Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00754/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00754-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Bhupat R. Bhatti
Plaintiff
County of Sacramento
Defendant
Seleena Ulahannan
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

BHUPAT R. BHATTI,

NO. CIV. S-05-754 WBS PAN (JFM)

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, SELEENA

ULAHANNAN, and DOES 1 to 50,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Bhupat R. Bhatti alleges several causes of

action against defendants, including violation of plaintiff’s

federal and state constitutional rights, actionable under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 and California Civil Code § 52.1, negligence, and

intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. 

(Compl.) Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c),

defendants County of Sacramento and Seleena Ulahannan now move

for summary judgment, maintaining that Ulahannan is entitled to

various immunities for her actions taken as a social worker. The

court agrees that absolute and qualified immunity attaches to

Ulahannan’s conduct and that plaintiff has failed to state a

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As an initial matter, the court notes that defendants 1

have raised dozens of “Objections to Plaintiff’s Response to

Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts.” But despite

defendants’ efforts to couch their arguments in terms of

evidentiary objections, they largely attack only the sufficiency,

not the admissibility, of plaintiff’s facts. For example, under

the heading “Objections” defendants repeatedly contend that

plaintiff’s evidence does not create “a substantial controversy

of fact” or alternatively, a dispute of material fact. (Defs.’

Objections No. 62.) These are simply arguments in furtherance of

their motion for summary judgment--not evidentiary objections.

Moreover, with the exception of their objections to the

declaration of Meena Kumari Bhatti (on which the court has not

relied), defendants primarily target plaintiff’s response to

defendants’ statement of undisputed facts and not the underlying

affidavits on which these statements are based. A plaintiff’s

statement of disputed facts is not evidence, the admissibility of

which can be challenged under the Federal Rules of Evidence. See

also Perma Research & Dev. Co. v. Singer Co., 410 F.2d 572, 579

(2d Cir. 1969) (holding that objections to an affidavit submitted

on a motion for summary judgment “must be precise” and “specify

which parts of the . . . affidavit should be stricken and why”

(emphasis added)); 10B Charles Alan Wright et al., 10B Federal

Practice and Procedure § 2738 (3d ed. 1998 & Supp. 2005) (“[A]

motion to strike should specify the objectionable portions of the

affidavit and the grounds for each objection.”). Consequently,

defendants’ “objections” are not well taken and are overruled. 

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claim against the County defendant. For the following reasons,

summary judgment is warranted. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background1

 Approximately two months after marrying Kulwinder

Bhatti in India, plaintiff returned to the United States without

his wife. (Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Facts (“SUF”) Nos. 1-

2.) Eight months later, in November of 1997, Kulwinder gave

birth to the couple’s son, Ammon Bhatti. (Defs.’ SUF No. 3.) 

Kulwinder raised Ammon in India, largely without plaintiff, until

March 2003. (Defs.’ SUF No. 4.) At that time, after two

extended visits to India, plaintiff arranged for Kulwinder and

Ammon to relocate to the United States. (Defs.’ SUF No. 5.) The

Bhattis then shared a home in Sacramento, California with

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plaintiff’s brother, Sudesh Bhatti, and his family. (Defs.’ SUF

No. 6.)

On August 29, 2003, Ulahannan, a social worker for the

County of Sacramento, responded to an Emergency Response Referral

regarding the potential abuse of Ammon by his mother. (Defs.’

SUF No. 43.) The referral alleged that Kulwinder emotionally

abused, threatened to kill, and generally neglected her son. 

(Defs.’ SUF No. 41.) When Ulahannan arrived at the Bhatti

residence and interviewed Kulwinder and Ammon, both denied abuse

on the part of Kulwinder. (Defs.’ SUF No. 56.) However, both

Kulwinder and Ammon alleged plaintiff was physically and

emotionally abusive towards them. (Id.) During this

conversation, Kulwinder advised Ulahannan that she was scared and

desired to leave the Bhatti residence. (Defs.’ SUF No. 56.) 

Ulahannan then contacted plaintiff, who returned to the

Bhatti residence for an interview. (Defs.’ SUF No. 60.) During

the course of this interview, Kulwinder again expressed her

desire to leave the Bhatti residence and requested assistance

from Ulahannan. (Defs.’ SUF No. 67.) Some form of dispute

between either Ulahannan and plaintiff or plaintiff and Kulwinder

concerning control over passports followed and in response,

Ulahannan requested and received assistance from law enforcement.

(Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ SUF Nos. 63-64.) 

In Ulahannan’s opinion, after over 3 hours of

interviewing Kulwinder, Ammon, plaintiff, and plaintiff’s

brother, there was no evidence of the allegations of abuse made

by the reporter--Kulwinder appeared stable and “very bonded” with

her child. (Ulahannan Decl. ¶ 6.) In contrast, Ulahannan

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The parties dispute the content of Ammon’s statements. 2

Plaintiff and his family members assert that Ammon was saying

that he wanted to stay with “daddy” while Kulwinder claims that

he said “I want to go with you.” (Compare Sudesh Bhatti Decl. ¶

16, with Kulwinder Bhatti Decl. ¶ 6.) Nevertheless, the parties

do not dispute that Ulahannan did not know what Ammon was saying

at this point.

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believed that she had uncovered evidence of domestic abuse

perpetrated by plaintiff and that she faced a situation where the

wife was anxious to leave a seemingly hostile environment. 

Accordingly, after a conference between Ulahannan’s supervisor

and the Emergency Response Program Manager, Kulwinder and Ammon

were offered, and Kulwinder accepted, transportation from the

home. Mother and son were eventually delivered to a Women

Escaping A Violent Environment (“WEAVE”) shelter. (Defs.’ SUF

No. 75.) While these plans were being formulated, plaintiff and

his family vociferously objected to the “removal” of Ammon, who

was crying and making declarations in Punjabi, a language not

understood by Ulahannan.2

This was not the first time that police had been to the

Bhatti residence. Just three days prior, law enforcement

officers had responded to another call, also made by plaintiff’s

sister-in-law Suzanne Bhatti, in which the caller made the same

allegations against Kulwinder that prompted the August 29th CPS

visit. (Defs.’ SUF No. 20.) Like Ulahannan, the officers found

no evidentiary support for Suzanne’s accusations. (Pl.’s Resp.

to Defs.’ SUF No. 31.) However, plaintiff’s complaint does not

appear to implicate the officers involved in either visit. 

In the months following the visits by law enforcement

and CPS, plaintiff fought to regain custody over Ammon. His

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Plaintiff’s declaration that he “was afforded primary 3

custody of Ammon” and that the evaluating psychologist “found

that [he] was a much better parent than Kulwinder” is not

supported by the evidence accompanying this motion or plaintiff’s

opposition. (See Bhupat Bhatti Decl. ¶ 39.) As noted above, the

family court order plainly awards joint custody to Ammon’s

parents and allotted plaintiff only two out of seven days a week. 

Because the order does not specify guardians other than Kulwinder

and Bhupat Bhatti, the court can only assume that Kulwinder has

custody during the rest of the week. (Zal Decl. Ex. 4 (In re

Bhatti, No. 03-FL-05779, slip op. ¶¶ 3-4 (Cal. Super. Ct. June

14, 2004).) Although the order was temporary, plaintiff has not

submitted evidence showing that it was amended. (But see Compl.

¶ 11 (alleging that plaintiff “presently has 70% physical custody

of Ammon”).)

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visitation rights were limited to one day a week. (Bhupat Bhatti

Decl. ¶ 38.) Additionally, Family Court Services (“FCS”) worker

Joyce Medari recommended domestic violence counseling for

plaintiff and his name was submitted to the Child Abuse Central

Index in December, 2003. (Id. ¶ 38, 67.)

Eventually, plaintiff and Kulwinder sought to dissolve

their marriage and the court settled, inter alia, the custody

battle over Ammon. Plaintiff was awarded joint custody,

consisting of “parenting time . . . every weekend from Friday at

6:00 p.m. to Sunday at 6:00 p.m.” (Zal Decl. Ex. 4 (In re 3

Bhatti, No. 03-FL-05779, slip op. ¶¶ 3-4 (Cal. Super. Ct. June

14, 2004).) Additionally, the court found that there was “no

domestic violence” and further declared that the FCS report and

CPS evaluations/findings were “unfounded” and “not to be used or

considered in further evaluations or mediations.” (Id. ¶¶ 6, 8.)

