Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-50528/USCOURTS-ca9-13-50528-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jose Alvarado-Pineda
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JOSE ALVARADO-PINEDA, AKA Jose

Alvarado-Pinedo,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-50528

D.C. No.

3:12-cr-00537-

BTM-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Barry T. Moskowitz, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

November 20, 2014—Pasadena, California

Filed December 19, 2014

Before: A. Wallace Tashima, William A. Fletcher,

and Jay S. Bybee, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge W. Fletcher

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2 UNITED STATES V. ALVARADO-PINEDA

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

Affirming a conviction for illegal reentry, the panel held

that a conviction of second-degree robbery under section

9A.56.190 of the Revised Code of Washington is a “theft

offense,” and that such a conviction, accompanied by a

sentence of imprisonment of at least one year, therefore

qualifies as an “aggravated felony” under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(43)(G).

The panel concluded that because the defendant’s

aggravated felony conviction renders him ineligible for relief

from his underlying removal orders, he suffered no prejudice

from any procedural defects that may have occurred in the

removal proceedings, and the district court therefore correctly

denied his motion to dismiss the indictment based on those

alleged defects.

COUNSEL

Joseph M. McMullen (argued), San Diego, California, for

Defendant-Appellant.

Christopher Alexander (argued), Assistant United States

Attorney, and Bruce R. Castetter, Chief, Appellate Section,

Criminal Division, Office of the United States Attorney, San

Diego, California, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. ALVARADO-PINEDA 3

OPINION

W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:

In this appeal, we must decide whether a defendant

convicted of second-degree robbery under section 9A.56.190

of the Revised Code of Washington and sentenced to prison

for at least one year has been convicted of an aggravated

felony under federal law. We hold that he has.

I. Background

Jose Alvarado-Pineda is a 29-year-old Mexican national

who first entered the United States in about 2003. In 2004, he

stole a wallet in Seattle, Washington, and was convicted of

second-degree robbery in violation of section 9A.56.190 of

the Revised Code of Washington. In 2005, while serving a

14-month prison sentence, he was served with a notice

informing him of the Department of Homeland Security

(“DHS”)’s intent to issue a final administrative removal

order. The notice alleged that Alvarado-Pineda had been

convicted of an aggravated felony — the robbery — and

charged him as removable on that basis. Alvarado-Pineda

signed the portion of the notice admitting the allegations and

the charge, and waiving his right to an appeal. He was

removed to Mexico three days later.

Over the next six years, Alvarado-Pineda reentered the

United States three times. Each time, he was apprehended. 

After his first reentry, in 2005, he was charged with two

counts of illegal entry in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1325. He

pled guilty to the charges and was sentenced to twelve

months in prison. In 2006, after serving that sentence, he was

served with a notice to appear; he stipulated to his

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4 UNITED STATES V. ALVARADO-PINEDA

removability, waiving his right to a hearing and an appeal,

and was removed to Mexico. After his second reentry, in

2006, he was charged with illegal reentry in violation of

8 U.S.C. § 1326. He pled guilty to a lesser charge of illegal

entry, and was sentenced to four years in prison. In the

written plea agreement, Alvarado-Pineda agreed to a

stipulated removal and to “waive[] any right to appeal, reopen

or challenge” the subsequently entered removal order. In

2010, near the end of his prison term, DHS reinstated

Alvarado-Pineda’s 2006 removal order, and removed him to

Mexico.

In 2011, Alvarado-Pineda reentered the United States for

a third and final time. He was apprehended near the U.S.-

Mexico border and was indicted on one count of illegal

reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Before the district

court, Alvarado-Pineda moved to dismiss the indictment on

the ground that his prior removal orders had been entered in

violation of his Fifth Amendment due process rights. The

district court denied the motion and, after a bench trial,

convicted Alvarado-Pineda of illegal reentry. This appeal

followed.

II. Discussion

We review de novo the denial of a motion to dismiss an

indictment under 8 U.S.C. § 1326 when the motion is based

on alleged due process defects in an underlying deportation

proceeding. United States v. Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d

1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2004).

