Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-01000/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-01000-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gerald Carrigan
Defendant
Timothy Cooper
Defendant
Harold Anthony Funk
Plaintiff
Robert Pickering
Defendant
Town of Paradise
Defendant

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HAROLD ANTHONY FUNK, No. 2:09-cv-01000-MCE-EFB (TEMP) 

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

TOWN OF PARADISE, et al.,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Harold A. Funk (“Plaintiff”) seeks monetary

damages against the Town of Paradise, Police Chief Gerald

Carrigan, and Officers Robert Pickering and Timothy Cooper

(collectively “Defendants”) arising out of Plaintiff’s excessive

force claims against the officers. Presently before the Court is

Defendants’ Request for Reconsideration of Magistrate Judge’s

Ruling as to various portions of the parties’ cross-motions to

compel (“Request”) (ECF No. 37). For the following reasons,

Defendants’ Request is DENIED. 

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STANDARD

In reviewing a magistrate judge’s determination, the

assigned judge shall apply the “clearly erroneous or contrary to

law” standard of review set forth in Local Rule 72-303(f), as

specifically authorized by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a)1

and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). Under this standard, the Court

must accept the magistrate judge’s decision unless it has a

“definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” 

Concrete Pipe & Products of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers

Pension Trust for So. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 622 (1993). If the

Court believes the conclusions reached by the magistrate judge

were at least plausible, after considering the record in its

entirety, the Court will not reverse even if convinced that it

would have weighed the evidence differently. Phoenix Eng. &

Supply Inc. v. Universal Elec. Co., Inc., 104 F.3d 1137, 1141

(9th Cir. 1997).

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 All further references to “Rule” or “Rules” are to the Federal 1

Rules of Civil Procedure unless otherwise noted.

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ANALYSIS

Defendants’ instant Request arises out of the magistrate

judge’s ruling on the parties’ cross-motions to compel. 

A. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Further Depositions of

Officers Pickering and Cooper

On August 5 and 9, 2010, Defendants Pickering and Cooper

appeared at Plaintiff’s counsel’s office for their respective

depositions. On numerous occasions during those depositions,

defense counsel instructed deponents not to answer, interrupted

questions and answers, interjected editorial comments, and

coached or suggested information to witnesses. See e.g., Dep. of

Cooper, 9:16-20, 12:6-17, 14:12-17, 35:2-16, 65:1-66:4, 66:19-

68:16 (ECF No. 33-1); Dep. of Pickering. 18:6-21:15, 27:7-23,

37:1-38:18, 53:3-15, 73:3-75:11, 77:17-80:10, and 82:2-25 (ECF

No. 33-1). Plaintiff consequently filed a motion to compel

requesting, in pertinent part: 1) an order compelling the further

depositions of Defendants Pickering and Cooper; and 2) $4,500 as

reasonable costs and attorney fees incurred in connection with

the motion proceedings. 

After a hearing on the matter, the magistrate judge ordered

the officers to appear for second depositions, limited to two

hours each, with defense counsel paying the cost of the

additional court reporter appearances. The magistrate judge also

awarded Plaintiff $3,800 in reasonable expenses. 

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Defendants seek reconsideration of the magistrate judge’s order

in its entirety and ask the Court, at the very least, to limit

the scope of the depositions. 

Defendants’ primary argument is that, during the hearing on

Plaintiff’s motion, the magistrate judge misstated Rule 30(c)(2). 

Even assuming, arguendo, that such a misstatement occurred,

however, Defendants have still failed to demonstrate sufficient

grounds to justify reconsideration here. The transcripts of the

depositions make clear both that defense counsel’s instructions

not to answer were improper under Rule 30(c)(2) and that his

behavior throughout the depositions independently warranted an

order to conduct further proceedings. 

