Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-02141/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-02141-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Advocates for American Disabled Individuals LLC
Plaintiff
Price Company
Defendant
David Ritzenthaler
Plaintiff

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Advocates for American Disabled 

Individuals LLC, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

The Price Company, 

Defendant. 

No. CV-16-02141-PHX-GMS

ORDER 

 “Federal courts are required sua sponte to examine jurisdictional issues such as 

standing.” Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 954 (9th Cir. 2011) (en 

banc) (citation omitted). After reviewing the complaint in this action, the Court has 

serious questions about whether Plaintiffs have standing to proceed. The Court will order 

Plaintiffs to show cause as to why this case should not be dismissed for lack of standing. 

 Plaintiff Advocates for Individuals with Disabilities, LLC (“Advocates”) makes no 

allegations in the complaint regarding its status, nature, or interest in this case. Plaintiff 

David Ritzenthaler alleges that he is legally disabled, that he has a state-issued 

handicapped license plate, and that, on or about December 13, 2015, he “became aware” 

that Defendant’s place of business lacked sufficient handicapped parking spaces, 

designation, signage, or disbursement of those parking spaces “in order to provide the 

shortest accessible route from parking to an entrance[,]” at Defendant’s place of business. 

(Doc. 1, Ex. 2 at 9–11, ¶¶ 1, 9, 10.) Plaintiff does not allege that he personally visited 

Defendant’s business, but alleges that he will avoid visiting the business in the future 

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unless it comes into compliance with the ADA. (Id. at 12, ¶ 15.) 

 The complaint alleges that Defendant owns and operates a business at 4502 E. Oak 

Street, Phoenix, Arizona, 85018, “which is a commercial facility.” (Id. at 10, ¶ 2.) The 

complaint does not identify the nature of Defendant’s business. The complaint alleges 

that Defendant’s facility has “insufficient handicapped parking spaces, insufficient 

designation or signage and or insufficient disbursement of such parking spaces[.]” (Id. at 

11, ¶ 10.) The complaint alleges that Defendant has violated Title III of the ADA and its 

implementing regulations, and seeks declaratory, injunctive, and damages relief as well 

as the payment of attorney’s fees. (Id. at 15–16.) 

 A plaintiff has standing to pursue injunctive relief only if he “is likely to suffer 

future injury” absent the requested injunction. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 

105 (1983). The threatened injury must be “concrete and particularized”; that is, it must 

affect the plaintiff “in a personal and individual way.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 

504 U.S. 555, 560 & n.1 (1992). An “undifferentiated” interest in ensuring compliance 

with the law will not suffice. Id. at 575 (citing United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 

166, 176–77 (1974)); see also Simon v. E. Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 

(1976) (“an organization’s abstract concern with a subject that could be affected by an 

adjudication does not substitute for the concrete injury required by” Article III).

 In cases under Title III of the ADA, a plaintiff can establish standing to pursue 

injunctive relief either by showing that “he intends to return to a noncompliant 

accommodation and is therefore likely to reencounter a discriminatory architectural 

barrier,” or by showing that “discriminatory architectural barriers deter him from 

returning to a noncompliant accommodation” that he otherwise would visit. Chapman, 

631 F.3d at 950. In either case, the plaintiff must show that he is personally affected by 

the barrier. Id. (claim for injunctive relief must seek to “vindicate the rights of the 

particular plaintiff rather than the rights of third parties”). “In determining whether a 

plaintiff’s likelihood of returning to a defendant is sufficient to confer standing, courts 

have examined factors such as (1) the proximity of the place of public accommodation to 

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plaintiff’s residence, (2) plaintiff’s past patronage of defendant’s business, (3) the 

definitiveness of plaintiff’s plans to return, and (4) the plaintiff’s frequency of travel near 

defendant.” Harris v. Del Taco, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1113 (C.D. Cal. 2005) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

 Courts have dismissed Title III claims for lack of standing where the plaintiff fails 

to assert a personalized injury stemming from the alleged violation. See Payne v. Chapel 

Hill N. Props., LLC, 947 F. Supp. 2d 567, 578 (M.D. N.C. 2013) (disability advocacy 

organization lacked standing to seek injunction under Title III where it failed to identify 

any member personally affected by the barrier); Small v. Gen. Nutrition Cos., Inc., 388 F. 

