Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_05-cr-01242/USCOURTS-azd-4_05-cr-01242-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Adolfo Lopez-Lopez
Defendant
Raul Martinez-Lopez
Defendant
United States of America
Plaintiff

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Document numbers refer to the Clerk's Record in this case.

WO

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Adolfo Lopez-Lopez, aka Raul Martinez-Lopez,

Petitioner,

v.

United States of America,

Respondent.

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CR 05-1242 TUC-DCB

CV 06-489 TUC-DCB

ORDER

Pending before this Court is Petitioner's "Motion for Time Reduction by an

Inmate in Federal Custody" (Petition) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The Court

summarily denies the motion and dismisses this action.

The Petitioner argues that his sentence is unconstitutional because it violates his

equal rights. Petitioner alleges that he is being discriminated against based on his

national origin as an alien because unlike United States citizens he may not participate in

a half-way house-drug program that would afford a one year reduction in his sentence 

(Document 24: Petition at 1-2.)1

 He argues that his sentence should, therefore, be

reduced.

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A. Conviction and Sentence

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Petitioner pleaded guilty on August 2, 2005, to

violating Title 8, U.S.C. § 1326(a) for illegal re-entry after deportation with a sentencing

enhancement pursuant to subsection (b). (Document 6: Indictment.)

On May 24, 2006, the Court sentenced the Petitioner to 67 months imprisonment,

3 years supervised release, and a $100.00 special assessment. (Document 23: Judgment of

Conviction.) Petitioner was sentenced pursuant to the Plea Agreement.

B. 28 U.S.C. § 2255: Summary Dismissal

Title 28 of the United States Code, Section 2255 provides for collateral review of

Petitioner's sentence as follows: 

A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of

Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the

sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or law of the

United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such

sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized

by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court

which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence. 

A motion for such relief may be made at any time.

28 U.S.C. § 2255.

A district court shall summarily dismiss a § 2255 petition "[i]f it plainly appears

from the face of the motion and any annexed exhibits and the prior proceedings in the

case that the movant is not entitled to relief." Rule 4(b), Rules Governing § 2255

Actions. The district court need not hold an evidentiary hearing when the movant's

allegations, viewed against the record, either fail to state a claim for relief or are patently

frivolous. Marrow v. United States, 772 F.2d 525, 526 (9th Cir. 1985). In other words,

the Court may summarily dismiss without ordering a response where the record

conclusively or plainly shows that the movant is not entitled to relief. Baumann v. United

States, 692 F.2d 565, 571 (9th Cir. 1982). Moreover, if there has been a valid waiver of

the right to file a federal habeas corpus petition, a court lacks jurisdiction to hear the case.

Washington v. Lampert, 422 F.3d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 2005).

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While the Court summarily dismisses this Petition based on the waiver of Petitioner's right

to collaterally attack his sentence contained in his Plea Agreement, the Court could equally have made

its findings based on the merits of Petitioner's claims. The Ninth Circuit has explicitly rejected

Petitioner’s equal protection argument in McLean v. Crabtree, 173 F.3d 1176, 1185-86 (9th Cir.

1999). 

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In this case, the record shows that summary dismissal under Rule 4(b) is

warranted and the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the Motion because Petitioner has

waived the right to bring a § 2255 motion.2

C. Waiver: 28 U.S.C. § 2255

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has found that there are “strict standards for

waiver of constitutional rights.” United States v. Gonzalez-Flores, 418 F.3d 1093, 1102

(9th Cir. 2005). It is impermissible to presume waiver from a silent record, and the Court

must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional

rights. Id. In this action, Petitioner’s waiver was clear, express, and unequivocal.

The right to petition for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, like the right to bring a

direct appeal, is statutory. United States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1992)

(citing see Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977) ("The right of appeal, as we

presently know it in criminal cases, is purely a creature of statute....")). Like the waiver

of the right to a direct appeal, a knowing and voluntary waiver of rights under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255 is enforceable. Id. (citing United States v. Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318,

321(9th Cir.1990)). 

Plea agreements are contractual in nature and their plain language will generally

be enforced if the agreement is clear and unambiguous on its face. United States v.

Jeronimo, 398 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005). Therefore, an express waiver of

appellate rights is enforceable if the language of the waiver encompasses the right to

appeal on the grounds raised and the waiver is knowingly and voluntarily made. Id.

