Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02603/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02603-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Tony Bennett
Appellee
Jose Alonzo Corpus
Appellant

Document Text:

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The Honorable David S. Doty, United States District Judge for the District of

Minnesota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 04-2603

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Jose Alonzo Corpus,

Appellant,

v.

Tony Bennett,

Appellee.

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Appeal from the United States

District Court for the 

District of Minnesota.

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Submitted: September 16, 2005 

 Filed: December 7, 2005

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Before MURPHY, BRIGHT, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges. 

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GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

A jury found for Jose Alonzo Corpus on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for the use

of excessive force during pretrial detention and awarded him $75,000 in “nominal”

damages. Corpus appeals the ruling of the district court1

 reducing the nominal

damages award to one dollar. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the

judgment of the district court.

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Corpus v. Bennett, No. 00-2060 (D. Minn. Dec. 12, 2001), aff’d 50 Fed. Appx.

801 (8th Cir. 2002) (unpub.).

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I. BACKGROUND

On November 18, 1995, Jose Alonzo Corpus was stopped by a Minnesota State

Patrol Officer for speeding. A records check revealed an outstanding warrant, and

Corpus was arrested and transported to the LeSueur County Jail. Corpus was seated

at the desk of Jailer Tony Bennett for the booking process. As Bennett inventoried

Corpus’s personal belongings, Corpus and Bennett exchanged words. Bennett then

reached over the desk and hit Corpus on the top of his head. Corpus responded by

throwing a heavy set of keys at Bennett, and a brief scuffle ensued in which Bennett

pushed Corpus into a wall and both men fell to the floor. Corpus then returned to his

chair. Bennett completed the booking process and apologized for losing his temper.

Corpus was held at the jail until a court appearance on Monday, November 20, 1995.

At the court appearance, Corpus stated that he had been assaulted by Bennett. An

investigator immediately interviewed Corpus. After the interview, Corpus was taken

to a local clinic for a medical examination. The examining physician found no serious

injury and ordered no treatment.

Corpus attempted to file suit against Bennett, LeSueur County and the LeSueur

County sheriff in September 2000 in federal district court, alleging civil rights

violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state tort claims of assault, battery and

intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court found that the complaint

stated constitutional claims against only LeSueur County and granted summary

judgment to LeSueur County on those claims.2

 Corpus refiled the claims against

Bennett in his individual capacity in November 2001, and the district court recognized

a properly stated § 1983 claim based on Corpus’s Fourth Amendment right to be free

of excessive force during pretrial detention. That claim proceeded to jury trial in May

2004.

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The special verdict form read as follows:

1. Did defendant Tony Bennett use excessive force upon plaintiff

Jose Corpus on November 18, 1995?

. . .

2. If your answer to Question No. 1 was “yes,” then answer this

question: Was the use of excessive force by defendant Tony Bennett a

direct cause of injuries to plaintiff Jose Corpus?

Note: If you answered “yes” to Question 2, please skip Question

3 and proceed to Question 4. If you answered “no” to Question 2, please

answer Question 3.

3. If defendant Tony Bennett’s use of excessive force was not a

direct cause of substantial injuries to plaintiff Jose Corpus, what nominal

sum of money will fairly and adequately compensate plaintiff Jose

Corpus for the deprivation of his constitutional rights?

Note: If you answered Question 3, do not answer Question 4 and

5. . . .

4. If you answered “yes” to Question 2, what sum of money will

fairly and adequately compensate plaintiff Jose Corpus for the injuries

he claims to have sustained on November 18, 1995, up through the date

of trial, for:

(a) past pain, disability and emotional distress?

(b) past medical expenses?

(c) past lost wages?

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Jury Instruction No. 27, to which Corpus did not object, stated: “If you find

that plaintiff is entitled to a verdict in accordance with these instructions, but do not

find that the plaintiff has sustained substantial damages, then you may return a verdict

for plaintiff in some nominal sum such as one dollar.” In addition, the jury was

provided with a special verdict form3

 to which Corpus also did not object.

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5. What sum of money will fairly and adequately compensate

plaintiff Jose Corpus for the injuries he claims to have sustained on

November 18, 1995, for such future damages as are reasonably certain

to occur:

(a) future pain, disability and emotional distress?

(b) future medical expenses?

(c) lost earning capacity?

