Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-08048/USCOURTS-ca10-90-08048-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Diane Aeschbacher
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

. 

I P lLED 

United Stat s Court of Appeals 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit 

TENTH CIRCUIT JUL .. 3 1991 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ) 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk ) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) No. 90-8048 

) D.C. No. 89-CR-0105-02J 

v. ) (D. Wyo.) 

) 

DIANE AESCHBACHER, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) No. 90-8054 

) D.C. No. 89-CR-0105-05J 

v. ) (D. Wyo.) 

) 

RON GILLIS, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) No. 90-8055 

) D.C. No. 89-CR-0105-0GJ 

v. ) (D. Wyo.) 

) 

GARY BARKDOLL, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before McKAY, SETH and LOGAN, Circuit Judges. 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppal. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-8048 Document: 010110128838 Date Filed: 07/03/1991 Page: 1 
Appellants Diane Aeschbacher, Ron Gillis and Gary Barkdoll 

were charged under a single indictment for various charges arising 

out of a methamphetamine distribution scheme, in violation of 21 

u.s.c. §§ 841(a)(l), 841(b)(l)(C) and 846. In addition to the 

above mentioned charges, Gillis and Barkdoll were indicted on 

violations of 18 u.s.c. § 924(c)(l). Aeschbacher was also charged 

with violating 18 u.s.c. § 1952(a)(l). They were convicted on all 

counts in a consolidated trial before a jury. Their contentions 

of error, either raised individually or by a group, are addressed 

in turn. 

Statement of the Facts 

In February 1988, the Campbell County Sheriff's Office 

initiated an investigation into illegal drug trafficking 

activities in the Gillette, Wyoming area. David Baumgardner, a 

paid confidential informant, was hired to infiltrate the 

operation. 

As part of the investigation, Baumgardner approached Marvin 

Aeschbacher ("Moe") in an attempt to purchase one pound of 

methamphetamine. Moe along with his girlfriend, Cindy Hanneman, 

went to Ron Gillis' home in Glenrock, Wyoming, to purchase a pound 

of methamphetamine. When Gillis told Moe that he could not supply 

that amount, Moe asked his uncle, William Aeschbacher, if he knew 

of a source capable of providing a pound of methamphetamine. 

William Aeschbacher told him that he thought David Ranger, who 

resided in California, might be able to supply that amount. 

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William Aeschbacher contacted Ranger by telephone. Ranger 

told him that he would only deal with Diane Aeschbacher, William's 

wife. After discussing the deal with Diane Aeschbacher, Ranger 

ultimately agreed to supply the pound of methamphetamine. 

William Aeschbacher drove to Dupuyer, Montana, to pick up 

Diane Aeschbacher. They both returned to Gillette where they met 

with Moe to make further plans. The three of them left Gillette, 

headed for California to meet with Ranger. While en route, Moe 

was stopped for a traffic violation and decided not to continue 

with the drug transaction, at least at that time. Hanneman drove 

Moe to the Casper airport where he took a flight to California to 

see another girlfriend. 

Thereafter, Hanneman, William and Diane Aeschbacher decided 

to continue with the purchase. Hanneman met with Baumgardner and 

another undercover agent where they agreed upon a price of $16,000 

for the pound of methamphetamine. Hanneman, William and Diane 

Aeschbacher drove to California in Hanneman's car. 

Upon arriving in California, Diane Aeschbacher contacted 

Ranger and he agreed to introduce Moe to his contact, Troll. 

Hanneman contacted Moe, who ultimately decided to proceed with the 

transaction. Moe then contacted Baumgardner, who subsequently 

agreed to wire an additional $5,000 to Hanneman. Upon receipt, 

Hanneman gave the money to Moe and returned to Gillette. 

Moe, William and Diane Aeschbacher drove to Ranger's 

apartment. Troll arrived and took Moe into the foothills where he 

delivered 12 and 3/4 ounces of methamphetamine. Moe returned to 

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Ranger's apartment and repackaged the drug. He used some of it 

with the others and gave some to Ranger for his services. 

