Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-50142/USCOURTS-ca9-14-50142-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Raul Guzman-Ibarez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

RAUL GUZMAN-IBAREZ, AKA Raul

Guzman, Raul Ibarez Guzman, Jr.,

Raul Ibarez, Raul Guzman Ibarez,

Jr., Little Playboy, Manuel Torres,

Miguel Duran Torres,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 14-50142

D.C. No.

2:12-cr-00843-

DMG-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Dolly M. Gee, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

June 2, 2015—Pasadena, California

Filed July 6, 2015

Before: Ferdinand F. Fernandez, Raymond C. Fisher,

and Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Fernandez;

Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Fisher

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2 UNITED STATES V. GUZMAN-IBAREZ

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel vacated a conviction and sentence for illegal

reentry after deportation or removal in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 1326 and remanded for the district court to consider

whether the defendant was prejudiced by the deprivation of

his due process rights in his removal proceeding.

The panel rejected the contention that the defendant’s due

process rights were violated because his first degree robbery

conviction did not qualify as an “aggravated felony” when his

immigration proceedings began in 1995, and therefore the

immigration judge (“IJ”) erred in finding him deportable

based on that offense. The panel held that the new definition

set forth in § 321(a) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and

Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”), making theft

offenses aggravated felonies so long as the defendant was

sentenced to one year or more in prison, rather than five years

or more, applied when the IJ acted in 1999 by entering a

removal order.

The panel held that the IJ erred when she failed to advise

the defendant of the possibility of relief under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(c). The panel explained that § 440(d) of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act was not

effective as to proceedings, such as the defendant’s, that had

commenced prior to the date of the Act’s enactment. In

addition, the provision of IIRIRA that eliminated relief under

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. GUZMAN-IBAREZ 3

§ 1182(c) did not apply to aliens, like the defendant, whose

proceedings had commenced before the enactment of IIRIRA. 

The panel vacated the defendant’s conviction and sentence

and remanded for the district court to consider whether he

was prejudiced by the deprivation of his due process rights in

his 1999 removal proceeding. The panel stated that if the

defendant was not prejudiced, then the district court could

reinstate his conviction and sentence. If the defendant was

prejudiced, then the district court must dismiss the

indictment.

The panel held that the IJ did not err or deprive the

defendant of due process when she failed to advise him of the

possibility of relief under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).

Judge Fisher concurred in Parts A and B of the opinion. 

Dissenting from Part C, he wrote that in addition to informing

the defendant about his eligibility for relief under § 1182(c),

the IJ should have advised him of his apparent eligibility for

§ 1182(h) relief.

COUNSEL

James H. Locklin (argued), Deputy Federal Public Defender;

Hilary L. Potashner, Federal Public Defender, Federal Public

Defender’s Office, Los Angeles, California, for DefendantAppellant.

Cassie D. Palmer (argued), Assistant United States

Attorney, General Crimes Section; Stephanie Yonekura,

Acting United States Attorney; Robert E. Dugdale, Assistant

United States Attorney, Chief, Criminal Division, Office of

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4 UNITED STATES V. GUZMAN-IBAREZ

the United States Attorney, Los Angeles, California, for

Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judge:

Raul Guzman-Ibarez appeals his conviction and sentence

for illegal reentry after deportation or removal. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326. Specifically, he asserts that his indictment should

have been dismissed by the district court because he was

denied due process at his deportation hearing on August 25,

1999, which precludes use of the deportation order in a

criminal proceeding. See id. § 1326(d). We vacate his

conviction and sentence and remand.

BACKGROUND

Guzman was born in Mexico, but came to the United

States in 1979, when he was about six years old. He became

a Legal Permanent Resident (“LPR”) on July 13, 1989. He

was far from being a perfect peregrine; rather, he committed

numerous crimes and on December 21, 1995, a deportation

proceeding was initiated against him. Undeterred, he

committed a robbery in California, was convicted of first

degree robbery1on February 14, 1997, and was sentenced to

four years’ imprisonment as a result. Because state criminal

proceedings necessitated a delay in the deportation

proceeding, it was administratively closed in 1997. Guzman

served his term, and the deportation proceeding was

 

1

See Cal. Penal Code §§ 211, 212.5(a).

