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Parties Involved:
Eluid Trevino-Casares
Petitioner
United States Parole Commission
Respondent

Document Text:

ELUID 

v . 

U.S. 

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

TREVINO-CASARES, ) 

) 

Petitioner, ) 

) 

F I L L PAppeall United ,~~t 

APR 2 8 1993 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

) No. 92-9539 

) 

PAROLE COMMISSION, ) 

) 

Respondent. ) 

Appeal from the Determination of the 

United States Parole Commission 

(No. 20-89-2) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Eluid Trevino-Casares, prose . 

Richard K. Preston, Attorney, U.S. Parole Commission, Chevy Chase, 

Maryland, for Respondent . 

Before McKAY, Chief Judge , HOLLOWAY, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges. 

McKAY, Chief Judge. 

Appellate Case: 92-9539 Document: 010110220224 Date Filed: 04/28/1993 Page: 1 
We are called upon in this appeal1 to interpret and apply the 

statutory provisions implementing the Prisoner Transfer Treaty 

(Treaty), Nov. 25, 1976, U.S.-Mex., 28 U.S.T. 7399, which entered 

into force November 30, 1977. Specifically, with respect to an 

American offender transferred to the United States from 

incarceration in Mexico pursuant to the Treaty, we must determine 

the correct method for arriving at an appropriate version of the 

foreign sentence, including terms of imprisonment and supervised 

release, for domestic enforcement under 18 U.S.C. § 4106A(b), 

while accommodating, or at least not interfering with, the proper 

application of the various credits toward service of that sentence 

("service credits") to which the offender may be entitled under 18 

u.s.c. § 4105. 

Mr. Trevino-Casares was arrested in Mexico on January 13, 

1989, and thereafter confined on drug charges for which he 

eventually received a nine-year sentence. After his transfer to 

the United States on January 31, 1991, the United States Parole 

Commission determined that Mr. Trevino-Casares would serve a term 

of 71 months' imprisonment followed by a period of 37 months of 

supervised 2 release . More importantly, because of the way this 

1 The parties have indicated they do not seek oral argument 

and, after examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal . See Fed. R. App . P. 

34 (a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument 

2 We 

though 

under§ 

sentence 

States. 

note here, to avoid any initial misunderstanding, that 

the domestic counterpart of a foreign sentence is imposed 

4106A after the offender's transfer, satisfaction of the 

is not limited to subsequent service in the United 

In fact, under § 4105(b) and (c), the transferred 

(continued on next page ) 

2 

Appellate Case: 92-9539 Document: 010110220224 Date Filed: 04/28/1993 Page: 2 
determination is designated by the Commission and, accordingly, 

implemented by the Bureau of Prisons, a substantial sum of earned 

and anticipated service credits concededly due Mr . Trevino-Casares 

under § 4105 were deemed to have no effect on his completion of 

this 108-month sentence. Mr. Trevino-Casarez now appeals that 

determination to this court, contending the Commission erred in 

two respects: it imposed an illegal sentence by violating the 

condition that "[t]he combined periods of imprisonment and 

supervised release ... shall not exceed the term of imprisonment 

imposed by the foreign court,"§ 4106A(b) (1) (C), and it did not 

accord him all due credit against service of his sentence, as 

required by§ 4105. 

I 

Before reaching the merits, we address a procedural 

complication that implicates the jurisdictional limitations of 

this appellate court, as well as the standards governing the scope 

of its substantive review. The following discussion should also 

help to clarify the overall analytical framework within which we 

view this case. Consistent with the construction of the pertinent 

statutes expressed throughout this opinion, issues arising 

thereunder fall into two general categories, involving distinct 

functions performed by different agencies, and, as a consequence, 

have separate procedural routes for judicial review. Although the 

Commission would characterize one of the functions differently, it 

(continued from previous page) offender is credited with presentence confinement and all due 

service credits for pre-transfer foreign incarceration. 

3 

Appellate Case: 92-9539 Document: 010110220224 Date Filed: 04/28/1993 Page: 3 
essentially agrees with this view and, on the basis of its 

categorization of the issues raised by Mr. Trevino-Casares, argues 

that this appeal is procedurally inappropriate and should be 

dismissed. See Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 9-12. 

