Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-07-04551/USCOURTS-ca4-07-04551-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Nancy Jean Siegel
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.  No. 07-4551

NANCY JEAN SIEGEL,

Defendant-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.

Andre M. Davis, District Judge.

(1:03-cr-00393-AMD)

Argued: May 15, 2008

Decided: August 12, 2008

Before TRAXLER and KING, Circuit Judges, and

Jackson L. KISER, Senior United States District Judge

for the Western District of Virginia, sitting by designation.

Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge Traxler wrote

the majority opinion, in which Judge King joined. Senior Judge Kiser

wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. 

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Christine Manuelian, OFFICE OF THE UNITED

STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Andrew

David Levy, BROWN, GOLDSTEIN & LEVY, LLP, Baltimore,

Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Rod J. Rosenstein, United

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States Attorney, Tamera Fine, Assistant United States Attorney,

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore,

Maryland, for Appellant. Jane R. Flanagan, BROWN, GOLDSTEIN

& LEVY, LLP, Baltimore, Maryland; Thomas J. Saunders, Baltimore,

Maryland, for Appellee. 

OPINION

TRAXLER, Circuit Judge: 

Nancy Jean Siegel is currently under indictment for numerous

fraud-based offenses, including mail and wire fraud, see 18 U.S.C.A.

§§ 1341 & 1343 (West 2000 & Supp. 2008). Siegel also faces a

charge of committing murder to prevent the reporting of her crimes.

See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1512(a)(1)(C) (West 2000 & Supp. 2008). A week

before her trial was scheduled to commence, the district court granted

Siegel’s motion to strike as surplusage allegations in the indictment

about certain crimes that were not the subject of a substantive criminal count and her motion to preclude the government from introducing in its case-in-chief evidence about those crimes and other crimes

not mentioned in the indictment. The government appeals. We reverse

the district court’s decisions and remand for trial. 

I.

A.

The allegations in the indictment against Siegel and the evidence

forecast by the government in its pre-trial filings establish the following.1

 Siegel married Charles Kucharski in 1968, and the couple

divorced in 1985. Sometime towards the end of the marriage, Siegel

began gambling. To support her gambling habit, Siegel used Kucharski’s name and personal information to obtain credit without Kuchar1Because this is a pre-trial appeal, our review of the facts is by necessity limited to the facts the government intends to prove at trial as evidenced by the allegations of the indictment and the evidence proffered

by the government in the course of the pre-trial proceedings. 

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ski’s knowledge. Siegel’s actions left Kucharski more than $100,000

in debt, and he was forced to file for bankruptcy a few years after the

couple divorced. 

Siegel married Ted Giesendaffer in 1985. She apparently continued

to gamble and continued to support her gambling habit by engaging

in the same kind of fraudulent conduct she began in her first marriage.

Siegel used Giesendaffer’s personal information to obtain credit, and

she stole money from him by altering mortgage-payment checks to

make them payable to her instead of the mortgage company. When

Giesendaffer discovered Siegel’s misconduct, he confronted her about

it and threatened to go to the police. Siegel responded to that threat

with such violence that Giesendaffer hid from her in a closet. Siegel

and Giesendaffer separated in February 1992 and divorced in 1993.

In 1992, Siegel convinced her friends John and Linda Mayberry to

co-sign a car loan and pay the required down-payment. Not surprisingly, Siegel defaulted on the car loan, and the Mayberrys ended up

repaying the loan. Siegel subsequently used John Mayberry’s personal information to obtain a $3,000 loan in his name. 

In December 1992, Siegel stole the wallet of Merle Beckman. She

used Beckman’s credit cards until they were cancelled, and she managed to convince bank employees to give her the number of the

account connected to Beckman’s ATM card. Siegel ultimately stole

thousands of dollars from Beckman. In January 1993, Siegel stole the

wallet of Burdell Dowdell. She wrote checks payable to "Charlene

Townsend" on Dowdell’s account and then posed as Townsend to

cash the checks. In February 1993, Siegel stole the wallet of Leslie

Wallace, whose daughter was in dance class with Siegel’s daughter.

Siegel immediately began draining the funds from Wallace’s bank

accounts. Wallace changed her account number twice, but Siegel

managed to convince bank employees to give her the new account

numbers over the telephone. Siegel also convinced bank employees

to make a large amount of cash available to her at the drive-through

window.2 Bank employees eventually caught on, and Siegel was

2Claiming to be Wallace, Siegel told the employees that she was being

treated for cancer and had forgotten her account number because the chemotherapy affected her memory. She also claimed that the chemotherapy

prevented her from entering the bank, so bank employees let her pick up

a large amount of money through the drive-through window. 

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finally arrested after making another pick-up at the drive-through

window. 

Siegel pleaded guilty in Maryland state court to charges stemming

from the Dowdell, Wallace, and Beckman wallet thefts. In December

1994, after pleading guilty but before being sentenced, Siegel stole

the wallet of co-worker Cynthia Kidwell. Although Kidwell did not

keep credit cards or checks in her wallet, the wallet did contain

Kidwell’s driver’s license. Siegel put her own picture on the license

and then used the license to take out loans in Kidwell’s name. After

the fraud was uncovered and Kidwell identified Siegel as a coworker, Kidwell recalled seeing Siegel on several occasions parked

near Kidwell’s home, presumably waiting to intercept mail connected

to the fraudulent loans. Siegel pleaded guilty to state charges stemming from the Kidwell theft, and she ultimately received suspended

sentences and probation for each of the wallet thefts. 

In 1994, while she was on probation for the wallet-theft crimes,

Siegel met Jack Watkins, a widower almost thirty years her senior.

Watkins lived on Sungold Road in Reisterstown, Maryland. He supported himself comfortably in his retirement through Social Security

benefits and annuity payments from New York Life. Before he met

Siegel, Watkins had a few credit cards that he used sparingly, and he

always paid the full balance when he did make a credit card purchase.

He owned his home outright, with no mortgage or other encumbrance.

Watkins and Siegel met in the fall of 1994, when she sold him a

burial vault, and the relationship quickly became close. From all

appearances, the relationship was a romantic one. Within months after

meeting Watkins, Siegel began using his personal information to open

new accounts, generally using her own address in Ellicott City, Maryland, as the address on the accounts. By December 1994, Siegel had

changed the address on many of Watkins’s pre-existing accounts to

her Ellicott City address. She made extensive charges on those

accounts and allowed the accounts to become delinquent. In May

1995, Siegel persuaded Watkins to buy her a new, $44,000 BMW.