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UNITED STATES V. GUZMAN-IBAREZ 5

reopened. On August 12, 1999, the robbery conviction was

added to the charges supporting his deportation. On August

25, 1999, the immigration judge (IJ) found that he was

deportable as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony

(8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)) and a firearm offense

(8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C)), and that he was ineligible for

discretionary relief based upon his robbery conviction. 

Guzman waived his right to appeal. He was deported.2

Guzman paid no more attention to the laws of the United

States than he paid to the laws of the State of California; he

reentered and was deported again in 2000, 2002, 2004 and

2010 based on the initial 1999 deportation. But ours is a

patient polity, and it was not until Guzman was found here in

July of 2012 that the current criminal proceeding was

commenced against him for violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a).

Guzman moved to dismiss the indictment on the basis that

his due process rights had been violated in the 1999

deportation proceeding because he had not been informed of

the availability of potential discretionary relief under the

provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (Immigration and

Nationality Act (“INA”) § 212(c)), and 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)

(INA § 212(h)). The district court denied the motion, found

Guzman guilty of the offense charged, and sentenced him to

imprisonment for 33 months. This appeal followed.

JURISDICTION AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

§ 3231. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

2 We recognize that removal is the term used currently, but we use

deportation throughout to avoid any undue complexity or confusion.

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6 UNITED STATES V. GUZMAN-IBAREZ

We review de novo a collateral attack on a prior

deportation order in a prosecution under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. 

See United States v. Vidal-Mendoza, 705 F.3d 1012, 1014

(9th Cir. 2013). We may affirm the district court’s denial of

a motion to dismiss an indictment on any basis supported by

the record. See United States v. Davis, 336 F.3d 920, 922

(9th Cir. 2003).

DISCUSSION

The parties agree that if neither the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,

110 Stat. 1214 (“AEDPA”) nor the Illegal Immigration

Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.

No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009–546 (“IIRIRA”) had been

enacted, Guzman would not have stood convicted of an

aggravated felony under the law as it previously existed3and

would have been entitled to consideration for waiver of

deportation.4

Thus, as is true of the situation of many LPRs, timing in

this case is everything. To briefly recapitulate the timeline

here: deportation proceedings commenced December 21,

1995; the AEDPA was enacted April 24, 1996;5IIRIRA was

enacted September 30, 1996;6 Guzman was convicted and

sentenced for first degree robbery February 14, 1997;

 

3

See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (1995).

 

4

See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c), (h) (1995).

 

5

 We will say more about effective dates hereafter.

 

6

Supra n.5.

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UNITED STATES V. GUZMAN-IBAREZ 7

Guzman was ordered deported August 25, 1999. Guzman’s

motion to dismiss the indictment depends upon his ability to

challenge the validity of his deportation order. That is

constrained by the provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d).

Essentially, when the IJ violates the “duty under [8

C.F.R.] § 1240.11(a)(2) to inform the alien of his or her

apparent eligibility to apply for certain discretionary relief [,

that] may be the centerpiece of a collateral challenge under

§ 1326(d).” Vidal-Mendoza, 705 F.3d at 1016 (internal

quotation marks omitted); see also 8 C.F.R. § 240.11(a)(2)

(1999). More specifically, in order to challenge a removal

order in a proceeding under § 1326, a defendant must first

demonstrate that he “exhausted any administrative remedies

that may have been available to seek relief against the order.” 

Id. § 1326(d)(1). Where, as here, a defendant contends that

“the IJ has failed to provide information about apparent

eligibility for relief, we excuse the alien from demonstrating

that the alien exhausted any administrative remedies that may

have been available.” Vidal-Mendoza, 705 F.3d at 1015

(internal quotation marks omitted). Next, a defendant must

demonstrate that the deportation proceedings in which the

order was issued improperly “‘deprived [him] of the

opportunity for judicial review.’” Id.; see also 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326(d)(2). An IJ’s failure to inform an alien regarding

apparent eligibility for relief deprives the alien of the

opportunity for judicial review. See Vidal-Mendoza,

705 F.3d at 1015. Finally, a defendant must demonstrate that

“the entry of the order was fundamentally unfair.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326(d)(3). An underlying deportation order is

fundamentally unfair if: (1) the defendant’s “due process

rights were violated by defects in his underlying deportation

proceeding, and (2) he suffered prejudice as a result of the

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8 UNITED STATES V. GUZMAN-IBAREZ

defects.” See Vidal-Mendoza, 705 F.3d at 1015–16 (internal

quotation marks omitted).

