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Parties Involved:
Kaitlyn Allen
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 24a0475n.06

Case No. 23-6054

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

KAITLYN ALLEN,

Defendant-Appellant.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED 

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

OPINION

Before: GIBBONS, McKEAGUE, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges.

JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Appellant Kaitlyn Allen pled guilty to 

conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. Prior to her guilty plea, Allen had moved to exclude 

evidence of weapons and drugs found in her home, arguing that the search warrant executed on 

her residence did not establish probable cause, but the district court denied the motion. The plea 

agreement preserved her right to appeal the suppression motion. 

At her sentencing hearing, Allen objected to the district court’s decisions to implement a 

two-point increase for possession of a dangerous firearm and to reject a sentencing decrease under 

the “safety valve” provision of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). We now AFFIRM the district court’s denial 

of her motion to suppress and its ultimate sentencing determination.

I.

In September 2022, Allen was indicted for conspiring to distribute 500 grams or more of a 

substance containing methamphetamine. The crucial evidence supporting this indictment was 

obtained through an August 25, 2022, search of Allen’s residence pursuant to a search warrant. 

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The supporting affidavit for the search warrant outlined a long investigation by federal 

authorities into Allen’s participation in a drug trafficking conspiracy with co-defendant Billy 

Letner, which spanned from January 2022 to August 2022. Beginning in January 2022, law 

enforcement began investigating Letner who had been identified by sources as a large-scale 

methamphetamine trafficker. A source told law enforcement that Letner was buying crystal 

methamphetamine from a white female residing in Lexington, Kentucky. Based on cellular 

analysis, other sources of information, and surveillance, law enforcement believed this individual 

to be Allen. Thus, agents began surveilling the activities of Allen in relation to Letner.

Four instances outlined in the affidavit are worth noting. First, in July 2022, a confidential 

source contacted law enforcement to tell them that Letner was intending to meet his source of 

drugs in the parking lot of a Taco Tico restaurant near Allen’s residence. Surveillance footage at 

a nearby Walgreens showed Allen’s vehicle enter the Taco Tico lot and drive towards Letner’s 

vehicle. The two vehicles left the parking lot within a few minutes of each other. The confidential 

source later told law enforcement that Letner had bought five pounds of crystal methamphetamine

from Allen. 

Second, in August 2022, the confidential source informed law enforcement that Letner 

planned to meet his source again. Law enforcement observed Allen exit her residence with a tan 

handbag and get in her vehicle. Allen then parked her vehicle next to Letner at an apartment 

complex. Letner was then observed sitting inside Allen’s vehicle and exiting her vehicle with the 

same tan handbag Allen had been seen with earlier. The confidential source informed law 

enforcement that a day later he had observed nine pounds of crystal methamphetamine and an 

unknown quantity of heroin and “molly” in Letner’s residence. 

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Third, a few days after the second incident, law enforcement observed Allen and Letner 

enter the Taco Tico parking lot around the same time and leave the parking lot together. Fourth, 

about a week after the third incident, officers observed Allen leaving her residence carrying a 

brown shopping style bag. Allen then drove to Target and parked near Letner’s vehicle, which 

was already present. Letner entered Allen’s vehicle and then exited carrying the same brown bag. 

Sheriffs later conducted a traffic stop of Letner’s vehicle and found Allen’s brown bag as well as 

one pound of suspected methamphetamine and two pounds of suspected heroin or fentanyl. 

Based on this information, the government concluded that Allen utilized her residence for 

“storing and distributing illegal drugs and drug proceeds on behalf of a significant drug trafficking 

organization.” The magistrate authorized the requested search warrant. During the search, law 

enforcement discovered individual wrapped baggies containing methamphetamine and other 

drugs. Law enforcement also found a 9-millimeter loaded semi-automatic handgun in Allen’s 

dresser, next to the drugs. Nearby were two more handguns in a bedroom closet and a small purse 

in a baby bassinet with $4,300 in United States currency. After the officers recovered the drugs, 

weapons, and money from Allen’s residence, Allen was indicted for conspiracy to distribute 

methamphetamine. 

Allen moved to the suppress the evidence seized during the August 25 search, arguing that 

the search warrant was not supported by probable cause and lacked a nexus between the apartment 

and evidence sought. Adopting the magistrate judge’s recommendation, the district court denied 

Allen’s motion to suppress, finding that the affidavit established probable cause and, even if it did 

not, the good-faith exception applied. Allen then pled guilty, reserving her right to appeal the 

district court’s denial of her motion to suppress. 

