Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-13-01222/USCOURTS-caDC-13-01222-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Federal Aviation Administration
Respondent
Anthony F. Shelley
Appointed Amicus Curiae for Appellant
Brian Allen Wallaesa
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 15, 2015 Decided June 10, 2016

No. 13-1222

BRIAN ALLEN WALLAESA,

PETITIONER

v.

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,

RESPONDENT

On Petition for Review of an Order of 

the Federal Aviation Administration

Adam P. Feinberg, appointed by the court, argued the 

cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Anthony F. 

Shelley, appointed by the court, and Aiysha S. Hussain.

Brian A. Wallaesa, pro se, was on the brief for petitioner. 

Lewis S. Yelin, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 

argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were 

Benjamin C. Mizer, Acting Assistant Attorney General, 

Vincent H. Cohen, Jr., Acting U.S. Attorney, Sharon Swingle, 

Attorney, and John C. Stuart Jr., Attorney, Federal Aviation 

Administration.

Before: BROWN and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and 

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.

USCA Case #13-1222 Document #1618604 Filed: 06/10/2016 Page 1 of 24
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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge BROWN.

BROWN, Circuit Judge: In the catalog of human 

endeavors, few activities are as fragile as flight. The air 

offers no mercy for mistakes and no second chances. Flight

is, as Winston Churchill observed, “an extremely dangerous, 

jealous and exacting mistress,” demanding unfettered 

attention and respect. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, THOUGHTS 

AND ADVENTURES 128 (Leo Cooper pub., 1990). In that 

unforgiving environment, otherwise minor disruptions may 

threaten major damage. 

In line with that reality, the Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA or Agency), charged with “promot[ing] 

safe flight of civil aircraft,” 49 U.S.C. § 44701(a), has long 

prohibited conduct aboard commercial flights that interferes

with crewmember duties, see 14 C.F.R. § 121.580. In the 

determination now on review, the FAA Administrator 

assessed a civil penalty against Brian Wallaesa for violating 

that rule aboard a Southwest Airlines flight in 2009. 

Aided by court-appointed amicus curiae, Wallaesa raises

multiple challenges to the Administrator’s determination. In 

particular, Wallaesa claims that the FAA lacks authority to 

proscribe non-violent, disruptive conduct and to initiate civil 

penalty proceedings against passengers. In view of the FAA’s 

broad statutory authority over aviation safety, and mindful of 

the precariousness of human flight, we reject those 

contentions and deny the petition for review. 

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I

A

On November 6, 2009, Wallaesa, a passenger on 

Southwest Airlines flight 3049 from Baltimore to Las Vegas,

struck up a conversation in the boarding line with a female

passenger, Jaime T. Once onboard, Jaime sat in the third row

aisle seat on the captain’s side.1 Wallaesa joined her, taking 

the window seat. After another passenger took the middle 

seat, Wallaesa switched seats with him. Before lifting off, the 

crew delivered the by-now familiar safety briefing, instructing 

passengers to keep their seatbelts fastened while the fasten 

seatbelt sign was illuminated and to follow crewmember 

instructions. See 14 C.F.R. § 121.571 (specifying 

requirements for pre-flight safety briefings). 

What began as innocuous “plane chatter” between 

Wallaesa and Jaime fast became an annoyance. Amicus 

Curiae Appendix (A.A.) 143. Wallaesa asked questions, and

Jaime “parried with polite attempts to end the conversation.” 

Id. at 7. Trying to tune him out, Jaime put on headphones and 

opened a book. Wallaesa did not take the hint. He tapped her 

on the shoulder and asked whether she would mind if he put 

his arm around her. She did mind, telling him “that is weird 

and uncomfortable,” and that she had a boyfriend. Id. at 144. 

Not long after, Wallaesa again tapped Jaime’s shoulder. 

He wanted to ask a “corny” question. Id. at 146. She told 

him not to ask, reminding him that she had a boyfriend. 

Wallaesa asked anyway, wanting to know whether he could 

“hold something beautiful today.” Id. Jaime told him he

 1 The captain’s side is the left side, looking toward the front of the 

aircraft. 

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crossed the line. She got up and exchanged seats with a 

passenger across the aisle in the middle seat of row two. She

also flagged down a flight attendant, Wendy Moorman, and 

relayed what happened. 

Moorman brought Wallaesa to the back of the plane. She 

explained that his behavior made Jaime uncomfortable. 

Wallaesa expressed surprise. He told Moorman that he loved

Jaime, “and that she was the one for him.” Id. at 194. 

Moorman told him to take his seat and not to talk to Jaime 

again. Wallaesa complied with the first instruction, returning 

to his seat. But a few minutes later, he was back up, walking 

across the aisle to speak to Jaime. Moorman brought him to 

the back of the plane a second time, again instructing him not 

to speak to her. Tearful and upset, Wallaesa returned to his 

seat. Soon, the same pattern repeated itself: Wallaesa left his 

seat to talk to Jaime, Moorman intercepted him, and brought 

him to the back. She reiterated her earlier instructions. 

