Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca2-15-00589/USCOURTS-ca2-15-00589-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cortron Corporation
Appellant
MacDermid Printing Solutions LLC
Appellee

Document Text:

15‐589‐cv  

MacDermid Printing Sols. LLC v. Cortron Corp.

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Second Circuit    

AUGUST TERM 2015

No. 15‐589‐cv

MACDERMID PRINTING SOLUTIONS LLC,

Plaintiff‐Counter‐Defendant–Appellee,

v.

CORTRON CORPORATION,

Defendant‐Counter‐Claimant–Appellant.

   

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Connecticut

   

ARGUED: MAY 13, 2016

DECIDED: AUGUST 10, 2016

   

Before: CABRANES, STRAUB, and LOHIER, Circuit Judges.

   

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On appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court

for the District of Connecticut (Michael P. Shea, Judge), which

awarded damages of $64,670,821 pursuant to a jury verdict on claims

for violations of federal and state antitrust laws, breach of contract,

misappropriation of trade secrets, spoliation, and violations of state

statutes prohibiting computer crimes and unfair trade practices.

Defendant‐appellant argues that the District Court erred in denying a

new trial or judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff‐appellee’s

antitrust claims; permitting plaintiff‐appellee to present evidence

previously withheld under the attorney‐client privilege and work‐

product doctrine; and failing to remit or to order a new trial on

damages regarding the antitrust and trade‐secrets claims.

We hold that the District Court erred in denying defendant‐

appellant judgment as a matter of law with respect to the antitrust

claims because plaintiff‐appellee failed to prove that the challenged

conduct harmed competition. We therefore REVERSE the judgment

of the District Court with respect to the federal and state antitrust

claims. We otherwise AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court

and REMAND the cause to the District Court to recalculate damages

in a manner consistent with this opinion.

   

         JOHN R. HORVACK, JR. (James K. Robertson,

Jr., Fatima Lahnin, John L. Cordani, Jr., on

the brief), Carmody Torrance Sandak &

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Hennessey LLP, New Haven, CT; for

Plaintiff‐Counter‐Defendant–Appellee.

JOHN P. ELWOOD (Joshua S. Johnson, on the

brief), Vinson & Elkins LLP, Washington,

DC; Harry First, New York, NY; Craig A.

Raabe, Nuala E. Droney, Robinson & Cole

LLP, Hartford, CT; for Defendant‐Counter‐

Claimant–Appellant.   

   

JOSÉ A. CABRANES, Circuit Judge:

This appeal primarily concerns the requirements for proving

an adverse effect on competition for purposes of section 1 of the

Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, in cases where the plaintiff has not

proved that the allegedly anticompetitive behavior led to higher

prices, reduced output, or lower quality in the market. We hold that

in such cases, a plaintiff may not prevail under the “rule of reason”

merely by proving that (1) the defendant exercised “market power,”

and (2) the challenged behavior may have misled consumers to

believe that certain products were no longer available, without

showing that consumers actually experienced reduced access to those

products.  

Defendant‐appellant Cortron Corp. (“Cortron”) appeals from a

February 17, 2015 judgment of the United States District Court for the

District of Connecticut (Michael P. Shea, Judge), which awarded

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damages of $64,670,821 pursuant to a jury verdict for plaintiff‐

appellee MacDermid Printing Solutions LLC (“MacDermid”) on its

claims for violations of federal and Connecticut antitrust laws, breach

of contract, misappropriation of trade secrets, spoliation, and

violations of Connecticut statutes prohibiting computer crimes and

unfair trade practices. MacDermid had alleged that its commercial

rival, nonparty E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (“DuPont”), filed a

bogus patent‐infringement suit against Cortron, MacDermid’s

supplier, and that when Cortron and DuPont settled that suit, they

entered into an anticompetitive conspiracy that damaged

MacDermid’s business and hurt consumers.

On appeal, Cortron argues that the District Court erred in (1)

denying Cortron a new trial or judgment as a matter of law on its

antitrust claims; (2) permitting MacDermid to present evidence of its

lawyers’ patent advice; (3) concluding that the jury’s identical awards

on each of the antitrust claims were not duplicative; and (4) failing to

remit or to order a new trial on damages regarding the antitrust and

trade‐secrets claims.

We agree with Cortron that the District Court erred in denying

Cortron judgment as a matter of law with respect to MacDermid’s

antitrust claims because MacDermid failed to present evidence that

Cortron’s conduct harmed competition. We therefore REVERSE the

judgment of the District Court with respect to the antitrust claims.

We otherwise AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court and

REMAND the cause to the District Court to recalculate damages in a

manner consistent with this opinion.

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I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background1

MacDermid and DuPont market thermal flexographic

processors, which are used to make plates for printing commercial

packaging. Such processors are typically sold either to commercial

printers, which produce packaging for consumer‐goods companies,

or to “trade shops,” which supply plates to commercial printers.

DuPont introduced the first thermal flexographic processor in

2000, under the “FAST” trade name. In 2002, MacDermid began to

develop an alternative to FAST, which it introduced in 2004 under

the “LAVA” trade name. At all relevant times, MacDermid and

DuPont were the only companies that marketed thermal flexographic

processors, and DuPont had a dominant share of that market.2

Soon after introducing its LAVA machines, MacDermid

entered into two contracts with Cortron. Under the “Joint

Development Agreement,” signed in November 2004, MacDermid

would pay Cortron to develop a second‐generation LAVA processor.

Under the “Manufacturing Agreement,” signed in April 2005,

 1 “Because this appeal follows a jury verdict, we view the facts in the light

most favorable to the prevailing party,” i.e., MacDermid. Vill. of Freeport v. Barrella,

814 F.3d 594, 599 n.1 (2d Cir. 2016).

2 MacDermid asserts in its brief that “DuPont controlled 90% of the relevant

market,” MacDermid Br. 21, but cites nothing in the record to support this figure.

Nonetheless, Cortron does not dispute that DuPont controlled most of the

relevant market.  

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MacDermid would pay Cortron to build first‐generation LAVA

processors and to safeguard MacDermid’s proprietary information.

In 2008, DuPont scheduled a meeting with Cortron, ostensibly

to discuss potential business opportunities. During the meeting,

which took place on April 1, 2008, DuPont informed Cortron that it

had filed a lawsuit alleging that Cortron’s work for MacDermid

infringed DuPont Patent No. 6,797,454 (“the ’454 patent”).

