Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-03064/USCOURTS-ca10-95-03064-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Angelo's Italian Foods, Inc.
Appellee
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Amicus Curiae
Angelo Fasciano
Appellee
John P. Fasciano
Appellee
Jamie Lowe
Appellant

Document Text:

Patrick J. Fisher, Jr. 

Clerk of Court 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

Office of the Clerk 

Byron White United States Courthouse 

Denver, Colorado 80257 

(303) 844-3157 

July 3, 1996 

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

ChiefDeputy Clerk 

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

RE: 95-3064, Lowe v. Angelo's Italian Foods, Inc. 

Please be advised of the following correction to the captioned decision. 

The ftrst page has been corrected to include the graphic lines that were omitted 

from the opinion ftled July 2, 1996. Please replace the ftrst page of the opinion with the 

one that is attached. 

Very truly yours, 

Trish Lane 

Deputy Clerk 

Appellate Case: 95-3064 Document: 01019276517 Date Filed: 07/03/1996 Page: 1 
.. 

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

JAMIE LOWE, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

FILED lJal&ed Statel Court of Appeall Tea*Ciml 

JUL 2 1996 

PATIUCK FISHER 

Clerk 

ANGELO'S ITALIAN FOODS, INC., 

and its Representatives, and ANGELO 

FASCIANO and JOHN P. FASCIANO, 

No. 95-3064 

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Kansas 

(D.C. No. 93-CV-1233) 

Jose Hurlstone-Peggs (William L. Fry with her on the brief) of William L. Fry, 

P .A., Wichita, Kansas, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Alexander B. Mitchell, II, of Klenda, Mitchell, Austerman & Zuercher, L.L.C., 

Wichita, Kansas, for Defendant-Appellees. 

(John P. Rowe, General Counsel (Acting), (Gwendolyn Young Reams, Associate 

General Counsel, Vincent J. Blackwood, Assistant General Counsel, John F. 

Suhre, Attorney, with him on the brief), Washington, D.C., filed an amicus curiae 

brief for the equal Employment Opportunity Commission.) 

Appellate Case: 95-3064 Document: 01019276517 Date Filed: 07/03/1996 Page: 2 
PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

JAMIE LOWE, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Teadt Circuit 

JUL 2 1996 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

ANGELO'S ITALIAN FOODS, INC., 

and its Representatives, and ANGELO 

FASCIANO and JOHN P. FASCIANO, 

No. 95-3064 

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Kansas 

(D.C. No. 93-CV-1233) 

Jose Hurlstone-Peggs (William L. Fry with her on the brief) of William L. Fry, 

P.A., Wichita, Kansas, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Alexander B. Mitchell, II, of Klenda, Mitchell, Austerman & Zuercher, L.L.C., 

Wichita, Kansas, for Defendant-Appellees. 

(John P. Rowe, General Counsel (Acting), (Gwendolyn Young Reams, Associate 

General Counsel, Vincent J. Blackwood, Assistant General Counsel, John F. 

Suhre, Attorney, with him on the brief), Washington, D.C., filed an amicus curiae 

brief for the equal Employment Opportunity Commission.) 

Appellate Case: 95-3064 Document: 01019276517 Date Filed: 07/03/1996 Page: 3 
Before BALDOCK, BRISCOE, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. 

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. 

Defendant terminated plaintiff's employment and plaintiff responded by 

filing this action, alleging violations of both the Americans with Disabilities Act 

("ADA") and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Plaintiff also sought 

recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court 

granted summary judgment to defendants. The court held that plaintiff was not 

disabled under the ADA; that she had failed to present a prima facie case of sex 

discrimination; and that she had failed to allege sufficient facts to support her 

state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. We affirm the 

grant of summary judgment to defendants on plaintiff's Title VII and pendent 

state law claims. We reverse the grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's ADA 

claim, however, because plaintiff has presented evidence which creates a genuine 

issue of fact with respect to whether her ability to lift is substantially impaired. 

We hold that lifting is a "major life activity" and that an individual whose ability 

to lift is substantially impaired qualifies as a disabled person within the meaning 

of the ADA. 

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Appellate Case: 95-3064 Document: 01019276517 Date Filed: 07/03/1996 Page: 4 
In late August 1992, plaintiff Jamie Lowe began work for defendant 

Angelo's Italian Foods, an Italian restaurant located in Wichita, Kansas. Her 

duties included purchasing and inventory control. When Lowe initially 

interviewed for a position at Angelo's, she heard a line cook remark "no skirts in 

the kitchen." Because the cook who made this remark left Angelo's the very next 

day, Lowe never saw him again. 

