Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06308/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06308-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Charles Lamont Thompson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

FI LED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

UG 16 1990 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. ) 

) 

No. 89-6308 

CHARLES LAMONT THOMPSON, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant.) 

(W.D. Okla. CR-89-86-T) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MCKAY, Circuit Judge, BARRETT, Senior Circuit Judge, and 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

Defendant-appellant Charles Lamont Thompson appeals the 24-

month sentence imposed on August 30, 1989, after he pled guilty in 

the United States District Court for the Western District of 

Oklahoma to one count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine in 

violation of 21 u.s.c. § 846. Defendant challenges the sentence 

on two grounds. First, defendant challenges the district court's 

failure to depart from the United States Sentencing Guidelines 

("U.S.S.G.") in light of defendant's cooperation with government 

investigations and in light of the government's alleged breach of 

its promise to file a motion for departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. 

§ 5Kl.1. Second, defendant argues that the district court erred 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

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' 

in taking account of four ounces of cocaine which defendant was 

not convicted of distributing when it determined defendant's 

offense level. Although defendant does not dispute that he 

offered to sell the four ounces of cocaine to an undercover agent, 

defendant argues he neither had the capacity nor the intent to 

complete the sale. We dismiss defendant's appeal for lack of 

jurisdiction. 

BACKGROUND 

On February 13, 1989, defendant was arrested and charged with 

conspiracy to distribute cocaine. Prior to his arrest, defendant 

was a quarterback for the University of Oklahoma's football team. 

The arrest was spurred by statements made by Barry Switzer, then 

head football coach of the University of Oklahoma, at a news 

conference announcing that defendant was being suspended from the 

football team pending an investigation into his activities. 

There was considerable national media coverage of the news 

conference and of defendant's arrest. 

On April 26, 1989, defendant pled guilty to one count of 

conspiracy to distribute cocaine. As part of his plea agreement, 

defendant agreed to assist the FBI with several criminal 

investigations. Defendant's ability to cooperate, however, was 

hindered by the degree of publicity surrounding his arrest. 

Although the government did acknowledge to the district court that 

defendant had cooperated with the FBI, the government did not file 

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a motion recommending departure as is required for departures 

1 under u.s.s.G. § 5Kl.1. 

As part of the undercover investigation of defendant, an FBI 

agent posing as a debt collector was introduced to defendant. 

During a drug transaction, defendant sold what was represented to 

be one ounce of cocaine to the undercover agent. The undercover 

agent subsequently informed defendant that he had received less 

then the promised one ounce of cocaine. In an apparent attempt to 

appease the undercover agent, defendant offered to sell the agent 

an additional four ounces of cocaine. Defendant argues that he 

never was capable of selling four ounces of cocaine and that he 

never intended to complete the sale. Nevertheless, the district 

1 At the time of sentencing,§ 5Kl.1 provided in part: 

Upon motion of the government stating that the defendant 

has made a good faith effort to provide substantial 

assistance in the investigation or prosecution of 

another person who has committed an offense, the court 

may depart from the guidelines. 

u.s.s.G. § SKl.1 (emphasis added) (United States Sentencing 

Commission, Guidelines Manual at 5.35 (incorporating all 

guidelines amendments through October, 1988)). All 

references to the sentencing guidelines in this order and 

judgment, unless otherwise indicated, are to the guidelines 

as they existed at the time of sentencing. See United States 

v. Hewitt, 902 F.2d 1082, 1083 (2d Cir. 1990) ("In applying 

the Guidelines, we look to the Guideline provisions in effect 

at the time of sentencing."); 18 u.s.c. § 3553(a)(4) & (5) 

("The court, in determining the particular sentence to be 

imposed, shall consider ... [guidelines and policy 

statements] that are in effect on the date the defendant is 

sentenced. " ) • 

We have recently upheld the constitutionality of§ 5Kl.1 

in United States v. Kuntz, No. 89-2182 (10th Cir. July 16, 

1990) (available on Westlaw at 1990 WL 96680). The defendant 

in Kuntz argued that§ SKl.1 was unconstitutional because it 

required the government to file a motion before departure was 

permitted under§ 5Kl.1. The court held that that 

requirement did not violate either the Due Process Clause or 

separation of powers principles. 

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court considered the additional four ounces of cocaine in 

determining defendant's offense level. 

If the additional four ounces of cocaine had not been 

considered, defendant would have had an offense level of 14 and a 

criminal history category of I, resulting in a guideline range of 

15-21 months incarceration. The inclusion of the additional four 

ounces of cocaine raised defendant's offense level to 16, 

resulting in a guideline range of 21-27 months incarceration. 

