Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-23-01887/USCOURTS-ca4-23-01887-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Matthew Christiansen
Appellee
Justin Davis
Appellee
Chris Figaretti
Appellant
Belinda Moss

Judd Uhl
Appellant
Andrew Waldron

West Virginia Parents for Religious Freedom
Appellant
Mindy Wilson

Document Text:

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-1887

WEST VIRGINIA PARENTS FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM; PASTOR CHRIS 

FIGARETTI; JUDD UHL, individually and on behalf of their minor children, and 

on behalf of others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs – Appellants,

and

ANDREW WALDRON,

Plaintiff,

v.

DR. MATTHEW CHRISTIANSEN, in his official capacity as the State Health 

Officer; JUSTIN DAVIS, in his official capacity as the Interim Commissioner for 

the Bureau of Public Health,

Defendants – Appellees,

and

BELINDA MOSS, in her official capacity as the Principal Administrator of Cheat 

Lake Elementary School; MINDY WILSON, in her official capacity as the Principal 

Administrator of the Jefferson Elementary Center,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at

Wheeling. John Preston Bailey, District Judge. (5:23-cv-00158-JPB)

Argued: September 25, 2024 Decided: December 31, 2024

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Before KING, BENJAMIN, and BERNER, Circuit Judges. 

Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge King wrote the opinion, in which 

Judge Benjamin joined. Judge Berner wrote a dissenting opinion.

ARGUED: Christopher David Wiest, Covington, Kentucky, for Appellants. Jonathan Zak 

Ritchie, HISSAM FORMAN DONOVAN RITCHIE PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, 

for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Aaron Siri, Elizabeth A. Brehm, Walker Moller, SIRI & 

GLIMSTAD LLP, New York, New York, for Appellants. Michael B. Hissam, Maureen 

F. Gleason, HISSAM FORMAN DONOVAN RITCHIE PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, 

for Appellees.

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KING, Circuit Judge:

The Plaintiffs herein seek appellate relief from an abstention ruling made against 

them in August 2023 in the Northern District of West Virginia. See W. Va. Parents for 

Religious Freedom v. Christiansen, 685 F. Supp. 3d 371 (N.D.W.Va. 2023) (the 

“Abstention Ruling”). By their Complaint, the Plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 

sought declaratory and injunctive relief against Dr. Matthew Christiansen, the State Health 

Officer and Commissioner of the West Virginia Bureau of Public Health (the 

“Commissioner”). The Complaint alleges a single First Amendment claim, i.e., that West 

Virginia’s mandatory vaccination requirement for children — section 16-3-4 of the West 

Virginia Code (the “Vaccination Mandate”) — is unconstitutional under the Free Exercise 

Clause of the First Amendment.

1

In its Abstention Ruling, the district court applied the so-called Pullman abstention 

doctrine and did not resolve the Free Exercise claim alleged in the Complaint. See R.R.

Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). As our colleague Judge Niemeyer

recognized recently in Sonda v. W. Va. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n, the Pullman 

abstention doctrine is described thusly:

[T]he Pullman exception may be applied when there is (1) an unclear issue 

of state law presented for decision (2) the resolution of which may moot or 

present in a different posture the federal constitutional issues such that the 

state law issue is potentially dispositive.

1 The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment provides that “Congress shall 

make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 

thereof . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. I.

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See 92 F.4th 213, 219 (4th Cir. Jan. 31, 2024) (cleaned up). As explained herein, we are 

satisfied that — in these circumstances — the Abstention Ruling was erroneously made,

and we therefore vacate and remand.

I.

A.

Pursuant to West Virginia law, the public school attendance of all children in the 

State aged six to seventeen is mandated, with exceptions for private schooling, parochial 

schooling, learning pods, microschooling, and home schooling. See W. Va. Code §§ 18-

8-1–1a. In order for the State’s children to attend a public, private, or parochial school,

however, their parents are obliged to comply with the Vaccination Mandate. Pursuant 

thereto, those children are required to be immunized against “chickenpox, hepatitis-b, 

measles, meningitis, mumps, diphtheria, polio, rubella, tetanus, and whooping cough.” See 

W. Va. Code § 16-3-4(b). 

The Commissioner is authorized, however, to exempt a child from the Vaccination 

Mandate “upon sufficient medical evidence that immunization is contraindicated or there 

exists a specific precaution to a particular vaccine.” See W. Va. Code § 16-3-4(h). A 

request for an exemption from the Vaccination Mandate must be accompanied by a 

certification of a licensed physician “stating that the physical condition of the child is such 

that immunization is contraindicated or there exists a specific precaution to a particular 

vaccine.” See W. Va. Code § 16-3-4(h)(1). The West Virginia Code does not authorize 

the Commissioner to issue an exemption authorized for religious reasons.

