Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-04124/USCOURTS-ca8-05-04124-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alfonzo Traymayne Lee
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Andrew W. Bogue, United States District Judge for the District

of South Dakota, sitting by designation.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-4124

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Nebraska.

Alfonzo Traymayne Lee, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: February 13, 2008

Filed: April 7, 2008

___________

Before COLLOTON, ARNOLD, Circuit Judges, and BOGUE,1

 District Judge.

___________

BOGUE, District Judge.

A jury convicted Alfonzo Traymayne Lee (“Lee”) of conspiring to distribute

fifty grams or more of cocaine base (crack cocaine), pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §§

841(a)(1), 841(b)(1), and 846, and using, carrying, or brandishing a firearm during a

drug trafficking offense, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). Lee was sentenced

by the district court to 262 months’ imprisonment on Count I and 84 months’

imprisonment on Count II, to be served consecutively. Lee brought four grounds for

appeal before this panel, including a claim that his sentence of 262 months for the

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 The United States Supreme Court held in Rita v. United States that it may be

reversible error for a sentencing court to presume that it should apply a sentence

within the Guidelines. 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2465, 168 L. Ed. 2d 203 (2007). Although

the appellate standard of review involves a presumption of reasonableness that the

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crack cocaine offense was unreasonable in that it was greater than necessary to

advance the goals of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. Lee, 451 F.3d 914, 918

(8th Cir. 2006). This panel affirmed in all respects, and Lee sought the review of the

United States Supreme Court. 

After its decision in United States v. Kimbrough, the United States Supreme

Court remanded Lee’s case back to this panel for further review. Lee v. United States,

128 S. Ct. 855 (2008). For the reasons stated below, we remand this case to the

district court for resentencing in light of Kimbrough. 

After his conviction but prior to sentencing, Lee filed a sentencing

memorandum with the sentencing judge, arguing, among other things, that his

situation warranted a deviation in light of the sentencing disparity between offenders

whose offense involves crack cocaine and those whose offense involves powder

cocaine. Lee also made an oral argument on these grounds, and the sentencing court

addressed this argument at length. 

At the sentencing hearing, the district court expressed its personal

dissatisfaction with the crack cocaine guidelines, stating that “if I were the person to

decide what guidelines – how the guidelines ought to be written, I would use a

different ratio than a 100-to-1.” Transcript of Sentencing Proceedings at 25.

However, said the court, “that is a call that Congress is permitted to make.” Id. At

this point, the district court pointed to a previously published opinion in which it

discussed its discontentment with the crack cocaine guidelines but nonetheless

reached the conclusion that courts should continue to apply the guidelines even when

they disapprove of the aforesaid sentencing disparity.2

 Id. (citing to United States v.

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district court’s sentence is reasonable, “the sentencing court does not enjoy the benefit

of a legal presumption that the Guidelines sentence should apply.” Id. See also

United States v. Greene, ___ F.3d ___, No. 07-1479, 2008 WL 238600, at *2 (8th Cir.

Jan. 30, 2008). In this case, the transcript of the sentencing hearing includes some

strong indications that the district court may have applied such a presumption of

reasonableness to the Guidelines. As remand for resentencing is appropriate in light

of Kimbrough, the panel need not make any finding regarding Rita other than to direct

the sentencing court to consider the strictures of both Rita and Kimbrough in its

resentencing.

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Tabor, 365 F. Supp. 2d 1052 (D. Neb. 2005)). The district court then stated that it had

looked at the circumstances of this individual case to determine whether it was outside

the heartland of similar drug conspiracy cases, examining “whether there is something

unusual, or different, or strange that would cause me to think that I ought to do

something different than what the guidelines call for.” Id. Ultimately, the district

court determined that “[w]hat we have is a fairly typical crack cocaine conspiracy, not

a terribly big one, not a terribly small one, but a dangerous one. . . . and I can’t, in

good conscience, find a reason not to implement the will of Congress here.” Id.

In Kimbrough v. United States, the United States Supreme Court stated that “it

would not be an abuse of discretion for a district court to conclude when sentencing

a particular defendant that the crack/powder disparity yields a sentence ‘greater than

necessary’ to achieve § 3553(a)’s purposes, even in a mine-run case.” 128 S. Ct. 558,

575 (2007) (emphasis added). Thus, a sentence outside of the Guidelines range is not

per se unreasonable “merely because the district court considered the sentencing

disparity created by the 100:1 crack to powder cocaine quantity ratio set out in the

Guidelines as a factor in determining the sentence.” United States v. King, ___ F.3d

___, No. 07-1961, 2008 WL 596728, at *4 (8th Cir. Mar. 6, 2008) (citing

Kimbrough). Of course, a district court does not commit error if it fails to consider

the crack/powder disparity. United States v. Roberson, ___ F.3d ___, Nos. 06-3458,

06-3663, 2008 WL 323223, at *4 (8th Cir. Feb. 7, 2008). But Kimbrough means that

a district court acts within its broad discretion when it considers the crack/powder

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disparity as one factor in determining that “a within-guidelines sentence is greater than

necessary to serve the objectives of sentencing.” Id. at *4 (citations omitted). 

The statements made by the district court demonstrate that although it was very

concerned about the crack/powder sentencing disparity, it did not feel that it could

vary from the Guidelines on that basis in such a case where nothing “unusual, or

different, or strange” brought it outside of the general heartland of cases. However,

the Supreme Court in Kimbrough made clear that sentencing courts can consider the

crack/powder disparity “even in a mine-run case.” 128 S. Ct. at 575. While the

information before this panel is insufficient to demonstrate for certain that the district

court would have varied outside of the Guidelines if it knew it could give weight to

its concerns about the crack/powder disparity, it is clear that the district court may

have done so. Thus, remand to the district court for resentencing is appropriate. See

Roberson, 2008 WL 323223, at *4. 

For these reasons, Lee’s sentence is vacated and this case is remanded to the

district court for further proceedings. 

______________________________

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