Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-03379/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-03379-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gordon W. Shaw
Plaintiff
The Commissioner of Social Security Administration
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GORDON W. SHAW,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant.

___________________________________/

No. C-07-3379 EMC

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

(Docket Nos. 19, 24)

In March 2004, Gordon W. Shaw filed applications for disability insurance and

Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) benefits. Mr. Shaw has, for the most part, exhausted his

administrative remedies with respect to his claim of disability. This Court has jurisdiction for

judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Mr. Shaw has moved for summary judgment or, in

the alternative, a remand for additional proceedings. The Commissioner has cross-moved for

summary judgment. Having considered the parties’ briefs and accompanying submissions, the Court

hereby DENIES Mr. Shaw’s motion for summary judgment and GRANTS the Commissioner’s

motion.

I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

 In March 2004, Mr. Shaw filed applications for disability insurance and SSI benefits,

alleging disability as of January 1, 2000. See, e.g., AR 60-62 (application for disability insurance

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 The administrative record provided to the Court did not contain certain documents related to

Mr. Shaw’s application for SSI benefits. See AR 5 (noting that “SSI Exhibits 1-5 are currently

unavailable for inclusion at this time”). The absence of these documents is not material.

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benefits).1 The applications were initially denied on August 27, 2004, see, e.g., AR 23-27 (notice of

disapproved claims), and again on reconsideration on January 11, 2005. See, e.g., AR 29-34 (notice

of reconsideration). Mr. Shaw then sought an administrative hearing before an administrative law

judge (“ALJ”). See AR 35 (request for hearing by ALJ). A hearing was held before ALJ Richard P.

Laverdure on June 1, 2006. See AR 307-49 (ALJ hearing transcript).

On October 12, 2006, ALJ Laverdure held that Mr. Shaw was not disabled under the Social

Security Act. See AR 10-20 (ALJ decision). The ALJ evaluated Mr. Shaw’s claim of disability

using the five-step sequential evaluation process for disability required under federal regulations. 

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. 

Step one disqualifies claimants who are engaged in substantial gainful

activity from being considered disabled under the regulations. Step

two disqualifies those claimants who do not have one or more severe

impairments that significantly limit their physical or mental ability to

conduct basic work activities. Step three automatically labels as

disabled those claimants whose impairment or impairments meet the

duration requirement and are listed or equal to those listed in a given

appendix. Benefits are awarded at step three if claimants are disabled. 

Step four disqualifies those remaining claimants whose impairments

do not prevent them from doing past relevant work considering the

claimant’s age, education, and work experience together with the

claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), or what the claimant

can do despite impairments. Step five disqualifies those claimants

whose impairments do not prevent them from doing other work, but at

this last step the burden of proof shifts from the claimant to the

government. Claimants not disqualified by step five are eligible for

benefits.

Celaya v. Halter, 332 F.3d 1177, 1180 (9th Cir. 2003).

At step one, ALJ Laverdure found that Mr. Shaw had not engaged in substantial gainful

activity since the alleged disability onset date of January 1, 2000. See AR 14 (ALJ decision). At

step two, the ALJ concluded that Mr. Shaw had the following medically determinable impairments:

a seizure disorder and osteoarthritis. See AR 14. At step three, the ALJ determined that the

impairments did not meet or equal the criteria of any impairment in the List of Impairments set forth

in 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. See AR 14. At step 4, AL Laverdure found that Mr.

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Shaw “retain[ed] the residual functional capacity to perform medium work permitting him to

alternate between sitting and standing one time per hour as needed for brief periods.” AR 18. The

ALJ also found that Mr. Shaw was “restricted from work involving heights, the use of heavy

machinery, and climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds” because of his seizure disorder. AR 18. 

Based on this RFC and restriction, ALJ Laverdure concluded that Mr. Shaw could return to his past

work as a companion/personal attendant and therefore was not disabled. See AR 19.

On April 23, 2007, Mr. Shaw’s request for review of ALJ Laverdure’s decision was

summarily denied by the Appeals Council. See AR 6-8 (notice of Appeals Council decision). This

petition ensued.

