Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-10337/USCOURTS-ca9-13-10337-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Randolph Benjamin Rodman
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

RANDOLPH BENJAMIN RODMAN,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-10337

D.C. No.

2:10-cr-01047-ROS-2

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

IDAN C. GREENBERG,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-10351

D.C. No.

2:10-cr-01047-ROS-6

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Roslyn O. Silver, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

October 9, 2014—Phoenix, Arizona

Filed January 9, 2015

Before: J. Clifford Wallace, Barry G. Silverman,

and Milan D. Smith, Jr., Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.

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2 UNITED STATES V. RODMAN

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed a conviction for conspiracy to defraud

an agency of the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 371, in a case in which Randolph Rodman and his codefendants were charged with conspiracy to transfer machine

guns unlawfully by making false entries on forms submitted

to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives.

The panel held that regulating the registration and transfer

of firearms using government forms is a lawful function of

the government, and that to be guilty of a conspiracy to

defraud the government in the context of this case, it is

sufficient that Rodman and his co-conspirators agreed to

submit, and did submit, machine gun registration and transfer

forms with false information to the ATF, thereby impairing

and obstructing the ATF’s lawful government function of

regulating the transfer of firearms. 

The panel held that the district court did not err in

declining to give a jury instruction for entrapment by estoppel

based on Rodman’s claim that George Clark, a federal

firearms licensee, told Rodman that the manner in which

Clark manufactured and transferred machine guns was legal. 

The panel held that Clark was not acting as an authorized

government official for purposes of the entrapment-byestoppel defense in this context in which Rodman is himself

a federal firearms licensee.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. RODMAN 3

The panel rejected Rodman’s argument that he was

entitled to a jury instruction explaining the buyer-seller

affirmative defense, as such an instruction would have been

inapposite to the charged conspiracy to submit fraudulent

forms to the ATF.

The panel addressed other claims raised by Rodman and

his co-defendant Idan Greenberg in memorandum

dispositions filed contemporaneously with the opinion.

COUNSEL

David T. Hardy (argued), Tucson, Arizona, for DefendantAppellant Randolph Rodman.

Steven Robert Shanin (argued), Chicago, Illinois, for

Defendant-Appellant Idan Greenberg.

Dominic Lanza (argued), Assistant United States Attorney,

and Mark Kokonavich, Deputy Appellate Chief, United

States Attorney’s Office, Phoenix, Arizona, for PlaintiffAppellee.

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4 UNITED STATES V. RODMAN

OPINION

M. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

Defendant-Appellant Randolph Rodman challenges his

conviction for conspiracy to defraud the government. 

Rodman contends that insufficient evidence existed to convict

him, and that the district court erred in failing to give jury

instructions for entrapment by estoppel, and instructions

concerning a buyer-seller relationship between George Clark

and Rodman.

We hold that regulating the registration and transfer of

firearms is a lawful function of the government. We also

conclude that the district court did not err in declining to give

the requested jury instructions because the lack of an

authorized government official precludes entrapment by

estoppel, and there was sufficient evidence of a conspiracy to

obstruct a lawful function of the government to eliminate the

possibility of a simple buyer-seller transaction.

All other claims raised by Rodman and his co-defendant,

Idan Greenberg, are addressed in two memorandum

dispositions filed concurrently with this opinion. We affirm

Rodman’s conviction.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Rodman and five other defendants were indicted for

conspiracy to defraud an agency of the United States, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Specifically, the defendants

were charged with conspiracy to transfer machine guns

unlawfully by making false entries on forms submitted to the

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives

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UNITED STATES V. RODMAN 5

(ATF). The National Firearms Act (NFA) provides that it is

unlawful for a private citizen to transfer or possess an

unregistered machine gun. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5812, 5822. 

Machine guns must be registered with the National Firearms

Registration and Transfer Record, which is maintained by the

National Firearms Act Branch (NFA Branch) of the ATF. In

order to transfer a machine gun between federal firearms

licensees, an ATF Form 3, signed under penalty of perjury,

must be completed and filed with the ATF. In order to

transfer a machine gun to a member of the general public, an

ATF Form 4, signed under penalty of perjury, must be

completed and filed with the ATF. Among other data, these

forms require a description of the firearm being transferred,

including the serial number, the type of firearm, the caliber,

the model, the length of the barrel, and the overall length of

the firearm.

