Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-05509/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-05509-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Barnes
Respondent
Jimmy L. Nabong
Petitioner

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JIMMY L. NABONG,

Petitioner,

v.

RON BARNES, Acting Warden,

Respondent.

Case No. 14-cv-05509-HSG (PR) 

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS; DENYING 

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Re: Dkt. No. 15

Petitioner, a pro se prisoner, filed this action for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent has moved to dismiss the petition as untimely. Petitioner has filed an 

opposition. Respondent did not file a reply, and the time in which to do so has passed.

BACKGROUND

In 2011, a San Mateo County jury found petitioner guilty of murder and robbery. Motion 

to Dismiss (“MTD”) Ex. A. He was sentenced to 50 years to life in state prison. Id. On June 10, 

2013, the California Court of Appeal modified the judgment to stay the sentence on the robbery 

count but otherwise affirmed. Id. On August 28, 2013, the California Supreme Court denied 

petitioner’s petition for review. MTD Exs. B, C. Petitioner did not file any state habeas petitions 

before filing this action. The instant federal petition has no signature date but was stamped “filed” 

at the Court on December 17, 2014. 

DISCUSSION

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) became law on 

April 24, 1996 and imposed for the first time a statute of limitations on petitions for a writ of 

habeas corpus filed by state prisoners. Petitions filed by prisoners challenging non-capital state 

convictions or sentences must be filed within one year of the latest of the date on which: (1) the 

judgment became final after the conclusion of direct review or the time passed for seeking direct 

review; (2) an impediment to filing an application created by unconstitutional state action was 

removed, if such action prevented petitioner from filing; (3) the constitutional right asserted was 

Case 4:14-cv-05509-HSG Document 17 Filed 06/09/15 Page 1 of 4
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right was newly recognized by the Supreme Court and 

made retroactive to cases on collateral review; or (4) the factual predicate of the claim could have 

been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Time during 

which a properly filed application for state post-conviction or other collateral review is pending is 

excluded from the one-year time limit. Id. § 2244(d)(2).

Here, the judgment became final and the limitations period began on November 26, 2013, 

ninety days after the California Supreme Court denied review. See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 

1159 (9th Cir. 1999) (if a petitioner fails to seek a writ of certiorari from the United States 

Supreme Court, the AEDPA’s one-year limitations period begins to run on the date the ninety-day 

period defined by Supreme Court Rule 13 expires). The presumptive deadline for petitioner to file 

his federal petition was November 25, 2014. He missed that deadline by twenty-two days, so 

unless he qualifies for tolling, the petition is untimely. 

A. Statutory Tolling

Petitioner does not claim he is entitled to statutory tolling. Even if petitioner had claimed 

such tolling, however, he would not be eligible for it. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244, the one-year 

limitations period is tolled for the “time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). An application for review remains “pending” in state court until it 

“has achieved final resolution through the State’s post-conviction procedures.” Carey v. Saffold, 

536 U.S. 214, 220 (2002).

Here, as noted, petitioner did not file any state habeas petitions before filing this action. 

Accordingly, the Court finds the petition is not rendered timely on the basis of statutory tolling. 

B. Equitable Tolling

AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate 

circumstances. Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010). “[A] petitioner is entitled to 

equitable tolling only if he shows (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that 

some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” Id. at 2562 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); accord Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th 

Case 4:14-cv-05509-HSG Document 17 Filed 06/09/15 Page 2 of 4
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Cir. 1999) (“When external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the 

failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate.”). 

The diligence required to establish entitlement to equitable tolling is “reasonable diligence.” 

Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2565.

Petitioner bears the burden of showing “extraordinary circumstances were the cause of his 

untimeliness.” Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). Where a petitioner fails to show “any causal connection” between the grounds 

upon which he asserts a right to equitable tolling and his inability to timely file a federal habeas 

application, the equitable tolling claim will be denied. Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034-35 

(9th Cir. 2005). Further, such petitioner must show “his untimeliness was caused by an external 

impediment and not by his own lack of diligence.” Bryant v. Arizona Attorney General, 499 F.3d 

1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 973 (9th Cir. 2006)).

Petitioner argues he is entitled to equitable tolling because he was placed in Administrative 

Segregation (“Ad-Seg”) from June 20, 2014 to October 28, 2014, during which time he had “no 

access to the law library.” Dkt. No. 3 at 1; Dkt. No. 16 at 1. Without more, this claim is not 

persuasive. The Ninth Circuit has clearly stated, “Ordinary prison limitations on [petitioner’s] 

access to the law library and copier . . . were neither ‘extraordinary’ nor made it ‘impossible’ for 

him to file his petition in a timely manner. Given even the most common day-to-day security 

restrictions in prison, concluding otherwise would permit the exception to swallow the rule . . . .” 

Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2009). As in Ramirez, petitioner offers no 

explanation regarding how his placement in Ad-Seg or his restricted law library access made it 

impossible for him to file a timely federal petition. See id.; see, e.g., Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 

1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (prisoner’s pro se status, law library missing a “handful” 

of reporter volumes, and reliance on inmate helpers who were transferred or too busy to attend to 

his petitions are not extraordinary circumstances “given the vicissitudes of prison life”). 

Further, petitioner has failed to show a causal connection between his alleged inability to 

file a timely federal petition and his restricted access to the law library or Ad-Seg placement. 

Petitioner states a general need for “legal materials” (dkt. no. 16 at 1), but does not indicate what 

Case 4:14-cv-05509-HSG Document 17 Filed 06/09/15 Page 3 of 4
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

materials he needed, when and why he needed them, and how he attempted to acquire them. 

Indeed, petitioner’s federal petition repeats the claims made in his direct appeal to the California 

Court of Appeal. See MTD Ex. A. Petitioner does not explain what other legal materials he might 

have needed in order to timely file a federal petition. Cf. Ford v. Pliler, 590 F.3d 782, 790 (9th 

Cir. 2009) (affirming district court’s determination that petitioner was not entitled to equitable 

tolling based on lack of access to his legal files because the record showed petitioner was aware of 

the factual basis for his claims without the files). 

Finally, even if tolling were available for the approximately four months that petitioner 

was in Ad-Seg, he has not shown that he could not have filed a timely petition in the 28 days that 

were available to him between his October 28, 2014 release from Ad-Seg and the November 25, 

2014 deadline to file a federal petition. See Luna v. Kernan, 784 F.3d 640, 651-52 (9th Cir. 2015) 

(noting that in Spitsyn, the Ninth Circuit imposed a requirement that a petitioner must also show 

diligence through the time of filing, even after the extraordinary circumstances have ended) (citing 

Spitsyn, 345 F.3d at 801-02).

Accordingly, the Court finds the petition is not rendered timely on the basis of equitable 

tolling.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons:

1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss the instant petition as untimely is GRANTED. 

2. Petitioner has not shown “that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the 

district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

Accordingly, a certificate of appealability is DENIED. 

3. The Clerk shall enter judgment and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

Case 4:14-cv-05509-HSG Document 17 Filed 06/09/15 Page 4 of 4