Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca6-06-05878/USCOURTS-ca6-06-05878-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joseph Swafford
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206

File Name: 08a0033p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JOSEPH SWAFFORD,

 Defendant-Appellant.

X

-

-

-

-

>

,

-

-

N

No. 06-5878

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Tennessee of Chattanooga.

No. 04-00138—Curtis Lynn Collier, Chief District Judge.

Argued: December 7, 2007

Decided and Filed: January 17, 2008 

Before: MERRITT, COLE, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Paul D. Cross, CLEMENTS & CROSS, Monteagle, Tennessee, for Appellant. Gregg

L. Sullivan, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for Appellee.

ON BRIEF: Paul D. Cross, CLEMENTS & CROSS, Monteagle, Tennessee, for Appellant. Perry

H. Piper, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for Appellee. 

_________________

OPINION _________________

I.

MERRITT, Circuit Judge. The defendant, Joseph Swafford, challenges his conviction for

selling iodine used in the production of methamphetamine, a controlled substance. We agree with

the defendant that his conviction on the two conspiracy counts suffers from an impermissible

variance because in each charge there were multiple conspiracies with different participants, and

therefore the conspiracy convictions must be overturned. Additionally, we find that the district court

erred by denying the defendant’s amended motion to strike or elect the substantive counts. The 38

substantive counts must therefore be merged into 19 counts. Accordingly, we reverse the district

court opinion in part and remand with instructions to resentence the defendant in accordance with

this opinion. 

1

 Case: 06-5878 Document: 006158532 Filed: 01/17/2008 Page: 1
No. 06-5878 United States v. Swafford Page 2

1

The sentence corresponded with a criminal history category I (no criminal history) and a baseline sentencing

level of 38, plus two enhancements: a 2-point enhancement for obstruction of justice and a 2-point enhancement for his

role in the offense. The attendant sentencing guidelines range was 360 months to life. The baseline level of 38 resulted

from the court’s calculation that the total amount of iodine sold by the defendant for use in the manufacture of

methamphetamine resulted in the production of 424 kilograms of the drug. We leave it to the district court in the first

instance to determine upon remand whether it is appropriate to aggregate the underlying drug production without the

conspiracy charges and what the appropriate Guidelines range is for the defendant.

II.

On February 24, 2005, a federal grand jury returned a forty-count superceding indictment

charging Swafford with crimes related to the sale of iodine, a necessary ingredient in the production

of methamphetamine. Count 1 charged that from August 1, 2001, to October 15, 2004, the

defendant and co-defendant corporation, JES, Inc. – operating as Broadway Home and Garden

(“Broadway”) – conspired to aid and abet the manufacture of 500 grams or more of

methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A) and 18 U.S.C. § 2.

Count 2 charged that for the same dates the defendants conspired to distribute iodine, having

reasonable cause to believe that it would be used to manufacture methamphetamine in violation of

21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(c). Counts 3 through 21 charged that on various dates the defendants

possessed chemicals knowing and having reasonable cause to believe that they would be used to

manufacture methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(a)(6). Finally, counts 22 through

40 charged that on various specific dates, the defendants unlawfully distributed iodine, knowing and

having reasonable cause to believe that the iodine would be used to manufacture methamphetamine

in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2). 

At trial, the government offered considerable testimony from approximately 20 former

Broadway customers and admitted methamphetamine “cooks,” each of whom testified that Swafford

had sold them iodine, many on a regular basis, over a number of years. The government attempted

to prove that such quantities clearly exceeded that necessary for a legal purpose (e.g. the treatment

of horses), thus precluding a potentially legitimate buyer-seller relationship. The government also

offered testimony tending to show that the defendant was aware that the iodine was destined for

methamphetamine production, including the following facts: the defendant only accepted cash for

the sales of iodine (but would allow credit cards for other sales), used trade language associated with

methamphetamine production, warned his iodine customers when federal agents were in the store,

advised his clients about different types of iodine available and enquired about the resulting product.

A jury found Swafford guilty on all forty counts and the judge sentenced Swafford to 360 months,

the minimum recommended Guidelines sentence.1

 Swafford filed a timely appeal and raises a total

of eight challenges to his conviction.

III.

