Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-04129/USCOURTS-ca10-90-04129-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Craig Dwight McCann
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FILED 

Uoired States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Cir01it 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ..IUL 2 6 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant/ 

Cross Appellee, 

v. 

CRAIG DWIGHT McCANN, 

Defendant-Appellee/ 

Cross Appellant. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

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No. 90-4109 

No. 90-4129 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 

(D.C. No. 89-NCR-11G) 

Mark Vincent, Assistant United States Attorney (Dee Benson, United 

States Attorney, and Richard D. McKelvie, Assistant United States 

Attorney, with him on the briefs), Salt Lake City, Utah, attorney 

for plaintiff-appellant/cross appellee. 

Ronald J. Yengich of Yengich, Rich, Xaiz & Metos, Salt Lake City, 

Utah, attorney for defendant-appellee/cross appellant. 

Before TACHA, BARRETT, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

BARRETT, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 90-4129 Document: 01019295259 Date Filed: 07/26/1991 Page: 1 
In these consolidated appeals, both parties challenge rulings 

of the district court in the sentencing of Craig D. McCann 

(McCann). 

McCann was charged in a nine count superseding indictment 

with: the passing of counterfeit money; possession of counterfeit 

money; possession of counterfeit birth certificates; possession of 

approximately 1.5 liters of P2P with intent to manufacture 

methamphetamine; attempt to manufacture approximately 450 

milliliters of P2P; attempt to manufacture approximately 2.2 

kilograms of methamphetamine; possession of four firearms in 

connection with a drug trafficking crime; possession of a firearm 

by a convicted felon; and possession of an unregistered firearm, 

in violation of 18 u.s.c. §§ 472, 1028(a)(3), 841(a)(1), 846, 

924(c), 922(g), 5861(d) and 5871. 

After one day of trial, McCann agreed to plead guilty to 

Counts II (possession of $6,250 in counterfeit money), IV 

(possession of P2P with intent to manufacture methamphetamine), 

and VII (possession of four firearms in connection with a drug 

trafficking crime). In exchange for McCann's plea, the government 

dismissed the remaining counts. The parties stipulated that the 

exact amount of P2P possessed by McCann "is not readily provable." 

(R., Supp. Addendum, p. 7). This stipulation effectively amended 

Count IV of the superseding indictment to charge McCann with 

"knowingly possessing a measurable amount [of P2P], but without 

statement as to how much." (R, Vol. II, p. 7). 

Out of the presence of the jury, the court questioned counsel 

concerning the stipulation. When the court i~quired of counsel 

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for defendant McCann whether he was satisfied that "this action" 

would be in the best interests of the defendant, counsel 

responded: 

MR. YENGICH: I am, given the potential of mandatory 

minimum sentencing under the drug counts, and 

particularly, and given the defendant's desire to settle 

this matter and enter a plea and accept responsibility • 

Id. at 2-3. 

Following the government's stipulation that it was not 

charging a specific quantity of drugs in the indictment, the 

parties proceeded under the belief that the mandatory minimum 

sentence based on the quantity of drugs involved was eliminated 

from the court's consideration. (R. Vol. I., Tab 50, pp. 2-3). In 

so doing, the parties relied on United States v. Crockett, 812 

F.2d 626, 628-29 (lOth Cir. 1987), a pre-sentencing guidelines 

case,

1 in which we adopted United States v. Alvarez, 735 F.2d 461, 

468 (11th Cir. 1984), for the proposition that, without an allegation as to drug quantity in the indictment, the trial court could 

not impose an enhanced sentence. 

The court observed that the amount of a particular drug would 

affect sentencing if it were found to exist at a certain level and 

that, under the plea bargain herein, the parties had stipulated 

that the amount was indeterminant. Counsel for the government 

responded that the court was "exactly right," and that the 

government had determined that the amount of drugs was "not 

readily determinable at this time." (R., Vol. II, p. 8). 

1 The United States Sentencing Commission's sentencing 

guidelines took effect on November 1, 1987, a~d applied to all 

offenses committed on or after that date. 

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Appellate Case: 90-4129 Document: 01019295259 Date Filed: 07/26/1991 Page: 3 
Thereafter, McCann pled guilty to Count IV "with [the] 

modification" that he would not be subject to a mandatory minimum 

sentence. Id. 