Guzman asserts that the IJ did, indeed, fail to properly

advise him regarding his eligibility for relief. He also argues

that the IJ’s basis for finding him deportable was

fundamentally flawed.

(A) Aggravated Felony

Guzman asserts for the first time on appeal that his due

process rights were violated because his first degree robbery

conviction did not qualify as an “aggravated felony” when his

immigration proceedings began in 1995, and therefore the IJ

erred in finding him deportable pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) based on that offense.7 We disagree.

Because he did not raise that specific issue before trial or

show good cause for not having done so, we would normally

treat the issue as waived. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3),

(c)(3); United States v. Anderson, 472 F.3d 662, 669–70 (9th

Cir. 2006); United States v. Murrillo, 288 F.3d 1126, 1135

(9th Cir. 2002). However, because the issue is basically a

pure issue of law and, more importantly, because we must

consider the aggravated felony question in any event, we will

review the issue. See United States v. Flores-Montano,

424 F.3d 1044, 1047 (9th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).

 

7

 The parties agree that Guzman was not deportable on the basis of the

concealed weapon offense. Thus, we do not further consider that issue at

this time, except to note that upon remand the district court should not rely

upon that offense either.

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UNITED STATES V. GUZMAN-IBAREZ 9

When the proceeding against Guzman commenced in

1995, a theft offense, like robbery, was an aggravated felony

if the term of imprisonment imposed upon the defendant was

at least five years. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (1995). 

Under that provision, his robbery conviction would not

constitute an aggravated felony because he was sentenced to

a term of four years. However, before he pled guilty to the

robbery offense, IIRIRA § 321(a) made theft offenses

aggravated felonies so long as the defendant was sentenced

to one year or more in prison, rather than five years or more. 

See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (1996). That new definition

applies to convictions “before, on, or after the date of

enactment.” IIRIRA § 321(b). Moreover, as we have

previously determined, the new definition applies when an IJ

takes action “on or after the date of the enactment.” Id. at (c);

see also Park v. INS, 252 F.3d 1018, 1025 (9th Cir. 2001)

overruled on other grounds by Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales,

466 F.3d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc); Ortiz v. INS,

179 F.3d 1148, 1155–56 (9th Cir. 1999); ValderramaFonseca v. INS, 116 F.3d 853, 854–56 (9th Cir. 1997).8 As

we have said: “‘actions taken’ refers to orders and decisions

issued against an alien by the Attorney General acting

through the BIA or Immigration Judge. This makes logical

and practical sense, as ‘actions taken’ is easily understood to

encompass things done by an agency to an alien.” 

Valderrama-Fonseca, 116 F.3d at 856.

8 Guzman asks that we overrule our prior cases which explain the

meaning of “actions taken.” See Saqr v. Holder, 580 F.3d 414, 422 (6th

Cir. 2009) (holding that the phrase refers to the commencement of a

proceeding only). That, of course, we cannot do. See Avagyan v. Holder,

646 F.3d 672, 677 (9th Cir. 2011).

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10 UNITED STATES V. GUZMAN-IBAREZ

Therefore, by the time the IJ acted on August 25, 1999, by

entering a removal order, she correctly decided that

Guzman’s robbery conviction was an aggravated felony

because the term of imprisonment for his offense exceeded

one year.

(B) INA § 212(c) Relief

Guzman next argues that the IJ erred, and violated his due

process rights, when she failed to advise him of the

possibility of relief under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (INA § 212(c)). 

We agree that the IJ erred. See United States v. Muro-Inclan,

249 F.3d 1180, 1183–84 (9th Cir. 2001).

When the proceedings against Guzman commenced,

consideration for waiver of deportation pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(c) (1995) (INA § 212(c)) was available.9 However,

the AEDPA was enacted a few months later and under its

provisions § 1182(c) was amended to entirely eliminate the

phrase “served for such felony . . . a term of imprisonment of

at least 5 years.” AEDPA § 440(d). However, as we have

previously held, the § 440(d) provision was not effective as

to proceedings which had commenced prior to the date of its

enactment. See Magana-Pizano v. INS, 200 F.3d 603, 611

(9th Cir. 1999). In other words, when Guzman pled guilty to

9 The section provided for discretionary relief, but excluded relief for

“an alien who has been convicted of one or more aggravated felonies and

has served for such felony or felonies a term of imprisonment of at least

5 years.”

