Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-18-11034/USCOURTS-ca5-18-11034-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kriss Ray Camp
Appellant
Elizabeth McGill
Appellee
Debora Rider
Appellee
Thelma Sanchez
Appellee
Christina Ubando
Appellee

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-11034

KRISS RAY CAMP, 

 Plaintiff−Appellant,

v.

ELIZABETH MCGILL, County Clerk, Tom Green County; CHRISTINA 

UBANDO, Chief Deputy Clerk, Tom Green County; DEBORA RIDER, 

Deputy Clerk, Tom Green County; THELMA SANCHEZ, Deputy Clerk, Tom 

Green County, 

 Defendants−Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 2:18-CV-81

Before OWEN, Chief Judge, and BARKSDALE and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Kriss Ray Camp, Texas prisoner # 140210, filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil 

rights action alleging that the defendants, employees of the Tom Green County 

Clerk’s Office, fabricated and altered trial documents relating to his state 

prosecution. The district court concluded that three of Camp’s previous civil 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 7, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 18-11034 Document: 00515261555 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/07/2020
No. 18-11034

2

rights actions had been dismissed as frivolous or for failure to state a claim. It 

dismissed the action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)’s “three strikes” provision, 

which bars a prisoner from future action in forma pauperis (IFP). Camp filed 

a timely Rule 59 motion to alter or amend the judgment, which the district 

court denied.1 Camp appealed both the dismissal of his action and the denial 

of his Rule 59 motion. Camp also moved to proceed IFP on appeal. The district 

court denied IFP status, certifying that Camp’s appeal was not taken in good 

faith. We granted IFP status, determining that Camp’s contention that the 

district court had erred in dismissing his claims under § 1915(g) was 

nonfrivolous.

In this appeal, Camp claims the district court wrongly dismissed his civil 

action under § 1915(g) based on an erroneous finding that his prior § 1983 

action in Camp v. Dobbs2 was entirely dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for 

failure to state a claim. Under § 1915(g), a prisoner is precluded from bringing 

a proceeding IFP if three or more of his prior civil actions brought while 

incarcerated or detained were “dismissed on the grounds that [they were]

frivolous, malicious, or fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical 

injury.”3 Importantly, “a strike does not issue when only some claims are 

dismissed on section 1915(g) grounds.”4 Rather, the entire case must have 

been dismissed for being frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a claim for 

which relief could be granted.5 Although our court has not expressly 

established a standard of review for a district court’s conclusion that a prior 

dismissal counts as a strike for purposes of § 1915(g), we review other 

 

1 See FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e). 2 No. 2:11-CV-0140, 2012 WL 75669 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 10, 2012).

3 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 4 Brown v. Megg, 857 F.3d 287, 288 (5th Cir. 2017). 5 Id. at 290-92.

Case: 18-11034 Document: 00515261555 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/07/2020
No. 18-11034

3

applications of this section de novo.6 Whether dismissal constitutes a strike is 

a purely legal question, so we join our sister circuits in reviewing the issue de 

novo.7

Camp argues that the dismissal of his prior action, Camp v. Dobbs,

should not count as a strike because the entire case was not dismissed as 

frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim. In that case, Camp raised

various claims relating to a criminal conviction and a related divorce 

proceeding. Camp later amended his complaint to include more claims and 

join more defendants. The district court treated Camp’s new claims as an 

amendment to his original complaint and found them—as well as his original 

claims—to be frivolous or to fail to state a claim for which relief could be 

granted.8

The question we must address is whether the district court dismissed 

Camp’s entire action for one of the reasons listed in § 1915(g) or whether it was 

only partially dismissed for those reasons. The confusion stems from the 

language at the end of the district court’s order. That order dismissed “the 

Civil Rights Complaint” with prejudice as frivolous and for failure to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted.9 But the court separately noted that 

 

6 See Jackson v. Johnson, 475 F.3d 261, 265 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (reviewing de 

novo whether the PLRA applied to a former prisoner based on his status at the time of filing); 

see also Ruiz v. Estelle, 161 F.3d 814, 819 (5th Cir. 1998) (reviewing de novo whether the 

PLRA provided legislators the right to intervene), abrogated on other grounds by Town of 

Chester, N.Y. v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1645 (2017). 7 See Ladeairous v. Sessions, 884 F.3d 1172, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (three strikes 

dismissal reviewed de novo); Mitchell v. Nobles, 873 F.3d 869, 873 (11th Cir. 2017) (same); 

Smith v. Veterans Admin., 636 F.3d 1306, 1309 (10th Cir. 2011) (same); Tolbert v. Stevenson, 

635 F.3d 646, 649 (4th Cir. 2011) (same); Tafari v. Hues, 473 F.3d 440, 442 (2d Cir. 2007)

(same); Owens v. Isaac, 487 F.3d 561, 563 (8th Cir. 2007) (same); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 

1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2005) (same); Evans v. Illinois Dept. of Corr., 150 F.3d 810, 811 (7th Cir. 

1998) (same). 

8 Camp v. Dobbs, No. 2:11-CV-0140, 2012 WL 75669, at *1-5 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 10, 2012).

9 Id. at *5.

Case: 18-11034 Document: 00515261555 Page: 3 Date Filed: 01/07/2020
No. 18-11034

4

it dismissed without prejudice Camp’s “claim of inadequate food while in jail.”10 

It is unclear from this portion of the order whether the district court intended 

to distinguish the inadequate food claim from the “Civil Rights Complaint.” 

Looking to the remainder of the order, in addressing the inadequate food 

claim, the district court noted that Camp’s “vague and global allegations are 

not sufficient to state a claim on which relief can be granted.”11 The district 

court then noted that, “[m]oreover, this claim is not properly joined with the 

claims originally asserted in this cause,” and admonished that “[Camp] may 

not avoid the three-strike provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act by 

pursuing a multitude of improperly-joined claims in a single cause.”12 

This language indicates that the inadequate food claim was dismissed 

on two independent grounds, one of which was for failure to state a claim. 

Looking to the order as a whole, we read the district court as referring to the 

entire action when it dismissed “the Civil Rights Complaint” as frivolous and 

for failure to state a claim and as merely stating an additional reason for 

dismissing the inadequate food claim. Section 1915(g) is intended to strike a 

“balance between deterring frivolous filings while maintaining access to the 

courts for facially valid claims.”13 In a case such as this, where the district 

court determined that the claim was not facially valid, it is proper to impose a 

strike. 

* * *

The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED. Camp’s motions for 

appointment of counsel, for an appeal conference and oral argument, for a 

 

10 Id.

11 Id. at *4. 12 Id. (emphasis added).

13 Brown v. Megg, 857 F.3d 287, 291 (5th Cir. 2017).

Case: 18-11034 Document: 00515261555 Page: 4 Date Filed: 01/07/2020
No. 18-11034

5

ruling on his motion to appoint counsel, and for the court to take judicial notice 

of case records are DENIED.

Case: 18-11034 Document: 00515261555 Page: 5 Date Filed: 01/07/2020