Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01689/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01689-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
SCI Management
Appellee
SCI Missouri Funeral Services
Appellee
Diana F. Wells
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

________________

No. 06-1689

________________

Diana F. Wells, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* Western District of Missouri.

SCI Management, L.P.; SCI *

Missouri Funeral Services, Inc., *

d/b/a Mount Moriah Funeral *

Home, *

*

Appellees. *

________________

Submitted: October 19, 2006

 Filed: December 1, 2006

________________

Before WOLLMAN, RILEY and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges. 

________________

GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

Diana F. Wells appeals an adverse grant of summary judgment on her claims

of gender discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and

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The Honorable Ortrie D. Smith, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri.

2

SCI Management is no longer a party to this litigation. The remaining

defendant will be referred to simply as “SCI.” 

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the Missouri Human Rights Act. The district court1

 held that Wells failed to establish

a prima facie case for either claim. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

SCI Missouri Funeral Services, Inc., a subsidiary of Service Corporation

International,2

 operates numerous funeral homes in Missouri. In 1981, Diana Wells

began working as an apprentice funeral director and embalmer for an SCI subsidiary

in Houston, Texas, and eventually advanced to the position of funeral director. In

1990, Wells began working as a funeral director in a Saint Louis SCI funeral home.

She was promoted to Regional Vice President of Revenue Services in 1995. Two

years later, Wells was assigned the same position for a different region, which

necessitated a move to Kansas City. In 1999, Wells’s position was eliminated, and

she was given a position as funeral director at Mount Moriah, an SCI funeral home in

Kansas City. Her immediate supervisor at Mount Moriah was Matt Roening. 

Wells’s employment at Mount Moriah was marked by complaints from both

customers and co-workers. In 1999, a representative from the Kansas City Star

contacted SCI and complained that Wells was rude and yelled at the newspaper staff

in regards to the way the newspaper had planned to word a particular obituary. In

1999 and 2000, SCI received complaints about Wells from families who had funerals

arranged by Mount Moriah. The McMillan family complained that Wells had been

argumentative, untruthful and lacking in compassion. To investigate the complaint,

two SCI Area Managers spoke with the McMillan family and then discussed their

complaints, as well as the complaints of at least three other families, with Wells.

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Wells was issued a written warning about her conduct. Subsequently, the Miller and

Edmond families, other Mount Moriah customers, also complained about Wells’s

behavior. The Dahl family also lodged a complaint against Wells, describing her

conduct as “at best abrasive in tone and manner.”

In 2001, three Mount Moriah employees complained to its General Manager,

Jerry Griffin, that Wells was rude, unprofessional and disruptive. Griffin interviewed

other employees to determine how pervasive the sentiment was and discovered three

additional employees whose sentiments echoed the original complaints. Griffin

reported the complaints of the employees, and those of the McMillan and Dahl

families, to SCI’s Regional Vice President, Mark McGilley, who suspended Wells for

five days and warned her that future problems would result in her termination. Wells

filed a complaint with the Missouri Human Rights Commission and Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (collectively, “EEOC”) alleging her

suspension was based on her gender. The EEOC declined to take action, and Wells

did not pursue the matter further. 

In 2003, a co-worker complained to SCI’s “CareLine,” a toll-free ombudsman

service, that Wells harassed and belittled him. During that same time, another family,

the Boones, complained that Wells had been argumentative during their interaction

with Wells in her capacity as funeral director.

SCI received customer complaints about other employees as well. Rodney

Heinsohn, a primary arranger at Mount Moriah, received a complaint from a family

alleging he was “abrupt, rude and pushy.” Forrest Walker, a funeral director at Mount

Moriah, received several complaints from customers, all of which were determined

to be unsubstantiated. The record is unclear as to the identity of Heinsohn’s and

Walker’s supervisor. Though not in response to a customer complaint, John Gattshall

and George Salyer, whose supervisor was Michael Shannon, received written

disciplinary notices for expressing contempt for management policies. 

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Wells also presented evidence that she endured sexist comments from coworkers. Leon Emas, a marketing employee at Mount Moriah, called Wells two

sexually explicit and offensive names. Walker also told Wells that she “was not in the

good old boys’ club and [she] never would be” and expressed his belief that “women

should be barefoot and pregnant.” 