Wallaesa appeared angry, his eyes wide with agitation.

Moorman decided to reseat him, having him switch places 

with passengers in row eighteen. 

About an hour away from Las Vegas, the captain turned 

on the fasten seatbelt sign in anticipation of turbulence. He 

likewise instructed the flight attendants to take their seats. 

Moorman fastened her seatbelt in the front of the aircraft. 

Another flight attendant, Robert Dumond, took his seat in the 

back. A short time later, Wallaesa stood up and walked 

briskly to the front of the aircraft. Unfastening his seat belt, 

Dumond chased after him. Moorman did the same from the 

front. They caught up with him around aisle five. Dumond 

grabbed his arm, telling him he needed to sit down. “I want 

to talk to her,” Wallaesa replied. Id. at 246. 

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Taking him to the front, the flight attendants asked him 

multiple times to return to his seat, noting that everyone—

crew included—had to remain seated with seatbelts fastened. 

Wallaesa refused each request. Dumond would later explain 

that the confrontation had become a “security situation.” Id.

at 248. Flight attendants are trained to protect the cockpit, 

which was only steps away from the ongoing standoff. Those 

security protocols in mind, Dumond stood with his back to the 

cockpit door. 

Moorman called the captain, who asked whether she 

needed to summon an FBI Special Agent onboard who had 

earlier identified himself to the crew. Moorman said she 

needed the help. She waved to FBI Agent James Mollica, 

who came forward to assist. Introducing himself as a law 

enforcement officer, Agent Mollica asked Wallaesa to follow 

the flight attendant’s instructions to return to his seat. 

Unfazed, Wallaesa refused to go back until he could talk to 

Jaime. 

Agent Mollica upped the ante, telling Wallaesa that he 

could do this the easy way or the hard way: the hard way, he 

said, would involve handcuffs. Wallaesa said he did not care:

he simply had to speak with Jaime. Having chosen the hard 

way, Agent Mollica handcuffed him. The flight attendants 

cleared a row of seats, moving the occupants elsewhere. 

Meanwhile, Wallaesa began yelling that he loved Jaime, 

blaming the crew for keeping him from her. 

Eventually he stopped yelling. Agent Mollica walked 

Wallaesa toward the cleared row of seats. But Wallaesa 

would not sit down, leaning back against Agent Mollica’s 

body. Agent Mollica overpowered him, pushing his body

onto the seats. By the time Wallaesa was finally subdued, 

roughly twenty-five minutes remained until touchdown. Once 

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on the ground, law enforcement officials met the plane at the 

gate. 

B

The FAA initiated civil penalty proceedings against 

Wallaesa in February 2010. In a Notice of Proposed Civil 

Penalty, the Agency sought a $5,500 penalty for interfering 

with crewmember duties in violation of 14 C.F.R. § 121.580 

(Interference Rule). See A.A. 33. The charge covered only

the last hour of the flight while the fasten seatbelt sign was 

illuminated. 

After Wallaesa requested an informal conference, the 

FAA realized it had “inadvertently omitted” two other

violations: one for failing to fasten a seatbelt while the fasten 

seatbelt sign was illuminated (14 C.F.R. § 121.317(f)), and 

the other for failing to follow crewmember instructions to 

comply with the fasten-seatbelt rule (14 C.F.R. 

§ 121.317(k)).2

 A.A. 35. In April 2010, the FAA added those 

charges in an Amended Notice of Proposed Civil Penalty, 

leaving the proposed penalty amount and the factual 

allegations unchanged. Two months later, in June, the FAA 

issued a substantively identical Final Notice of Proposed Civil 

Penalty. 

Wallaesa exercised his right to request a hearing. In 

response, the FAA issued a complaint reiterating the same 

charges and factual allegations. At a one-day hearing in May 

2012, four witnesses testified for the FAA: Jaime (by video 

deposition), Moorman, Dumond and an FAA aviation safety 

inspector. Proceeding pro se, Wallaesa testified on his own 

 2 We will collectively refer to these prohibitions as the Seatbelt 

Rules. 

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behalf and called no other witnesses. Wallaesa advanced a 

theory that a medical emergency—perhaps caused by 

medications for anxiety and depression—caused his erratic 

behavior. See id. at 309–13. 

