Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-14-14424/USCOURTS-ca11-14-14424-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
James Ryan Singletary
Appellee
Juan Vargas
Appellant

Document Text:

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14-14424

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 6:13-cv-00855-GAP-GJK

JAMES RYAN SINGLETARY, 

 Plaintiff–Appellee,

versus

JUAN VARGAS, 

in his individual capacity, 

 Defendant–Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

________________________

(October 29, 2015)

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Before WILLIAM PRYOR, JULIE CARNES, and SILER,

* Circuit Judges. 

JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judge:

In August of 2012, Defendant Juan Vargas, a deputy with the Brevard

County Sheriff’s Office (“Sheriff’s Office”), provided back-up during a drug bust 

of the driver of a vehicle in which Plaintiff James Singletary was a passenger. 

Perceiving that this vehicle was trying to run him down as he stood in front of it, 

Defendant fired shots at the car as he was falling to the ground. One of those shots 

hit Plaintiff, causing serious injury to his leg. Plaintiff sued Defendant in his 

individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, contending that the above response by 

Defendant constituted excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.1

 

Defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity. 

The district court denied the motion and Defendant now appeals. We conclude 

that Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, REVERSE the district court’s 

ruling on Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and direct that court to enter 

judgment consistent with this opinion.

 *

 Honorable Eugene E. Siler, Jr., United States Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by 

designation.

1

 An excessive force claim that arises in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop implicates 

the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable seizures of the person. Graham v. 

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394–95 (1989). 

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BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background2

While interviewing a drug suspect in July 2012, Sheriff’s Office Deputy 

Thomas Walter obtained the number of a cellphone purportedly used to conduct 

illegal drug deals.3

 Posing as an interested customer, Walter texted the number 

and indicated that he was looking to buy marijuana and oxycodone. Eventually 

directed to a second number, he this time texted that he wanted to buy high-grade 

marijuana. In response, the person at the other end of the text communication 

replied, “[C]ome see me.” 

Deputy Walter showed these texts to his supervisor, Lt. Jeffrey Ludwig, who 

decided to set up an operation to investigate this individual who appeared receptive 

to Walter’s efforts to purchase drugs. Defendant Vargas was assigned to the 

tactical support team for the operation. 

Around 11:00 p.m. on August 3, 2012, Lt. Ludwig met with Walter and 

several other deputies, including Defendant Vargas, to discuss the planned 

 

2

 In our review of the district court’s summary judgment ruling, we accept Plaintiff’s version of 

the facts and draw all inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the non-movant. See 

Tolan v. Cotton, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014) (“[C]ourts may not resolve genuine 

disputes of fact in favor of the party seeking summary judgment.”). However, we accept 

Defendant’s factual assertions when they are based on undisputed evidence and have not been 

contradicted by Plaintiff. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 379 (2007) (“[F]acts must be viewed 

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a ‘genuine’ dispute as to those 

facts.” (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c))). 

3 Deputy Walter was a member of the Street Crimes Unit in the Sheriff’s Office. The Street 

Crimes Unit conducted targeted operations, such as drug investigations. 

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operation. The plan was relatively simple. Walter would send another text 

proposing a drug buy at an agreed-upon location. Deputy Jason Roberts, dressed 

in plain clothes, would play the role of the drug purchaser. Followed by covert 

tactical personnel and Sheriff’s Office deputies, Roberts would meet the suspect at 

the designated location, after which the other deputies would conduct a “felony 

stop” and investigation. 

Following this planning session, Deputy Walter sent a text to the second 

number, stating that he wanted to buy $100 worth of marijuana. He received a 

response indicating that marijuana and oxycodone were available for purchase. 

Walter and the suspect agreed to meet at a nearby Sunoco gas station to conduct 

the deal. Deputy Roberts then began walking to this Sunoco station. Joined by 

Corporal Lyndale Smith and his service dog, Defendant moved to the back of the 

gas station, where he was concealed but could still observe Deputy Roberts. Two 

marked and two unmarked police cars hid themselves in other areas around the 

station. Lt. Ludwig remained about a quarter mile away, maintaining contact with 

the other officers via radio. 