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B.

On April 26, 2023, the Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in the Northern District of West 

Virginia. They sued the Commissioner in his official capacities and pleaded their single 

claim — that the Vaccination Mandate contravenes the Free Exercise Clause of the First 

Amendment.

2

 More specifically, the Plaintiffs simply contend that the Vaccination

Mandate is unconstitutional because there is no exemption for religious purposes.

Two days after the Complaint was filed, on April 28, 2023, the Plaintiffs moved for 

a preliminary injunction and sought expedited consideration of their § 1983 Free Exercise 

claim. The parties promptly submitted supporting and opposing briefs, and the district 

court, on May 10, heard oral argument from the lawyers.3

 On May 18, the district court 

entered an order denying the preliminary injunction request, ruling that the Plaintiffs had 

failed to demonstrate a substantial threat of irreparable injury if an injunction was denied. 

See J.A. 210–14.

4

 The court explained that the 2022-23 school year was ending soon, and 

“[P]laintiffs will not be forced to choose between religious conviction and mandatory 

2 Pursuant to § 1983 of Title 42, an individual can sue government officials and 

others acting “under the color of state law” for a civil rights violation.

3 Two amicus curiae participants — The Center for Rural Health Development, Inc. 

and the Attorney General of West Virginia — came forth and made submissions in the

preliminary injunction proceedings. The Center for Rural Health Department supported 

the Commissioner, and the Attorney General supported the Plaintiffs. Neither has 

participated in this appeal. 

4 Our citations herein to “J.A. ___” refer to the Joint Appendix filed herein by 

the parties.

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vaccination for several additional months.” See J.A. 214. The court also established an 

expedited briefing schedule for the relevant issues. 

Soon thereafter, the Plaintiffs and the Commissioner each moved for summary 

judgment. The Plaintiffs contended that the Vaccination Mandate plainly contravenes the 

Free Exercise Clause. The Commissioner made three contentions in response, arguing in 

what was designated as a cross-motion for summary judgment: (1) that the district court 

should abstain from resolving the Free Exercise claim, pursuant to the Pullman abstention 

doctrine; (2) that the Plaintiffs had failed to sue the proper State official, were unable to

satisfy the Ex Parte Young exception to sovereign immunity, and that the lack of 

redressability undermined Article III standing; and (3) that the Vaccination Mandate is 

constitutional and does not contravene the Free Exercise Clause. 

The Commissioner’s summary judgment brief advised the district court of a recent

State enactment — called the Equal Protection for Religion Act (the “EPRA”) — that was

passed by the West Virginia legislature in March 2023 and made effective on May 29, 

2023. The Commissioner asserted — in arguing for Pullman abstention — that the state 

courts should be accorded an initial opportunity to assess how EPRA impacted the

Vaccination Mandate.

5

 The Commissioner also pointed out that the Vaccination Mandate 

5 The ERPA provides, inter alia, as follows:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no state action may . . . 

[s]ubstantially burden a person’s exercise of religion unless applying the 

burden to that person’s exercise of religion in a particular situation is 

(Continued)

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had been upheld by our Court several years ago in the face of constitutional challenges, 

that is, in Workman v. Mingo Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 419 Fed. App’x 348 (4th Cir. 2011)

(unpublished) (holding that Vaccination Mandate does not contravene, inter alia, Free 

Exercise Clause). 

By its Abstention Ruling of August 2, 2023, the district court denied the Plaintiffs’ 

summary judgment request, resolved to abstain from the Free Exercise claim, and did not 

reach, address, or resolve the Commissioner’s substantive contentions. The Abstention 

Ruling decided that the Pullman abstention doctrine applied to the situation presented and 

that a stay of the proceedings was warranted on that basis, stating that an EPRA claim “has 

the potential to resolve this issue without this Court having to render an opinion on a 

substantial federal constitutional question.” See Abstention Ruling, 685 F. Supp. 3d at 379.