In the fall of 2003, SCI determined that, in light of decreasing revenues and

high operating expenses, it needed to restructure and that a reduction-in-force (“RIF”)

was necessary. McGilley’s position as Regional Vice President was eliminated, and

he accepted a position as Marketing Director for the Kansas City and Wichita areas,

in which he was tasked with implementing the RIF. In this capacity, McGilley

determined Mount Moriah was operating below expectations based on financial

conditions such as low operating margins and high salary expenses. McGilley’s

analysis also persuaded him that SCI had five more funeral directors than it needed

in the Kansas City area. As a result, he terminated the employment of five funeral

directors, three men and two women. In selecting Wells as one of the five, McGilley

considered her personnel record as well as the fact that she was the highest paid

funeral director at Mount Moriah. In total, McGilley eliminated nine positions during

the RIF, four men and five women. 

After her position was eliminated, Wells filed another charge with the EEOC.

After exhausting her administrative remedies, Wells filed a complaint in district court

alleging gender discrimination and unlawful retaliation. SCI moved for and received

summary judgment on both counts. The district court concluded that Wells’s evidence

was devoid of facts that would permit an inference that gender played a role in the

adverse employment action to support her discrimination claim. As for the retaliation

claim, the district court concluded that Wells failed to establish a causal connection

between her complaint to the EEOC and the elimination of her position during the

RIF. Wells appeals the grant of summary judgment. 

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II. DISCUSSION

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party. Cottrill v. MFA, Inc., 443 F.3d 629, 635 (8th

Cir. 2006). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers

to interrogatories, and admissions on file . . . show that there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

A. Gender Discrimination

Because Wells concedes that she does not have direct evidence to support her

claim of discrimination, we analyze her claim under the McDonnell Douglas

burden-shifting framework. Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 736-37 (8th

Cir. 2004). To survive the motion for summary judgment, Wells must present a prima

facie case of gender discrimination, which requires proof in the record that: (1) she

was a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for her job; (3) she suffered

an adverse employment action; and (4) there are facts that give rise to an inference of

unlawful gender discrimination. Rorie v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 151 F.3d 757,

760-61 (8th Cir. 1998). Wells attempts to satisfy the fourth element by showing that

she was treated differently from similarly situated males, which is a typical means of

proof for the fourth element in a gender discrimination case. E.g., Turner v. Gonzales,

421 F.3d 688, 694 (8th Cir. 2005). Once the employee establishes a prima facie case,

the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason

for its actions. McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973). Upon such

a showing, the burden shifts back to the employee to show that the employer’s reason

was pretextual. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. The parties do not dispute that

Wells satisfies elements (1), (2) and (3) of the prima facie case for gender

discrimination. The district court held that Wells failed to present any evidence that

would permit an inference that her gender was a factor in her termination, and we

agree. 

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Wells failed to establish the fourth element of the prima facie case because she

did not show that she was treated differently from similarly situated males. Wells

received complaints from four customers in 1999, one customer in 2000, three

employees in 2001, and one customer and one employee in 2003. SCI managers gave

her a warning about her conduct in 1999 and suspended her in 2001. 

Wells presented evidence that four males, Heinsohn, Gattshall, Salyer and

Walker, also received complaints and argues that, unlike her, they were not

disciplined. Wells has the burden of demonstrating that she and the allegedly

disparately treated men were “similarly situated in all respects.” Clark v. Runyon, 218

F.3d 915, 918 (8th Cir. 2000). We believe the relevant respects in this case include

the number of complaints each employee received, the employee’s position and the

employee’s supervisor. See id. The record reveals that Heinsohn received only one

customer complaint as compared to Wells’s six. Gatshall and Salyer did not receive

complaints from customers and were, in fact, disciplined for expressing contempt for

management. Additionally, they were not funeral directors, had different supervisors

from Wells and worked at different locations from Wells. Walker received fewer

complaints than Wells and, unlike the complaints lodged against Wells, those against

Walker were determined to be unsubstantiated. Given this undisputed evidence, we

agree with the district court that these four men were not similarly situated in all

relevant respects to Wells. 

Wells also failed to show that she was treated differently from similarly situated

males during the RIF. Wells presented no evidence that similarly situated males were

not terminated pursuant to the RIF. Rather, the record is clear that for the Kansas City

area, McGilley eliminated five funeral director positions, three men and two women.

