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Parties Involved:
Mark Steven Szekely
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 15-10502

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 3:14-cr-00034-HES-JRK-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

MARK STEVEN SZEKELY, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

________________________

(November 24, 2015)

Before TJOFLAT, JORDAN and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Mark Steven Szekely, in appealing his concurrent prison sentences, 108 

months, for committing eight violations of the wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, 

argues that the district court erred in enhancing his base offense level pursuant to 

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 by two levels for abusing a position of trust.1

 Specifically, he 

argues that in identifying himself as Jon Shapiro, a lawyer, when communicating 

with his victims via email (and inducing them to send him money), he was not 

occupying a position of trust vis-à-vis his victims. He was simply using the lawyer

identity as part of his fraudulent scheme. Assuming, though, that the court did not 

err in finding that he had abused a position of trust vis-à-vis his victims, he argues 

that the court failed to find as fact that Szekely’s abuse of his position of trust 

significantly facilitated the commission of the wire fraud scheme. We find no 

merit in Szekely’s arguments and accordingly affirm.

I.

We review for clear error a district court’s factual determination that a 

defendant abused a position of public trust, but we review de novo the court’s legal 

conclusion that the defendant’s conduct justified the abuse-of-trust enhancement. 

United States v. Garrison, 133 F.3d 831, 837 (11th Cir. 1998). The government 

had the burden of proving the applicability of sections that would enhance the 

offense level. See United States v. Bailey, 961 F.2d 180, 181 (11th Cir. 1992).

 1

 The sentence range for Szekely’s sentences was 87 to 108 months’ imprisonment. As 

indicated, the district court sentenced him to the high end of the range. 

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The government was required to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that 

Szekely abused a position of public trust. See United States v. Kummer, 89 F.3d 

1536, 1545 (11th Cir. 1996) (explaining that “the standard for a sentencing court 

on a disputed fact involved in sentencing is a preponderance of the evidence”).

Section 3B1.3 provides: “If the defendant abused a position of public or 

private trust, or used a special skill, in a manner that significantly facilitated the 

commission or concealment of the offense, increase [the offense level] by 2 

levels.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3. The commentary to § 3B1.3 provides that “[p]ublic or 

private trust” refers to a position of public or private trust characterized by 

professional or managerial discretion (i.e. substantial discretionary judgment that is 

ordinarily given considerable deference).” Id., cmt. n.1. 

This adjustment also applies in a case in which the defendant provides 

sufficient indicia to the victim that the defendant legitimately holds a 

position of private or public trust when, in fact, the defendant does not. For 

example, the adjustment applies in the case of a defendant who (A) 

perpetrates a financial fraud by leading an investor to believe the defendant 

is a legitimate investment broker; or (B) perpetrates a fraud by representing 

falsely to a patient or employer that the defendant is a licensed physician. In 

making the misrepresentation, the defendant assumes a position of trust, 

relative to the victim, that provides the defendant with the same opportunity 

to commit a difficult-to-detect crime that the defendant would have had if 

the position were held legitimately.

Id., cmt. n.3. Within the fraud context, we have explained that § 3B1.3 applies 

where the defendant is in a fiduciary, or other personal trust, relationship to the 

victim of the fraud, and the defendant takes advantage of the relationship to 

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perpetrate or conceal the offense. United States v. Ghertler, 605 F.3d 1256, 1264 

(11th Cir. 2010).

In Ghertler, we stated that “[t]he Commission has determined that, 

particularly from the perspective of the crime victim, an imposter who falsely 

assumes and takes advantage of a position of trust is as culpable and deserving of 

increased punishment as is a defendant who abuses an actual position of trust.” 

Ghertler, 605 F.3d at 1265; U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3. For example in Ghertler, we noted, 

“[w]hether an individual is actually a stock broker, or is just pretending to be 

one, is the same for applying the abuse-of-trust enhancement. This is 

because it makes no difference from the victim's perspective. In either case, 

the defendant actually enters into a relationship of trust with the victim, who 

in turn grants the defendant discretion to act over his or her affairs.”

Ghertler, 605 F.3d at 1265. 

