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Parties Involved:
Association of Civilian Technicians, Puerto Rico Army Chapter
Petitioner
Federal Labor Relations Authority
Respondent

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 10, 2001 Decided November 9, 2001

No. 00-1486

Association of Civilian Technicians,

Puerto Rico Army Chapter,

Petitioner

v.

Federal Labor Relations Authority,

Respondent

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Federal Labor Relations Authority

Daniel M. Schember argued the cause and filed the briefs

for petitioner.

David M. Smith, Solicitor, Federal Labor Relations Authority, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the

brief were William R. Tobey, Deputy Solicitor, and Judith A.

Hagley, Attorney.

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Before: Sentelle, Randolph and Garland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Sentelle.

Sentelle, Circuit Judge: The Association of Civilian Technicians, Puerto Rico Army Chapter ("the Union"), petitions

this Court for review of the Federal Labor Relations Authority's ("FLRA" or "Authority") decision in which the FLRA

determined that a collective bargaining agreement provision

that seeks reimbursement for out-of-pocket losses resulting

from agency cancellation of previously approved leave is

contrary to law and therefore nonnegotiable. Petitioner argues that the FLRA erroneously applied the Travel Expenses

Act, 5 U.S.C. s 5701, et seq., to resolve the dispute and failed

to consider whether the provision was authorized under the

collective bargaining law, 5 U.S.C. s 7101, et seq. (Federal

Services Labor-Management Relations Statute). Because we

agree with the petitioner that the Travel Expenses Act does

not prohibit the proposed provision, we grant the petition for

review, vacate the decision and order of the FLRA, and

remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Proceedings Below

The Association of Civilian Technicians, a federal employee

labor organization, filed a negotiability appeal with the FLRA

pursuant to 5 U.S.C. s 7105(a)(2)(E), concerning provisions of

a collective bargaining agreement that had been disapproved

by the head of the agency (the Department of Defense) as

contrary to law under 5 U.S.C. s 7114(c). Specifically, this

case involves the following provision:

Once leave has be[en] approved and the employer has a

compelling need to cancel the previously approved leave,

the employer agrees not to subject the employee to a loss

of funds expended in planning of the leave (i.e. hotel

reservations, airline tickets, etc.). The employee will

demonstrate the unavoida[bility] of the loss of funds.

Ass'n of Civilian Technicians, Puerto Rico Army Ch., 56

F.L.R.A. 493, 496 (2000). Both the Union and the agency

agreed that this provision would require the Department of

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Defense to use appropriated funds to reimburse an employee

for certain losses of funds, including (but not limited to) lost

travel expenses, resulting from the agency's cancellation of

previously approved leave.

In its statement to the FLRA the agency objected to the

disputed provision on the grounds that the Comptroller General's decisions "consistently held that purely personal expenses, such as forfeited hotel room deposits, dependent's

travel costs, and increased costs for alternate flight reservations, do not become a government obligation upon the cancellation of approved annual leave and may not be reimbursed." In one of those opinions, the Comptroller General

noted that its "own research ... has not revealed any law or

regulation under which we may authorize payment ... for the

additional personal travel expense incurred." Matter of:

John W. Keys, 60 Comp. Gen. 629 (1981). Thus the agency

concluded that "language which would agree to payment of

personal expenses as a blanket rule, when annual leave is

cancelled [sic] would create a violation of the Antideficiency

Act."

In response to the DOD, the Union noted that the Comptroller General's decisions were not dispositive because they

"by their own terms, do not prohibit collective bargaining

agreements." The Union accepted the "general principle that

expenditures are not authorized unless a law or regulation

affirmatively authorizes them." However, it suggested that

the collective bargaining provisions anticipate some expenditures, otherwise, the sweep of this principle "would bar all

proposals costing money unless the expenditure affirmatively

were authorized by law or regulation," a scenario not contemplated by Congress, it argued, given the specificity of the

collective bargaining law.

The FLRA affirmed the agency's rejection of this provision

as contrary to law and therefore nonnegotiable. 56 F.L.R.A.

