Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-03859/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-03859-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
S. Adamik
Defendant
M. W. Barker
Defendant
Jill L. Brown
Defendant
G. Fuller
Defendant
Gary D. Hines
Plaintiff
S. Petrakis
Defendant
J. R. Ward
Defendant
Jeanne S. Woodford
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1 Upon further consideration, the court concludes that this "food service" issue is a

claim that plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights were violated by his being served unhealthy cold

food, rather than a retaliation claim as it was described in the order of service. Although

plaintiff does mention that the change in policy regarding how the food was served was made

after he had filed grievances about the food, he does not, unlike with his other claims, contend

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

NOT FOR CITATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GARY D. HINES, 

Plaintiff,

 v.

S. ADAMIK, prison guard; J. R. WARD,

prison guard; G. FULLER, Lieutenant;

M. W. BARKER, Lieutenant; S.

PETRAKIS, Associate Warden; JILL L.

BROWN, Acting Warden; and JEANNE

S. WOODFORD, previous warden, 

Defendants. /

No. C 04-3859 PJH (PR)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS'

MOTION TO DISMISS; RULINGS

This is a civil rights case brought pro se by a state prisoner. In its initial review order

the court stated that plaintiff had raised four claims in his complaint: (1) that defendant

Adamik retaliated against him for writing a grievance by denying him double portions of

food which had been ordered by a doctor, “tampering” with his food, and filing false

disciplinary charges; (2) that defendants Brown, Petrakis and Fuller made him exercise in a

cage with no water, no toilet, no shower and no sunlight, unlike other occupants of his

housing unit; (3) that defendants Ward, Fuller and Barker wrote and filed false disciplinary

charges against him as a result of his reporting the abuse of a black inmate; and (4) that

defendants Woodford, Brown, Petrakis and Fuller changed his meal service procedure from

a “hot cart” to cold meals in retaliation for grievances.1

 The court found the complaint

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that the change was retaliatory, and he does specifically claim that the change violated his

Eighth Amendment rights.

2 If the court looks beyond the pleadings in deciding an unenumerated motion to

dismiss for failure to exhaust -- a procedure closely analogous to summary judgment -- the

court must give the prisoner fair notice of his opportunity to develop a record. Wyatt, 315 F.3d

at 1120 n.14. That was done in this case, the warning having been given with the order of

service.

2

sufficient to require a response and ordered that the defendants be served. Defendants

have moved to dismiss, and several other motions are also before the court for ruling.

DISCUSSION

A. Motion to dismiss

Defendants contend that plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to

issues one, two and three, and that he has failed to state a claim as to Woodford, Brown

and Petrakis.

1. Exhaustion

a. Applicable law

42 U.S.C. § 1997e provides that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison

conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in

any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are

available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Compliance with the exhaustion

requirement is mandatory. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002); Booth v. Churner,

532 U.S. 731, 739-40 & n.5 (2001). 

Nonexhaustion under § 1997e(a) is an affirmative defense – defendants have the

burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion. Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910,

919 (2007); Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). A nonexhaustion claim

should be raised in an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion rather than in a motion for

summary judgment. Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119. In deciding such a motion – a motion to

dismiss for failure to exhaust nonjudicial remedies – the court may look beyond the

pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact. Id. at 1119-20.2

 If the court concludes that

the prisoner has not exhausted nonjudicial remedies, the proper remedy is dismissal

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without prejudice. Id. at 1120. 

The State of California provides its inmates and parolees the right to appeal

administratively "any departmental decision, action, condition or policy perceived by those

individuals as adversely affecting their welfare." See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). 

It also provides its inmates the right to file administrative appeals alleging misconduct by

correctional officers. See id. § 3084.1(e). In order to exhaust available administrative

remedies within this system, a prisoner must proceed through several levels of appeal: (1)

informal resolution, (2) formal written appeal on a CDC 602 inmate appeal form, (3) second

level appeal to the institution head or designee, and (4) third level appeal to the Director of

the California Department of Corrections. See id. § 3084.5; Barry v. Ratelle, 985 F. Supp.

