Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00788/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00788-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Maribel Domantay
Plaintiff
NDEX West, LLC
Defendant
World Savings Bank
Defendant

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARIBEL DOMANTAY,

Plaintiffs,

v.

NDEX WEST, LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:15-cv-0788-MCE-KJN PS

ORDER and FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS

Plaintiff Maribel Domantay, who proceeds without counsel, commenced this action on 

January 20, 2015, in the Solano County Superior Court, which was subsequently removed to this 

court by defendants pursuant to this court’s diversity jurisdiction. (ECF No. 1.) On April 17, 

2015, defendant World Savings Bank filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to 

Rule 12(b)(6) and other grounds. (ECF No. 7.) Plaintiff twice failed to file an opposition to this 

motion to dismiss, despite plaintiff having been clearly warned of the consequences for failing to 

do so. Because of this repeated failure, and for the reasons set forth below, the undersigned 

recommends that plaintiff’s case be dismissed with prejudice and that this case be closed.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendants removed this action to this court on April 10, 2015. (ECF No. 1.) That same 

day, the court issued an order setting a status conference. (ECF No. 2.) That order advised the 

parties that “[f]ailing to obey federal or local rules, or [an] order of this court, may result in 

Case 2:15-cv-00788-MCE-KJN Document 11 Filed 06/09/15 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

dismissal of this action. This court will construe pro se pleadings liberally, but pro se litigants 

must comply with the procedural rules.” (Id. at 3.) Additionally, it cautioned the parties that 

“pursuant to Local Rule 230(c), opposition to granting of a motion must be filed fourteen days 

preceding the noticed hearing date. The Rule further provides that ‘no party will be entitled to be 

heard in opposition to a motion at oral arguments if written opposition to the motion has not been 

timely filed by that party.’ Moreover, Local Rule 230(i) provides that failure to appear may be 

deemed withdrawal of opposition to the motion or may result in sanctions.” (Id.) Finally, the 

order notified the parties that “Local Rule 110 provides that failure to comply with the Local 

Rules ‘may be grounds for imposition of any and all sanctions authorized by statute or Rule or 

within the inherent power of the Court.’” (Id.)

On April 17, 2015, defendant World Bank filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and other grounds. (ECF No. 7.) The 

motion to dismiss was noticed for hearing on May 21, 2015. (Id.) As noted above, pursuant to 

this court’s Local Rules, plaintiff was obligated to file and serve a written opposition, or a 

statement of non-opposition, to the pending motion at least fourteen (14) days prior to the hearing 

date, or May 7, 2015. See E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(c). However, plaintiff failed to file an opposition 

or statement of non-opposition to the motion by that deadline. 

As a result of plaintiff’s failure, but in light of her pro se status, the undersigned issued an 

order on May 11, 2015, continuing the hearing on the motion to dismiss until June 18, 2015, and 

providing plaintiff with an additional opportunity to file an opposition or statement of nonopposition to the motion on or before June 4, 2015. (ECF No. 10.) In that order, the undersigned

specifically warned plaintiff that her “failure to file a written opposition will be deemed a 

statement of non-opposition to the pending motion and consent to the granting of the motion, and 

shall constitute an additional ground for the imposition of appropriate sanctions, including a 

recommendation that plaintiffs’ entire case be involuntarily dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).” (Id. at 3). The order also advised plaintiff as follows:

////

////

Case 2:15-cv-00788-MCE-KJN Document 11 Filed 06/09/15 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Eastern District Local Rule 110 provides that “[f]ailure of counsel or of a party to 

comply with these Rules or with any order of the Court may be grounds for 

imposition by the Court of any and all sanctions authorized by statute or Rule or 

within the inherent power of the Court.” Moreover, Eastern District Local Rule 

183(a) provides, in part:

Any individual representing himself or herself without an attorney 

is bound by the Federal Rules of Civil or Criminal Procedure, these 

Rules, and all other applicable law. All obligations placed on 

“counsel” by these Rules apply to individuals appearing in propria 

persona. Failure to comply therewith may be ground for dismissal, 

judgment by default, or any other sanction appropriate under these 

Rules.

