Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-06-05166/USCOURTS-ca4-06-05166-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael Kevin Harris
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-5166

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL KEVIN HARRIS,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 06-5295

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

LARRY A. LYONS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern

District of West Virginia, at Elkins. Robert E. Maxwell, Senior

District Judge. (2:05-cr-00019-3; 2:05-cr-00019-4)

Argued: February 1, 2008 Decided: March 14, 2008

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Before MICHAEL and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and Liam O’GRADY, United

States District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting

by designation.

Affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part by unpublished

per curiam opinion.

ARGUED: Jonathan David Fittro, Clarksburg, West Virginia; Dorwin

John Wolfe, Elkins, West Virginia, for Appellants. Stephen Donald

Warner, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Elkins, West

Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Sharon L. Potter, United States

Attorney, Wheeling, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:

Larry A. Lyons and Michael Kevin Harris both appeal their

convictions and sentences related to widespread methamphetamine

seizures in the Northern District of West Virginia, which

culminated in a federal grand jury investigation and a series of

indictments. Michael Kevin Harris pled guilty to perjury, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623 and was sentenced to fifty-seven (57)

months’ incarceration. Harris appeals his sentence claiming that

the district court erred in finding his perjury was “in respect to

a criminal offense”, triggering a cross reference to U.S.S.G. §

2X3.1. Larry A. Lyons pled guilty to aiding and abetting the

manufacture of methamphetamine, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

841(a)(1) and (2). He appeals his sentence of one hundred (100)

months’ incarceration, contending that the district court

erroneously applied a sentencing enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G.

§ 2D1.1(b)(8)(B). We vacate and remand the sentence of Larry Lyons

finding that the while the district court identified the four

factors to consider when imposing such an enhancement, it failed to

abide by the requirements of the Guidelines and consider each

individual factor in the context of this case. We affirm the

sentence of Michael Kevin Harris, finding sufficient evidence in

the record to support the district court’s application of the

U.S.S.G. § 2X3.1 cross reference during sentencing. 

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I. 

On September 22, 2004 local police in Barbour County, West

Virginia discovered a methamphetamine laboratory in a trailer

behind the residence of Karl Kevin Hill on Mud Gut Road. This

discovery was the first seizure of a substantial methamphetamine

lab in Barbour County and led to the discovery and eradication of

numerous other methamphetamine labs over the next two years. As a

result of these seizures, a federal grand jury conducted an

investigation into the problem and returned a series of

indictments. During this investigation, Kevin Michael Harris was

called to testify concerning his knowledge of the methamphetamine

operation on Mud Gut Road. When testifying before the grand jury

on December 14, 2004, Harris denied having been to the Mud Gut Road

residence on more than one occasion. However, Harris had indeed

been to the residence on more than one occasion, and he

subsequently pled guilty to perjury related to this testimony on

November 7, 2005. 

Meanwhile, on May 3, 2005, an off-duty sheriff’s deputy, Mr.

Lee Wright, was traveling on Isner Creek Road in Randolph County,

West Virginia, when he noticed Larry Lyons and co-defendant Billy

Leary get out of Lyons’ vehicle and walk across the road into the

nearby woods carrying a white trash bag. The deputy called for

assistance and then approached both Lyons and Leary after

announcing that he was a police deputy. Lyons cooperated and came

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1United States and the defendant stipulated in a plea

agreement that the amount of liquid containing methamphetamine in

the glass globe was greater than 50ml but less than 200ml. 

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towards the deputy with his hands up, while Leary absconded into

the woods, where he also discarded the white trash bag. The

responding deputy stopped Leary and recovered the white trash bag,

which contained chemicals and items that could be used to

manufacture methamphetamine including: a glass mason jar, a plastic

milk jug with two clear plastic hoses, a pound of salt, coffee

filters, and liquid fire. A glass container containing traces1 of

liquid methamphetamine was also found in the woods, as well as

methamphetamine manufacturing equipment in the back of Lyons’ car.

Lyons was subsequently indicted in regard to this incident and pled

guilty to aiding and abetting in the manufacturing of

methamphetamine. 

II.

Harris challenges the district court’s finding that his

perjury was “in respect to a criminal offense”, triggering a cross

reference to U.S.S.G. § 2X3.1, accessory after the fact. We review

sentences for abuse of discretion. Gall v. United States, 128 S.

Ct. 586 (2007). We review the district court’s legal

interpretations of the sentencing guidelines de novo and a district

court’s factual findings for clear error. See United States v.

Green, 436 F.3d 449, 456 (4th Cir. 2006). 

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Guideline § 2J1.3's cross reference to the guideline § 2X3.1,

accessory after the fact, applies anytime a defendant has committed

perjury in respect to a criminal offense. The cross reference to

§ 2X3.1 applies even if the defendant has not actually acted as an

accessory, but has attempted to assist another person to escape

punishment for an offense.” See United States v. Dickerson, 114

F.3d 464, 467 (4th Cir. 1997). We find the Second Circuit’s

interpretation of § 2X3.1 and the meaning of “in respect to a

criminal offense” in United States v. Suleiman, 208 F.3d 32 (2d

Cir. 2000), persuasive. Namely, we are persuaded that perjury “in

respect to a criminal offense” is not limited to false statements

given in response to a question referring to a specific criminal

offense. Id. at 39. Indeed, the purpose of the cross reference

is to treat more severely perjuries that risk an incomplete or an

inaccurate investigation before a grand jury. Id. 