In addition, during the nine weeks she was employed at Angelo's, Lowe's 

supervisor, defendant Angelo Fasciano, referred to her as "girl" or "girlie" when 

he couldn't remember her name. Fasciano also required Lowe to wear dress 

clothes, while two of her male co-workers were allowed to wear jeans and tshirts. Once when Lowe wore red slacks and a red shirt to work, Fasciano told 

her "no more of this red thing." 

On October 22, 1992, Lowe presented Fasciano with a letter from her 

doctor. The letter stated: 

Jamie Lowe has seen me recently regarding pain and weakness in her 

right leg. Because of her neurological problems she fatigues 

exceedingly easily and needs to be able to sit down occasionally. 

She is not going to be able to do lots of stooping, bending and 

cannot carry anything heavy (greater than 15 lbs.) and anything up to 

15 lbs. only occasionally. She should avoid stairs. She needs to use 

a hand rail if she has to climb stairs, so [sic] cannot climb stairs and 

carry anything. 

Lowe was terminated that same day. She was thereafter diagnosed with multiple 

sclerosis. 

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This court reviews the district court's entry of summary judgment de novo, 

applying the same legal standard used by the district court. Schusterman v. 

United States, 63 F.3d 986, 989 (lOth Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 64 U.S.L.W. 3778 

(U.S. May 20, 1996). Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine 

issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56( c). Summary judgment should be denied "if the evidence 

is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

Lowe first argues that the district court erred by granting summary 

judgment to defendants on her ADA claim. Title I of the ADA provides that 

"[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a 

disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application 

procedures, [or] the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees." 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12112(a). To maintain a claim for wrongful discharge under the ADA, a 

plaintiff must demonstrate ( 1) that she is a disabled person within the meaning of 

the ADA; (2) that she is able to perform the essential functions of the job with or 

without reasonable accommodation; and (3) that the employer terminated her 

because of her disability. White v. York Int 'I Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 360-61 (lOth 

Cir. 1995). 

The term "disability" is defined as: 

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(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or 

more of the major life activities of such individual; 

(B) a record of such an impairment; or 

(C) being regarded as having such an impairment. 

42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). The term "major life activity" as defined in the 

regulations implementing the ADA encompasses "functions such as caring for 

oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, 

learning and working." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). The appendix to the regulations 

provides that "other major life activities include, but are not limited to, sitting, 

standing, lifting, reaching." 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, Appendix to Part 1630--

Interpretive Guidance to Title I of the ADA, § 1630.2(i) (citing S. Rep. No. 116, 

lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1989); H.R. Rep. No. 485 part 2, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 

52 (1990); H.R. Rep. No. 485 part 3, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1990)). 

The term "substantially limits" means "[s]ignificantly restricted as to the 

condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular 

major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which 

the average person in the general population can perform that same major life 

activity." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2U)(l)(ii). The three factors to be considered when 

determining whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity are 

"(i) [t]he nature and severity of the impairment; (ii) [t]he duration or expected 

duration of the impairment; and (iii) [t]he permanent or long term impact, or the 

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expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment." 

!d. § 1630.20)(2). 

Three additional factors may be considered when the individual claims that 

the impairment substantially limits her in the major life activity of working. !d. § 

1630.2U)(3)(ii). These factors are: 

(A) [t]he geographical area to which the individual has reasonable 

access; 

(B) [t]he job from which the individual has been disqualified 

because of an impairment, and the number and types of jobs utilizing 

similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within that 

geographical area, from which the individual is also disqualified 

because of the impairment (class of jobs); and/or 

(C) [t]he job from which the individual has been disqualified because of 

an impairment, and the number and types of other jobs not utilizing similar 

training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within that geographical area, from 

which the individual is also disqualified because of the impairment (broad 

range of jobs in various classes). 

Jd. Focusing on these additional factors, the district court held that Lowe failed 

to present evidence that her impairment was substantially limiting. 

Applying the first three factors laid out in the regulations, the evidence 

indicates that Lowe suffers from multiple sclerosis or MS: that as a result of her 

MS, Lowe is unable to lift items weighing more than fifteen pounds and that she 

should lift items weighing less than fifteen pounds only occasionally; that MS is 

a neurological disease for which there is no known cure; and that the long-term 

impact of the disease will vary depending on the form the MS takes. We hold 

that lifting is a major life activity and that the evidence creates a genuine issue of 

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material fact with respect to whether Lowe's impairment substantially limits her 

ability to lift. It is thus unnecessary to consider the additional factors relied upon 

by the district court. 

