Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-18-03530/USCOURTS-ca8-18-03530-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Chris Maurice Welch
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 18-3530

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Chris Maurice Welch

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant

 ____________

Appeal from United States District Court

for the District of Minnesota

 ____________

Submitted: December 13, 2019

Filed: February 27, 2020

____________

Before LOKEN, GRASZ, and STRAS, Circuit Judges. 

____________

GRASZ, Circuit Judge. 

Chris Welch was charged with illegal gun possession. At trial, the district

court1

admitted DNA and drug evidence over Welch’s objections. Welch now

1The Honorable Ann D. Montgomery, United States District Judge for the

District of Minnesota. 

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appeals, challenging admission of the evidence and claiming the government failed

to prove the necessary scienter requirement. We affirm. 

I. Background

A confidential informant told Minneapolis Police Officer Jeffrey Werner he

witnessed Chris Welch storing guns and drugs in a house on Aldrich Avenue North. 

The informant described Welch as “a black male about 30-35 years old, about 6’0 tall

with a medium build and medium afro.”

To verify the tip, Officer Werner searched for Welch’s name on the Minnesota

Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) website. He found a “Chris Maurice

Welch” whose description generallymatched the one given by the informant. Officer

Werner showed the informant Welch’s DMV photos, and the informant confirmed

Welch’s identity. Because Welch’s criminal history revealed a prior felony

conviction, Officer Werner knew it was illegal for Welch to possess a gun. Officer

Werner then surveilled the Aldrich house. He saw foot traffic at the house consistent

with drug-distribution. Another officer saw Welch sitting inside a car in the driveway

next to the house.

Officer Werner obtained a warrant to search the Aldrich house. Police officers

followed Welch to the house and began their search shortly after Welch went inside. 

The officers found three men, including Welch, in a bedroom. Welch’s hair was in

braids. In that same room, officers found three broken cellphones. The officers also

found inside the house four guns and “a large amount of synthetic marijuana,” some

of which was packaged for sale. Outside the house, police found two men in a car

with marijuana and a loaded gun.

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Welch was arrested, handcuffed, and given Miranda warnings. See Miranda

v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). He agreed to talk to Officer Werner. Their

conversation, as transcribed by the district court, follows:

Werner: Okay, well it’s customary too, is when we do a search

warrant and find guns in the house, we try to take DNA of

everyone that’s in the house. So . . .

Welch: Okay, well my DNA is already in the system.

Werner: I know, but we’ve got to take one anyway. (inaudible) So

you’re cool with me taking your DNA sample real quick?

(inaudible) So you’ve had this done before and stuff?

Welch: Yeah, I’ve done like three of them before (inaudible) DNA

for kids. 

Werner: Oh, for child support stuff?

Welch: Yeah (laughs).

Following this exchange, and without telling Welch he could refuse, Officer Werner

took Welch’s DNA with a cheek swab. The police then took Welch to the county jail.

Monthslater, the DNA test resultsshowed that a Ruger .22 caliber pistol found

at the Aldrich house very likely had Welch’s DNA on it. Federal prosecutors charged

Welch with illegal gun possession under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e)(1). The

prosecution also intended to introduce at trial evidence that Welch — a month after

his arrest — had in his car two bags of the same kind of synthetic marijuana as that

found at the Aldrich house. Welch moved to exclude the DNA evidence and the

synthetic marijuana evidence. However, the evidence was admitted and Welch was

convicted.

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Welch now appeals the district court’s admission of the DNA and synthetic

marijuana evidence. He also argues his conviction is invalid in light of a recent

Supreme Court decision. We affirm his conviction. 

II. Analysis

A. DNA Evidence

Welch argues the officers violated the Fourth Amendment when they arrested

him and took his DNA. See U.S. Const. amend. IV (prohibiting unreasonable

searches and seizures). According to Welch, because the officers never had probable

cause to arrest him and they never had consent to take his DNA, the DNA evidence

is inadmissible. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914) (articulating

the “exclusionary rule” generally prohibiting the use of unconstitutionally-obtained

evidence); see also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960) (applying the

exclusionary rule to evidence obtained by state officers and used in a federal

prosecution). 

