Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00622/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00622-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Antoine Hannon
Plaintiff
Jean Howard
Defendant
Matthew C. Kramer
Defendant
Georgia Thomatos
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTOINE HANNON,

Plaintiff,

v.

MATTHEW C. KRAMER, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:05-CV-00622-REC-SMS-P

ORDER DENYING REQUESTS FOR

EVIDENTIARY HEARING AND JUDICIAL

NOTICE, AND DISMISSING COMPLAINT

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

(Doc. 1)

I. Screening Order

A. Screening Requirement

Plaintiff Antoine Hannon (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action on April

28, 2005. 

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

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A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467

U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citingConley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Palmer v. Roosevelt

Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a complaint under this

standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg.

Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395

U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

B. Summary of Plaintiff’s Complaint

The events at issue in the instant action allegedly occurred at the Sierra Conservation Center

in Jamestown, where plaintiff is presently incarcerated. Plaintiff names Warden Matthew C.

Kramer, Health Care Manager Jean Howard, M.D., and Georgia Thomatos, M.D. as defendants.

Plaintiff is seeking money damages and an injunction requiring prison officials to provide further

medical treatment to plaintiff. In addition, plaintiff requests an evidentiary hearing and requests that

the court take judicial notice of his exhibits.

 Evidentiary hearings are not held as a matter of course in civil rights actions, and there is

no basis for one at this juncture. Therefore, plaintiff’s request is denied.

With respect to plaintiff’s exhibits, judicial notice is not a prerequisite to consideration of

the exhibits by the court. “A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute

in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2)

capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably

be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b) (emphasis added). Plaintiff’s exhibits are not appropriate

subject matter for judicial notice. Accordingly, plaintiff’s request is denied. 

C. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Claims

1. Claim Against Defendant Thomatos

In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that on August 1, 2004, he fell and injured his left rib cage

area. Plaintiff was prescribed Motrin and scheduled for an x-ray. On August 2, 2004, plaintiff was

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seen by defendant Thomatos, his treating physician. Defendant noted that plaintiff’s twelfth rib was

displaced anteriorly and diagnosed plaintiff as having probable lower rib fracture. Defendant

prescribed Motin, but provided no further treatment pending receipt of the x-rays.

On August 16, 2004, plaintiff was seen by Dr. L. Iannone, who noted plaintiff had a

protruding rib, diagnosed plaintiff as having a separated rib, requested a repeat chest x-ray, and

prescribed Motrin. On August 23, 2004, plaintiff was seen again by defendant Thomatos. Plaintiff

told defendant that the Motrin was not helping. Defendant noted that plaintiff still had anterior

displacement of the ribs, told plaintiff that he would probably have the deformity forever, but that

the pain would subside in six to eight weeks, and prescribed Motrin again. Plaintiff alleges that the

treatment provided by defendant Thomatos was inadequate and violated his rights.

To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison

conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452

U.S. 337, 347 (1981). A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not rise to the level of an

Eighth Amendment violation unless (1) “the prison official deprived the prisoner of the ‘minimal

civilized measure of life’s necessities,’” and (2) “the prison official ‘acted with deliberate

indifference in doing so.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Hallett

v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)). A prison official does not act in

a deliberately indifferent manner unless the official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to

inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Deliberate indifference may

be manifested “when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment,”

or in the manner “in which prison physicians provide medical care.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d

1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133,

1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). 

Plaintiff’s allegations do not support a claim that his rights under the Eighth Amendment

were violated by defendant Thomatos. “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi,

391 F.3d at 1060. At most, plaintiff allegations establish that he disagrees with defendant’s course

of treatment for his injured ribs and believes he should be provided with additional and different

treatment. However, “[a] difference of opinion between a prisoner-patient and prison medical

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authorities regarding treatment does not give rise to a s 1983 claim.” Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d

1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981) (internal citation omitted). Plaintiff’s allegations simply do not support

a claim that defendant “[knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to [plaintiff’s] health . . . .”

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.

2. Claim Against Defendants Kramer and Howard

Under section 1983, liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for the actions

of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior. When the named defendant holds a

supervisorial position, the causal link between the defendant and the claimed constitutional violation

must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v.

Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To state a claim for

relief under section 1983 for supervisory liability, plaintiff must allege some facts indicating that the

defendant either: personally participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of

the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient

that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the

constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations

omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Although federal pleading standards

are broad, some facts must be alleged to support claims under section 1983. See Leatherman v.

Tarrant County Narcotics Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). 

Plaintiff may not impose liability on defendants Kramer and Howard on the basis that they

hold managerial positions at the prison. Further, in this instance, plaintiff’s complaint does not state

a claim against his treating physician. Therefore, there is no basis upon which to impose supervisory

liability, even if plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts linking defendants Kramer and Howard to acts

or omissions relating to his medical treatment. 

D. Conclusion

The court finds that plaintiff’s complaint does not contain any claims upon which relief may

be granted under section 1983. The court will provide plaintiff with the opportunity to file an

amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the court in this order.

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Plaintiff is informed he must demonstrate in his complaint how the conditions complained

of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d

227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant is

involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or

connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S.

362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740,

743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Finally, plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended complaint be

complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an amended complaint

supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once

plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any function in the case.

Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement

of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s requests for an evidentiary hearing and judicial notice of his exhibits are

DENIED;

2. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend, for failure to state any claims

upon which relief may be granted under section 1983;

3. The Clerk’s Office shall send plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

4. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff shall file an

amended complaint; and

5. If plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, the court

will recommend that this action be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 31, 2005 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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