Based on Walter’s earlier investigation, the deputies anticipated that the 

suspect would arrive in a red Toyota. And in fact, at about 1:00 a.m., a red Toyota 

pulled into the Sunoco station. As the officers later learned, the car was driven by 

Nicholas Lechner, with Plaintiff riding in the passenger seat. As the car turned 

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into the station, Deputy Roberts told Lt. Ludwig over the phone: “This is the car. 

This is the car.” Lt. Ludwig then gave the “go” signal to the deputies. After 

waiting about 15–20 seconds, Defendant and Corporal Smith moved toward the 

car. Wearing his tactical uniform and patrol hat, Defendant loudly shouted, 

“Sheriff’s office, let me see your hands,” as he approached the car. 

Helpful to our review in this case, a surveillance video captured Defendant’s 

approach and the incident that followed.

4

 The video first shows Roberts, the 

putative purchaser, walking to the passenger window and then around the back and 

toward the driver’s side of the car. Shortly thereafter, Corporal Smith and his dog 

are seen running toward the passenger side of the car, with Defendant following 

slightly behind. Smith stops and points his handgun at the passenger window, 

while Defendant continues walking toward the front of the car. Defendant makes 

his way to the front of the car, as evidenced by the fact that the front right 

headlight of the car can be seen shining directly on his left pants leg. As soon as 

Defendant reaches this position, the car suddenly accelerates toward him, and the 

car’s headlight beam can be seen moving up Defendant’s pants leg as the car 

moves forward. Almost immediately, Defendant begins falling to the ground and, 

within one to two seconds of its initial acceleration, the car abruptly stops. While 

 

4 Several surveillance videos captured the incident. We describe and rely on the video with the 

best angle. 

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Defendant is on the ground near the right front tire, the car briefly rolls forward a 

second time, then stops again. 

Because the video has no audio component, it does not reveal when the 

gunshots at issue in this case were fired. Defendant, Lechner, and Plaintiff each 

offered statements on that matter. Defendant testified that after approaching from 

the passenger’s side of the car, he moved to the front of the car, at which point he 

stopped when the vehicle started coming toward him. Defendant tried to 

backpedal, but the right passenger side bumper struck him in the left leg, causing 

him to lose his balance, and he fell to the left. According to his testimony, he fired 

the first shot5 while the car was still accelerating. His first shot would have 

occurred “at the same time” as the vehicle made contact with him or “maybe . . . 

half a second sooner.” He pulled the trigger on his weapon four times, “as quick as 

[he] could,” and was “firing the rounds as [he was] falling to the ground.” 

Corroborating Defendant’s testimony regarding the timing of events, Lechner 

confirmed in an initial statement given shortly after the incident that the shots by 

the officer were fired as the car was moving, but he also stated that the car never 

actually struck Defendant.

6 

Understandably, given how quickly everything happened and how 

 

5

 As to the subsequent three shots, all witnesses appear to agree that these shots were fired in 

quick succession after the first shot. 

6 Lechner asserted his Fifth Amendment rights and refused to testify under oath at his 

deposition. 

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unanticipated were the turn of events from Plaintiff’s point of view, his account of 

the chronology was not very specific. He gave a statement two days after the 

incident and admitted that after the undercover officer had walked to Lechner’s 

side of the window, “everything’s pretty much just a blur.” He recalled that he put 

his hands up and “the next thing that happened [he] was getting shot through the 

passenger side of the door.” He opined that perhaps the officers thought Lechner 

was putting the car into the drive gear, but “[e]verything happened so fast . . . [he]

wasn’t paying attention.” As to the timing of the shots, he stated that they occurred 

about two seconds after the undercover officer had walked to the driver’s side of 

the car. He was uncertain whether the car had rolled forward once the officers 

approached, and he never saw Defendant fall down. In fact, it was his belief that 

Defendant was not standing in front of the car but that instead he was standing to 

the right side of the front of the car when the events unfolded. 

