Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-11-99011/USCOURTS-ca9-11-99011-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Raynard Paul Cummings
Appellant
Michael Martel
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RAYNARD PAUL CUMMINGS,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

MICHAEL MARTEL, Warden,

California State Prison at San

Quentin,

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 11-99011

D.C. No.

2:95-cv-07118-

CBM

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Consuelo B. Marshall, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

October 9, 2014—Stanford, California

Filed August 11, 2015

Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Chief Judge, and Diarmuid F.

O’Scannlain and M. Margaret McKeown, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge McKeown;

Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Chief Judge

Thomas;

Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge

O’Scannlain

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2 CUMMINGS V. MARTEL

SUMMARY*

Habeas Corpus / Death Penalty

The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of Raynard

Cummings’s habeas corpus petition challenging his

conviction for first-degree murder and death sentence for

killing Los Angeles Police Officer Paul Verna.

Cummings alleged that the prosecution violated his due

process rights under Turner v . Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466

(1965), by calling as a witness a deputy who served as a

courtroom bailiff and security officer during a portion of

Cummings’s trial. The panel held that even under AEDPA’s

deferential review, the California Supreme Court erred in

determining that the bailiff, who told the jury that Cummings

had confessed to shooting Verna, was not a key prosecution

witness under Turner. The panel affirmed the district court’s

denial of relief on this claim because the California Supreme

Court’s determination that Cummings did not satisfy the

second Turner requirement – that the testifying deputy had

continuous and intimate contact with jurors – was neither

contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law.

The panel granted a Certificate of Appealability on

Cummings’s claim that the prosecutor violated Batson v.

Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), by exercising peremptory

strikes against two prospective African American jurors. The

panel concluded that the California Supreme Court did not

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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CUMMINGS V. MARTEL 3

unreasonably apply Batson to the facts in determining that

Cummings did not establish that race was a substantial

motivating factor in the prosecutor’s decision to strike the

prospective jurors.

Affirming the district court’s denial of Cummings’s

ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the panel held that the

California Supreme Court had a reasonable basis to conclude

that Cummings was not prejudiced by his lawyers’

presentation of mitigation of evidence at the penalty phase of

his trial.

Chief Judge Thomas concurred in part and dissented in

part. He agreed with the majority that the Batson and

ineffective assistance claims should be denied, but dissented

from the conclusion that the due process claim must be

denied. He wrote that the California Supreme Court’s

decision to affirm the conviction cannot reasonably be

squared with Turner and Gonzales v. Beto, 405 U.S. 1052

(1972) (per curiam), in which the Supreme Court made clear

that a criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial is infringed

when the government solicits key testimony from a bailiff

who associated closely with the jury during the defendant’s

trial.

Judge O’Scannlain concurred in part, dissented in part,

and concurred in the judgment. He concurred in the opinion,

except as to Section I.A. He wrote separately to explain why

the California Supreme Court’s conclusion that the deputy

was not a “key witness” under Turner must be afforded

AEDPA deference.

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COUNSEL

K. Elizabeth Dahlstrom (argued), Research & Writing

Attorney, Sean K. Kennedy, Federal Public Defender,

Elizabeth Richardson-Royer, Deputy Federal Public

Defender, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Los

Angeles, California; Statia Peakhart, Los Angeles,California,

for Petitioner-Appellant.

Lance E. Winters (argued), Senior Assistant Attorney

General; Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General of California;

Dane R. Gillett, Chief Assistant Attorney General; A. Scott

Hayward, DeputyAttorneyGeneral, Los Angeles, California,

for Respondent-Appellee.

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CUMMINGS V. MARTEL 5

OPINION

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge:

Raynard Cummings was convicted of first-degree murder

and sentenced to death for killing Los Angeles Police Officer

Paul Verna. The California Supreme Court affirmed his

conviction on direct appeal. People v. Cummings, 850 P.2d 1

(Cal. 1993). It then denied his petitions for post-conviction

relief. The district court denied Cummings’s petition for a

writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On June 2, 1983, Los Angeles Police Officer Paul Verna

pulled over an Oldsmobile for rolling through a stop sign. 

During the traffic stop, one or more of the car’s occupants

shot Verna six times.

At Cummings’s trial, he did not dispute that he was one

of three occupants in the car when the shooting occurred. He

sat in the rear passenger seat, behind a friend, Kenneth Gay,

who was riding in the front seat. Cummings’s wife, Pamela,

was driving.

Both Gay and Cummings were charged with first-degree

murder. The government contended that Cummings shot

Officer Verna once, then passed the gun to Gay, who got out

of the car and fired five more shots. Cummings contested the

“two-shooter” theory, claiming that Gay fired all six shots.

Eyewitness accounts varied. Some witnesses lent

credence to the two-shooter theory, while others expressed

certainty that one person fired all six shots. Through forensic

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evidence and a crime scene reenactment, the prosecution

sought to demonstrate that the first bullet likely came from

Cummings’s perch in the back seat.

After nearly six months of trial proceedings, a courtroom

deputy named David La Casella overheard a conversation

between Cummings and Gay in their respective holding cells. 

According to La Casella, Cummings told Gay that the bullet

described by the medical examiner as “number six” was the

“one I put in the m-----f-----”—meaning the victim, Verna. 

The deputy was removed from his courtroom post and the

next court day testified to this exchange.

The jury convicted Cummings of first-degree murder. 

After a recess, the penalty phase commenced. To support its

case for the death penalty, the prosecution introduced

evidence that Cummings possessed a “shank” while in jail

awaiting trial; participated in the robbery of a vacuum store;

and schemed to use poisoned postage stamps to kill Gay and

his wife, Robin Gay, to prevent them from testifying at his

trial.

The prosecution also tried to introduce aggravating

evidence related to Cummings’s incarceration in Delaware. 

During that time, Cummings had altercations with two prison

guards and wrote a violent, profanity-laced letter that

expressed his desire to kill police officers. Following the

California Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Boyd,

700 P.2d 782 (Cal. 1985), the trial judge ruled that the

prosecution could not introduce this evidence as part of its

case-in-chief because the altercations and the letter were not

crimes. However, the court made clear that it would allow

the prosecution to introduce this evidence as rebuttal if

Cummings “open[ed] the door” during his mitigation case.

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CUMMINGS V. MARTEL 7

In light of this evidentiary ruling, Cummings’s lawyers

decided to present a “sterile” mitigation case. They told the

court that, for “tactical reasons,” they would “very carefully

ask [] witnesses not to get into” any subjects that would lead

to the admission of rebuttal evidence. They assured the judge

theywould avoid any discussion of Cummings’s “personality

or character traits.” Instead, his lawyers limited mitigation

evidence to Cummings’s “biographical information,” such as

“where he was born, who his parents were, the fact they got

divorced, [and] what his schooling was.”

In the penalty phase, the defense team put on testimony

from three witnesses. A sheriff’s deputy testified about

violence in jail (presumablyto demonstrate Cummings’s need

to protect himself with a shank). Then, Cummings’s older

brother Darrell related some of the hardships they faced

during their childhood. Darrell told the jury that their parents

had “knock-down, drag-out” fights, which once culminated

in their mother stabbing their father with a knife. He also

explained how their father frequently beat Raynard

“extremely hard” with a belt or extension cord. Darrell stated

that their mother began drinking to excess when her husband

left her, and he revealed that she had recently been in a

mental hospital. Finally, Cummings’s high school girlfriend

testified about his rocky relationship with his family before

his incarceration in Delaware.

