Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-11-05053/USCOURTS-caDC-11-05053-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Arthur Gilbert
Appellant
Janet Ann Napolitano
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 17, 2012 Decided March 2, 2012

No. 11-5053

ARTHUR GILBERT,

APPELLANT

v.

JANET ANN NAPOLITANO, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:05-cv-02128)

Leizer Z. Goldsmith argued the cause and filed the briefs 

for appellant.

Michelle Lo, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause 

for appellee. With her on the brief were Ronald C. Machen 

Jr., U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. 

Attorney.

Before: HENDERSON, TATEL, and GARLAND, Circuit 

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

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TATEL, Circuit Judge: Appellant alleges that his 

employer, the United States Customs and Border Protection 

Agency, repeatedly rejected him for promotions in violation 

of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age 

Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. The district court 

granted summary judgment for the agency. For the reasons set 

forth in this opinion, we reverse in part and affirm in part. 

I.

Arthur Gilbert has had a long and tumultuous history at 

Customs, now a component of the Department of Homeland 

Security. He originally worked in the agency’s San Diego 

field office, but in 1997 he was discharged for alleged 

misconduct during a botched cocaine seizure. Gilbert, who is 

Mexican American and was born in 1952, sued for 

reinstatement, claiming age and national-origin 

discrimination. When Customs refused to turn over certain 

documents, Gilbert asked Virginia Gengor, a Customs 

employee he had previously supervised, to get the documents 

for him. Gengor agreed and delivered them to Gilbert at a 

hotel. Armed with the documents, Gilbert settled with 

Customs, agreeing to take two years of leave without pay, 

after which he would receive a position in Customs’s D.C. 

Headquarters at the GS-13 grade of the federal government’s 

General Schedule pay scale. But because some of the 

documents that Gengor handed over to Gilbert were 

confidential and marked “official use only,” Customs 

disciplined her. Jayson Ahern, who later became Assistant 

Commissioner in the Office of Field Operations at Customs 

Headquarters and who made one of the promotion decisions

at issue in this case, presided over Gengor’s disciplinary 

hearing.

Immediately after arriving at Headquarters to begin work 

at his GS-13 position, Gilbert met with Robert Jacksta, his 

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second-line supervisor, and explained that he had brought

successful discrimination claims in San Diego and that he 

“wanted a clean start.” Gilbert Dep. 12:25, May 13, 2009. In 

his deposition, Gilbert testified that Jacksta responded that he 

would “take care of [him], don’t worry.” Id. at 12:7–8. Two 

months later, Gilbert started applying for promotions to GS14 positions. Gilbert’s name appeared on the selection register

(the list of eligible candidates) for several positions, but 

Jacksta never recommended him and he was not promoted. 

Instead, Customs promoted Gay Laxton, Mark Reefe, and 

John Milne—all white and all younger than Gilbert.

(Although Gilbert does not take issue with it, Customs also 

promoted Robert Colbert, a white male one year older than 

Gilbert.) Customs returned one register without selecting 

anyone. 

In response, Gilbert filed a complaint with Customs’s 

Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) office and then sued

in the United States District Court for the District of 

Columbia, alleging discrimination and retaliation in violation 

of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967

(ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq., and Title VII of the Civil 

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. During the 

pendency of these proceedings, Gilbert applied for another

GS-14 position, Chief of Staff to Assistant Commissioner 

Ahern. Gilbert’s name again appeared on the selection 

register, but Ahern selected Marcy Brodsky, a white woman 

younger than Gilbert. Gilbert amended his complaint to allege 

that this too was discriminatory and retaliatory. 

The district court struck Gilbert’s statement of material 

facts in dispute for failing to comply with Local Rule 7(h), 

which requires parties to file “a separate concise statement of 

genuine issues” including facts “as to which it is contended 

there exists a genuine issue necessary to be litigated.” D.D.C. 

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Local Civ. R. 7(h)(1). Then, after considering the remaining 

record, the district court granted summary judgment to 

Customs on all claims. See Gilbert v. Napolitano, 760 F. 

Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. 2011). Gilbert appeals, and we review 

the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. See 

Jones v. Bernanke, 557 F.3d 670, 674 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 

II.

Gilbert makes many arguments, only two of which have 

merit.

First, Gilbert contends that the district court erred in 

dismissing his claims stemming from John Milne’s

promotion. The district court dismissed those claims without 

reaching the merits “because Gilbert failed to exhaust his 

administrative remedies.” Gilbert, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 29.

