Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02115/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02115-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joseph A. Havens
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

FILED 

United Scares Court of Appea.Js 

Tenrh Circuit 

t.UG • 6 1990 

AOBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

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No. 89-2115 

JOSEPH A. HAVENS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. 88-399-JP) 

Teresa E. Storch, Assistant Federal Defender, Albuquerque, New 

Mexico, for Defendant-Appellant. 

David N. Williams, Assistant u.s. Attorney (William L. Lutz, 

United States Attorney for the District of New Mexico, with him on 

the brief), Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before McKAY, BARRETT, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

McKAY, Circuit Judge. 

This is an appeal from the sentence imposed on Joseph A. 

Havens after entering a plea of guilty to the charge of attempting 

to manufacture methamphetamine. Mr. Havens claims the district 

court erred in its judgment and sentencing decisions pursuant to 

the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. He argues that a due process 

Appellate Case: 89-2115 Document: 01019371220 Date Filed: 08/06/1990 Page: 1 
violation occurred as a result of calculating the methamphetamine 

producible with the precursor chemicals in his possession when a 

critical chemical was not present. He also argues that the court 

erred in finding that the role he played in the offense was more 

than a minimal or minor role. Finally, Mr. Havens argues that the 

court erred in refusing to make a downward departure from the 

~ applicable sentencing range. 

We review sentences imposed under the Sentencing Guidelines 

according to the standard provided by the Sentencing Reform Act of 

1984 and codified at 18 u.s.c. § 3742 (1988). Section 3742(e) 

directs us to determine whether the sentence "(1) was imposed in 

violation of law; (2) was imposed as a result of an incorrect 

application of the sentencing guidelines; (3) is outside the 

applicable guideline range ... ; or (4) was imposed for an 

offense for which there is no applicable sentencing guideline and 

is plainly unreasonable." 18 u.s.c. § 3742(e) (1988). Although 

we give "'due deference to the district court's application of the 

guidelines to the facts,' 18 u.s.c. § 3742(e), we review the 

application of the guidelines fully for errors of law." United 

States v. Smith, 888 F.2d 720, 723 (lOth Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 

___ U.S. ___ , 110 s. Ct. 1786 (1990) (citations omitted). The 

factual determinations made by the district court are reviewed 

under the clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Rutter, 

897 F.2d 1558, 1563 (lOth Cir. 1990); United States v. Beaulieu, 

893 F.2d 1177, 1181-82 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, ___ u.s. ___ , 

110 S. Ct. 3320 (1990). 

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Appellate Case: 89-2115 Document: 01019371220 Date Filed: 08/06/1990 Page: 2 
I. ATTEMPT TO MANUFACTURE METHAMPHETAMINE 

Mr. Havens entered a plea of guilty to the unlawful, knowing 

and intentional attempt to manufacture methamphetamine in violation of 21 u.s.c. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (1988), and 18 U.S.C § 2 

(1988). This appeal concerns only the sentence for those 

offenses. The base offense level for sentencing in attempt cases 

is the same as the offense level for the completed attempt. "If a 

defendant is convicted of a conspiracy or an attempt to commit any 

offense involving a controlled substance, the offense level shall 

be the same as if the object of the conspiracy or attempt had been 

completed." United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines 

Manual, §2D1.4(a) (Nov. 1989) (hereinafter U.S.S.G.). Except for 

one ingredient known as the "reducing agent" and a heating source, 

all of the chemical ingredients needed for manufacturing methamphetamine were seized from Mr. Havens' storage locker. Nevertheless, defendant could only be charged with attempt to manufacture 

methamphetamine because only small amounts of the completed drug 

were found with the large amounts of precursor chemicals. In 

cases where the amount of drugs seized does not reflect the scale 

of the offense, the commentary to the Guidelines requires the 

trial judge to approximate the quantity of the controlled substance. "Where there is no drug seizure or the amount seized does 

not reflect the scale of the offense, the sentencing judge shall 

approximate the quantity of the controlled substance." u.s.s.G. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2115 Document: 01019371220 Date Filed: 08/06/1990 Page: 3 
§2D1.4(a), comment. (n.2). 

