Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-08-04361/USCOURTS-ca3-08-04361-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Derrick Cruz
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

 

No. 08-4361

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

DERRICK CRUZ, a/k/a Reyes Benitez,

a/k/a David Cruz, a/k/a "Dee”,

Derrick Cruz,

 Appellant.

 

On Appeal from the United States District Court

 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 

(D. C. No. 1-95-cr-00204-001)

District Judge: Hon. William W. Caldwell

 

Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1 (a)

on July 17, 2009

Before: RENDELL, FUENTES and ROTH, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: March 18, 2010)

 

O P I N I O N

 

ROTH, Circuit Judge:

Derrick Cruz appeals the District Court order granting his motion for sentence

Case: 08-4361 Document: 003110064699 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/18/2010
 This Court conducts a plenary review of questions concerning the proper 1

interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines. See United States v. Edwards, 309 F.3d 110,

112 (3d Cir. 2002).

2

reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and denying his alternate bases for sentence

reduction. Cruz contends the District Court wrongly determined it was prohibited from

considering his other arguments for resentencing. We assume the parties’ familiarity with

the facts and record of prior proceedings, to which we refer only as necessary to explain

our decision. For the reasons given below, we will affirm the District Court’s order

granting Cruz’s section 3582(c)(2) motion and denying his other grounds for relief.1

In addition to a sentence reduction pursuant to section 3582(c)(2), to which he was

entitled, Cruz seeks further reduction on the following grounds: (1) under U.S.S.G. §

4A1.1, his criminal history category should be lowered from IV to III to account for a

conviction for attempted murder, the sentence for which he is currently serving; (2) he

should not have received a four-point increase for being a leader or organizer of the

conspiracy as there was no evidence to support such an increase; (3) his drug quantity

should have been set at 27 grams of crack cocaine, yielding a base offense level of 26,

because the witness testimony for the higher level should have been rejected as

unreliable; (4) he should not have received a two-point increase for possession of

firearms; and (5) the jury should not have received instructions allowing them to avoid

making a drug-quantity determination in violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.

466 (2000).

Case: 08-4361 Document: 003110064699 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/18/2010
3

The District Court was correct in determining that under section 3582(c)(2), Cruz

was not entitled to de novo sentencing. Section 3582(c)(2) provides that:

[I]n the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of

imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been

lowered by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(o), upon

motion of the defendant . . . , the court may reduce the term of

imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to

the extent that they are applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with

applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.

§ 3582(c)(2). Section 1B1.10(a)(3) is one such applicable policy statement that states,

“proceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and this policy statement do not constitute a

full resentencing of the defendant.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(3). Courts, when evaluating a

section 3582(c)(2) motion, must consider only the retroactive amendment at issue and

“leave all other guideline application decisions unaffected.” Id. § 1B1.10(b)(1); see

United States v. McBride, 283 F.3d 612, 615 (3d Cir. 2002).

As such, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to review Cruz’s alternate bases for

sentence reduction and properly refused to do so. Accordingly, we will affirm the District

Court’s order granting a sentence reduction pursuant to section 3582(c)(2) and leaving all

other provisions of the original judgment of May 1, 1996, in effect.

Case: 08-4361 Document: 003110064699 Page: 3 Date Filed: 03/18/2010