Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_18-cv-01725/USCOURTS-alnd-5_18-cv-01725-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
URS Federal Technical Services, Inc.
Defendant
Robert Washington
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

ROBERT WASHINGTON,

Plaintiff,

v.

URS FEDERAL TECHNICAL 

SERVICES, INC.,

Defendant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case No.: 5:18-cv-01725-LCB

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This case stems from the alleged discrimination Plaintiff Robert Washington 

experienced while employed by URS Federal Services, Inc1

. Plaintiff is African 

American. (Doc. 1 at 1). When he was an employee, Plaintiff claims that he was 

demoted from his position as general foreman and ultimately fired because of his 

race and color. (Id. at 7). Plaintiff also claims he experienced a hostile work 

environment because of racist comments and interactions that happened at work. (Id. 

at 3). Defendant denies that Plaintiff’s race or color was a factor in his demotion or 

termination. According to Defendant, Plaintiff was demoted due to financial 

considerations unrelated to his job performance or any other non-economic factor. 

 1 Defendant notes that it was misnamed URS Federal Technical Services in the complaint. (Doc. 

5 at 1).

FILED

 2020 Mar-30 AM 08:16

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 5:18-cv-01725-LCB Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 1 of 28
2

Defendant contends that Plaintiff was terminated for falsifying his time sheet by 

incorrectly reporting the hours he worked.

Before the Court are Defendant’s Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Evidentiary 

Submissions (Doc. 25) and Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 17). For the 

reasons stated below, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendant’s Motion 

to Strike. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 

I. MOTION TO STRIKE (Doc. 25)

Defendant filed a motion objecting to Plaintiff’s evidentiary submissions, or, 

in the alternative, moving to strike those submissions. (Doc. 25 at 1). Defendant 

objects to Plaintiff’s proposed submission of a letter written by the president of 

Plaintiff’s labor union in which the union president opined that Plaintiff’s 

termination was unfair. (Doc. 23-1). Defendant also objects to many of the facts 

Plaintiff presented in his reply brief. (Doc. 25). Plaintiff’s reply brief disputes or 

clarifies many of Defendant’s alleged undisputed facts, such as Defendant’s 

disciplinary policies regarding falsification of timesheets and other policies and 

practices regarding employee timesheets. (Doc. 22). Defendant also objects to 

Plaintiff’s characterization of these and other policies as well as his interpretation of 

the relevant collective bargaining agreement. Finally, Defendant objects to 

Plaintiff’s contention that several white employees improperly reported their hours 

but were not fired. The remaining objections are based on Defendant’s contention 

Case 5:18-cv-01725-LCB Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 2 of 28
3

that some of Plaintiff’s assertions in his response brief are not responsive to the 

actual allegations in Defendant’s motion. See (Doc. 25).

The Court finds that most of the challenged evidence is unnecessary to the 

resolution of the present motion. For example, the Court does not need to consider 

the letter from Plaintiff’s union president. Additionally, Defendant’s objections to 

Plaintiff’s interpretations of the company’s disciplinary policy and the collective 

bargaining agreement need not be resolved. Both the collective bargaining 

agreement and the employee handbook - which contains the company’s disciplinary 

policy – have been submitted. Those documents speak for themselves, and the Court 

does not need to consider the parties’ interpretation of either document. Thus, aside 

from the two matters discussed below, Defendant’s motion to strike is moot.

A. Legal Standards for a Motion to Strike

Courts will construe “a party’s motion to strike certain evidence as an 

objection to that evidence’s admissibility.” Taylor v. City of Gadsden, 958 F. Supp. 

2d 1287, 1291 (N.D. Ala. 2013), aff’d, 767 F.3d 1124 (11th Cir. 2014). Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 56(c)(2) allows a party to object “that the material cited to support 

or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). Evidence that is otherwise admissible can be submitted in 

inadmissible form at summary judgment. McMillian v. Johnson, 88 F.3d 1573, 1584 

(11th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff did not respond to Defendant’s Motion to Strike, so any 

Case 5:18-cv-01725-LCB Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 3 of 28
4

arguments Plaintiff could have made in opposition to this motion are abandoned. 

Jones v. Bank of America, N.A., 564 F. App’x. 432, 434 (11th Cir. 2014).

Typically, a court cannot consider inadmissible hearsay on a motion for 

summary judgment. Macuba v. Deboer, 193 F.3d 1316, 1322. However, “a district 

court may consider a hearsay statement in passing on a motion for summary 

judgment if the statement could be ‘reduced to admissible evidence at trial’ or 

‘reduced to admissible form.’” Id. at 1323. For example, a statement can be 

admissible if it survives under an exception to the hearsay rule, is not being offered 

for the truth of the matter asserted or is only offered for impeachment purposes. Id. 

at 1323-24. See also Fed. R. Evid. 803, 804. 