DuPont and Cortron settled that suit in June 2008. As part of

the settlement, Cortron agreed “to immediately cease manufacturing,

selling, and offering to sell” thermal flexographic systems;3 “to

immediately cease and desist providing all service and/or technical

support” for LAVA products; and to give DuPont “all Technical

Information relating to” LAVA.4 In exchange, DuPont agreed, inter

alia, to dismiss its patent‐infringement suit with prejudice and to

indemnify Cortron against any lawsuit brought by MacDermid. In

addition, under a separate agreement, DuPont paid Cortron about

$140,000 for design work related to certain DuPont products.

Pursuant to the settlement agreement, Cortron gave DuPont all

technical information it had regarding LAVA technology before

deleting that information from its own systems. About five months

later, Cortron ceased operations.

 3 Cortron was permitted to complete seven LAVA units then in progress, but

was required to tell DuPont where those units would be shipped. J.A. 1287. “J.A.”

refers to the Joint Appendix.

4 J.A. 1287, 1288.  

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DuPont announced the settlement in a press release issued on

July 30, 2008:  

Under the terms of the agreement, Cortron . . . agrees to

immediately cease manufacturing LAVA [processors],

as well as to immediately discontinue providing all

service, spare parts, and technical support for any

LAVA equipment . . . . Thermal processing equipment

manufactured by Cortron has been marketed and sold

by MacDermid Printing Solutions, LLC under the

LAVA trade name.5

Unsurprisingly, DuPont hoped that this press release would

make potential customers “more likely to buy DuPont’s FAST”

processors and “less likely” to buy MacDermid’s competing LAVA

products.6 Later that day, MacDermid issued its own press release,

which accused DuPont of “inappropriately rais[ing] some questions

regarding MacDermid’s ability to support” its LAVA products and

“assure[d] [MacDermid’s] customers that it will continue to sell,

support and service” LAVA equipment.7

Meanwhile, MacDermid had already started searching for a

new manufacturer to replace Cortron. MacDermid had been

concerned about Cortron’s financial stability even before the DuPont

 5 J.A. 1312.  

6 J.A. 641.

7 J.A. 1313.

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lawsuit. In 2007, MacDermid had started to plan for Cortron’s

potential failure, and by February 2008, MacDermid had contacted

three possible alternative suppliers. MacDermid’s concerns only

deepened after it learned about the pending litigation. In July 2008—

after learning about DuPont’s lawsuit, but before the Cortron‐

DuPont settlement agreement was announced—MacDermid decided

to switch from Cortron to a new manufacturer, OLEC Corporation.  

Ordinarily, MacDermid would have expected Cortron to

facilitate the transition by transferring to OLEC any technical

information it had regarding LAVA machines. But because Cortron

had given all extant LAVA technical information to DuPont, and

because MacDermid did not have its own copy of that information,

OLEC had to reverse‐engineer the specifications needed to

manufacture new LAVA machines. The reverse‐engineering process

cost $29,970 and took about nine months. During this transition

period, MacDermid was unable to obtain new LAVA machines.

Nonetheless, MacDermid always retained an inventory of LAVA

processors and “never was unable to fulfill a sale,” according to the

testimony of its general manager.8

B. Procedural History

MacDermid filed the instant action in September 2008 in

Connecticut state court, alleging that Cortron and DuPont had

engaged in an antitrust conspiracy in violation of section 1 of the

 8 J.A. 511.

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Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, and the Connecticut Antitrust Act, Conn.

Gen. Stat. §§ 35‐26, 35‐28. MacDermid also brought claims under the

Connecticut Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“CUTSA”), Conn. Gen. Stat.

§§ 35‐50 to 35‐58; under the state computer‐crime statute, Conn. Gen.

Stat. §§ 53a‐251, 52‐570b; under the Connecticut Unfair Trade

Practices Act (“CUTPA”), Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 42‐110a to 42‐110q;

under state contract law; and for spoliation of evidence. Cortron filed

various counterclaims9 and removed the case to the United States

District Court for the District of Connecticut.

After a trial in June and July 2014, the jury found for

MacDermid on all issues and awarded it approximately $35.4 million

in compensatory damages.10 The District Court denied Cortron’s

post‐verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law, and denied its

post‐verdict motion for a new trial on condition that MacDermid

agree to a remitted award of $19,757,854 in compensatory damages.11

 9 Namely, for breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent

misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, breach of the covenant of

good faith and fair dealing, and violation of CUTPA.

10 The jury awarded $7,903,909 on the breach‐of‐contract claim; $3,941,325 on

each of the three antitrust claims; $3,790,939 under CUTSA; $29,970 on the

computer‐crime claim; and $11,875,204 under CUTPA. Pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 50(a), the District Court granted judgment as a matter of law to

MacDermid on one of Cortron’s counterclaims for fraud and negligent

misrepresentation. See MacDermid Printing Sols., Inc. v. Cortron Corp., No. 3:08‐CV‐

1649 (MPS), 2014 WL 3943629, at *1 (D. Conn. Aug. 12, 2014).

11 MacDermid Printing Sols., LLC v. Cortron Corp., No. 3:08‐CV‐1649 (MPS), 2014

WL 3943629, at *17 (D. Conn. Jan. 20, 2015).

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The District Court also awarded punitive damages of $3,790,939

under CUTSA “as punishment for Cortron’s willful and malicious

disclosure of MacDermid’s trade secrets,” as well as $100,000 in

punitive damages for the “intentional or recklessly indifferent

violation of CUTPA in destroying MacDermid’s trade secrets.”12 All

told, the final judgment against Cortron—including attorneys’ fees,

interest, and treble antitrust damages—totaled $64,670,821. This

appeal followed.  

II. DISCUSSION

A. Judgment as a Matter of Law on MacDermid’s Antitrust

Claims

We first consider Cortron’s argument that the District Court

erred in denying it judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”) on

MacDermid’s federal and state antitrust claims.  

