Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01873/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01873-8/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Bakersfield Police Department
Defendant
City of Bakersfield
Defendant
Ryan Miller
Defendant
Jesse Trevino
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Plaintiff Jesse Trevino, who is deaf, asserts that Bakersfield Police Officer Ryan Miller used 

excessive force in the course of detainment. Plaintiff also asserts the City is liable for violations of the 

Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. Further, 

Plaintiff seeks to hold both the City and Officer Miller liable for assault, battery, and negligence. 

Defendants argue Plaintiff is unable to succeed on each of these claims, and seek summary judgment 

pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 36) 

Because there are genuine issues of material facts related to whether the force used by Officer 

Miller was reasonable, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part.

I. Procedural History

Plaintiff alleges that on the afternoon of October 16, 2013, Officer Miller “gave commands to 

Plaintiff while his back was turned, when he knew or reasonably should have known that Plaintiff was 

hearing impaired.” (Id. at 7, ¶ 17) He contends Officer Miller “struck Plaintiff in the back, and tackled 

JESSE TREVINO,

 Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF BAKERSFIELD, et al.,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 1:14-cv-001873 - JLT

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN 

PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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him from behind causing him to forcefully fall to the ground.” (Id., ¶ 18) Plaintiff alleges, “Being 

struck and tackled caused Plaintiff to suffer mental, emotional, and physical injuries, including but not 

limited to, a fractured wrist, bruises and abrasions.” (Id., ¶ 19)

In addition, Plaintiff contends the City “discriminated against or failed to reasonably 

accommodate Plaintiff with regard to their services, programs and activities.” (Doc. 1 at 15, ¶ 46) 

According to Plaintiff, “[s]uch programs and activities included the safe and appropriate provision of 

law enforcement services at or upon Plaintiff’s residence, and upon Plaintiff, who was not fleeing, did 

not pose a threat, and/or was not a flight risk. (Id.)

Based upon these facts, Plaintiff identified the following claims for relief: a violation of the 

Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force; a violation of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 

U.S.C. § 701; a violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12131; 

a violation of the Bane Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1; assault and battery; intentional infliction of 

emotional distress; and negligence. (See generally Doc. 1 at 9-25) Plaintiff dismissed the Bakersfield 

Police Department as a defendant on December 19, 2014. (Doc. 11) The same date, the City and 

Officer Miller filed their Answer to the allegations, denying any wrongdoing. (Doc. 12)

On February 11, 2016, the parties filed a stipulation for the dismissal of several claims. (Docs. 

34, 35) Accordingly, the claims remaining in this action include: (1) a Fourth Amendment violation 

against Officer Miller, (2) violation of the Rehabilitation Act against the City, (3) violation of Title II 

against the City; (4) assault and battery against the City and Officer Miller; and (5) negligence against 

the City and Officer Miller. (See id.) 

Defendants filed the motion for summary judgment now pending before the Court on February 

12, 2016, asserting Plaintiff is unable to succeed on the remaining claims. (Doc. 36) Plaintiff filed his 

opposition on March 4 (Doc. 37), to which Defendants filed a reply on March 11, 2016 (Doc. 38).

II. Legal Standards for Summary Judgment

The “purpose of summary judgment is to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to 

see whether there is a genuine need for trial.” Matsuhita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 

475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citation omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is “no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. 

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R. Civ. P. 56(a). In addition, Rule 56 allows a court to grant summary adjudication, or partial summary 

judgment, when there is no genuine issue of material fact as to a particular claim or portion of that 

claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Lies v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 641 F.2d 765, 769 n.3 (9th Cir. 1981) 

(“Rule 56 authorizes a summary adjudication that will often fall short of a final determination, even of a 

single claim . . .”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The standards that apply on a 

motion for summary judgment and a motion for summary adjudication are the same. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56 (a), (c); Mora v. Chem-Tronics, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 1998). 

Summary judgment, or summary adjudication, should be entered “after adequate time for 

discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the 

existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of 

proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The moving party bears the “initial 

responsibility” of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 

323. An issue of fact is genuine only if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable fact finder to find 

for the non-moving party, while a fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the 

governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Wool v. Tandem 

Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1422, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987). A party demonstrates summary adjudication is 

appropriate by “informing the district court of the basis of its motion, and identifying those portions of 

‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, 

if any,’ which it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex, 477 

U.S. at 323 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). 

If the moving party meets its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to 

present specific facts that show there is a genuine issue of a material fact. Fed R. Civ. P. 56(e); 

Matsuhita, 475 U.S. at 586. An opposing party “must do more than simply show that there is some 

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Id. at 587. The party is required to tender evidence of 

specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention 

that a factual dispute exits. Id. at 586 n.11; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Further, the opposing party is not 

required to establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor; it is sufficient that “the claimed 

factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth 

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at trial.” T.W. Electrical Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Assoc., 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 

1987). However, “failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case 

necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. 

The Court must apply standards consistent with Rule 56 to determine whether the moving party 

demonstrated there is no genuine issue of material fact and judgment is appropriate as a matter of law.