During closing arguments in the penalty phase,

Cummings’s lawyers made only passing reference to

Cummings’s background and personal characteristics, instead

arguing that “lingering doubt” about whether Cummings had

shot Verna should lead the jury to choose a life sentence over

the death penalty.

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The jury voted for the death sentence, and the trial court

imposed this sentence.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In his appeal to the California Supreme Court, Cummings

alleged that La Casella’s testimony violated his due process

rights as defined in Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965),

and that the prosecution’s use of peremptory strikes against

two black potential jurors violated People v. Wheeler,

583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978). The court rejected both claims. 

Cummings, 850 P.2d at 32, 37–38. Justice Mosk dissented as

to the Wheeler claim. Id. at 72.

Cummings next filed a petition for habeas relief with the

California Supreme Court, alleging dozens of errors and

supported by over 200 exhibits. The court rejected each of

his claims as “untimely” and “lack[ing] merit.”

Cummings then filed a petition for habeas corpus in the

Central District of California on July 22, 1997. The court

stayed federal proceedings while Cummings filed additional

habeas claims with the California Supreme Court, including

a claim that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at

sentencing. When those claims were rejected, Cummings

filed an amended habeas petition on October 13, 1998. The

district court considered and denied each of Cummings’s

claims over the ensuing years, entering a final judgment

denying his petition on July 28, 2011.

The district court granted a Certificate of Appealability

for Cummings’s claims that La Casella’s testimony violated

his due process rights and that he was denied effective

assistance of counsel at his sentencing proceedings. We

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CUMMINGS V. MARTEL 9

ordered supplemental briefing on Cummings’s objection to

the peremptory strikes under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79

(1986), and now grant the Certificate of Appealability on that

issue.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Cummings’s petition is governed by the Anti-Terrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254. We may grant his petition only if the

California Supreme Court’s decision was “contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States” or was “based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented

in the State court proceeding.” Id. § 2254(d).

This is a demanding standard. Cummings is not entitled

to relief if the state court is merely “incorrect.” Rather, we

may only grant his petition if the state court’s decision was

“unreasonable.” See Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773

(2010). The Supreme Court recently defined “unreasonable”

as a decision “so lacking in justification that there was an

error well understood and comprehended in existing law

beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” 

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011).

ANALYSIS

I. THE TURNER CLAIM—LA CASELLA’S TESTIMONY.

Cummings first alleges that the prosecution violated his

due process rights by calling as a witness Deputy David La

Casella, who served as a courtroom bailiff and security

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officer during a portion of Cummings’s trial. La Casella

testified that he overheard Cummings talking with Gay in

their holding cells during a break in trial proceedings. During

that conversation, Cummings stated that the bullet identified

by the medical examiner as “number six” was “the one I put

in the m-----f-----.” Based on the tone and circumstances of

the conversation, La Casella understood this statement as

Cummings’s confession to firing the first shot at Officer

Verna. Cummings argues the former bailiff’s testimony

violated due process because La Casella had undue influence

by virtue of his role as the jury’s “official guardian.”

Turner deals with a seldom-litigated principle of criminal

procedure, so we begin with an explanation of that case and

its lone sequel in the Supreme Court, Gonzales v. Beto,

405 U.S. 1052 (1972) (per curiam).

In Turner, two deputy sheriffs served both as courtroom

bailiffs and prosecution witnesses in a three-daydeath penalty

trial. 379 U.S. at 467. Before trial, the deputies had

investigated the murder, interviewed the defendant, and

accompanied him to the crime scene where they recovered a

cartridge clip from the murder weapon. Id. As part of the

deputies’ investigation, they also elicited incriminating

statements and a written confession from the defendant. Id.

At trial, the deputies assumed multiple responsibilities. 

In addition to testifying about their investigation and the

defendant’s statements, they “drove the jurors to a restaurant

for each meal, and to their lodgings each night. The deputies

ate with them, conversed with them, and did errands for

them.” Id. at 468. This interaction fostered a “close and

continual association with the jurors,” in which the deputies

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CUMMINGS V. MARTEL 11

“freely mingled and conversed with the jurors in and out of

the courthouse during the trial.” Id.

The Supreme Court held that these circumstances—with

courtroom bailiffs moonlighting as star prosecution

witnesses—violated due process and subverted the “basic

guarantees of trial by jury.” Id. at 474. The Court explained

that a defendant is subject to “extreme prejudice” when a

witness against him has “a continuous and intimate

association” with members of the jury. Id. at 473.

Seven years after Turner, the Court in Beto again found

a due process violation where the prosecution’s case “rested

almost totally upon the testimony of the country sheriff,” who

also doubled as courtroom bailiff. 405 U.S. at 1052 (Stewart,

J., concurring).1 Before trial, the sheriff had dictated the

defendant’s written confession. Id. Then, during a one-day

trial, the sheriff walked jurors to lunch, ate with them in a

private room, and brought them soft drinks in the jury

room—all while he took the stand as the key substantive

witness against the defendant. Id. at 1053–54.

In both Turner and Beto, the Court based its due process

analysis on two factors. First, the Court asked whether the

bailiff was a “key witness[]” or testified to some

“uncontroverted or merely formal aspect of the case.” 

Turner, 379 U.S. at 473. Second, the Court examined the

1 The Court in Beto was fractured: Two justices signed on to Justice

Stewart’s concurring opinion, and two justices dissented. 405 U.S. at

1052, 1056. The remaining four justices concurred only in the result and

provided no insight into their reasoning. Here, both parties treat Justice

Stewart’s concurrence as clearly established law. In any event, Justice

Stewart’s concurrence does not differ from Turner in any respect that is

dispositive to this case.

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relationship between bailiff and juryto determine whether the

official had a “continuous and intimate” relationship that

“foster[ed] the jurors’ confidence” in his testimony. Id. at

473–74; see also Williams v. Thurmer, 561 F.3d 740, 743 (7th

Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (explaining Turner’stwo-factor test). 

If both factors are met—that is, where a bailiff was a key

witness and had a continuous and intimate association with

the jury—the defendant has a due process claim under

Turner. See Cooper v. Calderon, 255 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th

Cir. 2001) (rejecting Turner claim where second prong,

continuous and intimate contact, was not established).

Applying those principles, the California Supreme Court

held that events in this case were distinguishable from Turner

and Beto, and that Cummings’s “right to a fair trial” was not

“undermined bythe admission of LaCasella’s testimony” and

therefore did not violate due process. Cummings, 850 P.2d at

38. It first noted that La Casella had no role as an

investigating officer and was not identified as a witness prior

to trial. Id. The court held that LaCasella was “not the

principal or ‘key’ prosecution witness.” Id. The court then

characterized La Casella’s interaction with jurors as

“minimal” and “professional,” unlike the deputies in Turner

and Beto who interacted with jurors outside the courtroom

and in social settings. Id. at 37, 38.

The facts surrounding La Casella’s tenure as bailiff and

his trial testimony, elicited at an evidentiary hearing in state

court, are essentially uncontested. As a result, our inquiry

focuses on whether the California Supreme Court

unreasonably applied Turner to those facts—a mixed

question of law and fact properly analyzed under

§ 2254(d)(1). See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 385–90

(2000).

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CUMMINGS V. MARTEL 13

Under § 2254(d)(1), we must determine whether the

California Supreme Court’s opinion “resulted in a decision

that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States.” (emphasis added). The

“unreasonable application” standard therefore applies to the

state court’s ultimate decision, not to components of its legal

reasoning. See LaCaze v. Warden La. Corr. Inst. for Women,

645 F.3d 728, 734 (5th Cir. 2011) (“We review the state

court’s ‘ultimate decision’ for unreasonableness.” (citation

omitted)).