Evidence is relevant if “it has any tendency to make a fact more or less 

probable than it would be without the evidence and the fact is of consequence in 

determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. All relevant evidence is admissible 

except when excluded by “the United States Constitution; a federal statute; these 

rules [the Federal Rules of Evidence]; or other rules prescribed by the Supreme 

Court.” Fed. R. Evid. 402.

B. Defendant’s remaining objections and motion to strike

1. Plaintiff’s claim that white employees worked fewer hours than 

reflected on their times sheets.

Case 5:18-cv-01725-LCB Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 4 of 28
5

The Court turns first to Defendant’s objection to and motion to strike 

Plaintiff’s contention that white employees “worked fewer hours than reflected on 

their timesheets.” (Doc. 22 at 4). Defendant objects based on hearsay, lack of 

foundation, and relevance. During Plaintiff’s first deposition, he claims he has a 

“whole list” of white employees who charged time they did not work. (Doc. 19-3 at

145). However, Plaintiff later admitted he only had second-hand knowledge that

most of these employees were falsifying their timesheets. See (Id. at 153, 206). This 

is hearsay without an exception. The only employee whom Plaintiff seemingly has 

direct knowledge is Billy Dunn because he reported to him and approved his time 

sheets. (Id. at 206). Accordingly, Plaintiff can only assert Billy Dunn as a white 

employee that falsified his time sheets without retribution. Therefore, Defendant’s 

motion to strike regarding this fact is granted in part and denied in part.

2. Plaintiff’s contention that his supervisor ignored his complaints of 

discriminatory behavior and allowed himself to be influenced by 

others who were prejudiced against Plaintiff

In its brief in support of its motion for summary judgment, Defendant asserted 

that race played no role in Plaintiff’s supervisor’s decision to terminate him. In his 

response to that claim, Plaintiff asserted that his supervisor, Donnie Crouch “ignored 

his complaints of discriminatory behavior” and “allowed himself to be influenced 

by others who were prejudiced against [Plaintiff].” (Doc. 22 at 4). Defendant objects

and moves to strike based on relevance. (Doc. 25).

Case 5:18-cv-01725-LCB Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 5 of 28
6

In his deposition, Plaintiff testified that Crouch ignored his claims of racial 

harassment after someone referred to him as a “monkey in a tree.” (Doc. 19-3 at 39). 

According to Plaintiff, he reported this incident to Crouch, and Crouch “didn’t really 

say nothing (sic). He just kind of shook his head, brushed it off.” (Id. at 12).

However, when asked if he knew what Crouch did after that, Plaintiff replied, “No. 

I don’t know that.” (Id.). Accordingly, this evidence does not refute Defendant’s 

assertion that race did not play a role in Crouch’s decision to terminate Plaintiff. 

Nevertheless, it is relevant and, therefore, not due to be stricken.

However, Plaintiff’s other contention, i.e., that Crouch “allowed himself to be 

influenced by others who were prejudiced against the Plaintiff” lacks any 

foundation. As noted, Plaintiff did not respond to Defendant’s motion to strike and, 

consequently, has failed to point to any other evidence in the record that would 

support his speculative statement. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to strike this 

assertion is granted.

II. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Doc. 17)

A. Factual Background

1. Plaintiff’s Demotion

It is undisputed that Plaintiff Robert Washington worked as an electrician at 

Defendant URS Technical Services, Inc. beginning in 1998. (Doc. 1 at 2). Plaintiff 

eventually was promoted while employed by the company. He started as an 

Case 5:18-cv-01725-LCB Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 6 of 28
7

apprentice electrician in 1998, was promoted to journeyman in 2002, foreman in 

2010, and general foreman in 2012. (Doc. 18 at 2-3). As general foreman, Plaintiff 

supervised a crew of 35 electricians and foremen. (Doc. 19-3 at 92). Ultimately,

Plaintiff was demoted back to foreman in 2017. (Doc. 1 at 3).

Plaintiff believes the reason for his demotion was based on his race and color. 

(Doc. 1 at 7). He supports this claim by comparing himself to Ken Turner, a white 

general foreman with less experience at the company was not demoted. (Doc. 19-3

at 91). Defendant claims that Plaintiff’s demotion was a monetary decision and that 

Turner kept his position as general foreman because his position required him to 

oversee “multiple crafts,” unlike Plaintiff who oversaw only one craft. (Doc. 19-1 at

3). Turner supervised laborers, carpenters, and pipefitters while Plaintiff supervised 

electricians. (Doc. 19-3 at 92). Plaintiff does not dispute these facts. However, he 

asserts that he had more seniority than Turner and that, although he supervised only 

one craft, he supervised a large crew of electricians.

