Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01616/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01616-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Craig T. Conklin
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CRAIG T. CONKLIN,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

No. 2:15-cv-1616-CKD

ORDER

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”) finding plaintiff was not disabled for purposes of receiving Disability 

Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act (“Act”). For the reasons 

discussed below, the court will grant plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, deny the 

Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and remand this matter under sentence four 

of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, born November 20, 1975, applied on October 24, 2013 for DIB, alleging 

disability beginning January 15, 2012. Administrative Transcript (“AT”) 42, 97, 209-15. 

Plaintiff alleged he was unable to work due to depression/anger, migraines with tension 

headaches, left lower extremity radiculopathy, patellofemoral disease of the right knee, a fused 

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artificial bone in his right hand, high blood pressure lower back spasm, discongenerative 

cartilage, neuropathy in his hands and feet, anal bleeding, arthritis, and tendonitis. AT 229. In a 

decision dated January 5, 2015, the ALJ determined that plaintiff was not disabled.

1

 AT 14-24. 

The ALJ made the following findings (citations to 20 C.F.R. omitted):

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social 

Security Act through June 30, 2017.

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

since January 15, 2012, the alleged onset date.

3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: peripheral 

neuropathy, hyperlipidemia, migraines, major depression, 

posttraumatic stress disorder, degenerative disc disease of the 

 

1 Disability Insurance Benefits are paid to disabled persons who have contributed to the 

Social Security program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401, et seq. Supplemental Security Income is paid to 

disabled persons with low income. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382, et seq. Both provisions define disability, 

in part, as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” due to “a medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment . . . .” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(a) & 1382c(a)(3)(A). 

A parallel five-step sequential evaluation governs eligibility for benefits under both programs. 

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 404.1571-76, 416.920 & 416.971-76; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 

137, 140-142 (1987). The following summarizes the sequential evaluation: 

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful 

activity? If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed 

to step two. 

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? 

If so, proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is 

appropriate. 

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination 

of impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 

404, Subpt. P, App.1? If so, the claimant is automatically 

determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four. 

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past 

work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step 

five. 

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional 

capacity to perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not 

disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled.

 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). 

The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 

process. Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5. The Commissioner bears the burden if the sequential 

evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.

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lumbar spine with radiculopathy and hemorrhoids.

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of 

the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned 

finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to 

perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) except

the claimant can lift and/or carry ten pounds occasionally and five 

pounds frequently, can stand and/or walk for two hours in an eighthour day, can sit for six hours in an eight-hour day, can sit and/or 

stand in thirty minute intervals, can occasionally climb ramps 

and/or stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch and/or crawl, cannot 

climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds, can frequently handle and/or 

finger, must avoid machinery, heights, concentrated exposure to 

temperature extremes, fumes, odors, dusts, gases and poor 

ventilation, requires ready access to a restroom, can perform simple 

instructions, cannot perform fast-paced work or work that requires 

intense concentration for more than one hour without a five minute 

change in focus and can occasionally interact with coworkers, 

supervisors and the public.

6. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work. 

7. The claimant was born on November 20, 1975 and was 36 years 

old, which is defined as a younger individual age 18-44, on the 

alleged disability onset date.

8. The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to 

communicate in English.

9. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination 

of disability because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a 

framework supports a finding that the claimant is “not disabled,” 

whether or not the claimant has transferrable job skills.

10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, 

and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in 

significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can

perform.

11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the 

Social Security Act, from January 15, 2012, through the date of this 

decision.

AT 16-23.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed the following errors in finding plaintiff not 

disabled: (1) failed to properly evaluate and credit the Veterans’ Administration’s (“VA”)

disability rating determination contained in the record; (2) improperly ignored VA psychologist 

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Dr. Brown’s psychological examination results and opinion regarding plaintiff’s mental residual 

functional capacity (“RFC”); and (3) improperly failed to adequately capture within his RFC 

determination the mental functional limitations opined by Dr. Sunde despite assigning 

“considerable weight” to that physician’s opinion.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

The court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether (1) it is based on 

proper legal standards pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and (2) substantial evidence in the record 

as a whole supports it. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial 

evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Connett v. Barnhart, 340 

F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). It means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable 

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005)). “The ALJ is 

responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving 

ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). 

