Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02168/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02168-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Eloy Horacio Desoto
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff - Appellee, 

FILED 

Unitoo St.ates Coprtqf Appeab Tenth C1rcu1t 

NOV 14 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

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) 

) 

) 

) 

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) 

) 

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No. 89-2168 

ELOY HORACIO DESOTO, 

Defendant - Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No .. CR-89-54) 

Susan L. Foreman, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Michael G. 

Katz, Federal Public Defender, with her on the briefs), Denver, 

Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant. 

James Murphy, Assistant u. s. Attorney (William L. Lutz, United 

States Attorney, and Robert J. Gorence, Assistant u. s. Attorney, 

on the briefs), District of New Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico, 

for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before McKAY, Chief Judge, ANDERSON, Circuit Judge, and BROWN, 

District Judge.1 

McKAY, Chief Judge. 

Defendant Eloy H. DeSoto was indicted on one count of 

possessing a firearm and ammunition after having been convicted of 

1 Honorable Wesley E. Brown, Senior United States District 

Judge for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

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a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. 

The indictment charged defendant with possessing a .9mm pistol and 

two magazines loaded with sixty rounds of .223 caliber ammunition 

in violation of 18 u.s.c. § 922(g)(l) (1988). The district court 

entered a judgment of conviction after a jury returned a guilty 

verdict. Defendant now appeals his conviction. 

I. 

On October 30, 1979, defendant was adjudged guilty of second 

degree murder in a state court of New Mexico. Nearly nine years 

later, in September 1988, his wife purchased a .9mm pistol from a 

gun store in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Defendant accompanied his 

wife into the gun store. He was not, however, involved in the 

purchase of the weapon. Instead, he distanced himself from the 

sales discussion and watched his young son. Mrs. DeSoto arranged 

the purchase, paid for the pistol, and completed the federal firearm form. At trial, Mrs. DeSoto testified that she bought the 

pistol for target shooting. In addition, a friend of the DeSoto's 

testified that he regularly went target shooting with Mrs. DeSoto. 

On October 5, 1988, defendant and his wife went to Frontier 

Ford, an Albuquerque car dealership, to buy a new van. They discussed and ultimately purchased a van from Harry Brown, a Frontier 

Ford salesman. Mr. Brown's girlfriend, Mydia Lucero, was present 

at the dealership during the sales discussion. Ms. Lucero testified that she saw defendant in possession of the pistol charged in 

the indictment, or one identical to it. She also testified that 

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\ 

she overheard defendant offer to sell guns to Mr. Brown. 

Defendant and his wife denied having a gun with them. They 

claimed that Ms. Lucero saw a toy gun their son had taken with him 

to Frontier Ford. 

On October 30, 1988, the Chief of Police of Grants, New 

Mexico, went to defendant's home in response to a report that gunshots had been heard in the vicinity. Defendant, apparently 

anticipating his arrival through the use of a radio police 

scanner, met the Chief in his front yard. Defendant invited the 

Chief into the house to demonstrate that he possessed no weapons. 

The Chief of Police saw a plastic bag containing .223 caliber 

ammunition in the kitchen. 

Officials from the United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 

and Firearms searched defendant's home on November 1, 1988, pursuant to a warrant. The officials seized a loaded .9mm pistol 

located behind a wall inside defendant's garage. Officials also 

seized two magazines of .223 caliber ammunition underneath the bed 

used by defendant and his wife. In addition, they found spent 

.223 caliber rounds in the basement and inside a sofa, as well as 

empty boxes for AR-15 and AK-47 assault rifles. 

Defendant denied possessing the firearm and ammunition 

charged in the indictment. Mrs. DeSoto testified that the pistol 

was hers, that she used it for target shooting, and that defendant 

never possessed it. She also testified that she had placed the 

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pistol on top of a sheetrock ledge in the garage and that it had 

fallen behind the sheetrock where she was unable to retrieve it. 