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At Allen’s sentencing, the district court determined that the sentencing guidelines range 

was between 168 and 210 months. In calculating the guidelines range, the district court applied a 

two-point sentencing enhancement because Allen possessed a dangerous firearm in the 

commission of her crime. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). Allen objected to the firearm enhancement, 

but the district court overruled her objection, noting that the presence of the loaded gun next to the

drugs showed that Allen possessed the firearm during the commission of her drug conspiracy. The 

district court also rejected Allen’s argument that she was eligible for a safety valve reduction to 

her sentence. The district court noted that Allen possessed a firearm in connection with the offense 

and was not completely forthcoming with the government. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(2), (5). But 

ultimately the district court sentenced Allen to a below the guidelines sentence of 144 months in 

prison. Allen timely appealed, challenging the district court’s denial of her motion to suppress and 

its sentencing determination. 

II.

“In appeals from a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we review the 

trial court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.” United States v. 

Frazier, 423 F.3d 526, 531 (6th Cir. 2005). Ultimately, the court must accord the magistrate’s 

initial determination of probable cause “great deference.” United States v. Abernathy, 843 F.3d 

243, 250 (6th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). 

A district court’s determination of the sentencing guidelines is reviewed de novo. United 

States v. Pryor, 842 F.3d 441, 452 (6th Cir. 2016). But the district court’s factual findings made 

in the sentencing determination, including whether the “defendant possessed a firearm during a 

drug crime,” are reviewed for clear error. United States v. Benson, 591 F.3d 491, 504 (6th Cir. 

2010) (citation omitted).

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III.

Allen argues that the affidavit attached to the search warrant failed to demonstrate probable 

cause, the district court inappropriately applied a sentencing enhancement for possession of a 

firearm, and the district court was incorrect when it declined to apply a safety valve reduction to 

Allen’s sentence. We reject Allen’s arguments. First, the evidence outlined in the affidavit 

established sufficient probable cause to show a nexus between Allen’s drug trafficking and her use 

of her residence to store drugs. Second, because the government provided evidence that Allen 

constructively possessed a firearm during the commission of her conspiracy the district court’s 

decision to apply the sentencing enhancement was proper. Third, because Allen possessed a 

firearm during the commission of her conspiracy, she did not qualify for a safety valve reduction.

A.

Under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, a search warrant shall only 

issue upon “probable cause.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; see Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557 

(2004) (“The Fourth Amendment states unambiguously that no Warrants shall issue, but upon 

probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 

searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” (cleaned up)). “Probable cause for a search 

warrant exists when ‘there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found 

in a particular place.’” United States v. Frechette, 583 F.3d 374, 379 (6th Cir. 2009) (citation 

omitted). In establishing this probability, a search warrant affidavit must contain “adequate 

supporting facts about the underlying circumstances to show that probable cause exists.” United 

States v. Weaver, 99 F.3d 1372, 1377 (6th Cir. 1996). To search a specific residence, the affidavit 

must show a “nexus between the place to be searched and the evidence sought.” United States v. 

Helton, 35 F.4th 511, 518 (6th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). 

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The affidavit here established a nexus between Allen’s drug dealing activities and her 

residence. See Helton, 35 F.4th at 518. The fact that Allen went to and from her residence carrying 

bags that she later gave to Letner and that drugs were later found in his car suggests that evidence 

of drugs could be found in her home. United States v. Sanders, 106 F.4th 455, 462 (6th Cir. 2024) 

(en banc) (“Other times, circumstantial evidence will do the trick. That is so where, for instance, 

officers, after observing a person leave a location, soon find the individual possessing contraband, 

possibly even engaging in a sale involving the contraband, suggesting that the illicit materials came 

from the location.”). 

