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Parties Involved:
Miguel Martinez-Cigarroa
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH FILED 

t1decl States Court of Appesb Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 2 4 1995 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

MIGUEL MARTINEZ-CIGARROA, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

No. 93-2232 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. CR-92-565-JB) 

Submitted on the briefs:* 

Michael G. Katz, Federal Public Defender, and James P. Moran, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for 

Defendant-Appellant. 

John J. Kelly, United States Attorney, and Kelly H. Burnham, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Las Cruces, New Mexico, for 

Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, McKAY and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge. 

* After exam1n1ng the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously to grant the parties' request for a 

decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(f) and lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

Appellate Case: 93-2232 Document: 01019290352 Date Filed: 01/24/1995 Page: 1 
Appellant Miguel Martinez-Cigarroa was convicted on two 

counts of transportation of illegal aliens in violation of 8 

U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1) (B) and aiding and abetting in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 2. Mr. Martinez-Cigarroa filed a pretrial motion to suppress certain evidence. The district court initially granted the 

motion to suppress, but upon the government's motion for reconsideration the court reversed its initial ruling and held the 

disputed evidence admissible. Mr. Martinez-Cigarroa appeals from 

the denial of his motion to suppress.1 We affirm. 

I. 

On November 20, 1992, United States Border Patrol Agent Jose 

Alvarado was on roving patrol, travelling south on Highway 185 in 

submitted without oral argument. 

1 The government argues that Mr. Martinez-Cigarroa did not preserve this issue for appeal because he failed to renew his 

objection to the admission of the evidence at trial. Mr. 

Martinez-Cigarroa's motion to suppress encompassed "any and all 

evidence which arose from the stop" of the Thunderbird. Rec., 

vol. I, doc. 40, at 1. While the substance of the motion 

concentrated on the spousal privilege argument, the district court 

sua sponte raised the questions of the warrantless stop of the van 

and the car, and the argument at the hearing focused on these 

issues. The district court was thus fully aware of the basis for 

suppression urged by Mr. Martinez-Cigarroa on appeal. "[T]he 

overruling of a pretrial motion to suppress the use at the trial 

of particular evidence preserves the point and renders it 

unnecessary again to object when such evidence is offered at the 

trial. I! Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 353 (1958); United 

States v. Layne, 973 F.2d 1417, 1420 n.4 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. 

denied, 113 S. Ct. 1011 (1993). The issue is therefore properly 

before us. 

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Appellate Case: 93-2232 Document: 01019290352 Date Filed: 01/24/1995 Page: 2 
Dona Ana County, New Mexico, when he observed a white van travelling north. Agent Alvarado testified that as he passed the white 

van he observed that the driver of the van was gripping the 

steering wheel tightly and was looking straight ahead. Agent 

Alvarado observed that the van had tinted rear windows and bore 

temporary Texas license plates. Based on his experience that 

smugglers of illegal aliens often use vehicles with temporary 

license plates, his observations of the driver, and the fact that 

highway 185 is often used to circumvent a border patrol checkpoint 

on Interstate 25, Agent Alvarado became suspicious and turned to 

follow the van. As he did so, Agent Alvarado testified, the van 

drastically reduced its speed and drifted from left to right. As 

Agent Alvarado continued to follow the van, he observed a gold 

Ford Thunderbird stopped by the side of the road. He testified 

that the occupant of the Thunderbird appeared to show "great 

interest" in the van and the border patrol car.2 Agent Alvarado 

stopped the van and discovered several illegal aliens therein. At 

that point, he radioed to other border patrol agents that he suspected the gold Thunderbird was a scout car for the van, and 

requested that the vehicle be stopped. Another border patrol 

officer, Agent Clinton, observed a gold Thunderbird travelling 

north on Interstate 25 and stopped it in response to Agent 

2 On cross-examination, Agent Alvarado modified this statement, 

testifying that the occupant of the Thunderbird actually showed "a 

little bit more interest than the average citizen would." Rec., 

vol. II, Suppression Hearing at 16. Agent Alvarado also testified 

that, in his experience, the general public "will pay some 

attention to our marked vehicles." Id. The car's occupant thus 

apparently showed "a little bit more than some interest" in the 

passing cars, but not "a great deal" of interest. 

