Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-03-01136/USCOURTS-caDC-03-01136-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Boca Airport, Inc.
Petitioner
Boca Raton Airport Authority
Intervenor
Federal Aviation Administration
Respondent

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notify

the Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made

before the bound volumes go to press.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 1, 2004 Decided November 16, 2004

No. 03-1136

BOCA AIRPORT, INC., D/B/A BOCA AVIATION,

PETITIONER

v.

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,

RESPONDENT

BOCA RATON AIRPORT AUTHORITY,

INTERVENOR

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Federal Aviation Administration

Steven S. Rosenthal argued the cause for petitioner. With

him on the briefs was Jeffery A. Tomasevich.

Teal Luthy Miller, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #03-1136 Document #859810 Filed: 11/16/2004 Page 1 of 12
2

Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, and Robert S.

Greenspan and Peter R. Maier, Attorneys.

Arthur P. Berg argued the cause for intervenor. With him

on the brief were Thomas R. Devine and Kenneth W. Salinger. David T. Ralston, Jr. entered an appearance.

Before: ROGERS, TATEL, and GARLAND, Circuit Judges.

GARLAND, Circuit Judge: The question in this case is

whether the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has unlawfully failed to enforce rights that the petitioner contends

arise from the 19th Amendment — not the 19th Amendment

to the Constitution of the United States, but the nineteenth

amendment to a contract between the petitioner and the Boca

Raton Airport Authority. Because that contractual amendment guarantees no federal rights to the petitioner, we deny

the petition for review.

I

Petitioner Boca Airport, Inc., which does business under

the name Boca Aviation, is a ‘‘fixed-base operator,’’ or FBO.

FBOs offer such services as fueling, maintenance, and storage

to aviators at public airports. Pursuant to a 1984 lease with

the Boca Raton Airport Authority, Boca Aviation served as

the sole FBO at the Boca Raton Airport. In 1997, Boca

Aviation and the Airport Authority executed an amendment

to the lease (the 15th Amendment) that gave Boca Aviation

the rights to lease, develop, and manage the airport’s only

remaining parcel of undeveloped aviation land. Thereafter, a

competitor of Boca Aviation, Boca Raton Jet Center (Boca

Jet), challenged the lease amendment in a ‘‘Part 16’’ proceeding.

Part 16 of the FAA’s regulations permits a ‘‘person directly

and substantially affected by any alleged noncompliance [to]

file a complaint with the Administrator.’’ 14 C.F.R. § 16.23.

The regulations define noncompliance as ‘‘anything done or

omitted to be done by any person in contravention of any

provision of any Act TTT as to matters within the jurisdiction

of the Administrator.’’ Id. § 16.3. In its Part 16 complaint,

Boca Jet alleged that the Authority’s grant to Boca Aviation

USCA Case #03-1136 Document #859810 Filed: 11/16/2004 Page 2 of 12
3

of the rights to the remaining parcel violated the exclusive

rights provision of the Airport and Airway Improvement Act

of 1982, 49 U.S.C. § 47107(a)(4). That provision states that

the ‘‘Secretary of Transportation may approve a project grant

application TTT for an airport development project only if the

Secretary receives written assurances TTT that TTT a person

providing, or intending to provide, aeronautical services to the

public will not be given an exclusive right to use the airportTTTT’’1

 The FAA, in turn, requires airports that receive

federal financial assistance to comply with a variety of ‘‘grant

assurances,’’ one of which — Grant Assurance No. 23 —

prohibits endowing aeronautical service providers with exclusive rights. See Director’s Determination, Boca Raton Jet

Center, Inc. v. Boca Raton Airport Auth., FAA Docket No.

16-97-06, 1997 WL 1120747, at *3 (FAA Dec. 22, 1997) [Boca

Jet Initial Director’s Determination].

