Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-02-01185/USCOURTS-caDC-02-01185-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Environmental Protection Agency
Respondent
Utility Air Regulatory Group
Petitioner

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notify

the Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made

before the bound volumes go to press.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 15, 2003 Decided April 9, 2004

No. 02-1181

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA,

PETITIONER

v.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

RESPONDENT

STATE OF NEW YORK, ET AL.,

INTERVENORS

Consolidated with

02-1185, 02-1188, 02-1193, 02-1200, 02-1204, 02-1205

On Petitions for Review of an Order of the

Environmental Protection Agency

Mary E. Welsh, Assistant Attorney General, Illinois Attorney General’s Office, argued the cause for petitioners State of

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

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Illinois and West Virginia. With her on the briefs were Lisa

Madigan, Attorney General, Gary S. Feinerman, Solicitor

General, and Thomas H. Zerbe, Senior Counsel, West Virginia Attorney General’s Office.

Norman W. Fichthorn argued the cause for petitioners

Utility Air Regulatory Group, et al. on Common Issues.

With him on the briefs were David M. Flannery, Gale R.

Lea, Kathy G. Beckett, Mel S. Schulze, Steven G. McKinney,

C. Grady Moore, III, Philip S. Gidiere, III, Daniel S. Reinhardt, Margaret C. Campbell, and Gary R. Sheehan, Jr.

Andrea B. Field entered an appearance.

C. Grady Moore, III, argued the cause for petitioners

Alabama Power Company, et al. on State–Specific Issues

With him on the briefs were Steven G. McKinney, P. Stephen

Gidiere, III, Daniel S. Reinhardt, Margaret Claiborne

Campbell, Gary R. Sheehan, Jr., David M. Flannery, Gale R.

Lea, and Kathy G. Beckett.

Norman L. Rave, Jr., Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief

were Howard J. Hoffman and Dwight C. Alpern, Attorneys,

Environmental Protection Agency.

William L. Pardee, Assistant Attorney General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts Attorney General’s Office, argued

the cause for intervenors States of Massachusetts, et al.

With him on the brief were Thomas F. Reilly, Attorney

General, Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General, Connecticut

Attorney General’s Office, Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General,

New York State Attorney General’s Office, J. Jared Snyder,

Assistant Attorney General, G. Steven Rowe, Attorney General, Maine Attorney General’s Office, Gerald D. Reid, Assistant Attorney General, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General, Maryland Attorney General’s Office, Kathy M. Kinsey,

Assistant Attorney General, Peter C. Harvey, Attorney General, New Jersey Attorney General’s Office, Howard Deduldig, Deputy Attorney General, Patrick C. Lynch, Attorney

General, Rhode Island Attorney General’s Office, Tricia JeUSCA Case #02-1185 Document #815078 Filed: 04/09/2004 Page 2 of 17
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dele, Special Assistant Attorney General, Peter W. Heed,

Attorney General, New Hampshire Attorney General’s Office,

Maureen D. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Kristen Campfield, William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, Vermont Attorney General’s Office, Eric Titrud, Assistant Attorney General, and Kevin Leske, Special Assistant Attorney

General. John M. Looney, Jr., Assistant Attorney General,

Connecticut Attorney General’s Office, entered an appearance.

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and SENTELLE and ROGERS,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.

SENTELLE, Circuit Judge: This is a petition for review of

the Environmental Protection Agency’s (‘‘EPA’’ or ‘‘Agency’’)

response to this Court’s remands in Appalachian Power Co.

v. EPA, 249 F.3d 1032 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (‘‘Appalachian I’’),

and Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 251 F.3d 1026 (D.C. Cir.

2001) (‘‘Appalachian II’’). In those cases, we remanded the

EPA’s electric generating unit (‘‘EGU’’) growth-factor determinations, which are used to develop Nitrogen Oxide (‘‘NOx’’)

emission limits for regulated states and EGUs. Petitioners—

two states and several business and energy policy entities—

raise multiple challenges to the Agency’s Order on remand.

