Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-05-03030/USCOURTS-caDC-05-03030-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sealed Case

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 2, 2006 Decided June 1, 2007

No. 05-3030

IN RE: SEALED CASE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 98cr00074-01)

Lisa B. Wright, Assistant Federal Defender, argued the

cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was A.J. Kramer,

Federal Public Defender.

Suzanne G. Curt, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellee. With her on the brief were Kenneth L. Wainstein,

U.S. Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and Roy W.

McLeese III and Elizabeth Trosman, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: GARLAND and BROWN, Circuit Judges, and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

GARLAND, Circuit Judge: The defendant in this case pled

guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute 50

grams or more of cocaine base. He now seeks to vacate his

sentence on the ground that his trial counsel was ineffective in

failing to accurately advise him of his sentencing range under

the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Assuming without

USCA Case #05-3030 Document #1044001 Filed: 06/01/2007 Page 1 of 16
2

deciding that counsel’s representation was deficient, we

conclude that the defendant was not prejudiced by that

deficiency. We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of his

motion to vacate his sentence.

I

On November 24, 1997, the defendant sold a buyer 11.6

grams of cocaine base (“crack”). The sale took place in a

grocery store parking lot, inside the buyer’s car. Unbeknownst

to the defendant, the buyer was an undercover law enforcement

officer, and the transaction was caught on tape.

On March 5, 1998, a grand jury issued an indictment

charging the defendant with two counts of unlawful use of a

telephone to facilitate the distribution of cocaine base, in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) (Counts 1 and 2), and one count

of distributing five grams or more of cocaine base, in violation

of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(iii) (Count 3). On March

10, agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency and officers of the

United States Park Police arrested the defendant on the

indictment and executed a search warrant at his apartment. In

the course of the search, the police found two semi-automatic

pistols and approximately 100 grams of crack. On March 19,

the grand jury issued a superseding indictment charging the

defendant with the three above-mentioned counts, as well as two

additional counts: possession with intent to distribute 50 grams

or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)

and (b)(1)(A)(iii) (Count 4); and possession of a firearm and

ammunition by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

922(g)(1) (Count 5).

On July 21, 1998, with the advice of counsel, the defendant

entered into a plea agreement with the government. The

defendant agreed to plead guilty to Count 4 of the indictment,

USCA Case #05-3030 Document #1044001 Filed: 06/01/2007 Page 2 of 16
3

possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine

base, which was based on the drugs found in the defendant’s

apartment. He also agreed to cooperate with law enforcement

authorities “in any matter as to which the Government deem[ed]

the cooperation relevant.” Plea Agreement ¶ 6(a). For its part,

the government agreed, inter alia, to: (i) dismiss the remaining

counts of the indictment; (ii) consent to a three-level decrease in

the defendant’s offense level under the United States Sentencing

Guidelines for acceptance of responsibility, see U.S.

SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (1998) [hereinafter

U.S.S.G.]; and (iii) file a motion, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1,

for a downward departure from the defendant’s Sentencing

Guidelines range if it “determine[d] that [the defendant] has

provided substantial assistance in the investigation or

prosecution of another person who has committed an offense,”

Plea Agreement ¶ 20. The plea agreement noted that the

defendant’s mandatory minimum sentence for the crime to

which he was pleading guilty was ten years’ imprisonment, that

the maximum possible sentence was life, and that the ultimate

sentence would be imposed in accordance with the Sentencing

Guidelines. The agreement further stated that the defendant

understood that the sentence was within the sole discretion of

the court, and that he would not be allowed to withdraw from

the guilty plea due to the harshness of the sentence.

On July 24, 1998, the district court held a plea hearing

pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Among other things, the court asked the defendant whether he

understood that he faced a mandatory minimum term of ten

years in prison and a maximum term of life. The defendant

stated that he understood. The court then discussed the

Sentencing Guidelines, telling the defendant that the court

would not “actually be able to determine the guideline range in

your case until after a presentence report has been completed,”

and that the court had “authority in some circumstances to

USCA Case #05-3030 Document #1044001 Filed: 06/01/2007 Page 3 of 16
4

impose a sentence that is more severe or less severe than the

sentence called for by the guidelines.” Plea Hr’g Tr. 7 (July 24,

1998). The court asked the defendant whether he understood

that “the sentence will be up to the Court,” and asked whether

anyone had “made any prediction or promise as to what

sentence” the court would impose. Id. at 9. The defendant

stated that he understood and that no one had made any

predictions about his sentence. The court again warned that the

defendant could not rely on any predictions because “I don’t

know myself right now until I get the presentence report.” Id.