“The court will uphold the ALJ’s conclusion when the evidence is susceptible to more than one 

rational interpretation.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008).

The record as a whole must be considered, Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th 

Cir. 1986), and both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the ALJ’s 

conclusion weighed. See Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). The court may not 

affirm the ALJ’s decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. Id.; see 

also Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). If substantial evidence supports the 

administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence supporting a finding of either disability 

or nondisability, the finding of the ALJ is conclusive, see Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 

1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987), and may be set aside only if an improper legal standard was applied in 

weighing the evidence. See Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988).

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IV. ANALYSIS

A. The ALJ Erred by not Properly Considering the VA’s Disability Ratings

First, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by not properly considering and weighing the 

VA’s determination that plaintiff had a service connected disability rating of 100 percent.

On August 9, 2012, the VA issued a disability rating decision that found plaintiff to have a 

combined disability rating of 80 percent as of February 22, 2012 as a result of his physical 

impairments, and deferred a decision on how his mental impairments, namely his depression, 

impacted his disability rating. AT 796-802. The VA subsequently reassessed plaintiff’s 

disability rating and issued an updated decision on June 26, 2013. AT 296-303. In this updated 

determination, the VA attributed a 70 percent disability rating to plaintiff’s depression, and 

increased the disability ratings associated with certain physical impairments that it had earlier 

determined to have been not disabling. Id. The VA further determined that plaintiff’s depression 

caused the assessed level of disability effective September 14, 2012, while the increased level of 

disability with regard to plaintiff’s physical impairments was established from May 9, 2013. AT 

303. Overall, the VA determined that plaintiff had a combined disability rating of 100 percent. 

Id.

 In his decision, the ALJ dismissed the VA’s disability ratings with the following 

rationale: “[t]he undersigned is not bound by a finding of disability provided by another agency as 

a finding of disability is reserved to the Commissioner.” AT 20. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s 

rationale was erroneous in light of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ case law regarding how an 

ALJ is supposed to treat VA disability rating determinations. The court agrees.

Generally, findings of disability for purposes of other programs or agencies are not 

binding in social security cases, because such programs may have rules that differ from social 

security law. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has

held that “an ALJ must ordinarily give great weight to a VA determination of disability.” 

McCartey v. Massanari, 298 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2002). In McCartey, the Ninth Circuit 

explained that it reached this conclusion:

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[B]ecause of the marked similarity between [the Social Security 

Administration’s (“SSA”) and VA’s disability programs]. Both 

programs serve the same governmental purpose—providing 

benefits to those unable to work because of a serious disability. 

Both programs evaluate a claimant’s ability to perform full-time 

work in the national economy on a sustained and continuing basis; 

both focus on analyzing a claimant's functional limitations; and 

both require claimants to present extensive medical documentation 

in support of their claims. Compare 38 C.F.R. § 4.1 et seq. (VA 

ratings) with 20 C.F.R. § 404.1 et seq (Social Security Disability). 

Both programs have a detailed regulatory scheme that promotes 

consistency in adjudication of claims. Both are administered by the 

federal government, and they share a common incentive to weed 

out meritless claims. The VA criteria for evaluating disability are 

very specific and translate easily into SSA’s disability framework.

Id. While an ALJ is ordinarily required to provide great weight to a VA disability rating, he “may 

give less weight to [such a] rating if he gives persuasive, specific, valid reasons for doing so that 

are supported by the record” because “VA and SSA criteria for determining disability are not 

identical.” Id.

