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Parties Involved:
Rodger Edmonds
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 15, 1995 Decided November 17, 1995

No. 91-3331

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

RODGER EDMONDS,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 90cr00303-04)

Peter M. Brody, appointed by the court, argued the cause for the appellant.

Michael N. Levy, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for the appellee, with whom

Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, and John R. Fisher and Roy W. McLeese, III, Assistant

United States Attorneys, were on the brief for the appellee. Elizabeth Trosman, Assistant United

States Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: BUCKLEY, WILLIAMS and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed PER CURIAM.

PERCURIAM: Defendant Edmonds appeals his narcotics convictions. He argues for reversal

because "other crimes" evidence and other testimony was, he alleges, erroneously admitted. He also

challengesthe sufficiency of the evidence as well asthe constitutionality of one of the statutes he was

convicted of violating. We affirm.

I. Facts

In the early evening of August 29, 1990 Rodger Edmonds and Anthony Morse were sitting

in a car near Union Station in the District of Columbia. At the same time, Julius Harrison and Gary

Davis, a Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)special agent who was working undercover, met at Union

Station to complete an exchange of drugs for money. After Special Agent Davis showed Harrison

his money, Harrison walked to where Edmonds and Morse were waiting. According to Harrison,

Edmonds showed him some drugs. Harrison returned to Davis but Davis refused to give him the

money before receiving the drugs. Harrison walked back to Edmonds and Morse. After a

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1

In 1990, section 405(a) of the Controlled Substances Act, codified at 21 U.S.C. § 845(a), was

transferred to 21 U.S.C. § 860. Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, sec. 1214, §

860, 104 Stat. 4789, 4833 (1990). We refer hereinafter to 21 U.S.C. § 860 rather than 21 U.S.C.

§ 845. 

conversation, both Edmonds, who was in the driver's seat, and Morse got out of the car. Harrison

followed Morse into an alley while Edmonds sat on a nearby stoop. Morse removed drugs from

under a rock in the alley and accompanied Harrison to Davis's car with the drugs. Edmonds left the

stoop for his car, which had the engine running, and watched Harrison and Morse walk toward Davis.

After a signal from Davis, other DEA agents who had been in the area observing arrested Edmonds,

Morse and Harrison.

Edmonds was charged with conspiracy to distribute more than fifty grams of cocaine base

(crack) in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A)(iii); aiding and abetting the

distribution of crack in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) and 18 U.S.C. § 2;

and aiding and abetting the distribution of crack within one thousand feet of a school in violation of

21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 845(a)1and 18 U.S.C. § 2. At his first trial, the jury hung. After a

second trial, he was convicted on all three counts. On December 11, 1991 the district court

sentenced Edmondsto 175 months' imprisonment and five years ofsupervised release on each of the

first two counts and 175 months' imprisonment and ten years ofsupervised release on the schoolyard

count, all prison terms to run concurrently.

Edmonds's notice of appeal, filed on December 18, 1991, was stayed by this Court pending

the disposition of his pro se motion for release pending appeal and his section 2255 motion. The

district court denied the motion for release and we affirmed on September 9, 1993. The district court

then denied the section 2255 motion. United States v. Edmonds, 870 F. Supp. 1140 (D.D.C. 1994).

Edmondsrequested newappointed counselfor the section 2255 appeal and moved to consolidate that

appeal with his direct appeal. On March 8, 1995 we denied his two requests and on April 27, 1995

we summarily affirmed the lower court's denial of his section 2255 motion. We now affirm

Edmonds's convictions except for count two and remand for resentencing on count one.

II. Discussion

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2Edmonds's related complaint that the prosecution misrepresented to the trial judge the thrust

of an earlier ruling is meritless. At the first trial the court had allowed the prosecutor to ask

Harrison "How would you characterize your relationship with Mr. Edmonds?" and "When did you

first begin obtaining cocaine for Mr. Edmonds?" Trial 1 Tr. (Tr. 1) vol. I at 98. At the second

trial, defense counsel objected to the prosecution's opening statement on the ground that the

statement improperly referred to uncharged conduct. In response, the prosecutor first stated that