1. Standard of Review

We review de novo a district court’s denial of JMOL pursuant to

Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.13 Where a jury has

rendered a verdict for the non‐movant, a court may grant JMOL

“only if the court, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

 12 Id. at *20.

13 Cash v. Cty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir. 2011).  

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the non‐movant, concludes that a reasonable juror would have been

compelled to accept the view of the moving party.”14  

“In order for a party to pursue a request for JMOL on appeal,

the party must have made timely motions for JMOL in the district

court.”15 In particular, a party must first move for JMOL pursuant to

Rule 50(a) before the case is submitted to the jury. If the Rule 50(a)

motion is denied, “the movant may, no later than 28 days after the

entry of a judgment, ‘file a renewed motion for judgment as a matter

of law.’”16 “Because the Rule 50(b) motion is only a renewal of the

preverdict motion, it can be granted only on grounds advanced in the

preverdict motion.”17 A district court may grant a Rule 50(b) motion

based on a ground not advanced in a Rule 50(a) motion “only if

necessary to prevent manifest injustice.”18

Here, Cortron moved for JMOL both before and after the case

was submitted to the jury. The parties disagree, however, about

which arguments Cortron preserved in its Rule 50(a) motion. The

District Court found that Cortron properly preserved its argument

 14 Id. at 333 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original).

15 Lore v. City of Syracuse, 670 F.3d 127, 152 (2d Cir. 2012).

16 Id. at 153 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b)) (emphasis in Lore).

17 Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 Advisory Comm. Note (2006)) (alteration and

emphasis omitted).

18 Crawford v. Tribeca Lending Corp., 815 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2016) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

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that MacDermid had failed to prove harm to competition, but that it

did not preserve several other arguments raised in its Rule 50(b)

motion.19 Cortron continues to press two of those purportedly

unpreserved arguments on appeal: (1) that MacDermid failed to

prove lost sales because its case relied on “expert testimony founded

on statistically insignificant results”;20 and (2) that the DuPont press

release was “commercial speech” that is presumptively harmless

under antitrust laws.21  

We agree with the District Court that Cortron preserved its

argument that MacDermid failed to prove harm to competition22—a

conclusion MacDermid does not challenge on appeal. We therefore

consider this argument de novo. Because we conclude below that this

argument offers a sufficient reason to entitle Cortron to JMOL on the

 19 Namely, (1) that MacDermid had failed to prove it was injured because the

proof offered was based on a statistical analysis that was insignificant at the 95%

confidence interval; (2) that the DuPont press release was presumptively harmless

commercial speech; (3) that settling a patent‐infringement claim cannot give rise

to antitrust liability unless that claim is proved to be baseless; (4) that the

procompetitive effects of Cortron’s actions outweighed the anticompetitive

effects; (5) that MacDermid had failed to prove concerted action between Cortron

and DuPont; and (6) that Conn. Gen. Stat. § 35‐28 bars only per se violations of

section 1 of the Sherman Act, and not violations under the “rule of reason.”  

20 Cortron Br. 36.

21 Id. at 27.

22 Cortron preserved this argument following the close of evidence, J.A. 769,

and in its renewed motion for JMOL, J.A. 1860–62.

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antitrust claims, we need not consider whether Cortron preserved its

other antitrust arguments.  

2. The Legal Framework Governing MacDermid’s Antitrust

Claims

MacDermid’s federal and state antitrust claims are identical for

purposes of this appeal.23 Accordingly, we focus here on

MacDermid’s federal claim, which was brought pursuant to section 1

of the Sherman Act.  

Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits, in relevant part,

“[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or

conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce.”24 Under section 1,

some restraints on trade, such as horizontal agreements to fix prices,

are unlawful per se, while others must be evaluated under the so‐

called “rule of reason.”25 MacDermid alleged that Cortron violated

section 1 of the Sherman Act under the rule of reason.

 23 See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 35‐44b (“It is the intent of the General Assembly that

in construing [the Connecticut Antitrust Act], the courts of this state shall be

guided by interpretations given by the federal courts to federal antitrust

statutes.”).  

24 15 U.S.C. § 1.  

25 See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885–86

(2007) (“Under [the] rule [of reason], the factfinder weighs all of the circumstances

of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as

imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition. . . . In its design and function

the rule distinguishes between restraints with anticompetitive effect that are

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A plaintiff seeking to prove an antitrust violation under the

rule of reason must initially show that the challenged action

adversely affected competition in the relevant market.26 (Here, the

relevant market is thermal flexographic processors.27) A plaintiff may

satisfy this requirement in either of two ways. First, a plaintiff may

offer direct evidence of harm to competition by proving higher

prices, reduced output, or lower quality in the market as a whole.28

Alternatively, a plaintiff may demonstrate an adverse effect

indirectly by establishing that the alleged conspirators had sufficient

“market power” to cause an adverse effect, “plus some other ground

for believing that the challenged behavior” has harmed

competition.29 “Market power” is “defined as the ability of a single

seller to raise prices and restrict output.”30

In Tops Markets, Inc. v. Quality Markets, Inc., we held that a

plaintiff seeking to prove an adverse effect indirectly need show only

 

harmful to the consumer and restraints stimulating competition that are in the

consumer’s best interest.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

26 Tops Mkts., Inc. v. Quality Mkts., Inc., 142 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 1998).

27 See MacDermid Printing Sols., Inc. v. Cortron Corp., No. 3:08‐CV‐1649 (MPS),

2014 WL 2615361, at *4–6 (D. Conn. June 12, 2014).  

28 See, e.g., Capital Imaging Assocs., P.C. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., Inc., 996

F.2d 537, 547 (2d Cir. 1993).

29 See Tops Mkts., 142 F.3d at 97.  

30 Virgin Atl. Airways Ltd. v. British Airways PLC, 257 F.3d 256, 265 (2d Cir.

2001) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).  

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“that the challenged behavior could harm competition.”31 Other

Second Circuit cases, however, have required evidence that the

challenged behavior will harm competition.32 But despite differences

in phrasing, our cases have always required, as a practical matter,

some evidence that the challenged action has already had an adverse

effect on competition, even if consumers have not yet felt that effect.33  

Indeed, although we have sometimes described “direct” and

“indirect” proof as alternative ways of satisfying the adverse‐effect

requirement, there is really only one way to prove an adverse effect

on competition under the rule of reason: by showing actual harm to

consumers in the relevant market.34 How “actual harm” is shown

determines whether proof of market power is also required. If a

 31 142 F.3d at 97 (emphasis supplied); see also F.T.C. v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476

U.S. 447, 460 (1986) (stating in dicta that “the purpose of the inquiries into market

definition and market power is to determine whether an arrangement has the

potential for genuine adverse effects on competition”).

32 See CDC Techs., Inc. v. IDEXX Labs., Inc., 186 F.3d 74, 81 (2d Cir. 1999); K.M.B.

Warehouse Distribs., Inc. v. Walker Mfg. Co., 61 F.3d 123, 129 (2d Cir. 1995).

