Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-94-01081/USCOURTS-caDC-94-01081-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
James Gilbert
Petitioner
International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers, AFL-CIO
Intervenor
National Labor Relations Board
Respondent

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 13, 1995 Decided June 16, 1995

No. 94-1081

JAMES GILBERT,

PETITIONER

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

RESPONDENT

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF BOILERMAKERS,

IRON SHIP BUILDERS, BLACKSMITHS, FORGERS AND HELPERS,

AFL-CIO,

INTERVENOR

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

National Labor Relations Board

Raymond J. LaJeunesse, Jr., argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner.

David A. Fleischer, Senior Attorney, National Labor Relations Board, argued the cause for

respondent. With him on the brief were Linda R. Sher, Acting Associate GeneralCounsel and Aileen

A. Armstrong, Deputy Associate General Counsel, National Labor Relations Board. Charles P.

Donnelly, Supervisory Attorney, National Labor Relations Board, entered an appearance.

Dana K. Apple argued the cause for intervenor. With her on the brief was Michael J. Stapp. Robert

J. Henry entered an appearance. 

Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, WILLIAMS and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge EDWARDS.

EDWARDS, Chief Judge: In 1988, petitioner James Gilbert was president of Local D-100 of

the InternationalBrotherhood ofBoilermakers, Iron ShipBuilders, Blacksmiths, Forgers andHelpers

("Boilermakers" or "Union"), which represented a unit of employees at the Kaiser Cement

Corporation ("Company") in California. During that year, Gilbert and several other members of the

local advocated certain proposals that would have undermined the strength of the Union within the

bargaining unit. Charges were filed against Gilbert and the other dissident members, and, upon

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finding them guilty, the Union barred them from holding any Union office or attending most Union

meetings for several years. Although Gilbert and the other officers never resigned their membership

in the Union, they asserted that, because of the discipline imposed on them, they were no longer

obligated to pay membership dues. When Gilbert stopped paying his dues, the Union threatened to

have himdischarged fromhis employment with the Company pursuant to a union-security agreement

between the Union and the Company, requiring bargaining unit employees to pay Union dues as a

condition of continued employment.

Gilbert thereafter filed an unfair labor practice charge against the Union with the National

Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or "Board"), alleging that the Union's threat to seek his discharge

under the union-security agreement violated the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA" or "Act").

The Board dismissed Gilbert's complaint, holding that the Union did not violate section 8(b)(1)(A)

of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1988), by demanding that he pay dues. The Board found that,

because the disciplinary action itself did not violate the Act, Gilbert remained obligated under the

union-security agreement to pay "periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required." Id. §

158(a)(3) (1988). Accordingly, the Board concluded that the Union acted lawfully when it gave

Gilbert a choice to either pay membership dues or sacrifice his job pursuant to the union-security

agreement.

Gilbert raises two challenges to the Board's decision. First, he contends that the result

reached by the Board is impermissible under the second proviso to section 8(a)(3) of the Act, which

prohibits a union from enforcing a union-security provision against an employee (1) if union

membership is not "available" to that employee on the same terms applicable to other employees, or

(2) if the employee's membership is "denied or terminated" for reasons other than the nonpayment

of membership dues. Id. Second, he claims that the Board's decision is arbitrary and capricious,

because it constitutes an unexplained departure from a line of Board precedent holding that a union

violatessection 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act if it requiresthe payment of dues as a condition of employment

when the union has imposed certain types of discipline on an employee for exercising a right

guaranteed by section 7 of the Act, id. § 157 (1988).

