Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-03049/USCOURTS-caDC-96-03049-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dennis S. Davis
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 8, 1997 Decided June 27, 1997 

No. 96-3013

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

BOBBY A. HOLTON,

APPELLANT

Consolidated with

No. 96-3049

----

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 91cr00677-01) 

(No. 91cr00677-02)

Robert S. Becker, appointed by the Court, argued the cause 

and filed the briefs for appellant Bobby A. Holton.

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Lee H. Karlin, appointed by the Court, argued the cause 

for appellant Dennis S. Davis.

William D. Weinreb, Assistant United States Attorney, 

argued the cause for appellee, with whom Eric H. Holder, Jr.,

United States Attorney, John R. Fisher, Elizabeth Trosman,

and Jennifer M. Anderson, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief.

Before: WALD, WILLIAMS and RANDOLPH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WALD.

WALD, Circuit Judge: A jury convicted Dennis S. Davis and 

Bobby A. Holton of crimes involving the unlawful possession 

and distribution of crack cocaine, conspiracy and the unlawful 

use of a communications facility. On appeal, both appellants 

challenge their convictions on the basis of alleged errors 

made by the district court when it (1) permitted the jurors to 

consider government-prepared transcripts of drug transactions during deliberations; (2) replayed recorded drug transactions for the jury during deliberations without the defendants being present; (3) refused to voir dire the jury about 

possible prejudice stemming from a television news program; 

and (4) determined that handwritten notes made by a government witness were not producible Jencks Act material. In 

addition, appellants contend that the Fifth Amendment requires a remand for resentencing under the guidelines applicable to individuals who have committed crimes involving 

powder cocaine. Finding none of these claims meritorious, 

we affirm the convictions and sentences.

I. BACKGROUND

In October 1991, a confidential informant advised the Metropolitan Police Department ("MPD") that individuals were 

selling drugs at the Barry Farms housing complex in southeast Washington, D.C. The MPD launched an undercover 

investigation in which MPD Detective Michael J. Quander 

posed as the brother of the confidential informant in order to 

gain an introduction to the drug dealers. Detective Quander 

made six trips to the Barry Farms complex during which he 

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purchased approximately 11 ounces of crack cocaine. Following the last purchase, the police executed search warrants at 

two homes in the complex and seized additional drugs and 

drug paraphernalia. They arrested appellants Dennis S. 

Davis, Bobby A. Holton and several others.

The government's evidence against appellants included 

body-wire tape recordings of conversations between Detective 

Quander and the individuals with whom he engaged in drug 

transactions. A trial was held at which the body-wire tapes 

were admitted into evidence but, based on an agreement 

between the parties, were never played to the jury. Appellants were convicted of all the charges against them. On 

appeal, this court vacated the convictions against appellants 

and remanded the case for a new trial.

At the second trial, the government announced its intention 

to play portions of the body-wire recordings to the jury. 

Defense counsel unsuccessfully moved to have the tapes 

excluded because of their poor quality. Just prior to calling 

Detective Quander to the witness stand, the government 

informed the court that it had not yet prepared transcripts of 

the tape recordings. The trial was recessed so that the 

government and defense counsel could listen to the tape 

recordings and the government could prepare transcriptions 

of the recordings. When presented with the government's 

transcripts, defendants objected to their accuracy, arguing 

that the tapes were inaudible in many parts and that, because 

defendants denied involvement in the drug transactions, the 

attribution of statements to them would be prejudicial. Appellant Davis' counsel proffered an alternative version of the 

transcript that eliminated the attributions and substituted 

"inaudible" for some of the statements. At the government's 

request, the court listened to the tape recordings while 

reading along with the government-prepared transcripts. 

The court heard objections from the defendants and ruled 

that the government transcripts of the recordings would aid 

the jury in listening to the tapes during the trial, but that the 

transcripts themselves would not be given to the jury during 

its deliberations.

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The tapes were played and authenticated during the examination of Detective Quander. The government-prepared 

transcriptions were distributed to the jury before the tapes 

were played and were collected directly afterwards. On 

cross-examination of the detective, it was revealed that Detective Quander had prepared handwritten notes or transcriptions of the tape recordings. Defense counsel made a Jencks 

Act request for the written notes, but the district court 

concluded that the documents did not constitute Jencks material and refused to hold a hearing. At defense counsel's 

request, however, the court agreed to examine the documents 

in camera and ordered that the government file the handwritten notes under seal so that they could be examined on 

appeal.

The evening after the defendants began presenting their 

cases, ABC News showed a Nightline program concerning 

the disparate sentences imposed for crimes involving powder 

cocaine and those involving cocaine base or crack cocaine. 