The Abstention Ruling explicitly recited that the court would “abstain from ruling on the 

substantive issues presented by this case” and “stay[ed] this matter until such time that the 

essential to further a compelling governmental interest; and is the least 

restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.

See W. Va. Code § 35-1A-1(a). EPRA purports to create a cause of action for any “person 

whose exercise of religion has been substantially burdened, or is likely to be substantially 

burdened” in violation of the Act. Id. at § 35-1A-1(b)(1). No West Virginia state court 

has heretofore applied or construed EPRA. 

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claims addressed herein are presented to the state courts of West Virginia.” Id.

6

 The 

Plaintiffs thereupon filed a notice of appeal, seeking reversal of the Abstention Ruling. 

In their appellate submissions, the parties each addressed the jurisdictional issue 

presented, in that the Abstention Ruling appears to be a non-final interlocutory order. The 

Plaintiffs contended that appellate jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, in that the 

Abstention Ruling placed them “effectively out of court.” Alternatively, the Plaintiffs

argued that appellate jurisdiction exists under the “collateral order doctrine.” The 

Commissioner’s brief agreed with the Plaintiffs’ jurisdictional contentions. 

Of importance, Judge Niemeyer’s recent Sonda decision has now resolved the

jurisdictional issue in favor of the Plaintiffs. See Sonda v. W. Va. Oil & Gas Conservation 

Comm’n, 94 F.4th 213, 218 (4th Cir. Jan. 31, 2024) (recognizing that § 1291 final order 

jurisdiction, as well as collateral order jurisdiction, are proper in appeal from stay order 

predicated on Pullman abstention). Pursuant to Sonda’s thorough explanation of its

jurisdictional ruling, we possess jurisdiction in this appeal.7

 

6 The Abstention Ruling denied the summary judgment request of the Plaintiffs and 

awarded the abstention request interposed by the Commissioner. The Abstention Ruling 

was entitled — apparently with a misnomer — as: 

Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and for Permanent 

Injunction and Granting Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.

See Abstention Ruling, 685 F. Supp. 3d at 371 (emphasis added). 

7 The Sonda decision was rendered on January 31, 2024, almost six months after the 

Abstention Ruling. Sonda’s rulings bear substantially on the controlling issues herein, and 

they constrain our resolution of this appeal. 

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II.

We are obliged to review a district court’s Pullman abstention decision for abuse of 

discretion. See Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. Frost, 4 F.3d 244, 250 

(4th Cir. 1993). And an abuse of discretion occurs when the district court is guided by an 

erroneous legal principle. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 401–02 

(1990). Importantly, however, “there is little or no discretion to abstain in a case which 

does not meet traditional abstention requirements.” See Martin v. Stewart, 499 F.3d 360, 

363 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). And “[w]hether a case satisfies the 

basic requirements of abstention” is a legal question that we review de novo. See Myles 

Lumber Co. v. CNA Fin. Corp., 233 F.3d 821, 823 (4th Cir. 2000).

III.

A.

The Plaintiffs pursue three contentions in arguing that the district court abused its 

discretion in abstaining under the Pullman abstention doctrine. First, they contend that the 

Abstention Ruling fails to satisfy the requirements of Pullman abstention. Second, the 

Plaintiffs contend that the Abstention Ruling improperly created a state court exhaustion 

requirement — compelling a West Virginia plaintiff pursuing a § 1983 claim under the 

Free Exercise Clause to first exhaust that claim in a state court. Third, they contend that 

Pullman abstention is not warranted in this situation, where the challenged state law, in 

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their view, plainly violates the Free Exercise Clause. As explained herein, we are satisfied 

that the Abstention Ruling is fatally flawed. 

B.

Put simply, a federal court’s decision to abstain from the exercise of its jurisdiction 

is “the exception, not the rule.” See Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 236 

(1984) (internal quotations omitted). And as a general proposition, as Judge Niemeyer 

emphasized in Sonda, “a federal court, whose jurisdiction has been invoked, must exercise 

that jurisdiction and address the matter before it.” See Sonda v. W. Va. Oil and Gas 

Conservation Comm’n, 92 F.4th 213, 219 (4th Cir. Jan. 31, 2024) (emphasis in the 

original). Indeed, “[t]he Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed that federal courts have 

a strict duty to exercise the jurisdiction that is conferred upon them by Congress.” See 

Martin v. Stewart, 499 F.3d 360, 363 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

As Sonda also emphasized, that duty constitutes a “virtually unflagging obligation.” See 

92 F.4th at 219 (internal quotation marks omitted).

There are multiple abstention doctrines — including Pullman abstention — that 

constitute “extraordinary and narrow exceptions to a federal court’s duty to exercise the 

jurisdiction conferred on it.” See Sonda, 92 F.4th at 219 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Again, — repetition sometimes being helpful — the Pullman abstention doctrine only 

applies where:

[T]here is (1) an unclear issue of state law presented for decision (2) the 

resolution of which may moot or present in a different posture the federal 

constitutional issue such that the state law issue is potentially dispositive.

