Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-99-01502/USCOURTS-caDC-99-01502-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Bluewater Network
Petitioner
Ocean Advocates
Petitioner

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 16, 2000 Decided December 22, 2000

No. 99-1502

In re: Bluewater Network and Ocean Advocates,

Petitioners

---------

Howard M. Crystal argued the cause for petitioners. With

him on the briefs was Eric R. Glitzenstein.

Eileen T. McDonough, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for respondents. With her on the brief

was Lois J. Schiffer, Assistant Attorney General.

Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Sentelle and Henderson,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge Edwards.

Edwards, Chief Judge: On March 24, 1989, the Exxon

Valdez supertanker struck Bligh Reef in Prince William

Sound, dumping nearly eleven million gallons of oil into

Alaska's once-pristine coastal ecosystem. Congress responded with the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 ("OPA" or "Act"), Pub.

L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (1990). The Act not only

broadened federal liability for oil spills, it also established

substantive tanker design and evaluation requirements to

prevent such spills from occurring in the first place. The Oil

Pollution Act of 1990 is now more than ten-years old, but the

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Coast Guard, the enforcing agency, still has failed to promulgate regulations required by the Act. Citing the agency's

failures on this score, petitioners Bluewater Network and

Ocean Advocates now seek a writ of mandamus to compel the

Coast Guard to finally make good on Congress' commitments.

One of the contested statutory provisions--s 4110--requires the Coast Guard, by August 18, 1991, to promulgate

regulations establishing minimum compliance standards and

use requirements for tank level and pressure monitoring

("TLPM") devices. No such regulations currently exist.

Furthermore, the Coast Guard admits that it will not undertake any rulemaking in the future, citing a temporary 1997

rulemaking that expired in 1999. The Coast Guard's earlier

temporary compliance standards are of no moment. Petitioners' claim here, with which we agree, is that the agency's

failure to pursue rulemaking once the temporary regulations

expired was a blatant violation of the statute. The Coast

Guard never stated in its 1997 regulation that, after sunset, it

would simply abandon standard-setting altogether. Indeed,

this does not even appear to be a viable option under the

statute. Moreover, the Coast Guard has never even attempted

to promulgate equipment use requirements. It cannot now

point to an admittedly incomplete, and now-expired, rule to

avoid a congressional mandate to establish some sort of

regulations.

The second contested provision--s 4116(c)--requires the

Coast Guard, by February 18, 1991, to initiate issuance of

regulations to define waters, including Prince William Sound

and two other named areas, over which single-hulled tankers

must be escorted by at least two towing vessels. Citing an

earlier rulemaking in which it promulgated regulations concerning the three named areas, the Coast Guard asserts that

petitioners should have brought their mandamus claims regarding regulation of "other waters" in a petition for review

of the earlier rulemaking. However, as with s 4110, petitioners are not challenging the earlier rulemaking; and the Coast

Guard gave interested parties no reason to believe that the

earlier regulations covering s 4116(c) would be the final word

on the matter. Nonetheless, we do agree with the Coast

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Guard that s 4116(c) does not create a sufficiently clear duty

regarding "other waters" to merit mandamus relief. In

particular, it is not at all obvious whether s 4116(c) actually

forces the Coast Guard itself to come up with the names of,

and instigate rulemaking regarding, possible "other waters."

Petitioners are certainly free to petition the agency for rulemaking when and if they alight on candidates for inclusion.

On the record at hand, we grant in part and deny in part

petitioners' mandamus request and order the Coast Guard to

conduct prompt rulemaking pursuant to s 4110 of the Act.

I. Background

A. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990

The OPA consists of nine distinct titles, two of which--

Titles I and IV--constitute the bulk of the Act's provisions.