Henry v. Gill Indus., Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1993). In resolving a motion for summary 

judgment, the Court can only consider admissible evidence. Orr v. Bank of America, NT & SA, 285 

F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Beyene v. Coleman Sec. Servs., Inc., 854 

F.2d 1179, 1181 (9th Cir. 1988)). Further, evidence must be viewed “in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party” and “all justifiable inferences” must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. Orr, 

285 F.3d at 772; Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000).

III. Undisputed Material Facts1

On the afternoon of October 16, 2013, Officer Miller “was dispatched to an apartment complex 

located at 8200 Kroll Way in Bakersfield, California.” (JSF 1) Officer Miller was informed that a 

possible burglary was in progress, and an individual “was kicking in the front door and then trying to 

use a rock to strike the door handle.” (JSF 3) “Officer Miller was advised that the suspect was a 

Hispanic male, 40s, with glasses, wearing a blue shirt and dark pants.” (JSF 4) 

Officer Miller arrived at the apartment complex alone, without a partner in his car. (JSF 2) “As 

soon as Officer Miller arrived, he saw the Plaintiff, who matched the description of the suspect, 

walking westbound towards the parking lot.” (JSF 7) When Officer Miller saw Plaintiff, “he was 

approximately 30 yards [away].” (JSF 8) Officer Miller reports he “called out ‘hey man, can I talk to 

you?’ and then he yelled ‘Stop. Police.’” (JSF 9) Plaintiff “kept walking,” and Officer Miller ran after 

him. (JSF 9, 10) While running, “Officer Miller continued to yell ‘stop police.’” (JSF 11)

When Officer Miller reached Plaintiff, he used his forearm “to push Mr. Trevino onto the 

ground.” (JSF 12) He was running “almost at a sprint” “when he hit [Plaintiff] from behind.” (UMF 

 

1 The parties prepared a Joint Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“JSF”). (Doc. 30-2). In addition, the parties 

prepared separate facts in connection with their motion and opposition. To the extent the fact is undisputed and the Court 

found the evidence cited supports the fact, these are identified as Undisputed Material Facts (“UMF”).

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17; Miller Depo. 36:11: 20) Officer Miller reported he “was trying to knock Mr. Trevino off balance 

in order to gain compliance,” and pushed him onto the grass. (JSF 13, 14) After Plaintiff was on the 

ground, he told Officer Miller, “I can’t hear you.” (JSF 15) Officer Miller placed handcuffs on 

Plaintiff “because he still felt he had a crime in progress,” after which he “noticed swelling in 

[Plaintiff’s] left wrist and called for an ambulance.” (JSF 16, 17) Miller removed the handcuffs and 

the ambulance arrived approximately three minutes later. (JSF 81; UMF 6)

Officer Miller attempted to question Plaintiff, to which Plaintiff “responded that he did not read 

lips.” (JSF 20, 21) Officer Miller then took out a notepad and wrote: “why are you breaking into that 

house?” (JSF 22) Plaintiff verbally responded and informed Officer Miller that he lived there, but tried 

“to force the door open because he had forgotten his key.” (JSF 22, 23)

Officers with the Bakersfield Police Department, including Officer Miller, “are trained that a 

person not answering a question or obeying a command or instruction may be an indicator of a hearing 

impairment.” (UMF 10, 11; Pflugh Depo. 49:12-16) Officer Miller “was instructed that an officer 

must be aware of the fact that if a person does not answer a question or obey a command or instruction, 

he or she may not be refusing to cooperate.” (UMF 11) Officer Miller testified he did not consider 

whether Plaintiff could not understand him or hear him while running after him, or prior to pushing 

Plaintiff to the ground. (UMF 21; Miller Depo. 41:23-42:7)

IV. Request for Judicial Notice

The Court may take judicial notice of a fact that “is not subject to reasonable dispute because it 

(1) is generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and 

readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201. 

Here, Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of the Complaint filed by Plaintiff 

on November 25, 2014 (Doc. 1) and the Answer filed by Defendants on December 16, 2014 (Doc. 9). 

The records of court proceedings cannot reasonably be questioned, and judicial notice may be taken of 

the Court’s record and docket. Mullis v. United States Bank. Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 n.9 (9th Cir. 

1987); Valerio v. Boise Cascade Corp., 80 F.R.D. 626, 635 n. 1 (N.D.Cal.1978), aff’d, 645 F.2d 699 

(9th Cir. 1981); see also Rodic v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 615 F.2d 736, 738 (6th. Cir. 1980). 

Accordingly, the Court may take judicial notice of the filing of these documents. However, the Court 

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declines to take judicial notice of the factual allegations therein, to the extent they are contradicted by 

the stipulated facts and evidence presented by the parties.

V. Discussion and Analysis

A. First Claim for Relief: Violation of the Fourth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 “is a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Albright v. 

Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). In relevant part, Section 1983 provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of 

any State or Territory... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United 

States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the 

party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress...

42 U.S.C. § 1983. To establish a Section 1983 violation, a plaintiff must show (1) deprivation of a 

constitutional right and (2) a person who committed the alleged violation acted under color of state law. 

West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Williams v. Gorton, 529 F.2d 668, 670 (9th Cir. 1976).