See also King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Pro se litigants must 

follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants”) (overruled on other 

grounds). Case law is in accord that a district court may impose sanctions, 

including involuntary dismissal of a plaintiff’s case pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 41(b), where that plaintiff fails to prosecute his or her case or fails 

to comply with the court’s orders, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or the 

court’s local rules.1 See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991) 

(recognizing that a court “may act sua sponte to dismiss a suit for failure to 

prosecute”); Hells Canyon Preservation Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 403 F.3d 

683, 689 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that courts may dismiss an action pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) sua sponte for a plaintiff’s failure to 

prosecute or comply with the rules of civil procedure or the court’s orders); 

Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (“Failure to follow a 

district court’s local rules is a proper ground for dismissal”); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 

963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

41(b), the district court may dismiss an action for failure to comply with any order 

of the court”); Thompson v. Housing Auth. of City of L.A., 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th 

Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (stating that district courts have inherent power to control 

their dockets and may impose sanctions including dismissal or default).

(Id. at 2-3.) Although the June 4, 2015 deadline has now passed, the court’s docket reveals that 

plaintiff again failed to file an opposition to the motion to dismiss.

////

////

////

 

1

 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had held that under certain circumstances a district court 

does not abuse its discretion by dismissing a plaintiff’s case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 41(b) for failing to file an opposition to a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Trice v. Clark 

County Sch. Dist., 376 Fed. App’x. 789, 790 (9th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).

Case 2:15-cv-00788-MCE-KJN Document 11 Filed 06/09/15 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

II. DISCUSSION

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), a district court may dismiss an action 

for failure to prosecute, failure to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, failure to 

comply with the court’s local rules, or failure to comply with the court’s orders. See, e.g., 

Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991) (recognizing that a court “may act sua sponte

to dismiss a suit for failure to prosecute”); Hells Canyon Preservation Council v. U.S. Forest 

Serv., 403 F.3d 683, 689 (9th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that courts may dismiss an action pursuant 

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) sua sponte for a plaintiff’s failure to prosecute or 

comply with the rules of civil procedure or the court’s orders); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 

1260 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), the district court may 

dismiss an action for failure to comply with any order of the court”); Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 

F.3d 639, 642-43 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming district court’s dismissal of case for failure to 

prosecute when habeas petitioner failed to file a first amended petition). This court’s Local Rules 

are in accord. See E.D. Cal. L.R. 110 (“Failure of counsel or of a party to comply with these 

Rules or with any order of the Court may be grounds for imposition by the Court of any and all 

sanctions authorized by statute or Rule or within the inherent power of the Court”); E.D. Cal. L.R. 

183(a) (providing that a pro se party’s failure to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, the court’s Local Rules, and other applicable law may support, among other things, 

dismissal of that party’s action). 

A court must weigh five factors in determining whether to dismiss a case for failure to 

prosecute, failure to comply with a court order, or failure to comply with a district court’s local 

rules. See, e.g., Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1260. Specifically, the court must consider:

(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s 

need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendant; (4) the public 

policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less 

drastic alternatives.

Id. at 1260-61; accord Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 642-43; Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 

1995). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that “[t]hese factors are not a series of 

conditions precedent before the judge can do anything, but a way for a district judge to think 

Case 2:15-cv-00788-MCE-KJN Document 11 Filed 06/09/15 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

about what to do.” In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 

(9th Cir. 2006). 

Although involuntary dismissal can be a harsh remedy, on balance the five relevant 

factors weigh in favor of dismissal of this action. The first two factors strongly support dismissal 

of this action. Plaintiff’s repeated failure to oppose defendant’s motion to dismiss, despite clear 

warnings of the consequences, strongly suggests that plaintiff has abandoned this action or is not 

interested in seriously prosecuting it. See, e.g., Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th 

Cir. 1999) (“The public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation always favors dismissal”). 

