Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01268/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01268-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Carlos Rivera
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1 The Honorable Richard H. Kyle, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota.

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-1268

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States 

v. * District Court for the District of

* Minnesota.

Carlos Rivera, *

*

Appellant. *

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Submitted: November 16, 2004

 Filed: June 6, 2005 

___________

Before MURPHY, HANSEN, and MELLOY Circuit Judges.

___________

MELLOY, Circuit Judge.

Appellant Carlos Rivera (“Rivera”) appeals the decision of the district court1

denying his motion to suppress evidence following a post-trial Franks hearing.

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Further, Rivera argues that his motion for a new trial should have been granted. We

affirm.

I.

During August of 2002, Deputy Daniel Lackner worked with a confidential

informant to set up controlled buys of heroin from an individual known as “Carlos.”

During each of the four controlled drug purchases, Lackner observed the confidential

informant purchasing drugs from a distance. The buys were set up by the confidential

informant calling a pager number and meeting for the drug deal at a location

determined by Deputy Lackner.

Based upon information from the confidential informant and his own

observations, Lackner started drafting a search warrant application. The application

sought authority to the search 528 Rice Street, Apartment 2 (“Rice Street apartment”),

including all rented or leased space associated with that address, a vehicle described

as a 1991 tan Nissan Sentra two-door sedan with Minnesota license number BBZ480, and the person of Carlos Rivera, date of birth April 17, 1979, a Hispanic male.

On September 18, 2002, before Deputy Lackner had finished drafting the

search warrant, Edgar Villanueva (“Villanueva”), also known as Carlos Rivera, and

Leonardo Chavez-Gonzalez (“Chavez-Gonzalez”), also known as Carlos Barragan,

were indicted for conspiracy to distribute heroin and aiding and abetting possession

with intent to distribute heroin. At that time, Deputy Lackner mistakenly believed

Villanueva was Rivera. Because Deputy Lackner was not party to the drug deals and

only observed them from afar, he was not able to positively identify the parties

involved. In his conversations with the confidential informant, he never clearly

established who actually was “Carlos Rivera.” 

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Subsequent to Villanueva’s indictment, the search warrant was issued. Police

executed the warrant and seized evidence from the Rice Street apartment. After

realizing that Villanueva was not Rivera, Deputy Lachner obtained an arrest warrant

for Rivera. On November 6, 2002, a superseding indictment was returned adding a

third defendant, Rivera, the appellant in this case. 

Rivera filed a series of pre-trial motions, including a motion to suppress

evidence found at his residence, the Rice Street apartment. The motion to suppress

argued that there was not sufficient probable cause to issue the warrant. The

magistrate judge recommended that the district court deny the motion to suppress and

the district court subsequently adopted the magistrate’s recommendation.

Before Rivera’s trial, his co-defendants, Villanueva and Chavez-Gonzalez,

pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute heroin and were sentenced. At trial,

evidence seized from the Rice Street apartment was offered and admitted without

objection by the defense. On July 10, 2003, the jury returned a verdict of guilty. 

On July 21, 2003, Rivera moved for a new trial pursuant to Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure 33(a) and (b)(2), arguing that evidence seized from his residence

that was admitted at trial was seized illegally because the warrant was based upon

false information. As a result, the district court ordered a post-trial Franks v.

Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), hearing. 

The Franks hearing was held before a magistrate judge. The only witness was

the affiant, Deputy Lackner. The confidential informant had testified at the trial that

Rivera was the seller of the drugs purchased during each of the controlled buys.

However, the confidential informant did not testify at the Franks hearing.

The magistrate judge recommended that Rivera’s motion be denied because the

search warrant affiant “did not make an intentional or reckless misrepresentation of

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material fact.” Further, if there were any inaccuracies, the magistrate judge found that

they were not material to probable cause. The district court adopted the

recommendation of the magistrate judge and denied Rivera’s motion for a new trial.

Rivera was sentenced to seventy-eight months of imprisonment. He appeals

the decision of the district court.

II.

On appeal, Rivera argues that the district court erred by failing to grant his

motion to suppress evidence pursuant to the Franks hearing and for denying a motion

for a new trial following the Franks hearing. We review the denial of a motion to

suppress evidence de novo and the underlying factual determinations for clear error.

United States v. Reinholz, 245 F.3d 765, 773 (8th Cir. 2001). The denial of a motion

for a new trial is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Lee, 274 F.3d

485, 493 (8th Cir. 2001). Franks requires a defendant to prove that: (1) “a false

statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was

included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit” and (2) “with the affidavit’s false

material set to one side, the affidavit’s remaining content is insufficient to establish

probable cause.” United States v. Searcy, 181 F.3d 975, 980 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting

Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56).