The financing for the car was in Watkins’s name, and the car was

titled and insured under Watkins’s name, but Siegel was the car’s

only driver. 

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Sometime in 1995, while Siegel was still on probation, the Mayberrys (who Siegel had previously left holding the bag on a car loan)

learned about the $3,000 loan Siegel had taken out in John Mayberry’s name. Mayberry repeatedly confronted Siegel about the loan,

until she finally repaid him. Around this same time, Siegel

approached Jack Butcher, an acquaintance. Siegel cried as she told

him that she would go to jail unless she could come up with $3,000.

Butcher borrowed the money and gave it to Siegel, on the condition

that she repay the loan herself. Siegel of course defaulted on the loan,

and she later tried to use Butcher’s personal information to obtain

another loan. Butcher found out about her efforts and cancelled the

loan. When he confronted her and threatened to go to the police, Siegel became hysterical. She eventually managed to repay the $3,000

loan. 

By August 1995, Siegel had accumulated tens of thousands of dollars of debt on credit cards in Watkins’s name, and the balance on the

car loan exceeded $40,000. At Siegel’s urging, Watkins obtained a

$44,000 mortgage on his home on August 22, 1995. Siegel used the

mortgage proceeds to pay off credit card debt, but then promptly

began making new charges. By November 1995, Siegel convinced

Watkins to re-finance the mortgage on his home. She persuaded him

to give her the balance of the mortgage proceeds (approximately

$20,000 after the August mortgage was satisfied) so she could buy the

condominium she lived in. Siegel’s condominium unit, however, was

not for sale, and Siegel used the mortgage proceeds for other purposes. 

Siegel apparently exerted as much control over Watkins’s personal

life as she did over his financial life. Before meeting Siegel, Watkins

had breakfast several times a week with a group of friends, and he had

regular contact with stepchildren from a prior marriage. After he met

Siegel, however, he began meeting his breakfast group less and less

frequently. Siegel eventually drove him to one final breakfast where

he said goodbye to his friends. Telephone calls to Watkins from his

stepchildren were forwarded to Siegel’s telephone, but Watkins never

knew about the calls. Before losing contact, Watkins had told his

stepchildren, breakfast friends, and a neighbor about his relationship

with Siegel. He told them that he and Siegel would be getting married

and that he would move into her condominium. 

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In February 1996, Siegel contacted a real estate company to inquire

about the company buying Watkins’s home. In the first week of April

1996, Siegel pawned most of Watkins’s personal possessions. The

company Siegel had contacted bought Watkins’s home on April 9,

1996. By the time of the sale, the November mortgage was already

several months in arrears. Watkins netted just over $3,800 from the

sale of his home, "a home he had owned free and clear before meeting

Siegel." Brief of Appellant at 14. 

After selling the house, Watkins and Siegel went to Atlantic City

to celebrate their upcoming marriage. Watkins apparently drank heavily in Atlantic City, and Siegel took him to an emergency room when

they returned to Maryland. Watkins was admitted to the hospital.

Watkins told hospital staff that Siegel was his fiancée, but Siegel told

the staff that she was simply his caregiver or housekeeper, not his

fiancée. Although Watkins was oriented in time, place, and person,

and appeared to hospital staff to be sensitive and responsive, he was

diagnosed as suffering from dementia, given his insistence in the face

of her denial that he was engaged to Siegel. Watkins was then transferred to the psychiatric ward. Hospital records indicate that Siegel

did not want Watkins to be discharged into her care and that she tried

to have him placed in a long-term care facility. She was unable to find

a facility with an immediate opening, and she took Watkins to her

condominium when he was discharged on April 16, 1996. 

On May 14, 1996, Watkins’s emaciated body was found near an

access point to the Appalachian Trail in Loudoun, Virginia. The body

was stuffed inside two duffle bags and then stuffed into a footlocker.

The cause of death was cervical compression, and there were bruises

and other marks on the body that were consistent with manual strangulation. A toxicology analysis revealed that Watkins’s blood and

liver contained toxic levels of an over-the-counter medication with

sedative effects, which suggested that Watkins had been ingesting

extremely high levels of the medication for a period of weeks or

months. Although Watkins’s body was found within days after his

death, the police were unable to identify the body. Siegel never

reported him missing, and because Watkins had lost contact with his

friends and family, no one else even knew that he had disappeared.

Siegel continued to use Watkins’s identity well after his death. She

stopped the direct deposit of his Social Security checks, had the

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checks mailed to her address (and later a post office box) in Ellicott

City, and deposited the checks in various bank accounts to which she

had access. Siegel continued to receive Watkins’s annuity payments,

and she opened new credit card accounts in Watkins’s name several

years after his death. 

Siegel had dated Eric Siegel, a wealthy commercial loan broker, for

a time in 1992. The relationship resumed in fits and starts in May or

June 1995, while Siegel was still involved with Watkins. By June

1996, shortly after Watkins’s death, the relationship was again in full

flower, and Siegel and Eric married in December 1998. Not surprisingly, Siegel did not spare Eric from her fraudulent schemes. She

stole money directly from his financial accounts and incurred substantial debt in his name through credit accounts and loans about which

Eric had no knowledge. When Siegel’s actions came to light, Eric

chose to make good on her debts (which amounted to about $300,000)

rather than report Siegel to the police. 

Siegel’s own daughters also became victims of her crimes. Siegel

took money that her daughter Jennifer had given her to make car payments, and Jennifer’s car eventually was repossessed. Siegel used

Jennifer’s identity and that of her daughter Amanda to open credit

accounts and then defaulted on those accounts, thus destroying her

daughters’ credit ratings. Siegel sometimes used her daughters’ identities and bank accounts when cashing Watkins’s Social Security

checks and annuity payments in the years after his death. 

In January 2003, nearly seven years after Watkins was murdered,

Virginia law enforcement officials identified his body through military fingerprint records. The Virginia officials sought help from

investigators with the Social Security Administration, who quickly

determined that Siegel had been receiving Watkins’s Social Security

checks since his death. 