2. Plaintiff’s Termination

It is undisputed that Defendant maintained a policy that an employee who 

charges more time than he works is subject to disciplinary action, “up to and 

including termination of employment.” (Doc. 19-4 at 21). It is also undisputed that

employees received training on how to correctly report time and consequences if 

time was not reported properly. (Doc. 18 at 4). Plaintiff admitted he received 

Case 5:18-cv-01725-LCB Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 7 of 28
8

timekeeping training. (Doc. 19-3 at 100). Employees are instructed to charge time 

taken for lunch beyond 30 minutes as vacation time. (Doc. 19-11 at 1). However, 

they can charge an additional two hours for a project if they arrive prior to the start 

of normal work hours. (Doc. 19-11 at 1). See also (Doc. 19-5 at 33). Workers are 

also allowed to charge four hours of overtime when coming in on an off day, 

regardless of how long they work on a project. (Doc. 19-11 at 1). 

Plaintiff was accused of incorrectly reporting his time on August 16, 2017, 

and August 18, 2017. (Doc. 19-3 at 194). On August 16, Plaintiff failed to correctly 

charge the time he was off location as vacation. Instead, he charged the time as if he 

were working. (Doc. 19-1 at 4). On August 18, Plaintiff worked overtime, and under 

the terms of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA), he could charge four hours

for the time he worked. (Id. at 5). Instead, Plaintiff charged six hours for his work 

on August 18. (Id.). Plaintiff’s timesheets reflect that he charged more time than was 

allowed under employee regulations and the CBA. (Doc. 19-6 at 69). He does not 

dispute he incorrectly reported his time, but maintains his entries were mistakes. 

(Doc. 19-3 at 144).

Jeff Bennett, Defendant’s deputy program manager, first discovered

Plaintiff’s incorrect time entries. (Doc. 19-11 at 2). On August 16, 2017, Plaintiff 

sent a text message to Bennett saying he was going off premises at 11:16 a.m. and 

did not return until 3:30 p.m. (Id.). After reviewing his timesheet, Bennett discovered 

Case 5:18-cv-01725-LCB Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 8 of 28
9

it did not reflect Plaintiff charged the correct hours to vacation time. (Id.). Regarding 

the August 18, 2017, entry, Bennett knew that Plaintiff had incorrectly charged time 

because he spent no more than two hours at the worksite and texted Bennett when 

he had completed the job. (Id. at 3). Once he learned of Plaintiff’s incorrect time 

entries, Bennett met with him on August 22, 2017, to discuss his timesheets. (Id.). 

Plaintiff attempted to amend his timesheets after being confronted. (Doc. 19-3 at

169). Donnie Crouch, program manager, ultimately decided to terminate Plaintiff’s 

employment on August 23, 2017, for falsifying his time after independently 

reviewing his timesheets. (Doc. 19-1 at 4). Before these two incidents, Plaintiff did 

not have any disciplinary marks on his record. (Doc. 1 at 4). He maintains his time 

entries were mistakes. (Doc. 19-3 at 115).

After his termination, Plaintiff contacted Defendant’s ethics and compliance 

hotline on August 25, 2017, to report Bennett and Crouch for discrimination. (Doc. 

19-7 at 15). In the report, he claimed that he was demoted and fired for

discriminatory reasons. (Id.). Plaintiff’s union also initiated a grievance challenging 

Plaintiff’s removal on August 24, 2017, and the dispute moved into arbitration. (Doc. 

19-2 at 5). The arbitrator found Defendant had submitted clear and convincing 

evidence that Plaintiff had violated the rules and had “discretionary authority to 

determine the appropriate penalty.” (Id. at 19). Plaintiff also filed a charge of 

discrimination with the EEOC for race and color discrimination on December 31, 

Case 5:18-cv-01725-LCB Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 9 of 28
10

2017. (Doc. 1-1 at 1). The EEOC closed Plaintiff’s file because it was unable to 

conclude Defendant had violated Plaintiff’s rights under Title VII. (Doc. 1-2 at 1).

Plaintiff maintains that he was fired because of his race and color because, he said,

another white employee committed the same offense and was not fired. (Doc. 19-3

at 206). Defendant maintains that Plaintiff was not fired for a discriminatory reason, 

but because he inappropriately charged time he did not work. (Doc. 18 at 7). 

3. Hostile Work Environment

While employed by Defendant, Plaintiff experienced actions he felt created a 

hostile work environment because of his race and color. (Doc. 1 at 5). When Plaintiff

started working at the company in 2002, “on several occasions” former employee

Bud Watkins called him a “nigger.” (Doc. 19-3 at 59). Labor manager Gene Keener

referred to him as “a monkey in a tree, on a ladder” when Plaintiff was performing 

work on a ladder. (Id. at 30). Keener also remarked, “Should I shake that monkey 

out of the tree?” when referring to Plaintiff. (Id. at 35). Plaintiff reported the incident 

to Donnie Crouch, who “brushed it off.” (Id. at 39). Crouch referred to employee 

Daniel Quillen as Jim Scrivner’s “KKK buddy.” (Id. at 46). Further, Plaintiff also 

claims Jeremy McGee, another employee, restricted access to the refrigerator to 

white employees only. (Id. at 72). McGee put a note on the refrigerator that stated 

that it was for his crew’s use only. (Id.). Plaintiff contends that because McGee’s 

crew was mostly white, it discriminated against black employees. (Id.). Plaintiff does 

Case 5:18-cv-01725-LCB Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 10 of 28
11

concede that Quincy Loveless, a black employee, was a member of McGee’s crew. 

