Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-03553/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-03553-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Brian Duffy
Respondent
Wendell James Tyree
Petitioner

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WENDELL JAMES TYREE,

Petitioner,

v.

BRIAN DUFFY, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No. 15-cv-03553-HSG (PR) 

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS; DENYING 

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Re: Dkt. No. 10

Petitioner, a pro se prisoner, filed this action for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent has moved to dismiss the petition as untimely. Petitioner did not file 

any opposition to the motion, and the time to do so has passed. 

BACKGROUND

A jury convicted petitioner of inflicting corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition 

on a former cohabitant (Cal. Pen. Code § 273.5, subd. (a)), assault with force likely to cause great 

bodily injury (Cal. Pen. Code § 245, subd. (a)(1)), and resisting arrest (Cal. Pen. Code § 148, subd. 

(a)(1)). Ex. A at 2.1 On December 2, 2011, the trial court sentenced petitioner to 25 years to life 

in state prison. Ex. C at 12. On August 20, 2013, the California Court of Appeal modified the 

judgment so as to strike a domestic violence fine but otherwise affirmed. Ex. A at 6. The 

California Supreme Court denied review on October 30, 2013. Ex. C at 2.

On March 27, 2015, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California 

Supreme Court. Ex. B at 2. The petition was denied on July 8, 2015. Id.

 

1 All page numbers used herein refer to those affixed to the top of the page by the court’s 

electronic filing program. All references herein to exhibits are to the exhibits submitted by 

respondent in support of the motion to dismiss.

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Petitioner then filed this action, seeking a writ of habeas corpus. The petition has a 

signature date of July 27, 2015 and was stamped “filed” at the Court on August 3, 2015. As a pro 

se prisoner, petitioner receives the benefit of the prisoner mailbox rule, which deems most 

documents filed when the prisoner gives them to prison officials to mail to the court. See Stillman 

v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 2003). The Court will assume he gave the petition to 

prison officials for mailing on the date he signed it, i.e., July 27, 2015, and deem the federal 

petition filed as of that date. 

DISCUSSION

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) became law on 

April 24, 1996 and imposed for the first time a statute of limitations on petitions for a writ of 

habeas corpus filed by state prisoners. Petitions filed by prisoners challenging non-capital state 

convictions or sentences must be filed within one year of the latest of the date on which: (1) the 

judgment became final after the conclusion of direct review or the time passed for seeking direct 

review; (2) an impediment to filing an application created by unconstitutional state action was 

removed, if such action prevented petitioner from filing; (3) the constitutional right asserted was 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right was newly recognized by the Supreme Court and 

made retroactive to cases on collateral review; or (4) the factual predicate of the claim could have 

been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Time during 

which a properly filed application for state post-conviction or other collateral review is pending is 

excluded from the one-year time limit. Id. § 2244(d)(2).

Here, the judgment became final and the limitations period began on January 28, 2014, 

ninety days after the California Supreme Court denied review. See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 

1159 (9th Cir. 1999) (if a petitioner fails to seek a writ of certiorari from the United States 

Supreme Court, the AEDPA’s one-year limitations period begins to run on the date the ninety-day 

period defined by Supreme Court Rule 13 expires). The presumptive deadline for petitioner to file 

his federal petition was January 27, 2015. He missed that deadline by six months, so unless he 

qualifies for tolling, the petition is untimely. 

//

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A. Statutory Tolling

Petitioner does not claim he is entitled to statutory tolling. Even if petitioner had claimed 

such tolling, however, he would not be eligible for it. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244, the one-year 

limitations period is tolled for the “time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). An application for review remains “pending” in state court until it 

“has achieved final resolution through the State’s post-conviction procedures.” Carey v. Saffold, 

536 U.S. 214, 220 (2002).

Here, petitioner did not file his first state habeas petition until March 27, 2015, two months 

after the limitations period under AEDPA had expired. See Ex. B. A state habeas petition filed 

before AEDPA’s statute of limitations begins to run tolls the limitations period. Jiminez v. Rice, 

276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001). However, a state habeas petition filed after AEDPA’s statute 

of limitations ended cannot toll the limitations period. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 

823 (9th Cir. 2003) (“section 2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that 

has ended before the state petition was filed,” even if the state petition was timely filed).

Accordingly, the Court finds the petition is not rendered timely on the basis of statutory 

tolling. 

B. Equitable Tolling

AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate 

circumstances. Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010). “[A] petitioner is entitled to 

equitable tolling only if he shows (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that 

some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” Id. at 2562 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); accord Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th 

Cir. 1999) (“When external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the 

failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate.”). 

The diligence required to establish entitlement to equitable tolling is “reasonable diligence.” 

Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2565.

Petitioner bears the burden of showing “extraordinary circumstances were the cause of his 

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untimeliness.” Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). Where a petitioner fails to show “any causal connection” between the grounds 

upon which he asserts a right to equitable tolling and his inability to timely file a federal habeas 

application, the equitable tolling claim will be denied. Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034-35 

(9th Cir. 2005). Further, such petitioner must show “his untimeliness was caused by an external 

impediment and not by his own lack of diligence.” Bryant v. Arizona Attorney General, 499 F.3d 

1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 973 (9th Cir. 2006)).

Petitioner does not argue he was prevented from filing his petition on time. Nor is there 

anything in the record to support such a finding.

Accordingly, the Court finds the petition is not rendered timely on the basis of equitable 

tolling.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons:

1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss the instant petition as untimely is GRANTED. 

2. Petitioner has not shown “that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the 

district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

Accordingly, a certificate of appealability is DENIED. 

3. The Clerk shall terminate all pending motions, enter judgment, and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 1, 2016

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

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