The three departed California in Hanneman's vehicle. Along 

the way, Moe expressed some doubt about Baumgardner. He then asked 

Gillis to meet him in Casper to help determine whether Baumgardner 

was a confidential informant. Moe, William and Diane Aeschbacher 

met with Gillis and his friend, Gary Barkdoll. Moe told the 

Aeschbachers to take Hanneman's car and return to Gillette. Moe, 

Gillis and Barkdoll then drove to the Eastridge Mall in Casper 

where Gillis bought Inositol, a cutting agent, for the 

methamphetamine. At that time, Barkdoll told Moe that 

Baumgardner's description was similar to that of a confidential 

informant used by the Wyoming law enforcement authorities. 

The three drove to Gillis' house in Glenrock and "cut" the 

methamphetamine with the Inositol. They packaged up the 

methamphetamine and drove to Gillette to determine whether 

Baumgardner was the same confidential informant used by the 

Wyoming law enforcement authorities. As they were driving to 

Gillette, Moe noticed a firearm under the seat and indicated that 

he wanted to shoot Baumgardner. When they arrived in Gillette, 

they picked up Hanneman, saw the Aeschbachers and identified 

Baumgardner as the same confidential informant. Moe then told the 

Aeschbachers that he would contact them later and gave them some 

money. 

Moe, Gillis, Barkdoll and Hanneman returned to Glenrock. Moe 

sold the methamphetamine to Gillis and Barkdoll and returned to 

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California. Barkdoll and Hanneman used some of the drugs and sold 

some in the Riverton area. 

Hanneman returned to Gillette and was ultimately arrested in 

connection with this case. She confessed as to her involvement 

and, in exchange for her testimony, the charges against her were 

dismissed. William and Diane Aeschbacher were subsequently 

contacted by the authorities. William pled guilty to the charge 

of conspiracy and testified on behalf of the government. Moe pled 

guilty to three state felony charges but was not prosecuted 

federally. He also testified at the trial. Ranger pled guilty to 

the charge of conspiracy and testified at the trial. All three 

appellants testified on their own behalf, denying their 

involvement in the conspiracy. 

Severance 

Appellants Aeschbacher, Gillis and Barkdoll challenge the 

trial court's denial of their motions for severance. Defendants 

charged jointly "are not entitled to separate trials as a matter 

of right." Bailey v. United States, 410 F.2d 1209, 1213 (10th 

Cir.). The trial court, however, has the discretion to grant a 

severance where joinder would prejudice one of the parties. Fed. 

R. Crim. P. 14. The decision to grant or deny a motion for 

severance requires the trial court to weigh the prejudice to the 

defendants against "considerations of economy and expedition in 

judicial administration." United States v. Petersen, 611 F.2d 

1313, 1331 (10th Cir.). 

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On appeal, the defendant bears a heavy burden of showing 

actual prejudice as a result of the denial, United States v. Hack, 

782 F.2d 862, 870 (10th Cir.), and the trial court's decision will 

not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. United States v. 

Cardall, 885 F.2d 656, 667 (10th Cir.). To establish an abuse of 

discretion, the defendant must demonstrate that the denial of 

severance deprived him of his right to a fair trial, United States 

v. Butler, 494 F.2d 1246, 1256 (10th Cir.), and "not merely that a 

separate trial might have offered him a better chance of 

acquittal." United States v. Pack, 773 F.2d 261, 267 (10th Cir.) 

(quoting United States v. Edwards, 488 F.2d 1154, 1160 (5th 

Cir.)). 

Appellants advance several reasons to support their argument 

that the trial court abused its discretion in denying their 

motions for severance. Central to all of their arguments is the 

contention that the evidence at trial demonstrated that two 

separate and distinct conspiracies existed, not the single 

conspiracy charged. 

To obtain a conspiracy conviction, the government must 

establish: (1) the existence of a conspiracy; (2) the defendant 

knew the essential objectives of that conspiracy; and (3) the 

defendant knowingly and voluntarily participated in that 

conspiracy. United States v. Bowie, 892 F.2d 1494, 1497 (10th 

Cir.) (citing United States v. Savaiano, 843 F.2d 1280, 1294 (10th 

Cir.)). "A defendant need not have knowledge of all the details 

or all the members of the conspiracy and may play only a minor 

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role." Savaiano, 843 F.2d at 1294 (citing United States v. 

