Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-95-01112/USCOURTS-caDC-95-01112-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
National Labor Relations Board
Respondent
Pennsylvania State Education Association
Petitioner

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 23, 1996 Decided March 15, 1996

No. 95-1112

PENNSYLVANIA STATE EDUCATION ASSOCIATION-NEA,

PETITIONER

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

RESPONDENT

Consolidated with

95-1124

On Petitions for Review and Cross-Application for

Enforcement of an Order of the

National Labor Relations Board

Robert G. Haas argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner

Polyclinic Medical Center of Harrisburg. William A. Chesnutt

entered an appearance.

Jonathan Walters argued the cause and filed the briefs for

petitioner Pennsylvania State Education Association-NEA.

Joseph A. Oertel, Attorney, National Labor Relations Board, argued

the cause for respondent, with whom Linda R. Sher, Associate

General Counsel, and Aileen A. Armstrong, Deputy Associate General

Counsel, were on the brief. William M. Bernstein, Attorney,

entered an appearance.

Before: WALD, WILLIAMS and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WALD.

WALD, Circuit Judge: The National Labor Relations Board

("NLRB" or "Board") ruled that petitioners unlawfully engaged in a

variety of unfair labor practices. We conclude that the Board's

ruling is supported by substantial evidence, and therefore deny the

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1Under Board precedent, authorization cards are not the only

means by which a union may establish its majority support. See,

e.g., JOHN D. FERRICK ET AL., NLRB REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS § 3.1, at

petitions for review and grant the NLRB's cross-petition for

enforcement. Petitioner Polyclinic Medical Center ("Polyclinic"),

an employer, withdrew recognition from a union which it had

previously recognized, and which under the law enjoyed a

presumption that it was supported by a majority of unit employees.

Polyclinic and petitioner Pennsylvania State Education AssociationNEA ("PSEA") then entered into a bargaining agreement without

evidence that PSEA had the support of a majority of the employees.

Further, that agreement provided that members of PSEA could not

resign their membership while the agreement remained in force.

Each act violated the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA").

I. BACKGROUND

In large part, this case involves the meaning and effect of

the "authorization cards" that PSEA collected from the registered

and licensed practical nurses employed by Polyclinic, who together

constitute the relevant "bargaining unit." Because authorization

cards may serve different functions at the various stages of a

union membership drive, we begin by setting forth a general

discussion of the union-recognition process.

A. The Process of Union Recognition

The heart of a union's membership drive is its effort to

persuade a majority of unit employees to support it, usually by

collecting employees' signatures on authorization cards indicating

that they wish to designate the union as their

collective-bargaining representative.1 What the union may do after

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73-74 (1985) (identifying employee petitions and employer polls

as alternative means); 4 THEODORE KHEEL, LABOR LAW § 15-01, at 15-2

(1995) (identifying strikes, strike votes, and employer's

independent knowledge). 

2Even if the union loses, the NLRB may require the employer

to bargain with the union if: (1) the union had majority support

before the election; and (2) the employer engaged in unfair

labor practices that had "the tendency to undermine majority

strength and impede the election processes." NLRB v. Gissel

Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 614 (1969). See generally Conair

Corp. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467

U.S. 1241 (1984). Where the employer's conduct is less pervasive

or disruptive, the Board may call a new election. Id.

collecting the cards depends on the degree of support it received.

If fewer than 30% of the unit employees signed such cards, the

union generally cannot move any closer toward achieving

representative status. If, on the other hand, more than 50% of the

unit employees signed such cards, the union may ask the employer

voluntarily to recognize it as the employees' collective-bargaining

representative. The employer, however, may decline that

invitation, Linden Lumber Division v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 309-10

(1974), and frequently does so, see STEVEN SCHLOSSBERG & JUDITH A.

SCOTT, ORGANIZING AND THE LAW 162 (3rd ed. 1983). The union may then

request that the NLRB conduct a representation election. See 29

U.S.C. § 159(c). It may also request an election in the first

instance so long as it collected cards from 30% of unit employees.

See NLRB RULES AND REGULATIONS AND STATEMENTS OF PROCEDURES § 101.18.

If the union prevails in the election, i.e., wins out over

both competing unions and the choice of no union at all, it becomes

the employees' collective-bargaining representative.2 An

employer's negotiations with a properly designated union generally

lead to the adoption of a "collective-bargaining agreement." When

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3These cards have been referred to by a variety of other

names as well, including "single purpose" cards. E.g., Road

Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No. 669 v. NLRB, 681 F.2d 11, 22

(D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1178 (1983). We utilize

a different term because, as shall be seen momentarily, such

cards inherently have a dual purpose. 

the collective-bargaining agreement expires, the incumbent union

retains a presumption of majority status. NLRB v. Creative Food

Design Ltd., 852 F.2d 1295, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1988). And, of course,

it remains an unfair labor practice under the NLRA for an employer

to withdraw recognition from a majority union, see 29 U.S.C. §

158(a)(5), (1), or to recognize a minority union, see id. §

158(a)(2), (1); International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v.

NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 737-38 (1961), even when the

collective-bargaining agreement has expired.

B. The Use of Authorization Cards

In reviewing bargaining disputes, the NLRB and courts have

identified four separate types of authorization cards. Most common

are "pure" cards,3 through which the employee designates a

particular union as her collective-bargaining representative; they

include an express, affirmative representation "on [their] face

that the signer authorizes the Union to represent the employee for

bargaining purposes." NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575,

584 (1969); see, e.g., Research Federal Credit Union, 310 N.L.R.B.

56, 64, 142 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1250 (1993) ("REPRESENTATION AND

AUTHORIZATION; I hereby designate and authorize the [Union] to

represent me for the purpose of collective bargaining."). As

discussed supra, a union may utilize such cards to achieve

representative status through either voluntary recognition or an

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election.

Functionally identical to "pure" cards are "dual purpose"

cards; both may be utilized by a union to request voluntary

recognition and to call for an election. The only difference

between the two is that "dual purpose" cards expressly set forth

the possibility of an election, while "pure" cards leave the point

implicit. That distinction was set out in NLRB v. Anchorage Times

Publishing Co., which reviewed an example of each:

[Pure Card] AUTHORIZATION FOR REPRESENTATION

I authorize the International Brotherhood of Electrical

Workers to represent me in collective bargaining with my

employer.

[Dual Purpose Card] I REQUEST A GOVERNMENT ELECTION

I, the undersigned of my own free will, hereby authorize

and designate the National Brotherhood of Electrical

Workers of the AFL-CIO and CLC to represent me in

collective bargaining with my employer in all matters

pertaining to rates of pay, hours of employment, and

other conditions of employment. This card is also for

the purpose of requesting the N.L.R.B. for an election.

637 F.2d 1359, 1362 n.2 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 835

(1981); see also id. at 1368 ("Both cards clearly and

unambiguously indicate the signer's intent to be represented by the

Union in collective bargaining.").

Not all cards, however, authorize a union to pursue

representative status through both voluntary recognition and an

NLRB-supervised election. The wording of the card itself may limit

the purpose for which it may be used. Specifically, "single

purpose election" cards indicate support for the union, but only

expressly call for an election, and do not carry any general

designation of the union as the signers' collective-bargaining

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representative. The affirmative representation on the cards' face

typically says that the signer "authorize[s] the union to petition

or request an NLRB election."

Finally, some cards have been identified as "ambiguous." Like

a "dual purpose" card, an "ambiguous" card includes language that

identifies both the employee's support for an election and her

general designation of the union as her collective-bargaining

representative. But such cards, by reason of either design or

content, fail to represent clearly that the employee supports both

eventualities. Specifically, this circuit deems cards to be

"ambiguous," rather than "dual purpose," if they do not "clearly

indicate[ ] on their face" the employee's desire to designate the

union as her bargaining representative. Amalgamated Clothing

Workers v. NLRB, 420 F.2d 1296, 1301-02 (D.C. Cir. 1969); see also

International Union, United Auto., Aero., & Ag. Implement Workers

of Am. v. NLRB, 363 F.2d 702, 705 (D.C. Cir.) ("To be sure, the

fine print at the bottom of the card says that it is for use in

support of a demand for recognition, "or for an NLRB election.'

But we agree with the Board that notwithstanding the fine print the

overall purpose of the card is clear."), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 973

(1966). In the Amalgamated Clothing case, for example, we

concluded that the union's authorization cards were ambiguous

because they set forth the employee's designation of the union as

her collective-bargaining representative and her support for an

election on opposite sides of the card. Accord NLRB v. Shelby Mfg.

Co., 390 F.2d 595, 596 (6th Cir. 1968).

In the case of "ambiguous" cards, we have allowed parol

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evidence about what was communicated to the employee to supplement

the language on the card in order to ascertain what the employees

intended by their signatures. "Ambiguous" cards may be utilized to

establish the union's majority support only if there is proof that

the signing employees were told by the union that the cards could

be used to establish the union's majority status even without an

election. Nissan Research & Development, 296 N.L.R.B. 598, 599,

132 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1169 (1989). If "the card [is] not clear on its

face as to its purpose, the "union must face the possibility that

the effectiveness of the cards may be undercut by parol testimony

showing that the purpose presented to the employees was that of

securing an election and that the purpose of union authorization

was not mentioned.' " Amalgamated Clothing, 420 F.2d at 1302

(citation omitted); see also Amalgamated Clothing Workers of Am.

v. NLRB, 365 F.2d 898, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ("When an authorization

card itself is unclear about its purpose and no reason is given an

employee for signing other than that "this card is to be used to

obtain an election,' the fair inference is that the only reason the

employee is signing is to obtain an election. In such

circumstances the card itself has so little thrust as signaling an

authorization intention, that its effectiveness for that purpose is

undercut even though the union representatives did not say in so

many words that its "only' purpose was to secure an election.").

