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Parties Involved:
William James Harmon
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FILED . Ut1itc-d Stares Cuurt of Appeals 

'renth Cim.1ir 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

IVUV l 1990 

R.OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

WILLIAM JAMES HARMON, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

89-8094 

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On Appeal From The 

United States District Court 

For The District Of Wyoming 

(D.C. No. CR-88-0067-02J) 

Peter Robinson, Santa Rosa, California, for Defendant-Appellant. 

John R. Green, Assistant United States Attorney (Richard A. Stacy, 

United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Cheyenne, Wyoming, 

for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before McKAY and SETH, Circuit Judges, and PARKER, District 

Judge*. 

SETH, Circuit Judge. 

*Honorable James A. Parker, United States District Judge for the 

District of New Mexico, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 89-8094 Document: 01019943050 Date Filed: 11/01/1990 Page: 1 
Defendant-appellant, William James Harmon, seeks reversal of 

his conviction of aiding and abetting Thomas William Thomas in 

possession of approximately nine pounds of cocaine with intent to 

distribute in violation of 21 u.s.c. § 841(a)(l) and 18 u.s.c. 

§ 2. Defendant contends that the trial court abused its 

discretion (1) in permitting the prosecutor to call Thomas as a 

witness, and (2) in admitting evidence of other crimes under Fed. 

R. Evid. Rule 404(b). We affirm the trial court's conclusion that 

the testimony of Thomas and the evidence of other crimes was 

properly admitted. 

On July 23, 1988, Officer Dan Dyer was patrolling Interstate 

80 in Albany County, Wyoming when he noticed a pickup and camper 

pulling a long silver trailer. Believing the trailer to be of the 

type commonly used in a commercial enterprise and noticing the 

absence of a required trip permit from the port of entry or a 

sticker from the Public Service Commission, Officer Dyer pulled 

the driver over for a possible commercial vehicle violation. The 

driver, Thomas, presented Officer Dyer with his driver's license 

and indicated that he was told at the port of entry that a trip 

permit was unnecessary. Along with his California driver's 

license, Thomas produced a vehicle and trailer registration which 

showed that defendant Harmon was the owner of both. The officer 

conducted a search of the trailer and seized approximately nine 

pounds of cocaine from a sealed box attached to the front of the 

trailer. Thomas was arrested and indicted for possession with the 

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Appellate Case: 89-8094 Document: 01019943050 Date Filed: 11/01/1990 Page: 2 
intent to distribute approximately nine pounds of cocaine in 

violation of 21 u.s.c. §§ 841(a)(l) and 841(b)(l)(B)(ii). 

A suppression hearing was held in January 1989 in the 

proceedings against Thomas to determine whether the stop was 

proper and whether Thomas had given Officer Dyer permission to 

search the trailer. The officer maintained that he requested and 

was given permission to search the trailer to determine whether 

Thomas was operating a commercial enterprise. Thomas, on the 

other hand, maintained that he did not give the officer permission 

to search the trailer. The court found the officer's testimony to 

be more credible than Thomas' testimony. It concluded that the 

stop was proper and that Thomas had consented to the search. 

Defendant Harmon's ownership of the truck and trailer was 

established, and he was indicted in February 1989 after the 

indictment and suppression hearing in the proceedings against the 

driver, Thomas. Defendant was not in the truck when Thomas was 

arrested, but after being charged asserted an expectation of 

privacy to challenge the search. In this challenge he adopted the 

arguments of Thomas as to the stop and search, including the 

testimony of Thomas that no consent was given for the search. 

This testimony as to consent was contrary to that of the officer 

who made the search. 

Thomas subsequently pled guilty to the charges in the 

proceedings against him and agreed to cooperate with the 

government. Defendant Harmon then moved the court for 

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Appellate Case: 89-8094 Document: 01019943050 Date Filed: 11/01/1990 Page: 3 
reconsideration of its order denying the motion to suppress. The 

trial court denied defendant's motion. 

In a pre-trial motion, defendant moved to exclude Thomas' 

testimony because the prosecutor would be in a position of arguing 

to the jury that Thomas' testimony relating to the search was 

untruthful, but as it related to defendant's involvement it was 

truthful. The trial court denied defendant's motion and concluded 

that it was for the jury to determine Thomas' credibility, his 

ability to perceive due to his drug usage, and his motives for 

testifying. 

Defendant claims that his due process rights were violated 

when the trial court allowed the government to call Thomas as a 

witness and asks that his conviction be reversed. Specifically, 

defendant asserts that the government introduced false testimony 

through Thomas and argued inconsistent facts to the jury. We 

disagree. 

On appeal, a trial court's decision to admit or exclude 

evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. 

Eufracio-Torres, 890 F.2d 266, 272 (10th Cir.). Here, we cannot 

say that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the 

testimony of Thomas. 

