Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-92-03232/USCOURTS-caDC-92-03232-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ron Morrison
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 20, 1996 Decided October 22, 1996

No. 92-3232

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

RON MORRISON,

APPELLANT

Consolidated with

Nos. 94-3146, 95-3041

-

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 91cr00693-02)

Ron Morrison, appearing pro se, was on the briefs for appellant.

Mark J. Rochon argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant.

E. Vaughn Dunnigan, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee, with whom Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States

Attorney, John R. Fisher, Roy W. McLeese, III, and Geoffrey G.

Bestor, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief.

Elizabeth Trosman entered an appearance.

Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, WALD and HENDERSON, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WALD.

WALD, Circuit Judge: On July 7, 1992, a jury found Ron

Morrison guilty of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with

intent to distribute crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §

846, two separate instances of possessing crack cocaine with intent

to distribute it in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841, and using and

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carrying deadly weapons during and in relation to these drug

offenses in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The jury also found

Morrison guilty on two counts of conspiring, and attempting, to

prevent potential witnesses from testifying truthfully in his

trial, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b). Morrison filed a

motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on the ground

of ineffective assistance of counsel on February 4, 1994, which the

district judge who presided over his trial denied on August 29,

1994. This court consolidated Morrison's appeal of the denial of

his § 2255 motion and his direct appeal of his convictions.

Morrison asserts that the district court erred in denying his

§ 2255 motion, and abused its discretion by ruling on the motion

without first conducting an evidentiary hearing. Morrison also

argues that the district court improperly limited cross-examination

of a government witness, that his convictions under § 924(c) should

be vacated in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in

Bailey v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 501 (1995), and that there was

insufficient evidence to support one of his convictions under §

1512(b).

We find merit only in the claim based on Bailey, and thus we

affirm the district court's summary denial of Morrison's § 2255

motion, as well as all of Morrison's convictions except his

convictions under § 924(c), which we reverse. We remand the case

for resentencing in light of this reversal. We find that the

decision of his trial counsel on which Morrison bases his claim of

ineffective assistance was a reasonable strategic choice, and the

record does not indicate that it resulted in prejudice to his

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trial. The court's limitations of the cross-examination of key

government witness Paulette Glenn were not abuses of discretion,

because they were imposed to prevent witnesses from giving

speculative answers and to prevent the introduction of evidence

with no probative value on issues in the case. Finally, the jury

was presented with sufficient evidence to support its conclusion

that Morrison attempted to "corruptly persuade" Doris Holmes to

give specific false testimony in an official proceeding, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b).

I. BACKGROUND

On November 8, 1991, police executed a search warrant at a

house rented by Paulette Glenn in Southeast Washington, D.C. In the

living room, police found a jacket belonging to Ron Morrison with

$113 cash in the pocket, Morrison's loaded .38 caliber pistol

underneath a sofa, and over thirty plastic bags containing a total

of 5.467 grams of crack cocaine. Morrison was in New York at the

time of this first search. On November 16, 1991, police executed

a second search warrant at this same house. As they entered, they

saw Morrison run from the living room, where he had been packaging

crack in plastic bags, toward the back door. An associate of

Morrison's inside the kitchen had been guarding the back door with

a sawed-off shotgun. Police found the loaded shotgun, ammunition,

and drug paraphernalia in the kitchen.

Morrison evaded the police and fled to North Carolina. While

in North Carolina he asked Doris Holmes, with whose son he was

acquainted, to tell anyone who asked that Morrison had been living

with her for a year, and that she took care of Morrison's children.

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Holmes refused.

Morrison returned to the District of Columbia and was arrested

and jailed in March of 1992. Soon after his return, Morrison's

girlfriend Audrey Wilson visited Glenn and told her that Morrison

wanted to see her. On a second visit, Wilson told her that

Morrison wanted Glenn to sign an affidavit stating that he had been

in the dining room, rather than the living room, when the police

conducted their second search. Some days later three associates of

Morrison's entered Glenn's home at five o'clock in the morning and

told her that Morrison had asked them to bring her to New York.

Glenn said she couldn't go with them because her mother was ill,

and they left. Later Wilson visited Glenn yet again, asked her

whether she would sign an affidavit that Morrison's lawyer would

bring to her, and offered her some furniture if she signed the

affidavit.

