Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-15-30023/USCOURTS-ca9-15-30023-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Carl Romero
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CARL ROMERO,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15-30023

D.C. No.

2:12-cr-00388-MJP-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Marsha J. Pechman, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted May 5, 2016

Seattle, Washington

Filed August 15, 2016

Before: Susan P. Graber, Marsha S. Berzon,

and Mary H. Murguia, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Berzon

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2 UNITED STATES V. ROMERO

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

Affirming a conviction for being a felon in possession of

a firearm, the panel held that the Speedy Trial Act

unambiguously requires the exclusion of all time during

which a defendant is incompetent to stand trial, 18 U.S.C.

§ 3161(h)(4), and other delays that may or may not occur

during a period of incompetency are irrelevant to the Speedy

Trial Act calculation.

COUNSEL

William C. Broberg, II (argued), Law Office of William

Broberg, Seattle, Washington, for Defendant-Appellant.

Teal LuthyMiller (argued), Assistant United States Attorney;

Annette L. Hayes, United States Attorney; Office of the

United States Attorney, Seattle, Washington; for PlaintiffAppellee.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. ROMERO 3

OPINION

BERZON, Circuit Judge:

Appellant Carl Romero challenges his conviction for

being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) on the ground that it violated the

Speedy Trial Act. He contends that the district court

improperly excluded 81 days that he maintains amounted to

an “unreasonable” delay under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F),

which governs the exclusion of transportation-related periods

of delay. Because Romero was incompetent to stand trial

during the relevant period, we conclude that all of the days

were properly excluded under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(4), and we

therefore affirm.

I.

On November 3, 2012, Carl Romero was arrested by

police officers who found a firearm on his person. Romero

had previously been convicted of a felony in Washington

State court. After his 2012 arrest, a grand jury returned an

indictment against Romero, charging him with being a felon

in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1). Romero pleaded not guilty.

On the day of his arraignment, the court granted a motion

by Romero’s appointed counsel requesting a mental

competency evaluation. Following that evaluation and a

competency hearing, the court found that Romero was

competent to stand trial. Shortly thereafter, Romero’s

counsel notified the court that Romero wished to represent

himself and asked leave to withdraw on that ground. After

conducting a hearing pursuant to Faretta v. California,

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4 UNITED STATES V. ROMERO

422 U.S. 806 (1975), the court found that Romero had

knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appointed

counsel and allowed him to proceed pro se.

On May 13, 2013, the parties appeared for the first day of

trial. Before beginning jury selection, the court sought to

confirm that Romero wanted to represent himself and that he

would be able to follow the court’s instructions if he did so. 

In the exchange that followed, Romero was argumentative,

aggressive, and at times rambling and incoherent. In light of

this behavior, the court determined that Romero would be

unable to follow its directives and, relying on Indiana v.

Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008), ruled that Romero, while

competent to stand trial, was not competent to represent

himself. The court adjourned the case to allow for the

appointment of counsel.

Romero’s newly appointed counsel moved for an

additional continuance to conduct a further evaluation of

Romero’s competence. The district court granted the motion. 

Beginning on November 21, the court conducted a two-day

competency hearing. After hearing testimony from the two

experts who had already evaluated Romero, the court ordered

a third, independent competency evaluation.

The next competency hearing took place in March 2014. 

Testifying during that hearing, the independent expert opined

that Romero was not competent to stand trial. The district

court issued an order on March 19, 2014, finding Romero not

competent and ordering him “committed to the custody of the

Attorney General for a reasonable period of time, not to

exceed four months, for the purpose of restoration of

competency, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d).” The court

further ordered that “the period of time from November 21,

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UNITED STATES V. ROMERO 5

2013, through the conclusion of the period of the defendant’s

commission to the custody of the Attorney General as

referenced above, be excluded from a Speedy Trial Act

computation pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(A).”

On July 7, 2014, the district court received a letter from

the warden of the United States Medical Center for Federal

Prisoners stating that Romero had not been received for

psychological evaluation and treatment until June 19, 2014. 

