Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-15-01666/USCOURTS-ca3-15-01666-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Torey Dobbin
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 15-1666

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

TOREY DOBBIN, a/k/a Truck

Torey Dobbin,

Appellant

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(M.D. Pa. No. 1-14-cr-00015-001)

District Judge: Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo

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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

November 16, 2015

Before: AMBRO, HARDIMAN, and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges

(Filed: December 4, 2015)

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OPINION*

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AMBRO, Circuit Judge

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.

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Appellant Torey Dobbin appeals his conviction and sentence. Currently before us 

are: (1) his attorney’s motion to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 

(1967), claiming that all potential grounds for this appeal are frivolous; (2) Dobbin’s pro 

se brief; and (3) Dobbin’s unopposed motion to seal volume three of the joint appendix. 

For the reasons that follow, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, affirm the District 

Court’s judgment and sentence, and seal volume three of the joint appendix.1

I. Background

In September 2014, Dobbin pled guilty to one count of Hobbs Act robbery in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 and one count of use of a firearm during a crime of 

violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Because of his extensive criminal history, 

the United States Probation Department in its Pre-Sentence Investigation Report (PSR) 

classified Dobbin as a career offender. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(c), the PSR 

determined that the total Guidelines’ range for Dobbin was 262 to 327 months. Dobbin 

moved for a downward departure from the Advisory Guidelines’ range and the District 

Court granted a two-level reduction, yielding a Guidelines’ range of 210 to 262 months’ 

imprisonment. After considering the § 3553(a) factors, the Court imposed an aggregate 

sentence of 210 months’ imprisonment to be followed by three years’ supervised release. 

II. Discussion

Under our rules “[w]here, upon review of the district court record, counsel is 

persuaded that the appeal presents no issue of even arguable merit, counsel may file a 

 

1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).

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motion to withdraw and supporting brief pursuant to Anders.” 3d Cir. L.A.R. 109.2(a). 

If we concur with counsel’s assessment, we “will grant [the] Anders motion, and dispose 

of the appeal without appointing new counsel.” Id. Accordingly, our “inquiry . . . is thus 

twofold: (1) whether counsel adequately fulfilled the rule’s requirements; and (2) whether 

an independent review of the record presents any nonfrivolous issues.” United States v. 

Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001). 

In his Anders brief, Dobbin’s attorney addresses and rejects three potential issues 

for appeal: whether (1) the District Court had jurisdiction; (2) the guilty plea was 

counseled and voluntary; and (3) the sentence was legal and reasonable. Our review of 

the record confirms counsel’s assessment that there are no non-frivolous issues for 

appeal. We agree with counsel that the record presents no basis to appeal either the 

District Court’s jurisdiction or the counseled and voluntary nature of the plea.

Although Dobbin makes arguments to the contrary, the record also provides no 

basis to appeal the legality or reasonableness of his sentence. District courts must follow 

a three-step process in imposing a sentence: (1) calculate the applicable Guidelines’ 

range; (2) formally rule on any departure motions; and (3) exercise discretion in applying 

any relevant factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 

237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006). As counsel explained in the Anders brief, the District Court 

precisely followed this three-step process: first, the Court calculated the Guidelines’ 

range in accordance with U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(c); second, it granted Dobbin’s motion for a 

downward departure; and, third, it considered the potentially mitigating circumstances of 

Dobbin’s life, as well as his criminal history and the seriousness of his conduct, in 

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determining that the sentence was appropriate. Because the Court followed proper 

sentencing procedures and sentenced Dobbin to a term of imprisonment at the bottom of 

the Guidelines’ range, we cannot say that his sentence is either procedurally or 

substantively unreasonable.

Dobbin’s attorney identified another possible avenue of appeal, but, as counsel 

notes, it would be frivolous. Dobbin could argue that he should not have been sentenced 

as a career offender. Individuals may be designated career offenders if they have “at least 

two prior felony convictions [for] crime[s] of violence. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). Dobbin 

could argue that his two predicate felony convictions should be treated as one because the 

incidents occurred near to one another (both geographically and temporally). However, 

the two prior sentences are considered distinct unless (1) “the sentences resulted from 

offenses contained in the same charging instrument” or (2) “the sentences were imposed 

on the same day.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2). Here, Dobbin’s two prior sentences were 

imposed by separate courts on different days. Thus, any argument that they should be 

considered would fail.

In his pro se brief, Dobbin makes four arguments that his sentence was illegal and 

unreasonable; on independent review of the record, we conclude that each of these 

arguments is without merit. First, Dobbin alleges that the District Court “doublecounted” the § 924(c) conviction by calculating the Advisory Guidelines’ range based on 

the § 924(c) conviction and imposing the mandatory minimum sentence on that count. 

Under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(c), the Court properly relied on the § 924(c) conviction in 

determining the Guidelines’ range. After determining that 210 months’ imprisonment 

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was the appropriate aggregate sentence under the Guidelines, the Court allocated the 

aggregate sentence between the § 924(c) and Hobbs Act robbery convictions in accord 

with U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(e): the mandatory minimum of 84 months to the § 924(c)

conviction, and the remaining 126 months to the Hobbs Act robbery conviction. The 

Court therefore properly calculated Dobbin’s sentence.

Second, Dobbin argues that his counsel’s failure to challenge the use of his prior 

state robbery convictions as predicate offenses for career offender status was ineffective 

assistance of counsel. However, “the proper avenue for pursuing [ineffective assistance] 

claims is through a collateral proceeding in which the factual basis for the claim may be 

developed” rather than through a direct appeal. United States v. Haywood, 155 F.3d 674, 

678 (3d Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). We therefore decline to rule on the ineffective 

assistance claim, and Dobbin may, if appropriate, pursue it through a habeas corpus

proceeding in the District Court under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

Third, Dobbin argues that his two prior armed robbery convictions are not “crimes 

of violence” for purposes of the career offender designation in light of Johnson v. United 

States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) defines a “crime of violence” as an 

offense that:

(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical 

force against the person of another, or

(2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, 

or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of 

physical injury to another.

In Johnson, the Supreme Court struck down the so-called residual clause of this 

definition – “or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of 

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physical injury to another” – as void for vagueness. 153 S. Ct. at 2563. But the 

remainder of the definition was left intact. Id. The record provides no indication that the 

District Court relied on the residual clause in designating Dobbin as a career offender. 

And because Dobbin was convicted of violating 18 Pa. C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(ii), which 

requires that the offender “threaten[] another with or intentionally put[] him in fear of 

immediate serious bodily injury,” his convictions satisfy the first prong of the definition. 

Johnson therefore does not support a challenge to the career offender designation in this 

case.

Finally, Dobbin argues that the District Court improperly required him to 

participate in the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program. This is simply not the case; 

the Court ordered Johnson to pay $400 in fines and assessments, and Dobbin may pay 

this amount through the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program if he so chooses.

* * * * *

Dobbin’s counsel fulfilled adequately the requirements of Anders. Because our 

independent review of the record fails to reveal any non-frivolous grounds for direct 

appeal, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm Dobbin’s sentence. We also 

grant Dobbin’s unopposed motion to seal volume three of the joint appendix because 

volume three is the transcript of a sealed sentencing proceeding in the District Court.

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