In his motion for summary judgment, Mr. Shaw argues that ALJ Laverdure’s decision was

erroneous because: (1) the ALJ rejected an opinion from a nurse practitioner without explaining

why; (2) the ALJ discounted Mr. Shaw’s credibility in spite of the nurse practitioner’s opinion; and

(3) the ALJ’s findings at step four were flawed in that (a) the ALJ failed to consider all of the

limitations that Mr. Shaw’s seizure disorder would have on his ability to do his past relevant work,

(b) the ALJ failed to recognize that Mr. Shaw’s prior job as a caretaker for his mother could not be

considered past relevant work as it was sheltered from the rigors of the competitive workplace, and

(c) the ALJ failed to address the fact that Mr. Shaw’s prior job as a caretaker as actually performed

exceeded the RFC for medium work.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

A court may disturb the final decision of the Social Security Administration “only if it is

based on legal error or if the fact findings are not supported by substantial evidence.” Sprague v.

Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 1987). “Substantial evidence, considering the entire record, is

relevant evidence which a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 

Matthews v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 679 (9th Cir. 1993). Substantial evidence means “more than a

mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” Young v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 180, 183 (9th Cir. 1990)

(internal quotation marks omitted). The court’s review “must consider the record as a whole,” both

that which supports as well as that which detracts from the Secretary’s decision. Desrosiers v.

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 SSR 06-03p became effective on August 9, 2006, prior to the date ALJ Laverdure issued his

decision regarding Mr. Shaw’s claim of disability.

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Secretary of Health & Hum. Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988). “If the evidence admits of

more than one rational interpretation, [the court] must uphold the decision of the ALJ.” Allen v.

Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984).

B. Opinion of Nurse Practitioner

As noted above, Mr. Shaw’s first argument is that ALJ Laverdure improperly rejected an

opinion from a nurse practitioner, Barbara Turner, without explaining why. Ms. Turner was an

employee of West Oakland Health Center (“WOHC”). Over a four-year period, from September

2001 to November 2005, she treated Mr. Shaw approximately twenty times for issues related to the

impairments at issue. See AR 150-79 (records from WOHC); AR 180-84 (records from WOHC);

AR 210-15 (records from WOHC); AR 244-55 (records from WOHC).

Under the Social Security regulations, licensed physicians are considered “acceptable

medical sources,” but nurse practitioners are not and instead are deemed “other medical sources.” 

Compare 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(a)(1), 416.913(a)(1) (acceptable medical source) with id. §§

404.1513(d)(1), 416.913(d)(1) (other medical source). Only acceptable medical sources can give

medical opinions, and therefore evidence from acceptable medical sources is needed to establish the

existence of a medically determinable impairment. See SSR 06-03p.2 Evidence from other medical

sources cannot establish the existence of a medically determinable impairment but may still be used

to show the severity of an individual’s impairment and how the impairment affects the individual’s

ability to function. See SSR 06-03p. 

Because acceptable medical sources are considered the most qualified health care

professionals, see SSR 06-03p, the Commissioner is allowed “to accord opinions from other

[medical] sources less weight than opinions from acceptable medical sources.” Gomez v. Chater, 74

F.3d 967, 970-71 (9th Cir. 1996). 

However, depending on the particular facts in a case, and after

applying the factors for weighing opinion evidence [see 20 C.F.R. §§

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 The factors listed in these regulations “explicitly apply only to the evaluation of medical

opinions from ‘acceptable medical sources’” but may also “be applied to opinion evidence from ‘other

sources.’” SSR 06-03p.

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404.1527(d), 416.927(d)3], an opinion from [an other] medical source .

. . may outweigh the opinion of an “acceptable medical source,”

including the medical opinion of a treating source. For example, it

may be appropriate to give more weight to the opinion of a medical

source who is not an “acceptable medical source” if he or she has seen

the individual more often than the treating source and has provided

better supporting evidence and a better explanation for his or her

opinion.

SSR 06-03p. Accordingly, the adjudicator of a disability claim must consider the opinions of other

medical sources and “generally should explain the weight given to [such] opinions . . . , or otherwise

ensure that the discussion of the evidence in the determination or decision allows a claimant or

subsequent reviewer to follow the adjudicator’s reasoning, when such opinions may have an effect

on the outcome of the case.” SSR 06-03p.