Title I, "Oil Pollution Compensation and Liability," contains

extensive new provisions regarding the liability of parties

responsible for an oil spill. See ss 1001-1020, 104 Stat. at

486-506 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. ss 2701-2719

(1994)). Included among these provisions is s 1017, which

grants this court exclusive jurisdiction to review challenges to

"any regulation promulgated under [the] Act." Section 1017

also imposes a 90-day jurisdictional time limit within which

challenges to regulations must be brought. See s 1017(a),

104 Stat. at 504 (codified at 33 U.S.C. s 2717(a)). Title IV,

"Prevention and Removal," for the most part amends existing

statutory provisions, in many cases instructing the Secretary

of Transportation, including the Coast Guard, to promulgate

regulations for ensuring the prevention of oil spills. See

ss 4101-4306, 104 Stat. at 509-541 (codified in scattered

sections of 46 U.S.C. (1994)). Two such preventative provisions are at issue in this case.

The first, s 4110, consists of two parts. See s 4110, 104

Stat. at 515 (codified at 46 U.S.C. s 3703 note). Section

4110(a) requires that the Coast Guard, no later than one year

after enactment of the OPA, establish regulations setting

"minimum standards" for TLPM devices. See s 4110(a), 104

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Stat. at 515. Such devices would continually monitor the

volume of oil contained in a tanker's hull and alert the crew to

recognizable drops in the oil level, thereby signalling a potential leak. Section 4110(b) mandates that the Coast Guard,

also no later than one year after enactment of the OPA, issue

"regulations establishing ... the use [by oil cargo ships] of

... tank level and pressure monitoring devices, which are

referred to in subsection (a) and which meet the standards

established by the Secretary under subsection (a)." s 4110(b),

104 Stat. at 515. The Coast Guard has interpreted s 4110(b)

to apply only to single, and not double, hulled tankers. See

46 C.F.R. s 32.22T-1(b) (1998). Petitioners do not challenge

that interpretation here.

Section 4116(c), the second provision at issue here, requires

that, not later than 6 months after enactment of the OPA,

"the Secretary shall initiate issuance of regulations ... to

define those areas, including Prince William Sound, Alaska,

and Rosario Strait and Puget Sound, Washington (including

those portions of the Strait of Juan de Fuca east of Port

Angeles, Haro Strait, and the Strait of Georgia subject to

United States jurisdiction), on which single hulled tankers

over 5,000 gross tons transporting oil in bulk shall be escorted by at least two towing vessels." s 4116(c), 104 Stat. at 523

(codified at 46 U.S.C. s 3703 note) (emphasis added). Thus,

the Act names three areas specifically for which the Coast

Guard must issue regulations.

B. Rulemaking and Regulatory History of the Two Provisions

Petitioners filed the present mandamus petition in December 1999, seeking to compel the Coast Guard to comply with

its obligations under both s 4110 and s 4116(c) of the OPA.

If the Coast Guard had simply disregarded both of the

provisions, deciding instead to delay indefinitely any rulemaking under either section, this would be a straightforward case

of unreasonable delay. What makes this case somewhat

unusual, albeit not difficult, is the fact that the Coast Guard

has episodically engaged in some rulemaking, and promulgated some regulations, pursuant to each of the provisions at

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issue. In order to put this case in proper perspective, we

must first outline the curious history of agency actions purportedly taken pursuant to s 4110 and s 4116.

1. s 4110-Overfill and Tank Level or Pressure Monitoring Devices

Approximately three months before the statutorily-imposed

deadline, the Coast Guard issued an advanced notice of

proposed rulemaking seeking comments and suggestions regarding possible proposed rules for complying with

ss 4110(a) and (b). See 56 Fed. Reg. 21,116 (May 7, 1991).

The Coast Guard also commissioned a technical feasibility

study of existing TLPM devices, released in early 1993, which

confirmed that, as of 1993, "existing level detectors [were] not

sufficiently sensitive to detect leakage before a large discharge occurr[ed]." Notice of Availability of Technical Feasibility Study, 58 Fed. Reg. 7,292, 7,292 col. 2 (Feb. 5, 1993).

The study found that "attainable accuracy is expected to be

within 1.0-2.0% of the actual level." Id. col. 3. Concerned

that a 1.0 to 2.0 percent error margin, which translates to

between 36,075 and 72,150 gallons of oil for a 400,000 ton

tanker, would provide "insufficient warning to allow prompt

action by the crew," the Coast Guard called for a public

hearing to augment comments to the original advanced notice.