After a few months of investigating and watching Siegel, postal

inspectors and an FBI agent approached Siegel after she had retrieved

Watkins’s Social Security check from her post office box. She agreed

to be interviewed. Siegel initially claimed that Watkins was alive and

well, living in Pennsylvania with a woman named Ruth. She said that

before moving to Pennsylvania some six years earlier, Watkins had

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lived with her for about eight months after selling his house. Siegel

said that she cashed Watkins’s checks for him because he was a gambler and had financial problems that made it impossible for him to

have a checking account. The investigators finally told Siegel that

they knew what had happened to Watkins. While Siegel repeatedly

told the investigators that she wanted to tell them everything, she

never provided them with any details about Watkins’s death, except

to say that "[i]t didn’t happen the way you think." J.A. 103. Siegel

later told family members that she came home one afternoon and

found Watkins sprawled across the bed with a cord around his neck.

B.

The government indicted Siegel in 2004, charging her with seven

counts of converting Jack Watkins’s Social Security checks, see 18

U.S.C.A. § 641 (West Supp. 2008); six counts of bank fraud, see 18

U.S.C.A. § 1344 (West 2000); one count of identity theft, see 18

U.S.C.A. § 1028 (West 2000 & Supp. 2008); two counts of mail

fraud, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341; and two counts of wire fraud, see 18

U.S.C.A. § 1343. The government also charged Siegel with murdering Watkins to prevent him from reporting her fraud, see 18 U.S.C.A.

§ 1512(a)(1)(C); and with impeding an official investigation by transporting Watkins’s body across state lines, see 18 U.S.C.A.

§ 1512(c)(2) (West Supp. 2008). 

Although the substantive criminal charges were all premised on

conduct involving Jack Watkins, the indictment alleged as part of Siegel’s "scheme and artifice to defraud" Siegel’s misconduct involving

her three husbands, her daughters, the Mayberrys, and Jack Butcher.

And while the indictment did not include allegations about the wallet

thefts that led to Siegel’s state-court convictions and probationary

sentences, the government before trial filed a motion notifying Siegel

of the wallet-theft evidence and seeking permission to present that

evidence at trial.3 Siegel filed a motion in limine seeking to preclude

3We will refer to the evidence of fraud involving victims other than

Jack Watkins as the "Other Crime Evidence." When necessary for clarity, we will refer to the Other Crime Evidence that was alleged in the

indictment as the "Charged Other Crime Evidence," and the Other Crime

Evidence that was not mentioned in the indictment as the "Uncharged

Other Crime Evidence." 

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the government from presenting at trial any of the Other Crime Evidence, and Siegel also sought to strike as surplusage the allegations

in the indictment about the Charged Other Crime Evidence. 

A week before Siegel’s trial was scheduled to begin, the district

court held a hearing to consider the pending motions. Counsel for Siegel argued that the Other Crime Evidence was inadmissible character

evidence, see Fed. R. Evid. 404(a), and counsel argued that the government could not avoid Rule 404 by including allegations of the

Charged Other Crime Evidence in the indictment. Counsel for Siegel

therefore argued that the allegations of the Charged Other Crime Evidence should be stricken from the indictment and that the government

should be precluded from presenting at trial any of the Other Crime

Evidence. 

The government argued that the mail and wire fraud statutes under

which Siegel was charged required proof of a "scheme or artifice to

defraud." The government contended that Siegel had a single, twentyyear long scheme to defraud various victims. The government argued

that it was entitled to include in the indictment allegations setting

forth the full scope of that scheme, including the allegations of the

Charged Other Crime Evidence, regardless of whether the conduct set

forth in those allegations was the subject of substantive criminal

counts. As for the Uncharged Other Crime Evidence, the government

contended that those crimes were an intrinsic part of the indicted

scheme to defraud and that the Uncharged Other Crime Evidence was

therefore admissible. Alternatively, the government contended that

the Other Crime Evidence was relevant to establish, among other

things, Siegel’s motive for killing Watkins and that the Other Crime

Evidence was therefore admissible under Rule 404(b). 

The district court granted Siegel’s motions, at least for purposes of

opening statements and the government’s case-in-chief. The court

concluded that the Other Crime Evidence would be offered to prove

Siegel’s propensity to commit fraud and that introduction of the evidence was therefore prohibited by Rule 404(b). As for the Charged

Other Crime Evidence, the court concluded that because the evidence

was not admissible, the allegations in the indictment about that misconduct should be stricken as surplusage. 

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The district court explained that while the Other Crime Evidence

might be "relevant in a very expansive way," J.A. 424, the evidence

of Siegel’s defrauding of her husbands and daughters "and all the

things that occurred prior to the 1993-94 period . . . . is inflammatory,

unduly prejudicial, is certain to give rise to a waste of time, [and] it

is cumulative and its probative value is significantly outweighed by

its . . . unfair prejudicial effect." J.A. 424-25. The court expressed its

view that "the case that should have been indicted is the murder case

involving Mr. Watkins and the related defrauding of Mr. Watkins and

the banks, insurance company and the Social Security Administration

thefts, [and] that’s the case we’re going to try." J.A. 426. 

It appears that the court’s ruling was at least partially driven by the

court’s concern about the length of trial. The court suggested that Siegel’s husbands and children might feel some amount of guilt, because

they effectively enabled Siegel’s crimes by not going to the police

before Watkins was murdered. The court stated that if Siegel’s family

had been less loving, less forgiving, less understanding . . . ,

maybe we wouldn’t be here today in federal court in a murder case. This case is not the place with all respect for those

persons to expiate their differences. This is not the forum for

that. . . . I go down this path just to point out why it clearly

would be very likely an enormous waste of time to permit

ex-husbands to come in here over the course of days and

days and days of what I understand is likely to be hours and

hours of testimony . . . . Clearly, we open up the whole panoply of issues relating to the defendant’s state of mind, her

mental health, his knowledge of it. Was he protecting her for

this reason or that reason or some other reason? And the

same thing can be said about the other husbands, exhusbands. Same thing can be said about the daughters. It’s

not a family law case. It’s a murder case. 

J.A. 427-28. 

Believing that the district court’s rulings severely hampered its

ability to prove the charges against Siegel, the government filed this

interlocutory appeal. 

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II.

We first consider Siegel’s claim that we lack jurisdiction over the

government’s appeal. The government’s right to appeal an adverse

ruling in a criminal case is controlled by 18 U.S.C.A. § 3731 (West

Supp. 2008). Section 3731 authorizes the government to appeal an

order 

suppressing or excluding evidence or requiring the return of

seized property in a criminal proceeding, not made after the

defendant has been put in jeopardy and before the verdict or

finding on an indictment or information.

Id.4 Siegel argues that the district court’s decision was a preliminary

ruling only and thus did not actually have the effect of suppressing

or excluding evidence. Siegel therefore contends that the district

court’s order is not appealable under § 3731. We disagree. 

