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Parties Involved:
Sealed Case

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Filed December 1, 1998

No. 98-3052

In re: Sealed Case

Consolidated with

Nos. 98-3053 & 98-3059

BEFORE: Ginsburg, Randolph, and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

O R D E R

Upon consideration of the responses of Francis D. Carter

and of the United States of America, acting through the

Office of the Independent Counsel, to the Court's order to

show cause why the opinion in this case should not be

unsealed, it is

ORDERED, that the opinion in this case is no longer

protected from public disclosure by Rule 6(e), Fed. R. Crim.

P., in view of the public release, by the House Committee on

the Judiciary, of Mr. Carter's grand jury testimony transcript, see H.R. Doc. 105-316, at 393-433 (Sept. 28, 1998); and

it is further

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ORDERED, that the judgment and opinion of this Court in

In re: Sealed Case, No. 98-3052 (D.C. Cir. May 26, 1998),

shall be unsealed; and it is further

ORDERED, that the order to show cause is discharged;

and it is further

ORDERED, pursuant to this Court's Local Rule 47.1(c),

that the following materials also shall be unsealed:

1. Motion of the United States of America for Summary

Dismissal of Appeal of Francis D. Carter, Esq., for Want of

Jurisdiction (May 1, 1998);

2. Motion of the United States of America to Expedite

Consideration of the Appeal and for an Abbreviated Briefing

Schedule (May 1, 1998);

3. Motion of Francis D. Carter for Extension of Time to

File Opposition to Motion for Summary Dismissal and Motion

to Set Briefing Schedule (May 5, 1998);

4. Response of the United States of America to Motion for

Extension of Time to File Opposition to Motion for Summary

Dismissal and Motion to Set Briefing Schedule (May 5, 1998);

5. Order of this Court granting motion to expedite and

setting briefing schedule (May 5, 1998);

6. Brief of Cross-Appellant United States (May 11, 1998);

7. Cross-Appellant's Appendix (May 11, 1998);

8. Brief for Appellant Francis D. Carter, Esq. (May 11,

1998);

9. Appendix for Appellant Francis D. Carter, Esq. (May

11, 1998);

10. Opening Brief of Appellant Monica Lewinsky (May 11,

1998);

11. Appendix of Appellant Monica Lewinsky (May 11,

1998);

12. Request for Judicial Notice by Appellant Monica Lewinsky (May 11, 1998);

13. Brief of Appellee United States (May 14, 1998);

14. Brief for Cross-Appellee Francis D. Carter, Esq.

(May 14, 1998);

15. Reply Brief for Appellant Francis D. Carter, Esq.

(May 15, 1998);

16. Reply Brief of Appellant Monica Lewinsky (Lodged

May 15, 1998);

17. Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant United States (May

15, 1998);

18. Motion to Night File Reply Brief of Monica Lewinsky

(May 19, 1998);

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19. Order of this Court granting leave to file lodged reply

brief out of time (May 26, 1998);

20. Order of this Court to show cause why the opinion in

this case should not be unsealed (Nov. 16, 1998);

21. Response of the United States of America to the

November 16, 1998 Order to Show Cause (Nov. 23, 1998);

22. Response of Francis D. Carter to Order to Show

Cause Why Opinion Should Not Be Unsealed and Motion to

Unseal Entire Record (Nov. 23, 1998).

Per Curiam

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Filed May 26, 1998

No. 98-3052

In re: Sealed Case

Consolidated with

Nos. 98-3053 & 98-3059

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(98ms00068)

Nathaniel H. Speights filed the briefs for appellant Monica

Lewinsky.

Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. filed the briefs for appellant Francis D. Carter, Esq.

Robert J. Bittman, Deputy Independent Counsel, filed the

briefs for cross-appellant the United States.

Before: Ginsburg, Randolph, and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Randolph.

