Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01838/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01838-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kevin P. Donnelly
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Linda R. Reade, now Chief Judge, United States District Court

for the Northern District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-1838

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States 

v. * District Court for the

* Northern District of Iowa.

Kevin P. Donnelly, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: October 17, 2006

Filed: February 5, 2007

___________

Before WOLLMAN, RILEY, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Kevin Donnelly entered a conditional plea of guilty to a charge of knowingly

and intentionally possessing pseudoephedrine pills with knowledge or reasonable

cause to believe that the pseudoephedrine would be used to manufacture

methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2). The district court1

 sentenced

him to 108 months in prison, to be followed by three years of supervised release.

Donnelly now appeals, arguing that the evidence should have been suppressed; he also

contends that his sentence is unreasonable. We affirm.

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I. Background

On July 12, 2003, at 10:50 a.m., Donnelly’s car sideswiped a semi-truck on

westbound Interstate 80 in Cedar County, Iowa. Iowa state Highway Patrol Trooper

Fitzer arrived at the scene at 11:03 a.m. After speaking with Donnelly and the truck

driver, Fitzer learned that Donnelly had fallen asleep at the wheel, crossed into the

other lane of traffic, and sideswiped the truck. All of this occurred on a bright, sunny

day. The truck driver informed Fitzer that Donnelly had not wanted the police to be

called. 

Fitzer observed that although he smelled no alcohol on him, Donnelly had

bloodshot, glazed-over eyes and seemed to be possibly impaired. Moreover, Donnelly

appeared nervous in a manner noticeably different from that of a shaken-up accident

victim. Fitzer asked Donnelly about his origin and destination. Donnelly answered

that he had been driving from Wisconsin to Ottumwa, Iowa, for a family reunion. He

said that he had originally intended to drive to Chicago after the reunion, from where

he would fly to London for a business trip. Because he had forgotten his passport in

Wisconsin, however, he would have to return to Wisconsin to retrieve it prior to

driving to Chicago. Fitzer found it odd that Donnelly did not seem at all perturbed

about having to make additional multi-state trips to recover the forgotten passport. 

Fitzer then proceeded to ask Donnelly a series of twelve questions, pausing

after each to allow an answer. He asked if Donnelly had been traveling with large

amounts of cash, weapons, cocaine, heroin, crank, methamphetamine, marijuana, and

other items of contraband. Donnelly clearly and quickly answered “no” to every

question except for those concerning possession of methamphetamine and marijuana.

On those two questions, “he kind of hesitated and stumbled a little bit in his speech,”

Sentencing Tr. at 16, before denying possession. After Donnelly denied Fitzer’s

request for permission to search his car’s trunk, Fitzer returned to his patrol car at

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The Honorable John A. Jarvey, Chief Magistrate Judge, United States District

Court for the Northern District of Iowa.

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11:15 a.m. and requested that a canine unit trained in detecting controlled substances

be dispatched to the scene.

Officer Neville arrived with his trained drug-sniffing dog, Baron, at 12:14 p.m.

At that time, Fitzer was still completing his police report. After Neville led Baron

around Donnelly’s car, Baron positively indicated controlled substances within the

vehicle. Fitzer searched the car and discovered methamphetamine, marijuana, and

pseudoephedrine tablets. 

Donnelly moved to suppress the drug evidence, arguing that Fitzer had

unconstitutionally seized him by asking him additional questions and by requiring him

to wait for the drug dog in the absence of reasonable suspicion. Both the magistrate

judge2

 and district court found that Fitzer had reasonable suspicion to justify calling

in a canine unit. The district court did not consider the wait for Neville to be

unreasonably long. It also implicitly accepted the magistrate judge’s conclusion that

Baron’s positive indication was sufficiently reliable to establish probable cause

despite evidence that Baron’s record for field accuracy was spotty. Following the

denial of his suppression motion, Donnelly entered a conditional plea of guilty and,

after being awarded a three-level reduction for his acceptance of responsibility and his

rehabilitative efforts, received a sentence falling within the recommended guidelines

range. 

II. Analysis

Donnelly contends that the drug evidence should have been suppressed because

(1) Fitzer lacked reasonable suspicion to question Donnelly about contraband or to

radio for a drug dog and therefore unconstitutionally prolonged his detention, (2) any

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arguably present reasonable suspicion did not justify detaining Donnelly for the 80

minutes it took to complete the sniff, and (3) Baron’s track record did not justify

reliance on his positive indication as a basis for probable cause. He also contends that

his sentence is unreasonable.

A. Denial of the Suppression Motion

We review de novo the district court’s determination that reasonable suspicion

and probable cause existed. United States v. Maltais, 403 F.3d 550, 554 (8th Cir.