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Appellate Case: 93-2232 Document: 01019290352 Date Filed: 01/24/1995 Page: 3 
Alvarado's request. The driver of the Thunderbird was Mr. 

Martinez-Cigarroa. Mr. Martinez-Cigarroa was arrested, and inside 

the car the border patrol agents found a notebook with the names 

of individuals corresponding to those of the illegal aliens 

discovered in the white van. 

Prior to trial, Mr. Martinez-Cigarroa filed a motion to suppress "any and all evidence which arose from the stop of a 1984 

Gold Thunderbird, driven by Miguel Martinez-Cigarroa, at milepost 

19, on I-25, North of Radium Springs." Rec., vol. I, doc. 40 at 

1. The premise of the motion was a violation of spousal 

privilege. At the hearing on the motion, however, the district 

court sua sponte raised the issue of the warrantless stop of the 

van and the car. The arguments at the hearing focused on this 

issue. At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court found 

that the stop of the van was illegal. The court also found that 

at the time the van was stopped, there was no proper basis for 

believing that the van and the Thunderbird were in any way 

connected. In its motion for reconsideration, the government 

argued that Mr. Martinez-Cigarroa lacked standing to contest the 

stopping of the van, but that because of the court's decision to 

raise the issue sua sponte at the hearing on the motion to 

suppress, the standing issue had not been properly presented. The 

district court agreed and vacated its earlier grant of Mr. 

Martinez-Cigarroa's motion to suppress, ordering that arguments on 

Mr. Martinez-Cigarroa's standing to contest the stopping of the 

van be heard on April 14, 1993. At that hearing, which was 

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Appellate Case: 93-2232 Document: 01019290352 Date Filed: 01/24/1995 Page: 4 
actually held on April 19, the court quickly concluded that Mr. 

Martinez-Cigarroa lacked standing to contest the stop of the van 

and denied the motion to suppress. On appeal, Mr. MartinezCigarroa does not contest the district court's denial of the 

motion to suppress with respect to evidence obtained from the 

stopping of the van. Rather, he contends that the notebook found 

in the gold Thunderbird, containing the names of the illegal 

aliens found in the van, should have been suppressed because the 

agents lacked reasonable suspicion to stop his car. 

II. 

On appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress, we accept 

the trial court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous, and 

we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

government. United States v. McAlpine, 919 F.2d 1461, 1463 (lOth 

Cir. 1990). Questions of law, including the ultimate 

determination of the reasonableness of a search under the Fourth 

Amendment, are reviewed de novo. United States v. Neu, 879 F.2d 

805, 807 (lOth Cir. 1989). 

It is settled law that border patrol agents on roving patrol 

"may stop vehicles only if they are aware of specific articulable 

facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that 

reasonably warrant suspicion that the vehicles" are involved in 

criminal activity. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 

884 (1975) . Here, we are concerned with ascertaining whether this 

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Appellate Case: 93-2232 Document: 01019290352 Date Filed: 01/24/1995 Page: 5 
test was met with respect to the gold Thunderbird. Accordingly, 

we must examine the specific articulable facts and the rational 

inferences to be drawn from them that might justify Agent 

Alvarado's decision to order the Thunderbird stopped.3 The 

government cites three articulable facts justifying the stop. 

These three facts, as found by the district court, are: 1) the 

car's occupant showed an interest in the passing van and the 

border patrol vehicle; 2) Agent Alvarado observed green out-ofstate license plates resembling Colorado plates on the 

Thunderbird; and 3) Agent Alvarado did not recognize the 

Thunderbird as a local vehicle.4 Agent Alvarado was "entitled to 

assess the[se] facts in light of his experience," Brignoni-Ponce, 

442 U.S. at 885, and we must assess his decision to have the 

Thunderbird stopped in light of the "totality of the 

circumstances." United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8 {1988). 

