Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-03172/USCOURTS-caDC-96-03172-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Pauline Ngo Bapack
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 7, 1997 Decided December 5, 1997 

No. 96-3172

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

PAULINE NGO BAPACK,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 96cr00092-01)

Evelina J. Norwinski, Assistant Federal Public Defender, 

argued the cause for the appellant. A.J. Kramer, Federal 

Public Defender, was on brief.

Darryl Blane Brooks, Assistant United States Attorney, 

argued the cause for the appellee. Mary Lou Leary, United 

States Attorney, and John R. Fisher, Thomas J. Tourish, Jr.,

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and Virginia Cheatham, Assistant United States Attorneys, 

were on brief.

Before: WALD, GINSBURG and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: A jury convicted appellant Pauline Ngo Bapack of conspiring to defraud the 

Government (18 U.S.C. § 286), submitting false Medicare and 

Medicaid claims for payment (18 U.S.C. § 287), mail fraud (18 

U.S.C. § 1341) and/or aiding and abetting (18 U.S.C. § 2) 

these offenses. She was sentenced to twenty-seven months' 

imprisonment and three years' supervised release and was 

ordered to pay $100,506.00 in restitution, reduced by approximately $38,000 based on the amount recovered in civil forfeiture proceedings. She now appeals her sentence, claiming 

that it was improperly enhanced under sections 2F1.1(b)(2)(A) 

(more than minimal planning) and 3B1.1(c) (aggravating role) 

of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) and 

that she was erroneously ordered to pay restitution without 

regard to her ability to pay.1 We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Bapack was the co-owner of Urgent Home Health Care 

Services, Inc. (Corporation), which provided nursing care to 

Medicaid and Medicare patients in their homes. She was 

responsible for billing Medicaid for the services the Corporation provided. Because Medicaid and Medicare pay only for 

services actually rendered, a home health care agency like the 

Corporation simply cannot bill for the services prescribed in 

the patient's Plan of Care (Plan). Instead the provider can 

__________

1 Section 2F1.1(b)(2) of the Guidelines provides that "[i]f the 

offense involved (A) more than minimal planning, ... increase [the 

sentence] by 2 levels," and section 3B1.1(c) of the Guidelines states 

that "[i]f the defendant was an organizer, leader, manager, or 

supervisor in any criminal activity ... increase [the sentence] by 2 

levels." United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 2F1.1(b)(2)(A) & § 3B1.1(c) (Nov. 1995).

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bill Medicaid and Medicare only for the number and kinds of 

treatment visits in fact made, which, for a variety of reasons, 

may differ from those prescribed in the patient's Plan. Thus, 

the provider typically generates billing invoices by reference 

to attending nurses' time sheets, treatment notes and other 

records.

The Corporation, however, did not do this. Instead, at 

Bapack's (and co-defendant Pierre Yopa's) direction, it billed 

Medicaid and Medicare for the number and type of visits 

prescribed in the patient's Plan. As a result, it remitted 

numerous invoices for services it did not perform; the evidence presented at trial established that the Corporation, 

under the superintendence of Bapack and Yopa, billed Medicaid and Medicare for more than 1,400 nurse visits that could 

not be substantiated, the value of which totaled approximately 

$100,506.00.

On a tip from a former Corporation employee, the Inspector General's Office of the United States Department of 

Health and Human Services learned of the billing practices 

and raided the Corporation's offices in November 1995. After reviewing the records seized, and after subpoenaing several Corporation nurses to testify, the grand jury returned an 

eighteen-count indictment against Bapack and her codefendant, Pierre Yopa. Yopa was the other co-owner of the 

Corporation and he was responsible for Medicare billing.

The Government's evidence included the testimony of Diane Bouchaud, a nurse who had been a case manager for the 

Corporation. Bouchaud testified that Bapack directed her 

and other nurses to falsify records of nursing visits that were 

not made. See 9/10/96 Trial Tr. 325, 333-36, 338. Zuliatu 

Sillah, another nurse who served as the Corporation's Acting 

Director of Nursing, testified that Bapack had instructed her 

and others to fabricate records of nursing visits to assist in 

meeting a survey administered by the District of Columbia 

Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs (DCRA). 