Plaintiff next took his legal battle to federal court,

where he filed the instant action on April 19, 2005. Plaintiff

seeks $4 million in compensatory damages and $1 million in

punitive damages based on the following claims: (1) violation of

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his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, actionable under 42

U.S.C. § 1983; (2) violation of his federal and state civil

rights, actionable under Cal. Civ. Code §§ 52.1 et seq.; (3)

negligence; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and

(5) negligent infliction of emotional distress. Defendants now

move for summary judgment, arguing that defendant Ulahannan is

entitled to either absolute or qualified immunity and that

plaintiff failed to plead, and alternatively cannot prove, a

Monell claim against defendant County. See Monell v. Dep’t of

Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). 

II. Discussion

A. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c). A material fact is one that could affect the outcome of

the suit, and a genuine issue is one that could permit a

reasonable jury to enter a verdict in the non-moving party’s

favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). 

The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial

burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact and can satisfy this burden by presenting evidence that

negates an essential element of the non-moving party’s case. 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). 

Alternatively, the movant can demonstrate that the non-moving

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party cannot provide evidence to support an essential element

upon which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id.

Any inferences drawn from the underlying facts must, however, be

viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the

motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 

B. Section 1983 Claims

Defendants argue that qualified, and in some instances

absolute, immunities bar plaintiff’s § 1983 claim. The Ninth

Circuit has held that social workers enjoy absolute immunity for

“discretionary, quasi-prosecutorial decisions”, Miller v.

Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 898 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Meyers v.

Contra Costa County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d 1154, 1157

(9th Cir. 1987)), and for “‘quasi-judicial’ actions in the

context of child welfare proceedings,” Caldwell v. LeFaver, 928

F.2d 331, 333 (9th Cir. 1991). However, the scope of this

immunity is “extremely narrow.” Miller, 335 F.3d at 898. Thus,

while social workers may claim absolute immunity, for example,

for decisions to institute dependency proceedings and for

submissions made to a court, they are not similarly protected

when they take actions to detain juveniles prior to any

dependency proceedings. Doe v. Lebbos, 348 F.3d 820, 825-26 (9th

Cir. 2003); Miller, 335 F.3d at 898; cf. Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d

1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that prosecutorial immunity,

on which social worker immunity is partially based, does not

extend to investigatory or administrative functions separate from

a prosecutor’s role as judicial a advocate).

More generally, social workers are also entitled to the

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immunities afforded to testifying witnesses. See Holt v.

Castaneda, 832 F.2d 123, 125 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that

“officer witnesses enjoy the same absolute immunity from

liability under section 1983 that private witnesses enjoy”). 

Significantly, witnesses who simply testify in an adversarial

setting are afforded immunity for their testimony--including

false testimony. White v. Frank, 855 F.2d 956, 958 (2d Cir.

1988); see also Burns v. County of King, 883 F.2d 819, 822 (9th

Cir. 1989) (noting that the Ninth Circuit has extended witness

immunity to adversarial pretrial proceedings and probation

officers’ pre-sentencing reports, which “serve a function

integral to the independent judicial process”). In contrast,

“those who play[] a role in initiating a prosecution--the

complaining witness--[do] not enjoy immunity.” White, 855 F.2d

at 958. Therefore, to the extent that Ulahannan was not the

“person ‘who actively instigated or encouraged [a] prosecution of

the plaintiff’” she is entitled to absolute immunity. Kulas v.

Flores, 255 F.3d 780, 783 n.1 (9th Cir. 2001) (defining

complaining witness). 

Plaintiff bases his § 1983 claim on alleged violations

of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. With regard to

the Fourth Amendment, plaintiff alleges an unreasonable seizure

and detention of his son, Ammon. However, plaintiff does not

have standing to claim a violation of his son’s Fourth Amendment

right to be free of unreasonable seizure and therefore has no

claim based on this theory. See Alderman v. United States, 394

U.S. 165, 174 (1969) (recognizing the “general rule that Fourth

Amendment rights are personal rights which, like some other

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Because plaintiff has a Fourteenth Amendment claim 4

based on the same conduct, however, this distinction is largely

irrelevant because “the same legal standard applies in evaluating

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims for the removal of

children . . . .” Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1137 n.8

(9th Cir. 2000) (observing that “[t]he claims of the parents [for

the wrongful seizure of their children] should properly be

assessed under the Fourteenth Amendment standard for interference

with the right to family association”).

Plaintiff also claims that his name was wrongly 5

submitted to the Child Abuse Central Index, (compl. ¶ 13), but

fails to identify the responsible actor. In the absence of

allegations or evidence that Ulahannan was directly involved, the

court assumes that this event was at most a consequence of

Ulahannan’s allegedly false reports and not something that she

personally accomplished. 