The defendant argues that the district court erred in granting the government’s motion to

disqualify his retained counsel. This Court’s standard of review of a district court’s decision

regarding the disqualification of counsel is a “generous one.” United States v. Mays, 69 F.3d 116,

121 (6th Cir. 1995). “The district court is to be given wide latitude” in making such determinations

and a decision will be upheld unless “arbitrary” or “without adequate reasons.” Id. 

The Sixth Amendment guarantees counsel for all defendants in criminal prosecutions and

recognizes a qualified right to choose that counsel. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 158-59

(1988). A defendant enjoys a presumption in favor of counsel of choice, but such a presumption

may be overcome because such a choice must be balanced with the “the court’s interest in the

integrity of the proceedings and the public’s interest in the proper administration of justice.” Mays, 69 F.3d at 121; see also Wheat, 486 U.S. at 164. In situations where a potential conflict of interest

 Case: 06-5878 Document: 006158532 Filed: 01/17/2008 Page: 2
No. 06-5878 United States v. Swafford Page 3

may arise, the court’s interest in the integrity of the proceedings may trump the defendant’s choice.

Whether the client waives his right to conflict-free representation is not dispositive, as district courts

have the ability to prevent a conflict “not only in those rare cases where an actual conflict may be

demonstrated before trial, but in the more common cases where a potential for conflict exists which

may or may not burgeon into an actual conflict as the trial progresses.” Wheat, 486 U.S. at 163. 

The defendant claims that the district court erred in granting the motion to disqualify counsel

because he had waived his right to an “advice of counsel” defense. Originally, the defendant

intended to offer the partial defense of “advice of counsel,” which disproves the mens rea element

of the offense, by showing that he had spoken with a lawyer from the same firm representing him

at trial about the legality of his iodine sales. In describing the potential for this defense to result in

a conflict of interest, the district judge noted that the firm had refused to allow the defendant to call

the lawyer who allegedly provided the advice, that the government intended to call an attorney from

the firm if Swafford testified as to his conversation, and that defense counsel’s potential loyalty to

the firm might prevent him from adequately cross-examining a fellow partner. See United States

v. Swafford, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26890, *26 (D. Tenn. 2005) (mem.) (citing Tenn. S.Ct. R. 8,

RPC 1.7(b)(2005)). The judge acknowledged that Swafford was prepared to waive this defense and

that his counsel did not believe that their representation would be adversely affected. Id. at *10-11.

Nevertheless, he granted the motion on the grounds that during the course of the trial, the

government might offer evidence leading the defendant to testify, which, in turn, might implicate

the conflict of interest within the firm. This potential, the court concluded, required resolution of

the issue before the trial because “the stakes are so high” (e.g. mistrial, replacing counsel). Id. at

*27.

The district court appropriately recognized its obligation to balance the defendant’s right to

counsel of choice with the court’s independent obligation to serve justice. The district court quoted

the following language from Wheat, which is instructive as well for the reviewing court:

Unfortunately for all concerned, a district court must pass on the issue whether or not

to allow a waiver of a conflict of interest by a criminal defendant not with the

wisdom of hindsight after the trial has taken place, but in the murkier pretrial context

when relationships between parties are seen through a glass, darkly. The likelihood

and dimensions of nascent conflicts of interest are notoriously hard to predict, even

for those thoroughly familiar with criminal trials. It is a rare attorney who will be

fortunate enough to learn the entire truth from his own client, much less be fully

apprised before trial of what each of the Government's witnesses will say on the

stand. A few bits of unforeseen testimony or a single previously unknown or

unnoticed document may significantly shift the relationship between multiple

defendants. These imponderables are difficult enough for a lawyer to assess, and

even more difficult to convey by way of explanation to a criminal defendant

untutored in the niceties of legal ethics. Nor is it amiss to observe that the willingness

of an attorney to obtain such waivers from his clients may bear an inverse relation

to the care with which he conveys all the necessary information to them. 

