Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-03590/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-03590-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Heather Fong
Defendant
Frank A. Lewis
Plaintiff
The City and County of San Francisco
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

NOT FOR CITATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRANK A. LEWIS, 

Plaintiff,

 v.

THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN

FRANCISCO; SAN FRANCISCO

POLICE; and Chief HEATHER FONG, 

Defendants. /

No. C 05-3590 PJH (PR)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

(Doc 2)

Plaintiff, a prisoner at the San Francisco County Jail, has filed a pro se civil rights

complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He has been granted leave to proceed in forma

pauperis. 

Venue is proper in this district because a substantial part of the events giving rise to

the action occurred in this district. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners

seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and

dismiss any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at

1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police

Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was

violated, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the

color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

B. Legal Claims 

Plaintiff was arrested for striking an elderly man. After forty days in jail it was

established that he was at a medical appointment at the time of the attack and so could not

have been the assailant, and the charges were dropped. He demands damages for “false

imprisonment.”

A claim for wrongful detention (false imprisonment) absent a cognizable claim for

wrongful arrest will not ordinarily state an independent claim under § 1983. Baker v.

McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 142-145 (1979). Whether plaintiff can maintain this claim,

therefore, turns on whether the arrest was wrongful. A claim of unlawful arrest is

cognizable under § 1983 for violation of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against

unreasonable search and seizure if the allegation is that the arrest was without probable

cause or other justification. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555-558 (1967). An arrest is

supported by probable cause if, under the totality of the circumstances known to the

arresting officer, a prudent person would have concluded that there was a fair probability

that the defendant had committed a crime. Beier v. City of Lewiston, 354 F.3d 1058, 1065

(9th Cir. 2004). 

Here, plaintiff alleges that the police arrested him because he had been identified as

the person who struck the elderly man. In the tort clam which is attached to the complaint

he provides more details. He says that he was stopped by a uniformed officer while buying

cigarettes in the Tenderloin. The uniformed officer was joined by a plain-clothes officer

who took plaintiff’s picture and went away. The plain-clothes officer came back and said

that plaintiff had been identified as the assailant. That is, plaintiff has alleged the existence

of probable cause, rather than its absence. Given that, the case will be dismissed with

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1 The court also notes that plaintiff has named as defendants only the City and County

of San Francisco, the San Francisco Police Department, and Chief of Police Heather Fong.

Fong, who is not mentioned in the statement of claim, appears to have been named on a

respondeat superior theory, that is, because she is the ultimate superior of the officers who

arrested plaintiff. That theory of recovery in not available under Section 1983. See Taylor v.

List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). As to the city and the police department, those

entitles can be liable only if the officers who arrested him were acting pursuant to an

unconstitutional official policy or practice of the city or of the police department, see Monell v.

Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978), and plaintiff has not alleged that. 

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prejudice.1 

CONCLUSION

This case is DISMISSED with prejudice. Plaintiff’s application for leave to proceed in

forma pauperis (doc 2) is DENIED. No fee is due. The clerk shall close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 12, 2006.

 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

G:\PRO-SE\PJH\CR.05\LEWIS590.DSM

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