Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-03014/USCOURTS-caDC-98-03014-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lizette Calderon
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 2, 1998 Decided January 12, 1999

No. 98-3014

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Lizette Calderon,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 90cr00270-02)

Thomas Lumbard, appointed by the court, argued the

cause and filed the briefs for appellant.

Rachel Adelman-Pierson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued

the cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Wilma A.

Lewis, U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher, Elizabeth Trosman,

and Richard L. Edwards, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

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Before: Randolph, Rogers and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed Per Curiam.

Per Curiam: Having pled guilty to possession of almost 10

kilograms of cocaine with intent to sell, appellant Lizette

Calderon now appeals her sentence of 97 months incarceration followed by 5 years of supervised release. We affirm the

district court's sentence in all respects save for the term of

supervised release.

While traveling by train from Miami to New York City in

June of 1990, Calderon and her cousin were arrested in Union

Station in Washington, D.C., after Amtrak police searched

their bags and found 9,871 grams of 100% pure cocaine.

They were charged with one count of unlawful possession

with intent to distribute 5 kilograms or more of cocaine. 21

U.S.C. ss 841(a) & (b)(1)(A)(ii) (1994). Calderon absconded

before her scheduled trial date and was rearrested seven

years later in Puerto Rico.

As part of a written agreement, in which Calderon agreed

to plead guilty to one count of possession with intent to

distribute 5 kilograms or more of cocaine, the parties agreed

(1) that the safety valve provision of the guidelines should

apply so as to make the mandatory minimum sentence for the

charge inapplicable; (2) that Calderon should receive a two

level reduction for acceptance of responsibility and that she

would not seek other adjustments to her offense level; (3)

that Calderon could seek a downward departure at sentencing

and that the government could oppose such a departure; (4)

that the government could advocate a sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice, but would not advocate other

enhancements or an upward departure; and (5) that the

government would not oppose sentencing at the bottom of the

guideline range. While not specified in the written plea

agreement, the failure to appear charge was dropped prior to

the court's consideration of Calderon's plea.

At her sentencing hearing, Calderon made four arguments

to the district court: (1) Her decision to accept $25,000 for

transporting the cocaine arose out of economic duress because she desperately needed the money to make a down

payment on a house so as to free herself from her abusive

boyfriend; (2) she had shown extraordinary rehabilitation

because she had not committed any crimes since she jumped

bail; (3) her extreme depression constituted diminished capacity; (4) this crime was a single act of aberrant behavior

despite the fact that she admitted to using drugs previously.

Carefully considering the record, the district court appropriately found each of these arguments wholly without merit,

sentencing her to 97 months in prison (the bottom of the

recommended range according to the sentencing guidelines)

and 5 years of supervised release. Calderon argues that the

district court erred by failing to consider her claims in

combination, or in the alternative, that her trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to ask the court to consider the claims in

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combination.

We need not consider whether the trial court should have

considered her claims in combination for it is clear from the

record that Calderon would have gained nothing from the

combined consideration of four completely frivolous claims.

Moreover, because considering these claims in combination

would not have affected the sentence the district court imposed, Calderon cannot show that her counsel's performance

was constitutionally ineffective. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) ("The defendant must show that

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.").

Despite the fact that she agreed as part of a valid plea

bargain not to seek any other downward adjustments to her

sentence, Calderon nevertheless maintains that the district

court erred by failing to consider her a "minor" or "minimal

participant" under Sentencing Guideline section 3B1.2(a).

She notes that the Commentary to the Sentencing Guidelines

explicitly envisions "a case where an individual was recruited

as a courier for a single smuggling transaction involving a

small amount of drugs." U.S.S.G. s 3B1.2, comment. (n.2).

While we seriously doubt whether the amount of drugs

involved in this case (10 kilograms of pure cocaine with a

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street value of almost $2 million) constitutes a "small

amount," we need not reach that issue as the plea agreement

barred defendant's claim. Moreover, Calderon has failed to

support her claim that her agreement to the relevant terms of

the plea bargain was unknowing or involuntary. The plea

agreement, which she signed, stated: "I fully understand this

agreement and agree to it without reservation. I do this

voluntarily and of my own free will." The district court

repeatedly asked her whether she understood and agreed

voluntarily to the terms of the plea bargain, and she repeatedly answered in the affirmative. Nothing in the plea

colloquy suggests any duress or lack of understanding of the

plea bargain's terms. And Calderon received an objectively

favorable deal by the government dropping her charge for

failure to appear.

In the alternative, Calderon argues that her counsel was

ineffective for agreeing to a clause in the plea agreement

limiting the legal grounds she could assert to reduce her

sentence. In order to set aside the plea agreement for

ineffective assistance of counsel, Calderon must show that her

"attorney performed below an objective standard of reasonableness, causing a 'reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, [she] would not have pleaded guilty and would

have insisted on going to trial.' " United States v. Holland,

117 F.3d 589, 594 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart,

474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). Calderon has not even alleged that

she would otherwise have gone to trial. Moreover, it is well

within the realm of valid strategic decisions of competent

counsel not to seek adjustments to a client's base offense level

when the government is willing both to drop a charge for

failure to appear and to forego seeking adjustments that

would increase a sentence. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689

("[A] court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's

conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional

assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action

'might be considered sound trial strategy.' " (quoting Michel

v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955))). We cannot agree

with Calderon that this plea bargain was a "contract of

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adhesion"; indeed, its terms do not suggest even a hint of

unfairness.

Finally, Calderon challenges the district court's imposition

of 5 years of supervised release, arguing that the district

judge was unaware that under Sentencing Guideline section

5D1.2(a) he had the discretion to sentence her to as few as 3

years of supervised release. See U.S.S.G. s 5D1.2(a) ("[I]f a

term of supervised release is ordered, the length of the term

shall be: (1) at last three years but not more than five years

for a defendant convicted of a Class A or B felony...."). We

agree. The pre-sentence report, upon which the court based

its sentence, erroneously stated that the Guidelines required

"a term of 5 years." Apparently following that recommendation, the district court wrote "- to 5 years" in the row

designated the "Supervised Release Range" on the "Statement of Reasons" of the judgment form. Given that the

district court admitted that if the court were not "locked in by

the guidelines in this case," it "would most likely not sentence

you to what is called for under the guidelines," and given that

the court chose the lowest possible prison term from the

range specified in the guidelines, it seems quite probable that

the court would also have sentenced Calderon to a term of

supervised release lower than the maximum specified in the

Guidelines.

This case is remanded for the district court to exercise its

discretion with regard to the term of supervised release. In

all other respects, we affirm.

So ordered.

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