In the instant case, ALJ Laverdure found that Mr. Shaw had two medically determinable

impairments -- i.e., a seizure disorder and osteoarthritis. See AR 14 (ALJ decision). Thus, ALJ

Laverdure should have considered evidence of treatment by and/or opinions from Ms. Turner, as an

other medical source, to evaluate the severity of Mr. Shaw’s impairments and how the impairments

affected his ability to function.

It is clear that ALJ Laverdure did consider the evidence of treatment by Ms. Turner. In his

decision, the ALJ took note that, from September 2001 to November 2005, Mr. Shaw had received

treatment at WOHC for chronic pain management, see AR 16 (ALJ decision), and Ms. Turner was

clearly the main person at WOHC who provided treatment. It is also clear that the ALJ considered

the opinion that Ms. Turner offered in March 2005 that Mr. Shaw was “unemployable” and could

not climb, kneel, do knee bends, bend at the waist, or walk because of his impairments. See AR

242-43 (Ms. Turner’s opinion). ALJ Laverdure specifically referred to the March 2005 opinion in

his decision. See AR 16 (ALJ decision). Mr. Shaw argues, however, that it was not enough for the

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 Ms. Turner also provided an opinion in June 2006 that Mr. Shaw was not employable. See AR

119 (Ms. Turner’s opinion). In his motion for summary judgment, however, Mr. Shaw only takes issue

with the ALJ’s treatment of the March 2005 opinion.

5 See Han v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1989) (acknowledging that “Social Security

Rulings do not have the force of law” but stating that, “[n]evertheless, they constitute Social Security

Administration interpretations of the statute it administers and of its own regulations [and,]

[a]ccordingly, we defer to Social Security Rulings unless they are plainly erroneous or inconsistent with

the Act or regulations”); see also Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625 636 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that,

“‘[a]lthough Social Security Rulings do not have the same force and effect as the statute or regulations,

they are binding on all components of the Social Security Administration, . . . and are to be relied upon

as precedents in adjudicating cases’”) (quoting 67 Fed. Reg. 57859, 57860 (2002)); Heckler v. Edwards, 465 U.S. 870, 873 n.3 (1984) (stating that, “once published, a ruling is binding on all components of the

Social Security Administration”; also stating that “[r]ulings do not have the force and effect of the law

or regulations but are to be relied upon as precedents in determining other cases where the facts are

basically the same”).

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ALJ to have considered the March 2005 opinion; according to Mr. Shaw, the ALJ should have

explained why he rejected or discounted the opinion.4

As indicated above, Social Security Ruling 06-03p provides that an adjudicator of a

disability claim “generally should explain the weight given to [other medical source] opinions . . . ,

or otherwise ensure that the discussion of the evidence in the determination or decision allows a

claimant or subsequent reviewer to follow the adjudicator’s reasoning, when such opinions may

have an effect on the outcome of the case.” SSR 06-03p.5

 The ALJ’s decision does not explicitly

discuss what weight, if any, Ms. Turner’s opinion was given and the reasons therefor. However, the

Court nonetheless is able to make a reasonable inference, based on the decision, as to what weight

the opinion was given and reasons therefor and accordingly finds no error here. Cf. Magallanes v.

Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 755 (9th Cir. 1989) (“As a reviewing court, we are not deprived of our

faculties for drawing specific and legitimate inferences from the ALJ’s opinion.”). 

In her March 2005 opinion, Ms. Turner stated that, because of arthritis and seizures, Mr.

Shaw could not climb, kneel, do knee bends, bend at the waist, or walk. See AR 242 (Ms. Turner’s

opinion). In his decision, the ALJ cited extensive medical evidence indicating that, in spite of the

arthritis, Mr. Shaw was not so limited. See AR 16-17 (ALJ decision). For example, in June 2004,

Dr. C.E. Gable, an internal medicine specialist, conducted a consultative examination of Mr. Shaw

at the Bayview Medical Clinic. Dr. Gable noted, inter alia, that there was no deformity, heat,

swelling, or redness about Mr. Shaw’s knees; that Mr. Shaw could flex his knees to about 130

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degrees bilaterally; that, although Mr. Shaw could not make a full squat, purportedly because of his

knees, he did manage to kneel on one knee and then raise himself up without any help; that Mr.

