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Parties Involved:
Mark Dennard Hoyle
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 23, 1997 Decided September 12, 1997 

No. 95-3157

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

MARK DENNARD HOYLE, A/K/A SLIM,

A/K/A MARKIE,

APPELLANT

Consolidated with

95-3158, 95-3159 & 95-3160

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(92cr0284-01, 92cr0284-02, 

92cr0284-03 & 92cr0284-08)

-

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Jensen E. Barber, Vincent A. Jankoski, William J. Garber,

and John J. Carney, all appointed by the court, argued the 

causes and filed the joint briefs for appellants.

Andrew C. Phelan, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee, with whom Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. 

Attorney at the time the brief was filed, John R. Fisher, 

Thomas C. Black, Gregg A. Maisel, Rachel Adelman-Pierson, and Lynn C. Leibovitz, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, were 

on the brief. Elizabeth Trosman, Assistant U.S. Attorney, 

entered an appearance.

Before: SILBERMAN, WILLIAMS and HENDERSON, Circuit 

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SILBERMAN.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

SILBERMAN, Circuit Judge: Appellants were convicted of 

participating in a RICO conspiracy and engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE). They contend that the imposition of cumulative sentences for these two offenses violates 

the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against double jeopardy. 

We affirm appellants' convictions.

I. 

Appellants are members of the so-called Newton Street 

Crew. They were found guilty after a five-month trial of a 

variety of offenses, including unlawful use of firearms, robbery, and murder relating to a conspiracy to distribute crack 

cocaine in the District of Columbia and Maryland. All four 

were shown to have been heavily involved in the organization's distribution of crack cocaine and use of violence, both to 

enforce organizational discipline and to eliminate competitors. 

Three of the four, Goldston, Hoyle, and McCollough, were 

further shown to have been leaders in the organization. They 

were each given multiple life sentences and assorted other 

prison terms. Although appellants raise numerous contentions on appeal, we think only one of these merits discussion.1

__________

1 We reject with one exception all of appellants' other challenges. Hoyle, McCullough, and Goldston argue that the separate 

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Hoyle, McCollough, and Goldston contend that it was an error 

of law for the district court to impose separate life sentences 

for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1994) (RICO conspiracy) 

and 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1994) (CCE).2 They argue that RICO 

conspiracy is a lesser included offense of CCE, and, thus, the 

imposition of cumulative sentences for these two crimes violates the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against double jeopardy.

II.

Although the Double Jeopardy Clause literally protects 

against successive prosecutions for the same offense, it has 

been interpreted as also precluding multiple punishments for 

the same offense. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333 

(1981). Under certain circumstances nominally separate offenses could be thought the same offensethus implicating 

the clause. It is a matter of legislative intent. If the 

legislature intends that the two offenses be treated as the 

same offense, the Double Jeopardy Clause applies. If the 

legislature intends that the two offenses be distinct, it does 

not. When a defendant is charged with two offenses, the 

"Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the 

sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than 

the legislature intended." Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 

366 (1983).

In determining legislative, in this case congressional, intent, Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), 

directs that we break down the elements of the two crimes 

__________

sentences imposed for their 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1994) (conspiracy to 

distribute cocaine) and 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1994) (CCE) convictions 

are cumulative and violate the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy 

Clause. The government concedes appellants' argument in light of 

the Supreme Court's recent holding in Rutledge v. United States,

116 S. Ct. 1241 (1996). Accordingly, we vacate Hoyle's, McCullough's, and Goldston's § 846 drug conspiracy convictions along 

with the attendant $50 special assessments.

2 This challenge does not apply to appellant Harris because he 

was not charged with a CCE offense.

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and determine "whether each provision requires proof of an 

additional fact which the other does not." Id. at 304. If 

crime "A" has all the elements of crime "B"even though 

"A" has additional ones that "B" does notthen "B" would be 

a lesser included offense within "A" and a defendant could not 

be charged with violation of "B" as well as "A" unless the 

legislature clearly indicated otherwise. United States v. Baker, 63 F.3d 1478, 1494 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 

824 (1996).

