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Parties Involved:
Darlene Mathis-Gardner
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 6, 2015 Decided April 21, 2015

No. 14-3031

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

DARLENE MATHIS-GARDNER,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:11-cr-00100)

A.J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender, argued the cause 

and filed the briefs for appellant. Michelle M. Peterson, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, entered an appearance.

Nickolai G. Levin, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 

argued the cause for appellee. With him on the briefs were 

William J. Baer, Assistant U.S. Attorney, and James J. 

Fredricks, Attorney. Adam D. Chandler, Attorney, entered an 

appearance.

Before: BROWN, SRINIVASAN and WILKINS, Circuit 

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WILKINS.

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WILKINS, Circuit Judge:

The question before the Court is whether and to what 

extent a district court must explain its decision to deny a 

motion to terminate supervised release. We conclude that 

while a district court is required to consider certain factors 

before granting or denying a motion to terminate supervised 

release, there is no requirement that the district court explain 

its decision to deny such a motion so long as the court’s 

reasoning is discernible from the record. In the present case, 

however, we cannot discern the District Court’s reasoning 

from the record. We therefore vacate the District Court’s 

judgment and remand for reconsideration with adequate 

explanation.

I.

In April of 2011, Darlene Mathis-Gardner pleaded guilty 

to charges of conspiracy to defraud the United States and 

making false claims against the United States. The charges 

were related to the falsification of information regarding the 

performance of government contracts. She was sentenced to 

concurrent eighteen-month terms of imprisonment and 

concurrent three-year terms of supervised release and ordered 

to perform community service and to pay restitution. 

Mathis-Gardner served her time without incident and 

began her term of supervised release on December 31, 2012. 

On February 25, 2014, Mathis-Gardner filed a motion for 

early termination of her supervised release pursuant to 18 

U.S.C. § 3583(e). The Government supported her motion. 

On April 23, 2014, the District Court denied the motion in a 

minute order that stated, in its entirety, “It is hereby ordered 

that defendant’s motion is DENIED.” 

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Mathis-Gardner filed a timely notice of appeal.

II.

Terminating supervised release is governed by 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3583(e)(1). The statute provides that 

The court may, after considering the factors set 

forth in [Title 18] section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), 

(a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and 

(a)(7)—

(1) terminate a term of supervised release and 

discharge the defendant released at any time 

after the expiration of one year of supervised 

release, pursuant to the provisions of the 

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure relating 

to the modification of probation, if it is 

satisfied that such action is warranted by the 

conduct of the defendant released and the 

interest of justice[.]

Id.

On its face, the statute requires district courts to consider 

certain factors before terminating supervised release and 

discharging the defendant, but one could argue that the statute 

does not expressly require a district court to consider these

factors before denying a motion to terminate supervised 

release. Nonetheless, other circuits that have considered the 

issue have either held or strongly implied that the district 

court is required to consider the statutory factors when 

reviewing a motion for early termination, regardless of 

whether that motion is granted or denied. See, e.g., United 

States v. Emmett, 749 F.3d 718, 720 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Section 

3583(e) requires a district court to “consider[]” particular 

. . . sentencing factors, and explaining whether these factors 

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weigh in favor of early termination is part and parcel of 

considering the factors.”); United States v. Mosby, 719 F.3d 

925, 930-31 (8th Cir. 2013) (referencing district court’s 

familiarity with defendant’s characteristics in determining that 

summary denial of early termination motion was not abuse of 

discretion); United States v. Lowe, 632 F.3d 996, 998 (7th Cir. 

2011) (“[W]e find the district court abused its discretion in 

failing to consider the statutory factors.”); United States v. 

Gammarano, 321 F.3d 311, 315 (2d Cir. 2003) (“We have 

previously held that district courts must consider the factors 

. . . in deciding whether to modify or terminate a term of 

supervised release.”); United States v. Pregent, 190 F.3d 279, 

283 (4th Cir. 1999) (“[B]ecause the district court followed the 

statutory mandate to consider both Pregent’s conduct and the 

interests of justice and concluded that Pregent’s behavior did 

not warrant an early termination of supervised release, the 

district court did not abuse its discretion . . . .”); United States 

v. Jeanes, 150 F.3d 483, 484-85 (5th Cir. 1998) (“The statute 

directs the court to take into account a variety of 

considerations . . . After weighing these factors, the court may 

discharge the defendant from supervised release . . . .”). 

