Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-06-05015/USCOURTS-ca10-06-05015-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
B. Willis, C.P.A., INC.
Appellant
BNSF Railway Corporation
Appellee
Public Service Company of Oklahoma
Appellee
Union Pacific Railroad Company
Appellee

Document Text:

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

July 16, 2008

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

B. WILLIS, C.P.A., INC., an

Oklahoma corporation,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

BNSF RAILWAY CORPORATION, a

foreign corporation; UNION PACIFIC

RAILROAD COMPANY, a foreign

corporation; PUBLIC SERVICE

COMPANY OF OKLAHOMA, an

Oklahoma corporation,

Defendants - Appellees.

No. 06-5015

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Oklahoma

(D.C. No. 04-CV-163-TCK)

William T. Dickson, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellant B. Willis, C.P.A.,

Inc. 

Stratton Taylor, Taylor, Burrage, Foster, Mallett, Downs & Ramsey, Claremore,

Oklahoma (Hugh D. Rice and William P. Tunnell, Rainey, Ross, Rice & Binns,

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; Mark H. Ramsey and Clinton D. Russell, Taylor,

Burrage, Foster, Mallett, Downs & Ramsey, Tulsa, Oklahoma; and Robert D.

Hart, Gibbs, Armstrong, Borochoff, Mullican & Hart, Tulsa, Oklahoma, with him

on the briefs), for Defendants-Appellees BNSF Railway Corporation, Union

Pacific Railroad Company and Public Service Company of Oklahoma.

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*

Honorable John L. Kane, Jr., Senior District Judge of the District of

Colorado, sitting by designation.

2

Before TACHA, EBEL and KANE,* Circuit Judges.

EBEL, Circuit Judge.

In 1992, Defendant-Appellee Public Service Company of Oklahoma

(“PSO”) used the eminent domain authority granted to it under Oklahoma law to

condemn an easement across property owned by Plaintiff-Appellant B. Willis,

C.P.A., Inc. (“Willis”). Willis, in turn, invoked remedies available under

Oklahoma law, first to challenge, before a state court judge, the necessity for PSO

to condemn this easement for a public use; and second to challenge, in a jury trial,

the amount of compensation awarded Willis for the easement. Pursuant to

Oklahoma law, PSO took possession of the easement while Willis’ challenges to

the condemnation proceedings were ongoing and, since 1995, has operated a rail

line across Willis’ property. 

Willis commenced this federal litigation while those state proceedings

remained pending, asserting federal and state law claims in this federal action that

challenged aspects of the state condemnation case. The district court dismissed

these claims, concluding that prior federal proceedings precluded one of Willis’

claims and that Willis’ other claims would not be ripe for adjudication as long as

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3

the state court condemnation action remained ongoing. While the district court’s

decision was before this court on appeal, however, the state courts finally

resolved Willis’ challenge to the necessity of PSO’s condemning the easement,

concluding that PSO had established a public necessity sufficient to warrant

condemnation of the easement. 

Because this decision conclusively resolved the material issues presented

by most of Willis’ claims asserted in this federal action, Oklahoma issue

preclusion principles preclude Willis from pursuing all but portions of two of its

claims. The two exceptions are 1) aspects of Willis’ due process/equal protection

claim, to the extent that Willis alleges PSO acted in concert with the state trial

judge to deprive Willis of an initial hearing and discovery to challenge the public

necessity of the easement; and 2) Willis’ trespass claim, to the extent that claim

alleges that PSO removed limestone and coal from below the surface of the

easement. 

We AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of all but these aspects of Willis’

due process/equal protection and trespass claims, but we REMAND those

precluded claims with directions that the district court dismiss them with

prejudice. As to those portions of Willis’ due process/equal protection and

trespass claims that are not precluded, because the state proceedings challenging

the amount of compensation awarded for the easement are still pending, those

claims are not yet ripe for adjudication. We, therefore, AFFIRM the dismissal of

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1

Willis is “a professional corporation whose sole stockholder is Buck Willis

CPA.” Aplt. Br. at 1. Throughout this opinion, we refer to the corporate entity,

rather than the individual.

4

those claims, but REMAND them to the district court to clarify that their

dismissal is without prejudice. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Prior litigation between the parties

Willis1

 owns property in Oolagah, Rogers County, Oklahoma. PSO

operates a power plant nearby. Defendant Union Pacific owns a rail line that runs

adjacent to this power plant. 

To fuel its plant, PSO purchases coal from the Powder River Basin in

Wyoming and contracts with Defendant BNSF Railway Corporation (“BNSF”) to

transport the coal to the Oolagah plant. Because BNSF did not own or operate a

rail line adjacent to the plant, however, it had to subcontract with Union Pacific to

complete delivery. PSO believed that it could obtain much better shipping terms

if BNSF also had a rail line running to the power plant, because then the two

railroads would have to compete for PSO’s shipping business. Therefore, PSO

sought to build a rail line, approximately ten miles long, connecting the power

plant to an already-existing BNSF line. That new line ran through Willis’

property. 

When Willis refused to grant PSO an easement across its property to build

and operate this rail line, PSO, in October 1992, began proceedings to condemn

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3

The Oklahoma Constitution, art. 2, § 24, provides, in pertinent part:

Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without

just compensation. . . . Such compensation shall be ascertained by a

board of commissioners of not less than three freeholders, in such

manner as may be prescribed by law. . . . The commissioners shall not

be appointed by any judge or court without reasonable notice having

been served upon all parties in interest. The commissioners shall be

selected from the regular jury list of names prepared and made as the

Legislature shall provide. Any party aggrieved shall have the right of

appeal, without bond, and trial by jury in a court of record. Until the

compensation shall be paid to the owner, or into court for the owner, the

property shall not be disturbed, or the proprietary rights of the owner

divested. When possession is taken of property condemned for any

public use, the owner shall be entitled to the immediate receipt of the

compensation awarded, without prejudice to the right of either party to

prosecute further proceedings for the judicial determination of the

sufficiency or insufficiency of such compensation. The fee of land

taken by common carriers for right of way, without the consent of the

owner, shall remain in such owner subject only to the use for which it

is taken. In all cases of condemnation of private property for public or

private use, the determination of the use shall be a judicial question.

4

Oklahoma Statutes tit. 27, § 7 provides, in full:

Any person, firm or corporation organized under the laws of this state,

or authorized to do business in this state, to furnish light, heat or power

by electricity or gas, or any other person, association or firm engaged

in furnishing lights, heat or power by electricity or gas shall have and

exercise the right of eminent domain in the same manner and by like

(continued...)

5

the easement under Oklahoma’s eminent domain provisions. The Oklahoma

Constitution permits the condemnation of private property for a public use. See

Okla. Const. art. 2, § 24.3 And Okla. Stat. tit. 27, § 7 expressly gives a power

company, such as PSO, “the right of eminent domain in the same manner and by

like proceedings as provided for railroad corporations” under Oklahoma law.4

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4

(...continued)

proceedings as provided for railroad corporations by laws of this state.

5

Oklahoma Statutes tit. 66, § 53 provides, in pertinent part:

A. If the owner of any real property or interest therein, over which any

railroad corporation, incorporated under the laws of this state, may

desire to locate its road, shall refuse to grant the right-of-way through

and over his premises, the district judge of the county in which said real

property may be situated shall, upon application or petition of either

party, and after ten (10) days’ notice to the opposite party, direct the

sheriff of said county to summon three disinterested freeholders, to be

selected by said judge as commissioners, and who shall not be

interested in a like question.

. . . . 

C. The commissioners shall be sworn to perform their duties

impartially and justly; and they shall inspect said real property and

consider the injury which said owner may sustain by reason of the

condemnation and they shall assess the just compensation to which said

owner is entitled; and they shall forthwith make report in writing to the

(continued...)

6

Oklahoma law further sets forth specific procedures, see Okla. Stat. tit. 66,

§§ 51-66, by which a railroad or power company can condemn private property

for “a lawful public use.” Pub. Serv. Co. of Okla. v. B. Willis, C.P.A., Inc., 941

P.2d 995, 999 (Okla. 1997) (citing Okla. Const. art. 2, §§ 23, 24). 

Acting pursuant to these eminent domain procedures, PSO filed a petition

in a Rogers County state court to condemn the easement across Willis’ property. 

