Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-03118/USCOURTS-ca10-94-03118-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Daisy Mae Johnson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

FILED ~ united States Co';'rt ~r Appeab 

Tenth Ctrcutt 

JUN 13 i995 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

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Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. No. 94-3118 

DAISY MAE JOHNSON, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

For the District of Kansas 

(D.C. No. 88-20111-02) 

Robin D. Fowler, Assistant United States Attorney, Kansas City, 

Kansas, (and Randall K. Rathbun, United States Attorney, Kansas 

City, Kansas, with her on the briefs), for the Plaintiff-Appellee. 

David J. Phillips, Federal Public Defender, Kansas City, Kansas, 

for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before EBEL and KELLY, Circuit Judges, and COOK, Senior District 

Judge.1 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

A jury convicted Defendant-Appellant Daisy Mae Johnson 

("Johnson") of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute under 

1 The Honorable H. Dale Cook, Senior United States District 

Judge for the Northern District of Oklahoma, sitting by 

designation. 

Appellate Case: 94-3118 Document: 01019279289 Date Filed: 06/13/1995 Page: 1 
21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (aiding and abetting), and 

of using a communication facility to commit or facilitate the 

possession of cocaine with intent to distribute under 21 U.S.C. 

§ 843(b) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (aiding and abetting); Johnson moved 

for judgment of acquittal based on insufficiency of the evidence 

on the mens rea elements of the§ 841(a) (1) and§ 843(b) crimes. 

The district court denied Johnson's motion and she brought this 

appeal. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 

affirm. 

FACTS 

The following evidence was presented to the jury at trial. 

On September 2, 19B8, Johnson arrived at the Federal Express 

office at the Los Angeles International Airport to mail a package. 

Undercover Officers Patti May and Michael Farrant, narcotics 

detectives with the Los Angeles Police Department, were stationed 

at the office to help identify packages that might contain illicit 

drugs. Officer May first noticed Johnson because Johnson arrived 

only five minutes before the office's 7:00 p.m. closing time, the 

last Federal Express drop time in the city at the only Federal 

Express location where packages are loaded directly onto planes 

for shipment, two characteristics that drug traffickers find 

attractive. 

Johnson also drew Officer May's attention because she was 

concealing her small package inside a large, white, plastic 

shopping bag, which May explained was somewhat unusual. Officer 

May testified that Johnson was very nervous, constantly looking 

"from side to side," "back and forth," and "around behind her," 

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Appellate Case: 94-3118 Document: 01019279289 Date Filed: 06/13/1995 Page: 2 
and seemed afraid to take her package out of the bag. After 

scanning the office, Johnson immediately filled out a shipping 

airbill without being instructed to do so, which May explained 

demonstrated unusual familiarity with the Federal Express process. 

When Johnson took her place in line, she 11 Clutched the 

package close to her, 11 and continued to look around and behind her 

in an 11 extremely nervous 11 fashion. When Johnson removed her 

package from the bag, Officer May noticed that it was very heavily 

taped, which she explained is often characteristic of a package 

containing drugs. Officer May testified that Johnson's persistent 

nervousness became increasingly focused on the package--she seemed 

11 very concerned 11 about whether the tape would stick properly and 

repeatedly pressed the tape down to make sure that it would not 

come undone. Officer Farrant corroborated this description, 

testifying that Johnson was 11 kneading the package, 11 repeatedly 

trying to press the tape down to ensure that it was properly 

sealed. 

Johnson paid cash to ship her package, including an 

additional ten dollars to guarantee overnight delivery, which 

Officer May explained is also consistent with a drug shipment. 

As Johnson drove away from the office, another officer recorded 

her license plate number. A computer check on the plate revealed 

that Johnson's true address matched the return address she had 

written on the airbill. However, Johnson had written the name 

11 Crashenda Jackson 11 as the package's sender. A computer check 

uncovered no driver's license or other record in California for a 

11 Crashenda Jackson11 at Johnson's address. 

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After Johnson left the Federal Express office, Officer May 

arranged a test by a narcotics detection dog, and the dog 

positively alerted to Johnson's box. May noted that the box was 

being sent to Kansas City, Missouri, so she contacted Agent Carl 

Hicks, a narcotics agent with the Drug Enforcement Administration 

in Kansas City, and described the package and the dog's positive 

alert. After obtaining a search warrant, Agent Hicks opened 

Johnson's package and found approximately one kilo of powdered 

cocaine with an estimated street value of $200,000: 

When Agent Hicks attempted a controlled undercover delivery 

to the recipient that Johnson had written on the airbill--a "Mary 

Jane" at 4329 Freeman in Kansas City, Missouri--he discovered that 

the address did not exist. Someone telephoned Federal Express, 

however, explaining that the correct address should be 4529 

Freeman in Kansas City, Kansas. Agent Hicks testified that 

sending a package to a fictitious address that is later corrected 

by phone is a tactic that drug traffickers commonly use to help 

avoid identification in case the shipment is intercepted by the 

police. Agent Hicks made the delivery to the new address where a 

woman signed for the package as "Mary Jones." She was promptly 

arrested, admitted that her real name was Janice Swift, and 

claimed that she was receiving the shipment to further her 

boyfriend's drug distribution scheme. A search of Swift's home 

uncovered a significant amount of additional cocaine. 

