Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00647/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00647-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
County of Sacramento
Defendant
Janet Duncan
Plaintiff
Robert Duncan
Plaintiff
Christopher G.
Plaintiff
Steve Lee
Defendant
Russell
Defendant

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The caption has been modified to reflect dismissal of the doe *

defendants, as stated in the Status (Pretrial Scheduling) Order filed

September 6, 2006, and the parties’ dismissal of former defendant

California Highway Patrol Officer Russell by stipulation filed on August

7, 2007.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT DUNCAN; JANET DUNCAN; and )

CHRISTOPHER G., a minor ) 2:06-cv-0647-GEB-DAD

through his guardian, ROBERT ) 

DUNCAN, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) ORDER*

)

COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO; and STEVE ) 

LEE, )

)

Defendants. )

)

Defendants County of Sacramento (the “County”) and Steve Lee

(“Lee”) (collectively, “Defendants”) move for summary judgment. 

Plaintiffs countered the motion by moving for a continuance under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 56(f), asserting that they

need time to conduct more discovery, and by filing an untimely

opposition brief.

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California Penal Code section 245 makes it a crime to “assault 1

. . . the person of another with a deadly weapon or instrument other

than a firearm or by any means of force likely to produce great bodily

injury . . . .” Because Christopher was a minor, it was necessary for

Lee to serve Robert. (Decl. of Steven Lee in Support of Defs.’ Mot. for

Summ. J. (“Lee Decl.”) ¶ 2.)

2

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are Robert Duncan (“Robert”), his wife Janet

Duncan (“Janet”), and Janet’s son from a previous relationship,

Christopher G. (“Christopher”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”). 

Plaintiffs allege that Lee, who is a process server employed in the

County district attorney’s office, violated Plaintiffs’ Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights by the manner in which Lee followed

Plaintiffs’ vehicle and caused California Highway Patrol (“CHP”)

officers to effectuate a stop of Plaintiffs’ vehicle and a seizure of

Plaintiffs.

On August 31, 2005, Plaintiffs approached their home in a

vehicle driven by Robert. (Decl. of Robert Duncan in Opp’n to Defs.’

Mot. for Summ. J. (“Duncan Decl.”) ¶ 8.) Lee was waiting at

Plaintiffs’ home so he could serve Robert with a subpoena requiring

Christopher to be a witness at a criminal trial involving allegations

under California Penal Code section 245. (Pls.’ Statement of 1

Disputed and Undisputed Facts (“SDUF”) ¶ 1.)

Plaintiffs had never seen Lee before. (Duncan Decl. ¶ 9.) 

Lee did not identify himself and was not wearing a uniform. (Id. 

¶¶ 9-10.) Further, Lee was driving a car that did not have any

official markings on it. (Id.) Lee walked toward Plaintiffs’ vehicle

as it approached Plaintiffs’ residence, but Robert changed the course

of the vehicle and drove away. (Id. ¶ 11; SDUF ¶ 4.) Lee got into

his own car and followed. (SDUF ¶ 4.) Lee attempted to serve the

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subpoena by getting out of his car and approaching Plaintiffs’ vehicle

on foot when Plaintiffs were stopped in traffic at least three times. 

(Id. ¶ 6.)

Lee persisted by following Plaintiffs on Highway 99 from Elk

Grove, California, to downtown Sacramento, California. (Id. ¶¶ 14-

15.) Lee accelerated quickly behind Plaintiffs several times, nearly

ramming the bumper of their car, and “tailgated” Plaintiffs’ car

numerous times. (Id. ¶¶ 16-17.) However, Lee’s car never came into

contact with Plaintiffs’ car, and he did not hinder Plaintiffs’

movement. (Id. ¶ 14.)

Robert declares that during the entire time of Lee’s

pursuit, Robert obeyed traffic signs and light signals, and drove at

or below the speed limit. (Duncan Decl. ¶ 13.)