Defendant makes several arguments that he contends warrant 

reversal of his conviction. We treat only two of those issues 

which we consider controlling. First, he argues that he was 

denied his sixth amendment right to cross-examine a prosecution 

witness and was thereby precluded from exposing the witness's 

motive for testifying falsely. Second, defendant contends the 

district court erred by refusing one of his tendered instructions. 

II. 

At trial, Ms. Lucero, the girlfriend of the Frontier Ford 

salesman who sold a van to the DeSoto's, testified that she saw 

defendant in possession of the pistol charged in the indictment, 

or one identical to it. During cross-examination, defense counsel 

sought to impeach her credibility by establishing her motive for 

testifying falsely. Counsel attempted to show that defendant had 

accused her boyfriend of embezzling the DeSoto's $10,000 downpayment on the van, and that she was lying in order to retaliate 

for the accusation. 2 

2 The accusation of embezzlement stemmed from a civil complaint 

brought by Frontier Ford against Mrs. DeSoto. In the complaint, 

Frontier Ford petitioned for replevin of the van based on fraud 

and breach of contract. Frontier Ford claimed that it had agreed 

with Mrs. DeSoto to cancel their contract for the van's purchase, 

but that Mrs. DeSoto refused to return the van despite the fact 

that she had retrieved the car used as a trade-in. It appears 

that Mrs. DeSoto refused to return the van because of a claimed 

$10,000 down-payment the DeSoto's made to Mr. Brown pursuant to 

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Defense counsel endeavoured to impeach the witness by asking 

the following three questions: "How long had Harry Brown been 

working at Frontier Ford?"; "Now, do you still have a relationship with Mr. Brown, Harry Brown?"; "Are you aware of a dispute 

between Mr. Brown and Mr. DeSoto?" Record, vol. 4, at 179-82. 

The prosecution objected to each of these questions on the basis 

of relevancy. The district court sustained the objections. 

Defense counsel then made the following proffer outside the 

presence of the jury: 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: -- the proffer would be that Ms. Lucero's 

boyfriend, Harry Brown, is involved in a dispute over 

wherein Mr. Brown has been accused by Mr. DeSoto of 

embezzling ten thousand dollars in these transactions involving the sale of that van. 

We would submit in a conversation at which Mrs. DeSoto 

was present last week when I was talking with Mr. Brown, Mr. 

Brown testified, this is my way of getting back at DeSoto for 

saying I stole ten thousand dollars.3 Mrs. Lucero's allegiance with Mr. Brown, and the fact that the dispute is relevant evidence of a bias on Ms. Lucero's part and a motive to 

their purchase negotiations. 

3 Defense counsel was referring to Mr. Brown's testimony at a 

pre-trial hearing on defendant's motion to suppress. In his 

proffer, defense counsel submitted that Mr. Brown tried to get 

revenge for defendant's allegations of embezzlement by testifying 

that he had filed a report with the police stating that the tradein vehicle had been stolen, thereby implying that the Desotos had 

stolen the trade-in from Frontier Ford. 

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see Mr. DeSoto get in trouble. It's prejudicial that I could 

not cross examine her on that dispute, because aside from the 

other testimony which I'll address in my motion, this is the 

only direct evidence of Mr. DeSoto at all handling or having 

any control or possession over that weapon. 

She's a very important witness and I should have been 

allowed to have cross examined her on her motive and her 

involvement in the entire set of circumstances involving Mr. 

DeSoto and Mr. Brown. 

THE COURT: All right. Well, the reason I denied that is you 

did not address anything of that nature to Ms. Lucero, that 

you were asking questions about her with Mr. Brown. And I 

think I heard some of this matter before at the motion to 

suppress. 

But at no time was there any indication that Ms. Lucero 

was involved in any way, and indeed, this is the first time 

I've seen her on the witness stand, and she testified that 

this is the only time she ever met Mr. DeSoto and she never 

saw him before or since. 

And so I do not see how you could show bias by the fact 

that at one time she had some type of relationship with Mr. 

Brown, and I think it's too attuniated (sic], in any event, 

and so I will sustain -- or at least I will reaffirm my ruling on the basis of lack of relevancy. 

