Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-16-02319/USCOURTS-ca13-16-02319-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Taquan Rahshe Gullet-El
Appellant
United States
Appellee

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

TAQUAN RAHSHE GULLET-EL,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2016-2319

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:16-cv-00541-NBF, Senior Judge Nancy B. 

Firestone. 

______________________ 

Decided: November 9, 2016 

______________________ 

TAQUAN RAHSHE GULLET-EL, Jacksonville, FL, pro se.

GEOFFREY KLIMAS, Appellate Section, Tax Division, 

United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, 

for defendant-appellee. Also represented by JONATHAN S.

COHEN, JOAN I. OPPENHEIMER, CAROLINE D. CIRAOLO. 

______________________ 

Before O’MALLEY, MAYER, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.

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2 GULLET-EL v. US

 PER CURIAM. 

Taquan Rahshe Gullet-El appeals a final judgment of 

the United States Court of Federal Claims dismissing his 

complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See 

Gullet-El v. United States, No. 1:16-cv-00541-NBF (Fed. 

Cl. July 8, 2016) (“Court of Federal Claims Decision”). For 

the reasons discussed below, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

In May 2016, Gullet-El filed a complaint in the Court 

of Federal Claims entitled “Claimant’s Complaint of Libel 

for Enforcement of Civil Contracts in Admiralty.” In his 

complaint, Gullet-El asserted that he had mailed two 

“Admiralty Civil Contracts” to various federal employees 

and agencies. These unexecuted contracts stated that 

Gullet-El’s name was protected intellectual property, and 

that the government was required to pay him $1 million 

as well as treble damages each time it used his name 

without his consent. According to Gullet-El, the government officials who received these alleged contracts waived 

any right to challenge their terms. He asserted, moreover, that government agents breached the alleged contracts by “initiating and proceeding with civil prosecution, 

criminal prosecution, unlawful detainment, registered 

copyright infringement, registered trademark infringement, [and] registered fictitious business name infringement.”

Gullet-El’s complaint did not allege that any federal 

government official signed the alleged contracts after 

receiving them. Instead, he asserted that because federal 

employees failed to explicitly renounce the alleged contracts, they agreed to all of their terms through “tacit 

acquiescence.” Gullet-El alleged, moreover, that under 

the terms of the alleged agreements he was due payments 

totaling at least $530 million from the United States. In 

addition, Gullet-El sought an order dismissing the pending criminal and civil cases against him with prejudice 

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GULLET-EL v. US 3

and an injunction prohibiting the United States from 

filing any future civil or criminal actions against him. 

Gullet-El also sought an injunction prohibiting the federal 

government from using his name without his consent in 

the future.

On July 8, 2016, the Court of Federal Claims dismissed Gullet-El’s complaint for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction. The court explained that it had no authority 

to consider his complaint alleging various violations of 

alleged admiralty contracts because the federal district 

courts have “exclusive jurisdiction . . . over admiralty or 

maritime cases.” Court of Federal Claims Decision, slip 

op. at 2. The court determined, moreover, that none of 

the other statutory provisions cited in Gullet-El’s complaint provided a predicate for the exercise of jurisdiction 

over his claims. Id. Gullet-El then appealed to this court.

DISCUSSION

We review de novo whether the Court of Federal

Claims correctly dismissed a complaint for lack of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Brandt v. United States, 710 F.3d 1369, 

1373 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Bianchi v. United States, 475 F.3d 

1268, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2007). “A party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims has the burden of 

establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” Fid. & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v. United 

States, 805 F.3d 1082, 1087 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Although 

pro se litigants are held to a less stringent pleading 

standard than those represented by counsel, see Haines v. 

Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), they are not exempt 

from meeting jurisdictional prerequisites. See Henke v. 

United States, 60 F.3d 795, 799 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“The fact 

that [the plaintiff] acted pro se in the drafting of his 

complaint may explain its ambiguities, but it does not 

excuse its failures, if such there be.”).

As the Court of Federal Claims correctly concluded, it 

was without jurisdiction to consider Gullet-El’s claims. 

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4 GULLET-EL v. US

The Tucker Act provides jurisdiction over “claim[s] 

against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an 

executive department, or upon any express or implied 

contract with the United States, or for liquidated or 

unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.” 28 

U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). The Act, however, is “only a jurisdictional statute; it does not create any substantive right 

enforceable against the United States for money damages.” United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976). 

Accordingly, to invoke Tucker Act jurisdiction, Gullet-El 

was required to “identify a contractual relationship, 

constitutional provision, statute, or regulation that provides a substantive right to money damages.” Khan v. 

United States, 201 F.3d 1375, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2000); 

Hamlet v. United States, 63 F.3d 1097, 1101 (Fed. Cir.

1995).

Gullet-El failed to allege facts that, if proven, would 

establish the existence of either an express or implied-infact contract with the United States. “The general requirements for a binding contract with the United States 

are identical for both express and implied contracts. The 

party alleging a contract must show a mutual intent to 

contract including an offer, an acceptance, and consideration.” Trauma Serv. Grp. v. United States, 104 F.3d 1321, 

1325 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citations omitted); see also Barrett 

Ref. Corp. v. United States, 242 F.3d 1055, 1060 (Fed. Cir. 

2001). Contrary to Gullet-El’s assertions, the failure of 

government officials to affirmatively renounce the terms 

of the unexecuted contracts he sent to them is not sufficient to establish that the government accepted the terms 

of those contracts. See Barrett, 242 F.3d at 1060 (explaining that a binding agreement with the government requires “mutuality of intent to contract”). Nor did GulletEl allege that the government received any consideration 

for purportedly acquiescing to the terms of the alleged 

contracts or that any of the federal employees to whom he 

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GULLET-EL v. US 5

sent the documents had authority to bind the government 

in contract. See Flexfab, L.L.C. v. United States, 424 F.3d 

1254, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (explaining that a valid government contract requires “actual authority on the part of 

the government’s representative to bind the government” 

(emphasis omitted)); El Centro v. United States, 922 F.2d 

816, 823 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (concluding that no contract was 

formed where “the Government received no consideration”). Accordingly, Gullet-El failed to allege facts sufficient to establish that he entered into a contractual 

relationship with the United States. 

In his complaint, moreover, Gullet-El repeatedly stated that he was seeking damages for the government’s 

breach of “Civil Contracts in Admiralty.” As the Court of 

Federal Claims correctly concluded, it had no authority to 

adjudicate Gullet-El’s admiralty claims. See Court of 

Federal Claims Decision, slip op. at 2. The federal district 

courts, not the Court of Federal Claims, have jurisdiction 

over admiralty claims against the government. See 46 

U.S.C. §§ 30906(a), 31104(a); see also El-Shifa Pharm. 

Indus. Co. v. United States, 378 F.3d 1346, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 

2004) (explaining that under 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) the 

federal district courts are “grant[ed] exclusive and original jurisdiction . . . over civil cases in admiralty and 

maritime”); Marine Logistics, Inc. v. England, 265 F.3d 

1322, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (stating that a claim for the 

breach of a contract that is “wholly maritime in nature . . . 

must be brought in the federal district courts”).

CONCLUSION

We have considered Gullet-El’s remaining arguments 

but do not find them persuasive. Accordingly, we affirm 

the judgment of the United States Court of Federal 

Claims dismissing his complaint for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction.

AFFIRMED

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