Among the individuals interviewed on the program were 

District of Columbia Superior Court Judge Reggie Walton 

and Michelle Roberts, a criminal defense attorney who practices in the District of Columbia. Judge Walton talked about 

patterns of violent behavior related to the crack cocaine trade 

and speculated that high mandatory sentences may have 

contributed to the lowering of the homicide rate in Washington, D.C. Ms. Roberts criticized the sentencing structure for 

crimes involving crack cocaine as lacking deterrent value. 

When trial resumed the following morning, counsel for appellant Holton requested that the district judge voir dire the 

jury in order to determine whether any of the jurors had 

viewed the television program and, if so, what impact it might 

have on their deliberations. The district court refused to 

question the jurors because they had been probed about their 

ability to be fair and impartial during jury selection and 

frequently had been admonished not to decide the case based 

on anything heard outside of the courtroom.

After deliberations began, the court received notes from 

the jury asking to hear all of the tape recordings. The 

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dure whereby his law clerk would play the tapes for the jury 

in the courtroomwhich the judge described as "an extension 

of the jury room"and distribute the transcripts as listening 

aids, to be collected at the completion of the playing of the 

tapes. Defense counsel objected to the jurors receiving the 

transcripts during deliberations because the transcripts had 

not been admitted into evidence, were not accurate and 

because the court had stated that the jury would not be given 

the transcripts during deliberations.

Appellant Holton was convicted of one count of Conspiracy 

to Distribute Cocaine Base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 

and 841, four counts of Unlawful Distribution of Cocaine Base 

Within 1000 Feet of a Playground and School in violation of 

21 U.S.C. § 860(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 2, and one count of 

Unlawful Use of a Communication Facility in violation of 21 

U.S.C. § 843(b). Appellant Davis was convicted of one count 

of Conspiracy to Distribute Cocaine Base in violation of 21 

U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841, six counts of Unlawful Distribution of 

Cocaine Base Within 1000 Feet of a Playground and School in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 860(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 2, and one 

count of Unlawful Use of a Communication Facility in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). The court sentenced appellant 

Holton to concurrent terms of 363 months imprisonment for 

the conspiracy and distribution offenses and 48 months imprisonment for the communication facility offense, and appellant Davis to concurrent terms of 370 months imprisonment 

for the conspiracy and distribution offenses and 48 months 

imprisonment for the communication facility offense. These 

consolidated appeals ensued.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Use of Transcripts and Replaying of Tapes During Jury 

Deliberations

1. Transcripts

A transcript repeating in written form a conversation recorded on tape may help a juror listening to the tape follow 

the conversation when the tape is of questionable clarity, see 

United States v. West, 948 F.2d 1042, 1044 n.1 (6th Cir. 1991); 

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United States v. Slade, 627 F.2d 293, 302 (D.C.Cir.1980), or 

contains the voices of multiple speakers who talk over each 

other or speak in quick succession. See Slade, 627 F.2d at 

302. Ironically, the same circumstances that make a transcript helpful to a juror may prejudice the defendant if it is 

presented without proper safeguards, for the only transcripts 

worth fighting about are those on which important words may 

be susceptible to different interpretations. After all, the 

jurors are likely to notice a clear discrepancy between a tape 

and a transcript.

The principal risk of indiscriminately permitting the use of 

transcripts by jurors is that in the case of a poor quality or 

unintelligible recording, the jurors may substitute the contents of the more accessible, printed dialogue for the sounds 

they cannot readily hear or distinguish on the tape and, in so 

doing, transform the transcript into independent evidence of 

the recorded statements. See United States v. Howard, 80 

F.3d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Strothers, 77 

F.3d 1389, 1392-93 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 374 

(1996). A related risk arises when a transcript attributes 

incriminating statements to a defendant that the defendant 

does not admit making. See Howard, 80 F.3d at 1200 (possibility of prejudice when transcript attributes statements to 

defendants who do not testify and there is no evidentiary 

basis for the attribution); see United States v. Berry, 92 F.3d 

597, 600-01 (7th Cir. 1996) (possibility of prejudice when 

identification is central issue in case and transcript identifies 

defendant as speaker). Placing a transcript in the jury room 

during deliberationsafter the completion of the supervised, 

adversarial portion of the trialopens up the possibility that 

jurors will see the transcript as a neutral exhibit placed 

before them by the court and increases the chance that the 

document will be read without the tape recording playing 

alongside for the purpose of comparison. See Strothers, 77 

F.3d at 1392-93 (error to admit transcript of tape into 

evidence because of the risk that the jury might rely on the 

government's version of the conversations during deliberations without simultaneously listening to the authenticated 

tapes to verify the transcript's accuracy).

