Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-08018/USCOURTS-ca10-91-08018-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Attorney General of the State of Wyoming
Appellee
Duane Shillinger
Appellee
Donald G. Sword
Appellant

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OP Al'PEALSUn\JsJ.l.i 

Ten~~rcut 

~.Rl ~ 

DONALD G. SWORD, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

DUANE SHILLINGER, and the ATTORNEY 

GENERAL OF THE STATE OF WYOMING, 

Respondents-Appellees. 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

AUG 2 0 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 91-8018 

(D.C. No. 89-0146K) 

(Dist. of Wyo. ) 

Before ANDERSON, BARRETT and TACHA, Circuit Judges. 

This is an appeal by Donald G. Sword (Sword), appearing pro 

se, from an order of the district court denying his petition for a 

writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The 

district court, following a telephonic hearing during which Sword, 

incarcerated in the Wyoming State Penitentiary, was represented by 

appointed counsel, found that no errors of federal constitutional 

magnitude had occurred during Sword's trial and that the state 

proceedings were not fundamentally unfair. While we shall not 

specifically address these issues, our review of the record and 

* This Order and Judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 91-8018 Document: 010110132109 Date Filed: 08/20/1991 Page: 1 
the briefs leads us to conclude that the district court did not 

err in its findings/ conclusions. However, we shall not address 

the merits because we conclude that we lack jurisdiction to 

consider this appeal. 

The district court entered its detailed "Order Dismissing 

Petitioner's Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (With Findings)" 

on March 27, 1991. On April 2, 1991, Sword, appearing pro se, 

filed two documents. One entitled "Notice of Appeal" bears the 

clerk's entry at 2:29 p.m. The other document, entitled "Motion 

for Reconsideration and Reinstatement of Petition," bears the 

clerk's entry at 2:30 p.m. The crux of the motion was that 

petitioner was entitled to an in-court evidentiary hearing and the 

opportunity to call witnesses. 

motion on April 15, 1991. 

appeal at any time thereafter. 

The district court denied the 

Sword did not file a new notice of 

Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(l) requires that a party must file a 

notice of appeal within thirty days of the entry of judgment. 

However, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4) provides that if a timely motion 

under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules 50(b), 52(b) or 

59) is filed by any party, the time for appeal shall run from the 

entry of the order granting or denying the motion. We construe 

Sword's "Motion for Reconsideration and Reinstatement of Petition" 

as a motion for rehearing. Pertinent here is the following 

language from Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4): 

A notice of appeal filed before the disposition of 

any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new 

notice of appeal must be filed within the prescribed 

time measured from the entry of the order disposing of 

the motion as provided above. No additional fees shall 

be required for such filing. 

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Appellate Case: 91-8018 Document: 010110132109 Date Filed: 08/20/1991 Page: 2 
Thus, a new notice of appeal had to be filed by Sword 

following the district court's April 15, 1991, order denying his 

"Motion for Reconsideration and Reinstatement" in order to vest 

jurisdiction in this court of the appeal. The time periods set 

forth in Fed. R. App. P. 4(a) are "'mandatory and 

jurisdictional.'" Browder v. Department of Corrections, 434 U.S. 

257, 264 (1978), quoting United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 

229 (1960) (involving a habeas corpus proceeding pursuant to 28 

u.s.c. § 2254). See also Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London 

v. Evans, 896 F.2d 1255, 1256 (10th Cir. 1990); Gooch v. Skelly 

Oil Co., 493 F.2d 366, 368 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 997 

(1974). In Martinez v. Sullivan, 874 F.2d 751, 753 (10th Cir. 

1989), we observed that a motion to reconsider a decision on the 

merits will be considered to fall under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), 

thus triggering the requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4), 

resulting in this holding: 

Because the ... notice of appeal is a nullity, 

and because appellants failed to file a separate notice 

of appeal after the district court denied appellees' 

Rule 59(e) motion, this appeal must be dismissed for 

lack of appellate jurisdiction. 

Id. at 754. 

This court has held that a post-judgment motion filed within 

ten days of a final judgment should, where possible, be construed 

as a rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment. Dalton v. 

First Interstate Bank of Denver, 863 F.2d 702, 703 (10th Cir. 