Under § 4106A, the Commission is charged with the task of 

translating a foreign sentence into terms appropriate to domestic 

penal enforcement . Specifically, applying the federal sentencing 

guidelines to the presentence investigation reports and 

recommendations of the probation service, see§ 4106A(b) (1) (B) and 

(D), the Commission must determine a combined term of imprisonment 

and supervised release, see§ 4106A(b) (1) (A) and (C) - -that is, g 

sentence, ~ 18 u.s.c. §§ 3551 (b) (3) , 3583(a)--for the 

transferred offender "as though the offender were convicted in the 

United States district court of a similar offense," 

§ 4106A(b) (1) (A). Accordingly, even though the statute speaks of 

the Commission's determination as the specification of "a release 

date and a period and conditions of supervised release," 

§ 4106A(b) (1) (A), it is in procedure, substance, and effect 

tantamount to the imposition of a federal sentence, and it should, 

for all practical purposes, be treated as such. 3 

Consistent with this conclusion, § 4106A(b) (2) (A) expressly 

makes the Commission's determination directly appealable to the 

3 Although not necessary to our construction of the statute, we 

note that the report explaining § 4106A(b) (1) (A) supports our 

conclusion by expressly recognizing that it "puts the Parole 

Commission, with regard to a [transferred] prisoner ... , in the 

position of a United States district court relative to a convicted 

defendant. Thus, the Parole Commission must use the sentencing 

guidelines and make the findings necessary to determine the 

applicable guideline range [for the offender's domestic 

sentence]." 134 Cong. Rec. 33,302 (Oct. 21, 1988). 

4 

Appellate Case: 92-9539 Document: 010110220224 Date Filed: 04/28/1993 Page: 4 
circuit level, where the court of appeals is to "decide and 

dispose of the appeal in accordance with [18 U.S . C. § 3742] as 

though the determination appealed had been a sentence imposed by a 

United States district court." § 4106A(b) (2) (B). Although the 

Commission seeks to recast this entire appeal into terms that fall 

outside the scope of§ 4106A(b) (2), we consider the first issue 

raised by Mr . Trevino-Casares to involve a challenge to the 

legality of the sentence imposed by the Commission. Thus, we have 

appellate jurisdiction to hear the issue under § 3742 (a ) (1 ) 

(authorizing appeal of sentence imposed in violation of law), and 

our review is governed by standards applicable on direct appeal, 

see generally United States v. Banashefski, 928 F.2d 349, 351 

(1 0th Cir. 1991) (legal conclusions in sentencing reviewed de nova, 

with due deference accorded application of law to underlying 

facts) . 

On the other hand, the administration (i.e., calculation, 

award, withholding) of service credits, is overseen by the Bureau 

of Prisons. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624. Furthermore, it involves the 

execution rather than imposition of sentence and, consequently, is 

a matter for habeas corpus review. See United States v . Jalili, 

925 F.2d 889, 893 (6th Cir. 1991); see, e.g., Sinclair v. Henman, 

986 F . 2d 407, 408 (10th Cir. 1993). The proper characterization 

of this component of the proceeding has a particular signifi cance 

f or this appellate court, because the circuit courts of appeal 

have no original jurisdiction to consider habeas corpus petitions. 

Nor i ega-Sandoval v. United States INS, 911 F.2d 258, 261 (9th Cir. 

1990) (citing numerous cases); Fed . R. App . P . 22 advisory 

5 

Appellate Case: 92-9539 Document: 010110220224 Date Filed: 04/28/1993 Page: 5 
committee's note to subdivision (a). This panel therefore lacks 

jurisdiction to issue a decision resolving, in the first instance, 

the specifics of the parties' dispute over calculation and award 

of the particular credits due Mr. Trevino-Casares against service 

of his sentence. 4 Nevertheless, for reasons that will become 

apparent presently, our analysis and disposition of the sentencing 

issue properly raised in this appeal will necessarily entail a 

substantial degree of implicit direction regarding the issue of 

service credits as well. Indeed, this unavoidable analytical 

overlap is the direct result of precisely the error that, in our 

view, fatally infects the Commission's determination under the 

pertinent statutes. 