Because Turner only applies where the testifying deputy

was both a key witness and had continuous and intimate

contacts with jurors, the California Supreme Court’s

reasonable resolution of either prong suffices.

A. LA CASELLA’S TESTIMONY.

The threshold inquiry under Turner turns on the

significance of the witness’s role at trial. The California

Supreme Court concluded that La Casella “was not the

principal or ‘key’ prosecution witness” and therefore did not

come within the ambit of Turner. Cummings, 850 P.2d at 38. 

The trial court made no factual findings as to the significance

of La Casella’s testimony.

Turner is not limited to a case where the testifying bailiff

is the “principal” or sole witness to a crime—or, as the

dissent framed it, a witness “whose testimony is absolutely

necessary to establish guilt.” O’Scannlain Partial Dissent at

43. The dissent mistakenly elevates “key” witness to linchpin

witness. Instead, the bailiff need only be a “key” witness

whose credibility is at issue, as opposed to a witness whose

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testimony is “confined to some uncontroverted or merely

formal aspect of the case for the prosecution.” Turner,

379 U.S. at 473; see Helmick v. Cupp, 437 F.2d 321, 322 (9th

Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (declining to find Turner violation

where the deputy’s testimony “did not concern the crime

itself but was directed to matters about which there was no

real issue—i.e., the authenticity of the signature on Helmick’s

confession and the victim’s age”).

Here, La Casella did not testify about an uncontested

issue or a matter of administrative housekeeping. Rather, he

told the jury that Cummings had confessed to shooting

Officer Verna. This revelation directly contradicted

Cummings’s defense. Cummings’s confession to pulling the

trigger ranks as “probably the most probative and damaging

evidence that can be admitted against him.” Arizona v.

Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296 (1991) (citation omitted). 

What could be more central or “key” to the case than a

confession by Cummings that he shot the victim?

In closing arguments, the prosecutor repeatedly

hammered home La Casella’s testimony and labeled him

“perhaps the most important witness in this case.” The

prosecutor was not exaggerating. He went on to tell the jury,

“His testimony alone should lead you to convict this man of

murder with special circumstances.” Cf. United States v.

Brandyberry, 438 F.2d 226, 227 (9th Cir. 1971) (noting that

“the testimony of one witness entitled to belief is sufficient to

convict”).

The government argues that La Casella was not a key

witness because other evidence showed that Cummings shot

the victim. It points out that five other witnesses testified to

self-incriminating statements made by Cummings. But La

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CUMMINGS V. MARTEL 15

Casella’s testimony stood out because it came from a reliable

source and gelled with the prosecution’s theory of the

shooting sequence—that Cummings fired the first shot from

the back seat and then handed the gun to Gay, who stepped

out of the car and fired the final five bullets. Cummings’s

other self-incriminating statements—relayed to the jury by

sheriff’s deputies and jailhouse informants—were either

vague on this point or contradicted the prosecution’s theory

of the case. Cummings, for example, purportedly bragged

that he “put six” in the victim. To be sure, at least one

eyewitness testified that the person in the back seat fired the

first shot; other witnesses contradicted that version of events. 

At any rate, the inquiry here is not whether other evidence

also supports the verdict. Under Turner, the question is

whether a testifying bailiff is a “key” witness, not the only

witness.

Turner does not require, as the California Supreme Court

wrote, that the bailiff be the “principal” prosecution witness. 

Cummings, 850 P.2d at 38. Even under AEDPA’s deferential

standard of review, it is hard to credit the court’s application

of Turner’s first prong. This error is not dispositive,

however, because Turner requires both a keywitness role and

a special relationship with the jury.

B. LA CASELLA’S CONTACTS WITH JURORS.

We now turn to the heart of the Turner analysis: whether

La Casella had continuous and intimate association with

jurors, such that his words had “undue credence” or “undue

weight,” creating “an aura of probable prejudice.” Helmick,

437 F.2d at 322–23 (describing Turner’s second prong).

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The trial judge held an evidentiary hearing on La

Casella’s contacts with jurors and admitted his testimony

after concluding he “probably has one of the most minimal

contacts and certainly isn’t the type of bailiff that gets

involved in talking and kidding and joking with the

jurors. . . .” On appeal, the California Supreme Court

described the trial court’s ruling: La Casella’s “association

with the jurors was so minimal and so professional that the

probative value of his testimony outweighed any prejudice to

Cummings from his status.” Cummings, 850 P.2d at 37. The

court agreed with this assessment, holding that La Casella’s

testimony did not violate Turner because he “had relatively

little direct contact with members of the jury and was

promptly relieved of his courtroom duties when he became a

witness.” Id. at 38. The jury was also “admonished” to judge

all witnesses on the same basis and to accord “no greater

weight . . . to La Casella because he had been a deputy in the

court.” Id.

We give AEDPA deference to this determination, despite

our conclusion with respect to the key witness issue.2 Unlike

2 Chief Judge Thomas’s dissent sidesteps AEDPA and reviews Turner’s

special relationship prong de novo because, in his view, the California

Supreme Court improperly layered a prejudice-balancing test on top ofthe

Turner inquiry. See Thomas Partial Dissent at 38. A close look at the

record reveals the source of this misapprehension of the court’s opinion. 

In state court, Cummings based his challenge on both state evidentiary and

constitutional grounds. At the outset of its analysis, presumably in a nod

to Cummings’s claim under California Evidence Code § 352, the

California Supreme Court stated that “the probative value of [La

Casella’s] testimony outweighed any prejudice to Cummings.” 850 P.2d

at 37. Significantly, however, the California Supreme Court specifically

framed the inquiry as one of due process, not a mere evidentiary issue;

quoted extensively the relevant standards from Gonzalez and Beto; and

carefully distinguished Cummings’s case with respect to both prongs of

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cases where no deference is owed because a claim hinges on

a state court’s “antecedent unreasonable application of federal

law,” the contacts requirement in Turneris independent of the

key witness requirement and stands on its own. The Supreme

Court highlighted the difference:

When a state court’s adjudication of a claim is

dependent on an antecedent unreasonable

application of federal law, the requirement set

forth in § 2254(d)(1) is satisfied. A federal

court must then resolve the claim without the

deference AEDPA otherwise requires.

Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953 (2007).

In Quarterman, Texas courts misapplied Ford v.

Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409–10 (1986), which prohibits

states from executing death-row inmates who are insane. 

Specifically, the state court unreasonably failed to provide the

defendant with “adequate means by which to submit expert

psychiatric evidence” via an evidentiary hearing. 

Quarterman, 551 U.S. at 948. De novo review was warranted

because the state court’s legal evaluation was based on an

incomplete set of facts.

In contrast, our case is different because Turner sets out

two independent lines of inquiry. The question of whether La

Casella had intimate and continuous contacts with the jury is

not “dependent” on the question of whether he was a key

witness. One conclusion is not tied to the other. Bound by

Turner. Id. at 37–38. The California Supreme Court squarely held:

“Neither defendant’s right to a fair trial, nor his right to jury trial was

undermined by the admission of LaCasella’s testimony.” Id. at 38.

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§ 2254(d)(1), we ask whether California’s application of

Turner’s second requirement was “contraryto, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.”

La Casella served as a uniformed deputy for 57 days of

Cummings’s six-month jury selection and murder trial. La

Casella’s tenure was split. He served as a courtroom bailiff

during jury selection, and then was a backup bailiff who sat

in the back of the courtroom and provided security at trial.