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We reject both contentions. First, the Union's actions in this case clearly did not violate the

second proviso to section 8(a)(3). That proviso protects employees from discharge under a

union-security agreement only when membership was not "available" to such employees on the same

terms as other employees, or when the membership of such employees has been "denied or

terminated" for any reason other than nonpayment of dues. In this case, Gilbert's membership was

always "available" to him on the same terms as other employees, for the Union never imposed any

conditions on Gilbert's membership that were not applicable to other members. Moreover, Gilbert's

membership was never "denied or terminated," because he never ceased being a member ofthe Union

during the relevant period. Rather, the discipline imposed on him was merely a lawful incident of his

continued membership in the Union, imposed for violating rules that applied to every other Union

member. Furthermore, because we find that the Board's dismissal of Gilbert's complaint in this case

is consistent with NLRB precedent, we reject Gilbert's contention that the Board's decision was

arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, we deny the petition for review.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Union-Security Agreements Under the NLRA

Although section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA generally makes it an unfair labor practice for an

employer "by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment ... to encourage or discourage

membership in any labor organization," see 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3), that section containstwo provisos

authorizing union-security agreements between employers and unions. The first proviso authorizes

a union and an employer to contract to require as a condition of employment that all employees in

the bargaining unit establish and maintain "membership" in the union. Id. The second proviso

requires that such membership must, inter alia, be equally available to all and obligate employees to

do no more than "tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required." Id. Thus,

under established law, section 8(a)(3) has been construed to allow an employer and the employees'

exclusive bargaining representative to enter into an agreement requiring all employees in the

bargaining unit to payperiodic union dues and initiation fees as a condition of continued employment,

whether or not the employees wish to become full union members.

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1

In this case, Gilbert charged the Union only with violating section 8(b)(1)(A), which makes it

unlawful for a union "to restrain or coerce ... employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in

[section 7 of the Act]." 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A). Section 7 of the Act gives employees the right

to engage in a range of activities in support of collective bargaining, but also gives employees "the

right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be

affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of

employment as authorized in section [8(a)(3) of the Act]." Id. § 157. 

Despite the broad meaning that might be implied bythe term"membership" in the first proviso

of section 8(a)(3), the Supreme Court has held that the section's second proviso mandates that such

union membership is "whittled down to itsfinancial core." NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S.

734, 742 (1963); see International Union of Elec., Elec., Salaried, Mach. & Furniture Workers v.

NLRB, 41 F.3d 1532, 1534 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("IUE v. NLRB "). Accordingly, "[i]t is well settled that

causing or attempting to cause an employer to discharge an employee for breach of any union

membership requirements other than failure to pay the financial core obligations of uniform initiation

fees and dues violates the Act, specifically sections 8(b)(2) and 8(b)(1)(A)."1IUE v. NLRB, 41 F.3d

at 1534 (citing Union Starch &Ref. Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 779, 787 (1949), enforced, 186 F.2d 1008 (7th

Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 815 (1951)). In its most recent decision in this area, Communications

Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 745 (1988), the Supreme Court held that section 8(a)(3) does not

oblige employees "to support union activities beyond those germane to collective bargaining, contract

administration, and grievance adjustment." The Court thus "limited employee obligations under

union-security agreements to comport with the congressional purpose of eliminating the problem of

"free riders,' i.e., employees who would receive the benefits of union representation but refuse to pay

their fair share of the costs." IUE v. NLRB, 41 F.3d at 1535 (citing Beck, 487 U.S. at 747-54).

B. The Present Dispute

The facts in this case are not in dispute. Prior to 1984, Local 100 of the Cement, Lime,

Gypsum and Allied Workers International Union ("Cement Workers") represented the relevant

bargaining unit employees at theCompany'sPermanente,California facility. The collective bargaining

representative for all bargaining unit employees at that facility was the AFL-CIO Building Trades

Council. In April 1984, the Cement Workers merged with the Boilermakers, and Local 100 became

Local D-100 of the Union.

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Gilbert had been president of the local since 1977 and remained president after the merger.

He and severalother employees became dissatisfied with the Unionwhen it terminated four long-term

Cement Workers' international representatives. In a letter dated September 16, 1986, Gilbert

requested that the termination of one of the fired international representatives be reconsidered, but

the Union refused. Later, in July 1988, Gilbert prepared and circulated a petition requesting a Board

election so that the bargaining unit employees could replace the Union with a new bargaining

representative. All but one of the employees in the unit signed the petition, but it was never filed with

the Board.