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constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted”); Mabe v.

San Bernardino County Dep’t of Pub. Soc. Servs., 237 F.3d 1101,

1111 (9th Cir. 2001) (same). As to the Fourteenth Amendment, 4

plaintiff alleges that defendants interfered with his right to

familial association by: (1) generating false reports, giving

false testimony, hiding evidence, and distorting the child abuse

investigation in an effort to keep Ammon out of plaintiff’s

custody; and (2) unlawfully seizing, detaining, and transporting

his son to a WEAVE shelter.

1. Ulahannan’s False Reports and Testimony

Plaintiff alleges that, during the investigation into

the abuse of Ammon and Kulwinder, Ulahannan generated false

reports, gave false testimony, concealed evidence, and

misrepresented the results of her investigation. (Compl. ¶ 13.) 5

These claims appear to be based on the same factual predicate;

namely that Ulahannan reported, and then testified in the Bhatti

divorce proceedings, that some of her information about domestic

abuse in the Bhatti household came from her interview with sixCase 2:05-cv-00754-WBS-EFB Document 53 Filed 06/01/06 Page 9 of 24
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year-old Ammon, which was purportedly conducted in Hindi. 

Plaintiff maintains that Ammon did not speak Hindi, although his

mother testified that “he could understand a little Hindi because

Punjabi [his native tongue] and Hindi are pretty closely

related.” (Zal Decl. Ex. 3 (Kulwinder Dep. 12:1-3).) 

Additionally, even plaintiff admits that Ammon “began to learn

the Hindi alphabet when he was about 4 [and a half] . . . .” 

(Bhupat Bhatti Decl. ¶ 61.)

As an initial matter, the court questions whether the

alleged conduct regarding Ulahannan’s reports and testimony

actually violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights, which is a

threshold question in a § 1983 case. See Baker v. McCollan, 443

U.S. 137, 140 (1979) (“The first inquiry in any § 1983 suit . . .

is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a right ‘secured by

the Constitution and laws.’”). The Ninth Circuit has held that

“there is no constitutional due process right to have child

witnesses, in [an] . . . abuse investigation, interviewed in a

particular manner or pursuant to a certain protocol.” Devereaux

v. Perez, 218 F.3d 1045, 1053 (9th Cir. 2000). Specifically, the

court in Devereaux rejected a parent’s “claimed legal right to

have [an] . . . abuse investigation conducted in such a manner to

avoid leading questions, influencing or manipulating the child

witnesses, or eliciting inconsistent statements.” Id. at 1054. 

Under an extension of the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning

then, the court would be justified in holding that even if

Ulahannan could barely communicate with Ammon and manipulated his

statements, this conduct did not violate plaintiff’s rights under

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Although the court believes that Devereaux provides 6

useful guidance, it is reluctant to base its decision entirely on

the observations of the court made therein because (1) the case

involved the alleged sexual abuse of a child, a fact that the

court seemed particularly motivated by, and (2) the court was

discussing the application of the qualified immunity doctrine,

and not more generally whether parents can base a § 1983 claim on

an allegedly inadequate, if not corrupt, investigation into

accusations of abuse. 

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federal law. The Constitution does not provide plaintiff with a 6

right to an error free abuse investigation. See Daniels v.

Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 333 (1986) (“Where a government

official’s act causing injury to life, liberty, or property is

merely negligent, no procedure for compensation is

constitutionally required.” (quotation omitted)); Watterson v.

Page, 987 F.2d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1993) (“The right to family

integrity clearly does not include a constitutional right to be

free from child abuse investigations.”).

Even assuming that Ulahannan’s conduct implicated

plaintiff’s constitutional rights, however, she is nonetheless

entitled to absolute immunity for her conduct in reporting and

testifying about alleged domestic abuse in the Bhatti home. 

Regarding her reporting activities, the court notes that absolute

immunity attaches when social workers are engaged in “quasiprosecutorial functions”--including instances “where a social

worker contributes as an advocate to an informed judgment by an

impartial decisionmaker.” Caldwell, 928 F.2d at 333; see also

Lebbos, 348 F.3d at 823 (citing Mabe for the proposition that

“where there [are] allegations that social workers did not

conduct their investigation properly and submitted false evidence

during juvenile court proceedings, . . . social workers [are]

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Indeed, in the proceedings at issue in this case, the 7

family court commissioner illustrated how the system is designed

to keep false reports in check when he determined that

Ulahannan’s reports were “unfounded” and “not to be used or

considered in further evaluations or mediations.” (Zal Decl. Ex.

