Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-11-05133/USCOURTS-caDC-11-05133-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Richard G. Convertino
Appellant
Jonathan Tukel
Appellee
United States Department of Justice
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 12, 2012 Decided June 22, 2012 

No. 11-5133 

RICHARD G. CONVERTINO, 

APPELLANT

v. 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

AND JONATHAN TUKEL, 

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:04-cv-00236) 

Stephen M. Kohn argued the cause for the appellant. 

David K. Colapinto entered an appearance. 

Samantha L. Chaifetz, Attorney, United States 

Department of Justice, argued the cause for the appellees. 

Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, Ronald C. Machen 

Jr., United States Attorney, Beth S. Brinkmann, Deputy 

Assistant Attorney General, and Mark B. Stern, Attorney, 

were on brief. R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant United States 

Attorney, entered an appearance. 

Before: HENDERSON, ROGERS and TATEL, Circuit Judges. 

USCA Case #11-5133 Document #1380246 Filed: 06/22/2012 Page 1 of 15
2 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON. 

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Richard 

Convertino (Convertino) appeals the district court’s order 

granting summary judgment to the United States Department 

of Justice (DOJ) and denying Convertino’s cross-motion to 

stay the court’s summary judgment ruling to allow for further 

discovery under Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure (FRCP).1

 As we explain below, we reverse and 

remand the district court’s summary judgment. 

I. 

Six days after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, 

members of the Detroit Joint Terrorism Task Force2

 wanted to 

interview Nabil Al-Marabh, whose name was included on the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) suspected terrorist 

“watch list.” Their investigation took them to a location they 

thought was Al-Marabh’s residence but, instead of AlMarabh, the Task Force found three other men—Ahmed 

Hannan, Farouk Ali-Haimoud and Karim Koubriti—living in 

the apartment “as apparent transients with little or no 

furniture.” Convertino v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 769 F. Supp. 

2d 139, 141 (D.D.C. 2011) (quotation marks omitted).3 A 

 

1

 In 2010, Rule 56(f) became Rule 56(d) of the FRCP. 

Following the parties’ briefs and the district court opinion, we refer 

to former Rule 56(f). 

2

 The Task Force included, inter alia, members of the FBI, the 

U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, the U.S. 

Immigration and Naturalization Service, the U.S. Drug 

Enforcement Administration, the U.S. Internal Revenue Service and 

the U.S. Customs Service. See United States v. Koubriti, 199 F. 

Supp. 2d 656, 659 n.3 (E.D. Mich. 2002). 

3

 The undisputed facts are set forth primarily in the district 

court’s order on appeal. See Convertino, 769 F. Supp. 2d at 141-44. 

USCA Case #11-5133 Document #1380246 Filed: 06/22/2012 Page 2 of 15
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subsequent search revealed false identity documents for all 

three men. The men were arrested and charged with 

possession of false documents in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 1028(a)(4), 1546 and 371. Assistant United States 

Attorney Convertino was named to lead the prosecution. 

While the case began as a fraudulent documents 

prosecution, it quickly escalated into a highly-publicized 

terrorism trial—the first since the September 11 attacks.

Convertino became convinced that Hannan, Ali-Haimoud and 

Koubriti—plus a fourth man, Abdel Ilah El Mardoudi—were 

members of a “sleeper cell” of an international Islamic 

terrorist organization. He filed superseding indictments 

adding El Mardoudi as a codefendant and charging each 

defendant with one count of conspiracy to provide “material 

support or resources” to “terrorists” in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 2339A and 371 and one count of conspiracy to commit 

document fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028(f), 1546 

and 371. In June 2003, after a trial lasting three months, the 

jury convicted three of the four Detroit Sleeper Cell 

defendants of at least one count.4

 

Convertino’s successful prosecution was short-lived. In 

the fall of 2003, the United States Attorney for the Eastern 

District of Michigan removed Convertino from the case 

(while the defendants’ sentencing was pending) for alleged 

ethical violations committed during the prosecution. Soon 

thereafter, the three convicted defendants moved for a new 

trial on the ground that they had been denied due process by 

the prosecution’s withholding of evidence that should have 

 

4

 Koubriti and El Mardoudi were convicted of the two 

conspiracy counts. See Koubriti v. Convertino, 593 F.3d 459, 463 

n.7 (6th Cir. 2010). Hannan was convicted of document fraud only. 

