Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-5_06-cv-00015/USCOURTS-ared-5_06-cv-00015-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joe Earl Morgan
Plaintiff
Larry Norris
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

PINE BLUFF DIVISION

JOE EARL MORGAN PETITIONER

vs. Civil Case No. 5:06CV00015 HLJ

LARRY NORRIS, Director, 

Arkansas Department of Correction RESPONDENT

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

INSTRUCTIONS

The following recommended disposition has been sent to United

States District Court Judge Susan Webber Wright. Any party may

serve and file written objections to this recommendation.

Objections should be specific and should include the factual or

legal basis for the objection. If the objection is to a factual

finding, specifically identify that finding and the evidence that

supports your objection. An original and one copy of your

objections must be received in the office of the United States

District Court Clerk no later than eleven (11) days from the date

of the findings and recommendations. The copy will be furnished to

the opposing party. Failure to file timely objections may result

in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact.

If you are objecting to the recommendation and also desire to

submit new, different, or additional evidence, and to have a

hearing for this purpose before the District Judge, you must, at

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the same time that you file your written objections, include the

following:

1. Why the record made before the Magistrate Judge is

inadequate.

2. Why the evidence proffered at the hearing before

the District Judge (if such a hearing is granted)

was not offered at the hearing before the

Magistrate Judge. 

3. The detail of any testimony desired to be

introduced at the hearing before the District Judge

in the form of an offer of proof, and a copy, or

the original, of any documentary or other nontestimonial evidence desired to be introduced at

the hearing before the District Judge.

From this submission, the District Judge will determine the

necessity for an additional evidentiary hearing, either before the

Magistrate Judge or before the District Judge.

Mail your objections and “Statement of Necessity” to:

Clerk, United States District Court

Eastern District of Arkansas

600 West Capitol Avenue, Suite 402

Little Rock, AR 72201-3325

DISPOSITION

Now before the court is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by Joe Earl Morgan, an inmate of the

Arkansas Department of Correction. Petitioner was charged in state

court with rape and sexual assault. He apparently filed a motion

to dismiss for lack of speedy trial (See State’s Response to

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Speedy Trial, Exhibit 10

to Respondent’s Amended Response). The trial court held a preCase 5:06-cv-00015-SWW Document 21 Filed 12/12/06 Page 2 of 12
1 According to the response filed by the prosecutor

(Respondent’s Exhibit 3) and the Arkansas Supreme Court

(Respondent’s Exhibit 6), although Petitioner actually entitled the

pleading an “Amended Petition,” it did not appear he filed a prior

petition.

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trial hearing on November 25, 2003, and determined his right to a

speedy trial had not been violated (See Order Denying Defendant’s

Rule 37 Motion, Exhibit 4 to Respondent’s Amended Response). On

December 4, 2003, Petitioner entered an unconditional guilty plea

to the charges, and the trial court sentenced him to concurrent

sentences of sixty years and thirty years imprisonment (Judgment

and Commitment, Exhibit 1 to Respondent’s Amended Response).

Because of his unconditional guilty plea, Petitioner was not

entitled to a direct appeal. Ark. Rules App. P.-Crim. 1. On

February 25, 2004, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief1

under Rule 37 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure (Exhibit

2 to Respondent’s Amended Response), which the trial court

dismissed on June 18, 2004 (Exhibit 4 to Respondent’s Amended

Response). 

Instead of filing an appeal of that order, Petitioner filed a

motion on June 29, 2004, asking the trial court to modify its order

of dismissal (Exhibit 5 to Respondent’s Amended Response). On July

28, 2004, he filed a notice of appeal of the order of dismissal

(See Exhibit 7 to Respondent’s Amended Response, p.1). On August

2, 2004, the trial court denied the motion to modify (Exhibit 6 to

Respondent’s Amended Response). On August 8, 2004, Petitioner

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filed a second notice of appeal and lodged an appeal from the trial

court’s orders entered on June 18, 2004, and August 2, 2004 (See

Exhibit 7 to Respondent’s Amended Response, p.1). The Arkansas

Supreme Court dismissed his appeal on January 6, 2005 (Exhibit 7 to

Respondent’s Amended Response). Petitioner then filed a motion for

reconsideration, which the court denied on February 24, 2005

(Exhibit 8 to Respondent’s Amended Response). He also filed a

motion for a belated appeal of the trial court’s June 18, 2004,

order denying the Rule 37 petition, but the Arkansas Supreme Court

denied that motion on January 19, 2006 (Exhibit 9 to Respondent’s

Amended Response). 