Defendants' arguments to the contrary are unavailing. Defendants urge 

that Lowe has failed to present evidence comparing her ability to lift with the 

ability of the average person. They assert that she has not demonstrated the 

impact of her condition on her life away from work. While the court agrees that 

more specific evidence on these issues will be helpful to the trier of fact on 

remand, Lowe has nevertheless presented sufficient evidence to withstand 

summary judgment. 

Defendants argue, in the alternative, that even if Lowe has created a 

genuine issue of fact with respect to whether she suffers from a disability under 

the ADA, she has nevertheless failed to demonstrate that she is qualified for her 

position at Angelo's. This court has adopted a two-part analysis for determining 

whether a disabled individual is qualified under the ADA: 

First, we must determine whether the individual could perform the 

essential functions of the job, i.e., functions that bear more than a 

marginal relationship to the job at issue. Second, if (but only if) we 

conclude that the individual is not able to perform the essential 

functions of the job, we must determine whether any reasonable 

accommodation by the employer would enable him to perform those 

functions. 

White, 45 F.3d at 361-62 (quoting Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1393-

94 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1386 (1994)). 

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Defendants concede that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the 

essential functions of Lowe's job at Angelo's. Nevertheless, they argue that the 

statement of Marsh Sears, an occupational therapist who examined Lowe after her 

dismissal, mandates a finding that Lowe is not qualified as a matter of law. 

Based on Lowe's decreased endurance and strength, Sears concluded that Lowe 

was "not a candidate for employment at this time as a kitchen manager." Sears's 

general statement does not, however, address the essential functions of Lowe's 

job at Angelo's, nor does it conclusively establish that Lowe is unable to perform 

those functions. Moreover, a finding that Lowe cannot perform the essential 

functions of her job does not end the inquiry. If the trial court finds that Lowe is 

unable to perform the essential functions of her position, it must then determine 

whether any reasonable accommodation by defendants would enable her to 

perform those functions. Because Lowe has raised a genuine issue of material 

fact as to the essential functions of her job at Angelo's, summary judgment 

premised on the testimony of the occupational therapist is inappropriate. 

Because the district court held that Lowe had failed to establish a prima 

facie case, it did not reach her claim that defendants discriminated against her by 

failing to provide reasonable accommodations for her impairment. Under the 

ADA, prohibited discrimination includes failure to make "reasonable 

accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise 

qualified individual with a disability." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). Because 

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Lowe has raised a genuine issue of fact with respect to whether she suffers from 

a disability and with respect to her qualifications for the position at Angelo's, the 

court remands this issue to the trial court for further consideration. 

Lowe next challenges the grant of summary judgment on her Title VII sex 

discrimination claims. Lowe first contends that her termination constituted 

disparate treatment. To establish a prima facie case, the discharged employee 

must show that: ( 1) she belongs to the protected class; (2) she was qualified for 

her job; (3) that, despite her qualifications, she was discharged; and (4) that after 

her discharge the job remained available. See Lujan v. New Mexico Health & 

Social Servs. Dep 't, 624 F.2d 968, 970 (lOth Cir. 1980) (citing McDonnell 

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). Assuming that Lowe was 

qualified to perform her job at Angelo's, she has nevertheless failed to present 

any evidence that the job remained available after she was discharged. 

Accordingly, Lowe has failed to establish a prima facie case of disparate 

treatment based on her termination. 

Lowe has likewise failed to establish a prima facie case of disparate 

treatment based on Fasciano's requirement that she wear "dress" clothes while 

two of her male co-workers were allowed to wear blue jeans and t-shirts. For 

purposes of evaluating Lowe's argument, this court will assume that imposing 

special appearance rules on members of only one sex may violate Title VII. See 

Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass 'n, 604 F.2d 1028, 1032-33 (7th Cir. 

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• 

1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 929 (1980). Lowe, however, has failed to show 

that she was treated less favorably than her similarly-situated male counterparts. 

See Cole v. Ruidoso Mun. Schs., 43 F.3d 1373, 1380 (lOth Cir. 1994). Although 

she testified that she was required to "dress up," her testimony is equivocal 

regarding the job descriptions of the two male employees who were exempted 

from this requirement. Because Lowe has failed to present evidence that these 

male co-workers were similarly situated with respect to their job functions, she 

has failed to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment based on the 

requirement she wear dress clothes. 

Lowe next contends that she was the victim of a hostile work environment 

based on her gender. The Supreme Court has held that "[w]hen the workplace is 

permeated with 'discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult' ... that is 

'sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's 

employment and create an abusive working environment,"' Title VII is violated. 

Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370 (1993) (quoting Meritor Sav. 

Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986)). The challenged conduct must create 

"an objectively hostile or abusive work environment--an environment that a 

reasonable person would find hostile or abusive." Jd. Casual or isolated 

manifestations of discriminatory conduct, such as a few sexual comments or 

slurs, may not support a cause of action. See Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 

F.2d 1406, 1414 (lOth Cir. 1987). 

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Upon review of this record, the court concludes that Lowe has failed to 

present sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in 

her favor. Lowe argues that Fasciano's requirement that she not wear red is 

evidence of a hostile work environment. She has failed, however, to establish 

that this requirement was related to her gender. In addition, the isolated comment 

"no skirts in the kitchen" and Fasciano's use of the term "girlie" to refer to Lowe, 

although regrettable, do not demonstrate that the work environment at Angelo's 

was "permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult." Harris, 

114 S. Ct. at 370 (citation and internal quotation marks citation omitted). 

In addition to these incidents, Lowe relies heavily on the deposition 

testimony of a former Angelo's employee, Ronald Sagely, to support her hostile 

work environment claim. Sagely left Angelo's in 1987, five years before Lowe 

started working there. He testified that the Fascianos occasionally called 

waitresses "fucking slow bitches" and blacks "niggers" or "melanzanes," a 

derogatory Italian term for blacks. He also testified that the Fascianos abused 

"pretty much everybody." 

Past discrimination may properly be considered evidence of current 

discriminatory intent in a disparate treatment case. Pitre v. Western Elec. Co., 

843 F.3d 1262, 1267 (lOth Cir. 1988). This court, however, has yet to address 

the issue of whether past discrimination may be considered evidence of a current 

hostile work environment. Assuming that Sagely's testimony can properly be 

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• 

considered, Lowe has nevertheless failed to establish a prima facie case of 

harassment based on her gender. Viewed in its entirety, Sagely's deposition 

establishes only that Angelo's was a highly volatile and frequently unpleasant 

place to work for both men and women. Similarly, the Fascianos use of racist 

epithets, although appalling, does not establish that Lowe suffered gender 

discrimination. 

In her last argument under Title VII, Lowe challenges the district court's 

grant of summary judgment on her claim that she was discharged in retaliation for 

advocating the hiring of African Americans. To establish a prima facie case of 

retaliation under Title VII, an employee must show that: ( 1) she engaged in 

protected opposition to statutorily prohibited discrimination; (2) the employer 

took adverse action contemporaneously or subsequent to the employee's protected 

activity; and (3) a causal connection exists between the employer's adverse action 

and the employee's protected activity. Meredith v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 18 F.3d 

890, 896 (lOth Cir. 1994). Assuming Lowe's activities qualified as protected 

opposition to statutorily prohibited discrimination, Lowe has nevertheless failed 

to provide any evidence demonstrating a causal connection between her 

termination and the protected activity. Accordingly, she has failed to establish a 

prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII. 

Finally, Lowe challenges the district co~rt' s grant of summary judgment on 

her Kansas state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress or 

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• 

outrage. This court recently considered the requirements for the tort of outrage 

under Kansas law in Bolden v. PRC Inc., 43 F.3d 545 (lOth Cir. 1994), cert. 

denied, 116 S. Ct. 92 (1995). To succeed on a claim of outrage, as a threshold 

matter, the employee must show that: (1) the defendant's conduct may 

reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery; and 

(2) the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff is so extreme the law must 

intervene because no reasonable person would be expected to endure it. Jd. at 

553 (citing Roberts v. Saylor, 637 P.2d 1175, 1179 (Kan. 1981), cert. denied, 482 

U.S. 906 (1987)). "'Conduct to be a sufficient basis for an action to recover for 

emotional distress must be outrageous to the point that it goes beyond the bounds 

of decency and is utterly intolerable in a civilized society."' Jd. at 554 (quoting 

Roberts, 637 P.2d at 1179). Because the court determines that defendants' 

conduct, although distasteful, is not so extreme that it "goes beyond the bounds 

of decency and is utterly intolerable in a civilized society," the district court's 

grant of summary judgment on Lowe's claim of outrage is affirmed. 

For the foregoing reasons, this court AFFIRMS the district court's grant of 

summary judgment on Lowe's Title VII and intentional infliction of emotional 

distress claims. The court REVERSES the grant of summary judgment on 

Lowe's ADA claim and REMANDS for further proceedings. 

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