The defendant confirmed his understanding.

Next, the court asked the government for a proffer of the

evidence that it would have presented at trial. The government

stated that its evidence would have established, among other

things, that the defendant sold approximately 11 grams of crack

to an undercover officer, and that a later search of the

defendant’s residence turned up approximately 100 more grams

of crack, as well as two semi-automatic pistols. The court asked

whether the defendant was “essentially in agreement with” the

government’s version of events, and the defendant stated that he

was. Id. at 10. Finally, the court asked whether the defendant

was guilty of the crime charged in Count 4 of the indictment.

After the defendant stated that he was, the court accepted his

plea of guilty.

The United States Probation Office prepared its first

Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) on November 5, 1998.

The report calculated the defendant’s base offense level as 32,

because the offense involved 50 to 150 grams of crack. See

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(4). After adjusting upward two levels

because of the pistols, see id. § 2D1.1(b)(1), and downward

three levels because the defendant accepted responsibility for the

offense, see id. § 3E1.1, the PSR settled upon a final offense

level of 31. The PSR also calculated the defendant’s criminal

USCA Case #05-3030 Document #1044001 Filed: 06/01/2007 Page 4 of 16
5

history, which included two prior felony convictions, as

Category IV. The resulting sentencing range was 151 to 188

months’ incarceration. Id. ch. 5, Pt. A (sentencing table). 

Upon receipt of the initial PSR, the government advised the

Probation Office that the report failed to account for the

defendant’s status as a career offender, which derived from the

fact that his two prior convictions were for “controlled substance

offenses.” Id. § 4B1.1. In 1990, the defendant had been

convicted of attempted distribution of cocaine in the Superior

Court of the District of Columbia. In 1993, he was convicted in

the same court of attempted possession with intent to distribute

cocaine.

The Probation Office revised the PSR accordingly. Under

the career offender guideline, § 4B1.1, the defendant’s base

offense level was 37, because the statutory maximum sentence

for the offense to which he pled guilty was life imprisonment.

See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A); U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. After

adjusting downward three points for acceptance of

responsibility, the revised PSR fixed the defendant’s final

offense level at 34. The defendant’s criminal history category

under the career offender provision was VI. See U.S.S.G. §

4B1.1. In contrast to the initial PSR’s sentencing range of 151

to 188 months, the sentencing range generated by the revised

offense level and criminal history category was 262 to 327

months. Id. ch. 5, Pt. A (sentencing table). 

At a status hearing held by the court on November 23, 1998,

defense counsel requested a continuance so that the defendant

could “get his head together” in light of the “major change in the

time he may get.” Status Hr’g Tr. 2, 3 (Nov. 23, 1998). The

court delayed sentencing two more times so that the defendant

could research the issues surrounding his sentencing. At some

point, the prosecutor also advised defense counsel that, although

USCA Case #05-3030 Document #1044001 Filed: 06/01/2007 Page 5 of 16
6

1

The defendant was sentenced under the mandatory Sentencing

Guidelines regime that was in effect prior to the Supreme Court’s

decision in United States v. Booker, a decision that rendered the

Guidelines “effectively advisory.” 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). He does

not raise any argument based on Booker on this appeal. 

the defendant had attempted to cooperate with the government,

he did not have enough information to provide substantial

assistance, and that the government would therefore be unable

to file a motion supporting a downward departure from the

Guidelines. 

The sentencing hearing was finally conducted on February

5, 1999. The hearing began with the defense asking the court to

allow the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea and go to trial.

The defendant told the court that his “understanding was that the

plea bargain would afford [him] the time of about 10 years, not

knowing what the presentence report would reveal,” but that

“about 10 years is a far cry different from more than twice as

much, which is what my guidelines call for from the presentence

report.” Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 5 (Feb. 5, 1999). The defendant

concluded: 

All the counts I’m not guilty of. There are counts that

I am guilty of, but not all of them. I have remorse for

that because I did time on that before. . . . So I do have

to own up to my responsibility [for] the counts that I

know that I did commit that were wrong, but I did not

commit all of the counts.