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The jury answered “yes” to Question 1 and “no” to Question 2 on the special

verdict form, thereby making a finding that Bennett used excessive force but that this

force was not a direct cause of any injury to Corpus. Accordingly, the jury left blank

Questions 4 and 5 regarding actual damages. However, in Question 3, the jury entered

$75,000 as the “nominal” sum of money that would fairly compensate Corpus for the

deprivation of his constitutional rights. The district court sua sponte reduced the

award of nominal damages to one dollar and entered judgment. Corpus’s motion for

a new trial or judgment as a matter of law, which challenged the admission of certain

evidence of Corpus’s past acts and asserted that the jury’s finding of no injury was

contrary to the evidence, was denied. Corpus appeals, arguing that the district court

erred in reducing the $75,000 damages award and in not offering him a choice

between a new trial on damages or a reduced damages award.

II. DISCUSSION

The district court did not exercise its discretion to reduce the $75,000 damages

award based on any finding that the amount was unsupported by the facts. Rather, the

district court ruled that, due to the jury’s finding that Bennett’s use of excessive force

was not a direct cause of injury to Corpus, the jury’s “nominal” damages award must

be reduced to a legally nominal sum as a matter of law. We review the district court’s

ruling on this question of law de novo. Cf. Ross v. Kansas City Power &

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Corpus did not raise the claim of inconsistent verdicts before the district court.

A party waives a claim of inconsistent answers on a special verdict form by failing to

raise it in district court before the jury is discharged. Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc. v.

Travelers Ins. Co., 391 F.3d 936, 945 (8th Cir. 2004). There is some question in this

case, however, whether Corpus had an opportunity to object before the jury was

discharged. Therefore, we assume without deciding that the argument was preserved,

and we address it on the merits. 

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Light Co., 293 F.3d 1041, 1048 (8th Cir. 2002) (reviewing de novo the district court’s

determination of the constitutionality of a punitive damages award).

Corpus first argues that the jury’s award of substantial “nominal” damages on

the special verdict form was inconsistent with its special finding of no direct injury.4

“Where there is a view of the case that makes the jury’s answers to special

interrogatories consistent, they must be resolved that way.” Lockard v. Missouri Pac.

R.R. Co., 894 F.2d 299, 305 (8th Cir. 1990) (quoting Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R.

Co., 372 U.S. 108, 119 (1963)). In this case, the jury answered “no” to Question 2 on

the special verdict form, “Was the use of excessive force by defendant Tony Bennett

a direct cause of injuries to plaintiff Jose Corpus?” This is an unambiguous finding

that Corpus suffered no compensable injuries at the hands of Bennett. Next, in

response to Question 3 on the special verdict form—“If defendant Tony Bennett’s use

of excessive force was not a direct cause of substantial injuries to plaintiff Jose

Corpus, what nominal sum of money will fairly and adequately compensate plaintiff

Jose Corpus for the deprivation of his constitutional rights?”—the jury entered

$75,000. The introductory clause to Question 3 itself presupposes that Corpus

suffered no compensable injuries at the hands of Bennett. Finally, the jury entered no

amount for Questions 4 and 5 concerning actual damages caused by Bennett. The

jury’s answers on the special verdict form are consistent if they are read to find no

actual injury to Corpus but to award $75,000 to compensate Corpus for the

deprivation of his constitutional rights in the absence of actual injury. The district

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The dissent cites two cases in which resubmission to the jury was necessary

because the jury failed to make findings of fact required by the jury instructions. See

Firemen’s Ins. Co. v. Craigie, 298 F.2d 457, 458-59 (8th Cir. 1962) (resubmitting the

case to the jury where the jury found for the plaintiff but failed to calculate and award

“the reasonable value of [the insured dwelling’s] contents plus reasonable added living

expenses incurred” as required by the insurance contract); Rios v. Empresas Lineas

Maritimas Argentinas, 575 F.2d 986, 990 (1st Cir. 1978) (resubmitting the case to the

jury where the jury failed to make a finding of fact on a third-party indemnity claim).

In the instant case, however, the jury made every finding of fact called for by the

instructions.

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court did not err in resolving the jury’s answers to the special interrogatories in this

consistent fashion.5

Nor did the district court err in reducing the damages award to a nominal sum.

“[W]hatever the constitutional basis for § 1983 liability, such damages must always

be designed ‘to compensate injuries caused by the [constitutional] deprivation.’”

Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 309 (1986) (quoting Carey v.

Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 265 (1978)) (emphasis and second set of brackets in Stachura).

Because the jury unambiguously found that Bennett’s use of excessive force caused

no direct injury to Corpus, an award of substantial damages cannot be permitted in this

case. Instead, nominal damages are the appropriate means “to vindicate constitutional

rights whose deprivation has not caused an actual, provable injury.” Westcott v.