I almost allowed it in, until I realized there was nothing that had been developed regarding this witness' bias. 

Now, if you had Mr. Brown here, that might have been something else. 

That'll be the Court's ruling. 

Record, vol. 4, at 185-86. 

Defendant argues that the district court deprived him of his 

sixth amendment right to confront the witnesses against him by 

limiting his cross-examination of Ms. Lucero such that he was precluded from demonstrating her bias and motive for testifying 

against him. 

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The confrontation clause of the sixth amendment guarantees 

defendants in criminal cases the right "to be confronted with the 

witnesses against" them. Its main purpose is to provide 

defendants with the opportunity for effective cross-examination. 

Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974), quoting 5 

J. Wigmore, Evidence§ 1395 p. 123 (3d ed. 1940). One of the most 

important aspects of the right of cross-examination is attacking 

the witness' credibility and the truth of the testimony. Id. at 

316. Credibility may be tested by interrogation that attempts to 

reveal possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives. Id. 

Defense counsel should ordinarily be given wide latitude when 

cross-examining a witness about credibility or bias. United 

States v. Haro, 573 F.2d 661, 667 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 

U.S. 85 (1978). Counsel should be allowed "to expose to the jury 

the facts from which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness." Davis, 415 U.S. at 318; see also 

Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 22 (1985) ("the Confrontation 

Clause is generally satisfied when the defense is given a full and 

fair opportunity to prove and expose these infirmities through 

cross-examination, thereby calling to the attention of the factfinder the reasons for giving scant weight to the witness' testimony"). The trial court, however, retains discretion to reasonably limit cross-examination to prevent, among other things, 

questioning that is repetitive or of marginal relevance. Delaware 

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v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986). 

In this case, the district court ruled that the crossexamination was irrelevant. Questions properly directed at 

revealing bias are, however, a permissible basis of impeachment, 

and are relevant and admissible. United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 

45, 50-51 (1984). 4 The issue before us, therefore, is whether the 

questions asked during cross-examination were relevant in terms of 

showing Ms. Lucero's possible bias against defendant. We conclude 

that they were. 

Contrary to the remarks of the district court, defense 

counsel's questions were aimed at revealing that Ms. Lucero was 

Mr. Brown's girlfriend, and that Mr. Brown was involved in a dispute with defendant in which defendant accused him of embezzling 

the $10,000 down-payment on the van.· Similarly, the district 

court erroneously concluded that Ms. Lucero's relationship with 

Mr. Brown was too attenuated to demonstrate a motive for testifying against defendant. Had counsel been allowed to explore this 

issue, the jury could have reasonably inferred that she was loyal 

to Mr. Brown and that her testimony was in retaliation for defendant's accusation against him. At the least, this line of questioning would have would have cast doubt on her credibility by 

exposing a motive for her to slant her testimony against 

defendant. 

4 At common law, bias is defined as a relationship between a 

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The government argues that defendant was not prohibited from 

engaging in appropriate cross-examination because the crossexamination called for inadmissible hearsay in the form of Mr. 

Brown's testimony at the pre-trial hearing on defendant's motion 

to suppress. See Davis, 415 U.S. at 318. The specific questions 

put to Ms. Lucero did not, however, call for her to respond with 

out-of-court statements. In addition, the district court sustained the government's objections on the grounds of relevancy, 

not hearsay. Thus, the government's argument is inappropriate. 5 

We conclude that defense counsel's questions were sufficiently probative of Ms. Lucero's possible bias against 

defendant to warrant allowing such interrogation. Defendant was 

therefore denied the opportunity to reveal to the jury the facts 

from which they could draw inferences about Ms. Lucero's reliability. See id. The district court's curtailment of crossexamination deprived defendant of his sixth amendment right of 

confrontation. 

Not all constitutional errors, however, require automatic 

reversal of a conviction. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 

witness and a party which might cause the witness to slant his 

testimony for or against the party. Abel, 469 U.S. at 52. 