At the close of the evidence, the Administrative Law 

Judge (ALJ) determined Wallaesa violated each of the 

charged regulations. The medical emergency defense was 

unpersuasive. The ALJ construed that argument as an 

affirmative defense, which Wallaesa bore the burden of 

proving. See id. at 10; 14 C.F.R. § 13.224(c). By offering no 

evidence of a medical emergency beyond his own testimony,

Wallaesa failed to meet his burden. See A.A. 10. The ALJ

imposed a penalty of $3,300 for violating the Interference 

Rule, accepting the FAA’s contention that the other violations 

did not merit a penalty. Wallaesa appealed to the FAA 

Administrator, who affirmed the ALJ’s findings and 

conclusions. 

Wallaesa subsequently filed a petition for review. We 

have jurisdiction to consider his petition under 49 U.S.C. 

§ 46301(g) and 49 U.S.C. § 46110.3

 

 3 After oral argument in this case, Wallaesa filed a petition under 

Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. Filing for bankruptcy 

ordinarily triggers an automatic stay of “the commencement or 

continuation . . . of a judicial, administrative, or other action or 

proceeding against the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1). But 

Congress excluded certain actions from the automatic stay, 

including actions by “a governmental unit” intended “to enforce 

such governmental unit’s . . . police and regulatory power.” Id.

§ 362(b)(4). Having reviewed supplemental briefing on the issue, 

we conclude the regulatory power exception applies here. The 

FAA is a governmental unit, see 11 U.S.C. § 101(27) (defining 

“governmental unit”), and the civil penalty proceeding against 

Wallaesa enforced the Agency’s regulatory powers over matters of 

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II

The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) governs our 

review. See City of Santa Monica v. FAA, 631 F.3d 550, 554 

(D.C. Cir. 2011). Agency findings of fact are conclusive 

when supported by substantial evidence. 49 U.S.C. 

§ 46110(c). Nonfactual determinations will be overturned 

“only if they are ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,

or otherwise not in accordance with the law.’” City of Santa 

Monica, 631 F.3d at 554 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)). By 

statute, we “may consider an objection to an order of the . . . 

Administrator only if the objection was made in the 

proceeding conducted by the . . . Administrator,” absent some 

“reasonable ground for not making the objection.” 49 U.S.C. 

§ 46110(d). Before proceeding to the merits, we address the 

import of this statutory exhaustion requirement.

4

Wallaesa filed his petition for review pro se. This court 

appointed counsel as amicus curiae to assist Wallaesa “for the 

limited purpose of presenting arguments in favor of 

petitioner’s position concerning whether the FAA has 

authority to impose civil penalties on passengers under 49 

 

safety, see H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 342 (1977) (identifying safety

as an object of police and regulatory powers). Therefore, the 

automatic stay does not apply to the civil penalty assessment or to 

Wallaesa’s petition challenging that determination.

4 The government’s brief did not discuss section 46110(d), relying 

instead on general principles of exhaustion. See Resp. Br. 31 n.7. 

But the statutory exhaustion requirement “is not ‘waived’ simply 

because the [government] fails to invoke it.” EEOC v. FLRA, 476 

U.S. 19, 23 (1986). Section 46110(d), like the exhaustion 

requirement at issue in EEOC v. FLRA, “speaks to courts, not 

parties, and its plain language evinces an intent that the [FAA] shall 

pass upon issues arising under the Act, thereby bringing its 

expertise to bear on the resolution of those issues.” Id. 

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U.S.C. § 46301(a)(5)(A).” A.A. 346. Section 46301 provides 

that “[a]n individual (except an airman serving as an airman) 

or small business concern is liable to the Government for a 

civil penalty of not more than $10,000 for violating (i) . . . 

chapter 447 . . . ; or (ii) a regulation prescribed or order issued 

under any provision to which clause (i) applies.” 49 U.S.C. 

§ 46301(a)(5)(A). 

Amicus’s brief focuses on the statutory subclauses, 

noting that the FAA justified the Interference Rule based on 

its authority under chapter 447. Amicus maintains that 

chapter 447 does not authorize the regulation of non-violent 

passenger conduct. Because the Interference Rule proscribes

non-violent passenger conduct, so the argument goes, it is 

ultra vires, and the penalty imposed against Wallaesa must be 

set aside. Section 46110(d) poses no bar to our considering 

this argument. Before the Administrator and this court, 

Wallaesa argued that chapter 447 “[a]pplies to requirements 

of Pilots and Aircraft to Conform to Safety Standards,” not to 

passengers. Resp. App. Br. 8, FAA v. Wallaesa (Oct. 26, 

2012) (No. CP10WP0010); Pet. Br. 9. That claim sufficiently 

includes the argument amicus now makes on Wallaesa’s 

behalf. 

Amicus raises several other issues, however, that

Wallaesa did not present to the Administrator.

5

 As a matter 

of first principles, court-appointed amici enjoy relatively wide 

latitude to raise arguments not addressed on appeal by pro se 

parties. See Bowie v. Maddox, 642 F.3d 1122, 1135 n.6 (D.C. 