A plaintiff must allege a specific injury was suffered, and show causal relationship between the 

defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72 (1976). A 

person deprives another of a right “if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative 

acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do so that it causes the deprivation of 

which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Plaintiff asserts Officer Miller is liable for a violation of the Fourth Amendment, which prohibits 

arrests without probable cause or other justification. (Doc. 1 at 9-10) Specifically, the Fourth 

Amendment provides: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons. . . against unreasonable 

searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 

supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing . . . the persons or things to be seized.” 

U.S. Constitution, amend. IV. 

1. Unlawful Seizure

As an initial matter, in the complaint, Plaintiff asserts Officer Miller is liable for a violation of 

his Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unlawful seizure. (Doc. 1 at 9) A plaintiff may succeed 

on a claim for an unlawful seizure where the arrest is made without probable cause, which “exists when 

officers have knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to lead a person of reasonable 

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caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the person being arrested.” 

Ramirez v. City of Buena Park, 560 F.3d 1012, 1023 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 

482 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007)).

Officer Miller received information from dispatch describing the person suspected of a 

residential burglary in process, and saw Plaintiff who matched the description given. (JSF 4, 5) 

Notably, Plaintiff does not oppose summary adjudication of his first claim for relief to the extent it is 

based upon an unlawful arrest, and focuses solely on the claim of excessive force. (See Doc. 37 at 9-12) 

In light of the stipulated facts and evidence presented, there is no dispute that Office Miller had 

probable cause to effectuate an arrest. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication of 

the First Claim for Relief, on the grounds of an unlawful seizure, is GRANTED. 

2. Excessive Use of Force

The Supreme Court of the United States has determined that the Due Process Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals who have not yet been convicted of a crime “from the use 

of excessive force that amounts to punishment.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989).

However, allegations of excessive force during the course of an arrest are analyzed under the Fourth 

Amendment, which prohibits arrests without probable cause or other justification. Id. (“claim[s] that 

law enforcement officials used excessive force in the course of making an arrest, investigatory stop, or 

other ‘seizure’ ... are properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s ‘objective reasonableness’

standard”); see also Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1440 (9th Cir. 1994) (“the use of force to effect an 

arrest is subject to the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable seizures”). The Supreme 

Court explained,

[T]he “reasonableness” inquiry in an excessive force case is an objective one: the 

question is whether the officers’ actions are “objectively reasonable” in light of the facts 

and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or 

motivation. An officer’s evil intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment violation out 

of an objectively reasonable use of force; nor will an officer’s good intentions make an 

objectively unreasonable use of force constitutional.

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97 (internal citations omitted). In applying this standard, the fact-finder

considers “the totality of the circumstances and . . . whatever specific factors may be appropriate in a 

particular case.” Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 826 (9th Cir. 2010). In short, the court must 

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balance the force used against the need for the use of force. Liston v. County of Riverside, 120 F.3d 

976.

To evaluate objective reasonableness, courts consider “the severity of the crime at issue, 

whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is 

actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (citing 

Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1985). Courts must also consider “the quantum of force used” 

“because the ‘factors articulated in Graham, and other factors bearing on the reasonableness of a 

particular application of force are not to be considered in a vacuum but only in relation to the amount 

of force used to effect a particular seizure.’” Davis v. City of Las Vegas, 478 F.3d 1048, 1055 (9th Cir. 

2007) quoting Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1441 (9th Cir.1994). Ultimately, the “reasonableness” of 

the actions “must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with 

the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 

Here, the Court finds the amount of force used was relatively minor. Though the officer was 

sprinting at full speed at the time he knocked Plaintiff over, Plaintiff does not claim he was injuries in 

the area where the officer pushed him. This supports the argument that the officer tempered the 

amount of force he used. Thus, this factor weighs in favor of the reasonableness of officer’s action.

As to the crime at issue, though a serious felony (Cal. Pen Code §§ 459, 460), does not 

necessarily constitute a violent crime. Beaver v. City of Federal Way, 507 F.Supp.2d 1137, 1144 

(W.D. WA 2007) [Describing a daytime residential burglary without visible weapons as “lessen[ing] 

the overall sense of danger.”]; Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1443, n. 11 (9th Cir. 1994) [“[T]he fact 

that ‘an unarmed suspect has broken into a dwelling at night does not automatically mean he is 

physically dangerous.’ Id. at 21, 105 S.Ct. at 1706. The [Garner] Court also took notice of statistics 

showing that burglaries only rarely involve physical violence, and of the FBI’s classification of 

burglary as a “property” rather than a “violent” crime. Id.”] quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 

11 (1985). However, on the sliding scale of severity, this crime—especially what the officers on the 

scene knew of it to—would likely fall farther on the spectrum toward severe, though certainly not to 

the level of severity where a person’s life was placed at risk. Even still, this factor weighs in favor of 

the reasonableness of officer’s action.

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More troubling, however, is the next Graham factor, which considers whether the plaintiff 

posed an immediate threat to the officer or others. Though the plaintiff used a rock to attempt to 

break the door lock, no one, including the officer or the reporting witness, saw him with the rock once 

he left the doorway (Doc. 36-4 at 11) and no one claims to have seen any weapon in Plaintiff’s hands

or saw him reaching for one. (Doc. 36-4 at 14 [The officer did not recall seeing the plaintiff hands go 

toward the front of his body.] Likewise, there is no suggestion that Plaintiff acted threateningly 

toward the officer or anyone else and, indeed, there is no evidence that there was anyone else around. 

