Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-04-07062/USCOURTS-caDC-04-07062-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Air Line Pilots Association
Appellant
Federal Express Corporation
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 10, 2005 Decided April 8, 2005

No. 04-7062

AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION,

APPELLANT

v.

FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(02cv01881)

Clay Warner argued the cause for appellant. With him on

the briefs was Marta Wagner.

Thomas E. Reinert, Jr. argued the cause for appellee. With

him on the brief was Adrienne A. Brown.

Before: RANDOLPH, TATEL, and GARLAND, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.

RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge: The union representing Federal

Express pilots -- the Air Line Pilots Association -- brought an

action to compel the company to arbitrate a grievance. On

cross-motions for summary judgment the district court ruled in

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FedEx’s favor, holding that the grievance was not arbitrable.

310 F. Supp. 2d 247 (D.D.C. 2004). The union’s appeal is on

the grounds that the district court misconstrued the collective

bargaining agreement and misunderstood the nature of the

grievance.

The FedEx Pilots Association, which represented the pilots

until it merged with their current union in 2002, entered into a

collective bargaining agreement with the company in 1999. As

the Railway Labor Act required, 45 U.S.C. § 184, the agreement

contained grievance and arbitration provisions. Section 20A of

the agreement defined “grievances” as “disputes growing out of

the interpretation or application of agreements between the

parties hereto concerning rates of pay, rules or working

conditions.” Section 20A also stated: “Any pilot, group of pilots

covered by this Agreement or the Association on behalf of such

pilot(s) who has a grievance concerning any action of the

Company affecting the pilot(s), except matters involving

discipline, shall have such grievance handled in accordance with

the following procedures,” which are then spelled out in detail.

If a grievance is not resolved to the union’s satisfaction, the

union may take it to arbitration before the Federal Express

Pilots’ System Board of Adjustment.

The grievance FedEx refused to arbitrate dealt with

“jumpseating,” the practice by which offline pilots travel

without charge in available seats in an aircraft’s cockpit,

passenger cabin or cargo compartment. FedEx pilots had the

option of jumpseating on FedEx aircraft. They also could

jumpseat on other aircraft because of reciprocal jumpseat

agreements between FedEx and other carriers. In light of the

fact that many FedEx pilots reported to work far from their

homes, they valued jumpseating.

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The FedEx collective bargaining agreement addressed the

subject: “To the extent permitted by law or regulation, pilots

shall be given access to Company jumpseats on terms no less

favorable than those provided in the Company jumpseat policy

effective January 25, 1998 and included in the [Pilot Benefit

Book]. Procedures for booking and other provisions governing

access to Company jumpseats shall be as provided in that

policy.” The Pilot Benefit Book mentioned in this provision

stated that: “FedEx management, in conjunction with the FPA

Jumpseat Committee, will enter into reciprocal jumpseat

agreements with other . . . carriers on behalf of FedEx flight

crew members. FPA Jumpseat Committee shall have the

opportunity to recommend additions, deletions or changes to the

reciprocal agreements.”

FedEx had been abiding by its reciprocal jumpseat

agreements with other carriers. Then, shortly after September

11, 2001, federal security directives prohibited offline

jumpseaters from using cockpit seats. Other carriers complied

with the directives but still permitted offline pilots to jumpseat

in passenger cabins and cargo compartments. FedEx did not. It

decided that for security reasons, no pilot other than one

working for FedEx could jumpseat on FedEx airplanes. As a

result, other carriers began denying FedEx pilots reciprocal

jumpseat privileges on their aircraft.

In February 2002, the FedEx Pilots Association filed a

grievance “on behalf of all FedEx pilots,” complaining that the

company’s position on jumpseating conflicted with the

collective bargaining agreement and that its “decision to

unilaterally change the decades of past practice of allowing

offline pilots access to Company jumpseats places the continued

existence of our reciprocal jumpseat agreements in jeopardy.”

FedEx refused to process the grievance on the ground that the

“inability of non-Federal Express employees to use our

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jumpseats is in no way related to the terms and conditions of

employment” of the FedEx pilots.

Under the collective bargaining agreement, a refusal to

process a grievance is considered a denial of the grievance. The

FedEx Pilots Association therefore appealed to the System

Board. FedEx responded in a letter stating that the System

Board had no jurisdiction because the “inability of non-Federal

Express employees to use Company jumpseats has in no way

affected the pilots covered by the contract. Such jumpseat

access has been a benefit only to individuals not employed by

Federal Express and not represented by [the union], and the

denial of jumpseats to those people is not a subject covered by

the collective bargaining agreement or by the” Railway Labor

Act.

In July 2002, the arbitrator assigned to the matter ruled that

the grievance was within the jurisdiction of the System Board.

Citing Supreme Court precedent, he had little “doubt that the

jumpseat issue grew out of the grievances concerning the

interpretation and application of the terms of the Agreement and

a long-standing past practice and thereby fall within the terms of

the Agreement. Thus, applying the presumption mandated by

the Supreme Court, I have concluded that the System Board has

jurisdiction to hear and decide this dispute.” The arbitrator

issued his decision “with the full knowledge that any ruling I

make is not final and binding and that court action is required

for enforcement if either party refuses to abide by the ruling.”

