Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01569/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01569-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kenneth D. Bland
Petitioner
Department of Health and Human Services
Respondent

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

KENNETH D. BLAND,

Petitioner

v.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 

SERVICES,

Respondent

______________________ 

2016-1569

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. CH-0752-13-0078-I-1.

______________________ 

Decided: June 14, 2016

______________________ 

KENNETH D. BLAND, Kansas City, MO, pro se.

JOSHUA SCHNELL, Commercial Litigation Branch,

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by 

BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., REGINALD 

T. BLADES, JR.; HARRY B. MALLIN, Office of the General 

Counsel, United States Department of Health and Human 

Services, Kansas City, MO.

______________________ 

Case: 16-1569 Document: 11-2 Page: 1 Filed: 06/14/2016
2 BLAND v. HHS

Before LOURIE, DYK, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Kenneth D. Bland (“Bland”) appeals from the final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board (the “Board”) 

affirming his removal from employment. See Bland v. 

Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. CH-0752-13-0078-I1 (M.S.P.B. Feb. 7, 2014) (“Final Order”); Bland v. Dep’t of 

Health & Human Servs., No. CH-0752-13-0078-I-1 

(M.S.P.B. Feb. 1, 2013) (“Initial Decision”). Because the 

Board did not err in denying the petition for review and in 

affirming the initial decision, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Bland was employed beginning in 2002 as a chemist 

by the Kansas City District Laboratory of the Department 

of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration (“FDA” or “the agency”). Pet’r’s Informal Br. 1. 

In 2005, the agency imposed a five-day suspension on 

Bland for misconduct unrelated to the current appeal, but 

that involved misrepresentation and providing inaccurate 

information. Resp’t’s App. (“R.A.”) 47. 

Bland was later prescribed narcotic medication for an 

injury, and he became addicted to prescription drugs. 

Pet’r’s Informal Br. 1. In July 2009, Bland presented an 

altered prescription for a prescription-only drug at a 

pharmacy. He was subsequently arrested at work in 

November 2009, and convicted of “unlawfully obtaining 

and distributing a prescription-only drug,” a misdemeanor

under Kansas state law, on September 7, 2010. Initial 

Decision at 2; R.A. 40. 

On September 22, 2010, the agency issued a notice of 

proposed removal detailing two charges: conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and lack of candor 

relating to that conduct. R.A. 18. The notice contained 

background facts, the specifications supporting the chargCase: 16-1569 Document: 11-2 Page: 2 Filed: 06/14/2016
BLAND v. HHS 3

es, and an analysis of factors considered in proposing the

penalty. R.A. 18–21. The notice also stated that the 

conviction would result in the removal of his security 

clearance, an aggravating factor affecting his inability to 

perform his assigned duties. R.A. 20–21. Ostensibly, the 

security clearance was not a requirement for Bland’s 

position as a chemist generally, but it was a requirement 

for his access to certain chemicals in a certain laboratory 

group.

After Bland’s response, the agency issued a removal 

notice on November 10, 2010, based on the charge of 

conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. 

R.A. 39. The deciding official found that Bland’s conduct 

not only violated a federal regulation requiring FDA 

employees to be “persons of integrity and observe the 

highest standards of conduct,” but also “directly detracted 

from the Agency’s image and reputation.” R.A. 40. The 

official noted that his misdemeanor conviction resulted in 

the removal of his security clearance, which prevented 

him from performing his assigned job duties. R.A. 42. 

Moreover, other aspects of Bland’s position required

credibility, leadership, and integrity allowing independence from constant oversight. R.A. 42–43. Because the 

misconduct involved misrepresentation and willfully 

tendering a falsified document, the official found a nexus 

between the misconduct and his ability to perform his 

position. See R.A. 42, 43, 45, 47. The official specifically

found that the offense related to his “reliability, veracity, 

trustworthiness, and ethical conduct.” R.A. 47. The 

official analyzed the Douglas factors at length and determined that removal was the appropriate penalty for 

Bland’s second incident of misconduct involving misrepresentation. R.A. 42–47; see Douglas v. Veterans Admin., 5 

M.S.P.B. 313 (1981). The removal became effective on 

November 20, 2010.

Bland appealed the removal to the Board. An administrative judge (“AJ”) issued an initial decision on FebruCase: 16-1569 Document: 11-2 Page: 3 Filed: 06/14/2016
4 BLAND v. HHS

ary 1, 2013, finding that the agency did not abuse its 

discretion in removing Bland, thus affirming the removal 

action. The AJ found that the misdemeanor conviction

supported the charge that Bland engaged in conduct 

“prejudicial to the best interest of the service.” Initial 

Decision at 2. The AJ also found a nexus between the 

charge and the efficiency of the service because the conviction impaired Bland’s ability to perform his job duties 

and resulted in the loss of the agency’s trust and confidence in his ability to perform his duties. Id. at 3. 