Plaintiff was deposed over eighteen months later. He testified that he saw 

only one of the two deputies who approached the car, but it is unclear from his 

testimony whether it was Corporal Smith or Defendant whom he saw. As to the 

timing of the acceleration of the car, Plaintiff indicated that when Lechner began 

talking to the undercover officer, Plaintiff asked Lechner to leave and take him 

home, at which point Lechner began pulling out of the parking lot. After Lechner 

began pulling out, Plaintiff saw a figure (one of the deputies) running toward his 

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side of the car, at which point Lechner hit the brakes. Either right after Lechner hit 

the brakes or just as he hit the brakes, “the sky just lit up” “like fireworks, and they 

were shooting in the car.” The car was no longer moving when Plaintiff heard the 

gunshots. He never felt the car hit anyone or saw the car hit a deputy. 

After the above events, officers found in the car a semiautomatic handgun in 

its locked glove compartment; a plastic bag containing 48 grams, plus nine smaller 

bags, of marijuana; and a cellphone containing the text messages sent between 

Deputy Walter and the suspect. Based on his acceleration of the car toward 

Defendant, Lechner was charged with battery on a police officer. He pled guilty to 

aggravated assault on a police officer, although he did not enter his plea until after 

the close of discovery and over two months after Defendant filed his motion for 

summary judgment in this case. In his plea, Lechner admitted that he had 

assaulted Defendant by “driving at him with a motor vehicle and causing in him a 

fear that violence was about to take place and that the motor vehicle would 

constitute a deadly weapon.” 

II. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed the present action, asserting § 1983 claims against Defendant 

and Lt. Ludwig, in their individual capacities.7

 At the close of discovery, both 

defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity. As 

7 Plaintiff also asserted a § 1983 claim against the Sheriff in his official capacity. That claim 

was dismissed by agreement of the parties. 

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noted, a few months after the motion was filed and also after Plaintiff had filed his 

response, Lechner entered his guilty plea to aggravated assault on a police officer. 

Defendant moved for leave to submit the plea transcript, which contained 

Lechner’s admission to “driving [the car] at” Defendant. The district court refused 

to allow Defendant to submit this transcript, and it subsequently denied 

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.8

 

In its summary judgment order, the district court acknowledged that 

Defendant was acting within his discretionary authority when he shot Plaintiff, and 

that it was therefore Plaintiff’s burden to show that qualified immunity was not 

justified. But it concluded that Plaintiff had met this burden based on the court’s 

determination that a reasonable officer would not have used deadly force under the 

circumstances. According to the court, Defendant had no reason to believe the 

suspect was dangerous because the crime under investigation involved only a $100 

drug deal. Further, although the court acknowledged that an officer who 

reasonably believed Lechner was trying to run him over would have been justified 

in using deadly force, the court found that material questions of fact existed as to 

whether Defendant could have reasonably perceived that he was in danger. In 

reaching this conclusion, the court relied on (1) Plaintiff’s testimony that 

 

8 The court did, however, grant summary judgment to Lt. Ludwig, noting that he was a quarter 

mile away when the shooting occurred and further finding no basis for imposing liability under a 

supervisory theory. 

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Defendant was not in the car’s path as it accelerated and that the car was stopped 

when Defendant began shooting and (2) the fact that the bullet holes were found in 

the side of the car, rather than in the front. 

Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration, again raising Lechner’s 

admission at his guilty plea hearing that he assaulted Defendant by “driving at 

him” with the car. The district court denied the motion, stating that the new 

evidence “would not change the Court’s opinion that a jury question exists as to 

the reasonableness of the force used” by Defendant. Defendant has appealed both 

the district court’s summary judgment order and its order denying reconsideration. 

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

“We review de novo a district court’s denial of summary judgment based on 

qualified immunity, applying the same legal standards that governed the district 

court.” Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707 F.3d 1244, 1247 (11th Cir. 2013). 