Glenn met with the prosecutor in charge of Morrison's criminal

case and told him of her conversations with Wilson and with

Morrison's associates. The prosecutor asked Glenn to visit

Morrison in jail wearing a recording device, to collect evidence

regarding attempts by Morrison to tamper with potential witnesses

against him. The prosecutor specifically instructed her not to ask

Morrison about the drug and weapon violations with which Morrison

had already been charged. When Glenn arrived at the jail she found

Wilson visiting Morrison. Wilson left as Glenn entered, and

Morrison and Glenn had a brief conversation which the police

recorded. Later, with Glenn's assistance, a police secretary

prepared a transcript of the tape.

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II. DISCUSSION

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

On February 4, 1994, Morrison filed a pro se motion under 28

U.S.C. § 2255 with the district judge who presided over his trial,

arguing that he had been denied the effective assistance of counsel

guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment because his lawyer had failed to

seek suppression of the taped conversation between himself and

Paulette Glenn at trial, and because this failure constituted such

a severe breach of the normal standards of competence required of

defense counsel, and was so prejudicial to the presentation of his

defense, that it required the court to vacate his conviction. The

government filed an opposition, to which it attached a declaration

by Morrison's trial counsel in which she explained that she had not

objected to the admission of the taped conversation because it was

"on its face, purely exculpatory and consistent with Mr. Morrison's

theory of the case which was plain denial of the charges," and

because the arguments that the government intended to use to cast

the conversation in an incriminating light were "not ...

particularly persuasive" and "did not outweigh the exculpatory use"

that she intended to make of the taped conversation. Appellee

Appendix ("App.") at 53-55. She added that Morrison himself had

not wanted her to object to the admission of the tape recording,

because he agreed that it was exculpatory and that it would give

him the benefit of having the jury hear his claims of innocence

without the risk involved in testifying at trial and subjecting

himself to cross-examination. Id. at 53-54. Morrison then filed

a reply to the government's opposition, in which he contradicted

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his counsel's argument that the taped conversation was exculpatory,

and claimed that he couldn't recall having had any conversation

with her regarding the admission or exclusion of the conversation.

District Court Case No. CR91-693-02 document 134, page 9, footnote

2.

On August 24, 1994, the district judge denied the motion,

holding that "[r]eview of the informant's statement in evidence,

the closing arguments of both counsel in response to it, and

defense counsel's affidavit reconfirm that defense counsel made a

"reasonable strategic or tactical judgment,' " because "the taped

statement was arguably exculpatory, and furnished the defendant

with favorable testimony which could not have been otherwise

available to him unless he had waived his Fifth Amendment

privilege." App. at 63. Morrison now appeals the district court's

denial in this court.

Morrison's claim of ineffective assistance is based on his

assertions that the conversation would have been excluded had an

objection been made, the taped conversation actually was

incriminating, and the government's significant use of it in

closing argument severely prejudiced the outcome of the trial. The

government acknowledges the first point, that the conversation

would have been suppressed had a timely objection been made at

trial, because Glenn was acting as a government agent when she

visited the defendant in jail, and Morrison made the taped

statements about crimes for which he had already been indicted

without having counsel present, in violation of his rights under

the Sixth Amendment. See Brief for Appellee at 20. We disagree,

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however, with Morrison's second and third claimsthat the

conversation was so clearly incriminating that his lawyer's failure

to object exhibited gross incompetence, and that the government's

use of the taped conversation at trial severely eroded the trial's

fairness.

To demonstrate that his counsel was constitutionally

ineffective, Morrison must show both that she "made errors so

serious that [she] was not functioning as the "counsel' guaranteed

the defendant by the Sixth Amendment," and that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for these errors, the result of

the trial would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The Strickland Court noted that "[t]here are

countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case,"

and that "strategic choices made after thorough investigation of

law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually

unchallengeable." Id. at 689-90.

