Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-70778/USCOURTS-ca9-12-70778-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Uriel Garcia
Petitioner
Loretta E. Lynch
Respondent

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

URIEL GARCIA,

Petitioner,

v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney

General,

Respondent.

No. 12-70778

Agency No.

A092-058-021

OPINION

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submission Deferred January 9, 2015

Submitted August 11, 2015*

Pasadena, California

Filed August 18, 2015

Before: Kim McLane Wardlaw, William A. Fletcher,

and John B. Owens, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge W. Fletcher

* The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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2 GARCIA V. LYNCH

SUMMARY**

Immigration

The panel denied Uriel Garcia Macedo’s petition for

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ affirmance of

an immigration judge’s denial of his motion for a

continuance. 

The panel held that the statutory criminal bar, 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a)(2)(C), does not strip this court of jurisdiction to

review the denial of a procedural motion that rests on a

ground independent of the conviction that triggered the bar. 

The panel denied Garcia’s petition for review on the merits,

holding that the IJ did not abuse discretion in denying the

motion to continue.

COUNSEL

Zulu Ali, Riverside, California, for Petitioner.

Stuart F. Delery, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney

General, Linda S. Wernery, Assistant Director, and Lindsay

B. Glauner, Trial Attorney, United States Department of

Justice, Civil Division, Office of Immigration Litigation,

Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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GARCIA V. LYNCH 3

OPINION

W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:

Uriel Garcia Macedo petitions for review of an order of

the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the

immigration judge (“IJ”)’s denial of his motion for a

continuance. We must determine whether 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a)(2)(C) precludes us from exercising jurisdiction. 

We conclude that § 1252(a)(2)(C) does not bar review of the

denial of procedural motions that are independent of the

merits of the removal order. We further hold, however, that

the IJ did not abuse his discretion in denying Garcia’s motion

for a continuance. We therefore deny Garcia’s petition for

review.

I. Background

Garcia is a 46-year-old Mexican national who first

entered the United States with his parents in or around 1979,

when he was nine years old. Although the record is not

entirely clear, it appears that Garcia was granted some form

of immigration status either upon entry or shortly thereafter. 

In 2006, Garcia was charged with some form of drug crime,

but applied for, and obtained, cancellation of removal.

In 2010, Garcia was charged with possessing

methamphetamine in violation of § 11377(a) of the California

Health and Safety Code, a misdemeanor. He was

simultaneously charged with possessing drug paraphernalia. 

He entered pleas of nolo contendere to both offenses, and was

sentenced to a one-year probation term. Garcia was placed

into a drug diversion program established by California’s

Proposition 36, under which adults convicted of nonviolent

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drug-related offenses can receive probation and drug

treatment rather than prison sentences. See Cal. Penal Code

§§ 1210, 1210.1, 3063.1. Under Proposition 36, a person

who successfully completes treatment can ask that his

conviction be expunged. Id. § 1210.1(e).

Garcia, however, did not complete the treatment program. 

He failed to appear at his first check-in, in March 2010, and

his probation was terminated. On January 10, 2011, Garcia

again appeared in court, his probation was restored, and he

was re-entered in the drug treatment program. One week

later, however, he was served with an arrest warrant and a

Notice to Appear (“NTA”). In February, having been

notified that Garcia was in the custody of U.S. Immigration

and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), the state court ordered his

probation and treatment terminated and imposed a sentence

of 48 days for time served.

Garcia was placed in immigration proceedings in January

2011 based on the NTA. He was charged as removable

because of his 2010 conviction, which ICE argued was for

violating a “law . . . relating to a controlled substance.” 

8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). At an early appearance before

the IJ, the government had not yet produced the documents of

conviction. Garcia, who was represented by counsel, denied

the allegations and the charge. When Garcia next appeared

before the IJ in early August 2011, he explained that he was

no longer represented by his prior counsel. The IJ granted a

continuance to allow him to seek a new attorney.

Garcia appeared at a second hearing the following week. 

He stated that he would proceed without counsel, and he

discussed with the IJ the possibility of applying for asylum,

withholding of removal, or adjustment of status. The IJ

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GARCIA V. LYNCH 5

continued the proceedings a second time, encouraging Garcia

to seek counsel. Garcia was still without counsel when he

appeared for a third hearing in late August. Rather than admit

the allegations, Garcia invoked his right to take ten days to

review the conviction documents, apparently in order either

to procure or locate documents that would demonstrate his

2010 conviction had been expunged, or to attempt to expunge

it. He told the IJ that he had sent “some dismissal

applications to the [state court], where [he] was quote,

unquote convicted.”

Garcia appeared at a fourth hearing on September 12,

having failed to secure postconviction relief. He admitted

that he had been convicted of possession of a controlled

substance, and the IJ sustained the charge of removability. 

The IJ asked if he feared persecution or torture in Mexico. 

Garcia said he did not. The IJ explained that Garcia was

ineligible for cancellation of removal because he had

previously been granted cancellation in 2006. He further

explained that Garcia was ineligible to apply for adjustment

of status because no waiver was available for his drug

offense. He stated that Garcia could apply for voluntary

departure.

