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Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Dewayne Williams
Appellant

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Richard S. Arnold died on September 23, 2004. This opinion

is being filed by the remaining judges of the panel pursuant to 8th Cir. Rule 47E.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-1158

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

v. * Eastern District of Missouri.

*

Dewayne Williams, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: September 17, 2004

Filed: May 12, 2005

___________

Before WOLLMAN, RICHARD S. ARNOLD,1

 and BYE, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Dewayne Williams appeals from his conviction and sentence for being a felon

in possession of a firearm, a violation of 18 U.S.C. §922(g). We affirm.

I.

Williams was walking down a street when he was approached by four officers

from the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department riding in a marked police car.

Shortly after seeing the officers, Williams began running through a yard adjacent to

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The Honorable Donald J. Stohr, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri.

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the street. Two officers began a foot chase, during which one of them saw Williams

remove a handgun from his front waistband area and toss it to the ground. The officer

retrieved the gun and continued his pursuit. After overcoming Williams, the officer

placed him under arrest and discovered crack cocaine and marijuana during a search

incident to arrest.

Prior to trial, Williams sought to exclude evidence of the crack cocaine and

marijuana obtained from the search incident to arrest. Williams argued that the

prejudicial effect of this evidence outweighed its probative value. The district court2

admitted the evidence as intrinsic evidence not governed by Federal Rule of Evidence

404(b) and reasoned in the alternative that the evidence was admissible under the

rule.

Following Williams’s conviction, the district court sentenced him to ten years’

imprisonment. Williams challenges the district court’s admission of evidence and its

enhancements to his sentence.

II.

The facts and arguments related to the district court’s admission of the drug

evidence closely resemble those we addressed in United States v. Rankin, 902 F.2d

1344 (8th Cir. 1990). We concluded in Rankin that the defendant’s drug possession

was part of the same criminal event as his gun possession. Id. at 1346. We held in

the alternative that the evidence was admissible to show motive under Rule 404(b).

Id. Those principles control here. 

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III.

Williams challenges, under the auspices of United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct.

738 (2005), enhancements to his sentence based on the district court’s determinations

that his past convictions were for “crimes of violence,” as defined in section 4B1.2

of the sentencing guidelines, and that he had used the firearm in connection with

another felony within the meaning of section 2K2.1(b)(5). Because Williams did not

preserve these challenges by timely objecting below, we review the district court’s

rulings for plain error. United States v. Pirani, No. 03-2871, slip op. at 6 (8th Cir.

April 29, 2005) (en banc). 

A.

Because the district court’s enhancements for past crimes of violence were

based upon facts of prior convictions, this aspect of Williams’s argument fails to

implicate constitutional concerns. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756 (“Any fact (other

than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the

maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must

be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”). The

Presentence Investigation Report indicates that Williams has two prior adult

convictions for burglary (for offenses committed when he was a minor). These

constitute crimes of violence under the guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, application

note 1 (“A conviction for an offense committed prior to age eighteen is an adult

conviction if it is classified as an adult conviction under the laws of the jurisdiction

in which the defendant was convicted.”). Accordingly, the district court did not err

in enhancing the sentence on the basis of Williams’s prior convictions.

B.

To resolve Williams’s remaining challenge to his sentence, we must conduct

plain error review under the four-part test of United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725

(1993). Pursuant to that test, before we can correct an error not raised at trial, “there

must be (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. Johnson v.

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At sentencing, Williams’s attorney stated that “[t]he Guidelines obviously

exceed the statutory maximum, so I think the only sentence the Court can impose in

this matter under the Guideline structure is 120 months and I expect that’s what the

Court will do.” Sen. Tr. at 4.

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United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1997). If all three conditions are met, we may

remedy the error only if it “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public

reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. 

The district court’s enhancement based on the fact that Williams had used the

firearm he was found to have possessed in connection with another felony was

erroneous in light of Booker. Under these circumstances, the first two Olano factors

are satisfied. See Pirani, slip op. at 8. Whether the error affected Williams’s

substantial rights is another matter. In order to satisfy this factor of Olano, “the

defendant must show a ‘reasonable probability,’ based on the appellate record as a

whole, that but for the error he would have received a more favorable sentence.” Id.

at 11.

After accounting for his prior convictions, Williams’s base offense level of 24

and his criminal history category of VI resulted in a sentencing range of 100-125

months. The district court’s finding pertaining to the firearm resulted in a four-level

upward adjustment, which produced a sentencing range of 140-175 months. Because

the low end of the sentencing range exceeded the statutory maximum of 120 months

under 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2), the parties did not dispute that the appropriate sentence

was 120 months.3

 

Williams implies that, had the district court considered the appropriate range

of 100-125 months, it could have imposed a sentence lower than the statutory

maximum. We do not believe, however, that this assertion by itself demonstrates a

reasonable probability that Williams would have received a more favorable sentence.

Prior to sentencing Williams, the district court observed that:

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Based upon the serious nature of the instant offense, which involved a

felon in possession of a firearm, and in consideration of defendant’s

significant criminal history that includes convictions for two burglaries

second-degree offenses, two tampering first-degree offenses, two assault

third-degree offenses, two misdemeanor stealing offenses and a felony

stealing offense, the [120 month] sentence would seem to address the

sentencing objectives of punishment, general deterrence, and

incapacitation.

Sen. Tr. at 5. The district court then imposed the statutory maximum of 120 months,

which falls within the range of 100-125 months that it would have considered absent

the Booker error. We conclude that, under these circumstances, Williams has not

demonstrated prejudicial plain error under Olano. 

The sentence is affirmed.

 ______________________________

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