Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00425/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00425-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Linda Chavez Gomez
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LINDA CHAVEZ GOMEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

Case No. 1:14-cv-00425-SMS

ORDER AFFIRMING AGENCY’S 

DENIAL OF BENEFITS AND ORDERING 

JUDGMENT FOR COMMISSIONER

Plaintiff Linda Chavez Gomez seeks review of a final decision of the Commissioner of 

Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her applications for disability insurance benefits (“DI”) 

under Title II and for supplemental security income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Social Security 

Act (42 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.) (“the Act”). The matter is before the Court on the parties’ cross-briefs, 

which were submitted, without oral argument, to the Magistrate Judge. Following a review of the 

record and applicable law, the Court concludes the decision of the Administrative Law Judge 

(“ALJ”) is supported by substantial evidence and free of legal error and, accordingly, affirms the 

ALJ’s decision. 

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

On March 21, 2011,

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Plaintiff applied for DI and SSI. In both applications, Plaintiff alleged 

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The ALJ’s decision states Plaintiff applied for benefits on March 3, 2011, but Plaintiff’s 

applications reflect March 21, 2011 as the application date. 

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disability beginning on August 15, 2003. The Commissioner denied the claims on August 1, 2011, 

and upon reconsideration, on May 11, 2012. Plaintiff then filed a timely request for a hearing.

Plaintiff appeared and testified before an ALJ, Sharon L. Madsen. Also at the hearing were 

Plaintiff’s counsel and an impartial vocational expert, Judith Najarian. In a written decision dated 

January 18, 2013, the ALJ found Plaintiff was not disabled under Titles II and XVI of the Act. On 

January 29, 2014, the Appeals Council denied review of the ALJ’s decision, which therefore became 

the Commissioner’s final decision and from which Plaintiff filed a timely complaint. 

B. Factual Background2

1. Plaintiff’s testimony before the ALJ (December 11, 2012). Appearing before the ALJ 

to discuss her claims based on depression, anxiety, back pain and rosacea, Plaintiff testified as 

follows: Born on September 30, 1974, Plaintiff had three children, aged six, nine and 11. Plaintiff 

did minimal household chores. Her daily routine involved getting her children ready for school, 

with the help of her mother, washing the dishes and cleaning the floor. AR 28. When Plaintiff’s 

back and neck pain were triggered by the household chores she would take a rest, leaving dinner 

preparations to her mother. Because Plaintiff was unable to focus, she did not watch T.V., listen to 

music, read or use the computer. Her energy fluctuated. When not engaged in chores, Plaintiff 

either napped or sat in her room. She did not have a hobby or participate in any social activity. 

Plaintiff’s work history included employment with various companies. She worked as a 

stocker, cashier, billing and in customer service. She was able to maintain the medical billing job for 

about three years. During this time, Plaintiff could lift five or ten pounds, sit for about 30-45 

minutes and stand for about 45 minutes to an hour. She could walk for about a block and a half. 

Plaintiff has had back and neck issues for about a year and takes Ibuprofen, but has not seen a 

physical therapist or obtained an x-ray. With regard to her anxiety, Plaintiff stated that dealing with 

her children and getting to appointments made her anxious. The anxiety resulted in panic attacks “at 

least two to three times a week,” lasting between 15-20 minutes. AR 34, 37. These panic attacks 

made Plaintiff weak and required her to rest for at least an hour, about five or six times a day. 

Additionally, she had trouble sleeping at nights. As for Plaintiff’s depression, she received

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The relevant facts herein are taken from the Administrative Record (“AR”). 

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counseling and took some medication. Her rosacea was in control with medication.

Plaintiff’s conditions affected certain aspects of her life. Her mother and sister handled her 

finances. She had problems getting along with people. She did not feel comfortable around people, 

would get irritated and her anxiety level would rise. She did not leave the house unless it was for a 

doctor’s appointment for herself or her children, which was about five times a week, and she would 

be accompanied by someone. 

2. Adult Function Report (April 30, 2011). As stated in Plaintiff’s Adult Function Report

(“AFR”), she spent her days getting her children ready for school, making her bed and doing a little 

cleaning. Plaintiff reported having trouble sleeping at night and being awake all day. Plaintiff also 

reported feeling claustrophobic and experiencing panic attacks. She could no longer work due to her 

conditions. 

