Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01006/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01006-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Gloria Ontiveros
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Plaintiff Gloria Ontiveros, by her attorneys, Law Offices of Lawrence L. Rohlfing, seeks 

judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) 

denying her application for disability insurance benefits pursuant to Title II of the Social Security 

Act (42 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.) (the “Act”). The matter is currently before the Court on the parties’ 

cross-briefs, which were submitted, without oral argument, to the Honorable Sandra M. Snyder, 

United States Magistrate Judge. Following a review of the complete record and applicable law, 

this Court finds the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) to be supported by 

substantial evidence in the record as a whole and based on proper legal standards. 

I. Background

A. Procedural History

On June 15, 2010, Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits. Plaintiff alleged an 

onset of disability date of February 28, 2009. The Commissioner initially denied the claims on 

January 19, 2011, and upon reconsideration again denied the claims on July 6, 2011. On August 

GLORIA ONTIVEROS,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

CASE NO. 1:14-CV-1006-SMS 

ORDER AFFIRMING AGENCY’S 

DENIAL OF BENEFITS AND ORDERING 

JUDGMENT FOR COMMISSIONER

(Doc. 14)

Case 1:14-cv-01006-SMS Document 16 Filed 09/09/15 Page 1 of 8
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8, 2011, Plaintiff filed a timely request for a hearing.

On August 29, 2012, and represented by counsel, Plaintiff appeared and testified a hearing 

presided over by John Cusker, Administrative Law Judge (“the ALJ”). See 20 C.F.R. 404.929 et 

seq. An impartial vocational expert, Kathryn A. Atha (“the VE”), also appeared and testified. 

On November 15, 2014, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s application. The Appeals Council 

denied review on April 9, 2014. The ALJ’s decision thus became the Commissioner’s final 

decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(h). On June 26, 2014, Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking this 

Court’s review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3).

B. Relevant Record

The only issue on appeal is whether the ALJ committed legal error when he failed to 

explain a deviation from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles at step four of the sequential 

analysis. Plaintiff’s physical and mental impairments and RFC are not on appeal. Hence, the 

record will not be summarized here.

C. Vocational Expert Testimony

At the administrative hearing, the VE classified Plaintiff’s past work as convenience store 

cashier (DOT # 915.477-01, light, SVP 3), food service worker (DOT # 319.677-014, medium, 

SVP 2), and home attendant (DOT # 354.377-014, medium SVP 3). The VE testified that her 

current job as home attendant was actually performed at less than medium. The ALJ asked the VE 

to assume a hypothetical person of the same age, education, and work history as Plaintiff, could 

lift and carry 100 pounds occasionally and 50 pounds frequently, and only occasionally reach 

above shoulder level on the right side, with the right side being the dominant extremity. The VE 

opined that this individual could perform the cashier and food service worker positions.

The ALJ proposed a similar hypothetical of an individual with the same vocational factors 

as Plaintiff, had no exertional or postural limitations, but was limited from working overhead with 

her right arm. The VE testified that such an individual could perform Plaintiff’s past work.

For the third hypothetical, the ALJ asked the VE to assume an individual with the same 

vocational factors and same RFC but was also limited to simple, repetitive tasks. The VE opined 

that such an individual could perform Plaintiff’s past work of food service worker in a hospital. 

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Plaintiff’s attorney questioned the VE as to the level of skill required for a food service worker in 

a hospital. The VE affirmed that the classification was unskilled even though she would enter 

dietary changes into the kitchen computer. 

D. Disability Determination

After considering the evidence, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial 

gainful activity since the alleged onset date of disability. He found that Plaintiff had the following 

severe impairments –bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, post right carpal tunnel release, and history 

of major depressive disorder in apparent partial remission– which significantly limited her ability 

to perform basic work activities. He found that Plaintiff also had a non-severe impairment of 

obesity, which did not cause more than a minimal limitation in activity. The ALJ found that 

Plaintiff did not have an impairment that met or medically equaled the severity of a listed 

impairment. He found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform a full range of work at all exertional 

levels but could only occasionally to frequently reach over shoulder level with the right dominant 

arm, and was limited to simple, repetitive tasks. The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was capable of

performing her past relevant work as a food service worker in a hospital. Hence, he determined 

that Plaintiff was “not disabled.” 