Several states intervene in support of the EPA.

We hold that the EPA satisfied its obligation on remand to

engage in reasoned decisionmaking and explain its choice of

methodology. The remaining claims are not properly before

this Court, as they were not raised at the time of the

rulemaking or in the initial proceedings, and the EPA did not

reopen these issues on remand. For these reasons, we deny

the petitions.

I. Background

A. Regulatory Background

The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (1994) (‘‘CAA’’),

requires the EPA to identify air pollutants that endanger the

public health, and to formulate National Ambient Air Quality

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Standards (‘‘NAAQS’’) that specify the maximum permissible

concentrations of those pollutants in the ambient air. Once

the EPA has established NAAQS, each state must adopt a

‘‘state implementation plan’’ (‘‘SIP’’) ‘‘providing for the implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of the NAAQS.’’

Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 669 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Pursuant to the statute, the EPA has promulgated NAAQS for

ozone, which is linked to multiple adverse health effects. See

40 C.F.R. pt. 50 (2003). Ozone, itself, is not emitted directly

into the air; rather, it is formed from chemical reactions

between NOx and volatile organic compounds in the presence

of sunlight. NOx is, therefore, a ‘‘precursor’’ of ozone. NOx

is emitted primarily from fossil fuel combustion sources,

including motor vehicles and power plants. Owing to the

ability of NOx to move through the atmosphere, emissions of

NOx in one area can result in ozone non-attainment in a

distant area. Evidence in the record demonstrates that

states in the eastern United States have difficulty attaining

ozone standards because of ozone, or ozone precursor, emissions in upwind states. 64 Fed. Reg. 28,253 (May 25, 1999).

The two rules at issue in this petition deal with NOx exhaust

limitations on upwind states and EGUs within their borders.

The first rule was based on the work of the Ozone Transport Assessment Group (‘‘OTAG’’). The OTAG was a national work group comprising 37 states, along with representatives of EPA, industry, and environmental groups, formed ‘‘to

study and devise solutions to the interstate ozone transport

problem.’’ Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d at 672; see also 62

Fed. Reg. 60,318 at 60,319. Based on OTAG’s findings, EPA

determined that NOx emissions from 23 jurisdictions were

‘‘contribut[ing] significantly’’ to non-attainment in downwind states in violation of the CAA. 42 U.S.C.

§ 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(I). Accordingly, in October 1998, the EPA

issued the NOx State Implementation Plans Call, which required 22 states and the District of Columbia to revise their

SIPs to impose controls on NOx emissions. 63 Fed Reg.

57,356 (Oct. 27, 1998) (‘‘NOx SIP Call’’). Under the NOx SIP

Call, each upwind state must limit its summertime NOx

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emissions to a statewide emissions ‘‘budget.’’ ‘‘The budgets

represent the amount of allowable NOx emissions remaining

after a covered state prohibits the NOx amount contributing

significantly to downwind non-attainment.’’ Michigan v.

EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 686 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Specifically, the

NOx state budgets represent the EPA’s projection for NOx

emissions in 2007 for each state if highly cost-effective controls were implemented. ‘‘Highly cost-effective’’ is defined as

those controls capable of removing NOx at a cost of $2,000 or

less per ton. See Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 251 F.3d

1026, 1030 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

The EPA adopted the second rule in response to petitions

from eight states requesting a finding, pursuant to CAA

section 126(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7426(b), that stationary sources in

upwind states were contributing to ozone non-attainment in

the petitioning states in violation of the CAA. 42 U.S.C.

§ 7410(a)(2)(D). Each petitioning state further sought direct

federal regulation of stationary sources in upwind states.

