Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01741/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01741-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michelle Baptiste
Appellant
Chris Blair
Appellant
City of Berkeley
Appellee
Russ Hardy
Appellant
Thomas Madison
Appellant
Joseph McNeal
Appellant
Bilal Olushola
Appellant
Dwayne Pearson
Appellant
Quentin Randolph
Appellant
Mark Stewart
Appellant
Terry Tatum
Appellant
Henry Williams
Appellant

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Henry E. Autry, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-1741

___________

Terry Tatum; Michelle Baptiste; *

Bilal Olushola; Mark Stewart; *

Chris Blair; Russ Hardy; *

Quentin Randolph; Henry * 

Williams; Dwayne Pearson; * Appeal from the United States

Thomas Madison; Joseph McNeal, * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Missouri

Appellants, *

*

v. * 

* 

City of Berkeley, *

*

Appellee. *

__________

Submitted: November 18, 2004

Filed: May 27, 2005

___________

Before RILEY, McMILLIAN and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge.

Seven African American individuals (collectively “plaintiffs”), all former or

current firefighters with the City of Berkeley, Missouri (“the City”), appeal from a

final judgment entered in the United States District Court1

 for the Eastern District of

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2

The spelling of this name as it appears in the court’s caption is consistent with

the caption on plaintiffs’ complaint.

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Missouri in favor of the City on their claims of racial discrimination and retaliation

under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e et seq., and intentional infliction of emotional distress under Missouri law.

For reversal, plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in granting the City’s motion

for judgment as a matter of law (“JAML”), at the close of plaintiffs’ presentation of

evidence at trial, upon concluding that each plaintiff had failed to present legally

sufficient evidence for the jury reasonably to find in his or her favor on each claim.

For the reasons stated below, we affirm in part and reverse in part and remand the

case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Jurisdiction in the district court was proper based upon 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,

1343, and 1367. Jurisdiction in this court is proper based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

The notice of appeal was timely filed pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a).

Background

In September 2001, plaintiffs filed a charge of racial discrimination with the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission against the City. Thereafter, they

brought the present action in federal court. The complaint was originally filed by ten

plaintiffs, three of whom voluntarily dismissed their claims prior to trial. The

remaining plaintiffs are: Terry Tatum, Michelle Battiest,2

 Bilal Olushola, Russell

Hardy, Quinten Randolph, Dwayne Pearson, and Joseph McNeal. Count I of the first

amended complaint alleged that plaintiffs were each subjected to racial discrimination

and retaliation in violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). Count II contained

a supplemental claim under the Missouri Human Rights Act (“MHRA”), Mo. Rev.

Stat. § 213.010 et seq. Count III alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress

under Missouri law. 

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The case proceeded to trial on February 23, 2004. Through their presentation

of evidence, plaintiffs attempted to show that the City, primarily through the actions

of Lloyd Vester, the former acting city manager and acting fire chief for the City,

subjected each of them to racially-motivated adverse employment treatment.

Numerous witnesses were called to the stand, including each of the seven plaintiffs,

Lloyd Vester, and John Sczepanski, a white firefighter whom plaintiff Battiest had

accused of racially-motivated workplace harassment. The City vigorously crossexamined each of the witnesses. After resting their case, plaintiffs voluntarily

dismissed their MHRA claim.

The City moved for JAML on plaintiffs’ remaining claims. The City argued

that, as to the Title VII claims, there was no direct evidence, nor sufficient indirect

evidence, of racial discrimination. The City maintained, for example, that plaintiffs

failed to identify any similarly situated individual outside the protected group who

had received more favorable treatment from the City. See Trial Transcript (Vol. IV)

at 131-34. The City suggested that the evidence established the following facts

beyond genuine dispute. Plaintiffs Tatum and McNeal were terminated as

probationary employees of the City because they falsified their written employment

applications, having each failed to disclose a prior arrest in response to a question

specifically asking for such information. Plaintiffs Hardy and Randolph were

terminated for testing positive for illegal drug use. Plaintiff Battiest, who alleged a

racially hostile work environment based upon the City’s failure to address her claims

of harassment by Sczepanski, failed to identify an adverse employment action taken

by the City or to show that the alleged harassment was motivated by race. Plaintiff

Pearson was initially terminated but was fully restored to his employment with the

City following a review by the Civil Service Board. Plaintiff Olushola, who alleged

that someone had put fertilizer in his oxygen mask, could not show that the City

failed to adequately investigate the matter. The City also argued that plaintiffs had

not presented any evidence of damages.