Shaw’s straight leg raising was negative to 70 degrees; and that Mr. Shaw had a normal gait. See

AR 188. Also in June 2004, Mr. Shaw was treated by Dr. Ananth Acharya at the neurology clinic of

the Alameda County Medical Center (“ACMC”). Similar to above, Dr. Acharya stated that Mr.

Shaw had a normal gait and only a slight limp secondary to pain. See AR 279. Finally, in July

2005, Mr. Shaw was treated by Dr. Lorinna H. Lombardi of the rheumatology clinic of the ACMC. 

Dr. Lombardi acknowledged that Mr. Shaw had some limitation in the movement of his hips due to

pain but that he had a full range of motion in his knees with crepitus. See AR 258.

As to Ms. Turner’s opinions regarding the disabling effect of Mr. Shaw’s seizures, ALJ

Laverdure cited in his decision medical evidence reflecting that Mr. Shaw’s seizures -- which could

affect his ability to climb at least -- were decreasing and becoming under control as a result of

medication. See AR 16 (ALJ decision). For instance, in October 2004, Dr. Acharya noted that, after

Mr. Shaw was prescribed medication for his seizures, they decreased in frequency. Dr. Acharya

changed the medication, however, because it was causing Mr. Shaw headaches. See AR 273. Dr.

Acharya’s treatment notes in February 2005 reflected that the seizures were better controlled on the

new medication, and Dr. Acharya increased the dosage from 500 to 750 milligrams. See AR 265. 

Notably, Mr. Shaw admitted at the administrative hearing that the medication was treating his

seizures “fairly well,” AR 324, a point that the ALJ took note of in his decision. See AR 18 (ALJ

decision). Finally, ALJ Laverdure noted in his decision that, based on the record submitted, it

appeared that Mr. Shaw had not been treated for any seizures since July 2005. See AR 258. Mr.

Shaw had scheduled an appointment with the ACMC’s neurology clinic in January 2006 but had not

kept that appointment. See AR 257.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court rejects Mr. Shaw’s contention that the ALJ failed to

explain why he was rejecting the opinion of Ms. Turner. It is evident from the ALJ’s conclusion

that Ms. Turner’s opinion was rejected in favor of the findings made by various doctors who reached

conclusions which contradicted Ms. Turner. In short, the ALJ’s reasoning was evident and

reasonable.

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 In his decision, the ALJ actually cited § 309.677-014 of the DOT, but, as Mr. Shaw notes, this

appears to have been an error as that particular section addresses “foster parents,” not companions or

personal attendants.

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 Social Security Ruling 82-62 provides that “[t]he claimant is the primary source for vocational

documentation, and statements by the claimant regarding past work are generally sufficient for

determining the skill level, exertional demands and nonexertional demands of such work.” SSR 82-62.

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C. Mr. Shaw’s Credibility

Mr. Shaw argues next that the ALJ improperly discounted Mr. Shaw’s credibility, again

based on the ALJ’s rejection of Ms. Turner. Because the Court found no error above, it also rejects

this argument. The Court further notes that there is no evidence that ALJ Laverdure deemed Ms.

Turner’s opinion evidence from a lay witness, as opposed to an other medical source.

D. Step Four Findings

Finally, Mr. Shaw contends that the ALJ made various errors at step four of the five-step

sequential evaluation process. Each claimed error is addressed below.

1. Function-by-Function Analysis

According to the ALJ, Mr. Shaw had past relevant work as a caretaker for his mother, a job

that most closely resembled a companion or personal attendant as defined in § 309.677-010 of the

Dictionary of Occupational Titles.6

 See AR 19. Mr. Shaw argues that ALJ Laverdure failed to take

into account that Mr. Shaw’s seizure symptoms, in particular, sudden loss of consciousness and

mobility, could at times prevent performance of “crucial parts” of his work as a caretaker for his

mother -- most notably, his “responsibility to notify others of any emergency of material negative

change in condition of his charge.” Mot. at 5.