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A defendant may waive the statutory right to bring a § 2255 action challenging

the length of his sentence, United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431, 433 (9th Cir. 1994);

Abarca, 985 F.2d at1014. The only claims that cannot be waived are claims that the plea

or waiver itself was involuntary or that ineffective assistance of counsel rendered the plea

or waiver involuntary. See Lampert, 422 F.3d at 871 (holding that a plea agreement that

waives the right to file a federal habeas petition pursuant to § 2254 is unenforceable with

respect to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim that challenges the voluntariness of

the waiver); Pruitt, 32 F.3d at 433 (expressing “doubt” that a plea agreement could waive

a claim that counsel erroneously induced a defendant to plead guilty or accept a particular

part of the plea bargain), Abarca, 985 F.2d at 1014 (expressly declining to hold that a

waiver forecloses a claim of ineffective assistance or involuntariness of the waiver); see

also Jeronimo, 398 F.3d at 1156 n.4 (summarizing Pruitt and Abarca, but declining to

decide whether waiver of all statutory rights included claims implicating the voluntariness

of the waiver). 

“Collateral attacks based on ineffective assistance of counsel claims that are

characterized as falling outside [the category of ineffective assistance of counsel claims

challenging the validity of the plea or the waiver] are waivable.” United States v.

Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 2001). See also Williams v. United States,

396 F.3d 1340, 1342 (11th Cir. 2005) (joining the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and

Tenth Circuits in holding that “a valid sentence-appeal waiver, entered into voluntarily

and knowingly, pursuant to a plea agreement, precludes the defendant from attempting to

attack, in a collateral proceeding, the sentence through a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel during sentencing.”).

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Petitioner made the following waiver: "The defendant waives any and all motions, defenses,

probable cause determinations, and objections which the defendant could assert to the indictment or

information or to the Court’s entry of judgment against the defendant and imposition of sentence

upon the defendant, providing the sentence is consistent with this agreement. The defendant further

waives: (1) any right to appeal the Court’s entry of judgment against defendant; (2) any right to

appeal the imposition of sentence upon defendant under Title 18, United States Code, Section 3742

(sentence appeals); and (3) any right to collaterally attack defendant’s conviction and sentence under

Title 28, United States Code, Section 2255, or any other collateral attack."

 Pursuant to the Plea Agreement, Defendant agreed that upon filing a Petition such as the one

filed here, the case would be remanded to this Court to determine whether he is in breach of the

agreement, and if so, the United States shall be permitted to withdraw from the Plea Agreement. Id.

While the filing of this Petition clearly breaches the Plea Agreement, in the interest of judicial

economy this Court shall dismiss it rather than allow the United States to withdraw from it and

prosecute the Defendant.

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D. The Plea Agreement.

Upon review of the record in this case, it appears that the Petitioner was

sentenced pursuant to a plea agreement containing an express waiver of all appeal rights,

direct and collateral. (Document 11: Plea Agreement at 4.)3

The Petitioner signed the Plea Agreement stating that he had discussed the terms

with his attorney, that he agreed to the terms and conditions, which included the waiver

of his right to appeal, and that he voluntarily and knowingly entered into the Plea

Agreement. Id. at 6-7.) This Court's sentencing colloquy fully complies with Fed. R. Cr.

P. 11, including an inquiry into the voluntariness of any plea agreement, gives notice to

the defendant if the plea agreement contains a waiver of appellate rights and inquires into

the voluntariness of the waiver.

E. Conclusion

Petitioner’s assertions in his § 2255 Motion pertain to sentencing and do not

pertain to the voluntariness of the waiver. Petitioner expressly waived issues regarding

the imposition of sentence and expressly waived a § 2255 action. The Court accepted his

plea as voluntarily made. Compare United States v. Nunez, 223 F.3d 956, 959 (9th Cir.

2000) (waiving appeal of sentencing issues also waives the right to argue on appeal that

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counsel was ineffective at sentencing). Consequently, the Court finds that Petitioner

waived the sentencing issue raised in his § 2255 motion. Because the issue cannot

survive even if Petitioner were permitted to amend the grounds of his Petition, the Court

will summarily dismiss the action as plainly without merit.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner's Motion for Time Reduction by an Inmate in

Federal Custody, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (document 24) filed in CR 05-1242 TUC

DCB and (document 1) filed in CV 06-489 TUC DCB is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Civil case number CV 06-489 TUC-DCB is

DISMISSED with prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment

accordingly.

DATED this 28th day of September, 2006.

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