(Id.). 

Additionally, Plaintiff states that inappropriate pictures were in the workplace 

and circulated by other employees. For example, Plaintiff claims that Jeremy McGee 

put a picture of someone wearing a Ku Klux Klan hood in his office. (Doc. 19-3 at

73-74). Another employee had doctored a photo of Steve Davis, a maintenance 

electrician, seemingly performing oral sex on a black television actor. (Doc. 19-9); 

(Doc. 19-3 at 73-74). While Plaintiff’s picture and name were not in the photo, he 

believes the picture reflected the sentiment that Davis was “kissing ass to 

[Plaintiff].” (Id. at 76-77).

Plaintiff also asserts other times where actions or remarks were not explicitly 

racial, but he considered them discriminatory. He stated that Crouch told him to 

“clean his drawers,” which Plaintiff felt was said to ridicule him because it implied 

he smelled. (Id. at 56). He also stated that when he was in a meeting, Jeff Bennett 

told him to “shut up” disrespectfully. (Id. at 67). Additionally, he alleges that he was 

denied a raise at the completion of his apprenticeship and was denied overtime. (Id.

at 61-62; 236-237). Plaintiff also claims that Crouch refused to supply him with a 

new phone after he had lost or broken other phones. (Id. at 252-253). 

B. Standard of Review

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is proper “if 

Case 5:18-cv-01725-LCB Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 11 of 28
12

the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The party asking for summary 

judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis 

for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings or filings which it 

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. Once 

the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56(c) requires the non-moving party to go 

beyond the pleadings and -- by pointing to affidavits, or depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and/or admissions on file -- designate specific facts showing that 

there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324. 

The substantive law will identify which facts are material and which are 

irrelevant. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) 

(“Anderson”). All reasonable doubts about the facts and all justifiable inferences are 

resolved in favor of the non-movant. See Allen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. For Bibb Cty., 

495 F.3d 1306, 1314 (11th Cir. 2007); Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 

1115 (11th Cir. 1993). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable 

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. If 

the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary 

judgment may be granted. See id. at 249.

Case 5:18-cv-01725-LCB Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 12 of 28
13

When faced with a “properly supported motion for summary judgment, [the 

non-moving party] must come forward with specific factual evidence, presenting 

more than mere allegations.” Gargiulo v. G.M. Sales, Inc., 131 F.3d 995, 999 (11th 

Cir. 1997). As Anderson teaches, under Rule 56(c) a plaintiff may not simply rest on 

her allegations made in the complaint; instead, as the party bearing the burden of 

proof at trial, she must come forward with at least some evidence to support each 

element essential to her case at trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. “[A] party 

opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment ‘may not rest upon the 

mere allegations or denials of [her] pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts 

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 248 (citations omitted).

“[A]t the summary judgment stage the judge’s function is not himself to 

weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether 

there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. “Essentially, the inquiry 

is ‘whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to 

the jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” 

Sawyer, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 1262 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52); see also 

LaRoche v. Denny’s, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1371 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (“The law is 

clear . . . that suspicion, perception, opinion, and belief cannot be used to defeat a 

motion for summary judgment.”)

C. Disparate Treatment Claims

Case 5:18-cv-01725-LCB Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 13 of 28
14

Defendant claims Plaintiff’s disparate treatment allegations cannot survive 

summary judgment. Defendant argues Plaintiff has not presented a prima facie case 

that his demotion or termination was racially motivated. See (Doc. 18 at 14, 19).

Instead, Defendant asserts it has presented enough evidence to show that its 

decisions to demote and subsequently terminate Plaintiff were legitimate and not a 

pretext for discrimination. (Id. at 14, 20). 

A party may show he suffered from disparate treatment discrimination by 

presenting direct or circumstantial evidence. Burke-Fowler v. Orange Cty., Fla., 447 

F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2006). Discrimination claims founded on circumstantial 

evidence are analyzed “under the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework.”

Id. See also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). To make a 

prima facie case for disparate treatment based on racial discrimination, a plaintiff 

must demonstrate: “(1) [he] is a member of a protected class; (2) [he] was subjected 

to an adverse employment action; (3) [his] employer treated similarly situated 

employees outside of [his] protected class more favorable than [he] was treated; and 

(4) [he] was qualified to do the job.” Burke-Fowler, 447 F.3d at 1323. If a plaintiff 

can satisfy these elements, “then the defendant must show a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action.” Id. Finally, if the defendant 

satisfies its burden, a plaintiff “must prove that the reason provided by the defendant 

is a pretext for unlawful discrimination.” Id. Only the third element is in dispute, 

Case 5:18-cv-01725-LCB Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 14 of 28
15

i.e., that Defendant treated a similarly situated white employee more favorably than 

Plaintiff.