Because the Section 126 petitions raised many of the same

issues as the NOx SIP Call, the EPA coordinated its response

to the section 126 petitions with the NOx SIP Call rulemaking. Based on the analysis underlying the NOx SIP Call, the

EPA determined that sources in all or parts of 12 states

contributed to non-attainment in the petitioning states;

therefore, the Agency established emission limits for major

NOx sources in those states. 65 Fed. Reg. 2674 (Jan. 18,

2000) (‘‘Section 126 Rule’’). As with the NOx SIP call, the

EPA considered both NOx emissions and the cost of controlling them in determining which sources contributed significantly to downwind ozone non-attainment. The EPA also

established a ‘‘cap and trade’’ program for the Section 126

Rule, which allows sources with emissions that exceed their

budget to purchase allowances from other facilities.

NOx emissions budgets for both the Section 126 Rule and

the NOx SIP Call are calculated for the year 2007, although

states and EGUs must begin meeting their budgets on May

31, 2004. See 67 Fed. Reg. 21,522–21,525 (April 30, 2002).

Additionally, both rules rely on the same underlying determinations. In setting the NOx budgets, the EPA divided each

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state’s NOx emissions according to five source types or

‘‘sectors’’: EGUs, non-EGU stationary sources (such as industrial boilers), area sources (smaller stationary sources),

highway mobile sources, and nonroad mobile sources. The

EPA calculated budget allocations for each sector. See Appalachian II, 251 F.3d at 1030. At issue in this petition is the

EPA’s method for determining the EGU budgets.

To calculate the EGU budgets, the EPA started with a

baseline utilization measured as heat input, in million British

thermal units (‘‘mmBtu’’), from fossil fuels for each EGU’s

actual heat input from 1995 or 1996, whichever was higher.

To that baseline, the EPA added a heat input growth factor.

To determine the growth factor, the EPA used the Integrated

Planning Model (‘‘IPM’’). Several assumptions went into the

IPM, one of the most critical of which was projected electricity demand for the states. The EPA utilized inputs derived

from the model for 2001–2010. The EPA then applied the

projected heat input growth for the 2001–2010 period to the

1995 or 1996 baseline to determine projected heat inputs for

the year 2007. Under the NOx SIP Call, each state can

allocate its NOx allowances to individual sources as it deems

appropriate. Under the Section 126 Rule, EPA distributed

the allowances to specific EGUs based on historical heat input

levels.

B. This Court’s Remands

We have previously considered petitions for review of both

the NOx SIP Call and the Section 126 Rule. In both cases

we remanded the rules and instructed the EPA to ‘‘fulfill its

obligation to engage in reasoned decisionmaking on how to

set EGU growth factors and explain why results that appear

arbitrary on their face are, in fact, reasonable determinations.’’ Appalachian I, 249 F.3d at 1055; Appalachian II,

251 F.3d at 1035. This decision was based, at least in part,

on the fact that in two states ‘‘actual utilization in 1998

already exceeded the EPA’s projected level for 2007.’’ Appalachian I, 249 F.3d at 1053. Additionally, the EPA’s implied

prediction of ‘‘negative growth in electricity generation over

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the course of a decade appear[ed] arbitrary,’’ as it was left

completely unexplained. Id. ‘‘While courts routinely defer

to agency modeling of complex phenomena, model assumptions must have a ‘rational relationship’ to the real world.’’

Id. (citing Chemical Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 28 F.3d 1259, 1265

(D.C. Cir. 1994)). In sum, although we noted that EPA’s

choice may have been reasonable, its failure to explain why it

made that choice was error, particularly in the face of contrary real-world data.

C. EPA’s Response on Remand

EPA published its response to this Court’s remands in the

Federal Register on May 1, 2002. 67 Fed. Reg. 21,868

(‘‘Remand Response’’). There, the EPA explained that it

decided to retain the previously determined growth rates and

provide a fuller explanation. The EPA first pointed out that

the 2001–2010 modeled period utilized a consistent set of

assumptions. While many commenters suggested using predicted annual growth rates in energy demand from 1995 or

1996 to 2007, the agency was ‘‘not aware of any projected

heat input growth rates for that period for each State TTT

that were developed using a consistent set of assumptions.’’

