-2 (Koch Affidavit), ¶ 47.

51 Id. ¶ 48 (alterations supplied).

52 Doc. no. 13-4 (Koch Deposition), at 100–101.

53 Id. at 88.

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informed Humphrey in a March 11, 2012 e-mail that “everything [was] finally in place

for [him] to let Joe King go.”54 

Plaintiff was asked to meet with Humphrey and Koch at Adtran’s Huntsville

headquarters on March 20, 2012.55 The meeting lasted approximately fifteen minutes,

and most of the discussion addressed the lost Huntsville City Schools sales

opportunity.56 It was “obvious” to plaintiff that Koch was “not happy” about losing

that account.57 Moreover, during his deposition, plaintiff could not recall whether

there had been any discussion of his Performance Improvement Plan during the

meeting.58 

At some point, Frank Humphrey asked Tom Koch to leave the room. When

Koch did so, Humphrey informed plaintiff that his employment with Adtran was

terminated, “effective immediately.”59 

On the date plaintiff was fired, he was fifty-five years of age. Tom Koch was

fifty years of age, Ted Cole was approximately sixty-one, and Frank Humphrey was

54 Doc. no. 13-4 (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 10 (Mar. 11, 2012 E-mail to Frank Humphrey)), at ECF

83.

55 Doc. no. 13-1 (Plaintiff Deposition), at 14; doc. no. 13-4 (Koch Deposition), at 106–07.

56 Doc. no. 13-1 (Plaintiff Deposition), at 251.

57 Id. at 25, 252 (“It was obvious in his demeanor and tone or volume of voice.”).

58 Id. at 252.

59 Id. at 13.

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Case 5:13-cv-01362-CLS Document 24 Filed 12/10/14 Page 14 of 25
in his fifties.60 Director of Sales Dave Sanford hired David Converse to replace

plaintiff. On the date of his hiring, Converse was forty-six years of age.61 

F. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Charge and Dismissal

Plaintiff filed a formal “Charge of Discrimination” with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission on September 13, 2012.62 The EEOC issued a “Dismissal

and Notice of Rights” on April 23 of the following year, stating that the agency had

terminated its investigation of his charge because it was unable to conclude that the

information obtained established violations of the civil rights statutes.63 That

document notified plaintiff of his right to file suit, and this action followed. 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Negligent Hiring, Training, and Supervision Claim

Plaintiff did not address Adtran’s contention that he had failed to assert any

facts supporting his state-law “negligent and/or wanton hiring, training, supervision

and retention” claim, and that summary judgment was, for that reason, due to be

entered in defendant’s favor on that claim.64 Upon consideration of the record, as well

60 Id. at 29–30; doc. no. 13-2 (Koch Affidavit), ¶¶ 6–7.

61 Doc. no. 13-2 (Koch Affidavit), ¶ 52.

62 Doc. no. 1-1.

63 Doc. no. 1-2.

64 See doc. no. 12 (Summary Judgment Brief), at 28–29; doc. no. 14 (Plaintiff’s Response

to Summary Judgment Motion).

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Case 5:13-cv-01362-CLS Document 24 Filed 12/10/14 Page 15 of 25
as plaintiff’s “Statement of Facts,” this court concludes that plaintiff has indeed failed

to assert any facts supporting that claim.65 Accordingly, summary judgment is due to

be entered in favor of Adtran. 

B. Age Discrimination

Plaintiff asserts claims of age discrimination under both the federal Age

Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (“ADEA”), and

the Alabama Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1997, Ala. Code § 25-1-20

et seq. (“AADEA”).66 However, one section of the Alabama Act explicitly states that

a plaintiff cannot simultaneously pursue an age discrimination claim under both

federal and state statutes, but must, instead, elect his or her remedies: 