33 See Tops Mkts., 142 F.3d at 97; see also United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344

F.3d 229, 238 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that after demonstrating market power, the

government must show that “defendants’ actions have had substantial adverse

effects on competition” (emphasis supplied)).

34 See Tops Mkts., 142 F.3d at 96, 97 (“[P]laintiff provided no evidence other

than market share to prove that defendants’ action had an adverse effect on

competition. . . . Hence, despite [defendant’s] presumed market power, [plaintiff]

still failed to show any adverse effect on competition as a whole.”); see also CDC

Techs., 186 F.3d at 81 (implying that the requirement for proving harm to

competition is the same whether or not market power is shown).

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plaintiff proves that consumers have already experienced harm from

the challenged behavior because of higher prices, reduced output, or

lower quality, then proof of market power is not required. Otherwise,

it is.35  

Our cases suggest that it is possible, at least in theory, to prove

that a challenged action harmed competition without offering

evidence of higher prices, reduced output, or reduced quality. We

have never explained, however, what such proof would look like.

Indeed, in no precedential opinion in this Circuit has a plaintiff

successfully proved an adverse effect on competition without

offering evidence of changed prices, output, or quality.

We first discussed “indirect” proof in Capital Imaging Associates,

P.C. v. Mohawk Valley Medical Associates, Inc.36 In that case, we

suggested that a plaintiff that is unable to prove an actual adverse

effect through price, output, or quality “must at least establish that

defendants possess the requisite market power so that [the

challenged action] has the potential for genuine adverse effects on

competition.”37 Because the plaintiff in that case failed to prove

 35 See Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 386 F.3d 485, 509 (2d Cir.

2004) (“If plaintiff can demonstrate an actual adverse effect on competition, such

as reduced output, there is no need to show market power in addition.” (citation

omitted)); K.M.B., 61 F.3d at 129.

36 996 F.2d 537.

37 Id. at 546 (emphasis supplied) (internal quotation marks omitted).  

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market power, we had no need to consider what additional evidence

of harm to competition might have been required.

We revisited the issue in K.M.B. Warehouse Distributors, Inc. v.

Walker Manufacturing Co.38 In K.M.B., we emphasized that under the

rule of reason, “a showing of market power, while necessary to show

adverse effect indirectly, is not sufficient,” and that a plaintiff must

offer “other grounds to believe that the defendant’s behavior will

harm competition market‐wide.”39 As in Capital Imaging, however,

we had no cause to decide what “other grounds” might suffice,

because the plaintiff offered no reason at all to think that the

challenged behavior had harmed or would harm competition.40  

We did suggest, in dicta, two possible examples of such “other

grounds”: “the inherent[ly] anticompetitive nature of [a] defendant’s

behavior or the structure of the interbrand market.”41 We have never

had occasion to determine in a precedential opinion, however, in

what situations either of these considerations would actually enable a

plaintiff to indirectly prove an adverse effect on competition. We

have suggested that actions that reduce consumer choice are

 38 61 F.3d 123.

39 Id. at 129.

40 Id. at 129–30.

41 Id. at 129.

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inherently anticompetitive.42 We have also suggested that “the

structure of the interbrand market” means, in practice, an inquiry

into whether the challenged behavior “significantly restrict[ed]”

competitors’ ability to enter the relevant market and compete—in

other words, whether the challenged behavior created significantly

higher barriers to entry.43 In no case, however, have we actually held

that proof of market power plus any particular interbrand market

structure was sufficient to prove an adverse effect on competition as

a whole.  

In sum, proving an adverse effect on competition without

showing increased price, reduced output, or reduced quality in the

market has remained possible in theory but elusive in practice.  

 42 See Ross v. Bank of Am., N.A. (USA), 524 F.3d 217, 223–24 (2d Cir. 2008). The

issue presented in Ross was whether plaintiffs had Article III standing; we thus

had no reason to make any definitive pronouncement about how to analyze

reduction in consumer choice under the rule of reason. See also Ross v. Citigroup,

Inc., 630 F. App’x 79, 82 n.4 (2d Cir. 2015) (summary order) (declining to reach

issue of whether collusion to reduce consumer choice in the circumstances

presented constituted an unreasonable restraint on trade). In many cases, of

course, “inherently anticompetitive” behavior would likely be deemed illegal per

se and thus not analyzed under the rule of reason. Cf. Copperweld Corp. v. Indep.

Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984) (“Certain agreements, such as horizontal price

fixing and market allocation, are thought so inherently anticompetitive that each

is illegal per se without inquiry into the harm it has actually caused.”).

43 See Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50, 59 (2d Cir. 1997) (internal

quotation marks omitted); see also Tops Mkts., 142 F.3d at 97 (suggesting that in

considering “the structure of the interbrand market,” the relevant inquiry was

whether the challenged action “foreclose[d] other prospective . . . competitors

from entering the market in desirable locations”).

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3. Application

MacDermid sought to prove an antitrust violation under the

rule of reason. As such, it was required to prove an adverse effect on

competition. It has failed to do so here.

a. Direct Proof of Competitive Harm

As an initial matter, we agree with the District Court that

MacDermid has not directly proved an adverse effect on

competition.44 Although MacDermid contends that the jury could

reasonably have found that the purported conspiracy increased

prices, MacDermid does not suggest, much less show, that prices for

thermal flexographic processors actually rose after DuPont’s

settlement with Cortron. Instead, MacDermid argues that DuPont

would have decreased its prices but for the conspiracy.45 But this

amounts to little more than speculation. To prove an actual adverse

effect on price, a plaintiff must show just that—that prices actually

increased.46

 44 See J.A. 772 (finding “no evidence” that the purported Cortron‐DuPont

conspiracy resulted in reduced output or higher prices in the market for thermal

flexography processors); J.A. 774. MacDermid comes close to conceding this point.

See MacDermid Br. 23 (criticizing Cortron’s “blinkered focus on ‘price, quality,

and output’”).

45 MacDermid Br. 25–26.

46 See Tops Mkts., 142 F.3d at 96; see also Virgin Atl., 257 F.3d at 264 (holding that

“expert testimony rooted in hypothetical assumptions cannot substitute for actual

market data” when showing an actual adverse effect on price).  