Before sentencing, defendant filed a motion for relief, 

seeking a downward departure because of the substantial assistance 

he had given to the FBI. 2 On August 30, 1989, the district court 

held an in camera evidentiary hearing which addressed defendant's 

motion for relief and whether the additional four ounces should be 

considered. At the sentencing hearing held later that day, the 

district court denied defendant's motion for departure, announced 

that it had included the four ounces of cocaine in determining 

defendant's sentence, and sentenced defendant to 24 months 

imprisonment. Defendant appeals the sentence imposed by the 

district court. 

DISCUSSION 

Defendant first argues that the district court erred in not 

granting defendant a downward departure based on defendant's 

substantial assistance to the FBI. Appellant's Br. at 7. Under 

U.S.S.G. § 5Kl.1, a court may depart downward from the applicable 

2 We grant defendant's motion to supplement the record with his 

motion for relief and the brief in support of his motion, both of 

which were filed with the district court. 

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guidelines range, upon motion of the government, if the defendant 

"has made a good faith effort to provide substantial assistance in 

the investigation or prosecution of another person." Downward 

departures are also permissible if the sentencing court finds 

mitigating circumstances not adequately considered by the 

Sentencing Commission which warrant departure. 18 u.s.c. 

s 3553(b); u.s.s.G. s 5K2.0. 

Under either§ 5Kl.1 or the general departure provisions the 

ultimate decision of whether to depart remains in the discretion 

of the district court. We have held that "when a sentence is 

within the guideline range and is not imposed in violation of law, 

or as a result of an incorrect application of the guidelines, then 

the district court's refusal to exercise its discretion to depart 

downward from the guideline range is not appealable." United 

States v. Davis, 900 F.2d 1524, 1530 (10th Cir. 1990) (footnotes 

omitted); see United States v. Richardson, 901 F.2d 867, 870 (10th 

Cir. 1990). 

The district court denied defendant's motion to depart 

because it found that additional cooperation on the part of 

defendant was necessary and that defendant's cooperation would 

best be evaluated when he had fully completed his role in the 

criminal investigations. 3 Defendant does not dispute that his 

3 The case before us is distinguishable from United States v. 

Howard, 902 F.2d 894 (11th Cir. 1990), in which the Eleventh 

Circuit held that the sentencing court could not postpone ruling 

on a§ 5Kl.1 motion until after the cooperation was completed if 

it would result in a ruling after the original sentence has been 

imposed. The Eleventh Circuit emphasized that Fed. R. Crim. P. 35 

was the vehicle designed to consider cooperation completed after 

the time of sentencing and that a post-sentence§ 5Kl.1 ruling 

[Footnote continued ... ] 

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cooperation was not completed at the time of sentencing. It was 

within the discretion of the district court to deny departure on 

this ground. Therefore, we do not have jurisdiction to review the 

district court's refusal to depart downward in this case because 

it was not contrary to law or to the sentencing guidelines. 4 

Defendant also argues that the district court erred in 

considering the four ounces of cocaine at issue in determining 

defendant's offense level because defendant was never capable of 

distributing that amount of cocaine. The sentencing guidelines 

provide that, if a defendant is being sentenced for an offense 

which includes the negotiation to traffic in illegal drugs, the 

"weight under negotiation in an uncompleted distribution shall be 

[ ... footnote continued] 

would disrupt the sentencing system created by the sentencing 

guidelines and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. However, 

in the case before us, the district court did not postpone ruling 

on defendant's§ 5Kl.1 motion for departure but instead denied 

defendant's motion and stated that a Rule 35 motion would be a 

more appropriate means for obtaining a reduction of sentence once 

defendant had completed his cooperation. 

4 A review of defendant's motion for relief indicates that, in 

seeking a downward departure, defendant argued before the district 

court that an oral plea agreement had been breached and that he 

was entitled to specific performance of that oral plea agreement 

in accordance with Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971). 

Although defendant refers to that motion in his brief on appeal, 

he has not renewed his request for specific performance on appeal 

but instead argues that the district court erred in not exercising 

its discretion to depart from the applicable guideline range. 

Appellant's Br. at 7-10. Even if defendant had raised the 

Santobello issue on appeal, we would still affirm because his 

written plea agreement does not contain any commitment by the 

government to file a motion for a downward departure pursuant to 

§ SKl.1. Ordinarily the defendant will be bound by his written 

plea agreement and he will not be permitted to assert an oral 

agreement in modification thereof. The written plea agreement 

itself provides "that there are no other deals, bargains, 

agreements, or understandings which modify or alter this 

agreement." Here, the record does not establish any justification 

to go beyond the written plea agreement. 