3 The government contends that another agent, Agent Martinez, 

actually ordered the Thunderbird stopped, and that Agent Martinez 

had additional information justifying the stop which was not 

available to Agent Alvarado. The district court found as a matter 

of fact that it was Agent Alvarado who ordered the Thunderbird 

stopped. "Agent Clinton also verifies that the T-Bird was stopped 

merely because -- or on the advice and information provided by 

Agent Alvarado. . . . [I]t's somewhat confusing, but it appears 

to the Court that whatever information Agent Martinez had at that 

time, he never conveyed that information to Agent Alvarado nor to 

Agent Clinton before the stop was made." Rec., vol. II, 

Suppression Hearing at 56-57. We agree with the District Court 

that the testimony is somewhat confusing, but we cannot say that 

the Court's finding is clearly erroneous. Accordingly, any 

additional information available to Agent Martinez is irrelevant 

to whether Agent Alvarado had sufficient grounds to order the stop 

of the Thunderbird. 

4 The government argues that the district court erred in finding that these three facts were the only facts available to Agent 

Alvarado when he ordered the Thunderbird stopped. We are not 

persuaded that the district court's findings in this regard are 

clearly erroneous. 

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Appellate Case: 93-2232 Document: 01019290352 Date Filed: 01/24/1995 Page: 6 
In performing this analysis, we must examine the facts individually in their context to determine whether rational inferences can 

be drawn from them which support the line of suspicion under 

investigation. See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884-85; Terry v. 

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-23 (1968). In other words, each fact must 

either be rationally suspicious in itself, or, despite being 

innocent on its face, must be rationally suspicious when viewed in 

context with the other articulable facts. 

Here, the first arguably suspicious fact is the interest that 

the occupant of the Thunderbird allegedly showed in the passing 

van and border patrol vehicle. This interest is at least equally 

consistent with the reaction that might be expected from one whose 

car had broken down and who was hoping for some assistance. 

Moreover we note Agent Alvarado's testimony that the general 

public shows at least 11 some 11 interest in passing border patrol 

cars. Taking this fact in the light most favorable to the 

government, however, we conclude that it provides some slight 

support for Agent Alvarado's decision to stop the vehicle. 

However, we cannot conclude that the other two facts, the out-ofstate license plates and Agent Alvarado's inability to identify 

the Thunderbird as a local vehicle, contribute measurably to the 

analysis. First, they are actually two different formulations of 

the same fact: a vehicle with out-of-state license plates is by 

definition not a local vehicle. Second, while out-of-state 

license plates may be a relevant consideration in some circumstances, see. e.g., United States v. Barbee, 968 F.2d 1026, 1029 

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Appellate Case: 93-2232 Document: 01019290352 Date Filed: 01/24/1995 Page: 7 
(lOth Cir. 1992), this factor in and of itself is not 

significantly probative of illegal activity and adds little to the 

reasonable suspicion equation, see United States v. Monsisvais, 

907 F.2d 987, 991 (lOth Cir. 1990). Therefore, the only arguably 

significant articulable fact before us upon which the decision to 

stop the Thunderbird could rationally have been based was the 

interest shown by its occupant in the passing van and the border 

patrol vehicle. Even if we add the marginally significant fact 

that the Thunderbird bore out-of-state license plates, the 

Brignoni-Ponce test is not met. Consequently, Agent Alvarado 

lacked reasonable suspicion to order the Thunderbird stopped, and 

the stop therefore violated the Fourth Amendment. The district 

court accordingly erred in denying Mr. Martinez-Cigarroa's motion 

to suppress the evidence found in his car. 

III. 