"[t]he court did [at the first trial] permit me to go into the prior transactions that Mr. Edmonds

had, Mr. Harrison's relationship." Tr. 2 vol. I at 82. She then stated: "You did let me go into,

just in general, the relationships that Mr. Harrison had with Mr. Edmonds." Id. at 83. Edmonds

insists that the prosecutor misstated the court's ruling made at the first trial. We disagree. Taken

alone, the prosecutor's statement that the judge permitted her to "go into the prior transactions"

might have been misleading. She continued, however, with a reference to Edmonds's and

Harrison's "relationship." Moreover, her second (and clearer) statement claimed only that the

judge had previously permitted testimony "just in general" about the "relationship" between

Harrison and Edmonds. Questions about Edmonds's and Harrison's relationship were in fact

permitted at the first trial. Id. at 82-83. That is all the prosecution claimed. 

A. "Other Crimes" Evidence

Edmonds argues that the district court's erroneous admission of certain testimony requires

reversal. During the second trial, Harrison testified that he sold drugs for Edmonds "over a hundred"

times during the previous nine years. Trial 2 Tr. (Tr. 2) vol. I at 173. Edmonds makes three

arguments in an effort to establish the inadmissibility of this and related testimony.2

1. Pre-trial Notice of "Other Crimes" Evidence

Edmonds first claims that the government did not give him pre-trial notice of Harrison's

proposed "other crimes" evidence. Before the first trial, Edmonds had requested notice of any

prosecution plans to use such evidence. See Trial 1 Tr. (Tr. 1) vol. I at 99. Nevertheless, he

contends he received no notice before the prosecution introduced Harrison's testimony about his

"other crimes" at the second trial. His lack of notice complaint fails for two reasons.

First, at the time Edmonds was tried the prosecution was under no obligation to notify him

of its intent to use "other crimes" evidence. In May 1991, when Edmonds's second trial took place,

Rule 404(b) contained no express notice requirement. 22 Charles A. Wright and Kenneth W.

Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure § 5249 (1978) ("Congress declined to add a notice

requirement to Rule 404(b)"). The decision Edmonds relies on merely suggested that the prosecution

notify defense counsel. See United States v. Foskey, 636 F.2d 517, 526 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("We

would suggest that in future cases the Government exercise the discretion given it by Fed.R.Crim.P.

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3Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) now reads:

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character

of a person in order to show conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible

for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,

knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request

by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in

advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause

shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial. 

12(d)(1) and notify the defense before trial of its intention to introduce any evidence of prior bad

acts."). The subsequent amendment to Rule 404(b), requiring the prosecution to notify the defendant

of its intent to use "other crimes" evidence, does not support Edmonds because it became effective

on December 1, 1991, several months after his second trial ended.3

Even assuming a notice requirement, the first trial itself provided sufficient notice of the

government's evidence. At that time, Harrison testified that he had bought drugs from Edmonds for

nine years, Edmonds sometimes paid him to sell drugs and he had "done this before." Tr. 1 vol. I at

98, 133. The prosecutor asked Harrison to describe his drug purchases from Edmonds during the

nine year period. Id. at 98. Disallowing the question, the court ruled that the prosecutor "can

develop whatever [Harrison's] role was in the conspiracy and Mr. Edmonds in the introduction [sic]

of these drugs, period." Id. at 101. At the second trial, the prosecutor asked Harrison whether he

entered into "any kind of businesstransaction with Mr. Edmonds" and on "approximately how many

[prior] occasions." Tr. 2 vol. I at 172. The difference between Harrison's first trial and second trial

testimony isthat during the latter Harrison was asked about the number oftimes he and Edmonds had

sold drugs together. The abbreviated, albeit focussed, nature of the questions in the second trial did

not alter the general nature of the testimony so as to deprive Edmonds of notice.

2. Exclusion under Rule 404(b)

Edmonds argues that the prosecution did not establish that Harrison's testimony was within

Rule 404(b). Edmonds relies on the prosecutor's statement at trial that she sought to use the

testimony to show "prior contact" with Edmonds. Because the rule does not expressly allow "other

crimes" evidence to show prior contact, Edmonds argues that the evidence was inadmissible.