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These risks can be markedly decreased when certain precautions are taken. Thus, we have upheld the practice of 

giving the jury a transcript to help follow a tape recording 

played during trial so long as procedures are followed to 

ensure that the jury does not rely on one party's version of 

the transcript instead of the tape recording. See Slade, 627 

F.2d at 302 (citing United States v. McMillan, 508 F.2d 101, 

105 (8th Cir. 1974)). We have approved of two alternative 

methods to ensure that a transcript is a sufficiently accurate 

rendition of the conversation recorded on tape to be used by 

the jury as a listening aid during trial and a third procedure 

to be used when the accuracy of the transcript has not been 

verified. Id. In a criminal case, the preferred approach is 

for the prosecution and defense to stipulate as to the accuracy 

of a transcript. If the parties cannot agree, however, the 

trial court can make a pretrial determination of accuracy 

after comparing the proposed transcript against the tapes or 

provide the jury with one transcript reflecting the prosecution's interpretation of the recording and one version reflecting the defendant's interpretation. Id. With respect to any 

one of the three procedures, we require the district court to 

"instruct the jurors that their personal understanding of the 

tape supersedes the text in a transcript." Id. The transcript 

then may be used in conjunction with the playing of the tape.

We have not previously adopted any rule regarding the use 

of the transcript by the jury during its deliberations or indeed 

for the admission of a transcript into evidence so that, like 

any other piece of evidence, it can be brought into the jury 

deliberations. See Dallago v. United States, 427 F.2d 546, 

552-54 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (jurors ordinarily are entitled to see 

any exhibits entered into evidence). In Slade, we upheld the 

district court's discretion to allow the jury to use an accurate 

transcript to assist them in listening to a tape, but it is not 

clear from the opinion whether use of the transcript in that 

case was limited to trial; the tapes were played both during 

trial and deliberations and the jury's use of the transcripts as 

a guide was cited in the opinion as a basis for finding that the 

tapes were not so marred by background noise so as to 

render them unintelligible. Slade, 627 F.2d at 302. In 

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Strothers, we found error when government-prepared transcripts were admitted into evidence and could be read by the 

jurors without listening to the tapes, but we did not rule out 

the admission of a transcript into evidence altogether. Certainly a transcript can be helpful when the jury listens to 

replays of tape recordings during deliberations as well as 

during trial. Indeed, it might well confuse the jurors to 

permit them to use transcripts as a guide during trial, but not 

during deliberations. Moreover, without a transcript to guide 

them, the jury could find itself involved in repetitious and 

time consuming replaying of unintelligible recordings. Thus, 

we agree with the other circuits that have held it is within the 

district court's discretion to permit the jury to use transcripts 

during deliberations. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 105 

F.3d 1, 10-11 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Delpit, 94 F.3d 

1134 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Elder, 90 F.3d 1110, 

1129 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 529 (1996).

Our survey of the practices of other circuits indicates that 

permissible procedures regarding transcripts vary widely. 

Some circuits have permitted transcripts to be brought into 

deliberations without requiring that they be formally admitted into evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Capers, 61 F.3d 

1100, 1107 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1830 (1996);

United States v. Bryant, 480 F.2d 785, 791 (2d Cir. 1973). 

Other circuits specifically have held that a transcript, disputed or not, may be admitted into evidence. See United States 

v. Onori, 535 F.2d 938 (5th Cir. 1976) (transcript used as a 

guide is analogous to the use of expert testimony as a device 

aiding the jury in understanding other types of real evidence); 

United States v. Hall, 342 F.2d 849 (4th Cir. 1965) (transcript 

similar to photograph, drawing, or mechanical model used by 

a witness to amplify testimony). Every circuit agrees, however, that, while a jury may draw inferences of guilt from 

testimony or from a tape recording, it should not draw such 

inferences from a transcript. The transcript is viewed by our 

circuit and others as an illustration of a witness's interpretation of the recording. The Advisory Committee Notes to 

Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence explain that 

"relevant evidence" permits the use of evidence that is "adUSCA Case #96-3049 Document #281643 Filed: 06/27/1997 Page 8 of 22
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mitted as an aid to understanding." FED. R. EVID. 401 

advisory committee's note. In addition, the court has the 

power to "exercise reasonable control over the mode and 

order of ... presenting evidence so as to (1) make the 

interrogation and presentation effective for ascertainment of 

the truth, [and] (2) avoid needless consumption of time...." 

FED. R. EVID. 611(a). Transcripts admitted for the limited 

purpose of being used as a jury aid can help prevent jury 

confusion and wasted time as a tape is being played. Appellants argue that providing transcripts to the jury during 

deliberations always is prejudicial because it unduly emphasizes those pieces of evidence. Although "double exposure to 

transcripts of crucial evidence, i.e., during the trial and in the 

jury room, can be prejudicial to a defendant," United States 

v. Rengifo, 789 F.2d 975, 982 (1st Cir. 1986), the district court 

retains ample discretion to exclude transcripts in circumstances where the prejudice might outweigh their usefulness 

as an aid. Id.; see also Fountain v. United States, 384 F.2d 

624 (5th Cir. 1967); see FED. R. EVID. 403. Moreover, Federal 

Rule of Evidence 611 would permit a judge broad discretion 

to exclude a transcript, particularly if it will not add anything 

to a juror's understanding of a tape recording.