The letter gave no explanation for the three-month delay

between the court’s transfer order and Romero’s arrival at the

treatment facility. In light of that delay, however, the warden

requested an extension of the period of Romero’s

commitment to 120 days from the date of his arrival. 

Romero, through counsel, objected to the proposed extension

and asserted that he “does not waive any rights that he may

have under the Speedy Trial Act.” The district court granted

the extension in a minute order.

In early November, the warden sent the district court a

Certificate of Competency and the report of the doctor who

had treated Romero. The parties next appeared before the

court for a status conference on November 18, 2014, at which

point the court set a trial date for January 20, 2015.

In the interim, the parties jointly moved for a competency

evaluation based on the report of the doctor who evaluated

Romero at the United States Medical Center, along with an

“Addendum Evaluation” by the doctor who initially

determined that Romero was not competent. At a hearing on

December 12, the court determined that Romero was now

competent to stand trial. Upon a renewed request by Romero

to proceed pro se, and after further examination, the court

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6 UNITED STATES V. ROMERO

again determined that Romero was not competent to represent

himself.

At the same hearing, the court also reviewed a proposed

order filed by the government, making factual findings and

conclusions of law relevant to the Speedy Trial Act

calculation for the case and setting a new trial date of

December 15, 2014. The order excluded various periods

from the Speedy Trial Act period under different statutory

exclusions. As relevant here, the order excluded the entire

period from December 6, 2013, through December 12, 2014,

under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(A), because Romero’s

“competencywas being evaluated,” and also under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3161(h)(7)(B)(i) and (ii) because of the complexity of the

case and because “[a] miscarriage of justice would also likely

result were the Court to proceed to trial without addressing

the competency questions raised by the defense.” Romero’s

counsel conceded that the government’s “calculation of the

excluded periods is correct,” but stressed that Romero “has

not waived any of his speedy trial rights and he continues to

insist on his right to [a] speedy trial.” The court adopted the

proposed order.

At trial, a jury convicted Romero, and the court sentenced

him to 36 months of imprisonment and another 36 months of

supervised release. This appeal followed.

II.

“The Speedy Trial Act of 1974 . . . requires that a

criminal defendant’s trial commence within 70 days after he

is charged or makes an initial appearance, whichever is later.” 

Bloate v. United States, 559 U.S. 196, 198–99 (2010)

(citation omitted). The Act further provides, however, that

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UNITED STATES V. ROMERO 7

delays caused by certain enumerated events “shall be

excluded in computing . . . the time within which the trial . . .

must commence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h). Romero argues on

appeal that the district court erred in making its Speedy Trial

Act calculation by excluding 81 of the 91 days between

March 19, 2014, when the court ordered Romero committed

to the custody of the Attorney General for the purpose of

restoring his competency, and June 19, 2014, the day on

which Romero actually arrived for treatment.1

The parties’ dispute on this point hinges on the

intersection of several of the exclusion provisions in the Act. 

Title 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1) provides for the exclusion of

various “period[s] of delay resulting from other proceedings

concerning the defendant.” As relevant here, these include

“delay resulting from any proceeding, including any

examinations, to determine the mental competency or

physical capacity of the defendant,” id. § 3161(h)(1)(A), and

“delay resulting from transportation of any defendant from

another district, or to and from places of examination or

hospitalization, except that any time consumed in excess of

ten days from the date an order of removal or an order

directing such transportation, and the defendant’s arrival at

the destination shall be presumed to be unreasonable,” id.

§ 3161(h)(1)(F). The statute also provides for the exclusion

of “[a]ny period of delay resulting from the fact that the

defendant is mentally incompetent or physically unable to

stand trial.” id. § 3161(h)(4).

1 Romero suggests that the district court may also have wrongly

excluded certain periods between October 18, 2014, and November 17,

2014, but he nowhere identifies those periods. He concedes that the

remainder of the district court’s Speedy Trial Act calculations were

correct.