II 

After applying the sentencing guidelines to the circumstances 

of Mr. Trevino-Casares' offense, the Commission concluded that the 

appropriate guideline range was 121-151 months. However, because 

4 A circuit judge, acting individually, has the authority to 

grant such habeas relief if the petitioner's custodian is located 

within the circuit, in which case the circuit judge's order "shall 

be entered in the records of the district court of the district 

wherein the restraint complained of is had," 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (a), 

but this is not the favored practice. See Demjanjuk v . Meese, 784 

F.2d 1114, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Zimmerman v. Spears, 565 F . 2d 

310, 316 (5th Cir. 1977). Indeed, even when an application 

specifically seeking habeas relief is made directly to a 

particular circuit judge, "the application will ordinarily be 

transferred to the appropriate district court . " Fed. R. App. P. 

22 (a ) and advisory committee's note; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2241(b). 

Because no member of this panel elects to issue an orde r 

independently resolving the details of the parties' dispute over 

service credits, that matter is transferred to the appropriate 

district court at the conclusion of this opinion. 

6 

Appellate Case: 92-9539 Document: 010110220224 Date Filed: 04/28/1993 Page: 6 
this range exceeds the nine-year term imposed by the Mexican 

authorities, which under§ 4106A fixes the maximum sentence that 

may be imposed, it could not be used and the guideline sentence 

was determined to be 108 months. U.S.S.G. § SGl.l(a) ( "Where the 

statutorily authorized maximum sentence is less than the minimum 

of the applicable guideline range, the statutorily authorized 

maximum sentence shall be the guideline sentence."); see Tho rpe v. 

United States Parole Comm'n, 902 F.2d 291, 292 (5th Cir. ) (treating 

foreign sentence as statutorily authorized maximum under 

§SGl.l(a)), cert . denied, 498 U.S. 868 (1990) . Furthermore, 

because Mr. Trevino-Casares suffered "serious and severe physical 

abuse while in foreign custody resulting in permanent physical 

damage," the Conunission imposed only 71 months imprisonment, see 

U. S . S . G. § SK2.0 (authorizing departure from guideline sentence 

based on circumstances not adequately considered in formulation of 

guidelines), adding 37 months supervised release to total the 

maximum combined sentence of 108 months. 5 R. Vol . I, tab 19, 

Corrected Transfer Treaty Determination (May 21, 1992). 

The parties have not raised, nor do we discern, any legal 

error in the length and composition per se of the 108-month 

5 One circuit has held that, although§ 4106A (and underlying 

Treaty Article V(3 )) expressly prohibits only domestic sentences 

that exceed foreign sentences, Treaty Article VI also precludes 

imposition of shorter domestic sentences, because it grants the 

transferring state exclusive jurisdiction over proceedings "to 

challenge, modify, or set aside sentences handed down by its 

courts." See Cannon v. United States Dep't of Justice, 973 F.2d 

1190, 1195-97 (5th Ci r. 1992), petition for cert. filed, (U. S. 

Feb . 2, 1993 ) (No. 92 - 7521) . We need not decide whether sentence 

imposition under § 4106A can ever constitute a collateral attack 

f or purposes of Article VI, as the issue is not before us. 

7 

Appellate Case: 92-9539 Document: 010110220224 Date Filed: 04/28/1993 Page: 7 
sentence imposed by the Commission under the sentencing 

guidelines. However, we agree with Mr. Trevino-Casares that the 

Commission nevertheless erred in improperly characterizing its 

§ 4106A detennination in such a way as to foreclose subsequent 

application of service credits. Specifically, the Commission, 

evidently with the full agreement of the Bureau of Prisons, denies 

its§ 4106A determination the status of a sentence for purposes of 

§ 4105, leaving the Bureau of Prisons nothing but the effectively 

superseded foreign sentence to subtract the offender's service 

credits from. See Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 16 . 6 Under 

this view, if the latter calculation results in a period of 

confinement shorter than the imprisonment portion of the § 4106A 

sentence, it determines the release date, in which case the 

Commission's determination is simply disregarded (though, 

presumably, the Commission's determination remains subject to 

reactivation in the event enough anticipated service credits are 

withheld, pursuant to § 4105(c) (3), to alter the relevant 

priorities). See id. at 14-16. 