Based on this evidence, a jury convicted Johnson of 

possessing cocaine with intent to distribute and of using a 

communication facility to possess cocaine with intent to 

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distribute.2 Johnson moved for judgment of acquittal based on 

insufficiency of the evidence on the mens rea elements of both 

offenses. The district court denied her motion, and she renews 

her challenge on this appeal. 

DISCUSSION 

We review the record for sufficiency of the evidence de novo. 

United States v. Chavez-Palacios, 30 F.3d 1290, 1294 (lOth Cir. 

1994) . 11 Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if a 

reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt, given the direct and circumstantial evidence, 

along with reasonable inferences therefrom, viewed in a light most 

favorable to the government. 11 United States v. Mains, 33 F. 3d 

1222, 1227 (lOth Cir. 1994). 

To sustain a conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 84l(a) (1), the 

government had to bring sufficient evidence to prove that Johnson 

knowingly possessed a controlled substance and intended to 

distribute it. See Mains, 33 F.3d at 1228. To sustain a 

conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 843(b), the government had to bring 

sufficient evidence to prove that Johnson knowingly or 

intentionally used a communication facility to commit or 

facilitate the possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. 

United States v. Willis, 890 F.2d 1099, 1103 (lOth Cir. 1989). 

Johnson contends that there was insufficient evidence to prove the 

11 knowing 11 and 11 intentional 11 elements of these two offenses. 

2 Swift was charged as a co-defendant in this case, but she 

pled guilty before trial to possession of cocaine with intent to 

distribute. 

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Although we agree that the mens rea evidence presented at 

trial was minimal, we cannot say that no reasonable jury could 

have inferred from the testimony and circumstances described that 

Johnson knew her package contained a controlled substance, 

intended to distribute it, and thus knowingly or intentionally 

used a communication facility to do so. The fact that the 

government proved Johnson's mental state largely, if not entirely, 

by combining various pieces of circumstantial evidence, perhaps 

none of which would independently be considered 11 sufficient, 11 does 

not alter this conclusion. See United States v. Grimes, 967 F.2d 

1468, 1470 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 355 (1992); 

United States v. Hooks, 780 F.2d 1526, 1529-30, 1532 (lOth Cir.), 

cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1128 (1986). 11 [R]ather than examining the 

evidence in bits and pieces, 11 we evaluate the sufficiency of the 

evidence by 11 consider[ing] the collective inferences to be drawn 

from the evidence as a whole. 11 Hooks, 780 F.2d at 1532. 

We do not use this evaluation as a chance to second-guess the 

jury's credibility determinations, nor do we reassess the jury's 

conclusions about the weight of the evidence presented. ChavezPalacios, 30 F.3d at 1294; United States v. Davis, 1 F.3d 1014, 

1017 (lOth Cir. 1993). We determine only if the 11 collective 

inferences 11 from the totality of that evidence could have led a 

rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Johnson 

possessed the requisite knowledge and intent. 

Applying these standards of review, while keeping in mind 

that the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the 

government, we find the combination of several pieces of evidence 

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sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that Johnson knew her 

package contained a controlled substance. 

First, we look at the evidence of Johnson's extreme and 

persistent nervousness, as described by Officers May and Farrant. 

It is true that in other contexts we have often expressed 

reservations about drawing conclusions from a defendant's nervous 

demeanor. ~' United States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874, 879 

(lOth Cir. 1994) (finding defendant's nervousness "of limited 

significance" in determining reasonable articulable suspicion to 

continue an investigative stop); United States v. Peters, 10 F.3d 

1517, 1521 (lOth Cir. 1993) (same); United States v. Hall, 978 

F.2d 616, 621 & n.4 (lOth Cir. 1992) (finding defendant's nervous 

behavior "of little significance" to support reasonable suspicion 

to seize and open a suitcase). Those cases, however, involved 

generalized nervousness displayed in response to a police 

encounter. See Fernandez, 18 F.3d at 879 (noting that "most 

citizens" exhibit some signs of nervousness when confronted by 

officers asking potentially incriminating questions); Peters, 10 

F.3d at 1521; Hall, 978 F.2d at 621. 