With that background, we turn to the facts of this case.

C. Factual Background

Polyclinic Medical Center of Harrisburg is a provider of

medical services. Since the early 1970s, Pennsylvania Nurses

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Association ("PNA") has been the representative of a bargaining

unit consisting of Polyclinic's registered and licensed practical

nurses, now numbering approximately 600. The most recent

Polyclinic-PNA bargaining agreement ran from July 1, 1990 to June

30, 1993. Almost immediately after that agreement expired,

Polyclinic entered into a representation agreement with a different

union, Pennsylvania State Education Association-NEA ("PSEA").

Polyclinic's decision to withdraw recognition from PNA, and enter

into a new agreement with PSEA, gave rise to the charges in this

case.

Between May 28 and June 25, 1993, representatives of

Polyclinic and PNA met seven times in an attempt to negotiate an

extension to their soon-to-expire collective-bargaining agreement.

They failed, however, to come to an agreement before the June 30

contract termination date. An eighth meeting was scheduled for

July 1. When Polyclinic's attorney and chief negotiator, Norman

White, arrived at the meeting place shortly after 10:00 a.m. on

July 1, however, he noticed that the meeting-room signboard bore

the name "PPNA," rather than "PNA." White inquired about the

discrepancy, and two individuals whom he knew as members of the PNA

bargaining team told him that they had formed a new organization

entitled Polyclinic Professional Nurses Association ("PPNA"). They

also stated that PPNA's chief spokesperson was Debra Ferguson, who

had served as PNA's labor representative in the prior bargaining

sessions.

Still in the hotel lobby, White was then approached by Alfred

Nelson, the Director of Organization and Media Relations for PSEA.

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Nelson showed White a stack of cards, which he represented as

having been signed by a majority of Polyclinic's unit employees.

White declined to review the entire stack, but did examine a single

card. Its format was as follows:

THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE EDUCATION-NEA

Collective Negotiations Authorization Card

Name:

Position:

Date:

As an employee of the

I hereby designate and authorize the

PENNSYLVANIA STATE EDUCATION ASSOCIATION NEA, its agents or

representatives to petition for a bargaining agent election.

Signature

During the previous weeks, the cards had been distributed to unit

members by Nelson, the PNA rank-and-file bargaining committee, and

other individuals. Nelson's "best guess" is that he personally

solicited between 50 and 100 nurses to sign cards. Nelson also

distributed cards to bargaining-committee members, and instructed

them to tell nurses that the cards had two purposes: (1) to seek

an NLRB-supervised election; and (2) to request that Polyclinic

voluntarily recognize PSEA as the unit's bargaining representative.

In his conversation with White at the hotel on July 1, Nelson

explained that the cards were for "dual purpose recognition."

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Nelson therefore requested that Polyclinic recognize PSEA as the

nurses' bargaining agent. White in turn requested that Nelson have

a neutral third party check the cards against a list of unit

employees. Nelson agreed to do so, and White arranged to make

Polyclinic's payroll list available for that purpose. Later that

afternoon, a representative of the Pennsylvania Labor Relations

Board, Dr. Arnold Hillman, checked the PSEA cards against

Polyclinic's payroll list; of 582 unit employees, he concluded

that 339, a majority, had signed on.

After speaking with Nelson in the lobby, White traveled to a

meeting room, where he spoke briefly with PNA's Director of Labor

Relations, Michael Kirkpatrick. This was the first time the two

had met; the earlier Polyclinic-PNA negotiation sessions had

generally been led by White and Debra Ferguson. Kirkpatrick

informed White that PNA had fired Ferguson. He also maintained

that, though the Polyclinic-PNA collective-bargaining agreement had

expired, Polyclinic remained obligated to recognize PNA as the

presumptive representative of the employees, until it received

proof to the contrary. White agreed, and told Kirkpatrick that he

would continue negotiating with PNA until there was evidence that

PNA did not have the support of a majority of the bargaining unit's

members. White also informed Kirkpatrick that a PSEA

representative had just approached him, claiming to have bargaining

authority from a majority of the nurses, and that if PSEA could

establish its claim to majority status, White would recognize PSEA

rather than PNA. Kirkpatrick warned White that he would file

unfair labor practice charges if Polyclinic unlawfully withdrew

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recognition from PNA.

Soon thereafter (at around 11:00 a.m.), Kirkpatrick left the

bargaining site. "Within moments," White "started right in

negotiating" with the PPNA negotiating team, which included all of

the former members of the PNA team, led by Debra Ferguson. The

PPNA bargaining team did not contend at that point either that it

was supported by a majority of unit employees, or that it spoke on

behalf of PSEA.

White engaged in "concessionary bargaining" with PPNA from

before noon until 1:00 a.m. In late afternoon, he was informed of

Dr. Hillman's conclusion that a majority of unit employees had

signed the PSEA cards. At the end of the session, Polyclinic and

PPNA agreed on a preliminary "contract settlement agreement," which

Debra Ferguson signed on behalf of PPNA.