Id. at 6. The court, however, denied the defendant’s motion to

withdraw the plea, finding that the defendant had “understood

the plea bargain” and “voluntarily accepted it.” Id. It then

sentenced the defendant to 262 months in prison, the bottom of

the Guidelines range. Id.1

USCA Case #05-3030 Document #1044001 Filed: 06/01/2007 Page 6 of 16
7

 On direct appeal to this court, with the assistance of new

counsel, the defendant argued that a provision in the plea

agreement waiving his right to seek a downward departure from

the Guidelines was unenforceable because he had not knowingly

waived that right. A panel of this court rejected the appeal,

noting that the defendant did not challenge the provision in the

district court, and that even on appeal he did not identify any

ground for a downward departure. See In re Sealed Case, No.

99-3028, 2000 WL 815995 (D.C. Cir. May 16, 2000)

(unpublished opinion). The Supreme Court denied the

defendant’s petition for a writ of certiorari on November 13,

2000. Sealed Petitioner v. United States, 531 U.S. 998 (2000).

On November 12, 2001, the defendant filed a motion in the

district court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, seeking to vacate

his sentence on the ground that his trial counsel failed to provide

effective assistance when he entered into the plea agreement.

The defendant asserted that counsel did not advise him that he

qualified as a career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines,

or that his Guidelines range would be 262 to 327 months.

Indeed, the defendant charged that his lawyer failed to give him

any estimate of his Guidelines exposure at all, telling him that

until the Probation Office prepares a PSR, “no one else has any

idea” what the Guidelines range will be. Defendant’s Mot. to

Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence at 11 (internal quotation

marks omitted). The defendant further contended that when he

“pressed,” his counsel told him to ask the prosecutor, and that

when the defendant did ask the prosecutor, he “understood her

to say that he would likely receive about 10 years.” Id. at 12,

13. If his counsel had correctly informed him of his sentencing

exposure, the defendant stated, he would have elected to go to

trial rather than plead guilty. And he affirmatively declared his

innocence of the crime “charged in Count Four.” Id. at 14.

USCA Case #05-3030 Document #1044001 Filed: 06/01/2007 Page 7 of 16
8

On December 7, 2004, the district court denied the

defendant’s motion to vacate his sentence. Relying on this

circuit’s opinion in United States v. Hanson, 339 F.3d 983 (D.C.

Cir. 2003), the court concluded that the defendant failed to show

that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness.

On July 29, 2005, the district court issued a certificate of

appealability pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The defendant

now appeals the district court’s denial of his ineffective

assistance of counsel claim. 

II

It is well-established that the validity of a guilty plea

depends on “‘whether the plea represents a voluntary and

intelligent choice,’” and that “the voluntariness of the plea

depends on whether counsel’s advice” satisfies the Sixth

Amendment guarantee of effective assistance. Hill v. Lockhart,

474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985) (quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400

U.S. 25, 31 (1970)). It is also “well-established that . . . Sixth

Amendment claims may be raised in section 2255 proceedings.”

United States v. Toms, 396 F.3d 427, 432 (D.C. Cir. 2005). As

we noted in Toms, however, the “standard under which we

review a district court’s dismissal of a section 2255 petition

alleging ineffective assistance is unsettled.” 396 F.3d at 432.

Although other circuits have held that ineffective assistance

cases brought under section 2255 are reviewed de novo, see,

e.g., Williams v. United States, 452 F.3d 1009, 1012 (8th Cir.

2006); United States v. Molina-Uribe, 429 F.3d 514, 518 (5th

Cir. 2005), “we have thus far expressly declined to fix the

appropriate standard, not having been confronted with a case in

which the standard made a difference.” Toms, 396 F.3d at 433.

As in Toms, we “persist in our agnosticism on the appropriate

standard of review in this case,” since “we find that [the

defendant’s] claim fails even under the more searching de novo

standard.” Id.

USCA Case #05-3030 Document #1044001 Filed: 06/01/2007 Page 8 of 16
9

In Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court established

the now-familiar two-part test for ineffective assistance of

counsel claims. “First, the defendant must show that counsel’s

performance was deficient . . . . Second, the defendant must

show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.”

466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). In this case, evaluation of the first

part of the Strickland test is complicated by the fact that the

defendant’s trial counsel has since died and is unable to testify

as to what advice he actually gave the defendant. As we have

found in other cases, however, this appeal can be resolved by

assuming that counsel was deficient in failing to inform the

defendant that he would be treated as a career offender under the

Sentencing Guidelines and, thus, that the first part of the

Strickland test has been met. See United States v. Horne, 987

F.2d 833, 835 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at

697 (“[A] court need not determine whether counsel’s

performance was deficient before examining the prejudice

suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged

deficiencies.”). We therefore turn directly to the question of

whether the defendant suffered prejudice due to his counsel’s

deficient performance. 

