Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01057/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01057-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jorge A
Defendant
Joshua A.
Plaintiff
Rocklin Unified School District
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Joshua A, a minor, by ) 

and through Jorge A., )

his guardian ad litem, ) 

 ) 

 )

 Plaintiff, )

 )

 v. )

 )

Rocklin Unified School )

District, and Does 1-25 ) 

 ) 

 ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. )

________________________)

CV 07-01057 LEW(KJMx) 

 

ORDER GRANTING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 

STAY PUT ORDER &

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

REQUEST FOR

REIMBURSEMENT

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S REQUEST

FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Plaintiff’s Motion for Stay Put Order came on regularly

for hearing on Friday August 17, 2007. The Court also

issued a ruling on Plaintiff’s Request for Reimbursement and

Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice. 

The Court has considered all of the papers and argument

submitted on the matters and THE COURT NOW FINDS AND RULES

AS FOLLOWS:

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A. Preliminary Issue - Judicial Notice

In Defendant’s Opposition Requests that this Court take

judicial notice of the following: 

(1) OAH Order Denying Motion for Stay Put, OAH Case No.

N200609663, by Administrative Law Judge Suzanne

Brown, dated October 16, 2006.

(2) OAH Decision, OAH Case No. N2006110278, by

Administrative Law Judge Gary A. Geren, dated May

25, 2007; 

(3) Amicus Brief filed by the United States Department

of Education, in the Seventh Circuit case of John

M. v. Board of Education of Evanston Township High

School District, 2007 WL 1571154, dated May 21,

2007; and

(4) Letter to Rieser decision by the United States

Department of Education’s Office of Special

Education Programs, 211 IDELR 403 (July 17, 1986). 

Finding that these documents are all capable of

accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose

accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned, the Court hereby

GRANTS Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice. 

I. INTRODUCTION

Joshua A. (“Plaintiff”) a six year-old boy diagnosed

with autism, has been receiving special education services

pursuant to the parties last agreed upon Individual

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Educational Plan (“IEP”), dated October 14, 2005. Since

that date, the special education services have been provided

through Therapeutic Pathways, Inc. a non-public agency

(“NPA”) and partially financed through Rocklin Unified

School District (“Defendant”). 

Defendant attempted to alter Plaintiff’s educational

placement and substitute the non-public agency services for

public agency services beginning February, 2005. However,

Plaintiff has consistently refused, stating that the

proposed changes will not adequately address Plaintiff’s

educational needs. 

In November 2006, Defendant sought administrative

review to determine whether the elimination of Therapeutic

Pathways’ services and placement into public school would be

a violation of the FAPE provisions. After a nine day

hearing in March 2007, the ALJ held that Defendant was able

to place Plaintiff in public school without violating FAPE. 

On June 23, 2007, Plaintiff filed an appeal with this

Court seeking a de novo review of the ALJ’s decision. That

matter is still pending. 

On July 10, 2007, Defendant informed Plaintiff that

Defendant would be changing the special education service

provider from Therapeutic Pathways to an unspecified NPA

provider as of August 1, 2007. [See Pl. Ex. 11].

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On July 19, 2007, Plaintiff filed the instant motion

under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) to prevent Defendant from altering

Plaintiff’s educational services through Therapeutic

Pathways until the completion of the appeal process. 

Plaintiff also seeks reimbursement for costs incurred as a

result of Defendant’s August 1, 2007 refusal to pay for

Plaintiff’s services through Therapeutic Pathways. 

III. DISCUSSION

A. This Court has Jurisdiction Over Instant Matter

District Courts have jurisdiction to hear claims

brought under the IDIEA. 20 U.S.C.S. § 1415 et. seq. This

jurisdictional right includes the right to issue Stay Put

Orders. Therefore, the instant matter is properly before the

Court.

B. Plaintiff is Entitled to A Stay Put Order

The unequivocal language of 1415(j), expresses

Congress’ intent to ensure that a student’s special

education services remained constant during the pendency of

any appellate process. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305,

329,(1988). 