Id. at 21,875. According to the EPA, this Court had already

held that the EPA’s decision to rely upon the IPM instead of

inconsistent projections offered by individual states was not

arbitrary and capricious. Appalachian I, 249 F.3d at 1052–

53. The EPA also noted that the two time periods at issue

overlap substantially and run a similar length of time. 67

Fed. Reg. 21,875. Furthermore, the EPA explained that the

increased costs in man-hours and dollars associated with

adding extra years to the model would require ‘‘simplifying

other assumptions within the model,’’ thus decreasing its

accuracy. Id. at 21,876. In addition, by utilizing the years

2001–2010, the IPM results could be used in a variety of EPA

programs, including implementation of the recently revised

NAAQS for ozone. Id. at 21,875.

The EPA also addressed this Court’s concerns regarding

the difference between EPA’s predictions and actual heat

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input levels at the time of the earlier Appalachian cases.

Using data for the two years following those decisions, the

EPA points out that heat input in the two states cited as

inconsistent with EPA’s predictions—Michigan and West Virginia—had significantly dropped. Id. at 21,882–90. The

Remand Response explained that most of the regulated

states’ actual heat input values are now consistent with EPA’s

predictions, and none are so far above EPA’s predictions as to

indicate that its assumptions are incorrect. The Agency also

conducted a historical analysis of heat input, which showed

that it is quite variable and subject to both up and down

swings. Thus, heat input can decline over multi-year periods.

Id. at 21,884–85.

Following EPA’s publication of its Remand Response, two

states and several business entities petitioned this Court for

review. They claim, inter alia, that the EPA’s projections

remain arbitrary, that EPA’s use of the 2001–2010 modeling

years is unsupportable, and that EPA’s predictions regarding

future electricity demand were unreasonable.

II. Analysis

This Court sets aside EPA final action under the CAA if

that action is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or

otherwise not in accordance with law. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9).

The standard of review is the same for the NOx SIP Call,

which is not subject to § 7607(d)(9), but is subject to the

Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Under

this familiar standard, ‘‘[a]gency determinations based upon

highly complex and technical matters are ‘entitled to great

deference.’ ’’ Appalachian I, 249 F.3d at 1051–52 (quoting

Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Brock, 823 F.2d

626, 628 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). See also Huls Am., Inc. v.

Browner, 83 F.3d 445, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (‘‘[W]e will give an

extreme degree of deference to the agency when it ‘is evaluating scientific data within its technical expertise.’ ’’) (citation

omitted). This is particularly true when we review the use of

computer models because ‘‘their scientific nature does not

easily lend itself to judicial review.’’ Appalachian Power Co.

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v. EPA, 135 F.3d 791, 802 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The EPA has

‘‘undoubted power to use predictive models’’ as long as it

‘‘explain[s] the assumptions and methodology used.’’ Small

Refiner Lead Phase–Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506,

535 (D.C. Cir. 1983). We will ‘‘defer to the agency’s decision

on how to balance the cost and complexity of a more elaborate model against the oversimplification of a simpler model.’’

Id. We will vacate if the agency’s conclusions drawn from

this model are unreasonable.

A. Standing

We first address the standing of petitioner States. The

EPA contends that West Virginia and Illinois do not have

standing to challenge the Agency’s action, arguing that these

States are suing as parens patriae on behalf of electric

generators inside their respective borders. While it is true

that ‘‘[a] State does not have standing as parens patriae to

bring an action against the Federal Government,’’ that is not

the case before us. Maryland People’s Counsel v. FERC,

760 F.2d 318, 320 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (internal citations omitted).

Here, the states are suing as states.

The NOx SIP Call directs each state to revise its SIP in

accordance with EPA’s NOx emissions budget for the state.

