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Parties Involved:
Rasheed Rashad
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 10, 2004 Decided January 21, 2005

No. 02-3010

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee

v.

RASHEED RASHAD, A/K/A MICHAEL THOMAS,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 01cr00159-01)

Daniel H. Bromberg, appointed by the court, argued the

cause and filed the briefs for appellant.

Thomas S. Rees, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellee. With him on the brief were Kenneth L. Wainstein,

U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher, Thomas J. Tourish, Jr., and

Daniel M. Cisin, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and RANDOLPH and

ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Chief Judge GINSBURG.

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Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.

GINSBURG, Chief Judge: Rasheed Rashad appeals the

decision of the district court rejecting his claim to have received

ineffective assistance of counsel. Rashad alleged his trial

counsel never told him his sentence might have been reduced for

accepting responsibility if he had pleaded guilty rather than

going to trial. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court

ruled that Rashad suffered no prejudice because he could not

have pleaded guilty while maintaining his innocence to some of

the charges against him. Because the district court seems not to

have realized that it had the discretion to accept a guilty plea in

these circumstances, see North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25,

37 (1970), we reverse and remand the case for the district court

to make additional findings of fact.

I. Background

Rashad was arrested after selling crack cocaine to a

government informant in two separate transactions, one of

which was captured on videotape. Several days after his arrest,

government attorneys showed Rashad the videotape and

recounted all their evidence of his drug offenses with the goal of

convincing him to plead guilty and to supply information

regarding other individuals whom the Government was

pursuing. Rashad refused to cooperate and instructed his

counsel to start preparing for trial. The Government then filed

an indictment that charged, in addition to the drug offenses,

several weapons offenses pre-dating the drug transactions.

Some months later Rashad decided to cooperate. He

admitted to the drug charges in the indictment and provided the

Government with details of those and other crimes. Rashad also

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provided information about various drug rings operating in West

Virginia and in the Washington, D.C. area. At the same time,

Rashad insisted he was not guilty of some of the weapons

offenses with which he was charged.

Rashad was told he was well on his way to earning a

downward departure from his presumptive sentence, pursuant to

§ 5K1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, for

providing substantial assistance to the Government. When a

government attorney told Rashad, however, that in order to

qualify for a departure he might have to testify against his wife,

he refused to cooperate any further. According to Rashad, he

believed the only options he had were to plead guilty and

cooperate with the government or to go to trial. When

cooperation became unpalatable, he chose trial.

A jury found Rashad guilty of the drug charges but not

guilty of the weapons charges, and the district court sentenced

Rashad to 235 months’ imprisonment. Rashad appealed,

arguing that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel

because his attorney had understated the strength of the

Government’s case against him and had never accurately

informed him of his potential sentence if he was found guilty at

trial. This court held that Rashad stated a valid claim of

ineffective assistance and remanded the record to the district

court for an evidentiary hearing. See United States v. Rashad,

331 F.3d 908, 911–12 (D.C. Cir. 2003).

Rashad, his wife, and his trial counsel testified at the

hearing on remand. Based upon their testimony, the district

court found that Rashad’s trial counsel had in fact informed

Rashad that the Government’s case against him was strong and

had encouraged him to plead guilty. Rashad also claimed his

attorney was ineffective because he never told Rashad that by

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pleading “straight up” -- that is, without having entered into a

plea bargain with the Government -- he could get a reduced

sentence pursuant to § 3E1.1 of the Guidelines for having

accepted responsibility for his crimes. The court rejected that

claim, however, on the ground that the alleged omission,

assuming there was one, did not prejudice Rashad because he

could not have pleaded guilty while insisting he was innocent of

some of the weapons charges. The district court therefore held

there was no basis for Rashad’s claim to have received

ineffective assistance of counsel.

II. Analysis

On this appeal Rashad argues the district court erred in

ruling that, as a matter of law, he could not have pleaded guilty

and therefore could not have gotten his sentence reduced for

having accepted responsibility for his crimes. According to

Rashad, the district court’s ruling is inconsistent with Alford, in

which the Court held that an “individual accused of a crime may

voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the

imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable

to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime.”

400 U.S. at 37.

According to the Government, however, the district court

did not conclude Rashad was ineligible to plead guilty but

merely stated that, under the facts presented, it would not have

accepted Rashad’s plea -- and that decision is within the

discretion of the district court. In the alternative the

Government argues that even if the district court did commit an

error of law, Rashad is not entitled to relief because it is highly

unlikely he would have obtained a reduction of his sentence for

acceptance of responsibility.