4 (In re Bhatti, No. 03-FL-05779, slip op. ¶¶ 6, 8 (Cal. Super.

Ct. June 14, 2004).)

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entitled to absolute immunity because their actions were part of

the initiation and pursuit of dependency proceedings”). 

Relatedly, several courts have recognized that in preparing

reports that will help the court in its fact-finding mission,

government officials act in a quasi-judicial capacity. Demoran

v. Witt, 781 F.2d 155, 157 (9th Cir. 1986) (probation officers);

Ward v. San Diego County Dep’t of Soc. Sevs., 691 F. Supp. 238,

239, 241 (S.D. Cal. 1988) (guardian ad litem). Underlying these

decisions is a recognition that “the threat of civil liability is

not necessary” because the “judicial system provides procedural

safeguards to protect against misconduct . . . .” Ward, 691 F. 7

Supp. at 240-41 (citing Meyers, 812 F.2d at 1158). Consistent

with these decisions and policy considerations, absolute immunity

for Ulahannan’s allegedly imperfect investigation and subsequent

reports is warranted.

Regarding plaintiff’s allegations that Ulahannan gave

false testimony and misrepresented the results of her

investigation while under oath in the family court proceedings,

she is likewise entitled to absolute immunity. The Ninth Circuit

has recognized that prosecution for perjury, not the imposition

of civil liability, is sufficient to deter witnesses “from

inflicting constitutional injury through false testimony.” Holt

v. Castaneda, 832 F.2d 123, 125 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Briggs

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Plaintiff describes a more complicated “conspiracy” in 8

which Ulahannan allegedly planned to take Kulwinder and Ammon to

a relative’s house in Oakley, California, where others would

assist Kulwinder in a scheme to take Ammon back to India. (Pl.’s

SUF No. 86.) However, discovery is complete in the case and

plaintiff has not produced any evidence that Ulahannan delivered

Kulwinder and Ammon to a destination other than her CPS office or

the WEAVE shelter, where she eventually left them. (July 14,

2005 Scheduling Order 2 (closing discovery on February 15,

2006).) Therefore, based on the facts before this court,

Ulahannan’s conduct appears to have been in accordance with state

procedures for responding to domestic violence accusations. See

Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 18294(h) (permitting social services

workers to provide “[e]mergency transportation to the shelter,

and when appropriate, arrangements with local law enforcement for

assistance in providing such transportation”).

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v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 10, 54 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). In the context of

a § 1983 suit, Ulahannan’s testimonial acts, performed in an

adversarial proceeding, constituted protected activities and she

is therefore entitled to absolute immunity for this conduct. 

2. Ulahannan’s “Removal” of Ammon from the Bhatti

Residence

Regarding plaintiff’s claim of interference with

familial association arising out of the transportation of Ammon

from the Bhatti residence to the WEAVE shelter, defendants

maintain that Ulahannan is entitled to qualified, rather than

absolute, immunity. The applicability of qualified immunity is 8

determined through a two-step inquiry where the court asks: “(1)

whether, ‘taken in the light most favorable to the party

asserting the injury, the facts alleged show the officer’s

conduct violated a constitutional right’; and, if a violation of

a constitutional right [can] indeed be found, (2) ‘whether the

right was clearly established.’” Sissoko v. Rocha, 412 F.3d

1021, 1038 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.

194, 201 (2001)). In other words, qualified immunity shields

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government officials from liability for a violation of

plaintiffs’ rights if “the official[s] objectively could have

believed the conduct was lawful.” Ram v. Rubin, 118 F.3d 1306,

1310 (9th Cir. 1997) (involving the qualified immunity of a

social worker and a police officer); see also Devereaux, 218 F.3d

at 1059 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (“The question, in a

qualified immunity legal analysis, boils down to ‘Should they

have known better?’”). Significantly, plaintiff bears the burden

of establishing that the claimed constitutional right was

“clearly established” at the time of the allegedly illegal

conduct. Maraziti v. First Interstate Bank, 953 F.2d 520, 523

(9th Cir. 1992). 

The right claimed by plaintiff, the right to familial

association, is a recognized substantive due process right

unquestionably protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Lee v.

City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 685 (9th Cir. 2001) (“It is well

established that a parent has a ‘fundamental liberty interest’ in

‘the companionship and society of his or her child’ and that

‘[t]he state’s interference with that liberty interest without

due process of law is remediable under [42 U.S.C. §] 1983.’”