1. Incompetence

We conclude, as did the trial judge, that the taped

conversation between Morrison and Glenn was susceptible to two

contradictory interpretations, one exculpatory and the other

incriminating, and that the incriminating interpretation was not so

unmistakably the more natural one that Morrison's lawyer's decision

to let the conversation be admitted in evidence without objection

was clearly incompetent. This is not to say that the other

choiceobjecting to its admissionwould not also have been a

competent one, perhaps in hindsight the better one. Yet this fact

alone does not indicate that the choice Morrison's lawyer made fell

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1See App. at 58-59 ("someone is lying on me ... someone is

trying to underminin' me, someone is trying framing me, someone

is talking some lies ... they're lying and that's it.... I don't

know who is blackmailing me.... I have to find out why they're

lying on me, why they're trying to frame me, understand?"). 

below the standard of competence demanded of a defense lawyer.

On their face, Morrison's statements on the tape were

undeniably exculpatory. Morrison spent the better part of the

ten-to-fifteen-minute conversation asserting that somebody had

tried to frame him, that he couldn't understand why he was being

prosecuted when the drugs had been found in Glenn's house and she

had received probation, that he had never sold or possessed

cocaine, and that he had never lived at her house and was merely

visiting when the police saw him fleeing from there. At oral

argument Morrison's counsel (not the same one who represented him

at trial) claimed that Morrison's taped statements added nothing to

the general denial already contained in his Not Guilty plea, and

did not tend to support the specific theory of Morrison's trial

defensethat Glenn had lied to the police about Morrison's

involvement in order to obtain a reduction in her own

punishmentand thus no competent counsel could have perceived any

strategic advantage in the admission of the taped conversation.

The transcript of the conversation, however, belies the certainty

of any such assertion. Morrison's recorded statements conveyed his

singularly strong conviction that someone had lied about him in

order to shift the focus of the prosecution onto him,1 and he

definitely articulated the theory of his defense by hinting that he

couldn't understand why Glenn had received only probation when the

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2App. at 58 ("I saw someone is lying on me because if, if,

if, if the police find drugs in your house, I, I, I, I, I, I, I

and give you probation all right what the f--- they holding

for...."). 

3Tr. 7/2/92 at 124 ("Well, you heard the tape. I ask you to

listen to it again and read the transcript. What happened is

that Mr. Morrison said I wasn't selling drugs. Those weren't my

drugs."). 

4Tr. 7/2/92 at 107 ("I suggest to you that what this tape

tells you is that Ron Morrison knew what Paulette Glen [sic] had

in her ear."). 

drugs were found in her house.2 Together, these statements could

have done much to help the jury believe that Glenn had played the

dishonest and traitorous role in which Morrison's defense theory

attempted to cast her. In her closing argument, Morrison's trial

counsel argued that his statements, which he made without any

awareness they were being recorded, should be taken at face

valueas proof that he wasn't selling drugs, and that the drugs

found in Glenn's house were not his.3 Her interpretation, grounded

in the literal meaning of the statements on the tape, had the

potential to persuade the jury, and in our view were supportive of

Morrison's overall defense strategy.

The government's incriminating "spin" on the same taped

conversation theorized that the circumstances of the conversation,

and the manner in which Morrison spoke, were strong evidence of

Morrison's consciousness of his own guilt. The government argued

that the totality of the conversation suggested that Morrison's

girlfriend Audrey Wilson, who had been visiting with him

immediately prior to the conversation, had warned him that Glenn

would be wearing a recording device when she came to see him.4

Morrison's manner of speaking, the government claimed, showed his

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guilt because he immediately and spontaneously "launched" into a

"long spill" about how someone had lied about him without having

been asked about this subject by Glenn. Furthermore, the

government pointed out that Morrison even denied that his name was

"Mike," a nickname that numerous witnesses had identified him with,

thus underscoring the doubtful nature of all of his protestations

on the tape. Tr. 7/2/92 at 107. In sum, the government told the

jury "when you listen to that tape ... you are hearing the

protestations of a guilty person who knows that somebody is

listening in to what he is saying." Id.

The government's incriminating interpretation of the

conversation was not inherently more plausible than defense

counsel's exculpatory interpretation, indeed it required a somewhat

complex explanation and set of inferences to make it work in the

government's favor. Thus Morrison's lawyer's decision to let the

conversation go in, and then argue the exculpatory interpretation

to the jury, was by no means an unreasonable strategic decision.