During the long-running jury selection, La Casella was

one of two courtroom bailiffs over three months when jurors

were individually questioned regarding their death penalty

views. La Casella handed excused jurors tickets that

indicated they were free to leave, directed prospective jurors

to their seats, and greeted jurors.

At the state court evidentiary hearing, La Casella testified

that he did not socialize or “chit-chat” with jurors or potential

jurors. The roughly two dozen times jurors asked La Casella

a question, he usually asked them to write it down and passed

the note along to the judge.

During trial, La Casella was reassigned to courtroom

security duty. In this capacity, La Casella sat in the back of

the courtroom and “ke[pt] an eye” on the audience,

defendants Cummings and Gay, and hallway traffic. He

continued to have some—albeit diminished—contact with

jurors. Specifically, La Casella took notes from jurors on two

occasions and responded to jurors who greeted him. He also

unlocked the jury room three times when jurors were present.

Based on this record, the California Supreme Court’s

conclusion that La Casella’s association with the jury was

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CUMMINGS V. MARTEL 19

“clearly distinguishable” from the deputies in Turner and

Beto is not unreasonable. In Turner, the deputies drove jurors

to restaurants for each meal and to their lodgings each night,

did errands for them, and “freelymingled and conversed with

the jurors”—allowing the deputies to “renew old friendships

and make new acquaintances among the members of the

jury.” 379 U.S. at 468, 473; see also Beto, 405 U.S. at 1053

(sheriff walked jurors to lunch, ate with them in a private

room, and brought them soft drinks in the jury room); Tong

Xiong v. Felker, 681 F.3d 1067, 1077 (9th Cir. 2012)

(emphasizing the “continuous” and “intimate” nature of the

contacts in Turner). Here, by contrast, the trial judge made

a factual finding that La Casella had “minimal contacts” and

didn’t “get[] involved in talking and kidding and joking with

the jurors”—a finding that we presume is correct, and which

Cummings offers no reason to doubt. So far as the record

discloses, La Casella did not dine, socialize, or otherwise

engage with jurors outside the context of official court

matters.

Cummings argues that the California Supreme Court

erred by failing to give appropriate weight to the length of La

Casella’s 57-day tenure as bailiff. But as the California

Supreme Court noted, La Casella had “relatively little direct

contact with members of the jury . . . .” Cummings, 850 P.2d

at 38 (emphasis added). The bulk of La Casella’s 57 days in

the courtroom came during extended voir dire and included

tasks such as handing tickets to excused jurors and thanking

them for their service—interactions, in other words, with

venire members who never sat on Cummings’s jury.

 More broadly, Cummings argues that even if La Casella

did not socialize with jurors, he was the jury’s “official

guardian.” Cummings urges that Turner requires no more,

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pointing to its statement that the bailiff-juror “relationship

was one which could not but foster the jurors’ confidence in

those who were their official guardians during the entire

period of the trial.” 379 U.S. at 474.

In no way does Turner categorically bar testimony from

any law enforcement officer who has served as bailiff during

jury selection. Indeed, its two-prong analysis provides a

foundation for determining, on a case-by-case basis, whether

a bailiff’s testimony results in a due process violation. As the

Seventh Circuit noted in a similar habeas case, Turner “did

not say how many or what types of associations would trigger

due-process concerns,” making the case susceptible to a 

“range of reasonable interpretations.” Thurmer, 561 F.3d at

745. La Casella’s limited role hardly casts him as the jury’s

shepard or guardian. And once the jury was selected, he had

minimal interaction with members of the jury. We cannot say

the California Supreme Court unreasonably read Turner to

require more than purely professional, arm’s-length

encounters, even if those encounters were spread over a long

trial. See Cooper, 255 F.3d at 1113 (rejecting Turner claim

in part because testifying bailiff was “never alone” with jury

and “was not singled out as ‘trustworthy’ to enter the private

realm of the jury room during deliberations” (citing United

States v. Pittman, 449 F.2d 1284, 1286 (9th Cir. 1971) (per

curiam)).

In sum, this case is not “materially indistinguishable from

a relevant Supreme Court precedent.” Williams, 529 U.S. at

405. The California Supreme Court’s denial of Cummings’s

Turner claim was not unreasonable.

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CUMMINGS V. MARTEL 21

II. THE BATSON CLAIM—THE PROSECUTOR’S

PEREMPTORIES.

As an initial matter, the district court did not certify for

appeal Cummings’s claim that the prosecutor violated Batson

v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), by exercising peremptory

strikes against two black prospective jurors. To warrant a

Certificate of Appealability, Cummings must make a

“substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The Supreme Court has instructed

that this is a low hurdle, requiring only that “jurists of reason

could disagree with the district court’s resolution of [the

petitioner’s] constitutional claims or that jurists could

conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve

encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell,

537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003) (reversing Fifth Circuit and

granting COA on Batson claim). Cummings has met this

threshold burden.

Batson’s touchstone is purposeful discrimination:

A Batson challenge has three steps: first, the

defendant must make a prima facie showing

that a challenge was based on race; second,

the prosecution must offer a race-neutral basis

for the challenge; and third, the court must

determine whether the defendant has shown

purposeful discrimination.

Cook v. LaMarque, 593 F.3d 810, 814 (9th Cir. 2010)

(quotation marks and citations omitted). In this case, only

Batson’s third step—purposeful discrimination—is in

dispute. This step requires a showing that race was a

“substantial motivating factor” in the prosecutor’s decision to

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strike a prospective juror. Id. at 815. Cummings bears the

burden of proving discriminatory intent. Johnson v.

California, 545 U.S. 162, 170–71 (2005).

At trial, Cummings’s counsel challenged the prosecutor’s

use of peremptories against two black prospective jurors,

Clarence Broussard and Leon Passmore, under People v.

Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978).3 The trial court

conducted a hearing and denied both motions, concluding,

“[T]here has been an effective showing of why the

peremptories were utilized in this case, and there has been no

showing of group bias.” The trial court’s credibility finding

is presumed correct and is entitled to “great deference,”

Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21, because “evaluation of the

prosecutor’s state of mind based on demeanor and credibility

lies peculiarly within a trial judge’s province,” Hernandez v.

New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365 (1991) (plurality opinion)

(quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 428 (1985)).

The California Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s

decision, holding that the “prosecutor adequately justified his

actions.” Cummings, 850 P.2d at 32. The district court denied

Cummings’s habeas petition on the Batson claim.

Once again, under § 2254(d)(1), we consider whether the

California Supreme Court unreasonablyapplied Batson to the

facts here. Cummings says that our review should be de novo

because the California Supreme Court failed to engage in a

thorough analysis at Batson’s step three and instead “merely

3 Wheeler is California’s equivalent to, and the state-law precursor of,

Batson. Cummings “preserved his federal constitutional claim because a

Wheeler motion serves as an implicit Batson objection.” Crittenden v.

Ayers, 624 F.3d 943, 951 n.2 (9th Cir. 2010).

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recited the reasons advanced by the prosecutor.” That

approach is incorrect: § 2254(d) applies even where the state

court “failed to undertake any meaningful inquiry into direct

or circumstantial evidence of the prosecutor’s intent in

striking the jurors.” Cook, 593 F.3d at 815–16 & n.2. Even

if the California Supreme Court had said nothing at all, and

issued only a summary denial, § 2254(d) would apply. See

Harrington, 562 U.S. at 98. Of course that was not the case

here.