(quoting Kelson v. City of Springfield, 767 F.2d 651, 654-55

(9th. Cir. 1985)) (alterations in original)). Decidedly less

clear, as discussed above, is how this right can be violated,

given that a parent’s interest in the care, custody, and

management of their child is not absolute. Caldwell, 928 F.2d at

333. A government actor can interfere with familial association

in a reasonable manner depending on the strength of the

government’s interest in the situation. See Smith v. City of

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Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1418 (9th Cir. 1987); see also, e.g.,

Wallis, 202 F.3d at 1138 (requiring reasonable cause to believe a

child is in imminent danger before government officials can

remove that child from its parent’s custody); Frazier v. Bailey,

957 F.2d 920, 931 (1st Cir. 1992) (acknowledging the substantive

due process right to familial association must always be balanced

against the government interest involved). Moreover, “[t]he

Fourteenth Amendment does not protect against all deprivations of

liberty, ‘only against deprivations of liberty accomplished

without due process of law.’” Devereaux, 218 F.3d at 1053

(quoting Baker, 443 U.S. at 145). 

Here, Ulahannan’s conduct did not unreasonably

interfere with the Bhatti family’s ability to associate. First,

Ulahannan believed that an emergency situation existed, based on

allegations of domestic abuse made by Kulwinder and under such

circumstances, her interference was warranted. See Caldwell, 928

F.2d at 333 (“In an emergency situation, a state agency may

remove children from their parents’ custody when the children are

subject to immediate or apparent danger or harm.”). Second,

Ulahannan did not actually remove Ammon from parental custody, as

he remained in the physical custody of his natural mother at all

times. (Kulwinder Decl. ¶¶ 6-7.) Additionally, neither

Kulwinder nor Ammon were detained, seized, or otherwise held

against their will by government officials when Kulwinder

requested and accepted an offer of transportation away from an

allegedly abusive environment. (Id. ¶ 6); see Caldwell, 928 F.2d

at 334 (implicitly holding that a social worker does not violate

a parent’s right to family integrity by removing a child from one

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custodial parent’s custody and placing the child with another

person who has legal custody rights); see also Cal. Welf. & Inst.

Code § 309(a) (outlining the required procedures that must be

followed immediately after a child is taken into temporary

custody and, significantly, noting that the social worker’s

procedural obligations are fulfilled once she releases the child

to a parent). Ulahannan consequently did not violate plaintiff’s

Fourteenth Amendment rights by transporting Ammon to the WEAVE

shelter.

Moreover, even if Ulahannan’s actions had violated

plaintiff’s constitutional rights, plaintiff has cited no

authority for the proposition that separating a child and one of

his custodial parents from the other custodial parent who has

been accused of domestic abuse violates a clearly established

constitutional right. Cf. Manzano v. S.D. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,

60 F.3d 505, 511 (8th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he parental liberty

interest in keeping the family unit intact is not a clearly

established right in the context of reasonable suspicion that

parents may be abusing children.” (citation omitted)); Callahan

v. Lancaster-Lebanon Intermediate Unit 13, 880 F. Supp. 319, 329

(E.D. Pa. 1994) (commenting that “in the context of child care

workers investigating and bringing child abuse proceedings, there

are no ‘clearly established’ substantive due process rights held

by parents”). Absent such authority, Ulahannan could have

objectively believed that her actions were reasonable. 

Specifically, Ulahannan acted on what she believed to

be statements from Kulwinder and Ammon that plaintiff was

abusive. (See Ulahannan Decl. ¶ 6; Ex. B 4-5.) She then provided

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emergency transportation as prescribed by California Welfare and

Institutions Code § 18294. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 18294(h)

(“Such programs shall be designed to provide the following basic

services to victims of domestic violence and their children: . .

. (h) Emergency transportation to the shelter and, when

appropriate, arrangements with local law enforcement for

assistance in providing such transportation.”); see also

Caldwell, 928 F.2d at 334 (noting that when a social worker acts

consistently with a state statute, this is an important

consideration in deciding whether the social worker violated a

clear constitutional right). Finally, she pursued this course of

action with support from her supervisor and the program manager,

suggesting that other social workers would have followed the

same, objectively reasonable, course of conduct. (Id. ¶ 6.) 