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*

Judge Randolph believes it is inappropriate for the court to consider

Rashad’s argument because Rashad did not present it to this court in

his first appeal. The district court, however, without objection from

the Government, considered Rashad’s argument as within the scope

of our remand and ruled on its merits. Our colleague suggests that is

“of no moment” because the forfeiture rule is meant to conserve

judicial resources. Had the district court rejected Rashad’s argument

on that ground, or had the Government advanced that argument on its

own, Judge Randolph’s view would have more force. Seeing that

neither the district court nor the Government considered Rashad’s

A. Standard of Review

As a preliminary matter, the Government urges this court to

review the decision of the district court only for “plain error”

because Rashad “did not ... object to the district court’s ruling on

Alford grounds.” Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 51(a),

however, provides that “[e]xceptions to rulings or orders of the

court are unnecessary.” All a defendant need do to preserve a

claim of error (and, hence, to obtain the more favorable

“harmless error” review) is inform the court and opposing

counsel of the ruling he wants the court to make and the ground

for so doing; he need not cite the particular case that supports his

position. See United States v. Rapone, 131 F.3d 188, 197 (D.C.

Cir. 1997); United States v. Morgan, 581 F.2d 933, 939 n.16

(D.C. Cir. 1978).

Rashad made his position clear in a pre-hearing submission

to the court and at the evidentiary hearing: He argued that, had

he received effective assistance of counsel, he would have

pleaded guilty to all the charges and consequently would have

received a shorter sentence for having accepted responsibility.

That is sufficient to preserve for review his present claim of

error. See Morgan, 581 F.2d at 939 n.16; see also United States

v. Rivera, 192 F.3d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 1999).*

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argument forfeited, however, we do not believe judicial economy

provides an adequate justification to raise, sua sponte, one party’s

failure to make an argument while ignoring the identical omission by

the opposing party. See United States v. Layeni, 90 F.3d 514, 522

(D.C. Cir. 1996) (Government “waived the waiver argument” by

failing to raise it at sentencing in district court).

B. Ineffective Assistance

On the merits the Government argues, first, the district

court’s ruling is consistent with Alford because the court

concluded not that Rashad could not have pleaded guilty but

rather that, under the circumstances of this case, it would not

have accepted such a plea. And that determination, according

to the Government, should be reviewed only for abuse of

discretion.

The district court is certainly not required to accept every

guilty plea it is tendered, let alone the guilty plea of every

defendant who maintains his innocence; indeed, the district

court has considerable discretion to decide whether a guilty plea

is appropriate in the circumstances of the particular case.

Alford, 400 U.S. at 38 n.11;see, e.g., United States v. Shepherd,

102 F.3d 558, 562–64 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (recognizing timing of

guilty plea and prejudice to co-defendants relevant when

deciding whether to accept guilty plea); United States v.

Preciado, 336 F.3d 739, 743 (8th Cir. 2003) (affirming district

court’s rejection of guilty plea where defendant repeatedly

changed his story, raising doubt about factual basis for plea);

United States v. Severino, 800 F.2d 42, 45–46 (2d Cir. 1986)

(not abuse of discretion for district court to reject guilty plea

where defendant was untruthful in describing events). It is clear

from the record in this case, however, that the district court

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thought it did not have discretion to accept Rashad’s guilty plea.

In response to Rashad’s assertion that he would have pleaded

guilty in order to seek a reduction of his sentence for acceptance

of responsibility, the court stated:

The problem with that position and the problem with

arguing prejudice here is that Mr. Rashad says that he is not

guilty. Therefore, he cannot plead under the law to several

of the counts relating to that gun charge .... [H]e wouldn’t

have been eligible to plead because the Court would not ...

accept a plea to something that he isn’t willing to admit

guilt. [Emphasis supplied.]

Apparently the district court believed that a defendant who

maintains his innocence simply is not permitted to plead guilty,

but that is not the law. See Alford, 400 U.S. at 37. Because the

court thought Rashad was not “eligible to plead” guilty, the

court did not go on to determine whether Rashad in fact would

have made such a plea and whether the court would have

accepted it. That was an error.

C. Prejudice

The Government argues that even if the district court did

err, Rashad was not prejudiced thereby. Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 11(b)(3) requires the court, before entering

judgment, to “determine that there is a factual basis for the

plea.” If the defendant proclaims his innocence, however, the

court must go further and determine that there is a “high

probability of conviction” before accepting his guilty plea.

Bruce v. United States, 379 F.2d 113, 119 (D.C. Cir. 1967).

