Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-01711/USCOURTS-ca8-03-01711-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Peter D'Ascoli
Appellee
Lawrence Long
Appellant
Planned Parenthood
Appellee
M. Michael Rounds
Appellant

Document Text:

1

The Hon. Daniel L. Hovland, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the

District of North Dakota, sitting by designation.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 03-1711SD

_____________

Planned Parenthood of *

Minnesota/South Dakota, and *

Peter D'Ascoli, M.D., *

*

Appellees, *

* On Appeal from the United

v. * States District Court

* for the District of

* South Dakota.

M. Michael Rounds, Governor, and *

Lawrence Long, Attorney General, *

in their official capacities, *

*

Appellants. *

___________

Submitted: February 9, 2004

Filed: June 21, 2004

___________

Before RILEY and RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Circuit Judges, and HOVLAND,1

 Chief

District Judge.

___________

RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.

Defendants appeal from the District Court's adverse grant of summary

judgment, arguing, among other things, that the District Court erred in holding that

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The relevant portion of this statute provides: "[a]n abortion may be performed

following the twelfth week of pregnancy and through the twenty-fourth week of

pregnancy by a physician only in a hospital . . . or in the case of hospital facilities not

being available, in a licensed physician's medical clinic or office of practice subject

to the requirements of §34-23A-6 [blood supply requirements]." S.D. Codified Laws

§ 34-23A-4. 

3

South Dakota Codified Laws § 34-23A-6 requires "a facility which has a

blood bank or a sufficient supply of blood immediately available . . .."

4

This statute provides: "[a]ny person who performs, procures or advises an

abortion other than authorized by chapter 34-23A is guilty of a Class 6 felony." S.D.

Codified Laws § 22-17-5.

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hospitals are available in South Dakota for abortions. This was the key to the District

Court's treatment of the case, leading, in the view of that Court, to a holding that the

South Dakota statute placed an undue burden on the right to choose between abortion

and live birth. In our view, this record does not support a conclusion that hospitals

in South Dakota are available for abortions. We therefore reverse and remand for

further proceedings described later in this opinion.

I.

Plaintiffs, Planned Parenthood of Minnesota/South Dakota and Peter D'Ascoli,

M.D., filed suit in the District Court, alleging that South Dakota Codified Laws §§

34-23A-4,2

 34-23A-6,3 and 22-17-54 are facially unconstitutional. Plaintiffs' original

complaint alleges that these statutory provisions violate the Due Process Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment by imposing an unconstitutional burden on a woman's

right to seek an abortion and by imposing strict liability on abortion providers.

After finding that Planned Parenthood and Dr. D'Ascoli had standing and that

the issues were ripe for review, the District Court granted summary judgment to

plaintiffs, holding that the statutes were unconstitutional because § 34-23A-4 —

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requiring abortions to be performed in a hospital if one is available — is an undue

burden and because § 22-17-5 lacks a scienter requirement and imposes strict

liability. This appeal followed. The State appeals only that portion of the District

Court's judgment declaring § 34-23A-4 unconstitutional and does not challenge the

District Court's holding that § 22-17-5 is unconstitutional. 

II.

The District Court began its analysis by stating that "[§] 34-23A-4 mandates

that abortions following the twelfth week of pregnancy be performed in a hospital

rather than an outpatient clinic." Planned Parenthood v. Janklow, 216 F. Supp. 2d

983, 992 (D. S.D. 2002). This conclusion followed from the District Court's

determination, made on summary judgment, that abortions are available in a hospital

in South Dakota. S.D. Codified Laws § 34-23A-4. Next, the District Court analyzed

extensively whether Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), overruled

Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983), which

invalidated an ordinance requiring hospitalization for women seeking secondtrimester abortions. After determining that Casey did not overrule Akron, the Court

held that § 34-23A-4 "is an undue burden and an unnecessary infringement upon a

woman's constitutional right to an abortion." Janklow, 216 F. Supp. 2d at 993. In so

doing, the Court held that "[b]ecause hospital facilities are available in South Dakota,

the alternative for an abortion in a clinic that has access to a blood supply is not an

option." Ibid. (emphasis added). Finally, the Court noted that because the " 'blood

bank' requirement cannot be severed from the hospitalization requirement . . . the

entire statute must fail." Ibid. 