Again, in the absence of any authority suggesting otherwise,

which it was plaintiff’s burden to produce, the court fails to

see how these actions violated plaintiff’s clearly established

constitutional rights. Ulahannan is consequently entitled to

qualified immunity for the transportation of Ammon and his mother

to the WEAVE shelter.

3. Liability of Defendant County Under § 1983

Although defendant Ulahannan is entitled to immunities,

these personal exemptions do not extend from the individual

government official to the municipality for which she works. 

Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence &

Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 166 (1993) (“[U]nlike various

government officials, municipalities do not enjoy immunity from

suit--either absolute or qualified--under § 1983.”). 

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Nevertheless, “a municipality cannot be held liable solely

because it employs a tortfeasor--or, in other words, a

municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat

superior theory.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. With respect to

claims against the county, plaintiff must instead allege that (1)

the violation was committed pursuant to a formal county policy or

a “longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the

‘standard operating procedure’ of the local governmental entity”,

Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989); (2)

the individual who committed the tort was an official with final

decision-making authority, Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475

U.S. 469, 480-81 (1986); or (3) an official with final

decision-making authority ratified a subordinate’s action and its

basis, City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988). 

See also Anthony v. County of Sacramento, 898 F. Supp. 1435, 1451

(E.D. Cal. 1995). Additionally, “plaintiff must demonstrate that

the official policy ‘evidences a “deliberate indifference”’ to

his constitutional rights.” Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470,

1477 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.

378, 389 (1989)). 

Plaintiff bases his § 1983 claim on the policy or

custom theory of municipal liability and further contends in his

opposition to this motion that defendant County, through

Ulahannan’s supervisor’s actions, ratified her conduct. (Compl.

¶¶ 7, 15, 16.; Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. 46.) In

support of these arguments, plaintiff has conceived of five

policies that “if shown to exist” amount to deliberate

indifference to plaintiff’s constitutional rights. (Pl.’s Opp’n

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to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. 45 (emphasis added).) Specifically,

plaintiff maintains that the following policies led to

deprivation of his rights: (1) “A policy of failing to train

[Ulahannan] and her supervisors”; (2) “A policy of allowing and

supporting the violations of parents’ rights by social workers”;

(3) “A policy of covering up the violations of parents’ rights by

social workers”; (4) “A policy of falsifying evidence”; and (5)

“A policy of committing perjury and condoning perjury.” (Id.) 

In support of these theories, plaintiff does not direct the court

to any tangible county policy but instead contends that the

Ulahannan’s supervisors, whom she consulted, “may be fairly said

to represent the official policy of Sacramento County.” (Pl.’s

Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. 46.) Alternatively, plaintiff

contends that a custom can be inferred from the County’s

suspected failure to discipline or reprimand Ulahannan. (Id. at

47.) 

a. Acts by a Final Policymaker

Contrary to plaintiff’s arguments, “supervisor” is not

inherently synonymous with “final policymaker.” Rather, a final

policymaker, for purposes of § 1983 municipal liability, is “some

official or body that has the responsibility for making law or

setting policy in any given area of a local government’s

business.” Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 124. Significantly,

plaintiff has not provided any legal support, and merely assumes,

that plaintiff’s supervisor, Fermin Perez, and Melinda Lake, the

Emergency Response Program Manager consulted during Ulahannan’s

response, serve in such a capacity. Although “the

identification of policymaking officials is not . . . a question

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of fact in the usual sense,” at a minimum the party seeking to

avoid summary judgment must provide the court with the titles of

those involved so that it can evaluate the viability of the nonmovant’s claims. See id. at 124-25 (holding that “the

identification of policymaking officials is a question of state

law”). Plaintiff has not even provided this basic information

for Perez. Consequently, because plaintiff has failed to meet

his burden, the court cannot deny summary judgment based on his

final policymaker arguments.

b. Failure to Reprimand

Alternatively, plaintiff attempts to create a question

of fact as to whether his injuries were the result of a county

policy by arguing that the County ratified Ulahannan’s conduct

when it allegedly failed to reprimand Ulahannan or “admit that

[her] conduct was in error.” (Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for

Summ. J. 47.) Generally, “isolated instances of official

misconduct are insufficient to establish municipal liability

under Monell.” Henry v. County of Shasta, 132 F.3d 512, 519 (9th

Cir. 1997) (citing Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985)). 

However, the Ninth Circuit has held that failure to fire or

reprimand officers in light of “a blatantly unconstitutional

course of treatment” can serve as “persuasive evidence of

deliberate indifference or of a policy encouraging such official

misconduct.” Id. at 520.

