Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-06822/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-06822-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ann Chapman
Defendant
Eleanor Lindquist
Plaintiff
Jeffrey C. Lindquist
Defendant
Jeff Payne
Defendant
Robert Vanden Bos
Defendant
Vanden Bos & Chapman
Defendant
Ian R. Yourtz
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ELEANOR LINDQUIST,

Plaintiff,

 v.

ANN CHAPMAN, ROBERT VANDEN BOS,

VANDEN BOS & CHAPMAN, A Law Firm,

JEFF PAYNE, IAN R. YOURTZ, JEFFREY

C. LINDQUIST and FIRST DOE THROUGH

TENTH DOE, Inclusive,

Defendants. /

No. C 06-06822 WHA

ORDER GRANTING MOTION 

TO DISMISS AND VACATING

HEARING

INTRODUCTION

This matter arises out of facts surrounding plaintiff Eleanor Lindquist’s attempt to

recover spousal-support payments from her former husband, defendant Jeffrey Lindquist. 

Defendant Ian Yourtz has filed a motion to dismiss alleging, among other things, that this Court

lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff filed no opposition. For the reasons stated below,

defendant’s motion is GRANTED.

STATEMENT

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges six causes of action: (1) malicious prosecution, (2) fraud

and deceit, (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (4) negligent infliction of emotional

distress, (5) conspiracy, and (6) violation of RICO statutes. Plaintiff’s claims arise out of

activities of lawyers in two proceedings: (1) bankruptcy proceedings in the District of Oregon

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For the Northern District of California

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against debtor Jeffrey Lindquist, and (2) the dissolution of plaintiff’s marriage to Mr. Lindquist

in San Mateo County Superior Court. Defendant Yourtz was Mr. Lindquist’s attorney in the

family law proceedings.

On June 17, 2005, the Oregon Bankruptcy Court issued an order staying any family-law

proceedings that might be initiated by plaintiff. On January 17, 2006, at plaintiff’s request, a

hearing was held in San Mateo County on spousal support. Yourtz asserted that the bankruptcy

court’s order automatically stayed all of plaintiff’s access to the family law court. The San

Mateo County Commissioner honored the bankruptcy court’s order and awakened defendant

Yourtz $1,000 in sanctions against plaintiff. 

Immediately thereafter, plaintiff filed an emergency petition to the Ninth Circuit for

relief from the bankruptcy stay. On January 30, 2006, the Ninth Circuit granted plaintiff’s

motion to vacate the stay order issued by the bankruptcy court. Upon receipt of the Ninth

Circuit’s order, the bankruptcy court issued a new order, dated January 31, 2006, stating that

plaintiff could proceed for the spousal support but could not apply for property division. The

San Mateo County Commissioner vacated the $1000 sanctions order but held that because Mr.

Lindquist no longer worked, plaintiff could not receive any spousal support.

Four months later, on May 25, 2006, the Ninth Circuit vacated the bankruptcy court’s

January 31 order. The bankruptcy court was directed to enter an order granting: (1) relief from

the automatic bankruptcy stay for any proceedings regarding the dissolution of marriage

between plaintiff and Mr. Lindquist; (2) the establishment or modification of an order for

domestic support obligations, including but not limited to payment of health insurance

premiums; or (3) a division of community property, except to the extent that such proceeding

sought to determine the division of property that was the property of the bankruptcy estate

(Compl. General Allegations; ¶ 8, Exhs. A, B, C).

Plaintiff attempts to state claims against Mr. Lindquist and several attorneys and law

firms who represented Mr. Lindquist in the bankruptcy and family law proceedings. In the first

five claims, plaintiff contends that the attorney defendants used the bankruptcy court’s order

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staying family-law proceedings against plaintiff knowing that it was “invalid.” Plaintiff alleges

that when defendant Yourtz offered the bankruptcy court’s order to the San Mateo County

Superior Court at the January 17 hearing, he knew it was an “illegal order and beyond the scope

of the jurisdiction of the Oregon Bankruptcy Court.” Plaintiff’s sixth claim alleges a violation

of civil RICO statutes, alleging that defendants engaged in acts constituting mail and wire fraud,

aider and abettor liability, and fraud connected with sections of the United States Code

exempting family law matters from the automatic bankruptcy stay. Plaintiff asserts these claims

based on: defendant Chapman’s mailing of a letter to plaintiff on February 10, 2006, mailing an

opposition to relief from the bankruptcy court’s stay, mailing a motion for summary judgment,

mailing an opposition to the petition for a writ of mandamus, mailing of objections for priority

claim status in bankruptcy, mailing of correspondence and other documents contesting the

priority claim status of plaintiff’s claim, and mailing of the bankruptcy court’s June 2005 order

to defendant Yourtz knowing it was “invalid” (Compl. ¶ 6, 26, 66).

Defendant Ian Yourtz filed a motion to dismiss this action on December 18, 2006, and

noticed the motion for hearing on January 25, 2007. Plaintiff’s opposition was thus due on

January 4. On December 29, plaintiff’s counsel filed a request for an extension of time to

review the motion to dismiss, in part due to a planned vacation to Florida. The Court postponed

until January 18 plaintiff’s deadline for filing an opposition to the motion, with hearing on the

motion continued to February 8. Plaintiff has still not filed any opposition. Soon after the

deadline had passed for plaintiff’s opposition, the Court’s staff contacted plaintiff’s counsel,

who indicated that he intended to file an amended complaint. None has been received. 

