Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-09-02727/USCOURTS-ca8-09-02727-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
William P. Cronan
Appellant
Scott Ewing
Appellee
Trevor Fowler
Appellee

Document Text:

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The Honorable Nanette K. Laughrey, United States District Judge for the

Western District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 09-2727

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William P. Cronan, 

Appellant,

v.

Trevor Fowler; Scott Ewing,

Appellees.

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Appeal from the United States

District Court for the

Western District of Missouri.

 [UNPUBLISHED]

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Submitted: June 14, 2010

 Filed: July 19, 2010

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Before MELLOY, HANSEN, and SMITH, Circuit Judges. 

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PER CURIAM.

After being arrested for stealing, William Cronan filed a lawsuit against two

officers in the Boone County Sheriff's Department under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming

that they arrested him unlawfully without probable cause. The district court1

 granted

the officers' motion for summary judgment based on a finding of qualified immunity.

Cronan appeals. For the following reasons, we affirm.

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On June 7, 2008, William Cronan dispensed $53.50 in fuel at the Little General

gas station in Columbia, Missouri, using a credit card to pay at the pump. The fuel

pump's payment device did not print a receipt and directed him to see an attendant.

Cronan entered the station. The attendant told him that his credit card had not been

charged and that the attendant had to run Cronan's credit card again. Cronan insisted

that he had paid and refused to give the attendant his credit card. Cronan left the

station after giving the attendant his name, telephone number, and address and

promising to pay if the charge did not appear on his credit card statement.

The attendant then notified the Boone County Sheriff's Department of a leavewithout-pay violation, and told Deputy Trevor Fowler about the situation, including

Cronan's promise to return to pay. Deputy Fowler then contacted Cronan and asked

him to return to the station to pay, but Cronan refused. Deputy Fowler and Sergeant

Scott Ewing (officers) then drove to Cronan's residence, where the officers confronted

Cronan on his porch. The officers asked Cronan if he had a receipt for the purchase.

When Cronan acknowledged that he did not have a receipt, they told him he needed

to return to the gas station and pay. Cronan refused, and Deputy Fowler informed him

that he would be arrested if he did not return to pay. Cronan again refused to return

to the station and attempted to reenter his home, and Deputy Fowler arrested him.

Cronan was booked for the offense, but the prosecutor declined to press charges. At

all relevant times, Cronan believed he had paid for the gas with his credit card at the

pump. Following this incident, Cronan checked his credit card statement and

acknowledged that his credit card was not actually charged for the gasoline, and he

returned to the store and paid for the gasoline.

Cronan subsequently filed suit against Deputy Fowler and Sergeant Ewing

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that they violated his constitutional rights by

arresting him without probable cause. Both parties filed motions for summary

judgment. The district court found that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest

Cronan but that they were entitled to qualified immunity. In discussing qualified

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immunity, the district court stated that qualified immunity "has been applied broadly,

and it protects 'all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the

law.' See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)." (Add. at 6.) The court

concluded that the officers were not "plainly incompetent" and granted the officers'

motion for summary judgment and denied Cronan's motion for summary judgment.

Cronan now appeals, arguing that the district court erred in granting the officers'

motion for summary judgment because it applied the incorrect standard in determining

qualified immunity and erred in denying his motion for summary judgment.

We review de novo a district court's grant of qualified immunity. Clegg v. Ark.

Dep't of Corr., 496 F.3d 922, 931 (8th Cir. 2007). "Qualified immunity protects

governmental officials from liability for civil damages if they have not violated

'clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

would have known.'" Akins v. Epperly, 588 F.3d 1178, 1183 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). "This defense 'provides ample

protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.'"

Id. (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). See also Engleman v.

Murray, 546 F.3d 944, 947 (8th Cir. 2008) ("'Officials are not liable for bad guesses

in gray areas; they are liable for transgressing bright lines.'" (quoting Davis v. Hall,

375 F.3d 703, 712 (8th Cir. 2004)).

"In the wrongful arrest context, officers are entitled to qualified immunity 'if

they arrest a suspect under the mistaken belief that they have probable cause to do so,

provided that the mistake is objectively reasonable.'" Baribeau v. City of Minneapolis,

596 F.3d 465, 478 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Amrine v. Brooks, 522 F.3d 823, 832 (8th

Cir. 2008)). The statute under which Cronan was arrested states that one commits the

crime of stealing if one "appropriates property or services of another with the purpose

to deprive him or her thereof, either without his or her consent or by means of deceit

or coercion." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 570.030.1. The officers do not now appear to dispute

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Cronan's contention that he lacked the requisite intent to commit theft because he

believed that he had already paid for the gasoline at the pump. However, it appears

that at the time of the arrest they believed Cronan had the requisite intent to violate

section 570.030.1. 

According to section 570.030.2, evidence that an individual "failed or refused

to pay for property or services of a hotel, restaurant, inn or boardinghouse" can be

admitted "in any criminal prosecution pursuant to [section 570.030.1] on the issue of

the requisite knowledge or belief of the alleged stealer." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 570.030.2.

While this case involves a gas station and not a hotel, restaurant, inn, or

boardinghouse, it is not unreasonable that, akin to section 570.030.2, the officers

would have believed that Cronan's failure to pay for the property of the gas station

was evidence of his intent to steal gasoline. Based on their knowledge of the law and

their understanding of what had occurred at the time of the arrest, the officers had a

reasonable, but mistaken, belief that they had probable cause to arrest Cronan for the

theft of the gasoline. 

Cronan suggests that the officers should have investigated more to determine

the existence of any more exculpatory evidence. We have previously "recognized a

substantive due process cause of action for reckless investigation" but have held that

"[m]ere negligent failure to investigate does not violate" an individual's due process

rights. Amrine, 522 F.3d at 833. Instead, to establish a violation, an individual must

show that the police "intentionally or recklessly failed to investigate, thereby shocking

the conscience." Id. at 834. Here, a mere failure to question Cronan in-depth at the

time of his arrest and a failure to review the master record from the gas station

showing the credit card authorization for Cronan's transaction was not an intentional

or reckless failure to investigate that shocks the conscience. See id.

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Because we affirm the district court's judgment granting summary judgment

in favor of the officers based on qualified immunity, we affirm the district court's

denial of Cronan's motion for summary judgment for the same reasons.

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Accordingly we cannot say that the district court erred in granting the officers

qualified immunity, see Baribeau, 596 F.3d at 478, and granting the officers' motion

for summary judgment.2

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

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