Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01703/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01703-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Emerald Cities Collaborative, Inc.
Appellant
Sheri Jean Roese
Appellee

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

EMERALD CITIES COLLABORATIVE, INC.,

Appellant

v.

SHERI JEAN ROESE,

Appellee

______________________ 

2016-1703

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Trademark Trial and Appeal Board in No. 

91197060.

______________________ 

Decided: December 13, 2016

______________________ 

LAWRENCE EDWIN JAMES, JR., Reed Smith LLP, Chicago, IL, for appellant. Also represented by JOSHUA 

NEWMAN. 

SHERI JEAN ROESE, Emerald Cities USA Ltd, Scottsdale, AZ, pro se.

______________________ 

Before PROST, Chief Judge, LOURIE and MOORE,

Circuit Judges.

Case: 16-1703 Document: 56-2 Page: 1 Filed: 12/13/2016
2 EMERALD CITIES COLLABORATIVE v. ROESE

LOURIE, Circuit Judge. 

Emerald Cities Collaborative, Inc. (“ECC”) appeals 

from the decision of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) Trademark Trial and Appeal Board 

(“the Board”) cancelling ECC’s trademark registration of 

THE EMERALD CITY and dismissing ECC’s opposition 

to an application filed by Sheri Jean Roese (“Roese”) to 

register the mark EMERALD CITIES. See Emerald 

Cities Collaborative, Inc. v. Roese, No. 91197060 (T.T.A.B. 

Dec. 4, 2015) (“Board Decision”). Because the Board did 

not err in determining that the 2009 agreement between 

ECC and Perry Orlando (“Orlando”) regarding the mark 

THE EMERALD CITY prior to its registration constituted 

an assignment of the intent-to-use application for that 

mark in violation of Section 10 of the Lanham Act, 15 

U.S.C. § 1060(a)(1), we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

I 

In November 2008, Orlando filed an application at the 

PTO, seeking to register the mark THE EMERALD CITY

for use in business development and consulting services in

the renewable energy industry. The application was an 

intent-to-use application under 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b). On 

November 24, 2009, the PTO issued a Notice of Allowance, which commenced a six-month period for Orlando to 

file a Statement of Use (“SOU”) as required for registration of the mark. 

Before filing the SOU, on December 30, 2009, Orlando 

and ECC entered into an agreement concerning Orlando’s

applied-for mark (“the Agreement”). J.A. 212–17. The 

Agreement is entitled “Trademark Assignment and License,” J.A. 212, is governed by the laws of Delaware, J.A. 

216, and has “an effective date of [December] 30, 2009,” 

J.A. 212 (emphasis added). 

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EMERALD CITIES COLLABORATIVE v. ROESE 3

The Agreement recites that “Orlando owns certain 

rights in the Mark, The Emerald City, U.S. Trademark 

Application Serial No. 76/684,594 (the ‘Mark’)” and further provides the following: 

Assignment. Mr. Orlando agrees to convey and 

assign unto ECC, all right, title and interest in 

and to the Mark and any and all derivatives 

thereof, together with any and all goodwill associated therewith, and the right to sue and recover 

damages and profits for past, present and future 

infringement, if any, related to the Mark, at such 

time as the Mark is registered at the [PTO]. . . .

Use. Between the Effective Date and the Registration Date, Mr. Orlando may continue to use the 

Mark. . . .

License. Upon registration of the Mark by the 

[PTO] and completion of the transfer of the Mark 

to ECC, ECC agrees to license certain rights in 

the Mark to Mr. Orlando . . . .

J.A. 212–13 (emphases and underline added). 

The Agreement additionally provides that: (1) “ECC 

shall promptly pay” Orlando $25,000; (2) “[u]pon payment 

of such amount, Mr. Orlando appoints Joel Rogers[, ECC’s 

cofounder (“Rogers”),] as his Power of Attorney (with the 

full power of substitution and resubstitution) for the 

limited purpose of allowing ECC (and its attorneys) to 

take over continued prosecution of the application for the 

Mark”; (3) “[t]he Power of Attorney . . . is a Durable Power 

of Attorney and is irrevocable”; (4) “[u]pon ECC’s request[,] Mr. Orlando agrees to execute any additional 

documents as may be reasonably required to effect and/or 

record this new Power of Attorney and to use reasonable 

effort to assist ECC and its attorneys with the prosecution 

of the application, satisfying the [PTO]’s requirement for 

use of the Mark in commerce, and ensure registration of 

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4 EMERALD CITIES COLLABORATIVE v. ROESE

the Mark in a timely manner”; and (5) “Orlando agrees to 

use the Mark . . . by January 31, 2010 and provide evidence of such use in the form of a specimen and date of 

first use to ECC to assist ECC in its registration of the 

Mark.” J.A. 213 (emphases added). Under the Agreement, ECC also agreed to pay Orlando $40,000 as a final 

installment upon registration of the mark at the PTO. Id.

