Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-05180/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-05180-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
A. P. Kane
Respondent
Agustin Monroy
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1 Citations to “Exh.” are to the exhibits attached to respondent’s answer.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AGUSTIN MONROY,

Petitioner,

 vs.

A. P. KANE, Warden, et al., 

Respondents. /

No. C 05-5180 WHA (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

This is a habeas corpus case filed by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254. The

petition is directed to denial of parole.

The court ordered respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted. 

Respondent has filed an answer and a memorandum of points and authorities in support of it,

and has lodged exhibits with the court. Petitioner has responded with a traverse. For the

reasons set forth below, the petition is DENIED.

STATEMENT

In 1990 a jury convicted petitioner of attempted first-degree murder with use of a deadly

weapon and shooting at an occupied vehicle (Exh. 7 at 1).1 He received a sentence of life with

the possibility of parole plus six years (Ibid.). On June 22, 2004, after a hearing before the

Board of Prison Terms (“Board”), during which petitioner was represented and was given an

opportunity to be heard, the Board found petitioner unsuitable for parole (Exh. 2 at 1-97). The

Board based its decision upon the viciousness of the offense, the triviality of the motive, that

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petitioner mutilated the victim, petitioner’s criminal record, his escalating pattern of criminal

activity, his use of drugs and unstable social history, his need for further participation in

Narcotics Anonymous, the psychological evaluations, weaknesses in his parole plans, and the

opposition of the district attorney (Exh. 2 at 89-97). 

DISCUSSION

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the

basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court's

adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first prong applies both to questions of law and to mixed questions of

law and fact, Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407-09 (2000), while the second prong

applies to decisions based on factual determinations, Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340

(2003).

A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court authority, that is, falls under the

first clause of § 2254(d)(1), only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that

reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case

differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” 

Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 412-13. A state court decision is an “unreasonable application of”

Supreme Court authority, falls under the second clause of § 2254(d)(1), if it correctly identifies

the governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but “unreasonably applies

that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. The federal court on habeas

review may not issue the writ “simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment

that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or

incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, the application must be “objectively unreasonable” to support

granting the writ. See id. at 409. 

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“Factual determinations by state courts are presumed correct absent clear and

convincing evidence to the contrary.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340. This presumption is not

altered by the fact that the finding was made by a state court of appeals, rather than by a state

trial court. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-47 (1981); Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082,

1087 (9th Cir.), amended, 253 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001). A petitioner must present clear and

convincing evidence to overcome § 2254(e)(1)'s presumption of correctness; conclusory

assertions will not do. Id.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual determination

will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the

evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340; see also Torres

v. Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000).

When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state court to consider the

petitioner’s claims, the court looks to the last reasoned opinion. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501

U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991); Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079, n. 2 (9th Cir.2000). 

B. ISSUES PRESENTED

As grounds for federal habeas relief, petitioner asserts that: (1) his due process rights

were denied when the Board denied parole for the fourth time based on the circumstances of his

crime; (2) the use of a “some evidence” standard of review of parole decisions by the state

courts violates due process; and (3) the Board’s decision is arbitrary, capricious, and not

supported by the evidence. 

Issues one and three are sufficiency of the evidence issues – claims that petitioner’s due

process rights were violated because the decision was not supported by sufficient evidence –

and issue two goes to the quantum of evidence required by due process. In response to these

claims, respondent contends that California prisoners do not have a liberty interest in parole;

that even if they do, due process does not require any particular quantum of evidence to support

denial; and that there was in fact sufficient evidence to support the denial. 

///

///

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1. LIBERTY INTEREST

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state may “deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1. In Greenholtz

v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979), the Supreme

Court found that the inmates had a liberty interest in discretionary parole that was protected by

the Due Process Clause. The right was created by the “expectancy of release provided in [the

Nebraska parole statute.]” That statute provided that the parole board “shall order” release of

eligible inmates unless that release would have certain negative impacts. Id. at 11–12. The

Supreme Court returned to the issue in Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369 (1987). There

it held that a similar liberty interest was created even though the parole board had great

discretion. Id. at 381. For parole decisions, this mode of analysis survived the Supreme Court’s

later rejection of it for prison disciplinary decisions in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). 

Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 914 (9th Cir. 2003) (Sandin “does not affect the creation of

liberty interests in parole under Greenholtz and Allen.”). 

While there is "no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be

conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence," Greenholtz v. Inmates of

Nebraska Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979), a state's statutory parole scheme, if it

uses mandatory language, may create a presumption that parole release will be granted when or

unless certain designated findings are made, and thereby give rise to a constitutionally protected

liberty interest, see Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 376-78 (1987) (Montana parole

statute providing that board "shall" release prisoner, subject to certain restrictions, creates due

process liberty interest in release on parole); Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11-12 (Nebraska parole

statute providing that board "shall" release prisoner, subject to certain restrictions, creates due

process liberty interest in release on parole). In such a case, a prisoner has liberty interest in

parole that cannot be denied without adequate procedural due process protections. See Allen,

482 U.S. at 373-81; Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11-16. 

Respondent contends that California law does not create a liberty interest in parole. But

California’s parole scheme uses mandatory language and is similar to the schemes in Allen and

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Greenholtz which the Supreme Court held gave rise to a protected liberty interest in release on

parole. In California, the panel or board "shall set a release date unless it determines that the

gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or past

convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration of the public safety requires a more

lengthy period of incarceration for this individual, and that a parole date, therefore, cannot be

fixed at this meeting." Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b). Under the clearly established framework of

Allen and Greenholtz, “California’s parole scheme gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest in

release on parole.” McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2002). The scheme

requires that parole release be granted unless the statutorily defined determination (that

considerations of public safety forbid it) is made. Ibid.; Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 915-16

(9th Cir. 2003) (finding initial refusal to set parole date for prisoner with fifteen-to-life sentence

implicated prisoner’s liberty interest). In sum, the structure of California's parole scheme --

with its mandatory language and substantive predicates – gives rise to a federally protected

liberty interest in parole such that an inmate has a federal right to due process in parole

proceedings.

Respondent relies on In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061 (Cal.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.

92 (2005), as authority for his contention that the California statute does not create a liberty

interest in parole. This argument has been rejected by the United States Court of Appeals for

the Ninth Circuit. See Sass v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1127-28 (2006). 

Respondent’s argument as to liberty interest is without merit. 

2. “SOME EVIDENCE” STANDARD

Petitioner contends that due process requires a standard for sufficiency of the evidence

higher than “some evidence,” and respondent contends there is no due process requirement of a

specific quantum of evidence at all. Both are wrong. 

The Supreme Court has clearly established that a parole board’s decision deprives a

prisoner of due process if the board’s decision is not supported by "some evidence in the

record", or is "otherwise arbitrary." Irons v. Carey, 479 F.3d 658, 662 (9th Cir. 2007) (applying

"some evidence" standard used for disciplinary hearings as outlined in Superintendent v. Hill,

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472 U.S. 445-455 (1985)); McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904 (same). The evidence underlying the

Board’s decision must also have "some indicia of reliability." McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904;

Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915. The some evidence standard identified in Hill is clearly established

federal law in the parole context for purposes of § 2254(d). See Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128-1129. 

Ascertaining whether the some evidence standard is met "does not require examination

of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the

evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that

could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board." Hill, 472 U.S. at 455; Sass,

461 F.3d at 1128. The some evidence standard is minimal, and assures that "the record is not so

devoid of evidence that the findings of the disciplinary board were without support or otherwise

arbitrary." Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129 (quoting Hill, 472 U.S. at 457). 