On September 22, 1988, at a meeting of Local D-100's membership, Gilbert presented a

"Letter of Understanding" written by the Company, which proposed to convert the jobs of 17 unit

employees, including Gilbert's, to salaried supervisory positions, thereby removing them from the

bargaining unit. While Gilbert took no formal position on the proposal, he described the proposal's

benefits as the Company had represented them. Local D-100 Financial Secretary Donald Hall

attended the meeting, but also took no position on the proposal. Unit employee Arthur Rose spoke

in favor of it. The bargaining unit employees ultimately rejected the proposal by a vote of 23 to 11.

About two weeks after the September 22 meeting, Joseph Gaxiola, a trustee of Local D-100,

circulated a petition asking for the members' views on a proposal to make allbargaining unit positions

salaried, therebyeliminating the unit. Gaxiola supported the proposal, but again a majority of the unit

employees opposed it.

InOctober 1988, a bargaining unit employee filed internalUnion charges against Gilbert, Hall,

Rose, and Gaxiola, alleging that the four employees had engaged in activitiesin support of removing

a number of personsfrom the bargaining unit. After a hearing before an international representative,

the Union found the four employees guilty of all charges and subsequently barred them from holding

any Union office or attending any Union meetings, except those called to vote on the ratification of

a contract directly affecting them. These penalties were to apply to Gilbert for five years, Hall for

three years, and Gaxiola and Rose for two years.

In April 1989, in a joint letter to Union president Charles W. Jones, the four disciplined

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employees asserted that they had been effectively suspended from the Union and therefore no longer

were obligated to pay union dues. In a letter dated May 22, 1989, Jones responded that the four

employees had not been suspended and must continue to pay duesin order to remain members of the

Union in good standing. In a subsequent letter dated July 20, 1989, the disciplined employees

inquired as to what penalties might be imposed on them if they stopped paying dues. Jones replied

that the Union's contract with the Company contained a union-security clause and that, if the four

employees ceased paying dues, the Union would so notify the Company, and the employees would

no longer be permitted to work at the plant. Nevertheless, Gilbert stopped paying his dues for two

months. He resumed payment, however, when the Company notified him that the Union had

requested his discharge under the union-security agreement. Gilbert was thus never dismissed from

his employment.

C. Board Proceedings

On October 6, 1989, Gilbert filed an unfair labor practice charge against the Union with the

NLRB, and, on December 14, 1989, the General Counsel issued a complaint. The Administrative

Law Judge ("ALJ") rejected the General Counsel's first contention that the Union had unlawfully

disciplined Gilbert and the three other subject employees. He found that the Union had the right to

protect itself against the activities of the four disciplined employees, which could have resulted in the

erosion or elimination of the bargaining unit that the Union represented. Kaiser Cement Corp., 312

N.L.R.B. 218, 227-28 (1993) ("NLRB Decision") (reprinting ALJ decision). Therefore, the ALJ

concluded that the GeneralCounsel had not established a prima facie case that the discipline violated

section 8(b)(1)(A). Id. at 228. On this point, the judge noted that the Union's internal rules had been

reasonably enforced against the four employees, who at all times were free to leave the Union to

escape those rules, but had not done so. Id.

The ALJ next held that the Union did not violate the Act by threatening to invoke the

union-security agreement. In this regard, the judge first found that the union's threat to invoke the

agreement was lawful, because the employees had not been disciplined for the exercise of any rights

protected by section 7 of the Act. Id. Because no section 7 rights were involved, the ALJ

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2The proviso to section 8(b)(1)(A) provides that the prohibitions of that section "shall not

impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or

retention of membership therein." Id. § 158(b)(1)(A). 

distinguished this case from cases relied on by the General Counsel, in which the Board held that a

union violated section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by threatening to invoke a union-security clause against

employees who had been disciplined in various ways for the exercise of certain section 7 rights. Id.

(citing Steelworkers Local 4186 (McGraw Edison Co.), 181 N.L.R.B. 992 (1970)).