 5 In particular, amicus contends that the Interference Rule and a set 

of regulations governing civil penalty proceedings, see 14 C.F.R. 

§ 13.14–16, were promulgated without adequate notice and 

comment. Amicus also argues that Wallaesa’s conduct falls outside 

of the FAA’s governing interpretation of the Interference Rule or, if 

not, that the Interference Rule is impermissibly vague.

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Cir. 2011). Indeed, “[i]t is precisely because an untrained pro 

se party may be unable to identify and articulate the 

potentially meritorious arguments in his case that we 

sometimes exercise our discretion to appoint amici.” Id.

Raising new arguments is one thing—raising new issues

is entirely another. “It is a hard and fast rule of administrative 

law, rooted in simple fairness, that issues not raised before an 

agency are waived and will not be considered by a court on 

review.” Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 

1297 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (emphasis added); see Nat’l Wildlife 

Fed’n v. EPA, 286 F.3d 554, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“[T]here is 

a near absolute bar against raising new issues—factual or 

legal—on appeal in the administrative context.”). That 

principle binds both parties and amici, whether courtappointed or not. It holds special force where, as here, an

appeal follows adversarial administrative proceedings in 

which parties are expected to present issues material to their 

case. In that setting, “the rationale for requiring issue 

exhaustion is at its greatest,” Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 110 

(2000), and the appetite of appellate courts to consider new 

issues at its nadir. Because Wallaesa did not raise these 

additional issues before the FAA, and no reasonable grounds 

excused that failure, we decline to address them. See 49 

U.S.C. § 46110(d).

Having whittled down the field of issues, five remain for 

our consideration: (1) whether the FAA has authority to 

prohibit passengers from interfering with crewmember duties, 

and to impose civil penalties on passengers; (2) whether the 

FAA unlawfully added charges for violating the Seatbelt 

Rules; (3) whether substantial evidence supported the finding 

that Wallaesa violated the charges; (4) whether Wallaesa 

proved an affirmative defense; and (5) whether the penalty

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amount improperly reflected guidance in an FAA order. We 

address each in turn. 

III

We first consider challenges to the FAA’s claim of 

statutory authority to prohibit passenger interference and to 

enforce the prohibition with civil penalties. We begin with a 

brief statutory history of federal aviation regulation. 

A

In 1903, the Wright Flyer leapt into the air and onto the 

pages of history. In 1926, as commercial and military 

applications of aviation evolved exponentially, Congress 

entered the fray, federalizing air traffic rules and authorizing 

certain regulations related to aviation safety. See Air 

Commerce Act of 1926, ch. 344, 44 Stat. 568. Little more 

than a decade later, Congress increased federal oversight of 

aviation safety in the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 

52 Stat. 973. The Act created the Civil Aeronautics Authority 

and charged it with prescribing, “Such reasonable rules and 

regulations, or minimum standards, governing other practices, 

methods, and procedure, as the Authority may find necessary 

to provide adequately for safety in air commerce.” Ch. 601, 

52 Stat. 973, 1008. Even with these developments, no single 

agency exercised centralized control over aviation regulation. 

Instead, a diffuse patchwork of executive branch actors 

claimed some role in the field. See H.R. Rep. No. 85-2360, at 

3743–44 (1958). 

That splintered arrangement did not last long. In 1958, 

following a rash of aircraft accidents, Congress 

“consolidate[d] regulatory authority” in a new agency, the 

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Sikkelee v. 

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Precision Airmotive Corp., No. 14-4193, 2016 WL 1567236, 

at *1 (3d Cir. Apr. 19, 2016). Section 601(a)(6) of the

Federal Aviation Act of 1958 transferred to the FAA 

Administrator the authority to make rules “necessary to 

provide adequately for national security and safety in air 

commerce.” Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731, 775. In 1994, 

Congress recodified that provision “without substantive 

change” at 49 U.S.C. § 44701(a)(5). H.R. Rep. No. 103-180, 

at 1 (1993). It provides that the Administrator “shall promote 

safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing . . . 

(5) regulations and minimum standards for other practices, 

methods, and procedure the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce and national security.” 49 U.S.C. 

§ 44701(a)(5). 

Three years after the passage of the 1958 Act, a string of 

aircraft hijackings “highlighted” to the FAA the need “to 

provide additional controls over the conduct of passengers in 

order to avoid a serious threat to the safety of flights and 

persons aboard them.” 26 Fed. Reg. 7009, 7009 (Aug. 4, 

1961). Relying on section 601 of the 1958 Act, the FAA 

promulgated a regulation providing that “[n]o person shall 

assault, threaten, intimidate, or interfere with a crewmember 

in the performance of his duties aboard an aircraft being 

operated in air transportation.” Id. That regulation remains in 

force. The current version, codified at 14 C.F.R. § 121.580, is 

substantially the same.6

 6 The modern version simply replaces the phrase “operated in air 

transportation” with the phrase “operated under this part.” 14 

C.F.R. § 121.580. 