The lower the emissions budget, the more difficult and onerous is the states’ task of devising an adequate SIP. Thus,

lower growth factors leading to lower emissions budgets

causes injury to the states as states. EPA’s own brief belies

its argument, as it states that ‘‘[u]nder the NOx SIP Call,

states have the option of participating in [a] cap and trade

program or obtaining the reductions through other mechanisms.’’ This injury is sufficient to confer standing. Cf. City

of Olmstead Falls v. FAA, 292 F.3d 261, 268 (D.C. Cir. 2002)

(declining to decide whether a city may sue as parens patriae

because injury to the city itself suffices for standing).

B. EPA’s Failure to Provide an Opportunity for Comment

Petitioner States challenge EPA’s failure to provide formal

notice-and-comment after adding data to the docket on reUSCA Case #02-1185 Document #815078 Filed: 04/09/2004 Page 9 of 17
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mand. According to petitioner States, the CAA requires

EPA to engage in formal notice-and-comment procedures

when promulgating or revising a SIP (under 42 U.S.C.

§ 7410(c)) or taking action under Section 126. 42 U.S.C.

§ 7607(d)(1)(B), (N). During the remand proceedings, the

EPA published a Notice of Data Availability (‘‘NODA’’) that

stated that the growth rates could ‘‘be supported with a more

robust explanation, based on the existing record.’’ 66 Fed.

Reg. 40,609 (Aug. 3, 2001). In addition, the EPA stated it

was ‘‘considering new data’’ that ‘‘appear[ed] to confirm the

reasonableness of the growth calculations.’’ Id. EPA invited

comment and gave thirty days to respond.

On March 11, 2002, EPA released its second NODA

(‘‘NODA II’’). 67 Fed. Reg. 10,844. After listing 15 documents, the EPA offered no invitation to comment. Id. Despite the lack of an invitation, Illinois responded and asked

for clarification of what had been added to the record and also

requested the opportunity to have ‘‘meaningful review and

comment.’’ Illinois also reasserted the concerns it had raised

in the first NODA and reattached them for EPA’s consideration. Id.

The EPA contends that no notice-and-comment was required, because our earlier Appalachian I & II cases merely

remanded for a fuller explanation. As such, on remand no

notice-and-comment was required because EPA was only

providing a better explanation, not engaging in rulemaking.

The EPA also claims that even if notice-and-comment were

required it complied because, although it did not expressly

request comment in NODA II, it did receive comments.

Petitioner States have the better argument. The EPA

erred in not providing an opportunity to comment when it

added new material to the record subsequent to its publication of the first NODA. The CAA specifically requires that

EPA shall specify a comment period for any ‘‘action of the

Administrator under [Section 126].’’ 42 U.S.C.

§ 7607(d)(1)(N), (d)(3).

This Court, however, will invalidate agency action because

of procedural error only if the error is ‘‘so serious and related

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to matters of such central relevance to the rule that there is a

substantial likelihood that the rule would have been significantly changed if such error[ ] had not been made.’’ National Petrochemicals & Refiners Ass’n v. EPA, 287 F.3d 1130,

1148 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting CAA § 307(d)(8), 42 U.S.C.

§ 7607(d)(8)). Petitioner States argue that EPA’s refusal to

conduct full notice-and-comment rulemaking fails under this

standard. The only support petitioner States offer for this

proposition, however, is their contention that had the states

been given meaningful opportunity for comment, Illinois

would have been able to offer evidence about its nuclear

power and electricity generation capacity that would have

countered EPA’s assumptions. This example is not convincing.

