Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00787/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00787-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Mitchell R. Skipworth
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MITCHELL R. SKIPWORTH,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

No. 2:15-cv-0787 DB

ORDER

This social security action was submitted to the court without oral argument for ruling on 

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment.1 

For the reasons explained below, plaintiff’s motion is denied, defendant’s cross-motion is 

granted, and the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) is affirmed.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In December of 2011, plaintiff filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits 

(“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act (“the Act”), alleging disability beginning on

September 1, 2010. (Transcript (“Tr.”) at 10, 131-32.) Plaintiff’s application was denied 

initially, (id. at 68-71), and upon reconsideration. (Id. at 81-85.) Plaintiff requested an 

 

1

 Both parties have previously consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction over this action 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (See Dkt. Nos. 3 & 9.)

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administrative hearing and a hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on 

November 4, 2013. (Id. at 22-47.) Plaintiff was represented by an attorney and testified at the 

administrative hearing. (Id. at 22-23.) 

In a decision issued on November 20, 2013, the ALJ found that plaintiff was not disabled. 

(Id. at 18.) The ALJ entered the following findings: 

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social 

Security Act through December 31, 2015. 

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity after

September 1, 2010, the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et 

seq.).

3. The claimant has the following severe impairments:

degenerative joint disease of the right knee (status post arthroscopy) 

and a right meniscus tear (status post medial meniscectomy) (20 

CFR 404.1520(c)).

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of 

the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 

(20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, and 404.1526).

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned 

finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to 

perform medium work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c) except 

that the claimant is limited to: occasional climbing of ramps and 

stairs; occasional climbing of ladders, ropes, and scaffolds; frequent 

balancing; occasionally kneeling and crouching; and no crawling. 

Furthermore, the claimant should have no exposure to extreme cold, 

wetness, vibrations, and workplace hazards-defined as moving 

machinery and unprotected heights. 

6. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work (20 

CFR 404.1565).

7. As the claimant was born on November 13, 1959, he has been 

between fifty and fifty-four years of age during the period at issue, 

which is defined as an individual closely approaching advanced age

(20 CFR 404.1563).

8. The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to 

communicate in English (20 CFR 404.1564).

9. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination 

of disability because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a 

framework supports a finding that the claimant is “not disabled” 

whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills (See SSR 82-

41 and 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2). 

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10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, 

and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in 

significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can

perform (20 CFR 404.1569 and 404.1569(a)).

11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the 

Social Security Act, from September 1, 2010, through the date of 

this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(g)). 

(Id. at 12-18.)

On February 11, 2015, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for review of the 

ALJ’s November 20, 2013 decision. (Id. at 1-3.) Plaintiff sought judicial review pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g) by filing the complaint in this action on April 10, 2015. (Dkt. No. 1.)

LEGAL STANDARD

“The district court reviews the Commissioner’s final decision for substantial evidence, 

and the Commissioner’s decision will be disturbed only if it is not supported by substantial 

evidence or is based on legal error.” Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 2012). 

Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion. Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001); Sandgathe v. 

Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997).

“[A] reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm 

simply by isolating a ‘specific quantum of supporting evidence.’” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 

466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir.

1989)). If, however, “the record considered as a whole can reasonably support either affirming or 

reversing the Commissioner’s decision, we must affirm.” McCartey v. Massanari, 298 F.3d 

1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2002). 

A five-step evaluation process is used to determine whether a claimant is disabled. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520; see also Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007). The five-step 

process has been summarized as follows:

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful activity? 

If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed to step 

two.

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Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? If so, 

proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is 

appropriate.

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination of 

impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 

404, Subpt. P, App. 1? If so, the claimant is automatically 

determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four.

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past work? If 

so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step five.

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional capacity 

to perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If 

not, the claimant is disabled.

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995).

The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 

process. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n. 5 (1987). The Commissioner bears the burden 

if the sequential evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.; Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 

1098 (9th Cir. 1999).

