Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-07061/USCOURTS-ca10-89-07061-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Billy Joe Pinter
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OP APPEALS 

POR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

FIL L JJ 

United Stau. Co1. rt of Appeal• 

'fenth Circuit 

JAN 2 0 1993 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk . 

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NO. 89-7061 

BILLY JOE PINTER, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OP OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. 89-16-CR) 

Kathleen A. Felton, Department of Justice, Criminal Divisi on, 

Appellate Section (John Raley, United States Attorney, Paul G. Hess, Assistant United States Attorney, with her on the brief), 

Washington, D.C., for Plaintiff-Appellee . 

Susan M. Otto, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Stephen J . 

Greubel, Assistant Federal Public Defender, on the brief), Tulsa, 

Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before SEYMOUR, MOORE, Circuit Judges, and THEIS, District Judge.* 

THEIS, District Judge. 

*The Honorable Frank G. Theis, District Judge, United States 

District Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

This is an appeal from the United States District Court for 

the Eastern District of Oklahoma, the Honorable Frank H. Seay 

presiding. The issue presented for appeal is whether the district 

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Appellate Case: 89-7061 Document: 010110157302 Date Filed: 09/04/1990 Page: 1 
court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence 

found in an open field. We find no error and therefore affirm. 

In February 1989, Defendant/ Appellant Billy Joe Pinter and 

three codefendants were charged in an eleven count indictment with 

violations of various drug statutes. Pinter was charged in six 

counts with conspiracy, manufacturing methamphetamine, possession 

of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, possession of 

methamphetamine oil with intent to manufacture methamphetamine, 

manufacturing phenylacetone, and maintaining and/or making 

available for use a place and enclosure for the purpose of 

manufacturing methamphetamine/amphetamine. R. Vol. I, Tab 1. 

Pinter was found guilty by a jury of all six counts against him was 

sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. R. Vol. I, Tab 30. This court 

recently recalled its mandate and reinstated Pinter's direct 

appeal. See United States v. Pinter, 971 F. 2d 554 ( 10th Cir. 

1992) . 

Before trial, Pinter filed a motion to suppress. R. Vol. I, 

Tab. 20. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court 

ruled that the seizure of all items taken at the drug lab site was 

proper under the open fields and plain view doctrines. The court 

did suppress all statements Pinter made before he was advised of 

his rights. R. Vol. I, Tab. 25. 

Special Agent Dorsey Shannon of the Drug Enforcement 

Administration (DEA) testified at the suppression hearing. During 

the summer of 1987, Pinter and his colleagues were under 

investigation by the DEA based on information received from a 

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Appellate Case: 89-7061 Document: 010110157302 Date Filed: 09/04/1990 Page: 2 
confidential informant. R. Vol. II at 33-35. On July 13, 1987, 

three agents from the DEA and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and 

Firearms observed Pinter purchase two 55 gallon drums of chemicals 

at a chemical company in Oklahoma City. Those agents followed 

Pinter to an area southwest of Beggs, Oklahoma. The agents 

observed Pinter unload the drums in a field. Pinter left the area 

and was not followed. Agent Shannon subsequently arrived at the 

scene. Shannon and DEA Agent Rande Matteson set off to find Pinter 

and interview him. R. Vol. II at 9-11. 

Agents Shannon and Matteson were driving to Pinter's house 

northeast of Beggs when they observed Pinter driving through Beggs 

and heading in the general direction of the field where the 

chemicals had been left. The agents decided to follow him. Pinter 

drove west from Beggs and turned south onto a gravel road. The 

agents eventually lost sight of Pinter but were able to follow the 

dust from Pinter's truck for a while. The agents then followed a 

set of tire tracks that they thought were left by Pinter's truck. 

The tire tracks entered an oil lease. The agents turned into the 

oil lease, continuing to follow the tire tracks they suspected were 

from Pinter's vehicle. The agents ended up on foot when the road 

became too rough for their vehicle. R. Vol. II at 11-13. 

Eventually the agents walked to a point where they observed a 

water tank mounted on a trailer approximately 100 yards away. The 

agents saw another vehicle at the site, but did not see Pinter's 

pickup. The agents proceeded toward the site for the purpose of 

asking anyone who may have been there whether they had seen Pinter. 

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Appellate Case: 89-7061 Document: 010110157302 Date Filed: 09/04/1990 Page: 3 
As they approached the site and at a distance of 75-80 yards away, 

they smelled the odor of ether (commonly associated with the 

manufacture of drugs) and observed an individual near the water 

tank. The agents walked closer, and when they thought they had 

been seen, announced themselves as federal agents. The individual 

at the site was Pinter. The agents then arrested him. R. Vol. II 

at 13-15. 