While not dispositive, the fact that at least six circuits 

have interpreted § 3583(e)(1) as requiring the district court to 

consider the specified § 3553(a) factors, as well as the fact

that the Government has not challenged this interpretation,

strongly indicates this interpretation is correct. Requiring 

consideration of the specified § 3553(a) factors is also 

consistent with our precedent and Supreme Court case law 

interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), a similarly worded sentence 

modification statute. See Freeman v. United States, 131 S. 

Ct. 2685, 2691 (2011); see also United States v. Lafayette, 

585 F.3d 435, 440 (D.C. Cir. 2009). We therefore conclude 

that a district court must consider the specified § 3553(a)

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factors before denying a motion for early termination of 

supervised release.

III.

Although other circuits have roundly accepted that 

district courts are bound to consider the specified § 3553(a)

factors before deciding on a motion to terminate early release, 

there is some dispute about whether and to what extent a 

district court must explain its decision. In the Seventh and 

Ninth Circuits, “the district court must give some indication 

that it has considered the statutory factors in reviewing a 

motion for early termination of supervised release.” Lowe, 

632 F.3d at 998; see also Emmett, 749 F.3d at 821-22 

(remanding because the record didn’t contain sufficient 

explanation, but noting that “[o]n remand, the district court 

need not give an elaborate explanation of its reasons for 

accepting or rejecting Emmett’s arguments”). The Eighth 

Circuit, however, has held that the district court is not 

required to explain its denial of an early termination motion. 

See Mosby, 719 F.3d at 931. 

Even where courts require an explanation for denying a 

motion to terminate supervised release, the real question on 

review is whether the record allows the appellate court to 

discern that the district court appropriately exercised its 

discretion after considering the statutory factors. Thus, in 

Emmett the Ninth Circuit vacated the trial judge’s order 

because “the single explanation in the record d[id] not provide 

a reason for rejecting [the defendant’s] arguments or explain 

why his request should be denied under the applicable legal 

standard,” 749 F.3d at 821. And the Second Circuit—which 

requires its district courts to state that they have considered 

the statutory factors—has held that such a statement need not 

come in the order denying relief, so long as it appears during 

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a hearing or elsewhere in the record. See Gammarano, 321 

F.3d at 316.

Where, as here, the District Court does not spell out its 

reasoning at all, we must strike a delicate balance. Our 

review for abuse of discretion does not permit us to 

“substitute our judgment” for that of the trial court, King v. 

Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1991), so we cannot 

decide the issue by determining whether we would have 

reached the same conclusion. Furthermore, we cannot just 

reflexively presume that the learned judge appropriately 

exercised his discretion and considered all of the relevant 

factors, because that would risk turning abuse of discretion 

review into merely a “rubber stamp.” Moore v. National 

Ass'n of Securities Dealers, Inc., 762 F.2d 1093, 1106 (D.C. 

Cir. 1985); see also Ross v. City of Waukegan, 5 F.3d 1084, 

1089 (7th Cir. 1993). Nonetheless, we agree that there may 

be instances where no explanation for denying a motion to 

terminate supervised release is necessary, a point made by 

Judge Nguyen’s dissent in Emmett, 794 F.3d at 824-25, such 

as where an explanation was provided when denying a 

previous motion and no new facts were presented in a 

subsequent request. Where clear and compelling reasons to 

deny relief leap out from the record, requiring an explanation 

from the district court to avoid reversal for abuse of discretion 

would elevate form over substance. See, e.g., Nunez v. 

Allstate Ins. Co., 604 F.3d 840, 848 (5th Cir. 2010) (no abuse 

of discretion to exclude testimony of purported expert without 

explanation, where four other judges had previously excluded 

his testimony due to his lack of qualifications and speculative 

opinions); Szabo Food Service, Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 

F.2d 1073, 1084 (7th Cir. 1987) (no explanation is required 

when denying a “foolish” motion for sanctions). In sum, 

“when the reasons for denying a colorable motion are 

apparent on the record,” Szabo Food Service, 823 F.2d at 

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1084, or when granting relief “was clearly appropriate from 

the face of the record,” Katz v. Household Intern., Inc., 36 

F.3d 670, 673 (7th Cir. 1994), we can properly review 

whether the district court appropriately exercised its 

discretion, even without an explanation.

But this is not a case where the reasons for denying the 

motion are apparent from the record. According to MathisGardner’s early termination petition, she served her prison 

time without incident and has exceeded the community 

service requirement instituted by the District Court, including 

by working to develop new programs to help ex-offenders. 