Plaintiff used a calendar as a reminder to take her medications. Though sometimes she had

no energy to cook, Plaintiff was able to prepare her own meals. She was also able, with breaks, to 

do some household chores like cleaning, laundry and wash the dishes (with her mother’s help when 

needed). Plaintiff was able to go outside and did so four or five times, though it is unclear from the 

report whether they were daily or weekly. She could drive and go out alone. She did her shopping 

in stores, buying groceries, personal hygiene items and clothes for the children, every two weeks for 

about three hours. She could manage her finances, but her conditions have made it “overwhelming 

when making checks out to bills.” AR 247. 

Reading was difficult because Plaintiff could not focus and would get headaches. Once or 

twice a month she spent time with others for about 15 minutes. She needed reminders about her 

doctor appointments which occurred once every six weeks, but she did not need to be accompanied. 

Because Plaintiff “sometimes does not like to hear people[’s] problems,” she had trouble 

getting along with others. AR 248. She did not like to be social with people whom she “use[d] to be 

close to.” AR 248. Plaintiff was able to walk for half a mile before needing to rest for 30 minutes. 

Her conditions negatively affected her memory, concentration, understanding and ability to follow 

instructions. She could pay attention for 45 minutes to an hour but could not finish what she started. 

It took her a couple of times to read and understand written instructions, and about two to three times 

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with spoken instructions. She worried a lot and was “ok” with changes in routine, but generally did 

not like change. 

3. Third Party Adult Function Report (April 30, 2011). Plaintiff’s sister, Sophia Macias, 

reported that Plaintiff’s daily activities involved getting her children ready for school, making her 

own bed and doing a little cleaning. Before her conditions began, Plaintiff could have long 

conversations but now worries a lot and has trouble sleeping at night. Sometimes Plaintiff needed 

reminding to take a shower, to take her medication for her anxiety and to go to the doctor.

Ms. Macias reported that Plaintiff could cook three to four times a week for two hours at a 

time but now takes longer due to her conditions. Plaintiff tries to wash her clothes and do the dishes 

for two or three hours every day with some help, but sometimes does not have the energy. 

She could not do yardwork because the heat or cold irritated her face. 

Plaintiff went outside four to six times a day, could do so alone and could drive a vehicle. 

She shopped in the stores twice a week for about three hours, could manage her finances with some 

help as she got overwhelmed, and has to take breaks when paying bills. She played with her 

children three to four times a day but gets tired easily or gets red in the face. 

Socially, Plaintiff spent time with others on the phone or goes on the internet once or twice a 

month and takes her children to church or the movies. She had problems getting along with others 

as she sometimes seems uninterested. The conditions affected Plaintiff’s memory, concentration and 

ability to complete tasks. Because her attention span lasted no longer than an hour she could not 

complete tasks like watching a movie, maintaining a conversation or doing chores. She needed to 

read written instructions twice and will ask that spoken instructions to be repeated. Plaintiff did not 

like changes in her routine and will get quiet. When stressed, she will get nervous and experience 

anxiety. 

4. Disability Appeal Reports. Plaintiff submitted multiple Disability Appeal Reports

(most undated) to the Social Security Administration for reconsideration of her claims. In the 

reports, Plaintiff listed Clinica Sierra Vista (“the Clinic”) as where she received treatment for her 

depression, anxiety and panic attacks. Drs. Sarah Morgan (psychiatrist) and Alexis Baca 

(psychologist) provided Plaintiff’s mental counseling and medication at the Clinic. Dr. Taylor 

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treated Plaintiff’s rosacea.

Plaintiff reported struggling with remembering appointments and taking her medications, and 

used a calendar to remind herself. She reported feeling tired, not having energy, and suffering from 

insomnia. In one report, Plaintiff reported her anxiety and panic attacks had gotten worse while in 

another report she indicated “no changes” to her ability to care for her personal needs. And in a 

separate report, Plaintiff indicated she had no medical tests and did not schedule any test for the 

treatment of her conditions since she last completed a disability report. 