To satisfy the prejudice requirement in the context of an

attack on a guilty plea, “the defendant must show that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would

not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to

trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. In United States v. Hanson, 339

F.3d 983, we confronted a case strikingly similar to the instant

appeal. In Hanson, the defendant pled guilty to distributing 50

grams or more of cocaine base. He subsequently moved to

withdraw his plea, asserting that his trial counsel had failed to

realize that he qualified as a career offender, and as a

consequence had calculated his Guidelines sentencing range as

121 to 151 months rather than the correct range of 262 to 327

months. The district court denied the motion and sentenced

USCA Case #05-3030 Document #1044001 Filed: 06/01/2007 Page 9 of 16
10

2

We note that in this case the sentencing prediction at issue was

allegedly made by the prosecutor rather than defense counsel, albeit

on a “referral” from defense counsel. See supra Part I. 

Hanson to 262 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, we accepted

that trial counsel’s assistance had been constitutionally

ineffective. Based upon a consideration of four factors,

however, we concluded that Hanson had failed to make the

required showing of prejudice. See id. at 990-92. Each of those

factors is present here as well.

The first factor in Hanson was “the district court’s

admonition at the plea hearing that Hanson should not rely on

sentencing predictions.” Id. at 990. Based on circuit precedent,

we found that admonition to “weaken[] the defendant’s claim

that those predictions were at the root of his decision to plead

guilty.” Id. (citing Horne, 987 F.2d at 834-38). The district

court gave the same admonition here, telling the defendant that

it would not “be able to determine the guideline range in your

case until after a presentence report has been completed,” Plea

Hr’g Tr. 7 (July 24, 1998), and that he could not rely on “any

prediction or promise as to what sentence” the court would

impose, since the court did not “know [itself] right now until [it

received] the presentence report,” id. at 9.

The defendant contends that it was not accurate for the

court to tell a defendant that his Guidelines range was

unknowable and that there was a risk he would be sentenced to

the statutory maximum. But even if the court’s admonition was

inaccurate, it nonetheless weakens the defendant’s claim of

reliance on a sentencing prediction.2

 We agree with the

defendant, however, that even if his claim of reliance on an

inaccurate sentencing prediction “is ‘weakened’ by the warning

he was given that no one could predict his sentence, it is not

defeated” by that warning. Defendant’s Br. 31 (quoting Hanson,

USCA Case #05-3030 Document #1044001 Filed: 06/01/2007 Page 10 of 16
11

339 F.3d at 990). The district court’s admonition is only one

factor in our analysis, and not the most important factor.

Second, in Hanson as in this case, “even if counsel had

told” the defendant the correct Guidelines range -- 262 to 327

months in each case -- the defendant “would nonetheless have

had reason to expect a sentence below that.” Hanson, 339 F.3d

at 990-91. In both cases, the plea agreement signed by the

defendant held out the possibility of a departure below the

Guidelines range, if the defendant were able to provide the

government with substantial assistance in other investigations.

Compare Hanson, 339 F.3d at 991, with Plea Agreement ¶ 20.

We do not dispute the defendant’s contention that he was less

likely than Hanson to be able to provide useful information

(because, unlike Hanson, he was not eligible for pretrial release),

and hence that his prospects of receiving a Guidelines departure

were dimmer. Even so, an examination of the plea agreement

leaves no doubt that the possibility of a sentence below the

Guidelines range was a factor in the defendant’s decision to

enter into the plea, and that this factor would have been relevant

(although not as important as in Hanson) even if he had been

correctly advised regarding that range.

Third, as in Hanson, had the defendant proceeded to trial

and been convicted, he would have confronted a substantially

higher Sentencing Guidelines range than that applicable to his

plea (and a substantially greater sentence than that which the

district court ultimately imposed). See Hanson, 339 F.3d at 991.

In making this determination, we consider not only the count to

which the defendant pled guilty, but also the other counts he

would have faced had he gone to trial. See United States v.