After Plaintiffs drove onto Highway 99, Lee called 911 on

his cell phone and told the 911 dispatch operator that he worked for

the district attorney’s office and was “following a driver that is

trying to evade me, driving erratically on Highway 99 northbound.” 

(See Decl. of Steven McKinney in Support of Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J.

(“McKinney Decl.”), Ex. B). Lee told the dispatch operator that

Christopher was “wanted as a witness in a 245 and he’s being

uncooperative . . . . He’s driving erratically, he’s been blowing red

lights, he’s been driving through bike lanes, he’s making right hand

turns out of left hand lanes.” (Id. (emphasis added).)

A CHP dispatch operator contacted a CHP officer and stated:

“I have the DA’s office requesting an assist to stop a vehicle. He’s

been in pursuit of this vehicle for approximately 10 minutes.” 

(McKinney Decl., Ex. C.) In response the officer asked the dispatch

operator if there were “[w]arrants for the stop[.]” (Id.) The

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dispatch operator responded: “The original warrant is a 245 and he

has been evading the [reporting party].” (Id. (emphasis added).) The

dispatch operator later told the officer again that “[t]he party is

wanted for 245.” (Id. (emphasis added).) The officer asked the

dispatch operator, “Guns? Weapons? Anything? Do we know anything

about that?” (Id.) The dispatch operator responded that Lee “doesn’t

believe that they are armed but the want is 245.” (Id.) The CHP

officer was told Plaintiffs were “evading” Lee; but there is no

evidence that the CHP officer was told Plaintiffs were driving

erratically, “blowing red lights,” making illegal turns, or driving in

bike lanes. (See id., Exs. B & C.)

Lee described Plaintiffs’ vehicle to the dispatch operator,

and provided updates on Plaintiffs’ current location on the highway. 

(Id., Ex. B.) Lee also turned on the flashing lights on his vehicle

so the officers would know to stop the vehicle he was following. 

(Id.) Subsequently, CHP officers stopped Plaintiffs’ vehicle by

activating their emergency lights. (Id.) After the stop, CHP

officers told Plaintiffs to exit their vehicle. (Duncan Decl. ¶ 20.) 

Several of the CHP officers had their guns drawn. (Id.) The officers

placed Janet in handcuffs and indicated that they wanted to handcuff

Robert, but Robert told them he was a dialysis patient; he was not

handcuffed. (Id.) Another CHP officer led Christopher away from the

stopped car. (Id.) Lee had no further participation in Plaintiffs’

detention, other than his communication to one of the CHP officers on

the scene that Christopher was only sought as a witness in a Penal

Code section 245 case. (Id. ¶ 13.) That CHP officer told Lee there

had been a miscommunication and asked Lee to apologize to Plaintiffs,

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which Lee did after serving the subpoena on Robert. (Id. ¶ 15; Lee

Decl. ¶ 11.)

Plaintiffs allege, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that Lee and the

County violated their rights not to be subjected to excessive force

and unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, and violated

their substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 

Plaintiffs also allege various state law claims and a § 1983 claim

against the County for failure to train Lee.

PLAINTIFFS’ RULE 56(f) MOTION

Plaintiffs move under Rule 56(f) for an opportunity to

conduct additional discovery on issues involved in Defendants’ summary

judgment motion. But an amendment of the Rule 16 Scheduling Order is

necessary before Plaintiffs can be authorized to conduct further

discovery since the prescribed discovery completion date and the final

hearing date for motions have passed. See Saavedra v. Murphy Oil

U.S.A., Inc., 930 F.2d 1104, 1107 (5th Cir. 1991) (stating movant

“should have sought an extension of the discovery cutoff date [before

moving for a Rule 56(f) continuance]”); see also Nidds v. Schindler

Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912, 920-21 (9th Cir. 1997) (upholding denial

of a Rule 56(f) motion where discovery deadline had passed). A Rule

16 scheduling order cannot be modified except upon a showing of good

cause. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b).

Plaintiffs have not met the “good cause” standard. 