493 (2000). It first observed that "[t]he disbursement of

appropriated funds must be authorized by statute. Thus, the

use of appropriated funds to reimburse employees for travel

expenses must be authorized by statute." Id. at 497 (citaUSCA Case #00-1486 Document #637315 Filed: 11/09/2001 Page 3 of 10
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tions and footnote omitted). Following this observation, it

noted that "payment of employee travel expenses is governed

by the provisions of the Travel Expenses Act." Id. Because

the "Comptroller General administers and interprets the

Travel Expense[s] Act," the Authority "look[ed] for guidance

to decisions of the Comptroller General to determine whether

the Agency has authority to reimburse employees in the

circumstances presented here." Id. The FLRA found that

the "Comptroller General has consistently held that purely

personal expenses, such as forfeited hotel room deposits,

dependents' travel costs, and increased costs for alternate

flight reservations, may not be reimbursed upon the cancellation of approved annual leave." Id. (citing Earl J. Barlow,

Comp. Gen. Decision B-241249 (1991)). Thus, the Authority

concluded that "given the nature of the reimbursement at

issue in this case, we agree with the Comptroller General that

no authority exists for agencies to use appropriated funds to

reimburse employees for purely personal expenses involved in

the planning of leave." Id.

The Union filed a motion for reconsideration before the

FLRA in which it argued that the Travel Expenses Act was

inapplicable. It further argued that the expenditures that

would be required by the disputed provision "are authorized

by the collective bargaining law, [5 U.S.C. s 7101, et seq.],

and therefore by the law that generally authorizes agency

expenditures." The Union cited two FLRA decisions, NTEU

and Department of the Treasury, BATF, 26 F.L.R.A. 497

(1987); and NFFE and GSA, 24 F.L.R.A. 430 (1986), which it

argued stood for the proposition that the "collective bargaining law creates new agency obligations which general agency

appropriations may be used to meet." In the order denying

the motion for reconsideration, 56 F.L.R.A. 807 (2000), the

FLRA noted that the "Union contends that the Authority

erroneously applied the Travel Expenses Act and Federal

Travel Regulations" and that the Union believes that " 'general agency appropriations ... may be used to meet obligations

of collective bargaining agreements' when those agreements

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gaining law." 56 F.L.R.A. at 807. The Authority dispensed

with the Union's arguments as follows:

The Union's first argument is that the Authority erroneously applied the Travel Expenses Act and its implementing Federal Travel Regulations in finding that the

provision is contrary to law. By its own terms, however,

the provision requires the Agency, among other things,

to reimburse employees for hotel reservations and airline

tickets.... The provision clearly requires the Agency to

pay employees for lost travel expenses. Accordingly, in

[the case below] Puerto Rico National Guard, we applied

Comptroller General decisions which have interpreted

the Federal Travel Regulations to hold that agencies

have "no authority" to reimburse employees for the kind

of purely personal travel expenses that are set forth by

the terms of the provision.

Id. at 808.

Finally, the FLRA addressed the Union's "further

argu[ment] that 'the collective bargaining law' authorizes the

Agency to negotiate over the provision" and concluded that

"[b]ecause there is no duty to bargain over a provision that is

contrary to law, we reject the Union's argument." Id. The

Authority responded, in a footnote, to the decisions cited by

the Union by observing that "[c]onsistent with those cases, it

is well accepted that agencies are required to negotiate on

matters pertaining to the conditions of employment of unit

employees that are within the discretion of the agency under

law and are not otherwise nonnegotiable. In contrast, however, the provision in this case has been demonstrated to be

contrary to law." Id. n.5 (citations omitted).

The Union sought review in this Court.

II. Analysis

In reviewing the FLRA's interpretation of its own enabling

statute, we are "mindful that we owe great deference to the

expertise of the Authority as it 'exercises its special function

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ties of federal labor relations.' " NLRB Union, Local 6 v.

FLRA, 842 F.2d 483, 486 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (quoting BATF v.

FLRA, 464 U.S. 89, 97 (1983)). Here, however, we are faced

with the FLRA's interpretation of the Travel Expenses Act, a

statute not committed to the Authority's administration. We

review such purely legal questions de novo. See Social

Security Admin. v. FLRA, 201 F.3d 465, 471 (D.C. Cir. 2000)

("We do not defer to the FLRA's interpretation of ... a

general statute not committed to the Authority's administration."). The Authority's reliance on opinions of the Comptroller General does not change our analysis. As we have held,

"we regard the assessment of the GAO [and thus, the Comptroller General] as an expert opinion, which we should prudently consider but to which we have no obligation to defer."