A plaintiff can show a “similarly situated” employee was treated more 

favorably than him by using a comparator. Lewis v. City of Union City, Ga., 918 

F.3d 1213, 1217 (11th Cir. 2019). This comparator analysis must be conducted at 

the prima facie stage of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting examination. Id. at 

1218. A meaningful comparator must be “similarly situated in all material respects” 

to the plaintiff. Id. A similarly situated comparator does not need to be “similar in 

all but the protected ways.” Id. at 1227 (quoting Young v. United Parcel Service, 

Inc., 575 U.S. 206, 228 (2015)). While determining who is similarly situated “in all 

material respects” to a plaintiff will “be worked out on a case-by-case basis,” there 

are certain “guideposts” a court can follow. Id. A similarly situated comparator: “will 

have engaged in the same basic conduct (or misconduct) as the plaintiff; will have 

been subject to the same employment policy, guideline, or rule as the plaintiff; will 

ordinarily (although not invariably) have been under the jurisdiction of the same 

supervisor as the plaintiff; and will share the plaintiff’s employment or disciplinary 

history.” Id. at 1227. Ultimately, “a plaintiff and her comparators must be 

sufficiently similar, in an objective sense, that they ‘cannot be reasonably 

distinguished.” Id. at 1228 (quoting Young, 575 U.S. at 231).

1. Plaintiff’s Demotion

Case 5:18-cv-01725-LCB Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 15 of 28
16

Plaintiff contends that he was demoted based on race and color discrimination.

(Doc. 22 at 10). He presents Ken Turner as a comparator for his demotion claim. 

According to Plaintiff, Turner, who is white, was not demoted from general foreman 

to foreman even though, Plaintiff claims, Turner had less seniority than him. (Doc. 

19-3 at 92). Both Plaintiff and Turner were general foremen who worked for 

Defendant. (Doc. 18 at 20). However, Turner is not an adequate comparator as he 

can be “reasonably distinguished” from Plaintiff. Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1228. As a 

general foreman, Plaintiff supervised one craft, electrical work. See (Doc. 19-1 at 3); 

(Doc. 19-3 at 92). However, Turner was general foreman over three crafts: laborers, 

carpenters, and pipefitters. (Doc. 19-3 at 91-92). Plaintiff admits he did not do 

Turner’s job. (Id. at 92). Accordingly, because Turner is reasonably distinguished 

from Plaintiff, he cannot be used as a comparator. 

Plaintiff asserts that absent any comparator evidence, he can survive summary 

judgment “other than through use of a comparator.” (Doc. 22 at 7). Instead of a 

comparator, Plaintiff argues that he has presented circumstantial evidence of 

Defendant’s discriminatory reasons for his demotion. Indeed, “[t]he methods of 

presenting a prima facie case are flexible and depend on the particular situation.” 

Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1264 (11th Cir. 2010). A 

plaintiff can also establish “a ‘convincing mosaic’ of circumstantial evidence that 

warrants inference of intentional discrimination.” Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1220, n.6.

Case 5:18-cv-01725-LCB Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 16 of 28
17

Plaintiff has not identified what circumstantial evidence he presents as enough to 

survive summary judgment. He generally asserts that he “was subjected to numerous 

racially discriminatory and hostile acts going back at least five years.” (Doc. 22 at

9). 

Assuming, arguendo, the allegedly discriminatory actions Plaintiff 

experienced2 were enough to make a prima case for discriminatory treatment, he 

does not automatically satisfy the requirements of successfully demonstrating 

disparate treatment. Even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, a

reasonable factfinder could conclude that Defendant has satisfied its burden of 

showing that Plaintiff’s demotion was based on a “legitimate, non-discriminatory 

reason.” Burke-Fowler, 447 F.3d at 1323. Program Manager Donnie Crouch stated 

that he had to make several personnel changes in response to “a reduction in the 

lump sum reoccurring services in the amount of $2.2 million dollars annually.” (Doc. 

19-1 at 2). This meant the company “had to perform the same amount of work with 

fewer people.” (Id.). Following this reduction of money for services, both white and 

black employees were demoted. (Id. at 2-3). Ken Turner remained in his position 

because, Crouch determined, Turner had “successfully performed over multiple 

crafts.” (Id. at 3). Therefore, Crouch said, it made “more sense” to allow Turner to 

 2 The actions Plaintiff claims were racially discriminatory, a “monkey in a tree,” will be 

discussed in greater detail in the Hostile Work Environment section of this opinion.

Case 5:18-cv-01725-LCB Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 17 of 28
18

remain in his role than to hire someone else without his experience. (Id.). Plaintiff 

has identified no facts that would call this into dispute.