In the present proceeding, Petitioner raises the following

grounds for relief:

1. His attorney was ineffective in that he failed to

preserve his right to appellate review of his speedy

trial claim when he entered his guilty plea;

2. The trial court violated his right to due process

when it allowed the state longer than thirty days to

conduct his mental examination;

3. His attorney was ineffective in that he allowed the

prosecutor to obtain full disclosure of his mental health

evaluation without an order, which created a conflict of

interest and

4. The Arkansas Supreme Court violated his right to due

process when it unreasonably and arbitrarily interpreted

his motion in the trial court to modify its order of

dismissal because he was trying to preserve for review an

issue not addressed by the trial court.

Respondent admits Petitioner is in his custody pursuant to

these convictions and that he has no non-futile state remedies

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available to him. He argues, however that the petition should be

dismissed as procedurally barred because Petitioner did not file a

timely appeal of the order denying his Rule 37 petition, he has not

shown cause for the default or resulting prejudice, and he has not

demonstrated he is actually innocent of the charges. Petitioner

denies he procedurally defaulted his claims and contends the state

court misinterpreted his motion for modification and that it

misinterpreted Arkansas law.

I.

Petitioner’s Rule 37 motion was a narrative, devoted primarily

to his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding his

pre-trial mental evaluation. He also raised a speedy trial claim.

In its order denying the petition, the trial court found he had not

established the prejudice prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668 (1984), since he stated in his petition that he had

entered his guilty plea to “spare his family a trial.” The court

explained that it had held a hearing on the substantive speedy

trial claim and found the issue should have been raised on direct

appeal rather than in a Rule 37 petition (Exhibit 4 to Respondent’s

Amended Response). 

In his motion for modification, Petitioner stated he had

raised three distinct issues in his Rule 37 petition, and that the

trial court had failed to address the following issue:

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 Rule 37.2(d) provides as follows:

(d) The decision of the court in any proceeding under

this rule shall be final when the judgment is rendered.

No petition for rehearing shall be considered.

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(b) Trial court committed jurisdictional abuse of

discretion where the court ordered sua sponte the

defendant’s trial period set forth in Ark.R.Crim.P. Rule

28.1(c) extended for an extra period of sixty days when

it violated Ark.Code Ann. § 5-2-305 (b)(1)(3) limitation

to thirty (30) days for the purpose of a mental

evaluation unless the director or his designee state such

period of time is necessary for the purpose.

Exhibit 5 to Respondent’s Amended Response.

In its order denying the motion for modification, the trial

court stated it had not extended the time for the examination and

that the time limitation for a speedy trial had been tolled at the

request of the defense for a mental examination. It reiterated

that it had addressed the speedy trial claim after a pre-trial

hearing and that Petitioner should have raised the issue on direct

appeal rather than in a Rule 37 petition (Exhibit 6 to Respondent’s

Amended Response). 

In its opinion dismissing Petitioner’s appeal on January 6,

2005, the Arkansas Supreme Court interpreted his motion for

modification as a motion for reconsideration and held that such

motions are not allowed under Rule 37.2(d)2 following the denial of

Rule 37 relief. It then found Petitioner’s first notice of appeal

was not timely, and that, even though the second notice of appeal

was timely with respect to the trial court’s order denying the

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motion for modification, the appeal had no merit because such

motions are not allowed (Exhibit 7 to Respondent’s Amended

Response). 

In its order denying Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration

on appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court acknowledged that a motion

for modification in the trial court is acceptable under Arkansas

law if it requests the court to modify its order to address omitted

issues and it is not a request for a rehearing. It found, however,

that Petitioner’s motion for modification merely restated the

issues raised in his Rule 37 motion with further argument, and

since the court had already ruled on the issues, the motion was an

unauthorized motion for rehearing or for reconsideration (Exhibit

8 to Respondent’s Amended Response).

In its order denying Petitioner’s motion for a belated appeal,

the Arkansas Supreme Court reiterated that Petitioner’s first

notice of appeal was untimely and that his second notice of appeal

pertained to an unauthorized motion. It further found that

Petitioner had not shown good cause for filing a belated appeal and

denied the motion (Exhibit 9 to Respondent’s Amended Response).

II.

Where a state court’s decision not to review a question of

federal law rests on an independent and adequate state procedural

ground, federal habeas review is barred unless the petitioner

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establishes cause for the default and resulting prejudice, or that

the failure to address the claim will result in a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-31,

749-50 (1991). A state court’s dismissal of an appeal of a motion

for post-conviction relief because the motion did not comply with

state procedural rules constitutes a procedural default. See

Lowe-Bey v. Groose, 28 F.3d 816, 818 (8th Cir. 1994)(finding

petitioner’s failure to appeal denial of post-conviction relief

according to state procedural rules constituted procedural

default). 