White then turned to the issue of PSEA's representation,

acknowledging that the cards had been signed by a majority of unit

employees. Accordingly, he wrote out a recognition agreement,

effective until June 30, 1995, which stated in part:

[A]s a result of the presentation of the cards and the

card check by Dr. Arnold Hillman, [Polyclinic] has

objective evidence that PNA is no longer the majority

representative of its employees in any appropriate unit

and that the union, PSEA, is the majority representative

of its employees in the unit formerly represented by PNA.

The agreement further stated that Polyclinic "hereby grants

recognition" to PSEA. In return, PSEA "accept[ed] the terms and

conditions of employment negotiated between [Polyclinic and PPNA]

... as the terms and conditions of its initial contract with

[Polyclinic]." The recognition agreement also included a

"maintenance-of-membership" clause, which provided:

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All employees who are, or shall become, members of [PSEA]

shall remain members over the full duration of this

Agreement, except an employee who joined [PSEA] may

resign her/his membership therein during the period of

fifteen (15) days prior to the expiration of this

Agreement.... [A]n employee shall be considered a member

of [PSEA] in good standing if the member timely tenders

her/his periodic dues. The payment of dues while a

member shall be deemed a condition of employment.

Nelson signed the agreement on behalf of PSEA.

PNA (as well as a local AFL-CIO chapter) filed charges with

the NLRB. The NLRB General Counsel investigated, and recommended

that the charges be pursued. A hearing was then held before an

administrative law judge ("ALJ"), who sustained the charges, and

the Board affirmed. The ALJ and Board ruled that petitioners had

engaged in a variety of unfair labor practices. First, Polyclinic

unlawfully refused to bargain with, and withdrew recognition from,

PNA at a time that PNA presumptively represented the unit

employees. NLRA § 8(a)(5), (1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (1).

Second, Polyclinic and PSEA entered into a collective-bargaining

agreement at a time that PSEA did not represent a majority of the

unit employees. See id. § 8(a)(2), (1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2), (1)

(employer); id. § 8(b)(1)(A), (2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A), (2)

(union). Finally, that agreement included a clause that coerced

employees into remaining members of PSEA, at a time that PSEA was

a minority union. See id. § 8(a)(3), (2), (1), 29 U.S.C. §

158(a)(3), (2), (1) (employer); § 8(b)(1)(A), (2), 29 U.S.C. §

158(b)(1)(A), (2) (union).

As a remedy, the Board ordered Polyclinic to recognize PNA,

rather than PSEA, at least until an election established the

nurses' support for an alternative representation arrangement. In

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addition, it required Polyclinic and PSEA to reimburse the

initiation fees and dues of PSEA members who had remained in the

union because of the maintenance-of-membership clause in the

Polyclinic-PSEA agreement.

D. Standard of Review

Polyclinic and PSEA petition for review of the Board's ruling,

and the Board cross-petitions for enforcement of its remedial

order. The NLRB's findings of fact are "conclusive" if supported

by substantial evidence on the record viewed as a whole, 29 U.S.C.

§ 160(e), and not arbitrary or otherwise contrary to established

law, International Union of Electronic, Elec., Salaried, Mach. &

Furniture Workers v. NLRB, 41 F.3d 1532, 1536 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

Thus, this court may not "displace the Board's choice between two

fairly conflicting views even though the court would justifiably

have made a different choice had the matter been before it de

novo." Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951).

Given that "the Board draws on a fund of knowledge and expertise

all its own," NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 612 n.32

(1969), "[w]e must also give great deference to the NLRB's

selection of remedy," Caterair Int'l v. NLRB, 22 F.3d 1114, 1120

(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 575 (1994). That said, it is

also clear that our review may not be so deferential as to act as

a rubber stamp for the Board's conclusions, Gold Coast Restaurant

Corp. v. NLRB, 995 F.3d 257, 263 (D.C. Cir. 1993), for our view of

the "substantiality of the evidence must take into account whatever

in the record fairly detracts from its weight," Universal Camera

Corp., 340 U.S. at 488.

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II. ANALYSIS

A. Polyclinic's Withdrawal of Recognition from PNA

1. Legal background

First we consider the Board's conclusion that Polyclinic

violated § 8(a)(5), (1) of the NLRA by summarily withdrawing

recognition from, and refusing to bargain with, PNA as the

exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the Polyclinic

nurses. A union that has been recognized by an employer enjoys a

rebuttable presumption of continuing majority support at the

expiration of the collective-bargaining agreement. NLRB v.

Creative Food Design Ltd., 852 F.2d 1295, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1988).

This presumption can, however, be overcome by proof that: (1) the

union did not in fact have majority support at the time recognition

was withdrawn; or (2) the employer had a good faith, objectively

based doubt about the union's majority support. NLRB v. Curtin

Matheson Scientific, 494 U.S. 775, 778 (1990).