The state court then appointed a three-member commission, which determined

“just compensation” PSO should pay Willis for the easement. Okla. Stat. tit. 66,

§ 53(A), (C);5

 see also City of Stigler v. Crumley, 99 P.3d 253, 254 (Okla. Civ.

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5

(...continued)

clerk of the court, setting forth the quantity, boundaries, and just

compensation for the property taken, and amount of injury done to the

property, either directly or indirectly, which they assess to the owner;

which report must be filed and recorded by the clerk. A certified copy

of the report may be transmitted to the county clerk of the county where

the land lies, to be by him filed and recorded, without further

acknowledgment or proof, in the manner and with like force and effect

as is provided for the recording of deeds. And if said corporation shall,

at any time before it enters upon said real property for the purpose of

constructing said road, pay to said clerk for the use of said owner the

sum so assessed and reported to him as aforesaid, it shall thereby be

authorized to construct and maintain its road over and across said

premises. 

6

With this objection, Willis preserved its right to have a court determine

whether or not the easement PSO sought was for a public use. See Bd. of County

Comm’rs v. Casteel, 522 P.2d 608, 611 (Okla. 1974) (noting that only a timely

filed objection to the commissioners’ report will preserve a challenge to the

necessity of the taking); see also Calhoun v. City of Durant, 970 P.2d 608, 610-11

(Okla. Civ. App. 1997). In addition, Willis requested a jury determination of the

adequacy of the compensation the three-member commission awarded Willis for

the easement, see Willis, 941 P.2d at 997, which was provided for by law, see

Okla. Const. art. 2, § 24; Okla. Stat. tit. 66, § 55(A). See generally Casteel, 522

P.2d at 611 (noting that only a jury demand preserves a challenge to the amount

of compensation awarded); Calhoun, 970 P.2d at 610-11 (noting that issue of

damages in a condemnation action is a jury question, while determination of the

character of the use served is a matter for the court); Williams v. State ex rel.

Dep’t of Transp., 998 P.2d 1245, 1252-53 (Okla. Civ. App. 2000) (noting that

only a jury demand preserves a challenge to the amount of compensation

awarded). 

7

App. 2004). Willis objected, not only to the amount of compensation the

three-member commission awarded, but to the validity of the condemnation itself,

asserting that PSO was not taking the easement for a public use.6

 See Willis, 941

P.2d at 997. 

Notwithstanding Willis’ objection challenging the public need for PSO to

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Okla. Stat. tit. 66, § 56 provides, in pertinent part, that 

[e]ither party aggrieved [in a condemnation proceeding in the state trial

or district court] may appeal from the decision of the district court to

the Supreme Court; but such review or appeal shall not delay the

prosecution of the work on such railroad over the premises in question,

if such corporation shall first have paid to the owner of said real

property, or deposited with the said clerk for said owner, the amount so

assessed by said commissioners or district court . . . . 

See also Okla. Const. art. 2, § 24 (“When possession is taken of property condemned

for any public use, the owner shall be entitled to the immediate receipt of the

compensation awarded, without prejudice to the right of either party to prosecute

further proceedings for the judicial determination of the sufficiency or insufficiency

of such compensation.”). See generally Richardson v. State ex rel. Okla. Dep’t of

Transp., 818 P.2d 1257, 1258 (Okla. Civ. App. 1991) (noting “[t]he power of

eminent domain is a special proceeding created as a necessary attribute of

sovereignty to facilitate the emergency acquisition of private property for public

(continued...)

8

take an easement across Willis’ property, the state trial court denied Willis

discovery on this issue and, without conducting an evidentiary hearing, held “that

[PSO’s] simple allegation of necessity in the [condemnation] petition was

sufficient to sustain PSO’s case” for condemning the easement; that is, because

PSO had statutory authority to condemn property under Okla. Stat. tit. 27, § 7,

Willis had no right to contest PSO’s taking the easement across Willis’ property. 

Willis, 941 P.2d at 997-98. Willis appealed that determination. See id. at 998.

Despite Willis’ pending appeal, Okla. Stat. tit. 66, § 56 permitted PSO to

take possession of the easement by paying the court clerk, on Willis’ behalf, the

amount of compensation the appointed three-member commission had awarded

Willis.7

 See Pub. Serv. Co. of Okla. v. B. Willis, C.P.A., Inc., 155 P.3d 845,

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(...continued)

use,” and further noting that “[b]ecause of the urgent necessity underlying

condemnation proceedings, statutes defining the procedure are subject to fairly short

time constraints”). 

9

848-49 (Okla. Civ. App. 2006), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 66 (2007). PSO then built

a railroad track and bridge across approximately 1,069 feet of Willis’ property. 

After completing construction of the track, PSO entered into an “Industrial Track

and Operating Agreement” with BNSF in March 1995. Under that agreement,

BNSF maintains this rail line and runs coal trains across it to PSO’s power plant. 

Even though the rail line had already been built, Willis’ state appeal

continued. In March 1995, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals held that the

allegation of necessity PSO made in its condemnation petition was sufficient to

state a prima facie case for PSO’s taking the easement across Willis’ property, but

that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying Willis discovery to

support its effort to rebut PSO’s prima facie condemnation case. See Willis, 941

P.2d at 998. Not obtaining all the relief it sought, Willis appealed this decision to

the Oklahoma Supreme Court. 

While Willis pursued that appeal, it also returned to the state trial court to

challenge PSO’s and BNSF’s continued use of the easement, asserting that PSO

had no legal right yet to the easement across Willis’ property. Willis, therefore,

demanded that PSO and BNSF immediately abandon the easement and stop

running coal trains across Willis’ land. The state trial court rejected Willis’

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position and, instead, issued a temporary injunction enjoining Willis from

interfering with PSO’s and BNSF’s continued use of the easement while the

Oklahoma Supreme Court considered Willis’ appeal. 

In 1997, the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided Willis’ appeal, vacating the

decision of the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals and remanding the

condemnation action to the state trial court for further proceedings. See id. at

997. In doing so, the Oklahoma Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Civil

Appeals and held instead that PSO’s

mere filing of a [condemnation] petition does not establish a prima facie

case [for condemnation]. It is well-settled that the condemnor has the

initial burden of proof on the issues in a condemnation proceeding and

meets that burden to the extent of making a prima facie case of

necessity by introduction into evidence of a resolution of necessity from

the condemning authority [PSO], whereupon the burden of proof shifts

to condemnee [Willis] to show that the taking is not necessary.

Id. at 999. The Oklahoma Supreme Court concluded that, in this case, because

PSO had “never attempted to have its resolution [of necessity] admitted into

evidence by the trial court,” PSO had never met its “initial burden” in the

condemnation proceeding. Id. 

The Oklahoma Supreme Court further held that, on remand, once PSO

meets its initial burden, Oklahoma

law provides a landowner such as Willis with the right and opportunity

to contest the condemnor’s right to take his property. There is a right

to a hearing on all aspects of the plaintiff’s right to condemnation upon

timely and proper exceptions to the report of commissioners which

challenge the condemnor’s right to take the intended particular

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property. Before an entity having eminent domain authority can

appropriate private land to its use, all the steps legally requisite must

have been taken.

Id. at 999-1000. In light of Willis’ right to a hearing, the Oklahoma Supreme

Court determined that the state trial court had erred by denying Willis “an

opportunity to challenge PSO’s asserted but unproven right to take [Willis’]

property as well as the right to conduct discovery” on that issue. Id. at 1000. 

Following the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s decision remanding the eminent

domain proceeding to the state trial court, Willis again argued to the trial court

that PSO’s and BNSF’s continued use of the easement during the ongoing eminent

domain proceeding was no longer lawful because PSO had never met its initial

burden of showing that its exercise of eminent domain in this case was lawful. 

Willis thus again demanded that PSO and BNSF immediately abandon the rail line

running across Willis’ property. Willis also requested that the trial court vacate

the injunction the court had previously entered enjoining Willis from interfering

with the operation of the coal trains across the easement during the state

condemnation proceedings. The state trial court, however, again rejected Willis’

argument and instead left the previously issued injunction “in place pending the

outcome of a hearing on [Willis’] objections” to PSO’s taking Willis’ property. 