In conducting our review, we construe the evidence in favor of the plaintiff and 

decide whether the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity under the plaintiff’s 

version of the facts. Id.; see also Tolan v. Cotton, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 

1866 (2014) (noting, in a qualified immunity case, “the importance of drawing 

inferences in favor of the nonmovant”). We acknowledge that the “facts, as 

accepted at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings, may not be the actual 

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facts of the case.” McCullough v. Antolini, 559 F.3d 1201, 1202 (11th Cir. 2009)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, we view the facts from the 

plaintiff’s perspective because the determinative issue on appeal is “not which 

facts the parties might be able to prove” but rather whether “certain given facts” 

demonstrate a violation of clearly established law. Crenshaw v. Lister, 556 F.3d 

1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1190 (11th 

Cir. 2002)). 

II. Qualified Immunity

Resolution of Defendant’s appeal requires us to decide whether Plaintiff 

proved that Defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity for his actions.9

 

Qualified immunity balances two important interests: the need to hold accountable 

a public official who has irresponsibly exercised his power and the obligation to 

protect from liability an official who has reasonably performed his duties. Pearson 

v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). We are required to grant qualified 

immunity to a defendant official unless the plaintiff can demonstrate two things: 

(1) that the facts, when construed in the plaintiff’s favor, show that the official 

committed a constitutional violation and, if so, (2) that the law, at the time of the 

 

9

 Before he can claim entitlement to qualified immunity, a public official must first show he was 

engaged in a discretionary duty when the allegedly wrongful act occurred. Dalrymple v. Reno, 

334 F.3d 991, 995 (11th Cir. 2003). Defendant was clearly acting within the scope of his 

discretionary authority when he shot at the car Lechner was driving, and Plaintiff does not 

disagree.

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official’s act, clearly established the unconstitutionality of that conduct. 

McCullough, 559 F.3d at 1205. 

In our inquiry as to the first prong of the test, we do not deal in abstractions, 

but instead look carefully at the specific facts of the case. Id. at 1206. And before 

deciding whether a police officer has actually used excessive force, we must “slosh 

our way through the factbound morass of ‘reasonableness’” because, in the end, 

“all that matters is whether [the officer’s] actions were reasonable.” Scott v. 

Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007). As to the second prong of the test, even if the 

defendant official’s acts are unconstitutional, he can be held liable only if the law 

so clearly established the wrongfulness of his conduct that any reasonable official 

in his place would have understood that he was violating the plaintiff’s 

constitutional rights. Plumhoff v. Rickard, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2023 

(2014). 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, we conclude 

that he has satisfied neither prong in this case, and therefore Defendant is entitled 

to summary judgment. 

A. Constitutional Violation

Plaintiff’s excessive force claim is analyzed under the objective 

reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 2020 (citing Graham v. 

Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) and Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)). The 

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reasonableness standard “requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality of 

the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the 

countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Id. (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Reasonableness in this context depends on all the circumstances relevant 

to an officer’s decision to use force and the amount of force used. See Jean–

Baptiste v. Gutierrez, 627 F.3d 816, 821 (11th Cir. 2010). We view the 

circumstances “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather 

than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. at 2020 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). And we allow for the fact that officers are often 

required to make “split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, 

uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a 

particular situation.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

As to deadly force, a police officer may use such force to dispel a threat of 

serious physical harm to either the officer or others, or to prevent the escape of a 

suspect who threatens this harm. McCullough, 559 F.3d at 1206; Morton v. 

Kirkwood, 707 F.3d 1276, 1283 (11th Cir. 2013). The district court concluded that 

the deputies would have had no reasonable belief that either Lechner or Plaintiff 

posed a risk of serious harm to others had Lechner merely been trying to escape the 

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scene.10 Thus, the use of deadly force to stop a perceived escape attempt would 

have been excessive. We agree with the district court on this point. 