When the officer pushed Plaintiff to the ground, he was in a parking lot and there is no evidence there 

was any risk he could attempt to enter another apartment unit.2 Notably, the officer indicated that his 

concern was that Plaintiff could break into a run or turn toward the officer and threaten a fight. (Doc. 

37-2 at 33) However, Defendants do not offer any articulable facts to support that either concern was 

likely to occur in this instance and it appears to be a generalized fear existing in every police contact 

with a suspect. Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272, 1281 (9th Cir. 2001) [“A simple statement by an 

officer that he fears for his safety or the safety of others is not enough; there must be objective factors 

to justify such a concern.”]

In any event, the Court must credit the facts endorsed by Plaintiff who indicates he was 

walking at a leisurely pace and, there is no indication he was acting suspiciously or attempting to 

secret himself in any manner. Moreover, Plaintiff did not act in any way to indicate his awareness of 

the police presence or react to the officer’s repeated, yelled commands—from as close as ten yards. 

Indeed, initially, Officer Miller thought that Plaintiff did not hear his order to stop. (Doc. 37-2 at 20) 

The Defendants provide no explanation why Plaintiff’s apparent continued unawareness of the police 

presence did not alert Officer Miller that something was awry.

In any event, while there is a strong government interest in apprehending felons, leaving the 

scene of a felony, alone, does not automatically justify the use of force. Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 

 

2 Defendants did not provide evidence whether there was a “choke-point” exit from the parking lot such that the back-up 

officer could have prevented Plaintiff’s escape by simply parking his patrol car across the driveway or whether this the 

property was not surrounded by fencing. Chew, at 1441 n. 5 (9th Cir.1994) [“[T]he availability of alternative methods of 

capturing or subduing a suspect may be a factor to consider” when evaluating the reasonableness of the officer’s use of 

force.] Thus, the Court is required to presume at least this one lesser intrusive means for preventing Plaintiff from leaving 

the property, was available.

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433, 441 (9th Cir. 2011) [“there are no per se rules in the Fourth Amendment excessive force 

context.”] Indeed, more than a decade ago, the Ninth Circuit rejected that force may always be used to 

apprehend a felon. Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1443, n. 11 (9th Cir. 1994). The Court stated that 

the “assumption that anything short of deadly force may constitutionally be used to apprehend a felon

. . . conflicts with the holding and the reasoning of Graham as well as with prior circuit law.” Id.

Thus, the Court concludes that though the plaintiff was leaving the area, there is no evidence he 

reasonably appeared to be doing so to evade arrest. Thus, this “most important” factor (Chew at

1441, n. 5) weighs against the use of force to make the detention.

Defendants contend Graham is similar to the matter now before the Court. (Doc. 36-1 at 12-

13) The Court disagrees. In Graham, the plaintiff sought “to recover damages for injuries allegedly 

sustained when law enforcement officers used physical force against him during the course of an 

investigatory stop.” Id., 490 U.S. at 388. During the stop, the driver told the police that Graham was 

“suffering from a ‘sugar reaction.’” Id. Graham exited the vehicle, in which he was a passenger, “ran 

around it twice, and finally sat down on the curb, where he passed out briefly.” Id. at 399. The driver 

pleaded with officers to get Graham some sugar, but an officer “rolled Graham over on the sidewalk 

and cuffed his hands tightly behind his back, ignoring [the] pleas.” Id. The Court noted:

Several officers then lifted Graham up from behind, carried him over to [the] car, and 

placed him face down on its hood. Regaining consciousness, Graham asked the officers 

to check in his wallet for a diabetic decal that he carried. In response, one of the officers 

told him to “shut up” and shoved his face down against the hood of the car. Four officers 

grabbed Graham and threw him headfirst into the police car.... At some point during his 

encounter with the police, Graham sustained a broken foot, cuts on his wrists, a bruised 

forehead, and an injured shoulder; he also claims to have developed a loud ringing in his 

right ear that continues to this day.

Id. at 389-390. The officers did not believe Graham was having a reaction due to diabetes, but was 

instead resisting. See id. at 389-90. Defendants, here, explain, “While the [Graham] Plaintiff’s actions 

were later explained as a medical condition, the officer was not privy to this information prior to his 

decision to act. The U.S. Supreme Court found that the officer’s actions were therefore entirely 

reasonable.” (Doc. 36-1 at 12) 

To the contrary, the Supreme Court reversed the grant of a directed verdict in favor of the 

defendants. Graham at 399 [“Because the Court of Appeals reviewed the District Court's ruling on the 

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motion for directed verdict under an erroneous view of the governing substantive law, its judgment 

must be vacated and the case remanded to that court for reconsideration of that issue under the proper 

Fourth Amendment standard.”] Notably, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the more stringent,

four-part test imposed on the Graham plaintiff to find a Fourth Amendment violation, by the district 

court and the court of appeals. Thus, rather than finding the officer’s conduct to be reasonable, the 

Court made is less likely that either lower court would do so on remand. 