We find no authority in the pertinent statutes for the rather 

convoluted 

involving 

interpretation 

parallel and 

offered 

mutually 

here by the Commission, 

exclusive confinement 

6 We note, however, that in arguing the jurisdictional issue 

addressed earlier, the Commission distinguishes its determination 

from that of the Bureau of Prisons--as we do consistently 

throughout- -precisely on the basis that "the Parole Commission is 

in the same position as a sentencing court and sentencing courts 

do not compute good time credits in order to impose sentence 

pursuant to the guidelines." Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 14; 

see id. at 9-12. 

8 

Appellate Case: 92-9539 Document: 010110220224 Date Filed: 04/28/1993 Page: 8 
detenninations with a divergent treatment of service credits. The 

Commission maintains that "[i)t is clear from § 4105(c) (1 ) that 

good time credits must be subtracted from the total foreign 

sentence and not the release date set by the Commission. That 

provision states that the good time credit shall be from' 

the total sentence imposed and certified by the foreign 

authorities.'" Id. at 15. Actually, the immediate context 

omitted from the Commission's quotation makes it clear that the 

reference to foreign sentences here has nothing whatever to do 

with specifying how or where service credits are to be applied. A 

more meaningful excerpt from § 4105(c) (1) would show that the 

provision is concerned, rather, with the computation of foreign 

and domestic service credits and refers to the foreign sentence 

simply to specify the appropriate rate of accumulation (evidently 

to clarify that the offender with less than one year left to be 

served after transfer should not cease earning service credits, 

see 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)): 

As 

Subsequent to the transfer, the offender shall in 

addition [to pre-transfer service credits) be entitled 

to credits computed on the basis of the time 

remaining to be served at the time of the transfer and 

at the rate provided in section 3624(b) of this title 

for a sentence of the length of the total sentence 

imposed and certified by the foreign authorities. These 

credits shall be combined to provide a release date for 

the offender pursuant to section 3624(a) of this title . 

the final sentence from § 4105(c) (1) recognizes, the 

application of service credits is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3624(a) , 

which indicates, uncontroversially, that such credits are applied 

to the sentence of confinement the prisoner is serving. See 

Mistretta v . United States, 488 U.S. 361, 367 (1989). In the 

9 

Appellate Case: 92-9539 Document: 010110220224 Date Filed: 04/28/1993 Page: 9 
present context, that is the sentence determined by the Commission 

"as though the offender were convicted in a United States district 

court of a similar offense," § 4106A(b) (1) (A), and reviewed on 

direct appeal "as though ... a sentence imposed by the United 

States district court, " § 4106A (bl (2) (Bl . 

There is also an internal inconsistency in the Commission's 

position that reflects an unwillingness to commit fully to the 

consequences of its construction of the statutory scheme . 

Specifically, even the Commission maintains that Mr. 

Trevino-Casares' 108-month sentence is to be treated as if it 

commenced on the date of his arrest in Mexico, nearly a year and a 

half before he was sentenced. See Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 

3-5. Thus, the Commission would permit Mr. Trevino-Casares 

credit, against his § 4106A sentence, for foreign presentence 

confinement, even though such credit is provided for in the same 

manner as the other service credits that the Commission holds do 

not so apply. Compare § 4105(b) with§ 4105(c). We certainly 

agree that the time spent in foreign incarceration should not be 

lost to the transferred offender serving a sentence under§ 4106A, 

but that is a result consistent with our construction of the 

statutes and at odds with the Commission's. 

Underlying our analysis is a rigorous responsibility to two 

clear congressional commands expressly incorporated into the 

statutes under review. The first, specifically invoked by Mr. 

Trevino -Casares, i s that the domestic sentence determined under 

§ 4106A, including both 

not exceed the term of 

confinement and supervised release, may 

imprisonment imposed by the foreign 

10 

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authorities. § 4106A (b) ( 1) (C) ; see also Treaty Article V (3) ( "No 

(foreign] sentence of confinement shall be enforced by the 

Receiving State in such a way as to extend its duration beyond the 

date [specified by] the Transferring State."). The second 

relates to the matter of service credits and directs that 

transferred prisoners receive the same treatment as all other 

inmates with respect to their domestic confinement: "Except as 

provided elsewhere in this section (regarding foreign time served 

prior to transfer], a[ transferred] offender . . . shall remain in 

the custody of the Attorney General under the same conditions and 

for the same period of time as an offender who had been committed 

to the custody of the Attorney General by a court of the United 

States . . . " § 4105(a) (emphasis added); see also§ 4105(c) 

(foreign and domestic service credits of transferred offender 

combine to provide release date for transferred offender that is 

otherwise determined in same manner as for all other inmates under 

18 u.s.c. § 3624). 

