Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-akd-3_15-cv-00020/USCOURTS-akd-3_15-cv-00020-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Adam M. Bloodgood
Petitioner
John Conant
Respondent

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA

ADAM M. BLOODGOOD,

 Petitioner,

 vs.

JOHN CONANT,

 Respondent. Case No. 3:15-cv-00020-TMB

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

On February 6, 2015, Adam M. Bloodgood, a state prisoner representing 

himself, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, 

challenging his 2002 conviction and sentence for theft in Alaska Superior Court 

Case Number 3AN-02-08854CR.

1 Under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 

2254 Cases, the Court must review the petition to determine whether “it plainly 

appears from the face of the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner 

is not entitled to relief in the district court.”2 If so, “the judge must dismiss the 

petition.”3

Mr. Bloodgood states that he has raised none of the grounds for relief 

brought in his Petition in the state courts, on direct appeal or in a state post1 Docket 1.

2 Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, Rule 4. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2243.

3 Id. 

 

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conviction petition.

4 But federal habeas relief is not available “unless the 

applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State.”5 That 

is, “[b]efore seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus, a state prisoner must . . . 

giv[e] the State the ‘opportunity to pass upon and correct’ alleged violations of its 

prisoners’ federal rights.”6 To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a “prisoner

must ‘fairly present’ his claim in each appropriate state court (including a state 

supreme court with powers of discretionary review), thereby alerting that court to 

the federal nature of the claim.”7 

The Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he exhaustion doctrine . . . is 

founded on concerns broader than those of the parties; in particular, the doctrine 

fosters respectful, harmonious relations between the state and federal 

judiciaries.”8 

Thus, Mr. Bloodgood must bring each of his claims in the state trial court, 

the state appellate court and the state supreme court, before filing a federal 

4 Docket 1 at 5-11.

5 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A).

6 Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (citations and internal quotation marks 

omitted).

7 Id. (citations omitted). In Alaska, a criminal defendant may request discretionary

review by the Supreme Court. See Alaska Statutes §§ 22.05.010, 22.07.020, 

22.07.030; Alaska Rules of Appellate Procedure 215, 301, and 302.

8 Wood v. Milyard, 132 S.Ct. 1826, 1833, U.S. (2012) (citations omitted).

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petition.9 Without satisfying the exhaustion requirement, this Court has no 

jurisdiction10 to hear a challenge to his state conviction and/or sentence.11

Please be aware that there is a one-year limitations period in which to file a 

habeas petition,12 and that a petition brought under § 2254 will be dismissed if 

not brought within that period, unless there are “extraordinary circumstances” 

beyond Mr. Bloodgood’s control, which made it impossible to file his petition on 

time.13 Although this time period is tolled (suspended) during the pendency of 

any state court post-conviction proceedings,14 the United States Supreme Court 

has decided that “an application for federal habeas corpus review is not an 

‘application for State post-conviction or other collateral review’ within the 

9 See Custer v. Hill, 378 F.3d 968. 974-75 (9th Cir. 2004) (Petitioner who failed to 

reference his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in his petition for review in Oregon 

Supreme Court failed to exhaust his state court remedies with respect to issue, for 

purposes of federal habeas corpus petition).

10 Jurisdiction is “[a] court’s power to decide a case or issue a decree.” Black’s Law 

Dictionary (9th ed. 2009).

11 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); see also Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29.

12 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

13 Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Court for Central Dist. of Cal., 128 F.3d 1282, 1288 (9th Cir. 

1997); but see Allen v. Lewis, 255 F.3d 798, 800-801 (9th Cir. 2001) (the time is not 

tolled where prisoner’s transfer between state prisons occurred at the beginning of the 

limitations period and was not the proximate cause of the prisoner’s failure to file on 

time).

14 See Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1153-54 (9th Cir. 2001) (under § 2244(d)(2), 

the limitations period is tolled while a state habeas petition is pending); Tillema v. Long, 

253 F.3d 494, 499-502 (9th Cir. 2001) (the period of limitation is tolled during the 

pendency of a state challenge to the pertinent judgment, even if that challenge does not 

include a claim later asserted in the federal habeas petition).

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meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).”15 Thus, the time during which Mr. 

Bloodgood has had an action pending in this Court, since not an “application for 

State post-conviction or other collateral review,” does not toll, in other words stop 

or pause, that one-year time period. So, in the event that the one-year limitations 

period has not yet run, Mr. Bloodgood should promptly begin exhausting his state 

court remedies, or risk the running of the statute of limitations, forever barring 

relief in federal court.16 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1. This case is DISMISSED. Mr. Bloodgood may file a timely new case in 

this Court after all issues that he seeks to raise are exhausted in the state 

courts by presentation first to the Alaska Superior Court then, if Mr. 

Bloodgood disagrees with that result, to the Alaska Court of Appeals and 

15 Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181 (2001); see also Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 

482 (9th Cir. 2001) (“We hold that section 2244(d)(2) does not toll the AEDPA 

limitations period while a federal habeas petition is pending”); Fail v. Hubbard, 315 F.3d 

1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 2001) (“the delay in this case was not beyond Fail’s control. By 

continuing to press his petition of entirely unexhausted claims after the district court 

informed him that he could only bring claims first brought in state court, Fail was the 

cause of the delay that ultimately made his second petition untimely.”).

16 Blood is further cautioned that the Court may entertain a petition for habeas corpus 

only if a petitioner “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the

United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); see also Chaker v. Crogan, 428 F.3d 1215, 1219

(9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1128 (2006) (“[A] petitioner is ‘in custody’ for the 

purposes of habeas jurisdiction while he remains on probation.”) (citations omitted).

Thus, Bloodgood must still be “in custody” as to the conviction and/or sentence he 

challenges at the time he files a federal petition, or the petition will be dismissed.

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then, if he disagrees with that result, in a petition for hearing to the Alaska 

Supreme Court. 

2. Any outstanding motions are DENIED.

3. The Clerk of Court will enter a Judgment in this case.

4. A Certificate of Appealability will be DENIED.17

Dated at Anchorage, Alaska this 25th day of February, 2015.

/s/ Timothy M. Burgess

TIMOTHY M. BURGESS

 U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

17 A certificate of appealability may issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial 

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); see also Ninth 

Circuit Rule 22-1(a) (“Petitioners appealing the district court’s judgment in either a 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 or a § 2255 proceeding shall follow the procedures set forth in FRAP 4 

and 22(b). A motion for a certificate of appealability (‘COA’) must first be considered by 

the district court. If the district court grants a COA, the court shall state which issue or 

issues satisfy the standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The court of appeals will 

not act on a motion for a COA if the district court has not ruled first.”).

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