Any person aggrieved may elect to pursue their remedies under

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, and the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act[,] 29 U.S.C. Section 621[,] or in the

alternative bring a civil action in the circuit court of the county in which

the person was or is employed for such legal or equitable relief as will

effectuate the purposes of this article. However, if an action is brought

in the federal court, any action pending in the state court shall be

simultaneously dismissed with prejudice. Further, any party bringing

action under this section shall only be entitled to one recovery of

damages. Any damages assessed in one court will offset any entitlement

to damages in any other state or federal court. In any action, a person

shall be entitled to a trial by jury of any issue of fact in any action for

recovery of amounts owed as a result of a violation of this article,

regardless of whether equitable relief is sought by any party in the

65 Doc. no. 1 (Complaint), ¶¶ 1, 38–44; doc. no. 14 (Plaintiff’s Response to Summary

Judgment Motion).

66 Doc. no. 1 (Complaint).

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Case 5:13-cv-01362-CLS Document 24 Filed 12/10/14 Page 16 of 25
action. Any employment practice authorized by the federal Age

Discrimination in Employment Act shall also be authorized by this

article and the remedies, defenses, and statutes of limitations, under this

article shall be the same as those authorized by the federal Age

Discrimination in Employment Act except that a plaintiff shall not be

required to pursue any administrative action or remedy prior to filing suit

under this article. 

Ala. Code § 25-1-29 (1975) (alterations and emphasis supplied). See also, e.g.,

Collins v. Compass Group, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1330 (N.D. Ala. 2013)

(Kallon, J.) (finding that, pursuant to the foregoing language of the AADEA, claims

based upon both that statute and the ADEA are “duplicative”). Accordingly, this court

will address plaintiff’s claims under only the rubric of the federal ADEA statute. 

The ADEA makes it “unlawful for an employer . . . to discharge any individual

or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,

terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.” 29

U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). The statute protects individuals who “are at least 40 years of age

but less than 70 years of age.” 29 U.S.C. § 621(a). 

Plaintiff has not produced direct evidence of age discrimination. Therefore, he

must satisfy the burden-shifting framework for claims based upon circumstantial

proofs that was promulgated by the Supreme Court in a trilogy of decisions, beginning

with McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), then elaborated in

Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), and finally

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elucidated in St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). The analytical

framework developed by that trilogy of cases has three steps, the goal of which is that

of “progressively . . . sharpen[ing] the inquiry into the elusive factual question of

intentional discrimination.” Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255

n.8) (alteration in original). Under that familiar framework, the plaintiff bears the

initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of his employer’s intent to

discriminate on the basis of the plaintiff’s age. If the plaintiff does so, he creates a

presumption of intentional discrimination. To rebut that presumption, the employer

must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the contested employment

action. If the employer shoulders that burden, the presumption of discrimination

drops from the case, and the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the

defendant’s proffered reason is merely a pretext for unlawful discrimination. See, e.g.,

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802–05; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252–56. 

A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of age discrimination if he proves that: 

he was a member of the class of persons protected by the Act (that is, individuals

between the ages of 40 and 70); he was qualified to perform the duties of his position;

he was, nonetheless, discharged; and that he was replaced by a substantially younger

person. See, e.g., Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142

(2000); Bogle v. Orange County Board of County Commissioners, 162 F.3d 653,

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656–57 (11th Cir. 1998); Turlington v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 135 F.3d 1428, 1432

(11th Cir. 1998); Benson v. Tocco, Inc., 113 F.3d 1203, 1207–08 (11th Cir. 1997). 

The first three elements of a prima facie case are not in dispute. A plaintiff may

satisfy the fourth element — the requirement to show that he was replaced by a

substantially younger person — by showing that he was replaced by an employee who

was at least three years younger. See, e.g., Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of

Florida, Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1360 (11th Cir. 1999); Carter v. DecisionOne Corp.,

122 F.3d 997, 1003 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing Carter v. City of Miami, 870 F.2d 578,

582–83 (11th Cir. 1989). Joseph King was replaced by a man who was nine years

younger than he.67 Accordingly, plaintiff has demonstrated a prima facie case of age

discrimination. 