Counsel for the defendant thereafter, in the course of 

examination of the defendant, asked the defendant whether he 

understood that the court "[w] ill rely upon the Probation 

Department and the Presentence Report and his own enlightened 

discretion to determine what he feels is best." Id. at 16. 

Defendant McCann responded, "Yes." Id. 

The trial court then found that the defendant had voluntarily 

changed his plea with full understanding of the consequences and 

with understanding of the penalties, taking into consideration the 

report of the Probation Department based on the Sentencing 

Guidelines Act. Id. at 16-17. After detailed examination, the 

court accepted McCann's guilty plea to Count IV, as modified. Id. 

at 30. 

Following the government's stipulation that the exact amount 

of P2P possessed by McCann "is not readily provable," the parties 

submitted briefs on whether the court, for purposes of computing a 

sentencing range, could consider the quantities of drugs which 

McCann possessed at his residence and which were contained in the 

laboratory therein. 

In its brief, the government asserted that the only purpose 

of the stipulation, i. e., not charging a specific quantity of 

drugs in the indictment, was to eliminate the mandatory minimum 

sentence to the substantial benefit of McCann: 

According to the government's calculations,, defendant 

possessed fifteen hundred milliliters of P2P and was 

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Appellate Case: 90-4129 Document: 01019295259 Date Filed: 07/26/1991 Page: 4 
capable of manufacturing with the other chemicals on 

hand an additional four hundred and fifty milliliters of 

P2P. Since defendant has stipulated that the P2P was 

possessed for purposes of manufacturing methamphetamine, 

one thousand nine hundred and fifty milliliters of P2P 

has the equivalency of four thousand fifty-six grams of 

cocaine under § 201.1 of the sentencing guidelines. 

Without the government's stipulation, 21 u.s.c. § 

841(b)(1)(B) would impose a statutory minimum mandatory 

sentence of five years for this quantity of P2P, and 

defendant would be subject to a ten year minimum 

mandatory sentence with a prior conviction such as he 

has. With respect to the attempted manufacture of 

methamphetamine, the above referenced equivalency tables 

state that the 2.2 kilograms which Defendant attempted 

to manufacture has the equivalency of 11 kilograms of 

cocaine. 21 u.s.c. § 841(b)(1)(A) creates a statutory 

minimum mandatory sentence for the defendant as to this 

quantity of ten years, twenty years if the defendant has 

a prior conviction. Thus, while the defendant appears 

to have a substantial guideline sentence according to 

probation office calculations (77-96 months) and a 

mandatory five year term in addition to that guideline 

sentence, he is spared a 35 year minimum mandatory 

sentence (20 years for attempted manufacture of 2.2 

kilos of meth, 10 years for possession of 1,950 grams of 

P2P and five years for possession of a firearm in 

connection with a drug trafficking crime). Using this 

analysis, there is a substantial benefit that the 

defendant reaps from his plea. 

(R., Vol. I, Tab 50, pp. 3-4). 

The defendant, on the other hand, contested the entire 

determination of the amounts of P2P and contended: 

The defendant entered a guilty plea in this case with 

the understanding that no amount levels could be 

determined. It was for that reason that the plea was 

entered. The defendant concedes that the maximum amount 

of P2P or methamphetamine to be employed in the 

calculation of guidelines, is two grams of 

methamphetamine and no more. 

(R., Vol. I, Tab 57, pp. 5-6). 

At a subsequent hearing, this colloquy occurred between the 

court and counsel for the government: 

THE COURT: Tell me, what is the value of a person 

bargaining for something like this if through the back 

door the probation office can put on evidence that the 

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Appellate Case: 90-4129 Document: 01019295259 Date Filed: 07/26/1991 Page: 5 
court is supposed to look at that would totally destroy 

the value of the bargain? 

MR. RYAN: Well, I guess it gets down to what the 

bargain is. 

(R., Vol. v, p. 17). Thereafter, the district court observed that 

it understood that it had the right to reject a plea agreement and 

look at whatever it wants. Id. at 19. 