Therefore, their Rule 56(f) motion is denied.

///

///

///

///

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28 The summary judgment standards are well known and need not be 2

repeated here.

6

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT2

I. Federal Claims Against Lee

A. Excessive Force and Unreasonable Seizure

Lee seeks summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment

claims, arguing he did not seize Plaintiffs and was not the proximate

cause of their seizure, and that he was not responsible for any

excessive force used. (Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. (“Defs.’ Mot.”) at

3:19-20.)

“A seizure occurs either when a suspect is physically forced

to stop or when the suspect submits to [an official’s] show of

authority.” United States v. Hernandez, 27 F.3d 1403, 1406 (9th Cir.

1994). Plaintiffs have demonstrated they were seized by evidence they

presented of the CHP officers’ stop of their vehicle. See Colo. v.

Bannister, 449 U.S. 1, 4 n.3 (1980) (per curiam) (“There can be no

question that the stopping of a vehicle and the detention of its

occupants constitute a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth

Amendment.”). Lee is liable for this seizure if his actions were the

proximate cause of the seizure; in other words, Lee is liable if he

“set[] in motion a series of acts by others which [Lee] kn[ew] or

reasonably should [have] know[n] would cause others to inflict the

constitutional injury.” Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th

Cir. 1997) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F2d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir.

1978)). Here the undisputed facts reveal Lee told CHP’s emergency

dispatch that an occupant in the vehicle eventually stopped was

involved with a 245 case and Lee activated his emergency vehicle

lights to assist the CHP effect the detention. (See McKinney Decl.,

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Ex. A.) Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence to create

genuine issues of material fact as to whether Lee knew or reasonably

should have known his actions caused the CHP officers to effectuate a

stop of Plaintiffs’ vehicle, temporarily detain Plaintiffs, and place

Janet Duncan in handcuffs. See White v. Roper, 901 F.2d 1501, 1506

(9th Cir. 1990) (stating that defendant’s summary judgment motion on 

§ 1983 claim should have been denied since “[t]he question of

proximate cause should have been left to the jury”).

Accordingly, Lee’s motion for summary judgment on

Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claims is denied on this ground.

B. Substantive Due Process

Lee seeks summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth

Amendment substantive due process claims, arguing that his vehicle

pursuit of Plaintiffs’ vehicle and his 911 call to CHP dispatch was

not sufficiently offensive to “shock the conscience” for him to be

exposed to liability under this claim. (Defs.’ Mot. at 4:13-22.) A

government official’s conduct that “is so egregious, so outrageous,

that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience”

violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. County

of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 n. 8 (1998).

These claims are subsumed in Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment

seizure claims; therefore, the Fourth Amendment is the constitutional

provision applicable to these claims. See Albright v. Oliver, 510

U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395

(1989) (indicating that the Fourth Amendment seizure analysis must be

applied in a situation that “‘provides an explicit textual source of

constitutional protection’” at issue)).

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Accordingly, Lee’s motion for summary judgment is granted on

Plaintiffs’ substantive due process claims.

C. Qualified Immunity

Lee seeks summary judgment on his qualified immunity

defense, arguing that it shields him from being exposed to liability

on Plaintiffs’ federal claims. (Defs.’ Mot. at 5:4-6:10.) The issues

involved in deciding this defense are whether Plaintiffs’ Fourth

Amendment rights were “clearly established,” and whether “a reasonable

[official] would have understood that what he was doing violated

th[ose] right[s].” Meredith v. Erath, 342 F.3d 1057, 1060-61 (9th

Cir. 2003).

Plaintiffs had a clearly established right to be free from a

traffic stop that was not justified by at least reasonable suspicion

that a Plaintiff violated a law. See Price v. Kramer, 200 F.3d 1237,

1248 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a vehicle stop is an unreasonable

seizure “[u]nless there is at least articulable and reasonable

suspicion . . . that either the vehicle or its occupant is . . .

subject to seizure for violation of law . . .” (quoting United States

v. Burt, 765 F.2d 1364, 1367 (9th Cir. 1985)).