The exculpatory interpretation was consistent with the literal

meaning of Morrison's statements and required far fewer inferences

than did the government's incriminating interpretation. The

government's interpretation required the jury to infer from the

fact that Audrey Wilson had visited Morrison before the

conversation, and from the manner in which Morrison spoke, that

Morrison's statements asserting his innocence actually proved the

opposite. Admittedly, the government's interpretation gained

plausibility from the extreme nature of certain of Morrison's

denials and, according to the government, the pronounced hesitation

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5See App. at 60 ("I never sold drugs, I don't know anything

about any drugs. I, I, I, my knowledge of drugs is what I see on

T.V., that's my knowledge...."). 

6Tr. 7/1/92 at 150 ("My client and I listened repeatedly to

the tape. You can't understand it."); Tr. 7/2/92 at 107 ("The

sound is probably not that great and Mr. Morrison speaks so

quickly."). 

and stuttering which characterized Morrison's pattern of speech.5

At the same time, Morrison's tone of voice and manner of speaking

could not lend much force to either interpretation, because both

parties admitted at trial that the conversation was barely audible

on the tape.6 On balance, the exculpatory interpretation of the

conversation was not significantly less plausible than the

inculpatory interpretation, and therefore the decision to permit

the tape to be introduced at Morrison's trial was not so

unreasonable strategically as to satisfy the first component of the

Strickland test.

2. Prejudice

But even if the decision to allow the conversation into

evidence had been sufficient evidence of incompetence, Morrison has

not made a compelling showing that its introduction severely

undermined his defense such that "there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at

694. Morrison's appellate counsel asserts that the government used

the conversation to "ma[k]e mincemeat" of Morrison, and then quotes

from the government's reference to the conversation in its closing

argument in support of this assertion. Brief for Appellant at 22.

But the simple fact that the government used evidence in its

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closing argument does not prove that the jury found the evidence

compelling or determinative. At trial, each side used the evidence

for whatever it was worth in supporting its case, and each side

pressed its own interpretation before the jury in closing argument.

We cannot, of course, ever be entirely certain to what degree, if

at all, a jury found particular evidence probative of either guilt

or innocence, but in this case it seems to us at most a toss-up.

Furthermore, whatever secondary negative inferences the jury

might have drawn from the taped conversation, they definitely were

eclipsed by a great deal of direct evidence supporting Morrison's

convictions, including the testimony of Paulette Glenn, Morrison's

weapons, drugs, ammunition, and clothing that police found in the

living room of the house Glenn rented, the fact that police saw

Morrison fleeing from the living room when they conducted their

second raid, and tally sheets, large quantities of cash, crack

cocaine and tools used for weighing and packaging the drug for sale

that police found in the house during the second raid. Because of

the plethora of other more cogent evidence supporting Morrison's

convictions, and because it is not at all apparent whether the

evidence on which Morrison bases his ineffective assistance claim

worked against him or in his favor, we are unable to conclude that

the admission of this evidence prejudiced his defense.

3. Denial of the § 2255 Motion Without a Hearing

Morrison also argues before this court that the district judge

who denied his § 2255 motion abused his discretion by failing to

first hold an evidentiary hearing on the motion.

A judge need not conduct an evidentiary hearing before denying

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7In United States v. Fennell, we held the approximate

converse of this propositionwhen an appellant has not raised a

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel before the district

court, either in a motion for a new trial or in a collateral

attack under § 2255, we generally do remand an ineffective

assistance claim raised in this court to the district court for

an evidentiary hearing. United States v. Fennell, 53 F.3d 1296,

1304 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Cyrus, 890 F.2d

1245, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1989); United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d

1197, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1973)). 

a petition for relief under § 2255 when "the motion and the files

and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is

entitled to no relief." 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1994). The rules

governing § 2255 proceedings in district courts provide that "[i]f

it plainly appears from the face of the motion and any annexed

exhibits and the prior proceedings in the case that the movant is

not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge shall make

an order for its summary dismissal...." Rules Governing § 2255

Proceedings, Rule 4, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2255 (1994). Our cases have

stressed that a district judge's decision not to hold an

evidentiary hearing before denying a § 2255 motion is generally

respected as a sound exercise of discretion when the judge denying

the § 2255 motion also presided over the trial in which the

petitioner claims to have been prejudiced. See, e.g., United

States v. Sayan, 968 F.2d 55, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (citing

Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 n.4 (1977)); United States

v. Pollard, 959 F.2d 1011, 1030-31 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 506