On December 22, 1997, David L. Bennett, the FAA’s Director of Airport Safety and Standards, agreed with Boca Jet

that the Airport Authority, by ‘‘leasing the last remaining

parcel of aviation land to Boca Aviation, [was] in noncompliance with the provisions regarding exclusive rights as set

forth in 49 U.S.C. Section 47107(a)(4) and the Authority’s

Federal grant agreements.’’ Boca Jet Initial Director’s Determination, at *1. This Initial Director’s Determination

ordered the Authority to present a Corrective Action Plan

(CAP) that would end Boca Aviation’s exclusive right to serve

as the airport’s FBO, and warned that the Authority’s failure

to do so would render it ineligible for any FAA grants. See

id. at *14.

1 An exception to this provision states that ‘‘a right given to only

one fixed-base operator to provide services at an airport’’ will be

deemed not to be an exclusive right if it ‘‘would be unreasonably

costly, burdensome, or impractical for more than one fixed-base

operator to provide the services; and TTT allowing more than one

fixed-base operator to provide the services would require reducing

the space leased under an existing agreement between the one

fixed-base operator and the airport owner or operator.’’ 49 U.S.C.

§ 47107(a)(4).

USCA Case #03-1136 Document #859810 Filed: 11/16/2004 Page 3 of 12
4

In September 1998, after meeting with the FAA to obtain

further guidance on an acceptable plan, the Airport Authority

submitted the 19th Amendment to the lease, which terminated the 15th Amendment and with it Boca Aviation’s rights to

the undeveloped parcel. The 19th Amendment explained that

‘‘the Lessor and Lessee have determined that it would be in

the best interests of the Airport, the public and its users to

terminate’’ Boca Aviation’s lease for the parcel, ‘‘so as to

cause the reinstatement of FDOT funding and the resolution

of the pending Part 16 Action.’’ J.A. 376. The Amendment

further stated that the Authority would submit a plan that

‘‘shall provide for the construction, development and operation by the [Authority]’’ of facilities on the parcel. Id. On

August 20, 1999, the Director issued a Final Director’s Determination, concluding that the amended lease cured the exclusive rights problem and dismissing Boca Jet’s complaint.

Final Director’s Determination, Boca Raton Jet Center, Inc.

v. Boca Raton Airport Auth., FAA Docket No. 16-97-06, 1999

WL 732710, at *2-*3 (FAA Aug. 20, 1999) [Boca Jet Final

Director’s Determination].

In January 2000, the Airport Authority decided to have a

third party — rather than the Authority itself — develop the

parcel. Pursuant to that decision, the Authority issued a

Request for Proposals. Because Boca Aviation was the sole

FBO at the airport, the Authority did not permit it to bid. In

June 2000, the Authority signed a lease agreement for development of the parcel with Premier Aviation of Boca Raton,

LLC.

Beginning in January 2000, Boca Aviation mounted a series

of legal challenges to the Authority’s decision to lease the

parcel to a third party. First, it sued the Authority in

Florida state court, contending that the 19th Amendment

required the Authority to develop the parcel itself, and that

the Request for Proposals violated Boca Aviation’s contractual rights under that amendment to the lease. In May 2000,

the Florida court dismissed that claim, holding that the lease

read as a whole permitted the Authority to assign its contractual rights to a third party. Boca Airport, Inc. v. Boca Raton

USCA Case #03-1136 Document #859810 Filed: 11/16/2004 Page 4 of 12
5

Airport Auth., No. CL 00-00777 AE (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2000).

That case is currently on appeal.

Second, in June 2000, Boca Aviation sued the Airport

Authority in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, alleging that the Authority’s new plan

for the parcel violated the Contracts Clause of the U.S.

Constitution. Two weeks later, the court denied Boca’s motion for a temporary injunction and entered final judgment

for the Authority. See Boca Raton Airport, Inc. v. Boca

Raton Airport Auth., No. 00-8488-CIV, 2000 WL 963365 (S.D.

Fla. June 25, 2000).