Petitioner argues he did not procedurally default his claims,

because the state court’s finding that the motion for modification

was not authorized under Rule 37.2 is incorrect, since the motion

asked the trial court to rule on “issue b” in order to preserve it,

which he contends is allowed under Beshears v. State, 340 Ark. 70

(2000), and Collins v. State, 324 Ark. 322 (1996). “Federal courts

should not consider whether the state court properly applied its

default rule to the claim; federal courts do not sit to correct a

state court's application of its procedural rules..., except in

unusual circumstances.” Clemons v. Luebbers, 381 F.3d 744, 750 (8th

Cir. 2004), citing Sweet v. Delo, 125 F.3d 1144, 1151 (8th Cir.

1997), cert. denied, Sweet v. Bowersox, 523 U.S. 1010 (1998). 

[I]t is not the province of a federal court to decide

whether a matter ought to be considered procedurally

defaulted under state law. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433

U.S. 72, 87, 90, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977);

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see also May v. State of Iowa, 251 F.3d 713, 2001 WL

515053 at *3 (8th Cir. May 16, 2001).

Murray v. Hvass, 269 F.3d 896, 898 (8th Cir. 2001), cert. denied,

535 U.S. 935 (2002). 

The “adequacy” of the state procedural rule, however, is

ordinarily a question of federal law. Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362,

375 (2002). In exceptional cases, “exorbitant application of a

generally sound rule” may render a state procedural ground

inadequate to bar consideration of a federal constitutional claim.

Id. at 376. 

Rule 2(a)(4) of the Arkansas Rules of Appellate ProcedureCriminal provides that a Rule 37 petitioner must file his notice of

appeal within thirty days from the date of the entry of an order

denying his Rule 37 petition. The court has examined Petitioner’s

Rule 37 petition and his motion for modification, and I find “issue

(b)” was merely one segment of Petitioner’s ineffective assistance

of counsel argument and his substantive speedy trial claim. The

trial court did not mistakenly omit the issue from its decision, it

merely based its decision on different grounds-- that Petitioner

had not established the prejudice prong of his ineffective counsel

claim and that the substantive speedy trial claim should have been

raised on direct appeal (Exhibit 4 to Respondent’s Amended

Response, p. 1). 

Given the Arkansas Supreme Court’s interpretation of the

pleadings, I do not find its dismissal of Petitioner’s appeal was

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an exorbitant application of its own rules or the Arkansas Rules of

Criminal Procedure. Thus, I find the Arkansas Supreme Court’s

refusal to address the merits of Petitioner’s appeal was based on

an independent and adequate state procedural ground, and Petitioner

must establish cause for the default and resulting prejudice, or

that the failure to address the claim will result in a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-31, 749-50.

III.

As cause for the default, Petitioner contends he relied on

Beshears and Collins when he filed his motion for modification,

believing he had to file that motion in order to preserve his

issues for appeal. Respondent did not address this argument. 

On April 20, 1995, Jeffrey Lee Collins filed a motion for

reconsideration of the denial of his Rule 37 petition. The trial

court denied the motion. On appeal, the State argued Collins’

appeal was untimely, but the Arkansas Supreme Court found that,

under Rule 36.22 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, a

defendant could file a motion for reconsideration in a Rule 37

proceeding and the time for filing an appeal did not expire until

thirty days after the order denying reconsideration. Collins v.

State, 349 Ark. at 325. 

In 2000, however, the court in Beshears distinguishes between

a pleading that requests the Rule 37 “trial court modify its order

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to include an omitted issue” and a pleading that requests a

“rehearing that is prohibited by Rule 37.2(d).” Beshears v. State,

340 Ark. at 73. Although Petitioner’s motion was titled a motion

for modification, it was actually a request for the court to

reconsider the speedy trial issue and, perhaps the ineffective

assistance of counsel issue as well. Despite Collins, which was

decided in 1996, Beshears and Rule 37.2(d) put Petitioner on notice

that, at the time of his Rule 37 proceeding, he could not ask for

such reconsideration. I find Petitioner has not established

sufficient cause for his procedural default. I further find he has

not alleged that “in light of new evidence, ‘it is more likely than

not that no reasonable juror would have found [him] guilty beyond

a reasonable doubt.’” House v. Bell, U.S. , 126 S.Ct. 2064,

2076-77 (2006), quoting Schlep v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995).

Petitioner’s claims are procedurally barred and may not be

considered. In light of this finding there is no need to address

Respondent’s other claims. Petitioner’s Motion to Strike

Petitioner’s Traverse to Amended Response to Reply and For

Permission to File a Replacement Amended Traverse to Amended

Response to Petition for Habeas Corpus (DE #20) is granted.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that this petition be, and it is

hereby, dismissed with prejudice. The relief prayed for is denied.

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SO ORDERED this 12th day of December, 2006.

 

United States Magistrate Judge

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