U.S. 915 (1992).7 We have also held that a summary denial of a §

2255 motion is appropriate when the ineffective assistance claim is

speculative (see United States v. Vecchiarello, 536 F.2d 420, 425

(D.C. Cir. 1976) ("The allegations [of judicial bias] fall short of

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requiring a hearing. The progressive steps from "opportunity' to

"inclination' to prejudicial discussion are purely speculative, and

the recorded actions of the trial judge are so free from error or

bias that success on this claim, even if it had been fairly

alleged, appears extremely unlikely."); United States v. Parman,

461 F.2d 1203, 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("As to appellant's charges of

a lack of proper investigation by defense counsel, while a hearing

is indicated when a 2255 motion is grounded upon a plausible claim

of attorney misconduct, such as wrongful inducement of a guilty

plea, a court cannot engage in vague speculations about the kind of

"investigation' defense counsel might have made in addition to the

prodigious efforts established by the record" (citation omitted)),

or when the claim does not necessitate the consideration of any

information not within the record or within the memory of the judge

ruling on the motion (see Pollard, 959 F.2d at 1031 (citing

Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 495 (1962))).

We believe that Morrison's ineffective assistance claim did

not give rise to the need for an evidentiary hearing because the

court could only speculate as to whether the decision to allow the

government to introduce the taped conversation prejudiced the

defense, and because we do not see how a decision on Morrison's

motion would have benefited from the consideration of any

information outside of the record and the judge's memory of the

trial. In ruling on the motion, the district judge stated clearly

that he had not taken Morrison's lawyer's affidavit at face value,

but had evaluated the lawyer's assertion that the taped

conversation was exculpatory by looking again at the transcript of

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8It is unlikely that the question of whether Morrison had

expressly agreed to the strategy chosen by his lawyer with regard

to the taped conversation would have merited a hearing even if

Morrison had unequivocally asserted that he had never agreed to

this strategy. The decision whether to object to a particular

item of evidence is not among those in regard to which the

client's input is considered essential, as are the decisions

whether to plead guilty, whether to testify, and whether to take

an appeal. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983); MODEL

RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1995). Nor must a lawyer,

as a general matter, inform the client of every incidental

tactical decision he or she will implement at trial. See MODEL

RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4 cmt. [2] (1995). So even if

Morrison's lawyer did not seek Morrison's opinion before making

this strategic decision, this fact could not render the decision

incompetent or inappropriate. 

the conversation, the two parties' closing arguments, and the fact

that by allowing the taped conversation to be admitted Morrison was

able to present his protestations of innocence to the jury without

subjecting himself to cross-examination. App. at 63. The court

did not explicitly discuss Morrison's statement casting doubt on

his lawyer's assertion that they had decided together to let the

evidence in, but Morrison did not deny having had such a

conversation; he only claimed not to remember it.8

Finally, even if Morrison could have shown that his lawyer's

failure to object to the admission of the conversation was the

product of inadvertence or ignorance, rather than a deliberate

strategy choice, that would not have affected the judge's

determination that the admission of the tape and transcript did not

prejudice Morrison's trial. See Appellee Appendix at 63. Thus,

the district judge was well within his discretion in deciding that

Morrison's § 2255 motion, the government's opposition, and the

files and records of the case, conclusively showed that Morrison

was entitled to no relief, and thus that an evidentiary hearing was

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9The defendant argues that an earlier decision of this

circuit, United States v. Barnes, 610 F.2d 888 (D.C. Cir. 1979),

supports his claim that he was entitled to a hearing on his §

2255 motion. Brief of Appellant at 42. But Barnes is readily

distinguishable from this case.

In Barnes, this court held that the district court was

required to conduct an evidentiary hearing before ruling on

defendant's § 2255 motion, because "the present record is subject

to differing interpretations [such that] we cannot determine

whether counsel's failure to raise the voluntariness claim was an

informed and deliberate strategic waiver." Id. at 892. In that

case, however, it appears that the district judge denied the

defendant's § 2255 motion without the benefit of responsive

filings by the government or affidavits by trial counsel. In

this case, the district judge reviewed the defendant's motion and

the government's opposition, each of which included extensive

discussion of the issues, the lawyer's affidavit, and the

defendant's reply to the government's opposition, before reaching

a decision that the failure to object to the admission of the

taped conversation was an informed and deliberate strategy

decision by the trial lawyer. 