Finally, the ALJrejected the GeneralCounsel's alternative argument that, even ifthe activities

for which the subject employees were disciplined were not protected, their membership rights were

so substantiallyreduced that enforcement ofthe union-security clause against thembecame unlawful.

Id. This argument, in the ALJ's view, presented the Union with the "Hobson's choice" of either

forgoing its right to discipline members under the proviso to section 8(b)(1)(A),2thereby rendering

that proviso a nullity, or relinquishing its right to enforce the provisions of a valid union-security

agreement, therebyultimatelyself-destructing without the dues of disciplined members. Id. The ALJ

concluded that the General Counsel's position, if implemented, would induce any members who are

unwilling to pay dues in the first place for financial or philosophical reasonsto subject themselves to

union discipline "so they would be "punished,' by not having to pay union dues, although they would

continue their employment." Id.

The Board affirmed. The Board first found that the Union had lawfully disciplined Gilbert

and the other employees. Id. at 220. The Board initially noted that there are certain limitations on

a union'sright to discipline members. For instance, employee-members are always free to resign their

membership, and thus escape union rules and discipline. However, the Board stated that employees

who "have opted for continued membership ... cannot be heard to complain if the union enforces the

rules of membership." Id. Another limitation on internal union discipline, the Board continued, is

where a union rule "impairs a policy that Congress has embedded in the labor laws." Id. For

example, a union may not discipline a member for exercising the "fundamental" section 7 right of

seeking access to the Board (i.e., filing a petition or charge with the Board). Id. In this case,

however, theBoard found no such fundamentalpolicyimplicated bythe disciplined members' actions.

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The Board also found that Gilbert and the others were at all times free to resign their membership,

but chose not to do so. Thus, the Union was free to discipline them, and "[t]he fact that the Union

chose to discipline them by impairing their membership, rather than by expelling themor fining them,

does not transform lawful discipline into unlawful discipline." Id.

TheBoard next held that the Union's enforcement ofthe union-securityagreement against the

employees whose membership lawfully had been impaired did not violate the Act. The Board stated

that, "[b]ecause the [Union's] discipline of these members did not violate the Act, the members

continued, as unit employees, to be required under the union- security agreement to satisfy the sole

obligation a union may enforce under a union-security provision: the tendering of uniform initiation

fees (if any) and dues." Id. (internal quotations and footnote omitted). The Board thus concluded

that the Union "did not violate Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by threatening to invoke the

union-security clause against Gilbert and the three other employee-members if they ceased paying

dues after the [Union] disciplined them." Id.

II. ANALYSIS

Gilbert challenges the Board's decision on two grounds. He initially claims that the result

reached by the Board is impermissible under the second proviso to section 8(a)(3) of the Act. He

next argues that the NLRB's decision is arbitrary and capricious, because the Board departed from

its own precedent without adequate explanation. We reject both contentions.

A. NLRA Section 8(a)(3)

As noted above, a union's threat to invoke a facially valid union-security agreement to cause

the discharge of an employee for any reason other than nonpayment of dues or initiation fees violates

section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. See IUE v. NLRB, 41 F.3d at 1534. Gilbert contends that the result

reached by the Boardthat the Union did not violate the Act by threatening to invoke the

union-security agreement unless Gilbert paid his union dueswas impermissible under the second

proviso to section 8(a)(3). In making this argument, Gilbert first contends that the Union's discipline

against him "substantially impaired" his membership rights, because he no longer was permitted to

hold office in the Union, attend most Union meetings, or vote on most Union matters. This

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3Gilbert does not dispute that the Union's internal rules were valid and applied uniformly to all

members. 

substantial impairment, Gilbert argues, placed him squarely within both of the conditions set forth in

section 8(a)(3)'s second proviso because: (1) membership was not "available" to him on the same

terms and conditions as other employees; and (2) his membership had been effectively "denied or

terminated" for reasons other than nonpayment of periodic dues uniformly required. Accordingly,

Gilbert concludes, the Union's threat to enforce the union-security agreement against him (unless he

paid his dues) violated section 8(a)(3), and wasthus an unfair labor practice undersection 8(b)(1)(A).