First, Rule 30(c)(2) permits counsel to “instruct a deponent

not to answer only when necessary to preserve a privilege, to

enforce a limitation ordered by the court, or to present a motion

under Rule 30(d)(3).” Rule 30(d)(3) in turn provides that “[a]t

any time during a deposition, the deponent or a party may move to

terminate or limit it on the ground that it is being conducted in

bad faith or in a manner that unreasonably annoys, embarrasses,

or oppresses the deponent or party.” According to Defendants,

their counsel’s invocation of Rule 30(d)(3) was proper because

both depositions were being conducted to harass deponents with

continuous “irrelevant” questions. Request, 7:6-9. Defendants

contend Plaintiff’s counsel’s “frequent or persistent inquiry

into matters outside the permissible scope of discovery” was

indicative of bad faith. Id., 7 n.6. (quoting W. R. Grace & Co.

v. Pullman Inc., 74 F.R.D. 80, 84 (W.D. Okla. 1977)). 

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Defendants’ argument is refuted by the record, however,

which demonstrates that counsel began instructing his clients not

to answer almost immediately during both depositions. Dep. of

Cooper, 4:11-12; Dep. Of Pickering, 4:9-5:13. Even if the

quantity of allegedly irrelevant questions from Plaintiff’s

counsel had eventually amounted to harassment, it would not

excuse defense counsel’s conduct here. Defendants’ above

authority thus provides no basis for relief. 

Defendants’ reliance on the magistrate judge’s ultimate

issuance of a protective order permitting redaction of certain

personal information (e.g., addresses, phone numbers, etc.) from

documents ordered produced is likewise not well-taken. See Order

on Motions to Compel, 1:23-2:5 (ECF No. 36) (“Order”). A ruling

that certain information is in fact irrelevant does not equate to

a finding that deposition questions pertaining to those matters

constituted harassment. 

Finally, this Court agrees with the magistrate judge that

defense counsel’s behavior, as reflected in the deposition

transcripts, was “appalling.” See Transcript of Proceedings,

7:8-9 (ECF No. 38) (“Transcript”). As stated above, counsel

repeatedly interrupted the proceedings, interjected editorial

comments, and coached or suggested information to the witnesses. 

Because defense counsel’s inappropriate conduct led to the

disruption of the depositions, it was entirely appropriate for

the magistrate judge to order the depositions reconvened at

Defendants’ expense. 

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Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 30(d)(2) (“The court may impose an appropriate

sanction--including the reasonable expenses and attorney’s fees

incurred by any party-–on a person who impedes, delays, or

frustrates the fair examination of the deponent”); see also

Jadwin v. Abraham, 2008 WL 4057921, *6-*7 (E.D. Cal. 2008). 

Defendants’ Request for Reconsideration is consequently

DENIED.

B. Defendants’ Motion to Compel Disclosure and Production

of Plaintiff’s Medical Records and Request for

Sanctions

Defendants’ motion to compel challenged Plaintiff’s

purported failure to produce documents subject to mandatory

disclosure under Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iii) and requested pursuant to

Defendants’ Document Request No. 6, or to produce true and

accurate responses to at least one interrogatory, Defendants’

Interrogatory No. 2. Defendants sought, in pertinent part, an

order compelling Plaintiff to prepare and serve Defendants with

complete Rule 26 disclosures, to respond to Interrogatory No. 2,

and to produce responsive documents. Defendants also sought

sanctions. 

The magistrate judge rejected Defendants’ request for

sanctions and ordered Plaintiff to provide: 1) an interrogatory

response identifying all health care providers who have provided

relevant treatment since November 17, 2002; and 2) a verification

that all documents in Plaintiff’s possession pertaining to the

calculation of damages have been produced. 

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The magistrate judge advised Defendants that it was their

responsibility to pursue any further documents at their own

expense. Defendants now seek reconsideration of the magistrate

judge’s decision challenging Plaintiff’s supplemental response to

Interrogatory No. 2 and challenging the decision itself to the

extent Plaintiff is only required to produce documents in his

possession, rather than all medical records in the possession of

his physicians. 

Defendants’ first argument is not properly before this Court

because the propriety of Plaintiff’s latest interrogatory

response has not yet been presented to the magistrate judge. 

