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Parties Involved:
Sean Ashley
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

SEAN ASHLEY, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

!1""'!LED 

United Stat.et Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

APPEALS :JUN 0 8 1994 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 93-1231 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

For the District of Colorado 

(D.C. No. 92-CR-403) 

Charlotte J. Mapes, Assistant United States Attorney (Henry 

L. Solano, U.S. Attorney; John M. Hutchins, Assistant U.S. 

Attorney; and Daniel J. Cassidy, Assistant U.S. Attorney, 

District of Colorado, with her on the brief), Mountain States 

Drug Task Force, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Clifford J. Barnard, Boulder, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Colorado, Attorney for 

Before BRORBY, Circuit Judge, McWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit 

Judge, and BROWN, Senior District Judge.* 

McWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge. 

* Honorable Wesley E. Brown, Senior District Judge, District of 

Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 93-1231 Document: 01019289234 Date Filed: 06/08/1994 Page: 1 
This appeal concerns the relationship between 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841 (a) (1) (1988) and 21 U.S.C. § 860 (a) (Supp. IV 1992). 

Section 841(a) (1) provides that it shall be unlawful for any 

person to knowingly and intentionally distribute a controlled 

substance. Section 860(a) provides that any person who violates section 841(a) (1) by distributing a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of, inter alia, a public school, is 

subject to twice the maximum punishment authorized by section 

841(a) (1). Specifically, section 860(a) reads as follows: 

(a) Penalty 

Any person who violates section 841(a) (1) 

or section 856 of this title by distributing, 

possessing with intent to distribute, or manufacturing a controlled substance in or on, or 

within one thousand feet of, the real property 

comprising a public or private elementary, 

vocational, or secondary school of a public or 

private college, junior college, or university, or a playground, or within 100 feet of a 

public or private youth center, public swimming pool, or video arcade facility, is (except as provided in subsection (b) of this 

section) subject to (1) twice the maximum punishment authorized by section 841(b) of this 

title; and (2) at least twice any term of supervised release authorized by section 841(b) 

of this title for a first offense. A fine up 

to twice that authorized by section 841(b) of 

this title may be imposed in addition to any 

term of imprisonment authorized by this subsection. Except to the extent a greater minimum sentence is otherwise provided by section 

841(b) of this title, a person shall be sentenced under this subsection to a term of imprisonment of not less than one year. The 

mandatory minimum sentencing provisions of 

this paragraph shall not apply to offenses 

involving 5 grams or less of marihuana. 

In a seven-count indictment, Sean Ashley was charged as 

follows: 

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Appellate Case: 93-1231 Document: 01019289234 Date Filed: 06/08/1994 Page: 2 
1. In count 1 Ashley was charged with knowingly and intentionally distributing on or 

about June 18, 1992, approximately 12.71 grams 

of cocaine base, a Schedule II controlled substance, within 1,000 feet of East Denver High 

School, a public secondary school in violation 

of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) and 860; 

2. In count 2 Ashley was charged with unlawfully and intentionally distributing on or 

about June 23, 1992, approximately 25.55 grams 

of cocaine base, a Schedule II controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1); 

3. In count 3 Ashley was charged with unlawfully and intentionally distributing on or 

about July 3, 1992, approximately 44.79 grams 

of cocaine base, a Schedule II controlled substance, within 1,000 feet of East High School, 

in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) (1) and 

860; 

4. In count 4 Ashley and one Ramona Jean 

Cooper were charged with unlawfully and intentionally distributing on or about July 11, 

1992, approximately 53.31 grams of cocaine 

base, a Schedule II controlled substance, 

within 1,000 feet of East High School, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 (a) (1) and 860; 

5. In count 5 Ashley was charged with unlawfully and intentionally distributing on or 

about August 19, 1992, approxima·tely 46.50 

grams of cocaine base, a Schedule II controlled substance, within 1,000 feet of East 

High School, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 

8 41 (a) ( 1 ) and 8 6 0 ; 

6. In count 6 Ashley was charged with unlawfully and intentionally distributing on or 

about September 16, 1992, approximately 23.40 

grams of cocaine base, a Schedule II controlled substance, within 1,000 feet of East 

High School, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 

841(a) (1) and 860; and 

7. In count 7 Ashley was charged with unlawfully and intentionally distributing on or 

about December 1, 1992, approximately 411.52 

grams of cocaine base, a Schedule II controlled substance, within 1,000 feet of East 

High School, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 

841 (a) (1) and 860. 

