Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-01-05107/USCOURTS-caDC-01-05107-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John D. Ashcroft
Appellee
Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.
Appellant
Ruth A. Harvey
Appellee
Long Island Lighting Company
Appellant
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
Appellant

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 15, 2002 Decided April 23, 2002

No. 01-5107

Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., et al.,

Appellants

v.

John D. Ashcroft,

Attorney General of the United States and

Ruth A. Harvey, Attorney, Civil Division,

Department of State,

Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 00cv01962)

Philip P. Kalodner argued the cause and filed the briefs

for appellant.

Bruce G. Forrest, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were

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Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and William Kanter,

Deputy Director, U.S. Department of Justice.

Before: Sentelle, Henderson and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Tatel.

Tatel, Circuit Judge: Following decades of oil overcharge

litigation under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, the

United States Attorney General recovered a multi-million

dollar judgment on behalf of thirty-seven utilities, including

the three appellants. Awarded by the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Alabama, that judgment

included an $800,000 surcharge payable to the Attorney General pursuant to the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act.

Appellants then filed suit in the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia seeking a writ of mandamus that

would direct the Attorney General to pay the $800,000 to

them. Concluding that Appellants failed to show that the

Attorney General's retention of the surcharge amounted to a

violation of a clear ministerial duty that would warrant mandamus, the district court denied the writ. We agree.

I.

The now-defunct Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 (ESA),

as amended, 12 U.S.C. s 1904 note, gave the President broad

authority to "issue such orders and regulations as he may

deem appropriate to stabilize prices." Pub. L. 91-379, s 202,

84 Stat. 799, 799 (1970) (expired 1974). Acting pursuant to

delegated ESA authority, see id. s 203, 84 Stat. at 800, the

Secretary of Energy created price controls for crude oil.

Under the ESA, the Attorney General (as well as private

parties) has authority to seek restitution for any "sale of

goods or services exceed[ing] the applicable ceiling under

regulations or orders issued under this title." Economic

Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, Pub. L. 91-379,

ss 209-10, 85 Stat. 743, 748 (1971).

In 1977, the Attorney General intervened in litigation pending in the United States District Court for the Southern

District of Alabama to obtain ESA restitution on behalf of

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thirty-seven utilities that had purchased crude oil at prices

exceeding Department of Energy limits. Among the thirtyseven utilities were the three appellants: Consolidated Edison, Long Island Lighting Company, and Niagara Mohawk

Power Corporation, to whom we will refer collectively

throughout this opinion as "Edison." Eleven years of litigation later, the Alabama district court awarded a judgment of

approximately $30 million in the Attorney General's favor.

Following another decade of litigation caused by the sellers'

efforts to escape payment, the court entered a final judgment

of $15.75 million. Pursuant to court order, the funds were

deposited into a Department of Energy escrow account for

distribution to the thirty-seven judgment beneficiaries on a

pro rata basis.

Central to this case, the Alabama judgment included an

$800,000 surcharge payable to the Attorney General pursuant

to the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act. That Act

provides that the U.S. government "is entitled to recover a

10% surcharge of the amount of the recovered debt in connection with recovery of the debt." 28 U.S.C. s 3011(a).

After the Alabama district court denied Edison's motion to

intervene to challenge the surcharge, Edison filed suit in the

United States District Court for the District of Columbia

seeking a writ of mandamus that would direct the Attorney

General to remit the $800,000 surcharge to the Department of

Energy for transmission to the judgment beneficiaries. According to Edison, nothing in the Debt Collection Act authorized the surcharge. Finding that "the decision of the Justice

Department to pursue recovery of a surcharge ... is not a

ministerial act[,] ... and it clearly is not so free from doubt

that the Government didn't have the authority and the discretion to seek to invoke [the Debt Collection Act]," Tr. Mots.

Hr'g of 1/30/01 at 6, the district court dismissed the complaint. Edison filed simultaneous appeals in this court and

the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,

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and successfully moved to stay the latter appeal pending the

resolution of this one.

II.

Before addressing the mandamus issue, we must consider

the Attorney General's arguments that jurisdiction lies exclusively in the Federal Circuit and that, in any event, Edison

lacks Article III standing. We consider each argument in

turn.

The Attorney General's first argument rests on ESA section 211, which placed exclusive jurisdiction over "cases or

controversies arising under" that statute in a specialized

federal court, the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals.

Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, Pub. L.

92-210, s 211(a), 85 Stat. 743, 748 (1971). That court has

since been dissolved and its jurisdiction transferred to the

Federal Circuit. See Federal Courts Administration Act of

1992, Pub. L. 102-572, s 102(a), 106 Stat. 4506, 4506 (1992)

(abolishing the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals); id.

at s 102(b), 106 Stat. at 4506 (codified as amended at 28

U.S.C. s 1295(a)(11)) (establishing exclusive Federal Circuit

jurisdiction over ESA issues). The Federal Circuit construes

its ESA jurisdiction narrowly. In Texas American Oil Co. v.