Moreover, the Agreement states that “[t]his Agreement shall commence on the Effective Date . . . and shall 

continue in perpetuity,” that either party may terminate 

the Agreement if the other party materially breaches, and 

that “[u]pon termination of this Agreement by ECC . . . 

Orlando shall promptly cease use of the Mark.” J.A. 214 

(emphases added). It further provides: 

The products and services sold by Mr. Orlando 

and his associated entities under the Mark shall 

at all times be of a high quality, as determined by 

ECC acting reasonably. If the products or services sold by Mr. Orlando and his associated entities under the Mark fail to meet such quality 

standards, Mr. Orlando shall immediately take 

corrective action to ensure that the products or 

services are of the appropriate quality. . . .

Mr. Orlando shall not challenge ECC’s use of the 

Mark or support challenges by third parties, 

whether before or after the Registration Date. 

Only ECC shall have the exclusive right to file oppositions or claims against the users of confusingly similar trademarks. . . .

ECC shall be responsible for all payments in connection with the continued prosecution of the 

Mark in the United States or its possessions. . . .

J.A. 215 (emphases added). 

On April 19, 2010, approximately four months after 

the Agreement, the applicant filed the SOU, which conCase: 16-1703 Document: 56-2 Page: 4 Filed: 12/13/2016
EMERALD CITIES COLLABORATIVE v. ROESE 5

tained an appointment of counsel to attorneys at Reed 

Smith LLP, the law firm representing ECC in this appeal. 

The SOU stated that THE EMERALD CITY was first 

used in commerce at least as early as January 15, 2010. 

The PTO accepted the SOU and registered the mark 

under Trademark Registration No. 3814868 on July 6, 

2010. Later that month, an assignment, which was

executed by Orlando and ECC on July 6, 2010, was recorded at the PTO, indicating that Orlando assigned the 

entire interest in the mark to ECC “with an effective date 

of July 6th 2010 . . . pursuant to that certain 2009 Trademark Assignment and License Agreement.” J.A. 218–19. 

II

In September 2009, Roese filed an application at the 

PTO, seeking to register the mark EMERALD CITIES. 

Shortly after publication of Roese’s application in October 

2010, ECC filed an opposition alleging that Roese’s mark 

would likely cause confusion with ECC’s then-registered 

mark THE EMERALD CITY. In response, Roese raised

several affirmative defenses, as well as a counterclaim, 

seeking to cancel ECC’s registration of THE EMERALD 

CITY. She alleged, inter alia, that ECC’s registration is 

invalid because the Agreement between Orlando and ECC 

violated 15 U.S.C. § 1060(a)(1). J.A. 42 (affirmative 

defense); J.A. 46 (counterclaim).

The Board ruled that the Agreement constituted an 

improper assignment of the intent-to-use application in 

violation of § 1060(a)(1). Board Decision at 12–17. In 

particular, the Board rejected ECC’s argument that the 

Agreement was merely an “agreement to assign in the 

future.” Id. at 13. Rather, based on the Agreement and 

the deposition testimony of Rogers, ECC’s cofounder, the 

Board concluded that “the ramifications of the Agreement 

were such that Mr. Orlando relinquished, and [ECC] 

acquired, control of the application and use of the involved mark, in [a] manner tantamount to an assignment 

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6 EMERALD CITIES COLLABORATIVE v. ROESE

of ownership of the application.” Id. at 17. The Board 

also found that the 2010 assignment recorded at the PTO

after registration was “merely a formality or confirmation 

of a fait accompli resulting from the Agreement.” Id. The 

Board therefore granted Roese’s request to cancel ECC’s 

trademark registration. Moreover, because ECC’s likelihood-of-confusion claim was based solely on its asserted 

rights in the pleaded registration, not on any prior common law rights, the Board dismissed ECC’s opposition. 

Id. at 17–18.

ECC timely appealed to this court. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(B).

DISCUSSION

We review the Board’s legal conclusions without deference and its factual findings for substantial evidence. 

In re Pacer Tech., 338 F.3d 1348, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 

The fundamental question in this appeal is the proper 

interpretation of the Agreement, and hence whether it 

constituted an assignment in violation of 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1060(a)(1). The proper interpretation of a contract is a 

question of law that is reviewed de novo. First Annapolis 

Bancorp, Inc. v. United States, 644 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. 

Cir. 2011).