The Board rejected Gilbert's contention, finding that he remained obligated under the

union-security agreement to pay dues after he was disciplined, and concluding that the Union'sthreat

to invoke the union-security agreement unless he paid those dues did not violate the Act. We agree.

In reviewing the Board's decision, we must accept the NLRB's reasonable construction of section

8(a)(3). See Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43

(1984). We also must uphold the Board's factual findings if, viewing the record as a whole, they are

supported by substantial evidence. See IUE v. NLRB, 41 F.3d at 1536-37. Here, we conclude that

the Board's decision is based on a reasonable construction of section 8(a)(3) and is supported by

substantial record evidence.

First, with respect to the first condition ofsection 8(a)(3)'ssecond proviso, the mere fact that

Gilbert was deprived of certain membership privileges as discipline for violating valid internal Union

rules that applied uniformly to every other member3does not mean that membership was not

"available" to Gilbert on the same terms and conditions as other employees. Membership was offered

to Gilbert on the same terms asit wasto other employees. This membership, however, included both

rights and obligations. When Gilbert freely chose to violate his obligations, he was disciplined just

as any other member would have been. And nothing in the record suggests that other members found

guilty of similar violations of the Union's internal rules were punished less severely than Gilbert.

Absent any such evidence, the only reasonable conclusion is the one reached by the

Boardmembership in the Union was "available" to Gilbert on the same terms and conditions as it

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was to other employees.

It is equallyclearthat the Union'simpairment of Gilbert's membership rights did not place him

within the second condition to section 8(a)(3)'s second proviso. This part of the proviso protects

employees from discharge under a union-security agreement if their union membership is "denied or

terminated" for any reason, however lawful, other than nonpayment of dues. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3).

However, even accepting Gilbert's characterization that his membership rights were "substantially

impaired" for reasons other than nonpayment of dues, the fact remains that his Union membership

was never "denied" or "terminated." Gilbert was specifically told by the Union following his

discipline that his membership had not been suspended, and Gilbert chose not to resign his

membership. Gilbert thus remained at all relevant times a full member of the Union. The discipline

imposed on him was merely an incident of that continued membership in the Union. Moreover, the

Board's decision not to equate the discipline imposed on Gilbert with a "denial" or termination" within

the meaning of the final proviso to section 8(a)(3) is clearly reasonable.

Furthermore, Gilbert's contention that a union may not lawfully compel the payment of dues

from a member against whom the union hasimposed lawful discipline fliesin the face ofthe Supreme

Court's decision in Beck. While the Court in Beck held that unions may not, pursuant to

union-security agreements, exact from unwilling employees sums used to finance activities that go

beyond the union's collective bargaining and representational obligations, 487 U.S. at 745, the Court

made clear that unions need not tolerate free riders, i.e., employees who would receive the benefits

of union representation but refuse to pay their fair share of the costs, id. at 750 ("Congress' decision

to allow union-security agreements at all reflects its concern that ... the parties to a collective

bargaining agreement be allowed to provide that there be no employees who are getting the benefits

of union representation without paying for them.") (internal quotations omitted). Yet, free riders are

exactly what Gilbert urgesthis court to sanction. Under Gilbert's theory, an employee would be free

to avoid his or her financial obligation to a union merely by flouting the union's rules, submitting to

discipline similar to that imposed on Gilbert, and then refusing to pay any membership dues on the

ground that his or her membership rights had been "substantially impaired." Remaining in the

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bargaining unit, such an employee still would be entitled to the benefits of union representation, but

would not be required to pay dues. Such a result is surely inconsistent with Beck.

B. Prior Board Precedent

Gilbert next contendsthat, even ifthe result reached bythe Board is permissible undersection

8(a)(3), the Union's actions in this case still violated section 8(b)(1)(A). Gilbert points to a line of

authority, beginning with Steelworkers Local 4186 (McGrawEdison Co.), 181 N.L.R.B. 992 (1970),

holding that unions may not demand, on pain of discharge under a union-security agreement, that

members who have been subjected to certain types of discipline for activity protected by section 7

of the Act continue to pay dues. Thus, according to Gilbert, the Board's determination in this case

that there was no violation ofsection 8(b)(1)(A) is arbitrary and capricious, because it constitutes an

unexplained departure from the Board's prior decisions. We disagree.