5. Medical evidence. Records show that Plaintiff visited the Clinic numerous times 

between 2008 and 2012 for various treatments. Concerning mental health, Drs. Morgan and Baca

were the treating physicians. Both diagnosed Plaintiff with major depressive disorder, Alzheimer’s 

disease, attention deficit disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, panic disorder without 

agoraphobia and/or general anxiety disorder. Dr. Morgan treated Plaintiff on at least ten occasions 

between 2011 and 2012. 

On June 18, 2011, Dr. C. Bullard, a state agency medical consultant, reviewed Plaintiff’s 

case. Based on information from Dr. Taylor and the Clinic, Dr. Bullard recommended categorizing 

Plaintiff as having non-severe mental and physical impairment. Dr. Bullard questioned Plaintiff’s 

credibility based on conflicting evidence about her level of social interaction and why she stopped 

working. 

On July 8, 2011, consultative examiner Dr. Mary Lewis conducted a comprehensive 

psychiatric evaluation. Plaintiff complained of anxiety and not being able to work as she would get 

bumps on her face when she is stressed out, which occurred twice a month. According to Dr. Lewis, 

Plaintiff showed no signs of substance abuse. She had no significant impairment in the following 

areas: daily activities, social functioning, managing her own funds, understanding and remembering 

instructions, concentration and attention, accepting instructions from a supervisor and responding

appropriately, sustaining an ordinary routine without special supervision, completing a normal 

workday and workweek without interruptions at a consistent pace, interacting with coworkers, and 

dealing with various changes in a work setting. Plaintiff also had minimal likelihood of emotionally 

deteriorating in a work environment.

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On July 22, 2011, Dr. Judy K. Martin, a state agency medical consultant, indicated in a

Psychiatric Review Technique Form (PRTF) that Plaintiff’s impairments were not severe. She noted 

the functional limitation on Plaintiff’s daily living, social functioning, and concentration were mild. 

Plaintiff had no episodes of decompensation. On May 2, 2012, Dr. E. Aquino-Carol, also a state 

agency medical consultant, affirmed the prior PRTF indicating no severe medically determinable 

impairment as to Plaintiff’s mental condition. Another state agency medical consultant, Dr. Roger 

Fast, concluded the same on May 4, 2012, as to Plaintiff’s physical condition. In his view, the 

alleged degree of limitations was not supported by objective findings. 

On May 31, 2012, Dr. Morgan completed a Medical Source Statement Concerning the 

Nature and Severity of an Individual’s Mental Impairment, a check-the-box form, for Plaintiff and 

rated her with a marked limitation in the following areas: (1) “ability to work in coordination with or 

proximity to others without being unduly distracted,” (2) “ability to complete a normal workday and 

workweek without interruptions from psychological symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace 

without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods,” (3) “ability to interact appropriately 

with the general public,” (4) “ability to get along with co-workers or peers without unduly 

distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes,” and (5) “ability to travel in unfamiliar places or 

to use public transportation.” AR 391. When Plaintiff’s counsel requested a written explanation, 

Dr. Morgan provided the following corresponding basis for her rating: (1) “Pt3states her anxiety 

increased to a point she was unable to function around others. When in a public situation[;]” (2) “Pt 

states she is easily overwhelmed and unable to function for long periods of time[;]” (3) “Pt states she 

becomes so anxious about not being able to answer the public’s questions. For [sic] she can not 

function[;]” (4) “Pt cries easily because is so easily overwhelmed[;]” and (5) “Pt becomes so 

overwhelmed she can not find her way[.]” AR 424-425.

6. Vocational expert testimony before the ALJ (December 11, 2012). Judith Najarian 

testified as a vocational expert at the hearing. The ALJ posed a number of hypotheticals for Ms. 

Najarian. First, she directed Ms. Najarian to assume a person of the same age, education and work 

background as Plaintiff, who has no exertional limitations and is limited to simple, routine tasks. 

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“Pt” refers to patient.

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Ms. Najarian opined that such an individual could not perform Plaintiff’s prior work (which was

generally semi-skilled), but could perform “the full range of unskilled work.” AR 44. The ALJ then 

directed Ms. Najarian to assume the same person who could perform medium work: lifting 50 

pounds ocassionally and frequently lifting or carrying 25 pounds; sit, stand or walk for six hours in 

an eight hour workday. She again opined that such a person could not perform Plaintiff’s prior 

work, but could perform all “medium, light and sedentary unskilled” work. AR 45. Finally, the ALJ 

asked Ms. Najarian to assume the same person as the second hypothetical and who cannot

concentrate for longer than an hour at a time and likely to miss four days of work each month. She 

opined that such person could perform “no work, past or otherwise.” AR 45.