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Appellate Case: 93-1231 Document: 01019289234 Date Filed: 06/08/1994 Page: 3 
During the conference on jury instructions, there was 

colloquy between court and counsel as to whether section 

860(a) sets forth a substantive offense independent of section 841(a) (1), or was merely a "sentencing enhancer" for one 

convicted under section 841(a) (1), and just how the jury 

should be instructed on the matter. Initially, the court and 

counsel for Ashley apparently agreed that section 860(a) was 

only a sentencing enhancer. Counsel for Ashley later changed 

his mind and then argued, along with counsel for Cooper, a 

co-defendant with Ashley in one count, that section 860(a) 

created a substantive offense and that one essential element 

of that offense was that the sale take place within 1,000 

feet of a public school. 

The district court eventually concluded that section 

860(a) was only a sentencing enhancer and instructed the jury 

that it should disregard all testimony concerning the distance between the place of distribution and East High School. 

In this regard, the district court instructed the jury as 

follows: 

Now, you will note that there is in the indictment certain language concerning the fact 

that this location was allegedly within 1,000 

feet of a school. And you've heard certain 

testimony to that effect. I now instruct you 

that you should not be confused or concerned 

about the 1,000 feet because it's not going to 

appear in these instructions. The 1,000 feet 

within a school language in the indictment 

bears on a question that is a decision for the 

Court alone at another point in the proceedings. So don't be confused by anything or any 

language concerning the allegation that this 

was with [sic] 1,000 feet of a school. 

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Appellate Case: 93-1231 Document: 01019289234 Date Filed: 06/08/1994 Page: 4 
In line with the foregoing instruction given the jury, 

the district court went on to instruct the jury as follows: 

The statute [here] in question, and there is 

only one statute that defines the substantive 

crime, is Section 841(a) (1) of Title 21 of the 

United States Code. It provides in part as 

follows. "It shall be unlawful for any person 

knowingly or intentionally to distribute a 

controlled substance." Now, there are several 

elements implicit in that statutory language, 

and I will define those elements for you. 

In order to sustain its burden of proof 

for the crime of distribution of a controlled 

substance, as charged in all seven counts of 

the indictment, the government must prove that 

on each such occasion for each such charge, 

that the following elements were satisfied. 

One, that the defendant whose guilt you have 

under consideration at a particular time, either Mr. Ashley or Ms. Cooper, knowingly and 

intentionally distributed a measureable amount 

of cocaine base, the controlled substance 

charged in the indictment. Secondly, at the 

time of the distribution, the defendant in 

question, Mr. Ashley or Ms. Cooper, depending 

on who[m] you are looking at [at] the particular time, knew that the substance was cocaine 

base, a controlled substance. 

So there are two elements; one is that 

the defendant knowingly and intentionally distributed a measurable amount of cocaine base, 

and two, at the time of such distribution, the 

defendant knew that the substance distributed 

was cocaine base, a controlled substance. 

The jury acquitted Cooper, but convicted Ashley on all 

seven counts in the indictment. Ashley was sentenced under 

the United States Sentencing Guidelines ("U.S.S.G.") to imprisonment for 240 months. Ashley now appeals his convictions and sentence imposed thereon. 

Ashley's initial argument is that the district court 

erred in holding that section 860(a) is only a sentencing 

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Appellate Case: 93-1231 Document: 01019289234 Date Filed: 06/08/1994 Page: 5 
enhancer and does not create a substantive offense. The government in this Court agrees with appellant. We also agree. 

An opinion from this Court filed after the trial in the instant case resolves this question. See United States v. 

Smith, 13 F.3d 380 (lOth Cir. 1993). In Smith we spoke as 

follows: 

We agree with those circuits that have 

concluded that § 860 constitutes an "offense" 

which has as an element of proof that the distribution occurred within 1,000 feet of a protected place. While some circuits construed § 

860 before it was renumbered and amended, 

these differences do not affect our inquiry. 

Similarly, § 860(a) includes as protected 

places playgrounds and various types of 

schools. Some circuits construed the statute 

in the school context, yet the analysis of § 

860(a) as an offense would also apply to a 

playground. See United States v. FreyreLazaro, 3 F.3d 1496, 1507 (11th Cir. 1993) 

(holding that § 841(a) is a lesser included 

offense of § 860); United States v. Scott, 987 

F.2d 261, 266 (5th Cir. 1993) (same); United 

States v. Thornton, 901 F.2d 738, 741 (9th 

Cir. 1990) (statute "incorporates the sentencing enhancement element into the underlying 

offense"); United States v. Holland, 810 F.2d 

1215, 1218 (D.C. Cir.) (statute "adds an element to the offense of section 841(a)" which 

must be "proved"), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 

1057, 107 S. Ct. 2199, 95 L.Ed.2d 854 (1987). 

Smith, 13 F.3d at 382-83. 