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B

Amicus argues the FAA lacks authority under section 

44701(a)(5) to proscribe the non-violent passenger conduct 

regulated by the Interference Rule. Our prior interpretation of 

the statute dictates otherwise. In Bargmann v. Helms, 715

F.2d 638 (D.C. Cir. 1983), we reviewed the FAA’s denial of a 

rulemaking petition seeking to require upgraded medical kits

on commercial aircraft. The FAA had denied the rulemaking 

petition on grounds that it had no authority to require 

upgraded kits. See 715 F.2d at 639–40. “[I]n light of the 

broad statutory mandate under which the FAA operates,” we 

found the FAA’s “attempt to limit” its power “unreasonable.” 

Id. at 642. 

We focused on Congress’s grant of authority in section 

601(a)(6) of the 1958 Act, which authorizes “rules or 

regulations . . . governing other practices, methods, and 

procedure, as the Administrator may find necessary to provide 

adequately for national security and safety in air commerce.” 

Though that language did not “constitute a general welfare 

clause, giving the FAA authority over virtually all aspects of 

life on board commercial aircraft,” we determined that its

“proper scope . . . must comport with the broad language in 

which Congress couched its delegation of authority.” Id.

That broad language conveyed a clear meaning: “The Act, by 

its terms, empowers the Administrator to promulgate 

regulations reasonably related to safety in flight.” Id.

(emphasis added). 

Legislative history supported that conclusion. The 1958 

Act gave “the FAA ‘plenary authority to [m]ake and enforce 

safety regulations governing the design and operation of civil 

aircraft’ in order to ensure the ‘maximum possible safety.’” 

Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 85-2360, at 3741–42); see id.

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(“The 1938 and 1958 Acts have been construed to embody a 

‘comprehensive scheme for the regulation of the safety aspect 

of aviation.’”) (quoting Pike v. CAB, 303 F.2d 353, 355 (8th 

Cir. 1962) (Blackmun, J.)). Against that backdrop, we had 

“no doubt” the FAA had authority to mandate upgraded

medical kits. Id. Medical equipment satisfied the “minimum 

nexus” to safety in flight, implicating “the personal safety of 

the stricken passengers” and crew. Id. As a result, we 

reversed and remanded the FAA’s denial of rulemaking 

authority. See id. at 642–43. 

The FAA justified the Interference Rule under 49 U.S.C. 

§ 44701(a)(5), the same authority we examined in Bargmann. 

Applying the rubric we set out in Bargmann, we agree with 

the FAA that the Interference Rule reasonably relates to 

safety in flight.

To begin, preventing passenger interference is no less 

related to safety in flight than the quality of onboard medical 

equipment. Without robust medical equipment, the crew 

could not adequately care for ill passengers. And without a 

prohibition on interference, the crew could not maintain the 

“calm, safe and orderly environment” vital to commercial air 

travel. See A.A. 30. 

To put this predicament in perspective, consider the 

following reported incidents of passenger misbehavior, which 

include

a passenger urinating on another passenger; an 

investment banker defecating on a food cart in response 

to not being served another glass of wine; . . . a passenger 

grabbing a flight attendant’s neck after being told to put 

his cigarette out; an enraged passenger attempting to 

enter the cockpit after being told he was whistling too 

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loudly; a passenger disrobing and proceeding to destroy 

the lavatory and fight with another passenger; and four 

members of a flight crew being physically assaulted by a 

passenger after the passenger had been refused a 

sandwich.

Tory A. Weigand, Air Rage and Legal Pitfalls for State-Based 

Claims Challenging Airline Regulation of Passenger Conduct 

During Flight, BOSTON B.J., May–June 2001, at 10. As those 

examples colorfully suggest, passenger interference bears a 

nexus to flight safety. Disruptive behavior sows distraction 

and chaos in an environment where law and order is 

paramount, potentially preventing the crew from executing 

emergency procedures or reaching passengers in need. See, 

e.g., Evgeniy V. Ignatov, FAA Order No. 96-6, 1996 WL 

210098, at *2 (Feb. 13, 1996) (observing “that flight 

attendants are responsible for” passenger safety and that 

“passengers must follow the directions given by flight 

attendants, because law and order in an enclosed capsule at 

30,000 feet must be maintained”); United States v. Hicks, 980 

F.2d 963, 972 (5th Cir. 1992) (“The potential for disaster 

being so great, even the more mundane duties of flight 

attendants which implicate safety cannot be taken for 

granted.”). 