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In response, plaintiffs argued that they had each presented sufficient evidence

at trial to survive the City’s motion for JAML. Id. at 134-38. They maintain that the

evidence sufficiently demonstrated the following facts. Regarding the racial

discrimination claims of Tatum and McNeal, a similarly situated white probationary

firefighter, Robert Laramie, was also terminated by the City for falsifying his

application, but he was allowed to change his termination to a resignation. Kevin

Post, a white firefighter who was hired by the City and attended a training program

at the St. Louis County Fire Academy (“the Academy”) around the same time as

Tatum and McNeal, resigned from the City’s employment while attending the

Academy and yet he was allowed to continue using the City’s “turnout gear”; by

contrast, Tatum and McNeal were ordered to return the City’s turnout gear

immediately upon their terminations. The turnout gear was necessary to complete the

training program. Moreover, prior to being hired, Tatum resolved the City’s concerns

about the suspended imposition of sentence (“SIS”) on his record, which indicated

that he had a prior arrest. Battiest was harassed by Sczepanski and suffered

compensable emotional harm, regardless of the fact that she did not lose any pay or

benefits. When she formally complained of the harassment, the City did not

genuinely investigate her claims. Similarly, when Olushola reported that someone

had put fertilizer in his face mask, the City’s investigation was perfunctory and

disingenuous. Randolph and Hardy, who were ostensibly terminated for illegal drug

use, were nevertheless subjected to racially-motivated adverse treatment in the form

of multiple drug tests. 

In addition, plaintiffs asserted: “[T]he one thread running through all the

complaints of harassment is that Lloyd Vester is the person who started it.” Id. at

136. Summing up their theory about Vester’s racial animus, plaintiffs contended:

Lloyd Vester is fired by a black man, Arbon Hairston, for acting

improperly with the city council. The city council hires Lloyd Vester as

acting City manager; fires Arbon Hairston, the black man. Lloyd Vester,

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first thing he does was . . . try to make it economically impossible for

Tatum and McNeal to go to the academy. When that didn’t work, . . .the

next workday, he went ahead and started the process . . . re-ordered the

background checks knowing that a public background check would not

reveal what he wanted to see because he knew going in that there was

a suspended imposition of sentence because he was on [Tatum’s] oral

boards the first time.

Lloyd Vester one month later fires Dwayne Pearson, two weeks

later fires Tatum and McNeal. In the space of that time, two more

African Americans quit. The man is unqualified for the job as was the

testimony. He got into the job, and within 60 days . . . half the African

Americans were gone, and the rest were complaining of harassment for

which perfunctory investigations were done.

Id. at 137.

Upon consideration of the parties’ arguments and the evidence presented at

trial, the district court granted the City’s motion for JAML. Regarding plaintiffs’

Title VII claims, the district court explained that, for each plaintiff, “[t]he issue is

whether the plaintiff has made a prima facie case such that a jury can be allowed to

determine as to each individual plaintiff whether the circumstances that they complain

of are the result of racial discrimination or racial bias, [and] whether there is any

racial animus that is the basis for the damage that they claim individually.” Id. at 141.

The district court held, without elaboration, that the evidence supporting plaintiffs’

Title VII claims was insufficient as a matter of law. The district court further held

that plaintiffs failed as a matter of law to establish their claims of intentional

infliction of emotional distress because proof of those claims depended upon proof

of the Title VII claims and, in any event, the evidence was insufficient as a matter of

law. Id. at 141-42. Thereafter, the district court entered judgment for the City, and

plaintiffs timely appealed.