Gilbert argues, as he did in the district court, that Customs 

forfeited its exhaustion defense by failing to raise it in its 

answer as required by Rule 8(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c) (“In responding to a 

pleading, a party must affirmatively state any . . . affirmative 

defense[.]”). Customs points out that it promptly asserted the 

defense in its motion to dismiss, but this misses the point: as 

we have explained, “a party must first raise its affirmative 

defenses in a responsive pleading before it can raise them in a 

dispositive motion.” Harris v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Veterans 

Affairs, 126 F.3d 339, 345 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Thus, Customs 

forfeited the exhaustion defense, and the district court “should 

not . . . have considered” it. Id. at 341; see also id. at 345

(noting that defendant may seek leave to amend its answer on 

remand).

Alternatively, Customs urges us to affirm on the ground

that “Gilbert fail[ed] to show that he was significantly better 

qualified than Milne.” Appellee’s Br. 56. The district court, 

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however, never reached this question, and we normally 

decline to consider issues for the first time on appeal. See, 

e.g., Solomon v. Vilsack, 628 F.3d 555, 568 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 

(“Lacking the benefit of the district court’s analysis of 

whether genuine issues of material fact exist that would 

preclude the entry of summary judgment, we believe the most 

prudent course is to remand for the district court to consider 

this issue in the first instance.”). We shall thus remand this 

claim to the district court.

Second, Gilbert argues that a genuine issue of material 

fact exists as to whether Customs discriminated and retaliated 

against him when it promoted Mark Reefe. Customs contends 

that it selected Reefe over Gilbert solely because Reefe was 

more qualified. Where, as here, an employer offers a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for its decision to 

promote one employee over another, “the one central inquiry 

on summary judgment is whether the plaintiff produced 

sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the 

employer’s asserted non-discriminatory [or non-retaliatory] 

reason was not the actual reason and that the employer 

intentionally discriminated [or retaliated] against the plaintiff 

on a prohibited basis.” Hamilton v. Geithner, No. 10-5419, 

2012 WL 119134, at *5 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 17, 2012) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Because “[i]n a close case, a 

reasonable juror would usually assume that the employer is 

more capable of assessing the significance of small 

differences in the qualifications of the candidates, or that the 

employer simply made a judgment call,” the employee must 

show that a reasonable juror could find him “substantially 

more qualified” than the selected employee. Holcomb v. 

Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 897 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). That said, “[e]ven if [the employee] 

show[s] that [the asserted reason] was not the actual reason 

for his [adverse employment action], he still would have to 

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demonstrate that the actual reason was a . . . discriminatory 

[or retaliatory] reason.” Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 

520 F.3d 490, 496 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2008). And a jury, having 

found the employer’s explanation pretextual, may in 

appropriate circumstances infer discrimination if the plaintiff 

is a member of a protected class (or, for ADEA claims, over 

forty years of age, see 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a)), and the slot for 

which he applied went to an applicant outside that class. See

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 

147 (2000) (“The factfinder’s disbelief of the reasons put 

forward by the defendant . . . may, together with the elements 

of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional 

discrimination.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also 

Cones v. Shalala, 199 F.3d 512, 516 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (the 

prima facie framework is “(1) [the employee] is a member of 

a protected class; (2) he applied for and was qualified for an 

available position; (3) despite his qualifications he was 

rejected; and (4) either someone not of his protected class 

filled the position or the position remained vacant and the 

employer continued to seek applicants”). Similarly, having 

found the employer’s explanation pretextual, the jury may in 

appropriate circumstances infer retaliation if it finds “(1) that 

[the plaintiff] engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) that 

he suffered a materially adverse action by his employer; and 

(3) that a causal link connects the two.” Jones, 557 F.3d at 

677.

We start with Customs’s claim that Reefe was promoted 

to the GS-14 position because of his superior qualifications. 

In response, Gilbert points to evidence he says shows that he 

was in fact substantially more qualified than Reefe. For 

example, Arthur Pitts, who was Gilbert’s supervisor at the 

time of the promotion and who served as the first-line 

supervisor for the GS-14 position being filled, testified that “if 

you were making a selection based on qualification and 

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experience, the qualification and experience of Art Gilbert 

would dwarf that of Mark Reefe. I know that.” Pitts Dep. 