Private citizens, whether federal firearms licensees or

members of the general public, who are not acting under the

authority of the United States or a state, may transfer or

possess only machine guns that were registered on or before

May 16, 1986. 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(o)(2)(A)–(B). In this

opinion, we refer to machine guns registered on or before

May 16, 1986 as “pre-ban machine guns,” and to machine

guns registered after May 16, 1986 as “post-ban machine

guns.”

In order to circumvent the restrictions described, Rodman,

along with his codefendants Idan Greenberg, George Clark,

Hal Goldstein, James Arnberger, and Lorren Kalish, all of

whom were federal firearms licensees, entered into a

conspiracy to build, possess, and sell post-ban machine guns

that used serial numbers cut from pre-ban machine guns. 

Clark, who was also licensed to manufacture firearms, would

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6 UNITED STATES V. RODMAN

cut the serial number from an inexpensive registered pre-ban

machine gun, and discard the remaining parts of the gun. 

Clark would then use new parts, often supplied by his

codefendants, to construct a new machine gun, and would

weld the serial number of the pre-ban machine gun onto the

new, post-ban machine gun. The defendants would then sell

the new, post-ban machine guns as pre-ban machine guns, in

some cases for a significant profit, without telling the buyers

of those guns the method by which the machine guns had

been made, or that the machine guns offered to the buyers

were actually post-ban machine guns.

The defendants registered and transferred these “new”

machine guns amongst themselves and others by filling out

either a Form 3 or a Form 4 using the serial number,

manufacturer, and model of the pre-ban machine guns. These

transfer forms were fraudulent. The forms listed the model

and manufacture of the pre-ban machine gun even though the

machine gun actually sold was a new gun, a different model

than the pre-ban gun, and had been manufactured by Clark. 

Additionally, the forms did not mention that the serial

number on the gun being sold had been cut from a pre-ban

machine gun and affixed onto the new post-ban machine gun. 

The ATF approved these transfers because none of the

defendants disclosed that they were selling post-ban machine

guns using pre-ban machine gun information, and the ATF

relied on the false representations made in the transfer forms.

Consistent with the conspiracy, Rodman purchased

Clark’s machine guns manufactured post-ban but affixed with

pre-ban serial numbers. Rodman knew the method by which

Clark manufactured the machine guns, but claimed during

trial that Clark told him this method was lawful. Clark filed

transfer papers with the ATF to transfer 13 machine guns to

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UNITED STATES V. RODMAN 7

Rodman between 2000 and 2008. These new machine guns

were transferred to Rodman using the serial number and other

information, such as the model name and manufacturer, from

the pre-ban machine guns. Rodman sold and filed transfer

papers with the ATF for seven of the Clark-made machine

guns, again using pre-ban information to sell and transfer

post-ban guns.

Rodman moved for acquittal, and to dismiss the charge

for conspiracy to defraud the government under 18 U.S.C.

§ 371. The district court denied both motions. Rodman also

unsuccessfully requested a jury instruction for entrapment by

estoppel based on Clark’s alleged statements that his method

of manufacturing machine guns was lawful, and a jury

instruction regarding a buyer-seller relationship between

Rodman and Clark.

JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We

review de novo Rodman’s motion for acquittal of the

conspiracy charge, and Rodman’s motion to dismiss the

charge for conspiracy. United States v. Neill, 166 F.3d 943,

947 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Yoshida, 303 F.3d 1145,

1149 (9th Cir. 2002). We also review de novo a district

court’s decision declining to issue a requested jury

instruction. See United States v. Ibarra-Pino, 657 F.3d 1000,

1003 (9th Cir. 2011).

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8 UNITED STATES V. RODMAN

DISCUSSION

I. Conspiracy to Defraud

The federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, makes it

a crime:

If two or more persons conspire either to

commit any offense against the United States,

or to defraud the United States, or any agency

thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and

one or more of such persons do any act to

effect the object of the conspiracy . . . .