See Notice of Public Meeting, 59 Fed. Reg. 58,810, 58,811 col.

2 (Nov. 15, 1994).

In its August 1995 notice of proposed rulemaking, the

Coast Guard limited its proposed rule to the establishment of

standards for TLPM devices pursuant to s 4110(a), leaving

questions of installation and use of compliant devices, pursuant to s 4110(b), for another day. See 60 Fed. Reg. 43,427,

43,428-29 (Aug. 21, 1995). The Coast Guard proposed "that a

leak detection device must sound an alarm before the contents of the tank decline to a level of 0.5 percent below the

level at which the tank was loaded, or at the loss of 1,000

gallons of cargo, whichever is less." Id. at 43,429 col. 3. It

chose this exacting standard, despite the technical feasibility

study, because "[a] loss of 1,000 or more gallons in virtually

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ronment." Id. The Coast Guard acknowledged that "currently available devices may not meet the proposed standards

for meaningful leak detection; however, establishing the standards may lead to development of devices which will provide

appropriate leak detection." Id. col. 2.

In March 1997, nearly six years after the statutory deadline, the Coast Guard adopted the proposed standards in the

form of a temporary rule, effective for two years beginning

April 28, 1997. See 62 Fed. Reg. 14,828, 14,830-31 (March 28,

1997) (to be codified at 46 C.F.R. ss 32.22T-1 & .22T-5).

The rule did not require installation or use of TLPM devices

unless and until s 4110(a) compliant technology had been

invented and the appropriate s 4110(b) rulemaking undertaken. See 46 C.F.R. s 32.22T-1(c). In establishing the short

two-year sunset, the Coast Guard cited its belief that "unless

a tank level or pressure monitoring device is developed within

2 years from the effective date of [the] temporary rule, it may

not be economically feasible to require installation of such a

device considering phaseout schedules." 62 Fed. Reg. at

14,829 col. 3. All single-hulled vessels will be phased out of

operation by the year 2010. See 46 U.S.C. s 3703a.

The temporary regulations did, in fact, sunset on April 28,

1999. In November of that year, the Coast Guard gave

notice of completed action in the s 4110 TLPM rulemaking:

"Because current technology can not create a device that can

meet reasonable expectations, the temporary rule was allowed

to expire, and no further action is required. If the Coast

Guard ever receives information about a device that is accurate enough to meet the standard, the rulemaking will be

reinitiated." 64 Fed. Reg. 64,739, 64,740 (Nov. 22, 1999).

Thus, there are currently no regulations in place under either

of s 4110's two provisions. Moreover, the Coast Guard never

even attempted rulemaking pursuant s 4110(b).

2. s 4116(c)-Escorts for Certain Tankers

Nearly two years after passage of the OPA, the Coast

Guard published a notice of proposed rulemaking. See 57

Fed. Reg. 30,058 (July 7, 1992). The proposed rule contemplated applying the dual-escort requirement only to those

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three areas specifically mentioned in s 4116(c) itself--namely,

Prince William Sound, Rosario Strait, and Puget Sound. See

id. at 30,064 (proposed July 7, 1992) (to be codified at 33

C.F.R. pt. 168). The Coast Guard did, however, invite comments regarding "other waters" to which the dual-escort

requirement might be extended: "The Coast Guard may

require two escorts in other territorial waters of the United

States. This notice does not propose additional areas. Any

additional areas proposed will be included in a notice of

proposed rulemaking and the public will be afforded an

opportunity to comment." Id. at 30,060 col. 1. In the

alternative, the Coast Guard suggested that it would consider

"other waters" towing and escort requirements pursuant to

the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, as amended by

the Port and Tanker Safety Act of 1978 ("PWSA/PTSA"),

under which "[t]he Coast Guard has significantly broader

authority." Id. at 30,060 col. 2.