Supp. 2d 83, 90–99 (E.D. N.Y. 2005) (same). 

 Courts have also dismissed Title III claims on standing grounds where the plaintiff 

fails to plausibly allege that he intends to return to the defendant’s accommodation if the 

barrier to access is removed. The Eleventh Circuit provided examples of such cases in 

Shotz v. Cates, 256 F.3d 1077 (11th Cir. 2001): 

In Proctor [v. Prince George’s Hosp. Ctr., 32 F. Supp. 2d 830 (D. Md. 1998)], the plaintiff admitted that it was purely speculative whether he would have to visit the hospital, given the fact that his only other visit was because of a motorcycle accident. In Hoepfl [v. Barlow, 906 F. Supp. 317 (E.D. Va. 

1995)], the court stated “because [the plaintiff] now resides in a different state, it is highly unlikely that she will ever again be in a position where any discrimination by [the defendant] against disabled individuals will affect 

her personally.” In Aikins [v. St. Helena Hosp., 843 F. Supp. 1329 (N.D. Cal. 

1994)], the plaintiff owned a mobile home at which she stayed only several days a year. During one such visit, she alleged that she was discriminated 

against by a nearby hospital. The court concluded that the limited amount 

of time she spent in the area, coupled with the fact that she visited the 

hospital only because of her husband’s illness, failed to suggest a “real or immediate threat” of future discrimination by the hospital. See also Tyler v. The Kansas Lottery, 14 F. Supp. 2d 1220 (D. Kan. 1998) (plaintiff who had since moved to Wisconsin was unlikely to be harmed by discrimination at lottery outlets in Kansas). 

Id. at 1081–82 (some internal citations omitted). In Harris, 396 F. Supp. 2d 1107, the 

court dismissed a claim for injunctive relief against a restaurant because the plaintiff 

lived approximately 570 miles from the restaurant and made no allegation that he was 

likely to return. 

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 Plaintiffs’ complaint appears to fall short of establishing standing. It provides no 

information from which the Court could conclude that Advocates has suffered injury or 

will suffer injury in the future from Defendant’s actions. Advocates appears to be suing 

on the basis of a generalized interest in ensuring that Defendant complies with the ADA, 

but such an interest is insufficient to confer standing. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 575; Simon, 

426 U.S. at 40. The fact that Advocates seeks to promote the interests of disabled 

individuals does not change this analysis. See Payne, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 578; Small, 388 

F. Supp. 2d. at 90–99. 

 Nor is there information from which the Court could conclude that Plaintiff 

Ritzenthaler has suffered injury or will suffer injury in the future from Defendant’s 

actions. Plaintiff Ritzenthaler does not allege that he as ever visited Defendant’s 

business. Indeed, he fails even to identify the nature of Defendant’s business. Although 

he alleges that he will be deterred from visiting Defendant’s business in the future, he 

provides no facts—like those discussed in the cases above—from which the Court can 

plausibly conclude that he will visit Defendant’s business in the future if the barrier to 

access is removed. Indeed, the complaint alleges only that “Plaintiff, or an agent of 

Plaintiff, intends to return to Defendant’s Commercial Facility to ascertain whether it 

remains in violation of the . . . ADA.” (Doc. 1 at 13, ¶ 21 (emphasis added).) 

 For these reasons, the Court orders Plaintiffs to show cause as to why this case 

should not be dismissed for want of standing. Cf. Chapman, 631 F.3d at 955 (“Because 

Chapman lacked standing at the outset of this litigation to assert the ADA claims, the 

district court should have dismissed them.”). 

 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff and its attorney individually are 

directed to show cause why this case should not be dismissed for lack of standing by 

September 8, 2016. Defendant, if it wishes to do so, may file a response by September 

15, 2016. Plaintiff may file a reply by September 22, 2016. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that an Order to Show Cause Hearing is set for 

September 29, 2016 at 2:30 p.m. in Courtroom 602, Sandra Day O’Connor U.S. Federal 

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Courthouse, 401 W. Washington St., Phoenix, Arizona 85003-2151. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED vacating the Scheduling Conference currently set 

for September 2, 2016. 

 Dated this 1st day of September, 2016. 

Honorable G. Murray Snow

United States District Judge

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