As Siegel points out, the district court repeatedly indicated that its

rulings were preliminary and could change as the trial progressed.

See, e.g., J.A. 423 (indicating that the district court would "wait until

[it] hears the evidence so as to make a better informed, more reasonable decision about what really is surplusage and what is not"); J.A.

426-27 ("Now with respect to what the Government describes as the

uncharged conduct, the Court does not intend at this time to admit any

of such evidence. . . . [D]epending on how things go, I’m not foreclosing the Government from persuading me. I seriously doubt the

Government will persuade me. But I’m not totally foreclosing the

possibility that the Government will persuade me to admit evidence

of . . . no more than one . . . of the wallet theft incidents."). The district court’s order, however, while described as preliminary, precluded the government from referring to any of the Other Crime

Evidence in opening statements and from presenting any of that evidence during its case-in-chief. Moreover, the district court made it

4Section 3731 also requires the United States attorney to certify to the

district court "that the appeal is not taken for purpose of delay and that

the evidence is a substantial proof of a fact material in the proceeding."

The government has complied with the certification requirement in this

case. 

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clear that it would reconsider the issue only after the close of the government’s case-in-chief. By that point in the trial, however, jeopardy

would have long since attached, see, e.g., United States v. Osteen, 254

F.3d 521, 526 (4th Cir. 2001), and the government would be statutorily prohibited from pursuing an appeal. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3731

(permitting appeal of orders excluding evidence only if the order was

"not made after the defendant has been put in jeopardy"). 

Section 3731 was enacted "to remove all statutory barriers to Government appeals and to allow appeals whenever the Constitution

would permit," United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 337 (1975),

and the statute by its own terms must be "liberally construed to effectuate its purposes." 18 U.S.C.A. § 3731. Because no jury has been

sworn in this case, the Double Jeopardy clause clearly does not preclude the government’s appeal. And the district court’s ruling without

question prevents the government from presenting in its case-in-chief

substantial evidence establishing a significant portion of the fraudulent scheme alleged by the government in the indictment. Even if the

district court reconsidered the issue, the court stated that it would at

most permit the government to present evidence of one of the wallet

thefts. The district court’s decision, though couched in preliminary

terms, therefore effectively and finally suppressed a large portion of

the evidence the government intended to present at trial. Under these

circumstances, we have no difficulty concluding that the government’s appeal of the district court’s rulings is authorized by § 3731.

To conclude otherwise would insulate the district court’s ruling from

appellate review, thus frustrating rather than furthering the purposes

of § 3731. See United States v. Horwitz, 622 F.2d 1101, 1104-05 (2d

Cir. 1980) (permitting government to appeal district court’s conditional ruling that testimony of government witnesses would be suppressed unless the government also granted immunity to certain

defense witnesses, which the government insisted it would not do:

"[I]f the judge’s decision to suppress evidence is incorrect and a judgment of acquittal results, principles of double jeopardy will prevent

a government appeal, a situation which section 3731 was designed to

prevent. Under the circumstances, it would be an exercise in pure formalism to hold that the district court’s order is not appealable at this

juncture."); United States v. Helstoski, 576 F.2d 511, 521 (3d Cir.

1978) ("Section 3731 was designed to allow appeals . . . to insure that

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prosecutions are not unduly restricted by erroneous pre-trial decisions

to exclude evidence."), aff’d, 442 U.S. 477 (1979). 

III.

We turn now to the government’s contention that the district court

erred by excluding the Other Crime Evidence. Under the Federal

Rules of Evidence, "[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not

admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action

in conformity therewith." Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). Such evidence, however, may "be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence

of mistake or accident." Id. The Rule 404(b) inquiry applies only to

evidence of other acts that are "extrinsic to the one charged." United

States v. Chin, 83 F.3d 83, 87 (4th Cir. 1996). "[A]cts intrinsic to the

alleged crime do not fall under Rule 404(b)’s limitations on admissible evidence." Id. at 87-88. 

The government argues that the Other Crime Evidence involves

crimes that were part of Siegel’s twenty-year scheme to support her

gambling habit by defrauding anyone available, be it family or

friends. The government contends that the conduct described by the

Other Crime Evidence was intrinsic to the charged crimes and that the

Other Crime Evidence therefore is not subject to the limitations of

Rule 404(b). And even if the Other Crime Evidence involved crimes

that should be viewed as extrinsic to the charged crimes, the government argues that the evidence was nonetheless admissible under Rule

404(b). 

Siegel, however, contends that fraudulent acts committed (in some

instances years) before she even met Jack Watkins and involving victims with no connection to Watkins cannot be considered intrinsic to

the Watkins-related crimes charged in the indictment. Siegel insists

that the Other Crime Evidence was offered solely to show her bad

character and her propensity to commit fraud and that the district

court therefore properly excluded the evidence under Rule 404(b). 

A.

Evidence of uncharged conduct is not "other crimes" evidence subject to Rule 404 if the uncharged conduct "arose out of the same

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series of transactions as the charged offense, or if [evidence of the

uncharged conduct] is necessary to complete the story of the crime on

trial." United States v. Kennedy, 32 F.3d 876, 885 (4th Cir. 1994)

(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); see also Chin, 83

F.3d at 88 ("Other criminal acts are intrinsic when they are inextricably intertwined or both acts are part of a single criminal episode or

the other acts were necessary preliminaries to the crime charged."

(internal quotation marks omitted)). 

In our view, at least some of the conduct underlying the Other

Crime Evidence is properly viewed as intrinsic to the Watkins-related

counts with which Siegel was charged. For example, evidence of Siegel’s crimes against Eric Siegel, and the scope of those crimes, would

provide important context for the government’s charge that Siegel

murdered Watkins to prevent him from discovering and reporting her

crimes. By the time Siegel had exhausted Watkins’s financial

resources, she had already re-established her relationship with Eric,

her future husband. Eric’s wealth made him a much more attractive

target for Siegel’s attentions, so she needed to find a way to end her

relationship with Watkins that would not jeopardize her freedom or

her access to Eric’s financial resources. If Siegel had simply walked

away from Watkins in order to pursue her relationship with Eric,

Watkins—who no longer had his own place to live (or any personal

possessions, for that matter)—would have had little choice but to turn

to his long-neglected friends or family for help. His family and

friends would almost certainly have discovered and explained to Watkins what Siegel had done to him, which would have placed Siegel

at great risk. Siegel had already failed in her efforts to have Watkins

institutionalized, and it surely would have been difficult for Siegel to

pull off a marriage to Eric if she were living with another man. Evidence of her crimes against Eric would thus provide the jury with the

necessary context for the government’s claim that Siegel murdered

Watkins so that she could safely move forward in her relationship

with Eric. See United States v. Cooper, 482 F.3d 658, 663 (4th Cir.