Swafford, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26890 at *23-24 (quoting Wheat, 486 U.S. at 162-163). Such

discretion is warranted, moreover, because of the “whipsaw” nature of waiver of conflict-free

representation: “If a trial court disqualifies counsel, defendant will argue . . . a violation of his Sixth

Amendment right to counsel of his choice. If a trial court refuses to disqualify an attorney, a

defendant may later attempt to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on conflict of

interest, asserting that his waiver was not knowingly or voluntarily made.” Serra v. Michigan Dep’t

of Corrections, 4 F.3d 1348, 1353-1354 (6th Cir. 1993) (citing Wheat, 486 U.S. at 161-62). We are

aware that such an argument – taken to its logical extreme – could allow a district court judge to

disqualify counsel every time the government files a motion, but believe that the district court

 Case: 06-5878 Document: 006158532 Filed: 01/17/2008 Page: 3
No. 06-5878 United States v. Swafford Page 4

2

The district court denied the government’s motion to disqualify the firm from representing JES, Inc., a codefendant. This fact provides additional support that the district court exercised appropriate discretion and did not

arbitrarily disqualify counsel.

appropriately found that this was not the case. See Swafford, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26890 at *24-

25 (discussing that the possibility for the government to “manufacture” conflicts).2

We have previously affirmed the disqualification of counsel in a case involving a potential

advice-of-counsel defense. See United States v. Timmer, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 37057 (6th Cir.

1995). In Timmer, a criminal defendant was charged with bankruptcy fraud and the same attorney

who represented him in the bankruptcy proceedings in which he was alleged to have committed

fraud represented him in the criminal proceedings. This Court affirmed the magistrate judge’s

decision to disqualify counsel, relying on Wheat, because the attorney was “likely to be called as

a witness” by the government even if he was not called by the defense. Id. at *4. Consequently, in

language quoted by the district court’s memorandum in the instant case, the magistrate judge in

Timmer concluded, “developments during the trial might well give rise to a need for [the attorney]

to testify even if the defense could not foresee those developments prior to trial.” Id. at *3-4;

Swafford, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26890 at *26. The instant case does not present as strong a case

for disqualifying counsel, for the defendant waived the defense potentially giving rise to the conflict

of interest. Nevertheless, we believe that the district judge appropriately explained his decision –

i.e. that a conflict of interest might arise during trial – and that this decision was thus not arbitrary.

IV.

The defendant argues that both the first and second counts of the indictment suffer from fatal

variances. In the first count, the government charged Swafford with a single conspiracy to aid and

abet the manufacture of methamphetamine. And in the second count, the government charged the

defendant with a single conspiracy to distribute iodine to be used to manufacture methamphetamine.

The defendant contends that the proof offered at trial failed to support the existence of a single

conspiracy for either count, but instead only tended to show the existence of multiple conspiracies.

We review the question of whether a variance has occurred de novo. United States v. Caver, 470 F.3d 220, 235-37 (6th Cir. 2006). “A variance to the indictment occurs when the charging terms

of the indictment are unchanged, but the evidence at trial proves facts materially different from those

alleged in the indictment.” Id. at 236. In determining whether the evidence can reasonably support

only a finding of multiple conspiracies, we view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the

government.” Id. When a defendant first alleges a variance at trial, this Court will reverse a

conviction if “a variance occurred and that variance affected [the defendant’s] substantial rights.”

Id. at 235; see also Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946). But where the issue is first

raised on appeal, as here, we review for plain error, Caver, 470 F.3d at 235, which requires the

defendant to prove that the error affected the outcome of the district court proceedings. United

States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-34 (1993).

In the instant case, the evidence shows that the defendant was part of multiple conspiracies

and not a single conspiracy as charged in the indictment. None of the customers to whom Swafford

sold iodine for use in the production of methamphetamine directly interacted with one another

except Michelle Dixon and Becky McAllister. And “while a single conspiracy does not become

multiple conspiracies simply because each member of the conspiracy does not know every other

member,” it is necessary to show that each alleged member “agreed to participate in what he knew

to be a collective venture directed toward a common goal.” United States v. Warner, 690 F.2d 545,

549 (6th Cir. 1982); see also Jury Instructions, J. Apx. p. 625. We have found single conspiracies

even where the connections between the co-conspirators were minimal. See, e.g., United States v.

 Case: 06-5878 Document: 006158532 Filed: 01/17/2008 Page: 4
No. 06-5878 United States v. Swafford Page 5

3

Defining the common enterprise as simply the illegal sale of drugs would render the conspiracy an essentially

limitless enterprise. Additional facts must connect the putative co-conspirators. Moreover, this is not a “chain

conspiracy” where the existence of a single conspiracy is proved by the fact that operators at different levels are

connected by a common scheme or enterprise. 

