Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-00081/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-00081-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Del Norte Superior Court
Defendant
George M. Mavris
Defendant
Tyrone Youngs
Plaintiff

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28 No. C 15-0081 RS (PR)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

*E-Filed 5/13/15*

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

TYRONE YOUNGS,

Plaintiff, 

v.

GEORGE M. MAVRIS, and

THE DEL NORTE SUPERIOR COURT,

Defendants. /

No. C 15-0081 RS (PR)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

INTRODUCTION

This federal civil rights action was filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by a pro se state

prisoner. The Court now reviews the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). For the

reasons stated herein, the action is DISMISSED. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner

seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the Court must identify any cognizable claims and

dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id.

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1 The Court assumes Mavris was a public defender. If he was a private attorney,

plaintiff’s claims would be dismissed all the same. Private actors are not liable under section

1983. Gomez, 446 U.S. at 640. 

No. C 15-0081 RS (PR)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

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§ 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica

Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). 

A “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim

to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)

(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Furthermore, a court “is not required to accept legal conclusions

cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from

the facts alleged.” Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754–55 (9th Cir. 1994). 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and 

(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. 

See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 

B. Legal Claims 

Plaintiff alleges that (1) his public defender George Mavris violated his constitutional

rights by misleading him as to benefits of a plea bargain; and (2) the Del Norte Superior

Court violated his constitutional rights by denying him relief on his claim that he was serving

an illegal prison term. He asks for money damages and injunctive relief.

The complaint will be dismissed for the following reasons. First, Mavris, in his role

as a court-appointed attorney, is not liable under section 1983, which requires that the

defendant be a state actor.1

 See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). A

state-appointed defense attorney “does not qualify as a state actor when engaged in his

general representation of a criminal defendant.” Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 321

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28 No. C 15-0081 RS (PR)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

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(1981). Polk County “noted, without deciding, that a public defender may act under color of

state law while performing certain administrative [such as making hiring and firing

decisions], and possibly investigative, functions.” Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 54

(1992) (citing Polk County, 454 U.S. at 325.) Because Mavris was engaged in the general

representation of his client when the plea bargain was entered into and discussed, he was not

a state actor, and therefore he is not liable under § 1983. 

Second, the Del Norte Superior Court is immune from suit under the facts alleged

here. A state judge is absolutely immune from civil liability for damages for acts performed

in his judicial capacity. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553–55 (1967) (applying judicial

immunity to actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Judicial immunity is an immunity from suit

for damages, not just from an ultimate assessment of damages. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472

U.S. 511, 526 (1985). When the state court denied or failed to address his claims, it clearly

was acting in its judicial capacity, and therefore is immune to plaintiff’s suit for damages.

The doctrine of judicial immunity does not bar claims for injunctive relief in § 1983

actions, however. See Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541–42 (1984); Ashelman v. Pope, 

793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc). Injunctive relief “shall not be granted unless

a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Plaintiff’s facts, however, do not meet this standard.

Even if injunctive relief were available to plaintiff, this Court would refrain from

granting it. A section 1983 action is not the correct method to challenge his incarceration. 

If plaintiff seeks release from an unlawful detention, the should file a habeas action (either in

state or federal court), which is the proper method for challenging the legality or duration of

confinement. See Badea v. Cox, 931 F.2d 573, 574 (9th Cir. 1991). A habeas petition form

will be sent to plaintiff.

Plaintiff’s motion to be heard (Docket No. 2) is DENIED as moot. The Clerk shall

terminate Docket No. 2, enter judgment in favor of defendants, and close the file. 

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28 No. C 15-0081 RS (PR)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 13, 2015 

 RICHARD SEEBORG

United States District Judge

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