This meant that PSO and BNSF could continue to operate coal trains on the rail

line crossing Willis’ property while the state trial court further considered PSO’s

petition seeking condemnation of the easement. 

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8

Willis initiated these federal actions after the first Oklahoma Court of

Civil Appeals’ decision, and while Willis’ appeal from that decision was pending

before the Oklahoma Supreme Court. But the federal courts did not finally

resolve Willis’ federal actions until after the Oklahoma Supreme Court remanded

the eminent domain proceedings to the state trial court for further proceedings. 

12

Willis pursued an interlocutory appeal of that decision. But the Oklahoma

Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s decision to leave the injunction in place,

concluding that, although “[a]fter issuance of [the] mandate in the prior appeal

[decided by the Oklahoma Supreme Court], the trial court was required to give

[Willis] a[] meaningful[] evidentiary hearing on the issues of necessity and public

use, . . . [i]t was not require[d] to undo all that had transpired before then.” “The

first appeal resolved only [Willis’] right to an evidentiary hearing, and the

question whether PSO established a prima facie case of necessity by alleging

necessity in its original petition.” The Oklahoma Supreme Court denied Willis’

petition for a writ of certiorari challenging that decision of the Oklahoma Court of

Civil Appeals. 

Despite the fact that the state condemnation proceedings remained ongoing,

Willis instituted two actions in the federal district court for the Northern District

of Oklahoma collaterally challenging those state court proceedings.8

 Underlying

the claims Willis asserted in those federal actions was Willis’ continued belief,

already rejected by the state courts, that PSO and BNSF were not entitled to use

the easement over Willis’ property while the state condemnation action remained

unsettled. 

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9

This first federal action was actually the product of two separate lawsuits

Willis filed in federal court, which the federal court consolidated into one action.

10In asserting this First Amendment claim, Willis was “primarily concerned

with a contempt proceeding brought to enforce the injunction” precluding Willis

from interfering with PSO’s and BNSF’s possession of the easement, after Willis

sent a letter to BNSF informing the railroad that, in light of the Oklahoma

Supreme Court’s decision in that state condemnation action, Willis intended to

restore its fence line around the disputed easement and post “No Trespassing”

signs. Willis, 1999 WL 335207, at *4. 

13

In the first of these federal actions,9 Willis asserted claims under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, as well as an Oklahoma state law trespass claim, alleging Willis “was

constitutionally entitled to a final judicial determination on condemnation before

PSO could take possession of the easement over [Willis’] property.” B. Willis,

C.P.A., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Okla., No. 97-5107, 1999 WL 335207, at *2

(10th Cir. May 27, 1999) (unpublished) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 528 U.S.

1003 (1999). The district court denied Willis relief. See id. 

On appeal from that decision, this court rejected on the merits Willis’ facial

constitutional challenge to the Oklahoma condemnation scheme, upholding the

aspect of that scheme that permitted the condemnor to take possession of the

property sought to be condemned before the condemnation proceedings were

finally resolved. See id. at *2-*3. This court also rejected Willis’ claim that the

state trial court’s enjoining Willis from interfering with PSO’s and BNSF’s

continued use of the easement violated Willis’ First Amendment freedom of

speech.10 See id. at *4. 

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This court, however, dismissed without prejudice Willis’ claims against

BNSF for trespass and Willis’ constitutional claims alleging the Oklahoma

eminent domain proceedings denied Willis just compensation, due process, and

equal protection of the law. See id. at *2, *4. We concluded those claims would

not be ripe for adjudication until the state condemnation proceeding was

concluded. Id. at *2. 

In the second of these federal actions, Willis similarly asserted, among

other claims, that the state trial judge and PSO had violated Willis’ First

Amendment right to free speech when the court, in 1997, held Willis in contempt

for violating the injunction precluding Willis from interfering with PSO’s use of

the easement while the state condemnation proceedings remained ongoing. See B.

Willis, C.P.A., Inc. v. Goodpaster, 183 F.3d 1231, 1233-34 (10th Cir.), cert.

denied, 528 U.S. 1046 (1999). The contempt citation resulted when, after the

Oklahoma Supreme Court remanded the condemnation proceedings to the state

trial court, Willis’ attorney wrote PSO and BNSF and demanded that they cease

running trains across Willis’ property until the second condemnation hearing was

completed. See id. at 1233. This court affirmed the district court’s decision

rejecting Willis’ First Amendment claim on the merits. See id. at 1233-35. 

Having failed to obtain relief in these two federal actions, Willis next filed

a petition with the federal Surface Transportation Board (“STB”) in February

2001, seeking a declaration that the rail line PSO had already constructed across

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Willis’ property was subject to the STB’s exclusive jurisdiction. See B. Willis,

C.P.A., Inc., No. 34013, 2001 WL 211240, at *1 (S.T.B. Mar. 5, 2001)

(unpublished). If it was, then it was Willis’ contention that PSO had unlawfully

constructed that line without first obtaining the required certificate of public

convenience and necessity from the STB. See B. Willis, C.P.A., Inc., No. 34013,

2001 WL 1168090, at *1-*2 (S.T.B. Oct. 1, 2001) (unpublished). In that federal

administrative proceeding, however, the STB determined that the rail line running

across Willis’ property was a private rail line, over which the STB did not have

jurisdiction. See id. at *2-*3. The Circuit Court for the District of Columbia

affirmed the STB’s determination, see B. Willis, C.P.A., Inc. v. Surface Transp.

Bd., 51 Fed. App’x 321 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 26, 2002) (per curiam) (unpublished), and

the United States Supreme Court denied Willis’ petition for a writ of certiorari,

see 540 U.S. 811 (2003). During all of these federal proceedings, the state

condemnation action remained ongoing.

B. This litigation

The specific federal litigation underlying this appeal stems from two

consolidated cases Willis commenced after failing to obtain any relief in his

previous three federal actions. In the first such case underlying this appeal,

Willis sued BNSF in Oklahoma state court in February 2004, asserting state law

tort and contract claims. Willis based those claims on Willis’ continued belief

that BNSF was wrongfully possessing the easement across Willis’ property, in

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11In this federal action, Willis specifically alleged that BNSF 1) was

wrongfully possessing and using Willis’ land; 2) had been unjustly enriched as a

result; 3) should be bound, based upon quasi-contract principles, to a licensing

agreement (which BNSF had wrongly rejected) by which Willis would have

agreed to permit BNSF to continue to use the easement while the eminent domain

proceedings continued; and 4) was liable to Willis for punitive damages because

BNSF’s possession of Willis’ property was “done deliberately, wantonly,

intentionally and maliciously with full knowledge that there was no easement or

right of way across Willis’ property.” 

12The ICCTA is “codified generally at Title 49.” Sompo Japan Ins. Co. of

Am. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 456 F.3d 54, 58 (2d Cir. 2006).

13In this action, Willis alleged that 1) the ICCTA has preempted

Oklahoma’s eminent domain statutes, as those statutes have been applied to

Willis; 2) the condemnation of Willis’ property by PSO and BNSF deprived

Willis of due process because it was not effected for a public purpose; 3) the

condemnation by PSO and BNSF also deprived Willis of equal protection of the

law; 4) PSO was trespassing, under Oklahoma law, by going beyond the surface

easement it had in Willis’ property when PSO removed coal and limestone from

(continued...)

16

light of the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s earlier decision to remand the state

eminent domain action to the state trial court for discovery and a hearing.11

BNSF removed this litigation to federal court pursuant to the federal court’s

diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 

In August 2004, Willis commenced another action in federal court, this

time asserting a claim under the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination

Act (“ICCTA”)12 against BNSF, Union Pacific, and PSO, and claims under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, as well as state law tort and property claims, against PSO and

BNSF, again claiming their continued use of the easement across Willis’ property

was wrongful.13 The district court consolidated these two actions. 

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13(...continued)

below the surface of Willis’ property; 5) title to the easement should be quieted in

Willis; 6) PSO and BNSF should be ejected from Willis’ property; 7) PSO and

BNSF are liable to Willis for treble damages under Oklahoma law because they

trespassed and wrongfully possessed Willis’ property “by means of a state

eminent domain proceeding that was rife with fraud, bad faith and oppressive

conduct”; and 8) PSO and BNSF are liable to Willis for punitive damages because

they violated Willis’ rights to due process and equal protection “deliberately,

wantonly, intentionally and maliciously.” 