Disruptive behavior need not be violent to interfere with 

crewmember duties. To offer only two potential examples, 

imagine a seated passenger loudly played a portable boombox 

and refused to wear headphones, forcing crewmembers to 

intervene.7 Alternatively, imagine that a passenger blocked

 7 This hypothetical actually happened. In 1991, several passengers 

on a flight from Montego Bay, Jamaica to Houston, Texas blasted a 

boombox radio, and indignantly refused multiple requests from 

flight attendants to wear headphones or turn it off. Hicks, 980 F.2d 

at 965–68. In language representative of the incident, one of the 

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the aisle, obstinately declining requests to move. Both 

examples could theoretically constitute interference and 

jeopardize flight safety, even though neither one involved 

violence or the threat of violence (and, in the first example, 

the offending passenger never left his seat).

It comes as no surprise, then, that the FAA has assessed 

penalties for non-violent but disruptive passenger behavior. 

In one case, a passenger refused to fasten his seatbelt, loudly 

bickered with a flight attendant, and refused to return the 

attendant’s security badge after she let him review it. See

David G. Stout, FAA Order No. 98-12, 1998 WL 348025, at 

*1–4 (June 11, 1998). In another, a passenger angrily rejected 

requests to turn off his personal electronic device and verbally 

abused a flight attendant. See Hillard Abroms, FAA Order 

No. 2008-2, 2008 WL 345387, at *1–3, *5–6 (Jan. 28, 2008). 

These examples highlight a basic reality: without some 

means of controlling disruptive passenger behavior, the FAA 

could not hope to promote—much less to provide for—the 

safety of passengers “encased in a metal capsule hurtling 

through the air.” Ignatov, 1996 WL 210098, at *2. 

Promoting aviation safety is the touchstone of the 1958 Act, 

and the FAA’s surpassing responsibility. That mandate runs 

throughout the Act from top to bottom. Congress commanded 

that safety and security would hold “the highest priorities in 

air commerce.” 49 U.S.C. § 40101(d)(1). And when 

 

passengers told an attendant “to get her ‘ass[] back there and do 

[her] job to get them something to eat and drink.’” Id. at 966. 

None of the misbehaving passengers “committed assault or battery 

or verbally threatened” anyone. Id. at 968. Even so, the Fifth 

Circuit upheld their criminal convictions for interfering with 

crewmember duties by way of intimidation. See id. at 975. The 

court had no difficulty concluding that the outrageous—but nonviolent—behavior interfered with crewmember duties. See id. 

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prescribing regulations under section 44701, the 

Administrator must first consider “the duty of an air carrier to 

provide service with the highest possible degree of safety in 

the public interest.” Id. § 44701(d)(1)(A). By prohibiting 

behavior that puts at risk the safety of flight, the FAA has

satisfied our inquiry in Bargmann and acted within the 

bounds of its statutory mandate. 

Amicus lodges three counterarguments, none of which 

have purchase. The first claims that non-violent passenger 

behavior does not constitute a practice, method, or procedure 

under section 44701(a)(5). That is a red herring. A

prohibition on such conduct may itself be a practice, method, 

or procedure. Taking that view does not open the provision to 

abuse. Bargmann requires that rules promulgated pursuant to 

section 44701(a)(5) relate to safety in flight. Consider a rule 

requiring crewmembers to wear socks of a certain color. That 

mandate may well qualify as a “practice,” but the FAA may 

have difficulty justifying it as related to safety in flight. 

Amicus next employs the ejusdem generis canon to argue

that section 44701(a)(5) must bear a meaning similar to the 

four subparts that precede it. That canon “limits general 

terms which follow specific ones to matters similar to those 

specified.” Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 128 (1936). 

Amicus suggests the preceding subparts in section 44701

relate solely to matters “involving the physical aircraft or air 

carrier personnel.” Amicus Br. 20. According to amicus, the 

fifth subpart, concerning practices and procedures “the 

Administrator finds necessary for safety,” cannot reach the 

separate matter of passenger conduct. 

We disagree. First, the ejusdem generis “canon does not 

control . . . when the whole context dictates a different 

conclusion.” Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Am. Train Dispatchers 

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Ass’n, 499 U.S. 117, 129 (1991). That rule of thumb applies 

here. As we held in Bargmann, section 44701’s broad 

language conveys broad authority. The subpart at issue, 

(a)(5), provides authority to make rules reasonably related to 

flight safety. It will not tolerate the narrower ambit amicus 

seeks to impose. Second, even if the canon applied, the 

Interference Rule would fall within the parameters amicus 

suggests. As the earlier analysis reveals, passenger 

interference necessarily involves the safety of the “physical 

aircraft or air carrier personnel.” 

In the third counterargument, amicus contends that 

Congress implicitly barred the FAA from outlawing 

passenger misbehavior when it enacted a statute criminalizing 

limited forms of interference, 49 U.S.C. § 46504. Section 

46504 applies to “[a]n individual . . . who, by assaulting or 

intimidating a flight crew member or flight attendant of the 

aircraft, interferes with the performance of the duties of the 

member or attendant or lessens the ability of the member or 

attendant to perform those duties.” 49 U.S.C. § 46504. 