Consideration of the summary judgment record in the light

most favorable to Plaintiffs reveals that the reasonable inference can

be drawn that Lee’s only reason for causing the CHP officers to seize

Plaintiffs was to enable Lee to serve the witness appearance subpoena. 

This record shows Lee is exposed to liability for Plaintiffs’ Fourth

Amendment seizure claims since a reasonable official in Lee’s

situation would have known he lacked reasonable suspicion justifying

seizure of Plaintiffs. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)

(holding that officials may be on notice of a clearly established

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constitutional violation “even in novel factual circumstances”). 

Since genuine issues of material fact exist concerning Lee’s qualified

immunity defense, his summary judgment motion on this ground is

denied.

II. Federal Claim Against the County

The County seeks summary judgment of Plaintiffs’ federal

claim against it, arguing that the County is not liable under Monell

v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The undisputed facts

reveal the County’s policy in effect at the time “prohibit[ed]

breaking traffic laws” in the situation at issue, and “allow[ed]

pursuits only in the instance of a serious crime involving great

bodily harm,” and “require[d] a pursuit be terminated if the risk to

the public outweighs the benefit of the pursuit . . .” (SDUF ¶ 17.) 

Plaintiffs have not countered the County’s evidence with specific

facts establishing a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial. 

Therefore, the portion of the County’s motion made under Monell is

granted.

Plaintiffs argue the County is still exposed to liability

for their claim that it improperly trained Lee, since “Lee’s conduct

and driving tactics were so outrageous and dangerous, and he had such

disregard for every major District Attorney policy regarding vehicle

pursuits, that it is clear that Lee received no training, or received

inadequate training.” (Pls.’ Opp’n at 11:3-5.) However, it is

undisputed that Lee has no previous incidents of improper vehicle

pursuits and only the incident itself has been proffered on training. 

(SDUF ¶ 18.) “That a particular officer may be unsatisfactorily

trained will not alone suffice to fasten liability on the city, for

the officer’s shortcomings may have resulted from factors other than a

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faulty training program.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378,

390-91 (1989). Accordingly, the County’s motion on this ground is

granted.

III. State Law Claims

A. Section 52.1 Claim

Lee seeks summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ California Civil

Code section 52.1 claim, arguing that “there is no evidence that Lee 

. . . threatened or otherwise prevented [P]laintiffs from exercising

any legal right . . . .” (Defs.’ Mot. at 9:7-8.)

Section 52.1(a) provides a claim against “a person [who] 

. . . interferes by threats, intimidation, or coercion . . . with the

exercise or enjoyment by any . . . individuals of rights secured by

the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Cal. Civ. Code 

§ 52.1. “The word ‘interferes’ as used in [section 52.1] means

‘violates.’” Austin B. v. Escondido Union Sch. Dist., 149 Cal. App.

4th 860, 883 (2007).

Lee argues that he “merely followed [Plaintiffs] in an

attempt to serve process.” (Defs.’ Mot. at 9:8.) However, Plaintiffs

have presented evidence that Lee violated their Fourth Amendment

rights by causing CHP officers to effectuate an unconstitutional stop

of Plaintiffs’ vehicle. (See supra.) Further, Plaintiffs have

presented evidence that Lee’s interference with their constitutional

rights was accompanied by intimidation. Duncan declares that during

Lee’s pursuit of Plaintiffs, Lee “accelerated quickly behind me,

nearly ramming the bumper of my car. This happened several times, and

I feared for my life because I thought [] Lee was trying to run me off

the road or trying to get my car to spin out.” (Duncan Decl. ¶ 16.) 

Janet and Christopher also declare that Lee made them fear for their

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lives. (See Decl. of Janet Duncan in Opp’n to Mot. for Summ. J. ¶ 6;

Decl. of Christopher Gaines in Opp’n to Mot. for Summ. J. ¶ 6.) 