II. Legal Standard

A. The Five-Step Sequential Analysis

An individual is considered disabled for purposes of disability benefits if she is unable to 

engage in any substantial, gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or 

mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted, or can be expected to 

last, for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a) 

(3)(A); see also Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 23 (2003). The impairment(s) must result from 

anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities that are demonstrable by medically 

accepted clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and must be of such severity that the 

claimant is not only unable to do her previous work but cannot, considering her age, education, 

and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial, gainful work that exists in the 

national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)-(3), 1382c(a)(3)(B), (D). 

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To encourage uniformity in decision making, the Commissioner has promulgated 

regulations prescribing a five-step sequential process for evaluating an alleged disability. 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 (a)-(f); 416.920 (a)-(f). In the five-step sequential review process, the burden 

of proof is on the claimant at steps one through four, but shifts to the Commissioner at step five. 

See Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1099 (9th Cir. 1999). If a claimant is found to be disabled or 

not disabled at any step in the sequence, there is no need to consider subsequent steps. Id. at 

1098–99; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.

In the first step of the analysis, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is currently 

engaged in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If not, in the 

second step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has a severe impairment or a 

combination of impairments significantly limiting her from performing basic work activities. Id. 

§§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If so, in the third step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant 

has a severe impairment or combination of impairments that meets or equals the requirements of 

the Listing of Impairments, 20 C.F.R. 404, Subpart P, App. 1. Id. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If 

not, in the fourth step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has sufficient RFC, despite 

the impairment or various limitations to perform his past work. Id. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). If 

not, in step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can perform 

other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. Id. §§ 404.1520(g), 

416.920(g).

B. Standard of Review

Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision 

to deny benefits under the Act. The record as a whole must be considered, weighing both the 

evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s decision. 

Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). In weighing the evidence and making findings, the Commissioner must apply the proper 

legal standards. See, e.g., Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988). If an ALJ 

applied the proper legal standards and the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, 

this Court must uphold the ALJ’s determination that the claimant is not disabled. See, e.g., Ukolov 

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v. Barnhart, 420 F.3d 1002, 104 (9th Cir. 2005); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial 

evidence means “more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance.” Ryan v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1998 (9th Cir. 2008). It is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 

2005). Where the evidence as a whole can support either outcome, the Court may not substitute its 

judgment for the ALJ’s, rather, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld. Id. 

III. Discussion

Plaintiff argues the description for food service worker, hospital in the Dictionary of 

Occupational Titles (“DOT”) requires her to perform at a higher reasoning level, Level 3, than is

permitted by her RFC which restricts her to simple repetitive tasks. She argues that the ALJ erred 

in failing to resolve the deviation from the DOT. 

A. Applicable Law

“The DOT lists maximum requirements of occupations as generally performed, not the 

range of requirements of a particular job as it is performed in specific settings.” SSR 00-4p. “The 

term ‘occupation,’ as used in the DOT, refers to the collective description of those jobs. Each 

occupation represents numerous jobs.” Id. “Information about a particular job’s requirements [...]

may be available [...] from a VE's or VS's experience in job placement or career counseling.” Id. 

A VE may be able to provide more specific information about jobs or occupations than the DOT.

Id. 

An ALJ cannot rely on the VE’s testimony without inquiring whether it conflicts with the 

DOT and obtaining a reasonable explanation for any apparent conflict. Massachi v. Astrue, 486 

F.3d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 2007). “An example of a conflict between the DOT and a VE’s 

testimony is when the DOT’s description of a job includes activities a claimant is precluded from 

doing, and the VE nonetheless testifies that the claimant would be able to perform that job.” Tovar 

v. Colvin, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3997, *9-10 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2015)(citing Tommasetti v. 

Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 2008)). If the ALJ relies on a VE’s testimony that 

contradicts the DOT, the record must contain “persuasive evidence to support the deviation.”

Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1435 (9th Cir. 1995). “[I]n order for an ALJ to rely on a job 

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description in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles that fails to comport with a claimant’s noted 

limitations, the ALJ must definitively explain this deviation.” Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 

847 (9th Cir. 2001). 

The Ninth Circuit found that “there is an apparent conflict between the residual functional 

capacity to perform simple, repetitive tasks, and the demands of Level 3 Reasoning.” Zavalin v. 

