Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01534/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01534-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Shane L. Elder
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted January 19, 2016 

 Decided January 19, 2016 

Before 

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge 

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 15-1534 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

SHANE L. ELDER, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 13-10108-001 

Joe Billy McDade, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

After his wife found several files of child pornography on his laptop and turned 

him into the police, Shane Elder entered open guilty pleas to two counts of distributing 

pornography. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(2), 2256(8)(A)–(B). The district court sentenced 

him below the guidelines range to 120 months’ imprisonment on each count to be 

served concurrently. Elder filed a notice of appeal, but his lawyer has concluded that 

the appeal is frivolous and seeks to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 

(1967). Counsel has submitted a brief that explains the nature of the case and addresses 

the issues that an appeal of this kind might be expected to involve; Elder declined to 

respond to counsel’s motion. See CIR. R. 51(b). Because counsel’s analysis appears to be 

thorough, we limit our review to the subjects that counsel has discussed. See United 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 

Case: 15-1534 Document: 13 Filed: 01/19/2016 Pages: 3
No. 15-1534 Page 2 

States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 

(7th Cir. 1996). 

Counsel first considers whether Elder could challenge the adequacy of the plea 

colloquy or the voluntariness of his guilty pleas. But counsel neglects to say whether 

Elder wants his guilty pleas set aside. See United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 

(7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 670–71 (7th Cir. 2002). Regardless, our 

own review of the record persuades us that a challenge would be frivolous. See United 

States v. Davenport, 719 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 2013); Konczak, 683 F.3d at 349. During the 

plea colloquy the district court substantially complied with Federal Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 11(b), and substantial compliance typically is enough to shield a guilty plea 

from challenge on direct appeal. See United States v. Zitt, 714 F.3d 511, 515 (7th Cir. 

2013); United States v. Blalock, 321 F.3d 686, 688–89 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. 

Akinsola, 105 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1997). The court advised Elder of his constitutional 

rights, the charges against him, the maximum penalties, the role of the sentencing 

guidelines, and its discretion in applying the guidelines. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1). The 

court also ensured that his pleas were made voluntarily and supported by a satisfactory 

factual basis. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2), (3). The court neglected to inform Elder that he 

had the right to persist in his plea of not guilty, FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(B), but he must 

have known as much because he already had pleaded not guilty at arraignment and the 

very purpose of the colloquy was to change that plea. See Knox, 287 F.3d at 670. The 

court’s omission of any reference to its authority to order restitution, FED. R. CRIM. P.

11(b)(1)(K), was also inconsequential because restitution was not imposed. See United 

States v. Fox, 941 F.3d 480, 484–85 (7th Cir. 1991). 

Counsel also considers challenging Elder’s sentence, but rightly concludes that 

doing so would be frivolous. Elder’s 10-year sentence fell below the 20-year statutory 

maximum. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(1). Elder also waived any challenge to the 

calculation of his guideline range when he confirmed at sentencing that he read the 

presentence report and had no objections. See United States v. Jones, 635 F.3d 909, 915 n.6 

(7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Brodie, 507 F.3d 527, 531–32 (7th Cir. 2007). Counsel 

further points out that the court adequately addressed Elder’s mitigating arguments. 

See United States v. Velazquez, 772 F.3d 788, 800–01 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. 

Stinefast, 724 F.3d 925, 931 (7th Cir. 2013). His below-guidelines sentence is also 

presumptively reasonable. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007); United States 

v. Purham, 795 F.3d 761, 765 (7th Cir. 2015). Counsel identified no reason to disturb that 

presumption, nor can we. The district court adequately considered the sentencing 

factors by discussing Elder’s history—his dysfunctional upbringing and lack of prior 

Case: 15-1534 Document: 13 Filed: 01/19/2016 Pages: 3
No. 15-1534 Page 3 

child-sex offenses—and characteristics—his emotional problems that required 

psychotropic medications. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). 

Counsel does not mention one of Elder’s standard conditions of supervised 

release—his being barred from leaving the judicial district without permission—that we 

have criticized as vague because it lacks a scienter requirement. See United States v. 

Kappes, 782 F.3d 828, 849–50 (7th Cir. 2015). But we have no reason to believe that Elder 

wants to challenge this condition because counsel did not identify it as a potential issue 

and Elder did not respond to the Anders brief. See United States v. Bryant, 754 F.3d 443, 

447 (7th Cir. 2014). Moreover, even if Elder finds this condition to be problematic upon 

serving his supervised-release term, he would be free to seek modification under 

18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2). 

Finally, counsel properly concludes that any claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel is best saved for collateral review, where an evidentiary foundation can be 

developed. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504–05 (2003); United States v. 

Flores, 739 F.3d 337, 341 (7th Cir. 2014). 

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and the appeal is DISMISSED. 

Case: 15-1534 Document: 13 Filed: 01/19/2016 Pages: 3