Garcia requested a continuance to give him time for

further attempts to expunge his conviction. The IJ denied the

request, stating that Garcia had been in immigration

proceedings for over six months and that Garcia had been

given “ample time” to pursue postconviction relief. Garcia

stated that he wanted to apply for voluntary departure, but the

IJ explained that the immigration statutes did not permit him

to do so unless he waived appeal. Garcia refused to waive his

appeal rights. The IJ rendered an oral decision finding him

removable as charged and denying voluntary departure.

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Garcia appealed to the BIA, arguing only that the IJ had

erred in denying a further continuance so that he could seek

postconviction relief. The BIA dismissed the appeal on the

ground that the IJ had “appropriately considered the relevant

factors to determine whether good cause for a continuance

was shown.” It held that because Garcia had not yet shown

that the conviction had been vacated, the IJ did not err in

refusing a further continuance. Garcia petitions for review,

arguing only that the BIA had erred in affirming the IJ’s

denial of a further continuance.

II. Jurisdiction

We must first determine whether we have jurisdiction to

review the denial of a motion to continue when the movant

has been convicted of a qualifying criminal offense under

8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) and a removal order has been

entered on that basis. We conclude that the immigration

statutes do not bar judicial review of the denial of such a

motion.

Our jurisdiction over petitions for review of final orders

of removal rests on 8 U.S.C. § 1252. That statutory provision

imposes three limitations on our review. First, it bars judicial

review of removal orders entered after the “expedited

removal” process set out at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). See

8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A). Second, it bars judicial review of

certain denials of discretionary relief, including, inter alia,

“any . . . decision or action of the Attorney General or the

Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is

specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the

Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security.” 

Id. § 1252(a)(2)(B); see Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233,

251–52 (2010). Finally, it bars judicial review over removal

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GARCIA V. LYNCH 7

orders predicated upon certain criminal offenses. 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a)(2)(C). The last two bars do not preclude “review

of constitutional claims or questions of law.” Id.

§ 1252(a)(2)(D).

The question in this case is whether any of these statutory

limitations bars our review of the denial of Garcia’s motion

for a continuance.

It is well established in this circuit that the second bar,

over certain denials of discretionary relief, does not apply to

a motion for a continuance. In Sandoval-Luna v. Mukasey,

526 F.3d 1243 (9th Cir. 2008) (per curiam), we held that

because the denial of a continuance was neither specifically

enumerated at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) nor “‘specified

under’ the subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney

General,” the limitation in § 1252(a)(2)(B) does not bar our

review over the denial of a motion for a continuance. Id. at

1246 (quoting Alsamhouri v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 117, 122

(1st Cir. 2007)). In Kucana, the Supreme Court affirmed this

interpretation of § 1252(a)(2)(B). See Kucana, 558 U.S. at

247 (holding that § 1252(a)(2)(B) bars review of a

discretionary decision “only when Congress itself set out the

Attorney General’s discretionary authority in the statute”).

The government argues, however, that the third bar, set

out at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), strips us of jurisdiction to

review the denial of a motion to continue when the movant

has been convicted of a qualifying crime, as Garcia has been. 

Section 1252(a)(2)(C) states that “no court shall have

jurisdiction to review any final order of removal against an

alien who is removable by reason of having committed”

certain crimes. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C). The crimes

referenced by the statute include any crimes that would

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render a noncitizen inadmissible into the United States,

including crimes involving moral turpitude, see id.

§ 1182(a)(2), and many crimes that would render a noncitizen

removable, including aggravated felonies, see id.

§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). As relevant here, an alien who is

removable by reason of having been convicted of violating a

law “relating to a controlled substance” is subject to the

§ 1252(a)(2)(C) bar. See id. § 1227(a)(2)(B).

There is no dispute that Garcia has been convicted of

violating a law relating to a controlled substance. Garcia was

convicted in 2010 of violating California Health & Safety

Code § 11377(a), which makes possession of certain

controlled substances a misdemeanor under state law. 

Although this statute is overbroad, in that it sweeps more

drugs into its ambit than does the federal Controlled

Substances Act, it is also divisible, such that we may consult

judicially noticeable conviction documents to determine

whether Garcia was convicted of a crime that corresponds to

the federal definition. See Coronado v. Holder, 759 F.3d

977, 983–85 (9th Cir. 2014) (as amended). Here, the

conviction documents establish “that [Garcia’s] criminal

conviction was for possession of a substance” —

methamphetamine — “that is listed under California law and

the [federal drug] schedules.” Id. at 982 (emphasis omitted).