2007) (explaining that evidence of bad acts that "provide[s] context

relevant to the criminal charges" is admissible without consideration

of the requirements of Rule 404); United States v. Lipford, 203 F.3d

259, 268 (4th Cir. 2000) (evidence of other criminal acts admissible

without regard to Rule 404(b) where the evidence "served to complete

the story" of the charged crimes).

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For similar reasons, the wallet thefts to which Siegel pleaded guilty

in state court are also properly viewed as intrinsic to the Watkinsrelated crimes. Siegel was still on probation for these crimes when

Watkins was killed. Thus, Siegel’s relationship with Eric and her personal freedom depended on her ability to extricate herself from the

relationship with Watkins without him discovering and reporting her

crimes. 

We are not certain, however, that all of the Other Crime Evidence

involves conduct that can be viewed as intrinsic to the crimes with

which Siegel was charged. For example, it is not apparent that Siegel’s defrauding of the Mayberrys and Jack Butcher were inextricably

intertwined with her defrauding of Watkins, and her conduct with

regard to Butcher and the Mayberrys does not at first blush seem to

provide relevant context for any of the Watkins-related crimes with

which Siegel was charged. We need not, however, definitively determine whether each piece of the Other Crime Evidence may be viewed

as intrinsic to the crimes for which Siegel has been indicted. As we

explain below, we conclude that the Other Crime Evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b), which makes further inquiry into the

intrinsic-extrinsic divide unnecessary. 

B.

"Rule 404(b) prohibits evidence of other crimes or bad acts to show

bad character or propensity to break the law." United States v. Young,

248 F.3d 260, 271 (4th Cir. 2001). Evidence of other crimes nonetheless is

admissible for other purposes, which include, but are not

limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,

plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

Rule 404(b) is viewed as an inclusive rule, admitting all evidence of other crimes or acts except that which tends to

prove only criminal disposition. 

Id. (emphasis added; citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

To be admissible under Rule 404(b), evidence must be "(1) relevant

to an issue other than character; (2) necessary; and (3) reliable."

United States v. Wells, 163 F.3d 889, 895 (4th Cir. 1998) (internal

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quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Queen, 132 F.3d

991, 997 (4th Cir. 1997). 

We agree with the government that the Other Crime Evidence was

relevant to issues other than Siegel’s bad character. The Other Crime

Evidence is most directly relevant to establishing Siegel’s motive for

killing Jack Watkins. The government charged Siegel under 18

U.S.C.A. § 1512(a)(1)(C), which required the government to prove

not only that she killed Watkins, but that she killed him for the purpose of preventing him or anyone else from providing law enforcement with information about the federal crimes she had committed.

The Other Crime Evidence showed that Siegel had an extensive history of fraud that inflicted significant financial losses on numerous

victims. Given the scope of her fraudulent conduct, Siegel would

likely face a lengthy prison term and substantial restitution obligations if she were caught. The Other Crime Evidence would thus give

a jury a basis for concluding that Siegel had a very strong interest in

keeping Watkins quiet. See United States v. Willoughby, 860 F.2d 15,

24 (2d Cir. 1988) (in case where the defendants were charged with

obstruction of justice, evidence of defendants’ participation in a robbery was admissible under Rule 404(b) because it was "highly probative of their motive, and the intensity of that motive, to seek to

prevent certain witnesses from testifying at their trial for robbery").

Accordingly, because the Other Crime Evidence established the

extent of Siegel’s fraudulent scheme and explained her motive for

killing Watkins, the Other Crime Evidence was relevant to an issue

other than Siegel’s character. 

The Other Crime Evidence likewise tended to show Siegel’s modus

operandi: Her typical pattern was to obtain the personal information

of another person, use that information to obtain credit in that person’s name, and take whatever steps were necessary to prevent that

person from learning about the new accounts until it was too late. She

engaged in that pattern when defrauding each of her husbands, her

daughters, the Mayberrys, Jack Butcher, and, of course, Jack Watkins.

Because the Other Crime Evidence established a modus operandi, it

is admissible under Rule 404(b). See United States v. Tanner, 61 F.3d

231, 237 (4th Cir. 1995); see also Queen, 132 F.3d at 997 (explaining

that "the more similar the prior act is (in terms of physical similarity

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or mental state) to the act being proved, the more relevant it becomes"

for purposes of Rule 404(b)). 

We likewise conclude that the components of the Other Crime Evidence are individually relevant to issues other than character. Siegel

told federal investigators that Watkins had a gambling problem that

led to his financial difficulties, which suggests that Siegel may claim

at trial that Watkins lost his house and other assets not because she

stole them, but because of his gambling problem. Such a defense

would undercut the government’s theory of the case and its explanation of her motive for killing Watkins. The evidence that Siegel

started gambling while married to her first husband and began to steal

money from him to cover her losses would therefore be admissible as

evidence of Siegel’s motive. 

The evidence of the wallet thefts showed that Siegel was in real

danger of going to jail if arrested again, given that she was still on

probation for those crimes when Watkins was killed. The evidence

that John Mayberry repeatedly confronted Siegel about repayment of

a $3,000 loan and that Siegel repaid Mayberry around the same time

that she induced Butcher to provide her with that precise amount of

money indicates that Siegel’s house of cards was on the verge of collapsing, thus magnifying the possibility that her probation would be

revoked. The evidence that Siegel became violent when her second

husband threatened to go to the police again shows the depth of Siegel’s fear of going to jail. The evidence showing that Siegel defrauded

her own daughters and her husbands tends to show the hold that gambling had on Siegel and tends to refute any suggestion that Watkins

knew about the accounts she opened in his name. Cf. Queen, 132 F.3d

at 997 ("the more similar the prior act is . . . to the act being proved,

the more relevant it becomes" for purposes of Rule 404(b)). Finally,

for the reasons discussed previously, the evidence of Siegel’s defrauding of Eric helps establish Siegel’s motive for killing Watkins. 

Because Siegel had been defrauding multiple victims for at least

twenty years and had never previously taken such extreme action, it

is particularly important for the government to be able to explain to

the jury why it was suddenly necessary for Siegel to resort to murder.