Still relying on Graham, Defendants argue, “While it may now be explained that Mr. Trevino 

was not disregarding Officer Miller’s orders to stop, Officer Miller had no idea that Mr. Trevino was 

deaf.” (Id. at 12) Defendants argue:

What Officer Miller did know was that he was responding to a call for service wherein 

the reporting party indicated that the Plaintiff was attempting to break into an apartment 

with a rock and by kicking the door handle. The reporting party specifically referenced 

the rock, which is a weapon that could cause harm. Therefore, it was reasonable for 

Officer Miller to believe he was confronting a suspect with a weapon that could cause 

harm. When Officer Miller arrived on the scene is observed Mr. Trevino and called out 

to him to stop. Mr. Trevino walked in the other direction and did not slow or pause. 

Officer Miller continued to call out and chase after Mr. Trevino. When he ultimately 

reached him, Officer Miller pushed Mr. Trevino down onto the grass.

(Id. at 36-1 at 12-13) Defendants argue the amount of force used was “entirely reasonable,” seemingly,

because Officer Miller “pushed [Plaintiff] onto the ground” rather than using greater force that could 

have been inflicted by his baton or taser. (Id. at 13) However, of course, the quantum of force used is 

only one factor for the Court to consider.

Defendants rely also on DeContreras v. City of Rialto, 894 F.Supp.1238 (C.D. CA 2012). They 

argue DeContreras is “directly on point.” (Doc. 36-1 at 16) Notably, however, the officers responded 

to a fight occurring in a home where one of those involved had a knife. DeContreras at 1264. When 

the officers entered the home, they found DeContreras and Diaz fighting. Id. Diaz immediately 

stopped fighting and surrendered to the officers. Id. However, DeContreras assumed a fighting stance, 

advanced at the officers and shouted at them, “shoot me m****r f****r.” Id. The officers tazed him 

and only later learned he was deaf. Id.

Likewise, Defendants rely on Love v. City of Mobile, 2011 WL 3843697 at *2 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 

29, 2011) aff'd, 478 F. App'x 652 (11th Cir. 2012), which also involved a deaf man. In Love, plaintiff 

locked himself in a bathroom at a store and, due to failing to take his psychotropic meds, began 

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speaking in his alter ego’s voice and made statements about getting knives and getting cut. Id. at 1. 

When the officers arrived, unaware the suspect was deaf, they ordered him to open the door but 

received no response. Id. They tried to pry the door open and sprayed pepper spray under the door but 

still received no response, though water began pouring out from under the door. Id. at 2. Once they 

finally pried the door open, the plaintiff slammed it closed in their faces and, when they opened it 

again, the plaintiff lunged at them with an open umbrella. Id. The officers tazed the plaintiff three 

times before he dropped the umbrella and stopped trying to get to his knees. Id. at 3-4. In finding that 

the force used was reasonable, the court noted that the officers did not know the plaintiff was deaf but 

more importantly, found the plaintiff was actively resisting arrest. Id. 

The cases upon which Defendants rely, provide little assistance. Unlike here, in DeContreras

and Love, the suspects actively posed a threat to the safety of the officers. Likewise, the fact that the 

suspects were deaf played no role in the failure of the suspects to comply or incited them to attack the 

officers.

For his part, Plaintiff asserts the force used by Officer Miller was not reasonable and summary 

judgment is not appropriate “because genuine disputes exists at to the facts and circumstances” of the 

encounter between Plaintiff and Officer Miller. (Doc. 37 at 10, emphasis omitted) Plaintiff contends 

there are disputes as to whether Plaintiff “posed a threat, let alone a serious threat, to anyone.” (Id. at 

11) In addition, Plaintiff observes “there are disputes as to whether Mr. Trevino looked in Ryan 

Miller’s direction, or increased his pace at any point in time before Ryan Miller tackled him.” (Id. at 

11-12) In essence, Plaintiff argues that there was reason for Officer Miller to doubt whether Plaintiff 

heard or could hear the commands before Miller used the force.

Indeed, the evidence reveals several conflicts between the facts presented by Officer Miller and 

Plaintiff. Officer Miller testified that when he arrived at the apartment complex, he saw Plaintiff 

walking about 20 to 30 yards away. (Doc. 36-4 at 11, Miller Depo. 33:10-13) Officer Miller reported 

he “called out” to Plaintiff, who “looked right at [Officer Miller]” and kept walking. (Id. at 12, Miller 

Depo. 34:5-16) Officer Miller also reports that Plaintiff “[a]ppeared to” increase his speed while 

walking away. (Id., 34:24-25) Plaintiff, however, testified he “did not look at or see [Officer] Miller, 

or even see a police car arrive at the apartment complex. (Doc. 37-3 at 2, Trevino Decl. ¶ 6) Instead, 

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Plaintiff reported he was walking at a “leisurely pace,” and was first aware of the presence of a police 

officer “[a]fter [he] was pushed to the ground” and “saw the stripe from his pants and the – the baton.” 

(Doc. 37-2 at 42, Trevino Depo. 47:13-16; Trevino Decl. ¶ 5) Thus, the accounts conflict related to

Plaintiff’s actions prior to the officer forcing him to the ground, which are relevant to the determination 

of “whether he [was] actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” See Graham, 490 

U.S. at 396.