United States Department of Energy, the Federal Circuit

held that it possesses only " 'issue' jurisdiction, not 'case' or

'arising under' jurisdiction" over ESA issues, emphasizing

that such a holding "steadfastly implement[s] the jurisdictional policy and practice of deciding only the ESA issues in a

case, leaving to the regional circuit courts all other issues

arising in the same transaction or joined to [the] ESA issues."

44 F.3d 1557, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1995). In other words, the

Federal Circuit will only "decide certain questions that do not

aris[e] independently of the substantive [ESA] claim or cause

of action and have no life apart from that substantive claim."

Stertz v. Gulf Oil Corp., 783 F.2d 1064, 1069 (Temp. Emer.

Ct. App. 1986) (alterations in original) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). The Federal Circuit uses a

two-part test for determining whether an issue falls within its

exclusive ESA jurisdiction. First, resolution of the litigation

must require application or interpretation of the ESA or

regulations issued thereunder; and second, the ESA issue

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must have been adjudicated in the district court. Tex. Am.,

44 F.3d at 1563.

The issue raised here fails the first element of the Texas

American test. Although the litigation leading to this appeal

has its origins in the ESA, the substantive question under

that statute--whether Edison was entitled to restitution for

alleged oil overcharges--was long ago resolved by the Alabama district court. Moreover, the issue Edison now raises--whether the Debt Collection Act authorizes the Attorney

General's $800,000 surcharge--requires neither interpretation

nor application of the ESA. Asked at oral argument to

identify any ESA issues we must decide to resolve this

appeal, the Attorney General's counsel candidly conceded

there are none. Because the Debt Collection Act question

has "life apart" from the substantive ESA cause of action that

gave rise to this litigation decades ago, we have jurisdiction to

consider it.

This result comports with decisions of both the Supreme

Court and one of our sister circuits holding that issues

relating to enforcement of an ESA judgment fall outside the

Federal Circuit's exclusive jurisdiction if they require neither

interpretation nor application of the ESA. In Bray v. United

States, the Supreme Court held that the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals' exclusive jurisdiction did not encompass an appeal of a contempt proceeding growing out of a

party's refusal to produce documents subpoenaed in connection with a possible ESA violation. 423 U.S. 73, 73-74 (1975).

"Although the contempt charge related to an order entered in

connection with an investigation of [ESA] violations," the

Court explained, "it was not dependent on the existence of

such violations," and thus sufficiently separate from the substantive ESA issues that the Tenth Circuit should have

exercised jurisdiction. Id. at 75-76. Similarly, in CitronelleMobile Gathering Inc. v. Watkins, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed a challenge to a district court's appointment of a

receiver whose sole purpose was to enforce an ESA judgment. 934 F.2d 1180, 1184-85 (1991). The court pointed out

that because "appellants' liability for ESA ... violations has

already been fully litigated, ... [t]here remains no question

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of liability based on those ... violations." Id. at 1185. It

went on to hold that because "the issues on this appeal

concern the post-judgment enforcement of the ... decision,"

the challenge to the appointment was not integrally related to

the ESA, thus not within the Federal Circuit's exclusive

jurisdiction. Id. Here too, determining whether the Attorney General may retain the Debt Collection Act surcharge

does not require that we review--or even question--the

Alabama district court's conclusion that the ESA entitles

Edison to restitution for the oil overcharges.

Insisting that this case nevertheless belongs in the Federal

Circuit, the Attorney General claims that the district court

here considered "an important issue requiring the interpretation of the ... ESA," namely, whether "plaintiffs failed to

state a claim under the Economic Stabilization Act." Appellee's Br. at 17, 18. It is true that the district court ruled that

because "there is no private right of action under the Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971[,] ... there is no

standing," and therefore extensively considered the ESA's

provisions for public and private rights of action as well as

related Federal Circuit decisions. Tr. Mots. Hr'g of 1/30/01

at 6, 6-11. The district court's ESA discussion, however, has

no effect on our jurisdiction. As the Federal Circuit has

repeatedly emphasized, its ESA jurisdiction is issue-specific,

and the issue we must resolve in this appeal does not require

in that Edison state a cause of action under the ESA.

Instead, because Edison sought a writ of mandamus, whether

it stated a cause of action depends on the All Writs Act, which

authorizes federal courts to "issue all writs necessary or

appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." 28 U.S.C. s 1651.

Next, the Attorney General contends that Edison seeks to

"split" its appeal, and that the company intends to follow up

any adverse result on the merits by briefing the same issues

again in its pending appeal in the Federal Circuit. Appellee's

Br. at 18-19. A bifurcated appeals process, however, seems

precisely what the Federal Circuit's issue-based approach

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cations of the ... ESA[ ] or related regulations has been held

to be within the exclusive purview of the [Federal Circuit],

and separated from the appeal of any other substantive

issue." Tex. Am., 44 F.3d at 1563. In any event, no duplicative merits determinations could occur, for if we have jurisdiction over the Debt Collection Act issue, that issue would

necessarily fall outside the Federal Circuit's exclusive ESA

jurisdiction.