Polyclinic contends that it had a good faith basis for

doubting PNA's majority status at the point that it ceased

negotiating with PNA. On this point, Polyclinic bears the burden

of proof. Allied Indus. Workers, AFL-CIO Local Union No. 289 v.

NLRB, 476 F.2d 868, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The good faith doubt

must have been based on objective considerations, known at the time

Polyclinic refused to bargain with PNA, and not arising from an

unfair labor practice aimed at causing employee disaffection with

PNA. Sullivan Indus. v. NLRB, 957 F.2d 890, 897-98 (D.C. Cir.

1992); Louisiana Dock Co., 297 N.L.R.B. 439, 133 L.R.R.M. (BNA)

1179 (1989).

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2. When did the withdrawal occur?

A threshold issue for us to address is the point in time at

which Polyclinic refused to bargain with, and withdrew recognition

from, PNA. In their briefs on appeal, both Polyclinic and the

Board assumed that the withdrawal occurred when White entered into

negotiations with the PPNA representatives. See Brief for NLRB at

9 ("Polyclinic withdrew recognition after it cancelled a final

bargaining session on July 1 ...."); id. at 15 ("Polyclinic

actually repudiated PNA when it broke off negotiations with PNA and

reached agreement with the upstart PPNA ...." (emphasis added));

Reply Brief for Polyclinic at 4 ("[T]he evidence in this case shows

that Polyclinic knew from the outset of the day when recognition

was withdrawn from PNA that PSEA and not PPNA was the driving force

behind the change in bargaining unit affiliation." (emphasis

added)). At oral argument, however, Polyclinic appeared to shift

ground, and contended that, technically, a refusal to bargain and

withdrawal of recognition did not occur until Polyclinic entered

into an agreement with PPNA at 1:00 a.m. We believe that

Polyclinic had it right in its brief.

White's own testimony before the ALJ plainly shows that he

refused to bargainin the most literal sense of that termwhen he

ended his conversation with the PNA official, Michael Kirkpatrick:

Q. Now isn't it true that when Mr. Kirkpatrick showed up

he told you that he was prepared to sit down and

negotiate with you at that time?

A. I wouldn't deny that. I don't remember him saying it,

but I'm sure if he says he said it, he did.

Q. He did in fact tell you that he represented PNA?

A. Oh, sure, yes.

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Q. And there was no doubt in your mind that he did

represent PNA.

A. Right. I'd never met him, but I knew his name.

Q. And is it true that you made it pretty clear to him

that you weren't going to sit down and negotiate with

him, but you were going to negotiate with that committee

that you'd been negotiating with?

A. That is correct.

Joint Appendix ("App.") at 48-49.

We further conclude that Polyclinic withdrew recognition from

PNA at that same point in time. White testified that he began

negotiating with PPNA, rather than PNA, because he believed that

PNA had lost its majority support. As he put it, "I dealt with the

people who in my judgment, in the judgment of our bargaining team,

in fact had the representative status of those nurses." App. at

50-51. The label of the particular organization was irrelevant:

I negotiated with the same group of people, no matter

what they wanted to call themselves, that I had been

dealing with all along. It was not one new face, and

they were all old faces in that room.

They chose to call themselves PPNA. They could have

called themselves the Boston Red Sox. I was going to

deal with those people because I had to get a contract.

App. at 47.

While Polyclinic did not formally withdraw recognition from

PNA until the 1:00 a.m. agreement with PPNA, we believe that

White's conduct and motivation in negotiating with PPNA constituted

a de facto withdrawal. A similar situation was presented in

Cargill, Inc. & Teamsters Local Union No. 769, 294 N.L.R.B. 867

(1989), in which an employer declined to bargain with an incumbent

union on the basis of a decertification petition signed by a

majority of unit employees. The Board concluded that the employer

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had unlawfully withdrawn recognition:

The totality of the [employer's] conduct persuades

us that the ... refusal to bargain was effectively a

withdrawal of recognition. First, both of the ...

refusals were based on the petition.... Further, it is

apparent ... that in the Respondent's view, the Union no

longer retained its status as the representative of the

unit employees.

Id. at 867; see also Exxel-Atmos, Inc. & United Steelworkers of

Am., 309 N.L.R.B. 1024, 1024 (1992) (withdrawal of recognition

occurred when employer who believed that election should be held

"refus[ed] to meet with the Union's full bargaining committee to

engage in any "formal' negotiations").

3. Was the withdrawal justified?

a. Authorization cards

The charges of unlawful withdrawal of recognition and refusal

to bargain therefore turn on the essentially factual question of

whether Polyclinic had sufficient information to overcome the

presumption of PNA's continued majority status when White abruptly

began negotiating with PPNA rather than PNA. According to

Polyclinic, White acted only after the conversation in the hotel

lobby in which Nelson presented White with the PSEA cards that

ostensibly showed that PSEA didand therefore PNA necessarily did

nothave majority support. But at the point White began

negotiating with PPNA, the only information he had about PSEA's

cards was Nelson's claim that they were signed by a majority of

unit employees; White himself had refused to review the cards,

requesting instead that Nelson have them examined by a neutral

third party. Cf. Allied Indus. Workers, 476 F.2d at 881 ("The

naked showing that a decertification petition has been filed, with

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no indication of the number of signatories or other related

matters, is an insufficient basis in fact for refusing to bargain

...." (emphasis added)). Critically, White began negotiating with

PPNA before he received the results of Dr. Hillman's card count.

