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Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellant
Ralph Joseph Walker
Appellee

Document Text:

PQBLISH 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 7- 1991 

ROBERT L HOECKER 

Clerk 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

vs. 

RALPH JOSEPH WALKER, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

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No. 90-4067 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 

(D.C .• No. 90-CR-13) 

Dee Benson, United States Attorney (Wayne Dance, Assistant United 

States Attorney, with him on the brief), Salt Lake City, Utah, for 

Plaintiff-Appellant. 

James Esparza, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before SBDlOUR and BBBL, Circuit Judges, and BROD, District 

Judge.* 

BROD, District Judge.• 

* The Honorable Wesley E. Brown, United States District Senior 

Judge for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 90-4067 Document: 01019292096 Date Filed: 05/07/1991 Page: 1 
In this appeal, the Government challenges the district court's 

order suppressing cocaine found in the defendant's car. The 

district court granted the defendant's motion to suppress the 

evidence upon finding that the defendant had been illegally 

detained and questioned after he was stopped for speeding on a Utah 

highway. For the reasons set forth herein, we remand the case to 

the district court for further proceedings. 

The pertinent facts as found by the district court are as 

follows. On January 10, 1990, the defendant was traveling west on 

Interstate 70 in Emery County, Utah, in a 1988 Cadillac. Officer 

Richard Graham of the Emery County Sheriff's Department was 

traveling east on the interstate. Officer Graham clocked the 

defendant's car going 67 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour speed 

zone. Graham made a "u-turn" and pulled the defendant over. 

Before getting out of his car, Graham ran an NCIC (National 

Crime Information Center) check on the defendant's car and was 

informed that it had not been reported stolen. Graham approached 

the defendant's car and told the defendant that he had been clocked 

speeding. Graham asked the defendant for a driver's license and 

vehicle registration and also asked the defendant where he was 

coming from and his destination. The defendant stated that he was 

coming from Kansas City and was on his way home. The defendant 

asked permission to get out of his car so he could get his license 

out of his back pocket. As the defendant stepped out of his car, 

he gave Graham the vehicle registration. The defendant was 

nervous. His hands shook. It was difficult for him to retrieve 

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Appellate Case: 90-4067 Document: 01019292096 Date Filed: 05/07/1991 Page: 2 
his license from the small compartment in his wallet. He retrieved 

the license and gave it to Officer Graham. 

The license was issued in the defendant's name. It identified 

him and established his right to operate a motor vehicle. The car 

was registered in the name of Marian Smith. Officer Graham 

questioned the defendant about the registration. The defendant 

told Graham that Marian Smith was his sister and that he was 

driving the car with her permission. It was later established that 

the defendant had subleased the vehicle from Ms. Smith. A copy of 

the sublease agreement was in the glove compartment of the vehicle 

at the time the defendant was stopped. 

While retaining the defendant's license and registration, 

Officer Graham asked the defendant a number of specific questions 

unrelated to the traffic stop. He asked if there were any weapons 

in the vehicle, if there were any open containers of alcohol in the 

vehicle, and if there was any controlled substance or paraphernalia 

of any kind in the vehicle. Graham also asked if the defendant 

were carrying any large quantities of cash. The defendant answered 

"no" to each question except for stating that he had about $1600. oo 

in cash in the glove compartment and about $150. 00 cash in his 

pocket. While still holding the defendant's license and 

registration, and without discussing the speeding violation or 

writing a citation or informing the defendant that he was free to 

go, Officer Graham asked the defendant if he could search the 

vehicle for the items about which he had inquired. The defendant 

responded, "Sure, go ahead." Officer Graham asked the defendant 

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to stand by the front fender of the car, which he did. Graham 

patted the defendant down, checking under his sweater, the top of 

his slacks, and down his legs. Graham then searched the passenger 

compartment of the car. He found two rolls of cash in the glove 

compartment. Graham asked for and received the key to the trunk. 

Upon opening the trunk, he noticed two packages wrapped in clear 

plastic tape near the back seat. They appeared to be kilogram 

packages of cocaine. Graham then arrested the defendant. A search 

warrant was later obtained which led to the discovery of 86 

kilogram packages of cocaine in the car. 

Relying on United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512 (lOth Cir. 