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Discussion

We review de novo the district court's decision to grant the City’s motion for

JAML. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 401 F.3d 901, 906 (8th Cir.

2005). Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits the district court

to enter judgment against a party in a jury trial on a claim or defense that the party

cannot maintain under the controlling law, so long as the party has been fully heard

on the issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury

to find for that party on the issue. See Kinserlow v. CMI Corp., 217 F.3d 1021, 1025

(8th Cir. 2000) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)). We apply the same legal standard as

is applied for summary judgments. “In both Rule 56 motions for summary judgment

and Rule 50 motions for judgment as a matter of law, the inquiry is the same:

‘[W]hether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to

a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.’”

Id.; see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000)

(Reeves) (“[T]he standard for granting summary judgment ‘mirrors’ the standard for

judgment as a matter of law, such that ‘the inquiry under each is the same.’”)

(citations omitted). In ruling on a motion for JAML, the court should review all of

the evidence in the record and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the

nonmoving party, without making credibility determinations or weighing the

evidence. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150.

Title VII discrimination claims 

When Title VII claims of unlawful employment discrimination are analyzed

under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.

792 (1973), “[w]hether judgment as a matter of law is appropriate in any particular

case will depend on a number of factors. Those include the strength of the plaintiff’s

prima facie case, the probative value of the proof that the employer’s explanation is

false, and any other evidence that supports the employer’s case and that properly may

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3

In the present case, there is no dispute that all seven plaintiffs are within a

protected group and thus meet the first element of their respective prima facie cases.

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be considered on a motion for judgment as a matter of law.” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148-

49. In the present case, the district court granted the City JAML upon concluding that

each plaintiff had not sufficiently established his or her prima facie case.

If a plaintiff fails to establish a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for the jury

reasonably to find just one element of his or her prima facie case, then JAML for the

defendant may properly be granted. Cf. Erenberg v. Methodist Hosp., 357 F.3d 787,

793 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that the district court properly granted summary judgment

for the defendant where the plaintiff “did not prove a prima facie case of age

discrimination, because she failed to show that she was qualified for the position from

which she was discharged”). 

In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 802, the Title VII prima

facie burden was described as follows.

The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden

under the statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial

discrimination. This may be done by showing (i) that he belongs to a

racial minority[3]; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for

which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his

qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the

position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants

from persons of complainant’s qualifications.

The Supreme Court added, however, that, as a general proposition, “[t]he facts

necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and the specification above of the prima facie

proof required from respondent is not necessarily applicable in every respect to

differing factual situations.” Id. at 802 n.13. Since then, the Supreme Court has

repeatedly emphasized that “the precise requirements of a prima facie case can vary

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depending on the context and were ‘never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or

ritualistic.’” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (quoting

Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)). Accordingly, we will

consider whether the evidence supports the prima facie case for each individual

plaintiff’s Title VII discrimination claim. 

We begin by considering Battiest’s claim. Battiest asserted a hostile work

environment theory based upon allegations that her coworker, Szcepanski, subjected

her to racial harassment. See Brief for Appellant at 14-15 (“Michelle Battiest was

forced to work in a hostile work environment with John Sczepanski after he assaulted

her and Berkeley took no real action.”). To establish her prima facie case of racial

discrimination based on a hostile work environment, Battiest was required to show:

(1) that she belongs to a protected group, (2) that she was subjected to unwelcome

harassment, (3) that the harassment was based on race, (4) that the harassment

affected a term, condition, or privilege of her employment, and (5) that the City knew

or should have known of the harassment and failed to take proper remedial action.

See Pedroza v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, 397 F.3d 1063, 1068 (8th Cir. 2005) (Title VII

sexual harassment claim). Upon complete review of the evidence presented at trial,

viewed in the light most favorable to Battiest, we hold that plaintiffs did not present

a legally sufficient evidentiary basis on which the jury reasonably could have found

that the harassment she alleged was based on race or that the alleged harassment

affected a term, condition, or privilege of her employment. Accordingly, we hold that

the district court did not err in granting JAML for the City on her Title VII

discrimination claim.