We refuse to the draw the strained inference proposed by 

amicus. Section 46504 pertains only to interference by way 

of assault or intimidation, a much narrower slice of conduct 

than the Interference Rule’s comprehensive prohibition on

interference with crewmember duties. We fail to see how 

Congress, in carving out as criminal a small universe of 

conduct, forbade sub silentio the FAA from proscribing less 

serious conduct that is nevertheless detrimental to safety in 

flight. Cf. Tex. Rural Legal Aid, Inc. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 

940 F.2d 685, 694 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“[A] congressional 

prohibition of particular conduct may actually support the 

view that the administrative entity can exercise its authority to 

eliminate a similar danger.”). 

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In sum, “we have no doubt” that proscribing passenger 

interference with crewmember duties satisfies the “minimum 

nexus” to safety in flight required by Bargmann. See 715 

F.2d at 642. We therefore reject amicus’s argument. 

C

Wallaesa next argues that the FAA lacks authority to 

impose civil penalties on passengers. The relevant statute

reads as follows: 

(A) An individual (except an airman serving as an 

airman) or small business concern is liable to the Government 

for a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 for violating—

 (i) . . . chapter 447 (except sections 44717-44723); or

 (ii) a regulation prescribed or order issued under any 

 provision to which clause (i) of this paragraph applies.

49 U.S.C. § 46301(a)(5)(A). 

Because statutory text is the ultimate measuring stick of 

statutory meaning, we start there. Section 46301 applies to 

“individual[s],” a term the statute does not define. When 

Congress leaves a term undefined, “we look first to the 

word’s ordinary meaning.” Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 

132 S. Ct. 1702, 1706 (2012). For that task, we have some 

help. The Supreme Court recently considered the meaning of 

“individual” in the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), 

which also left the word undefined. See id. The Court turned 

first to dictionaries. “As a noun, ‘individual’ ordinarily 

means ‘[a] human being, a person.’” Id. at 1707 (quoting 

7 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 880 (2d ed. 1989)); see also, 

e.g., WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY

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1152 (1986) (“a particular person”); BLACK’S LAW 

DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“a single person or thing”). 

Everyday parlance confirmed that common sense 

understanding. “We say ‘the individual went to the store,’ 

‘the individual left the room,’ and ‘the individual took the 

car,’ each time referring unmistakably to a natural person.” 

Mohamad, 132 S. Ct. at 1707. While Congress “remains free, 

as always, to give the word a broader or different meaning,” 

“there must be some indication Congress intended such a 

result.” Id. In the TVPA, the Court found no such contrary

indication.

 

A similar analysis applies here. Left undefined, the term 

“individual” in section 46301 carries its ordinary meaning, 

referring to a natural person. Very plainly, an airline 

passenger is a natural person not serving as an airman.8

 See

49 U.S.C. § 46301(a)(5)(A). No evidence supports a broader 

or different meaning. 

If anything, statutory context reinforces our reading. In 

section 46301(d)(5)(B), Congress provided special privileges 

for some, but not all, “individuals.” Specifically, “[a]n 

individual acting as a pilot, flight engineer, mechanic, or 

repairman may appeal” a civil penalty order to the National 

Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). 49 U.S.C.

§ 46301(d)(5)(B). Individuals not acting in those positions—

all other natural persons—have no right to appeal to the 

NTSB. Wallaesa is therefore mistaken to suggest the term 

individual includes only “operators of the service.” See Pet. 

 8 Congress defined “airman” to mean, among other things, “an 

individual . . . in command, or as pilot, mechanic, or member of the 

crew, who navigates aircraft when under way.” 49 U.S.C. 

§ 40102(a)(8)(A).

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Br. 10. If Congress had intended that narrow meaning, it 

knew how to say so. Cf. Conn. Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 

U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992) (“[A] legislature says in a statute 

what it means and means in a statute what it says.”). 

 

It is true that Congress sometimes refers to passenger 

conduct directly. In language familiar to anyone who has 

flown, section 46301(b)(1) provides that “[a] passenger may 

not tamper with, disable, or destroy a smoke alarm device 

located in a lavatory on an aircraft providing air 

transportation.” 49 U.S.C. § 46301(b)(1). While the 

prohibition in (b)(1) speaks to passengers, the penalty 

provision in (b)(2) instead addresses individuals: “An 

individual violating this subsection is liable . . . for a civil 

penalty of not more than $2,000.” Id. § 46301(b)(2)

(emphasis added). This juxtaposition must mean that the term 

individual includes passengers. Were it otherwise, the penalty 

provision would have no effect, authorizing fines against a 

class of persons not subject to the prohibition. 