To protect jury deliberations from improper influence, we 

ordinarily restrict the jury's access only to exhibits that have 

been accepted into evidence and "consideration by the jury of 

documents not in evidence is error...." United States v. 

Treadwell, 760 F.2d 327, 339 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (citing Dallago,

427 F.2d at 553). Although it makes little practical difference 

if a transcript is formally admitted into evidence, so long as 

its transmission to the jury is accompanied by appropriate 

instructions limiting its use to that of an aid, we believe that it 

is the better practice to require formal admission into evidence during the trial so that parties objecting to the transcript will be apprised of the possibility that the document 

could be given to the jury during deliberations and so that the 

judge will be sure to provide the jury with appropriate 

instructions as to its limited use on admission. Formal 

admission would reduce the risk of surprising counsel by a 

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last minute decision to send the transcript into the jury room 

if the jury requests a replaying of the tapes.

Our precedents indicate that it is permissible to present the 

jury either with an "accurate" transcript or two alternative 

transcripts. We believe that the best practice remains for 

the parties to devise a stipulated transcript. See Onori, 535 

F.2d at 948. On many occasions a defendant may object to 

the accuracy of a transcript and argue that the underlying 

tape recording is too unintelligible to be effectively challenged. If there is a general objection to the accuracy of the 

transcript, but no alternative transcript is offered, then the 

judge may review the transcript against the tape and whatever other evidence is presented and certify the transcript's 

accuracy, but the jury must be informed that the transcript is 

only one party's version. If a party makes specific objections 

to the transcript, or offers an alternative transcript, then "the 

jury is entitled to consider the divergence in two transcripts 

of the same conversation, with the recording of it, as a 

problem of fact to be resolved in the traditional manner." 

Howard, 80 F.3d at 1199. The jury may be given one 

transcript containing both versions of the disputed portions or 

two separate transcripts. The parties should each be given 

an opportunity to put on evidence supporting the accuracy of 

its version or challenging the accuracy of the other side's 

version. Id. No matter which of these procedures is utilized, 

the jury should be instructed that the tape recording constitutes evidence of the recorded conversations and the transcript is an interpretation of the tape. The jury must be 

instructed that they should disregard anything in the transcript that they do not hear on the recording itself. Moreover, the court must ensure that the transcript is used only in 

conjunction with the tape recording.

To sum up: The district court, in the exercise of its 

discretion, should decide whether transcripts should be admitted into evidence as an aid to the jury. It is within the 

district court's discretion to decide whether, upon request of 

the jury to hear tape replays, it will permit the jury to use 

the transcripts during deliberations. The court should reach 

a decision in this respect sufficiently early in the trial to allow 

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defense counsel an opportunity to challenge the accuracy of 

any government-prepared transcript, to support the accuracy 

of any alternative transcript that the defendant wishes to 

introduce, to raise objections, and to request appropriate jury 

instructions. Upon an objection of one of the parties, and 

failing agreement between the parties on a stipulated transcript, each party should be permitted an opportunity to 

introduce its own transcript or the parties should create a 

single transcript that shows both versions at the points of 

disagreement. When the jury receives two transcripts of the 

same recording, it should be instructed that there is a difference of opinion as to the accuracy of the transcripts and that 

it is up to them to decide which, if any, version to accept. 

The jurors also should be instructed that they should disregard any portion of the transcript or transcripts that they 

think differs from what they hear on the tape recording. 

Further limiting instructions will depend on the circumstances of the case.

Although we recognize that the district court could not 

have anticipated the rule we lay down today, we find that the 

court failed to meet the standards previously set forth in 

Slade for the use of a transcript during trial. A careful 

reading of the transcript reveals that the trial judge acknowledged that the tapes were sufficiently audible and intelligible 

to be played to the jury and that the transcripts would aid the 

jury in listening to the tapes, but that he never explicitly 

found that the transcripts accurately reflected statements 

recorded on the tapes or that the attributions in the transcripts were accurate.

The trial judge did indeed listen to each tape recording 

while he read the government-prepared transcripts. After 

playing the October 4, 1991 tape for the judge, the government stated "I would suggest that the court can now find that 

not only are the excerpts that the government intends to play 

audible and intelligible, but that the material on the tape that 

the government intends to play is highly probative...." 

After making two changes to the transcript of the October 4, 

1991 tape, the government stated that it "stands by its 

transcript 100 percent." The court ruled "I am satisfied and 

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make essentially the findings that are articulated by [the 

government] with respect to the October 4th transcript." 