Delta Data Systems Corp. v. Webster, 744 F.2d 197, 201 & n.1

(D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J.) (concluding that "[s]ince the GAO

has been thought to be 'an arm of the legislature,' there

might be a constitutional impediment to such binding effect"

(citation omitted)); cf. Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S.

152, 177 (1990) ("[T]he vast body of administrative interpretation that exists--innumerable advisory opinions not only of

the Attorney General, the OLC, and the Office of Government

Ethics, but also of the Comptroller General and the general

counsels for various agencies--is not an administrative interpretation that is entitled to deference under Chevron....").

With that standard of review in mind, we turn to the Authority's decision.

The FLRA's decision was premised on the assumption that

the Travel Expenses Act governs the disputed provision in

the collective bargaining agreement. It does not. The disputed provision says that "[o]nce leave has be[en] approved

and the employer has a compelling need to cancel the previously approved leave, the employer agrees not to subject the

employee to a loss of funds expended in the planning of the

leave," and gives costs incurred from hotel reservations and

airline tickets as examples. 56 F.L.R.A at 496 (emphasis

added). That provision does not speak in terms of travel

expenses, personal, official, or otherwise. As the Union

notes, it requires the agency to "pay employees' out-of-pocket

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losses (whether or not travel-related) when the agency--

acting for its convenience, and in its interest--exercises its

management right under 5 U.S.C. s 7106(a)(2)(B) to cancel

leave and assign work instead." In contrast, the Travel

Expenses Act, and specifically 5 U.S.C. s 5702, the provision

in question, only governs per diem and reimbursement when

an employee is "traveling on official business." The Union

proposal does not necessarily even involve canceled travel,

and it certainly does not address official business.

The FLRA cannot cite a single provision within the Travel

Expenses Act, much less s 5702, that prohibits the disputed

provision, expressly or impliedly. The Act addresses different subject matter altogether. It authorizes official travel.

It does not by its terms prohibit anything. The Authority is

attempting to force a square peg into a round hole. No

faithful reading of the Travel Expenses Act, which establishes

"entitled" reimbursement or allowance "when traveling on

official business," 5 U.S.C. s 5702(a)(1), is relevant to the

disputed provision, which provides compensation for unavoidable expenses resulting from canceled leave. To force such a

reading turns the Travel Expenses Act on its head.

This is not to say that the expenditure of appropriated

funds in a manner not authorized by law is negotiable--it is

not. In an attempt to salvage its decision, the Authority now

argues that its decision was based on the general principle

that expenditures are not authorized unless a law or regulation affirmatively authorizes them, and that there is no authorization for the expenditure required by the disputed provision. But the Authority's decision was not based on a lack of

authorization for the expenditure. Rather, it is clear that the

FLRA's decision reasoned that because the Travel Expenses

Act did not authorize the expenditure, it was prohibited. The

Authority offered no other reason. Specifically, it did not rely

on the lack of authorization elsewhere in governing law.

Agency decisions must generally be affirmed on the grounds

stated in them. See, e.g., Fort Stewart Schools v. FLRA, 495

U.S. 641, 651-52 (1990) ("[I]t is elementary that if an agency's

decision is to be sustained in the courts on any rationale

under which the agency's factual or legal determinations are

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entitled to deference, it must be upheld on the rationale set

forth by the agency itself."); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S.

80, 93-95 (1943). Post-hoc rationalizations, developed for

litigation are insufficient. See Burlington Truck Lines, Inc.

v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962) ("The courts may

not accept appellate counsel's post hoc rationalizations for

agency action...."). If the Authority only based its decision

on the Travel Expenses Act, then that is the only rationale we

may consider.

In its original opinion below, under "Analysis and Conclusions," the FLRA begins its analysis as follows: "The disbursement of appropriated funds must be authorized by

statute. Thus, the use of appropriated funds to reimburse

employees for travel expenses must be authorized by statute."

56 F.L.R.A. at 497 (emphasis added). The FLRA clearly saw

the provision as one involving travel expenses and treated it

as squarely governed by the Travel Expenses Act. Because

the Travel Expenses Act did not authorize these expenditures, it concluded (following the Comptroller General's opinions), that there was no authority for the disputed provision,

and declared it nonnegotiable. That proves at most that the

Travel Expenses Act cannot be the source of authority for the

disputed provision, not that the provision is contrary to law.