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Nor has MacDermid produced evidence that the purported

conspiracy led to reduced output in the market. A reasonable jury

could have found that the Cortron‐DuPont settlement resulted in

MacDermid’s losing its critical supplier, which in turn prevented the

production of new LAVA machines for about nine months. But while

this disruption may have reduced the total number of thermal

flexographic processors in the world, it did not reduce the number of

such processors from the perspective of consumers.

47 During

MacDermid’s transition from Cortron to OLEC, MacDermid always

maintained an inventory of LAVA machines, which always exceeded

consumer demand.48 Accordingly, the production of additional

LAVA machines during that time would not have increased, in any

meaningful sense, the number of machines that consumers could

actually buy.49

 47 See Tops Mkts., 142 F.3d at 96 (“[E]ven if plaintiff were hindered from

competing, nothing changed in the relevant product market from the consumer’s

perspective.”); Capital Imaging, 996 F.2d at 547 (“It has not [been] shown that

defendants’ activities have had any adverse impact on . . . output . . . offered to

consumers . . . .”).

48 See J.A. 511 (testimony of MacDermid general manager that MacDermid

“never was unable to fulfill a sale” due to insufficient inventory).

49 Our conclusions with respect to price and output reinforce each other. Basic

principles of economics teach us that, all things being equal, price and output

have an inverse relationship. See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross‐Simmons Hardwood

Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 324–25 (2007); Cal. Dental Ass’n v. F.T.C., 526 U.S. 756, 777

(1999). Therefore, if Cortron’s actions had resulted in reduced quantity, they

should also have resulted in higher prices, absent some other explanation.  

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We note, finally, that MacDermid does not argue that the

purported conspiracy reduced the overall quality of processors in the

market.50 We turn, then, to indirect evidence of harm to competition.

b. Indirect Proof of Competitive Harm

As discussed above, to prove harm to competition indirectly,

MacDermid was required to show (1) that the conspirators had

sufficient “market power” to cause an adverse effect, and (2) “some

other ground for believing that the challenged behavior” harmed

competition.51 Even if we assume arguendo that MacDermid has

proved market power, MacDermid has failed to provide any reason

to think that the Cortron‐DuPont agreement harmed competition in

the market as a whole.

MacDermid offers three possible reasons to believe that

Cortron’s behavior harmed competition, none of which has merit.

First, MacDermid suggests that the Cortron‐DuPont settlement “was

inherently anticompetitive” because “Cortron and DuPont had a

competitive relationship at the time.”52 But as the District Court

correctly observed, Cortron and DuPont did not compete for

 50 We do not consider MacDermid’s bare assertions to the contrary. See

MacDermid Br. 11, 12, 22; Tolbert v. Queens Coll., 242 F.3d 58, 75 (2d Cir. 2001) (“It

is a settled appellate rule that issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner,

unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed

waived.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  

51 Tops Mkts., 142 F.3d at 97.  

52 MacDermid Br. 21–22.

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customers. Rather, Cortron was an upstream supplier of MacDermid

and later of DuPont. Accordingly, the mere fact that Cortron and

DuPont reached an agreement was no more inherently

anticompetitive than the earlier agreement between Cortron and

MacDermid. And although the settlement of patent litigation is not

immune from possible antitrust liability, neither is it inherently

anticompetitive.53

Second, MacDermid argues that “the relevant interbrand

market was a duopoly,” which “is ground alone for finding [that] the

challenged behavior harmed competition.”54 But although

“competition is necessarily limited” in a duopoly,55 the mere fact that

a market has few competitors does not transform every action by one

of them into an antitrust violation. Rather, even in a duopoly, a

plaintiff must offer some other reason to think that the challenged

behavior harmed competition.56  

 53 See F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013) (suggesting that while

so‐called “reverse payment” settlements of patent litigation can sometimes violate

antitrust laws, settling patent litigation without reverse payments is less likely to

have impermissible anticompetitive effects).

54 MacDermid Br. 22.

55 See Visa U.S.A., 344 F.3d at 240.

56 See id. (finding evidence of harm to competition based on, inter alia, evidence

of “the total exclusion of [two competitors] from a segment of the market”). One

approach might be to show that the challenged behavior resulted in greater

barriers to entry. See CDC Techs., 186 F.3d at 80; ante note 43 and accompanying

text. MacDermid’s expert testified at trial that “[t]here are barriers to entry” in the

market for thermal flexographic processors, but he did not suggest that the

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Finally, MacDermid argues that the Cortron‐DuPont

conspiracy harmed competition by reducing the range of options

available to consumers. MacDermid is correct that reduced consumer

choice can constitute harm to competition.57 But the Cortron‐DuPont

agreement did not restrict the options available to consumers, who

never lost the option of buying LAVA processors.

MacDermid argues, and the District Court found, that the

Cortron‐DuPont conspiracy—and especially DuPont’s press

release—could have led “consumers to believe that MacDermid’s

LAVA technology was no longer available.”58 But even if a press

release can rise to the level of “[c]oercive activity that prevents its

victims from making free choices between market alternatives”—the

standard courts have used in the past when evaluating purported

 

Cortron‐DuPont settlement or press release affected those barriers. See J.A. 601.

Instead, MacDermid used the prior existence of barriers to entry to establish

DuPont’s market power. See MacDermid Printing Sols., 2015 WL 251527, at *7.

MacDermid does not mention barriers to entry on appeal, much less show that the

purported conspiracy heightened existing barriers or created new ones.

57 See, e.g., Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 459; Visa U.S.A., 344 F.3d at 240; see

also Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459

U.S. 519, 528 (1983) (“Coercive activity that prevents its victims from making free

choices between market alternatives is inherently destructive of competitive

conditions and may be condemned even without proof of its actual market

effect.”); Ross, 524 F.3d at 224 (“The reduction in choice and diminished quality of

credit services to which the cardholders claim they have been subjected are

present anti‐competitive effects . . . .”).  

58 MacDermid Printing Sols., 2015 WL 251527, at *7.

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limitations on consumer choice59—it is clear that the press release at

issue here did not prevent any consumer from freely choosing

between DuPont and MacDermid processors.  