While Mr. Shaw’s argument is not without some force, the problem is that (1) there is no

indication that the job of companion/personal attendant as generally performed involves this

particular responsibility and (2) Mr. Shaw never informed the ALJ or anyone else within the Social

Security Administration (“SSA”) that “his duties [as actually performed] included the responsibility

[of] notify[ing] others of any emergency or material negative change in condition of his charge.”7

Mot. at 5. For example, in his initial disability report filed with the SSA, Mr. Shaw described his

job caring for his mother as involving, e.g., cooking and cleaning; no mention was made of having

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 In his reply, Mr. Shaw argues that the Commissioner, in his opposition brief, “admits that

Plaintiff’s job duties included awareness and ability to report medical changes in ‘emergency’ or ‘medic

alert’ mode.” Reply at 6. The critical question is what Mr. Shaw testified his job duties were. As noted

above, Mr. Shaw testified that it was his mother who had the medic alert; he was responsible for only

the medic alert bracelet.

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 Mr. Shaw makes no reference to this ruling in his papers, citing instead only Social Security

Rulings 82-61 and 82-62.

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responsibility for notifying others of an emergency. See AR 74-80. Similarly, at the hearing before

the ALJ, Mr. Shaw simply testified that, as a caretaker for his mother, he did basic housecleaning,

bought groceries, and entertained her (e.g., by reading to her or discussing soap operas with her). 

See AR 339-42. While Mr. Shaw did testify about a medic alert, he stated that it was his mother that

had the alert -- he had only the medic alert bracelet -- see AR 340 (“She had the medic alert. I had

the medic alert bracelet.”), which would suggest that he did not have the responsibility of notifying

others of an emergency.8

To the extent that Mr. Shaw is contending that the ALJ failed to make an explicit functionby-function assessment as discussed in Social Security Ruling 96-8p,9

 that argument has been

rejected by other courts in Tavares v. Astrue, No. C 06-6583 PJH, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93763, at

*34 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2007) (“Because this court’s review of the record strongly suggests that the

ALJ considered [claimant’s] function-by-function limitations even if he did not explicitly state in his

decision that he was doing so, [claimant] is not entitled to relief on this claim.”) (emphasis added),

and Catalano v. Barnhart, No. C 04-2649 CRB, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9397, at *21 (“Although the

ALJ did not engage in an explicit function-by-function analysis, he did consider all the appropriate

evidence in the record, including both medical consultants’ function-by-function assessments, in

making his finding. A reviewing court may use its own faculties for drawing specific and legitimate

inferences from the ALJ’s opinion. . . . The ALJ properly relied on the function-by-function

assessment conducted by the consulting physicians and was not required to repeat the exercise.”)

(emphasis added). This Court agrees with Tavares and Catalano. The ALJ discussed the opinion of

Dr. Gable (who assessed, e.g., Mr. Shaw’s ability to sit, stand, lift, etc.). He also discussed the

opinion of the state agency (which assessed, e.g., Mr. Shaw’s ability to stand, push/pull, etc.). See

AR 17 (ALJ decision).

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10 In Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103 (2000), the Supreme Court held that a Social Security

claimant’s failure to present an issue to the Appeals Council does not waive judicial review of that issue

but specifically deferred ruling on whether a claimant must exhaust issues before the ALJ prior to

seeking judicial review. See id. at 107, 112. The First Circuit explained in Mills that “[t]he impact of

a no-waiver approach at the Appeals Council level is relatively mild; at the ALJ level it could cause

havoc, severely undermining the administrative process.” Mills, 244 F.3d at 8.