17

In June 2005, the district court dismissed all of Willis’ state law and

42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), concluding those claims

would not be ripe for adjudication as long as the state condemnation proceeding

remained pending. Later, in January 2006, the district court granted BNSF, PSO

and Union Pacific summary judgment on the remaining ICCTA claim, concluding

that the earlier federal proceedings before the STB precluded Willis from

reasserting that claim in these proceedings. Willis now appeals both district court

decisions. 

C. Determination, in the state condemnation proceeding, that PSO had

established the existence of a public use warranting condemnation of

the easement 

The state condemnation proceeding has remained ongoing during all of this

federal litigation. In October 2004, seven years after the Oklahoma Supreme

Court remanded the condemnation case for further proceedings, the state trial

court conducted a hearing, after which the court concluded that PSO had

sufficiently established that its condemnation of Willis’ property was for a public

use or necessity. See Willis, 155 P.3d at 847. On September 19, 2006, the

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14In January 2008, the state trial court held a jury trial on the issue of

whether the three-member commission awarded Willis adequate compensation for

the easement. In that proceeding, the jury awarded Willis less compensation than

did the three-member commission. Willis has appealed that decision and so the

compensation matter has not been finally resolved. 

15Willis asserts that Defendants filed their motion to dismiss the appeal out

of time. 10th Cir. R. 27.2(A)(3) requires a party, “[i]f possible,” to file a motion

to dismiss an appeal “within 15 days after the notice of appeal is filed.” 

Defendants instead filed their motion to dismiss two months after Willis filed its

(continued...)

18

Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. See id. at 852. While the instant

appeal was pending before this court, the Oklahoma Supreme Court denied

Willis’ petition for a writ of certiorari and the United States Supreme Court did

the same. See Willis v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Okla., 128 S. Ct. 66 (2007). Those

state proceedings finally determined not only that PSO had established a public

necessity justifying its condemnation of an easement across Willis’ property, but

also that PSO’s and BNSF’s possession of the easement during the state

condemnation proceedings was lawful.14 See Brink v. Bartlett, 294 P. 106, 107

(Okla. 1930) (noting judgment became final after United States Supreme Court

denied a petition for a writ of certiorari); cf. Walker v. Telex Corp., 583 P.2d 482,

484 (Okla. 1978) (noting court of appeals’ decision became final after petitioner

withdrew petition for certiorari filed with Oklahoma Supreme Court). 

II. APPELLATE JURISDICTION

As a threshold matter, Defendants have filed with this court a motion to

dismiss this appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.15 We disagree. This court

Appellate Case: 06-5015 Document: 01012490666 Date Filed: 07/16/2008 Page: 18 
15(...continued)

notice of appeal. Nevertheless, “we may not ignore the jurisdictional issue raised

in the motion [to dismiss]. This court has an independent obligation to determine

its . . . jurisdiction.” Perales-Cumpean v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 977, 981 n.3 (10th

Cir. 2005). 

19

has jurisdiction to consider this appeal from the district court’s final judgment

entered in this case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

Willis did file its notice of appeal prematurely. The district court

dismissed most of Willis’ claims on June 23, 2005, leaving only Willis’ ICCTA

preemption claim still pending against all three Defendants. BNSF and PSO, but

not Union Pacific, moved for summary judgment on that remaining claim. On

January 3, 2006, the district court granted those two defendants summary

judgment. 

On January 17, 2006, Willis filed its notice of appeal. But the district court

had not yet entered a final, appealable order because Willis’ ICCTA claim

remained pending against Union Pacific. See Jackson v. Volvo Trucks N. Am.,

Inc., 462 F.3d 1234, 1238 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting that “a judgment . . . that does

not dispose of all claims is not considered a final appealable decision under [28

U.S.C.] § 1291”). 

On January 27, 2006, Union Pacific requested summary judgment on that

remaining claim. The district court granted the motion on January 31, 2006, and

on that same day entered judgment “terminating this matter.” 

The district court’s final decision, on January 31, 2006, ripened Willis’

Appellate Case: 06-5015 Document: 01012490666 Date Filed: 07/16/2008 Page: 19 
20

prematurely filed notice of appeal. “[A]n otherwise nonfinal decision becomes

final and appealable if the district court adjudicates all remaining claims against

all remaining parties before the appellate court acts to dismiss the appeal on the

merits for lack of jurisdiction.” Harbert v. Healthcare Servs. Group, Inc., 391

F.3d 1140, 1146 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Lewis v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 850 F.2d

641, 645 (10th Cir. 1988) (en banc)); see also Jackson, 462 F.3d at 1238; Ashley

Creek Phosphate Co. v. Chevron USA, Inc., 315 F.3d 1245, 1263 (10th Cir.

2003). This court, therefore, has jurisdiction to consider an appeal from the

district court’s January 3, 2006, order, which was the decision named in the

prematurely filed notice of appeal. See Harbert, 391 F.3d at 1144-45, 1146. And,

because the premature notice of appeal referred to both the January 3, 2006

decision, “as well as the prior orders of the Court that did not dispose of all of the

claims brought by Plaintiff,” this court also has jurisdiction to review the district

court’s earlier decision dismissing most of Willis’ claims as unripe. Cf. Breeden

v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 115 F.3d 749, 752 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding premature

notice of appeal that, pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4), ripened after trial court

denied Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion, was sufficient to give court of appeals

jurisdiction to consider “any orders specified in the original notice”). 

Willis’ prematurely filed notice of appeal, however, was not sufficient to

give this court jurisdiction to consider an appeal from the district court’s final

judgment, dated January 31, 2006. See Nolan v. U. S. Dep’t of Justice, 973 F.2d

Appellate Case: 06-5015 Document: 01012490666 Date Filed: 07/16/2008 Page: 20 
21

843, 846 (10th Cir. 1992). To preserve that decision for appeal, Willis needed to

file another notice of appeal. See Ashley Creek Phosphate Co., 315 F.3d at 1263;

EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 187 F.3d 1241, 1250 (10th Cir. 1999). Willis

failed to do so. Nevertheless, this court can treat Willis’ amended docketing

statement, filed with this court on February 9, 2006, after the district court’s final

decision, as the “functional equivalent” of a second notice of appeal. See Smith

v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 245, 248-49 (1992) (treating a pro se litigant’s appellate

brief as the “functional equivalent” of a timely filed notice of appeal); see also

Haney v. Addison, 175 F.3d 1217, 1219 (10th Cir. 1999) (treating a pro se

litigant’s amended docketing statement as a notice of appeal, although noting that

“we strongly discourage this practice”); Grimsley v. MacKay, 93 F.3d 676, 678

(10th Cir. 1996) (permitting docketing statement filed in counselled case to

correct notice of appeal’s failure to name party appealing, as required by Fed. R.

App. P. 3); cf. Berrey v. Asarco Inc., 439 F.3d 636, 641-42 (10th Cir. 2006)

(deeming counselled litigant’s “motion to certify district court’s order” to be

functional equivalent of timely filed notice of appeal). 

This court can do so, however, only if Willis’ amended docketing statement

gives the proper notice required under Fed. R. App. P. 3: “Notices ‘shall specify

the party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment, order or part

thereof appealed from; and shall name the court to which the appeal is taken.’” 

Smith, 502 U.S. at 248 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 3(c)); see also Berrey, 439 F.3d at

Appellate Case: 06-5015 Document: 01012490666 Date Filed: 07/16/2008 Page: 21 
16Although the district court dismissed most of Willis’ claims because they

were not yet ripe for adjudication, the district court did not specify whether that

dismissal was with or without prejudice. Presumably, the court dismissed the

claims without prejudice in order to permit Willis to reassert those claims after

the state condemnation proceedings concluded and the claims thereby ripened. 

See Graham v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 501 F.3d 1153, 1154, 1161,

1163 (10th Cir. 2007) (directing district court to dismiss without prejudice claim

for attorneys’ fees that was not yet ripe for adjudication), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct.

1650 (2008). 

This circuit has recognized that in some circumstances, a dismissal without

prejudice will not be a final, appealable decision. See Moya v. Schollenbarger,

465 F.3d 444, 448 (10th Cir. 2006). However, the fact that the district court’s

“dismissal was without prejudice does not necessarily make it non-final under

section 1291.” Id. “Rather, in this circuit, whether an order of dismissal is

appealable generally depends on whether the district court dismissed the

(continued...)