“We review a district court’sfindings of fact for clear error and its conclusions

of law regarding its denial of a motion to suppress de novo.” United States v.

Lothridge, 332 F.3d 502, 503 (8th Cir. 2003). 

We turn first to Welch’s arrest. Under the Fourth Amendment, a warrantless

arrest must be based on probable cause. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). 

“Probable cause existsto make a warrantless arrest when, at the moment of the arrest,

the collective knowledge of the officersinvolved was‘sufficient to warrant a prudent

man in believing that the [defendant] had committed or was committing an offense.’” 

United States v. Wajda, 810 F.2d 754, 758 (8th Cir. 1987) (internal citation omitted)

(quoting Beck, 379 U.S. at 91). Probable cause depends on the totality of the

circumstances. United States v. Kelly, 329 F.3d 624, 628 (8th Cir. 2003). 

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Welch argues that probable cause did not exist. He characterizes the

informant’s description (“a black male about 30–35 years old, about 6’0 tall with a

medium build and medium afro”) as false and inaccurate. And he argues that,

because the police never saw him selling or storing drugs at the Aldrich house, his

mere presence at the house could not provide probable cause to arrest him. See

Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 90–91 (1979) (finding a person’s proximity to

suspected criminals insufficient to establish probable cause).

Considering the totality of the circumstances, we disagree. The police matched

the informant’ssomewhat vague description toWelch’s DMVphotos. They observed

foot traffic consistent with the informant’s allegation that drugs were at the house. 

They knew Welch was prohibited from gun possession and they confirmed he spent

time at or near the Aldrich house. During the search of the house, police found drugs

and guns. Outside the house, in a parked car, police found more drugs and another

gun. And police identified Welch as one of the three men inside the house standing

next to three broken cellphones. While the informant got Welch’s hairstyle wrong,

he got the gun and drug possession right. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 245

n.14 (1983) (“We have never required that informants used by the police be infallible,

and can see no reason to impose such a requirement in this case.”). The officers’

knowledge warranted prudent belief that Welch had committed or was committing

an offense; they had probable cause to arrest him. 

But probable cause alone does not resolve the DNA evidence’s admissibility. 

The police did not have a warrant to take Welch’s DNA; they relied on his consent

to swab his cheek. Free and voluntary consent renders a search reasonable under the

Fourth Amendment. United States v. Sanders, 424 F.3d 768, 773 (8th Cir. 2005). If

the government showsthat Welch knowingly and voluntarily consented to the cheek

swab, then the DNA evidence is admissible. See id. The government’s “burden

cannot be discharged by showing mere acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority.” 

Id. “Rather, the government mustshow that a reasonable person would have believed

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that the subject of a search gave consent that was the product of an essentially free

and unconstrained choice that he or she was making.” Id. (quoting United States v.

Cedano-Medina, 366 F.3d 682, 684 (8th Cir. 2004)). We review a district court’s

finding of voluntary consent for clear error. Id. 

The district court explained that Welch’s age, intelligence, sobriety, and

experience with the criminal justice system, coupled with his Miranda warning,

supported a finding of voluntary consent. Additionally, the district court found that,

while Welch was under arrest when the DNA swab was taken, he had not been

detained and questioned for long. The district court also noted the interview was

“calm and cordial” and free from police intimidation. In fact, as the district court

pointed out, “Welch responded to questions cooperatively and in a steady voice, even

chuckling at times.” And in the midst of this even-keeled conversation, Welch

complied with Officer Werner’s request for a cheek swab “without hesitation.” 

According to the district court, the facts surrounding the interrogation support a

finding of voluntary consent. 

The district court’s account of the conversation between Welch and Officer

Werner is well-supported by the record. And besides casually explaining that his

“DNA is already in the system,” Welch never expressed any reluctance in providing

the sample. After reviewing the entire record, we are not “left with the definite and

firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. (quoting United States v. Booker,

269 F.3d 930, 931–32 (8th Cir. 2001)). As such, we find no clear error in the district

court’s finding of voluntary consent. Given Welch’s lawful arrest and voluntary

consent, the district court properly denied Welch’s motion to suppress the DNA

evidence. 