Randolph, Circuit Judge: In 1997, Monica S. Lewinsky, a

former White House intern, received a subpoena to produce

items and to testify in Paula Jones v. William Jefferson

Clinton, a civil matter then pending in the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. The

subpoena requested, among other things, documents relating

to an alleged relationship between President Clinton and

Lewinsky and any gifts the President may have given her.

Lewinsky retained Francis D. Carter, Esq., to represent her

regarding the subpoena.

Carter drafted an affidavit for Lewinsky, which she signed

under penalty of perjury. The affidavit, submitted to the

Arkansas district court as an exhibit to Lewinsky's motion to

quash the subpoena, states in relevant part:

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dent, [and] he did not propose that we have a sexual

relationship.... The occasions that I saw the President

after I left my employment at the White House in April,

1996, were official receptions, formal functions or events

related to the U.S. Department of Defense, where I was

working at the time. There were other people present

on those occasions.

On January 16, 1998, at the request of the Attorney

General, a Special Division of this Court expanded the jurisdiction of the Office of Independent Counsel to include "authority to investigate ... whether Monica Lewinsky or others

suborned perjury, obstructed justice, intimidated witnesses,

or otherwise violated federal law ... in dealing with witnesses, potential witnesses, attorneys, or others concerning

the civil case Jones v. Clinton." Order of the Special Division, Jan. 16, 1998. On February 2 and 9, 1998, as part of

that investigation, a grand jury issued subpoenas to Carter,

the first for documents and other items, the second for his

testimony. Carter moved to quash the subpoenas, contending, inter alia, that the documents, testimony, and other

items sought were protected from disclosure by the attorneyclient privilege, the work-product privilege, and Lewinsky's

Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Lewinsky, as the real-party-in-interest, filed a response in support

of Carter's motion. The United States opposed the motion,

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arguing among other things that the crime-fraud exception

vitiated any claims of attorney-client or work-product privilege and that the Fifth Amendment did not bar production of

the requested materials. The district court ordered Carter to

comply with the two grand jury subpoenas except to the

extent that compliance would "call for him to disclose materials in his possession that may not be revealed without violating Monica S. Lewinsky's Fifth Amendment rights."

Carter and Lewinsky argue in separate appeals that the

district court erred in rejecting their motions to quash the

grand jury subpoenas in their entirety. In its cross-appeal,

the United States, through the Office of Independent Counsel, claims that the Fifth Amendment does not bar production

of any of the materials the grand jury subpoenaed from

Carter.

We dismiss Carter's appeal for want of jurisdiction. Wellsettled law dictates that "one to whom a subpoena is directed

may not appeal the denial of a motion to quash that subpoena

but must either obey its commands or refuse to do so and

contest the validity of the subpoena if he is subsequently cited

for contempt on account of his failure to obey." United

States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 532 (1971); see Cobbledick v.

United States, 309 U.S. 323, 328 (1940); In re Sealed Case,

107 F.3d 46, 48 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Rather than risking

contempt, Carter has sworn that he will comply with the

subpoenas if ordered to do so.1

Our jurisdiction over Lewinsky's appeal is another matter.

Lewinsky is the holder of the privilege. Given Carter's

sworn declaration that he will give testimony if ordered, she

is entitled to appeal the district court's ruling rejecting Car-

__________

1 In addition to adopting Lewinsky's arguments regarding the

crime-fraud exception, Carter claims that the subpoenas are overbroad, unreasonable, and oppressive and that the district court's

reliance on the Independent Counsel's ex parte submissions in

enforcing the subpoenas violated due process. Contrary to Carter's

contention, the issues he seeks to present are thus neither "virtually

identical" to, nor "inextricably intertwined" with, those Lewinsky

raises.

ter's assertion of the privilege. See In re Sealed Case, 107

F.3d at 48 n.1.