Next we consider the claims of Hardy and Randolph, who were each terminated

by the City after testing positive for illegal drug use. At trial, neither Hardy nor

Randolph denied using illegal drugs. Nevertheless, on appeal, they maintain that the

jury reasonably could have found that their terminations were motivated by race

because they “were terminated under questionable circumstances and pursuant to

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4

In the district court, plaintiffs argued that the racial discrimination claims of

Hardy and Randolph were not based on their terminations but, rather, were based on

the “multiple drug tests.” See Trial Transcript (Vol. IV) at 138.

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Lloyd Vester’s implementation of the drug policy enacted under his watch.” Brief for

Appellants at 14.4

 To satisfy their prima facie burdens, Hardy and Randolph were

each required to show: (1) that he belongs to a protected group, (2) that he was

qualified to be a Berkeley firefighter, (3) that he was subjected to an adverse

employment action, and (4) that the adverse action occurred under circumstances

giving rise to an inference of discrimination. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Aventis Pharms.,

360 F.3d 853, 857 (8th Cir. 2004) (Wheeler). To the extent Hardy and Randolph rely

on their respective terminations to show an adverse employment action, neither can

overcome the City’s facially legitimate reason for terminating them: their undisputed

use of illegal drugs in violation of the City’s zero-tolerance drug policy. To the

extent they contend that the drug testing itself was an adverse employment action,

plaintiffs have identified no evidence from which the jury reasonably could have

concluded that the drug testing was conducted in a racially discriminatory manner.

Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not err in granting JAML for the City

on their Title VII discrimination claims.

Next we consider Olushola. He bases his unlawful employment discrimination

claim on the assertion that he “was forced to resign when he could not get a loan from

his pension.” Brief for Appellants at 14. Because it is undisputed that Olushola

voluntarily resigned in order to draw his pension, see Trial Transcript (Vol. I) at 131,

his claim of racial discrimination rests upon a constructive discharge theory.

“[C]onstructive discharge is but one incident by which an employee can demonstrate

an adverse [employment] action.” MacGregor v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 373 F.3d 923,

928 (8th Cir. 2004). “A constructive discharge occurs when an employee resigns

after the employer has created an intolerable working environment in a deliberate

attempt to compel such a resignation.” Id. 

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5

See Brief for Appellants at 3 (“Plaintiff Bilal Olushola had his breathing

apparatus tampered with – someone put fertilizer in his breathing mask – a potentially

life threatening occurrence. He complained, and the matter went up the chain of

command. Supposedly, an investigation, nothing happened. White firefighters felt

comfortable enough to so act because they were not punished for their actions.”). 

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In the present case, Olushola testified that, prior to his resignation, he spoke

with Police Sergeant Jim Bakula, the chairman of the pension board, and requested

a loan from his pension account because of a family emergency; he added that he was

willing to pay back the loan in whatever manner the pension board deemed

appropriate. Trial Transcript (Vol. I) at 148-49. According to Olushola, Bakula’s

response was: “No. Can’t do it.” Olushola then asked him: “[H]ow am I able to get

a loan against my pension?” Bakula responded: “You have to quit. You have to

resign.” Id. at 149. Bakula subsequently sent Olushola a written correspondence

identifying a written provision which Bakula believed supported the denial of

Olushola’s loan request, but which Olushola interpreted as inapplicable to his

situation. Id. at 150. At a meeting of the pension board, the board decided against

granting Olushola a loan. Id. at 150-51. Thereafter, Olushola resigned. He testified

that he was not aware of any employee of the City who was allowed to borrow money

against his or her pension. Id. at 141, 151. Upon review, we hold that Olushola’s

testimony regarding his loan request does not reasonably support a finding that the

City took any action with the intent to create an intolerable working environment in

order to compel him to resign.

