Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-15-02444/USCOURTS-ca3-15-02444-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Javier Oswaldo Jovel-Aguilar
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

_____________

No. 15-2444

_____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

JAVIER OSWALDO JOVEL-AGUILAR,

 Appellant 

_____________

 

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 

(M.D. Pa. No. 4-13-cr-00220-001)

District Judge: Honorable Matthew W. Brann

 

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

February 29, 2016

Before: SMITH, HARDIMAN, and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges

(Filed: March 2, 2016) 

_____________________

 OPINION

_____________________ 

 

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

 

 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 

not constitute binding precedent.

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Defendant Javier Oswaldo Jovel-Aguilar has filed a notice of appeal from 

the judgment entered in this case. His defense counsel submits that there are no 

non-frivolous issues to raise on appeal and accordingly seeks to withdraw pursuant 

to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). For the reasons that follow, we will 

grant the motion to withdraw and we will dismiss Mr. Aguilar’s appeal.1

I.

In 2013, a grand jury indicted Aguilar on one count of first-degree murder in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a) for killing his cellmate at United States 

Penitentiary, Lewisburg. On May 27, 2015, Aguilar pled guilty to second-degree 

murder under the same statute. Aguilar entered into a negotiated plea pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C), which allows a defendant and the 

Government to “agree that a specific sentence or sentencing range is the 

appropriate disposition of the case.” Id. In this case, the parties agreed to a 

binding sentencing range of 240 to 360 months. After the District Court sentenced 

Aguilar to 360 months’ imprisonment, defense counsel entered a timely notice of 

appeal on June 10, 2015, and then filed an Anders brief with the Court.2 After the 

 

1 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3742(a). Because defendant did not raise any objections at the District Court, we 

review for plain error. See United States v. Goodson, 544 F.3d 529, 539 (3d Cir. 2008) 

(citing United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55 (2002)).

2 The Clerk’s Office then notified Aguilar of his right under 3d Cir. L.A.R. 109.2(a) to 

file a pro se brief. Aguilar has not availed himself of that opportunity.

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government responded, the case was referred to a merits panel on September 21, 

2015.

II.

Defense counsel may move to withdraw from representation if, after a 

thorough examination of the District Court record, he or she is “persuaded that the 

appeal presents no issue of even arguable merit.” 3d Cir. L.A.R. 109.2(a); see also 

Anders, 386 U.S. at 744 (“[I]f counsel finds his case to be wholly frivolous, after a 

conscientious examination of it, he should so advise the court and request 

permission to withdraw.”). When presented with an Anders motion to withdraw, 

we must determine: (1) whether counsel has thoroughly examined the record for 

appealable issues and explained why any such issues are frivolous; and (2) whether 

an independent review of the record presents any nonfrivolous issues. United 

States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001). If “the Anders brief initially 

appears adequate on its face,” our independent review is “guided . . . by the Anders

brief itself.” Id. at 301 (internal quotation marks omitted).

A.

Here, after a thorough examination of the record, defense counsel identified 

three issues that Aguilar could possibly raise on appeal following a guilty plea. 

See United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989). These included (a) the 

jurisdiction of the District Court, (b) the validity of Aguilar’s guilty plea, and (c) 

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the legality and reasonableness of the sentence imposed. After identifying the 

appealable issues, defense counsel also satisfactorily explained—with citations to 

the record and applicable legal authority—why an appeal based on those issues 

was wholly frivolous. He explained that (a) there is no dispute with regard to the 

District Court’s jurisdiction; (b) the plea colloquy fully complied with Rule 11 of 

the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; and (c) the sentence was both legal and 

reasonable.

Because defense counsel fulfilled 3d Cir. L.A.R. 109.2(a)’s requirements, 

we accept his Anders brief as adequate on this basis.

B.

Having satisfied the first prong of Anders, our next inquiry requires an 

“independent review” of the record to determine whether Aguilar’s appeal presents 

any non-frivolous issues. Youla, 241 F.3d at 300. However, where defense 

counsel’s Anders brief appears adequate on its face, we scrutinize only the issues 

and portions of the record identified by the Anders brief itself. Id. at 301. “An 

appeal on a matter of law is frivolous where [none] of the legal points [are] 

arguable on their merits.” Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

Following the guidance of defense counsel’s Anders brief, we consider the 

three issues that could be raised on appeal from a plea bargain. See Broce, 488 

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U.S. at 569. First, we see no basis for disputing the District Court’s jurisdiction in 

this case. Aguilar was indicted and properly charged with violating 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1111(a). Thus, the District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.

Second, we conclude that Aguilar’s guilty plea was entered knowingly and 

voluntarily. During the change of plea hearing, the District Court fully addressed 

with Aguilar each issue set forth in Rule 11(b) in compliance with Boykin v. 

Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). Thus, we are satisfied the District Court fully 

ensured that Aguilar knew what he was pleading guilty to and chose to do so 

voluntarily.

Third, we conclude that the District Court entered a sentence that was 

reasonable and in conformity with the law. The 360-month sentence was within 

both the applicable sentencing guidelines range and was consistent with the Rule 

11(c)(1)(C) binding agreement’s range of 240 to 360 months. As we have 

recognized,

Rule [11(c)(1)(C)] disposes of the case, requiring us to hold that a 

sentencing court has the authority to accept a plea agreement 

stipulating to a sentencing factor or a provision of the sentencing 

guidelines that otherwise would not apply, or specifying a sentence 

that falls outside the applicable guidelines range. Once the District 

Court has accepted such an agreement, it is binding.

United States v. Bernard, 373 F.3d 339, 343-44 (3d Cir. 2004). See also Freeman 

v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2685, 2692 (2011) (“Rule 11(c)(1)(C) makes the 

parties’ recommended sentence binding on the court once the court accepts the 

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plea agreement.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The District Court also 

properly applied the three-step Gunter framework at sentencing. See United States 

v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006). Accordingly, any challenge to the 

reasonableness or legality of the sentence would be frivolous.

III.

In sum, we agree with defense counsel’s assessment of Aguilar’s appeal. 

Our own independent review of the record fails to reveal any non-frivolous issues 

for appeal. Accordingly, we will grant defense counsel’s motion to withdraw and 

affirm the judgment of the District Court entered on May 27, 2015. We certify that 

the issues presented in the appeal lack legal merit and thus do not require the filing 

of a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court pursuant to 3d Cir. 

L.A.R. 109.2(b).

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