Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02837/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02837-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Martha Hillier
Appellant
Social Security Administration
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable H. David Young, United States Magistrate Judge for the

Eastern District of Arkansas, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by

consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-2837

___________

Martha Hillier, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Arkansas.

Social Security Administration, *

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: December 7, 2006

Filed: May 15, 2007

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, BEAM, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

___________

RILEY, Circuit Judge.

 Martha Hillier (Hillier) appeals the district court’s1

 order affirming the

Commissioner’s denial of her application for disability insurance benefits (SSDI) and

supplemental security income (SSI) under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act

(Act), 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-434, 1381-1383f. We affirm. 

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I. BACKGROUND

Before filing the instant application for SSDI and SSI, Hillier filed a prior

application for SSDI and SSI on August 30, 2000, alleging an onset date of March 10,

2000 due to her myofascial pain syndrome/fibromyalgia; muscle spasms; bad feet,

knees, and back; numbness; ulnar entrapment at the elbow; headaches; blurred vision;

sinusitis; nasal and breathing problems; previous nose surgeries; and stress

incontinence. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held a hearing, and on September

25, 2001, the ALJ issued a decision, concluding Hillier was not disabled within the

meaning of the Act, because Hillier had the residual functional capacity to perform

light work and could perform her past relevant work. The appeals council denied

review of the ALJ’s decision. 

On January 16, 2002, Hillier (a forty-three-year-old woman) filed the instant

application for SSDI and SSI, alleging a disability onset date of September 26, 2001,

due to her myofascial pain syndrome/fibromyalgia; osteoarthritis; carpal tunnel

syndrome; bad feet, knees, right elbow, right wrist, and back; numbness; ulnar

entrapment at the elbow; neck and shoulder pain; hypertension; blurred vision; stress

incontinence; and mental retardation. Before Hillier’s alleged onset date, Hillier had

completed the tenth grade. Additionally, Hillier previously had (1) cooked food,

taken customers’ orders, and operated a cash register at Wendy’s Old Fashion

Hamburgers restaurant (Wendy’s); (2) worked as a cashier and priced items at the

Salvation Army; and (3) been employed at National Uniforms, Captain D’s restaurant,

and Shoney’s restaurant. Hillier claimed her multiple conditions preclude gainful

employment. 

Several doctors and other healthcare professionals examined Hillier. On

January 23, 2001, Tammie Orlicek (Orlicek), a licensed psychological examiner,

administered several tests. The test results showed Hillier was functionally illiterate;

could spell at a third-grade level and do mathematics at a fifth-grade level; and had

below average general verbal-academic aptitudes, word-recognition capacities,

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abilities to deal with abstract problems requiring sequential reasoning and judgment,

and visual-motor development. Hillier’s handwriting was illegible. Orlicek

concluded “[Hillier] may reasonably be expected to function independently by means

of low demand employment,” if she is provided “on-the-job training, supported

employment[,] or job placement services,” as well as “[g]uidance and counseling.” 

On February 26, 2001, Dr. A. Roy Tyrer (Dr. Tyrer) conducted a neurosurgical

consultation of Hillier. Dr. Tyrer noted Hillier moved about with good agility, had a

normal gait, exhibited a normal range of neck and shoulder motion, showed no cranial

nerve or other neurological abnormality, and stood erect with reasonable flexibility.

Furthermore, Dr. Tyrer discovered “no significant abnormal physical or neurological

findings” and opined “[Hillier’s] symptoms are somatic without organic basis.” 

On June 4, 2002, Dr. Sam Hester (Dr. Hester) and Claudia Davis (Davis)

evaluated Hillier. Dr. Hester and Davis tested Hillier, concluding Hillier had a verbal

IQ of 77, a performance IQ of 73, and a full-scale IQ of 73. Dr. Hester and Davis

suggested Hillier “would have difficulty in cooperation with others in a job[-]related

environment.” Dr. Hester and Davis expressly conceded that “[d]ue to [Hillier’s]

varying effort and resistance[,] the testing may not closely match [Hillier’s] true

ability.” 