McCoy, 215 F.3d 102, 106-07 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Released from

the strictures of its plea agreement, the government would have

had no reason not to try the defendant on all five counts of the

indictment. In addition, we proceed on the assumption that a

USCA Case #05-3030 Document #1044001 Filed: 06/01/2007 Page 11 of 16
12

3

The 360 to life range results from a criminal history category of

VI and an offense level of 37, with no reduction in the latter for

acceptance of responsibility as in the case of a plea, see U.S.S.G. §

3E1.1, cmt. n.2. See U.S.S.G. ch. 5, Pt. A (sentencing table). The

defendant’s status as a career offender mandates the criminal history

category. See id. § 4B1.1. The offense level of 37 results from a

combination of the career offender guideline, which assigns level 37

when the maximum statutory sentence is life, id. § 4B1.1, and the

relevant statute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B), which authorizes a

maximum sentence of life for anyone who distributes five grams or

more of cocaine base and who has a prior felony drug conviction. The

defendant correctly points out that the statutory maximum life

sentence applies only if, before trial, the government files “an

information with the court . . . stating in writing the previous

convictions to be relied upon.” Id. § 851(a)(1). But there is no reason

to expect that the prosecutor would have failed to file the necessary

information in the absence of a negotiated plea agreement.

knowledgeable attorney would have correctly advised the

defendant of the sentence he faced as a career offender if he

chose not to plead -- even if trial counsel in this case did not do

so. See Hanson, 339 F.3d at 991. 

Focusing on the two most significant counts of the

indictment, we note that a conviction on Count 3 -- for

distributing five grams or more of cocaine base to the

undercover officer in the grocery store parking lot -- would have

yielded a Guidelines range of 360 months to life, rather than the

262 to 327 months range applicable to his plea.3 Moreover, had

the defendant been convicted on the count to which he

ultimately pled guilty (Count 4) -- possession with intent to

distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base discovered during

the search of his apartment -- he would have received a

USCA Case #05-3030 Document #1044001 Filed: 06/01/2007 Page 12 of 16
13

4

See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (requiring a mandatory life

sentence if the defendant committed the offense after two prior

convictions for felony drug offenses). The mandatory life provision

applies only if the government files an information regarding a

defendant’s prior convictions, id. § 851(a)(1), but again we see no

reason why the prosecutor would have failed to do so here. See supra

note 3.

mandatory sentence of life in prison.4 As in Hanson, “there is

no question but that a competent attorney would have advised

[the defendant] of the mandatory minimum sentence he faced”

if he decided not to plead. 339 F.3d at 991 (citing United States

v Booze, 293 F.3d 516, 518-19 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).

The final factor in analyzing the defendant’s claim of

prejudice is the strength of the defenses he would have had

against these charges had he gone to trial. As we explained in

Hanson, a defendant “does not need to show that he would have

prevailed at trial, only that there was a reasonable probability

that he ‘would have gone to trial.’” Hanson, 339 F.3d at 991

(quoting McCoy, 215 F.3d at 108) (emphasis in original).

“[A]ny rational decision regarding the latter,” however, “would

have required a realistic assessment” of the probability of the

former. Id. 

The fact is that the defendant did not proffer any defense at

all to Count 3 in the briefs he filed in either this court or the

district court. That is not surprising, given that the defendant’s

sale of 11.6 grams of crack was to an undercover officer and

was caught on tape. At the time of his plea, the defendant

expressly admitted selling crack to the officer. See Plea Hr’g Tr.

10 (July 24, 1998). And even when he subsequently sought to

withdraw his plea to Count 4, the defendant never suggested that

he was innocent of Count 3. To the contrary, he conceded that

“[t]here are counts that I am guilty of,” and by the context

USCA Case #05-3030 Document #1044001 Filed: 06/01/2007 Page 13 of 16
14

5

The defendant, who had a prior conviction for attempted

distribution of cocaine, told the court that he had “remorse for” the

counts he was guilty of “because I did time on that before. . . [, s]o I

do have to own up to my responsibility of the counts that I know I did

commit that were wrong, but I did not commit all of the counts.”

Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 6.

indicated that these included the charge of distributing crack to

the officer. Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 6 (Feb. 5, 1999).5 Under these

circumstances, any knowledgeable attorney would “have

advised [the defendant] that he stood little chance of obtaining

an acquittal at trial” on the distribution count, Hanson, 339 F.3d

at 991, which carried a Sentencing Guidelines range of 360

months to life. 