Given the conflicting evidence presented by Officer Miller and Plaintiff, Defendants have not 

met their burden to show an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. A 

jury must make credibility determinations and resolve the conflicts between the evidence. See T.W. 

Electrical Serv., Inc., 809 F.2d at 630. 

3. Qualified Immunity

Defendants contend Officer Miller is entitled to qualified immunity, which protects government 

officials from “liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established 

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. 

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The doctrine of qualified immunity “balances two important 

interests — the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and 

the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties 

reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009).

The threshold inquiry to a qualified immunity determination is whether the facts alleged, when 

taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, demonstrate that the official’s conduct violated a 

statutory or constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). If the alleged conduct 

would not be considered a violation, the inquiry stops and the defense of qualified immunity applies. 

See id. However, if a constitutional violation occurred, the Court must next determine whether the 

statutory or constitutional right was “clearly established.” Id. Defendant has the burden to prove that 

he is entitled to qualified immunity. Moreno v. Baca, 431 F.3d 633, 638 (9th Cir.2005).

a. Whether a constitutional violation occurred

As discussed above, Plaintiff’s version of the encounter with Officer Miller is that he was 

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walking at his apartment complex, without any weapon in hand,

3 when Officer Miller knocked him to 

the ground without a warning or provocation. Accordingly, for purposes of summary judgment, the 

facts demonstrate a violation of Plaintiff’s right to be free from the excessive use of force.

b. Whether the right was “clearly established”

A right is “clearly established” in the context of qualified immunity if “it would be clear to a 

reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted’ . . . or whether the state 

of the law [at the time of the violation] gave ‘fair warning’ to the official[] that [his] conduct was 

unconstitutional.” Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 906 (2002) (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202).

This inquiry “must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general 

proposition.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. “This is not to say that an official action is protected by 

qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful, but it is to say 

that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 

U.S. 635, 640 (1987).

The right to be free from excessive force and the general principle that “force is only justified 

when there is a need for force” were clearly established prior to October 2013. Blankenhorn v. City of 

Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 481 (9th Cir. 2007) (“In assessing the state of the law at the time of

[defendant’s] arrest, we need look no further than Graham's holding . . . ”) Triable issues of fact here 

precluding a grant of qualified immunity for Officer Miller. Adopting Plaintiff’s version of the facts, it 

should have been clear to a reasonable officer that he lacked justification to knock Plaintiff to the 

ground given that he was not behaving aggressively or threateningly toward the officer or anyone else, 

there was no one else around, and he did not appear to be leaving the area to evade arrest,. See id.

Finally, as noted above, the mere fact that Plaintiff was leaving the scene of a felony, alone, was 

insufficient justification to use force. Accordingly, qualified immunity is not warranted at this time. 

See also Espinosa v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 598 F.3d 528, 532 (9th Cir. 2010) (premature to 

find qualified immunity where there remained unresolved issues of fact regarding whether officers 

violated the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights and whether the officers’ belief in the legality of their 

 

3

Although the dispatch report indicated the suspect was using a rock to beat the door, Officer Miller testified he 

did not see a rock in Plaintiff’s hand. (Doc. 36-4 at 11, Miller Depo. 33:4-6)

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actions was reasonable). 

Consequently, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim for a violation of 

his right to be free from the excessive use of force is DENIED.

B. Second and Third Cause of Action: Violations of the Rehabilitation and Title II of 

the Americans with Disabilities Act against the City

Plaintiff asserts Defendants are liable for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act and 

the Rehabilitation Act for the actions taken in his encounter with Officer Miller. (Doc. 1 at 13-16) Both 

the ADA and RA prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability. The Ninth Circuit explained, “The 

ADA applies only to public entities, whereas the RA proscribes discrimination in all federally-funded 

programs.” Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of 

such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or 

activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. 

Title II applies to law enforcement agencies and arrests. Sheehan v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 743 

F.3d 1211, 1232 (9th Cir. 2014) rev’d in part, cert. dismissed in part sub nom., City & Cty. of San 

Francisco, Cal. v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765 (2015). To make succeed on a claim for a violation of

Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must establish:

(1) he is an individual with a disability; (2) he is otherwise qualified to participate in or 

receive the benefit of some public entity’s services, programs, or activities; (3) he was 

either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the public entity’s services, 

programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and 

(4) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of [his] disability.

McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d 1259, 1265 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Thompson v. Davis, 295 

F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

The Ninth Circuit has also determined that “[t]o recover monetary damages under Title II of the 

ADA or the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must prove intentional discrimination on the part of the 

defendant.” Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138 (2001) (citing Ferguson v. City of 

Phoenix, 157 F.3d 688, 674 (9th Cir. 1998)). This requires a plaintiff to establish the defendant was 

“deliberately indifferent” to his disability, which “requires both knowledge that a harm to a federally 

protected right is substantially likely, and a failure to act upon that the likelihood.” Id. at 1139 (citing 

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City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1988).

