Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-18-03626/USCOURTS-ca8-18-03626-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rubin Morrow
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 18-3626

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Rubin Morrow, also known as Chubbs, also known as Cuzzo

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant

 ____________

Appeal from United States District Court

for the Western District of Arkansas - Fayetteville

 ____________

 Submitted: November 11, 2019

Filed: February 11, 2020

[Unpublished]

____________

Before SHEPHERD, GRASZ, and KOBES, Circuit Judges. 

____________

PER CURIAM.

Rubin Morrow pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute a mixture

or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine, a Schedule II

controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. The district

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court1

sentenced Morrowto 135 monthsimprisonment. Morrow appeals hissentence,

arguing that the district court improperly applied a two-level enhancement for

possession of a firearm under USSG § 2D1.1 and a two-level enhancement for

obstruction of justice under USSG § 3C1.1. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291, we affirm.

I.

From 2016 through early 2018, the Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted

an investigation into a drug trafficking organization led by Derrick Nicholson and

operating within and outside the Western District of Arkansas. The investigation

revealed that Morrow was a major supplier of methamphetamine to Nicholson’s

organization. Specifically, investigators learned that Morrow would package and

send methamphetamine from Inglewood, California to Nicholson and his wife in

Fayetteville, Arkansas. On January 23, 2018, a grand jury charged Morrow with one

count of conspiracy to distribute a mixture or substance containing a detectable

amount of methamphetamine.

On January 31, 2018,investigators arrested Morrowat hisInglewood residence

and then executed a search warrantfor the residence. During the search, investigators

located four firearms: (1) a Marlin 30-30 rifle in a gun case in Morrow’s garage; (2)

a Smith & Wesson Bodyguard .380 caliber handgun in an upstairs bedroom of the

residence; (3) a Ruger .9 millimeter handgun in a plastic box in the front trunk of a

Volkswagen Beetle parked inside Morrow’s garage; and (4) a loaded Smith &

Wesson .9 millimeter handgun also in the front trunk of the Volkswagen Beetle. 

Investigators discovered that the loaded Smith & Wesson .9 millimeter handgun had

been reported stolen in Rogers, Arkansas. Further, investigators learned that the

1The Honorable Timothy L. Brooks, United States District Judge for the

Western District of Arkansas.

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Volkswagen Beetle was registered to Anna Jovel, Morrow’s wife. Finally, in the

front passenger compartment of the Volkswagen Beetle, officers found two digital

scales, two glass beakers, a piece of vacuum sealing equipment, and sealing bags.

Morrow pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. On September 25, 2018,

Morrow filed a Sentencing Memorandum asking the district court to grant a

downward variance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and attached a mitigation expert’s

report and letters of support. Morrow’s phone call records from the Washington

County Sheriff’s Office revealed that he had asked his wife to forge a letter of support

from his former employer stating that he would have a job upon his release from the

Bureau of Prisons. They also showed that Morrow had asked his ex-wife, Sabrina

Coleman, to forge a letter of support from her father, Sam Coleman, stating that

Morrow would be offered a job at Coleman’s trucking company upon his release. 

The district court noted at sentencing that it had, in fact, received a letter of support

from Sam Coleman that was extremely consistent with Morrow’s request to Sabrina.

At sentencing, the district court applied a two-level enhancement for

possession of a firearm under USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1), a two-level enhancement for

obstruction of justice under USSG § 3C1.1, and a three-level downward adjustment

for acceptance of responsibility under USSG § 3E1.1, resulting in a Guidelinesrange

of 168 to 210 monthsimprisonment. Applying the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),

the district court varied downward and sentenced Morrow to 135 months

imprisonment. Morrow appeals his sentence, arguing that the district court erred in

applying the enhancements under USSG §§ 2D1.1 and 3C1.1.

II.

We review a district court’s application of the Guidelines de novo and its

factual findings for clear error. United States v. Savage, 414 F.3d 964, 966 (8th Cir.

2005).

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A.

“Section 2D1.1(b)(1)mandates a two-level enhancement if the Government can

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant possessed ‘a dangerous

weapon (including a firearm)’ while violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(b).” Id. (quoting

USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1)). “In order for the enhancement to apply, the government must

establish two things: (1) the gun was possessed and (2) it was not clearly improbable

that the weapon was connected to the drug offense.” United States v. Young, 689

F.3d 941, 946 (8th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A district court’s

finding that a defendant possessed a firearm for purposes of § 2D1.1(b)(1) may be

overturned only if clearly erroneous.” Id.

A defendant “possessed” a firearm for purposes of the enhancement if he

“exercised ‘ownership, dominion, or control’ either over the firearm or the premises

on which it [was] found.” United States v. Payne, 81 F.3d 759, 762 (8th Cir. 1996)

(quoting United States v. Luster, 896 F.2d 1122, 1129 (8th Cir. 1990)). Here, the

record establishes that Morrow lived at the Inglewood residence in which the four

firearms were found and that he was present in the residence at the time of his arrest

and immediately prior to the seizure of the firearms. These facts are sufficient to

prove that Morrow exercised control over the premises in which the firearms were

found, as well as the Volkswagen Beetle located in his garage. See Young, 689 F.3d

at 947 (finding possession where firearm was found in defendant’s apartment, even

though firearm was located in another person’s locked bedroom). That the

Volkswagen Beetle was registered to Morrow’s wife, rather than to Morrow, is of no

consequence. See Payne, 81 F.3d at 762-63 (finding constructive possession where

firearm was found in defendant’s apartment, even though apartment was leased in

another person’s name). Thus, the record supports a finding that Morrow

constructively possessed the firearms. See id. (“[C]onstructive possession is

sufficient[.]”). 