In total, McGilley eliminated nine positions, including, in addition to funeral directors,

administrative and driver positions. Of the nine people terminated under the RIF, four

were men. This evidence, even viewed in a light most favorable to Wells, does not

give rise to an inference that gender played a role in her termination. See Hesse v.

Avis Rent-a-Car Sys., Inc., 394 F.3d 624, 631–32 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that

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evidence that plaintiff was the only female out of 14 employees terminated pursuant

to a RIF was not sufficient to show she was treated differently from similarly situated

males because job classifications were different). 

Wells also presented evidence that she endured sexist comments made by some

of her male co-workers at Mount Moriah. We decline to address this argument to the

extent that Wells frames it as evidence of the “environment” at Mount Moriah because

she did not allege a hostile work environment claim. As to the gender discrimination

claim, we believe the statements are immaterial because they were made by nondecisionmakers and were unrelated to the decisional process itself. See Rivers-Frison

v. Southeast Mo. Cmty. Treatment Ctr., 133 F.3d 616, 619 (8th Cir. 1998).

Furthermore, to the extent that Wells offers as evidence that would permit an

inference of discrimination the fact that her position subsequently was assumed by a

male, we disagree. Holley v. Sanyo Mfg., Inc., 771 F.2d 1161, 1167 (8th Cir. 1985)

(“The fact alone that [Plaintiff]’s duties were assumed by a younger person . . . itself

is insufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case.”). We therefore agree with the

district court that Wells failed to prove a prima facie case of gender discrimination.

Having determined that Wells failed to present a prima facie case of

discrimination, we need not analyze SCI’s proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for the discharge, although we note a RIF certainly constitutes such a reason.

See Wittenburg v. Am. Express Fin. Advisors, Inc., 464 F.3d 831, 836 (8th Cir. 2006);

Hardin v. Hussman, 45 F.3d 262, 265 (8th Cir. 1995); Holley, 771 F.2d at 1168.

Wells’s remaining evidence—that a male funeral director assumed her duties and that

SCI changed its proffered explanation for her termination—amounts to a challenge

to the legitimacy of the RIF, which is only relevant to the pretext portion of the

McDonnell Douglas test. See Grabovac v. Allstate Ins. Co. 426 F.3d 951, 956 (8th

Cir. 2005) (evaluating replacement by someone of opposite gender at the pretext stage

of gender discrimination analysis); Kobrin v. Univ. of Minn., 34 F.3d 698, 703 (8th

Cir. 1994) (explaining that changes in proffered reason for termination are relevant

to a finding of pretext). Because she has not made a prima facie case, we need not

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address these arguments. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of

summary judgment on Wells’s gender discrimination claim. 

B. Retaliation

To survive summary judgment, Wells must make a prima facie case of unlawful

retaliation by demonstrating that: (1) she engaged in statutorily protected conduct; (2)

she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection exists

between the two. Cheshewalla v. Rand & Son Constr. Co., 415 F.3d 847, 851 (8th

Cir. 2005). The district court held that Wells satisfied the first two elements but failed

to satisfy the third. We agree.

Wells filed her initial charge of discrimination with the EEOC in January 2001

and was fired in November 2003, creating a 34-month gap between the charge and the

termination. “A gap in time between the protected activity and the adverse

employment action weakens an inference of retaliatory motive.” Hesse, 394 F.3d at

633. Additionally, the Supreme Court has held that an adverse employment action

taken 20 months after the employee filed an EEOC complaint “suggests, by itself, no

causality at all.” Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 274 (2001) (per

curiam). Here, the lack of a causal connection is reinforced by the undisputed

evidence of the various customer and co-worker complaints lodged against Wells.

“Filing a complaint [of discrimination] does not clothe [Wells] with immunity for past

and present inadequacies.” Calder v. TCI Cablevision of Mo., 298 F.3d 723, 731 (8th

Cir. 2002) (internal quotations omitted).

Wells asserts that the same evidence that supports her claim of discrimination

supports her claim of retaliation. We have addressed those arguments, and based upon

our review of the record we find Wells’s claim too attenuated to withstand summary

judgment, for there is a notable absence of any causal connection between her report

of discrimination to the EEOC and the termination of her employment pursuant to the

RIF. Because Wells failed to establish a prima facie case for unlawful retaliation, we

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are not required to address her argument that the RIF was pretextual. Turner, 421

F.3d at 696.

 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

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