It is, of course, elementary that an agency must conform to its prior decisions or explain the

reason for its departure from such precedent. See Greater Boston Tel. Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841,

852 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("[A]n agency changing its course must supply a reasoned analysis indicating

that prior policies and standards are being deliberately changed, not casually ignored, and if any

agency glosses over or swerves from prior precedents without discussion it may cross the line from

the tolerably terse to the intolerably mute.") (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971);

see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 57 (1983).

However, as we stated in Hall v. McLaughlin, 864 F.2d 868, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1989), "[w]here the

reviewing court can ascertain that the agency has not in fact diverged from past decisions, the need

for a comprehensive and explicit statement of its current rationale isless pressing." We further noted

in Hall that, where the circumstances of the prior cases are sufficiently different from those of the

case before the court, an agency is justified in declining to follow them, and the court may accept

even a "laconic explanation as an "ample' articulation ofitsreasoning." Id. at 873 (citing United Mun.

Distribs. Group v. FERC, 732 F.2d 202, 211 (D.C. Cir. 1984)); see also West Coast Media, Inc. v.

FCC, 695 F.2d 617, 621 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding that agency had engaged in "eminently

reasonable" decisionmaking when it distinguished an asserted precedent by merely reciting factual

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differences between prior case and one before it), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 816 (1983). We thus

concluded that, "if the court itself finds the past decisions to involve materially different situations,

the agency's burden of explanation about any alleged "departures' is considerably less." Hall, 864

F.2d at 873; see also New England Grain & Feed Council v. ICC, 598 F.2d 281, 285 (D.C. Cir.

1979) ("While we are somewhat disturbed by the Commission's failure to explain why [an asserted

precedent]isinapplicable here, that case issufficientlydistinguishable to assure that theCommission's

oversight does not present a danger that it has arbitrarily departed from its own precedents.").

Following this rationale, we recently held that an agency "may distinguish precedent simply by

emphasizing the importance of considerations not previously contemplated, and that in so doing it

need not refer to the cases being distinguished by name." Environmental Action v. FERC, 996 F.2d

401, 411-12 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

Applying these standards to the case at hand, we find that the decision of the Board must be

upheld. Gilbert argues that this case is controlled by a line of six Board decisions beginning with

McGrawEdison, and culminating with Machinists District 94 (McDonnell Douglas), 283 N.L.R.B.

881 (1987). As noted above, these cases have held, under varying factual circumstances, that a union

violates section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by invoking a lawful union-security clause to enforce the

payment of dues where employees have been subjected to certain types of discipline for exercising

a right guaranteed by section 7 of the Act. However, because all but one of these cases are

"sufficiently distinguishable" from the case at hand, and because we can discern the path of the

Board's position, we are satisfied that the Board has not departed from its precedent. With respect

to the one case cited by Gilbert that is arguably on point, McDonnell Douglas, we find that the

Board's decision here provided adequate reasoning for and notice of the Board's departure from that

case.

First, the McGraw Edison line of cases all involved unions' discipline of members for

exercising rights guaranteed under section 7 of the Act. Indeed, if no section 7 rights had been

involved, the Board in McGraw Edison and its progeny could not have found violations of section

8(b)(1)(A), because that section creates an unfair labor practice only when a union restrains or

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coerces an employee "in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in [section 7]." 29 U.S.C. §

158(b)(1)(A). In this case, however, the ALJ found that Gilbert was disciplined for activity that did

not constitute conduct protected by section 7. NLRB Decision, 312 N.L.R.B. at 228 ("I have found

that the alleged discriminatees were not disciplined for the exercise of any rights protected by Section

7 of the Act."). Based on this conclusion, the ALJ properly held that the McGraw Edison line of

cases are inapplicable. In affirming the ALJ's findings and conclusions, the Board did not take issue

with the ALJ's conclusion that the activity resulting in Gilbert's discipline was not conduct protected

by section 7. See id. at 218-20. Obviously, if the Board meant to say that section 7 rights were not

involved hereand there is no reason to believe that they meant to say otherwisethen McGraw

Edison and its progeny are inapplicable to this case.