Badolato, 701 F.2d 915, 920 (11th Cir.)). Separate transactions 

may constitute a single conspiracy where they are "'essential and 

integral steps toward the realization of a common, illicit goal.'" 

United States v. Dickey, 736 F.2d 571, 582 (10th Cir.) (quoting 

United States v. Brewer, 630 F.2d 795, 799 (10th Cir.)). 

We must conclude that the evidence presented at trial 

established the existence of one single conspiracy rather than two 

separate and distinct conspiracies. The evidence showed that 

appellants knowingly and voluntarily participated in one 

conspiracy, the thrust of which was to obtain methamphetamine and 

distribute it for profit. Their roles were essential to the goal 

of distributing methamphetamine for profit. Aeschbacher was 

instrumental in obtaining the methamphetamine while Gillis and 

Barkdoll were necessary for its distribution. The fact that 

Aeschbacher did not know Gillis and Barkdoll is immaterial. 

Appellants' claim that as a result of their joint trial they 

were forced to contend with the "spill-over" effect of evidence 

introduced against the other defendants is unpersuasive. The fact 

that they may have had a better chance of acquittal without the 

"spill-over" effect does not warrant severance. See Cardall, 885 

F.2d at 668. See also United States v. Mabry, 809 F.2d 671, 682-

83 (10th Cir.). 

Gillis and Barkdoll also claim that the trial court erred in 

denying their motions for severance because their defenses on the 

firearm charges were antagonistic with one another and Agent 

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Hughes' testimony concerning their respective confessions 

prejudiced their cases. Both Gillis and Barkdoll gave statements 

to the authorities as to their involvement in the methamphetamine 

conspiracy. Agent Hughes subsequently testified at trial 

concerning those statements. 

Upon review of the record, it appears that their defenses 

were compatible with the other. Gillis and Barkdoll both denied 

the existence of the firearm and neither directly implicated the 

other. While Agent Hughes testified that Barkdoll admitted the 

presence of a firearm in the vehicle, Barkdoll denied making this 

statement at trial. Therefore, we do not find this argument 

persuasive. 

As to Agent Hughes' testimony concerning Gillis' confession, 

Barkdoll was not implicated in any manner. While Agent Hughes' 

testimony referred to Gillis' involvement, he avoided using 

Gillis' name. At trial, both Gillis and Barkdoll testified and 

were subject to cross-examination. Further, the trial court 

cautioned the jury that the confessions could only be considered 

as evidence against the defendant who made the statement. See 

United States v. Peveto, 881 F.2d 844, 851 (10th Cir.) (cautionary 

instructions are usually sufficient to cure any prejudice alleged 

by the defendant). Without evidence to the contrary, we can 

presume that the jury fulfilled its task and followed the trial 

court's instructions. United States v. Lane, 883 F.2d 1484, 1498 

(10th Cir.). We cannot say that Agent Hughes' testimony 

concerning their confessions was so prejudicial as to result in 

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the denial of a fair trial. We must conclude that the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion in denying their motions for 

severance. 

Firearm Offense 

Appellants Gillis and Barkdoll challenge the sufficiency of 

the evidence to sustain their convictions under 18 u.s.c. 

§ 924(c)(l), which penalizes a defendant who "uses or carries" a 

firearm during or in relation to a drug trafficking crime. In 

considering sufficiency of the evidence claims, we "view the proof 

presented in the light most favorable to the government to 

ascertain if there is sufficient substantial proof, direct and 

circumstantial, together with reasonable inferences to be drawn 

therefrom, from which a jury might find a defendant guilty beyond 

a reasonable doubt." United States v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 1403, 

1431 (10th Cir.). 

In order to convict Gillis or Barkdoll under 18 u.s.c. 

