Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-23-04339/USCOURTS-ca4-23-04339-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Christopher William Kuehner
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-4339

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

CHRISTOPHER WILLIAM KUEHNER, a/k/a nechris, a/k/a William Christopher 

Kuehner,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at 

Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, District Judge. (1:22-cr-00120-LMB-4)

Argued: September 27, 2024 Decided: January 16, 2025 

Before GREGORY, QUATTLEBAUM, and BERNER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Berner wrote the opinion in which Judge Gregory 

and Judge Quattlebaum joined.

ARGUED: Lana Manitta, LAW OFFICE OF LANA MANITTA, PLLC, Alexandria, 

Virginia, for Appellant. Seth Michael Schlessinger, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Jessica D. Aber, United 

States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, Daniel Honold, Assistant United States Attorney, 

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4339 Doc: 52 Filed: 01/16/2025 Pg: 1 of 20
2

BERNER, Circuit Judge:

More than forty years ago in New York v. Ferber, the United States Supreme Court 

expressed profound concern about the rise of child exploitation and abuse through the 

production and dissemination of photographs and films depicting minors engaging in 

sexual activity. 458 U.S. 747, 749 (1982). The Court emphasized that the “prevention of 

sexual exploitation and abuse of children constitutes a government objective of surpassing 

importance.” Id. at 757. This is because such photographs and films become “a permanent 

record” of the abuse of a child “and the harm to the child is exacerbated by their 

circulation.” Id. at 759. Ferber was decided long before the advent of the Internet and social 

media, digital cameras, video cameras, and cell phones at the ready, and relatively 

inexpensive computer equipment. Taken together, these technological advances have 

enabled an exponential increase in the instantaneous, often anonymous, and broad 

dissemination of such material. 

Congress recognized this growing problem when, in 2006, it enacted the Adam 

Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act to protect children from sexual exploitation and 

abuse, by promoting Internet safety and preventing the production and dissemination of 

child pornography, which we will refer to as child sexual abuse material.

1 Adam Walsh 

1 “Child pornography” is defined as the “visual depiction” of a minor “engaging in 

sexually explicit conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8); see United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 

285, 288 (2008). We refer to such content as “child sexual abuse material” to reflect more 

accurately the abusive and exploitative nature of child pornography. Child Sexual Abuse 

Material, Nat’l Ctr. for Missing & Exploited Children (accessed Jan. 2, 2025), 

https://www.missingkids.org/theissues/csam [https://perma.cc/PV8D-GZEX]; United 

States v. Larson, No. 19-cr-50165, 2023 WL 196171, at *1 n.1 (D.S.D. Jan. 17, 2023) 

(Continued)

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4339 Doc: 52 Filed: 01/16/2025 Pg: 2 of 20
3

Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587, 587 (2006); 

id. § 501; see id. § 701. Among its many provisions, the Walsh Act amended Section 

2252A of Title 18 of the United States Code, to add a criminal ban on “child exploitation 

enterprises.” Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 § 701. This case 

concerns the proper interpretation of that provision.

Christopher William Kuehner actively used a website and a messaging server

dedicated to sexual violence and the sexual exploitation of minors. Employing two 

different usernames, he produced and encouraged the production of child sexual abuse 

material on these platforms. After authorities revealed that Kuehner was behind the 

usernames, they charged him with one count of engaging in a child exploitation enterprise. 

Following a two-day bench trial, Kuehner was convicted and subsequently sentenced to 

serve twenty years in prison.

On appeal, Kuehner raises several challenges to his conviction. First, he maintains 

that the district court erroneously interpreted the requirement of the child exploitation 

enterprises statute that predicate felony offenses be performed “in concert with three or 

more other persons.” The district court considered the number of people involved in the 

predicate offenses cumulatively. In other words, it was enough that all the predicate 

felonies were committed with a total of three or more other people when summed together. 

(explaining that pornography “connotes a certain aspect of consent that is impossible when 

the images or videos depict children,” and because of this lack of consent, child sexual 

abuse material is “evidence of a child being sexually abused.”). Other courts have done the 

same. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 93 F.4th 605, 608 (2d Cir. 2024); Doe #1 v. 

Twitter, Inc., No. 22-15103, 2023 WL 3220912, at *1 (9th Cir. May 3, 2023); United States 

v. Glowacki, No. 22-3279, 2023 WL 179887, at *1 (6th Cir. Jan. 13, 2023).