10See Brief for Appellant at 30 ("Glenn was critical to

supplying the criminal element to appellant's presence in the

apartment on one of the two raids."); Brief for Appellee at 21

note 15 ("[T]he government's case hinged on the credibility of

Paulette Glenn...."). 

not a necessary precursor to his denial of the motion.9

B. Limitation of Cross-Examination of Paulette Glenn

The second arrow in Morrison's quiver is his claim that the

district court abused its discretion in twice limiting his

cross-examination of Paulette Glenn, a witness both parties agree

was essential to the government's case.10 In one instance, the

judge cut short Morrison's counsel's cross-examination with regard

to Glenn's possible bias in favor of the government, based on her

fear of losing custody of her children. In another, he prevented

Morrison's counsel from trying to impeach Glenn with a civil suit

that had allegedly been filed against her.

1. Limitation of Cross-Examination Regarding Possible Bias

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In cross-examining Glenn, Morrison's counsel attempted to

impeach her by showing that she was cooperating with the government

under threat of a prison sentence which would mean losing custody

of her children, and thus she had a strong incentive to say

anything the government wanted her to. In pursuit of this

objective, Morrison's counsel elicited from Glenn that her two

children lived with her, and that she would lose custody of them

"if [she] were locked up." Tr. 7/1/92 at 232. At this point,

Morrison's counsel pressed on, precipitating the following

exchange:

Q. Okay. So the only way to keep from losing your children is to

testify against Mr. Morrison?

A. Could you repeat that question?

THE COURT: I am afraid I am going to have to sustain an

objection to that question that has not been made. Sentencing

is the responsibility of the court, and nobody knows now what

is going to happen at the sentencing.

MS. NORMAN: All right, your honor, but

THE COURT: And certainly the witness does not.

MS. NORMAN: But if she didn't cooperate

THE COURT: I don't want to hear any more about it.

MS. NORMAN: (Continuing)it would be a mandatory 

sentence.

Id. at 232-33.

This limitation on Glenn's cross-examination did not amount to

an abuse of discretion, because the question called for a

speculative answer on Glenn's part. Glenn had pled guilty to a

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856, a crime with no statutorily-mandated

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minimum sentence. See 21 U.S.C. § 856 (1994). Thus, the only

floor placed on Glenn's sentencing was that created by the

sentencing guidelines, and while the guidelines place significant

constraints on the discretion of sentencing judges, they permit

judges to depart from guideline sentences when the judges find "an

aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree,

not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing

Commission ... that should result in a sentence different from that

described." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994). Glenn could only

speculate as to what would happen had she refused to testify

against Morrison and the government consequently declined to

request a downward departure at sentencing. As the trial judge

correctly observed, the sentencing judge might nevertheless have

granted her a downward departure under § 3553(b), enabling her to

retain custody of her children.

Furthermore, even if the premise of the judge's objection had

been false, any error would certainly have been harmless in light

of the cumulative nature of this portion of the cross-examination.

Before the judge intervened, Morrison's counsel had already brought

out the facts that Glenn was testifying pursuant to a plea

agreement, that she had three children, two of whom lived with her,

and that she could lose custody of her children if she went to

prison. In fact, before the exchange quoted above occurred,

Morrison's counsel had already asked Glenn the same question about

the connection between Glenn's testimony and her ability to retain

custody of her children and, after some confusion on Glenn's part,

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11See Tr. 7/1/92 at 202: 

Q. And [testifying against Morrison] was the only way out of

the two-year prison term

A. Yes.

Q. (continuing)is that correct?

A. Yes.

elicited the answer she sought.11 Even in the exchange during which

the judge attempted to limit the cross-examination, Morrison's

counsel was able to articulate for the jury the precise point she

had been trying to elicit from Glenn by saying, over the judge's

interruption, "[b]ut if she didn't cooperate it would be a

mandatory sentence." Therefore, because Morrison's counsel had

ample opportunity to impeach Glenn on the issue of Glenn's

motivation to help the government in order to avoid losing custody

of her children, we hold that the district judge's error, if indeed

any error had been committed, would in this instance be harmless.