In any event, it seems quite clear that McGrawEdison isinapposite. In McGrawEdison, 181

N.L.R.B. at 992, the union disciplined an employee for filing a decertification petition with the

Board. When the employee indicated his intention not to pay dues after the significant impairment

of his membership rights (the union had suspended his rights to attend union meetings for over one

year and barred him from holding office indefinitely), the union threatened to invoke a union-security

clause to enforce payment of the dues. Id. The Board held that the union's threat violated section

8(b)(1)(A), because it "constituted a continuing form of coercion tending to operate as a serious

restraint upon accessto Board processes." Id. In this case, the Board stated that the right of seeking

access to the Board is a "fundamental" section 7 right, because all other rights under the Act are

dependent on it. NLRB Decision, 312 N.L.R.B. at 220 & n.7. However, the Board properly

concluded that Gilbert's conduct did not involve one ofthose so-called "fundamental" section 7 rights.

Moreover, four of the five post-McGraw Edison cases relied on by Gilbert are clearly

distinguishable from this case. In each of those four cases, the union sought to enforce a

union-security clause on employees who had either been denied membership, see Communications

Workers Local 1104 (NewYork Tel. Co.), 211 N.L.R.B. 114, 116-17 (1974), enforced, 520 F.2d 411

(2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1051 (1976), expelled frommembership,see Communications

Workers Local 9509 (Pacific Tel. &Tel. Co.), 193 N.L.R.B. 83, 83 (1971), or fully suspended from

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4The critically different nature of the discipline involved in these post-McGraw Edison cases is

also evidenced by the additional unfair labor practice findings made in those cases. In all but one

of these cases, the Board held that, in addition to violating section 8(b)(1)(A), the union had also

violated sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2). See Dillingham Tug & Barge, 276 N.L.R.B. at 1271; New

York Telephone, 211 N.L.R.B. at 116-18; Pacific Telephone, 193 N.L.R.B. at 83-84. The

unions' actions in these cases fell within the literal language of section 8(a)(3)'s second proviso,

the Board found, because the unions had invoked or threatened to invoke union-security

agreements against employees whose membership had been "denied" or "terminated" for reasons

other than failure to pay dues. On this point, while the employees in Dillingham Tug & Barge

were technically "suspended" for 15 years, the Board found that this was the practical equivalent

of expulsion or termination for purposes of sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2). 278 N.L.R.B. at 85-86. 

Under this rationale, even though no section 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2) violations were alleged in the

fourth case, Telephone Traffic Union, 241 N.L.R.B. at 827, the union's one-year full suspension

of the employee in that case would have supported a finding of a violation of those sections. 

Thus, each of these post-McGraw Edison cases involved action of a fundamentally different

nature from that involved in the case before us. The action in those cases was sufficient to find a

violation of sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2), but, as we have already held, the discipline involved in

this case clearly did not amount to the "denial" or "termination" of membership necessary to

support such a finding. While this fact is not dispositive of the issue before us, it obviously

supports our conclusion that the post-McGraw Edison cases cited above are entirely

distinguishable from, and thus inapplicable to, the case at hand. 

5Our conclusion is unaltered by the fact that two of these cases contained dicta suggesting that

the holding of McGraw Edison might extend to cases where membership is "impaired," see

Telephone Traffic Union, 241 N.L.R.B. at 826 n.3; New York Telephone, 211 N.L.R.B. at 116-

17, for dicta does not create a rule. 

membership,see Inland Boatmen's Union (Dillingham Tug &BargeCo.), 276 N.L.R.B. 1261, 1262-

66 (1985), further proceedings, 278 N.L.R.B. 83 (1986); Telephone Traffic Union (New York Tel.