At the sentencing hearing Mr. Havens challenged the drug 

quantity computation contained in the pre-sentence report. 

Mr. Havens argued that the computation was speculative because not 

all the elements necessary to manufacture methamphetamine were 

possessed. The government and the defendant presented testimony 

regarding the drug quantity computation. The government presented 

two expert witnesses who were chemists. The chemist who prepared 

the pre-sentence report estimated that 300 grams of pure methamphetamine could be produced from the chemicals confiscated from 

defendant's locker if the final ingredient were added. The other 

chemist testified that 689 grams of methamphetamine could be produced. Defendant's expert testified that it was not possible to 

manufacture methamphetamine from the seized chemicals because the 

heat source and reducing agent were absent. The witnesses 

explained to the court the difference between the theoretical and 

actual yield, as well as the effect that that type of reducing 

agent has on the yield. After hearing this testimony, the district court found that the amount of methamphetamine which could 

have been produced by adding heat and an appropriate amount of 

reducing agent was in the range of 300 to 689 grams. 

Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a base offense level of 28 

is attained when at least 400 grams but less than 700 grams of 

methamphetamine are involved. u.s.s.G. §2Dl.l(c)(8). When at 

least 100 grams but less than 400 grams of methamphetamine are 

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Appellate Case: 89-2115 Document: 01019371220 Date Filed: 08/06/1990 Page: 4 
involved, the base offense level is 26. U.S.S.G. §2Dl.l(c)(9). 

In determining the base offense level for Mr. Havens the district 

court used the lower estimated quantity of more than 100 but less 

than 400 grams. We do not find that determination by the district 

court to be clearly erroneous. It is fully supported by expert 

testimony. The quarrel here is not with that fact-finding, but 

with whether the court may legally find the ultimate amount which 

could be produced when additional component drugs and equipment 

are necessary to produce the final product. This is an issue of 

law where the conviction for attempt involves less than all of the 

component parts. We hold that the trial court, upon proper testimony, may estimate the ultimate quantity of produceable drugs. 

This estimate should be equal to the amount of drugs produceable 

if the precursor chemicals possessed by the defendant were 

combined with proportionate amounts of the missing ingredients 

including processing equipment. Thus, we hold that the trial 

court's proper factual determination of the amount of drugs 

involved in this case was not clearly erroneous. 

We wish to emphasize the weakness of defendant's position in 

this case. Defendant pleaded guilty to attempt to manufacture 

methamphetamine. Defendant then argued that he should be sentenced for only the trace amounts of finished drugs found with his 

precursor chemicals. Defendant's position on the amount of drugs 

is inconsistent with his guilty plea to attempt to manufacture. 

Defendant had not "attempted" to produce the completed drugs actually found. Had defendant pleaded guilty to actual manufacture, 

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Appellate Case: 89-2115 Document: 01019371220 Date Filed: 08/06/1990 Page: 5 
his position would have more validity. However, once the determination of guilty of attempt is made from good evidence--here a 

guilty plea--the court is required to estimate the amount of drugs 

that could be manufactured. 1 

Mr. Havens also argued that section 2Dl.4(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines was unconstitutional because there was no way to 

determine with exactitude the yield of the completed manufacture. 

Under the guidelines, the sentencing judge is required to 

"approximate the quantity of the controlled substance." u.s.s.G. 

§2D1.4(a), comment. (n.2). It is not a denial of due process to 

determine facts based on estimates derived from expert testimony. 

We note that under this holding two defendants found with identical amounts of precursor chemicals could be found guilty of 

attempted manufacture of widely differing quantities of drugs. 