In this Court at oral argument, counsel for Ashley argued that Ashley's six convictions for distributing cocaine 

base within 1,000 feet of East High School should be reversed 

and the case remanded for a new . 1 1 tr1a . In his written 

1 As indicated, count 2 charged Ashley with distributing cocaine base on June 22, 1992, without any reference to the proximity of the sale to East High School. So, the "within 1,000 feet" 

argument has no relevancy to Ashley's conviction on count 2. 

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Appellate Case: 93-1231 Document: 01019289234 Date Filed: 06/08/1994 Page: 6 
brief, counsel's position was basically the same as the government, i.e., the judgment and sentence should be reversed 

and the case remanded with direction that Ashley be adjudged 

guilty of violations of section 841(a) (1), a lesser included 

offense to section 860(a), and resentenced in accord with 

section 841(a) (1). We take a slightly different view of this 

matter. 

In the present case, the jury was specifically instructed that evidence of the proximity of the six sales to 

East High School was irrelevant and should be disregarded. 

Further the jury was instructed that all seven counts were 

based on section 841(a) (1), and the jury's verdict was that 

Ashley was guilty of seven violations of section 841(a) (1). 

Accordingly, on the record before us we can only conclude 

that Ashley was convicted for violating section 841(a) (1), 

not section 860(a). 

The follow-up question is whether thereafter Ashley was 

sentenced in accord with section 841(a) (1) or section 860(a). 

Our study of the presentence report and the transcript of the 

sentencing hearing indicates quite clearly, to us, that 

Ashley was sentenced pursuant to section 841(a) (1} and was 

not subjected to the stepped-up penalties provided for in 

section 860(a). Indeed, at page 12 of Ashley's opening 

brief, counsel concedes that in sentencing Ashley the "trial 

court did not enhance the Defendant's sentence based on the 

offenses having occurred 'within 1,000 feet of a school.'" 

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Appellate Case: 93-1231 Document: 01019289234 Date Filed: 06/08/1994 Page: 7 
In sum, Ashley was not convicted under the provisions of 

section 860(a), as all parties apparently assume that he was. 

Instead, the district court erroneously withdrew any charge 

based on that statute from the jury's consideration in the 

mistaken belief that section 860(a) did not create a substantive offense and was only a sentencing enhancer. Such, of 

course, was to Ashley's benefit. In any event, it is too 

late to inject that statute back into the case. Accordingly, 

the case was submitted to the jury on the basis of section 

841(a) (1), a lesser included offense encompassed in section 

860(a). In this regard, we note, parenthetically, that section 841(a) (1) was specifically identified in all seven 

counts of the indictment. So, Ashley, in all seven counts, 

was convicted of violating section 841(a) (1), and he was then 

sentenced in accord with that statute. He was not subjected 

to the stepped-up penalties provided for in section 860(a). 

Thus, the premise that Ashley was convicted under section 

860(a) is simply incorrect. 2 

Subsequent to the return of the jury's verdicts, counsel 

moved to dismiss count 7 on the basis of outrageous government conduct. An evidentiary hearing was held on this matter, at the conclusion of which the district court denied the 

2 In view of our conclusion that Ashley was not convicted under 

section 860(a), we need not here consider Ashley's next argument 

that his convictions on six counts of distributing cocaine base 11 within 1,000 feet of a school 11 must be reversed because the government did not establish that Ashley's place of business on East 

Colfax Avenue in Denver, Colorado, where six of the seven sales 

occurred, was within 1,000 feet of East Denver High School. 

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Appellate Case: 93-1231 Document: 01019289234 Date Filed: 06/08/1994 Page: 8 
motion. Counsel now asserts this was error. In this regard, 

we are only concerned with count 7. 

As indicated, the seven counts were based on seven separate transactions. The seventh transaction was based on an 

alleged distribution occurring on or about December 1, 1992, 

and involving the distribution of 411.52 grams of cocaine 

base. Counts 1 through 6 involved the total distribution of 

only 206.26 grams of cocaine base. It was counsel's position 

that the seventh and last distribution was for the purpose of 

"ratcheting up" the total amount of cocaine base involved in 

the seven transactions so that Ashley would be subject to a 

more severe sentence. 

At the hearing on this matter, Ashley's trial counsel, 

who represents him on appeal, testified that at some point 

during the trial he had conversation with a drug agent named 

Pope, who, in response to inquiry, said that the reason for 

the last transaction was to "up" the amount of cocaine base 

involved and thereby "up" Ashley's base offense level. Agent 

Pope testified and denied making such a statement. His testimony was corroborated, to a degree, by a fellow drug agent. 

In any event, the district court was of the view that 

defense counsel had misunderstood Officer Pope and held, in 

effect, that Pope had not made the statement attributed to 

him by defense counsel. And there was testimony that the 

reason for the seven transactions was an effort by the government to determine Ashley's drug supplier and to determine 

whether he was acting in concert with others. 