Id. at 412-13, 418-19, 436-38. The Corporation was required 

to meet DCRA requirements, including complying with the 

surveys, to be a certified Medicare provider.

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On September 16, 1996, the jury returned a general verdict, finding both Bapack and Yopa guilty on all counts. The 

district court sentenced Bapack on December 9, 1996. Concluding that her offenses involved "more than minimal planning," it enhanced her sentence by two levels pursuant to 

section 2F1.1(b)(2)(A) of the Guidelines. 12/9/96 Sentencing 

Tr. 20. The court also found that, under section 3B1.1(c) of 

the Guidelines, an additional two-level enhancement was appropriate for Bapack's role as an "organizer, leader, manager, 

or supervisor":

Well, [appellant] clearly was, at the very least, a manager 

or supervisor. There was at least more than one participant other than Ms. Bapack herself. The testimony is 

that she was, in fact, a manager of the enterprise that 

was found guilty of defrauding Medicare.

Id. at 18. The presentence investigation report (Report), 

which the district court adopted in the Judgment in a Criminal Case (Judgment), also recited that "[f]ormer employees 

testified that Ms. Ngo Bapack, [sic] asked some of the staff 

members to create nursing records so that the patient's file 

would falsely reflect that nurses had followed the doctors' 

orders and reflect that the nurse visits had been consistent 

with the 'Plans of Care.' " 11/20/96 Report ¶ 11.

Finally, the district court ordered Bapack to pay restitution:

You shall pay a total restitution in the amount of 

$100,506.... The Court finds you do not possess the 

ability to pay a fine, the cost of imprisonment, or supervision unless otherwise determined by the Bureau of Prisons. In view of your financial status and your need to 

secure employment upon release to begin paying your 

restitution payments, an alternative sanction is not recommended.... Finally, I want to note for the record 

that there is a companion civil case that's running alongside this case. It's a forfeiture case.... And the effect 

of that forfeiture entered on the sentencing in this case is 

as follows: It doesn't affect the level of loss for purposes 

of the sentence. But I believe it will operate to reduce 

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the amount of restitution that [co-defendant] and Ms. 

Bapack will have to make. And so the final orders will 

reflect a restitution amount which is the approximately 

hundred thousand dollars that I recited minus the approximately $38,000 that has been seized and forfeited. 

And also, for the record, that restitution amount will 

necessarily be joint and several for whatever effect that 

has if Mr. Yopa is ever apprehended and returned and 

sentenced.

12/9/96 Sentencing Tr. 22, 24 (reporter's indenting and paragraph structure omitted). The Report noted "[b]ased on her 

current financial status, it does not appear that [appellant] 

has the ability to pay a fine, the costs of incarceration and/or 

supervision, in addition to her restitution obligation, if ordered by the court." 11/20/96 Report ¶ 57. It also noted that 

"the Government reported that when the seizure warrant was 

executed on March 4, 1996, the defendant had a [bank] 

balance of $102,645.17." 2Id. The district court then ordered Bapack to pay restitution in the amount of 

$62,294.50.3 Bapack contested neither the restitution order 

__________

2 The Government's sentencing memorandum indicated that this 

amount was held in two Crestar Bank accounts. (Appellee App. 

Tab H at 10 n.4.) Neither the sentencing memorandum nor the 

Report indicates, however, whether and to what extent Bapack (as 

distinguished from her co-defendant) had access to the accounts. 

Moreover, there is no record indication that the district court relied 

on this information in ordering restitution.

