Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-02400/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-02400-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mildred Brown
Defendant
California Special Education Hearing Office McGeorge School of Law
Defendant
Ken Ferro
Defendant
Mount Diablo Unified School District
Defendant
Vincent Pastorino
Defendant
Michael Petersen
Plaintiff

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL PETERSEN, et al., 

Plaintiffs,

 v.

CALIFORNIA SPECIAL EDUCATION

HEARING OFFICE MCGEORGE SCHOOL OF

LAW, et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 07-2400 SI

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’

MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE AND

DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ REQUEST FOR

DISQUALIFICATION; AND GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR A

MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT

Numerous motions filed by the parties are scheduled for a hearing on November 9, 2007.

Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court determines that the matters are appropriate for resolution

without oral argument, and VACATES the hearing. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES

plaintiffs’ motion to transfer venue, DENIES plaintiffs’ request for disqualification, and GRANTS

defendants’ motions for a more definite statement. If plaintiffs choose to amend the complaint, they

must file an amended complaint no later than November 28, 2007. The Case Management

Conference scheduled for November 9, 2007at 2:00 p.m. is continued until February 8, 2008 at

2:00 p.m.

BACKGROUND

On April 27, 2007, plaintiff Michael Petersen filed this action on behalf of himself as “parent

and next friend” to his children Michael Jr. (“Mikey”) and Ryan. The action was filed in the Eastern

District of California. According to the complaint, Mikey is 14 years old, and has been diagnosed with

auditory processing disorder, sensory integration dysfunction, and pervasive developmental disorder

(autism spectrum disorder). Complaint ¶ 6. Ryan is 12 years old and is a “low incidence deaf student”

and has been diagnosed with auditory processing disorder and bilateral hearing loss. Id. ¶ 7. The

Case 3:07-cv-02400-SI Document 40 Filed 11/06/07 Page 1 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 The instant case is the latest in a series of cases filed by plaintiff and/or his ex-wife against the

Mount Diablo School District and defendants Brown and Ferro. The other cases are Randi Peterson et

al. v. Mount Diablo School District et al., C 02-887 SI, Randi and Michael Peterson et al. v. Mount

Diablo School District et al., C 04-1059 SI, and Randi Petersen v. Mount Diablo School District et al., C 05-1032 CRB.

2

complaint alleges that both children are qualified students with disabilities within the meaning of all

applicable statutes. Id. ¶¶ 6-7.

Plaintiffs have sued the California Special Education Hearing Office, McGeorge School of Law,

Hearing Officer Vincent Pastorino, Mount Diablo Unified School District, Assistant Superintendent of

Special Education Mildred Brown, and Alternative Dispute Resolution Administrator Ken Ferro. The

complaint alleges that defendants violated (1) “state and federal contract law,” (2) “MDUSD federal

consent decree contract,” (3) “ADA and section 504 contract laws,” (4) “42 U.S.C. § 1983 due process

and equal protection contract obligations,” (5) “42 U.S.C. § 1985 contract provisions,” (6) “29 U.S.C.

§ 794 contract obligations,” and (7) “public contract code and public policy provisions.” Id. ¶¶ 40-42.

On May 1, 2007, the court in the Eastern District sua sponte transferred the case to this District.

No defendant objected to the transfer. After transfer, this case was assigned to Judge Armstrong. By

order filed May 14, 2007, Judge Armstrong issued an Order of Referral to this Court for consideration

of whether this action is related to Petersen et al., v. Mount Diablo School District, C 04-1059 SI. By

order filed May 18, 2007, this Court found that the two actions were related, and accordingly this action

was reassigned to this Court.1

 

Now before the Court are plaintiffs’ motion to transfer venue to the Eastern District of

California, plaintiffs’ request for disqualification of the undersigned judge, and motions to dismiss

and/or for a more definite statement filed by all defendants.

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiffs’ motion to transfer venue

Plaintiffs seek to change venue of this case to the Eastern District of California, Fresno Division,

where it was originally filed. Plaintiffs bring the motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), which

provides that “for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may

Case 3:07-cv-02400-SI Document 40 Filed 11/06/07 Page 2 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.” In support

of their motion plaintiffs also cite 28 U.S.C. § 1631, which authorizes a district court to transfer a case

“to cure want of jurisdiction.” Finally, although somewhat unclear, it also appears that plaintiffs seek

to transfer this case to the Eastern District of California based on allegations that the undersigned judge

(and the entire Northern District bench) is biased. Because the issues of transferring venue and

disqualification are distinct, the Court analyzes them separately.

The purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) is to “prevent the waste of time, energy, and money and to

protect litigants, witnesses and the public against unnecessary inconvenience and expense.” Van Dusen

v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616 (1964) (internal citations and quotation omitted). To support a motion

for transfer, the moving party must establish: (1) that venue is proper in the transferor district; (2) that

the transferee district is one where the action might have been brought; and (3) that the transfer will

serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses, and will promote the interests of justice. See

Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 820 F. Supp. 503, 506 (C.D. Cal. 1992),

aff’d, 907 F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1990). A motion for transfer lies within the broad discretion of the district

court, and must be determined on an individualized basis. See Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d

495, 498 (9th Cir. 2000).

The Court finds that transfer of venue to the Eastern District, Fresno Division would be

improper. As an initial matter, plaintiffs’ assertion that this Court should transfer the case to cure want

of jurisdiction is meritless; the complaint alleges that all plaintiffs and three defendants reside within

the Northern District, and that the Mount Diablo defendants have generally violated Mikey and Ryan’s

rights to receive educational services in the Mount Diablo Unified School District. As such, to the

extent plaintiffs are able to state any cognizable federal claims, this Court would have jurisdiction over

this case.

Plaintiffs also contend that transfer is warranted because two of the defendants – McGeorge

School of Law and California Special Education Hearing Office (“SEHO”) – are located in Sacramento.

The Court notes that these defendants’ residence in Sacramento suggests only that venue might lie in

the Eastern District of California, Sacramento Division, not the Fresno Division. More importantly,

however, plaintiffs have not submitted any evidence showing that “transfer will serve the convenience

Case 3:07-cv-02400-SI Document 40 Filed 11/06/07 Page 3 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 It appears that plaintiffs are referring to Randi Petersen v. Mount Diablo School District et al., C 05-1032 CRB, in which the undersigned was named as a defendant. The case was assigned to Judge

Breyer of this Court, and by order filed July 1, 2005, Judge Breyer granted a motion to dismiss and

dismissed the case for failure to prosecute.

3

 Plaintiffs do not identify this lawsuit.

4

of the parties and witnesses, and will promote the interests of justice.” Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,

820 F. Supp. at 506. Indeed, the allegations of the complaint strongly indicate otherwise, as the majority

of parties (including all plaintiffs) are located within the Northern District, and the events which give

rise to plaintiffs’ complaint – as nearly as the Court can discern from plaintiffs’ complaint – appear to

have largely taken place in the Northern District. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ motion to transfer venue is

DENIED.

II. Plaintiffs’ request for disqualification

Plaintiffs’ motion for transfer also contains a request for disqualification pursuant to Civil Local

Rule 3-15. That rule provides,

Whenever an affidavit of bias or prejudice directed at a Judge of this Court is filed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144, and the Judge has determined not to recuse him or herself

and found that the affidavit is neither legally insufficient nor interposed for delay, the

Judge shall refer the request for disqualification to the Clerk for random assignment to

another Judge.

Civ. L. R. 3-12. Plaintiffs’ motion argues that the undersigned is biased because “not only was Judge

Illston previously sued on behalf of the children by others,2

 the entire Northern District courthouse was

also sued in the previous lawsuit creating bias against the children.3 Additionally, the consent decree

filed and adjudicated on behalf of all special education students in the Oakland Division court creates

a bias atmosphere against plaintiff’s children as documented in plaintiff’s 5/14/07 affidavit to the court.”

Motion at 3:13-18. Plaintiffs have attached to the motion an “affidavit” by Michael Petersen, which is

a letter dated May 14, 2007 from Petersen to Congressman George Miller, Chief Judge Walker of the

Northern District, the Chief Judge of the Eastern District, and the U.S. Department of Justice. Plaintiff’s

letter protests the transfer of this action from the Eastern District to this District, and complains about

an interaction he had with several clerks at the Oakland Division of the Northern District regarding

issuance of summons in this case. 

Case 3:07-cv-02400-SI Document 40 Filed 11/06/07 Page 4 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

The Court finds no reason for disqualification, and accordingly denies plaintiffs’ request. The

Court further finds that plaintiff’s May 14, 2007 “affidavit” is legally insufficient and does not present

any cognizable basis for disqualification, and thus the Court will not refer the request to another judge.