Dr. Brad Williams (Dr. Williams) examined Hillier’s medical records for the

Commissioner. Dr. Williams concluded Hillier had borderline intellectual

functioning; was mildly restricted in the activities of daily living and in maintaining

social functioning; and moderately restricted in maintaining concentration,

persistence, and pace. Dr. Williams completed a mental residual functional capacity

assessment, finding Hillier was moderately limited in the ability to: (1) understand,

remember, and follow detailed instructions; (2) maintain attention and concentration

for extended periods; (3) complete a normal workday and workweek without

interruptions from psychologically based symptoms and perform at a consistent pace

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without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods; (4) accept instructions and

respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors; and (5) set realistic goals or make

plans independently of others. Dr. Williams found Hillier was not significantly

limited in the ability to: (1) remember locations and work-like procedures;

(2) understand, remember, and follow very short and simple instructions; (3) perform

activities within a schedule, maintain regular attendance, and be punctual within

customary tolerances; (4) sustain an ordinary routine without special supervision;

(5) work in coordination with or proximity to others without being distracted by them;

(6) make simple work-related decisions; (7) interact appropriately with the general

public; (8) ask simple questions and request assistance; (9) get along with co-workers

or peers without distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes; and (10) maintain

socially appropriate behavior and adhere to basic standards of neatness and

cleanliness. Dr. Williams noted Hillier could “perform work where interpersonal

contact is incidental to work performed.” 

An ALJ held a hearing on November 4, 2003. At the hearing, Hillier testified

no doctor had prohibited her from working and her only limitations are not being able

to reach over her head and lift heavy objects. Hillier’s husband, Raymond Hillier,

testified Hillier had a bad knee and doctors had diagnosed Hillier with mild arthritis.

The vocational expert testified an individual of Hillier’s age, education, past work

experience, and residual functional capacity–someone who has mild to moderate pain

that is restrictive; can lift twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently;

cannot stand for longer than an hour without restriction and can stand for four hours

out of an eight-hour workday; can sit for two hours without interruption and can sit

for six to eight hours out of an eight-hour workday; has some limitation in standing

and walking; can push or pull twenty pounds; can occasionally reach overhead, climb,

stoop, crouch, kneel, and crawl; cannot constantly reach or handle; has a low average

to borderline IQ; can understand, remember, and follow concrete instructions; can

interact with the public; and can perform simple, concrete work that is unskilled or

semiskilled–could not perform Hillier’s past jobs, but could perform cashier work

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with a sit/stand option at either the unskilled or semiskilled level. The vocational

expert further testified there are approximately 9,000 cashier positions with a sit/stand

option at the unskilled level, and 5,800 sedentary cashier positions at the semiskilled

level in Arkansas, 400,000 and 605,000 nationally, respectively. 

The ALJ performed the five-step analysis set forth at 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520

and 416.920. See generally Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987). At step

one, the ALJ found Hillier had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since

September 26, 2001. At step two, the ALJ found Hillier’s conditions imposed

significant restrictions on Hillier’s ability to work, and thus were severe impairments.

At step three, the ALJ found “no evidence to show the existence of any impairment

that meets the criteria of any of the listed impairments.” At step four, the ALJ found

Hillier had the residual functional capacity (1) to lift, carry, push, or pull twenty

pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently; (2) to sit for six to eight hours out of

an eight-hour workday without significant restriction; (3) to stand or walk for up to

four hours out of an eight-hour workday with a stand-sit option and the ability to sit

for at least one hour; (4) to reach over her head occasionally; and (5) to climb, stoop,

crouch, kneel, and crawl occasionally. Additionally, the ALJ noted Hillier had low

average to borderline intellectual functioning, exhibited some symptoms of depression

(which were controlled by medication), could perform unskilled to low semiskilled

work, and could understand, remember, and follow simple, concrete instructions. The

ALJ concluded Hillier’s conditions preclude performance of her past relevant work.