1988), the district court determined that Officer Graham's 

continued detention of the defendant in order to ask him intrusive 

questions unrelated to the traffic stop was a violation of the 

defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. 

the defendant's nervousness did 

The district court found that 

not create an objectively 

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity that would justify the 

detention. The court further indicated that the defendant had 

produced sufficient proof showing he was entitled to operate the 

car such that no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity arose 

from the fact that the car was not registered to the defendant. 

Having found that the detention and questioning violated the 

defendant's constitutional rights, the district court suppressed 

the evidence found in the car. The court did not address the 

Government's argument that the search was justified by the 

defendant's consent. 

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The appellant United States makes several arguments on appeal. 

First, appellant argues that the district court erred by finding 

that the officer had to have reasonable suspicion before asking 

questions of the defendant unrelated to the traffic stop. 

Appellant contends that Officer Graham's conduct was reasonable 

when judged by the totality of the circumstances. Alternatively, 

appellant contends that Officer Graham's detention and questioning 

of the defendant were based on a reasonable suspicion of criminal 

activity and were therefore lawful. Finally, appellant contends 

that the district court erred by failing to address the issue of 

consent. We affirm the district court insofar as it found that the 

detention violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights; 

however, we find that under Guzman the district court must address 

the issue of whether the search was nonetheless justified by the 

defendant's consent. 

In reviewing appellant's claims, we do not substitute our 

judgment for the factual findings of the district court unless 

those findings are clearly erroneous. United States v. Werking, 

915 F.2d 1404, 1406 (lOth Cir. 1990). At a hearing on a motion to 

suppress, the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be 

given the evidence, together with the inferences, deductions and 

conclusions to be drawn from the evidence, are all matters to be 

determined by the trial judge. 19. (citing United States v. Pappas, 

735 F.2d 1232, 1233 (lOth Cir. 1984)). Accordingly, we review the 

evidence in a light favorable to the district court's 

determination. Id. The ultimate determination of reasonableness 

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under the Fourth Amendment, however, is a determination of law that 

we review~ novo. United States v. Pena, 920 F.2d 1509, 1513-14 

(lOth Cir. 1990). 

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches 

and seizures. The stopping of a vehicle and the detention of its 

occupants constitute a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth 

Amendment. An ordinary traffic stop is a limited seizure, however, 

and is more like an investigative detention than a custodial 

arrest. see Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 u.s. 420, 439, 104 s.ct. 

3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) ("[T]he usual traffic stop is more 

analogous to a so-called • Terry stop • • than to a formal 

arrest.") Accordingly, we have judged the reasonableness of traffic 

stops under the principles pertaining to investigative detentions 

announced in Terry v. Ohio, 392 u.s. 1, 88 s.ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 

889 (1968). United states v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1519 (lOth 

Cir. 1988). 

The Supreme Court has adopted a dual inquiry for evaluating 

the reasonableness of investigative detentions. Under this 

approach, the court determines "whether the officer's action was 

justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related 

in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in 

the first place." Terry, 392 u.s. at 20. As the district court 

here recognized, we applied this inquiry in United States v. 

Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512 (lOth Cir. 1988), a case involving a routine 

traffic stop. In Guzman, a state police officer stopped a vehicle 

because the driver and a passenger in the car were not wearing 

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Appellate Case: 90-4067 Document: 01019292096 Date Filed: 05/07/1991 Page: 6 
their seat belts. The driver produced documents that satisfied the 

officer as to the driver's right to operate the vehicle. Although 

the officer had no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity other 

than a seat belt violation, he decided to conduct a further 

investigation and proceeded to ask the occupants a series of 

intrusive questions unrelated to the traffic stop. He did not 

return the defendant's driver's license. We concluded that the 

officer's detention of the occupants to ask these intrusive 

questions was unreasonable. We stated: 

An officer conducting a routine traffic 

stop may request a driver's license and vehicle 

registration, run a computer check, and issue 

a citation. * * * When the driver has produced 

a valid license and proof that he is entitled 

to operate the car, he must be allowed to 

proceed on his way, without being subject to 

further delay by police for additional 

questioning. 

15;1. at 1519 (citations omitted). We noted that although the 

detention was of a relatively short duration, 11 it nevertheless 

unreasonably extended beyond the length necessary for its only 

legitimate purpose-- the issuance of a citation for a seat belt 

violation." Id. at 1519 n.s. 