Defendant argues, however, that he fired his gun, not to prevent an escape,

but in self-defense because he thought the car occupied by Plaintiff and Lechner 

was about to run him over. We have held that it is reasonable, and therefore 

constitutionally permissible, for an officer to use deadly force when he has 

“probable cause to believe that his own life is in peril.” Robinson v. Arrugueta, 

415 F.3d 1252, 1256 (11th Cir. 2005). For that reason, we have “consistently 

upheld” an officer’s use of deadly force in cases where the officer reasonably 

believed his life was endangered by a suspect who “used or threatened to use his 

car as a weapon.” McCullough, 559 F.3d at 1207; see also Terrell v. Smith, 668 

F.3d 1244, 1255 (11th Cir. 2012) (granting qualified immunity where “an 

objectively reasonable law enforcement officer could well have perceived that [a] 

moving vehicle was being used as a deadly weapon”). 

Indeed, the district court acknowledged the above legal principle and 

recognized that had Defendant believed “Lechner was trying to run him over . . . 

 

10 Although its holding did not rest on this fact, a point of emphasis in the district court’s order 

was that the crime under investigation was a “minor, non-violent drug offense.” We agree with 

the district court that it would have been unreasonable to use deadly force to apprehend the 

suspect of such a crime in the absence of any other evidence to suggest he posed a danger. 

However, we also note Lt. Ludwig’s undisputed testimony that officers investigating even minor 

drug crimes frequently encounter firearms and counter-surveillance equipment, meaning that in 

assessing the risks involved in such an investigation, a prudent officer must consider the 

possibility of a violent response from the subject. And, in fact, in searching Lechner’s car after 

his arrest, officers found a semiautomatic handgun and ammunition in the glove compartment. 

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[Defendant] would have been justified in using deadly force to stop the car.” But 

taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the court inferred that 

Defendant was not in the car’s path and moreover that the car had stopped its 

forward movement before he began shooting. For this reason, the court concluded 

that Defendant “was not in danger of being hit by the car when he opened fire,” 

and thus a reasonable officer in his position could not have had probable cause to 

believe that he was being threatened with the infliction of serious physical harm. 

And because Defendant was under no threat of serious physical injury, the court 

found his use of deadly force to be unreasonable, which conclusion disqualified

Defendant from qualified immunity. 

Because we, the district court, and the parties agree on the governing legal 

principles, the question before us then becomes whether the district court’s

construction of the evidence in the record was accurate. Having carefully reviewed 

that evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, we disagree with the district 

court and conclude that a reasonable officer would have reasonably perceived that 

he was in imminent danger of being run over by Lechner’s car. Thus, the officer’s 

firing of his gun in an effort to stop the car did not constitute excessive force.

The district court reached its conclusion that Defendant was not in the path

of the car and that the car was stationary when he fired his shots based largely on a 

few fragmentary statements in Plaintiff’s deposition testimony. It is true that in 

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determining whether summary judgment is appropriate based on qualified 

immunity, a district court must generally consider the facts in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiff. Scott, 550 U.S. at 377. It is unclear whether Plaintiff’s 

testimony on these points creates a viable dispute as to the above questions. 

Leaving aside the fact that in his original statement Plaintiff had said that the entire 

incident was pretty much a blur to him, that everything happened fast and he was 

not paying attention, and that he was uncertain whether the car had rolled forward 

once the officers had approached, we note that Plaintiff’s somewhat clearer

recollection during his deposition is likewise ambiguous. In fact, it is impossible 

to determine whether Plaintiff ever saw Defendant or whether his testimony 

instead referenced Corporal Smith. Plaintiff stated in his deposition that he could 

barely see anything at the time of the shooting because the parking lot was 

extremely dark. In addition, Plaintiff said that he saw only one of the two deputies 

who approached his side of the car. According to Plaintiff, he was looking out the 

passenger-side window when he saw the deputy approach. The video shows that

Corporal Smith is the deputy who headed toward Plaintiff’s side of the car and 

approached the passenger-side window, whereas Defendant, following behind, 

went toward the front of the car. If the deputy that Plaintiff observed was Smith, it 

means that he failed to observe the pivotal event in this case: whether the car 

accelerated toward Defendant when the latter was allegedly in front of the vehicle. 