3 Bapack's Judgment orders restitution in the amount of 

$72,294.50, which is $10,000.00 more than the district court's oral

sentence. The Government attributes the difference to a simple 

arithmetic error: the amount of loss, $100,506.00, less the amount 

recovered in forfeiture proceedings, $38,211.50, should have resulted 

in a restitution order in the amount of $62,294.50, not $72,294.50. It 

suggests that we let the district court resolve the matter without 

remand (pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 36) and without delaying 

consideration of the merits. See Appellee Br. at 25 n.14. We think 

the preferable procedure is to conform the written sentence to the 

oral one. See Bartone v. United States, 375 U.S. 52, 53 (1963) 

("This error, in enlarging the sentence in the absence of petitioner, 

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nor the enhancement for more than minimal planning. She 

did argue, however, that there was insufficient evidence to 

support the aggravating role enhancement. 12/9/96 Sentencing Tr. 12-13. Bapack timely appealed and we now affirm.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Aggravating Role Enhancement

Bapack first contends that because there was no evidence 

to establish her role as a supervisor or manager of another 

participant in the crimes with which she was charged, the 

district court erred in enhancing her sentence pursuant to 

section 3B1.1(c) of the Guidelines. We review the sentencing 

court's finding for clear error.4See United States v. Baylor,

97 F.3d 542, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1996); United States v. Kelley, 36 

F.3d 1118, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("[W]e give due deference to 

the district court's application of the sentencing guidelines to 

the facts, and we accept the district court's findings of fact 

unless they are clearly erroneous.").

At sentencing, it is the Government's burden to demonstrate by a fair preponderance of the evidence that an enhancement is warranted. See United States v. Cruz, 120 F.3d 

1, 2 (1st Cir. 1997) (en banc). Thus, to support an aggravating role enhancement, the Government must show that more 

likely than not the defendant organized, led, managed or 

supervised the crime. See United States Sentencing Com-

__________

was so plain in light of the requirements of Rule 43 that it should 

have been dealt with by the Court of Appeals, even though it had 

not been alleged as error."). Accordingly, we hereby conform the 

written and oral restitution orders, revising the Judgment to require restitution of $62,294.50, the amount the district court plainly 

intended to order.

4 While she also asserts the district court applied the wrong legal 

standard (Appellant Br. 8), we find nothing in the sentencing 

transcript to support her assertion.

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mission, Guidelines Manual, § 3B1.1 application note 2 

[hereinafter Guidelines Manual].5 The Guidelines direct the 

sentencing judge to consider several factors, including

the exercise of decision making authority, the nature of 

participation in the commission of the offense, the recruitment of accomplices, the claimed right to a larger 

share of the fruits of the crime, the degree of participation in planning and organizing the offense, the nature 

and scope of the illegal activity, and the degree of control 

and authority exercised over others.

Id. application note 4; accord United States v. Thomas, 114 

F.3d 228, 261 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("The Sentencing Guidelines 

instruct the sentencing court to consider the numerous factors listed above, no one of which is determinative.") (emphasis added), petition for cert. filed, No. 97-6660 (U.S. Nov. 6, 

1997).

Mere "control over a scheme rather than over a participant

in a scheme," however, does not warrant a sentencing adjustment pursuant to section 3B1.1(c).6 United States v. Gort-

__________

5 The Commentary to the Guidelines binds the sentencing court 

to the same extent as the Guidelines themselves. See Stinson v. 

United States, 508 U.S. 36, 45 (1993).

6 The Commentary recites that "[a]n upward departure may be 

warranted, however, in the case of a defendant who did not organize, lead, manage, or supervise another participant, but who nevertheless exercised management responsibility over the property, 

assets, or activities of a criminal organization." Guidelines Manual, § 3B1.1 application note 2. Because the district court indicated 

that it was adjusting Bapack's sentence, rather than upwardly 

departing, however, we cannot affirm the sentence on the basis of 

her evident role in exercising "management responsibility over the 

property, assets, or activities of" the Corporation. See United 

States v. Jobe, 101 F.3d 1046, 1048 (5th Cir. 1996) ("As the district 

court did not order an upward departure, this ground of enhancement is unavailable to sustain the enhancement on appeal."), cert. 

denied 118 S. Ct. 81 (1997); but cf. United States v. Giraldo, 111 

F.3d 21, 24 (5th Cir. 1997) (although sentencing judge improperly 

relied on asset management theory to adjust sentence instead of 

upwardly departing, court declined to vacate sentence because 

evidence also supported adjustment making Guidelines application 

error harmless).