The Coast Guard issued a final rule in August of 1994. See

33 C.F.R. pt. 168 (1999). The final rule did not expand

coverage beyond the statutorily-mentioned areas. In response to comments nominating additional waters besides

those named, the Coast Guard stated simply that such comments "will be considered in the separate 'other waters'

rulemaking project." See Final Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. 42,962,

42,964 col. 2 (Aug. 19, 1994) (emphasis added). "The separate

'other waters' rulemaking project" presumably referred to an

ongoing effort, initiated in 1993, to establish "other waters"

escort requirements pursuant to the PWSA/PTSA. See Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 58 Fed. Reg. 25,766

(April 27, 1993). The Coast Guard had chosen the PWSA/

PTSA route, rather than s 4116(c)'s rigid two escort minimum, because "section 4116(c) provides no authority to require the use of escort vessels for ships other than laden,

single-hulled oil tankers over 5,000 GT. In contrast, the

PWSA has no such limitations." Request for Comments, 59

Fed. Reg. 65,741, 65,742 col. 3 (Dec. 21, 1994). To date, the

Coast Guard has not promulgated final "other waters" escort

requirements. It has since reiterated, however, that "[e]xtending escort requirements beyond the OPA 90 mandated

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areas is discretionary." Advanced Notice of Proposed PWSA

Rulemaking, 63 Fed. Reg. 64,937, 64,939 col. 1 (Nov. 24,

1998).

II. Jurisdiction

The instant litigation presents two distinct jurisdictional

issues, one general and one specific to this case. Citing the

Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Locke,

120 S. Ct. 1135 (2000), petitioners now suggest that

s 1017(a)'s grant of exclusive jurisdiction to this court might

apply only to actions challenging regulations promulgated

pursuant to Title I, and not Title IV, of the OPA. As such,

this court would not have original jurisdiction to hear petitioners' mandamus claims. See Telecommunications Research and Action Ctr., 750 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984) [hereinafter TRAC]. For its part, the Coast Guard argues that

s 1017(a) does apply, but that petitioners could have, and

therefore should have, brought their mandamus claims as

separate petitions for review of the earlier ss 4110 and

4116(c) rulemakings. That being the case, the Coast Guard

claims, petitioners cannot now circumvent s 1017(a)'s 90-day

jurisdictional time limit for filing challenges to final agency

action.

Petitioners are wrong in their suggestion that this court

does not have exclusive jurisdiction over this case pursuant to

s 1017. And the Coast Guard is wrong in its contention that

petitioners' claims are untimely.

A. Scope of this court's exclusive jurisdiction under the OPA

Where a statute commits final agency action to review by

this court, we also retain exclusive jurisdiction "to hear suits

seeking relief that might affect [our] future statutory power

of review." TRAC, 750 F.2d at 72. This includes mandamus

actions challenging an agency's unreasonable delay. Id. We

must therefore determine whether the OPA vests this court

with jurisdiction in the first instance to hear challenges to

regulations, like those at issue here, promulgated pursuant to

Title IV of the Act.

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Section 1017(a) of the OPA states: "Review of any regulation promulgated under this Act may be had upon application

by any interested person only in the Circuit Court of Appeals

of the United States for the District of Columbia." s 1017(a),

104 Stat. at 504 (emphasis added). On its face, the term "this

Act" would seem to suggest broad application of the review

provision to all titles of the OPA. Petitioners, however, point

to a possible complication. The Supreme Court earlier this

year held that s 1018's pre-emption savings clause-the provision immediately following s 1017 in Title I of the OPAapplied only to the pre-emptive effect of provisions like those

contained in Title I, and not those contained in the remainder

of the Act. See Locke, 120 S. Ct. at 1146. Petitioners argue

that, in so holding, the Supreme Court interpreted "this Act,"

as used in s 1018, to refer only to Title I of the OPA. Why,

they ask, should it be interpreted more broadly in the context

of s 1017(a)? Petitioners fundamentally misunderstand both

the holding and reasoning of Locke.