Turning to the merits, we consider the California Supreme

Court’s determination in light of the prosecutor’s use of a

peremptory strike against two of the African American

potential jurors.4 To aid in the task of divining a prosecutor’s

intent, we employ comparative juror analysis—that is,

“‘side-by-side comparisons’ of the African American

panelists who were struck and white panelists who were

allowed to serve.” Cook, 593 F.3d at 815 (citing Miller-El v.

Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 241 (2005)).

A. CLARENCE BROUSSARD.

The prosecutor offered a litany of reasons for striking

Broussard from the jury pool—from Broussard’s view on the

death penalty to his brother’s prior run-in with the law.

4 At the 11th hour in this appeal, Cummings argued in his reply brief that

the prosecutor racially profiled another black juror who was dismissed for

cause. The racial profiling argument was forfeited, because Cummings

never made that argument to the California Supreme Court, the district

court, or in his opening brief here. United States v. Scott, 705 F.3d 410,

415 (9th Cir. 2012) (deeming an argument forfeited for failure to raise it).

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On questioning, Broussard admitted that he had voted

against the death penalty in a 1976 California referendum and

said he would do so again because he did not believe it

deterred crime. Striking a juror who opposes the death

penalty, even one who promises to apply the law impartially,

is a valid and non-pretextual reason for using a peremptory

challenge. See, e.g., Crittenden, 624 F.3d at 952 (noting that,

in death penalty case, prosecutor exercised most of 26

peremptory strikes against jurors “disinclined from a

philosophical standpoint to impose capital punishment”).

The record also revealed that Broussard’s brother was

tried and convicted of robbery in Los Angeles County five

years earlier—by the same District Attorney’s Office that

prosecuted Cummings. The California Supreme Court surely

was not unreasonable to view this reason as non-pretextual. 

The coincidence of having the same prosecutor’s office at the

helm goes beyond having a relative who was convicted of a

crime, a circumstance that in itself has justified the use of a

peremptory strike. See Murray v. Groose, 106 F.3d 812, 815

(8th Cir. 1997) (upholding strike of potential jurors whose

“relatives . . . had been charged with or convicted of crimes,”

which led prosecutor to believe “that they would be

‘defendant’s jurors’”).

Cummings claims that the coincidence rationale is

pretextual because the prosecutor failed to strike another

white juror, even though that juror’s brother similarly was

arrested for felony marijuana possession. But that juror

supported the death penalty, which distinguished him from

Broussard. Any comparison between the two jurors is

unilluminating.

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Finally, the prosecutor said Broussard gave him “dirty

looks” in the courtroom. This is also a valid reason for

dismissing a potential juror. Burks v. Borg, 27 F.3d 1424,

1429 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that prosecutors may “take into

account tone, demeanor, facial expression” in exercising

peremptories).

Taken together, these race-neutral reasons justified the

prosecutor’s decision to strike Broussard.

Cummings also argues that two other reasons cited by the

prosecutor were racially tinged and revealed the prosecutor’s

true, discriminatory intent. The prosecutor made passing

reference to a potential friendship among three black jurors

and to Broussard’s own statements on race. During voir dire,

Broussard said, “I would be less than honest if I said I was

not aware that we are trying two black individuals, therefore

I was going to make sure that we are fair in terms of the

evidence as presented against those individuals.” Broussard

also revealed that he had been “victimized by racial prejudice

being born and raised in this town” and added: “It has had an

impact on me in terms of the criminal justice system.”

Although these reasons touch on race, the record does not

show that the strike was “based on” race or stereotyping. 

Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 375 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“No

matter how closely tied or significantly correlated to race the

explanation for a peremptory strike may be, the strike does

not implicate the Equal Protection Clause unless it is based on

race.”). Broussard made affirmative statements indicating

potential bias, which is a far cry from when a prosecutor

assumes a black juror will be partial to a black defendant. 

Tolbert v. Gomez, 190 F.3d 985, 989 (9th Cir. 1999)

(upholding peremptory of juror who believed the criminal

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justice system discriminates against minorities and noting that

“[c]hallenging a prospective juror on the basis of his

expressed opinions about the judicial system does not violate

Batson.”).

Viewed in totality, we have little difficulty holding that

the California Supreme Court did not unreasonably uphold

the prosecutor’s strike of Broussard.

B. LEON PASSMORE.

The California Supreme Court, over the dissent of Justice

Mosk, also upheld the prosecutor’s decision to strike Leon

Passmore, primarily because Passmore lived close to the

crime scene and may have known trial witnesses. Cummings,

850 P.2d at 32.

Passmore testified he had lived in West Lakeview

Terrace, near the site of the murder, for eleven or twelve

years. He also worked at a local high school and testified that

if any students were called as witnesses he might know them.

Residency can be a valid reason for exercising a

peremptory strike. See Stubbs v. Gomez, 189 F.3d 1099, 1106

(9th Cir. 1999) (recognizing that “residence could be a

race-neutral factor when applied to a specific juror’s

suitability to sit in a particular case”). But was Passmore’s

residency a pretext for discrimination, as Cummings alleges?

To support pretext, Cummings points to two venire members

who, like Passmore, lived in Lakeview Terrace yet were not

struck by the prosecutor.

Significantly, the first comparative juror lived in East

Lakeview Terrace—“away” from West Lakeview Terrace

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where Passmore lived and the shooting occurred.5 The

second venire member, who also lived in Lakeview Terrace,

never sat in the jury box, so the prosecutor had no need or

opportunity to use a peremptory against her.

TheCalifornia Supreme Court was reasonable in crediting

the prosecutor’s residency rationale, given the total lack of

proof that similarly situated jurors were treated differently. 

See Cook, 593 F.3d at 817 (“Because no similarly situated

white jurors were permitted to serve, the evidence indicates

this justification was legitimate and not pretextual.”).

Cummings’s habeas petition under Batson was properly

denied.

III. THESTRICKLANDCLAIM—CUMMINGS’SCOUNSEL.

The California Supreme Court summarily denied

Cummings’s petition alleging ineffective assistance of

counsel during the penalty phase of his trial. To prevail under

AEDPA, Cummings must demonstrate that there was “no

reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief” under the

standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668

(1984). Harrington, 562 U.S. at 98. Because the California

Supreme Court had a reasonable basis to conclude that

Cummings was not prejudiced by his lawyers’ presentation of

mitigation evidence at the penalty phase, “we [] need not

5 As Cummings acknowledged on appeal, this juror himself may have

been black. If true, this is yet another reason why he is not a proper

subject of comparative juror analysis.

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reach [Strickland’s] performance prong.” See Wharton v.

Chappell, 765 F.3d 953, 975 (9th Cir. 2014).6

In Harrington, the Supreme Court stressed the deference

permeating federal habeas review of ineffective assistance

claims. It pointed out that “[t]he standards created by

Strickland and § 2254(d) are both highly deferential, and

when the two apply in tandem, review is doubly so.” 

562 U.S. at 105 (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted). The multiple layers of deference create a standard

that is “difficult to meet,” and “even a strong case for relief

does not mean the state court’s contrary conclusion was

unreasonable.” Id. at 102. Rather, a “state court’s

determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal

habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on

the correctness of the decision.” Id. at 101 (quoting

Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)).

The crux of Cummings’s ineffective assistance claim is

that his counsel’s presentation of mitigating evidence during

the penalty phase did not adequately detail the difficulties he

experienced as a child. During state habeas proceedings,

Cummings’s counsel prepared a “social history report” that

detailed his abusive upbringing and eventual descent into

drug abuse and violent crime.7 Cummings argues that if the

6

In light of this conclusion, we do not address whether Cummings’s

alternative request for an evidentiary hearing on his counsel’s performance

is barred by Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011).