Crinklaw, 133 F.3d 658, 662 (8th Cir. 1998). Despite an instruction that any nominal

damages should be awarded in a “sum such as one dollar,” the jury decided that, in the

absence of actual damages, $75,000 would be appropriate to vindicate Corpus’s

constitutional rights. Therefore, the district court had a duty to make the nominal

damages award conform to the law. Cf. Ross, 293 F.3d at 1049 (“[A] court has a

mandatory duty to correct an unconstitutionally excessive verdict so that it conforms

to the requirements of the due process clause.”) (quoting Johansen v. Combustion

Eng’g, Inc., 170 F.3d 1320, 1331 (11th Cir. 1999)). Finally, one dollar is recognized

as an appropriate value for nominal damages. See, e.g., Risdal v. Halford, 209 F.3d

1071, 1073 (8th Cir. 2000) (instructing the district court to award one dollar in

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nominal damages where a jury found for the § 1983 plaintiff but found no actual

damages). The district court did not err in reducing the nominal damages award to

one dollar.

 We next address Corpus’s contention that the district court erred in not

offering him a choice between a new trial on damages or a reduced damages award.

“The decision to order remittitur is circumscribed by the Seventh Amendment” right

to a jury trial. Thorne v. Welk Inv., Inc., 197 F.3d 1205, 1212 (8th Cir. 1999).

However, although the wording of the district court’s order in this case “remits” the

damages award to one dollar, the order was not technically a remittitur. We have

contrasted remittitur with a reduction of damages to conform with the applicable law

in the context of the reduction of punitive damages awards to comport with due

process:

A remittitur is a substitution of the court’s judgment for that of the jury

regarding the appropriate award of damages. The court orders a

remittitur when it believes the jury’s award is unreasonable on the facts.

A constitutional reduction, on the other hand, is a determination that the

law does not permit the award. Unlike a remittitur, which is

discretionary with the court . . . a court has a mandatory duty to correct

an unconstitutionally excessive verdict so that it conforms to the

requirements of the due process clause.

Ross, 293 F.3d at 1049 (quoting Johansen, 170 F.3d at 1331) (emphasis in Johansen).

Here, the district court did not substitute its own evaluation of the evidence

regarding damages for the jury’s factual findings. Instead, the district court made “a

determination that the law does not permit the award,” id., and followed its duty to

reduce the nominal damages award to conform with the law. Therefore, Corpus’s

Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial was not implicated, and the district court was

not required to offer Corpus the option of a new trial on damages if he did not consent

to the reduced damages award. Ross, 293 F.3d at 1049-50.

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III. CONCLUSION

We conclude that the district court did not err in reducing the $75,000 nominal

damages award to the nominal amount of one dollar nor in not offering Corpus a

choice between a new trial on damages or a reduced damages award. Therefore, we

affirm the judgment of the district court.

BRIGHT, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. Corpus testified that Bennett’s excessive force consisted

of Bennett striking him on the head with a closed fist, then ramming his knee into

Corpus’s stomach, jams “like lightening” causing “a sharp pain.” During an interview

conducted two days later by Deputy Tietz, Corpus complained of scratches on his

stomach, bruises in his groin area, and back pain. The initial physician’s report

reflected lower abdominal and back strain. Corpus’s sister and wife observed that

following the incident Corpus changed completely. He led a less active lifestyle, lost

a job, and complained of flashbacks, nightmares, and humiliation. He suffered from

headaches and he testified that his back pain intensified. He tried physical therapy,

saw various doctors, and eventually he received a diagnosis of a herniated disc. 

While the defense presented evidence and argued other possible causes for

Corpus’s physical, emotional, and employment problems, the jury’s substantial award

of $75,000 suggests an intention to compensate actual injuries that conflicts with its

finding that “Bennett’s use of excessive force was not a direct cause of substantial

injuries to plaintiff Jose Corpus.” The jury’s verdict also conflicts with the district

court’s instruction on nominal damages as limited to “some nominal sum such as one

dollar.” 

It is obvious that the jury did not follow the district court’s instructions and had

the trial judge who charged the jury been available to receive the verdict these

conflicts may have been clarified. But, in fact, a different judge accepted the verdict,

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commenting: “Obviously I don’t know much about it[,] but I’m guessing you paid

careful attention . . . . I have to go back to my courtroom and back to trial.” The jury

was then discharged without clarifying the uncertainty surrounding its verdict

answers, and it appears counsel did not receive an opportunity to inspect the verdict

and object to the inconsistency. 