At step five, the ALJ found the Commissioner had proven Hillier could work as a

cashier and a significant number of cashier jobs exist in the local and national

economy. Therefore, because the ability to perform other work precludes a finding

that an individual is disabled, the ALJ concluded Hillier was not disabled under the

Act, and thus was not entitled to SSDI or SSI. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g),

416.920(g). 

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The Commissioner can waive the defense of res judicata by reopening the

claimant’s prior application. See Boock v. Shalala, 48 F.3d 348, 351-52 (8th Cir.

1995); White v. Sullivan, 901 F.2d 94, 95 (8th Cir. 1990) (per curiam); see also 18B

Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and

Procedure § 4475 (2d ed. 2002) (stating “the agency may waive preclusion just as a

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Hillier requested the appeals council review the ALJ’s decision. The appeals

council denied Hillier’s request. Hillier then appealed to the federal court, which

affirmed the Commissioner’s denial of SSDI and SSI. This appeal followed. Hillier

argues the ALJ erred at step five by (1) phrasing the hypothetical question without

including both the concrete consequences of Hillier’s borderline intellectual

functioning and Hillier’s restrictions in dealing with others; and (2) relying on the

vocational expert’s testimony, which was not responsive to the ALJ’s hypothetical

question, and identified jobs that exceeded Hillier’s mental limitations. The

Commissioner argues res judicata precludes any consideration of Orlicek’s report. 

II. DISCUSSION

We review de novo the court’s decision to affirm the Commissioner’s denial of

SSDI and SSI. Schultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 982 (8th Cir. 2007). If substantial

evidence, that is, “relevant evidence that a reasonable mind would accept as adequate

to support the Commissioner’s conclusion,” on the record as a whole supports the

Commissioner’s denial of SSDI and SSI, we must affirm the Commissioner’s

decision. Id. (quotation omitted). 

A. Res Judicata

As a preliminary matter, to determine whether res judicata bars consideration

of Orlicek’s report, we must determine the relevance and persuasiveness, if any, of

Hillier’s medical records dated before the ALJ’s decision in the prior proceeding. Res

judicata bars subsequent applications for SSDI and SSI based on the same facts and

issues the Commissioner previously found to be insufficient to prove the claimant was

disabled.2

 Robbins v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 895 F.2d 1223, 1224 (8th Cir.

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party to a judicial proceeding can do”). Here, the ALJ did not reopen Hillier’s prior

application for SSDI and SSI by reviewing Hillier’s medical records dated before

Hillier’s alleged onset date. See Robertson v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 623, 625 (8th Cir.

1992) (per curiam) (“The review of a claimant’s medical history, however, does not

constitute reconsideration ‘“on the merits” necessary to constitute a de facto reopening

of the earlier application.’” (quoting Rohrich v. Bowen, 796 F.2d 1030, 1031 (8th Cir.

1986))). 

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1990) (per curiam); Janka v. Sec’y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 589 F.2d 365, 367

(8th Cir. 1978); see generally 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.957(c)(1), 416.1457(c)(1). If res

judicata applies, “the medical evidence from the initial proceeding cannot be

subsequently reevaluated.” Bladow v. Apfel, 205 F.3d 356, 360 n.7 (8th Cir. 2000).

Res judicata only precludes subsequent applications for SSDI and SSI if the

claimant “has not presented any new evidence that . . . [her] condition changed or

deteriorated” since the prior proceeding. Robbins, 895 F.2d at 1224. New evidence

includes both facts and issues that differ from the facts and issues of concern at the

prior proceeding, Janka, 589 F.2d at 367, as well as evidence that was not part of the

record in the prior proceeding, Bladow, 205 F.3d at 361 n.8 (treating a medical report

dated before the ALJ’s decision in the prior proceeding as new evidence because it

was not part of the prior record). Especially in the context of a progressive disease or

degenerative condition, evidence that is offered as proof of a disability, and not found

persuasive by an ALJ in a prior proceeding, may be considered in a subsequent

proceeding in combination with new evidence for the purpose of determining if the

claimant has become disabled since the ALJ’s previous decision. See Groves v.