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used to calculate the applicable amount. Where the defendant was 

not reasonably capable of producing the negotiated amount, the 

court may depart and impose a sentence lower than the sentence 

that would otherwise result." U.S.S.G. § 2D1.4, application note 

1 (emphasis added). 5 Additional guidelines provisions properly 

relied on by the district court included: u.s.s.G. § 2D1.1, 

application note 11, which allows quantities of drugs not 

specified in the count of conviction to be considered in 

determining the offense level; and§ 1Bl.3(a)(2), which allow acts 

that were part of the same course of conduct, scheme, or plan to 

be considered by the sentencing court. See,~, United States 

v. Vazzano, 906 F.2d 879 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Garcia, 

889 F.2d 1454, 1456 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1829 

(1990). 

In a letter dated August 14, 1989, the district court advised 

the parties that it was considering a greater weight of drugs to 

determine defendant's offense level than was used in the 

presentence report's calculation of defendant's sentence. 

R. Doc. 21. In its letter, the district court noted that "an 

5 The quoted language is from the sentencing guidelines prior to 

the amendments effective November 1, 1989. See u.s.s.G. § 2D1.4, 

United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, at 2.48 

(incorporating all guideline amendments through October, 1988). 

Under the current version of the guidelines, "the [sentencing] 

court shall exclude from the guideline calculation the amount that 

it finds the defendant did not intend to produce and was not 

reasonably capable of producing." u.s.s.G. § 2D1.4, application 

note 1 (as amended effective November 1, 1989). However, as 

discussed in footnote 1, in reviewing a sentence, we apply the 

guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing. Therefore, 

pursuant to§ 2D1.4, as it existed at the time of sentencing, we 

must characterize the sentence imposed by the district court as a 

discretionary decision not to depart downward from the applicable 

guidelines range. 

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additional four ounces (113 grams) of cocaine, at least, were 

negotiated for sale by the defendant on February 10, 1989," and 

the court asked the parties to respond to its tentative findings. 

Id. The district court was provided a tape and transcript of 

defendant's offer to sell the four ounces of cocaine. Also, 

during the August 30, 1989 in camera hearing, the district court 

considered defendant's argument that the offer to sell the 

additional four ounces of cocaine was mere puffery. At the 

sentencing hearing the court explained that: 

"the disputed four ounce or 113 gram of cocaine item 

which was the subject of some dispute is being included 

as an item as quantity of drugs not specified in the 

count of conviction but which may be considered in 

determining the offense level in this case and thus 

affects the applicable guideline range .... " 

R. Vol. VI at 3. 

The dispute between the parties is whether defendant was 

capable of selling the additional four ounces of cocaine. 6 Under 

6 Defendant also argues that the district court violated Local 

Rule 41 of the Rules for the United States District Court of the 

Western District of Oklahoma by participating in plea agreement 

negotiations. Rule 41 sets out plea agreement procedures and 

provides that "[t]he Court shall not participate in any [plea 

agreement] discussions" between the government and the attorney 

for the defendant. Although the district court sent letters to 

both parties and held an in camera hearing seeking additional 

information concerning the amount of cocaine that would be 

considered by the court in determining defendant's sentence, the 

court did not participate in any plea agreement discussions. 

Therefore, its actions were not contrary to Rule 41. The actions 

of the district court were consistent with U.S.S.G. § 6Al.3(b), 

which allows the district court to notify the parties of tentative 

findings and to provide the parties a reasonable opportunity to 

respond to the proposed findings. Moreover, the district court is 

not bound by any sentencing stipulation in the plea agreement as 

to the quantity of drugs but can consider information in the 

presentence report and evidentiary hearings to determine 

defendant's guidelines sentence. See United States v. Richardson, 

901 F.2d 867 (10th Cir. 1990). 

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§ 2Dl.4, as it existed at the time of sentencing, the negotiated 

weight was to be counted in determining the offense level, and 

defendant's inability to sell the negotiated amount merely 

provided grounds for a discretionary departure. See United States 

v. Thomas, 870 F.2d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1989) (§ 2Dl.4, application 

note 1, "proposes that the sentencing judge consider a 

discretionary departure."). As discussed above, we do not have 

jurisdiction to review the district court's discretionary decision 

not to depart downward unless it is contrary to law or 

inconsistent with the guidelines. There is no basis in the record 

to find that the district court's discretionary decision was 

contrary to law or inconsistent with the guidelines. AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

David M. Ebel 

Circuit Judge 

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