Id. Ali-Haimoud was acquitted of all charges. Id.

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been disclosed under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),5

and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).6

 A 

subsequent court-ordered investigation “disclosed numerous 

additional documents that had not previously been submitted 

or shown to . . . the . . . defendants.” Koubriti, 593 F.3d at 

463. Eventually, in September 2004, the trial court vacated 

the defendants’ convictions and granted a new trial on the 

document fraud counts. See United States v. Koubriti, 336 F. 

Supp. 2d 676 (E.D. Mich. 2004). 

In the meantime, Convertino’s alleged prosecutorial 

misconduct led to his referral to DOJ’s Office of Professional 

Responsibility (OPR), which began an internal investigation 

into whether Convertino knowingly withheld evidence from 

the defense. News of Convertino’s OPR referral eventually 

found its way into the hands of a reporter who, on January 17, 

2004, published a front-page article in the Detroit Free Press

(Free Press) entitled Terror Case Prosecutor is Probed on 

Conduct. David Ashenfelter, Terror Case Prosecutor is 

Probed on Conduct, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Jan. 17, 2004, at 

A1. The article included details of the OPR referral, which 

details it traced to “Department officials” “who spoke on 

condition of anonymity, fearing repercussions.” Id.7 DOJ’s 

Office of Inspector General (OIG) subsequently began an 

investigation into the source of the leaked information. See 

 

5

 In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held that due 

process requires a prosecutor to disclose all evidence “favorable to 

[the] accused” and “material either to guilt or to punishment.” 373 

U.S. at 87. 

6

 In Giglio, the Court held that the prosecution’s Brady 

obligation includes impeachment evidence. 405 U.S. at 154. 

7

 The reporter later confirmed that his source was an unnamed 

DOJ employee. Ashenfelter Decl. at 1, Convertino, No. 07-cv13842 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 26, 2008). 

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Convertino, 769 F. Supp. 2d at 142. Ultimately, however, the 

OIG was unable to pinpoint the leak. Id.8

On February 14, 2004, Convertino brought suit in the 

district court here, alleging that an unidentified DOJ 

employee willfully or intentionally disclosed “confidential 

Privacy Act-protected information” to the reporter. Complaint 

at 33, Convertino, No. 1:04-cv-00236 (D.D.C. Feb. 13, 

2004).9 Discovery commenced in the spring of 2006 and was 

both slow and litigious. On April 30, 2007 and May 2, 2007, 

Convertino obtained subpoenas duces tecum from the United 

States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan 

(Eastern District) and served them on both the Free Press 

reporter and the Free Press. See Convertino, No. 2:07-cv13842, 2007 WL 2782039, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 24, 2007). 

The subpoenas required “[the reporter] to appear for [a] 

deposition concerning the identity of the source(s) for the 

Free Press Article, and to produce any and all related 

documents in his possession or control, and commanded the 

Free Press to designate a corporate representative to do the 

 

8

 The OIG focused its investigation on “approximately [thirty] 

DOJ employees” who, it believed, had access to the confidential 

material referenced in the newspaper article. Convertino, 769 F. 

Supp. 2d at 142 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 

9

 Convertino’s complaint included claims against the Attorney 

General and various individual DOJ employees, alleging violations 

of the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a et seq., the First Amendment, 

the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 704 et seq., and the 

Lloyd-LaFollette Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7211. See generally Complaint, 

Convertino, No. 1:04-cv-00236 (D.D.C. Feb. 14, 2004). In October 

2005, the district court dismissed all of Convertino’s claims except 

his Privacy Act claim against DOJ, see Convertino v. U.S. Dep't of 

Justice, 393 F. Supp. 2d 42 (D.D.C. 2005), which is the only claim 

before us. 

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same.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Neither party complied. 

Convertino then moved in the Eastern District to compel their 

compliance. See Plaintiff’s Mot. to Compel Ashenfelter and 

the Free Press, Convertino, No. 2:07-cv-13842 (E.D. Mich. 

July 6, 2007). 