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DiDonato, 109 F.3d 318, 322 (6th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added). 

Instead "the defendant must have been the organizer, leader, 

manager, or supervisor of one or more participants." Guidelines Manual, § 3B1.1 application note 2 (emphasis added). 

A "participant" is a "person who is criminally responsible for 

the commission of the offense, but need not have been 

convicted." Id. application note 1. In turn, a person is 

"criminally responsible" if he "commit[s] all of the elements of 

a statutory crime with the requisite mens rea." United 

States v. Badaracco, 954 F.2d 928, 934-35 (3d Cir. 1992). 

This does not mean, however, that to qualify as a "participant" a person must be found criminally responsible as a 

principal or culpable in the same crime of which the supervising defendant was convicted: "[J]ust as a party who knowingly assists a criminal enterprise is criminally responsible under 

principles of accessory liability, a party who gives knowing 

aid in some part of the criminal enterprise is a 'criminally 

responsible party' under the Guidelines." United States v. 

Hall, 101 F.3d 1174, 1178 (7th Cir. 1996). Thus, "the facts 

that none of [the participants] benefitted from the commission 

of the offense or were convicted of any offenses arising from 

the criminal activity do not necessarily determine the ultimate 

issue." United States v. Braun, 60 F.3d 451, 453 (8th Cir. 

1995).

Bapack argues that none of the nurses who falsified treatment records and time sheets at her instruction can be 

considered criminally responsible for the crimes of which she 

was convicted because (1) none of the nurses was involved in 

the billing and (2) the falsified records were not used to bill 

Medicaid or Medicare but instead were used only to meet the 

DCRA certification survey. In her view, therefore, none of 

the supervised nurses had "the specific intent to facilitate 

Medicare/Medicaid fraud." (Appellant Reply Br. 3.) In 

short, Bapack asserts that, to the extent the nurses she 

supervised contributed to the offenses of which she was 

ultimately convicted, they did so unwittingly.7

__________

7 She also argues that the only other "participant" in the charged 

crimes, her business partner and co-defendant Yopa, was not shown 

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Her contentions are beside the point as they are mistakenly 

predicated on the assumption that only supervision of "participants" in the crimes with which she was charged, or of which 

she was convicted, warrants a section 3B1.1(c) enhancement. 

To the contrary, as provided by the Guidelines as well as 

circuit precedent, "[t]he determination of a defendant's role in 

the offense is to be made on the basis of all conduct within 

the scope of § 1B1.3 ... and not solely on the basis of 

elements and acts cited in the count of conviction." 8 Guidelines Manual, § 3B1.1 introductory commentary (emphasis 

added); accord United States v. Caballero, 936 F.2d 1292, 

1298 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("[W]e conclude that section 3B1 allows 

the sentencing judge to look to the contours of the underlying 

__________

or even alleged to have been supervised, managed or led by her. 

Because we find sufficient evidence that Bapack supervised nurses 

in the commission of certain crimes with which both she and the 

involved nurses could have been charged, we do not reach the issue 

of Bapack's role vis-à-vis her co-defendant.

8 Section 1B1.3 defines "relevant conduct" as:

(1)(A) all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the 

defendant; and (B) in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal 

activity (a criminal plan, scheme, endeavor, or enterprise undertaken by the defendant in concert with others, whether or 

not charged as a conspiracy), all reasonably foreseeable acts 

and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity, that occurred during the commission of the 

offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the 

course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for 

that offense; (2) solely with respect to offenses of a character 

for which § 3D1.2(d) would require grouping of multiple 

counts, all acts and omissions described in subdivisions (1)(A) 

and (1)(B) above that were part of the same course of conduct 

or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction; (3) all 

harm that resulted from the acts and omissions specified in 

subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) above, and all harm that was the 

object of such acts and omissions; and (4) any other information specified in the applicable guideline.