III. Defendants’ motions to dismiss and/or for a more definite statement

All defendants have moved to dismiss and/or for a more definite statement. The Mount Diablo

Unified School District defendants (“District defendants”) argue that it is impossible to determine the

factual basis for plaintiffs’ claims. Defendants note that although four and a half pages of the complaint

are devoted to describing six SEHO cases previously filed between the District and Mikey, the

complaint does not contain any specific allegations regarding how the District defendants violated any

statutes or breached any contracts. The District defendants also note that none of the claims are alleged

against the District, and that the two claims alleged against defendants Brown and Ferro are identical

and simply list the statutes or laws that were allegedly violated. See Complaint ¶¶ 40-42. The motion

filed by McGeorge School of Law, SEHO and defendant Pastorino asserts these same arguments, and

additionally raises the issues of administrative exhaustion and judicial immunity. 

Plaintiffs’ opposition is largely unintelligible, and does not clarify the nature of plaintiffs’

claims. Plaintiffs also assert that all of the defendants were agents for each other. That assertion,

however, is insufficient to state a claim against any defendant. Plaintiffs alternatively request leave to

amend the complaint.

The Court finds that the complaint is so vague and ambiguous that defendants cannot reasonably

frame a response, and accordingly GRANTS defendants’ motions for a more definite statement. The

complaint does not state the factual basis for each claim alleged, and does not identify how each of the

defendants allegedly violated the law. The complaint does not identify what contracts defendants

allegedly breached, nor does the complaint specify the provisions of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation

Act or the ADA that defendants allegedly violated. The complaint also does not state how defendants

violated plaintiffs’ rights to due process and equal protection. Finally, the Court notes that although the

complaint references federal law (such as the ADA), these references are in the context of “contract

violations.” If plaintiffs’ complaint is essentially one for breach of contract, this Court would likely not

Case 3:07-cv-02400-SI Document 40 Filed 11/06/07 Page 5 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

 Plaintiffs’ assertion that defendants have waived various defenses by filing the motions to

dismiss lacks merit.

6

have jurisdiction over such a claim absent some allegation specifically showing the existence of federal

jurisdiction.

The Court will allow plaintiffs the opportunity to cure these deficiencies. See Cato v. United

States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (“A pro se litigant must be given leave to amend his or her

complaint, and some notice of its deficiencies, unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the

complaint could not be cured by amendment.”). At this juncture, the Court will not rule on the questions

of judicial immunity and administrative exhaustion. If plaintiffs amend the complaint, defendants may

renew these contentions if appropriate, as well as any other relevant defense.4

 If plaintiffs choose to

amend the complaint, they must do the following:

• for plaintiffs’ breach of contract claims, plaintiffs must identify the contracts at issue and

state how defendants breached those contracts;

• identify the specific provisions of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the

Americans with Disabilities Act that plaintiffs allege defendants violated, and state how

defendants violated those provisions;

• state how defendants violated plaintiffs’ rights to due process and equal protection; in

addition, for any 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, plaintiffs must allege facts showing (1) “the

conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law” and

that (2) “this conduct deprived the claimant of a constitutional right.” Rinker v. County

of Napa, 831 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1987);

• for plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claim, state how defendants violated this provision,

which requires racial or other class-based discrimination. See generally United

Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 838 (1983);

• clarify the difference, if any, between the first and third claims;

• specify which claims, if any, are alleged against Mount Diablo Unified School District

and McGeorge School of Law; and

• identify for which acts defendants Brown and Ferro are being sued in their official

Case 3:07-cv-02400-SI Document 40 Filed 11/06/07 Page 6 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

capacities, and for which acts these defendants are being sued in their individual

capacities.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES plaintiffs’ motion to transfer venue and

request for disqualification (Docket No. 23), and GRANTS defendants’ motions for a more definite

statement. (Docket Nos. 11, 13 and 17). If plaintiffs wish to amend the complaint, they must file an

amended complaint no later than November 28, 2007. The Case Management Conference scheduled

for November 9, 2007at 2:00 p.m. is continued until February 8, 2008 at 2:00 p.m.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 6, 2007 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:07-cv-02400-SI Document 40 Filed 11/06/07 Page 7 of 7