Locke involved a claim that various federal oil cargo statutes, including the OPA, pre-empted the State of Washington's rules governing tanker vessel manning, operation, and

design. The Court of Appeals had held that s 1018 of the

OPA effectively saved all state tanker provisions from its, and

the other statutes', pre-emptive reach. Section 1018 reads in

pertinent part:

(a) Preservation of State Authorities ... Nothing in this

Act or the Act of March 3, 1851 shall--

(1) affect, or be construed or interpreted as preempting, the authority of any State or political subdivision

thereof from imposing any additional liability or requirements with respect to--

(A) the discharge of oil or other pollution by oil

within such State; or

(B) any removal activities in connection with such a

discharge;

...

(c) Additional Requirements and Liabilities; Penalties.

Nothing in this Act ... shall in any way affect, or be

construed to affect, the authority of the United States or

any State or political subdivision thereof---

(1) to impose additional liability or additional requirements; or

(2) to impose, or to determine the amount of, any fine

or penalty (whether criminal or civil in nature) for any

violation of law;

relating to the discharge, or substantial threat of a

discharge, of oil.

s 1018, 104 Stat. at 505-06 (codified at 33 U.S.C. s 2718)

(emphasis added). Relying in large part on Congress' placeUSCA Case #99-1502 Document #566082 Filed: 12/22/2000 Page 9 of 18
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ment of the provision in Title I, the Supreme Court held that

Congress intended these savings clauses only "to preserve

state laws of a scope similar to the matters contained in Title

I of OPA." Locke, 120 S. Ct. at 1146. The Court's conclusion

was "fortified" by s 1018(c)'s use of the phrase "relating to

the discharge, or substantial threat of discharge, of oil," for

Congress had used these same "key words" in declaring the

scope of Title I. Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. s 2702(a), which

codified s 1002(a), 104 Stat. at 489). In other words, Congress intended to save from pre-emption only those State

laws having to do with liability and compensation regarding

an oil spill. Because the State provisions at issue dealt with

tanker manning, operation, and design, rather than liability

and compensation, the Court concluded that they were subject to pre-emption. Id. at 1148-50.

At no point in its analysis did the Court profess to interpret

the phrase "this Act" or suggest that it was limited to Title I

of the OPA. At no point did the Court hold that s 1018

disarmed the pre-emptive effect of Title I provisions alone.

Rather, the Court merely held that s 1018 insulates only

those state regulations of the type contained in Title I,

whether it be from provisions contained in other titles of the

OPA or any provision contained in one of the other named

statutes. Because Locke gives us no reason to part from the

natural interpretation of s 1017(a)'s "this Act," we turn now

to the jurisdictional claims specific to this case.

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B. Effect of earlier rulemakings on present mandamus action

1. TLPM Device Challenge-s 4110

The Coast Guard asserts that its 1997 temporary, and nowexpired, rulemaking constitutes its final word on s 4110. The

Coast Guard said as much in its November 1999 Notice of

Completed Action. The Government does not contend here

that petitioners should have challenged the 1999 Notice of

Completed Action, nor could it given s 1017(a)'s restriction on

review to final regulations. Rather, the agency contends that

petitioners' present mandamus action is tantamount to an

untimely petition for review of the agency's completed 1997

temporary rulemaking. In other words, according to the

Coast Guard, petitioners cannot now, over two years after the

1997 rulemaking, attempt to circumvent s 1017(a)'s jurisdictional 90-day filing limit by fashioning their petition as one

for unreasonable delay. This is a specious argument and we

reject it.

At the outset, it is important to recall what the 1997

temporary rulemaking did not do. The Coast Guard never

addressed s 4110(b)'s distinct use and installation mandate,

deferring any action on that front until compliant equipment

had been identified. See, e.g., 46 C.F.R. s 32.22T-1(c) ("During the effective period of this subpart no owner or operator

is required to install any tank level or pressure monitoring

device meeting the performance standards of this subpart

unless required by the Coast Guard in a separate regulation."); 60 Fed. Reg. at 43,427 col. 3 ("Requirements for the

installation and use of the devices will be proposed separately."). Nor did the Coast Guard make clear, at any point in

the rulemaking, that it would not take further action pursuant

to s 4110 upon expiration of the 1997 temporary regulations.

Rather, the agency merely said that the "temporary rule

[would] only be in effect for 2 years from the effective date."