The record shows that customers continued to buy LAVA

machines even after July 2008, when DuPont announced its

settlement with Cortron and when MacDermid switched suppliers.60

There is no evidence that even a single customer was actually misled

into thinking that LAVA processors were no longer available.61 That

is not surprising: users of thermal flexography are “large

sophisticated customers” that are unlikely to be tricked into thinking

that a viable supplier no longer exists, especially when it comes to

making sizable capital expenditures.62 And even if the press release

did mislead some customers regarding the continued availability of

LAVA machines, actions that “merely interfere with the consumer’s

freedom of choice in deciding” whether to buy a product are

 59 See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., 459 U.S. at 528.

60 For instance, James Levinsohn, MacDermid’s expert, testified that two

customers, Bemis and Exopack, continued to buy LAVA machines after DuPont

issued the press release. J.A. 601.  

61 See J.A. 769.

62 See J.A. 629; see also J.A. 1621 (quoting one LAVA model as costing $99,000

and another model as costing $109,000); J.A. 589 (suggesting that DuPont made $2

million from every processor it sold, including subsequent sales of printing

plates).

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insufficient to support an antitrust claim, absent any further showing

of “demonstrable, anti‐competitive impact.”63

It is certainly possible that the purported Cortron‐DuPont

conspiracy, including DuPont’s press release, led some consumers to

buy DuPont machines instead of MacDermid ones. But even if true,

that would merely establish harm to MacDermid, not harm to

competition in the market as a whole. “[B]ecause the antitrust laws

protect competition, not competitors,” a plaintiff must show that

more than its own business suffered; it must ultimately show that the

challenged action harmed consumers.64 MacDermid has not done so

here.65  

 63 See Coniglio v. Highwood Servs., Inc., 495 F.2d 1286, 1293 (2d Cir. 1974); cf.

Nat’l Ass’n of Pharm. Mfrs., Inc. v. Ayerst Labs., Div. of/and Am. Home Prods. Corp.,

850 F.2d 904, 916 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that, under section 2 of the Sherman Act,

“a plaintiff asserting a monopolization claim based on misleading advertising

must overcome a presumption that the effect on competition of such a practice

was de minimis” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

64 Clorox Co., 117 F.3d at 57; see Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl‐O‐Mat, Inc., 429

U.S. 477, 488 (1977) (“The antitrust laws . . . were enacted for ‘the protection of

competition, not competitors[.]’” (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.

294, 320 (1962))).

65 Because we hold that Cortron is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on

MacDermid’s antitrust claims, we need not consider Cortron’s alternative request

for a new trial or its argument that the jury awarded duplicative antitrust

damages.

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B. Admission of Evidence Concerning MacDermid’s Patent

Advice

We next consider Cortron’s argument that the District Court

“abused its discretion” in permitting MacDermid to present evidence

of its patent counsel’s advice, which it had previously withheld based

on claims of attorney‐client privilege and the work‐product doctrine.  

1. Background

The events leading to this appeal began with a patent‐

infringement suit filed by DuPont, alleging that Cortron’s work for

MacDermid had infringed DuPont’s ’454 patent. Whether Cortron or

MacDermid has, in fact, infringed any DuPont patent is not directly

at issue in this litigation.66 Nonetheless, the question of infringement

lurks beneath several of the claims in this suit. Of particular

relevance to this appeal, evidence of infringement could have

provided Cortron with a defense against MacDermid’s breach‐of‐

contract claim: Cortron argues that MacDermid had warranted that

LAVA infringed no third‐party patent, and that any infringement of

 66 MacDermid challenged the validity of the ’454 patent in a separate

proceeding before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. See MacDermid Printing

Sols., LLC v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., No. 2015‐1750, 2016 WL 1042927 (Fed.

Cir. Mar. 16, 2016). In addition, DuPont sued MacDermid in the District of

Connecticut for patent infringement. DuPont and Cortron both moved to

consolidate that action with the instant litigation, but MacDermid opposed

consolidation and moved to transfer DuPont’s suit to the District of New Jersey,

where other litigation was pending between MacDermid and DuPont. The

District Court granted MacDermid’s motion to transfer and denied the motions to

consolidate as moot.  

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the ’454 patent therefore constituted a breach of warranty by

MacDermid.67  

Accordingly, during discovery in 2009, Cortron sought

evidence, through document requests, interrogatories, and

depositions, about MacDermid’s efforts to determine whether its

LAVA machines infringed any DuPont patent. MacDermid initially

resisted some of these discovery requests by invoking the attorney‐

client privilege and the work‐product doctrine.  

In September 2012, however, the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey held, in related litigation between

DuPont and MacDermid, that MacDermid had waived any privileges

regarding the advice of its patent counsel about the design of LAVA

 67 See MacDermid Printing Sols., 2014 WL 3943629, at *1 (explaining why the

District Court granted MacDermid JMOL on the issue of “whether MacDermid

fraudulently and negligently represented that its technology did not infringe a

patent held by a third party”).

The question of infringement was also potentially relevant to MacDermid’s

antitrust claims. Cortron essentially argued that if DuPont had an objective basis

for thinking that LAVA infringed the ’454 patent, then DuPont’s patent‐

infringement suit against Cortron was not an anticompetitive sham that violated

federal and state antitrust laws. See Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures

Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 51, 61 (1993) (holding that patent litigation is generally

immune from antitrust liability as long as it is not (1) “objectively baseless” and

(2) subjectively intended “as an anticompetitive weapon” (internal quotation

marks omitted)). Because we hold that MacDermid’s antitrust claim fails as a

matter of law on other grounds, we need not consider whether DuPont’s suit was

objectively baseless. See also ante note 19 (discussing whether Cortron waived this

argument).

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machines and their potential infringement of DuPont patents. In

response to that ruling, MacDermid supplemented its production of

documents in the instant litigation and amended its exhibit and

witness lists. Included among MacDermid’s new proposed exhibits

was an opinion by the law firm of Wiggin & Dana LLP stating that

LAVA processors did not infringe DuPont’s ’454 patent.  

On September 6, 2013, Cortron filed a motion in limine to

preclude MacDermid from presenting the newly disclosed evidence.

The District Court granted the motion in part and denied it in part in

an order of June 4, 2014.68 The court excluded the Wiggin & Dana

opinion, as well as any opinion testimony that MacDermid did not

actually infringe the ’454 patent, but permitted testimony by John

Cordani (MacDermid’s general counsel)69 and other witnesses

concerning MacDermid’s efforts to avoid infringement.

To avoid prejudicing Cortron, the District Court permitted

Cortron to engage in additional discovery in response to

MacDermid’s newly disclosed evidence.70 Specifically, the court

ordered MacDermid to supplement its interrogatory response and

 68 When Cortron filed its motion, the trial was scheduled to begin on October

15, 2013. The trial actually began on June 18, 2014.  