At the site, the agents saw other vehicles, including a second 

trailer, Pinter's truck, and a car. The agents also observed a 

quantity of laboratory equipment on the ground. A search of the 

two trailers, pursuant to a written consent to search executed by 

Pinter, revealed laboratory equipment, scales and plastic bags, and 

a powder later determined to be a controlled substance. R. Vol. II 

at 15-26. 

On appeal, Pinter argues that the federal agents' warrantless 

search and seizure conducted on a private oil lease was in 

violation of his fourth amendment rights and that the district 

court erred in failing to sustain his motion to suppress. The 

standard of review of a district court's denial of a motion to 

suppress is well established. The district court's findings of 

fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard, with the 

evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the district court's 

findings. United States v. Preciado, 966 F.2d 596, 597 (10th Cir. 

1992) (quoting United States v. Benitez, 899 F.2d 995, 997 (10th 

Cir. 1990)). The question of whether a fourth amendment violation 

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Appellate Case: 89-7061 Document: 010110157302 Date Filed: 09/04/1990 Page: 4 
occurred is a question of law reviewed de novo. United States v . 

Corral, 970 F.2d 719, 723 (10th Cir. 1992). 

Pinter challenges both the factual findings and the legal 

conclusion of the district court. Pinter asserts that the 

following factual findings are clearly erroneous: 

Agent Shannon and another agent continued to follow Pinter in 

his vehicle down a remote , rural, dirt (oil lease) road, to a 

point where the agents stopped their vehicle and proceeded on 

foot. The agents then came to a place where, about 100 yards 

away, they could see a water tank and defendant Pinter's 

vehicle . At that point, Agent Shannon could smell odors of 

chemicals which in his experience associated with the 

operation of clandestine drug labs, principally, the smell of 

ether. 

Appellant's brief at 11, 13, 15 (quoting District Court's Order, R. 

Vol . I, Tab 25 at pp. 1-2). 

Pinter argues that the district court's factual findings are 

erroneous in several respects. Pinter's basic complaint is that 

the district court's factual findings do not match precisely the 

agent's testimony from the hearing. The alleged errors in the 

district court's findings are as follows: the agents did not in 

fact see Pinter's truck at first: they saw another vehicle from the 

100 yard distance; they saw Pinter's vehicle only after arriving at 

the site: and the agents smelled ether at a distance of 75-80 

yards, not at a distance of 100 yards. After examining the 

transcript of the hearing, it is evident that the district court 

merely summarized the testimony from the hearing, leaving out many 

of the minor details. The factual discrepancies are of no 

significance under the open fields doctrine and provide no basis 

for reversal of the district court's decision. 

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Pinter argues that the open fields doctrine should not be a 

license for the police to "indiscriminately frolic" through private 

fields in search of possible wrongdoing. Pinter argues that, at a 

minimum, the intruding officers should have some legitimate reason 

for being present prior to availing themselves of the open fields 

doctrine. 

The United States Supreme Court held in Hester v. United 

States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924) that the "open fields" doctrine permits 

police officers to enter and search a field without a warrant. In 

Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984), the Supreme Court 

reaffirmed the open fields doctrine, holding that the government's 

intrusion upon an open field "is not one of those 'unreasonable 

searches' proscribed by the text of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 

177. The Court reaffirmed that no expectation of privacy 

legitimately attaches to an open field. Id. at 180. Further, an 

open field "need be neither 'open' nor a 'field' as those terms are 

used in common speech." Id. at 180 n. 11. The fact that the 

officers trespass onto private property does not transform their 

actions into a "search" within the meaning of the fourth amendment. 

Id. at 183-84 & n. 15. 

The open fields doctrine does not require that law enforcement 

officials have some objective reason -- either probable cause or 

reasonable suspicion -- before entering an open field. The fact 

that the agents suspected Pinter of wrongdoing makes no difference 

to the analysis. The fact that the property was privately owned 

and the agents were trespassers makes no difference. The fact that 

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Appellate Case: 89-7061 Document: 010110157302 Date Filed: 09/04/1990 Page: 6 
the property may not have been "open" in the sense that the area 

was wooded and the laboratory location was not visible from a 

public place likewise is of no significance. 

Pinter asks this court to carve out an exception to the open 

fields doctrine, one which would require probable cause or 

reasonable suspicion before law enforcement officers could enter an 

open field. Prior precedent from the United States Supreme Court 

does not require law enforcement officers to have probable cause or 

reasonable suspicion prior to entering an open field. Our prior 

precedents do not impose such a requirement. We decline to impose 

such a limitation on the open fields doctrine. 

Pinter's prose motion to supplement the record is denied. 

AFFIRMED. 

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