Guidelines Manual, § 1B1.3(a)(1)-(4) (emphasis added).

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scheme itself rather than the mere elements of the offense 

charged.") (internal quotations omitted; emphasis added), 

cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1061 (1992). Accordingly, the district 

court was free to consider Bapack's role with respect to all 

crimes, charged or otherwise, "that were part of the same 

course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of 

conviction." Guidelines Manual, § 1B1.3(a)(2).9In other 

words, application of the section 3B1.1(c) enhancement does 

not require a finding that Bapack supervised "participants" 

who were unindicted co-conspirators or accessories in the 

crimes of which she was convicted. Rather, it is enough that 

the "participants" she supervised were culpably involved in 

uncharged crimes "that were part of the same course of 

conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction." Id.

We therefore have no trouble concluding that Bapack supervised or managed at least one other "participant." Specifically, the testimony of at least two Corporation nurses 

(Bouchaud and Sillah), as well as the representations made in 

the Report, establish by well more than a fair preponderance 

of the evidence that Bapack supervised the knowing creation 

of a materially false document.10 Although the Government 

elected not to pursue it, the knowing falsification of records is 

a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, for which both Bapack and 

the involved nurses could have been prosecuted.11 The nurs-

__________

9 Section 1B1.3(a)(2) of the Guidelines applies because section 

3D1.2(d) requires that Bapack's fraud and conspiracy convictions be 

grouped.

10 Indeed, Bouchaud's testimony was so suggestive of her criminal 

culpability it prompted defense counsel to inquire whether she had 

been granted immunity. See 9/10/96 Trial Tr. 336:11-338:16.

11 Section 1001, in relevant part, provides:

[W]hoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the 

United States, knowingly and willingly... (2) makes any 

materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or (3) makes or uses any false writing or document 

knowing the same to contain any material false, fictitious, or 

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es' actions were indisputably "part of the same course of 

conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense[s]" of which 

Bapack was convicted. Although they admitted only that 

they falsified records for the DCRA certification requirements, a jury might reasonably disbelieve their knowledge 

was so limited and conclude from the totality of the circumstances that the nurses were well aware that the falsified 

records would ultimately be submitted to the Medicaid program.12 Accordingly, the district court did not clearly err in 

finding Bapack played an aggravating role in the offenses.

B. Cumulative Application of Sections 

3B1.1(c) and 2F1.1(b)(2)(A)

Bapack next argues that by cumulatively enhancing her 

sentence for her managerial role and for more than minimal 

planning, the sentencing court punished her twice for the 

same conduct. Since Bapack did not raise the doublecounting argument below, we review the district court's decision for plain error. See United States v. Plunkett, 125 F.3d 

873, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The Guidelines provide:

Absent an instruction to the contrary, the adjustments 

from different guideline sections are applied cumulatively 

__________

fraudulent statement or entry; shall be fined under this title or 

imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.

18 U.S.C.A. § 1001(a) (West Supp. 1997) (paragraph structure 

omitted). Bouchaud's testimony (see supra note 10,) also suggested 

that she might have been prosecuted for submitting false claims in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 287, providing yet another basis for enhancing Bapack's sentence pursuant to section 3B1.1(c).

12 In any event, because DCRA acts as an agent for the United 

States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) regarding 

D.C. Medicare certifications, 9/9/96 Trial Tr. 200-205, the DCRA 

survey itself may qualify as a "matter within the jurisdiction of the 

executive ... branch of the Government of the United States." Cf. 

United States v. Murphy, 935 F.2d 899, 900 n.1 (7th Cir. 1991) ("As 

we have previously held, HHS' regulatory oversight and provision 

of funding for Illinois' AFDC program establishes the applicability 

of § 1001 to that program.").

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(added together). For example, the adjustments from 

§ 2F1.1(b)(2) (more than minimal planning) and 

§ 3B1.1 (Aggravating Role) are applied cumulatively.