Adtran articulated two primary reasons for Koch’s decision to terminate

plaintiff’s employment: plaintiff’s failure to meet the requirements of his

Performance Improvement Plan; and his inadequate handling of the Huntsville City

Schools sales opportunity.68 Accordingly, Adtran met its burden of coming forward

with legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for firing plaintiff. 

In order to show that an employer’s stated reasons are merely a pretext for

discrimination, a plaintiff “must demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities,

67 Doc. no. 13-1 (Plaintiff Deposition), at 29–30; doc. no. 13-2 (Koch Affidavit), ¶ 52.

68 Doc. no. 12 (Summary Judgment Brief), at 12–13, ¶¶ 59–60. 

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inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered

legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could find them unworthy

of credence.” Alvarez v. Royal Atlantic Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1265 (11th

Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g., Kragor v. Takeda

Pharmaceuticals America, Inc., 702 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2012); Combs v.

Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997); Cooper-Houston v.

Southern Railway Co., 37 F.3d 603, 605 (11th Cir. 1994). 

Plaintiff has offered substantial evidence that one of Adtran’s stated reasons for

his termination — i.e., his failure to meet the requirements of his Performance

Improvement Plan — is unworthy of belief.69 Even so, the Eleventh Circuit held in

an en banc opinion that an employee must show that each of the employer’s stated

reasons for the adverse employment action is pretextual in order to survive summary

judgment. Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1024–25 (11th Cir. 2000) (en

banc); see also id. at 1049 (Birch, J., dissenting) (“As a general rule, I agree with the

[majority’s holding] that, where an employer offers multiple legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for its challenged action, the employee must proffer

evidence that shows pretext as to each of the proffered reasons.” (alteration supplied,

emphasis in original)). Here, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate pretext as to Adtran’s

69 See, e.g., supra Part II.E.

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second stated reason for his discharge: i.e., his inadequate handling of the Huntsville

City Schools sales opportunity. 

Plaintiff contends that Adtran’s assertion that Koch terminated him because of

the loss of the Huntsville City Schools sales opportunity contradicts Koch’s testimony

that he did not hold King accountable for the loss of that account.70 The court

disagrees. Koch testified during his deposition that he faulted plaintiff for not

realizing that Adtran was in danger of losing the Huntsville City Schools sales

opportunity, and for not involving others in Adtran’s corporate hierarchy in an effort

to salvage the opportunity, but not for the loss itself: 

I didn’t hold Joe accountable [for the loss of] that opportunity at

all.

. . . .

[T]he key is you can’t win them all. But as long as we don’t give up —

you know, our management has a philosophy that says never lose alone.

At any point in time if you feel you’re going to lose, it’s your

responsibility to escalate to the next level and to the next level. 

So if Joe was losing that deal and he knew it, it would be

incumbent upon him to pick up the phone to call me. 

Doc. no. 13-4 (Koch Deposition), at 124-25 (alterations and emphasis supplied). 

Later in his deposition, Koch elaborated as follows: 

70 Doc. no. 14 (Plaintiff’s Response to Summary Judgment Motion), at 4, ¶ 60.

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It wasn’t — the fact that that deal was lost — and again, it was

one of those situations where the opportunity was lost. 

It was my perception and my opinion that Joe did not . . . involve

anybody other than himself to bring other people in to help win that

deal. And it came as a surprise. 

And it was identified by me as . . . another example of where

opportunities in our own backyard, which it was real obvious to me and

I assume to Joe, too, especially after the Madison County Courthouse

situation earlier in 2011 that opportunities that involved Adtran product

in the City of Huntsville were . . . very serious losses in the state. And

we needed to be all over making sure that people knew what was going

on. And if we were — if it was ever an inkling we were going to lose a

deal, we had to notify as many people. We had to make sure that we

weren’t going to lose that deal without making sure everybody else knew

in advance.

[I]t was just simply another example in my mind that Joe didn’t have a

handle on what was happening in the territory. 