However, the Union does not rely on the Travel Expenses

Act as a source of authority--quite to the contrary, it expressly argues that the Act is inapplicable, instead relying on

the collective bargaining laws as authorizing resulting expenditures. The FLRA did not address this argument.

The argument that the collective bargaining laws themselves authorize the expenditure is one reason that the Comptroller General opinions relied on by the FLRA cannot resolve this case. Those opinions did not address a collective

bargaining situation and did not consider what effect, if any,

the collective bargaining laws would have in authorizing the

disputed provision. See 56 F.L.R.A. at 497 (discussing Comptroller General opinions). Reliance on these opinions of the

Comptroller General is flawed for yet another reason. To the

extent that the these opinions stand for the proposition that

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tional personal travel expenses incurred when employee's

official duties caused him to make alternative flight reservations," 56 F.L.R.A. at 497 (quoting John W. Keys, 60 Comp.

Gen. 629)) (1981), they must be read narrowly. This pronouncement would necessarily only apply to the agency before the Comptroller General at that time--the Department

of the Interior (in the Keys matter), not the Department of

Defense, as we have here. Moreover, any subsequent appropriations acts would, of course, render that opinion, expert

though it may have been at the time, obsolete. Therefore the

FLRA should have confronted the specific facts before it--a

collective bargaining agreement provision, with the DOD, in

the year 2000. It did not, either in its original order or the

order denying reconsideration.

In its motion for reconsideration, the Union expressly

argued that the expenditures required by the disputed provision "are authorized by the collective bargaining law, [5

U.S.C. s 7101, et seq.], and therefore by the law that generally authorizes agency expenditures." (emphasis added). Yet

again, however, the Authority failed to address this argument.

Instead it relied on its position that the "provision clearly

requires the Agency to pay employees for lost travel expenses," and noted that in the original decision it "applied

Comptroller General decisions which have interpreted the

Federal Travel Regulations to hold that agencies have 'no

authority' to reimburse employees for the kind of purely

personal travel expenses that are set forth by the terms of

the provision." 56 F.L.R.A. at 808 (emphasis added). The

FLRA was only "appl[ying]" a rule that under the Travel

Expenses Act and corresponding regulations, there is no

authority to reimburse personal travel expenses or expenses

that arise from canceled leave, and that rule does not dispose

of the Union's argument that the collective bargaining laws

and laws that generally authorize agency expenditures provide an independent source of authority. Instead, the FLRA

acknowledges the Union's "further argu[ment] that 'the collective bargaining law' authorizes the Agency to negotiate

over the provision" only to respond that "[b]ecause there is no

duty to bargain over a provision that is contrary to law, we

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reject the Union's argument." Id. The FLRA cannot now

argue that its decision was based on the general proposition

that expenditures must be authorized, because after reaching

the conclusion that there is no duty to bargain over a provision that is contrary to law, the Authority clearly states in a

footnote: "In light of this result, it is unnecessary for the

Authority to address the Union's additional arguments." Id.

at 808 n.6. These unaddressed "additional arguments" included the Union's position that the collective bargaining laws

themselves permitted the use of general agency appropriations to meet the obligations of bargaining. See id. at 807-08.

Despite its protestations to the contrary, the Authority only

considered whether the disputed provision was prohibited by

the Travel Expenses Act. Because the FLRA's application of

the Travel Expenses Act was erroneous we must grant the

petition for review.

III. Conclusion

On remand, the Authority should consider whether the

expenditures required by the disputed provision are "authorized by the collective bargaining law," 5 U.S.C. s 7101, et

seq., or are specifically authorized as an "appropriate arrangement[ ] for employees adversely affected by the exercise of

[agency management] authority" in canceling leave and "assign[ing] work," 5 U.S.C. ss 7106(a)(2)(B), (b)(3), as argued

by the Union. That question is not properly before this

Court because the FLRA based its decision solely on a

misinterpretation of the Travel Expenses Act, and we decline

to address it. Similarly, whether the Union failed to, or even

needed to cite a general agency appropriations bill in the

FLRA proceedings is also not before us. The only issue

confronting this Court is the validity of the FLRA's decision--that the Travel Expenses Act prohibits the disputed

provision. Because it does not, we grant the petition for

review, vacate the decision and order below, and remand for

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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