§ 924(c)(l), the government was required to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that they had "'ready access' to the firearm and 

the firearm 'was an integral part of [the] criminal undertaking 

and its availability increased the likelihood that the criminal 

undertaking would succeed,'" United States v. Williams, 923 F.2d 

1397, 1402-03 (10th Cir.) (quoting United States v. McKinnell, 888 

F.2d 669, 675 (10th Cir.)) (quoting United States v. Matra, 841 

F.2d 837, 843 (8th Cir.)), or that one of their co-conspirators 

committed this crime during and in furtherance of the conspiracy 

and that this act was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the 

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conspiracy. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647-48. It 

is not necessary that the government prove that the firearm was 

displayed or brandished, United States v. Moore, 919 F.2d 1471, 

1475 (10th Cir.), or that the firearm was actually loaded during 

the drug trafficking offense. United States v. Martinez, 912 F.2d 

419 (10th Cir.). 

The government met its burden of proof. In its case, the 

government presented evidence that two firearms were involved in 

the conspiracy. Moe testified that while travelling with Gillis 

and Barkdoll between Glenrock and Gillette with the 

methamphetamine, he noticed a firearm under the seat in the 

vehicle. Barkdoll also admitted to Agent Kevin Hughes that there 

was a firearm in the vehicle. Moe further testified that Gillis 

and Barkdoll were afraid that he was going to take the firearm and 

shoot Baumgardner. Although the other occupants in the car deny 

that this conversation occurred, viewing the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the government, the jury could have believed 

Moe's testimony that a firearm was in the vehicle, that all of the 

co-conspirators were aware of its presence, that the firearm was 

readily accessible to any of the co-conspirators, and that it was 

an integral part of their criminal undertaking by providing a 

means of protecting the methamphetamine operation in the course of 

the drug transactions. Based upon this evidence and the 

reasonable inferences therefrom, a reasonable jury could have 

found that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions 

of Gillis and Barkdoll on the firearm charges. 

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Lesser Included Offense 

Appellants Aeschbacher and Barkdoll challenge the trial 

court's denial of their requests for jury instructions on a lesser 

included offense of simple possession. They claim that the jury 

could have found them guilty of possession of methamphetamine 

without having expressly joined the conspiracy, and that the trial 

court's failure to instruct on a lesser included offense deprived 

them of their theory of the case. 

When reviewing a claim of error relating to jury 

instructions, we review the instructions as a whole. 

United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 674. "Although a criminal 

defendant is entitled to an instruction regarding his theory of 

the case, a trial judge is given substantial latitude and 

discretion in tailoring and formulating the instructions so long 

as they are correct statements of law and fairly and adequately 

cover the issues presented." Pack, 773 F.2d at 267. 

In Fitzgerald v. United States, 719 F.2d 1069, 1071 (10th 

Cir.), we set out the requirements which a defendant must satisfy 

in order to warrant a lesser included offense instruction: 

"1. A proper request. 

"2. The lesser included offense consists of 

some, but not all, of the elements of the 

offense charged. 

"3. The elements differentiating the two 

offenses is a matter in dispute. 

"4. A jury could rationally convict the 

defendant of the lesser offense and 

acquit of the greater offense." 

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"Failure to meet any part of the test is fatal for the defendant." 

United States v. Joe, 831 F.2d 218, 219 (10th Cir.). 

While appellants met the first two requirements of the test, 

they did not satisfy the remaining two. In support of their 

argument that the elements differentiating the two offenses were 

sufficiently in dispute, they argue that the jury could have found 

that they possessed the methamphetamine during the period when the 

conspiracy was in operation but were not actual members of the 

conspiracy. While the evidence may be construed so as to support 

this theory, we have held that "[a]bsent some evidence to counter 

the strong inference of [the offense charged] ... the issue is 

not elevated to a truly disputed one." Id. at 220 (quoting 

United States v. Rogers, 504 F.2d 1079, 1084 (5th Cir.)). 

As indicated above, there was overwhelming evidence regarding 

the involvement of both Aeschbacher and Barkdoll in the 

conspiracy. Both of their roles were instrumental in the success 

of the methamphetamine operation. Without Aeschbacher's 

involvement, there would not have been any methamphetamine to 

distribute. The evidence demonstrated that she knowingly and 

voluntarily participated in the conspiracy. Once Moe sold the 

methamphetamine to Barkdoll and Gillis, Barkdoll was responsible 

for the actual distribution of the methamphetamine in the Riverton 

area. 