The phrase “to defraud . . . in any manner or for any purpose”

covers “any conspiracy for the purpose of impairing,

obstructing or defeating the lawful function of any

department of Government.” Tanner v. United States,

483 U.S. 107, 128 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted).

We have construed the language in 18 U.S.C. § 371 to

include “obstructing the operation of any government agency

by any ‘deceit, craft or trickery, or at least by means that are

dishonest.’” United States v. Caldwell, 989 F.2d 1056, 1058

(9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Hammerschmidt v. United States,

265 U.S. 182, 188 (1924)). We have also clarified that a

conspiracy need not deprive the government of property,

involve any detrimental reliance by the government, or

involve independently illegal goals or means. Id. at 1058–59. 

Instead, the elements of a conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371

are “(1) [defendant] entered into an agreement (2) to obstruct

a lawful function of the government (3) by deceitful or

dishonest means and (4) at least one overt act in furtherance

of the conspiracy.” Id. at 1059.

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UNITED STATES V. RODMAN 9

Using these elements, we have held that 18 U.S.C. § 371

“applies to conspiracies to impede, impair, obstruct, or defeat

the lawful function of the Department of Treasury in the

collection of income taxes” by filing fraudulent income tax

returns. United States v. Little, 753 F.2d 1420, 1443 (9th Cir.

1984) (citing United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 771 (2d

Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981)). 

Additionally, in United States v. Lorenzo, we affirmed a

conviction for conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371 when

defendants filed fraudulent IRS 1099-MISC forms requesting

tax refunds from the IRS. 995 F.2d 1448, 1451–52 (9th Cir.

1993). Thus, the submission of fraudulent forms to a

governmental agency by two or more persons when those

fraudulent forms impede that agency’s lawful functions

constitutes a conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371.

There is ample evidence here that Rodman impeded the

lawful government functions of the ATF and the NFA Branch

by submitting fraudulent forms. The NFA gives the ATF the

authority to regulate the transfer and making of firearms. 

26 U.S.C. §§ 5812, 5822. These statutes provide that a

“firearm shall not be transferred unless . . . the transferor of

the firearm has filed with the Secretary a written application

. . . for the transfer and registration of the firearm to the

transferee on the application form prescribed by the

Secretary” and “the firearm is identified in the application

form in such manner as the Secretary may by regulations

prescribe.” 26 U.S.C. § 5812(a). They also provide that

“[n]o person shall make a firearm unless he has . . . filed with

the Secretary a written application . . . to make and register

the firearm on the form prescribed by the Secretary” and

“identified the firearm to be made in the application form in

such manner as the Secretary may by regulations prescribe.” 

26 U.S.C. § 5822. Under both statutes, the maker and

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10 UNITED STATES V. RODMAN

transferor are required to obtain the approval of the Secretary

before making or transferring the firearm. Id. §§ 5812(a),

5822. Just as we did in the context of filing IRS forms, we

conclude that regulating the registration and transfer of

firearms using government forms is a lawful function of the

government. The ATF approves or denies transfers based on

the information alleged in the forms. If the information

provided to the ATF is inaccurate or fraudulent, the ATF is

unable to approve transfers correctly pursuant to the NFA. 

Therefore, to be guilty of a conspiracy to defraud the

government in the context of this case, it is sufficient that

Rodman and his co-conspirators agreed to submit, and did

submit, machine gun registration and transfer forms with

false information to the ATF, thereby impairing and

obstructing the ATF’s lawful government function of

regulating the transfer of firearms.

We also observe that because Rodman’s actions constitute

a conspiracy to impair the functioning of the ATF, it was not

necessary that there be evidence of any other form of injury

to the ATF in order for Rodman to be found guilty of a

conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371. See Tanner, 483 U.S. at

128.

II. Entrapment by Estoppel

“The entrapment by estoppel defense applies when [(1)]

an authorized government official tells the defendant that

certain conduct is legal and [(2)] the defendant believes the

official.” United States v. Brebner, 951 F.2d 1017, 1024 (9th

Cir. 1991). Rodman argues that the district court erred when

it refused to give an entrapment by estoppel instruction based

on his claim that Clark, a federal firearms licensee, told

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UNITED STATES V. RODMAN 11

Rodman that the manner in which Clark manufactured and

then transferred machine guns was legal.