Subsequently, in denying the defendants' motion for new trial or amendment

of the judgment, the District Court stated:

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With the 24 abortions performed in the hospital during 1997 to 2000, compare

the 3,186 abortions performed at the Planned Parenthood Clinic within the same time

period.

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[t]he court's conclusion that hospitals are available for

abortions . . . is based on the undisputed evidence that

approximately twenty abortions have been performed at

Sioux Valley Hospital during the past four years. Sioux

Valley Hospital permits second trimester abortions to be

performed in the hospital when continuing the pregnancy

would significantly endanger the woman's life or health or

when the fetus has a lethal, medical condition. For at least

a number of women, therefore, Sioux Valley Hospital "is

available" for second trimester abortions. Because a

hospital is available in South Dakota, at least for women

who meet the Sioux Valley Hospital criteria, the court did

not commit an error of fact . . ..

Planned Parenthood v. Janklow, No. 02-4009 (D. S.D. Feb. 13, 2003), Add. 24.5

 The

District Court also noted that the "[d]efendants failed to argue in their response to

plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment that hospitals were not available, even

though plaintiffs raised the issue in their motion." Id. at 25. Finally, the District

Court found that even if the finding that hospitals were available was erroneous, § 34-

23A-4 was void for vagueness. Id. at 31. Despite the fact that the Court itself

reached the conclusion that Sioux Valley Hospital was "available," the District Court

held that a reasonable physician would not know when he could perform an abortion

outside a hospital because there is no easily discernible meaning of the term

"available." Id. at 29. 

III.

We review the District Court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Riedl v.

General Am. Life Ins. Co., 248 F.3d 753, 756 (8th Cir. 2001). Summary judgment

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is proper when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact" such that "the

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

Once a party has filed a motion for summary judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to "go beyond the pleadings and 'by affidavit or otherwise' designate

'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.' " Commercial Union

Ins. Co. v. Schmidt, 967 F.2d 270, 271 (8th Cir. 1992). A dispute is genuine "if the

evidence is such that a reasonable trier of fact could return a decision in favor of the

party opposing summary judgment." Id. at 272. 

The question whether hospitals, or a hospital, are available for abortions in

South Dakota is the key to further analysis of this case. If a hospital is available,

patients must go there, and the continuing validity of Akron, after Casey, would have

to be decided. This is the path the District Court took. In that Court's view, all of the

evidence in the record was to the effect that hospitals are available. If, on the other

hand, hospitals are not available, patients may avail themselves of a clinic, but any

such clinic must meet the blood-supply requirements of South Dakota Codified Laws

§ 34-23A-6 ("a blood bank or a sufficient supply of blood [must be] immediately

available"). Here, the District Court took the view that all of the evidence in the

record was to the effect that hospitals are available. Accordingly, there was no

genuine issue of material fact, and, the Court having taken the additional step of

holding that Akron is still good law, summary judgment was entered, holding the

statutes unconstitutional on their face.

With respect, our reading of the record is different from that of the District

Court. The plaintiffs' complaint itself alleges that "[i]n South Dakota, abortions are

virtually unavailable in hospitals. There is only one hospital — Sioux Valley

Hospital — that has reported to the State that abortions have been performed at their

facilities. Sioux Valley Hospital will allow abortions only under very limited

circumstances, i.e., when the woman's life or health would be significantly

endangered by continuing the pregnancy, or when the fetus appears to have serious

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and uncorrectable medical conditions or genetic disorder." App. 17. Plaintiffs' first

and second amended complaints contain the same allegations. Id. at 58, 250. These

pleadings also allege that "Planned Parenthood's Sioux Falls clinic is the only

outpatient clinic providing abortions in the state of South Dakota." Ibid. The first

and second amended complaints allege that "[a] South Dakota woman who is unable

to secure an abortion at Planned Parenthood must travel long distances out of state

to obtain such medical care." Ibid. These two allegations taken together must mean

that there is no hospital that performs abortions in South Dakota. Furthermore,

plaintiffs filed the affidavit of Dr. D'Ascoli, wherein he stated, "It is my

understanding that Planned Parenthood is the only recognized provider of abortion

services in the state of South Dakota." Id. at 24. Dr. D'Ascoli also stated, "To my

knowledge, there is only one hospital in the state of South Dakota — Sioux Valley

Hospital — that has reported to the State that abortions have been performed at their

facilities. I believe, however, that Sioux Valley Hospital will allow abortions only

under very limited circumstances . . . I do not believe, therefore, that women in South

Dakota have the option of seeking abortion services in a hospital in South Dakota."

