Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_98-cr-00074/USCOURTS-almd-1_98-cr-00074-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alex Tyrone McNair
Defendant
United States of America
Plaintiff

Document Text:

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, SOUTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

)

v. ) CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 

) 1:98cr74-MHT

ALEX TYRONE McNAIR ) (WO)

OPINION

In 1998, defendant Alex Tyrone McNair was convicted

of the federal offense of distribution of cocaine base

and sentenced to 65 months in custody, followed by five

years of supervised release. After two revocations of

supervised release followed by in-custody sentences, one

in 2004 and the other in 2006, this criminal case is

again before the court, this time on a petition to

revoke McNair’s supervised release for committing a

“state crime” on December 24, 2007. Since that petition

was filed on January 3, 2008, this case has had a

lengthy and complicated procedural history. After

multiple hearings and continuances--primarily the result

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of questions about McNair’s competency and sanity, as

well as the inability of defense counsel to provide

crucial evidence related to McNair’s mental health--this

court held its “final” hearing on the revocation

petition on October 28, 2008.

For the reasons that follow, the court holds that

McNair should be found not guilty of the offense charged

in the revocation petition but that the conditions of

his supervised release should be modified in the manner

outlined in this opinion.

I. Factual Background

On December 23, 2007, Gabrielle White gave birth to

McNair’s child at a hospital in Birmingham, Alabama.

McNair had stayed with White in the hospital for several

days, sleeping in the room with her, and he remained

with her the night of the birth. The next day, McNair’s

behavior became extremely bizarre. He came into White’s

hospital room and began calling her names, including

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“Lucifer.” McNair told White that he could “see

through” her. McNair’s strange behavior continued, and

he eventually attacked White, pulling her hair, hitting

her in the face, and knocking her to the floor. White

testified that this behavior was completely out of

character for McNair and that nothing had precipitated

the outburst.

The officer responding to the scene testified that

McNair “seemed to be not mentally all there.” McNair

was calm and cooperative with officers, but he was not

able to articulate fully the answers to their questions.

He continued calling the victim “Lucifer,” and he spoke

erratically. McNair himself has no recollection of the

incident.

McNair has a long history of mental health

problems, including, but not limited to, auditory and

visual hallucinations, depression, amnesia, and posttraumatic stress disorder. McNair and his family

confirm that his behavior is far more normal when he is

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taking anti-psychotic medication, but McNair claims that

prior to the incident he had been off medication for two

years.

Several of McNair’s long-term symptoms worsened

after he was shot in 2003, and McNair’s family and White

separately confirmed episodes of strange behavior prior

to the incident that is the subject of this proceeding.

McNair’s sister reported that McNair would often refer

to himself as Jesus, saying that he was doing the Lord’s

work. White reported that McNair wanted to name their

child “Jacob” because a prophet had spoken to him. The

day before the incident, McNair and White had a

disagreement about the name of the child on the birth

certificate. The day of the attack, however, the two

had a pleasant interaction until McNair reentered the

room and became violent without warning.

The mental-health expert, Dr. Catherine Lee Boyer,

testified in detail and submitted a written report to

the court after examining McNair’s lengthy medical

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records and interviewing him in person on multiple

occasions. Dr. Boyer concluded that McNair “was clearly

experiencing an abnormal and psychotic mental state at

the time of the offense.” Boyer Report (Doc. 138), at

10. She explained that by McNair’s “bizarre logic,” it

would make sense to think of White as “evil” if she were

preventing the baby from having the name given by the

prophet. Id. at 11. Dr. Boyer thus concluded that

McNair would not have appreciated the wrongfulness of

his actions if he believed that he was attacking the

devil on behalf of God.

Dr. Boyer also concluded that McNair’s history of

substance abuse was not the cause of his extreme

symptoms, and, indeed, it was far more likely that

McNair had turned to drugs as a result of his mental

illness. Such a conclusion is far more consistent with

both the chronology and severity of McNair’s symptoms.

Dr. Boyer’s detailed testimony and report include a more

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complete record of the mental-health problems from which

McNair has suffered.

II. Procedural Background

McNair was arrested on December 24, 2007. He was

charged with Domestic Violence, Third Degree, which is

a Class A misdemeanor in Alabama. 1975 Ala. Code

§ 13A-6-132. McNair has been in federal custody for

over 11 months, serving a sentence imposed in a separate

matter. Now before the court is, essentially, the issue

of what effect, if any, the events of December 24 should

have on McNair’s status after his upcoming release from

custody in that other matter. This opinion addresses

that question.