An initial presentence report was prepared within which 

McCann was assigned an offense level of 24. The offense level of 

24 was calculated by using 1,950 grams of P2P as the quantity 

possessed by McCann. The 1,950 grams of P2P was based on the 

information provided by a DEA agent that 1,500 grams of P2P were 

found in McCann's home and by a DEA chemist's determination that 

450 grams of P2P could be produced from the precursor chemicals 

also found in McCann's home. These determinations were made by 

chemists following the stipulation entered into by the parties. 

The offense level of 24 resulted in a recommended sentence range 

of 77 to 96 months imprisonment on Count IV. 

Following review of the presentence report by McCann and his 

counsel, McCann filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea or, in 

the alternative, for a hearing on the application of the 

sentencing guidelines. (R., Vol. III, p. 2). The crux of 

defendant's position on Count IV was that he had pled guilty 

simply to possession of an indeterminative amount of P2P. Id. at 

8. The government responded that "the probation office, knowing 

this stipulation, can and should include all the amounts of drugs 

under the relevant conduct provisions of the sentencing 

guidelines." Id. at 12. The court denied the qefendant's motion 

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to withdraw the guilty plea, but did set down for further hearing 

a determination of the meaning of the plea bargain. 

A revised presentence report and addendum calculated McCann's 

sentence on the amount of methamphetamine which 1,950 grams of P2P 

would produce. The report determined that 1,950 grams of P2P 

would produce 2.2 kilograms of methamphetamine (according to the 

DEA chemists), resulting in an offense level of 30. The offense 

level of 30 was the basis for a recommended sentence range of 110 

to 137 months imprisonment on Count IV. 

McCann objected to the recommended sentence. He argued that 

he had pled guilty based on his understanding that the 

government's stipulation that the exact amount of P2P he possessed 

"is not readily provable" precluded any consideration of the P2P 

and precursor chemicals in determining his sentence. (R., Vol. 

IV, pp. 1-2). The government responded that the stipulation was 

intended only to eliminate the mandatory minimum sentence on the 

drug count, but not to restrict the district court's consideration 

of the chemicals found in McCann's home in computing a sentencing 

range. 

The court subsequently entered a written order in which it 

found: 

6. The specific term in the stipulated facts portion of 

the plea agreement which provided that the amount of P2P 

possessed by defendant is not readily provable modified 

the general understanding and recognition . . . that the 

court should consider factual data and information as to 

counts to be dismissed. In this regard, the court finds 

that it was reasonable for defendant to conclude and 

that he did conclude that drug quantities beyond a 

measurable amount would not be presented for purposes of 

computing a sentencing range. 

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Appellate Case: 90-4129 Document: 01019295259 Date Filed: 07/26/1991 Page: 7 
(R., Vol. I, Tab 62, p. 7). 

During a subsequent hearing, the district court directed the 

probation office to recalculate McCann's sentence range without 

regard to the amount of P2P or other precursor chemicals which 

McCann possessed. In so doing, the court found: 

I have . . . previously entered a finding that there was 

a meeting of the minds and agreement between the 

government and the defendant, that the quantity of P2P 

possessed at the residence contained in the laboratory 

included in Count 4 was indeterminate and would not affect sentencing. 

I now find based upon all of the evidence 

subsequently brought forward that as part of the meeting 

of the minds of the party (sic] in the plea agreement it 

was understood that not only the amount of P2P found at 

the residence but also the chemicals that would have and 

could have produced P2P were not readily provable and 

constitute an indeterminate amount which would not 

affect sentencing. 

In making this finding I resolve any ambiguities in 

favor of the defendant as I must and I observe that any 

other result would render that plea bargain illusory and 

of no force and effect and no meaning . . . . 

So ..• it's what was the agreement between the 

Government and the defendant that governs and controls. 

(R., Vol. VIII, pp. 62-63). 

The final presentence report set forth a base offense level 

of 12 and a sentencing range of 27 to 33 months imprisonment, 

predicated on the "two grams or less" of methamphetamine found in 

various syringes at McCann's residence. 

