Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02712/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02712-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ansel Percival Allen
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

I 

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

F 1 LE 0 

U<1itt<l States C'.ou1•( of Appeabi 

Tenth Cir·-:.1i: 

DEC 2 0 1989 

ROBERT L. HOECI<...ER 

Clerk 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 88-2712 

ANSEL PERCIVAL ALLEN, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D,C. No. 88-CR-222) 

Mark J. Rosenblum, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Michael G. 

Katz, Federal Public Defender, with him on the. brief), for 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Kathryn Meyer, Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of 

Colorado (Michael J. Norton, Acting United States Attorney, and 

Robert G. Chadwell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, with her on the 

brief), for Plaintiff-Appellee . 

. Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, GARTH* and MCKAY, Circuit Judges. 

MCKAY, Circuit Judge. 

*Honorable Leonard I. Garth, Circuit Judge for the United States 

Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 88-2712 Document: 010110192468 Date Filed: 12/20/1989 Page: 1 
In 1987 defendant was arrested, charged, pled guilty, and was 

sentenced for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1542. Throughout those proceedings, including his sentencing, defendant used the name "Glenn 

Wayne Miller.'' On June 24, 1987, the day the complaint was filed 

against him, defendant filed a financial affidavit seeking the 

appointment of an attorney without payment of a fee. In that 

affidavit he used the name Glenn Wayne Miller and parenthetically 

indicated he was also known as Steven E. Bates. The application 

for appointed counsel was granted. 

In 1988 defendant was arrested for failure to appear following a deportation hearing. In the course of the arrest, it was 

learned that the defendant's true name was Ansel Percival Allen. 

Because of that discovery, Mr. Allen was prosecuted in the present 

proceeding with the crime of perjury, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 

1621(2), for using a false name on his financial affidavit. Based 

on stipulated facts, the district court found defendant guilty as 

charged. 

The first issue on appeal is whether the use of an alias in 

Mr. Allen's financial affidavit "in support of request for attorney, expert or other court services without payment of fee" 

(Financial Affidavit, see Addendum to Brief of Appellee filed 

March 17, 1989) constitutes a materially false statement in violation of section 1621(2). The key is materiality. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2712 Document: 010110192468 Date Filed: 12/20/1989 Page: 2 
In an essentially identical case, the Ninth Circuit held that 

the government did not fulfill its burden to prove materiality 

where the government failed to show that a defendant's use of a 

false name on a financial affidavit would have changed the court's 

determination of indigency. United States v. Martinez, 855 F.2d 

621 (9th Cir. 1988). On the facts of this case, we also hold that 

the government failed to fulfill its burden to prove materiality. 

While the government need not prove the element of materiality 

beyond a reasonable doubt, it does bear the burden to produce some 

evidence showing materiality. United States v. Farnham, 791 F.2d 

331, 334 (4th Cir. 1986). "[T]he sufficiency of the evidence 

regarding materiality must be judged in terms of what was available to the judge." United States v. Dipp, 581 F.2d 1323, 1328 

(9th Cir. 1978). 

The test for materiality is whether the false statement has a 

natural tendency to influence or was capable of influencing the 

decision required to be made. United States v. Girdner, 773 F.2d 

257, 259 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1066 (1986). In 

this case, the materiality issue is governed by the purpose of the 

affidavit which was filed. The relevant inquiry was simply 

whether the defendant was financially impecunious and thus qualified for the appointment of counsel. While there are many circumstances in which the use of an alias in an affidavit of impecuniosity would be material, on the narrow facts of this case we do 

not believe that is so. In this case, the government failed to 

show that the determination of indigency would have been changed 

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Appellate Case: 88-2712 Document: 010110192468 Date Filed: 12/20/1989 Page: 3 
or otherwise affected by the use of the true name. There is nothing in the record to indicate that had the defendant used his true 

name, either the results or the inquiry into impecuniosity would 

have been any different. The defendant was "indigent" under 

either name. Since the government failed to offer any evidence 

that the financial information was untrue or any evidence to show 

what effect the use of an alias would have had on the indigency 

determination, it failed to prove materiality--an essential 

element of its case. 

In this case, the government did not make even as strong a 

showing of materiality as it did in United States v. Martinez, . 

supra. In that case, as the dissent pointed out, the two identities suggested vastly different facts concerning the appropriate 

inquiry concerning the financial status of the applicant. One 

identity indicated that the applicant was an American citizen who 

was an attorney admitted to practice in Colorado and the name the 

defendant actually used indicated that he was an impoverished 

Mexican citizen. Nothing in this case suggests that the two identities, alias and real, result in different inquiries or different 

results flowing from the trial court inquiry concerning eligibility for counsel. 

The government argues that because the magistrate was also 

determining eligibility for bail and other factors at the same 

time, these other inquiries justify a finding of materiality. 

However, the test for materiality is materiality to the purpose 

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Appellate Case: 88-2712 Document: 010110192468 Date Filed: 12/20/1989 Page: 4 
for which the allegedly false statement is made. In this case, 

the false statement was made on a form seeking a determination of 

indigency in order to secure appointed counsel. The statement was 

neither made nor submitted for the purposes of any of the proceedings which were only simultaneous, not intertwined. The materiality test is determined at the time and for the purpose for which 

the allegedly false statement was made. On the facts of this 

case, the test confines materiality to the determination of impecuniosity. 

The defendant also claims in this proceeding that the government breached its plea agreement with him. In view of our 

reversal of the defendant's conviction under the materiality 

issue, it is not necessary for us to reach the breach of agreement 

claim. 

This case is therefore REVERSED and REMANDED with directions 

to dismiss. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2712 Document: 010110192468 Date Filed: 12/20/1989 Page: 5