III. Discussion

This court must first determine if McNair has

violated the conditions of his supervised release. The

petition alleges that McNair violated a mandatory

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condition of his supervised release by committing

“another federal, state, or local crime” on December 24,

2007. Because the circumstances surrounding McNair’s

arrest for Domestic Violence, Third Degree, raise

significant questions about his sanity at the time of

the offense, this court must address whether and how

McNair’s sanity is actually relevant to the

determination of whether he violated this condition of

his supervised release.

At the outset, it is important to provide some

background about the use of the insanity defense in

revocation proceedings. Several federal courts have

held that the insanity defense, as provided in 18 U.S.C.

§ 17, is not available in revocation proceedings dealing

with the violation of a condition of probation or

parole. See United States v. Brown, 899 F.2d 189 (2d

Cir. 1990) (refusing to allow insanity defense in

probation revocation); Steinberg v. Police Court of

Albany, 610 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1979) (applying similar

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reasoning in parole context). These courts have noted

that revocation proceedings typically consist of two

stages. See Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 611 (1985)

(noting that, because of due process requirements, “the

decision to revoke probation typically involves two

distinct components: (1) a retrospective factual

question whether the probationer has violated a

condition of probation; and (2) a discretionary

determination by the sentencing authority whether

violation of a condition warrants revocation of

probation”).

According to these courts, in the first of these

stages the court simply determines whether there has

been a technical violation of the conditions. At that

stage, “[w]hat is important is whether the [defendant]

violated his [conditions], not whether he did so

voluntarily.” Steinberg, 610 F.2d at 452. At the second

stage, the court determines the disposition of the case-

-whether to order revocation--given that there has been

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1. Statutory law on this question is ambiguous. The

insanity defense applies “to a prosecution under any

Federal Statute” if the defendant was insane “at the time

of the commission of the acts constituting the offense.”

18 U.S.C. § 17. Nothing in this statute explicitly makes

the defense available or unavailable in revocation

proceedings, although the question turns on the

interpretation of the words “prosecution” and “offense.”

Moreover, 18 U.S.C. § 4241, which governs competency

determinations, explicitly applies equally to trials and

postrelease proceedings. However, nothing in that

statute--which links revocation hearings and trials for

the purpose of competency determinations--explicitly

links these different proceedings for the purpose of the

insanity defense.

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a violation of conditions. It is only at this latter

stage, the argument goes, that questions of

voluntariness and culpability enter the calculus.1

Thus, while insanity is unavailable as a defense to a

violation, the underlying mental health issues and

degree of culpability are considered important for

determining a proper course of action. See, e.g.,

Brown, 899 F.2d at 194 (“Lack of volition, while not a

defense to revocation, is often a factor pertinent to

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2. Part of the rationale underlying these opinions

appears to be the belief that a violation of a condition,

whether voluntary or involuntary, would signify that

supervised release is not serving the purpose for which

it was intended. Because the punishment is imposed not

for the violation, but pursuant to the previous criminal

conviction, these courts have found it unnecessary to

require criminal responsibility in all cases of

revocation. This formalism simply ignores, however, that

significant liberty interests are at stake no matter how

the proceeding is styled. It also ignores that some sort

of criminal responsibility is, for our legal system,

deeply linked to the justness of any potential punitive

responses. The court also wonders if this absolute

pronouncement about voluntariness suggests that other

defenses, such as duress, would also be unavailable; if

so, such a result could obviously lead to anomalous

(continued...)

10

the disposition of a revocation proceeding.”) (internal

citation omitted).

One problem with this analysis is, of course, that

there are instances in which revocation is mandatory

once a violation is found. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g).

This situation eviscerates the second stage and could,

in practice, mandate significant prison time to be

imposed for conduct completely outside the control of

the offender.2

 Because there are important

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(...continued)

outcomes.

11

constitutional interests implicated in these

determinations about a person’s liberty, the procedures

at revocation hearings must be fundamentally fair. See

Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 668-69 (1983). It

would seem fundamentally unfair, however, to order

revocation if, for example, someone was forced at

gunpoint to possess marijuana, thus technically

violating a condition of her release.