2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1345 (2006); United States v. Beck, 140 F.3d 1129,

1133 (8th Cir. 1998). We review the district court’s factual findings under a clearly

erroneous standard. United States v. Lebrun, 261 F.3d 731, 733 (8th Cir. 2001). We

will affirm the denial of a suppression motion “unless we find that the decision is

unsupported by the evidence, based on an erroneous view of the law, or the Court is

left with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” United States v. Madrid,

152 F.3d 1034, 1037 (8th Cir. 1998) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

i. Reasonable Suspicion for Contraband Questions and a Drug-Dog Sniff

Donnelly contends that by questioning him about contraband and by requiring

him to wait for a drug-sniffing dog, Fitzer unreasonably prolonged his detention. We

disagree. To establish an unreasonably prolonged detention, the defendant must show

that the officer detained him beyond the amount of time otherwise justified by the

purpose of the stop and did so without reasonable suspicion. See United States v.

Martin, 411 F.3d 998, 1002 (8th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Jones, 269 F.3d

919, 926 (8th Cir. 2001) (“investigative detention must remain within the scope of the

traffic stop to be reasonable”). We must consider, then, whether Fitzer had a

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to expand the scope of his accident

investigation to include the potential presence of contraband. See Terry v. Ohio, 392

U.S. 1, 30 (1968). 

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For an investigative Terry-type seizure to be constitutional under the Fourth

Amendment, an officer must be aware of “particularized, objective facts which, taken

together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant suspicion that

a crime is being committed.” United States v. Martin, 706 F.2d 263, 265 (8th Cir.

1983); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21. Although a reasonable suspicion requires

more than an “inchoate hunch,” the officer need only “articulate some minimal,

objective justification for an investigatory stop” in order to comply with the Fourth

Amendment. United States v. Fuse, 391 F.3d 924, 929 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing United

States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). “Whether the particular facts known to the

officer amount to an objective and particularized basis for a reasonable suspicion of

criminal activity is determined in light of the totality of the circumstances.” United

States v. Garcia, 23 F.3d 1331, 1334 (8th Cir. 1994). When considering the

circumstances involved, due weight must be given “to the factual inferences drawn

by the law enforcement officer.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002);

cf. United States v. Wallraff, 705 F.2d 980, 988 (8th Cir. 1983) (“conduct which

would be wholly innocent to the untrained observer . . . might acquire significance

when viewed by an agent who is familiar with the practices of drug smugglers and the

methods used to avoid detection” (internal quotations omitted)); Illinois v. Gates, 462

U.S. 213, 232 (1983) (explaining that a court’s review of evidence “must be seen and

weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed

in the field of law enforcement”). 

Donnelly contends that the circumstances gave rise to, at most, a reasonable

suspicion that he was driving while impaired. We disagree. Donnelly’s admission

that he had fallen asleep at the wheel in broad daylight, his glassy, bloodshot eyes,

see United States v. Neeman, 2000 WL 489581, *1 (8th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table

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Officers found Neeman asleep in a car that was parked askew with its lights

on and engine running. After they woke him up, the officers noticed that Neeman had

watery, red eyes. Although Neeman passed the field sobriety tests subsequently

administered to him, the officers continued to detain him while they visually inspected

his vehicle. The officers found marijuana. We held that the detention for the vehicle

inspection was appropriately supported by the suspicious circumstances present.

Neeman, 2000 WL 489581, *1.

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decision),3

 his attempt to avoid police involvement, the nonchalance with which he

recounted to Fitzer an arguably implausible itinerary involving a number of multi-state

trips to recover a forgotten passport, and the nervousness he exhibited, which, in

Fitzer’s experience, appeared to be of a nature atypical of accident victims, see, e.g.,

United States v. Weaver, 966 F.2d 391, 396 (8th Cir. 1992), when combined with the

nature of the accident and the absence of alcohol-based impairment indicia, formed

the basis for a reasonable suspicion that Donnelly may have been transporting and

using drugs. 

Donnelly argues that each of the foregoing factors has an innocent explanation

that should not be combined to form reasonable suspicion. When considered together,

however, otherwise innocent facts can give rise to a reasonable suspicion, especially

when viewed through the perspective of an experienced law enforcement officer.

Lebrun, 261 F.3d at 733; see also Fuse, 391 F.3d at 929; United States v. Linkous, 285

F.3d 716, 720 (8th Cir. 2002). We conclude that this is one of those cases. Given the

totality of the circumstances, then, we conclude that Fitzer possessed a “minimal,

objective justification” for investigating the potential presence of contraband. See

Fuse, 391 F.3d at 929. 