22

642. Willis’ amended docketing statement meets all three of these requirements. 

It specifically refers to the district court’s January 31, 2006 decision; identifies

Willis as the appealing party; and names this court as the court to which Willis is

appealing. 

Furthermore, Willis filed that document in a timely manner, within thirty

days of the district court’s January 31, 2006 decision. See Fed. R. App. P.

4(a)(1)(A); see also Berrey, 439 F.3d at 641. In light of that, Willis’ amended

docketing statement was sufficient to give this court jurisdiction to consider

Willis’ appeal from the district court’s January 31, 2006 decision granting Union

Pacific summary judgment on the ICCTA claim. This court, therefore, has

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to consider on appeal all of the district

court’s decisions entered in this case.16

Appellate Case: 06-5015 Document: 01012490666 Date Filed: 07/16/2008 Page: 22 
16(...continued)

complaint or the action. A dismissal of the complaint is ordinarily a non-final,

nonappealable order (since amendment would generally be available), while a

dismissal of the entire action is ordinarily final.” Id. at 448-49 (quotation

omitted). In applying this rule, however, this court takes a practical approach and

does not rely upon the precise language that the district court used in its dismissal

order, but instead “look[s] to the substance and objective intent of the district

court’s order.” Id. at 449. This court has recognized that where the district court

dismisses because of a defect that “cannot be cured through an amendment to the

complaint, that dismissal . . . is for practical purposes” a dismissal of the entire

action and is therefore final and appealable. Id. at 450-51. If the district court’s

decision is ambiguous, this court also looks to “whether the district court’s order

evidences an intent to extinguish the plaintiff’s cause of action and whether the

plaintiff has been effectively excluded from federal court under the present

circumstances. If so, then our appellate jurisdiction is proper.” Id. at 450

(quotations, citations, alterations omitted); see also id. at 451. 

That is the case here. The district court’s decision clearly indicated that the

district court ultimately intended “to extinguish” Willis’ action, excluding Willis

“from federal court under the present circumstances.” Id. at 450 (quotation

omitted). And Willis could not have saved its claims by merely amending its

complaints. Presuming that the district court dismissed some of Willis’ claims

without prejudice, therefore, this court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to

consider this appeal from the district court’s final judgment. See Signature Props.

Int’l Ltd. P’ship v. City of Edmond, 310 F.3d 1258, 1260-61 & 1261 n.2 (10th

Cir. 2002) (holding, in case where appellate jurisdiction was based upon 28

U.S.C. § 1291, “fact that most of plaintiff’s claims were dismissed without

prejudice does not create a jurisdictional impediment,” citing cases); see also

Bateman v. City of W. Bountiful, 89 F.3d 704, 705-06 (10th Cir. 1996)

(reviewing district court’s dismissal of claims without prejudice because they

were not yet ripe for adjudication). 

23

III. DISCUSSION

Satisfied that this court has jurisdiction, we turn to the merits of Willis’

appeal. The district court dismissed most of Willis’ claims because they were not

Appellate Case: 06-5015 Document: 01012490666 Date Filed: 07/16/2008 Page: 23 
17The district court addressed the merits of Willis’ ICCTA claim,

concluding earlier litigation precluded Willis from reasserting that claim in this

action.

18At this court’s request, the parties filed supplemental briefs addressing the

preclusive effect the state court’s final determination of these issues had on

Willis’ claims asserted in this federal case. 

24

yet ripe for adjudication in light of the ongoing state condemnation proceeding.17

That state proceeding remains ongoing as to the issue of whether the

compensation awarded Willis is adequate. But the state courts have now finally

determined that PSO established a public use that necessitated its condemning the

easement across Willis’ property and that PSO’s and BNSF’s possession and use

of the easement during the state condemnation proceeding was lawful. The state

courts’ decisions finally resolving these two issues preclude Willis from pursuing

the claims it is asserting in this federal action, with two exceptions.18 See

Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 412 (2000) (noting court’s raising res

judicata sua sponte may be appropriate in special circumstances to avoid

unnecessary judicial waste); United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 432

(1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting court may dismiss, sua sponte, on basis

of res judicata); Burrell v. Armijo, 456 F.3d 1159, 1176 (10th Cir. 2006)

(McConnell, J., concurring in judgment) (noting court can raise preclusion on its

own motion, citing cases), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1132 (2007); 18 Charles Alan

Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure

§ 4405 (2d ed. 2002) (noting it is possible that a court may raise preclusion on its

Appellate Case: 06-5015 Document: 01012490666 Date Filed: 07/16/2008 Page: 24 
19Such takings claims are grounded in the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition

against “‘private property be[ing] taken for public use, without just

compensation,’” which applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 

Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 175 n.1 (quoting U.S. Const. amend. V). 

25

own motion; further noting that “[p]reclusion even can be raised by an appellate

court for the first time on appeal”); see also Lowell Staats Mining Co. v.

Philadelphia Elec. Co., 878 F.2d 1271, 1274 (10th Cir. 1989) (noting district

court applied res judicata sua sponte). But see Jicarilla Apache Nation v. Rio

Arriba County, 440 F.3d 1202, 1208 n.3 (10th Cir. 2006) (declining to raise res

judicata sua sponte); cf. Okla. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. McCrady, 176 P.3d 1194,

1199 n.21 (Okla. 2007) (noting that, while “it is uncommon” for appellate court to

apply preclusion principles, it “is not unheard of”). These two exceptions are

1) Willis’ due process/equal protection claim, to the extent that claim is based

upon a theory other than Willis rearguing that PSO unlawfully possessed and used

the easement during the state condemnation proceeding, and 2) Willis’ trespass

claim alleging PSO removed limestone and coal from below the surface easement.

A. Relevant legal principles

In concluding that most of Willis’ claims were not yet ripe for adjudication,

the district court relied upon Williamson County Regional Planning Commission

v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), as well as this court’s decision in Willis’

earlier appeal, Willis, 1999 WL 335207. Williamson County held that a claim

asserting an unconstitutional taking19 or the deprivation of due process resulting

Appellate Case: 06-5015 Document: 01012490666 Date Filed: 07/16/2008 Page: 25 
20In Williamson County, a land developer sued the County’s regional

planning commission, alleging that the commission’s application of zoning laws

and regulations to the developer’s property amounted to a temporary taking of

that property. See 473 U.S. at 175, 185. Without deciding whether such

allegations state a takings or a due process claim, the Supreme Court held that the

developer’s claim was not ripe for adjudication until the developer obtained a

final decision regarding the application of the zoning ordinance and subdivision

regulations and utilized state procedures for obtaining compensation for any

taking. See id. at 185-87, 193-94, 197, 199-200; see also Signature Props., 310

F.3d at 1264-66; SK Fin. SA v. La Plata County, Bd. of County Comm’rs, 126

F.3d 1272, 1276 (10th Cir. 1997); Bateman, 89 F.3d at 706, 708. 

This court has applied Williamson County’s reasoning to conclude that, in

addition to takings claims, related constitutional claims challenging the state

condemnation proceedings will also not be ripe for adjudication until the state or

local condemnation proceedings are finally concluded. See Signature Props., 310

F.3d at 1265-68 (addressing substantive due process claim and holding “finality

requirements are the same for due process claims and for takings claims”);

Bateman, 89 F.3d at 709 (holding Williamson County’s ripeness requirement

“applies to due process and equal protection claims that rest upon the same facts

as a concomitant takings claim,” citing cases); see also Willis, 1999 WL 335207,

at *2 (applying Williamson County and concluding that Willis’ claims, which

included due process, equal protection and access-to-courts claims that “derive, in

one way or another, from the eminent domain proceeding prosecuted by PSO,”

were unripe for adjudication until the state eminent domain proceeding was

concluded). 

This court has acknowledged the possibility that, “[u]nder certain

circumstances, due process rights may arise which are beyond the more

particularized claim asserted pursuant to the Just Compensation Clause.” J.B.

Ranch, Inc. v. Grand County, 958 F.2d 306, 309 (10th Cir. 1992) (citing

Landmark Land Co. of Okla., Inc. v. Buchanan, 874 F.2d 717, 723 (10th Cir.