Our construction of the statutory scheme adheres to these two 

equally important principles by enforcing the requirement that the 

sentence imposed under § 4106A not exceed the foreign sentence 

and, at the same time, according the transferred offender the same 

service credit benefit against execution of that sentence as would 

be accorded any other inmate against the service of his or her 

sentence. In contrast, depending on how the Conunission's action 

is characterized, it either (1) satisfies§ 4106A by imposing an 

authorized 108-month domestic sentence, but violates§ 410S (a) by 

precluding application of due credit against service of that 

11 

Appellate Case: 92-9539 Document: 010110220224 Date Filed: 04/28/1993 Page: 11 
sentence, or (2) directly violates § 4106A by imposing an 

excessive domestic sentence (in effect, 108 months plus the time 

represented by the due, yet unawarded, service credit) . 

We are mindful that the Commission administers, in part, the 

statutory scheme under review and, therefore, the principles of 

deferential review summarized in Chevron, U.S .A., Inc. v . Natural 

Resources Defense Council. Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), are 

implicated here: 

When a court reviews an agency's construction of 

the statute which it administers, it is confronted with 

two questions. First, always, is the question whether 

Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at 

issue . If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the 

end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, 

must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent 

of Congress. If, however, .. . the statute is silent 

or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the 

question for the court is whether the agency's answer is 

based on a permissible construction of the statute. 

Id. at 842-43 (footnotes omitted) . With respect to the first 

question, we think Congress expressly prescribed how transferred 

offenders should be treated for purposes of domestic confinement. 

While perhaps not clear enough to remove all ambiguity, certainly 

the mandatory, directive language employed in the statutes gives 

no indication, explicitly or implicitly, that Congress intended 

the critical issue of what sentence to reduce by service credits 

to be merely a matter of administrative choice, i.e. , "a gap for 

the agency to fill . " Id. at 843. 

Assuming, for purposes of argument, that enough ambiguity 

exists t o bring us to the second question articulated in Chevron, 

we "must look to the structure and language of the statute[s] as a 

whole" to decide whether the Commission has advanced a permissible 

12 

Appellate Case: 92-9539 Document: 010110220224 Date Filed: 04/28/1993 Page: 12 
construction. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine 

Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1394, 1401 (1992). We have met this 

responsibility in the detailed analysis developed throughout this 

opinion, from which we have concluded that the Commission's 

construction is both internally inconsistent and impennissibly at 

odds with the evident intent of the statutory scheme. 

Accordingly, we consider it proper, indeed our duty, to follow our 

own independent interpretation of the statutes that govern the 

controversy before us. 

Finally, we acknowledge that the Fifth Circuit has recently 

construed these statutes in a way that is inconsistent at various 

points with both our views and those of the Commission. See, 

~. Cannon v. United States Dep't of Justice, 961 F.2d 82 (5th 

Cir.), reh'g denied, 973 F.2d 1190 (1992), petition for cert. 

filed, (U.S. Feb. 2, 1993) (No. 92-7521); Thorpe v. United States 

Parole Comm'n, 902 F.2d 291 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S . 868 

(1990). We do not deem it necessary to engage in a lengthy pointby- point 

for the 

discussion of our differences. Suffice it to say that, 

reasons we have already expressed, we think our 

construction correctly implements in straightforward fashion the 

language and overall structure of the statutes under review. 

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the Commission's 

§ 4106A with respect to its length and 

expressly MODIFY its legal status to that 

detennination 

composition, 

of 

under 

but we 

purposes of the statutory scheme under review. 

a sentence for 

The habeas corpus 

component of this proceeding, involving the actual computation of 

13 

Appellate Case: 92-9539 Document: 010110220224 Date Filed: 04/28/1993 Page: 13 
the particular service credits due Mr. Trevino-Casares against 

this sentence, is TRANSFERRED to the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Oklahoma, the district in which Mr. 

Trevino-Casares is confined. 

14 

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