Because the only proposed findings articulated by the government related to the quality of the tape, not the transcript, we 

are unable to conclude that the judge verified the accuracy of 

the transcript. After playing the October 16, 1991 tape, the 

government stated its belief that its transcript "is the appropriate transcript to aid the jury in playing these tapes." The 

court agreed but did not state that the transcript was accurate. The court appears to have made the same "finding" 

with respect to the transcript of the October 23, 1991 recording and the transcript of the October 30, 1991, recording. 

The court never ruled on any of the specific objections that 

were raised by defense counsel.

Despite our skepticism, it is possible that the court's "findings" could be interpreted as verifying the accuracy of the 

transcripts. There was no way, however, for the judge to 

know whether the attribution of certain voices to certain 

defendants was accurate; Detective Quander had not yet 

testified as to the identity of the speakers and the defendants 

had not testified. Nor did the district judge condition his 

accuracy "finding" on subsequent proof that the attributions 

were correct or ever revisit the issue. We must conclude, 

therefore, that the district judge did not follow any of the 

procedures described in Slade that must precede the jurors 

being given the transcripts.

The immediate question then is whether the court's error 

in placing the transcripts before the jury during deliberations 

requires reversal of the convictions. As we discussed above, 

we restrict the jury's access to information in order to protect 

the jury's deliberations from improper influence. If there 

was an intrusion in the jury room that did not result in harm, 

then reversal would be pointless. See United States v. Olano,

507 U.S. 725, 738 (1993). In examining the possibility of 

prejudice, we consider whether we can "reasonably conclude 

that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error." Treadwell, 760 F.2d at 339.

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The facts of this case do not suggest that the court should 

presume prejudice or that there is a reasonable probability 

that the jury was prejudiced by the transcripts. The record 

"provides substantial support for the relative accuracy of the 

transcripts." Slade, 627 F.2d at 303. During trial, Detective 

Quander, a party to the taped conversations, corroborated the 

identity of the parties who had been recorded. Officer Curtis, who observed the October 23rd and 30th transactions, 

corroborated Detective Quander's testimony as to the identity 

of the participants on those particular days. See Dallago, 427 

F.2d at 559. In addition, the information on the tapes was 

only a portion of a larger set of facts that the prosecution put 

before the jury through proper means. Cf. Treadwell, 760 

F.2d at 340. That evidence included testimony that appellant 

Davis attempted to flee from the bathroom of a house at 1361 

Stevens Road when police executed a search warrant at that 

location; the recovery of ziploc bags containing nearly 32 

grams of crack cocaine from the toilet in that bathroom; a 

plate and razor blade next to the sink in the bathroom; the 

recovery of narcotics packaging paraphernalia from the 

house; the recovery from Davis of $3000 in prerecorded 

funds that Detective Quander had earlier used to pay for a 

purchase of cocaine; the arrest of Holton beside the open 

driver's door of an Acura automobile in which a cellular 

telephone used in the drug transactions was found; and the 

recovery of $559 from Holton.

Appellants insist that the court's "about-face" with respect 

to the jury having the transcripts during deliberations compromised defense counsel's ability to highlight alleged inaccuracies or present alternative transcripts, but the facts simply 

do not bear out such a claim. Defense counsel seized the 

opportunity to challenge the preparation and accuracy of the 

government-prepared transcripts during their crossexamination of Detective Quander and during their closing 

arguments. Thus, "the jury was made aware that the transcripts offered only the government's interpretations" of the 

tape recordings, Slade, 627 F.2d at 303, and that it had to 

resolve an issue as to the identity of the speakers on the tape 

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in light of the evidence introduced at trial. See Strothers, 77 

F.3d at 1393.

The district court's frequent limiting instructions also 

served to avert the possibility of prejudice. The court instructed the jury prior to the distribution of each transcript 

and at the close of trial that the transcripts were not to be 

considered independent evidence and that only the tape recordings constituted evidence of the conversations recorded 

therein.1 The jury was also provided with a written instruction as to the limited use to be made of the transcripts and 

was referred to that instruction by the judge when he informed the jury that arrangements had been made for them 

to hear the tapes.2See United States v. Crowder, 36 F.3d 

__________

1 Prior to introduction of the first tape, the district court instructed the jury:

[O]nly portions of the tape will be played. You will be provided 

with Exhibit 10C-1, which has been identified as a transcript. 

It has not been received into evidence. The transcript that 

you'll be provided with is simply an aid to assist you in listening 

to the tape. And it is the tape which is in evidence. If you 

hear anything on the tape but do not see anything in the 

transcript, it's what you understand to be on the tape, which is 

actually in evidence.

A similar instruction was given prior to the distribution of each 

transcript. During its final instructions to the jury, the court 

charged:

Transcripts of ... tape recordings, recorded conversations, 

were furnished for your convenience and guidance as you 

listened to the tapes to clarify portions of the tapes which are 

difficult to hear and to help you identify the speakers.