Accordingly, we conclude that the Other Crime Evidence, individually and as a whole, was relevant to issues other than Siegel’s characUNITED STATES v. SIEGEL 17

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ter or propensity to commit fraud. See United States v. Aramony, 88

F.3d 1369, 1377 (4th Cir. 1996) ("To be relevant, evidence need only

to have any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less

probable than it would be without the evidence." (internal quotation

marks omitted)). 

The Other Crime Evidence was also necessary within the meaning

of our Rule 404(b) jurisprudence. See Wells, 163 F.3d at 895. For purposes of Rule 404(b), evidence of other crimes or bad acts is necessary if it is "an essential part of the crimes on trial, or where it

furnishes part of the context of the crime." Queen, 132 F.3d at 998

(internal quotation marks omitted)). As explained above, the § 1512

charge requires the government to prove that Siegel killed Watkins

for the purpose of preventing her crimes from being reported to the

police. As we have explained, the Other Crime Evidence is important

to establishing Siegel’s motive, an essential element of the § 1512

charge. The Other Crime Evidence was therefore necessary for purposes of Rule 404(b). 

The final requirement for admissibility under Rule 404(b)—that the

evidence of other crimes be reliable, see Wells, 163 F.3d at 895—is

likewise satisfied in this case. Evidence is reliable for purposes of

Rule 404(b) "unless it is so preposterous that it could not be believed

by a rational and properly instructed juror." Aramony, 88 F.3d at 1378

(internal quotation marks omitted). Although the Other Crime Evidence shows that Siegel was willing to go to shocking lengths to get

the money she needed to fuel her gambling addiction, it is in no sense

preposterous or unbelievable. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the Other Crime Evidence satisfies

the requirements for admissibility established by Rule 404(b). 

C.

Evidence sought to be admitted under Rule 404(b) must also satisfy

Rule 403’s requirement that the probative value of the evidence must

not be "substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,

confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations

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of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative

evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 403; see Queen, 132 F.3d at 997. 

Although the district court indicated that the Other Crime Evidence

should be excluded under Rule 403 as unfairly prejudicial, the court

did not explain why it found the evidence to be unfairly prejudicial.

After considering the record before us, we find nothing to support the

district court’s determination on this issue. 

The Other Crime Evidence is certainly prejudicial to Siegel’s case,

"just as all evidence suggesting guilt is prejudicial to a defendant."

United States v. Williams, 445 F.3d 724, 730 (4th Cir. 2006). That

kind of general prejudice, however, is not enough to warrant exclusion of otherwise relevant, admissible evidence. Evidence may be

excluded under Rule 403 only if the evidence is unfairly prejudicial

and, even then, only if the unfair prejudice substantially outweighs

the probative value of the evidence. See id. "Evidence is unfairly prejudicial and thus should be excluded under Rule 403 when there is a

genuine risk that the emotions of a jury will be excited to irrational

behavior, and this risk is disproportionate to the probative value of the

offered evidence." Id. at 730 (internal quotation marks and alteration

omitted). Because the Other Crime Evidence describes fraudulent

conduct that is substantially similar to the conduct that Siegel engaged

in while defrauding Jack Watkins, we cannot conclude that introduction of the Other Crime Evidence would create a substantial risk that

jurors would be excited to irrational behavior. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion by

determining that Rule 403 required exclusion of the Other Crime Evidence. See United States v. Kelly, 510 F.3d 433, 437 (4th Cir. 2007)

("[W]e defer to the district court’s Rule 403 balancing . . . unless it

is an arbitrary or irrational exercise of discretion" (internal quotation

marks omitted)), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1917 (2008); Aramony, 88

F.3d at 1378 ("Because the evidence sought to be excluded under

Rule 403 is concededly probative, the balance under Rule 403 should

be struck in favor of admissibility, and evidence should be excluded

only sparingly."). 

The district court’s decision to exclude the Other Crime Evidence

was also grounded in the court’s concern about the length of time it

would take to present the evidence. See J.A. 428 ("I go down this path

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just to point out why it clearly would be very likely an enormous

waste of time to permit ex-husbands to come in here over the course

of days and days and days of what I understand is likely to be hours

and hours of testimony. . . ."). A district court is, of course, vested

with broad authority to control the manner of trial and the presentation of evidence. See United States v. Janati, 374 F.3d 263, 273 (4th

Cir. 2004) ("The scope of the district court’s discretion to manage trials before it is and must be particularly broad."); see also Fed. R.

Evid. 611. Nevertheless, "[s]ubject to the district court’s reasonable

management of cases brought to the court for trial, the government

too has broad discretion to prosecute crimes." Janati, 374 F.3d at 274.

Although we sympathize with the district court’s concern about the

length and complexity of the trial, we agree with the government that

the district court excluded the Other Crime Evidence without sufficiently considering the importance of the evidence to the government’s case. While the government could easily prove the fraud and

identity theft charges against Siegel without the Other Crime Evidence, the § 1512(a)(1)(C) charge, as we have previously discussed,

requires the government to prove that Siegel killed Watkins for the

purpose of preventing Watkins or others from giving law enforcement

officials information about federal crimes she had committed. Intent

is often a difficult element to prove, but the Other Crime Evidence,

as we have explained, is highly probative of Siegel’s intent. The district court, however, excluded the Other Crime Evidence in its

entirety, without considering whether there was other evidence that

could establish the elements necessary to prove the § 1512(a)(1)(C)

charge. 

A trial where none of the Other Crime Evidence was admitted

would certainly be shorter than a trial where all of the Other Crime

Evidence was admitted and subjected to thorough cross-examination,

and the district court’s preference for a shorter trial focusing only on

the conduct related to Jack Watkins is understandable. The district

court, however, has other tools available to it to ensure that the trial

proceeds as expeditiously as possible — for example, by requiring to

the extent possible that the direct and cross-examination of Siegel’s

ex-husbands and daughters focus on the specifics of Siegel’s actions

— while still giving the government sufficient "latitude during trial

to carry its burden of proof." Janati, 374 F.3d at 274. Under these cir20 UNITED STATES v. SIEGEL

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cumstances, we simply cannot conclude that the district court’s preference for a shorter, more focused trial provides a sufficient basis for

the wholesale exclusion of the Other Crime Evidence, evidence that,

as we have explained, is relevant, admissible, and highly probative.