Rivera alleges that the affidavit upon which the search warrant was based

contained several false statements. Specifically, he argues that: (1) Deputy Lackner’s

description of the controlled buys was inaccurate, (2) Deputy Lackner’s identification

of an individual as Carlos Rivera was inaccurate, and (3) Deputy Lackner omitted a

series of material facts.

Rivera argues that the description of the controlled buy was misleading because

it implied that Deputy Lackner was actually present at the controlled buys and was

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listening to phone calls to set up the buys. In fact, a confidential informant made the

purchases and Deputy Lackner was only able to survey the buys from a distance.

Deputy Lackner also failed to get contemporaneous information from the confidential

informant about the controlled buys. Instead, he waited until time had passed before

fully debriefing the confidential informant.

However, Rivera’s argument relies on an inference from the affidavit as there

is no explicit reference to Deputy Lackner being present at the controlled buys.

Rivera relies on a reading of the affidavit that suggests the sequence of the sentences

and the lack of a clear subject creates the impression that Deputy Lackner was

actually present at the controlled buys. The district court found that Deputy Lackner

“did not make an intentional misrepresentation of a material fact to the issuing judge

with respect to the sequence in which he described the procedures.” Rivera asks that

we accept one particular reading of the search warrant text even if it is not common

sense to do so. Given the “hyper technical” reading upon which Rivera relies, we

cannot find that the district court was in clear error in denying Rivera’s motion.

United States v. Goodson, 165 F.3d 610, 613 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting Walden v.

Carmack, 156 F.3d 861, 870 (8th Cir. 1998)).

Rivera further argues that the affidavit was false because Deputy Lackner did

not personally know the pager number that the confidential informant used to set up

the buys. The district court agreed with Rivera since Deputy Lackner did not have

actual knowledge of the number and implied that he did so in the warrant, but found

that the false statements were not material to probable cause. Primarily because the

subsequent controlled buys demonstrated the reliability of the pager number, actual

knowledge of the specific pager number was not necessary for probable cause. As

a result, we do not find error with the district court’s finding concerning Deputy

Lackner’s knowledge of the pager number.

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Concerning the second set of allegedly false statements, Rivera argues that

Deputy Lackner incorrectly stated that “Carlos” was the confirmed source of drugs

purchased on August 5, 2002 and August 8, 2002. Rivera also argues that Deputy

Lackner misidentified the same individual leaving a hotel room on August 29, 2002.

This confusion led to the arrest of Villanueva, who the police believed was Rivera.

While that mix-up made Lackner’s identification incorrect, it does not affect probable

cause for the locations searched. Because the target was the Rice Street apartment

that was listed as the location where Rivera received mail, it did not matter that the

police were confused as to which person actually was Rivera at a previous time.

Further, there is no suggestion that Deputy Lackner knew that he was mistaken, or

held a reckless disregard to the truth, about which man was actually Rivera.

The district court found that Deputy Lackner had incorrectly stated that the

confidential informant had identified “Carlos” as the source of drugs. However, the

district court found ample probable cause even after the misleading statements were

removed from the affidavit. Significant other evidence included that gained through

surveillance, other statements made by the confidential informant about “Carlos’s”

involvement in drug sales, and heroin received by Deputy Lackner from the

confidential informant at the conclusion of the controlled buys. 

There is no evidence to suggest that Deputy Lackner’s misstatement was

intentional or reckless. Even if such evidence existed, it would require us to question

the district court’s credibility determination of the affiant which is “virtually

unreviewable on appeal.” United States v. Candie, 974 F.2d 61, 64 (8th Cir. 1992);

see also United States v. Martin, 28 F.3d 742, 745-46 (8th Cir. 1994). While Deputy

Lackner may have been negligent in his description of these buys, that is not a

sufficient basis for us to overturn the finding of the district court. See United States

v. Gibson, 123 F.3d 1121, 1124 (8th Cir. 1997) (citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 170). 

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Rivera also alleges several material omissions in the affidavit. Specifically, the

issuing judge was not informed that the confidential informant was a long-term heroin

addict who received cash payments for information, that the vehicles of the alleged

drug dealers were followed to motels (and not the Rice Street apartment), and that the

“other” Carlos Rivera, also known as Villanueva, was already in custody. The district

court found that such omissions were not material to probable cause. The statements

of the confidential informant were corroborated by surveillance and the drugs

obtained after the controlled buys and so his general credibility is not a basis for

finding error. See United States v. Humphreys, 982 F.2d 254, 258-259 (8th Cir.

1992) (noting that a confidential informant’s credibility is not crucial for probable

cause if partial corroboration exists). That the vehicles were not observed traveling

to the Rice Street apartment is not significant because the affiant had observed the

vehicles at the buy sites and at the apartment building. Concerning the problem of

the mistaken identity, there is no evidence to suggest Deputy Lackner had any intent

to deceive the issuing judge. As a result, we can find neither clear error in the factual

analysis of the district court nor any legal error concerning the alleged material

omissions.

III.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

______________________________

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