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The record also supports a finding that it was not clearly improbable that the

firearms were connected to the drug trafficking offense. Morrow argues that the

government failed to prove that the firearms were connected to the offense because

the firearms were not found on his person, there is no evidence that any violence was

connected to the conspiracy, and no drugs were found in proximity to the firearms. 

However, “the Government need not show that a defendant used or even touched a

weapon to prove a connection between the weapon and the offense.” Savage, 414

F.3d at 967. Moreover, the government can establish the requisite nexus between a

weapon and a drug trafficking offense by “prov[ing] by a preponderance of the

evidence that the weapon was found in the same location where drugs or drug

paraphernalia were stored, or where part of the conspiracy took place.” Payne, 81

F.3d at 763 (emphasis added). Atsentencing, Special Agent Randy Jackson testified

that, in his training and experience, the items found in the Volkswagen

Beetle—digital scales, glass beakers, vacuum sealing equipment, and sealing

bags—are often used in the drug trafficking trade to seal varying quantities of illegal

substances.

2 Further, the record establishes that these items of drug paraphernalia

were found in the front passenger compartment of the Volkswagen Beetle, in close

proximity to the two firearms found in the front trunk of the vehicle. While Morrow

argues that the firearms were physically separated from the drug paraphernalia, the

district court did not clearly err in finding that these firearms were in close proximity

to the drug paraphernalia. See United States v. Betz, 82 F.3d 205, 210-11 (8th Cir.

1996) (finding no clear error where firearms were found in a van on defendant’s

2Morrow argues that the government cannot rely on the drug paraphernalia

found in the Volkswagen Beetle because reference to these seized items was stricken

from the plea agreement. However, “any plea agreement entered into by the

defendant and the government cannot limit the district court in examining the

defendant’s conduct for sentencing.” United States v. Griggs, 71 F.3d 276, 281 (8th

Cir. 1995). The presentence investigation report and Special Agent Jackson’s

testimony establish that investigators found drug paraphernalia in the Volkswagen

Beetle, and the district court was permitted to consider these facts for sentencing. 

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property and throughout the residence, and drugs were found in a shed); United States

v. Hiveley, 61 F.3d 1358, 1362-63 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (finding no clear error

where firearms were found in one trailer on defendant’s property, and drugs were

found in a different trailer on the property). Finally, one of the firearms found in the

Volkswagen Beetle—the loaded Smith & Wesson .9 millimeter handgun—had been

reported stolen in Rogers, a northwest Arkansas community in the vicinity where the

Nicholson drug trafficking organization operated. These facts support a finding that

it was not clearly improbable that the firearms were connected to the offense. 

Accordingly, the district court did not clearly err in applying the two-level

enhancement for possession of a firearm under USSG § 2D1.1.

B.

“We review the district court’s factual findings underlying an adjustment for

obstruction of justice for clear error, giving great deference to the sentencing court’s

determination.” United States v. Brown, 539 F.3d 835, 839 (8th Cir. 2008).

Section 3C1.1 mandates a two-level enhancement if “(1) the defendant

willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the

administration of justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing

of the instant offense of conviction, and (2) the obstructive conduct related to (A) the

defendant’s offense of conviction and any relevant conduct; or (B) a closely related

offense.” One example of the type of conduct to which § 3C1.1 appliesis “producing

or attempting to produce a false, altered, or counterfeit document or record during an

official investigation or judicial proceeding.” USSG § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(C).

We agree with the district court that Morrow’s conduct in seeking to obtain

forged letters of support from his wife and ex-wife constituted obstruction for the

purposes of the enhancement. In determining an appropriate sentence, the district

court isrequired to consider the sentencing factorslisted in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Gall

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v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49-50 (2007). As the district court indicated, letters of

supportfroma former employer and a prospective employer stating that the defendant

will have job opportunities upon his release are relevant to the defendant’s “history

and characteristics.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). The district court noted that, consistent

with the opinion of Morrow’s mitigation expert, such information is intended to

convince the court to impose a lighter sentence and to let the defendant return to work

in the community. The district court found that falsification of thisinformation taints

and obstructs the judicial process and impedes the due administration of justice. We

agree. Morrow’s attempt to provide the court with false information for the purpose

of receiving a lighter sentence constitutes a proper basis for applying the

enhancement in this case. See United States v. Rickert, 685 F.3d 760, 767-68 (8th

Cir. 2012) (finding the district court properly applied the enhancement where the

defendant submitted forged letters for the purpose of receiving a lighter sentence). 

Accordingly, the district court did not clearly err in applying the two-level

enhancement under USSG § 3C1.1.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

______________________________

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