But even if the close relationship between Allen’s home and the drug dealing activity was 

not specific and direct evidence that drugs would be in the home, circumstantial evidence can 

suffice. As recently noted by this court, sitting en banc, when an affidavit establishes both where 

the defendant lives and the defendant’s active engagement in a criminal activity, an officer may 

allege, based on his experience,1that it is likely that the “criminal suspect keeps the 

instrumentalities and fruits of his crime in his residence,” and that allegation may be sufficient, in 

context, to create probable cause. Sanders, 106 F.4th at 462 (citations omitted); see, e.g., United 

States v. Reed, 993 F.3d 441, 448 (6th Cir. 2021) (“Even if no specific evidence ties drug dealing 

to a home, we have also called it ‘well established’ that a nexus to search the home can exist if a 

suspect’s drug dealing is ‘ongoing’ at the time the police seek the warrant.” (citation omitted)); 

United States v. Williams, 544 F.3d 683, 687 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e have held that an issuing judge 

may infer that drug traffickers use their homes to store drugs and otherwise further their drug 

trafficking.”); United States v. Gunter, 266 F. App’x 415, 419 (6th Cir. 2008) (noting that the Sixth 

1 The officer in this case notes in his affidavit that he has been employed by the Drug Enforcement Administration for 

thirteen and a half years. This is sufficient to show his experience without a specific affirmation that he has relied on 

it in his conclusion in the affidavit. 

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Circuit has “upheld a warrant authorizing a search of a residence despite only a limited connection 

between the residence and drug related activity”).

2

Further, even if the affidavit in the search warrant lacked probable cause, under United 

States v. Leon, the evidence would not be subject to the exclusionary rule because it was “seized 

in reasonable, good-faith reliance on [the] search warrant[.]” 468 U.S. 897, 904 (1984). 

“Following Leon, courts presented with a motion to suppress claiming a lack of probable cause 

must ask ‘whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal 

despite the magistrate’s decision.’” United States v. White, 874 F.3d 490, 496 (6th Cir. 2017) 

(citation omitted). The affidavit lacks the requisite indicia of probable cause such that a belief in 

the existence of probable cause would be objectively unreasonable if it is a “bare-bones” affidavit. 

United States v. Rose, 714 F.3d 362, 367 (6th Cir. 2013). The inquiry into whether an affidavit is 

bare bones, precluding application of the good-faith exception, “requires examination of the 

affidavit for particularized facts that indicate veracity, reliability, and basis [for] knowledge [] that 

go beyond bare conclusions and suppositions.” Id.

As discussed, the affidavit in this case is detailed and specific and establishes Allen’s drug 

dealing and her comings and goings from her residence while carrying drugs. Such evidence is 

not so objectively unreasonable as to be considered a bare-bones affidavit. Our circuit has applied

the good-faith exception in cases with a far more tenuous nexus between the residence and drug 

activity. See United States v. Carpenter, 360 F.3d 591, 596 (6th Cir. 2004) (collecting exemplars 

of the minimal bar for the good-faith exception); see also United States v. McCoy, 905 F.3d 409, 

2 However, as this court noted in Reed, there is a fine but significant line between the permissible inference, founded 

in the allegations of an experienced officer, that someone engaged in drug dealing on an ongoing basis may be storing 

drugs in her home, and an inference that “the defendant's status as a drug dealer, standing alone, gives rise to a fair 

probability that drugs will be found in his home.” Reed, 993 F.3d at 448. The former is permissible; the latter is not. 

Id. 

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417 (6th Cir. 2018) (“[A] link between the drug dealer’s activities and his home that would be 

insufficient to establish probable cause may suffice to establish good-faith reliance on the 

warrant.”). 

Because the affidavit supplied probable cause for the search and, in any event, the goodfaith exception applies, the district court did not err in denying Allen’s motion to suppress.

B.

The Sentencing Guidelines provide for a two-point increase “[i]f a dangerous weapon 

(including a firearm) was possessed” during the commission of the crime. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). 

“Once the government establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that ‘(1) the defendant 

actually or constructively “possessed” the weapon, and (2) such possession was during the 

commission of the offense,’ the burden shifts to the defendant to show that it was ‘clearly 

improbable’ that the weapon was connected to the offense.” United States. v. Catalan, 499 F.3d 

604, 606 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). In determining whether a defendant met his burden 

under the clearly improbable standard, we consider several factors:

(1) the type of firearm involved; (2) the accessibility of the weapon to the 

defendant; (3) the presence of ammunition; (4) the proximity of the weapon to illicit 

drugs, proceeds, or paraphernalia; (5) the defendant’s evidence concerning the use 

of the weapon; and (6) whether the defendant was actually engaged in drugtrafficking, rather than mere manufacturing or possession.

