Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-2_06-cv-00637/USCOURTS-alsd-2_06-cv-00637-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert Gaines
Defendant
Alberto Gonzales
Respondent
Paul Mousset Joseph
Petitioner

Document Text:

1 Robert Gaines is no longer the acting warden of the Perry County Correctional

Center. Accordingly, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the new warden of the Perry County Correctional Center, David O. Strieff, is hereby

substituted for Gaines as a proper respondent in this action. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

PAUL MOUSSET JOSEPH, :

Petitioner, :

vs. : CA 06-0637-KD-C

ALBERTO GONZALES, :

et al.,1

:

Respondents.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

On October 6, 2006, Paul Mousset Joseph, a native and citizen of Haiti

ordered removed from the United States, petitioned this Court for habeas relief

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This matter has been referred to the undersigned

for entry of a report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)

and Local Rule 72.1(c). It is recommended that the instant petition be

dismissed because petitioner is no longer in the custody of the United States

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) arm of the United States

Department of Homeland Security, having been repatriated to his native

Case 2:06-cv-00637-KD-C Document 14 Filed 12/18/06 Page 1 of 8
2 In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court held that the post-removal-period detention

statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1231, “read in light of the Constitution’s demands, limits an alien’s postremoval-period detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal

from the United States. It does not permit indefinite detention.” 533 U.S. at 689, 121 S.Ct. at

2498. 

3 Petitioner never objected to his removal to Haiti as evidenced by his complete

cooperation with the federal respondents regarding issuance of his travel document to Haiti. (Id.

(“Petitioner does not intend on fighting his case.”))

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country of Haiti.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Joseph, a native and citizen of Haiti, entered the United States

as a refugee on May 31, 1985. (Doc. 10, Exhibit C, Declaration of Jim D.

Thorp, ¶ 3) On March 3, 1986, petitioner’s status was adjusted to that of

permanent legal resident. (Id.) Joseph’s sole argument, in his habeas petition

filed on October 6, 2006, was that his continued custody by ICE violated the

provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) as interpreted by the Supreme Court in

Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001).

(See Doc. 1, at 1)2

 Petitioner sought release from “actual physical confinement

after twenty-two months plus in DHS/ICE detention.” (Id.)3

2. Joseph was taken into ICE custody on November 17, 2004,

following completion of a state sentence on aggravated assault and theft

charges in Georgia. (Id.)

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3. By order dated March 17, 2005, Immigration Judge William A.

Cassidy ruled that Joseph was to be removed from the United States and

returned to his native country of Haiti. (Doc. 10, Exhibit A) Decisions to

continue Joseph’s detention pending his removal to Haiti were made on June

27, 2005 (Doc. 10, Exhibit C, Thorp declar., at ¶ 6) and, again, on October 17,

2005 (Doc. 10, Exhibit D). 

4. Joseph was transferred to the Etowah County Jail in Gadsden,

Alabama on November 26, 2006 and released from that facility the following

day, November 27, 2006, for the purpose of effectuating his deportation to

Haiti. (Compare Doc. 13, Exhibit A with id. Exhibit B) 

On November 28, 2006, JOSEPH was deported to his native

Haiti via JPATS. The United States Marshals Service runs the

JPATS transportation system. ICE turns over subjects that are to

be deported via JPATS to the Officers/crew of the aircraft and

they verify the subjects’ departure on the Warrant of

Deportation (I-205). After the subjects are returned to their

native countries the Officers sign the Warrants and return them

to the respective ICE Field Offices via a self addressed stamped

envelope that is provided them. The return of signed and served

Warrants from a JPATS removal typically takes between two

and six weeks. ICE has not received the signed and served

Warrant for the above named subject from the JPATS Officers

as of yet. I have attached a copy of our Record of Persons and

Property Transferred (I-216), which shows that the subject was

turned over to the JPATS Officers for removal on November 28,

2006.

(Doc. 13, Exhibit C, Declaration of Earl K. Kennedy; see also id., Exhibit B,

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Record of Persons and Property Transferred) 

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. “In reviewing a petition for writ of habeas corpus by a detained

alien who is subject to a final order of removal, a federal district court,

pursuant to the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3), is to gauge whether a

particular set of circumstances amounts to detention within, or beyond, a

period reasonably necessary to secure removal.” He v. Gonzales, 2006 WL

1687796, *1 (W.D. La. 2006). Where, as here, a § 2241 petitioner has been

released from federal custody and repatriated to his native country, thereby

garnering the relief sought in filing his habeas corpus petition, the issue

becomes whether there is any longer a live case or controversy or, instead, if

the petition has become moot. See id.

2. As recognized by the Eleventh Circuit, “Article III of the

Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to the consideration of

‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” Soliman v. United States ex rel. INS, 296 F.3d

1237, 1242 (11th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted); see also Al Najjar v. Ashcroft,

273 F.3d 1330, 1335 (11th Cir. 2001) (same). Moreover, “[t]he doctrine of

mootness derives directly from the case or controversy limitation because ‘an

action that is moot cannot be characterized as an active case or controversy.’”