Apfel, 148 F.3d 809, 810-11 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating “there is no necessary

inconsistency in finding [a claimant] not disabled at time t but disabled at t+1,” and

thus, there is “no absolute bar to the admission in the second proceeding of evidence

that had been introduced in the prior proceeding yet had not persuaded the agency to

award benefits”); see also Rogers v. Chater, 118 F.3d 600, 601 (8th Cir. 1997) (noting

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a claimant generally cannot seek benefits in a subsequent proceeding for any timeperiod for which the prior proceeding had denied benefits). 

Both Dr. Tyrer’s and Orlicek’s reports are dated before the ALJ’s decision in

the prior proceedings. Hillier submitted Dr. Tyrer’s report and did not submit

Orlicek’s report during the prior proceedings. Because Hillier previously submitted

Dr. Tyrer’s report, Dr. Tyrer’s report “cannot be reevaluated in this proceeding,”

rather it can only be considered “as a background for new and additional evidence of

deteriorating mental or physical conditions occurring after the prior proceeding.”

Robbins, 895 F.2d at 1224. Because Hillier did not submit Orlicek’s report during the

prior proceeding, Orlicek’s report constitutes new evidence and thus res judicata does

not bar consideration of Orlicek’s report. See Bladow, 205 F.3d at 361 n.8.

B. Hypothetical Question

Hillier argues the ALJ’s hypothetical question to the vocational expert was

deficient because the hypothetical question failed to capture the concrete

consequences of Hillier’s borderline intellectual functioning and Hillier’s restricted

ability to interact with others. “Testimony based on hypothetical questions that do not

encompass all relevant impairments cannot constitute substantial evidence to support

the ALJ’s decision.” Lacroix v. Barnhart, 465 F.3d 881, 889 (8th Cir. 2006)

(quotation omitted). Hypothetical questions should “set[] forth impairments supported

by substantial evidence [on] the record and accepted as true,” Goff v. Barnhart, 421

F.3d 785, 794 (8th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted), and “capture the ‘concrete

consequences’ of those impairments,” Lacroix, 465 F.3d at 889 (quoting Roe v.

Chater, 92 F.3d 672, 676-77 (8th Cir. 1996)). 

In phrasing the hypothetical question, the ALJ stated, “[t]he file indicates

[Hillier] has an IQ score in the 70’s, . . . I find her IQ to be low average to borderline.”

The ALJ also stated Hillier could understand, remember, and follow concrete

instructions and limited Hillier to simple, concrete work, either unskilled or

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Hillier also argues the vocational expert’s testimony is not responsive to the

ALJ’s hypothetical question because working as a cashier involves interacting with

others. This argument is without merit because substantial evidence on the record as

a whole supports the ALJ’s conclusion Hillier was not limited in the ability to interact

with the public and co-workers. See supra Part II.B.

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semiskilled. Although the ALJ’s hypothetical question did not expressly state Hillier

was functionally illiterate and had poor reading and writing skills, Hillier’s low

average to borderline intellectual functioning necessitated limiting Hillier to simple,

concrete work, either unskilled or semiskilled. By limiting Hillier to simple, concrete

work, the ALJ captured the practical consequences of Hillier’s low average to

borderline intellectual functioning. Cf. Roe, 92 F.3d at 676-77.

The ALJ also phrased the hypothetical question without any limitation on

Hillier’s ability to interact with the public or co-workers. Although the record

includes facts indicating Hillier has difficulty interacting with others, Dr. Williams

found Hillier was not significantly limited in the ability either to interact appropriately

with the general public or to get along with co-workers and Orlicek concluded Hillier

could succeed in the proper work environment. Hillier had interacted with the public

and co-workers during her tenure at Wendy’s and the Salvation Army. Substantial

evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Hillier was not limited in the ability to

interact with the public and co-workers. See Travis v. Astrue, 477 F.3d 1037,

1041-42 (8th Cir. 2007) (stating “[i]t is the ALJ’s duty to resolve conflicts in the

evidence,” and we do “not reverse merely because evidence also points to an alternate

outcome”). The ALJ presented the vocational expert with a fair hypothetical question

that accurately set forth Hillier’s limitations. 