Accordingly, this Court declines to entertain that argument in

the first instance here.

Defendants’ second argument regarding production of

Plaintiff’s medical records also fails. Defendants’ only

argument to this Court is that Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iii) requires

Plaintiff to produce all documents “bearing on the nature and

extent of injuries suffered.” Request, 1:3-6. Defendants,

however, quote the excerpt from Rule 26 out of context. The

entirety of Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iii) states as follows: 

[A] party must, without awaiting a discovery request,

provide to the other parties...a computation of each

category of damages claimed by the disclosing party--

who must also make available for inspection and copying

as under Rule 34 the documents or other evidentiary

material, unless privileged or protected from

disclosure, on which each computation is based,

including materials bearing on the nature and extent of

injuries suffered. 

Read in its entirety, it is clear that Plaintiff’s obligation

under Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iii) is to produce documents Plaintiff

relied upon in calculating its damages sought. 

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See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 26 advisory committee’ note (2000)

(“The scope of the disclosure obligation is narrowed to cover

only information that the disclosing party may use to support its

position.”). 

2

Plaintiff’s counsel stated on the record at the hearing

before the magistrate judge that no Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iii)

documents have been withheld. Transcript, 24:10-16. Plaintiff 3

was also ordered to provide Defendants with a verification that

he has produced all such documents in his possession. See id.,

(“I’m going to require that you do a verification that all

responsive documents have been produced and that you’ve done a

reasonable search and no such documents have been found.”);

Order, 2:15-3:2. Defendants do not make any argument here that

Plaintiff relied on or intends to rely on any documents not in

his possession to calculate damages; Defendants simply argue

Plaintiff has not produced all medical records relevant to his

injury. That is not what Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iii) requires,

however. 

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 While the text of Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iii) did not itself change 2

with the 2000 amendments, this Court will construe the existing

language in the context of the Rule as a whole and read this

subsection to require production only of those records relied

upon by Plaintiff. 

 According to Plaintiff’s Counsel, the only documents withheld 3

from production that are responsive to the calculation of damages

are statements provided to Plaintiff’s counsel from Plaintiff and

his wife. The withholding of these statements is not at issue.

(Tr. 34-35, ECF No. 38). 

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Accordingly, in light of both Defendants’ failure to point this

Court to any persuasive authority to the contrary and 4

Plaintiff’s willingness to verify all documents relied upon by

Plaintiff in his calculation of damages have been produced, the

Court finds no clear error in the magistrate judge’s decision.5

Accordingly, reconsideration is not warranted.

Finally, Defendants request $7,840 in sanctions, but point

this Court to no authority justifying reconsideration of the

magistrate judge’s decision not to award sanctions nor justifying

sanctions in light of this Court’s above disposition of

Defendants’ current Request. Sanctions are denied. 

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 Defendants only authority, Kifle v. Parks & History Ass’n., 4

1998 WL 1109117 (D.D.C.), is distinguishable on its facts

because, in that case, the defendants’ discovery challenges were

much broader than those at issue here and because the plaintiff

in that case produced no documents pursuant to Rule 26 or in

response to the defendants’ requests. 

 The magistrate judge advised Plaintiff he would have to “live 5

with the consequences” of his verification. Transcript, 24:24-

25. To the extent Defendants nonetheless believe Plaintiff has

failed to produce documents on which he has relied or eventually

intends to rely in calculating damages, the Rules themselves

provide appropriate sanctions to combat such conduct. See, e.g.,

Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 37(c) (“If a party fails to provide information

or identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party

is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply

evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the

failure was substantially justified or is harmless. In addition

to or instead of this sanction, the court, on motion and after

giving an opportunity to be heard: (A) may order payment of the

reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the

failure; (B) may inform the jury of the party’s failure; and (C)

may impose other appropriate sanctions...”).

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons just stated, Defendants’ Request for

Reconsideration (ECF No. 37) is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: June 28, 2011

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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