Case 2:06-cv-00637-KD-C Document 14 Filed 12/18/06 Page 4 of 8
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Soliman, 296 F.3d at 1242.

As this Court has explained, “[p]ut another way, ‘a case is moot

when it no longer presents a live controversy with respect to

which the court can give meaningful relief.’” Therefore, “[i]f

events that occur subsequent to the filing of a lawsuit or an

appeal deprive the court of the ability to give the plaintiff or

appellant meaningful relief, then the case is moot and must be

dismissed.” In fact. “dismissal is required because mootness is

jurisdictional.”

Id. (internal citations omitted). 

3. Several district courts have determined that once a § 2241

petitioner has been removed from the United States and deported to his native

country his petition seeking release from detention and ICE custody becomes

moot as “there is no longer a live case or controversy as required under Art. 3,

§ 2, cl. 1.” Gauchier v. Davis, 2002 WL 975434, *2 (E.D. La. 2002); see Xing

Hai Liu v. Ashcroft, 218 F.Supp.2d 1 (D. Me. 2002) (petition for writ of habeas

corpus dismissed as moot because petitioner had been returned to China);

Malainak v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 2002 WL 220061 (N.D.

Tex. 2002) (§ 2241 petition dismissed as moot because petitioner was removed

to his native country of Thailand). 

4. This case is indistinguishable from the foregoing cases.

Accordingly, this Court finds that Joseph’s petition for writ of habeas corpus

is now moot because there exists no active case or controversy. This Court can

Case 2:06-cv-00637-KD-C Document 14 Filed 12/18/06 Page 5 of 8
4 The Eleventh Circuit has recognized an exception to the mootness doctrine which

the undersigned does not find applicable in the instant case.

Although there is an exception to the mootness doctrine when the action

being challenged by the lawsuit is capable of being repeated and evading review,

we have held that “this exception is ‘narrow,’ and applies only in ‘exceptional

situations.’” In particular, the exception can be invoked only when “(1) there [is]

a reasonable expectation or a demonstrated probability that the same controversy

will recur involving the same complaining party, and (2) the challenged action is

in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration.”

Simply put, “[t]he remote possibility that an event might recur is not enough to

overcome mootness, and even a likely recurrence is insufficient if there would be

ample opportunity for review at that time.”

Soliman, 296 F.3d at 1242-1243 (internal citations omitted; emphasis in original). There is

nothing to suggest that Joseph will ever find himself again in the custody of ICE since he has

been removed from the United States and returned to his native country of Haiti. Accordingly,

the foregoing exception to the mootness doctrine is inapplicable.

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no longer order the federal respondents to immediately release petitioner from

custody pending his removal to Haiti, in accordance with the specific request

contained in the habeas corpus petition (Doc. 1, at 1 (“Petitioner does not

intend on fighting his case. He is seeking release from actual physical

confinement after twenty-two months plus in DHS/ICE detention.”)), because

Joseph has been repatriated to Haiti. “Quite simply, ‘there is nothing for us to

remedy, even if we were disposed to do so.’” Soliman, supra, 296 F.3d at

1243, quoting Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 18, 118 S.Ct. 978, 988, 140

L.Ed.2d 43 (1998). Dismissal of the instant petition is required since mootness

is jurisdictional.4

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CONCLUSION

The Magistrate Judge recommends that Joseph’s petition for writ of

habeas corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, be DISMISSED as moot.

The attached sheet contains important information regarding objections

to the report and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.

DONE this the 14th day of December, 2006.

s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS AND

RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION, AND

FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

l. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything in it must,

within ten days of the date of service of this document, file specific written objections with

the Clerk of this court. Failure to do so will bar a de novo determination by the district

judge of anything in the recommendation and will bar an attack, on appeal, of the factual

findings of the Magistrate Judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d

736, 738 (11th Cir. 1988); Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. Unit B, 1982)(en

banc). The procedure for challenging the findings and recommendations of the Magistrate

Judge is set out in more detail in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which provides that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a magistrate judge in

a dispositive matter, that is, a matter excepted by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A),

by filing a ‘Statement of Objection to Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation’

within ten days after being served with a copy of the recommendation,

unless a different time is established by order. The statement of objection

shall specify those portions of the recommendation to which objection is

made and the basis for the objection. The objecting party shall submit to

the district judge, at the time of filing the objection, a brief setting forth the

party’s arguments that the magistrate judge’s recommendation should be

reviewed de novo and a different disposition made. It is insufficient to

submit only a copy of the original brief submitted to the magistrate judge,

although a copy of the original brief may be submitted or referred to and

incorporated into the brief in support of the objection. Failure to submit a

brief in support of the objection may be deemed an abandonment of the

objection. 

A magistrate judge's recommendation cannot be appealed to a Court of Appeals;

only the district judge's order or judgment can be appealed.

2. Transcript (applicable Where Proceedings Tape Recorded). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915 and FED.R.CIV.P. 72(b), the Magistrate Judge finds that the tapes and original

records in this case are adequate for purposes of review. Any party planning to object to this

recommendation, but unable to pay the fee for a transcript, is advised that a judicial

determination that transcription is necessary is required before the United States will pay the

cost of the transcript.

s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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