Because plaintiffs’ recitation of the facts also emphasizes the incident in which

someone allegedly put fertilizer in Olushola’s face mask,5

 we now consider whether

that evidence, when added to the evidence regarding the denial of his loan request,

creates a legally sufficient basis for the jury reasonably to have found a constructive

discharge. On cross-examination, Olushola acknowledged that no policy of the City

permitted such malicious conduct, Trial Transcript (Vol. I) at 145, and further

acknowledged that there was probably nothing the City could have done to prevent

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6

Although Olushola does not assert a hostile work environment theory on

appeal, one might be inferred from the evidence regarding the incident involving his

face mask. In any event, Olushola could not establish the required prima facie

elements because the jury could not reasonably have concluded from the evidence

that the City should have anticipated the single incident or that the City failed to take

proper remedial action once the matter was reported.

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it. Id. at 147. Thus, upon viewing the record in its entirety, in the light most

favorable to Olushola, we still conclude that the evidence could not reasonably

support a finding that the City took any action with the intent to create an intolerable

working environment, in order to compel Olushola to resign. Accordingly, we hold

that the district court did not err in granting JAML for the City on Olushola’s Title

VII discrimination claim.6

Turning next to Pearson, we note that plaintiffs’ entire argument on appeal

regarding his Title VII discrimination claim is as follows: 

Lloyd Vester had racial animus against African American

firefighters because Arbon Hairston, the African American City manager

fired him. Lloyd Vester [was] appointed Acting City manager and

Acting Fire Chief on August 19, 2001 and two weeks later fired Dwayne

Pearson on August 26, 2001 [sic]. Dwayne Pearson ha[d] to go through

the expense to hire an attorney to get his job back. Dwayne Pearson also

received treatment for stress because of the situation at Berkeley.

Brief for Appellants at 15 (citations to the trial transcript omitted). 

Contrary to plaintiffs’ suggestion, the mere fact that an individual was

terminated by a person of a racial minority and then subsequently terminated a

different person of the same racial minority does not reasonably support an inference

that the second termination was motivated by racial animus. In the present case, the

evidence showed that the stated reason for Pearson’s termination in August 2001 was

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the accumulation of accidents involving his operation of fire department vehicles.

Pearson conceded that he had three such accidents in 2000 and, as a result, was

disciplined. See Trial Transcript (Vol. IV) at 114-15. In June of 2001, Pearson was

involved in a fourth incident, in which he failed to fully retract a fire truck ladder

before driving the truck into the firehouse. The error caused some damage to the

ladder and to the overhead door of the firehouse and also affected a response to a

call. Id. Vester testified that he made the decision to terminate Pearson after

investigating the June 2001 incident. Id. (Vol. III) at 169-71. 

Pearson appealed his termination to the Civil Service Board in September

2001, and the Civil Service Board reversed Pearson’s termination and reinstated him

without any loss of pay or rank. Id. (Vol. IV) at 125-26. There is no evidence that

Pearson suffered any adverse employment action after his reinstatement. Thus, the

only possible adverse employment action that the jury could have found was the

August 2001 termination, which was later reversed. Upon consideration of the

totality of evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Pearson, we hold that the

jury could not reasonably have concluded that the termination occurred under

circumstances giving rise to an inference of racial discrimination. We therefore hold

that the district court did not err in granting JAML for the City on Pearson’s Title VII

discrimination claim.

The two remaining plaintiffs are Tatum and McNeal, who were probationary

firefighters when the City terminated them ostensibly for failing to reference prior

arrests on the written employment application, notwithstanding a question specifically

asking for information about any prior arrests. Tatum and McNeal maintain that the

City’s justification – falsification of their employment applications – was merely a

pretext for racial discrimination. They claim that similarly situated white

probationary firefighters were treated more favorably than they were. 