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4339 Doc: 52 Filed: 01/16/2025 Pg: 3 of 20
4

Kuehner argues that each predicate offense must have been committed in concert with three 

or more other people. Second, Kuehner argues that there was insufficient evidence to 

support his conviction for engaging in a child exploitation enterprise. Third, he contends 

that the district court erred in denying his motion to vacate his conviction and dismiss the 

indictment because the Government failed to turn over certain information in its 

possession.

We reject each of these challenges and affirm the judgment of the district court.

I. Background

A.

Kuehner and four co-defendants were charged with one count of knowingly 

engaging in a child exploitation enterprise in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(g). One of 

the co-defendants, Nathan Larson, had created a website called “Rapey.su” (the Website)

and served as its administrator.

2 The conduct at issue in Kuehner’s criminal case arose 

from activities on the Website, which was dedicated to discussions of sexual exploitation 

and rape, and on “Discord,” an online communications platform that allows users to 

message each other, share images and videos, and audio or video call.

2 Larson died in federal pre-trial custody, and the Government subsequently 

dismissed the indictment as to Larson.

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4339 Doc: 52 Filed: 01/16/2025 Pg: 4 of 20
5

Kuehner waived his right to a jury trial and consented to a bench trial. Witnesses at 

the trial included three minor victims (MVs)3

: MV1, MV2, and MV7, a co-defendant who 

pled guilty, Homeland Security Investigation special agents, and forensic analysts and 

experts, including James Fottrell, Director of the High Technology Investigative Unit of 

the Department of Justice’s Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section. 

The Website maintained a dedicated section for users interested in the sexual 

exploitation of children. This section had forums, galleries, and options that allowed users 

to message one another privately and in groups. Website users could also earn and display 

“badges” in their profiles to convey particular messages or the completion of a task, such 

as a badge for “confirmed rapist” or “confirmed child molester.” See, e.g., J.A. 147.4

“Confirmed” users of the Website were provided greater access to chats with other users

and access to non-public galleries and media. 

The Government presented evidence that Kuehner joined the Website on September 

27, 2020, under the username “nechris.” “Nechris” earned the status of confirmed user on 

the Website by posting a picture of himself with the name of the Website written on his 

forearm. “Nechris” also earned “Confirmed rapist” and “Rapey” badges. United States v. 

Kuehner, Case No. 22-cr-120, 2023 WL 1422310, at *2 (E.D. Va. Jan. 31, 2023). The 

“nechris” profile described the user as a 36-year-old, 5’8”, “Caucasian/Asian” man from 

Washington state, which Director Fottrell testified generally matched Kuehner’s 

3 In an effort to protect their privacy and to avoid revictimization, we avoid using 

the names and Website usernames of the minor victims. As the egregious facts of this case 

make abundantly clear, content that is posted online becomes nearly impossible to remove. 

4 Citations to “J.A.” refer to the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this appeal.

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4339 Doc: 52 Filed: 01/16/2025 Pg: 5 of 20
6

description. Id. Kuehner admitted to federal agents that he had used his personal email, 

necryz@gmail.com, to register on the Website as “nechris.” On October 6, 2020, some of 

the information in “nechris’s” profile on the Website, including the birth year, location,

identifying information, and age, were modified, and the email address associated with the 

username was changed from necryz@gmail.com to mc3996250@gmail.com.

At trial, the Government produced evidence that Kuehner, under the username

“nechris,” repeatedly interacted with, encouraged, and pressured minor victims to post 

child sexual abuse material. Director Fottrell testified about the conduct involving the

minor victims. Unless otherwise noted, the events described below took place before the 

“nechris” profile information was changed on October 6, 2020.

“Nechris” messaged MV1 describing his desire to sexually abuse her and directing

her to send him sexually explicit material of herself. Following these instructions, MV1 

posted five videos of herself, including videos showing her masturbating. MV1 tagged 

“nechris” in this post. He acknowledged the videos by thanking her in the gallery where 

MV1 posted the media. The Website had a public chat that was a “running commentary” 

between Website users. J.A. 144. In the public chat, “nechris” discussed the child sexual 

abuse material depicting MV1 with another confirmed adult user and bragged about his

role in convincing MV1 to post the material. 

MV2 testified at trial about her interactions with “nechris” on Discord. “Nechris”

also requested child sexual abuse material from MV2, as well as other minor victims. 