140:11–14, Dec. 6, 2002. According to Pitts, the difference 

between Gilbert and Reefe’s qualifications “was large enough 

to slap you in the face.” Pitts Dep. 69:5–7, June 30, 2009. The 

government objects, claiming that because “Pitts had not 

supervised Reefe prior to the selection,” he “had no basis for 

comparing their relative qualifications.” Appellee’s Br. 43. 

Not so. A reasonable jury could easily conclude that Pitts—

not only the supervisor for the very position in question, but 

someone who worked directly with both Reefe and Gilbert 

immediately after the promotion—was well-positioned to

assess their relative qualifications. Should the jury credit 

Pitts’s testimony, it could find that Gilbert’s qualifications 

indeed “dwarf[ed]” Reefe’s, and that Customs’s reliance on 

relative qualifications was pretextual. Because Gilbert is 

Mexican American and was over forty when Customs 

promoted Reefe, a younger white male, the jury could then 

conclude that Customs’s true reason was Gilbert’s race or age.

We shall therefore reverse the grant of summary judgment on 

Gilbert’s discrimination claims stemming from this promotion 

and remand for trial.

Gilbert’s retaliation claim is a different matter. To create 

a triable issue of fact on that claim, aside from establishing 

pretext, Gilbert must offer evidence that he engaged in 

protected activity, i.e., “opposed any practice made an 

unlawful employment practice by [Title VII],” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000e-3(a), and that a causal link connects the protected 

activity and his non-promotion. Jones, 557 F.3d at 677; see

also Talavera v. Shah, 638 F.3d 303, 313 (D.C. Cir. 2011)

(employee must “present evidence from which a reasonable 

jury could find that [the] non-promotion was the result of 

unlawful retaliation”). Gilbert identifies two incidents he 

claims qualify as protected activity. 

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First, he argues that his initial meeting with Jacksta, in 

which he asked for a clean start, was itself protected because 

he “demanded non-retaliation.” Appellant’s Br. 43. Gilbert 

cites Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & 

Davidson County, which held that describing an employer’s 

past discrimination while responding to questions in an 

internal investigation constitutes opposing the unlawful 

practice. 555 U.S. 271 (2009). But Crawford provides no

support for the odd proposition that asking a new employer 

for fair treatment going forward, as opposed to challenging 

the employer’s past unlawful activity, qualifies as opposing a

practice made unlawful by Title VII.

Second, Gilbert points to the discrimination claims he 

brought in the San Diego litigation, reasoning that Jacksta, 

who knew of those proceedings, retaliated against him by 

declining to recommend him for the promotion that ultimately 

went to Reefe. Although bringing discrimination charges 

undoubtedly qualifies as protected activity, see 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000e-3(a), Customs argues, and we agree, that Gilbert has 

failed to establish a causal link to that activity. Not only did

the litigation take place more than three years earlier, see 

Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 274 (2001) 

(“Action taken . . . 20 months later suggests, by itself, no 

causality at all.”), but Gilbert acknowledges that he never 

gave Jacksta any details about the charges, instead merely 

informing him that “I had a prior EEO activity in San Diego,”

Gilbert Dep. 12:15. In our view, no reasonable jury could 

infer that the mere mention of such long-ago activity at a 

distant office would give Jacksta a reason to discriminate. 

This is especially so given that Jacksta was based in 

Washington and had no involvement in the events underlying 

Gilbert’s San Diego claims. See Vickers v. Powell, 493 F.3d 

186, 196 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that no reasonable jury 

could “find a retaliatory motive at work” where selecting 

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official never “participate[d] in any of the alleged incidents 

that make up [employee’s] [Title VII] claim”).

We can easily dispose of Gilbert’s remaining arguments. 

He challenges the district court’s order striking his 

statement of material facts for failing to comply with Local 

Rule 7(h), which requires that parties file a “concise”

statement that includes only issues actually in dispute. D.D.C. 

Local Civ. R. 7(h)(1). Gilbert filed a ninety-page statement 

containing 758 facts, many of which the district court found 

“neither material nor disputed.” Gilbert, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 23 

n.1. Given this, the district court’s rejection of his statement 

can hardly be considered an abuse of discretion. See Twist v. 

Meese, 854 F.2d 1421, 1424–25 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (reviewing 

for abuse of discretion district court’s refusal to consider 

plaintiff’s statement of disputed material facts). Moreover, 

because the district court struck only the statement itself 

without treating any facts as conceded, Gilbert has failed to

show how this decision, even if erroneous, would lead to a 

different outcome on any of his claims. 

