Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caeb-2_16-ap-02134/USCOURTS-caeb-2_16-ap-02134-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael D. McGranahan
Plaintiff
Sylvia Mae Kinerson
Defendant
Stanley G. Laffranchini
Defendant

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SACRAMENTO DIVISION

In re

SYLVIA MAE KINERSON,

Debtor.

 

MICHAEL D. MCGRANAHAN, 

Chapter 7 Trustee,

Plaintiff,

vs.

SYLVIA MAE KINERSON and STANLEY

G. LAFFRANCHINI,

Defendants.

 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

)

) 

)

 

Case No. 16-22163-A-7

Adv. No. 16-02134

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff Michael D. McGranahan is the chapter 7 trustee in

the bankruptcy case filed by debtor and defendant Sylvia Mae

Kinerson. He seeks to avoid a transfer of an undivided 50%

Filed 12/04/17 Case 16-02134 Doc 96
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

interest in residential real property by defendant Kinerson to

her son, defendant Stanley G. Laffranchini.

This avoidance action was consolidated for a court trial on

September 6 and 7, 2017, with a second adversary proceeding, Case

No. 16-2160, in which the plaintiff seeks the denial of defendant

Kinerson's chapter 7 discharge on the ground that she made a

false oath when she failed to disclose the transfer of the

subject property to defendant Laffranchini.

This court has jurisdiction over this adversary proceeding

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157, and 1334. This is a core

proceeding within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 157(B)(2)(H), in

which the court has the constitutional power to enter a final

judgment.

Findings of Fact

1. The subject property is located at 955 Ebbetts Avenue,

Manteca, California and is described as "Lot sixty-three (63), as

shown upon Map entitled, TRACT No. 1128, SEQUOIA HOMESITES, UNIT

No. 4, filed for record January 28, 1976, in Vol. 21 of Maps and

Plats, Page 59, San Joaquin County Records" (hereafter, “the

property” or “subject property”). Defendant Kinerson purchased

it in 1977.

2. Defendant Kinerson married Lawrence Kinerson in 1990.

3. Mick Kinerson is the only child of Lawrence. Defendant

Laffranchini is the only child of defendant Kinerson.

4. On September 5, 2000, defendant Kinerson signed a grant

deed transferring an undivided one-half interest in the subject

property to defendant Laffranchini. This grant deed was recorded

2

Filed 12/04/17 Case 16-02134 Doc 96
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

on September 11, 2000. As a result of this transfer, defendant

Kinerson and defendant Laffranchini each owned a 50% undivided

interest in the subject property as joint tenants. The plaintiff

does not seek to avoid this transfer.

5. In connection with the 2000 transfer, on September 5,

2000 defendant Kinerson signed a Preliminary Change of Ownership

Report indicating that the transfer was between a parent and

child. In addition, both defendant Kinerson and defendant

Laffranchini signed and filed with the San Joaquin County

Assessor a Claim for Reassessment Exclusion for Transfer Between

Parent and Child. This document, signed under penalty of

perjury, confirmed that defendant Kinerson transferred a 50%

interest in the subject property to defendant Laffranchini. 

6. In 2003, defendant Kinerson and defendant Laffranchini

established a $183,254 line of credit with Washington Mutual Bank

using the subject property as collateral. In the deed of trust

for this loan, recorded on November 12, 2003, defendant Kinerson

and defendant Laffranchini represented that they were the

co-owners of the subject property.

7. Defendant Kinerson and Lawrence Kinerson filed joint

federal tax returns for the years 2007 and 2008 wherein they

reported rental income and expenses for the subject property.

8. Defendant Kinerson admitted at trial that she collected

rent for the subject property after granting her son an interest

in it.

9. In 2010, defendant Laffranchini filed a declaration in

his divorce action stating under penalty of perjury that he and

defendant Kinerson each were entitled to one-half of the rents

3

Filed 12/04/17 Case 16-02134 Doc 96
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

from the property.

10. The foregoing clearly indicates that defendant Kinerson

continued to own an undivided 50% interest in the subject

property after the 2000 conveyance. As a result of this

transfer, the defendants became co-owners of the property.

11. The court does not believe the testimony of defendant

Kinerson and defendant Laffranchini to the effect that the 2000

grant deed transferred or was intended to transfer a 100%

interest to defendant Laffranchini in exchange for his payment of

$75,000.00 to defendant Kinerson together with his agreement to

shoulder the responsibility for repaying a $20,000 encumbrance on

the property. This consideration, totaling approximately

$95,000, was given for a 50% interest only. And, the assertion

that defendant Kinerson transferred a 100% is flatly contradicted

by the defendants' representations to the assessor and their

division of the rents derived from the property.