7 The government asserts we cannot consider this evidence because it

was contained in a social history report prepared during habeas

proceedings, and the report itself is inadmissible hearsay. The report,

however, was not prepared to serve as admissible evidence. Rather, it

illustrates what mitigation evidence would have been available to a lawyer

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CUMMINGS V. MARTEL 29

jury had been exposed to the contents of this report, at least

one juror may have been persuaded to choose life over death. 

The California Supreme Court had a reasonable basis to

conclude otherwise.

The social history report was largely cumulative of

testimony that was introduced during penalty phase

proceedings. For example, Cummings asserts that the jury

did not learn about the extent of the violence in his

household. His brother Darrell, however, testified that

Raynard was subject to “extremely hard” beatings involving

extension cords and belts. He also told the jury that their

parents regularly had “knock-down, drag-out” fights that

sometimes ended with their parents beating one another with

household objects. The jury likewise heard Darrell testify

that their mother had substance abuse issues and spent time

in a mental hospital. The social history report contains more

extensive recitation of her history of drug use, alcohol abuse,

and psychiatric hospitalizations, but these details would not

have changed the narrative of Cummings’s upbringing in any

meaningful way.

To the extent the social history report offered mitigating

evidence that was not cumulative, it is not compelling. The

report notes that Cummings’s mother drank alcohol while

pregnant. Although evidence that a defendant suffers from

who conducted a reasonable investigation into Cummings’s life history. 

Approving of the use of just such a report in Wiggins v. Smith, the

Supreme Court instructed that we must “evaluate the totality of the

evidence—‘both that adduced at trial, and the evidence adduced in the

habeas proceeding[s].’” 539 U.S. 510, 536 (2003) (quoting Williams,

529 U.S. at 397–98). The social history report was properly presented to

the California Supreme Court during habeas proceedings, so we consider

its contents.

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fetal alcohol syndrome may have a significant mitigating

effect, Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 392 (2005),

Cummings does not allege that he suffered from this ailment. 

Cf. Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 480–81 (2007)

(describing defendant’s assertion that he was “exposed to

alcohol and drugs in utero, which may have resulted in

cognitive and behavioral deficiencies” as “weak” mitigation

evidence). Cummings also points out that the jury never

learned that his brother was sexually abused. While evidence

that a defendant was sexually abused can be a “powerful”

mitigating factor, Wharton, 765 F.3d at 977, the fact that

Cummings’s brother was sexually abused lacks the same

force.

The report details some evidence that calls into question

Cummings’s mental well-being. School records indicate that

Cummings exhibited symptoms of trauma in his home. 

While incarcerated in his earlytwenties, Cummings exhibited

bizarre behavior such as spreading feces on the walls of his

prison cell. However, a pre-trial psychiatric evaluation

yielded no conclusions that his lawyers saw fit to use as

evidence at trial,8and even at this stage of the proceedings,

Cummings does not claim that he suffers from a mental

illness. This evidence of mental instability adds little to his

claims of prejudice.

Even if testimony about certain aspects of the social

history report would have had some mitigating effect, this

strategy would have triggered overwhelming aggravating

evidence. See Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15, 26 (2009)

(per curiam) (noting that a “reviewing court must consider all

the evidence—the good and the bad—when evaluating

 

8

 The notes from this evaluation appear to have been lost.

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CUMMINGS V. MARTEL 31

prejudice”). Had Cummings’s counsel gone beyond a

“sterile” life history presentation, the prosecution could have

countered with evidence that Cummings assaulted two prison

guards and wrote a letter announcing his intention to shoot

“pigs” eighteen months before Verna’s murder.

Although the prison assaults are relatively minor

aggravating factors, introduction of the letter would have

been devastating to Cummings’s defense. Cummings wrote:

“[I]f I got to steal or kill for what I want, I will do that . . . I

might die, but the pig – one pig or two – is coming with me,

and there will be funerals on both sides this time . . . I will

always hate pigs, the man, the system, and any White, Black

or whatever who is on that side. I have a bullet for that m-----

f-----, too, if he gets in my way.” This manifesto would not

only have negated sympathy generated by tales of

Cummings’s troubled upbringing, it also would have

undermined any “lingering doubt” about his willingness to

shoot a police officer.

The mitigating effect of the evidence that the jury did not

hear was limited in scope and would have opened the door to

inflammatory and prejudicial aggravating evidence. The

California Supreme Court had a “reasonable basis” to

conclude that Cummings failed to demonstrate prejudice as

a result of his counsel’s penalty phase presentation of

evidence. We affirm the district court’s denial of

Cummings’s habeas petition as to his ineffective assistance of

counsel claim.

CONCLUSION

Cummings’s petition for habeas relief is DENIED.

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THOMAS, Chief Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in

part:

I agree with the majority that Raynard Cummings’s equal

protection and ineffective assistance of counsel claims should

be denied. I respectfully dissent, however, from the

conclusion that Cummings’s due process claim must also be

denied. The Supreme Court made clear in Turner v.

Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965), and Gonzales v. Beto,

405 U.S. 1052 (1972) (per curiam), that a criminal

defendant’s right to a fair trial is infringed when the

government solicits key testimony from a bailiff who

associated closely with the jury during the defendant’s trial. 

Because that is precisely what occurred during Cummings’s

trial, the California Supreme Court’s decision to affirm his

conviction, People v. Cummings, 4 Cal. 4th 1233 (1993),

cannot reasonably be squared with Turner and Beto. I would

therefore grant Cummings’s habeas petition.

I

Bailiffs play an important role during criminal trials by

maintaining order inside the courtroom and ensuring the

safety of jurors and court officers. But when they step

beyond that traditional role by testifying against the accused,

their competing interests may deprive the defendant of due

process.

Justice Stewart highlighted this danger in Beto, focusing

on “the great prejudice inherent in the dual role of jury bailiff

and key prosecution witness.” 405 U.S. at 1055 (Stewart, J.,

concurring). He explained:

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Our adversary system of criminal justice

demands that the respective roles of

prosecution and defense and the neutral role

of the court be kept separate and distinct in a

criminal trial. When a key witness against a

defendant doubles as the officer of the court

specifically charged with the care and

protection of the jurors, associating with them

on both a personal and an official basis while

simultaneously testifying for the prosecution,

the adversary system of justice is perverted.

Id. at 1055–56; see also Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363,

365 (1966) (noting that “the official character of the

bailiff—as an officer of the court as well as the

State—beyond question carries great weight with a jury”);

Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 149-50 (1892) (“It is

vital in capital cases that the jury should pass upon the case

free from external causes tending to disturb the exercise of

deliberate and unbiased judgment. . . . Private

communications, possibly prejudicial, between jurors and

third persons, or witnesses, or the officer in charge, are

absolutely forbidden . . . .” (emphasis added)).

Recognizing that this risk of “great prejudice” arises

whenever a bailiff testifies for the prosecution, the Supreme

Court in Turner and Beto held that the admission of such

testimony may sometimes violate a criminal defendant’s due

process rights. The Court’s due process inquiry in those

cases focused on two factors: (1) the importance of the

bailiff’s testimony and (2) the nature of the bailiff’s

relationship with the jury.