Fitzer’s subsequent contraband questions represented a minimally intrusive way

of addressing his reasonable suspicion; asking them did not, therefore, constitute an

unreasonably prolonged detention. After Donnelly gave noticeably irregular denials

to questions involving methamphetamine and marijuana, Fitzer’s suspicions were

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strengthened rather than alleviated. See United States v. Barahona, 990 F.2d 412, 416

(8th Cir. 1993) (“[I]f the responses of the detainee and the circumstances give rise to

suspicions unrelated to the traffic offense, an officer may broaden his inquiry and

satisfy those suspicions.”). Accordingly, Fitzer possessed a reasonable suspicion

necessary to justify the deployment of a drug-dog to sniff the vehicle.

ii. Reasonable Delay

Donnelly contends that even if Fitzer held a reasonable suspicion that

Donnelly’s car contained drugs, United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709-10 (1983),

requires us to find the detention unconstitutional. Again, we disagree. 

An investigative detention may turn into an arrest if it “lasts for an

unreasonably long time or if officers use unreasonable force.” United States v.

Navarrete-Barron, 192 F.3d 786, 790 (8th Cir. 1999). During an investigative stop,

officers should “employ the least intrusive means of detention and investigation, in

terms of scope and duration, that are reasonably necessary to achieve the purpose” of

the stop. Id.

Although the Supreme Court in Place did declare unreasonable the police’s

seizure of a suspected drug trafficker’s luggage for 90 minutes so that it could be

taken to another airport for a dog-sniff, the decision turned more on the unnecessary

nature of the delay than on its duration. 462 U.S. at 709-10 (noting that the police

knew when Place would arrive and that they would want to investigate his bag;

therefore, they could have arranged for a drug dog’s presence well in advance). We

have considered time an important factor in distinguishing between a legitimate

investigative stop and a de facto arrest, United States v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910, 916

(8th Cir. 1994) (en banc), but we recognize that there is “no rigid time limitation on

[investigative] stops.” United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985); see also

Place, 462 U.S. at 709-10 n.10 (“[W]e question the wisdom of a rigid time limitation.

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In fact, the Supreme Court has lauded the use of drug-sniffing dogs for their

unique ability to directly dispel suspicion quickly and with minimal intrusion. See

Bloomfield, 40 F.3d at 917 n.7 (recognizing that the Supreme Court considers drugdog sniffs “often the fastest and least intrusive method of resolving suspicions during

an investigative stop”); Place, 462 U.S. at 707 (“[i]n these respects, the canine sniff

is sui generis”).

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Such a limit would undermine the . . . important need to allow authorities to graduate

their responses to the demands of any particular situation.”). Accordingly, under the

proper circumstances, we have considered delays for dog-sniffs far in excess of 90

minutes reasonable. See Maltais, 403 F.3d at 557-58 (holding that a three-hour delay

allowing a drug dog to reach the remote location of the investigation was acceptable

because the officers “acted with diligence and pursued the quickest and least intrusive

means of investigation reasonably available to confirm or dispel their . . . suspicions

that [the defendant] was engaged in drug trafficking.”).

Nothing in the record suggests that Fitzer exercised suboptimal diligence in

investigating his suspicion of drugs in Donnelly’s vehicle4

 or that Neville had been

dilatory in mobilizing Baron to the scene, which was a rural section of Interstate 80.

Unlike the officers in Place, who knew well in advance that they would need a drugsniffing dog yet did nothing to ensure one’s presence, Fitzer called in his request for

a drug-dog within twelve minutes of his arrival and immediately after he developed

a reasonable suspicion of narcotics possession and was denied access to Donnelly’s

trunk. Donnelly has not suggested that a similarly trained canine unit could have

reached the scene sooner. Furthermore, we have previously acknowledged that

“[w]hen police need the assistance of a drug dog in roadside Terry stops, it will in

general take time to obtain one. . . .” Bloomfield, 40 F.3d at 917. The constitutional

prohibition against unreasonable seizures does not require “law enforcement officials,

at considerable public expense, to maintain specialized personnel and equipment at

remote locations at all hours of the day and night, or to forgo the timely investigation

of serious offenses as to which they have reasonable, articulable suspicion. . . .”

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Maltais, 403 F.3d at 558. Accordingly, we conclude that the detention was reasonable

in the circumstances presented.

iii. Probable Cause

Donnelly next argues that Baron’s positive indication could not establish

probable cause because Baron lacked a track record of sufficient reliability. We agree

with the government that, under the totality of the circumstances, Baron’s indication

added enough new information to elevate Fitzer’s reasonable suspicion to probable

cause. 

Law enforcement officials require probable cause to search a vehicle without

a warrant. United States v. Ameling, 328 F.3d 443, 448 (8th Cir. 2003). Probable

cause exists where there is a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime

will be found in a particular place.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. Determining whether

probable cause exists at the time of the search is a “commonsense, practical question”

to be judged from the “totality-of-the-circumstances.” Id. at 230. “Probable cause .