Nonetheless, the government used Harrison's testimony for a permissible purpose. In United States

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v. Clarke, 24 F.3d 257 (D.C. Cir. 1994), the defendants were charged with conspiring to possess, and

possessing, with intent to distribute cocaine. One defendant testified that he and the other defendants

had in the past engaged in numerous drug transactions together. We found the testimony admissible

to show intent. Because the testimony was used for a permissible purpose, see Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)

(other crimes evidence admissible to prove "intent, preparation, plan"), and not to prove the

defendant's bad character, its admission did not violate Rule 404(b). Here, the government

introduced the "one hundred times" testimony to show that Harrison expected to receive payment

from Edmonds for acting as a middleman. At trial, Edmonds attempted to establish that Harrison

supplied the drugs. The government sought to prove instead that Edmonds was the supplier. With

Edmonds as the supplier, the government wanted to establish why Harrison sold Edmonds's drugs,

a legitimate inquiry under Rule 404(b). See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) (other crimes evidence admissible

to prove "motive").

3. Exclusion under Rule 403 Balancing

Edmonds next argues that Rule 403 required exclusion of Harrison's testimony. Rule 403

provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice...." Edmonds claims Harrison's testimony had little

probative value because the last alleged transaction between Edmonds and Harrison ended in 1988,

two years before the drug transaction charged in this case. He argues the testimony was instead

highly prejudicial because it may have led the jury to convict based "entirely on accused's propensity

to offend again."

Edmonds's Rule 403 argument also fails. As discussed above, Harrison's testimony was

offered to explain why he sold drugs for Edmonds. The evidence was "damaging," as Edmonds

claims, but there was little danger of unfair prejudice because the prosecutor never argued an

impermissible inference and did not emphasize the testimony. Moreover, a Rule 403 decision is

reviewed only for a " "grave abuse' of discretion," United States v. Johnson, 970 F.2d 907, 912 (D.C.

Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. Payne, 805 F.2d 1062, 1066 (D.C. Cir. 1986)), a standard not

met here.

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4Regarding Edmonds's related insufficiency argument, we conclude that the evidence against

Edmonds was plainly sufficient to convict and we refer to the district court's detailed treatment of

this issue. Edmonds, 765 F. Supp. at 1116-18. 

Finally, even if Harrison's testimony was erroneously admitted, the error was harmless. As

described in detail by the district court, United States v. Edmonds, 765 F. Supp. 1112, 1116-18

(D.D.C. 1991), the evidence against Edmonds aliunde the "other crimes" evidence was strong and

renders any evidentiary error harmless.4

B. Plea Agreement

Under section 5K1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines(guidelines), the sentencing

court may depart from the guidelines when the government makes a motion "stating that the

defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person."

In the District of Columbia, a departure committee decides whether a defendant's assistance has been

substantial enough to warrant filing a section 5K1.1 motion. Like many defendants facing drug

charges, Harrison entered a plea agreement with the government. Letter fromAssistant United States

Attorney Patricia M. Haynes to Ferris Bond, Harrison's Counsel(Appellee's Record Material at Tab

A). He agreed to plead guilty to conspiracy to distribute fifty grams of cocaine base. Id. at 1 ¶ 2.

In return, the prosecution agreed that "[i]fMr. Harrison cooperatesfully and testifiestruthfully about

all matters at trial, the nature and extent of his cooperation will be brought to the attention of the

departure committee for possible consideration that the government willfile a departure letter under

18 U.S.C. 3553e/5K1.1 on Mr. Harrison's behalf." Id. at 3 ¶ 9.

Edmonds contendsthat Harrison's plea agreement made Harrison'strial testimony inherently

unreliable. According to Edmonds, Harrison's plea agreement created a "risk of perjury [by Harrison]

so great that [Edmonds's] due processright to a fair trial was violated." Edmonds uses both text and

testimony in an effort to show that Harrison's plea agreement conditioned the government's section

5K1.1 motion on Edmonds's conviction.

First, the plea agreement required that Harrison "provide[ ] substantial assistance to the

government in the investigation and prosecution of violations of criminal law." Id. at 2 ¶ 4 (paragraph

four of the standard District of Columbia U.S. Attorney plea agreement). Second, Harrison testified

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at trial that he understood the plea agreement to require him to give "suitable testimony." Tr. 2 vol.

I at 197. Edmonds's argument is foreclosed both by the record and by circuit precedent.