Id. at 25 (emphasis added). 

In plaintiffs' application for a temporary restraining order and motion for

preliminary injunction, plaintiffs state:

Planned Parenthood is the only recognized provider of

abortion services in the State of South Dakota . . . A South

Dakota woman who is unable to secure an abortion at

Planned Parenthood must travel out of state to secure such

medical care. Hospitals in South Dakota very rarely allow

the performance of abortions. In fact, there is only one

hospital — Sioux Valley Hospital — that has reported to

the State that abortions have been performed at their

facilities. And that facility will only allow abortions where

there are severe health or life risks to the woman or in the

case of fetal anomoly [sic]. Therefore, women in South

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Dakota do not have the option of seeking abortion services

in a hospital in South Dakota. 

Id. at 32 (emphasis added). 

Moreover, plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and statement of material

undisputed facts states that "[i]n South Dakota, only one of the state's sixty-six

counties has a recognized provider of abortion services — and that provider is

Planned Parenthood." Id. at 66, 90. Defendants admitted this statement as true. See

id. at 220. Logic tells us that if there is only one provider of abortion services and

that provider is Planned Parenthood, then no hospital provides abortions in South

Dakota. 

Despite all of these statements in the pleadings and motions, the plaintiffs'

reply brief in support of their motion for summary judgment stated that "[d]efendants

have never stated that it is their position that hospital facilities are unavailable; nor

have they given any indication of what it means for a hospital to be 'available.' " Id.

at 227b. Plaintiffs cannot place the burden on the defendants to prove whether

hospitals are available. Plaintiffs brought suit alleging that the South Dakota statute

was facially unconstitutional, and therefore they have the burden of proving whether

hospitals are available in South Dakota. Plaintiffs' complaint and supporting

affidavits contend that hospitals are unavailable, and defendants agreed with this fact.

Defendants never had the burden of proving unavailability. 

The pleadings and affidavits lead to only one conclusion — hospitals are for

all practical purposes unavailable for abortions in South Dakota. Although the

plaintiffs' reply brief tries to ignore their earlier pleadings and supporting affidavits,

the plaintiffs cannot create an issue of material fact merely by contradicting their

earlier statements. See Wilson v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 838 F.2d 286, 289 (8th

Cir. 1988) (holding that generally conflicts in testimony are matters for a jury, but a

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District Court may grant summary judgment when the sudden change in testimony is

to create an issue of material fact where none existed previously). 

Because we hold that hospitals are not available for purposes of § 34-23A-4,

we reverse the District Court's grant of summary judgment. 

IV.

In denying the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the District Court

held that even if hospitals were unavailable, the statute was unconstitutionally vague.

It seems odd to us that the parties can agree on the meaning of a term as applied to the

facts of the present case, and the District Court itself can apply the term by holding

there is no genuine issue of fact as to availability, but yet hold the term

unconstitutionally vague.

In any event, there is no substantial evidence in the present record to show that

hospitals, in any meaningful sense of the word, are "available" for abortions after the

twelfth week. When both sides agree to the meaning of a particular word, we do not

see how either side can say, in good faith, that it was unable to understand the

meaning of that word. Accordingly, the vagueness argument, in the peculiar

configuration of the record before us, is without merit.

V.

Accordingly, the summary judgment entered in favor of plaintiffs, which is

based on a holding that there is no genuine issue of fact as to availability, and that

hospitals, as a matter of law, are available, must be reversed. It is clear on this record

that hospitals are not available. Analysis of the case must, therefore, proceed to the

clinic stage, as it were. South Dakota law permits abortions in clinics, but only if a

blood-supply requirement is met. Plaintiffs will no doubt argue that the blood-supply

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requirement creates an undue burden and is therefore unconstitutional. The District

Court has not reached this issue, and neither do we. It should be addressed on

remand.

The judgment of the District Court, and the injunction entered by it, are

reversed, and this case is remanded to that Court for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

______________________________

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