Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-08-03920/USCOURTS-ca8-08-03920-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mark Adams
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable William Jay Riley became Chief Judge of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on April 1, 2010.

2

The Honorable E. Richard Webber, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 08-3920

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

*

v. * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

Mark Adams, * Eastern District of Missouri.

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: December 16, 2009

Filed: May 11, 2010

___________

Before RILEY, Chief Judge,1

 WOLLMAN, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________

MELLOY, Circuit Judge.

A jury found Mark Adams guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court2

 sentenced Adams to 115

months' imprisonment. Adams appeals his conviction, arguing the district court

abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence and clearly erred in rejecting his

challenge under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), to the government's

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peremptory strikes of African American venire persons. For the following reasons,

we affirm. 

I. Background

A grand jury returned a one-count indictment charging Adams with being a

felon in possession of a firearm "on or about March 14, 2008." At trial, Adams

stipulated to his felon status. The government's main witnesses were St. Louis police

officer Daniel Fox and one of Adams's roommates, Lamario Thomas.

Fox testified that he began investigating Adams in March 2008 based on

information that Adams was distributing drugs out of the house he shared with

Thomas and several other individuals. Fox also had information that Adams

possessed firearms on the premises and determined Adams had a prior felony

conviction. On three occasions between March 7 and March 10, 2008, Fox conducted

surveillance of the residence and witnessed Adams engage in what he believed, based

on his experience, to be a total of seven "hand-to-hand" drug transactions with

different individuals. On March 12, Fox obtained a warrant for the house to search

for drugs and firearms. The following day, Fox was patrolling in the vicinity of the

house and observed Adams walking nearby. Fox approached Adams, explained he

had a search warrant, detained Adams on an outstanding traffic warrant, searched him,

and transported him back to the house. 

Fox and other officers then executed the search warrant. In a second-floor

bedroom, Fox discovered a loaded semiautomatic rifle lying on the floor next to the

bed. On top of a speaker next to the bed, Fox found state identification paperwork,

bearing Adam's name and photograph, but a different address. From a shoebox on top

of a dresser, Fox recovered an AutoZone receipt with "M. Adams" on it and two bags

of ammunition, one of which contained rounds consistent with the rifle. Officers did

not recover drugs during the search. Adams was arrested on the additional charge of

being a felon in possession of a firearm. 

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Thomas confirmed Adams lived with him and testified that he observed Adams

possess the firearm at the house on four occasions prior to Adams's arrest. According

to Thomas, Adams primarily used two rooms in the house: he slept and kept his

belongings in the second-floor bedroom where the gun, papers, and ammunition were

found and used another second-floor room, painted blue, for entertainment. In fall

2007, Thomas walked into the kitchen and observed the rifle on the kitchen table

within arm's reach of Adams. Adams yelled at Thomas to leave, and Thomas ran out

of the room. Later in 2007, Thomas entered the "blue room" without knocking and

saw Adams with the rifle close to him. Adams again yelled at Thomas to leave and

Thomas complied. In early 2008, Thomas heard rapid gunfire close to the back of the

house. Thomas went to the kitchen and saw Adams emerge from the basement with

the rifle. Adams apologized for scaring Thomas and promised to tell Thomas next

time he decided to fire the gun. Finally, around February 2008, Thomas again heard

a gun discharge in the backyard. Thomas met Adams when Adams returned to the

house. Concerned that the shots had attracted the attention of police patrolling the

area, Thomas exited the house and informed the police about what had occurred,

though he did not indicate whether the police investigated the incident that night.

Thomas testified that Adams was the only person he had seen possess or discharge the

rifle at the residence. 

II. Discussion

A. Prior possession testimony 

Adams challenges the district court's rulings concerning his prior possession

and discharge of the rifle. Before trial, the district court ruled the government could

introduce the testimony pursuant to Rule 404(b) as evidence of knowledge or intent

to possess the firearm. Citing our decision in United States v. Rock, 282 F.3d 548

(8th Cir. 2002), the district court determined at trial that the evidence of prior

possession was intrinsic to the charged offense. Although Adams does not concede

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the evidence could be properly admitted under Rule 404(b), he primarily argues on

appeal that the district court erred in relying on Rock to treat the evidence as intrinsic

to the crime charged and to admit it without a limiting instruction. Reviewing for

abuse of discretion, United States v. Nadeau, 598 F.3d 966, 968 (8th Cir. 2010), we

find no error in the admission of this evidence. 