Moreover, the defendant would also have faced the prospect

of conviction on Count 4, which carried a mandatory minimum

statutory sentence of life in prison. As the defendant correctly

points out, there was less certainty of conviction on this charge

than there was on Count 3; and there was likewise less certainty

that he would face a mandatory life sentence than was true for

the defendant in Hanson. Count 4 was based on the discovery

of 100 grams of crack during the execution of a search warrant

at the defendant’s residence. Because the defendant did not

have physical possession of the drugs at the time they were

seized, the government’s case would have had to rest on a theory

of constructive possession, requiring proof that he “knew of, and

was in a position to exercise dominion and control over them.”

United States v. Cassell, 292 F.3d 788, 792 (D.C. Cir. 2002)

(internal quotation marks omitted). The government’s chances

of obtaining a conviction under such circumstances are certainly

lower than where it has both a tape and an eyewitness to the

defendant’s physical possession. 

USCA Case #05-3030 Document #1044001 Filed: 06/01/2007 Page 14 of 16
15

Nevertheless, the chances of conviction were substantial.

In addition to the 100 grams of crack found in the defendant’s

home, uncontested evidence supported the charge that he had

sold the same drug to an undercover officer less than four

months earlier. That evidence would have been admissible not

only as direct evidence to prove Count 3, but also -- under

Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) -- to prove the defendant’s

knowledge and intent regarding the 100 grams at issue in Count

4. See, e.g., United States v. Douglas, 482 F.3d 591, 596-601

(D.C. Cir. 2007); United States v. Crowder, 141 F.3d 1202, 1208

(D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc); cf. Cassell, 292 F.3d at 794-95 (“A

prior history of intentionally possessing guns, or for that matter

chattels of any sort, is certainly relevant to the determination of

whether a person in proximity to such a chattel on the occasion

under litigation knew what he was possessing and intended to do

so.”). The evidence of one or both of the defendant’s prior drug

convictions could also have been admitted for the same purpose

(depending on the district court’s balancing of prejudice and

probativeness under Rule 403, see Cassell, 292 F.3d at 791-96;

United States v. Watson, 171 F.3d 695, 702-03 (D.C. Cir.

1999)).

In sum, if the defendant had been represented by

knowledgeable counsel at the time he was presented with the

opportunity to plead guilty, counsel would have told him that he

faced the following choice: On the one hand, he could accept

the proffered plea agreement and receive a sentence in the range

of 262 to 327 months, with the possibility of a lower sentence if

he were able to provide substantial assistance to the government.

On the other hand, he could go to trial and face the

overwhelming likelihood that he would serve at least 360

months in prison (more than eight years longer than the sentence

he actually received), coupled with the substantial possibility

that he would face a mandatory life sentence. Under these

circumstances, we conclude that the defendant has failed to

USCA Case #05-3030 Document #1044001 Filed: 06/01/2007 Page 15 of 16
16

6

In support of his claim of prejudice, the defendant cites two

cases in which, on direct appeal, we reversed district courts that had

refused to permit the withdrawal of guilty pleas where defendants

received higher-than-predicted sentences. Those cases are readily

distinguishable. In United States v. McCoy, unlike here, the defendant

asserted his innocence both to the charge to which he pled and to

another as to which he had also been indicted, and we found that he

had defenses to both. 215 F.3d at 106, 107. Moreover, as we

explained in Hanson, in McCoy the defendant did not have “the

opportunity for a reduced sentence if he pled guilty and cooperated

with the government,” and “the district court not only did not warn the

defendant against relying on sentencing predictions, it failed to advise

him of the maximum statutory penalty.” Hanson, 339 F.3d at 991 n.7

(citing McCoy, 215 F.3d at 105, 106, 108). The other case cited by the

defendant, United States v. Watley, is also distinguishable because not

only did the district court not tell the defendant that “‘he should not

rely upon any [sentencing] estimate made by his counsel or anyone

else,’” 987 F.2d 841, 847 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (quoting Horne, 987

F.2d at 836), but the court itself “reinforced” the defendant’s

misunderstanding of the sentence he “would likely” receive, id. at 847.

See also Hanson, 339 F.3d at 990 n.5 (distinguishing Watley).

demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have

insisted on going to trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. Because he has

therefore failed to satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland

test, we reject the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel.6

III

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court,

denying the defendant’s section 2255 motion, is 

Affirmed.

USCA Case #05-3030 Document #1044001 Filed: 06/01/2007 Page 16 of 16