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8 UNITED STATES V. ROMERO

The district court’s Order Governing Speedy Trial Act

Computation excluded the entire period from December 6,

2013, through December 12, 2014, under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3161(h)(1)(A), because Romero’s “competency was being

evaluated,” and also under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(i) and

(ii) because of the complexity of the case and because “[a]

miscarriage of justice would also likely result were the Court

to proceed to trial without addressing the competency

questions raised by the defense.” The order did not

differentiate among any specific periods within that time

frame.

As an initial matter, the parties agree that the district court

could not properly rely on § 3161(h)(1)(A) to exclude the

period beginning on March 19, 2014, when the court found

that Romero was not competent to stand trial. That section

applies to delays “resulting from any proceeding . . . to

determine the” competency of a defendant. 18 U.S.C.

§ 3161(h)(1)(A) (emphasis added). As of March 19,

however, Romero’s competency had been determined — his

examinations and treatment from that point onward were for

the purpose of restoring his competency.

The government nonetheless argues that this error was

harmless because, “[w]hen the district court found that

Romero was incompetent, a different provision of the [Act]

came into play: section 3161(h)(4).” The government argues

that § 3161(h)(4) automatically excludes all time during

which a defendant is incompetent, whether or not any other

provisions of the Act apply. Romero, on the other hand,

argues that the period between the district court’s March 19,

2014 order and June 19, when Romero arrived at the

treatment facility, is governed by § 3161(h)(1)(F), the socalled transportation exclusion. Because § 3161(h)(1)(F)

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UNITED STATES V. ROMERO 9

provides that any delays in excess of 10 days are presumed

unreasonable and thus not excluded, Romero maintains that

the Speedy Trial Act clock ran for 81 of the 91 days before he

was transferred for treatment, and that his conviction

therefore violated the Act.

We agree with the government that the entire period

between March 19, 2014 — when Romero was declared

incompetent — and December 12, 2014 — when the district

court determined that his competency had been restored — is

excludable under § 3161(h)(4). The plain meaning of the

statute supports this conclusion. The statute provides that

“[a]ny period of delay resulting from the fact that the

defendant is mentally incompetent” “shall be excluded” from

the Speedy Trial Act calculation. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(4)

(emphases added). On its face, this provision is absolute; any

period during which a trial cannot commence because of a

defendant’s incompetence must be excluded. The provision’s

legislative history supports this interpretation, explaining that

§ 3161(h)(4) “provides for the exclusion from the time limits

between arrest and trial of the period during which a

defendant is incompetent to stand trial.” H.R. Rep. No. 93-

1508, at 33 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7401,

7426.

The Supreme Court’s Speedy Trial Act case law further

supports this result. In United States v. Tinklenberg, 563 U.S.

647, 650 (2011), the Court held that the exclusions listed

under § 3161(h)(1) apply automatically, “irrespective of

whether” one of the enumerated events “actually causes, or is

expected to cause, delay in starting a trial.” Section

3161(h)(1), the Court explained, should be understood as an

example of a statute that “specif[ies] that a set of

circumstances exhibits a certain characteristic virtually as a

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10 UNITED STATES V. ROMERO

matter of definition and irrespective of how a court may view

it in a particular case.” Id. at 654. Because requiring a

factual inquiry into the applicability of the provisions in every

instance would render them “significantly more difficult to

administer,” and thus “significantly hinder the Speedy Trial

Act’s efforts to secure fair and efficient criminal trial

proceedings,” the Court held that § 3161(h)(1) should apply

automatically, without regard to the factual circumstances of

individual cases. Id. at 657.

The same reasoning applies to § 3161(h)(4), which, like

§ 3161(h)(1), describes a specific “period of delay” which

“shall be excluded” from the Speedy Trial Act calculation. 