Finally, also in June 2000, Boca Aviation filed the Part 16

FAA complaint that gave rise to the present case. In that

complaint, Boca Aviation alleged that the Authority’s lease

agreement with Premier Aviation violated a number of federal grant assurances including, in particular, Grant Assurance

No. 1 (‘‘General Federal Requirements’’), which states:

[The airport sponsor] will comply with all applicable

Federal laws, regulations, TTT and requirements as they

relate to the application, acceptance and use of Federal

funds for this project including but not limited to TTT 14

C.F.R. Part 16 — Rules of Practice For Federally Assisted Airport Enforcement Proceedings.

Director’s Determination, Boca Airport, Inc. v. Boca Raton

Airport Auth., FAA Docket No. 16-00-10, 2001 WL 438619, at

*11 (FAA Apr. 26, 2001) [Boca Aviation Director’s Determination]. Boca Aviation argued that the Boca Jet Final

Director’s Determination required the Authority to develop

the remaining parcel itself, and that the Authority’s lease

with Premier violated Boca Jet and therefore Grant Assurance No. 1.

On April 26, 2001, Director Bennett rejected Boca Aviation’s complaint, finding that:

A plain reading of the [Boca Jet Initial] Director’s Determination reveals that the FAA’s sole purpose for requiring the Authority to submit a CAP was to ensure that

the exclusive right granted to Boca Aviation TTT was in

USCA Case #03-1136 Document #859810 Filed: 11/16/2004 Page 5 of 12
6

fact extinguished. The Director’s Determination neither

specified the facilities to be constructed nor required the

[Authority] itself to construct and operate facilities on

the parcel.

Boca Aviation Director’s Determination, at *18. ‘‘Likewise,’’

he continued,

the [Boca Jet] Final Director’s determination that accepted the Authority’s CAP was limited to ensuring that the

exclusive right was extinguishedTTTT [T]he CAP did not

require the [Authority] itself to construct or operate the

facilities described in the 19th Amendment to Boca Aviation’s lease. Rather, this Office accepted the [Authority’s] proposal as one way to extinguish the exclusive

right granted to Boca Aviation.

Id. at *18-*19. Finding that the lease with Premier was

‘‘consistent with the express intent of the [Boca Jet] Final

Director’s Determination and the Authority’s continuing Federal obligations under the grant assurances,’’ Director Bennett dismissed the complaint. Id. at *19.

Boca Aviation appealed the Boca Aviation Director’s Determination to the FAA’s Associate Administrator for Airports.

In its appeal, Boca Aviation contended that the Director had

misread the Boca Jet Final Director’s Determination. It

insisted that Boca Jet had obligated the Authority itself to

develop the parcel, as provided in the 19th Amendment.

The Associate Administrator, who issued the FAA’s final

decision in this matter, affirmed the Director’s reading of

Boca Jet. First, he noted that the same person, Director

Bennett, had issued the determinations in both Boca Jet and

Boca Aviation, and said that he doubted the Director had

failed to ‘‘interpret the words in his own report correctly.’’

Final Decision and Order, Boca Airport, Inc. v. Boca Raton

Airport Auth., FAA Docket No. 16-00-10, 2003 WL 1963859,

at *20 (FAA Mar. 20, 2003) [Boca Aviation Final Decision].

Second, the Associate Administrator’s own reading of Boca

Jet persuaded him that, although the decision ‘‘contemplated

that the Authority would operate the aeronautical facilities on

USCA Case #03-1136 Document #859810 Filed: 11/16/2004 Page 6 of 12
7

the parcel,’’ that was ‘‘not material to the decision.’’ Id.

Rather, ‘‘[w]hat was material to the Final Director’s Determination in Boca Jet was that the Authority eliminate Boca

Aviation’s exclusive right.’’ Id. at *21. The Administrator

therefore affirmed the Boca Aviation Director’s Determination and dismissed the appeal. Id. at *45.