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Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). As a result, Pullman abstention can only be invoked 

to avoid the unnecessary adjudication of a federal constitutional issue and to prevent 

friction between federal and state legal principles. See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 236.

Pullman abstention is typically reserved for a situation where the state law being 

presented is unclear and could be interpreted in a way that avoids the federal constitutional 

issue. See City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 467 (1987). And Pullman abstention is 

not applicable if the state law is not subject to an interpretation that would render 

unnecessary the adjudication of a federal constitutional question. See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 

236 (quoting Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 535 (1965)) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that abstention should only be 

invoked in “special circumstances,” after careful consideration of the applicable facts, due 

to litigation delays that can be caused by abstention. See Harris Cnty. Comm’rs Ct. v. 

Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 83 (1975). And an exercise of caution by a court abstaining in a Free 

Exercise claim is particularly important, because the delay may impact the exercise of 

religious freedoms. Indeed, the Court has “been particularly reluctant to abstain in cases 

involving facial challenges based on the First Amendment.” See City of Houston, 482 U.S. 

at 467.

With these authorities in mind, we turn to resolution of this appeal. As the Plaintiffs 

correctly contend, the only state law presented for decision here is the Vaccination 

Mandate. On the other hand, the only state law identified as being unclear is the recently 

adopted EPRA. And the Plaintiffs are not challenging the Vaccination Mandate under 

EPRA. Rather, the Plaintiffs pursue their Free Exercise claim solely under the Free 

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Exercise Clause. Otherwise stated, they consider and steadfastly maintain that EPRA is 

irrelevant.

If the Plaintiffs had deemed it appropriate, they could have sought to pursue a claim 

under EPRA. As the Supreme Court has emphasized, however, “abstention cannot be 

ordered simply to give state courts the first opportunity to vindicate the federal claim.” See 

Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 251 (1967) (discussing McNeese v. Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S. 

668 (1963)). And the Court has also recognized that abstention is not justified when “the 

plaintiffs might have sought relief under a similar provision of the state constitution.” See 

Examining Bd. of Engr’s, Architects, and Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 598 

(1976); see also Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 439 (1971); Midkiff, 467 U.S. 

229, 237 n.4. 

Finally, the Commissioner argues — perhaps hoping the federal courts set off on a

“wild goose chase” — that abstention under the Pullman doctrine is proper in these 

circumstances. But the Pullman abstention doctrine requires that the federal claim

“present” an unclear issue of state law, or that the federal court will have to “interpret an 

unclear state law.” See Nivens v. Gilchrist, 444 F.3d 237, 246 (4th Cir. 2006); see also 

Sonda, 92 F.4th at 219. Again, EPRA — the Commissioner’s assertedly unclear state law 

— is not “presented” as unclear in connection with the Free Exercise claim, and the district 

court was not “required” to interpret it.8

 

8 Although the Commissioner also asserts that an assessment of strict scrutiny and 

rational basis standards of review are somehow impacted by EPRA, those assertions are 

akin to a “red herring.” The West Virginia legislature is not empowered to bind a federal 

(Continued)

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Anticipating that he could receive an adverse decision from us on the Abstention 

Ruling, the Commissioner alternatively argued that we should resolve this appeal by 

awarding judgment to him based on his contentions regarding Ex Parte Young and Article 

III standing. But — as we have emphasized may times — we are a “court of review, not 

of first view.” See Moses Enter., LLC v. Lexington Ins. Co., 66 F.4th 523, 529 (4th Cir. 

2023) (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 718 n.7 (2005)). So, we will be content

to leave resolution of the issues concerning Ex Parte Young and Article III standing to the 

sound judgment of the district court. As his final alternative, if those contentions fail, the 

Commissioner urges that we remand for the district court to resolve the Free Exercise 

claim. 