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As to the timing of the shooting in relation to the stopping of the vehicle, 

Plaintiff recalled that Lechner hit the brakes at the same time as the deputy 

observed by Plaintiff approached his side of the car. Then, either at the moment 

that Lechner hit the brakes or right after, “the sky just lit up” and “they were 

shooting in the car.” If shots were fired around the same time as Lechner hit the 

brakes, Plaintiff’s testimony is largely consistent with Defendant’s version of the 

timing of events. 

But even if we spruce up Plaintiff’s testimony and, as did the district court, 

infer him to be stating either that the car did not accelerate while Defendant was 

standing in front of it or that Defendant was never, at any time, standing in front of 

the car, the surveillance video conclusively rebuts such testimony. The video 

establishes that Defendant was in the path of the car when it accelerated because it 

shows the car’s right front headlight beam shining directly on Defendant’s left 

pants leg. As the car accelerates, the headlight beam moves up Defendant’s pants 

leg until Defendant begins falling to the ground and the car comes to an abrupt 

stop. 

It is true that that we construe the facts in the light most favorable to the 

non-moving party. But when “opposing parties tell two different stories, one of 

which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could 

believe it,” a court should not adopt the contradicted version for purposes of ruling 

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on a motion for summary judgment. Scott, 550 U.S. at 380 (holding that where 

videotape footage clearly contradicted the non-movant’s testimony, the district 

court should not have relied on the testimony in resolving the motion for summary 

judgment on a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim). This is so because 

when the non-movant’s assertion is “so utterly discredited” by the record, no 

“genuine” dispute of material fact exists sufficient to prompt an inference on 

behalf of the non-movant. Id. 

And that is the case here. Given the video evidence, Plaintiff’s testimony 

cannot call into question Defendant’s assertion that he was in the path of Lechner’s 

car when the latter accelerated toward him, thereby causing Defendant to

reasonably fear for his life. As to the district court’s reliance on Plaintiff’s 

testimony that Lechner applied the brakes at the same moment the shots rang out, 

we assume this assertion to be true, but it does not create an issue of fact as to 

whether any danger had dissipated in the split-second immediately preceding 

Defendant’s decision to use deadly force. See Robinson, 415 F.3d at 1256 (“Even 

if in hindsight the facts show that [the defendant] perhaps could have escaped 

unharmed, we conclude that a reasonable officer could have perceived that [the 

suspect] was using the [car] as a deadly weapon.”). Moreover, whether the car hit 

Defendant or just rapidly accelerated toward him, it would have been reasonable 

for Defendant to fear for his safety. See Long v. Slaton, 508 F.3d 576, 581 (11th 

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Cir. 2007) (“[T]he law does not require officers in a tense and dangerous situation 

to wait until the moment a suspect uses a deadly weapon to act to stop the 

suspect.”). Indeed, when previously addressing circumstances that are not 

materially distinguishable from the facts here, we found an officer’s use of deadly 

force to be constitutional. See Robinson, 415 F.3d at 1256 (upholding an officer’s 

use of deadly force against a suspect who slowly—at one or two miles per hour—

drove a vehicle toward the officer as he stood between the suspect’s vehicle and a 

parked car). 

Nor do we find persuasive the district court’s observation that, although not 

dispositive, the location of the bullet holes in the side of the car, not the front, “also 

supports a conclusion that [Defendant] was not in danger of being hit by the car 

when he opened fire.” Again, the surveillance video clearly shows that Defendant 

was in the path of the car when it accelerated. The only ballistics evidence in the 

record is the report of defense expert Richard Ernest,

11 who concluded that the 

shots entered the side of the car because of the direction Defendant was falling 

when he began firing, and not because Defendant was standing at the side of the 

car when he began shooting. 

 

11 Plaintiff’s expert, Robert Wyman, whom Plaintiff characterized as a “forensic photographer,” 

opined that the shots originated from the passenger side, as opposed to the front of the vehicle. 