On August 28, 2008, the Eastern District granted 

Convertino’s motion to compel discovery from the reporter, 

noting that identification of the reporter’s source was vital to 

Convertino’s Privacy Act claim. See Convertino, No. 2:07-cv13842, 2008 WL 4104347, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 28, 2008) 

(“As Convertino’s claim depends on his ability to question 

[the reporter’s] sources, their identifies [sic] are undoubtedly 

relevant . . . .”). The court denied his motion to compel the 

Free Press, however, on the ground that discovery from it 

would be “duplicative.” Id. at *9, 10 (“Convertino’s best 

chance of learning the identity of Ashenfelter’s sources is 

deposing Ashenfelter himself, and [] an additional subpoena 

of the Free Press is unlikely to produce more information than 

that uncovered in a deposition of Ashenfelter . . . .”). Its 

denial was without prejudice and, importantly, it noted that it 

might reconsider its decision if, for example, the reporter was 

unable to comply with the court’s order. Id. at *10 n.17 

(“Contingent upon, for example, evidence of non-compliance 

with this order through impossibility, it may be appropriate to 

revisit the court’s analysis as to the discovery obligations of 

the Free Press.”). 

On December 8, 2008, the reporter attended his 

deposition but, invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege 

against self-incrimination, refused to answer substantive 

questions. Convertino, 769 F. Supp. 2d at 143. Convertino 

promptly applied for a contempt of court citation and 

sanctions in the Eastern District. Id. at 144. That court denied 

the motions but ordered the reporter to appear at a second 

deposition to be held at the federal courthouse in Detroit. Id. 

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There, the reporter once again invoked his Fifth Amendment 

privilege and refused to answer questions regarding his 

source. Id. The Eastern District then conducted an ex parte, in 

camera hearing with the reporter and his counsel, ultimately 

upholding his Fifth Amendment privilege. Id. Convertino 

moved for reconsideration on the “ground[] that [the reporter] 

waived any Fifth Amendment privilege he had as to the 

identity of his source(s).” Supplemental Br. in Supp. of Arg. 

that Ashenfelter Waived Any Fifth Amend. Privilege at 1, 

Convertino, No. 2:07-cv-13842 (E.D. Mich. May 5, 2009). 

The Eastern District denied that motion. Op. and Order 

Denying Plaintiff’s Mot. for Recon., Convertino, No. 2:07-cv13842 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 9, 2010). At the same time, 

Convertino renewed his motion to compel the Free Press, 

Pl.’s Renewed Mot. to Compel Produc. from the Free Press, 

Convertino, No. 2:07-cv-13842 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 29, 2009).10

The latter motion remains pending in the Eastern District, 

where the discovery proceedings are being held in abeyance 

pending this appeal. See Order Holding Proceedings in 

Abeyance, Convertino, No. 2:07-cv-13842 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 

15, 2011). 

As the discovery dispute progressed in the Eastern 

District, Convertino pressed his Privacy Act claim in the 

district court here. After numerous discovery disputes and 

extensions, the district court established July 12, 2010 as the 

deadline for DOJ’s motion for summary judgment. See Order 

at 2, Convertino, No. 1:04-cv-00236 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2009).11

 

10 Convertino also asked DOJ to grant the reporter immunity 

“from any potential prosecution related to the OPR leak or the 

January 17, 2004 article” but received no response. Kohn Aff. at 4. 

11 The district court ordered that “Defendant’s motion for 

summary judgment shall be filed by the latter of July 12, 2010, or 

60 days after the Court’s ruling on Plaintiff’s pending motion to 

compel production of documents.” See Order at 2, Convertino, No. 

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When the July 12, 2010 deadline arrived and Convertino had 

yet to discover the source of the DOJ leak, DOJ moved for 

summary judgment. Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., Convertino, 

No. 1:04-cv-00236 (D.D.C. July 12, 2010). DOJ argued that 

Convertino could not establish a prima facie violation of the 

Privacy Act because, without knowing the source’s identity, 

he could not establish the source’s state of mind. Mem. in 

Supp. of Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 47, Convertino, No. 

1:04-cv-00236 (D.D.C. July 12, 2010) (“To establish the 

requisite intent, Convertino must introduce evidence 

concerning the state of mind of the particular individual(s) 

who actually disclosed the information . . . .”). Convertino 

cross-moved for a stay under Rule 56(f) on the ground that he 

was pursuing discovery to learn the source’s identity from the 

Free Press in the Eastern District. Mot. for Stay to Depose 

Key Witnesses, Convertino, No. 1:04-cv-00236 (D.D.C. Oct. 

