Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00132/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00132-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Fresno County Jail
Defendant
LaTonia Jones
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LATONIA JONES,

Plaintiff,

v.

FRESNO COUNTY JAIL,

Defendant.

CASE No. 1:16-cv-00132-MJS (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH 

LEAVE TO AMEND

(ECF NO. 1)

AMENDED COMPLAINT DUE WITHIN 

THIRTY (30) DAYS

Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action 

brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF Nos. 1 & 4.) She has consented to 

Magistrate Judge jurisdiction. (ECF No. 5.) No other parties have appeared in the action.

Plaintiff’s complaint is before the Court for screening.

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has 

raised claims that are legally “frivolous, malicious,” or that fail to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 

such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion 

thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court 

Case 1:16-cv-00132-MJS Document 6 Filed 02/22/16 Page 1 of 7
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determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may 

be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

II. PLEADING STANDARD

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” 

Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for 

vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 

(1989).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and 

(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state 

law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 

1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere 

possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are 

accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78.

III. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff is housed at the Fresno County Jail. Her custodial status is unclear –

Plaintiff does not specify whether she is being held pre-trial or already has been 

convicted. She names the Fresno County Jail as Defendant. Her allegations may be 

summarized essentially as follows.

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There is mildew, black mold, and rust in the shower and living area of the jail.

Plaintiff alleges that these conditions violate her Eighth Amendment right to be 

free from cruel and unusual punishment. She seeks compensatory damages and to 

have females moved to a different jail facility.

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Conditions of Confinement

Although Plaintiff alleges claims for violation of the Eighth Amendment, it is 

unclear whether she was a convicted prisoner or a pretrial detainee at the time of the 

events in question. The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth 

Amendment protects convicted prisoners from inhumane conditions of confinement. 

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979); 

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989). Conditions of confinement claims 

brought by pretrial detainees are analyzed under the Due Process Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment rather than under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of 

the Eighth Amendment. Oregon Advocacy Center v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101, 1120 (9th Cir. 

2003). However, the Eighth Amendment’s deliberate indifference standard also sets the 

minimum standard of care due pretrial detainees. Id. at 1120. 

Under the Eighth Amendment, a conditions of confinement claim has both an 

objective and a subjective component. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. “First, the 

deprivation alleged must be . . . sufficiently serious,” and must “result in the denial of the 

minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Id. “[E]xtreme deprivations are required 

to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9. Second, the 

prison official must have acted with “deliberate indifference” to a substantial risk of 

serious harm to the inmate. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. “Mere negligence is not sufficient 

to establish liability.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). Rather, a 

plaintiff must set forth facts to show that a defendant knew of, but disregarded, an 

excessive risk to inmate health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. That is, “the official 

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must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial 

risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id.

There is some question whether, after the decision in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 

135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015), a pre-trial detainee alleging a Fourteenth Amendment conditions 

of confinement claim must specifically allege deliberate indifference. See Hatter v. Dyer, 

No. 2:14-cv-616-AG (GJS), 2015 WL 9613769 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2015) (discussing 

Kingsley and concluding that pre-trial detainees still must allege deliberate indifference). 

Kingsley addressed a Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claim, and held that such 

a claim requires a showing that the force used was “objectively unreasonable,” rather 

than a showing of the officer’s subjective state of mind. Courts thus far have declined to 

extend Kingsley beyond the excessive force context. See, e.g., Hatter, 2015 WL 

9613769 (declining to extent to conditions of confinement claims); Castro v. Cnty. of Los 

Angeles, 797 F.3d 654 (9th Cir. 2015) (declining to extent to failure to protect claims). 

Nevertheless, the effect of Kingsley in this context remains an open question. The Court 

need not resolve the applicable standard at this juncture because Plaintiff’s allegations 

fail under either standard. 

First, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate that the deprivation at 

issue is sufficiently serious. The Ninth Circuit has determined that “subjection of a 

prisoner to lack of sanitation that is severe or prolonged can constitute an infliction of 

pain within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.” Anderson v. Cnty. of Kern, 45 F.3d 

1310, 1314, opinion amended on denial of reh'g, 75 F.3d 448 (9th Cir.1995) (holding an 

inmate must demonstrate that the sanitary limitations imposed on him or her were more 

than temporary). According to Plaintiff, there is mildew, mold, and rust in the showers 

and living areas of the jail. However, Plaintiff fails to allege how, if at all, the presence of 

these conditions have caused her harm or how the deprivation was so severe as to 

constitute a deprivation of minimal life necessities.