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In analyzing the first factor, the Court examined the

extent to which the jury’s verdict in each case turned on the

credibility of the bailiffs’ testimony. See Turner, 379 U.S. at

473 (concluding that “the credibility which the jury attached

to the testimony of these two key witnesses must inevitably

have determined whether Wayne Turner was to be sent to his

death”); Beto, 405 U.S. at 1053 (Stewart, J., concurring)

(referring to the case as one “that turned so largely on [the

jurors’] assessment of the sheriff’s credibility”). For

guidance, it looked at whether the bailiffs had served as “key

witnesses” or confined their testimony “to some

uncontroverted or merely formal aspect of the case for the

prosecution.” Turner, 379 U.S. at 473; see also Beto, 405

U.S. at 1054 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting the same

language from Turner). Because the bailiffs in Turner and

Beto had testified to crucial inculpatory facts, including the

defendants’ alleged confessions, the Court held that they fell

on the “key witness” end of this spectrum. See 379 U.S. at

467 (referring to the bailiffs as “[t]he two principal witnesses

for the prosecution”); 405 U.S. at 1052 (Stewart, J.,

concurring) (referring to the bailiff as “the key prosecution

witness”).

Deputy La Casella’s testimony regarding Cummings’s

alleged confession was similarly crucial to the prosecution

during the trial in this case. As the majority notes, La Casella

was the only witness—other than a jailhouse informant who

later recanted his testimony—to corroborate the coroner’s

specific theory that Cummings fired the first shot and Gay

fired the final five. See Slip Op. 14–15. Because multiple

forensic experts and at least one eyewitness disputed the

coroner’s theory of events, La Casella’s testimony proved

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central to the prosecution’s case.1Indeed, the prosecution

itself referred to La Casella during its closing argument as

“perhaps the most important witness in this case,” calling his

testimony “obviously very important.” It told the jury: “His

testimony alone should lead you to the conclusion to convict”

Cummings.

Given the primacy that the state itself attributed to La

Casella’s testimony, I agree with the majority that “[e]ven

under AEDPA’s deferential standard of review, it is hard to

credit the [state] court’s application of Turner’s first prong.” 

Slip Op. 15. I would therefore hold that the California

Supreme Court’s conclusion that La Casella was not a key

witness constituted an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law as determined by Turner and Beto. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Unlike the majority, however, I

would hold that the state court’s application of Turner’s

second prong—regarding the nature of the bailiff’s

relationship with the jury—also conflicts with these

controlling precedents.

In Turner, the Supreme Court addressed this prong by

noting that a “continuous and intimate association” between

a testifying bailiff and the jury would give rise to a due

process violation while a “brief encounter” would not. 

379 U.S. at 473. In drawing this distinction, “Turner

1 Of the nine eyewitnesses who testified at trial, only one claimed to see

Cummings fire the first shot at Officer Verna from the car. That witness

had failed to identify Cummings as the shooter on two prior

occasions—during both a police lineup and grand jury proceedings—and

admitted that he had previously lied under oath. The witness also

admitted that he had changed his testimony to implicate Cummings only

after he and a detective conducted a “walk-through” of the shooting

following the preliminary hearing.

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recognized that there is a continuum of potential prejudice

resulting from different types of contacts” and that the

defendant’s due process claim depends on the extent of those

contacts. Beto, 405 U.S. at 1058 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);

see also id. at 1054–55 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“[Turner]

indicated that a mere ‘brief encounter,’ by chance, with the

jury would not generally contravene due process

principles.”). To illustrate the prejudicial nature of the

bailiffs’ contacts with the jury in Turner, the Court explained

that it “would have undermined the basic guarantees of trial

by jury to permit this kind of an association between the

jurors and two key prosecution witnesses who were not

deputy sheriffs.” 379 U.S. at 474. The fact that the two

witnesses had served as bailiffs simply “made the association

even more prejudicial.” Id.

Turner’s contacts inquiry is distinct from the general

weighing of probative value and prejudice that California

courts typically use to determine the admissibility of

evidence. See Cal. Evid. Code § 352 (“The court in its

discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is

substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission

will . . . create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of

confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.”). Unlike that

balancing test, Turner’s focus is constitutional, not

evidentiary, and centers on the potential prejudice resulting

from the bailiff’s relationship with the jury—without regard

to the probative value of the bailiff’s testimony.

2

2 Although the first prong of Turner—considering the significance of the

bailiff’s testimony—requires something akin to a traditional probativevalue analysis, the focus of Turner nevertheless remains distinct from the

admissibility question. After all, the two Turner factors are not weighed

against each other but, rather, assessed independently, as the majority

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Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court resolved the

Turner question in this case by applying the balancing test. 

Rather than examining where La Casella’s contacts with the

jury fell on the spectrum between “brief encounter” and

“continuous and intimate association,” the California

Supreme Court simply reaffirmed the trial court’s ruling that

La Casella’s “association with the jurors was so minimal and

so professional that the probative value of his testimony

outweighed any prejudice to Cummings from his status.” 

Cummings, 4 Cal. 4th at 1290 (emphasis added). The court

included its Turner analysis under the heading, “Evidentiary

Rulings,” id. at 1288, and concluded the analysis by stating

that the trial court “did not err in admitting [La Casella’s]

testimony,” id. at 1290 (emphasis added). In short, despite

the California Supreme Court’s passing references to due

process, the language and organization of its opinion make

clear that it never applied Turner’s second prong and, instead,

relied on a state evidentiary rule to deny Cummings’s due

process claim.3

explains. See Slip Op. at 16–17 (emphasizing that “the contacts

requirement in Turner is independent of the key witness requirement and

stands on its own”). To the extent that the California Supreme Court did

consider the two Turner factors together here, its decision would not be

entitled to AEDPA deference because, as explained above, its resolution

of the first Turner prong was unreasonable.

3 Although the majority suggests that the state court’s application of the

evidentiary balancing test was separate from its application of the Turner

test, the language and structure of the opinion suggest otherwise. The

state court specifically cited the balancing test in the middle of its

discussion of Turner and Beto and, as noted above, situated its analysis of

these cases within a broader discussion of the trial court’s “Evidentiary

Rulings.” The court’s reliance on the balancing test therefore appears

central—not merely incidental—to its resolution of the Turner issue.

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“[W]hen a state court employs the wrong legal standard,

the AEDPA rule of deference does not apply.” Cooperwood

v. Cambra, 245 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2001). As this

court explained in Frantz v. Hazey, a state court’s “use of the

wrong legal rule or framework . . . constitute[s] error under

the ‘contrary to’ prong of § 2254(d)(1).” 533 F.3d 724, 734

(9th Cir. 2008) (en banc); Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640

(2003) (explaining that “a decision by a state court is

‘contrary to’ our clearly established law if it ‘applies a rule

that contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases’”

(citations omitted)). Thus, while we must defer to state

courts under AEDPA, we may not permit them to circumvent

controlling Supreme Court precedent by resolving federal

constitutional issues under their own state evidentiary rules. 

See Slovik v. Yates, 556 F.3d 747, 754 (9th Cir. 2009)

(granting habeas petition where the “California Court of

Appeal analyzed [the petitioner]’s claim as an evidentiary

issue governed by state law, rather than a confrontation

question governed by the Sixth Amendment”).

In sum, the California Supreme Court’s decision to deny

Cummings’s due process claim is not entitled to AEDPA

deference. The court’s analysis of the first Turner factor was

objectively unreasonable while its analysis of the second

factor was based on an incorrect legal standard and, thus,

contrary to federal law. Because the state court’s resolution

of Cummings’s due process claim is not entitled to deference,

this court should review that claim de novo. Panetti v.

Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953 (2007).