Plaintiff is seeking an original Stay Put Order and not

attempting to alter an existing Stay Put Order, therefore,

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1 During the pendency of any proceedings initiated under

the Act, unless the state or local educational agency and

the parents or guardian of a disabled child otherwise agree,

"the child shall remain in the then current educational

placement." 20 U.S.C.S § 1415(j)(emphasis added). 

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it unnecessary for Plaintiff to meet the traditional

preliminary injunction standards. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(j)1;

See also Honig, 484 U.S. at 333 ([i]n any suit brought by

parents seeking injunctive relief for a violation of §

[1415(j)], the burden rests with the school district to

demonstrate that the educational status quo must be

altered.”). 

 

Defendant asserts that the Court should follow the

holding of Johnson v. Special Educ. Hearing Office, 287 F.3d

1176 (9th Cir. 2002). However, even Defendant concedes that

factually and procedurally distinguishable from the instant

matter. The Johnson Court held that when a party seeks to

enjoin a preexisting Stay Put Order, that party must meet

the traditional preliminary injunction standards. Id. at

1180. The Johnson Court also recognized that other Circuits

apply an automatic injunction standard to stay put orders,

and distinguished those cases on procedural grounds only. 

Id. (citing Zvi D. v. Ambach, 694 F.2d 904, 906 (2d Cir.

1982; and Drinker v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 78 F.3d 859, 864

(3d Cir. 1996)). Thus, this Court’s ruling does not

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conflict with Johnson. 

Therefore, as Plaintiff is seeking an original Stay Put

Order, the Order is issued automatically. 

B. Therapeutic Pathways’ Services Must be Included In

Plaintiff’s Stay Put Order

The purpose of the stay put provision is to maintain

the status quo and to prevent school districts from

unilaterally denying placement to a student while a dispute

over the placement is being resolved. Honig, 484 U.S. at

326; see also Van Scoy v. San Luis Coastal Unified Sch.

Dist., 353 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1086 (C.D. Cal. 2005). The

stay put requirement should allow the student to maintain

the status quo, to the extent possible, until the finality

of the student’s placement has been reached. Johnson, 287

F.3d at 1180. This will ensure that the student’s education

remains continuous. 

 

In the instant matter, Plaintiff’s current educational

placement is clearly ascertainable. He is, and has been,

receiving special education services from the same provider

for more than two years. 

Under the strict interpretation of §1415(j),

Plaintiff’s “current educational placement” is not credibly

in question. Defendant, however, citing several OAH

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decisions, asserts that legal precedent demands this Court

determine the “then current educational placement” through

an examination of the IEP. [Def. Opp. at 7-8]. Even

assuming that Defendant’s assertion is correct, Therapeutic

Pathways would still be required under the Stay Put Order. 

Where controversy arises regarding the physical

component of an order to stay put, the Ninth Circuit looks

to the individualized education program (“IEP”), to

determine the “then current educational placement.” Johnson,

287 F.3d at 1180; Ms. S v. Vashon Island Sch. Dist., 337

F.3d 1115, 1133 (9th Cir. 2003).

Defendant maintains Therapeutic Pathways is not

required by the IEP because Therapeutic Pathways is not

specified as the non-public agency, therefore Defendant’s

obligation is limited only to providing the services of a

non-public agency. [Def. Opp. at 7]. 

Defendant reaches this conclusion through the

examination of the single “IEP Services” page of the IEP

document. [Def. Opp. at 10]. However, 20 U.S.C.S. § 1414(d)

controls and enumerates multiple categories of information

that are not included on the single page Defendant

references. Id. 

After examination of the entire IEP, the Court is

satisfied that IEP does make reference to the services

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provided by Therapeutic Pathways. Indeed, the IEP lists

Therapeutic Pathways under “IEP Agency Linkages”. [Pl. Ex.

1, page 5]. Further, given the intent of the entire

statutory scheme, this Court cannot simply ignore the

entirety of the evidence before it, as Defendant requests. 