United States v. Kennedy, 65 F.4th 314, 318 (6th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). If the defendant 

fails to meet his burden, the district court applies the sentencing enhancement. Catalan, 499 F.3d 

604, 607–08.

Allen had clear constructive possession of the firearm as it was in a drawer in her residence. 

See United States v. Bailey, 553 F.3d 940, 944 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Constructive possession exists 

when a person does not have actual possession but instead knowingly has the power and the 

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intention at a given time to exercise dominion and control over an object either directly or through 

others. Proof that the person has dominion over the premises where the firearm is located is 

sufficient to establish constructive possession.” (cleaned up)). It does not matter that there is no 

evidence that Allen was actually using the gun while conspiring to deal drugs. The government 

need not establish such a direct connection between the firearm and the drug dealing; it need only 

show that the defendant possessed the gun during the relevant conduct (i.e., the drug conspiracy). 

United States v. West, 962 F.3d 183, 188 (6th Cir. 2020); see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B)

(describing relevant conduct as conduct “that occurred during the commission of the offense of 

conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or 

responsibility for that offense”). Thus, in cases much like this one, where weapons were found 

near drugs, and the defendant was charged in a drug conspiracy, we have held that the government 

met its initial burden where no evidence suggested the guns were actually used in the commission 

of drug sales. See, e.g., United States v. Bucio-Cabrales, 635 F. App’x 324, 338 (6th Cir. 2016). 

It is entirely plausible, as Allen argues, that she bought the guns for safety reasons. 

Nonetheless, the fact remains that, perhaps in tandem with concerns for safety, Allen possessed a 

firearm while also conspiring to deal drugs. See United States v. Hill, 79 F.3d 1477, 1486 (6th Cir. 

1996) (affirming application of firearm enhancement because, even if the gun was possessed by 

someone else in the house for their protection, it still “located in a residence to which [defendant] 

had full access and where drugs were found”). The government therefore met its initial burden. 

Allen, now having the burden upon her shoulders, fails to demonstrate that it is clearly 

improbable that the weapon was connected to the offense. If anything, the factors outlined above 

point heavily in the direction that the loaded handgun was possessed during the commission of 

Allen’s offense. Allen does not dispute the facts or provide any evidence that the drugs found next 

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to the firearm were not, or could not, have been used in the drug conspiracy. At best, she presents 

an argument for another reason she may have needed the guns in addition to drug trafficking.

To conclude, the government met its burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence 

that Allen possessed a weapon during relevant conduct to her conviction and Allen failed to present 

evidence that it would be clearly improbable that the firearms would be connected to the offense.

The application of the enhancement was appropriate.

C.

Under the safety valve provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, a district court may 

disregard a mandatory minimum sentence “if the court finds that the defendant meets the criteria 

in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1)–(5)[.]” U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a). The “defendant bears the burden of proving 

by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to relief under the safety valve.” United 

States v. Barron, 940 F.3d 903, 914 (6th Cir. 2019). 

Allen possessed a weapon during the commission of her drug conspiracy, so she cannot 

show that she “did not . . . possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon (or induce another 

participant to do so) in connection with the offense[.]”3 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(2). Not only does 

Allen present no evidence that she did not possess a weapon during the drug conspiracy, there is 

ample evidence, particularly the fact that the firearm was found near the drugs, to indicate that she 

did possess the firearm during the offense. See United States v. Mackey, 265 F.3d 457, 462–63 

(6th Cir. 2001) (noting that finding a loaded gun, easily accessible and near drug paraphernalia, is 

3

It is important to note that a district court’s application of the sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) 

does not make Allen necessarily ineligible for the safety valve reduction. See United States v. Bolka, 355 F.3d 909, 

914 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting the possibility that a defendant can satisfy the preponderance of the evidence standard 

under the safety valve provision but fail to make the “clearly improbable” showing to avoid the sentencing 

enhancement). But that is not the case here. As explained in this opinion, Allen has failed to satisfy both the 

preponderance of the evidence standard with respect to the safety valve provision and the “clearly improbable” 

showing with respect to the sentencing enhancement.

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evidence that the gun is intended “to provide defense or deterrence in furtherance of [] drug 

trafficking”). Thus, the district court did not err in declining to apply the safety valve provision.

IV.

For the reasons discussed, we affirm the district court’s denial of Allen’s motion to 

suppress and its ultimate sentencing determination.

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