Id. at 154–55 (emphasis and alteration supplied). That testimony is consistent with

the statements from Koch’s affidavit that were quoted in Part II.D., supra. It also is

consistent with Koch’s observation in the Performance Improvement Plan that

plaintiff exhibited poor communication skills and poor partner management.71 

Plaintiff attempts to show a contradiction in the foregoing stated reason by

pointing out that Adtran Chief Executive Officer Tom Stanton became involved in

discussions with Huntsville City Schools before the company lost the account. The

court sees no reason why that fact casts doubt upon Koch’s testimony that King was

71 Doc. no. 13-4 (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 12 (Performance Improvement Plan)), at ECF 85.

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at fault for failing “to notify [Koch], Dave Sanford, or anyone else of any potential

issues with obtaining the business or problems that he was encountering in having

contact with Huntsville City Schools.”72 

Plaintiff also has alleged that Adtran’s termination of five older employees is

evidence of an intent to discriminate on the basis of age.73 “Even when offered to

show pretext rather than a prima facie case, ‘me, too’ evidence is suspect. To be

probative, the other incidents must implicate a common decisionmaker.” Bell v.

Crowne Management, LLC, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1236 (S.D. Ala. 2012) (Steele, J.)

(citing Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., 513 F.3d 1261, 1286 (11th Cir. 2008)). Koch

has testified that he was the direct supervisor to only one of the five employees

identified by King: Chris Volta, whose “employment was terminated after he released

confidential information and misrepresented this fact to Ted Cole and [Koch].”74 The

court finds that Koch’s termination of the employment of one older employee, for

misconduct unrelated to the circumstances surrounding plaintiff’s termination, is not

probative of his intent to discriminate on the basis of age. 

Plaintiff has presented no other evidence casting doubt upon that stated reason. 

Accordingly, the court concludes that summary judgment is due to be entered in favor

72 Doc. no. 13-2 (Koch Affidavit), ¶ 49. 

73 Doc. no. 14 (Plaintiff’s Response to Summary Judgment Motion), at 21, ¶ 68.

74 Doc. no. 13-2 (Koch Affidavit), ¶¶ 55–59 (alteration supplied). 

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of Adtran on his federal age discrimination claim. 

C. Retaliation

Plaintiff contends that Adtran terminated his employment in retaliation for his

complaints of age discrimination, in violation of the ADEA and the AADEA.75 As

previously noted, the AADEA does not permit the simultaneous pursuit of ADEA and

AADEA claims. See Ala. Code § 25-1-29 (1975). Accordingly, the court will address

only King’s ADEA retaliation claim. 

When, as here, there is no direct evidence of retaliation, courts again employ

the burden-shifting analytical framework articulated in McDonnell Douglas and

Burdine to evaluate a plaintiff’s circumstantial evidence of retaliation. To establish

a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: he engaged in

statutorily protected activity; he suffered an adverse employment action; and there is

a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. 

See, e.g., Hurlbert v. St. Mary’s Health Care System, Inc., 439 F.3d 1286, 1297 (11th

Cir. 2006). If the plaintiff does so, the employer must come forward with a legitimate,

non-retaliatory reason for the adverse employment action. Holified v. Reno, 115 F.3d

1555, 1566 (11th Cir. 1997). If the employer does so, the plaintiff then bears the

burden of demonstrating that the employer’s stated reason is merely a pretextual

75 Doc. no. 1 (Complaint).

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excuse for retaliation. Id. 

The court need not decide whether King has established a prima facie case of

retaliation, because it already has concluded that King has not shown that both of

Adtran’s stated reasons for terminating his employment were pretextual. Accordingly,

summary judgment is due to be entered in favor of Adtran on King’s retaliation

claims. 

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDERS

In accordance with the foregoing, defendant’s motion for summary judgment

is GRANTED, and all claims asserted against Adtran, Inc., are DISMISSED with

prejudice. Costs are taxed to plaintiff. The Clerk is directed to close this file. 

DONE and ORDERED this 10th day of December, 2014. 

______________________________

United States District Judge

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