Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_21-cv-02246/USCOURTS-caed-2_21-cv-02246-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Linanne Marie Turner
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LINANNE MARIE TURNER,

Plaintiff,

v.

MARTIN O’MALLEY, 

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY,

Defendant.

Case No. 2:21-cv-02246-JDP

ORDER 

GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL

ATTORNEY FEES UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 

406(b) 

ECF No. 15

Plaintiff prevailed in this action after the parties stipulated to voluntary remand and entry 

of judgment under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). ECF Nos. 11 & 12. The Social Security Administration 

(“SSA”) subsequently determined that plaintiff was disabled and granted her $79,286.00 in pastdue benefits. ECF No. 15-2; ECF No. 15-3 at 2. Plaintiff’s counsel filed a motion seeking 

$9,000.00 in attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), with a credit to plaintiff for the fees 

previously awarded under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), in the 

amount of $1,200.00. ECF No. 15; see also ECF No. 14. For the reasons discussed below, I find 

that counsel’s fee request is reasonable, and grant the motion.

An attorney is entitled to reasonable fees for successfully representing social security 

claimants in district court. 

Case 2:21-cv-02246-JDP Document 18 Filed 04/26/24 Page 1 of 3
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Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under 

this subchapter who was represented before the court by an 

attorney, the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment 

a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent 

of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled 

by reason of such judgment.

42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). Rather than being paid by the government, fees under section 406(b) 

are paid by the claimant from the awarded past-due benefits. Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 

1147 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (citing Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 802 (2002)). The 

twenty-five percent statutory maximum fee is not an automatic entitlement; the court must ensure 

that the requested fee is reasonable. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808-09 (“We hold that § 406(b) does 

not displace contingent-fee agreements within the statutory ceiling; instead, § 406(b) instructs 

courts to review for reasonableness fees yielded by those agreements.”). In assessing whether a 

fee is reasonable, the court should consider “the character of the representation and the results the 

representative achieved.” Id. at 808. A “court may properly reduce the fee for substandard 

performance, delay, or benefits that are not in proportion to the time spent on the case.” 

Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151.

Plaintiff entered into a contingency-fee agreement with counsel that stated in relevant 

part:

If this matter requires judicial review of any adverse decision of the 

Social Security Administration, the fee for successful prosecution 

of this matter is a separate 25% of the past due benefits awarded 

upon reversal of any unfavorable ALJ decision for work before 

the court.

ECF No. 15-1 at ¶ 4 (emphasis in original). The docket shows that after plaintiff’s counsel filed a 

complaint challenging the Commissioner’s disability denial, the parties’ stipulated to voluntary 

remand and entry of judgment. See ECF Nos. 1, 10-12. During remand proceedings, the SSA 

found that plaintiff is disabled, and granted her $79,286.00 in retroactive benefits.1 See ECF No. 

15-2; ECF No. 15-3.

1 The SSA’s Notice of Award states that plaintiff is entitled to past-due monthly benefits 

in amounts ranging from $1,548.20 to $1,862.90 during the time period January 2020 through 

December 2023. ECF No. 15-3 at 1. The Notice also states that the SSA withheld $19,821.50, 

which was twenty-five percent of past-due benefits, to pay her representative. Id. at 2. Based on 

these figures, the court accepts $79,286.00 as a reasonable determination of the total amount of 

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Counsel’s billing records reflect that 4.3 hours of attorney time and 2.2 hours of paralegal 

time were spent litigating the case. ECF No. 15-4. An award of $9,000.00 for 6.5 combined 

hours of attorney and paralegal work translates to an effective hourly rate of approximately 

$1,384.62. Other district courts have approved similar or even higher de facto hourly rates under 

42 U.S.C. § 406(b). See, e.g., Bridget M. v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL 18142544, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 

13, 2022) (“The Court finds an award of $24,750.00 for 16.5 hours of combined attorney and 

paralegal time–yielding a combined effective hourly rate of $1,500–is appropriate.”); Ramon R. v. 

Saul, 2021 WL 4805438, at *5 (C.D. Cal. June 3, 2021) (finding reasonable effective hourly rate 

of $1,400 for combined attorney and paralegal work); Langston v. Saul, 2020 WL 4501941, at *3 

(E.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2020) (approving effective hourly rate of $1,453.42 for combined attorney and 

paralegal work).

There is no indication that a reduction in fees is warranted because of dilatory conduct or 

substandard assistance on counsel’s part. Additionally, the requested award of $9,000.00 only 

amounts to 11.4 percent of plaintiff’s retroactive benefits—well below the cap of twenty-five 

percent that the parties stipulated to in the contingency-fee agreement. Given the result obtained 

in this case, and the risk of loss that counsel assumed in representing plaintiff, the court finds the 

requested award reasonable. 

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that: 

1. Plaintiff’s counsel’s motion for attorney’s fees, ECF No. 15, is granted.

2. Plaintiff’s counsel is awarded $9,000.00 in fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b).

3. Plaintiff’s counsel is directed to reimburse plaintiff the sum of $1,200.00 for 

previously paid EAJA fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 25, 2024 

JEREMY D. PETERSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

retroactive benefits. 

Case 2:21-cv-02246-JDP Document 18 Filed 04/26/24 Page 3 of 3