The goal of supervised release and its concomitant

revocation and modification hearings is to craft a

viable alternative to incarceration, helping the

offender rehabilitate and reducing the strain on a penal

system of scarce resources. The long tradition of

discretion afforded to the decisionmaker at these

proceedings highlights a culture of calibration--an

attention to the idiosyncracies of individual cases. It

is true that when the court has discretion at the second

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3. When revocation is mandatory, it could be argued

that the violation is more criminal and punitive in

nature, thus triggering different procedural and

substantive requirements in order to establish the

violation. In fact, because mandatory revocation

violations generally require the commission of a new

substantive offense, it may be more reasonable to imply

affirmative defenses to that already criminal conduct.

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stage, it can in practice order relief similar to what

it could have ordered had it been allowed to make the

determination based on insanity or voluntariness at the

first stage. Most judges, then, could usually achieve

the outcome consistent with their best judgment. When

the court lacks discretion, however, the first stage may

become a crucially important step in crafting a fair,

rational, and above all, effective response to

nonconforming conduct.3

 

Because of the unique challenges posed by mental

illness, discretion to design appropriate responses to

violative conduct is particularly important, and any

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4. In developing the standards of fundamental

fairness, the Supreme Court has not addressed the

question of whether the insanity defense might apply to

revocation hearings. In Bearden, the Court held that an

indigent probationer could not be imprisoned for failure

to pay a fine because it was “fundamentally unfair to

revoke probation automatically” when the failure to obey

the condition occurred “through no fault of his own.”

Bearden, 461 U.S. at 668. Despite the importance of the

lack of fault to its holding, the Court complicated

matters in a footnote, in which it suggested that

revoking probation would not always require a finding of

fault. The Court gave the example of “a condition like

chronic drunken driving,” which was itself a “threat to

the safety [and] welfare of society.” Id. at 669 & n.9.

This seems to suggest that a key question would be

whether the “condition” at issue here--psychiatric

problems--is itself a “threat to the safety or welfare of

society.” In that case, it may be acceptable to revoke

probation even if there were no evidence of criminal

fault. It is important to note, however, the contextual

and ungeneralizable nature of this analysis.

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rule removing that discretion completely in a certain

class of revocation proceedings would be problematic.4

The exact substantive and procedural requirements

of a supervised release revocation hearing, then, may

turn on the kind of violation alleged (i.e., whether

revocation would be mandatory) as well as on the reason

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that lay behind the violation (i.e., indigence or mental

illness).

While the court notes significant potential

problems with a blanket rule depriving defendants in

revocation proceedings of defenses that negate

culpability, this case does not provide the opportunity

for the court to delve further into these difficult

questions of statutory interpretation, constitutional

mandate, and general prudence. In this case, the

violation with which McNair is charged itself provides

him with the defense of insanity.

The petition charges McNair with committing a crime

in Alabama. McNair could not have committed this crime,

however, if he was insane as defined by 1975 Ala. Code

§ 13A-3-1. In other words, the inquiry into McNair’s

sanity is, by definition, relevant at the first stage

described in Brown, Steinberg, and Romano. Unlike other

violations of supervised release, which would merely

require McNair to avoid certain conduct (such as leaving

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5. The court would still be forced to decide

definitively whether to apply the federal insanity

defense if Alabama did not make that defense available

for the crime with which McNair is charged. Similarly,

if the content of the state and federal defenses differed

substantially, and the court found McNair sane under

Alabama law, it could be forced to make a determination

of McNair’s sanity under federal law. As it is however,

because the defense is available under Alabama law, the

court chooses not to rest its opinion on the application

of the federal defense (18 U.S.C. § 17).

15

the country or quitting a treatment program), this

condition requires McNair to avoid breaking the law. If

Alabama would not consider McNair guilty of breaking its

law, then McNair has not violated his supervised

release. Thus, McNair’s sanity becomes critical in

determining the “retrospective factual” issue of whether

a condition was violated, see Romano, 471 U.S. at 611,

and not as a defense once the elements of a supervised

release violation have already been established.5

 

McNair was arrested for Domestic Violence, Third

Degree, pursuant to 1975 Ala. Code § 13A-6-132. There

is overwhelming evidence that McNair’s conduct satisfied

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6. Alabama would require McNair to prove these

elements by clear and convincing evidence. 1975 Ala.

Code § 13A-3-1. However, the burden of proof at

revocation hearings is a preponderance of the evidence.

In any case, as described below, the evidence of insanity

is overwhelming, and the court would find McNair insane

under either standard of proof.