Cf. United States v. Colomb, 419 F.3d 292, 297 (5th Cir. 2005)

("Although decisions that a court makes under Rule 611 may indirectly affect whether proof is admitted, the Rule does not provide an

independent ground for excluding otherwise-admissible evidence.").

Accordingly, after carefully considering the nature of the Other Crime

Evidence, we are constrained to conclude that the district court erred

by granting Siegel’s motion in limine to preclude the government

from introducing the Other Crime Evidence at trial. 

IV.

We pause briefly to address the district court’s decision to strike as

surplusage the portions of the indictment setting forth the Charged

Other Crime Evidence. The district court’s decision to strike the allegations flowed directly from its conclusion that the Other Crime Evidence should be excluded; the district court concluded that the Other

Crime Evidence was inadmissible, and the court then struck from the

indictment any allegations touching on the evidence deemed inadmissible. 

Given our determination that the Other Crime Evidence was admissible under Rule 404(b) and not excludable under Rule 403, there

simply is no basis for striking the allegations of the Charged Other

Crime Evidence from the indictment. See Williams, 445 F.3d at 733

("A motion to strike surplusage from the indictment should be granted

only if it is clear that the allegations are not relevant to the charge and

are inflammatory and prejudicial." (internal quotation marks and

alteration omitted)). 

V.

To summarize, we conclude that we have jurisdiction over the government’s appeal from the district court’s pre-trial decisions to

exclude from trial the Other Crime Evidence and to strike from the

indictment allegations of the Charged Other Crime Evidence. We also

conclude that the Other Crime Evidence, individually and as a whole,

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is admissible under Rule 404(b) and, at least on the record before us,

cannot be excluded under Rule 403. Finally, given our determination

that the Other Crime Evidence is admissible, we conclude that the district court erred by striking allegations of the Charged Other Crime

Evidence from the indictment. 

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we hereby reverse the district court’s decision excluding the Other Crime Evidence and its

decision striking allegations of the Charged Other Crime Evidence

from the indictment, and we remand the case for trial. 

REVERSED AND REMANDED

KISER, Senior District Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in

part: 

I concur with part II of the opinion which holds that the court has

jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3731. I dissent to

part III, however, because the majority does not review the district

judge’s factual and evidentiary rulings under the proper standard —

abuse of discretion.

I.

In ruling on the admissibility of the Other Crime Evidence proffered by the government and set forth in the indictment, the trial court

is required to make factual determinations. Fed. R. Evid. 104(a). "The

applicability of a particular rule of evidence often depends upon the

existence of a condition . . . To the extent that these inquiries are factual, the judge acts as a trier of fact. Often, however, rulings on evidence call for an evaluation in terms of a legally set standard . . .

These decisions, too, are made by the judge." Fed. R. Evid. 104(a)

advisory committee’s note.

First a judge has to decide whether the "other crimes" are intrinsic

to the charged offense. Second, if the "other crimes" are not intrinsic,

then admissibility must be tested under Federal Rules of Evidence

404(b) and 403. As the majority recognizes, the trial court found that

the Other Crime Evidence was not properly part of the alleged

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scheme as set forth in the charged counts, nor was it admissible under

Rules 404(b) and 403. Viewing these rulings on an abuse of discretion

standard, I would largely uphold the district judge’s determinations.

As the majority points out, all of the charged offenses, including

the murder, involve Jack Watkins. Siegel’s relations with him began

in 1994 and her fraudulent conduct with regard to him continued

through June 2003 (even though Watkins was allegedly murdered on

or about May 13, 1996). The Charged Other Crime Evidence was

sought to be introduced solely as part of the "scheme or artifice to

defraud" elements of the mail and wire fraud charges. This evidence

included:

1. 1968-1985: Siegel opened credit accounts under the identity of

her first husband, Charles Kucharski.

2. 1985-1993: Siegel defrauded Ted Giesendaffer, her second husband. When confronted she became violent.

3. 1992-1994: Siegel had John Mayberry sign an auto loan for her,

then used that information to take out an unrelated loan for $3,000.

She repaid the loan in 1994.

4. 1992-2003: Siegel met Eric Siegel, her third husband in 1992.

The relationship was periodically interrupted before they finally married in 1998. Defendant took over Mr. Siegel’s existing accounts and

opened new ones, resulting in approximately $300,000 in losses to

Mr. Siegel. He repaid these debts.

5. 1994: After Jack Butcher gave her a $3,000 loan, she defaulted

on the loan and unsuccessfully attempted to use Mr. Butcher’s personal information to take out a loan. Siegel became hysterical when

he threatened to go to the police.

6. 1997: Siegel stole mail from the mailbox of James and Janice

Lee and opened various credit accounts using their identities.

7. 1996: Siegel used her daughters’ identities to open credit

accounts. She also used their identities to cash benefit checks made

out to Watkins.

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The government also sought to introduce Uncharged Other Crime

Evidence, which consisted of four separate incidents in which Siegel

stole an acquaintance’s wallet and used the information found therein

to defraud the victim. These incidents occurred between January 1993

and December 1994. Siegel pled guilty to these crimes and received

a suspended sentence and probation, which was still effective when

she murdered Watkins.

II.

A.

The trial judge found that these other crimes were not properly part

of a common scheme with the charged crimes, but rather that they

were discrete acts of fraud. Indeed, the only thing in common with the

charged crimes was the element of deception, but that can be said of

all fraudulent conduct. Where the incidents were temporally separated, used different means, and were otherwise unrelated to the

charged conduct, a district judge does not abuse his discretion in

refusing to allow the government to present these other incidents as

part of the scheme. See McLendon v. United States, 2 F.2d 660, 660-

61 (6th Cir. 1924) ("it has never yet been thought that the ‘scheme to

defraud’ . . . could be found in the mere succession of diverse swindles, unrelated save as they had a common stage.").

The district judge did abuse his discretion with regard to the evidence that Siegel used her daughters’ identities to cash Watkins’s

checks. This is clearly intrinsic to the charged conduct and must

therefore be admissible. 

B.

That the government chose to denominate these other crimes as

part of a scheme does not free them from scrutiny by the trial judge

as to whether they qualify as part of the scheme. Nor does it free the

evidence from the constraints of Rules 404(b) and 403. The majority

finds that the trial court did not adequately explain why he found the

evidence to be unduly prejudicial under Rule 403. I disagree. Rule

403 provides that evidence may be excluded if the court finds it to

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cause "unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues . . . or by considerations of undue delay." 