II

Reviewing Cummings’s due process claim de novo, I

would grant his petition for habeas relief. La Casella’s

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CUMMINGS V. MARTEL 39

testimony was critical to the prosecution’s case against

Cummings and, as explained above, the trial record easily

demonstrates that he was a “key witness” under Turner’s first

prong. While Turner’s second prong presents a closer

question, I would hold that it, too, weighs in Cummings’s

favor since La Casella’s contacts with the jury were

significant enough to result in prejudice.

First, La Casella served as a bailiff for a much longer

period of time than the bailiffs in Turner and Beto. Although

La Casella may not have socialized with the jurors to the

extent that the bailiffs did in those cases, he served as bailiff

for more than three months during voir dire and continued to

serve throughout the first week and a half of witness

presentations. In contrast, the bailiffs in Turner served for

only a three-day trial while the bailiff in Beto served for only

a one-day trial. The Seventh Circuit has specifically pointed

to Beto as a basis for granting habeas relief to a petitioner

who had been convicted of robbery based on the testimony of

a bailiff who served for just one day of trial. Agnew v.

Leibach, 250 F.3d 1123, 1132 (7th Cir. 2001) (granting

habeas petition under pre-AEDPA law based on the bailiff’s

“continuous association [with the jury] throughout the first

day of a two-day trial”). Notably, the Seventh Circuit granted

the petition even though the record did not “reveal whether

the [bailiff] accompanied any jurors to lunch” or contain any

other “information about the deputy’s out-of-court contact

with the jurors.” Id.

The nature of La Casella’s contacts with the jury likewise

suggests that his testimony was unduly prejudicial. He

testified that jurors had asked him roughly two dozen

questions throughout the course of the trial, that he

sometimes greeted jurors as they entered the courtroom, and

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that he unlocked the jury room for them on a handful of

occasions. Although these encounters might have seemed

inconsequential when La Casella was merely a bailiff, once

he became the prosecution’s star witness, these interactions

would have likely taken on added significance for at least

some jurors. The standard for determining whether those

interactions were permissible under Turner is not whether

they rose to some abstract level of intimacy. Rather, the

proper inquiry is whether it “would have undermined the

basic guarantees of trial by jury to permit this kind of an

association between the jurors and [a] key prosecution

witness[]” who was not a bailiff. Turner, 379 U.S. at 474; see

also Beto, 405 U.S. at 1055 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting

the same language from Turner).

In this case, the length and nature of La Casella’s

association with the jury would have likely precluded him

from serving as a witness had he not been assigned to the

courtroom as a bailiff during Cummings’s trial. Indeed, it is

difficult to imagine another witness being permitted to testify

after interacting with jurors, however briefly, on more than

two dozen occasions over the course of such a lengthy trial. 

Cf. Agnew, 250 F.3d at 1132 (“This was not a chance

encounter on an elevator but was a continuous association

throughout the first day of a two-day trial.”). The fact that

these interactions occurred while La Casella was serving as

a bailiff—tasked specifically with ensuring the jury’s

safety—only compounds the risk of prejudice.4See Turner,

4 The prosecution itself may have sought to exploit this potential

prejudice. In its closing argument, it stressed that La Casella was “a

deputy sheriff who acted as security in this courtroom,” and told the jury,

“if you don’t convict [Cummings] of first-degree murder with special

circumstances, you are telling Deputy La Casella in effect that he lied. I

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CUMMINGS V. MARTEL 41

379 U.S. at 474 (“[T]he role that Simmons and Rispone

played as deputies made the association even more

prejudicial. For the relationship was one which could not but

foster the jurors’ confidence in those who were their official

guardians during the entire period of the trial.”).

For these reasons, I would hold that La Casella’s

testimony infringed Cummings’s due process rights and

would grant his petition for habeas relief.

O’SCANNLAIN,CircuitJudge, concurring in part, dissenting

in part, and concurring in the judgment:

I agree with Judge McKeown that the district court’s

decision to deny the petition for habeas corpus must be

affirmed. Therefore, I concur in her opinion, and in its

excellent reasoning—except as to Section I.A. I respectfully

dissent from Section I.A., and write separately to explain why

the California Supreme Court’s conclusion that Deputy

LaCasella was not a “key witness” under Turner must be

afforded AEDPA deference.

I

I begin by noting that Section I.A. is dicta—whether it is

included or excised, the result is the same because, as Section

I.B. persuasively explains, Cummings cannot show that the

California Supreme Court erred in evaluating Turner’s

second prong—the “heart of the Turner analysis.”

don’t think you believe that.”

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Further, Section I.A. is not only unnecessary to resolution

of this case, but is, in my view, incorrect. The California

Supreme Court was not objectively unreasonable in

concluding that a “key” witness under Turner must be the

“principal” witness—not merely one of several witnesses

whose testimony is probative of guilt. Furthermore, because

its key witness analysis did not contravene Turner, and

because its decision was not “so lacking in justification that

there was an error well understood and comprehended in

existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded

disagreement,” it is our obligation to defer to the state court’s

conclusion. White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

A

The majority opinion1concludes that LaCasella was a

“key prosecution witness” under Turner because he was

important—although not necessary—to the state’s case. 

Specifically, the majority notes that: (1) the prosecutor

emphasized the importance of LaCasella’s testimony to the

jury, and (2) no other witness—or more accurately, no other

witness of such credibility2—provided testimonial support for

the government’s precise theory of the case.

Although I agree with the majority’s conclusion that

LaCasella’s testimony was important, I disagree with its

 

1

 Because Chief Judge Thomas agrees with Section I.A., I refer to it as

part of the “majority opinion.”

2 As the majority notes, LaCasella’s testimony was not the only

testimony supporting the prosecution’s “first-shot” theory— “at least one

eyewitness testified that the person in the back seat fired the first shot.”

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CUMMINGS V. MARTEL 43

conclusion that the California state court was thus compelled

to treat LaCasella as a “key” witness under Turner, and with

any resulting implications. The majority argues that a “key”

witness is any witness who testifies to an important issue,

beyond “some uncontroverted or merely formal aspect of the

case for the prosecution,” even when “other evidence [and

testimony] also supports the verdict.” But Turner does not

establish that such “important” and “key” witnesses are the

same.

While Turner “emphasized” that the bailiff-witnesses in

that case were the “key witnesses” whose testimony “must

inevitably have determined whether Wayne Turner was to be

sent to his death,” 379 U.S. at 473, this statement does not

“clearly establish” that any important witness whose

testimony is probative of guilt is a “key witness.” If

anything, Turner suggests that a “key” witness is one whose

testimony is absolutely necessary to establish guilt, as was

the case with the two bailiffs in Turner. See 379 U.S. at 474

(explaining that “Turner’s fate depended upon how much

confidence the jury placed in these two witnesses”). By

contrast, as the majority concedes, LaCasella was only one of

several witnesses who testified to Cummings’s guilt.

Thus, the California Supreme Court’s conclusion that

LaCasella “was not the principal or key prosecution witness,”

Cummings, 4 Cal.4th at 1290, is not “objectively

unreasonable” and “so lacking in justification that there was

an error well understood and comprehended in existing law

beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” White,

134 S.Ct. at 1702.

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II

I agree with Judge McKeown that the denial of

Cumming’s petition must be affirmed. However, because the

California Supreme Court was not “objectivelyunreasonable”

in its interpretation of the minimal Supreme Court guidance

on the Turner “key” and “principal” witness issue, and,

although I concur in the rest of the opinion, I must

respectfully dissent from Section I.A.

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