Corpus in his appellant’s brief argues that “[t]o the extent there was a

conflict–between a finding [of] no compensatory damages and $75,000.00 in nominal

damages,” the district court should have returned the jury for further deliberations or

granted a new trial. See Auwood v. Harry Brandt Booking Office, Inc., 850 F.2d 884,

890-91 (2d Cir. 1988). In his conclusion, Corpus asked “in the alternative, he be

given a new trial.” Further, because Corpus argues the greater relief of judgment in

his favor for $75,000, this court may consider the more limited relief of remand for

a new trial. See Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 101 (1968) (“[A]uthority under

28 U.S.C. § 2106 [exists] to make such disposition of the case ‘as may be just under

the circumstances.’”); First Wis. Nat’l Bank of Rice Lake v. Klapmeier, 526 F.2d 77,

80 (8th Cir. 1975) (“The parties have not argued the issue in this manner in this court.

. . . Nonetheless, we feel the right to trial by jury is so fundamental that . . . . [w]e

order a new trial . . . .”).

The majority reasons that “[t]he jury’s answers on the special verdict form are

consistent if they are read to find no actual injury to Corpus but to award $75,000 to

compensate Corpus for the deprivation of his constitutional rights in the absence of

actual injury.” Slip Op. at 5. However, the law requires consistency in light of both

the interrogatories and the jury instructions, which precluded compensating Corpus

for the value of the constitutional deprivation beyond a “nominal sum such as one

dollar.” Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 372 U.S. 108, 119-22 (1963) (determining

the consistency of the jury’s answers in light of the jury instructions); Firemen’s Ins.

Co. of Newark, N.J. v. Craigie, 298 F.2d 457, 457-59 (8th Cir. 1962) (where insurance

policy covered $75,000 for value of house, $30,000 for its contents, and $15,000 for

post-fire living expenses, initial verdict of $75,000 “obviously could not legally have

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been sustained” and trial judge properly reinstructed the jury that if it decided to find

for plaintiffs, it also had to award for contents and living expenses); Rios v. Empresas

Lineas Martimas Argentinas, 575 F.2d 986, 990 (1st Cir. 1978) (“When the jury

returned the first verdict, which was directly contrary to instructions given by the

court, the trial court properly instructed the jury that it had to decide as between

Lineas and Fred Imbert on the third party complaint. Resubmitting the case to the jury

with renewed instructions has been held proper where the jury has failed to follow the

court’s instructions in returning a verdict.”).

The decision reached in this case fails to give proper accord to the Seventh

Amendment right to trial by jury. “Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is

of such importance and occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that

any seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the

utmost care.” Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935). “[A] view of the case

which will make the jury’s finding[s] inconsistent results in a collision with the

Seventh Amendment.” Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369

U.S. 355, 364 (1962). 

I agree with the several courts of appeal which have considered verdicts

awarding substantial damages labeled as “nominal” and recognized the need to

remand when the fact-finder’s intent is unclear. Auwood, 850 F.2d at 891-92 (“If in

fact there had been an interrogatory asking whether plaintiffs had proven any damages

and the jury answered ‘no,’ that answer would have been inconsistent with the

answers specifying dollar amounts of damage [labeled as NOMINAL]. . . . Had such

an irreconcilable inconsistency existed, the court should have granted a new trial as

to damages.”); Magnett v. Pelletier, 488 F.2d 33, 35 (1st Cir. 1973) (per curiam)

(holding that award of $500 in “nominal damages” in Section 1983 action “cannot be

properly regarded as nominal damages” but “[s]ince it is conceivable that the court

misspoke itself, fairness dictates a remand for further findings or articulation . . . .”).

Of course where the record shows no damages, as in United States ex rel. Tyrell v.

Speaker, 535 F.2d 823, 829 & n.13 (3d Cir. 1976), a trial court is justified in reducing

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an award of $500 damages to a nominal amount such as one dollar.

The risk here is more than remote that the district court disregarded a jury

finding of $75,000 in damages, at least some of which compensated for actual injuries,

when it reduced the “nominal damages” award to one dollar. Corpus presented

evidence of substantial injuries and the jury returned a very substantial award contrary

to its finding under interrogatory two of no substantial injuries. The jury may have

decided to award a lump sum instead of deliberating on an itemized award under

interrogatories four and five. All that can be said with any confidence from this

record is that the jury did not follow the district court’s instructions. For these

reasons, I would reverse and remand for a new trial.

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