The parties dispute onlywhether § 1252(a)(2)(C)’s bar on

judicial review applies to the denial of a procedural motion

such as Garcia’s motion to continue. The statute provides

that “no court shall have jurisdiction to review any final order

of removal against an alien who is removable by reason of

having committed a criminal offense covered in” various

other provisions. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C). The government

argues that this statutory language strips us of jurisdiction not

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GARCIA V. LYNCH 9

only over the removal order itself, but also over all other

orders that precede it, whether substantive or procedural in

nature. In the government’s view, and in the view of several

of our sister circuits, such orders are encompassed in the

statutory phrase “final order of removal.” See, e.g., MoralSalazar v. Holder, 708 F.3d 957, 962 (7th Cir. 2013);

Ogunfuye v. Holder, 610 F.3d 303, 307 (5th Cir. 2010).

We disagree with the government. We have previously

held that the statute, which refers to an “order of removal

against an alien who is removable by reason of” a qualifying

conviction, does not sweep in “all petitions for review filed

by petitioners with a[] [qualifying] conviction in their past.” 

Unuakhaulu v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 931, 935–36 (9th Cir.

2005) (as amended). Rather, it bars review only of those

orders that are actually “predicated on commission or

admission of a crime.” Id. (quoting Alvarez-Santos v. INS,

332 F.3d 1245, 1247 (9th Cir. 2003)). On this rationale, we

have held that the § 1252(a)(2)(C) bar does not preclude

review of a denial of relief that is based not on the

“commission or admission of a crime,” but rather on the

alien’s failure to establish his or her eligibility for the relief

sought. See Pechenkov v. Holder, 705 F.3d 444, 448–49 (9th

Cir. 2012); Bromfield v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1071, 1074–76

(9th Cir. 2008); Morales v. Gonzales, 478 F.3d 972, 976,

980–81 (9th Cir. 2007) (as amended). Under the rule

established by these cases, we retain jurisdiction over a

petition for review challenging the denial of relief “on the

merits,” rather than on the basis of the qualifying conviction. 

Despite criticism from within our court, see Pechenkov,

705 F.3d at 449–52 (Graber, J., concurring), Unuakhaulu and

its progeny remain good law.

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The government identifies no principled way to

distinguish these cases from the one before us, and we can

think of none. If the § 1252(a)(2)(C) bar precludes review

only of decisions “predicated on commission or admission of

a crime,” see id., it stands to reason that the provision does

not bar review of the denial of a procedural motion (such as

a motion to continue) that is not predicated on the fact that

the movant has been convicted of a qualifying crime. We see

no reason why the rule established by our caselaw should

apply to the denial of substantive relief, but not the denial of

procedural relief. Indeed, the case for reading

§ 1252(a)(2)(C) to bar review of the denial of substantive

relief is stronger than the case for reading it to bar review of

the denial of procedural relief, given that most procedural

decisions are unrelated to the substantive basis for finding an

alien removable — i.e., the predicate crime triggering

§ 1252(a)(2)(C). See Calma v. Holder, 663 F.3d 868, 876–77

(7th Cir. 2011) (“We are persuaded that there are identifiable

circumstances under which a critical procedural step in a

removal proceeding . . . lies within our jurisdiction even

though we are barred from evaluating the BIA’s ultimate

decision . . . .”). For these reasons, we conclude that the

§ 1252(a)(2)(C) bar does not apply to the denial of a

procedural motion that rests on a ground independent of the

conviction that triggers the bar.

Because we conclude that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) does

not bar our review of the denial of Garcia’s motion to

continue, we proceed to the merits of Garcia’s claim.

III. Denial of a Further Continuance

The governing regulations permit an immigration judge

to “grant a motion for continuance for good cause shown.” 

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8 C.F.R. § 1003.29. The decision to grant or deny the

continuance is within “the sound discretion of the judge and

will not be overturned except on a showing of clear abuse.” 

Sandoval-Luna, 526 F.3d at 1247 (quoting De la Cruz v. INS,

951 F.2d 226, 229 (9th Cir. 1991)). When reviewing an IJ’s

denial of a continuance, we consider several factors,

including: (1) the nature of the evidence not obtained or

admitted as a result of the denial of the continuance, (2) the

reasonableness of the alien’s conduct, (3) the inconvenience

to the court, and (4) the number of continuances previously

granted. Ahmed v. Holder, 569 F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir.

2009).

On the facts here, we conclude there was no abuse of

discretion. Although it would have been reasonable for the

IJ to grant Garcia an additional continuance, it was not

unreasonable for him not to do so. Garcia claimed that he

would have used the additional time to seek postconviction

relief, but he had previously sought such relief to no avail. 

Indeed, he had failed to complete the program that could have

resulted in the expungement of his state conviction. Further,

the IJ had previously continued Garcia’s proceedings three

times for various procedural reasons. Although “[t]he IJ’s

discretion . . . is not without limits,” id., the IJ here acted

within those limits in declining to continue Garcia’s

proceedings for a fourth time. There was no abuse of

discretion.

Conclusion

We hold that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) does not bar

review over the denial of a procedural motion, such as a

motion for a continuance, that rests on a ground independent

from the conviction that triggers the statutory bar. However,

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12 GARCIA V. LYNCH

because the IJ did not abuse his discretion in denying

Garcia’s motion to continue, we deny Garcia’s petition for

review.

PETITION DENIED.

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