Defendant cites a number of cases in support of his argument 

but places primary support on United States v. Levario, 877 F.2d 

1483 (10th Cir.). In Levario, the government used the testimony 

of a witness as to travel to California as the truth for one 

count, but asserted it was false as to another count--that of 

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Appellate Case: 89-8094 Document: 01019943050 Date Filed: 11/01/1990 Page: 4 
conspiracy. This court held that it was not possible to advance 

contradictory inferences from the testimony of one witness as to a 

single event. 

Throughout the case before us the government maintained that 

Officer Dyer's testimony concerning the consent to search was its 

theory of the case and not that of Thomas as to the consent to 

search issue. The government did adopt Thomas' testimony that the 

defendant was involved in the transportation of cocaine from 

California to Michigan. The government did not argue that Thomas' 

testimony was untruthful concerning the search and truthful as to 

defendant's involvement as defendant would have us believe. On 

the contrary, a review of the transcript shows that the prosecutor 

reminded the jury that it was its job to assess Thomas' 

credibility by looking into his motives, law enforcement problems 

and ability to perceive the events of July 23, 1988. These 

avenues were fully explored by defense counsel on crossexamination as well. 

Defendant also cites to Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, and 

Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, in support of his 

contention. These are readily distinguishable. In Giglio, a 

witness testified that he was not given a promise of leniency when 

in actuality, the government had promised him leniency. The court 

held that the government's failure to correct that witness' false 

testimony constituted a violation of due process. In Napue, 

reversal of a conviction was mandated for a violation of the 

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Appellate Case: 89-8094 Document: 01019943050 Date Filed: 11/01/1990 Page: 5 
defendant's due process rights where the government knowingly and 

willingly offered false testimony concerning a plea agreement. 

Here, defendant did not show that the government knowingly 

presented false testimony to the jury. The government may have 

believed that Officer Dyer was more credible and concentrated on 

presenting that theory to the jury, but there was no concrete 

evidence as to which story was correct as to this typically gray 

issue. It was a factual dispute as to which story was more 

credible, and the trial court properly presented that issue to the 

jury for its determination. 

The government offered Thomas' testimony and reminded the 

jury that it was its job to determine his credibility and 

reliability as a witness. rn addition, the trial court instructed 

the jury that it could assign whatever weight it believed the 

testimony merited. The fact that the jury chose to believe 

Officer Dyer's testimony as to the search and Thomas' testimony as 

to defendant's involvement does not appear unusual, nor does the 

fact that the government chose to introduce testimony from both 

witnesses constitute the procurement of false testimony. We 

conclude that the testimony was properly presented to the jury and 

affirm the trial court. 

Defendant also contends that the trial court abused its 

discretion in allowing Thomas to testify, under Fed. R. Evid. Rule 

404(b), concerning prior trips in which he transported cocaine for 

the defendant. Defendant does not dispute the relevance of this 

evidence as to the issue of his knowledge, but contends that the 

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Appellate Case: 89-8094 Document: 01019943050 Date Filed: 11/01/1990 Page: 6 
trial court erred in failing to balance the probative value of 

Thomas' uncorroborated testimony against its prejudicial impact. 

Although the government concedes that the trial court did not make 

a finding as to its probative value at the first hearing, the 

government contends that the trial court did adequately address 

the issue, and the testimony was properly admitted. 

A trial court has broad discretion in striking a balance 

between probative value and unfair prejudice. United States v. 

Nolan, 551 F.2d 266, 271 (10th Cir.). A trial court's decision to 

admit or exclude evidence will be reversed only for an abuse of 

discretion. United States v. McKinnell, 888 F.2d 669, 676 (10th 

Cir.) . 

Once the court finds that the prior acts are admissible under 

Rule 404(b), it is required to balance the probative value of the 

evidence against the prejudice to the defendant under Rule 403. 

United States v. Record, 873 F.2d 1363, 1375 (10th Cir.). The 

record supports the trial court's procedure and determination that 

the probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect of the 

evidence. The court weighed the testimony, articulated its 

purpose for admitting the testimony and determined that its 

probative value outweighed it prejudicial effect towards 

defendant. 

Defendant asserts that Thomas' testimony was uncorroborated 

and directs us to United States v. Shepherd, 739 F.2d 510 (10th 

Cir.), as precedent for reversal. We find Shepherd not 

applicable. Unlike Shepherd, Thomas' testimony regarding the 

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Appellate Case: 89-8094 Document: 01019943050 Date Filed: 11/01/1990 Page: 7 
trips he made to Michigan, the mode of transportation, the 

payment, and the meetings in Michigan between the defendant and 

himself were not disputed. In addition, Thomas' testimony was 

corroborated by fingerprint evidence and Tom Neely's testimony. 

The court gave a cautionary instruction on accomplice testimony. 

United States v. Hill, 627 F.2d 1052 (10th Cir.). 

AFFIRMED. 

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