18, 2010). He stated that he “fully intends to appeal the 

Eastern District[’s] [] ruling on the 5th Amendment issue” in 

the event his motion to compel the Free Press was finally 

denied. Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Stay at 4, Convertino, 

No. 1:04-cv-00236 (D.D.C. Oct. 18, 2010). 

On March 24, 2011, the district court granted summary 

judgment to DOJ and denied Convertino’s Rule 56(f) motion 

to stay. Convertino, 769 F. Supp. 2d at 156. The court 

concluded that, although Convertino’s motion to compel the 

Free Press “is still pending in the Eastern District,” a stay 

“would likely be futile” as Convertino had been “wholly 

unsuccessful” in identifying the reporter’s source for “several 

years.” Id. at 155-56. The court was “unwilling to prolong this 

litigation further” on “Convertino’s speculative hope that 

 

1:04-cv-00236 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2009). Three days later, the court 

denied Convertino’s motion to compel production. See Order, 

Convertino, No. 1:04-cv-00236 (D.D.C. Dec. 10, 2009). 

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things will suddenly go his way in Michigan.” Id. at 156. The 

court then assured Convertino that, “if the Eastern District . . . 

compels discovery and Convertino is in fact able to obtain the 

information he seeks, he is free to move for reconsideration in 

light of newly discovered evidence.” Id. 

Convertino timely appealed. 

II. 

It is undisputed that Convertino currently lacks the 

evidence necessary to survive summary judgment on his 

Privacy Act claim. “To state a claim for relief [under the 

Privacy Act], a plaintiff must establish that (1) the agency 

violated a provision of the [] Act, (2) the violation was 

intentional or willful, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4), and (3) the 

violation had an adverse effect on the plaintiff, 5 U.S.C. 

§ 552a(g)(1)(D).” Paige v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 665 

F.3d 1355, 1358-1359 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Because Convertino does not know the 

identity of the individual(s) who disclosed information 

regarding the OPR referral, he cannot show that the disclosure 

was “intentional or willful.” See Maydak v. United States, 630 

F.3d 166, 169 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (to recover on Privacy Act 

claim plaintiff must “show ‘that the agency acted in a manner 

which was intentional or willful’ ” (quoting 5 U.S.C. 

§ 552a(g)(4))). Sifting through the multiple issues in 

Convertino’s pursuit of his claims, we decide today only 

whether the district court erred in denying Convertino’s Rule 

56(f) motion to stay.12 

 

12 Rule 56(f) provides: 

If a party opposing the motion shows by affidavit that, for 

specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify 

its opposition, the court may: 

 (1) deny the motion; 

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 “[W]e review the denial of a Rule 56(f) motion for abuse 

of discretion . . . .” Chappell-Johnson v. Powell, 440 F.3d 

484, 487 (D.C. Cir. 2006). While the district court enjoys 

“broad discretion in structuring discovery,” Edmond v. U.S. 

Postal Serv. Gen. Counsel, 949 F.2d 415, 425 (D.C. Cir. 

1991), summary judgment is premature unless all parties have 

“had a full opportunity to conduct discovery.” Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986). A Rule 56(f) 

motion requesting time for additional discovery should be 

granted “almost as a matter of course unless the non-moving 

party has not diligently pursued discovery of the evidence.” 

Berkeley v. Home Ins. Co., 68 F.3d 1409, 1414 (D.C. Cir. 

1995); see also Resolution Trust Corp. v. N. Bridge Assocs., 

22 F.3d 1198, 1203 (1st Cir. 1994) (“Consistent with the 

salutary purposes underlying Rule 56(f), district courts should 

construe motions that invoke the rule generously, holding 

parties to the rule’s spirit rather than its letter.”). 

To obtain Rule 56(f) relief, the movant must submit an 

affidavit which “state[s] with sufficient particularity . . . why 

[additional] discovery [is] necessary.” Ikossi v. Dep’t. of 

Navy, 516 F.3d 1037, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (internal 

quotation marks, citation omitted). The affidavit must satisfy 

three criteria. First, it must outline the particular facts he 

intends to discover and describe why those facts are necessary 

to the litigation. Byrd v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 174 F.3d 

239, 248 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“Byrd [must] show what facts he 

intended to discover that would create a triable issue . . . .”). 