The district court subsequently sentenced McCann to 

concurrent terms of 33 months imprisonment on Counts II 

(possession of counterfeit money) and IV (possession of a 

measurable amount of P2P with intent to manufacture 

methamphetamine) and to a consecutive term of 60 months 

-BAppellate Case: 90-4129 Document: 01019295259 Date Filed: 07/26/1991 Page: 8 
imprisonment on 

connection with 

Count 

a drug 

VII (possession of 

trafficking crime). 

four firearms in 

The sentences 

reflected the court's refusal to depart downward based on McCann's 

claim that he was a minor or minimal participant. The sentences 

also reflected an upward departure based on the court's finding 

that McCann obstructed justice by threatening a potential witness. 

On appeal the government contends that the court erred in 

finding that the parties' stipulation that the exact amount of 

P2P "is not readily provable" precluded the court from considering 

the chemicals found in McCann's home in arriving at the 

appropriate sentence. McCann contends that the court erred (1) in 

refusing to depart downward, and (2) in departing upward. 

I. 

The government contends that the district court erred in 

determining that the parties' stipulation that the exact amount of 

P2P possessed by McCann "is not readily provable" precluded the 

court from considering the chemicals found in McCann's home in 

arriving at an appropriate sentence. 

A. 

Under u.s.s.G. 6B1.4(d), the "court is not bound by the 

stipulation [of facts], but may with the aid of the presentence 

report, determine the facts relative to sentencing." Similarly, 

under 18 u.s.c. § 3661, "[n]o limitation shall be placed on the 

information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a 

person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States 

may receive and consider for the purpose . of imposing an 

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Appellate Case: 90-4129 Document: 01019295259 Date Filed: 07/26/1991 Page: 9 
appropriate sentence." 

In United States v. Rutter, 897 F.2d 1558, 1562 (lOth Cir.), 

cert. denied, U.S. ___ (1990), we joined other circuits in 

holding that the district court is required to consider not only 

the drug quantities associated with the offense of conviction but 

also those quantities which were part of the same course of 

conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction: 

Thus, under the Sentencing Guidelines, the district 

court properly considered quantities associated with not 

only the offense of conviction, but also those 

quantities which facilitated the commercial relationship 

between the defendant as drug dealer and the DEA agent 

as drug purchaser. . . . We agree with those circuits 

which have indicated that Guidelines§§ 1Bl.3(a)(2) and 

3D1.2(d) require aggregation of quantities from drug 

offenses encompassed by § 201.1 'that were part of the 

same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the 

offense of conviction,' regardless of whether the 

defendant was convicted of the underlying offenses 

pertaining to the additional amounts. 

See also, United States v. Ross, 920 F.2d 1530, 1538 (lOth Cir. 

1990); United States v. Boyd, 901 F.2d 842, 844 (lOth Cir. 1990). 

we must hold that the court erred in finding that the 

stipulation precluded the court from considering the chemicals 

found in McCann's home in arriving at an appropriate sentence; 

indeed, the court was required to consider the chemicals. 

B. 

Our discussion of the stipulation cannot end here. As set 

forth, supra, following the stipulation that the government was 

not charging a specific quantity of drugs in Count IV, the parties 

and the district court, relying on United States v. Crockett, 

supra, proceeded under the belief that the mandatory minimum 

sentence under Count IV was eliminated from the court's 

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Appellate Case: 90-4129 Document: 01019295259 Date Filed: 07/26/1991 Page: 10 
consideration. Thereafter, McCann pled guilty to Count IV with 

the understanding that he would not be subject to a mandatory 

minimum sentence. This understanding was erroneous. 

As Rutter, supra, makes clear, the sentencing guidelines 

require the district court to consider all relevant chemicals in 

sentencing, not just those chemicals charged in the indictment. 

Thus, the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence under the 

guidelines cannot be eliminated from the court's consideration 

simply because a specific amount of drugs was not alleged in the 

indictment. Accordingly, we hold that the contrary holding in 

Crockett, a pre-guideline case, is inapposite to post-guideline 

cases. See, ~' United States v. Ware, 897 F.2d 1538, 1542-43 

(lOth Cir.), cert. denied, ___ u.s. ___ (1990). 

Given this holding, we conclude that McCann was subject to 

the mandatory minimum sentence under Count IV and that the court 

was required to so advise him. The court, however, erroneously 

relying on Crockett, failed to do so. This failure violated Fed. 