Given the overwhelming evidence, a rational jury could not 

have convicted on the lesser charge and acquitted appellants on 

the greater offense charged. We must conclude that the trial 

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court's refusal to instruct on a lesser included offense was not 

an abuse of discretion. 

Outrageous Conduct 

Appellants Aeschbacher and Barkdoll challenge their 

conspiracy convictions asserting that the government's conduct as 

a whole was outrageous and violated fundamental notions of due 

process. They claim that they were minor pawns in a government 

created scheme and that there was no predisposition on their parts 

to commit the offenses. They further challenge the trial court's 

failure to give an outrageous conduct instruction. 

When a claim of outrageous conduct is asserted, we review the 

conduct against notions of "fundamental fairness" and "the 

universal sense of justice" considering the entire record before 

us. United States v. Spivey, 508 F.2d 146, 151 (10th Cir.) 

(quoting United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432). 

Having reviewed the record, the government's conduct was not 

so outrageous as to violate fundamental fairness or the universal 

sense of justice. The government paid an informant to infiltrate 

the methamphetamine conspiracy already in operation in the 

Gillette area. Appellants voluntarily joined and knowingly 

participated in the conspiracy without any contact by the 

government or its agents until after the conspiracy had ended. 

Having found no evidence of outrageous conduct on the part of the 

government, we must further conclude that the trial court's denial 

of a related instruction was not an abuse of discretion. 

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Co-conspirator Statements 

Appellants Aeschbacher and Barkdoll challenge the sufficiency 

of the evidence presented before the trial court in determining 

the admissibility of the co-conspirators' statements, claiming 

that the verbal proffer made by the government was insufficient. 

We have given considerable discretion to the trial court in 

determining the admissibility of co-conspirator statements, 

United States v. Mobile Materials, Inc., 881 F.2d 866, 869 (10th 

Cir.) (citing United States v. Hernandez, 829 F.2d 988, 994 (10th 

Cir.)), and in the procedures used to make that determination. 

See United States v. Austin, 786 F.2d 986, 990 (10th Cir.). We 

will not reverse the trial court's determination absent an abuse 

of discretion. United States v. Wolf, 839 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir.). 

There was not such an abuse in this instance. By verbal 

proffer, the government presented to the trial court during a 

pretrial hearing what it expected the evidence would show at 

trial. This included, among other things, testimony from 

witnesses, traffic tickets, hotel receipts, and the hearsay 

statements themselves. See Mobile Materials, 881 F.2d at 869 

(citing Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 181) (trial 

court may consider independent evidence as well as the actual 

hearsay statements in determining the admissibility of the statements). The trial court concluded that the government's proffer 

and the evidence presented demonstrated that a conspiracy existed; 

that the three appellants were members of that conspiracy; and 

that the statements were made during the course and in furtherance 

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of the conspiracy. At the conclusion of the trial, it was 

apparent that the proffered statements made by the government 

conformed with the evidence subsequently presented. We cannot say 

that the trial court abused its discretion in accepting the 

proffered statements. See Hernandez, 829 F.2d at 994 (court may 

be able to determine the admissibility of the hearsay statements 

on the basis of verbal proffers, on the opening statement, or on 

what it knows of the evidence based upon pretrial or suppression 

hearings). 

Aeschbacher's New Evidence 

Appellant Aeschbacher challenges the trial court's denial of 

her motion for a new trial or a judgment of acquittal based upon 

newly discovered evidence. In considering such motions, the trial 

court must determine whether the new evidence is "material to the 

issues involved" and "must be such that it would probably produce 

an acquittal." United States v. Sutton, 767 F.2d 726, 728 (10th 

Cir.). The evidence must be more than impeaching or cumulative. 

We will not disturb the decision of the trial court absent an 

abuse of discretion. 

In support of her motions, appellant Aeschbacher presented 

"newly discovered evidence" consisting of letters written by her 

husband, William Aeschbacher. In ruling upon the motions, the 

trial court found that the letters were simply an acknowledgment 

of his guilt and that the testimony of William Aeschbacher at 

trial was not inconsistent with the letters. It further found 

Ranger's testimony implicating Diane Aeschbacher was the most 

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credible, and that the jury properly arrived at that conclusion in 

finding her guilty. Upon review of the letters, we agree with the 

trial court and conclude that the letters are insufficient to 

provide a basis for an acquittal. 