II

Boca Aviation now petitions for review of the Boca Aviation Final Decision. This court may overturn the FAA’s

factual findings only if they are not ‘‘supported by substantial

evidence.’’ 49 U.S.C. § 46110(c). We may overturn nonfactual aspects of the FAA’s decision only if they are ‘‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in

accordance with law.’’ 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); see D&F Afonso

Realty Trust v. Garvey, 216 F.3d 1191, 1194 (D.C. Cir. 2000);

Public Citizen, Inc. v. FAA, 988 F.2d 186, 197 (D.C. Cir.

1993).

Boca Aviation’s central argument is that the 19th Amendment required the Airport Authority to develop the parcel on

its own, that the FAA ‘‘incorporated [the 19th Amendment’s]

critical terms into the Boca Jet Final Director’s Determination,’’ Petitioner’s Br. at 35, and that the Authority’s decision

to lease the parcel to Premier Aviation was therefore a

violation of Federal Grant Assurance No. 1, which provides

that an airport sponsor ‘‘will comply with all applicable Federal TTT requirements TTT including but not limited to TTT

Part 16 TTT Proceedings.’’ The lynchpin of this argument is,

of course, the claim that the determination in the Boca Jet

Part 16 proceeding incorporated the provision of the 19th

Amendment that required the Authority itself to develop the

parcel. If Boca Jet did not do so, then the Authority’s failure

to comply with the provision did not constitute a failure to

comply with the results of a Part 16 proceeding.2

2 Boca Aviation also attacks the FAA’s Final Decision on the

ground that it incorrectly asserted that 49 U.S.C. § 47107(a)(4)

barred the Airport Authority from permitting Boca Aviation to

develop the remaining parcel in the first place. But the Final

USCA Case #03-1136 Document #859810 Filed: 11/16/2004 Page 7 of 12
8

As noted above, Director Bennett — the same person who

wrote the Boca Jet Final Director’s Determination — disagreed with Boca Aviation’s reading of that determination.

‘‘[T]he Final Director’s Determination that accepted the Authority’s CAP,’’ he said, ‘‘was limited to ensuring that the

exclusive right was extinguishedTTTT [T]he CAP did not

require the [Authority] itself to construct or operate the

facilities described in the 19th Amendment to Boca Aviation’s

lease.’’ Boca Aviation Director’s Determination, at *18-*19.

The FAA’s Associate Administrator read Boca Jet the same

way the Director did, concluding that Boca Jet ‘‘neither

specified the facilities to be constructed nor required the

Authority itself to construct and operate facilities on the

parcel,’’ and that ‘‘[w]hat was material to the Final Director’s

Determination in Boca Jet was that the Authority eliminate

Boca Aviation’s exclusive right.’’ Boca Aviation Final Decision, at *21.

As we have repeatedly held, ‘‘[a]n agency’s interpretation of

its own precedent is entitled to deference.’’ Cassell v. FCC,

154 F.3d 478, 483 (D.C. Cir. 1998).3

 The FAA’s reading of

Boca Jet is certainly a reasonable one. The Initial Director’s

Determination in that case declared that ‘‘the [Authority], by

denying a lease to Boca Jet, and leasing the last remaining

parcel of aviation land to Boca Aviation, is in noncompliance

with the provisions regarding exclusive rights as set forth in

49 U.S.C. Section 47107(a)(4).’’ Boca Jet Initial Director’s

Determination, at *14. The Director therefore ordered the

Decision’s statement on that point was merely a reference to Boca

Jet, which so held, and the petitioner cannot collaterally attack that

determination in this case. See Boca Aviation Final Decision, at

*23 (discussing Boca Jet Final Director’s Determination). More

important, and as Boca Aviation acknowledges in its Reply Brief,

the ‘‘question raised by this Petition for Review is not whether the

15th Amendment created an unlawful exclusive right, but rather

whether FAA erred in not enforcing the terms of TTT the 19th

Amendment[ ] against the Authority.’’ Reply Br. at 20.