Here, the ALJ failed to provide persuasive, specific, valid reasons for not assigning great 

weight to the VA’s disability ratings determinations. The ALJ’s sole stated reason for 

discounting the VA’s disability rating decisions was that he was not bound by that Agency’s 

determinations because a conclusion regarding whether plaintiff was disabled was reserved to the 

Commissioner with regard to plaintiff’s DIB application. AT 20. Such a summary rejection of 

the VA’s disability ratings merely because they were issued by another agency— an agency that 

utilizes criteria for assessing disability that easily translate into the SSA’s disability framework—

was insufficient to meet the Ninth Circuit’s “persuasive, specific, valid reasons” requirement. 

See McCartey, 298 F.3d at 1076. Accordingly, the ALJ’s consideration of the VA’s disability 

determination was erroneous.

Defendant argues that the ALJ’s treatment of the VA’s disability rating decision was not 

erroneous because the mental limitations contained in the ALJ’s RFC determination were actually 

consistent with the VA’s assignment of a 70 percent disability rating to plaintiff’s mental 

impairments. However, this argument is without merit because the VA’s overall disability ratings 

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were not based solely on plaintiff’s mental impairments, but also took into account plaintiff’s 

physical impairments. Moreover, the ALJ specifically noted in his decision that he declined to 

adopt or assign any weight to the VA’s ratings, thus indicating that the ALJ understood that 

agency’s determination, including its determination regarding the impact of plaintiff’s mental 

impairments, to be inconsistent with his own findings regarding the extent of plaintiff’s 

limitations. Because the ALJ rejected the VA’s disability ratings in the record without providing 

“persuasive, specific, valid reasons” in support of his determination, the court finds that the ALJ 

committed prejudicial error. McCartey, 298 F.3d at 1076.

B. The ALJ also Erred in Failing to Discuss and Weigh the Medical Opinion of Dr. 

Brown

Second, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to specifically discuss or weigh the 

medical opinion of VA psychologist Dr. Brown.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c) mandates that the Commissioner consider every medical source 

opinion by promising claimants that the administration “will evaluate every medical opinion we 

receive.” Id. This regulation defines medical opinions as “statements from physicians and 

psychologists or other acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and 

severity of [the claimant’s] impairment(s), including [the claimant’s] symptoms, diagnosis and 

prognosis, what [the claimant] can still do despite impairment(s), and [the claimant’s] physical or 

mental restrictions.” Id. § 404.1527(a)(2).

The court finds that the medical report issued by Dr. Brown constituted a physician’s

opinion under the applicable regulations because it reflected the medical judgment of one of 

plaintiff’s physicians regarding the nature and severity of plaintiff’s mental impairments made in 

functional terms applicable to determining disability under the Act. See id. Accordingly, the 

ALJ was required to consider Dr. Brown’s opinion and to explain what, if any, weight he 

assigned to it in determining plaintiff’s RFC along with reasons in support of that conclusion. Id.

§ 404.1527(c). However, the ALJ failed to satisfy these requirements. Indeed, the ALJ failed to 

specify in his RFC discussion what weight, if any, he accorded to Dr. Brown’s opinion and his 

reasons for making such a determination. See AT 19-22. Moreover, the ALJ provided no 

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specific discussion of Dr. Brown’s opinion at any point in the decision, thus providing a strong 

indication that he wholly failed to consider it. The ALJ’s lack of consideration makes it difficult 

for the court to conduct its review of the final decision of the Commissioner and violates the 

ALJ’s duty to evaluate all of the medical opinion evidence in the record. Accordingly, the ALJ 

erred by failing to consider Dr. Brown’s opinion. See Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1012-13 

(9th Cir. 2014) (“[A]n ALJ errs when he rejects a medical opinion or assigns it little weight while 

doing nothing more than ignoring it, asserting without explanation that another medical opinion is 

more persuasive, or criticizing it with boilerplate language that fails to offer a substantive basis 

for his conclusion.”)

Defendant argues that any error the ALJ may have committed in failing to consider Dr. 