Tapes, however, as I told you, are evidence in the case; the 

transcripts are not evidence. If you perceived any variation 

between the transcripts and the tapes as to the words spoken 

or the speakers, you must be guided solely by the tapes and 

not by the transcripts.

If you cannot determine from the tape that particular words 

were spoken, you must disregard the transcript insofar as 

those words are concerned.

2 The court's note to the jury explained:

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691, 697 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1146 (1995). 

The court may presume that the jury followed the trial 

court's instructions. Olano, 507 U.S. at 740-41.

Finally, it is clear that the jury did not use the transcripts 

as a substitute for listening to the tapes in deliberations. The 

record indicates that the transcripts were made available only 

in conjunction with the relevant tape recordings and the 

record suggests that the jury did listen to the tapes being 

replayed during deliberations. Cf. United States v. Collazo,

732 F.2d 1200, 1204 (4th Cir. 1984). For all these reasons, we 

conclude that, although the trial court erred when it permitted the jury to consider the government-prepared transcripts 

without verifying their accuracy or, alternatively, admitting a 

defense version, there was no reasonable probability that the 

jury substituted the transcripts for the evidence in the record 

or that prejudice resulted.

Appellants argue that by allowing the transcripts to be 

seen and read by the jury, the district court violated the best 

evidence rule, which requires the production of an original 

recording, when available, to prove its contents. FED. R.

EVID. 1002. We note that the best evidence rule would not be 

implicated in circumstances in which the district court follows 

the proper procedure. "The elementary wisdom of the best 

evidence rule rests on the fact that the [recording itself] is a 

more reliable, complete and accurate source of information as 

to its contents and meaning than anyone's description [of it]." 

Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414, 420 (1953). Thus, the 

rule is a mechanism to prevent fraud or mistransmission of 

information, i.e., to ensure accuracy. When the original tape 

is available and presented to the jury and the accuracy of the 

__________

As you will recall and is set forth on p. 19 of the instructions, 

which I ask you to review, the transcripts are not evidence, but 

are mere aids in listening to the tapes, with the tapes themselves having been received into evidence. Before each tape is 

played in its entirety, the transcripts of the portions played will 

be given to you, as before to assist you. After each tape has 

been played, the transcripts once again will be collected from 

you.

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transcript has been stipulated or is made an issue for the jury 

to decide, concerns addressed by the best evidence rule are 

not at issue.

2. Replaying of Tapes

Appellants also challenge the trial court's decision to replay 

the tapes for the jury during deliberations when neither they 

nor their attorneys were present. They argue that they were 

denied their Sixth Amendment right to confront the evidence 

against them and their Fifth Amendment right to due process. The government asserts that defendants' counsel 

agreed with the district court's proposal that only his law 

clerk be present, but the trial transcript is decidedly vague on 

that point, probably because there were prior discussions off 

the record between the lawyers and the judge which are not a 

matter of record.

First, appellants speculate about problems that might have 

occurred during the replaying, which was conducted in the 

courtroom by the judge's law clerk according to procedures of 

which both parties were informed beforehand. But, there is 

in fact no evidence suggesting that the law clerk either made 

independent decisions about whether or how to replay tapes 

or remained in the courtroom while the jury was deliberating, 

except for the actual playing of the tapes. Under these 

circumstances, there is no reason to presume harm. See 

United States v. Sobamowo, 892 F.2d 90, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1989) 

(citing United States v. Kupau, 781 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 

1986) (even where tape-playing government agent and jury 

were alone in the courtroom, error found harmless beyond 

reasonable doubt given "the obvious efforts of the court, by 

clearing the courtroom, to prevent any outside influences, and 

the absence of any suggestion that extraneous matters came 

before the jury")); see United States v. Florea, 541 F.2d 568, 

570-71 (6th Cir. 1976); cf. Riley v. Deeds, 56 F.3d 1117, 

1119-20 (9th Cir. 1995) (complete abdication of judicial control 

where law clerk independently granted jury's readback request and control over what was read to jury was in hands of 

jurors and clerk).

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Second, appellants assert that Sobamowo requires supervision by defense counsel during the replaying of tapes. In 

that case, the court reasoned that the district court's procedure requiring the presence of the prosecution and at least 

one defense attorney rendered any potential error harmless. 

In that same case, however, we held that "tape replaying [for 

the jury during deliberations is] not a stage of trial implicating the confrontation clause or Rule 43(a)." Sobamowo, 892 

F.2d at 96 (citing Dallago, 427 F.2d at 552-53 (defendant's 

presence not required when exhibits are submitted to the 

jury during deliberations)); but see United States v. FelixRodriguez, 22 F.3d 964, 967 (9th Cir. 1994) (defendant has a 

right under Rule 43 to be present when a tape-recorded 

conversation is replayed to a jury during its deliberations).3

The Sobamowo court also held that a defendant's absence 

during replaying does not violate the due process clause 

because the absence has no " 'relation ... to the fulness of 

[the defendant's] opportunity to defend' " himself. Id. (quoting United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985)). 