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7

McNeal does not make the same disparate treatment argument based upon

Robert Laramie’s resignation. It appears from McNeal’s testimony that he was

allowed to change his termination to a resignation. Trial Transcript (Vol. IV) at 93

(“ . . . I was allowed to change my status of being terminated or resigned.”), 110-11

(testifying that he was terminated on October 2, 2001, was told of the termination on

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To establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination based upon a disparate

treatment theory, Tatum and McNeal were each required to show that he: (1) is in a

protected group, (2) was qualified for the probationary firefighter position, (3)

suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) was treated less favorably than a

similarly situated employee outside the protected group. See, e.g., Tolen v. Ashcroft,

377 F.3d 879, 882 (8th Cir. 2004). 

On appeal, Tatum and McNeal compare themselves to Kevin Post, a Caucasian

probationary Berkeley firefighter with whom they attended the Academy’s training

program. Around the same time that Tatum and McNeal were terminated, Post

resigned from his employment with the City. He was allowed to continue using the

City’s turnout gear and complete the training program, while Tatum and McNeal were

ordered to return their turnout gear immediately upon their terminations. As a result,

they were not able to complete the training program. 

Although Post was similarly situated to Tatum and McNeal in some respects,

he was not similarly situated to them in one material respect. Post had voluntarily

resigned, whereas Tatum and McNeal had been terminated. We hold that the jury

could not reasonably have concluded from the evidence that Post was similarly

situated to Tatum and McNeal.

Tatum, alone, also suggests on appeal that Robert Laramie provides an example

of disparate treatment. Brief for Appellants at 3 (“Lloyd Vester allowed Robert

Laramie, a white male, who was terminated at the same time as Terry Tatum for the

same reason, to change his termination to a resignation.”).7

 Laramie, like Tatum, was

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October 3, 2001, and submitted his letter of resignation on October 4, 2001). 

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terminated for falsifying his application. On direct examination, Vester recalled that

a union representative had come to him requesting that Laramie’s termination be

changed to a resignation. Trial Transcript (Vol. III) at 163. Tatum testified that he

received a letter from the local union offering to help negotiate with the City for his

resignation, as opposed to termination, but he never responded to the union’s letter.

Id. (Vol. I) at 92, 105. There is no evidence that Tatum, himself, asked the City to

change his termination to a resignation. Consequently, we hold that the jury could

not reasonably have concluded from the evidence that the City treated Tatum less

favorably than Laramie under similar circumstances.

We recognize that Tatum introduced additional evidence at trial regarding his

personal experience in the hiring process to support the inference that Vester’s

reliance on Tatum’s alleged falsification of his employment application was actually

a pretext for racial discrimination. See Trial Transcript (Vol. I) at 79-82. Tatum

testified that, after taking the City’s written examination, he went before an oral

interview panel which included: Henry Williams (African American), Jim Linhardt

(Caucasian), Lloyd Vester (Caucasian), and Jane Albert-Morris (African American).

After the interview, Albert-Morris, the City’s human resources director at the time,

telephoned Tatum and stated that he needed to come back in to discuss some issues

that had come up during a background check. Tatum indicated to Albert-Morris on

the telephone that he believed he knew what the issue was and would bring

documentation to set the matter straight. Shortly thereafter, Tatum met with AlbertMorris in her office and then with Hairston, the city manager at the time, in his office.

According to Tatum, Albert-Morris told him that his background check revealed an

SIS, to which he responded that he had been told that the SIS would be removed from

his record and would not have to be disclosed on an application. He produced

documentation to support his explanation. Tatum further testified that, after also

discussing the matter with Hairston, and showing Hairston the documentation,

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Hairston stated, in effect: “[T]his will suffice. And this will no longer be an issue.”

Id. at 82. 

Although there is no evidence that Tatum ever spoke directly with Vester

regarding the SIS at the time he was being interviewed and hired, Vester’s integral

role in Tatum’s hiring process reasonably suggests that Vester became aware of the

SIS and Hairston’s verbal acceptance of Tatum’s explanation. That conclusion does

not necessarily prove that Vester was motivated by race when he later terminated

Tatum, but it does reasonably support the inference that Vester’s stated reason for

terminating Tatum – falsification of the application – was not his true reason. The

City presents no argument on appeal to dispel this inference, but merely continues to

assert that Tatum was lawfully terminated for falsifying his application. See Brief for

Appellee at 10-11. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Tatum, we

conclude that the circumstances of Tatum’s termination reasonably give rise to the

inference that Vester’s stated reason for terminating him was a pretext for an unlawful

employment decision – possibly one motivated by race. We thus conclude that Tatum

presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case, see Wheeler, 360 F.3d

at 857 (setting forth prima facie case based upon circumstantial evidence giving rise

to an inference of unlawful discrimination), and that the district court should not have

granted the City’s motion for JAML on Tatum’s Title VII discrimination claim.