12. Further, while no party introduced evidence of the

market value of the property at the time of the 2000 transfer,

the court notes that the $183,254 line of credit obtained by both

defendants in 2003 strongly suggests that the $95,000 in

consideration given by defendant Laffranchini was for one-half of

defendant Kinerson's interest in the property.

13. Lawrence Kinerson died on November 7, 2009. 

Approximately two months before he died, Lawrence Kinerson filed

a petition to dissolve his marriage with defendant Kinerson. 

However, no divorce was granted prior to his death.

14. Lawrence Kinserson died intestate. Over defendant

Kinerson's objection, Mick Kinerson was appointed personal

4

Filed 12/04/17 Case 16-02134 Doc 96
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

representative of the probate estate (the "administrator") by the

Merced County Superior Court.

15. Defendant Kinerson filed a spousal property petition in

the Merced County Superior Court.

16. The administrator filed a petition under Cal. Probate

Code § 850 to confirm assets of the probate estate. Defendant

Kinerson's spousal property petition was consolidated for trial

with the administrator's petition. Cyril Lawrence, attorney at

law, represented defendant Kinerson.

17. Defendant Kinerson and the administrator were locked in

litigation for approximately three years. After a six-day court

trial conducted in November and December 2013, on July 10, 2014,

the Merced County Superior Court entered a judgment largely in

the administrator's favor.

18. Therefore, the Merced County Superior Court awarded the

administrator his reasonable attorney's fees and costs pursuant

to Probate Code § 859 and Welfare and Institutions Code § 15657.5

based upon the court's finding that "Sylvia [Kinerson] and/or her

son [defendant Laffranchini] unabashedly testified at trial about

financial schemes involving unrecorded cash transactions,

manipulation of multiple bank accounts, shifting of assets and

potential money laundering, tax evasion, perjury, and conspiracy

to hide marital assets in dissolution proceedings."

19. On July 11, 2014, the administrator filed a Memorandum

of Costs in the probate case.

20. Over defendant Kinerson's objection, the administrator

was awarded costs of $11,278.20. These costs remain unpaid.

21. As of July 8, 2014, the administrator had incurred

5

Filed 12/04/17 Case 16-02134 Doc 96
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

attorney's fees in excess of $400,000. However, the probate

court has not yet determined whether defendant Kinerson must pay

any of these fees. This determination will be made by the

probate court if defendant Kinerson's bankruptcy discharge is

denied.

22. On July 28, 2014, defendant Kinerson executed and

recorded a second grant deed which conveyed her remaining

undivided 50% interest in the property to defendant Laffranchini.

23. On September 9, 2014 and October 20, 2014, defendant

Kinerson and defendant Laffranchini, respectively, signed a Claim

for Reassessment Exclusion for Transfer Between Parent and Child. 

This document confirmed that, prior to the 2014 grant deed, the

property had been owned in joint tenancy by defendant Kinerson

and defendant Laffranchini.

24. In connection with the 2014 grant deed, defendant

Kinerson signed an Affidavit of Exemption from Documentary

Transfer Tax wherein she confirmed under penalty of perjury that

the transfer to defendant Laffranchini was a gift for which no

consideration was paid.

25. Defendant Kinerson admitted at trial that at the time

she signed the 2014 grant deed she was unable to pay any judgment

in favor of the administrator, whether it was for $100 or

$11,278.20.

26. The probate judgment was served on Cyril Lawrence on

July 10, 2014. Mr. Lawrence testified that it is his standard

practice to promptly mail judgments and other orders to his

clients upon his receipt of same. Mr. Lawrence further testified

that he mailed the judgment to defendant Kinerson and that he met

6

Filed 12/04/17 Case 16-02134 Doc 96
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

with her to discuss it.

27. Defendant Kinerson knew of the judgment when she

executed the second grant deed on July 28, 2014.

28. Mr. Lawrence is a creditor of defendant Kinerson. His

fees were in arrears when the second grant deed was given to

defendant Laffranchini. As of that date he was owed more than

$40,000.

29. Defendant Kinerson appealed the July 10, 2014 judgment. 

However, on February 22, 2016, the California Court of Appeal

affirmed the judgment and the award of costs to the

administrator.

30. This rather antiseptic recitation of the facts does not

convey the deep animosity between the administrator and defendant

Kinerson. Hard feelings abound and it is clear that defendant

Kinerson executed and recorded the 2014 grant deed for the

express purpose of preventing the administrator from collecting a

judgment, whether it was for only the costs or for the costs plus

his attorney's fees.