Second, it must explain “why [he] could not produce [the 

 

(2) order a continuance to enable affidavits to be 

obtained, depositions to be taken, or other discovery to be 

undertaken; or 

 (3) issue any other just order. 

FED. R. CIV. P. 56(f) (2009). 

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facts] in opposition to the motion [for summary judgment].” 

Carpenter v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 174 F.3d 231, 237 

(D.C. Cir. 1999); see also Berkeley, 68 F.3d at 1414 

(“Notwithstanding the usual generous approach toward 

granting Rule 56(f) motions, the rule is not properly invoked 

to relieve counsel’s lack of diligence.”); Wichita Falls Office 

Assocs. v. Banc One Corp., 978 F.2d 915, 919 (5th Cir. 1992) 

(“[T]he trial court need not aid [a party] who ha[s] occasioned 

[its] own predicament through sloth.”). Third, it must show 

the information is in fact discoverable. Messina v. Krakower, 

439 F.3d 755, 762 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“We will not find an 

abuse of discretion where the requesting party has offered 

only a conclusory assertion without any supporting facts to 

justify the proposition that the discovery sought will produce 

the evidence required.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Convertino easily satisfied the first two Rule 56(f) 

criteria. In opposition to DOJ’s summary judgment motion, 

Convertino submitted the affidavit of his counsel, who 

outlined the particular facts Convertino hoped to discover and 

why those facts were necessary to his claim. See Kohn Aff. at 

2, Convertino, No. 1:04-cv-00236 (D.D.C. Oct. 18, 2010) 

(Kohn Affidavit) (“[K]knowledge of the identity of Mr. 

Ashenfelter’s source for the Article is essential to every 

element of Mr. Convertino’s Privacy Act claim against 

Defendant DOJ.”). Convertino’s counsel also described why 

Convertino “could not produce [the facts] in opposition to the 

[DOJ’s] motion [for summary judgment],” Carpenter, 174 

F.3d at 237, to wit: although the reporter knew the identity of 

his source, the Eastern District had sustained the reporter’s 

Fifth Amendment assertion, requiring Convertino to again 

seek discovery from the Free Press. See Kohn Affidavit at 4-

5. Convertino’s counsel also set forth Convertino’s extensive 

efforts to obtain the identity of the DOJ leaker. See id. In fact, 

the district court here described his efforts in the Eastern 

District as “monumental.” Convertino, 769 F. Supp. 2d at 

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144. Convertino’s failure to discover the source’s identity, 

then, was plainly not the product of a “lack of diligence,”

Berkeley, 68 F.3d at 1414, or “sloth,” Wichita Falls, 978 F.2d 

at 919. 

The remaining issue is whether the information can in 

fact be obtained through additional discovery. See Messina, 

439 F.3d at 762. DOJ argues that further discovery is simply a 

waste of time. Appellee’s Br. 20-24. The reporter has thus far 

successfully maintained his Fifth Amendment privilege and 

the Free Press has consistently stated that the reporter is the 

“only person on the newspaper’s staff with knowledge 

regarding the article’s confidential sources.” Id. at 2. Thus, in 

DOJ’s view, Convertino has offered no more than a 

“ ‘speculative hope’ that further discovery . . . would be likely 

to produce a triable issue of fact.” Id. at 18; see Carney v. U.S. 

Dep’t of Justice, 19 F.3d 807, 813 (2d Cir. 1994) (upholding 

Rule 56(f) denial because pursuit of discovery was “grounded 

in mere speculation”). 

Convertino counters that he has alleged more than 

enough facts to show that the reporter and/or the Free Press 

has the information he needs and that he can obtain that 

information through discovery. Appellant’s Br. 24-26. In 

particular, because his ability to obtain the information from 

the reporter is—for now—foreclosed, he believes the Eastern 

District may revisit—and grant—his pending motion to 

compel discovery from the Free Press. Appellant’s Br. 17. 

And if the Eastern District denies that motion, Convertino 

plans to appeal the Eastern District’s ruling upholding the 

reporter’s Fifth Amendment claim. Kohn Affidavit at 5 

(“Should the Eastern District deny the Motion to Compel the 

Detroit Free Press, . . . Convertino will appeal the Eastern 

District’s decision to sustain Mr. Ashenfelter’s claim of Fifth 

Amendment privilege.”). 