Colvin, 778 F.3d 842, 847 (9th Cir. 2015). This conflict invokes the ALJ’s duty to resolve the 

deviation. The Zavalin appeal was reversed because the ALJ in that case had failed to recognize 

the inconsistency and did not ask the expert to explain why a person with Zavalin’s limitation 

could nevertheless meet the demands of Level 3 Reasoning. Id. While Level 3 reasoning seems 

inconsistent with an RFC limited to simple and routine work tasks, Level 2 reasoning appears 

more consistent. Hackett v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1168, 1176 (10th Cir. 2005).

B. Analysis

Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was limited to simple, repetitive tasks. The ALJ also 

found that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work of food service worker, hospital, which 

has a Reasoning Level of 2, not 3, as argued by Plaintiff. DOT # 319.677-014. The DOT identifies

food service worker, hospital as SVP 2, the VE testified that it was SVP 2, and the ALJ identified 

it in the written decision as SVP 2. 

Level 2 Reasoning requires a person to: “Apply commonsense understanding to carry out 

detailed but uninvolved written or oral instructions. Deal with problems involving a few concrete 

variables in or from standardized situations.” DOT, Appx. C, III; Zavalin, 778 F. 3d at 847. The 

food service worker, hospital title describes the functions as follows:

Prepares and delivers food trays to hospital patients, performing any combination of 

following duties on tray line: Reads production orders on color-coded menu cards on trays 

to determine items to place on tray. Places items, such as eating utensils, napkins, and 

condiments on trays. Prepares food items, such as sandwiches, salads, soups, and 

beverages. Places servings in blender to make foods for soft or liquid diets. Apportions and 

places food servings on plates and trays according to diet list on menu card. Examines 

filled tray for completeness and places on cart, dumbwaiter, or conveyor belt. Pushes carts 

to halls or ward kitchen. Serves trays to patients. Collects and stacks dirty dishes on cart 

and returns cart to kitchen. Washes dishes and cleans work area, tables, cabinets, and 

ovens. Collects and places garbage and trash in designated containers. May record amount 

and types of special food items served to patients. May assemble and serve food items to 

hospital staff in cafeteria.

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DOT # 319.677-014. This relatively lengthy DOT description reveals that the hospital food service 

worker is required to perform simple and repetitive tasks that seem to comport with the 

requirements of Level 2 Reasoning. There is no apparent deviation from the DOT. 

Nevertheless, even if there was an apparent conflict between SVP 2 and a limitation to 

simple, repetitive tasks, this conflict was resolved. The VE specifically testified, when questioned 

by Plaintiff’s attorney, that the hypothetical person limited to simple, repetitive tasks would be 

capable of performing the functions of the hospital food service worker. She testified that the 

hypothetical individual would be able to enter orders into the kitchen computer and would not be 

required actually to make the decision to change a patient’s diet. 

Further, the ALJ compared Plaintiff’s RFC with the physical and mental demands of the 

work and found that she was able to perform it as actually performed. This finding is supported by 

substantial evidence in the record. The ALJ discussed Plaintiff’s testimony. Plaintiff’s part-time 

work involves home patient care. She makes sure the patients are comfortable, walks with them to 

the restroom, and does a little cleaning. Plaintiff is able to pay bills, count change, and handle 

bank accounts. She completed eleventh grade and completed vocational training as a certified 

nursing assistant. She likes to read and can read for about four hours. She is able to drive. Plaintiff 

wrote in her Work History Report that, as a hospital food service worker, she would change diet 

for patients, answer phones, push and dock cart, move plates and newspapers, use a computer to 

find patients’ menu preference, stock pantries, and deliver trays to patients. This indicates that she 

is able to perform at Level 2 Reasoning and that she would be able to perform her past relevant 

work as a hospital food service worker, as it was actually performed.

Thus, the ALJ’s step-four finding that Plaintiff can perform her past relevant work as a 

hospital food service worker is supported by substantial evidence in the record.

IV. Conclusion and Order

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the ALJ applied appropriate legal standards 

and that substantial credible evidence supported the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff was not 

disabled. Accordingly, the Court hereby DENIES Plaintiff’s appeal from the administrative 

decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter 

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judgment in favor of the Commissioner and against Plaintiff. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 8, 2015 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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