Gilbert next argues that a jury could deem him 

substantially more qualified than Gay Laxton because Laxton 

had no land border program experience and because Pitts 

testified that Gilbert was the substantially more qualified of 

the two. Laxton, who had more than four years at 

Headquarters including work on passenger control systems 

directly relevant to the position, was in many ways more 

qualified than Gilbert, who applied for this promotion after a 

mere two months at Headquarters. And no reasonable jury

could find Customs’s qualification-based explanation 

pretextual based solely on Laxton’s dearth of land border 

program experience because neither the position, as described 

by Customs employees, nor the vacancy announcement 

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required such experience. Nor does Pitts’s testimony that 

Gilbert was substantially more qualified than Laxton create a 

genuine dispute of fact because Pitts was unfamiliar with the

relative qualifications of Gilbert and Laxton. Pitts himself 

admitted that he was “not necessarily” “paying particular 

attention” to employees, including Gay Laxton, “who worked 

for other Division Directors.” Pitts Dep. 132:17–20, June 30, 

2009. Pitts also acknowledged that he “did not object to” or 

“evaluate” Laxton’s promotion. Id. at 132:20–22.

Next, Gilbert contends that Customs acted unlawfully 

when it returned a selection register without selecting anyone 

for a promotion. To prevail on this claim, Gilbert “must show 

that the position was not withdrawn simply for lack of a 

vacancy.” Carter v. George Washington Univ., 387 F.3d 872, 

883 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Gilbert failed to do so, offering nothing 

more than his own speculation about Customs’s needs based 

on transfers within the GS-13 grade. Gilbert nonetheless 

argues that he should benefit from an adverse inference 

because Customs violated Office of Personnel Management

regulations when it lost or destroyed promotion files related to 

the non-selection. See Talavera, 638 F.3d at 312 (deeming 

appropriate an adverse inference where an official destroyed 

notes that went to the heart of the dispute and that regulations 

required he keep). But we have no need to consider whether 

an adverse inference is appropriate here because Gilbert 

sought no information that would help him establish the key 

missing component for this claim—that a vacancy continued 

to exist.

Gilbert’s claims with respect to Marcy Brodsky’s 

promotion to Ahern’s Chief of Staff are equally meritless. 

Ahern offered a nondiscriminatory reason for declining to 

select Gilbert: that he sought “somebody that has [his]

confidence, loyalty, trust” because he “need[ed] to make sure 

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as far as the confidentiality of discussions, making sure as far 

as the integrity [of] reports, everything is maintained in this 

whole process going forward.” Ahern Dep. 96:3–8, Dec. 9, 

2008. Having presided over Virginia Gengor’s disciplinary 

proceeding, Ahern explained that he doubted Gilbert’s ability 

to maintain agency confidences because Gilbert had asked 

Gengor to retrieve confidential agency documents for his 

personal use. Gilbert contends that a jury might find Brodsky 

similarly untrustworthy and thus doubt Ahern’s explanation. 

In his reply brief, however, Gilbert concedes that “Ahern 

‘honestly’ believes that he rejected Gilbert for having 

obtained the documents a decade earlier.” Appellant’s Reply 

Br. 33 n.13. The only question, then, is whether this reason is 

itself unlawful. See Woodruff v. Peters, 482 F.3d 521, 531

(D.C. Cir. 2007) (given a legitimate, nondiscriminatory, nonretaliatory explanation, “[w]e review not the correctness or 

desirability of the reasons offered but whether the employer 

honestly believes in the reasons it offers” (internal quotation 

marks omitted)). Insisting it is, Gilbert emphasizes that he

obtained the documents while pursuing his discrimination 

claims. But it makes no difference that Gilbert’s actions—

which Ahern honestly believed constituted misconduct—

occurred in the course of a discrimination case because asking 

a government employee to obtain documents unlawfully 

cannot itself qualify as protected activity. Thus, because 

Ahern had an honestly held, nondiscriminatory, nonretaliatory reason for rejecting Gilbert, summary judgment for

Customs was entirely warranted.

III.

We reverse the district court’s dismissal of Gilbert’s

claims stemming from Milne’s promotion, reverse its grant of

summary judgment with respect to his age and race 

discrimination claims stemming from Reefe’s promotion, and 

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remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

In all other respects, we affirm. 

So ordered.

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