In its response to NODA II, Illinois stated that it had

already ‘‘provided detailed support for [Illinois’ position that

EPA’s projected electrical generation was too low] to EPA

and we have explained our analyses and supporting facts in

detail.’’ Illinois pointed out that during the NODA I comment period, it had commented on the ‘‘data and on the

broader underlying growth factor issues which Illinois has

repeatedly raised to EPA.’’ In Illinois’ response to NODA I,

it specifically provided its opinion regarding its nuclear power

generation and capacity. In sum, the only evidence petitioning States offer to show that the absence of formal procedures following NODA II caused EPA to decide differently

was, in fact, before the EPA in responses to NODA I. This is

not sufficient under the applicable standard of review. While

EPA erred in failing to provide comment following NODA II,

petitioners have offered no evidence that there is a ‘‘substantial likelihood’’ that the rule would have been ‘‘significantly

changed’’ in the absence of the procedural error.

C. EPA’s Growth Factor Methodology

This Court previously found that the EPA failed to explain

its method for projecting EGU growth rates. In Appalachian I and Appalachian II, we remanded the rules at issue

and instructed the EPA to ‘‘fulfill its obligation to engage in

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reasoned decisionmaking on how to set EGU growth factors

and explain why results that appear arbitrary on their face

are, in fact, reasonable determinations.’’ Appalachian I, 249

F.3d at 1055; Appalachian II, 251 F.3d at 1035. In particular, we were concerned about EPA’s decision to apply projected heat input growth rates from 2001–2010 to the 1996–2007

period. Appalachian I, 249 F.3d at 1053–54. Fueling those

concerns was our observation that real-world growth rates

were not in line with EPA’s projections. Id. Petitioners

contend that on remand the agency has failed to satisfy its

obligation to resolve these concerns.

According to petitioners, the overlapping quality of the

time periods is irrelevant, because 2001–2010 is not representative of 1996–2007. In particular, petitioners argue that

there is an absence of evidence regarding heat-input growth

for the 1996–2000 period. If growth rates during that time

period were different, it would set all of the EPA’s predictions askew, because the IPM uses the difference between

two modeled years to determine the growth rate. In other

words, according to petitioners, the starting point matters

greatly in determining the end result, as the years build on

one another. Furthermore, petitioners do not accept the

agency’s explanation that the high costs in conducting extra

IPM runs militate against adding runs for the additional

years 1996–2001, and they question the EPA’s explanation

that by running the IPM for 2001–2010, the EPA will be able

to utilize the information for several other programs. In

sum, petitioners argue that EPA cannot rely on generalized

cost savings as an excuse for limiting the quality of its work.

We think EPA has reasonably explained why it chose to

rely on the IPM projections for years 2001–2010 in determining the projected growth rate for 1996–2007. We pause to

note that actual heat inputs have changed since our prior

decisions. The discrepancies we observed between the actual

heat input values and the projections for various states during

the original Appalachian cases – which discrepancies made

EPA’s modeled growth rates appear arbitrary – are no longer

so severe. Both West Virginia and Michigan, which were

cited in our earlier opinions as having actual heat input in

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1998 already exceeding the EPA’s 2007 projections, have both

experienced declining heat input from 1998 to 2001. Appalachian I, 249 F.3d at 1053. By 2001, the last year for which

data was available for EPA’s Remand Response, Michigan’s

heat input levels had dropped significantly and were in line

with EPA’s 2001 projections and 8.7% below 2007 projections.

67 Fed. Reg. 21,895. Furthermore, actual heat-input values

have decreased in several of the regulated states from 1998 to

2001. 67 Fed. Reg. 21,883. Finally, EPA points out that the

NOx SIP Call covers 23 jurisdictions, and the existence of

some margin of error with respect to some of the predictions

is not indicative of an unreasonable approach.

In response to our concern that ‘‘[f]uture growth projections that implicitly assume a baseline of negative growth in

electricity generation over the course of a decade appear

arbitrary, and the EPA can point to nothing in the record to

dispel this appearance,’’ Appalachian I, 249 F.3d at 1053, the

EPA has published historical data that shows there have been

historical periods of multi-year heat-input decline. 67 Fed.

Reg. 21,884–21,885.