 Plaintiff’s counsel also presented a hypothetical. He asked Ms. Najarian to assume a person 

as described by the ALJ and who is also markedly limited in ways similar to the Plaintiff with the 

addition that this person is “markedly limited in the ability to travel to unfamiliar places or use 

public transportation.” AR 45. To this, Ms. Najarian opined such person could perform no work. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standards

A claimant is disabled under Titled II and XVI if she is unable to engage in substantial 

gainful activity because of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that can be 

expected to result in death or has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of no less 

than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A) (2011). To encourage uniformity 

in decision making, the Commissioner has promulgated regulations prescribing a five-step sequential 

process which an ALJ must employ to evaluate an alleged disability. The ALJ must determine: “(1) 

whether the claimant is doing substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe 

medically determinable physical or mental impairment or combination of impairments that has lasted 

for more than 12 months; (3) whether the impairment meets or equals one of the listings in the 

regulations; (4) whether, given the claimant’s residual functional capacity, the claimant can still do 

his or her past relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant can make an adjustment to other work.” 

Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2014) (quotations, citations and footnote omitted); 

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520; 416.920 (2011). Residual functional capacity is what a claimant “can still 

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do despite [the claimant’s] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1) (2011). “The claimant carries 

the initial burden of proving a disability in steps one through four of the analysis. However, if a 

claimant establishes an inability to continue her past work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner in 

step five to show that the claimant can perform other substantial gainful work.” Burch v. Barnhart, 

400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). 

In this case, the ALJ found that at step one, Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful 

activity since the alleged onset date of August 15, 2003. At step two, Plaintiff had severe 

impairments of major depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, panic disorder without agoraphobia, and 

lumbar strain. At step three, Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments 

that met or equaled the severity of a listed impairment in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 

Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to lift and carry 50 pounds occasionally, 25 pounds 

frequently, stand and/or walk 6 hours, sit 6 hours in an 8-hour workday, and was limited to 

performance of simple, routine tasks. And at step four, Plaintiff was unable to perform any past 

relevant work. But, at step five, Plaintiff had acquired the skills from her past relevant work which 

are transferable to other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy. 

Consequently, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled as defined under the Act.

This Court reviews the Commissioner’s final decision to determine if the findings are 

supported by substantial evidence and free of legal error. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2011). Substantial 

evidence means “more than a mere scintilla” (Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)), but 

“less than a preponderance.” Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 n. 10 (9th Cir. 1975). It 

is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 

Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401. “If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing a 

decision, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the Commissioner. However, we must 

consider the entire record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that 

detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion, and may not affirm simply by isolating a specific 

quantum of supporting evidence.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007) 

(internal citation and quotations omitted). “If the evidence can support either outcome, the 

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Commissioner’s decision must be upheld.” Benton v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 

2003); see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2011).

 B. Analysis

Plaintiff contends the ALJ erroneously rejected the opinions of Dr. Morgan, a treating 

physician. According to Plaintiff, the ALJ did not provide specific and legitimate reasons, and failed 

to view the medical record as a whole, engaging instead in a simplistic reading of the reports, 

assessments and progress notes. In response, the Commissioner asserts the ALJ provided 

permissible reasons for rejecting Dr. Morgan’s opinions, namely that they were unsupported and 

based on Plaintiff’s subjective complaints which were contradicted by the record. Def.’s Opp. 6-7. 

“Cases in this circuit distinguish among the opinions of three types of physicians: (1) those 

who treat the claimant (treating physicians); (2) those who examine but do not treat the claimant 

(examining physicians); and (3) those who neither examine nor treat the claimant (nonexamining 

physicians). As a general rule, more weight should be given to the opinion of a treating source than 

to the opinion of doctors who do not treat the claimant.” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 

1995) (footnote and citation omitted). To reject a treating physician’s opinion which is contradicted 

by another physician, the ALJ must provide specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial 

evidence in the record. Id. (internal quotations omitted); Turner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 613 

F.3d 1217, 1222 (9th Cir. 2010). But an “ALJ need not accept the opinion of any physician, 

including a treating physician, if that opinion is brief, conclusory, and inadequately supported by 

clinical findings.” Chaudhry v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 661, 671 (9th Cir. 2012) (quotations and citation

omitted). 

