Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-15-03948/USCOURTS-ca3-15-03948-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John Petrucelli
Appellant
Kristin Rusin
Appellee

Document Text:

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BLD-167 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 15-3948

___________

JOHN PETRUCELLI,

Appellant

v.

KRISTIN RUSIN, Court reporter

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil No. 4-14-cv-01214)

District Judge Matthew W. Brann

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

or Summary Action Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

March 3, 2016

Before: FUENTES, KRAUSE and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: March 8, 2016)

_________

OPINION*

_________

PER CURIAM

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.

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Pro se appellant John Petrucelli appeals from the judgment of the United States 

District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania in his § 1983 action. As the appeal 

does not present a substantial question, we will summarily affirm the decision of the 

District Court.

Petrucelli initiated this § 1983 action in 2014 against Kristin Rusin, the court 

reporter during a number of Petrucelli’s criminal hearings in the Southern District of New 

York, where Petrucelli was sentenced to life in prison in 2003 on murder and 

racketeering charges. Petrucelli alleges that Rusin altered, destroyed, or incompletely 

transcribed audio recordings from his hearings, depriving him the ability to raise certain 

issues on appeal. Petrucelli filed this action in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, 

where he is currently incarcerated at FCI-Allenwood. Rusin, who currently resides in 

Nevada and claims to have no contacts with Middle District of Pennsylvania, filed a 

motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction on March 17, 2015. On October 19, 

2015 the Magistrate Judge recommended that Rusin’s motion be granted, and in a 

November 19, 2015 order, the District Court adopted the Report and Recommendation in 

full, over Petrucelli’s objections, and directed the Clerk to close the case. Petrucelli filed 

a timely notice of appeal from this order on December 9, 2015. Our Clerk advised 

Petrucelli that his appeal faced dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 or summary action and 

invited him to file a response. He has done so.

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II.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We review a district court's 

decision that it possesses or lacks personal jurisdiction de novo [but review] factual 

findings . . . for clear error.” Telcordia Tech Inc. v. Telkom SA Ltd., 458 F.3d 172, 176 

(3d Cir. 2006). We may summarily affirm the District Court where “it clearly appears 

that no substantial question is presented or that subsequent precedent or a change in 

circumstances warrants such action.” 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6 (2015).

When a defendant challenges a court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction in a 

12(b)(2) motion, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction by a 

preponderance of the evidence and must do so by “establishing with reasonable 

particularity sufficient contacts between the defendant and the forum state.” Mellon Bank 

(East) PSFS, Nat’l Ass'n v. Farino, 960 F.2d 1217, 1223 (3d Cir. 1992) (internal 

quotations omitted).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) authorizes federal courts to exercise 

“personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants to the extent permissible under the 

law of the state where the district court sits.” Pennzoil Prods. Co. v. Colelli & Assocs., 

Inc., 149 F.3d 197, 200 (3d Cir. 1998). Pennsylvania’s long-arm statute permits courts to 

exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants “to the fullest extent allowed 

under the Constitution of the United States” and “based on the most minimum contact 

with this Commonwealth allowed under the Constitution.” 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5322(b). 

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a non-resident 

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defendant have certain minimum contacts with a forum state – contacts that would 

provide the defendant “fair warning” that he might be sued there – before a federal court 

in that forum can constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over that defendant. 

Kehm Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 537 F.3d 290, 299-300 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Burger 

King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985)).

Personal jurisdiction may be general or specific; “[g]eneral jurisdiction exists 

when a defendant has maintained systematic and continuous contacts with the forum 

state.” Marten v. Godwin, 499 F.3d 290, 296 (3d Cir. 2007). Specific jurisdiction, on the 

other hand, requires a court to conduct a three-part inquiry: “First, the defendant must 

have purposefully directed [its] activities at the forum. Second, the litigation must arise 

out of or relate to at least one of those activities. And third, if the prior two requirements 

are met, a court may consider whether the exercise of jurisdiction otherwise comport[s] 

with fair play and substantial justice.” O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., Ltd., 496 F.3d 

312, 317 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

Here, with respect to general jurisdiction, the District Court found that the facts 

plead indicated that Rusin has systematic contact with only the states of New York and 

Nevada – she resided in New York during Petrucelli’s criminal proceedings and then 

relocated to Reno, Nevada. The facts indicate no contact with Pennsylvania. 

As to specific jurisdiction, the District Court accurately observed that the 

complained-of conduct was directed at New York – the state of Petrucelli’s criminal 

proceedings – and that the only connection Petrucelli’s criminal proceeding has with the 

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Middle District of Pennsylvania is that he is now, thirteen years after his conviction, 

serving a portion of his life sentence at FCI-Allenwood.

We have nothing to add to the District Court’s reasoning.1 Because it is plain that 

the District Court lacked personal jurisdiction over Rusin, we will summarily affirm the 

judgment of the District Court. 

 

1 We have considered Petrucelli’s arguments on appeal, but are unpersuaded by them.

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