By this time, the Air Line Pilots Association had taken over

as the union representing the FedEx pilots. When FedEx refused

to accept the arbitrator’s decision, the union filed an action

seeking to compel the company to arbitrate. On cross-motions

for summary judgment, the district court ruled in favor of

FedEx. It very much appears -- although we cannot be certain --

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that the court believed the union was not the collective

bargaining representative of the FedEx pilots and that it was

pursuing the grievance on behalf of non-FedEx pilots. After

reviewing provisions in the agreement the court concluded that

it “only covers pilots employed by FedEx.” 310 F. Supp. 2d at

250. The court then said: “the only conclusion to be drawn is

that the plaintiff, an association representing non-FedEx pilots,

cannot place a properly arbitrable issue before the grievance

board,” to which the court added “there simply is no colorable

argument that the plaintiff is covered by the subject matter of the

agreement.” Id.

District courts may grant summary judgment without

issuing an opinion. When they do explain their action, their

explanation is entitled to respectful consideration. Still,

appellate review of orders granting summary judgment is de

novo, at least when the order does not rest on a determination of

ultimate facts. See Troy Corp. v. Browner, 120 F.3d 277, 281

(D.C. Cir. 1997); WILLIAM W. SCHWARZER ET AL., THE

ANALYSIS AND DECISION OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS 79-

81(Federal Judicial Center 1991). Here, our independent

examination of the case leads us to a conclusion opposed to the

district court’s.

We may prepare the ground this way. Section 20A of the

contract permits only FedEx pilots and their collective

bargaining representative to pursue grievances. If we agreed

that the union was prosecuting this grievance on behalf of nonFedEx pilots we would therefore affirm. But there is no room

for such an argument. True enough, the Air Line Pilots

Association represents pilots working for companies other than

FedEx. True also, non-FedEx pilots would benefit if the

arbitration went in the union’s favor -- they could resume

jumpseating on FedEx planes. But neither circumstance

changes the fact that the union filing this grievance did so on

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behalf of FedEx pilots in order to preserve the benefits they

received from the reciprocal jumpseat agreements. We know

the grievance was filed on behalf of FedEx pilots because, at the

time of filing, their exclusive bargaining agent was the FedEx

Pilots Association, which represented only them. We know this

as well from the grievance itself: “This grievance is filed by the

[FedEx Pilots Association] on behalf of all FedEx pilots and the

[FedEx Pilots Association]”; and “this grievance” seeks “to

correct management’s manner of dealing with the FedEx pilots

and [the FedEx Pilots Association] with regard to jumpseat

issues . . . .” We also must assume that a favorable resolution of

the grievance would promote the interests of the FedEx pilots

because they would again enjoy the privilege of traveling free of

charge on the aircraft of other carriers who had reciprocal

jumpseat agreements with FedEx. We must assume this because

the union said so in its uncontested statement of material facts

not in dispute. That the union’s success in arbitration might also

assist employees of other companies cannot make a difference

on this question. No one would suppose that a grievance

protesting a manufacturing company’s decision to cease

covering its employees with a medical insurance plan should be

viewed as a grievance on behalf of the insurance company’s

employees who administered the plan.

This brings us to four well-settled points of the federal law

governing the arbitrability of labor disputes. One, “‘arbitration

is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit

to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to

submit.’” AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers

of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986), quoting United Steelworkers

v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960).

Two, “[u]nless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide

otherwise, the question . . . whether the parties agreed to

arbitrate is to be decided by the court, not the arbitrator.” 475

U.S. at 649. Three, “in deciding whether the parties have agreed

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to submit a particular grievance to arbitration, a court is not to

rule on the potential merits of the underlying claims.” Id. And

four, an “order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be

denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the

arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that

covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor

of coverage.” Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at 582-83.

We have already explained why we are satisfied that a

proper party, as defined in the agreement, brought this grievance

and why a proper party is pursuing it. We are also convinced

that the grievance concerns a proper subject, as set forth in

Section 20A of the agreement, quoted earlier. The jumpseat

controversy grows out of a dispute over the meaning of

contractual terms, among which is Section 26J.1, also quoted

above. Whether Section 26J.1’ s reference to the Pilot Benefit

Book had the effect of making the jumpseat provisions of the

Book part of the collective bargaining agreement, as the union

maintains, is one of the issues for the arbitrator. The

agreement’s provision governing arbitration, Section 21A, gives

the System Board “jurisdiction over disputes between pilots or

the Association and the Company growing out of grievances, or

out of the interpretation or application of any of the terms of the

Agreement . . . .” For the reasons already stated, we are far from

positively convinced that this provision cannot be interpreted to

cover the jumpseating dispute. No more is needed to order

FedEx to arbitrate.

The judgment of the district court is reversed, and the case

is remanded for the entry of an order compelling FedEx to

arbitrate the jumpseat grievance.

So ordered.

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