4

In the instant case, the methamphetamine cooks were co-conspirators and not co-defendants. Nevertheless,

as discussed infra, we still believe that the same problem of prejudice exists.

Kelley, 849 F.2d 999, 1003 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that a defendant who was involved only in

distributing drugs in San Francisco was part of a single conspiracy with a common distributor who

also operated in Washington and Los Angeles). 

Nevertheless, the evidence proved at this trial demonstrated the existence of multiple

conspiracies between the defendant and many of the Broadway customers who testified. Even

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the government failed to prove

a common goal as between the customers, a necessary element of a single conspiracy charge. That

is, the government’s metaphorical argument that this was a “wheel conspiracy” (or “hub-and-spoke”

conspiracy) – wherein the defendant served as the hub connected to each of the customers via a

spoke (i.e. provision of iodine) – fails because no common goal or enterprise existed.3 As the

Supreme Court described in Kotteakos, “without the rim of the wheel to enclose the spokes,” a

single, wheel conspiracy cannot exist but instead is a series of multiple conspiracies between the

common defendant and each of the other defendants. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 755. “A rimless wheel

conspiracy is one in which various defendants enter into separate agreements with a common

defendant, but where the defendants have no connection with one another, other than the common

defendant’s involvement in each transaction.” Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 203 (4th

Cir. 2002); see also United States v. Chandler, 388 F.3d 796, 808 (11th Cir. 2004) (“for a wheel

conspiracy to exist, those people who form the wheel’s spokes must have been aware and must do

something in furtherance of some single, illicit enterprise”) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).

Here, we have exactly this type of rimless conspiracy. The government failed to prove that the

methamphetamine cooks were acting in furtherance of a common goal or that there was any

significant interdependence among them. See Chandler, 388 F.3d at 811. Consequently, there is

a variance between the crime charged (a single conspiracy) and the crime proved (multiple

conspiracies). 

Finding a variance does not mandate a reversal; in order for the variance to constitute

reversible error, a defendant must at the very least show that this variance prejudiced him. See

Caver, 470 F.3d at 237 (a variance is not per se prejudicial). “Where the evidence demonstrates

only multiple conspiracies, a defendant is prejudiced if the error of trying multiple conspiracies

under a single indictment substantially influenced the outcome of the trial.” Id. (citing Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 765) (emphasis in original). 

This case does not present the two most problematic forms of prejudice: (1) where the

defendant is unable to present his case and is “taken by surprise by the evidence offered at trial,”

United States v. Budd, 496 F.3d 517, 527 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S.

78, 82 (1935)), or (2) where the defendant is “convicted for substantive offenses committed by

another.” United States v. Friesel, 224 F.3d 107, 115 (2d Cir. 2000). Swafford had notice of the

crimes charged against him and was not convicted for substantive crimes committed by another.

But this observation does not end the enquiry, for as the Second Circuit describes, prejudice may

also exist where “‘spillover’ [occurs] because of a large number of improperly joined defendants.”

Id. Indeed, “the possibility of prejudice resulting from a variance increases with the number of

defendants tried and the number of conspiracies proven.” United States v. Bertolotti, 529 F.2d 149,

156 (2d Cir. 1975) (emphasis added) (citing Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 559

(1947)).4

 The sale of iodine to many unrelated customers is no different from the sale of birdseed

 Case: 06-5878 Document: 006158532 Filed: 01/17/2008 Page: 5
No. 06-5878 United States v. Swafford Page 6

5

The single conspiracy convictions allowed the government to attribute all of the defendant’s iodine sales to

the production of methamphetamine. This quantity, as discussed in footnote 1 supra, informed the applicable guidelines

sentencing range. Had the government been required to prove each of the multiple conspiracies, the amount of

iodine/methamphetamine – and the attendant guidelines range – may very well have been lower. 

6

Our decision that there was a fatal variance in both counts 1 and 2 of the superceding indictment, which

requires a remand for resentencing, allows us to pretermit the following issues raised by the defendant: (1) that count

1 of the indictment failed to state an offense; (2) that the government offered insufficient testimony as to the existence

of either conspiracy; and (3) that the district court improperly calculated the statutory maximum under 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(c), which is ten years, not twenty.