Applying the Blockburger rule to determine whether RICO 

conspiracy is a lesser included offense incorporated within 

CCE, we observe that in order to make out a CCE violation 

the government must show that the defendant committed: 

"1) a felony violation of the federal narcotics law; 2) as part 

of a continuing series of violations; 3) in concert with five or 

more persons; 4) for whom the defendant is an organizer or 

supervisor; 5) from which he derives substantial income or 

resources." United States v. Grayson, 795 F.2d 278, 283-84 

(3d Cir. 1986). A "continuing series of violations" is defined 

as "at least three related felony narcotics violations, including 

the one charged." United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 126, 129 

(4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1087 (1997).

A RICO conspiracy charge, on the other hand, requires 

proof that the defendant agreed to further a substantive 

RICO violation. That obliges the government to show "(1) 

the existence of an enterprise which affects interstate or 

foreign commerce; (2) that the defendant 'associated with' 

the enterprise; (3) that the defendant participated in the 

conduct of the enterprise's affairs; and, (4) that the participation was through a pattern of racketeering activity, i.e., by 

committing at least two acts of racketeering activity as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)." United States v. Phillips, 664 

F.2d 971, 1011 (5th Cir. 1981).3

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3 The Supreme Court has held that "[i]n order to 'participate, 

directly or indirectly, in the conduct of [a RICO] enterprise's 

affairs,' one must have some part in directing those affairs." Reves 

v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 179 (1993). We have yet to decide 

whether the Reves "operation or management" test also applies to 

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CCE's requirement that the defendant have organized or 

supervised five or more persons is not matched by any of the 

RICO conspiracy elements, but the question before us is not 

whether the offenses are identicalonly whether if a CCE 

violation is shown, a RICO conspiracy is also necessarily 

made out. The government contends that the one element of 

RICO not subsumed within CCE is the requirement of a 

showing of a criminal enterprise. Such an enterprise is 

proved both by evidence of an ongoing organization and by 

evidence that the "associates are bound together ... so that 

they function as a continuing unit." United States v. Perholtz, 842 F.2d 343, 362 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see United States v. 

Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981). Appellants assert that 

such an organization and constancy of personnel are necessarily implied by CCE's requirement that the government prove 

a continuing series of violations, in concert with five or more 

persons, for whom the defendant is an organizer or supervisor.

Seven of our sister circuits have accepted the government's 

position, that a CCE violation does not require proof of the 

existence of a RICO enterprise. United States v. Bennett, 44 

F.3d 1364, 1375 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2279 (1995);

United States v. Muhammad, 824 F.2d 214, 218 (2d Cir. 

1987); Grayson, 795 F.2d at 286; United States v. Ryland,

806 F.2d 941, 943 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Love, 767 

F.2d 1052, 1061 n.13 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Sinito,

723 F.2d 1250, 1262 (6th Cir. 1983); Phillips, 664 F.2d at 

1014.

Although appellants are facing overwhelmingly negative 

case law on this exact issue, the Seventh Circuitbreaking 

with other circuits on the related question of whether a CCE 

violation is made out if the defendant supervised five subordinates on successive occasions even if no two were operating 

__________

RICO conspiracy, see United States v. Thomas, 114 F.3d 228, 242 

(D.C. Cir. 1997), but the resolution of that question is not relevant 

to the disposition of this case. Even if we were to apply the 

"operation or management test" to a RICO conspiracy charge, the 

CCE statute contains an analogous requirement in its supervision 

prong.