In Rock, we held evidence that the defendant burgled a storage unit, carried

firearms to the residence he shared with his girlfriend, and displayed them to various

people on a date prior to his arrest "was not merely evidence of other wrongs" but

"directly supported" the government's charge that the defendant possessed the

firearms. Id. at 550–51. The defendant in Rock argued that while the display of the

weapons at other times was evidence of possession, the government did not need the

burglary evidence to prove its case. Id. at 551. We concluded that 404(b) did not bar

presentation of the entire episode because it "completes the story of the crime or

explains the relationship of the parties or the circumstances surrounding a particular

event." Id. Adams's argument that the prior possession testimony neither completes

the story nor gives a "total picture" of his possession of the rifle on March 14, 2008

misses the mark. This testimony is evidence of possession that "directly supports" the

charge. 

Even if we were to find Rock inapplicable, we affirm nonetheless. See United

States v. Gettel, 474 F.3d 1081, 1087 (8th Cir. 2007) (court of appeals may affirm the

admission of evidence on any basis supported by the record). The government could

prove that Adams knowingly possessed the gun by showing he actually or

constructively possessed it. United States v. Byas, 581 F.3d 723, 726 (8th Cir. 2009).

Constructive possession may be established by evidence demonstrating ownership,

dominion, or control over a gun. Id. (quotation omitted). Here, the testimony indicates

that the same individual was in sole, knowing possession of the same rifle in the same

house on four successive occasions leading up to the charged date. Such testimony

therefore helps to establish his ownership or control of the gun. As the evidence

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"tends logically to prove [an] element of the crime charged," it is not subject to Rule

404(b). Moore v. United States, 178 F.3d 994, 1000 (8th Cir. 1999). Such evidence

is still subject to Rule 403. Id. We have little trouble in concluding that Rule 403

would not bar the testimony here. How the defendant used and controlled the weapon

under similar circumstances is directly relevant to the charged offense. See Rock, 282

F.3d 548. 

Adams next asserts that the prior possession testimony constructively amended

the indictment because it altered the date of the offense. The government counters

Adams is really arguing a variance arose instead. The difference between the two is

well established, though at times difficult to apply: "a constructive amendment

changes the charge, while the evidence remains the same; a variance changes the

evidence, while the charge remains the same." United States v. Stuckey, 220 F.3d

976, 981 (8th Cir. 2000). A constructive amendment primarily affects the defendant's

Fifth Amendment right to indictment by a grand jury and constitutes reversible error

per se, while a variance implicates the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to notice

of the nature of the charge and is subject to harmless error analysis. Id. Upon de

novo review, see id. at 979, we conclude neither constructive amendment nor a

variance occurred. 

Because Adams argues the testimony changed the date of the offense, not the

offense charged, no constructive amendment occurred. See United States v. Howe,

538 F.3d 842, 850 (8th Cir. 2008), abrogated on other grounds by United States v.

Villareal-Amarillas, 562 F.3d 892 (8th Cir. 2009). We conclude no variance occurred

either, particularly because the government never wavered in its theory of the case at

trial: the location where the gun was found established Adams possessed the firearm

"on or about" the charged date and Thomas's testimony simply provided confirmation

of possession. See Howe, 538 F.3d at 851 (no variance where government's theory

did not change and allegedly problematic closing argument merely summarized that

theory); cf. United States v. Johnson, 934 F.2d 936, 941–42 (8th Cir. 1991) (no

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constructive amendment for same reason). In sum, we reject Adams's arguments that

there was either a constructive amendment to or a variance in the indictment. 

B. Surveillance and drug transaction testimony

Adams also argues that the district court should have limited Officer Fox's

testimony to the execution of the search warrant. According to Adams, the testimony

concerning the surveillance was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial, and the testimony

of hand-to-hand transactions amounted to propensity evidence in violation of Rule

404(b). The district court had excluded baggies and a digital scale found in the same

room as the firearm out of a concern that the trial would become a narcotics case.

Adams reasons the same should have applied to other evidence of drug dealing as

well. 

Assuming, without deciding, that the district court abused its discretion in

admitting this evidence, any error was harmless. United State v. LaDue, 561 F.3d 855,

859 (8th Cir. 2009) (improper evidentiary rulings are subject to harmless error

analysis and will be disregarded if there is no substantial influence on the verdict). 