1235, 1237 (S.D. Cal. 1997). This satisfies the administrative remedies exhaustion

requirement under § 1997e(a). See id. at 1237-38.

An action must be dismissed unless the prisoner exhausted his available

administrative remedies before he or she filed suit, even if the prisoner fully exhausts while

the suit is pending. McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002); see Vaden v.

Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2006) (where administrative remedies are not

exhausted before the prisoner sends his complaint to the court it will be dismissed even if

exhaustion is completed by the time the complaint is actually filed). However, the PLRA

does not require dismissal of the entire complaint when a prisoner has failed to exhaust

some, but not all, of the claims included in the complaint. Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910,

925-26 (2007) (rejecting "total exhaustion-dismissal" rule); Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164,

1170 (9th Cir. 2005) (same).

b. Analysis

Defendants contend that the first three issues were not administratively exhausted

before this case was filed, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e . 

Plaintiff’s first claim is that defendant Adamik retaliated against him for filing

administrative appeals (grievances). Retaliation itself is not, of course, a violation of the

Constitution, hence not actionable under Section 1983; but retaliation for the exercise of a

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constitutional right is actionable, as if it were a violation of the right itself. See Mt. Healthy

City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 283-84 (1977). Retaliation, though it is not

expressly referred to in the Constitution, is actionable because retaliatory actions may tend

to chill individuals' exercise of constitutional rights. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S.

593, 597 (1972). 

Compliance with prison grievance procedures is all that is required by the PLRA to

properly exhaust, so the level of detail necessary in a grievance to comply with the

grievance procedures will vary from system to system and claim to claim, but it is the

prison's requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion. 

Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910, 923 (2007). In California, the regulations permit an

administrative appeal to be filed as to "any departmental decision, action, condition, or

policy which they can demonstrate as having an adverse effect upon their welfare." Cal.

Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a)." As to content, the regulations only instruct the prisoner to 

"describe the problem and action requested... ." Id. at § 3084.2(a). 

Although what would constitute "the problem" might vary depending on the facts of

the claim, the court concludes that to exhaust this claim plaintiff had to allege (1) that

Adamick denied him double portions of food which had been ordered by a doctor,

“tamper[ed]” with his food, or filed false disciplinary charges; and (2) that he did it in

retaliation, or because of, plaintiff's having filed grievances. 

Adamick has established with declarations and supporting exhibits that only one of

plaintiff's grievances, log number 02-02335, contained a contention that Adamick retaliated

against him for past inmate grievances, and have established that 02-02335 was not

appealed to the third and final level. 

In opposition, plaintiff contends that several of his grievances were sufficient to

exhaust, pointing to exhibits A and K attached to his opposition. These grievances do not,

however, contain an allegation that Adamick's actions were taken in retaliation for prior

grievances. The other grievances to which plaintiff also refers are complaints about

Adamick arising from events other than those which are the basis for this claim. 

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The motion to dismiss will be granted as to claim one against Adamick.

Plaintiff's second claim is that defendants Brown, Petrakis and Fuller made him

exercise in a cage with no water, no toilet, no shower and no sunlight, unlike other

occupants of his housing unit. Defendants Brown, Petrakis and Fuller have established

that plaintiff did not exhaust this issue. In opposition he points to grievance log number 04-

1266, but that grievance does not claim retaliation. The motion to dismiss will be granted

as to this claim.

Plaintiff's third claim is that defendants Ward, Fuller and Barker wrote and filed a

false informational chrono (memo to file) against him as a result of his reporting the abuse

of a black inmate. These defendants have established that plaintiff did not exhaust this

issue until after he filed this suit. They assert that this claim must be dismissed because

exhaustion after filing, rather than before, is not sufficient to comply with 1997e(a). See

McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Vaden v. Summerhill,

449 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2006) (where administrative remedies are not exhausted

before the prisoner sends his complaint to the court it will be dismissed even if exhaustion

is completed by the time the complaint is actually filed). In opposition, plaintiff contends

that he exhausted this claim, but does not address the issue of his having exhausted only

after filing suit. The motion will be granted on this claim.

c. Plaintiff's other contentions as to exhaustion

Plaintiff contends that the motion to dismiss is really a motion for summary judgment

under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and that the evidence submitted by

defendants in support of the motion may not properly be considered in deciding a motion

for summary judgment. 