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under the defendant's direction at the same time4has reasoned in a fashion that lends support to appellants' claim. In 

United States v. Bond, 847 F.2d 1233, 1237 (7th Cir. 1988), 

the Seventh Circuit said that the CCE statute, designed to 

reach the so-called kingpins of the drug trade, United States 

v. Johnson, 575 F.2d 1347, 1358 (5th Cir. 1978), was "aim[ed] 

at criminal organizations." Therefore, although it would not 

be necessary to show that the defendant supervised the same

five persons through a continuous series of crimes, it would 

not suffice if "[a] small timer had one servant in January, a 

second in February, a third in March and so on." Bond, 847 

F.2d at 1237. Judge Posner, dissenting in United States v. 

Bafia, 949 F.2d 1465 (7th Cir. 1991), setting forth his understanding of the logic of Bond, thought that although simultaneous supervision of the same five subordinates was not 

required, the organization must have at least five "slots"

which does imply a continuous framework. Id. at 1481.5 To 

be sure, the Seventh Circuit has not even suggested that such 

a concept is equivalent to a RICO enterprise, but that proposition might be thought a logical extension.

We think that the Seventh Circuit has a powerful position 

in contending that CCE does not cover the periodic employment by a drug dealer of a single rotating runner. Even if 

that is so, however, we do not believe that the government 

must show, under CCE, the structure of a continuing organization equivalent to a RICO "enterprise." The statute does 

refer to the defendant as an organizer or supervisor but one 

can organize events and supervise transitory subordinates 

without creating an organizational structure. And although 

the phrase "continuing series" certainly connotes related 

events, see Hall, 93 F.3d at 129, those events can be related 

__________

4 Compare Phillips, 664 F.2d at 1010 (holding that the government need only prove that the defendant supervised at least five 

other persons and "such relationships need not have existed at the 

same moment of time ....") and Muhammad, 824 F.2d at 218, with 

United States v. Bond, 847 F.2d 1233, 1237 (7th Cir. 1988).

5 The majority opinion does not really deal with Judge Posner's 

analysis.

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by virtue of a defendant's specific modus operandi, even in 

the absence of the use of common subordinates.6 Take as an 

example a drug dealer who, perhaps for security reasons, 

recruits a different group of distributors, picked rather at 

random in areas where such persons might be found. If he 

should do so on three separate days in a single month, on 

each occasion recruiting and temporarily organizing more 

than five runners with no overlap of personnel, this could be 

thought a "continuing series" of violations in concert with five 

or more persons for whom the defendant is the organizer or 

supervisor. But no actual organization or structure is 

formed; it is only inchoate.7In order to form an actual 

organization equating to RICO's "enterprise," there would 

have to be a certain core of constant personnel. Therefore, 

even if it is possible to describe a shadow structure complete 

with slots only in the defendant's mind as a CCE "organization," that seems too tenuous a concept to apply to RICO, 

whichit will be recalledrequires "associates bound together ... [in] ... a continuing unit."

The difference in the required evidence is explicable in 

light of the somewhat different objectives of the two statutes; 

CCE is aimed at the organizer more than the organization, 

whereas RICO is directed at the organization. See Phillips,

664 F.2d at 1013 n.62 ("[CCE] focuses on the organizers of 

narcotics operations while RICO focuses on all direct and 

indirect participants in the organized criminal enterprise.").

* * * *

Therefore, we reject appellants' argument that their CCE 

and RICO convictions may not coexist.

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6

If we did interpret the statute as requiring common subordinates, we then would be faced with the question of how much 

overlap was necessary.

7

Judge Posner spoke of a "table of organization that, however 

informal, has at least five spaces on it." Bafia, 949 F.2d at 1481. 

That logic could suggest that even an organizational structure in the 

defendant's mind would suffice for CCE purposes, but that still 

would not necessarily amount to an enterprise under RICO.

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KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge, concurring:

While I fully concur in the result, I believe it is not 

necessary, and unwise, to opine on the simultaneity issue. As 

the opinion acknowledges, even if a CCE required simultaneous management of at least five subordinates, a RICO 

conspiracy charge would nonetheless not constitute a lesser 

included offense of the CCE charge. Majority Op. at 6-7.

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