3 Accord Entergy Servs., Inc. v. FERC, 319 F.3d 536, 541 (D.C.

Cir. 2003); Global Crossing Telecomms., Inc. v. FCC, 259 F.3d 740,

746 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

USCA Case #03-1136 Document #859810 Filed: 11/16/2004 Page 8 of 12
9

Authority to ‘‘present a plan for approval TTT on how it

intends to eliminate the continuation of an exclusive right to

Boca Aviation.’’ Id. (emphasis added). After the Authority

submitted the 19th Amendment, the Boca Jet Final Director’s Determination explained exactly why it was approved: ‘‘The 19th [A]mendment was acceptable in that it

served to require that Boca Aviation relinquish any and all

rights in and to the [parcel].’’ Boca Jet Final Director’s

Determination, at *2.

Nothing in the Boca Jet Final Director’s Determination

suggests that it made any difference to the FAA whether the

Authority developed the parcel on its own or contracted with

a third party. To the contrary, the Determination made clear

that what mattered was that ‘‘the 19th [A]mendment will

resolve the issue of the exclusive right as previously granted

to Boca Aviation.’’ Id. Indeed, as the Director subsequently

noted, Boca Jet ‘‘specifically contemplated that the [Authority] may choose an alternative CAP’’ involving a lease to a

third party, since Boca Jet contained a ‘‘ ‘request that the

Authority seek guidance from the [FAA] on any future

change in the use or operation of these facilities, including

any intent to lease the facilities to a commercial aeronautical service provider.’ ’’ Boca Aviation Director’s Decision, at

*19 (quoting Boca Jet Final Director’s Determination, at *2)

(emphasis added).4

4 Boca Aviation contends that this request referred only to a lease

of ‘‘presumably already built’’ facilities, rather than to a lease

permitting the building of facilities. Reply Br. at 7. The petitioner’s reading is reasonable; but so, too, is the FAA’s view that the

language contemplated the kind of lease offered to Premier Aviation. The petitioner further contends that this request was included only because the FAA was concerned that the Authority might

once again decide to lease the facilities to Boca Aviation. But that

construction is plainly unreasonable, as the Director had already

made it unmistakably clear that such a lease would violate 49 U.S.C.

§ 47107(a)(4) and render the Airport Authority ineligible for new

FAA grants. See Boca Jet Initial Director’s Determination, at

*14.

USCA Case #03-1136 Document #859810 Filed: 11/16/2004 Page 9 of 12
10

Boca Aviation places great weight on the fact that the Boca

Jet Final Director’s Determination described the course of

the negotiations leading to the 19th Amendment, including

proposed changes to the airport layout plan that provided for

the ‘‘construction, development and operation by the Authority’’ of the disputed parcel. Boca Jet Final Director’s Determination, at *2. But the cited passages are just that: a

description of the background negotiations. By contrast, as

the Director noted in his determination in Boca Aviation, the

Boca Jet Final Director’s Determination made clear that the

FAA regarded the 19th Amendment as ‘‘acceptable in that it

served to require that Boca Aviation relinquish any and all

rights in and to the [parcel].’’ Boca Aviation Director’s

Determination, at *18 (quoting Boca Jet Final Director’s

Determination, at *2) (emphasis added). That language neither states nor suggests that the provision requiring the

Authority to develop the property was relevant to its acceptability.

Boca Aviation further contends that entering into the 19th

Amendment, which extinguished its exclusive lease, would

have been irrational had it not expected that it would have a

federal forum in which to enforce the Airport Authority’s

promise to develop the parcel. The petitioner offers no

reason why it would have been irrational for it to rely on the

Florida state courts — rather than the FAA — to provide a

forum for enforcement of the contractual obligations created

by the lease amendment.5

 But whether Boca Aviation acted

rationally or irrationally is beside the point. As the FAA

5 Nor is it clear that it would have been irrational for Boca

Aviation to give up its exclusive rights even if it had received no

concession in return. As the preamble to the 19th Amendment

explained, the ‘‘Lessor and Lessee have determined that it would be

in the best interests of the Airport, the public and its users to

terminate’’ Boca Aviation’s lease ‘‘so as to cause the reinstatement

of FDOT funding and resolution of the pending Part 16 Action.’’