“Nechris” also sent nude images of himself to MV2. Kuehner’s face was visible in some 

of these images. 

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4339 Doc: 52 Filed: 01/16/2025 Pg: 6 of 20
7

Director Fottrell testified that “nechris” asked MV3 to produce and post child sexual 

abuse material. In the public chat, in response to Larson’s commentary, “nechris” posted 

that he was looking forward to MV3’s next video. “Nechris” gave a “thumbs up” reaction 

to a comment by Larson that MV3 was an “ephebophile’s delight,”5 and commented that 

he “love[d]” the child sexual abuse material depicting MV3. J.A. 123–24. “Nechris” gave 

a “thumbs up” reaction to a crude comment by Larson about MV3’s body. “Nechris” and 

other users of the Website commented on the child sexual abuse material posted by MV3, 

expressing their gratification.

In the public chat on the Website with several other confirmed adult users, “nechris”

commented “[l]et’s see this now” in response to another user who wanted MV4 to produce 

a child sexual abuse material video. J.A. 112. Another confirmed adult user indicated his 

agreement and approval by reacting with a “smiley face” to “nechris’s” comment. J.A. 112.

“Nechris” also publicly commented on child sexual abuse material posted by MV5, 

referring to some of this material as “the gold standard.” J.A. 111. He encouraged MV5 to 

make another video, saying “we all look forward to it . . . .” J.A. 111. Another confirmed 

adult user “liked” a comment by “nechris” about MV5 having engaged in sexually explicit 

conduct before going to school in the morning. 

“Nechris” advised yet another minor, MV6, on the optimal placement of the camera 

to make child sexual abuse material. MV6 proposed an idea for a child sexual abuse 

5 Director Fottrell testified that an “ephebophile” is someone “who is sexually 

interested [in] post pubescent minors.” J.A. 124.

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4339 Doc: 52 Filed: 01/16/2025 Pg: 7 of 20
8

material video and “nechris” encouraged her to record herself engaging in lewd acts 

because he wanted to watch her. MV6 complied with these requests.

After the “nechris” profile was changed, in the Website’s public chat, “nechris”

urged MV7 to make a lewd video and pressured her to do so several times, despite MV7 

repeatedly declining. Another confirmed adult user joined “nechris” to urge MV7 to 

produce an exploitative video. MV7 finally acceded to the pressure from “nechris” and 

other Website members and posted child sexual abuse material.

Kuehner’s exploitation of minor victims was not limited to the Website. “Nechris”

was one of the individuals who ran a private “server” on Discord, akin to a chat room, to 

share and distribute child sexual abuse material. “Nechris” and other adult users of the 

Website invited minor victims, including MV1 and MV2, to join Discord to communicate 

with one another. All three minor victims who testified at trial, MV1, MV2, and MV7,

described their interactions with “nechris” on Discord. “Nechris” had asked each of them 

to provide sexually explicit content on the Discord server.

Kuehner’s principal defense at trial was that someone had impersonated him as 

“nechris” on the Website and Discord, such that he himself had not engaged in the charged 

activities. The evidence indicated otherwise, however. Kuehner’s own statements 

implicated him. In addition to Kuehner’s confessions about his email address and Website 

account, Kuehner admitted that he took a confirmation photo for the “nechris” account and 

posted it to the Website. Even then, Kuehner argued that there was no evidence that he was 

always behind the “nechris” account.

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4339 Doc: 52 Filed: 01/16/2025 Pg: 8 of 20
9

The Government also presented significant forensic evidence connecting Kuehner 

to the Website. Federal agents had executed a search warrant of Kuehner’s home and 

recovered a desktop computer, a laptop, and a cell phone. Law enforcement successfully 

conducted a forensic analysis of the desktop computer and cell phone, but forensic experts 

could only access the deleted files on the laptop. The evidence presented at trial established 

that Kuehner had accessed child sexual abuse material, including videos and images of 

minors, on these devices. Analyses of Kuehner’s web browser history and his laptop 

confirmed that he had used the necryz@gmail.com email address and variations of the alias 

“nechris.” 