In explaining his ruling the district judge spoke to these concerns:

"[W]hile that’s very interesting evidence and relevant in a very

expansive way . . . the Court is satisfied that it is inflammatory,

unduly prejudicial, is certain to give rise to a waste of time, it is

cumulative and its probative value is significantly outweighed by its

prejudicial and unfair prejudicial effect." J.A. 424-25. Because the

trial judge found that the Other Crime Evidence has little legal relevance, his conclusion differs from that of the government and the

majority. Because this ruling was within the district judge’s discretion, the majority errs in overturning it. 

C.

Testing the Other Crimes Evidence against the requirements of

Rule 404(b), the district judge found that if offered by the government

in its case-in-chief it would not qualify under any exception to the

Rule. Instead, the district judge found that it would only be used to

demonstrate that which Rule 404 is meant to prohibit — criminal

character and propensity. It must be remembered that the court’s ruling went only to the opening statement and the government’s case-inchief. The court left open the question of whether the evidence would

be admissible after Siegel put on her defense. Of course, if Siegel

should testify the evidence would be available for impeachment purposes.

Under Rule 404(b), the Other Crime Evidence may also be admissible if it is used as "proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,

plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." The

majority opines that the Other Crime Evidence fits under several of

these options. In analyzing each of these, the majority explains why

it would have reached a different conclusion than the district judge.

However, it is never explained why the district judge’s decision was

an abuse of discretion.

Initially, the majority opinion argues that much of the Other Crime

Evidence goes toward Siegel’s motive for killing Watkins. Under this

theory, Siegel killed Watkins not only to prevent him from telling the

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government about the crimes she had perpetuated against him, but

also because then the Other Crime Evidence would be discovered.

Because the Other Crime Evidence would have affected her prison

term and restitution obligations, she had an enhanced motive to try to

keep the Other Crime Evidence hidden. 

In its analysis, the majority relies on Willoughby, 860 F.2d 15, 24

(2d Cir. 1988). In Willoughby the defendants were charged with

obstruction of justice for seeking to prevent witnesses from testifying

at their trial for robbery. The challenged evidence, which the district

judge admitted, was the defendants’ participation in that robbery. The

court concluded that "when a defendant has been charged with

attempted or actual obstruction of justice with respect to a given

crime, evidence of the underlying crime and the defendant’s part in

it is admissible to show the motive for his efforts." Id.

Willoughby is inapplicable to the present case for two reasons.

First, the district court in that case admitted the challenged evidence

and the circuit court concluded that this was not an abuse of discretion. Second, the challenged evidence here is not part of the underlying crime. This analysis would be appropriate if the challenged

evidence was Siegel’s defrauding of Watkins. As discussed above,

however, the district judge concluded that the Other Crime Evidence

was not part of the scheme, and thus not part of the underlying crime.

It is true that the Other Crime Evidence may have been relevant to

enhance Siegel’s motive to silence Watkins, but the district court

found that the prejudice sufficiently outweighed the probative value

of such evidence. The government already had a solid motive and the

cumulative nature of this evidence was disproportionately prejudicial.

Thus it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude it. 

The district judge did abuse his discretion, however, by failing to

admit two pieces of evidence under this theory. First, Siegel’s relationship and subsequent defrauding of Eric Siegel should be admitted.

The overlap of their relationship with Siegel’s relationship with Watkins and her incentive of having access to Eric Siegel’s substantial

financial resources provide ample proof of motive. 

Second, Siegel’s suspended sentence and probation which stemmed

from the wallet thefts enhanced her motive to prevent Watkins from

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going to the police because she would have received a separate and

increased penalty. This motive is considerably more concrete and thus

more probative than the theoretical motives advanced by the government for the rest of her earlier crimes. The district judge recognizes

this theory of relevance and says "depending on how things go, I’m

not foreclosing the government from persuading me . . . I’m not

totally foreclosing the possibility that the Government will persuade

me to admit evidence of at least one, of no more than one I should

say of the wallet theft incidents." J.A. 426. The motive is not created

by the wallet thefts themselves, but instead by the suspended sentence

and probation. Due to the heightened probative value of this evidence,

the district judge, having recognized the valid purpose of this evidence, abused his discretion by excluding it.

Next, the majority determines that the Other Crime Evidence is

admissible under the "identity" or "modus operandi" exception to

Rule 404(b). Evidence of this type should be admitted where the

crimes are similarly unique and distinctive. See United States v.

Haney, 914 F.2d 602, 607 (4th Cir. 1990) (noting that the evidence

demonstrated a "signature crime."). The modus operandi that the

majority points to here is that Siegel obtained her victims’ personal

information, used that information to obtain credit, and took steps to

conceal her fraud. These are the routine steps in any identity theft

crime. There is nothing sufficiently unique to admit this evidence

under this exception to Rule 404(b).

The majority also justifies reversing the district court judge’s

exclusion of the Other Crime Evidence because it could be used to

refute Siegel’s potential defense strategies. For example, evidence

that Siegel stole from her first husband to cover her gambling debts

should be admitted to refute her potential defense that Watkins’s

financial difficulties were caused by his own gambling problem.

Every defendant has the right to elect to provide no defense at all, and

the government would still be required to meet its burden. Therefore,

it is improper for the government to present evidence which is used

solely to attack a defense which has not yet been presented. It certainly is not an abuse of discretion to, as here, exclude such evidence

from being presented during the government’s case-in-chief.

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III.

Whether the excluded evidence was intrinsic to the charged scheme

was a fact committed to the judgement of the district court under Rule

104 and must be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Burt

Rigid Box, Inc. v. Travelers Property Casualty Corp., 302 F.3d 83, 92

(2d Cir. 2002). Whether the excluded evidence was admissible under

Rules 404(b) and 403 is also reviewed under an abuse of discretion

standard. 

"Judgments of evidentiary relevance and prejudice are fundamentally a matter of trial management, for trial judges are much closer to

the pulse of a trial than we can ever be and broad discretion is necessarily accorded them. The standard of review therefore counsels deference to the discretion of trial courts. In a criminal appeal, we will

not vacate a conviction unless we find that the district judge acted

arbitrarily or irrationally in admitting evidence." United States v.

Benkahla, No. 07-4778, 2008 WL 2486741, at *7 (4th Cir. June 23,

2008). The same would apply for the exclusion of evidence.

Because the majority has failed to apply the abuse of discretion

level of review to the rulings of the district judge, I dissent.

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