Finally, the Attorney General cites Texas American for the

proposition that "[w]hen the [Federal Circuit] has taken

jurisdiction [of ESA issues], the court has occasionally been

required to consider and apply laws in interaction with the

ESA." Id. at 1564. But that proposition--where an issue

requires interpretation of both the ESA and another statute,

the Federal Circuit can exercise jurisdiction over the nonESA issue--sheds no light on which questions this circuit

may entertain. Besides, because the Debt Collection Act

issue does not require interpretation of the ESA, see supra at

5, no such "interaction" could take place.

As to Edison's standing, the Attorney General does not

articulate his claim in terms of the familiar constitutional

standard: a "concrete and particularized" "injury-in-fact" that

is "fairly ... trace[able]" to the conduct of the defendant and

may be "redressed by a favorable decision." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (alterations in

original). Instead, he argues, the relief Edison seeks requires "this court [to] attribute a desire on the part of the

Department of Energy to obtain, via judicial fiat, an order

running against federal officials from one Executive Branch

agency to another." Appellee's Br. at 20. We assume that

the Attorney General means that Edison's claim is not redressable--that is, requiring him to remit the surcharge to

the Energy Department would fail to redress Edison's

claimed injury because it would fail to place the $800,000 in

the judgment beneficiaries' corporate hands. This claim,

however, ignores the Alabama district court's express requirement that "[w]henever ... the amount held by DOE in

escrow for this case ... exceeds $1,000,000, but in any event

no less often than once every two years, DOE shall make

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further pro rata payments to the claimants." Order of the

United States District Court of the Southern District for

Alabama at 2, Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc. v. Watkins

(May 14, 1992) (No. Civ. 77-101-A). Thus, had the district

court here issued the writ and directed the Attorney General

to deposit $800,000 in the Department of Energy escrow

account, the Alabama district court's order would have required Energy to disburse those funds directly to Edison.

Accordingly, the presence of the Department of Energy as an

intermediary between Edison and the Attorney General does

not deprive Edison of standing.

III.

"[A] 'drastic' remedy, 'to be invoked only in extraordinary

situations,' " In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 249 (D.C. Cir.

1998) (quoting Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402

(1976)), mandamus is inappropriate except where a public

official has violated a "ministerial" duty. Such a duty must

be "so plainly prescribed as to be free from doubt and

equivalent to a positive command.... [W]here the duty is

not thus plainly prescribed, but depends on a statute or

statutes the construction or application of which is not free

from doubt, it is regarded as involving the character of

judgment or discretion which cannot be controlled by mandamus." Wilbur v. United States, 281 U.S. 206, 218-19 (1929).

We agree with the district court that Edison's showing falls

far short of this high standard. To begin with, the Attorney

General obtained the surcharge and now retains it pursuant

to a federal court order. He is thus complying with--not

violating--his legal obligations. Resisting this obvious proposition, Edison argues that the Attorney General's possession

of the surcharge is so plainly wrong that it amounts to a

violation of a ministerial duty. In our view, however, this

argument amounts to a completely inappropriate collateral

attack on the Alabama court's judgment. See Roche v.

Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1946) (holding that

mandamus is only available to "confine an inferior court to a

lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to

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exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so"). Although

Edison never formally asked the district court here to mandamus the Alabama district court, the relief it seeks amounts to

exactly the same thing, for however phrased, Edison's complaint challenges the Alabama district court's interpretation

of the Debt Collection Act.

Even if we were free to consider Edison's arguments, they

would provide no basis for mandamus. Edison first claims

that "this is simply a case in which a lawyer is withholding

funds improperly from his client," Appellants' Opening Br. at

32, thus violating a duty that is "ministerial, plainly defined,

peremptory, and owed to the plaintiff," id. (quoting Public

Citizen v. Kantor, 864 F. Supp. 208, 212 (D.D.C. 1994)). The

cases Edison cites, though, all involve attorneys refusing to

pay funds courts had awarded to clients. Here, by contrast,

the Alabama district court ordered the $800,000 paid to the

Attorney General. See Order of the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Alabama at 2, CitronelleMobile Gathering, Inc. v. PeNa (Sept. 23, 1997) (No. Civ.

77-101-A).

Equally without merit is Edison's argument that the Debt

Collection Act so plainly does not authorize the surcharge

that the Attorney General wrongly possesses the $800,000

and should therefore be required to remit it to the judgment

beneficiaries. According to Edison, the "essence of the authorized 'surcharge' is that it be imposed on the debtor as an

addition to the judgment debt," and "the withholding by the

Attorney General of funds due clients from the partially

collected judgment is a 'surcharge' not upon the debtor, but

upon the Judgment Beneficiaries." Appellants' Opening Br.

at 24. We agree with the district court that this argument is

"somewhat of a stretch." Tr. Mots. Hr'g of 1/30/01 at 14.

While the term "surcharge" might refer to an amount added

on to--not subtracted from--the judgment, the Debt Collection Act's language by no means unambiguously requires this

conclusion, and Edison cites no authority, other than Webster's Dictionary, to support its interpretation. The dictionary, however, provides no basis for concluding that the

Attorney General of the United States violated a duty "so

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plainly prescribed as to be free from doubt and equivalent to

a positive command."

The district court's dismissal of the complaint is affirmed.

So ordered.

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