1989), abrogated on other grounds by Fed. Lands Legal Consortium ex rel. Robart

Estate v. United States, 195 F.3d 1190, 1195-96 (10th Cir. 1999)); see also Rocky

Mountain Materials & Asphalt, Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 972 F.2d 309,

310-11 (10th Cir. 1992). Under such circumstances, the due process claim may

(continued...)

26

from a condemnation proceeding will not be ripe for adjudication until the state or

local condemnation proceedings are final.20 See

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20(...continued)

be ripe for adjudication before the state condemnation proceedings are complete. 

See Rocky Mountain Materials, 195 F.3d at 1195-96; J.B. Ranch, 958 F.2d at 309. 

Nevertheless, this court has held that, “where the property interest in which a

plaintiff asserts a right to procedural due process is coextensive with the asserted

takings claim,” Williamson County’s ripeness principle still applies. See Rocky

Mountain Materials, 972 F.2d at 311. 

In this case, because all of Willis’ federal and state claims stem from the

Oklahoma eminent domain proceedings, Williamson County’s ripeness rule

applies, requiring Willis to conclude the state condemnation proceedings before

those claims will be ripe for adjudication in federal court. Cf. J.B. Ranch, 958

F.2d at 309-10 (holding that “[t]he facts of this case fall squarely within Fifth

Amendment [takings] analysis. We do not find anything in the record which

dictates a due process analysis above and beyond our consideration of Plaintiff’s

Just Compensation Clause claim”); Miller v. Campbell County, 945 F.2d 348, 352

(10th Cir. 1991) (holding court is “reluctant in the context of a factual situation

that falls squarely within [the Just Compensation Clause] to impose new and

potentially inconsistent obligations upon the parties under the substantive or

procedural components of the Due Process Clause. It is appropriate in this case

to subsume the more generalized Fourteenth Amendment due process protections

within the more particularized protections of the Just Compensation Clause”). 

27

473 U.S. at 185-86, 194-95, 197, 199-200; see also San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City

& County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 327 (2005). And “whether an

unconstitutionally improper taking occurred cannot be determined until both the

taking and compensation have been legally evaluated.” Wilkinson v. Pitkin

County Bd. of County Comm’rs, 142 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1998) (per

curiam) (emphasis added); see also San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. at 327 (noting that

Williamson County held that “‘takings claims are not ripe until a State fails to

provide adequate compensation for the taking,’” quoting Williamson County, 473

U.S. at 195); Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 733-34

Appellate Case: 06-5015 Document: 01012490666 Date Filed: 07/16/2008 Page: 27 
21We can apply issue preclusion principles, even though Willis’ claims are

otherwise unripe for review. Cf. Wilkinson, 142 F.3d at 1320-21 & 1321 n.2,

1324 (applying res judicata to preclude federal claims stemming from County’s

denial of three land use applications for a real estate development, where

developer had previously filed three state actions challenging those decisions, and

two of those three state actions were finally resolved). “The ripeness doctrine is

drawn both from Article III limitations on judicial power and from prudential

reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction.” Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v.

Dep’t of the Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003) (citing Reno v. Catholic Soc.

Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 57 n.18 (1993)); see also Suitum, 520 U.S. at 733 n.7. 

Where, as here, Willis asserts a “genuine case or controversy,” ripeness

implicates only prudential concerns. See Suitum, 520 U.S. at 733 n.7. Those

prudential concerns will not preclude us from applying preclusion principles in

this appeal, where the state courts have now finally resolved the legal issues

relevant to Willis’ claims asserted in this federal action. See id. at 739-40

(concluding Williamson County’s ripeness requirement did not preclude

considering takings claim on its merits, where resolution of the relevant legal

issue would not require any further action by the relevant local land use agency);

see also San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. at 349 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in

judgment) (referring to Williamson’s requirement that litigant asserting claim in

federal court must first pursue compensation for that taking in state court “as

merely a prudential requirement,” citing Suitum).

28

(1997). In this case, because the state court has not yet finally resolved the

question of just compensation for the easement, Willis’ claims challenging that

state condemnation proceeding are still not ripe for adjudication. 

Even so, Williamson County will not preclude the application of relevant

preclusion principles.21 See Wilkinson, 142 F.3d at 1323-24 (holding complying

with Williamson County’s ripeness requirement will not negate application of

preclusion principles). And here, because the state court has finally concluded

both that PSO has established a public use warranting its condemnation of an

easement across Willis’ property and that PSO’s and BNSF’s use of that easement

Appellate Case: 06-5015 Document: 01012490666 Date Filed: 07/16/2008 Page: 28 
22Courts applying Williamson have recognized the anomalous result that,

once the state court proceeding is finally resolved, the litigant may not be able to

challenge the result entered in that state proceeding in federal court because of

preclusion principles. See San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. at 341-46 (rejecting

argument that “federal courts simply should not apply ordinary preclusion rules to

state-court judgments when a case is forced into state court by the ripeness rule of

Williamson County”); see also Wilkinson, 142 F.3d at 1323-25 (concluding,

pre-San Remo Hotel, that “the Williamson ripeness requirement is insufficient to

preclude application of res judicata and collateral estoppel principles,” citing

cases). The Supreme Court has rejected the argument “that plaintiffs have a right

to vindicate their federal claims in a federal forum.” San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S.

at 342. 

[T]o the contrary, . . . issues actually decided in valid state-court

judgments may well deprive plaintiffs of the “right” to have their

federal claims relitigated in federal court. This is so even when the

plaintiff would have preferred not to litigate in state court, but was

required to do so by statute or prudential rules. The relevant question

in such cases is not whether the plaintiff has been afforded access to a

federal forum; rather, the question is whether the state court actually

decided an issue of fact or law that was necessary to its judgment. 

Id. (citations omitted). 

2328 U.S.C. § 1738 provides, in pertinent part: 

The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such

State, Territory or Possession, or copies thereof, shall be proved or

admitted in other courts within the United States and its Territories and

Possessions by the attestation of the clerk and seal of the court annexed,

(continued...)

29

during the state condemnation proceedings was lawful, those final determinations

preclude Willis from pursuing all but two of the claims it asserts in this federal

action.22 

“Under 28 U.S.C. § 1738, the preclusive effect of a state judgment is

governed by the rules of preclusion of that state.”23 Valley View Angus Ranch,

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23(...continued)

if a seal exists, together with a certificate of a judge of the court that

the said attestation is in proper form.

Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so

authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every court

within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have

by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from

which they are taken. 

24Under Oklahoma law, 

[p]reclusion doctrine consists of two precepts. Claim preclusion,

formerly known at common law as res judicata, teaches that a final

judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties from

re-litigating not only the adjudicated claim, but also any theories or

issues that were actually decided, or could have been decided, in that

action. The other preclusion doctrine, formerly known at common law

as collateral estoppel, is issue preclusion. Under this doctrine, once a

court decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, the same

parties or their privies may not relitigate that issue in a suit brought

upon a different claim. Issue preclusion prevents relitigation of facts

and issues actually litigated and necessarily determined in an earlier

proceeding between the same parties or their privies.

State ex rel. Dep’t of Transp. v. Little, 100 P.3d 707, 719 n.47 (Okla. 2004)

(citations omitted). 

30

Inc. v. Duke Energy Field Servs., Inc., 497 F.3d 1096, 1100 (10th Cir. 2007)

(footnote omitted); see also Wilkinson, 142 F.3d at 1322. “As a general rule”

under Oklahoma law, “the doctrine of preclusion operates to enjoin successive

attempts to relitigate the same issue in different forums.”24 State ex rel. Dep’t of

Transp. v. Little, 100 P.3d 707, 719 (Okla. 2004). Further, Oklahoma law

recognizes the “well established rule that where two actions involving the same

issues, between the same parties, are pending at the same time in different courts,

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25There is no question that the issues of whether PSO established a public

need for the easement across Willis’ property and whether PSO and BNSF were

unlawfully possessing that easement, while the state condemnation proceedings

remained pending, have now been finally determined in the state condemnation

(continued...)

31

a final judgment in one will be res judicata, or a bar in the other.” Hixson v.