62 Fed. Reg. at 14,829 col. 3.

The temporary regulations questioned whether, in light of

phaseout schedules, it would be "economically feasible" to

require installation of tank level and pressure monitoring

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devices if such devices were not developed within two years.

Id. But this question was raised because the agency knew

that the temporary regulations proposed very high standards,

i.e., standards that arguably embodied technology-forcing requirements that were beyond the current capacity of the

affected industry. The Coast Guard never suggested, however, that the standards proposed in the temporary regulations

were the only viable options to address the statutory mandate

compelling the agency to establish some sort of rules as to

both compliance standards and use requirements. Indeed,

the temporary regulations were an experimental first-step

toward achieving the required standards and requirements,

nothing more, nothing less. They certainly did not forewarn

anyone that the Coast Guard meant to say "this is it."

The Coast Guard is correct that petitioners cannot use the

present mandamus action to challenge the substance of the

1997 temporary regulations. See In re United Mine Workers

of America Int'l Union, 190 F.3d 545, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1999);

Florida Power & Light Co. v. EPA, 145 F.3d 1414, 1419 (D.C.

Cir. 1998). Petitioners are not, however, challenging anything that the Coast Guard did in 1997. Nor do they challenge the Coast Guard's 1997 decision not to take certain

actions or implement permanent regulations at that time.

Rather, petitioners challenge what the Coast Guard has since

failed to do: it has never established permanent s 4110(a)

regulations; and it has put off, and now disregards, addressing s 4110(b)'s use and installation requirements.

"[A]n agency's failure to regulate more comprehensively

[than it has] is not ordinarily a basis for concluding that the

regulations already promulgated are invalid." Hazardous

Waste Treatment Council v. EPA, 861 F.2d 277, 287 (D.C.

Cir. 1988) [hereinafter HWTC]. Likewise, an agency's pronouncement of its intent to defer or to engage in future

rulemaking generally does not constitute final agency action

reviewable by this court. See American Portland Cement

Alliance v. EPA, 101 F.3d 772, 777 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also

Florida P & L, 145 F.3d at 1418 (establishing three-factor

test for identifying reviewable "final" regulations). Nothing

in s 1017(a), the OPA's judicial review provision, suggests

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departure from these general principles. With this in mind,

petitioners argue that, had they challenged the deferral or

"incompleteness" of the rules as the Coast Guard claims they

should have, this court would have dismissed their petition on

ripeness grounds. See American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA,

216 F.3d 50, 68-69 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ("A decision to defer has

no binding effect on the parties or on EPA's ability to issue a

ruling in the future."); HWTC, 861 F.2d at 287 ("Unless the

agency's first step takes it down a path that forecloses more

comprehensive regulation, the first step is not assailable

merely because the agency failed to take a second.").

We are guided by our recent United Mine Workers decision. There, the union sought an order compelling the agency to establish permissible exposure limits ("PELs") for

diesel exhaust from mining equipment. The Mine Safety and

Health Administration ("MSHA") argued, much as the Coast

Guard does here, that the union should have raised the PEL

issue in the context of an earlier equipment standards rulemaking. The court disagreed:

From the outset, the agency disavowed any intention to

consider new PELs for the diesel exhaust gases during

its diesel equipment rulemaking, stating that the PELs

would be reexamined as part of its omnibus air quality

rulemaking. The UMWA does not take issue with that

decision, or any other aspect of the diesel equipment

rules. Although the PELs are plainly related to the

equipment rules, since the latter incorporate them for

certain equipment standards, the UMWA's challenge is

to the content of the PELs and not to the agency's

decision to incorporate them into the equipment rules.

Indeed, had the UMWA challenged the diesel equipment

rules on the ground that MSHA had failed to include

revised PELs for diesel exhaust gases, we might well

have denied its petition as premature.

United Mine Workers, 190 F.3d at 548-49 (citations omitted).