In Henry, several officers were involved in an incident

where the plaintiff was held naked in a urine-stained padded

cell, paraded through the station house naked, and made to suffer

other indignities in an effort to get him to sign his traffic

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ticket. Id. Additionally, two other individuals testified that

they had experienced similar treatment in the months following

the plaintiff’s arrest. Id. at 518. Despite having been sued

for “a blatantly unconstitutional course of treatment”

perpetrated by a host of officers, the municipality did not take

any disciplinary action. Id. at 520. Based on these

circumstances, the Ninth Circuit held that “[w]hen a county

continues to turn a blind eye to severe violations of . . .

constitutional rights--despite having received notice of such

violations--a rational fact finder may properly infer the

existence of a previous policy or custom of deliberate

indifference.” Henry v. County of Shasta, 137 F.3d 1372 (9th

Cir. 1998) (amended opinion).

However, as the emphasized language suggests, the Ninth

Circuit has applied this rule only “when there were very clear

instances of abuse and gross recklessness.” Harrington v. City

of Napa, No. C 04-00958, 2005 WL 1656883, at *8 (N.D. Cal. July

14, 2005). Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has subsequently noted

that failure to discipline a municipal actor for an isolated

incident does not, standing alone, constitute ratification. 

Haugen v. Brosseau, 351 F.3d 372, 393 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing for

support Santiago v. Fenton, 891 F.2d 373, 382 (1st Cir. 1989),

where the First Circuit “refus[ed] to hold that the ‘failure of a

police department to discipline in a specific instance is an

adequate basis for municipal liability under Monell’”)), rev’d on

other grounds, Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (2004); see also

Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1348 (9th Cir. 1992)

(observing that “fail[ure] to overrule the unconstitutional

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discretionary acts of subordinates would simply smuggle

respondeat superior liability into section 1983 law”). 

Therefore, Henry should not be broadly read to support the

proposition that “post-event evidence . . . of a municipal

defendant’s policy or custom” can be used to create an issue of

fact sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Henry,

132 F.3d at 519. The holding is limited by its plain language to

circumstances where officers “blatantly” violated constitutional

rights.

As already noted, the court has doubts that plaintiff’s

constitutional rights were even violated here. Accordingly, any

violation here was not blatant. Moreover, despite having the

opportunity to depose Ulahannan, plaintiff has not presented any

evidence that she was or was not reprimanded. He offers only

speculation, which is insufficient to create a question of fact. 

(See Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. 47 (noting only

that “defendants have presented no evidence that [Ulahannan] was

even reprimanded”)); Karam v. City of Burbank, 352 F.3d 1188,

1194 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that “speculation . . . does not

rise to the level of evidence sufficient to survive summary

judgment”). Therefore, given that plaintiff has failed to show

that the County had an actual policy that violated his rights or

that, in ratifying Ulahannan’s conduct, the County implicitly

adopted such a policy, summary judgment for the County is

warranted.

///

///

///

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C. Remaining State Law Claims

Section 1367(c)(3) allows a district court to decline

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim

where, as here, “the district court has dismissed all claims over

which it has original jurisdiction . . . .” 28 U.S.C. §

1367(c)(3). Factors for the court to consider in deciding

whether to dismiss supplemental state claims include judicial

economy, convenience, fairness, and comity. Imagineering, Inc.

v. Kiewit Pac. Co., 976 F.2d 1303, 1309 (9th Cir. 1992). “[I]n

the usual case in which federal law claims are eliminated before

trial, the balance of factors . . . will point toward declining

to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.” 

Reynolds v. County of San Diego, 84 F.3d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir.

1996) overruled on other grounds by Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc.,

114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997). On prior occasions, this

court has noted that some circuits have gone even farther and

held that, absent extraordinary or unusual circumstances, federal

courts should not retain jurisdiction. See, e.g., Musson

Theatrical, Inc. v. Fed. Express Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1255 (6th

Cir. 1996); Wentzka v. Gellman, 991 F.2d 423, 425 (7th Cir.

1993).

While litigation of a new suit in state court may

somewhat inconvenience plaintiff, plaintiff has not argued that,

in the event that the court decides to dismiss his federal

claims, extraordinary or unusual circumstances nevertheless

support continued federal jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court

declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §

1367(c)(3) as to the remaining state law claims.

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion for

summary judgment be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED. 

DATED: May 31, 2006

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