Accordingly, Lee has not shown that the uncontroverted facts

demonstrate Lee did not intimidate Plaintiffs while causing their

constitutional rights to be violated. See Cole v. Doe 1 thru 2

Officers of City of Emeryville Police Dep’t, 387 F. Supp. 2d 1084,

1103-04 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (denying police officers’ summary judgment

motion on section 52.1 claim where police officers violated

plaintiff’s right against unreasonable search and seizure by stopping

and searching his vehicle even though he had not committed a traffic

violation). The motion on this ground is denied.

B. Section 51.7 Claim

Lee seeks summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ California Civil

Code section 51.7 claim, arguing that there is no “evidence that

[P]laintiffs’ race had anything to do with Lee’s attempts at servi[ng

the subpoena].” (Defs.’ Mot. at 9:8-9.) 

Section 51.7(a) provides: “All persons within the

jurisdiction of this state have the right to be free from violence, or

intimidation by threat of violence, committed against their persons 

. . . on account of [certain characteristics, including race].” Cal.

Civ. Code § 51.7(a)-(b). “In order to prevail on this claim,

Plaintiffs would have to prove that [Lee] committed violence against

them and some degree of animus [was] a motivating factor for that

violence.” Tovar v. City of Fresno, 2007 WL 2253605, at *13 (E.D.

Cal. 2007) (citing Winarto v. Toshiba Am. Elecs. Components, Inc., 274

F.3d 1276, 1290 n. 15 (9th Cir.2001)). Plaintiffs argue that “they

believe, under all the circumstances, that Lee’s outrageous behavior

and dangerous tactics were motivated by racial animus.” (Pls.’ Opp’n

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at 13:6-8.) However, Plaintiffs, who are African-American, present no

facts showing that Lee, who is white, was motivated by racial bias. 

See Tovar, 2007 WL 2253605, at *13 (granting summary judgment on

plaintiff’s section 51.7 claim and stating that “[w]hile [plaintiff]

does make allegations that she was discriminated against or that

certain officers had a racist attitude towards her, there is no

evidence to support those bald allegations”). Accordingly, Lee’s

summary judgment motion is granted on Plaintiffs’ section 51.7 claim.

C. Assault

Lee seeks summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ assault claim,

arguing he “never put his vehicle in a position to ‘ram’ [P]laintiffs,

nor did he have any intent to cause contact.” (Defs.’ Mot. at 9:24-

25.)

“To make out a claim for assault under California law,

[Plaintiffs must] ‘establish (1) that [Lee] intended to cause harmful

or offensive contact, or the imminent apprehension of such contact,

and (2) that [P]laintiff[s] w[ere] put in imminent apprehension of

such contact.’” Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1172 (9th Cir.

2004) (quoting Brooks v. United States, 29 F. Supp. 2d 613, 617 (N.D.

Cal. 1998)).

Plaintiffs argue that Lee committed an assault when he

nearly rammed Plaintiffs’ vehicle. (Pls.’ Opp’n at 13:12-13.) Robert

declares that during the pursuit, Lee “accelerated quickly behind me,

nearly ramming the rear bumper of my car.” (Duncan Decl. ¶ 16.) Lee

counters that “[t]he fact that [he] contacted CHP regarding

[Plaintiffs’] erratic driving, and did not request their apprehension,

belies an intent to force [P]laintiffs to stop of his own accord or

effort.” (Defs.’ Mot. at 9:25-26.) However, Defendants have not

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shown that no reasonable jury could infer from the evidence that Lee

intended to cause an “imminent apprehension” of harmful contact by

nearly ramming Plaintiffs’ rear bumper. See Vaughn v. Baxter, 488

P.2d 1234, 1237 (Okl. 1971) (finding that a defendant’s vehicular

pursuit of plaintiffs “became an assault with a dangerous instrument

if [defendant] intended to cause fright and terror in the occupants of

the [plaintiffs’] car.”). Further, Plaintiffs declare that they were

put in an “imminent apprehension” of harmful contact. (See Duncan

Decl. ¶ 16 (“I feared for my life because I thought [] Lee was trying

to run me off the road or trying to get my car to spin out.”); Decl.