ANALYSIS

Defendants have moved to dismiss this action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. “[I]n reviewing a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to

dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, [a court must] take the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint as

true.” Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004). The party seeking to invoke the

Court’s jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing subject-matter jurisdiction. It is presumed

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that this Court lacks jurisdiction until plaintiff proves otherwise. See Kokkonen v. Guardian

Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Plaintiff alleges that both federal question and

diversity jurisdiction exist. For the reasons stated below, this order disagrees.

“In order to invoke federal jurisdiction ‘for the purposes of determining whether [the

plaintiff] stated a cause of action on which relief could be granted,’ the complaint must fulfill

only two criteria: (1) it must ‘claim a right to recover under the Constitution and laws of the

United States,’ and (2) the claim must not be ‘wholly insubstantial and frivolous.’” Keniston v.

Roberts, 717 F.2d 1295, 1298 (9th Cir. 1983). Plaintiff’s sixth claim, brought under the civil

RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. 1962, is her only claim brought under a federal statute. This order

holds that plaintiff’s civil RICO claim is wholly insubstantial and frivolous. 

To state a civil RICO claim, plaintiff must allege: (1) conduct, (2) of an enterprise, (3)

through a pattern, (4) of racketeering activity, (5) causing injury to plaintiff’s business or

property. See Chang v. Chen, 80 F.3d 1293, 1298–00 (9th Cir. 1996). It appears that plaintiff

contends that by mailing various documents following the bankruptcy court’s order granting a

stay, defendants were involved in an “enterprise” conducting a “pattern of racketeering

activity.” The Ninth Circuit has held that to be an “enterprise, an entity must exhibit ‘some sort

of structure . . . for the making of decisions, whether it be hierarchical or consensual.” Id. at

1299. Plaintiff has alleged no facts to establish that defendant Yourtz is an “enterprise” or is

otherwise involved with a RICO enterprise. Additionally, there are no facts alleging that

defendant Yourtz — or any other defendant — was involved in a “pattern” of “racketeering

activity” causing injury to plaintiff. As the Ninth Circuit has stated, “a plaintiff seeking civil

damages for a violation of § 1962(a) must allege facts tending to show that he or she was

injured by the use or investment of racketeering income.” Wagh v. Metris Direct, Inc., 363 F.3d

821, 828 (9th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff’s complaint states no claim regarding how plaintiff was

injured “by the use or investment of racketeering income.” It is clear that plaintiff has failed to

state a civil RICO claim. Moreover, the Court can imagine no circumstances under which the

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*

 In his motion, defendant Yourtz states that he also is a resident of California. Without any sworn

declaration in support however, this order will rely only on the face of the complaint and its exhibits.

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facts as pled could be amended to state such a claim. Plaintiff’s civil RICO claim is

insubstantial and frivolous.

Plaintiff’s remaining claims are state common-law claims. Because she only stated a

frivolous federal claim, the only remaining basis for jurisdiction in this Court could be diversity

of citizenship, which plaintiff’s complaint alleges exists. In order for this Court to exercise

diversity jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims, each defendant must be a citizen of a different state

from plaintiff. See Owen Equip. and Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 (1978). Here,

plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts in the complaint to rebut the presumption against

jurisdiction. Plaintiff has not alleged the citizenship of each and every party so that the Court

may consider whether complete diversity exists. This alone is sufficient to find diversity

jurisdiction lacking. See Schwarzer, et al., California Practice Guide: Federal Civil Procedure

Before Trial 2:541 (“In diversity cases, this requires allegations [in the complaint] as to the

citizenship of each party (since all defendants must be citizens of different states than any

plaintiff).”).

Moreover, it appears from the complaint that plaintiff and Mr. Lindquist both reside in

California. In an exhibit to the complaint, plaintiff submitted a letter addressed to her which

indicates her address, at least at the time the letter was written in 2005, was in San Mateo,

California. Paragraph 3 of the complaint indicates that Mr. Lindquist is “probably a domiciliary

of California” and that he is “on the jury rolls of San Mateo County for jury service.” This also

demonstrates that plaintiff has failed to rebut the presumption that diversity jurisdiction does

not exist.*

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this order finds subject-matter jurisdiction lacking over this

matter. The allegations of any federal claim are wholly insubstantial and frivolous. There are

insufficient allegations to support diversity jurisdiction. For these reasons, and because of

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plaintiff’s failure to oppose, defendant Yourtz’s motion to dismiss is accordingly GRANTED. If

she wishes to amend her complaint, plaintiff must file a motion for leave to amend by NOON on

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 2007. Failure to file by that date may be grounds for dismissal for

failure to prosecute. Finding no argument necessary, the hearing on this motion is hereby

VACATED. The case management conference will proceed as scheduled on FEBRUARY 8, 2007.

In light of this ruling, the pending motion to dismiss filed by defendants Ann Chapman,

Robert Vanden Bos, Jeffrey Payne, and Vanden Bos & Chapman, LLP is MOOT. This order

does not disturb, however, the pending motion for Rule 11 sanctions against plaintiff’s counsel,

which is still scheduled for hearing on February 22, 2007. Plaintiff’s counsel is reminded that

an opposition to that motion was due on February 1. None has been received.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 6, 2007. WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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