Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03763/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03763-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alexander Sandoval
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable David S. Doty, United States District Judge for the District of

Minnesota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-3763

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Minnesota.

Alexander Sandoval, also known as *

Juan Armando Cruz Villa, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: February 7, 2006

Filed: February 13, 2006

___________

Before MELLOY, FAGG, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Alexander Sandoval appeals the 70-month sentence the district court1

 imposed

after he pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute amphetamine, in violation of 21

U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(C) and 846. His counsel has moved to withdraw and filed a brief

under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Sandoval has filed a motion for

appointment of counsel.

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We reject each of the Anders brief arguments. First, we conclude that the

district court did not plainly err in determining that amphetamine was properly

reclassified as a Schedule II controlled substance for Guidelines purposes, resulting

in a statutory maximum of 20 years. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-

37 (1993) (court reviews for plain error claims not raised in district court; plain-error

standard; at minimum, court of appeals cannot correct an error unless it is clear under

current law); cf. United States v. Roark, 924 F.2d 1426, 1428-29 (8th Cir. 1991)

(finding Attorney General and Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs followed

correct procedures and made necessary finding in 1971 to reclassify

methamphetamine as a Schedule II controlled substance).

We also conclude that the district court did not plainly err in finding that a

factual basis existed for Sandoval’s guilty plea, because not only did the written plea

agreement recite a factual basis, but Sandoval acknowledged in the agreement and

testified at the plea hearing that he was pleading guilty to conspiracy to possess with

intent to distribute amphetamine. See United States v. Marks, 38 F.3d 1009, 1012 (8th

Cir. 1994) (factual basis for plea is established when court determines there is

sufficient evidence at time of plea upon which court may reasonably determine that

defendant likely committed offense), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1067 (1995). 

Finally we conclude that the alleged errors under Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 11 do not provide a basis for reversal. See United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S.

55, 58-59 (2002) (defendant who allows Rule 11 error to pass without objection in

trial court must satisfy plain-error rule); United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S.

74, 83 (2004) (defendant seeking reversal of conviction entered upon guilty plea,

based on plain error under Rule 11, must show reasonable probability that, but for

error, he would not have entered plea).

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Having reviewed the record independently under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75,

80 (1988), we have found no nonfrivolous issues. Accordingly, we grant counsel’s

motion to withdraw, deny Sandoval’s motion for appointment of counsel, and affirm.

______________________________

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