To support his defense that someone had impersonated him, Kuehner elicited 

testimony from Director Fottrell that as the Website’s creator and administrator, Larson 

had access to statistics and data pertaining to the Website, including records of users’ 

activity and associated IP addresses. Director Fottrell testified that Larson could edit 

profiles, change passwords, and modify or delete the administrative logs that track his own 

actions taken as an administrator. Director Fottrell further testified that there were “three 

fundamental problems” with the theory that Larson, or perhaps another administrator, 

impersonated Kuehner. J.A. 152. To impersonate Kuehner as “nechris,” Director Fottrell

testified that the impersonator would need to know: (1) “nechris’s” password; (2) 

Kuehner’s IP address; and (3) how to fake the administrative logs to cover the 

impersonator’s actions.

Director Fottrell specifically testified that without access to “nechris’s” password, 

neither Larson nor any other administrator could login as “nechris” to impersonate 

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4339 Doc: 52 Filed: 01/16/2025 Pg: 9 of 20
10

Kuehner. Larson could have changed “nechris’s” password and then logged in, but he 

would have been unable to change it back to “nechris’s” original password—because 

Larson never knew the original password. After an extensive review, Director Fottrell

identified no evidence suggesting that Larson knew “nechris’s” password or that someone 

else logged in as “nechris.” There was no evidence that the password to the “nechris” 

account had ever been changed. Although it is possible that someone could have altered

the IP address to make it appear as if that person was using the Website from “nechris’s” 

location, according to Director Fottrell, it was highly improbable that someone could do so

without leaving a record. Director Fottrell further testified that most of the IP addresses 

connected to “nechris” were from the Seattle area, where Kuehner resided, and that, taken 

together, it was “very unlikely” that Larson, or another individual, impersonated Kuehner.

B.

The district court found Kuehner guilty of engaging in a child exploitation 

enterprise. That statute provides that a:

person engages in a child exploitation enterprise for the purposes of this 

section if the person violates section 1591, section 1201 if the victim is a 

minor, or chapter 109A (involving a minor victim), 110 (except for

sections 2257 and 2257A), or 117 (involving a minor victim), as a part of a 

series of felony violations constituting three or more separate incidents and 

involving more than one victim, and commits those offenses in concert with 

three or more other persons.

18 U.S.C. § 2252A(g)(2). 

The district court held that the evidence at trial “established that Kuehner committed

a series of predicate felony violations constituting over three or more separate incidents.” 

Kuehner, 2023 WL 1422310, at *6. Section 2251(a) and (e) of Title 18 of the United States 

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4339 Doc: 52 Filed: 01/16/2025 Pg: 10 of 20
11 

Code “criminalize production and attempted production of child [sexual abuse material], 

which are predicate offenses of engaging in a child exploitation enterprise 

under § 2252A(g).” Kuehner, 2023 WL 1422310, at *6. Kuehner “violated or attempted to 

violate 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a),” and his conduct “also constituted enticement or attempted 

enticement of a minor to engage in unlawful sexual conduct in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 2422(b).” Kuehner, 2023 WL 1422310, at *7–8. The district court sentenced 

Kuehner to the mandatory minimum sentence of twenty years’ incarceration, as well as 

twenty years’ supervised release. 

After sentencing, Kuehner filed a motion to vacate the district court’s judgment, 

commitment order, and memorandum opinion, and to dismiss the indictment, or, in the 

alternative, to grant him a new trial. Kuehner argued that the Government’s failure to 

disclose material it received in response to subpoenas sent to Google and Discord was a 

violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Following an evidentiary hearing, the 

district court denied Kuehner’s motion. Kuehner filed a timely appeal. 

II. Analysis 

Kuehner contends that the district court erred in three ways. First, he challenges the 

district court’s interpretation of the “in concert with” requirement of the child exploitation 

enterprises statute. Second, he maintains that there was insufficient evidence to support his 

guilty verdict. Third, he contends that the district court erred in denying his Brady motion 

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4339 Doc: 52 Filed: 01/16/2025 Pg: 11 of 20
12

because the Government failed to turn over material and exculpatory information received 

from various Google and Discord accounts. We address each in turn.

A. Statutory Interpretation of the Child Exploitation Enterprises Statute

Kuehner maintains that the district court’s interpretation of the child exploitation 

enterprises statute was erroneous because the statute requires a defendant to act “in concert 

with” three or more individuals when committing each of the predicate felony offenses. He 

also maintains that the rule of lenity requires us to interpret the child exploitation 

enterprises statute in his favor. We disagree with both arguments.