Guidelines Manual, § 1B1.1 application note 4(¶ 2) (emphasis 

added). Nevertheless Bapack encourages us to set aside the 

enhancement for more than minimal planning, asserting that 

the holding in United States v. Gottfried, 58 F.3d 648, 653 

(D.C. Cir. 1995), supports her. We disagree. In Gottfried,

we had to decide whether enhancements for more than minimal planning and for abuse of a position of trust were 

duplicative. See 58 F.3d at 652-53. We held that, because 

the two enhancements were based on separate elements of 

the defendant's offense, their cumulative application did not 

punish him twice for the same conduct. Id. at 653. In 

Gottfried we noted in dicta two Sixth Circuit cases "to the 

same effect." Id. Although those casesUnited States v. 

Chichy, 1 F.3d 1501, 1507 (6th Cir. 1993), and United States 

v. Romano, 970 F.2d 164, 167 (6th Cir. 1992)held that 

enhancements for an organizing role and for more than 

minimal planning could be impermissibly duplicative, they did 

not involve a situation in which a different element supported 

each enhancement. Bapack's case is plainly distinguishable 

from those cases because her sentence was enhanced for her 

managerial/supervisory role and for more than minimal planning. Moreover, as the Sixth Circuit has since acknowledged, 

both Chichy and Romano were overruled in 1993 when the 

Sentencing Commission amended the Commentary to section 

1B1.1 to include the unequivocal language quoted above. See 

United States v. Cobleigh, 75 F.3d 242, 251 (6th Cir. 1996) 

("The Sentencing Commission's regulations have thus abrogated the holdings of Romano and Chichy."). [B]ecause "the 

force of the [Guidelines] commentary is near complete," United States v. Smaw, 22 F.3d 330, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1994), we, like 

the Sixth Circuit, think that Application Note 4 to section 

1B1.1 of the Guidelines is dispositive.

The enhancements Bapack received were based on different elements of the offenses of which she was convicted. The 

aggravating role enhancement (as Bapack herself argues) was 

based on her directing nurses to falsify records of treatment 

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visits that were not made whereas the more than minimal 

planning enhancement was based on the overarching fraudulent billing scheme Bapack and her co-defendant engineered. 

Thus, contrary to her contention, Bapack was not found to 

have engaged in more than minimal planning because she 

supervised or managed a "participant," nor was she found to 

have supervised or managed a "participant" because she 

engaged in more than minimal planning. Accordingly, the 

district court did not err, much less plainly err, in cumulatively applying sections 3B1.1(c) and 2F1.1(b)(2)(A) of the Guidelines to enhance Bapack's sentence.

C. The Restitution Order

Finally Bapack contends that the district court erred in 

ordering restitution both because it apparently failed to consider her ability to pay and because the available evidence 

demonstrated that she could not make restitution.13 Bapack 

specifically asserts that, as the Report indicates, she has four 

minor children living in Cameroon, her debts exceed her 

assets and she is subject to deportation proceedings upon 

release from federal custody. For these reasons, she asserts, 

the court erred in ordering restitution in any amount. Because Bapack did not contest the restitution order below, we 

review it for plain error. See Plunkett, 125 F.3d at 874-75; 

United States v. Davis, 117 F.3d 459, 462 (11th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 118 S. Ct. 355; United States v. Zink, 107 F.3d 716, 

718 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Castner, 50 F.3d 1267, 

1277 (4th Cir. 1995).

The Guidelines direct that "[i]n determining whether to 

impose an order of restitution, and the amount of restitution, 

the court shall consider the amount of loss the victim suffered 

__________

13 Although the restitution provisions of Title 18, 18 U.S.C.A. 

§§ 3663 et seq. (West Supp. 1997), have recently been amended to 

make restitution mandatory in cases like this one, we apply the 

provisions in effect at the time Bapack was sentenced. See United 

States v. Thompson, 113 F.3d 13, 15 n.1 (2d Cir. 1997) (concluding 

that retroactive application of mandatory restitution provisions raises ex post facto concerns).