Accordingly, we reject appellants' constitutional arguments.

B. Jencks Act Claims

Appellants contend that the district court committed reversible error when it denied appellant Davis' requestunder 

the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1988)for documents 

created by Detective Quander during the course of preparing 

the transcripts of the body-wire recordings. The Jencks Act 

provides, in pertinent part:

(b) After a witness called by the United States has testified 

on direct examination, the court shall, on motion of the 

defendant, order the United States to produce any statement (as hereinafter defined) of the witness ... which 

relates to the subject matter as to which the witness has 

testified....

__________

3 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43(a) provides that "[t]he 

defendant shall be present ... at every stage of the trial including 

the impaneling if the jury and the return of the verdict...." 

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* * * * * *

(e) The term "statement," as used in subsection[ ] (b) ... 

of this section in relation to any witness called by the 

United States, means

(1) a written statement made by said witness and signed 

or otherwise adopted or approved by him....

Id. §§ 3500(b), 3500(e). The Act "was intended to enable the 

defense to impeach a government witness by bringing any [ ] 

variances [between Jencks material and the witness's testimony] to the attention of [the finder of fact]." Norinsberg Corp. 

v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 47 F.3d 1224, 1229 

(D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Prieto, 505 F.2d 8, 

11 (5th Cir. 1974)); see also United States v. Harrison, 524 

F.2d 421, 431 n.29 (D.C. Cir. 1975).

The trial court has a duty under the Jencks Act to engage 

in an adequate inquiry into the nature of documents requested before ruling against Jencks Act production. United 

States v. North America Reporting, Inc., 740 F.2d 50, 55 

(D.C. Cir. 1984). In this case, the district court concluded 

that the documents at issue were not "statements" under the 

Jencks Act because they represented early drafts of a work in 

progress that were not "adopted" by the detective witness 

until he verified the final version of the transcript. The court 

refused to hold a hearing but agreed to review the notes in 

camera and ordered the government to file the documents 

under seal for the purposes of appeal. The government did 

not provide the documents to the district court and did not 

file the notes until it filed the appendix to its brief in this 

appeal. Therefore, the notes were not available to appellant 

until after he filed his initial brief on appeal. We are 

displeased by the government's failure to meet its express 

undertakings in this case but, in the absence of prejudice 

caused by the omission, will assume this is an aberration 

rather than evidence of any pattern of failing to comply with 

court orders on potential Jencks material.

After careful review of the documents belatedly supplied by 

the government we find the attributions and the statements 

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reflected in Detective Quander's handwritten notes to be 

entirely consistent with his testimony on the witness stand 

and we cannot conceive of any reasonable basis on which 

appellant was prejudiced by his inability to inspect the notes 

before Detective Quander testified. Thus, the government's 

failure to produce the documents had no actual consequence. 

When the information contained in undisclosed Jencks materials does not vary from that provided by the witness at trial, 

"it would offend common sense and the fair administration of 

justice to order a new trial." Rosenberg v. United States, 360 

U.S. 367, 371 (1959). See also United States v. Rippy, 606 

F.2d 1150, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Jencks violation harmless 

where evidence of guilt was strong, undisclosed statement 

was relatively insignificant, and no evidence was adduced of 

bad faith by government). Therefore, we need not reach 

appellant's contention that the handwritten notes are "statements" in order to support our conclusion that any error by 

the trial court with respect to the disclosure of Detective 

Quander's handwritten notes was harmless.

C. Jury Contamination

Every criminal defendant is entitled to an impartial jury, as 

free as practicable from extraneous influences that could 

subvert the fact-finding process. Appellant Holton claims he 

was denied that right because, on the evening after the 

defendants began to present their cases, members of the jury 

may have seen a Nightline program dealing with sentencing 

standards for crack cocaine offenses. During the broadcast, 

the link between crack and violence was discussed extensively. Holton particularly targets a televised comment by District of Columbia Superior Court Judge Reggie Walton that 

credited high sentences for crack offenses with a reduction in 

the murder rate in the District of Columbia. The program 

did not refer specifically to anyone involved in this case.

There is no general presumption of prejudice where jurors 

are exposed to media coverage about the case on which they 

are sitting, United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 501 

(D.C. Cir. 1996), and we find no special circumstances to 

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ly concern the trial or the parties in this case. "It is for the 

trial judge to decide at the threshold whether news accounts 

are actually prejudicial; whether the jurors were probably 

exposed to the publicity and whether jurors would be sufficiently influenced by bench instructions alone to disregard 

the publicity." Gordon v. United States, 438 F.2d 858, 873 

(5th Cir. 1971); Waldorf v. Shuta, 3 F.3d 705, 709-10 (3d Cir. 