Any further time spent by the court on this case, which plaintiffs has demonstrated a lack of any 

serious intention to pursue, will consume scarce judicial resources and take away from other 

active cases. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1261 (recognizing that district courts have inherent power to 

manage their dockets without being subject to noncompliant litigants). 

In addition, the third factor, which considers prejudice to a defendant, should be given

some weight. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262. Here, defendants have been named in a lawsuit that 

plaintiff has effectively abandoned. At a minimum, defendants have been prevented from 

attempting to resolve this case on the merits by plaintiff’s unreasonable delay in prosecuting this 

action. Unreasonable delay is presumed to be prejudicial. See, e.g., In re Phenylpropanolamine 

(PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d at 1227.

The fifth factor, which considers the availability of less drastic measures, also supports 

dismissal of this action. As noted above, the court has actually pursued remedies that are less 

drastic than a recommendation of dismissal. See Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 132 

(9th Cir. 1987) (“[E]xplicit discussion of alternatives is unnecessary if the district court actually 

tries alternatives before employing the ultimate sanction of dismissal”). Before recommending 

dismissal, the court granted plaintiff an additional opportunity to oppose the motion to dismiss 

and advised plaintiff that she was required to actively prosecute the action and follow the court’s 

orders. It also warned plaintiff in clear terms that failure to oppose the motion to dismiss, or file a 

statement of non-opposition to the motion, would result in a recommendation of dismissal of the 

action with prejudice. Warning a plaintiff that failure to take steps towards resolution of his or 

Case 2:15-cv-00788-MCE-KJN Document 11 Filed 06/09/15 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

her action on the merits will result in dismissal satisfies the requirement that the court consider 

the alternatives. See, e.g., Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262 (“[O]ur decisions also suggest that a district 

court’s warning to a party that his failure to obey the court’s order will result in dismissal can 

satisfy the ‘consideration of alternatives’ requirement”) (citing Malone, 833 F.2d at 132-33). In 

any event, the court finds no suitable alternative to a recommendation for dismissal at this 

juncture. Because plaintiff has not made any attempt to comply with the court’s prior orders, the 

court has little confidence that plaintiff would pay monetary sanctions if they were to be imposed 

in lieu of dismissing the case. 

The court also recognizes the importance of giving due weight to the fourth factor, which 

addresses the public policy favoring disposition of cases on the merits. However, for the reasons 

set forth above, factors one, two, three, and five strongly support a recommendation of dismissal 

of this action, and factor four does not materially counsel otherwise. Dismissal is proper “where 

at least four factors support dismissal or where at least three factors ‘strongly’ support dismissal.” 

Hernandez v. City of El Monte, 138 F.3d 393, 399 (9th Cir. 1998) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). Under the circumstances of this case, the other relevant factors outweigh the general 

public policy favoring disposition of actions on their merits. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1263. If 

anything, a disposition on the merits has been hindered by plaintiff’s own failure to prosecute the 

case and comply with court orders. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The June 18, 2015 hearing on defendant’s World Savings Bank’s motion to dismiss is 

VACATED. 

2. The September 17, 2015 status conference is VACATED. If necessary, the court will 

reset the date of that conference. 

Furthermore, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiff’s action be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to prosecute the action and failure to follow the Local Rules and 

the court’s orders.

Case 2:15-cv-00788-MCE-KJN Document 11 Filed 06/09/15 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

2. Defendant World Savings Bank’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 7) be DENIED AS 

MOOT. 

3. The Clerk of Court be directed to close this case and vacate all dates.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen (14) 

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections 

shall be served on all parties and filed with the court within fourteen (14) days after service of the 

objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 

waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th 

Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED AND RECOMMENDED.

Dated: June 9, 2015

Case 2:15-cv-00788-MCE-KJN Document 11 Filed 06/09/15 Page 7 of 7