The district court held that the crime-fraud exception to

the attorney-client privilege applied. After reviewing the

government's in camera submission, the court found that

"Ms. Lewinsky consulted Mr. Carter for the purpose of

committing perjury and obstructing justice and used the

material he prepared for her for the purpose of committing

perjury and obstructing justice."2 Lewinsky tells us she

could not have committed either crime: the government could

not establish perjury because her denial of having had a

"sexual relationship" with President Clinton was not "material" to the Arkansas proceedings within the meaning of 18

U.S.C. s 1623(a); and her affidavit containing this denial

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could not have constituted a "corrupt[ ] ... endeavor[ ] to

influence" the Arkansas district court within the meaning of

18 U.S.C. s 1503. Both of Lewinsky's propositions rely on

the Arkansas district court's ruling on January 30, 1998, after

Lewinsky had filed her affidavit, that although evidence concerning Lewinsky might be relevant, it would be excluded

from the civil case under Fed. R. Evid. 403 as unduly prejudicial, "not essential to the core issues in th[e] case," and to

prevent undue delay resulting from the Independent Counsel's investigation.3

A statement is "material" if it "has a natural tendency to

influence, or was capable of influencing, the decision of the

tribunal in making a [particular] determination." United

States v. Barrett, 111 F.3d 947, 953 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,

118 S. Ct. 176 (1997). The "central object" of any materiality

inquiry is "whether the misrepresentation or concealment was

predictably capable of affecting, i.e., had a natural tendency

__________

2 The district court did not find, nor did the Independent Counsel

suggest, any impropriety by Carter.

3 Lewinsky does not appear to contest directly the district court's

finding that she made one or more false statements in her sworn

affidavit. Even so, we have independently reviewed the in camera

materials considered by the district court and conclude that sufficient evidence existed to support the court's finding.

to affect, the official decision." Kungys v. United States, 485

U.S. 759, 771 (1988). Lewinsky used the statement in her

affidavit, quoted above, to support her motion to quash the

subpoena issued in the discovery phase of the Arkansas

litigation. District courts faced with such motions must

decide whether the testimony or material sought is reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence and, if so,

whether the need for the testimony, its probative value, the

nature and importance of the litigation, and similar factors

outweigh any burden enforcement of the subpoena might

impose. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), 45(c)(3)(A)(iv); Linder v.

Department of Defense, 133 F.3d 17, 24 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see

generally 9A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller,

Federal Practice and Procedure s 2459 (2d ed. 1995).

There can be no doubt that Lewinsky's statements in her

affidavit were--in the words of Kungys v. United States--

"predictably capable of affecting" this decision. She executed

and filed her affidavit for this very purpose.

As to obstruction of justice, 18 U.S.C. s 1503 is satisfied

whenever a person, with the "intent to influence judicial or

grand jury proceedings," takes actions having the "natural

and probable effect" of doing so. United States v. Aguilar,

515 U.S. 593, 600 (1995) (citations and quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Russo, 104 F.3d 431, 435-36 (D.C.

Cir. 1997). Our review of the in camera materials on which

the district court based its decision convinces us that the

government sufficiently established the elements of a violation of s 1503. That is, the government offered "evidence

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that if believed by the trier of fact would establish the

elements of" the crime of obstruction of justice. In re Sealed

Case, 107 F.3d at 50 (citation and quotation marks omitted);

see In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395, 399-400 (D.C. Cir. 1985)

(same).

Lewinsky maintains that the district court erred in treating, as admissible for in camera review, transcripts of taped

conversations between Lewinsky and Linda Tripp. She relies

on the following statement in United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S.

554, 575 (1989): "the threshold showing to obtain in camera

review may be met by using any relevant evidence, lawfully

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obtained, that has not been adjudicated to be privileged."

Zolin, and the statement just quoted, dealt with a rather

different problem than the one presented here. Sometimes a

party seeking to overcome the privilege by invoking the

crime-fraud exception asks the district court to examine in

camera the privileged material to determine whether it provides evidence of a crime. The issue Zolin addressed is

under what circumstances a district court should undertake

such in camera review. Zolin's answer, as the quotation

indicates, was that the court should do so only when there has

been a threshold showing through evidence lawfully obtained.