Bland’s petition for review to the full Board was denied. The full Board found that, rather than improperly 

implying that Bland was convicted of a drug-related 

offense, the AJ correctly cited the title of the statute 

under which Bland was convicted as “unlawfully obtaining and distributing a prescription-only drug.” Final 

Decision at 3. The Board then considered the AJ’s finding 

of nexus between Bland’s off-duty conduct and the efficiency of the service. The Board noted that the misconduct affected Bland’s job performance because it 

(1) “impaired his ability to testify as a credible witness,” 

(2) resulted in the termination of his security clearance, 

(3) “was potentially damaging to the agency’s reputation 

because it was publicly known,” and (4) “caused the 

agency to lose trust and confidence in allowing him continued access to toxic chemicals.” Id. at 3–4. The Board 

also rejected Bland’s argument that his 2005 suspension

was improperly considered, because the 2010 proposed 

removal notice stated that it would be considered and 

there was no evidence that the prior disciplinary action 

was clearly erroneous. Id. at 4. Noting the deference 

afforded to an agency in imposing penalties, the Board 

found that the agency weighed the relevant factors and 

that the penalty of removal was within the bounds of 

reasonableness for the particular misconduct. Id. at 5. In 

a footnote, the Board noted Bland’s assertion that the 

proper procedures for terminating his security clearance

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BLAND v. HHS 5

were not followed, but declined to consider the argument 

raised for the first time on appeal. Id. at 5 n.3. The full 

Board thus affirmed the AJ’s initial decision affirming the 

agency’s removal action.

Bland appealed from the Board’s final decision to the 

United States District Court for the Western District of 

Missouri, which determined that it lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction over the claim and transferred it to this court. 

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).

DISCUSSION

We must affirm the decision of the Board unless we 

find it to be “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained 

without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation 

having been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial 

evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c). “The choice of penalty is 

committed to the sound discretion of the employing agency and will not be overturned unless the agency’s choice of 

penalty is wholly unwarranted in light of all the relevant 

factors.” Guise v. Dep’t of Justice, 330 F.3d 1376, 1382 

(Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing Lachance v. Devall, 178 F.3d 1246, 

1251 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Douglas v. Veterans Admin., 5 

M.S.P.B. 313 (1981) (setting forth generally recognized 

relevant factors)). 

Bland argues that his removal was based on incorrect 

and misleading allegations by the agency. Bland claims 

that his special security clearance was not revoked as a 

consequence of his conviction by the issuing agencies, the 

Department of Justice and the Centers for Disease Control, but rather that his clearance was removed at his 

FDA supervisor’s request. Bland also faults the agency 

for not providing him with an opportunity to appeal the 

revocation of his clearance. Moreover, Bland asserts that 

he was not provided with the opportunity for a last chance 

agreement, despite an Instruction regarding corrective 

actions in the Human Resources Manual stating that the 

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6 BLAND v. HHS

agency would not initiate disciplinary action in response 

to an admission of drug use, and the fact that Bland 

voluntarily entered a counseling and rehabilitation program. Bland insists that his conviction was for a nondrug offense, possession of an altered prescription, and 

therefore that the agency’s reliance on his “conviction of a 

drug charge” was flawed. 

The government responds that Bland appears to challenge only procedural aspects of the removal penalty, not 

the Board’s holdings on nexus and prior misconduct. 

Because Bland’s arguments challenging the propriety of 

the removal procedures were not raised before the AJ, the 

government contends that those arguments have been 

waived. Even if the arguments were not waived, the 

government counters that the Board could not review the 

merits of a security clearance revocation in the context of 

considering a removal decision. The government also

argues that the Instruction provided non-binding guidelines and thus that the deciding official had discretion to 

deviate from the table of suggested penalties. The government further asserts that the Board correctly concluded that the removal decision accurately described Bland’s 

conviction; although Bland asserts that he was neither 

charged nor convicted of a drug offense, the government 

maintains that he was convicted of a “prescription-drug 

offense” involving a controlled substance.

We agree with the government that the Board did not 

err in affirming the agency’s removal action. Although 

removal is a harsh penalty, agencies are given deference 

in their penalty determinations if based on a consideration of the relevant factors and within the tolerable limits 

of reasonableness. See Douglas, 5 M.S.P.B. at 329. The

evidence in the record before us provides sufficient support for the Board’s affirmance of the agency’s removal 

action. 

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BLAND v. HHS 7

We agree with the government that Bland has waived 

his challenge to the security clearance revocation. And we 

do not accept Bland’s characterization of his conviction as 

of a “non-drug” nature; the Kansas State Legislature 

categorizes the offense as a crime involving controlled 

substances. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-36a08 (2010) (transferred to Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-5708 (2012)). Regardless, 

Bland was convicted of a crime not only involving a controlled substance, but also implicating misrepresentation 

and willful tendering of falsified documents. The agency’s 

rationale for the removal penalty emphasizes the loss of 

credibility and trustworthiness that stemmed from the 

misconduct, not from the mere fact that his actions in 

some way dealt with a controlled substance. That being 

said, the fact that the crime Bland was convicted of involved a controlled substance is no minor detail; his 

position as a chemist in a laboratory requiring special 

security clearance provided “unfettered access to chemicals,” which the agency found to be problematic in light of 

the drug charge. 

Moreover, to the extent that Bland is arguing the disproportionality or unreasonableness of the removal penalty with respect to his misconduct, the agency initiated 

disciplinary action as the result of a criminal conviction 

that involved misrepresentation, not as the result of 

simple identification of Bland’s drug use problem. Because this was his second disciplinary action involving 

misrepresentation, the evidence supports the conclusion

that removal was not an excessive penalty. We also note 

that the agency’s Instruction regarding corrective action 

plainly does not mandate a last chance agreement in 

every case of removal. Accordingly, Bland failed to show 

that the agency’s removal action was not supported by 

substantial evidence or that the Board committed reversible error. 

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8 BLAND v. HHS

CONCLUSION

We have considered Bland’s remaining arguments 

and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, 

the decision of the Board is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.

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