First, the record manifests that Harrison understood the agreement only to require him to

testify truthfully. He stated that "to my understanding, I just have to sit here and tell the truth about

what happened." Tr. 2 vol. I at 198. In view of this testimony, his use of the word "suitable" to

describe the type oftestimony he was expected to give does not at all establish that Harrison believed

his testimony had to ensure Edmonds's conviction in order for the government to make a section

5K1.1 motion.

Moreover, the holding in United States v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 1418 (D.C. Cir. 1988),

forecloses Edmonds's argument. That case involved an accomplice/witness who testified against a

narcotics defendant after the prosecution promised to advise the witness's sentencing judge of the

"value" of his testimony. The defendant argued that conditioning the witness's sentence on the

"value" of his testimony created an "overwhelming" incentive to lie. This Court acknowledged that

the "value" condition might increase the witness's incentive to lie but we nevertheless permitted the

testimony. We reasoned that the "value" requirement did not necessarily condition the prosecution's

motion for a downward departure on the success ofthe prosecution; instead, the agreement expressly

required only truthful testimony and was the subject of extensive cross-examination. Similarly,

Harrison's plea agreement did not create an incentive to lie because the agreement simply required

truthful testimony and was subject to cross-examination. Accord United States v. Fallon, 776 F.2d

727, 733 (7th Cir. 1985) (approving "performance deals" that require truthful testimony).

Finally, as the appellant concedes, because he did not object at trial to Harrison's plea

agreement, we review his argument for plain error only. (Appellant's Br. at 27.) As our above

discussion illustrates, Edmonds has not shown that the district court's admission of Harrison's

testimony constitutes error, much less "plain error."

C. Schoolyard Statute and the Commerce Clause

Edmonds claims that his conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 860 (schoolyard statute) should be

vacated because the law exceeds the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. The

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5That appellant's second trial took place in May 1991, before the Fifth Circuit's opinion in

United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993), aff'd, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), does not

affect our decision. 

schoolyard statute prohibits distributing drugs within one thousand feet of a school. 21 U.S.C. §

860(a) ("distributing ... in or on, or within one thousand feet of, the real property comprising a public

or private elementary, vocational, orsecondaryschool"). Edmonds claims the law is unconstitutional

under the Supreme Court's most recent interpretation of the commerce clause. See United States v.

Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995). Edmonds did not challenge the law below; nevertheless, he argues

that we may consider the merits of his Lopez argument because Lopez qualifies as a "supervening

decision." See United States v. Washington, 12 F.3d 1128, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

We recently rejected the same argument in United States v. Baucum, 66 F.3d 362 (D.C. Cir.

1995). In Baucum, we refused to consider the merits of the appellant's commerce clause challenge

to the schoolyard statute because "neither the Supreme Court nor this circuit had definitively ruled

that this statute, or even one like it, fell within Congress' commerce clause powers." 66 F.3d at __

(Slip Opinion at 4). The same rationale precludes us from reaching the merits of Edmonds's

challenge: there was no reason for Edmonds "to assume at the time of trial that his challenge would

be futile."5Id.

D. Sentencing Errors

Edmonds was convicted of conspiring to distribute crack (count one), aiding the distribution

of crack (count two) and aiding the distribution of crack near a school (count three). The district

court sentenced Edmonds to 175 months' imprisonment on each of the three counts. Edmonds and

the government agree that the district court miscalculated Edmonds's sentence.

Under the guidelines, Edmonds's criminal history category isI. The sentencing range on each

of the first two counts is 121-151 months. The 175 months' imprisonment sentences imposed for

counts one and two are therefore outside the permissible range. Moreover, Edmonds cannot be

convicted of both distribution and distribution near a school under the same facts. See United States

v. Whren, 53 F.3d 371, 376 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding section 841(a)(1) to be lesser included offense

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6We commend the government for bringing this issue to our attention. 

of 21 U.S.C. § 860(a)). Accordingly, Edmonds's conviction on count two must be vacated.6 The 175

month prison term is proper as to count three because the schoolyard statute carries an enhanced

penalty. 21 U.S.C. § 860(a).

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Edmonds's conviction on counts one and three, vacate

his conviction on count two and remand his case for resentencing on count one.

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