See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 33 F.3d 342, 350 (4th Cir.

1994). In this case, the district court reviewed in camera not

the allegedly privileged material, but other evidence intended

to establish that the crime-fraud exception applied. In any

event, even if Zolin applied, Lewinsky gains nothing from the

decision. She maintains that the Tripp tapes were not "lawfully obtained" and therefore should not have been considered

in camera. But the government satisfied its burden wholly

apart from the Tripp tapes. Other government evidence--

consisting of grand jury testimony and documents--established that the crime-fraud exception applied. Because that

other evidence, if believed by the trier of fact, combined with

the circumstances under which Lewinsky retained Carter,

would establish the elements of the crime-fraud exception,

there is no reason for us to consider her arguments about the

tapes.4

Lewinsky raises other objections to the district court's

decision, including the argument that production of the sub-

__________

4 Lewinsky's brief suggests, in a short passage, that other evidence obtained by the grand jury is tainted by the alleged illegality

of the Tripp tapes. United States v. Callandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974),

refused to extend the exclusionary rule--and hence doctrines such

as the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree--to grand jury proceedings. No

grand jury witness may refuse to answer questions on the ground

that the questions are based on illegally obtained evidence. See 414

U.S. at 353-55. It follows that regardless of the legality of the

Tripp tapes, the grand jury did not unlawfully obtain the other

evidence presented to the district court in camera.

poenaed materials would violate her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Our resolution of the crossappeal, discussed next, disposes of that claim. As to the

remainder of Lewinsky's arguments, we have accorded each

of them full consideration and conclude that none has merit.5

This brings us to the Independent Counsel's cross-appeal.

The district court ruled that compelling Carter to produce

materials his client gave him would violate Lewinsky's Fifth

Amendment privilege because it would compel her to admit

the materials exist and had been in her possession. The

Supreme Court foreclosed that line of reasoning in Fisher v.

United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976). Documents transferred

from the accused to his attorney are "obtainable without

personal compulsion on the accused," and hence the accused's

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"Fifth Amendment privilege is ... not violated by enforcement of the [subpoena] directed toward [his] attorneys. This

is true whether or not the Amendment would have barred a

subpoena directing the [accused] to produce the documents

while they were in his hands." Id. at 398, 397; see also

Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973).

Regardless whether Lewinsky herself would have been able

to invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege, but see Andresen v.

Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 473-74 (1976), the district court's

refusal to order full compliance with the subpoenas could be

sustained only if the materials sought fell under a valid claim

of attorney-client privilege. See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 403-05;

see also In re Feldberg, 862 F.2d 622, 629 (7th Cir. 1988).

But the district court held, correctly, that no valid attorneyclient privilege existed. Under Fisher, the district court

therefore should have denied the motions to quash in their

entirety.6

__________

5 In her reply brief, Lewinsky argues for the first time that the

district court should have permitted her to examine the material the

court reviewed in camera. This argument comes too late to be

considered. See Rollins Envtl. Servs. (NJ) Inc. v. EPA, 937 F.2d

649, 652 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

6 As respondent in the cross-appeal, Carter makes additional

arguments against the applicability of the crime-fraud exception.

But because the only issue in the cross-appeal is the applicability of

Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the

order of the district court and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. No. 98-3053 is dismissed.

The mandate shall issue seven days after the date of this

opinion. See Fed. R. App. P. 41(a); D.C. Cir. R. 41(a)(1);

Johnson v. Bechtel Assocs. Prof'l Corp., 801 F.2d 412, 415

(D.C. Cir. 1986); Public Citizen Health Research Group v.

Auchter, 702 F.2d 1150, 1159 n.31 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

So ordered.

__________

the Fifth Amendment, Carter may not use the cross-appeal to press

arguments we will not consider in his direct appeal. See Grimes v.

District of Columbia, 836 F.2d 647, 651-52 (D.C. Cir. 1988).

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