As noted above, a claim of failure to exhaust in a prisoner case is properly brought

as defendants have done, in an unenumerated motion under Rule 12(b). See Wyatt, 315

F.3d at 1119. Unlike the situation on a motion for summary judgment, in ruling upon an

unenumerated motion to dismiss the court can resolve disputed issues of fact based on the

evidence before it. Id. at 1119-20. Plaintiff's contention that the motion to dismiss really is

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a motion for summary judgment is incorrect. 

Plaintiff also contends that he does not need to exhaust because he is asking only

for damages, citing Rumbles v. Hill, 182 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 1999). Rumbles was

overruled by the United States Supreme Court in Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739

(2001). This contention is without merit.

Plaintiff also contends that defendants' exhibits should be stricken as not properly

authenticated and as hearsay. The declaration of Denise Dull, the litigation coordinator at

San Quentin and the custodian of the files of inmate grievances, is sufficient to authenticate

the records and establish that they come within the hearsay exception for records kept in

the regular course of business. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). The motion to strike contained

in plaintiff's opposition to respondent's motion to dismiss is denied.

2. Failure to state a claim

Defendants Brown, Woodford and Petrakis contend that plaintiff has failed to state a

claim against them. 

a. Standard

"`[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears

beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would

entitle him to relief.'" Terracom v. Valley National Bank, 49 F.3d 555, 558 (9th Cir. 1995)

(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). Review is limited to the contents of

the complaint. Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994). In

addition, the court may take judicial notice of facts that are not subject to reasonable

dispute. Id. at 688 (discussing Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)). Allegations of fact in the complaint

must be taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. 

Spreewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). Pro se pleadings

must be construed liberally on a defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 

Ortez v. Washington County Oregon, 88 F.3d 804, 807 (9th Cir. 1996).

b. Analysis

Defendants Brown and Woodford contend that plaintiff has failed to allege any

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"personal wrongdoing" on their part, and Brown, Woodford and Petrakis contend that

plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege supervisory liability. The court has above concluded

that plaintiff's failure to exhaust requires that his first three claims be dismissed, without

prejudice but also without leave to amend, meaning that the only claim remaining in this

case is the fourth claim, that defendants Woodford, Brown, Petrakis and Fuller violated his

Eighth Amendment rights by changing his meal service from a “hot cart” to unhealthy cold

meals. Thus the question here is whether plaintiff's contentions as to the fourth issue are

sufficient to state a claim against any of the three moving defendants, whether on what

might be called a "direct theory" – that they did something that directly violated his rights –

or an "indirect theory" – that they adopted a policy that caused the constitutional violation. 

Fuller does not move to dismiss this claim as to him.

1. Direct theory

Only Brown and Woodward make the argument that plaintiff has failed to allege that

they were directly involved in the alleged violations of his rights.

Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that he wrote two letters to Woodford when she was

warden and that she did not respond to them. He alleges that in one letter he "pleaded to

be left alone" and in the other asked Woodford to end the "retaliation" by Ward. These do

not relate to the only issue remaining in the case, the contention that a new food policy was

unhealthy. Plaintiff has failed to state a claim that Woodford was involved directly in the

alleged constitutional violation.

Brown is the current warden. The complaint contains no allegations that she was

involved in the events giving rise to the food claim. Her motion to dismiss will be granted

as to the claim against her in her individual capacity. The claim for injunctive relief against

her in her official capacity will be allowed to proceed so the court can provide such relief if it

is justified. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (suit against 

state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather a suit

against the official's office, i.e., the state); see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. at 165-

168 (official capacity suits are suits against entity that individual represents). The Eleventh

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Amendment permits suits against state officials in their official capacity for injunctive relief

only. See Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n.10 (recognizing Ex parte Young exception).

