Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-14-01949/USCOURTS-ca3-14-01949-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Derrick Chappelle
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 14-1949

_____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

DERRICK CHAPPELLE,

a/k/a D-NICE

DERRICK CHAPPELLE,

 Appellant

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(District Court No.: 2-12-cr-00447-001)

District Court Judge: Honorable Joel H. Slomsky

Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

on January 23, 2015

Before: RENDELL, SMITH, and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: January 29, 2015)

Case: 14-1949 Document: 003111861602 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/29/2015
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O P I N I O N*

RENDELL, Circuit Judge:

Arguing sentencing factor manipulation, Derrick Chappelle (“Chappelle”) appeals 

from the District Court’s sentencing order. Because no manipulation occurred here, we 

will affirm.

I. Introduction

Chappelle sold crack cocaine to a confidential informant for the FBI on two 

occasions, which were less than one month apart. The first purchase was for 24.5 grams, 

and the second purchase was for 48.8 grams. Thereafter, the government charged 

Chappelle with two counts of distribution of crack cocaine pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) and § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). Chappelle pled guilty, and his 

final Guideline range was set at 77-96 months. Chappelle argued for a downward 

variance based on what is known as “sentencing factor manipulation,” urging that the 

Government engaged in a second drug transaction so as to increase his sentence, thereby 

manipulating his sentence unfairly. The District Court rejected this argument and 

imposed a within-Guideline sentence of 96 months. On appeal, the sole issue is whether 

the District Court should have granted the downward variance based on this factor.

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.

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II. Discussion

“In reviewing the District Court’s sentence for reasonableness, we examine its 

factual findings for clear error, and its legal conclusions de novo.” United States v. Sed, 

601 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal citation omitted). We have explained that the 

“broadest formulation” of sentencing factor manipulation “holds that it is ‘a violation of 

the Due Process Clause,’ . . . when the government unfairly exaggerates the defendant’s 

sentencing range by engaging in a longer-than-needed investigation and, thus, increasing 

the drug quantities for which the defendant is responsible.” Id. at 231 (internal citation 

omitted) (quoting United States v. Torres, 563 F.3d 731, 734 (8th Cir. 2009)). Similarly, 

Chappelle characterizes sentencing factor manipulation as “occur[ring] in those 

circumstances where the defendant, although inclined to commit a lesser crime, is 

manipulated by the government into committing a greater crime, and therefore a greater 

punishment.” (Blue Br. 8 (emphasis added).)

While we “have neither adopted nor rejected” the doctrine of sentencing factor 

manipulation, Sed, 601 F.3d at 229, we agree with the District Court that the second drug 

deal here does not constitute sentencing factor manipulation, see id. at 231 (rejecting a 

sentencing factor manipulation claim where law enforcement had arranged a second drug 

deal, thereby increasing the defendant’s sentence). The key is manipulation, and the 

government did not in any way manipulate Chappelle, as Chappelle’s own counsel 

conceded that “he was predisposed to sell drugs. He’s a drug dealer. There’s no doubt 

about it.” (App. 69.) Although the FBI did wait a significant amount of time after the 

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second drug deal before charging Chappelle, the FBI did not use that time to unfairly 

augment Chappelle’s future prison sentence by, for instance, conducting a new drug deal 

every month for the almost three years that intervened before Chappelle was charged. 

The FBI’s decision to arrange a second drug deal was legitimate. See United States v. 

Shephard, 4 F.3d 647, 649 (8th Cir. 1993) (“[I]t is legitimate for police to continue to 

deal with someone with whom they have already engaged in illicit transactions in order to 

establish that person’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt or to ‘probe the depth and extent 

of a criminal enterprise, to determine whether coconspirators exist, and to trace the drug 

deeper into the distribution hierarchy.’” (quoting United States v. Calva, 979 F.2d 119, 

123 (8th Cir. 1992))). A contrary ruling “would unnecessarily and unfairly restrict the 

discretion and judgment of investigators and prosecutors.” United States v. Jones, 18 

F.3d 1145, 1155 (4th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, Chappelle has not established sentencing 

factor manipulation, even if we were to adopt the doctrine, and the District Court’s 

within-Guideline sentence was reasonable.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s sentencing order. 

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