Cook, 379 P.2d 677, 684 (Okla. 1962). Oklahoma law specifically affords

preclusive effect to condemnation proceedings. See Okla. City v. Cooper, 420

P.2d 508, 511-12 (Okla. 1966); see also Elliott v. City of Guthrie, 725 P.2d 861,

862-63 & 863 n.7 (Okla. 1986); Graham v. City of Duncan, 354 P.2d 458, 464

(Okla. 1960); Fischer v. Okla. City, 174 P.2d 244, 246-47 (Okla. 1946). 

Although “[t]he issue (collateral estoppel) and claim (res judicata)

preclusion doctrines are often used interchangeably because they are closely

related and both promote the same general public policy concerns,” Tibbetts v.

Sight ‘n Sound Appliance Ctrs., Inc., 77 P.3d 1042, 1060 n.31 (Okla. 2003)

(Opala, C.J., dissenting in part), in this case issue preclusion is the most relevant

preclusion doctrine. “In accordance with the doctrine of issue preclusion

(previously known as collateral estoppel), once a court has decided an issue of

fact or law necessary to its judgment, the same parties or their privies may not

relitigate that issue in a suit brought upon a different claim.” McCrady, 176 P.3d

at 1199 (footnote omitted). To invoke issue preclusion, “there need not be a prior

adjudication on the merits (as is often the case with res judicata) but only a final

determination of a material issue common to both cases.”25 Id. Further, the

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25(...continued)

action. “A final judgment is one in which no appeal has been perfected within the

time allotted by law or one in which an appeal has been properly perfected and

acted upon by the highest court whose review has been sought.” Nealis v. Baird,

996 P.2d 438, 459 (Okla. 1999). While the entire eminent domain proceeding is

not yet final, because the state courts are still considering the amount of

compensation to which Willis is entitled for the easement, see Willis, 155 P.3d at

849 n.7 (noting “that Oklahoma’s eminent domain procedures are not ‘complete’

until (1) the condemnor’s right to take is finally resolved and (2) the amount of

the condemnation award is determined”), that fact is of no moment because the

claims that Willis asserts in this federal action do not implicate the adequacy of

the compensation award. See 18 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller &

Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 4434 (2d ed. 2002) (noting

“[r]ecent decisions have relaxed traditional views of the finality requirement by

applying issue preclusion to matters resolved by preliminary rulings or to

determinations of liability that have not yet been completed by an award of

damages or other relief,” particularly when the issue has been resolved “by appeal

prior to final judgment”); cf. Cities Serv. Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 980 P.2d 116,

127 (Okla. 1999) (applying federal preclusive principles). 

26Willis specifically alleged the following: 1) “From March 16, 1995 until it

(continued...)

32

doctrine of issue preclusion “may not be invoked if the party against whom the

earlier decision is interposed did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate

the critical issue in the previous case.” Id. (quotation omitted).

B. Applying these legal principles to Willis’ claims asserted in this

federal action

1. Willis’ state law claims alleging that PSO and BNSF

wrongfully possessed and used the easement across Willis’

property during the state condemnation proceeding

Willis asserts state law claims against both PSO and BNSF premised on

Willis’ belief that PSO and BNSF wrongfully possessed and used the easement

across Willis’ property during the state condemnation proceedings.26 The state

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26(...continued)

abandoned possession of Willis’ property, BNSF was in wrongful possession of

Willis’ property.” 2) BNSF was unjustly enriched “[b]y virtue of [its] wrongful

possession and use of Willis’ property.” 3) After the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s

decision remanding the state condemnation proceeding to the state trial court, see

941 P.2d at 995, “Willis made a written demand that BNSF cease its wrongful

possession and use of Willis’ property.” BNSF rejected that demand and yet

continued to run trains across Willis’ property. Thus, “justice and equity require

that a [quasi-]contractual obligation be imposed on BNSF to compensate Willis

for the use of Willis’ property at the rate Willis was prepared to negotiate with”

BNSF. 4) BNSF was liable to Willis for punitive damages because BNSF’s

actions “in wrongfully possessing and using Willis’ property were done

deliberately, wantonly, intentionally and maliciously with full knowledge that

there was no easement or right of way across Willis’ property.” 5) PSO, acting in

concert with BNSF, trespassed on Willis’ property by possessing and using the

easement across Willis’ property. 6) PSO and BNSF are liable to Willis for

treble damages resulting from PSO’s trespass onto Willis’ property because PSO

and BNSF were able to gain possession of the easement across Willis’ property

“by means of a state eminent domain proceeding rife with fraud, bad faith and

oppressive conduct.” 7) Because PSO’s and BNSF’s possession of the easement

across Willis’ property was “void,” title to the easement should be quieted in

Willis. 8) Because PSO’s and BNSF’s possession and use of the easement across

Willis’ property was wrongful, they should be ejected and possession restored to

Willis. 

33

courts’ final determination that PSO established a public use sufficient to warrant

its condemning an easement across Willis’ property and the Oklahoma courts’

determination that PSO and BNSF did not wrongfully possess the easement

during the state condemnation proceedings now preclude these claims.

PSO, of course, is the same party that initiated the state condemnation

action. And BNSF is in privity with PSO. “Privity is usually defined as mutual

or successive relationships to the same rights of property.” Sautbine v. Keller,

423 P.2d 447, 457 (Okla. 1966) (quotation omitted). However, “[t]here are no

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34

hard and fast rules; the existence of privity depends upon the circumstances and

requires a person so identified in interest with another that he represents the same

legal right.” Wilson v. City of Tulsa, 91 P.3d 673, 677 (Okla. Civ. App. 2004)

(quotation omitted); see also Hildebrand v. Gray, 866 P.2d 447, 450-51 (Okla.

Civ. App. 1993). In this case, BNSF’s use of the easement running across Willis’

property, and BNSF’s right to use that easement, both stem from its contract with

PSO. And PSO’s right to access the easement across Willis’ property stems from

its ability to condemn and use that easement. Under these circumstances, then,

BNSF and PSO are in privity. Cf. State ex rel. Trimble v. Kindrick, 852 P.2d

758, 760-61 (Okla. Civ. App. 1992) (concluding corporate entity which received

the deed to a hospital sold to a second corporate entity stood in privity with the

second corporate entity in actions challenging sale of hospital). 

The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals determined, in the state

condemnation proceeding, that PSO was entitled to take possession of the

easement across Willis’ property after PSO paid the amount of compensation the

three-member commission awarded Willis, after the state trial court entered its

initial decision in that case. See Willis, 155 P.3d at 848-50. In reaching this

conclusion, the state appellate court specifically rejected Willis’ contention that

PSO was a trespasser at the time PSO built the railroad track across Willis’

property and began operating trains across it. See id. 

The state condemnation proceedings, therefore, resolved the issue at the

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35

heart of all of the state law claims that Willis asserts in this federal action, save

one. As part of the trespass claim Willis asserted against PSO, Willis alleged

that, although “PSO sought only to condemn a surface easement and explicitly

disclaimed any interest in the subsurface minerals,” PSO nevertheless “sever[ed]

and remove[d] coal and limestone from below the surface of the property.” See

generally Kirby-Smith Mach., Inc. v. City of Okla. City, 19 P.3d 331, 333 (Okla.

Civ. App. 2000) (noting “[e]asements are limited to the particular purpose for

which they are created”) (quotation omitted). The state eminent domain

proceedings, so far as we can tell, did not specifically address that issue. 

The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals’ decision is now final, after both the

Oklahoma Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court denied Willis’

petition for a writ of certiorari, see Willis v. Pub. Serv. Co., 128 S. Ct. 66 (2007). 

Lastly, Willis does not specifically assert, in its supplemental brief, that it

did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of whether PSO, and

BNSF through its contractual relationship with PSO, wrongfully possessed and

used the easement across Willis’ property during the state condemnation

proceedings. For these reasons, then, the state condemnation proceedings

preclude Willis from further pursuing his state law claims premised on allegations

that PSO and BNSF wrongfully possessed the easement across Willis’ property. 

The state condemnation proceedings do not, however, preclude Willis from

pursuing its trespass claim to the extent that it alleges that PSO wrongfully

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36

removed limestone and coal from underneath PSO’s surface easement across

Willis’ property. 

2. Willis’ ICCTA claim

Willis asserts a claim seeking a declaratory judgment, see 28 U.S.C.