R. Crim. P., Rule 11, 18 u.s.c.A., and undermined 

voluntariness of McCann's guilty plea: 

[T]o determine whether a plea is voluntary, a court must 

assess whether the defendant fully understood the 

consequences of the plea. . 

Both the attorneys and the court have a duty to 

apprise the defendant of the consequences of the plea 

and ensure that it is voluntary. If these duties are 

not discharged, the defendant is not 'fully aware' of 

the consequences of the plea and it is therefore 

involuntary. The court's duties are delineated by Rule 

ll(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. With 

respect to advising the defendant as to his potential 

sentence in a guidelines case, the court's obligation 

under Rule 11 is to advise the defendant of the 

mandatory minimum and maximum penalties for the crime 

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the 

Appellate Case: 90-4129 Document: 01019295259 Date Filed: 07/26/1991 Page: 11 
committed 

sentencing. 

and that the guidelines will govern 

United States v. Williams, 919 F.2d 1451, 1456 (lOth Cir. 1990), 

cert. denied, u.s. (1991). 

Inasmuch as McCann was not fully aware of the consequences of 

his plea, we hold that he entered an involuntary guilty plea. 

McCann's belief, and that of the government and the court, that 

the stipulation prevented the court from considering the mandatory 

minimum sentence on Count IV was erroneous. As such, it rendered 

his plea involuntary. United States v. Brady, 397 U.S. 742, 755 

(1970) (a plea of guilty must stand unless induced by 

misrepresentations including unfilled or unfulfillable promises); 

United States v. Hand, 913 F.2d 854, 856 (lOth Cir. 1990) (where 

the government obtains a guilty plea predicated in any significant 

degree on a promise or agreement with the prosecuting attorney, 

such promise must be fulfilled to maintain the integrity of the 

plea). 

We hold that McCann's guilty plea was involuntary. It was 

based on the erroneous assumption that the stipulation precluded 

the court from considering the other chemicals and the mandatory 

minimum sentence. Moreover, inasmuch as the district court 

fundamentally erred when it accepted McCann's involuntary guilty 

plea, McCann is entitled to plead anew. United States v. 

McCarthy, 394 u.s. 459, 463-64 (1969). 

II. 

McCann contends that the district court erred in refusing to 

depart downward in sentencing him under Count II and in enhancing 

his sentence upward two levels for obstruction of justice under 

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u.s.S.G. § 3Cl.l. Although not necessary for our disposition, we 

review these allegations of error for the benefit of the court 

upon remand. 

A. 

McCann argues that a "[d]ownward departure is particularly 

compelling under u.s.s.G. § 3B1.2, because his role in the Count 

II offense was extremely limited." (Opening Brief of DefendantCross Appellee at p. 20). § 3B1.22 does not provide a downward 

"departure" but, rather, a downward adjustment in computing the 

offense level. McCann contends that he is entitled to at least a 

two-point reduction as a minor participant, if not a four-point 

reduction as a minimal participant, because his role in the Count 

II offense was merely that of a courier, he did not know how to 

print counterfeit notes, he was not a major distributor, and he 

derived no cognizable profit from the illicit activity. 

We review sentences imposed under the Sentencing Guidelines 

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and we are to determine if the 

sentence "'(1) was imposed in violation of law; (2) was imposed as 

a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines; 

(3) is outside the applicable guideline range .. . 

. ' or (4) was 

imposed for an offense for which there is no applicable sentencing 

guideline and is plainly unreasonable.'" United States v. Havens, 

2s 3B1.2 provides in part: 

Based on the defendant's role in the offense, decrease the 

offense level as follows: 

(a) If the defendant was a minimal participant in any 

criminal activity, decrease by 4 levels. 

(b) If the defendant was a minor participant in any 

criminal activity, decrease by 2 levels. 

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910 F.2d 703, 704 (lOth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 

(quoting, 18 u.s.c. § 3742(e) (1988)). 

u.s. (1991), 

The district court's application of the sentencing guidelines 

to the facts of a particular case is entitled to due deference and 

the court's factual findings will not be reversed unless clearly 

erroneous. United States v. Urbanek, F.2d _ (lOth Cir. 

1991). A defendant has the burden of showing, by a preponderance 

of the evidence, that he is entitled to a downward adjustment. 