5 The government also argues that defendant manufactured the 

error of which he complains by opting not to call Mr. Brown to the 

stand to attempt to discredit Ms. Lucero. This position misses 

the thrust of defendant's argument -- that he was denied his right 

to confront Ms. Lucero through cross-examination. Whether 

defendant chose to call Mr. Brown as a defense witness is not 

responsive to the issue of whether he was deprived of his constitutional right to cross-examine Ms. Lucero. 

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(1967). "[I]f the defendant had counsel and was tried by an 

impartial adjudicator, there is a strong presumption that any 

other errors that may have occurred are subject to harmless error 

analysis." Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 (1986). The 

harmless-error doctrine recognizes that the main purpose of criminal trials is to decide the defendant's guilt or innocence, and it 

focuses on "the underlying fairness of the trial rather than on 

the virtually inevitable presence of immaterial error." Van 

Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 681. In applying harmless-error analysis, we 

must determine whether the error, assuming the damaging potential 

of the improperly curtailed cross-examination was fully realized, 

was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 684. Among the 

factors that we consider are "the importance of the witness' 

testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the testimony was 

cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or 

contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the 

extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and of course, 

the overall strength of the prosecution's case." Id. 

Ms. Lucero's testimony was particularly important to the 

prosecution's case. She testified that defendant had actual possession of the pistol charged in the indictment. She was the only 

witness to so testify. None of the other witnesses corroborated 

Ms. Lucero's statements that she saw defendant holding a .9mm 

pistol or that defendant offered to sell guns to Mr. Brown. 

Rather, defendant and Mrs. DeSoto directly contradicted her version of the events at Frontier Ford. In addition, defendant did 

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not have sufficient opportunity to pursue Ms. Lucero's motives and 

bias in other cross-examination. Cf. Graham v. Wilson, 828 F.2d 

656, 660 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1069 (1988). 

Questioning was limited to impeaching Ms. Lucero's ability to 

accurately perceive the pistol allegedly held by defendant. 

Finally, absent Ms. Lucero's testimony, the prosecution's 

case was not especially strong. Because she was the only witness 

to testify as to actual possession, the rest of the prosecution's 

case attempted to demonstrate that defendant had constructive 

possession of the .9mm pistol and ammunition charged in the 

indictment. The evidence showed that the pistol was located 

behind a sheetrock wall in the DeSoto's garage, and that ammunition was found under their bed. Although the jury might infer 

that defendant had the power and intent to exercise control over 

the pistol and ammunition, the evidence on constructive possession 

was not substantial. Accordingly, we are unable to conclude that 

the improper limitation of defendant's cross- examination constituted harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. 

III. 

Defendant's next argument is that the district court committed reversible error when it refused his tendered instruction on 

his theory of defense. The government maintains that the jury 

instructions, when taken as a whole, were correct and adequately 

covered the issues presented. 

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Defendant's theory of the case was that he had neither actual 

nor constructive possession of the pistol and ammunition charged 

in the indictment. Instead, he contended that his wife owned 

these items and exclusively possessed them. Defendant's tendered 

Instruction No. 5 stated: "Defendant's wife has a constitutionally secured right to keep and bear arms. There is no law prohibiting the spouse of a convicted felon from possessing a weapon." 

Record, vol. 1, doc. 11. The district court rejected the instruction after deciding that Mrs. DeSoto's right to bear arms was a 

"false issue" that had "absolutely no bearing in this case." 

Record, vol. 4, at 260. 