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2. Competitiveness of Past Work as Caretaker

Mr. Shaw argues next that ALJ Laverdure erred in characterizing Mr. Shaw’s past work as a

caretaker for his mother as past relevant work under the Social Security regulations because, “to be

considered past relevant work, a job must not have been sheltered from the rigors of the competitive

workplace.” Mot. at 6; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1573(b), 416.973(b) (“If you are doing work that

involves minimal duties that make little or no demands on you and that are of little or no use to your

employer, or to the operation of a business if you are self-employed, this does not show that you are

working at the substantial gainful activity level.”). The Court finds that the argument was waived

because Mr. Shaw failed to assert the argument during the proceedings before the ALJ. See Meanel

v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that “at least when claimants are represented

by counsel, they must raise all issues and evidence at their administrative hearings in order to

preserve them on appeal”); Marathon Oil Co. v. United States, 807 F.2d 759, 767 (9th Cir. 1986)

(stating that, “[a]s a general rule, we will not consider issues not presented before an administrative

proceeding at the appropriate time.”); see also Mills v. Apfel, 244 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2001) (finding

waiver due to failure to raise issue at hearing before ALJ, as opposed to the Appeals Council).10 At

the hearing, the ALJ was clearly considering Mr. Shaw’s job as a caretaker as past relevant work --

e.g., posing hypotheticals to the vocational expert about that job -- but neither Mr. Shaw nor his

counsel ever voice an objection on the basis that the job could not be considered past relevant work

based on the differing or unique factual circumstances. Compare Silveira v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 1257,

1260 n.8 (9th Cir. 2000) (considering an issue raised for the first time on appeal “because it is a pure

question of law and the Commissioner will not be unfairly prejudiced by [plaintiff’s] failure to raise

the issue below”); Kokal v. Massanari, 163 F. Supp.2d 1122, 1129 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (Laporte, J.)

(concluding that claimant who was not represented by counsel at administrative hearing did not

waive issue by failing to raise it before ALJ).

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3. Past Relevant Work as Actually Performed and Generally Performed

Finally, Mr. Shaw contends that ALJ Laverdure erred in failing to make a distinction

between Mr. Shaw’s caretaker job as actually performed and as generally performed and further

erred with respect to his findings about the job as generally performed because there was no

occupation listed in the DOT comparable to Mr. Shaw’s. Neither argument is availing.

First, the transcript for the hearing reflects that the ALJ did consider separately Mr. Shaw’s

caretaker job as actually performed, see AR 339-42, and as generally performed. See AR 342-44. 

The ALJ’s decision also reflects such. See AR 19 (“The vocational expert testified that the

claimant’s past work as a caretaker most closely resembles a companion/personal attendant, as

defined in section 309.677-01[0] of the Dictionary of Occupational Titles.”). That the ALJ did not

make specific findings about Mr. Shaw’s ability to do his work as actually and generally performed

is not material. The Ninth Circuit has stated that it has “we have never required explicit findings at

step four regarding a claimant’s past relevant work both as generally performed and as actually

performed.” Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 2001).

Second, Mr. Shaw’s contention that there was no occupation listed in the DOT comparable

to his because his job involved the duty of lifting adult patients is without merit because he testified

at the administrative hearing that, as a caretaker for his mother, he did not have to lift her. See AR

341 (answering “no” to the question “Did you have to lift your mother”). Mr. Shaw explained that a

nurse took care of his mother’s personal duties. See AR 341; see also AR 343 (vocational expert

noting that Mr. Shaw did not lift his mother, transfer her to the bed, toilet, or shower, to which no

objection was made by Mr. Shaw or his counsel). Mr. Shaw points out that, in his initial disability

report, he did make a claim that he “would assist [his] mother in going to and from the restroom, her

bed, and the bathtub. [He] would completely lift her up 6-7 times per day.” AR 76. While this is

true, Mr. Shaw fails to adequately explain why he then testified before the ALJ that he did not have

to lift his mother. See Mot. at 6 n.7 (acknowledging that “he also stated [at the hearing that] he did

not lift his mother, possibly referring to a different period”) (emphasis added). Mr. Shaw’s

testimony at the hearing may properly be afforded greater weight by the ALJ than the initial

disability report.

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Shaw’s motion for summary judgment is denied and the

Commissioner’s cross-motion is granted.

This order disposes of Docket Nos. 19 and 24.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 14, 2008

_________________________ EDWARD M. CHEN

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 3:07-cv-03379-EMC Document 26 Filed 04/14/08 Page 12 of 12