The Supreme Court has “repeatedly and consistently

recognized that ‘the criminal trial of an incompetent

defendant violates due process.’” Cooper v. Oklahoma,

517 U.S. 348, 354 (1996) (quoting Medina v. California,

505 U.S. 437, 453 (1992)). Given this foundational principle

of our criminal justice system, it would make little sense to

require a district court to inquire into the applicability of

§ 3161(h)(4) in individual cases. Rather, given that a

defendant’s incompetence makes a trial impossible in every

instance, § 3161(h)(4) applies upon a finding of

incompetence “as a matter of definition and irrespective of

how a court may view it in a particular case.” Tinklenberg,

563 U.S. at 654.

In short, we conclude that the Speedy Trial Act

unambiguously requires the exclusion of all time during

which a defendant is incompetent to stand trial. Because this

is so, other delays that may or may not occur during a period

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UNITED STATES V. ROMERO 11

of incompetence are irrelevant to the Speedy Trial Act

calculation;2 they cannot change the statutory bottom-line.

With respect to the transportation exclusion in particular,

we first note our skepticism that it applies at all in

circumstances like those presented here. Section

3161(h)(1)(F) appears under the broader umbrella of

§ 3161(h)(1), which requires the exclusion of “[a]ny period

of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the

defendant, including but not limited to” the section’s eight

subparts. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1) (emphasis added). Because

each of the subparts is listed as an example of “delay

resulting from . . . proceedings concerning the defendant,” it

appears that a transportation delay under § 3161(h)(1)(F)

must, in some way, be related to such a “proceeding.” 

“Proceeding,” in legal parlance, ordinarily refers to a

transaction before a court or other adjudicatory or

administrative body. See Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed.

2014). Thus, for example, the provision would apply to a

delayin transporting a defendant for psychological evaluation

as part of a legal “proceeding” to determine his competency. 

But here, as discussed above, all such proceedings concluded

with the determination that Romero was not competent. 

Section 3161(h)(1)(F), then, is likely inapplicable for the

same reason § 3161(h)(1)(A) does not pertain — there was no

proceeding pending when the delay took place. To the

contrary, all proceedings had necessarily been put on hold

until Romero’s competency was restored.

 

2

 We express no opinion here as to whether such delays may affect the

reasonableness of an incompetent defendant’s detention under 18 U.S.C.

§ 4241(d)(2). See United States v. Strong, 489 F.3d 1055, 1061 (9th Cir.

2007).

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12 UNITED STATES V. ROMERO

Ultimately, however, we need not resolve this question. 

Even if § 3161(h)(1)(F) does apply in the absence of a

“proceeding,” nothing in that provision suggests that it should

trump the requirements of § 3161(h)(4). As noted,

§ 3161(h)(1)(F) requires the exclusion of any “delay resulting

from transportation of any defendant . . . except that any time

consumed in excess of ten days . . . shall be presumed to be

unreasonable.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F). The presumption

that delays in excess of ten days are “unreasonable” is best

understood merely to preclude the application of the

transportation exclusion itself to the additional time. Where,

as here, a different exclusion provision also applies, nothing

in the statute suggests that it should not operate as usual.

Romero argues that § 3161(h)(1)(F) must control under

the “specific-controls-the-general canon,” according to which

we “avoid interpretations that render superfluous more

specific [Speedy Trial Act] provisions.” United States v.

Hernandez-Meza, 720 F.3d 760, 764 (9th Cir. 2013). That

canon does not apply here, because neither section is

necessarily more specific than the other. Section

3161(h)(1)(F) applies to the transportation of defendants not

only as a result of their incompetence, but also “from another

district, or to and from places of examination or

hospitalization.” While it might be argued that the

transportation exclusion is more specific, because it applies

only when a defendant is moved from one place to another,

it could just as well be argued that § 3161(h)(4) is the more

specific provision, given that it applies only in the case of

incompetence, whereas § 3161(h)(1)(F) applies to a wide

range of transportation delays. Section 3161(h)(1)(F), in

other words, applies in circumstances where § 3161(h)(4)

does not, and vice versa, so our reliance on § 3161(h)(4)

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UNITED STATES V. ROMERO 13

cannot “render [§ 3161(h)(1)(F)] superfluous.” HernandezMeza, 720 F.3d at 764.

For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s Speedy

Trial Act ruling.

3

AFFIRMED.

3 Because we affirm on this basis, we do not consider the government’s

alternative argument that the time was excludable as a so-called “ends of

justice” continuance under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7).

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