Here, in contrast, Johnson displayed more than generalized 

nervousness, and her behavior could not be explained as an 

understandable response to a police encounter, because she was 

never approached by Officers May and Farrant, whose plain-clothed 

attire could not have alerted her to their presence. Instead, 

Johnson's nervousness was specifically directed at the package in 

question: she concealed the package in a shopping bag, "clutched" 

the package close to her, and continually pressed its heavily 

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taped edges, 11 kneading 11 the tape to ensure that it would not come 

undone. We find that a reasonable jury, entitled to deem Officer 

May's. and Farrant's descriptions credible, could have found this 

excessive concern targeted specifically at the package as evidence 

that Johnson knew the package contained a controlled substance. 

A jury's reasonable inference of Johnson's knowledge is 

supported, secondly, by the fact that Johnson lived at the 

residence she identified as the package's return addre~s, and the 

fact that she attached a false name to that address. A jury could 

reasonably infer Johnson's involvement in preparing the package 

from the former piece of evidence, and her understanding of the 

contents' illegality from the latter. Hooks, 780 F.2d at 1532 

( 11 [T]he jury could have inferred appellant's guilty knowledge 

[that a controlled substance was hidden in the vehicle he was 

driving] from the undisputed testimony that appellant gave the 

police a false name. 11 That evidence when considered in 

conjunction with other circumstantial evidence, held sufficient to 

sustain conviction.). 

Similarly probative of Johnson's guilty knowledge is the fact 

that Johnson listed on the airbill a false name and nonexistent 

address for the package's destination. Officer Hicks testified 

that this was a common tactic among drug traffickers trying to 

hinder police efforts to trace a package. The jury was entitled 

to deem that testimony credible, believe that Johnson was making 

use of that tactic, and rationally infer that she knew what her 

package contained. Johnson argues that this evidence holds no 

probative force, however, because a jury could also have 

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reasonably inferred that she simply made an innocent mistake. The 

fact that the evidence may also be consistent with a hypothesis of 

innocence, however, does not require reversal where there is 

sufficient evidence to support a guilty inference as well. Hooks, 

780 F.2d at 1530. 

These three facts must also be considered in light of 

additional testimony by Officer Hicks, who explained his 

understanding of typical drug courier behavior from his seventeen 

years of experience. Hicks said that he believed drug couriers 

"always know" the contents of the packages they transport because 

dealers will not risk entrusting an ignorant person with such 

valuable contraband--in this case, $200,000 of cocaine. Although 

one could question the accuracy of this testimony as an empirical 

matter, we must nevertheless assume for purposes of this review 

that the jury found this testimony to be credible. See ChavezPalacios, 30 F.3d at 1294; Hooks, 780 F.2d at 1532 (DEA agent's 

testimony that the drugs at issue were worth $10,000 "supports the 

jury's finding that appellant knowingly possessed the PCP" because 

it was "unlikely that ... anyone else[] would have left such a 

valuable substance" in appellant's possession). Thus, based on 

this testimony, along with the facts that Johnson directed unusual 

nervousness towards the package, wrote someone else's name as the 

package's sender, and provided a nonexistent recipient and 

shipping address, we conclude that a reasonable jury could have 

found beyond a reasonable doubt that Johnson knew her package 

contained a controlled substance. 

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Having found sufficient evidence that Johnson knew what her 

package contained, we believe a jury could also reasonably have 

inferred that Johnson intended to distribute those contents when 

she mailed the package to an alleged drug dealer in Kansas City. 

Officer Hicks also testified to the unlikelihood that such a large 

quantity of cocaine would be possessed for purely personal use, 

and again .the jury is entitled to believe that assessment. See 

Levario, 877 F.2d at 1486 n.2 (holding that the large quantity of 

drugs at issue constitutes sufficient evidence to support a 

finding of intent to distribute); Hooks, 780 F.2d at 1532 (where 

there was sufficient evidence to prove knowing possession of PCP, 

the large quantity involved was sufficient to prove intent to 

distribute) . 

Because we find that a reasonable jury could have concluded 

that Johnson knew the package contained a controlled substance and 

intended to distribute it, we also find that a jury could 

reasonably have inferred that Johnson knowingly or intentionally 

used a communication facility, Federal Express, to facilitate the 

commission of that offense. 

CONCLUSION 

Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the 

government and giving due deference to the jury's assessment of 

the evidence and witness credibility, we conclude that a rational 

jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Johnson 

possessed the mens rea required for both offenses. Accordingly, 

the district court properly denied Johnson's motion for judgment 

of acquittal based on insufficiency of the evidence and we AFFIRM. 

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