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as a result of the offense, the financial resources of the 

defendant, the financial needs of the defendant and his dependents, and other factors the court deems appropriate." 

Guidelines Manual, § 5E1.1 background ¶ 3 (paraphrasing 

18 U.S.C. § 3664(a)). The Guidelines do not, however, require a sentencing judge to make specific factual findings 

regarding the factors. On the contrary, they instruct that 

"[i]f the court does not order restitution or orders only 

partial restitution, it must state its reasons for doing so." Id.

background ¶ 2.

As we have observed in the analogous context of assessing 

a defendant's ability to pay a fine, because

[t]he guidelines set forth no requirement ... that the 

sentencing court make express findings on this question[,] ... we decline to create one. So long as the 

sentencing judge in fact considers ability to pay, he is in 

compliance with the guidelines' mandates. Thus, where 

the record demonstrates that the judge considered that 

factor before imposing the fine, the appellate court will 

not reverse the fine merely because no express finding 

was made but will review the finding of ability to pay 

necessarily implied by such consideration.

United States v. Mastropierro, 931 F.2d 905, 906 (D.C. Cir. 

1991). In applying this rule, we join the clear majority of our 

sister circuits. See, e.g., Davis, 117 F.3d at 463 (11th Cir. 

1997) (noting that specific factual findings not required); 

United States v. Sanders, 95 F.3d 449, 456 (6th Cir. 1996) 

(similar); United States v. Giwah, 84 F.3d 109, 114 (2d Cir. 

1996) (similar); United States v. Newman, 49 F.3d 1, 10 (1st 

Cir. 1995) (similar); United States v. Gio, 7 F.3d 1279, 1291 

(7th Cir. 1993) (similar); United States v. Ramilo, 986 F.2d 

333, 335 (9th Cir. 1993) (similar); United States v. Rogat, 924 

F.2d 983, 986 (10th Cir.) (similar), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 982 

(1991); United States v. Ryan, 874 F.2d 1052, 1053 (5th Cir.) 

(concluding that legislative predecessor to 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3664(a) 

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did not require specific findings), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1019 

(1989).14

We conclude that the record adequately evinces the district 

court's consideration of Bapack's ability to pay, the only one 

of the required factors she challenges. In particular, we note 

that the court adopted the unchallenged ability-to-pay findings of the Report, which discussed Bapack's financial worth, 

past work history and future ability to pay. The judge also 

stated "[t]he Court finds you do not possess the ability to pay 

a fine, the cost of imprisonment, or supervision[;] ... [i]n 

view of your financial status and your need to secure employment upon release to begin paying your restitution payments, 

an alternative sanction [fines, etc.] is not recommended." 

12/9/96 Sentencing Tr. 22. These indicia of the court's consideration of Bapack's ability to pay restitution satisfy us that it 

considered the required factors in ordering her to pay restitution. See Davis, 117 F.3d at 464 (record reflected consideration of defendant's ability to pay where sentencing judge 

adopted presentence report regarding defendant's financial 

circumstances and where defendant was given opportunity to 

object but did not); Castner, 50 F.3d at 1278 (sentencing 

judge's failure to make specific factual findings regarding 

defendant's ability to pay restitution was not plain error 

where judge adopted presentence report that considered 18 

U.S.C. § 3664(a) factors); United States v. Mizrachi, 48 F.3d 

651, 657 (2d Cir. 1995) (upholding restitution order where 

presentence report contained detailed discussion of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3664(a) factors and where court mentioned restitution in 

connection with its decision not to assess fine or incarceration 

costs); Nelson, 5 F.3d at 258 (record reflected consideration 

of defendant's ability to pay restitution where sentencing 

judge determined "[d]efendant does not have a financial 

ability to pay a fine, costs of incarceration, community confinement, or supervision, and, therefore, [the court] waives 

__________

14 We therefore reject the approach of the Third Circuit and the 

Fourth Circuit, which seem to require specific findings as to each of 

the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3664(a). See United States v. 

