Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-02166/USCOURTS-ca10-94-02166-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Douglas Elkins
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

:'FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Uuated States Court of Appca~ 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

DOUGLAS ELKINS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

NOV 0 6 1995 

PATRICK FISHER 

Cieri' 

94-2166 

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On Appea~ From The 

United States District Court 

For The District Of New Mexico 

(D.C. No. CR-94-55-LH) 

Roger A. Finzel, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Albuquerque, 

New Mexico, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Tara C. Neda, Assistant United States Attorney (John J. Kelly, 

United States Attorney, with her on the brief), Albuquerque, 

New Mexico, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before TACHA, SETH, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

SETH, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 94-2166 Document: 01019279132 Date Filed: 11/06/1995 Page: 1 
Appellant Douglas Elkins appeals his conviction by jury of 

two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm and two 

counts of being a felon in possession of ammunition. 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 922(g) (1) and 924(e) (1). He was sentenced to four concurrent 

262-month sentences. Our jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291. 

On appeal, Elkins alleges that the trial court erred in its 

denial of his suppression motion based upon the initial stop of 

the vehicle in which he was travelling. He further challenges the 

admission of hearsay testimony of an unavailable witness, as well 

as testimony regarding gang membership. The denial of a motion to 

suppress is reviewed in the light most favorable to the 

government, with factual determinations reviewed for clear error. 

United States v. Carhee, 27 F.3d 1493, 1496-97 (lOth Cir.). We 

review de novo, however, the ultimate determination of 

reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1497. With 

regard to admission of evidence, the trial court's rulings are 

reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Keys, 899 F.2d 

983, 985 (lOth Cir.); United States v. Puckett, 692 F.2d 663, 670 

(lOth Cir.). 

In December 1993 tension escalated between two rival gangs in 

an area of Albuquerque known as the "war zone." This escalation 

was characterized by reports of gunshots, an apparent attempted 

drive-by shooting, and six arrests in the preceding two and a half 

months relating to the turf war. Following up on reports of 

gunshots, street gang detectives Torgrimson and Lewis were 

dispatched to the problem area and interviewed a member of a gang 

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Appellate Case: 94-2166 Document: 01019279132 Date Filed: 11/06/1995 Page: 2 
who informed the detectives that occupants in a maroon Chrysler 

New Yorker had fired shots at him the previous day. During the 

interview, the Albuquerque Police Department dispatched the 

detectives to investigate another report of gunshots. Upon 

arrival at the location of the reported gunshots, Detectives 

Torgrimson and Lewis observed a maroon Chrysler New Yorker and 

interviewed known members of another area gang. 

On January 12, 1994, Detectives Torgrimson and Lewis were 

patrolling the "war zone" area separately when they were informed 

by the police department that several callers had reported shots 

in that area. While observing a residence of a known gang member, 

Detective Lewis saw the same maroon New Yorker depart from the 

driveway. He followed it until he lost sight of it. He radioed 

the approximate location of the vehicle to Detective Torgrimson, 

who located the car as it pulled out of a parking lot. The New 

Yorker immediately proceeded in the opposite direction of 

Detective Torgrimson's patrol vehicle. Torgrimson turned around 

to follow the New Yorker. At that time, quite a bit of activity 

took place in the rear seat and the right rear door of the New 

Yorker opened several inches. Detective Torgrimson, in an effort 

to stop evidence from being discarded or passengers from fleeing, 

shined his spotlight on the door, which then closed. The 

detective turned on his flashing lights, and after three blocks 

the New Yorker pulled over. During the ensuing search, which is 

not independently contested on appeal, the detectives discovered a 

sawed off shotgun, a revolver, ammunition, a baseball bat and a 

tire iron. 

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Appellate Case: 94-2166 Document: 01019279132 Date Filed: 11/06/1995 Page: 3 
We initially examine Appellant's contentions regarding the 

denial of his motion to suppress the evidence found in the 

vehicle. The issue presented is whether sufficient justification 

existed to warrant the initial stop of the New Yorker. It is well 

settled that an investigative stop is justified where police 

officers have "a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the 

detainee has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal 

activity." United States v. Nicholson, 983 F.2d 983, 987 (10th 

Cir.) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21). The presence of 

reasonable suspicion is not determined by any one factor, but by 

the totality of the circumstances. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 

325, 330. Tips, even if anonymous, coupled with independent 

police work, provide reasonable suspicion to warrant an 

investigative stop. Id. at 329-31. 

The district court concluded that based upon the facts that 

the automobile had been identified as one involved in a drive-by 

shooting, that the same automobile had been seen at a known gang 

member's address on several occasions, and that there were reports 

of shots being fired in the neighborhood near the time the vehicle 

was observed, reasonable suspicion existed justifying an 

investigative stop. Moreover, we note that the rear door of the 

vehicle opened at the time the officer's marked patrol car 

approached from the rear. This provides a further degree of 

suspicion regarding the occupants of the vehicle. Finally, 

Detective Torgrimson testified that the New Yorker did not 

immediately pull over, but proceeded three blocks before it 

finally stopped. A vehicle's failure to immediately stop provides 

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Appellate Case: 94-2166 Document: 01019279132 Date Filed: 11/06/1995 Page: 4 
additional justification for an investigative detention. 

United States v. Walraven, 892 F.2d 972, 975 (lOth Cir.). 

These circumstances do not, as Elkins contends, pile 

inference upon inference in order to justify the stop. Rather, 

based upon several weeks of observation and independent 

investigation by the detectives concerning the maroon New Yorker, 

its operators, and the locations at which it was spotted, as well 

as the activity of the vehicle at the time it was stopped, a 

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity existed. Accordingly, 

we conclude that under all the circumstances the detective acted 

properly in making an investigative stop. See Nicholson, 983 F.2d 

at 987; United States v. Morgan, 936 F.2d 1561, 1567-68 (lOth 

Cir.). 