31. Defendant Kinerson filed her bankruptcy petition on

April 6, 2016, which was within two years of the execution,

delivery, and recording of the 2014 grant deed.

32. In her response to question 18 of the Statement of

Financial Affairs, filed on April 6, 2016, defendant Kinerson

indicated that she had not transferred any real property during

two years prior to her bankruptcy petition. She signed the

Statement of Financial Affairs under penalty of perjury.

33. At the May 3, 2016 meeting of creditors, the

administrator questioned defendant Kinerson about the 2014 grant

7

Filed 12/04/17 Case 16-02134 Doc 96
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

deed. This was when the plaintiff discovered the 2014 transfer

to defendant Laffranchini. At this meeting of creditors, the

plaintiff instructed defendant Kinerson to file an amended

Statement of Financial Affairs to disclose the transfer.

34. On June 2, 2016, defendant Kinerson filed an amended

Statement of Financial Affairs. Once again she responded under

penalty of perjury that no transfer had been made within two

years of bankruptcy. However, she qualified her denial by

admitting that a July 28, 2014 grant deed had been given to

defendant Laffranchini but claiming that it "solemnized" an

earlier transfer on September 11, 2000 of her entire interest in

the property. As explained above, the earlier transfer actually

transferred, and was intended to transfer, only a 50% interest in

the property to defendant Laffranchini. Defendant Kinerson’s

response to question 18 in the amended Statement of Financial

Affairs was false and was intended to discourage the plaintiff

from avoiding the 2014 transfer.

35. In her amended Statement of Financial Affairs, filed on

June 2, 2016, defendant Kinerson also falsely stated under oath

that she had used the proceeds from the sale of an annuity to pay

a retainer to her state court attorney, Cyril Lawrence, for legal

representation in possible bankruptcy litigation. Mr. Lawrence

testified that defendant Kinerson had not paid such a retainer. 

The court finds that defendant Kinerson made this false statement

under oath to avoid turning over these funds to the plaintiff.

36. To the extent any of the conclusions of law below are

findings of fact, they are incorporated by reference as findings

of fact.

8

Filed 12/04/17 Case 16-02134 Doc 96
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Conclusions of Law

37. To the extent any of the foregoing findings of fact are

conclusions of law, they are incorporated by reference as

conclusions of law.

38. The plaintiff, as the bankruptcy trustee, has standing

to seek the avoidance of the 2014 transfer by defendant Kinerson

of her remaining 50% undivided interest in the property to

defendant Laffranchini pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b)(1), 548,

and 550.

39. The 2014 grant deed transferred defendant Kinerson’s

remaining undivided 50% legal and beneficial interest in the

subject property to defendant Laffranchini. This was a transfer

within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(54)(D)(i) and (ii). Until

that transfer, defendant Kinerson was the owner of a 50%

undivided interest in the property.

40. Both defendants attempted to argue at trial that

defendant Laffranchini became the owner of 100% of the subject

property as a result of the 2000 transfer. The court concludes

otherwise. The 2000 transfer gave defendant Laffranchini only a

50% interest in the property. He acquired the other 50% interest

from his mother as a result of the 2014 transfer.

41. "The owner of the legal title to property is presumed

to be the owner of the full beneficial title. This presumption

may be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence." See Cal.

Evid. Code § 662, At trial, defendant Kinerson and defendant

Laffranchini failed to present clear and convincing evidence that

the 2000 grant deed transferred a 100%, not a 50%, interest to

defendant Laffranchini.

9

Filed 12/04/17 Case 16-02134 Doc 96
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

42. It is unnecessary, however, to rely only on the

defendants’ failure to rebut this presumption. The circumstances

clearly demonstrate that defendant Kinerson retained a 50%

interest after the 2000 grant deed and gave it up only by

executing the 2014 grant deed. See Findings of Fact, ¶¶ 4

through 12, above.

43. "A debtor that is generally not paying the debtor's

debts as they become due other than as a result of a bona fide

dispute is presumed to be insolvent. The presumption imposes on

the party against which the presumption is directed the burden of

proving that the nonexistence of insolvency is more probable than

its existence." See Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.02(b).

44. Defendant Kinerson did not pay the administrator's

costs awarded in the judgment and she admitted she was unable to

pay them when they were awarded. These costs are not subject to

a bona fide dispute. Further, defendant Kinerson owed her

attorney more than $43,000 in past due legal fees as of July 28,

2014. The obligation to her attorney is not in bona fide

dispute.

45. At the time of the 2014 transfer, defendant Kinerson

had only minimal Social Security income of approximately $1,500

per month.