In this case, Harris was called to testify in a grand jury

investigation regarding his knowledge of the Mud Gut Road

methamphetamine investigation. Harris had ample notice that the

grand jury was investigating a criminal offense, and that his

statements, if false, could impede the progress or accuracy of such

an investigation. Upon review of the record, we find the facts

and circumstances sufficient to support the district court’s

determination that Harris’ perjury was “in respect to a criminal

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2Formerly, U.S.S.G. § 2D.1.1(b)(6)(B).

3Pursuant to Application Note 20 of § 2D1.1, the four factors

a court must consider are as follows: (i) the quantity of any

chemicals or hazardous or toxic substances found at the laboratory,

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offense.” We therefore affirm Harris’ sentence and the application

of a cross reference to U.S.S.G. § 2X3.1, accessory after the fact.

III.

Lyons contends that the district court erroneously imposed

upon him a sentencing enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. §

2D1.1(b)(8)(B)2. “When reviewing the district court’s application

of the guidelines in regard to sentence enhancement, we review the

court’s findings of fact for clear error.” United States v.

Houchins, 364 F.3d 182, 187 (4th Cir. 2004); see also United States

v. Daughtrey, 874 F.2d 213, 217 (4th Cir. 1989). Whether a

district court has properly found the existence of a substantial

risk of harm to human life or the environment within the meaning of

§ 2D1.1(b)(8)(B) is a mixed question of law and fact which we

review de novo. Id.; see also United States v. Layne, 324 F.3d

464, 468 (6th Cir. 2003). 

Application Note 20 of U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(8)(B) identifies

four factors that a sentencing court is required to assess in

determining whether an offense created a substantial risk of harm

to human life or the environment.3

 While earlier versions of

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and the manner in which the chemicals or substances were stored;

(ii) the manner in which hazardous or toxic substances were

disposed, and the likelihood of release into the environment of

hazardous or toxic substances; (iii) the duration of the offense,

and the extent of the manufacturing operation; (iv) the location of

the laboratory (e.g., whether the laboratory is located in a

residential neighborhood or remote area), and the number of human

lives placed at substantial risk of harm. 

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Application Note 20 provided only that a court “may” consider the

factors in determining applicability of the risk enhancement, the

note was amended in November 2001 to mandate that the four factors

“shall” be considered. Houchins, 364 F.3d 182, at 188. In order

to pass muster on appellate review, a sentencing court need not

find each factor satisfied to apply the sentencing enhancement at

hand, but it must consider the four Guideline factors and their

relevance to the individual circumstances of the case before

applying the enhancement. Houchins, 364 F.3d 182, at n.9. 

Upon review of the record, it is clear that the district court

carefully identified the four factors that must be considered in

order to impose the substantial risk enhancement. In addition, the

district court discussed a previous evidentiary hearing, United

States v. Rose, in which the court found through expert testimony

that anytime methamphetamine is “cooked” there is a substantial

risk of harm to human life and the environment. However,

Application Note 20 requires something more, specifically that the

district court apply each factor to the facts of the case before it

to determine whether there is a substantial risk under §

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4Lyons makes an additional argument contending that the

district court erred in sentencing him to 100 months’ imprisonment,

while sentencing his co-defendant to probation. We will not

entertain claims in regard to a sentencing disparity of this kind,

thus Lyons’ claim merits no additional consideration. See United

States v. Khan, 161 F.3d 477, 500 (4th Cir. 2007); see also United

States v. Pyles, 482 F.3d 282, 290 (4th Cir. 2006). 

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2D1.1(b)(8)(B). The Guidelines mandate consideration of several

factors, such as the amount of chemicals found at the site, the

duration of the offense, and the location of the laboratory. While

the district court was welcome to consider the expert testimony

heard in the case of United States v. Rose, the Guidelines prohibit

the district court from reaching the automatic conclusion that in

every instance in which methamphetamine is “cooked”, there is a

substantial risk of harm to human life and the environment. Such

a generalized conclusion cannot be squared with the individualized

four factor inquiry that is required by the plain language of

Application Note 20 of the guideline. Therefore, finding that the

district court failed to apply the required factors for a

sentencing enhancement based on substantial risk, we vacate and

remand for further consideration of the factors under Application

Note 20, as they apply to the facts in this case.4 

IV. 

In conclusion, we find that the district court did not abuse

its discretion and was not clearly erroneous in finding that

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Harris’ perjury was “related to a criminal offense”, nor in its

subsequent application of the cross reference to U.S.S.G. § 2X3.1.

As such, we affirm Harris’ sentence. 

In the case of Larry Lyons, we find that the district court

failed to abide by the requirements of U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(8)(B)

and Application Note 20, which mandates that the court shall

consider each of four individual factors when determining whether

an offense created a substantial risk of harm to human life.

Therefore, we vacate the district court’s imposition of a

sentencing enhancement and remand for further consideration of the

four factors as required by the statute. 

 AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED

 AND REMANDED IN PART

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