. . does not require evidence sufficient to support a conviction, nor even evidence

demonstrating that it is more likely than not that the suspect committed a crime.”

United States v. Mounts 248 F.3d 712, 715 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v.

Sawyer, 224 F.3d 675, 678-79 (7th Cir. 2000)); see also United States v. Carpenter,

462 F.3d 981, 986 (8th Cir. 2006) (pointing out that reasonable suspicion has a lower

threshold than probable cause and a considerably lower threshold than preponderance

of the evidence); Gates, 462 U.S. at 244 n.13.

Assuming that the dog is reliable, a dog sniff resulting in an alert on a container,

car, or other item, standing alone, gives an officer probable cause to believe that there

are drugs present. United States v. Sundby, 186 F.3d 873, 875-76 (8th Cir. 1999). In

finding sufficient the affidavit at issue in Sundby, we declared that “[in order to

establish the dog’s reliability,] the affidavit need only state the dog has been trained

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and certified to detect drugs. . . . An affidavit need not give a detailed account of the

dog’s track record or education.” Id. at 876 (citations omitted). Such statements only

establish the affidavit’s facial validity, however. Id. (holding that the defendant

would have been entitled to a Franks hearing had he shown that officers withheld

negative information casting into doubt the dog’s reliability). 

Because Baron’s performance record raises questions about his reliability,

further inquiry was required. According to the record, non-trace quantities of drugs

are discovered at least fifty-four percent of the time that Baron positively indicates

their presence in the field. Although Baron may not be a model of canine accuracy,

his record is only one of the factors we consider in the totality of the circumstances

calculation. Donnelly does not dispute that Baron received consistent training, that

Baron had been examined and considered competent by independent evaluators, that

he had been properly certified, that he had been considered reliable by prior courts,

and that his accuracy rate exceeded fifty percent. Accordingly, taking into account

the totality of the circumstances present at the scene of the accident, Donnelly’s

behavior and condition, Baron’s history and pedigree, and Baron’s positive indication

of drugs within the vehicle, we conclude that there was a fair probability that

Donnelly’s vehicle contained drugs. Accordingly, Fitzer had probable cause to search

Donnelly’s car pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. See

United States v. Alexander, 448 F.3d 1014, 1017 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 75

USLW 3350 (2007).

B. Donnelly’s Sentence

Donnelly argues that the district court erred in concluding that Donnelly’s

rehabilitative efforts and other positive characteristics had to be atypical to qualify for

a variance and that it failed to give appropriate weight to his rehabilitation.

We review the reasonableness of a defendant’s sentence for abuse of discretion.

United States v. Haack, 403 F.3d 997, 1003 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.

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The factor at issue, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), requires that the court consider the

“nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the

defendant. . . .” 

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276 (2005). Following United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), the advisory

guidelines must be taken into account by the sentencing court, together with the

sentencing factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Id. at 259-60. A sentence

within the guidelines range is presumptively reasonable. United States v. Walker,

439 F.3d 890, 892 (8th Cir. 2006). A sentence may be unreasonable if the sentencing

court failed to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight,

gave significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or considered only the

appropriate factors but committed a clear error of judgment by imposing a sentence

outside of the guidelines range dictated by the facts of the case. Id. 

Donnelly’s contention that the sentence is unreasonable because the district

court failed to give appropriate weight to his rehabilitation is without merit. As the

district court noted, Donnelly already received a three-level reduction from within the

guidelines in recognition of his post-offense rehabilitation and timely acceptance of

responsibility. Sentencing Tr. at 30-31; see also U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 comment n. 1(g),

(h) (specifying post-offense rehabilitative efforts and timely acceptance of

responsibility as considerations that may justify a reduction). The district court,

applying the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, concluded that Donnelly’s rehabilitative

efforts were not of an extraordinary nature outside the heartland of cases and were

already accounted for by the guidelines’s recommendations.5

 While a district court

has discretion to vary from the advisory guidelines even where a departure would not

be appropriate, see United States v. Hadash, 408 F.3d 1080, 1083-84 (8th Cir. 2005),

the district court here imposed a presumptively reasonable sentence comporting with

the guidelines recommendation, and we see nothing in the record indicating that it

applied significant weight to an “improper or irrelevant factor” or a failed to apply

appropriate weight “to a relevant factor.” See Haack, 403 F.3d at 1004. Accordingly,

Donnelly has failed to rebut the presumption of reasonableness attached to his

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sentence. See United States v. Lincoln, 413 F.3d 716, 718 (8th Cir. 2005), cert.

denied, 126 S. Ct. 840 (2005).

The judgment is affirmed.

______________________________

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