46. Defendant Kinerson was insolvent as of July 28, 2014.

47. Under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A), the bankruptcy trustee

may avoid any transfer within two years of the bankruptcy case if

made with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor

to which the debtor was or became indebted on or after the date

that such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred.

10

Filed 12/04/17 Case 16-02134 Doc 96
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

48. Intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors may be

inferred from circumstances such as: (1) actual or threatened

litigation against the debtor; (2) a purported transfer of all or

substantially all of the debtor's property; (3) insolvency or

other unmanageable indebtedness on the part of the debtor; (4) a

special or close relationship between the debtor and the

transferee; (5) the debtor’s continued possession and use of the

property after the putative transfer. See Acequia, Inc. v.

Clinton (In re Acequia, Inc.), 34 F.3d 800, 805-06 (9th Cir.

1994) and cases cited therein. The court, however, it not

limited to these circumstances when determining the debtor’s

intent in making the transfer.

49. In the same vein, Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.04(b) provides

that intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors may be

inferred from facts such as:

“(1) Whether the transfer or obligation was to an

insider.

(2) Whether the debtor retained possession or control

of the property transferred after the transfer.

(3) Whether the transfer or obligation was disclosed or

concealed.

(4) Whether before the transfer was made or obligation

was incurred, the debtor had been sued or threatened

with suit.

(5) Whether the transfer was of substantially all the

debtor's assets.

(6) Whether the debtor absconded.

(7) Whether the debtor removed or concealed assets.

(8) Whether the value of the consideration received by

the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of

the asset transferred or the amount of the obligation

incurred.

(9) Whether the debtor was insolvent or became

insolvent shortly after the transfer was made or the

obligation was incurred.

(10) Whether the transfer occurred shortly before or

shortly after a substantial debt was incurred.”

50. These factors, or badges of fraud, are intended "to

11

Filed 12/04/17 Case 16-02134 Doc 96
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

provide guidance to the trial court, not compel a finding one way

or another." Filip v. Bucurenciu, 129 Cal. App.4th 825, 834, 28

Cal. Rptr. 3d 884 (2005). There is no mathematical formula for

applying these factors. No minimum number of factors is required

to establish actual intent, and a court may find actual intent

based on the evidence in the case even if no badges of fraud are

present. Wolkowitz v. Beverly (In re Beverly), 374 B.R. 221, 236

(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2007).

51. Here, the court concludes that the debtor’s intent to

hinder, delay, and defraud her creditors, primarily the

administrator, is compelled by the following facts:

52. The transfer was to an insider. The term “insider”, as

used in to 11 U.S.C. § 101(31)(A)(i), includes a relative of the

debtor. Defendant Laffranchini is the son of defendant Kinerson. 

He is an insider. See Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.04(b)(1)).

53. Defendant Kinerson retained possession of the property

after the putative transfer. Defendant Kinerson has lived at the

property since 2010. Nothing changed after the July 2014

transfer of her remaining 50% interest in the property to

defendant Laffranchini. She continued to live in the property. 

See Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.04(b)(2).

54. Defendant Kinerson concealed the transfer. In her

response to question 18 of her original Statement of Financial

Affairs, she did not disclose the transfer. In her amended

response to that question, defendant Kinerson attempted to

mislead the plaintiff and her creditors by falsely stating under

oath that the transfer was effective in 2000. See Cal. Civ. Code

§ 3439.04(b)(3).

12

Filed 12/04/17 Case 16-02134 Doc 96
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

55. Defendant Kinerson made the 2014 transfer while she was

embroiled in lengthy and contentious litigation with the

administrator, and just 18 days after an adverse judgment was

entered against her. See Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.04(b)(4).

56. The judgment included an award of costs in favor of the

administrator against defendant Kinerson for $11,278.20. 

Moreover, in the judgment the Superior Court indicated it

intended to award the administrator his attorney’s fees because

defendant Kinerson had concealed marital assets in a dissolution

proceeding (Cal. Probate Code § 859) and had committed financial

elder abuse (Cal. Welfare & Inst. Code § 15657.5).

57. Defendant Laffranchini gave no consideration for the

2014 transfer. This was confirmed by defendant Kinerson under

penalty of perjury in the Affidavit of Exemption from Documentary

Transfer Tax. See Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.04(b)(8).

58. Defendant Kinerson was or became insolvent after the

transfer. Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.04(b)(9).