We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo and begin our interpretation 

with the plain text of the statute. United States v. Muhammed, 16 F.4th 126, 127–28 (4th 

Cir. 2021). A person violates the child exploitation enterprises statute if that person “as a 

part of a series of felony violations constituting three or more separate incidents and 

involving more than one victim, . . . commits those offenses in concert with three or more 

other persons.” 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(g)(2) (emphasis added). The most natural reading of 

this text is that the phrase “those offenses” refers to the collective “series of felony 

violations.” The phrase “with three or more other persons” modifies “those offenses,”

thereby indicating that the series of felony offenses must have been committed with “three 

or more other persons.” A person will therefore have been found to have engaged in a child 

exploitation enterprise if the predicate felony offenses, as a series: (1) constituted three or 

more separate incidents; (2) involved more than one victim; and (3) were committed in 

concert with three or more people. If Congress wanted to require that each predicate 

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4339 Doc: 52 Filed: 01/16/2025 Pg: 12 of 20
13

offense be committed in concert with three or more people, the statute would have included 

this requirement.

We decline to adopt Kuehner’s strained construction of the statute to require that 

“each” predicate offense be committed in concert with three or more other people and find 

ourselves in good company. All our sister circuits that have addressed this interpretive 

question have held that the number of people for the “in concert with” requirement may be 

considered cumulatively. See, e.g., United States v. El-Battouty, 38 F.4th 327, 329 (3d Cir. 

2022); United States v. DeFoggi, 839 F.3d 701, 710 n.4 (8th Cir. 2016); United States v. 

Grovo, 826 F.3d 1207, 1215 (9th Cir. 2016); see also United States v. Daniels, 653 F.3d 

399, 412 (6th Cir. 2011). Not a single circuit has interpreted the child exploitation 

enterprises statute in the manner urged by Kuehner.

The continuing criminal enterprise statute, 21 U.S.C. § 848, informs our reading of 

the child exploitation enterprises statute as well. The child exploitation enterprises statute

and the continuing criminal enterprise statute are structured similarly: a person is found to 

have engaged in either enterprise if that person committed certain predicate felonies, and 

such violations are part of a series committed in concert with several people. See Grovo, 

826 F.3d at 1214; compare 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(g)(2) with 21 U.S.C. § 848(c). In relevant 

part, the continuing criminal enterprise statute requires that the requisite predicate felony 

violations be “undertaken by such person in concert with five or more other persons . . . .” 

21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(2)(A). In defining “in concert with” under the continuing criminal 

enterprise statute, this court has not required that each predicate felony have been 

committed by five individuals at the same time or even that five people collectively 

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4339 Doc: 52 Filed: 01/16/2025 Pg: 13 of 20
14

engaged in a single specific offense. See United States v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1150, 1155 (4th 

Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Ricks, 882 F.2d 885, 891 (4th Cir. 1989)). We decline 

to construct the child exploitation enterprises statute in a contradictory manner.

Kuehner also contends that the rule of lenity requires us to find in his favor due to 

the ambiguity present in the interpretation of the child exploitation enterprises statute. The 

rule of lenity guides courts to “strictly construe[ ]” criminal statutes and avoid interpreting 

them to “extend criminal liability beyond that which Congress has ‘plainly and 

unmistakably’ proscribed.” United States v. Hilton, 701 F.3d 959, 966 (4th Cir. 2012) 

(citation omitted). “Under [this] well-established principle of statutory construction, 

ambiguities in criminal statutes must be resolved in favor of lenity for the accused.” United 

States v. Headspeth, 852 F.2d 753, 759 (4th Cir. 1988). This rule, however, is employed 

only if, after “considering text, structure, history, and purpose, there remains a ‘grievous 

ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute,’ . . . such that the Court must simply ‘guess as to 

what Congress intended.’” Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474, 488 (2010) (citations and 

quotations omitted). No such uncertainty or ambiguity exists here. Upon review of the text 

of the child exploitation enterprises statute, we find that the meaning is clear and does not 

call for application of the rule of lenity. 

We hold that the child exploitation enterprises statute does not require that each

predicate felony be committed “in concert with” three or more people. The required total 

of three or more people can be summed across the relevant predicate offenses.

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4339 Doc: 52 Filed: 01/16/2025 Pg: 14 of 20
15

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

We next address Kuehner’s contentions regarding the sufficiency of the evidence. 