The EPA also points out the significant overlap between

the modeled time period and the regulated time period.

Again, the IPM was run for the years 2001–2010, and then

applied to the 1995 or 1996 to 2007 time frame. Therefore,

for the 2001–2007 period, all of the underlying inputs would

be the same as if the model had been conducted on the 1995

or 1996 to 2007 time period. The resulting projected demand

for those years would also be the same. Because the growth

factor is derived from the difference in heat input growth

between modeled years, for this entire period the growth rate

is directly correlated.

Finally, the EPA describes its effort to ‘‘balance the cost

and complexity of a more elaborate model against the oversimplification of a simpler model.’’ Id. at 21,876 (quoting

Small Refiner Lead Phase–Down Task Force v. EPA, 705

F.2d 506, 535 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). As the EPA explains, ‘‘[t]he

complexity of the model – its simulations, inputs, and variables – means that each additional run year adds many more

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calculations to the model, a task that requires time and

resources.’’ Id. Because of the increased cost, ‘‘other ways

would have had to be [sic] found to reduce the number of

equations,’’ including reduction of variables or constraints

which would have decreased the accuracy of the model. Id.

In addition, by starting the IPM in 2001, ‘‘the model adequately served the needs of several programs.’’ Id. In sum,

EPA asserts that any further refinement in the heat input

growth rate that may have resulted from adding additional

years would not have been worth the increased cost.

In the Appalachian cases we were faced with a situation in

which ‘‘even in the face of evidence suggesting the EPA’s

projections were erroneous, the EPA never explained why it

adopted this particular methodology.’’ Appalachian I, 249

F.3d at 1053. On remand, EPA adequately explained why it

chose to apply IPM results from 2001–2010 to determine 2007

heat input requirements, and the evidence suggesting the

projections were erroneous has greatly diminished. As we

stated in the earlier cases, we will ‘‘give an extreme degree of

deference to the agency when it is evaluating scientific data

within its technical expertise.’’ Id. at 1052 (quoting Huls

Am., Inc. v. Browner, 83 F.3d 445, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).

Furthermore, ‘‘we must defer to the agency’s decision on how

to balance the cost and complexity of a more elaborate model

against the oversimplification of a simpler model.’’ Small

Refiner Lead Phase–Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d at

535. We will ‘‘reverse only if the model is so oversimplified

that the agency’s conclusions from it are unreasonable.’’ Id.

This great degree of deference, coupled with EPA’s explanation and the evidence added to the record on remand, requires that the petitions be denied.

D. EPA’s Electrical Demand Projections

and Disaggregation

Petitioners raise two other distinct challenges. First, they

claim that the EPA erred in projecting electricity demand

growth. More specifically, petitioners contend that EPA

erred in discounting electricity demand projections made by

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the North American Electric Reliability Council (‘‘NERC’’), a

not-for-profit corporation made up of electric utility generators, sellers, and users. Petitioners also challenge EPA’s

reduction of projections made by the Energy Information

Administration (‘‘EIA’’), a department within the United

States Department of Energy. The EPA made these reductions because it thought the forecasts did not take into

account future reductions in electricity demand caused by

energy conservation programs. Petitioners challenge both

the amount of the reduction EPA applied, and the premise

that these energy conservation programs were not already

accounted for in the projections.

Second, they challenge EPA’s method of disaggregating

regional data. Because the IPM ‘‘necessarily models electricity generation and sales on a regional basis in order to reflect

the regional nature of the electricity sector,’’ EPA is required

to take regional results and turn them into state-specific

budgets. 67 Fed. Reg. 21,888. Petitioners contend that EPA

failed to adequately explain its disaggregation methodology,

and that failure to do so on remand was arbitrary.

Both petitioners’ disaggregation and electricity demand

reduction claims are forfeit. The EPA correctly points out

that petitioners never raised these claims to the agency in the

administrative proceedings when the modeling period was

adopted, or in the earlier challenges in this Court. To the

extent that petitioners challenged the validity of EPA’s use of

the IPM, this Court has already rejected that challenge.