C. Non-responsive Answer To The Hypothetical Question

Hillier contends the vocational expert failed to respond to the ALJ’s

hypothetical question.3

 The vocational expert testified Hillier could work as a

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The vocational expert testified Hillier could work as a cashier II (clerical) or

check cashier. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Dictionary of Occupational Titles

§§ 211.462-010, 211.462-026 (1991), available at

http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/DOT/REFERENCES/DOT02A.HTM. 

5

Both the cashier II (clerical) and check cashier positions require level three

reasoning development, defined as the ability to “[a]pply commonsense understanding

to carry out instructions furnished in written, oral, or diagrammatic form” and “[d]eal

with problems involving several concrete variables in or from standardized

situations.” Dictionary of Occupational Titles app. C, available at

http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/DOT/REFERENCES/DOTAPPC.HTM.

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cashier.4

 Hillier contends working as a cashier requires level three reasoning

development,5

 which is inconsistent with the ALJ’s hypothetical question limiting

Hillier to understanding, remembering, and following concrete instructions. 

“[A]n ALJ cannot rely on expert testimony that conflicts with the job

classifications in the [Dictionary of Occupational Titles] unless there is evidence in

the record to rebut those classifications.” Jones ex rel. Morris v. Barnhart, 315 F.3d

974, 979 (8th Cir. 2003). The Dictionary of Occupational Title definitions “are

simply generic job descriptions that offer the approximate maximum requirements for

each position, rather than their range.” Wheeler v. Apfel, 224 F.3d 891, 897 (8th Cir.

2000) (quoting Hall v. Chater, 109 F.3d 1255, 1259 (8th Cir. 1997)). “[N]ot all of the

jobs in every category have requirements identical to or as rigorous as those listed in

the [Dictionary of Occupational Titles].” Id.

In Clay v. Barnhart, 417 F.3d 922, 931 (8th Cir. 2005), the vocational expert

responded to a hypothetical question that, among other things, limited the ability of

the claimant to understanding, remembering, and following simple, concrete

instructions. The vocational expert testified the claimant could work as a cashier. Id.

We noted the vocational expert’s testimony that the claimant in the hypothetical

question could work as a cashier was “arguably inconsistent with the [Dictionary of

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Occupational Titles’s] definition of the job of cashier.” Id. We, however, refrained

from deciding the issue because the vocational expert also testified the claimant could

work in the areas of unskilled, sedentary assembly work, which existed in significant

numbers. Id.; see also Wilson v. Zoellner, 114 F.3d 713, 721 n.4 (8th Cir. 1997)

(noting a panel is bound to follow Eighth Circuit precedent, not dicta). 

Here, we must answer the question whether Hillier–who can understand,

remember, and follow simple, concrete instructions–can work as a cashier. In the

abstract, tension exists between only being able to understand, remember, and follow

simple, concrete instructions and working as a cashier. See Clay, 417 F.3d at 931.

We, however, do not decide cases in the abstract. Here, Hillier previously worked as

a cashier at both Wendy’s and the Salvation Army. Hillier’s past work experience,

in combination with the absence of any evidence showing any mental deterioration

since Hillier worked at Wendy’s and the Salvation Army, demonstrate Hillier has the

mental capacity to work as a cashier. Cf. Jones, 315 F.3d at 979 (concluding a

claimant had the mental capacity to perform work, even though the work exceeded the

claimant’s skill level according to the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, based on the

claimant’s prior work history). The vocational expert’s testimony adequately

responded to the hypothetical question posed by the ALJ, and Hillier’s job history

supported a conclusion Hillier’s mental limitations did not preclude her from working

as a cashier. 

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the judgment of the district court. 

______________________________

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