Here, the parties do not dispute that the Agreement is 

governed by Delaware law. “Delaware law adheres to the 

objective theory of contracts, i.e., a contract’s construction 

should be that which would be understood by an objective, 

reasonable third party.” Salamone v. Gorman, 106 A.3d 

354, 367–68 (Del. 2014). When interpreting a contract, a 

court “give[s] priority to the parties’ intentions as reflected in the four corners of the agreement, construing the 

agreement as a whole and giving effect to all its provisions.” Id. at 368. Accordingly, “the meaning which 

arises from a particular portion of an agreement cannot 

control the meaning of the entire agreement where such 

inference runs counter to the agreement’s overall scheme 

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EMERALD CITIES COLLABORATIVE v. ROESE 7

and plan.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Shell Oil

Co., 498 A.2d 1108, 1113 (Del. 1985). 

ECC argues that the Board erred in construing the 

Agreement as an immediate assignment, and therefore 

that it was not in violation of § 1060(a)(1). ECC contends

that the Agreement shows that ECC and Orlando intended to assign the mark only upon registration, and that the 

Board’s interpretation disregarded and contradicted the

intention of the parties. ECC also argues that the Board 

erred in interpreting the provisions relating to (1) ECC’s 

right to oversee the quality of products sold under the 

mark, and (2) ECC’s exclusive right to enforce the mark 

against third parties, as evidence of an immediate assignment. According to ECC, those provisions only applied after registration. ECC also contends that the 

Power of Attorney merely created an agent-principal 

relationship between Orlando, the trademark owner, and 

the appointed representative. ECC argues, moreover, 

that the Board improperly relied on Rogers’s ambiguous 

deposition testimony in interpreting the Agreement. 

Lastly, ECC contends that the Board improperly acted as 

de facto counsel for Roese, who was a pro se litigant. 

Roese, proceeding pro se in this appeal, responds that 

the Board properly construed the Agreement as an immediate assignment of the intent-to-use application in violation of Section 10 of the Lanham Act.

We agree with the Board and Roese that the Agreement, when construed as a whole, constituted an immediate assignment of Orlando’s intent-to-use application

before the filing of the SOU, which rendered the subsequent registration of THE EMERALD CITY invalid. 

Section 10 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1060(a)(1), 

contains an anti-trafficking rule, which provides that: 

[N]o application to register a mark under section 

1051(b) of this title shall be assignable prior to 

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8 EMERALD CITIES COLLABORATIVE v. ROESE

the filing of an amendment under section 1051(c) 

of this title to bring the application into conformity with section 1051(a) of this title or the filing of 

the verified statement of use under section 

1051(d) of this title, except for an assignment to a 

successor to the business of the applicant, or portion thereof, to which the mark pertains, if that 

business is ongoing and existing. 

Section 1060(a)(1)’s anti-trafficking rule prohibits the 

assignment of an intent-to-use application prior to the 

filing of an SOU, unless a statutory exception is met, viz., 

that the intent-to-use application is transferred with at 

least part of the applicant’s “ongoing and existing” business to which the mark pertains. As the Board found, and 

ECC does not dispute, such statutory exception does not 

apply to ECC. Board Decision at 13 n.23. The question, 

then, is whether the Agreement constituted an improper

assignment of the intent-to-use application prior to the 

filing of the SOU on April 19, 2010. We conclude that it 

did. 

On its face, the Agreement provides that it has an “effective date” of December 30, 2009, J.A. 212, and that it 

“shall commence on the Effective Date,” J.A. 214. On the 

other hand, the Agreement also provides that “Orlando 

agrees to convey and assign . . . the Mark . . . at such time 

as the Mark is registered at the [PTO],” J.A. 212, and that 

upon registration, ECC agrees to license certain rights to 

Orlando, id., which might suggest that Orlando retained 

ownership of the intent-to-use application at least until 

registration of the mark on July 6, 2010. However, we 

must construe the Agreement as a whole. In doing so, we 

reach the same conclusion as the Board that the overall 

scheme and plan of the Agreement is that, by virtue of its 

execution, Orlando relinquished, and ECC acquired, 

immediate control and ownership over the intent-to-use 

application and the associated mark. 

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EMERALD CITIES COLLABORATIVE v. ROESE 9

First, the Agreement grants an irrevocable Power of 

Attorney to Rogers, ECC’s cofounder, with the full power 

of substitution and resubstitution, “for the limited purpose of allowing ECC (and its attorneys) to take over 

continued prosecution of the application.” J.A. 213. It 

requires Orlando “to assist ECC and its attorneys with the 

prosecution of the application” and “to assist ECC in its

registration of the Mark.” Id. (emphases added). Thus, 

rather than establishing an agent (Rogers) and principal 

(Orlando) relationship under a standard Power of Attorney, the contract language here indicates that Orlando 

ceded control over the intent-to-use application to ECC 

and instead became obligated to assist ECC in its registration of the applied-for mark. 