Here, according to the Government, the district court would

likely have rejected Rashad’s plea because the Government’s

evidence with respect to the disputed weapons charges (all

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dating to September 15, 2000), although “sufficient for

conviction, ... was not strong,” as “there was no videotape or

other forensic evidence supporting” those charges.

The Government’s evidence on those weapons charges,

although it did not persuade the jury of Rashad’s guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt, was not so sparse that it would have been an

abuse of discretion for the district court to have accepted a guilty

plea from the defendant. For example, a government informant

testified at trial that Rashad had personally sold him a firearm in

mid-September, 2000, as charged. We need not rehearse all the

evidence here, however; for we must leave it to the district court

in its discretion to determine whether the evidence was

sufficiently strong to justify an Alford plea.

The Government also argues that, even if Rashad had

offered and the district court had accepted a straight-up guilty

plea, it is highly doubtful the district court would have reduced

Rashad’s sentence on the ground that he had accepted

responsibility for his crimes. Here the Government cites

comment 3 to § 3E1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines, which

provides: “A defendant who enters a guilty plea is not entitled

to an adjustment under this section as a matter of right.”

Comment 5, on the other hand, reminds us that “[t]he sentencing

judge is in a unique position to evaluate the acceptance of

responsibility,” and for that reason the sentencing judge’s

determination “is entitled to great deference on review.” In this

case, of course, the district court never made that determination

and so the proper course is for us to remand the case for the

district court to determine whether it would have accepted

Rashad’s plea and, if so, whether it also would have reduced his

sentence for having accepted responsibility.

Finally, the Government claims it “likely would have

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** The version of § 3E1.1 in effect when Rashad committed his

offenses permitted the district court to reduce a defendant’s sentence

by three levels for his acceptance of responsibility regardless whether

the Government objected to the reduction of sentence. Under the 2003

amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines, the district court may still

grant a two-level reduction, but the third level may be granted only

“upon motion of the government.”

opposed” Rashad’s plea -- let alone his motion for a reduction

of sentence -- and “could well have” filed additional charges

against Rashad, thus “put[ting] the prospect of a ‘straight up’

plea out of reach.” But the Government’s opposition would not

have been dispositive; a reduction for acceptance of

responsibility under § 3E1.1 -- unlike a reduction for substantial

assistance under § 5K1.1, which requires the support of the

Government -- “is directed to the defendant’s affirmative

recognition of responsibility for his own conduct,” as

determined by the district court. Sentencing Guidelines § 5K1.1

cmt. 2.** Meanwhile, the Government’s speculation that it might

have brought additional charges does not bear upon whether

Rashad was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s failure to tell him

he had the option of pleading (or attempting to plead) straight up

to the charges the Government actually brought against him.

III. Conclusion

In sum, the district court erred as a matter of law when it

determined Rashad was not eligible to plead guilty because he

asserted his innocence to some of the charges against him.

Therefore, we remand this case to the district court for further

proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion.

So ordered.

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RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge, dissenting: In 2003, when we

heard Rashad’s direct appeal from his criminal conviction, he

gave two, and only two, grounds for his claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel: (1) his attorney underestimated the

strength of the government’s case, and (2) his attorney

misadvised him about the potential sentence he faced. See

United States v. Rashad, 331 F.3d 908, 909 (D.C. Cir. 2003).

Because the factual validity of these contentions was unclear, we

remanded “the record” to the district court for an evidentiary

hearing. 313 F.3d at 912. Under our rules, we therefore

retained jurisdiction over the case. See D.C. CIR. R. 41(b);

United States v. Williams, 754 F.2d 1001, 1002-03 (D.C. Cir.

1985).

The district court fully discharged the duty we imposed on

it. After an extensive hearing, at which both Rashad and his trial

attorney testified, the court found that the attorney correctly

advised Rashad about the strength of the government’s case and

about how much time Rashad might serve if he were convicted.

When the record returned to us, Rashad argued neither of these

grounds. Instead he raised an entirely new one, claiming that his

attorney never told him that if he pleaded guilty to the charges

“straight up,” he might receive a reduced sentence for accepting

responsibility pursuant to § 3E1.1 of the Guidelines. The district

court made no findings about whether Rashad’s trial attorney

ever advised him about § 3E1.1, so my colleagues decide to

send the case back again for findings on this new claim. I would

reject the claim outright because Rashad did not raise it in his

original appeal and because we remanded the record only for

findings on the two claims Rashad has now abandoned.