In determining Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity,4the ALJ discussed the opinions of 

Drs. Lewis, Aquino-Carol, and Morgan. With regard to Dr. Morgan, the ALJ stated:

I give very little weight to [Dr. Morgan’s] opinion because Dr. Morgan 

relied heavily on the subjective report of symptoms and limitations 

provided by the claimant, and seemed to accept as true most, if not all, 

of what the claimant reported. As noted above, the claimant is able to 

perform her activities of daily living and spend time with others. [¶] 

After careful consideration of the evidence, I find that the claimant’s 

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The residual functional capacity finding at step three is used at the fourth and fifth steps of the 

sequential evaluation process. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e) (2011).

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medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to 

cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s statements 

concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these 

symptoms are not entirely credible for the reasons explained in this 

section. [¶] In this case, the claimant is less than fully credible 

because of inconsistent statements and unsupported allegations.

AR 15. Stated otherwise, the ALJ’s reasons for minimizing the weight of Dr. Morgan’s opinion are: 

(1) because Dr. Morgan relied heavily on Plaintiff’s subjective reporting, (2) because there is 

evidence contrary to the opinion, and (3) because Plaintiff’s symptoms and allegations are not fully 

credible. These reasons are supported by substantial evidence in the record. 

First, Dr. Morgan’s assessments of Plaintiff’s marked limitations appear in a check-the-box 

form, which is conclusory and devoid of analysis. Such forms are generally disfavored. Cf. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1527 (2011) (“The better an explanation a source provides for an opinion, the more 

weight we will give that opinion.”) When Plaintiff’s counsel requested an explanation, Dr. Morgan 

wrote in response for the most part that they were based on what “Pt state[d] . . . .” AR 424. Her 

responses were brief. 5 

Plaintiff urges that the ALJ should have viewed Dr. Morgan’s treatment notes, which support 

her assessments. The treatment notes contain Plaintiff’s subjective statements and Dr. Morgan’s 

objective observations. The subjective statements range from descriptions of Plaintiff’s anxiety and 

panic attacks to her family-related issues. The objective observations include ratings of mood, 

affect, concentration, insight, and orientation, among other. The ratings were generally “dysphoric” 

as to mood, “broad” as to affect, and “fair” as to concentration and insight. On their face, the 

treatment notes do not suggest a connection to the marked limitations of completing a normal 

workday and workweek, ability to interact with the general public or get along with co-workers, or 

the ability to travel to unfamiliar places. Consequently, one could conclude that Dr. Morgan relied 

heavily on Plaintiff’s statements rather than the clinical observations and statements obtained during 

treatment in concluding Plaintiff suffered marked limitations. Contra Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 

 

5 On the same document containing Dr. Morgan’s handwritten responses were the words, “pull 

chart,” which suggests she may have referred to some chart in drafting her responses. But no chart 

appears in the record. Rather, Dr. Morgan’s treatment notes include use of a table to classify her

objective observations of Plaintiff.

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995, 1014 n.7 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he Commissioner suggests that the ALJ was entitled to reject 

their opinions on the ground that they were reflected in mere check-box forms . . . . This argument

rests on a mistaken factual premise. The check-box forms did not stand alone: they reflected and 

were entirely consistent with the hundreds of pages of treatment notes created . . . in the course of 

their relationship with Garrison.”) (emphasis added).

Second, Plaintiff’s statements in her AFR and to Dr. Lewis and the Third Party AFR belie 

Dr. Morgan’s opinion. Plaintiff reported daily activities which involved getting her children ready 

for school, making her bed, and doing some household chores. She was able to drive, go out alone, 

shop in stores twice a week and take her children to the movies once or twice a month. Plaintiff 

spent time with others once or twice a month and had several friends with whom she has been close 

for 30 years. Collectively, this evidence does not suggest an individual with marked limitations in 

her ability to work in coordination with or in proximity to others, or ability to interact appropriately 

with the general public. 