59. The transfer occurred soon after a substantial debt was

incurred. The Superior Court entered its judgment against

defendant Kinerson in favor of the administrator 18 days prior to

the transfer of her remaining 50% interest in the property to

defendant Laffranchini. Defendant Kinerson admitted in her

testimony that given her limited income and resources she was

unable to pay the $11,278.20 judgment. See Cal. Civ. Code §

3439.04(b)(10).

60. The court concludes that defendant Kinerson made the

2014 transfer of an undivided 50% interest in the property to

defendant Laffranchini with actual intent to hinder, delay, or

13

Filed 12/04/17 Case 16-02134 Doc 96
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

defraud a creditor, namely, the administrator, to which the

defendant Kinerson was or became indebted on or before the date

that such transfer was made.

61. The transfer on July 28, 2014 of defendant Kinerson’s

50% interest in the property to defendant Laffranchini was within

two years of the April 6, 2016 bankruptcy petition.

62. The 2014 transfer, in addition to being actually

fraudulent, also was constructively fraudulent under 11 U.S.C. §

548(a)(1)(B)(i) and (ii)(I) because defendant Kinerson received

less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the

transfer and she was insolvent or became insolvent as a result of

the transfer.

63. Relief under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i) and (ii)(III)

is inappropriate because there is no evidence that defendant

Kinerson intended to incur debts after the 2014 transfer that

were beyond her ability to pay. The debts to the administrator

and to her own attorney were incurred before the transfer.

64. A transfer is fraudulent and avoidable pursuant to Cal.

Civ. Code § 3439.05 if the creditor's claim arose before the

transfer was made if the debtor made the transfer without

receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the

transfer and the debtor was insolvent at that time or the debtor

became insolvent as a result of the transfer.

65. As the bankruptcy trustee, 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1) gives

the plaintiff the rights of an actual unsecured creditor under

applicable nonbankruptcy law to avoid a fraudulent transfer. 

Here, California's codification of the Uniform Voidable

Transactions Act (Cal. Civ. Code §§ 3439.01 – 3439.14) is the

14

Filed 12/04/17 Case 16-02134 Doc 96
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

applicable nonbankruptcy law and, in particular, section 3439.05

is applicable.

66. Here, defendant Laffranchini gave no value for the 2014

transfer of defendant Kinerson’s 50% remaining interest in the

property, and defendant Kinerson was insolvent at the time of the

transfer. In these circumstances, the administrator, as an

actual unsecured creditor of defendant Kinerson is permitted by

section 3439.05 to avoid the 2014 transfer to defendant

Laffranchini. Therefore, the plaintiff may assert the

administrator’s rights. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1).

67. Under 11 U.S.C. § 550(a), to the extent that a transfer

is avoided under 11 U.S.C. §§ 544 and/or 548, a bankruptcy

trustee may recover, for the benefit of the estate, the property

transferred or its value from the transferee. 

68. The 2014 grant deed was a transfer by defendant

Kinerson to defendant Laffranchini that is avoidable pursuant to

11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1), 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A), and 11 U.S.C. §

548(a)(1)(B)(I) and (ii)(I).

69. Defendant Laffranchini is the transferee and the person

for whose benefit the transfer was made.

Accordingly, the court will enter a separate judgment

finding in favor of the plaintiff on his first claim for relief

pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A), on his second claim for

relief pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i) and (ii)(I), on

his fourth claim for relief pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1) and

Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.05, and on the fifth claim for relief under

11 U.S.C. § 550, avoiding the 2014 transfer of an undivided 50%

15

Filed 12/04/17 Case 16-02134 Doc 96
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

interest in the subject property. The plaintiff has not

requested a judgment for the value of the 50% interest

transferred.

The plaintiff is the prevailing party and shall recover

costs, other than attorney's fees, from defendants Sylvia Mae

Kinerson and Stanley G. Laffranchini pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

54(d)(1) as incorporated by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7054.

Counsel for the plaintiff shall lodge a conforming judgment.

Dated: By the Court

 

Michael S. McManus

United States Bankruptcy Judge

16

Filed 12/04/17 Case 16-02134 Doc 96
Instructions to Clerk of Court

Service List – Not Part of Order/Judgment

The Clerk of Court is instructed to send the Order/Judgment or other court

generated document transmitted herewith to the parties below. The Clerk of

Court will send the Order via the BNC.

Michael D. McGranahan

PO Box 5018

Modesto CA 95352

Stanley G. Laffranchini Sylvia Mae Kinerson

955 Ebbetts Ave.

Manteca CA 95337

Anthony D. Johnston

1600 G Street. Suite103

Modesto CA 95354

James D. Struck

125 McHenry Avenue

Modesto CA 95354

Filed 12/04/17 Case 16-02134 Doc 96