The defendant in Ghertler telephoned a series of companies, identified 

himself as a high-ranking company official, claimed he needed a quick cash 

transfer and provided instructions on how to transfer the money to him. Id. at 

1260. We decided the district court erred in applying the abuse of trust 

enhancement to Ghertler because there was no relationship of trust between the 

defendant and his victims. Id. at 1266–67. We found that the defendant did not 

have a lengthy relationship with his victims or commit difficult-to-detect frauds 

over time with minimal oversight from superiors. Id. In fact, the company’s 

suspicions were raised quickly because the frauds were so overt. Id. 

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Particularly regarding attorneys, one’s status as an attorney does not 

necessarily mean he or she has abused a position of trust. United States v. Morris. 

286 F.3d 1291, 1297 (11th Cir. 2002). In Morris, there were insufficient facts to 

establish that a bona fide relationship of trust existed between the defendant and 

the investors. Id. at 1298–99. 

The district court did not err in applying the § 3B1.3 two-level enhancement. 

Szekely was in a trust relationship with his victims, and he abused that relationship 

to commit the offense conduct. When posing as fictitious attorneys or other legal 

workers, he led his victims to believe they were in an attorney-client relationship,

unlike in Morris. Id. In contrast to Ghertler, Szekely’s victims provided him 

professional discretion to do what was necessary to handle their legal affairs.

Ghertler, 605 F.3d at 1266–67. In his fictitious attorney role, he provided legal 

advice, treated his victims as clients and accepted their retainers and other 

payments. Also, his relationships with his victims lasted for years, while 

Ghertler’s did not. Id.

II.

Szekely’s fall back argument—that the district court failed to find that his 

abuse of trust significantly facilitated the commission of his offenses—is presented 

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for the first time on appeal.2 We review claims of error raised for the first time on 

appeal under the plain error standard to avoid manifest injustice. United States v. 

Harness, 180 F.3d 1232, 1234 (11th Cir.1999). The test for plain error requires 

error, that is plain, and that affects the appellant’s substantial rights. Id. 

To determine whether the defendant abused the position of trust in a way 

that significantly facilitated the commission of the offense, the court should inquire 

as to whether the defendant used any special knowledge provided by his position 

of trust to facilitate the offense. United States v. Brenson, 104 F.3d 1267, 1287 

(11th Cir. 1997). There must be a nexus between the offense of conviction and the 

abuse of the position of trust such that the defendant uses the “position of trust to 

give him an advantage in the commission . . . of the offense.” United States v. 

Barakat, 130 F.3d 1448, 1455–1456 (11th Cir. 1997). In Barakat, we reversed the 

§ 3B1.3 enhancement because the defendant’s status as the head of the Broward 

County Housing Authority did not give him an advantage when he committed 

personal tax evasion, as the crime of tax evasion was neutral as to the method by 

which the defendant obtained the income. Id. In United States v. Long, we held 

 2

 After the district court pronounced sentence, it said: “The Court having pronounced 

sentence, does counsel for the government or the defendant have any objections to the sentence 

or the manner in which the Court has pronounced sentence other than what has been previously 

stated?” Doc. 74 at 203. Defense counsel stated that her only objections were those previously 

indicated, which, with respect to § 3B1.3, was that the government failed to establish the 

application of the enhancement. 

 

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that even if the defendant had discretion as a food service foreman, he did not 

abuse the specific discretion given to him in that position to bring drugs into the 

prison, and thus the enhancement did not apply. United States v. Long, 122 F.3d 

1360, 1366 (11th Cir. 1997). 

In communicating with his victims, Szekely acted as if he were an attorney, 

in a position of trust. Some victims actually believed they were in an attorneyclient relationship with Szekely, which provided him with an opportunity to 

provide advice and ask for payment. It was obvious to the court that Szekely’s use 

of the lawyer identity facilitated his execution of his fraudulent scheme and the 

commission of wire fraud---the identity was indispensable to the scheme’s success. 

Its finding that this was so was implicit in the court’s decision to sentence Szekely 

at the top of the Guidelines sentence range. 

AFFIRMED.

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