See NLRB v. Pennco, Inc., 684 F.2d 340, 342 (6th Cir.)

("[S]ubsequent events cannot validate an improper withdrawal of

recognition."), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 994 (1982).

b. Defections from PNA

Polyclinic also contends that it had a good faith, objectively

based doubt about PNA's majority status given that the entire PNA

collective bargaining team had defected from PNA to form PPNA.

Polyclinic cites to two Board decisions that draw upon a variety of

circumstances in support of a finding that an employer held a

sufficient good faith doubt. Accord Celanese Corp., 95 N.L.R.B.

664, 673 (1951) ("By its very nature, the issue of whether an

employer has questioned a union's majority in good faith cannot be

resolved by resort to any simple formula. It can only be answered

in light of the totality of the circumstances involved in a

particular case."). But those cases involved much stronger indicia

of unit employees' disaffection with the incumbent union than is

present on these facts. As Polyclinic itself concedes, in

Alexander Muss & Sons, 274 N.L.R.B. 1330, 1330, 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA)

1629 (1985), "most of the employees once represented by the union

had been on strike for over one year and had been permanently

replaced, ... a majority of the current employees had signed

authorizations [sic] cards authorizing an outside union to

represent them for collective bargaining purposes, and ... the

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employees had given no indication of support for the incumbent

union." Brief for Polyclinic at 18. Similarly, in White Castle

Systems, 224 N.L.R.B. 1089, 1092, 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1591 (1976),

the union had been essentially inactive, union representatives

themselves had intimated that the union lacked majority support,

and a majority of employees had indicated to the employer that they

did not support the union. Accord International Medication Sys.,

253 N.L.R.B. 863, 868 n.23, 106 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1067 (1980)

(describing White Castle as involving "overwhelming" "objective"

evidence).

In this case, by contrast, at the time Polyclinic began

negotiating with PPNA, it lacked any indication of the degree or

extent of loss in support for PNA by the 582 unit employees (other

than the few, individual members of the bargaining committee),

except for the nonspecific knowledge that an unknown number had

signed authorization cards calling for a representation election.

See Peoples Gas System v. NLRB, 629 F.2d 35, 44 (D.C. Cir. 1980)

("Permitting what is essentially a subjective and speculative

interpretation of the probable meaning of particular behavior to

suffice as "objective' indicia of lack of majority support would

give too little weight to industrial stability, and would result in

repeated disruption of collective bargaining at its most critical

point, during the negotiation of new contracts."). White made no

effort to discern whether a majority of Polyclinic's 582 nurses

agreed with the committee's decision to abandon PNA before he began

negotiating with the new, self-appointed PPNA team.

In sum, Polyclinic failed to produce the " "clear, cogent, and

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convincing' showing" that this circuit requires of an employer

seeking to establish a good faith basis for nonrecognition of an

existing representative union. Williams Enters. v. NLRB, 956 F.2d

1226, 1234 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting St. Agnes Med. Ctr. v. NLRB,

871 F.2d 137, 145 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). Accord NLRB v. Koenig Iron

Works, 681 F.2d 130, 137 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that employers

"must come forward with easily verifiable and unambiguous evidence

supporting their belief that their employees have rejected the

incumbent union as bargaining agent"). Certainly, the Board's

conclusion that Polyclinic had an insufficient basis for any good

faith doubt is supported by substantial evidence on the record

viewed as a whole.

B. The Polyclinic-PSEA Agreement

1. Legal background

Polyclinic and PPNA agreed on a contract at 1:00 a.m.

Polyclinic then immediately executed a contract settlement with

PSEA that adopted the terms of its just-penned agreement with PPNA.

The NLRB concluded that Polyclinic and PSEA thereby violated the

NLRA, given that PSEA did not represent a majority of unit

employees for collective-bargaining purposes.

In contrast to Polyclinic's argument on the withdrawal charge

that it had an objectively based, good faith doubt about PNA's

majority status, on these charges involving affirmative recognition

of an allegedly minority union, the issue is whether PSEA had

majority status at the time Polyclinic and PSEA executed their

agreement. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB,

366 U.S. 731, 737-38 (1961). A threshold issue, however, is

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determining the proper burden of proof. According to PSEA, under

this court's decision in Teamsters National United Parcel Service

Negotiating Committee v. NLRB, the NLRB General Counsel bears the

burden of proving that PSEA was not in fact a majority union at the

time Polyclinic recognized it. 17 F.3d 1518, 1523 (D.C. Cir. 1994)

(citing Rainey Security Agency, 274 N.L.R.B. 269, 279 (1985);

American Beef Packers, 187 N.L.R.B. 996, 997 (1971), enf'd, 463

F.2d 818 (D.C. Cir. 1972)), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 722 (1995). 