Although a defendant is entitled to an instruction on his 

theory of defense, "a trial judge is given substantial latitude 

and discretion in tailoring and formulating the instructions so 

long as they are correct statements of the law and fairly and 

adequately cover the issues presented." United States v. Pack, 

773 F.2d 261, 267 (10th Cir. 1985). A criminal defendant is not 

entitled to any particular wording of instructions. United States 

v. Bryant, 892 F.2d 1466, 1468 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 

S. Ct. 3220 (1990). When analyzing a challenge to jury instructions, "we review the record as a whole to determine whether the 

instructions 'state the law which governs and provided the jury 

with an ample understanding of the issues and the standards 

applicable.'" Big Horn Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 852 

F.2d 1259, 1271 (10th Cir. 1988), quoting Ramsey v. Culpepper, 738 

{ F.2d 1092, 1098 (10th Cir. 1984). In addition, we "consider all 

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that the jury heard and, from the standpoint of the jury, decide 

'not whether the charge was faultless in every particular but 

whether the jury was misled in any way and whether it had understanding of the issues and its duty to determine these issues.'" 

Durflinger v. Artiles, 727 F.2d 888, 895 (10th Cir. 1984), quoting 

Alloy Int'l Co. v. Hoover-NSK Bearing Co., 635 F.2d 1222, 1226-27 

(7th Cir. 1980). We reverse the judgment of the district court 

only if the error is prejudicial in light of these considerations. 

United States v. Cardall, 885 F.2d 656, 673 (10th Cir. 1989). 

Although defendant's tendered instruction would have specifically informed the jury that his wife was allowed to possess a 

firearm, defendant does not contend that the jury was incorrectly 

instructed on actual and constructive possession. Indeed, the 

instructions submitted to the jury accurately set forth the legal 

standards for actual and constructive possession. Given that 

defendant's theory of the case was to show that he had neither 

actual nor constructive possession of the firearm and ammunition, 

and that the jury was properly instructed on this theory, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

refusing defendant's tendered instruction. 

Defendant also contends that the district court erred when it 

submitted Instruction No. 11 to the jury. The instruction stated: 

The defendant's motive for the acquisition of a firearm or 

ammunition is not material to the issue before you. Whether 

the firearm or ammunition was sold or acquired for his own 

use or for that of another is not material, and would not 

constitute a defense to the charges made in this case if all 

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of the essential elements as set out in these instructions 

have been proved. 

Record, vol. 4, at 295-96. (emphasis added). 

Defendant argues that the instruction was improper because it 

assumed that he acquired a firearm and that he, therefore, must 

have possessed it. We agree. It is likely that the jury was 

misled to think that defendant "acquired" the .9mm pistol charged 

in the indictment. Although the instruction stated that defendant's motive for acquiring a firearm is not a defense if all the 

essential elements of the charge have been proved, the jury would 

probably interpret the instruction to mean that defendant acquired 

the firearm and that he therefore must have knowingly possessed 

it, thereby satisfying the central and disputed element of the 

offense. We conclude, therefore, that defendant was prejudiced by 

the erroneous instruction. 

The government cites two cases to support its proposition 

that Instruction No. 11 was appropriate. See United States v. 

Hammons, 566 F.2d 1301 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Cornett, 

484 F.2d 1365 (6th Cir. 1973). Although both Hammons and Cornett 

involved previously convicted felons charged with possessing a 

firearm, they are inapposite to the issue we address here. In 

Hammons, defendant admitted receiving the firearm, but alleged 

that he did so only to protect his friend's girlfriend. The judge 

refused to give a requested instruction on this theory of defense, 

and instructed the jury to disregard defendant's motive for 

receiving the gun. Similarly, in Cornett, the defendant did not 

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1 ' \' 

dispute that he purchased a gun. Instead, he argued that he 

bought it for his brother and not for himself. The Sixth Circuit 

Court of Appeals affirmed the trial judge's refusal to admit evidence on defendant's motive as a defense. 

By contrast, defendant DeSoto vigorously denied that he possessed the pistol. Further, his theory of defense was not that 

his alleged firearm possession was justified or excused. Thus, 

unlike Hammons and Cornett, Instruction No. 11 incorrectly assumed 

that defendant acquired a firearm. Because we reverse and remand 

this case for a new trial based on the violation of defendant's 

sixth amendment right, the district court is directed to formulate 

instructions that do not mislead the jury to assume that defendant 

acquired a firearm. 

This case is REVERSED and REMANDED for a new trial. 

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