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UNITED STATES V. GUZMAN-IBAREZ 11

first degree robbery, the protections previously offered by

§ 1182(c) remained in full force and effect.10

By the time Guzman pled guilty, IIRIRA had also been

enacted and it eliminated relief under § 1182(c) (INA

§ 212(c)). IIRIRA § 304(b). However, that provision did not

apply to aliens, like Guzman, whose proceedings had

commenced before the enactment of IIRIRA. See Pascua v.

Holder, 641 F.3d 316, 321 (9th Cir. 2011).

In other words, at the time Guzman pled guilty, for him

the § 1182(c) relief provision was “in full bloom, [and] the

amending and repealing statutes did not retroactively take

away that provision.” United States v. Leon-Paz, 340 F.3d

1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 2003).

In short, the IJ erred when she failed to tell Guzman of the

possibility that § 1182(c) (INA § 212(c)) relief was available;

that violated his due process rights. Moreover, “the district

court erred when it held to the contrary.” Leon-Paz, 340 F.3d

at 1007.

10 We recognize that at that time and at the time the IJ acted, the Board

of Immigration Appeals (BIA) had determined that the provisions of

§ 440(d) did apply to cases like Guzman’s. See In re Soriano, 21 I. & N.

Dec. 516, 519 (B.I.A. 1996) overruled by Magana-Pizano, 200 F.3d at

611 n.11. Nevertheless, the IJ knew, or should have known, that we had

not yet addressed the retroactivity question and, therefore, that the BIA’s

ruling did not obviate her duty to inform Guzman of the § 1182(c)

possibility. See Vidal-Mendoza, 705 F.3d at 1017–18, 1018 n.6. 

(“Because only the federal courts, and not the BIA, have the authority to

determine a ‘question ofstatutory retroactivity,’ the IJ’s duty to inform an

alien of a ‘reasonable possibility’ of the continued availability of § 212(c)

relief was not eliminated by the BIA’s conclusion on this issue.” 

(citations omitted)).

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12 UNITED STATES V. GUZMAN-IBAREZ

That leaves the issue of prejudice to be resolved. The

issue was not addressed by the district court, but should now

be considered by it. See id. As we declared in Leon-Paz, id.:

We, therefore, vacate [Guzman’s] conviction

and sentence, and remand the case to the

district court so that it can consider whether

[Guzman] was prejudiced by the deprivation

of his due process rights in his [1999] removal

proceeding. If he was not prejudiced, the

district court may reinstate the conviction and

sentence. If he was prejudiced, the district

court must dismiss the indictment.

(C) INA § 212(h) Relief

Guzman finally argues that the IJ erred, and violated his

due process rights, when she failed to advise him of the

possibility of relief under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (INA

§ 212(h)).11 We do not agree.

Because he had committed an aggravated felony, that

would preclude him from relief if he was an LPR who had

been “lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(h) (1999) (INA § 212(h)). Guzman was not admitted

11 The section as modified by IIRIRA § 348 provides for waiver of

inadmissibility for aliens whose denial of admission “would result in

extreme hardship to [a] United States citizen or lawfully resident spouse,

parent, son or daughter ofsuch alien.” § 1182(h)(1)(B). But: “No waiver

shall be granted under this subsection in the case of an alien who has

previously been admitted to the United States as an alien lawfully

admitted for permanent residence if . . . since the date of such admission

the alien has been convicted of an aggravated felony.” § 1182(h) (closing

paragraph).

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UNITED STATES V. GUZMAN-IBAREZ 13

as an LPR; he became one some ten years after he entered the

United States. Nevertheless, commencing before the IJ

decided Guzman’s case12and for over a decade thereafter, the

BIA interpreted that phrase to include those who were

accorded LPR status after their admission.13 According to

that interpretation, Guzman would not be eligible for

§ 1182(h) consideration. But in 2010, we decided that

“admitted” meant what that word normally means, that is, at

entry only; it did not include those who later become LPRs on

one basis or another. See Negrete-Ramirez v. Holder,

741 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Hing Sum v.

Holder, 602 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2010). We do not

question that decision14

and it certainlywould entitle Guzman

to § 1182(h) consideration if he were before the IJ at this

time.