Elkins additionally maintains that a statement to police by 

another passenger in the automobile that at Elkins' instruction he 

took the shotgun and shoved it to the trunk through the stereo 

speaker is not sufficiently against the maker's interest to be 

admissible as hearsay under Fed. R. Evid. 804(b) (3). Elkins 

further argues that the prosecution failed to show that the maker 

was unavailable as contemplated by Rule 804. We reject these 

arguments. The passenger that made the statement to police 

clearly made a statement against his own interest. Not only was 

he on probation at the time of the stop, but he admitted to 

concealing an illegally possessed firearm. Further, our review of 

the government's efforts to locate the passenger indicates that he 

was indeed unavailable at the time of the trial. Finally, we note 

that even if the district court's decision regarding admissibility 

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of the statement in this instance was erroneous, it was harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 

18, 24. Elkins himself stated at the scene that the weapons were 

his and that the other passengers were innocent. 

A basic issue in this appeal is the admission of testimony on 

cross examination by the government of defense witness Joe 

Gonzales as to gang membership and gang activity, including that 

of the witness. The trial court permitted the testimony on the 

theory that it went to credibility. However, this testimony was 

not admissible under the circumstances as it was contrary to·our 

holding in United States v. Keys, 899 F.2d 983 (lOth Cir.), and 

the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 

45. 

In Abel, the Supreme Court established that "[a] witness' and 

a party's common membership in an organization, even without proof 

that the witness or party has personally adopted its tenets, is 

certainly probative of bias." Abel, 469 U.S. at 52. The Court 

went on to note that the testimony "was not offered to convict 

either [the defendant or the witness] of a crime, but to impeach 

[the witness'] testimony." Id. at 53. 

This court in Keys similarly, and in line with Abel, 

recognized clear parameters regarding the admissibility of gangrelated evidence at trial. Following Abel, Keys held that in 

specific contexts gang membership testimony to show the bias of a 

witness can be admissible. Keys, 899 F.2d at 986-87. Essential 

for the admission of such testimony, however, is the establishment 

of a foundation that demonstrates "the defendant and the witness 

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Appellate Case: 94-2166 Document: 01019279132 Date Filed: 11/06/1995 Page: 6 
to be impeached belong to the same gang." Id. at 986 (footnote 

omitted) . Keys additionally stated that a district court does not 

abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of gang membership to 

show bias where a defense witness' testimony "might have been 

influenced by [a] fear of [the defendant] and his gang." Id. at 

987. Thus, a foundation must be made which demonstrates 

membership on the part of the defendant and the witness whose 

credibility is at issue in a common gang, or that the witness' 

testimony was biased due to fear. 

We have carefully reviewed the record, and conclude that not 

only was there no foundation established as outlined by Keys, but 

also that the prosecution's presentation of the evidence was 

inconsistent with Keys. At the outset, we note that there was no 

demonstration by the government, either by testimony or extrinsic 

evidence, that Elkins and Gonzales were members of the same gang. 

The government did attempt to establish Elkins' affiliation in 

some gang by testimony as well as by the tattoo on his stomach. 

This does not meet the foundation requirement that evidence be 

admitted that demonstrates common membership of the .defendant and 

the witness. Similarly, although the government did question 

Gonzales on the stand regarding his gang membership, there was no 

evidence offered regarding his common membership in the gang with 

which the prosecution attempted to associate Elkins. This is an 

insufficient basis for admission of this evidence under Keys, 

which clearly does not emphasize membership in any ~ but rather 

the same ggng. See id. at 986-87. Because there was no 

foundation regarding common membership in a gang, the 

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prosecution's questioning regarding gang membership was not proper 

under the initial criteria of the Keys decision. 

The second criteria under which gang testimony may be 

admissible, as stated above, is if it is shown that the testimony 

was biased by fear. It is this aspect of Keys under which the 

government in its response brief attempts to legitimatize use of 

gang membership testimony. Specifically, the government contends 

that Elkins was a member of a prison enforcer gang known as the 

New Mexico Syndicate. Testimony was offered that this gang 

controls discipline in and out of prison. The problem with the 

government's position, however, is that it failed to establish a 

foundation demonstrating bias due to fear. There was no attempt 

to demonstrate that Joe Gonzales, the witness, was aware of 

potential repercussions that would form a basis for fear. There 

was simply no effort on the part of the government to establish 

the basis under which gang evidence testimony was admissible under 

Keys. 

In addition to the foregoing, we note that the presentation 

of gang membership evidence by the prosecution in its closing 

argument was not in line with Keys. In its closing argument, the 

government stated that Elkins was "gang banging," a "gang member," 

and "admired by the street gang members." Tr. Vol. IV at 374-75, 

379. Such statements go beyond the demonstration of bias on the 

part of defense witnesses, and seek to provide a basis for the 

gang testimony not contemplated by Keys. 

In sum, we agree with the district court that the initial 

stop of the vehicle in which Elkins was travelling was supported 

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by reasonable suspicion and thus not in violation of the Fourth 

Amendment. We further hold that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion with regard to the admission of testimony from an 

unavailable witness. 

Based upon Abel and this circuit's decision in Keys, we must 

hold that Elkins' conviction cannot stand because inadmissible 

testimony of gang membership was improperly presented by the 

prosecution and argued in closing. 

The conviction of Douglas Elkins is REVERSED, and the case is 

REMANDED. 

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