16

the elements of that offense when he pulled White’s hair

and struck her in the face, knocking her to the floor.

Under § 13A-3-1, McNair is not guilty by reason of

insanity if, “as a result of severe mental disease or

defect, [he] was unable to appreciate the nature and

quality or wrongfulness of his acts.”6

 The elements of

this defense are nearly identical to the federal

insanity defense. See Archie v. State, 875 So.2d 336,

340 (Ala. Ct. Crim. App. 2003). 

In Herbert v. State, 357 So.2d 683 (Ala. Ct. Crim.

App. 1978), the defendant shot and killed his wife

because he believed that she was possessed and that she

was controlling his mind. The court noted that the

expert found the defendant insane and that there was no

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evidence to rebut the evidence of insanity. Similarly,

here, there is simply no evidence to rebut the

overwhelming evidence of McNair’s insanity. Both White

and the responding officers testified that McNair did

not appear mentally lucid. White testified that

McNair’s conduct was completely out of character and

unprecipitated. McNair himself has no recollection of

the incident, and both White and McNair’s family report

similar incidents of bizarre, irrational behavior.

Moreover, McNair’s clinical history suggests lengthy

battles with various mental-health issues, and Dr.

Boyer, after reviewing those records and examining

McNair, determined that he suffered from serious mental

defects at the time of the offense and likely did not

appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct. There is

simply no meaningful evidence to contradict this

thorough analysis. The evidence establishes that, at

the time of the offense, McNair suffered from a serious

mental disease, and Dr. Boyer’s analysis of McNair’s

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motivation to fight the devil who stood in the way of

what the prophet had ordained is the only credible

explanation for conduct that no one else, including the

victim, can explain.

As a result, the court holds that McNair is not

guilty of committing the state crime charged in the

revocation petition, that is, Domestic Violence, Third

Degree, because he was unable to appreciate the nature

and quality and wrongfulness of his conduct. However,

while McNair is not guilty by reason of insanity, the

evidence at the hearing (including testimony from the

defense’s own expert) leaves the court with serious

concerns about McNair’s behavior and, as a result, the

appropriate conditions of his supervised release.

IV. Modifications

The evidence before the court also demonstrates

that McNair has responded well in the past to intensive

treatment. In her report, the defense’s expert

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recommends inpatient treatment at a dual-diagnosis

facility for a period of three-to-six months. Pursuant

to this court’s direction, counsel for McNair has

developed a detailed treatment plan that is consistent

with the recommendations of Dr. Boyer.

This treatment plan contains conditions that the

court finds particularly important. These include:

McNair’s enrollment in an intensive inpatient-dualdiagnosis facility that will allow him to receive

treatment for both his mental illness and his substance

abuse; McNair’s eventual transfer to the residential

program of this treatment facility, at which he would be

required to obtain employment in the community and to

contribute to the cost of his treatment; and a full

psychiatric evaluation by the University of Alabama

Birmingham Community Psychiatry Department.

It is worth emphasizing, however, the flexibility

of this treatment process. Because of the nature of the

problems with which McNair is dealing, a treatment plan

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developed in advance should be subject to the best

judgment of those most involved in McNair’s care--those

best able to assess his progress and his needs. While

the treatment plan submitted to this court contains some

exact time periods and other details, this opinion

should not be viewed as mandating strict adherence to

those details if McNair and those responsible for his

treatment feel that substantial progress has been made

or is best achieved in a different way.

The United States Probation Office will monitor

McNair’s treatment closely, and the court remains

interested in and hopeful about McNair’s progress. Even

though the court has supervisory authority over McNair

pursuant to this case for only approximately another 11

months, McNair’s counsel suggests that McNair’s

treatment program could last for substantially longer.

Counsel has submitted to the court that the treatment

developed for McNair can be made a part of his

conditions of supervised release in the separate matter

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for which he is now imprisoned. The court leaves that

determination to the best judgment of those involved in

McNair’s long-term treatment; McNair and the government

may want to file a joint motion in his other criminal

case to make the treatment program a part of his

supervised release there.

Nonetheless, when McNair is released from custody

in the separate matter, his supervising probation

officer should ensure that he begins intensive inpatient

treatment in this case immediately.

***

By separate order, the court will set another

hearing so that, absent objections from the government

or McNair or both that warrant different relief, the

court can orally impose the verdict and relief outlined

above and then enter an appropriate judgment. 

DONE, this the 4th day of December, 2008.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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