Co.), 241 N.L.R.B. 826, 827 (1979), for engaging in varioussection 7 activities. Thus, each of these

cases involved situations in which a union stripped an employee-member of all rights and privileges

of union membership. However, no such situation is involved here, for in this case the Union merely

imposed routine discipline on an employee who voluntarily retained his membership in the union.4

Thus, the Board's failure to address these cases in its opinion can hardly be deemed an unexplained

"departure" from precedent, because the rule of these cases is simply inapplicable to the case before

us.5

Finally, the only post-McGraw Edison case cited by Gilbert that is arguably on point is

Machinists District 94 (McDonnell DouglasCorp.), 283 N.L.R.B. 881 (1987). In affirming an ALJ's

decision, the Board in McDonnell Douglas held that a union violated section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act

when it threatened to invoke (for nonpayment of dues) a union-security agreement against several

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6Obviously, petitioner does not challenge the rule of McGraw Edison and its progeny, and we

thus have no occasion to rule on it in this case. 

employees who had been forbidden by the union from holding union office for five years as discipline

for engaging in certain section 7 activities. Id. at 892-93. Thus, the Board appeared to extend the

holding of McGraw Edison and its progeny to a case where the union's discipline resulted in only the

substantialimpairment of an employee's membership rights. Id. However, the Board's actual holding

in McDonnell Douglas is of little moment here, because (1) the employees were disciplined for

engaging in section 7 activities, and (2) the subject employees had actually resigned from the union

prior to being disciplined. Id. at 885, 892-93. Where an employee has resigned from a union, the

union has no power to discipline the former member. See NLRB v. Textile Workers Local 1029, 409

U.S. 213, 217 (1972). Thus, it is hard to view McDonnell Douglas as an "impairment" case, as

Gilbert would have it. Rather, it is really a case where the union improperly attempted to discipline

employees who were no longer members. In short, McDonnell Douglas is clearly inapposite to this

case.

Even if McDonnell Douglas is fairly viewed as an "impairment" case, we think the Board's

decision in this case provided adequate reasoning for and notice of the Board's departure from that

precedent. The contours of the Board's holding in this case are readily discernablea union security

clause may "be enforced against those whose membership has been lawfully impaired." NLRB

Decision, 312 N.L.R.B. at 220 (emphasis added). And when the case before us is read in conjunction

with McGraw Edison and its progeny, we can discern the following rule: For a union lawfully to

demand, as a condition of continued employment, the continued payment of duesfroma member who

has been disciplined, two conditions must be met: (1) the discipline imposed on the employee must

not result in the denial, termination, or full suspension of the employee's membership, and (2) the

discipline itself must not impair the exercise of a "fundamental" section 7 right (e.g., the right of

seeking access to the Board's processes).6Id. Thus, even though the Board never mentioned

McDonnell Douglas by name, we can discern the Board's position based on its holding and reasoning

in this case, which in relatively clear terms signals the Board's departure from any contrary rule that

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7All of the McGraw Edison cases relied on by Gilbert were decided prior to Beck.

arguably might be gleaned from McDonnell Douglas. And, by emphasizing that mere impairment of

membership rightsisinsufficient in casessuch asthisto support an unfair labor practice finding under

section 8(b)(1)(A), and by stressing the overriding importance of "fundamental" section 7 rights, the

Board has adequately signaled the reasons for its changed position.

Furthermore, the Board's decision is eminently reasonable in light of the Supreme Court's

decision in Beck.7 Beck, in clear terms, permits unions to use union-security provisions to avoid the

problem of free riders. A rule prohibiting a union from enforcing such a provision against its

members, merely because they were subjected (as Gilbert was here) to routine internal discipline,

would create a free rider out of every union member who was subjected to lawful discipline for

violating valid union rules and who no longer desired to pay dues. Such a result is clearly inconsistent

with the Act, specifically section 8(a)(3), and the Court's interpretation of the Act in Beck.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is denied.

So ordered.

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