Having determined that the district court erred in admitting 

the notebook containing the names of the illegal aliens, we must 

now consider whether the error was harmless. In performing this 

analysis, we ask "not whether, in a trial that occurred without 

the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but 

whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was 

surely unattributable to the error." Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 

S. Ct. 2078, 2081 (1993); United States v. March, 999 F.2d 456, 

463 (lOth Cir. 1993). We will reverse unless the state can show 

"beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not 

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Appellate Case: 93-2232 Document: 01019290352 Date Filed: 01/24/1995 Page: 8 
contribute to the verdict obtained." Sullivan, 113 S. Ct. at 2081 

(quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). 

Considering the trial record as a whole, we conclude that the 

introduction of the notebook was harmless beyond a reasonable 

doubt. We base our decision on the following evidence. Two of 

the illegal aliens discovered in the van identified Mr. MartinezCigarroa as the man who met them in Mexico to help them enter the 

United States illegally. One of these aliens testified that Mr. 

Martinez-Cigarroa drove him to the river in a gold Ford which he 

identified as the gold Thunderbird Agent Alvarez believed to be 

the scout car. A used car salesman testified that Mr. MartinezCigarroa had purchased the van using a different name. Agent 

Martinez testified Agent Alvarez told him that Alvarez remembered 

the Thunderbird from one of his prior lookouts. One of the other 

agents testified as to Mr. Martinez-Cigarroa's involvement in a 

large illegal-alien smuggling operation based on information the 

agent had received from Mr. Martinez-Cigarroa's wife. It is true 

that Mr. Martinez-Cigarroa's wife denied on the stand that her 

husband was involved in alien smuggling, explaining that she had 

set him up because she was angry. Even accepting her testimony, 

the remaining evidence is strong enough to render harmless beyond 

a reasonable doubt the admission of the list of the alien's names 

and hotels found in the Thunderbird. In view of the direct 

testimony of the two aliens identifying Mr. Martinez-Cigarroa and 

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Appellate Case: 93-2232 Document: 01019290352 Date Filed: 01/24/1995 Page: 9 
placing him at their hotels, the list naming them and their hotels 

must be considered cumulative to the testimony of those two 

individuals. 

We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 

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Appellate Case: 93-2232 Document: 01019290352 Date Filed: 01/24/1995 Page: 10 
No. 93-2232, United States of America v. Miguel Martinez-Cigarroa 

McKAY, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 

I agree with all of the court's opinion except Part III. 

Because I do not believe that the error was harmless, I 

respectfully dissent. 

Appellate Case: 93-2232 Document: 01019290352 Date Filed: 01/24/1995 Page: 11 
Appellate Case: 93-2232 Document: 01019290352 Date Filed: 01/24/1995 Page: 12 
No. 93-2232, United States v. Martinez-Cigarroa 

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge, concurring. 

I concur in this court's affirmance of the district court. 

However, I write separately because I believe the district court 

correctly found Agent Alvarado's stop of the Thunderbird was 

founded upon reasonable suspicion. I would affirm that finding 

for the reasons that follow. 

This court correctly notes that we must employ a 

totality-of-the-circumstances approach to determine whether the 

stop was based on reasonable suspicion. See United States v. 

Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8 (1989). Under the 

totality-of-the-circumstances approach, we consider whether the 

articulated facts in aggregate support the stop. See id. at 9. 

Even if each fact, viewed separately, "is not by itself proof of 

any illegal conduct," the facts considered as a whole may 

nonetheless "amount to reasonable suspicion." Id.; see also Terry 

v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968) (noting that "a series of acts, 

each of them perhaps innocent in itself . . . taken together 

warranted further investigation"). Therefore, in employing the 

totality-of-the-circumstances approach, we do not "pigeonhole each 

purported fact as either consistent with innocent travel or 

manifestly suspicious." United States v. Lopez-Martinez, 25 F.3d 

1481, .1484 (lOth Cir. 1994). Rather, we consider whether the 

individual facts in aggregate yield reasonable suspicion. Id. 