Oddly, Plaintiff presents significant evidence regarding the training the City provided its 

officers, including defendant Miller. Plaintiff contends, “Bakersfield Police Department officers are 

trained that a person not answering a question or obeying a command or instruction may be an indicator 

of a hearing impairment.” (Doc. 37 at 7) Plaintiff asserts the officers’ training includes “POST 

Learning Domain 37,” which addresses how officers should interact with people with disabilities. (Id.; 

see also Doc. 37-2 at 53-62) Specifically, Learning Domain 37 provides, in relevant part:

Many indicators can alert an officer that an individual may be deaf or hard of hearing. 

These indicators include, but are not limited to the following:

 use of signing

 wearing hearing aid(s)

 use of a signal dog

 speaking with difficulty or in an unconventional method

 pointing to an ear and shaking the head negatively

 point to an ear and then lips

 reaching for a pad and pencil

 failing to respond to an officer’s questions or statements

 failing to follow an officer’s instructions or commands

 attempting to gain attention through body movement or touching (e.g., foot 

stomping, hand waiving, clapping hands, etc.)

(Doc. 37-2 at 55, emphasis added) In addition, as Plaintiff observes, Learning Domain 37 directs 

officers in the field to “be aware of the act that if a person does not answer a question or obey a 

command or instruction, he or she may not be refusing to cooperate. If the person is deaf or hard of 

hearing, he or she may not hear the officer or even been aware of the officer’s presence.” (Id. at 56) 

Also, Plaintiff offered the testimony of BPD Detective Andrea Pflugh, a “person most 

knowledgeable” designated by the City, who testified to training given officers that addresses how they 

are to recognize and respond to those with physical and mental disabilities, including deafness. (Doc. 

37-2 at 68-103) As in Learning Domain 37, Pflugh testified that BPD officers are trained that if a 

person doesn’t respond or doesn’t answer, this may be an indication that the person has a hearing 

impairment.” Id. at 75-75.

Charles Sherman, another of the City’s designated “person most knowledgeable,” testified that 

if there is a situation not specifically addressed in the Bakersfield Police Department policies, he would 

expect an officer to rely upon training and education, including POST training. (Doc. 37-2 at 119, 

Sherman Depo. at 18:17-23) Accordingly, Plaintiff contends that officers, such as defendant Miller 

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were “trained that an indicator of a person being hard of hearing is a failure to respond to an officer’s 

questions or statements,” and another indicator “is failing to follow an officer’s instructions or 

commands.” (Doc. 37 at 7) Thus, Plaintiff contends “Ryan Miller could and should have applied his 

POST and Bakersfield Police Department training in order to recognize Jesse Trevino’s hearing 

impairment.” (Id. at 17)

Significantly, the evidence presented by Plaintiff that Officer Miller failed to comply with his 

training undermines a finding that the City did not train its officers regarding how to interact with a 

deaf person, or that the City intended to discriminate against deaf individuals. To the contrary, the 

evidence presented by Plaintiff demonstrates that the City did train its officers that those with hearing 

impairments, such as Plaintiff, may not respond to an officer’s questions or commands. Clearly, the 

City recognized the difficulty deaf persons may have when communicating with officers in the field, 

and acted upon that recognition by training its officers. Consequently, Plaintiff fails to show that the 

City acted with deliberate indifference towards his disability, as required under the ADA and 

Rehabilitation Act. See Duvall v, 260 F.3d at 1138-139. 

Because Plaintiff cannot prove an essential element of his claims for violation of the ADA and 

the RA, Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication of the Second and Third Causes of Action is 

GRANTED. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

C. Fifth Cause of Action: Assault and Battery

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants are liable for assault and battery in violation of California law. 

(Doc. 1 at 21-22) Because these are separate torts under state law, the Court addresses each claim 

individually.

1. Assault

Under California law, an assault is a “demonstration of an unlawful intent by on person to 

inflict immediate injury on the person of another then present.” Lowry v. Standard Oil Co., 63 Cal. 

App. 2d 1, 6-7, 146 P.2d 57 (1944); see also CACI § 1301. “The tort of assault is complete when 

anticipation of harm occurs.” Kiseskey v. Carpenters' Trust for S. Cal., 144 Cal.App.3d 222, 232, 

(1983). To succeed upon a claim of assault under California law, a plaintiff must demonstrate: “(1) that 

defendant intended to cause harmful or offensive contact, or the imminent apprehension of such 

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contact, and (2) that plaintiff was put in imminent apprehension of such contact.” Brooks v. United 

States, 29 F. Supp. 2d 613, 617 (N.D.Cal.1998) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 21 (1965)).

There is no dispute that Officer Miller intended to strike Plaintiff to force him to the ground. 

However, there are no facts supporting the conclusion that Plaintiff was placed in immediate 

apprehension of the contact. To the contrary, Officer Miller struck Plaintiff from behind and Plaintiff

admits he did not become aware of any officers on the scene until he was on the ground and looking up 

at Miller. (Doc. 37-2 at 42) Thus, Plaintiff cannot prove an essential element of his claim for assault. 

See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Accordingly, summary adjudication of his claim for assault is 

appropriate, and Defendants’ motion is GRANTED.