Teamsters National, however, recognized that "[t]he General

Counsel's burden should be sensitively calibrated ... to the

context in which it must be carried," id., and expressly concluded

that certain presumptions could establish a prima facie case of

"unlawful recognition," id. at 1523-24. In fact, the prime example

drawn in Teamsters National was the presumption that an incumbent

union has continued majority support at the termination of a

collective-bargaining agreement. Id. at 1524. As applied to this

case, the presumption that PNA had continued majority support when

the Polyclinic-PNA agreement expired establishes the corollary

prima facie case that PSEA did not have majority support at that

point in time. Under Teamsters National, Polyclinic and PSEA

therefore bear the burden of rebutting that prima facie case by

producing "some reliable evidence of [PSEA's] majority status."

Id. If they successfully carry that burden, then the unlawful

recognition charge may be sustained only if the evidence presented

by the General Counsel establishes that PSEA was not supported by

a majority of the nurses. Id.

2. Authorization cards

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As we noted earlier, a union can attempt to prove that it has

the support of a majority of unit employees through "pure" or "dual

purpose" cards, or "ambiguous" cards so long as parol evidence

establishes that employees were informed that the cards could be

used to gain majority status without an election. The PSEA cards

at issue in this case are plainly not "pure" cards; they do not

state that their purpose is the designation of PSEA as the signers'

bargaining representative. For the same reason, they are not "dual

purpose" cards. A "dual purpose" card is simply a "pure" card that

in addition expressly states that the employee also supports

calling an NLRB-supervised election.

What remains is Polyclinic's defense that the cards are

"ambiguous," Brief for Polyclinic at 23; Reply Brief for

Polyclinic at 6 n.1, and that this court should accordingly

consider parol evidence that the nurses were told that they were

authorizing PSEA to seek voluntary recognition as well as an

election. The ambiguity that Polyclinic identifies is the

bold-type statement at the top of the cards: "Collective

Negotiations Authorization Card." Polyclinic, however, stretches

the term "ambiguous" far beyond its accepted meaning. An

"ambiguous" authorization card has the basic characteristics of a

"dual purpose" cardi.e., language found in both a "pure" and a

"single purpose election" cardbut some other factor detracts from

the card's clarity. Critically, the PSEA cards do not on their

face include any statemente.g., "I authorize PSEA to represent me

for the purpose of collective bargaining" or "I authorize and

designate PSEA to represent me in collective bargaining"clearly

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4It may be that the bold-type statement at the top of the

PSEA cards was designed to comply with the Board's reading of the

NLRA to require that even "single purpose election" cards include

some indication that the signer authorizes the union to represent

her. As the Board explained in the Nissan Research & Development

case:

[In] Levi Strauss & Co., 172 NLRB 732, 733 (1968), a

case involving a single-purpose authorization card[,

we] explained why the language of [NLRA §] 9(c)(1)(A)

renders a simple request for a representation election

legally insufficient to trigger the Board's processes

without some showing that "the employees wish to be

represented by a particular labor organization, a

requirement that entails an expression of intent in all

respects the same as that in an authorization card." 

Thus, as a practical matter, an ostensibly

single-purpose card requesting an election will

inevitably be a dual-purpose one, having some reference

to the union being the authorized bargaining agent for

the signatory employee. The conundrum is whether the

signatory employee is understood to have granted only

conditional representational authority for the purpose

of holding an election, or instead to have given

unreserved authority (which can be used to establish

the union's majority status without an election).

296 N.L.R.B. 598, 600 n.6, 132 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1169 (1989) (third

emphasis added). 

calculated to put the signing employee on notice that the card may

be used to establish the employee's support for PSEA's recognition

absent an election. Compare NLRB v. Fosdal, 367 F.2d 784, 786 (7th

Cir. 1966) (identifying "dual purpose" cards with heading "I WANT

AN NLRB ELECTION NOW! AUTHORIZATION FOR REPRESENTATION," but also

with affirmative statement that "I authorize the International

Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, to represent me in collective

bargaining with my employer").4 They are in the final analysis, at

least on their face, "single purpose election" cards.

That is not to say, however, that even with regard to such

cards, the Board would not consider parol evidence of

representations made by the union to signing employees that the

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cards had a "dual purpose." The Board did consider such evidence

here, and counsel for the Board took the position at oral argument

that such evidence was not irrelevant. That evidence, however,

would undoubtedly have to be extremely persuasive to overcome the

representations on the cards themselves. Cf. Gissel Packing, 395

U.S. at 606 ("[E]mployees should be bound by the clear language of

what they sign unless that language is deliberately and clearly

canceled by a union adherent with words calculated to direct the

signer to disregard and forget the language above his signature.").