Absent such facts, the Court cannot conclude that the conditions were “objectively 

unreasonable” under the Kingsley standard. And, assuming Plaintiff instead must allege 

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deliberate indifference, the Court notes that Plaintiff has failed to name any individual 

Defendants in this action. She therefore has not pled that any particular person knew of, 

but disregarded, a substantial risk to her health or safety caused by the unsanitary 

conditions. Nor has she alleged that the jail acted with such state of mind. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a conditions of confinement claim. 

Plaintiff will be given leave to amend. If she chooses to do so, she must allege sufficient 

facts to show that the unsanitary conditions at the jail are severe or prolonged, and 

objectively unreasonable. Furthermore, given the uncertainty regarding the effect of 

Kingsley on conditions of confinement claims, Plaintiff should show, to the extent she is 

able, that a particular official at the jail – or the jail itself – was deliberately indifferent to 

the risks caused by these conditions.

B. Municipal Liability

The sole Defendant in this action is the Fresno County Jail. 

Municipalities and other local government units are subject to suit under section 

1983. Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Monell 

v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690, (1978)). However, a local 

government unit may only be held liable if it inflicts the injury complained of. Monell, 436 

U.S. at 694; Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1185 (9th Cir. 2002).

Generally, a claim against a local government unit for municipal or county liability 

requires an allegation that “a deliberate policy, custom, or practice . . . was the ‘moving 

force’ behind the constitutional violation . . . suffered.” Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 

477 F.3d 652, 667 (9th Cir. 2007); City of Canton, Ohio, v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 

(1989). Alternatively, and more difficult to prove, municipal liability may be imposed 

where the local government unit’s omission led to the constitutional violation by its 

employee. Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1186. Under this route to municipal liability, the “plaintiff 

must show that the municipality’s deliberate indifference led to its omission and that the 

omission caused the employee to commit the constitutional violation.” Id. Deliberate 

indifference requires a showing “that the municipality was on actual or constructive 

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notice that its omissions would likely result in a constitutional violation.” Id. Municipal 

liability does not attach for acts of negligence by employees of the jail or for isolated

unconstitutional acts by a non policy-making employee. Davis v. City of Ellensburg, 869 

F.2d 1230, 1234-35 (9th Cir.1989). 

Plaintiff has not alleged that the unsanitary conditions at the jail result from a 

deliberate policy, practice or custom. Nor has she alleged that the jail was on actual or 

constructive notice that omission would result in a constitutional violation. Indeed, 

Plaintiff has yet to allege sufficient facts to show that a constitutional violation actually 

resulted. Plaintiff cannot maintain a municipal liability claim in the absence of an 

underlying constitutional violation. Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 

1021 (9th Cir. 2010).

Plaintiff will be given leave to amend.

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff’s complaint does not state a claim. The Court will grant Plaintiff an 

opportunity to file an amended complaint. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th 

Cir. 1987). If Plaintiff chooses to amend, she must demonstrate that the alleged acts 

resulted in a deprivation of her constitutional rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78. Plaintiff 

must set forth “sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” 

Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must also demonstrate 

that each named Defendant personally participated in a deprivation of her rights. Jones 

v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).

Plaintiff should note that although she has been given the opportunity to amend, it 

is not for the purposes of adding new claims. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th 

Cir. 2007). Plaintiff should carefully read this screening order and focus her efforts on 

curing the deficiencies set forth above.

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, 

an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 

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55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once an amended complaint is filed, the original complaint no 

longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an 

original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be 

sufficiently alleged. The amended complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “First 

Amended Complaint,” refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original signed 

under penalty of perjury. Plaintiff's amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a). Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a 

right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations 

omitted).

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a blank civil rights complaint form and a 

copy of his complaint, filed January 28, 2016;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must file a 

first amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in this 

order or a notice of voluntary dismissal; and

4. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint or notice of voluntary dismissal, 

this action will be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to comply with a court 

order and failure to state a claim, and will be subject to the “three strikes” 

provision set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 19, 2016 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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