At the same time, the ALJ’s credibility finding is well supported by substantial evidence. 

“Credibility determinations are the province of the ALJ,” Bowen, 885 F.2d at 604. “If the ALJ’s 

credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record, we may not engage in secondguessing.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. 2002). But the findings must be 

“sufficiently specific to permit the court to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit 

claimant’s testimony. The ALJ may consider . . . inconsistencies either in [claimant’s] testimony or 

between [her] testimony and [her] conduct, [claimant’s] daily activities, [her] work record, and 

testimony from physicians and third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect of the 

symptoms of which [claimant] complains.” Id. at 958-959 (quotations and citations omitted).

The ALJ noted that at the hearing Plaintiff testified to having back and neck issues but only 

took Ibuprofen for her pain. She had not obtained any diagnostic images or began physical therapy 

though she was advised to do so in April 2012 (about eight months before the hearing). An April 4, 

2012 handwritten and largely illegible document from the Clinic, which the ALJ cited, shows a plan 

for Plaintiff to undergo physical therapy and obtain certain medications, without any plan to obtain 

diagnostic images. The ALJ’s finding on this point is thus not entirely accurate. But this partial 

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inaccuracy does not invalidate the ALJ’s credibility finding because Plaintiff herself testified she had 

not seen a physical therapist even though the plan was for her to undergo physical therapy. 

Additionally, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff testified she does not get along with others or feel 

comfortable around them, yet during a visit to the Clinic reported that she enjoyed being with her 

children, roller skating, and going to the movies. Plaintiff also reported to Dr. Lewis that she has 

several friends. Plaintiff’s contradictory evidence is therefore fully supported by the record. 

Related to this credibility finding, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s AFR indicates she spent time with 

others once or twice a month and the Third Party AFT indicates Plaintiff shopped in stores twice a 

week, all of which are activities inconsistent with Plaintiff’s testimony about being uncomfortable 

around others. 

Moreover, the Court notes other contradictions which cast doubt on Plaintiff’s credibility. 

While Plaintiff testified that her mother and sister handled her finances, she reported in the AFR that 

she could manage her finances though she gets overwhelmed when writing checks to pay the bills. 

This was confirmed by her sister’s statements in the Third Party AFR. Finally, Plaintiff testified she 

only left the house for a doctor’s appointment and would be accompanied by someone, but her sister 

stated in the Third Party AFR that Plaintiff goes outside four to six times a day and could do so 

alone. 

Though not in abundance, the record supports the ALJ’s belief that Plaintiff is not fully 

credible. Thus, the ALJ aptly gave very little weight Dr. Morgan’s opinions as based on Plaintiff’s 

subjective representations of her conditions. 

Lastly, Plaintiff’s contention that the ALJ should have sought clarification from Dr. Morgan 

is without merit. An ALJ will seek additional evidence or clarification when the evidence received 

from the medical source presents an insufficient basis from which to make the disability 

determination. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(e); 416.912(e) (2011). This occurs “when the report from 

[the] medical source contains a conflict or ambiguity that must be resolved, the report does not 

contain all the necessary information, or does not appear to be based on medically acceptable clinical 

and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” Id. Here, the ALJ found no such defect in Dr. Morgan’s 

opinions which required additional evidence or clarification. Instead, the ALJ found Dr. Morgan 

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relied too heavily on Plaintiff’s subjective statements and questioned Plaintiff’s credibility. See 

Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he requirement for additional 

information is triggered only when the evidence from the treating medical source is inadequate to 

make a determination as to the claimant’s disability. The ALJ did not make a finding that the report 

was inadequate to make a determination regarding Ms. Thomas’ disability. Instead, the ALJ 

disagreed with the report's finding . . . .”) The ALJ properly considered Dr. Morgan’s opinions and 

afforded them proper weight. 

III. CONCLUSION

The Court finds that the ALJ applied appropriate legal standards and that substantial 

evidence supported the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff was not disabled.6 Accordingly, the Court

DENIES Plaintiff’s appeal from the administrative decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. 

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of the Commissioner and against 

Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 29, 2015 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Finding the ALJ did not err, the Court need not address Plaintiff’s discussion of the “credit-as-true” 

rule. 

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