In these circumstances, we are satisfied that the district court erred in applying the

Pullman abstention doctrine, and that it abused its discretion in making the Abstention

Ruling. We will therefore vacate and remand for further proceedings. Those proceedings 

should include resolution of the Commissioner’s Ex Parte Young and Article III standing

contentions, and, if necessary, the Plaintiffs’ Free Exercise claim.

9

 

court, and it cannot require us to apply strict scrutiny principles to a federal legal issue. 

Nor could the West Virginia legislature offer controlling guidance to the federal courts on 

when or whether strict scrutiny should be applied. See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of 

Med. Exam’rs, 375 U.S. 411 (1964) (recognizing “the primacy of the federal judiciary in 

deciding questions of federal law”). 

9 If the district court’s remand proceedings reach the merits of the Free Exercise 

claim, the court should assess the applicability of our 2011 decision in Workman v. Mingo 

Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 419 Fed. App’x 348 (4th Cir. 2011) (unpublished). As noted, we have 

therein already ruled, inter alia, that the Vaccination Mandate does not contravene the Free 

Exercise Clause. And although that decision was not published, it was unanimously 

(Continued)

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IV. 

Pursuant to the foregoing, we vacate the Abstention Ruling and remand for such 

other and further proceedings as may be appropriate. 

VACATED AND REMANDED

rendered after full briefing and oral argument, and on the basis of Jacobson v. 

Massachusetts and its progeny. See 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 

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BERNER, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

In light of the deference owed to the district court, I would affirm its decision to 

abstain. Two conditions must exist for a federal court to invoke Pullman abstention. See

R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). The doctrine applies only where 

“there is (1) an unclear issue of state law presented for decision (2) the resolution of which 

may moot or present in a different posture the federal constitutional issue such that the state 

law issue is potentially dispositive.” Wise v. Circosta, 978 F.3d 93, 101 (4th Cir. 2020) (en 

banc) (citation omitted). Whether a case meets these two basic requirements is reviewed 

de novo. See Erie Ins. Exch. v. Md. Ins. Admin., 105 F.4th 145, 149 (4th Cir. 2024). If a 

case fulfills both prerequisites, however, “we review the district court’s ultimate decision 

to abstain for abuse of discretion.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Unlike the majority, I believe this case comfortably satisfies both Pullman

prerequisites. Plaintiffs argue that Section 16-3-4 of the West Virginia Code (the 

Vaccination Mandate) is unlawful. They seek to challenge the Vaccination Mandate under 

the Free Exercise Clause of the United States Constitution. The answer to an unclear 

question of West Virginia law, however, may moot their federal constitutional claim or, at 

the very least, present their case “in a different posture.” Wise, 978 F.3d at 101. Whether 

the Vaccination Mandate violates West Virginia’s Equal Protection for Religion Act (the 

EPRA) is an open and fundamentally different question from whether the Vaccination 

Mandate violates the Free Exercise Clause. West Virginia state courts’ resolution of the 

former may obviate the federal courts’ need to decide the latter. 

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This case satisfies the first Pullman requirement because there is “an unclear issue 

of state law presented for decision.” Wise, 978 F.3d at 101. No one disputes that the 

Vaccination Mandate’s legality under the EPRA is an unsettled question of West Virginia 

law. The EPRA establishes that strict scrutiny applies to any state regulation that 

substantially burdens religion. W. Va. Code § 35-1A-1. The statute applies 

“[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law,” id. § 35-1A-1(a), and Plaintiffs argue that 

the Vaccination Mandate substantially burdens religion. Plaintiffs decline to pursue a state 

law claim, but the West Virginia Attorney General, writing in support of the Plaintiffs as 

amicus curiae before the district court, asserted that the Vaccination Mandate’s lack of a 

religious exemption is unlawful under the EPRA. See J.A. 219, 224-25. 

In arguing that this case fails to satisfy the first Pullman factor, Plaintiffs misread 

the phrase “presented for decision,” Wise, 978 F.3d at 101. According to Plaintiffs, there 

cannot be “an unclear issue of state law presented for decision,” id., unless a litigant raises 

a state law claim. Plaintiffs contend that “[w]hether or not the [Vaccination Mandate] 

violates the EPRA has not been ‘presented for decision’ because it is not and never has 

been at issue in this litigation as Plaintiffs have not asked a federal court to interpret that 

statute.” Plaintiffs’ Opening Br. 30-31. In Plaintiffs’ view, “[t]he only claim ‘presented for 

decision’ below was a federal constitutional claim.” Plaintiffs’ Reply Br. 2. 