The properly admitted evidence established both Adams's dominion and control over

the location where the firearm was found out in the open as well as his dominion and

control over the weapon itself. We therefore reject Adams's arguments based on the

admission of this evidence. 

C. Batson challenge

Adams also challenges the government's use of peremptory strikes against three

African American venire persons, jurors 1, 23, and 27. Batson applies to the federal

government through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. United States

v. Wilcox, 487 F.3d 1163, 1170 (8th Cir. 2007). The Batson inquiry involves the

following three-step analysis:

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First, a defendant must make a prima facie showing that a peremptory

challenge has been exercised on the basis of race. Second, if that

showing has been made, the prosecution must offer a race-neutral basis

for striking the juror in question. Third, in light of the parties'

submissions, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has

shown purposeful discrimination.

United States v. Morrison, 594 F.3d 626, 632 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Miller-El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 328–29 (2003)). We review the district court's resolution

of a Batson challenge for clear error. United States v. Granados, 596 F.3d 970, 975

(8th Cir. 2010). 

The district court determined that Adams established a prima facie case because

three of the six venire persons the government struck were African American and one

of those struck, juror 1, had not spoken during voir dire except to state where he lived

in response to the court's question. In response, the government, relying on the jurors'

answers to a questionnaire, explained that it exercised peremptory strikes against all

jurors who rented their homes out of a concern that they would have an insufficient

stake in the community. These challenges included jurors 1 and 27 as well as two

white jurors. The district court had randomly excused the remaining renter on the

venire panel. Additionally, the government stated that it struck juror 23 along with

another juror because they expressed dissatisfaction with law enforcement's response

to crimes committed against them.

The district court determined these explanations were race neutral, a finding

that we conclude was not clearly erroneous. An individual's status as a renter may

indicate he or she does not have substantial ties to the community. See United States

v. Carr, 67 F.3d 171, 175–76 (8th Cir. 1995). We have found a lack of attachment to

the community to be a valid reason to exercise a peremptory strike. United States v.

Gibson, 105 F.3d 1229, 1232 (8th Cir. 1997) (collecting cases). Furthermore, we have

stated that "[a] juror's expression of past dissatisfaction with law enforcement officers,

which could indicate potential bias against the prosecution, is a legitimate race neutral

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The district court was troubled by the fact that the government used a facially

race-neutral rationale, renter status, to strike African American jurors, when, as the

district court noted, African Americans in St. Louis were more likely to rent than to

own their homes. This opinion should not be read to mean that a defendant can never

sustain a Batson challenge when the government advances a potential juror's renter

status and/or insufficient stake in the community as a race-neutral reason for a

peremptory strike. Instead, this case is an example of our limited scope of review. In

rejecting the challenge, the district court noted its belief that the prosecutors were

credible. Because a trial court's findings on a Batson challenge largely turn on an

evaluation of the prosecutor's credibility, the court of appeals gives great deference

to its conclusions. United States v. Roebke, 333 F.3d 911, 913 (8th Cir. 2003). 

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reason for striking potential jurors." United States v. Booker, 576 F.3d 506, 511 (8th

Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Brown, 560 F.3d 754, 763 (8th Cir. 2009); Gibson,

105 F.3d at 1232.

After the government articulated race-neutral reasons for striking AfricanAmericans, the burden returned to Adams to show pretext. Gibson, 105 F.3d at 1232.

Adams argued that the proffered reasons were pretextual because the government had

failed to ask follow-up questions that would probe the jurors' responses, particularly

regarding the renters' ties to the community. The district court acknowledged for the

record that, in St. Louis, African Americans were among those individuals more likely

to rent than to own their homes. Notwithstanding Adams's argument and despite

acknowledging a correlation between race and a lack of property ownership, the district

court held Adams had failed to show purposeful discrimination in the government's

exercise of peremptory strikes. Its rejection of the Batson challenge was not clearly

erroneous. See United States v. Davis, 154 F.3d 772, 782 (8th Cir. 1998) (no Batson

violation when the government failed to solicit certain information through voir dire

that nonetheless became known); United States v. Hart, 544 F.3d 911, 915 (8th Cir.

2008) (no Batson violation where all venire panel members similarly situated to

African Americans were struck).3

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III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. 

______________________________

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