She submitted several letters from members of her community 

in support of early termination; these letters demonstrate both 

that she has continued to accept responsibility for her actions 

and that she has made efforts to let the mistakes she made be 

a lesson to herself as well as to others. Perhaps most 

significantly, the Government strongly supported early 

termination in her case, acknowledging “that the defendant 

has not only complied with the conditions of her supervised 

release, but . . . has also taken rehabilitative steps that go 

above and beyond the Court-ordered requirements,” noting 

that “Ms. Mathis-Gardner’s frank acceptance of responsibility 

for her criminal conduct has not wavered and she has 

thoroughly committed to a different way of life,” and opining 

that “[t]he resources of the Probation Office would be better 

used for supervision of offenders who have not taken the 

rehabilitative steps that this defendant has.” S.A. 1-2. In 

consideration of these factors, “the government urge[d] the 

Court to grant the Motion.” S.A. 2. 

In United States v. Lussier, 104 F.3d 32, 32 (2d Cir. 

1996), the Second Circuit explained that “[o]ccasionally, 

changed circumstances—for instance, exceptionally good 

behavior by the defendant or a downward turn in the 

defendant’s ability to pay a fine or restitution imposed as 

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conditions of release—will render a previously imposed term 

or condition of release either too harsh or inappropriately 

tailored to serve the general punishment goals of section 

3553(a).” Here, Mathis-Gardner advanced a substantial

argument that her post-sentencing conduct met this high 

burden—an assessment shared by the government. In such 

circumstances, the record must provide some indication of the 

trial court’s reasons for denying a §3583(e)(1) motion.

Nothing in the record indicates what factors the District 

Court considered in denying early termination. The 

Government—tasked on appeal with defending the District 

Court’s judgment—argues that the District Court put some 

significance on the performance of community service over 

three years at a rate of 120 hours per year (as opposed to 

simply the completion of 360 hours of community service). 

But it is far from clear from the record that the District Court, 

during sentencing, put any independent significance on 

spreading out the community service over three years rather 

than simply wanting to ensure that all of the required hours 

were completed. At sentencing, the District Court noted the 

many people who had come to support Mathis-Gardner and 

acknowledged that “[t]his isn’t your typical sentencing in any 

way, shape or form.” J.A. 250. The District Court concluded 

that “[o]bviously [Mathis-Gardner] ha[s] been deterred. 

There is no question about that in my mind. There’s no 

question [she] ha[s] accepted responsibility. None. Zero.” 

J.A. 252. Citing the need for general deterrence, the District 

Court determined that “[i]n this case, there has to be jail time 

. . . [and] I don’t think a sentence with jail time alone is 

enough either. I think there needs to be community service” 

“as a lesson to others where they [can] see [Mathis-Gardner] 

in the community.” J.A. 253-54. “So you are going to have 

to do your jail time first and then you are going to have to do 

your community service next, and you will do that during a 

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period of what’s called supervised release . . . I think in this 

case, a combination of jail time combined with community 

service is plenty.” J.A. 254-55. The District Court clearly 

believed that community service was important at sentencing, 

but the record does not explain why the District Court would 

have wanted supervised release to continue once the 

community service obligation was completed. 

IV.

The District Court focused its sentencing decision on the 

need for general deterrence, and specifically determined that 

jail time and community service would promote this aim. 

Mathis-Gardner served her prison time and completed the 

mandated 360 hours of community service. It is impossible to 

discern from the record how or why denying the motion to 

terminate comported with consideration of the relevant 

§ 3553(a) factors, and the District Court gave us no 

explanation to assist our review. This Court cannot conclude 

that the District Court appropriately exercised its discretion 

under these circumstances. We therefore vacate the District 

Court’s denial of Mathis-Gardner’s motion for early 

termination of supervised release and remand to the District 

Court for reconsideration consistent with this opinion. Cf. 

Jackson v. Culinary School of Washington, Ltd., 59 F.3d 254, 

256 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (remanding where “impossible to assess 

whether the district court abused its discretion” due to lack of 

explanation given when granting request for declaratory 

judgment). We see no other choice, lest we abdicate “our 

responsibility to review [discretionary] rulings carefully and 

to rectify any erroneous application of legal criteria and any 

abuse of discretion.” Wagner v. Taylor, 836 F.2d 578, 586 

(D.C. Cir. 1987).

So ordered. 

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