2. Supervisory liability theory

This argument is made by Brown, Woodford, and Petrakis.

The theory of respondeat superior, which holds a superior liable for the wrongs of his

or her subordinate regardless of the superior's involvement, is not applicable in Section

1983 cases. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Under Section 1983

a supervisor can be held liable only if he or she participated in the violation of constitutional

rights, or if there is a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's wrongful

conduct and the constitutional violation. Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435,

1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). The latter theory requires evidence that a supervisor

implemented "a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional

rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation." Redman, 942 F.2d at 1446. 

Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that Petrakis, an associate warden, changed the

food service system for death row prisoners such as plaintiff, who eat in their cells. He

alleges that rather than bringing food over from the serving area and keeping it on a "hot

cart," which kept it hot, the new system involved making up trays in the food service area,

covering them with plastic, then taking them to death row, where they sit without being kept

warm until guards serve them. He asserts that the plastic trays are unclean and that food

on them is cold by the time it is served, creating a health hazard. This is sufficient to state

a claim for supervisory liability against Petrakis for implementing a policy which allegedly is

unhealthy. See Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 1996), amended, 135 F.3d

1318 (9th Cir. 1998) (spoiled food inadequate to maintain health). Petrakis' motion to

dismiss as to this claim will be denied. 

Plaintiff's only reference to other defendants in the portion of his complaint devoted

to this claim is this sentence: "Defendant[]s Woodford, Petrakis, Fuller, and Barker have all

allowed plaintiff to be served unsanitary food on unclean plastic tray[]s in which [sic]

presented a danger to the health and well-being of plaintiff." The failure to provide any

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factual allegations as to what role movants Woodford and Barker had in adoption of the

new food policy means that plaintiff has not stated a claim against them on the theory that

they implemented a policy so deficient as to be a repudiation of constitutional rights. Their

motion will be granted. 

B. Other motions

Plaintiff requests a temporary restraining order requiring the return of certain legal

materials which were seized when he attempted to send them to another inmate by means

which violated prison rules. It appears from plaintiff's extensive and well-argued opposition

to the motion to dismiss that he no longer is without these, but in any event an injunction

cannot be granted which is unrelated to the subject of the litigation, as is the case here. 

See Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th Cir. 1994) (party seeking injunctive relief

must show "a relationship between the injury claimed in the party's motion and the conduct

asserted in the complaint"; prisoner's request for injunction against retaliation for lawsuit

was properly denied because not related to medical care issue of complaint). The motion

will be denied.

Defendant Petrakis joined in the other defendants' motion for an extension of time,

which was granted. Plaintiff's motion for default against Petrakis will be denied.

CONCLUSION

1. Plaintiff's motions for a TRO (document number 17 on the docket) and for

entry of default against Petrakis (document 26) are DENIED. Plaintiff's motion for an

extension of time to oppose the motion to dismiss (document 36) is GRANTED. The

opposition is deemed timely. The motion for stay of discovery (document 34) is DENIED as

moot. 

2. Defendants' motion to dismiss (document 29) is GRANTED IN PART and

DENIED IN PART. It is GRANTED as to plaintiff's first three claims, which are

DISMISSED without prejudice. The portion of the motion to dismiss in which Woodford

contends that plaintiff failed to state against her as to the remaining claim is GRANTED. 

Brown's motion to dismiss the remaining claim against her in her individual capacity is

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GRANTED; it is DENIED as to the claim against her in her official capacity. The motion to

dismiss by Petrakis as to the remaining claim is DENIED.

3. The only remaining claim is plaintiff's fourth claim, the Eighth Amendment

claim regarding cold food. The defendants on this claim who remain in the case are Brown

in her official capacity, Petrakis, and Fuller.

Discovery shall be completed by April 23, 2007. The dispositive motion deadline is

May 21, 2007. If a dispositive motion is filed, the opposition is due within thirty days of the

date the motion is served. Any reply is due fourteen days from the date the opposition is

served. Any such motion will be considered without oral argument unless the court orders

otherwise at a later date.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 12, 2007. 

 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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