2. Battery

Under California law, a battery occurs when: “[a] defendant intentionally performed an act that 

resulted in a harmful or offensive contact with the plaintiff’s person; (2) [the] plaintiff did not consent 

to the contact; and (3) the harmful or offensive contact caused injury, damage, loss or harm to [the] 

plaintiff.” Brown v. Ransweiler, 89 Cal.Rptr.3d 801, 811 (2009). Thus, the claim for battery by a 

police officer is analogous to a claim for excessive use of force. Id.; see also Edson v. City of Anaheim, 

63 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1272 (1998) (an officer who uses force in the course of an arrest is not liable for 

battery unless the plaintiff proves that the force used was unreasonable). Consequently, a claim for 

battery under California law is analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard. 

Edson, 63 Cal. App. 4th at 1274; Saman v. Robbins, 173 F.3d 1150, 1156-57 & n. 6 (9th Cir. 1999).

As discussed above, there are disputed questions of fact related to the circumstances of Officer 

Miller’s encounter with Plaintiff—including whether Plaintiff was aware of the officer’s presence and 

was attempting to evade him. Given the factual disputes that must be resolved to determine whether 

Officer Miller’s actions were reasonable, summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s claim for battery is not 

appropriate. See Brown, 89 Cal. Rptr at 811; Edson, 63 Cal.App.4t h at 1272. Therefore, Defendants’ 

motion for summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s claim for battery is DENIED.

///

D. Seventh Cause of Action: Negligence

To establish a claim for negligence, Plaintiff “must establish four required elements: (1) duty; 

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(2) breach; (3) causation; and (4) damages.” Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1203 (9th Cir. 2003). 

In general, “the plaintiff must show that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff.” See John B. v. 

Superior Court, 38 Cal. 4th 1177, 1188 (2006). The existence of a duty is a matter of law for a court to 

decide, and under California law, police officers have a duty to use reasonable force. See Munoz v. City 

of Union City, 120 Cal. App. 4th 1077, 1100 (2004). 

1. Liability of Officer Miller

This standard of “objective reasonableness” under California law is the analog to the standard of 

reasonableness for Fourth Amendment claims under federal law. As such, federal cases are 

“instructive” in deciding whether a given exertion of force is reasonable. See Brown, 171 Cal. App. 4th 

at 534. Under Brown, the Court’s conclusions regarding Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim are 

equally applicable in addressing his negligence claim. See id. 171 Cal. App. 4th at 534; see also Young 

v. County of Los Angeles, 655 F.3d 1156, 1170 (9th Cir. 2011). Because, the disputes of fact related to 

the reasonableness of the force used by Officer Miller preclude a determination on Plaintiff’s 

negligence claim, Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication on this seventh cause of action against 

Officer Miller is DENIED.

2. Liability of the City

In the compliant, Plaintiff asserts the City is also liable for negligence. (See Doc. 1 at 24) 

Under California law, a “public entity is not liable for an injury,” “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by 

statute.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 815. “[D]irect tort liability of public entities must be based on a specific 

statute declaring them to be liable, or at least creating some specific duty of care, and not on the general 

tort provisions of Civil Code section 1714.” Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority, 31 Cal. 

4th 1175, 1183 (2003). “Otherwise, the general rule of immunity for public entities would be largely 

eroded by the routine application of general tort principles.” Id. (citations omitted). As the California 

Supreme Court observed, “the intent of the Tort Claims Act is not to expand the rights of plaintiffs in 

suits against governmental entities, but to confine potential governmental liability to rigidly delineated 

circumstances[.]” Zelig v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 27 Cal. 4th 1112, 1127 (2002).

Here, Plaintiff never specifies what statute serves as a basis for his negligence claim and, in fact,

there is not one. Indeed, under California law, “no state statute sets forth a duty of care with respect to 

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the supervision, training, retention, or discipline of [police] officers.” Jaramillo v. City of San Mateo, 

76 F.Supp.3d 905, 926 (N.D. Cal. 2014 ); see also Munoz v. City of Union City, 120 Cal. App. 4th 

1077, 1111-15 (2004) (reversing judgment against city for “negligence in the selection, training, 

retention, supervision and discipline of police officers” and finding no “statutory basis” for the asserted 

duty of care). Therefore, summary judgment is GRANTED as to the City.

VI. Conclusion and Order

Given the conflicting evidence presented by the parties related to the circumstances of 

Plaintiff’s encounter with Officer Miller and the reasonableness of the force exerted, Defendants have

not carried its burden to show an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. 

A jury must make credibility determinations and resolve the conflicts between the evidence. See T.W. 

Electrical Serv., Inc., 809 F.2d at 630. Based upon the foregoing, the Court ORDERS:

1. Summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action (to the extent it is based on a 

theory of unlawful seizure), Second Cause of Action (violation of the Rehabilitation 

Act), Third Cause of Action (violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act), Fifth 

Cause of Action (to the extent it is based on assault) and Seventh Cause of Action 

(negligence against the City) is GRANTED; and

2. Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication of the remaining claims—including The 

First Clause of Action (Fourth Amendment violation for excessive force)4, Fifth Cause 

of Action (battery) and Seventh Cause of Action (negligence against Officer Miller)—is

DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 21, 2016 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 

4 The denial of Officer’s Miller’s claim of qualified immunity is denied without prejudice to his raising this defense to the 

Court once the facts have been determined by the trier of fact.

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