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We note, first, that the district court’s decision is built, at 

least in part, on a faulty premise. In granting summary 

judgment, the court suggested that Rule 60(b) provides 

Convertino with an “escape valve” in the event he eventually 

discovers the source’s identity through Eastern District 

discovery. See Convertino, 769 F. Supp. 2d at 156 (“[A]n 

escape valve is still available to Convertino even after this 

Opinion and the Order memorializing its reasoning. After all, 

if the Eastern District . . . compels discovery and Convertino 

is in fact able to obtain the information he seeks, he is free to 

move for reconsideration in light of newly discovered 

evidence.”). The court apparently (and mistakenly) assumed 

that Convertino could maintain the ancillary discovery 

proceedings in the Eastern District even after the Privacy Act 

litigation ended here. As we explained in In re City of El 

Paso, 887 F.2d 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1989), however, if there is 

“no pending trial in which [the requested] discovery can be 

used,” the “availability of discovery subpoenas” becomes a 

“moot [question].” 887 F.2d at 1106; see also Green v. 

Nevers, 196 F.3d 627, 632 (6th Cir. 1999) (pending discovery 

motions mooted by disposition of underlying cause of action). 

Even DOJ acknowledged this error at oral argument. See Oral 

Argument Recording at 49:40, Convertino, No. 11-5133, 

(D.C. Cir. Mar. 12, 2012) (district court’s suggestion that 

Eastern District discovery can continue after court’s grant of 

summary judgment here “is clearly wrong”). 

Moreover, we believe that Convertino submitted ample 

evidence to suggest that additional discovery could reveal the 

source’s identity. First, the Eastern District may decide to 

compel discovery from the Free Press as presaged in its order 

denying Convertino’s initial motion to compel the Free Press. 

See Convertino, 2008 WL 4104347, at *10 n.17. Referencing 

the public record in the Eastern District’s discovery 

proceeding, during which the reporter produced a privilege 

log listing 108 documents, Convertino also produced evidence 

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suggesting at least one other individual at the Free Press 

knows the identity of the reporter’s source. See Mem. in 

Supp. of Renewed Mot. to Compel Produc. at 2-3, 

Convertino, No. 2:07-cv-13842 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 29, 2009). It 

is reasonably likely that a Free Press “editor” was also privy 

to at least some of these documents in view of the Free 

Press’s assertion that it permits a reporter to publish an 

anonymously-sourced article only if the article is approved by 

“the highest-ranking editor available” and the fact that the 

documents were created within the scope of the reporter’s 

employment with the Free Press. Id. at 4. At the very least, a 

deposition or document disclosure from the Free Press may 

produce information leading to the source’s identity. While its 

reporter invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination, the Free Press—as a corporation—enjoys no 

Fifth Amendment privilege. See United States v. White, 322 

U.S. 694, 698 (1944) (“The constitutional privilege against 

self-incrimination is essentially a personal one, applying only 

to natural individuals.”); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 576 

F.2d 703, 705 (6th Cir. 1978) (“Since the privilege against 

self-incrimination is a purely personal one, it cannot be 

utilized by or on behalf of any organization, such as a 

corporation.”). Finally, Convertino can appeal the Eastern 

District’s Fifth Amendment ruling to the Sixth Circuit once a 

final order is entered.13 

Considering the “generous approach” the district court 

should take in deciding a Rule 56(f) motion, Berkeley, 68 

F.3d at 1414, the district court’s mistaken view that 

Convertino could continue to seek discovery in the Eastern 

 

13 We also note that the discovery delays in Convertino’s pursuit 

of his Privacy Act claim have not occurred because of his 

action/inaction. See Resolution Trust, 22 F.3d at 1208-09 (district 

court abused discretion in denying Rule 56(f) motion when most of 

delay attributable to opposing party). 

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District notwithstanding the termination of Convertino’s 

Privacy Act litigation and the “monumental” efforts 

Convertino has taken to discover the needed information, 

Convertino, 769 F. Supp. 2d at 144, we believe the district 

court committed an abuse of discretion in denying 

Convertino’s Rule 56(f) motion. Accordingly, we reverse the 

district court’s judgment and remand the case for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

 So ordered. 

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