Filing a Daubert motion to exclude consideration of Wyman’s opinion, Defendant argued that 

Wyman lacked any specialized training in ballistics and that his opinion as to the origin of the 

shots was unreliable and based on speculation. Plaintiff did not oppose Defendant’s motion, and 

the district court never referenced the Wyman testimony in its summary judgment order. 

Similarly, we do not consider Wyman’s opinion on appeal.

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In short, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, we 

conclude that this evidence demonstrates that Lechner’s car began accelerating 

toward Defendant as he stood in front of it and that his use of deadly force to stop 

what appeared to be an imminent threat to his life was not excessive. That being 

so, Defendant did not violate the Constitution when he responded with deadly 

force. 

B. Clearly Established Law

Even assuming a constitutional violation, Defendant is entitled to qualified 

immunity unless Plaintiff can show that his Fourth Amendment rights were 

“clearly established” at the time of the shooting. Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. at 2023. To 

be clearly established, the contours of a right must be “sufficiently definite that any 

reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would have understood that he was 

violating it.” Id. “The salient question is whether the state of the law at the time of 

an incident provided ‘fair warning’ to the defendant[] that [his] alleged conduct 

was unconstitutional.” Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1866 (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

Fair warning is most commonly provided by materially similar precedent 

from the Supreme Court, this Court, or the highest state court in which the case 

arose. See Terrell, 668 F.3d at 1256. However, a “judicial precedent with

materially identical facts is not essential for the law to be clearly established.” 

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Youmans v. Gagnon, 626 F.3d 557, 563 (11th Cir. 2010). Authoritative judicial 

decisions may “establish broad principles of law” that are clearly applicable to the 

conduct at issue, and it may also be obvious from “explicit statutory or 

constitutional statements” that certain conduct is unconstitutional. Griffin Indus.,

Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1209 (11th Cir. 2007); see also Taylor v. Barkes, __

U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015) (“We do not require a case directly on point, 

but existing precedent must have placed the . . . constitutional question beyond 

debate.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

As explained above, it is well established that an officer may constitutionally 

use deadly force when his life is threatened by a car that is being used as a deadly 

weapon. See Robinson, 415 F.3d at 1256; McCullough, 559 F.3d at 1207. The 

district court thus acknowledged that Defendant would be entitled to qualified 

immunity if he reasonably believed Lechner was trying to run him over with the 

car and thus feared for his safety. The court nevertheless denied qualified

immunity because it discounted undisputed video evidence showing that Defendant 

was in the path of the car when it accelerated and that he fired just as—or a split 

second after—Lechner hit the brakes. Properly accounting for this evidence, our 

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case law did not put Defendant on notice that his use of deadly force violated any 

clearly established rights.12 

CONCLUSION

For all of the above reasons, we conclude that Defendant is entitled to 

qualified immunity as a matter of law. Accordingly, we REVERSE the order of 

the district court denying his motion for summary judgment and direct that court to 

enter judgment consistent with this opinion. 

 12 In support of his argument that Defendant had “fair warning,” Plaintiff cites Morton v. 

Kirkwood, 707 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2013): a case in which an officer had pursued, and 

ultimately shot, the plaintiff in his car. Id. at 1282. Although the officer claimed he shot the 

plaintiff to prevent him from running over a fellow officer on the scene, the plaintiff disputed 

that testimony, stating that the officer could not have reasonably perceived a threat to his life 

because the plaintiff had put his car in park and raised his hands as soon as the officer identified 

himself. Id. Taking the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we denied the defendant 

qualified immunity because the evidence indicated that the officer “shot an unarmed man in a 

stationary vehicle while having no reason to believe that the man would place anyone’s safety in 

danger.” Id. The facts in Morton are clearly not the facts in this case, as the surveillance video 

here shows that Lechner’s car did accelerate toward Defendant. See Robinson, 415 F.3d at 1256 

(“[T]he inquiry into whether the law is clearly established must be undertaken in light of the 

specific context of the case.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

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