As Defendant has shown that there were legitimate, non-discriminatory 

reasons for his demotion, Plaintiff must demonstrate that the reasons proffered by 

Defendant for his demotion were pretextual. Burke-Fowler, 447 F.3d at 1323. To 

show a defendant’s reason was pretextual, a plaintiff must show “such weaknesses, 

implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s 

proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could find 

them unworthy of credence.” Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1265 (quoting Combs v. 

Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997)). See also Chapman v. AI

Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Provided that the proffered reason 

is one that might motivate a reasonable employer, an employee must meet that 

reason head on and rebut it, and the employee cannot succeed by simply quarrelling 

with the wisdom of that reason.”)

Here, Plaintiff’s contention that he was demoted because of race and color

discrimination cannot survive summary judgment. A reasonable factfinder would 

not find that Defendant’s reason for Plaintiff’s demotion was implausible, 

inconsistent, or incoherent. See Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1265. Besides Plaintiff’s 

suspicions, he has presented no evidence such that a reasonable factfinder would 

conclude Defendant’s reason for demoting black and white employees is “unworthy 

Case 5:18-cv-01725-LCB Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 18 of 28
19

of credence.” Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1265. Accordingly, there is no genuine dispute of 

material fact about whether Plaintiff’s demotion was predicated on racial 

discrimination, and summary judgment as to this claim is granted. 

2. Plaintiff’s Termination

Plaintiff also alleges that his termination was motivated by discriminatory 

reasons. (Doc. 1 at 8). In this case, Defendant claims that Plaintiff was terminated 

for submitting falsified timesheets. (Id. at 7). As noted in the previous section, to 

make a prima facie showing of racial discrimination, Plaintiff must present evidence 

of a comparator or other circumstantial evidence. See Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1217; See 

also Burke-Fowler, 447 F.3d at 1325.

Plaintiff claimed that he “had a whole list” of white employees who also 

falsified timesheets but were not disciplined. (Doc. 19-3 at 145). Besides Billy Dunn, 

Plaintiff did not have any direct knowledge about the activities of other employees. 

See Part(I)A(11). Plaintiff claimed Dunn would take long lunches and “charge 10 

hours even though [he] didn’t work 10 hours.” (Id. at 205-206). However, Billy 

Dunn is not an adequate comparator because he is reasonably distinguishable from 

Plaintiff. See Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1228. Plaintiff’s time sheet errors were caught by 

his supervisors. If Dunn did falsify his timesheets as Plaintiff alleged, there is no 

evidence that he was caught and reprimanded for this action but still allowed to 

remain in his position. 

Case 5:18-cv-01725-LCB Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 19 of 28
20

A lack of a comparator is not automatically fatal to Plaintiff’s case, as a prima 

facie discrimination case can be proven with other circumstantial evidence. See 

Burke-Fowler, 447 F.3d at 1325. Again, Plaintiff did not explicitly identify which 

pieces of circumstantial evidence establish that his termination was discriminatory. 

See (Doc. 22). Assuming, once more arguendo, that Plaintiff’s circumstantial 

evidence of racial harassment is enough to make a prima facie case, Defendant has 

the burden to show there was a “legitimate, non-discriminatory reason” for its 

actions. Burke-Fowler, 447 F.3d at 1323. 

Defendant makes clear how important it is for the company that its employees 

properly report their time. See (Doc. 18 at 2). Plaintiff does not dispute he received 

training on how to enter time correctly. (Doc. 19-3 at 100). Because Defendant is a 

federal contractor, it could “lose future government business” if they were audited 

and it was discovered that its employees were charging more time than they worked. 

(Doc. 19-1 at 4). The employee handbook states that “falsification of a timesheet...is 

grounds for disciplinary action, up to and including termination of employment.” 

(Id. at 18). Plaintiff had incorrectly entered time twice in the same week. (Doc. 19-

1 at 4-5). Even though Plaintiff argues he had no prior marks on his record and, 

therefore, did not have to be terminated for his first offense, the language of the 

employee handbook is clear. An employee that falsifies timesheets is subject to any 

form of discipline “up to and including” termination. (Id. at 18). Defendant also

Case 5:18-cv-01725-LCB Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 20 of 28
21

offers evidence of Donnie Crouch terminating Keith Cox, a white employee with no 

disciplinary marks on his record who was terminated for falsely reporting his time.3

(Id. at 5). Accordingly, Defendant has presented a legitimate, non-discriminatory 

reason for terminating Plaintiff.

Plaintiff must now show that his firing was “pretext for unlawful 

discrimination.” Burke-Fowler, 447 F.3d at 1323. Plaintiff contends that his firing 

was pretextual because, he says, firing was a “multistep process” and requires that 

the company “implement a corrective action plan.” (Doc. 22 at 11). However, the 

company’s use of a corrective action plan does not refer to problems with employees. 