For example, Therapeutic Pathways participated in the

October 15, 2005 IEP meeting and handwritten notes taken at

that meeting indicate that Therapeutic Pathways will be

providing Plaintiff with special education services. [Pl.

Ex. 1]. 

 

Therefore, while the Court does not find it necessary

to examine the IEP to reach its conclusion, examination of

the IEP supports the conclusion that Plaintiff’s Stay Put

Order includes the services of Therapeutic Pathways. 

Defendant maintains that changing service providers

would not alter the status quo because Plaintiff would still

be receiving the same treatment at home through a non-public

service provider. [Def. Opp. at 13-14]. This argument is

unpersuasive. First, the plain language of the statute

requires Plaintiff to remain in his “then current

educational placement.” Altering the NPA would require

Plaintiff to change from one program to another, with

different staffing, facilities and knowledge of Plaintiff’s

specific disability. This disruption appears to be exactly

what Congress intended to avoid through §1415(j). 

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Defendant is accurate that Plaintiff is not inherently

entitled to identical services where those services are no

longer possible or practicable. [Def. Opp. at 8-13. See,

e.g. Ms. S. ex rel. G v. Vashon Island Sch. Dist., 337 F.3d

1115, 1133 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding a School District’s

placement of a transfer student because the school attempted

to comply with the most recent IEP.)(“Although the

‘stay-put’ provision is meant to preserve the status quo, we

recognize that when a student transfers educational

jurisdictions, the status quo no longer exists. . . . the

new district must implement the last agreed-upon IEP ‘to the

extent possible.’”) Id. 

Ms. S. is distinguishable from the instant case because 

identical services are available, and Plaintiff has not

changed circumstance such that a change in service providers

would be warranted. 

Indeed, each case relied on by Defendant is

distinguishable for the same reason - those cases addressed

a change in circumstances necessitating an alteration from

the literal “current educational placement.” 

Moreover, unlike each case cited by Defendant, there

has been no review into whether the yet unidentified nonpublic agency proposed by Defendant would comply with the

IEP or would provide adequate services. Defendant has yet

to present any evidence regarding the proposed NPA or any

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justification for changing service providers. Even the

cases cited by Defendant, demand that the substitution

comply with the IEP. 

The Court recognizes that School Districts must have

the ability to contract with service providers, however,

where Congress fails to make an exception, it is not within

the jurisdiction of this Court to make one. 

Should the Defendant wish to alter the Stay Put Order,

it could do so by complying with the rules set out in

Johnson and meet the traditional preliminary injunction

standards. Defendant has failed to do that.

 

Based on the above analysis, Plaintiff’s Motion for

Stay Put Order is GRANTED.

C. Plaintiff is Not Currently Entitled to Reimbursement

Plaintiff seeks reimbursement for costs incurred as a

result of refusing to consent to Defendant’s alternate

placement and continuing to pay out of pocket for

Therapeutic Pathways. Parents may be entitled to

reimbursement for the costs of placement or services they

have procured for their child when: (1) the school district

failed to provide a FAPE; and (2) the private placement or

services procured are (a) proper under IDEA and (b)

reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit to the

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child. 20 U.S.C.S. §1412; see also Sch. Committee of

Burlington v. Dept. of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985);

Glendale Unified Sch. Dist. V. Almasi, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1093,

1105 (9th Cir. 2000); Student W. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist., 31

F.3d 1489, 1496 (9th Cir. 1994).

Plaintiff cited no authority, nor does there appear to

be any, that would entitle Plaintiff to reimbursement prior

to the determination of a FAPE violation. 

Here, there has been no determination that Defendant

violated FAPE. Indeed, that issue is before the Court on

appeal. Therefore, this issue is not ripe for

determination. 

Plaintiff’s Request for reimbursement is hereby DENIED. 

IV. CONCLUSION

In accordance with the above ruling, Defendant is

hereby ORDERED to Reinstate the services provided to

Plaintiff prior to August 1, 2007. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 

HONORABLE RONALD S.W. LEW

Senior, U. S. District Court Judge

DATED: August 17, 2007

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