Brown’s opinion is harmless error because the mental limitations contained within the ALJ’s RFC 

determination indicate that the ALJ incorporated all of the functional limitations Dr. Brown 

opined. This argument is not well taken, however, because it is not especially clear that the ALJ 

actually tried to capture the limitations Dr. Brown opined. Given the somewhat vague nature of 

the functional limitations Dr. Brown opined, see AT 563-64, and the ALJ’s complete silence as to 

how he considered and weighed those opined limitations, the court is unable to effectively 

determine whether the ALJ’s RFC determination adequately captured Dr. Brown’s findings. 

Furthermore, while defendant provides her own seemingly reasonable interpretation of what Dr. 

Brown meant with regard to her opined limitations, the interpretation of medical opinion evidence 

and how it factors into a claimant’s RFC is a matter left solely to the ALJ, see Andrews v. 

Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995), and the ALJ has not provided any indication as to 

how he considered Dr. Brown’s opinion. Accordingly, the ALJ’s error in failing to even 

specifically discuss Dr. Brown’s opinion, let alone provide what, if any, weight he gave it, was 

not harmless error.

C. The ALJ’s Errors Warrant Remand for Further Administrative Proceedings

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s prejudicial errors warrant remand of this case for 

payment of benefits. The court disagrees and finds instead that remand of this case for further 

administrative proceedings is appropriate.

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When the court finds that the ALJ committed prejudicial error, it has the discretion to 

remand or reverse and award benefits. McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Generally, if the court finds that the ALJ’s decision was erroneous or not supported by substantial 

evidence, the court must follow the “ordinary remand rule,” meaning that “the proper course, 

except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or 

explanation.” Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th Cir. 2014). A 

remand for an award of benefits is inappropriate where the record has not been fully developed or 

there is a need to resolve conflicts, ambiguities, or other outstanding issues. Id. at 1101.

Here, the ALJ’s failure to properly discuss and weigh the VA’s disability rating 

determinations and Dr. Brown’s opinion require remand so that the ALJ can properly consider 

and weigh them in light of the other evidence in the record. On remand, the ALJ shall reassess 

the VA’s disability rating determinations and the medical opinion evidence in the record, and 

clearly discuss, physician-by-physician, what, if any, weight he assigned to each opinion, his 

reasons for making such a determination, and why substantial evidence supports such a 

determination. The ALJ is free to develop the record in other ways, as needed.

Importantly, the court expresses no opinion regarding how the evidence should ultimately 

be weighed, and any ambiguities or inconsistencies resolved, on remand. The court also does not 

instruct the ALJ to credit any particular opinion or testimony. On remand, the ALJ may 

determine that any, some, or all of medical opinions in the record, are entitled to controlling 

weight, substantial weight, reduced weight, or no weight at all—provided that the ALJ’s 

determination complies with applicable legal standards, is clearly articulated via appropriate 

reasoning provided in the decision, and is supported by substantial evidence in the record. 

D. Other Issues

In light of the court’s conclusion that the case must be remanded for further analysis of the 

VA’s disability rating determinations and Dr. Brown’s opinion with regard to determining 

plaintiff’s RFC, the court declines to reach the remaining issue presented by plaintiff, namely, 

plaintiff’s contention that the ALJ erred in considering and weighing Dr. Sunde’s opinion. On 

remand, the ALJ will have an opportunity to further consider Dr. Sunde’s opinion in the context 

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of a proper evaluation of the VA’s disability rating determinations, Dr. Brown’s opinion, and the

record as a whole. The ALJ will also be free to reevaluate his analysis and/or further develop the 

record with respect to any other issue, as needed.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, this matter will be remanded under sentence four of 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g) for further administrative proceedings that address the errors noted above. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 13) is granted for purposes of 

further administrative proceedings consistent with the court’s directions set forth above;

2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 18) is denied; and,

3. This matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this order.

Dated: October 3, 2016

11 conklin1616.ss

_____________________________________

CAROLYN K. DELANEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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