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UNITED STATES V. ALVARADO-PINEDA 5

A

“To convict an alien criminal defendant of illegal reentry

under 8 U.S.C. § 1326, the government must prove that the

alien left the United States under order of exclusion,

deportation, or removal, and then illegally reentered.” United

States v. Barajas-Alvarado, 655 F.3d 1077, 1079 (9th Cir.

2011) (internal footnote omitted). A noncitizen charged with

illegal reentry therefore “has a Fifth Amendment right to

collaterally attack his removal order because the removal

order serves as a predicate element of his conviction.” 

Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d at 1047; see also United States v.

Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 837–38 (1987). Since 1996,

that right has been codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d).

To mount a collateral attack under § 1326(d),

a defendant must, within constitutional

limitations, demonstrate (1) that he exhausted

all administrative remedies available to him to

appeal his removal order, (2) that the

underlying removal proceedings at which the

order was issued improperly deprived him of

the opportunity for judicial review, and

(3) that the entry of the order was

fundamentally unfair.

Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d at 1048; see 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d).

An underlying order is “fundamentally unfair” if (1) a

defendant’s due process rights were violated by defects in his

underlying deportation proceeding, and (2) he suffered

prejudice as a result of the defects. Ubaldo-Figueroa,

364 F.3d at 1048.

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6 UNITED STATES V. ALVARADO-PINEDA

As a general matter, a defendant who has been convicted

of an aggravated felony cannot show that he was prejudiced

by defects in his underlying proceedings. United States v.

Garcia-Martinez, 228 F.3d 956, 963–64 (9th Cir. 2000). This

is so because noncitizens convicted of aggravated felonies are

removable on that basis, see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii),

and are ineligible for almost all forms of discretionary relief. 

See id. § 1228(b)(5) (barring persons not admitted into the

United States, and convicted of aggravated felonies, from

“any relief from removal that the Attorney General may grant

in the Attorney General’s discretion”); see also id.

§ 1158(b)(2)(B)(i) (barring persons convicted of aggravated

felonies from applying for asylum); id. § 1229b(a)(3)

(cancellation of removal); id. § 1229c(a)(1) (voluntary

departure).

There are exceptions to this general rule, but they are not

relevant here. For example, a person who has been convicted

of some statutorily enumerated aggravated felonies, but who

is otherwise eligible to apply for admission into the United

States, may apply for a waiver of inadmissibility under

8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). See Negrete-Ramirez v. Holder, 741 F.3d

1047, 1053–54 (9th Cir. 2014). An aggravated felony

conviction also does not automatically bar an application for

certain forms of hardship relief, including withholding of

removal, see 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), and a T- or U-visa, see

id. § 1101(a)(15)(T), (U). Alvarado-Pineda has not

demonstrated that he has “plausible grounds for relief” under

any of these provisions, or that any other exceptions apply. 

United States v. Gonzalez-Valerio, 342 F.3d 1051, 1054 (9th

Cir. 2003).

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UNITED STATES V. ALVARADO-PINEDA 7

Accordingly, if Alvarado-Pineda was convicted of an

aggravated felony, his collateral attacks based on alleged

procedural defects must necessarily fail.

B

The government offers two reasons why Washington

second-degree robbery constitutes an aggravated felony. It

argues that (1) it is a “crime of violence,” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(43)(F); and (2) it is a “theft offense,” id.

§ 1101(a)(43)(G). If second-degree robbery under

Washington law is either a crime of violence or a theft

offense, a defendant convicted of violating the statute and

sentenced to a “term of imprisonment [of] at least one year”

has been convicted of an aggravated felony. Id.

§ 1101(a)(43)(F), (G). The district court concluded that

second-degree robbery is a “crime of violence,” and on that

basis held that Alvarado-Pineda, who was sentenced to a 14-

month prison term, had been convicted of an aggravated

felony. We affirm on a different ground: we hold that a

conviction under the statute is a conviction of a “theft

offense.”

Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, a statute may

qualify as an aggravated felony if it is a “theft offense.” 

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G). We have defined generic “theft”

as “a taking of property or an exercise of control over

property without consent with the criminal intent to deprive

the owner of the rights and benefits of ownership.” United

States v. Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d 1201, 1205 (9th Cir.