1993) (cited in Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d at 501). "The trial 

judge has broad discretion in ruling on the issue of prejudice 

resulting from a jury's exposure to news articles concerning a 

trial." United States v. Aragon, 962 F.2d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 

1992). Therefore, the court reviews the judge's decision not 

to conduct a mid-trial voir dire of the jury for an abuse of 

discretion.

First, courts must determine if the nature of the news 

material in question is innately prejudicial. Courts are more 

likely to find publicity prejudicial if it was broadcast close to 

the time of trial, discussed information that would have been 

inadmissible at trial, reported on the outcome of proceedings 

against co-defendants, or was inflammatory. See, e.g., Salemme v. Ristaino, 587 F.2d 81, 88 (1st Cir. 1978); United 

States v. Holman, 680 F.2d 1340, 1348 (11th Cir. 1982). The 

second inquiry involves the likelihood that the publicity has in 

fact reached the jury. The prominence of the coverage and 

the nature and number of judicial warnings against viewing 

outside coverage become relevant at this stage. United 

States v. Manzella, 782 F.2d 533, 542 (5th Cir. 1986) (citations 

omitted).

In this case, the Nightline broadcast was a half-hour 

national network program televised midway through appellants' trial at 11:30 p.m. (a promotional trailer may have 

appeared earlier in the evening). The focus on the Nightline

show was the level of sentencing for crimes involving crack 

cocaine. Although it dealt with an issue that collaterally 

affected the defendants, it had nothing to do with their guilt 

(which they stoically denied) and prejudice to their individual 

defenses was extremely unlikely. We agree with the district 

court that its frequent reminders to the jury not to consider 

information gleaned outside of the courtroom also acted to 

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stem any conceivable prejudicial inferences a viewer might 

take away from the program about sentencing in crack cases 

generally. In light of the absence of any obvious connection 

between the broadcast and the defendants, a mid-trial voir 

dire of the jury might well have prejudiced the defendants by 

drawing attention to the sentencing issues discussed in the 

broadcast before these defendants had even been found 

guilty. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did 

not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant's request for 

a mid-trial voir dire.

D. Equal Protection

Appellant Holton contends that minorities are denied the 

equal protection of the law because they are disproportionately impacted by the higher mandatory minimum sentences 

applied for crimes involving crack cocaine than for crimes 

involving powder cocaine. He notes that the United States 

Sentencing Commission and an article published in the Journal of the American Medical Association support the conclusion that there is no rational basis for treating crack cocaine 

differently than powder cocaine. See Dorothy K. Hatsukami 

and Marian W. Fischman, Crack Cocaine and Cocaine Hydrochloride: Are the Differences Myth or Reality?, 276 J. AM.

MED. ASS'N 1580-88 (1996). He argues that "where a law has 

a grossly disproportionate impact on one racial group, and 

where there are strong indications that the disparity is the 

result of an irrational statutory distinction and discriminatory 

enforcement," Holton Brief at 28, the Fifth Amendment right 

to equal protection of the law is violated.

In analyzing whether the sentencing disparity denies constitutional equal protection, the first inquiry is whether the 

mandatory crack minimums discriminate based on race. In 

order to prove that a facially neutral statute, such as the one 

involved here, violates equal protection guarantees, a challenger must demonstrate a racially discriminatory purpose 

behind the statute. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 

(1976). Disparate racial impact can be probative of such 

purpose, but it is not dispositive without more. See id.

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Here, appellant has not offered any specific evidence of 

disparate impact. Because he concentrates on the irrationality of the sentencing disparity, we surmise that his current 

argument is that since the Sentencing Commission and scientific analysis, such as that published in the Journal of the 

American Medical Association, indicate that crack cocaine and 

powder cocaine are not distinguishable, Congress should 

change the law and equalize the mandatory minimums. The 

opinions of the Sentencing Commission and scientific journals 

do not provide the requisite proof that Congress was motivated by any impermissible considerations. Moreover, this circuit recently reaffirmed its conclusion that there is a raceneutral explanation for the sentencing disparity. "As evident 

from our analysis in United States v. Cyrus and Thompson,

Congress acted in light of the distributional efficiencies, 

heightened potency and acute violence associated with crack 

cocaine. The crack/powder distinction in the statute is thus 

readily explained on grounds other than race." United States 

v. Johnson, 40 F.3d 436, 440 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 

S. Ct. 1412 (1995); see United States v. Thompson, 27 F.3d 

671, 678-79 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United States v. Cyrus, 890 

F.2d 1245, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1989).

The convictions and sentences below are affirmed.

So ordered.

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