69 John L. Cordani, MacDermid’s general counsel and secretary, is not to be

confused with John L. Cordani, Jr., an attorney for Carmody Torrance Sandak &

Hennessey LLP, who appears on MacDermid’s brief.  

70 Although the court decided Cortron’s motion in limine on June 4, 2014, the

court had indicated during a telephonic status conference on May 28, 2014, that it

was inclined to authorize additional discovery. Special App. 1.

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document production and permitted Cortron to re‐depose several

witnesses.71 The District Court also permitted Cortron to designate an

expert on the issue of whether MacDermid had given Wiggin & Dana

enough information to render an adequately informed patent

opinion.

Pursuant to the District Court’s order, MacDermid

supplemented its interrogatory response, and Cortron re‐deposed

four witnesses between June 6 and June 13, 2014. MacDermid also

provided Cortron with a transcript of an earlier deposition of

Cordani in New Jersey. Cortron declined to designate an expert on

the subject of infringement.

2. Analysis

A party challenging a district court’s evidentiary ruling is

generally entitled to a new trial if (1) “the district court committed

errors that were a clear abuse of discretion,” and (2) those errors

“were clearly prejudicial to the outcome of the trial, where prejudice

is measured by assessing the error in light of the record as a whole.”72

 71 In particular, the District Court permitted additional depositions of Cordani;

James Hennessy, an engineer at MacDermid; Ryan Vest, MacDermid’s director of

research and development; and a witness from OLEC. The District Court noted

that MacDermid had already given Cortron an opportunity to depose Cordani,

and perhaps also Hennessy and Vest, in September 2013.  

72 Marshall v. Randall, 719 F.3d 113, 116 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks

omitted). As we have often observed, “abuse of discretion” is a “term of art” that

“merely signifies that a district court based its ruling on an erroneous view of the

law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or rendered a decision

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“In civil cases, the burden falls on the appellant to show that the error

was not harmless and that it is likely that in some material respect the

factfinder’s judgment was swayed by the error.”73

Cortron has not met this burden. First, Cortron has not even

shown that the District Court erred, much less “abused its

discretion,” in admitting the challenged evidence. We have generally

been reluctant to second‐guess a district court’s decision whether to

exclude evidence previously withheld as privileged.74 Although

Cortron cites several cases suggesting that the District Court would

have been permitted to exclude the challenged evidence, none

suggests that exclusion was required.

75 Indeed, we have encouraged

 

that cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” Barrella, 814

F.3d at 611 (internal quotation marks omitted).

73 Warren v. Pataki, 823 F.3d 125, 138 (2d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

74 Cf. United States v. 4003–4005 5th Ave., Brooklyn, NY, 55 F.3d 78, 85 (2d Cir.

1995) (noting, in the context of the privilege against self‐incrimination, that “as

long as a trial court considers the relevant factors and acts with moderation to

accommodate both a litigant’s valid [privilege] interests and the opposing parties’

needs in having the litigation conducted fairly, we will not disturb the measures

used by that court in the exercise of its discretion.”).

75 See, e.g., id. at 85 (holding that a district court did not abuse its discretion by

precluding the submission of evidence previously claimed to be within the

privilege against self‐incrimination); Columbia Pictures Television, Inc. v. Krypton

Broad. of Birmingham, Inc., 259 F.3d 1186, 1196 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The district court

was also within its discretion in excluding evidence of [defendant’s] reliance on

advice of counsel.”). Cortron argues that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1)

mandated the exclusion of certain evidence because MacDermid did not timely

supplement its responses to Cortron’s interrogatories and production requests.

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district courts to “take a liberal view” toward the withdrawal of a

claim of privilege, which “allows adjudication based on

consideration of all the material facts.”76  

A district court “may be fully entitled” to preclude the

presentation of evidence “about matters previously hidden from

discovery through an invocation of” privilege, if a party has

manipulated the privilege “primarily to abuse, manipulate or gain an

unfair strategic advantage over opposing parties.”77 Here, however,

we agree with the District Court that MacDermid did not proceed in

bad faith. To the contrary, MacDermid vigorously defended its

privilege until the United States District Court for the District of New

Jersey made a finding of waiver over MacDermid’s objection.

MacDermid then promptly sought to introduce the newly

unprivileged evidence in the instant litigation.  

Nor has Cortron shown that it was prejudiced by the District

Court’s ruling. Cortron had ample opportunity to respond to

MacDermid’s late disclosures and to prepare to rebut the newly

produced evidence at trial. MacDermid invited Cortron in September

2013—eight months before the evidentiary ruling at issue here—to

depose Cordani on the questions as to which MacDermid had

 

But we have rejected the view that Rule 37(c)(1) invariably requires exclusion. See

Design Strategy, Inc. v. Davis, 469 F.3d 284, 297–98 (2d Cir. 2006).

76 4003–4005 5th Ave., 55 F.3d at 84.

77 Id. at 84–85.

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previously asserted a privilege. Cortron declined to do so. After the

District Court’s ruling of June 4, 2014, Cortron re‐deposed Cordani

and three other witnesses, and MacDermid supplemented its

relevant interrogatory response. The District Court also offered

Cortron an opportunity to designate an expert on patent validity, but

Cortron declined to do that as well. Moreover, Cortron rejected an

opportunity to pursue a continuance.78 Cortron must bear the

consequences of these tactical decisions.79

C. Denial of Remittitur or New Trial on CUTSA Damages

Finally, we consider Cortron’s argument that the jury’s award

of $3,790,939 for damages under CUTSA was excessive, and that the

District Court therefore should have remitted the award or ordered a

new trial on CUTSA damages.  

We review for “abuse of discretion” a district court’s denial of

remittitur or a new trial on damages.80 “In considering motions for a

new trial and/or remittitur, the role of the district court is to

 78 Cf. Manley v. AmBase Corp., 337 F.3d 237, 247 n.7 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Although

[appellant] complains that [appellee’s] motion to preclude the use of [a] discovery

deposition was not made until the eve of the second trial, the record fails to

evidence prejudice, particularly since [appellant] did not seek a

continuance . . . .”); United States v. Andrews, 381 F.2d 377, 378 (2d Cir. 1967)

(“If . . . appellant . . . was surprised by the . . . evidence, his proper remedy would

have been to seek a continuance . . . .”).