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Appellate Case: 91-8018 Document: 010110132109 Date Filed: 08/20/1991 Page: 3 
1988); Venable v. Haislip, 721 F.2d 297, 299 (10th Cir. 1983). 

While pro se pleadings by prisoners must be liberally 

construed without regard to technicalities, see Wallace v. 

McManus, 776 F.2d 915, 916 (10th Cir. 1985), Hughes v. Rowe, 449 

U.S. 5, 9 (1980), this court did not treat a scenario quite 

similar to that presented in the case at bar as coming within the 

purview of the liberality rule. In Skagerberg v. Oklahoma, 797 

F.2d 881 (10th Cir. 1986), a state habeas corpus petitioner, 

appearing prose, filed a single document denominated "Motion for 

Rule 60 Relief, or Appeal" following the district court's order 

denying§ 2254 relief. The court held: 

Although petitioner stated in his alternative 

motion/notice of appeal document that he sought Rule 60 

relief, petitioner's characterization is not 

controlling. Rather, regardless of how it is 

characterized, a post-judgment motion made within ten 

days of the entry of judgment that questions the 

correctness of a judgment is properly construed as a 

motion to alter or amend judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 

59(e). Petitioner's motion/notice of appeal, 

which was served within ten days of the district court's 

denial of the § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus, questioned the correctness of the district 

court's dismissal of his action. Consequently, 

petitioner's mischaracterized motion for Rule 60 relief 

should have been construed as a timely Rule 59(e) 

motion. Venable, 721 F.2d at 299. 

Under Rule 4(a)(4), a timely Rule 59(e) motion 

tolls the time for filing a notice of appeal from a 

district court judgment. Clayton v. Douglas, 670 F.2d 

143, 144 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1109, 102 

S. Ct. 2911, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1319 (1982). A notice of 

appeal filed while a timely Rule 59(e) motion is pending 

is ineffective to confer jurisdiction on a court of 

appeals. Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 

U.S. 56, 61, 103 S. Ct. 400, 403, 74 L. Ed. 2d 225 

(1982). Likewise, a notice of appeal filed before a 

timely Rule 59(e) motion is also ineffective to confer 

jurisdiction. Id. 

Accordingly, we conclude that when a timely Rule 

59(e) motion and a notice of appeal are combined in one 

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document the notice of appeal is premature and has no 

effect. See Portis v. Harris County, Texas, 632 F.2d 

486 (5th Cir. 1980) .... After receiving a ruling on 

the timely motion, the appellant is required to file a 

new notice of appeal in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 

4(a)(l). 

797 F.2d at 882-83. 

Appellant Sword argues that Skagerberg, supra, does not apply 

here. He first contends that under Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 

(1972), a prose complainant is held to less stringent pleading 

standards than those drafted by lawyers. He does not explain, 

however, how Haines v. Kerner applies here. This case does not 

involve any problem of inartful pleading. Thus, the rule of 

liberality has no application. Sword also argues that appellees' 

reliance on Skagerberg is misplaced because in that case the Rule 

59(e) motion and the notice of appeal were combined in one 

document whereas in the instant case Sword submitted two distinct 

and separate documents. This argument is without merit. Even 

though the Rule 59(e) motion was filed in the same document as the 

notice of appeal in Skagerberg, this court treated it as tolling 

the time for filing a notice of appeal, in that there could be no 

appellate jurisdiction until the district court ruled on the Rule 

59(e) motion and then only after a new notice of appeal was filed. 

In the instant case, the filing records reflect that Sword's Rule 

59(e) motion for Reconsideration and Reinstatment was filed one 

minute after his Notice of Appeal, thus rendering the Notice of 

Appeal moot. 

We have before us petitioner Sword's "Motion for Production 

of the Transcript at Government Expense." The motion is denied. 

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Appellate Case: 91-8018 Document: 010110132109 Date Filed: 08/20/1991 Page: 5 
The notice of appeal was not timely filed. This court is 

without jurisdiction to entertain or consider this appeal. 

The appeal is DISMISSED. 

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Entered for the Court: 

James E. Barrett, 

Senior United States 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 91-8018 Document: 010110132109 Date Filed: 08/20/1991 Page: 6