Instead, this plan refers to an office being out of compliance, not an employee. See 

(Doc. 19-1 at 24). Additionally, the language in the employee handbook makes it 

clear that an employee can be immediately fired for falsifying timesheets. (Doc. 19-

1 at 18). Thus, even when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, 

a reasonable factfinder would not conclude this was evidence of pretext. See Alvarez,

610 F.3d at 1265.

Plaintiff also contends that the emails between Donnie Crouch and Jeff 

Bennett “suggested another motive” for his dismissal. In this email, Crouch remarks

 3 Washington’s termination memo for incorrectly reporting time lists the reasons for his firing 

such as: neglect of duty; failure to record time properly; and giving false or misleading 

information to URS (Doc. 19-1 at 64). Similarly, when Cox was fired for incorrectly reporting 

time, his termination memo includes reasons such as: neglect of duty; failure to record time 

properly; giving false or misleading information to URS; and leaving the facility or work 

assignment during working hours without proper supervisory permission. (Id. at 62).

Case 5:18-cv-01725-LCB Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 21 of 28
22

that he believed the appropriate action to take against Plaintiff was termination after 

his time theft was discovered. He apparently rationalized this decision by 

commenting that Plaintiff was uncooperative and had a combative attitude towards 

management. (Doc. 19-1 at 70). Plaintiff suggests that this exchange was evidence 

of discriminatory pretext. (Doc. 22 at 12). However, Crouch’s thoughts about 

Plaintiff’s performance as an employee do not contradict nor are they inconsistent 

with the reason why Plaintiff was ultimately terminated – for falsifying timesheets. 

See Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1265. The employee handbook shows that the consequences 

of time theft include termination. (Doc. 19-1 at 18). Whether Plaintiff was a good

employee and should have kept his position despite these two infractions is not for 

the Court to decide. Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1266, (quoting Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1030

(“We do not sit as a ‘super-personnel department,’ and it is not our role to secondguess the wisdom of an employer’s business decisions...as long as those decisions 

are not made with a discriminatory motive.”))

Finally, Plaintiff argues his firing was pretextual because he was given a 

different reason for dismissal. (Doc. 1 at 8-9). Plaintiff remarks he felt there was 

some type of plan among the employees to get him fired. (Doc. 19-3 at 77). However, 

what matters in this case is what the employer believes, not the employee. Alvarez, 

610 F.3d at 1266. With the evidence presented, a reasonable factfinder could not 

find that there was any discriminatory pretext with Plaintiff’s firing. Accordingly, 

Case 5:18-cv-01725-LCB Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 22 of 28
23

no genuine dispute of material fact exists regarding whether Plaintiff’s termination 

was discriminatory. Therefore, summary judgment as to this claim is granted. 

D. Hostile Work Environment Claim

Defendant also moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s hostile work 

environment claim. (Doc. 17 at 2). Plaintiff contends that he experienced a hostile 

work environment based on his race and color. (Doc. 1 at 7). Defendant argues that 

Plaintiff’s claims, even if true, cannot constitute a hostile work environment. (Doc. 

18 at 21).

To successfully establish a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must 

show “the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and 

insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s 

employment and create an abusive working environment.” Adams v. Austal, U.S.A., 

L.L.C., 754 F.3d 1240, 1248 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 

510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)). A party must present five elements if his hostile work 

environment claim is based on race: 

(1) that he is a member of a protected class; (2) that he was subjected to 

unwelcome racial harassment; (3) that the harassment was based on his race; 

(4) that the harassment was severe or pervasive enough to alter the terms and 

conditions of his employment and create a discriminatorily abusive working 

environment; and (5) that the employer is responsible for the environment 

under a theory of either vicarious or direct liability. 

Id. at 1248-49. 

Case 5:18-cv-01725-LCB Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 23 of 28
24

Regarding the fourth element, a plaintiff “must prove that the work 

environment is both subjectively and objectively hostile.” Id. at 1249. A plaintiff 

“must ‘subjectively perceive’ the harassment as sufficiently severe and pervasive to 

alter the terms or conditions of employment.” Id. (quoting Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 

195 F.3d 1238, 1246 (11th Cir. 1999)). The Court considers four factors to determine 

if a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s situation would find the work environment

objectively hostile: “(1) the frequency of the conduct; (2) the severity of the conduct; 

(3) whether the conduct is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive 

utterance; and (4) whether the conduct unreasonably interferes with the employee’s 

job performance.” Id. at 1250-51 (quoting Mendoza, 195 F.3d at 1246). Under this 

objective framework, the Court will ultimately consider the totality of the 

circumstances of the harassment a plaintiff has experienced. Miller v. Kenworth of 

Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1276 (11th Cir. 2002). See also Adams, 754 F.3d at 

1250 (District courts must “examine the conduct in context, not as isolated acts, and 

determine under the totality of the circumstances whether the harassing conduct is 

sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms or conditions of the plaintiff’s 

employment and create a hostile or abusive working environment.”)