There is no question that the initial stop of the defendant's 

vehicle in the instant case was justified. The district court 

concluded that the defendant had been lawfully stopped for 

speeding. After being stopped, the defendant produced a valid 

driver's license that established his right to operate a motor 

vehicle. The defendant also produced the registration slip for the 

car. The district court concluded that under the circumstances the 

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defendant had produced sufficient proof to show he was entitled to 

operate the car. The car was registered to Marian Smith, whom the 

defendant identified as his sister. An NCIC check indicated to 

Graham that the car was not stolen. Officer Graham did not pursue 

the matter of the registration any further and his testimony shows 

that he was satisfied as to the defendant's right to operate the 

car. Graham gave no testimony indicating that he suspected that 

the defendant was involved in any criminal activity. Cf. United 

States v. Pena, 920 F.2d 1509, 1514 (lOth Cir. 1990), petition for 

cert. filed, Mar. 4, 1991, No. 90-7324 (Circumstances, including 

the fact that the driver did not recognize the name of the 

registered owner of the vehicle, justified a detention to 

investigate whether vehicle was stolen); United States v. Obregon, 

748 F.2d 1371, 1376 (lOth Cir. 1984)(The driver was not listed as 

an authorized operator on a rental agreement and was unable to 

provide a means of contacting the lessee). Had Officer Graham been 

concerned about the registration and requested further proof, the 

defendant could have produced a contract showing that he subleased 

the car from Ms. Smith. In this case, as in Guzman, the defendant 

produced sufficient proof that he was entitled to operate the car. 

Instead of issuing a citation, Officer Graham decided to 

detain the defendant and conduct an inquiry into matters unrelated 

to the traffic stop. As we stated in Guzman, the officer making 

a traffic stop may request a driver's license and registration, run 

a computer check, and issue a citation. Once the driver has 

produced a valid license and proof that he is entitled to operate 

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Appellate Case: 90-4067 Document: 01019292096 Date Filed: 05/07/1991 Page: 8 
the car, "he must be allowed to proceed on his way, without being 

subject to further delay by police for additional questioning." 

Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1519. See also~' supra. In this case, as 

in Guzman, the detention of the defendant unreasonably extended 

beyond the length necessary for the issuance of a citation. 1 The 

officer detained the defendant to ask him questions unrelated to 

the speeding infraction or to the defendant's right to operate the 

car. Thus, the detention was not reasonably related in scope to 

the circumstances that justified the interference in the first 

place. As such, it was an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth 

Amendment. Cf. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 105 S.Ct. 

1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) ("Clearly this case does not involve any 

delay unnecessary to the legitimate investigation of the law 

enforcement officers"). See also United States v. Morales-Zamora, 

914 F.2d 200, 203 (lOth Cir. 1990) (At a roadblock to check drivers• 

licenses and registrations, a canine sniff of the defendants • 

vehicle was not an unlawful detention because agents completed the 

canine sniff before another agent completed his examination of the 

defendants• documents). 2 

1 Although neither party has addressed the issue, it appears 

that Utah law does not allow an officer in these circumstances to 

make a custodial arrest for a speeding violation. See Utah Code 

Ann. § 77-7-18 et seq. 

2 Under the reasoning of United States v. Morales-Zamora, 914 

F.2d 200 (lOth cir. 1990), our determination that the defendant was 

unlawfully detained might be different if the questioning by the 

officer did not delay the stop beyond the measure of time necessary 

to issue a citation. For example, this case would be changed 

significantly if the officer asked the same questions while 

awaiting the results of an NCIC license or registration inquiry. 

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Appellant's effort at distinguishing the Guzman case is 

ineffectual. Without relating any significant factual differences 

between the two cases, appellant simply asserts that the conduct 

of the officer in Guzman was unreasonable whereas Officer Graham's 

conduct was reasonable. We see no facts that would make the rule 

of Guzman inapplicable here. Notwithstanding Guzman, appellant 

insists that this court has "consistently recognized the 

appropriateness of a request to search made by a police officer 

during a valid traffic stop, without a requirement of independent 

justification for the request." App. Br. at 6. Appellant 

characterizes the type of questioning that occurred here as a 

consensual encounter that is not governed by the Fourth Amendment. 

We have noted on several occasions that the Fourth Amendment's ban 

on unreasonable seizures does not prohibit a police officer from 

asking a motorist questions if the encounter is a consensual one. 