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B. Synthetic Marijuana Evidence

The district court also admitted evidence of the synthetic marijuana found in

Welch’s car a month after the Aldrich house search. According to Welch, this

violated Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1), which states “[e]vidence of a crime,

wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show

that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Fed.

R. Evid. 404(b)(1). The district court, however, admitted the evidence after finding

it probative of Welch’s motive to possess the gun. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2)

(permitting evidence of prior bad acts to show “motive, opportunity, intent,

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident”).

“We review the admission of [Rule 404(b)] evidence for abuse of discretion,

and we will reverse only when such evidence clearly has no bearing on the case and

was introduced solely to prove the defendant’s propensity to commit criminal acts.” 

United States v. Brown, 148 F.3d 1003, 1009 (8th Cir. 1998). 

Under the circumstances of this case, the synthetic marijuana evidence made

it more likely that Welch knew of and possessed the .22 caliber Ruger handgun. 

Welch’s defense — that he was not involved with the guns and drugs at the house —

is far less plausible when he was later found with the exact same (unique) kind of

synthetic marijuana as was earlier found in the Aldrich house. Moreover, this court

has held that drug possession can be relevant to motive in gun-possession cases. 

United States v. Williams, 796 F.3d 951, 961–62 (8th Cir. 2015). And facts tying a

defendant to drug-trafficking may show a defendant’s “motive, opportunity, intent,

and plan” to possess a gun. United States v. Claybourne, 415 F.3d 790, 797 (8th Cir.

2005). As such, we see no reason to suppose the synthetic marijuana evidence was

only introduced to prove Welch’s criminal propensity. The district court did not

abuse its discretion.

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C. Rehaif Scienter Requirement

Welch finally argues that his conviction is invalid in light of the Supreme

Court’s recent Rehaif v. United States decision.

2

139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019). Under

Rehaif, the government in a § 922(g) prosecution must prove the defendant “knew he

belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.” Id.

at 2200. And while at trial Welch stipulated to being a felon prohibited from gun

possession, the government never proved, at the time of the Aldrich house search, he

knew he had “been convicted in any court of[] a crime punishable by imprisonment

for a term exceeding one year.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Because Welch failed to raise the issue at trial, we review for plain error.

United States v. Hollingshed, 940 F.3d 410, 415 (8th Cir. 2019). Plain error is “(1)

an error (2) that was obvious and (3) that affected the defendant’s substantial rights

and (4) that seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

proceedings.” Id. (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993)).

To prove the alleged error affected his substantial rights, Welch must “show

a reasonable probability that, but for the error, the outcome of the proceeding would

have been different.” Id. at 415–16 (quoting Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136

S. Ct. 1338, 1343 (2016)). But this he cannot do. Welch has received and served

several prison sentences longer than one year for felony convictions. It is not

reasonably probable that, if the government had to prove Welch’s knowledge of a

previous conviction for “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding

one year,” he would have been acquitted. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); see also

Hollingshed, 940 F.3d at 415 (finding no plain error when the defendant was

previously incarcerated for a year or more).

2Welch, through counsel, moved for leave to brief this court on Rehaif. The

motion is granted; we here consider Welch’s Rehaif argument. 

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III. Conclusion

The district court rightly denied Welch’s motion to suppress the DNA

evidence, and it exercised its sound discretion by admitting the synthetic marijuana

evidence. And because the Supreme Court’s Rehaif decision leaves Welch’s

conviction unaffected, we affirm his conviction.

3

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3Welch raised several arguments pro se, and moved to supplement the record

and obtain new counsel. We deny the pro se motion and do not consider his pro se

arguments, as Welch is presently represented by counsel. United States v. McIntosh,

492 F.3d 956, 961 n.2 (8th Cir. 2007) (denying an appellant’s pro se motion because

he was represented by counsel).

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