J.A. 376. Insisting on its exclusive lease could well have been selfdefeating for Boca Aviation, as it would have led to a cut-off of

federal funds that would likely have injured Boca Aviation as well

as the airport.

USCA Case #03-1136 Document #859810 Filed: 11/16/2004 Page 10 of 12
11

found, the sole ‘‘intent of the Director’s Determination in the

Boca Jet case was to eliminate an exclusive rights violation at

the airport.’’ Boca Aviation Final Decision, at *24. Hence,

‘‘[w]hether the option exercised by the Authority in following

through on its plan to develop the 15 acres violated a specific

issue of contract law between [Boca Aviation] and the [Authority] is a matter for a state court to decide; a Part 16

complaint is not the right forum to resolve that issue.’’ Id.

The petitioner protests that this conclusion is inconsistent

with a number of cases in which agencies have enforced

agreements like that made by the Authority here. One such

case is City of Pompano Beach v. FAA, 774 F.2d 1529 (11th

Cir. 1985), in which the FAA enforced a Part 16 stipulation

requiring the City to offer the complainant its ‘‘standard fixed

base operator lease.’’ 774 F.2d at 1537. Pompano Beach

does not, however, advance the petitioner’s cause. There, the

FAA enforced the stipulation because the City’s refusal to

offer the complainant its standard lease was ‘‘unjustly discriminatory,’’ and had ‘‘the effect of granting [an] exclusive

right to the use’’ of the City’s airpark, in violation of 49

U.S.C. app. § 1349(a) (1982). Id. at 1538. The Boca Raton

Airport Authority’s decision to lease the remaining airport

parcel to Premier Aviation, by comparison, violates no statutory provision.

Boca Aviation also cites Conant v. Office of Personnel

Management, 255 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001), for the proposition that ‘‘[w]here a settlement agreement between the parties is relevant to an administrative proceeding, directly

addresses an issue in dispute, and is not contrary to law, an

administrative agency cannot choose to ignore the agreement.’’ 255 F.3d at 1377. But both parties in Conant (one of

which was a government agency) expressly intended that

their settlement agreement would govern future administrative proceedings in that case. Id. at 1376-77. There was no

such agreement here; to the contrary, the FAA found that

the development provision pressed by Boca Aviation was

immaterial to the agency proceedings.6

6 Two other cases cited by the petitioner, Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. v. FERC, 966 F.2d 1506 (D.C. Cir. 1992), and Cajun

USCA Case #03-1136 Document #859810 Filed: 11/16/2004 Page 11 of 12
12

In sum, there was nothing arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise unlawful in the FAA’s conclusion that the Airport Authority’s lease with Premier Aviation was in compliance with

federal requirements, including the decision in Boca Jet.

III

The 19th Amendment notwithstanding, we hold that Boca

Aviation has no federally enforceable right to compel the

Boca Raton Airport Authority to construct, develop, and

operate the last remaining parcel of land at the Airport. If

relief is to be had at all, Boca Aviation must continue to

pursue it in state court. The petition for review is therefore

Denied.

Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. v. FERC, 924 F.2d 1132 (D.C. Cir.

1991), are even less relevant to the issues on review here. Those

cases merely observed that a court should defer to an agency’s

interpretation of a private settlement agreement approved by the

agency. They did not hold that the agency was required to enforce

all of the terms of such an agreement. See Texas Eastern, 966 F.2d

at 1509; Cajun Electric, 924 F.2d at 1135.

USCA Case #03-1136 Document #859810 Filed: 11/16/2004 Page 12 of 12