United States v. Caruth, 930 F.2d 811, 812 (lOth Cir. 1991); 

United States v. Maldonado-Campos, 920 F.2d 714, 717 (lOth Cir. 

1990). A district court's finding that a defendant is a minor (or 

minimal) participant under § 3Bl.2 and entitled to an offense 

level reduction is a finding of fact which we must accept unless 

clearly erroneous. United States v. Arrendondo-Santos, 911 F.2d 

424, 425 (lOth Cir. 1990). 

Applying these standards to the facts herein, we hold that 

the district court's refusal to adjust downward was not clearly 

erroneous. A defendant's status as a courier does not necessarily 

mean that he was a minor participant. United States v. PelayoMunoz, 905 F.2d 1429, 1430 (lOth Cir. 1990). Section 3Bl.2 turns 

on culpability, not courier status. Id. at 1431 (quoting United 

States v. Buenrostro, 868 F.2d 135, 138 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. 

denied, u.s. (1990)). we agree with the amended 

presentence report of February 6, 1990, that "[i]nasmuch as Mr. 

McCann was the only individual charged in these matters [i.e., 

Count II], no adjustment [downward] . is given for his role in 

the offense." (R., Supp. Vol. I, Presentence Report, p. 10) 

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(emphasis supplied). 

B. 

McCann contends that the district court erred in enhancing 

his sentence upward two levels for obstruction of justice under 

u.s.s.G. s 3C1.1. 

During McCann's sentencing hearing, Special Agent Blackhurst, 

a secret service agent of 21 years, related that he had 

interviewed one Richard (Dicki) Graves, an "informant and 

potential witness" in McCann's case. (R., Vol. VIII, pp. 3-4). 

During the interview, Graves had provided Agent Blackhurst with 

several letters which McCann had written and which he (Graves) was 

concerned about. 

Within one letter, McCann wrote that "the government has done 

a pretty good job of protecting Dicki. I have been every day 

tring [sic] to get at him for what he has done to me." (R., Supp. 

Addendum, p. 12). In another letter, McCann wrote that "I have 

sent out copies of this paper to people I no [sic] here & with any 

luck maybe someone out there hates rats and will punish Dicki and 

his family for me." Id. at 11. 

The district court subsequently found McCann guilty of 

obstructing justice. (R., Vol. VIII, p. 64; Vol. IX, p. 13). In 

so doing, the court rejected McCann's contentions that he was not 

attempting to coerce Graves, that he had written the letters when 

he was disappointed and frustrated, and that what he had actually 

meant by the letters was that "he hoped to see Graves incarcerated 

and suffer the same kind of financial and emotional difficulties 

that confronted him." (Opening brief of MCann, P•. 23). 

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We review a district court's determination to enhance a 

sentence for obstruction of justice under§ 3Cl.l only for clear 

error. United States v. Williams, 897 F.2d 1034, 1041 (lOth Cir. 

1990), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___ (1991). The degree of upward 

adjustment in the base offense level for obstruction of justice is 

a matter within the sound discretion of the sentencing court. 

United States v. St. Julian, 922 F.2d 563, 571 (lOth Cir. 1990). 

Conduct which may provide a basis for applying§ 3Cl.l to 

enhance a sentence 

otherwise unlawfully 

includes "threatening, 

attempting to influence 

intimidating, or 

a co-defendant, 

witness, or juror, directly or indirectly." u.s.s.G. § 3Cl.l 

comment (n. l(d)); United States v. Reid, 911 F.2d 1456, 1463 

(lOth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, ___ u.s. ___ (1991). "Threatening 

a witness before the witness testifies and prior to conviction and 

sentencing plainly is within the scope of§ 3Cl.l." United States 

v. Reid, supra, 911 F.2d at 1463, n. 6 (quoting United States v. 

Rivera, 879 F.2d 1247, 1253-54 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, u.s. 

(1989). We hold that the district court's determination to 

enhance McCann's sentence for obstruction of justice was not 

clearly erroneous. 

McCann's convictions are REVERSED. The case is REMANDED 

with direction that the district court permit McCann to withdraw 

his plea of guilty and plea anew to the nine counts set forth in 

the superseding indictment. 

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