Second, as the Board noted, the Agreement provides 

that, after the Agreement “commence[d] on the Effective 

Date,” in the event of termination by ECC, “Orlando shall 

promptly cease use of the Mark.” J.A. 214. That language is inconsistent with the interpretation now advocated by ECC that Orlando retained ownership between 

the effective date and the registration date. Indeed, the 

Agreement provides that Orlando “may continue to use” 

the mark during that period, J.A. 213 (emphasis added), 

and gives ECC the right to ensure that Orlando’s products 

sold under the mark “shall at all times be of a high quality,” J.A. 215 (emphasis added). The contract language 

thus signals that, by virtue of the Agreement, ECC acquired an ownership interest, including the right to 

control the quality of goods and services sold under the 

mark by a licensee, and Orlando became such a de facto 

licensee. 

Third, the Agreement provides that Orlando “shall 

not challenge ECC’s use of the Mark or support challenges by third parties, whether before or after the Registration 

Date.” J.A. 215 (emphasis added). That language again

reinforces the interpretation that ECC became an owner, 

and Orlando only a licensee, well before the registration 

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10 EMERALD CITIES COLLABORATIVE v. ROESE

date. Indeed, the next sentence states: “Only ECC shall 

have the exclusive right to file oppositions or claims 

against the users of confusingly similar trademarks.” Id.

(emphases added). Notably, the contract does not limit 

ECC’s exclusive right to enforce the mark to a particular 

period, such as only after the registration of the mark.

We are unpersuaded by ECC’s argument that the 

quality-control and right-to-enforce provisions only apply 

upon registration of the mark. Although it is true that 

certain provisions in the Agreement contain the language 

“[u]pon registration of the Mark by the [PTO] and completion of the transfer of the Mark to ECC,” J.A. 213–14

(Sections 2.2 (Final Payment), 2.3 (License), 3.1 (Grant of 

License)), that language does not appear anywhere in the 

quality-control or right-to-enforce provision. Instead, as 

indicated, the quality-control provision says “at all times,” 

and the immediately preceding sentence to the exclusiveright-to-enforce provision states “whether before or after 

the Registration Date.” J.A. 215. ECC’s argument is thus 

contrary to the plain language of the Agreement.

ECC also argues conclusorily that the Agreement did 

not result in the transfer of all rights in the mark. Appellant’s Br. 10. The only such unassigned right ECC identifies, however, is “the right to sue and recover damages 

and profits for past, present and future infringement.” Id.

at 19–20 n.6 (citing J.A. 212) (Assignment provision). We 

find ECC’s argument to be without merit. Although the 

Assignment provision does state that Orlando agrees to 

assign the right to sue, along with other rights, “at such 

time as the Mark is registered at the [PTO],” J.A. 212, the 

contract clearly provides that “[o]nly ECC shall have the 

exclusive right to file oppositions or claims” against third 

parties, J.A. 215, and that Orlando may not challenge 

ECC’s use of the mark “whether before or after the Registration Date,” id. When read as a whole, the Agreement 

did not reserve the right to sue to Orlando for the period 

between the effective date and the registration date. 

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EMERALD CITIES COLLABORATIVE v. ROESE 11

Accordingly, we conclude that the Agreement, when 

read in its entirety, unambiguously shows that, by virtue

of its execution, ECC acquired, and Orlando relinquished, 

immediate control and ownership of the intent-to-use 

application in a “manner tantamount to an assignment.” 

Board Decision at 17. Because the Agreement itself is

clear and unambiguous, we need not consider whether 

Rogers’s deposition testimony supports or contradicts the 

Board’s and our interpretation of the Agreement. GMG 

Capital Invs., LLC v. Athenian Venture Partners I, L.P., 

36 A.3d 776, 783 (Del. 2012) (“If a contract is unambiguous, extrinsic evidence may not be used to interpret the 

intent of the parties, to vary the terms of the contract or 

to create an ambiguity.”).

Lastly, because the Agreement violated § 1060(a)(1), 

we further conclude that the Board did not err in cancelling the registration of the mark THE EMERALD CITY. 

See, e.g., Oculu, LLC v. Oculus VR, Inc., No. 14-0196, 

2015 WL 3619204, at *7 (C.D. Cal. June 8, 2015) (“Violating this ‘anti-trafficking rule’ [of § 1060(a)(1)] voids the 

assignment as well as the underlying application and 

resulting registration.”) (citing The Clorox Co. v. Chemical 

Bank, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1098, 1104 (T.T.A.B. 1996)). 

Moreover, because ECC’s opposition to Roese’s application 

was based solely on the now-canceled registration, the 

Board properly dismissed ECC’s opposition.

CONCLUSION

We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments, but find them to be unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Board’s decision cancelling the 

registration of THE EMERALD CITY and dismissing 

ECC’s opposition.

AFFIRMED

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