The trial judge's factual determination in this area could be 

influenced by the availability or cost of missing components, the 

quality of the "cooker" assigned to mix the chemicals, and many 

other factors. ·The factual question is what each specific defendant could have actually produced, not the theoretical maximum 

amount produceable from the chemicals involved. In this case, 

sufficient testimony was presented at the sentencing hearing to 

1 Trial courts must be presented with substantial evidence of 

guilt in order to find a defendant guilty of attempted manufacture, particularly when all of the components necessary for the 

manufacture of drugs are not present. Defendant's guilty plea 

removes that issue from this case. Here we address only the sentencing for attempted manufacture after the issue of guilt has 

been properly settled. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2115 Document: 01019371220 Date Filed: 08/06/1990 Page: 6 
provide the district court with a proper range of estimates. We 

hold that no denial of due process was made by the district 

court's approximation of drugs that could be manufactured when the 

estimate was based on record-supported expert testimony. 

II. ROLE IN THE OFFENSE 

Mr. Havens argued that a reduction in the offense level 

should have been made under section 3B1.2 of the Guidelines to 

reflect his minor role in the offense. That section provides a 

decrease in the offense level when the defendant has a minimal 

role or is a minor participant in any criminal activity. 2 The 

minor or minimal role which Mr. Havens claimed he held was primarily based on the fact that another individual was responsible for 

negotiating the purchase of the chemicals. Mr. Havens argued his 

role was to store the chemicals which he claimed would be turned 

over to a third individual. Because he was not an aider and 

abettor, Mr. Havens also argued that he was entitled to a 

2 Section 3B1.2 states: 

Based on the defendant's role in the offense, decrease 

the offense level as follows: 

(a) 

(b) 

If the defendant was a minimal participant in any 

criminal activity, decrease by 4 levels. 

If the defendant was a minor participant in any 

criminal activity, decrease by 2 levels. 

In cases falling between (a) and (b), decrease by 3 

levels. 

u.s.s.G. S3B1.2. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2115 Document: 01019371220 Date Filed: 08/06/1990 Page: 7 
reduction in this case. 

The Guidelines' commentary informs us that "a defendant who 

plays a minimal role in concerted activity ... [is] among the 

least culpable of those involved in the conduct of the group." 

U.S.S.G. §3B1.2, comment. (n.l). A minor participant involves 

"any participant who is less culpable than most other participants 

.... " Id. at comment. (n.3). The determination to apply this 

section "involves a determination that is heavily dependent upon 

the facts of the particular case." u.s.s.G. §3B1.2, comment. 

(backg'd.). We review the district court's factual determination 

that defendant had more than a minor role under a clearly erroneous standard. 

We have held that "the quantum of proof required for factual 

determinations under the Sentencing Guidelines is a preponderance 

of the evidence and the burden of proof_generally is allocated to 

the government for sentence increases and to the defendant for 

sentence decreases." United States v. Rutter, 897 F.2d 1558, 1560 

(lOth Cir. 1990). The district court found that Havens "played 

neither an aggravating role, as defined under Section 3(b)l.l of 

the guidelines, nor a mitigating role, as defined under Section 

3(b)1.2." Record, val. 2, at 77-78. Based on our review of the 

record, we cannot find that the defendant has proven that the 

trial court's determination was clearly erroneous. 

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III. DOWNWARD DEPARTURE 

Mr. Havens argued that he should be granted a downward departure from his base offense level because he was incapable of producing methamphetamine himself and therefore acted as a remote 

aider and abettor. The decision to depart from the guidelines is 

within the sound discretion of the sentencing court. In United 

States v. Davis, 900 F.2d 1524, 1529-30 (lOth Cir. 1990), we 

stated that 

we do not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal over the 

trial court's discretionary refusal to depart downward 

from the guidelines. In short, when a sentence is 

within the guideline range and is not imposed in violation of law, or as a result of an incorrect application 

of the guidelines, then the district court's refusal to 

exercise its discretion to depart downward from the 

guideline range is not appealable. 

(footnotes omitted). Mr. Havens' argument that the district court 

abused its discretion does not assert a violation of the law or an 

incorrect application of the guidelines. Thus, we do not have 

jurisdiction to review the trial court's refusal to depart downward from the guidelines. 

AFFIRMED. 

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