2. Limitation of Cross-Examination Regarding Civil Lawsuit

Morrison also claims that the district judge abused his

discretion by sustaining the government's objection to a question

by defense counsel about a civil complaint that had been filed

against Ms. Glenn. Morrison's lawyer first asked Glenn whether she

had ever made false accusations against anyone. After Glenn

answered "[n]ot to my knowledge" counsel asked "[i]sn't it a fact

that in January of 1991, Simone Davis filed a complaint against you

in court in Maryland?" Tr. 7/1/92 at 232. At this point the

government successfully objected to the question. When Morrison's

counsel requested a sidebar conference, the judge refused on the

ground that the question was "so obviously wrong." Id.

The Federal Rules of Evidence expressly prohibit the use of

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"extrinsic evidence" of a witness' conduct (except for certain

types of criminal convictions) to impeach the witness, but permit

"inquir[y] into" such conduct if, in the discretion of the court,

the conduct is "probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness." FED.

R. EVID. 608(b) (1996). In this case, the district judge evidently

sustained the objection on the ground that the mere filing of a

complaint is not "probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness,"

regardless of whether the allegations in the complaint, if true,

would seriously undermine the witness' credibility. This ruling

was in no way an abuse of discretion.

C. Morrison's Convictions Under § 924(c)

The jury returned guilty verdicts on two counts of using or

carrying firearms during and in relation to drug trafficking in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The district judge's instructions

to the jury on these counts stated that "[t]o find that the

defendant carried or used the fire arm, the government must prove

that the defendant actually or constructively possessed the fire

arm. The government does not have to show that the defendant

actively employed the fire arm in any manner." Tr. 7/2/92 at 168.

After Morrison's trial the Supreme Court held, in Bailey v. United

States, that the "use" of a weapon underlying a § 924(c) conviction

"must connote more than mere possession" by the person committing

the drug offense, and must rise to the level of "active

employment." Bailey v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 501, 506 (1995).

The government properly concedes Morrison's claim that his § 924(c)

convictions must be reversed in light of the fact that the jury

could have premised its guilty verdict solely on a "use" standard

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foreclosed by the Supreme Court in Bailey, and requests that this

court remand the case for resentencing on the remaining

convictions. Specifically, the government indicates that it will

seek a two-level upward adjustment of Morrison's sentences on his

other convictions for possession of a dangerous weapon in

connection with a drug trafficking offense, as provided under §

2D1.1(b)(1) of the Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. §

2D1.1(b)(1) (1995). In conformity with our disposition of similar

requests, we reverse Morrison's convictions under § 924(c), and

remand the case to the district court for resentencing. See United

States v. Fennell, 77 F.3d 510, 510-11 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

D. Sufficiency of the Evidence Underlying the Challenged § 1512(b)

Conviction

Finally, Morrison argues that the jury had insufficient

evidence to convict him of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) by

attempting to induce Doris Moore to present false testimony in

court. Section 1512(b) provides, in pertinent part:

Whoever knowingly uses intimidation or physical force,

threatens, or corruptly persuades another person, or

attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct

toward another person, with intent to influence, delay,

or prevent the testimony of any person in an official

proceeding ... shall be fined under this title or

imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.

18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) (1994).

The evidence that Morrison had attempted to "corruptly

persuade" Moore with the intent to influence her testimony in an

official proceeding included Moore's in-court testimony that

Morrison "asked me to come down here or wherever and if anybody

asks me say he had been living with me a year ... and that I

babysitted his kids." Tr. 7/2/92 at 9. Moore testified that she

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had never seen Morrison's kids, and that Morrison had never lived

with her. Id.

Morrison's argument on appeal is premised on this court's

holding that the term "corruptly," as employed in 18 U.S.C. § 1505,

a statute criminalizing the obstruction of congressional

investigations, was unconstitutionally vague as applied to the

defendant in that case. United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369,

379 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1021 (1992). The portion

of § 1505 at issue there read as follows:

Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any

threatening letter or communication influences,

obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence,

obstruct, or impede ... the due and proper exercise of

the power of inquiry under which any inquiry or

investigation is being had by either House, or any

committee of either House or any joint committee of the

Congress shall be fined under this title or imprisoned

not more than five years, or both.