12

See In re Rosas-Ramirez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 616, 618–19 (B.I.A. 1999)

(interpreting the phrase as used in INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii)); see also

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20).

13 See In re Koljenovic, 25 I. & N. Dec. 219, 220–21 (B.I.A. 2010)

(interpreting the phrase in INA § 212(h) specifically), overruled by In re

J-H-J-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 563, 564–65 (BIA 2015) (withdrawing from

decision in light of “overwhelming circuit court authority”).

14 Interestingly enough, we had previously interpreted the phrase to

encompass those who were lawfully admitted at any time; not just at entry. 

See Garcia-Quintero v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 1006, 1015 (9th Cir. 2006);

Shivaraman v. Ashcroft, 360 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2004);

Ocampo-Duran v. Ashcroft, 254 F.3d 1133, 1134–35 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Like Rosas-Ramirez, those cases were not considering § 212(h) as such. 

We mention them here solely for the purpose of pointing out that the

restriction which we later discovered in the language of § 212(h), which

limited that section to those who were admitted as LPRs at the border, was

far from obvious ten years earlier.

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14 UNITED STATES V. GUZMAN-IBAREZ

However, what we are concerned with here is whether the

IJ had to predict that possibility when she advised Guzman of

his rights in 1999. We think not. As we have previously

declared, with narrow exceptions,15“an IJ’s duty is limited to

informing an alien of a reasonable possibility that the alien is

eligible for relief at the time of the hearing.” United States v.

Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d 894, 895 (9th Cir. 2010) (en

banc). The change wrought by our decision was one of

substantive law about which clairvoyance could not have

been expected of the IJ. See Vidal-Mendoza, 705 F.3d at

1017; Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d at 900. Thus, Guzman’s

due process rights were not violated when the IJ failed to

advise him of possible relief under § 212(h). The IJ could not

have been expected to know that relief might be possible

under the circumstances.

CONCLUSION

While we do not intend to vilipend legislative efforts in

this area of the law, we must say that, as is all too often the

case, it has taken a good deal of concentrated praxis to wend

our waythrough the maze of overlapping statutorycommands

that affect the seemingly simple question of whether an IJ

was a seer who could discover what Guzman had to be told

at the time of his hearing before her. We have determined

that the IJ correctly decided that Guzman’s robbery

conviction was an aggravated felony, and did not err when

she failed to inform him that he might be entitled to relief

under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (INA § 212(h)). However, she did

err when she failed to inform him that he might be entitled to

relief under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (INA § 212(c)). Thus,

15 See discussion in part (B) of this opinion regarding the narrow

exception for retroactivity decisions.

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UNITED STATES V. GUZMAN-IBAREZ 15

because he was denied due process in that respect, if he was

also prejudiced as a result, the indictment for violation of

8 U.S.C. § 1326 must be dismissed. Therefore, we vacate his

conviction and sentence and remand to the district court for

further proceedings.

VACATED and REMANDED.

FISHER, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in

part:

I concur fully in Parts A and B of the opinion, but I

respectfully disagree with the analysis in Part C. In addition

to informing Guzman about his eligibility for § 212(c) relief,

the IJ should have advised him he was eligible for § 212(h)

relief.

Section 212(h) prohibits relief only for “an alien who has

previously been admitted to the United States as an alien

lawfully admitted for permanent residence if . . . since the

date of such admission the alien has been convicted of an

aggravated felony.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (emphasis added). 

Relying on In re Rosas-Ramirez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 616, 618–19

(BIA 1999), the opinion concludes the IJ had no obligation to

inform Guzman of his eligibility for § 212(h) relief because

the term “admitted” includes adjustments of status.

Rosas is inapposite. There, the BIA analyzed the

meaning of “admission” in the specific statutory context of

INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), which

provides that “[a]ny alien who is convicted of an aggravated

felony at any time after admission is deportable.” 22 I. & N.

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16 UNITED STATES V. GUZMAN-IBAREZ

at 617 (emphasis added). The BIA concluded “the reference

in section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act to ‘after admission’

includes both those aliens who are ‘admitted’ at the time of

entry . . . as well as those who are ‘lawfully admitted for

permanent residence.’” Id. at 623. Under this definition, the

BIA held “the respondent’s adjustment of status . . .

constituted an ‘admission’ to the United States as that term is

used in section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii).” Id. (emphasis added). 