Appalachian I, 249 F.3d at 1052–53. Petitioners, having

forgone the ability to attack these aspects of the model while

the rule was being promulgated and initially challenged in

court, cannot now do so. Appalachian II, 251 F.3d at 1036

(‘‘It is black-letter administrative law that ‘absent special

circumstances, a party must initially present its comment to

the agency during the rulemaking in order for the court to

consider the issue’ ’’) (quoting Tex Tin Corp. v. EPA, 935

F.2d 1321, 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). Because neither of these

claims were raised in the initial litigation or the original

rulemaking, they cannot be raised now.

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Additionally, EPA did not reopen these issues in the remand proceedings. Petitioners argue vehemently that EPA

did so because it ‘‘respond[ed] on the merits’’ to virtually all

comments. 67 Fed. Reg. 21,901. That statement in the

Federal Register, however, was made in response to commenters’ request that EPA treat any comments it believed outside the scope of the remand as a petition to reconsider. Id.

As we have previously held, ‘‘the reopening rule of Ohio v.

EPA is not a license for bootstrap procedures by which

petitioners can comment on matters other than those actually

at issue, goad an agency into a reply, and then sue on the

grounds that the agency had re-opened [sic] the issue.’’

American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 886 F.2d 390, 398 (D.C.

Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted). Petitioners are correct

that ‘‘[w]hether an agency has in fact reopened an issue,

explicitly or implicitly,’’ depends on ‘‘the entire context of the

rulemaking including all relevant proposals and reactions of

the agency.’’ Public Citizens v. NRC, 901 F.2d 147, 150 (D.C.

Cir. 1990). However, petitioners have not shown that the

EPA either explicitly or implicitly reconsidered these issues

on remand.

As a threshold matter, EPA expressly stated on remand

that it ‘‘is not soliciting comment on IPM itself or on statespecific approaches for determining 2007 heat input levels.’’

66 Fed. Reg. 40,616 (August 3, 2001). Looking for implicit

reconsideration of these claims, we find none. A reading of

EPA’s explanation of its reduction of EIA and NERC forecasts, contained in its Remand Response, shows that it did

not reconsider that aspect of the rule; rather, it responded to

commenters’ concerns by further explaining its reasoning.

See Fed. Reg. 21,867–21,881. This is also true of its disaggregation methodology. The EPA’s disaggregation methodology was made public on August 24, 1998. 63 Fed. Reg.

45,032–45,033. Petitioners, however, did not raise any claims

about EPA’s disaggregation methodology in the previous

litigation. Again, a reading of the EPA’s Remand Response

shows that there was no implicit reconsideration of its

disaggregation methodology; instead, it simply reiterated the

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reasoning it had used from the beginning. 67 Fed. Reg.

21,881.

In sum, these claims fall squarely within the ambit of

American Iron & Steel Institute. Here, petitioners submitted comments, ‘‘goad[ed] [EPA] into a reply, and [now] sue on

the grounds that the agency ha[s] re-opened [sic] the issue.’’

American Iron & Steel Inst. 886 F.2d at 398. This, we cannot

allow. The record does not reflect that EPA explicitly or

implicitly reopened the issue. See Public Citizens v. NRC,

901 F.2d at 150.

III. Conclusion

The EPA erred in not providing an opportunity to comment

when it added new material to the docket subsequent to its

initial NODA, but because the petitioners have not shown a

substantial likelihood that the rule would have been significantly changed in the absence of that procedural error, it will

not serve as the basis for invalidating the agency’s action.

Because EPA has now explained its choice of methodology for

projecting EGU growth factors, and because petitioners’

claims regarding: (1) EPA’s reduction of NERC and EIA

forecasts, and (2) EPA’s disaggregation methodology have

been waived, we deny the petitions for review.

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