79 See Lee v. Edwards, 101 F.3d 805, 813 (2d Cir. 1996) (“We are disinclined . . . to

facilitate a new trial in which the defense can repair a tactical error.”).

80 Psihoyos v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 748 F.3d 120, 126 (2d Cir. 2014).

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determine whether the jury’s verdict is within the confines set by

state law, and to determine, by reference to federal standards

developed under Rule 59, whether a new trial or remittitur should be

ordered.”81

Under Connecticut law, “the relevant inquiry” in determining

whether an award is excessive is whether it “falls within the

necessarily uncertain limits of fair and reasonable compensation or

whether it so shocks the conscience as to compel the conclusion that

it was due to partiality, prejudice or mistake.”82 Damages may also be

excessive under Connecticut law “when the record, viewed in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff, does not support the juryʹs

award.”83

Cortron argues that the jury’s award of damages under

CUTSA lacked an evidentiary basis. MacDermid’s CUTSA claim

derived from Cortron’s transfer to DuPont of technical information

for LAVA machines. The jury’s award of damages was based on an

estimate by MacDermid’s expert, James Levinsohn, of the amount

Cortron and MacDermid would have agreed Cortron would pay in a

 81 Stampf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 761 F.3d 192, 204 (2d Cir. 2014) (brackets and

internal quotation marks omitted).

82 Duncan v. Mill Mgmt. Co. of Greenwich, 60 A.3d 222, 244 (Conn. 2013)

(internal quotation marks omitted); accord Munn v. Hotchkiss Sch., 795 F.3d 324, 335

(2d Cir. 2015).

83 Duncan, 60 A.3d at 244.

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“hypothetical negotiation” for the right to give DuPont that

information.

Cortron does not challenge Levinsohn’s use of a hypothetical

negotiation to estimate CUTSA damages.84 Rather, Cortron argues

that Levinsohn’s estimate was too speculative to support the jury’s

award. In particular, Cortron argues that, in any hypothetical

negotiation, it would have paid MacDermid “no more than the

amount for which” Cortron could have resold the technical

information to DuPont.85 The record, Cortron maintains, is devoid of

any information suggesting what that amount might have been,

especially since—according to Cortron—DuPont had “no use” for

technical information about existing LAVA machines, which were

inferior to DuPont’s own FAST processors.86 At most, Cortron argues,

DuPont would have paid no more than what it would have cost to

 84 An award based on a “hypothetical negotiation,” also known as a

“reasonable royalty,” is common “in both trade secret and patent cases.” Vt.

Microsystems, Inc. v. Autodesk, Inc., 138 F.3d 449, 450 (2d Cir. 1998). Connecticut

courts have not resolved whether this methodology is compatible with CUTSA.

Compare MacDermid, Inc. v. Cookson Grp., PLC, No. X10UWYCV095014518, 2014

WL 7525513, at *6–8 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 21, 2014), with Evans v. Gen. Motors

Corp., No. X06CV940156090S, 2003 WL 21040255 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 22, 2003).

Because Cortron does not suggest otherwise, we assume without deciding that

CUTSA permits a “hypothetical negotiation” methodology.

85 Cortron Br. 63.

86 Id.

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obtain the information by reverse‐engineering a LAVA processor—a

process that would have cost less than $30,000.87

Under Connecticut law, a jury is entitled to award damages

that are based on an expert’s estimate, especially when that estimate

is based on calculations that have been explained to the jury.88

Although Cortron contested the accuracy and reliability of

Levinsohn’s approach, his estimate was based on evidence in the

record, which the jury had ample opportunity to evaluate. In

particular, Levinsohn testified that MacDermid had spent about $3.8

million to develop the technical information underlying its first

generation of LAVA machines;89 MacDermid’s general manager,

Timothy Gotsick, offered a similar figure.90 That testimony, viewed in

the light most favorable to MacDermid, was sufficient to support a

finding that MacDermid would not have sold its technical

information to Cortron (for resale to DuPont) for less than that

amount, and that the amount therefore reflects what MacDermid and

Cortron would have agreed to in a hypothetical negotiation.  

 87 Id. at 63–64.

88 See Duncan, 60 A.3d at 245–46; cf. Earlington v. Anastasi, 976 A.2d 689, 698

(Conn. 2009) (holding that the trial court improperly denied remittitur when the

jury awarded damages that were more than 50 percent greater than what the

plaintiff’s expert had calculated).

89 J.A. 589.

90 J.A. 723.

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We therefore conclude that the District Court did not err, much

less “abuse its discretion,” in allowing the jury’s award to stand.  

III. CONCLUSION

To summarize, we hold as follows:

(1) MacDermid failed to prove harm to competition. The

District Court therefore erred in rejecting Cortron’s Rule

50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law on

MacDermid’s antitrust claims.  

a. Under section 1 of the Sherman Act, as well as

corresponding Connecticut law, a plaintiff seeking to

prove an antitrust violation under the so‐called “rule

of reason” must initially show that the challenged

action has adversely affected competition in the

market as a whole.  

b. A plaintiff may prove an adverse effect on

competition either directly (by offering evidence of

higher prices, lower output, or reduced quality in the

relevant market) or indirectly (by showing that the

defendant exercised “market power” in the relevant

market, as well as some other ground for believing

that the challenged behavior has harmed

competition).  

c. MacDermid has failed to show that Cortron’s actions

harmed competition in the market as a whole.

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i. MacDermid has not shown that the alleged

Cortron‐DuPont conspiracy affected prices,

output, or quality in the market.

ii. MacDermid has not proved that the alleged

Cortron‐DuPont conspiracy reduced the range

of choices available to consumers or harmed

consumers in any other way.  

(2) The District Court did not “abuse its discretion” in

permitting MacDermid to introduce evidence previously

withheld under the attorney‐client privilege and the work‐

product doctrine.

(3) The District Court did not “abuse its discretion” in denying

remittitur or a new trial on damages on MacDermid’s state‐

law claim for misappropriation of trade secrets.

For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the judgment of the

District Court insofar as it denied Cortron’s post‐verdict motion for

judgment as a matter of law on MacDermid’s antitrust claims. We

otherwise AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court, leaving

undisturbed the award of damages on MacDermid’s state‐law claims

for misappropriation of trade secrets, unfair trade practices,

computer crimes, and breach of contract. We REMAND the cause to

the District Court to recalculate damages in a manner consistent with

this opinion.

Case 15-589, Document 118-1, 08/10/2016, 1837233, Page37 of 37