Kuehner maintains that there was insufficient evidence to convict him because (1) someone 

else could have used the “nechris” account and (2) the predicate felonies were not 

performed in concert with at least three other people.

We review “judgments resulting from a bench trial under a mixed standard of 

review: factual findings may be reversed only if clearly erroneous,” and legal findings are 

reviewed de novo. United States v. Landersman, 886 F.3d 393, 406 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting 

Raleigh Wake Citizens Ass’n v. Wake Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 827 F.3d 333, 340 (4th Cir. 

2016)). The court should “uphold a guilty verdict if, taking the view most favorable to the 

Government, there is substantial evidence to support the verdict. ‘Substantial evidence’

means evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to 

support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 406 (quoting 

United States v. Armel, 585 F.3d 182, 184 (4th Cir. 2009)).

1.

The district court did not clearly err in finding that no one else accessed the 

“nechris” account and impersonated Kuehner. Indeed, the Government presented 

substantial evidence showing that, at the time of the conduct in question, Kuehner 

controlled the “nechris” account.

Kuehner’s own admissions to federal law enforcement agents established that his 

username on the Website was “nechris.” The three minor victims identified Kuehner in 

open court and testified that “nechris” told them his name and, in some instances, shared 

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4339 Doc: 52 Filed: 01/16/2025 Pg: 15 of 20
16

other specific details about his life that pertained to his family, location, and age. He even 

shared photos of himself. All of these details described Kuehner accurately. 

The forensic evidence presented at trial also overwhelmingly supported a 

conclusion that Kuehner was “nechris”: The IP addresses, computer files, browser history, 

and shortcut files all indicate that Kuehner accessed child sexual abuse material on the 

Website and used the username “nechris.” Further strengthening this conclusion is Director 

Fottrell’s testimony on how unlikely it was for anyone else to have accessed the “nechris” 

account and Kuehner’s failure to identify any forensic evidence of anyone else logging in 

under this username. The most reasonable inference, based on the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the Government, is that Kuehner operated the “nechris” account.

2.

Kuehner’s final argument is that, even if there is sufficient evidence that there had 

been a “tacit agreement” among Kuehner and others to produce or attempt to produce child 

sexual abuse material, that is only evidence of a conspiracy to commit those offenses, and 

not evidence of a violation of the child exploitation enterprises statute. The Supreme Court

has recognized, however, that “the plain meaning of the phrase ‘in concert’ signifies mutual 

agreement in a common plan or enterprise” and requires proof of a conspiracy. Rutledge v. 

United States, 517 U.S. 292, 300 (1996). There is no reason why this meaning does not 

apply equally to the child exploitation enterprises statute. See DeFoggi, 839 F.3d at 710; 

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4339 Doc: 52 Filed: 01/16/2025 Pg: 16 of 20
17

Grovo, 826 F.3d at 1214; Daniels, 653 F.3d at 413; United States v. Wayerski, 624 F.3d 

1342, 1351 (11th Cir. 2010).

The Government need only produce evidence showing that Kuehner entered into

“an agreement with three or more other persons to commit the series of predicate felonies.” 

Grovo, 826 F.3d at 1214. An agreement need not be explicit. This court has established 

that an “agreement may be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case,” and “a 

tacit or mutual understanding among or between the parties will suffice.” United States v. 

Baker, 985 F.2d 1248, 1255 (4th Cir. 1993) (first quote); United States v. Depew, 932 F.2d 

324, 326 (4th Cir. 1991) (second quote). There was sufficient evidence to conclude that 

Kuehner had tacitly agreed with other Website users to produce or attempt to produce child 

sexual abuse material and entice or attempt to entice minor victims to engage in unlawful 

sexual conduct. See Grovo, 826 F.3d at 1216. 

The Government also produced evidence sufficient to show that Kuehner acted “in 

concert” with at least three other people, and the district court did not err in relying on 

evidence from the Website’s public chat, including Kuehner’s comments and likes in the 

public chat. Taking the view most favorable to the Government, a reasonable factfinder 

could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Kuehner produced and attempted to 

produce child sexual abuse material and enticed or attempted to entice minor victims to 

engage in unlawful sexual conduct with the approval and support of other confirmed 

Website users. See id. at 1216. Kuehner repeatedly encouraged minor victims to post and 

share child sexual abuse material because users on the Website wanted to see that material.