This cramped reading of the phrase “presented for decision” does not comport with 

our precedent. The majority seemingly accepts Plaintiffs’ interpretation, stating that “the 

only state law presented for decision here is the Vaccination Mandate.” Maj. Op. 11. Yet 

no federal court of appeals, including the Fourth Circuit, has conditioned the 

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appropriateness of Pullman abstention on the affirmative invocation of a state law claim. 

An issue of state law may be “presented for decision” even where the plaintiff does not 

plead a state law claim. In Franklin & Waldron, Inc. v. City of Martinsville, for example, 

this court affirmed a district court’s decision to abstain under Pullman even where no 

violation of state law was alleged and, indeed, the plaintiff “insist[ed] that relief in the 

courts of Virginia [was] precluded.” 493 F.2d 481, 483 (4th Cir. 1974) (Clark, J., sitting 

by designation). This court similarly found abstention proper in multiple other instances 

where the plaintiffs declined to raise a claim under state law. See Webster v. Perry, 512 

F.2d 612 (4th Cir. 1975) (per curiam); Ratcliff v. Buncombe County, 759 F.2d 1183 (4th 

Cir. 1985). 

Conditioning the availability of Pullman abstention on whether the plaintiff 

affirmatively raised a state law claim also defies common sense. As the Second Circuit 

explained, “[i]t is no answer to the contention that the district court should have abstained, 

that [plaintiffs-appellants] did not raise their state claims in their complaint. [Plaintiffsappellants] cannot be allowed to frustrate the policies underlying the doctrine of abstention 

by this simple expedient.” Reid v. Bd. of Ed. of City of N.Y., 453 F.2d 238, 243 n.7 (2d Cir. 

1971). 

After setting aside the EPRA issue as not “presented,” the majority concludes that 

this case cannot satisfy the first Pullman prerequisite. It endorses Plaintiffs’ argument that 

there is no “unclear issue of state law” because the wording of the Vaccination Mandate is 

unambiguous. See Plaintiffs’ Reply Br. 8. This limited inquiry misses the mark. In 

determining whether Pullman abstention is appropriate, we are not constrained to 

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evaluating only whether the meaning of the challenged law seems “unclear” in isolation. 

Rather, the ambiguity may derive from the uncertain relationship between the challenged 

provision and another state law. The unclear issue of state law in this case concerns the 

relationship between the Vaccination Mandate and the EPRA. The text of the Vaccination 

Mandate may be unambiguous, but no West Virginia court has analyzed whether the 

Vaccination Mandate, as it applies to people with a religious objection to vaccination, 

violates the EPRA. This is an unresolved issue of state law with no clear answer. 

In several cases where the meaning of the challenged state law was perfectly clear, 

this court and the Supreme Court have found abstention proper because the challenged 

law’s relationship with a different state law or constitutional provision was unsettled. In 

Ratcliff, for example, we held that the district court should properly have abstained from 

hearing a federal constitutional challenge to a North Carolina law because a different 

provision of the North Carolina code may have conflicted with that law: “[T]he dual office 

holding provision in Chapter 129 may well control . . . because, in North Carolina, a special 

and particular statute controls over a statute that is general in nature.” 759 F.2d at 1186. 

Similarly, the Supreme Court in Reetz v. Bozanich found abstention appropriate where the 

challenged Alaska law, though not facially ambiguous, was potentially invalidated by 

“provisions of the Alaska Constitution at issue [that] have never been interpreted by an 

Alaska court.” 397 U.S. 82, 86 (1970); see also City of Meridian v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 

358 U.S. 639, 641 (1959) (per curiam); Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476, 478 (1971) (per 

curiam); Harris Cnty. Comm’rs Ct. v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 84 (1975) (“[I]n this case, the 

uncertain status of local law stems from the unsettled relationship between the state 

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constitution and [the challenged] statute.”). Because the relationship between the 

Vaccination Mandate and the EPRA is unsettled, this case satisfies the first Pullman

requirement. 