Here, too, petitioners do not challenge the substance of the

earlier regulations. Here, too, the Coast Guard clearly took

only temporary, experimental action on s 4110(a) standards

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and deferred s 4110(b) use and installation regulations until

compliant equipment had been located. By adopting a temporary s 4110(a) standard, the Coast Guard set in motion a

two-year trial period during which such equipment might be

invented. Petitioners could not have predicted that none

would be found. Nor did petitioners have good reason to

suppose that the absence of certain devices would result in no

standards or requirements whatsoever.

Despite the express incompleteness of the temporary regulations, and despite any clear warning that it would abandon

s 4110 rulemaking altogether following sunset, the Coast

Guard argues that petitioners still should have construed the

1997 rulemaking as the agency's final action on s 4110. This

is so, says the Coast Guard, because the statutory deadline

for agency action had long since passed. This argument is

wholly unconvincing.

The Coast Guard points us to Hercules Inc. v. EPA, 938

F.2d 276 (D.C. Cir. 1991). There, we recognized a limited

exception to the general rule against reviewing the incompleteness of a regulation: "when the statutory deadline for

issuing regulations has passed, the promulgated regulation

must be deemed the agency's 'complete response in compliance with the statutory requirements' ... [and] 'even if [the

agency] promulgates additional ... rules sometime in the

future, petitioners' claim that existing final regulations are

unlawful remains reviewable by this court.' " Id. at 282

(emphasis in original) (quoting Colorado v. Dep't of Interior,

880 F.2d 481, 485-86 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). Grabbing hold of the

phrase "must be deemed," the Coast Guard attempts to turn

s 4110's clear and long-passed deadlines--the very concern

animating petitioners' complaints--on their head. This argument resting on Hercules fails.

In Sierra Club v. EPA, 992 F.2d 337 (D.C. Cir. 1993), we

held that passage of a statutory deadline rendered an agency's action final only when "the respondent agencies themselves considered their actions to be complete and sufficient

responses to the relevant statutory requirements." Id. at

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346. Though the statutory deadline for promulgating regulations had passed, the court held that,

[f]ar from claiming that its actions are complete, the

Agency explicitly states its intention to issue revised

criteria for non-municipal facilities when it has the data

necessary to do so. In such circumstances, it would be

incongruous to categorize the Agency's rule as the 'final'

regulation concerning the issue of non-municipal facilities.

Id. at 347. Likewise, in the present case, the 1997 temporary

regulations explicitly stated the Coast Guard's intention to

defer implementation of permanent s 4110(a) compliance

standards and to delay rulemaking on s 4110(b) requirements.

In short, under Sierra Club, it is doubtful whether petitioners could have challenged the 1997 temporary regulations, for

such a challenge would have appeared premature. But this

really is beside the point in this case. Petitioners do not here

challenge the 1997 temporary regulations, either for what

they did or did not do; those regulations have expired.

Whatever issues could have been raised regarding their legality are moot. What is at issue in this case is the absence of

any regulations under s 4110. The statute compels the

agency to establish both compliance standards and use requirements. There are no such standards or requirements in

existence-none-and the agency has no present intention to

promulgate any. Petitioners argue, rather convincingly, that

the agency's current "we-will-not-promulgate-regulations" position is a blatant violation of the Act. That is the question

that is before this court. The issues that petitioners have

raised are timely and they are fully cognizable in connection

with their request for mandamus relief.

2. "Other Waters" Challenge-s 4116(c)

Petitioners interpret the use of the term "including" in

s 4116(c) to require the Coast Guard to initiate rulemaking to

define "other waters" to be included with the three named

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mented. Though the Coast Guard, by its 1994 rulemaking,

established final dual-escort requirements for the specificallynamed areas, it has not yet initiated rulemaking extending

the requirements to "other waters." Petitioners challenge

this ongoing failure. As with s 4110, the Coast Guard argues

that petitioners should have brought the present challenge in

a petition for review of the earlier s 4116(c) rulemaking. For

many of the reasons articulated above, we again disagree--

petitioners are not challenging the 1994 rulemaking, but

rather the Coast Guard's failure to follow through on expressly deferred and, petitioners argue, mandated promises. Petitioners' challenge is not untimely. We take up the issue of

whether s 4116(c) indeed contains such an "other waters"

requirement in the next section.