We have held that a licensed firearms dealer is an

authorized government official “in connection with the

gathering and dispensing of information” on whether a given

customer, usually one with a criminal history, can legally

purchase a firearm. United States v. Tallmadge, 829 F.2d

767, 774 (9th Cir. 1987). See also, e.g., United States v.

Batterjee, 361 F.3d 1210, 1217–19 (9th Cir. 2004). However,

the circumstances of the present case are quite different than

the circumstances in Tallmadge and Batterjee. Rodman is not

some customer off the street inquiring about whether he can

legally purchase a firearm. Rodman is himself a federal

firearms licensee. Therefore, Clark’s status as a federal

firearms licensee puts Clark in no better position than

Rodman to know whether Clark’s methods of manufacturing

and transferring the machine guns were legal. Moreover, in

determining that federal firearms licensees should be deemed

authorized government officials, the court in Tallmadge relied

on the fact that the relevant form placed an affirmative duty

on the seller of the firearms to determine the lawfulness of the

transaction, to be familiar with the relevant law, and to

inform the buyer of any restrictions imposed by Congress on

the purchase of firearms. See 829 F.2d at 774. Rodman has

failed to show that Congress has placed similar duties on a

federal firearms licensee when he sells a firearm to another

federal firearms licensee. Accordingly, we decline to extend

the holdings of Tallmadge and Batterjee to apply when the

firearm transaction is made between two federal firearms

licensees. Therefore, the district court did not err by failing

to give the requested entrapment by estoppel instruction as

Clark was not acting as an authorized government official in

this context.

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12 UNITED STATES V. RODMAN

III. Buyer-Seller Relationship

Finally, Rodman argues that he was entitled to a jury

instruction explaining the buyer-seller defense to conspiracy. 

The buyer-seller jury instruction is an affirmative defense

available in cases charging conspiracy to distribute a

controlled substance. In such cases, the buyer-seller defense

requires that the government show “‘an agreement to commit

a crime other than the crime that consists of the sale itself.’” 

United States v. Lennick, 18 F.3d 814, 819 (9th Cir. 1994)

(quoting United States v. Lechuga, 994 F.2d 346, 347 (7th

Cir. 1993)). This is necessary because “otherwise, every

narcotics sale would constitute a conspiracy.” Id. In such

cases, the buyer-seller defense is used to distinguish between

a conviction for the sale of narcotics, and a conviction for a

conspiracy to distribute narcotics; it requires the government

to establish that the seller not only sold narcotics to the buyer,

but “that the buyer and seller in a narcotics transaction had an

agreement to further distribute the narcotics in question.” 

United States v. Mincoff, 574 F.3d 1186, 1193–94 (9th Cir.

2009).

Rodman argues is that he is not guilty of conspiracy

because he merely had a buyer-seller relationship with Clark,

and thus was not part of a conspiracy to defraud the

government. This argument is untenable. The elements of

conspiracy to defraud the government under 18 U.S.C. § 371,

the crime of which Rodman was convicted, are

“(1) [defendant] entered into an agreement (2) to obstruct a

lawful function of the government (3) by deceitful or

dishonest means and (4) at least one overt act in furtherance

of the conspiracy.” Caldwell, 989 F.2d at 1059. In asserting

his alleged right to raise the buyer-seller defense, Rodman

refers to sales of post-ban machine guns to which Clark

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UNITED STATES V. RODMAN 13

had affixed the serial numbers of pre-ban machine guns. 

These sales were made in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§§ 922(o)(2)(A)–(B). However, Rodman was not convicted

of conspiracy to distribute these post-ban machine guns. 

Instead, he was convicted of conspiracy to submit fraudulent

transfer forms to the ATF. Even if Rodman could prove that

the government was unable to establish that Clark and

Rodman had an agreement to further distribute the machine

guns beyond the initial sale, Rodman would still have been

found guilty of a conspiracy to defraud the government by

obstructing one of its lawful functions.

A buyer-seller jury instruction would have been

inapposite to the conspiracy of which Rodman was charged,

and the district court did not err in declining to give a buyerseller jury instruction.

IV. Conclusion

Rodman was properly convicted of conspiracy to defraud

the government in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and the

district court did not err when it declined to give jury

instructions for entrapment by estoppel and the buyer-seller

rule. We therefore affirm Rodman’s conviction.

AFFIRMED.

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