2002) (en banc) (quoting Hernandez-Mancilla v. INS,

246 F.3d 1002, 1009 (7th Cir. 2001)). Generic theft, in other

words, requires (1) the taking of (2) property (3) without

consent (4) with the intent “to deprive the owner of rights and

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8 UNITED STATES V. ALVARADO-PINEDA

benefits of ownership.” See id.; see also Mandujano-Real v.

Mukasey, 526 F.3d 585, 589–90 (9th Cir. 2008).

To determine whether a defendant has been convicted of

a “generic” crime, such as theft, we employ the categorical

approach. That is, we “compare the elements of the statute

forming the basis of the defendant’s conviction with the

elements of the ‘generic’ crime.” Descamps v. United States,

133 S. Ct. 2276, 2281 (2013). “The prior conviction qualifies

as [the generic offense] only if the statute’s elements are the

same as, or narrower than, those of the generic offense.” Id.

A state offense qualifies as a generic offense — and

therefore, in this case, as an aggravated felony — only if “the

‘full range of conduct covered by [the state statute] falls

within the meaning’” of the generic offense. MandujanoReal, 526 F.3d at 589 (quoting Martinez-Perez v. Gonzales,

417 F.3d 1022, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005)).

The State of Washington defines second-degree robbery

as the “tak[ing of] personal property from the person of

another or in his or her presence against his or her will,”

when accompanied by the use of force or the fear of injury. 

Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.56.190. Though the statute does not

explicitly provide that specific intent to steal is an element of

the crime, the state courts have so held. State v. Sublett,

292 P.3d 715, 730 (Wash. 2012). The crime thus “requires

(1) taking (2) personal property (3) from another person or

from another’s immediate presence (4) against his or her will

(5) by force or threatened force (6) with the specific intent to

steal.” Id. A comparison of the elements of the statute to the

elements of generic theft makes clear that the “full range of

conduct” criminalized byWashington second-degree robbery

falls within the meaning of generic theft in that both require

(1) the taking of (2) personal property (3) without consent and

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UNITED STATES V. ALVARADO-PINEDA 9

(4) with the specific intent to steal. One leading treatise

states that “[r]obbery consists of all [the] elements of larceny

. . . plus two additional requirements”: that the property be

taken from the victim’s presence, and that the taking be

accomplished by means of force or fear. 3 Wayne R. LaFave,

Substantive Criminal Law § 20.3 (2d ed. 2003). In

Washington, as elsewhere, theft is a lesser-included offense

of robbery. State v. Satterlee, 361 P.2d 168, 169 (Wash.

1961); State v. Herrera, 977 P.2d 12, 13 n.1 (Wash. Ct. App.

1999); see also LaFave, supra, § 20.3 n.2. That is, a

defendant charged with robbery can be convicted of theft if

the evidence of force or fear is insufficient to sustain a guilty

verdict on robbery.

Alvarado-Pineda cites Washington cases that define

somewhat broadly the “force” required by the statute. See

State v. Ammlung, 644 P.2d 717, 721 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982)

(“Any force or threat, no matter how slight, which induces an

owner to part with his property is sufficient to sustain a

robbery conviction.”). While this authority might bear on

whether Washington second-degree robbery is a “crime of

violence” — a question we do not reach — it has little

relevance to whether the statute criminalizes the essential

elements of theft.

We conclude that a conviction for Washington seconddegree robbery, where accompanied by a sentence of at least

one year, qualifies as an “aggravated felony” under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(43)(G). Because Alvarado-Pineda was sentenced

to a 14-month prison term, he was convicted of an aggravated

felony.

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10 UNITED STATES V. ALVARADO-PINEDA

Conclusion

Because we conclude that Alvarado-Pineda was convicted

of an aggravated felony in 2004, we need not decide whether

his underlying removal proceedings were defective, or

whether the plea agreement he signed in 2007 bars him from

attacking those proceedings. Because he is ineligible for

relief, he suffered no prejudice from any procedural defects

that may have occurred, and the district court correctly denied

his motion to dismiss his indictment.

AFFIRMED.

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