"Because an individual is free to leave at any time during such an 

encounter, he is not •seized' within the meaning of the fourth 

amendment." United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1408 (lOth 

Cir. 1990). See also United States v. Turner, 1991 u.s. App. LEXIS 

4361 (lOth Cir., Mar. 20, 1991): United States v. Deases, 918 F.2d 

118, 122 (lOth Cir. 1990), petition for cert. filed, Feb. 22, 1991, 

No. 90-7283. This line of cases does not help appellant's cause, 

however, because the encounter in this case was clearly not 

consensual. Officer Graham retained the defendant's driver's 

license and registration during the entire time he questioned the 

defendant. The district court found that the defendant was not 

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free to leave and that his detention was a seizure within the 

meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See TUrner, supra; Werking, 915 

F.2d at 1409. These findings are supported by the evidence. 

Appellant next contends that the continuing detention of the 

defendant was justified by a reasonable suspicion of criminal 

activity. The Government points out that when the defendant was 

stopped he was nervous and his hands shook. Appellant states that 

we have previously upheld investigative detentions based solely on 

an individual's "nervousness." (citing United States v. Benitez, 

899 F.2d 995, 997 (lOth Cir. 1990)). As an initial matter, we note 

that although Officer Graham indicated that the shaking of the 

defendant's hands was unusual, he did not testify that it caused 

him to suspect that the defendant was involved in any kind of 

criminal activity. Moreover, the district court here concluded 

that under the circumstances the defendant's nervousness did not 

give rise to an objective reasonable suspicion. We must accept 

this determination unless it is clearly erroneous. United states 

v. Turner, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 4361 (lOth Cir., Mar. 20, 1991). 

The significance of the defendant's actions must be judged in light 

of all the circumstances. ~. TUrner, supra ("Defendant's 

increased nervousness added to the officer's suspicion, justifying 

the request to search the car. ") In this case the defendant 1 s hands 

shook after he had been stopped by a police officer for speeding. 

The district court heard the testimony of the witnesses and was in 

a better position than we to judge the extent and significance of 

the defendant's nervousness. We are not convinced after reviewing 

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the record that the district court • s finding on this issue is 

clearly erroneous. 3 

Although we conclude that the defendant's Fourth Amendment 

rights were violated by the detention, we agree with appellant that 

the district court should have addressed the issue of the 

defendant's consent to the search of his car. In Guzman we noted 

that consent given following a Fourth Amendment violation may be 

valid if it is voluntary in fact. Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1520. If 

the consent is not sufficiently an act of free will to purge the 

primary taint of the illegal detention, however, it must be 

suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree. " United States v. 

~, 872 F.2d 1444, 1453 (lOth cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 s.ct. 

1005 (1991). Voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined 

from the totality of the circumstances. Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 

412 u.s. 218, 93 s.ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). 

In Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 

416 (1975) the Supreme Court cited three factors relevant to the 

determination of whether evidence obtained from a suspect was 

"sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint" of 

an illegal arrest. These factors take into account the interests 

underlying the Fourth Amendment, including the concern that 

evidence not be obtained by exploitation of illegal police conduct. 

3 The general term "nervousness" encompasses an almost 

infinite variety of behaviors. No doubt there are circumstances in 

which an individual's nervous behavior would give rise to a 

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. We find only that the 

district court's determination that it did not do so here is not 

clearly erroneous. 

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• • c 

Brown, 422 u.s. at 602-04. In Guzman, we directed the district 

court to consider these "Brown factors" upon remand in making its 

determination of whether the consent to search was voluntary. 

Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1521. 

We likewise remand this case to the district court for 

findings on the issue of voluntariness, with directions to consider 

the factors articulated in Brown. See United States v. Carson, 793 

F.2d 1141, 1152 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 479 u.s. 914 (1986). 

The district court should examine the totality of the circumstances 

surrounding the defendant's consent, focusing on: the temporal 

proximity of the illegal detention and the consent, any intervening 

circumstances, and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the 

officer's unlawful conduct. Cf. Brown, 422 u.s. at 603-04. As 

always, the burden of proving the voluntariness of consent is on 

the Government. Schneckloth, 412 u.s. at 222. 

The order of the district court is VACATED and the case is 

REMANDED for further proceedings. 

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