Rule 404(b) Evidence 

Appellant Gillis challenges the admission of evidence 

concerning a meeting he had with Moe and Hanneman where they 

discussed the possibility of Gillis supplying the methamphetamine. 

On appeal, he claims that the admission of this evidence violated 

Fed. R. Evid. 404(b); however, at trial, he objected on the 

grounds of hearsay. We have held that "[t]he specific ground for 

reversal of an evidentiary ruling on appeal must also be the same 

as that raised at trial." United States v. Taylor, 800 F.2d 1012, 

1017 (10th Cir.) (citing Fortier v. Dona Anna Plaza Partners, 747 

F.2d 1324, 1331 (10th Cir.)). Absent a proper and timely 

objection, we will reverse only for plain error. United States v. 

Lonedog, 929 F.2d 568, 570 (10th Cir.). In order to determine 

whether the trial court has committed plain error, we must review 

the entire record. United States v. Culpepper, 834 F.2d 879, 883 

(10th Cir.). 

Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) governs the admissibility of other 

crimes evidence. In Culpepper, we stated that "evidence of other 

crimes or acts relevant to any issue at trial may be admitted 

unless this evidence tends to prove only criminal disposition." 

Id. at 883 (citing United States v. DeLuna, 763 F.2d 897, 912 (8th 

Cir.)). In determining the admissibility of this evidence, the 

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trial court must weigh its probative value against its prejudicial 

effect. Fed. R. Evid. 403. 

Upon a review of the record, we cannot say the admission of 

appellant's prior drug dealings constituted plain error. The 

evidence concerning his prior drug dealings with the coconspirators was inextricably intertwined with the methamphetamine 

conspiracy charged in the Indictment. It was relevant to show why 

Moe contacted Gillis for help in the operation of the conspiracy 

and to show Gillis' knowledge of Moe's activities in dealing in 

methamphetamine. It was not admitted to show a general criminal 

disposition on the part of Gillis. Its probative value outweighed 

any prejudicial effect. Further, there was overwhelming evidence 

of Gillis' involvement in the conspiracy; therefore, the admission 

of the evidence did not rise to the level of plain error. 

Gillis' Sentence 

Appellant Gillis also challenges the trial court's 

determination that his role was minor rather than minimal. "A 

finding that a defendant is or is not a minor participant is a 

finding of fact," United States v. Arredondo-Santos, 911 F.2d 424, 

425 (10th Cir.); therefore, we review the trial court's 

determination under the clearly erroneous standard. United States 

v. Alvarez, 914 F.2d 213 (10th Cir.). 

At the sentencing hearing, Gillis requested a downward 

departure for his role in the conspiracy as a "minimal 

participant" because he was not involved in the acquisition of the 

methamphetamine from California. Although the trial court 

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conceded that Gillis did not join the conspiracy until later, it 

found that he was the "brains" behind the conspiracy and acted as 

the advisor to the other members of the conspiracy. Balancing 

those facts, the trial court awarded Gillis a two level downward 

departure for having a "minor" role in the conspiracy. 

Gillis claims that his role was minimal because he was not 

involved in the acquisition of the methamphetamine from California 

and his role was merely to determine whether Baumgardner was a 

confidential informant. While it is true that Gillis did not join 

the conspiracy until Moe returned from California, his role was 

much more than determining whether Baumgardner was a confidential 

informant. Once Gillis joined the conspiracy, the whole focus of 

the conspiracy shifted. Gillis introduced Moe to Barkdoll, who 

ultimately identified Baumgardner as a confidential informant. 

Gillis was also responsible for introducing firearms into the 

operation. Once Baumgardner was identified, Gillis participated 

in devising a new distribution plan for the methamphetamine. 

Given these facts, we cannot say that the trial court erred in 

awarding a two level downward departure for Gillis' role as a 

minor participant rather than the four level downward departure he 

requested. 

The judgments of the United States District Court for the 

District of Wyoming against appellants and the sentences are 

AFFIRMED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

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Entered for the Court 

Oliver Seth 

Circuit Judge 

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