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Also, there 

Appellate Case: 93-1231 Document: 01019289234 Date Filed: 06/08/1994 Page: 9 
was testimony that the DEA wanted to have an undercover agent 

accompany Williams, a "cooperating" drug offender, on some of 

these sales, believing that the testimony of the undercover 

agent might have greater credibility in the eyes of the jury 

than the testimony of a drug offender who, in exchange for 

f . 'h h h .. 3 

avors, was "cooperat1ng" w1t t e aut or1t1es. We find no 

error in the district court's denial of defendant's motion to 

dismiss count 7. The government didn't have to make an arrest after the first transaction, and its decision to go forward and arrange for other transactions was not outrageous, 

in our view. 

In support of the foregoing, see United States v. Diggs, 

8 F.3d 1520 (lOth Cir. 1993), where at p. 1525, we spoke as 

follows: 

Under the above circumstances, we cannot 

hold that the government's conduct was so outrageous that "due process principles would 

absolutely bar the government from invoking 

judicial processes to obtain a conviction." 

Russell, 411 U.S. at 431-32, 93 S. Ct. at 

3 Evelyn King Williams was arrested on January 30, 1992, for 

the sale of cocaine. She agreed to "cooperate" with the authorities in exchange for not being charged with a drug violation. On 

June 18, 1992, Williams made a buy of cocaine base from Sean 

Ashley at Ashley's place of business at 2424 East Colfax, Denver, 

Colorado. She also made a second buy on June 23, 1992, from Sean 

Ashley, which did not occur at Ashley's business premises. On 

July 3, 1992, she made a third buy from Ashley at his place of 

business. On July 31, 1992, Williams made a fourth buy from 

Ashley at his place of business. On this occasion she was 

accompanied by Suzanne Reid, a DEA undercover agent. On August 

19, 1992, Williams, accompanied by Reid, made a fifth buy from 

Ashley at his business premises. On September 16, 1992, Reid, 

unaccompanied by Williams, made a cocaine base buy from Ashley at 

his place of business. On December 1, 1992, Reid, again 

unaccompanied by Williams, made a buy of 411.52 grams of cocaine 

base for $13,500. On this last transaction, Ashley, after a brief 

chase, was arrested. 

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Appellate Case: 93-1231 Document: 01019289234 Date Filed: 06/08/1994 Page: 10 
1642-43. It is n~t outrageous for the government to induce a defendant to repeat or continue a crime or even to induce him to expand 

or extend previous criminal activity. Mosley, 

965 F.2d at 911; Cantwell, 806 F.2d at 1468-69 

& n. 3. In order to induce a suspect to repeat, continue, or expand criminal activity, 

the government ca~ suggest the illegal activity. United States v. Biswell, 700 F.2d 1310, 

1313 (lOth Cir. 1983) (government agent suggested selling fc8d stamps) . 

Lastly, Ashley challe~ges on constitutional grounds section 84l(b) (1) (A) (iii) and U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l(a) (3), both of 

which, for sentencing purposes, treat one gram of cocaine 

base as the equivalent of 100 grams of cocaine powder. Counsel claims that such violates Ashley's due process rights and 

denies him equal protection of the laws. He further asserts 

that such has an unconstitutional impact on black persons. 

At sentencing, both Ashley and the government called a chemist, each of whom testified regarding the differences between 

cocaine base and other forrrcS of cocaine. Be all that as it 

may, these same arguments have been considered and rejected 

by us. See United States v. Thurmond, 7 F.3d 947 (lOth Cir. 

1993) (enhanced penalty scheme for one distributing cocaine 

base, as opposed to cocaine powder, did not violate due process and was not enacted for a discriminatory purpose), cert. 

denied, 114 8. Ct. 1311 (1994); United States v. Turner, 928 

F.2d 956 (lOth Cir.) (sentencing guidelines that treat one 

gram of cocaine base as equivalent to 100 grams of cocaine 

powder does not violate due process), cert. denied, 112 s. 

Ct. 230 (1991). 

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Appellate Case: 93-1231 Document: 01019289234 Date Filed: 06/08/1994 Page: 11 
Although, as above indicated, the district court did not 

submit to the jury any charge based on§ 860(a), in its 

formal "Judgment in a Criminal Case" the district court 

nonetheless did recite that Ashley had been convicted by a 

jury of the following offenses: "21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) (1) and 

860, and 18 U.S.C. § 2." Accordingly, that part of the 

judgment which states that Ashley was convicted of violating 

21 U.S.C. § 860 is hereby vacated. Otherwise, the judgment 

finding Ashley guilty of § 841(a) (1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (aider 

and abettor is punishable as a principal) is affirmed and the 

sentence imposed thereon is also affirmed. 

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