of Janet Duncan in Opp’n to Mot. for Summ. J. ¶ 6 (“I feared for my

life because it looked like [] Lee was trying to run us off the road

or was trying to hit our car.”); Decl. of Christopher Gaines in Opp’n

to Mot. for Summ. J. ¶ 6 (“[I]t made me fear for my life [because]

[i]t looked like [] Lee was trying to run us off the road or was

trying to hit our car.”).) Accordingly, Lee’s motion on this ground

is denied.

D. Battery

Lee seeks summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ battery claim,

arguing since “Lee did not touch, or even attempt to touch any of the

Plaintiffs . . . he cannot be held liable.” (Defs.’ Mot. at 9:16-17.) 

Plaintiffs counter that, although Lee did not touch Plaintiffs, “Lee

helped bring to bear the CHP’s force and actual touching of the

Plaintiffs by his intentional act.” (Pls.’ Opp’n at 14:6-8.) The CHP

officers touched Janet when they placed her in handcuffs. (Duncan

Decl. ¶ 20.)

Under California law, a party injured by a battery may

recover damages not only from the actual assailant, “but [also] from

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any other person who aids, abets, counsels or encourages” the battery. 

Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Trans. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 926 (9th Cir.

2001) (quoting Ayer v. Robinson, 163 Cal. App. 2d 424, 428 (1958)). A

genuine issue material fact exists as to whether Lee actions expose

him to liability for the CHP officers seizure of Plaintiffs. 

Accordingly, Lee’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ battery

claims is denied.

D. Negligent Hiring and Supervision

The County seeks summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim that

the County negligently hired and supervised Lee, arguing that “Lee has

not previously demonstrated that in his efforts to serve process on

behalf of the District Attorney, [] he would engage in unlawful or

violent acts, or, that he harbored any racial animus.” (Mot. at 7:24-

8:5.) Plaintiff counters that “Lee’s conduct and driving tactics were

so outrageous and dangerous, and he had such disregard for every major

District Attorney policy regarding vehicle pursuits, that it is clear

that Lee received no training, or received inadequate training.” 

(Pls.’ Opp’n at 11:3-5.)

Under California law, “‘an employer can be liable to a third

person for negligently hiring, supervising, or retaining an unfit

employee’ [and] [t]his liability extends to public entities. ” United

States v. Sequel Contractors, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1155 (C.D.

Cal. 2005) (quoting Doe v. Capital Cities, 50 Cal. App. 4th 1038, 1054

(1996)).

Liability for negligent hiring and supervision “is premised

upon the fact that the employer either knew or should have known that

the employee created a particular hazard, and that type of hazard

materialized.” Madrigal v. California, 2006 WL 2792826, at *3 (E.D.

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Cal. Sept. 28, 2006) (citing Capital Cities, 50 Cal. App. 4th at

1054). However, Plaintiffs present no facts showing that the County

knew or should have known that Lee created a hazard. It is undisputed

that Lee has not previously been reported as engaging in either

dangerous driving behavior or as exhibiting any racially intolerant

actions. (SDUF ¶ 18.) Accordingly, the County’s motion for summary

judgment is granted on Plaintiffs’ negligent hiring and supervision

claim.

SUMMARY

Plaintiffs’ Rule 56(f) motions is denied. Defendants’

summary judgment motion is granted on: Plaintiffs’ substantive due

process claim against Lee, Plaintiffs’ federal claims against the

County, Plaintiffs’ section 51.7 claim against Lee, and Plaintiffs’

negligent hiring and supervision claim against the County. The

remainder of Defendants’ summary judgment motion is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 22, 2008

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

Case 2:06-cv-00647-GEB-DAD Document 27 Filed 02/25/08 Page 15 of 15