Several recent Ninth Circuit cases have addressed the Board’s use of evidence from the

commitment offense and prior offenses. In Biggs, the court explained that the some evidence

standard may be considered in light of the Board’s decisions over time. Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916-

917. The court reasoned that "[t]he Parole Board’s decision is one of ‘equity’ and requires a

careful balancing and assessment of the factors considered . . . A continued reliance in the

future on an unchanging factor, the circumstance of the offense and conduct prior to

imprisonment, runs contrary to the rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison system and could

result in a due process violation." Id. Although the Biggs court upheld the initial denial of a

parole release date based solely on the nature of the crime and the prisoner’s conduct before

incarceration, the court cautioned that "[o]ver time, however, should Biggs continue to

demonstrate exemplary behavior and evidence of rehabilitation, denying him a parole date

simply because of the nature of his offense would raise serious questions involving his liberty

interest." Id. at 916. 

The Sass court criticized the decision in Biggs: "Under AEDPA it is not our function to

speculate about how future parole hearings could proceed." Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129. Sass

determined that it is not a due process violation per se if the Board determines parole suitability

based solely on the unchanging factors of the commitment offense and prior offenses. See id.

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(prisoner’s commitment offenses in combination with prior offenses amounted to some

evidence to support the Board’s denial of parole). However, Sass does not dispute the argument

in Biggs that, over time, a commitment offense may be less probative of a prisoner’s current

threat to the public safety. 

In Irons the Ninth Circuit emphasized the continuing vitality of Biggs, but concluded

that relief for Irons was precluded by Sass. See Irons, 470 F.3d at 664. The Ninth Circuit

explained that all of the cases in which it previously held that denying parole based solely on

the commitment offense comported with due process were ones in which the prisoner had not

yet served the minimum years required by the sentence. Id. at 665. Also, noting that the parole

board in Sass and Irons appeared to give little or no weight to evidence of the prisoner’s

rehabilitation, the Ninth Circuit stressed its hope that "the Board will come to recognize that in

some cases, indefinite detention based solely on an inmate’s commitment offense, regardless of

the extent of his rehabilitation, will at some point violate due process, given the liberty interest

in parole that flows from relevant California statutes." Id. (citing Biggs, 334 F.3d at 917). The

Ninth Circuit has not said when a complete reliance on unchanging circumstances would

amount to a due process violation, unfortunately. 

3. APPLICATION OF THE “SOME EVIDENCE” STANDARD

The Board in denying petitioner parole, cited the viciousness of the offense, the triviality

of the motive, petitioner’s criminal record, his escalating pattern of criminal activity, his use of

drugs and unstable social history, his need for further participation in self-help programs,

weaknesses in his parole plans, and the opposition of the district attorney (Exh. 2 at 89-97). 

These circumstances “tend to indicate unsuitability for parole” under California regulations. 

Cal. Code Regs. Title 15, § 2402(a), (c)(1)(A). The Board did not deny parole solely because of

the unchanging factor of the nature of petitioner’s offense, so the concern expressed in Biggs,

that after passage of enough time such a factor would cease to be “some evidence,” is not

triggered here. 

Petitioner stabbed his ex-wife’s boyfriend in front of her children (Exh. 7 (opinion of

Court of Appeal) at 3-4). He stabbed the victim eleven times, and when the victim recovered

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consciousness, started stabbing him again (ibid.). He stopped only because another person

interfered (ibid.). In addition to this evidence of his danger to society from the nature of the

offense, the Board’s denial was supported by petitioner’s over-confidence about his ability to

resist drugs and his lack of parole plans (id. at 79-80, 93, 95). There was sufficient evidence to

support the denial. See Rosas v. Nielsen, 428 F.3d 1229, 1232–33 (9th Cir. 2005) (facts of the

offense and psychiatric reports about the would-be parolee sufficient to support denial).

Because there was no constitutional violation, the state courts’ rejection of petitioner’s

claims was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme

Court authority. 

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The clerk shall close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 19 , 2007. 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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