The defendant also raises two other issues. First, the defendant’s argument that the verdict form was flawed

is simply without merit. Second, the defendant’s argument that the district erred in denying his Rule 29 motion, in which

he contended that the indictment failed to state the time of the crimes with sufficient accuracy, is without merit. The

government is not required to prove the exact date of an offense if, as was the case here, the indictment includes the

language “on or about” and the date proved at trial is “reasonably near” the date alleged in the indictment. See United

States v. Ford, 872 F.2d 1231, 1236 (6th Cir. 1989). 

to many birdwatchers or the sale of other products at retail to many users who are unconnected to

each other. Where there is no connection between users of the same product but the factfinder

mistakenly believes there is a union of interest and criminal intent and an agreement to coordinate

activity, the harm to the public will appear to be greater and the participants more culpable. Here,

the appearance of coordinated criminal activity appears more culpable than individual sales,

implicating the Supreme Court’s long-standing admonition that “charges of conspiracy are not to

be made out by piling inference upon inference, thus fashioning . . . a dragnet to draw in all

substantive crimes.” Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 711 (1943).

In the instant case, the spillover problem is manifestly evident. More than 20 Broadway

customers testified about making iodine purchases, and while some of the methamphetamine cooks

testified to frequent purchases of large quantities of iodine, others testified to limited purchases of

small amounts. In the latter situation, a jury might have concluded that Swafford did not have the

requisite knowledge that the iodine was being used for methamphetamine production as opposed to

a legitimate purpose. Similarly, the other, extrinsic testimony as to Swafford’s knowledge of the

illicit use of iodine varied. Several witnesses testified that the defendant exhibited suspicious

behavior demonstrating such knowledge – for example, one witness testified that Swafford warned

him that federal agents were in the store – but the testimony regarding other transactions was

arguably indistinguishable from a legitimate buyer-seller relationship. Here, the variance created

the following problem: instead of having to prove each of the multiple conspiracies, which was

necessary due to the failure to demonstrate a single conspiracy, the government offered evidence

only as to the alleged single criminal enterprise. Consequently, the jury could simply seize upon the

most significant iodine sales and the most suspicious behavior exhibited by Swafford and then apply

that evidence against the defendant vis-à-vis each of the alleged co-conspirators. This distributive

application of evidence diminishes the level of proof necessary for convictions based on the multiple

conspiracy theory proven at trial. Under such circumstances, it is impossible to say that the variance

did not affect the outcome of the trial. A jury might have concluded that conspiracies existed

between the defendant and certain customers but not others. The resulting guidelines sentence, in

turn, would perhaps have been lower.5

 The jury instructions reflected this concern and informed

the jury that they could only convict the defendant if they found that he was a member of a single

conspiracy. J. Apx. p. 624. Because the jury could not have found the existence of a single

conspiracy, and because the proof offered as to the multiple conspiracies prejudiced the defendant,

the convictions on counts 1 and 2 must be overturned.6 

V.

The defendant argues that the district court erred by denying a motion to strike or elect

 Case: 06-5878 Document: 006158532 Filed: 01/17/2008 Page: 6
No. 06-5878 United States v. Swafford Page 7

7

21 U.S.C. § 843(a)(6) reads: “[T]o possess any three-neck round-bottom flask, tableting machine,

encapsulating machine, or gelatin capsule, or any equipment, chemical, product, or material which may be used to

manufacture a controlled substance or listed chemical, knowing, intending, or having reasonable cause to believe, that

it will be used to manufacture a controlled substance or listed chemical in violation of this title or title II.” The controlled

substance at issue in the case is methamphetamine.

8

21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) reads: “possesses or distributes a listed chemical knowing, or having reasonable cause

to believe, that the listed chemical will be used to manufacture a controlled substance except as authorized by this title.”

(Emphasis added.) Again, the controlled substance is methamphetamine. 

counts of multiplicity, thereby implicating the double jeopardy clause’s prohibition against multiple

punishments for the same crime. Whether an indictment suffers from a problem of duplicity or

multiplicity is a legal question that this Court reviews de novo. United States v. Campbell, 279 F.3d

392, 398 (6th Cir. 2002). 