Immediately after this sentence, the BIA included a footnote

in which it stated: “We do not here attempt to resolve the

meaning of ‘admission’ in other contexts.” Id. at 623 n.5.1

Unlike the provision interpreted in Rosas, § 212(h)

contains both the terms “previously been admitted” and

“lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” Under the

INA’s own definitions – of which the IJ presiding over

Guzman’s hearing would have undoubtedly been aware –

these terms have different meanings. “Admitted” means “the

lawful entry of an alien into the United States after inspection

and authorization,” see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A), whereas

“lawfullybeen admitted for permanent residence” means “the

status of having been lawfully accorded the privilege of

residing permanently in the United States,” see 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(20). If an adjustment of status could constitute an

“admission” under § 212(h), as the opinion concludes, the

phrase “previously been admitted” in § 212(h) would be

superfluous. The provision could simply have prohibited

relief for “an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence

if, since the date of such admission, the alien has been

1 Only in 2010 did the BIA explicitly extend Rosas to the § 212(h)

context. See Matter of Koljenovic, 25 I. & N. 25 I. & N. Dec. 219, 222

(BIA 2010), withdrawn by Matter of J-H-J-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 563 (BIA

2015).

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UNITED STATES V. GUZMAN-IBAREZ 17

convicted of an aggravated felony.” But § 212(h) refers to

“an alien who has previously been admitted to the United

States as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence,”

meaning a noncitizen who was granted lawful entry into the

United States as a lawful permanent resident. Under this

reading, Guzman could not have fallen within the purview of

§ 212(h)’s prohibition because he had not entered the United

States as an LPR.

Given the significant difference in the statutory provision

interpreted in Rosas and the one at issue here, the IJ had a

duty to inform Guzman of his apparent eligibility for § 212(h)

relief under the INA’s own definitions of the relevant terms. 

“We have interpreted ‘apparent eligibility’ to mean ‘where

the record, fairly reviewed by an individual who is intimately

familiar with the immigration laws – as IJs no doubt are –

raises a reasonable possibility that the petitioner may be

eligible for relief.’” United States v. Lopez-Velasquez,

629 F.3d 894, 896 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (emphasis

added). Here, the IJ was faced with a situation in which the

INA’s own definitions of the relevant terms compelled the

conclusion that Guzman remained eligible for 212(h) relief,

whereas the interpretation of “admission” in Rosas merely

suggested Guzman might not be eligible, if the BIA chose to

extend that interpretation to the context of 212(h), which it

had not done.

The opinion relies on Lopez-Velasquez and VidalMendoza for the proposition that the IJ could not have been

expected to inform Guzman of his eligibility for § 212(h)

relief. But in those cases, our ex post interpretation of the

relevant statutory term upended the definition that governed

at the time of the hearing. For example, in United States v.

Vidal-Mendoza, 705 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2013), the petitioner

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18 UNITED STATES V. GUZMAN-IBAREZ

argued his conviction for third-degree rape did not constitute

“sexual abuse of a minor” under an en banc decision

postdating his removal order. Id. at 1019. We rejected the

petitioner’s argument, concluding the decision “deviat[ed]

from longstanding Ninth Circuit and BIA precedent,” and

therefore the IJ could not have been expected to advise the

petitioner about it. See id. at 1020 (internal quotation marks

omitted). Similarly, in Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d at 894, we

concluded the definition of “domicile” in a decision

postdating the petitioner’s removal was a “deviation” from

established precedent, and therefore the IJ did not erroneously

advise the petitioner he was ineligible for certain relief. Id.

at 898.

In Vidal-Mendoza and Lopez-Velasquez, the IJ could not

have been reasonably expected to inform the petitioners they

were eligible for such relief because they were

unquestionably ineligible under governing law at the time of

their proceedings. Here, by contrast, Rosas’ interpretation of

an entirely different statutory provision did not govern in the

context of § 212(h), and the definitions contained within the

INA required concluding that Guzman was eligible for such

relief. Under these circumstances, I cannot agree that “[t]he

IJ could not have been expected to know that relief might be

possible.”

At the time of Guzman’s hearing, § 212(h) relief was

“reasonably possible” under the statutory definitions, and the

IJ should have so advised him. I would therefore hold the

removal order is constitutionally infirm both on § 212(c) and

§ 212(h) grounds.

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