In the instant case, the government articulates three facts 

in support of the stop: 1) Defendant displayed unusual interest 

in the van and border patrol vehicle; (2) the Thunderbird bore 

Appellate Case: 93-2232 Document: 01019290352 Date Filed: 01/24/1995 Page: 13 
out-of-state license plates; and (3) Agent Alvarado did not 

recognize the Thunderbird as a local vehicle. 

Purporting to apply the totality-of-the-circumstances 

approach, this court individually discredits each fact articulated 

by the government, and ignores the sum of the three. Indeed, this 

court simply "pigeonhole[s] each purported fact as either 

consistent with innocent travel or manifestly suspicious," id., in 

contravention of the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. I 

conclude that each fact supports the stop and, in aggregate, 

yields reasonable suspicion. 

First, this court acknowledges Defendant's interest in the 

van supported the stop. This court characterizes the support as 

"slight," however, reasoning that Defendant's interest in the van 

"is at least equally consistent with the reaction that might be 

expected from one whose car had broken down and who was hoping for 

some assistance." Op. at This reasoning is purely 

hypothetical, however, and discounts the ability of a trained law 

enforcement officer to distinguish between innocent and suspicious 

actions. See Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 8 (law enforcement officers 

entitled to make "common-sense conclusions about human behavior") 

(quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418)); Lopez-Martinez, 25 F.3d at 

1484 ("Supreme Court has expressly acknowledged law enforcement 

officers' prerogative to perceive and articulate meaning in 

actions that, to the untrained observer, appear innocuous.") 

(citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 & n.2 (1979)). Based on 

his experience as a law enforcement officer and his on-the-scene 

observations, Agent Alvarado determined that Defendant's 

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Appellate Case: 93-2232 Document: 01019290352 Date Filed: 01/24/1995 Page: 14 
above-average interest in the van was suspicious. Under Sokolow, 

Agent Alvarado was entitled to draw such a conclusion, and I 

believe his on-the-scene determination provides much support for 

the stop. 

Next, this court concludes the fact that the Thunderbird bore 

out-of-state plates "adds little to the reasonable suspicion 

equation." Op. at __ . Further, this court dismisses out-of-hand 

the fact that Agent Alvarado did not recognize the Thunderbird as 

a local vehicle. To dismiss both facts, this court subsumes them 

into one fact saying they "are actually two different formulations 

of the same fact .... " Op. at As a result, this court 

considers only the Thunderbird's out-of-state license plates, 

which appears rather benign standing alone. This analysis 

misapplies the totality-of-the-circumstances test. 

When both facts are considered together, it is clear Agent 

Alvarado was properly suspicious of the facts that the Thunderbird 

bore out-of-state plates and that he did not recognize the 

Thunderbird as a local vehicle. These two facts, considered 

together with Defendant's interest in the van, support the stop. 

See United States v. Leyba, 627 F.2d 1059, 1064 (lOth Cir.) ("That 

the vehicle bore out-of-state plates . is ... entitled to 

some limited consideration because agent Martinez did not 

recognize the vehicle as local traffic from the area."), cert. 

denied, 449 U.S. 987 (1980). 

In sum, this court purports to apply the 

totality-of-the-circumstances test. However, in doing so the 

court gives too little weight to each fact and no weight to the 

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sum of the three. See Lopez-Martinez, 25 F.3d at 1487 

(considering facts in isolation "ignores the Supreme Court's 

direction to examine 'the whole picture'"). When all three 

articulated facts are considered together, as they must be under 

the totality-of-the-circumstances approach, and viewed in the 

light most favorable to the government, they provide ample support 

for Agent Alvarado's decision to stop the Thunderbird. See 

Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885 (driver's behavior and aspects of 

vehicle are factors that may justify reasonable suspicion). Thus, 

I believe the district court did not err in concluding Agent 

Alvarado based his decision to stop the Thunderbird upon 

reasonable suspicion. I would affirm the district court's denial 

of Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence found in the 

Thunderbird. I would therefore not reach the harmless error 

analysis. I concur in the result. 

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