§ 2201, that the ICCTA preempts Oklahoma’s eminent domain statutes, as applied

to PSO’s condemnation of an easement across Willis’ property, because in

obtaining this easement, PSO is attempting to regulate interstate rail

transportation. Willis asserted this claim against all three defendants, PSO, BNSF

and Union Pacific. The final determinations made by the Oklahoma courts in the

state condemnation proceeding preclude Willis from further pursuing this claim. 

PSO is the same party that initiated the state condemnation proceeding. 

And, as discussed above, BNSF is in privity with PSO under the circumstances of

this case. Union Pacific owned the already existing track adjacent to PSO’s

power plant but is not otherwise involved in PSO’s condemnation action. Willis,

nevertheless, named Union Pacific as an “interested party” to its declaratory

judgment claim based upon the ICCTA. Willis apparently did so because the

Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a), provides, in pertinent part, that

“[i]n a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, . . . any court of the

United States . . . may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested

party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be

sought.” (Emphasis added.) Willis believed that the Declaratory Judgment Act

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37

required Willis to name all parties “interested” in its claim and further believed

that Union Pacific was an interested party because PSO’s new track across Willis’

property had diverted business from Union Pacific. Under these circumstances,

we will deem Union Pacific to be in privity with PSO for purposes of this claim.

In the state condemnation action, Willis argued that the state trial court

“was without jurisdiction to enter its November 2004 Order because federal

regulation of railroads preempts any assertion of State authority over the rail spur

constructed by PSO.” Willis, 155 P.3d at 850. The Oklahoma Court of Civil

Appeals determined that Willis’ earlier federal action before the STB precluded

Willis from relitigating this issue. See id. In reaching this conclusion, the

Oklahoma appellate court noted that the STB, in the earlier federal administrative

proceedings, had determined that it did not have jurisdiction over PSO and its rail

line running across Willis’ property because PSO was not a rail carrier and

because PSO’s rail spur was a private track. See id. In light of that earlier

administrative determination, the Oklahoma appellate court held that, “[a]bsent

federal jurisdiction over PSO in its construction and operation of this rail spur,

there is no basis for federal preemption of the proceedings in the [state] Trial

Court.” Id. at 851. 

The state appellate court’s determination is final. And Willis does not

specifically assert, in its appellate brief, that it did not have a full and fair

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27Willis does assert, in its supplemental brief, that it did not have a full and

fair opportunity to litigate this issue in the STB proceeding. That is an issue that

Willis could have argued to the Oklahoma appellate court. But Willis does not

assert that it lacked a full and fair opportunity to litigate the preclusive effect to

be given those STB proceedings before the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals.

38

opportunity to litigate this issue before the Oklahoma appellate court.

27

Therefore, the state appellate court’s determination precludes Willis’ ICCTA

preemption claim asserted here.

3. Willis’ state and federal law claims challenging the

conduct of the state condemnation proceedings

Willis asserts several claims against PSO and BNSF challenging the general

manner in which the Oklahoma courts conducted the state condemnation

proceedings. 

a. Willis’ due process/equal protection claim against

BNSF

Willis alleged, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that BNSF deprived Willis of both

due process and equal protection because, no later than the Oklahoma Supreme

Court’s decision in Willis, 941 P.2d 995, “BNSF was aware that its possession

and use of Willis’ property was wrongful and in violation of Willis’ constitutional

rights.” In addition, Willis alleged that BNSF is liable for punitive damages

because BNSF violated Willis’ due process and equal protection rights

“deliberately, wantonly, intentionally and maliciously.” 

As previously discussed, BNSF is in privity with PSO, and PSO was a party

to the state condemnation action. In that condemnation action, the Oklahoma

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39

Court of Civil Appeals finally determined that PSO, and thus BNSF through its

contractual relationship with PSO, was entitled to possess the easement after PSO

paid the determined amount of compensation to the court clerk on Willis’ behalf. 

See Willis, 155 P.3d at 848-50. Willis does not specifically assert, in its

supplemental brief, that it did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate this

issue. Thus, the Oklahoma courts’ determination precludes Willis’ due

process/equal protection claim against BNSF.

b. Willis’ due process/equal protection claim against

PSO

Willis alleges, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that PSO, acting under color of

state law, seized the easement across Willis’ property in violation of Willis’

federal due process and equal protection rights. Specifically, Willis asserted that

PSO accomplished this seizure “by knowingly and deliberately prevailing on the

state district court to [exercise] its jurisdiction corruptly and issue an order that

contradicted what the state district court admitted it knew the law to be and

permit PSO to seize Willis’ property without giving Willis the process due in

violation of Willis’ rights under the Oklahoma Constitution.” Further, Willis

contends that PSO is liable for punitive damages because PSO violated Willis’

due process and equal protection rights “deliberately, wantonly, intentionally and

maliciously.” 

Willis’ due process and equal protection claims are difficult to pin down. 

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28“In order to state a [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must ‘allege the

violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and

must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under

color of state law.’” Bruner v. Baker, 506 F.3d 1021, 1025-26 (10th Cir. 2007)

(continued...)

40

In its opening brief, Willis asserted that “neither PSO nor BNSF had any right to

be on or had any rights in Willis’ property until” the state trial court’s November

15, 2004, order, following the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s remand. “Until that

date, they were trespassing on the property as state actors under color of state law

in violation of both Willis’ state law property rights under the Oklahoma

Constitution and Willis’ federally protected rights to due process and equal

protection of the law.” To the extent that this is the basis for Willis’ due process

and equal protection claims, the state courts finally resolved those issues against

Willis when the state court held that PSO and BNSF did not wrongfully possess

and use the easement during the state condemnation proceedings.

In its supplemental brief, however, Willis also asserts that its due process

and equal protection claims asserted against PSO are based instead upon the state

trial court initially depriving Willis of discovery and a hearing, the reasons for

which the Oklahoma Supreme Court remanded the state condemnation action to

the state trial court. In addition, in what appears to be an effort to allege that

PSO acted under color of state law, as is required for liability under § 1983,

Willis further alleged that PSO acted in concert with the state trial judge to

deprive Willis of due process and equal protection.28 The state condemnation

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28(...continued)

(quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)). At different times, Willis

appears to have asserted, in a contradictory manner, that PSO was acting under

color of state law simply by exercising the eminent domain authority Oklahoma

law gave PSO and, alternatively, that PSO was acting under color of state law

instead by acting in concert with the state trial judge to deprive Willis of due

process and equal protection of the law, relying upon Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S.

24, 27-29 (1980) (holding private parties might act under color of state law if they

act in concert with state actor). We need not decide here whether PSO was, in

fact, acting under color of state law. 

41

proceedings, as far as we can tell, did not specifically address and resolve such a

claim. To the extent that this is the basis for Willis’ due process and equal

protection claim, the already resolved state court matters do not preclude it. The

same is true for Willis’ claim for punitive damages stemming from these alleged

constitutional violations. Nevertheless, because those claims stem from the

ongoing state condemnation proceedings, they are not yet ripe for adjudication. 

We, therefore, affirm the district court’s decision to dismiss these due

process/equal protection claims without prejudice. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, final determinations that Oklahoma courts have

made in the state condemnation proceedings preclude Willis from pursuing all of

the state and federal claims Willis asserts in this action, with only two limited

exceptions. Final determinations made in the state proceedings do not preclude

1) Willis’ state law trespass claim to the extent it alleges that PSO wrongfully

removed coal and limestone from beneath the surface easement; and 2) Willis’

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42

due process/equal protection claim asserted against PSO, to the extent that claim

is based upon allegations other than that PSO wrongfully possessed and used the

easement across Willis’ property during the state condemnation proceedings. 

These two viable claims are, nevertheless, not yet ripe for adjudication. We,

therefore, AFFIRM the district court’s decision to dismiss them and REMAND

for the district court to dismiss these two claims without prejudice. 

The rest of Willis’ claims are precluded. We, therefore, AFFIRM the

district court’s decision to dismiss those claims, but REMAND for the district

court to dismiss those claims with prejudice. See MACTEC, Inc. v. Gorelick, 427

F.3d 821, 827, 830-33 (10th Cir. 2005) (affirming dismissal of precluded claim

with prejudice). 

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