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4339 Doc: 52 Filed: 01/16/2025 Pg: 17 of 20
18

Taken together, the Government presented substantial evidence that Kuehner 

committed the predicate felonies in concert with three or more people.

C. Brady Violation

Finally, Kuehner maintains that the Government violated Brady v. Maryland by 

failing to disclose information it received from Google and Discord about various accounts.

Kuehner also contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to vacate his 

conviction or, in the alternative, to order a new trial. In Brady, the Supreme Court held that 

the prosecution’s withholding of evidence that was favorable to a defendant and material 

to guilt or punishment violated the defendant’s due process rights. 373 U.S. at 87.

The court reviews a district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial under the abuse 

of discretion standard. See United States v. Stokes, 261 F.3d 496, 502 (4th Cir. 2001). We

review the district court’s legal conclusions in a Brady ruling de novo and its factual 

findings under the clear error standard. United States v. King, 628 F.3d 693, 702 (4th Cir. 

2011).

To establish a Brady violation, Kuehner must show: “(1) that the undisclosed 

information was favorable, either because it was exculpatory or because it was impeaching; 

(2) that the information was material; and (3) that the prosecution knew about the evidence 

and failed to disclose it.” United States v. Parker, 790 F.3d 550, 558 (4th Cir. 2015).

“Evidence is ‘exculpatory’ and ‘favorable’ if it ‘may make the difference between 

conviction and acquittal’ had it been ‘disclosed and used effectively.’” United States v. 

Wilson, 624 F.3d 640, 661 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 

676 (1985)). Evidence is material if “there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence 

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4339 Doc: 52 Filed: 01/16/2025 Pg: 18 of 20
19

been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 

Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682. A “‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to 

undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. It is undisputed that the Government had in its 

possession information from Google and Discord and failed to disclose it. Kuehner does 

not argue that this information was impeaching. He contends that the information was both 

exculpatory and material. Even assuming the information was exculpatory, the information 

from neither Google nor Discord is material.

Relevant here, the Government issued subpoenas to Google to produce information 

about the mc3996250@gmail.com email account and Discord to produce information

about the “Nekryz#9079” account. The information received from Google showed that

mc3996250@gmail.com had been created on October 6, 2020, and was registered to a 

“John McJanal.” 

According to Kuehner, the information received by the Government from Google 

showed that someone other than him created and used mc3996250@gmail.com and posted 

as “nechris” on the Website after October 6, 2020. Yet Kuehner fails to explain how that 

is material when most of the offending conduct took place prior to October 6, 2020.

Kuehner also offers no convincing response to the forensic evidence connecting him to 

mc3996250@gmail.com, including evidence that this email was accessed from a tablet 

recovered from Kuehner’s home and created at the request of a user with an IP address 

from the area in which Kuehner lived.

Kuehner’s contentions regarding the information received from Discord are equally 

unavailing. Discord was “unable to locate a user” by the username of “Nekryz#9079” and 

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4339 Doc: 52 Filed: 01/16/2025 Pg: 19 of 20
20

had “no information” on this account. J.A. 488. The Government posits that this was due 

to Discord’s retention policy. At that time, Discord deleted a user’s information from its 

back-up systems after 45 days. Even if the information from Discord had been disclosed, 

it was not material to Kuehner’s claim that he had been impersonated. The evidence in the 

record still tied Kuehner to this Discord account. Director Fottrell testified that “nechris”

invited a minor Website user to join him on Discord under the name “Nekyrz#9079.” There 

was an overwhelming amount of evidence against Kuehner notwithstanding the 

information from Discord about the “Nekryz#9079” account. Kuehner has not 

demonstrated a reasonable probability that the information produced by Discord would 

have made the difference between conviction and acquittal. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682; 

J.A. 514–15.

We find no Brady violation. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

Kuehner’s motion to vacate his conviction, or, in the alternative, for a new trial.

III. Conclusion

We hold that the total number of people required for the “in concert with” element 

may be summed across the series of predicate offenses under the child exploitation 

enterprises statute. We also hold that there was sufficient evidence to convict Kuehner of 

engaging in a child exploitation enterprise, and that the Government did not commit a 

Brady violation.

The district court’s judgment is therefore

AFFIRMED.

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4339 Doc: 52 Filed: 01/16/2025 Pg: 20 of 20