Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01345/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01345-12/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
J.F. Salazar
Respondent
Ronald M. Williams
Petitioner

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONALD M. WILLIAMS, No. CIV S-07-1345-FCD-CMK-P

Petitioner, 

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

J.F. SALAZAR,

Respondent.

 /

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this petition for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pending before the court is respondent’s motion to

dismiss (Doc. 36) the instant petition as untimely. 

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder. The jury found true the

allegation that petitioner had used a deadly weapon. He was sentenced on June 1, 2001. On

February 6, 2003, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction and sentence on direct

appeal. The California Supreme Court denied direct review on April 16, 2003. 

/ / /

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It appears that petitioner filed a habeas petition in the Sacramento County 1

Superior Court in 2001, before his conviction became final. 

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Petitioner then filed a series of state post-conviction actions. Giving petitioner the

benefit of the “mailbox rule,” the following is a summary of the dates relevant to these actions:

First Action Sacramento County Superior Court 1

Filed June August 15, 2003

Denied November 13, 2003

Second Action California Court of Appeal

Filed December 3, 2003

Denied January 15, 2004

Third Action California Supreme Court

Filed March 4, 2004

Denied January 12, 2005

Fourth Action California Supreme Court

Filed March 19, 2004

Denied January 12, 2005

Fifth Action Sacramento County Superior Court

Filed February 6, 2005

Denied April 12, 2005

Sixth Action Sacramento County Superior Court

Filed May 5, 2005

Denied June 27, 2005

Seventh Action Sacramento County Superior Court

Filed June 30, 2005

Denied September 20, 2005

Eighth Action California Court of Appeal

Filed September 27, 2005

Denied October 6, 2005

Ninth Action California Supreme Court

Filed May 14, 2006

Denied December 20, 2006, as untimely

Petitioner filed the instant federal petition on May 29, 2007. 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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II. DISCUSSION

Federal habeas corpus petitions must be filed within one year from the later of: (1)

the date the state court judgment became final; (2) the date on which an impediment to filing

created by state action is removed; (3) the date on which a constitutional right is newlyrecognized and made retroactive on collateral review; or (4) the date on which the factual

predicate of the claim could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. See 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d). Typically, the statute of limitations will begin to run when the state court

judgment becomes final by the conclusion of direct review or expiration of the time to seek direct

review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

Where a petition for review by the California Supreme Court is filed and no

petition for certiorari is filed in the United States Supreme Court, the one-year limitations period

begins running the day after expiration of the 90-day time within which to seek review by the

U.S. Supreme Court. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001). Where no

petition for review by the California Supreme Court is filed, the conviction becomes final 40

days following the Court of Appeal’s decision, and the limitations period begins running the

following day. See Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809 (9th Cir. 2002). If no appeal is filed in the

Court of Appeal, the conviction becomes final 60 days after conclusion of proceedings in the

state trial court, and the limitations period begins running the following day. If the conviction

became final before April 24, 1996 – the effective date of the statute of limitations – the one-year

period begins to run the day after the effective date, or April 25, 1996. See Miles v. Prunty, 187

F.3d 1104, 1105 (9th Cir. 1999).

The limitations period is tolled, however, for the time a properly filed application

for post-conviction relief is pending in the state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). To be

“properly filed,” the application must be authorized by, and in compliance with, state law. See

Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4 (2000); see also Allen v. Siebert, ___ U.S. ___ (Nov. 5, 2007); Pace

v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005) (holding that, regardless of whether there are exceptions to

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26 2004 was a leap year and, as a result, February 2004 had an extra day. 

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a state’s timeliness bar, time limits for filing a state post-conviction petition are filing conditions

and the failure to comply with those time limits precludes a finding that the state petition is

properly filed). A state court application for post-conviction relief is “pending”during all the

time the petitioner is attempting, through proper use of state court procedures, to present his

claims. See Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). It is not, however, considered

“pending” after the state post-conviction process is concluded. See Lawrence v. Florida, ___

U.S. ___ (2007) (holding that federal habeas petition not tolled for time during which certiorari

petition to the Supreme Court was pending). Where the petitioner unreasonably delays between

state court applications, however, there is no tolling for that period of time. See Carey v. Saffold,

536 U.S. 214 (2002). If the state court does not explicitly deny a post-conviction application as

untimely, the federal court must independently determine whether there was undue delay. See id.

at 226-27. 

There is no tolling for the interval of time between post-conviction applications

where the petitioner is not moving to the next higher appellate level of review. See Nino, 183

F.3d at 1006-07; see also Dils v. Small, 260 F.3d 984, 986 (9th Cir. 2001). There is also no

tolling for the period between different sets of post-conviction applications. See Biggs v.

Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2003). Finally, the period between the conclusion of direct

review and the filing of a state post-conviction application does not toll the limitations period. 

See Nino, 1983 F.3d at 1006-07. 

In this case, the California Supreme Court denied direct review on April 16, 2003. 

Thus, petitioner’s conviction became final on July 15, 2003, and the one-year clock began to run

the following day. Absent tolling, petitioner’s federal petition was due by July 15, 2004. As to 2

tolling, petitioner would be entitled to statutory tolling for the time properly filed state postconvictions actions were pending, and the intervals between them, so long as he was moving up

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the levels of state court review. Turning to his first four state court habeas petitions – which

were filed in successively higher state courts and which respondent concedes were properly filed

without unreasonable delay – the first such action was filed on August 15, 2003, and the last such

action was denied on January 12, 2005. By the time the first post-conviction action was filed, 30

days of the one-year clock had elapsed. At the time the third action was denied, therefore,

petitioner had 11 months remaining within which to file his federal petition. 

As to the remaining state habeas petitions, the court agrees with respondent that

interval tolling is not available for the time between denial of the fourth action and filing of the

fifth action because petitioner was not proceeding to a higher state court. Rather, his state postconviction actions ended on January 12, 2005, with the California Supreme Court’s denial and

petitioner chose to begin the process again with his filing on February 6, 2005, in the Sacramento

County Superior Court. Therefore, by the time the second round of habeas petitions began with

the February 6, 2005, filing, 25 days of the remaining 11 months had elapsed. 

Similarly, assuming for the moment that petitioner would be entitled to some

tolling for the time the second round of petitions was pending, he is not entitled to interval tolling

between the fifth, sixth, and seventh actions because they were not filed in successively higher

state courts. The intervals for which petitioner is not entitled to tolling are: April 12, 2005,

through May 5, 2005 (24 days), and June 27, 2005, through June 30, 2005 (3 days) – a total of 27

additional days of the remaining 11 months. 

As to the time between the denial of the seventh action by the Sacramento County

Superior Court on September 20, 2005, through the date he filed his eighth action in the

California Court of Appeal on September 27, 2005, the court will assume petitioner is entitled to

interval tolling for this period. The court will also assume for the moment that petitioner is

entitled to interval tolling during the time the eighth action was pending (i.e., between September

27, 2005, and October 6, 2005). As to petitioner’s final action – the ninth action – filed in the

California Supreme Court, that action was denied as untimely. Therefore, it was not properly

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filed and petitioner is not entitled to any tolling incident to the ninth action. 

As stated above, by the time petitioner’s first round of state post-conviction

actions was concluded on January 12, 2005, 11 months of the one-year deadline remained. 

Continuing to assume that petitioner would be entitled to some kind of statutory tolling while the

second round of actions was pending in the Sacramento County Superior Court, he is not entitled

to any interval tolling for the time between the denial of the fourth action and filing of the fifth

action (25 days) or interval tolling with respect to the times between the fifth, sixth, and seventh

actions (27 days). Assuming tolling during the times the fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth actions

were pending, and the interval between the seventh and eighth actions, by October 6, 2005 –

when the eighth action was denied – petitioner had 283 days left within which to file his federal

petition. The instant federal petition was filed on May 29, 2007, well in excess of 283 days after

October 6, 2005. Therefore, the court concludes that the instant petition is untimely.

This result would be the same even if the court were to find that petitioner was

entitled to the 25 days interval tolling for the time between the denial of the fourth action and

filing of the fifth action and the 27 days interval tolling with respect to the times between the

fifth, sixth, and seventh actions. In essence, the federal petition is rendered untimely because the

ninth post-conviction action was not properly filed and, therefore, no tolling results from this

action. Petitioner’s conviction was final on July 15, 2003. He filed his first round of habeas

petitions one month later, leaving 11 months on the one-year clock. Giving petitioner the benefit

of all tolling through the denial of the eighth post-conviction petition on October 6, 2005, the

remaining 11 months had long since expired by the time the instant action was filed in May

2007. 

Petitioner attempts to avoid dismissal by arguing that he is entitled to equitable

tolling. Specifically, he indicates that various placements in administrative segregation (which

petitioner describes as “lock-downs”) prevented him from filing on time. However, the court

agrees with respondent that petitioner’s placement in administrative segregation can hardly be

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considered a circumstance beyond his control. See United States v. Van Poyck, 980 F. Supp.

1108, 1111 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (concluding that lock-downs and limited prison library access do

not constitute extraordinary circumstances). 

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that:

1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 36) be granted;

2. Petitioner’s motion for leave to amend (Doc. 44) be denied as moot; and

3. The Clerk of the Court be directed to enter judgment of dismissal and

close this action. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 20 days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's

Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive

the right to appeal. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: March 26, 2008

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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