APPLICATION

In his pending motion plaintiff asserts that the ALJ’s treatment of plaintiff’s testimony 

constituted error. (Pl.’s MSJ (Dkt. No. 18) at 5-15.) The Ninth Circuit has summarized the 

ALJ’s task with respect to assessing a claimant’s credibility as follows:

To determine whether a claimant’s testimony regarding subjective

pain or symptoms is credible, an ALJ must engage in a two-step 

analysis. First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has 

presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment 

which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other 

symptoms alleged. The claimant, however, need not show that her 

impairment could reasonably be expected to cause the severity of 

the symptom she has alleged; she need only show that it could 

reasonably have caused some degree of the symptom. Thus, the

ALJ may not reject subjective symptom testimony . . . simply 

because there is no showing that the impairment can reasonably 

produce the degree of symptom alleged.

Second, if the claimant meets this first test, and there is no evidence 

of malingering, the ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony about 

the severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and 

convincing reasons for doing so . . . .

Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). “The clear and convincing standard is the most demanding required in Social Security 

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cases.” Moore v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 278 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2002). “At 

the same time, the ALJ is not required to believe every allegation of disabling pain, or else 

disability benefits would be available for the asking . . . .” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 

(9th Cir. 2012).

“The ALJ must specifically identify what testimony is credible and what testimony 

undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Valentine v. Commissioner Social Sec. Admin., 574 

F.3d 685, 693 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 

599 (9th Cir. 1999)). In weighing a claimant’s credibility, an ALJ may consider, among other 

things, the “[claimant’s] reputation for truthfulness, inconsistencies either in [claimant’s] 

testimony or between [her] testimony and [her] conduct, [claimant’s] daily activities, [her] work 

record, and testimony from physicians and third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect 

of the symptoms of which [claimant] complains.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 

(9th Cir. 2002) (modification in original) (quoting Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 

(9th Cir. 1997)). If the ALJ’s credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence in the 

record, the court “may not engage in second-guessing.” Id. 

Here, the ALJ found that plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably 

be expected to cause the alleged symptoms, but that plaintiff’s statements concerning the 

intensity, persistence and limiting effects of those symptoms was not entirely credible. (Tr. at 

14.) Specifically, the ALJ found plaintiff only “partially credible” and his allegations of “workpreclusive limitations” unsupported by the record. (Id.)

In this regard, the ALJ noted that plaintiff’s testimony was not supported by the “balance 

of medical evidence . . . .” (Id.) “[A]fter a claimant produces objective medical evidence of an 

underlying impairment, an ALJ may not reject a claimant’s subjective complaints based solely on 

a lack of medical evidence to fully corroborate the alleged severity of pain.” Burch v. Barnhart, 

400 F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). Here, however, the ALJ did not reject 

plaintiff’s testimony based solely on a lack of medical evidence.

The ALJ also rejected plaintiff’s testimony due to plaintiff’s failure to seek treatment 

beginning in January of 2012. (Tr. at 15.) In this regard, plaintiff testified that since January of 

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2012 he was “just getting through the pain . . . just going and going.” (Id. at 34.) It is wellestablished that an ALJ may discredit a plaintiff’s testimony for lack of consistent treatment.2

 

See Burch, 400 F.3d at 680-81 (ALJ may properly rely on failure to seek treatment during “three 

or four month period” to discredit plaintiff’s subjective complaints). 

Accordingly, the court finds that plaintiff is not entitled to relief with respect to his claim

that the ALJ erred by rejecting plaintiff’s testimony concerning the severity of his impairments.

CONCLUSION

The court finds that plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment in his favor with respect 

to the sole argument advanced in the pending motion.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 18) is denied;

2. Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 22) is granted; and

3. The decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is affirmed.

Dated: January 10, 2017

DLB:6

DLB1\orders.soc sec\skipworth0787.ord

 

2

 The ALJ’s decision also noted that plaintiff failed to appear at two separate consultative 

examinations. (Tr. at 15.) Such repeated failures, under some circumstances, may alone warrant 

a denial of benefits. See McCann v. Astrue, No. EDCV 09-1432 SS, 2010 WL 2803964, at *5 

(C.D. Cal. July 15, 2010) (“the ALJ was entitled to deny benefits as a sanction for Plaintiff’s 

failure to appear at her consultative examinations”); Kreidler v. Barnhart, 385 F.Supp.2d 1034, 

1037 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (“Plaintiff’s repeated failures to attend the consultative examinations 

scheduled for her constitute a failure to cooperate sufficient to warrant termination of her 

disability benefits.”).

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