18 U.S.C. § 1505 (1994). The Poindexter court held that "as used

in § 1505 ... the term "corruptly' is too vague to provide

constitutionally adequate notice that it prohibits lying to the

congress." Poindexter, 951 F.2d at 379.

Morrison claims that under Poindexter, we must construe the

term "corruptly persuades" in § 1512(b) so as to exclude from its

coverage "a simple request to testify falsely," because the

Poindexter court held that in order not to be unconstitutionally

vague, "corruptly" would have to be construed as referring "to the

manner of influencing another, not the motive for influencing

another," and because § 1512(b) shares with § 1505 the

characteristics that led the Poindexter court to hold that this

"transitive" interpretation of "corruptly" was required. Brief for

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Appellant at 35; see Poindexter, 951 F.2d at 379 ("On its face, §

1505 favors the transitive reading. The other terms in the

disjunctive series in which it appears are "by threats,' "[by]

force,' and "by any threatening letter or communication,' all of

which are transitiveindeed all of which take as their object a

natural person. In addition, to read "corruptly' in an

intransitive sense as "wickedly' or "immorally' would appear to

render the other methods of violating the statute superfluous:

surely the use of force to influence a congressional inquiry would

always be "wicked' or at least "immoral.' ").

While we agree that the two statutes are sufficiently similar

to support a "transitive" reading of the word "corruptly" in §

1512(b), we disagree with Morrison's claim that his conduct could

not still fall under the statutory ban. We note, in that regard,

that the Poindexter court expressly approved of an interpretation

of § 1505 which outlawed conduct " "corrupting' another person by

influencing him to violate his legal duty." Poindexter, 951 F.2d

at 379. Morrison tried to "corrupt" Doris Holmes by exhorting her

to violate her legal duty to testify truthfully in court. Holmes

understood well enough that Morrison was attempting to "corrupt"

her, and she refused, in no uncertain terms, to be corrupted: "I

told them I could not do that because it would be a lie and I would

perjure myself." Tr. 7/2/92 at 10.

In his reply brief, Morrison retools his argument somewhat,

focusing on the fact that at the time Morrison importuned Holmes,

the government had not yet announced that Holmes was a potential

witness against Morrison, and that Morrison hadn't specifically

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asked Holmes to testify for him either. Thus, there was not yet

any "official proceeding" to which Morrison's inducement seems

connected. Reply Brief for Appellant at 5-7. This argument does

nothing to enhance Morrison's challenge of this § 1512(b)

conviction. Clearly it was foreseeable by Morrison that the

government would use Doris Holmes in its case against him, because

Holmes had dealt with Morrison between the second police raid and

Morrison's subsequent arrest, and could testify regarding

Morrison's actions and behavior during this time. We have held

that a conviction under § 1512 does not require proof that the

proceeding in question actually was pending or about to be

instituted at the time of the attempted obstruction; it requires

only that the defendant "fear[ed]" that such a proceeding "had been

or might be instituted," and "corruptly persuaded persons with the

intent to influence their possible testimony in such a proceeding."

United States v. Kelley, 36 F.3d 1118, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1994). And

while Morrison assuredly didn't use the word "testify" or "trial"

when he attempted to influence Holmes' behavior, the clear import

of his request was that "anyone who asked" should be deceived;

this understanding is reflected in Holmes' answer refusing to

"perjure" herself, a term used almost exclusively with respect to

testimony under oath. In sum, the jury was presented with

sufficient evidence to support its verdict convicting Morrison of

violating § 1512(b) by attempting to "corruptly persuade[ ] [Doris

Holmes] ... with intent to influence [her testimony] in an official

proceeding."

III. CONCLUSION

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Appellant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel

guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution, and the

district judge did not abuse his discretion by denying appellant's

§ 2255 motion without first holding an evidentiary hearing, or by

limiting the cross- examination of government witness Paulette

Glenn. The jury was provided with sufficient evidence to find

appellant guilty of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) by attempting

"corruptly" to influence the testimony of a potential witness in

his trial. Appellant's convictions under § 924(c) must be reversed

because the trial judge's instruction permitted the jury to return

a guilty verdict based on an interpretation of that statute that

was subsequently foreclosed by the Supreme Court in Bailey v.

United States. Accordingly, we affirm all convictions except those

for § 924(c) offenses, and we remand the case to the district court

for resentencing.

So ordered.

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