This case also meets the second Pullman precondition, which provides that a federal 

court should abstain only where “the resolution of [the state law issue] may moot or present 

in a different posture the federal constitutional issue such that the state law issue is 

potentially dispositive.” Wise, 978 F.3d at 101. There is no requirement that the resolution 

of the state law issue necessarily moot the federal constitutional issue. Instead, it is enough 

that questions of state law “may dispose of the case and avoid the need for deciding the 

constitutional question.” Meredith v. Talbot County, 828 F.2d 228, 231 (4th Cir. 1987). See 

also Martin v. Stewart, 499 F.3d 360, 364 (4th Cir. 2007) (stating that “courts may abstain 

when the need to decide a federal constitutional question might be avoided.”). In this 

instance, it is sufficiently likely that a ruling from a West Virginia state court would render 

unnecessary the adjudication of the Free Exercise claim in federal court. 

At the very least, adjudication of the state law issue may “present the issue in a 

different posture.” Wise, 978 F.3d at 101. The EPRA requires West Virginia courts to apply 

strict scrutiny to laws substantially burdening religion, see W. Va. Code § 35-1A-1, but 

heightened scrutiny might not apply to Plaintiffs’ Free Exercise claim. As the district court 

correctly noted, “the most hotly contested issue for decision posed to this Court is whether 

strict scrutiny applies under federal law.” W. Va. Parents for Religious Freedom v. 

Christiansen, 685 F. Supp. 3d 371, 378 (N.D. W. Va. 2023). Plaintiffs argue that federal 

courts evaluating a Free Exercise claim must also apply strict scrutiny, citing two recent 

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rulings by the Supreme Court, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 593 U.S. 522 (2021), and 

Tandon v. Newsom, 593 U.S. 61 (2021) (per curiam), which Plaintiffs describe as “directly 

on point.” Plaintiffs’ Opening Br. 1. This characterization of Fulton and Tandon overstates 

their relevance here. All three federal courts of appeals to hear post- Fulton and Tandon

challenges to compulsory vaccination policies similar to the Vaccination Mandate—

regulations that provide for medical exemptions but not religious exemptions—declined to 

apply strict scrutiny. See Does 1-6 v. Mills, 16 F.4th 20, 29-32 (1st Cir. 2021); We the 

Patriots USA, Inc. v. Conn. Off. of Early Childhood Dev., 76 F.4th 130, 147-54 (2d Cir. 

2023); Spivack v. City of Philadelphia, 109 F.4th 158, 173-77 (3d Cir. 2024). At a 

minimum, a challenge under the EPRA may “present the issue in a different posture” than 

a challenge under the Free Exercise Clause because, under the EPRA, the level of scrutiny 

would not be disputed. 

The majority points to the Supreme Court’s admonitions that (1) “abstention cannot 

be ordered simply to give state courts the first opportunity to vindicate the federal claim,” 

Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 251 (1967), and (2) abstention is not justified when 

“plaintiffs might have sought relief under a similar provision of the state constitution,” 

Examining Bd. of Eng’rs, Architects, and Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 598 

(1976) (quoting Harris County, 420 U.S. at 84). Maj. Op. 12. This case brushes up against 

neither of those limitations, however. First, abstention was ordered to provide the state 

court the initial opportunity to vindicate the state claim. Second, the EPRA and the Free 

Exercise Clause are not “similar provision[s].” Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. at 598; compare

U.S. Const. amend. I with W. Va. Code § 35-1A-1. 

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Because this case satisfies Pullman’s two prerequisites, we should analyze the 

district court’s abstention decision solely for abuse of discretion. Erie Ins. Exch., 105 F.4th 

at 149. Federal courts should be reluctant to abstain in cases involving facial challenges 

under the First Amendment, see Zwickler, 389 U.S. at 252, but “abstention is not always 

precluded by a claim of First Amendment privilege.” Pub. Citizen Health Rsch. Grp. v. 

Comm’n. on Med. Discipline of Md., 573 F.2d 863, 866 (4th Cir. 1978) (per curiam). The 

Supreme Court has found abstention appropriate in several such cases. E.g., Gov’t & Civic 

Emps. Org. Comm. v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364 (1957); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 

(1959); Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l. Union, 442 U.S. 289 (1979). So too has this 

court. In Public Citizen, a case presenting a First Amendment challenge, this court affirmed 

the district court’s decision to abstain despite recognizing that “First Amendment claims 

do require special attention from a federal court that is considering whether to order 

abstention.” 573 F.2d at 865-66. The invocation of the First Amendment does not foreclose 

abstention. For these reasons, I cannot conclude that the district court’s use of Pullman

abstention in this case amounted to an abuse of discretion. I respectfully dissent.

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