Copple, 74 F.3d 479, 482 (3d Cir. 1996); United States v. Piche, 981 

F.2d 706, 718 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 916 (1993).

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the interests on the fine, costs of incarceration, community 

confinement and supervision in this case").

The cases Bapack relies on are easily distinguished from 

hers. In Thompson, 113 F.3d at 16, the Second Circuit was 

not satisfied that the sentencing judge had considered the 

required factors because, unlike here, the judge refrained 

from fining the defendant without comment on the defendant's ability to pay either a fine or restitution. In Sanders,

95 F.3d at 456, the sentencing judge stated that he was 

"required" to order restitution whereas his restitution order 

was instead held to be discretionary and the Sixth Circuit was 

uncertain, in view of a silent record, that the required factors 

had been considered. There is nothing in the record here 

that leads us to conclude that the district court believed it had 

to order restitution and thus Sanders is inapposite. Finally, 

in United States v. Remillong, 55 F.3d 572 (11th Cir. 1995), 

the Eleventh Circuit remanded the defendant's sentence to 

the district court for the third time because the only evidence 

of consideration of the required factors consisted of the 

sentencing judge's handwritten note on the Judgment, which 

indicated only that restitution was appropriate because the 

defendant had at one time had physical custody of the stolen 

money. See 55 F.3d at 574.

Nor do we find plain error in the sentencing court's conclusion that Bapack should be ordered to pay restitution in the 

amount of $62,294.50. Bapack bore the burden at sentencing 

of demonstrating by a fair preponderance of the evidence her 

financial condition. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d) ("The burden of 

demonstrating the financial resources of the defendant and 

the financial needs of the defendant and such defendant's 

dependents shall be on the defendant."). To prevail on 

appeal she must "show that the record is devoid of any 

evidence that [she] is able to satisfy the restitution order." 

Davis, 117 F.3d at 459 (internal quotation marks omitted; 

emphasis added). The "burden is particularly acute under 

the plain error standard of review." Id. Bapack has not 

satisfied her appellate burden, as the Report's unchallenged 

ability to pay findings suffice to sustain the restitution orUSCA Case #96-3172 Document #313756 Filed: 12/05/1997 Page 16 of 17
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der.15 See United States v. Twitty, 107 F.3d 1482, 1494 n.14 

(11th Cir.) (sentencing court entitled to rely on uncontroverted findings of presentence report in deeming defendant able 

to pay restitution), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 253 (1997). Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not plainly 

err in ordering Bapack to pay restitution in the amount of 

$62,294.50. Cf. Castner, 50 F.3d at 1278 ("Although Appellants at time of sentencing had a negative net monthly cash 

flow, this does not necessarily indicate an inability to pay, 

particularly when their [presentence reports] reflect past 

success in business and above average earning capacities."); 

Nelson, 5 F.3d at 259 (holding that although defendant had 

negative net worth at time of sentencing, record indicated he 

"demonstrated considerable talent in perpetrating his 

crime[,]" and thus "[t]he restitution order gives [him] an 

incentive to apply these talents in a lawful manner upon 

release to make his victim whole").

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the district 

court correctly (1) enhanced Bapack's sentence pursuant to 

section 3B1.1(c) of the Guidelines, (2) cumulatively enhanced 

her sentence pursuant to sections 3B1.1(c) and 2F1.1(b)(2)(A) 

of the Guidelines and (3) ordered her to pay restitution in the 

amount of $62,294.50. Accordingly, Pauline Ngo Bapack's 

sentence is

Affirmed.

__________

15 The Report noted as to Bapack's ability to satisfy a future (and 

joint) restitution obligation: (1) she has made a good living since 

seeking asylum in this country in 1984; (2) she is trained as a 

nurse; (3) she has a long and stable history of successful employment as a nurse; and (4) she possesses entrepreneurial talent as 

evidenced by her ability to obtain the necessary certifications for, 

and launch, her own home health care agency. See Report ¶¶ 44-

57.

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