We conclude that the ordinary meaning of “individual” 

applies, and that passengers naturally fall within that 

understanding. Any discussion of “legislative history is 

unnecessary in light of the statute’s unambiguous language.” 

Mohamad, 132 S. Ct. at 1709. 

IV

In this section, we consider four challenges to decisions 

made by the ALJ and the Administrator. We reject each one. 

A

The FAA originally charged Wallaesa with violating the 

Interference Rule. When Wallaesa requested an informal 

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conference, the Agency realized it had omitted violations of 

the Seatbelt Rules, and added them in an amended notice. 

The factual allegations and proposed penalty amount 

remained the same. Wallaesa alleges the Agency improperly 

added the new violations. As did the government, we read 

Wallaesa’s challenge to suggest he received inadequate 

notice. 

That argument fails. “The Due Process Clause and the 

APA require that an agency setting a matter for hearing 

provide parties with adequate notice of the issues that would 

be considered, and ultimately resolved, at that hearing.” Pub.

Serv. Comm’n of Ky. v. FERC, 397 F.3d 1004, 1012 (D.C. 

Cir. 2005) (Roberts, J.); see 5 U.S.C. § 554(b)(3) (“Persons 

entitled to notice of an agency hearing shall be timely 

informed of . . . the matters of fact and law asserted.”). 

Wallaesa received three separate notifications of the 

additional charges: an Amended Notice of Proposed Civil 

Penalty, a Final Notice of Proposed Civil Penalty, and a 

formal Complaint. The Complaint issued in July 2010—

nearly two years before Wallaesa’s administrative hearing in

May 2012. On these facts, Wallaesa had more than adequate 

notice. Neither the Due Process Clause nor the APA requires

anything more. 

B

The final cluster of challenges centers on the 

Administrator’s determination that Wallaesa violated the 

Interference Rule and the Seatbelt Rules. That determination 

stands if supported by substantial evidence, “mean[ing] such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.” Consol. Edison Co. v. 

NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). 

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Substantial evidence supported the finding that Wallaesa 

violated the Seatbelt Rules. Multiple eyewitnesses testified 

that Wallaesa left his seat after the captain activated the fasten 

seatbelt sign, strode toward the front of the aircraft, and 

refused multiple requests to return to his seat. The 

Administrator appropriately found that conduct in violation of 

14 C.F.R. § 121.317(f), which requires passengers to remain 

seated while the fasten seatbelt sign is activated, and 14 

C.F.R. § 121.317(k), which requires passengers to follow 

crewmember instructions concerning compliance with the 

seatbelt sign. 

Substantial evidence likewise supported the finding 

concerning the Interference Rule, 14 C.F.R. § 121.580. As 

the Administrator concluded, the flight attendants were 

obligated “to obey the instructions of the pilot” to remain 

seated and “to maintain a calm, safe and orderly 

environment.” A.A. 30. Wallaesa directly interfered with 

those duties. By marching to the front of the aircraft and 

repeatedly ignoring crew instructions, Wallaesa effectively 

forced the crew to stand during a potentially turbulent descent 

in violation of the captain’s command to remain seated. And 

he disrupted the crew’s ability to provide a safe and orderly 

environment, triggering a standoff ended only by the 

intervention of law enforcement. In short, adequate evidence 

supported the finding that Wallaesa violated the Interference 

Rule. 

Wallaesa raises two final issues. In the first, he 

challenges the Administrator’s finding that he failed to prove 

an affirmative defense. We find no reason to disturb that

determination. Wallaesa bore the burden to prove his

affirmative defense, see 14 C.F.R. § 13.224(c), but failed to 

introduce any evidence beyond his self-serving, 

uncorroborated testimony. 

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Finally, Wallaesa contends that the amount of his civil 

penalty improperly reflected the FAA’s guidance on 

administrative penalties contained in FAA Order No. 

2150.3B. According to Wallaesa, that order “has no basis in 

U.S. code” and is not mentioned in the Agency’s civil penalty 

regulations. Pet. Br. 8. Wallaesa misses the mark. FAA 

Order 2150.3B simply articulates “the general policy the FAA 

intends to apply in selecting the types of sanctions . . . and 

specific sanction amounts to impose in legal enforcement 

actions for typical violations of the FAA’s statute and 

regulations.” FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, ORDER 

NO. 2150.3B, FAA COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 

PROGRAM 7-1 (2007). In this case, the ALJ set a penalty 

amount “based upon his analysis of sanctions imposed in past 

cases involving similar violations,” not on the general 

guidance contained in FAA Order No. 2150.3B. A.A. 26; see 

also id. at 27 (noting that the $3,300 penalty imposed “was 

below the recommended range” of $4,400 to $11,000). We 

reject Wallaesa’s challenge. 

V

Finding no merit in Wallaesa’s challenges, we deny the 

petition for review. 

 So ordered.

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