Evidence Plaintiff claims contributed to a hostile work environment includes

a picture of an employee he claims is modified to look like a member of the Ku Klux 

Klan. See (Doc. 19-3 at 73-74). See also (Doc. 19-9 at 45). He also claims that an 

Case 5:18-cv-01725-LCB Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 24 of 28
25

altered photo in which employee Steve Davis was depicted giving a television actor 

oral sex was meant to refer to him. See (Doc. 19-3 at 76-77). See also (Doc. 19-9 at

51). Plaintiff did not find out about these pictures until after he was fired from his 

position. (Id. at 24-25; 33). Even if Plaintiff thought these materials were offensive, 

he was not aware of them while employed by Defendant. Therefore, he cannot use 

these as evidence for his hostile work environment claim. See Adams, 754 F.3d at 

1250 (“A reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position is not one who knows what 

the plaintiff learned only after her employment ended or what discovery later 

revealed.”)

Additional evidence Plaintiff presents to prove he experienced a hostile work 

environment cannot survive summary judgment. A plaintiff must show he is 

experiencing harassment because of his race. See Adams, 754 F.3d at 1249. Plaintiff 

has not created a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether some of these actions 

were motivated because of his race or color. For example, a reasonable fact finder 

would not conclude that Donnie Crouch directing Plaintiff to “clean his drawers” 

was racially motivated. Likewise, Plaintiff has not presented evidence that being told 

to “shut up” once during a meeting, denied a raise, an opportunity to work overtime,

and not being offered a cell phone after breaking or losing three would lead a 

reasonable fact finder to find that this harassment was based on Plaintiff’s race. (Doc. 

19-3 at 252-254).

Case 5:18-cv-01725-LCB Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 25 of 28
26

Further, Plaintiff’s claims that employee Jeremy McGee discriminated against 

black workers cannot survive for similar reasons. Jeremy McGee put a sign on the 

refrigerator only allowing his crew members access, most of whom were white. (Id. 

at 72). However, black employees had refrigerator access because Quincy Loveless, 

who is black, was in McGee’s crew. (Id. at 72). Finally, Plaintiff claims that Donnie 

Crouch referred to employee Daniel Quillen as Jim Scrivner’s “KKK buddy” in a 

joking fashion. (Id. at 46). While the comment referred to the Klan, this remark was 

not directed towards Plaintiff. There is also no evidence that this comment, while 

certainly inappropriate, was made in Plaintiff’s presence because of his race.

Finally, Plaintiff also claims he experienced a variety racially motivated

insults when employed by Defendant. In 2002 as an apprentice, he states an 

employee named Bud Watkins called him a nigger on “several occasions.” (Id. at 

59-60). He also claims that employee Gene Keener referred to him as “a monkey in 

a tree, on a ladder.” (Id. at 30).

Construing the facts in the most favorable light to Plaintiff, he has not created 

a genuine dispute of material fact that his workplace was “permeated with 

discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult.” Adams, 754 F.3d at 1248. A

reasonable factfinder in Plaintiff’s position could find being called a nigger is severe 

and being referred to as that offensive slur and a monkey is humiliating. See Smelter 

v. Southern Home Care Services Inc., 904 F.3d 1276, 1286 (11th Cir. 2018) (finding 

Case 5:18-cv-01725-LCB Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 26 of 28
27

the use of the racial slur “particularly egregious when directed toward a person in an 

offensive or humiliating manner.”) Indeed, there is no place for this type of conduct 

in any work environment.

However, the Court cannot consider these two incidents in isolation, but must 

consider the totality of the circumstances. Adams, 754 F.3d at 1250. The occasions 

in which Bud Watkins called Plaintiff a racial slur happened in 2002 when he was 

an apprentice. (Doc. 19-3 at 59-60). Plaintiff recalls Keener referred called “a 

monkey in a tree” once five or six years before his deposition was taken in 2019. (Id. 

at 30-31). If true, this language is beyond repugnant and indefensible. However, 

these incidents do not rise to a level that is actionable. Compare Miller, 277 F.3d at 

1276 (plaintiff established discriminatory treatment was frequent as he faced racial 

slurs daily). Plaintiff has also failed to present sufficient evidence that these 

experiences with Watkins and Keener unreasonably interfered with his job 

performance while employed. To be clear, if true, the conduct of Plaintiff’s coworkers was extremely vile. But, considering the totality of the circumstances, there 

is no genuine dispute of material fact Plaintiff experienced a hostile work 

environment. Therefore, summary judgment as to this claim is granted. 

III. CONCLUSION

Case 5:18-cv-01725-LCB Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 27 of 28
28

For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

(Doc. 17) is granted. An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will be 

entered. 

DONE and ORDERED this March 29, 2020.

 _________________________________

 LILES C. BURKE

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 5:18-cv-01725-LCB Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 28 of 28