When “an argument could have been raised on an initial

appeal, it is inappropriate to consider that argument on a second

appeal following remand.” Northwestern Indiana Tel. Co. v.

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FCC, 872 F.2d 465, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The “rule serves

judicial economy by forcing parties to raise issues whose

resolution might spare the court and parties later remands and

appeals. Crocker v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 49 F.3d 735, 740

(D.C. Cir. 1995).” Hartman v.Duffey, 88 F.3d 1232, 1236 (D.C.

Cir. 1996). It is of no moment that the government has not

made this argument. As we recognized in Hartman, the rule is

meant to conserve judicial resources, not to confer some right on

the government that it may waive by not arguing the point. See

United States v. Pryce, 938 F.2d 1343, 1348 (D.C. Cir. 1991);

id. at 1351 (Randolph, J., concurring). There is all the more

reason to invoke the remand rule in a case such as this. Our

practice is to allow a defendant, on direct appeal from a criminal

conviction, to claim ineffective assistance of counsel despite the

defendant’s failure to do so in the district court, and to remand

for an evidentiary hearing if the record does not permit

resolution of the claim on appeal. Other circuits would force a

defendant in these circumstances to file a “habeas” petition

under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See, e.g., United States v. Weaver, 281

F.3d 229, 234 (D.C. Cir. 2002); United States v. Geraldo, 271

F.3d 1112, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 2001). In effect, then, our practice

serves as a substitute for habeas. Congress has imposed severe

limitations on successive habeas petitions. See 28 U.S.C.

§§ 2244(b)(1), 2255; United States v. Vargas, No. 03-3105,

2004 WL 2937252 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 21, 2004). Rashad’s new

ineffective assistance claim is analogous to a successive habeas

petition and it too should be disallowed for similar reasons --

namely, to prevent repetitive litigation and delay. See, e.g.,

Rodwell v. Pepe, 324 F.3d 66, 72 (1st Cir. 2003).

Even if we may reach Rashad’s new claim, I would reject

it. It is no wonder that the district court made no findings on the

question whether Rashad knew his sentence might be reduced

for acceptance of responsibility if he pleaded guilty without a

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3

plea deal. That question was not within the scope of our remand

and was not litigated. We remanded the record only for findings

on Rashad’s original ineffective assistance contentions. This is

doubtless why, at the evidentiary hearing, neither Rashad nor his

attorney was ever asked about whether Rashad received advice

regarding acceptance of responsibility. As to whether Rashad

knew he could plead “straight up,” it is clear that he did know

and that his attorney so advised him. Rashad testified that the

government’s final plea offer was for him to plead to the

indictment. When the court asked “The plea was straight up to

the indictment?” Rashad answered “Yes.” A few moments later

Rashad explained that he rejected the offer, “feeling, you know,

why plead to the entire indictment.”

I believe my colleagues also misunderstand the district

court’s findings, delivered orally. The majority opinion quotes

one of the court’s statements and concludes that the court

thought, incorrectly, that a defendant who maintains his

innocence cannot plead guilty. Whatever the court had in mind,

and in context this is far from clear, it had no effect on the

court’s ultimate conclusion that Rashad’s attorney provided

effective assistance. Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 688, 692 (1984), a defendant cannot prevail on an

ineffective assistance claim unless he shows not only that

“counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness,” but also that counsel’s deficiencies were

prejudicial. Before making its statement about the likelihood of

Rashad pleading guilty, the court found that Rashad’s attorney

had in fact advised him correctly about sentencing and the

government’s case. That was enough to reject Rashad’s

ineffective assistance claim. Only as an alternative ruling did

the court add that even if Rashad had received bad advice on

these subjects, he was not prejudiced because he still would not

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*** That is precisely the way Rashad argued his case on remand. His

memorandum of law stated that his “trial counsel committed two

errors in advising Mr. Rashad.” The only alleged errors were those on

which we ordered an evidentiary hearing:

First, he advised Mr. Rashad to go to trial based upon a

negligent mis-assessment of the strength of the Government’s

case on the drug charges. Second, trial counsel advised Mr.

Rashad incorrectly concerning the sentencing that he faced if

convicted at trial.

Defendant’s Memorandum of Law Concerning Ineffective Assistance

of Counsel, at 11. The memorandum mentioned the prospect of

Rashad’s pleading to the indictment “straight up,” not as an

ineffectiveness claim, but as the prejudice he suffered as a result of his

attorney’s alleged “two errors.”

have pleaded guilty.***

For these reasons I respectfully dissent.

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