The evidence presented in this case does not come close to

meeting that standard. Nelson testified that his "best guess" is

that he personally solicited cards from between 50 and 100 nurses,

far fewer than a majority. Moreover, while Nelson testified that

he spoke to those individuals "about card signing," there is no

evidence of what in particular he told them. Some of the remaining

unit employees were solicited by the members of PNA's bargaining

committee, whom Nelson says he instructed to tell prospective

signers that the cards had a "dual purpose." There is no evidence

from committee members, however, that they in fact followed that

instruction. Further, Nelson could not confirm what percentage of

the cards had been solicited by the bargaining committee, rather

than by other individuals to whom he had never spoken. Given these

substantial gaps in Nelson's testimony, the ALJ found Nelson's

conclusion that the Polyclinic employees knew they were signing

"dual purpose" cards to be "incredible and unsubstantiated." We

find that conclusion to be supported by substantial evidence.

"[T]he Board is one of those agencies presumably equipped or

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informed by experience to deal with a specialized field of

knowledge, and it would be difficult to imagine a topic more

clearly within this specialized field than the evaluation of the

significance of the circumstances under which authorization cards

are solicited." International Union, United Auto., Aero. & Ag.

Implement Workers of Am. v. NLRB, 392 F.2d 801, 808 (D.C. Cir.

1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 906 (1968) (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted).

Even if the PSEA cards, as supplemented by Nelson's testimony,

constituted sufficiently "reliable evidence" to overcome the

General Counsel's prima facie showing of unlawful recognition,

petitioners would nonetheless not prevail. The Board could still

properly conclude that petitioners' evidence did not overcome the

persuasive force of the evidence underlying the General Counsel's

prima facie case. Accordingly, the Board's conclusion that

petitioners violated NLRA § 8(a)(2), (1) and § 8(b)(1)(A), (2) by

entering into a collective-bargaining agreement shall be sustained.

C. The Maintenance-of-Membership Agreement

The final charges against petitioners involve the

maintenance-of-membership clause in the Polyclinic-PSEA agreement,

which provides that an employee who joined PSEA was required to

"remain a member ... for the duration of the collective-bargaining

agreement." The NLRB concluded that the clause unlawfully coerced

Polyclinic nurses who joined the union, but otherwise would have

resigned, into remaining members:

Inasmuch as the collective-bargaining agreement between

the Respondent Employer and the Respondent Union was

entered into at a time when it was not established that

the Respondent Union represented a majority of the unit

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5In its Reply Brief, PSEA suggests that, at the least, the

General Counsel should have been required to prove that PSEA had

at least one member at Polyclinic. "Not only was there no

evidence that any unit employee became a member of PSEA after the

execution of the collective bargaining agreement between [sic]

Polyclinic but there was, likewise, no evidence that any unit

employee joined PSEA prior to the execution of the collective

bargaining agreement and was thus forced to remain a member." 

PSEA Reply Brief at 3. Admittedly, there is no such evidence in

the record. But PSEA was the exclusive collective-bargaining

agent for Polyclinic's nurses for an entire year (from July 1,

1993 until the ALJ instituted a remedial order on June 30, 1994). 

Moreover, in response to the other charges in this case, PSEA

takes the contrary position that the 339 unit employees who

signed cards intended to designate PSEA to represent them in

collective bargaining. In these particular circumstances, had

PSEA wished to establish that it had no members, it could easily

have put on evidence to that effect in the administrative

proceedings. It did not do so, and for a good reason: at oral

argument, counsel for PSEA proffered to the court that PSEA does

in fact have members at Polyclinic. 

employees, the existence of the clause itself, without

more, unlawfully discriminates among employees by

encouraging membership in the Respondent Union.

PSEA contends that the Board's finding lacks substantial

evidence because the General Counsel failed to identify a single

individual who wished to resign from PSEA, but failed to do so

because of the maintenance-of-membership clause. Given that PSEA

was not the majority representative of the employees, however, we

do not believe that the Board was required to identify by name a

specific Polyclinic employee who was coerced into remaining a PSEA

member.5 The clause unquestionably discourages PSEA members from

resigning while the Polyclinic-PSEA agreement remains in force. It

therefore necessarily discriminated by encouraging Polyclinic

employees to remain members of a minority union. See 29 U.S.C. §

158(a)(3), (2), (1), id. § 158(b)(1)(A), (2); International Union

of Petro. & Indus. Workers v. NLRB, 980 F.2d 774, 778 (D.C. Cir.

1992) ("When an employer and a minority union enter into a contract

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that contains a union security provision, the employer violates

section 8(a)(3) of the Act, and the union violates section 8(b)(2)

of the Act."). PSEA is, however, correct that reimbursement is

owed only to those employees who retained their membership because

of the clause, but identifying which employees voluntarily stayed

in the union is an issue to be examined at the compliance stage,

not as part of the finding of a violation of the NLRA in the first

instance.

III. CONCLUSION

We conclude that the NLRB's finding that Polyclinic and PSEA

engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of the National

Labor Relations Act is supported by substantial evidence on the

record, and is consistent with established law.

Petitions denied; order enforced.

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