“‘Multiplicity’ is charging a single offense in more than one count in an indictment.” United

States v. Lemons, 941 F.2d 309, 317 (5th Cir. 1991). Multiplicity may result in a defendant being

punished twice for the same crime, United States v. Brandon, 17 F.3d 409 (1st Cir. 1994), or may

unfairly suggest that more than one crime has been committed. United Stats v. Dixon, 921 F.2d 194

(8th Cir. 1990). To determine if multiplicity exists, a court must first look to “whether Congress

intended to punish each statutory violation separately.” Pandelli v. United States, 635 F.2d 533 (6th

Cir. 1980) (quoting Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 155 (1977)). Where this enquiry does

not resolve the issue, “the general test for compliance with the double jeopardy clause looks to

‘whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.’” United States v. Davis, 306 F.3d 398, 417 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)

(emphasis added)). Using the same evidence to prove violations of two statutes does not violate

Blockburger. See United States v. Medina, 992 F.2d 573, 588 (6th Cir. 2003). But in examining

whether the elements overlap the Blockburger analysis does require us to “go further and look to the

legal theory of the case or the elements of the specific criminal cause of action for which the

defendant was convicted without examining the facts in detail.” Pandelli, 635 F.2d at 538. 

In the instant case, the defendant argues that Counts 3 through 21, which are based on 21

U.S.C. § 843(a)(6)7

 include the same elements as Count 22 through 40, which are based on 21

U.S.C. § 841 (c)(2).8 The government relies on United States v. Miller, 870 F.2d 1067 (6th Cir.

1989), for the proposition that Congress intended to punish the defendant under both statutes. This

case is not controlling, for in Miller, the defendant possessed marijuana with the intent to distribute

it and manufactured (i.e. grew) the marijuana. As the Miller Court described,

The offense of possession with intent to distribute undoubtedly can be proved

without any proof of manufacture of that substance. Furthermore, the offense of

manufacturing, while likely involving proof of possession, does not require any proof

regarding an intent to distribute the substance.

870 F.2d at 1071. In Miller, the manufacturing of marijuana, itself, constituted a violation of the

statute. The Miller court thus reasonably concluded that Congress sought to criminalize both the

manufacture of marijuana and its possession with the intent to distribute. In the instant case, it is

not obvious why Congress would twice want to criminalize iodine vis-à-vis its role in

methamphetamine production. Perhaps Congress sought to distinguish regular, unlisted chemicals

from listed chemicals, and to punish the latter more harshly. However, neither is inherently a crime,

unlike manufacturing or possessing marijuana; only when the possession or distribution of iodine

is tied to the manufacturing of a controlled substance (i.e. methamphetamine) does it become illegal.

Thus, we believe that § 843(a)(6) comprises a “catch-all” statute proscribing the possession of

certain items with the intent of assisting the manufacturing of illegal drugs, while § 841(c)(2)

 Case: 06-5878 Document: 006158532 Filed: 01/17/2008 Page: 7
No. 06-5878 United States v. Swafford Page 8

specifically addresses the use of listed chemicals to facilitate the same goal. The latter is thus a

more specific statute, one that specifically addresses the situation at hand. 

 Under the Blockburger test, Counts 22 through 40 include an element that the government

was required to prove – distribution – that is not present in Counts 3 to 21. But in order to satisfy

Blockburger – and not be a lesser included offense – Counts 3 to 21 must similarly include an

element not present in the other. The government states in a conclusory fashion that possession and

distribution necessarily include elements not present in the other; however, distribution of iodine

presupposes that the defendant possessed iodine at some point. See Charge to the Jury, J. Apx. p.

624 (defining “distribute” as “to deliver or to transfer possession or control of something from one

person to another”). Consequently, the indictment fails to satisfy Blockburger on its face and the

indictment suffers from multiplicity. Furthermore, the “legal theory” of this case is the same under

both statutes – namely, that the defendant distributed iodine (whether described as a “chemical” or

a “listed chemical”) to facilitate the production of methamphetamine. See Pandelli, 635 F.2d at 538.

Because multiplicity exists, the charges must be merged under § 841(c)(2) to satisfy the

prohibition against double jeopardy. See Pandelli, 635 F.2d at 539. In turn, the consecutive

sentences imposed must be vacated. On remand, the district court should sentence the defendant

according to the 19 substantive violations of § 841(c)(2).

VI.

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court in part, REVERSE in part, and

REMAND for resentencing in accordance with this opinion.

 Case: 06-5878 Document: 006158532 Filed: 01/17/2008 Page: 8