Title VII retaliation claims

We now turn to plaintiffs’ Title VII retaliation claims. The following is

plaintiffs’ entire argument on appeal regarding the legal sufficiency of the evidence

at trial to support these claims. 

In September 2001, all the African American firefighters at the

City of Berkeley went to the EEOC to complain about the racial

discrimination to Berkeley. See Tr., Vol. II, p. 95. Subsequently, they

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all suffered the adverse employment actions described [in plaintiffs’

brief on appeal]. The causal relation of the protected activity and the

adverse employment action can be inferred from the temporal proximity

of the protected activity and the adverse employment actions.

Brief for Appellants at 18.

It is well-established in this circuit that mere temporal proximity between an

employee’s protected activity and the employer’s adverse employment treatment

generally will not suffice to create a genuine issue of fact on a retaliation claim. See

Kiel v. Select Artificials, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1136 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,

528 U.S. 818 (1999) (“Generally, more than a temporal connection between the

protected conduct and the adverse employment action is required to present a genuine

factual issue on retaliation.”). In the present case, there is no evidentiary basis on

which to make an exception to this general rule for any of the plaintiffs except Tatum.

As discussed above, Tatum established a genuine issue of fact as to whether Vester’s

stated reason for terminating him was a pretext for an unlawful employment decision.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Tatum, we conclude that the jury

reasonably could have found that Vester’s motivation was retaliatory. Accordingly,

we affirm the district court’s grant of JAML on each of the plaintiffs’ retaliation

claims, except for Tatum’s.

State law claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress 

Finally, we consider plaintiffs’ state law claims of intentional infliction of

emotional distress, upon which the district court also granted the City’s motion for

JAML. The essential elements of this claim required plaintiffs to prove that (1) the

City’s conduct was extreme and outrageous, (2) the City acted intentionally or

recklessly, and (3) the City’s conduct caused plaintiffs to suffer severe emotional

distress. See Hendrix v. Wainwright Indus., 755 S.W.2d 411, 412 (Mo. Ct. App.

1988).

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The following is plaintiffs’ entire argument on appeal regarding the legal

sufficiency of the evidence supporting their emotional distress claims.

In this case, Plaintiffs have pleaded the aforementioned elements

necessary to state a claim for the intentional infliction of emotional

distress in Count III. Furthermore, Plaintiffs Russ Hardy, Michelle

Battiest and Dwayne Pearson all testified that they received treatment

for stress as a result of the problems at the City of Berkeley. Therefore,

the [District] Court should not have granted the City of Berkeley

[JAML] on the emotional distress claims.

Brief for Appellants at 19. 

With the exception of Tatum, plaintiffs did not present legally sufficient

evidence to establish an issue of fact as to whether the City’s conduct was illegal,

much less “extreme and outrageous.” Cf. id. (where harassment of employee for

filing a complaint was illegal, it nevertheless did not rise to the level of “extreme and

outrageous” conduct). As to Tatum, even if we were to conclude that the evidence

was legally sufficient to support a reasonable finding that the City’s conduct toward

him was extreme and outrageous, plaintiffs failed to present legally sufficient

evidence from which the jury reasonably could have found that Tatum suffered severe

emotional distress. Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not err in granting

JAML on all of plaintiffs’ claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated, we reverse the district court’s grant of judgment as a

matter of law for the City on Tatum’s Title VII racial discrimination and retaliation

claims. We affirm the judgment of the district court in all other respects. The case

is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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