III. Merits

Our consideration of any and all mandamus actions starts

from the premise that issuance of the writ is an extraordinary

remedy, reserved only for the most transparent violations of a

clear duty to act. In the case of agency inaction, we not only

must satisfy ourselves that there indeed exists such a duty,

but that the agency has "unreasonably delayed" the contemplated action. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.

s 706(1) (1994); see also 5 U.S.C. s 555(b) (1994). This court

analyzes unreasonable delay claims under the now-familiar

criteria set forth in TRAC:

(1) the time agencies take to make decisions must be

governed by a "rule of reason"; (2) where Congress has

provided a timetable or other indication of the speed with

which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling

statute, that statutory scheme may supply content for

this rule of reason; (3) delays that might be reasonable

in the sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable

when human health and welfare are at stake; (4) the

court should consider the effect of expediting delayed

action on agency activities of a higher or competing

priority; (5) the court should also take into account the

nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by delay;

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(6) the court need not "find any impropriety lurking

behind agency lassitude in order to hold that agency

action is unreasonably delayed."

United Mine Workers, 190 F.3d at 549 (quoting TRAC, 750

F.2d at 80). We take ss 4110 and 4116 in reverse order.

We disagree with petitioners that, by using the term "including" before the three specifically-named areas, s 4116(c)

places a clear and mandatory duty on the Coast Guard to

undertake "other waters" rulemaking. Petitioners do not

provide any parameters or criteria for the hypothetical set of

"other waters." Must it contain only one unnamed area?

Two? When asked at oral argument, counsel for petitioners

could not identify a single additional area compelled by

s 4116(c), nor could we have countenanced one had they done

so. Petitioners' utter inability to give a coherent account of

what a mandamus order might look like belies their assertion

that the provision in fact contains a clear, non-discretionary

duty to act. As with similar listing "requirements," petitioners remain free to petition the Coast Guard for a rulemaking

to add particular "other waters" should it alight on justifiable

reasons for so doing. Denial of such a petition would then be

subject to review.

Sections 4110(a) and (b) stand in stark contrast to

s 4116(c). The statute indisputably commands the Coast

Guard to establish some sort of compliance standards and use

requirements by August 1991. There are no such standards

or requirements, and the Coast Guard has disavowed any

further action. The Coast Guard contends only that any

attempt now to promulgate compliance standards and use

requirements will run into the same practical problems encountered in the 1997 rulemaking--namely, that no equipment currently exists to meet the necessary standards. This

argument misses the point.

Section 4110(a) commands the Coast Guard to establish

compliance standards. There are none. And s 4110(b) commands the Coast Guard to establish requirements regarding

the installation and use of compliant equipment. There are

none. The agency cannot avoid these commands by pointing

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to too-stringent compliance standards that have expired.

Neither the Coast Guard in its prior rulemakings, nor government counsel at argument, dispute that functioning TLPM

devices are available on the market. Nor, as a result, do they

dispute that some sort of minimum s 4110(a) standard is

possible--whether it be a less-stringent numbers standard or

a simple technology-based standard.

The Coast Guard has not disputed petitioners' arguments

regarding the specific TRAC factors, and we do not pause to

analyze them. Suffice it to say that all favor granting mandamus: a nine-year delay is unreasonable given a clear one-year

time line and the Coast Guard's admission that it will do no

more; the delayed regulations implicate important environmental concerns; and the Coast Guard has not shown that

expedited rulemaking here will interfere with other, higher

priority activities. We will, therefore, retain jurisdiction over

the case until final agency action disposes of the Coast

Guard's obligations under s 4110 of the OPA.

Mandamus pursuant to TRAC is an extraordinary remedy,

reserved only for extraordinary circumstances. This is just

such a circumstance. We are here faced with a clear statutory mandate, a deadline nine-years ignored, and an agency

that has admitted its continuing recalcitrance. For the foregoing reasons, we hereby direct the Coast Guard to undertake prompt s 4110 rulemaking.

So ordered.

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